This dissertation coordinates two problems which have hitherto resisted adequate synthesis: the form-critical problem of describing proverbial-sounding Synoptic sayings and the tradition-historical problem of assessing the rhetorical habits of Jesus and his immediate successors in oral tradition. The approach taken here to linking these qualifies not only form-critical assumptions of continuity between written forms - in Kleinliteratur - and identifies oral Sitz im Leben of mnemotechnical scholasticism, but also of the recent emphases on radical discontinuity between oral and writing modes of tradition. The connection proposed here between re-description of so-called Wisdom-sayings and oral traditional aspects of gospel educational category of gnome. Defined, exemplified and prescribed in basic Graeco-Roman educational texts as well as in technical, philosophical manuals of Rhetoric and in a rich collection-literature, gnome is superbly attested as an exercise in primary education, in all kinds of public-speaking and in cross-cultural (including Jewish) tradition. Moreover, Hellenistic cultivation of gnome primarily as a speech-type, indeed as a conversational means of argumentation in any Sitz im Leben, and only secondarily though still extensively as a literary technique makes it a particularly pertinent term of comparison for New Testament criticism. Recognizing gnomic continuity between oral and written Synoptic tradition allows discussion of the authenticity not only of individual sayings (on criteria of dissimilarity), but also collectively of the gnomic manner (on criteria of oral-literate continuity and multiple attestation): quite apart from the (in)authenticity of each gnome, gnomic style is central to Jesus' self-expression and earliest tradition. In this sense gnomai are a particularly valuable data-set for reassessing the critically controverted relationship between Jesus' rhetoric and law in Synoptic tradition gnome is exploited suggestively as a non-legal means of addressing conventionally legal topics.
This dissertation seeks to coordinate two sets of problems which have hitherto resisted adequate synthesis: the form-critical problem of describing proverbial-sounding elements in Synoptic sayings-matter and the tradition-historical problem of assessing the rhetorical preferences of Jesus and his immediate successors in oral tradition. The approach taken here to linking these problem-sets very largely accepts criticism of the classic form-critical assumption of specific continuity between the forms of the Synoptic literature - patronizingly viewed as *Kleinliteratur* - and forms and identifiable *Sitz im Leben* in pre-Synoptic oral tradition. Indeed the essential criticisms, on the one hand, that Synoptic forms are fully literary and, on the other, that definitive influence of traditionally fixed *Sitz im Leben* on the formulation and transmission of sayings ascribed to Jesus can only exceptionally be demonstrated (eg of liturgical tradition), apply equally against revisionist assignment of Synoptic sayings-stuff to the single *Sitz im Leben* of mnemotechnical scholasticism. In spite of the failure, in this respect, of the form-critical enterprise, a hermeneutically and historically radical
opposition of gospel literacy to gospel orality is also unjustified at least by Synoptic data.

In fact, the connection identified here between less prejudicial redescription of so-called Wisdom-sayings in the Synoptic gospels and the task of characterizing, authenticating and interpreting oral traditional aspects of gospel literature - through the Hellenistic rhetorical and educational category of gnome - functions as a remarkable bridge between orality and literacy not only in the Synoptics and in the New Testament but indeed in the Hellenized and Ancient Near Eastern worlds generally. Defined, exemplified and prescribed in the most basic Greek and Latin educational texts, especially among the exercises of the progymnasmata, as well as in the more theoretical manuals of technical and philosophical Rhetoric, and illustrated both in a richly varied collection-literature and in the compositional habits, the literary rhetoric, of practically all Greek writers, gnome is a doubly appropriate term of comparison for gospel sayings.

This massive and varied treatment in both theoretical and practical literature throughout the Hellenistic period gives gnome a matchless density of attestation. Even in comparison with the closely related chria-form and its apophthegmatic variants, literary forms which captured to an extraordinary degree the Zeitgeist of the Hellenistic age, the discussion and use of gnome supports abstract definition and application to the New Testament. Thus the evidence for chria is itself evidence for gnome: chria is never defined except in distinction to gnome and chriae in practise very often include
gnomic punch-lines. In addition, **gnome** was, unlike **chria**, the subject of permanently valuable philosophical enquiries by theoretical Rhetoricians, notably Aristotle and Quintillian. It is Aristotle, in particular, who emphasizes the peculiarity of **gnome** (with **paradeigma**) as a basic strategy for rhetorical proof, rather than as a strictly formal category like the formulaically determined **chria**. **Gnome** is thus characterized by (1) syntactic separability from its verbal contexts, (2) normative, ethically urgent, function over against its contexts and (3) analogical structure, rather than by peculiar syntactical form or conventional association with particular **Sitze im Leben**.

But Hellenistic attestation of **gnome** is not only such as to invite its descriptive application to New Testament rhetoric: the evidence also has positive tradition-historical implications. That **gnome** has its place in a strongly rhetorical tradition, that is in a tradition which emphasizes actual public-speaking at least as much as literary composition, that its place in rhetorical culture is equally secure in theoretical reflection, in actual performance habits (so far as we know them) and in the most primary educational prescription, that individual **gnomai** were cross-culturally transmitted (eg from Ahiqar to Aesop or from Epicure to the Rabbis) and, finally, that Hellenistic **gnome** corresponds so closely to basic elements in Ancient Near Eastern Wisdom all contribute to a recognition that **gnome** is a rare and active bridge between the oral rhetoric of speech and its secondary development into the rhetoric of literary composition and appreciation. The potential importance of such a bridge for Synoptic
studies can hardly be understated, especially in view of the failure of classical form-criticism in precisely this regard. In the first place, this privileged continuity of gnome-use between oral and literary rhetoric and its availability even to relatively uneducated and/or un-hellenized speakers, listeners, readers and writers combine with the actual patterns of Synoptic gnome-use to create a strong presumption of traditionality and authenticity in gnomai attributed to Jesus. That is, given the potential orality of gnomic rhetoric, its massive Synoptic ascription to Jesus, across form-, source- and redaction-critical boundaries, is sufficient to confirm (1) that Jesus' rhetoric was characteristically gnomic and (2) that gospel gnomai are, if not all individually authentic, then collectively representative of the manner and content of the earliest tradition.

Such an argument for collective authenticity (compare the more complicated but similar arguments for the collective authenticity of parable) has the enormous advantage of allowing a fully historical approach to Synoptic oral tradition and to sayings-tradition particularly without appeal either to the authenticity and perspicuity of individual sayings or to the notoriously two-edged authenticating criterion of dissimilarity. In fact several aspects of Synoptic gnome are consistent and pronounced enough to imply the considerable originality of Jesus' determinative influence, but the mannerisms of Synoptic gnome are attributable to Jesus because of the prior authentication of gnomic style generally within which they are unusual but not radically dissimilar. In fact, as a data-set not for reconstructing, but for describing and interpreting the rhetoric of Jesus' earliest tradition, gnomai are preferable to conventional
selections of "core" sayings, more-or-less widely and plausibly regarded as authentic, in two respects: first, the authentication of Jesus' gnomic manner rests not on its dissimilarity, but rather on its essential, albeit creative continuity with his environment and on its practically unanimous attestation and attribution to a Jesus whose rhetoric is not monstrously idiosyncratic. Second, though, gnome, just because of its argumentatively universal scope, ie because of its applicability in principle within any rhetorical Sitz im Leben, may seriously claim again, collectively, as a category, to represent the whole range of Jesus' argumentative interests, especially in view of the uncensored character of some individual gnomai (eg Mt 8:22 or Mk 7:27). At the very least, the criteria for selecting gnomai as a potential data-set and the criteria for confirming their collective, stylistic authenticity are not exactly the same.

In addition, recognition of the essential continuity of gnome-use between oral and literary tradition-modes suggests not only that gnome is not a formal category in the form-critical sense (syntactically defined and related to particular Sitz im Leben), but also that it is to be distinguished a fortiori from specifically literary genres. This means that study of Synoptic gnomai has little to offer to discussions of the literary genres of gospel literature except, negatively, that gnomai cannot be read as in themselves indices of sapiential literary genre: they are not, in this sense, Wisdom-sayings. Indeed in Wisdom literature and elsewhere, literary reception of gnomic and analogous styles may offer a basis for comparison not so much of the literary genre as of the relative
literacy itself of generically similar texts. That is not at all to say that gnomic style may simply be taken as an index of oral-traditional antecedents behind texts; it may, however, provide a textual dimension within which to appraise and compare the balance of oral and specifically literary poetics within texts and canons of texts. It may then be that orally transmitted traditional backgrounds should be postulated for texts and text-groups within which (as within the Synoptics) compositional sensibility seems to vary most dramatically between strongly oral and impressively literate. At any rate gnomai in Synoptic tradition are an important indication of the complexity and vigour of interaction between orality and literacy in Jesus' movement.

Interpretation of Synoptic gnomai underlines the semantic importance of the tension between analogical connotivity and normative address. A typical aspect of proverb-use in many cultures is as an oblique means for addressing socially sensitive fields of normativity; among Synoptic gnomai, this potential for crisis-management in analogical norms seems, surprisingly, to be realized in a deliberate heightening of normative conflict. This is most noticeable in three overlapping areas: personal assertion, anti-proverbiality and quasi- legality. For the first of these, an important group of gospel gnomai may be noted, from a range of form- and source-critical contexts, which refer figuratively more-or-less directly to the speaker himself, especially where the speaker is in all cases at least putatively Jesus. Together with such explicitly self-referential gnomai, the self-evidential quality of gnomic assertions generally and especially of figuratively less explicit but still strongly personal gospel
sayings emphasizes the dependence of the disciple or of gnomic normativity in general upon the authority of the gnome-speaker, without defining its character or source. Much the same strategy of impulsively personal, strongly conflictive assertion, but always within a veil of analogical connotivity, appears in the Synoptic tendency to turn proverbial or proverbial-sounding gnomai in unproverbial or even anti-proverbial senses or indeed to coin gnomai which, though superficially conventional, are intrinsically startlingly anti-proverbial in sense.

The remaining sub-category of Synoptic gnomai, that of sayings which address the specifically non-legal normativity of gnomic analogy specifically legal topics, is of enormous tradition-historical importance. The double fact that the most representative sample available of Jesus' and his earliest tradents' rhetoric refers often and outspokenly to legal topics but does so in the deliberately non-legal style of gnomic connotivity goes far toward explaining the legal diversity and controversies within the early church and specifically toward motivating the complicated and equivocal developments behind those Synoptic legal pericopae which incorporate topically legal gnomai and seek, vainly, to interpret them as laws. The explanatory power of recognizing the most probably authentic sayings of Jesus on legal topics as essentially, stubbornly non-legal gnomai extends also not only to the paucity of non-gospel references to Jesus' sayings but especially to the partial exception of Paul's very few probable allusions to dominical norms - in topically legal settings, but without direct citation of gnomic sayings which may well inspire, but
can hardly inform legislation. Such topically legal *gnomai* in Jesus' tradition also raise, in a new form, the question of Jesus' historical attitude to his own Judaism, the Torah and its legal normativity. The evidence of the Synoptics' quasi-legal *gnomai* suggests, however, an assertive, indeed, combative attitude to laws and to legal institutions, even to those divinely sanctionied, as practical, normative obstacles to the effective acknowledgement of his own authority. That is, no abstract or perhaps even potentially abstract attitude to the Law in its entirety is expressed in gnomic sayings which are as normatively concrete in their selection of particular norms as they are connotatively and personally non-legal.
SENTENTIAE JESU

GNOMIC SAYINGS IN THE TRADITION OF JESUS

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D.Phil, Trinity Term 1988
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: Synoptic Wisdom-Saying and Hellenistic Gnome</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: Gnome between Literature and Tradition</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: Gnome and Wisdom-Saying</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: Synoptic Gnomai: Distribution and Separability in Literary Tradition</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: Personality and Normativity in Synoptic Gnomai</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: Gnomic Normativity and Law in Synoptic and Pauline Reception</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion:</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note On Abbreviation</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: A Catalogue of Synoptic Gnomai</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The following study presents the reader with many difficulties, not all of which are due to the admitted infirmities of the writer. The very quantity, variety and poetic economy of the sayings taken up here, and their often subtle and complex integration into Synoptic literature impose a degree of exegetical allusiveness intended as a compromise between mere sketchiness and a really proper treatment of each example in all its aspects, such as would greatly exceed the available time and space. The task at hand, the definition and analysis of a sample of Synoptic logia which will be both poetically and historically more appropriate to the description of Jesus' tradition, may therefore usefully be prefaced by two introductory notes: first, an outline of the argument as a whole and its relation to the divisions of the text below and, second, a disclaimer of allegiance (and acknowledgement of indebtedness) to several currently influential streams of New Testament criticism.

I

For the first, the historical thesis proposed here has three broad aspects, which may be labelled constructive, analytical and exegetical respectively. I would rate as primarily constructive the basic observation that the category of gnome in Hellenistic primary
and secondary education as well as in advanced Rhetorical theory
offers simply the best available generic and historical classification
for a large range of Synoptic "sayings". On this descriptive level
the appropriateness of referring to many Synoptic units as gnomai is
in the category's widespread and well-documented use as a medium both
of basic education and of practice in public-speaking and,
derivatively, written composition. But this already leads to
important theoretical considerations within the project of
constructing a category which will be both historically and
phenomenologically descriptive. Already among the ancients gnome was
the object not only of prescriptive and descriptive interest but also
of intensive theoretical reflection. Aristotle and Quintilian
particularly anticipate the theoretical questions of the historical
and semantic relationships between gnome and proverbial language and
between "sayings" generally and literature, be it in Synoptic or in
Wisdom tradition. Use of the Hellenistic category of gnome in
Synoptic literary- and tradition-criticism thus involves a
rapprochement between the Hellenists' educational examples and
prescriptive definitions and the more theoretical analysis of the same
sayings by Aristotle and, eventually, of cross-culturally similar
phenomena by modern paroimiologists. The result is a powerfully
descriptive definition of gnome in terms of its syntactical
independence, its analogical structure, and its normative rhetorical
function. This constructive motif, and its structural and functional
underpinnings in ancient and modern theory furnish the leading matter
of the first two chapters below.

At the same time, however, a second line of consideration emerges
which is oriented less to the constructive problem of defining and
describing gnomai than to the problem of their status between speech
and written composition, i.e., to the problem of oral-traditional theory
as such. The problem is present already in Hellenistic educational
and philosophical Rhetoric, that is, in books which are nevertheless
fundamentally about speaking well or, at most, about how to write good
speeches. The relationship between gnome in speech and in writing
becomes even more problematic and fertile in their confrontation in
Synoptic and in Wisdom literature; theoretically, the single
communicative category of gnome has virtually the same outward
functions and internal economy, though not exhaustively the same
meaning, in spoken situation and written context. There is therefore
in gnome a hypothetically historical as well as semantic bridge
between oral and written tradition, a bridge which, if it will bear
traffic, is urgently needed in Synoptic studies - though by no means
only there. Even at this hypothetical stage, analysis of gnome and of
more-or-less gnomic texts reveals a kind and degree of continuity
between orality and literacy not readily describable - though also not
falsifiable - on the basis of form-critical and derivative theories of
the Synoptics' oral-traditional pre-history. Independent of precise
correspondence between formal and social developments of
institutional, memorizational continuity or of radical hermeneutical
antipathy between orality and literacy, gnome is not only a useful
index of the argumentative character of the Synoptic texts: it also
contributes to the hypothetical description of oral tradition and so
to critical analysis of available models of the relationships between
oral tradition and gospel literature. In other words, recognition
that Synoptic sayings-tradition is largely and, on form-critical, source-critical, or redaction-critical grounds, irreducibly gnomic provides a needed standpoint from which to nuance models of oral tradition and to reassess the balance of continuity and conflict between written and spoken modes of transmission and experience. Such considerations, theoretical in matter as well as in manner, surface already in the opening two chapters, but they remain a strong undercurrent throughout; indeed reappraisal of oral-traditional theory in relation to the Synoptics is an essential, albeit ulterior motive for interest in gnome at all.

The remaining four chapters, progressively more exegetical, represent attempts to test both the descriptive power of gnome and its theoretical capacity to bridge gaps in our understanding of sayings-tradition in Jesus' name. Chapter Three is thus devoted to measuring and where possible to spanning the cultural and linguistic gap between Greek and non-Greek rhetorical strategies and the much more formidable chasm between conversationally wise speech and the Forms of Literary Wisdom-sayings. Chapter Four takes up the pre-exegetical task of showing the continuity and coherence of the gnomic category across boundaries of New Testament historical criticism, boundaries between literary forms, between hypothetical sources and between authorial/redactional styles. The primary purpose of these intermediate chapters is therefore to connect the descriptive definition of gnomai with the concrete task of identifying and interpreting actual gnomai in Jesus' environment and tradition. Still, the secondary interest in gnome as a fulcrum from which to align oral-traditional theory more realistically with the complexity of
oral and literate interaction in Synoptic history asserts itself continuously in both chapters in that the link between gnome in general and its particular significance for Synoptic development is precisely its mobility and continuity between quite different, even competing styles of language and tradition. Unlike literary or mnemotechnical forms, gnomai are imaginable, memorable and actually attested in modes of tradition from the orality of ordinary conversation, to the more self-conscious rhetoric of persuasion and debate, to the relative literacy of textual memorization and written composition.

The final pair of chapters, Five and Six, is occupied with exegesis of Synoptic gnomai. But exegesis must be carried out here under special conditions, imposed, on the one hand, by the singularity of gnome as a matchless principle of continuity amongst speech, oral tradition and literature and, on the other, by the exegetical goal of historical as well as poetic insight. That is, the same combination in gnomai of linguistic flexibility and persistence which makes the literary deposit of Synoptic gnomai so promising a vein for the recovery of generally authentic tradition also makes it impossible fully to assure the authenticity or inauthenticity of individual gnomai in ascription to Jesus: the ore of historic tradition must be mined and refined in its entirety and not sifted like alluvium for nuggets of purity. The goal of exegesis will therefore be the identification of historically interesting features of Synoptic gnome as a category which is collectively much more probably authentic than even its most striking individual examples. Indeed the
characteristics in our initial descriptive definition of **gnome**, analogy, syntactical independence and normativity, have particular relevance for understanding Jesus' speech-style and its tradition-history. The combined concreteness and elusiveness of analogical poetics and the authoritative urgency of syntactically separable but still normative sayings makes **gnome** an expressively non-abstract vehicle for intuitions of Jesus' personal sovereignty and of the complex response it demands. The availability of **gnome** to both oral and written tradition, its prevalence in the latter and the tradition-historical respectability of individual Synoptic **gnomai** constitute, moreover, exceptionally probable grounds for attributing to Jesus' own rhetoric these seeds of later christological abstraction.

II

The object of our second introductory note is more negative: to point out the limits within which the following study should be identified with each of several currents in New Testament criticism. More positively, this will be an opportunity to acknowledge debts too general to be adequately reflected in the normal argumentative apparatus. In addition, I think it a point of great importance that a gnomic approach to Synoptic sayings material points beyond fragmentation and eclecticism toward a more nuanced integration of methods, very much a desideratum of contemporary criticism.\(^1\)

Certainly, at first glance, a reader could be excused for classifying a dissertation about a category (**gnome**) derived explicitly from ancient rhetorical theory and education as an instance of
Rhetorical Criticism. The inadequacy of the classification already becomes clear in the ambiguity of Rhetorical Criticism itself: on the one hand, the gnomic approach mapped out here differs markedly from attempts to explain New Testament texts as more or less typical examples of rules prescribed in Graeco-Roman Rhetoric for particularly literary and oratorical genres, as in HD Betz's persuasive explication of Galatians² or in recently extensive discussion of the chria.³ From this point of view gnome is not a rhetorical genre so much as a basic argumentative strategy available across generic boundaries and therefore a part of the rhetoricians' basic curriculum. Above all, gnome is adduced here as an asset not only for describing Synoptic documents, but also for understanding the limited continuity between Synoptic literature and presumed oral traditional antecedents. That is, recognition of gnomai in the Synoptic gospels focuses attention on their attribution to Jesus of rhetoric in the rather stronger sense of actual public-speaking. On the other hand, this interest in tradition precisely as cohesive rhetoric, potentially spoken, also goes well beyond the usual agenda of the more modern Rhetorical Criticism associated with the name of J Muilenburg⁴, criticism which evokes natural rather than specifically Graeco-Roman communicative categories, though still primarily in texts. By contrast, the currency of gnome in specifically Hellenistic primary education is of importance to our thesis - though so too is a degree of cross-cultural relevance in an environment which is deeply Hellenistic but still not Greek. Apart from this cross-cultural perspective, though, gnome anticipates the new Rhetorical Criticism in its prior descriptive interest in communicative argumentative strategies rather than in the figures and tropes which, often
unjustly, are seen as signs of the pedantry of the old Rhetoric. That is, even as a category from ancient Rhetoric, gnome is exceptional - as Aristotle recognized\(^5\) - in the fundamental level of argumentative abstraction which it represents.

The same subliminality marks gnome off from the categories of classical Form-Criticism, some of which, of course, eg chria, are also syntheses of ancient Rhetorical categories with modern theoretical requirements, but practically none of which can seriously pretend to be a recognized, indeed prescribed category of spoken communication and tradition as well of literary composition in Jesus’ culture-area. It is a truism to notice that the communicative categories of Hellenistic rhetorical and literary theory rarely correspond comfortably with modern critical requirements for abstractly consistent genres; this is all the more truly said of such biblical categories as mashal and parabole. As defined, analysed, exemplified, prescribed and collected by the Hellenists, gnome shows a notable consistency captured in our three-point descriptive definition (separability, analogy and normativity). Thus every gnome - take, for example, that of the prophet respected except at home (Mk 6:4 par; Jn 4:44) - has an integrity over against its potentially various contexts, an integrity which is based in analogy or dis-analogy (prophet:home::prophet:abroad) and which essentially challenges or reinforces socially important behavioral norms. This level of structural identity, however, may be preserved in tradition with only a minimum of syntactical, textual continuity and, above all, without either systematic memorization or socially fixed Sitze im Leben: the Sitz im
Leben of gnome is argumentation. An approach to Synoptic tradition through gnome thus reinforces most current criticism of form-criticism at the same time that it seeks to expose an exceptional, perhaps not completely unique, possibility of discerning a category of sayings material which may span the gap between the Synoptics and their oral pre-history in Jesus' and his disciples' rhetoric. In fact the use of gnome proposed here is equivocally related, in spite of much indebtedness, even to the revised form-criticism of K Berger with its severely chastened historical pretensions and acknowledgement of the quite exceptional tradition-historical relevance of gnomic sayings: it is the purpose of the following pages not only to illustrate and exploit the tradition-historical peculiarity of gnome, but also to account for it as a function of gnome's unusual, form-critically sub-liminal, level of structural definition: gnome is not exactly a form. Rather like the parable, and quite unlike (other) rhetorical and/or form-critical categories (eg, chria/apophthegm), gnome is, first and last, an argumentative strategy, the verbal form of which, even in individual cases, may vary greatly. To the extent that historical continuity between orality and literacy in Synoptic sayings tradition can be described in terms of gnome (and parable), Synoptic Form-Criticism is replaced and not renewed here, in spite of an essential continuity of critical goals.

Indeed, of the three conceptually shaky pillars of classical Form-Criticism (Form, Sitz im Leben and Oral Tradition), only the notion of Oral Tradition figures positively in the following treatment of Synoptic gnomai: in the first place, even if gnome is a structure argumentatively more basic and syntactically more variable than those
usually recognized as 'Forms', and even if it can be assigned only to
the most general of life-settings, that of effective speech, gnomai
are nonetheless - indeed, all the more - the stuff of Tradition,
deliberately, impressively memorable language. Gnomai themselves
impose upon the critic a range of properly sociological questions
about the milieux and purposes of traditional recollection. A gnomic
approach to the Synoptic gospels has above all one contribution to
make to sociological study of Christian origins: a data-set which may
seriously, perhaps uniquely, claim to be representative of the
continuity between oral tradition and Synoptic literature, a data-set
which is, moreover, characterized by the authoritative and normative
rhetorical function of its elements. Clearly such rhetorical
normativity in gnomai cannot automatically be translated into social
normativity without, eg, detailed investigation of the processes of
normative reception. Still, given a specific continuity of rhetorical
style between (gnomic) oral tradition and (gnomic) gospel literature,
the potential relevance for a sociology of Jesus' movement and
tradition of gnomic normativity is not to be ignored. Paradoxically,
then, an important aspect of the emphasis below on normativity in
gnomai is its provision of more adequate foundations for the long
since imposing edifice of social-historical exegesis of sayings
attributed to Jesus.9

The new perspective on pre-Synoptic oral tradition in gospel
gnomai, freed from the excess form-critical baggage of folkloric
collectivity and formalism, has, in addition, a major relevance to
the more nuanced description of orality itself and of the
philosophical and historical relationship between orality and literacy in early Christianity. Historically, a survey of Synoptic gnomai is an opportunity to illustrate the complexity and variability of the psychic and social as well as technical factors relating spoken and written language; philosophically and theologically, the significant and extensive continuity between orality and Synoptic literacy in gnomai and in the gnomic style generally is a good starting point for an appreciative but firm rejection of attempts to absolutize oral-literary tension in gospel tradition into a radically oral hermeneutic. Indeed the particular hermeneutical danger of overstressing the polarity between orality and literacy in the Synoptics is that it distracts from the more basic challenge of Synoptic gnomai, viewed both as speech and as elements of literary style: the saturation of gospel texts with gnomai and the structuring of pre-Synoptic sayings tradition around the recollection of gnomai agree in emphasizing and attributing to Jesus' authority the strongly personal poetic economy of such sayings. In addition, the particular content of the Synoptic gnomai shows just how disturbingly deconstructive this gnostic voice can be, lurking in the depths of the gospel's language.
CHAPTER ONE: Synoptic Wisdom Saying and Hellenistic Gnome

Any attempt to analyse the sayings tradition of Jesus into its elements for purposes of historical inquiry must face the problems of defining form in terms which are meaningful in relation to both the literary, canonical tradition and its primarily oral antecedents in both church and dominical rhetoric. To satisfy the particular requirements of historical Jesus research, a formal category must not only accurately reflect the actualities of the received texts, it must also be at least hypothetically intelligible within non-canonical, non-literary and non-ecclesiastical discourse. But it is still not enough that a class of sayings should have a distinct place among the forms of the tradition; to be more than merely datable and hypothetically intelligible as words of Jesus they must also stand in a fairly permanent and pervasive tension with the tradition which values and preserves them. The unique status of the parable-form as such in modern attempts to reconstruct the teaching or, less prejudicially, the speech of Jesus is thus due not only to its attractiveness and durable integrity, but also to its apparent difficulty of digestion: the same defining characteristics made discourse in parables convenient to preserve and easier to imitate than to modify successfully. Indeed, the same tension between the parables and the leading facts of Jesus' public career which makes the form an indispensable and challenging piece of evidence has also aggravated
the difficulty of sketching even an outline of Jesus as both habitual parable-maker and victim of crucifixion. Appropriation of the remainder of the sayings material as evidence for Jesus has been for the most part piecemeal and by theme. Thus it has proven notoriously impossible to extract from the Son of Man sayings any unified historically comprehensible meaning, while the symbolic and idiomatic ambiguity of the formula itself has excluded all but the dimmest of light from outside the New Testament. Other forms are also unhelpful: the macarism is so widespread a form as to say nothing special about those who use it; even the antithesis-form with its deceptively clear implications cannot reliably be placed in Jesus' repertoire of forms. Indeed, modern discussion of the antitheses is instructive in its limitations for any investigation of the forms of discourse behind the gospel traditions.

Above all, it has been impossible to relate the antithesis-form to Jesus apart from demonstrations of the authenticity of some or all of its Matthaean examples. Although the usual division of the six antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount into two groups is justified on the at least vaguely formal grounds that the tension between thesis and antithesis is weaker in nos. 1, 2 and 4 and that these are more nearly integrated sayings than those antitheses (nos. 3, 5, 6) with Lucan (non-antithetical) parallels, authentication as Jesus' own of any combination of these suspiciously Matthaean formulations must depend ultimately on non-formal considerations. Of course the possibility may be urged that some of the antitheses (nos. 3, 5 and 6) preserve and interpret correctly 'originally isolated words of
Christ, that the elements of the Matthaean antithesis are attested elsewhere in the Synoptic tradition, and that Matthew's antithetical manner after all captures the impression which the teaching and attitude of Jesus conveyed. But all this must be the demonstrandum, not the premise of any study of the antithesis-form as such: in the meantime not only have we no way of telling which antitheses are authentic or preserve authentic tensions, we really cannot even say how they should be interpreted if they were clearly Jesus' own words.9

I Jesus as Teacher of Wisdom (R Bultmann).

These same problems of distinguishing forms which have a recognizable history within the tradition and which can be interpreted with some precision for each stage of transmission are, of course, fundamental to the whole enterprise of form-criticism. All the more interesting, then, is the limited success of Bultmann's approach to the smaller sayings of the Synoptic tradition under the rubric of 'Jesus as the Teacher of Wisdom.'10 The division of the logia among three 'basic forms': principles (in declaratory form), exhortations (in imperative form), and questions, is inoffensive, but the overarching category of 'proverbial Wisdom', which presumably does not include every possible declaration, exhortation or question, is not defined formally but by content and by examples from biblical and rabbinic wisdom. Moreover, the list of gospel-sayings which Bultmann treats, though unquestionably dominated by proverbs or by forms related to proverbial language, includes also forms which tend toward the developed narrative of parable (eg Mt 6:19-21/Lk 12:33f.) or
towards legal prescription (eg Lk 17:3f./Mt 18:15,22). Perhaps most interesting of all is Bultmann's concluding comment on the genuineness of the logia attributed to Jesus. The use by Jesus of conventional proverbs and proverbial patterns of speech can only be assessed and distinguished from the usage of the Church - and then only tentatively - where the process of appropriation has pushed a saying away from the realm of convention toward a more and more individual style and content. The detection of that individual flavour which alone might authenticate the attribution of Jesus of a saying modelled formally on wisdom patterns goes well beyond the limits of formal definition; it is only "Worte, die aus dem Hochgefühl der eschatologischen Stimmung gesprochen sind,` or, `die von der Energie des Bussrufs getragen sind," that can be ascribed with any confidence of Jesus. Three points, then, emerge from Bultmann's consideration of the Synoptic logia: first, the usefulness of 'mood' as a criterion for authenticity depends here upon Bultmann's precise knowledge of the themes and style which characterize Jesus. If the distinctiveness of Jesus' 'eschatological piety' be questioned, the possibility of sensing original sayings - already for Bultmann pretty slight - is further diminished. On the other hand, the much more than proverbial force of some of the gospel-sayings (eg Lk 9:60b) over against the comparative banality of others (eg Lk 10:7b) makes it undesirable to dismiss Bultmann's procedure completely. Secondly though, the appeal to the categories of Wisdom-saying (Weisheitspräche) and proverb (Sprichwort; Maschal) raises the whole problem of their formal definition, especially in relation to New Testament materials. Finally, how do Wisdom and proverbial forms actually function in settings which are not predominantly literary collections of Wisdom,
as for example in apocalyptic and legal contexts, or, above all for an inquiry into the discourse of the Church and of its originator, in oral presentation without the sustained catalogues and sic et non of the sapiential manner in writing? Without doubting the deep relationship between folkloric use of proverb and the sophisticated structures of courtly and learned Wisdom, we may wonder how far and in what sense these *logia* (in Bultmann's *sensu strictiore*¹⁶) belong to a portrayal of Jesus as Wisdom-Teacher and how far they historically justify such a portrait.

Bultmann's intuition that some of the proverbial sayings attributed to Jesus in the gospel tradition are distinguished by an exaltation of mood which can plausibly be referred to the inspiration or authorship of the historical Jesus is redefined by W A Beardslee¹⁷ in the light of Bultmann's own later reflections, in the context of a less historically-oriented study, on the function of proverb in general and in Christian proclamation in particular.¹⁸ For Bultmann, though general truths such as ethical imperatives and proverbs give, in the first place, a reassuring sense of the continuity and intelligibility of existence, these same formulations can, by eluding the hearer's confident grasp, become a most forceful expression of the ambiguity of life, even of life at its most orderly and rational: "sie ist gerade nicht "eineleuchtend", sondern paradox, ein Ärgernis für den "natürlichen" Menschen."¹⁹ It is this tension, or rather this implicit movement from general and conceptual to personal, existential address, which makes the forms of general truth, especially ethical imperatives and proverbs, appropriate for Christian
discourse. This is the insight into the structure and function of particularly the proverb which Beardslee seeks to carry further and which may, by the way, provide a broadly formal anchorage for Bultmann's earlier, prematurely historicized, perception of a certain exaltation of mood in a comparative few of the gospels' proverbial sayings.

II Synoptic Proverb (W Beardslee and C E Carlston)

Beardslee begins by sharpening Bultmann's characterization of the function of proverb as the expression of a general truth addressed at least potentially with singular force to the concrete situation of its hearer, by emphasizing more strongly the element of confrontation inherent in the formulation and/or selection for a particular occasion of 'even the most 'cracker-barrel' type of wisdom.' That is to say, the functional tension which Bultmann notes, this tendency within the outward, generalized structure of the form to confront the hearer all the more forcefully in his particular situation, is always fundamental to the form and meaning of proverb whether we wish to call this confrontation 'christliche Verkündigung' or not. Thus proverb is only in a limited sense a 'generalization': it presents always to some degree a confrontation of the particular case under the form of generalization, a 'challenge to insight and action' in which generalization and confrontation are only relatively distinct. Turning then to the proverb-like sayings of the Synoptic traditions, Beardslee finds a minority of sayings in which the confrontational
aspect has been heightened, primarily by the extension of antithesis into paradox (eg Lk 17:33) and by hyperbolic exaggeration of the forms of general statement (eg Mt 8:20 para.; 8:22 para.). At the same time, the presence at every level of Synoptic tradition of proverbs which have not been thus sharpened helps to delineate the "field of intensification" of ordinary life and wisdom expressed in proverbs in which the aspect of confrontation lies in comparative concealment.

The value of such an approach to the gospels' use of proverb-forms in terms of their function as confrontation in apparent generalization is not least that it accounts at once for the usefulness of the form in Wisdom, in the most ordinary conversation and in the gospel-tradition without dissolving the peculiarities of each separate situation along the continuum from dispassionate reflection to authoritative demand. In particular, Beardslee's study points the way towards relating such forms as a category to Jesus' own way of speaking.

If we could undertake a more detailed form-critical analysis we should show, despite all the judgements of probability involved, that the proverb, like the parable, comes into the tradition from its use by Jesus himself, and that the same is true of its intensification by paradox and hyperbole, which is the distinctive mark of the use of the proverb in the Synoptics.

Thus the characteristic shift in the Synoptic proverb toward more intense confrontation can be referred to Jesus' inspiration, if not always to his authorship, while the presence within the tradition of many quite conventional truisms is presumably due not entirely to the moralizing work of the Church. Conceptually, functional analysis of the proverb invites us to see just how intimate is the relationship between quasi-generalization (since the proverb is never a truly adequate summary of experience, but is always ad hoc or ad hominem)
and confrontation and proclamation. Historically, the frequency of such forms ascribed to Jesus and the intensification of a sub-set of the whole category creates a strong presumption in favour of the authenticity not of any particular saying but of the whole manner of speaking in (and intensifying) proverbial language. This point is absolutely fundamental to any credible examination of these sayings as evidence for Jesus: while Bultmann's discussion of the logia was limited by the inevitably arbitrary use of a criterion of authenticity (in this case "eschatological mood") to select individual sayings, Beardslee's analysis of function promises to authenticate no one, single saying but rather a habit of speaking in proverbs and especially of heightening their implicit tone of confrontation. Even N Perrin's treatment of 'The Proverbial Sayings', which follows Beardslee closely, seems to miss the essential importance of dealing with the history of the category as a whole and instead turns the notion of intensification into a kind of subsidiary index of authenticating dissimilarity. The advantage of Beardslee's approach is that it offers a direction towards meaningful discussion of Jesus' language without undertaking the desperate project of isolating a corpus of authentic sayings.

The same warning against the selection of authentic fragments especially by a criterion of dissimilarity - especially applied to forms which depend for their effect on apparently commonplace generalization - is sounded even more strongly by C E Carlston. He is particularly conscious of the staggering range of parallels available from antiquity and from traditional cultures generally in
relation to which claims for the distinctiveness of the gospel materials are shown to be at best relative and at worst an unconvincing pursuit of 'invidious comparisons.'\textsuperscript{28} In view of this, it is all the more necessary to deal with the proverbs ascribed to Jesus not piecemeal but as a category which is one of the points of continuity between Jesus and his world. Thus the very attribution of so large a group of sayings to Jesus by all the recognizable streams of gospel tradition must be in itself a significant fact for our understanding of their putative author.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, Carlston's thematic analysis of the Synoptic proverbs indicates the intriguing absence of some (by no means all) typically sapiential themes: 'education, personal character and habits, friendship, women and family relationships, ethnic matters, politics and prudence.'\textsuperscript{30} Whether or not this result can be exactly duplicated, the procedure of subdividing the category of gospel-proverbs for comparison on a topical basis is probably an improvement on Bultmann's breakdown according to sentence construction (declaratory, imperative or interrogatory, v.supra p.14) which varies considerably according to 'performances' of a given saying, especially in oral tradition where the critical structures for memory may be patterns of sense and imagery rather than of syntax.\textsuperscript{31}

III Literacy and Orality in Sayings Tradition

So far, the most important problem for the definition of a coherent formal category within the smaller sayings attributed to Jesus has only been skirted. It is a problem of which form-criticism
has always been quite conscious, namely that of the tension between overlapping formal criteria, which, on the one hand, derive from literary analysis of the Synoptics and from the hypothetical contexts of the oral tradition and which, on the other, belong to the possibilities of primary oral discourse. Thus for example, the proverb, in the sense of a saying in common use, familiar to all within a language community, is certainly a general if not universal feature of oral thought and expression, but the main distinction between proverbs and other witticisms is one of social convention rather than verbal form. The curious equilibrium among the Synoptic logia between conventionality and heightening/intensification of meaning would seem to demand a less prejudicial designation than "proverb", which seems to derive its most coherent formal sense from the perception that it is the basic sub-unit of the literary forms we lump together as "Wisdom". To be sure, many of the sayings in the Synoptics do seem to have been shaped through the literary tradition of Wisdom-collections. Nevertheless, such sayings do not seem, as a group, intrinsically either more or less proverbial or sapiential than the large number of important logia which are wedded to narrative contexts.

Of this latter group, the question of the historical and formal relationships between written Gattung and oral forms of anecdote and saying is particularly pressing, as in fact it does not seem possible to generalize accurately about the extent to which reflection on dependent sayings has generated narrative, dialogue and commentary: a certain dialectic between "punch-line" and context is too regular an element in successful apophthegms/paradigms for any safe conclusion to
be drawn about their original integrity or evolution. Thus, even though the general tendency of his exegesis clearly is to regard sayings as historically prior when they are logically primary in an apophthegm, Bultmann can caution against automatically treating sayings as originally independent of their narrative settings in the written tradition.\textsuperscript{33}

The situation is complicated in the work of M Dibelius by his commitment to the "constructive method"\textsuperscript{34} and the consequent necessity of discovering in the life of the community fully oral forms capable of describing the patterns of gospel-tradition and literature. Where Bultmann's categories of "apophthegm" and "proverb" can usefully retain a certain heuristic vagueness appropriate to the analysis of ancient literature, Dibelius must define forms which reflect precisely that secondary orality of the early community within which the primary speech of Jesus has been transformed and stylized to meet the textual requirements of preaching. Thus the investigation of the Paradigm form is carried through not in relation to the primary discourse of Jesus, about which the textual needs of the Church provide scant hints, but rather in comparison with the apparently "unliterary"\textsuperscript{35} forms of Rabbinic and Hellenistic anecdote. This first group of analogies does not really raise the question of the construction of anecdotes around formerly independent sayings so strongly as the related but distinct problem of the relative priority of case study or halakic generalization in the formation of Talmudic stories.\textsuperscript{36}

Something like this latter problem of motivation will have to be
addressed to Christian use of dominical authority (see chapter 6 below), but for the present essay in formal definition, the Greek analogies which Dibelius notes show closer formal similarities with the gospel literature, which presents itself, after all, in a deliberately Hellenized literacy. Moreover, these analogies situate the New Testament scholarly topic of setting-and-saying in relation to the intensive discussion by Hellenistic grammarians and rhetoricians of the correct use and relationship between anecdote and saying. Apart from Dibelius' and more recent references, the peculiar usefulness of the Greek rhetorical tradition in comparison with gospel-forms depends not only upon its certainly extensive direct influence on the formulation of all kinds of oral and literary culture in the world of Christian origins, but also upon the intrinsic value of the rhetoricians' research into and fascination with forms which operate on quite varied levels of literacy and orality, as written and oral school-exercises, as stylishly entertaining memoirs, as serious vehicles for philosophical reflexion, as elements of actual speech-performances and as topics of technical discussion. That is, the rhetorical manuals and related literature embody, like the gospels, the shifting balance between orality and literacy within a traditional equilibrium. Both gospels and rhetorical manuals counter the assumption that the processes of tradition and invention are governed by fixed rules which can be known for both oral and literate aspects of development. Indeed, insofar as assumptions about regular tendencies of oral or written transmission and modification can be tested, they have proved disappointing as being based upon a much too simple evolutionary view of the processes involved.
The weakness here of most models of Synoptic development lies not only in their repeated failure to take seriously the complex problems of difference and continuity between writing and non-writing traditions, but more particularly in failure to appreciate that New Testament origins involve not only a radical shift of transmission but also a dramatic, if less radical, shift in sensibilities and that these two transformations almost certainly did not evolve pari passu. In this limited sense, G. Theissen is quite correct to defend Bultmann's refusal to differentiate too sharply between oral tradition and its significantly unliterary, though, as Kleinliteratur, written tradition of the Synoptics: although modern studies suggest that it takes only a moderate degree of literacy to make a tremendous difference in thought processes, commitment to scribal techniques, especially under the conditions of antiquity, does not immediately, completely or even quickly uproot the oral sensibility from which, after all, it springs.

It is difficult to emphasize enough the importance of this distinction between sensibility and technique for oral traditional theory generally and specifically for its application to the literature of the New Testament. The importance of the distinction lies firstly in the fact that a written text is ipso facto overwhelmingly and irretrievably literate with respect to technique. This may be qualified hermeneutically by recognition that ancient literature is meant to be read aloud. In the Synoptics it is certainly qualified tradition-historically by the massive emphasis on Jesus as speaker and his potential tradents as audience and
conversation-partners: as far as the Synoptists are concerned the only explicity and technically literary tradition relevant to Jesus is the Old Testament. Beyond the unanimity of the New Testament literature that Jesus' tradition originated and for a short but significant while persisted without decisive use of writing, however, our only access to this orally technical tradition as such is through its supra-technical influence, its influence despite the technical revolution of writing on the style, forms and themes - the poetic sensibility - of the written texts.

It is the particular poetic character of the Synoptic texts, their sensibility, which is the grain of intuitive truth in Bultmann's ultimately misleading allegation of unusual continuity between the forms of gospel literature and oral tradition. That is, the Synoptics do show an aesthetic, a sensibility or rather a juxtaposition of differing sensibilities within single texts which rightly recalls patterns of conversation and of literature from marginally or newly literate situations. It is this uncomforting aspect of juxtaposition in the hybrid sensibility of the gospels which has provoked W Kelber's polemically, or else misleadingly, absolutized call for an 'oral hermeneutic' of strong interpretive opposition between gospel tradition and gospel literature. Such absolutism cannot, however, escape the fact that it is the texts themselves, technically written and ultimately literate in poetics, which nevertheless imply in their literacy another co-assertive sensibility.

The identification as well as the interpretation of this, from the literary point of view, always secondary and implicit sensibility
in texts, and its association with a Synoptic pre-history of technically oral tradition as specifically 'oral' sensibility is thus partial and relative. That is, it is the mixture of quite different sensibilities within quite limited contexts and the comparison of differing contexts and texts which allows more or less probable reference to the relatively oral environment and (even technical) antecedents of some literature. Indeed rather as the identification of Semitisms may contribute in a general way to the probability on other grounds of a non-Greek Synoptic pre-history, in spite of the uncertainty of particular indentifications and in spite of the influence of the LXX, yet does practically nothing to establish the pre-history, if any, of individual gospel texts, so also the detection of relatively oral sensibility in gospel literacy and in its sub-texts contributes to the possibility of understanding the Synoptics as literature with a self-consciously non-literate past without implying much about the transmissional histories of this or that text-fragment. There is a positive relation between the particular mixture of sensibilities in the Synoptic literature and the technically oral tradition which certainly preceded them in the early Christian movement, but the relation is not one of mechanically direct correspondence between pockets of relatively non-literary sensibility in the Synoptics and formerly orally transmitted texts.

