Construction of National Identities in Azerbaijan Kazakhstan and Ukraine in Soviet Historiography (1936-1953)

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy at the History Faculty, University of Oxford

S. Harun Yilmaz, St. Antony’s College, Trinity 2011.
This dissertation aims to explain how Soviet national historiographies were constructed in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, in 1936-1953 and what the political and ideological reasons were behind the way they were written. The dissertation aims to contribute to current scholarship on Soviet nationality policies; on Stalinist nation-building projects; and to the debate on whether the Soviet period was a project of developmentalist modernization or not. This dissertation aims to examine the process of national history writing in three republics from the local point of view, by using the local archival sources. For this research, archival materials that have been overlooked by scholars up to this point from the archives of the communist parties, academy of sciences, and central state archives in Kiev, Ukraine, Baku, Azerbaijan, and Almaty, Kazakhstan have been collected. The timeline starts with Zhdanov’s commission in 1936, which summoned historians and ideologues of the Communist Party in Moscow to write an all-Union history because a parallel campaign of writing national histories had been initialized by the local communist parties. The first two chapters cover the pre-war (1936-1941) period, when national histories were written after the demise of Pokrovskiiian historiography. Although there was one ideology, there were different preferences in solving the problem of ethnogenesis, defining national heroes, and also different preferences among the sections of the past that national histories emphasized. The third chapter explains the construction of national histories during the war period (1941-1945). The chapter also presents how national histories were used for wartime propaganda. Finally, the last chapter is about the post-war discussions and the shift of emphasis from ‘national’ to ‘class’ that occurred in the non-Russian national narratives in the Zhdanovshchina period. While there was an ‘imperial design’ for the necessities of managing a multi-national state, the Soviet Union also appears as a modernization project for all three cases by constructing national narratives. Though non-Russian Soviet historiographies produced contradictory narratives in different decades, they also homogenized, codified and nationalized the narrative of the past. Regional, dynastic, religious, tribal figures and events incorporated into grandiose national narratives. Nations were primordialized and their national identities armed with spatial and temporal indigenousness within the borders of their national republics. Modern national identities of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gained from this homogenization and codification by the Soviet regime. Although modernism is not only about construction of national narratives, the latter points out the developmental and modernizing character of the Soviet period.
This dissertation aims to explain how Soviet national historiographies were constructed in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, in 1936-1953 and what the political and ideological reasons were behind the way they were written. The dissertation aims to contribute to current scholarship on Soviet nationality policies; on Stalinist nation-building projects; and to the debate on whether the Soviet period was a project of developmentalist modernization or not. This dissertation aims to examine the process of national history writing in three republics from the local point of view, by using the local archival sources. Previous scholarship on Soviet historiography was limited both in terms of access to archives in the Soviet Union and restricted to Moscow and Leningrad. The existing literature on the Soviet historiography puts emphasis on the re-emergence of Russian culture and history after 1936 and the Soviet falsification of ‘historical relations’ between Russians and non-Russians. When the Pokrovskiian historiography was removed, national histories had to cover much more ground than relations with Russia, and ranged from an ethnogenesis narrative to historical figures, national heroes, historical enemies of the nation, and relations with neighbouring peoples other than the Russians. Thus, the rehabilitation of Russian culture and the formulation of all-Union history around the Russian narrative, supported by Moscow after 1934-36, should be considered only the first half of the story. This dissertation covering the Stalin era aims to reveal the other half of the story—that is, the construction of national histories from the perspective of the union republics. For this research, archival materials that have been overlooked by scholars up to this point from the archives of the communist parties, academy of sciences, and central state archives in Kiev, Ukraine, Baku, Azerbaijan, and Almaty, Kazakhstan have been collected.

The timeline starts with the Zhdanov commission in 1936, which summoned historians and ideologues of the Communist Party in Moscow to write an all-Union history because a parallel campaign of writing national histories had been initialized by the local communist parties. The first two chapters cover the pre-war (1936-1941) period, when national histories were written after the demise of Pokrovskiian historiography. The new history had to explain the ancient times, provide a golden age, and national leaders and struggles that unified the nation for centuries. The local communist parties in all three republics reacted to the initial signals from Moscow and mobilized their agitation-propaganda section, local historians and writers to construct a national history. Although there was one ideology, there were different preferences for solving the problem of ethnogenesis, defining national heroes, and also different preferences among the sections of the past that national histories emphasized. The third chapter explains the construction of national histories during the war period (1941-1945). The chapter also presents how national histories were used for wartime propaganda. The last chapter is about the post-war discussions and the shift of emphasis from ‘national’ to ‘class’ that occurred in the non-Russian national narratives in the Zhdanovshchina period.
The period can be understood as an experiment of how to write history in the first socialist country. While there was an ‘imperial design’ for the necessities of managing a multi-national state, the Soviet Union appears as a modernization project for all three cases. Though non-Russian historiographies produced contradictory narratives in different decades, they also homogenized, codified and nationalized the narrative of the past. Regional, dynastic, religious, tribal figures and events incorporated into grandiose national narratives. Nations were primordialized and their national identities armed with spatial and temporal indigenousness within the borders of their national republics. Although modernism is not only about construction of national narratives, the latter points out the developmental and modernizing character of the Soviet period. Modern national identities of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gained so much from this homogenization and codification by the Soviet regime that it is not always possible to reject the Soviet legacy. It is also not easy to define this homogenization and codification merely as the facilitators of imperial administration of complex territories or as an ‘imperial necessity’. In other words, placing the constructions of ‘India’, and ‘Ukraine’ or ‘Kazakhstan’ into one category can lead us to an over-simplification. Although results are similar in terms of homogenization and codification, differences in ideologies and goals behind these policies matter. Finally, labelling the agents who wrote national histories—local historians and ideologues in Baku, Almaty and Kiev—as ‘local servants of the regime’ or ‘silenced and terrorized nationalists’ is an over-simplification. The generation that wrote national histories after the Great Terror in three republics was neither of these things. These historians and ideologues had a sincere belief in socialism—especially as a project of modernism and development—and were strongly attached to their national identities.
“History, after all, is nothing more than a pack of tricks we play on the dead”
Voltaire
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I have presented pieces of my work and received valuable comments at the Annual National Conventions of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies) in 2008, 2009, 2010, and at the Annual Conferences of Central Eurasian Studies in 2007 and 2009. I owe an academic debt to the comments that I have received in these conventions. I am especially thankful to the valuable comments and suggestions that I have received from Profs Bruce Grant of New York University, Adrienne Edgar of the University of California, Mark Beissinger of Princeton University, and Shoshana Keller of Hamilton College.

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Glossary

Agitprop – agitatsiia-propaganda-agitation-propaganda.
AGU – Azerbaidzhanskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet-Azerbaijan State University.
AKP(b) – Azerbaidzhanskaia Komunisticheskaia Partiiia (bolshevikov)-Azerbaijan Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
AN – Akademiia Nauk-Academy of Sciences.
API – Azerbaidzhanskii Pedagogicheskii Institut-Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute.
AzFAN – Azerbaidzhanskii Filial Akademii Nauk SSSR -Azerbaijani Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
AzGNI – Azerbaidzhanskii Gosudarstvennyi Nauchno-Issledovatel’skii Institut-Azerbaijan State Institute of Scientific Research.
AzOZFan – Azerbaidzhanskoe Otdelenie Zakavkazskogo Filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR-Azerbaijani Sector of Transcaucasian Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
AzSSR – Azerbaidzhanskaia Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika-Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.
KazGU – Kazakhskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet-Kazakh State University.
KazFAN – Kazakhskii Filial Akademii Nauk SSSR – Kazakh Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
Kazkraikom – Kazakhskii Kraevoi Komitet-Kazakh Regional Committee.
KazPI – Kazakhskii Pedagogicheskii Institut-Kazakh Pedagogical Institute.
KP(b)A – Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia (bol’shevikov) Azerbaidzhana-Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan.
KP(b)K – Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia (bol’shevikov) Kazakhstana-Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Kazakhstan.
KP(b)U – Komunisticheskaia Partiiia (bol’shevikov) Ukrainy-Communist Party of (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine.
KPZU – Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Zapadnoi UKrainy – Communist Party of Western Ukraine.
Krai – Territory.
LKSM – Leninskii Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezh-Union of Leninist Young Communist League.
LKSMU – Leninskii Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi Ukrainy-Union of Leninist Young Communist League of Ukraine.
Medrabfak – Meditsinskii Rabochii Fakul’tet – Medical Workers’ Faculty.
MTS – Mashinno-Traktornaia Stantsiia-Machine and Tractor Station.
Narkompros – Narodnyi Komisariat Prosvesheniia-People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment.
NKVD – Narodnyi Komisariat Vnutrenykh Del-People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
Obkom – Oblastnoi Komitet-Regional Committee of the communist party of the republic.
Oblast’ – Region.
OOIAz – Obshchestvo Obsledovaniia i Izucheniiia Azerbaidzhana-Society of Research and Learning of Azerbaijan.
Rabfak – Rabochii Fakul’tet – Workers’ Faculty.
Raion – District.
RKP(b) – Rossiiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bol’shevikov)-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (1918-1925).
RSDRP(b) – Rossiiskaia Sotsial-Demokraticheskaia Rabochaia Partiia (bol’shevikov)-Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (until 1918).
SNK – Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov-Council of People’s Commissars.
SSPK – Soiuz Sovietskih Pisatelei Kazakhstana-Union of the Soviet Writers of Kazakhstan.
TsIK – Tsentral’nyi Ispal’nitel’nii Komitet-Central Execution Committee.
TsK – Tsentral’nyi Komitet-the Central Committee.
UNDO – Ukrains’ke Natsional’ne Demokratychne Ob’iednannia – Ukrainian National-Democratic Alliance.
UPA – Ukraïns’ka Povstants’ka Armiia – Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
VKP(b) – Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bol’shevikov), (1925-1952).
VLKSM – Vsesoiuznyi Leninskii Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi-All-Union of Leninist Young Communist League of Ukraine.
VUAMLIN – Vseukraïns’ka Asotsiatsiia Marksists’ko-Lenins’kh Instytutiv-All-Ukrainian Association of Marxist-Leninist Institutes.

The following abbreviations are used for assigning the language of a non-English word:

Az. – Azerbaijani; Kaz. – Kazakh; Per. – Persian; Pol. – Polish; Ru. – Russian; Tur. – Turkish; Turc. – Turkic; Ukr. – Ukrainian
Notes on Archives and Transliteration

For Russian and Ukrainian words, I have used a simplified version of the ALA-LC transliteration system. I have removed accents from Polish words. Turkish and contemporary Azerbaijani languages are written in alphabets based on Latin script. Kazakh still uses Cyrillic script with additional signs for Kazakh voices. For the Kazakh voices, I have used a simplified version of transliteration. The unfamiliar sounds in Turkish and Azerbaijani alphabet for the Western reader and the simplified Kazakh transliteration are listed below.

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<tr>
<th>Kazakh (Cyrillic)</th>
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The contemporary Azerbaijani alphabet and the Turkish alphabet are the same, with three exceptions (ə, x, q), and very similar to the one used in Azerbaijan in 1929-39, with six exceptions (а, ə, z, θ, γ, j).

The archives in the former Soviet republics are cited and numbered by collection (fond, or f.), inventory (opis’, or op.), file (delo or d.), and page (list or l. or in plural ll.) numbers. Although there are also Azerbaijani, Kazakh and Ukrainian equivalents of this terminology, Russian is used in the bibliography of this dissertation for simplicity. When an archival document is cited, only these numbers are used and they are divided by a dash (-) in this order. Runs of pages in archival documents are divided by a slash (/). Numerical citation of an archival document is
followed by the date of the document. Unfortunately, Archive of the Institute of History (Tarix Institutu Arxiv) in Baku, Azerbaijan does not have this classification system yet. That is why the documents are cited by available title and date.

All dates are given in the form of ‘day-month-year’, unless they indicate an archival document. In the latter case, they are in the form of ‘month-day-year’. This is done to avoid any confusion between the page number and the numerical part of the date of a document. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to identify the exact date of archival documents. When the day or the month is missing, the available or estimated information is recorded after the numerical citation of the document in parentheses.

Ukrainian personal and geographical names pose another challenge. Archival sources and printed materials are both in Russian and Ukrainian and same names occur both in Russian and Ukrainian forms. The archival materials usually record persons with their surnames, without mentioning first and middle names. However, printed materials included the latter and the initials sometimes change according the Russian or Ukrainian version of the name. In order to easily trace one person in all records and citations, I have used the Ukrainian form of surnames. In the Azerbaijani case, personal names and toponyms may have Azerbaijani and Iranian versions. The literature is dominated by the latter. That is why, in order to provide familiarity, in most cases I have chosen the Iranian version.
INTRODUCTION

This research aims to explain how Soviet national historiographies were constructed in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, in 1936-1953 and what the political and ideological reasons were behind the way they were written. Analyzing the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union has been a challenging issue for historians, because the Soviet system presented a series of contradictions. For instance, the Soviet regime emphasized the Russian language and culture, but at the same time the same regime promoted the cultures and languages of non-Russian nationalities. Moreover, this was a federation with its republics and autonomous territories divided according to ethnic borders. While some historians argued that the Soviet Union was a colonial empire or totalitarian repressive structure above numerous nationalities, whose ultimate goal was to Russify, another group recognized the construction of non-Russian national identities by the Soviet regime but defined this as part of a greater imperial design.¹ The revisionists, however, underlined how the Soviet Union differed from modern colonial empires and how the Soviet system constructed national identities.² The discussion over the nature of

¹ F. C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (Oxford, 1956); H. Seton-Watson, Soviet Nationality Policy, Russian
the Soviet ‘empire’, and how far this construction and homogenization of national identities can be called ‘imperial designs’ still continues.

It is clearer now that the Soviet Union accelerated the homogenization attempts within the borders of the union-republics after 1936-38. Instead of promoting all ethno-linguistic identities in the later decades, emphasis was given only to the titular nations of every republic of the federation. The original approach to ethnicity considered nations as products of the capitalist stage of socio-economic development, which would be ‘scientifically’ manipulated to hasten their final disappearance. However, in the mid-1930s, it became clear that it would take much more time before national identities would be displayed in the museum of antiquities. The ideological reply to this reality was the Stalinist concept of ‘socialist nations’, which would disappear only as a consequence of a global socialist economy. These socialist nations were supposed to have ethnic roots that historians and archaeologists could find in the past. Thus, every nation had to have a national history. This dissertation aims to present how the Soviet national histories of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were constructed in the period of 1936-1953, and to compare the outcomes.³

In the Soviet Union, history had multiple functions: a repository of tradition and legend; exhorter and agitator; another means of moulding public opinion; a legitimizer of the system; a rationalizer of official programmes and policies. Finally, it was a barometer of the political climate; it assisted in sensing the political climate and signalling shifts in the wind; it was also a political weapon among the factions.\(^4\) By the late 1930s, when Stalinism claimed that the classes had disappeared, the theoretical consequence had to be the withering away of the state.\(^5\) However, state remained and was even consolidated. At this stage, national identities and their histories provided ever more legitimacy for the system. Soviet modernity, which provided the contiguity of settled population, historical continuity, coherent unity of the political area, and a state-idea, occupied an important place in the development of national identities and these practices created or consolidated national identities.\(^6\) Each nationhood and nationality was codified and institutionalized.\(^7\) The codification and institutionalization of the nations in the Soviet Union encompassed a broad area, including their cultures, languages, symbols, and histories.

Previous scholarship on Soviet historiography was limited both in terms of access to archives in the Soviet Union and restricted to Moscow and Leningrad. Before the ‘archival revolution’ in


\(^6\) Instead of class based quotas, polls and identity cards, the national identity became dominant: Yuri Slezkine, ‘The USSR’, p. 442.


the 1990s, scholars could glean from their research that a Russocentric narrative of Soviet historians falsified historical relations between Russians and non-Russians and could address non-Russian nations and their histories only to the extent of indicating this falsification. Moreover, these researchers could comment authoritatively on the published histories, but they were not able to discuss the process of writing official histories behind the scenes. Lowell Tillet demonstrated how Russocentrist historiography changed the narrative of the historical relations between Russians and non-Russians. However, as he mentions in his fundamental work, he used merely secondary materials in Russian, available in the Library of Congress. That is why he and others could comment authoritatively on the published histories but could not depict the process and details of writing non-Russian national histories and the reasons behind particular decisions. Parallel to Tillet’s work, broader studies on Soviet historiography have been produced by Cyrill Black, Anatole Mazour, Nancy Heer, and Konstantin Shteppa. These studies focused on the Soviet historiography of the Communist Party, the Russian Empire, or broad issues such as collectivization and the Great Terror, accompanied by particular attention to developments at the institutes in Moscow or Leningrad. Similar to Tillet, these authors also covered non-Russian nations and their histories, only to indicate how Soviet historians falsified

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the relations between these nations and the Russian Empire. In recent years, Yuri Slezkine and Victor Shnirelman have examined the issue of ethnogenesis. Their research explains how strategies of writing national history shifted in the 1930s, from the universalizing linguistic thesis of Nikolai Marr to an increasingly primordial ethno-centric formulation. While these works are very helpful in exploring the increasing importance of ethnogenesis in Soviet national historiography, the issue has remained isolated from the broader project of Soviet construction of national histories. After the Soviet archives became available, it has been much better understood that Russian national identity with its history and culture was promoted, and the Soviet policy on history writing was altered well before the Second World War. Historical figures who had been previously condemned as feudal exploiters were now praised as state builders and heroic leaders. Recently, Ukrainian-Canadian historians have published their meticulous works, in English, on the Ukrainian case. There are also works in Russian, which cover the Soviet historiography, both on the developments in Moscow and Leningrad and in the republics. However, these works, until 1991, could not cover the whole story for political reasons. After

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10 C. E. Black (ed.), *Rewriting Russian History* (New York, 1956); J. Keep (ed.), *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror* (New York, 1964); A. G. Mazur, *The Writing of History in the Soviet Union* (Stanford, 1971) (in this seminal volume there is a long list of studies as footnotes that have been done on Azerbaijan, the Ukraine and Georgia. However, these sources are predominantly from Moscow and not from the member republics, see: pp. 102-104); N. W. Heer, *Politics*; Also a recent publication on the post-Stalin Soviet historiography, see: R. D. Markwick, *Rewriting History in Soviet Russia, The Politics of Revisionist Historiography, 1956-1974* (New York, 2001).


1991, there is a tendency to present the picture as a struggle for writing national histories despite the Russian rule, which was disguised behind the Soviet mask.\textsuperscript{14}

The above-mentioned English literature on the Soviet historiography puts emphasis on the re-emergence of Russian culture and history after 1936. It is true that Russian national history came back with its heroes and battlefields, and an all-Union history was constructed around the Russian Soviet national history. This is an accurate conclusion for the construction of Russian national narrative, as well as for the unifying narrative for the whole Soviet Union. My research at a regional archival level, however, reveals that neither the rehabilitation of Russian nationality and Russian culture nor Russocentric history writing prevented the construction of national histories in these union republics at the same time. Indeed, despite widely prevalent historical Russocentrism, the Soviet state vociferously argued at the time that every Soviet nation was a historical nation, and had to be clearly presented as such. Russocentrism only influenced the formulation of ‘fraternal’ relations between Russians and other Soviet nations in these national histories. When the Pokrovskiiian historiography was removed, national histories had to cover much more ground than relations with Russia, and ranged from an ethnogenesis narrative to historical figures, national heroes, historical enemies of the nation, and relations

\textsuperscript{14} See for example, on the history of Soviet historiography, at all-Union level: Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR (5 vols. Moscow, 1966), iv; Istoriografiiia istorii SSSR (Moscow, 1971); G. D Alekseeva, G.I. Zheltova, Stanovlenie i razvitie sovetskoi sistemty sauchno-Istoricheskikh ucherezhdeni (20-30-e gody) (Tashkent, 1977); Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR (5 vols. Moscow, 1985), v; G. D. Burdei, Istorik i voina 1941-1945 (Saratov, 1991). In Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine: A. S. Sumbatza, Azerbaidzhanskaia istoriographiia XIX-XX vekov (Baku,1987); G. F. Dakhshleiger, Istoriografia sovetskogo Kazakhstana (Almaty, 1969); Rozvytok nauky v Ukrain'sii RSR za 40 rokov (Kiev, 1957); Lenins'ka teoretychna spadshchyna v ukrains'kii radians'kii istoriografii (Kiev, 1969); Rozvytok istorychnoi nauky na Ukraini za roky Radians'koi vlady (Kiev, 1973); A. V. Santsevich and N. V, Komarenko, Razvitie istoricheskoi nauki v Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi SSR 1936-1986 gg. (Kiev, 1986). After 1991: I. M. Kozybaev, Istoriekaia nauka Kazakhstan (40-800e gody XX veika) (Almaty, 1992); B.A. Balashov and V.A. Iurchenkov, Istoriografia otechestvennoi istorii (1917-nachalo 90-kh gg.) (Sarnsk, 1994); Lu. N. Afanasieva (ed.) Sovetskaia istoriografia (Moscow, 1996); Istoriekaia nauka Rossii v XX veke (Moscow, 1997); G. D. Alekseeva, et al., Istoriekaia nauka Rossii v XX veke (1997); A. A. Formozov, Russkie arkheologi v period totalitarizma (Moscow, 2004);
with neighbouring peoples other than the Russians. Thus, the rehabilitation of Russian culture and the formulation of an all-Union history around a Russian narrative, supported by Moscow after 1934-36, should be considered only the first half of the story. This dissertation covering the Stalin era aims to reveal the other half of the story—that is, the construction of national histories from the perspective of the union republics.

This dissertation—as it covers three countries and a long period—tries to keep the focus on particular issues and discussions, and aims to fill the gaps that exist in the current Soviet literature. I hope to contribute to current scholarship on Soviet nationality policies; on Stalinist nation-building projects; and to the debate on whether the Soviet period was a project of developmentalist modernization. The construction of a national history is a modern production of a homogenous narrative for the people that it claims to cover their common past. It is a selection of various events and figures of the past that were previously defined in terms of region, tribe, religion, or dynasty. In the process of constructing national histories, a medieval Caucasian feudal lord of a particular mountain valley is recast as an Azerbaijani national hero, and an uprising of a Persian-speaking religious sect against Muslim Arabs in the ninth century is turned into a national independence struggle of modern Azerbaijani identity. Similarly, in the Kazakh Steppes, a disagreement between various tribes or their conflict with local Russian authorities is transformed into Kazakh national resistance against an imperial-colonial power.

The gathering of local information is followed by the creation of a coherent pan-national narrative and the construction of a category or identity that we call ‘national’. In other words, this is a process of gathering information, labelling this information as national, and finally

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categorizing individuals by national identities. The construction of national histories in Stalin’s time has a continuing impact even today. Numerous elements, which were incorporated into national histories in those years, continue to decorate contemporary national narratives, or at least constitute subjects of discussion, in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

The Soviet system as a modernization project is important when we try to understand the Soviet agents who wrote national histories. It is true that the function of Russian and non-Russian intelligentsia and historians in particular, their position in their respective societies and their relations with the state officials in the Soviet Union were much different from in the Russian Empire. The definition and function of intelligentsia changed dramatically. Instead of intelligentsia, they have been defined as ‘mandarins’ of the Soviet system.  

the agents who wrote national histories—local historians and ideologues in Baku, Almaty and Kiev—as ‘local servants of the regime’ or ‘silenced and terrorized nationalists’ is an oversimplification. The generation that wrote national histories after the Great Terror in three republics was neither of these things. They both had a sincere belief in socialism—especially as a project of modernism—and were also strongly attached to their national identities. These intellectuals, and historians for that matter, saw the Soviet system that they were trained in as a system for the annihilation of illiteracy, conducting education in native tongues, training national cadres for administration, eliminating the the old socio-economic structures, developing national cultures and languages, and being able to participate in politics with their national identities. We should also underline that there was a difference between the national Bolsheviks, who occupied key positions until 1933 in Ukraine and until 1937 in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and the indigenous Soviet cadres (including historians), who replaced them after the Great Terror. While the former had their education in the pre-revolutionary institutions and saw the Soviet system as a modernization attempt in their localities, the latter additionally saw the system as the intrinsic part of the world that in which they lived and were educated. The belief that they shared was the struggle to develop a backward country.

The method of the dissertation is to make a systematic comparison between three countries, “with the intention of identifying, and eventually explaining, the differences or similarities between them, with respect to the construction of national histories in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan online version <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/ii.htm> (last access, 10 November 2010); 17 For the Ukrainian case: Yekelchyk, Stalin’s. 18 The Soviet Union experienced a dual backwardness. The country was backward relative to the industrialized West. The non-Russian regions were backward relative to Russia. P.A. Blistain, ‘Stalin’s Nations: Soviet Nationality Policy between Planning and Primordialism, 1936-1953’ (University of California, Berkeley, PhD thesis,1999), pp.4-5.
and Ukraine, in 1936-53. There are two ways of studying a limited number of countries. These approaches are either to focus on countries that are similar, or that are different. The comparative study of the dissertation will be based on the comparative method of the ‘most different systems’. According to this comparative approach, if a hypothesized relationship between two or more variables is repeated across a wide variety of differences, then causality between the variables can be suggested. The countries have to share certain characteristics such as being territories of an empire in the recent history; however, at the same time, and more importantly, they have to differ dramatically in many other aspects, such as levels of economic development, culture, religion, and geography. Therefore, we have chosen Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as having some similarities, in spite of the fundamental differences between them. The most important common independent variable is that the three countries were integrated parts of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and these territories had never been a core area of an empire with court historians who had produced a continuous record of the past.

This work does not aim to compare the ‘correct’ version of national histories with the national Soviet narratives. Relatively accepted versions of the past are provided in order to present the Soviet way of the construction of national histories and the problems that the Soviet historians faced. This became a necessity, especially in the Azerbaijani case because the degree to which

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the Azerbaijani Soviet historians were free to construct their national narrative was exceptional. Moreover, most of the building elements that they used for this construction were already part of the Iranian past. The latter was well recorded by ancient and medieval sources and it was already well researched. Thus, in the 1930s and 1940s there were already established interpretations and accepted versions of the past of the territories where the Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan are located. The Kazakh case, however, was nearly a *tabula rasa*. In Ukraine, Ukrainization of the past already had a long record, since the nineteenth century. There had already been conceptual discussions concerning various interpretations by Ukrainian and Russian national historiographies. The great debate between the two national histories before 1936 is out of the scope of this dissertation. However, I have tried to summarize major discussions by referring to the views of prominent participants.

This dissertation aims to examine the process of national history writing in three republics from the local point of view, by using the local archival sources. For this research, archival materials that have been overlooked by scholars up to this point from the archives of the communist parties, academy of sciences, and central state archives in Kiev, Ukraine, Baku, Azerbaijan, and Almaty, Kazakhstan have been collected. At the communist party archives, the files of the special section (Ru. *osobyi otdel*) of the first secretary, the agitation-propaganda section, and the science-education section contain rich sources to follow the process of writing national histories. The resolutions and minutes of the bureau of central committees of each party or special commission meetings summoned to discuss how to formulate particular historical issues can be found only in these archives. The archives of the Academy of Sciences (Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Ukrainian) in these capitals are also very valuable primary sources. The minutes of meetings
among historians, their discussions and decisions on particular questions, and their relations with the party apparatchiks can be traced in these archives. Finally, the state archives of each republic provide additional materials such as personal files of some historians or writers involved in history writing. However, it should be noted that archival materials were not always enough to cover all details in this period. In order to provide a complete picture of changing priorities and policies, I compared numerous drafts, limited editions, and published volumes of national histories that were prepared in different years.

The first chapter of this research briefly explains important and interrelated factors in the 1933-1941 period at the all-Union level, which shaped the construction of national histories in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to varying degrees. These common factors are the Nazi regime and its ideology in Germany; the gradual removal of some elements of Marrism; and the demise of Pokrovskiian historiography and re-establishment of history classes and faculties. The timeline starts with Zhdanov’s commission, which summoned historians and ideologues of the Communist Party in Moscow to write an all-Union history. When Zhdanov’s commission in 1936 worked to develop an all-Union history and ended up endorsing the famous textbook of Shestakov, both Moscow and republican communist parties vigorously demanded the writing of national histories. The chapter explains these first attempts of construction of national histories after 1936 and aims to present the level of involvement of the local communist parties in three republics. It also discusses the impact of the Great Terror on the local cadres and features of historians who wrote national histories after the purges of 1936-38. This chapter also pays particular attention to how the narratives, which were formulated in 1937-1941, explained the ethnogenesis of each nation, and it provides a comparative approach.
The second chapter focuses on changing descriptions of individuals in national histories written in 1937-41. Following the demise of Pokrovskiiian historiography, the focus of national narratives moved from ‘leaders of the toiling masses’ and ‘class struggles’ to ‘national heroes’ and ‘national-liberation struggles’. The current literature mentioned above explains this shift in Russian and Ukrainian Soviet national narratives and points out the pre-war period as the timing of this shift. The chapter adds the Azerbaijani and Kazakh cases, and compares the components of the three cases.

The third chapter is on the role of history as a means of propaganda during the Second World War. We know that Moscow based all-Union propaganda on Russian national history. However, both the Soviet population and the Red Army were multinational. After all, this was not a war between Russians and Germans. Then what happened in the national republics? Obviously, Russian history could not be used to manipulate a Kazakh kolkhoz worker, Azeri oil-driller, or Ukrainian soldier. The agitation-propaganda departments of local communist parties and local historians initiated a big propaganda campaign by providing non-Russian heroic national histories for increasing the fighting spirit and production levels. At the same time, this chapter shows that the pre-war shift from ‘class’ to ‘national’ intensified.

The last chapter is on the post-war period. The policies of famous Zhdanovshchina, which shaped the ideological and cultural spheres in the post-war period, aimed to eliminate real or imaginary western impact on the Soviet culture and to fight against ‘liberalism’. However, the impact of this policy in the union republics and on national historiographies in particular, was different. The Party was aware of the fact that in a socialist country all histories had become far too ‘national’. Though there had to be a kind of 'correction', nobody was sure what should be
the new line. The national historiographies experienced a second shift, which is the most important development in this period. Historians holding different views were involved in the discussions on national histories, which started in 1944 and intensified after the War. This chapter aims to examine these different groups of historians and to define the timing of the shift in national historiographies.

CHAPTER 1: THE GREAT TERROR & ETHNOGENESIS.

Ethnic arguments have been strong components of national identities in Eastern Europe, where the three cases dealt with in this thesis can be placed together as a category. Different factors can be asserted to explain this dominance by ethnicity. When national movements began agitating in the nineteenth century, the target ethnic group had neither a political education nor any experience with public activity in the burgeoning civil society. The reality of a common language and customs (ethnic-cultural ties) could be grasped more easily than remote conceptions of constitutional liberty or citizenship.\(^{22}\) That is why incorporating the ancient or even pre-historic period into national history and defining the nation on the basis of a specific ethnicity becomes important in all cases. Another common element is that in none of the three cases had there been a centralized state or a well-developed bureaucracy in the past.\(^{23}\) These regions had not been core areas of any empire through which reference to a ‘Golden Age’ of the nation could be made.


In the age of ‘agro-literate societies’, there was little necessity for a common genesis that would be shared by all members of a society. The members of the ruling elite could build an elaborate genealogy or divinity in order to legitimize their positions. In Ukraine, individual princes could trace their predecessors to the Kievan princes, and for the Kazakh Khans, a genealogical link to Genghis Khan would be enough. In the Azerbaijani case, amirs would establish a link to the Prophet of Islam, while khans would emphasize kinship with Iranian Shahs. However, in national narratives the positing of a collective ancestor or common ethnic roots is an attempt to provide a genesis for all members of the nation. Emphasizing common ethnic roots, firstly, consolidates the ties among the imagined community—the nation. It creates a sense of loyalty and belonging for everyone. When a particular past of an ethnicity becomes a national history, the nation does not only share a contemporary culture but also a common past, with its glories and sufferings. In this way, nationalism usually glorifies ancient traditions shared by the common ancestors of the members of that nation. According to Hroch, this common past or common memory is one of the irreplaceable ties. Furthermore, if nationalism is a metaphoric kinship, then common ethnic roots transform this metaphor into a tangible object. Eriksen stresses that consequently, the nation becomes a very large family—a union of brothers and sisters—or a living individual—a tree, a friend, a mother, and a creature with a soul—by virtue of its constructed ethnic past. Finally, ethnogenesis and the first spatial location of the nation’s ancestors are important for assigning the borders of an ancient homeland. In the 1930s,

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26 For the construction of a link between the ancient and modern ‘rediscovery of the past’ by intellectuals and historians, see: D. Deletant and H. Hanak (eds.), Historians as Nation-Builders, Central and South-Eastern Europe (London, 1988).
archaeology was already a study of finding the ancient roots of nations in the debris of prehistoric pottery and human skeletons, providing national histories with the necessary evidence to demarcate the ancient fatherland.  

1.1. THREE COMMON FACTORS.

There are three important and interrelated factors in the 1933-1941 period that shaped the construction of national histories in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to varying degrees. First, the racist theory of the superiority of Aryans became the official ideology under Nazi rule in Germany from 1933. Moreover, this German Aryanism emphasized the Germanic race as the highest and greatest among other representatives of Aryans, such as Slavs. As a consequence of this discourse, in the late 1930s the teachings of Marr on prehistory were gradually abandoned. Second, from 1933 to 1937, history as an academic discipline came back from a decade of hibernation in the Soviet Union. History institutes were re-established in universities and academies and history as a subject was installed with a classical curriculum, while Pokrovskiian historiography was denounced. Frustrated by the failed attempts over the previous three years, the rulers of the USSR launched a campaign of writing national histories in 1936. This campaign included both Russian and non-Russian nations. Moreover, these national histories were written in conformity with the contemporary borders of the union republics. In most cases, the increasing tendency was establishing a link between the archaeological culture in each republic and the titular national identity of that republic. In other words, titular national identities became increasingly primordial. Before the examination of each republic, it may be useful to explain these three factors in detail.

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The first factor is Aryan theory, which was formulated in Europe in the nineteenth century, and Nazi rule in Germany, which turned this racist theory into an official ideology. Aryan theory and Nazi rule were important ideological challenges to which the construction of the national histories of Soviet nations after 1934-6 had to reply. Aryan theory is related to the discovery by Sir William Jones in 1796 that Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit were connected and that they all had sprung from a common, ancient, and forgotten prehistoric tongue. This language family was expanded in time by other scholars and included Armenian, Persian, and even Hittite. As a next step, the Indo-European language family was equated to a race and to a particular culture. The popular mid-nineteenth century conception of the speakers of prehistoric Proto-Indo-European was a noble race of civilized, brilliant warriors and priests who firmly marched from somewhere in the central regions of Asia to Europe and on their way brought civilization to different corners of the world from India and Mesopotamia (Sumerians) to Egypt, Greece, and Rome. Aryan theory contained expansionism and supremacy over other peoples. It was claimed that the Aryans migrated long distances in Asia and Europe and colonized non-Indo-European communities in large territories, by dint of their iron weapons and their prevailing civilization.

Aryan theory threatened non-Europeans by depicting them as inferior. The key element was confusion of language classification, race, and culture. Those who spoke Indo-European languages were of Aryan racial descent. According to racial theories, cultural and behavioural characteristics were linked to racial traits. These traits were transmitted unaltered through generations, and social conditions could not improve the human condition. The theory of superior Aryans and their migrations coincided with the age of expansionist European colonial

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empires and provided a convenient ideological matrix. Until the 1930s, Aryan/Pan-European/Indo-European theory was a threat only to non-European or non-Aryans, such as Chinese, Japanese, Jews, and Turkic peoples. However, following the establishment of Nazi rule, a particular racist Aryanism that favoured only Germanic peoples as the most developed human beings among the nations of the Aryan race became the official ideology of Germany. According to this theory, which was supported by archaeologists such as Gustaf Kossinna, North Europe, as the cradle of the Nordic-Aryan (or Teutonic) race, independently evolved most important inventions (such as writing and iron works), which from there found their way to other parts of Europe.

Aryan theory and the Nordic-Aryan superiority thesis that challenged other national identities raised the question of ethnogenesis in all national histories. However, the writing of Soviet

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prehistory in those years was under the influence of Nikolai Marr, a well-trained Orientalist and linguist, especially in Armenian and Georgian philology. According to Marr, ethnogenesis was not a priority, because modern languages and peoples themselves were of mixed ancestry and had emerged from close interrelations among various populations deep in the past. History was an endless process of intermixing between contiguous ethnic groups. Thus, one had to study universal stages of cultural evolution rather than particular lines of development of cultures. ‘Homelands’ or ‘proto-peoples’ and their ‘proto-languages’, concepts that were very popular among the nation-builders, were rejected. Everyone was autochthonous in a spatial sense and at the same time did not bear a single ethnic root. This autochthonous development was claimed to be of primary importance, and it took place locally and continuously. According to this perspective, migrations played a lesser role or were completely rejected. Every contemporary nation turned into another one as a result of socio-economic transformation, not as a consequence of the migration or diffusion of ethnicities. According to Marr, the reason for linguistic and cultural change was not external mass immigrations but revolutionary shifts that resulted from qualitatively different conditions of material life.

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32 P. Kushner, ‘Nuzhno li izuchat obshchestvennye formy’, Istorik-Marksist, no. 6 (1927), pp. 206-14; N. Marr, Izbrannye raboty (5 vols., Moscow and Leningrad, 1933), i, pp. 236; For example, according to Bykovskii, Eastern Slavic tribes were Cimmerians, S.N. Bykovskii, ‘Iafeticheskii predok vostochnykh slavian – kimmeriitsy’, IGAIMK, vol. 8, issue 8-10 (1931); Marr claimed that Eastern Slavic Language was a descendant of Scythian and Sarmatian languages; see: N.Ia. Marr, Izbrannye. According to another Marrist, the descendants of Cimmerians were Scythians, the descendants of Scythians were Sarmatians and the descendants of the latter were Goths. V.I. Ravdonikas, ‘Peshchernye goroda Kryma i gotskaiia problema v sviazi so stadial’nym razvitiem severnogo prichernomor’ia’, GAIMK, vol. 12, (1932), pp. 5-106.
33 Historians who defended theories of migration of peoples were accused of being racists and ideologists of imperialists. V.I. Ravdonikas, ‘Za Marksistskuiu istoriiu material’noi kul’tury’, IGAIMK, vol. 8, issue 3-4 (1931).
34 For example, it was the discovery and expansion of metallurgy that forced Japhetic languages to turn into Indo-European ones. For the theories of Marr, see: V. M. Alpatov, Istoriia odnogo mifa: Marr and marrizm (Moscow, 1991); Yu. Slezkine, ‘N.Ia. Marr’, p. 843. V.A. Shnirelman, ‘From Internationalism’; Härke claims that this immobilization covered only the Slavs. Other migrations were accepted. See: H. Härke, ‘Archaeologists and Migrations’, Current Anthropology, vol. 39, no. 1 (1998), pp. 19-45, p. 23
Although sociological interpretations continued to shape the interpretations of archaeologists, Marrist interpretations lost their initial impact on Soviet studies of prehistory and archaeology after 1936. Socio-economic periodization remained the primary task of archaeology, the role of migration was acknowledged and the search for the ethnic roots of nations was added to the task of prehistoric studies. Ethnos began to be considered as durable and static in time, and a link between archaeological cultures and contemporary ethnic groups gradually became established. When a meeting of famous historians took place in Moscow on May 5, 1937, one of the main decisions was that one should not produce abstract sociological schemes, but publish more data on the concrete history of peoples. It was explained that there was an urgent need to actively combat the fascist falsifications of history, including the anti-Slavist approaches of German historians. In the following decades, prehistory and explanations of the ethnogenesis of different nations contained a mixture of Marrist concepts and archaeological cultures in prehistory gradually identified with ethnicities. Consequently, in the Soviet Union, nations were increasingly constructed on the basis of ethnic identities and nations were understood as

35 N. M. Matorin (ed.), Pervobytnoe obschestvo: sbornik statei (Moscow, 1932); P.P. Efimenko, Doradovoe obschestvo: ocherki po istorii pervobytno-kommunisticheskogo obschestva (Moscow and Leningrad, 1934); N.K. Auerbakh, A.F. Gammerman, et al., Paleolit SSSR: materialy po istorii dorodovogo obschestva (Moscow, 1935); Kratkii otchet o rabote Akademii v 1935 (Leningrad, 1936); P.S. Rykov, Ocherki po istorii Nizhnego Povolzh’ia (Saratov, 1936); P.P. Efimenko, Pervobytnoe pbshchestvo: Ocherki po istorii Paleoliticheskogo vremeni (Leningrad, 1938). Also see following special collections of articles for interpretation of pre-history in this period: N. Ia. Marr (ed.), Karl Marks i problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh formati: sbornik k piatidesiatletniiu so dnia smerti Karla Marksia (Moscow and Leningrad, 1934); A.M. Deborin (ed.), Voprosy istorii doklassovogo obschestva: sbornik statei k piatidesiatletiiu knigi Fr. Engel’sa ‘Proiskhozhdenie sem’i, chastnoi sobstvennosti i gosudarstva (Moscow and Leningrad, 1936).


Historians, archaeologists or ethnographers had to demonstrate that the contemporary inhabitants of each republic were descendants of the autochthonous people of those lands. This was an all-Union policy that had an impact on every republic to varying degrees. Although the Bolsheviks considered national identity a stage in history, a function of capitalism and the modern era, these national identities were gradually described as primordial entities. Archaeological cultures became evidence of the autochthonous evolution of nations. In other words, these cultures were each attached to a specific ethnos. In fact, in the age of nationalism, the Soviet Union was neither the first nor the last example. The aim was to legitimize the Soviet state by historically legitimizing each Soviet republic separately. However, every titular nation had its particularities. As will be discussed, in order to make every titular nation of the Soviet republic indigenous, national histories were constructed through different strategies.

The third factor that played an important role in the construction of history for the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union was the demise of the Pokrovskii School. M. N. Pokrovskii (1868-1932) was a Russian historian who was prominent due to his Marxist interpretation of Russian history well before the revolution. In the 1920s, when Pokrovskii became the chief

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41 T. Martin, ‘Modernization’.
42 V.A. Shnirelman, ‘From Internationalism’, p. 130-133.
historian of the Bolshevik regime, he and his followers aimed to reconstruct previous national and imperial narratives according to the Marxist scheme, in which classes (and the conflicts between them) were the main agents of all narratives. Pokrovskii minimized the role of institutional structures such as the state that could be depicted as the focal point of the nation. Pokrovskiian history also de-emphasized historical personages, their ideologies, and their national identities. Pokrovskiian history writing was more interested in merchant capitalism, the rise of the working class, class struggles, and analogies of the German peasant wars in Russian history than it was in constructing a Russian or a non-Russian national history. While looking for an analogy of the *Jacquerie* in France, the Hussite War in Bohemia, and the Peasant War in sixteenth century Germany, Pokrovskii identified four popular revolutions in territories of the Russian Empire: the Hmel’nyts’kyi Uprising (1648-54) in Ukraine, the Time of Troubles in Russia (1604-13), the Uprising of Stenka Razin (1670-1), and the Pugachev rebellion (1773-5).

Additionally, Pokrovskii was not focussed on non-Russian histories and he left this area to be addressed by historians in non-Russian republics. Pokrovskii dispelled all kinds of national and imperial narratives, including the Russian one. He described Russian rule over non-Russian peoples (Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Caucasians, Siberians, etc.) as a ruthless force of oppression, plundering, and mass-killing. He categorically refused to acknowledge any progressive aspect to

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44 For example, Ivan the Terrible did not play a significant role in the organization of *oprichniki*, because the struggle was not between individual men but between classes. He was the speaker of the exploiters of merchant capitalism, far from being an autocratic ruler feared by all his subordinates. This was also valid for the Peter the Great. See: M. Pokrovskii, *Russkaia istoriia v samom zhatom ocherke* (Moscow, 1933), p. 44, 66-68

this relation.\textsuperscript{46} Pokrovskii’s view of the Russian Empire was probably the most nihilistic one. Finally, Pokrovskii was also against the classical teaching of history. Classical history classes asked pupils to memorize the names and deeds of princes, kings, and emperors, who were nothing more than representatives of exploiting classes.

From 1934, the priorities and concepts of the Pokrovskii era were removed from the discipline of history.\textsuperscript{47} One, great leaders and great events were incorporated into the history. The historical figure had an extraordinary life and personality. He could once again influence the course of history. He had an independent consciousness and the power to lead the masses. Two, instead of class conflict and building communism, another purpose became the teleological reason of history: ‘building a centralized state structure’. The state had a historical and progressive mission. Interest in revolutionary events and revolutionary movements slightly yielded to interest in diplomatic relations and wars. The description and selection of the ‘other’ as a nation also came to the fore because international or inter-state relations also became an elementary part of history. Three, economic history ceded its primary position to political history. Statist (etatist) or dynastic periodization replaced materialist periodization. The linear trajectory of history followed the formation of consecutive states from antiquity until the 1936 constitution of Stalin. Four, the difference between the pre-revolutionary period and the Soviet


\textsuperscript{47} A special collection of essays was printed to underline the change: \textit{Protiv istoricheskoi kontseptsii M. N. Pokrovskogo: sbornik statei} (Moscow and Leningrad, 1939).
period was blurred. Five, the ‘lesser evil’ became the paradigm for interpreting the historical relations between Russians and the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union. It was true that these nationalities had suffered from the colonial rule of Tsarism. However, their incorporation into the Russian Empire was a better choice with historical importance, as compared to alternatives. Polish or Turkish/Tatar rule for Ukrainians, probable Iranian or Turkish rule for Azerbaijanis, Chinese or Central Asian Khanates for Kazakhs as alternatives would have had worse results. It only remains to remark that all these alterations in history writing were closely connected to the rise of the fascist regime in Germany and its racist history theory.

In the 1930s, while Pokrovskiian history writing and some aspects of Marrism were ‘demoted’, history classes and traditional pedagogic methods were reinstalled in secondary schools and universities. Alongside this reestablishment was a series of party and state resolutions calling for standardized (Ru. stabil’nye) textbooks. In 1933, the resolution of TsK VKP(b) on education clearly demanded that standardized textbooks for primary and secondary schools be ready by 1

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48 The periodization was according to the ‘state principle’. The changes in the state structure, in state policy and legislation were put to the forefront, whereas the history of peoples or classes was downgraded to a secondary position. See: ‘Ob itogakh diskusii o periodizatsii istorii SSSR’, Voprosy Istorii, no. 3 (1951), pp. 53-60. This distinct change of policy of writing history in all-union level examined in other works. See: K. Shteppa, Russian, p.187; D. Brandenberger, National, pp. 28-62.

49 L. R. Tillett, The Great Friendship, p. 40-49;

50 K. Shteppa points to the following reasons for the change of the history writing: one-man rule (Stalin) demanded historical justification; the subjection of economy to political purposes required a reappraisal of base-superstructure relations in history; the victory of fascists in Germany raised an alternative nationalist narrative. See his, Russian Historians, pp. 131-132; Brandenberger counts three reasons for this change: state-building, legitimacy for the regime, and the need for a popular mobilization. Marxist tenets were too complicated for these tasks and a simple popular discourse was created. See his National Bolshevism, p. 61; Erickson in his article counts the reasons as the emphasis on the construction of ‘socialism in one country’, and the threat posed to the Soviet security by the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy. See A.K. Erickson, ‘E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime’, American Slavic and East European Review, no. 2 (1960), pp. 202-216, p. 205.

51 There were consecutive resolutions of the TsK (the Central Committee) in Moscow, on this issue. See: Sbornik postanovlenii partii i pravitel’stva o shkole (Moscow, 1936); KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh 5”ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK (12 vols, Moscow, 1971), v; Shteppa underlines that this turn was in the middle of the 1930s; see: K. Shteppa, Russian, p. 26; see also: F. Barghoorn, ‘Stalinism and the Russian Cultural Heritage’, The Review of Politics, no.2 (1952), pp. 178-203.
September, 1933. These signals were not ignored in the union republics. For example, in Baku, AKP(b) reacted to this resolution in May 1933 and established a commission for the unification of syllabi and textbooks for primary and secondary schools in the republic. However, the level of instruction in the classrooms was unsatisfactory. A survey commissioned by the all-Union Narkompros in 1933-34 found that there were serious problems in the teaching of new history classes. A similar report addressing the Bureau of the KASSR on the teaching of the civil history and geography of Kazakhstan in the 1934-35 academic year revealed the poor level of historical knowledge among teachers and students, as well as the impact of the Pokrovskiian period on history teaching in the Kazakh Republic.

Apparently, attempts at standardization in general and for history teaching in particular were far from satisfactory to the Party leaders in Moscow. The most prominent critique of the time was penned by Stalin, Zhdanov, and Kirov in August, 1934. After failed attempts at writing an all-Union history textbook since 1934, the joint resolution of the SNK and TsK VKP(b) of 27 January, 1936 reflected the growing impatience of the Soviet leaders. The resolution denounced the teachings of Pokrovskii. Moreover, it lamented the unsuccessful attempts at writing a history of the peoples of the Soviet Union. The joint resolution aimed to accelerate the successful completion of this work. A multi-national commission was set up, headed by Zhdanov and

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52 See the resolution of the TsK VKP(b), ‘Ob Uchebnikakh Dlia Nachal’noi i Srednei Shkoly’ (12 February 1933), in Sbornik postanovlenii partii i pravitel’stva o shkole (Moscow, 1936), pp. 18-19.
53 Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsi Siyasi Partiyalar və İctimai Harakatlar Dövlet Arxivi, (The Political Parties and Public Movements State Archive of the Executive Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, hereafter ARPİİSPİHDA), (fond) 1- (opis) 74- (dela) 331- (listy) 218, May 5, 1933.
54 D. Brandenberger, National, p. 32
55 Kazakhstan Respublikasy Prezidentining Murağaty, (The Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, hereafter KRPM) (fond)141- (opis) 1- (dela) 11705- (listy)3/5 and 7 (1936)
56 ‘Iz postanovleniia sovnarkoma i TsK VKP(b) o prepodavanii grazhdanskoi istorii v shkolakh SSSR’ (16 May 1934), I.Stalin, A.Zhdanov, S.Kirov, Sbornik k izucheniiu istorii (Moscow, 1937), pp. 18; ‘Zamechaniia po povodu konspecta uchebnika po istorii SSSR’ (8 August 1934), Sbornik K Izucheniiu Istorii (Moscow, 1937), pp. 22-24; ‘V sovnarkome soiuza SSR i TsK VKP(b)’, Pravda, 27 January 1936.
containing prominent political and academic figures, in order to supervise the writing of textbooks. Zhdanov intervened more than once to secure his—and most probably Stalin’s—goals in the history textbook.\textsuperscript{57} The draft of Shestakov’s team of historians was the end product of his commission.\textsuperscript{58} \textit{The History of the Soviet Union} by Shestakov was published in the following year. Shestakov’s textbook was a history of Russians.\textsuperscript{59} The non-Russian nations appeared in the narrative only when discussions of broader imperial trends—such as territorial conquests, colonial expansion, and peasant revolts—dictated. The annexation of Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia was explained by the ‘lesser evil’ formula.

However, the construction of national histories for the titular nation of every union republic remained a priority, since the critique of Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov. When the commission for writing an all-union history textbook was summoned in Moscow, Zhdanov asked each republic to write its own national history and to send a copy to him. In 1936, the new Institute of History in Moscow re-declared the intention of writing histories of the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{60} In October 1936, at a meeting of the Scientific-Policy Section of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} The members of the commission were K. Radek, A. Svanidze (Georgia), Gorin, Lukin, Ia. A. Iakovlev, V. A. Bystrianskii, V.P. Zatonskii (Ukraine), F. Khodzhaev (Uzbekistan), K.Ia. Bauman (with considerable experience in Central Asia), A.S. Bubnov, and N.I. Bukharin. However, Radek, Svanidze, Iakovlev, Zatonskii, Khodzhaev, Bauman, Bubnov, Bukharin were purged during the Great Terror. For the resolution, see: \textit{Sbornik}, pp. 24-26; For the list of the members, see: D. Brandenberger, ‘Who Killed Pokrovskii? (the second time)’, \textit{Revolutionary Russia}, vol.11, no.1 (1998), pp. 67-73, p. 68; For the intervention of Zhdanov and his commission on the writing of the history of the USSR, see: D. Brandenberger, \textit{National}.
\item \textsuperscript{58} This commission published another textbook to increase patriotic feelings among the students in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} classes. See: A. Stetskii, S. Ingulov, N. Baranskii, \textit{Nasha Rodina} (Moscow, 1937), also see the review of the book by V. Losev in \textit{Istoricheskii zhurnal}, no.11 (1937), pp. 106-9.
\item \textsuperscript{59} A.V. Shestakov, \textit{Istoria SSSR: kratkii kurs} (Moscow, 1938).
\item \textsuperscript{60} At the Institute of History of Academy of Sciences in Moscow, a section was assigned for studying the history of peoples of the Soviet Union (Ukraine, Central Asia, Siberia, the Volga region, and the Caucasus). The first goal of the Institute was to publicize the Oriental sources for writing the history of the peoples of the Soviet Union (such as Arabic or Chinese). ‘Khronika istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR, v institute istorii Akademii Nauk’, \textit{Istorik Marksist}, no.2 (1936), p. 172.
\end{itemize}
Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Moscow on writing histories, it was stated to the leading historians that:

Historians of the peoples of the USSR [hitherto] examined the history of the peoples of the USSR only after these peoples had entered the great prison, namely the Russian Empire; but as a rule, they were uninterested in what had existed before that. Allegedly, these peoples never possessed their histories; they never existed. This is an absolutely wrong approach. In fact, the peoples of the USSR appear in history not only as objects but also as subjects, and it is likely that, first, these nations are the subjects of the historical process. [...] If this is not the case, then only the Russian people appear as a historical people, and other peoples are more or less not viewed as historical peoples. [...] This kind of history [writing] will feed the great power chauvinists and will even provide arguments for the German Fascists and Japanese aggressors.61

As the speech implied, the German fascist regime demanded reply not only in terms of economic or social achievements, but also in ideological discussions and in scientific forums.62 It had to be demonstrated in a scholarly manner that, Kazakhs, Turkmens, and Ukrainians had their history, just as Germans and Russians did. Accordingly, Zhdanov and his commission not only wrote a Russocentric all-union history, but also collected histories from the communist parties of the republics. In each republic, the agitprop section or the science and school section of Central Committees (TsK) and first secretaries were involved in this task and conveyed the orders from of Moscow to local historians who, in order to participate in this all-Union project, hastily prepared texts.

1.2. AZERBAIJAN IN 1936-1941.

Over the course of the 1930s, how to define the ethnogenesis of the titular nation of Azerbaijan SSR became an increasingly challenging issue. In addition to the three factors that increased the

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61 ARPIISPİHDA, 1-14-35-141,142, October 27, 1936.
62 There is a broad range of texts that were produced for this purpose. Initial publication were done in the 1930s and continued during the war: S.N. Bykovskii, ‘Delenie sovremennogo chelovechestva na rasy i tak nazvyamaia rasovaia teoriia’, in N. M. Matorin (ed.), Pervobytnoe obshchestvo: sbornik statei (Moscow, 1932), pp. 27-41; E. Kagarov, Perezhitki pervobytnogo kommunizma v obshchestvennom stroe drevnikh grekov i nemtsev (Leningrad and Moscow, 1937); Nauka o rasakh i rasizm (Leningrad and Moscow, 1938); Protiv fashistskoi fal’sifikatsii istorii: sbornik statei (Moscow and Leningrad, 1939); S. K. Bushuev, Fashistskaia fal’sifikatsiia istorii (Sverdlov, 1943).
importance of the ethnogenesis of every Soviet nation, in the Azerbaijani case, contrary to the other two examples, the definition of ethnogenesis was radically changed. In April 1920, when the Red Army entered Baku, the Bolsheviks followed the designation of the previous nationalist government and accepted Türk in the native tongue and Turkic (Ru. Tiurk), as the name for the titular nation of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In the native language, the name of the titular nation was Türk, meaning both Turk and Turkic, because in Turkic tongues there is no equivalent for the difference between ‘Turkic’ and ‘Turkish’. This Turkic/Turkish ethno-linguistic identity continued to be the official definition of the titular nation until 1937. In 1937 the name for the nation was altered from Turkic to a geographical term: ‘Azerbaijani’. Previously it has been claimed that the change in 1937 from Turkic/Turkish to Azerbaijani was merely an effort to cut off the Turks of Turkey from their kin in the Soviet Union, and that Azerbaijani identity was artificially created by a broader ‘divide and rule’ policy.63 This decision was a conceptual change not only in national identity but also in all aspects of national history writing. For this reason, the main argument of the dissertation on Azerbaijan in the pre-war years develops around this alteration.

1.2.1. END OF PRO-TURKIC NARRATIVE.

Following the resolution of the VKP(b) on 27 January, 1936, which organized the Zhdanov commission, Mir Jafar Bagirov, the first secretary of the AKP(b), assigned an editing commission in Baku, on 15 March, 1936 to write a history of the nation. All prominent historians of the Republic—such as A. Bukshpan, Veli Khuluflu, Gaziz Gubaidullin, A. Zifle’d-Simumiagi, and

Pakhomov—were invited to join the editing commission.\textsuperscript{64} One of the chief ideologues of the republic and chair of the commission, Rukhulla Akhundov, had to identify the task of each member and distribute the burden of the creation of a national history. He was also charged with presenting the results of the work for the overview of the TsK AK(b), on 15 May, 1936.\textsuperscript{65}

Most probably, the team in Baku was not clearly informed as to how far Moscow had moved away from the views of Pokrovskii and the last thing they wanted was to be stigmatized as nationalists or Pan-Turkists. This explains why the text was written in a clear Pokrovskiian manner. As planned, Bagirov received the draft of the national history from the commission. After examining it in June 1936, he instructed R. Akhundov and Usein Rakhmanov, the chair of the SovNarKom AzSSR, to duplicate the material and distribute it among the members of the TsK AKP(b) so that the text could be examined and discussed at the following session of the TsK.\textsuperscript{66}

The draft of the official national history had to be kept secret until receiving absolute sanction from Moscow. That is why Rakhmanov prepared only thirteen copies and sent them to the TsK.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, only seven historians and thirteen TsK members knew the ‘true’ history of Azerbaijan. The TsK AKP(b) discussed the draft history and approved it in August 1936 with minor amendments.\textsuperscript{68} Finally, the materials on the history of the people of Azerbaijan were sent to Zhdanov.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{64} Gubaidullin stayed in Kazan’, Tatarstan until 1936. His return to Baku must be related to his involvement in this project. Similarly, Zifel’dt-Simumiagi moved from Tbilisi to Baku in December 1935. The time of their return to Baku before the resolution of the TsK VKP(b) on Zhdanov commission, and the resolution of the AKP(b) on Azerbaijani history suggests that they were informed by the project of writing national history for Azerbaijan, in December 1935. For the time of their return to Baku see: T. Kerimova, Iz istorii Natsional’noi Akademii Nauk Azerbaidzhana (Baku, 2005), pp. 357, 389.

\textsuperscript{65} ARPI\textsuperscript{ISPIHDA}, 1-74-416-18, 19, 87, March 15, 1936.

\textsuperscript{66} ARPI\textsuperscript{ISPIHDA}, 1-74-427-58, June 6, 1936.

\textsuperscript{67} ARPI\textsuperscript{ISPIHDA}, 1-74-427-59, June 21, 1936.

\textsuperscript{68} ARPI\textsuperscript{ISPIHDA}, 1-74-433-316, August 11, 1936.

\textsuperscript{69} ARPI\textsuperscript{ISPIHDA}, 1-74-444-168, October 22, 1936.
This national history that was prepared in 1936 was never printed. However, the project of writing national histories and the emphasis on ancient and pre-historic times raised the question of the ethnogenesis of Azerbaijani people. Similarly to other national histories of Turkic peoples, Turkic identity posed a dilemma for Azerbaijani national history, because the final Turkification of the territory happened between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Shnirelman summarizes this problem of Turkic peoples on the Tatar-Chuvash history:

“A confirmed autochthonous origin serves as a basis for claims to territory, and a language with ancient roots encourages a feeling of pride in one’s culture, since language is closely associated with culture in the minds of most people. Together they provide cultural and hence political prestige. [...] The Turkic languages were not of local origin but had come to the Volga region from elsewhere. Thus a choice had to be made: either an autochthonous origin and a language shift [to Turkic at some point in history] or an original Turkic language and a nonindigenous origin”.

In other words, the Turkic ethnogenesis could provide a legitimate claim for the contemporary territory only after the eleventh century. For this reason, an emphasis on the Turkic roots could seriously hamper the primordial claims of the titular nation of the republic to the same territory.

There is also a regional factor that turned national claims concerning prehistoric and ancient times into a crucial issue. Complying with the new policy, Georgia and Armenia, the other titular nations of Transcaucasia, were also in the process of constructing their national narratives. As opposed to the Azerbaijani Turkic case, Georgians and Armenians could easily link their

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71 V.A. Shnirelman, Who Gets, pp.25-6.
contemporary national identities with the peoples of ancient Iberia or Urartu because both of them had a long recorded past that revealed legends and historical events such as catastrophes or victories. Additionally, the absence of continuous secular polities and court in Georgia and Armenia was filled by a tradition of chronicling within religious institutions dating back to the fifth century.\textsuperscript{72} These particularities of Armenia and Georgia created disequilibrium in Transcaucasia that could have serious political implications. While the Turkic nation of Azerbaijan seemed to have arrived in the eleventh century as a latecomer or even as an occupier of the region, two neighbours could pride themselves on being autochthonous inhabitants of the land.

Following ethnic and religious clashes that resulted in ethnic cleansing, massacres, and deportations in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the region was in the process of reconciliation.\textsuperscript{73} The bloody memories of the recent past were quite fresh in people’s minds. By presenting one side as latecomer-occupants and the other as ancient settlers, burgeoning national histories could provide a pretext for further ethnic tensions or territorial claims. For the Bolsheviks, this was the least desirable situation. They had to establish balance among the identities and maintain peace in the region in order to implement their modernist projects.\textsuperscript{74} In 1936, when Molotov welcomed the Armenian delegates in Moscow, he summarized this situation in Bolshevik language:

\textsuperscript{74} L. Beria, the head of the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Federation, always emphasized this brotherhood in his speeches. He underlined that the brotherhood of three nations (Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Georgians) was an essential condition for the development of the region. See: L. Beria, \textit{Pobeda Leninsko-Stalinskoi natsional’noi politiki} (Tbilisi, 1936); L. Beria, \textit{Novaia Konstitutsiia SSR i Zakavkazskaia Federatsiia} (Tbilisi, 1936); L. Beria, \textit{Edinaia sem’ia narodov} (Tbilisi, 1937).
“We have achieved the following; for a long time there was a fierce struggle between the toilers of different nationalities in the multi-national Transcaucasia. This struggle was ignited by capitalists and the servants of Tsars. Today, this struggle has been liquidated forever and instead of this struggle, a friendly life is blossoming among the toilers of Transcaucasia”.

The ethogenesis and ancient history of the Turkic-speaking people of Azerbaijan had to be constructed in a way that would allow them to claim indigeneity alongside Armenians and Georgians. In order to connect Azerbaijani identity with prehistoric archaeological cultures in the Azerbaijani SSR, the Turkic ethno-linguistic identity had to be removed from the narrative. However, there was no consensus on this issue in Azerbaijan. Until the purges two approaches co-existed in academic circles. The Baku commission, mentioned above, brought together historians with these two different approaches. On the one hand, there was a group of scholars supporting a single ethno-linguistic interpretation of national history who insisted on continuity with a Turkic language. They accepted the thesis that their ancestors were relatively late settlers in Azerbaijan. During the Turkification of the contemporary territories of the Azerbaijani SSR in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, the influx of Turkic nomadic tribes was so high that these people quickly constituted a majority and established cultural dominance. For these historians, the roots of Azerbaijani had to be traced in the Turkic past. Therefore, it was the Seljuk Empire that was singled out as the precursor polity of Turkic people in Azerbaijan. The prominent historians and linguists of this group were Gubaidullin (1887-1937?), Choban-Zade (1893-1937), and Khuluflu (1894-1937). We should note that all three leading figures were well-trained

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experts in history or literature of Turkic nations. On the other hand, there were scholars who stressed the indigenous nature of the people in Azerbaijan. They accepted the fact of a language shift but rejected the link to a Turkic legacy. These scholars based their approach on the theories of Nikolai Marr. They considered the contemporary population to be an amalgamation of different ethnicities and cultures. They did not prefer to explain the ethnogenesis of the Azerbaijani nation by a common or predominant ethnicity. Artur Zifel’d-t-Simumiagi (1889-1939), Gulam Bagirov, and A. Alekperov were members of this second group. Each group produced its own narrative. For example, in the history section of the article ‘Azerbaijan’ of the Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia, which was produced by the second group, there is not a single word about Turkic dynastic states such as the Seljuks and Safavids.
We can also find the argument of the second group of historians in Zifel’dt-Simumiagi’s review of A. Alekperov’s essay, in which the latter explained how Azerbaijani identity had to be defined. This report-review is also an important archival source to demonstrate how closely Simumiagi, an expert in Azerbaijan, was aware of the recent nation-building policies in Turkey. This review was sent to the school and science section of the TsK AKP(b), and it is likely that Mir Jafar Bagirov also had a copy of it. Zifel’dt-Simumiagi summarizes the developments in Turkey and explains how Azerbaijan had to respond through the theory of the de-Turkification of Azerbaijani identity. It is necessary to look at this work in some detail. In the first line he notes that in terms of political urgency (Ru. politicheskii aktual’nost) it was high time for such a study on the roots of Azerbaijanis. He begins by explaining how various peoples recorded by East Roman and Arab historians as Turks or Turkic did not always belong to the Turkic-Tatar linguistic group and not all peoples who spoke a Turkic language called themselves Turks. The continuity and commonness of Turkic identity in history was therefore questioned. Next, he criticized the pro-Turkic thesis of the first group of historians;

“Turkified, Ottomanified, pan-Turkified Azerbaijani literature, grammar, terminology and orthography. Choban-zade, in his work Türk Grameri went shamelessly so far that, he named all real Turkic-Tatar languages, including Azerbaijani language, not even as a ‘dialect’ but only ‘accents’ of some kind of a united Turkic language. The school of Choban-zade had something similar with classification of Prof. Köprülüzade of Istanbul and (until the last year) of A.N. Samoilovich in Leningrad”.

According to Zifel’dt-Simumiagi, to name Azerbaijanis as Türk (Turkic/Turk) in the native tongue was a mistake, as it would include them within a single national identity with the Turks of Turkey. Furthermore, he criticized a similar approach that prevailed in the discipline of history.

The article under review “repeated the intoxicating views of V. Khuluflu on the Seljuks”:

“In recent years, B. Choban-zade advocated the ‘theory’ that, all Azerbaijanis are direct descendants of those Seljuks who allegedly settled in large numbers in Azerbaijan at the end of the eleventh century. However, it is also considered that the Ottomans
came out of the same womb as the Seljuks. So this theory seems to emphasize the ‘historical foundations’ of the fraternity of Azerbaijanis and the Ottomans in blood”.

According to him, there was no ethnic connection between Azerbaijanis and Turks of Turkey because:

“It is clear to everyone that the Ottomans were a mixture of Albanian-Slavic-Greek-Armenian-Laz-Kurdish-Assyrian and also Circassians, [while] Azerbaijanis were a mixture of Japhetic-Armenian-Iranian-Arabic”.

In other words, the Turkic element was insignificant in both cases and the ethnic make-up of the Turkic speakers of the Ottoman Empire (and contemporary Turks of Turkey) and the Turkic speakers of Azerbaijan was completely different. Under these conditions, to claim brotherhood was very difficult. Zifel’d Simumaggi continues by commenting on the impact of the Seljuks:

“On the Seljuks it should be noted that (1) Seljuks were not necessarily a people with a large population; they were probably a few thousand Teke or Yomuts, in any case, they were not numbered in the millions. (2) They occupied a territory that was great in contemporary terms: a part from Persia, [they occupied] Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, Kurdistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, parts of Georgia, Anatolia, etc.; they had to keep their garrisons in all these territories. The Crusaders of all Europe forced [Seljuks] to concentrate their power in Palestine. How many Seljuks could come to the territories of Azerbaijan? It was clear that they were a few thousand and even this figure should be used carefully. (3) After the Seljuks emigrated from Turkmenistan (where they came from), before they started their big expansion, they inhabited Iran, they acquired Persian wives with hybrid offspring, Persian habits, rules and religion, and […] language. It is a fact that Seljuk sultans and begs addressed the population […] not in the Turkmén language but in Persian. In other words, they appeared here [in Azerbaijan] only with Iranizing forces, not with Turkifying forces. (4) In fact, the real Seljuks formed a small group of the higher ranks of their army, but the combatant masses were from Persia, from various Iranian peoples and from other peoples; in this way, the role of ‘Seljuks’ [and] their various tribal mixture in their garrisons comes very close to zero in the Turkification of Azerbaijan”.

Both in Turkish of Turkey and in the Turkic language of Azerbaijan, Türk means Turkic as well as Turkish. As Zifel’d Simumiagi was very much concerned about this issue, and he returned to the terms Turk and Turkic at the final page of his review. Here he very clearly explains the recent construction of Turkish identity in Turkey and defines the outcomes for Azerbaijani identity:

“Among the Ottoman Turks, the term Turkic was elevated by the bourgeois-democratic movement. In the old Turkey of sultans, the term ‘türk’ interpreted as ‘uncultivated’,
‘redneck’, ‘yokel’; the opposed term ‘osmanlı’ was sounded proudly. The alteration of the Turkish identity, which was related with the overthrow of the caliphate-sultanate, the declaration of the republic, [and with] the consolidation of Balkano-Anatolian Turks into a nation (1908-1920) accompanied by the refusal of the name of the dynastic past ‘osmanlı’ and legitimization of ‘türk’ as a national name. That is why we henceforth have to name only Balkano-Anatolian Turks as ‘Turkic’ [Ru. Tiurk, Tur. Türk], keep the term ‘Ottomans’ only to name Turks in the epoch of the caliphate before the revolution, but ‘osmanists’ can be used only by those who try to depersonalize the Azerbaijani (or other) nation or its language, subject them to the old or new Turkish norms, which are alien to [Azerbaijanis].”

