

BETWEEN POETRY AND MUSIC

INTRODUCTION: WHAT ARE POEMS?

Simply by formulating a question about the nature of ancient Greek poetry or music, any modern English speaker is already guilty of anachronism. In recent years especially, scholars have reminded one another that the words ‘music’ and ‘poetry’ denote concepts with no easy counterpart in Greek. Μουσική in its broadest sense evokes not only innumerable kinds of structured movement and sound, but also the political, psychological, and cosmic order of which song, verse, and dance are supposed to be perceptible manifestations.¹ Likewise, ποίησις and the ποιητικὴ τέχνη can encompass all kinds of ‘making,’ from the assembly of a table to the construction of a rhetorical argument.² Of course there were specifically artistic usages of these terms — according to Plato, ‘musical and metrical production’ was the

¹ See e.g. P. Murray and P. Wilson, ‘Introduction’, in P. Murray and P. Wilson (edd.), *Music and the Muses* (Oxford, 2004), 1-8, at 1-6; L. Woodward, ‘Diogenes of Babylon reading Plato on music’, in V. Harte, M.M. McCabe, R.W. Sharples, and A. Sheppard (edd.), *Aristotle and the Stoics Reading Plato* (London, 2010), 233-53, at 236, 244-5; A. Rotstein, ‘*Mousikoi agones* and the conception of genre in ancient Greece’, *ClAnt* 31 (2012), 92-127, at 94; P. Brüllmann, ‘Music builds character’, *Apeiron* 46 (2013), 345-73, at 349-50; A. D’Angour, ‘Sense and sensation in music’, in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics*, (Chichester, 2015), 188-203, at 188-90; cf. M.L. West, ‘The singing of Homer and the modes of early Greek music’, *JHS* 101 (1981), 113-29, at 113-4.

² See especially Pl. *Sph.* 219a8-c1, 265a10-8d5; S. Halliwell, *The Aesthetics of Mimesis* (Princeton, 2002), 62-5.

default meaning of ποίησις in everyday speech.³ But even in discussions which restrict themselves to the sphere of human art, we find nothing like the neat compartmentalisation of harmonised rhythmic melody on the one hand, and stylised verbal composition on the other, which is often casually implied or expressly formulated in modern comparisons of ‘music’ with ‘poetry.’⁴ For many ancient theorists the City Dionysia, a dithyrambic festival, and a recitation of Homer all featured different versions of one and the same form of composition, a μουσική or ποιητική to which λόγοι, γράμματα, and συλλαβαί were just as essential as ἁρμονία, φθόγγοι, ῥυθμός, and χρόνοι.⁵

But the Aristotelian, Platonic, and Aristoxenean definitions to which I have just alluded all have three components: verbal language, tonal arrangement, rhythmically structured time. This fact testifies to an enduring awareness that the one art in question entails three distinct realms of compositional activity. Of these, one (λόγος/γράμμα/συλλαβή) is almost inescapably verbal, while the two others (ῥυθμός/χρόνος; ἁρμονία/φθόγγος) often have to do with musical sound abstracted from linguistic diction. Of course, concepts like λόγος and ἁρμονία could map onto both language and wordless song, as well as any number of other things.⁶ But increasingly over time, Greek theory makes lexical composition distinct from

³ Pl. *Smp.* 205b8-c10; see further C.O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry* (Cambridge, 1963), 1.76-8.

⁴ See e.g. G. Maxwell, *On Poems* (London, 2012), 1-4.

⁵ See Pl. *R.* 398d1-3 (and cf. *Gorg.* 501d7-2b8); Arist. *Po.* 1447a13-23; [Plu.] *de Mus.* 1144a8-b2 with A.D. Barker, *The Science of Harmonics in Classical Greece* (Cambridge, 2007), 236-9.

⁶ See esp. Pl. *R.* 400dl1-402a4 with Halliwell (n. 2), 131-2; *Tim.* 36e5-7b6; Z. Petraki, ‘The soul “dances”’, *Apeiron* 41 (2008), 147-70, at 162-3; T. Lynch, ‘The symphony of temperance in *Republic* 4’, *GRMS* 5 (2017), 18-34, at 22-4 *et passim*.

melodic and rhythmic arrangement. That this distinction was artificially applied to a performance tradition in which verse and song were bound tightly together is a fact of which scholarly awareness has recently become heightened. But it is precisely in the context of this heightened awareness that we can fruitfully ask what methods ancient critics used to analyse that tradition into its component parts. The question, ‘what makes something a poem, and is it distinct from what makes something music?’ naturally vexed antiquity just as it does modernity.⁷ Ancient definitions of poetic art have received no end of attention, but they still need to be more fully understood *as* definitions — that is, as applications of the philosophical principles which their authors espoused about how to properly distinguish one thing from another. This paper addresses that need: it interprets the history of Peripatetic and Stoic distinctions between ποίησις and μουσική using theories of definition and material change from those same traditions.

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle's definitions

For Aristotle, definition was a matter of uniqueness and essentiality. To summarise: Aristotle uses the neuter substantive ἴδιον to mean a description which may be predicated of one species (εἶδος) or individual, and not of any other species or individual. ‘Two-legged animal capable of laughter’ is thus an ἴδιον of ‘human being,’ while ‘two-legged animal sitting

⁷ For one recent treatment see J.D. Culler, *Theory of the Lyric* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2015), 84, 134-7, 182-3, and *passim* with further bibliography.

in seat 43 of the Bodleian library' is an ἴδιον of me at the moment of this writing.⁸ Strictly speaking, an ἴδιον is a definition (ὅρος) if it describes an essential feature which invariably belongs to its subject by the nature of that subject (καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀεί), not only in a particular moment or in relation to particular other things (πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ).⁹ In these terms, the two examples I gave above are ἰδίᾳ of 'human being' and of me respectively, but neither is a ὅρος. 'Mortal animal capable of reason,' though, is a ὅρος: a description of 'what it is to be' (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) a human.¹⁰ Aristotle maintains this distinction throughout his work on log-

⁸ See Arist. *Top.* 128b16-21; J. Barnes, 'Property in Aristotle's *Topics*', *AGPh* 52 (1970), 136-55, at 137-40. One may predicate an ἴδιον of a larger group such as a γένος, but Aristotle is most interested in uniquely describing εἶδη and individuals: the former are the proper object of all definition, and the latter are the πρῶται οὐσίαι, the most real and fundamentally existent things: see *Cat.* 2a11-37; *Top.* 132a10-21 with A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1987), 1.181; T. Reinhardt, 'La propiedad en los "Tópicos" de Aristóteles', *AnFil* 35 (2002), 341-64, at 344.

⁹ Arist. *Top.* 128b34-9a5.

¹⁰ Arist. *Top.* 101b19-39. See Reinhardt (n. 8), 349-55; K. Chiba, 'Aristotle on essence and defining-phrase in his dialectic', in D. Charles (ed.), *Definition in Greek Philosophy* (Oxford, 2010), 203-51, at 214-20; P. Crivelli, 'The Stoics on definitions', in *ibid.*, 359-423, at 402 with n. 141; M. Ferejohn, *Formal Causes* (Oxford, 2013), 118-9.

ic by using ἴδιον in what has been called its ‘weak’ sense — to mean a unique property which may be, but is not necessarily, essential to and therefore definitive of the thing it describes.¹¹

In other contexts, Aristotle also talks about unique individuals in terms of a ὑποκείμενον, an underlying ‘stuff’ or ‘matter,’ of which various properties may come to be predicated. It is a vexed question whether Aristotle thought that there exists, actually or conceivably, some unqualified ‘prime matter’ (πρώτη ὕλη) which can take on any characteristic and out of whose various individuations every known thing is formed.¹² All we need say here, however, is that Aristotle describes the things we encounter around us as being composed of

¹¹ See Barnes (n. 8), 141-2 on *Top.* 155a3-10; J. Brunschwig, ‘Sur le système des prédicables dans les *Topiques* d’Aristote’, in *Energeia* (Paris, 1986), 145-57, at 146-7, 153-5. A special case is when Aristotle defines a class of things by predicating of a term such as ‘triangle’ a coextensive ἴδιον such as ‘shape whose angles add up to 180 degrees.’ Such an ἴδιον naturally articulates τὸ τί ἔστιν. See further Reinhardt (n. 8), 360-2 on Arist. *APO.* 91a15-18.

¹² The question is controversial but has been persuasively answered in the affirmative: see H.M. Robinson, ‘Prime matter in Aristotle’, *Phronesis* 19 (1974), 168-88, at 169-83; D. Bostock, ‘Aristotle’s theory of matter’, in *Space, Time, Matter, and Form* (Oxford, 2006), 30-47 (reprinted from D. Sphendonē-Mentzou, J.N. Hattiangadi, and D.M. Johnson [edd.], *Aristotle and Contemporary Science* [Oxford, 2001], 3-22), at 31-44; D. Charles, ‘Simple genesis and prime matter’, in F. de Haas and J. Mansfeld (edd.), *Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Book I* (Oxford, 2004), 151-69, at 158-65; F.A. Lewis, “‘What’s the matter with prime matter?’”, *OSAPh* 34 (2008), 123-46, at 136-45 with Arist. *Metaph.* 1029a7-26; *GC* 329a24-b5, 334a16-24 against e.g. W. Charlton, *Aristotle: Physics, Books I and II* (Oxford, 1970), 129-45; M. Furth, *Substance, Form, and Psyche* (Cambridge, 1988), 87-8; M.L. Gill, *Aristotle on Substance* (Princeton, 1989), 42-6, 243-52.

some underlying substance which, though in itself unqualified in some respect, can come to be qualified in that same respect.¹³ By way of illustration we are invited to imagine shapeless bronze, which may be shaped first into a square, then into a circle. The sculptor would thereby have made two different things, but the bronze ‘subsists’ (ὑπόκειται) or ‘endures’ (ὑπομένει). The plastic arts are a natural point of reference for this mode of thought, and the ὑποκείμενον may be referred to somewhat figuratively as ὕλη — the ‘wood’ or ‘material’ out of which an individual is ‘carved’ to take on the properties which make it unlike other things.

