Why Is It So Hard to Counteract Wealth Inequality? Evidence from England and Wales*

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Abstract

Taxing inheritance is an effective way of abating wealth inequality. Yet despite persistently high levels of wealth inequality, inheritance tax rates have declined significantly in recent decades. We argue that it is difficult to tax inherited wealth because, paradoxically, the people who have the strongest material interest in such taxation are those least likely to express an opinion. Instead, the political terrain is shaped by the preferences of homeowners, and their children, who have a strong material interest in low inheritance taxes. Empirically, we first evaluate this argument using original survey data from England and Wales. We then examine whether providing information about the unequal distribution of housing wealth locally and/or nationally can shape preferences over inheritance taxation, but find no effect of our information treatment. The paper helps explain why addressing wealth inequality is politically difficult, and it thereby contributes to an increasingly salient public and academic debate.

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1 Introduction

In the last century advanced democracies have experienced a strong accumulation of wealth (Piketty, 2014). With rising wealth accumulation, inherited wealth has gained importance: An increasing share of national income is transferred between generations each year, and inherited wealth makes up an ever-larger proportion of total wealth (Piketty and Zucman, 2015). According to some estimates, up to 60% of all privately held wealth in Europe and the United States today is inherited (Alvaredo, Garbinti and Piketty, 2017). As the baby-boom generation ages, and if the current trends in asset and property prices continue, the number of inheritances and their sums are likely to grow even larger in the coming years. That would further exacerbate (absolute) wealth inequality, which has remained persistently high in recent decades—much higher than income inequality (Elinder, Erixson and Waldenström, 2018; OECD, 2021).

Economically, there are strong rationales for taxing inherited wealth. From a meritocratic standpoint, Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2013) argue that an ideal tax system would feature a progressive inheritance tax schedule with taxes on inherited wealth being higher than those on earned income. Some estimates suggest that the optimal inheritance tax rate for top bequests may be as high as 50%-60% (Piketty and Saez, 2013), which is far above the highest marginal rates in place in most countries today (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016). Such a tax system would generate positive welfare effects by increasing equity and equality of opportunity, and by raising tax revenues that could be used in a variety of welfare-enhancing ways (increased redistribution, improved public goods provision, lower non-wealth taxes, and so on). In addition, taxing inheritances is more efficient, and comes with lower administrative costs, than other kinds of wealth taxation (OECD, 2021).

Yet, despite the powerful economic arguments for taxing inherited wealth, policymakers have refrained from using inheritance taxation to effectively abate high levels of wealth inequality. To the contrary, across advanced democracies, inheritance taxation has become less stringent. As shown in Figure 1, not only have marginal inheritance tax rates dropped significantly since the 1980s, but the tax schedules have also become less progressive. Several countries — Israel, New Zealand, Austria, Sweden, and Norway among others — have abolished the inheritance tax altogether.

The central question we ask in this paper is: Why is it seemingly so hard politically to address wealth inequality through inheritance taxation? Since real estate by far constitutes the largest share of wealth for any ordinary citizen (OECD, 2021), this question inevitably directs our attention to the political conflict between property owners and renters, who have opposing material interests in inheritance taxation. Property owners—who stand to pass on a property to their children—and their children themselves—who expect to inherit a property in the future—have a strong material interest in low inheritance taxes. Families of renters, by contrast, would stand to benefit from stronger inheritance taxation, as it would enhance equality

Figure 1: Average Marginal Inheritance Tax Rates by Multiple of GDP Per Capita, 18 Advanced Democracies



Note: The figure shows average marginal inheritance tax rates by multiple of GDP per capita for the following 18 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Korea (South), Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. The data was collected by the authors.

of opportunity and raise tax revenues.[1]

But because property owners are more likely than non-owners to be exposed to inheritance taxation, and because they have greater incentives to actively acquire information about it, they are in a better position to develop coherent preferences in line with their material self-interest (Berinsky, 2004). While families of property owners are able to articulate strong preferences for low inheritance taxes, families of renters tend to express weak preferences, if any at all. We argue that this difference between families of property owners and non-owners has direct implications for the politics of wealth inequality. Because the people who would stand to gain the most from taxing inheritances, paradoxically, are those least likely to articulate a clear preference, the political environment surrounding the inheritance tax is shaped by the preferences of property owners, making it politically difficult to use inheritance taxation as a tool to effectively counter wealth inequality. Using the terminology of Converse (2006), the "issue public" on inheritance taxation consists (mainly) of highly resourceful families of property owners, who are opposed to high inheritance taxes.

To test this argument, we leverage an original survey of over 3,000 respondents in England and Wales. The respondents were first asked to provide information about their own and their parents' housing situation, and then to answer a series of questions about their preferences over inheritance taxation (including a conjoint

[1]In a recent report, OECD (2021) shows that well-designed inheritance taxes can both improve equality of opportunity and increase tax revenues.

experiment). The analysis shows that not only are property owners and their children much more likely to articulate a preference regarding inheritance taxation (compared to renters and children of renters), they are also strongly opposed to high inheritance taxes. These findings provide support for our theoretical argument, and help explain the lack of political appetite for using inheritance taxation to combat persistently high levels of wealth inequality.

After empirically demonstrating our argument, we proceed to examine whether it is possible to shift preferences over inheritance taxation by providing information about the unequal distribution of housing wealth. Previous studies have found mixed evidence of information effects on tax preferences, but we surmise that informing people about a highly relatable facet of wealth inequality—the value of peoples' homes—might be more effective. We thus designed a treatment that randomly exposed respondents to information about the distribution of house prices either locally, where the respondent lives, and/or nationally. Contrary to our expectations, however, the information treatments did not shift preferences in significant ways, adding evidence to a growing body of literature which highlights the complexity of mobilizing popular support for inheritance taxation (Bartels, 2008; Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018; Bastani and Waldenström, 2021).

The rest of the paper is structured as followed. First, we develop our theoretical argument from which we extract a set of testable implications. We then test these implications, analyzing responses to a set of six questions about inheritance taxes and to a forced-choice conjoint experiment about preferred marginal inheritance tax rates. In the final part of the analysis, we analyze the effects of the survey experiment that was embedded in our survey. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the politics of wealth inequality and for future research.

2 Information, Homeownership, and The Formation of Inheritance Tax Preferences

It is a widely-accepted fact that many people are ill-informed about politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Althaus, 2003; Converse, 2006; Page and Shapiro, 1992). Respondents to political surveys routinely get basic facts about the political system, their representatives, and current policies wrong. Economic policy and taxation is no exception in this regard (Stantcheva, 2021), and specific information about inheritance tax policies is likely to be especially lacking (see e.g., Slemrod, 2006; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Bartels, 2008). This is because most people have less direct exposure to inheritance taxation compared to other types of taxation, such as income or consumption. But, as we argue, there are important informational differences between families of homeowners and non-homeowners, who differ in wealth, and therefore, in their exposure

to inheritance taxation. These informational disparities have important consequences for opinions toward inheritance tax policies, and, in turn, for the politics of wealth inequality.

Information about inheritance taxation can be gained in two ways: through exogenous exposure or through active acquisition. Exogenous exposure to inheritance taxation typically happens when an older family member dies and their estate is transferred to younger members of the family. In OECD countries, about one in three households can expect to experience this at some point during their lives, but it's much more common for households at the top of the wealth distribution than for those at the bottom (OECD, 2021, 32-33). Most of the personal wealth that is transferred at death is tied up in housing, implying that non-homeowning families usually have little wealth to transfer at death, and whatever wealth they might have is likely to fall below the exemption threshold. Consequently, many people who grow up in a family of non-homeowners will never be exogenously exposed to inheritance tax policies, and they will therefore not receive much information about the inheritance tax system. Families of homeowners, on the other hand, are highly likely at some point in their lives to be exposed to the inheritance tax system. This is because wealth is sticky and tends to travel across generations (Clark and Cummins, 2015; Charles and Hurst, 2003). In the United Kingdom, for instance, the most common age at which today's 20 to 35-year olds can expect to inherit is at age 61 (Gardiner, 2017; Balestra and Tonkin, 2018), which means that exogenous exposure to inheritance taxation often travels through multiple generations. Middle-aged children are exposed to inheritance taxation when they inherit their parents' property; the grandchildren also acquire information by experiencing the handling of their grandparents' estate.[2]

But not only are families of homeowners more likely to be exogenously exposed to inheritance taxation, they also have greater incentives to actively acquire information about it. Many countries allow parents to transfer a certain amount of wealth to their children each year as a tax-exempt gift.[3] And most countries also have an exemption threshold under which no taxation applies. By planning when and how to pass wealth to their children, parents can transfer entire estates to their children without paying any or much taxes. Knowing that such a possibility exists, and how to exploit it most effectively, requires intimate knowledge about the policies related to wealth transfers, such as inheritance and gift taxes. Indeed, financial literacy has been shown to be strongly and positively associated with wealth accumulation (Behrman et al., 2012). Contrary to non-homeowners, therefore, homeowners have strong material incentives to become acquainted with inheritance tax rules, even before they inherit.