In fact - and this is the fundamental weakness of classical form-criticism - the least likely bridge between literature and oral tradition (sensibility and technique) is the essentially literate concept 'text'. Technically, texts may be created and transmitted
without writing by memorization especially with the aid of mnemotechnical devices such as versification, enumeration, even alphabetic cues, devices which leave a relatively clear impression on the sensibility of texts so produced and published. It is thus possible for a technically oral tradition to transmit texts, ie syntactical units conceived on analogy with written textuality and with the literate ideal of verbatim repetition. Such a mnemo-technical tradition may easily be used to supplement a written tradition, especially a craft-literate tradition, ie one controlled by a limited professional (eg priestly or scribal) class, or to cultivate without books an otherwise impossible verbatim liturgical uniformity. B Gerhardson, inter alios,44 has indeed sought to replace the admittedly flawed form-critical model of oral tradition by identifying such an economy of mnemo-technical and broadly craft-literate tradition behind Rabbinic literature and adapting it as a new model for Synoptic tradition. Unqualified description of Rabbinic tradition as mnemo-technical is probably misleading; in any case the application of such a model to Synoptic literature reveals mainly the weakness of memorizational influence on gospel texts. Even the liturgical traditions of the Lord's Prayer and the Lord's Supper show an embarrassing lack of concern for verbatim iteration: not only are the Synoptics largely innocent of reference to memorizational technique and the scholastic institutions it demands, they show only the rarest indications of mnemo-technical sensibility, the poetics of memorizational texts as distinct from those of simply memorable speech.
Far more noticeable in the Synoptics are indications of a sensibility compatible with the technically stronger orality of conversation and of recollection, even careful, deliberate recollection of its "gist" without significant influence from a literary concept of textuality. Technically such strongly oral tradition need not be naive; rather it is dominated by the tricks of impressively memorable speech, the performantial aspects of rhetorical skill. The sensibility of such strong orality is thus relatively distinguishable in its influence on written texts designed for memorization. The most relevant criteria of strongly (ie not just memorizational) oral sensibility in Synoptic contexts and especially sayings-matter (see chapter 4) are: (1) syntactical and argumentative additivity, ie, a tendency to poly- or asyndeton rather than to graded subordination; (2) aggregative rather than analytical composition, ie, readier tolerance of logical inconsistencies than of discursive gaps, as in the conversational, not only mnemo-technical use of catchwords; (3) verbal redundancy/repetition without evident verse or mnemotechnical value; (4) a conceptual concreteness which prefers symbolism and figuration from concrete imagery to conceptual abstraction.45

In mentioning such criteria, however, it is absolutely necessary to emphasize once more their relative and, after all, textual character. One of the fallacies of oral theoretical literary criticism since the pioneering studies of A Lord and M Parry46 has been that criteria of orality can identify or isolate orally composed and transmitted compositions behind or within written texts. Instead
such criteria identify—and even then only relatively in comparison among texts—the influence of strongly oral sensibility as a more or less pronounced residue in literary, authorial style. In the case of Jesus' sayings tradition, the virtual certainty on the grounds of its initially oral transmission (technique), allows historical retrojection of the Synoptics' strong oral sensibility to permit description of an actually prevenient oral tradition as strongly (not mnemo-technically) oral. Even apart from their as yet fragile empirical grounding in psycho- and ethnological study, criteria of even the strongest orality are criteria of oral sensibility which themselves do not allow the postulation of prior oral-technical composition for individual Synoptic sub-texts. Their use is rather as indications in general of the character, the sensibility, of pre-Synoptic oral tradition and as bases for comparison among sub-texts plausibly identified on other (eg source critical) grounds as once independently transmitted, ie technically distinct, elements of tradition. Above all, such criteria do not support a radical denial of even the short-term compatibility of strong orality and impressive literacy; the particular quality of the Synoptic literature lies at least as much in its successful balancing of oral and literate sensibilities as in the literate threat of radical transformation of its oral heritage. Certainly the finely graded mixture of sensibilities and traditional techniques (including languages) in the world of the gospels militates against any over-sharp dissociation of Synoptic sensibilities

E A Havelock's seminal description of the 'dynamic tension' between orality and literacy in classical Greece thus indentifies
important stages (craft-literacy, semi-, recitation- and scriptorial literacy) in the assimilation of sensibility to the possibilities and limits of literary (chirographic) technique. Moreover, by comparison either with the classical problems of a non-writing Socrates, of Homeric orality or of oral residue in classical authors or with the anthropological investigation of the modern transformation of till recently oral societies, the situation of the gospel-tradition is in at least one vital respect further complicated. That is, the Synoptic tradition like, in fact, the majority of "traditional societies" apart from ultimately Greek influence represents not only the interaction of oral and literary techniques and sensibilities. Some account must also be made of the influence of non-Greek (unvocalised) writing systems especially as they push oral tradition towards the non-literate but still scribal sensibility of craft-literacy, even where, as in pre-Mishnaic tradition, oral transmission does not technically yield to written. Thus, beyond the limits imposed by "craft-literacy", there is a further element of control likely to intrude into the content of all pre-alphabetic scripts, one which operated independently of writing. Not only was the content required to be limited and familiar. To meet this requirement it was likely to have been put together according to the laws of composition which would tend to preserve the statement in its oral form. In this respect the tension between writing and non-writing technique may be less important for the Jesus-tradition than its early, intensive exposure and eventual commitment to a specifically Hellenized literacy, even where it may also have adopted aspects of a occasional more Hebrew/Aramaic scribal and memorizational sensibility.
Certainly, against Kelber, it is more than a truism that one does not deal with a pre-literate culture in first-century Palestine: within gospel literacy we must expect not only strong residual orality but also some degree of residual influence from especially non-Greek craft-literacy. Thus for instance Kelber's unargued assertion that 'Q represents an oral genre' can hardly remain unqualified: to the (debatable) extent that Q represents a recognizable genre, it represents a significantly literary genre showing a degree of 'careful literary stylization' nearer to the 'explicitly scribal' economy of the EvTh. Indeed EvTh and, so far as it may be reconstructed, Q are equally good instances against too patronizingly literate (Kleinliteratur) or too romantically oral a notion of the transition from spoken to written tradition. Amid all this complexity, then, it is all the more important to identify features of language, if any there be, which are specific instances much of formal continuity within a tradition distinguished as/by fundamental continuity as by revolutionary social and technical changes. For it is only where such specific cases can be added to a general respect for the resilience of tradition, that the possibility of transferring insights into the Jesus movement to Jesus himself may be realized. At any rate, in describing either the varied and mixed oral culture of Palestine, where so much scripture was studied and produced, literature of peculiarly authoritative oral residue, or the self-conscious orality of Greco-Roman Rhetoric and education, it is more satisfactory to use the metaphors of an often-displaced equilibrium between oral and literate (even when un-written) expression than to speak too absolutely either of continuity or of impassable obstacles between modes and phases of tradition. It is just the forms of such an uneasy
balance which are the concern of Greek and Latin technical Rhetoric and which gave its texts an ambiguity which the purely literary critic may too easily misconstrue.

IV  Hellenistic Analogues: Chreia and Gnome in the Progymnasmata

By far the most widely noted analogy between Hellenistic technical Rhetoric and the forms of the Synoptic sayings-tradition is that between the framed sayings and pronouncement-stories of the gospels together with similar Rabbinic units and the chreia (Lat. chria, usus, sententia) of the Progymnasmata, ie manuals of elementary oratorical exercises rather than of rhetorical theory. Perhaps the most important point to be made about these eminently practical educational handbooks, is that in keeping with their function they are not primarily interested in literary criticism or formal analysis of actual rhetoric but rather confine themselves to the prescription of school-boy drills in basic speech-composition and elaboration of set texts. To be sure, the earliest literary collections of chriae, anecdotes relating a characteristic or simply intriguing action or saying of named individual, a famous sage (or a famous hetaira), significantly predate the inclusion of the chria-form among the exercises of the progymnasmatic curriculum. The collecting, editing and writing of such anthologies, on the whole more entertaining than edifying, enjoyed a long and extensive vogue in the Hellenistic world, although the plural title, ΧΡΕΙΑΙ of Ν, seems gradually to have lost favour. At any rate, the singular, chria, seems never to have designated the individual anecdotes except as texts for progymnasmatic elaboration (expolitio; exergasia). The chria thus originated as a
formally distinct Gattung in a literary development, of which indeed it is the most typically Hellenistic aspect. Yet it always retained, in literary as in progymnasmatic use, the character of a summary account of a bon-mot or deed attributed to some celebrity whose name gives the anecdote much of its interest. Its strikingly witty and entertaining character moved Dibelius to distinguish the chria from the plainer and more circumstantial "paradigm" forms of the gospel traditions. Dibelius' desire to dissociate from Jesus and his tradition a form of which is "dominated by the eutrapelia, the dexterity in jocular speech which Aristotle called educated insolence," is, as K Berger notes, probably motivated by unnecessary theological scruples and in any case is justified on really form-critical grounds. These suggest that the gospel-forms are indeed instances, not merely analogies, of the Gattung Chria/Apophthegm, however distorted by the special conditions of the writing of the gospels. The very element of sharp humour which made chria a favourite medium for Stoic and especially Cynic moral and social critique may well have recommended the form to those who formulated the gospel traditions about Jesus. The important point is that drama and wit rather than profundity give the chria its place in philosophical propaganda, so that, its use by Stoics, Cynics, Rabbis and Christians not at all withstanding, the form as such was the most constant and widespread feature of primary rhetorical (not philosophical) education: the power of the form seems to derive from the ready, usually unconventional response of the protagonist (pros ten chreian) to the usually conventional requirements of a situation; it remained important in education because it remained a
versatile, simple yet effective way to engage an audience and not more generally, because they [scil. chriae] were maxims which were taught to school children to impress their memories with views, ideas and statements which would be serviceable for the various needs they would experience in later walks of life. Instead, the primary usefulness of the chria was to the beginning public-speaker and his teacher as a convenient and fashionable literary reference which added decorative colour and personal interest to the speaker's own remarks. The ideological pregnancy of the chria depended upon its broader cultivation as a rhetorical technique and not vice versa, though collections of chriae might well have a more markedly didactic/dogmatic aspect. Thus the student, given a chria, was expected to apply and comment upon it from a series of fixed viewpoints (quis, quid, cur, contra, simile et paradigmata, testes antiquorum).

But this procedure is not restricted to the use of the chria. Because of its usefulness in oratory and ease of learning, the chria has always an early and prominent place among the progymnasmata in spite of the reshuffling each author gives to the steps in this primary rhetorical curriculum. Nevertheless, the discussion of the chria is always coupled with some treatment of the gnome (Lat. gnome (Lat. gnome, sententia) either as a separate progynasma or at least as part of the definition of chria. Moreover, the procedure for elaborating the gnome is the same as that prescribed for the chria exercise and unlike those applied to the other progynasmata. This pairing of chria and gnome is of course no accident: as ground-forms for rhetorical elaboration the two are essentially similar so that
indeed the progymnasmatists are regularly at some pains to distinguish the one from the other. Persisting over centuries, the inclusion of two such similar forms and the discussion of their relative characters are potentially much more useful for the student of the forms/the New Testament than the mere observation of analogy between the chria and the framed sayings ascribed to Jesus.

The oldest extant Progymnasmata is that of Aelius Theon of Alexandria (first or second century AD), although its formal perfection strongly suggests dependence on an already settled oral/written tradition of progymnasmatic lessons. Having defined chria as a "brief, witty saying or deed ascribed to some definite person or relating to a person," Theon distinguishes it from gnome, which becomes a chria when it is ascribed to anyone in particular, and from apomnemoneuma generally, which is always essentially biopheles where chria is seldom more than decorative. This broad distinction is then completed in four points: First, Theon repeats that a chria must always include a personal ascription while a gnome does not at all (ou pantos). Presumably when it does, it is no longer independent but is part of chria, so closely are the forms linked. Second, while chria is sometimes general, sometimes particular in reference, the gnome is always general. Third, a chria must always be witty and elegant but need not be ethically useful (biopheles). Finally, chria may be the report of a saying or of a deed but gnome is always a saying. Clearly a speaker may attribute to someone else either words or actions but cannot utter propria voce anything other than words, be they borrowed or of his own invention. By way of completing his
definitions, Theon adds that *gnome* differs in two respects from *apomnemoneuma* which is like *chria* in that it is attributed to a certain person and unlike *chria* and *gnome* in its greater length. The remaining pages of Theon's chapter on the *chria* are devoted to a threefold taxonomy of *chria*, distinguishing between those which recall an action, those which relate a saying, and a mixed class with examples of each.

Of comparable antiquity are the *Progymnasmata* doubtfully ascribed to Hermogenes of Tarsus but probably still dating from roughly his period. Unlike Theon's version of the exercises, of which these seem quite independent, there are here two chapters dealing with *chria* and *gnome* separately, in the first of which the *chria* is defined as an abbreviated *apomnemoneuma* of a word or deed with an ascription to some name/author. The list of, this time, three differences between *gnome* and *chria* begins by pointing out that the former is spoken *'in (the form of a) bare assertion*, whereas the *chria* is oftentimes in a basic question-and-answer format. The remaining two points agree with distinctions in Theon's catalogue: that *gnome* is a saying only without any direct reference to actions and without explicit ascription. For the rest, Hermogenes' shows none of Theon's interest in taxonomy and instead dwells upon the student's task of elaboration (*ergasia*) along the traditional lines, beginning with an encomium of the *chria*’s putative author. The next chapter requires only a brief introductory definition of *gnome* as a saying in the summary form of a general statement used to dissuade, commend or clarify, that is, used rather more strongly than the *chria* as a rhetorical proof of the speaker’s position and authority without the
distraction of a personal attribution. That the gnome, though always without explicit attribution, is not necessarily anonymous is suggested rather clearly by the repetition of the exercises for exposition used with the chria, beginning again with a short encomium of the original speaker of the saying. That the gnome need not be anonymous is confirmed by Hermogenes' selection as an example of gnome a saying which Theon incorporates as the first saying of a chria in which Diogenes wittily replies to a comment of Alexander's. The decision whether to use gnome or chria clearly depends upon the desired effect (with emphasis on the saying itself as of intrinsic ethical relevance or upon the personality and wit of the original speaker) and not upon the availability of a plausible or appropriate ascription.

Two more Greek progymnasmata remain to be discussed, of which the older is that of Nicolaus the Sophist (fourth century AD), in which quite full treatment is given to questions of taxonomy, exemplification and exposition by students. Nicolaus' definition of chria is unremarkable except for its relatively heavy stress on the utility of chria as an example for ethical improvement, its standard distinction between chria and gnome on the basis of ascription and a justification of the application to this particular exercise among all the variations of the progymnasmata of the name 'chria' because of its pre-eminent usefulness. And indeed, apart from Nicolaus' quasi-etymological requirements, the chria, with its deep roots in Hellenic literature and its captivating appeal to the wit of past heroes is quite probably the most characteristic form of Hellenistic rhetorical
culture. The definition of gnome, with which the next chapter of Nicolaus' Progymnasmata is concerned, is couched in the language of a received tradition and has few surprises: the gnome is a statement of universal and ethical application differing from chria in familiar respects. First, the gnome is 'in words alone' without narration of a deed or dialogue, then also it is a general (katholike) statement and is never ascribed or related to a particular person, unlike the chria which is always circumstantial. 'For [the gnome] functions as a rhetorical proof of what is said before it and at the same time offers general guidance.' Thus a gnome is introduced into a speech to enforce a moral decision whereas the chria is employed above all for elegance' sake. The last set of Progymnasmata requiring attention here is that of Aphthonius the Sophist (fourth or fifth century AD), who has only the briefest definitions but whose examples of practice-elaboration agree with the inference from Hermogenes that the absence of an ascription from the gnome is far from implying its anonymity. Aphthonius' exposition of a sample gnome begins with an encomium of its author, Theognis, and concludes with an epilogos in his praise!

V Gnome (and chreia) in Rhetorical Theory

Unlike the chria, the gnome received critical attention outside the tradition of the progymnasmata in the more advanced manuals of Rhetoric (technai rhetorikai), especially those of broadest theoretical scope written under Sophist or philosophic influence. The absence of the chria from these more advanced handbooks before
Quintilian is in part an accident of date: the technai predate the progyrnsmatists' reception of the literary chria-form as a model for primary oratorical instruction. But the difference between the interests of the technai and those of the progyrnsmata is not merely chronological: the latter with their emphasis on primary and traditional education embody the ethos of the Hellenistic age as does the biographical and witty chria-form. In this respect it is possible to speak not only of deep analogy between the gnome-chria tension in the progyrnsmata and the inner dynamics of the gospel tradition, but of actual influence on its formulation. No such direct relationship can be posited between the Rhetoric of the classical technai and the orality of the Church or of Jesus, who like the Cynic heroes and later propagandists, must consciously have managed circumstances to provide settings conducive to anecdotal preservation of his extraordinary words or deeds. The technai have, however, the advantage of being primarily descriptive beside a progyrnsmatic tradition which is controlled by the need for educational prescription. The special relevance of the more philosophical tradition is thus its theoretical interest in the possibilities of direct discourse in relation to which the chria and cognate forms are always secondary to the sayings (or deeds) which they incorporate. Hence the disinterest of the Greek technai in chria, in spite, or rather precisely because of its importance as a literary genre. The point, either for the rhetoricians or for Jesus-research, is not that the gnome is historically prior as it is conceptually, but that the gnome as a form conveys an immediate link with speech as chria does not. Put bluntly, apart from considerations of authenticity of ascription, gnome always presents itself as a tract of someone's direct discourse while in
chria direct discourse is always analysed and modulated (if it is present at all) through reflection on circumstances and personalities.

In the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, a fourth-century BC Sophistic manual 'probably originally the work of Anaximenes of Lampsacus (ca. 380-320 B.C.) and certainly our earliest explicit reference, though passing, to progymnasmatic exercises, this emphasis on the orator's own expression rather than on the derivative orality of the school-room appears especially in the inclusion of gnome (chria is not treated at all) among pisteis, the standard types of rhetorical proof. In keeping with this functional insight is the initial definition of the gnome as a 'summary expression of personal judgement on things in general' (or perhaps, reading with Spengel katholou instead of MSS kath'holon, 'a general summary expression'). If the gnome may, as regularly in the progymnasmata, be borrowed from literature or from proverbial common stock, it is still essentially an expression of the speaker's own dogma couched in general terms so as to win the general consent of an audience. The gnome may be generally acceptable or unexpected (paradoxos) and in the latter case had better be accompanied by clarifying reasons, although the possibility of employing gnome against received opinion is suggestive of the confrontational aspect detected in Beardslee's analysis of proverb-forms and even more strongly of the capacity of such forms for intensification beyond the merely commonplace and 'proverbial'. The speaker's responsibility for the balance of personal expression and generalized form is thus final: he is throughout the maker of the gnome.
The same emphasis on gnomic invention is present in Aristotle's own *Ars Rhetorica* in which *gnomologia* is the art of speaking in *gnoma*, not the name of a literary genre. More important, however, is the insistence on the ethical character of gnomic generalization which must have to do with moral actions (*praxeis*), so that an axiom of geometry, though similar, is not a *gnome*: the true *gnome* articulates and demands a moral judgement (*kai haireta e pheukta esti pros to prattein*). The function of *gnome* therefore is to demand decision from the hearers; it is the conclusion or the major premise of an *enthumeme*, or rhetorical syllogism. Its effect then is presumably that of a more fully articulated syllogistic proof except that its credibility rests more clearly upon aptness of phrase and thought and, ultimately, upon the speaker's authority than upon the implicit - indeed, for Aristotle, more or less consciously suppressed - appeal to generally acceptable moral presuppositions. There are consequently four kinds of gnomic expression, 1) those which are virtually proverbial, universally known and acceptable; 2) those which, though newly minted, are self-evident; those which being less conventional (*paradoxos*) require some explanatory supplement either 3) by incorporation into a syllogistic argument (*enthumeme*) or more commonly 4) by the addition of a logically informal reason (*aitia*). The need to supplement a *gnome* (as briefly as possible) or to incorporate it into an intermediate form of discourse is thus related to its difficulty or ambiguity as an independent unit, so that, in fact, the explanation of *gnoma* which are not so much intrinsically "paradoxical", ie unexpected in sentiment, as unclear for lack of special historical/circumstantial background is very properly...
expressed in "Laconic apothegmata and riddles" (ta ainigmatode), that is, in forms very closely akin to the chria as later defined. In this way, a traditional saying borrowed by a speaker will often need a narrative supplement, while a saying coined by its speaker will be more likely to receive a discursive explanation. A gnomic style should, moreover, be restricted to persons of maturity and experience and to subjects of which the speaker may plausibly profess knowledge lest lack of authority make the speaker and his words appear foolish. A hyperbolic use of gnome presenting in the form of a universal generalization what is only occasionally or partially true is particularly appropriate as the high-point of some especially impassioned discourse. Finally, the relationship between gnomai and proverbs (paroimiai) is explored in some detail, since some universally accepted maxims are, or can be used as gnomai. Once again, as in the Rhet. ad Alex., the possibility is raised of using gnomai in confrontational, anti-proverbial senses whenever one's character is likely to be put in a more favourable light (thereby), or the gnome has been pronounced in an excited state of feeling.87

These tensions between expected and unconventional meanings, between generalized form and particular, partial ethical demand and between proverbial and personal expressions lead to Aristotle's summary of the double usefulness of the gnome and of gnomic style. Firstly then, in relation to the audience, the use of gnome may make up for the want of cultivation in the listener, securing his assent by capturing (therein) in the form of a sententious generalization his own inarticulate and partial intuitions. But more important, the use
of gnomai gives ethical point to speech since every gnome expresses above all the speaker's deliberate moral commitment (proairesis).

Aristotle's discussion of gnome is the best context in which to offer some explanation for the reluctance, indeed, the refusal in the present study to speak of gnome as a Form/Gattung among others. In large part this reservation is born of a tactical ambivalence toward the classical form-critical use of the concepts of Gattung and Form and their definition in much more syntactical and textual than functional and semantic terms. In addition, I should own a practical desire to recognize the difference of kind between gnome and the most closely related Gattungen and so to take advantage of the form- and tradition-critical subliminality of a sayings-style which is defined by its combination of formal independence and argumentative integration (as implied premise or conclusion). Thus a gnome introduced by a formula of attribution becomes a chria; a gnomology is a series of verse (often hexameter) gnomai; a gnome cited as basis for a word of command makes a Mahnspruch; etc. That is, although gnome is a typical part of a great many Gattungen, is indeed never performed except in the context of a larger Gattung, and although there are several Gattungen among gnomai, there is no Gattung which is typically part of a gnomai.

Such fairly superficial misgivings are, however, given serious grounding by the Aristotelian apprehension that gnome, as either the premise or the conclusion of an implied rhetorical syllogism (an enthumeme), is not only to be treated as an aspect of rhetorical proof
rather than of decoration as in the Rhet. ad Alexandrum; it is to be seen, with paradeigma (narration of a fable, parabolic or of historical example), as one of the two basic patterns of rhetorical proof, 'die allen Redegattungen gemeinsamen Beweismittel'.

More plainly, gnome is characterised over against most (other) Gattungen by its peculiarly explicit attempt to represent an argumentative (analogical) logic which corresponds within the concrete communicative conditions of real rhetoric to the abstraction of the syllogism. Every rhetorical or literary Gattung is a specific cultivation of prevenient and permanent linguistic possibilities, of ordinary speech; every Gattung is to that extent an oral Gattung. But in singling out paradeigma and enthumeme (of which, we may add, gnome is the paradigmatic part), Aristotle is recognizing there a peculiar immediacy in poetic and narrative texture of the essential probative strategies immanent in all rhetoric, ie in every Gattung, the strategies of inferential assertion (gnome/enthumeme) and exemplification (paradeigma).

In form-critical fact, gnome and paradeigma do underlie, do partly compose an enormous range of (other) Gattungen; Aristotle's insight is that, furthermore, they are defined as Gattungen themselves in a peculiar sense and by the criterion that they realize in formal independence probative strategies the same as those which are informally implicit in all argumentative discourse. If gnomai and paradeigma are Gattungen, they are from Aristotle's point of view peculiarly the Gattungen of formal abstraction, symbolizing specifically and self-consciously fields of argumentative intention which are elsewhere either tacitly assumed or gnomically or
paradigmatically cited. The questions posed by Aristotle's very remarkable signalization of gnome are therefore much the same as those raised, though within the prejudicial framework of "folklore", by A Jolles' *Einfache Formen*¹, questions, inter alia of the relation between argumentation and formal classifications, which cannot be decided within the range of this essay, but which may be honoured by the discipline of terminological forbearance.⁹²

Of the gnome or sententia in Latin manuals of Rhetoric nothing need be said here except about Quintilian's monumental work on the education of an orator in which so many strands of ancient Rhetoric, including the progymnasmatic, are drawn together into a comparatively coherent treatise, the single most important source for understanding Greco-Roman Rhetoric. The *Institutio Oratoria*, written before the end of the first century, includes two passages which discuss the gnome/sententia, I.9.3–6 and VIII.5.1–35, of which the second is by far the more complete and the first somewhat the more difficult. Indeed the difficulty of the shorter passage is very largely in its brevity, as it summarizes in barely a page the whole primary level of instruction of the would-be orator, that is, the whole phase of study covered by the progymnasmata, but with hints of important divergence and innovation over against contemporary Greek practice. Thus, in a single sentence, Quintillian passes over the traditional topic of the mutual definition of gnome (sententia) and chria and makes as well the puzzling addition of a third form, the ethologia or aetiologia:

Sententiae quoque at chriae et aetiologicalae subjectis dictorum rationibus apud grammaticos scribantur, quia initium ex lectione ducunt: quorum omnium similis est
Clearly, as F H Colson points out, unless it is no more than a completely arbitrary and inexplicable addition by Quintilian, the intrusive third exercise must be understood to satisfy two major requirements: it must be co-ordinate with chria and gnome, and must (like chria) be associated with particular personalities. The first of these really does not seem to be met by the widely accepted emendation of the text to "ethologia" instead of "aetiologia", unless the word is read in a sense quite incongruous with its other known occurrences in Latin. This suggests that the MS reading ought to be retained, as in fact it has been by more recent editors, and further emendation avoided. The more authoritative reading can, I think, be squared with the double needs of the context if Quintilian is understood to be collecting under the heading of aetiologia the various larger forms related to gnome and chria by the progymnasmatists and to gnome by Aristotle. Thus apomnemoneuma, like chria, personis continetur, while in Aristotle apophthegm seems to be only one possible result of the addition of an often personal epilogos to gnome. Finally, the possibility of adding an aitia to a gnome to produce an enthume, a form which admittedly need not refer to any particular person, may have suggested the designation aetiologia, of which Quintilian was aware from Rutilius (Inst. Orat. IX.3. 93). Certainly Quintilian and other Latin writers seem uncertain about the definition of enthume, so that a general designation for the several forms which add a personal, historical or logical aitia to the basic form of gnome might have served Quintilian's summarizing
intention well. The point is that if he has added, without giving any description, a new progymnasma to which we have no other witness whatever, the result is in fact an impenetrable obscurity, however emended. On the other hand, if aetiologia is only a vague category within which to harmonize the shadowy forms which are implied by Aristotle and only hastily described by the progymnasmata, it will satisfy all the demands of the text: a relationship to gnome and chria as being interested in personalities. The use of 'aetiologia' allows Quintilian to devote a mere eight words to the most important characteristics of sententia and of the polymorphous group of chria-like forms, which together with chria provide written texts for school exercises, before going on to discuss the chria in relative detail.

This conclusion differs not only from Colson's but also from J D Crossan's excursion into the same problem. Crossan accepts without comment the emendation 'ethologia' in the sense of H E Butler's note, 'a simple character-sketch of some famous man.' a sense which seems to differ precisely in the vital matter of personal reference from other occurrences of the word, especially in Seneca Ep. 95, 65, where it refers to the impersonal characterization of an abstract virtue. Nevertheless, this 'forced' understanding of a doubtful text leads Crossan to the useful insight that Quintilian's distinction between 'vox universalis' as applied to gnome/sententia and 'personis continetur' in relation to chria-like forms is not simply between anonymous units and units of known or supposed authorship, between proverb and aphorism, say. As Crossan notices of Quintilian's examples of sententiae in VIII.5.4-7, 'a named authority is behind them,' though, against Crossan, this is

47
The progymnastists do not simply equate the gnome with the proverb, while the Rhet. ad Alex. and Aristotle are very clear that a gnome may sometimes be a proverb or the adaptation or contradiction of one. Moreover, it does not follow from the recognition that "vox universalis" need not imply anonymity, that "personis continetur" does not involve personal attribution. If, as I think, aetioLOGIA represents the chria-like forms normally related to gnome and chria in the progymnasmata, aetioLOGIA, like chria, the purer form and more important exercise, is distinguished from gnome by its inclusion within the form itself of an explicit attribution of sayings or actions to a named person or persons, while, alone of the three forms, the gnome/sententia consists only and entirely of a logion. Any attribution or circumstantial qualifications are appended as external exegesis of the basic form. This has the advantage not only of making Quintilian intelligible in relation to the progymnastic tradition, upon which he is quite obviously dependent here, but also of making clear the distinctive character of gnome/sententia over against the closely related chria and chria-like forms with their tendency to move from generalization to personal and narrative specification. As in Quintilian Inst. Orat. VII.2.1, "personis continetur" here requires personal, historical (or psuedo-historical) reference, by name, as a distinctive mark of, in this passage, aetiology and of chria as Quintilian exemplifies it (I.9.4-7), as also of the quaestiones treated in book VII.

In his longer discussion of sententious forms in VIII.5.1-35,
Quintillian uses the word 'sententia', as Crossan observes, rather more loosely in keeping with the wider range of meaning of the Latin term, especially when it is uncontrolled by a progymnastic context. Indeed in this second account the sententia seems to comprise the chria-like forms noticed formerly, I think, under the category of aetiologia as well as the enthumeme or rhetorical syllogism, which is in Latin authors even more closely related to sententia than to gnome in Aristotle. Interestingly, the description of sententia in book VIII departs from Aristotelean models by treating the subject under the head not of proofs (pisteis) but of ornatus. Let it be said that for Quintilian this surprising shift has more to do with the exalted importance and moral seriousness of 'ornamentation' than with a lack of interest in sententia as proof, although, especially for judicial oratory, with which a Roman writer is specially concerned, Quintillian is quite right to stress that not every sententia is part of an enthumeme (VIII.5.4) and not every enthumeme is truly an effective probatio (.10). Moreover, Quintillian's major purpose in VIII.5 is to condemn the over-use of sententious cliches (catholica) associated, by him, closely with a post-Aristotellean exaggeration of the probative worth of gnome, in order to preserve the possibility of their judicious and economical use. Thus it is the oldest sayings to which the name of sententia (and gnome) most properly belongs, sayings which are again 'vox universalis' (VIII.5.3) in the sense that they resemble, but transcend, public resolutions and decrees. Crossan once again finds the vox universalis in the 'universality of application and not the anonymity of attribution.' One of the examples of sententia immediately following in .5.3 is ascribed to Domitius Afer. Once again, however, the important point is not that
these sayings usually have a recognizable author, which is the case in all examples of the grammarians and rhetoricians. The distinguishing mark of the gnome and of all Quintilian's examples of sententia is the absence of explicit/internal to the form: only the direct discourse of a logion is spoken, though subsequent elaboration may reveal the author if he is other than the speaker. Two classes of apparent exception among Quintilian's examples may help clarify this. First, Quintilian recognizes the possibility of ad personam sayings, giving one example of a saying addressed to the "princeps" and two addressed to Caesar by name. Suffice it to say that this is not an ascription of the saying though it does bespeak the blurring of gnome/sententia into forms which personis continentur: these forms are not chriae by any ancient definition. Quintilian never uses sententia in so wide a sense as to confuse it with chria as defined by the progymnasmatists and exemplified by his own hand. More interesting is the fact that many of the examples of sententia and, as Crossan notices, all of the examples of newer, less conventional types of the form (.15ss) have explicit formal attributions: "the examples cited are instances of the chria." Against Crossan, however, this is not a sign that Quintilian does not distinguish chria from gnome, or that he does so only on the principle of application without reference to ascription; rather the persons to whom, chria-fashion, Quintilian ascribes sententia are all, with the very partial exception of Ovid's Medea, famous orators whose speeches are thus cited. That is, the citations are gnomai and sententiae but not at all chriae within the direct discourse of their original contexts. When Domitius Afer said, 'princeps qui vult omnia scire necesse habet multa ignoscere,' it was
a *gnome/sententia*, a fact which Quintillian could not possibly record without converting the form, or rather incorporating it into the most basic type of saying-*chria*. (It bears remembrance that progymnasmatic *chriae* can relate actions, sayings or both.) This also means, of course, that most of Quintillian's examples were composed *ad hoc* by their original speakers and were recorded as direct discourse but in written form; where a saying is only heard, not written, it must either become proverbial and lose its personal attribution or be preserved in a more or less elaborated *chria*, i.e. become a nuclear narrative or discourse. And in oral tradition both options may be pursued side by side or in alteration. A final note from Quintillian's discussion points likewise towards the situation of primary discourse: like Aristotle the Roman author forbids the frequent use of *sententiae*/*gnome* to the young or undistinguished speaker. In relation above all to the use of *sententiae ad personam* Quintillian warns:

> Magis enim decet eos in quibus est auctoritas ut rei pondus etiam persona confirmet. (VIII.5.8)

The *gnome/sententia* is an authoritative form, whether essentially probative or decorative, and its use especially when intensified into personal confrontation succeeds or fails largely according to the personal authority of the speaker.

The purpose of this relatively extended discussion of the formal definitions of Greco-Roman Rhetoric has been twofold: to suggest a general convergence between ancient analysis of the characteristics and functions of the *gnome/sententia* and the modern discussion of
proverb in relation to the tradition of sayings ascribed to Jesus; secondly to urge that gnomic forms even when embedded in other larger text-forms have as a category a peculiar interest for the recovery of the forms of primary discourse behind parts of the Synoptic tradition, that the conceptual differences between gnomic and more chria-like forms may be expected to have discernable implications for the differing historical developments of the forms of oral and written tradition. For the first point there is in the Greek and Latin manuals the almost universally expressed tension between the generalized form and application of gnome/sententia and the speaker's appropriation of its quasi-proverbial, quasi-probative powers to assert his moral authority in ethical decision. Gnome functions not only to win audience approval of the ethical character of a speaker but also to confront personalities and values within a particular situation. Both chria and gnome are agonistic forms, but in the chria with its explicitly historical dramatis personae the hearer is formally distanced from the conflict of values and personalities, as he is not in the immediate address of speaker to audience in gnome. Thus although the gnome may be borrowed from a known authority or from public wisdom in paroimiae, it is understood in the more advanced manuals to be normally of the speaker's own coinage, and is in any case spoken as the orator's own authoritative expression. Indeed Quintillian shows his awareness of this relation between the speaker and his sententia mainly by deploring the overuse of the form as a fashionable and often insubstantial way to escape the duty of providing real argumentation. Still, however, there is the positive recognition that in gnome the apparent generalization of the vox
universalis is interim ad rem tantum relata ... interim ad personam
(VIII.5.3). Even more apposite is the perception in Aristotle and the
Rhet. ad Alex. of possibilities of heightening gnomic language by
generalizing the unconventional or hyperbolic,112 which approaches the
phenomenon of intensification noted amongst the "proverb"-forms of the
Synoptic tradition. Indeed the greatest advantage to speaking of
gnomai/sententiae within the gospels and related literature is that
the anonymous social forces of generation and transmission behind
proverb and the highly self-conscious though formally loose processes
of aphoristic composition are comprised under a single formal
category, as all too strikingly within the New Testament where
"heightened" and conventional expressions mingle and compete.

Over against such general designations of "proverb" and
"aphorism", the definition of gnome by its close relationships with
chria and chria-like forms throws into relief another aspect of the
New Testament texts and of their oral and written antecedents, namely
the presence together of episodic and sententious elements within the
sayings material attributed to Jesus. In particular, J D Crossan's
reduction of gnome to "proverb" and of Quintillian's sententia to
"aphorism"113 does an injustice to the descriptive usefulness of the
Rhetoricians' categories. The ancient writers are, I think, unanimous
in admitting a proverbial element in all sententious language - the
ongoing appropriation and adaptation of paroimiai to unique
occasions - while maintaining the primary importance of each speaker's
aphoristic invention. Composition, discovery, performance,
elaboration and integration into more explicit forms (chria, etc) are
simultaneous processes within both spoken discourse and its tradition,
written and oral. Once again, this situation is to be described in metaphors of balance and equilibrium in a system of tradition shifting in accord with no known rules. Still, the elements of such an equilibrium all have their special historical significances, and in particular the gnomic aspect of the Jesus-tradition, even the gnomic aspect of the chria-like, apophthegmatic, forms which mediate between discourse and narrative, as the common building-block of both direct (oral) and indirect (oral and written) discourse has a strong a priori claim to relevance to the reconstruction of Jesus' oratory.\textsuperscript{114}

Gnome and chreia, consistently the most basic of the basic rhetorical exercises (progymnasmata), constitute, with the alphabet, the lowest common denominator of all Hellenistic education, "the minimum formal rhetorical equipment of any literate person from the Hellenistic period on.\textsuperscript{115} In Jesus' world, it was not necessary to read Aristotle to recognise, appreciate, use and remember good gnomic sayings as such.\textsuperscript{116} Indeed, it was not necessary to have studied the progymnasmata, even in summary form\textsuperscript{117} or to have known the abundant gnomological and chria-collective literature of Hellenism:\textsuperscript{118} from at least Roman times gnomai (rather oftener than chriae) are richly attested as standard beginning hand-writing exercises.\textsuperscript{119} Furthermore the phenomenon, if not the name, of gnome (again, more frequently, as far as I can tell, and certainly more distinctly than anecdotally developed chria/apophthegmatic forms)\textsuperscript{120} would seem to have been all but inevitably familiar even to the (in Greek) unlettered through the widespread media of legal and especially diatribic oratory.\textsuperscript{121} Finally, the claim of Hellenistic gnome to relevance in the cross-
cultural context of early Christianity is justified not only by the
phenomenological analogy and historical continuity between the non-
Greek Wisdom-sayings and our *gnome*, but more concretely in the
penetration of actual Hellenistic *gnomai* into Rabbinic literature and
tradition. D E Aune is thus greatly deceived to dismiss
apopthegms, chria and *gnome*, as "more or less synonymous" and to
misrepresent the progymnasmaticists' primary- and pre-school curriculum
as the "generally academic" province of "the later rhetoricians",
divorced from "popular usage." Gnome and its formal development
toward episodic narrative in chria were the basic compositional/
interpretive reflexes of anyone capable of writing, reading out or
even listening to a gospel, an epistle or an improvised diatribe in
Greek; they were moreover a recognized and freely exploited link
between the styles of intelligent, authoritative speech (Wisdom) in Greek
and in the languages of Near Eastern antiquity. Above all perhaps,
attention to *gnome* offers to lift New Testament oral traditional study
out of the realm of folklore, while at the same time recognizing the
perennial and cross-cultural appeal of a gnomic style in both
rhetorical performance and tradition. It remains to test such a
prevenient claim to relevance with reference to forms within Jewish
literature and above all in relation to the actual "sayings" ascribed
in the gospel literature to Jesus.
CHAPTER TWO: gnome between Literature and Tradition

An important aspect of gnome and some consequent limitations on its usefulness as an index of the continuity between Jesus and the written and oral tradition of his words become evident when we begin to draw up lists of gnomic forms attributed to him: the gnome, however clearly defined or exemplified, resists being understood simply as a Gattung among others, at least if Gattung be defined to any degree on grammatical, syntactical or philological criteria.  
That is, individual sententiae do not specifically constitute a genus litterarium, though they are fundamental to several eg gnomology, chria, apophthegm, as well as the sapiential Admonition (Mahnspruch) and Instruction (Lehrrede). Indeed the progymnasmatists and, even more clearly, the rhetoricians are right to treat gnome less as a form than as an exercise or technique for concentrating speech in general into a tract of words narrow enough to suggest the immediacy of thought, speech and experience; in this respect the gnome - even in literature - always refers the reader/hearer to a mode of oral discourse and memory not at all confined, even in principle, to any particular syntactical form or to any corresponding Sitz im Leben. In fact, the tendency toward intensification which Beardslee noted particularly in the "proverbs" of the Jesus-tradition is in varying degrees the characteristic of all sententious language: ordinary discourse heightened by rigorous economy and poetic imagination. Expanded into oral narrative or discourse or collected and
incorporated into literary forms, gnomic language interacts with its contexts in such a way that traditional and freshly composed materials are not reliably distinguished by any criterion of style or form. In relation to the New Testament this means not only that a list of Jesus' 'authentic' gnomic sayings cannot be confidently abstracted from the diction of the evangelists and their predecessors, but even that the best definition or catalogue of Synoptic gnomai will be marked by an unavoidable openness to the evolution of gnome into or from more extended and articulated forms. The very same - syntactically indeterminate though rhetorically quite definite - textuality of gnome which makes it (with, I think, parable) an unusually plausible bridge to oral expression and tradition, creates extraordinary problems of definition and interpretation.

I Gnome in the New Testament (K Berger)

The most comprehensive essay in recent study towards definition of gnome in specifically New Testament contexts is in the explicitly, though advisedly, form-critical work of K Berger; Berger's studies are particularly useful in that they emphasize the pre-eminent importance of ancient Rhetoric for any description of New Testament forms: first, because the rhetoricians draw critical attention away from the pursuit of anthropologically universal forms to ways of speaking which were among the most widely and systematically disseminated aspects of Hellenistic culture and, second, because they emphasize the relation between speech-forms and their predictable effect upon an audience over more private aspects of an author's choice of forms. Thus the rhetoricians, by identifying performance
factors and techniques, point the modern critics toward the key concern of Hellenism everywhere with the spoken effect of language whether written down or not, a concern which is a principle of continuity between the tradition of Jesus, the New Testament and its contemporary literature. More particularly, this means that ancient Rhetoric is the most appropriate source for critical categories relevant to the purposes and history of the New Testament documents, especially in view of the dominance of the progymnasmata as the commonest denominator of education and practice in public speaking and writing, adapted not least to the formulation of rabbinic tradition especially as gnome or chria.

Following the rhetoricians, then, Berger devotes important chapters to the gnome as such and not only to the larger gospel-forms or to some vague category of logia or "aphorisms". But Berger differs also - and self-consciously - in other respects from the "classical" form-criticism of Bultmann and Dibelius, most significantly in his critique of early assumptions about the relations between oral tradition and written and above all about regularities in the development of pre-literary forms. Thus with Berger there is considerably less insistence on the oral pre-history of gospel forms: that individual forms do have particular historical interest is not avoided, but neither is it adopted as a major pre-supposition for criticism of the New Testament text as it stands. Consequently, the correspondence between literary or spoken form and historical situation is not to be insisted upon:
Der Begriff 'Sitz im Leben' ist unklar. Ist er auf eine 'geschichtliche Situation' oder auf eine Institution bezogen? Für eine Form gibt es mehrere Sitze im Leben und umgekehrt.\textsuperscript{10}

Moreover, some of the strongest formative interests within the tradition; for example, anxious relations with Judaism are so perennial and pervasive as to be almost useless as indices of tradition-history.\textsuperscript{11} In addition, different \textit{Gattungen} overlap or are embedded in each other without any necessary implication of historical priority, especially of the smaller forms within a compilation.\textsuperscript{12} In the cases of \textit{Sentenzen/Gnomen} and \textit{Chrien} this involves the renunciation of the dangerously naive schemes of evolutionary development imposed upon New Testament texts by early form-criticism. Thus no '\textit{reine Urform}' lies behind New Testament Wisdom-sayings\textsuperscript{13} while in \textit{chria} and apophthegm the pre-existence of the 'punch-line' as an independent saying cannot be pre-supposed.\textsuperscript{14} Thus although Berger recognizes the fundamental importance of the Church's spoken culture, including oral tradition originating in Jesus, the recognition leads him mainly towards a synchronic analysis of New Testament rhetoric with only occasional (diachronic) excursions into the histories of individual forms.\textsuperscript{15} As the relationship between \textit{Mündlichkeit} and \textit{Schriftlichkeit} in the early Christian documents is seen to be much more complex than that imagined by the pioneer form-critics, there being apparently no historically controllable standards of (dis)continuity identifiable between Jesus, the oral tradition and the New Testament, no orderly development of an oral tradition shielded from the formal influences of writing and literary rhetoric and no privileged historicity of sayings-tradition as opposed to narrative,\textsuperscript{16}
so projects of reconstruction and authentication of sayings attributed to Jesus must be largely suspended and judgements about the historical Jesus reduced to a matter of "wirkungsgeschichtlichen Plausibilität".  

Within such a generally - for historical Jesus research - unpromising outlook, however, it is all the more important to note that Berger does not move towards a dehistoricized 'oral hermeneutic' like that of, for example, W Kelber, but rather acknowledges that the individual forms of the New Testament, adapted as they are from those of Hellenistic Rhetoric even more than from literature, do often have traceable histories even where these do not cohere within any universal Entwicklungsschema. But in the absence of any plausible general scheme, Berger takes a very singular interest in the special historical background of the forms he classifies as Sentenzen (and the closely related Wanderlogien) or as Gnomen. This interest, moreover, raises peculiar difficulties for the form-critic: in his slightly earlier treatment of Hellenistic Gattungen in the New Testament, Berger discusses gnome, hypotheke and sententia together as a single, indeed his first, category of deliberative (symbouleutic) rhetoric. Here the historically interesting point is that gnome, because of its pre-eminence in primary rhetorical (progymnasmatic) education and its peerless ability to cross cultural, religious, linguistic and even form-critical (e.g. between narrative and paraenetic forms) boundaries, is perhaps the finest witness to just how slight the threshold between orality and literary can be.
Dabei ist die Nahe zwischen Schriftlichkeit und Mundlichkeit überdies eine wichtige Brücke, um von der literarischen Gestalt auf alltägliche Rede zurückzuschließen.

But the potential use of such a link as an important point of contact between everyday discourse of Jesus and the earliest community and developing attempts at codification is not taken up in what remains, after all, a preliminary marshalling of form-critical data.

The situation in Berger's more complete handbook of New Testament form-criticism is rather more complicated and challenging than in his earlier essay. Where, in the earlier experimental catalogue of Hellenistic forms, gnome/sententia is considered a single category of deliberative rhetoric, in the newer work, gnome and sententia are analysed into two closely related but distinct classifications only one of which (gnome) is deliberative. In part this move can be seen as a sensible response to the inadequacies of the classical division of Rhetoric into its three departments: deliberative, judicial and laudatory (sambouleutikon/demegorikon; dikaiikon; epideiktikon/egko miastikon/panegurikon). With only the slimmest warrant among the progmnasmatusists and none among the technical and philosophical rhetoricians, the assignment of gnome to any particular division of rhetoric would seem an imprudent functional limitation of a kind of language which characteristically links the most widely varying occasions. At any rate, the typical economy, mobility, variety and connotivity of gnomic formulations and their availability for collection or incorporation into diverse larger forms make it difficult to place gnome within a formal scheme based, like Berger's
(or Aristotle's) upon broad categories of relationship between speaker and hearer. If Berger intends to evoke the classical threefold division of the tria genera causarum as only heuristic categories, they are hardly to be preferred to the justly criticized assignment of forms to sociologically ill-defined Sitze im Leben:

Gnomen gehören zu denGattungen, die keinen ursprünglichen Sitz im Leben haben.

Further, if an even more fundamentally analytical distinction is meant, between functions intrinsic to genuinely corresponding forms, a much greater precision of definition will be required in relation both to the significant structures of gnomic and sententious forms and to specific, historically and socially intelligible communicative aims in order to avoid classifications which are as confused as they are arbitrary and irrelevant to the complicated rhetorical situation of the early Church.