A third important way in which Aristotle characterises individuals is via the notorious ἔργον. This word is very often understood to mean the action which some thing performs *qua* that thing. However, a recent interpretation argues that the term also denotes the product of that essential work.¹⁴ Whether or not we can accept this assertion for Aristotle generally, it will soon appear to hold good in terms of his poetic theory. In any case the ἔργον of a thing must be unique (ἴδιον) to it, and is closely wrapped up with its definition: when we know what x does that no other kind of thing or person does, then we are able to know x *qua* x, and to evaluate it in the terms proper to its unique nature.¹⁵

The concepts of ἴδιον, ὑποκείμενον, and ἔργον provide three different but interrelated means of specifying what something is: they represent distinct systems of thought which may

¹³ See Arist. *Cat.* 4a10-b19; *Metaph.* 1028a20-31; *Phys.* 190a33-1a21; Charlton (n. 12), 73-4; Furth (n. 12), 58-65.

¹⁴ S.H. Baker, ‘The concept of *ergon*’, *OSAPh* 48 (2015), 227-66, at 229-41, 248-54.

¹⁵ See *EN* 1097b28-34. Cf. H.H. Joachim, *Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford, 1951), 48-50; S. Broadie (commentary) and C. Rowe (translation), *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford, 2002), 276; Baker (n. 14), 229-30 n. 10.

nevertheless describe the same subject in complementary ways. To give an example of all these terms in action: if a man knows no music but then receives training to become an aulete, we may say that ‘man’ was the ὑποκείμενον which underwent the change from ‘un-musical’ to ‘musical.’ Now our man might be said to have acquired the ἴδιον (‘mortal animal trained in music’), and to be able to accomplish the unique ἔργον (aulos-playing), which makes him an aulete. The thing which results from that action, a performed piece of aulos music, might also be called the aulete’s ἔργον.¹⁶

Aristotle’s definition of poetry

Aristotle’s application of his definitional terminology to literary criticism is sparse but suggestive. In the *Poetics* he usually uses ἴδιον to designate a unique property, not of the τέχνη ποιητική itself, but of a particular genre or sub-genre thereof.¹⁷ However Aristotle writes at *Po.* 1456a34-6 that the discussion of διάνοια is something more properly ἴδιον to the study of rhetoric than to that of poetry — this suggests that he thought ποιητική had a definite identity characterised by unique features. There is even a tantalising but inconclusively la-

¹⁶ Cf. Arist. *GC* 319b24-6; *Metaph.* 983b8-17, 1049b24-32, 1081a1-11; *Phys.* 189b30-90a13; *EN* 1097b25-8. In this example, for someone learning to perform, the ἔργον produced would naturally be a real-time performance. But, *mutatis mutandis*, someone learning to compose might be said to produce as his ἔργον the sequence of notes and words constituting the composition itself, to be performed and re-performed at will on numerous occasions.

¹⁷ E.g. Arist. *Po.* 1449b16-17, 1452b17-27, 32-3, 1459b22-6. This may perhaps suggest that poetry is a γένος for Aristotle of which tragedy, aulody, etc. are the εἶδη (see above, n. 8), though of course in the *Poetics* the word εἶδος takes on a specific usage to mean a ‘part’ or ‘feature’ of tragic composition (see below, nn. 41, 43).

cunose mention of an ἴδιον ποιητοῦ in what may perhaps be a fragment of Aristotle's *On Poets*.¹⁸ We know Aristotle at least thought that auletes had a unique ἔργον on the basis of whose accomplishment they were to be evaluated — he says so at *EN* 1097b25-8. It is thus not surprising that in the *Poetics* he formulates something like an ἔργον for poets in general, and uses it to define them and their craft: famously, making a μίμησις in one or a combination of ἁρμονία, λόγος, and ῥυθμός is the action that all kinds of poets perform (*Po.* 1447a21-3). We might call this an ἴδιον ἔργον in both senses of the latter word: making a μίμησις in the relevant media is what all poets and only poets do, and the product of that action is the particular kind of μίμησις which qualifies as a poem. Not performing that action means a person is not making poetry, even if his work shares other features, such as metre, with many things which are poems.¹⁹ Like all characterisations based on the ἔργον, this description of poets and poems is aspectual: it enables us to consider poets' work solely in its capacity as poetry and

¹⁸ *Apud* Phld. *Po.* 4.CIV.13-16, 17-21 Janko; see R. Janko, *Philodemus: On Poems, Books 3-4, with the Fragments of Aristotle, On Poets* (Oxford, 2011), 219 with n. 2. Unless otherwise specified, all readings of Philodemus' *On Poems* Books 3 and 4 cited in this paper are from this edition. For Book 1 I cite R. Janko, *Philodemus: On Poems Book 1* (Oxford, 2000); for sections of Book 2 from *P.Herc.* 1676, 1074b, 1081b, and 994, F. Sbordone, *Sui papiri della Poetica di Filodemo* (Naples, 1983); for Book 5, C. Mangoni, *Filodemo: Il quinto libro della Poetica* (Naples, 1993); for *On Music*, D. Delattre, *Philodème de Gadara: Sur la musique, livre IV* (Paris, 2007).

¹⁹ Arist. *Po.* 1447b13-24, 1451b27-9.

eschew from our assessment other things which the same work may simultaneously be.²⁰ Hence a poem may fail *qua* scientifically accurate description, but succeed *qua* mimetically compelling depiction, that is, *qua* poem.²¹

A consequence of this is that for Aristotle, poets and the poems they create are defined according to a single concept of composition which includes both music and language: an instrumentalist, a Homeric rhapsode, and a lyric soloist all perform poetic μίμησις and thus all accomplish what is essentially one and the same act. This act brings about a particular kind of change which may be described metaphorically in material terms: Aristotle, like many others, often refers to the events and emotions which poets or rhetoricians convey as ὑποκείμενα, the ‘underlying matter’ which, though itself not essentially poetic or rhetorical, can be given qualities which make it so by the right kind of artist.²² On this model, though the story of Oedipus is presented by both Pseudo-Apollodorus and Sophocles, only Sophocles presents it mimetically in the media required for it to qualify as ποιητική. What poets are fundamentally doing, then, is giving to narrative events (πράξεις) the particular expressive

²⁰ On aspectuality and conceptual ‘separation’ (χωρισμός) as characteristic features of Aristotelian thought and poetics, see J. Porter, ‘Content and form in Philodemus’, in D. Obbink (ed.), *Philodemus and Poetry* (Oxford, 1995), 97-147, at 118-22.

²¹ Arist. *Po.* 1460b13-22. A. Ford, ‘The purpose of Aristotle’s *Poetics*’, *CPh* 110 (2015), 1-21, at 7-14, similarly argues that Aristotle specifies which errors count as poetic because he wants his treatise to articulate the precise nature of poetry and the particular kind of criticism to which it should be subjected.

²² Arist. *Po.* 1452a29-b3; *Rh.* 1408a9-10.

format which makes them into a poetic *μίμησις*.²³ This may entail suggesting narrative or conveying emotion via purely instrumental music, as in the expressive sound effects of the Pythian *nomos*.²⁴ It may entail communicating a story in ‘bare’ (*ψιλοί*) words without instrumental melody, as in a spoken recitation of Homer. It may entail depicting a series of events and actions using rhythmic language sung to instrumental accompaniment, as in a tragic choral ode. But whatever collection of features may be present or absent in an individual work, the *τέχνη ποιητική* remains essentially an art of tone, rhythm, and language.

THE STOICS

Definition in Stoicism

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Stoics such as Chrysippus broadly agreed with Aristotle that the requirements of definition were satisfied by ἡ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις, the furnishing of the ἴδιον.²⁵ Chrysippus may have meant ἴδιον to include the notion of essence, in which case his account was the same as Aristotle’s: definitions are unique and essential descriptions of the thing defined. But it is possible that Chrysippus did not believe in

²³ The idea that tragedians are in the business of transforming commonly available narrative material into poetry by presenting it in some particular poetic way was to become a commonplace trope: see M. Wright, ‘Poets and poetry in later Greek comedy’, *CQ* 63 (2013), 603-22, at 606-7 on Antiph. *Poiesis* fr. 189 and Xenarch. *Porphyra* fr. 7.1-3.

²⁴ See Pollux, *Onomasticon* 4.84; Str. 9.3.10; cf. Pi. *P.* 12.18-21.

²⁵ Alex. Aphrod. in Arist. *Top.* 101b39 (= fr. 628 *FDS*); D.L. 7.60 (= fr. 621.1-3 *FDS*); Σ Dionys. Thr. p. 107 Hilgaro (= fr. 627.2-4 *FDS*).

essences and therefore used ἴδιον here to mean simply any unique set of characteristics.²⁶ On either reading what remains consistent is the stipulation of uniqueness — the requirement that definitions predicate of their subject some property which only that subject possesses.

The Stoics also had their own concept of a ὑποκείμενον or ἄποιος ὕλη, some unformed matter which could be shaped into various types of individual by the acquisition of qualities. Whereas in Aristotle this idea of ‘molding’ or ‘shaping’ is best understood as an illustrative metaphor, among the Stoics it was a literal tenet of physics.²⁷ In the universe imagined by the Stoa there did exist a corporeal prime matter — an undivided and continuous σῶμα which could be molded like putty or clay.²⁸ Dexippus details how a section of the general ὑποκείμενον can be altered so as to become ποιόν, qualified in a certain way such as ‘fragrant’ or ‘square.’ This newly qualified entity can then itself become a second kind of ὑποκείμενον: if, for example, the general ὑποκείμενον were so qualified as to become white, the resulting white entity would then be considered a secondary ὑποκείμενον, to be molded more precisely into, say, a white oblong. When the matter of a ὑποκείμενον is arranged in a way unlike that of any other, it becomes ἰδίως ποιόν — a uniquely qualified entity such as

²⁶ See M. Reesor, ‘The Stoic ἴδιον and Prodicus’ near-synonyms’, *AJPh* 104 (1983), 124-33, at 124-9; Long and Sedley (n. 8), 1.194; Crivelli (n. 10), 396-404.