While homeowners and non-homeowners differ in their exposure to inheritance taxation, both groups have clearly defined and conflicting material interests at stake. For non-homeowners, taxing inherited wealth could

[2]Within the group of homeowners, the wealth gradient also shapes exposure to inheritance taxation through the widespread existence of exemption thresholds: In the UK for instance, only one in twenty estates pay inheritance taxes (source: HMRC).

[3]For example, £3,000 per year in the UK and 100,000€ per parent to each of their children every fifteen years in France.

provide a range of beneficial outcomes. The narrowing of wealth inequalities through inheritance taxation may improve equality of opportunity for them and their children (and potentially also reduce property prices). Additionally, the funds raised by inheritance taxation could be used for redistribution and public goods provision; or they could replace taxes that non-homeowners do incur, and facilitate cuts in income or consumption taxes. For homeowners, the stakes are obvious: giving up a (potentially large) proportion of one's family's wealth to the state.

But although both groups have (at least some) incentives to stay informed about inheritance tax policies, the incentives are likely to be stronger for homeowners. This is because homeowners are facing the prospect of direct, concentrated losses from paying inheritance taxes, whereas the benefits for non-homeowners are indirect and diffuse. In addition, the negative utility of paying inheritance taxes for homeowners is likely to outweigh the positive utility for non-homeowners of increasing tax revenues (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As a consequence, families of homeowners are far more likely to be well-informed about inheritance taxes than those of non-homeowners.

How do these informational asymmetries matter for political preferences? Public opinion research points to two possibilities: The uninformed may be unable to form a preference over inheritance taxation (Berinsky, 2004), and if they do, they may do so wholly at random (Converse, 2006). In this case, when aggregating individual responses, the random responses provided by the uninformed will tend to cancel each other out, and public opinion will reflect the opinion of informed respondents (Page and Shapiro, 1992). Alternatively, the uninformed may express a preference following basic heuristics and cues, which is likely to bias estimates of public opinion (e.g., Bartels, 1996; Althaus, 2003; Zaller, 1992).

It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which each of these effects are at work when it comes to the formation of preferences over inheritance taxation, but both are likely to bias public opinion in the same direction. In the first scenario, if all uninformed respondents do not express a preference, or answer wholly at random, the "rational" or "issue" public—to use the terminology of Page and Shapiro (1992) and Converse (2006)—would consist primarily of members of families of homeowners, who have clearly defined material interests in low inheritance taxes. In the second scenario, the predominance in the public sphere of discourses that frame the inheritance tax as a 'double tax' or a 'death tax' suggests that following simple heuristics or cues is more likely to bias support for inheritance taxation downwards than upwards. In a recent study using text analysis on open-ended survey answers about tax preferences in the United States, Ferrario and Stantcheva (2022) indeed find that the main concern that emerges around the estate tax is that of "double taxation". More generally, individuals' main concerns when it comes to the taxation of inheritances appear to reflect notions of fairness, such as whether "double taxation" or a "tax on death" is perceived to be fair, rather than considerations over economic efficiency (Ferrario and Stantcheva, 2022; Fisman et al., 2020).

To the extent that public opinion matters for politics, the informational asymmetries between families of homeowners and non-homeowners, and the effects of these asymmetries on public opinion, will shape the political environment surrounding the inheritance tax. Homeowners both constitute a majority in most electorates (Ansell and Cansunar, 2021) *and* have strongly-anchored preferences. Hence, public opinion will be driven by homeowners, and their families. This potential for a mobilized electorate creates a fertile political terrain for organized business groups who work to repeal the inheritance tax. This was for instance the case in Sweden and Austria, where organized business interests played an important role in the abolishing of the tax (Klitgaard and Paster, 2021). Likewise, in the United States, conservative interest groups and think thanks have long been advocating for a repeal of the estate tax (Graetz and Shapiro, 2005). Moreover, even though left-wing governments may have broader goals of greater equality of opportunity and outcomes, they have few electoral incentives to pursue these goals through inheritance taxation. The voters who should find inheritance taxation most appealing are likely to hold weak preferences, if any at all, and those who are most strongly opposed to such policies are resourceful, well-informed families of homeowners. In such an environment, it is difficult to mobilize political support in favor of inheritance taxation, limiting the tools available to governments to effectively counteract wealth inequality.

2.1 Does Information About Wealth Affect Inheritance Tax Preferences?

Our argument implies that because public opinion is driven by resourceful families of homeowners, the signal that politicians receive from the public is one of opposition to high taxes on inherited wealth. In the second part of the analysis, we probe whether we can shift support for inheritance taxation by informing people about a relatable aspect of wealth inequality: the value of peoples' homes.

Previous studies have found mixed evidence of information effects. In the U.S., some studies find that providing information about the limited number of estates that are subject to the estate tax increases support for the tax (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Sides, 2015). But since no other country has an exemption threshold anywhere near that of the U.S. estate tax (OECD, 2021, 88), the U.S. results do not travel well to other countries. In Sweden, Bastani and Waldenström (2021) inform respondents how much of total wealth is inherited, who inherits, and that most Swedish billionaires have inherited their fortunes. This information significantly increased support for reintroducing a broad-based inheritance tax in Sweden, but it did not increase support for introducing an inheritance tax only on large estates. In a cross-national study of France, Sweden, Italy, the UK, and the U.S., Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso (2018) show respondents two short, animated movies explaining that whereas few poor kids grow up to become rich, many rich kids remain rich in adulthood. While this treatment successfully altered peoples' views on intergenerational mobility, it

did not have an effect on support for the estate tax.

It is also noteworthy that even though factual information in some cases substantially increases support for inheritance taxation, it is usually from very low levels. In Kuziemko et al. (2015), for example, the information treatment had a very large effect, tripling support for increasing the estate tax, but from a baseline level of only 17.5%. Support in the treatment group, therefore, just barely rose above 50% (52.8% to be exact). In Sides (2015), the (similar) information treatment increased support for retaining the estate tax by about 11 percentage points, but among the treated support again hovered around 50%. In Bastani and Waldenström (2021), the baseline support for reintroducing a broad-based inheritance tax in Sweden was just 24.5%, and support in the treatment group was only 32.5%. Moreover, respondents in both the control and treatment groups opposed a new tax only on large inheritances. So although there is evidence of information effects, previous studies suggest it is hard to boost support for inheritance taxation to an extent that would make it electorally rewarding for governments to support higher taxes.

Building on this experimental literature, we examine the effects of a new intervention that informed respondents about the distribution of house prices locally, where the respondent lives, and/or nationally. Since the majority of ordinary citizens' wealth is tied up in real estate, showing the distribution of house prices provides relevant and relatable information about the distribution of inheritances that ordinary people can expect to receive. Thus, we surmise that this treatment may elicit stronger responses than those that have been used in previous surveys. Having both a local and a national treatment condition further enables us to distinguish between national and local effects of housing wealth. Perhaps people care more about wealth inequality in their local community than in the nation as a whole. Indeed, previous research has found important local effects of exposure to inequality (Sands, 2017; Sands and de Kadt, 2020). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first not only to examine the effects of exposing people to the distribution of (housing) wealth, but also to distinguish between local- and national-level effects.

2.2 Hypotheses

We derive a number testable implications from our argument. The first hypothesis follows directly from the fact that if property owners and their children are better informed about inheritance taxation than families of non-owners, they should be in a better position to answer questions about inheritance taxation:

H1: Homeowners and children of homeowners are more likely to express an opinion regarding inheritance taxation than non-homeowners and children of non-homeowners.

Second, because members of families of homeowners are more likely to express a clear preference, public opinion should generally be sceptical of inheritance taxation. Yet, homeowners do not constitute a homogeneous group. While some inhabit an inexpensive property in a rural district or a former industrial town, others own apartments or town houses in booming urban areas. Families who own a relatively cheap property would also stand to benefit from taxing large inheritances, and we would therefore expect variation in preferences over inheritance taxation within the group of homeowning families. People owning more expensive properties should be more concerned about taxes applying to larger estates. The second hypothesis is therefore:

H2: a) Public opinion is opposed to higher taxes on inherited wealth; b) opposition to inheritance taxation is concentrated among members of families who own more expensive properties.

Finally, based on the experimental literature, we hypothesize that informing people about the (unequal) distribution of house prices locally and/or nationally will increase support for inheritance taxation. In addition, since low-wealth individuals would stand to gain more from such taxation, we expect that this effect is stronger among members of families who possess lower housing wealth or are not on the property ladder. Accordingly, the third hypothesis is:

H3: a) Informing people about the (unequal) distribution of housing wealth increases support for taxing inheritances; b) the effect of information is stronger among low-wealth individuals.

3 Data

To test our arguments, we designed a survey that asked respondents about their own and their parents' housing wealth, and about their preferences over inheritance taxation. The survey also included a conjoint experiment designed to reveal the respondents' preferred marginal tax rates on different-sized inheritances, and a survey information experiment to assess whether providing information about the distribution of housing wealth affects people's inheritance tax preferences. The survey was conducted by YouGov, using their nationally representative online panel, and included 3186 adults living England and Wales.