Considering the change of the meaning Türk from a general ethno-linguistic term to a national identity in Turkey, Zifel’d – Simumiagi suggested a de-Turkificed Azerbaijani identity. Though this de-Turkificed Azerbaijani identity became official from 1937 until the end of the Soviet Union, Zifel’d – Simumiagi never witnessed this. At the end of 1936, parallel to the developments in all-Union level, Bagirov launched a campaign against the cadres in the higher institutions. The initial wave purged the pro-Turkic group. On 17 December, 1936, Rukhulla Akhundov, the former secretary of the AKP(b) and the vice-chairman of the AzFAN, was arrested in front of his house. On 4 January, 1937, the commissar of Narkompros AzSSR, Shakhbazov, and his deputy Gasanov were removed from their posts and the latter was accused of being a former Musavvatist. Within a single meeting of the Bureau of the TsK AKP(b), the local historians V. Khuluflu and A.S. Bukshpan, who worked at the AzFAN and the API, the director of the AGU Gasanbekov, and the Chief of the AzGlavlits Eminbeili were all dismissed from the AKP(b) and removed from their posts. According to the customs of the day, they were accused

80 ARPiİSPİHDA, 1-14-35-19/24, April 16/17, 1937.
81 ARPiİSPİHDA, 1-14-33-17, January 1938.
83 ARPiİSPİHDA, 1-74-453-330, January 4, 1937.
of being counter-revolutionaries, Trotskyites, and nationalists. On the same day that Bagirov launched these purges, a special detachment of the AzNKVD arrived in Kislovodsk in order to arrest B.V. Choban-Zade, the prominent Crimean Tatar linguist of Turkic languages, who had worked in Baku since 1924. On the night of 18 March, 1937, Gubaidullin was also arrested in Baku. He was accused of organizing an anti-Soviet uprising, being a spy of Turkey, Germany, and Japan, and finally, of being a pan-Turkist. Both the Institute of History and Material Culture and the Institute of Language and Literature were victims of the Great Terror. As a consequence, in 1937 the two institutions merged as the Institute of History, Language, and Literature. Other flagship institutions of the republic, the AGU and API, were also purged. The purges within the history and literature sections of these institutes were especially dramatic. In 1936 alone, two directors were replaced at the API. Musaev, the director of the API in 1937, suggested to the TsK AKP(b) that graduate students who were studying history at the API had to be sent to Moscow or Leningrad because there was not a single history lecturer left in the institution after the first wave of the purges.

84 ARPlisPihda, 1-74-457-7, January 28, 1937. The list of the scholars in the higher institutions occupying various positions included Gasanbekov, Chichikalov, Nikolaev, Tikhomirov, Khuluflu, Billiarli, Bukshpan, Tagi-Zade, Choban-Zade, Azim Gasanov, Tagi Shakhbazov, Rizabeli, V. Mustafaev, Gubaidullin, P. Guseinov, Vanandetsi. Parallel to the purge of the scholars in the higher institutions, the cadres in the Narkompros AzSSR were also purged more than once. ARPlisPihda, 1-14-7-79, April 17, 1937.
88 Many scholars simultaneously worked at different institutions. A removal of one person had impact on different institutions. For example Khuluflu, while a member of the AzFAN, worked at the API since 1934 as a historian of Transcaucasia. ARPlisPihda, 1-74-359-44, October 7, 1934.
89 ARPlisPihda, 1-14-7-35 (1937) and ARPlisPihda, 1-14-7-79, April 17, 1937.
Since 1934, when the AGU reopened, until 1938, the University had five rectors. The terror hit the AGU to the extent that no Azerbaijani professor of history with Turkic origins remained. The rector of the AGU, A. Aliev, who reported this fact and complained that not enough scholars remained to run the classes and conduct research, was also purged. A. Iusupov, the next rector of the AGU, found time to write a letter more than once to the school and science section of the TsK before being purged, and complained that there was nobody in the university to conduct lectures on history, political economics, and Leninism. Until 1937, the history faculty was chaired by B.N. Tikhomirov, whose scholarly interest was in the history of the Communist Party. However, he was one of the first unveiled ‘enemies of the people’ among the historians and lost his positions at different institutes. In 1937-1940, there were four consecutive deans of the history faculty at the AGU. In 1940-41, the faculty operated without a dean. By 1941, only two full-time professors remained in the faculty.

As the witch-hunt continued, a committee was formed at the AzFAN to investigate and liquidate the ‘remaining wrecking activities’. The monographs and other works that had been written by the purged scholars were hastily examined for critical views. The personal libraries, unpublished notes, and published works of the pro-Turkic scholars were collected and destroyed. This also meant that all publishing activities that were previously planned had to be halted until it could

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90 When the AGU was reopened in November 1934, M.K. Alekberli was assigned as the rector. After two months, he was replaced by B. Gasanbekov. The latter managed to keep his position until January 1937. Between January and November of 1937, a number of different academics were assigned to the position of rector at the AGU. The other three were: A.Aliev, A. Iusupov, A.Guliev. See: A. Atakishiev, Istoriia, pp. 191.

91 ARPI İSPIHDA, 1-14-12-94, July 31, 1937.

92 These four deans in 1937-1940 were M. Kasumov, Prof.A.K. Gerval'd, M.S. Makhmudov and K.V. Luk'ianov; A. Atakishiev, Istoriia, p.200.
be confirmed that they would not be a pretext for another wave of purges. Although the collection of research papers prepared by the history faculty of the AGU in 1935 and 1936 was ready for publication, publication was stalled once it was revealed that the authors were the enemies of the people. The periodical of the AzFAN, which was published at the end of 1936, was allocated for history studies, but there were no recent essays on the substantial issues of the national history of Azerbaijan. None of the prominent historians were included, and some essays were reports on research that had been conducted as long ago as 1933.

By autumn 1937, the Great Terror in Azerbaijan had removed the first group of historians who were Turkic by ethnic origin and proponents of a Turkic ethno-linguistic explanation. In 1938 some of the internationalist-Marrists, such as Gulam Bagirov and Zifel’dt-Simumiagi, were also arrested and accused of being part of a pan-Turkist conspiracy against the Soviet regime! After their long interrogation, in 1939 both Gulam Bagirov and Zifel’dt Simumiagi were sent to Kolyma in Siberia. Zifel’dt-Simumiagi died in the labour camp in the same year. When the carnage came to an end in 1938, there were no experienced historians left in Baku. It should be noted that the majority of victims were indigenous Turkic intellectuals, whose intellectually most formative period was before the Revolution, and who aimed to construct a national history based on Turkic ethno-linguistic ancestors. Baku, an important centre of Turkology before 1937,

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94 ARPI/SPIHDA, 1-14-7-36, (1937).
was deprived of Turkologists. Nevertheless, the Marrist historians were also victims of the Great
Terror. Yet, ironically, it was the Marrist theory that was to be used in the following years, in
order to construct a national history with an autochthonous past.
Mir Jafar Bagirov  
(1896-1956)  
First Secretary of the AKP(b)  
(1932-1953)

Bekir Chobanzade  
(1893-1937)  
Before and after his arrest

Veli Khuluflu  
(1894-1937)

Rukhulla Akhundov  
(1897-1938)

Gaziz Gubaidullin  
(1887-1937)

Artur Zifel'd – Simumiagi  
(1889-1937)  
Before and after his arrest
1.2.2. NEW ETHNOGENESIS FOR A NEW IDENTITY.

Following the Great Terror, a new team continued to work on the construction of national history in Baku. However, these new authors were not authorities on either Turkic history or Caucasian history. They were a bunch of young graduates, party activists, and vydvizhentsy. One of the editors of the new history was Isag Dzafarzade (1895-1982), an Azerbaijani graduate of the Ethnography Faculty of the AGU. He participated in various archaeological expeditions in Azerbaijan SSR and Ukraine SSR. In 1938, he became the head of the archeological section of the Institute of History of the AzFAN and occupied this post until 1964.\textsuperscript{97} Aleksei Klimov was originally from Kaluzhka Oblast (now in Ukraine) and received higher education in the Psychoneurological Institute in St. Petersburg and Commercial Institute in Kiev. It is not clear if he finished his education in these institutes and he probably became a member of the Bolshevik Party in those years. At the end of 1920, he arrived in Baku and worked in various administrative positions. At this time, there was a great deficit of educated cadres in Baku, and one with a higher education could quickly climb the career ladder. From 1925, Klimov participated in the ethnographical researched in the Republic within the OOIAz and AzGNII. In 1937-38 he became the director of the Museum of the History of Azerbaijan, which was under the directory of the AzFAN. In 1938 he was assigned the role of deputy-director of the Institute of History, Language and Literature of the AzFAN, and after the purge of Zimfel’d-Simumiagi, as the acting director of the Institute. In 1941-1945 he was the head of the Institute of History of the AzFAN.\textsuperscript{98} The third editor of the history book, Zelik Iampol’skii (1911-1981), was from Lenkeren, Azerbaijan and he was most probably a Jew.

\textsuperscript{97} T. Kerimova, \textit{Iz istorii}, pp. 372-3.
1930s, he returned to Azerbaijan and worked at the Institute of History of the AzFAN in Baku. In 1940 he became the head of the section of modern history at the Institute of History. The first draft of the national history was prepared by these three editors, and 100 copies were printed in 1939 for the historians and party apparatchiks responsible for constructing a national history of Azerbaijan. The draft clearly defined people living in Soviet Azerbaijan as an autochthonous ethnic mixture that was Turkified in later stages of history. Following the Marrist approach, the text claimed that Azerbaijani tribes shared similar languages with Armenian, Georgian, and Dagestani tribes because they were all at a similar stage of economic and social development. In time, differentiation among them increased. Thus, there was no connection between the contemporary Azerbaijani nation and the rest of the Turkic peoples.

In order to achieve primordiality, the Medes was also integrated into the national history. In April 1938, a ten-day festival (dekada) of Azerbaijani art was organized in Moscow. The festival aimed to present the achievements of Soviet Azerbaijan in the arts. In the evening of the last day of the festival an official reception was organized in the Kremlin’s St. George Hall. At this reception writers, composers, artists, musicians, and opera singers met with the heads of the VKP (b) when Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Chubar’, Mikoian, Kosior, Zhdanov, Ezhov, and Bagirov joined the reception. It is claimed that at this reception Stalin honoured the Azerbaijani people by raising his glass for the ‘Azerbaijani nation, who are the

99 T. Kerimova, Iz istorii, pp. 541.
100 I. Dzhafarzade, A.A. Klimov, Z.I. Iampolskii (eds.), Istoriia Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR uchebnik dlia 8 i 9 klassov (Baku, 1939).
103 The dekada was organized April 6-16, 1938. ‘Dekada’, Bakinskii Rabochii (18 April 1938), p.2
obvious descendants of the great civilization of the Medes’. This was an astonishing
definition. In those days, the Medes were considered a group of Aryans who arrived in Western
Iran following the great Aryan exodus from the Himalayas. Moreover, the Medes lived in the
Iranian Plateau, not in Azerbaijan. Stalin’s interpretation of Azerbaijani history became a tenet, and in the coming years the Medes came to be thought of as the non-Aryan ancestors of
Azerbaijanis. The history of Azerbaijan was increasingly detached from a Turkic past, and the
emerging gap was filled by the incorporation of an Iranian past into Azerbaijani history.

Despite Stalin’s approval, the history published in 1939 did not attribute to the Medes a ‘golden
age’ for Azerbaijanis. The editors did not seem to be informed of Stalin’s ideas on the
‘historical role of the Medes’. The text of 1939 was discussed at a conference organized by the
history and philosophy section of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow on 26-27 May, 1939. The
authors of the draft continued to work according to the comments that they received at this
conference. In 1941, two months before the German assault on the USSR, the new history of
Azerbaijan was published.

The differences between the draft of 1939 and the edition of 1941 provide us with some ideas
about the comments that historians received in Moscow. The edition of 1941 defends the
theory of Marr even more strongly. In terms of socio-economic development, it describes the
tribes in ancient Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and in some parts of Dagestan as being from the

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104 This anecdote was conveyed to me by Emeritus Prof. Süleyman Aliyarlı of Baku University in 2007.
105 V.V. Bartol’d, ‘Mesto Prikaspiiskikh Oblastei v Istorii Musul’manskogo Mira’, in V.V. Bartol’d, Sochineniiia (9 vols.,
Moscow, 1963), ii/1, pp. 651-774, p. 656.
107 A similar gap can be observed in Tatar and Chuvash case, after 1944, when to construct a link between Tatars
and the Golden Horde was forbidden by the TsK VKP. For this issue see: V.A. Shnirelman, Who Gets, pp. 7, 22-24.
110 Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana kratkii ocherk (Baku, 1941).
same stock, thus all spoken dialects of the same native language. They all used the same Japhetist or Caucasian languages together with all humanity; their differentiation was a later process. The authors imply that language defined their identity and that the Caucasian nations (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Dagestanis) shared the same ethno-linguistic ancestors. In the following pages, the text launches an assault against the Turkic definition of national identity. Contrary to the preceding text, the authors openly claim that “language is not the crucial element that identifies a nation”. The contemporary mother tongue of a people may differ from that of their ethno-linguistic ancestors. In other words, although Azerbaijanis were Turkic speakers, their ancient roots had nothing to do with Turkic identity. Hence, Azerbaijanis could not be related to the Seljuks. According to the authors, a common territory, which was defended against enemies in the course of a national history, was the main factor that united the nation.

In conclusion, the authors argued that Azerbaijani identity had been primordial and that it had not changed over the past centuries. The peoples that migrated to Azerbaijan for millennia were small in number and primitive in their socio-economic structure. That is why they did not have a decisive impact on the autochthonous habitants of Azerbaijan. Obviously, these arguments cannot explain how Turkification started during—as defined by the authors—the invasion of Azerbaijan by the “primitive” and “small in number” pastoral nomads of the Seljuks. Additionally, the authors implied that even if there was a Turkification, this did not mean that Azerbaijanis were from Turkic stock. By blood, they were ancestors of the ancient Caucasians, who shared the same primordial ancestors with Armenians and Georgians. Consequently, Marr’s internationalist theories were used to construct a spatially defined primordial national
identity. The ‘indigenousness’ of the nation and the friendship with two other Soviet nations (Armenia and Georgia) were both established in a single stroke.

Apparently, the draft of 1939 had been criticized in Moscow for its weakness in defending Azerbaijani identity against the Turkic ethno-linguistic definition and its failure to emphasize the primordial brotherhood of Armenians, Georgians, and Azerbaijanis. Consequently, the authors made this additional three-page argumentation in 1941, which started with Marr’s internationalist theories and concluded with a spatially defined primordial national identity. However, one question remained: ‘When was the golden age of this primordial Azerbaijani nation?’ The text, for the first time, incorporated the Medes as the great ancestors of the Azerbaijani nation from the first millennium B.C.E. and explicitly points to Stalin as the source of this ‘scientific truth’:

“The only scientifically correct point of view on the descent of the Azerbaijani nation has been provided by comrade Stalin and it connects contemporary Azerbaijanis with their ancient ancestors—Medes”.

It is not a surprise that the next sections are devoted to “Beginning of the Median State”, “Conquests of Media”, “On the Culture of Media”, and the “Fight [of Medes] against Persians”. In order to summarize the theory, the text describes Azerbaijanis as a mixture of “the Medes, [Caucasian] Albanians, and the descendants of Caspians”. The genesis of the Azerbaijani people was defined geographically and this ethnogenesis did not bear a mono-ethno-linguistic identity.

111 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana kratkii, p.17-19
112 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana kratkii, p.17-19
113 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana kratkii, p.19
114 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana kratkii, pp.21-31.
115 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana kratkii, p.31.
In 1934, at the Twelfth Congress of the AKP(b), Bagirov referred to the majority of the republic as Turkic (Ru. Tiurki or Tiurchanki) and their language as the Turkic language (Ru. Tiurkskii iazyk). The terminology he used, in step with the official line, described an ethno-linguistic identity.\(^{116}\) However, at the Thirteenth Congress of the AKP(b) in 1937, Bagirov referred to the Turkic majority of Azerbaijan as ‘Azerbaijanis’ and their language as ‘the Azerbaijani language’ rather than Turkic or Turkish.\(^{117}\) A few months before the congress, at the beginning of 1937, the definition of the titular nation was silently changed from Turkic to Azerbaijani in the official documents. We can summarize that Bagirov and Stalin aimed at a conscious consolidation of the national identity of the titular nation of Azerbaijan.

1.3. KAZAKHSTAN IN 1936-1941.

As in the Azerbaijani case, construction of Kazakh Soviet national history was closely monitored by the agitation and propaganda section of the republican communist party (Kazkraikom VKP (b) and its successor the KP(b)K). When the first commission was organized to write a national history of Kazakhs, the chair was at the same time the head of the agitation-propaganda section of the Kazkraikom VKP(b). Following the purges of 1937-38, two consecutive heads of the history section of KazFAN were party bureaucrats without any significant career in the discipline of history. Moreover, one of them was the head of the agitation propaganda section of the KP(b)K. The most important impact of the Great Terror on Kazakh national history writing was removing national Bolshevik Kazakh historians, who followed the teachings of Pokrovskii. Given the vigorous campaign of primordialization in Azerbaijani SSR, one might expect to find a similar

\(^{116}\) M.D. Bagirov, *O rabote TsK AKP(b), otchetnyi doklad XII s’ezdu AKP(b)* (Baku, 1934), pp. 58-60. The exact dates of the Twelfth Congress of AKP(b) are 11-13 January 1934.

policy in Kazakh SSR. However, in terms of primordialization, the Kazakh history published in 1941 was an incomplete work. The narrative abstained from explaining Kazakh ethnogenesis in ancient times. There was little eagerness to find ancient Kazakhs in the time of the Scythians or Huns. The Kazakh ethnogenesis remained an unsolved question until 1943. This suggests that even under a one-party system and one ideology, the ways in which national histories were constructed were various.

1.3.1. THE GREAT TERROR IN ALMATY.

The reaction of Almaty to the resolution of the TsK VKP(b) in January 1936 was similar to that of Baku. The SNK KASSR and the Bureau of the Kazkraikom VKP(b) issued a joint resolution on writing the history of Kazakh Literature. In accordance with this resolution, a committee was formed within the Narkompros KASSR for writing a book outlining the history of Kazakh literature and a textbook on Kazakh literature for secondary schools. The commission, chaired by the Narkompros KASSR Temirbek Zhurgenev, was a mixture of eminent writers, intellectuals, pedagogues, and apparatchiki such as Saken Seifullin (1894-1938), Mukhtar Auezov (1897-1961), Gabbas Togzhanov (1900-1938), Moldagalii Zholdybaev (1887-1937), Telzhan Shonanov (1894-1938), Arystanov (most probably an apparatchik), Sultan Lepesov (1904-1937?), and Sabit Mukanov (1900-1973). This resolution of 15 March, 1936 was the first step towards the penning of a national history.

A month after ordering the production of a textbook on the history of national literature, the first secretary of the Kazkraikom VKP(b) Mirzoian was eager to expedite the writing of a Kazakh

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118 In fact, the poet, writer, and public figure Saken Seifullin had written a textbook on the history of Kazakh literature. Apparently, this book was not valid any more. The members of the commission; G. Togzhanov together with Sabit Mukanov and Saken Seifullin actively participated in the organization of the SSPK. In 1937, he was the chair of the SSPK. For the commission see: KRPM, 141-1-10583-268/270, March 15, 1936.
national history. At this stage, the history was named ‘The History of Kazakh People and Kazakhstan’. There was an intended implication in this title. The geographical emphasis (Kazakhstan) would embrace other peoples of these lands (Uygurs, Dungans, Uzbeks, Russians, etc.). Archival documents suggest that from the beginning the agitation propaganda department of the KP(b)K in Almaty was intensively involved in writing this national history. However, insufficient preparations on the part of the agitprop department and the historians in the region repeatedly delayed its presentation to the Bureau of the Kazkraikom. In fact, the real reason for the delay was the initial measures of the Great Terror.

After the official demise of Pokrovskii, the historian Tomsinskii, who was a leading figure in the Leningrad branch of the Pokrovskiiian school, was drawn away from Leningrad.\textsuperscript{119} It is not widely known that he was sent to Almaty as the first director of the history section, which had recently been founded within the KazFAN. Tomsinskii was responsible for history writing in the republic, but he did not have enough time to satisfy the demands of the Bureau of the Kazkraikom. Soon after his arrival in Almaty, he was arrested on 29 April, 1936. The Bureau of the Kazkraikom, however, was keen to discuss the topic of writing a history and to issue a resolution.\textsuperscript{120} The Zhdanov commission was not the only reason. Another reason was peculiar to Kazakhstan. In the spring of 1936, the all-Union constitutional commission in Moscow prepared a draft of a new constitution, which would be called Stalin’s constitution, and submitted it for a nationwide discussion. According to the new constitution of 1936, Kazakhstan would become a union-

\textsuperscript{119} N. Vanag and S. Tomsinskii, \textit{Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Rossii: epokha promyshlennogo kapitalisma} (Moscow and Leningrad, 1928); S.G. Tomsinskii, \textit{Ocherki Istorii feodal’no-krepostnoi Rossi, chast’ 1, Krest’ianskie voiny v epokhu obrazovaniia Imperii} (Moscow and Leningrad, 1934)

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{KRPM}, 141-1-10585-377, April 15, 1936; \textit{KRPM}, 141-1-10586-471, May 4, 1936.
republic. After the arrest of Tomsinskii in April 1936, it took more than a month to reorganize responsibilities at the KazFAN and prepare a draft. Finally, at the end of May 1936, the Bureau of the Kazkraikom received the structure of the textbook’s draft and instructed historians on further steps. According to the resolution of the Bureau of the Kazkraikom, a history textbook on Kazakh people and Kazakhstan for the final year students of secondary schools had to be ready by September. As the resolution concluded, historians had serious issues to face. They had to work out the different periods, sources, and materials of Kazakh history. The task was mainly given to the history section of the KazFAN. The abstract of the Kazakh national history textbook that was prepared after the resolution of Moscow in January 1936 recalls the preferences of Pokrovskii. After the arrest of Tomsinskii, Sandzhar Asfendiiarov (1889–1938) became the head of the history section of the KazFAN. Asfendiiarov was a Kazakh historian, a national Bolshevik, party official, and a public figure who occupied important party and public posts. Asfendiiarov was also an author of the first history of Kazakhs in the Soviet period, which was written according to the principles of Pokrovskii. In order to write the national history, a permanent commission of historians and apparatchiki was appointed. The commission was headed by the

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121 Apparently, the initial opinion of Stalin was different. In 1934, he preferred that Kazakhstan remain as an autonomous republic within the RSFSR. The elevation of Kazakhstan to a union-republic was decided at a later stage. See: Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (The Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, hereafter, RGASPI), (fond) 81- (opis) 3- (delo) 100- (listy) 67/71, August 28, 1934, in R.W. Davies, et.al. (eds.), Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-36 (Yale, 2003), p. 266.

122 S.D. Asfendiiarov, Istoria Kazakhstana (Almaty, [1935] 1993). The references are from the 1993 edition. Sandzhar Asfendiiarov was the head of the section of the socio-economic disciplines at the KazPI. At the same time, he was the vice-chairman of the KazFAN, a member of the Scientific Council and of the Presidium of the KazFAN until autumn 1937. See: KRPM, 141-1-10598-4/5, November 11, 1936; KRPM, 708-1-39-117/118, November 10, 1937. For a detailed biography, also see A.S. Tokenov, ‘Sandzhar Dzhafafarovich Asfendiiarov i ego ’Istoria Kazakhstana’ (s drevneishikh vremen)’, in S. D. Asfendiiarov, Istoria, p.3-11; L.D. Degitaeva, Politicheskie represii v Kazakhstane v 1937-38gg. Sbornik dokumentov (Almaty, 1998), pp.265-66.
experienced Turkmen Bolshevik Khalmurad Sakhat-Muradov, the secretary of the school and science department of the Bureau of the Kazkraikom, who would organize and manage the project. The task of working out the textbook was given to Asfendiiarov. Also, some prominent members of Kazakh intelligentsia were asked to participate in this colossal work. The issues for further investigation were so enormous and complicated that it would be impossible to finish the task within three months. Asfendiiarov quickly prepared and presented the structure of the textbook to the Party. He was consistent with his previous approach in 1935. For one thing, the great bulk of the book (three out of four chapters) was devoted to the Russian period commencing in 1717. This book would be a shorter form of Asfendiiarov’s history, published in 1935.

In addition to Asfendiiarov, the resolution called on other Kazakh national Bolsheviks, such as Saken Seifullin and Turar Ryskulov, to be involved in the project. Some of the leading members of the Alash-Orda movement had already been persecuted before 1936. However, contrary to the Ukrainian purges in 1929-33, the repressions in 1928-32 in Kazakhstan were limited to Alash-Orda leaders and did not remove all national Bolsheviks. Contrary to the Ukrainian case, many

123 The other members of the commission were the head of the agit-prop section I. Kabulov, the Commissar of Narkompros KASSR Temirbek Zhurgenev; the historian of the Communist Party E. G. Fedorov. KRPM, 141-1-10587-323, May 28, 1936. In the meantime, the Institute of the National Culture merged with the Institute of History and the Institute of Language and Kazakh Literature.

124 KRPM, 141-1-10587-324, May 28, 1936.

125 Kazakh intelligentsia experienced more than one wave of terror and purges. The first wave engulfed more than 40 prominent ex-Alash Orda members in 1928-31. The Alash Case (Alashkoe delo) was launched in 1928 and continued until April-May 1932. Fifteen of them were exiled or imprisoned, including M. Tynyshpaev, Akhmet Baitursynov, Khalel Dosmukahmedov, Magzhan Dzhumabaev, Ali Khan Bokeikhanov, and Dzhumakhan Kuderin. Zhushupbek Aimautov, Mirzhakup Dulatov, and some others were shot in 1931. Most of them were exiled to Russia. Magzhan Zhumabaev was sentenced to 10 years of labour camp in 1929. In 1936 he was released, however, in December 1937 he was arrested for the last time. He was shot in March 1938. Baitursynov, after being exiled to Arkhangelsk for three years, was released in 1935 and returned to Almaty. In August 1937 he was arrested again. On December 8, 1938, he was shot. Mirzhakup (Mir-lakub) Dulatov died in a labour camp in 1935. Kazakh writer Mukhtar Auezov was also among the prosecuted. Initially he was sentenced to 3 years in a labour camp. After 2.5 years, he was released with the condition that he would publish an apology and denounce his previous works. Only
national Bolshevik figures such as T. Ryskulov, S. Asfendiiarov, and S. Seifullin were involved in the first project of national history writing and were purged only in 1937-38. The terror of 1937-38 in Kazakhstan wiped out the Kazakh intelligentsia, which had emerged at the beginning of the century. All these names were accused of being in touch with Turkic émigré groups and collaborating with foreign secret services in order to pursue their pan-Turkist goals.

After receiving the sealed letter of 29 July, 1936 from the TsK VKP(b), the Bureau of the Kazkraikom VKP(b) met two times to discuss the purges in the Party. These meetings launched the first wave of the terror. We should note that at this point the purges did not yet reach an intense level. However, it was enough to prevent Kazakhstan from sending a national history to Moscow, because the terror commenced before the history could be completed. Using inexperienced local graduates or calling for more experts from Moscow were the only proposed solutions. The local graduates were not only young, but also lacked knowledge, because the teaching of the history of Kazakhstan in the local university was merely an experiment. The arrests were a sustained process in 1937. The plenum of the Kazkraikom VKP(b) on 16-23 January, 1937 demanded that the Party reveal more counterrevolutionary terrorists, Kazakh

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126 *KRPM*, 141-1-10592-430, August 5, 1936; *KRPM*, 141-1-10599-501/503, November 1, 1936

127 During the August-October period, 43 ‘counterrevolutionaries Trotskyites-Zinovievits’ were unveiled. *KRPM*, 141-1-10599-501/503, November 1, 1936

128 *KRPM*, 141-1-10620-46,64, September 25, 1936. The repressed historians were not only leading ones such as Tomkinskii and Asfendiiarov. Numerous assistants such as Butovskaia, Palamarchuk, and Prusak also disappeared in 1937. See: *KRPM*, 141-1-11793-45, Autumn 1936.

129 *KRPM*, 141-1-11792-3 (1936). According to the document Asfendiiarov had to conduct these lectures eight hours per week.
nationalists, and Trotskyites, who were also the agents of Germany and Japan, within its own organization.\textsuperscript{130} The February-March plenum of the TsK VKP(b) in Moscow suddenly increased the speed of the terror in Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{131} In this plenum, Stalin publicly criticized Mirzoian for transferring his protégés from the Caucasus and Ural and employing them in Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{132} Mirzoian had to show his capacity and diligence as first secretary after his return to Almaty. According to his report to Stalin at the end of July 1937, there were already 400 unveiled members of the ‘National-Fascist Organization’ who were also Japanese agents, led by Ryskulov, Nurmakov, and Khodzhanov. These arrests included important public figures, party and state bureaucrats, and technocrats.\textsuperscript{133} Apparently these arrests were not enough. In September 1937, an article in Pravda criticized Party organization in Kazakhstan for being incapable of revealing the enemies of the people in Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{134} After the article, arrests and executions accelerated. From 22 September to 14 November, 1937, hundreds of party members of Kazakhstan were arrested. Among the accused were the commissars of agriculture, finance, sovkozov, etc.\textsuperscript{135} At the beginning, the Terror targeted party and state bureaucrats in the regions, such as secretaries of obkoms, economists in the planning departments, engineers, and regional prosecutors. In the summer and autumn of 1937, however, leading Kazakh writers Beimbet Mailin, Il’ias Dzhansugurov, Gabbas Togzhanov, Saken Seifullin, Sabit Mukanov, and Mukhtar Auezov were

\textsuperscript{130} For the plenum of the Kazkraikom on January 16-23, 1937, KRPM, 141-1-12801-8/21, January 22, 1937; and also see KRPM, 141-1-12811-377, February 4, 1937.
\textsuperscript{131} The plenum of the VKP(b) met on February 23 - March 5, 1937. Following Moscow, the Kazkraikom VKP(b) also organized a plenum for March 19-20, 1937. In this plenum the Party organization in Kazakhstan was informed that the list of the enemies that had to be revealed was extended by adding Bukharin, Rykov, and their supporters, KRPM, 141-1-12801-179/180, January 20, 1937. For the denouncements of the writers-poets, following the plenum in February-March 1937; KRPM, 708-1-604-35/41, July 13, 1937.
\textsuperscript{133} KRPM, 708-1-82-24/27, July 30, 1937.
\textsuperscript{134} ‘Karaganda gotovitsia k vyboram’, Pravda (26 September 1937), p.3.
\textsuperscript{135} KRPM, 708-1-106-176,177, November 14, 1937.
condemned, and in the following months most of them were arrested.\textsuperscript{136} The figures involved in the first project of history writing disappeared one by one. The commissar of the Narkompros KazSSR Temirbek Zhurgenev was removed in August 1937.\textsuperscript{137} Asfendiyarov was also arrested on August 22, 1937 and accused of being a spy for Germany, Japan, and Britain, and spreading anti-Soviet, pan-Turkist ideas. Together with other Kazakh intellectuals and public figures, he was shot following the last show trial in Moscow, in February 1938.\textsuperscript{138} In the first half of 1938, another local historian and secretary of the KazFAN, L.P. Mamet, temporarily headed the history section, but soon he was also arrested and shot.\textsuperscript{139} Within three years (1936-39) the chair of the institute of history in Kazakhstan changed five times, three of them ending up in unknown graves.\textsuperscript{140} Writing a national history became increasingly perilous. On the one hand, historians were warned that the Pokrovskiiian internationalist school was banned. Moreover, history had to emphasize the ‘golden age’ and ‘great leaders and events’ of the nation. On the other hand, there was a campaign of unveiling and removing ‘nationalists’. While historians had to escape from being ‘nationalists’, they also had to avoid being seen as Pokrovskiiian anti-Marxist ‘falsifiers’ of history. In reality, all these labels did not matter much. The arrested historians were in fact denounced as being both Pokrovskiiian and nationalist. For example, Asfendiayarov was accused of being an anti-Marxist Pokrovskiiian, but he was at the same time indicted for being a leader of a counter-revolutionary nationalist organization.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{136} Only Mukanov and Aezov, remained after the purges of 1937-38.
\textsuperscript{137} KRPM, 708-1-25-2/4, August1-5, 1937.
\textsuperscript{138} According to the archive material in Almaty, he was shot on February 23, 1938. Kazakstan Respublikasy Ortalyk Memleketlik Muraqaty (The Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan, hereafter KROMMM), (fond) 2178-(opis) 1- (delo) 12- (list) 1. However, according to the KGB archives in Almaty, he was shot on February 25, 1938.
\textsuperscript{139} KRPM, 708-2.1-752-6 (1937); KRPM, 708-2.1-752-15 (the first half of 1938).
\textsuperscript{140} Tomsinskii, Asfendiayarov, Mamet, Baimurzin, Shakhmatov.
\textsuperscript{141} Following the January 1936 resolution of the TsK VKP(b) on history writing, Kabulov, the head of the agit-prop department in Kazakhstan, accused Asfendiayarov and Fedorov of being the representatives of Pokrovskii in
After the Great Terror, Nikolai Skvortsov, the new first secretary of the KP(b)K, got off to a vigorous start, including resuming the writing of a national history. In the summer of 1938, the school and science department of the KP(b)K issued an order that asked for intensive cooperation between the history sections of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the KazFAN, the KazPI, and the KazGU in order to write the ‘History of Kazakhstan’. A working plan had to be prepared by 20 September, 1938, and preliminary texts had to be presented by 1 January, 1939. Nothing came out in 1938, because all these institutions were affected by the purges. According to official reports, in 1935, 51% of the Kazakh population was illiterate and the educated elite comprised a very small portion of the Kazakh population. That is why, before the Great Terror, there were very few trained local cadres, including historians, in the Republic. In terms of quantity of cadres, even Azerbaijan was in a better position. Hence, the impact of the Great Terror on the Kazakh intelligentsia was worse than in the Azerbaijani or Ukrainian cases. Following the resolutions of the Eighteenth Congress of the VKP(b) and the decree of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on 5 November, 1938 on the consolidation of the history sections with highly qualified historians, the SNK of KazSSR issued another resolution on 13 December 1938, according to the report received from the KazFAN, and A.Ia. Baimurzin, who was an apparatchik in the KP(b)K and did not have an academic status in history, became

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142 KRPM, 708-2.1-752-56, August 16, 1938.
143 Other planned publications of historians in Kazakhstan were also not published. Most of them waited for a decade before publication. For example, the work of M.P. Viatkin on Srym Batyr was planned for publication in 1938, but published in 1947. In 1938, research prepared by Apollova, M.P. Viatkin, and Bekenbaev had the following title ‘Natsional’no-kolonial’naia politika tsarizma v Kazakhstane v 50-70-kh gg. XVIII v.’ see: ‘Khronika’, Istorik-marxist, no. 5 (1937), p. 266. However, the monograph of N. G. Apollova published in 1948 was Prisoedinenie Kazakhstana k Rossii v 30-kh godakh XVIII veka (Almaty, 1948).
144 KRPM, 141-1-11661-3, October 26, 1936.
the new head of the history section.\textsuperscript{145} This was a sign of close Party control over the history section. The KP(b)K renewed the task for the history section, which was the preparation of a textbook of the history of Kazakhstan for higher education institutes by 1 July, 1939.\textsuperscript{146} However, when the deadline came, the history section could not even provide a date for the conclusion of writing of a national history. There was not a single chapter on the desk.

In order to overcome the lack of experienced historians, assistance was asked from institutions in Leningrad and Moscow. In 1939-40, the Institute of History in Moscow was involved in the project of writing the national history of Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{147} Prof. Viatkin was invited from Leningrad to Almaty in February 1939, in order to organize the work. His team in Leningrad prepared the structure of the history from ancient times until the 1870s. According to this structure, the book had five chapters: (1) from ancient times until the 1870s; (2) From the 1870s until the Imperialistic War (World War One); (3) the Imperialistic War and the uprising of 1916; (4) the February and the October Revolutions and the Civil War in Kazakhstan; (5) the Soviet Period of the History of Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{148} The local historians N.T. Timofeev, E. Fedorov, A.P. Chizhov, and A. F. Lakunin were supposed to contribute only to the chapters covering 1870-1936. These historians were mostly experts on Party history and the twentieth century of Kazakhstan and were not themselves Kazakhs. Moreover, Prof. M. P. Viatkin with his team in Leningrad had the responsibility of writing the entirety of the history from the beginning until the 1870s. For historians such as Chuloshnikov, Viatkin, and Bernshtam, who were located in Moscow or

\textsuperscript{145} Following the purges, A.Ia. Baimurzin, who had no academic status in history, headed the section. After May 1939, he was appointed as head of the Kazakh branch of the Glavlit, i.e. the head of censorship.

\textsuperscript{146} KRPM, 708-3.2-136-45, May 10, 1939.


\textsuperscript{148} KRPM, 708-3.1-789-24, the first quarter of 1940; KRPM, 708-3.2-136-4, May 10, 1939; KRPM, 708-3.2-137-42/43, July 26, 1939
Leningrad, their own institutes held a clear priority. Almaty was not an attractive assignment either. In the following months, the performance of the KazFAN in general, and the history section in particular, did not satisfy the Party. The twentieth anniversary of Soviet rule in Kazakhstan had to be celebrated without an official national history. That is why the Bureau of the KP(b)K again asked for support from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in providing qualified specialists, parallel to the reorganization in Almaty.

Additionally, in May-August 1940, the deputy secretary of the agitation-propaganda department of the KP(b)K, Abdulla (Gabdulla) Urazbaevich Buzurbaev (1908-1943), while keeping his former position, became the vice-chairman of the KazFAN. Two weeks before the German attack on the Soviet Union, he became the Kazakhstan party secretary for agitation and propaganda of the KP(b)K. Although he was only 32, he had high-ranking positions in both the Party and the academy. He was a young and energetic Kazakh with a meteoric career, representing the new Soviet generation. Before his education at the rabfak in Omsk (1927-31), he was a peasant and later a lower-rank worker at a dam construction site. He became a party member in 1928. After the rabfak, he worked as a teacher at the Medrabfak in Omsk. Further, he graduated from the institute of Marxism-Leninism in Novosibirisk (1932-37). During the purges, he moved upwards (1937-1940) in administrative positions very fast, and finally, in 1940, he became the vice-secretary of the agitprop department of the KP(b)K. Additionally, in 1941, he became a member

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149 The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR of November 5, 1938 and the resolution of the SNK of KazSSR on December 13, 1938, were the administrative steps behind the assignment of Bernshtam and the invitation for M.P. Viatkin to Almaty. See: KRPM, 708-3.1-789-24, the first quarter of 1940; KRPM, 708-3.2-136-4, May 10, 1939.
151 In July 1941, Buzurbaev became the head of the agitprop section and freed from his position in the KazFAN. However, as a history teacher and head of agitprop department, he continued to be involved in the formation of national history. KRPM, 708-5.1-77, July 8, 1941.
of the editorial council of the KazOGIZ.152 The example of Buzurbaev is an important one for two reasons. First, Buzurbaev was a typical vydvizhenets of the 1930s, and such figures were not only in the party, but were also among a number of young historians and linguists who were promoted after the generation of experienced historians, linguists and national Bolsheviks were purged in 1936-38. Second, he was a link between the academic world and political authorities, especially in the sphere of history writing. M. Abdykalykov, his successor as head of the agitprop department, was a teacher at the Kazakh branch of IMEL, and co-author of the first official history of Kazakhstan in 1943. Thus, the young Buzurbaev was the harbinger of practices in the following decades.

The draft of the national history of Kazakhs from ancient times until the 1870s by M.P. Viatkin was finally ready for review in 1940. The text was sent to the historians in Leningrad and Moscow and received approval from them. Moreover, the authors of the chapters presented and publicized their work by conducting lectures. After more than two years of work, the text was printed in 1941.153 However, as we will see below, this national history was far from defining ethnogenesis of Kazakhs. An important reason for this absence is pastoral nomadic-tribal past, which was a great challenge for national identity construction.

1.3.2. THE DIFFICULTIES IN WRITING A NATIONAL HISTORY OF THE NOMADS.

The shift to Turkic identity, which Azerbaijan experienced in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, happened in Kazakhstan much earlier. The contemporary Kazakh steppes were

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153 M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR (Moscow and Almaty, 1941).
already Turkified by the sixth century.\textsuperscript{154} However, the Soviet Kazakh historiography did not come to the conclusion that Kazakhs were Turkic. Considering the Azerbaijani case, one might think that the reason was a desire to locate the beginning of the nation at a much earlier starting point in ancient times. However, as mentioned above, there was no attempt at primordialization either.

From a purely disciplinary perspective, the problem of identifying the ethnogenesis of Kazakhs may be more complicated than in the Azerbaijani case. The particularities of pastoral nomadic tribes jeopardize any modern attempt at assigning such a group as the ethnic ancestors of a contemporary nation. The first reason for this is the lack of written historical records of Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{155} Second, was the problem of the hyper-mobility of pastoral nomads. For centuries, pastoral nomadic clans or tribes constantly changed their alliances with other clans, and the content of the tribal confederations that emerged as huge Turkic nomadic states—Huns, Gök-Türks—constantly shifted.\textsuperscript{156} For example, the Dulat tribe, which had Mongol origins, was initially within the Mongol confederation, then in the Chagatai Ulus, and finally among the Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{157} Tribal kinships could be eroded, created, re-created, mixed, and merged with others.


Additionally, the name of a tribe, layer, or group could change its meaning over time.\textsuperscript{158} This hyper-mobility of nomadic tribes makes the tracking of a specific tribe under a single name very difficult.\textsuperscript{159} Finally, tribal names that can be found in ancient or medieval records are hardly helpful. The tribal or clan names, whether through reference to an individual (mythical or actual) or to a group from ‘past days of glory’, could recur again and again among Mongols, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Nogais, and Karakalpaks.\textsuperscript{160} The mobility of these pastoral nomadic tribes also makes it difficult to identify a particular territory as the primordial territory or fatherland of a tribe. Homelands of particular tribes or tribal confederations could stretch until they met a geographical boundary. Except during the period of domination by a single great centre, such as the Empire of Genghis Khan, the people of the Desht-i Kypchak, including Kazakh tribes, were constantly in flux. Pressure from the Chinese or from local neighbours, local wars, droughts, frosts, floods, and epidemics of man and/or beasts in any combination could compel a pastoral group to move to a new \textit{patria}—if this term makes sense for a nomadic group.\textsuperscript{161}


\textsuperscript{159} Tribes which existed before the formation of Kazakh identity within the Huns, Gök-Türks, or Mongols later on can be seen both within Kazakhs and also in Uzbeks or Nogays. Some of these tribes are: Konrat, Naiman, Dzhalair, Kipchak. S. Asfendiiarov, ‘O nekotorykh osnovnykh voprosakh istorii kazakov’, \textit{Bolshevik Kazakstana}, no.10 (1933), pp. 29-37, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{160} L. Krader, \textit{Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads} (The Hauge, 1963), p. 193.

\textsuperscript{161} L. Krader, \textit{Social}, p. 192. The map of the distribution of Kazakh tribes of Middle and Great Horde in Karkalinskii uezd by Bokeikhanov demonstrates that there was no particular corner in the steppe that would be defined as the single territory of a tribe. Each tribe possessed different territories detached from each other in the steppe, which created patchworks of enclaves and exclaves. A.N. Bokeikhanov, \textit{Izbrannoe} (Almaty, 1995).
In all efforts at identifying the ethnogenesis of the Kazakh nation while also demonstrating spatial and temporal continuity, another elementary problem was that the territories of Kazakh tribes, or the tribes which were defined as Kazakh in the later stages of history, did not overlap with contemporary Kazakhstan. They occupied either much bigger spaces or a small section of it. For example, the supra-national territory of Desht-i Kypchak (Per. for Steppe of Kypchaks) was a natural habitat of the tribes that formed the Kazakh Union. Although the borders of Desht-i Kypchak changed over time, in general, this ethnotoonym defined the great steppe stretching from the lower banks of Syr-Darya and Lake Balkhash to Dnepr and the Black Sea littoral. It was divided into two sub-territories that were delineated by the Ural River. In the medieval records Desht-i Kypchak was first noted in the ninth century in the ‘Small Map’ of al’-Idrisi as the ‘Steppe of Kypchaks’, and in the eleventh century this became a conventional name.\footnote{V.V. Bartol’d, ‘Dvenadtsat’ lektsii po istorii turetskikh narodov Srednei Azii’ Sochineniia (9 vols., Moscow, 2002), v, pp. 19-194, p. 98; O.P.Kobzeva, Istoriicheskie sviazi Kipchaskikh narodov s sosediami po Velikomu shelkovomu puti, in D.M. Nasilov, Desht-i Kipchak i Zolotaia Orda v stanovlenii kul’tury evraziiskikh narodov (Moscow, 2003), pp. 35-40, p. 35.} In the historical record there was no such territorial division as ‘Kazakhstan’ within the Desht-i Kypchak. The historical divisions, such as the Üst-Yurt Plato, the steppe around the Zhaiyk (Ural) River, or Mo’ wara an-Nahr (Transoxiana) were mostly delineated according to river basins, high mountains, or big lakes. In other words, the traditional delineations of Desht-i Kypchak complicate the spatial definitions of a national history. Different tribes that could be considered the ethnic components of the Kazakh nation entered into and settled in the contemporary territories of Kazakhstan in different episodes of history. However, in most cases, they did not cover the whole territory. For example, the early Turkic tribal confederations, such as Huns and Gök-Türks, were dominant in eastern Kazakhstan, and the core territories of Huns and Gök-Türks were not
located in Kazakhstan at all.\textsuperscript{163} Sogdians, or Usuns, settled in the south of Kazakhstan, especially in \textit{Zheti-Su} (Ru. \textit{Semirechie}), but not in Turgai or in Üst-Yurt. After their migration in the second half of the eighth century, Oğuz Tribes were dominant in the Üst-Yurt and the lower section of Syr-Daria but not in the eastern parts of Kazakhstan. Oğuz tribes moved to Mangyshlak in the tenth century and stayed there until the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{164} Mongolic tribes, such as the Jungar (Oirat) tribal union, were more active in the Jungarian Altai (Ru. \textit{Zhungarskii Altai}), eastern Kazakhstan, and Zheti-su even before their westward migration in the seventeenth century.

Pastoral nomadic tribal confederations, such as Kazakhs, shared a real or mythical single primogenitor (Kaz. \textit{Alash} or \textit{Alas Khan}) common name, territory, culture, and language. However, in a society where territorial boundaries were weak, social or political allegiances were expressed by tribal kinships. Tribes, in other words, were the primary political organizations. Tribes often formed loose confederations guided by their interactions with neighbouring sedentary states. In other words, the nature of relations with the outside world would determine the importance of supra-tribal organizations. These imperial tribal confederations had a multi-ethnic character, mostly an amalgamation of Turkic and Mongolic tribes.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{163} A. Taşağılı, \textit{Gök-Türkler}, pp. 31-33.
\textsuperscript{164} These Oğuz tribes in Mangyshlak were first attacked by Nogais at the end of the sixteenth century, then by Kalmiks in the 1630s, and finally displaced by Kazakhs in the eighteenth century. V.V. Bartol’d, ‘Dvenadtsat’’, ii, part 1, p. 609; V.V. Bartol’d, \textit{Sochineniia} (9 vols., Moscow, 2002), v, pp. 19-194, p. 98
The Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century shattered the previous Turkic and Mongolic tribal system by dispersing tribes into different army units and moving them to different geographies. In other words, the Mongol invasion disrupted the historical continuity of Turkic and Mongolic tribes.\textsuperscript{166} The tribes in Mongolia such as the Naimans moved to Syr-Daria, while Dzhalairs also moved south and became part of the Great Zhuz. Mongol Kereits entered tribal conglomerations that would later constitute Turkic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{167} Parallel to the destruction of old tribal kinships, the ulus (horde) system of Genghis Khan divided contemporary Kazakhstan into three uluses—Dzhuchi (the Golden Horde), Chagatai, and Ugedei.\textsuperscript{168} The Golden Horde was further divided into Blue Horde (Turc. Kök Orda), White Horde (Turc. Ak Orda), and Grey Horde (Turc. Boz Orda).\textsuperscript{169} The territories that were under the control of the Kypchak (Ru. Polovtsy) confederation (11\textsuperscript{th}-13\textsuperscript{th} centuries) or the Nogai (Mangyt) confederation (15\textsuperscript{th}-17\textsuperscript{th} centuries) did not overlap with contemporary Kazakhstan either because in addition to western Kazakhstan, they covered Ukraine and the south of European Russia.\textsuperscript{170} In the fifteenth century, the Balkhash Lake was the division between ‘Mogulistan’ (the land of Turko-Mongol shamanic tribes) and ‘Uzbekistan’ (the lands under the control of Muslim Uzbek Khan or the Ulus of Uzbek).\textsuperscript{171} ‘Kazakhstan’ as an ethnotoponym was still not used.


\textsuperscript{167} There is no consensus on the Turkic or Mongolic origins of Naimans, Kereits, and Dzhalairs. see: A.Sh. Kadyrbaev, \textit{Ocherki’}, pp. 57-9.


The Kazakhs were the part of the Ulus of Uzbek that remained in the Desht-i Kypchak. Kazakh Khanate was formed at the end of the fifteenth century, and steadily expanded to the north-west and south-east. This was the time when the term ‘Kazakh’ gained ethnonymic significance. Yet even after this, the Kazakh pastoral nomadic tribal union was not capable of generating a unified history. The only exception might be the period of Kazakhs under a single khan from Dzhanybek Khan in 1473 until the end of Shygai Khan’s reign in 1583; however, this also ended in subdivisions of Kazakhs into three zhuz by the early seventeenth century (or even earlier). Territorial and political separation according to zhuzes continued to prevent a common history. Furthermore, we cannot talk about a common past within a zhuz because due to the mobility of tribes, various tribes and clans continually left and rejoined different zhuzes. Along with zhuz divisions, tribal identities were also very dominant, further preventing a common historical memory. The hierarchy among the tribes within each zhuz meant that tribal identifications determined social status, relations with others, and prestige and authority symbolically expressed by the sitting order at formal feasts, the reception gifts or particular portions of the slaughtered animal, and the order of proposing toasts. When two nomads met in the steppe they would first ask each other their tribal identity. The answer would define their relations with one another. For example, within the Great Zhuz, the Zhalair tribe was superior to the Dulats, and the latter was above the Oshakts. Moreover, the expansion of Kazakhs

172 For the list of tribes of Uzbek Ulus see: T.I. Sultanov, Kochevy plemena Priaral’ia (Moscow, 1982), pp. 8-52.
173 L. Krader, Social, p. 189.
174 M.S. Mukanov, Etnicheskaia, pp. 5-6.
177 In Turkic-Mongolian tribal confederations, there was usually a ranking system of tribes within the confederacy. see: O.Pritzak, ‘Titles’, pp. 60-116, pp. 63-6.
towards the Caspian littoral and southern Siberia came only at the end of this period. They were rivals with the descendants of Uzbek Ulus in the south of Syr Daria and continued to fight against the Turkicized Mongols (of Mogulistan) in Zheti-su in the sixteenth century.

After the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, important events took place in western Kazakhstan, south-east of Aktöbe and north-west of South Kazakhstan, in the territories where the Small Zhuz would be formed in the coming centuries. The formation of the Golden Horde, its struggle with Tamerlane and eventual demise, the emergence of the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimean Khanates, and their competition for the legacy of the Golden Horde all created great turmoil, wars, destruction, and migration in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. In this sense, the history of the western territories of Kazakhstan was separate from the rest of contemporary Kazakhstan and closer to the history of the western section of Desht-i Kypchak where Mangyts (Nogays) lived. Hence, the epics of ‘Edyge-Batyr’, ‘Ormambet-bii’, Er-Kokche’, and ‘Shora-batyr’ that reflect this period were well-known tales in North Caucasus, Crimea, and among Bashkirs and Kazaks of Small Zhuz, but not in eastern Kazakhstan and Zheti-su. The task of constructing a national history—tying together various figures, events, and tribes—meant carving out a section of Desht-i Kypchak. Asfendiiarov, in his article on Kazakh Epics in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* rightly comments:

“Kazakhstan is a vast country stretching for hundreds of thousands of kilometres. That is why, in the past, its separate regions had their own history. This situation is also reflected in the folk poetic works of Kazaks. Historical events, for which one or another region of Kazakhstan was an arena, had impact on folklore. In this regard, we

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have a great difference between western and eastern Kazakhstan. Folk epics (tales on batyrs etc.), developed in western Kazakhstan (previous Small Zhuz) and in ‘Middle Zhuz’, [but] we have a very weak adoption of the development of epics from ‘Small Zhuz’, and in the ‘Great Zhuz’ (Almaty oblast and eastern section of southern Kazakhstan) folk epics do not exist at all. In our opinion, the reason behind this situation is the difference in the developments of historical events within three divisions of Kazakhstan.”

These historical divisions can also been seen in the regional customs and rites in Zhedisu, eastern Kazakhstan, the Syr-Daria region, and Mangystau. In Kazakh history it was very rare that one khan organized three zhuzes into a single political and military unit. Each tribe or zhuz very often had its own khan. For instance, Argyns recognized Ablai-Khan as their khan, but Kypchaks never saw him as their khan and were against him. For the Naimans, Barak was the khan, while other Kazakhs considered him merely a sultan (prince). Khans vied with each other in order to gain as much control as possible of tribal unions. Nomadic life constantly favoured centripetal forces. In the socio-political structure, Kazakh nomads never had a single khan ruling all Kazakhs. Similarly to other nomadic states, there was no centralized structure and Kazakh khans never enjoyed the power of absolute monarchy because they could not exert absolute control on the economy, means of violence, and ideology. Similarly, tribal aristocracies (Turc. beg, bey, or bii) existed, but their role in this highly mobile society was more

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181 S. Asfendiiarov, ‘O Kazakskom epose’, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 5 August 1934, p. 3
183 After the rule of Shygai Khan (r.1581-3) there are no khans who ruled three zhuzes at the same time. See the genealogy chart of Kazakh and Astrakhan Khanates: Z.V. Togan, ‘Özbek Hanların Kazak ve Astarkanlı Şubeleri’ in Z.V. Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakın Tarihi: Cilt 1, Bati ve Kuzey Türkistan (Istanbul, 1942-47); S. Sabol, Russian, pp. 18-9.
limited than that of landed or service aristocracies in the sedentary world.\textsuperscript{186} A nineteenth century Russian Turkologist Vasili Grigoriev noted:

“Nowhere in the world had the heads of the nation and the aristocracy of birth so little meaning, so little real strength, as the Kirghiz [Kazakh] Khans and Sultans. If any of them attained any influence, so as to be able to draw a crowd after him, he reached this not because of his ‘white bone’, but on account of his personal worth, and personal qualities have gained exactly the same influence for simple Kirgiz [Kazakh] of the ‘black bone’.”\textsuperscript{187}

Consequently, to construct a national history which would define ethnogenesis, national heroes and national struggles, was a challenging project for Kazakh Soviet historians.

\textbf{1.3.3. KAZAKH ETHNOGENESIS: AN UNSOLVED QUESTION.}

The explanations of Kazakh ethnogenesis can be grouped into two schools: autochthonous and immigrationist approaches. Although a pastoral nomadic past obstructs the construction of national history, there have been historians who primordialized national history by tracing tribal names back to ancient times.\textsuperscript{188} At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the autochthonous approach was represented by Aryanists, who referred to the pre-Turkic ancient period. Ia. Gaverdovskii claimed that Scythians were the ancestors of Kazakhs. According to this theory, Kazakhs were descendants of Indo-Iranians and Scythians.\textsuperscript{189} Abel-Rémusat and von Klaproth claimed that Usuns, the ancient settlers of Zhetisu, were Aryans. V.V. Radlov and N.A. Aristov, however, claimed that Usuns were Turkic.\textsuperscript{190} The autochthonous theory was further developed

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{187} This is quoted by S. Sabol, \textit{Russian}, p. 18
  \item \textsuperscript{188} B.B. Irmukhanov, \textit{Usun’ i etnogenez kazakhskogo naroda} (Almaty, 2006).
  \item \textsuperscript{189} N.E. Masanov, ‘Mifologizatsiia’, pp. 52-131, p. 86.
  \item \textsuperscript{190} V.V. Bartol’d, ‘Ocherk’, ii/1, pp. 23-106, p. 26.
\end{itemize}
by S.P. Tolstov in the 1930s, according to the principles of Marr. Though Marrists did not recognize any ethnic ancestors, the territorial autochthonousness approach of Marrists paved the way to considering the tribes of the Cooper Age, such as Scythians, Usuns, Siunnu, and the tribes of Andronov culture as the forefathers of Kazakhs. A.I. Levshin also supported the pre-Mongolian formation of Kazakhs. Vamberry, one of the leading Turkologists, claimed that Kazakh people were formed before the thirteenth century, as Constantine Porphyrogenitus in his *De Aministrando Imperio* and Firdausi mentioned the term ‘Kazakh’ in the tenth century. M.Zh. Dulaţov, the Kazakh historian and poet, also agreed with this view. Russian orientalist N. Aristov, in his works at the end of the nineteenth century, argued that Kazakhs were even older because some Kazakh tribal names such as Kangly or Usuns can be found in the old Chinese records. In the 1920s the Soviet historians Chuloshnikov in Leningrad and Kazakh Soviet historian Tynyspaev concurred with this idea. In the 1920s, Kazakh historian Tynyspaev emphasized the genealogy of Kazakh tribes and stretched the history of Kazakhs to well before the formation of Kazakh Khanate in the fifteenth century, into ancient times. By doing this he implicitly included certain individuals in Kazakh national history. However, he

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195 A. Chuloshnikov, *Ocherki po istorii kazak-kirgizskogo naroda v sviasii s obshchimi istoricheskimi sud’bami drugikh türskikh plemen* (Orenburg, 1924)
subsequently emphasized Zhanybek and Kirai as the first rulers of Kazakhs within the Altyn-Ordu (Golden Horde) political structure.\textsuperscript{196}

In the nineteenth century, P.I. Rychkov, S. Bronevskii, and N. Maev were the first researchers who formulated the migration theory. Proponents of this theory asserted that the ancestors of Kazakhs migrated to contemporary Kazakhstan at a later stage and did not have any links with ancient settlers of the Indo-Iranian group in the region. V.V. Vel’iaminov-Zernov and Chokan Valikhanov, the first Kazakh historian and ethnographer, emphasized the usage of ‘Kazakh’ as covering all nomadic tribes under the rule of Zhanybek and Kirai after the foundation of Kazakh Khanate, instead of tracing the tribal names back over history. Valikhanov connected Kazakhness with the previous Uzbek-Kazakh union, but did not attempt to go earlier.\textsuperscript{197} A. Kharuzin also asserted that there are no records of Kazakhs, in the way we understand this word, until the mid-fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{198}

Saken Seifullin, in his work on the history of Kazakh literature in 1932, criticizes Tynyshpaev’s approach. According to Seifullin, Tynyshpaev tried to show that Kazakh was an ancient nation by using ancient and medieval texts that contained ‘Kazakh’ or similar terms.\textsuperscript{199} Another Soviet researcher N.N. Koz’min supported the theory that Kazakh identity was formed after the Mongol invasion. Motivated by Marxist theory, he related this development to the type of production.

\textsuperscript{198} A. Kharuzin, ‘K Voprosu pro proiskhozhdenii kirgizskogo naroda’, Etnografichesko Obozrenie, no. 3 (1895)
\textsuperscript{199} S. Seifullin, Qazaq ədebijeti: 1 inci kitap Bijler Deyirining ədebijeti (Almaty, 1932), pp.8-9.
reflected in identity. In his History of Kazakhstan, Asfendiiarov followed the formulation of Koz’min. He claimed that Kazakhs, Nogais, and Uzbeks were all Turkic-Mongol people. The formation of the Kazakh nation and its differentiation from numerous groups of Turkic-Mongol (Tiurko-Mongol’skie) clans and tribes as an identity could be dated back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries but not earlier. This differentiation was based on the socio-economic structure of nomadic Kazakhs versus that of sedentary Tajiks and Uzbeks. He disapproved of the approach of Tynyshpaev, tracing the tribal names of contemporary Kazakhs back to the era of the Huns with primordial claims for the ethnogenesis of the Kazakh nation.

Asfendiiarov, criticizing Tynyshpaev, also refused to name Dzhanybek, Girei, Khak-Nazar, and Taukel’ as purely Kazakh Khans. According to Asfendiiarov, during this period Kazakh identity was not differentiated clearly from Uzbek or Nogai identity. The Empire of Genghis Khan was a Turkic-Mongol mixture, but in time the Mongol element was assimilated by the Turkic elements. The Islamization of the Turkic-Mongol tribes in Central Asia engendered closer relations with the settled Iranian peoples in the region. From this moment, a cleavage appeared between the remaining Mongols in Mongolia and the Turkic-Mongol tribes of Central Asia. After the collapse of the Nogai-Kazakh-Uzbek alliance, Kazakh identity started to develop as a separate entity. In other words, the differentiation of Kazakhs comes to the fore as the other tribes are fully assimilated by the settled peoples of Central Asia and adopt a sedentary life.
This theory was shared by other researchers, including V.V. Bartol’d and G.E. Grumm-Grzhimailo.\textsuperscript{206}

The construction of a national history incorporates particular ethnic groups, ancient states, and tribal confederations into the national narrative as the common ancestors of nation. However, in terms of the ethnic components of the Kazakh people, the issue was contentious. Valikhanov based Kazakhs on Turkic identity: “According to most [researchers] Kirgiz-Kaizaks belong to the Turkic people by language and by origin”.\textsuperscript{207} Kharuzin, for example, insisted that Kazakhs were composed of “heterogeneous shreds of Turkic, Mongolic, Turco-Mongolic, and other tribes”.\textsuperscript{208} V.V. Radlov also agreed with this view and described the formation of Kazakhs as a mixture of Turkic, Mongolic, and Caucasian tribes.\textsuperscript{209} Some other Russian historians such as L. Meier and F. Krasovskii came to the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{210} Bartol’d mentions Turkic Kypchaks as the core group of Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{211}

The thirty-first volume of the \textit{Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia}, which covered Kazakhstan, was published in 1937. The article provided an ambiguous terminology of ethnicity. Considering the bibliography that was used for the article on the history of Kazakhstan, we can easily say that the text was prepared before the purges in 1936-37. At the beginning of the article, authors used the term ‘Turkish’ instead of ‘Turkic’. According to the narrative, after the fall of the Scythian-Sarmatian union in the fourth century B.C.E., ‘early-Turkish’ (\textit{ranne-Turetskii}) ethnic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item A. Kharuzin, \textit{K Voprosu}, p. 92.
\item V.V. Radlov, \textit{Turkskie stepnye kocheviki} (Astana, 2007), pp. 11-12.
\item L. Meier, \textit{Kirgizskaia step’ Orenburgskogo vedomstva} (St. Petersburg, 1865), p. 3; F. Krasovskii, \textit{Oblast’ sibirskikh kirgiz} (St. Petersburg, 1868), pp. 12-3.
\item V.V. Bartol’d, ‘Istoriia’, v, pp. 195-232, p. 213.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
formation comes to the fore. This also indicated a very early Turkification of the Kazakh Steppe. However, further in the article, Kazakhs appear in the fifteenth century as a group of ‘Turco-Mongolian’ tribes.\textsuperscript{212}

In the first official Kazakh Soviet national history, Viatkin rightly mentioned Turkic tribal confederations that settled in the territories of contemporary Kazakhstan such as the Huns, Usuns, and Kangly. However, he did not attempt to construct a link between them and Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{213} This was also noticed by Fedorov, a Russian historian based in Almaty.\textsuperscript{214} He mentioned that Sogdians, an East Iranian people, arrived in the south of contemporary Kazakhstan and were assimilated by Turkic elements,\textsuperscript{215} after which the Turkic Khanate (Gök-Türk) ruled the Eurasian steppes. However, there is no link between the previous Turkic tribal confederations, Turkic Khanate, and Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{216} After the arrival of Mongols, as Viatkin underlined, Mongol elements were included in the ethnogenesis of the peoples (\textit{narodnosti}) of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. After their arrival in contemporary Kazakhstan, Mongol tribes rapidly Turkified.\textsuperscript{217} The Mongol period changed the configuration of tribes by dividing and regrouping them with different tribes. Consequently, Kazakh identity still remained an amorphous formation, including Iranian, Mongolic, and Turkic peoples, without any linear historical roots. Viatkin celebrated the Khans Dzhanibek and Girei in the sixteenth century as the first leaders of the “Kazakh Union”.\textsuperscript{218} However, at this stage, Kazakh national identity was not

\textsuperscript{213} M.P. Viatkin, \textit{Ocherki}, pp.40-42.
\textsuperscript{214} \textit{KROMM}, 1202-1-59-1/3 (1941).
\textsuperscript{215} M.P. Viatkin, \textit{Ocherki}, pp.43-44.
\textsuperscript{216} M.P. Viatkin, \textit{Ocherki}, pp.44-48.
\textsuperscript{217} M.P. Viatkin, \textit{Ocherki}, pp.58,61,
\textsuperscript{218} M.P. Viatkin, \textit{Ocherki}, pp.77-78.
fully developed and Kazakhs did not possess the Stalinist prerequisites of being a nation. It was rather a narodnost’ or natsionalnost’.\textsuperscript{219} The Kazakh narodnost’ was a mixture of different ethnic elements from numerous Turkic-Mongol tribes and clans. According to Viatkin:

“It is clear that the unity of the Kazakh narodnost’ did not emerge on the basis of ethnical homogeneity, but [was] a result of the homogenous economic and political conditions [...] of the Kazakh Union”.\textsuperscript{220}

This narodnost’ first formed in the sixteenth century and evolved into a nation by the 1840s. That is why up until the nineteenth century Viatkin called Kazakhs either the Kazakh Union or the Kazakh narodnost’ or ulus. He does not have a primordial claim for Kazakhs, and he does not assign a tribe, tribal confederation, or ancient state as the historical ancestors of Kazakhs. Moreover, he criticizes the thesis of Asfendiiaarov and moves the formation of Kazakh national identity from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{221} We can conclude that, contrary to the Azerbaijani example, there is no conscious effort to primordialize Kazakh identity. Compared to the Ukrainian and Azerbaijani cases, in 1941, Kazakh national history resembled an unfinished construction.

1.4. UKRAINE IN 1936-1941.

Contrary to the Kazakh and Azerbaijani cases, Ukrainian national history writing was already developed by Ukrainian historians and there were already disputed and heavily politicized subjects before the Soviet attempt to write a Soviet version of Ukrainian national history. These disputed issues below dominated Ukrainian Soviet historiography so much that this chapter on Ukraine is constructed around these specific issues, in order to present the priorities of Ukrainian Soviet history construction and the political reasons behind these priorities. That is

\textsuperscript{219} M.P. Viatkin uses these two terms as synonyms, and refers to Stalin; M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, pp. 78-80.
\textsuperscript{220} M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{221} S.D. Asfendiiaarov, Istoriia, pp. 98-99.
why this chapter is designed around some major discussions: These are (1) the origins of the eastern Slavs and the ethogenesis of Ukrainians, (2) the origin and population of the Kievan Rus’, (3) the anti-Polish national history of Ukrainians that idealized the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising, and (4) the fraternity of eastern Slavs. I should also remark that the details of the removal of Hrushevs’kyi, denunciation of his historiography in 1929-1934, and the details of discussions on Ukrainian history before 1936 are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

According to the imperial narrative that was constructed by Russian historians and commissioned by the Russian administration in the nineteenth century, the Kievan Rus’ was the historical reflection of Russian identity, or of the Russian Empire in history. The Muscovite State since the fifteenth century and the Russian Empire legitimized their expansion by defining themselves as successors of the Kievan Rus’ and gathered the lands of Rus’, which had been divided since the appanage (Ru. udel’nyi) period in the thirteenth century. Thus, the Rus’ was the ancestor of the contemporary Russian State and Russians. The Western Rus’ (the western territories of Dnieper and Belourussia), which we call now Belorus and Ukraine, were integral parts of this broader understanding of Russia. In an unfortunate period of history, they were alienated as a result of the Polish rule. We should also keep in mind that, in this Russian imperial discourse, ‘Russian’ and ‘Russia’ had been used not as an ethnicity or nationality in the narrow sense, but as a broader dynastic and statist concept. Even some Slavophiles in the nineteenth century used the term ‘Russian people’ as akin to ‘Eastern Slavs,’ whose language and culture

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was divided into Great Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian.\textsuperscript{223} When these interpretations used ‘Russia’ or when they defined the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a ‘Russian’ state, they used the term in dynastic or statist form, which was derived from the Kievan Rus’. In other words, the imperial narrative defined the population according to the state or dynasty to which they were subject.

In 1890-1930, this imperial narrative that constructed an all-Russian (covering the ‘great’, ‘little’, and ‘white’) narrative was already in demise. First, in the nineteenth century this understanding of a nationhood of people vested in their sovereigns started to mix with the romantic idea of a nationhood of shared culture and language. Thus, a narrower meaning of Russianness gradually emerged. Consequently, Russian authors interchangeably used Slavs/Russians; Rus’/Russia; Little Rus’/Little Russia/Ukraine.\textsuperscript{224} At the end of the nineteenth century, Russian imperial and national definitions started to compete with each other. Second, these two had to struggle against the emerging Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian national narrative. The increasing bifurcation of an all-embracing imperial Russian culture and identity (or even trifurcation with Belorussians) into Russian and Ukrainian sent a clear message that the Russian culture and history was destined to retreat from Ukraine into its ethnic borderlands.\textsuperscript{225} In the 1920s, during


the last decade of this period of trifurcation, the Ukrainian national histories of Hrushevs’kyi and his Ukrainian Marxist-Pokrovs’kiian opposition lavors’kyi demonstrated independence from both Polish and Russian national histories. Third, the Pokrovs’kiian historiography literally declared war against Russian imperial and Russian national history writing.

For a good part of modern history, Ukrainians have been challenging—in one form or another and with varying degrees of success—Russia’s manner of national self-imaging and self-legitimization. In terms of national history construction, Hrushevs’kyi and his predecessors in the nineteenth century claimed the Kievan Rus’ as the spiritual and ethnic ancestor of Ukrainians, and denied that the Muscovite Russians were descended from the medieval Kievan state. Additionally, the Cossacks of Zaporozhian Sich and their struggle against Poles, Muscovites, and Ottomans were incorporated into the Ukrainian national narrative. The competition between the Russian narratives and Ukrainian national history created various questions. Was the Slavic population in the Dnieper basin, which founded the Kievan Rus’ in the south, and the Slavic stock, which settled in and around the Muscovite Principality, based on the same tribal roots? Was the Kievan Rus’ a Russian or Ukrainian state or a state founded by the Normans? To which national history did the leaders of the Kievan Rus’ belong? Who were Bohdan Khmel’nys’kii and Ivan Mazepa?