For his part, however, Berger does not simply remove gnome from his symbouleutikon genos into a new category of functionally indefinite Sammelgattungen, including inter alia, parable and chria; he distinguishes between indicative (Sentenzen) and imperative/vetitive (Gnomen) gnomai, the latter being always deliberative and essentially basic (Grundbausteine) to exhortation, parenesis and chria. Apart from the syntactical distinction, then, Sentenzen seem to be marked by greater independence over against intermediate units like apophthegm, chria and parenesis and it is to these rather than to the formally compromised Gnomen that Berger ascribes special historical relevance as an exceptionally sure link
to the oral beginnings (mündliche Vorstufen) of the gospel-tradition in a community whose characteristics Berger describes with unusual historical confidence. Berger's "Sentenzen - im deutlichen Unterschied zu Gnomen" are most clearly related to the parable: not only do Sentenzen often function as concluding comments on parables (eg Lk 19:26 par Mt 25:29; Lk 18:14; Mt 20:16; Mt 22:14) or even as elucidating companion-texts to shorter parabolic sayings (eg Mt 12:34; Mk 4:22; 4:25), Sentenzen can also function themselves as virtual parables (eg Lk 23:31; 17:37 par Mt 24:28; Lk 14:34 cf Mt 5:13, Mk 9:50), posing ordinary human experience rather as a challenging puzzle than as sage commonplace. Indeed parable and Sentenz are linked by much more than frequently shared contexts and occasionally transferred function: parabolic and sententious ways of speaking and writing bring "allgemeinere menschliche Erfahrung" into intensified rhetorical focus in essentially similar ways. Here, it may be possible to go beyond Berger's strictly form-critical interest to see both forms (and not only parable) as valuable guages of continuity and change between Jesus and our evangelists. In any case, the peculiarly close and exceptionally clear relationship between historical stages of orality and literacy in the Sentenzen, where a generally indistinct social continuity between Jesus, tradition and literature hardens into a few identifiable texts, is not extended by Berger to the historical Jesus, but the method for such extension is indicated not in the search for discontinuities between Jesus and his tradition, but in the exploitation of just such exceptionally persistent features of both tradition and literature as the Sentenzen. Berger himself cites an instance from his own work:
Ein Beispiel für gattungsgeschichtliche Kontinuität zwischen vor und nach Ostern sind die Drohworte gegen Städte. Aus dem vorhandenen Material läßt sich die These begründen, dass Jesus in erster Linie wegen seiner prophetischen Drohworte gegen Stadt und Tempel umgebracht werden sollte.

For the purpose of defining at least one characteristic mode of Jesus' rhetorical style, Berger's form-critical discussion of the Sentenz, with its almost grudging concession of the historical relevance of a form which even more than that of the parables retains the marks of originally spoken discourse, is a challenge to define historical controls - such as the place-names in the civic Drohworte - by which to go beyond the primary orality of the gospel Sentenzen to claim where possible a more specific relationship to Christian origins and their Jewish context.

First, however, something more need be said about Berger's quite sharp distinction between Sentenz and Gnome, a distinction which as we have seen is clearest in the very close and exclusive functional and formal analogy between indicative Sentenz and Parable. The distinction is again fairly emphatic in the treatment of (imperative/vetitive) Gnomen strictly as 'Grundbausteine der Mahnreden und Paraenesen' worked out in Berger's chapters on Paraenesis and Gnomik. That is, Gnomen are most positively differentiated from Sentenzen in Berger's analysis where the former are examined above all for their collective significance as stylistic elements of New Testament parenesis and exhortation and of the often substantial gnomological catalogues of pagan, Jewish and Christian literature while examples given of Sentenzen are - like parable - more often
impressively individual in content and in relation to context.

This syntactical and functional distinction between Sentenzen and Gnomen in Berger's form-criticism must be qualified, however, by a clear recognition of the essential cohesion of these two main formal sub-categories of gnome. First, (1) the definitions and examples of the progymnasmatis and rhetoricians agree rather with Berger's earlier, more modestly differentiated treatment of gnome as a single category embracing imperatival and vetitive as well as indicative and, for that matter, interrogative forms. In addition, (2) Berger's two categories overlap extensively in function, especially on the - for Synoptic study decisive - ground of their use in chria, apophthegm and related forms. Thus Berger rightly stresses the regular use of Gnomen in chriae as a major link between the gospels and Christian epistolary style with its frequent recourse to gnomic parenesis. But New Testament parenesis, epistolary (eg Gal 5:25-6:10) or gospel (eg Mt 6), is not incompatible with the sententious indicative, while the chria-form itself freely employs both Sentenzen and Gnomen (eg Lk 4:23,24) without formal distinction - as Berger recognises. Berger, moreover, rightly notes the importance of the regular use of Gnomen to answer legally relevant questions in chriae, a use which marks a historically more important relationship between Gnomik and Law than those established by the general literary coordination of the roles of Law-giver and gnomic poet or by the summary of ethical and legal obligations in gnomic (parenetic) form. But again, Sentenzen too and not only Gnomen answer such legal questions in Synoptic chriae (eg Mk 2:19-22; 27,28).
Furthermore, beyond their standard relationship to the definitions and examples of progyrnasmatists and rhetors, and specifically beyond a shared and deeply significant relationship to Synoptic chria-forms and Synoptic halakic interests, Berger's Sentenzen and Gnome have in common (3) their basic analogical structure, so that, e.g., the Q (imperatival) Gnome, Lk 12:3par, and the Marcan (indicative) Sentenz, Mk 4:22parr, are rightly coordinated (cf Lk 12:2par). Finally, (4) the same exceptional historical interest attaches to at least some instances of each formal sub-category. Many Sentenzen (ie indicative gnomai) suggest with particular clarity the character of (hypothetical) pre-Synoptic orality and some, indeed, (Berger cites especially the Wanderlogien, eg Mt 13:12; 25:29; Mk 4:25; Lk 8:18; 19:26) are tradition-critically among the very best opportunities to document oral sayings-tradition. But exactly the same hypothetical and actual historical interest belongs to at least some Gnome (ie imperatival/vetitive gnomai). Thus, for example, if comparison between Lk 16:13par and EvTh 47 indicates the very probably oral transmission of the shared gnome of the Two Masters, comparison between Did. 9.5 and Mt 7:6 yields much the same probability, especially as the two gnomai, Mt 7:6 and Lk 16:13par, are embedded in very similar Synoptic quatrain-forms. Even (especially) within one of the most broadly attested and historically-interesting Wanderlogien, it seems wanton to distinguish as radically between an imperatival gnome (Lk 22:26) and its indicative, but no less prescriptive, cousins (Mk 9:35; 10:43; Mt 20:26; 23:11; Lk 22:26), yet not between the latter and still further versions which are indicative in sense as well as in form (Mk 10:31;
Mt 19:30; 20:16; Lk 13:30).

Berger's earlier handling of gnome, hypothèke and sententia as a single rhetorical order (with many form-critical sub-divisions) is therefore probably to be preferred, historically, as better grounded both in the definitions and examples of the progymnasmatists and rhetors and in the usage of all kinds of gnomological literature and, formally, as reflecting the continuity among gnomic patterns even when these are expressed in a variety of verbal forms and/or across a range of formally quite dissimilar contexts. The point is not, however, to dispense completely with the distinction between imperative (Gnomen) and indicative gnomai (Sentenzen), but to place the distinction more clearly within a context of form-critical analysis secondary to the definition of the single semantic/rhetorical category of gnome. Thus, in one direction, the formal affinity between parable and gnome does show a form-critical bias toward indicative gnomai (Berger's Sentenzen). Such a bias may well also have tradition-critical implications about the history of the parabolic and gnomic styles together in early Christian rhetoric, especially since the Wanderlogen are also predominantly indicative in style. Above all, though, it suggests an interesting literary-functional relation between the (form-critically barely definable) category of parable and one sub-set of gnomic language. More broadly, the distinction between imperative and indicative gnomai (Gnomen and Sentenzen) is also a valuable, if critically secondary exercise it makes explicit a tension within the continuum of gnomic style between its use in 'prose' forms of oration and narrative and the more specialised situations of parenetic and gnomological literature. Differentiation of this sort
between gnomic materials preserved in catalogue forms (whether brief 
parenetic passages or elaborate, often versified, sapiential 
treatises) and the use of gnome in actual speech or in the hybrid 
forms (like the chria) of historical/biographical narrative is a 
necessary step towards a differentiation within the historical meaning 
of gnome in its differing literary contexts. In a sense 
unfortunately, differences among gnomai in these two settings are not 
ought to overcome the unity of our single category—and with it the 
problem of historical control, of separating the traditional from the 
merely commonplace. Put boldly, Berger is right to discern the 
existence of a category of gnomic saying with, at least potentially, 
unique historical interest for investigations of the oral aspect of 
the gospel tradition, but his form-critical separation of Sentenzen 
from (in my view, other) Gnomen does not seem to correspond to that 
special historical character definitely enough to support further 
historical probing without further structural and formal analysis 
first. And, in all fairness, Berger never intended to provide such 
support. Nevertheless, Berger's studies do turn the historian's 
attention toward the peculiar historical significance of the most 
sententious (in content and in (ir)relation to literary context, 
rather than in verbal mood) of the New Testament gnomai as lonely 
indices of early Christian orality while the relevance of the 
formidable mass of ancient Gnomik, the great Wisdom collections and 
even smaller ethical compositions is that of overwhelmingly literary 
phenomena, a literary "field of intensification" (to borrow 
Beardslee's phrase). In other words, although the sententious units 
of sapiential and parenetic list-forms share the name of gnome and
separately fit the progymnasmaticists' and rhetoricians' definitions and so share -theoretically- the gnome's close relation to spoken language and interest for study of early Christian orality, the strongly literary character of the collection-forms emphasises conventionality over against the chria and related forms which stress gnomic originality and gnomic origins in direct discourse. Witness here the remarkably easy interpenetration of pagan, Jewish and Christian wisdom in literary gnomology.  

Berger's attempt to divorce Sentenzen from Gnomen generally is, thus, not without use, as it underscores the importance of the chria-form as an intersection of two sometimes divergent, sometimes convergent patterns of gnomic language; to be sure, particular sententious formulations move back and forth between the inclusive forms of literary collection, of which we mainly think in relation to 'proverbs' and 'Wisdom-sayings', and the forms of narrative and primary discourse for which the rhetorical and progymnasmatic definitions were intended (cf perhaps Mt 7:13/Lk 13:24; Mt 15:14/Lk 6:39). This traffic must be especially heavy where, as for example in the Ahiqar-tradition sapiential collection and narrative or discourse are juxtaposed and mixed together. But the chria is most important for our purposes as a medium between collection and apparently independent saying, because it offers an interpretive frame, often historicising and therefore sometimes historically verifiable or falsifiable. Doubtless this mediating role of the chria is a large part of its attraction for the evangelists (literary and oral) for whom the form allowed both the clarification of the obscurely individual saying and the intensification of what is more
commonplace - although it bears remembrance that not all chriae are centred, let alone constructed, around a saying at all and, moreover, that not every saying is gnomic. Be that as it may, Berger's recognition of sententious/gnomic language in New Testament chriae implies that the 'special historical value' of Sentenzen\textsuperscript{62} extends at least potentially to Gnomen embedded in chriae and kindred forms. And if the priority of gnome (Sentenz or Gnome) over chria cannot be presumed,\textsuperscript{63} the integrity of the gnomic chria is not to be held inviolable either. The special historical privilege of gnome in general to cross and recross the borders between oral discourse and literature strongly reinforces the presumption that Christian propagandists and writers early began to settle gnomic tradition into chria-texts.\textsuperscript{64}

Berger's distinction between imperative (Gnomen) and indicative gnomai (Sentenzen), then, needs to be qualified by recognition of the underlying unity and special historical interest of the whole range of gnomic language in the New Testament, particularly as it is attributed to Jesus. On the other hand, this should not be taken to imply that New Testament Gnomik is an undifferentiated and featureless mass. Thus, incorporation of gnomai into the homogeneous structures of collection-forms generalises (if it does not diminish) their historic character as traces of primary rhetoric. The tendency of parenesis to imperative/vetitive formulation (a tendency much less uniform than the countervailing parabolic bias) is significant in this sense. But literary units such as the chria which to some considerable extent emphasise both historical ascription and the separate identity of a
gnomic saying consequently assume a double importance, not because they somehow magically authenticate a saying, but because they allow sometimes historically relevant individualities of style and content to assert themselves. This point may be instructively illustrated from Berger's discussion 'zum Verhältnis von Torah, Paraenesis und Recht.'  

On a general level the importance of this relationship is clear: gnomic style is an index of a law-giver's personal authority, be he prophet, messiah or apostle; gnomic forms are likewise a means of extending the regulation of religious norms with or without sanctions into areas of life not easily subject to public legislation. Again, gnomic parenesis dissolves the distinction between law and prudence, making the former apologetically and didactically more palatable. Berger, however, notices as well that this close relationship between Gnomik und Recht functions in a much more specific sense where, as in several Synoptic chriae (eg Mt 22:15-22), Jesus is represented as answering a clearly legal question ('exestin ...?' v.17) with a gnomic saying (in this instance, v.21, an imperative (Gnome), but compare the indicative (Sentenz), Mk 2:27).

So ist also auch auf dieser Ebene eine enge Beziehung zwischen Recht und Gnomik feststellbar.

That the gospel chriae often forcefully present in special, perhaps historically controllable cases the tension and close relationship between Gnomik and Recht generally, is a liminal insight beyond which it may indeed be possible to explore wider areas of ancient Judaism especially in relation to the gnomic rhetoric of Jesus and the early
Church. Suffice it for the present, however, to anticipate that on levels of gnomic discourse which most closely evoke the forms of speech this relation of Law and gnome may provide a fundamental point of contact between the form-criticism of sententious elements of the New Testament and the perplexing question of Jesus' and his immediate followers' attitudes to their contemporary Judaism.

A final question emerges from Berger's studies of gnome/sententia, one of particular importance for the present enquiry. In neither of his treatments of gnomic language does Berger provide anything like an exhaustive list of the forms he has in mind, although there are forms for which full catalogues are given, notably chria/apophthegma. Instead he provides for each of his earlier perparatory essay and his more developed form-criticism a (different) listing of examples of a wide range of formal sub-categories. In the earlier list, a single New Testament instance of each sub-group is followed by references to formal analogies in Jewish, pagan and early Christian gnomology; the whole is supplemented by a tabulation of the distribution of formal characteristics among the gnomai of each of the main Greek-language collections. The later emphasis on the distinction between imperative (Gnomen) and indicative gnome (Sentenzen) is only the most important index of the formal variety which Berger documents among the gnomai of the New Testament as well as of Hellenistic progymnasmatic, rhetorical and collection literatures. Viewed as a whole, then, the category of gnome overlaps, yet differs essentially from such syntactically defined categories as the Mahnspruch or functionally defined genres as the
II Recollection and Variation in Oral Tradition (J D Crossan)

This formal diversity and openness of gnomic language, which makes any purely syntactical taxonomy descriptively inadequate, has also a further dimension in relation to the invention and transmission of gnomai over time, especially, though not only, in oral tradition. Syntactical subdivision of gnome can be, as Berger shows, useful for the criticism of a single text or canon of writings. Nevertheless, in tradition, either oral or writing, individual gnomai are subject to important formal and syntactical variation within recognizably preserved cores of imagery and structure. For the Synoptic gospels, as texts powerfully marked by the tension between oral and literate mentalities within the tradition, J D Crossan has stated the limitations of syntactical analysis with irresistible clarity in his description of 'aphoristic core' rather than 'syntactical sequence' as the focus of continuity in the transmission of sayings in Jesus' tradition. Crossan makes two distinctions, even more fundamental for the present study than for Crossan's own work, between oral and literate sensibilities in tradents and between performantial and hermeneutical variations in actual tradition. He does not elaborate on the accurate differentiation implicit in his language between orality and literacy or on the even more significant refusal simply to confuse techniques (whether of writing, scribal memorization or oral performance) with the persistent sensibility of the orally conditioned memory, except to notice - what is again fundamental to the study of gnomic tradition - the much greater orientation of strongly oral
tradition to formulaic and synchronic structures rather than to the
exact replication of a sequence of members. This latter is the
hallmark of literary technique and of relatively literary sensibility
- even where writing is not actually used or used only as an auxiliary
technique - the identification of Synoptic tradition as strongly oral
in sensibility implies among other things an interest less in
syntactically faithful, verbatim iteration than in recollecting the
emotional and argumentative gist of remembered speech. Crossan's
perception adopted here of oral sensibility and of the transmission
priorities (gist rather than syntax) which correspond to it and our
own specification for the first time of the strongly gnomic aspect of
Synoptic tradition make between them a model of oral tradition which,
if still incomplete, nevertheless goes far beyond either form-critical
or mnemotechnical models.

The primary interest of such a distinction is that traditional
and authori/cal sensibilities have a more direct influence on poetic,
ii compositional, technique than does transmissional technique. The
Synoptic literature thus seems to express a strong residue of oral
sensibility and overwhelmingly attributes to Jesus and his following
both strong oral sensibility and technique - in contrast not only with
more abstract literacy, but also with the predominantly scribal,
mnemotechnical mentality and technique reflected in much Rabbinic
literature.\textsuperscript{75} The contrast with an oral tradition organized on
scribal sensibilities, together with the still mixed sensibility and
possibly\textsuperscript{76} technique of much of the Apostolic Fathers' gospel
tradition, and the gradual canonization of oral tolerance toward
'textual' incongruities and redundancies for the sake of a variably

74
recreated gist in an irreducibly four-fold gospel scripture justify the description of the Synoptic tradition as 'oral' not only in the weak sense of 'originally unwritten', but also in the stronger sense of essentially non-scribal. As Crossan has pointed out succinctly, if Jesus or the earliest community actually purposed a sribally organized, textually fixed, but technically memorized tradition, the Synoptic result must be reckoned a dramatic failure compared with, eg, the neighbouring development of Rabbinic tradition. The appearance of literary gospels, then, may well mark an important shift toward textuality in the Jesus-tradition, though almost certainly a less radical revolution than that canvassed by W Kelber.

That the shift was evidently not more traumatic, underscores the degree of continuity, in literary hindsight perhaps surprising, between oral and literate sensibilities and their partial independence of less continuous technical developments. Literate and scribal or mnemonic sensibilities need not be opposed as radical antinomies to orality; differentiation and interaction between sensibilities is much less clear-cut than the technical distinction between writing and non-writing traditions.

In consequence, we are left with the double problem (1) of discerning gradations of sensibility within the Synoptic texts and (2) of coordinating their mixed sensibility (from a literary point of view, their strong oral residue) with the origins of the tradition in deliberate (ie rhetorical) orality self-consciously differing from nearby, active literary and, probably, mnemonic technical traditions.
The problem is not hopeless. First, the same theoretical criteria of orality which, on the whole, fail to isolate orally transmitted (i.e., technically oral) textual units in the Synoptics fail precisely because they are indices not of transmissinal, but rather of compositional technique, i.e., sensibility. Second, the continuity of gnome-use and probably of gnome-tradition across boundaries of both technique and sensibility, provides a common denominator for the comparison of contexts which include gnomai. Re-application of criteria of oral sensibility to gnomic gospel-contexts can, therefore, seldom be expected to yield compelling evidence of the direct local influence of non-literary transmission techniques, at least without supplementary tradition-critical evidence. It should, however, give a soberer estimate if not of oral traditions, then at least of the tradition of orality generally and specifically where the texts incorporate sayings of the type (gnome) in which literary textuality and oral performantial flexibility are least in tension.

The special historical interest, so often alluded to here, of the gnome among early Christian sayings-forms lies very largely in the coincidence of oral structure and rigorous formal expression, that is, in fully oral yet textual identity intense and economical enough to survive not only oral memory and transmission but also scribal memorization and more literate redaction. That granted, however, the specifically syntactical characteristics of Synoptic sayings, such as, for example, the use of imperatival, conditional or relatival formats, must be regarded as among the least secure aspects of a tradition which, even in its (still quite unstandardized) literary form retains a strongly oral flavour. This historical dimension of
variety amongst gnomic forms, a dimension particularly evident in the Synoptic materials perhaps, but present presumably in the interaction of wisdom-traditions and gnomic literatures elsewhere, limits the usefulness for historical criticism of syntactical differences among gnomai in two ways, corresponding to the sides of Crossan's second distinction, between performantial and hermeneutic variations. By performantial variation, Crossan means the comparatively gratuitous variations in form which a given unit will go through as its 'aphoristic core' pattern is recreated in successive, non-identical performances; some such performantial variations may be aesthetically more successful than others or statistically more frequent, but none is original to the extent that each reproduces the critical pattern of the originating oral core: none becomes exclusively normative. As oral tradition comes increasingly under scribal influence the possibility of unselfconsciously performantial variation of an orally permanent but flexible structure will, on this model, recede as sensitivity to core structure and corresponding relative indifference to formal accidence are displaced by attention to syntactical iteration. That is, variations in form which will be practically invisible and irrelevant to oral mentality will become critically interesting on exposure to scribal norms and, a fortiori, scribal techniques. Thus, for example, the formal differences between Mk 10:15 and Mt 18:3 are more nearly a consequence than examples of performance variation; rather they reflect such variation through the scribal selection of particular performantial (and translational) variants as appropriate for particular scribally conceived if not actually written contexts. Crossan's second category of aphoristic
change, 'hermeneutical', is, by contrast, as fully typical of scribal sensibilities as of oral, though the introduction of scribal ideas of canonicity will tend to suppress variation of any kind within the limits of technology. Hermeneutical variation modifies the form of a unit with a view to committing the hearer/reader to a particular interpretation within the range of possibilities offered by the core pattern. Redactional variation is in these terms mainly hermeneutical though some quite performantial variety occurs, 'simply because of residual orality, residual reluctance to be bound finally and irrevocably to one ultimate formulation'. Theoretical explanations apart, several rather happy examples of apparently performantial variation seem to be available in the alternative versions of Q gnomai, eg Lk 12:6par; Lk 11:11fpar; Lk 12:54fpar Mt 16:2f, whatever the textual history of the latter. The example cited above of Mk 10:15 parr, where Crossan speaks of 'preferred performances', would suggest the occurrence of 'aesthetic' variation: not strictly hermeneutical in motivation and not performantial in the oral sense since it is the product not of ex tempore recreations of the oral core but instead of quite distinctly scribal/literate criticism treating performantial possibilities as compositional options. The main lessons to be drawn for the present argument from Crossan's digest of a view, better nuanced than that of the first form-critics, of the relation between orality, scribality and gospel literature are, first, that syntactical form, though form-critically interesting, is tradition-critically an unreliable guide and, second, that those sayings, especially gnomai and among them those gnomai which show the most definitely structured 'core' patterns, will be particularly promising indicators of the
character of the earliest oral tradition. 89

The importance of these two lessons and of an awareness generally of the limited but real vulnerability of gnomic 'core' to the suppression of performantial variety in favour of syntactical standardization is perhaps greatest in relation to what we have called 'aesthetic' variation. For the opportunities for redactional choice presented to scribal sensibility by the technique of large-scale literary composition (especially in Greek) are by no means limited to the theological, i.e. hermeneutical preferences which have long been the demonstranda of redaction-criticism. Scribal mentality and, above all, the actual business of writing offer for the first time to individual authors the possibility of systematically asserting stylistic preferences which, in contrast to, e.g., theological judgements can be primarily personal and authorial - especially at the beginning of a literary genre like that of Gospel. Indeed a pattern like gnome which is radically less a literary Gattung than a rhetorical mannerism, that is, itself a stylistic device, gives particular scope to the poetic imagination of a writer who has undertaken to erect a literary monument to an oral tradition. Any investigation of the role of gnome, as a natural and wide-spread mode of orally conditioned language, in the predominantly and characteristically oral first phases of Synoptic tradition must fail, then, unless it can also distinguish, at any rate in principle, between the scribal/literary interest of gospel writers in gnomic forms of their own devising and the survival of oral 'core' patterns closely reflecting a still powerful, though residual, orality at odds
with the evangelists' aesthetic as well as theological scribality.

III Gnomic Orality and Literary Style : Against the Poetics of M Goulder

This challenge to control the relationship between oral patterns and scribal styles is urgently formulated in M Goulder's description of the 'Matthaean Manner' in connection with a view of Synoptic development which by its extreme simplicity condemns the vagueness of received form-critical models of tradition. The connection with general models of Synoptic transmission and development is especially provocative since the 'differentiated treatment of orality versus textuality' pursued by Kelber and Crossan implies not only a critique of form-critical presumptions of simple formal continuity and analogy between word-of-mouth and written tradition but also an opportunity for establishing a harmony or at least a better balance between views of Synoptic tradition which emphasize simple, strongly textual and therefore literary or memorizational transmission and those which emphasize the complex, social and therefore much more significantly oral processes of transmission and formation. Thus in the light of an understanding of oral tradition no longer in the merely negative sense of unwritten transmission strictly dependent upon narrowly defined social settings, it is possible to speak of a deliberate, self-conscious and socially well-defined effort to assemble and pass on Jesus' tradition on a fairly modest scale (1) without needing to ascribe to it the techniques and attitudes of either literature or scribal mnemonics, (2) without denying to it the considerable though not unlimited performantial as well as
hermeneutical variation attendant on oral transmission in this stronger sense and, (3) without ignoring the selective and formative impact of changing social and ecclesiastical interests. The transformation of often irreducible formal variety within an essentially single system of tradition into literary complexity is from this point of view referrable to scribal and incipiently literary tastes of (would-be or actual) readers and writers - as Goulder’s analysis would suggest - without implying the literary history which Goulder would infer. That is, in terms of a more refined concept of orality it is possible to grant that ‘Matthew was the Church’s poet’, its leading exponent of the craft-literate art of imitating and stereotyping oral patterns, without making Matthaean love of textuality normative for the whole tradition by, for example, designating every attempt to formalize and standardize oral variety ‘Matthaean style’. Certainly, on any model of Synoptic development the evangelists’ strong authorial influence is to be expected not least on an aesthetic, stylistic level (especially if writing is being used to stabilize oral performantial and hermeneutical fluctuation) where the presence of Matthaean, or any other, identifiable mannerism need not at all indicate the absence or destructive modification of oral tradition. Simply put, Matthew need not be the author of every ‘core’ structure upon which he impresses Matthaean style nor can stylistic tendencies be unequivocally attributed to an individual author when there is so serious a likelihood that they are rather signs of scribal, stereotypical reception of a strong but residual oral influence.
Still, specific comparison of Goulder's corpus of 'Matthaean' poetry ('scribal' would be a less prejudicial denominator) with an independently defined category of gnome will be an interesting test of both Goulder's and the present thesis: to the extent that gnome proves not to be a function of 'Matthaean' style, the limits of both will be more plainly in view; conversely, failure to show such stylistic irreducibility will seriously undermine the plausibility of the claim for privileged access to oral tradition through Synoptic gnomai. The suitability of Goulder's own tests for such an attempt to trace gnomic language beyond the Synoptic threshold is of course in the coincidence of gnome at every level of orality and literary, in primary orality, in craft-literary and scribal mnemonics, in technical (literary) oratory and in all classes of Greek literature and education. Thus the 'saying', central to the 'poetised speech' of oral performance and memory, is not for all its variety syntactically distinguishable from the 'rather more formalized version' preserved under conditions of (especially Semitic) craft-literary or mnemonotechnical tradition or again from the units of Hellenic gnomology and the progymnasmatic examples. This continuity within a limited but impressive formal variety doubtless accounts for the appeal of any attempt whether modern or progymnasmatic to define proverbial/gnomic language with reference to both structural and functional considerations. For the present study detailed knowledge of gnomic functions may not be presupposed so that the concentration of Goulder's tests upon rhythm and imagery, ie upon structural factors, may be an additional advantage. With regard to the test for authorially distinctive distributions of imagery, a test which has been successfully applied to questions of disputed literary authorship.
in a very wide range of literatures and which is patient of rigorous statistical control, it may be admitted that Goulder produces decisive evidence\textsuperscript{104} that the 'teaching materials' of the Synoptic gospels were not entirely written by an single author, though this falls rather short of proof that 'the theory of a common source in Jesus behind the non-Marcan parts of Matthew is invalid.'\textsuperscript{105} Indeed within one major cross-section of Synoptic 'teaching' matter, the category of units identifiable as \textit{gnomai}, a much less anomalous distribution is produced when Goulder's procedure is reapplied as closely as possible,\textsuperscript{106} suggesting an imaginatively more homogeneous tradition informing the varied work of our several gospel-writers.

Goulder's other approach to the 'Matthaean Manner', by way of the notion of 'rhythm' is, however, less summarily to be disposed of as far as this study of Synoptic \textit{gnome} is concerned. In particular, discussions of 'poetised speech' with reference to predominantly oral sensibilities characteristically emphasize the importance of some kind of 'rhythm'\textsuperscript{107} though 'rhythm' need certainly not imply literate conceptions of metre or verse. In this respect, Goulder's analysis of the rhythmic features of the Gospels 'as they stand in the Greek'\textsuperscript{108} can be the basis of a fair test of poetic/gnomic continuity not only because he eschews the occasionally stimulating but generally dubious practice of retroversion into hypothetical Aramaic\textsuperscript{109} but more especially (and against Goulder's own interest) because any model of the oral transmission of Jesus' sayings like that adopted here must look for the persistence of 'core' structures more fundamental than orally variable word-order and syntax and consequently than rhyme and
other acoustic effects. This is not just the product of oral performantial freedom especially with units which have not passed into folklore, for non-literate tradition, whether properly oral or craft-literate/scribal, shows marked attentiveness to the sounds of the spoken word. It has also much to do with the special circumstance of the early imposition of the Greek language upon Synoptic tradition: any gnomic material not easily translated into Greek gnomai is presumably either lost to us or hidden in literary paraphrase. Indeed the possibility of such paraphrastic expansion motivated by hermeneutic, translational or aesthetic considerations makes it impossible to close the gnome-category too tightly against more generally – usually longer – gnomic units: the closed units of gnomai proper do, after all, share formal characteristics with the more open categories of poetic language which Goulder investigates. The most important consideration here, though, is simply that Goulder’s analysis of Synoptic ‘rhythms’ without reference to metrical patterns selects as critical, structures which are reminiscent of Crossan’s ‘aphoristic core’.

In oral sensibility one speaks or writes an aphoristic saying, but one remembers and recalls an aphoristic core. The only exceptions are those superbly special cases where the crafted sequence is so precisely memorable that one cannot recall the structure without also recalling the sequence and the syntax.

The peculiar character of Hebrew/Old Testament poetic forms with their strongly ‘sense’-rhythmic structures is perhaps an important factor facilitating the continuity of oral into memorized and written forms in Greek: much, though by no means all, Hellenistic gnome is in metre, but the underlying sense structures are never far from those of Hebrew
and Aramaic rhythms which 'survive translation' well.\textsuperscript{111} Still, the positive description of such 'rhythmic' structures, independent of 'stress-regularity, rhyme and alliteration',\textsuperscript{112} poses a problem which neither Goulder nor Crossan really addresses.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, Goulder's introductory characterisation of the Gospel rhythms over against their Old Testament background is tantalizingly unsatisfactory as a basis for such detailed study as he intends: 'the Gospel rhythms are more complex than those of the Psalms or Proverbs', but this complexity seems fundamentally to be distinguished only by a 'more epigrammatic style' of which the 'essence is a certain paradoxical flavour',\textsuperscript{114} language which once again recalls Beardslee's detection of a Synoptic heightening of paradoxical or hyperbolic confrontation compared with traditional and Old Testament wisdom.

If it is thus possible to agree at once with Goulder's insight into the peculiar mood of Synoptic poetry as it coheres with the thematic concept of 'intensification',\textsuperscript{115} it is all the more urgent to notice that epigrammatic paradox and rhythmic complexity are by no means clearly related. In fact, it seems that many of the most complex rhythmic units, those most clearly Matthaean as Goulder shows,\textsuperscript{116} are the least paradoxical and epigrammatic and in this important sense the least Synoptic in their poesy. In spite of his wise tactical avoidance of the more crudely syntactical, 'contingent'\textsuperscript{117} features of poetic language, Goulder's structural analysis stops at the lexical level of Septuagint/Synoptic expression, counting stressed words and phrases, a level of great interest for a stylistic essay but unreliable as a measure of the 'essence'\textsuperscript{118} of the
gospel style. Here the proximity between the lexical parallelism and antithesis which are 'the stuff of Semitic poetry' and such sense structures as hyperbole and paradox, though it is largely responsible for the durability of Biblical poetry in memory and in translation, is also a misleading guide to the character of Synoptic poetry especially when this is to be contrasted with the Matthaean scribal, prophetic Muse. To illustrate with examples from early in Goulder's discussion, we may agree that Mk 14:38 is, on the lexical level, a 'four-point antithesis' and, on the figurative level, 'paradoxical' and that these levels are very close together in this instance. Still, the paradox would remain if the antithesis were resolved: The spirit is weak and the flesh is willing. Or again, we may wonder whether Mk 7:27 is a four-point antithesis in quite the same (paradoxical) sense: is the unit really structured around the contrast between 'take'/'cast' as well as that between 'children'/'dogs'? With quite different intentions, Goulder has raised the central problems of the present research project: the problem of identifying a language which will adequately describe from an historical as well as a formal point of view at least a representative cross-section of the shorter poetised sayings ascribed to Jesus and the special problem of accounting for the peculiar intensity of mood which marks any such sample from the Synoptic logia.

Goulder's extenuated notion of lexical rhythm serves rather better in relation to the former problem in so far as it does help us to distinguish between more and less poetic units in the sayings material. Its major weaknesses, however, are that it was only ever intended to describe Matthew's poetry, making only the smallest
possible concession to continuity with Semitic tastes for parallelism and antithesis, while it fails, by succeeding only very partially, even as a gauge of Matthaean inventiveness. The case for ascribing the more complex rhythms to non-Marcan, non-Lucan authorial tastes is relatively strong since the structures by which Goulder defines such rhythms are more explicit and sustained than the lexical patterns which define his simpler styles. Yet even here, the distributions of 'crinics' and 'scandalics' are so different as to suggest a more complicated source-critical solution than Goulder's. Moreover, whatever else can be made of his figures for the distribution of simpler rhythms, they seem to indicate that on any source-critical hypothesis the basic poetic forms of the Synoptics are present at every stage of the unwritten tradition: even on Goulder's representation of Matthew as the Church's foremost poet, the evangelist is emphatically not the inventor of those same rhythms or of that characteristic mood which is the essence of Synoptic, not just Matthaean, poetic style. Indeed, Goulder himself explicitly ascribes at least two of the Marcan rhythmic sayings to Jesus. Of course, it must also be clear that Goulder's definitions and counts of poetic forms, and not only the inferences he draws from them, are to be treated with caution especially in the realm of his simpler patterns: occurrences of 'pardic' are a good deal more difficult to count than examples of such an explicit phenomenon as a Greek particle. Similar difficulty is reflected in the inclusion of Mt 7:13f under two different rhythmic patterns with a resultant minor inflation in Goulder's count of rhythms in the important category of the Matthaean 'Q' material. For such a doubling is no mere oversight since, to
give due credit, the example is structured both as a "converse" logion by the surprising double antithesis of the two gates and their two ways and as a "mylic" by the secondary antithetical parallelism between the many entering and the few finding, if this is what is meant by a "mylic chorus"(?). On the contrary, the great interest of this saying is that the doubly compounded antithesis of its logic is ambiguously - though still forcefully - represented in the lexical rhythms which Goulder is trying to count. It might be fair to say that Mt 7:13f is more rhythmic than the Lucan version (13:23f), which is a more explicit performance of the same antithetical scheme, but to exclude Lk 13:23f from a catalogue of rhythms while assigning the Matthaean version simultaneously to two different rhythmic types exposes the vagueness of Goulder's metaphor of "rhythm".

The essential strength of Goulder's discussion of Synoptic poetry is, however, not in its playful taxonomy of pardics, machaerics, etc nor in the mere statistical predominance of these rhythms in Matthew. The latter indeed only suggests that there is a Matthaean style to which the Lucan "Q" is somehow akin, phenomena of which any documentary theory of Synoptic development may give an adequate account. Instead, therefore, of offering a primarily statistical treatment like that given to Matthaean imagery in his following chapter, Goulder wisely emphasized the importance for his thesis of overwhelming Matthaean originality of "two vital factors": the distinctive quality of the Matthaean poetry, and the poetic abilities of Matthew and Luke as disclosed by their handling of Mark. Goulder's comparison of rhythms in Matthaean and Lucan redaction, though necessarily brief, is revealing of his assumptions about the
relation between Synoptic mood and Matthaean forms in actual cases and provides some indication of the potential usefulness of \textit{gnome} as a critical bridge between traditional and authorial styles. Goulder's general result is clear: 'Almost always Matthew sharpens the antithesis in any saying he draws from Mark',\textsuperscript{129} while Luke's special material (except in the infancy canticles) is essentially prose and his tendency in redaction, whether of Mark or of Q/Matthew is toward 'a less rhythmical version'.\textsuperscript{130} Goulder's survey of Synoptic rhythms supports his thesis only if the rhythmic characteristics of Lucan 'Q' can be shown to be in tension with Luke's elsewhere evidenced redactional habits\textsuperscript{131} and if the rhythms residual in Lucan 'Q' can be shown to be typical of Matthew's gospel as a whole.\textsuperscript{132}

The success or failure of this demonstration might have been unimportant for the study of \textit{gnome}, except for the very remarkable overlap between 'rhythmic' and 'gnomic' categories: more than half of the Synoptic instances of \textit{gnome} are also examples of one or other of Goulder's rhythms; conversely, of Goulder's 181 instances of the 'simple rhythms', nearly forty per cent are also \textit{gnomai}.\textsuperscript{133} The situation is complicated by the occurrence of individual \textit{gnomai} in several performantial or hermeneutic variations some of which Goulder judges unrhythmic while others are distributed unevenly amongst various rhythmic sub-categories; a few more of Goulder's examples will help to qualify the relation between \textit{gnome} and rhythm. His first example\textsuperscript{134} of rhythmic improvement in Matthaean redaction is the 'pardic' Mt 10:26. Goulder is clearly right to indicate that the antithesis present in Mk 4:22 is sharper in Mt 10:26 where, on the
lexical level, there are fewer words in total and somewhat more variety of significant vocabulary. Beyond wondering whether these are sufficient grounds for excluding the Marcan version from a list of rhythmically notable sayings, synoptic comparison should be extended (as it is not by Goulder) to the two Lucan versions of the same antithesis, Lk 8:17; 12:2. The second of these, nearly identical to Matthew's version, is also listed as a 'pardic', but the rhythm of 8:17 is presumably spoiled for Goulder by the presence of an 'extra' verb in the second clause. In preferring Lk 12:2 par Mt 10:26, Goulder, it must be conceded, is not acting arbitrarily: the Matthaeo-Lucan form is from one point of view more 'rhythmic' and 'antithetical', even simply more poetic than the untidier Mk 4:22 par Lk 8:17. It is impossible from only a few examples and unnecessary for the present study to decide whether the author of Matthew's Gospel or the writer of a hypothetical source is the originator of the poetic style which Goulder has detected, but it is important to describe more carefully than Goulder - with his interest in authorship - does the 'distinctive quality' of this Q/Matthaean aesthetic.

Above all, it is literary. That is, the form of Lk 12:2 and Mt 10:26 is superior to that of either Mk 4:22 or Lk 8:17 on the essentially literate or mnemo-technical criterion of numerical word-economy with a dislike for (typically oral) repetition and redundancy even, as here, under the stylizing influence of Semitic parallelism. The Q version looks neater, is perhaps easier to memorize verbatim and is fairly described as more epigrammatic, but it is specifically not more paradoxical than the rather less literate
performances of the same gnomic core, although the strong residual orality of Mk 4:22 par Lk 8:17, with its pleonasm and repetition, produces - for a more literate sensibility - a disagreeable effect of static interference. To be sure, the differences between Mk 4:22 and Lk 8:17 illustrate a mixture of oral and literate characteristics, especially in the latter where relative grammatical tidiness sacrifices some of Mark's vividness of literary (aesthetic) standardization and paradox is expressed by heightening synonymous parallelism into a kind of climax, with the sharpened negation of ou me and the rhythmically disturbing but emphatic extension of the last clause (ho ou me gnosthe kai eis phaneron elthe). The features which strike the eye as 'unrhythical' conceal a typically Lucan as well as more broadly Hellenistic ambiguity between non-literate orality and the carefully reconstructed orality of cultured, literate Rhetoric. Nonetheless, in all this variety of more or less aesthetically literate (even 'rhythmic') versions, reflecting as a whole the pluralism of oral performance-culture as well as a drive towards gospel-literacy, the unmistakable unifying structure is that of a single paradoxical gnome captured in an uncertain stratigraphy of literary fossils.

This particular Synoptic gnome is a good example of the 'aesthetic' variation possible with the commitment of oral tradition to writing or to technical memorization, but the 'rhythmic' inferiority which Goulder rightly finds in two of these literary versions still strongly suggests that the gospel-authors were at work in an environment of deeply oral performantial variation. This does not mean, of course, that the more strongly oral Marcan version is the
original form of this saying: that would be the equally illegitimate
counter-part of that use of more marked antithesis as a criterion of
"the originality of one form or another of a logion" which Goulder
rightly rejects in C.F. Burney and his successors. Rather, the
meaning of examples like Mk 4:22 parr is that Synoptic variety
evidences an equilibrium between literacy (including perhaps the
simulated literacy of scribal craft-memorization) and orality very
heavily displaced towards literacy in the development of written
gospels. At least in this example, the vital but clumsy literacy of
some sayings-versions and the presence in others of Goulder's
"rhythms" are symptoms of this displacement in spite of which the
persistence of strongly oral traces in some written versions (eg Mk
4:22) and of rhythmically indifferent performantial variation (Lk
8:17) - even in authors who have aesthetically more successful
literary tradition at hand (Lk 12:2 par) - indicates an earlier
equilibrium originally displaced decisively in the direction of a non-
literate, non-mnemotechnic oral tradition. Within such an oral
background, Goulder's rhythms may well have been placed within a range
of performantial options significantly wider than that of the Synoptic
written tradition, a place quite unlike the normative stylizing of
writers like Matthew and Goulder. This understanding of Goulder's
notion of "rhythm" mainly as an index of relative performantial
literacy works likewise for the remaining examples cited by him of
Matthaean and Lucan redactional tendencies. Thus in the pair of
gnomai, Mark 8:35,36, Goulder identifies all but one (Lk 17:33) of the
Synoptic versions of the first saying as "rhythmic". Still, within
this spectrum, he distinguishes Mt 10:39 as rhythmically superior,
again because its verbal economy 'sharpens the antithesis'.

The offending Lucan version (17:33) is even briefer (with only fifteen words) but is spoiled for Goulder presumably by, once more, the inclusion for emphasis of an 'extra' verb (peripopesasthai). In fact the rhythmic quality of this latter rendition might be defended as it alone avoids the necessity of distorting the symmetry of the gnome with an explanatory prepositional phrase (heneken emou in Mt 10:39; 16:25; Lk 9:24 and Mk 8:35, where kai tou euaggelion is added). That is, Luke here seems to have a strategy (scil. emphasis; cf. houtos in Lk 9:24) for sublimating the orality of the tradition which rivals Matthew's "rhythms"; in Mark, by contrast, the oral residue asserts itself somewhat more strongly in the accumulation of objects for heneken. But easily the most successful version in terms of rhythmic balance and literary finesse is the Johannine (12:25) in which the central antithesis between life-attitudes is made lexically and grammatically explicit in the two participles (ho philon ... ho mison) and then not only inverted, as in all versions, but reinforced by the addition in sharp antithesis of two explanatory phrases (... en to ... aionion ...). Once again, there is no serious possibility of reconstructing an "original form" since in oral sensibility there is no necessarily original formulation but only a range of performantial limits within which improvised recreation develops. Above all, judgements of relative "trace" orality in particular versions/documents are more informative about the mentality of authors than about the quality of their received tradition. Persistence of oral characteristics in our literary versions of gnomai like Mk 4:22 parr or Mk 8:35 parr and especially of oral qualities which are not assets for the technically literate immaterial persons.
associated with Synoptic sayings-tradition.

Mk 8:36 parr is given as a further example of Lucan unrhythmic style; the rhythm of the Lucan version is indeed impaired, here also, by a verbal redundancy (apolesas e zemiotheis) which, however it was motivated, is much more noticeable on literary/visual than on oral/aural criteria in relation to which it is an unremarkable performantial variation, perhaps slightly more elegant and climactic than its parallels, a mixture of oral and literate traits noticeably different from that of either the Marcan or the Matthaean versions but nonetheless clearly and verbally dependent upon a single gnomic core. The selection of Mk 10:31 parr to exemplify both Matthaean rhythmic and Lucan unrhythmic redactional tendencies is less straightforward: the four versions are all included in Goulder's count of rhythmic forms and are as much hermeneutical as performantial or aesthetic in motive. Mt 20:16 with its definite articles (hoi eschatoi ... hoi protoi) is the most clearly antithetical in sense, especially as it follows (somewhat illogically) Mt 19:30 and 20: 1-15, the parable of the casual labourers. Indeed in context it becomes difficult to say whether Mt 20:16 is a failed hermeneutical variation on 19:30 or only a fairly gratuitous aesthetic heightening of an antithetical structure implicit in the gnomic core but qualified in all the other instances of the saying. In any case, Matthew's preference for rhythm seems to have led him into a rhythmically brilliant but less coherent recapitulation here of Mt 19:30; Mk 10:31 with their less absolute polloi. As for Lk 13:30, it seems a puzzle that Goulder finds it less rhythmic than Mt 20:16: in each the gnome has an arhythmic introduction (outos ... Mt; kai idou ... Lk) apart from which the
Lucan essay succeeds uniquely in shaping the antithesis and qualifying it at the same time within a rigourously symmetrical syntax which is nothing if not rhythmic (contrast the loose esontai of Mt 20:16):

\begin{verbatim}
eisin eschatoi hoi esontai protoi, hoi esontai eschatoi.
\end{verbatim}

Once more Luke can be charged with a degree of verbal redundancy more noticeable as such to the reader than the auditor, in which the antithetical structure is made explicit without being absolutized in the Matthaean manner.