In the first part of the survey, we included a range of questions about the respondents' wealth. For example, we asked about their housing situation, and if they were homeowners, we followed up by asking them to estimate the current value of their house. In Online Appendix A, we assess the quality of the estimated house prices by comparing our survey estimates to land registry data from the Office of National

Statistics (ONS). Although the homeowners in our survey tend to be slightly overoptimistic (about £10,000 on average), they match the national distribution of homeowners very well, giving us confidence in our sample of homeowners and in their ability to accurately estimate the current value of their house. To provide an example, the regional median of estimated house prices in our sample is an average of just £5,000 away from the regional averages for the same month reported by the ONS.

We also asked about the housing situation of the respondents' parents, so we could assess how being a future property inheritor, who may stand to pay inheritance taxes in the future, affects one's preferences over inheritance taxation. Since many (older) respondents had already lost their parents, the modal response to this question is 'don't know/not applicable' (54%), but about half of the respondents still had their parents and were willing to answer the question.[4] If their parents owned a property, we asked them to provide an estimate of the value of the property (about 31% of the total sample did).[5]

After answering the questions about wealth, the respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three information treatments: one third was assigned to a control group and did not receive any information, another third was assigned to a national information treatment and saw the distribution of house prices across England and Wales, and the last third saw the distribution of house prices both in their local authority and nationally. To ensure randomization within the groups, we stratified the randomization within the three groups by average local house prices. After the information treatment, we asked the respondents a range of questions about their political preferences, and the survey concluded with a forced-choice conjoint experiment to assess their preferred tax rates on different inheritance groups. We provide more detailed information about the survey questions as we move through the empirical analysis.

4 Results

4.1 A Paradox of Inheritance Taxation

We begin the empirical analysis by analyzing responses to a set of six questions about inheritance taxation. The questions asked: "Regarding the level of inheritance tax people pay in United Kingdom, do you think the level is too low, too high, or about right?." In randomized order, the respondents were asked to express their opinion about the 1) "overall level of inheritance tax", 2) "inheritance tax you might pay in the future", 3) "inheritance tax your heirs might pay in the future", 4) "inheritance tax for those who receive under £325,000", 5) "inheritance tax for those who receive between £325,000 and £1m", and 6) "inheritance tax for those who receive over £1m."

[4]Respondents who answered 'don't know/not applicable' to the question about their parents' housing situation are on average 13.5 years older (55.4 years) than the rest of the sample (41.9 years).

[5]Descriptive statistics of the estimated house price variables can also be found in Online Appendix A.

In Figure 2, we display the distribution of responses to the six questions; in particular two patterns stand out. First, despite decades-long declines in inheritance tax rates, the public in England and Wales are, still, more likely to think that inheritance taxes are too high than too low. On average across the six questions, 31% of respondents said that taxes were (much) too high, whereas just 11% said that they were (much) too low. The only exception to this pattern is the question about inheritances above £1m, where 25% of respondents think taxes are (much) too low, compared to 21% who think they are (much) too high. These results are consistent with H2a and the expectation that the public is generally opposed to higher taxes on inherited wealth.

Second, on all six inheritance tax questions, the modal response is 'don't know'—strikingly, between 34% to 43% of respondents appear to have no preference on inheritance taxation. The high proportions of 'don't know'-responses are a clear indication that inheritance taxation is a low-information environment, where many feel that they lack the basic information needed to formulate a preference. The lack of information is further demonstrated by the fact that 34% of respondents believe that taxes on inheritances under £325k are either 'too high' or 'much too high' despite these inheritances being fully exempt from taxation.

Who are the people who seemingly don't know their preference, and how are they different from those who do? To find out, and thereby test H1, we regress a dummy variable of whether the respondent expressed a preference (1) or answered 'don't know' (0) to the question about the overall inheritance tax level on measures of housing wealth and other socio-economic variables. As a measure of current housing wealth, we include a self-reported estimate of the value of the respondent's house rescaled into eight categories, with

Figure 2: Preferences over inheritance taxation



the baseline being a non-homeowner. To capture the effect of being a future property inheritor, we include a self-reported estimate of the value of the property owned by the respondent's parents. We rescale this variable into six categories; the omitted category is again non-homeowner. We also include measures of household income (measured in 15 categories), age, gender, and whether the respondent has a university degree.

Table 1 presents the results. Model (1) shows the results from a linear probability model, which we use to interpret marginal effects; Model (2) shows the (very similar) results from a logit model, which we will use to calculate predicted probabilities for different wealth profiles below. The results of Model (1) show that most of the usual suspects predict the propensity to express a preference: Being male, thirty years older, and having an income above £150k (compared to one below £5000) adds about 12 percentage points each to the probability of answering the question, whereas one of the strongest predictors of 'don't know' responses in previous studies—having a university degree (see e.g. Berinsky, 2004)—is not associated with higher rates of expressing a preference.

Importantly, the results also show that even after accounting for the impact of these socio-demographic variables, housing wealth is a strong predictor of expressing a preference. Homeowners owning a property worth more than £400k are about 20 percentage points more likely to express a preference than are renters, and children of homeowners owning a property valued higher than £400k are about 13 percentage points more likely to answer the question compared to children of renters. There is consequently a strong wealth gradient in the probability of expressing an opinion on inheritance taxation: Individuals who either expect to pass on a house to the next generation of their family and/or who stand to inherit a property from their parents are much more likely to express an opinion on inheritance taxation compared to respondents who do not own a house and/or whose parents do not own a house. In Online Appendix B we show the results for all six questions included in Figure 2, and they are substantively similar to those reported here.

To better visualize the substantive effects, Figure 3 displays the predicted probability of answering the question about the overall level of inheritance taxes for individuals with low and high wealth status. We define low wealth status as a female adult of average age (49 years) who earns less than £5000 a year and does not have a university degree; she is a renter and so are her parents. By contrast, a high-wealth individual is a male adult of average age who earns more than £150,000 a year, who owns a house valued more than £750k, and whose parents own a house valued more than £600k.[6] Figure 3 shows that low and high-wealth individuals have very different probabilities of expressing an opinion on inheritance taxation.[7] Whereas just

[6]Since women, people without a university degree, and people with low incomes tend to accumulate much less wealth (see e.g., Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2018), we let these socio-demographic characteristics vary across the two wealth profiles. As shown in Table 1, the wealth gradient remains even if we keep these variables constant.

[7]We base our calculations on the logit model of Table 1, rather than the LPM, because the predicted probability of expressing a preference for high-wealth individuals is very close to the upper limit. In fact, the LPM yields a value slightly above one.

Table 1: Determinants of registering an opinion on question about overall inheritance tax rates

	LPM	Logit
Value of own house:		
£100k and under	0.060	0.256
	(0.055)	(0.269)
£100k to £200k	0.065*	0.272
	(0.029)	(0.144)
£200k to £300k	0.160*	0.789*
	(0.030)	(0.162)
£300k to £400k	0.177*	0.927*
	(0.035)	(0.201)
£400k to £500k	0.208*	1.234*
	(0.045)	(0.291)
£500k to £750k	0.214*	1.320*
	(0.047)	(0.321)
£750k and up	0.198*	1.281*
	(0.061)	(0.426)
Value of parents' house:		
Not applicable/deceased	0.032	0.107
	(0.029)	(0.141)
£200k and under	0.073*	0.315
	(0.037)	(0.184)
£200k to £400k	0.103*	0.480*
	(0.035)	(0.180)
£400k to £600k	0.129*	0.626*
	(0.047)	(0.259)
£600k and up	0.130*	0.630*
	(0.051)	(0.288)
Demographics:		
Household income	0.008*	0.038*
	(0.003)	(0.015)
Age	0.004*	0.020*
	(0.001)	(0.004)
Female	−0.121*	−0.650*
	(0.019)	(0.099)
University degree	0.008	0.043
	(0.020)	(0.105)
Constant	0.352*	−0.710*
	(0.045)	(0.225)
Observations	2,258	2,258
R^2	0.118	

Note: * p<0.05. Baselines for the value of own and parents' house are in both cases 'not property owner'.

Figure 3: High-wealth individuals are more likely to express a preference for inheritance taxation



Note: The predicted percentages are based on the coefficients for the logistic regression of model (2) of Table 1. A low-wealth individual is a female adult of average age (49 years) who earns less than £5000 a year and does not have a university degree; she is a renter and so are her parents. A high-wealth individual is a male adult of average age who earns more than £150,000 a year, who owns a house valued more than £750k, and whose parents own a house valued more than £600k.

about two in five low-wealth individuals express an opinion on inheritance taxes, about 19 of 20 high-wealth individuals do.

These results support H1 and highlight the following paradox of inheritance taxation: Low-wealth individuals, who would stand to gain the most from taxing inherited wealth, are those least likely to express an opinion about inheritance taxation. The existence of this paradox hints at one of the political obstacles to implementing higher inheritance tax rates: Many people simply don't have an opinion about inheritance taxation, and the ones who do are homeowners and children of homeowners, who are generally opposed to higher taxes. In such an environment, it is difficult for proponents of wealth taxation to mobilize political support, and there are few electoral incentives for governments to advocate for higher inheritance taxes since at best, voters won't care. At the same time, the environment is highly fertile for organized interests working to repeal the inheritance tax: The voters who should be most hostile to their agenda are those least likely to voice an opinion, and those most in favor are highly resourceful homeowners and their children.

