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Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions

Abstract:
Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.001

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Social Sciences Division
Department:
Economics
Oxford college:
St John's College
Role:
Author


Publisher:
Elsevier
Journal:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization More from this journal
Volume:
137
Pages:
132-144
Publication date:
2017-03-07
Acceptance date:
2017-03-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0167-2681


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:987653
UUID:
uuid:561e1973-c94d-437b-b549-5d7c5aa2fcb0
Local pid:
pubs:987653
Source identifiers:
987653
Deposit date:
2019-04-08

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