Journal article
Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science
- Abstract:
- Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 448.5KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s11098-017-0962-x
Authors
- Publisher:
- Springer Netherlands
- Journal:
- Philosophical Studies More from this journal
- Volume:
- 175
- Issue:
- 9
- Pages:
- 2353–2372
- Publication date:
- 2017-09-06
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1573-0883
- ISSN:
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0031-8116
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:826690
- UUID:
-
uuid:555ffb0c-f87d-429d-9515-09165ba9e14c
- Local pid:
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pubs:826690
- Source identifiers:
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826690
- Deposit date:
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2018-04-17
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
-
Copyright © 2017 The Authors.
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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