One may wonder whether these results are unique to inheritance taxation, or whether they hold for all types of taxation. Indeed, research has shown that people have low levels of information regarding many different aspects of taxation and that the public also supports lower income taxes (Stantcheva, 2021; Barnes, 2015). In Online Appendix C, we examine preferences over income taxation using similar questions as those we presented here for inheritance taxation. The results show that preferences over inheritance taxation are

distinct from those over income taxation. Less than half as many respondents answer "don't know" to the income tax questions (15%-19%), and there is almost twice as much support for a more progressive income tax schedule than for a more progressive inheritance tax schedule (46% vs. 25%). Finally, the total effect of current and future expected housing wealth is considerably stronger for inheritance taxation than for income taxation. Among respondents with high socio-economic status, the effect of owning an expensive property, and having parents who do so too, is more than three times stronger on expressing an opinion about inheritance taxation compared to expressing an opinion about income taxation (.23 vs. .07).[8] At least compared to income taxation, preferences over inheritance taxation are clearly distinct.

4.2 Opposition to Inheritance Taxation Is Concentrated Among High-Wealth Individuals

Having corroborated H1 and H2a, we proceed to examine H2b, which stipulates that opposition to inheritance taxation is concentrated among high-wealth individuals. We begin by analyzing the three broad questions about the 'overall tax level', 'taxes you might pay in the future', and 'taxes your heirs might pay in the future'. In Figure 4, we regress responses to these three questions on the value of the respondent's own house, the value of the respondent's parents' house, and the same set of demographic covariates as used above using linear probability models, where the dependent variable is rescaled to equal one if the respondent thinks that taxes are (much) too high, and zero otherwise.

The figure shows that homeowners who own a more expensive property are more likely to say that the overall tax level, taxes that they might pay in the future, and taxes that their heirs might pay, are too high. The preferences of homeowners, however, only start to diverge significantly from those of non-homeowners when the value of their house exceeds £400k. Since inheritances below £325k are exempt from taxation, this result indicates that it is only homeowners whose heirs stand to pay inheritance tax who have preferences significantly different from renters. Therefore, property owners appear highly aware of their family's exposure to the inheritance tax.

In terms of effect sizes, the differences in preferences between renters and property owners are substantial. Homeowners owning a house valued more than £400k are between 13-20% more likely to think the overall tax level is too high. And homeowners owning a house valued more than £500k are 17-20% more likely to think taxes that they or their heirs might pay in the future are too high. For the children of homeowners, we generally see a similar pattern as for homeowners themselves, but the effects are weaker and only occasionally statistically significant.

[8] The difference in wealth effects is weaker for respondents with low socio-economic status, where it is .41 for inheritance and .37 for income.

Figure 4: The Effect of Current and Future Housing Wealth on Preferences over Inheritance Taxation



Linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals (thick line) and 90% confidence intervals (thin line). Dependent variable is whether the respondent thinks that taxes are (much) too high. The model includes controls for household income, age, gender, and level of education. N = 1,559 (overall level), 1,361 (you pay), and 1,370 (heirs pay). The full set of results is reported in Online Appendix D, which also includes the results when using ordered logistic regression.

In Figure 5, we analyze responses to the more specific set of questions about taxes on inheritances of a specific size. For inheritances below the threshold of £325k, housing wealth has no impact on inheritance tax preferences. In fact, the only significant predictor in the model is whether the respondent holds a university degree, which might suggest that more highly educated respondents are better informed about the inheritance tax threshold (for the full set of results see Online Appendix D). For inheritances above the exemption threshold (£325k), housing wealth is an important predictor of tax preferences. Individuals who own a house worth more than £300k are significantly more likely to say that taxes on inheritances between £325k and £1m are too high, and again the effects are substantial. Compared to renters, the predicted probability of supporting lower taxes is about 12 percentage points higher for homeowners with a house valued between £300k-£400k and up to 28 percentage points higher for homeowners who own a property worth more than £400k. For expected property inheritors, we see a similar, though slightly weaker, pattern. Compared to people whose parents do not own a property, individuals whose parents own a property worth more than £600k are 14 percentage points more likely to think that taxes on inheritances between £325k-£1m

are too high.

Figure 5: The Effects of Being a Homeowner or Property Inheritor on Preferences over Inheritance Taxation on Specific Groups



Linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals (thick line) and 90% confidence intervals (thin line). Dependent variable is whether the respondent thinks that taxes are (much) too high. The model includes controls for household income, age, gender, and level of education. N = 1,545 (<325k), 1,565 (£325k-1m), and 1,557 (>£1m). The full set of results is reported in Online Appendix D, which also includes the results when using ordered logistic regression.

Regarding taxes on inheritances above £1m, we see a sharp discontinuous spike in support for lower taxes for people owning a house worth more than £500k. These homeowners are the ones in our sample who are most likely to be exposed to taxes on inheritances above £1m, and it is therefore unsurprising that they are the ones most in favor of lower taxes on these large inheritances. Indeed, the predicted probability of saying that taxes are too high on inheritances over £1m is 21 percentage points higher for homeowners owning a house worth more than £750k than it is for renters. For future property inheritors, we see a similar pattern. Those whose parents own a property valued more than £600k are 17 percentage points more likely to think taxes on large inheritances above £1m are too high compared to individuals whose parents are not on the property ladder or own a house worth less than £400k.

Overall, the results suggest that owning a more expensive property and/or having parents who do so is associated with stronger opposition to higher inheritance taxes. The results also indicate that property

owners are highly aware of their family's exposure to the inheritance tax and are especially concerned about higher taxes on inheritances equivalent in value to the value of their property. These findings are consistent with H2b and indicate that the broad opposition to stronger taxation of inherited wealth, which is shown in Figure 2, is driven notably by homeowners who own relatively expensive properties.

4.3 Preferred Inheritance Tax Rates: Results from A Conjoint Experiment

The evidence so far strongly supports the argument that members of families of homeowners drive public opinion in opposition to higher inheritance taxes. At the same time, it says little about which marginal tax rates the public would actually prefer. Inspired by the work of Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve (2017), in this section we therefore present the results of a forced-choice conjoint experiment about support for different inheritance tax schedules. The conjoint experiment complements the previous analysis in several ways. First, it enables us to make more detailed inferences than simply inferring whether the public wants higher or lower taxes. More precisely, it allows us to elicit peoples' preferred marginal tax rates on different-sized inheritances. Simultaneously, the conjoint tests the robustness of our initial set of results to using a different survey technique. Finally, because the conjoint, following standard practice (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014), forced respondents to choose the tax system they preferred the most, it allows us to directly estimate the opinions of the respondents who did not voluntarily offer an opinion on our other inheritance tax questions. That stands in contrast to the work of Berinsky (2004) who examines the "silent voices" by imputing responses based on the socio-demographic background of respondents.

The conjoint experiment showed each respondent five comparisons of two hypothetical tax systems and asked them to pick the one they favored the most. Table 2 shows the attributes and tax rates of the potential tax systems. Because we wanted to allow for the possibility that the public may favor a progressive inheritance tax schedule, we did not mimic the current British inheritance tax schedule, which exempts inheritances below £325k and taxes the rest at 40%. Instead, we asked respondents to pick between two tax systems that each had four different tax brackets. These tax brackets were selected so we could distinguish between preferred marginal rates on small, medium, large, and very large inheritances. The tax rates were chosen to minimize the number of regressive tax systems shown, which are vanishingly rare in advanced democracies, and have never been in place in Britain. Therefore, the rates are generally higher for larger inheritances, but we did allow for the possibility that respondents may prefer a proportional tax schedule, in that a 20% marginal tax rate is included in all four tax brackets. This approach contrasts with that used in Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve (2017), where there are no restrictions placed on the rates that each bracket can face.

Table 2: Inheritance Categories and Inheritance Tax Rates Used in the Conjoint Experiment.

Inheritance categories	**Possible tax rates**
Inheritances valued up to £125,000	0%, 10%, 20%
£125,000 to £500,000	0%, 10%, 20%, 40%
£500,001 to £1,000,000	20%, 40%, 60%, 80%
Inheritances valued over £1,000,000	20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 90%

Figure 6 presents the overall results of the conjoint experiment. The left panel shows the average marginal component effects (AMCE); the right panel displays the marginal means. The results indicate that the public strongly supports letting small inheritances under £125k be exempted from taxation. Even a low marginal tax rate of 10% is much less popular than the preferred 0% tax rate. For larger inheritances between £125k-£500k, the public is slightly more supportive of a marginal tax rate of 10% than of one of 0%, yet they are strongly opposed to a higher tax rate of 40%. For even larger inheritances between £500k-£1m, the most popular marginal tax rate is 20%, followed closely by a tax rate of 40%. Higher tax rates of 60% and, especially, 80% are widely unpopular. For the top category, describing the marginal tax rate on inheritances in excess of £1m, the public is significantly more supportive of a marginal tax rate falling somewhere between 40% and 80% than of a lower one of 20% or an even higher one of 90%.