228 The initial and prominent work that defended this interpretation was the monograph *Istoriia Rusov*. The author and the exact dates of its creation are under dispute; however, historians of Ukraine propose different years in the period 1775-1825. J. Basarab, *Pereiaslav: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 76-77. The copy that is referred to in this dissertation: G. Koniskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rosii* (Moscow, 1846). M. A. Maksymovich (1804-1873) and M.I. Kostomarov (1817-1885) were the founding fathers of the modern Ukrainian national history in the nineteenth century. On Hrushevs’kyi and his vision of the Ukrainian Past, see: F. E. Sysyn, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky* (Saskatoon, 2001)
All these problems were not created by Soviet policies, but the Soviet Ukraine inherited these disputed topics from the recent past. In the Pokrovskiian era of the 1920s, these questions did not matter much. The Kievan Princes of the Middle Ages, despite their ‘constructed national identities’, were merely the representatives of exploiting classes. The class identities of Khmel’nyts’kii and Mazepa came first; their political decisions or alliances came second. In the second half of the 1930s, when Ukrainian Soviet historiography changed its course from a Pokrovskiian view to a romantic national one, it had to accommodate both Russians and Ukrainians, who were pillar-nations of the Soviet Union. The emerging Ukrainian and Russian national narratives, after two decades of hibernation, claimed overlapping heroes and states and territories from the past. This Soviet search for a middle ground is an important factor that shaped the Ukrainian Soviet national history. This middle ground was established by a common east Slavic identity, which continued from time immemorial until the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. The Ukrainian Soviet national history, which was written after 1937, was also extremely anti-Polish.

1.4.1. THE GREAT TERROR AND HISTORIANS IN KIEV.

I would now like to address the impact of the Great Terror on the construction of a Ukrainian national narrative and on the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1936-38. The Ukrainian case differs from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan because it had already experienced a grand scale of terror in 1929-1933, when the Ukrainization policy was halted. In those years, many Ukrainian historians, including Ukrainian national Bolsheviks, were exiled, sentenced to long imprisonments, or shot. The schools of Hrushevskyi and lavr’skyi were
removed from academic institutions. Following this first purge, the figures who supervised history writing in Kiev were young graduates, party officials, and vydvizhentsy. They all became Bolsheviks either before or during the 1917 Revolution and they received their formal education from the new Soviet institutions. Moreover, almost none of them were Ukrainian. Mikhail Popov (1891-1938), the agitation-propaganda secretary of the KP(b)U and the editor of the first commission for writing the history of Ukraine in 1935 was a Russian party official. Osval’d Dzenis (1896-1937) was a Latvian from Riga and a Bolshevik since 1915, who became the president of the VUAMLIN and a member of the TsIK UkrSSR in 1934. During the Civil War, he was a commissar in the Red Army and stayed in the Army until 1923. Artashes Saradzhev (1898-1937) had been a Bolshevik from Armenia since 1917 and worked as a party bureaucrat in Baku before becoming the scientific-secretary of the VUAMLIN in 1934. Later, he was appointed as the head of the Institute of Philosophy and the Institute of History of the VUAMLIN. Zarmair Ashrafian (1898-1937), who was also a party bureaucrat from Armenia, became the director of the Institute of Red Professors in Kiev and at the same time the head of the agit-prop section in KP(b)U. He was appointed to these posts when he arrived in Ukraine in 1934, after the


231 O.V. Iurkova, Dokumenty, pp.21-22.

purges conducted by Postyshev. The Great Terror in Ukraine replaced all these non-Ukrainian figures with young Ukrainian and Russian historians.

In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the local communist parties initiated the process of construction of Soviet national histories after 1936, when they received orders from the Zhdanov commission. In Ukraine, however, before the Zhdanov commission in Moscow, the Institute of History of the VUAMLIN initiated the project of writing a new history of Ukraine, following the first signals from Moscow in 1934-35. In 1935, the TsK KP(b)U issued a resolution on this issue and Mikhail Popov was appointed as the chief-editor of textbooks covering the history of Ukraine and Ukrainian Literature. Initially, the textbook ‘History of Ukraine’ was slated to be published in October 1935. Teachers and historians discussed the draft plan of the textbook at a special meeting as well as at a meeting of the presidium of the VUAMLIN in 1935. At the beginning of 1936, the Institute of History finished planning the four-volume national history. K.G. Huslysty, T.T. Skubyts’kyi, G.D. Lukonenko, F.O. Iastrebov, Senchenko, and Mezhberg prepared the draft of the first volume. The editorial board, consisting of A.Kh. Saradzhev, V.M. Smol’nyi, O.P. Dzenis (the president of the VUAMLIN), and N.M. Voityns’kyi (the director of the Institute of Red Professors in Kiev), commenced their work in order to publish the volume by July 1936. By that summer, the Institute also had to prepare the drafts of the second and third volumes of the history of Ukraine.

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233 O.V. Iurkova, Dokumenty, p.20.
234 O.V. Iurkova, Dokumenty, pp. 44, 52.
235 V. A. Smolii (ed.), Natsional’na, p.413.
236 O.V. Iurkova, Dokumenty, pp. 6-8. The last two historians, Senchenko and Mezhberg, are mentioned in the list provided by Bilousov. Tsentral’niy Derzhavnyi Arkhyv Hromads’kykh Ob’ednann’ Ukrainy, (The Central State Archives of the Public Organizations of Ukraine, hereafter TsDAHO Ukrainy) (fond) 1- (opis) 20- (delo) 4291- (list) 189, and TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-20-7092-86/89 (June 19, 1937).
237 O.V. Iurkova, Dokumenty, pp. 6-8.
Even though the tasks were successfully executed, the VUAMLIN and its Institute of History were liquidated by the decree of the TsK KP(b)U of 23 July, 1936. The historians in the VUAMLIN were moved to the Department of the Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the UkrSSR (consequently the Institute of History of Ukraine), which had previously gained a new status by the resolution of the Party in February 1936. This was done in order to centralize scholarly institutions and intensify control over them. A.Kh. Saradzhev was appointed as the first director of the Institute of History of Ukraine before his arrest a few months later. The historians affiliated with the Institute of History of Ukraine were V.V. Hurystrymba, K.G. Huslystyi, I.M. Premysler, T.T. Skubyts’kyi, M.F. Tregubenko, and the younger scholars F.E. Los’ and F.O. Iastrebov.

In the autumn of 1936, a wave of arrests among former members of the VUAMLIN and the Institute of Red Professors was initiated and all the members of the editorial board, which was writing the first volume, were arrested and consecutively shot. Additionally, L.A. Gittel’, the former director of the Institute of Red Professors, Z.A. Ashrafiyan, and Kh. Saradzhev, the director of the Institute of the History of Ukraine at the AN UkrSSR, were all purged. On November 23, 1936 S.M. Bilousov was appointed as the new director. This decision was confirmed by the presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.SSR on December 26, 1936. After the purges, the majority of the sixteen members of the Institute of History of Ukraine had no graduate degree. Gradually, more experienced historians such as M.N. Petrovs’kyi joined the team. However, as the prominent Ukrainian director and poet Dovzhenko has noted, in those

238 TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-20-6851-15/22 and 15, 16 and 18, July 23, 1936; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-20-7092-32, April 2, 1937.
239 V. A. Smolii (ed.), Natsional’na, p.8.
240 The secretary of the KP(b)U Kosior also informed this decision to Malenkov in Moscow. TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-20-6851-137, November 23, 1936. V. A. Smolii (ed.), Natsional’na, pp. 310-11.
days nobody wanted to study history because it was a dangerous career. The annual research plans were dictated to the institute of history and professors were arrested periodically.\textsuperscript{241}

The new head of the Institute, Serhii Bilousov (1892-1985), originally from Tula, was not only a scholar, but also a Russian party apparatchik; and, his knowledge of Ukrainian language was poor. In 1930, he was one of the hundred successful party members who were sent to the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow to receive a higher degree. In 1932, he became a ‘red professor’ of the Party History. After finishing his three years of education he was sent to Odessa as the head of the political administration of the Grushov MTS by the TsK VKP(b), in 1933. He was probably very successful in implementing the government’s policies in the rural areas during the \textit{Holodomor}, and consequently he was rewarded with the Order of Lenin. His later assignment was as the secretary of Bobrinets raikom of the Odessa \textit{Oblast’}. In January 1937, he started to work at his new office as the head of the Institute of History of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{242} Bilousov was a Ukrainian \textit{vydvizhenets} similar to Buzurbaev in Almaty. They both had working class origins and had no opportunities to receive a proper education. For them, the pre-revolutionary times represented impossibilities, repressions, and poverty. They supported and believed in the new system. The Party promised a new future; moreover, it provided them with ‘higher’ education, though this education was on Party ideology and Party history. They were rapidly promoted to higher positions at academic institutions and in the communist parties of their respective republics as the purges unfolded. They were young and eager party bureaucrats who symbolized the new socialist era declared by the new constitution in 1936.

\textsuperscript{241} O.P. Dovzhenko, \textit{Ukraïna v ohni} (Kiev, 1990), p. 135.
The report from Bilousov addressing the TsK KP(b)U on the tasks of the Institute and on the preparation of a history textbook on Ukraine in June 1937 provides details about the situation on the ‘history front’. In the days of the Great Terror, he urged that there was a serious problem of insufficient cadres. The textbook had to be prepared in three volumes, but most of the members of the editorial board had been arrested as ‘enemies of the people’ or ‘Trotskyites’. The remaining historians Huslystyi and Iastrebov worked on the first volume, Tregubenko on the second volume, and Hurystrymba and Premysler on the third. However, the team at the Institute was not sufficient for finishing this task. Bilousov then complained about the shortcoming of historians to the TsK KP(b)U, which in 1937 could easily convey historians to the firing squad. His comments offer a good example of what the Party expected by appointing an apparatchik to supervise historians. He ‘revealed’ that both Iastrebov and Huslystyi, the only historians who worked in the section on the feudal period, were not Party members. This implied that they could not be fully controlled by the Party cell in the academy. According to Bilousov, both historians were “politically unreliable”. Iastrebov did not deliver any work and he seemed to decelerate the work of the section after Skubyts’kyi, (the previous head of the section on the feudal period) was arrested. The historians who worked on the third volume, especially Hurystrymba, had committed political errors in the past. Hurystrymba’s closeness to Skubyts’kyi before the latter was purged seemed to Bilousov “strange”. Additionally, “his political inclinations were not clear”. Probably the most experienced historian in this group was Prof. Petrovs’kyi, who became the head of the feudal period section after Skubyts’kyi. However, Bilousov was not happy with him either. He could not convince Petrovs’kyi to be involved in the history textbook project. In the time of the Great Terror, it was not hard to guess why Petrovs’kyi avoided working on the project. After the first accusation, Bilousov continued to
vilify Petrovs’kyi. According to Bilousov, Prof. Petrovs’kyi could not be allowed to remain at the Institute of History. For the latter, the Institute was merely a cover to continue his old nationalist line. Although Bilousov slandered nearly every historian under his control, he was also aware of the fact that the Party urgently demanded a history textbook. He saw the employment of more historians as a priority, and suggested the creation of a commission whose sole task would be writing up the textbook.\textsuperscript{243}

In 1937, the campaign of terror was revived by a resolution of the VKP(b), “On the Unsatisfactory Party Work of the Kiev Oblast Committee of the KPU(b) and Shortcomings in the Work of the KPU(b)”. The targets of the critique were the first secretary of the KPU(b) Postyshev and his team.\textsuperscript{244} During this wave of terror, the liquidation of historians at the newly founded Institute of History in Kiev continued.\textsuperscript{245} Hurystrymba, Lukonenko, Skybyts’kyi, and Tregubenko, who were all involved in the writing of national history, were arrested and shot. According to the indictments of the NKVD and the verdicts of military courts, these purged historians were accused of adding nationalist interpretations to the draft textbook of the History of Ukraine in 1935-36.\textsuperscript{246} In addition, citing the works of the purged historians was prohibited, numerous manuscripts vanished, and the younger generation no longer had access to these works. As in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the main problem of the social science sections in Ukraine was that

\textsuperscript{243} TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-20-4291-189, and TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-20-7092-86/89 (June 19, 1937).
\textsuperscript{246} For the collection of archival documents and protocols of the NKVD see: O.V. Iurkova, \textit{Dokumenty}, pp. 49-65.
there were not enough qualified scholars; the directors or deputy directors and scientific secretaries of the sections did not exist. Consequently, in spite of the vilifying report of his boss, Petrovs’kyi was not purged. Petrovs’kyi, Iastrebov and Huslystyi, who survived the Great Terror, constructed Ukrainian Soviet national narrative in the post-Pokrovskiiian era. Petrovs’kyi (1894-1951) was a son of a priest and he received his first education at a religious seminary in Chernigov. He was educated as a historian in the 1920s, when Hrushevs’kyi and lavors’kyi were both existing schools in Ukraine. At some point, he was a student of Hrushevs’kyi. He became the head of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the Academy of Sciences of Ukr.SSR in 1942 and remained in this post until 1947. Petrovs'kyi was considered an ‘old specialist’ and never became a member of the Communist party. Huslystyi (1902-1973) was from Zaporozh’e and educated in the Soviet institutions in the 1920s. Both Petrovs’kyi and Huslystyi specialized in the medieval history of Ukraine. Iastrebov (1903-1973) was originally from Russia but moved to Kiev in 1919, where he received his entire education in the Soviet educational institutions. Although the works of these historians before 1934 predominantly reflected the Pokrovskiiian historiography, these were the leading historians who wrote the Ukrainian Soviet national history, which gradually moved from ‘class analysis and class struggles’ to ‘national heroes and national struggles’.

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247 TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-20-7092-33, April 2, 1937.
249 V. A. Smolii (ed.), Natsional’na, p.527.
250 V. A. Smolii (ed.), Natsional’na, p.692.
251 For a summary of this period by Iastrebov and Huslystyi see: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-753-104-9 and 246, April 29, 1947.
1.4.2. THE FRATERNITY OF EASTERN SLAVS.

As mentioned earlier, in the 1920s the conflict between Ukrainian and Russian national narratives was in hibernation, because Pokrovskiiian historiography was not interested in the ancient roots of national identities, national heroes, or national liberation movements. However, when the national narratives returned after the demise of Pokrovskii, the old disputes came to the fore. The Soviet solution to the dispute over the origins of Ukrainian and Russian nations was an emphasis on the eastern Slavic brotherhood. Moreover, the Soviet historiography claimed an eastern Slavic identity, which had continued for a thousand years and encompassed the ancestors of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians.252

Pokrovskiiian history, which was dominant until the mid-1930s in Ukraine, underlined that, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians ("Velikorus"), though they all spoke Eastern Slavic languages, were composed of different ethnic mixtures and sprung from different roots. Russians, according to Pokrovskii, were a mixture of eastern Slavs, Finnic tribes, and other Asiatic elements such as Chuvash. Probably, Pokrovskii argued, Belorussians were the most isolated group and also the remnants of those ancient eastern Slavs who settled in Polissia and on the banks of the Dnieper.253 Contemporary Ukraine was exposed to the movement of peoples from Eastern Europe, such as Slavs, the arrival of the ancient Greeks with their commercial cities, and the consecutive immigrations of steppe nomads from Asia, such as Scythians. Since the second millennium B.C.E., various large ethno-linguistic groups had arrived

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and settled on vast plains north of the Black Sea and created a diverse mixture.\footnote{P.R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto, 1996), pp. 26-35.} In Ukraine, the discussions between Hrushevs’kyi and his Marxist-Pokrovskiiian opponent lavors’kyi were centred around the place of class struggle in history but not on ethnogenesis.\footnote{M. Iavors’kyi, *Korotka*, p.18, 28; M.lavors’kyi, *Istoriia*, p.23, 31; S. Plokhy, *Unmaking*, p.365, citation 63.}

After the Great Terror, the first official history of Ukraine was the *Narysy z Istoriï Ukrainy*, which was published in autumn 1937, just after the publication of Shestakov’s *Short Course of the History of the USSR*. The monograph was written by the survivors of the Great Terror, Iastrebov and Huslystyi, under the editorial supervision of Bilousov. The preface reminded the reader about Stalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov’s comments on the situation with history. It also put forward the task of the textbook as “writing the Marxist history of the Ukrainian nation [and] Ukrainian statehood from ancient times up until our own times. This kind of Marxist history of the Ukrainian nation will arm the nation more and help reveal bourgeois-nationalist lies”.\footnote{S.N. Bilousov (ed.), *Narysy z istoriï Ukraïny: vyp.1, Kyïvs’ka Rus’ i feodal’ni kniazivstva, (XII-XIIIct.)* (Kiev, 1937), p. 3} The volume covered the pre-Slavic period of Ukraine, Eastern Slavs and their settlement in Ukraine, Kievan Rus’, and the first century of Tatar rule. Following this volume, in 1938, the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR urgently requested the permission of N. Khrushchev, the new first secretary of the KP(b)U, to organize a competition to write a short text on Ukrainian history and to establish an editorial board at the Institute of History of the Academy.\footnote{TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-20-7240-2, February 20, 1938.} Following Khrushchev’s approval, another history textbook, *Istoriia Ukrainy - Korotkyi Kurs* (History of Ukraine – Short Course), which covered the entire history of Ukraine, was prepared. *Korotkyi Kurs*, which was published in 1940, was officially authored by Bilousov, Huslystyi, Ogloblyn,
Petrovs’kyi, Suprunenko, and Iastrebov.\textsuperscript{258} However, various historians in Kiev had worked on this textbook since 1935, and historians who were purged in 1936-38 had written some sections.\textsuperscript{259} The Institute had planned to publish it in 1939.\textsuperscript{260} Apparently, the unification of Ukraine in 1939 had demanded some revisions and delayed publication for a year.\textsuperscript{261} 

In the 1937 publication, the prehistoric period had a Marrist interpretation, far from explicitly identifying archaeological cultures with ethnicities. At first, Trypillian (Ukr. \textit{Trypillian}) culture\textsuperscript{262} was praised as “specifying a highly cultivated artistic taste. On the whole, Trypillian culture is one of the brightest periods of the history of primitive society in East Europe”. Then the narrative implied that the people of Trypillian culture did not live only in the contemporary territories of the town of Trypillia, but also in other places in the USSR, East Galicia, Bukovina, Romania, and Hungary.\textsuperscript{263} Although the narrative did not name them as Eastern Slavs, it emphasized that the people who founded this culture lived beyond the Pripyat Marshes, including western Ukraine. Following this stage, there had been immigration to the contemporary territory of Ukraine, followed by a merging of newly-arrived ethnicities with those who had lived in these lands from time immemorial, starting with Cimmerians and Scythians.\textsuperscript{264} There are detailed pictures of Scythian archaeological findings in the book. Although these tribes were mostly nomadic, they could produce elegant artefacts and metalwork. The aim of the

\textsuperscript{258} S.M. Bilousov, et al., \textit{Istoriia Ukraïny korotkyi kurs} (Kiev, 1940).
\textsuperscript{259} TsDAHO Ukraїny, 1-70-753-254, April 30, 1947.
\textsuperscript{260} S.M. Bilousov, ‘V Instytuti istorii Ukraїni’, Visti (11 October 1938).
\textsuperscript{261} Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhyv Vyshchykh Orhaniv Vlady ta Upravlinnia Ukraїni, (The Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine, hereafter TsDAVO Ukraїni), (fond) 3561-(opis) 1- (delo) 237- (list) 26.
\textsuperscript{262} V.V. Khvoika (1850-1914), Ukrainian archaeologist of Czech origin discovered Tripolye culture. He interpreted the Tripolye-Zarubintsian-Chernyakhovian cultural sequences as consecutive stages in the development of Slavic ethnicity.
\textsuperscript{263} S.N.Bilousov (ed.), \textit{Narysy}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{264} S.N.Bilousov (ed.), \textit{Narysy}, pp. 14-20
chapter was to demonstrate that Ukrainian lands had been inhabited by skillful craftsmen. There had been no need to wait for a Germanic tribe to bring civilization to Ukraine! Following the skillful pastoral nomads, Greek colonizers from Miletus had arrived in southern Ukraine. The Greeks possessed the most developed culture of the time and left footprints of their higher level of civilization in Ukraine. Ukraine became part of the Mediterranean high culture.\textsuperscript{265} The Germanic Goths, according to Bilousov, represented another Asian tribal federation, which arrived in contemporary Ukraine and moved to the West. He also referred to Engels to corroborate his view. According to the narrative, the Goths ruled a territory stretching from the Danube to the Dnieper. The text emphasized that the Goths could not enslave the local tribes, who fought against them. This was a direct response to theories from Nazi Germany. Next, the Huns of Turkic stock came from the northern borders of China to the northern plains of the Black Sea and dominated the region in the fourth century. The Huns were presented as victorious warriors by underlining their struggle to liberate the fatherland from the Goths. Consequently, the first leader that Bilousov addressed in detail was Attila, the king of the Turkic Huns.\textsuperscript{266} Attila, previously a demonic figure, became a liberator, because he had beaten the Germans. Thus, there could be no historical claims over Ukrainian lands by the Germans of the twentieth century.

Although Goths were described as Asiatic in the narrative, “Slavic tribes lived from time immemorial in Europe and occupied wide spaces.” Bilousov defined the Venedi as Slavs, and described habitation areas stretching to the Vistula River in the west, the Carpathian Mountains in the south, and the Dnieper River in the east. Their neighbours to the north were Finns, and

\textsuperscript{265} S.N.Bilousov (ed.), Narysy, pp. 22-24.  
\textsuperscript{266} S.N.Bilousov (ed.), Narysy, p. 27
they extended to the Black Sea in the south. In the second half of the fifth century, Slavs moved towards the Alps and the Balkans as well as the Volga and Dnieper basins. Bilousov again referred to Engels to indicate that Slavic lands expanded to the Elbe River and the Bohemian Forests.\textsuperscript{267} He underlined that contrary to the Goths, the Slavs had represented a substantial part of Europe and had occupied Eastern Europe since the beginning of history. The Antes, ancestors of the eastern Slavs, had lived between the rivers Dniestr and Dniepr. By the sixth century, they had managed to Slavisize and “colonize” contemporary Ukraine as far as the Don River in the east.\textsuperscript{268} Previously, Hrushevskyi had described these Slavic colonizers as the ancestors exclusively of Ukrainians and the creators of the first Ukrainian state. This time, however, readers were prepared for the unity of three nations in early history:

“[This Slavic colonization process] became the starting point of all further historical developments because it resulted in formation of East Slavic tribes—ancestors of the great nations [Ukr. velykykh narodiv] of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians”\textsuperscript{269}.

Different tribal roots for Ukrainians and Russians, as Hrushevskyi had emphasized, did not exist.\textsuperscript{270} Bilousov considered different eastern Slavic tribes and their habitats, but concluded that they formed a common ethnic pool for eastern Slavs.\textsuperscript{271}

The \textit{Istoriia Ukrayiny - Korotkyi Kurs} (1940) was the first history book published after the unification of Western and Eastern Ukraine, and it clearly reflected the priorities of the day. The Russian and Ukrainian Slavic brotherhood and their struggle against foreigners are the clear themes of the narrative. As in the 1937 edition, the \textit{Istoriia Ukrayiny - Korotkyi Kurs} did not define

\textsuperscript{267} S.N.Bilousov (ed.), \textit{Narysy}, p.29.
\textsuperscript{268} S.N.Bilousov (ed.), \textit{Narysy}, p. 30. The narrative did not cover discussions on the Slavic nature of the Antes. For these discussions see: P.R. Magocsi, \textit{A History}, pp. 39-40.
\textsuperscript{270} We can see the same attitude in another work such as S.V. Iushkov, \textit{Ocherki po istorii feofalizma v Kievskoi Rusi} (Moscow and Leningrad, 1939).
\textsuperscript{271} S.N.Bilousov (ed.), \textit{Narysy}, pp.34-5.
Trypillian culture as Slavic. One particular difference is the introduction of the Stone, Copper-Bronze, and Iron Ages, which had been avoided by the authors in 1937 due to Marrist teachings.\textsuperscript{272} This newer text also confirmed that the Scythians and Cimmerians were the first recorded settlers of the Ukrainian lands. The same pictures of metal archaeological findings of Scythians as well as ancient Greek marble busts, clay pots, and amphorae were added to the book to demonstrate that Ukraine possessed a high level of civilization in the early stages of its history. In the \textit{Korotkyi Kurs}, however, Sarmathians, Goths, and Huns were passed over with only a short explanation. Goths were mentioned in only a few sentences as nomadic tribes from the Vistula River. The narrative did not provide the same kind of explanation for Germanic tribes offered in 1937. After brief mentions of pre-Slavic tribes without their ethno-linguistic identifications, the following chapter heralded the arrival of the Slavs in Ukrainian territories. The troublesome word ‘colonization’ in the 1937 version disappeared in 1940. This time the common origins of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians and the primordiality of eastern Slavs in Europe are strongly emphasized from the beginning:

\begin{quote}
“Ukrainian, Russian, and Belorussian nations [...] share a common early period of historical development and are closely connected by joint struggle against foreign enemies for centuries. These nations originate from Slavic tribes, which inhabited from time immemorial Eastern Europe. In the fifth and sixth centuries the great union of eastern Slavic tribes, the Antes, occupied the territories from the Don to the Dnestr”.
\end{quote}

In fact, this statement may stand as a Soviet compromise between the imperial narrative of Kliuchevskii and the Ukrainian national narrative of Hrushevs’kyi. The text acknowledged that there were Ukrainian and Belorussian nations. At the same time, we are also told that the three brotherly nations had the same roots—the Antes—and that they were brothers in arms against the foreign aggressors. The Antes were designated as the common ethnic origins, and the text

\textsuperscript{272} S.M.Bilousov, et al., \textit{Istorii}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{273} S.M.Bilousov, et al., \textit{Istorii}, p. 18.
provided detailed information about them. In the following paragraph, the authors went on to explain that from the eighth century and at the beginning of the ninth century, eastern Slavs were already known as Rus’. So the Rus’ and eastern Slavs were the same people. They inhabited the basins of the Western Bug, Dniester, Dnieper, Don, Western Dvina, and Volga, and the territories between these rivers.274

In summary, the narrative made a strong claim for ethnogenesis. First, it suggested that the Antes were the ancestors of the eastern Slavs who settled in the contemporary Russia, Belorus, and Ukraine. Second, the people of Rus’ were encompassed under a single identity of a nationality (Ru. narodnost’), and as the successors of the Antes. The Land of the Kievan Rus’ (or Rus’ land) possessed a unified identity. Although Ukrainians had to share their past with Russians and Belorussians, they had ethno-linguistic unity and continuity in their national history. The ancestors of Ukrainians were not described as ‘a mixture of Turkic-Nordic-Finnic-Slavic-Germanic tribes’. The Antes were followed by the eastern Slavs and Kievan Rus’, and the latter was the precursor of Ukraine.275 According to Iastrebov’s account, which was published a few months before the German attack in 1941, “The ancestors of eastern Slavs settled in the territory of contemporary Ukraine, Belorus, and Russia one and a half thousand years ago. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Kiev was the major centre of the east Slavic tribe, the Polians.”276

274 S.M.Bilousov, et al., Istoriia, p. 20.
275 On discussions of how the Rus’ was diverse in terms of identities, see: S. Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 45-48.
276 F. Iastrebov, Kyïvs’ka Rus’ (Kiev, 1941), p. 3.
The grey areas are the lands that were populated by the eastern Slavs. The stripped borderlines mark the territories that paid tribute to the Khazar Khanate. The dotted road is the famous trade route from the Variags to the Greeks. The grey areas with their well-defined borders emphasize a clearly depicted fatherland for the eastern Slavs. At the same time, as happens with this kind of map, the grey area also implies ethnic homogeneity.
There are a few major points that should be summarized. First, in 1936 the Zhdanov Commission in Moscow was formed to write an all-Union history. This commission’s end product—Shestakov’s book—was predominantly a Russian narrative. However, this development in Moscow did not prevent construction of national histories in non-Russian republics. The local communist parties in all three republics reacted to the initial signals from Moscow and mobilized their agitation-propaganda section, local historians, and writers to construct a national history. National history writing was a very detailed work and had to be accomplished at the republican level under the supervision of the local communist party. Second, the agitation-propaganda sections and even the first secretaries of the local communist parties were involved in these projects of history writing. National history writing was not only a detailed work, but also had a very strong political significance. Third, the Great Terror, by purging historians who wrote according to the Pokrovskiian School of historiography, opened the way for histories with emphasis on national aspects. The same period of terror also removed Azerbaijani and Kazakh national-Bolsheviks from academic institutions. Most of the new faces were young graduates, party officials, and vydvizhentsy. Finally, the question of ethnogenesis was solved in each republic differently. Although there was one ideology, there were different preferences in solving the problem of ethnogenesis. In the Ukrainian case, the ancient Eastern Slavic state Kievan Rus’ was considered the common ancestor of Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians. Furthermore, some Slavic tribes or tribal federations (the Antes and following tribes such as Siveriani, Derevliani) were identified as the ancient progenitors of these nations. This approach was primordial, mono-ethnic, and unifying. Although there were Iranian, Finnic, Germanic, and Turkic tribal waves which had moved across the Pontus Steppe (contemporary Ukraine) for more than a thousand years, the description of the eastern Slavs and Ukrainians in
fact remains mono-ethnic. In the Azerbaijani case, we have a clear primordialization attempt by rejecting a Turkic past and incorporating autochthonous Caucasian tribes, Albanians, and the Medes as ancient ancestors of the nation. Alternatively, the Seljuks could be incorporated into the narrative as the Turkic ancestors. Though a primordial and autochthonous definition of ethnogenesis was established in this case, there is no mono-ethnicity. The explanation of ethnogenesis is primordial and autochthonous, but there is a mixture of different ethnic sources, which merges in Azerbaijani identity. In the Kazakh case, both primordialism and mono-ethnicity is absent. In other words, comparing to Ukraine and Azerbaijan, the Kazakh case is an incomplete narrative. Alternatively, some tribal names in the Hsiung-nu or Hun confederation could have been used to construct a primordial beginning. If the Kievan Rus’ could play the role of common ancestor for Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, the Kypchak identity could play the same role for Kazakh, Uzbek and Karakalpak identities.277 However, in the Kazakh case, the construction of primordial and mono-ethnic ancestors was not a priority.

CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL LEADERS AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

The construction of a national history includes the incorporation of tribal, regional, dynastic, imperial, or ecclesiastic leaders and movements into the narrative as if they were ‘national’. Similarly, a tribal, regional, dynastic, imperial, or religious conflict can be defined as a national conflict. Pokrovskii was against the idealization and exaltation of any figures that could be

defined by definitions above. If classes and class struggles provided a ‘meaning’ and motion to history, individuals had a limited or no impact on the course of history. Pokrovskii only made an exception for figures of the past who had led an uprising of exploited classes (slaves, peasants, and workers). An individual could be a hero only if he personified the working class and led a class struggle. Pugachev in Russian history, Babak (Per. Babak Kurrami or Az. Babək) in Azerbaijani history, and Syrym Batyr in Kazakh history were some of these Pokrovskiiian heroes.

After the demise of Pokrovskii, national heroes were restored to history. They could again influence the course of history. Histories came closer in line with romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century, than Marxism. The hero appeared as the embodiment of his nation leading a national struggle. Although class conflict was still mentioned, the nation was somehow united and marched in unison towards a single goal within the ‘progressive’ (i.e Marxist) course of history. Moreover, the leader had an extraordinary life and personality. He had an independent consciousness and the power to lead the masses. The description and selection of the enemy nation or the ‘other’ also came to the fore, as international or inter-state relations became a fundamental part of history. In the Russian Soviet national narrative, there had been a stronger emphasis on national leaders since 1936, much earlier than the Second World War. The new narrative continued to recognize the leaders of the toiling classes but at the same time incorporated Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in Russia. What happened in the historiography of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union? Did the emerging Russian national narrative prevent a similar inclination in other republics? Was the change that happened in the non-Russian narratives a consequence of the Second World War? This chapter proposes that, parallel to the Russian case, the historical narratives of non-Russian nationalities gradually moved from Pokrovskiiian or strict Marxist class-based analyses to a more romantic
national discourse, and this change happened before the Second World War. This move happened gradually, in 1936-41, in two ways. First, previously-exalted heroes of the toiling classes and organizers of peasant uprisings, such as Babak in Azerbaijan, became at the same time national heroes of national-liberation movements. Second, the rulers, who were demonized as the representatives of exploiting classes and distanced from their people, such as Khmel’nyts’kyi in Ukraine, now became national heroes of national-liberation uprisings. The decreasing emphasis on class analysis also changed the definitions of some revolts. ‘Peasant uprisings’ became ‘national-liberation struggles’. Thus, the construction of Azerbaijani and Ukrainian national histories changed course.

2.1. AZERBAIJAN IN 1936-1941.

In the beginning of the 1920s, the Soviet works published in Azerbaijan or on Azerbaijan lacked a national concept. Some of these early works also lacked the ‘class-struggle’ theme. The narratives were merely a chronological order of events and some figures, which happened to be in the contemporary territories of Azerbaijani SSR. In the following decade, the narrative was dominated by the Pokrovskiian approach. After the Great Terror, parallel to de-Turkification, the Pokrovskiian concept was also removed from the Azerbaijani Soviet national history. Now

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278 Basarab claims that, in Ukrainian case, the shift from Pokrovskiian to a national one happened as consequence of the Second World War. J. Basarab, Pereiaslav, p. 173-4.

279 R. Izmailov (Ismaïlov), Istoria Azerbaidzhana (Baku,1923); V.A. Riumin, Azerbaidzhanovedenie, kratkie Istoricheski i etnograficheskii ocherki Azerbaidzhana (Baku, 1924); E. A. Pakhomov, Kratkii kurs istorii Azerbaidzhana (Baku, 1923); M. Sysoev, Kratkii ocherk istorii Azerbaidzhana (Baku, 1925).

280 O. Shmidt, et.al., ‘Azerbaidzhanskai SSR’, Bol’shaia, col. 659-661; M. Sysoev, Azerbaidzhan v I tome ‘Bol’shoi sovetskoi entsiklopdii’ (Baku, 1927); A. Gubaidullin, Feodal’nye klassy i krest’ianstvo v Azerbaidzhane v XIX veke (Baku, 1928); E. Zevakin, Azerbaidzhan v nachale XVIII veka (Baku, 1929); V.K. Khuluflu, Selcut; A. A. Mamedov, Azerbaidzhanskoe neftianoe khoziaistvo do otmeny otkupnoi sistemy (1800-1872), Istorik-Marksist, no.4 (1936), p. 98-112; G. Munasazov, Sto let odnoi revolutsii (Azerbaidzhanskoe vosstanie 1826g.) (Baku, 1930); V.K. Khuluflu and E. Pakhomov, KRONIKA VOI DZHARA V XVIII (Baku, 1931); A. A. Salamzade, Feodal’nuye otnoshenia v pervoi polovine XIX v. v Azerbaidzhane (voprosy zemel’noi sobstvennosti, kreposnichestva) (Leningrad, 1935); A. A. Mamedov, Iz Istorii okkupatsii i prevrashchenia Azerbaidzhana v koloni (nachalo XVIIIv.) (Baku, 1939).
the new history had to have national heroes and national-liberation wars. However, there was a major problem. In the Middle Ages, ‘Azerbaijan’ as a toponym did not define the territories of the Soviet Azerbaijan. The territory of Soviet Azerbaijan was not defined as Azerbaijan until the nineteenth century. In ancient times, and the middle ages, the area north of the Aras River was known as Aghvan to Armenians, Arran to Arabs and Iranians, and (Caucasian) Albania to Greeks. The ethno-linguistic unity of Caucasian Albania and Azerbaijan was established only after the Turkification of both sides of the Aras River. However, as explained in the previous chapter, after the Great Terror, Azerbaijani Soviet national history was de-Turkified. This also meant that leaders in the national history could not be taken from the Turkic past. The Azerbaijani Soviet history had to find another way to construct a unity. The solution was found in carefully incorporating selections from the past of both ancient Albania and Iran. The first such incorporation was the Medes, which was assigned as the ancient Golden Age of the primordial Azerbaijani history.

2.1.1. ANTIQUITY.

Though Media proper was located to the south of historical Azerbaijan, this did not prevent historians in 1939 from incorporating the Medes and Median rulers into the national history as

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283 The Caucasian Albanian Kingdom was not assigned as the earliest state of Azerbaijan, because the archaeological research on the Albanians was at a nascent level. There were publications on this issue in Tbilisi: A.G. Shanidze, ‘Novootkrytiy alfavit kavkaszkikh albantsev i ego znachenie dla nauki’, Izvestiiia Institutu iazyka, istorii material’noi kul’tury Gruzinskogo filiala AN SSSR, vol.4, no.1 (1938); I.V. Abuladze, ‘K otkrytiu alfavita kavkaszkikh albantsev’, Izvestiiia Institutu iazyka, istorii material’noi kul’tury Gruzinskogo filiala AN SSSR, vol.4, no.1 (1938).
the forefathers and the ancient leaders of Azerbaijanis. The first leader who bore an
affirmative description as a brave national liberator was the Median ruler Cyaxares, who
successfully fought against the Assyrians. Here we have an example of selective memory.
First, there is no mention of the subjugation of Media by Assyrian kings over the previous
centuries, and second, there is no attention given to the expansion of the Medes towards the
Central Asian territories. Most probably, the history did not want to present the ‘ancestors of
Azerbaijanis’ attacking the ancestors of Central Asian Soviet nations. The incorporation of Media
as an “ancient Azerbaijani state” became even stronger in the national history published in
1941. For example, the narrative offered the first known “Azerbaijani King of Media”, Deioces,
as a new national leader. He was followed by more Azerbaijani kings of Media, such as Phraortes
and again, Cyaxares. In 1939 and 1941, neither of them were presented as slave owners and
exploiters. On the contrary, they were national leaders who fought for their nation. Compared
to the 1939 publication, the 1941 edition provided more detailed information about the
victories of the Median kings over Assyrians, Scythians, and Lydians. However, this did not mean
that Azerbaijanis should be considered to be Persians or from the Iranian stock. The Persians,
according to the account, had different ethno-linguistic roots from the Medians. Moreover, the
level of development of the Persians at that time was too low to be called a ‘civilization’.

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284 For the original settlement of Median tribes, see: R. N. Frye, The History, p. 67. For a broad description of
the location of Media see: I.M. Diakonoff, ‘Media’, in I. Gershevitch (ed.), The Cambridge History of Iran (7 vols.,
285 Cyaxares was a Median King who ruled in 624-585 B.C., I.M. Diakonoff, ‘Media’, p. 113.
the Assyrian expeditions to Median territories, pp. 74-87; for the Central Asian expansion of the Medes, pp. 127-
132; M. Dandamayev and I. Medvedskaya, ‘Media’.
Thus, ‘Azerbaijani Medes’ was presented as superior to Persia. Accordingly, the narrative included the struggle of Azerbaijani Medians against the Persians. The Median-Persian conflict was the first anti-Iranian antagonism in the national history, with numerous similar examples to follow. Azerbaijani Medians were not alone in their struggle against the Persians; Armenians joined them. The narrative again emphasized a long-standing historical brotherhood against the enemies of the Caucasian nations.\textsuperscript{288} The following leader, Atropates, was the satrap of Media, who was sent by the Achaemenid Persian Empire in the fourth century B.C.\textsuperscript{289} The 1941 edition

\textsuperscript{288} Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana, p. 29.
described him as the ruler of Media without mentioning that he was a satrap of the Persians there, which would have revealed his affiliation with the ‘enemy’. After the conquest of the Achaemenid Persian Empire by Alexander the Great, Atropates was re-installed by the new Macedonian rulers as the governor of Media proper. Upon the death of Alexander, he established his own dynasty in the adjacent territory of Media to the north—modern Iranian Azerbaijan. In the Azerbaijani narrative, although he was not clearly designated as the ruler of “Azerbaijan”, it was pointed out that the name ‘Azerbaijan’ and its ancient version ‘Atropatene’ were derived from the name of this satrap, Atropates. Caucasian Albania was a different region to the north of the Aras River and neither the Achaemenid Persian Empire nor Atropates ruled this territory. At this point, we may think that the focus of the national history was on modern Iranian Azerbaijan. However, the national history blurred the difference between Albania and Atropatene, causing deliberate confusion. The narrative claimed that “Azerbaijan” was ruled by the Arsacid Dynasty of Parthia, but did not lose its independence. If the designation of Azerbaijan was referring to Atropatene, then it was part of the Parthian Empire. However, if it was referring to Albania, it was not a part of the Empire.

In the history published in 1941, the brotherhood of Caucasian Soviet nations was more strongly emphasized and traced back farther in history. The text claimed that Chaldeans and Urartians were the same people and identified them as the ancestors of the brotherly nations of Armenia and Georgia. For this reason, the bellicose relations between “Azerbaijanis” and Chaldeans-

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290 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, p. 32.
Urartu, explained in detail in 1939, were removed from the narrative in 1941. Additionally, the narrative elected not to include the military expeditions of Urartu to the future lands of Atropatene. The first common enemy in antiquity was the Assyrians. The Azerbaijani Medians and the ancestors of Armenians fought against them together. Although all societies of the period were in fact slave-owner societies, only the Assyrians bore the stigma of being one.  

According to the narrative, in ancient times, the Romans with their slave-owner society and mighty armies were also enemies of “Azerbaijanis”. Moreover, they were common enemies of Georgians (Iberians) and Armenians. Thus, the solidarity of the Caucasian Soviet nations was bolstered in antiquity against the Roman invaders. There was obvious exaggeration here. First, when Sulla was in the region, his aim was to support the Cappadocian Principality, a client state of Rome, against the kingdom of Pontus and Armenia. The Albanians were not involved in this conflict. When Pompey was in the region, he did not aim to occupy Iberia or Albania. He simply set out in pursuit of King Mitridates of Pontus, who had fled the Roman Army. Iberia and Albania were far beyond Roman horizons. Secondly, the primary battleground between the Romans and the Parthian Empire was the ancient Armenian kingdom. During most of this period, the Euphrates was the eastern border of the Roman Empire. The “Georgian” or “Azerbaijani” territories were far from this confrontation. Neither Caucasian Albania nor Atropatene could be included into this conflict zone. We can only speak of a Roman invasion

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294 *Istoriia Azerbaidzhana*, pp. 20-22.
when Atropatene was attacked by the army of Mark Anthony. The aim of this campaign was to defeat Parthia, not to invade Caucasian Albania or Atropatene.

Contrary to the claim of fraternity in the narrative, the kingdoms and satrapies in Lazica, Colchis, Iberia (ancient Georgia), Armenia, Albania, and Atropatene had to play one powerful empire off against the other. That is why they mostly followed conflicting policies. For instance, Tigran II the Great, the Armenian king of the Artashesid Dynasty, brought contemporary Iranian Azerbaijan into his domain in 88-85 B.C.E., when Parthia was busy with Central Asian nomads and Rome was fighting against Mithradates VI of Pontus. In Crassus’s campaign against Parthia in 53 B.C.E., the Armenian king Artawazd provided the Armenian cavalry to the Roman general. In the following decades, the Armenian throne and Armenia itself became a stage of rivalry between Romans and Parthians. There are also plenty of examples in which the Parthians assigned members of the Arsacid line the role of kings of Armenia; the latter aided the Parthians in their campaigns against Roman territories. While Armenia was partitioned by the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires, neither Albania nor Atropatene faced a Roman legion. The border between Rome/Byzantine and the Sasanian Empire fluctuated between the Tigris and the Euphrates, depending on the military power of either side at a given time.

301 Though in the campaign of Mark Anthony, Artawazd was considered a betrayer and was executed by the former in Egypt. N. Garosian, ‘The Emergence’, i, pp. 37-63, p. 60
303 The main confrontations were in ancient Armenia and Assyria. The defeat of the Romans at Carrhae is the most prominent one. A.D.H. Bivar, ‘The Political History of Iran Under the Arsacids’, in E. Yarshater (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran* (7 vols., Cambridge, 1985), iii/1, pp. 21-100, for a brief explanation of the campaigns of the Roman generals Lucullus and Pompey against the Parthian Empire in the region, see: pp. 45-47; for the campaign of Mark Anthony and the siege of Maragha in Atropatene of Parthia, in 37 B.C.E., see: pp. 58-64; for the battles the Sassanid
episodes of solidarity but these should be interpreted as religious (Christian) or dynastic in motivation, rather than as solidarity among ‘Caucasians nations’. Nevertheless, Soviet Azerbaijani history had to emphasize the common enemy of Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians. Following the Romans, the Sassanid Empire was designated as the next common enemy.

There was also a danger from the north. According to the narrative, “Azerbaijanis” built walls to protect their country from nomads, especially the Alans and Huns. This comment implied that the text was referring to Albania as Azerbaijan. The focus of the narrative shifted to the north of the Aras River, and the narrative described Alans and Huns as enemies of the nation. However, historically, Transcaucasian states such as Albania and Iberia had made temporary alliances with these people. While the former gained additional military support against the mighty empires of Romans, Persians, and Sassanids, the latter gained access to rich regions further south for pillage. It should be remembered that it was the Iranian rulers, such as Yazdegerd II, who initiated the construction of defence systems at the Darband Pass. However, this fact was left out of the narrative, because Sassanids had already been defined as the ‘enemies of the nation’.


\(^{304}\) For example, the Armenian support of the Albanians against the Iranians, see: M. Dasxuranci, The History, p. 65-8.


\(^{306}\) I. Dzhafarzade, A.A. Klimov, Z.I. lampol'skii (eds.), Istoriiia Azerbaidzhanskoi, p. 38

\(^{307}\) V.V. Barto'ld, ‘Mesto’, ii/1, pp. 651-774, pp. 667, 669.

\(^{308}\) V.V. Barto'ld, ‘Mesto’, ii/1, pp. 651-774, pp. 669.
2.1.2. THE MIDDLE AGES.

Until the arrival of Muslim Arabs in the region, the most dangerous enemies of the nation were polities of Iranian origin, such as the Sassanid Empire. The 1941 edition placed more emphasis on this issue. Both narratives in 1939 and 1941 named Vachang, an Albanian prince, as the leader of the resistance against the Sassanid Empire. The authors also merged ‘Albanian’ and ‘Azerbaijani’, in order to ‘nationalize’ the Caucasian Albanian Kingdom. In 1939, Vachang was defined as the “one of the Azerbaijani feudal lords from Albania”. In the 1941 version, Vachang was referred to more as a national leader than an exploiter: “In this heroic resistance, the uprising of Azerbaijanis in 485 under the leadership of Vachang, the king of Albania, was especially peculiar”.309 The Caucasian Albanian Prince Varaz Grigor was not named as an Albanian but as an “Azerbaijani” prince. However, the Caucasian Albanian rulers had never ruled the south of the Aras River (Azerbaijan or Atropatene). Moreover, neither the north nor the south of the Aras River could be called ‘Azerbaijan’ yet. Naming polities and prominent figures before the seventh century as Azerbaijani was a purely retrospective construction without any historical justification.

Furthermore, while the Mihranid dynasty founded by Varaz Grigor claimed to be of Sassanid descent, it was most likely of Parthian origin.310 Despite this fact, in the official narrative Javanshir, the son of Varaz Grigor, emerged as the defender of “Azerbaijan” against the Khazars in the north, the Arabs in the south, and the Byzantines in the west.311 Although he could have

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310 C. E. Bosworth, ‘Arran’.
311 I. Dzhafarzade, A.A. Klimov, Z.l. Iampol’skii (eds.), Istoriiia Azerbaidzhanskoi, the text mentions Albanians only once, p. 35; on Varaz Grigor, p. 46; on Javanshir, pp. 48-9.
been discredited as a member of the oppressing classes, the narrative did not mention a single word about his class origins. Thus, Javansir was elevated to the status of a great leader and hero of the nation. The historical narrative underlined the Albanian-Sassanid antagonism. However, the reality was more complex. Frequently, Albania had been a vassal of Iranian empires and provided auxiliary forces for the Sassanid armies. That is why the Albanian King Grigor and his son Javansir confronted the Arabs within the Sassanid forces. At a certain moment, Javansir changed sides to fight against the Sassanids and became a vassal of Constantinople. Finally, he entered into an alliance with the Huns, his archenemies, in order to overcome the threat from the south.\textsuperscript{312} Like other leaders in Transcaucasia, he played off one side against the other. However, the national narrative articulated a more selective view.

The next national hero presented after Javansir is Mazdak. The uprising of Mazdak was an Iranian story that was incorporated into the Azerbaijani national narrative. Although Mazdak was an Iranian priest preaching egalitarianism in the sixth century,\textsuperscript{313} the editors of the history opted to present him as a revolutionary and an early communist. There had already been interest in Mazdakism and Khurramite movements from European socialist writers because of the unexpectedly egalitarian view of these sects.\textsuperscript{314} Mazdak differed from Javansir as a leader of the peasant class fighting against the exploiting rulers. In fact, the uprising had not been a local phenomenon within the borders of Atropatene or Albania, but rather an all-Iranian uprising.

\textsuperscript{312} M. Dasxuranci, \textit{The History}, for the period when they fought within the Persian Army, p. 109-112; when Javansir was a vassal of Byzantine, pp. 112-121; on the agreement with Huns, p. 122-4.


However, incorporating this uprising and its leader into the national history of Azerbaijan implied that he was a member of the Azerbaijani pantheon.\textsuperscript{315}

In the book's account of the seventh century, the Arab invaders took the place of Iranians as the major enemy of the nation. Azerbaijani historiography was not alone in this move. In Dagestan, another Muslim republic of the region, the historian R. Magomedov wrote about the anti-Arab resistance.\textsuperscript{316} Arab occupiers had forced the indigenous peoples to convert to Islam, ransacked all of Atropatene and Albania, and colonized these territories by moving Arab settlers into the region. These attempts at Arabization were clearly described in the narrative. Similar policies were pursued in Armenia and Kartli-Kakheti (Georgia). In the context of explaining the Arab invasion, another figure from the Iranian past, Babak, was incorporated into the national history of Azerbaijan. The Babak uprising was one of numerous uprisings during the Arab rule of Iran. These uprisings had two dominant characteristics: (1) ending Arab rule and restoring the Sassanids; (2) expressing egalitarian and rural demands. In later centuries, the regions where these uprisings occurred became strongholds of Shi’ite denomination.\textsuperscript{317} The Babak uprising had been a reaction from Persian speakers in the Atropatene region against Arab dominance. Babak’s ideology was part of a broader movement that could only be associated with Iran.\textsuperscript{318} However, it was not only an anti-Arab but also an anti-Muslim uprising, since these insurgents were a mixture of Khurramites (neo-Mazdakism), and neo-Zoroastrians.\textsuperscript{319} We cannot describe

\textsuperscript{316} R. Magomedov, Zavoevanie arabami Dagestana v VII-IX vekakh (Makhachkala, 1940).
\textsuperscript{317} V.V. Bartol’d, ‘Mesto’, ii/1, pp. 651-774, pp. 678-9.
\textsuperscript{318} E. Yarshater, ‘Mazdakism’, iii/2, pp. 991-1024, p. 1004.
\textsuperscript{319} For Mazdakism, see: E. Yarshater, ‘Mazdakism’, iii/2, pp. 991-1024.
this uprising as merely Khurramite because Tabaristan, the strongholds of Khurramite belief, did not support the uprising at all.\textsuperscript{320}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{babak_uprising.jpg}
\caption{An illustration of the Babak Uprising}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: M. Tomara, Babek: zhizn’ zamechatel’nykh liudei} (Moscow, 1936).

There is no direct historical link between Albania and Babak. The centre of the uprising was initially in the mountains of Sabalan, and then in the Arasbaran Forest, where the legendary Bazz (or Badd) Castle was located. Both of these places were located in Atropatene, not Albania. Babak was captured by the Arabs, following his betrayal by an ally. The narratives from 1939 and 1941 described this betrayal, but neither mentioned that Sakhl’ ibn Sumbat, the person who betrayed Babak, was an Armenian prince, who extended his rule over Albania. Clearly, revealing this part of the story would have challenged the Albanian-Azerbaijani union and the fraternity of the three Transcaucasian nations.

Initially, Soviet Azerbaijani historiography had taken a different stance. In 1925, Sysoev had described Babak as “a leader of a communist uprising”. He was clearly referring here to the egalitarian aspect of the Khurramites. When the biography of Babak and the story of his uprising was first published in 1936, he was again described as a leader of exploited classes. This book was part of a popular series of biographies with the title ‘The Life of a Remarkable People’ (Ru. zhizn’ zamechatel’nykh liudei), initiated by Maksim Gorky. According to this first Soviet account, Babak had been a leader of a class (peasant) uprising, and not an Azerbaijani national hero. He had mobilized the labouring peasants against the exploiting class for their class emancipation, but not for Azerbaijan. In the following years, Babak was defined both as a national leader and class leader. Bagirov, at the fourteenth congress of the AKP(b) in 1938,

322 M. Sysoev, Kratkii, p. 48.
323 M. Tomara, Babek, zhizn’ zamechatel’nykh liudei (Moscow, 1936).
324 Some of the other biographies of this series were: A. Voronskii, Zheliabov (Moscow, 1934); A. Vinogradov, Bairon [Byron] (Moscow, 1936); A. Gaisinovich, Pugachev (Moscow, 1937); K. Osipov, Bogdan Kmel’nitskii (Moscow, 1939).
defined the uprising as a national-liberation struggle of Azerbaijani nation against the Arab occupants.\textsuperscript{326} The next account, in 1939, depicted him as a ‘peasant leader’. The uprising of Babak was presented as a revolutionary-peasant war against the Muslim-Arab exploiters, and his position as a leader of a religious sect was downplayed.\textsuperscript{327} Although in the 1941 edition, Babak was still a leader of the peasant uprising, he also became an Azerbaijani national hero and organizer of Azerbaijani national-liberation struggle. So, there was a gradual ‘nationalization’ of Babak in the narrative.

It is clear that Babak was incorporated into the Azerbaijani narrative at a time when Pokrovskiian history writing was the official line, and when Soviet historians hastily looked for peasant uprisings and class conflicts in the ancient and medieval periods of every national history.\textsuperscript{328} In a way, Babak was a forerunner of Shamil in the ninth century. Both had strong religious motives. Referring to Engels, Soviet historians interpreted this religious aspect as a progressive element. Egalitarian Mazdakism and Sufism were peasant ideologies in a pre-capitalist society that mobilized masses for a class uprising. Sufism and Muridizm, led by Shamil, had already been described by Bushuev as a way for peasant masses to resist the colonial expansion of the Russian Empire and her local agents—feudal lords—in Dagestan and Chechnya, as well as progressive ideas for the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{329} In 1940, when the twentieth anniversary of Soviet autonomy in Dagestan was celebrated, a series of works was published in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[328] In neighboring Armenia there were similar publications on Armenian peasant uprisings in history; see: A. Arutunian, \textit{Krest’ianskie dvizheniia v Armenii v pervoi chetverti XVII veka} (Eriwan: Izd-vo ArmFAN, 1939).
\item[329] S.K. Bushuev, \textit{Bor’ba gortsev za nezavisimost’ pod rukovodstvom Shamilia} (Moscow and Leningrad, 1939);
\end{footnotes}
Makhachkala depicting Shamil as a heroic national leader of the national-liberation struggle of Dagestani people and Chechens against the Russian colonial occupation.\footnote{R. Magomedov, \textit{Bor'ba gortsev za nezavisimost' pod rukovodstvom Shamilia} (Makhachkala, 1939); R. Magomedov, \textit{Shamil'} (Makhachkala, 1940); R. Magomedov, \textit{Dagestan v period tsarskogo zavoevaniia} (Makhachkala, 1940); Also see: R. Magomedov, \textit{Vosstanie gortsev Dagestana v 1877g}. (Makhachkala, 1940). Also see the publication on Shamil in Chechnya in autumn 1941: N. Kroviakov, \textit{Shamil': ocherk iz istorii bor'by narodov Kavkaza za nezavisimost'} (Groznyi, 1941).}

According to the national history, after the Arabs, a greater menace for the Azerbaijani nation was posed by the Seljuks in the eleventh century. The description of the Seljuks in both narratives shows increasing anti-Turkish policy in Azerbaijani Soviet national history writing. Although the narrative described how they plundered the Byzantines, Georgians, and the Armenian city of Ani, no similar acts were mentioned in Arran-Albania and Atropatene-Azerbaijan. Most likely, the preceding Islamization of Albania and Atropatene played a role. Notwithstanding the difference in the policy of the Seljuks, the narrative presented them as the common enemy of Armenians, Georgians, and Azerbaijani. The Seljuks compelled the local dynasties in Arran and Azerbaijan to pay high tributes or else replaced them with members of the Seljuk family. Although these dynasties had been Arab or Kurdish ruling families, which moved to the region after the Arab conquest and gained independence over time, the narrative patriotically named them “Azerbaijani”.\footnote{I. Dzhafarzade, A.A. Klimov, Z.I. Iampol'skii (eds.), \textit{Istoriia Azerbaidzhanskoi}, pp.72-5. These local dynasties from the Arab conquest of the region were: The Arab Hashimids of Darband, the Daylamite Musafirids of Azerbaijan (south of Aras), the Arab Yazidids of Sharvan, and the Kurdish Shaddadids of Arran. See: V. Minorsky, \textit{A History of Sharvan and Darband in the 10th and 11th Centuries} (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 13,17-20ff ; V.V. Bartol'd, 'Kratkii', ii/1, pp.775-783, p. 778; C.E. Bosworth, 'The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (A.D. 1000-1217)', in J.A. Boyle (ed.), \textit{The Cambridge History of Iran} (7 vols., Cambridge, 2007), v, pp. 1-202, p. 2.} In other words, by being labelled “Azerbaijani”, these Arab and Kurdish dynasties were nationalized, and the Seljuks became the ‘other’. Following the Seljuks, Mongols appeared as the common enemies of all Soviet nations. After the first wave of occupation and ransacking, the Mongols established their rule in the region. Upon the division
of Genghis Khan’s empire, Arran and Azerbaijan became part of the Ilkhanate State of the Mongols. Naturally, the narrative explained how “Azerbaijanis” fought against the Mongol exploiters-occupiers.  

In the next episode, the authors, covering the Middle Ages, tried to forge a centralizing state structure and a leader akin to Ivan the Terrible of Russia, or David the Builder of Georgia. After the Ilkhanates, a consistent pattern appeared in the history of Arran (north) and Azerbaijan (south), creating a duality. In the north, local dynasties emerged as centrifugal powers from Darband, Ganja, Sheki and Baku. Historical Azerbaijan, on the other hand, continued to generate centripetal states, such as the Il-Khanids, Kara-Koyunlu, Ak-Koyunlu, aiming to rule the Iranian plateau, Armenia, and Arran-Shirvan. This duality became a problem that the national history had to resolve in the following chapters. From the chapters on antiquity, the history had tried to merge both territories in one historical identity. At this point, addressing the medieval period, it had to reconcile this duality. In the conflict between Ibrahim of Shirvan in the north and the Chupanid-Jalayerid Dynasty in the south (fourteenth century) and the following Kara-Koyunlu Turkic nomadic tribal federation in the south, the narrative deemed Ibrahim of Shirvan the leader of the nation. Ibrahim of Shirvan was celebrated as a leader who struggled for the unification of “Azerbaijan”, though Shirvan had not been located in historical Azerbaijan and it had been the Chupanids and Kara-Koyunlu who were. The Kara-Koyunlu were not yet considered Azerbaijani, and the narrative derogatively called them “Turkmen feudals”.

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332 *Istoriia Azerbaidzhana*, pp. 100-110.
333 The boundaries of Shirvan nearly overlaps with Arran with the exception of Mogan (Mugan) district. For the borders and history of Shirvan, see: C. E. Bosworth, ‘Servan’, *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, online edition, 11 February 2011, available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/servan.
334 *Istoriia Azerbaidzhana*, pp. 116-122. In the Middle Ages, the north of Aras was still named Arran and the south was Azerbaijan. Saljuq-nama described Arran and Azerbaijan as separate territories. C.E. Bosworth (ed.), *Rashid al-
When the narrative addressed the Safavid Dynasty emerging from the south, it named it “Azerbaijani”. The Safavids were originally adherents to a mystical, or Sufi, order known as Safavid after its founder, Sheikh Safi al-Din (1252-1334) of Erdebil. In the fifteenth century, the family embraced a militant form of Shiism and began actively proselytizing in neighbouring Anatolia. Shiism, in the hands of Safavids, became an ideology that managed to create political legitimacy and a union around a charismatic religious-political leader. The secret of Ismail’s success in uniting Iranian territories was that he transformed the Safavid movement from a Sufi order to an ideology of an imperial polity. Ismail defined himself and legitimized his rule through the following ideological manoeuvres: a messianic rhetoric to mobilize his zealot nomadic adherents; Turco-Mongol symbols and apocryphal legends; Twelver Shi’ite doctrine; ancient, pre-Islamic Iranian notions of divine kingship and statecraft; and a vigorous citation of Abrahamic prophetic history. In other words, neither Ismail nor the Safavids defined themselves as ‘Azerbaijani’.

Nevertheless, after the emergence of the Safavids, the 1941 official history stopped defining Shirvan and other principalities in the north as Azerbaijani, because it wanted to affirm the Safavids as a centralizing force. In a way, Shah Ismail I of the Safavids played the equivalent role of Ivan III and Ivan IV for Azerbaijani history. He was praised as the leader of his nation, instead

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Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, p. 121.

of being slandered as a leader of the exploiters. The Safavids declared the Shi’ite denomination the official religion, however, the conversion to Shi’ism was gradual and uneven, especially in areas under less close control from the capital. The northern principality of Shirvan retained Sunni loyalties for longer than some other regions. Possibly the Shirvani elites ‘played up’ their Sunni loyalties for political purposes, as a mark of resistance to Safavids and claim for the Ottoman support. Thus, there was a religious differentiation between the two regions. The narrative, however, did not point to this division within the country. The problem of historical or religious duality in the constructed history of Azerbaijan was solved by the introduction of a common enemy. “The Ottoman-Turks” or simply “the Turks” become the enemy of the nation. This anti-Turkish narrative helped the authors build an account of a united Azerbaijani history, despite the fact that the unity was absent in reality. Although the narrative presented this antagonism as a national one between the Turks and Azerbaijanis, the actual fault line had been between Shiia and Sunni denominations, or between Safavid or Ottoman dynasties. According to Bartol’d,

[they] were the founders of a Shi’ite dynasty in Iran. [...] In this way, the Shi’ite dynasty was founded by Turkic [people]. This point should be kept in mind because very often the struggle between Persia and Turkey is described in national terms. [...] National ideas did not play a role here at all.

In other words, conflicts were either sectarian or dynastic. In fact, nationalizing Safavids, as Azerbaijani historians did in 1941, was a complex issue. From the time of the Seljuks, “Iran [had] generally been ruled by non-Persian dynasties, usually Turkish [Turkic] but sometimes Mongol or

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337 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, pp. 130-133.
338 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, pp. 134-135, 140-141.
339 V.V. Bartol’d, ‘Mesto’, il/1, pp. 651-774, pp. 678.
Kurdish”. Turkic rulers with Persian-Turkic subjects did not consider self-definition a problem. The Seljuk rulers, as the leaders of Turkic pastoral nomadic federations, traced their genealogy back to the Turkic mythical ruler Afrasiab or Alp Er Tunga, and at the same time they used the traditional Iranian title and called themselves shahanshahs. The Seljuks conveyed Turko-Persian culture, which had been formed initially in Ma’ wara an-nahr (Transoxiana) by the Ghaznavids (989-1149), to Iran (including Azerbaijan), Iraq, Syria, and Anatolia as well as expanding the Turko-Persian ecumene to these territories. The formation of this Turko-Persian ecumene accelerated during the Mongol and Timurid period when the predominant influences were imposed from Central Asia. Consequently, the Turko-Persian Islamic ecumene became more sharply distinguished from the Arabic Islamic world in the south. The Ottomans in Asia Minor, Safavids in Iran, Mughals in India, and Timurids and Shaibanids in Ma’ wara an-nahr were all part of this ecumene. The construction of a national history out of this multi-cultural past demanded clear borderlines between modern Turkish and Iranian identities, which did not exist in the sixteenth century. That is why it became disputed as to which national history the Safavids belonged.

The Soviet approach complicated the situation by claiming Safavids for Azerbaijani national history. In 1941, Soviet Azerbaijani history writing divided the Safavid period into two parts. The history defined the first period of the Safavid dynasty as “Azerbaijani”. In the second period,

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342 V.V. Bartol’d, ’Dvenadtsat’’, v, pp. 19-194, p. 93

122
however, the Safavid state was left for Iranian national history, as it was transformed into an “Iranian” state. The shift happened when Shah Abbas moved the capital to Isfahan in 1598. According to the history of 1941, Safavid State transferred from an Azerbaijani state to an Iranian state when there was tension between the “Azerbaijani feudal lords” (the Qizilbashs leaders\textsuperscript{345}) and Shah Abbas. The Soviet narrative, which explained the tension within a Marxist frame of class conflict, captured only a part of the reality. On one side were Turkic or Turcoman nomads, who were mostly members of the Qizilbash confederation acting as centrifugal powers.

For the central authorities, these nomadic tribes were an asset when the former needed zealous warriors at their disposal. However, especially in times of peace, they were uncontrollable, too mobile to be subject to taxation, and posed a great threat to the sedentary population.\textsuperscript{346}

This problem was not unique to the Safavids. The Seljuks, who were a branch of the Turkic-Oguz tribes, posed a risk to the Ghaznavids, and when the former established their rule they also suffered from the same threat of Turkic-Oguz pastoral nomads. In general, it was not easy to keep a balance between Turkic tribalism and Persian-Islamic authoritarianism. There were always freshly-arrived Turkic tribes from the Central Asian steppes who kept alive a consciousness of the old ways, being firmly opposed to absolutist centralized state structures.\textsuperscript{347}

\textsuperscript{345} The Qizilbash were a coalition of different ethnicities, though they were predominantly Turkic tribes and at the same time the disciples of Safavid sect in Ardabil. R.M., Savory, "Ḳızıl-bāş." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman; , Th. Bianquis; , C.E. Bosworth; , E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2011. Brill Online. Oxford University libraries. 11 September 2011 <http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-4415>

\textsuperscript{346} S. N. Fisher, W. Ochseneald, The Middle East, i, pp. 216-223.

The Safavid shahs and successive Turkic dynasties favoured centralization as a means of levying taxes and recruiting armies, in order to resist Ottoman expansion. Centralization meant moving away from Turkic nomadic-Qizilbash roots towards Iranian state tradition with an official Shi’ite outlook, and Iranization in general. The Soviet narrative missed this crucial dichotomy, which had dominated Iranian history for the past thousand years. It simply named the Turkic nomadic tribal chieftains as “Azerbaijani feudals” and the Turco-Persian monarchs as “Iranian Shahs”. Consequently, Azerbaijanis struggled against the “Turkish Sultans” and “Iranian Shahs” until the arrival of the Russians as liberators. When the small khans to the north of the Aras River acted independently or struggled against Turkish or Iranian central states, they were depicted as the leaders of national liberation movements against the Iranian or Turkish yoke. When referring to these khans, the focus of the narrative moved back to the north and refers to Shirvan or Arran as “Azerbaijan”.

After the purge of the pro-Turkic historians in 1936-38 and before the Second World War, the Azerbaijani Soviet construction of national history aimed to disseminate three messages: (1) ancient Albania and Atropatene were historical parts of contemporary Azerbaijan and they had been united from the time immemorial. (2) Persians, Arabs and all Turkic peoples and their polities, from the Seljuks to Ottomans, were enemies of the Azerbaijani Soviet nation. In this narrative, an especially anti-Persian and anti-Turkish narrative was established. (3) The leaders of revolts, who were depicted as leaders of peasant uprisings, such as Babak, gradually became national leaders of national-liberation movements. Some of the princes, khans and shahs, who

tribal confederation decided to settle down in a city. This could create a conflict between him and the tribal leaders. For a nomad to become sedentary was a serious act akin to converting religion. For examples: V.V. Bartol’d, “Dvenadtsat”, v, pp. 19-194, p. 173.

348 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, pp. 142-162.
were formerly cursed as reactionary-exploiters, turned into national leaders, who organized centralized states and standing armies.

As previously mentioned, Soviet Azerbaijani historiography had to exclude Turkic or Muslim identities from the national narrative. The problem was that these were the only labels that could unite the ethno-linguistic majority on both sides of the Aras River. At the beginning of the history, the narrative identified Albania and Atropatene as two parts of the same entity. The first way it did this was by constructing an economic unity. According to the narrative, both Albania-Arran-Shirvan and Atropatene-Azerbaijan were important players in international trade. In fact, before the Arab invasion, these territories had not been crucial areas of international trade. The East-West trade corridor crossed the Iranian Plateau, reaching Susa or Ctesiphon, and followed the Mesopotamian plains towards ancient Armenia. It is not surprising that the Royal Highway of Persia did not cross over Atropatene or Albania, and Alexander the Great did not bother to conquer these territories either. There was a route passing Albania, Iberia, and Colchis, but compared to the southern route it held secondary importance. The north’s primary significance was military-strategic. Possessing the Darband Pass was important for all the empires that emerged in the Iranian Plateau, if they wanted to control the flow of pastoral nomads from the Eurasian plains.

In terms of political history, Albania and Atropatene had not been unified polities either. Especially in the pre-Islamic period, Albania, Atropatene, and Media were separate entities. For example, the description of the Sassanid administrative organization of Iran in 262 was very

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clear on this issue; the names Aturpatakan or Adurbadagan [Atropatene], Albania or Arran, and Media are mentioned separately. The same division was present in the list of provinces during the reign of Kusrau I. In order to establish a unity between two historically distinct entities, the Soviet Azerbaijani national narrative shifted the focus back and forth from one territory in the south to the other in the north at a bewildering speed, referring to them both as ‘Azerbaijani’. Along with these shifts, the list of the enemies of the nation became very long. The Persians, the Romans, the Sassanids, the Turkic pastoral nomads such as the Huns or Khazars, the Muslim-Arabs, the Seljuks, the Ottoman-Turks, and the Iranian Turkic dynasties were just some of them. The Russian expansion of Peter the Great is thought to be the lesser evil compared to the Turkish and Iranian yoke.

The construction of national leaders for Azerbaijani national history deserves close attention for two reasons in particular. First, the sudden shifts allowed the narrative to encompass leaders in both the north and the south, even though they represented different polities, religions, and traditions. Parallel to the de-Turkification of the ethnogenesis of Azerbaijani, historical leaders of Azerbaijanis had to be non-Turkic. In order to remove both Turkic and Shi’ite elements of the identity, a non-Muslim and non-Turkic figure had to be elevated as the historical leader of the nation. Javansir, as a prince from Christian Albania with Sassanid origins, and Babak, as a follower of the egalitarian creed of Mazdak, a native of Persian-speaking Azerbaijan, and a leader of an anti-Muslim religious sect, were good candidates for national heroes. Armenians already had David of Sasun, who had fought against the Arab occupiers in the Caucasus. An Azerbaijani analogy was constructed around the figures of Javansir and Babak. The two

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prominent leaders of the Islamic period were Ibrahim of Shirvan and Ismail of the Safavids. They were as distinct from one another as Babak and Javansir. Ibrahim was a Sunni ruler, originally from a Persianized Arab family of Darband. He sought the unification of the territories north of the Aras River. Ismail was the head of Safavi State with the Shi’ite order as the state religion in the south. In the absence of Turkic or Muslim unifying identities, Soviet Azerbaijani historiography incorporated events, leaders, and heroes of Albania-Arran-Shirvan and Atropatene-Azerbaijan into one Azerbaijani national narrative. The history of Azerbaijan was gradually detached from the Turkic past, and the emerging gap was increasingly filled by the inclusion of the Iranian past into Azerbaijani history.