In fine, this sort of re-reading of Goulder's examples of 'the distinctive quality of Matthaean-poetry' confirms that his notion of 'rhythm' has indeed exposed an important and easily ignored aspect of the Synoptic tradition, though perhaps not quite that required by his argument. The Matthaean taste for explicit verbal antithesis is real but its relationship to a similar taste in the Q material generally is ambiguous. Whatever its origins as a literary style typical of whole documents, the 'rhythmic' manner is anticipated in a few Marcan sentences of Jesus, which implies that 'rhythm' is one performance option prevenient among others in oral tradition, selected by some gospel writers for cultivation as an aesthetically preferred strategy for expressing the underlying antithetic and confrontational logic of many gnomai. That is, the relationship between 'rhythm' and gnome in Synoptic literature and tradition is neither accidental nor simple: in Matthew (and perhaps Q) one range of oral performance possibilities is adopted rather consistently - though not at all exclusively - to 'translate' gnomic core into literary formulations and to relate gnomic elements to longer compositional units. The
particular, 'rhythmic', approach is encouraged in part by the availability and prestige of Old Testament models of literary antithetical poetry and in part by the remarkable frequency in Synoptic tradition—especially in its gnomic sayings—of intensely paradoxical/hyperbolic logic. In this way, there is a real connection between the peculiar mood of Synoptic poetry as a whole, particularly, as Goulder implicitly allows, in its most sententious sayings and the sharply antithetical style which Matthew, as it were, canonizes, but the connection is not a necessary one viewed against a hypothetically oral performantial variety or its observable traces in Synoptic literary variation: different stylistic decisions lead in Luke's gospel on the whole to (pace Goulder) an equally satisfactory literary expression of the Synoptic oral inspiration: where Matthew develops paradox and hyperbole into antithesis, Luke seems to affect a more integrated rhetoric of some grammatical and verbal elegance expressing very often the same core structures but preferring emphasis and climax to achieve what is typically a formally more generalized gnomic style. To put crudely the difference between Matthaean and Lucan receptions of Synoptic gnomic, the former represents the assertion of scribal, scriptural, craft-literate values in a conscious adaptation of Old Testament norms, the latter the reflex of Hellenistic literary rhetoric toward ethically generalized gnome. In this sense, Goulder's "rhythms" stand in the Synoptic literature as only partially literate poetry over against the less technically "practised speech" of oral tradition: in "rhythmic" as in metrical formulation an aesthetic and mnemo-technical or craft-literate selection is made among the more diverse poetic characteristics that distinguish
traditional performance or preserved oral core (in proverb, *gnome* or parable) from other conversation. The disadvantages of such a selection of poetic conventions is the expressive flatness of scribal literature and memorization, as when Matthew tends to paraphrase paradoxical nuance into formally standard antithesis, the "rather more formalised version" which distinguishes craft-literate, poetic documentation from oral tradition. The advantage is that such narrowed conventions facilitate the extension of still less than fully literate textuality beyond the confines of "core" structures of saying, episode and ritual formula into more and more connected narrative and — so noticeably in Matthew and Q — discourse.

Set over against the concept of *gnome/sententia* as Berger locates it in the specific contexts of the New Testament and against the richer understanding of Synoptic tradition which differentiates between the competing sensibilities as well as between competing techniques of oral, memorizational and literary publication, Goulder's deceptively straightforward discussion of Synoptic poetry and Matthaean rhythm has thus raised a whole series of basic questions. Of these, those which have to do with the relationship between Synoptic poetry especially in its gnomic aspect and Old Testament and other Jewish literature will form the substance of a succeeding chapter.

**IV Gnome and Bildwort in the Tradition of J Jeremias**

This may be the place to notice briefly MG Steinhauser's form—
and tradition-critical essay into the *Doppelbildworte* of the Synoptic sayings-material\(^{154}\) an essay which, like Goulder's discussion of ‘rhythms’ and the present study of Synoptic *gnome*, seeks to categorize sayings according to criteria more semantic than syntactic\(^{155}\) and then to interpret such semantic relationships as indices of the development of style in Synoptic oral and/or literary tradition.\(^{156}\) Even more than Goulder's ‘rhythm’,\(^{157}\) Steinhauser's category of *Doppelbildworte*, based upon J Jeremias' definition,\(^{158}\) overlaps too extensively with the set of synoptic *gnomai* to be ignored here.\(^{159}\) With this shared preference for semantic definition of potentially traditional units and consequent abstraction of rather similar samples, however, substantial family resemblance among Jeremias' and Steinhauser's *Doppelbildworte*, Goulder's 'rhythms' and New Testament *gnomai* ends. Steinhauser's basic thesis is that the semantic balance (described in terms of its ‘kognitiv-kohärent’ and ‘emotiv-intentional’ aspects) within each Synoptic Bildwort is causally determinative for the simplicity/complexity of its tradition-history.\(^{160}\) The limitation of the study to *Doppelbildworte*, then, is principally tactical: semantic variety is easier to document and describe in paired connotative sayings (*Doppelbildworte*) and the additional semantic dimension of doubling (*Doppelung*) also makes the crucial leap from (form-critical) variety to (tradition-critical) semantic change more plausible.\(^{161}\)

Apart from providing an occasion for many notable semantic and exegetical insights, the working-out of Steinhauser's project illustrates richly the pit-falls as well as the potential benefits of co-ordinating semantic analysis with tradition-historical study, pit-
falls which an analogous approach to Synoptic **gnome** must conscientiously circumvent.

In the first place, the notion of **Doppelbildwort**, inherited from Jeremias, designates a semantic and literary-critical, let alone traditional-historical, will-o'-the-whisp a class of parabolic or connotative sayings (**Bildwort**) which "je denselben Gedanken in verschiedenen Bildern zum Ausdruck bringen." Thus even after dropping four of Jeremias' twenty-three proposed instances, Steinhauser must acknowledge that two more are not strictly **Doppelbildworte** while a further three (in my view an underestimate) "sich im Überlieferungsprozess auflösen." Among the surviving examples and four more suggested by Steinhauser the integrity of many **Doppelbildworte** as argumentative units and their coherence as a category are open to serious question. Thus, for example, the unity as a **Doppelbildwort** of either Mt 12:33-35 or its correlate Lk 6:43-45 may be seriously doubted in view of the interjection of semantically very similar material in, respectively, (the **Bildwort**) Mt 12:34 and (the much more convincing **Doppelbildwort**) Lk 6:44 and in view of the more positive integrity of the **gnomai** Mt 12:34b /Lk 6:45b and Mt 12:35 /Lk 6:45a. Likewise among sayings which Steinhauser accepts as **Doppelbildworte**, and indeed as authentic sayings of Jesus, there are instances in which the unity of the thought allegedly expressed in a plurality of analogies is doubtful, for example, in Mt 11:17par Lk 7:32 which the Synoptic Jesus seems to interpret in terms of contrasting even contradictory thoughts, or the undoubted **Doppelbildwort** Mt 7:13f behind which the Synoptic tradition-critic,
faced with Lk 13:24, may be forgiven for seeing a tension of thought as well as a duality of imagery. We may well wonder whether the phenomenon of ‘doubling’ itself has the same meaning or the same history in such examples as Mt 7:6, Mk 3:24f, Mt 6:26–30 or Mt 7:13f. Indeed a telling difference between Doppelbildworte and gnomai is the frequency with which the former fail to preserve their allegedly essential characteristics through even the literary tradition of ‘parallel’ Synoptic redactions (eg Lk 12:33 contrast Mt 6:19f; Mk 3:24f contrast Mt 12:25 /Lk 11:17; Mk 4:21–25 contrast Mt, Lk).

Steinhauser is therefore very much making a virtue of necessity when he emphasizes the description of semantic change instead of recognizing more clearly the fundamental incoherence of Jeremias’ Doppelbildworte as a category in Synoptic literature: if Doppelbildworte are not clearly a literary category, we will never know whether they were also a category in pre-Synoptic oral tradition. And the emphasis on chronicling semantic change rather than on definitional refinement brings its own difficulties, especially in conjunction with a Jeremian heritage of tradition-historical positivism. Thus description of semantic change in the transmission of Bildworte is necessarily almost entirely confined to description of specifically literary, redactional changes, ‘die literarische Tätigkeit des Frühchristentums’, only equivocally relevant to the description of non-writing transmissional processes. But Steinhauser makes very explicit pretensions to describing the whole traditional development of his Doppelbildworte. His tradition-historical optimism rests, moreover, not on any particular relationship of the
Doppelbildworte as a category to oral expression, but rather upon a tradition-critical examination of each individual saying with a view to reconstructing its developmental history and hence its "ursprünglichen Wortlaut" and then to assessing its authenticity as a saying of Jesus. We may forego wider criticism of this procedure with the remark that it presupposes knowledge of both the process of tradition and the "Situation Jesu," which in its extent and precision would be difficult to defend. That the approach is somewhat tendentious at least in Steinhauser's hands may be suggested by his surprisingly confident conclusion that seventeen out of nineteen of the Doppelbildworte he investigates originate as such im Munde Jesu. In all, then, even so hasty a glance at Steinhauser's Doppelbildwort underscores the importance of three aspects of the present study of the gnomic sayings: (1) positively, the interest for criticism of sayings material categories which are more semantically than syntactically defined; (2) more negatively, the definition of a sayings-category not only by potentially arbitrary semantic abstraction (eg Bildwort), but also with reference, as specific as possible, to tradition-critically relevant groupings such as those of Hellenistic primary education (eg gnome); (3) and an emphasis on the collective historicity of the gnomic category rather than on the reconstruction/authentication of individual sayings.

The fundamental thematic connection among the otherwise dissimilar New Testament studies of Berger, Crossan, Goulder and Steinhauser is thus that of the positive, especially the semantic characteristics of gnomic "core" structures which are represented flexibly in the formal improvisation of oral tradition and textually
more or less standardised in technical memorisation and writing. Crossan, from whom the idea of 'core' structures is adapted here, avoids, probably wisely, any lengthy discussion of the positive nature of such 'basic structures': his application of the concept to the very general formally undefined category of 'aphorism' requires only the recognition that deliberately traditional composition and transmission of sayings is possible (and probable behind the Synoptics) without commitment to particular syntactical formulations. Application of Crossan's 'core' to the narrower, ancient and rhetorical rather than form-critical category of gnome presses the urgency for supplementary structural definition to complement the broadly functional insights of progymnasmatsists and modern form-critics. This need is reflected in the difficulty of distinguishing any semantic difference between Berger's functional and grammatical categories (relatively oral and literate respectively) of imperative Gnome and indicative Sentenz. Indeed Berger more explicitly than Crossan prefers in principle over any anthropological theory of a priori language-forms a 'kommunicative Gattungstheorie' which coheres with the essential functionalism of ancient Rhetoric (especially among the progymnasmatic educationists) and which doubts the usefulness of universally definable forms '(keine universal nachweisbaren Gattungen)'. Still, taking such warnings to heart, some attempt to deal with the semantic structure of gnome in particular and of Synoptic sayings material does seem to be required if only by the open-endedness of Crossan's 'aphorism' and Berger's Sentenz/Gnome. But the interest, if not the strength, of Goulder's work on gospel poetics is in his attempt to co-ordinate two different
features of structural analysis, the paradoxical and epigrammatic quality of the Synoptic sayings and the rhythmic consistency of, especially but not exclusively, their Q and Matthaean versions. The foregoing discussion has been mainly intended to show that Goulder's project fails because of its author's reluctance to relate differing structural phenomena to quantum-shifts in the balance of orality and literacy in the tradition instead of to successive stages of literary redaction. The complex relationship between 'core' and syntactical structures is thus rather fudged, but nevertheless points to an area of importance where structural questions may cautiously be asked without excessive philosophical and anthropological pretensions, inasmuch as the issue of paradoxical and hyperbolic intensification is related primarily to the structure of gnomic 'core' and only secondarily to particular oral performances, written or memorized versions. That is, if functional continuity of gnome between oral and scribal/literary sensibilities and media is necessary in order to relate the formal variety persistent in the written documents and the pervasiveness of a mood of heightened paradox in the sayings to the antecedent period of exclusively oral Synoptic tradition, it would seem worthwhile to look as well for the structural conditions for such heightening where these are evidently not a simple function of such authorial, performantial features as verbal antithesis.

V Toward a Working Definition of Gnome (P Crépeau)

The most accessible systematic approach to something akin to
gnomic 'core' structures, orally conditioned and circulated like the Synoptic sayings, is in modern attempts to define proverb. Perhaps the strongest continuing influence on modern paroimiological definitions is that of A Jolles, who, in fact, offered no systematic, much less structural definition of proverb, but who strongly criticized descriptions of proverb primarily in relation either to the ambiguous notion of its 'popular' origins or to the proverb's supposed didactic function. Not only is proverb not essentially a statement of educational principle: it is indeed the opposite, a summary of (quite particular) experience, the conclusion to an argument not its premise. These seminal insights, accurate in what they deny, cohere with the judgement of A Taylor, for whom an incommunicable quality tells us that this sentence is a proverb and that one is not, that the best attainable definition of proverb is itself gnomic as in Lord Russell's dictum, 'the wisdom of many and the wit of one.' A more positive, if slightly doctrinaire, essay toward structural definition is that by Greimas, who emphasizes the 'connotative' character of proverbs, that is, the equivocal pertinence of their syntactical dimensions to the meaning of proverbial performances. The definitive structure at work in the proverb is its 'modulation binaire' though this can often express itself as lexical antithesis like that of Goulder's rhythms:

The problems of too rigourously syntactical an approach to
definition and taxonomy are illustrated in a group of articles by G B Milner which seek in sentence structure criteria for identifying otherwise unrecognized proverbs. For this more limited purpose, Milner's "quadripartite structure" is of more use than as a definition of the gnomic category as a whole or for the basis of a systematic taxonomy. For the former, Milner himself admits that

dans certains cas, la mention d'un seul quadrant, tel que "rendre à Cesar" ..., suffit même à évoquer les trois autres.\textsuperscript{189}

Pretensions to an adequate taxonomy are even more fragile as they depend upon the possibility of assigning an almost arithmetic "positive" or "negative" value to each "quadrant" in isolation from its relationships to the other terms. This procedure, and Milner's discussion generally, suffer, even more than Goulder's definition and taxonomy of "rhythm", from an over-commitment to the "counting-up" of strictly lexical elements, an over-commitment which in this case 1) excludes proverbial/gnomic forms which are not obviously quadripartite, 2) provides by simplistic addition of quadrant "values" a taxonomy of sub-categories which in no way corresponds to differences in actual function or usage, 3) ignores the distinctive ambiguity of a great many proverbs/gnomai to which syntactically identical performances can attach diametrically different values\textsuperscript{190} 4) depends upon the isolation of structural elements from the relationships which often make them into a coherent structure\textsuperscript{191} and 5) relies upon structures which, visible primarily to the literate eye, obscure the remarkable continuity of proverb/gnome across the complex boundaries of orality and literacy. Especially the first of...
these objections to Milner's proposal is reinforced by O Blehr's demonstration\textsuperscript{192} that 'wellerisms', orally traditional sayings which include an expressed context and which are thus structurally close to *chriai* and apophthegmata, 'and other metaphorical proverbs belong to the same cognitive category and have the same functions.'\textsuperscript{193} Blehr also suggests that specifically metaphorical proverbs (including most wellerisms) are functionally related to the need for speakers to minimize the 'social cost' of communicating value-judgements in highly-charged situations.\textsuperscript{194} A Dundes opposes Milner's system on similar grounds, pointing to the structural continuity between proverbs and riddles,\textsuperscript{195} so that some sayings can be used in either sense.\textsuperscript{196} Whereas wellerisms are proverbial sayings which typically resist analysis on Milner's criterion of quadripartite structure, riddles are often four-part, but are necessarily impatient of value-analysis: even where 'positive' and 'negative' values can be assigned to the quadrants of a riddle the assignment sheds little light on the saying's overall meaning (see eg the riddles of Judges 14:14, 18). Instead Dundes advocates a return to a binary structure of topic and comment and a taxonomy based on their relationship in individual formulations: the two defining elements of such a binary structure need not appear in conjunction on the syntactical level and, in the other direction, syntactical expansion can easily occur without modifying the essential structures so as, for example, to give the frequent appearance of (Milner's) quadripartite plan. As a correction, then, of Milner's mechanically syntactical definition of proverb structure, Dundes' description succeeds; it lacks, however, the advantages of Milner's system: especially for transfer to an
historically oriented discussion of Synoptic gnome, it is Milner's criteria not Dundes' (Goulder's not Berger's!) which can provide an exclusive definition, a basis other than intuition for classifying some sayings as proverbial or gnomic and others not.

A much nearer approach to a generally accurate definition precise enough to become the basis for the selection of proverbs/gnomai from amongst other sayings is made by P Crépeau, an approach which succeeds by balancing structural and functional, relational, theoretical and pragmatic considerations and by seeking a definition which will be fully descriptive of a large, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and predominantly oral sample. Among structural determinants of proverb - or, we may add, of gnome - brevity is the least useful, a function of other more fundamental patterns among which formal independence within spoken (nb) contexts, the sentence's 'statut particulier dans la chaîne parlée', is evident:

That is, the relationship of proverb/gnome to its discursive framework is neither deductive nor inductive (still less didactic), but associative, eg distinguished from its surroundings as well as joined to them by an introductory formula. Crépeau thus echoes both Greimas' insistence that all proverb is essentially connotative and T Todorov's insistence on the importance of the gnomic performance, the definitive event of proverb-articulation. While criticising Milner, on the other hand, for failing to take
account of these associative structures in proverbial language and for arbitrary assignment of a single "value" to each "quadrant". Crepeau seizes the basic insight of Milner's quadripartite analytical scheme as an implicit identification in proverb of the essential four-fold structure of any analogy (A:B::C:D). This analogical structure, for Crepeau basic to all proverbs, is much more subtly related to the syntactical elements of proverb-performance than are Goulder's "rhythms" or Milner's "values". In the first place, the "key" to the analogy, however explicitly expressed by the proverb's syntax is a relationship of corresponding, opposing or quite contrary proportions to one another and therefore cannot be identified with any (or even the sum) of the terms of proportionality, Milner's quadrants; even where all four elements of analogy are also explicit elements in quadripartite syntax, the key to their inter-relationship need not be a lexical or syntactical item. Similarly, neither rhythm nor metaphor is essential to proverb: un-rhythmic examples can be given which nonetheless forcefully express their analogical structure, while the arbitrary, binary relation posited in metaphor is not quite the same as the associative process implied in analogy, though many, even most, proverbs employ metaphorical figures. Proverbial analogy may thus be between relations constituted explicitly or implicitly, metaphorically or in metonymy synecdoche, but the primary structure of proverbial proportionality, of the opposition of relatively similar or contrary associations, is not the same as the structures of the relations themselves.
L'analogie ne constitue donc pas une rassemblance imparfaite entre des objects. Elle pose un égalité de rapports entre des objects divers, dissemblables, opposés ... L'analogie se fonde sur l'opposition de contrarité ou sur l'opposition relative.

In particular this description of the analogical structure of proverb/gnome may offer a structural insight into the Synoptic phenomenon of 'intensification' which seems inexplicable only with reference to paradox, ambiguity, metaphor, rhythm or even degrees of implicit/explicitness, though these are presumably contributory factors. The structurally more profound possibility remains of intensifying gnomic and proverbial mood by opposing relations the proportionality of which is not suspected or cannot easily be accepted by the hearer.

The best illustration may be to essay, in anticipation of a fuller discussion, a structured analysis of a notorious example, the saying, ‘Leave the dead to bury their dead’ (Lk 9:60; Mk 8:22). Syntactically there is a fairly clear quadripartite structure, (A) ‘their dead’, (B) ‘the dead’ in an extended sense, (C) the act of burial in particular and (D) observant piety in general, which may be projected onto Crépeau's analogical model thus:

\[
\frac{A}{B} : \frac{C}{D}
\]

Put this way, the saying's most striking characteristic is the incommensurability of the two supposedly proportionate 'ratios'. The second half instantiates the relationship of Torah-observance in what may well have been its most universally recognizable and acceptable
aspects; instead of providing an epitome or summary, the strongest possible (and actual) case for Torah-observance is cited. Indeed, if a narrative (and substantially historical) framework for the saying were lacking, the relation C:D would reliably guide conjecture. On the other side, by contrast, nothing is quite as clear: first, the 'denominator' (B) is defined only by metaphorical relationship with its co-ordinate (D). The repetition of 'dead' brings rich and sobering (and confrontational) overtones to the sentence, but its main effect is to suggest that the non-literary 'dead' (B) are a disconcertingly ill-defined though very real group of people. Parenthetically then, the metaphor does seem to be one source of 'intensification' here, but it is not so intrinsically but because of its place in the analogical structure: neither the sentence as a whole nor either of the two groups designated 'dead' is essentially metaphorical. The function of the metaphor is apparently to leave one side of our analogy alarmingly open-ended. The other term of the first hemistich (A) also seems calculated to increase alarm. Where a call to discipleship generally, to the pursuit of wisdom or the study of Torah, say, might have salvaged the verse as an uncontroversial commonplace, we find instead the Lucan oblique implication and the Matthaean emphatic assertion of a narrowly personal allegiance. Just as C:D expresses no abstract relation but rather evokes a particular, though common, case, so also A:B, except that in the relation of discipleship to Jesus no specific content (unless it be 'leaving') is named to ground it in intelligible cases: A is not even metaphorically co-ordinate with C.

On the whole, then, Mt 8:22 par bears an equivocal relation to
Crepeau's model of analogical structure. On one hand, this sort of analysis suggests a structural basis for the 'double impact' of the saying: the logion is an analogy between two flagrantly disproportionate relations, (1) the apparently negative relation between discipleship to Jesus and the undefined mass of the spiritually defunct against (2) the apparently positive relation between filial Torah-piety and the urgent demands of the physically dead. That the imbalance of the gnome clearly favours the open-ended relation defined only by discipleship to Jesus over the just claims of religious order is as emphatically a comment on the latter as it is a jealous demand for the former. On the other hand, the very fact of so striking a disproportion is without parallel in Crepeau's examples; this particular Synoptic example (admittedly the extreme case) presents itself as an analogy without a 'key', unless it be the metaphoric extension of 'dead' to describe the well-nigh universal situation over against which discipleship to Jesus is set. This need not, however, be a failing of Crepeau's model; rather should it be taken in evidence for the intensification of Jesus' saying beyond what can seriously be called the proverbial. Set against Crepeau's scheme, Mt 8:22 par. shows the analogical structure of a proverb distorted by the radical re-orientation of one of its elements to produce a locution which is sui generis, rather a telling parody of proverb than a proverb itself. Clearly, this example is unusual even among Synoptic gnomai, but it does epitomize the possibilities of deep intensification of proverbial analogy. In this remarkable case such intensity is achieved by, in the first place, the selection of symbols of unusual connotative power, the symbols of basic social and
covenantal loyalty over against the symbols of ultimate marginality.\textsuperscript{212} This symbolic tension is, moreover, heightened by paradoxical association of conventional antinomies as the "dead"\textsuperscript{213} and by the essential disproportion of our analogy:\textsuperscript{214} In analogy ... one half of the comparison is our ultimate concern,\textsuperscript{215} and in this case particularly the relationship of discipleship and the "dead" is given an absolute priority over the strongest relation of religious duty to the kindred dead, an asymmetry which is signaled not only by the metaphorical indefiniteness of the "dead" but also in Luke by the nearly elliptical\textsuperscript{216} and in Matthew technically amplified introductory element. This unusual intensity of at least some Synoptic gnomai, which differentiates them from ordinary proverbs, should not, however, be allowed to distract from the essential point that analogy is central to structural definition of gnomai as well as of most proverbs.

Crépeau himself refers to "intensity" in a quite different sense as part of his discussion of the normative function of proverb, his third and final defining characteristic of the category. Normative function (normativity) is, with analogy and formal separability, essential to Crépeau's definition of proverb: the same three features characterize almost all of the progymnasmatis and rhetoricians' examples of gnomai and will be adopted here as criteria for identification of Synoptic gnomai. The paroimiologist's recognition that proverb cannot be adequately defined on purely structural criteria but must be related broadly to its rhetorical and social (and therefore historical) functions is a necessary point of contact for the application of his definition to the problems of Synoptic
A concept of normativity like that offered by Crépeau is a necessity for any sociological or form-critical appropriation of the sayings of Jesus, but must nevertheless be qualified by the admission, however expressed, that 'die Jesusbewegung ist durch eine gewisse "UngrundsHtzlichkeit" characterisiert.' Crépeau's theory, by insisting on the intimate but variable connection between normative function and analogical structure, opens the possibility of giving systematic foundations and nuance to sociological studies very largely based upon study of Synoptic gnomai, unrecognized as such. Thus, to return to Mt 8:22 par., the manipulation of proverbial structure has not only changed the abstract significance of the saying but has also effected a functional narrowing of its 'normativity,' the saying has become specifically a word of Jesus, an invitation to close discipleship, and one set challengingly against the most attractive and universally binding of social and Torah-norms. In other words, the author of this example has used the poetised language of meta-historical and analogical gnome to increase rather than to decrease 'social cost,' a direction of gnomic control unforeseen in Blehr's work on the use of wellerisms and other metaphorical proverbs.

From the point of view of 'normativity,' our example sets a special puzzle for Crépeau's suggested classification of proverbial norms on complementary criteria of intensity (imperative, directive, indicative) and range (universal, specific, optional). Clearly this gnome is imperatival, which goes a very little way toward accounting for its peculiarities; its normative range is more difficult to determine. The first element, 'Follow me and let ...' (A), is highly 'specific,' especially if 'follow' is a technical term,
while the second, the metaphorical "dead" (8) is "optional" or rather, we might say, "equivocal" allowing even of a universalizing interpretation. In the other arm of the saying, the "universal" and the "specific" are implicated in one another; the particular case and the general principle are inseparable. The expression as a whole must be judged to have been specific to the unequivocal call of a particular individual and yet disturbingly universal undertones linger in the willingness of the speaker to enunciate his call as a bluntly specific challenge to a universally imperative legal and social norm. Thus the *gnome* Mt 8:22 par. is clearly not a proverb in the informal sense of a generalized folk-norm even granting the paroimiologists' recognition that "il faut éliminer de la definition du proverbe l'épithète populaire." The sharp individuality of this particular analogical saying argues strongly the pertinence of Crépeau's structural and functional insights to the "traditional saying" understood as broadly as possible in a sense congruent with the rhetorical and progynasmatic *gnome* inasmuch as it expects the complex interaction of traditional with authorial and circumstantial influences on analogical expression. As for "proverb" in sensu strictiore, it may be that Aristotle is right to say that *paroimiai* are metaphors about which little else can be said or that they are *gnomai* of which the extreme fixity of form is such that no performantial variation is possible (without comic effect in spite of wide social and historical dissemination. Of these there are few, if any, in the Synoptic literature, though with growing textual canonicity some gospel *gnomai* did acquire virtual or potential proverbiality.
The value of Crépeau's study for the present investigation is therefore the provision of a structural vocabulary which is nevertheless consciously open to the more functional dimension of gnomic language in which the historian of the Synoptic materials is mainly interested. In particular, his criteria of 1) formal autonomy within the structures of surrounding discourse, 2) analogical structure ('De structure et non de forme analogique') and 3) variably normative function are necessary for the reliable identification of proverbs/gnomai in Synoptic texts. They are also useful as an analytical control by which to measure the peculiarities of the units selected, especially their general but not universal mood of intensification. In this double task, a certain circularity of interpretive logic will have to be consciously accepted: the same criteria, by which a representative sample of gnomai is selected, will provide the standards for comparing individual examples in the hope that, inter alia, further insight may be gained into the general significance and defining characteristics of the whole category. Still, the main purpose of structural analysis, as indeed of rhetorical classification, will be to provide a more adequate formal and exegetical basis for a description of the social functions of gnomai in the tradition of Jesus' words especially with attention to nuancing their sometimes odd normative aspect and analogical intensity. Finally, understanding gnome in terms of analogical structure will allow us to speak more clearly of such continuities as those between gnome and parable and between gnome and Law in Synoptic literature and in the rhetoric of Jesus.
Thus far our argument has been mainly constructive, devoted essentially to criticizing and re-building conceptual and theoretical models of early Christian oral tradition generally and of the special economy of the so-called 'Wisdom-sayings' in particular. Apart from the theoretical inadequacies of earlier form-critical models of oral transmission and development is the recognition that many of the Synoptic 'Wisdom-sayings' are more appropriately to be described in terms of the Hellenistic Rhetorical category of gnome. The importance of this redesignation is that the rhetoricians' category is not simply a form-critical Gattung, but rather a more broadly functional structure, an educational and compositional technique available alike for oral and written expression. Given the suitability of such a stylistic technique for oral tradition and its presence in all strata of the Synoptic literature, the possibility becomes a quite exceptional probability of specific continuity among oral expression and tradition, written literature and (possible) scribal, mnemotechnical tradition within a general sociological continuity of the early Jesus-movement. In short, the widely influential definitions and examples of the rhetoricians and their progymnasmatic popularisers give us an extraordinary measure of control over one of the Gospels' basic rhetorical reflexes. That gnome is in this respect a special historical case among Synoptic direct speech types, confirms
suspicions that classical form-criticism greatly overemphasized the continuity of forms and developmental processes (laws) between differing modes of tradition, although the differentiation adopted here between oral, scribal/mnemonic and literary techniques and mentalities is not so absolute as that proposed by some enthusiasts of oral hermeneutics. On the other hand, the failure of traditional methods to grasp more firmly the historical relevance of gnome in Jesus-tradition suggests the need for an inquiry into the structure and functions of so apparently subliminal a form. The result, once again mainly theoretical, is that while gnome can by no means be restricted to a single, social Sitz im Leben, its rhetorical function seems to be bound up in a characteristically analogical normativity. It remains now to test the explanatory power of practical insights into the ubiquity of gnome in Hellenistic oral and written culture and of these theoretical insights into the complex relationships between modes of oral tradition and literature and of poetic/rhetorical texture not effectively noticed by magisterial form-criticism. In particular it will be necessary to assess, however summarily, the orality and normativity of gnomic and comparable forms within Jewish literatures germane to the New Testament. Especially interesting will be literatures belonging to a tradition, that is, for which there is evidence of development over time so that questions may be asked not only about implicit, compositional sensibility, but also about actual transmission.

The most obvious field of comparison for New Testament gnome is in the proverb-literature of the Old Testament and the Ancient Near East. The comparison is made problematic, however, by the nature of
the literature itself and by the kinds of critical approach which have been made to it. Thus, in the first place, the Wisdom collections, like the Hellenistic gnomologies, recall the direct speech of primary rhetoric in their sub-units. They do so, however, without the important supplements of contemporary theoretical reflection like that provided by Greek rhetoricians and progymnasmaticst and of an extensive performance-literature, whether discursive or apophthegmatic: Old Testament narrative and prophecy have a surprisingly narrow range of gnomic performances to offer. More important perhaps, because of its prejudicial influence on studies of New Testament 'Wisdom-sayings', has been the modern critical investigation of the Hebrew and related sapiential collections, concerned mainly with fixing (socially and chronologically) the origins and syntactic forms of literary compositions the ethos and style of which can seem ill-matched with the rest of Israelite literature. A 'wisdom literature seems to engender a particular failure of method rather more often than other texts. This failure, all too easily duplicated in relation to New Testament 'Wisdom', can be illustrated by the two controlling distinctions in Old Testament Wisdom studies: between Kunstspruch and Volkssprichwort and between Mahnung and Aussage (sometimes, as in Bultmann's triage, together with Frage).

I Kunstspruch and Volkssprichwort (O Eissfeldt)

The former of these distinctions is particularly misleading: Volk and Kunst are vague notions at best; where they are co-ordinated in a single distinction, it becomes unclear what order of difference is
intended. Attempts to identify on formal criteria a corpus of Volkssprichworte are best represented by O Eissfeldt's study of Old Testament mashal. From a very short list of sayings explicitly identified in their biblical contexts as meshalim (Ex 12:22; 18:2=Jer 31:29; ISam 10:12=19:24; 24:14; Ez 16:44 (not mentioned by Eissfeldt), to which might be added a few sayings with apparently formulaic introductions (eg Gn 10:9; II Sam 5:8 fin; 20:8), including a selection of (suspiciously unproverbial) prophetic Disputationsworte (Is 40:27; Zeph 1:2; Ez 9:9; 18:25, 29; 33:10, 17, 20; 37:11, to which add Is 5:19; Jer 5:12 fin and Ez 8:12), the riddles of the Samson cycle (Jdg 14:14, 18) and, less confidently, a range of proverbial-sounding units (eg Jdg 8:2, 21; Jer 8:20; 12:13; 51:48 fin (cf Hab 2:13); Is 22:13; 37:3; ISam 16:7; IKg 20:11; with Job 2:4; Ez 11:3b; Hos 4:11b and 14b not mentioned by Eissfeldt), the optimistic critic may hope to abstract formal criteria for distinguishing elements of folklore hidden among more "artful" units in the literary Wisdom-collections.

Eissfeldt's basic position, that the sententious meshalim and units which resemble them represent an earlier, original stratum of pre-poetic Wisdom or that a partly recognizable nucleus of Hebrew proverbs was transcribed into Old Testament literature from folklore, has not been generally accepted; the original character of his folkloric sayings over against the other units of the Wisdom literature remains an unprovable though persistent supposition. Formal resemblance of a Wisdom unit to folk-proverbs simply cannot prove its actual origin in popular, presumably oral usage. The extent
of Eissfeldt's failure has, however, been considerably exaggerated by his critics (notably H-J Hermisson): if the distinction between folk and art was misleading, the practical distinction between sayings-performances specifically identified as such and the mass of literary Wisdom 'sayings' remains important. Certainly Eissfeldt's essential insight, as distinct from his evolutionary conclusions, has survived criticism. The few positively identifiable mashal-sayings outwith the collection-literature, that is, in literary contexts which to a greater extent seek to evoke the conditions of direct speech, do show a remarkable but poetically limited formal and thematic similarity to the collection-proverbs. The impossibility of defining an 'original' sayings-form on the basis of such slim and itself literary evidence for the use of non-writing proverbs is especially striking in view of the massive scale and long tradition of the Wisdom literature; combined with formal and thematic tensions within the Wisdom-collections proper, Old Testament hints of oral proverb-performance are just sufficient to suggest a differentiation not so much of date or social origin (at least in literary performance Eissfeldt's most convincing Volkssprichworte seem attracted to courtly/diplomatic contexts though one may imagine less glamorous applications) as of oral versus scribal sensibility. Indeed, as a 'rather more formalized version' of the already 'poetized speech' favoured by oral memory and plausibly recreated in the sayings-performances of Old Testament narrative the biblical Wisdom-collection may usefully be represented as specific and monumental responses to the possibilities and limitations of scribal craft-literacy.
Zeigt schon das Volkssprichwort eine Tendenz zur sprachlichen Veredelung, denn es bewegt sich gern in einer gehobenen Sprache, so hebt sich davon der den Schulen entstammende Kunstspruch durch eine noch wesentlich stärkere sprachliche und inhaltliche Kultivierung ab. Man spricht dann besser von einer Spruchpoesie.

Thus the fact that Eissfeldt's most probable extra-sapiential Volkssprichwörter (with the partial exception of ISam 24: (13), 14) are 'single-line' units cannot prove 'that the "one-line" saying is the evolutionary precursor of the "two-limbed" wisdom-saying,' but such relatively oral sayings-performances may throw light on the somewhat more literary (scribal) poetics of our various Hebrew Wisdom and liturgical texts. Specifically, within the discussion of the relative importance of stress-metre and parallelism to the essence of Hebrew poetry, the tendency of conversational rhetoric (to which Eissfeldt's Volkssprichwörter belong even where they are incorporated into oracular poems) toward non-metrical or, rather, rhythmically self-contained monostichs suggests that metre and parallelism be placed along a scale of 'poetized speech' from the strict verbal economy of the oral monostich through the mnemotechnical advantages of metrification and formulaic composition to the explicit symmetry of scribal parallelism. Not that any of monostich, metre and parallelism is completely absent from any point on the continuum between oral and scribal textuality: rather, structuring factors like rhythm, parallelism and extension into polystich verse are implicit in the architecture of the most professedly oral one-line sayings. That is, almost all of the few identifiable Old Testament Volkssprichwörter can most conveniently be analysed on a structural model of analogical symmetry/asymmetry like that proposed above for New Testament...
gnome: the various structural developments identified as basic in competing contemporary analyses of Hebrew poesy, stress-metre, formulaic word-pairs, grammatical line-forms would then all be recognisable as only relatively different systems for extending the play of symmetry/asymmetry over larger and more complex textual units, an essential continuity which, in fact, WGE Watson's liminal note on 'symmetry, asymmetry and parallelism' seems already to have discerned. Less explicitly, JL Kugel's recognition that the distinction between 'prose' and 'poetry' in the Old Testament is never absolute, least of all in relation to 'parallelism', highlights the structural interest of Eissfeldt's Sprichwörter as basically 'prose' units which by their connotative compression nevertheless imply the basic structures of polystich poetry. Such insights have no necessary bearing on the priority of one form over others, but they do seem to fit with ease the anticipations of a theoretical model in which poetic/rhetorical sensibilities are examined in relation to the needs, possibilities and limits of a gradation of compositional and transmissional techniques from the (strongly) oral through the mnemotechnical to the craft-literate or scribal. The relative predominance of individual poetic techniques in particular documents may thus be used to indicate differences, not of date, but of compositional or transmissional mode, so that, ceteris paribus, heavy use in a text of formulaic word-pairs (eg Ps 54) very probably indicates strong influence of oral improvisational techniques, while dependence of poetic structure mainly upon stress-metre -- without precluding less intensive use of word-pairs -- as in Mic 3:9-12 would be evidence for more memorizational, though still significantly 'oral' realisation. By contrast, repeated use of enjambment would
seem to be an index of the relative literacy of scribal compositions (eg Ps 119:40).

The relevance of the foregoing timorous excursion into a neighbouring field is mainly in the implication that Old Testament studies, usually the source for refinements in New Testament oral theory, are at most - in recent discussion of Hebrew poetics - on the verge of describing the "Wisdom-saying" in terms of a graduated continuum between orality and craft-literacy in social and chronological equilibrium. Study of the peculiar situation of Jesus' movement and its literature at a busy crossroads of differently oral and literate cultures may yield in fact strategies for reformulating and illuminating 'some of the problems of Hebrew metrics which Bishop Robert Lowth left unsolved, for example, that of whether or not the popular proverb made use of parallelismus membrorum. Secondly, though, it is useful to stress the correspondence of oral-literate differentiation among Old Testament Wisdom-sayings to similar treatment of New Testament sayings-tradition, with the corollary that gnomai attributed to Jesus are stylistically most closely related to the sayings selected by Eissfeldt and more recently taken up by C Fontaine: where parallelism, line forms, accentual and semantic patterning have been applied at every level of Wisdom literature to produce the extended incantatory effect of versification, the same means are used in Eissfeldt's sayings and the Synoptic logia (as distinct from simply Matthaean or Lucan poetic styles) to the different end of effecting closure and emphasis in the individual spoken word. That said, we may recall some essential differences of
the Jesuan gnomai from Old Testament traditional sayings, especially the short duration and personal attribution of the tradition and -- perhaps more decisively -- the impact of (Hellenistic) literacy to pre-empt the stereotyping tendency of scribal literacy or mnemotechnical tradition (pace Gerhardsson et al.46)

II Aussage and Mahnwort (W Richter and D Zeller)

The second distinction which is thematic for studies of Old Testament proverb materials, between Aussage and Mahnung/Mahnwort, has had a more direct influence on research into the language of the Synoptics and of the historical Jesus. Indeed, the classification of Wisdom-sayings into Aussagen, Fordeir and Fragen provides a convenient framework for Bultmann’s discussion of the sayings of Jesus,47 wenn man nur aus der Unterscheidung keine Trennung macht.48 The simpler two-fold division (for most purposes questions may be included with Aussagen as essentially rhetorical49) has become sufficiently standard in Old Testament criticism to be assumed almost without comment.50 This inner division of the Grundgattung of the Wisdom collections, however descriptive, nevertheless poses serious problems for historical investigation of biblical sayings as such. H-J Hermission, for example, extrapolating from A Jolles’ recognition that proverbs are not primarily didactic, excludes Mahnworte a priori from consideration as possible Volkssprichwörter.51

Soberer attempts to co-ordinate the two formal types with differing Sitze im Leben and histories in the Wisdom literature begin, however, from the twin observations (1) that particular Mahnworte seem
sometimes to depend logically upon particular Aussagen (eg Prv 22:14a upon 23:27; 13:9b upon 24:20; further, according to Zeller, 20:66 upon 22:27 and 21:17 upon 23:31\textsuperscript{52}) and (2) that the ratio of Aussagen to Mahnworte varies greatly among and within the Wisdom books.\textsuperscript{53} The initially obvious explanation for such a close but apparently dynamic relationship was evolutionary: just as Eissfeldt understood the relation between Volkssprichwörter and Kunstsprüche, so Gressmann, Hempel, Zimmerli et al. deduced the gattungsgeächichtliche priority of the Aussage from its preponderance in early collections.\textsuperscript{54} Particularly as it cohered so well with Eissfeldt's "folkloric" criterion for the relative dating of Wisdom-collections, the distinction between Aussagen and Mahnworte became standard for Old Testament form-criticism - with complicated results.\textsuperscript{55} Unfortunately, even apart from the problems of relative dating of sub-collections in Wisdom books, the gradual coming of Mahnworte into Wisdom literary fashion is not evidence of the late or foreign origin of the jussive style unless the 'genuine Form des eigentlichen Sprichwortes'\textsuperscript{56} is already known on other grounds. Indeed comparative study in relation to other Ancient Near Eastern literatures makes it overwhelmingly probable that the Mahnwort in Israelite literary culture evolved under the very early influence of an international literary "instructional genre."\textsuperscript{57} But the relationship between this literary history and the forms of oral tradition remains unclear.

For the question of origins, the simple fact of the admixture everywhere of the two modes may thus be more important than fluctuations of their balance from one collection to another. In this direction, W Richter has sought to break the form-critical isolation
of the Mahnwort-form as a possibly foreign Untergattung of the literary proverb genre, by specifying its peculiar form and content so as to relate Mahnwort not only to its Wisdom-literary context but also much more generally to the whole range of Israelite literature and everyday rhetoric. Richter thus seeks first to define the classical form of what he prefers to call Mahnspruch (Admonition) as it is exemplified above all in Prv 22:17-24:22 and then secondly to relate especially its grammatical/syntactical features to Hebrew speech-forms as they can be reconstructed from the Old Testament rather than to Egyptian influence. Curiously, a degree of Egyptian influence is recognized on the level of the "content", as against the "form", of the Vetitiv-Form which is determined mainly by the Sitz im Leben which it shares with legal and prophetic prohibitions. He therefore rejects E Gerstenberger's too exclusive identification of 'weisheitlichen Mahn- und Warnwort' with the forms of tribal ethics as the origin (sic) of biblical apodeictic. For Richter the forms and content of both prohibitive and jussive sayings were synthesized in school-situations, broadly understood, so that even imperatival prohibitions are not to be classed as "law" in anything like the strong sense of more narrowly cultic commandments.

The comparative interest for the present study of New Testament gnome of Richter's attempt to have his Admonition (Mahnspruch) both ways, popular and scholastic, will be clear even from so brief a summary: Richter has tried to reconcile literary-critical clarity of definition with a recognition of the essential formal continuity of Admonition and Wisdom-sayings generally with the wider possibilities
of spoken rhetoric. The ultimate incoherence of defining such a specifically literary sayings—Gattung and then seeking its extraliterary origin is, I suspect, behind Richter’s resort to deliberately different accounts of the ‘content’ of Admonition, determined like that of more explicit Prohibitive by school-activity and of the ‘form’ which stems ‘aus dem alltäglichen Brauch der Volkssprache.’

This alienation of ‘form’ from ‘content’ within a single Gattung is all the more problematic in view of Richter’s recognition of the close functional relationship between jussive (Mahnspruch) and imperatival prohibitions. Thus Hermisson rightly points out that the origins of ‘form’ in a grammatical-syntactical sense are almost tautologically to be found in everyday language:

Fragt man in diesem Sinn nach der Herkunft der grammatischen Form des Mahnspruchs, nämlich in der Abfolge von Vetitiv und Begründungssatz, so wird man mit einiger Notwendigkeit zu dem Ergebnis Richters kommen.

Beyond this though, AJ Bjorndalen has shown that Richter’s very definition of the elements of the Admonition-form—a ‘Warnung oder Mahnung,’ usually with a jussive verb, occasionally with an imperative (‘besonders in Aufmerkruf’) or even a ‘heisende(n) Präsens,’ joined to a ‘Motivierung,’ whether introduced by KI or occasionally PN or simply in asyndeton— involves not strictly formal but also functional (Warnung, Mahnung, Motivierung) and badly semantic indices (heisendes Präsens, Aufmerkruf, Asyndese.)

According to Bjorndalen, Richter’s definition lacks a description of the deictic peculiarity of the admonitory saying as saying, i.e. again a semantic characteristic.
At any rate, Richter has succeeded in describing the sapiential Admonition as a literary sub-genre of the Wisdom-aphorism (Spruch) on grammatical and syntactical grounds and even, if Bjorndalen's coda be accepted, in terms of a difference in something like our category of normativity. Thus Richter, with others, can recognize the close relationship of Admonitions (Mahnsprüche) not only to the Aussagen but also to cultic and prophetic Gebote and Prohibitive which share mutatis mutandis the normative rhetorical function. Richter's definition fails, however, to throw decisive light on the development, ie the historical relationship, of his literary form from either of its alleged 'roots' (1) in everyday speech-forms or (2) - with prohibitive forms - in the particular needs of school activity. In this respect W Mc Kan e's refusal, against Richter and Gerstenberger, to see the Instruction-genre (Lehrrede) as other than an essentially literary formed development is wholly justified: there is no privileged continuity between the Admonition and orality.

All this becomes more problematic when Richter's definition is applied to the gospel sayings-materials and to the rhetoric of Jesus, as it is by D Zeller. Zeller's adaptation slightly refines the distinction from legal and prophetic imperatives and eliminates specifically Hebrew definitional elements:

Das Charakteristikum des Mahnspruchs ist ein verbales Element, dessen volitiver Modus anzeigt, dass fremdes Tunherbeigeführt werden soll. Es wendet sich in dem Spr durchgehend an die 2.Sg. Der Mahnsatz ist fast nie ohne eine Begründung, deren Stellung grundsätzlich frei ist.