²⁷ Similarly S. Menn, ‘The Stoic theory of categories’, *OSAPh* 17 (1999), 215-47, at 216 n. 6.

²⁸ See esp. D.L. 7.150 (= fr. 742 *FDS*).

Socrates or Westminster Abbey.²⁹ Since nearly everything, including the mind and soul, is corporeal in Stoicism, this progressively individuated molding of physical ‘stuff’ is all that is

²⁹ Dexippus in Arist. *Categ.* 23.25-24.9 Busse (= fr. 835 *FDS*); Plot. *Enn.* 6.1.25.1-33 Henry and Schwyzer (= fr. 827 *FDS*). Cf. Simplicius in Arist. *de An.* 429a10 (= fr. 846 *FDS*); Syrianus in Arist. *Metaph.* 28.15-19 Kroll (= fr. 849 *FDS*); D.L. 7.58 (= fr. 536 *FDS*). On the system of progressively individuated material change into which these terms fit (misleadingly termed the Stoic ‘categories’) see further P. de Lacy, ‘The Stoic categories as methodological principles’, *TAPhA* 76 (1945), 246-63, esp. 250-1, 255, 262; M. Reesor, ‘The Stoic categories’, *AJPh* 78 (1957), 63-82 and ‘Poion and poiotes in Stoic philosophy’, *Phronesis* 17 (1972), 279-85; A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London, 1986), 161; Long and Sedley (n. 8), 1.165-6; Menn (n. 27), 215-23; G. Armato, ‘Stoics on bodies, identity and *ιδίως ποιός*’, *C&M* 56 (2005), 129-54, at 146-8; J.-B. Gourinat, *La dialectique des Stoïciens* (Paris, 2000), 132-6 and ‘The Stoics on matter and prime matter’, in R. Salles (ed.), *God and Cosmos in Stoicism* (Oxford, 2009), 46-69, at 48. For the peculiar Chrysippian paradox, which need not concern us here, about unique qualification, see Ph. *de Aetern. Mundi* 48.1-9.6 Cohn and Reiter (= fr. 845 *FDS*); Plut. *de Comm. Not.* 1077d (= *SVF* 2 fr. 396) with M. Reesor, ‘The Stoic concept of quality’, *AJPh* 75 (1954), 40-58, at 46-7; J.M. Rist, ‘Categories and their uses’, in A.A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism* (New York, 1971), 38-55, at 44-8; Armato (*ibid.*), 135-8.

needed to shape a complete being with all of the characteristics that individuate it from other beings.³⁰

Stoic definitions of poetry

This material terminology is not explicitly used in the Stoic definitions of poetic art which come down to us through Posidonius and Varro. But we may fruitfully interpret those definitions in light of the theories just described. Both writers gesture back towards a distinction invoked by Neoptolemus of Parium (and probably others before him) between ποίημα (or πόημα) and ποίησις (or πόησις).³¹ Neoptolemus, a Peripatetic with demonstrably Aristotelian sensibilities, used these as aspectual distinctions — for him they were different ways

³⁰ See M.D. Boeri, ‘The Stoics on bodies and incorporeals’, *RMeta* 54 (2001), 723-52, at 726-50; E. Dodson-Robinson, ‘Rending others’, *Mouseion* 10 (2010), 45-68, at 47 with n. 8. I refrain here from calling the Stoics materialists (although many do so: in addition to Dodson-Robinson see J.B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* [Leiden, 1970], 107-9; O. Bloch, *Le Matérialisme* [Paris, 1985], 48-52) because of the doubts raised by Gourinat (n. 29 [2009]), esp. 61-2, 66-9. But at the very least the words of poetry, and the humans who compose and utter them, are material in Stoicism — see below, pp. 16-18.

³¹ The full system also includes the poet (ποιητής) and/or his art (ποιητική). See Brink (n. 3), 1.54-74; E. Asmis, ‘Neoptolemus and the classification of poetry’, *CPh* 87 (1992), 206-231, at 211-5 *et passim*; Porter (n. 20), 102-6 *et passim*; *The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, 2010), 116 with n. 190; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 152-3; P. Hadju, ‘The mad poet in Horace’s *Ars Poetica*’, *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 41 (2014), 28-40, at 31-2; D. Steiner, ‘The poetics of sound’, *CPh* 110 (2015), 99-123, at 105.

of looking at the same piece of linguistic material.³² Neoptolemus, says Philodemus, undertook ‘to distinguish (χωρίζειν) the cognitive content (διανοήματα) from the diction (λέξις)’ so that ‘only subject matter (ὑπόθεσις) belongs to πόησις’ whereas ‘only the arrangement of the diction (σύνθεσις λέξεως) is involved in ποίημα.’³³

Posidonius, for his part, defines ποίημα as any ‘diction with metre or rhythm (λέξις ἔμμετρος ἢ ἔνρυθμος),’ whereas ποίησις is specifically ‘ποίημα which signifies (σημαντικὸν ποίημα), comprising a μίμησις of mortal and godly things.’³⁴ Tellingly, the example that Posidonius gives of ποίημα which fails to attain the status of ποίησις is Euripides’ γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθήρ (E. fr. 839.1 Nauck). This instance of λέξις actually is σημαντική according to the principles of the Stoic Τέχνη Περί Φωνῆς to which Posidonius’ definition was probably a later contribution. That is, the fragment has a comprehensible semantic refer-

³² So Porter (n. 20), 108-9. See esp. Phld. *Po.* 5.XIV.31-3, where the *Iliad* is considered alternately as both πόημα and πόησις. On Neoptolemus’ Aristotelian roots see further Brink (n. 3), 1.51, 57-8, 93-100; Hadju (n. 31), 29-32.

³³ See Phld. *Po.* 5.XIII.32-XIV.2: [ἀ]λλὰ μὴν ὅ [γε Νεοπ]τόλεμος (. . .) [ἔδοξ]ε τὴν σύνθεσιν [τῆς λέξε]ω[ς τ]ῶν διανοημ[άτων χωρί]ζειν, XIV.27-9: τῇ[ς] ποιήσεω[ς] εἶναι τ[ῇ]ν ὑπόθεσιν [μ]όνον, xv.1-3: ποιή[ματος μό]νον τὴν [σύνθεσιν τῆς] λέξεως μ[ετέχειν].

³⁴ D.L. 7.60.1-6 (= fr. 594.11-16 *FDS*): σημαντικὸν ποίημα, μίμησιν περιέχον θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρωπειῶν.

ent and is not a meaningless concatenation of letters such as βλίτυρι.³⁵ Therefore Posidonius seems to be articulating two features, both of which rhythmic or metrical λέξεις must have to qualify as ποίησις.³⁶ Such λέξεις must both 1) be semantically meaningful and 2) use its semantic meaning to deliver an artistic representation, probably in narrative form. The Euripides fragment satisfies one of these requirements, but not the other: while it denotes the earth and ether, it does not describe or depict them in action.

In Varro it is even more clear that *poema* may be semantically meaningful without qualifying as *poesis*: this is the status afforded to a *distichon epigrammaticum*, a two-line epigram, in his scheme. *Poesis* must not only have semantic meaning but convey a *perpetuum argumentum*, as do the *Iliad* and the *Annales*.³⁷ Hellenistic concerns about length and brevity may have been at stake here so that *poesis* for Varro had to be not only meaningful and narrative, but also relatively long.³⁸ However the fundamental issue is most likely not length *qua*

³⁵ See D.L. 7.56.3-57.7 (= fr. 476 *FDS*). On the organisation of the Τεχνή and the place of musical and poetic language within it see D.M. Schenkeveld, ‘The Stoic Τέχνη Περί Φωνῆς’, *Mnemosyne* 43 (1990), 86-108, esp. 94, 98-9. Cf. D.M. Schenkeveld and J. Barnes, ‘Language: poetics’, in K. Algra (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 221-5, at 224.

³⁶ Pace Brink (n. 3), 1.65-6.

³⁷ Varro *Sat. Men.* fr. 398, p. 67 Astbury (= fr. 605 *FDS*); see *FDS* p. 702.

³⁸ Similarly Lucilius *Sat.* 9.338-47. See Brink (n. 3), 1.63-4, 71-2.

length, but narrative completeness of the kind which in Aristotle necessitates that poems be neither too large nor too small to be contemplated as a mimetic whole.³⁹

What is clear in both Stoic definitions is that the underlying thing which may be so qualified as to count as ποῖημα or ποίησις is verbal language (λέξις). This too may come from Neoptolemus, who argued that ποήματα, words considered purely as formal arrangements of phonemes, ‘are primary among the εἶδη ([π]ρωτεύειν τῶν εἰδῶν).’⁴⁰ That is Aristotelian language, though it is unclear to us, as it was to Philodemus, what it means for an εἶδος or ‘part’ of poetry ‘to be primary.’⁴¹ But we might suggest a comparison here with the πρώτη ὕλη: perhaps metrical λέξις is poetry’s ‘primary matter,’ the basic substance capable of acquiring poetic properties. For ποήματα to πρωτεύειν among the aspects of poetic composition would then mean that formalised λέξις is the first underlying matter of which other qualifiers such as ‘mimetic’ or ‘meaningful’ may or may not come to be predicated.⁴² This could have led Neoptolemus to the view that the formal arrangement of language was the first ac-

³⁹ See Arist. *Po.* 1450b34-51a15, 1459a17-b7; M. Heath, *Unity in Greek Poetics* (Oxford, 1989), 43-4; Belfiore, ‘Dramatic and epic time’, in Ø. Andersen and J. Haarberg (edd.), *Making Sense of Aristotle* (London, 2001), 25-49, at 34-6. Asmis (n. 31), 213-5 agrees that Neoptolemus and those who came after him may well have allowed for examples of ποίησις which were shorter than the epics they cited. Cf. R.H. Tukey, ‘The Stoic usage of λέξις and φράσις’, *CPh* 6 (1911), 444-9, at 446; N.A. Greenberg, ‘The use of *poiema* and *poiesis*’, *HSCP* 65 (1961), 263-89, at 269.

