Journal article
Acquiring a new concept is not explicable-by-content
- Abstract:
- Carey's book describes many cases in which children develop new concepts with expressive power that could not be constructed out of their input. How does she side-step Fodor's paradox of radical concept nativism? I suggest that it is by rejecting the tacit assumption that psychology can only explain concept acquisition when it occurs by rational inference or other transitions that are explicable-by-content. © 2011 Cambridge University Press.
- Publication status:
- Published
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Bibliographic Details
- Journal:
- BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES More from this journal
- Volume:
- 34
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 148-U47
- Publication date:
- 2011-06-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1469-1825
- ISSN:
-
0140-525X
Item Description
- Language:
-
English
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:251714
- UUID:
-
uuid:566c1065-4880-4de5-b7b1-bbe46d4b1206
- Local pid:
-
pubs:251714
- Source identifiers:
-
251714
- Deposit date:
-
2012-12-19
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- Copyright date:
- 2011
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