While Richter was interested in the needs of everyday expression only
as one necessary (authentically Israelite) Wurzel of Admonition (Mahnspruch), Zeller, in order to speak of die Mahnsprüche in der Verkündigung Jesu, must show more than the continuing popularity of a specifically literaryGattung and its general connection with everyday idiom: he must show that the literary form has its characteristic place in oral tradition and in the conversation of Jesus. This can only be done by emphasizing, as indeed Zeller does, the continuity of Mahnworte with Sprüche/Sprichworte generally so that his catalogue of characteristics common to both Aussagen and Mahnworte (formal independence, paratactic isolation, poetized, often metaphoric or symmetrical style, etc) has for some time been "wohl innerhalb der exegetischen Literatur die beste Beschreibung dieser beiden Logiensorten." The relationship between Aussage and Mahnwort is therefore above all of shared sprachliche Resistenz. This is, however, complicated by Richter's definition of Mahnspruch as an essentially double form consisting of a Mahnung and a Begründung, very often in an Aussage of which the 'logische Priorität' may easily be asserted and which is indeed sometimes available in independent literary performances. In terms of our earlier discussions, then, Admonition (Mahnspruch) is represented as a variational alternative to direct statement (Aussage) in which the normative function is made syntactically explicit in the Mahnung-address.

Zeller quite rightly insists, however, that such performantial variation towards Mahnwort and literary aesthetic tendency towards more articulated Wisdom-forms generally make no merely accidental difference to the meaning of Sprüche. Rather, in terms of Crépeau's
model, the explicit address to a still generalized second person singular marks a significant increase in normative 'intensity' so that a norm which in Aussage could be construed as 'indicative' or 'directive' becomes 'imperative'. The 'paradigmatische Funktion des Sprichworts' is not surrendered, but 'eine auf den angeredeten zugehende Bewegung' brings a decisively coercive authority to bear:

This difference (in degree rather than in kind) of normativity between Aussage and Mahnspruch is the justification for Zeller's selection of the latter for study in relation to the rhetoric of Jesus:

Apart from the over-concentration of Beardslee and Perrin on Aussage-forms, Zeller thus holds that the directness of the Mahnsprüche makes them a more suitable focus for his historical investigation of the Synoptic deposit than their sister-form. Against this assumption, however, two considerations militate.

Firstly, the particular directness of address in Admonition (Mahnsprüche) does not have any necessary or even probable historical relevance. On the contrary, the widely differing frequency of
Admonitions in written Wisdom-collections suggests that, whatever its status in oral performantial variation, Admonition is a largely aesthetic feature of developing literary/poetic styles, as indeed a series of more broadly comparative studies of Instruction-literature has emphasized. If any sub-category of Sprüche (or gnomai) has a special claim to historical relevance it should be those sayings which show an unusual directness, not of rhetorical address, but of topicality as where sapiential and cultic or prophetic norms impinge on one another (in the Old Testament cp eg the prohibition II Sam 5:8 with Lv 21:18; Prv 14:31, 17:5 with Lv 19:14; 17:15, 18:5 with Ex 23:7, etc and in Jesus' tradition see Mt 8:22 parr; Mk 6:4 parr, etc). That is, normative directness in the sense of, at least potential, casuistic relevance may well offer a possibility of historical control; but this has little to do with the grammatical directness of second person singular which so largely defines the Admonition.

Secondly, the Admonition (Mahnspruch) as defined by Richter and Zeller does not simply represent an alternative jussive or imperative performance pattern to the Aussage: rather, the former is an essentially double form, composed typically of a Mahnung and an Aussage, and therefore not formally co-ordinate with Aussage as a sub-genre of the Spruch. Thus, among Eissfeldt's forty-one extra-sapiential Sprichworte, four are, or contain a Mahnung (ie a jussive or imperative sentence) of which only one (Isa 22:13) is complemented by a Begründung and none is addressed in the second person singular. The point is that Admonition-form of Prv 10-29 is a compound form capable of analysis into parts of which at least the Begründung has
its own 'sprachliche Resistenz' and, perhaps, an independent claim to represent tradition. The Admonition, as we have seen, is defined by Richter and Zeller primarily in terms of grammatical and syntactic patterns with, however, a strong semantic aspect implicitly retained to allow projection of the 'klassische Form' of Prv 10-29 onto everyday speech. With Richter this is to show the authentically Israelite character of the Admonition (Mahnspruch) and with Zeller to allow formal classification of the sayings of the rabbinic Fathers and Jesus to show the latter, at least, as affecting recognizably Wisdom-traditional forms of speech. Zeller thus admits as a problem the overwhelmingly plural usage of those Mahnworte most likely to reflect primary rhetoric, i.e., those of the prophets the Synoptics and Abot. That the plural form represents in these cases the specificity of address to definite groups of disciples is not a sufficient solution to the problem of justifying concentrated recourse to Richter's Mahnspruch when the Synoptics (and Abot) show a variety of Mahnung-forms and usages (very often without Begründungen) more nearly akin to the whole range of Old Testament imperative and jussive forms than to the 'classical' pattern of the Wisdom literature strictly defined. The meaning of the Admonition-form therefore, against the intentions of both Richter and Zeller, is as an index of strongly literary tradition over and against the variety of orally-conditioned expression, as in the stark contrast in sensibility between the classical Mahnspruch (Admonition) ((2ps +Begründung(en)) in the literary-defined Wisdom of Didache 3-4 and the varied, mixed and mostly plural forms of sections even of the same document informed by Synoptic orality.
Thus, Zeller's selection of twenty-six New Testament Admonitions includes only nine in the second person singular, of which nine, four are "ohne Begründung." These nine are indeed "Verhaltenmassregeln für typische Situationen des Einzelnen"\(^1\) and this strongly individual slant presumably determines the verb-number.\(^2\)

Among the seventeen remaining plural forms identified by Zeller as Admonitions, three are clearly gnomai (Mt 7:12 par Lk 6:31; Mt 7:7f par Lk 11:9f; Mt 10:16b), two are perhaps gnomic (Mk 11:25, Mt 5:48 par Lk 6:36) and ten out of the remaining twelve (the exceptions are Mk 11:24 par and Mt 6:7f) are longer, rather less clearly independent sections containing a structurally independent analogical sentence, typically as part of the Begründung. In fact the syntactical relation between Mahnung and Begründung is itself significantly less clear in the examples from Wisdom literature. To mention two examples: (1) Mt 10:28-31\(^3\) shows a three- rather than a two-part structure with a double Mahnung (v. 28), a three-part argument based on a rhetorical question-gnome (v. 30) rather equivocally related to the first. (2) The gnome at the end of Mt 6:34\(^4\) (the Aussage, "arketon...autes") is topically independent as well as syntactically unrelated to the rest of the Begründung. Indeed the first half of Mt 6:34, Mahnung and Begründung together, is the conclusion (oun) of a longer Mahnspruch, Mt 6:25-33;\(^5\) the complex formal extension of the discourse/poem Mt 6:25-33, 34, with its several interrelated Mahnungen and Begründungen is, if not out of place in the Wisdom literature, then at least hard to confine within the definition of Admonition as an independent and coherent form, "frei von literarischen Kontext."\(^6\)
Even Richter had difficulty reconciling the isolation of his 'classical' form within loose Wisdom collections with context- and situation-based formal analogues in Psalms, prophecy and narrative. Once allowances have been made for the formal irregularity of Admonitions in the gospels, their occurrence there need no more be referred to narrowly Wisdom influence than Isocrates' repeated use of second person singular jussive with Begründungen in the hortatory sections of the ad Nicoclean (nineteen times in sections 13-38) - the Admonition (as Mahnung and Begründung) is only a modest specialization of Aristotle's rhetorical syllogism, the enthumeme.

To sum up, then, the Mahnspruch as defined by Richter and Zeller from Prv 10-29 suffers not only from the dichotomy between the origins of grammatical and syntactical Form and of Content, but perhaps more fundamentally from the need paradoxically to assign to Form, rigorously defined from literary models a genesis and continuing place in primary (oral) discourse (of Israel and of Jesus); both Richter and Zeller are essentially confused about the relation of the literary Gattung of Prv to the spoken idiom more nearly reflected in the Synoptics or Abot. One consequence is that Zeller's New Testament Admonitions show very notable grammatical/syntactical eccentricities compared to the 'classical' form defined. A second consequence, vital for the present study, is that the Mahnspruch and Aussage are not co-ordinate sister-forms, sub-genres of the more comprehensive category of Sprüche, as Aussage and Mahnung, differentiated on exclusively grammatical lines, may still be. Instead, the 'logische Priorität' of the Aussage is supplemented by a categorical weakness of the Mahnspruch-definition for application outside its 'classical'
contexts: the formal consistency of the Gattung falters in
application to texts and discourses outside Prv and Sir -- leaving a
general admonitory idiom of doubtful relevance as a link between oral
expression and literary form or else as a strictly literary Gattung:
are Mk 7:27 par, Mk 12:17 parr, Lk 12:15, Mt 7:6 and Mt 5:16 really
eamples of a common genre,\textsuperscript{110} or do they simply show a similar logic?
And except for those doubtful instances, the literary character of the
Admonition in Synoptic literature is almost wholly that of a standard
and integral component of the literary Instruction-genre
(Lehrrede).\textsuperscript{111} Indeed the extremely doubtful relation of Zeller's
Admonitions (Mahnsprüche) to Sprüche as oral communication or as
independent units of tradition leads Berger to substitute the less
prejudicial description "begünstigte Mahnrede."\textsuperscript{112}

III Oral-Traditional Sayings in the Old Testament

This uncomfortable fit of form-critical categories from Old
Testament Wisdom on the texts and traditions of the gospels is an
important reason for trying out instead the most basic of the
rhetoricians' communicative patterns as an element of actual
continuity between spoken and written "sayings." Outside the Wisdom
literature, Mahnspruch, in this respect like Eissfeldt's
Volkssprichwort and Kunstspruch, is recognized by an indeterminate
mixture of semantic and formal indices to which we should prefer
grammatical/syntactical categories of Aussage, (Frage) and Mahnung or
the unashamedly semantic designations, Spruch or gnome (of the three
criteria for gnome, analogical structure, normativity and

135
independence, only the last necessarily has a grammatical/syntactical aspect, and then only negatively). Incidental to these problems especially with Zeller’s appropriation of Admonition is the objection that its explicit directness of address may not be a more important clue to the ‘Hintergrund der Direktiven Jesu’ \(^{113}\) than the explicit normative topicality of key gospel Sprüche, whether Mahnungen or Aussage.

It remains to consider as briefly as possible the degree to which the Sprüche of the Old Testament and closely related literature are defined by the same characteristics as those detected in the Hellenistic gnome. Eissfeldt’s selection of possible Volkssprichworte, whatever its limitations as such, may provide a convenient sample of ostensibly traditional sayings from outside the Wisdom literature.\(^{114}\) In fact, its weakness, that it is too eagerly inclusive ensures that it is at the very least the most representative selection available of probably independent sayings in the Old Testament — or for that matter in much of the Psuedepigrapha.\(^{115}\) Of the thirty-nine instances of twenty-nine sayings isolated by Eissfeldt in narrative and prophetic literature, by no means all are describable on Crépeau’s structural model.\(^{116}\) Sayings within larger prophetic discourses are especially difficult: in spite of introductory formulae attributing them to Israel, the six sayings (four from Ez) which belong to prophetic dispute-passages\(^{117}\) are closely dependent on their literary contexts and (perhaps in consequence) are not analogically structured. Likewise the eight ‘proverbial-sounding’ units which Eissfeldt identifies in the prophetic discourses include
four which seem rather too closely integrated with their contexts (Jer 8:20; 12:13; 23:28). Outside the prophetic literature, the clichéd metaphors of Gn 16:12 and I Sam 24:15 (cp II Sam 9:8; 16:9) are both grammatically and logically dependent upon their contexts. The point is not that these examples are not traditional sayings, though this is probably also true at least for the prophetic items, but more particularly that they are not clearly enough sayings over against their discursive contexts to be comparable even with the Sprüche of the Wisdom collections.

Leaving these aside, then, there remain nineteen of Eissfeldt’s units in twenty-four instances of which three I cannot regard essentially as analogical, normative sayings, ie as gnomai (hebraice). Thus the conventional comparison with Nimrod the hunter (Gn 10:9) is clearly not itself an analogical saying though analogically structured performances could be imagined. By contrast, another wellerism, the famous rhetorical question about Saul’s relation to the prophets, the ambiguities of which are reflected in two performances, one royalist and the other anti- (I Sam 10:12; 19:24 respectively), certainly meets our three criteria for gnome (separability, analogy and normativity), evoking with remarkable intensity the tensions between competing charismatic institutions. Rather similarly, the normative analogy of Jdg 14:18 and the riddle (14:14) to which it replies are intensified by changing co-relations of mellow sweetness and leonine strength with their analogues in Samson and his enemies and Israel and its enemies; through successive dramatic peripaties in Samson’s story and in Jdg generally, 14:18 becomes an increasingly ironical norm. A second saying which does not, in either of its variants and despite
attractive double entendre, satisfy the criterion of analogy is the local slogan II Sam 20:18; the less conventionalized word in Jdg 8:2 contrives to combine clear regional reference with a subtly paradoxical analogical development in a way all the more interesting as it suggests (like the Samson saying) the speaker's role as gnome-author instead of passive tradent. The third non-analogical saying, II Sam 5:8, is an explicitly cultic, apodeictic regulation added as a gloss on a difficult but symbolically important narrative: this a useful reminder that legal matter is not always hermetically isolated in homogeneous collections either in oral or in scribal tradition. On the other hand, this saying illustrates the tendency of prohibitive or prescriptive regulations away from the rather different normativity of fully analogical formulation, though semi-independent, normative analogies may be offered as quasi-legal Begründungen (eg Lv 17:11a, 14). The meaning of this repeatedly close relationship between the majority of analogical, and the minority of non-(or incompletely) analogical sayings, is nicely apparent in the marginal case of Jer 51:58 (Hab 2:13b). Like the rest of the prophetic Sprüche passed over above, there is a problem speaking of formal independence, a problem only partially solved by the occurrence of two slightly variant performances: an analogical structure seems to be implied, but only incompletely realized in the saying itself, so that Jer 51:58b requires v.58a and the discourse from 46:1-51:57, and Hab 2:13b requires either the probably intrusive intrusive formula of allusion in v.12 in order analogically to express its implied normativity. The moral is that the criteria developed from Hellenistic gnomai remain, even cumulativity, relative
That said, however, by far the largest part of Eissfeldt's sayings (especially when the prophetic Disputationsworte are discounted) are describable using the criteria proposed for gnome-analysis. In terms of C Fontaine's performantial discussion of 'Traditional Sayings in the Old Testament' gnome-criteria attend primarily to the 'Proverb Situation,' the identity of the saying as such and its internal logic, rather than to the 'Interaction Situation,' the prior relationship of speaker and audience, or the 'Context Situation,' the connotative connections between internal structure and historical and/or narrative matrices. This focus is inevitable where the 'Interaction Situation' and the historical and sometimes also the narrative contexts are known only in the general terms of Jesus' ministry and the Church's formation or of the great Wisdom collections or known only to the extent that the 'Context' and 'Interactive' situations are connoted by the structure of the saying itself. Still it has already been possible to notice that many of the most 'gnomic' of Eissfeldt's sayings can on occasion be exploited in narrative to give a heightened effect of irony, an intensification most easily noticeable in the 'context situations' of the Saul and Samson sayings. It is important to distinguish, then, between this sort of extrinsic, contextual intensification and the intensification, implied in the analogical structure of the gnome itself, which distinguished the extreme Synoptic example of Mt 8:22.

Of course, extrinsic, narrative intensity does have a structural basis, most commonly, among the more independent units in Eissfeldt's
list, in the evaluative ambiguity of an analogical saying, so that the force of both I Sam 10:12 and 19:24 depends on the ambiguous, indeed rapidly shifting, relative valuation of charismatic offices; I Sam 24:13 (Heb v.14) leaves unclear whether 'touch' implies mere contact or adoption of the violent tactics of wickedness; Ez 12:22 gains interest from the variety of connotations in the 'fading visions'. Ambiguity in the structure of a traditional 'core' is on the other hand performantically resolved in two treatments of another analogy (Is 37:3; Hos 13:3). Less strikingly, Jdg 8:21 is a comment as much on Jether's weakness as on Gideon's strength, or I Sam 16:7 on two different qualities of 'seeing': with these as in I Kg 20:11 it is perhaps better to speak not of ambiguity but of deliberate contrast of meanings. In short, the analogical units which dominate Eissfeldt's sample - once contextually dependent sayings are discounted - show most of the structural means of intensification anticipated by application of Crépeau's theoretical model to one Synoptic example (Mt 8:22) above. Topical urgency, analogical asyndety, symbolic ambiguity or hyperbole, even an element of paradox. The structural peculiarity of this particular Jesus-saying viewed against such a background is thus a matter of degree rather than of kind: there is no parallel among Eissfeldt's sayings for the combination of so many means of intensification with so important a topic into so disproportionate an analogy.

IV Literary Versification in Old Testament Wisdom

An important aspect of Eissfeldt's examples and especially of the
nineteen most independent sayings among them is their notable poetic informality by the standards of Hebrew sapiential, lyric and psalmic poetry. For example, though most of the extra-sapiential sayings show a dual structure at the level of syntax, only five (Ez 18:2 cf Jer 31:29; Jdg 14:18; Is 37:3 cf Hab 2:13; I Sam 24:13 (Heb 14)) fall into the sort of two-line verbal parallelism typical of even the most individual units in Prv and throughout biblical Hebrew verse literature. The organisation of topically various sub-units into comparatively uniform two-line sentences is thus the most remarkable difference between the elements of Eissfeldt's corpus of sayings and those of even the least discursively developed (in fact, the central) collections of Prv (chs 10-22; 25-29). The classical form of the biblical 'proverb' is thus formally one degree further along the continuum from rhetorically heightened speech to verse and this difference implies also an increased distance between *gnome* and the 'proverbs' of these collections. Although most of the couplets in Prv can be helpfully analysed on the criteria evolved for *gnome* and although such analysis highlights familiar means of intensification (eg paradox: 14:12 par; 14:13; 11:24; 14:4; 18:20 parr; 13:24 parr; 25:15, hyperbole: 18:18 par; 26:14, 15 par, 16, dramatic irony 18:11 par; 20:14, occasional ambiguity 18:1, 19:27; 22:16 and sometimes very striking disproportions 10:13; 13:19; 16:2; 19:27), the couplet format can be applied not only to analogical structures (for which it does seem graphically quite suitable) but also to the linear repetition of baldly synonomous or antithetical parallelism (eg 16:18 parr; 15:1) or to the expansion of single-line analogies with a sometimes non-analogical, quasi-parallelistic completion (eg 19:2; 20:22). An
interesting case of the latter pattern of versifying development through parallelism is the completion of an already syntactically two-part analogical "singlet" with three totally different — and successful — seconding reflections in Prv 12:14; 13:2; 18:20. Rather similarly, the units (25:2-12) which introduce the Hezekiah collection (25:1-29:27) experiment with the development of analogical patterns over four parts, by pairing Aussagen (vv. 2,3) or by extending them through parallelism (vv. 4,5). Once again, nothing is being said about the relative dating of different styles and formulations, only about the relative textuality of the Wisdom literature in even its formally least integrated sub-units compared with extra-sapiential Sprüche or with our gnome: the claim of written Wisdom couplets to be "sayings" is, in general, only very indirect, an indirectness which appears, in part, in the casting of analogical structures into quite standard line-forms and lengths (Prv 19:7c seems to be exceptional) and, in part, their inclusion with non-analogical elements in collection determined more by simple verse-form and sapiential topic than by analogical structure.

Unsurprisingly, clearly recognizable analogical norms are even less common in verse-forms more complex than what would generally be recognized as a couplet, so that for instance the nine Mahnungen of Prv 10:1-22:16 all fairly clearly express an analogical norm (in 20:22 with a non-analogical preface) while in the generally more extended literary structures of 22:17-24:34 (including many "classical" Mahnsprüche) analogy is only one element in complex argumentation and much less consistently characterises an independent poetic sub-unit. The cultivation in these collections of the Admonition (MahnSpruch)
whether in couplet or extended form, is symptomatic of this shift from constative and implied to argued, prescriptive norms. Generally in Prv, continuity between jussive and other sayings-forms is still apparent in the use of analogy within Admonition (eg 27:1) or more commonly in either the Mahnung (eg 26:4) or its Begründung (27:10c; 20:22), although a few Admonitions (eg 25:17) do not seem to fit the analogical model at all. What is noteworthy in collections III and IV of Prv, in addition to the greater length and argumentative complexity of the units, is a decline in the connotative/analogical aspect; apart from a couple of independent analogies (23:23; 24:7a; 24:26), the Mahnsprüche and Aussagen alike employ fewer and more conventional metaphor providing norms of more narrowly specified range.

Tension between the "saying" aspect of Israelite Wisdom and growing poetic and speculative requirements for continuous versification and argumentation is evidenced also in the almost complete absorption of "sayings" material into discourse in the first nine chapters of Prv: the convention of father-son address minimizes the individuality of particular sub-units, especially Mahnungen, and individual analogical structures are almost always subordinated to thematically developed organic arguments, though much of the content is still recognizably based on at least potentially independent, "proverbial" couplets. Only occasionally do the latter stand out clearly from their contexts as items of wider currency or as the rubrics of discursive sub-sections (or both, as in the thematic 1:7a parr). The masterpiece of this art of discursive verse, the content and forms of which make only a stylized reference to direct speech,
is, however, the book of Job, in which the couplet verse-form sometimes suggests an independence of collected sayings usually belied by close argumentative contexts. (The exception, 2:4, a notably independent analogical norm, should be added to Eissfeldt's list of probable Sprichworte.) Indeed although Job uses the verse-forms and language common to the written aphorism and exploits all the metaphorical facilities of poetic expression, including those of the gnomic sentence, allusion to relatively independent analogical norms is only occasional and usually expresses reservation towards the oversimplification implied in proverbial norms (eg 4:17; for the general attitude cf 13:12).

The situation is nearly reversed in Ecclesiastes, in which the stream of consciousness lingers often in sententious pools more easily distinguished from their framework of first-person opinion; in Qoh both versification and coherent argumentation are, if not entirely absent, certainly much less powerful integrating forces - the book's achievement is rather in the evocation of mood than in the philosophic articulation or poetic finish. The more prosaic character of the discourse makes detection of independent sub-units easier than in Job or the discursive parts of Prv. From a semantic point of view, the work consists almost entirely of explicitly personal value-judgements cemented loosely by juxtaposition of analogically stated norms. The semantic as well as formal independence of many of the latter is emphasized by their as thematic introductions (1:15,18; 2:12; 7:7; 8:1) to speculative passages which also include (and are in their abstraction somewhat limited by) normative analogies. The sharp relation of analogical norms to context and their
formal/metrical variety, as in Eissfeldt's category and in the Synoptic sayings, compared with similar sub-units of sapiential or psalmic poetry, argues strongly against the bland use of 'Wisdom-saying' as a descriptive class: in spite of common ground in the use of analogy, in each of the documents examined thus far a distinctive adjustment maintains the tension between poetic form, philosophical Wisdom and the rhetorical immediacy of the saying as such.

Sir finds still another balance between the drive of Wisdom toward textually coherent poetic discourse and the traditional requirement that wisdom (and its literature) be grounded in the conversational, practical sagacity expressed largely in normatively independent sayings, however stereotyped. Where Job criticizes and parodies such sayings-Wisdom before reconstructing it at a higher level of theoretical and poetic abstraction and Qoh takes up the sayings-norms to articulate an idiosyncratic vision, Sir self-consciously expresses loyalty to the sayings tradition by taking over topics and imagery from Prv. In this sense Sir is, by contrast with Job and Qoh, "solidly in the Judaic proverbial tradition."

In keeping with this basic conservatism, Sir tries to effect a compromise between discourse- and saying-forms: apart from the chapters devoted to natural and national history (42:15-51:30), syntactically independent couplets are proportionately very common and are also very often analogically structured. The independence of such "sayings" is, however, usually minimized by thematic and formulaic integration into longer poetic and paraenetic sections (e.g. 1:11-20; 2:7-9, 15-17; 4:1-5, 22-31; 41; 17ff; 42; 1ff). Even more than Prv 1-9, in which

145
'sayings' material is not prominent, and with a more conservative purpose than Job, Sir has recast the individual proverbial couplet into an element of grander textual design: analogical structure is often presumed in individual couplets but form and content are almost mechanically regimented so that recognition of units comparable to our gnome is straightforward, but judgements about their separability from their literary context are less often possible. Moreover, themes which in Prv are treated in scattered analogical 'sayings' usually receive both more extended and more integrated development in Sir in sections of organically related analogical sub-units (eg cf Prv 21:3, Sir 35:1-9). Important exceptions are nonetheless found in the 'final summary proverbs' with which thematic sections frequently end (eg 7:36; 28:6; 35:10; 37:15; ) and in the book's (analogical) climax in 41:12,13 and surrounding vv, as well as in a few more randomly assembled collections (eg 20:18ff). Indeed it is characteristic of Sir that the keystone of its larger architecture is a deliberate but nuanced, versified and thematically integrated reference to somewhat less thoroughly poetic 'sayings' (Prv 22:1, Qoh 7:1) from literary tradition of slightly stronger oral sensibility. In Sir's architectonic use of analogically normative sayings to signalise key points (eg by the repetition of 20:30, 31 in 41:14b, 15) there is a relatively direct parallel - Qoh had moved less decisively in a similar direction - to Hellenistic rhetorical uses of gnome in discursive argumentation. The book's likely provenance makes this an unsurprising conclusion. Even so, the use of similar (often though not always analogical), usually parallelistic materials to construct
the discourse itself, to provide most of its themes, forms, imagery and logic, even sometimes at the expense of argumentative coherence and abstraction, testifies to Sir's background in Hebrew and (as JT Sanders has shown) Egyptian Demotic Wisdom literatures. And the same trends are visible also in WisSol, especially the first, most general section (chs 1-5), toward integration of gnomic sayings-wisdom into homogeneous argumentative and hortatory compositions except (and less markedly than in Sir) where a more independent 'saying' may serve an architectural purpose (eg 1:10,15; 3:1, 10, 13;4:1, 7; 5:14). On the other hand, WisSol, in its choice of form and language, has distinguished itself from the Hebrew sayings-wisdom of the larger collections in Prv and also from their Egyptian and other analogues.

V Literacy and Orality in the Ahiqar-Tradition and in Rabbinic Tradition.

An interesting comparison to this, on the whole, increasingly literary development of Hebrew Wisdom from Prv on may briefly be noticed in the Ahiqar-traditions, perhaps the best example of the persistence and wide, multi-lingual diffusion of sayings-wisdom in the Ancient Near East. In antiquity roughly comparable to the biblical wisdom literature the sayings-material with its probably later narrative supplement is extant in a famous fifth century BC Aramaic MS from Elephantine and in very considerably expanded versions from the Christian period. In addition, the influence of Ahiqar-story is felt in Demotic fragments from Roman Egypt, in the Greek Vita Aesopi and in the deuto-canonical Tobit, while that of the
sayings matter is felt in the latter book and in the rabbis.\textsuperscript{142} Without entering into linguistic and traditional-critical questions which I am not competent to treat, a few observations will be worth their ink. Clearly Kuechler's conclusion that the sayings are \textsuperscript{143} \textit{das mobiliste Element} of the Ahiqar tradition is justified in virtually all respects: dissemination, expansion, variation and edition through time, space and cultural barriers. The Aramaic and the Oriental (especially the Syriac) versions provide widely separated benchmarks which in comparison reveal the great extent to which the sayings collection has transformed itself by substitution as well as by accretion; against this background, specific instances of the continuity of sayings and/or of core-structures between Elephantine and the much later versions\textsuperscript{144} are particularly interesting. They suggest, according to Kuechler, that our widely separated data are linked by an oral tradition in stark contrast to the patently literary relations among the Oriental versions themselves or among the varying receptions of Tobit.\textsuperscript{145} And if the Ahiqar-tradition was transmitted orally as well as sometimes in writing, it seems to represent oral tradition in our stronger sense, for neither the Aramaic nor the later versions shows any specific sign of mnemotechnical organization. Certainly the almost random distribution and textual imprecision of isolated parallels between AramAhqi\textsuperscript{ar} and Jewish literature from canonical Prv to Sir, Tob (including the Qumran Aramaic fragments\textsuperscript{146}), Talmud and Midrash and perhaps the New Testament\textsuperscript{147} would seem to imply that the name of Ahiqar has illuminated only one possible trajectory through the large and amorphous cloud of sayings circulated orally in the ancient Near Eastern environment: the relationship
between the Ahiqar material as a whole and Jewish literature seems in general not to be textually mediated, whatever the internal economy of the Ahiqar-tradition. In this latter respect, the texts which give evidence for written transmission (the Oriental versions) also show signs, especially the homogeneous presentation of the sayings in Mahnung-form with a formulaic introduction (‘my son...’ Syr.; ‘O my boy...’ Arb.; ‘Son...’ Arm.148), of a relatively scribal/literary sensibility in spite of the residual orality of the sayings-form. The comparative orality of the earlier literary terminus of the Ahiqar tradition appears not only in the absence of such formulae but in the formal variety and independence of sayings which include animal-fables as well as more sententious logia without any of the noticeable regularity of line-form or parallelism which marks even the least textually integrated collections of biblical proverbs as verse. Moreover, the variation of single core structures within AramAhiqar itself without obvious redactional purpose suggest the strong influence of the oral mentality of performantial pluralism (cf logia 39,41,93, or 40,42), though the repetition of already fixed pairs of unrelated logia (39 and 40, 41 and 42) implies some degree of textual determination, whether by writing or memorization.

Thus the considerable differences between AramAhiqar and the Oriental versions are generally in the same direction as the tendency of the Hebrew literature, more or less pronounced in each document, to compromise the individuality of the saying as such in favour of the literary possibilities of extended argumentative and poetic development. Even in the formally more homogeneous later versions, however, the formal as well as topical independence of individual
sayings is emphasized by the variety of material in the Ahiqar-tradition and by the very large scale on which new sayings have replaced or been added to old. The ambiguities of the designation 'Wisdom-saying' are shown up well in the contrasts between the formal and topical variety and ephemeral textuality of the Ahiqar-sayings and the standard verse-forms, increasingly thematic organization and stable growth of the Hebrew Wisdom literature. To the extent that we may examine its documents, the Ahiqar-tradition is obviously a literary phenomenon, but it seems to share with the Jesus-tradition, in spite of a vastly different time-scale, a continuing openness to oral sensibilities and techniques of transmission and composition. The analogy is a useful one not only because it captures much of the difference between Synoptic gnome and the styles of Old Testament Wisdom (styles to some extent adopted/imitated by the evangelists, as we have seen), but also because it warns of the continuous infiltration of new sayings into traditional and eventually literary ascription in traditions which emphasise so strongly the oral peculiarity of the saying. Finally, and not unexpectedly within a tradition which regards so highly the independence of its component sayings, we may note that only a very few units (e.g., the philologically interesting logion 34) cannot be described as independent, more or less explicitly analogical norms; indeed even the animal fables can, it seems to me, be described in this way, through the narrative extension of such parables takes them rather beyond gnome for present purposes, as in logion 35 which is constructed around an apparently prior gnome of remarkable intensity.
For a written witness which emphasizes to a paradoxical degree comparable with the Ahiqar-tradition the spokenness of the saying and its consequent relative independence from literary context, we may briefly turn to the rabbinic literature from which two convergent selections may offer a particularly relevant comparison. For the rabbinic literature generally, the "Spruch, sei es ein im Volksmund umlaufendes Sprichwort oder ein popular gewordenes Diktum eines Gelehrten," lags only behind story-telling and Scripture comment as a favourite pattern for haggadah. Of such Sprüche, it will suffice to notice generally their very great formal diversity compared with models from Wisdom poetry - models of which the rabbis are not unaware, as frequent citations indicate - and their conformity for the most part to our criteria for gnomai and comparable sayings.

A priori, some tension might be expected between the always relative, connotative normativity of an analogical sentence and the requirements of clarity and universality in legal debate; in fact, independent analogical norms pepper halakic as well as haggadic contexts, although the only instances known to me of judgements actually couched in such independently analogical sayings are denials of halakic relevance rather than positive adjudications: the role of formally independent analogical norms in halakic contexts seems to me to be mainly that of making explicit the (essentially analogical) logic which interrelates legal judgements (e.g. R. Meir's saying Ned 9.3 or even Hillel's famous summation of the Torah bShab 31a) to provide a logical rather than a legal principle.

A more manageable selection of rabbinic materials has been made by J. Neusner for which, moreover, rough contemporaneity with Jesus may
plausibly be claimed if not proven. Whatever the historical probabilities of Neusner's wise distinction between *type* and *form* of tradition it allows him, on the one hand, to point to laws and wisdom-sayings as the 'two important types' of biblical literature that recur in rabbinic traditions about the Pharisees, and, on the other, to recognize that these two types are formally distinct both from one another and from their respective biblical analogues. Thus the wisdom-sayings which Neusner attributes to the earliest strata of rabbinic tradition are characterized by forms which strongly contrast with literary Wisdom verse with its fixed line-forms, often 'synonymous' parallelism, rhythm patterns and tendency to integration into larger poems/discourse. Except by way of contrast, formal comparison of Neusner's wisdom-sayings with Eissfeldt's collection or with the Ahiqar materials would scarcely need to refer to the literary tradition from Prv to Sir. Neusner's Pharisaic-rabbinic wisdom sentences lack the literary qualities of classical Wisdom poetry but also fall short of the generally strong orality of Synoptic gnoma by a tendency to schematization which seems to point toward the requirements of scribal craft-literacy or possibly mnemotechnics. If formal criteria suggest analogy with a more orally conditioned Wisdom, they and redactional technique seem to indicate a difference of kind between the orality of Neusner's sayings (at least those from the Abot collections) and that of less scribal-textual traditions: attribution of each individual saying to an individual master and the very often forced triplet-form tend to confirm, even for the early stages Neusner is trying to reconstruct, the impression that pre-rabbinic tradition is mnemotechnical in orientation. Whatever the
difficulties of applying oral theory to ancient texts, \textsuperscript{159} differentiation along a continuum of oral-mnemotechnical-scribal-literary characteristics qualified by a distinction between sensibility and technique, seems not only to be a priori plausible but also to offer an explanation (as Neusner does not) of why "Pharisaic sayings not in narrative setting do not seem to follow the model of Proverbs or BenSira" and yet nonetheless "do not exhibit the rich variations and full expression of the equivalent Jesus-logia." \textsuperscript{160}

Further, if the results of Neusner's form-criticism emphasize stylistic discontinuity between Pharisaic-rabbinic Wisdom sentences and their obvious analogues in Old Testament poetry and less sharply even in Synoptic tradition, the distinctness of halakic sayings within his sample is still more remarkable. Over against the several legal forms of the Old Testament and the laws of Qumranic Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphic writers, "Pharisaic-rabbinic laws seldom use the imperative." \textsuperscript{163} (Indeed, in the exemplary area of Sabbath rules, one "never finds the imperative." \textsuperscript{164} Instead, "it is chiefly in M. Avot 1:1-18 that we find the imperative, in moral sayings." \textsuperscript{165} There is still, on Neusner's showing, considerable variety among Pharisaic legal forms before AD 70, \textsuperscript{166} but this is limited by a schematic avoidance of the imperative which, however motivated, further differentiates legal, non-analogical norms \textsuperscript{167} from norms expressed in the connotative language of analogy.

Neusner's ambitious reconstruction is attended by difficulties even greater than those associated with the classical New Testament form-criticism with which it seeks comparison:\textsuperscript{168} the "tunnel-period"
between the data and the objects of study, along with the number of known tradents, is greater than in the criticism of Synoptic tradition; the forms and subject-matter of the rabbinic literature seem calculated to frustrate reconstructive interest especially where so little is known about pre-70 authors and Sitze im Leben of proto-rabbinic tradition. Apart from this doubtful, historical dimension of Neusner's approach and conclusions, however, most of his more strictly phenomenological observations, as they touch on our problem of 'written sayings', can be documented with perhaps greater comparative security in the Mishnah tractate Abot, from which 'single document' Neusner's 'Pharisaic sayings not in narrative settings' primarily derive. Setting aside Neusner's questions about Pharisaic identities and the origins of rabbinic tradition, the extraordinary character of the Abot collection within rabbinic literature, determined as it is so largely by the concentration there of independent normative analogies and the virtual absence of units comparable to Neusner's legal forms/types, demands special attention in the present context. The predominance of forms analogous to our gnome is, as always in collection literature of whatever origin, not absolute: relative independence of sayings within a pericope is sometimes difficult to determine and in any case a considerable inmixture of non-analogical structures takes place, especially, in Ab, for the sake of the favoured triplet-form. Thus, for example, Ab 2.10 consists of two sayings, one in three parts, the second of which, 'be not easily provoked,' does not seem to me to be analogical, and the other an analogical saying developed into bewildering metaphysical complexity. Only rarely do I find pericopae which seem essentially
non-analogical in inward structure, though they may employ particular
metaphors (eg 2.13; 1.9); such exceptions here and elsewhere are
useful reminders that in the Hellenistic rhetorical gnome and even
more in its non-Greek analogues we have to do not with a Gattung, of
simply reproducible form, but with a style, a technique grounded in
the patterns of informal logic in spoken conversation. Formally the
imperative predominates over Aussagen and Fragen to about the same
degree as analogical norms overshadow non-analogical. The absence of
Begründungen from so many of these Mahnworte, Zeller explains with
reference to mnemotechnical abbreviation and to a universally implicit Begründung in the wisdom of Torah fulfilment. From the
point of view of the present chapter the general rarity in Abot of
forms genuinely conformable to eg Zeller's Mahnspruch form needs no
special explanation (though the increased frequency of classical
Admonitions (MahnSprüche) which Zeller finds in later strata may,
if datings are correct, reflect increased literary influence of Wisdom
books). Above all, the important point concerning the relation of Ab
to other collection literature is the discontinuity of its sayings-
forms with those of classical biblical Wisdom poetry within the single
type of non-legal, mainly with those of classical biblical Wisdom
poetry within the single type of non-legal, mainly analogical
materials. In this respect Neusner's observations about the
uniqueness of Phaisaic/rabbinic wisdom sayings can be transferred with
very little reservation to Sprüche of Ab (upon which this part of
Neusner's sample is, after all, based). To select an obvious
formal feature, a three-fold syntactical structure occurs occasionally
in Wisdom literature (eg Sir 31:12; 32:1,2), where it is little more
than an extension of the basic couplet parallelism; by contrast the

155
triplet in Ab has little to do with the 'parallelism' usually attributed to biblical verse. The Ab triplet typically includes members which conform to no particular line type (e.g. 1.3) or length (e.g. 1.17), which may not develop the same topic (e.g. 2.10a) or even have the same authors (e.g. 4.20). A more specific formal similarity is found in the 'three things' formulaic introduction in Ab (1.2, 18; 2.10; 3.1; 5.19; cf 4.13b) and Sir 25:1, 2, a similarity in which the essential difference of sensibility is evident. In Sir or in Prv 30:15ff the numerical formulae are incorporated into verse-forms of a regularity not at all imitated in the Ab sayings.

The formal peculiarity of Ab in comparison with the rest of rabbinic literature and with biblical Wisdom corresponds, moreover, to peculiarities in the history of the tractate's transmission and redaction which make it more than hypothetically plausible to speak of oral traditions, rather more mnemotechnically oriented than that of Jesus' words and much less literary than the Wisdom tradition, interrupted and supplemented repeatedly by scribal (i.e. craft-literate) redaction. As Neusner points out in his discussion of Ab 1.1-18, 'none of the apophthegms (sic) in the M.Avot-list even is discussed or even referred to by Tannaim or in Tannaitic collections,' a fact which he explains by late dating. Against this explanation is the synoptic relationship, uncharacteristic of either gemara or tosefta, between Ab and the two recensions of AdRN which presuppose an Abot-tradition unlike that of the Mishnaic redaction and in some respects prior to it. No position need be taken here about the complex pre-history of the Ab tractate except to suggest that tension between
documentary and oral theories of its development\textsuperscript{179} may be controlled by the recognition that even the individual units of the collection attest a mixed or hybrid sensibility more textually oriented than ordinary speech and memory but much less self-consciously literate than Wisdom poetry (though it too is, as we have noticed, only relatively \textsuperscript{180} 'literate'): the present condition of the Abot material thus strongly reflects the redactional intrusion of writing technique.

Analogy between the roughly mixed oral and literate sensibilities and probable transmissional histories of the two literatures of Ab and of the gospels yields at closer range to contrast between the even greater formal diversity (non-standardization) of the Synoptic sayings and the cultivation in Ab of various triplet and catalogue forms, aesthetically unrefined in comparison with available but as such neglected models from Wisdom poetry, but mnemotechnically sophisticated. It is the paucity or evidently redactional quality of such sayings in Synoptic tradition which make narrowly mnemotechnical models of Synoptic oral tradition of Jesus' sayings implausible:\textsuperscript{181} an important aspect of the present thesis would be falsified by production of authentic Jesus-sayings which were really mnemotechnically analogous to (especially the earliest) sayings of the Ab collections.

VI Conclusions

If any general conclusion may be drawn from so cursory an overview, it must be that continuity of type among the units of biblical and post-biblical Wisdom poetry - those of such formally less
coherent, homogeneous collections as Ahiqar and Abot and the sayings of Jesus' tradition or the uncollected performances of Eissfeldt's selection - is seriously limited by formal differences. These are significant as they reflect on a level complementary to other critical indices variously mixed techniques and sensibilities of composition and transmission, so that the disciplined and progressively grander verse of the classical Wisdom tradition attests an increasingly literate attitude to the saying, a willingness to compromise its independent and analogical structure. Biblical Wisdom and its continuators witness to a long and busy development, but its smallest epigrammatic forms as well as its most substantial documents are primarily scribal/literary poetry, profoundly different from the rhetoric of Eissfeldt's sayings - though still unlike the liturgical orality of some psalmody. The long gap between our Aramaic Ahiqar text and later versions dramatizes the much stronger orality of the Ahiqar tradition, which is evidenced also in formal variety and performancial variation of core-structures in tradition and even within single documents and in a tremendous turn-over of sayings from version to version; even the formulaic standardization of the Oriental versions marks only a modest concession to textual conformity. In fairly gentle contrast to the similarly strong orality of the Ahiqar sayings, the Abot collections do seem to make formal concessions to the needs of memorized transmission. One consequence of this variety among documents in the balance struck between orality and literacy must be the suppression of any urge to absolutize the distinction between oral and literate. At least for present purposes, there are no pure oral texts (and, arguably, no such thing as an 'oral genre' in any strong sense); such criteria (various modes of redundancy;
repetition, especially formulaic; paratactic addition rather than subordination, e.g. in polysyndeton or asyndeton; aggregation rather than analysis, e.g. in toleration of second-order contradictions of "detail"; etc.) as are available for identifying the strength of oral residues in texts are by definition relative and comparative criteria. Indeed this is a major reason why the study of relative orality and literacy in the synoptic aspect of Jesus' tradition may help to liberate oral theory generally.

Despite their different approaches to the 'saying' as an underlying structural principle, however, each of these literatures incorporates a very high proportion of sub-units which, at least potentially, meet our criteria for gnome, though in linguistic contexts in which the Greek designation is less appropriate than it is in the New Testament. We should notice, though, that Crépeau's criteria, which were intended to be 'du moins utile pour les études parémiologiques comparatives,'¹⁸³ did not describe the structures of sayings in any of the collections surveyed without remainder or quite as well as they fitted the gnome-examples of the rhetoricians and progymnasmaticists. That this gap was particularly noticeable in the biblical and post-biblical Wisdom literature proper, may be explained as a function of the priority of verse-forms such as that of the couplet and of increasingly elaborate contextual integration at the expense of both the formal independence and analogical autonomy of sub-units. Similarly in the Abot sayings we may suppose that mnemotechnical devices such as the triplet form may have facilitated the mixing of analogical and non-analogical matter. Generally,
however, the persistence of 'exceptions' in predominantly analogical collections need signify only that gnome even as cultivated in Hellenistic Rhetoric and still more emphatically elsewhere is not in the first place a conscious mannerism, an "oral genre", but a communicative tactic the purity of which, especially in written recreation, need not be too much insisted upon.\textsuperscript{184}

Even with this proviso, however, our survey of texts central to Wisdom Tradition illustrates clearly the ambiguous relationship between gnome and Wisdom literature. On the other hand, Wisdom literature generally and the relatively well-documented genre of the Admonition (Mahnspruch) in particular are characterized by the fictive orality of direct personal admonition. Inclusion and/or collection of gnomai bolsters considerably – albeit paradoxically – the verisimilitude of the Wisdom genres' still irreducibly literary-conventional claim to represent speech. Sapiential, even more than other literature both needs and belies the orality implied in gnome.