⁴⁰ Phld. *Po.* 5.XV.27-8.

⁴¹ See Brink (n. 3), 1.58-60, 93 with Arist. *Po.* 1450a13, 1452b14, etc.

⁴² Somewhat similarly P. Boyancé, ‘À propos de l’*Art poétique* d’Horace’, *RPh* 10 (1936), 20-36, at 25-8.

tivity to which a poet ought to devote his attention,⁴³ after the accomplishment or mastery of which he may turn to investing that language with a plot or subject matter.⁴⁴

Certainly this two-tiered system of progressive qualification helps make good sense out of our Stoic definitions. We can understand those definitions better if we speculate that for Posidonius and Varro, λέξις is a ὑποκείμενον which becomes ποιόν as ποίημα when arranged in a metrical or rhythmic format (*contra* Aristotle).⁴⁵ That ποίημα may then itself act as a ὑποκείμενον and become more specifically ποιόν when its words are so arranged as to semantically present a narrative or depiction. This model is appropriate in the system of linguistic atomism which underlies the Τέχνη Περί Φωνῆς. For Stoics such as Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon, speech is a material thing made out of physical building-blocks — the sonic airstreams of uttered letters are irreducible elements, στοιχεῖα, which are then arranged

⁴³ The idea that Aristotle's εἶδη were in fact successive actions in the process of composition is defended by M.S. Silk, 'The "six parts" of tragedy in Aristotle's *Poetics*', *PCPhs* 40 (1994), 108-15, who reanimates an interpretation advanced by G.F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957), 12, 237, 279-80 *et passim*.

⁴⁴ Philodemus (*Po.* 5.XV.30-33) considers something like this interpretation, which is elaborated upon more fully by Asmis (n. 31), 216-7. Cf. D.H. *Comp.* 1.18-41.

⁴⁵ But in agreement with many others, e.g. Gorg. *Hel.* 9.54-5.

into the progressively complex structures of syllables, words, clauses, and sentences.⁴⁶ The idea which is thereby communicated, the λεκτόν or ‘sayable,’ is one of the few incorporeal things in Stoic theory.⁴⁷ But it too arises — the details of how are not specified — out of

⁴⁶ See Gal. *PHP* 8.3.12-13 (= fr. 539 *FDS*) and above, n. 35. As is well known, this linguistic atomism is neither unique to nor original in Stoicism: cf. Democr. fr. 21 Diels-Kranz; Arist. *GC* 315b6-15; Pl. *Tht.* 201d8-e2; *Cra.* 422a1-b5, 424d5-5a5; Arist. *Metaph.* 985b12-19; *Po.* 1456b20-7a30; D.H. *Comp* 14; W. Burkert, ‘Στοιχεῖον’, *Philologus* 103 (1959), 167-97; P. Gentinetta, *Zur Sprachbetrachtung bei den Sophisten und in der stoisch-hellenistischen Zeit* (Winterthur, 1961), 27-35, 98-118; J. Porter (n. 31), 230-1; ‘Philodemus on material difference’, *CErc* 19 (1989), 149-78, at 170; D. Armstrong, ‘The impossibility of metathesis’, in Obbink (n. 20), 210-32, at 211-3; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 281 n. 1; F. Ademollo, *The Cratylus of Plato* (Cambridge, 2011), 166 n. 51, 258-9.

⁴⁷ See S.E. *M.* 8.409, 10.218, 11.224.4-5.1 (= fr. 272.1-12, 720.7-13, 708.1-6 *FDS*); Long (n. 29), 136; Long and Sedley (n. 8), 1.163-5, 181-2; J. Brunschwig, ‘La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême’, in J. Barnes and M. Mignucci (edd.), *Matter and Metaphysics* (Naples, 1988), 20-127, at 92-3; M. Frede, ‘The Stoic notion of a *lekton*’, in S. Everson (ed.), *Language* (Cambridge, 1994), 109-28, at 114-8; Gourinat (n. 29 [2000]), 115-9; Boeri (n. 30), 735-7; A. Drozdek, ‘Λεκτόν’, *AAntHung* 42 (2002), 93-104; R. Dufour, *Chrysippe* (Paris, 2004), 1.177-8, 470-1; P. Kitzler, ‘Nihil enim anima si non corpus’, *Wiener Studien* 122 (2009), 145-69, at 148; N. Powers, ‘Void and space in Stoic ontology’, *JHPh* 52 (2014), 411-32, at 411-2; K. Ierodiakonou, ‘The Stoic system: logic and knowledge’, in J. Warren and F. Sheffield (edd.), *The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy* (New York, 2014), 438-54, at 446-8; V. de Harven, ‘How nothing can be something’, *AncPhil* 35 (2015), 405-29, at 406-7; and above, n. 30.

physical στοιχεῖα when they are arranged in a particular way so as to communicate meaning.⁴⁸ Similarly in Posidonius and Varro, metre or rhythm can be conceived of literally as the shape given to words, the form into which the ὑποκείμενον of linguistic sound is arranged to become ποιόν as ποίημα. The resultant ποίημα can then act as a secondary ὑποκείμενον to be shaped again so that meaningful μίμησις emerges out of it — that is, so that it becomes ποίησις.

We may note also that Posidonius is careful to use two terms — ἔμμετρος and ἔνρυθμος — making it very likely that he means to discuss both musical and non-musical linguistic art.⁴⁹ So like Aristotle, Posidonius thinks poetry may involve both unaccompanied words and sung poems. At the same time the nonverbal aspects of the art have become inessential in Posidonius in a way they are not in Aristotle. For Aristotle it was plot and action, whether conveyed wordlessly or verbally, that constituted the essential material to be worked into a poetic format. For Posidonius the indispensable material of poetry is λέξις, and the formal elements which qualify something as ποίημα are qualities which attach specifically to words, whether those qualities include sung rhythm or spoken metre. Ποίησις, moreover, does not only have to accomplish μίμησις: it must specifically do so semantically, as meaningful language. Therefore musical melody and rhythm, which could stand alone as

⁴⁸ See Long and Sedley (n. 8), 1.165 on ‘transition’ (μετάβασις: D.L. 7.53.7-8 [= fr. 255.58-60 *FDS*]), 199-202; de Harven (n. 47), 418-24, esp. n. 19. Cf. A.C. Lloyd, ‘Grammar and metaphysics in the Stoa’, in Long (n. 29), 58-74, at 60-1.

⁴⁹ Posidonius does not seem to mean ῥυθμός here as the irregular rhythm of spoken prose (i.e. not as at Arist. *Rhet.* 1408b30) — he is only talking about syllabic configurations which possess arrangement (σκευή) beyond that of τὸ λογοειδές. In this he may be said to agree with Dionysius (*Comp.* 11.120-33) that rhythmic prose is εὐρυθμος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔνρυθμος.

ποιητική for Aristotle, are for Posidonius optional additions to the words and meanings which properly constitute poetic art.

THE EUPHONISTS

Andromenides and the ἔργον

Both Stoic and Peripatetic modes of definition were brought to bear on poetry by a group of scholars known to modernity as the Euphonists. These critics' views are reported only in the nightmarishly mangled papyri containing Philodemus of Gadara's survey *Περὶ Ποιημάτων*. I use the Greek title to highlight something these Euphonists have in common, namely their exclusive focus on the formal elements of verbal composition (ποίημα). Specifically they often reduced poetry to σύνθεσις λέξεως, which for them meant the arrangement of letters, words, clauses, and sentences to produce aurally pleasing combinations.⁵⁰ The Euphonists' attempts to isolate σύνθεσις as poetry's sole important feature were motivated by an impulse to articulate ever more precisely the definition of poetic art using the conceptual tools of the ἴδιον and ἔργον. Philodemus' *On Poems* lets us observe how the Euphonists employed this definitional terminology to distinguish poetry not only from music, but also from all other uses of language.

Philodemus' review seems to proceed in chronological order, and the first critic whose ideas emerge with real clarity from the extant fragments is Andromenides.⁵¹ Most modern scholars believe he was a Peripatetic who flourished around the turn of the third century

⁵⁰ See Porter (n. 20), 124.

⁵¹ For a trenchant account of Philodemus' hypomnematic technique see Delattre (n. 18), xxvi-xxx. I follow Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 139-40 in attributing Phld. *Po.* 1.IX-XII and CL-CLXVI to Andromenides rather than Megaclides.

B.C.⁵² One reason for agreeing with this assessment is the fact that Andromenides appeals to a number of Aristotelian concepts, including the ἔργον.⁵³ He writes that ‘the task of poets (ποιητῶν ἔργον) is not to say what no one else has, but to say it in a way that no one else would express himself.’⁵⁴ Elsewhere he specifies that ‘the work (ἔργον) will be accomplished if, among the (words) used about (sc. the subject at hand), the poet picks the more beautiful and stays away from the uglier ones.’⁵⁵ Andromenides is describing the kind of action that all poets and only poets perform, and the unique kind of work they produce thereby. Thus a poet is a poet insofar as he can ‘choose words akin to the content so that they fit harmoniously’

⁵² See A. Ardizzoni, *Ποίημα* (Bari, 1953), 87-90; A. Rostagni, ‘Filodemo contro l’estetica classica’, in *Scritti minori, I* (Turin, 1955), 394-416 (= *RIFC* 1 [1923], pp. 401-23), at 411-4; Mangoni (n. 18), 279; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 151-2. C. Jensen, *Philodemos über die Gedichte, fünftes Buch* (Berlin, 1923), 151 argued that Andromenides was a Stoic; C. Romeo, *Demetrio Lacone: La poesia* (Naples, 1988), 48 dated him slightly earlier.

⁵³ He also seems to adopt Neoptolemus’ tripartition: see Mangoni (n. 18), 277-8; Asmis (n. 31), 227; Porter (n. 20), 138 n. 124, 147; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 152-3.

⁵⁴ Phld. *Po.* 1.CXXXI.8-12: ποιητῶν ἔργον οὐ λέγειν ὃ μηδεὶς, ἀλλ’ οὕτως εἰπεῖν ὥς οὐκ ἄν ἕτερος ἐρμη[νεύσ]ειε. In this Andromenides is not unlike the persona of Pope’s *Essay on Criticism* (2.93-8).