Second, in addition to labouring class leaders, there were multiple national leaders, who were presented as the embodiment of their nation. By 1941, Pokrovskiiian selection of historical figures was already behind. Babak was not a leader of a peasant uprising anymore. He was a leader of a national-liberation movement. The Median Kings, Albanian Princes, Ibrahim of Shirvan, and finally Shah Ismail were not feudal exploiters. They were military leaders, who aimed to establish a centralized state and a strong army, which would stand against the enemies of the nation.

2.2. KAZAKHSTAN IN 1936-1941.

Beginning in the 1920s, Kazakh Soviet national history construction prioritized the nineteenth century anti-Russian uprisings as the primary source from which historical leaders emerged. Among other factors, the influence of the Pokrovskiian approach to history was significant in the popularity of this theme. After 1934, Pokrovskii was denounced as a vulgar interpreter of Marxist history. As a consequence, the construction of national histories in Azerbaijan and
Ukraine altered their course. Folk leaders such as Babak in Azerbaijan were kept in the narrative and steadily transformed from class leaders to the leaders of their nations. Some of the local rulers (princes, khans, emirs, etc.) came to the fore as wise leaders who had sought the unification of the nation and establishing a centralized state. In Kazakhstan, however, the nineteenth century anti-Russian uprisings and leading batyrs continued to be a dominant narrative and a very popular research subject. Akin to the ethnogenesis issue, Kazakhstan represents a departure from the Azerbaijani and Ukrainian cases. Although Russian national history had been promoted since 1936, and a Russocentric all-Union history was written, the Kazakh tribal uprisings against the Russian Empire were not considered off-limits as subjects. Even on the eve of the war, the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)K was using the theme of anti-Russian uprisings. It employed propagandist-lecturers for every region of the republic who would conduct courses and lectures in step with Party policies. There was a long list of lectures, and two of them were on the heroism of the Kazakhs: “Hero of Kazakh Nation Amangel’dy Imanov” covered the Soviet hero of the 1916 uprising, and “Uprising of Kazakh Labourers under the Leadership of Isatai Taimanov and Makhambet Utemisov” described the anti-Russian popular “nomad-peasant” uprisings led by batyrs in the nineteenth century. This section aims to explain the popularity of nineteenth century batyrs as dominant figures of national history and to suggest the reasons behind the consistent anti-Russian approach.

2.2.1. BATYRS OF THE NOMADIC WORLD.

Barfield describes the ideal leader of pastoral nomadic society as: “a heroic warrior blessed by heaven with luck and charisma, who showered his followers with gifts. [...] The power of a

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353 KRPM, 708-5.1-570-38, 39, April 11, 1941.
steppe autocrat was purely personal”. Both Radloff and Barthold suggested that the nomadic
states were inherently ephemeral, the state organization disappearing upon the death of its
founder. Hence, in the absence of a bureaucracy or institutions, a central figure—a
charismatic batyr, bii, or khan—was essential in any narrative of the past. Soviet Kazakh national
history construction was quite selective in choosing national heroes, and priority was given to
batyrs. The Turkic word batyr or bağatur, shared by all Turkic and Mongolic languages, describes
a courageous, decisive, virile, bold, valiant hero or leader. This title was given to warriors who
became renowned for heroic deeds on the battlefield. Batyrs frequently played military (in some
cases legal) roles for one or two clans. Famous batyrs would become protagonists of folk
narratives and songs, which conveyed their heroic deeds to next generations.

There are legendary batyrs, such as Alpamys (Alpamysh) or Shora (Shura or Chora), who lived
before the formation of Kazakh Khanate but were incorporated into Kazakh heroic epics. The
legend of Alpamys Batyr was also famous among other Turkic nationalities such as the
Karakalpaks, Tatars, Bashkirs, the Turkic people of Altai, and Uzbeks. The legend of Shora Batyr
was known to Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Tatars. There were many other batyrs who were
protagonists of legendary tales, such as Er-Targyn, Er-Sayn, and Kambar. For the appearance
of ‘Kazakh batyrs’, the struggle against Jungar attacks in the eighteenth century provided fertile

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356 Russian bagatyr and Persian bahadur come from this Turkic word. For a detailed explanation, variants in
different Turkic languages and dialects, and a discussion on the origin of the word, see: E.V. Sevortian,
Etimologicheskii slovar turkskikh iazykov: obshchetiurkskie i mezhtiurkskie osnovy na bukvu ‘B’ (Moscow, 1978),
pp. 82-5.
357 For a detailed explanation of Alpamys, Koblandy, Er-Sayn, Er-Targyn, Shura Batyr, Kambar Batyr, and Edyge, see:
Batyrlar Jyry (Almaty, 1939); A.S. Orlov, Kazakhskii geroicheskii epos (Moscow and Leningrad, 1945), for the role of
Bogenbai Batyr (1690-1775) was from the Middle Zhuz of Kazakhs and was one of the military leaders who led the struggle against the Jungars. His life and leadership was depicted in the epics ‘Elim-ai’, ‘Bogenbai Batyr’ and ‘Kanzhygaly Bogenbai’. Kabanbai Batyr (c.1691-c.1769) from the Karakerei brach of Naimans was also a military leader whose life and battles against Jungars subsequently became epic tales, including ‘Er-Kabanbai’. Nauryzbai (1706-1781), Otegen (1699-1773), and Raiymbek (1705-1785) were also renowned batyrs of the Great Zhuz, who led the Kazakh tribes and forced the Jungars to leave Zheti-su. Zhankozha Batyr (1777-1860), who fought against the Khanates of Kokand and Khiva in the south and Russian forces in the north, was a leader of the Shekti clan of Small Zhuz and also a very popular leader. The last wave of batyrs, including Zhankozha, Isatai, and Syrym, appeared in the nineteenth century, fighting against Russian colonial expansion in contemporary Kazakhstan.

The first reason for the preference of batyrs as national heroes in Soviet Kazakh historiography was that in a pastoral nomadic society anyone could potentially become a batyr. This egalitarian fact was related to the socio-economic structure of these societies. In a pastoral nomadic group, everyone was at the same time a shepherd, artisan, hunter, and warrior. In the absence of a landed aristocracy, even a simple member of the society could become a batyr through his deeds. Hence, many batyrs had been simple shepherds as teenagers. Batyrs were self-made men for whom personal charisma and chance circumstances were key factors in their ascent.

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Nomadic culture glorified military adventure and heroic personal achievement.\textsuperscript{363} It is true that, in pastoral nomadic society, tribal membership also imposed strong bonds of communal obligations and loyalties on every individual. However, due to the inherent mobility of nomad life, which required self-reliance and ability to take responsibility for decisions, individual nomads remained autonomous agents, who if dissatisfied could move with their household and flocks to new locations.\textsuperscript{364} The administration of nomadic empires did not diminish the power of tribal leaders in a particular locality.\textsuperscript{365}

In fact, taking personal initiative to gain a place in a society was an ancient Turkic tradition, and not limited to the commoners. As explained in Oğuz-Name, each member of a tribe, after the age of fifteen, received a new and permanent name reflecting his birth, deeds, or abilities in his youth.\textsuperscript{366} For example, Kabanbai Batyr was named wild boar (Kaz. kaban), because as a teenager he had protected flocks of horses from a wild boar attack.\textsuperscript{367} This image of a ‘simple labourer transforming into a folk leader’ and the egalitarian system of a nomadic society were invaluable assets for the Soviet Kazakh literature and for national history writing. It offered a popular theme and a local symbol that could be incorporated into the Soviet narrative both in fine arts and national history. That is why instead of focusing on khans, Soviet Kazakh history writing centred on batyrs from the beginning.

Another reason for this preference for batyrs can be traced to Pokrovskiiian historiography. Pokrovskii and his colleagues were opposed to the emphasis on individuals such as emperors

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{363} T.J. Barfield, \textit{The Perilous Frontier}, p.2; T.J. Barfield, \textit{The Nomadic}, p. 131.
\item \textsuperscript{365} T.J. Barfield, \textit{The Perilous Frontier}, p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{366} Fazlallakh Rashid ad-Din, \textit{Oguz-Name} (Baku, 1987).
\item \textsuperscript{367} ‘Kabanbai Kozhakuly’, \textit{Kazakhstan: Natsional’naia entsiklopediia} (5 vols., Almaty, 2005), iii, p. 5.
\end{itemize}
and khans. They preferred to emphasize folk leaders, those who had led uprisings against their contemporary political structures. These figures, backed by popular support, were considered to be the real national leaders. Batyrs were ideal figures for conveying this revolutionary spirit. However, not every batyr was incorporated into the narrative. Shockingly enough, the batyrs who fought against Jungars in the eighteenth century (mentioned above) were absent from early Soviet historiography.\(^{368}\) In the Soviet Kazakh national history construction, the role of national hero and leader was played by some of the leaders of the nineteenth century uprisings against the Russian forces in the North Caspian plateau.

There are multiple reasons for selecting these leaders of anti-Russian nineteenth century uprisings. First, these uprisings occurred within the historical time limits that Pokrovskii and his colleagues found most relevant. They saw the French Revolution and the following centuries as the period most deserving of study. As the study groups at the first congress of Marxist historians in 1928/29 argued, world history commenced with the French Revolution, and Russian history with the 1861 reforms.\(^{369}\) While the French peasants were attacking the Bastille and Napoleon’s career was unfolding in Europe, the only significant thing occurring in Kazakh

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\(^{368}\) Three Kazakh researchers worked in 1917-1941 on the Dzungar attacks and batyrs of this period. However, all three were former members of Alash-Orda and were purged. Their works were re-published only after 1991: A. Bokeikhanov, *Istoricheskie sudby kirgizskogo naroda: izbrannoe* (Almaty, 1996). M.Tynyshpaev, *Istoriia kazakhskogo naroda* (Almaty, [1925] 1997); M. Dulatov, *Shygarmalary* (Almaty, 1994). This absence continued in the following decades. I.V. Erofeeva, ‘Sobytiia i liudi kazakhskoi stepi (epokha pozdnego srednevek’ia i novogo vremeni) Kak ob”ekt istoricheskoj remistifikatsii’, in N.E. Masanov, Zh.B.Abylkhozhin, I.V. Erofeeva, *Nauchnoe znanie i mifotvorchestvo v sovremennoi istoriografii Kazakhstana* (Almaty, 2007), pp. 132-224, p. 141.

\(^{369}\) *Trudy Pervoi vsesoizuznoi konferentsii istorikov-marksitov* (2 vols., Moscow, 1930), i, especially the section on the history of the peoples of the USSR, pp. 426-522. In the preface of this work Pokrovskii rejected the classical periodization of history and parallel departmental organizations. He enumerates four important questions that cover nearly the entire discipline of history: (1) imperialism, (2) bourgeois-democratic revolutions, (3) the history of working class, and (4) methodology. Another example: Iu. M. Bochkarov, A.Z. Ioannisani et al., *Uchebnik istorii klassovoi bor’by* (Moscow & Leningrad, 1931).
lands was Russian colonization and the resistance of Kazakh tribal confederations. Kazakhs seemed to appear for the first time in modern world history with their anti-colonial uprisings.

Secondly, the Kazakh revolts were similar to peasant revolts (or wars) in Germany and Russia. There was an ‘obvious’ dimension of class struggle that had to be revealed. The Kazakh nomads, akin to Russian or German peasants, revolted and fought against the imperialism of merchant capitalism. Pokrovskiiian historiography looked for analogies in every national history. In the 1920s, Pokrovskii interpreted various events, such as the Time of Troubles (1604-1613), the Pugachev Rebellion (1773-75) in Russian history, and the uprisings of the seventeenth century in Ukraine as examples of peasant wars. The uprisings in the Small and Inner Zhuz against Russian colonization possibly reveal that Kazakhs also had a revolutionary spirit, and that they were part of the materialist development pattern in history.

Thirdly, Kazakhs as an oppressed nation were opposed to their Russian oppressors-colonizers. Thus, it was a precious moment in history that could be depicted both as a class struggle of the labouring masses and as an anti-colonial movement. The Russian Empire was the colonizing power and the prison of the peoples of Central Asia. Kazakh tribal uprisings were anti-colonial movements. These priorities could also be seen in the resolution of the first All-union Turkology Congress in 1926. The congress called for closer attention to the modern [Ru.

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372 This was a popular theme for the Central Asian historians in this period. See: P. Galuzo, ‘Kolonial’naia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva v Srednei Azii’, Istorik Marksist, no. 9 (1928), pp. 128-33; P. Galuzo, Turkestans-kolonia (Moscow, 1929); V. Lavrent’ev, Kapitalizm v Turkestane, burzhuaznaia kolonizatsiia Srednei Azii (Leningrad, 1930).
noveishikh] epoch, economic and social history, and popular and revolutionary movements within the Turkic nationalities. This was part of a general ‘nihilist’ approach to the Russian history by Pokrovskiian historiography and revolutionaries in those days towards the Russian Empire and towards the pre-revolutionary research conducted by historians on Kazakhs.

Lastly, the preferences of Soviet Kazakh historiography in the 1920s and 1930s were also a result of easily available written records. Chinese, Arab, Eastern Roman, and Eastern Slavic records and the accounts of various travellers provided an important picture of the Desht-i Kypchak over the centuries. However, these records were limited and a great spectrum of languages needed to use them. The indigenous source on the batyrs who fought against Jungars or Central Asian khanates or emirates was folklore passed down by Zhiraus or Akyns (Turkic bards). However, the nomadic tribes of the Desht-i Kypchak did not leave written records of the events. Due to their proximity to Russia, there were many more written records in Russian archives on the social and political structure and economic developments in the Small and Inner Zhuzes than there were for the Middle or Great Zhuz. Additionally, the uprisings in the Middle and Inner Zhuzes and their struggles against Russian-Cossack forces were well recorded by the Russian bureaucratic apparatus, and most of these records were housed in the Orenburg archives.

Before moving to the nineteenth century uprisings, one discrepant example should be noted. Although from the beginning Soviet Kazakh national history construction focused on nineteenth century anti-Russian uprisings, A. Margulan presented one Nogai leader before the formation of

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373 ‘Rezoliutsii 1-go Vsesoiuznogo tiurkologicheskogo s’ezda’, Pervyi vsesoiuznyi tiurkologicheskii s’ezd (Baku, 1926), pp. 401-408, p. 403.
375 Some of these documents were published as the first volume of a planned multi-volume collection. Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR (1785-1828gg.) (Moscow and Leningrad, 1940) M.P. Viatkin prepared this volume. However, the editor of the volume (otvetstvennyi redaktor) was V.I. Lebedev. See for a detailed explanation on the sources: M.K. Kozybaev, ‘Kazakhskie istochniki po istorii XVIII-nachala XX vv.’, in M.K. Kozybaev, Problemy, pp. 120-145.
Kazakh Khanate as a Kazakh folk hero. By doing this, Margulan moved the beginning of the Kazakh nation back by one hundred years and incorporated a hero who had not fought against Russian colonials. The example Margulan presented was Edyge Batyr (1340-1419)\^376. Edyge was known from a widespread epic tale whose variants could be found in the folk narratives of Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, the nomadic Uzbek tribes, Nogais, Turkmen, Bashkir, Barabin, Taranchi, Crimean Tatars, Siberian Tatars, and the Turkic people of Altai.\^377 They all shared the heritage of the Nogai Horde. The importance of the Edyge epic tale was akin to that of the *Slovo o Polku Igoreve* of the Eastern Slavs or *Manas* of Kyrgyz. As mentioned earlier, the volatile past of the Desht-i Kypchak did not allow for well-marked, stable boundaries. Figures of the past, such as Edyge, who were nationalized or incorporated into the national history, could be easily claimed by others as well.\^378 The incorporation of Edyge into Tatar national history starts in the nineteenth century, when Tatar scholars in Kazan and Russian orientalists worked on Edyge.\^379 The nationalization of the Edyge epic by Kazakhs begins with Chokan Valikhanov, who recorded the Kazakh version with his father Sultan Cengis and described it as “the most outstanding Kirgiz [Kazakh] dzhir”.\^380 Margulan followed Valikhanov’s interpretation and wrote an essay on Edyge in 1940. He first recalled his Nogay origins, but then asserted:

\^376 ‘Edyge’, *Kazakhstan: National’naia entsiklopediia* (5 vols., Almaty, 2005), ii, pp. 231-2. This is the Kazakh pronunciation; however, there are other variants: Edige-Bek, Edigu, Edygei, Idigei, Idegei, Idikgii.
\^377 A.S. Orlov, *Kazakhskii*, p. 5
\^378 According to A.Z.V. Togan, it was artificial to designate these epic tales as national tales of particular Turkic nations. The Chagatai was used as the written language among all Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Volga even in the nineteenth century and it would be more proper to define these epic tales as belonging to the Middle Turks (Orta türkler) – Kazakh, Uzbek, Tatar, and Nogai. A.Z.V. Togan, *Türkili Haritası ve Ona Ait İzahlar* (Istanbul, 1943), p. 21.
The epic tale of Edyge [...] remains a masterpiece of Kazakh national poetry. [...] The poem on ‘Edyge’ is a genius work of Kazakh folk epic. It should be studied by our scientific researchers of organizations on literature and prepared for publication.\(^{381}\)

Margulan went on to depict Edyge Batyr as a folk hero who fought for his people and against internal and external oppressors. While all the other Kazakh heroes who were praised had fought against the Russian colonialist Empire, Edyge fought against Germanic-Teutonic Knights with the Muscovite forces. He was therefore a unique example in the historiography produced during this period. As will be shown in the next chapter, this work of Margulan became a headache for him after the Second World War.

2.2.2. NINETEENTH CENTURY ANTI-RUSSIAN UPRISING LEADERS.

The works of A.F. Riazanov in the 1920s on the Kazakh tribal revolts of the nineteenth century provided a Pokrovskiiian interpretation of anti-Russian uprisings.\(^{382}\) At the same time, his books on the revolts of the Small and Inner Zhuzes in 1797-1838 also elevated three tribal or regional events onto an anti-colonial all-national scale. These uprisings were labouring people’s revolts against the colonialists and the local exploiting rulers who had collaborated with the Russians. At the same time, according to the title, these revolts aimed at ‘national independence’. However, the content depicted these revolts as ‘progressive peasant’ uprisings against a European colonial power. The final claim of the title—and the whole book—was that these uprisings caused a chain reaction. From Syrym to Kenesary, all leaders were representatives of one idea, one goal, over half a century. Riazanov presented leaders and heroes in detail and granted them a central role only in order to emphasize these aspects. For instance, Syrym Batyr and Karatai Sultan were

\(^{381}\) A. Margulan, ‘Edyge i Oor-Mamai’, Literatura i iskusstvo Kazakhstana, no.2 (1940), pp. 92-7, p. 92

\(^{382}\) A.F. Riazanov, Vosstaniia Isatai Taimanova (1836-1838), (Kzyl-Orda, 1927); A.F. Riazanov, Sorok let bor‘by za natsional’nuiu nezavisimost’ kazakskogo naroda (1797-1838g.) (Kzyl-Orda, 1928). To write these works Riazanov used extensively the archives of the border department of the Orenburg Governorship.

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defined as “historical figures around whom Kirgiz [Kazakh] parties assembled”.

At the same time, there was a clear difference between the uprisings led by sultans (Kazakh aristocracy) and those led by popular batyrs. Isatai Taimanov was an illiterate batyr challenging the khan in an attempt to eliminate the exploiting classes of landowners as well as the despot. In the narrative Isatai was placed on the imaginary line drawn by Soviet historiography from Spartacus to the Bolsheviks as a leader of the labouring classes. Before the revolt, Isatai Batyr had been confined in a Russian prison for petty offences (murder and burglary). According to Riazanov, this experience was “an inescapable school of all great revolutionaries”. Here we are invited by the author to recall the Russian Revolutionaries who ‘sacrificed’ their lives and spent years in prisons and in exile for the sake of the labouring masses. At this point, Riazanov counted three individuals as “Kazakh revolutionaries”: Isatai Batyr (Taimanov), Mukhamed Utemisov, and Sultan Kaip Gali Ishimov. These three were elevated to the pantheon of national history.

As described in the previous chapter, western Kazakhstan followed a completely different trajectory from the eastern Kazakh regions. As a matter of fact, these uprisings were not all-Kazakh movements, simply because there was no unifying Kazakh national identity or organization at the time. Rather, these revolts were mostly confined to a single zhuz. Moreover, most of these resistance movements were organized by a section (one or two tribes) of a zhuz. The leaders that were mentioned could not control all people of a zhuz. Though Riazanov wrote

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383 A.F. Riazanov, Sorok, 12.
385 A.F. Riazanov, Sorok, pp. 288-298; A.F. Riazanov, Vosstanie, 6-15, It should be noted that the contemporary Russian administration preferred to label Isatai and his followers a ‘disturbance’ (vozmosuchenie), instead of an ‘uprising’ or ‘revolt’ (vosstanie, miatezh). Most probably, the administration did not assign a political character to this movement; see: A.F. Riazanov, Vosstanie, p. 82, footnote.
386 A.F. Riazanov, Vosstanie, pp. 16-17.
according to the Pokrovskiian rules, he successfully constructed a national history by using regional events.

S. Asfendiiarov, another follower of Pokrovskii in Kazakhstan, wrote the next history of the people of the Kazakh lands, in 1935. In the first part of the book, he summarizes the period before the emergence of the Kazakhs in several sections, including ‘The State of Huns’, ‘The Turkish period of the history of Central Asia’, ‘The Mongol period of the history of Central Asia’, and ‘The Period of Timur’. In these early chapters of Asfendiiarov’s Istoriia, individuals and leaders rarely figured in the narrative. When they did, they had little significance. They were like shooting stars, unexpectedly appearing, and immediately disappearing, in the narrative. Relatively longer sections were devoted to Genghis-Khan and Kublai Khan, who seemed to achieve some status as independent figures. However, the spirit of Pokrovskii was still present. According to the history of Asfendiiarov:

The descendants of Kublai Khan, under the title of the Yuan dynasty, were representatives of the interests of the landed aristocracy and commercial capital. [...] Chagatai and his sons, to a considerable extent, served the interests of the commercial capital of Turkestan.

In Central Asia there was constant conflict between “feudal-nomads” and the sedentary “commercial bourgeoisie”. Amir Timur was merely a “hangman of commercial capital”. Asfendiiarov, criticizing Tynyshpaev, chose not to identify Dzhanybek, Girei, Khak-Nazar, and Taukel’ as purely Kazakh Khans. According to Asfendiiarov, during this period Kazakh identity

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387 S. D. Asfendiiarov, Istoriia...
390 S.D. Asfendiiarov, Istoriia, p. 80, 81.
391 S.D. Asfendiiarov, Istoriia, p. 82-84.
was not clearly differentiated from Uzbek or Nogai identity.\textsuperscript{392} For Asfendiiarov, the development of a Kazakh feudal structure at the end of sixteenth century was more significant than these semi-Kazakh Khans.\textsuperscript{393} The temporary union of zhuzes under Esim Khan, Abulkhair Khan, and others was downplayed and these names mentioned only once.\textsuperscript{394} Khans did not play a decisive role in Asfendiiarov’s history. Even in the acceptance of the Russian suzerainty, it was not the individual khans, but the feudal aristocracy of Kazakhs, who were mainly serving the interests of traders and whose class interests were under threat from the Oirats, that made the decision. In return, Russian colonial rule agreed to protect their interests.\textsuperscript{395}

In Asfendiiarov’s history, Syrym Batyr (Datov) appeared as the first Kazakh hero and a significant leader in the history of Kazakhs. Syrym is described as “the leader of the movement, […] the chief enemy of sultans [aristocrats], and the popular leader of the masses”. Moreover, this movement was “a revolutionary movement of masses”.\textsuperscript{396} Isatai Batyr (Taimanov) was described as a leader of “the struggle of enslaved masses against ‘white-bones’ [Kazakh feudal aristocrats]” and, a bit later, “against Tsarism”. In the end, he also escaped to the Khanate of Khiva.\textsuperscript{397} Ironically, the Khanate of Khiva was depicted as a safe haven for the Kazakh ‘revolutionaries’ escaping from the Tsarist prison of nations.

The unpublished history of Kazakhstan that was prepared by the commission in 1936 also followed the Pokrovskiiian approach. Heroes and enemies mostly appeared in the last 300 years of the history. In the chapters on Russian domination, the leaders of tribal revolts were counted

\textsuperscript{394} S.D. Asfendiiarov, \textit{Istoriiia}, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{397} S.D. Asfendiiarov, \textit{Istoriiia}, pp. 163-166.
as the leaders of “nomad-peasant” uprisings. Syrym Datov of the Small Zhuz was one of them. The planning of the textbook suggested that further research had to be done on the revolts of Eset (Iset) Batyr, Beket Batyr, Dzhangodzhi, and Sadyk, and on the uprising of 1869-70 in western Kazakhstan. Although their movements never spread to all three zhuzes, again, these figures were elevated to a national level. A reference in the text to Stalin’s interview with Emil Ludwig in 1931 shed light on the type of leaders that could be included. In fact, both Tomsinskii, at the beginning of his book on the peasant revolts, and Asfendiiarov, in his Istoriia, quoted this part of the interview. Stalin advised historians to define “national leaders and heroes”. Kazakh Pugachovs and Razins had to be identified and elevated to hero status. Asfendiiarov was not alone in this endeavor. Although his name was absent from documents, Tomsinskii, as head of the history section, contributed to this abstract. Both Tomsinskii and Asfendiiarov faithfully followed Stalin’s 1931 instructions.

Likewise, the 31st volume of the Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, covering Kazakhstan and published in 1937, was written according to the Pokrovskiiian approach. The article did not mention a single leader or hero until the uprising of Syrym Batyr (Datov) at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Syrym was presented as “a popular leader of a big movement of the Kazakh masses”. Isatai Taimanov, Mukhambet Utemisov, and Kenesary Kasymov were also mentioned. The expansion of the Russian Empire towards the Kazakh steppe was explained as being motivated by “the demands of commercial capitalism”. Russians were presented as the foreign

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398 KRPM, 141-1-10587-324, May 28, 1936.
399 S.G. Tomsinskii, Ocherki, p. 3; S.D. Asfendiiarov, Istoriia, p. 171.
intervention that enabled the indigenous exploitation of the Kazakh people. Jungar (Oirats) were presented as the enemies of the nation. The article acknowledged that it was Chinese intervention that eliminated the Jungar threat, and did not grant Russians the status of “liberator”. An earlier agreement of vassalage by the Small and the Middle Zhuzes with the Russian Empire was accounted for in a contradictory and ambiguous way: an attempt to gain Russian support against the Jungar threat and a result of the colonial policies of Russia. Among the uprisings of the nineteenth century, the controversial insurgency of Kenesary was also included, yet there was no indication that it had been against Russian rule. Actually, all uprisings were defined as a class struggle of the masses against the Kazakh ‘feudal’ rulers.\(^{402}\)

Shestakov, in his book *Istoriia SSSR* published in 1937, mentioned only one Kazakh figure, Syrym Batyr, while the khans of Small Zhuz (Horde) were accused of betraying their own people by assisting the Russians in conquering Kazakh lands:

“Against their traitor-khans and the subjugation of Kazakh people to the Russian Tsar, the Kazaks revolted more than once. In 1783, brave Sarym [Syrym] Datov became the leader of the revolting Kazakh people. For fourteen years, Kazakh people fought against their enemies under the leadership of the fearless leader Syrym, who became the hero of [his] people. Sarym was killed by the enemies and the uprising was suppressed. [...] In the first half of the nineteenth century, all Kazakhstan was conquered [by the Russians].”\(^{403}\)

It seems that Shestakov’s history had abandoned ‘the lesser evil’ formula, once Russians enter the Kazakh steppes. In the narrative, there was no difference between Russians, Central Asian khanates, and China. They all represented rivals who wanted to rule the Kazakhs. However, after


\(^{403}\) Shestakov, *Istoriia*, pp. 73-74.
the publication of his book, Shestakov added that the Russian conquest of the Kazakh steppe was a ‘lesser evil’ for the Kazakhs.404

Leading Kazakh historians Tynyshpaev and Asfendiiarov were purged in 1938, however, they were never accused of studying the nineteenth century anti-Russian uprisings. During the Great Terror, V.F. Shakhmatov and L. P. Mamet, young Kazakh historians, who were influenced by Pokrovskiiian historiography, continued to work on ‘The Revolt of Kazakhs under the Leadership of Isatai Taimanov in Bukei [Inner] Zhuz, in 1836-1838’.405 Nineteen thirty-six or 1937 could have been declared the centennial of the uprising of Isatai Taimanov. However, the continuous purges in the academy and in the Party did not permit this event to be celebrated on a grand scale. According to the report of the secretary of the KazFAN in 1939, the history section prepared a draft for the celebrations and sent it to the TsK of the KP(b)K and SNK KazSSR.406 Though these celebrations did not take place, Kazakh historians continued to collect documents about “the people’s uprisings of Isetai [Isatai] Taimanov and Makhambet, and the Adaev uprisings”, and also worked on “the history of the [Russian] colonial seizure of Semirechie”.407 After his colleague Mamed was purged, V. F. Shakhmatov continued to work on ‘The Revolt of Kazakhs under the Leadership of Isatai Taimanov in 1836-1838’.408 In 1940, the title of the manuscript was altered to “The Uprising of Kazakh Labourers in 1836-39 under the leadership of Isatai Taimanov and Makhambet Utemisov”. The insurgents were no longer Kazakhs as a whole, but Kazakh labourers, shifting the emphasis away from the purely ‘national’. The work was

405 KRPM, 708-2.1-752-30 (the first half of 1938).
406 KRPM, 708-2.2-66-2ob, April 9, 1939.
407 KRPM, 708-2.2-66-2ob, April 9, 1939
described as “one of the glorious pages of the revolutionary national-independence struggles of Kazakh labourers against the colonial yoke of tsarism and its agents—bais, mullas, sultans”.\(^\text{409}\) In this formulation, there was a remarkable mixture of national and socialist discourse.

The first official version of Kazakh history from ancient times until the 1870s was written by M.P. Viatkin and his team in Leningrad and it was published in 1941. In this account, Viatkin presented various leaders, such as Mode [Mete] of the Huns, Shabolo-Khilishi of the Western branch of the Turkic Khanate, Sultan Sanjar of the Seljuks, Genghis-Khan and his descendants (Dzhuchi, Batu, Sheiban), and Timur. However, none of them were described as ancient or medieval national leaders. Contrary to the Azerbaijani case, none of these leaders or their polities was stamped as ‘Kazakh’, because the narrative did not aim to primordialize the national history. According to the text, the Mongol period was significant because it firmly established a feudal system in Kazakhstan. Departing from the argument in other national histories, Viatkin suggested that Mongols did not only have a destructive impact in the region, but also contributed to the socio-economic development of the people living in contemporary Kazakhstan.\(^\text{410}\) Viatkin celebrated the khans Dzhanibek and Girei in the sixteenth century as the first leaders of the Kazakh Union.\(^\text{411}\) However, as mentioned above, they were not named national leaders, as the nation did not exist yet. After that, Kasym Khan came to the fore as the Khan of Kazakhs. He established an alliance with the Mongols against the Uzbeks. As a ruler, he was strong enough to pursue independent policies with his neighbours. The last years of his

\(^{409}\) KRPM, 708-3.1-789-25/26 (the first quarter of 1940). In order to create a feudal period, Bais (or Bei/Bey in other Turkic dialects and languages) played the role of feudal seniors in the Kazakh Soviet historiography, while sultans were designated as aristocrats.

\(^{410}\) M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, pp. 40-57, on Genghis Khan and his descendants, pp. 58-72, on Timur, pp. 72-74.

\(^{411}\) M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, pp. 77-78.
reign brought peace and prosperity to Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{412} When Viatkin examined the following Kazakh khans, he did not emphasize a particular khan as a national hero.\textsuperscript{413} Khak-Nazar and Tauke Khan were more charismatic figures. “This Khan [Tauke] in the eyes of his contemporaries resurrected the powerful Union of Kazakhs as it had been in the times of Kasym and Khak-Nazar. Kazakh domains were united again under the rule of one khan”. At the same time, Tauke Khan was the first ruler of Kazakhs who asked for suzerainty under the Russian Tsar. Viatkin explained this as a necessity against the Jungar danger. Tauke was also renowned for his reforms and particularly his juridical codifications.\textsuperscript{414} However, Viatkin claimed that when these Kazakh khan faced Jungars during the Great Calamity of 1723-1730, they could not organize a resistance. In a Pokrovskian way, Viatkin championed the toiling classes as the backbone of this patriotic resistance. Here, three leaders of ordinary origins (black bones) appeared in the history: Taichek of the Small Zhuz, Sairyk of the Great Zhuz, and Bogenbai, an elder from the Middle Zhuz.

In the following episode, Abulkhair of the Small Zhuz emerged as the khan who came to an agreement with the Russians. His political goal was to re-establish the Kazakh Union. However, his union was a feudal confederation and not a centralized structure. For this reason Viatkin determined Abulkhair to be out-dated. He also included four popular batyrs who limited the rule of the khan: Iset, Bogenbai, Khudai-Nazar, and Zhanibek. However, these accounts of batyrs resisting Jungars in the eighteenth century were surprisingly shorter than his descriptions of anti-Russian uprisings in the following chapter.\textsuperscript{415} Subsequently, Abulkhair Khan led the Small Zhuz and some elements of the Middle Zhuz towards the Russian rule. According to Viatkin, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{412} M.P. Viatkin, \textit{Ocherki}, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{413} M.P. Viatkin, \textit{Ocherki}, (Tagir Khan) pp. 88-89.
\textsuperscript{414} M.P. Viatkin, \textit{Ocherki}, pp. 103-107.
\end{footnotesize}
leadership of Ablai Khan was an important factor. His capacity to unify the Middle Zhuz provided him with the strength to resist tsarism. He managed to become, with his Middle Zhuz, a vassal of the Chinese and Russian empires at the same time. In practice, he maintained the independence of the Middle Zhuz. “This was the greatest achievement of the policy of Ablai”, Viatkin wrote. \(^{416}\)

After 1771, Ablai became Khan of both the Middle and Great Zhuz, and went on to rule for another decade. He expanded the power of the khan as an institution against the council of elders. This could be easily interpreted as the beginning of centralization. Nevertheless, Viatkin preferred to emphasize class conflict, concluding that the increasing power of the khan engendered hardship for the Kazakh labouring classes. \(^{417}\)

Viatkin, in his history of Kazakhs (1941) followed Pokrovskiiian rules. He devoted a long chapter for the nineteenth century anti-Russian uprisings, and interpreted most of them as “anti-colonial”, “nomad-peasant” uprisings. According to Viatkin, Syrym Datov’s movement could not fully possess the characteristics of a peasant war because the leaders of the movement were elders and notables of different clans within the Small Zhuz. The elders simply wanted a submissive khan and they manipulated the masses for ‘a good khan’. Viatkin pointed to similarities with the peasant uprisings in Russia for ‘a good tsar’. Syrym Batyr, on the other hand, wanted the liquidation of the khan as an institution. At a later stage, after 1791, he fought against the khan and Russian colonial rule. In his struggle, he found an external ally in Bukhara. However, Viatkin emphasized that Syrym was careful to avoid any binding obligations in this alliance. He hoped to establish that Syrym was not a ‘cat’s paw’. The progressive side of the movement was a liberating movement of ‘nomad peasants’ against the colonial aims of

\(^{416}\) M.P. Viatkin, *Ocherki*, p. 179.
tsarism, with Syrym leading the labouring masses. The courage and heroism of the masses had to be noticed. Viatkin, echoing Stalin, claimed that the movement was unsuccessful because the proletariat was absent as the leading class. Kazakhs were a patriarchal-tribal society and tribal allegiance was very strong. For this reason the movement could not be a feudal-serf conflict, and could not be successful. Syrym never aimed to abolish the existing patriarchal-tribal structure. However, he acted against the elders and notables, and according to Viatkin, this was enough for the Kazakh masses to remember him as a hero. Another uprising in the Inner Zhuz was led by Isatai Batyr (Taimanov). Although Viatkin identified the previous events as movements, he named the case of Isatai Taimanov an ‘uprising’. Moreover, this uprising was “unique in the first half of the nineteenth century of the history of Kazakhstan, for clearly bearing the characteristics of a peasant war”. Viatkin explained this ‘uniqueness’ with ‘socio-economic change’. The revolt provided an image of uprising peasants burning down the manor of the lord and grabbing his land. This image convinced Viatkin to name this uprising a genuine ‘peasant war’. He concluded, “All of these were typical for a peasant war”. The oppressed and exploited peasant masses were opposed to the feudal sultans and the despot khan Zhangir.

Viatkin was in complete agreement with Riazanov and Asfendiiarov by repeating Pokrovskiian interpretations. What Viatkin offered was a novel explanation for the defeat of Isatai and Srym. According to Viatkin, the primary reason for both defeats was the absence of a revolutionary struggle of the working class (proletariat). That is why it was easy for the sultans and the Tsar to suppress Isatai’s movement. Consequently, the failure of Isatai showed “for the second time on

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418 M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, pp. 197-203.
419 M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, pp. 210-212.
420 M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, p. 257.
421 M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, p. 258.
a grand scale that freedom of the labouring masses was connected in an unbreakable way to the
downfall of autocracy in Russia”.422

2.2.3. KENESARY KASYMOV AND HIS REVOLT.

From the beginning of Kazakh national history construction, Kenesary Kasymov, the Khan of the Middle Zhuz, and his uprising (1837-47) presented a controversial issue for Soviet Kazakh historiography. In the 1920s it was a popular theme, along with other anti-tsarist uprisings. Riazanov worked on the uprising and prepared a monograph. Another work on Kenesary by A. Bokeikhanov was published in Tashkent, the academic centre of Central Asia in those years.423 In 1924 M. Auezov, a young and promising Kazakh writer of the time, wrote a play, ‘Khan-Kene’, apparently following the example of another historical play, ‘Pugashchevchina’ by K. A.Trenev. However, the play and its author were denounced for favourably presenting the khanate as an institution. Nineteenth-century Kazakhstan was full of popular anti-tsarist sentiments, but to present a khan as the leader of the nation was not acceptable. When discussions of this issue flared up in the summer of 1934, an article appeared simultaneously in Kazakhstankaia Pravda and Sotsialdy Kazakstan. The article warned:

“In the play ‘Khan-Kene’, the class nature of this last khan is obscure—he moves on stage as the leader and commander of the Kazakh nation and dies as a hero, suffering for the nation, but the nation, especially the Dulats, appear in the role of betrayers of their hero”.424

Another newspaper article critical of the play appeared in August. This article, written by Kabulov, the head of kultprop of KazKraikom VKP(b), demanded that the fine arts reflect socialist realism. Among other features, socialist realism had the mission of

422 M.P. Viatkin, Ocherki, p. 258.
423 A. Bokeikhanov (pseudonym K. Stepniak), Materialy k istorii sultana Kenesary Kasymova: vospominaniia kara-kirgiza Kaligully Alibekova o poslednikh dnikah Kenesary (Tashkent, 1923)
“education of laboring masses in the spirit of socialism, [it should bear] ‘objective’ depictions, snapshots. [...] Let us take, for example, the last work of our playwright comrade Auezov, ‘Khan-Kene’. This work contains idealization of heroism and boldness of the khan’s descendants, and together with this, there is an attempt at reconciling this boldness and heroism with the dominant contemporary worldview. There is a fabrication of fraternization in the Kenesary movement. [...] In general, the play ‘Khan-Kene’ [...] provides an idealization of the khanate’s social system [khanski stroi].” 425

These comments on the play also provided an idea of how national history was supposed to interpret Kenesary Kasymov and his uprising.

As a follower of Pokrovskii, Asfendiiarov did not sympathize with Kenesary Khan. According to Asfendiiarov, Kenesary Kasymov initiated a revolt because of the circumstances. In other words, he did not have a “progressive political agenda”. He escaped from the pressure of the Khanate of Kokand towards the northern territories of the Middle Zhuz, where his winter pastures were located. However, other sultans who had close relations with the Russian administration occupied these territories. Kenesary could see no alternative but to revolt. It was not about ideology, toilers, or nation. He simply found himself at a dead-end. Eventually the revolt gained its own momentum and Kenesary conducted a “partisan war”. The movement expanded and gained new recruits and supporters. 426 Asfendiiarov was aware of the fact that, unlike Isetai Batyr, Kenesary was a khan. That is why he added this note:

It is absolutely clear that Kenesary, as a distinct feudal, tried to secure the seat of khan[;] the reactionary side in his actions and in the motives of his policies (especially the fight against Kyrgyz) can be easily seen. However, this circumstance in any case does not minimize the revolutionary character of the movement of Kazakh masses. 427

In the following pages he added that Kenesary merely wanted to be khan, attacking the clans that did not accept his rule, such as Dzhappas, and occupying Kyrgyz lands. In other words, the leader could be reactionary or may have had personal interests. However, it was the

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revolutionary masses dictating the course of history, with the leader becoming a passive idol. Asfendiiarov accepted that the uprising was a popular revolt and in time the massive participation of peasant-nomads changed the revolt from a reactionary-monarchical to a progressive peasant class struggle. In this way his history adjusted Kazakh past into Pokrovskii’s theses. However, he was not always consistent in his evaluations. According to Asfendiiarov:

> the character of Kazakh liberation movements in the period of the conquest of Kazakhstan by tsarism was spontaneous peasant uprisings against colonial theft [and] against the feudal yoke.  

They also constituted a distinctive part of the global resistance of labourers against the imperialist-colonizers. He connected Kazakh revolts to those in other colonial territories: India, Malay, Sudan (led by Makhdii), and recent developments in the Middle East. In all these revolts, the common fact was that local peasants raised the flag of liberty against European capitalism and the indigenous feudal aristocracy collaborating with the occupant-colonizers.  

In 1936, when the Bolsheviks of Kazakhstan wanted to prepare a book on their republic for the next Congress of the Soviets of the USSR, the theory of Kazakh ‘voluntary subjugation’ (Ru. *dobrovol’noe poddanstvo*) to Russia in the nineteenth century was labelled a fabrication. Tsarism was depicted as a “military-feudal imperialism”. Tsarist rule was vilified in order to emphasize the achievements of the new regime in the successive pages. The anti-colonial fighters Syrym Datov and Isatai Taimanov were on the list as usual. However, Kenesary Kasymov was left off at the last moment.  It was good to criticize the Tsarist period and depict the tribal uprisings against Russian forces as glorious days, but the leading figure could not be a khan. This policy continued in the following years. When Shakhmatov worked on the revolts of the 1840-

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430 KRPM, 141-1-10592-158, September 1936.
50s with his colleague A. Iakunin in the first half of 1939, Kenesary Kasymov and his uprising were still off the list. It seems that historians did not want to emphasize this problematic figure.\textsuperscript{431}

Following the purges of 1936-38, the Kazakh historian A. Margulan, an assistant at that time, began to work in the second half of 1939 on “the uprising of Kazakhs in 1837-47 (Kenesary Kasymov)” by collecting archival materials. At this stage, these archival sources were supposed to be added to the collection of materials prepared by the Institute of History in Moscow and the KazFAN on the history of Kazakhstan. That is why the materials collected by Margulan were immediately sent to Moscow for analysis.\textsuperscript{432} However, the collection on the history of Kazakhstan printed in 1940 did not include these materials on the revolt of Kenesary.\textsuperscript{433} Though the materials on 1830-1840 were ready for publication, the scope of the volume ended at 1828. It was a well-known fact that Kenesary fought against the Russians, yet this aspect of his resistance cannot be taken as the reason for its exclusion, because all the other uprisings mentioned in the text were also against the Russians.\textsuperscript{434} By being a khan with a strong character, and unifying different clans through his personality, he could have easily been elevated to a leader of the national independence movement against a non-Kazakh state. However, with the abundance of batyrs, it would have been controversial to show a khan as a leader of the labouring masses. That is why Viatkin described his movement as merely an anti-colonial

\textsuperscript{431} KRPM, 708-3.1-788-43/45, May 31, 1939.
\textsuperscript{432} These materials and the text on the uprising were supposed to constitute a separate book, and they were included in the project of the four-volume history of KazSSR, for the future. KRPM, 708-3.1-789-26, first quarter of 1940.

\textsuperscript{433} \textit{Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi}.

\textsuperscript{434} In addition to the Kenesary revolt, the history section had other purely anti-Russian themes for research such as ‘The Colonial Seizure of Priirtysh and Semirech’ and ‘The uprising of Kazakhs in 1916’.

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national-liberation movement against “Russian Tsarism” and “the khanates of Kokand and Khiva”, leaving out any dimension of a revolutionary struggle of the working class.\textsuperscript{435}

In summary, the history of the Kazakhs continued to show Pokrovskiiian tendencies. Akin to the incomplete explanation of ethnogenesis, the narrative on national heroes and leaders did not aim at any kind of primordialization of the history. The Kazakhs and their leaders appear in history very late. The leaders or heroes who were included in the narrative were surprisingly Pokrovskiiian. Instead of great khans or biis, they were predominantly batyrs. As outlined above, pastoral nomadic society had its distinct characteristics, and batyrs were a convenient subject for the Soviet narrative. The reawakening of Russian national narrative after 1934-36 did not constitute a barrier for Kazakh national history writing to emphasize the anti-Russian uprisings of the nineteenth century. In 1941, history classes on the Uprising of Isatai Taimanov were still in the lecture lists.\textsuperscript{436} Kenesary’s uprising was the only exclusion, and this was because instead of a batyr, it was led by khan. Nevertheless, when the Society of Studying Kazakhstan was founded under the SNK KazSSR in February 1941, the planned publication on “legendary national heroes” still included Kenesary Kasymov.\textsuperscript{437}

\section*{2.3. UKRAINE IN 1936-1941.}

In order to end the pre-Soviet discussions mentioned in the first chapter, the Ukrainian Soviet narrative not only historicized Russian-Ukrainian friendship, but also constructed a primordial

\textsuperscript{436} \textit{KROMM}, 1692-1-514 (1941).
\textsuperscript{437} \textit{KRPM}, 708-5.1-673-15,16, February 15, 1941.
brotherhood through a long shared history with eastern Slavdom. This would be an optimum solution between the Russian and Ukrainian theses. Historicizing Ukrainian and Russian brotherhood would also provide legitimacy for the contemporary union. The Soviet idea was to create a spirit of commonwealth among the three eastern Slavic nations by manipulating history. Another feature of the Ukrainian Soviet national narrative, which was constructed after 1936, was its strong anti-Polish language. In increasing anticipation of a Polish-German attack, Ukrainian history gradually emphasized an anti-Polish aspect and aimed to bring Ukrainian and Russian narratives as close as possible, in order to provide a common spirit for Russians and Ukrainians for when Polish-German occupation forces would cross the Soviet border in the near future. Thus, souring relations with Poland in the interwar period, and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, can be counted as important political factors in the construction of a historical


439 N. Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland in Two Volumes (2 vols., Oxford, 1981), ii, p. 404; P. R. Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (London, 1993), p. 131. According to the memoirs of the counsel of the American Mission to Poland in 1919, the Poles and Ukrainians in all Galician territories were almost equally divided. There were about four and a half million Poles and three and a half million Ukrainians. A.L. Goodhart, Poland and The Minority Races (London, 1920). In 1921, when the borders of Poland were formed, national minorities constituted nearly one third of the twenty one million citizens. Ukrainians formed the largest of the territorial minorities. They lived in the provinces of L'vov, Stanislawow, Tarnopol, and Volynia and to a lesser extent in the provinces of Polesia and Lublin. N. Davies, God’s Playground, ii, p.404-10; J. Lukowski and H. Zawadzki, A Concise
Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood and for an anti-Polish discourse. However, this narrative of common roots was utilized for the first time when the Red Army crossed the same border in the opposite direction and annexed the Polish Ukraine in 1939.

2.3.1 THE KIEVAN RUS’: THE MIGHTY STATE OF EASTERN SLAVS.

The origin of the Kievan Rus’ had been a battleground for historians since the eighteenth century. While the Normanist school of historians claimed that the founders of the Kievan Rus’ were Nordic Vikings who gradually Slavisized, the Anti-Normanist school saw the arrival of the Normans as a later stage following the foundation of the Kievan Rus’ by the autochthonous Slavic people. The first Normanist claim came from a historian of German origin, Gerhard Friedrich Müller (1705-1783), who was the official imperial historiographer and a member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. Following Müller, numerous scholars, many of them with German or Scandinavian origins, became adherents of this view. August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845), a German historian and a key figure in Orientalist scholarship in Germany, argued, “Slavs everywhere and under all circumstances are destined to slavery (a word which derives from them, without a doubt) [...] a Slavic nation needs foreign infusions into the whole mass”, just as the Germanic Norsemen had shaped the genesis of Russian statehood.

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the views of the Normanist theory, German historians such as Peisker energetically aimed to prove that Slavs were incapable of developing a state structure. Thus, the Kievan Rus’ was not only claimed by the Russian imperial (and later Ukrainian national) narrative; it was also incorporated into Germanic discourse as part of German national history. According to Peisker, there had never been a Slavic state in history and Slavs could not maintain themselves without a Germanic or Altaian warrior stratum. These states were, at best, either Germano-Slavic or Altaio-Slavic, and Slavs deserved to be either slaves or serfs. He wrote:

All so-called Slavic states for which we have sufficient information turn out to have either Germanic or Altaian foundations. [...] We must not represent the remaining Slavic states as being of Slavic origin merely because there is no express statement of their German or Altaian origin. 442

While the Russian imperial narrative fought against German claims, the Ukrainian national history completed by Hrushevs'kyi also made claims on the Kievan Rus’ during the same period. The Kievan Rus’, as the first great polity representing the Golden Age of the nation, became an important element for both Ukrainian and Russian narratives. For the Russian narrative, removing the Kievan Rus’ would mean that the start of Russian statehood would have to take the diminished form of a small principality in the middle of the remote northern forests that revolted from Mongol-Tatar rule as late as in the fifteenth century. This was not so desirable for either the emerging Russian national identity or the Russian imperial narrative. The Kievan Rus’, for the Ukrainian narrative, represented a Ukrainian state that provided an example of a stable state form within the recorded history. This historical state allowed contemporary nationalist discourse to claim a ‘re-emergence’ or ‘re-awakening’ of the nation. Ukrainians were not alone in this perception of history. The Poles, whose republic had vanished more than a century

earlier, could claim the old Polish Kingdom of the eleventh century, while the Czechs could point to the Principality of Bohemia. In order to become a ‘historic’ nation, Ukrainian national history had to include the Kievan Rus’. 443

Another disputed issue was the original eastern Slavic population of the Kievan Rus’ area. Russian historians M.P. Pogodin, an adherent of the Normanist theory, and M.A. Maksymovich initiated this discussion, which was also known as ‘the Quarrel between the Southerners and Northerners’. In 1856, Pogodin claimed that the Kievan area and the Dnieper River basin had originally been populated by the Great Russians, who were forced by invading Mongol-Tatar armies to move north. While these Great Russian tribes re-established their state—the Muscovy—the areas they deserted in the south were repopulated by the Little Russians, who had immigrated from Subcarpathia. The Cossacks, according to Pogodin, were a separate Slavic-Turkic tribe. It was the Great Russians, not the Little Russians (Ukrainians), who had created the Kievan Rus’ state. 444 Maksymovych, criticizing Pogodin’s arguments, claimed that the ancestors of the Ukrainians inhabited the Kievan region before and after the Tatar invasion, and that Kievan Rus’ should therefore be considered part of Ukrainian history. 445

The Ukrainian Soviet historiography did not initiate these debates, but merely inherited them from the previous decades. However, these discussions temporarily became meaningless, when Pokrovskii started to destroy all imperial and national narratives in the 1920s. Pokrovskii confirmed that the Rurik dynasty was from Sweden, but rejected the Normanist theories and


argued that the idea that “the beginning of statehood was allegedly brought to us by princes overseas is out of the question”. However, this was not the most important issue, for “Russian princes [of Rus’] were as patriarchal as lords as were their Slavic contemporaries”. In his Russkaia Istoriia v Samom Szhatom Ocherke, he suggested that for previous Imperial historians it had been shameful to say that the first rulers of Russians were foreigners. However, Pokrovskii continued, these historians themselves also lived under the foreign rulers, as the Romanov family was Germanized in time. In fact, Pokrovskii argued, the Swedish origin of the first Kievan and Novgorodian rulers was not important; “[a] much more important fact is that these Swedes were slave-owners and slave-traders”. In other words, the nationality or ethno-linguistic identity of rulers was far less significant than the fact that they were exploiters or representatives of exploiting classes. By the end of the tenth century, these Swedish kings had become Slaviszed.

Finally, Pokrovskii refuted the imperial theory that the Kievan Rus’, Muscovite Principality, and Russian Empire were consecutive Russian states. The old Kievan Rus’ could not have been absorbed by the Muscovite Principality because “from Novgorod or Vladimir, they went ‘to the Rus’”, but Novgorod and Vladimir was not within the Rus’. Besides, Rus’ was a cultural (bytovoi) term and it did not have a political meaning: in terms of politics, the ancient Rus’ knew the Kievan or Chernigovian or Suzdalian principalities, but not the Russian state [or State of Rus’]. There was nothing to fall apart, so there was nothing to ‘gather together’”. Pokrovskii decisively rejected the theory of the Russian state’s gathering mission, which was for him merely an

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446 M.N. Pokrovskii, Izbrannye, i, p.99.
obsolete formula of Karamzin’s. Finally, he considered the nature of the Muscovite Principality to be too different from the Kievan Rus’ to be considered its successor.\footnote{M.N. Pokrovskii, Izbrannye, i, pp. 207-9.}

Once the Pokrovskiiian school and its attitude to Russian national identity and history were abandoned, the century-old discussions seemed ready to resurface at any moment. Soviet national narratives had to find a way to accommodate both Russian and Ukrainian national self-identification. The solution was the ‘cradle formula’, according to which the Kievan Rus’ was the ‘cradle’ for Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. It did not belong to any nationality in a narrow sense, and at the same time, it belonged to all three nations and their national narratives. Still, the Soviet narratives were staunch supporters of anti-Normanist theories and refused any positive Norman impact on state building in the Kievan Rus’. The Normans were merely barbaric destroyers and slave-traders. Their rapid assimilation by the eastern Slavs was further proof of their low level of culture. On the dispute over the population of the Kievan Rus’, Ukrainian Soviet historiography, contrary to Hrushevs’kyi, claimed that the population, from the Oka River to the Black Sea, and from Kiev to Galicia and Bukovyna, was homogenous. However, this was not an affirmation of Pogodin’s argument. The homogenous population was not the Great Russians, but the eastern Slavs, and it was they who were the common ancestors of the three nations. In other words, Soviet Ukrainian historiography tried to avoid the whole discussion by establishing a common predecessor identity.\footnote{B. Grekov, ‘Drevneishie Sudby Zabadnoi Ukrainy’, Novyi Mir, no. 10-11 (1939); M. Petrovs’kyi, ‘Kyïvs’ka Rus’ – spil’nyi, Pochatkovyi Period Istorii Rosiis’koho’ Ukrains’koho i Bilorus’koho Narodiv’, Pratsi Sichnevoi Sesii Akademii Nauk URSR (Ufa, 1942), i, pp. 5-22.}

In the history published in 1937, Bilousov first described the emergence of Slavic towns and slave-owning society and agriculture in the seventh and eighth centuries. These socio-economic
developments engendered the crystallization of classes, which in turn formed a state as a polity, well before the arrival of the Normans. These states were small “eastern Slavic principalities”.\(^{450}\)

The Normans were plundering barbarians who sought slaves for trading, attacked the rich, and cultivated lands of eastern Slavic principalities.\(^{451}\) In time, these Norman warlords were Slavisized. Although initially there were numerous tribes, the increase in trade facilitated ties above tribal links, generated large eastern Slavic cities such as Novgorod and Kiev, and united all eastern Slavs under a single identity and their state, the Kievan Rus’. The important point here is that the emphasis on ‘the eastern Slavs’ created a common ancestral identity.\(^{452}\) It clearly answered the question of ‘Where did we come from?’ As a result of the change in economic relations—an embedded Marxist rationale—the eastern Slavs, already called the Rus’, founded their mighty state.

After mentioning the Normanist and anti-Normanist theories, Bilousov argued that there were two Rus’—the people in the Norman polity in Sweden and the south Slavic people. Kiev was the point of convergence for these two Rus’es.\(^{453}\) He referred to the writings of Marx, in order to avoid any ‘misunderstanding’. In fact, Marx had named the Kievan Rus’ ‘the Gothic Russia’ or ‘the Empire of Riurikovich’ and defined it as a Norman state within the epoch of the Norman conquests over all of Europe in the Middle Ages. Marx argued that although Norman rulers were eventually Slavisized, *druzhina*, the military power base of these Norman princes, was exclusively Norman. The reason for the demise of the Kievan Rus’ was the gradual

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\(^{450}\) S.M.Bilousov (ed.), *Narysy*, pp. 36-41, 49.

\(^{451}\) S.M.Bilousov (ed.), *Narysy*, pp. 50-1.

\(^{452}\) For the function of common ancestry in ethnicity, T.H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity*, pp.68-70

\(^{453}\) S.M.Bilousov (ed.), *Narysy*, p. 52.
disappearance of this Germanic seed.\textsuperscript{454} However, Bilousov wanted to assure us that Marx was not implying that the Kievan state was a Germanic one:

By characterizing the Kievan state as the Empire of Riurikovichov, or as the state of the Goths, such as the Empire of Charlemagne, Marx underlines the barbarian, primitive characteristics similar to those of the latter. The Kievan state was the polity of the eastern Slavs, and Varangian conquests played a partial role in its formation.\textsuperscript{455}

In the 1940 edition, Bilousov and his colleagues avoided any discussion on the Norman impact in the Kievan Rus’ and did not go into details about Marx’s definition of the Kievan Rus’. They merely mentioned that Marx had called the Kievan Rus’ ‘the Empire of Riurikovichs’.\textsuperscript{456} Iastrebov, in his account on the Kievan Rus’ published in 1941, explained at length how the eastern Slavs resisted the Normans, as well as the political, military, and economic might of the Kievan state and the high level of its culture.\textsuperscript{457}

Both histories published in 1937 and 1941 described a spatial unity. The lands controlled by the princes of the Kievan Rus’ were designated the fatherland of eastern Slavs or of all three nations. There was no differentiation between the Rus’ territories per se (narrow description as a fatherland) and the lands controlled by the Rus’ princes (broader description as a realm). It was true that tribal affiliations and their geographical roots were dissolved, but in the Primary Chronicles, there was a subtle division between the core territories within the triangle of Kiev, Chernihiv (Chernigov), Pereiaslav and the rest, including the future Muscovite territories, as the dependencies of Kievan Rus’.\textsuperscript{458} Though Pokrovskii underlined this difference, the Soviet

\textsuperscript{455} S.M. Bilousov, \textit{Narysy}, p. 81.  
\textsuperscript{456} S.M. Bilousov, et al., \textit{Istoriia}, p. 25.  
\textsuperscript{457} F. Iastrebov, \textit{Kyiv's'ka}, pp. 9-10.  
\textsuperscript{458} O. Pritsak suggests that the ‘Outer’ Rus’ and ‘Inner’ Rus’ (Rosia) division is mentioned in the Constantine Porphyrogenitus \textit{De Administrando Imperio}. ‘Inner Rosia’ was the old patrimony of the Rus’; see his ‘Where Was
narrative omitted it. Thus, the ancient fatherland of Ukrainians and Russians and the territories controlled by the Kievan Rus’ possessed the same borders.

Another perception of territoriality emerged after the demise of the Kievan central structure. The chronicles of Vladimir-Suzdal Rus’ and Galicia-Volhynia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries gradually identified themselves separately from one another, each referring to their own principalities as the Rus’ Land per se.\(^459\) Especially after the twelfth century, people within the former Riurik realm started to identify themselves with the semi-independent principalities in which they lived.\(^460\) Nevertheless, the narrative both in Narysy z Istorii and Korotkyi Kurs argued that the people within the realm of the Kievan Rus’ and its successors perceived all the territories previously under the control of the Kievan Rus’ princes as their united fatherlands. In order to be consistent with this argument, the realm of the Kievan Rus’ was indicated clearly on the maps in the Korotkyi Kurs as the fatherland in a broader sense.\(^461\) The histories published in 1937 and 1940 aimed to construct a broad fatherland with well-defined borders.

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\(^{459}\) S. Plokhy, The Origins, pp. 49-84.

\(^{460}\) However, the later works on the Primary Chronicle suggest that “Rus’ Land” as the spatial location of Rus’ was located in the triangle between Kiev, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav. The identity was not tribal, nor was it statist in the sense of loyalty to the whole Riurikid realm. Instead, core possessions were considered the ‘fatherland’. The other conquered territories were “outer Rus'”. See: S. Plokhy, The Origins, pp. 33-41.

\(^{461}\) S.M. Bilousov, et al., Istorria, maps between pp. 28-29; 32-33.
The map shows the well-defined borders of the fatherland. It is noteworthy that neither the western neighbours, such as the Baltic tribes, Poles, Hungarians, Slavisized Bulgarians, and the Byzantine Empire, nor the eastern neighbours, such as Turkic Bulgarians, Finnic Mordvians, and Turkic Pechenegs, have any well-defined borders on the map. As in the map of eastern Slavic settlement in chapter 1, only the eastern Slavs or the Kievan Rus’ has the privilege of having a fatherland with well-defined borders.

Throughout the text, Bilousov rarely referred to ‘Ukraine’, and when he did, only in the form of “in the territories of Ukraine” or “in the lands of Ukraine”, because Ukrainian national identity
would emerge only after the Mongol-Tatar conquest. None of the Kievan rulers or the lands under their sovereignty were called Ukrainian, implying that Ukraine as a label, which appeared later, was used retrospectively only very selectively. Bilousov did not make it clear in his *Narysy* when the Ukrainians emerged from the eastern Slavic people. He made two contradictory statements on one page. According to the first statement, in this period “neither Ukrainian, nor Belorussian, nor Russian people were formed”. However, in the next paragraph he alters his position:

> In the eleventh century, the tribal attachments of the eastern Slavs collapsed and the territorial attachments, the ones peculiar to the victorious feudalism that existed in the ninth and tenth centuries only as a lifestyle, became stronger. In this period, the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russian nationalities [Ukr. *narodnosti*], tied together by a common initial period of historical development, fight against the foreign enemies, attached by single language, culture, and lifestyle that have started to arise [as separate identities]. This commonness laid the beginning of the brotherly connection of these people and their common actions in the historical arena.

The *Narysy* of 1937 therefore did not provide a clear idea of when and how Ukrainians diverged from Russians. The *Istoriia Ukrainy - Korotkyi Kurs* (1940) offered an answer of “closer to the fifteenth century”, as a result of feudal divisions of the old Kievan territories. Within these divisions, Galicia-Volhynia, as the most important feudal principality, came to the fore in the contemporary territories of Ukraine. Although Shestakov’s account did not mention Galicia-Volhynia, the *Korotkyi Kurs* was eager to include Galicia-Volhynia in the post-Kievan period. In the following chapter, the *Korotkyi Kurs* no longer mentioned eastern Slavs and began to use “Ukrainian nationality” (*narodnost’*). Thus, the Ukrainian nation appeared within the territories

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462 In nearly in all occasions, ‘the lands of Ukraine’ or ‘the territories of Ukraine’ are used in the titles of the chapters, but never in the text. S.M.Bilousov, *Narysy*, pp. 4, 5, 22, 116, 139.
of contemporary Ukraine, with the vague description “[in the] fourteenth to sixteenth centuries”.465

2.3.2 THE KHMEL’NYTS’KYI UPRISING AS THE CLIMAX OF ANTI-POLISH HISTORY.

According to a Western account written during a visit to Polish Ukraine in 1919, the Poles in western Ukraine were the big landowners and they controlled the towns. Most of the peasants, however, were Ukrainians. The Poles had always oppressed them and prevented them from getting a proper education. The Ukrainian population in the region had been brought up on stories about Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, who had conducted an anti-Polish uprising and was considered a hero by the oppressed peasants.466 Thus, Khmel’nyts’kyi had been a popular anti-Polish hero before his promotion by Ukrainian Soviet historiography in the second half of the 1930s. The Ukrainian Soviet national historiography, however, primordialized the anti-Polish antagonism, and the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising became a culmination of this centuries-old anti-Polish struggle of the Ukrainian nation.

The first anti-Polish account described Riurik Prince Sviatopol (the Accursed) (980-1019), who was depicted as a betrayer and a puppet prince of the Poles, and the coalition that supported him as a bunch of looters and occupiers of the fatherland lacking popular support. The Kievan people rose up against Sviatopol and expelled him and his Polish allies from the city. However, this was not the only interpretation of Sviatopol.467 If the Ukrainian national history is

467 Although Iaroslav was positioned by Bilousov as an anti-Polish leader, Dobronega, his sister, married the Polish King Kazimir, and the latter’s sister Gertrude married Iziaslav, the son of Iaroslav. In the next account, the Poles again intervened into the rivalry between the candidates for the throne and the Polish King Boleslav II supported his kinsman Iziaslav. However, this intervention was pictured again as another chance “for Polish occupants to rob the
considered separately, these events can be read in a different way. For example, Lypynsky, who aimed at the beginning of the twentieth century to construct a Ukrainian lineage of statehood, described Sviatopolk as a westernizer and the first prince with ‘Ukrainian’ tendencies. In the absence of a strong central structure, the Kievan throne could be obtained and kept only by a coalition. Increasing ties with the Polish or Hungarian monarchical families demonstrated that over the eleventh century part of the Kievan dynasty gradually joined the European aristocratic family network. However, the Ukrainian Soviet historiography presented to the reader every attempt at westernization as a betrayal of the nation. After the disintegration of Kievan Rus’, anti-Polish enmity continued, and the narrative described Galicia-Volhynia as a target for Poles and Hungarians.

This anti-Polish narrative was also related to the policy of depicting as national heroes figures of the past who had hitherto been merely representatives of the exploiting classes. In the 1937 Narysy z Istorii, the rulers of the Kievan Rus’ were blamed for their exploitative ways and their class identity was underlined, immediately after their deeds as ‘national leaders’. The same materialist interpretation of history was repeated at the end of every episode, in a separate chapter entitled “Socio-political Order”. However, in the 1940 Korotkyi Kurs, princes are

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468 Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931) was a Ukrainian historian, political activist, and ideologue of Ukrainian conservatism. As a historian, he was the founder of the statist school of Ukrainian history writing and the main ideological rival of Hrushevsky. He accused the latter of neglecting the role of the state in Ukrainian history. Especially after 1917, he was a conservative historian who supported the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky. Under the government of the Hetmanate, he served as the ambassador of Ukraine to Austria. After the Sovietization of Ukraine, he lived in exile in Berlin and Vienna. His monograph Ukraine on the Break of 1657-69 was published in 1920. In this work, Lypynsky analyzed the historical process of the creation of Ukrainian state in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. S. Plokhy, Unmaking, pp. 24, 144, 222, 286.

469 Even Bilousov provided an example. Sviatopolk II, the son of Iziaslav and Gertrude, became the Kievan Great Prince due to the support of the Princes of Chernihiv, Poles, and Hungarians. See: S.M. Bilousov, Narysy, p.100.

470 S.M.Bilousov, Narysy, pp. 118-124.
depicted only as heroic national leaders. Their role as the leading exploiters is either omitted or limited to very short passages. The image of ‘national leader’ was made to overshadow the account of ‘class identity’. The Poles came to the fore as the eternal enemies of the eastern Slavs, while these ‘national leaders’ were described as the defenders of the fatherland.

In the history published in 1940, out of the first nine chapters three were devoted to the fight of Ukrainians against the Poles. According to the narrative, the western bastion of the eastern Slavs, the principality of Galicia-Volhynia, had struggled against the Poles and Hungarians since the twelfth century. The history praised Danylo for his skillful diplomacy, capacity as a warrior, attempts at centralization in the principality, attention to economic development, building of cities, and development of handicrafts as well as trading. A map of the principality was included in the book. However, unlike the maps of the eastern Slavs and the Kievan Rus’, the borders of the Galician-Volhynia Principality were not defined. There could be more than one reason for this. First, in 1939-40, it would have been risky to define the historical borders when the contemporary borders of Ukrainian SSR were being re-drawn. Second, there could have been a desire to avoid giving too much importance to the Galicia-Volynia Principality. After all, Galicia-Volhynia at some point added the city of Kiev and stretched to the Black Sea shores, while the Principality of Moscow did not exist. After the demise of Galicia-Volhynia, the national history concentrated on the Polish menace. The cause of national antagonism was a combination of class struggle and religious conflict. On the one hand, Lithuanian or Polish monarchs and the collaborating Rus’ feudal lords exploited the Ukrainian people. On the other hand, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth supported the Catholic and Uniate Church against the Orthodoxy.

471 S.M.Bilousov, et al., Istorii, pp. 36-37.
Once Ukrainian lands were transferred to the Poles following the Lublin Agreement in 1567, the narrative suddenly recognized the “Ukrainian nation” as a specific identity and also recognized its struggle against the “national-religious” yoke imposed by the Polish landed aristocracy (Pol. szlachta). The Cossacks were praised in the narrative as Ukrainians fighting against Poles and Turks. They were also considered part of a class conflict and peasant uprisings, which were important elements within Marxist-Leninist historiography. As a consequence of the anti-Polish

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472 S.M.Bilousov, et al., Istoriiia, pp. 78-93.
approach, and the ‘lesser evil formula’, the military campaigns or raids of the Cossacks against Polish or Ottoman-Turkish territories were included in the history, but their armed activities against the Muscovite Principality or alliances with the Poles or Ottomans were excluded. In reality, the Cossack rulers, in order to keep a balance between their strong neighbours, played them off against each other.\textsuperscript{473} The \textit{Korotkyi Kurs} mentioned that many Cossacks crossed the border to serve Russia. However, the fact that these Cossacks were not considered part of the Orthodox Church or the Great Rus’ by the Muscovite rulers, unless they were re-baptized by triple immersion, was not mentioned.\textsuperscript{474}

The long list of ‘national uprisings’ led by Cossack Hetmans continued in the following pages. “The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Polish rule in the 1630s and 1640s” was described as being led by the Cossack leaders Taras Fedorovych (1630), Ivan Sulym (1635), and Pavel But (1637-38).\textsuperscript{475} The narrative constantly repeats how terrible it was for Ukrainians to live under Polish rule. In some cases, the authors did not hesitate to provide graphic details:

“The Polish nobles and soldiers, who were constantly in Ukraine, brutally treated the population: [...] blinded them, cut their beards, raped the women, cut off their breasts, murdered them; children were thrown into cauldrons of boiling water”.\textsuperscript{476}

The culmination of this anti-Polish discourse was the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising in 1648-1654. The importance of this uprising was that it led to an agreement between the Cossack Hetmanate of Khmel’nyts’kyi and the representatives of the Muscovite state. According to this agreement, the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{In the \textit{Korotkyi kurs}, the attacks of the Hetman Petro Konashevich-Sagaidachnyi against the Ottomans were mentioned. S. Plokhy, \textit{The Origins}, p.81. However, the text was silent on his campaigns against the Muscovites. For this issue, see: S. Plokhy, \textit{The Origins}, p. 229. Also there were Ukrainian Cossack units within the Polish-Lithuanian Army fought against the Muscovite-Rus, S. Plokhy, \textit{The Origins}, p.155. The Cossacks constituted the majority of the ‘Polish’ armies that crossed the Muscovite border heading to Moscow during the Time of Troubles. See: S. Plokhy, \textit{The Origins}, p.205.}
\footnote{S.M.Bilousov, et al., \textit{Istoryia}, p. 82, 85; S. Plokhy, \textit{The Origin}, p.231-34.}
\footnote{S. M.Bilousov, et al., \textit{Istoryia}, p. 82-84.}
\footnote{S. M.Bilousov, et al., \textit{Istoryia}, p. 84.}
\end{footnotes}
Cossacks became vassals of the Muscovite Tsar, in exchange for his support against the Poles. That is why Soviet Ukrainian historians gradually increased the importance of this agreement.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising was already considered a sensitive historical topic. Hrushevs’kyi was not a strong supporter of Khmel’nyts’kyi. He judged the uprising to be a ‘complete fiasco’ in the long run, because it did not bring any benefits to the masses, and the alliance with Muscovy, which was intended to be temporary, came to determine Ukraine's political fate. Hrushevs’kyi criticized Khmel’nyts’kyi for his indifference toward the masses and his failure to turn to them as his base of support. Khmel’nyts’kyi achieved personal power at the cost of terrible suffering by the Ukrainian masses; he destroyed half of the Ukrainian population and most of the economy. Hrushevs’kyi, nevertheless, also considered the Cossack uprisings of the Khmel’nyts’kyi period as a turning point in the development of Ukrainian nationhood and in the awakening of a national consciousness. Conservative Ukrainian historian V. Lypyns’kyi idealized Khmel’nyts’kyi as a statesman of genius, who sought to create a hereditary monarchy and a Ukrainian state. The Pereiaslav Agreement, according to Lypyns’kyi, was an agreement between equals, which also functioned as the first constitution, akin to the Magna Carta.