Looking across the four tax brackets, these results suggest that there is support for replacing the current British inheritance tax schedule with a more progressive one. Yet, support for a more progressive schedule does not reflect a preference for higher taxes at the top. A quasi-confiscatory marginal tax rate on top bequests of 90% is about as (un)popular as a low marginal tax rate of only 20%, and the public is about as happy with the current 40% tax rate as with a higher one of 60% or 80%. Rather, support for a more progressive tax schedule reflects a preference for lower marginal rates, and greater progressivity in the schedule, on inheritances below £1m. Consistent with H2a, these findings provide further support for the conclusion that there is little appetite for higher taxes on inherited wealth than those in place today.

4.3.1 Housing Wealth Is A Powerful Predictor of Preferred Marginal Inheritance Tax Rates

To examine how peoples' preferred marginal tax rates depend on housing wealth, we disaggregate the results by the value of one's own property and the value of one's parent's property in Figure 7. Following the recommendations of Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020), we show the results in terms of marginal means, and we evaluate whether preferences differ significantly across subgroups using omnibus F-tests. Note also that we break the estimated house price variables differently here than we did above, so that they concord with the inheritance tax brackets used in the conjoint. Yet, because very few respondents in our survey own a property, or have parents who own a property, worth more than £1m, the top category starts at £500k.

Figure 6: Preferred tax rates on differently sized inheritances



Figure 7: Preferred tax rates on differently sized inheritances, by value of own and parents' properties



The left panel of Figure 7 shows considerable heterogeneity in preferred marginal tax rates across housing wealth groups, and an omnibus F-test confirm that the differences are statistically significant (F(39; 29,607)=3.72, p=0.000). More specifically, the preferences of homeowners depend highly on their own tax exposure. For example, homeowners who own a property worth less than £125k are the strongest supporters of exempting inheritances under £125k from taxation; at the same time, they are the strongest opponents of taxing inheritances of this size at 20%. We observe a similar pattern for inheritances between £125k-£500k: Homeowners owning a house worth between £125k-£500k are, by far, the strongest opponents of a marginal tax rate of 40%, and those most in favor of low tax rates of 0% or 10%. And again, the story is broadly similar for larger inheritances between £500k-£1m. This time it's homeowners who own a house valued above £500k, who are the strongest opponents of an 80% marginal tax rate and the strongest proponents of a 20% tax rate. Finally, for very large inheritances above £1m, we don't see as strong differences between the house price groups as for the other tax brackets, which is probably due to the low number of respondents in the survey who own a house worth more than £1m. Yet, we do see that homeowners with relatively inexpensive houses, who are unlikely to be exposed to this tax in the future, are generally the ones most in favor of high tax rates of 60% and 80%, but they are also the ones most opposed to the highest tax rate of 90%.

For non-homeowners, we see that, despite having a material interest in higher taxes on inherited wealth, they do not consistently support higher inheritance taxes than do homeowners. In fact, they generally tend to hold more moderate preferences than most homeowners do, which can be seen from the many marginal means that are relatively closer to the neutral value of .5. In Online Appendix E, we show that a similar pattern exists for the respondents who answered 'don't know' to the inheritance tax questions analyzed above, many of whom are renters and/or children of renters (see Figure 3). These results are consistent with the argument that many non-homeowners are relatively uninformed about the inheritance tax system, and therefore, hold relatively weak preferences, if any at all. This is an important finding because it implies that mobilizing low-wealth individuals is in and of itself not enough to create stronger support for inheritance taxation. More fundamentally, proponents of inheritance taxation must convince low-wealth individuals of their material interests at stake.

How about the children of homeowners, who stand to inherit a property in the future? In the right panel of Figure 7, we break down preferred tax rates by the value of one's parents' house. Although an omnibus test of whether preferences differ by the value of the parents' house is insignificant (F(52; 31,847)=1.22, p=0.13), the figure shows similar, though weaker, patterns as those for homeowners on the two middle tax brackets. Respondents whose parents own a property worth between £125-£500k are more opposed to a tax rate of 40% on inheritances of this size than are individuals whose parents own either a cheaper or more expensive property. Similarly, respondents whose parents own a property worth more than £500k are the

strongest opponents of a tax rate of 80% on inheritances between £500-£1m and the strongest proponents of tax rates of 20% and 40%. Finally, we again see that low-wealth respondents, whose parents don't own a property, tend to hold more moderate preferences.

Overall, then, and consistent with H2b, these results suggest that members of families of homeowners are highly self-interested actors, who care deeply about taxes that apply directly to the family estate. Non-homeowners, on the other hand, who don't stand to pass on a house to their children, are not consistently more favorable of higher inheritance taxes. In fact, they generally tend to have more moderate preferences than homeowners, which again points to the conclusion that many of the people who would stand to gain from inheritance taxation do not have very strong views about it.

4.4 Does Factual Information about the Distribution of Housing Wealth Affect Inheritance Tax Preferences?

The above analysis consistently shows that the public, and mainly members of families of homeowners, are opposed to high taxes in inherited wealth. Many non-homeowners do not feel informed enough to articulate a preference, and if forced to do so, their preference is often inconsistent with their material interest. In this section, we investigate whether we can shift individuals' preferences over inheritance taxation by providing them with information about the distribution of housing wealth either locally, where they live, and/or nationally.[9]

As discussed, our information treatment divided respondents into three groups: a national and a national+local treatment group, and a control group which did not receive any information. Figure 8 shows the national+local treatment in the case of Greenwich. The housing ladder in the middle of the image shows house prices ranging from £0 to £1m. On the right of the ladder, we showed the percentiles of the distribution of house prices in England and Wales, and on the left, we showed the percentiles of the distribution of house prices locally in Greenwich. The image came with the following description:

> "The HOUSING LADDER figure below shows the cost of houses in your local authority (left) and in England and Wales (right) in 2019. Each number represents the percentage of houses sold in that area that were cheaper than the price shown on the housing ladder. For example, the number 95 indicates that 95 percent of houses sold for less than that price. The number 20 indicates that 20 percent of houses sold for less than that price. The number 50 shows the average (median) price of a house sold in that area."

[9]The following analysis was preregistered ahead of data collection at Open Science Framework under DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/PFN7Z.

Figure 8: The National+Local Information Treatment for Greenwich



Respondents in the national treatment were shown the same image and text, but with no information about their local authority. By providing relevant and relatable information about the kind of inheritances ordinary citizens can expect to receive, and by simultaneously highlighting the large inequalities in the housing market, we anticipate an increase in support for inheritance taxation in our treatment groups. To maximize understanding and to check the comprehension of the treatment, we followed up with two comprehension questions that asked how much you would have to pay in order to buy a house that was more expensive than 90% of houses sold in England and Wales. In addition, respondents in the local+national treatment condition were asked whether an average house in the respondent's local authority was cheaper than an average house nationally, and respondents in the national treatment condition were asked what the price was of an average house in England and Wales in 2019.[10]

In Figure 9, we show the direct effects of the information treatment on preferences over inheritance taxation. The dependent variables are the full five-category preference variables analyzed in Section 4, and all models are estimated using ordered logistic regression. The figure shows that neither of the information treatments had any direct impact on responses to the six inheritance tax questions. For the overall level, taxes you might pay, taxes your heirs might pay, and inheritances below £325k, the effects of the national+local

[10] 65% (696 of 1,067 respondents) in the national treatment group and 46% (485 of 1,048 individuals) in the local+national treatment condition answered both comprehension questions correctly. The results are robust to restricting the sample to respondents gave the right answer to both comprehension questions (results are included in Online Appendix F).

Figure 9: The Information Treatment Had No Effect on Inheritance Tax Preferences



Ordered logistic regression with 95% confidence intervals (thick line) and 90% confidence intervals (thin line). Dependent variable is whether the respondent thinks that the given level of taxes are too high (five points scale). N = 2,090. The corresponding table is found in Online Appendix G.

treatment suggest that people become slightly less opposed to higher taxes when seeing the treatment but for inheritances above £325k, the coefficients of both information treatments are positive, suggesting that, if anything, the treatments made respondents more opposed to higher taxes on medium-to-large inheritances.

To examine heterogeneity in the treatment effect across individuals with different levels of housing wealth, we next interact the information treatments with the value of the respondent's own house and the value of their parents' house. In Figure 10, we show the results for the question about the overall tax level, and while the figure shows one significant interaction term, the results overall suggest that the treatment effect is not conditioned by either the respondent's own housing wealth or that of their parents. The results are similar for the other questions (see Online Appendix G).

Next, we examine whether the treatment had any impact on responses in the conjoint experiment. Figure 11 displays the difference in marginal means between the control group and the two treatment groups, and shows that the treatments appear to have made respondents slightly less supportive of higher taxes on inheritances below £125k and slightly more supportive of keeping these inheritances exempt from taxation. An omnibus F-test, however, indicates that the treatments overall had no impact on preferences ($F(26; 31{,}847)=1.08$, $p=0.36$), and there is also no significant differences in preferences on any of the other brackets.

Figure 10: The treatment effect does not vary across wealth groups



Ordered logistic regression with 95% confidence intervals (thick line) and 90% confidence intervals (thin line). Dependent variable is whether the respondent thinks that the overall level of taxes are too high (five points scale). N = 1,948 (Panel A), and 2,090 (Panel B).