⁵⁵ Phld. *Po.* 1.CLXVII.20-26: γενήσεσθαι τοῦργον ἂν τὰ κα[λ]λίω τῶν κατ’ αὐτοῦ τιθεμένων ῥήματ’ ἐγλέγηται, τὰ [δ]’ αἰσχίω περιστήτ[αι]. This elaboration of the elliptical τῶν κατ’ αὐτοῦ τιθεμένων is the one that fits best with Andromenides’ views — see further Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 383 n. 6.

and attain ‘similarity in the diction to the content depicted.’⁵⁶ Andromenides shares this insistence upon appropriateness (τὸ πρέπον or οἰκειότης) of word-choice (ἐκλογή) with many ancient rhetorical theorists.⁵⁷ But unlike his predecessors, Andromenides excludes everything besides aurally felicitous ἐκλογή from his definition of the art. A poet *qua* poet does not make arguments or choose his content: if he does do these things, he does them in some other capacity, such as *qua* dialectician.⁵⁸ By contrast the poetic act (ἔργον) just is the selection of the most beautiful words from among the appropriate ones, and a work (ἔργον) of poetry is a composition whose words have been chosen to exhibit beauty.

What makes a word beautiful for Andromenides? Theophrastus thought that words possess beauty if the sound of them pleases the hearing (ἀκοή), if they convey imagery that appeals to the sight (ὄψις), or if they express a concept that is ‘dignified to the mind’ (τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔντιμον).⁵⁹ For Andromenides, though, the poet by definition seeks the first kind of beautiful word, the kind that delights by means of the real or imagined impact of its phonetic

⁵⁶ Phld. *Po.* 1.XVIII.1-6: [οἰκειότα]τα τοῦ πρά[γ]ματος ἐγλ[έγεσ]θαι τὰ ῥήμαθ’ ἵνα προ[σαρμόσῃ] and 5.XXXV.17-20: ὁμοιότητα λέξεως τοῖς δηλουμένοις πράγμασιν. See also 1.CLXIX.15-18, 5.XXXIV.35-XXXV.1; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 387 n. 1, 389 n. 1. The appearance of οἰκεῖα ῥήματα at *Po.* 1.CLXXII.19-22 supports the supplement [οἰκειότα]τα at XVIII.1-6.

⁵⁷ E.g. Arist. *Rh.* 1376a33-b30, 1405a3-7a18; Isoc. 4.9, 10.11; [Cic.] *Rhet. Her.* 3.VI.11. Cf. Arist. *Po.* 1450b4-7 and C. Macleod, *Collected Essays* (Oxford, 1983), 52; S. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (London, 1987), 46-7; *A Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford, 1991), 1.59-60.

⁵⁸ See Phld. *Po.* 1.XII.21-5; CLXI.2-6.

⁵⁹ Thphr. *ap.* Demetr. *Eloc.* 173-5; cf. Licymnius *ap.* Arist. *Rh.* 1405b5-7. The comparison between Andromenides and Theophrastus originates with Ardizzoni (n. 52), 88; see further P. Chiron, *Démétrios: Du Style* (Paris, 1993), 117; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 149 n. 5.

structure on our hearing.⁶⁰ ‘A word contributes beauty’ to a poem, he writes, ‘whenever the syllables seem densely woven with letters, and the mouth can grab onto them and toss forth weighty syllables of the most incandescent tones.’⁶¹ The whole project of what is now called Euphonism — the project of defining and evaluating poetry purely on the basis of its phonetic makeup — begins with these first steps. Andromenides’ contribution is in essence a definitional distinction between the poetic ἔργον and all other acts: poets are poets only insofar as they please the ear with well-chosen words.

Heracleodorus, Pausimachus, and the ἴδιον

Euphonism comes into its own when later theorists, notably Heracleodorus and Pausimachus, further circumscribe the concept of poetry using the notion of an ἴδιον. Taken as a whole, the work of these two thinkers represents a developing effort to isolate verbal

⁶⁰ Similarly F. Sbordone, *Contributo alla poetica degli antichi* (Naples, 1961), 63.

⁶¹ Phld. *Po.* 1.XXI.1-14: ὄνομα π[αρέχε]σθαι κάλλος, ὅτα[ν] ἐσπαθημέναι γράμμασιν [φαίνω]σιν αἱ συλλαβαί {1}, καὶ δράξασθαι τὸ στόμα καὶ ῥίπτειν ὀγκώδεις συλ[λαβὰς] τ]ῶν λαμπροτά[των φθό]γγων. Cf. also Phld. *Po.* 1.CLXX.22-CLXXI, where Andromenides advocates that poets bring their characters to life in the ears of a listener rather than, as is usual in discussions of ἐνάργεια, that they make their imagery vivid in the mind’s eye (cf. e.g. Arist. *Po.* 1455a22-6; [Long.] *On the Sublime* 15.2; [Cic.] *Rhet. Her.* 4.LV.68-9; Quint. 8.3.61; F. Berardi, ‘Alcune riflessioni sull’ ἐνάργεια dall’ *Ars rhetorica* di Pseudo-Dionigi di Alicarnasso’, *Rhetorica* 30 [2012], 339-53, at 339, with further bibliography at 340 n. 1. But cf. D.H. *Comp.* 15.60-16.24).

sound as the sole feature which characterises and defines poetry *qua* poetry.⁶² This argument is first formulated in terms of a bipartite scheme of lexical σύνθεσις and the euphony which results from it. The poet's unique feature is that he arranges words in such an order that they sound lovely; when he does so his work will possess the specific kind of lovely sound that makes it a poem.⁶³ Thus we read, in a passage attributed to Heracleodorus, that 'the poet aims

⁶² Heracleodorus and Pausimachus did have some significant disagreements, which are complicated by the fact that Janko's forthcoming edition of *On Poems* Book II will probably reattribute to Heracleodorus some passages currently ascribed to Pausimachus — cf. 'Miscellanea Papyrologica Herculaniensia I' (Review), *JHS* 132 (2012), 182-3, at 183. But the burden of their arguments, and the development of Euphonism over time, is already clear from the text as it stands.

⁶³ On this position, its origins in atomism, and its defense via lexical metathesis, see esp. Phld. *Po.* 1.XXXIX, XL, LXXXVI.25-LXXXVII.1; Jensen (n. 52), 147-9; H. Gomoll, 'Heracleodorus und die κριτικοί bei Philodem', *Philologus* 91 (1936), 373-84, at 373, 376-7; N.A. Greenberg, 'Metathesis as an instrument of criticism in poetry', *TAPhA* 89 (1958), 262-70; W. Pohl, *Die Lehre von den drei Wortfügungsarten* (Tübingen, 1968), 145-9; Porter (n. 46), 170-4; 'Οἱ κριτικοί', in J.G.J. Abbenes, S.R. Slings, and I. Sluiter (edd.), *Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle* (Amsterdam, 1995), 82-109, at 88-9; 'Des sons qu'on ne peut entendre', in C. Auvray-Assayas and D. Delattre (edd.), *Cicéron et Philodème* (Paris, 2001), 315-41, at 332-6; G.M. Rispoli, *Dal suono all'immagine* (Rome, 1995), 131-2; Armstrong (n. 46), 221-3 and *passim*; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 227 n. 2; 'Reconstructing Philodemus' *On Poems*', in Obbink (n. 20), 69-96, at 90. Cf. [Longin.] *On the Sublime* 40.

for the ἴδιον in σύνθεσις’ and that ‘the σύνθεσις is something ἴδιον to the poet.’⁶⁴ When the poet achieves good σύνθεσις, his words exhibit εὐφωνία, which is the ἴδιον of poetry: ‘the εὐφωνία which supervenes’ upon his verbal arrangements ‘is the ἴδιον.’⁶⁵ This is ‘supervenience’ (ἐπιγίγνεσθαι) in the sense also used by the Stoics: good σύνθεσις is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the emergence of euphonious verbal sound.⁶⁶ Consequently there is an attempt in later Euphonism, currently attributed to Pausimachus, to locate the ἴδιον of poetry in verbal euphony of any kind, whether produced by σύνθεσις or arising from some other source such as the inherent beauty of certain letters.⁶⁷ On this model even parrots, if they repeat euphonious language, are said to produce poetry though they do not themselves

⁶⁴ *P.Herc.* 1676 v.17-19: ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ (. . .) ἴδιον ἐν τῇ συνθέσει β[ούλ]λ[ε]σθαι (text from Janko [n. 18 (2011)], 51 n. 2); *Phld. Po.* 1.XXXVII.8-10: τὴν σύνθεσιν (. . .) ἰδιόν τι τοῦ ποιητοῦ φ[α]μεν. See also *P.Herc.* 1676.IV.18-25, VII.12-16.

⁶⁵ *P.Herc.* 1676 VI.1-7 (with corrections from Janko [n. 18 (2011)], 51 n. 2): σύνθε[σιν μόνην ἰδίαν] ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ (. . .) τὴν (. . .) ἐπ[ι]γ[ι]γ[ν]ομένην [ε]ὐφω[ν]ίαν ἴδιον [εἶν]αι. This also means that the ἴδιον of poems is the ἴδιον of good poems, which suggests the somewhat surprising result that unsuccessful attempts at poetry fail to qualify as poetry at all: see *Phld. Po.* 1.LVIII.16-26, CXXVI.20-5.

⁶⁶ See also *Phld. Po.* 1.CCVIII, 5.XXIV.27-32; *P.Herc.* 1676.VII.8-12; Porter (n. 20), 152, 162-4; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 162 n. 6. On ἐπιγίγνεσθαι as the term for supervenience and its use in Stoic aesthetics see M. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago, 2007), 29, 32-3; A. Celkyte, ‘The Stoic definition of beauty as *summetra*’, *CQ* 67 (2017), 88-105, at 95.

