Journal article
Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
- Abstract:
- Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 1007.1KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.001
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization More from this journal
- Volume:
- 137
- Pages:
- 132-144
- Publication date:
- 2017-03-07
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-03-01
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0167-2681
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:987653
- UUID:
-
uuid:561e1973-c94d-437b-b549-5d7c5aa2fcb0
- Local pid:
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pubs:987653
- Source identifiers:
-
987653
- Deposit date:
-
2019-04-08
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier BV
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- © Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.001
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