We also did not find any conditional effect of the treatment by housing wealth, future expected housing wealth, income, education, or gender. This is shown in Table 3, which reports the results of omnibus F-tests for the joint significance of the interaction of the treatment with the respective socio-economic group (here we again follow the recommendations of Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley, 2020). Overall, therefore, the results cannot corroborate either H3a or H3b.

The lack of any systematic effects of our information treatments could be due to several factors. Economics, personal finances, and taxes are complicated for many people to understand and not all respondents may have been able to make the necessary mental links between house price inequality and inequality in inherited wealth. It is also possible that informing respondents about inequality in house prices is simply too weak a treatment to elicit strong responses. Alternatively, it may be the case that inheritance tax preferences are inherently sticky and not easily altered even by a strong information treatment. The existing literature is certainly compatible with this view, as information effects on tax preferences are often small and/or insignificant (see e.g., Kuziemko et al., 2015; Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018). Regardless of the reason for the null effects, it seems safe to conclude that inheritance tax preferences are not easily altered by information highlighting the highly unequal distribution of house prices and housing wealth in either peoples' local areas and/or nationally.

Figure 11: Treatment effects on preferred inheritance tax rates



Table 3: Omnibus tests of differential treatment effects by own and parents' housing tenure.

	Test statistic	P-value
Treatment × homeowner	F(52; 31,834)=1.21	0.14
Treatment × parents homeowner	F(78; 31,821)=0.96	0.58
Treatment × value of own house	F(104; 29,568)=1.05	0.36
Treatment × value of parents' house	F(130; 31,795)=1.03	0.40
Treatment × income (3 groups)	F(78; 22,721)=0.88	0.76
Treatment × university degree	F(52; 30,364)=1.13	0.24
Treatment × gender	F(52; 31,834)=1.00	0.48

5 Conclusion

Wealth is far more unequally distributed than income. But inheritance taxes are relatively low in most countries and tax rates have declined significantly since the 1980s. We argue that one important cause of this disjuncture is that low-wealth individuals, notably renters and children of renters, who would stand to benefit from inheritance taxation, generally have ambiguous or moderate preferences, whereas property owners and their children, who would stand to lose out, hold strongly antagonistic views and are more vocal than their low-wealth counterparts. The key to understanding the lack of political appetite for using inheritance taxation to counteract wealth inequality, we have argued, lies in the contrasting political behaviours of families of property owners and non-owners.

Using a survey of over 3000 respondents in England and Wales, we provide a wide array of evidence to support this conjecture. Individuals who do not own property are far less likely to express an opinion on inheritance taxation—in general or on specific groups—than those who own property. And among those who own property, there are strong connections between their estimated property price (or their estimation of their parents' property price) and their attitudes to inheritance taxation, with those owning properties worth over an estimated £500,000 particularly unsupportive of inheritance taxation. Using a forced-choice conjoint experiment, we find similar results, and also confirm that those people who did not state an opinion on inheritance taxation in earlier questions have more moderate preferences than those who did. Finally, we address the question of whether support for inheritance taxation can be galvanized by providing information on the distribution of local or national house prices. In line with several existing studies, we find no conclusive evidence that factual information alters attitudes towards inheritance taxation.

All in all, it appears that inheritance taxation faces two obstacles - ambivalence and hostility. While very few people's estates incur inheritance tax, few citizens seem especially supportive of high rates of inheritance tax—on inheritances below a million pounds, the modal preferred tax rate in our analyses is never above 20 %. And providing information about wealth inequality does not alter this ambivalence. On the other side of

the ledger, property owners have strongly held and hostile views towards inheritance taxation, which largely match their material interest. In light of these twin challenges, it is unsurprising that the cross-national direction of travel has been to cut inheritance tax or remove it entirely.

One corollary of this is that in an era of rising house prices, the effects identified in this study stand to be amplified and opposition to inheritance taxation is likely to increase further. In the medium term, this will make it even harder for left-parties to be strong advocates for higher inheritance taxes—they would stand to gain little, while their opponents would find it easy to mobilise support against the proposals. Thus, it may become increasingly difficult to counteract wealth inequality through inheritance taxation.

Considering that many low-wealth individuals express preferences that are inconsistent with their material self-interest, a promising avenue for future experimental research appears to be informing these groups of their material interests at stake. This could for instance be done by highlighting the benefits of inheritance taxation in terms of the promotion of equal opportunity, or that the tax revenues generated by inheritance taxation might be spend in welfare-enhancing ways (for instance, increased redistribution, better public goods provision, lower non-wealth taxes, and so on).

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Appendix: For Online Publication

Contents

A House Price Estimates versus National Level

Our survey was conducted in England and Wales between the 28th of May and 7th of June 2021.

Data from the ONS (at https://landregistry.data.gov.uk/app/ukhpi) shows that for June 2021 the average house price in England was £285,002 and in Wales was £196,536. Adjusting for the relative volumes of houses sold (138,270 in England and 6,110 in Wales) gives and England and Wales average of £281,112.

Table A1: Comparing house price estimates from the YouGov survey to those from ONS

Region	Median Price from ONS (June 2021)	Median Price in Survey
East Midlands	£225,824	£210,000
East of England	£323,910	£327,500
London	£506,583	£500,000
North-East	£152,416	£150,000
North-West	£200,568	£200,000
South-East	£359,672	£350,000
South-West	£299,218	£300,000
Wales	£196,536	£200,000
West Midlands	£231,513	£217,500
Yorkshire and Humber	£196,452	£197,500

It is immediately apparent from Table A1 that these figures are very close - the average deviation is £5,240 pounds (an average gap of 1.7 percent). The largest differences are in the Midlands, where our respondents had slightly cheaper houses (by around £15,000 or seven percent).

Histograms of (logged) individual house price estimates for England and Wales as a whole and each region follow (Figures A2 and A3). We can see a largely log-normal distribution across the country and in each region.

Respondents were shown data on the local authority house median house price at the end of 2019 (i.e. before the pandemic to avoid the possible distortions introduced by the shock to housing sales of using 2020/2021 data). Average house prices in England at the end of 2019 were £248,097, whereas in the month of the survey they were somewhat higher £285,002 due to COVID's effects on the housing market which raised prices, particularly for detached housing in the countryside. So on average, median prices at the time of the survey were around £38,000 higher.

We now compare the 2019 local authority prices to the estimates given by respondents in May/June 2021 (note respondents gave their house price before seeing these figures). Figure A3 shows the full data on people who owned houses (omitting those who put down a house price of more than £2m). The black line shows a 45 degree line, whereas the blue line and confidence interval are the best linear fit.

Figure A1: Histogram of estimated house prices



Figure A2: Histogram of estimated house prices, by Region



Figure A3: Association between estimated house price and actual house, local authority level



Table A2: DV: Individual House Price Estimate

(Intercept)	59955.2
	-10210
Median Local Authority Price	1.051
	-0.037
Num.Obs.	1700
R2	0.317
R2 Adj.	0.316
AIC	45864
BIC	45880.3
Log.Lik.	-22929
F	787.416

We see a very close linear relationship but with an offset of around £60,000. This may reflect two things. First, house prices had increased by £38,000 over the time period on average - as noted above. The remaining £22,000 could come from either (a) over-optimistic estimates, (b) the fact that regression takes the mean (not median) of the conditional expectation, (c) that some residences sold are occupied by renters, who do not answer our house price question, (d) or some un-representativeness at the local authority level (though note the sample is highly representative of house prices at the regional level).

We can deal with problem (b) by taking the median house price offered by the sample of respondents for each local authority and removing local authorities with fewer than seven respondents. The numbers in

Figure A4 below reflect the number of observations in each local authority.

Figure A4: Association between estimated house price and actual house, local authority level



Table A3: DV: Median House Price Estimate by Local Authority

(Intercept)	49223.771
	(12746.289)
Median Local Authority Price	0.997
	(0.045)
Num.Obs.	200
R2	0.715
R2 Adj.	0.714
AIC	5075.3
BIC	5085.2
Log.Lik.	-2534.634
F	496.598

Here we see the intercept has been reduced by £10,000 once we take the median answer into account. This leaves over-optimism, different tenure status, and sample un-representativeness as potential explanations for the remaining difference of around £10,000. Our R squared measure of fit also more than doubles from 0.316 to 0.714, largely because we have reduced dispersion by aggregating. Finally, whereas the line of best fit was 1.05 in the previous analysis it is now 0.997 - slightly closer to a one to one relationship.

Figure A5: Distributions of The Grouped House Price Variables



B The Wealth Gradient in 'Don't Know'-Responses for All Inheritance Tax Questions

Figure B1: The relationship between wealth and registering an opinion on question about inheritance tax rates



Logistic regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals (thick line) and 90% confidence intervals (thin line). All models include controls for household income, age, gender, and level of education. N = 2,258.

C Inheritance vs. Income Taxation

Figure C1: Preferences over income taxation



Figure C2: Preferences over the progressivity of the inheritance and income tax systems



Table C1: Probability of answering questions about overall inheritance and income tax levels, by socio-economic and wealth status

Panel A: Inheritance Taxation				
		Wealth Status		
		Low	High	Wealth effect
Socio-economic status	Low	0.42	0.83	0.41
	High	0.71	0.94	0.23
Panel B: Income Taxation				
		Wealth Status		
		Low	High	Wealth effect
Socio-economic status	Low	0.56	0.93	0.37
	High	0.92	0.99	0.07

Note: A person with low socio-economic status is a female respondent of average age without a university degree who earns less than £5000 a year. A person with high socio-economic status is a male respondent of average age with a university degree who earns more than £150k a year. A person with low wealth status is a renter and whose parents don't own a property. A person with high wealth status owns a house worth more than £750k and whose parents own a property worth more than £600.