⁶⁷ See *Phld. Po.* 1.LXXXIII.11-14, LXXXVI.19-24; Porter (n. 46), 175; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 287 n. 2.

choose, arrange, or understand the words.⁶⁸ These progressive moves towards a singular ἴδιον of poetry aim to define the art as nothing more or less than lexical sound which strikes a listener as beautiful.⁶⁹

James Porter has pointed out that these attempts by Euphonists to isolate the essential nature of poems are not only reminiscent of Aristotle, but even result in some conclusions about poetic art which are akin to Aristotle's.⁷⁰ Like Aristotle, the Euphonists use their precise definition of the art to identify things like metre which, though commonly considered essential to poetry, are in fact not part of poetry's ἴδιον.⁷¹ The Euphonists also agree with Aristotle that an artist is only deficient *qua* poet if he fails in his uniquely poetic task — errors of any other kind are excusable 'if the poet does not fall short as regards his particular excellence (ἴδιον ἀγαθόν).'⁷² But the Euphonists' idea of what makes a poem is of course much narrower than Aristotle's, and consequently they exclude from their definitions all sorts of concerns which Aristotle considered central to poetic composition. Perhaps most importantly, in Euphonism proper the communication of content has nothing to do with poetic composition, and a poet *qua* poet is not someone who pays any attention to the meaning of

⁶⁸ Phld. *Po.* 1.CXV.1-8. See Porter (n. 20), 134-5; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 171-2, 181.

⁶⁹ See further N. Pace, 'Problematiche di poetica in Filodemo', *CErc* 25 (1995), 111-90, at 137-42.

⁷⁰ Porter (n. 20), 118-22; (n. 31), 242.

⁷¹ Phld. *Po.* 1.CXCVIII.24-CXCIX.25. See also Phld. *Po.* 1.CCI (with Janko [n. 18 (2000)], 430 n. 1); cf. Cic. *Orator* 20.67.

⁷² Phld. *Po.* 2 N 1074b fr. 21 + 1081b fr. 8 sup. 1-5: εἰ [κατ]ὰ τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν ὁ ποιη[τῆ]ς μὴ ἀποπίπτοι.

words. In fact, composing meaningless gibberish is one of the things a poet can do without failing in terms of the ἴδιον ἀγαθόν.⁷³

This exclusion of semantic meaning from the act of poetic composition also puts the Euphonists at odds with Posidonius. But in other ways Heracleodorus' and Pausimachus' poetic definitions show signs of cross-pollination with the Stoa.⁷⁴ One point of contact is Pausimachus' atomistic analysis of language which, like the Τέχνη Περί Φωνῆς, treats verbal utterances as material constructions made from irreducibly small στοιχεῖα.⁷⁵ I have argued already that linguistic physicalism is what leads Posidonius and Varro to imagine poets materially molding verbal elements into poetic structures. In Euphonism, this sculptural model for poetic composition is quite explicit: Heracleodorus says that poets apply their unique genius (ἴδιος νοῦς) to 'unpoetic subject matter' (ἀπόητος ὑπόθεσις), just as those who sculpt by hand

⁷³ See Phld. *Po.* 1.XXXIII.1-5, 2 *N* 1081b fr. 1 + 5b + 1074b fr. 13.7-13 (text in Janko [n. 18 (2000)], 162 n. 6), 1081b fr. 23.6-8; *P.Herc.* 1676 fr. 11.27-col. I.5, IV.10-14, VI.2-7; Gomoll (n. 63), 373-4; Porter (n. 63 [1995]), 88; (n. 31), 116-7, 225 n. 164; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 161, 221 n. 1. Cf. Neoptolemus at Phld. *Po.* 5.xv.1-6 and Crates of Mallos at Phld. *Po.* 1.CXXXII.27-CXXXIII.3.

⁷⁴ Some intellectual exchange between the two schools of thought is certain: see E. Asmis, 'The poetic theory of the Stoic "Aristo"', *Apeiron* 23 (1990), 147-201; 'Crates on poetic criticism', *Phoenix* 46 (1992), 138-69, at 139-40, 144-5, 156-9; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 178-83, 188.

⁷⁵ See Phld. *Po.* 1 LXXXIV.6-LXXXV.26, LXXXVI.5-24, LXXXVIII.3-15, XCI.3-13; *P.Herc.* 994 fr. 18.26-19.7; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 175-83, 283 n. 1.

may use material (ὕλη) which other kinds of plastic artists use.⁷⁶ One is first reminded that Aristotle already employed the language of ὑποκείμενα as a metaphor for ‘subject matter’ which could be shaped into a particular kind of literary composition. But just as the Stoic philosophy of material change literalises sculptural language that is only figurative in Aristotle, so the Euphonists take literally a metaphor from earlier criticism: poets really are in the business of sculpting verses, arranging words next to one another so that they will sound beautiful and thus poetic.⁷⁷ We might even hear echoes, in this physical molding practiced upon a commonly available ‘unpoetic subject-matter’ (ἀπόητος ὑπόθεσις), of the sculptural formation of qualified individuals out of a general ‘unqualified matter’ (ἄποιος ὕλη) in Stoic physics.

But whereas Posidonius thought that poets molded words first into metrical arrangements, and then into semantically meaningful ones, in Euphonism the only kind of arrangement that matters poetically is euphonious arrangement. This difference can be understood using the terminology of material change: in Stoicism, lexical elements constitute the ὑποκείμενον, itself not inherently poetic or unpoetic, which is shaped first into metre, then into semantic μίμησις so as to become poetry. In Euphonism, by contrast, the poetically neutral ὑποκείμενον is narratives and characters, and the poet’s task is to arrange the language which describes that content so it achieves the poetic ἴδιον of beautiful sound. Both of these formulations turn upon relations of emergence. For Stoics, the meaning of an utterance is an immaterial thing which emerges when sound is materially arranged in a certain way. In Eu-

⁷⁶ *P.Herc.* 1081 + 1074 fr. e, I.20-II.24. Cf. *Phld. Po.* 1.LXXIV.7-26; *P.Herc.* 1676.III.12-22, IV-V; E. Asmis, ‘Philodemus on censorship, moral utility, and formalism in poetry’, in Obbink (n. 20), 148-77, at 157-77.

⁷⁷ So Porter (n. 31), 494-510.

phonism, poetic euphony emerges from language which is materially shaped by the poet's σύνθεσις.⁷⁸ In some senses, then, the Euphonist idea of poetry is an alternative version of the Stoic one, in which semantic μίμησις is replaced by beautiful sound as the defining feature which emerges out of the particular kind of verbal arrangement that constitutes the poetic act.

Where Euphonism is in complete agreement with Stoicism is in the view of poetry as fundamentally verbal: it is specifically the sound of well-arranged λέξις that makes something a poem for the Euphonists. At the same time Euphonists do tend to describe verbal sound with musical language. Andromenides refers to the φθόγγοι exhibited by syllables, and a later Euphonist compares beautiful pitch-accentuation to the proper application of tension (ἄνεσις) in an instrument (ὄργανον), which achieves attunement (ἁρμογή).⁷⁹ This is because the Euphonists share with the Aristoxenean musicological tradition a belief that all poetic language, melodic progression, and rhythmic structure are essentially series of arranged sounds experienced by a listener in real time. All such sound — whether melodic or syllabic — can be fittingly evaluated and described using one set of aural terms.⁸⁰ But the Euphonists still aim to isolate as uniquely poetic the kinds of sound which attach to words, and to analyse those sounds on their own merits without reference to musical concerns. Thus the ῥυθμικὴ θεωρία discussed at Phld. *Po.* 1.CI.2-CIV.10 turns out to be a study of linguistic metre, not

⁷⁸ There is some evidence to suggest the Stoics also thought that beauty and other aesthetic properties supervene upon material arrangements, much as meaning supervenes upon verbal arrangements: see Celkyte (n. 66), 95-6 on Stob. *Ecl.* 2.62.15-63.5 Wachsmuth (= *SVF* 3 fr. 278).

⁷⁹ See Phld. *Po.* 1.XCIII.19-XCIV.3 and below, pp. 37-8.

⁸⁰ Hence Philodemus (*Po.* 1.CLI.1-4) unfairly accuses his opponents of conflating poetry with music.

musical rhythm. And discussions of pitch are limited to verbal accent without reference to musical melody — even when the artists under scrutiny are musicians like Timotheus, for whom the two are very likely to have diverged from one another.⁸¹ A fundamental premise of Euphonism is that all music and poetry just is sound as heard by an audience. But in the context of this auditory phenomenalism, the Euphonists take great pains to isolate poetic (verbal) sound from all other sounds, including those of music. This too is a project which shares much with that of Aristoxenus, to whose definitional efforts we will now turn.

ARISTOXENUS AND THE DEFINITION OF MUSIC

The birth of musicology

Aristoxenus of Tarentum claimed to be Greece's first true harmonic scientist precisely because no thinker before him had defined just what is and is not musical ἁρμονία. In his view no one failed more entirely in this regard than the ἁρμονικοί, who were guilty of including in their conception of the science such irrelevancies as notation and the structure of in-

⁸¹ See M.L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford, 1992), 198-9, 357-8, 361-4 with D.H. Comp. 11.93-119; E. Pöhlmann and M.L. West, *Documents of Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford, 2001), 16-17; E. Csapo, 'The politics of the New Music', in Murray and Wilson (n. 1), 207-48, at 223-5; E. Csapo and P. Wilson, 'Timotheus the New Musician', in F. Budelmann (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Lyric* (Cambridge 2009), 277-94, at 287-90; A. D'Angour, 'The musical setting of ancient Greek texts', in A. D'Angour and T. Phillips (edd.), *Music, Text, and Culture in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 2018), 47-72, at 58-60; O. Thomas, 'Music in Euripides' *Medea*', in D'Angour and Phillips (ibid.), 99-120, at 99-100, 107-9. Cf. A.D. Barker, *Greek Musical Writings* (Cambridge, 1984-9), 1.93-8; J.H. Hordern, *The Fragments of Timotheus of Miletus* (Oxford, 2002), 34-5.

struments.⁸² In general Aristoxenus did not look favorably upon anyone whose theoretical axioms were not fully abstracted from the contingent exigencies of live performance.⁸³ He attempted to distinguish himself from such amateurs by defining the essential nature of har-

⁸² See Aristox. *El. Harm.* 1.2.11-3.2 Da Rios, 2.34.30-35.21, 37.13-8.3, with Barker (n. 81), 2.124-5; ‘Οἱ καλούμενοι ἁρμονικοί’, *PCPhS* 24 (1978), 1-21, at 8-18. On Aristoxenus’ predecessors see further A. Bélis, *Aristoxène de Tarente et Aristote* (Paris, 1986), 90-107, but with Barker’s notes about the identity of οἱ ἔμπροσθεν. For the possibility that the author of *P.Hibeh* 1.13 also accuses some ἁρμονικοί of confounding practical performance concerns with scientific theory see F. Pelosi, ‘Against musical ἀτεχνία’, *Apeiron* 50 (2017) 401-7 (on the view of music expressed in this papyrus more generally see Barker (n. 81), 1.183-4; Pelosi (ibid.) 393-4 with n. 1).