On the other hand, much more than, \textit{eg} the Admonition, the gnome represents conversational and not only conventional language. Erosion of the literary genres of literary Wisdom in documents written under the influence of mnemotechnical or more strongly oral sensibilities and traditions could even be a consequence of the gnomic character of sapiential literature.\textsuperscript{185} At any rate, the use of gnome in the whole range of more or less literary Wisdom cannot pre-empt its wider implications for conversation and tradition; Gnome contributes to the definition of Wisdom literary genres without itself being categorically either sapiential or literary (\textit{cf} Eissfeldt's \textit{Volkssprichwörter}).\textsuperscript{186}
CHAPTER FOUR: Synoptic Gnomai: Distribution and Separability in Literary Tradition

After our extended theoretical introduction, criticizing current models of New Testament oral tradition and reconstructing them in relation to the culturally and historically appropriate category of gnome - as neglected in modern study as it was fundamental to the educational and oratorical practice of Greek-speaking and -influenced antiquity - we turn now to apply this more nuanced theoretical perspective exegetically and historically to specific Synoptic texts. To be sure, every effort has been made to relate theoretical argument to exegetically-based discussions of the rhetoricians (ch.1) and of the Synoptics (ch.2, on eg Goulder and Berger). Moreover, somewhere between theoretical construction and historical exegesis of gospel texts, it has been necessary to undertake the only superficially quixotic exercise of re-reading non-Greek Jewish Wisdom from the standpoint of an appreciation of Hellenistic gnome and its fluctuating position within variously oral and literate economies (ch.3). The strangeness of this application of the Hellenistic category to a largely alien literature is greatly diminished by the present controlling interest in a time, place and social setting where distinctions between ancient near eastern Wisdom and Hellenistic rhetoric would become less and less reliable. Apart from this convergence, though, and more to the point are the insufficiency and
generality of descriptive categories such as mashal for form- or tradition-critical study of even Old Testament Wisdom-sayings and the specificity of forms abstracted, like the classical Mahnspruch, from particular texts, forms which are by their very nature indices of primarily literary tradition. Indeed the difficulties of making the latter type of formal definition fit Abot and the Synoptics are part of the evidence for a relatively strong influence of mnemotechnical and oral sensibilities on their formation. Thus it is true to say that “the major form of prescriptive Wisdom... is the Instruction” only with the double reservation that “Wisdom” here means an essentially scribal literary tradition equivocally related as such not only to predominantly oral expression (such as may plausibly be ascribed to the historical Jesus) but also to the basic units of the wisdom-texts themselves insofar as they quite variously imitate or reproduce actual “sayings”. In the terms of J M Robinson’s influential essays on theGattung of Q, closer attention to the varying character of the “saying” in Wisdom literature yields evidence of nothing so unified or directional as a single “trajectory” along which to plot the development of a literaryGattung. On the contrary, we find a restless equilibrium between “saying” and “writing”, which more than any static, formal characteristic is the commonest denominator of the long tradition described by Robinson’s Logoi Sophon and which offers an invaluable meter of the relative orality of highly individual documents. Thus C E Carlson (again with Q in the foreground) is quite right to insist that the venerable near eastern habit of committing to writing sayings attributable to wise men marks a tradition (not Gattung) to which Jesus — and certainly not just the Q community — contributed.
This then is at last the place to begin describing and evaluating more microscopically the particular conditions of written sayings attributed to Jesus in the New Testament literature by drawing out the implied oral pre-history of the Synoptic gnomai. This application to primary texts of the category of gnome, partly derived (from Hellenistic reflection) and partly constructed (from modern parolimiological discussions), and of the hermeneutical as well as social-historical insight into the complex and uneasy relations between orality and literacy in and around early Christianity, may most conveniently be presented in two steps. In the first of these, general observations will be made about the gnomic category as a whole in Synoptic literature and tradition to illustrate, on the one hand, the diffusion of gnomai across all kinds of critical boundary and, on the other, their cohesion as a rigorously definable category in spite of considerable formal and thematic variety. Beyond these generally descriptive theses, however, and further especially to the second, the sayings themselves as items of both invention and tradition require that a second step be taken toward sorting the Synoptic gnomai as data for assessing more precisely the rhetorical continuity between oral and written tradition and between Jesus and his early exponents. Beardslee and Carlston\(^5\) have already argued that the wide distribution and frequency of proverbs make an irresistible presumption in favour of the authenticity of the category as a whole in its ascription to Jesus. Extensive argument has been offered here to extend that general assurance of authenticity and consequent historical relevance by replacing the vague and prejudicial category of 'proverb' or

163
Wisdom-saying' with the historically more appropriate and structurally more definite notion of gnome. Within this general historicality, though, some Synoptic gnomai show a particular historical topicality and/or a particular pattern of diffusion which should be co-ordinated more narrowly with specific problems in early Christian history and rhetoric. This second, topically more specific and historically more emphatic stage of enquiry will, however, only be a legitimate construction if it is clearly seen to depend upon the results and assumptions of the larger discussions; it will therefore be reserved for a subsequent discussion (chs. 5 and 6).

The first stage has already been anticipated in its redaction-critical aspect in response above to M Goulder's attempt to assign a majority of the poetry - largely gnomic - of the Synoptics to a single imaginative genius. There it was possible to agree to a considerable extent with Goulder's essential observations that the 'poetry' of Mt and of the Q material in Lk shared imagery and rhythms much rarer in Mk and non-Q Lk and that the Matthaean and Lucan versions of materials also attested in Mk differed characteristically: broadly (and begging the question of the status of Q!), Lucan 'poetry' is characterized by effects of emphasis and climax and Matthaean more often by Goulder's 'rhythms'. Still it was necessary to stop far short of Goulder's bold conclusions not least because of the loose ends of Marcan and Lucan rhythmic poetry but more especially because the thesis of Matthaean inventiveness pre-empted serious consideration of the positive character of the rhythmic style, to say nothing of the much-abused Lucan as a principle of continuity between literary composition and tradition. Closer examinations of instances
of the large overlap between Goulder's rhythms and gnomai in material shared by all three Synoptics shows indeed that each evangelist has a fairly distinctive style of literary performance of shared gnomic 'cores'. The distinction, however, does not seem to be that Matthew's poetry is brilliantly original, Luke's a lame imitation and Mark's a pale shadow of authentic tradition; rather, each evangelist seems to have struck a more or less peculiar balance between the consistencies of a personal and literary style and the persistent oral residue of sayings transmitted and varied as such or adopted from an already written source. On the hypothesis of a strongly oral background shared by the Synoptics, oral-performantial variation may be expected to persist into written tradition in familiar Synoptic forms: and irreducible diversity of literary, aesthetic styles (so that recovery of an 'original form' is as difficult in principle as it is in practice), styles which are qualified almost everywhere by perceptible inconsistencies of redactional style as well as more largely by the phenomena of Synoptic interdependence. Thus if the Matthaean manner can be described as 'rhythmic' by analogy with Old Testament Wisdom-literary styles and the Lucan rather more tentatively as emphatic or climactic, the use of these figures is not restricted to these authors nor is it consistent within the work of each. Most important for the present point, the presence in Synoptic gnome-performances of literary authorial style is an indifferent measure of the influence of oral sensibility on Synoptic tradition, except that Synoptic literary variety and stylistic instability even in manifestly careful redaction do suggest in general and among the gnomai a shared tradition in
strongly oral re-creation.

I  Gnomic Tradition and Gnomic Redaction in Triple Attestation

But if recognizable literary-authorial style in a gnome or in a larger context does not imply the absence of oral traditional influence or of orally formulated "core" structures, there is some evidence which may be taken to indicate continuing interest in gnome at comparatively final levels of literary redaction, not only as an element in substantially independent units of tradition but also as an oral compositional technique still current and available to literary redactors. This double character of the Synoptic writers' interest in gnome, as pretext of redaction and its instrument, can best be shown from the nature and large number of synoptic gnomai which are the sole, or the essential differentiae between otherwise parallel literary units. To begin with the most straightforward example, Lk 5:39 is a signal of redactional change may have been: one typical Synoptic use of gnome is to conclude or supplement a larger unit, especially a parabolic saying, although in this context the obvious proverbial associations given by Luke are somewhat malapropos.

Other cases are more involved. Thus the "city" of Mt 5:14b provides a degree of visibility intermediate between the light of the world (v. 14a) and the homely lamp (v. 15). On the other hand, its imagery is again slightly incongruous. Either way, its Matthaean inclusion or its exclusion elsewhere hinges on the redactional interest of the gnome Mt 5:15 parr Mk 4:21; Lk 8:16; 11:33, a sentence on the very
borderline between parable and gnome. The historical sequence of
invention and redaction behind this saying and the four gnomai which
follow in Mk 4 (vv. 22, 23, 24 and 25) and (excepting Mk 4:23,24) in Lk
8 is less at issue here than the inescapable independence of these
gnomai implied in the evangelists' redactional liberty whether to
collect or disperse and in either case to vary performationally and
hermeneutically (nb the special character of the Lucan versions) these
Wanderlogien, each of which conserves throughout its recognizable
core of logic and imagery. In this case it is difficult to imagine
that gnomai originally dispersed, as apparently in 'Q', were
secondarily compiled into the collection now in Mk 4: the separate
sayings are too well integrated into their various Matthaean and Lucan
contexts to motivate such violent redational relocation, though more
complicated developments are imaginable. Moreover, although the
Marcan version of the unusual (pre-Marcan?) gnomic composition
coheres loosely around the theme of final revelation and adjustment,
underscored by the emphatic gnome v. 23 (repeated in Marcan redaction
from 4:9?), the individual gnomai, especially those of the discourse's
second sub-section (vv. 24, 25), are otherwise painfully discordant
with one another in spite of a mediating "gloss" on the gnomic core of
4:24. Thus the Lucan parallel collection (8:16-18), at the price of
blunting the sharply compounded intensity of Mark 4, moderates the
paradoxes of vv. 22, 25 by skillful hermeneutical additions to
otherwise intact gnomic cores and relegates the least apposite of
Mark's gnomai to the better integrated, ultimately less contradictory
context of Lk 6:38 (though see below on this verse). Where, as
between Mk 4:21ss and Lk 8:16ss, a development of literary technique
is one way or the other virtually certain, the fact that one literary

167
version, in this case the Marcan, is marked by bold, immediately audible structures (the emphatic repetitions of the formula, kai elegen autois, vv.21,24 and of the summons to attention, vv.23,23), by repeated paradox and by a toleration of contradictions of detail, ie by a noticeably less literary sensibility, should count provisionally in favour of its priority unless there is special reason to see the redactional process as one of deliberate literary mutilation.

This particular situation is complicated still further, however, by the location of one gnome, Mk 4:24 par Lk 6:38b, at the heart of two distinct collections of gnomai between which it is the sole point of redactional contact. It is difficult to imagine a clearer indication of the importance of gnome in the birth and development of synoptic written tradition than this intersection of apparently separate redactional paths in slightly variant interpretations and contextualizations of a single impressive core. At the same time the saying provides a striking instance of gnomic independence and resilience even through intensive, perhaps successive, literary redactions. The range of Synoptic interpretation of this gnome is, by the way, fairly obviously not over-determined by the much more narrowly juridical sense of Ptolemaic parallels. If comparison between Mk 4 and Lk 8 tends to suggest the relative literary and probably secondary character of the latter, the redactional differences between Mt 7:1-5 and Lk 6:37-42 are more ambiguous, though just as clearly indicative of the importance of gnome as both a means and an inspiration for redactional change. The logical minimum of the
'Q' discourse against judging, the central saying Lk 6:38c/Mt 7:2b= Mk 4:24c, interpreted by an introductory gnome Lk 6:37a/Mt 7:1 and illustrated by an extended metaphor, is also the exact measure of material shared in this context by our two extant versions. Given the occurrence of the 'metric' gnome in Mk 4:24 and its weak integration into that context, it is more than plausible to guess that the logical and redactional minimum of the Matthaeo-Lucan composition on judging is itself an interpretation, again literary by comparison with Mark's, of an orally independent gnome. What is not speculative is that the rubric Mt 7:1/Lk 6:37a and the imaginative illustration (again from the border-lands of gnome and parable) determine the meaning of the gnome about measurement in a more ethically normative direction than the textually less integrated but clearly eschatological Marcan performance. This tactic of contextual specification by supplementing gnome with gnome is carried further in both our surviving literary redactions: in Mt 7 the connection between vv. 1 and 2b is made formally explicit in the hybrid gnome v. 2a; in Lk 6, by contrast, the interpretive rubric v. 37 is emphasized over against the central gnome by a catalogue of parallel forms building to the ethical climax of v. 38. Then the addition of two more gnomai with a Lucan introductory formula16 (vv. 39, 40) further qualifies on emphatically dominical authority the (original?) gnome on just measurement: its horizons are not those of apocalyptic retribution or of revelation to reward discernment as in Mk 4:24, but rather those of secular society and of the fraternity of disciples in which Jesus alone (v. 39b) gives (v. 39a) and is (v. 40) the relevant paradigm. The 'metric' saying is simply eliminated from Lk 8: in Lk 6 its meaning is radically transformed by the ethical disproportionality of

169
Christian experience (vv. 38, 40) beyond an ethical situation of unredeemed reciprocity (v. 39b). It is of course uncertain how much of this redactional/compositional achievement should be attributed to the evangelist and how much to his source. As with the gnomai of Mk 4 so also with those of Lk 6:39-40, Matthaean dispersion to separate, well-integrated contexts rich in evidence of redactional activity suggests that the collected form in Lk is pre-Matthaean in outline. Certainly the contexts of predicted suffering for disciples of Jesus, Mt 10:24, and of sharp polemic, 15:14 cf 23:16, 24, offer few invitations for further redaction.

From the point of view of comparative orality, Matthaean redaction of individual gnomai into argumentatively integrated and subordinated contexts seems more self-consciously literate than the repetitions, redundancies, more or less controlled contradictions, dependence for emphasis upon introductory formulae and the cumulative effect of series of co-ordinate (rather than argumentatively subordinated) sayings which characterize both Mk 4:21-25 and Lk 6:37-42. This does not mean that either of these collections is strictly an 'oral text', though it does add to the probability of their redactional priority over Matthew's work. The only firm conclusions are that redactional use of gnome varies with the literary techniques and sensibilities of different - especially successive - writers within a literary tradition, but that the gnomic character of the tradition remains assertive. This can be established not only against Matthaean redactive practice but also on the basis of the rather more subtle differentiation between Lk 6 and Mk 4 in their uses of gnome.
and the balancing of orality and literacy. In several respects these two collections show similar traces of strong orality, even apart from the basic fact that each, particularly in contrast to the Matthaean tangential developments, emphasizes the integrity of discrete gnomai within the composition.

As we have seen, the Marcan pericope 4:21-25 depends for its structure mainly upon the repetition of an introductory formula and of a gnomic summons to attention. In addition the passage is marked by minor verbal redundancy (v. 21 ἐν...ἐν...) and by considerable semantic tension among the gnomai: the repeated γὰρ hardly indicates any clear subordination of thoughts while a redactional supplement (καὶ προστέθεται ὑμῖν) to the core of v. 24 makes only a fragile bridge to v. 25. The main internal division of the Lucan discourse 6:37-42 is likewise marked by a formulaic introduction (v. 39a). Moreover, considerable tension amongst the individual gnomai is brought under redactional control again by explanatory additions which are themselves almost gnomai (vv. 37b-38b, 40b). The repetitiveness of the opening polysyndeton (six of twenty-two words are καὶ) is above all an orally-aurally appreciable figure of speech. Beyond these similarities of oral orientation in the texts, however, there are indications of the specifically Lucan harmony between literacy and strong orality which reconsideration and comparative study of Goulder's redactional poetics exposed. Indeed among the Synoptists the auctor ad Theophilum approaches most nearly the ideal of progymnasmatic education, exploiting the techniques and sensibility of literacy to refine, even imitate oral performance. Thus in the Marcan discourse the major division of the 'text' is indicated very audibly
by the formula *kai elegen autois*, a form which apart from its structural function has little theological or narrative significance. The central *gnome* is the unit, v. 22, likewise signalled by the reuse here of a Marcan *gnome*, v. 23; though certainly itself a symbol of Marcan theology it is nevertheless used here essentially to emphasize without modifying the preceding saying and by means of echoes in 24b to subordinate the difficult saying v. 24 to the theme of 'hidden revelation' in v. 22. In the Lucan sample the division is indicated by the common introduction, "Eipen de *kai* parabolen *autois*..." In this instance, however, the content of the formula - the reference to parabole - is hermeneutically significant beyond any formulaic function of the phrase; in contrast to Mk 4:21a, 24a, the Lucan formula in all its occurrences has the functions not only of audible narrative punctuation but also of an explicitly authorial hermeneutical clue. Mk 4:23, 24b more nearly resembles Lk 6:39 in its argumentative function, but unlike the Lucan cliché its authorial character is concealed: Mk 4:23 is itself a complete *gnome*, reported in direct speech and attributed to Jesus.

That these subtly differing uses of formulaic marks are related to the relatively strong orality of both passages and are therefore good indices of difference in this respect between them is further indicated by the absence from both of other signs of argumentative subordination: both appear otherwise to be ordered in a primarily cumulative sequence cemented by the simplest conjunctions (*gar*; *kai*). Once again, however, this shared polysyndetic character, generally indicative of strong residual orality, is rather more equivocal in
Lk 6. Thus the vv. 37b–38a bridge the interpretive gap between vv. 37a and 38a by a catalogue of gnomai constructed on the formal and logical pattern of the opening admonition against judging; this is notably not the only context in Lucan redaction marked by strongly moralizing (rather than eschatological) gnomai in the form of simple reciprocal proportions (cp 7:47; 12:28; 14:11; 16:10; 18:14). The polysyndeton and formal regularity of the series conceal much more than a straightforward accumulation of parallels; there is movement from negative to positively formulated commands and on to the climactic homoeoteleuton of v. 38b which enables the reader to accept the proverbial gnome v. 38c without its obvious retributive associations. In other words, although Lk 6 shows many of the same signs of oral residue as Mk 4, the design of the Lucan passage is much less fully explicable in terms simply of strong orality: there is a remainder, not least in the Lucan taste for subtly measured climax, which suggests the special balance and self-conscious integration of oral and literate culture in Hellenistic Rhetoric.

Begging many questions of redactional-critical method, it is still possible to offer Mk 4:24c, its parallels and developments as a particularly fair illustration of three essential points. In the first place, evident redactional interest in modifying, transferring, deleting, coining and interpreting gnomai confirms the relevance to Synoptic criticism of the Hellenistic rhetorical category and broadly the structural analysis that allows identification of individual Synoptic gnomai. In the second, the anticipation, from criticism of Coulter's research, is borne out that the treatment of gnomai by
different redactors would be an index of personal balances between orality and literacy as well as generally of the strong residual orality shared within the tradition as a whole. That the Matthaean bridge-form (7:20) is the product of reflection on the written words of vv. 1 and 2b is made probable by its mechanical dependence on the following as well as the preceding gnome - to the extent of using unfamiliar materials in a strained setting (en krimati) in order to wed the vocabulary of one gnome to the syntax of another to produce a kind of gnomic hybrid. Lk 6 also provides a bridge of gnomic material between incompatible gnomai (vv. 37a, 38c), but this is less clearly the product of literary technique. The hidden literacy of Lucan redactional style can reliably be measured only in comparison with Marcan compositional technique: both evangelists are intolerant of the superficial contradiction between thematically similar gnomai, but the Lucan solution consists of a relatively thorough-going textual reintegration of the individual sayings while the Marcan relies upon insertion between gnomai of largely formulaic punctuation. Indeed Mk 4:24b is hermetically as well as hermeneutically isolated by the preceding calls to attention and interpretive caution (vv. 23, 24), which underscore v. 22 and set the "metric" gnome into a strange context of apocalyptic discernment, and the duplicating extension v. 24 ad fin., which distorts v. 24c and prepares for its supercession by v. 25: in effect, the meaning of Mk 4 would hardly be altered if the gnome v. 24b were dropped, as of course it is from Lk 8:16-18.

The relative orality of Mk is clearest not in some supposed structural simplicity or naivety, but in its commitment to the linear, sequential development of spoken and heard communication; Lucan composition - or Matthaean - suggests by contrast an art of spacing related forms in a
written medium (eg Mt 7:1-2; Lk 6:37-38). In the third place, Mk 4:24b parr is a good instance of a gnome the core structure of which is largely respected through redactional processes of hermeneutical (Mk 4:24 ad fin.) and performantial (Lk 6:38c, antimetreo) variation and elaborate contextual reinterpretation, even editorial omission. Mk 4:21-25 parr and Lk 6:37-42 par show that the category of gnome can be a useful index of redactional activity and style; the same categorization, however, also identifies a datum more basic than any identifiable literary redactor in Mk 4:24c and a range of gnomic material (eg Lk 6:39, 40) which does not seem redactional, or necessarily literary in origin.

Redactional interest in and respect for gnome can also be attractively illustrated from the Wanderlogien of the first/last and of self-exaltation/humility. Perhaps the simplest version of the former, Mk 9:35, is set in its context so curiously as to raise questions about Marcan redaction even if synoptic comparison were impossible: v. 35 and vv. 36, 37 seem equally satisfactory but to that extent reciprocally superfluous conclusions to a single chria introduction. In fact Mk 9:33-37 with its three suspiciously similar transitional formulae (vv. 35a, 36a, b) can be taken to illustrate not one or two but all three of the traditional subtypes of the progymnasmatic chria: the introduction vv. 33, 34 makes with v. 35 a logike chreia; with v. 36a instead, a praktike chreia; with vv. 36, 37 (and perhaps 35 for good measure) the mixed chreia mikte.19 In the main, then, VK Robbins' helpful essay on Mk 10:13-16 parr and Mk 9:33-37 parr is quite correct to represent the redaction of these chriae as
exemplary of the progymnasmatic rules for the elaboration and variation of chria in rhetorical performance or written composition. Some protest may still be made against the bland failure to distinguish the essential programme of the progymnasmata, mainly oral education in public-speaking, from their secondary though natural interest in and influence upon written composition, a failure which distorts Robbins' otherwise exemplary view of 'rhetorical process'. Thus, for example, where Robbins has Theon advising his students to write out their chria-variations, there is in fact no reference even implied to the use of writing and a clear expectation of oral performance; the very fact that Theon has to recommend daily writing practice for each student is probably a fair indication of the important but secondary place of literacy in the progymnasmatic curriculum. Robbins' interest in the relationship between the two parts of 9:36 in the conjectured evolution of this chria even 'before the story reached the writers of the synoptic gospels' seems to have distracted him from the irreducible structural redundancy of the Marcan unit, which principally distinguishes it from either the Matthaean or the Lucan version. For Robbins, Mark uses the chreia about greatness as a setting to introduce a maxim [the gnome Mk 9:35] that recalls the teaching in Mark 8:34 and which even more clearly anticipates its own restatement in Mk 10:31, but this is to oversimplify the redactional situation in Mk 9. That is, the importance of Mk 9:33-37 seems not to lie in the possibility of reconstructing an original pre-synoptic form of the chria or even in the plausible literary priority of the Marcan version, but in the
likelihood that the Marcan collection reflects the pluralism of oral chria-performance in literary acceptance of an orally established formal redundancy. Mk 9:35 and 8:34 do share similarly nuanced formulaic introductions (kai...eipen/elegen autois) and conditional format (ei tis thelei...); more important, 9:35 and 10:31 have much the same structural core but with a change in normative range and urgency from optional/imperative to specific/indicative respectively. What distinguishes 9:35 from these analogues is above all its curious relationship to the chria context: 9:34 introduces a series of sayings, several of them gnomai, while 10:31 has the typically gnomic function of a semi-independent appendix to a larger unit, so that the other synoptic instances of this gnomic core are all either the concluding (Lk 9:48; 13:30; 18:14; 14:11; Mt 23:11, 12; 19:30; 20:16) or the penultimate (Lk 22:26; Mk 10:43b, 44; Mt 20:26b, 27; 18:4) element in a larger context.

Lk 9:48 and Mt 18:4 are of course particularly apposite as they represent two redactional solutions, both of which respect the unity of the chria-form by subordinating the paradoxical gnome to the practical demonstration. All these analogues serve essentially to emphasize that the paratactic redundancy of Mk 9:35 is witness not to the literary incompetence of Marcan redaction but to its special sensitivity to the equality of performantial alternatives in the oral elaboration of chriae. The manner of including a gnome at Mk 9:35 thus attests by its very peculiarity a strong redactional interest, an interest which is nevertheless limited in its freedom by the shadow of oral performantial tradition connecting this gnome to this particular situation to form one of several possible chriae yet incidentally
documenting the independence of the **gnome** by comparison with the situationally more engaged 9:37 parr. Robbins concludes - and in relation to these same gospel contexts - that 'it is necessary to distinguish between free-floating maxims and maxims that have arisen through a rhetorical process in which a general statement has been created as commentary of a chreia tradition.' Lk 9:48 and Mt 6:8:4 do have the formal aspect of, in Crossan's phrase, 'aphoristic commentary', but it is in precisely this respect that the Marcan 9:35 differs, presenting itself in the strictest formal parallel to the demonstrative action in v.36a and in no logical sense a commentary upon it: an unpromising ground for evolutionary preferences.

This same independence is dramatized in a quite different way by the dispersion of the same basic core structure(s) of socially first/last, self-exalting/humbled in a variety of performantial and hermeneutical variations attached loosely to one another. Thus the form as well as the position of Lk 9:48 may be treated as inventive redaction of Mk 9:35, as also Mk 10:31 par Mt 19:30 cf 20:16 and Mk 10:43b, 44 parr Mt 20:26b, 27; Lk 22:26, 27b, though the derivation of Lk 13:30 from literary influence would be difficult to prove. The close association through Mt 18:4 and 23:11, 12 between this family of variations and sayings of a very similar analogical kind about humbling/exalting is, however, at odds with the formal purity and exclusively Lucan contexts of Lk 18:14; 14:11 in a way that makes it difficult to speak of literary relationship. Clearly the **gnomai** about the first/last and humiliation/exaltation have been attractive objects for intensive redactional variation and reuse in ways that have
everything to do with differing authorial styles and with the larger structural requirements of each literary composition, as, for example, in the Marcan architectural use of repetition and variation in 9:35b; 10:31; 10:43bf. These gnomai are not exactly 'free-floating' either in redactional development or, hypothetically, in an oral tradition which within different constraints can be just as purposeful. Fundamentally, though, neither core pattern, the protos/eschatos or the tapeinoun/hypsoun, can in all its synoptic instances be described solely as the product of a redactional 'rhetorical process' without reference to the complication of a much less fixedly literate gnomic tradition.

Strong redactional interest in and freedom with gnome may again be evidenced alongside a certain gnomic transcendence of literary redaction in the complex of differences between Mk 9:42-50 and its partial parallels. 9:43-47(48) is among the longest of synoptic units describable as gnome: emphatically normative and analogically structured (two relations, between physical wholeness and moral/spiritual integrity respectively and eschatological destiny are opposed though not as simple contraries), its at least potential independence is indicated by the Matthaean double use (18:8f; 5:29f). Indeed, the Marcan version is more in the nature of a gnomic discourse in which a basic core and conditional introduction are repeated into an extended tricolon with the addition of rather randomly placed and, from the point of view of content, redundant amplifications on geenna (vv.43 ad fin., 48; cf misplacements in 44, 46). Examination of this three-fold saying shows in fact a degree of barely modified verbal iteration which goes well beyond the norms of either Hebrew verse
parallelism or mnemotechnical triplet-form as in Ab. If we discount the two extraneous notes on geenna, and two synonymous variations (once each, apelthein for blethenai and basilean tou theou for zoen) only the bare minimum of variation necessary to express the hand, foot, eye pattern (affecting ten words in a total seventy-nine) is allowed to modify strict verbal repetition. This performantial development of a single gnomic form in three minimally differing variations seem calculated, if not necessarily to make a memorizable school-text, then certainly to given an aurally more memorable and impressive rhetorical effect. Such repetition and randomness are plausibly attributable to Marcan literary development, so that as always identification of oral residue in a written text is strictly relative; that said, however, by comparison with the Matthaean versions and on criteria of almost formulaic repetition and toleration, even cultivation of formal redundancies, the three-fold Marcan series does seem more calculated to impress the hearer than the reader, composed by a writer whose sensibilities seem consistently and effectively those of a public speaker. It is this general continuity of sensibility between synoptic diversity altogether (with Marcan versions in particular) and the technical orality of Jesus' earliest tradition which, combined with the special continuity of gnome between oral and written composition, offers some hope of contact with Jesus' rhetoric in the style as well as the individual fragments of the synoptic sayings tradition. At any rate, both Matthaean versions of this discursively extended gnome reduce the — in literary terms rather laboured — Marcan triple development to two-part parallelism by omitting the foot from the sample of potentially scandalous body—
parts. The two Marcan comments on *geenna*, out of balance with each other and with their three-part context, are simplified and better integrated into each Matthaean composition.

The weakness of the catchword connections of the next two Marcan sayings (Mk 9:49, 50) to their context and to one another and the quite dissimilar contextualization of both Mt 5:13 and Lk 14:34, 35 highlight the independence of these two *gnomai*. V.49 is especially interesting as it reapplies language related to sacrificial cult in a much wider field of normative connotation: a non-analogical norm has become a particularly difficult *gnome* of rare intensity in its mixed and undefined metaphors of fire and salt. This verse is doubly important because it shares this relationship of analogical extension from Mosaic norms with the one other Marcan *gnome* not attested in Mt and Lk, Mk 2:27. For the present, though, we need only notice again the interest of *gnomai* for literary redactors together with the difficulty of reducing 9:49 or, for that matter, 2:27 to mere redactional authorial developments from their Marcan contexts. Or, in other words, authorial inclusion of Mk 2:27 and 9:49 is most characteristic of Marcan redactional/compositional values where these are at least often more tolerant than the other Synoptists' of forcefully independent sub-units equivocally related to their literary contexts. If this modest comparative singularity of Marcan *gnome*-use may reasonably be related to a relatively oral style generally, it may also provide an occasion to recall (1) - lest Marcan literacy be discounted - that detection of oral traces in written texts is strictly comparative and (2) that judgements of relative orality or literacy need not entail, though they could inform, aesthetic or
theological preferences.

The **gnome** which follows in Mk, 9:50, could more plausibly be described as a development from its preceding context; what is certain, however, is that neither Mt not Lk sensed any such dependence. Here as elsewhere (e.g. Mk 8:35 parr cf Mt 10:39 par Lk 17:33; Mk 9:40 par Lk 9:50b cf Lk 11:23 par Mt 12:30; Mk 13:31 parr cfMt 5:18 par Lk 16:17) significant differences between 'Marcan' and 'Q' instances of single gnomic cores make it difficult to reduce gnomic variation to a literary redactional phenomenon. In this case, Lk 14:34, 35 and Mt 5:13 agree in giving the same gnomic core found in Mk 9:50 - a definitive proposition about salt followed by a hypothetical reversal and rhetorical question - without any explicit reference to that of 9:49 (although Mt **halisthesetai** may be an echo) and in providing, in different but related versions, a speculative consequence to the hypothetical condition. The implications of this sort of performaial variation within 'Q' material apart, the differences in contextualization and detail between the Lucan and Matthaean and between the Matthaeo-Lucan and Marcan versions document once more both the considerable, though still limited, extent of redactional liberty and the pre-synoptic independence of the shared **gnome**-core. It is a fair measure of this real but limited role of **gnome** that about a quarter of all instances shared by Mt and Lk, whether from Marcan or 'Q' material or both, are the essential links between otherwise redactionally unrelated contexts, and not only, though noticeably, in the composition (or dismemberment) of gnomic collections in Mk 4 and Lk 6 (cf Mk 4:21 par, 22 par, 24 par, 25 par;
This is the equivocal relation to redactional practice which we should expect from a category which functions so often to link tradition and innovation, oral and literary composition: the same Matthaeo-Lucan relationship which allows some measurement of the frequency with which gnomai appear as redactional-critical differentiae obliges us to refer the same gnomai to at least an earlier stage of literary development.

II Gnomai in 'Q' Material

The compilation of parables and gnomai on the right and wrong use of wealth in Lk 16, interrupted by vv.16, 17 and 18, is a case in point. As J Dupont has argued in an exemplary approach to the gnome Lk 16:13 par, the central discourse on money with its catchword construction (oikonomos; oikonomia vv.1-9, oiketes v.13, mamonas vv.11, 13) is sufficiently atypical of Lucan composition to be probably the work of a pre-synoptic author. Within this longer unit, v.13 is only superficially assimilated; its potential, probably original, independence is essayed in the verbally identical (except for the omission of oiketes) Mt 6:24, the sole point of contact between Lk 16 and Mt 6. Part of a series of gnomai in short spoken settings (vv.8 +9 commentary; 10 +11, 12 comm; 13a +13b-d comm; 15 ad fin. +14, 15 comm), v.13 is itself a complete discourse: the opening gnome is followed by a more or less synonymous parallel which subtly redirects attention from the servant's predicament to the character of his relationships to the competing masters, an interpretive movement.
completed in a sort of inclusio by the concluding, transformed reprise of the opening gnome specifying the dilemma of a no longer generalized (dunasthe) audience.

The source- and redactional-critical situation is complex, specifically in relation to the balance of orality/literacy and the use of gnome: though linked to the surrounding context by shared themes and catchwords and by the structural importance of gnomai, 16:10-12 and 13 stand out together as four-line expositions of a gnome given in the opening line of each. By contrast, the patterns of concluding a parable as in 16:1-9 or a chria (especially a controversy) as in vv.14-15 with a gnome can be widely documented in Lk and in the other Synoptics. Moreover, where Mk 9:33-37 parr or 10:13-16 may be represented as conforming to regular progymnasmatic practice for the expansion of a chria, these two quatrains seem to be formally more stylised and thematically more specific than the specimen gnome-expositions of the progymnasmatists.34 The two gnome-poems resemble each other not only in being expositions in each case of a gnome and in shared reference to Mammon, but also in reliance upon fixed line-forms and lengths and upon syntactical parallelism to give very much the impression of a regular, if short verse-form. The two stanzas differ as verse, but only superficially: the first is constructed in two couplets, giving the gnome in two forms, positive and negative (cp Mt 11:17/Lk 7:32b), and then a 2pp application again in two forms, this time complementary; the second stanza begins, as noted, with the gnome followed by an explanation given in synonymous parallelism and then a restatement of the opening gnome modified only to identify explicitly the audience (2pp) and the two masters. That
the priority of the gnomai over their respective stanzas is more than logical, is suggested by the very difficulty of the logic which in each quatrain leads to a deliberately startling as well as personal conclusion.

The balance of orality and literacy in these two gnomic miniatures eludes easy description. The fairly superficial catch-word organization of the chapter is compatible with either oral or mnemotechnical influence, but the verse-forms in 16:10-12 and 13 distinguish their orality to some extent from that residual in Lk or Lk's sources. Comparison with the rather strongly oral, probably not mnemotechnical tricolon in Mk 9:43-47 may be helpful: Lk 16:10-12 and 13 offer only double repetition more compatible with mnemotechnical composition/transmission than the rhetorically impressive but memorizationally useless tripling of Mk 9; secondly, the unit of repetition is the couplet in Lk 16 (though one couplet in v.13 bisects the other), more compact than the free Marcan form; finally, the density of variation is much higher in the (pre-)Lucan passages. That is, the proportion of words affected by significant variation is much greater in the Lucan quatrains (23/74 or 31%) than in the Marcan tricolon (10-14/79 or 13-18%), raising the suspicion (made even more tentative by the likelihood of a non-Greek textual background and consequent loss of any alliterative or metrical structure) that the Lucan stanzas are poems composed - rather more than the Marcan passage in our comparison - with a view to verbatim memorization and mnemotechnical transmission or publication: they are not just memorable, they are memorizable, a difference which is likely to have
been deliberate as it is essential to the sayings' form of a memorable (and variable) gnome + a memorizable (and therefore less flexible) application.

In the same speculative vein, it is tempting to find in these two thematically and formally related but clearly distinct gnome-interpretation verses the remains of an "oral genre" to which, in contrast to gnome itself, properly form-critical questions of, eg, Sitz im Leben might be addressed. At any rate, the balance of orality and literacy in these verses and the use of gnome are clearly not those typical of Lucan redaction or of the "Q" material generally or in the immediate Lucan context. Like gnomai, these little poems are equally adapted for oral presentation and for literary collection. Unlike gnomai, indeed as carefully specific applications of gnomai, they embody a drive away from performantly free variation of cores toward verbally fixed textuality, which requires us to think not of the most strongly oral, virtually conversational, tradition, but rather of mnemotechnical or written design and use. Still, if these gnome-commentaries in four sense-lines of standard length could conceivably, and more probably than Q as a whole, 'represent an oral genre', it is a genre unfamiliar from culturally adjacent literatures which may be appealed to for mnemonically fixed oral traditions, as in old Testament prophecy or among the Rabbis.

Once again though, at the very least, these two stanzas and their Lucan/Q context attest differing but uniformly strong redactional/compositional interest in gnome at the same time as they imply the prior independence of the gnomic habit generally and probably of individual gnomai like Lk 16:10 and 13a par Mt 6:24a at

186
every level of Synoptic redactional and compositional development. A third gnomic Quatrain is to be detected in Mt 6:22-23/Lk 11:34-36, especially if Luke's v.36 is regarded as a redactional gloss. Structurally this verse very much resembles Mt 6:24 par: in both, an opening, and very probably proverbial gnome is amplified in a closely parallelistic couplet followed by a fourth line in which the original gnome is applied within an intensified perspective which is at once more definitely personal and more dualistically eschatological. Indeed the movement from objectively prudent gnomic principle to personally and eschatologically intensified normative reception is the hallmark of the Quatrain-form.

A context less significant, because so densely gnomic, but still interesting for the comparison of Matthaean and Lucan attitudes to gnomai within the 'Q' material, is that of Mt 5:38-48 and Lk 6:27-36. The Lucan and Matthaean versions differ in many details and especially in the order in which each presents similar matter and in the range of stylistic (perhaps sometimes translational) variation, the literary counterparts of oral performantial variation. What is of interest for the present, however, is the focal place of several gnomai amid these redactional/compositional differences. In the first place, the importance, and also the separability of the Golden Rule are indicated by its Matthaean isolation (Mt 7:12) as well as by its less dramatic Lucan use as a bridge between gnomic demands for non-retaliation and actual love for enemies. Indeed, two emphatically analogical gnomai (kathos vv.31, 36) used in the typical, though not at all exclusively,
Lucan manner as conclusions to more discursive or parabolic units, give the section a relatively coherent ethical and theological framework, equivalent to the double mandate of Lk 10:27; the Matthaean framework is provided instead by the logic and the formulae of the antithesis, in which the style of the Matthaean sermonist appears in its most self-conscious balancing of orality and literacy: as in the literature of philosophical diatribe and epitome an explicitly oral form and tone is literally [sic] reconstructed. The "oral hermeneutic" demanded by these nonetheless literary texts is in the antithesis form further complicated by the sharp qualification of one explicitly oral authority (ekousate hōtì errethe...) with another (ego de lego humin...) when both oral authorities turn out to be substantially though not exhaustively written, in the Old Testament and in the Sermon itself respectively. However these paradoxical juxtapositions of orality and literacy are to be worked out in the Sermon and in the gospel as a whole, the distinctiveness of gnomai and their importance to redactional/compositional differentiation are visible not only in the different structural values attached to the gnomai Mt 5:45b, 48 and Lk 6:35 ad fin., 36, but also in the differing content of Lucan and Matthaean versions: the Lucan forms of both gnomai are varied to fit their context and the ethos of Lk generally, in contrast especially to the surprisingly secular wisdom of Mt 5:45b, but also to the more austere 5:48 (though Mt 5:48 and Lk 6:36 do share the very common gnomic function of marking a transition between literary sections). This Lucan redactional piety in comparison with a Matthaean secular gnome is, moreover, repeated in the difference between Mt 6:34 with its two almost fatalistic gnomai and the much more theologically and pastorally controlled Lk 12:32.
In Mt 6:19-21/Lk 12:33-34, the shared gnome, (Mt v.21; Lk v.34) has once more the function of concluding a section and linking it with the following context. In this case the gnomic saying is not the object of redactional difference, but instead the point of contact between strongly differentiated parallel redactions set in quite different overall contexts. The only variation of the gnome itself is in the number of the personal pronoun which in Mt only and against the plurals in preceding verses is singular, anticipating maybe the following Matthaean pericope, but in any case accentuating the independence of the gnome from its interpretive situation. Even in so small an example, the real point of these comparisons is clear: that the relationship between gnome and the redactional/compositional procedures of the gospel writers attests both the creative individuality and the formal independence and probable priority of many gnoma, even those most closely associated with redactional activity, over their literary contexts.

III  Gnomai in Special Material

Gnomai which exist only in the special material of a single evangelist might be thought to show most unequivocally the creativity of the redactor/author, especially where, as in Mt, half of the special gnomai (Mt 5:14b; 6:34b; 7:6; 7:15; 10:8) are enclosed in or appended to "Q" material. Already the uncertain integration of Mk 2:27 and 9:49 into their respective contexts has been adduced to suggest limits to authorial freedom in the selection or creation of
gnomai: a range of Matthaean and Lucan peculiarities may also be cited to show indeed considerable compositional liberty but also the resistance of even authorially introduced gnomai to complete absorption into their literary contexts and the coherence of such gnomai with pre-Synoptic as well as more broadly gnomic tradition.

Mt 7:6 is an interesting case in point. Formally, it is to be compared with the other three four-line gnomic poems, Lk 16:10-12; 13 par Mt 6:22f par, treated above; all four units share the basic form of a gnome supplemented by parallelistic, but argumentatively pointed comments designed to focus interpretation of the first element as well as, thematically, an almost dualistic interest in the opposition of sacral/secular property and its faithful/unrighteous disposition. Like Lk 16:10-12, Mt 7:6 follows the basic gnome immediately with a parallel restatement, though in the latter text the shift from to hagion to tous margaritas humon indicates already a double interpretive step toward the application of sacral but still material metaphors to the social institutions and traditions of a definite group and reserves the final couplet for a reinforcement and development of the reciprocal hostility implied by the anti-Gentile or, in this metaphorical context, more broadly anti-outsider images. The argument of Mt 7:6, then, is in two movements, from to hagion to tous margaritas humon in the first couplet and from the kuon/choiros imagery to the corresponding double threat of persecution in the second, to make a chiasm only somewhat different in structure from th of Lk 16:13 or Mt 6:22f par, and very like them in acerbity of tone. That this analogy of form between Mt 7:6 and the three units in
Lk 16:10-13 and Mt 6:22f par rather dramatically crosses source-critical categories makes it doubly appealing to see behind these sayings not the textuality of a written source but that of a mnemotechnical oral tradition of quite limited scope concerned precisely with fixing the interpretation of a few of many gnomai from formally and technically less defined oral tradition. But the essential and less speculative point for the moment is that the gnome Mt 7:6a is to some extent at odds with the immediate context of the rest of a verse, which is deliberate modification and expansion of a formally, logically and possibly traditionally distinct 'proverb', a proverb indeed like Lk 16:10, 13a of more than commonplace sharpness (Mt 6:22a is, perhaps, tamer). This further separability of Mt 7:6 as a whole from its literary context whether in Mt or a written source confirms the impression that the gnome with which the verse begins is more than an authorial development in the process of composition and more than an anonymous bon mot of general proverbial authority to either author or redactor. In this case, of course, the separability and quite likely the traditional independence of the gnome are indicated not only by traces within the gospel text but also by citation as a saying [sic] of the Lord in Didache 9:5 as the conclusion of one of the sections of that document for which the most serious claims to an unwritten, substantially pre-Synoptic tradition may be made. The Didachist's use of this gnome is all the more important, as its sense shows no necessary relation to either the development in Mt 7:6 or the verse's larger context; in fact, the implied reference of to hagion in Did 9.5 to consecrated food seems quite contrary to the more metaphorically extended sense of the Matthaean performance.
Mt 7:15-20 offers instances in which the role of Matthaean redactional/authorial creativity is clearer as it combines and expands imagery and gnomai which appear in different combinations elsewhere in the same evangelist’s work. Thus, in keeping with the Matthaean Wisdom-literary taste for animal fables and proverbs, Mt 7:15 takes up the rather conventional imagery of one-sided conflict between sheep and wolves, perhaps from the commonplace tradition, perhaps from Mt 10:16a, compared with which the core structure of the analogy is considerably reworked to express both the deceit and the internal character of the pseudoprophetic threat to the flock: the opposition between enemy and friend is crossed with the opposition between inside and out. At least the separability of the gnome and probably its pre-Matthaean inclusion in this “Q” context is indicated by the parallel in Lk 10:3: Matthew places the gnome and a supplement at the end of his redaction of this section, Luke at the beginning as a supplement to the gnome Lk 10:2/Mt 9:37. In Mt 10:16 itself we find a pair of animal gnomai only the first of which can be referred to Q; the second, purely Matthaean depends likewise upon a conventional opposition between animal types though the opposition is intensified into paradox as Matthew’s readers are bidden to identify at once with the characteristics of contradictory stereotypes. Even granting, however, a Matthaean taste for animal-gnomai, similarity with Mt 10:16/Lk 10:3 warns, at least on presumption of a documentary Q, against hasty dismissal of 7:15 as redactional invention.

The larger part of Mt 7:15-20 is, however, taken up with variations on the gnomic core about the correspondence between a tree
and its fruit, imagery which appears in further mutations in Mt 12:33-35 and Lk 6:43-45, as well as in parabolic and allegorical expansion (Mt 13:24-30; 36-43; Lk 13:6-9; Jn 15:1-17). The essential core of the analogy seems to be expressed in Mt 7:16a (=7:20; 12:33b)/Lk 6:44a, which both discourses apply to a generally clear distinction between unspecified qualities (kaloς-sapros), Mt 7:17ss/Lk 6:43; Mt 12:33) and then also to a more mixed distinction between unproductive species of plant (thorns/brambles) and those which yield desirable fruit (figs/grapes, Mt 7:16/Lk 6:44). The organization of gnomic and other materials in Mt 7:15-20 may be seen in part as an attempt to overcome this disparity of imagery by bringing it into a clearer argumentative relationship with the explicitly defined problem of v.15: the essential conclusion of the Matthaean argument here, the solution to the problem of identifying pseudoprophets, is emphasized in the repeated gnomic summary vv.16, 20. Within this frame, the order of Mt 7:16, 17, reverse in comparison with Lk 6:43, 44, reduces the incongruity between general and specific, perhaps biblically inspired (Gn 3:18; Hos 10:8) imagery by offering the latter first as a relatively easy, because specific, example of discernment before stating and paraphrasing the general maxim. The rhetorical, if not necessarily logical strength of this Matthaean inferential pattern, leading to the conclusion (ara) of vv.16, 20 is remarkable in comparison with the succession of weaker links in the Lucan version (gar vv.43, 44 (bis), 45). In this quite deliberate Matthaean rhetorical structure of subordination of special (v.16b) to general (vv.17, 18) imagery and of the whole to a clearly stated problem (v.15) and to its solution (vv.16, 20), Mt 7:19 has an interesting place: it is an impressive though brief excursion from the topic of
recognition into that of punishment, an impressive interruption casting the long judicial and eschatological shadow of Matthaean ecclesiology (cf 16:19), but not really contributing to the inference of v.20 which depends primarily on vv.16b-18. This slightly intrusive character of the gnome 7:19 is confirmed by its absence not only from Lk 6 but also from the closely parallel development of Mt 12:33ss in which its functional equivalent is the appendix 12:36, 37 (on which see below).