D Full Set of Results for Figures 4 and 5

Table D1: The Effect of Current and Future Housing Wealth on Preferences over Inheritance Taxation

	Overall level	You pay	Heirs pay	Overall level	You pay	Heirs pay
	Ordered logistic regression			*Linear Probability Model*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Value of own house:						
£100k and under	0.324	0.467	0.473	0.118	0.043	0.087
	(0.278)	(0.334)	(0.322)	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.087)
£100k to £200k	−0.065	−0.280	−0.284	−0.049	−0.106*	−0.119*
	(0.149)	(0.167)	(0.164)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.044)
£200k to £300k	0.173	−0.088	0.056	0.055	−0.016	0.028
	(0.149)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.043)
£300k to £400k	0.231	0.100	0.108	0.085	0.045	0.067
	(0.171)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.049)
£400k to £500k	0.429*	0.182	0.233	0.126*	0.085	0.074
	(0.205)	(0.218)	(0.220)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.059)
£500k to £750k	0.764*	0.913*	0.718*	0.202*	0.200*	0.174*
	(0.222)	(0.238)	(0.239)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.063)
£750k and up	0.543*	0.558	0.452	0.141	0.195*	0.170*
	(0.276)	(0.302)	(0.292)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.078)
Value of parents' house:						
Not applicable/deceased	0.183	0.209	0.513*	−0.009	−0.016	0.079
	(0.158)	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.046)
£200k and under	0.122	0.301	0.509*	0.022	0.054	0.090
	(0.191)	(0.207)	(0.213)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.056)
£200k to £400k	0.251	0.389*	0.537*	0.064	0.082	0.125*
	(0.179)	(0.195)	(0.200)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.053)
£400k to £600k	0.351	0.293	0.537*	0.033	0.003	0.087
	(0.229)	(0.245)	(0.246)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.065)
£600k and up	0.141	0.223	0.550*	0.027	0.037	0.114
	(0.253)	(0.267)	(0.273)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.072)
Demographics:						
Household income	−0.003	−0.020	−0.001	−0.002	−0.005	−0.002
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	−0.009*	−0.010*	−0.007	−0.002	−0.002*	−0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.268*	0.224*	0.162	0.085*	0.077*	0.066*
	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
University degree	−0.495*	−0.439*	−0.509*	−0.116*	−0.113*	−0.119*
	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Constant				0.585*	0.703*	0.566*
				(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Observations	1,559	1,361	1,370	1,559	1,361	1,370

Note: * p<0.05. Baselines for the value of own and parents' house are in both cases 'not property owner'.

Table D2: The Effects of Being a Homeowner or Property Inheritor on Preferences over Inheritance Taxation on Specific Groups

	<£325k	£325k-£1m	>£1m	<£325k	£325k-£1m	>£1m
	Ordered logistic regression			*Linear Probability Model*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Value of own house:						
£100k and under	0.311	0.111	0.138	0.082	0.021	−0.065
	(0.290)	(0.282)	(0.268)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.070)
£100k to £200k	−0.159	−0.001	0.086	−0.035	−0.025	−0.028
	(0.153)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.038)
£200k to £300k	0.142	0.210	0.313*	0.058	0.078	0.051
	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)
£300k to £400k	0.013	0.305	0.239	0.045	0.118*	0.031
	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.043)
£400k to £500k	0.148	0.717*	0.380	0.074	0.232*	0.013
	(0.210)	(0.202)	(0.207)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.052)
£500k to £750k	0.190	0.997*	0.836*	0.049	0.281*	0.120*
	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.216)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.054)
£750k and up	0.065	0.806*	1.077*	0.026	0.238*	0.209*
	(0.285)	(0.275)	(0.273)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.069)
Value of parents' house:						
Not applicable/deceased	0.084	0.414*	0.208	−0.025	0.042	0.021
	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.039)
£200k and under	0.095	0.126	0.023	0.008	0.033	0.007
	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.191)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.048)
£200k to £400k	0.286	0.413*	−0.051	0.032	0.083	−0.034
	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.179)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.045)
£400k to £600k	0.077	0.542*	0.378	−0.016	0.089	0.059
	(0.231)	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.057)
£600k and up	0.229	0.610*	0.608*	0.014	0.139*	0.165*
	(0.257)	(0.245)	(0.253)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.062)
Demographics:						
Household income	−0.018	0.002	−0.013	−0.006	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	−0.003	−0.007	−0.006	−0.001	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.066	0.224*	0.172	0.028	0.060*	0.005
	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)
University degree	−0.368*	−0.458*	−0.479*	−0.090*	−0.106*	−0.057*
	(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Constant				0.644*	0.427*	0.361*
				(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.059)
Observations	1,545	1,565	1,557	1,545	1,565	1,557

Note: * p<0.05. Baselines for the value of own and parents' house are in both cases 'not property owner'.

E How Do 'Don't Knowers' Answer When Forced To?

In the main part of the paper, we argue that many low-wealth individuals are unable to form an opinion about inheritance taxation, and that if they do, they are likely to hold relatively weak preferences. Because our survey included both regular survey items, which usually allow people to answer 'don't know' and a standard conjoint experiment, which always forces respondents to answer, we can directly estimate the difference in answers between people who don't freely express an opinion on inheritance taxation and those who do. In a conjoint analysis, weak preferences would translate into marginal means equal to .5, which would be the result if everyone answered wholly at random or if a given attribute had no impact on support for a tax system. The implication of our argument is therefore that 'don't knowers' have preferences closer to .5 compared to the respondents who freely expressed their preference. By contrast, if the 'don't knowers' in fact hold strong preferences in line with their material self-interest when pressed to express an opinion, we would expect them to support high marginal tax rates and oppose low ones.

In Figure E1, we show the marginal means separately for respondents who answered 'don't know' to the question about the overall inheritance tax level, and for those who offered an opinion. On small inheritances below £125k and on large inheritances above £1m, there is no difference in answers between the groups, but in the two middle tax brackets, respondents who answered 'don't know' to our inheritance tax question above hold weaker, more moderate preferences. They are slightly less opposed to the highest marginal tax rates and slightly less in favor of the lowest marginal tax rates. Overall, the omnibus F-test indicates that preferences differ between respondents who answered 'don't know' to the overall inheritance tax questions and those who provided an answer ($F(13;\ 31{,}847)=2.13$, $p=0.01$). This is consistent with our overall argument that many low-wealth individuals are unable to form an opinion on inheritance taxation in the first place, and if they do, they tend to hold relatively weak preferences that depart from their material self-interest.

Figure E1: Preferred tax rates on differently sized inheritances, by whether respondent responded to question about overall inheritance tax rate



F Treatment Effects for Comprehenders

Even limiting the analysis of treatment effects to those respondents in the treatment groups who answered both comprehension questions correctly (696 of 1,067 respondents in the national treatment group and 485 of 1,048 individuals in the local+national treatment group) does not produce meaningful treatment effects. Table F1 shows that neither of the information treatments had any direct impact on responses to the six inheritance tax questions, with the sole exception of the local+national treatment, which appears to make respondents who understood the treatment less opposed to higher taxes on currently exempt inheritances. Panels B and C show that just as in the full sample, the treatment effects are not conditioned by the respondent's own housing wealth or their parents' housing wealth. The analysis of the conjoint in Figure F1 indicates that respondents who received and understood either treatment are significantly more supportive of a 0% tax rate on small inheritances of less than £125k and significantly more opposed to a 20% tax rate on such inheritances than the control group. Other than this, however, there are still no systematic treatment effects if we limit the sample to only those respondents who correctly answered the comprehension questions. Overall, this mirrors the findings in the main analysis.