⁸³ Practical theorists of this kind would probably have included Lasus of Hermione (on whose performance and theory see Barker [n. 81], 2.14, 29; A. D’Angour, ‘How the dithyramb got its shape’, *CQ* 47 [1997], 331-51, esp. 334-9; F.R. Levin, *Greek Reflections on the Nature of Music* [Cambridge, 2009], 86, 189-90; J. Porter, ‘Lasus of Hermione, Pindar and the riddle of *S*’, *CQ* 57 [2007], 1-21, at 10-14) and Damon of Athens (on whom see T. Lynch, ‘A sophist “in disguise”’, *EPlaton* 10 [2013, not paginated] with Pl. *R.* 399e8-400c6, and Cf. West [n. 81], 248-90; A. Brancacci, *Musica e filosofia da Damone a Filodemo* [Florence, 2008], 88-9).

monics in terms that scholars have long recognised as Aristotelian.⁸⁴ We have now seen several ways in which Peripatetic definitional science influenced efforts to distinguish poetic language from musical sound. With Aristoxenus we can see how Aristotelian principles also inspired a complementary attempt to distinguish musical sound from poetic language.

To qualify as a free-standing science in Aristotelian terms, harmonics would have to begin from sources, ἀρχαί, which are wholly present to our senses and from which we can reason to discover axioms that are distinct from those governing other sciences.⁸⁵ Thus Aristoxenus was keen to rebut the Pythagorean idea, which Aristotle accepted, that harmonic consonance is simply a consequence of numerical relationships and therefore properly the object,

⁸⁴ See Barker (n. 81), 2.67-9, 123-4; (n. 5), 105-64; ‘Aristoxenus’ theorems and the foundations of harmonic science’, *AncPhil* 4 (1984), 23-64, at 24-5; ‘Aristoxenus’ harmonics and Aristotle’s theory of science’, in A.C. Bowen (ed.), *Science and Philosophy in Classical Greece* (New York, 1991), 188-226, at 201-22 *et passim*; Bélis (n. 82), 34-8 *et passim*; S. Gibson, *Aristoxenus of Tarentum and the Birth of Musicology* (London, 2005), 30-38, 61-73; cf. Levin (n. 83), 66-9, 74-5.

⁸⁵ See Arist. *APo* 71b9-3a20, 75b14-20.

not of its own unique branch of science, but of mathematical analysis.⁸⁶ If when I hear a fifth all I am actually hearing is the sound generated by the ratio of 3:2, then I can account for my experience via mathematical axioms which are also used to account for, say, the structural integrity of a building. Aristoxenus' rebuttal of this line of reasoning is that, although musical ratios may explain why certain strings or lengths of pipe produce consonant tones, they actually tell us nothing about the qualitative experience of hearing those tones. That experience is a perception unto itself, a recognition of tonal relationship 'according to the way it appears to

⁸⁶ On the Pythagorean idea see Barker (n. 84 [1984]), 28-9; cf. 'Pythagorean harmonics', in C.A. Huffman (ed.), *A History of Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, 2014), 185-203, esp. 188-90, 196-7; L. Zhmud, *Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans* (Oxford, 2012), 289-303 with Nicom. *Harm.* 6; Aristid. Quint. 3.2.6-2; Gaud. *Harm.* 11. On its adoption by Aristotle see J. Lear, 'Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics', *PhR* 91 (1982), 161-92, at 164-9; Bélis (n. 82), 65-9; J.G. Lennox, 'Aristotle, Galileo and "mixed sciences"', in W.A. Wallace (ed.), *Reinterpreting Galileo* (Washington, D.C., 1986), 29-51, at 42-4; Barker (n. 84 [1991]), 202-4 with Arist. *Met.* 1077b17-8a17; *APo.* 78b32-9a16; *Sens.* 439b19-40a31. On the persistence of this view into the medieval period cf. e.g. E.E. Leach, *Sung Birds* (Ithaca, NY, 2015), 15.

our senses.’⁸⁷ This phenomenism allowed Aristoxenus to find in the listener’s perceptual experience of harmonious notes the ἀρχαί for a unique science.

So Aristoxenus lights upon a precise definition of musical ἁρμονία, which for him is the relationship between tones as perceived by a trained listener. That definition is not framed in terms of the ἴδιον, but it is nevertheless manifestly concerned with Aristotelian notions of unique essence. Aristoxenus primarily wants to distinguish harmonics from mathematics, but in doing so he also, as he takes care to emphasise, distinguishes musical ἁρμονία from an array of other things with which it was conflated by his misguided predecessors. To begin with, ἁρμονία of the kind Aristoxenus studies is different from the many other kinds of order, such as political cooperation or psychological alignment, which may also be described as ἁρμονία — as Aristides Quintilianus (1.13.1-5) would later put it, the qualities under discussion are those which may be ascribed ‘uniquely to sound’ (ιδίως ἐπὶ φωνῆς).⁸⁸ Moreover, the study of musical ἁρμονία describes tonal sound only, and has nothing to say about ethical concerns

⁸⁷ Κατὰ τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντασίαν: See e.g. Aristox. *El. Harm.* 1.8.19-9.21, 20.2-28, 2.48.15-27. Cf. Aristoxenus’ definition of a note as an actual incidence of audible sound (φωνή) at a consistent pitch (1.15.15-18; reiterated in e.g. Cleonid. *Harm.* 1.7-8; Gaud. *Harm.* 2.1-2; Nicom. *Harm.* 12.6-9). Musical sound thus becomes not an abstracted concept but a perceptually manifested quality (ποιότης — see Cleonid. *Harm.* 2.1-3). This makes the Pythagorean project of discerning the ratios behind musical sound largely irrelevant to Aristoxenus’ aims: see Barker (n. 81), 2.120 with Aristox. *El. Harm.* 2.32.18-33.1; (n. 82), 3-4.

⁸⁸ Cf. Aristoxenus’ co-heir to the Aristotelian tradition, Theophrastus (*apud* Porph. in Ptol. *Harm.* 62.1-33), who seeks to distinguish a certain ιδιότης which is unique to φωνή. See further A.D. Barker, ‘Music and mathematics’, *PCPhS* 23 (1977), 1-15, at 9-10; *Porphyry’s Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics* (Cambridge, 2015), 209 n. 212.

which might dictate the correct relationships between that sound and the λέξις it often accompanies.⁸⁹ Thus, as we shall now see, Aristoxenus wants to restrict himself in the *Harmonics* to tonal issues as abstracted from lexical ones, even while maintaining a notion that ἁρμονία and λέξις may be united in a single poetic act.

Putting it Together: Music and words in Aristoxenus

Λέξις for Aristoxenus is definitely not ἁρμονία, but neither is it wholly outside of the study of music, broadly conceived. This issue is complicated by the fact that Aristoxenus seems to have reformulated his views on the subject in the process of revision between what is now our Book 1 and Book 2 of the *El. Harm.*⁹⁰ Nevertheless, Aristoxenus articulates in both books a notion that some things lie outside of the harmonic art but are still to be considered ‘when composition (ποιητική) makes use of intervals and tones.’ Such considerations are extraneous to the science of harmonics, but they are ‘the purview of the musical man (τοῦ μουσικοῦ).’⁹¹ Even when Aristoxenus widens the scope of his treatise to include the stringing together of notes in a melody (μελοποιία), there remain some things which, though not relevant to the *Harmonics*, are included among the parts of μουσική which figure into ποιητική. The question is whether lexical composition is one such part.

⁸⁹ Aristox. *El. Harm.* 2.31.16-29.

⁹⁰ On this subject I agree with Barker (n. 81), 2.120-3; (n. 5), 115-35, cf. 230-3; Gibson (n. 84), 43-61; and E. Rocconi, ‘La dottrina aristossenica dell’*ethos* musicale nel *de musica* dello Ps.-Plutarco’, *SemRom* 8 (2005), 291-7, at 292; ‘Aristoxenus and musical *ēthos*’, in C.A. Huffman (ed.), *Aristoxenus of Tarentum* (London, 2012), 65-90, at 77-8 n. 43; *contra* Bélis (n. 82), 24-48 that the text as we have it is not a unified whole.

⁹¹ *El. Harm.* 1.1.24-2.7, 2.32.3-9 — see Gibson (n. 84), 44.

I translate ποιητική with Barker as ‘composition,’ rather than with Macran as ‘poetry,’ in order to avoid begging the question of whether Aristoxenus thinks that verbal language figures into the definition of μουσική.⁹² But I want to argue that lexical arrangement was indeed part of the musical art in Aristoxenus’ view. For one thing, in Book 2 Aristoxenus lists as parts of the overarching musical science ἡ τε ῥυθμικὴ καὶ ἡ μετρικὴ, suggesting that syllabic metre is just as much a part of the discipline as musical rhythm.⁹³ Moreover, when Pseudo-Plutarch has Soterichus invoke Aristoxenean thought on the subject (*De Musica* 1143f3-4e9), there emerges this telling pronouncement:

Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τρί’ ἐλάχιστα εἶναι τὰ πίπτοντα ἅμ’ εἰς τὴν ἀκοήν, φθόγγον τε καὶ χρόνον καὶ συλλαβὴν ἢ γράμμα. συμβήσεται δ’ ἐκ μὲν τῆς κατὰ τὸν φθόγγον πορείας τὸ ἡρμοσμένον γνωρίζεσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τῆς κατὰ χρόνον τὸν ῥυθμόν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς κατὰ γράμμα ἢ συλλαβὴν τὸ λεγόμενον.