The actual independence of Mt 7:19 from its context is, moreover, assured by its use in Mt 3:10/Lk 3:9, whence Matthew has doubtless adapted it in a bold transfer or rather duplication of attribution, first to John the Baptist and then derivatively to Jesus. It is hard to imagine a more impressive indication of the redactional usefulness of gnome, an indication which at the same time also points beyond the potentially misleading structural/formal separability which is a necessary part of our working definition of gnome toward actual gnomic independence. That in this case the independence of the gnome in relation to one of its contexts is - from the other - so demonstrably more redactional than traditional is notable because it is thoroughly exceptional even among those gnomai most closely bound up with redactional activity. Much more important, the exceptional Matthaean urge symbolically to represent and delimit the (undoubtedly historic) continuity of rhetoric (scil. in 'oral tradition') from the Baptist to the Christ confirms the impression that 7:19 is not wholly integrated into its context, again without reducing Mt 3:10/7:19 to a flourish of Matthaean poetry or theology as in the less gnomic duplication of

194
The point is obviously not that Mt 7:19=3:10 is a verifiably authentic saying of either putative speaker, but that even here, where redactional ingenuity is certain and redactional creativity most plausible, we find a gnome which is surprisingly not reducible to an authorial stylistic or theological reflex.

This degree of irreducibility cannot be confirmed in the related developments in Mt 12:34–37/Lk 6:45, but a few signs of gnomic resistance to authorial control may be noted. As in Mt 7:16, 17/Lk 6:44, 43 [sic], the reversed order of a gnomic pair in Mt 12:34b, 35/Lk 6:45b, allows not only for a more rhetorically pointed opening address (Mt 7:15; 12:34a respectively) but also for a more argumentatively subordinated presentation of the gnomai generally than that of the parallel Lucan section with its repeated "gar". Again, as in Mt 7:19, a gnomic series in response to an initial problem of deceptive appearances (7:15; 12:34) concludes with an eschatological gnomic tour de force. The differences, however, are telling: whereas 7:19 is grammatically unconnected to what precedes and logically unconnected to the inference which follows in v.20, 12:36, 37 are introduced by a new formula (v.36 lego de humin) and are formally the conclusion and not a sort of apostrophe to the argument of the whole section. Finally, 7:19 is in its entirety a gnome while the gnome 12:37 depends closely on the preceding verse. Still, if Matthaean authorship seems the simplest explanation for 12:37, the relatively paratactic structure of Lk 6:45, indeed of the whole of 6:37–4549 with the relative literacy of the Matthaean redactional parallels, makes it difficult to reduce gnomai like Mt 12:34b, 35/Lk 6:45w, to the work of any literary redactor. Above all, this is not simply to rephrase a
source-critical conclusion that Lk 6:37-45 more nearly represents a common source-document than its various Matthaean parallels, though proponents of a documentary 'Q' might find some comfort in attribution of a stronger oral residue to Q handling of this collection of gnomai than to more thoroughly Lucan or Matthaean developments. The vital point, which is independent of source-critical judgements, is that, with a few evidently literary-redactional exceptions (eg Mt 7:2; Lk 6:37; Mt 12:37), the abundant evidence of redaction in Lk 6:37ss and its parallels is consistent with an origin prior to any literary redaction of most gnomai in these sections and that a few in this group of sayings, especially Mk 4:24 parr, may contribute positively to the probability of such a supposition. The historian's great difficulty is not in assigning to such gnomai in general an entry into Synoptic literature from much less literary, conversational-rhetorical tradition, but in deciding how far to describe such tradition as characteristic of, or peculiar to the Jesus-movement.

A very few examples more will complete the list of gnomai which mark redaction-critical watersheds. Mt 22:14 has the quite common gnomic function of rounding off a longer discursive unit, in this case the clumsily extended parable of the great feast: its isolation at the margin of Matthaean redaction/composition relegates it also to the margins of the present sample of redactionally significant gnomai. The gnome Mt 26:52b is a salutary warning against the urge uncritically to equate gnomic formal separability with pre-literary origin; here a quasi-proverbial saying has been introduced in a relatively — in comparison with the Synoptic and Johannine parallels —
and evidently secondary attempt to make sense of a puzzling narrative detail. Affinities with Gn 9:6; Jer 15:2 and the problematic sayings Mt 10:34 par; Lk 22:36 do not detract from the judgement that Mt 26:52b is good Matthaean coinage. The important lesson is that without the further probabilities of special tradition-critical leverage, individual gnomai coined by a literate redactor are structurally indistinguishable from individual gnomai received from one kind of tradition or another. That there are very probable instances of both categories in the Synoptics (eg Mt 26:52b; Mk 4:24 respectively) is essential evidence of the continuity between literary and oral use of gnomai, but final historical judgements about the role of gnome in the formation and transmission of early Christian rhetoric and thought cannot be based on single cases but only on the whole gnomic category, insofar as it can be found to underline virtually every detectable level of written activity.

This difficulty of distinguishing traditional from authorial gnomai - indeed an impossibility on redactional-critical grounds alone - is illustrated in one last major example of a redactional seam marked by gnome-use, the unusually explicit identification of a proverbial gnome in Lk 4:23: not only is the gnome cited as a parabole (for this sense of the word see also 6:39), its ethopoetic attribution by Jesus to the Nazarenes marks it as a unit of the widest currency at least in the Lucan redactor's eyes, a currency confirmed, by the way, by widespread classical and rabbinic parallels. With the "Q" gnomai Lk 12:54f par; Lk 7:32b par and the gnomic dialogue Mk 7:27f par, Lk 4:23 is the Synoptic analogue to Eissfeldt's Old Testament proverb-performances compared with which they are
remarkable only for their less aristocratic social settings. The poor motivation and rough transition from Lk 4:16-22 to Jesus' speech have with other textual data given rise to source-critical explanations which entail at least a pre-Lucan composition for the gnome and its setting in v.23.

We may liken this in passing to the somewhat similar position of the gnome Lk 7:47: the history of the pericope Lk 7:36-50 is unclear, but formally the section is a graft of an anti-Pharisaic parable (vv.41-43, 47b) onto a narrative roughly parallel to that of Mk 14:3-9 par. The Lucan unit has a powerful dramatic unity in the opposition of the women and the Pharisee, but conceptually there is a curious - albeit effective - ambiguity of moral object-lessons: in the parabolic narrative and the gnome, love is a foreseeable consequence of being forgiven; in the primary narrative, love is by contrast liminal to forgiveness. As with Lk 4:16-22 so also here, the actual process behind the Lucan composition hardly matters, although some historical process (whether of redactional omission or commission in Synoptic relationship with Mk) surely does lie behind the dramatic tensions in the present texts. The main point is that the story's contrasting formal and tonal aspects come into their most intimate and inescapable contact in the gnome v.47b and its setting in Jesus' saying v.47a. The whole section is determined formally and quite possibly historically by reflection on and narrative inversion of a gnome which is at least not a derivation from the Marcan story.

Certainly compared with Mk 6:1-6a/Mt 13:53-58 and even in its
internal economy, Lk 4:16-30 is in some sense a hybrid story, a hybridization which makes the relations between story and gnome and between the two gnomai in vv.23, 24 all the more problematic, especially since the discovery of a hybrid version of our gnomai preserved without narrative framework (pOxyr. 1.6/EvTh 31). There is as well the further complication of the intrinsic factual plausibility of accounts/sayings which acknowledge Jesus' home-town failure. Whatever their value and probability, theories of source-conflation go only a very little way toward explaining how a literary redactor could allow so many aporias in so programmatic a composition. Another step may be taken by recognizing that the same juxtaposition of gnomai which divides the passage (and distinguishes it most fundamentally from the Marcan parallel) also gives it its greatest dramatic effect: within a minimal narrative, the reading from Isaiah and the discourse about Elijah and Elisha impressively frame a central dialogue which is further marked off by obtrusive introductory formulae (kai eipen pros autous... v.23; eipen de... v.24) which are in fact duplicated (pantos ereite moi... v.23; amen lego humin...v.24). The result is a statement of the uneasy relation between prophetic mission and prophetic reception, an uneasiness which is effectively expressed in the uneasy balance of the writing - whether by art or by chance, I cannot say. As for Luke's use of gnomai, we may say positively that the redactor/author of Lk 4:16-30 felt himself constrained (not merely licensed) to relate Jesus' rejection in Nazareth to both gnomai and that this constraint applied to the Marcan gnome as it did not to details as germane as the genomena eis ten Kapharnaoum of v.23 itself. That is, whatever the historicity of the event, its apparently independent association with each of two gnomai was stronger, at least
in Lucan literary redaction, than any other narrative detail.

The Marcan Nazareth-rejection too is not without inward tension between story and gnome; the initial similarities between Mk 6:1-6 and Mk 1:21-23, 27-28 are sufficiently striking to justify suspicions that the discontinuity of tone between 6:2 and 3 is not only a dramatic turn but also a trace of literary redactional development, leading the story toward the negative conclusion of v.4 and its consequences. The independence of the gnome is suggested also by its expansion to include kin and household with hometown in a narrative context which may mention also the first but condemns only the last of these. Needless to say, this falls far short of establishing the conclusion that Mk 6:4 par was the fulcrum for the secondary reorientation of an originally more optimistic story. It is enough, however, to underscore the importance of the gnome for the Marcan as well as for the Lucan redaction (with its two gnomai) and its probable independence even without reference to the external testimonies of Jn 4:44 and pOx 1.6/EvTh 31.

The mention of the Johannine and Egyptian attestations of the gnome of the prophet at home is a reminder that an even more fundamental problem underlies that of the relation between gnome and narrative in the Synoptics (or hybrid narrative and paired gnomai in Lk particularly), the problem of relations among variant performances of particular gnomic cores. Decisions about the relation of Jn 4:44 to the Synoptic instances will usually be prejudiced by more general considerations. Of the separability of the gnome from whatever
context the Johannine evangelist found it in and of its independence from the context of John 4 there can, however, be no doubt: once again, whether artfully or clumsily, the saying is sharply juxtaposed to its surroundings. The Egyptian versions are less helpful, as they may be taken to represent a dependent conflation of Lk 4:23 and 24. At a minimum, however, they do indicate an early concurrence with the judgement that these gnomai are at least in principle separable from their Synoptic contexts. In addition, the direction of the cross-fertilization is interesting as it hardly reflects the juxtaposition of gnomai in Jesus’ speech in Lk 4. A hint of tension with familiars as well as with compatriots is reintroduced, a tension explicit in Mk 6:4b but at most latent in Lk, where foreshadowing the Passion is the dominant interest. Any implied narrative in the second limb of pOx 1.6/EvTh 31 is, moreover, more congruent with the Marcan story (see especially 6:5) than with the Lucan (see especially 4:18-22). All in all, if pOx 1.6/EvTh 31 must be assigned literary parentage, it may as well be found in Mk 6 and 2:17 parr as in Lk 4:23, 24. At any rate, there seems to be no compelling reason to assume the literary dependence at this juncture of either the Johnannine or the Egyptian variants on our Synoptic witnesses and at least a few reasons for preferring, though indirect literary influence cannot be precluded, appeal to variation of these gnomai in predominantly oral transmission in which even a strong episodic connection with home-town rejection need not bespeak indissoluble commitment to a narrative (let alone a Synoptic) context.

Mercifully, the thesis that a significantly high proportion of Synoptic gnomai, including not a few embedded in narrative contexts,
has a claim to represent oral tradition independently of the historical pretensions of redactional contexts, does not require what in the case of Mk 6:1-6 parr Mt 13:53-58; Lk 4:16-30 cannot be supplied: a really satisfying history of the Synoptic redactional development. What matters more here than the possibility that the narratives were redactionally shaped, reshaped and/or mixed on the basis of pre-existent gnomai is (1) the certainty that the gnomai Mk 6:4 parr and Lk 4:23 are separable sub-units within rather loosely integrated narrative contexts and (2) the probability that at least the former gnome circulated - and in Jesus-tradition - independently of a textually fixed narrative about a Nazareth rejection-episode. Both of these and especially the difficult move from semantic separability to the probability of independent tradition are supported by the dislocations which mark both the Matthaeo-Marcan and the Lucan narratives, dislocations which do most likely indicate development seams, and which seem to isolate the gnomai as items of consciously distinct interest to successive redactors. The Johannine and Egyptian evidence establish the separability of the prophet-gnome and, despite the peculiar difficulties of Jn and EvTh in their relation to the Synoptic literature, add very considerably to the probability of their circulation within Jesus tradition as gnomai independent of textually fixed narrative context.

In other words, Mk 6:4 parr and, with its lesser probabilities, Lk 4:23 are important reminders that the structural separability required by definition for the detection of gnomai cannot be converted directly into tradition-historical independence without the mediation
of properly historical and therefore irredeemably probabilistic considerations. Thus in the present cases, structural separability is given greater significance by contextual indicators of actual separateness (e.g., formulaic introductions, tensions within the logic of the context). Separability is further extended into separateness and toward probable independence by Synoptic comparison of quite distinct but similarly stylized/hybridized episodic contexts and by reference to extra-Synoptic, more or less probably non-Synoptic Jesus-tradition. The fragmentary character of the latter as preserved in Jn, Paul, at Nag Hammadi or Oxyryynchus and the inevitable partiality of synoptic comparison severely limit the opportunities for proving independent tradition of individual gnome, but at the same time make the probable independence of the most broadly attested gnomai doubly impressive for the category as a whole.

IV Gnome in Redaction: Conclusions

More generally, the foregoing examples, for which redactional, i.e., literary authorial, interest in gnome may be proven by Synoptic comparison, show that redactional use of gnome as a compositional tool in the Synoptics is noteworthy and that some redactional invention of gnomai is probable. This is important not least as an indication of the relevance of our gnomic category to actual Synoptics contexts. On the other hand, such demonstrably redactional gnomai are neither so numerous nor so varied as to make redactional activity an acceptable primary explanation for the prevalence of gnomai in the Synoptic Gospels. Moreover, the redactional character of even those most
demonstrably redactional gospel gnomai is not unequivocal: even Mt 7:19 and Lk 4:23 are not without bases in more traditional gnomic material. That is, almost none of the most "redactional" gnomai is clearly reducible to an impulse of authorial invention, while a great many are related to their literary contexts in such a way as to make circulation in pre-literary Jesus-tradition relatively probable. The double fact, that literary redactors show an active interest in units recognizable as gnomai and that at every identifiable redactional level a pre-redactional circulation of gnomai in Jesus-tradition seems to be presupposed, precludes the conversion of individual gnomai into historical data simply by the introduction of an "oral hermeneutic". Instead a chain of several links must be forged from the definition of a cohesive category, the identification of individual instances, through the synoptic assessment of individual claims to represent tradition, toward a generally probable measurement of the historicity of the whole category as it is collectively attributed to Jesus. Thus to take once more the conveniently comparable examples of Lk 4:23 and Mk 6:4 parr, each may claim with some probability to be associated with Jesus' tradition independently of redactional invention or episodic contextualization, but the probabilities in these two cases are by no means equally clear: the historical probabilities, though basically similar in kind, are not properly commensurable not only because one example is so much better-attested from a tradition-critical point of view, but also because the historical significance of such differences in attestation is not really clear. The essential point relates not to the examples singularly but to the category as a whole, which is clearly not to be reduced to a function of literary redaction and which must
collectively be referred to the influence of gnomai in tradition, even though in the nature of the Synoptic evidence literary redaction has in all cases played a role. At the same time that synoptic comparison uncovers considerable traces of specific and shared interest in gnomai among successive literary redactors, the inadequacy becomes apparent of appealing to redactional tastes as the primary explanation for the gnomic quality of the Synoptics.

The inclusion in any list of Synoptic gnomai of many sayings which are more or less thoroughly integrated into chreiai/apophthegmata is historically the most challenging instance of the extension of gnome well beyond the form-critical bounds of paraenetical collections as well as across redactional boundaries. Indeed because of the intimate connection between gnome and chria/apophthegm, by comparison, for example, with the loose, though frequent and important association between gnome and parable,\(^{57}\) the problem of the historical as well as structural cohesion of the category 'gnome' across form-critical frontiers may be treated as almost identical to the question of whether and how non-apophthegmatic and apophthegmatic gnomai belong together in their historical significance.\(^{58}\) If, on the level of structural definition, the relative contextual independence of gnome has been stressed,\(^{59}\) on the levels of historical (Synoptic) reception and of historicizing interpretation, an aspect also of textual dependence should be acknowledged - and is nowhere better illustrated than in the relation between gnome and apophthegm/chria.\(^{60}\) A gnome could (though it need not) be remembered alone; it cannot be performed, ie transmitted,
without at least a temporary context.

Understanding of the historical relation between apophthegms and the sayings, often gnomic, which they frame has been seriously prejudiced by the form-critical tendency to ignore the integrity of gospel chriae, assuming or asserting without argument the prior independence of the logion against its setting: 61 'In fast allen Fällen [scil. of controversy- or school-apophthegm] war das die Antwort bildende Jesuswort ursprünglich isoliert überliefert.' 62 Still, if reaction against such over-confidently historicizing judgements is fully justified, 63 the basic form-critical insight remains, that the pronouncement stories represent ideal scenes in which historical verisimilitude is compromised in favour of dramatic effect and polemical/apologetic/dogmatic pointedness, a compromise which need not interfere with gnome, the historical and rhetorical character of which is in any case to achieve such pointedness whether in a more or less textually fixed or performantially variable context. Thus, apart from exceptional Wanderlogion such as Mk 8:35 cf 10:43 parr 64 or Mk 10:31 par cf Mt 20:16/Lk 13:30, it is almost never possible to tell (and therefore seldom desirable to argue) whether a pronouncement, or rather its structural 'core', was at some early stage independently transmitted before incorporation into an episodic setting or was always recalled in a narrative context. What matters for the present thesis - more than exceptionally probable instances of gnomic priority - is that gnome, unlike its background whether in conversation or episode, in discourse or narrative, is essentially and from its initial performance a conscious attempt at impressive and consequently memorable stylization.
Put simply, all kinds of oral and writing tradition are primarily verbal (even allowing for the importance of gesture in oral performance). Gnome, as verbal event—and as a species of verbal event rhetorically calculated to impress the imagination—is to that extent less removed from verbal tradition than are gestural events, even if these are the decisive historic context for the reception of a gnome into the tradition. That is, the concept “authenticity” is more inclusive in relation to the recreation of a gnomic core than in relation to the narration of an event, even where gnome-recreation is apopthegmatically embedded in an episodic narrative.

To take an example: it seems historically plausible that Jesus experienced a rejection incident in Nazareth which motivated the narrative tradition in Mk 6:1–6 parr. It is also (independently) plausible that Jesus used the gnome Mk 6:4 parr. The difference is that, even allowing for variation within the gnomic core (cf Lk 4:24; Jn 4:44), the origin and the medium of the gnome-tradition are verbally comparable as even authentic narrative tradition and gestural event are not. A gnome recalled is a gnome, though its context has changed; a gestural event recalled is a story. The difference is not absolute, so that in this example most of the story, except the identification of the patris (cf Jn 4:44), is implicit in the gnome. Furthermore, the closer relation between event and text in gnome does not justify a presumption that apopthegmatic gnomai are always or usually historically prior to their narrative settings. Thus, in spite of Jn 4:44, it is entirely possible that the association between prophet-gnome and Nazareth-rejection is original. Even in that case,
though, the abruptness of the dialogue in Mk 6:1-6 parr, its relation to Mk 1:21ff and the Johannine evidence would argue the preferential accessibility of authentic tradition in the gnome. The real point is that the latitude for distortive variation in the course of tradition is less for gnomic-core (cf Mk 6:4 par; Lk 4:24; Jn 4:44) than for narrative-plot (cf Mk 6:1-6a; Lk 4:16-30; Jn 6:42, 7:15!); an authentic gnome is more authentic than an authentic narrative.

This relationship between gnome and pronouncement-story is, of course, a special case of the general relationship between gnome and Synoptic context, a continuity emphasized by the occurrence of a few Synoptic gnomai (apart from Johannine and other parallels) in both apophthegmatic and non-apophthegmatic contexts (again the Wanderlogien Mk 9:35 etc and 10:31 etc and also the gnome Mt 7:13a; Lk 13:24) as well as by the frequent extension of Synoptic apophthegmata beyond the concise narrative framework of the basic chria-forms, tightly integrated around a single action and/or saying, into longer argumentation and instruction mixed with biographical interest. Within such 'erweiterte Chrien' we may thus find gnomai which function more or less simultaneously as apophthegmatic punchlines and as elements in paraenetic discourse (eg Mk 2:19a parr, 21f parr). This hybridization is made possible not only by the evangelists' - the tradition's - admirable indifference to the purity of literary forms, but also by the innate suitability of gnome, borne of a determined effort toward memorable linguistic concentration, integration and abstraction, for inclusion in the widest variety of formal contexts (and Sitze im Leben): wherever the rhetoric of direct discourse is being reported or imitated. But the frequently intimate relation
between *gnome* and *chria/apophthegm* is also something more than just a special instance of this general continuity of the gnomic category across form-critical lines.\(^6^8\)

As Aristotle clearly recognized,\(^6^9\) especially those *gnomai* in which the elements of analogy are most specific and/or enigmatic do seem to imply a special demand for more narrative or circumstantial as well as discursive explanation. Confrontation of quite specific *gemeindeinterne Probleme* with the most direct expression of dominical authority is the primary function of the Synoptic *chria/apophthegm.*\(^7^0\)

This dramatic topicality of the *chria*-forms together with the implicit openness of, above all, the most specific and enigmatic *gnomai* to a narrative *epilogos* (whether from inference or memory) may account for the noticeable, though not overwhelmingly disproportionate affinity between *apophthegm* and that sub-category of *gnome* which shows a properly religious and legal as well as ethical topicality.\(^7^1\) Two very rough measures of this affinity between *chria* and particularly the more challenging sub-categories of *gnome* may be offered in passing. First, about 20% of all Synoptic *gnomai* are identifiably on potentially *halachaic* topics (admittedly an imprecise category in itself). Depending whose list of *chrias/apophthegms* is used, 30–36% of *gnomai* in *apophthegms* are on such topics.\(^7^2\) Second, and more generally, of the 22 or so *chrias/apophthegms* that contain *gnomai*, 13(59%) would scarcely be identifiable as such without the *gnome* and its introductory formula while, in a further 4(18%) Mk 2:23–28 (the parr omit the *gnome* v.27); 7:1–23 parr; 10:2–12 par; 12:18–27 parr), *gnomai* stand over against elaborate Script 1 argumentation to make
decisively Jewish, but still fundamentally gnomic chrias (to these should perhaps be added the various workings of the Beelzebub controversy). Moreover, of these 17 most strongly gnomic apophthegms, 9 are based on gnomai which seem to touch potentially halachic subjects. That is, from the one point of view, gnomai which are challenging because of their implicit topicality are disproportionately frequent in chriic or apophthegmatic settings while, from another, chrias/apophthegms very often depend upon gnomai as an essential integrating element in their formal structure.

V Form-critical Distribution of Gnomai

Finally, the distribution of gnomai across form-critical sub-categories of apophthegm is to be noticed: within RC Tannehill's recent descriptive typology of apophthegms, all five sub-genres contain examples of apophthegmatic gnome, though it cannot be surprising that Tannehill's least confrontational class, the Commendation Stories, numbers only one definitely gnomic apophthegm, Lk 10:38-42, and that only this sub-category is without any topically 'legal' gnomai.

Above all, this means that the relation between gnome and chrias/forms has, without wishing to overstate the point, a peculiar relevance to the assessment of the role of gnomai in the Synoptic tradition, within the broader distribution of gnomai of all kinds through all the form-critical categories of sayings-material. Still, it can hardly be repeated often enough or forcefully enough and should
surely be clear in the present context that this relevance does not depend upon or authorize a wholesale retreat to the naive priorization of gnome over apophthegmatic context with which we have taxed classical form-criticism. The point is not that every gnome is historically prior to any apophthegm in which it is incorporated, but rather that because of the intimate connection between a logike chreia and a gnome in (the 13-18) cases where the apophthegmatic response is basically gnomic, such apophthegmatic gnomai offer the tempting possibility of testing the historical character of a sample of the Synoptic gnomai against contexts which purport to share that character. Such a control will be doubly valuable in the 4-7 gnomai which are both potentially halachic and fundamental to the structure of the apophthegm in which they appear.

The object of such an exercise will not be to dismiss as derivative the historical character of apophthegms, though this may be attractive where a setting, originally historical or not, has been idealized into implausibility. The early and accurate form-critical recognition that the Synoptic apophthegms are ideal constructions cannot yield a criterion of inauthenticity: presumably presentation of a memoir in chria-form entails formalization and a degree of distortion if not of unbridled fancy, but even this presumption must be balanced by a respect for the Synoptists' willingness to subvert the idealizing purity of received forms like the chria for motives to which historical and biographical interests are not wholly alien. Conversely, no criterion of individual authenticity - as, for example, that the chria/apophthegm is derivative from the 'pregnant speech' of the gnomai saying is being proposed or sought for what may be
called the strongly apophthegmatic gnomai, those most integral to chria-forms, or even for those which show the most specific topicality, though in some cases authenticity is difficult to ignore (eg Mt 8:22). What may be hoped for is that comparison of strongly apophthegmatic gnomai with their apophthegmatic contexts will yield a consistent differential between chria and gnome as historical data and so also a relative confirmation or invalidation of our thesis of historical privilege of the gnomic category for reconstructing early Christian rhetoric. That this will be possible is suggested not only a priori but also on the basis of the intrinsic implausibility of many of the Synoptic apophthegms - indeed, most pointedly, those which invite historical verification and criticism by their explicitly legal topicality and which are (as I would hope to argue, not wholly coincidentally) marked by structurally important gnomai (eg Mk2:23-28 parr; Mk 7:1-23 parr; Mk 3:1-6 parr).78

All this must provide matter for subsequent discussion.79 For the present we require only to note, first, that the relationship between gnome and chria-related forms is too important either to be taken for granted (Bultmann) or to be ignored in our attempt to marshal the data for Jesus' rhetoric. In this relation it will be useful to distinguish where possible between gnomai which are basic to the formal definition of particular apophthegms (eg Mk 2:19 parr; Mk 3:24f parr) and those formally (though not at all necessarily chronologically) secondary discursive expansions (eg Mk 2:21f parr; Mt 12:30 par) which blur the distinction between apophthegmatic and partic forms.80 Second, that there are nearly as many of the

212
latter as of the former among apophthegmatic gnomai and that
apophthegmatic gnomai are in turn a minority, albeit large, within the
gnomic category as a whole is a testimony to the breadth of form-
critical distribution of gnomai: (1) integral to apophthegms,
apophthegmatic dialogues (eg Mt 8:20, 22), paraenetic series (eg Mk
4:21-25 parr), vaticinia (eg Mt 10:24), apocalyptic discourse (eg Mk
13:13b), etc, as well as to the special, possibly mnemotechnical
gnomic forms noticed above (eg Lk 16:10); (2) appended to parables
(eg Lk 18:14), apophthegms of various kinds (eg Mk 10:31 parr; Lk
10:42a), and instructional compositions (eg Mt 6:34) and (3) in close,
just possibly irreducible association with the Son of Man mannerism
(Mk 2:27; Mk 10:43 par; Mt 8:20 par; Mt 11:16-19 par).

VI Source-critical Distribution of Gnomai

The relationship between our gnomic category and Synoptic source-
criticism must and may also be dealt with cursorily here, not least
because the form-critical diffusion of gnomai implies the difficulty if
not the impossibility of constructing any general theory of
sources/origins of sayings-material attributed to Jesus without
assuming the fundamental - not merely occasional - presence of gnomai
in pre-Synoptic tradition. Thus to take a range of currently
plausible source-critical proposals: Q in recent reconstruction contains 26 gnomai (of which at least 4 have quasi-halakic
implications), though this count would be drastically reduced by P
Vassiliadis' prejudicial exclusion of many short proverbial sayings
from Q because they might be oral. The sermon on the Mount includes
23 (with the same 4), although HD Betz' source-critical suggestion is
not yet available in its textual details; the Marcan Grundschrift has 15, of which fully 9 have a potentially halakic character; the 'Eschatological Discourse' possibly behind Mk 13, Mt 24, Lk 21, etc, has 4 non-legal gnomai. On a smaller source-critical scale, Mt 7:7-11 par and Mk 9:37, 41-50 would contain two and three gnomai respectively, none potentially legal. Mk 4:3-10, 13-20, 26-33 would be a widely accepted example of a (probably written) sayings-source without gnomai. Clearly the frequency and importance of gnome and of potentially halakic gnomai vary greatly within even so short a list of possible sources, a sign not least of the tendency to homogenize the contents of critically reconstructed sources so that a narrative and apophthegmatic source has more than the overall 20% of potentially legal gnomai and other sources less; a mainly apocalyptic text has very few gnomai of any kind, and a parabolic collection has none at all, since the gnomic discourse Mk 4:21-25 may be source critically dismissed, on suspiciously formal grounds, as a Marcan collection inserted into an older composition. Equally clear, however, and the principal lesson here, is that the historical interest of the gnomic category as a whole and of its potentially legal sub-category is independent of actual or foreseeable source-critical results.

This comparatively negative conclusion notwithstanding, critical awareness of the role of gnome in Synoptic literature and tradition should also have more positive implications for the investigation and reconstruction of underlying sources, especially when these are conceived on a more modest scale. The inclusion or exclusion of gnome
cannot in itself be a formal criterion of source-criticism. It can, however, alert the gospel reader to the very wide spectrum of oral literary coloration available to writers in a cultural situation where active conversational and oratorical, mnemo-technical and professionally scribal, as well as more fully literate techniques are co-ordinated only partially and provisionally by reigning rhetorical conventions. That is, by virtue of its general function as a bridge between tradition in the broadest sense and its reception in specific texts and contexts, gnome can be expected at least sometimes to mark otherwise unidentifiable gradations of free composition, redaction of sources and adaptation of tradition in the Synoptics, as indeed we have already noticed in relation to, eg, the complex situation in and around Mk 4:21-2595 or to the gnomically-controlled class of verse-forms in Lk 16:10-12, 13 par and Mt 7:6. In the latter group it seemed possible as well as preferable to speak of mnemo-technically formalized oral tradition, a category of source-material rather than a unitary source, written or oral.96 Indeed, the reflection on the nature and diversity of oral and literary tradition which follows from attention to the transmission and distribution of gnome through Synoptic literature should have consequences of greatest importance for the description and recovery of Synoptic sources, precisely where source-criticism has shown an inability to distinguish systematically between oral and written sources or sometimes to appreciate the significance of the distinction. Thus, to return to earlier examples, E Schweizer's discussion of Mk 9:37, 41-50 rightly takes the catchword organization of the presumed source to be an aid to memorization; such a text may be said to be relatively oral in its intention and sensibility,97 but it is not therefore, as JM Robinson takes it to
be an 'oral source' in respect of its composition and transmission. Recognition of the continuity between quite different compositional and transmissional economies from the conversational to the highly and to some conscious extent exclusively literate, which can be documented unusually well in relation to gnome-use in Jesus' period and culture-area, should make source-critical equivocation about the orality or literacy of reconstructed texts at least more cautious, especially where the credibility of source-critical theories may depend upon a believable account of the transmission and development of sources with only relatively fixed textual identities. That is, the tools of source-criticism are inevitably and legitimately literate, sensitive to the kind of textuality which, if it may occasionally be transmitted without writing, is nevertheless far from the conversationally conditioned tradition which the gospels unanimously profess to recall. The range of rhetorical sensibilities from the conversational (eg Mk 7:26, 27) to the highly literate (Gal 5:25-6:10) traversed by gnome within the Biblical canon suggests that the straightforward choice or honest equivocation between oral (ie un-written) and written technique for the transmission of postulated sources is in either case too simple.

This is particularly true for the most important and controversial source-critical category of all, Q. The written character and largely literary sensibility of the source are demanded more or less ex hypothesi in order to explain the apparent textual coherence and fixity in Greek of the extra-Marcan, Matthaeo-Lucan overlaps, so that primarily literary explanations must be sought for
lapses in the same general textual coherence and fixity, eg by the
differentiation of successive recensions and/or competing versions of
the source or by the introduction of translational considerations. A particularly apposite example of this source-critical amplification
of literary technique and sensibility in Q-reconstruction is the
systematic exclusion of "sayings of a proverbial character" from Q
precisely as "possibly due to the oral tradition." Against this
approach is the fundamental insight of the present thesis, that gnome
is a rhetorical omnibus, busily linking the several stations between
extremes of orality and literary cultivation. Without some critical
bias, however qualified, toward literary technique and sensibility in
Q, the source quickly declines into a merely critical category or at
best "a layer of tradition partly written and partly oral" without
much power to explain Matthaeo-Lucan relationships. It may be that Q
deserves such a fate, but even if the literary slant of source-
critical sensitivities and criteria makes it difficult to distinguish
between literate technique and literary sensibility, secondary
reflection on the more or less reconstructed document does seem to
confirm its "careful literary stylization", its literary sensibility
as well as documentary form. Certainly Kloppenborg's complaint
against the corrective "oral hermeneutic" of W Kelber must be
admitted, that the "oral" nature of Q is asserted rather than
proved; indeed the possibility of proof is only likely to arise
where assertions about relative orality persistent in writing
technique and so in documents or genres (1) take into account the wide
range of balances between literacy and orality available even to
writers and (2) identify sub-structures in which such balance can be
analysed, however experimentally. In this respect discussion of gnome
in Q and elsewhere may offer advantages over intuitive assertions of orality in the face of detailed examinations of Q's apparently literary style and literary reception by Mt and Lk. Thus the more nuanced investigation of the specifically literary character of Q, to some extent beyond the influence of source-criticism's innate literary sensibility, has been hitherto rightly co-ordinated with the questions of Aramaic antecedents to Synoptic Greek and of the genre(s) of Q. For the first, the comprehensive conclusion of M Black will suffice, that 'it is the Greek literary factor which has had the final word with the shaping of the Q tradition,' with relatively marginal traces of Aramaic orality or scribal literacy.

The study of gnomai has, however, special relevance to the reformulation of questions of genre in Q, bound up as these are with questions of its development. At least since JM Robinson's essay towards the definition of a Gattung, "Sayings of the Wise," it has been impossible to ignore the sapiential nature of the hypothetical document, though we have found reason, in passing, to agree with doubts that Robinson's Wisdom-trajectory is really a unitary Gattung rather than a tradition in some more general sense. As a minimum, the importance in Q of sayings quite explicitly about Wisdom demands comparison with Wisdom literature. Of more obvious importance in a discussion of gnome is CE Carlson's observation that

Such texts... are not the only form in which Q reflects wisdom. On the contrary, Q contains a very large number of sententious sayings placed on the lips of Jesus, and several sayings --though not explicitly sententious in form-- seem to reflect a way of thinking that should be characterized as wisdom-thought.
That in this sense Q belonged to Wisdom Literature is however, a beginning not an end to questions of genre in a document which was apparently more heterogeneous than most of its nearest analogues and decidedly sectarian in the specification of its audience and in which, above all, urgent eschatology and world-affirming wisdom were juxtaposed even more bluntly than in our extant gospels. That Q seems to have been, from a literary point of view, at once both Wisdom literature and Eschatological treatise has motivated repeated attempts to prioritize one or the other thematic/generic pattern as the "formative component" or "compositional stage" of Q within more or less complicated developmental theories. Apart from the difficulties and dangers of declaring one developmental stage - often enough not even the last - to be generically definitive in spite of the tensions within the end-product, "one must establish more clearly the range of forms that sapiential genres permitted and describe the inner dynamics of those genres", before saying the last word on Q as Wisdom Literature. It is one of the merits of JS Kloppenborg's study of genre in Q that it adopts the definition of the "Instruction" genre as a consistently and explicitly literary Wisdom-form based indeed upon the Mahnspruch (Admonition), but without Richter's and Zeller's exaggerated claims for its formal orality. The cost is that, the form-critical Gordian knot between literary form and pre-literary rhetoric once severed, the literary form can no longer serve as a critical bridge between written and oral tradition or between Wisdom and Eschatology either in traditional genres (Zeller) or in documentary reconstruction - hence the limitation of Kloppenborg's conclusions to, at best, a specific, allegedly formative, but scarcely definitive stratum of Q.
Within his qualified recognition that Q was, if not exclusively, then still undeniably a "wisdom" document, CE Carlston offers an insight into the relation between Eschatology and Wisdom in the single document, Q, which in the context of the present broader study of gnome ought probably to be extended to cover the whole Synoptic tradition. We have long since acknowledged fundamental indebtedness to Carlston's and Beardslee's earlier works on Synoptic proverb for the perception that the ascription of Jesus' own rhetorical style of a sayings category so widely and variously attested must be taken seriously even apart from the claims of individual sayings to authenticity. Carlston's subsequent contribution deals exclusively with the "at least two dozen sententious sayings" and "equal number of statements that reflect motifs of popular wisdom" in Q. Two aspects of Carlston's analysis are particularly important here.

First, Carlston's "sententious sayings" are given no very precise definition either as a form-critical category among others or as a sub-genre of literary Wisdom. As in his earlier essay so also here, Carlston's perfectly legitimate interest is in the distribution of themes rather more than of formal patterns (whether literary or rhetorical), though he does attempt a rather provisional formal sub-division of his more or less sententious sayings. This deliberate imprecision is most evident in the self-consciously vague distinction between sententious sayings and sayings "not explicitly sententious in form", all of which are in clear contrast to the
thematically rather well-defined texts of 'Wisdom speculation'.\textsuperscript{131} Obviously, I would argue that Carlston's form-critically very loose category\textsuperscript{132} would be better replaced with the fundamentally non-form-critical, ie broadly rhetorical category of gnome. What is more important though, is that Carlston quite rightly senses that formally and thematically well-defined texts of Wisdom-speculation and his more-or-less-sententious sayings give quite different qualities of evidence for the sapiential genre of Q. Indeed by itself the presence of gnomai in a text or discourse is scarcely an indication of its sapiential genre, so that Carlston goes on to qualify his identification of the 'sententious sayings' themselves as wisdom in the light of their wider thematic implications. But even before returning to thematic considerations, Carlston's notion of 'sententious saying' corresponds to gnome in that it identifies a level of structure which is necessary to the definition of Wisdom literature and kindred genres precisely because it belongs rather to a much broader realm of sensibly wise speech. Put simply, even appropriate co-ordination of Carlston's 'sententious saying' with our gnome entails the extension of the category through the whole Synoptic sayings tradition and not at all in Q alone, so that whatever sententious language adds to the literary genre of Q it takes away again by its prominence in the gospels proper (and for that matter in other New Testament genres\textsuperscript{133}). And this paradox is implicit in Carlston's own insistence that a sententious style belongs at least as much to the rhetoric of Jesus as to the literary source of Q.\textsuperscript{134}

This tension between form-critically sub-liminal units - almost all of them gnomai\textsuperscript{135} - and form-critically better defined texts as
evidence for the Wisdom-generic character of Q is an especially acute
case of the uncertain balance between literary forms and orality
exposed in Wisdom documents more generally by the concept of gnome.\textsuperscript{136}
From this stand-point, at least part of the difficulty of describing
the genre of Q stems from the peculiarly intense ambiguity between
orality and literacy, latent in Wisdom literature to the extent that
it seeks consistently to evoke the forms of direct discourse as well
as to integrate this oral reference with specifically, generically
sapiential themes and forms. Q thus appears to have contained and
emphasized \textit{inter alia} selected forms, Admonition (Mahnspruch) and
Instructions (Lehrrede) (Kloppenborg), and themes, eg of Wisdom
speculation (Carlston), which are specifically literary together with
form-critically much less definite units, eg gnomai, which reflect in
their relative frequency and importance not only the oral/rhetorical
intention of the text but also its oral, relatively un-literary
technical background, in comparison with many Wisdom texts.\textsuperscript{137} In
this respect the prominence of gnoma in Q at the same time confirms
and subverts the Wisdom-literary genre of the hypothetical source-
document. On the one hand, extensive use of gnome lends to Q, viewed
as a literary unity, as to most other Wisdom books, a substantial part
of its rhetorical character as a literary genre in which the giving of
direct advice predominates. On the other hand, the inclusion of
gnomai in a literary context - for the sake of a certain rhetorical
verisimilitude and force - exposes Wisdom literature, to judge from
the variety and variation in even its most literate documents,\textsuperscript{138} to
the intrusion of themes and presumably of formal traits which are no
longer narrowly sapiential and no longer fully under authorial
control. That such exposure was relatively strong in Q (and in the gospels even dominant) is made probable not only by the importance of eschatological themes and forms, which should therefore be seen in Q as evidence of generic hybridization and not necessarily of historical development, but also by the deformation of the best defined Wisdom-literary form, the Mahnspruch from 2Ps to 2PP address in Q and the gospels generally as well as in Aboth: The recipients of wisdom in Q and, it might be added, the addressees of sayings matter in the Jesus-tradition, in Ab and, often all, in the prophets are defined in more exclusive terms... than is the case in much of the sapiential corpus.

The general observation that gnomai can function as a bridge not only between oral traditional situation and literary production but also between competing literary themes and forms within a written unit, brings us to a second important insight from Carlston's survey of 'sententious sayings' in Q, namely 'that wisdom materials are shaped in an eschatological direction,' or, to go beyond Carlston's cautious formulation but not his data, that the wisdom elements themselves - Carlston's examples of this are gnomai - are often at once both eschatological and sapiential in implication. That is, if sententious style indicates the sapiential genre of Q, it does so equivocally: not only is sententious language disseminated far beyond the conjectured boundaries of the Wisdom-book Q; the individual sententious sayings themselves within Q prove that both eschatology and wisdom are fundamental to the sayings-source and, by the way, to the tradition behind it. In spite of the nearly complete inclusion of Carlston's category of sententious and related sayings

223
within that of gnome\textsuperscript{145} his description is form-critically as indefinite as it is source-critically restricted to Q. Nevertheless the essential point, that sententious sayings are often, though not always, thematically ambivalent/multivalent, even in literary contexts, and are certainly not primarily sapiential, can readily and suggestively be transferred to the analysis of the gnomic category throughout the Synoptics, with the implication of an even more serious qualification of the association of Q with Wisdom literature than Carlston himself envisaged. Indeed Carlston's lead is valuable because it points beyond the commonplace reflection that sententious sayings are often \textit{more} valent to the more specific insight that their literary function in the Synoptics, more than in most other literature, is to integrate, more intimately than even the Synoptists' purposefully hybridized literary forms are able, themes which in a purist form-criticism ought not to be compatible in a single narrow context. Perhaps equally important is Carlston's recognition that the thematic variety and ambiguity of such sententious language is neither infinite nor random but embraces most notably themes in most direct form-critical competition in the Synoptic documents (including their literary sources), i.e. sapiential, eschatological and, I would at least add, legal.

In other words, the structure of Carlston's argument, notwithstanding its narrower focus on a hypothetical source and the informality of his concept of 'sententious saying' anticipates rather accurately the conditions for an investigation of the 'content' of so varied a category as the Synoptic gnome. It is an indispensable part of
the present project that the extension of Carlston's perceptions here, as indeed of Beardslee's and Carlston's earlier insights into the Synoptic 'proverb', so far beyond their authors' immediate intentions and the acknowledged informality of their categories is only possible in conjunction with the recognition and more rigorous definition of the role of sententious language in literature and speech. These requirements have been sufficiently met by the confrontation of modern paroimiological essays toward the definition of the 'proverb' and of Biblical and related Wisdom literature with the Hellenists' educational and communicative category of gnome. Even so, the largely thematic description of the Synoptic gnome to which we now turn will remain provisional and heuristic not only because it is often in the nature of the sententious saying to evoke more than one complex of themes, and because, as Carlston notes, the literary reception/use of individual gnomai is sometimes thematically obscure, but also because historically significant categories, Wisdom, Eschatology, Law, etc are themselves by no means fully distinct, even in principle. Such a provisional approach should, however, serve to describe the large majority of Synoptic gnomai, especially those which share a degree of thematic ambiguity, and to support a return to the questions of 'intensification' in Synoptic gnomai and of their historical meaning in and for early Christian rhetoric. But this is to enter upon a second stage in the description of the role of gnome in the Synoptics beyond Carlston's intentions and beyond the limits of the present chapter.
The proposal that gnome should occupy a far more decisive place in gospel criticism and in Synoptic oral-tradition theory, took its starting point in the attempts of Bultmann, Beardslee and Carlston to intuit the meaning of a range of 'logia', not all of which could be inauthentic, which (semantically) recall and sometimes appear to subvert the world(s) of proverbial and literary Wisdom, but which, in their variety, have eluded adequate definition within traditional form- and tradition-criticism. Such intuitions have, as we have noticed, been carried furthest in the pursuit of aGattung - and a theology - for Q, a development which has tended to aggravate the confusion of 'proverbial' with Wisdom-literary language in spite of the increasingly recognized pervasiveness of eschatological concern in apparently 'Wisdom' sayings. The task of defining and analyzing the fund of Synoptic 'proverbial' sayings has been largely pre-empted by the narrower but more definite question of Q's relation to Wisdom literature/tradition. This is symptomatic of the paradoxical inadequacy of classical form- and tradition-criticism to deal more rigorously with a 'form' which, for once, actually is as firmly anchored in oral composition and performance as it is in literary formulation and which therefore requires a definition more nuanced especially in its semantic and oral theoretical aspects than those forthcoming for logia, proverbs, aphorisms, etc.
In the meanwhile, a basis has been laid for a less baldly intuitive approach by adoption and refinement of the Hellenists' category of gnome, painstakingly defined and exemplified for use in basic education and written composition and above all in the largely oral activities of public speaking and listening.\(^6\) Gnome is, moreover, closely analogous to ancient near eastern "sayings" types.\(^7\) Apart from the foundational role of gnome in an education oriented primarily toward effective speech, its value as an exceptionally firm link between oral and literary sensibilities and, probably, among various available transmissional techniques (conversation, memorization, scribal annotation and literary formulation), is attested by the distribution of Synoptic gnomai across major critical boundaries.\(^8\) Investigation of Synoptic gnomai even from a historical-Jesus point of view need therefore no longer be confined by or even focused on the progress of the Q hypothesis.