In the 1920s, the Soviet interpretation of the Khmel’nyts’kyi era was based on a desire to dismantle the Russian imperial narrative. The imperial narrative had embraced the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising as a Russian movement against Polish rule. The monument of Khmel’nyts’kyi, with his hand holding his *bulova* pointing to the east—Moscow—was inaugurated at St. Sophia Square in Kiev in 1888. This imperial narrative was altered by the Pokrovskiian narrative, and Khmel’nyts’kyi became a representative of the exploiting class, little different from a Russian Boyar or a Polish magnate. As a consequence, until the mid-1930s, the Soviet authorities saw the monument of Khmel’nyts’kyi as an embarrassment. During the mass celebrations of Soviet holidays, the monument was boarded up with wooden panels and the local bosses even considered demolishing it altogether. The volume of the first edition of the *Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediiia* that covered the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising was published in 1935. This first edition described him as “a traitor and ardent enemy of the revolting Ukrainian peasantry”. According to Pokrovskii, the events of the Khmel’nyts’kyi era were a consequence of two competing exploiting classes: Polish magnates on the one hand, and Ukrainian burgers and Cossack landowners on the other. The Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising was a ‘revolution’ of the latter against the former. An alliance with Muscovy was pursued by Khmel’nyts’kyi and his followers, but not because of religious or national brotherhood. The common interests of the same classes in two societies were the major factor. The only point in common between Pokrovskii and the imperial narrative was the refusal to define the uprising as a ‘Ukrainian national liberation war’, but each for its own reasons.

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480 S. Yekelchyk, *Stalin’s*, p. 17.
In line with the approach of Pokrovskii, in the 1920s Marxist historians in Ukraine aimed to reconstruct history based on reading classes as the main agents of history and class struggles as its motivating force. M. lavors’kyi was a leading ideologue and historian of Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, who represented the Pokrovskiiian historiography. lavors’kyi called the uprising a revolution of landed aristocracy.⁴⁸³ At the end of the revolution, the feudal order was abolished and centralized Muscovite serfdom with its commercial capitalism was established.⁴⁸⁴ The treaty of Pereiaslav, in the history of lavors’kyi, was briefly mentioned as an agreement of autonomy for the Cossacks. lavors’kyi did not favour Muscovite rule over Polish rule. He even mentioned that seventeenth century Ukrainians did not know that a fate worse than that under the [Polish] landed aristocracy awaited them at the hands of the Muscovite dvorianstvo and its autocrat. Moreover, he presented Khmel’nyts’kyi and Mazepa in the same manner. His Korotka Istoriia Ukraïny even had a portrait of Mazepa as big as that of Khmel’nyts’kyi. He denounced Mazepa for bringing corvée to Ukraine, but not for his collaboration with the Swedes.⁴⁸⁵ In the final analysis, instead of being the leaders of their nation, they were the representatives of the Cossack exploiting classes, betraying their people for their class interests. lavors’kyi did not refrain from belittling their role in history, complying with Pokrovskiiian rules.⁴⁸⁶ Within the Pokrovskiiian School, there were other Ukrainian historians: Sukhyno-Khomenko and H. Karpenko Iastrebov, who presented various interpretations within the walls of this school. They called the uprising a ‘Ukrainian bourgeois revolution’, ‘Cossack War’ and ‘the Peasant War of 1648 in Ukraine’. Needless to say, these interpretations diminished the role of any figures such as Khmel’nys’kyi or Bohun to mere executers of the interests of the exploiting classes that they

⁴⁸³ M.Iavors’kyi, Korotka, p. 48-50.
⁴⁸⁴ M.Iavors’kyi, Korotka, p.51-54.
⁴⁸⁵ M.Iavors’kyi, Korotka, p.56, 61,63.
⁴⁸⁶ M. lavors’kyi, Korotka, p. 13
represented. The Pereiaslav Agreement with the Principality of Moscow was a pact between
Ukrainian landowners and the representatives of the big landowners or commercial capitalists
of Muscovy, in order to keep the popular demands of the labouring masses under control.\footnote{M. Iavors’kyi, Korotka, p. 58,61; M. Iavors’kyi, Istoriia, p. 52-59. For other interpretations of Khmel’nyts’kii uprising of the Pokrovskian era historians of Ukraine see: J. E. Mace, Communism; S. Plokhy, Bourgeois, pp. 345-370.} In
1929, M.A. Rubach and F.O. Iastrebov published articles demonizing Hrushevskyi. Iastrebov
even criticized Hrushevskyi for describing the revolution of 1648-54 as a national revolution
that aimed to liberate Ukraine from Poland. According to Iastrebov, Hrushevskyi intentionally
obscured the class struggle in Ukraine because, as a ‘bourgoise nationalist’ historian, he wanted
to deny the existence of class differentiation and class conflict within the Ukrainian nation.\footnote{M.A. Rubach, ‘Burzhuazo-kurku’s’ka nationalystychna ideolohiia pid mashkaroiu demokratii “Trudovoho
narodu” [Sotsial’no-politychni Pohliady M.S. Hrushevskyi’ko], Chervonyi Shliakh, no.5-6 (1932), pp. 115-35; no. 7-8, pp. 118-26; no. 11-12, pp. 127-36; F.O. Iastrebov, ‘Tomu dev’iatoho pershia polovyna’, Prapor Marksymu, no.1 (1930), pp. 133-48; F.O. Iastrebov, ‘Natsional-fashysts’ka konseptsiia selians’koi viyny 1648 r. na Ukraini’, Zapysky Istorichno-arkhaeohrafichnoho institutu, no.1 (1934); For a review of Pokrovskian historians in Ukraine who
emphasis from the class conflict of revolutionary masses to national heroes. Thus, Soviet
Ukrainian historiography rejected the term ‘revolution’ as a definition of the uprising. Now, the
uprising of Khmel’nyts’kyi was described as ‘a national-liberation war of the Ukrainian nation
against Polish oppressors’, and Khmel’nyts’kyi and Bohun became ‘Ukrainian national heroes’. Ukrainian historian Petrovs’kyi led this new interpretation in Kiev and interpreted Khmel’nytsk’yi
as a national hero.\footnote{TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-753-171, April 29, 1947.}
The first signs of the rehabilitation of Khmel’nyts’kyi started with the application of the ‘lesser evil formula’. After all, Bohdan preferred the suzerainty of the Muscovite Principality to the
Polish Kingdom or Ottoman Empire at Pereiaslav. In 1938, on the three hundred year anniversary of the 1637-38 uprising, Petrovs’kyi published an article at Bil’shovyk Ukraïny, on the liberation struggle of Ukrainian nation against Poland in the seventeenth century, where he depicted Khmel’nyt’s’kyi as a national leader. In 1938, the Ukrainian playwright Oleksandr Korniichuk wrote a play called ‘Bohdan Khmel’nyt’s’kyi’ and film director Ihor Savcheiko directed a film of the same title, which screened in 1941. The popular series of biographies initiated by Gorky, under the title ‘The Life of a Remarkable People’ (Rus. zhizn’ zamechatel’nykh liudei), published volumes on various historical figures, including Babak (1936) and Pugachev (1937). Previous figures were chosen according to the Pokrovskiian line. In November 1939, following the occupation of eastern Poland or western Ukraine and Belorussia, another volume appeared—a biography of Bohdan Khmel’nyt’s’kyi. For the author K. Osipov (Osip Kuperman), the aim of the publication was very clear. In the preface, he emphasized that in order to understand Khmel’nyt’s’kyi, the “undisputed national hero of the Ukrainian nation”, and his deeds, one should understand:

“the connection of the consanguineous Great Russians [Russian: velikorusskie] and Ukrainians, the occupation of Ukraine by the Poles, the centuries-old struggle of the [Ukrainian] nation against the Polish yoke, [...] and the fights of Cossacks against Turks and Poles.”

The narrative that followed was strongly anti-Polish and emphasized the fraternity of Moscow and the Ukrainians at every possible opportunity. The same attitude could be seen in

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491 M. P[etrows’]kyi, ‘Z istorii vyzvol’noi borot’by ukraïns’koho narodu proty shliakhets’koi Pol’shchi’, Bil’shovyk Ukraïny, no.8 (1938), pp.73-84.
492 Historians of the Institute of History in Kiev provided consultancy to Korniichuk, A. V. Santsevich and N. V, Komarenko, Razvitie, p.40.
493 K. Osipov, Bohdan. In order to emphasize the Russo-centric aspect of Soviet historiography, J. Basarab, in his account, erroneously argued that Khmel’nyt’s’kyi was the only non-Russian popularized figure in this series before the Second World War. However, as we mentioned in the chapter on Azerbaijan, the biography of Babak was also published within the same series. For Basarab’s argument, see his, Pereiaslav, p. 172.
494 K. Osipov, Bohdan, pp. 6-7.
Petrovs’kyi’s work on the uprising, published in 1939. After referring to Stalin’s conversation with the German correspondent Luidwig on the role of the leader in history, the text underlined that by deciding to declare war against Polish rule and ally the nation to Russia, Khmel’nyts’kyi achieved the best situation under the given conditions. The text then attacked both the Ukrainian émigré nationalist interpretations and the previous Soviet interpretations of Khmel’nyts’kyi. Petrovs’kyi argued that the émigré nationalist groups, as collaborators of the former Poland state or other imperialists, could not claim Khmel’nyts’kyi as their own hero. He then criticized Pokrovskiian historiography:

“It is not possible to downplay the role of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi in the history of Ukraine, in the struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the Polish gentry, or to vilify Bohdan only because he was a leading feudal lord and did not completely destroy feudal exploitation in Ukraine. This is a hypocritical [dvorushnyts’ka], ‘leftist’ [‘livats’ka’], and anti-Marxist approach. Historical figures should be evaluated only within the historical conditions of their time. Therefore, we must place Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi side by side with the heroes of our nation, such as Alexander Nevskii, Minin, Pozharskii, and others, who fought against the occupation of our country by all kinds of foreign invaders.” 495

The figures could have been previously vilified as feudal leaders, such as Khmel’nyts’kyi; they could also have been depicted as peasant leaders such as Babak in the Azerbaijani narrative. Now it was time to hail them as national liberation leaders, regardless of their class origins. However, the shift in Kiev was too close not to miss for the hardliner Marxist historians, who considered evaluation of history without class struggles as a deviation. Both the theatre play of Korniichuk and Petrovs’kyi’s book were criticized by hardliner historians and officials at the agitation-propaganda department of the TsK VKP(b). These Russian and Ukrainian hardliners accused both authors of showing Khmel’nyts’kyi as a leader of the Ukrainian nation instead of a

defender of the feudal class. After the war, during a discussion between Petrovs’kyi and hardliners, the former called these critics “dirty hands”. The discussion continued even after the Soviet annexation of Polish Ukraine. Nevertheless, some of the Cossack military leaders who led anti-Polish uprisings were also added to this series of national leaders and heroes. These included Maksym Kryvonis and Khmel’nyts’kyi’s army commanders, Danylo Nechai and Ivan Bohun.
Maksym Kryvonis

Source: M.E. Podorozhnyi, Vyzvol’na viina ukrains’koho narodu (1648-1654 rr.) (Kiev, 1940), p.41.
Danylo Nechai

Source: M.E. Podorozhnyi, Vyzvol’na viina ukraïns’koho narodu (1648-1654 rr.) (Kiev, 1940), p.67.
Ivan Bohun

Source: M.E. Podorozhnyi, Vyzvol’na viina ukrains’koho narodu (1648-1654 rr.) (Kiev, 1940), p.68.
Massacres of [Ukrainian] Peasants by Polish Lords
(“Pans’ka Rozprava z Selianami”)

Source: M.E. Podorozhnyi, Vyzvol’na viina ukraïns’koho narodu (1648-1654 rr.) (Kiev, 1940), p.9.

This drawing, from the book ‘The Liberation War of the Ukrainian Nation’, depicted the double burden (national and class struggle) that continued for centuries. Poor Ukrainian peasants were killed and exploited by their Polish noble masters, while hopelessly but patiently waiting for their liberators.

The anti-Polish narrative continued as the Soviet Red Army crossed the Polish-Soviet border in 1939.500 One of these anti-Polish history books was entitled ‘The Struggle of the Ukrainian

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500 N.N. Petrovs’kyi, Voennoe proshloe ukrainskogo naroda (Moscow, 1939); K. Huslysty, Ukrains’ki zemli pid vladoiu Lytty, zakhoplennia ikh Pol’shcheiu (Kiev, 1939); K. Huslysty, Vyzvol’na borot’ba ukraïns’koho narodu proty shliakhets’koi Pol’shchi v drugii polabyni XVI i v pershii polovyni XVII stolitiia: (60-ти roky XVI- 30-ти roky XVII stolitiia) (Kiev, 1940); V. Picheta, Osnovne momenty istoricheskogo razvitiia Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorussii (Moscow, 1940); S.M. Bilousov, M. N. Petrovs’kyi, F.A. Iastrebov, I.M. Premysler, Bor’ba ukrainskogo naroda protiv panskoi Pol’shi (Kiev, 1940). At the same time the latter was published in Ukrainian under the title Borot’ba ukraïns’koho narodu proty pans’koi Pol’shchi. The following quotations are from the Russian version. Other publications on history that contained an anti-Polish Ukrainian narrative were the Ukrainian Soviet version of the
Nation against the Poland of Lords [Ukr. \textit{Pany}].\textsuperscript{501} This book, written by leading historians at the Institute of History of the AN UkrSSR in the autumn of 1939 and printed in January 1940, summarized ‘centuries of Polish rule’ from the Kievan Rus’ up to the twentieth century. The formulation of the antagonism covers both class struggle and national conflict (Ukrainian peasants versus Polish landed aristocracy). At the same time, the authors aimed to justify the recent annexation of Polish lands by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{502} The text rigorously outlined a historical background since the eleventh century to demonstrate how consecutive states of the Polish aristocracy had aggressively attacked and exploited Ukrainian labourers. The last episode of this terrible history was the interwar period when the yoke of “Poland of Lords [Ukr. \textit{Pany}]” became unbearable. “The Polish-German War [in 1939] hastened the inevitable end of the Polish state. The Polish patchwork state, built on oppression by plundering national minorities, revealed in this war all its non-viability and internal bankruptcy, and collapsed like a house of cards”.\textsuperscript{503} In today’s terms, the Polish state was a ‘failed state’ due to the absence of national integrity.

\textquoteright\textquoteleft Disintegration, anarchy, and disorder began to reign in Poland, of course, and made the Soviet people anxious about the fate of their consanguineous [Ru. \textit{edinokrovnykh}] Ukrainians and Belorussians. [...] The Soviet Union extended a helping hand to its brothers. [...] On September 17, 1939, on the orders from the Soviet government, the workers’ and peasants’ Red Army entered the territory of enslaved western Ukraine in order to fulfill the great mission of liberation\textquoteright\textquoteright.\textsuperscript{504}

\textsuperscript{501} S. M. Bilousov, M. N. Petrovs’kyi, F. A. Iastrebov, I. M. Premysler, \textit{Bor’ba}.
\textsuperscript{502} S. M. Bilousov, M. N. Petrovs’kyi, F. A. Iastrebov, I. M. Premysler, \textit{Bor’ba}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{503} S. M. Bilousov, M. N. Petrovs’kyi, F. A. Iastrebov, I. M. Premysler, \textit{Bor’ba}, pp. 43-4.
\textsuperscript{504} S. M. Bilousov, M. N. Petrovs’kyi, F. A. Iastrebov, I. M. Premysler, \textit{Bor’ba}, p. 44.
The Parade of the Red Army in L’viv (1939)

This photograph, as the propaganda image of the unification of Ukraine by the Red Army, was used in nearly all relevant printed materials of the period.

So, centuries of exploitation and misery of Ukrainians came to an end by through the actions of the Soviet Union. For the first time in modern history, Ukraine, as a nation united under the red
flag of a multi-national land of labourers, could enjoy the new era and bury Polish rule under the debris of history. That is why this supposed history text ended with the following passage:

“The consanguineous [Ru, edinokrovnye] population in western Ukraine became equal among equals, building under the banner of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin a new society, namely communism” 505

The Pereiasлав Agreement between the representatives of the Muscovite Principality and the Cossack Hetmanate was part of the Khmel’nyts’kyi period. If the Uprising was a national-liberation war, then what was the Pereiaslav Agreement? Did the Ukrainians fight against the Poles just to be subjects of the Russian Tsars? Until 1944, the question of the Pereiaslav Agreement had been solved by the ‘lesser evil’ formula, introduced by Stalin, Zhdanov, and Kirov in 1934. According to this formula, the Pereiaslav Agreement and the incorporation of Ukraine into the Muscovite state was a ‘lesser evil’ in comparison to the occupation of Ukraine by the Poland of landed aristocracy or the sultans of Turkey. This formula was also applied to Russians and other non-Russian nationalities with varying intensities. However, in the Ukrainian (and Belorussian) case, this formula was open to different interpretations because of ethno-linguistic and religious ties. Was it merely a rational, calculated act on the part of Ukrainians? Or was it also a natural choice for two nations that had more in common to join them than differences to keep them apart? Alternatively, was it merely a long-awaited reunion? These various takes on the ‘lesser evil’ formula were visible in different texts. The annexation of Ukraine by Russia (Ru. prisoedinenie, Ukr. pryednannia) was described as a lesser evil in a textbook in 1938. 506 While some books kept this line until 1944, there were also tendencies towards the ‘natural reunion’

505 S.M. Bilousov, M. N. Petrovs’kyi, F.A. Iastrebov, I.M. Premysler, Bor’ba, p. 45.
interpretation. The uprising and the Pereiaslav Agreement gained a teleological explanation as the ‘reunion of Ukraine with Russia’.  

“During the Liberation War, a desire grew among the Ukrainian people to unite with the fraternal Russian people. Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi continuously led the negotiations with the Russian government on the annexation [Ukrainian: pryednannia] of Ukraine by Russia. Finally, on October 1, 1653, Zemskii Sabor in Moscow agreed to the accession of Ukraine to Russia. On January 8, 1654, at the National Council in Pereiaslav, the accession of Ukraine to Russia was declared”.

According to this reading, this was not an alliance coming out of strategic necessity, but the embrace of two brotherly nations who happened to be in different polities for historical reasons. According to the account of Osipov, union with Russia was the destiny of Ukrainian Cossaks. The Pereiaslav Agreement represented the reunion (Rus. vossoedinenie) of Ukrainians and Russians.

In summary, first, it was a struggle in the Azerbaijani case to unify historical Azerbaijani geography with the territories of the Soviet Azerbaijan without Turkic or Muslim identity. It was attempted by incorporating historical figures from the north (Albania/Arran) and south (historical Azerbaijan) of the Aras River. At the same time, Turkic element, the only factor that united both territories in the past, was removed from national history. The Azerbaijani Soviet narrative became increasingly anti-Turkish and anti-Iranian. Second, Ukrainian Soviet national narrative aimed to create a spirit of commonwealth among three eastern Slavic nations by manipulating history. This was done to end the pre-Soviet discussions between Russian imperial, Russian national, and Ukrainian national histories. Ukrainian and Russian narratives were brought together as close as possible under the common eastern Slavic, and a strong anti-Polish

\[\text{507} \quad \text{S. M. Bilousov, et al., Istoriia, p. 86, 90.}\]
\[\text{508} \quad \text{S. M. Bilousov, et al., Istoriia, p.90.}\]
\[\text{509} \quad \text{K. Osipov, Bohdan, pp. 326-46.}\]
\[\text{510} \quad \text{K. Osipov, Bohdan, pp. 347-390.}\]
aspect was added in increasing anticipation of a Polish-German attack. Third, there was a shift towards ‘nationalization’ of heroes and movements not only in Russian Soviet national narrative, but also in Ukrainian and Azerbaijani Soviet national histories. The formerly demonised feudal lords, exploiters were gradually turned into national heroes, the leaders of peasant uprisings also re-defined as national heroes, or incorporated into the narrative with a mixture of national-class definition. However, this shift did not occur in the Kazakh narrative. Kazakh heroes continued to be the leaders of nineteenth century anti-Russian, anti-colonial ‘nomad-peasant’ uprisings. The Kazakh case, as we have seen in the ethnogenesis issue, continued to be a Pokrovskiian history. Finally, the difference of Azerbaijan and Ukraine from Kazakhstan can be explained by external reasons. Similarly to the souring relations with Poland, the Soviet-Turkish and Soviet-Iranian relations had also been deteriorating since 1934. However, the Kazakh case did not pose any such urgency from an external point of view, and it remained ‘incomplete’ until World War II.

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Struggle of the Ukrainian Nation against the Poland of Lords

Source: S.N. Bilousov, N.N. Petrovs'kyi, F.A. Iastrebov, I.M. Premysler, *Borot’ba ukraïns’koho narodu proty pans’koï Pol’shchi* (Kiev: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury pri SNK USSR, 1940)

This cover conveys multiple ideas in a theatrical way. The Polish Eagle has been just smashed by a powerful axe. At the same time, representatives of Ukrainian workers and peasants raise the coat of arms of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. While Ukrainian crowds gather at this moment under the protection of the red banner, a grandmother points out to her grandchild the Ukrainian Soviet coat of arms, as she finally enjoys this moment of liberation after a life of anticipation.
CHAPTER 3: THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

The Second World War was a devastating experience for the USSR. The German armies advanced from the western borders of the Soviet Union to the outskirts of Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov in fewer than six months. The 5.5 million-strong Red Army had lost at least 2.8 million men by October 1, 1941, and 1.6 million more by December 31.\(^{512}\) The first wartime task for the Soviet economy was to recover from the huge losses of soldiers and equipment incurred under the catastrophic conditions of an all-out invasion. In addition, the economy had to supply yet more resources for the huge expansion of the armed forces. Following the German invasion in autumn 1941, the Soviet government lost two-fifths of the grain harvest and two-thirds of the potato crop. The total agricultural output fell to a mere two-fifths of the prewar level. By 1942, civilian industry output had fallen to one-third of the prewar benchmark. The economy struggled to meet the enormous demand, but after 1942 civilian output began to recover. In 1943, there was a stable increase of military goods, while overall Soviet military production demonstrated an impressive increase. This was a total mobilization of society for the war effort.\(^{513}\) Although Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were far from the frontlines, they along with Ukraine contributed to the war effort by providing manpower, raw materials, and agricultural and industrial products. The republican communist parties were aware of the fact that national sentiments and narratives were important for mobilizing millions. The most prominent national identity in Soviet war propaganda was the Russian identity, with its military past and heroic

\(^{512}\) D.M. Glantz, *Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War 1941-43* (Lawrence, Kansas, 2003)  
leaders. However, the Soviet Union was a multi-national state, claiming to protect and promote all national identities and cultures. Furthermore, both the Red Army and the home front consisted of various non-Russian nationalities. The war against German occupiers was not only a German-Russian national conflict. For the Soviet rule, first of all, this conflict was an ideological struggle. In other words, the struggle was between a nation-state with a nationalist-fascist ideology and a multi-national state with an internationalist-communist ideology. Soviet propaganda during the war period had to keep a delicate balance: on the one hand, it had to continue an intensive Russian national narrative, which would maintain the fighting spirit of the Russians within the Union, because Russians held a numerical majority in the Red Army and at the home front, and they were also a majority in the highly-skilled labour force. On the other hand, the propaganda had to avoid turning the conflict into a national struggle between Germans and Russians. It also had to emphasize that the Soviet Union was a multi-national state with an international ideology fighting against a fascist state that regarded most of the non-Germanic nations—not only Russians—as inferiors. Maintaining this balance was difficult for the Soviet propaganda policy, which used the heroic past of each nation in order to elevate the fighting spirit among Red Army soldiers and to increase the productivity of workers and peasants in factories, production lines, and collective farms. With the expectation that this delicate balance could not be achieved by Soviet propaganda, an OUN pamphlet prepared for leading figures of the organization anticipated:

“This [Russian] nationalist horse will throw off the Bolsheviks (it must throw them off), for they themselves have pounded a different philosophy into the heads of the people over the last twenty-five years. By all its recent shifts in policy, Bolshevism has definitely weakened its ideological position among the masses, and its ‘nationalistic’, pro-Russian policy has spurred the growth of national antagonisms.”

Although this Ukrainian nationalist statement of the war period generalized the Soviet nationalities policy, it also reflected the delicate balance that the Soviet propaganda had to maintain. This chapter aims to present how this delicate balance was maintained by the Soviet authorities. While the propaganda-agitation of Moscow focussed on the Russian population of the multi-national union, every republican centre with its local communist parties initiated a very strong propaganda campaign by using their national heroes and events, which were already developed before 1941.\footnote{For an all-Union account, see: G. D. Burdei, \textit{Istorik}.}

3.1. AZERBAIJAN.

In Azerbaijan the principles of national history were already defined before the war. These principles can be listed as: (1) the de-Turkification of history, (2) an anti-Turkish and anti-Iranian narrative, (3) emphasis on the historical fraternity of the Transcaucasian nations, and (4) the merger of Albania and Azerbaijan into a single historical entity. During the war, these principles were utilized and even intensified. One reason for this intensification was to provide a historical legitimacy for the possible unification of Soviet Azerbaijan and Iranian Azerbaijan. Furthermore, as Turkish-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, the anti-Turkish aspect of the national history became even more pronounced.

3.1.1. OCCUPATION OF IRANIAN AZERBAIJAN.

The Soviet Union had an expansionist policy towards the south, just as it did towards the west. As with the unification of Belorussia and Ukraine, an Azerbaijani unification was on the Soviet agenda. Soviet leaders, both in Moscow and Baku, tried to use to their own interests the
nationalist sentiments of Azerbaijanis on both sides of the border. The Red Army crossed the Soviet–Iranian border on 25 August 1941, occupying northern Iranian territories.\footnote{On this episode of the war see: L. Fawcett, \textit{Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946} (Cambridge, 1992); J. Hasanli, \textit{At the Dawn of the Cold War, The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941-1946} (Oxford, 2006), pp. 2-3.} Initially, Moscow showed serious interest in the Iranian Azerbaijani territory and Iranian oil.\footnote{J. Hasanli, \textit{At the Dawn}.} The issue was so important that Bagirov for the first and last time left the Soviet Union as the first secretary and visited Tabriz in 1941.\footnote{J. Hasanli, \textit{At the Dawn}, p. 4} After the entry of the Red Army, Soviet Azerbaijan exerted great influence over Iranian Azerbaijan to the south. One source of this influence was the thousands of people exiled from Soviet Azerbaijan to the south shortly before the war. They had lived in Soviet Azerbaijan for nearly two decades, becoming exposed to cultural change in this period. Another source was the members of the Soviet Azerbaijani intelligentsia. With the encouragement of Baku, these intellectuals strongly influenced the national movement in Tabriz. Thus, in 1945-46, the national administration in Tabriz formed a sense of the motherland and a system of national values in the minds of the Iranian Azerbaijani population. In order to support the Azerbaijani national movement in Tabriz, apart from the military units, the Soviet Union sent various materials (printing paper, grain, flour, sugar, kerosene, fabric, etc.), and dispatched civil activists and administrative and cultural workers to Iranian Azerbaijan. At the same time, the intelligentsia in Tabriz and the leaders of the Shahsevan tribes were invited to Baku in 1941.\footnote{According to Jamil Hasanli, there were 50.000 exiles that were expelled from Azerbaijan to Iran in 1938. For the 1941-42 activities, see his \textit{At the Dawn}, xi, p. 2, 9, 14. For 1944-46, see his chapters 2, 3, 4.} During this visit, the rulers of Soviet Azerbaijan did their best to impress their kinsmen from Iran and to show the benefits of the Soviet rule in the north. A printing press was established in Tabriz, printing two newspapers in Azerbaijani, \textit{For the Fatherland} and \textit{Voice of\footnote{519 In the 1941-42 activities, see his \textit{At the Dawn}, xi, p. 2, 9, 14. For 1944-46, see his chapters 2, 3, 4.}}
Azerbaijan. Printed materials explaining the achievements of Soviet Azerbaijan were sent to Iranian Azerbaijan. Most of these aimed to inform the population about the current events, such as Stalin’s speech on 7 November 1941 and Molotov’s diplomatic notes as the Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Another type of material that Baku prepared and sent was information on sanitation, as there were widespread epidemics of malaria, diphtheria, trachoma, and typhoid in Iranian Azerbaijan.520 These leaflets were accompanied by Soviet paramedics and doctors, in an effort to win the hearts of Iranian Azerbaijani. However, these materials did not include historical novels or history books. The main reason behind the absence of historical materials was the low literacy rate in the region. Even the leaflets that were distributed by the Soviet air force did not bring the anticipated impact among villagers. Therefore, agitation-propaganda workers were dispatched and radio broadcasting from Baku was established to deliver the message of the Soviet government. Additionally, theatre groups and the state opera in Soviet Azerbaijan were sent to perform in different towns of Iranian Azerbaijan. These plays included historical ones such as ‘Köroğlu’ and ‘Shah Ismail’, which aimed to popularize these title figures as Azerbaijani national heroes and establish a standard national past in the south.521

The Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan had various impacts on the construction of national history in Azerbaijan. The speeches of Mir Jafar Bagirov, the first secretary of the AKP(b), provided clear indication as to how historians had to interpret the past. First of all, Soviet propaganda, and Azerbaijani history in particular, emphasized the liberation of the Azerbaijani people from centuries of Iranian rule. When Bagirov addressed the intelligentsia of Tabriz who arrived in Baku in 1941, he declared:

520 ARPI/SPİHDA, 1-238-141-12/17, January 30, 1942.
521 J. Hasanli, At the Dawn, 5.
“First we are Azerbaijanis, we know we are Azerbaijanis. We know what honour is. Enough of being slaves for decades, centuries, the Azerbaijani people have been under [Iranian] slavery”.\textsuperscript{522}

Secondly, the contemporary kinship of Iranian Azerbaijanis had previously never been mentioned. After 1941, it was even articulated by Bagirov. He shared his view on this issue at various meetings of dispatched workers before their departure for Iran:

“In some places of the city [of Tabriz] I met seven to eight boys and girls and wanted to talk with them. However, when my car stopped, they were about to run away. I addressed them in Azeri, saying ‘Come here’. Having heard their native tongue, they returned. [...] The land of South Azerbaijan is our motherland. Citizens living on the border of our Republic are those separated from their relatives. [...] Historically, these are Azerbaijani lands. The largest towns of Iran, including Qazvin, Urmiyeh, Miyaneh, Maragha, Tabriz, Ardabil, Salmas, Khoy, Enzeli, etc. are the motherland of our ancestors. To tell the truth, Tehran is an ancient Azerbaijani town. [...] I would like to add that while the Red Army is still there, we could not leave hundreds of people starving to death. If your Azerbaijani blood still boils, we should strive for the unification of a once divided people. [...] Your task is of great responsibility and honour. Should you succeed, your service to the Azerbaijani people would be immense. Success on this track means the fulfillment of century-long dreams of a people partitioned. You will thus unite partitioned hearts, loves and feelings. This is a matter of honour, fidelity and love”.\textsuperscript{523}

Indeed, these are very strong Azerbaijani nationalist declarations. Since the independence of Azerbaijan in 1991, there has been a tendency to present Bagirov as a national leader who strived for the unification of his nation.\textsuperscript{524} According to this narrative, Bagirov did his best in terms of using the contemporary policies of the Red Empire in order to help his kinsmen in Iran and unite the fatherland. In fact, the Soviet Union utilized Azerbaijani national sentiments in order to guarantee a bigger stake in the Middle East at the end of the war.\textsuperscript{525}

The Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan also paved the way for the opening of a department of Turkish and Persian languages at the Azerbaijan State University in Baku. The all-Union

\textsuperscript{522} ARPIİSPİHDA, 1-89-10-137/41, November 20, 1941, also cited in J. Hasanli, \textit{At the Dawn}, p. 14.  
\textsuperscript{523} ARPIİSPİHDA, 1-162-30-6, September 12-14, 1941, and ARPIİSPİHDA, 1-162-28-1, September 12-25, 1941, also cited in J. Hasanli, \textit{At the Dawn}, 5,6.  
\textsuperscript{524} RamizƏhmədov, \textit{Miร คาฟาร์ บะเกรริว} (Baku, 2004); T. Qurban, \textit{Düşmanlardan Güçlü Şaksıiyet} (Baku, 2006); F. Mammədov, \textit{Miร คาฟาร์ บะเกรริว: Xrusşovun Qarazlı vi Şifarışlı Baki Divanxanası} (Baku, 2008);  
\textsuperscript{525} Eldar İsmailov, \textit{Vlast’ i Narod, Poslevoennyi Stalinizm v Azerbaidzhanе} (Baku, 2003), pp. 273-4; J. Hasanli, \textit{At the Dawn}.  

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committee on higher institutes at the SNK SSSR issued a resolution on November 16, 1943, and the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)Az followed with a decree. This department was intended to concentrate on Iranian and Turkish studies and train Turkologists and Iranian experts. Since the Great Terror, there had not been a single expert Turkologist in the higher institutes of the republic. That is why the bureau resolution also asked the Narkompros AzSSR to invite a professor of oriental studies (Ru. vostokoved) from Moscow or Leningrad. Turkish and Persian philology departments in Baku were opened as a result of these resolutions.526

Before the war, Azerbaijani national history had already been de-Turkified. The gap was filled by incorporating Iranian history into the Azerbaijani national narrative. The Azerbaijani nation had already been defined as a separate nation occupied by Turkic and Persian states but successfully resisting assimilation. The time came for the utilization of this anti-Persian and anti-Turkic/anti-Turkish reading of Azerbaijani history when the Red Army entered Iran in 1941. Along with English and Iranian agents, Turkish agents observed the developments in Tabriz under the Soviet rule. The Turkish press, identifying the Azerbaijani Turkic population in Iran as ‘Azerbaijani Turks’, published articles defending their rights against Iranian authorities. In the meantime, Mir Jafar Bagirov, the first secretary of AKP(b), received reports on Turkish internal and external policies and political figures, and on the activities of Azerbaijani emigrants in Turkey and Europe.527 Bagirov, far from being enthusiastic about Turkish or Turkic brotherhood, attacked these articles from Baku:

526 For the resolution of the all-union committee on higher institutions at the SNK SSSR, see: ARPiİSPİHDA, 1-29-6-45, November 16, 1943; for the decree of the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)Az see: ARPiİSPİHDA, 1-29-6-42/42ob, January 3, 1944.
527 Azarbaycan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi (The State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan, hereafter, ARDA), (fond) 28 - (opis) 4 - (delo) 3 - (listy) 141/142, January 26, 1943; ARDA, 28-4-4-96, December 29, 1944; ARDA, 28-4-3-162-168, December 29, 1944; 28-4-3-104-5, March 31, 1942.
“Now, South Azerbaijanis have a new boss—the Ottoman Turks. They have possibly been instructed to allege that the residents of South Azerbaijan are their kinsfolk. What are they up to now? Who disturbed them? Things went so far that Tehran and Ankara got into an argument. They say it is imperative to lead the country. As if the five million-strong Azerbaijani people have so far been homeless. These [Turks] say ‘ours’, those [Iranians] insist ‘ours’, and they start sharing the nation [of Azerbaijan]. Tehran lost its head so much that they ‘forgot’ some historical facts. However, our goals are clear, our path is distinct. We, the citizens of Soviet Azerbaijan, may confidently say that we have already accomplished one goal: Azerbaijanis are a nation with an ancient statehood and millennia-long history.”

Bagirov was clearly proud of the de-Turkified construction of Azerbaijani identity before the war.

Although Azerbaijani people had been Turkified in a ‘baleful episode of history’, Azerbaijan was a separate nation with its roots in ancient Media and Albania. So the Turkic language that Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijaniis shared was not the only reason for re-union. The real reason could be found in ancient history. Iranian Azerbaijan was an essential part of the Empire of Medes, the ancestors of the Azerbaijani nation. These were the ‘historical facts’ that Bagirov wanted to remind Turks and Iranians of in his speech.

3.1.2. WARTIME PROPAGANDA AND NATIONAL HISTORY.

Azerbaijani wartime propaganda, as in all Soviet lands, aimed to increase the fighting spirit of soldiers and mobilize civilian population for higher level of productions under severe living conditions. As Bagirov noted at the seventh plenum of the Baku Committee of the KP(b)Az, in November 1941, propaganda agitation work had to be conducted at every moment in the daily lives in kolkhozes and towns of Azerbaijan. To this end, historical figures were used in propaganda activities both in Azerbaijan and in other Caucasian republics. During the war,

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Azerbaijani national identity and history, which was constructed after the Great Terror, was fully utilized.

For the Azerbaijani SSR, the occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan and the possibility of Soviet annexation was one side of the story. There were also Azerbaijani soldiers in the Red Army fighting against the German invasion, which stretched to the north Caucasus in 1942. At the production front, the oilfields of Baku supplied seventy percent of the Soviet fuel in the war period. Both the civil population and the Azerbaijani soldiers had to be aroused and national sentiments had been used to this end. Although the German occupation did not reach Transcaucasia, Azerbaijani soldiers served in different armies, including the Black Sea Fleet, the South Front, the South-West Front, and in Georgia, Armenia, and Iran.\footnote{ARPiISPhDA, 1-238-109-10, March 12, 1942. Also, for the military publication section in the Azerbaijani language at the Transcaucasian Front in Tbilisi, see: ARPiISPhDA, 1-238-109-97, November 8, 1942.} There had already been single sheet newspapers printed in Azerbaijani for Azerbaijani soldiers since 1942.\footnote{ARPiISPhDA, 1-103-64-138/140, March 18, 1942.} Another platform on which these propaganda activities took place was the theatre. The war affected the list of plays that were staged at Azerbaijani theatres in 1942. The Bureau of the TsK KP(b)Az recommended that heroic figures of the Azerbaijani people should be memorialized in operas. The program of the Azerbaijani state opera included some new plays with national or heroic themes, such as ‘\textit{Aslan Yatağı}’ (the Lion’s Bed), ‘Nizami’, ‘Dumanlı Tabriz’ (Foggy Tabriz), and ‘Babak’.\footnote{Shaldzhian, ‘Armianskie streli’, \textit{Izvestiia ArmFAN}, no.1-2 / 15-16 (1942), pp. 31-33; G.B. Muradian, \textit{Vardan Mamikonian} (Erivan, 1943); M.G. Iusian, \textit{David-Bek} (Erivan, 1943); R. M. Dzhanpoladian, \textit{Smbat Khosrov – Shum Bagratuni} (Erivan, 1943); S. T. Eremian, \textit{Amirspasalar Zakharia Dolgorukii} (Erivan, 1944); F. Grigorian, \textit{Smbat I Bagratuni} (Erivan, 1946). For Georgian examples: G. Kikodze, \textit{Iraklii Vtoroi: monografiia} (Tbilisi, 1945)}

The primary historical theme pursued before and during the war was the historical brotherhood of Caucasian people. That is why, at the end of his speech ‘Let us turn the Caucasus into a grave
for the Hitlerites’, Bagirov defined Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Dagestanis, the peoples of Checheno-Ingushetia and Ossetia as “proud and freedom-loving sons of the Caucasus and fraternal nations”.\footnote{M.D. Bagirov, Prevratim Kavkaz v Mogilu dlia Gitlerovtsev (Baku, 1942), p. 16.} Another theme was the ‘Azerbaijani figure’ Kör-oğlu. Kör-oğlu had been a very popular epic tale among western Turkic peoples (Turkmens, Azerbaijanis, and the Turks of Turkey), symbolizing bravery.\footnote{This epic tale was also widespread among the Georgians and Armenians. Vambery, Samoilovich, and Khuluflu also wrote about this epic tale. For the most prominent and groundbreaking account of the Köroğlu epic and summaries of these previous accounts, see: P.N. Boratav, Köroğlu Destanı (Istanbul, [1931], 1984).} During the war, the nationalization (or Azerbaijanization) of Köroğlu intensified. On 25 November 1941, an image of the eponymous Kör-oğlu with a Soviet soldier and a pioneer (Ru. pionerka) appeared in the republican daily Qommunist. The image, and the patriotic poem printed beneath, demonstrated the utilization of national sentiments for the Soviet-German War.\footnote{‘Körəğlu’, Qommunist (25 November 1941), p.1.} On 21 December 1941, the image of Kör-oğlu was used once again, this time in the article ‘Sovet Pahlavani’.\footnote{‘Sovet Pahlavani’, Qommunist (21 December 1941), p.1.} This first page article in Qommunist first described the heroic deeds of Azerbaijani soldiers on the Moscow front, and then emphasized that these contemporary soldiers fought, as had their predecessor pahlavans (Ru. Bagatyr, Kaz. Batyr), including Kör-oğlu.
Epic Hero Kör-Oğlu, a Red Army Soldier, and a Pioneer Girl (Ru. pionerka)


Moreover, the article included a quatrain from the epic tale of Kör-oğlu in Azerbaijani:

“Koroğluyam gorxu nadir bilmaram.
Mard kimi meydanda dayanmag qarak!
İğitlərim buqun dava qunudur,
Duşmanın ölkəsi talanmag qarak!” 538

I am Kör-oğlu, I do no know what fear is.
One must stand bravely on the battlefield!
My warriors, today it is judgment day,
The land of the enemy must be ransacked!

From the first days of the war, Azerbaijani historians provided heroic historical accounts for publication. By 1945, the members of the Institute of History and the Institute of Language and Literature of the AzFAN had written more than sixty texts on historical themes, revealing the patriotism and heroism of the Azerbaijani nation, and frequently delivered lectures and speeches in Baku and other regions of Azerbaijan. The historians of the AzFAN organized public lectures, in cooperation with the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)Az, on the heroic past of the nation. Historians Iampol’skii, Vekilov, Kaziev, and Ismail Guseinov addressed themes such as “The heroic past of the Azerbaijani nation”, “Patriotic ideas in the history of Azerbaijan”, and “Babak—warrior for the liberation of the Azerbaijani nation”. Petrushevskii conducted lectures on “The heroic history of the Azerbaijani nation” and “The joint struggle of Transcaucasian nations against foreign occupants”. At the same time, the AzFAN continued to contribute to agitation-propaganda initiatives by organizing lectures on the heroic past of the nation. These lectures covered the heroic past of the Azerbaijani nation, the Stalinist friendship of nations, especially the friendship among Transcaucasian nations (Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians), and the past heroic struggles of the Azerbaijani nation with other Transcaucasian nations against foreign occupants, particularly Mongols and Arabs. There were also lectures organized on Javanshir, Babak, Köroğlu, Katak Nebi, and Ibrahim Shirvanshah. Parallel to these lectures, the propaganda-agitation materials with national historic themes were immediately prepared and published in the first months of the War. In October 1941, the first booklet was written by M. Vekilov, a historian of the AzFAN, and described the heroic deeds of

541 ARPIİSPİHDA, 1-238-156-31/31ob, (January 1943).
the Albanian prince Javanshir against Arab armies.\textsuperscript{542} The second booklet concerned Babak and was hastily prepared by Iampol’skii in December 1941 on the Babak Uprising. The editorial remarks at the beginning explained that, “By publishing this brochure, the Institute of History of the AzFAN declares the necessity of broad propaganda of the heroic traditions of our Soviet nation, whose beginning lies in deep antiquity”.\textsuperscript{543} Iampol’skii, in this short booklet, criticized the work of Tomara published in 1936. According to Iampol’skii, “The main flaw of the brochure of Tomara is that it does not connect the uprising of Babak to the history of the USSR”.\textsuperscript{544} In other words, Babak had not been sufficiently incorporated into Azerbaijani national history. Additionally, Tomara used the phrase “Turkish military forces” (Ru. Turetskaia voiska). Iampol’skii underlined the fact that according to contemporary Russian usage, Turks (Turok) meant the Ottomans and their successors. Retrospectively referring to a group in the sixth century as Turks was a distortion of Ottoman history.\textsuperscript{545} Nevertheless, Iampol’skii demonstrated the same retrospective thinking when he continuously labelled Babak an ‘Azerbaijani leader’, his uprising an ‘Azerbaijani uprising’, and the people living in Albania and Azerbaijan in the ninth century as ‘the Azerbaijani people’. As noted earlier, Babak did not define himself as a leader of Azerbaijani people, and the territory that was named as Azerbaijan during Arab rule did not include the territory that became Soviet Azerbaijan. Though the northern territories of Aras were called Albania or Arran by Arab sources such as Tabari, Iampol’skii retrospectively named these territories Azerbaijan. Moreover, he expanded the historical territories of Azerbaijan to

\textsuperscript{543} Z.I. Iampol’skii, Vosstanie Babaka, kratkii ocherk (Baku, 1941), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{544} Z.I. Iampol’skii, Vosstanie, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{545} Z.I. Iampol’skii, Vosstanie, p. 7.
the south by referring to Hamadan (Ecbatana) as an ancient capital of Azerbaijan, the result of incorporating the Medes into Azerbaijani history as an Azerbaijani state. He also challenged the medieval records that identified Babak as Persian. Iampol’skii first pointed out that “sources do not say anything about the language in which Babakites conversed.” He then continued with a debatable point:

“It can be confidently argued that the language of the majority of Azerbaijani Babakites was an ancient Azerbaijani-Japhetic language at a particular stage of its development. [Although] we cannot provide here materials that would characterize this language, we note that, in any case, the language that they spoke at that time was a separate language (ancient Azeri), differing from all languages of the peoples of the Near East and particularly from Persian”.

In other words, according to Iampol’skii, the dominant language in ninth century Iranian Azerbaijan was a language of Caucasian origin. For this reason, the Babakites had no connection with the peoples of Iran. There was no indication whether this language was similar to Persian or Caucasian Albanian. Although this ‘Azerbaijani language’ was used broadly by Babakites, nothing remained of it that could document its existence. Finally, Iampol’skii added that the Khurramite sect and Babak’s ideas inspired Sufism in the coming centuries. In a way, Babak was a forerunner of Shamil in the ninth century.

Another small booklet prepared in the autumn of 1941 was ‘From the Heroic Struggle of the Azerbaijani Nation in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’ by I.P. Petrushevskii. The subject was the struggle of the Azerbaijani nation against Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century. Petrushevskii’s work followed the anti-Turkic formulation established before the war. The account covered the period when the Seljuk Empire lost its power and former governors of

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546 Z.I. Iampol’skii, Vosstanie, p. 22.
547 Z.I. Iampol’skii, Vosstanie, p. 33.
548 Z.I. Iampol’skii, Vosstanie, p. 42
549 I.P. Petrushevskii, Iz geroicheskoi bor’by azerbaidzhanskogo naroda v XIII-XIV vekakh (Baku, 1941).
this empire emerged as regional rulers. Thus, there was no central force that could resist the
Mongol forces. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the territories that were reviewed by
Petrushevskii had divided into various polities as dynastic formations based around major trade
cities such as Ganja, Shamakhi, Ani, and Sheki. It is not a surprise that Petrushevskii could not
name a single battle between an Azerbaijani leader and the Mongol forces of Subutai, Dzhebe,
or Ögedei (Oktay). In short, the period could be described as dynastic, religious, and regional.\textsuperscript{550}
Petrushevskii, however, had the task of constructing a heroic national history out of this
patchwork. That is why his account aimed to incorporate all these various khanates,
principalities, and individual cities under the name of ‘Azerbaijan’, and to call their
confrontations with the Mongols an ‘Azerbaijani struggle’ against foreign invaders. As an
alternative, Petrushevskii could have used the Turkic Seljuks and their battles during the same
period as heroic figures for Azerbaijanis. However, the Seljuks had already been declared anti-
Azerbaijani before the war. Petrushevskii continued this de-Turkification of the history. He
described Turkic nomadic tribes as “the main part of the feudal armed forces”, and blamed the
Mongol period for the settlement of Turkic tribes of Central Asia in Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{551} Finally, as in
the work of Iampol’skii, he described Sufism as a progressive popular movement against the
feudal rule, by referring to Engels.\textsuperscript{552} Petrushevskii also wrote another booklet on Ibrahim of the
Shirvanshah. The title of the booklet, ‘the Great Patriot Ibrahim of Shirvanshah’ declares that
Ibrahim was far from being a feudal lord. In line with the history that was constructed before the
war, Ibrahim was described as a national leader. He was a “talented orator and diplomat”,

\textsuperscript{550} The author also mentions this in his brochure. I.P. Petrushevskii, \textit{Iz geroicheskoi}, p. 8
\textsuperscript{551} I.P. Petrushevskii, \textit{Iz geroicheskoi}, pp. 44-45
\textsuperscript{552} I.P. Petrushevskii, \textit{Iz geroicheskoi}, p. 13, 56, 57.
“talented ruler”, and “great military leader” who wanted to unite and liberate Azerbaijani lands under a centralized state.\textsuperscript{553}

The fifth booklet was M. Kaziev’s ‘From the History of Struggle of the Azerbaijani Nation against Foreign Occupants’.\textsuperscript{554} At the beginning of his narrative Kaziev declared:

> “The centuries-old history of the Azerbaijani nation is full of names of patriots; fighters for the people’s happiness. Legendary Babak, self-asserted Mazdak, the hero Javanshir, Kör-oğlu, Gachak Nabi, his comrade in arms Khadzhar, Gachag Kiaram, Katyr Mamed, and others”\textsuperscript{555}

In the following pages, Kaziev continued in the same manner and provided more detailed historical examples. The fruits of de-Turkification and primordialization of the Azerbaijani nation before the War had ripened:

> “The Azerbaijani nation is one of the ancient nations of the world. Its history covers approximately three thousand years. […] Hordes of Romans, Parthians, Khazars, Arabs, Mongols, and other occupants one after another trampled across the beautiful fields of Azerbaijan, ransacked and destroyed its towns and villages. The Azerbaijani nation fought against all these intruders”\textsuperscript{556}

Following this prelude, Kaziev explained how the fraternal nations of the Caucasus—Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians—fought together against the Romans, who were the ancestors of contemporary fascist Italians. Moreover, the Roman legions contained Germanic peoples, the predecessors of contemporary Hitlerites. Thus, Azerbaijanis had been fighting against Italians and Germans since the dawn of the history. The Azerbaijani nation also fought against the Arab-Muslim invaders. As Kaziev noted, at the fourteenth congress of the KP(b)Az, in June 1938, Bagirov explained:

> “In the middle of the eighth century, Arabs occupy Azerbaijan. They bring turmoil, they deprive them of their native tongue, forbidding the Azerbaijani nation to converse in

\textsuperscript{553} I. P. Petrushevskii, Velikii patriot shirvanshakh Ibragim (Baku, 1942), pp.16-38.
\textsuperscript{554} M. Kaziev, Iz istorii bor’by azerbaidzhanskogo naroda protiv inozemnykh zakhvatчиков (Baku, 1942)
\textsuperscript{555} M. Kaziev, Iz istorii, p. 3
\textsuperscript{556} M. Kaziev, Iz istorii, p. 7
her native language, they attach the Azerbaijani nation to the Arab language and Mohammed's belief by the force of their swords".  

Kaziev then described the anti-Arab struggles of Javanshir and Babak, who by this point were familiar names as Azerbaijani national heroes. He also emphasized over and over again the friendship of the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani nations in ancient times and the Middle Ages. Other printed materials from 1942 included the heroic epic ‘Köroğlu’ and ‘From the History of Struggle of the Azerbaijani Nation against German Occupiers’. In 1943, similar efforts continued and the publication of ‘Historians and Writers on the Bravery and Courage of Azerbaijanis’ was planned. This was a collection of historical stories reflecting a heroic national past. The first part of the booklet included the ancient history of Azerbaijan as described by ancient and early medieval historians, historical examples of bravery and courage in ‘Köroğlu’ and ‘Kitab-i Dede Korkut’, the poems of Nizami, and Persian historical records on the leadership and military bravery of Ibrahim of Shirvanshah and Shah Ismail. To increase its effectiveness as propaganda-agitation among Azerbaijani women, Tuti Bike of Darband from the eighteenth century was also included in the booklet.

Apparently, Moscow also backed these national propaganda efforts. On 11 August 1943, A. Sherbakov, the head of the Political Administration of the Red Army (GlavPURKKA), ciphered a telegram to Bagirov on measures for (1) consolidating ties between Azerbaijani soldiers of the Red Army and Azerbaijani people and (2) for strengthening their education in Soviet patriotism. Sherbakov’s suggestions included:

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557 M. Kaziev, Iz istorii, pp. 11-12.
559 M. Kaziev, Iz istorii, pp. 6-14, 18,19.
560 ARPIISPIHDA, 1-238-140-5 and 11, (1942).
561 ARPIISPIHDA, 1-238-141-10, (1942).
“The publication of small booklets for agitators and soldiers on the heroic traditions of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani nation in the fight for its fatherland, a collection of selections from national epic tales and from the works of the best writers of Azerbaijan, and on the Russian nation—the elder brother of the Azerbaijani nation.”

Sherbakov’s message made it clear that the Bolshevik leaders of Azerbaijan had to continue to propagate the heroic deeds of the Azerbaijani nation. This meant another wave of anti-Turkish and anti-Persian history writing. It also emphasized the Russian position among the other nationalities. The Bureau of the TsK KP(b)Az issued a decree based on Sherbakov’s message. Bagirov immediately sent a copy of the message to Gazanfar Mamedov, the agitation-propaganda secretary, in order to summon Azerbaijani writers and prepare texts for this purpose. Three days later, the Bureau of the KP(b)Az charged the historians of AzFAN “with the organization of popular booklets with the topics ‘on the Stalinist friendship of nations’, ‘on the great Russian nation’, ‘on the heroic past of Azerbaijani people’, ‘on the historical friendship of the Azerbaijani nation and the great Russian nation’, and ‘on the great military leaders of the Azerbaijani nation’ for Azerbaijani agitation-propaganda officers in the military units”.

Additionally, Bagirov ordered Mamedov and Shakhgeldiev to send 5-10% of the printed materials on popular political-fiction and military texts (Ru. massaia politicheskaia khudozhestvennaia, voennaia literatura) in the Azerbaijani language to the soldiers and to organize lecturers for the army divisions with Azerbaijani soldiers. The lecturers included Ismail Guseinov, the director of the institute of history of the AzFAN, because the heroic past of the nation had to be disseminated among Azerbaijani soldiers. It is no surprise that the historical friendship of Russian and Azerbaijani people also had to be emphasized in the divisions in which

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562 *ARPiISPIHDA*, 1-28-30-73, August 11, 1943.
563 *ARPiISPIHDA*, 1-28-30-72, August 11, 1943.
564 *ARPiISPIHDA*, 1-28-30-65, August 14, 1943.
565 *ARPiISPIHDA*, 1-103-84-31, October 19-30, 1942. Ismail Abbas Ogly Guseinov was born in 1910 and became a member of the VKP(b) in 1940. He graduated from the institute of nationalities at the TsK VKP(b). see: *ARPiISPIHDA*, 1-253-1-5 and 35 (1941).
Azerbaijanis and Russians fought together. In a multi-national army, the propaganda of historical friendship of participants was very important. Thus, the editorial board of the Boets RKKA, a Red Army newspaper for the Transcaucasian front, asked the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)Az for “texts about the historical friendship of the Azerbaijani nation and the great Russian nation”. In order to satisfy these needs the Azerneshr (or AzGlavlit) published “Velikaia Druzhba” by historian Ibragimov in 1944, who explained the historical solidarity of the two nations.

3.1.3. THE 1946 EDITION OF ISTORIIA AZERBAIDZHANA.

The construction of a national history continued in the war period. On 25 June, 1942, the AzFAN sent two copies of ‘The History of Azerbaijan’ to Gazanfar Mamedov, the agitation-propaganda secretary of the KP(b)Az, to receive his and Mir Jafar Bagirov’s comments. These copies are not located in the archive file, but the cover letter gives evidence of a revised text in 1942. In light of the war, the prospective text had to “reflect the heroic traditions of Azerbaijani history”. Along with these efforts, Sysoev’s history of Azerbaijan published in 1928 was banned and removed from the public libraries. The older accounts were contradicted by the newer ones, so they had to be removed in order to avoid confusion. In 1943, the historians received various comments from Bagirov and edited their texts accordingly. On 12 January, 1944, the authors met with Bagirov. Apparently, the first secretary of the KP(b)Az asked the historians to finalize their texts. Two days later, a report sent to Bagirov informed him that the new text would be

566 ARPIİSPIHDA, 1-29-384-31, May 13, 1944.
567 ARPIİSPIHDA, 1-29-387-144, August 1944.
569 ARPIİSPIHDA, 1-238-222-1/2 (1943).
570 ARPIİSPIHDA, 1-238-109-125, (1942).
ready at the end of January.\textsuperscript{571} From 28 January to 4 February, the chapters of the textbook were discussed at the committee of historians.\textsuperscript{572} The book was scheduled to be published for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet rule in Azerbaijan in the following year.\textsuperscript{573} However, the text remained unpublished because of disputed issues. The history textbook of Azerbaijan was finally published in 1946.

The 1941 edition of the national history of Azerbaijan had already established some of the themes that consolidated their place in the 1946 edition. As in the previous history, the 1946 edition emphasized the ancient fraternity of Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Georgian tribes. This ancient alliance was based on the common struggle of the Urartu, who were considered the ancient Armenians, and the Medes against “the slave-owning and carnivorous state of Assyrians”.\textsuperscript{574} Unlike the 1941 edition, the new history did not explicitly mention Marr and his theory. The division between the area north of the Aras River where the ancient Caucasian tribes were located and the Medes in the south remained obscure. In order to make a connection between the Medes and the ancient Caucasian tribes, the text claimed, “In the bourgeoning period of the ancient Medes, the influence of Median tribes, apparently, reached up to the foothills of the main Caucasian mountain ridge.”\textsuperscript{575}

The Median Empire was then depicted as the golden age of ancient Azerbaijanis. The Persians, as historical enemies of the ancient Azerbaijanis, were depicted as culturally inferior and former vassals of the Medes. With the assistance of Armenians, the Medes heroically resisted against

\textsuperscript{571} The historians were Z.I. Iampolskii, V.V. Leviatov, E.B. Shukur-Zade, E.A. Tokarshevskii, G.N. Guzeinov, and M.A. Kaziev. ARPIISPİHDA, 1-29-237-8/10, January 14, 1944.
\textsuperscript{572} ARPIISPİHDA, 1-29-400-14, February 5, 1944,
\textsuperscript{573} ARPIISPİHDA, 1-29-400-44 (1944).
\textsuperscript{574} Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1: uchebnoe posobie dlia srednikh shkol (Baku, 1946), p. 28-9.
\textsuperscript{575} Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, p. 28.
the revolting Persians; however, the struggle ended in a victory for the latter.\textsuperscript{576} In order to present the situation in a dramatic tone, the history describes how:

“The Persians, led by Darius, defeated the Medians, enslaved Fraourt [the Median king], cut off his nose and ears, gouged his eyes out, and completed [this torture] by impaling him”\textsuperscript{577}

As in the 1941 edition, the text incorporated Albanians as ancient Azerbaijanis. It referred to the Albanian alphabet, a source of curiosity in the 1940s, as “an ancient Azerbaijani Albanian writing”.\textsuperscript{578} In other words, the ancient Albanian scripts were defined as an early Azerbaijani national alphabet. Claim for ancient Albania was so important that, despite the severe conditions of the war in 1944, the AzFAN decided to conduct an archaeological expedition in the ancient capital of Caucasian Albania, the town of Kabala.\textsuperscript{579}

The Romans and Sassanids were again enemies of the nation in history. Soon, ancient Armenians and Georgians joined this force of “ancestors of Azerbaijanis (Albanians and Atropatenians)”.\textsuperscript{580} Mazdak was depicted as an ancient Azerbaijani revolutionary. The uprising of the Albanian prince Vachagan was called a “liberation struggle of the nation”.\textsuperscript{581} Although in the 1941 text there was a section on the Albanian Church, the evangelization of Albanian tribes, and the impact of this event on their culture, it was removed from the 1946 edition. The issue is passed over with few remarks.\textsuperscript{582} The 1941 edition explained how the Arabs converted Azerbaijanis to Islam by force. This event was emphasized in order to show that the religion in which people believed was actually an alien system imposed upon them. In the new edition of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{576} \textit{Istoriia Azerbaidzhana}, pp.30-2.
\bibitem{577} \textit{Istoriia Azerbaidzhana}, p. 32.
\bibitem{578} \textit{Istoriia Azerbaidzhana}, p. 37-8.
\bibitem{579} \textit{ARPiISPiHDA}, 1-29-400-42/43, April 3, 1944.
\bibitem{580} \textit{Istoriia Azerbaidzhana}, p. 37.
\bibitem{581} \textit{Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1}, p. 38-40
\bibitem{582} \textit{Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1}, p. 38.
\end{thebibliography}

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1946, however, this crucial turn was surprisingly absent.\textsuperscript{583} Most probably, this was done to avoid answering why it was only Azerbaijanis out of the three nations of Transcaucasia that became Muslims. Another omitted paragraph in the 1946 edition concerned the ‘Azerbaijani language’. The 1941 text stated:

“In spite of the violence of the Arab occupiers, the Azerbaijani language continued to develop further, [and] only some Arab words infiltrated the Azerbaijani language. Arab historians of the time called the ancient Azerbaijani language Arrani [Arranski] and Azeri [Azeri].” \textsuperscript{584}

This statement created more questions than it answered. As mentioned above, the authors had already claimed that Azeri was a different language from Persian. According to this further statement, the Azerbaijani language—the one used before the Turkification of the region—was a widespread and developed tongue that resisted Arabization. In other words, the population became Muslims, but they refused to use the language of the new religion and sedentary culture. However, this statement could not explain how the same language was replaced by the Turkic of ‘primitive nomadic warriors’ in the following centuries. Furthermore, in order to eliminate any ethno-linguistic difference between Arran and Azerbaijan, the 1941 edition implied that Arrani and Azeri was the same language. In fact, these languages were entirely different.\textsuperscript{585} The final confusion engendered by this phrase concerned the term ‘Azeri’. Consequently, instead of further complicating the picture, the statement above was removed from the 1946 edition.

When the Arab-Muslim armies appeared on the horizon, Azerbaijanis, led by their leaders Javanshir and Babak, fought together with Armenians and Georgians against the invaders.\textsuperscript{586} The

\textsuperscript{583} Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, pp. 41-50.
\textsuperscript{584} Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{585} V.V. Bartol’d, ‘Kratkii’, ii/1, pp. 775-783, p.777
\textsuperscript{586} Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, pp. 43-45.
uprisings of Javanshir and Babak were described as “a real national liberation struggle” as well as “one of the biggest peasant movements in the world”. While the 1941 edition still played out both peasant and national elements, the 1946 edition increased the emphasis on the aspect of national liberation struggle against Arab occupiers. The ‘shift of Babak’ from a leader of peasant war to that of a national leader was complete. Compared to the previous edition, the episodes on the struggle of Azerbaijani against Sassanid and Arab rulers were now described in much more colour and detail. For example, the valour of Javanshir as the leader of his nation, received this description: “For seven years, Javanshir continuously fought against the Arab occupiers for his fatherland’s honour and independence. He was wounded eleven times in these bloody fights.”

Interestingly, contrary to the earlier narrative, the 1946 text mentioned Kurdish identity in two cases. First, Kurds were mentioned in the context of the Babak uprising as participants in this movement. Second, we are reminded that the founders of the Shaddadid dynasty in the tenth century were Kurds. This change can be interpreted as a result of Soviet foreign policy in Iran, which promoted Kurdish nationalists and their short-lived republic of Iranian Kurdistan in 1946. While Kurds appeared in the narrative, the warriors of the Kievan Rus’, who ransacked Azerbaijan more than once in the tenth century, disappeared. The 1941 text explained in detail how the Rus’ warriors, “the ancestors of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians”, sailed in their boats all the way from Kiev, arrived in Azerbaijan (Arran), and plundered the region. The destruction was so massive that following this disaster, the city of Barda, the ancient centre of

587 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p. 51.
588 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p. 40.
589 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, pp. 51,58.
Arran that had survived previous invasions, disappeared from the stage of history. In 1946, however, this account was completely removed from the official history of Azerbaijan. Clearly, the authors were anxious not to damage the mythical fraternity of Russians and Azerbaijanis.

In line with the reading constructed before the war, the sensitive Turkic Seljuk issue was addressed again in an anti-Turkic manner. However, the explanation offered for the success of Turkification and Seljuk expansion differed. The new explanation, which aimed to clear any confusion, was based on class. The feudal rulers in both historical Azerbaijan and Shirvan were blamed for the success of the Seljuks in gaining the control of these territories:

“There was not a unified state in the country when the horsemen of the Seljuk Sultan Togrulbek [Toğrul Bey], whose military success started in Central Asia, appeared at the borders of Azerbaijan. ‘They have destroyed and burned down everything, and [they] sow death, and the same sword of the victorious [Seljuks] hit both father and son’.”

However, this reading did not explain how these territories were Turkified so successfully. The change of the language was mentioned in 1941 edition without explanation. The text mentioned it for the first time in the chapter on the tenth and twelfth centuries. After designating Persian as the language of the feudal class and Arabic as the language of liturgy and religious texts, it continued:

“The Azerbaijani language of commoners developed from the previous Azerbaijani tribes. This language contained many words from other nationalities that settled in Azerbaijan. In particular, nomads, who entered to Azerbaijan from the north through Derbend and also from the south, brought words and phrases to the Azerbaijani language from various Turkic languages. [...] The [original] ancient Azerbaijani language remained without change only among Udis and other tribes in some mountainous regions of Azerbaijan”.

This statement did not give clear indication of the Turkification of the language. Moreover, the 1941 text dated Turkification to as late as the fifteenth century.

590 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, pp. 76-77.
591 Here the text quotes a medieval Arab source. Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p.61.
592 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, p. 92.
“There were many pastoral nomadic tribes that came from the south of Russia and Central Asia and settled in Azerbaijan at various times. These included Kypchak, Seljuk, Turkmen, and even Mongol tribes. Azerbaijanis started to use separate words and even the word order of the languages of these tribes and of earlier ones. This is why the ancient Azerbaijani language changed very much. Besides, the ancient Azerbaijani language constantly developed. New words, new phrases appeared. As a result, the Azerbaijani language became very similar to the contemporary language [that we use] and it became very different from the language that was used by Azerbaijanis who fought against Pompey.”

Thus, Turkification was a process that began in the tenth century and continued until the fifteenth century. These accounts were absent in the 1946 edition, which did not explain at all how and when Azerbaijan was Turkified. The question that the 1946 edition was avoiding was how the Seljuk and Mongol armies of pastoral nomadic tribes managed to Turkify the region, in spite of the fact that the Arabs with their sedentary culture failed to change the ethno-linguistic structure of Azerbaijan. The narrative in 1946 clearly refused the population theory and argued, “The number of the families belonging to Oğuz tribes was not more than one thousand”.

Another topic that was formulated in the pre-war years and continued to develop after was Ibrahim of Shirvanshakh as a national figure who had aimed to unite Azerbaijani lands. However, this time, the narrative tried to strike a more equal balance between the Shirvanshahs in the north and the Kara-Koyunlu and Ak-Konyunlu states in the south. The latter two ruled Iranian or historical Azerbaijan, with Tabriz as their capital. The disputes between the rulers of Shirvan and the Kara-Koyunlu sultans were described in detail. Contrary to the 1941 edition, the latter were not depicted as enemies of the nation and Ibrahim of Shirvan was not the only national leader. Although they fought against each other, both the rulers of Shirvan and the Kara-Koyunlu sultans were described positively. Moreover, they were incorporated into the national narrative. While the 1941 edition despised the Kara-Koyunlu Turkic nomadic tribal federation as

593 Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana, pp.122-3.
594 Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p. 62.
595 Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p. 91-6.
“Turkmen feudals”, the 1946 edition affirmatively called them “Azerbaijani nomadic tribes”.596 The reason for this alteration was that given the possibility of unification between Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan, the national history had to reconcile this historical conflict and embrace the territories in the south. This approach continued in the narrative of the Ak-Koyunlu period. For the same reason, a long and colourful description of Tabriz was included in the newer text. The account of the occupation of Tabriz by Ibrahim of Shirvan also changed. The earlier text merely stated that Ibrahim conquered Tabriz.597 The 1946 edition, however, placed greater emphasis on the popularity of Ibrahim and the unification of Azerbaijan:

“[Ibrahim] as a ruler was the protector of crafts and trade; he sought to maintain peace in Shirvan and [that is why] he was very popular in all of Azerbaijan. The people of Tabriz felt sympathy for him precisely because of these features. [... When] Ibrahim crossed the river of Aras [and] in May 1406 occupied Tabriz, the population of the city hailed the Shirvanshah. The annexation of Tabriz was another step towards the creation of the great Azerbaijani state”.598

In a very contradictory manner, Seljuks, who had initiated the Turkification of Azerbaijan, were depicted as blundering horsemen and feudal occupiers of Azerbaijan, while the Kara-Koyunlu and Ak-Koyunlu Turkic nomadic tribal confederations were described positively as “Azerbaijani”. Although controversial, this interpretation offered certain advantages for the construction of national history. First of all, departing from the 1941 edition, it allowed the fifteenth century of historical (Iranian) Azerbaijan to be incorporated into the national narrative. The political motivation for this was the Soviet interest in Iranian Azerbaijan, explained above. Second, it helped fill the long gap in the history of Iranian Azerbaijan from the ancient Medes to the medieval Shah Ismail’s Safavids, which were both identified as ‘Azerbaijani’. Third, the description of Kara-Koyunlu and Ak-Koyunlu as ‘ours’ facilitated the definition of the Ottomans

596 Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana, p. 121; Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p.91.
597 Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana, p.120;
598 Istoriiia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p. 91
as ‘others’. If the Khanate of Shirvan had remained as the only independent Azerbaijani state in the narrative, it would have been difficult to position the Ottomans as enemies because there was no known conflict between them. However, the Ak-Koyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan and his struggle against the Ottomans opened the way to emphasizing the ‘historical antagonism’ between Azerbaijani and the Ottoman Turks. This anti-Turkish discourse, which continued in the chapter on the Safavid State, reflected the increasing tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union after the Second World War.