At least three things must always strike our ears: the note, the temporal unit, and the syllable or letter. And the harmonics will become recognisable in the note-by-note progression, the rhythm in the succession of temporal units, and what is said in the succession of letters or syllables.⁹⁴

⁹² H.S. Macran, *The Harmonics of Aristoxenus* (Oxford, 1902), 165; Barker (n. 5), 231-3.

⁹³ *El. Harm.* 2.32.5-9.

⁹⁴ On the Aristoxenean pedigree of this passage see F. Lassere, *Plutarque: De la musique* (Lausanne, 1954), 102-3, 175-6; A. Meriani, *Sulla musica greca antica* (Naples, Guida), 51-5; Rocconi (n. 90 [2005]), 296 with n. 26.

Soterichus says further that someone who is only educated in harmonics (α ἁρμονικός) will be limited in his full appreciation of music. This is because each composition (τῶν ποιημάτων ἕκαστον) is a complete whole (τέλειον) to be evaluated not only on the reductive basis of its correct harmonic composition but also on its combination of harmonic, rhythmic, and syllabic structure to convey some depiction or referent. By judging not only the internal correctness of these three types of arrangement, but also their use alongside one another, we are able to properly evaluate their collective depiction ‘of those emotional states communicated by the art of composition in works of composition (τῶν παθῶν τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ποιητικῆς σημαινομένων ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν).’

What we can see from this rich passage is that Aristoxenus, at least as interpreted by Pseudo-Plutarch, held a broad view of μουσική as involving lexical, rhythmic, and harmonic sound. These three types of sound are present to the senses as a unity, but separated from one another aspectually by the mind and described according to the principles of their respective sciences.⁹⁵ All three of these sciences were probably governed by their own principles of atomistic σύνθεσις: we read in the *El. Harm.* (1.27.16-34) that ‘there appears to be a nature governing continuity in melody similar to the one in diction (λέξις) which governs the

⁹⁵ On this use of Aristotelian χωρισμός to abstract several cognitive elements out of a single perceptual experience see Rocconi (n. 90 [2012]), 81-6. Cf. L. Lalory, *Aristoxène de Tarente et la musique de l'antiquité* (Paris, 1904), 154-64, although Lalory is wrong to exclude ethical concerns from the final analysis of a complete composition.

arrangement (σύνθεσις) of letters.⁹⁶ Rhythm too is described as a series of progressively complex arrangements out of the elemental unit or ‘primary time’ (πρῶτος χρόνος).⁹⁷

In each realm of study, then, correctness is to be judged on principles of combination specific to the particular στοιχεῖα which are to be synthetically arranged and combined: letters into syllables and words, notes into intervals and melodies, beats into cola and periods. Aristoxenus is very clear that the synthetic system governing the arrangement of syllables is distinct (κεχώριται) from that of pitch. Each, in fact, has its own ‘unique quality’ — its own ιδιότης according to which it is to be evaluated.⁹⁸ But the respective συνθέσεις of syllable, note, and beat are also analogous to one another, and the correct use of all three together results in a unified act of artistic expression that communicates a single σημαίνον, something represented or signified. It is this holistic accomplishment which is, in Soterichus’ words, the ‘work (ἔργον) of the artist,’ and evaluation of it constitutes full appreciation of μουσική.⁹⁹ Thus Aristoxenus retained Aristotle’s broad definition of poets as those who compose depictions in the media of melody, rhythm, and language. But within that definition he also worked to carve out aspectually distinct natures and governing principles of composition for each of the three individual media.

CONCLUSIONS

⁹⁶ Cf. Pl. *Phlb.* 16c5-8d2 with J.C.B. Gosling, *Plato: Philebus* (Oxford, 1975), 170-3; *Soph.* 253a4-b4; Adrastus *apud* Theon Sm. 49.6-20 Hiller; Barker (n. 81), 2.145 n. 115, 213-4 n. 12.

⁹⁷ Aristox. *El. Rhythm.* 2.8, 10 Pearson; Porph. *in* Ptol. *Harm.* 79 Düring (= pp. 32-5 Pearson). Cf. *El. Harm.* 1.18.16-19.1.

⁹⁸ Aristox. *El. Harm.* 1.18.5-27.

⁹⁹ [Plu.] *de Mus.* 1143a2-d12.

The aim of this survey has been to observe how the implications of a few Peripatetic and Stoic definitional systems were played out in the intersecting arenas of musical and literary theory. One thing we have seen is that the definitions of ποιητική and μουσική which emerge from these systems can fit cogently into them even when they are not expressly framed using their terminology. In Aristotle one is a poet if and only if one performs the relevant unique action (ἔργον). The particular sort of work (also ἔργον) which results uses stories and emotions (ὑποκείμενα) which are not in themselves poetic. But once that underlying subject matter has been mimetically presented in the relevant media, it possesses the ἴδιον which qualifies it as a poem. For the Stoics, λέξις is the ὑποκείμενον which becomes ποιόν in a distinct way, shaped to take on the characteristics which qualify it first as ποίημα and then as ποίησις. The sculptured universe in which the Stoics operate lends itself to a physicalised conception of the poetic act as one of shaping, a molding of words first into metrical, then into semantic, patterns. This primacy of lexical structure constitutes the Stoics' most important departure from Aristotle's concept of ποιητική.

That departure also figures into another trend we have observed, which is the progressive delineation of separate frameworks for musical sound and poetic language. This, too, is a theoretical impulse that emerges out of definitional theory, as philosophers work to differentiate the semantic, harmonic, and temporal features which for Aristotle were ultimately part of one and the same ποιητική. In Aristoxenus, who remains faithful to Aristotle's principles though not to his application of them, this differentiation takes the form of aspectual separation within a unified whole. Lexical utterance, tonal melody, and temporal structure are now emphatically distinguished from one another as objects of scientific study, but all three are co-partners in an overarching musical activity which is ποίησις, composition. In Euphonism, where the Stoic tradition intermingles with the Peripatetic one, the poet's ἔργον and the ἴδιον

of poetry which results from it have fundamentally to do with the shaping and arrangement of verbal sound. Here language and language alone becomes the medium of ποιητική, a material art which is uniquely defined as molding words into sound-sculptures. This act of linguistic molding is aspectually separate from all other uses of language to communicate semantically or argue logically, and in that the Euphonists strip the definition of poetry of the requirement, live in Aristoxenus as well as in Aristotle and the Stoics, that it convey some content, depiction, or referent.

At the same time, for the Euphonists this distinctly verbal art of poetry is akin to musical composition in that both are essentially instances of sound, occurring in time and over a series of pitches. Hence poetry and music can be described using the same language of harmonious or inharmonious joining (ἁρμογή) between tones (φθόγγοι) and temporal structures (ῥυθμοί). The Euphonists share this impulse to analogise tonal and verbal art to one another with Aristoxenus, for whom the act of interweaving and arrangement (σύνθεσις) is the one common activity which gets enacted in distinct but comparable ways in harmonic, rhythmic, and lexical composition. We can find a lay heir to this mode of thought in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for whom spoken prose, recited verse, and rhythmic song are on the same sonic continuum, but who understands himself to be applying words such as ῥυθμός and ἁρμονία to prose when they are more obviously germane to μουσική.¹⁰⁰ Dionysius acknowledges that this constitutes a kind of terminological borrowing, but ultimately, he insists (*Comp.* 11.64-5), ‘even the study of political speeches is a branch of μουσική.’

Writing on this same subject over a century ago, Wilhelm Kroll referred to an ‘Uebertragung von Kategorien aus einer fremden Disciplin und an der Specialisirung von

¹⁰⁰ Compare *Comp.* 11.64-119 with 17.1-9.

Erörterungen liegen, die ursprünglich für Musik, Poesie und Prosa galten.’¹⁰¹ Subsequent scholarship has shown how prescient Kroll was: the more we learn about the erudite theoretical controversies of the Hellenistic era, the more we understand them to depend upon a set of terms and models shared easily between musicology and literary criticism.¹⁰² What I have argued here is that within that common theoretical framework, philosophical theories of definition and change influenced a diverse array of efforts to distinguish between the various different ways in which sound can become art.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ See W. Kroll, ‘Randbemerkungen’, *RhM* 6 (1907), 86-101, at 93-6, esp. 96 n. 1.

¹⁰² See H. Koller, *Die Mimesis in der Antike* (Bern, 1954), 137-42; Pohl (n. 63), 121-6, 157-9; Porter (n. 20), 97-8, 140-1; (n. 63 [2001]), 328-33; (n. 31), 322-3, 369-71, 492-4; Janko (n. 18 [2000]), 134-8 (on *P.Herc.* 1677.VI.5-28 Romeo; *Phld. Po.* 5.III.13-VI.5), 173-6.

¹⁰³ We have touched only briefly on the related and simultaneous attempts in ancient theory to disambiguate poetry from prose, which must be understood with reference not only to the schools of thought discussed here but also to the rhetorical tradition: a forthcoming paper by E. Rocconi (‘The notion of *synthesis* in harmonic science (and beyond)’, presented at a conference on *Harmonic Theory in Ancient Greece* [Berlin, 2018]) will argue that the concept of *synthesis* was shared, not only between musical and poetic theorists as I have indicated here, but also between harmonic scientists and rhetoricians. See also R.L. Hunter, ‘Rhythmical language and poetic citation in Greek narrative texts’, in G. Bastianini and A. Casanova (edd.), *I papiri del romanzo antico* (Florence, 2010), 223-45, at 231. Hunter gestures towards Arist. *Rh.* 1408b21-9a23; Demetr. *Eloc.* 118, 179-86; Quint. 9, 4, 56, 72-8. See also D.H. Comp. 20.139-46, 26; Str. 1.2.6.1-17.