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Beat 'Em or Join 'Em?: Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets.

Abstract:

This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D; and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D.; When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D; is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidization may yield welfare levels mu...

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Volume:
1916
Series:
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Publication date:
1998-06-30
URN:
uuid:551892b0-4d9e-46b2-b9a8-0e143fd025fd
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11729
Language:
English

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