However, this national construction caused a problem. The Ak-Koyunlu, Kara-Koyunlu, Shirvanshahs, and Safavids were all defined as Azerbaijani, but in reality they were also bitter enemies of each other. The Ak-Koyunlu ended the rule of Kara-Koyunlu; Ak-Koyunlu expelled the ancestors of Safavids from Ardabil, and Safavids attacked Shirvan for three consecutive generations. The 1946 edition, however, solved this complex issue by providing an anti-Turkish teleology for these events. The struggle among different polities was for a centralized state against Turkey and Safavids were the winners and organizers of this state.

“The Safavid sheikhs who led the Shi’ite movement, moved forward with the claim of uniting the territories of neighbouring countries. The foundation of a new centralized state completely answered the urgent demands of the population, and at the same time, it [ complied with] the duties of defending the country [i.e. Azerbaijan] first of all against Turkey in the west”.

Thus, the aim of the sheikhs of Ardabil, according to the 1946 edition, was to found a centralized powerful state in order to fight against the Ottoman-Turks. At the same time, the text was careful on the Shi’ite-Sunni schism and downplayed this division within the population. In fact, the army of Ismail, which defeated the Shirvanshahs, was dominated by fanatic Turkmen Shi’ite

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599 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p. 97.
600 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p. 106.
601 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1, p. 104.
warriors. The cleavage between the two denominations and the antagonism between the Ardabil sheikhs and Shirvanshahs sharpened when Juneid and his son Haidar were defeated and killed by Sunni Shirvanshahs in the previous decades. This is why the siege of Baku in 1501, as depicted in the 1941 edition, included some extraordinary images, such as the following: “[The Safavids] exhumed and burned the bones of the members of Shirvanshahs family, who were buried in Baku.” Indeed, even today, visitors are surprised to see the empty chambers of mausoleums at the Shirvanshah Palace in Baku. Thereafter, most of the Baku population was forcibly converted to the Shi’ite denomination. This exhumation episode was removed from the 1946 edition in order to conceal the sectarian conflict between Shirvan and Azerbaijan in the Middle Ages. The denominational division was emphasized only in the conflict against Sunni Turkey. Another construction of history in the 1946 edition concerned the Celali revolts. These revolts were a series of uprisings in Anatolia against the central authority of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These revolts were dominated by Turkic clans, who were Ottoman subjects, and motivated by economic reasons such as taxation. These revolts were similar to the Russian Pughachev rebellion—rural resistance to the establishment of centralized order. The Celali revolts and the Safavid period of Iran had a common component. Both were initiated by Turkic tribes, and the leader of the first Celali uprising in 1519, Celal, was an Alevi (a Turkic version of Shi’ite) preacher in Tokat, in Anatolia, hundreds of kilometres away from Azerbaijan. In numerous senses, these uprisings belonged to Ottoman

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602 Istoriia Azerbaidzhan, p. 132.
604 Istoriia Azerbaidzhan: chast’ 1, p. 106.
economic and political history. Soviet Azerbaijani national history construction, however, incorporated the Celali uprisings in an astonishing way. The 1941 edition expanded the usage of the term ‘Celali uprisings’, akin to how it labelled Turkic nomadic tribes in Anatolia and Iran as ‘Azerbaijani villagers’. The aim of incorporating the Celali uprisings into the national narrative was to present an indigenous peasant war in the Middle Ages comparable to the German peasant wars and the Pugachev uprising in Russia. The 1941 edition asserted that “The most brave and active Azerbaijani peasants gathered in the divisions of Celali”. They fought “against local feudal [lords] and against Turkish and Iranian occupiers”. In other words, according to the 1941 edition, Celali rebels were patriotic Azerbaijani peasants who fought against local and foreign exploiters. In 1941, the national history not only claimed the Celali revolts as Azerbaijani, but also nationalized a heroic legend prominent in the oral traditions of Turkic peoples of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan: Kör-Oğlu. The legend first emerged in the eleventh century and took on different forms in different corners of the Turkic-speaking world. Soviet Azerbaijani history not only incorporated Kör-Oğlu as a national hero, but also placed him as a leader of ‘The Azerbaijani Celali Uprisings’ in the sixteenth century. The 1946 edition dropped the name ‘Celali’ but still claimed that there had been peasant uprisings. In this text, the anti-Turkish emphasis became more apparent. Although the previous edition counted local feudal lords, Turkish sultans, and Iranian shahs as three equal enemies, the uprisings in the new edition were only against local feudal lords and Turkish Sultans. Kör-Oğlu, as in the 1941 edition, was again described as a leading figure in these Azerbaijani peasant uprisings. Consequently, Kör-

606 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, p. 147.
608 Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, pp. 147-8.
Oğlu, the legendary hero prominent in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Uzbekistan, became an Azerbaijani peasant warrior against the Turkish sultans. 

### 3.2. KAZAKHSTAN: NATIONAL HISTORY IN 1943.

According to one interpretation, the history of Kazakhstan published in 1943 was an effort on the part of a group of brave historians such as Pankratova to balance out the Russocentric narrative that had become the major line of the regime in the previous decade. According to this reading, Pankratova and her colleagues decided to write a national history of Kazakhs that would emphasize Kazakh uprisings against the colonial expansion of the Russian Empire. Eventually, these Moscow historians, who were more ‘moderate’ in political terms and respected non-Russian nationalities, came under fire from their more hard-line, Russocentrist colleagues (such as Bushuev, Iakovlev, and Efimov), who prioritized the mobilization of the Union’s Russian majority. These Russocentric bureaucrats and historians denounced the national history upon its publication. This interpretation reduces the Kazakh national history published in 1943 to an ideological clash between some historians and ideologues over how to present anti-Russian Kazakh uprisings of the nineteenth century; in particular the resistance of Kenesary Kasymov. Unfortunately, the leaders of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and Kazakh historians—local agents—are absent in this explanation. It is true that the historians who were evacuated to Almaty played a crucial role in writing a Kazakh national history. However, the picture would not be complete without assessing the policy of the KP(b)K and its rulers in those days. Nowadays, there are attempts to depict Shaiakhmetov (the second secretary of the KP(b)K during the war and the first secretary after the war) as the defender of the Kazakh cause.

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609 *Istoriia Azerbaidzhana: chast’ 1*, p. 187.
against the Red Empire. According to this interpretation, the Kazakh leaders took the war period as an opportunity to promote Kazakh heritage and history, and they initiated writing a national history.\textsuperscript{611} This kind of black and white explanation has become even more popular since the independence of the Caucasian and Central Asian republics, because it rehabilitates part of the ruling communist elite and provides ‘patriot’ predecessors in the twentieth century for the current presidents and surrounding political elites.

First, it is argued here that the publication of the history in 1943 was not merely an initiative of some prominent Moscow historians intended to mobilize the locals. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the local historians and writers were already working on using a heroic Kazakh past for the purpose of wartime propaganda before the arrival of the Moscow’s historians. Considering the greater milieu, I would like to conclude that the 1943 edition of Kazakh history was also a project of the KP(b)K. Hence, once the project was launched, the first, second, and third secretaries and the local agitation-propaganda section of the Party were directly involved in the process of writing national history. It should also be emphasized that it would be a mistake to present the Kazakh Party elite and intellectuals as opportunists who perceived the war period as a convenient time for promoting Kazakh national history and culture against a Russocentric narrative. In most cases, these local cadres of the period believed in socialism and the regime, while also being strongly devoted to their own republics. Many historians internalized both official doctrine and patriotism. Shaiakhmetov, the second secretary of the KP(b)K, Abdykalykov, the secretary of agitation propaganda, and the historian-bureaucrat Bekmakhanov were all part of the same Soviet system as Moscow’s historians and Party leaders.

\textsuperscript{611} For the rehabilitation attempt of Shaiakhmetov and his attempts to ‘protect Bekmakhnov’ see: M. A. Akkozin, \textit{Vernut’ iz zabvenia: pravdivaia istoria o Zhumabae Shaiakhmetove, pervom kazakhe, vozglavivshem republiku} (Almaty, 2008)
The important aspect of the history which was published in 1943 is that it aimed to complete the national narrative, which remained incomplete. As described in the previous chapter, the question of the ethnogenesis of the Azerbaijani and Ukrainian nations was already solved before 1941. However, the official explanation for the ethnogenesis of Kazaks remained unclear until the publication of The History of Kazakhstan SSR in 1943. The accepted thesis of the Kazakh ethnogenesis in 1943 was similar to that in the Azerbaijani case. While primordialization was aimed at, any monoethnic explanation, as in the Ukrainian case, was avoided.

3.2.1. IMPERATIVES OF WAR & REACTION OF KAZAKH COMMUNIST PARTY.

From the first weeks of the war, enormous numbers of people evacuated the occupied territories and ended up in the far corners of Siberia or Central Asia. While recruits crowded wagons and freight cars to the west, factories, plants, and institutes were relocated to Siberia and Central Asia, behind the Ural Mountains. Soon all Central Asian towns and cities, including Almaty, were filled with hundreds of thousands of evacuees from the western regions of the USSR. They were mostly women, the elderly, and children, who were all exhausted and in terrible condition after travelling for nearly a month.
Kazakh Party Leaders, Writers, Historians

Nikolai Skvortsov
The first secretary of the KP(b)K 1938-1945

Zhumabai Shaikhmetov
The second secretary 1939-1946 and
the first secretary of the KP(b)K in 1946-1954

Mukhamedzhan Abdykalykov,
The commissar of Narkompros KazSSR
(1938-41); the head of the agitation –
propaganda department of the KP(b)K (1942-47)

Nurtas Undasyrov,
The Chair of the SNK KazSSR
(1938-1946)

S. Tolybekov,
The head of the the directorate
of arts at the SNK KazSSR

Ernuqan Bekmakhanov
As a young bureaucrat and
historian in 1941

Alkei Margulan
Historian, ethnographer,
archaeologist.

Sabit Mukanov
Writer

Mukhtar Auezov
Writer
“State Committee of Defence—Under the banner of Lenin and Stalin, forward to smash German occupiers”.

In this poster, there is a merge of the Party slogan and the pastoral nomadic image of Kazakhs—a shepherd, a flock of sheep, and the tall mountains of Tien-Shan provide an indigenous image for communication and propaganda.
“Citizen of the USSR—Your subscription to War Bonds is Your Bomb for the Enemies”.

*Kazakh facial features provide an indigenous image for propaganda*
Your Investment into a Savings Account is Your Investment into Crushing the Enemy.

The authorities also had even bigger issues to tackle. The war efforts had clear aims, and mobilization of the home front was very important. People behind the front lines had to be mobilized for the production of supplies and weapons. World War II was a total war in which mobilization of the home front was very important. The war efforts had clear aims, and recruiting soldiers came first. The war efforts had clear aims, and mobilization of the home front was very important.
of weapons, food, and clothes for an expanding army, and for transporting troops and goods to west. As all of Ukraine and Belorus, as well as numerous industrial centres and some black earth districts of Russia fell into the hands of the enemy within a matter of a few months, Soviet food production, industry, and mining suffered simultaneously. All this meant a sharp increase in Moscow’s demands on Kazakhstan. For example, during the war, Kazakhstan produced 30% of all smelted copper production in the Union, 50% of copper ore, 60% of manganese ore, and 86% of lead. Karaganda coalmine increased its capacity by a factor of 2.3. Compared to 1940, Kazakhstan provided nearly three times more meat in 1943. As a propaganda memo summarized,

“The task of the Kazakh nation is [...] to provide the necessities (more cotton, beetroots, grain, leather, meet, warm clothes, industrial products) to the glorious Red Army for the complete defeat of the hated invaders”

Along with these resolutions on economic issues, the bureau of TsK KP(b)K also made decisions in the sphere of agitation-propaganda, and mobilized people. Moreover, the bureau was well aware of the importance of the Kazakh language and the Kazakh national heroic past in agitation and propaganda activities among the Kazakh population. The reports of the Kazakh propagandists-lecturers on the regions confirmed this view. The Party urged local historians to produce the necessary pamphlets and construct a heroic past. Historians would incorporate tribal uprisings or nomadic coalitions into the national history. Buzurbaev and Abdykalykov, the consecutive secretaries of the KP(b)K for agitation and propaganda, as well as local historians and writers, played a leading role at this stage. During the war, the agitator was not only

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612 A summary of the demands of the KP(b)K from kolkhozes can be found in Zh. Shaikhmetov, Dadim Krasnoi armii, strane bol’she miasa, masla, shersti (Almaty, 1942); also see: M.B. Olcott, The Kazakhs, pp. 188-191.
614 M.K Kozybaev, Istoria i sovremennost’, p. 63.
615 An example for such a degree: KRPM, 708-5.1-596-157 (Summer-Autumn 1941).
responsible for organizing talks; he also had to convince people to provide practical support to the front. Buzurbaev, at a meeting of Almaty intelligentsia on 22 September, 1941 demanded that the intelligentsia—including historians—act as ardent agitators and increase vigilance among the masses.

On the third day of the war, experienced lecturers were dispatched by Buzurbaev to the main regions of the republic in order to convey new instructions to the regional party organs and conduct propaganda meetings for the collective farm workers and town dwellers. These propaganda trips to the regions were also a good opportunity to observe the state of public opinion, local rumours, and the issues to which the attention of agitation-propaganda had to be directed. Typically, the propagandists would note down the questions posed by the audience and report them to the centre, so that appropriate answers and further instructions could be prepared for lecturers before the next talk.

In June and July of 1941, when the first wave of propaganda activities concluded, the reports started to flow to the centre. According to these reports, both agitator-propagandists and audiences urged the Party to conduct more activities in the Kazakh language. It is not surprising that lectures delivered to Kazakhs in their native tongue were more effective in mobilizing them for the tasks of the war period. After conducting activities in different regions of Kazakhstan during the first weeks of the war, the propagandists also suggested that the lecturers had to be

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616 M.K Kozybaev, Istoriia i sovremennost’, p. 87.
617 G. Buzurbaev, ‘Intelligentsia Kazakhstana v Dni Otechestvennoi Voiny’, Bolshevik Kazakhstana, no.10 (September 1941), pp. 11-17.
618 See the report of the propagandist-lecturer after his trip to Akmola, Karaganda and Balkhash on June24, 1941; KRPM, 708-5.1-588-from 2 to 5, July 17, 1941.
619 KRPM, 708-5.1-601-19, September 25, 1941; KRPM, 708-5.1-601-36 (November 1941);
much better prepared for questions and examples on “the heroic past of our fatherland”.\textsuperscript{620} According to the report of another propagandist, a lecture in the Kazakh language would have a greater impact if the message was conveyed by reference to “a heroic past”. The same agitator in his report suggested that:

“The unparalleled dedication of Kazakh heroes, such as Amaneldy Imanov, Batyr Syrym, Edyge Batyr, Bugenbi Batyr, Isatai Taimanov, and others, to their homeland serves as an example of heroic deeds for [the Kazakh population] today. [...] As [in the case of] the Russian comrades [agitators], Kazakh comrades are also very much in need of materials on the heroic deeds of the forefathers of the Kazakh nation and their military traditions. I consider that it is high time for us to organize two to three of these kinds of brochures with high circulation and in a small format”.\textsuperscript{621}

Thus, within the first two months of the war it became apparent that in order to convey its message and mobilize the Kazakh people, the KP(b)K had to use a Kazakh packaging. The national divisions formed in the autumn and winter of 1941 demonstrated the kind of reaction the people could have when an endeavour was formulated in ‘Kazakh’. At the bureau meeting of the TsK KP(b)K, Aleksei Babkin, the commissar of the KazNKVD, noted that after the announcement of the formation of Kazakh national divisions, even “people who are excluded from military service wanted to be conscripted into the national formations [of troops]”.\textsuperscript{622} At the end of 1941, Kazakh national military units contained 13,622 soldiers, hardly a significant number. However, their recruitment was important for political and propaganda purposes. Nikolai Skvortsov, the first party secretary of the KP(b)K, emphasized:

“More than anything, it must be said [to Kazakh collective farms] that Kazakhstan is forming its own divisions; our divisions are participating in the fight”.\textsuperscript{623}

These national divisions—two infantry and two cavalry regiments—had to be formed urgently, when the enemy was at the gates of Moscow. Every collective farm had to provide clothes for

\textsuperscript{620} KRP\textit{M}, 708-5.1-588-99, July 21, 1941; KRP\textit{M}, 708-5.1-79 (August 1941).
\textsuperscript{621} KRP\textit{M}, 708-5.1-601-20, 24, September 25, 1941.
\textsuperscript{622} KRP\textit{M}, 708-5.1-144-67, December 8, 1941.
\textsuperscript{623} KRP\textit{M}, 708-5.1-144-121, December 17, 1941.
soldiers as well as horses, fodder, and saddles for the cavalry. The leaders of the Kazakhstan SSR were aware of the emphasis that had been placed on the national character of these regiments. These national divisions in turn engendered more need for agitation-propaganda that used the national past. Skvortsov concluded at the fifth plenum of the TsK KP(b)K that:

“It is necessary to significantly intensify the [propaganda] efforts among the Kazakhs in our republic, to bring out their rich traditions of heroism”.  

The centre in Almaty was well aware of these necessities and promptly responded to the reports of propagandists. First of all, the bureau (in the directive to the obkoms and raikoms) demanded that:

“Political work among the population must be implemented every day, day and night, and cover all segments of the population. Political work has to be directed towards mobilization, greater patriotic enthusiasm of workers, collective farmers, and intelligentsia, and the fight against the spread of various kinds of rumours by disorganizers and panic-mongers”.  

The decree on ‘The changing priorities and tactics of agitation-propaganda activities in light of the war period’ emphasized more than once that activities among the Kazakh population had to be conducted by Kazakh agitators in the Kazakh language. It further stressed that the mobile agitation groups of four or five propagandists visiting collective farms had to contain Kazakhs among them. Moreover, the agitation-propaganda section had to assist the agitpunkty in factories and collective farms, and to prepare newspaper boards, slogans, posters, and exhibitions that would reflect the heroic past of both the Russian and the Kazakh nations. Finally, this struggle was not a Russian-German affair and the Party wanted to make sure that the masses understood that point well. The groups of agitators-propagandists were organized according to the nationality of the audience. For example, in Dzhambul oblast, talks were

625 KRP, 708-5.1-146-85 (1941).
626 KRP, 708-5.1-596-97ob,98 (Summer-Autumn 1941).
conducted in Dungan, Uzbek, Russian, and Kazakh. The agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)K even sent propagandists to the Ural region and Siberia of the RSFSR, where thousands of Kazakhs were working in production lines, mines, and construction sites.\footnote{M.K Kozybaev, *Istoriia i sovremennost*, p.72, 87. During the war period, 200,000 workers were moved from Kazakhstan to Ural, Siberia, and Central Russia. B.K. Adambekov, 'Bor’ba Sovetskikh respublik za sozdanie voennyoi ekonomiki v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny’, in Problemy istorii i etnologii Kazakhstana (Karagandy, 2001), pp. 132-9, p.134.}

The annual programs of theatres and cinemas were reconsidered according to the needs of the war. This meant that theatres had to show patriotic plays and movies. In a similar vein, the publication plans of the KazOGIZ for the second half of 1941 were altered. There were standard Soviet publications such as “Amangel’dy Imanov”, “Stalin’s Falcons” or “Four Battles of Voroshilov”, “Chapaev”, “The Defence of Tsaritsyn” by A. Tolstoi, and “How the Steel was Tempered” by Ostrovskii. In addition, the bureau asked the KazOGIZ to publish collections of Kazakh folk epics and Kazakh proverbs and sayings on heroism. These included publications such as “Zhangozha Batyr [an epic hero] against the Central Asian Khans”, “The Kazakh Nation against Zhongar Khans”, “Bolat Tondy Batyrlar” by Kazakh bard Zhambul, and “Isatai [Taimanov] Makhambet [Utemisov]”.\footnote{KRPM, 708-5.1-80-1, 47, 54, 55, 56, June 14-17, 1941.} This list offered broad coverage of the struggles of different Kazakh tribes or clans against Jungar-Oirots, Russians, and Central Asian khanates. During the first year of the war, the KazOGIZ published heroic materials as booklets in the Kazakh language, thereby popularizing figures such as Bazar Batyr, Isatai Makhambet, and Koblandy Batyr.\footnote{KRPM, 708-6.1-661 (June 1942.)}

In September 1941, the Party decided to celebrate the anniversary of the infamous 1916 uprising. Shaiakhmetov, the second secretary of the KP(b)K, referred to the heroic past of the Kazakh nation in his patriotic speech for the occasion. He emphasised that:
“The warlike Kazakh nation since time immemorial has enjoyed courage and bravery, and highly-appreciated feats of arms. The leaders of national-independence uprisings, Batyrs Beket, Kenesary [Kasymov], and Nauryzbai [Batyr], Isatai [Taimanov], and Makhambet [Utemisov] were distinguished by their extraordinary courage and fearlessness, and they have always served as an example for future generations.”

In the Kazakh version of the text, Shaiakhmetov provides a similar argument:

“In all national-liberation wars, the sons of the Kazakh nation became examples of bravery and sacrifice. It had to be like this. From ancient times, the Kazakh nation has loved to be a batyr. Beket [Batyr], Kenesary [Kasymov] and Nauryzbai [Batyr], Isatai [Taimoanov] and Makhambet [Utemisov], Amangel’dy [Imanov]—batyrs of the Kazakhs—fought for freedom and independence. They defeated their enemies numerous times."

After the publication of the speech in the republic’s daily papers, the propagandists strongly advised that the speech be printed and distributed as agitation-propaganda material. Although the speech mentioned the Kazakh revolt leader Amangel’dy Imanov and emphasized the role of the Bolshevik Party and the solidarity with the Russian working class, it also covered the heroic past of the Kazakh nation and sought legitimacy in this heroic past.

The work of the KP(b)K could also be clearly seen in the sphere of arts and popular writings.

During the initial months of the war, the writer Mukhtar Auezov created a new Kazakh opera on the heroic past of the Kazakh nation. The topic was the uprising of Beket Batyr in the eighteenth century. In 1941 and 1942, the theatre play ‘Isatai i Makhambet’, which narrated the uprising of Isatai Taimanov against the Russian forces, was staged in various Kazakh theatres in

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630 KRPM, 708-5.1-603-73, also Zh. Shaiakhmetov, ‘Kazakhskii narod aktivnyi uchastnik Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny’, Bolshevik Kazakhstana, no. 10 (September 1941), pp. 8-10.
632 The libretto of the opera was written by M. Auezov and the music was composed by A. Zil’ber. See: ‘Dve Premery: Beket’, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (12 February 1942).
Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, the agitation-propaganda department of the KP(b)K criticized the repertoire of Kazakh theatres and demanded:

“There have to be more plays on the heroic past of the Kazakh nation and the civil war. [These plays should] demonstrate epic and romantic heroes, who are closer and more familiar [blizkie i znakomye] to the Kazakh nation, such as ‘Mak-Pal’, ‘Kambar-Batyr’, ‘Isatai and Makhambet’, ‘Kozy Korpes’, and ‘Baian Slu’ in opera”.

These efforts did not come to an end in 1942. Kazakh writers continued to write on historical themes with the encouragement of the Party. In February-March 1943, Auezov wrote the play ‘Kara-Kypchak Koblandy’ based on an epic tale, and depicted the Kypchaks as ancient Kazakhs. According to a Party report, “The play deals with the struggle of the Kazakh people and its batyr Koblandy against foreign enemies [and] oppressors”. Along with the efforts of Margulan in the discipline of history, Khazhim Zhumaliev wrote a play on Batyr Edyge, incorporating him into Kazakh national history. The play was about “the struggle of Edyge Batyr for the independence of his people during the expansion of the Golden Horde”. These and similar works were under the control of the secretary of the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)K and they were encouraged by the latter. Both plays were first staged in 1944. However, the bureau of the TsK KP(b)K was still dissatisfied and appealed to the directorate of arts at the SNK KazSSR to prepare even more plays and operas in 1945 that would cover “the heroic past of the Kazakh nation”.

All these efforts were part of a general approach that involved a mixture of Kazakh patriotism and allegiance to socialism. This discourse can also be observed in various articles or speeches.

634 KRPM, 708-6.1-559-19 (February, ’42).
635 KRPM, 708-7.1-90-17/18 December 16, 1943.
published in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* and *Sotsialistik Kazakstan* beginning in June 1941. In the first week of the war, a Kazakh article, ‘We will Win’, assured that:

“The Kazakh nation, which was created batyrs with brave hearts, such as Edyge and Koblandy, Isatai and Makhabent, Kenesary and Nauryzbai, Amangel’dy, will be in the first ranks of the war.”

In October 1941, another article, entitled ‘Military Traditions of the Kazakh Nation’, again explained in detail the heroic deeds of Isatai Batyr, Kenesary Kasymov, and Nauryzbai Batyr.

In July-August 1941, the military training of the population started. One of the first Kazakh divisions was the 316th infantry division. Although the national composition of every division differed, this division was predominantly Kazakh and Kyrgyz (75-80%). The recruitment figures increased every week. In 1938-1945, the total number of enlisted Kazakhs was 1,366,000, which was 21.2% of the republic’s population. From the beginning of 1941 until 1945, Kazakhstan lost 601,011 soldiers; 11% of the total population of the republic. In other words, the percentages of mobilization and casualties were much higher than in other republics. Figures from national history were used in order to mobilize this enormous number of soldiers, and also in the preparation of Kazakh soldiers for the front. The speech of a Kazakh soldier at an agitation-propaganda meeting held at the army recruiting centre in Kökçetau (a regional centre in the

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639 In Kazakhstan 12 infantry divisions, 4 cavalry units, 7 infantry brigades, and approximately 50 various regiments were formed between July 1941 and April 1942. The average national content of these military units was 30% Kazakhs, 30-40% Russians, and 20-25% Ukrainians and other nationalities. However, in some units such as 100th and 101st infantry brigades and the 96th, 105th, and 106th cavalry divisions Kazakh soldiers composed approximately 90% of these units. A.N. Nusupbekov, *Voprosy istorii Kazakhstana, izbrannye trudy* (Almaty, 1989), p. 104; ‘Kazakhstanskie Voinskiie Soedineniiia Perioda Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny 1941-45’, *Kazakhstan: Natsional’naia entsiklopediia*, vol.3, pp.77-8.
north of Kazakhstan) in July 1941 clearly demonstrates the line of patriotic propaganda conducted among Kazakh recruits:

“The peoples of the Soviet Union constitute a single family. Each of our nations has a heroic past. We [Kazakhs] are the people brought up by Lenin and Stalin [who] will fight for the fatherland like a tiger, as our forefathers Amaneldy [Imanov], [Batyr] Syrym [Datov], [Batyr] Isatai [Taimanov], [and] Edyge [Batyr fought], until the destruction of the enemy of our people—Hitler”. 641

These historical figures furnished the image of ‘batyr’ as a folk hero, a figure of valour, and a defender of his people. Subsequently, military propaganda publications such as Otandy Qorghauuda in the Kazakh language constantly called Kazakh soldiers ‘batyrs’, associating them with the national figures of the past. Although the historical batyrs belonged to tribes or tribal confederations (Kaz. Zhuz or Orda), contemporary history writing elevated them to a national level. The contemporary batyrs of the Red Army were at the same time batyrs of the Kazakh nation and the Soviet Union (Kaz. Sovie'tter Soiuzynyng batyry).642 In some cases, the materials printed for Kazakh soldiers referred to the heroic leaders Edyge, Er-Targyn, Syrym Batyr, Kenesary Kasymov, Nauryzbai Batyr, Isatai Taimanov, and Akyn Makhambet.643 The KP(b)K continued to use the heroic Kazakh past until the end of the war. In his article on the achievements of Soviet Kazakh music, Kenzhebaev describes how Kazakh folk music was closely connected to the heroic deeds of Ablai Khan, Srym Datov, Isatai Batyr and Makhambet, Kenesary Kasymov, Nauryzbai Batyr, and Beket Batyr.644 When N. Undasynov, the chair of the KazSNK, delivered a speech at the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet KazSSR in 1944 concerning the establishment of the people’s commissariat of defense of KazSSR, he stressed:

641 KRPM, 708-5.1-601-17, the date of the meeting was July 25 or 26, 1941.
“The freedom-loving Kazakh nation has led a heroic struggle for freedom and independence for centuries. The images of its legendary leaders Edyge, Koblandy, Kambar, Srym, Kenesary, Eset, Isatai, and other fighters for the independence and honour of the [Kazakh] nation has lived in the hearts of our nation for centuries.” 645

A few days later, the head of the directorate of arts at the SNK KazSSR, S. Tolybekov, emphasized at the eighth session of the Supreme Soviet of the KazSSR in 1944 that:

“These days, the task of our writers, playwrights, composers, and painters has been the creation of the [...] image of the heroes of the patriotic war and the heroic ancestors of the Kazakh nation.” 646

At the 1944 anniversary of the 1916 uprisings, M. Abdykalykov, the secretary of agitation and propaganda of the KP(b)K and the co-author of the history of Kazakhstan named the past leaders “Srymn Datov, Isatai Taimanov, Makhambet Utemisov, and Kenesary Kasymov” as the forefathers of Amangel’dy Imanov in 1916. 647

Both the Kazakh language and native themes were important for successful agitation-propaganda. The majority of the Kazakh population lived in rural areas and could not understand Russian. This was the same for the Kazakh recruits and even for the Kazakh propagandists, who were supposed to convey the message of the Party to the masses. Skvortsov, the first secretary of the KP(b)K, noted in his letter to Shcherbakov, the secretary of the TsK VKP(b) in Moscow, that “there are 45,000 Kazakh agitators in Kazakhstan and in most cases their level of Russian is either bad or insufficient”. 648 Moreover, the level of education among the Kazakh population was very low. In order to establish communication with this rural population, the usable past, which was constructed to increase the fighting spirit, had to be made familiar to them. The stories transmitted by zhyraus or akyns (bards) as folk tales or

645 VII sessiia Verkhovnogo Soveta Kazakhskoi SSR I-go sozyva’, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (14 April 1944), p.3.
646 S. Tolybekov, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (18 April 1944).
648 KRPM, 708-7.1-198-3 (10 June 1943).
narratives about the nineteenth century uprisings and their leaders Srym and Kenesary were well-known, especially in the regions where uprisings had occurred. For agitation and propaganda purposes, this was an important asset to use, and apparently the KP(b)K was aware of this fact. Agitation-propaganda workers were therefore accompanied by national akyns, such as Dzhambul, Nurpeis, Baiganin, and Shashubai, who addressed the Kazakh people in poetic forms of verbal literature.649

3.2.2. REACTION OF LOCAL HISTORIANS.

The history section of the KazFAN immediately reacted to the needs of the front and to the KP(b)K’s call for publications addressing the heroic national past. Local historians prepared a series of “Booklets dedicated to the heroic past of the Kazakh nation”. A. Margulan prepared three of these volumes with the goal of increasing the fighting spirit of the soldiers and helping propaganda activities in Kazakh towns, mines, and collective farms. The first booklet, ‘Srym Batyr’, covered, according to the summary:

“One of the most important events in the history of the Kazakh nation—the famous uprising of Srym Batyr. The outline describes with vivid images how the heroic Kazakh nation, under the leadership of its beloved hero Srym Datov, selflessly fought against the oppressors of peoples, khans and tsarism. The essay clearly characterizes the colonial oppression of Kazakhs of the Small Khorde by tsarism and illuminates the dastardly deeds of khans who were agents of tsars in the steppes of western Kazakhstan. [...] In the final pages, the author outlines the military legacy of the great Srym Batyr and his heroic generation in light of the young Kazakh warriors who are selflessly fighting against the German fascism”.650

Margulan’s second booklet was about the Kypchaks. This was an important step for historiography because Margulan built a direct link between the contemporary Kazakhs and the Kypchaks of Desht-i Kypchak. As the report to the KP(b)K explained:

649 M.K Kozybaev, *Istoriia i sovremennost’,* p. 87.
650 *KRPM, 708-5.1-151-78* (December 1941).
"The booklet is about the struggle of the ancient Kypchaks against the Italian concessionaires (Genoese and Venetians) on the south shores of the Crimea and in the Azov Sea. It describes the expansion of Italian merchants, the slave owners, who wanted to seize the Crimea and the basins of the Tanais [Don] River and Azov Sea for their colonial purposes, and the heroic resistance of the ancient Kypchaks (Kamans), who were ancestors of our Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, and Nogais. In the booklet there are separate episodes on each of the armed clashes between the Kypchaks and the Italian occupiers, and the defeat of the latter".  

Margulan’s final booklet was entitled “The Struggle of Edyge against the Order of Magistrate”:

“In this booklet, the author uses, in addition to the historical materials, folk tales, describes the famous struggle of Batyr Edyge against the combined forces of European feudal lords and their defeat at the Battle of Vorskla River (1399). In the second part of the booklet the figure of Edyge is depicted as a wise folk hero who dedicates himself to the happiness of the people. Here he acts as a fighter for the freedom of his people, a great patriot, and a courageous fighter, whose heroic activities became in the following centuries an example for many Kazakh fighters for freedom (Srym Datov, Kenesary Kasymov, Isatai Taimanov).”

Margulan provided only a partial account of Edyge and the Battle of Vorskla River. The enemy coalition also included Toktamysh Khan of the Golden Horde. Moreover, the primary cause of the battle was rivalry between Edyge and Toktamysh over the Golden Horde. However, in terms of the construction of national history, Margulan’s narratives are significant because both in the Kypchak case and in the struggle of Edyge, Margulan introduced two novelties. First, he projected ‘Kazakhness’ back from the first emergence of the Kazakh khans in the fifteenth century to the fourteenth century in his account of Edyge, and even further, to the thirteenth century, as in the Kypchak case. Edyge’s Nogai Horde of Edyge and, before that, the Kypchaks, became the direct ancestors of Kazakhs. Second, he expanded the terrain of Kazakh national history beyond the contemporary borders of the Kazakh SSR. The historical Deshd-i Kypchak, or the Great Eurasian Steppe, which stretches from the northern shores of the Black Sea to Central Asia, was a territory that pastoral nomads considered a single entity. Margulan took this unity of the steppe and defined it as the fatherland. The obvious reason was a desire to find a historical

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651 KRPM, 708-5.1-151-79 (December 1941).
652 KRPM, 708-5.1-151-79 (December 1941).
struggle of Kazakhs against feudal invaders from the west, bringing to mind the Battle of Ice in the Russian national narrative. Margulan carried the national history to just north of the Black Sea via the Nogais, while famous struggles against the Jungars in the east and the sedentary territories in the Mavera-un Nehr to the south were left behind.

Viatkin covered these heroic episodes with the last volume in the series, which addressed the nineteenth century uprisings, “From the Struggles of the Kazakh Nation for Independence”. Viatkin aimed to cover all the events that could be presented as part of a struggle for national independence, from the Kypchaks up to the twentieth century. These events were:

“a) the struggle of ancient Kypchak heroes (batyrs) for the destiny of ancient Kazakh tribes until the formation of Kazakh state; b) the struggle of the Kazakh nation against Jungars (seventeenth century); c) the Kazakh nation at the uprising of Pugachev; d) the uprising of Srym Datov; e) the uprising of the Kazakh nation under the leadership of Kenesary Kasymov and Isatai Taimanov; f) the uprising of Kazakhs in connection with the introduction of new provisions (1868); g) the uprising of Kazakhs in 1916 and the role of the legendary hero Amangeldy Imanov in this uprising”.

Like Margulan, Viatkin also nationalized the past before the Kazakh Khanate of Zhanybek and defined Kypchaks as ancient Kazakhs. Furthermore, he included Kenesary Kasymov in the pantheon of national leaders.

The other texts that Margulan worked on were ‘The role of Ablai [Khan] in the struggle of the Kazakh nation for independence’, ‘The heroic fighters of the Kazakh nation Seiten and Taizhan’, and ‘Edyge-Batyr in history and legends’. All these efforts were prepared either before the arrival of Moscow’s historians, or before the project of ‘The History of the Kazakh SSR’ was launched. After the arrival of Moscow’s historians, the efforts of the Kazakh historians continued. For example, the Kazakh branch of the IMEL prepared the booklet ‘From the Heroic

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653 KRPM, 708-5.1-151-80 (December 1941).
Past of the Kazakh Nation’ and the KazFAN worked on ‘The Military Legacy of the Kazakh Nation: A Collection of articles and outlines dedicated to portraying the heroic deeds of the Kazakh batyrs in the past and in the days of the patriotic war’.655

As we noted earlier, the uprising of Kenesary Kasymov was a sensitive issue even before the publication of the history in 1943. The Kazakh writers knew that emphasizing Kenesary could have unintended results. On the one hand, the uprising was the most formidable and well-organized uprising of the nineteenth century. This heroic past could provide valuable material for wartime propaganda. On the other hand, in the absence of a class dimension, this uprising could only be interpreted as a national conflict between Kazakhs and Russians. With Kazakhs and Russians fighting together under the red banner, this example could hardly promote comradeship at the front or on the production lines. In December 1941, when writers and film studio representatives discussed projects for 1942, they worried about precisely this issue. The uprising of Isatai Taimanov and Makhambet Utemisov was considered appropriate. However, writers objected to Kenesary Kasymov. M. Auezov, S. Mukanov, A. Tazhibaev656, and Musrepov argued, “The main theme of the biography of this hero was a struggle with Russian oppressors, and this may be understood as fighting between Russians and Kazakhs, which is particularly harmful at a time when we need to show the unity of the nations of the Soviet Union”.657 They worried that the uprising may not have been the best story for fulfilling the aims of wartime agitation-propaganda when Kazakhs and Russian were fighting in the same trenches.658

656 The secretary of the presidium of SSPK.
657 Initially, Auezov intended to write a script about Kasymov but later changed his mind. KRPM, 708-5.1-645-77, December 5, 1941.
658 While Kazakh historians and writers were worried about the ambiguous impact of Kenesary as a propaganda figure, the periodical of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow published an article in 1942
By the time that members of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences arrived in Almaty on November 10, 1941, the KP(b)K had already decided to use the Kazakh heroic past for wartime propaganda. The agitation and propaganda section of the KP(b)K and Kazakh writers and historians had already been using this heroic past for the mobilization of the Kazakh population.

3.2.3. ARRIVAL OF MOSCOW’S HISTORIANS.

Initially, Buzurbaev considered the arrival of Moscow’s historians and philosophers to be a great opportunity, because the KP(b)K could employ them as high-quality lecturers and speakers for agitation-propaganda purposes, or as tutors at local institutes. Even though there was a shortage of accommodation, Buzurbaev insisted that some of them stay in Almaty. Anna Pankratova, the head of the group of historians, had asked in her letter to Buzurbaev for permission for the historians to stay in Almaty and deliver lectures and presentations. In the following days, the historians delivered lectures according to the needs of the agitation-propaganda section. Within the first month of their stay, a group of fifteen historians had prepared a booklet entitled ‘Teaching history under the conditions of the Great Patriotic War’.

In the meantime, hundreds of thousands of refugees were already overcrowding Central Asian cities, including Tashkent. Almaty was much smaller than Tashkent and the Kazakh authorities

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were unable to cope with the wave of refugees. The historians were dismayed to learn that they would soon be sent to regional towns as lecturers. At this point, Anna Pankratova met with the leading members of the Ministry of Education and learned that the Kazakh administration had made a decision long ago to prepare a textbook on the history of the Kazakh SSR. She then prepared a working plan and proposed the project to the KP(b)K and the Narkompros KazSSR. The Bureau of the TsK KP(b)K and the Narkompros KazSSR saw this as an opportunity to gain additional agitation-propaganda material and approved Pankratova’s working plan. Consequently, none of the historians were sent to the towns and eleven of the scholars from Moscow began to work with their local colleagues in Almaty. Kazakh leaders continued to support the project and did their best to provide comfortable conditions for the historians.

Pankratova’s working plan was adapted according to the directives of the Narkompros KazSSR. The historians aimed to prepare the textbook for the 1942-43 school year.

The writers comprised three different contingents. First, there were evacuated historians from Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, such as Pankratova, Grekov, Druzhinin, and Viatkin, whose history of Kazakhstan had been published earlier in 1941. There were also the Kazakh writers Mukhtar Auezov, Sabit Mukanov, Musrepov, Kenzhebaev, and Ismailov, as well as Kazakhstan historians including A. Fedorov, Timofeev, A. Margulan, and E. Bekmakhanov. Finally, there were leading Party members and administrative representatives of the KP(b)K and Kazakh SSR. Some of them, such as Buzurbaev and Abdykalykov, the consecutive secretaries of agitation and

662 N. M. Druzhinin, Izbrannye, p. 111, 228-231. In 1941, the Kazakh historian Bekmakhanov was an aspirant of the Academy and the director of a secondary school. p.231.
663 KRPM, 708-5.1-562-11, December 12, 1941.
propaganda, were co-editors of the book. When Abdykalykov became secretary, Skvortsov named him a co-editor.\textsuperscript{664} As Anna Pankratova put it, “It would be appropriate to entrust to the propaganda section of the TsK KP(b)K overall political control”.\textsuperscript{665} Others, such as Shaiaikhmetov, the second secretary of the KP(b)K, were involved in the project from behind the scenes.\textsuperscript{666}

An outline of the textbook was ready by March 1942. According to the plan, there would be twenty-three chapters. Five of them were already written and the materials for the rest of the chapters had been collected.\textsuperscript{667} Initially, it seemed that the historians could write up the text within the planned period. However, disagreements arose within this diverse group, especially over the nineteenth century. One of the topics of discussion was the uprising of Kenesary Kasymov. This section was initially written by Viatkin, but the local historians criticized the draft, and the task of re-writing was delivered to the young Kazakh historian and head of the Administration of Schools section at the Narkompros KazSSR, E. Bekmakhanov, who also worked on the chapter ‘The Establishment of Soviet Rule in Zhetysu (Kazakh name of the Semirechie region in Russian).’\textsuperscript{668} Two tendencies were apparent in the initial draft. The first was an emphasis on the colonial policies of the Russian Empire, and the second was an attention to the benefits of the Russian annexation of Kazakhstan. The question at issue was to what extent these uprisings could be defined as progressive and backed by popular support.

In order to solve such controversies, Anna Pankratova and, later, the director of the Institute of History in Moscow, Boris Grekov, came to Almaty from Tashkent in the summer of 1942. The

\textsuperscript{664} KRPM, 708-5.1-562-37; KRPM, 708-6.1-449-30b, January 1, 1942; KRPM, 708-7.1-652-120ob, March 6, 1943.
\textsuperscript{665} ‘Istoriia pro to, kak delali Istoriiu’, Argumenty i Fakty Kazakhstana, no.8 (February 1997), p.6.
\textsuperscript{666} KRPM, 708-6.1-449-1, January 1, 1942.
\textsuperscript{667} N.M. Druzhinin, Izbrannie, p. 243-44.
\textsuperscript{668} KRPM, 708-5.1-562, March 12, 1942.
\textsuperscript{668} Zhetysu is the area between Balyk Lake and the Alatau (Tian-Shan) mountain range.
outcome, according to Druzhinin, was a compromise between the two sides. Overall, Grekov was content with the work being done in Almaty and blocked the re-writing of any chapters. Once the historians submitted their reviews of the draft of the history, Grekov again came to Almaty for further consultation with the authors. Eighteen reviews approved the text with minor suggestions. Originally, the bureau of the TsK KP(b)K had asked for a history textbook for secondary schools. However, the reviews emphasized that the work was very detailed and too extensive to be published as a secondary school textbook. Therefore, another shorter and simpler textbook had to be written. At the end of Grekov’s meetings with the historians, they all agreed to publish the book as ‘The History of Kazakhstan SSR’ and to urge the bureau of the TsK KP(b)K to accept this idea and issue a new decree for the writing of a shorter and simpler textbook based on this text. Grekov also wrote a separate report to the agitation-propaganda section of the TsK KP(b)K indicating this necessity.

In the autumn of 1942, the draft of the textbook was also discussed at a special editorial commission organized at the agitation and propaganda section of the KP(b)K. It was also reviewed twice at a special commission of the Narkompros KazSSR, in 1942. According to the history teachers who provided their comments, the text did not make clear how the tribes at the Desht-i Kypchak formed the Kazakh nation, or which tribes played the leading role in this formation. At this meeting, one of the writers representing the editorial board posed the following question: “Has the question of the annexation or the conquest of Kazakhstan been stated according to the ‘lesser evil [formula]’?” Not everyone in the meeting found the text clear.

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669 N.M. Druzhinin, Izbrannie, p. 232,234, 243, 244. For the previous research of Bekmakhanov, see: KRPM, 708-5.1-562-41ob., December 13, 1941.
671 KRPM, 708-6.1-469-97, October 23, 1942.
672 KRPM, 708-7.1-652-120ob, March 6, 1943.
on this issue. After the discussion, Viatkin, as the representative of the authors, replied to the critiques. He agreed that the issue of the ethnogenesis of Kazakhs had not been stated well. He suggested adding more information on the Kypchaks and on the proximity of Uzbeks to Kazakhs. He added that during the writing stage, there had been a proposal to depict Kenesary Kasymov as the leader of the national independence movement and the founder of the feudal khanate.

Although criticisms were expressed, the committee of the Narkompros concluded:

“In the absence of necessary materials and written sources, the decision of the authors to not comment on some unclear questions, [such as] on the annexation or conquest of Kazakhstan by Tsarist Russia, and also about the ethnogenesis of the Kazakh people and the relation between different nationalities who settled in Kazakhstan, is considered the correct position.”

After the discussions among historians, the TsK KP(b)K also reviewed each chapter of the history book over the course of two months. Finally, ‘The History of the Kazakh SSR’ was published in 1943, with 10,000 copies printed, under the co-editors Anna Pankratova and M. Abdykalykov.

Articles celebrating the publication appeared in both Kazakhstankaia Pravda and the all-Union Pravda. The initial reaction was positive. The Kazakh Communist Party was keen on using the publication for continuing efforts in agitation-propaganda. The best way of disseminating the heroic past of the Kazakh people as described in the textbook was to re-print the relevant sections in daily newspapers. Kazakhstankaia Pravda and Sotsialistik Kazakstan started to publish a series of articles under the general title ‘Hero-Batyrs of the Kazakh Nation’. The first

673 KRPM, 708-6.1-449-30,31, October 14, 1942.
674 I.M. Kozybaev, Istoricheskaia Nauka, p. 28.
675 At first, Buzurbaev, the head of the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)K, was co-editor of the project. However, after his accidental death in the winter of 1942, Abdykalykov became co-editor. He was assigned this position by the bureau of the TsK KP(b)K in December 1942. As the head of the agitation-propaganda section and a former history teacher, he was also co-editor of the project on the outlines of the history of Kazakh social thought. See: KRPM, 708-6.1-85a-73, December 11, 1942. A. Pankratova and M. Abdykalykov (ed.), Istoriiia Kazakhskoi SSR (Almaty, 1943).
article was on Ablai Khan, followed by other national heroes, including Srym Datov, Isatai Taimanov, and Kenesary Kasymov.\textsuperscript{677} According to Abdykalykov, the history book was sent to the front and distributed to the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)K.\textsuperscript{678}

We should also note that in addition to the history of Kazakhstan, Moscow’s historians in Almaty continued their efforts in publishing patriotic texts, just as their Kazakh colleagues did. Pankratova planned to publish a booklet on liberation wars in the history of the peoples of the USSR, while Viatkin worked on a project on the independence struggle of the Kazakh people at the end of the eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{679} All of the historians were supposed to organize lectures for the public on contemporary issues and historical episodes. The historical lectures included topics like ‘Alexander Nevskii and the defeat of the German knights’, ‘The great Russian general Sukhorov’, and ‘Field-marshai Kutuzov and the Patriotic War in 1812’. However, the lectures were not limited to the Russian heroic past. For the Kazakh population, there were lectures such as ‘Heroes of the struggle of the Kazakh people for independence—Baty Srym, Isatai Taimanov, Kenesary Kasymov, and Amangel’dy Imanov’ and ‘Liberation wars of the peoples of the USSR’.\textsuperscript{680} Iakunin’s lectures on the heroic past of the Kazakh nation offered a very colourful narrative ranging from the tribes or tribal federations of Uisun, Kangly, and Kipchak, before the formation of Kazakh Khanate in the fourteenth century, to the struggle against the Jungars. Iakunin then continued with the anti-Russian uprisings of the eighteenth


\textsuperscript{678} ‘Istoriiia pro to’, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{679} \textit{KRPM}, 708-6.1-469-77, December 3, 1941.

\textsuperscript{680} \textit{KRPM}, 708-6.1-469-91, December 22, 1941.
and nineteenth centuries. Meanwhile, Orlov was writing ‘From the History of the Kazakh Heroic Epic’, which aimed “to popularize the heroic themes in Kazakh folklore”. This work portrayed various batyrs and heroic leaders of Desht-i Kypchak as Kazakh heroes, including Er-Targyn and Edyge.

3.2.4. ETHNOGENESIS OF KAZAKHS.

Contrary to the Azerbaijani and Ukrainian cases, the ethnogenesis of the Kazakh nation remained a disputed issue. Probably the most novel aspect of the history published in 1943 was the answer it proposed to the question of ethnogenesis. The ethnogenesis of Soviet nations, which emerged as an important question in the 1930s, became a pressing issue during the war. The ethnogenesis of the Central Asian nations, including Kazakhs, continued to be a central issue. The committee on ethnogenesis and ethnography at the Academy of Sciences, which was relocated to Tashkent, organized a session on the ethnogenesis of the nations of Central Asia in August 1942 and invited scholars from the Central Asian republics to attend. At the most basic level, the session was organized in order to respond to the German claims. After referring to Stalin and Marr, the closing declaration of the session argued:

“"The main ethnic formation of the Central Asian nations happened in their territories, and the majority of Central Asian nations are autochthonous, with the exception of the Kyrgyz, of which the main core formed at the upper Yenisei River. The direct ancestors of modern Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, and Karakalpaks established the ancient cultures of Central Asia. [...] The ethnogenesis of Kazakhs is related to the Saka Union [Scythians], the North Hun State, the Western [Gok] Turkic Khanate, [and] the Kypchak Union"."
The issue of autochthony also garnered the attention of the historians who prepared the 1943 history. The question of the origin of Kazakhs had previously received ambiguous answers. Asfendiiarov in 1935 and Viatkin in 1941 took different approaches and proposed different dates for the emergence of Kazakhs. Asfendiiarov disapproved of the approach of Tynyshpaev, who traced the tribal names of contemporary Kazakhs back to the era of the Huns and made primordial claims for the ethnogenesis of the Kazakh nation. Asfendiiarov even contested the claim that Dzhanybek, Girei, Khak-Nazar, and Taukel from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries had been purely Kazakh khans. According to Asfendiiarov, during this period Kazakh identity was not sufficiently differentiated from Uzbek or Nogai identity. In 1941, Viatkin, criticizing the thesis of Asfendiiarov, moved the formation of Kazakh national identity from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century.

During the preparation of the ‘The History of the Kazakh SSR’ in 1942-43, this subject came to the fore again. This time, the crystallization of Kazakh identity was moved back to the fifteenth century. Moreover, it was described as part of a process that had begun at the dawn of human history. The key to resolving the issue of ethnogenesis was the emphasis on the process itself. In order to reconcile the primordial claim with a linear process, the historians referred to Marr as their inspiration. Although Marr was not the most popular name to reference in the first half of the 1940s, both Grekov and Pankratova turned to Marr in 1943 because to do so meant to oppose the German racist theories and to secure a primordial claim at the same time. The formation of the nation was a process that could be traced back to antiquity, thanks to Marr.

When Grekov visited Almaty two month after the session on ethnogenesis in Tashkent, this topic

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686 S.D. Asfendiiarov, Istoriiia; Viatkin, Ocherki.
687 For the works of Tynyshpaev written in 1920s, M. Tynyshpaev, Istoriiia.
was still being disputed. In his speech to the historians in Almaty, he felt the need to explain the indigenousness of the people, because apparently one of the reviews of the draft had objected that the text did not demonstrate the autochthony of Kazaks. According to Grekov:

“We [historians of the AN] understand the concept of being autochthonous according to Marr. The historian’s task is to determine the process of the constitution of peoples. With respect to the Slavs, this issue is still not resolved because of the variety of tribes appearing in ancient times and [because of] the lack of accurate sources. The position of the Kazakh people is better in this sense because they were formed a little later and there is much more information about the tribes that were included into the Kazakh nation”.

Further on, he criticized the authors of the critique for not being aware of Marr’s theories. In other words, Grekov refused to identify a particular tribe or tribal confederation as the ancient Kazaks. In his mind, the formation of Kazakh identity was a recent phenomenon resulting from a change in the means of production.

The formula aimed, on the one hand, to secure the autochthony of the nation within the contemporary Soviet borders. On the other hand, it avoided presenting any particular tribes as ancient Kazaks. However, these were two views that could hardly be reconciled. That is why each interpretation of the text altered the other. For example, in his report to Skvortsov, N.T. Sauranbaev, the director of the Institute of History, Language, and Literature of the KazFAN, expressed his pleasure because:

“[Hitherto] the problem of genesis [of the Kazakh nation] had been the least studied subject. These sources mentioned [above] were carefully studied [by the authors] and the autochthony of the Kazakh nation was established. So the formation of the nation and the territory where it takes place are connected [and] it demonstrated that the tribes that subsequently formed the basis of the Kazakh people had lived in the territories of [contemporary] Kazakhstan in early antiquity”.

Indeed, Sauranbaev effectively summarized the primary task of the 1943 text in terms of ethnogenesis. There had to be a link between the contemporary borders of Kazakhstan and the

689 KRPM, 708-6.1-468-32, October 24, 1942.
settlements of ‘the ancient Kazakhs’. In March 1943, right after publication, Anna Pankratova in her report to Skvortsov, Shaiaikhmetov, and Undasynov also underlined the importance of this primordiality. According to her:

‘The History of the Kazakh SSR’, in terms of content, covers a huge historical period spanning the development of the Kazakh people, from the first traces of human life in the territory of Kazakhstan up to our time. [...] In the current [history] some issues are addressed in a new way: the tribal unions and pre-feudal states in the territory of Kazakhstan, and the origin of Kazakh nationality.  

Pankratova claimed that the Marxist-Leninist understanding saw the formation of national identity from different ancient tribes as a process and that Kazakh nationality, as with all other cases, emerged following the consolidation of local tribes. However, the text did not aim to identify an ancient tribe or tribal confederation as the ‘ancient Kazakhs’. She therefore added that these ancient tribes were not Kazakhs. Kazakh identity developed over the course of many centuries and became fully formed only in the fifteenth century. Later, Pankratova returned to the primordial roots of Kazakhs, this time describing them as a mixture that developed as a process over time:

It is clear that the ethnic nucleus around which the process of the consolidation of the Kazakh people happened was the group of Kypchak tribes. The question of the role of the eastern group of Mongol tribes [in this formation] needs further study. The authors rejected the idea of Huns as the main Kazakh tribes. Similarly, the authors refused to analyse Kazakhs alongside Mongols. Mongolian and Turkic tribes came [to the contemporary Kazakhstan], mixed and merged with local tribes, and provided a new and separate identity for Kazakh nationality.

Also in March 1943, Pankratova was invited to deliver a speech on the newly published history at a conference of the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)K. The KP(b)K leaders and the affiliates of the agitation-propaganda section carefully listened to Pankratova’s summary.
After mentioning the pre-revolutionary works of Aristov and Kharuzin on the ethnogenesis of Kazakhs, Pankratova described how the authors of the new history followed Marr as they studied the ethnogenesis of Kazakhs:

“By following [the theory of] Marr, the authors of ‘The History of the Kazakh SSR’ started to recognize the autochthony of the Kazakh nation. This means that the history of the formation of each nation should be associated with the territory where it took place [and] the level of productive forces typical at that stage for this or that nation. In Kazakhstan, the tribes that later on formed the basis of the Kazakh nation lived in ancient times. [...] These tribes were the Usuns, Kanglys, Argyns, Dulats, Kereis, Naimans, Alchins, and Kypchaks. [...] The Alchins and Kypchaks belonged to the Turkic group of tribes. [...] According to their origin, the Naimans and Kereis were Mongol tribes”.

In other words, the discussion among Aristov, Kharuzin, Vambery, and others in the 1890s concluded with the eventual victory of Kharuzin and his followers. According to ‘The History of the Kazakh SSR’, Kazakhs were a mixture of autochthonous tribes living in the Central Asian steppes at the dawn of history, later Turkic tribes, and finally, Mongolian tribes. However, this was not primordialism in the same sense as in the Ukrainian case, because there was no single ethnic root of Kazakhs.

3.3. UKRAINE IN WAR: CLASH OF NATIONALISMS.

Ukraine was a major battleground for German and Soviet armies both in 1941-42 as the Germans steadily moved eastwards, and in 1943-44 when the Red Army pursued them towards Eastern Europe. An important peculiarity of the eastern front that distinguished it from the other fronts was that the war against the Soviet Union had been deliberately conceived by Nazi Germany’s highest political and military authorities, and was actually waged as a war of extermination. Besides the racial-ideological war of annihilation, the invasion of the Soviet

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694 KRPM, 708-7.1-652-125, 125ob, March 6, 1943.
Union was motivated by agricultural-economic considerations at its core. The object of attaining *Lebensraum* was to provide more space and thus more natural resources, raw materials, and foodstuffs so that the German nation could exist on a self-sufficient, ‘healthy’ basis. The Germans created an elaborate network to remove foodstuffs and raw materials from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. The local population was forced to work for 14-16 hours per day for pitifully small payment. When the German army was defeated in the winter of 1941-42 at the gates of Moscow, German authorities began the practice of forcibly deporting healthy people of the occupied lands to Germany as forced labourers. In 1942 alone, about two million Soviet citizens were deported to Germany. During the War, Ukraine became home to different armed units, including regular troops of the German army, and the Red Army, which included Ukrainian recruits. There were also Soviet and non-Soviet partisan groups: the Red partisans, who were Soviet forces acting behind enemy lines, *Polis’ka Sich*, the paramilitary formation of Otaman Taras Borovets (Bul'ba-Borovets), the UPA, which fought against the Germans and the Soviets, and the Polish underground movement, which was known as the Home Army (AK). Finally, there were various Ukrainian military units that were initiated or supported by the Germans: the Ukrainian Legion (Ukr. *Druzhyna Ukrainskykh natsionalistiv*), the *Nachtingall* and *Roland* units within the *Wehrmacht*, and the Waffen SS ‘Galicia’ Division. There were also Ukrainian Police units organized by the Nazis.


Ukraine was not only a battlefield of regular or irregular combatants, but also a field of ideological competition. Ukrainian nationalists and Soviet authorities in particular did their best to win over the population. According to Basarab, “During the war, when the Germans invaded Ukraine, there was an upsurge in Ukrainian national feeling”. The German side also promoted an anti-Soviet Ukrainian national movement by different means. They revealed the mass executions of the Ukrainian NKVD in L’viv and other Ukrainian cities. In the German-initiated Ukrainian armed units, German instructors used an anti-Bolshevik and Ukrainian nationalist rhetoric. Basarab rightly underlines this upsurge in Ukrainian national feeling. However, for the Soviet authorities, this upsurge was not merely a fait accompli with which they had to contend. In fact, Ukrainian nationalism and national history were used as agitation-propaganda material by nearly all belligerents, including the Soviet authorities. Moreover, we might even argue that it was the Soviet Union that used Ukrainian national history as propaganda-agitation material with the greatest success. Soviet authorities were not only superior in producing and


698 J. Basarab, Pereiaslav, p. 173.

distributing their national propaganda; they were also very keen on using national history in their propaganda-agitation activities. In this chapter, I would like to put emphasis on the usage of history by the Ukrainian Soviet authorities and Ukrainian nationalists.

3.3.1. UKRAINIAN SOVIET NATIONAL NARRATIVE.

In wartime, memories were still fresh of forced collectivization, the Great Terror, and the annihilation of a generation of national political and cultural figures in Ukraine. German efforts to reveal mass graves of the NKVD victims aimed to increase this anti-Soviet and anti-Russian inclination among the Ukrainian population under occupation. For the Soviet authorities, the revival of Russian nationalism and historical heroes was of little use in securing the allegiance of Ukrainians. Moreover, following the hasty retreat of the Red Army in 1941, Soviet propaganda in Ukrainian territories, as in other occupied lands, was poorly organized. Because radio transmission units were destroyed or broken, messages from Moscow could not reach the occupied lands. Until the Battle of Moscow, the frontline constantly moved eastwards as the German troops advanced. This created a chaotic situation. The population in the occupied regions was exposed to an abundant amount of German propaganda material distributed by German planes. Despite these obstacles, the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)U continued to work, observing the German propaganda activities, studying their materials, and preparing responses for the ideological front of the war. Eventually, along with the victories on the battlefields, Soviet Ukrainian political propaganda also gained the upper hand.\(^700\)

\(^700\) The following documents may provide a picture of the Soviet Ukrainian propaganda work in the first stages of the war: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-17-2, September 15, 1941; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-17-11, October 17, 1941; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-11-16/17, June 26, 1942.
During the period of 1941-45, Soviet Ukrainian propaganda targeted three groups. The first was the Ukrainian population, which remained under German occupation until the complete removal of German forces from Ukraine in the summer of 1944. The Bolsheviks aimed to dissuade this population from serving the Germans in any capacity. Khrushchev, as the first secretary of the KP(b)U, received periodical reports of the NKVD UkrSSR on the situation of the occupied territories. These reports included notes on the mood of the population. Propaganda activities were organized according to these reports. The second group consisted of Ukrainians who were evacuated to Russia and participated in the war effort, either as soldiers at the front or as workers on the home front. The third target audience for propaganda was the population living in the newly annexed territories. Though they had experienced a Soviet period in 1939/40-41, it was short-lived. When the Red Army removed German occupation forces from these areas, the KP(b)U started a lecture series in L’viv, Ternopil’, Rivne, northern Bukovyna, and the Uzhhorod (Transcarpathia) regions. In addition to the ideological indoctrination of local people in these territories, the propaganda-agitation activities also aimed to emphasize the historical unity of all these territories as part of the Ukrainian fatherland.

The Soviet propaganda continued to use historical figures and themes targeting these three groups. For example, the Ukrainian Bolshevik and ideologist Dmitro Manuïl’s’kyi produced numerous propaganda brochures with a circulation of 100,000. These propaganda texts

701 For various examples of these NKVD UkrSSR reports on the situation of the occupied territories in 1942, see the files: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-22-75-19/36, January 9, 1943; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-124, for the reports in 1943, see: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-535.

702 For the agitation-propaganda works in this period of annexation in 1944-45, see the following reports sent from regions to Khrushchev: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-895-6/6ob, November 1944 (Chernihiv); 1-23-895-7/7ob, November 18, 1944 (Ochagovskii region); 1-23-895-20/25, November 15, 1944 (Ternopil’); 1-23-895-26-34, April 10, 1944 (Rovensk); 1-23-895-48-63, July 16, 1944 (Chernivets’ka region). I. A. Ilev and A. F. Iudenkov, Oruzhiem kontrpropagandy: sovetskaia propaganda sredi naseleniia okkupirovannoi territorii sssr. 1941-1944gg. (Moscow, 1981).
addressed both the contemporary conflict with the Nazis and historical episodes.\textsuperscript{703} When the Ukrainian authorities addressed Ukrainians in the occupied territories in a radio broadcast in September 1941, they called on the population to resist the Germans and emphasized, “Each Ukrainian who is a descendent of brave and freedom-loving Zaparozhian Cossacks cries with pride: ‘It is better to die than to fall into this shameful slavery’.”\textsuperscript{704} The same use of history could be seen in a declaration issued by the KP(b)U and the Soviet Ukrainian government. The Soviet leaders announced:

“The cursed enemy occupied part of our dear Ukraine by a perfidious attack. This cannot scare our mighty belligerent nation. The German Dog-Knights were hacked by the swords of the soldiers of Danylo Halyt's'kyi, they were chopped by the sabres of the Cossacks of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi [...]. We have always defeated the German bandits”.\textsuperscript{705}

Moreover, this declaration addressed Ukrainians for the first time as “the Great Ukrainian nation”.\textsuperscript{706} In fact, the ‘greatness’, which was always secured for Russians, was temporarily used in 1939, when the Red Army crossed the Polish border. A leaflet addressing the Ukrainians in the Polish Ukraine and signed by the commander of the Red Army Semen Timoshenko started with “To the Workers and Peasants of Western Ukraine”, and ended with the phrase “Long live the

\textsuperscript{703} D. Z. Manuil’s’kyi was an important Ukrainian Communist leader and an ideologue. He became a member of the RSDWP(b) in 1907 and graduated from the Law Faculty of Sorbone University in Paris in 1911. After the revolution in 1917, he returned to Russia. In 1921, he was the first secretary of the KP(b)U, and became a member of the TsK VKP(b) in 1922. He worked at the Comintern in 1922-42. In 1942-44, he worked at the General Political Administration of the Red Army. \textit{TsDAHO Ukrainy}, 1-70-95-29/30, (December 1944). As a prominent ideologue, he was also actively involved in different stages of constructing the national history of Ukraine. On his biography see: B. Zav’ialov, \textit{Dimitro Zakharovich Manuil’s’kyi} (Kiev, 1963); L. O. Suiarko, \textit{Dimitro Zakharovich Manuil’s’kyi} (Kiev, 1979); His propaganda works during the war: D. Z. Manuil’skii, \textit{Sudba Nashei Pobedy v Vashikh Rukakh, Tovarishchi Krasnoarmeitsy i Komandiry} (n.a., 1942); D. Z. Manuil’skii, \textit{Gitterovskaia Tiuma Narodov} (Moscow, 1943); D.Z. Manuil’s’kyi, \textit{Narod-Geroi, Narod-Voin} (Kiev, 1944);\textsuperscript{704} \textit{TsDAHO Ukrainy}, 1-23-17-28, September 15, 1941.

\textsuperscript{704} \textit{TsDAHO Ukrainy}, 1-23-17-11, October 17, 1941

\textsuperscript{705} \textit{TsDAHO Ukrainy}, 1-23-17-11, October 17, 1941.
great and free Ukrainian nation!”.

Extolling the greatness of Ukrainians returned during the Second World War, and appeared in some statements until 1944.

During the German occupation of Ukraine, the members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev were evacuated to Ufa, Bashkiria in July-August 1941. They provided historical figures and themes to be used in propaganda. By April 1942, thirteen popular historical texts published for propaganda purposes covered different periods of Ukrainian history. The historical narratives in these propaganda materials were anti-German, anti-Polish, and anti-Hungarian.

According to the report of the Academy of Sciences, the aims of the historians had been: “(1) the complete exposure of fascism and its plans against humanity; (2) a thorough explanation of the struggle of the Slavic nations against the German occupiers; and (3) a thorough explanation of the struggle of the nations of the USSR and in particular of the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, against the Germans and other foreign occupiers”. Moreover, half of the works produced at the institutes of humanities and social sciences were on the history and culture of Ukraine, because these publications were at same time created as a reply to the German

707 V. Picheta, Osnovnye momenty istoricheskogo razvitii zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorusii (Moscow, 1940), p.128-9.
708 A. V. Santsevich and N. V. Komarenko, Razvitie, p.46.
710 See the following texts for the activities and plans of the Insitute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR on producing a heroic past for the war efforts, and the correspondence between Petrovs’kyi, the head of this Insitute, and Lytvyn, the secretary for the agitation and propaganda of the KP(b)U: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-150-126/130 (1941); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-46-1/12 (1942); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-46-12/24 (1942); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-48-5/12, April 23, 1942; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-46-71/97 (autumn 1942); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-46-99, January 14, 1943; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-46-193/6, (the first half of 1943); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-46-101/104, February 9, 1943; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-121-3ob,4,7, (end of 1942); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-151-4/5, May 19, 1943 (the list of anti-German historic events that Ukrainian historians used in their presentations); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-151-6/9, May 19,1943 (the list of anti-Polish historic events that Ukrainian historians used in their presentations); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-151-10, May 19, 1943 (the list of anti-Hungarian historic events that Ukrainian historians used in their presentations).
propaganda in the occupied territories. The works planned on Ukrainian history included
textbooks—a four-volume history for universities and a single volume short course for
schools.\textsuperscript{711} According to the report by A.A. Bohomolets, the head of the Academy, the
publications of the Academy on Ukrainian literature, history and culture were very important
because:

“Following their occupation of Ukraine, [German] Fascists are, on the one hand,
spreading the word that science in the Soviet Ukraine and at the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences in particular has come to an end. On the other hand, they are also falsifying
the subjects of Ukrainian studies. For example, the authors of the Nazi ‘History of
Ukrainian Culture’, a publication ordered by Hitler, try to prove utter nonsense about
the true common interests of the Ukrainian and German nations and, in opposition, the
antagonism between Ukrainians and Russians. We have to struggle now more than
ever against these fabrications of Hitlerism”.\textsuperscript{712}

The first volume of the four-volume history of Ukraine for higher institutions and universities
was published in 1943.\textsuperscript{713} In fact, the Ukrainian historians (M. Petrovs’kyi [ed.], L. Slavin, S.
Iushkov, and K. Huslystyi) had started to work on this multi-volume text in Kiev before the war,
and prepared a text by April 1942.\textsuperscript{714} The Bureau of the TsK KP(b)U decided on 5 September
1942 to review the draft of this textbook before publication. For the rest of the autumn of 1942,
historians were assigned by the secretary of the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)U to
review the text.\textsuperscript{715} Once the draft was printed in very limited circulation, the Presidium of the
Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR sent two copies to Lytvyn,\textsuperscript{716} the secretary of the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{711} The planned Ukrainian History textbook for universities and higher institutions of education was a four-volume work. The Ukrainian textbook for schools was for the third and fourth grades. TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-23-91-50, April 4, 1942.
\footnote{712} TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-23-91-49, April 4, 1942.
\footnote{713} The first history textbook published during the war was Narys istoriï Ukraïny in 1942. Huslystyi, Slavin, lastrebov, Narys istoriï Ukraïny (Ufa, 1942). The whole group consisted of eight historians. However, this work was considered a failed attempt.
\footnote{714} TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-48-5, April 23, 1942.
\footnote{715} TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-69-6, November 16, 1942.
\footnote{716} Kostiantyn Zakharovych Lytvyn (1907-?) held a PhD on history. He was the head of the agitation propaganda section of the KP(b)U from September 1941 until 1951. See: Litopys UPA Nova seria: Borot’ba proty UPA i natsionalistichnoho pidpilia: direktyvni dokumenty TsK Kompartii Ukraïny 1943-1959 (33 vols. Kiev, 2001), iii, p.605.
\end{footnotes}
agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)U, on 14 January, 1943. The textbook was finally published in Ufa in 1943 by the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

As the authors stressed in the preface, they believed that “studying the history of our nation would increase even more the Soviet patriotism of Ukrainians on the battlefields or working on the home front for the defence”. This text, as in the previous histories, did not define Trypillian culture as eastern Slavic. However, the emphasis on particular issues in the national narrative was increased. The volume covered Scythian society and Greek colonies in detail, defining them as well-developed slave-owner societies. The Goths, however, were depicted as “German barbarian pastoral nomadic tribes [...] that arrived to seize land and wealth created by the local population, who had a higher degree of culture than the Goths”. These “barbarian German nomads” attacked numerous Greek, Sarmathian, and Scythian cities. Finally, the Goths were defeated by the indigenous population, who allied with the Huns and drew them beyond the Danube River. The Goths who remained were quickly assimilated by the superior local culture in Ukraine. “This is how the attempt at establishing a Gothic state in the land of developed and civilized [Ukr. kul’turnyi] people of the Black Sea ended in failure”.