Table F1: No treatment effect on inheritance tax preferences among comprehenders

	Dependent variable:					
	Overall level	You might pay	Your heirs might pay	<£325k	£325k-£1m	>£1m
Panel A: Direct treatment effects						
National	−0.047	0.008	−0.027	0.086	0.146	0.065
	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.104)
National+local	−0.187	−0.160	−0.238	−0.267*	−0.022	−0.086
	(0.120)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Panel B: Treatment × value of own house						
National × £100k and under	−0.523	−0.873	−0.402	−0.433	0.006	−0.393
	(0.826)	(1.014)	(0.907)	(0.801)	(0.771)	(0.716)
National+local × £100k and under	0.333	−0.705	−0.426	0.704	−0.982	−0.974
	(0.798)	(1.191)	(1.183)	(0.905)	(0.962)	(0.989)
National × £100k to £200k	0.666*	0.041	0.178	0.192	0.249	0.374
	(0.333)	(0.370)	(0.366)	(0.334)	(0.335)	(0.327)
National+local × £100k to £200k	0.528	0.493	0.274	0.266	0.003	0.057
	(0.395)	(0.442)	(0.432)	(0.420)	(0.397)	(0.404)
National × £200k to £300k	−0.180	−0.246	−0.059	−0.556	−0.293	0.189
	(0.325)	(0.351)	(0.352)	(0.330)	(0.325)	(0.323)
National+local × £200k to £300k	0.008	0.126	0.005	−0.290	−0.185	0.017
	(0.365)	(0.400)	(0.398)	(0.372)	(0.366)	(0.366)
National × £300k to £400k	0.173	0.354	0.780	0.079	0.539	0.387
	(0.381)	(0.396)	(0.398)	(0.375)	(0.371)	(0.361)
National+local × £300k to £400k	0.165	0.411	0.460	0.046	0.017	0.169
	(0.391)	(0.416)	(0.417)	(0.406)	(0.389)	(0.385)
National × £400k to £500k	−0.158	−0.239	−0.165	−0.330	−0.362	−0.507
	(0.421)	(0.434)	(0.447)	(0.436)	(0.416)	(0.418)
National+local × £400k to £500k	0.136	0.182	0.247	−0.309	−0.175	−0.110
	(0.510)	(0.534)	(0.531)	(0.515)	(0.488)	(0.501)
National × £500k to £750k	0.531	0.241	0.280	−0.251	0.394	0.144
	(0.469)	(0.511)	(0.518)	(0.467)	(0.460)	(0.471)
National+local × £500k to £750k	0.587	0.539	0.957	−0.334	0.463	0.469
	(0.548)	(0.570)	(0.592)	(0.543)	(0.532)	(0.526)
National × £750k and up	−0.871	−1.103	−1.255	−0.629	−0.699	−0.522
	(0.591)	(0.661)	(0.650)	(0.629)	(0.584)	(0.601)
National+local × £750k and up	−0.462	−0.409	−0.513	−0.052	−0.246	−0.154
	(0.582)	(0.647)	(0.636)	(0.630)	(0.607)	(0.579)
Panel C: Treatment × value of parents' house						
National × Not applicable/deceased	0.483	0.313	0.341	−0.408	0.227	0.196
	(0.340)	(0.366)	(0.375)	(0.341)	(0.342)	(0.339)
National+local × Not applicable/deceased	0.600	0.859*	0.624	0.361	0.189	0.212
	(0.380)	(0.418)	(0.418)	(0.394)	(0.376)	(0.386)
National × £200k and under	−0.053	0.021	0.358	−0.498	0.270	−0.174
	(0.445)	(0.474)	(0.489)	(0.451)	(0.446)	(0.437)
National+local × £200k and under	−0.328	0.015	−0.221	−0.324	−0.155	−0.286
	(0.492)	(0.550)	(0.553)	(0.512)	(0.510)	(0.512)
National × £200k to £400k	0.078	−0.020	0.153	−0.389	0.290	0.072
	(0.409)	(0.435)	(0.455)	(0.417)	(0.414)	(0.412)
National+local × £200k to £400k	0.285	0.638	0.190	0.245	−0.158	−0.026
	(0.460)	(0.499)	(0.511)	(0.473)	(0.466)	(0.467)
National × £400k to £600k	−0.363	−0.223	−0.192	−0.485	−0.718	−0.542
	(0.563)	(0.582)	(0.618)	(0.561)	(0.560)	(0.572)
National+local × £400k to £600k	0.484	1.092	0.597	0.181	−0.503	−0.542
	(0.579)	(0.616)	(0.622)	(0.592)	(0.574)	(0.580)
National × £600k and up	0.021	0.164	0.308	−0.720	−0.255	0.064
	(0.585)	(0.613)	(0.659)	(0.598)	(0.577)	(0.598)
National+local × £600k and up	−0.780	0.130	0.126	0.176	−0.590	−0.563
	(0.620)	(0.663)	(0.664)	(0.644)	(0.613)	(0.644)

Note: Main effects omitted from the output. $^{*}p<0.05$.

Figure F1: Treatment effects on preferred inheritance tax rates (comprehenders only)



G Table for Figures 10 and 9

Table G1: The Information Treatment Had No Effect on Inheritance Tax Preferences

	Dependent variable:					
	Overall level	You might pay	Your heirs might pay	<£325k	£325k-£1m	>£1m
Panel A: Direct treatment effects						
National	0.013	−0.010	−0.0002	0.074	0.170	0.128
	(0.096)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.095)
National+local	−0.065	−0.095	−0.140	−0.134	0.050	0.009
	(0.097)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.096)

Note: * p<0.05.

Table G2: No evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects

	Dependent variable:					
	Overall level	You might pay	Your heirs might pay	<£325k	£325k-£1m	>£1m
Panel A: Treatment × value of own house						
National × £100k and under	−0.310	−1.009	−0.038	−0.177	−0.305	−0.272
	(0.639)	(0.761)	(0.732)	(0.647)	(0.636)	(0.598)
National+local × £100k and under	0.008	−0.026	0.153	−0.337	−0.366	−0.399
	(0.582)	(0.698)	(0.646)	(0.595)	(0.591)	(0.569)
National × £100k to £200k	0.782*	0.247	0.512	0.467	0.205	0.428
	(0.300)	(0.331)	(0.323)	(0.303)	(0.300)	(0.297)
National+local × £100k to £200k	0.501	0.491	0.400	0.511	0.088	0.195
	(0.301)	(0.331)	(0.319)	(0.308)	(0.302)	(0.298)
National × £200k to £300k	−0.029	−0.119	0.249	−0.321	−0.241	−0.062
	(0.291)	(0.316)	(0.317)	(0.296)	(0.291)	(0.292)
National+local × £200k to £300k	0.137	0.271	0.399	−0.044	0.064	0.153
	(0.295)	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.298)	(0.297)	(0.296)
National × £300k to £400k	0.312	0.431	0.926*	0.155	0.361	0.229
	(0.339)	(0.355)	(0.355)	(0.335)	(0.330)	(0.325)
National+local × £300k to £400k	0.391	0.827*	0.972*	0.443	0.465	0.170
	(0.332)	(0.346)	(0.351)	(0.337)	(0.329)	(0.323)
National × £400k to £500k	0.008	−0.050	0.170	−0.224	−0.343	−0.611
	(0.402)	(0.412)	(0.422)	(0.418)	(0.394)	(0.398)
National+local × £400k to £500k	0.204	0.702	0.711	0.231	0.005	0.142
	(0.442)	(0.463)	(0.467)	(0.445)	(0.431)	(0.439)
National × £500k to £750k	0.500	0.312	0.519	−0.138	0.156	0.009
	(0.439)	(0.480)	(0.481)	(0.443)	(0.433)	(0.445)
National+local × £500k to £750k	0.448	0.907	1.062*	−0.141	0.142	0.127
	(0.460)	(0.495)	(0.489)	(0.456)	(0.442)	(0.430)
National × £750k and up	−0.356	−0.507	−0.561	−0.228	−0.407	−0.322
	(0.542)	(0.605)	(0.593)	(0.558)	(0.530)	(0.551)
National+local × £750k and up	−0.555	−0.218	−0.426	0.091	−0.298	−0.316
	(0.550)	(0.606)	(0.594)	(0.595)	(0.571)	(0.553)
Panel B: Treatment × value of parents house						
National × Not applicable/deceased	0.413	0.206	0.604	−0.357	−0.087	0.156
	(0.301)	(0.319)	(0.326)	(0.299)	(0.298)	(0.300)
National+local × Not applicable/deceased	0.250	0.521	0.338	−0.089	0.024	−0.163
	(0.305)	(0.322)	(0.324)	(0.307)	(0.300)	(0.303)
National × £200k and under	0.035	0.116	0.642	−0.310	0.227	−0.112
	(0.401)	(0.427)	(0.439)	(0.407)	(0.404)	(0.400)
National+local × £200k and under	−0.457	0.025	−0.175	−0.580	−0.208	−0.621
	(0.406)	(0.435)	(0.439)	(0.412)	(0.412)	(0.406)
National × £200k to £400k	0.071	0.079	0.453	−0.130	0.045	0.077
	(0.377)	(0.398)	(0.415)	(0.381)	(0.377)	(0.379)
National+local × £200k to £400k	0.057	0.294	0.235	−0.029	−0.122	−0.384
	(0.378)	(0.403)	(0.415)	(0.385)	(0.382)	(0.379)
National × £400k to £600k	−0.562	−0.383	−0.045	−0.453	−0.967	−0.659
	(0.523)	(0.538)	(0.557)	(0.512)	(0.518)	(0.528)
National+local × £400k to £600k	0.095	0.729	0.358	−0.389	−0.622	−0.878
	(0.509)	(0.524)	(0.536)	(0.510)	(0.506)	(0.509)
National × £600k and up	0.090	0.272	0.850	−0.339	−0.353	0.262
	(0.535)	(0.564)	(0.586)	(0.555)	(0.526)	(0.554)
National+local × £600k and up	−0.961	0.094	−0.046	−0.200	−0.536	−0.832
	(0.560)	(0.590)	(0.591)	(0.581)	(0.551)	(0.580)
N	2,090	1,819	1,848	2,077	2,102	2,104

Note: * p<0.05. The table reports interaction terms of interactions between the treatment variable and the value of the respondent's own property (panel A) and the value of their parents' property (panel B).