Although in this sentence the authors used a general geographic term for the local people, on the next page the text underlined that Slavs already existed in Ukraine during the time of the Scythians and Sarmathians: “The indigenous population, who were the direct ancestors of the Slavs, continued to grow steadily during the hard times of the consecutive Sarmathian, Gothic, and Hunnic tribal

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717 *TsDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-70-46-99, January 14, 1943
718 The text of the short course for the third and fourth grade was ready for publication. See: *TsDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-436-34, May 5, 1943.
720 M.N. Petrovs’kyi (ed.), *Istoriia*, p. 31
Departing from the previous histories, the text also connected these indigenous Slavs with the field burial urns of Bronze Age (Ukr. *polia pokhovan’*). This attachment of archaeological cultures to a specific (in this case eastern Slavic) ethnus was a gradual return to the pre-Marrist approach of V.A. Gorodtsov (1860-1945), A.A. Spitzyn (1858-1931) and V.V. Khvoika (1850-1914) in the beginning of the twentieth century. The primordialization of Slavic existence in Ukraine continued in the next chapter on the Slavic Tribes:

The Ukrainian, Russian, and Belorussian nations are descended from the Slavic tribes in Eastern Europe, and in particular in contemporary Ukraine in the first millennium C.E. These [Slavic] tribes were mostly composed of descendants of the local sedentary population of the Scythian and Sarmatian periods, who previously lived in this territory.

Following this claim of Slavic primordialism in Ukraine, the history emphasized that the Antes, as “early Slavic tribes”, lived between the Dniestr and Don and that these early Slavs were freedom-loving and bellicose peoples. The narrative avoided mentioning that the earliest ancient writers actually described the original habitat of the Antes as being between the Dniester and Bug rivers and that they moved to contemporary Ukraine at a later stage. Finally, the connection between the Antes and eastern Slavs was firmly established in the subsequent pages. In the chapter on the Kievan Rus’, the 1943 history integrated the discussion on the role of the Normans in the formation of the Kievan Rus’. The text outlined the discussion starting in the eighteenth century, conveying each point of the Normanist theory in detail and

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721 M.N. Petrovs’kyi (ed.), *Istoriia*, p. 32.
723 M.N. Petrovs’kyi (ed.), *Istoriia*, p. 32.
724 The text also mentioned the Sclavini as another early Slavic tribe. M.N. Petrovs’kyi (ed.), *Istoriia*, pp. 32-7.
providing a response to each argument. It was clear that Ukrainian historians in 1943 did not want to give any ground at all to the historical front: either to the Normanist theory, or to the German claims of the Germanic origin of the Kievan Rus’.

Finally, the history turned to Marx in order to argue that the Kievan Rus’ was very close to an empire. Marx had defined the Kievan Rus’ as “the incongruous, unwieldy and precocious empire heaped together by the Ruriks like the other empires of similar growth”. The Ukrainian historians in 1943 took this to mean support for their attempt to demonstrate how the features of the Kievan Rus’ resembled an empire. Although they did not explicitly call the Kievan Rus’ an empire, they implied that as a polity it was similar to one, because it ruled over different ethnicities and regions and also because the relation of the Grand Prince of Kiev to other regional princes was that of a superior to a subordinate. On the emergence of the Ukrainian nation, the history of 1943 was not clear. It noted that ‘Ukraine’ as a term was first recorded in a chronicle in 1187. The text identified the feudal principalities as part of Ukrainian territory. The development of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian identity were described as processes that started in the thirteenth century and “took a step forward in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries”.

The next chapter described the Ukrainian nation stepping onto the stage of history in the sixteenth century through the uprising against the Poland of Lords. The Polish–Ukrainian conflict was not only based on class struggle between Polish owners of great estates and Ukrainian peasants or poor Cossacks. It was at the same time a Ukrainian struggle against

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725 M.N. Petrovs’kyi (ed.), Istoryia, pp. 39-44.
726 K. Marx, Revelations.
727 M.N. Petrovs’kyi (ed.), Istoryia, pp. 52-3.
national and religious oppression.\textsuperscript{729} The text, as had been done for the Normanist debate, summarized the historiography on the Cossack uprisings of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries. Although the text initially named these uprisings “Cossack peasant uprisings”, the narrative described them as part of a national-liberation struggle. According to the authors, “The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the overlordship [Ukr. \textit{panuvannia}] of the Polish nobility was a just and progressive one”.\textsuperscript{730} The description of the Khmel’nits’kyi uprising is very clear: “The Liberation War of the Ukrainian Nation against the Yoke of the Poland of Lords”.\textsuperscript{731}

On the one hand, the Soviet text criticized previous historians for depicting these uprisings as a national struggle and avoiding mentioning the class interests of different groups in Ukrainian society. It did not want to echo the interpretation of nationalist historians, and aimed instead to emphasize class struggle as the motivating force behind historical events. On the other hand, in the particular conditions of the war, a nationalist narrative became inevitable and the authors, as they stressed in the preface, wanted to participate in the war by producing a text that would increase the fighting spirit of the Ukrainians. The final section of the text summarized accounts of the Khmel’nits’kyi Uprising and explained the Soviet ‘lesser evil’ formula, referring to the review of Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanov in 1934.\textsuperscript{732}

While this first volume was sent to the printing house in Ufa, the abridged textbook for the third and fourth grades was read and evaluated by Lytvyn, the secretary of agitation-propaganda

department of the KP(b)U, and M. Bazhan, a prominent Ukrainian Soviet writer and poet. While both examined the text in terms of political appropriateness, the latter also reviewed the manuscript for editorial purposes. Their comments give us a clear idea of their political priorities and the level of intervention of the KP(b)U in history writing.733 First, Bazhan noted, “It was impossible to simply ignore the legend of the Varangians. The fascists are making a lot of noise about this ‘Nordic element’ in our history. We have to give a scientific answer to their noise—we should not take the position of an ostrich”. He also criticized the authors who omitted the fact that the Prince of Vladimir ransacked Kiev in 1169. As he saw it, “The ransacking of Kiev by Bogoliubs’kyi should not be ignored [...]. What is this sensitivity over Bogoliubs’kyi?” He also suggested that the fraternity of the eastern Slavs, the struggle of Galician princes against the Germans and their efforts to construct a centralized state, and the anti-Polish struggle had to receive more emphasis. A delicate balance of different topics had to be found. On the one hand, the fraternity of Russians and Ukrainians against Germans had to be emphasized: “It would be easy to record Alexandr Nevskii as a hero of Ukraine; however, this is not correct. The common defence of eastern Slavdom against German aggression should be demonstrated—if Russia has Aleksandr [Nevskii], we [Ukrainians] have Danylo [Halytskyi].”734 On the other hand, this friendship should not become the sole aim of history: “It is not possible [to interpret] all anti-Polish uprisings and struggles of labourers as a desire for the unification of Ukraine and Russia—this is too much simplification”. There were also new sensitivities over western Ukraine. It was inadvisable to show all members of the Uniate Church as traitors because “This is wrong and offensive to the population of western Ukraine”. It was not enough to describe Khmel’nyts’kyi as

733 There are two files that contain the reviews, first one is TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-153 (first half of 1943), where the review of Bazhan can be found. The other one is TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-46, April 14, 1943, where the joint review of Lytvyn and Bazhan can be found.

734 TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-153-1 (first half of 1943).
a talented leader; his talents also had to be described. “There should be more emphasis on Bohdan and on his generals. “The chapter on the annexation of Ukraine by Russia has to be expanded. The Tsarist policy should be mentioned [...]. In general, ideas should be elaborated [on the following]: What were the reasons that stipulated such an important historical act? It is impossible to forget the Stalinist formula of the ‘lesser evil’”. At the same time, the rich Ukrainian cultural heritage should be emphasized: “All chapters on the national arts, culture, and literature from the middle ages until the Soviet period must be expanded and substantiated.”

According to another reviewer in 1944, there were also problems in the Polish-Ukrainian account. It might be true that Ukrainian identity did not exist in the fourteenth century and that Galicia was a province of Poland from 1387 until the partition of Poland in 1772. The reviewer noted, however, that Galicia had been on Ukrainian soil and that there had to be clear emphasis on the struggle of Ukrainians against Polish expansion in the fourteenth century. According to the review, Galicia, Volhynia, Kholm (Chelm), and the right bank of the Dnieper had never belonged to Poland because these territories were not ethnically Polish. While Ukrainian historians were writing the first volume, the necessities of the war altered the ways in which Ukrainian history was constructed. Consequently, some elements in the first volume became obsolete six months after publication. The first trend had to do with the interpretation of the pre-historic period. During the period of the war, we can observe the first signs of a departure from what had been the dominant reading of pre-historic times, which rejected the concept of archaeological cultures as an equivalent of ethnicity. Grekov’s ‘Bor’ba Rusi za Sozdanie Svoego

735 TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-153-1/2 (first half of 1943); 1-70-46-146/149, April 14, 1943.
736 TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-23-864-14/15, May 5, 1944.
Gosudarstva’ in 1942, and Derzhavin’s ‘Proiskhozhdenie Russkogo Naroda: Velikorusskogo, Ukrainskogo, Belorusskogo’ published in 1944 signalled this policy change.\textsuperscript{737} N.S. Derzhavin, in his work on the origins of the Russians, referred to V.V. Khvoika, who located Trypillian culture in the end of the nineteenth century and defined this Neolithic culture as proto-Slavic. Derzhavin, after giving lip service to the Marrist-Marxist view by using familiar terminology such as” matriarchal society” and “patriarchal-tribal relations”, openly affirmed Khvoika’s conclusions. The Trypillian culture that continued from the Neolithic to the Copper and Bronze Ages and expanded from the Dnieper River basin to the Carpathians presented a culture with features that recurred in archaeological excavations. Derzhavin concluded that the people of Trypillian culture were ancestors of the three eastern Slavic nations.\textsuperscript{738} In 1944, a report of KP(b)U on the activities of the Institute of History in Kiev severely criticized the activities of Ukrainian historians, referring to their interpretation of Ukrainian prehistory and the period pre-Kievan Rus’.\textsuperscript{739} The author of the review warned that the historians had created a dangerous gap in history and that this gap could be used by German historians. The reviewer criticized the authors for not studying the recent work of Grekov, which was published in 1942 and ‘successfully’ demonstrated that the eastern Slavs had already established their political unity as early as the sixth century.\textsuperscript{740} The reviewer was also critical of the historians for being ambiguous as to when exactly the formation of the Ukrainian nation began and was completed. In various publications, the Ukrainian historians made contradictory statements on this issue. They even

\textsuperscript{737} B.D. Grekov, Bor’ba Rusi za sozdanie svoego gosudarstva (Moscow and Leningrad, 1942); N.S. Derzhavin, Proiskhozhdenie.
\textsuperscript{738} N.S. Derzhavin, Proiskhozhdenie, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{739} The review was written by F. Enevych. TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-864-5/27, May 5, 1944.
\textsuperscript{740} B.D. Grekov, Bor’ba; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-864-11/12, May 5, 1944.
identified different times as the period of national formation within the same text.\textsuperscript{741} In the following year, Huslystyi, one of the authors of the 1943 volume, reiterated the primordiality of the eastern Slavs. At his lecture in Kiev on the ‘Heroic Past of Kiev’ on 29 March 1945, he started with a reference to the archaeological excavations of the Paleolithic Age by V. Khvoika in 1893 in Kiev. He then continued by tracing a linear progression from the Antes to the Polians to the Kievan Rus’.\textsuperscript{742} Though this campaign of primordializing eastern Slavs went into high gear after 1945, the first signs emerged during the war.\textsuperscript{743}

In fact, the primordialization of national history was not limited to textbooks or propaganda leaflets. For example, Stalin ordered that Ukrainian district, town, and city names that seemed Polish, German, or anything other than Ukrainian should be renamed in a Ukrainian form. This changing of toponyms and spatial construction of the national past aimed to retrospectively endorse the primordiality of Ukrainian or east-Slavic habitation in these territories. In other words, this was a construction of a \textit{patria} by changing toponyms.\textsuperscript{744} As Ukraine was liberated, numerous names were changed into forms that seemed more Ukrainian or east Slavic, based on the toponyms found in medieval records. If record of an old name could not be found, the authorities simply made it up. For example, the Polish ‘Lipitsa Dol’na’ in L’viv became ‘Nizhnaia Lipitsa’; the Turkish ‘Akkerman’ became ‘Belgorod-Dnestroevskii’. This renaming was even done

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\textsuperscript{741} TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-23-864-13/14, May 5, 1944.
\textsuperscript{743} P.N. Tret’iakov, Vostochnoslavianskie plemena (Moscow and Leningrad, 1948); M. I. Artamonov, \textit{Proiskhozhdenie slavian} (Leningrad, 1950)
\textsuperscript{744} Similarly, toponyms were Russified or Slavisized in the areas from which the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars were deported. See: J. Murray, \textit{Politics and Place Names: Changing Names in the Late Soviet Period} (Birmingham, 2000). For a similar exercise in Turkey on changing the toponyms see: Kerem Öktem, ‘The Nation’s Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of Toponyms in Republican Turkey’, \textit{European Journal of Turkish Studies} [Online], no.7, 2008, Online since 18 novembre 2009, Connection on 12 septembre 2011. URL:
http://ejts.revues.org/index2243.html

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for previously Bolshevisized place names, if the place bore historical importance. For example, Pechersk, part of the historical city of Kiev and also a district of contemporary Kiev, was named Kirovskii after the assassination of Kirov. In 1944, the name of the district was changed from Kirovskii to Pecherskii or Pechersk.\footnote{TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-709-1/17, August 3, 1944.}

Another departure could be observed in the interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement. After 1937, the Pereiaslav Agreement of the seventeenth century and the following annexation was understood according to the infamous ‘lesser evil’ formula. The formula argued that it was a lesser evil for Ukrainians to be annexed by Russia than by Turkey or Poland. During the war, however, this annexation agreement became a ‘historical declaration of fraternity between the Russian and Ukrainian nations’.\footnote{For the summary of this new interpretation, see: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-151-18/39 (1943).} The annexation of Ukraine by Russia (Rus. prisoedinenie, Ukr. pryednannia) was not only a ‘lesser evil’, but also a natural consequence of a fraternity.\footnote{M. Petrovs’kyi, Ivan Bohun (n.a., 1942); M. Petrovs’kyi, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’ky (Saratov, 1942); M.N. Petrovs’kyi, Nezlamnyi dukh velikogo Ukrains’kogo narodu (Kharkov, 1943)} As part of this new interpretation, the Pereiaslav Agreement became the crucial point in Ukrainian history and Khmel’nyts’kyi became the most important figure in the history. Consequently, earlier works of Ukrainian history, including the 1943 volume, were criticized according to this new line. According to the report mentioned above, the historians had made a “serious mistake” in suggesting the lesser evil formula alone: “Apart from this external reason, there were also domestic reasons, [such as] ethnic, historical, cultural, and linguistic factors, similar domestic habits [Ukr. pobutovoï], and even the religious affinity of the Ukrainian nation with the Russian nation”. The correct interpretation was the following: “Foreign invaders tore Ukraine from Russia, but the union and friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian nations was preserved”,
even over many centuries. This Party critique of the Soviet Ukrainian historians claimed that, even Kostomarov, though he was not a Marxist historian, managed to grasp the historical truth of a spiritual unity between the two nations.\footnote{He refers to the work of Kostomarov ‘Spogady pro Dvokh Maliariv’, Osnova (April, 1861); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-864-18, May 5, 1944} Thus, the historical link between Russians and Ukrainians was no longer the solidarity of the toiling masses; it was instead an ethno-linguistic link.

From the beginning of the war, Khmel’nyts’kyi was celebrated as a national hero against the foreign occupants. Although it was an odd number for an anniversary, on 8 August 1942, the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR and the Union of the Soviet Writers of Ukraine organized meetings in Ufa to commemorate the 285th anniversary of Khmel’nyts’kyi’s death.\footnote{A. V. Santsevich and N. V, Komarenko, Razvitie, p.50; M. N. Petrovs’kyi, ‘Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi: do 285-littia z dnya smerti’, Visti, no.1-2, (1944) pp.20-9.} In the following year, propaganda around the image of Khmel’nyts’kyi was intensified. The following steps taken in autumn 1943 reflected this new approach. When the city of Pereiaslav was liberated from German occupation, the Soviet government renamed this hometown of Khmel’nyts’kyi and the place where the agreement of 1654 was signed as Pereiaslav-Khmel’nyts’kyi. It was Stalin who proposed this change. At the same time, when the liberation of the eastern regions of Ukraine began, Khrushchev proposed to Stalin the establishment of a military order of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. After gaining the approval of Stalin, Khrushchev and M. Bazhan, the eminent Ukrainian writer, worked on this project.\footnote{TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-355-1, October 8, 1943; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-328-1/4, The resolution of the TsK KP(b)U and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 12, 1943.} The image of the famous hetman was at the centre of the medal. Various sketches were examined by Khrushchev and
then by Stalin.\textsuperscript{751} The military order of Khmel’nıyts’kyi was established on 10 October, 1943. Another resolution of the TsK KP(b)U on 29 October 1943 asked historians to organize talks on Khmel’nıyts’kyi, publish brochures on this historical figure, and to print his portrait.\textsuperscript{752} Finally, when a competition for the national anthem of the Ukrainian SSR was organized in 1944, Khmel’nıyts’kyi, as the primary figure in Soviet Ukrainian history, found his way into most of the proposed lyrics.\textsuperscript{753} The eighteenth of January 1944 was the 290\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement. The renaming of the town of Pereiaslav and the establishment of a military order offered an ideal opportunity to increase the public awareness of this agreement. In his letter to Stalin, Khrushchev requested approval for a grand celebration in Kharkov, and pointed to the reason behind this anniversary celebration. According to Khrushchev, the celebration of this day would act as a propaganda response to the German propaganda disseminated during their occupation of Ukraine, and to Ukrainian nationalist propaganda opposed to the union of Ukraine and Russia. Khrushchev added that the aim would be to underline the positive value of this agreement for the history of the Ukrainian and Russian nations. As Khrushchev noted at the end of his letter, this momentous day had never been celebrated in the Ukrainian SSR.\textsuperscript{754}

We should note that this ‘fraternal annexation’ of the Pereiaslav Agreement did not always imply an unequal relationship between a Russian elder brother and a Ukrainian younger and weaker brother. It is true that the adjective ‘great’ was used to describe Russia.

\textsuperscript{751} One of the sketches contained the words ‘for free Ukraine’ (Ukr. za vil’nu Ukrainu), but apparently this was considered nationalist content lacking a Soviet dimension, and the final version did not bear any such phrase. TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-355-28/29, September 11, 1943.
\textsuperscript{752} A. V. Santsevich and N. V, Komarenko, Razvitie, p.50.
\textsuperscript{753} For different proposed anthems, see: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-261-3 (April 1944); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-261-7 (April 1944); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-261-5 (April 1944); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-262-16/17 (April 1944); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-262-21 (April 1944).
\textsuperscript{754} TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-91-44 (autumn 1943).
The Pereiaslav Council

Source: M.E. Podorozhnyi, Vyzvol’na viina ukraïns’koho narodu (1648-1654 rr.) (Kiev, 1940), p. 77.

This iconic picture of the Pereiaslav Council and the Agreement features Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi with other Cossack leaders hailing the Muscovite representatives who had just arrived from the north.

However, during the war, Ukraine was the exceptional nation and it was also described as ‘great’. Thus, Petrovs’kyi in his account writes of the Pereiaslav Agreement as the union of two great, consanguineous nations (Ukr. ob’ednannia dvokh velykykh iedynokrovnykh narodiv). Later, the emphasis on the greatness of the Ukrainian nation appeared again. The resolution of the TsK KP(b)U and the Soviet Ukrainian government on the renaming of Pereiaslav to Pereiaslav-Khmel’nyts’kyi reiterated in 1943 the ‘greatness’ of the Ukrainian nation. This was the

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755 M. Petrovs’kyi, Vyzvol’na, p. 3.
756 See the declaration mentioned above of the KP(b)U and the Soviet Ukrainian government, TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-23-17-11, October 17, 1941.
place where “the indissoluble union of the two fraternal and consanguineous peoples, the great Ukrainian nation and the great Russian nation”, \textsuperscript{757} was signed.

During the war, various Ukrainian historical figures were used for Soviet propaganda in Ukraine. While the champion of these figures was Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, he was not alone in the Ukrainian pantheon. Chronologically, the first were the leaders of the Kievan Rus’. As the princes of the Kievan state were considered common ancestors of today’s Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, they could be used in both Russian and Ukrainian histories. Next came Danylo Halyts’kyi, the prince of Galicia and Volhynia in the twelfth century, described as “one of the greatest forefathers of Ukrainian nation”. \textsuperscript{758} Other figures included Maksym Kryvonis, the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans and leaders, Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi, and Ivan Bohun. The biographies of Danylo Galyts’kyi, Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi, Ivan Bohun, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, Semen Palii, and Ustym Karmaliuk were published in a series of popular historical texts under the title ‘Our Great Forefathers’ (Ukr. \textit{Nashi Velyki Predky}). \textsuperscript{759} The first pages of this series quoted from the Soviet government’s declaration upon the first meeting of Ukrainian representatives following the German occupation, which stated, “The freedom-loving Ukrainians, the descendants of the glorious fighters of the fatherland, Danylo Galyts’kyi and Sahaidachnyi, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and Bohun, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, Bozhenko and Mykola Shchors, will never become slaves of the Germans”. This list, akin to Stalin’s famous

\textsuperscript{757} TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-328-2, The resolution of the TsK KP(b)U and the Soviet Ukrainian government was approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 12, 1943.

\textsuperscript{758} K. Huslystyj, \textit{Danylo Halyts’kyi} (n.a., c.a.1942)

\textsuperscript{759} K. Huslystyj, \textit{Danylo}; K. Huslystyj, \textit{Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi} (n.a., c.a.1942); M. Petrovs’kyi, \textit{Ivan}; M. Petrovs’kyi, \textit{Bohdan}; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-864-9/10. According to the report of Petrovs’kyi to Lytvyn there were also biographies of Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, but I did not have a chance to study them; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-48-7, April 23, 1942. The list of the biographies were discussed at the meeting of Institute of History and Archaeology in Ufa; NAIIU, 1-1-44-21, June 16, 1942.
list of Russian historical figures, enumerated the figures of the Soviet Ukrainian national narrative.\textsuperscript{760}

As fighting against the German army continued, Germanic-Slavic antagonism as a historical theme became part of Soviet historiography for both Ukraine and Russia. These narratives naturally denied any Norman (i.e. Germanic-Nordic) element in the foundation of the Kievan Rus’. They emphatically depicted the Kievan Rus’ as a common state of all eastern Slavs. These works traced the history of Germanic-Slavic antagonism and also accounted for the anti-Slavic and expansionist history that had been constructed in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{761} The infamous German policy of ‘\textit{Drang nach Osten}’ was described as an anti-Slavic expansionist policy, which had been consistently pursued for centuries. The narrative retrojected this German expansionism, however, to a time before the Teutonic Knights. According to one of the essays in the collection, Germans had been enemies of all Slavs, including the forefathers of Ukrainians, since the eleventh century, when ‘Germans’ under the leadership of the Polish king occupied the Kievan Rus’. While the prince of Galicia-Volynia was fighting against the Germans in order to protect the eastern Slavic lands, Aleksandr Nevskii was fighting in the north for the same cause. Subsequently, the text described how this united eastern Slavdom transformed into a pan-Slavic opposition to the Germans with the inclusion of the Poles at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410. Other essays in this collection addressed subsequent confrontations on the western front of the

\textsuperscript{760} Ivan Gonta, who organized an anti-Polish uprising in the eighteenth century, was also a national hero.

\textsuperscript{761} F. Iastrebov, \textit{Kyïvs’ka}, p. 10; N.S. Derzhavin, \textit{Fashizm – zleishii vrag Sslavianstva} (Kazan’, 1942); B.D. Grekov, \textit{Bor’ba}; N.M. Druzhinin, \textit{Vekovaia bor’ba slavian s nemetskimi zakhvatichkami} (Moscow, 1943); V.V. Mavronov, \textit{Bor’ba russkogo naroda za Nevskie berega} (Leningrad, 1944); Z.R. Needly, \textit{Vekovaia bor’ba zapadnykh i luzhnykh slavian protiv germanskoi agressii} (Moscow, 1944); V.V. Mavrodin, \textit{Obrazovanie Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva} (Leningrad, 1945); For naming the Antes and Venedi as Russians, see: V.V. Mavrodin, \textit{Narodnye dvizheniia protiv inozemnykh zakhvatichkov v drevnei Rusi} (Leningrad, 1945);
Russian Empire, interpreting each as an aggression against both Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian-German conflict was even included in a description of Napoleon’s march into the Russian Empire.

### 3.3.2. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE.

The armed struggle and ideological war continued between Ukrainian nationalists and the Soviet regime in the Ukrainian territories, which were re-taken from the Germans. Writing a national history and using it for agitation and propaganda purposes was a key part of the Soviet ideological campaign against Ukrainian nationalists. At the time, as Soviet forces moved westward into Ukraine, Khrushchev and other Ukrainian Communist Party leaders were kept well-informed by the NKVD on the tactics and ideology of the nationalists. In order to wage the ideological war, the TsK VKP(b) issued a resolution on 27 September, 1944 entitled ‘On the

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763 Ukrains’ki kozachi polky i ukraïns’ke opolchennia u vitchyznianii viini 1812 roku (n.a., 1943).

764 RGANI, 52-1-85-128/137, September 19, 1944. For the reports of the raikom and obkom secretaries in western Ukraine and the reports of the head of the NKGB UkrSSR to N. Khrushchev on the activities of the Ukrainian nationalists and the armed struggle between the latter and the Soviet internal security forces in the region in 1944 and 1945, see: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-889-1/8, January 19, 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-889-18, June 21, 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-889-19/22 (end of July 1944); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-889-32/36, June 6, 1944. TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890-1/4, February 24, 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890-5/12, February, 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890-13-18, March 31, 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890-19/31, March 24, 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890-32/40, April 14, 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890-41/46 (not before April 15) 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890-52/58, May 31, 1945; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890-66/72, September 8, 1944. There are more reports from the region on the armed and ideological war against the Ukrainian nationalists in 1944-45. See: TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-890; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-937-1/4, January 17, 1944 (the report of Khrushchev to Stalin on the activities of Ukrainian nationalists, after the former’s investigative trip to western Ukraine); TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-67-38, April 27, 1944 (on the necessity of agitation-propaganda activities in the Western regions on the Kolkhoz issue). Also see: TsDAHO Ukrainy 1-16-25-72, July 15, 1943; TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-6-757-13/14, February 14, 1944; TsDAHO Ukrainy 1-6-757-15-24, February 14, 1944

Lack of Political Work among the Population of the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR’. In the following days, the KP(b)U also issued a similar resolution emphasizing the shortcomings of political propaganda work in western Ukraine to combat Ukrainian nationalists. The resolution ordered that political propaganda meetings be organized in every single village, town, organization, and institution each month.766 Newspapers and various other publications, as well as radio broadcasts, were ordered to concentrate on these propaganda efforts. Khrushchev, Manuïl’s’kyi, Lytvyn, and other secretaries of the KP(b)U organized the initial meetings in the regions and supervised the propaganda work.767 When Khrushchev addressed Party workers in L’viv on the struggle against Ukrainian and Polish nationalists, he stressed:

“The most important and powerful weapon is ideological struggle; ideological-educational work with the masses, [...] we should not isolate ourselves. We must find a way to the masses. Is it possible to let the population be sympathetic to the OUN fighters? [ounsams]. We have to know the slogans and programme of the OUN, so that we can deal with them fully armed [...]. That is why, comrades, we have to conduct educational work, offensive work”.

One of the easiest ways of “finding a way to the masses” was reinterpreting the Ukrainian past, constructing a Soviet national narrative from this past, and emphasizing the historical brotherhood of Russia and Ukraine. A long list of themes for agitation-propaganda and political education materials was produced. This list included the history of Ukraine and the joint struggle of the Russian and Ukrainian nations against foreign occupiers. These kinds of propaganda materials were already in circulation during the war. The titles of some of these texts published in this period on the history of Ukraine were: “L’viv—The Old Ukrainian City”, “The Centuries Old

766 For another resolution on the political propaganda works in the Western Ukraine, see: TsDAHO України, 1-6-819-20/28, July 9, 1945; A series of agitation and propaganda meetings were organized after these warnings in 1944 and 1945. TsDAHO України, 1-23-895-6/60b, November 1944 (Chernihiv); TsDAHO України, 1-23-895-7/70b, November 18, 1944 (Ochagovskii region); TsDAHO України, 1-23-895-20/25, November 15, 1944 (Ternopil’); TsDAHO України, 1-23-895-26-34, April 10, 1944 (Rovensk); TsDAHO України, 1-23-895-48-63, July 16, 1944 (Chernivetsk); TsDAHO України, 1-23-1633-11/12, March 5, 1945 (L’viv); TsDAHO України, 1-23-1633-12/17a, February 26, 1945.
767 TsDAHO України, 1-6-778-121/174, October 7, 1944.
768 RGANI, 52-1-85-144, October 11, 1944
Meanwhile, the obkoms of western Ukraine organized propaganda lectures on various subjects, including the history of Ukraine, and regional newspapers published articles on the subject as well. In Volinia and Galicia, class and national divisions overlapped, as nearly all the landed gentry were Polish, while the peasants were Ukrainian. Consequently, the Soviet Ukrainian propaganda, which was based on Ukrainian national history, had to keep these divisions in mind. It emphasized the social and national oppression (Rus. sotsialno i natsional’nyi gnet) suffered by the Ukrainian nation for centuries. D. Manuil’s’kyi’s comment at a meeting of western Ukrainian teachers on 6 January, 1945 provides a typical example of this approach. While explaining the advantages of the Soviet socialist system in Ukraine, he provided historical and contemporary examples of both social and national oppression:

“For centuries the Ukrainian people defended themselves against those who encroached on their land. Brazen Teutons, greedy Hungarians, a conceited Polish gentry, arrogant Swedes, Tatar hordes, and Turkish Janissaries. Traitors and criminals like Hetman Mazepa helped them in their dark deeds”. 

[...] It is well known that there were not only Ukrainian landowners in Ukraine; the major landowners were Russian and Polish. In right-bank Ukraine as well as in Galicia, there were Polish magnates possessing huge lands, such as Potots’ki, Sangushky, Radzyvilly, Branys’ts’ki, Sheptyts’ki, and others. Ukrainian peasants worked for these magnates for many years, and by taking lands from them, one of the essential foundations of national oppression was broken [...]. From whom were these factories and plants taken [in Ukraine during Soviet rule]? [They were taken] from capitalists. Not only from the Ukrainian capitalists; they were also taken from Russian capitalists, and from the capitalists of other countries—Germans, French, Belgians and others”. 

The Soviet Union united the territories that had been claimed by Ukrainian nationalists with the establishment of Soviet Ukraine. At the same time, Soviet Ukrainian historiography provided the

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769 There were also lectures on Ukrainian literature, in particular on T. Shevchenko, I. Franko, L. Ukrainka, and Kotsobinskii.

770 TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-6-778-121/174, October 7, 1944.

771 N.N. Petrovs’kyi, Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom Sovetskom gosudarstve (n.a., 1944)


773 D. Manuil’s’kyi, Ukrains’ko-nimets’ki, p. 3.
narrative necessary to present different parts of contemporary Ukraine (Transcarpathia, Galicia, Volhynia, Northern Bukovyna, the right and left banks of the Dnieper) as having a homogenous culture and past dating back to the Kievan Rus’. Although these numerous territories experienced the political rule and cultural influence of various empires and kingdoms for centuries, the national history aimed to provide a picture that presented them as linked to each other and unified by a Ukrainian national consciousness as well as cultural and ethnic homogeneity.\textsuperscript{774} The Soviet government had an advantageous position by unifying all the lands in which Ukrainian speakers were the majority. Although various nationalist groups since the nineteenth century had dreamed about or struggled for this ultimate goal, it was Manuïl’s’kyi’s right to boast of his achievement by arguing that “This was the dream of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, the courageous Hetman of Ukraine, this is what Taras Shevchenko, the great democrat-revolutionary, fought for”.\textsuperscript{775} Soviet propaganda materials also underlined this achievement. For example, in the appeal of the Soviet Ukrainian authorities to western Ukrainians, explaining the benefits of Soviet rule and calling on the OUN-UPA members to give up their armed struggle, one of the slogans at the end of the text was “Long live the great Ukrainian nation, united in a single Ukrainian Soviet state”.\textsuperscript{776} Along with this union, the Soviet historiography increased the emphasis on the historical or national unity of these regions that had in fact been part of different imperial or national states for centuries.\textsuperscript{777} Thus, the Soviet Union could be understood as the latest historical stage in Ukrainian history, in which national and class oppression was eliminated and all Ukrainian lands were united. The Soviet Union did not

\textsuperscript{775} D. Manuil’s’kyi, \textit{Ukrains’ko-Nimets’ki}, p.7.
\textsuperscript{776} TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-780-23 (1944).
\textsuperscript{777} M. Petrovs’kyi, \textit{Bukovyna}; M. Petrovs’kyi, \textit{Zakhidna}.
represent an interruption in the national history, but rather the continuity of Ukrainian identity. From this point of view, it is no surprise that Ukrainian historians were criticized in 1944 for weakness in terms of “showing the continuity of Ukrainian patriotic traditions and cultural heritage represented by Bolshevism”.

There were different Ukrainian nationalist groups before and during the Second World War. The biggest organization was the OUN, which divided into two factions in 1941. Other organizations with limited popularity were the group led by Hetman Skoropads'kyi in Berlin; the UNR government in exile in Europe; the SVU or in Kiev; some Cossack groups in Kuban (Lugansk or the Voroshilovgrad region); the armed group led by ‘Taras Bulba’ (Bul’bovtsy) in Roven oblast’, whose real name was Borovets. The OUN strove for a national revolution. Its corporatist social program, which emphasized the state supervision of every aspect of national life, was inspired by the example of Mussolini’s Italy. The programme also promised peasants, who were the majority in the area of the OUN’s activities, that they would become landowners in an independent Ukraine. In 1941, the OUN split into two groups—a group of older and more moderate members led by Andrii Melnyk (OUN-M), and a group of younger and more radical members following Stepan Bandera (OUN-B). The latter came to control the military wing of the organization, UPA, which was founded in 1943. Although there were different factions within the OUN, they shared a common goal. They sought the defeat of Soviet Ukraine and the

778 TsDAHO Ukraïny, 1-23-864-24/26, May 5, 1944.
establishment of an independent Ukrainian nation-state by means of military resistance.\textsuperscript{781}

Naturally, the Ukrainian nationalists in the OUN-B, OUN-M, or in Waffen SS ‘Galicia’ Division had to include a version of national history in their discourse in order to mobilize the masses and recruit soldiers and militants against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{782} In the case of the Waffen SS ‘Galicia’ Division, the propaganda campaign that was pursued to recruit Ukrainians into its ranks concentrated on two central themes: (1) fighting together with the German Army against Bolshevism, the deadliest enemy of the Ukrainian nation, and (2) fighting for Ukraine, for the fatherland. The nationalist propagandists appealed to national sentiments, stressing the defence of Ukrainian native soil. One favoured approach was to seek historical parallels between the Waffen SS ‘Galicia’ and the Ukrainian martial tradition. Historians such as Ivan Krypia’kevych prepared propaganda texts and newspaper articles that conveyed this nationalist message.\textsuperscript{783}

Other historians, including A. P. Ohloblin, remained in occupied Ukraine and collaborated with the Germans.\textsuperscript{784}

The OUN-UPA leaders were well aware of the ideological front. One of the internal pamphlets of the OUN-UPA in 1943 warned the leaders of the movement, “Fire must be fought with fire. The

\textsuperscript{781} T. Hunczak, \textit{On the Horns}.

\textsuperscript{782} The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) split into two factions in March 1941. The one led by a member of the older generation, Andrii Melnyk, a colonel of the Ukrainian Army who had fought during 1917-21, was named OUN-M. The leader of the other faction, OUN-B, was Stepan Bandera. The Bandera group organized in April 1941, with the help of the German intelligentsia, a military unit consisting of some 650 men. At the same time, the OUN-B created a second military group. After the OUN-B declared the renewal of the Ukrainian state on June 30, 1941 in Lviv, the Germans arrested prominent members of the group including Stephan Bandera and his deputy Yaroslav Stetsko, who were subsequently sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Melnyk was kept under house arrest and then sent to Sachsenhausen in 1944. P.J. Potichnyj and Y. Shtendera, \textit{Political}, p. xv; J.A. Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian}, pp. 37-43; T. Hunczak, \textit{On the Horns}, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{783} T. Hunczak, \textit{On the Horns}, pp. 25-7. Krypia’kevych was a historian at the L’viv Universtity. During the German occupation he continued his works as a historian and publisher. After the Soviet victory, he remained in the Soviet Union. His History of Ukraine of Ukraine published in the west under the pseudonym Ivan Kholmsky in 1949. His historiography follows Hrushev’s’kyi. For Ukrainian reprint see: I. P. Kryp’iakevich, \textit{Istoriiia ukrainy} (L’viv, 1990).

\textsuperscript{784} During the occupation, Ohloblin worked as the director of the museum and archive in Kiev. see: TsDAHO \textit{Ukrainy}, 1-23-117-1/29, February 3, 1944.

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Bolsheviks have been striking at us throughout the Soviet Union, primarily with their ideology. We must turn their methods and ideology against them”.\textsuperscript{785} This could be done by disseminating an alternate Ukrainian national history in response to the Ukrainian Soviet national history. When new recruits joined the organization, the first thing they had to learn was the OUN version of Ukrainian history. Ideological or organizational instruction would come afterwards.\textsuperscript{786} The Ukrainian nationalists, naturally, were against the Soviet construction of national history. According to the pamphlets of the OUN, “Marxist ideology has become a tool of Russian imperialism”, and “the Communist Party has quietly transformed itself into a red Ivan Kalita”. The Russians, under the disguise of international Bolshevism, Russified “the glorious era of old princely Ukraine”; “The aim of the Soviet education in Ukraine was the destruction of the historical memory of Ukrainian youth”.\textsuperscript{787} One article ridiculed the politicized selection of historical figures by Soviet historiography:

\textit{“Why [do] Soviet historians vilify Mazepa as a traitor [?] What does this have to do with Marxism? Why has Dmitrii Donskoi remained a hero, in spite of the fact that he betrayed the khan? Let them [the Ukrainian youth] explain why the betrayal of one is heroism, and of the other, treachery. Let them explain why there is such an amazing unity of opinion on this matter among Peter [the Great] his priests, who anathemized the great Hetman [Mazepa], Karamzin, Ilovaisky, Pokrovsky and a long line of Soviet historians. Perhaps this is because Mazepa was a bourgeois, a feudalist? But what was Peter? A miner in the Urals, or a farm labourer in some Russian village?”}\textsuperscript{788}

Following this critique of Soviet Ukrainian historiography, the OUN provided its own account of the past. As in the Soviet version, the OUN version primordialized Ukrainian identity, stating that the Ukrainian youth was learning that “We are not illegitimate sons, but we are one of the oldest nations of Europe, a nation that, having settled this land several thousand years ago,

\textsuperscript{788} Iu. M. Khersonets, ‘At the Turning Point’, pp.229-242, p.234.
withstood invasions from the plains and were not driven out by Goths, Huns, or the hordes of Genghis Khan”. Also like the Soviet narrative, the nationalist history emphasized that the Kievan Rus’ was not a product of Germanic or Norman invaders, but “it was our [Ukrainian] ancestors alone, without any foreign Varangian aid, who established the great state”. The clear difference between the two narratives is that while the Soviet version described the Kievan Rus’ as a common state of the eastern Slavs, the narrative of the OUN, as Hrushevs’kyi had done previously, nationalized the Kievan Rus’ and its leaders. It also presented a broader range of Cossack leaders, including Mazepa, as historical figures of the Ukrainian nation. Finally, the OUN’s narrative underlined the manly character of the Ukrainian nation:

“This is not a belief in that ‘mother’ figure, draped in embroidery, which is idolized by whiners and sentimental dreamers. No! It is a belief in Ukraine of the Conqueror [Sviatoslav I], [Volodymyr] Monomakh, [Bohdan] Khmelnitsky, [Ivan] Bohun, [Symon] Petliura, and [Iehven] Konovalets”. 789

Another piece of OUN propaganda refers to history, while criticizing Soviet policies:

“What are we reproaching the Soviets for?
- MOSKALI [plural form of Moskal’ a derogative Ukrainian term for Russians] exterminated our country three times: The invasion of Andrei Bogoliubskii in the time of the [udel’] principalities; the invasion of Peter I in the time of Hetman Mazepa; and the Bolshevik invasion of Lenin. [...] 
- MOSKALY robbed the sacred history of our [Kievan] principality epoch with all its cultural acquisitions and made it their own.
- MOSKALY constructed their capital (St. Petersburg), canals, and roads on the bones of our Cossacks and built up their empire.
- MOSKALY brought [to Ukraine] serfdom, lordship, and a little bit later, with the serfdom of collectivization, they started to feed hungry katsapchuks [small Moskal?] with our Ukrainian bread”. 790

Probably the image of M. Abdykalykov, the secretary of agitation-propaganda at the KP(b)K, who travelled extensively throughout the regions and stayed in Karaganda (one of the biggest coal mines in the USSR) for several months in 1942—all to ensure the success of agitation and propaganda activities among miners and workers—summarizes the situation in the non-Russian

790 TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-523-71/72, May 24, 1943.
republics.\textsuperscript{791} Right from the start of the war, agitation-propaganda work was oriented towards mobilizing Azerbaijani, Kazakh and Ukrainian people. In order to do this, a heroic past had to be incorporated into the official narrative. Thus, while Moscow intensified a Russian Soviet national narrative, the local communist parties did their best to counter-balance this Russocentric propaganda with a non-Russian heroic past. In closing, we should note an important point that has hitherto been missed by the literature because of the discussions concerning Kenesary Kasymov and E. Bekmakhanov. The history of Kazakhstan (1943) explained the origins of the Kazakh nation. As described in the previous chapter, pre-war Azerbaijani and Ukrainian historiography had already answered the question of ethnogenesis for those nations. However, Kazakh national history remained without a clear definition of the primordial roots of Kazakhs. The conditions of the war accelerated the process of primordialization in Kazakhstan. Although there was a clear attempt at primordialization, the Kazakh identity still did not bear a mono-ethnic root. In this sense, the Kazakh case strongly resembles the Azerbaijani account of ethnogenesis.

\textsuperscript{791} For the interview with M. Abdykalykov about those days, see: ‘Istoriia pro to, kak delali Istoriiu’, \textit{Argumenty i Fakty Kazakhstana}, no.8 (February 1997), p. 6.
Nikita Khrushchev awards the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Star to the Hero of the Soviet Union, Kazakh officer Dordiev. July 1942

The first secretary of the KP(b)U
Nikita Khrushchev in the late 1930s

Dmytro Manuil’s’kyi

Ilias Omarov
The secretary of the agitation propaganda department of the KP(b)U (1947-1952)

Kostiantyn Lytvyn
The secretary of the agitation propaganda department of the KP(b)U (1941-1951)
CHAPTER 4: THE POSTWAR PERIOD.

In most of the works covering the Soviet postwar era, the central paradigm is the continuity from the 1930s up to the last days of Stalin. There was indeed continuity in the ruling cadres, the one-party rule of the All-Union Communist Party, the use of state terror and repression as demonstrated by Zhdanovshchina, and central economic planning. Despite these evident continuities, there is also an emerging literature that questions this understanding of post-war continuity in the Soviet Union and provides an alternative reading. This chapter argues that the post-war period saw a break from the mainstream paradigm of national histories initiated in 1936-8. Covering the post-war Stalinist period, the chapter focuses primarily on this shift—the most dramatic development in post-war national historiography until the death of Stalin.

This change in paradigm becomes tangible in two topics. As described in the previous chapters, the Soviet regime supported the construction of non-Russian national narratives before the Second World War. These heroic pasts of non-Russian nations were then used for agitation-propaganda purposes during the War. This new wartime history, reacting against Pokrovskiian...
historiography, distanced itself from class analysis and sought past examples of national unification. Not all historians adopted this new mode, however. There were the ‘moderates’ who understood this shift and practised it in their work. These were the historians who wrote the Ukrainian history in 1940, the Azerbaijani history in 1941, and the Kazakh history in 1943. There were also more orthodox Marxists or ‘hardliners’, who were aware in 1938 that the shift was taking place, but were not fully convinced they should go along with it. They maintained that this nationalist emphasis was an anti-Marxist tendency that had to be rectified at some point. After all, Marx and Engels had defined human history in the Communist Manifesto as a history of class struggle.

The Kazakh and Ukrainian archives in particular provide important evidence of the differences between the local hardliners and the moderates. The hardliners’ day finally came after the war, when the nationalist emphasis became a subject of discussion. Agitation-propaganda officials gave voice to the debate by complaining that too much national fuss had been produced during the war. The debate was evident at a meeting of the directors and lecturers of departments of social sciences and humanities in the Azerbaijani SSR, the Armenian SSR, and the Georgian SSR in 1947. This meeting was prompted by criticisms on the Institute of History in Tbilisi and the textbook on the history of Georgia published in Tbilisi. When the participants started to question if the historiography during the war period had been correct or not, a high-ranking official from the AKP(b) responded:

“[At] the time of the Patriotic War, we sometimes had to resort to means and methods of stimulation, [...] this was a stimulation against the enemy, [a stimulation] of hatred against the enemy. However, in that period we emphasized the historical veracity with

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794 W. G. Hahn also claims that there were some hardliners or dogmatists in the postwar Soviet institutions. According to him, at the beginning of the postwar period, moderates occupied most of the key positions in social and natural sciences. W. G. Hahn, Postwar, pp. 10-11.
regard to the martial traditions of our people, with regard to the patriotism of the people. That truth [of that time] has not ceased to be true now. The strength of our propaganda and agitation is that it has always been based on the Bolshevik truth. [At that time] it was right. At that time, that side bulged.\textsuperscript{795}

In Kazakhstan the issue centred on the khans Edyge and Kenesary Kasymov. During the war, a propaganda letter, ‘From the Kazakh Nation to the Kazakh Soldiers at the Front’, was prepared by the agitation-propaganda sections of the KP(b)K and Kazakh historians. The fact that Edyge had been included in this letter became a hot topic at the conference of Kazakh historians in May 1946. When the moderate Kazakh historians were accused of making a ‘mistake’, Adil’gireev, one of the moderates, turned to the auditorium, where all the higher officials of the KP(b)K were sitting, and said, “You were sitting at the TsK [KP(b)K]; you have to know [why Edyge was included]”.\textsuperscript{796} In Ukraine, Lytvyn, the secretary of the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)U, speaking at the Ukrainian Writers Conference in August 1946, first enumerated the mistakes in the 1943 history. He then continued:

“Why did these comrades made these gross mistakes? Because they concluded from a wrong assumption that allegedly the party had changed its policy during the war. In the name of educating our nation in patriotism, many things were written about Aleksandr Nevskii, Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. These followed the publication of several patriotic calls to the Ukrainian nation, in which great emphasis was placed on the historical heroic traditions of our nation. ‘Kobzar’ [by Shevchenko] was published in small numbers and distributed behind the enemy lines, as well as many leaflets in which the works of Shevchenko were used for purely propaganda purposes—some [comrades] made a wrong conclusions out of these.”\textsuperscript{797}

In short, invoking national sentiments had been a good policy during the war, but now it had to be limited. However, the problem was defining where the line should be drawn. How far should national discourse be toned down and class struggle and peasant uprisings emphasized again?\textsuperscript{798}

The archival evidence, especially from Kazakhstan and Ukraine, suggests that the discussion of

\textsuperscript{795} ARPliSPIHDA, 1-32-340-19/21, February 6, 1947.  
\textsuperscript{796} Sh. Sh. Uelikhanov Atyndaşy Tarih zhane Etnologiiia Institutyndyng Arkhivy (The Archive of the Sh.Sh. Uelikhanov Institute of History and Etnography, hereafter UATEIA), (fond) 11 – (opis) 2 – (delo) 3 – (list) 62; May 16, 1947.  
\textsuperscript{797} TsDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-514-25, August 27, 1946.  
\textsuperscript{798} See the file of the presentations at the meeting of lecturers of social sciences and humanities at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, on 12 February 1947. ARPliSPIHDA, 1-32-341-3/13, February 12, 1947.
this issue continued between the moderate and the so-called hardliner or dogmatist historians, through the period of *Zhdanovshchina*, until the eventual victory of the hardliners. In other words, while *Zhdanovshchina* was experienced by Moscow and Leningrad intellectuals as a crusade against liberalism and western influences in arts and literature, historians in the non-Russian republics experienced this period as a shift in historiography from an emphasis on national elements to one on class struggle, and the de-nationalization of history.\(^{799}\)

The concurrent situation in Russian historiography must also be kept in mind. While the emphasis in the non-Russian national narratives moved from national to class struggles and heroes, the Russian national narrative did not experience a similar turn. Moreover, the ‘lesser evil’ formula for the expansion of the Russian Empire into non-Russian territories was gradually replaced by an ‘all-progressive’ interpretation. In this sense, the non-Russian hardliners were not the only winners of the shift in history writing. While in non-Russian republics the hardliner local historians celebrated their victory, the Russian historians who defended Russocentric historiography also joined in the victory parade. The fault line between the winners and losers therefore did not have a purely ethnic character.

4.1. AZERBAIJAN: ANTI-TURKISH, ANTI-IRANIAN, ANTI-SHAMIL.

In the postwar period, Fatali-Khan of Quba was increasingly depicted as a figure who aimed to unite historical Azerbaijani lands and establish a centralized state, leading a struggle against Iranian rule, and who, in order to realize these plans, sought to secure the support of Russia. In this reading, while Russia was presented as a centre of progress, Iran and Turkey appeared as

\(^{799}\) For the Ukrainian case see; Yekelchyk, Stalin’s, pp. 72-87.
expansionist feudal societies.\textsuperscript{800} The priorities of the KP(b)Az were evident in the critiques expressed at the meeting of the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)Az, in which a screenplay about Fatali Khan was discussed by the secretary of agitation-propaganda, ideologues of the party, and the Azerbaijani writer Samad Vurgun. According to one committee member, the Iranian tyranny had to be further emphasized. Furthermore, the Turkish plans to occupy Azerbaijan were not mentioned as Iranian rule was. As enemies of Azerbaijan, they should have received equal emphasis.\textsuperscript{801} According to an ideologue at the meeting, “It is not possible to change history, but particular realities and events in history can be shown a little bit differently, as long as the epoch, people, and their feelings as a whole are shown in a correct way.”\textsuperscript{802}

In summary, the meeting at the KP(b)Az informed the writers that, first, Fatali Khan should be shown as a national leader who was very popular and wanted to unite Azerbaijan. Second, he should be shown as a pro-Russian leader, and this aspect should be interpreted as progressive, particularly compared to Iran and Turkey.\textsuperscript{803} The same ideologue quoted above stressed, “Although Russia was more advanced than Iran and Turkey, all the same, it was Tsarist [Russia]. There is no need to make history better than it is. This has to be shown as a ‘lesser evil’.”\textsuperscript{804}

Following the famous toast of Stalin to the greatness of Russian nation at the Kremlin in 1945, the ‘historical’ friendship of Russia and Azerbaijan received greater emphasis. In 1946, Geidar

\textsuperscript{800} The major historical lecture themes of the KP(b)Az can be found in \textit{ARPiİSPIHDA}, 1-31-417-51 (1946). A special commission was dispatched to Moscow to collect archival materials about Fatali Khan. \textit{ARPiİSPIHDA}, 1-32-273-13, June 21, 1947. These documents could be used to construct a ‘scientific’ narrative on the period of Fatali Khan. For the committee reported to Bagirov on the documents, see: \textit{ARPiİSPIHDA}, 1-32-158-13/27, October 7, 1947.

\textsuperscript{801} \textit{ARPiİSPIHDA}, 1-32-273-1, April 30, 1947.

\textsuperscript{802} \textit{ARPiİSPIHDA}, 1-32-273-2, April 30, 1947.

\textsuperscript{803} \textit{ARPiİSPIHDA}, 1-32-273-1/12, April 30, 1947.

\textsuperscript{804} \textit{ARPiİSPIHDA}, 1-32-273-4/5, April 30, 1947.
Guseinov published ‘On the Historical Friendship [Ru. sodruzhestvo] of the Russian and Azerbaijani Nations’, constructing a fraternity that started “in the twelfth century and continued until our times—a Stalinist friendship of nations”. The lesser evil formula was still the official line, but there were also different interpretations. At the meeting which was organized at the agitation-propaganda on Fatali-Khan of Quba, the participants underlined the ‘lesser evil’ formula, and the report of the Institute of History to the KP(b)Az in 1947 interpreted the annexation of Azerbaijan by Russia as “a progressive step in the given conditions of the time”. While the ‘lesser evil’ reading was still considered correct in 1947, the annexation of Azerbaijan was also described in a pro-Russian manner. Historians began to claim that the majority of the Azerbaijani nation supported the annexation.

Along with the increasing emphasis on the brotherhood of Russians and Azerbaijanis, the anti-Turkish and anti-Iranian aspect of national history was also amplified. Relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey continued to be very tense after the Second World War. While the details of this tension are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that escalating conflict between the two countries was an important factor in national historiography in all Caucasian Soviet republics, intensifying de-Turkification and the anti-Turkish approach. In 1947, the KP(b)Az issued a decree with the aim of popularizing the anti-Turkish narrative by focusing on the “long struggle of the Azerbaijani nation against Turks for liberty and

805 G. N. Guseinov, ‘Ob istoricheskom sodruzhestve azerbaidzhanskogo i russkogo narodov’, Maruzalar AN AzSSR, vol.1, no.1 (1945), pp.47-51; ARPlISPIdHA, 1-31-103-58, November 12, 1946; G. N. Guseinov, Ob istoricheskom sodruzhestve russkogo i azerbaidzhanskogo narodov (Baku, 1946) Parallel to this trend, some works published (“Philosophical views of M.F. Akhundov” and “Enlightener-Democrat, G. Zardabi”) which emphasized the progressive role of the Russian thought in the nineteenth century on Azerbaijani intellectuals. ARPlISPIdHA, 1-31-137-4, October 4, 1946. 
Anti-Turkish publications were not limited to Azerbaijan, but found in Armenia and Georgia as well. The anti-Iranian approach also continued. The same KP(b)Az decree also called on historians to emphasize the “centuries-old struggle of the Azerbaijani nation against the Iranian occupiers”. The aim was to increase the distance between Azerbaijan on the one side and Turkey and Iran on other, while drawing Azerbaijan closer to Russia through their histories. The ‘centuries-old struggle’ of the Azerbaijani nation against Turkey and its friendship with Russia were historicized by reinterpreting Shamil. Thus, the denunciation of the Shamil Uprising became a crossroads of the anti-Turkish discourse and the demise of the ‘lesser evil’ formula in Azerbaijani-Russian relations. Shamil had hitherto been described as a progressive and anti-colonial uprising. Sufism and other religious ideas were understood as peasant ideologies that played an important role in various uprisings in the Middle Ages. Azerbaijani historians could therefore claim the uprising was an Azerbaijani one because the Shamil uprising spread into contemporary territories of Azerbaijan such as Quba.

808 ARPIİSPİHDA, 1-32-37-87, July 15, 1947. As part of this anti-Turkish campaign, the Turkish military presence in Azerbaijan in 1918 was interpreted as a Turkish-German intervention constituting an occupation of Azerbaijan. Tokarzhevskii, a historian from the Institute of Marxism and Leninism, wrote a book on this topic: E. A. Tokarzhevskii, ‘Bakinskie Bol’sheviki – Organizatory borby protiv germano-turetskich intereventov v Azerbaidzhane v 1918 g.’, Trudy Azerbaidzhanskogo filiala IMEL, vol.4 (1947)


Qazakh, Kürdemir, and Nukha; Sunni territories that followed the orders of Shamil. According to the new version, Shamil was an agent of British imperialism and the Ottoman-Turkish reactionary state.

Bagirov, in his speech at Stalin’s seventieth birthday celebration in December 1949, underlined the progressive significance of the Russian annexation of Azerbaijan. At the Seventeenth Congress of the KP(b)Az in May 1950, Bagirov again emphasized “the progressive role of the annexation of Azerbaijan to Russia”. The interpretation was changing and historians had to be prepared. Finally, Bagirov’s address at a meeting of Baku intellectuals on 14 July 1950 severely criticized historians who described Shamil as a progressive figure, and who included Azerbaijan as part of the territories where Shamil found support. Those accused were mostly members of the newly founded Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijani SSR. Bagirov attacked in particular Geidar Guseinov (Heydar Huseinov), whose book portrayed the Shamil uprising in a positive light, as an ally of Azerbaijani nation against the Russian colonialism and Azerbaijani toiling masses against the local feudal lords. Moreover, Guseinov referred to Mirza Kazem-Bek—a Caucasian Tatar (Azerbaijani) intellectual of the nineteenth century and celebrated by the Soviet historiography as a progressive figure—regarding his positive opinion about Shamil.

Following this accusation from the head of the KP(b)Az, public meetings were organized in Baku. At these meetings the accused scholars acknowledged their ‘mistakes’ in Bagirov’s presence and

812 Sh. V. Tsagareishvili (ed.), Shamil’ – stavlennik sultanskoj turtsii i angliiskikh kolonizatorov (sbornik dokumental’nykh materialov) (Tbilisi, 1953).
813 TİA, Protokol no. 6, May 29, 1950.
814 G. Guseinov, Iz istorii obshchestvennoi i filosofskoi mysli v azerbaidzhane XIX veka (Baku, 1949), pp.61, 62, 123, 230, 233, 237,
expressed their gratitude to him and to the KP(b)Az for showing them the correct interpretation. Guseinov was publicly censured for approving of the Shamil uprising as only “nationalists, pan-Turkists, pan-Islamists”, and “agents of imperialists” had done. Every person who addressed the meeting of Baku intelligentsia condemned Guseinov.\footnote{The file of the meeting is AРРиСПИHДA, 1-36-116 July 15, 1950.} Out of consideration for his family and friends, Guseinov committed suicide the day following Bagirov’s speech.\footnote{Apparently, this issue started to became serious problem at the beginning of 1950. Bagirov withdrew the candidicy of Guseinov’ book for Stalin premium.}

At the beginning of October 1950, the historians of the Institute of History decided to review all the works of the Institute, especially those on the history of the Medes and the friendship of the Russian and Azerbaijani nations, in light of Stalin’s “Marxism and Linguistics” and Bagirov’s recent speeches.\footnote{TiA, Protokol no.17, October 3, 1950; TiA, Protokol no.11, October 6, 1950.} A meeting of Azerbaijani historians was organized for 18-19 October, 1950, and the meeting was chaired by Zevin, the secretary of the KP(b)Az. The meeting turned into an endless critique of previous works and historical concepts.\footnote{AРРиСПИHДA, 1-36-419-1/220, October 18-19, 1950.} Following the demise of Shamil’s uprising, now other uprisings with religious content, which had previously been included in Azerbaijani national history, had to be examined. According to the Azerbaijani party ideologue and historian Kuliev:

“In evaluating each of the rebellion movements, we must study in detail the particular historical environment and conditions in which these movements and rebellions took place and sometimes adopted a religious cover.”\footnote{AРРиСПИHДA, 1-36-419-1, October 18-19, 1950.}

The uprising of Mazdak was one of the ones at issue. Kuliev asked, “Is it not clear that we cannot talk about this movement as a popular revolutionary movement just because Mazdak declared communal ownership of property and rose up against utter poverty?”\footnote{AРРиСПИHДA, 1-36-419-18, October 18-19, 1950.} He then criticized
Azerbaijani historians who defined the uprising of Hasan Sabbah as a popular revolutionary movement, whose participants were shown as the followers of the egalitarian Babakites. Excluding the Babak Uprising, all other uprisings had to be considered reactionary religious movements that did not bring any benefit to the labouring masses.\footnote{ARPİİSPİHDA, 1-36-419-19/20, October 18-19, 1950.} Along with the new interpretation of Shamil, eighteenth century regional uprisings in the Sunni territories of northern Azerbaijan and Dagestan against Shia Iran (such as Haji Davud), where central authority had been weakened, had to be labelled as the work of Turkish agents.\footnote{ARPİİSPİHDA, 1-36-419-22, October 18-19, 1950.} Finally, Kuliev clearly warned Azerbaijani historians that the ‘lesser evil’ formula had already become obsolete:

“Perhaps most of us held such a view until the report of comrade M. D. Bagirov on the seventieth birthday of I.V. Stalin [in December 1949]. However, comrade Bagirov provided a very extensive argument on the positive significance of the annexation of Azerbaijan to Russia and none of us has the right to continue to say something like ‘lesser evil’”.\footnote{ARPİİSPİHDA, 1-36-419-22, October 18-19, 1950.}

In addition to the demise of the leaders of various uprisings, Azerbaijani historians were warned that some figures who had been elevated to the pantheon of Azerbaijani national heroes should be re-examined as puppets of the ruling classes. Now Azerbaijani historians had to go back to the old class concept in order to underline the class identity of figures such as Javanshir and Shah Ismail within their feudal societies.\footnote{ARPİİSPİHDA, 1-36-419-46, October 18-19, 1950.} Following the meeting of Azerbaijani historians on 18-19 October, 1950, the resolution of the TsK KP(b)Az “on the state of historical scholarship in the republic” in February 1951 finalized the whole process of changing the discourse of national history. The resolution criticized the history of Azerbaijan published in 1946 as having “a low scholarly and ideological-theoretical level”. The authors “glossed over the class struggle and idealized the past; they allocated too much space for the deeds of various shahs, khans, and
commanders”. The historians of the Institute were accused of making mistakes “in the nationalist and bourgeois-objectivist character, not correctly interpreting the annexation of Azerbaijan to Russia, downplaying its progressive significance, idealizing the feudal past and the deeds of shahs and khans, [...] glossing over the reactionary nature of Islam and its various denominations, arguing against the need to review existing misconceptions about the supposedly progressive national-liberationist character of [M]uridism and Shamil”.825 This resolution can be considered the official decree that brought an end to the long trend, since 1938, of writing history with a national emphasis.

4.2. MODERATES VERSUS KAZAKH HARDLINERS.

The Bekmakhanov case is a very well-known issue in the history of postwar Kazakhstan. Bekmakhanov is generally described as one of those ‘silenced and terrorized nationalists’ by Moscow. The Kazakh historians who were against him were considered the ‘local servants of the regime’.826 The first sign of confrontation on Kazakh national narrative, however, was not between the moderate historians and the hardliners; it was rather between two divisions of Russian historians. During the war, as part of the emphasis on national aspects and unifying historical figures, historians of Russia with nationalist tendencies gained a stronger voice. The Russocentric narrative was so natural for lakovlev, for instance, that any further attempt to write an all-Union narrative encompassing all the nations of the Soviet Union under the

paradigm of class solidarity seemed to be nonsense. At a committee meeting at the all-Union Narkompros in Moscow in January 1944, he argued against the new history textbooks, saying, “There should not be a new history textbook of the USSR, there should be a textbook of Russian history, and ‘Russian nationalism’ as a motivating force should be brought forward. All history textbooks for Russian schools have to be Russian national textbooks. It is not possible to mix this content with the interests of a hundred other nations.” Tarle, another representative of this camp, suggested that Soviet historians look to the past from the perspective of 1944. According to this approach, “The people of Dagestan had to be happy to live under the sun of the Stalinist constitution, instead of the Imamate of Shamil”. At his 1944 lecture in Saratov, “The Role of Territorial Expansion of Russia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries”, Tarle questioned the descriptions of nineteenth century Russia as a ‘prison of nations’ and a ‘gendarmerie of Europe’ and argued that these were mere myths. He also argued at Leningrad State University in March 1944 that the Soviet victory over Germany was a result of its large size and questioned why Soviet historiography should be so critical of the Russian Empire that gathered this territory. He defended this same position in the second volume of his book on the Crimean War and reinterpreted the writings of Marx and Engels on the foreign policy of Russia during this period. The Armenian historian Adzhemian expressed similar views. In his unpublished essay, “The Social Nature of Caucasian Muridism”, he argued that Tsarist Russia united nations and brought them progress and culture. Pugachev and other leaders of popular movements were reactionaries because they aimed to demolish the state. On the other hand, Ekaterina II and

827 KRPM, 708-8-197-13, June 15, 1944.
828 KRPM, 708-8-197-19/20, June 15, 1944.
829 KRPM, 708-8-197-1ob, 6, June 15, 1944.
other tsars were relatively progressive because they consolidated and expanded the state. This group of historians argued that the class struggle concept, which was supposed to unite all the nations of the Union, was not effective. The ongoing war was further proof of the fact that the divisions between nations were stronger than any class solidarity. These historians therefore sought the further removal of class conflict from the historical narrative and at the same time the intensification of Russian national aspects. They were also the leading critics of the recently published history of Kazakhstan.

Clearly, not everyone agreed with this camp, including the co-editor of the Kazakh history, Anna Pankratova. She and other Russian historians led a struggle against this rising Russocentric or Russian nationalist view. Pankratova wrote more than once to Stalin, Zhdanov, Malenkov, and Sherbakov about these nationalist tendencies among Russian historians and asked for a meeting of historians with the Party leaders to discuss this issue. Pankratova accused them of being revisionists because they wanted to resurrect the concepts of Russian imperial historiography, such as great-statehood [Ru. velikoderzhavnicheskaia]. This concept defined, in a Hegelian manner, the state as the highest form of organization of the nation and considered the Russian state and the Russian people as a whole. As a result of her letters, meetings were organized, with Malenkov chairing the first meeting on 29 May, 1944. The historians responded on 1 June, 1944. They criticized Pankratova and the Kazakh history text for various reasons. Bushuev, who supported the rehabilitation of Tsarist policies, accused the History of being “anti-Russian”

KRPM, 708-8-197-3ob, June 15, 1944.
831 This series of meetings was held at the TsK VKP(b) on May 29, June 1 (Bushuev, Adzhemian, Pankratova, Nechkina); June 5 (Bakhirshin, Sidorov, Rubinshtein, Syromiatnikov, Mind); June 10 (Picheta, Efimov, Iakovlev, Gorodetskii, Grekov); and June 22 (Bazilevich, Tarle, Tolstov, Genkina, Derzhavin, Pankratova). Most of these archival materials were published in 1988: ‘Pis’ma Anny Mikhailovny Pankratovoi’, Voprosy istorii, no.11 (1988) , pp. 54-79.
and idealizing national uprisings against Russia. The historical approach of Bushuev, as well as Adzhemian and Efimov, merged the state and people in one narrative. At the meeting, Pankratova explained that in the course of preparing the book there had been a discussion on whether the lesser evil formula worked in the Kazakh case. Their conclusion was that this formula could not be applied to Kazakhstan, as it had been to Ukraine or Georgia, because there was no well-defined alternative to Russian expansion. She explained to Sherbakov and to the historians in the meeting that neither China nor the Central Asian khanates, nor Britain, had been on the brink of attacking the Kazakh steppes. She also added that the authors of the text wanted to emphasize the progressive aspects of Russian rule in Kazakhstan, the friendship of the Russian and Kazakh nations, and the international struggle of the working class. Sherbakov’s commentaries and questions demonstrated his support for this view. In the following meeting of historians at the TsK VKP(b) on 22 June, 1944, Pankratova cleverly manoeuvred to avoid further critiques and polemics in front of the leading figures of the Party by giving a petition to Sherbakov to review the book for a second edition. The confrontation between the two groups continued in the last meeting, again chaired by Sherbakov, on 8 July, 1944. While one side defended the class conflict oriented and non-national approach to Russian history, the other side accused this first group of imitating Pokrovskiiian views, and were themselves keen on providing a statist and Russocentric history. Following Pankratova’s petition to re-edit the text, which gained Sherbakov’s support, the Russocentric camp backed down. Tarle, for instance,

832 KRPM, 708-8-197-2/3, June 15, 1944.
833 KRPM, 708-8-197-9ob, June 15, 1944.
834 KRPM, 708-8-197-23/26, June 15, 1944.
835 KRPM, 708-8-197-1/1ob, June 15, 1944.
836 KRPM, 708-8-197-32/34ob, June 22, 1944.
837 KRPM, 708-8-99a-17/27, July 8, 1944. In this meeting the following participant addressed the audience: Kovalev (a member of the directory of propaganda of the TsK VKP(b)), the historians Volgin, Volin, Amanzholov, Tarle, Grekov, Adzhemian, and Pankratova.
distanced himself from his lectures in Saratov, blaming the people who recorded the minutes. He claimed, “One would be crazy to say that Tsarism was not the ‘gendarmerie of Europe’ or Russia was not ‘a prison of nations’. They did not understand me right. I merely said that we do not provide history with all its sides, we just paint it with one colour”. At the end of the session, it was clear that Pankratova had won the day. Tarle, Iakovlev, and Adzhemian surrounded Sherbakov and tried to repair their damaged reputations by denouncing themselves. Iakovlev approached Pankratova and said, “Please do not be upset with me; no more than ten pages should be changed in different sections of the book. In general, the book is good”. We should note that historians in Kiev, Baku, and Almaty were aware of these discussions in Moscow; however, it was not yet clear if a change in the course of history writing was indeed occurring.

Things seemed to settle down until the end of the war. However, Kazakh historiography was soon attacked by the hardliner Marxist camp for not making class conflicts a priority. In May 1945, Morozov, an ideologue at the agitation-propaganda section of the TsK VKP(b) wrote a review of the History of the Kazakh SSR in the journal Bolshevik, in which the text was called “the failed embodiment of nationalist ideas”. He objected that the authors of the History counted all uprisings as national-liberation struggles, and they declared “the leaders of all uprisings to be ‘batyrs’, and transform them into national heroes”. Following this review, in August 1945, the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)K held a discussion of the issues that had to be corrected in the second edition. Klimov, a member of the agitation-propaganda section of the TsK KP(b)K, prepared a draft resolution, based on the discussions in Moscow in 1944, to be

838 KRPM, 708-8-99a-24, July 8, 1944.
839 KRPM, 708-8-99a-27, July 8, 1944.
discussed at the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)K. Although the discussions and critiques of the first edition concentrated on Kazakh-Russian relations in the nineteenth century, there was also an earlier historical figure on the table. In the first edition, Edyge Khan had been incorporated into the narrative as a Kazakh national hero. This was done to extend Kazakh identity further into the past, before the Kazakh Khanate, and to provide a heroic past. However, since 1944, Edyge had been vilified in other national histories of the Union. He was considered a successor of the demonic Genghiside Mongol Empire. Moreover, in 1409, Edyge Khan led an army of 30,000 that attacked and ransacked the Principality of Moscow. In the following year he also attacked Riazan and Kiev. Thus, the incorporation of Edyge into the national history not only projected Kazakh identity back to the thirteenth century with a heroic figure, but also posited a Russian-Kazakh conflict many centuries before. Shaiakhmetov, the second secretary of the KP(b)K, and Abdykalykov, the secretary for agitation-propaganda and the co-editor of the book, participated in this meeting. Shaiakhmetov took a mild stance, most likely not wanting the Bureau to issue a sharply critical resolution because of his involvement in the writing of the history. Borkov, the new Russian first secretary of the KP(b)K, and Shaiakhmetov discussed the interpretation of Edyge on the day before the meeting without reaching an agreement. In Shaiakhmetov’s view, Edyge was already a very popular hero among Kazakhs long before Soviet popularization

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841 The resolution of the TsK VKP(b) ‘O Sostoianii i Merakh Uluchsheniiia Massovo-Politicheskoi i Ideologicheskoi Raboty v Tatarskoi Partiinoi Organizatsii’, on August 9, 1944, accused the leaders, historians, and writers of Tataristan of exaggerating attention to the national factor. A play of Tatar writer Naki Isanbet on Edige was declared nationalist and idealizing of the khans-feudal epoch. The Obkom VKP(b) in Tataristan issued a resolution on October 6, 1944 ‘Ob Oshibkakh i Nedostatkakh v Rabote Tatarskogo Nauchno-Issledovatel’skogo Instituta Iazyka, Literatury i Istori’i. Following these resolutions, the Russo-centric view became established as a central point of Tatar national history. Edige was excluded from the list of national heroes in this period.

842 KRPM, 708-9-75-126, August 14, 1945.

843 In 1945, few days before the end of the War in Europe, Skvortsov, the first secretary of the KP(b)K since 1937, was removed from his post and G. A. Borkov was assigned as the first secretary. KRPM, 708-9-23-10, May 3, 1945. Before his assignment in Kazakhstan, Gennadii Andreevich Borkov was first secretary of Khabarovsk Kraikom.
Edyge was so much embedded into Kazakh culture as a hero, that depicting him in the new edition as an exploiter and enemy of the Kazakh nation would not make any sense to the reader. Perhaps, he added, the popularity of other historical Kazakh figures such as Abai was a product of the strong backing of the Party, but Edyge was intrinsically a folk hero. Klimov argued that there were two Edyges. One was the Emir of the Golden Horde, who ransacked towns and represented the exploiting classes of his society. The other was the Edyge of popular heroic folktales among Kazakhs. The mistake of the first edition’s authors was describing Edyge according to these folktales. In the opinion of the first secretary Borkov, it could very well be true that the popular narrative of Edyge conveyed a positive figure. However, these were merely epic figures. The real and only Edyge was the Edyge of the Golden Horde. There were “bogatyrs in the Russian epic tales, such as Il’ia Muromets, Dobrynia Nikitich, Alesha Popovich. However, these are epic figures, fusions of multiple characters [...] there are no historical generalizations; conclusions are made based on these stories”. The resolution issued following these discussions was a sharp denunciation of the published history book. It asked that national motives be deemphasized, while class conflict within Kazakh society (between the Kazakh sultans and biis, and the poor), the common struggle of the Russian and Kazakh nations against the Russian imperial regime, and the progressive impact of nineteenth century Russian expansion in the Kazakh steppe be emphasized. The resolution also decried the fact that “one of the emirs of the Golden Horde, Edyge—the choker and exploiter of the Kazakh nation—has been presented by the authors as a national hero and protector of labourers”. The message

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844 KRPM, 708-9-75-113/4, August 14, 1945.
845 KRPM, 708-9-75-113/4, August 14, 1945.
847 KRPM, 708-9-75-119, August 14, 1945.
848 KRPM, 708-9-27-394/7, August 14, 1945.
was simple: the nationalization of the past could not include Edyge Edyge because it could harm the historical friendship between Slavic and Turkic nations. Instead, history had to highlight class struggles in Kazakh society. An article ‘Edyge – choker of toiling masses’ was published in the Kazakh daily.\footnote{Iu. Feliks and N. Kopylov, ‘Edyge – dushitel’ narodnykh mass’, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (9 September 1945), p.2.} In the following month, Kazakh historian Bekmakhanov\footnote{Ermukhan Bekmakhanov (1915-1966) was a member of the VKP(b) who had graduated from the Voronezh Pedagogical Institute in 1938. He participated in the writing of first and second editions of the History of the KazSSR. He worked at the Narkompros KazSSR, Institute of History of KazFAN, and the Academy of Sciences of KazSSR and the KazGU. He was the first Kazakh to receive a PhD in history, in 1946; KRPM, 708-9-137-137-13, 11 November 1949. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kazakhstan in the 1820-40s, during which time the Kenesary Uprising took place.} also wrote a parallel article.\footnote{E. Bekmakhanov, ‘Kazakhstan vo vremena tataro-mongol’skogo iga’, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (10 October 1945).} It is interesting that Abdykalykov, as the co-editor responsible for the book, remained in his post as the secretary of agitation-propaganda, as if he had not participated in the project. The resolution of the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)K was distributed among the members of the KazFAN and Kazakh historians, in particular at a meeting that was organized—ironically—by the agitation-propaganda section and chaired by Abdykalykov.\footnote{KRPM, 708-9-137-137-137, 12 September 1945. Although Edige was removed from the official history, A. Margulan depicted Edige in his work as a hero. A. Margulan, ‘O kharaktere i istoricheskoi obuslovnostii kazakhskogo eposa’, Izvestiia AN KazSSR: seriia Istoriicheskaia, vyp.2 (1946), pp.75-81.} He maintained his position, most likely thanks to Shaikakhmetov’s support.

In addition to the class emphasis, Kazakh national history was instructed not to undermine the fraternity of the nations in the Soviet Union by historicizing their conflict. However, this was not limited to the Slavic-Turkic conflict, but extended to other Soviet nations.\footnote{For example, see: KRPM, 708-9-137-37-42, (1945).} In 1943, when the first edition was published, Kyrgyz authorities protested the section of the book describing Kenesary Kasymov’s attack on the Kyrgyz territories. According to historian Serafim Iushkov, who participated in the project, “Kyrgyz authorities protested because the occupation of
Kyrgyzstan is allegedly considered [in the book] as a positive phenomenon”. Thus, raising Kasymov to the status of national leader had the potential to historicize an antagonism between Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. Another example of this sensitivity is found in Bekmakhanov’s review from 1945. In his review of a draft textbook on Kazakh literature for the secondary schools, Bekmakhanov criticized the section covering Kazakh Koblandy Batyr’s military campaign to the city of Kazan. His preference was purely political and dependent on the contemporary situation. If Kazan was the capital of “our fraternal Tatarstan”, it should be removed, but if it was the town of Kazan in Iran, it must be emphasized. Bekmakhanov was also critical of the book’s treatment of folk poems about the struggle between Kazakhs and Kyrgyz: “This may only raise the dissatisfaction of the fraternal Kyrgyz nation”. According to this reading of a historical friendship, Kenesary’s attacks on Kyrgyz territories had to be interpreted “as a united struggle [of Kazakh and Kyrgyz labourers] against the Khan of Kokand, Kyrgyz manaps [i.e. feudals], and Tsarism”.

Following the resolution of the KP(b)K in August 1945, a new history of the Kazakh nation had to be written by 1947. The Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the KazSSR continued to reconstruct the national history. The resolution also provided a clear signal to the hardliner Kazakh historians in Almaty. These historians were against the incorporation of historical figures who were members of exploiting classes as Kazakh national heroes. The discussion between the moderate group, who had written the national history up until then, and the hardliner Kazakhs intensified over the interpretation of Edyge Khan and Kenesary Khan. The historians Akhinzhanova and Tursunbaev wrote an article, “How Professor Margulan Distorts History”, in

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856 In 1946, the KazFAN was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR. see: *KRPM*, 708-9-45-10, November 27, 1945. The members of the new Academy were assigned by the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)K on August 8, 1946; see: *KRPM*, 708-10-102-15.
the Kazakh daily *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*. Following this, Margulan was questioned at a meeting of historians of the Institute of History, and he ‘recognized’ his mistakes in front of other historians.857

The discussion between the two groups of Kazakh historians continued at the first meeting on the history of Kazakhstan at the Institute of History held on 15-20 May, 1947. Kh. Aidarova,858 the deputy director of the Institute, in her speech on “nationalistic distortions in the problems of Kazakh history”, complained that the nationalist tendencies that emerged in the first edition of the History of the KazSSR and were criticized by the resolution of the TsK KP(b)K in August 1945 were still quite prominent. She provided various examples from Kazakh historians who depicted a positive picture of Kazakh tribal leaders without their class identity. Her primary argument was the absence of class struggles, presentation of khans, tribal chieftains (Kaz. bii) as national leaders, and extreme primordialization of Kazakh identity in recent works. She attacked Bekmakhanov’s interpretation of the Kenesary Uprising. According to Aidarova, the uprising was not a progressive one because Kenesary’s attempt to form a centralized state came too late, while his military campaign against Kyrgyz lands was not progressive at all. She also criticized Margulan’s interpretation of Edyge and argued that Ablai Khan had been idealized. She suggested Isatai Taimanov as the hero that should be promoted, because of his lower class origin.859 Her speech triggered long discussions among the historians in the meeting. The

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857 *UATEIA*, 11-2- 4-1/6, March 7, 1947.
858 Kh.G. Aidarova was a member of the VKP(b) and a 1938 graduate of the Moscow Politprosvet Institute. She worked as a member of the Institute of History of the KazFAN and the Academy of Sciences of the KazSSR. *KRPM*, 708-13-187-104, November 11, 1949.
moderate group accused her of “crying down the entire history of Kazakhs”. While the hardliner Kazakh historians continued their critiques, Bekmakhanov’s dissertation on the Kenesary Uprising was published in 1947. In his work, Bekmakhanov described the uprising as a “progressive national-liberation struggle” and even a “revolution”. He also published an article on the centennial of Kenesary Kasymov’s death in Sotsialistik Kazakstan. Both sides continued to exchange blows and prepared for another round.

In the following months, hardliner Bolshevik Kazakh historians such as Shoinbaev, Aidarova, and Tursunbaev persisted in criticizing Bekmakhanov’s interpretation of the uprising. According to these critiques, published by Shoinbaev and Akhinzhanov in the Kazakh Soviet newspapers Leninshil lash and Sotsialistik Kazakstan: 1) Kenesary was a feudal lord, a representative of the feudal order, who could not and did not represent the Kazakh nation; moreover, he never thought that he represented the Kazakh people, and like all other khans, he had Mongol origins. 2) The uprising was not a mass movement; the tribes that participated were forced into the uprising. 3) Kenesary was idealized as a national hero and the class conflict in Kazakh society was overlooked. In Bekmakhanov’s work there was a “single stream” (Ru. edinii potok), or a union of feudal lords and labourers, by which Kazakhs are depicted as a classless society united under the leadership of Kenesary. By doing this, he made the same mistake recently made in Ukraine. 4)
Kenesary’s military campaign against the Kyrgyz was clearly a feudal expansionist war.\textsuperscript{864} Still, all these hardline critiques targeted the absence of class conflict and idealization of feudal leaders. The judgments were not based on the anti-Russian character of these events. The colonial aspect of the Russian Empire in the Kazakh steppes was emphasized by different articles and books. When Shakhmatov’s work on the uprising of Isatai Taimanov against the local Kazakh khan and his Russian supporters was published in 1946, he defined this uprising in the Small Horde as “a popular peasant uprising against Kazakh feudals [and] anti-colonial uprising against the Russian Tsarism and therefore revolutionary”.\textsuperscript{865} In the following year, Viatkin published his account on the uprising of Batyr Srym against the Kazakh feudals and Russian colonial expansionism.\textsuperscript{866}

At the end of 1947, Ilias Omarov became the new secretary of agitation-propaganda and he replaced Abdykalykov in the book project.\textsuperscript{867} Shaiakhmatov, who became the first secretary of the KP(b)K in 1946, requested that historians in Almaty and Moscow discuss the work of Bekmakhanov and the second edition of the History “in a calm and open way”.\textsuperscript{868} A joint meeting of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the KazSSR and the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was called. At the meeting, the Kazakh historians Akhinzhanov and Aidarova repeated their critique, supporting it with details. They accused Bekmakhanov of systemically pursuing a “bourgeois-nationalist” approach from the time he wrote the chapter on Kenesary in the first edition of the History of Kazakhstan in 1942-

\textsuperscript{864} KRPM, 708-12-1422-4/25, February 28, 1948.
\textsuperscript{866} M. P. Viatkin, Batyr Srym (Moscow and Leningrad, 1947).
\textsuperscript{867} KRPM, 708-11-164-35, December 23, 1947.
\textsuperscript{868} KRPM, 708-12-1422-143, (January 1948).
3. At the same time, Aidarova characterized the Russian expansion as a colonial occupation and the annexation of Kazakhstan as the “lesser evil” between colonial Russia and the feudal oppression of Kenesary. Aidarova preferred Russian colonialism because of its “higher civilization” that benefited Kazakhs. Referring to Stalin’s interpretation of Georgian history, she saw the uprising as “reactionary”, akin to the Georgian feudal lords who attempted to organize a resistance to Russian expansion because it jeopardized their class interests.869

The Russian historians of the Institute of History in Moscow, including A.P. Kuchin, N.M. Druzhinin, S.V. Bakhrushin, M.P. Viatkin, and Iakunin, responded by characterizing the uprising as a progressive national-liberation struggle and approving of the work of Bekmakhanov, with minor critiques. N. Druzhinin strongly countered Aidarova’s position. As the Russian historians underlined, the movement was a popular and progressive one; with his administrative reforms, Kenesary aimed to form a centralized and independent Kazakh Khanate, and he fought against the particular interests of regional Kazakh feudal biis. If Kenesary had to be defined as “reactionary”, then Russian historical figures like Dimitri Donskoi and Ivan Groznyi had to as well.870 Druzhinin also explained that Georgia was at a different level of socio-economic development than Kazakhstan; thus, it could not be a benchmark for the evaluation of the Kenesary Uprising. In terms of the “lesser evil” formula, Druzhinin and others pointed out that, as Bekmakhanov explained in his book, Kenesary preferred an alliance with Russia and never sought one with his southern enemies, the khanates of Kokand and Khiva. Initially, he even hoped to become a Russian protectorate. In terms of the argument of the higher culture of Russia, Druzhinin argued that, following the same logic, the Indian resistance to the British

colonial regime or Shamil also had to be called reactionary. Next, Bakhrushin highlighted that in all anti-colonial uprisings a socially and economically disadvantaged colony fights against a stronger colonial state, thus lower social and economic development could not be a reason for characterization of these anti-colonial uprisings as reactionary. He provided examples, such as Ethiopians fighting against Italians and the Bashkir uprising against Moscow, which were anti-colonial and that was why they were progressive. In a way, both sides were hardliner Marxists and also internationalists. Just as these Russian historians detested the Russian national narrative, the Kazakh hardliners also rejected any hint of a nationalist narrative. When the meeting concluded, Bekmakhanov and his moderate supporters left the room in victory, thanks to the support of Russian hardliner Marxists such as Druzhinin and Pankratova. More joint meetings of historians from Almaty and Moscow continued until the summer of 1948, covering nearly all the chapters of the second edition of the book.

However, Kazakh hardliners were determined to make their case. Another meeting on the work of Bekmakhanov was organized at the Institute of History of Academy of Sciences of the KazSSR on 14-19 July, 1948. All Kazakh historians at the Institute of History in Almaty and in other higher institutions of Almaty participated. Out of the twenty-one historians (excluding Bekmakhanov) who addressed the meeting, nearly half of them were against Bekmakhanov. Kazakh historian Shoinbaev criticized Bekmakhanov for seeing khans and sultans not as exploiters but as national heroes. Kenesary’s priority was not an anti-colonial war, but the re-establishment of his khanate. The anti-Russian uprising of Kenesary was a belated movement that would isolate

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872 KRPM, 708-12-1422-77, February 28, 1948.
873 KRPM, 708-12-1422-143/146, May 1, 1948.
Kazakhs from their most developed neighbours, i.e. Russians.\textsuperscript{875} The economist Tolybekov criticized Bekmakhanov’s economic analysis of nineteenth century Kazakh society. He hypothetically asked, “What kind of a Kazakhstan would there have been if one of the uprisings of feudals like Kenesary had succeeded? There is only one answer: nothing but stagnation and degradation of the means of production; the banditry of Kokand-Khiva-Bukhara khanates; complete illiteracy; intellectual sluggishness; and oppression of Kazakh cattlemen”.\textsuperscript{876} According to Tolybekov, Kenesary was against the lesser evil for the Kazakh nation (Russians), and not against the greater evil (the khanates of Central Asia).\textsuperscript{877} Aidarova, in addressing the meeting, defined the uprising as a ‘feudal-monarchist’ movement. According to her, Kenesary prevented Kazakhs from experiencing the modernizing impact of Russian economy and culture. Nevertheless, she continued, Chokan Valikhanov, the first Kazakh intellectual with Russian, i.e. European, training, appeared merely ten years after the Kenesary Uprising.\textsuperscript{878} Akhinzhanov, another radical Bolshevik Kazakh historian, also analyzed Bekmakhanov’s work and accused him of being a bourgeois-nationalist historian.\textsuperscript{879} In the midst of these discussions, the second edition of the History was published in February 1949.\textsuperscript{880} The most significant change was in the description of some national heroes. For example, Edyge was demoted from a national hero to a “typical feudal-oppressor and exploiter of the masses”.\textsuperscript{881} The Kenesary Uprising section, written by Bekmakhanov, did not change so

\textsuperscript{875} UATEIA, 11-2-5-11/25, July 14, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{876} UATEIA, 11-2-5-70, July 14, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{877} UATEIA, 11-2-5-81/82, July 14, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{878} UATEIA, 11-2-5-183, July 15, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{879} UATEIA, 11-2-5-272/287, July 16, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{881} KRPM, 708-13-187-17, (February 1949); For the 1943 version see: A. Pankratova and M. Abdykalykov (ed.), Istoriia, pp.28, 87, 89, 142, 264, 265, for the 1949 version see: A. Pankratova and I. Omarov (ed.), Istoriia, 106.
much. The uprising was described as “anti-colonial [in] character and played a progressive role in the history of the Kazakh nation”.\textsuperscript{882} Discussions between the Kazakh hardliners and moderates intensified after the publication of the second edition. The former also found support in the Russian historians who favoured a Russocentric history.

The papers of the first scientific meeting at the Institute of History in Almaty were published in 1948. Iakunin published a review of the papers in \textit{Voprosii Istorii} supporting the line of Aidarova.\textsuperscript{883} K. Sharipov, the editor of the \textit{Sotsialistik Kazakstan}, published a critique of Bekmakhanov’s book in \textit{Voprosyi Istorii} in 1949. He characterized the uprising as an anti-colonial, national-liberation movement, but he criticized Bekmakhanov for not underlining the class struggle within Kazakh society. Rumours started to circulate that it was in fact a historian who wrote the text, because Sharipov was not a historian. If the claim is true, some hardliner Kazakh historians must have helped him.\textsuperscript{884} In the autumn of 1949, Akhinzhanov’s new target was Shoinbaev’s recently published work on the uprising of Kazakhs in 1856-57, which was led by a \textit{batyr}.\textsuperscript{885} Akhinzhanov, in his critique published in a Kazakh daily, stated bluntly that any Kazakh resistance or uprising against Russian expansion, whether led by a khan or a \textit{batyr}, was a reactionary movement and against the stream of history.\textsuperscript{886}

Shaiaakhmatov summoned a session of historians at the TsK KP(b)K on 22 November, 1949. He figured that another meeting of historians would bring an end to these discussions. Nearly a

\textsuperscript{882} \textit{KRPM}, 708-13-187-19/20, (February 1949)
\textsuperscript{885} T. Shoinbaev, \textit{Vosstanie Syr-Dar’inskikh kazakhov pod rukovodstvom Batyra Dzhankhozhi Nurmukhamedova (1856-57.g.g.)} (Almaty, 1949).
\textsuperscript{886} M. Akhimzhanov, ‘Nel’zia iskazhat istoriiu’, \textit{Sotsialistik Kazakstan} (30 September 1949), p.3.
hundred historians were invited. At the beginning of the meeting Ilias Omarov delivered a long speech criticizing the development of the history discipline in the republic. According to Omarov, the agitation-propaganda secretary and the co-author of the second edition of the History, the Kenesary Uprising was a “popular, anti-colonial movement of Kazaks, whose vital interests were hurt by the attack of Tsarism and the Central Asian khanates”.\footnote{KRPM, 708-13-237-24, November 22, 1949.} In his view, Bekmakanov’s mistake was overestimating Kenesary as a progressive leader. He was also a feudal khan and did not aim to implement any progressive reforms that would move Kazakh society forward in history. Bekmakanov’s second mistake was not to see that Kenesary’s attack on the Kyrgyz was a feudal war and a reflection of his class identity.\footnote{KRPM, 708-13-237-25, November 22, 1949.} Following Omarov, Bekmakanov addressed the historians and acknowledged these mistakes.\footnote{KRPM, 708-13-237-44, November 22, 1949.}

Not everyone was satisfied with this meeting. A report of the agitation-propaganda section addressing Kruglov, the second secretary of the TsK KP(b)K, continued to criticize historians such as Margulan and Bekmakanov for their interpretations of Edyge and Kenesary, respectively.\footnote{KRPM, 708-14-30-87/91, January 3, 1950.} The language of the report was sharper than in the following party resolution. On 20 February, 1950, the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)K issued a resolution “on the state and tasks of historical science in Kazakhstan”. The resolution criticized historical research in the republic. There was a series of issues, the first one being the insufficient work that was done on the Soviet period of the republic and the history of the KP(b)K. The resolution also underlined the fact that Bekmakanov “had made serious methodological mistakes”, and that among various subjects “the historical roots of the friendship of Kazakh and Russian nations” had to be shown there was
no emphasis on a particular historical figure or event.\(^{891}\) The debate over Kenesary seemed to come to an end.

However, on 26 December, 1950, an article on Berkmakhanov’s book by Shoinbaev, Aidarova, and Iakunin, ‘*Za Marksistsko-Leninskoe Osveshchenie Voprosov Istorii Kazakhstana*’, was published in *Pravda*. The authors had a harliner Marxist tone. They turned to Stalin’s interpretation of Georgian feudal lords who organized abortive uprisings against Russian rule because their privileges had been lost. According to this reading, the Kenesary Uprising was not a national-liberation movement, but a reactionary feudal-monarchist movement. The article underlined that in general, anti-colonial movements, including those against Russian colonialism, had a progressive character. Yet, the Kenesary movement could not be included in this group because Kazakh masses had not supported it and—according to the authors—they had wanted closer relations with Russia. Moreover, Kenesary’s reforms could not be considered ‘reforms’. His feudal class identity was much too dominating in the movement. Following a discussion of Kenesary’s attack on the Kyrgyz, the authors provided new arguments. These arguments were a clear sign that the Russocentric approach, after establishing itself in Azerbaijan in July 1950, had now reached the shores of Kazakhstan’s national history. First, the authors argued, British imperialism was a rival of Tsarist Russia in the region. Though the British colonial forces were not in Kazakhstan, their agents—the Central Asian khanates—allegedly had the support of the British. Moreover, these khanates supported Kenesary against Russian expansion, as their British masters demanded. This argument was rejected by Pankratova in 1944, at a meeting of historians and party ideologues at the TsK VKP(b). Applying Stalin’s

interpretation of the Georgian case to Kazakhstan was also something that was refuted by Druzhinin in 1948. However, all these points found their place in the article published in December 1950. Finally, the annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia was not only ‘a lesser evil’, but even a progressive development. Though the authors underlined that “Marxist-Leninist historical science has to reveal the essence of the repression of the labouring masses by Russian Tsarism”, the text explained the annexation as a progressive event because of the Russian economic and cultural impact in the Kazakh steppes. Thus, the opinions of historians expressed in 1944 and 1948 on the higher and lower civilizations also became obsolete.  

Following the publication of this article, the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)K organized a committee to respond to it. After intensive work for a month, the committee of historians and ideologues prepared a report on the Kenesary movement by using archive materials. At last, the orthodox Kazakh historians had the chance to express their view on Kenesary, with the backing of an article in *Pravda*. The Bureau then called Bekmakhanov. However, instead of participating in the Party meetings in Almaty, Bekmakhanov went to Moscow to meet with Russian historian friends and ideologues of the VKP(b). Apparently, he could no longer find the support that he had before. When he returned to Almaty and the members of the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)K contacted him, there was nothing he could do but write his ‘confession’.  

On 31 March, 1951, the members of the Bureau of the KP(b)K met to discuss the conclusions of the committee. Shaiakhmetov, Kruglov, Omarov, Sharipov, and Bekmakhanov were all present. Omarov backed down by defining the movement as a reactionary-feudal-monarchist movement and “confessed his mistake”. He was both the co-editor of the History of the Kazakh SSR, in

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which Kenesary was depicted according to Bekmakanov, and the secretary of agitation-propaganda. As he mentioned, he had a “double responsibility” in this issue. Sharipov, who wrote articles in Bolshevik and Voprosii Istorii, also addressed the Bureau. Though in his 1948 article he criticized Bekmakanov, he at that time named the Kenesary movement a ‘progressive and national-liberation movement’. He argued that when he wrote the article and when the discussions were taking place in 1948, the uprising was considered progressive. Sharipov explained that even Morozov supported this view, asking questions to be sure of Sharapov’s conviction. “What I want to say with this is that at that time, three years ago in 1948, the progressiveness of the [Kenesary] movement was not questioned […] but now the meaning of the movement is defined in another way, in particular, according to the new consideration of the Shamil movement. This [new interpretation of Shamil] forced our public to reconsider the meaning of the Kenesary movement”. Undasynov, the chair of the Sovnarkom KazSSR, underlined that it was not so important what happened in history: “Whatever the history was, even a particular event could have played an important role at the time, but in the contemporary period it could be harmful”. In other words, the important thing was the time of evaluation of this event in the past, and Kenesary did not pass the test. Bekmakanov also addressed the Bureau. He mentioned the recent case of Guseinov in Baku and confirmed his mistake. However, his ‘self-criticism’ was not sharp enough for the other members of the Bureau to accept it as a sincere confession. Other members of the Bureau and invitees increased the tone of hostility towards Bekmakanov. At some point, the latter said, “I confess again that I explained the movement of Kenesary Kasymov according to a bourgeois-nationalist concept, but it is not right to say that I became a nationalist. […] I am ready to accept any punishment with

my guilty head. However, I have never been a nationalist, never will be, and nobody will be successful in pushing me down this road”. After the discussion, the Bureau issued a decree on the issue, which defined Bekmakanov’s work as a book “written from a bourgoise-nationalist position”. The book was removed from all libraries. Bekmakanov was dismissed from the Party and stripped of his doctoral degree, as the book under discussion was also his doctoral dissertation. He was exiled and jailed in 1952. He was freed and returned to Almaty after Khrushchev’s thaw, when Pankratova raised the issue with Khrushchev.

4.3. MODERATES VERSUS UKRAINIAN HARDLINERS.

After the war, a Soviet Ukrainian history constructed around national figures and national-liberation struggles was still needed. Ukraine, with its eastern and western parts including Trans-Carpathian Rus’ and Northern Bukovyna, was for the first time united. This union under the Soviet flag could be historicized by emphasizing that these territories had historically been part of Ukraine. Furthermore, all these territories (as with Western Belorus and the Baltic states) became part of the Soviet Union. Membership in this union also had to be historicized. In the Ukrainian case, the easiest way of doing this was emphasizing past Ukrainian-Russian-Belorussian fraternity. Thus, a history covering national figures and national-liberation wars was needed for propaganda, which aimed to incorporate the new territories and populations.

To complicate matters, the non-Soviet interpretation of Ukrainian national history was very popular in the western regions, where an alternative reading of a long list of historical figures and events—such as Khmel’nyts’kyi, Pereiaslavskaya Rada, Poltava, and Mazepa—prevailed. An internal report written in 1946 provides insight into how western Ukrainians understood their

history. A guide at the L’viv History Museum leading some Red Army soldiers and students (most probably from western Ukraine) through the exhibition hall on Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi turned to the visitors and said, “‘This was our history. Now, your history starts’, and began explaining the events in 1648”. This was an ideological challenge for the KP(b)U, and cultivating the Soviet Ukrainian national narrative was the only available response. The propaganda against nationalist resistance in western Ukraine also demanded a history with national colours.

The agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)U was well aware of all these issues. A meeting of agitation-propaganda officials that included the Soviet writer Bazhan and the leading Ukrainian historian Petrovs’kyi was called to discuss a TsK KP(b)U draft resolution on the nationalist resistance in western Ukraine. K.Z. Lytvyn, the agitation-propaganda secretary of the KP(b)U, described the content of the resolution, which emphasized the unification of all Ukrainian territories under the leadership of the Bolsheviks:

“In order to present the historical greatness of this act of unification, a correct historical explanation should be given [in the resolution], which would be based on more ancient monuments such as ‘the Kievan Rus’’, not only to mark Prince Vladimir, but also Danylo Halyts’kyi and others; the [historical] connection between L’viv and Kiev and the struggle of L’viv and Kiev against the Polish gentry should also be pointed out”.

The participants of the meeting agreed that historical themes that underlined the connection between the Ukrainian and Russian nations, such as the Battle of Poltava and Pereiaslavska Rada, also had to be used in the resolution as well as in agitation-propaganda activities in western Ukraine. The Soviet Ukrainian interpretations of Mazepa and the Battle of Poltava were

897 TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-459-16/17, (1946)
898 For the examples of Soviet propaganda with a blend of class struggle and the national-liberation struggle of western Ukraine against the Poles and Hungarians, the fraternity of the Russian and Ukrainian nations, and the popularity of the non-Soviet history of Ukraine in the region, see: TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-339-1/15, November 13, 1945; TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-399-1/38, October 25, 1945; TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-326-34, December 12, 1945; TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-2767-49/51, (first half of 1946).
899 TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-340-2 , October 20, 1945.
especially important because these were the two favourite historical subjects of Ukrainian nationalists.\(^{900}\)

During the war, historians had put strong emphasis on national heroes and national-liberation struggles. As in the Kazakh case, not all Ukrainian historians agreed with this approach. The dispute among leading historians at the meeting of historians, writers, and party ideologues at the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)U in 1945 demonstrated this division. Lytvyn invited historians to discuss various unresolved issues in Ukrainian history writing. At the meeting, he implied that historians had hitherto given conflicting answers to important questions about the Ukrainian past. The meeting aimed to discuss exactly these issues.\(^{901}\)

Petrovs’kyi was the first to point to inconsistencies, such as the description of Khmel’nyts’kyi. On this point, he criticized Korniichuk’s play and his other work, which depicted Khmel’nyts’kyi as a national hero since 1938. Petrovs’kyi argued that when this work was published, even the Soviet periodical Istorik-Marksist noted, “the work was eclectic and [in fact] Khmel’nyts’kyi was a traitor”.\(^{902}\) Petrovs’kyi described how the historians were receiving two contradictory sets of instructions:

“[When historians say] The Ukrainian nation wanted to re-unite with the Russian nation, and about the union with the Russian nation — [the reply is] this was very bad, [this interpretation] prevented struggle against social strife. Or again, they said this is praising the Ukrainian national hero [Khmel’nyts’kyi]. They said that, this is nationalism. [...] Many historians among us say, “Why would I put my head on the chopping block? It is better to shut up and await what will happen.”\(^{903}\)

Petrovs’kyi, a moderate, argued that there were many historians thinking that the emphasis on Khmel’nyts’kyi and national-liberation struggles was a Marxist revisionist trend that would soon

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\(^{900}\) TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-340-1/15, October 20, 1945.
\(^{901}\) TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-1652-1,8, March 10, 1945.
\(^{902}\) Petrovs’kyi referred to the following article: A. Baraboi, ‘Kritika’.
\(^{903}\) TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-23-1652-18/19, March 10, 1945.
be reversed. He clearly targeted hardliner Ukrainian historians, who had labelled him a nationalist. According to Petrovs’kyi, nearly all the major stages of Ukrainian national history were under dispute. The first question was:

“When [for which time period] can we begin to talk about the history of Ukraine? ...”
To go further, what happened after the collapse of the Kievan Rus’ in 1169? The Ukrainian centre moves to Galicia-Volhynia Principality. They put the question very frequently as the following: the Kievan Rus’ collapsed, the Galicia-Volhynia Principality starts. The Principality of Galicia pursued the task of re-uniting Ukrainian lands. Yes, but there was not a Ukraine at that time and [consequently] it [the Principality of Galicia] could not try to do this."

The next question was how to define the Lithuanian-Rus’ until the Union of Lublin in 1569, when it came under Polish rule. Was Ukraine under Lithuanian rule? Or was it a Lithuanian-Rus’ state? Furthermore, the historical relations between Russia and Ukraine had to be defined. The first problem here was defining when the Ukrainian nation emerged. Petrovs’kyi noted, “A commission was summoned to answer this question and it resorted to voting (laughter).”

Finally, the description of national-liberation movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries posed another problem. According to some authors, Petrovs’kyi contended, “When someone made something good for Ukrainian culture or fought against Tsarism, it meant that he was a progressive figure in history. [However] By this criteria, Mazepa could also be defined a progressive figure.”

The hardliner Ukrainian historians Los’ and Rubach were next to take the floor. Los’ complained, “The periodization of Ukrainian history has been done according to external signals—Ukrainian lands under Mongol rule, Ukraine under the rule of Lithuania, Ukraine under Polish rule. The
He argued that while Petrovs’kyi’s work on Khmel’nyts’kyi included some class aspects, it was done in a ‘mechanical’ way with a good deal of simplification. Rubach, who studied the Soviet period of Ukraine, also spoke for an increased emphasis on class conflict. “We highlight the national hero Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi or Mazepa or this or that battle—Ukrainian history does not emerge from this. The essence is not here. History is not the history of generals or leaders, even if they were great”.  

Criticizing Petrovs’kyi, Rubach argued that the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising was not only a national-liberation struggle against the Polish gentry, but also a struggle of the peasant masses against their class enemies. Petrovs’kyi showed this aspect of the movement, but he idealized Khmel’nyts’kyi by overlooking the discrepancies in his decisions. Rubach also criticized the theory of the re-union of Russia and Ukraine:

“Is it indeed true that the labouring classes of Ukraine or the entire Ukrainian nation at some point in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries or in the eighteenth century only thought about the re-union [with the Russian nation] and they did not have any other fundamental problems in their social and political development [?] … I think there were [other problems]. I think the struggle against feudalism and against serfdom until its eradication was a serious and decisive problem”.

In the next meeting, Rubach continued to criticize. According to him, the discussion was about nation and class. One had not eliminated the other. There was no need to place them against each other. However, there was a need to differentiate them. A Marxist had to show which factor was the primary one, and which subordinate. A Marxist had to find class motives in the most national movement. He implied that Petrovs’kyi was moving into the territory of a bourgeois historian. Rubach then argued that the war did not weaken Marxism, as it seemed to some historians. Despite the war, the national factor remained subordinate to class struggle in

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the writing of history.\textsuperscript{911} He accounted for the uprisings of the seventeenth century and the annexation of Ukraine by Russia in terms of social and economic factors. The rapprochement of Ukrainians and Russians could not be explained by related languages, similar lifestyles, or common roots in the Kievan Rus’. European history was full of examples when two factions of one nation killed each other. Social and economic reasons were the motivation. Finally, Rubach advocated the ‘lesser evil’ formula for the annexation of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{912} Another Ukrainian historian, Suprunenko, argued that Petrovs’kyi had made a mistake by defining Pereiaslav in 1654 as a union of two nations; this would be against the Marxist line and would diminish the role of the October Revolution. He also questioned whether Khmel’nyts’kyi wanted a union with Russia from the beginning, or whether the conditions brought him to this point later. Iastrebov, another moderate author of Ukrainian history in Kiev, repeated that there were two interpretations of history, one focusing on class conflict and the other developing around the nation and the founding of a state. In recent years, Iastrebov continued, the latter approach had come to the fore. The war period in particular had made this approach even stronger. Iastrebov argued that there could not be a general rule on the correctness of one approach over the other. Every case, whether it was Peter I or Khmel’nyts’kyi, had to be examined independently. He also defended Petrovs’kyi’s work on Khmel’nyts’kyi and responded to Rubach’s critiques. “There is a return to the view of Pokrovskii. For example, it is nihilistic [?] to say that the individual is not important and the economy has to be emphasized more”.\textsuperscript{913} Another participating moderate historian, K. Huslysty, was also supportive of the current emphasis on

\textsuperscript{911} \textit{TSDAHO Ukraïny}, 1-23-1652-67, March 17, 1945.
\textsuperscript{912} \textit{TSDAHO Ukraïny}, 1-23-1652-69/74, March 17, 1945.
\textsuperscript{913} \textit{TSDAHO Ukraïny}, 1-23-1652-118, March 17, 1945.
national heroes in Ukrainian history. Petrovs’kyi then addressed the audience for the second time, responding to Los’ and Rubach’s arguments. First he provided examples from his work, showing that it presented both class struggle and national-liberation struggle. He assured the audience, “There are moments in history when there is a threat to all classes and they unite and fight together. However, this does not mean that the class antagonism between them disappears”. He also asked Rubach and Los’ to name a Soviet historical publication on Aleksandr Nevskii, Donskoi, Minin, or Pozharskii that would satisfy their demands for an emphasis on class struggle. He asserted that the Pereiaslavka Rada was a union between two nations. Moreover, he pointed to the Soviet call for the establishment of the Khmel’nyts’kyi military order published in Pravda, adding that this was a necessity of nationalist policy, decided upon by the Soviet government. In Petrovs’kyi’s view, the question of whether Khmel’nyts’kyi sought a union with Russia or was brought to this position by circumstances was a “political issue”. If Khmel’nyts’kyi’s attempt to establish an independent Ukrainian state were denied, this could play into the hands of the fascists, who claimed that Ukrainians could not establish an independent state on their own. According to Petrovs’kyi, both German fascists and Ukrainian nationalists were claiming that Khmel’nyts’kyi first attempted to establish a separate state, but following his failure to do so, he had no choice but to seek Russian annexation. Petrovs’kyi also quoted Lypynskyi to show the Ukrainian émigré nationalists’ position. As he saw it, even if Khmel’nyts’kyi had sought annexation at the later stage, following a famine, it was a political issue as well as historical. He therefore concluded that Khmel’nyts’yi and Ukraine both wanted this union, and this was the most important point. Thus, the meeting in March 1945 ended

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914 *TSDAHO Ukrainy*, 1-70-385-147, March 17, 1945.
after an open clash between moderate and hardliner Ukrainian historians in Kiev, in front of the agitation-propaganda secretary of the KP(b)U.

On 8 July, 1946, another meeting of historians and ideologues was organized at the agitation-propaganda section of the KP(b)U. Lytvyn and Manuïl’s’kyi chaired the meeting. The meeting had been called by Lytvyn, following some discussions at the scientific council (Rus. uchenyi sovet) of the Institute of History in Kiev. Apparently, the last council meeting had turned into a heated debate between Rubach and Huslystyi, dividing the Institute members into two groups. It became impossible to work further, and now they were at the agitation-propaganda section to resolve this dispute. Rubach spoke first, criticizing Petrovs’kyi for not having “the correct position on various issue in Ukrainian history”. Then he brought out the recent review of the History of the Kazakh SSR in Bolshevik:

“This review, in my opinion, is to a large extent relevant to our history [writing]. In the review it is said that the class struggle of Kazakhs is replaced by national struggle. It would be odd to refuse the national-liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation, however, the class struggle must also be found, [and] the class struggle should not be replaced by national struggle. This is the main reproach, this is the main defect in our work [at the Institute].”

Rubach continued his accusations on various issues. When he criticized Petrovs’kyi’s management style at the Institute, Lytvyn intervened and responded with suspicion. Petrovs’kyi then defended his position, and the discussion at the 1945 meeting on the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising was repeated. Petrovs’kyi claimed that Rubach had been accusing him of being a bourgeois historian since 1944, when the latter was not nominated at the elections of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR for the position of member-correspondent. Subsequently, others also took the floor and shared their opinions. However, most of time the

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917 TSDAHO Ukrayiny, 1-23-2849-6, July 8, 1946.
participants merely squabbled. After three and a half hours of discussion, Lytvyn and
Manuïl’s’kyi were fed up with the discussions and scolded the historians for their petty quarrels.

They stood firmly behind Petrvoskii. Manuïl’s’kyi said:

“We know comrade Petrvos’kyi and his biography and his mistakes; however, I have to
say that he accomplished a great deal of work [...] in answering nationalists and
establishing the point of view of the Party. Nationalists hate him because, first of all, he
is a Ukrainian, and second, he is the author of the book that is an official document for
us. [...] This is a big ideological war”. 918

According to Manuïl’s’kyi, Petrvos’kyi was at fault for being too soft on his subordinates at the
Institute. He assured him that:

“You [Petrvos’kyi] have the armour of the authority of the Party; you, as the director of
the Institute, have to show your strong will [in addressing other historians]. I have
observed com[rade] Petrvos’kyi in San Francisco and in London. I am pleased to say
that I am deeply impressed by his political work, by [this] Soviet patriot, though he is
not a Party member. My good impression [of Petrvos’kyi] is shared by the TsK and by
Nikita Sergeevich [Khrushchev]”. 919

Petrovs’kyi and other moderates left the room at the TsK KP(b)U in victory. In July 1946, an
article was published in Kultura i Zhizn’ on the Ukrainian national history. The author Kovalev
had already participated in the series of discussions of Russian historians in 1944 in Moscow.
According to this paper of the agitation-propaganda section of the VKP(b), the History of
Ukraine published in 1943 did not sufficiently emphasize a class reading of the events, nor the
socio-economic factors in the past. Rather, the commentary continued, the text idealized
national features. 920 Taking this signal from Moscow, Khrushchev, at the thirteenth plenary
session of the TsK KP(b)U on August 15, 1946, argued that the published history contained
some nationalistic departures. 921 Following this, in his speech at the writers’ conference on 27-
28 August, 1946, Lytvyn gave a long lecture about Hrushevs’kyi and then argued that a Marxist

918 TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-23-2849-54, July 8, 1946.
919 TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-23-2849-58. 63,64, July 8, 1946. Manuil’s’kyi mentions here their visit to London and San
Francisco, when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. L. O. Suiarko, Dintro, pp. 73-96.
921 Yekelchyk, p.64.
history of Ukraine had not yet been written. He continued by describing how the 1943 history of Ukraine placed the national struggle above the class struggle and social problems. Previously, the emphasis on national heroes and national liberation struggles as well as the primordialization of the nation had been the correct approach, but now a new narrative, reflecting class struggle in Ukrainian history, had to be constructed. In February 1947, when Khrushchev moved to Moscow and Lazar Kaganovich became the first secretary of the KP(b)U for a year, the issue was still open. One of Kaganovich’s first acts in Kiev was ‘revealing’ the real face of historian Krypia’kevych, who had recently been brought from L’viv to Kiev. In a resolution of the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)U in April 1947, Krypia’kevych was denounced as a former student of Hrushevskyi and author of the History of Ukraine in L’viv, when Ukraine was under the German occupation.

The TsK KP(b)U organized a conference of historians in order to further discuss ‘bourgeois-nationalist mistakes’ among historians. On 29 April 1947 the conference of historians was assembled. Los’, having already established his orthodox Marxist approach, was the first to speak. As at the previous meeting two years before, he accused some historians of “not overcoming bourgeois-nationalist schemes”. Instead of “socio-economic formations”, i.e., “means of production and production relations”, these historians constructed their narrative according to “external factors”.

After Los’, Petrovs’kyi took the floor. First he acknowledged that he had been responsible for the most disputed chapters (uprisings in the seventeenth century) either as an author or, after he

923 TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-6-1036-17.
924 TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-8-316-27, April 27, 1947.
925 TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-753-4, April 29, 1947.
became the director of the institute, as editor. Instead of defending his line, Petrovs’kyi ‘confessed’ to his mistakes in this work, saying, “the national started to dominate the social”. He did not obey the dictum that the national question followed the class struggle. Petrovs’kyi also ‘confessed’ that the bourgeois-nationalist view of Hrushevs’kyi tended to influence him. The Ukrainian nation not only fought against the Polish feudal class, Petrovs’kyi continued, it also continued a struggle against Ukrainian feudal lords. He ‘acknowledged’ that this point had to be shown better in the published histories of Ukraine.\(^{926}\) Finally, he addressed the issue of Russian annexation and the decision of Khmel’nyts’kyi at Pereiaslav. To be on the safe side, he quoted the all-Union history written by Shestakov and Pankratova, which says that Ukraine did not have a choice because the country was in ruins after consecutive wars and there were not enough resources to protect an independent state against aggressive neighbours. The question was, according to Petrovs’kyi, what the Ukrainian nation was fighting for. If the primary factor in history was class struggle, Ukrainians fought for their class interests, against their exploiters. In this case, where could the national liberation be placed?\(^{927}\) There were also historians in the meeting who tried to avoid being part of this discussion by repeating the basic principles of Marxism, emphasizing socio-economic factors or the fraternity of the Russian and Ukrainian nations, or by playing the fool.\(^{928}\) In his speech, Rubach first complained that nearly all the same faces discussed the same issues two years ago at the agitation-propaganda meeting, which amounted to nothing. The only bit of progress had been Kovalev’s 1946 article.\(^{929}\) Rubach once again articulated an orthodox Marxist critique and at some point mentioned that Petrovs’kyi had

\(^{926}\) TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-753-16/7, April 29, 1947.
\(^{927}\) TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-753-23/4, April 29, 1947.
\(^{928}\) TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-753-30/38 (Brickevich), 38/51 (Lavrov), 52/63 (Vvedenskii), 72/104 (Boiko), April 29, 1947.
\(^{929}\) TSDAHO Ukraïny, 1-70-753-169, April 29, 1947.
been a very close student of Hrushevskyi. Manuil’s’kyi and Korniichuk intervened and defended Petrovs’kyi. Over the following hours and the next day, Rubach continued with the orthodox arguments that he had presented two years before.

At some point, Kaganovich intervened to say that he saw “invisible links” between current historians and Hrushevskyi. It was not comprehensible to him that Ukrainian Soviet historians with a good knowledge of Marxism could write things that could be defined later as being far from class analysis. It is not clear whether he was being sincere in his critique, or whether he was seeking to create a conspiracy and a purge of Ukrainian historians. The main point is that since 1936, heroes and events had been gradually defined as ‘national’ than in terms of class, and this narrative contradicted the class struggle narrative. The contradiction became most visible when the discussion turned to the annexation of Ukraine and the Khmelnytskyi Uprising. At the same meeting another Ukrainian historian, Boiko, asked how, if this was a national-liberation war against Polish rule and for an independent Ukraine, the annexation by Russia could be explained. Was the struggle merely meant to exchange the Polish exploiting classes with Russian ones? This could also, Boiko pointed out, support the German theories that Ukraine did not have the capacity to have its own state. If this struggle was a class struggle of the higher stratum of Cossacks who wanted more from the Polish crown, then where was the national-liberation aspect? As Boiko argued, the solution could only be found by going back to ‘class analysis’. There were two classes and each had its aims. One was made up of well-off Cossacks who sought a compromise with Poles or anyone else, and did not seek an independent

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930 TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-753-174/5, April 29, 1947.
931 TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-753-174/5, April 29, 1947.
932 TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-753-159/213, April 29, 1947.
934 TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-753-84, April 29, 1947.
Ukraine (Khmel’nyts’kyi, then, could not be called a national hero). The Ukrainian labouring masses, however, were sincere in their demand for independence, and in the end, in order to get rid of their Polish and Ukrainian lords, these ‘Ukrainian labourers’ ‘joined forces’ with the Russian ‘labourers’. What we know as the Pereiaslav Agreement was a consequence of this decision.  

Iastrebov also argued that the class conflict interpretation and the nationalist interpretation contradicted each other. Both Iastrebov and Huslystyi emphasized that the conditions of the war forced historians to lay greater emphasis on the role of the individual in history and to explain popular movements from a national perspective. When Huslystyi suggested that in the future, instead of depicting Khmel’nyts’kyi as a national hero, his class identity should be highlighted, Lytvyn responded that it would be absurd to discuss Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, as there was already a military order in his name issued by the Soviet government and Soviet soldiers were proudly carrying it on their chests. In fact, Huslystyi was more than happy to hear this contradiction from Lytvyn:

“This is exactly what happened. When we read the [new] work of Mykola Neonovich [Petros’kyi, following a class-based reading], we started to ask, then why was the [military] order of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi established? (Laughter) We started to ask the same questions when we started to discuss this issue here.”

Huslystyi continued by stating that in the histories that they had written, Ukrainians were shown as the only people in the country. Russians and Jews, for instance, were not mentioned; all Poles were shown only as the enemies of Ukrainians. Finally, Huslystyi complained about the re-emergence of Russian nationalist tendencies in Derzhavin’s book. In his book, Derzhavin used

935 TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-753-113/5, April 29, 1947.
936 TSDAHO Ukrainy, 1-70-753-114/5 (Iastrebov)254 (Guslistyi), April 29 and 30, 1947.
the imperial Russian term “Velikorusskii” to describe a mixture of the Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian nations. Picheta, another Russian historian, was also criticized for the same approach. At this point in the meeting, some, including M. Bazhan, started to shout for Manuil’s’kyi’s opinion; the latter said he found these ideas to be wrong. Apparently, the Russocentric turn in Moscow was being closely observed in Kiev. Ukrainian historians and writers did not hesitate to protest this trend in front of Kaganovich. The meeting came to an end without any concluding speech or declaration, and the division between moderates and hardliners remained.

Over time it became more difficult to make sharp shifts because national figures and events became immensely popularized with Party support dating back to 1938-9. The creation of the Khmel’nyts’kyi military order and the change in town name from Pereiaslav to Pereiaslav-Khmel’nyts’kyi were part of this popularization of the Soviet national narrative. Apparently, Kaganovich wanted to use national history writing as a pretext for a general assault against the Ukrainian intelligentsia by accusing them of ‘bourgeois-national deviation’ on a republican scale. Apparently, Stalin was also aware of this move. Though a general assault was not accomplished, in August 1947, the Bureau of the TsK KP(b)U passed a resolution denouncing the wartime works of the Institute of History as having “gross political mistakes and bourgeois-nationalist distortions”. The resolution demanded a Ukrainian history closely tied to the Russian past, and it also asked for more class analysis, particularly in terms of the Khmel’nyts’kyi...
Uprising (i.e., more emphasis on the peasant masses). According to the resolution, Khmel’nyts’kyi was also a member of the feudal class, though he fought against the Polish-oriented Ukrainian feudal class and sought a union with Russia. In brief, the ‘class analysis’ was partially used in order to emphasize the fraternity of Russians and Ukrainians in the seventeenth century. As the previous histories became ‘wrong’, the resolution urgently demanded a draft of a new Ukrainian history. Finally, Petrovs’kyi’s works were determined to be contaminated with nationalist trends. The resolution contained obvious inconsistencies in terms of class analysis, such as the description of the Principality of Moscow as a ‘progressive’ place and Khmel’nyts’kyi as a peasant leader.

Following the resolution, another conference of Kiev historians took place at the TsK KP(b)U on 16-19 September, 1947. This time Kaganovich was absent, but all the heads of the agitation-propaganda department of the KP(b)U came. Basically, this conference was not so different from the previous two meetings in 1945 and 1947. The resolution had given orthodox Marxist historians an ideal opportunity to raise their critiques once again. Petrovs’kyi reiterated that while he had made some mistakes in his books, he refused to be accused of being a ‘nationalist’. While some historians complained about the practical difficulties of writing a national history that would encompass both national elements and class conflict, Huslystyi reminded everyone that the heads of agitation-propaganda section had supported the History of Ukraine until recently.

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942 *TSDAHO Ukrainy* 1-6-1073-16/23, August 29, 1947.
Parallel to this conference of historians, the Party organization of the Institute of History met to declare that historians were correcting their mistakes. Moreover, meetings were organized by the Party in other institutions and cities with the aim of counteracting the ‘intoxicating’ effect of the history books and disseminating the Party line, as expressed in the resolution. In the meantime, Ukrainian historians prepared an outline of a new Ukrainian history, which emphasized class analysis and offered critiques of ‘bourgeois-national’ history. The project was hastily presented to Lytvyn, and the historians were not in agreement on all the changes. Kaganovich, dissatisfied with the results of the first resolution, issued another one, which criticized the superficial approach of the institutes, and asked for more denunciatory sessions, which would uncover more political mistakes. The most important impact of this resolution was that Petrovs’kyi was removed from his post as director of the Institute of History in Kiev.

This was also Kaganovich’s last resolution on Ukrainian history because he was called back to Moscow in December 1947. Although this dissertation does not cover the measures taken against Ukrainian writers in 1947, it is worth noting that Kaganovich’s second, brief secretarial position in Ukraine was full of anti-nationalist ideological campaigns against Ukrainian writers and historians. Why did Kaganovich terrorize intellectuals, and in particular historians and historians.

946 TSDAHO Ukraїny, 1-70-762-1/21, October 2, 1947; TSDAHO Ukraїny, 1-70-763-1, October 2, 1947; TSDAHO Ukraїny, 1-70-763-23, October 14, 1947.
948 TSDAHO Ukraїny, 1-70-1084-372/373, December 1, 1947.
writers, with accusations of bourgeois-nationalism? And why did the shift from ‘national’ to ‘class’ in Ukraine happen much earlier than in Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan? According to Yekelchyk, Kaganovich lacked the expertise to solve the major problem in Ukraine—agriculture—but as he was “eager to demonstrate to Moscow his ability to ferret out and solve problems, Kaganovich began looking for errors elsewhere, especially in ideology”. Yekelchyk then quotes Khrushchev on Kaganovich: “From the very beginning of his activities in Ukraine, Kaganovich looked for every opportunity to show off and to throw his weight around”. Finally, he found mistakes in Ukrainian history and literature.  

Kaganovich had been a reliable member of Stalin’s core team since the beginning of the 1920s, and his need to demonstrate his ‘purging abilities’ in 1947 is questionable. Alternatively, it can be argued that Kaganovich reacted to the conditions in postwar Ukraine from the Bolshevik point of view. Post-war Ukraine experienced a heavy flow of nationalist ideology from non-Soviet sources. During the German occupation, Ukrainian nationalists had relative freedom with their propaganda. In the newly acquired western Ukraine there had been private ownership and religious freedom until recently. The peasantry was terrified by the possibility of collectivization. In town and cities, most of the western Ukrainian youth and intelligentsia were committed to Ukrainian nationalism and considered the Soviet Union to be their greatest enemy. Additionally, there were around a million repatriated Ukrainians who had either lived in other regions of Poland, or had endured forced labour in Germany. Some of them concluded that the Soviet regime was not the best option, which was reflected in the internal party reports as “anti-Soviet thoughts”. The tension and mutual violence between Poles and Ukrainians continued until the

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949 Yekelchyk, *Stalin’s*, p.73.
former were deported to Poland. Ukrainian nationalist underground organizations fought ferociously against both Polish and Soviet forces. Violence and atrocities in the rural areas, mutilated corpses of Soviet soldiers, and publicly hanged Ukrainian nationalist militants were common sights. The armed resistance of Ukrainian nationalist organizations in western Ukraine continued until the 1950s.\(^{950}\) In the post-war period, it was easy to find history and literature books published in western Ukraine before the war. These publications even found their way to the eastern territories of the Ukrainian SSR.\(^{951}\) Nationalist propaganda was still active in 1947. For example, in December 1947, on the day of the all-Union elections, a nationalist leaflet could be found in the centre of Kiev.\(^{952}\) All these elements created a climate different from the majority of the Soviet territories, including Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. As a reaction to this situation, the local organizations of the KP(b)U organized thousands of propaganda meetings and lectures. Additionally, sightseeing trips to eastern Ukraine were organized for leading figures in the districts of western Ukraine.\(^{953}\) As the first secretary of the KP(b)U, Kaganovich saw


\(^{951}\) Yekelchyk, p.84,

\(^{952}\) Yekelchyk presents this and other examples as a nationalist reaction to Kaganovich’s anti-nationalist campaign. However, 1947 was not an exception and the nationalists had been active since the end of the war. Yekelchyk, 85. Additional to the examples of Yekelchyk see: *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-4956-1/6, December 22, 1947.

\(^{953}\) Lytvyn enumerated some of these factors at the conference of agitation-propaganda officials in 1946. *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-70-436-12, June 24, 1946. There are numerous archival documents on the situation in the Western Ukraine. For the postwar anti-nationalist propaganda of the Soviet authorities and the activities of the Ukrainian nationalists: *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-1633-11 (Lvov) March 5, 1945; *TSDAHO Ukraïny* 1-23-1633-13/15,17a, February 26, 1945 (Ternopil’); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-2767-32/36, March 3, 1946(Lvov); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-2767-48/58 (March 1946, Transcarpathia); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-2767-61/67, September 13, 1946 (Lvov); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-2767-7/12, January 28, 1946 (Stanislav); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-2768-29/40, January 22, 1946 (Izmail Oblast); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-23-2768-41/79, January 31, 1946 (Rovensk Oblast); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-70-351-1 (1945); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-70-351-4/16 (The letter to the Ukrainian people of Western Ukraine, 1945); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-70-455-15/16, (Transcarpathia, end of 1946); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-70-455-17/29 (Transcarpathia, 1946); *TSDAHO Ukraïny*, 1-70-455-40/46 (Transcarpathia, 1946). The resolution of the TsK KP(b)U
the situation in 1947 as a very serious ideological threat and raised some disputed issues in
Ukrainian history (and literature) as a signal or as show cases. In the Bolshevik mind, part of the
solution was a re-emphasis on class struggle and the historical kinship between the Ukrainian
and Russian nations in the form of both east Slavic brotherhood and working class solidarity. As
a consequence of Kaganovich’s interventions, Ukrainian national history writing shifted from a
national emphasis to a class analysis. As emphasized at the beginning of this chapter, Soviet
Russian national history writing did not experience a similar shift. When this unbalanced picture
combined with the emphasis on the fraternity of eastern Slavic nations, and the Russian image
of ‘elder brother’, the road to a Russocentric narrative was paved.

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on the activities of Ukrainian nationalists see: TSDAHO України, 1-16-32-50/58, June 20, 1947; TSDAHO України, 1-16-32-321/3 August 12, 1947; TSDAHO України, 1-16-32-324/7, August 17, 1947. On the trips to eastern Ukraine for the leading figures of western Ukraine, TSDAHO України, 1-70-455-11, (1946). On the opinions of intellectuals of Lvov see: TSDAHO України, 1-23-2843-6/10, August 3, 1946; TSDAHO України, 1-23-2843-17/22, September 27, 1946. On the nationalist tendencies at the Academy of Sciences in Kiev: TSDAHO України, 1-23-2848-7/10, February 18, 1946; The Polish-Ukrainian clashes ended when the Polish population was moved to the Polish territories of post-1945 borders. According to the Soviet official records, the Polish population that was sent to Poland from western Ukraine by January 1946 was 612,530; TSDAHO України, 1-23-2615-1/6, January 2, 1946; This figure came closer to 800,000 by August 1946; TSDAHO України, 1-23-2615-36, August 1, 1946; On the non-Soviet or anti-Soviet thoughts among the repatriated Ukrainians from Germany, see TSDAHO України, 1-23-2768-8, January 11, 1946 (In Kam’ianets’-Podil’s’kyi Oblast, 70,000 Soviet citizens were repatriated.)
CONCLUSIONS

First, the evidence suggests that the construction of national histories in the republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was not merely a result of top-down communication from Moscow. Although the leading politicians and ideologists in Moscow declared some major principles, the national narratives, entailing enormous detail, had to be written by local apparatchiks and historians. The local communist parties, including the first secretaries and the agitation-propaganda sections, were deeply involved in the process of writing national narratives. Second, the impact of the Great Terror was dramatic, especially in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. There were already few local historians in these republics before 1936. The Great Terror also changed the composition of local historians. In Azerbaijan, historians, who were educated in the pre-revolutionary period, were shot. While Baku was the centre of Turkology in the 1920s, there was no prominent Turkologist left after 1938. New faces were either fresh graduates of the Soviet institutions, who did not have yet a substantial work, or party officials. In Kazakhstan the lack of experienced historians to write a national history after the Great Terror was so high that Russian historians from Leningrad temporarily aided in the publication of the national history in 1941. Third, when Pokrovskiiian historiography was denounced, questions that a romantic national history should answer came to the fore. The new history had to explain the ancient times, provide a golden age, national leaders and struggles that unified the nation for centuries. These elements of national histories were gradually established in the new narratives, after the Great Terror. The historians, who were purged in 1936-38, were eager to write a Marxist history of their nations and followed the Pokrovskiiian interpretation until the day they were shot. In a way, the purge of historians in 1936-38 ‘facilitated’ the shift from the Pokrovskiiian class-based narrative to a history which created national unities. The surviving
historians after 1938, who were inexperienced or recent graduates, followed this shift. Fourth, this new history writing was not limited to the Russian Soviet national history. The increasing emphasis on Russian culture and language and the construction of a Russian Soviet narrative did not prevent each republic writing its own national history (histories of each titular nation). In fact, the Communist Party (both central and local organizations) asked for the construction of national histories from local historians long before the Second World War. Fifth, the national histories of each republic were constructed in different ways, despite the one-party rule and one official ideology. This difference can be seen in various elements of the national narrative, such as the explanation of ethnogenesis, national heroes, and villains. Sixth, the war period was a brilliant example of how national histories were used for increasing the fighting spirit at the front and production levels at the home front. While authorities in Moscow intensified a propaganda campaign which was decorated with the heroic past of the Russian nation, the local communist party officials ran a parallel propaganda campaign by using their national heroes and national-liberation struggles. In the meantime, the efforts toward construction of national histories continued. If the first shift happened in 1936-38, another shift happened after the War, in the Zhdanovshchina period. While this shift initialized in Ukraine earlier in 1947 by Kaganovich, it happened in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 1950-51. Finally, non-Russian histories, which had been written since 1938, were denounced by the Party officials as nationalist and lacking class-analysis. However, the Russian Soviet national narrative did not experience a similar critique and the Russian national leaders, who had been rehabilitated since the 1930s, were not redefined according to their class origin. If Zhdanovshchina was an anti-Western campaign in culture in Moscow and Leningrad, the outcome of the same period in the
historiography of non-Russian nations was becoming a supportive element for the Russian narrative.

In fact, the whole period can be understood as an experiment of how to write history in the first socialist country. In a meeting of Ukrainian historians and ideologues in 1947, Kaganovich confessed that Pokrovskii and his interpretation of the past was the only real history school that the Soviet Union had ever had. The problem, which could not be definitely answered, was what to put next as the officially correct narrative. After the concept of Pokrovskii was declared as anti-Marxist, it was not always clear for the Party ideologues and Soviet historians how to conciliate the ideology, which defined the history of humanity as the history of classes and their struggles on the one hand, and a new emphasis on the titular nations of each union republic with their unique pasts on the other.

There are historians of the post-war period in the three countries who are nowadays commemorated as loyal sons of their nation. These figures, such as Bekmakanov in Kazakhstan, Guseinov in Azerbaijan, and Petrovs’kyi in Ukraine, were accused of being ‘bourgeois-nationalists’ and ‘anti-Marxist’ by the Soviet authorities. The accusers aimed to show these people as ‘nationalist germs’ within a ‘healthy Marxist or Bolshevik body’. It is true that these historians were victims of the repressive regime of the Soviet Union. However, nowadays the interpretation is that these figures waged an ideological war against the Soviet system and that they were ‘silenced and terrorized nationalists’. Probably the main reason for this misjudgement is taking at face value the jargon that the Soviet authorities used when they accused these figures. So, who were these accused historians in 1947 in or in 1950-1, and what were their

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954 TSDAHO Ukraïny 1-70-753-171, April 29, 1947.
ideological thoughts epitomized by Bekmakhanov and Guseinov? Neither Bekmakhanov nor Guseinov were anti-Bolshevik or anti-Marxist. They were moulded by Soviet education and developed their careers in the Soviet institutions. They believed in the Party, and in the communist rule in their republics, as the best available choice. They knew that both their own republics at the local level and the Soviet Union in general followed a fast path of development and saw the rest of the world from the point of Leninist imperialist theories. It would even be a fantasy to imagine them as the proponents of the Musavvat or Alash-Orda. Their accusers cursed them in political terms, because in a totalitarian regime such as the Soviet Union, any kind of debate—an academic dispute for that matter—was formulated within ideological motives. They had a Marxist but moderate interpretation in terms of construction of national histories. As is clear in the Kazakh and Ukrainian cases, there were also more radical local historians in terms of ideological stance and it would be a simplification to label them as the ‘local servants of the regime’. These ideological radicals fought against the moderates, when they felt that during the war national elements went too far in the narratives. For example, it was the orthodox Kazakh historians who persistently drummed up the campaign against including the Kenesary Uprising in the national narrative. For these Kazakh historians, who held a radical line, Kenesary was a symbol of Kazakh nationalists, and whoever promoted this symbol could not claim to be a ‘progressive Marxist historian’. According to these radical Bolshevik Kazakh historians, the interpretation of the Kenesary uprising by Bekmakhanov (or Edyge by Margulan) was the first sign of turning a dark feudal and reactionary past into a glorious and venerable national history. They worried that if today Edyge or Kenesary, who were feudal khans of nomadic tribes, could be rehabilitated, then tomorrow who knows who or what was next—another tribal chieftain, or a religious leader? Moreover, progressiveness for these Kazakh
intellectuals with a radical Bolshevik conviction also included a world view which endorsed a close contact with Russia in the past and present. Undasynov, the chair of the Sovnarkom KazSSR, summarized all these ideas clearly at the Bureau TsK KP(b)K meeting, where they discussed Bekmakhanov: “When we read and write history, that history must help us to move forward; this is the major importance and power [of history] and it consolidates the friendship between nations—I mean between Russian and Kazakh nations”. According to Undasynov, this progressive example of history could be personified in scientists such as Valikhanov, poet and writer Abai, and ‘revolutionary’ Imanov. As in the moderate camp, the Kazakh radicals also had Russian confederates in Moscow, but these were not radical Bolsheviks; they were rather Russian nationalists who consolidated their position during the War. Tarle or Iakovlev were two of them. These Russian historians thought it insane to promote anti-Russian uprisings, which would create anti-Russian sentiments in a union where Russia was a cornerstone.

If there was an ‘imperial design’, it can be seen in the following aspects of the Soviet construction of national histories. The discrepancy of the Kazakhstani case suggests that there were factors other than Marxist-Leninist ideology which played a role in the constructions of national histories between the Great Terror and the Second World War. Ukraine and Azerbaijan, with their kinsmen in the Polish Ukraine (1920-1939) and in the Iranian Azerbaijan respectively, had the potential to construct alternative national histories. Turkey, as the only Turkic country which was not located within the Soviet Union and possessing ethno-linguistic closeness, also had the potential to create an alternative narrative. Moreover, after 1934, a serious distrust ruled the relations of the Soviet Union with Turkey, Iran, and Poland. The anticipation of a

serious crisis on the western or southern borders had an impact on the narrative of regional fraternities. There was not a southern or western Kazakhstan and there was not an external threat towards the Kazakh SSR. As a consequence of tension with Poland, the Ukrainian, Russian and Belorussian fraternity was underlined by the concept of common eastern Slavic roots in antiquity and in medieval times. We also see a similar picture on the southern borders. A primordial fraternity of three Caucasian nations—Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians—was established in Azerbaijani Soviet national history. Additionally, the anti-Turkish and anti-Iranian narrative was also constructed in the Azerbaijani narrative. All these features create something similar to a defence line in the south. It is interesting to see that the eastern Slavic fraternity on the western borders was not the only example of creating a unity among the nations of one particular region. The tightening of fraternities also aimed to erase enmities between various nationalities and consolidate the legitimacy of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the Soviet Union appears as a modernization project for all three cases. Though non-Russian historiographies produced contradictory narratives in different decades, they also homogenized, codified and nationalized the narrative of the past. Regional, dynastic, religious, tribal figures and events incorporated into grandiose national narratives. Nations were primordialized and their national identities armed with spatial and temporal indigenousness within the borders of their national republics. Modern Azerbaijani, Kazakh and Ukrainian identities gained so much from this homogenization and codification by the Soviet regime that it is not always possible to reject the Soviet legacy. It is not also easy to define this homogenization and codification merely as the facilitators of imperial administration of complex territories or as an ‘imperial necessity’. In other words, placing the constructions of ‘India’ and
‘Ukraine’ or ‘Kazakhstan’ into one category can lead us to an oversimplification. Although results are similar in terms of homogenization and codification, differences in ideologies and goals behind these policies matter.

The construction of national histories in the 1930s and 1940s has a continuing impact, even after the independence of these countries as separate nation-states. Obviously, not everyone is happy with the Soviet legacy. For example, Ukrainians complain that Russians stole the Ukrainian past under the disguise of ‘eastern Slavs’. Azerbaijanis are in an uncomfortable position because of speaking a Turkic language but not having a Turkic past. They still need to claim ancient Albania and Media for the new republican narrative, and at the same time, emphasize their Turkicness. In other words, they try to reconcile the non-Turkic and Turkic pasts in one narrative. Kazakhs retain the anti-Russian regional uprisings of the nineteenth century as national events, and additionally, discovering Kazakh tribes in ancient times and the medieval period. Thus, numerous elements, which were incorporated into national histories in those years, continue to decorate contemporary national narratives, or at least constitute subjects of discussion. A further study on the impact of the Soviet national narratives on the current national historiographies in these independent nation-states would enable us to understand better the contemporary national identities in these countries and their perception of the past.
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