In particular Edwards\(^9\) and Carlston\(^\text{'s}\) conclusion that, in Q, sayings which we may now often recognize as gnomai are the medium of both sapiential\(^9\) and eschatological expression may be extended beyond Q to sharpen Bultmann\(^\text{'s}\) pregnant criterion of 'eschatological mood'\(^10\) and Beardslee\(^\text{‘s}\) paradoxical and hyperbolic 'intensification'\(^11\) as a beginning toward historical exegesis of the gnomic category in Synoptic literature and tradition. The selection of the axis between 'Wisdom' and Eschatology is, of course, not accidental, nor is it grounded only in the intuition that gnomic sayings resemble but still somehow resist assimilation to Old Testament 'proverbs'. As hermeneutical constructs, 'Wisdom' and 'Eschatology' are not antinomies but rather belong together as forms of 'gewährte
Wahrheit', so that the latter may be seen as a particularly urgent embodiment of the Wisdom (Theological) tension between sensibility and experience. At least 'Wisdom' and 'Eschatology' seem both to include an impulse toward oracular (ie relatively pre-contextual/context-free) normativity which corresponds favourably to the possibilities of gnome as a medium in which both the 'aoristic' quality (not necessarily its verb tense!) of traditional sagacity and the temporally and socially narrower normativity of eschatological apprehension may be expressed - even within a single gnomic 'core'.

All this has, as Zeller notices in relation to his Mahnsprüche, very little to do with modern exegetical preferences and short-cuts, from existentialism to 'interim ethics', but it has potentially a great deal to do with the persistent problem of continuity and coherence in Jesus' message and tradition and its intelligibility to modern criticism. Wisdom and Eschatology are the proper descriptive categories for Synoptic gnome in this limited sense, that there is no gnome which may not be understood at least partially under one or both of these heads. To the inevitable extent, moreover, that they remain only loosely definable, even as opposites, and so unmistakeably do not exhaust the meaning(s) of the sayings, 'Eschatology' and 'Wisdom' serve rather to emphasize than to gloss over the inevitable question of the perspicuity of Synoptic "sayings", even gnomai, which could as such have their own histories, in uncertain relation to their received gospel contexts. "Meaning is context-bound, but context is boundless", especially in self-consciously historical exegesis which recognizes, indeed assumes, change in meaning and discontinuities of
context. The problem is nowhere more "standard" than in traditional criticism of the Synoptic sayings-stuff where reconstruction and authentication typically result in the interpretive alienation of a "saying" from its literary context(s). But gnome is in several respects a special case among sayings-types. Notably, its textual identity is found not so much in its syntactical pattern, as eg. in Mahnspruch, Käsemann's "Satz heiligen Rechts" or Edwards' "eschatological correlative", as in its semantic character as independent analogical norm, so that "reconstruction" of a textually compromised "original form" is doubly senseless. In addition, recognition that Synoptic gnomai belong to a larger rhetorical category allows an argument for collective "authentication" and interpretation which would transcend but need not ignore individual literary contexts.

Still the multivalence, especially of such small units and the ambiguity of their relation to seldom unproblematic contexts remain. The complicated relationship between saying and setting in those pronouncement-stories which culminate in a gnome has already been sufficiently introduced. But the interpretive and historical tension between saying and context arises not only where the gnome has a narrative frame, but also where saying and saying are contextually juxtaposed. Thus, for example, Joachim Wanke's stimulating description of Synoptic Kommentarworte (commentary) and/or their Bezugsätze (pre-text) as evidence of (1) the early normativity of even difficult sayings in Jesus' tradition and (2) of the relative antiquity of at least the Bezugsätze within the wider sayings material is limited by the inescapable semantic as well as
tradition-historical weakness of the distinction between Kommentarwort and Bezugswort. Since in ten of Wanke's fourteen examples of commentary-pretext pairs, either the Kommentarwort (seven times) or the Bezugswort (five times) is gnomic— in three cases both—it is important to notice that the designation of one saying as 'commentary' on another is often very uncertain (e.g., Mt 12:34b, 35 par on 33 par; Mt 8:19f. par on Mt 8:21f par; Mk 2:21f parr on 2:18-20 parr). That is, associations of gnomai with other gnomai, with more generally styled logia, parables or apophthegms may have the special significance Wanke finds for pre-Synoptic sayings-reception, but the principle of association, whether rhetorical or historical, is not simply that of a reflex toward commentary which would so often illuminate obscurum per obscurius. The relationship between gnome and Synoptic context is thus paradoxical and problematic not only from the perspective of a sometimes justified historical skepticism:25 defined in part by its semantic and, sometimes, traditional-historical independence from context gnome is also because of its compactness and connotative richness often open toward, even dependent upon, external context: the essence of gnomic independence seems to be the expectation of particularly artful and therefore variable as well as memorable contextualization. No one, not even Jesus, ever spoke entirely in disconnected parables and gnomai.26

These problems of authentication and contextualization, inescapable in historical exegesis of any part of the sayings material attributed to Jesus, have thus a peculiar dimension of difficulty and of promise in relation to gnome. Above all the same conditions which
allow gnome to be identified as an important literary-rhetorical and probably traditional category diminish the, in any case contested, role of piecemeal and reconstructive tradition-history. On the other hand the definition of gnome as a unitary although by no means uniform category, invites an exegetical approach which is (1) collective or cumulative and not dependent on the often rather limited intelligibility of individual cases, and (2) orientated toward the reception of gnome across the wide range of extant Synoptic contexts. Clearly these two interpretive canons impose some limitations upon the historical and general interest of exegesis, but the limitations need not be so severe as they are liable at first to seem: if Beardslee's thesis, that the variety and multitude of proverbial sayings attest the authenticity of the category apart from that of its individual members be applied to gnome, the undoubted creativity and openness to outside influences of at least the literary tradition may be balanced against the presumed - hardly ever directly demonstrable - Synoptic reception of individually authentic gnomai. Furthermore, Synoptic invention or adoption of interest as reception of 'authentic' gnomai for evaluating reception of the traditional and probably Jesuan category as such, precisely because we cannot to any extent tell the difference. (Thus discussion of Synoptic 'reception' of a gnome is not meant to deny the possibility of authorial invention, but rather to imply that generic reception of the category is the focus of exegetical and historical interest.) The general probability of this argument from the 'authenticity' of the category, gnome, admittedly allows of little nicety. Confirmation and refinement may be sought in the fact that some, indeed not a few, gnomai do materially transcend the limited perspicuity and/or historical relevance of their Synoptic
contexts individually as well as generically. A gnome may be marked by such strong imagery as to pre-determine all but the details of reception/interpretation: it carries its context with it. Alternatively or in addition, peculiarities in the Synoptic reception of a gnome may allow a more than usually confident guess as to the historic range of its meanings: hence the historical interest of the Wanderlogien.²⁸

I Personality and Normativity in Mt 8:22 par (M Hengel)

The proposed strategy of complementing and correcting especially for historical purposes a general survey of Synoptic gnome-reception by attention where possible to peculiarities of reception and to implicit gnomic context may be illustrated by the egregious case of Mt 8:22/Lk 9:60 especially in the light of M Hengel's extraordinary effective historical-exegetical essay and striking insistence on the importance of analyses of such individual small units over against intuitive generalization.²⁹ Indeed what follows here by way of discussion of Synoptic gnome-reception may be conceived very much as testing the coherence and complementarity of a collective exegesis of gnome in relation to the exceptional results achieved by Hengel in study of a single, exceptional example. That the example of Mt 8:22 par is exceptional, even unique in its individual historical perspicuity,³⁰ can hardly be denied. As first-fruits from the recognition that even this extraordinary case belongs within the comprehensive category of gnome, however, some more precise suggestions may be offered as to the grounds and limits of the
saying's distinctiveness. First as regards peculiarity of reception, the Synoptic contexts (including, hypothetically that of a reconstructed Q) are remarkably unimposing: they are, with only modest allowances for redactional style and emphasis, thrifty evocations of the only context any sane person would have supplied, only given ascription to Jesus.\textsuperscript{31} Of course the almost (probably originally) formulaic multiplication - in Mt 8:18-22 duplication and in Lk 9:57-62 (and Q?) triplication - of rather plain gnomic apophthegms gives literary (mnemotechnical?) emphasis to the insistence of Mt 8:22 on the seriousness of following Jesus. The series Lk 9:57-62/Mt 8:18-22 is clearly meaningful beyond the sum of its gnomic parts, in particular serving to associate Mt 8:20/Lk 9:58 with the discipleship theme. Still Lk 9:57f, 59f and 61f are all strongly gnomic apophthegms\textsuperscript{32} scarcely meaningful without gnomic punch-lines which, at least in the last two cases, virtually imply their apophthegmatic reception.

Mt 8:22 par is thus reception-critically unusual in the semantic redundancy of the literary context compared with the implied context of the gnome itself, a redundancy that is possible in turn because of the saying's offensively strong language:\textsuperscript{33} urgent, basically antinomian\textsuperscript{34} normativity (aphes) made worse (and more memorable) by the use of heavily value-laden terms in a barely metaphorical paradox. In calculated spite of its sententious form, the gnome is intrinsically and not only reception-critically an 'anti-proverb'.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, an eschatological horizon is at any rate suggested by the uncompromising condemnation of the abandoned 'grave-diggers'. In all
then, the reception-critical rarity (not uniqueness) of our gnome's
dominance over its apophthegmatic setting is matched by a wealth of
semantic peculiarities: other gnomai are urgently normative; others
are topically related to discipleship and/or legal duties, even in an
apparently antinomian sense (Mk 2:27); others use similar imagery
(Mk 12:27 parr); others are intrinsically and/or in Synoptic reception
'anti-proverbial' and/or positively eschatological; others imply the
overweening authority of the speaker. It may well be that Mt 8:22 is
unique in the degree to which it combines so many peculiarities, but
the range of peculiarities which so characterize this gnome is by and
large that which, albeit in usually less imposing combinations,
distinguishes the exegetically and historically important pattern of
'intensification' among Synoptic gnomai from the 'field of
intensification' which bears more straightforward comparison with our
expectations of 'proverbial Wisdom'. The same peculiarity of degree
(of intensity) rather than of kind in the gnome Mt 8:22 par (and
again, proportionately and collectively in other gnomai) also release
the historical exegete from many of the vagaries of form- and
tradition-critical reconstruction and piecemeal authentication, a
factor in the success of Hengel's essay (and the lack of equally
impressive imitators).

Both the persuasiveness of Hengel's exegesis of Mt 8:22 par and
the difficulty of duplicating it elsewhere are thus largely to be
accounted for by his inspired (again, too largely intuitive) selection
of a saying which is the acme of gnomic intensification in the
Synoptics. That is, the very characteristics which signalize the
saying among words attributed to Jesus, identify it as belonging after all to a larger category. And the Synoptists’ reception of the burial-gnome confirms this sense of both the conditions and the limits of the saying’s uniqueness. Within the context of the apophthegm Mt 8:21f/Lk 9:59f, as we already noticed, the gnome is given only a modest narrative and epexegetical framework; within the larger context of Mt:18-22/Lk 9:57-62, however, our gnome and its reception are central for the parallel reception in likewise strongly gnomic apophthegms of two other gnomai (Mt 8:20/Lk 9:58 and Lk 9:62) each of which is only less singular than Mt 8:22 par.

Mt 8:20 might thus be read mutatis mutandis, as a melancholic proverb of the human condition,36 couched in the commonplace language of animal fables, but on the lips of Jesus — and attribution to Jesus would seem to be the minimum and only assured connotation of the Synoptic Son-of-Man idiosyncracy — acquire already some of the paradigmatic specificity of the broader Matt-Lucan context(s) (including Mt 8:22 par) of discipleship in an eschatological horizon (cf Mt 8:1-9:38; Lk 9:51-10:20 etc). The saying is thus not only contextually but also intrinsically non-proverbial, that is, at the basic semantic level of the saying’s own historically inscrutable reception of the (Greek) stamp of personal definiteness (ho huios), eschatologically and personally oriented to Jesuan discipleship, though clearly it is a sadder and more allusive gnome than the urgent Mt 8:22 par.

The third gnome in the triple series of strongly gnomic
apophthegms, Lk 9:62, does not show the narrowed personal normativity of the two preceding gnomai. Its reception into the larger pericope with its thematic of eschatological discipleship, presumably for the sake of allusion to I Kgs 19:19-21, is not however, arbitrary in relation to the saying's primary imagery and implied narrative or to its uncompromising reference to fitness for the Kingdom. If Carlyle is doubtless right that "many modern interpreters probably overinterpret Luke 9:62...because of its context", but it is surely overstating the case to say that "as an isolated saying it hardly goes beyond what everyone who has ever ploughed already knows." To be sure, the imagery on one side is rustic and commonplace enough, but it is more than perverse urbanity which suggests that the answering image of unfitness for God's kingdom deliberately exceeds our expectations of proverbial good sense: even apart from its literary context, the gnome intrinsically recalls the wider context of ascription to a speaker who knows not only about ploughing, but also about the kingdom of God. Lk 9:62 may well have a somehow proverbial background, but the gnome itself is no proverb. Both the gnomai which frame Lk 9:60 thus employ the same mechanism to bias reception away from the proverbial and into the direction which the Matthaeo-Lucan contexts do in fact follow, the mechanism namely of taking up a cliché of strongly Jesuan association - whether by adaptation or by new coinage and at what stage in Jesus' tradition we cannot tell. Indeed the conjunction here of rarities, explicit reference to the Kingdom of God (cf Mt 19:12 Mk 3:24f parr) and the strongest example of association between gnomic style and Son of Man language, makes an intriguing bridge over the chasm between the two symbolic categories. The gnome of the burial of the dead achieves, though more emphatically and
by a differing strategy, the same antiproverbial, eschatological and
highly personal effect. The theme of transcendent commitment beyond
the demands of normal "discipleship" is, if anything, more clearly
implied in the gnome of the ploughman than in Mt 8:22 par; on its
side, moreover, the christological tendency of Mt 8:20 par provides a
positive focus for the anti-socialization which it shares with Mt 8:22
par.

All of this is, of necessity, grounded in the formulations and
contexts, receptions, available to us in Synoptic literature and
remains, therefore, speculative in relation to individual sayings,
especially when extended by implication toward description of Jesus'
rhetoric. But apparently speculative exegeses yield reception-
critical and historical probability of an increasingly high order (1)
when it is recognized that the relation between gnome and context is
never arbitrary and often reflects more or less clear normative
implications of the gnomic analogy and (2) when the gnomai are seen to
be, above all, members of a definite class over against the receptive
context of the Synoptic literature as a whole. The significance of
Mt 8:22 is not only that it is unique - each gnome is - or that it
uniquely overcomes our historicizing scruples as few other sayings-
units do, but also that it yields a model for both movements necessary
for an historical appropriation of gnome as a whole class in early
Christian rhetoric: (1) the movement - so brilliantly essayed by
Hengel- toward analysis of individual cases of the relation between
gnomic structure and reception, between inward and outward context,
and (2) the movement toward synthesis, toward interpretation of the
gnome (context(s) and content) as an instance of a category which is
rhetorically and historically more significant than the sum of its parts. This identification of *gnomai* with a gnomic category allows the possibilities of (a) reference to a Jesus-tradition which need not be exclusively written or exclusively Synoptic and (b) comparison with a broader rhetorical *Zeitgeist* which likewise sought to capture normativity in gnomic speech.

Clearly there is no possibility here for thorough exegesis of any, let alone every, *gnome*. The double task of (1) analysing the structure and reception of individual *gnomai* and (2) collating them together in the context of a transcendent category can, I think, in any case be better served by reviewing the Synoptic *gnomai* under several sample headings, none of which is exhaustive, and each of which represent in fact a line of tension amongst *gnomai* - and in the sayings-tradition generally. Given that the rhetorical as well as literary category of Synoptic *gnome* does have a more likely claim than the Synoptic sayings-material *in toto* (or in fragments) to recall stylistic continuity in early Christian discourse, this approach gives the benefit of easier co-ordination with larger questions of historical-Jesus research and Synoptic exegesis. Apart from providing exegetical coverage for an otherwise unwieldy mass of sayings, headings have therefore been selected with a view toward the normative function of *gnome*.

The normativity essential to *gnome* offers no pretext for rehabilitating a notion of *Sitz im Leben*: rhetorical normativity is related to social norms mimaetically or even dialectically, with room
for the play of wit in connotation and function. An appropriate
vocabulary for describing some of this normative complexity is
available in Crépeau's typology of conscious norms, such as are
expressed (and compressed) in gnomai. Crépeau describes norms (and
normative formulae) in terms of normative (1) intensité (tone) and (2)
contenu (range). Normative tone is straightforward enough
(imperative, directive or indicative) though, nb, it is not always
reliably indicated by the grammatical criterion of verbal mood.
Similarly, normative authority (or pretensions) may be universal,
specific or optional in range: specific if norms isolate socially
recognized roles or categories of persons (eg professional), optional
if the roles normatively selected are socially less sensitive, in that
they are available in principle to anyone in the society. Especially
this last distinction between specific and optional normativity
identifies the often severe limitations of our insight into New
Testament societies. At least in Palestine, normative diversity and
conflict make association of even the topically most explicit
normative formula with a particular field of regulation or social
function tentative and partial. Thus, for example, a gnome referring
explicitly to the master/disciple relation is, by itself, only
indirectly relevant to the history of discipleship or to the
historical relationship between Jesus and the Twelve, as the parallel
reception in some contexts of a lord/slave analogy shows (Mt 10:24; Jn
13:15; 15:20 cf Lk 6:40). Moreover, the possibility, unforeseen, I
think, by Crépeau, of mixing different normative tones or ranges
within single normative sayings to make a positive double entendre
(and not just an ambiguity to be contextually resolved), seems almost
to be itself the norm among Synoptic gnomai.
Once again, the consequence is that interpretation of gnomic normativity must be collective in order to focus many such indirect lights into a usable image. In this way, collectivity is a prerequisite as much for the selection of interpretive sub-categories as it is for the definition of gnome in the first place; it is not only for coverage's sake, then, that inclusive and normatively critical headings have been chosen, but also for a degree of cumulative authenticity and intelligibility - and bearing on the historical questions of modern study. Above all, the separate headings are not meant to designate mutually exclusive or commensurable sub-categories; their relevance is heuristic not taxonomic and depends in large part on their interaction. Two of these, 'eschatology' and 'proverbiality' refer less to topics than to normative moods, present more or less in any gnome, and provide an inclusive frame for the three more narrowly normative topical fields, 'discipleship', 'individual particularity' and 'legality'.

Lastly, and perhaps obviously, the relative importance of intrinsic and extrinsic (ie more clearly receptional in literary terms) indications of topicality will vary from gnome to gnome and between topical categories: 'Individual particularity' covers gnomai which, in reference to an individual become relatively univocal, but in relation to Jesus are an unsystematic anticipation of christology; the category is thus determined mainly from the (intrinsic) form of the gnome itself, though contextualization rarely fails to confirm the assignment. 'Proverbiality' is as difficult to detect as it is to
define; its "anti-proverbial" intensification, however, should be possible either in un-conventional, allusive formulation (hermeneutical variation) or in un-conventional reception of a conventionally cited commonplace - but hardly both at once. Clearly though, receptional, extrinsic considerations function in general as subsidiary and/or corrective indices of topicality and normative character of gnomai.

II Gnomic Eschatology

The tenor of an approach to eschatology and gnome in the Synoptics has already been indicated by Carlston's essay on the complementarity (even we would add, the simultaneity) of wisdom and eschatology in and among sententious sayings in the Q material. On the one hand, gnome is essentially neither an eschatological nor a sapiential genre; on the other, its quasi-oracular, pre-contextual style makes gnome an attractive vehicle for both attitudes and indeed a natural common ground between them. Gnome is thus (again with parable) a valuable basis upon which to build a sensitivity to both fundamental moods in early Christian tradition, without the obligation of appealing directly to comparison with alleged Wisdom and Eschatological/Apocalyptic literary terms.

Jesus als "Lehrer", der sogenannte "weisheitliche" Formen verwendet, und Jesus, als "eschatologischer Charasmatiker," als "messianischer" Prophet, sind so keinesfalls Gegensätze...

Specifically in relation to eschatology in Jesus' tradition, an approach to the Synoptic tradition and its literature through gnome
has much to offer toward a more coherent and comprehensive perspective
on a range of language and tradition which is too well-attested to be
dismissed as fragmentary, yet too nicely differentiated to support
collective exegesis as a unitary category.

Die relative Unverbundenheit von Gotteslehre, Zukunftsansage
und Ethik bzw. von weisheitlich, apokalyptisch und
rabbinisch sich darstellenden Material in der
Jesusüberlieferung zusammen mit deren
traditionsgeschichtlicher Differenziertheit ...scheinen die
verschiedensten Akzentuierungen zu legitimieren. 44

It is in this latter respect that 'eschatology' even more than
'wisdom' differs from gnome as an exegetical category: gnome makes a
coherent, however atomized, structural category with a relatively
unitary, continuous tradition-critical and rhetorical significance.
Thus, although gnome has important connections with large discrete
complexes of Son-of-Man (Mt 8:20 par; Mk 2:27f; 14:21 parr; Mt 24:28)
and Kingdom-of-God (Lk 9:62; Mt 19:12, cf Mk 3:24f) symbolism, its
essential interest is as a peerless sample of the eschatological
background against which Jesus' more abstractly symbolic
idiosyncracies are sensible as such, if not intelligible in all their
connotations. Comparison between gnome and parable may help to
clarify the relation of the former to Synoptic and, eventually and
with due reserve, Jesus' eschatology: not every parable is strictly
about the Kingdom of God,45 indeed almost none (the dialogue
Mt 21:28-32 is a nicely marginal, rule-proving exception) is about
the Kingdom intrinsically and explicitly, that is, beyond a general
introductory formula. On the other hand, no serious account could be
given either of eschatology in general in Jesus' tradition or of the
Kingdom-language specifically without an appreciation of their
fundamental compatibility with symbolically less fixed, still

242
essentially eschatological, analogical narratives.

The modest proposal being made here, then, is that gnome-like parable is an indispensable witness to the singularity of the Kingdom-of-God and Son-of-Man symbols within Synoptic and Jesus’ own eschatology (as well as against a still more general cultural background); ‘the kingdom as an idea with identifiable content’ is the pinnacle, not the sum of eschatological language in Jesus’ tradition. Gnomai are a necessary illustration of (1) the pervasiveness of eschatology and, with the self-assertive exceptions of the Kingdom and the Son of Man, (2) its ideological informality, at least as relevant a background to early Christian eschatology as that given by apocalyptic literature. As such, gnomai are as useful as a source of definition for ‘eschatology’ as an historical category as they are for describing its saturation of Jesus’ language. An appreciation of the gnomic aspect of Synoptic tradition goes some way to explaining how Jesus could be ‘in der Tat Eschatologie von Grund auf’ while retaining the freedom to define distinctively, durably individual uses of the symbols of Kingdom and Sonship.

Only a relatively small number of gnomai is strongly and intrinsically eschatological in the sense that they are dominated by an express normative tension between the present and an urgent, terminal future. The relation between these and the less eschatological majority is nicely caught in the difference between the aggravated reversal of the future in Mk 4:25 and the harmonious proportionality of present and future in 4:24 par, Mt 7:1 par, 7f par and Lk 6:38, all of which are received as basically eschatological.
references in their Synoptic contexts. The richly-attested paradox of Mk 8:35 parr sets present and future even more strikingly over against each other. Or again, the vivid presently demanding urgency of coming judgement in Mk 9:43-47 contrasts characteristically with the other triple gnome of self-mutilation, Mt 19:12; each is essentially determined by the same imminent future rather than by, say, timeless asceticism, but in the Marcan saying the eschatological horizon is less dimly twilit. The following Marcan gnomai, 9:49, 50 parr, differ less clearly from one another, but again, while both are intrinsically as well as receptionally eschatological, stronger apocalyptic overtones and starker futurity mark the more oracular, exclusively Marcan v.49. A difference of eschatological intensity is also notable between Mk 9:35/10:43 parr and Mk 10:31 parr. The former group has, to be sure, an eschatological quality in its normative dependence upon Jesus' personal authority as servant but it remains (in spite of its verb-tense) anchored in the pastoral and prudential present, especially in contrast to the plural norm, 10:31 parr (cf Mt 22:14), with its genuinely temporal stress. Intrinsically, both Mk 13:31 parr and Mt 5:18/Lk 16:17 are explicitly eschatological in imagery and in future expectation. In the Q gnome, however, the expectation is negatively expressed (ie the non-abrogation of the Law within a distant, indefinite eschatological horizon in this age). In the Marcan saying, the expectation of a discontinuous future and the presence in Jesus' words of a principle of continuity between the ages combine to express an eschatology which is more urgently future and more powerfully present, 'permanent eschatology' in JD Crossan's phrase. In one last example of this kind, Mt 18:7/Lk 17:1 vs Mk 14:21 parr, the point is particularly clear that the differentiation
is never between eschatological and non-eschatological or even simply between future and realized eschatology. In this case each version finds in the historically realized relationship between Jesus and his betrayer implications for an historic future as well as for a post-historic judgement; against Matthaean and Lucan generalizations, the Marcan versions, however, make relatively explicit the concentration of eschatological implications on the concrete fate of the Son of Man. 50

Not all unambiguously eschatological sayings (e.g. Mk 2:19b parr; 13:13 parr; Lk 15:8, 9; and to some extent 23:31) can be so tidily paired with less futuristically intense, but still implicitly eschatological turnings of similar imagery in similar analogies. The strategy of pairing is useful, however, as an illustration of just how finely and variously tuned broadly eschatological language can be and as a warning of the quite different accents of expectation which may be given to single or to closely related gnomic cores in trad and redactional variation. The former point may be brought home by following a little further the uneven and uncharted gradient from sharply eschatological to timelessly proverbial-sounding gnomai.

An interesting group from this point of view may be assembled of gnomai which draw analogies from the same permanent, approximately predictable relationships and cycles of nature and agriculture which inform so many of the parables. A priori, such familiar imagery with its associations of predictability and cyclical permanence, and yet also of mortal urgency and hazard, stands in an archetypally rich
relation to ultimate hopes and fears. The richness is in evidence in
Synoptic practice: the receptions of the tree/fruit; tree/fire; and
fire/salt relations (Mt 7:16 par, 12:33; 7:19, and 3:10 par, Lk 23:31;
and Mk 9:49 and 50) are largely complementary variations not least of
all of eschatological nuance. Equally pregnant imagery of the
planting (Mt 15:13), the harvest (Mt 9:37 par, cf Jn 4:35), the
weather (Mt 16:2 and Lk 12:54f, again cf Jn 4:35!), of death and
burial (Mt 24:28 par; 8:22 par) is certainly received as
eschatological. Indeed such images are to some degree intrinsically
eschatological in contrast with conventional animal imagery, which
seems to require non-figurative specification for an eschatological
reading: the false prophets in Mt 7:15 or the Son of Man in Mt 8:20
par (contrast Mt 10:16; 29 par). The central point is this question
of degree, of the particular relativity and flexibility of the
eschatological aspect of gnomic sayings marked in these cases by
imagery which is intrinsically prone to eschatological reception,
which indeed could hardly be attributed to Jesus without
eschatological undertones, but many of which may at the time and
without force be read more prosaically, even in Synoptic context:
Lk 12:48; 16:15; 13:24 par; 7:32 par for such eschatological common
sense.51

The gnomic Quatrains, Mt 6:22f/Lk 11:34–36; Mt 6:24/Lk 16:13;
Lk 16:10–12 and Mt 7:6,52 present a special balance of eschatological
undertones in the gnomaI themselves with overtones in their poetic
reception. That is, in each case the quatrain-development of an
initial gnome emphasizes its eschatological relevance. But such eschatological inferences come as a surprise: two of the basic gnomai, Mt 6:22a par and Lk 16:10, are among the intrinsically least eschatological in the Synoptics; the other two, Mt 6:24a par and Mk 7:6a (=Did 9:5) are rather better suited to eschatological interpretation, but need not be read in such a light. Clearly, ethical (eg Mt 5:36; 6:34; 10:8; Lk 5:39; 6:43; 7:47; Mt 5:39-48 par) and quasi-legal maxims (Mk 7:15; 10:9; 12:17; Mt 10:10 par) acquire in Jesus' rhetoric and in (developing) tradition a strong patina of eschatological urgency. The relationship between such contextual acquisition, gradual or immediate, and the intrinsic characteristics of individual gnomai is, however, quite variable.

An approach via eschatology to the exegesis of the gnomic element in Synoptic tradition produces, then, modest though important results. On the one hand, the inevitability of eschatology as an interpretive category for gnome and for the tradition as a whole is vindicated and on the basis of a sample the providential (if not sapiential) nature of which is usually assumed. An eschatological aspect is unavoidable in the reception and/or formulation of enough gnomai rightly to bias the use, spoken or written, of even the least eschatological sayings. On the other hand, and more importantly for the present, the fact of gnomic (and Synoptic) eschatology yields comparatively little explanatory power, especially for the normativity of gnomic (and other) sayings, or for the authenticity of gnomic style generally. This is not only because of the vulnerability, flexibility and variability of eschatological mood in written and spoken
tradition, but even more because of the simultaneity of Wisdom and Eschatology, or rather of super-natural apprehension and common (analogical) sense in individual gnomai as well as in the tradition collectively. That is, Bultmann's intuition of the "Hochgefühl der eschatologischen Stimmung" remains useful as a partial account of the relative intensity of some gnomai. Moreover, on the profoundest level of meaning - of doubtful tradition-critical relevance - gnome, as a distillation of analogical sense, may well live intrinsically from a symbolically apprehended eschatological tension. But eschatology is at most a pervasive undercurrent within the gnomic style generally in Jesus' tradition, a mood rather than a coherent topical or speculative code comparable to those of apocalyptic literacy. The relevance of gnomic (like parabolic) eschatology to the wider problem of eschatology in Jesuan rhetoric is in this bias towards non-speculative, non-systematic, heuristic appropriation of the revelatory future, a bias plausibly discoverable also in Jesus' personally more specific but still willfully multivalent cultivation of the Son of Man and Kingdom-of-God symbols. In the end, the pervasive vagueness of gnomic eschatology points beyond the generality of "eschatological mood" to the specification of personal authority as the basis of rhetorical, including eschatological normativity: the only thing special about the eschatology of Synoptic gnomai, apart from its quantity and multivalent expression in gnomai, is its attribution - together with Son of Man, Kingdom of God and parabolic symbolism - to Jesus.

248
III  **Gnome** as Proverb and Anti-Proverb

A similarly elusive aspect of Synoptic **gnome**, 'proverbiality' — or more significantly from a normative point of view, 'anti-proverbiality' — is the implicit rationale for a notable range of essentially reception-critical studies of individual Synoptic **gnomai** as well as for Beardslee's philosophically more refined essays. It is an approach fraught with the dangers of apologetic abuse and lamed both by the impossibility of any tradition-critically, sociologically, persuasive distinction between 'proverbial' and its presumed intensification into something nearly opposite an 'antiproverb', and by the overwhelming difficulty of controlling the tradition-history of actual proverbs in the Hellenistic world. Still, neither intuition — of proverbial-antiproverbial tension generally among the sayings attributed to Jesus or of anti-proverbial intensification intrinsic to extreme cases of (usually gnomic) hyperbole and paradox (eg Mt 8:22 par) — is without proximate relevance for the reception, modern or Synoptic, of **gnome**. Hence the descriptive relevance to **gnome** of Crépeau's definition of proverb. Indeed Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of giving a deliberately anti-proverbial (**par ta dedemosieumena**) turn of form or of context to a known commonplace in order to emphasize the speaker's character and strong emotion. Certainly enough Synoptic **gnomai** reflect Beardslee's leading concept of 'proverbiality' as positive, socially integrative normativity fairly directly, 'the typical proverbial stance of making a continuous project out of our life' (eg Mk 14:38b; 9:40 par; 10:27 parr; Mt 6:34b; 7:15; Lk 5:39; 6:38; Mt 6:22 par; 10:10 par). **Gnomai** of 'impossibility' (eg Mk 9:50
parr); Mt 5:14b, 36b; Lk 5:39; 6:43; Mt 15:14 par; 6:27 par) and antithetical gnomai (eg Mk 10:9 par, 27 parr; 12:17 parr; Mt 11:17 par) are also familiar in the Synoptics as in the wider and non-identical worlds of tradition-critically and normatively "proverbial" expression. It is against this "field of intensification" in relatively integrative normativity that Beardslee seeks to exemplify the historically significant Synoptic tendency toward unchecked paradox and hyperbole which answers roughly to Crossan's notion of antiproverb and which describes rather well the movement beyond hyperbole to such sayings as Mt 5:39 par, 44 par and beyond antithesis to the paradox of Mk 8:35 parr. This relative contrast between normal and hyperbolic or paradoxical proverbiality, even antiproverbiality, is complicated by the fact that some gnomai are more easily related than others to the actual currency of proverbs, ie of gnomai recognizable beyond the bonds of private traditions. Beardslee's qualified generalization that Synoptic tradition collectively is relatively more paradoxical and hyperbolic than wider proverb-tradition is one of the bases for the present study. Yet even this legitimate and quite correctly collective judgement is ultimately based on the comparison of motifs variously expressed and received in the Synoptics and in general tradition which in its scale, more-than-literary character and, indeed, variety of motifs is never securely within our grasp. In this respect the definitions and examples of the progymasmatists and rhetoricians are indispensable as a self-consciously intended tertium comparationis between particular (eg Synoptic) cultivation of gnomai and the uncontrollable mass of Hellenistic gnomic traditions. Short of appropriating this
qualitatively and historically ideal background, even Beardslee is forced to become a collector in order to construct a context for comparison in antiquity for an exemplary anti-proverbial Jesuan paradox (the *Wanderlogion* Mk 8:35 *parr*). The comparison perhaps inevitably confirms the dissimilarity of the saying's paradoxical inferiority while qualifying the originality of its "motifs" against a topological and/or proverbial background of patriotic, principled or loyal self-sacrifice or even of suicide. Such emphatically paradoxical *gnomai* as Mk 8:35 *parr* or Mt 8:22 *par* and hyperbolic sentences as Mt 5:39, 44 *par* may securely be said to characterize Synoptic tradition over against the rhetoric of its day not because in individual cases the available extra-biblical parallels can always or unequivocally be shown to be less intense in the use of similar motifs, as though there were a fixed canon of Hellenistic gnomic variational possibilities. Rather the persuasive contrast is between this aspect of Synoptic tradition and the progymnasmaticists' general prescriptive emphasis on the dogmatic and probative lucidity and acceptability of *gnome*. To the latter may be added Aristotle's concession that unconventional or challenging *gnomai* may be used sparingly and bolstered in performance by explanations, and his repeated emphasis on the close relation between a speaker's personal authority and character and the propriety of his using such unconventional challenging or actually anti-proverbial gnomai. Indeed Quintilian's treatment of *sententia* under the heading rather of ornament than of proof and his condemnation of modern overuse of *gnomai* and modern taste for the paradoxical or allusive are not so much a rejection of Aristotelean precedents as a recognition that few speakers may claim the *auctoritas* which alone can justify and sustain
The weakness of Beardslee's proverbs, then, is just that they are not recognized as gnomai, for which guidelines, if not rules, of usage can be found at the educational and practical roots of Hellenistic culture.

Other attempts to locate Synoptic gnomai in a spectrum of proverbiality-unconventionality are much more piecemeal and less qualified than Beardslee's, though they may nonetheless produce an exegetically interesting contrast. Here the emphasis is less on the intrinsic character of the saying (e.g. paradoxical or hyperbolic) than on the difference or similarity of its receptions in the Synoptics and elsewhere. Thus it is helpful to see Mk 4:24 parr over against the commonplace reception of almost formulaically analogous gnomai in the prosaically juridical context of the grain exchange. The value of the analogy is not, however, that it establishes 'le sens primitif' of the logion, but only that it provides a vivid contrast to the personal and eschatological reception of the gnome in the Synoptics. Similarly G Lindeskog sees in the Wanderlogion Mk 4:25 parr an instance of anti-proverbial reception (by Jesus) of a common, prudential proverb into a newly eschatological and personal context. The undoubted tradition-historical significance of the phenomenon of Synoptic Wanderlogion does make the contrast between proverbial and anti-proverbial in this particular Synoptic gnome exceptionally valuable as a potential relic of early rhetorical patterns. Nevertheless, as in all cases, the identification of a 'proverb' is uncertain. Furthermore, the identification of proverbial/anti-proverbial contrast must be qualified in this instance to the extent that even in its most
proverbial aspect, Mk 4:25 bespeaks a social alienation which positively, intrinsically anticipates the eschatological alienation of its gospel-receptions. "So redet niemand, der viel hat."

SJ Noorda's investigation of classical parallels to Lk 4:23 is more ambiguous, even though the Lucan citation-formula makes an unusually strong ground for consulting proverbial parallels. It illustrates the difficulty of an approach to gnome through proverb: Noorda finds the same motifs current in two quite distinct topoi, of which the more uncommon (roughly in the sense of 'charity begins at home') seems to be dominant in this case, though (pace Noorda) surely the context of rejection and the quotation-form also evoke the classically more frequent sense (that the helpless should not pretend to helpfulness). In fact, however, the sense of Lk 4:23 is more complicated even than double entendre in a context so dramatically controlled by foreboding (cf the pregnant futurity of ereite) of rejection not only in Nazareth but also in Jerusalem. The most relevant parallel, formal as well as topical, is the bitter mockery of Lk 23:35 par.

Rather similarly, J Dupont identifies two senses current in ancient literature for a proverb of the impossibility of serving two masters, (1) that of the slave's excessive work-load or (2) that of his virtual independence under conflicting authorities. In Mt 6:24/Lk 16:13, however, the proverb is received in neither sense, but is instead dramatically redirected toward existential/theological decision. Examples of this kind, more or less pointedly unexpected receptions of fairly certainly proverbial gnoma, could doubtless be

253
multiplied. In this case though, the Synoptic gnome-reception is recognizably anti-proverbial in the more basic sense that it exploits gnome rather deliberately as a means of evangelical disorientation, even apart from the probability that the gnome actually did function as a commonplace in its more obvious prudential senses: the rhetorical essence of what I have called a Quatrain-form in Mt 6:24 par, Mt 6:22 par, Lk 16:10-12 and Mt 7:6 is its movement from an apparently straightforward gnome to a startling theological/existential conclusion.81

Within this group of forms, Mt 6:22f/Lk 11:34ff is also based on a gnome which is almost certainly proverbial (v.22a/34a).82 In this case there is no suggestion that the proverb's Matthaeo-Lucan reception so deliberately rubs against the grain of more commonplace proverbial reception as in Mt 6:24 par, but the application (v23) is still surprisingly far removed from the gnome's obvious sense, as perhaps the Lucan variations attest (vs. 35, 36).83 In fact, in each of our four gnomic Quatrains (including Mt 7:6;cf Did 9:5) and Lk 16:10-12), an innocent-sounding, likely proverbial gnome is received very clearly as a challenge to disrupt the apparent "continuity of the project of life".84 If the gnomai were indeed widely received proverbs in more prosaic senses, this effect would be all the more striking. The essential and historically interesting point is, however, that the Synoptics are marked both by gnomai which are intrinsically disruptive of the hearer's/reader's proverbial expectations and by a corresponding reception of relatively conventional-sounding gnomai in evidently unconventional senses. To
the extent that it does not depend solely upon doubtful reconstructions of proverb currency and reception, appeal to the Quatrain-form is helpful confirmation of this latter tendency.

The usefulness of this emphasis on the ambiguous relationship between Synoptic sayings and more widely circulating proverbs is limited by the uncertainties of identifying proverbs and the scope of their conventional reception as well as by possibility of tendentious abuse. Thus, for example, Mt 8:20 par cannot be identified as a non-proverb or as a hyperbolic anti-proverb simply because ('nach profaner judischer Weisheit') homelessness is not basic to the human condition. This is close to the pursuit of 'in idious comparisons' against which we have already accepted Carlston's warning. Even if the construction of a corpus of proverbs (and their commonly received interpretations and contexts) current in the Hellenistic world were an achievable goal, its desirability would remain in doubt. But even if a new Wettstein is likely to produce equivocal results for/from gnomai comparison, exegetical confrontation of specific gnomai with the possibility of their proverbiality and with the constructive, even where often pessimistic, programme implied in proverbial language does tend to confirm the basic perception that Synoptic gnomai in both their coinage and their reception show a frequently anti-proverbial or, better, disintegrative, de-constructive genius. Above all, the historically basic contrast noted by Beardslee between the impressive number of intrinsically paradoxical sayings among the Synoptic gnomai and their background in an apparently more constructive, conventional 'field of intensification', is matched in historical importance by a Synoptic tendency to receive even less startling gnomai as pretexts.
for a reorientation away from merely integrative, proverbial normativity. Even allowing for the difficulty of fairly comparing (reception of) Synoptic gnomes and Hellenistic proverb, the situation of not a few Synoptic gnomai does seem to be as paradoxical and un-proverbial as the formulation of the most paradoxically intense sayings noticed by Beardslee. However uncertain our knowledge of Hellenistic proverbs and their reception, especially outside classical literature, this agreement in striking unproverbiality between the reception and the formulation respectively of two large minorities among the Synoptic gnomai, places at last a firmer foundation under Beardslee's narrower intuition that the strategy of rhetorical intensification is historically fundamental (and, we might add, unusually prominent) in the tradition of Jesus' rhetoric.

That such deconstructive use of gnomic language plays an even greater role in the Synoptics than Beardslee sensed, gives the whole problem of Synoptic (and gnomic) normativity an even greater urgency and relevance than foreseen: the tension between integrative and deconstructive normativity comes into question not only as a useful topic of historical-critical interest, but more especially as a problem intrinsic to the gnomic style of the Synoptics. The paradoxical place of gnomic language within Synoptic tradition is defined by the presence of Beardslee's large 'field of intensification', of constructive gnomai straightforwardly received over against less integrative formulations and receptions. That is, the paradox of gnomic normativity is an internalized tension within the universe of Synoptic gnome and neither simply a rejection of proverbial
normativity nor a marginal ‘disfunctionality’.\(^1\) By itself, however, this result remains a description, albeit a good one, of the fundamental, perhaps not altogether benign tension within the rhetorical normativity of Synoptic gnome. In addition, however, this rhetorical tension, expressed as it is sometimes in the very structure, sometimes in the reception of gnomai, is referable with great probability to Jesus’ own as well as to Synoptic style. In view of this it becomes all the more important to distinguish the rhetorical normativity of gnomai in writing and speech from the normative functions of social institutions viewed as such.

Tradition, literature and rhetoric were certainly potent social institutions in the world of Christian origins, but the normative function of gnome within Synoptic literature and oratory cannot unquestioningly be identified with the normative function and reception of gnomai in actual social groups. Gnome as a communicative category, like literature and tradition in general, is an active model, for conversation and for change, and not a passive mirror of social functions. Its relation to reality is concrete, but dialectical. (Hence, by the way, part of the danger in New Testament studies of the all-too-commonly direct inference from texts to ‘communities’). Thus such intrinsically disintegrative gnomai as Mt 8:22 and Mk 2:19 show already in Synoptic reception their directly normative influence on Christian rhetoric more than on Christian burial-customs and fasting-behaviour. Likewise, a gnome can be applied to one context as deconstructive and to another as integrative, albeit sectarian (eg Mk 4:22/Mt 10:26; Lk 12:2; 8:17 cf Mt 10:27/Lk 12:3). The urgent point here is that for both rhetorical

257
Thus its strongly gnomic aspect functions both to distinguish and to integrate Synoptic rhetoric within the very broad and self-conscious "whole" of antique rhetoric, including but by no means consisting entirely of literature; within Synoptic rhetoric, as in the larger context, in either case normative function relating the hearer/reader to the (partly fictive) universe of discourse; not only the relative frequency and prominence of gnomic elements but also the relative importance of the disintegrative side of gnomic normativity distinguish Synoptic rhetoric within this broad field of comparison. These relationships are not anhistorical, but they are circumscribed not least in connection with the historical Jesus by the self-consciously abstract and aesthetic business of speaking well.

It will be apparent that, if rhetorical and social normativity cannot simply be identified, they are neither absolutely to be divorced. The distinction is, however, significant enough to provide a further and decisive ground for turning increasingly to cases, that is, to topical sub-categories on which rhetorical and social normativity may be expected to have converged, leaving historically meaningful traces of their interaction in the formulation of Synoptic literature and tradition.
The selection of especially the following topical headings (personal reference, discipleship and, in the next chapter, legality) is therefore to be identified as a hypothetical construction again, heuristic, but not arbitrary. Instead it is based essentially on a perception of Christian origins as by and large ein Phänomen sozialer Desintegration over against its social and religious background, a situation which the development of Synoptic tradition should also be seen, with increasing reservation in view of the new movement's growing integrative capacity attested, for example, in its increasingly canonical literacy. The value of adopting even so perfunctorily a predominantly conflictive model of Jesus' movement, apart from its historical plausibility, is in its openness to the hypothetical translation of the disintegrative rhetorical aspect of Synoptic gnomai into sociological (and psychological) terms of normative conflict (i) externally with other groups manoeuvring in the same general environment and (ii) internally within the earliest movement itself.

IV Personally Attributive Gnomai

The most fragile of the remaining sub-categories embraces gnomai which, again intrinsically or in Synoptic reception, refer to the tradition's central personality. The number of gnomai attributed to Jesus which also directly, intrinsically refer to the personality of the putative speaker is not large. Together with gnomai which are received in their literary contexts as Jesuan self-references they
are, however, unusually clear witnesses to the primary contextual fact— for both exegesis and history— about the gnomai of the Synoptic tradition, namely their attribution, with instructively partial exceptions (Mk 7:28 parr; Mt 11:17 par; 16:2f par; 3:10 par, but cf 7:19; Lk 4:23), to Jesus.

The most striking examples of intrinsically personal gnomai attributed to Jesus as self-references are curiously but closely interrelated: Mk 2:17 and 2:19 belong to adjacent, form- and probably source-critically kindred literary settings; shared “physician” imagery links Mk 2:17 and Lk 4:23; the latter is, in turn, connected with Mk 6:4 by the shared context of Lk 4 and but the existence of a collected form with the same pretensions to tradition-historical independence (pOxy 1.6; EvTh 31). The significance of this constellation, together with the Matthaean “Thunderbolt” (Mt 11:27/Lk 10:22) and also with the nexus of more prescriptive didaskalos/kurios gnomai (Mt 10:24f parr), is that the range of imagery from personal roles applied directly to Jesus, at least in the volatile connotative style of gnome, was rather self-consciously narrow. In only partial contrast to even the autonomous, normatively optional symbolism of the Father-Son relationship, the more specific role-names are limited and coordinated by their connotative complementarity: none is a self-sufficient description of Jesus’ ministry, whence perhaps the juxtaposition of teacher/lord (Mt 10:24f/Lk 6:40 cf Jn 13:16) or of prophet/physician images (pOxy 1.6; EvTh 31; Lk 4:23f). In literary context and also intrinsically, given the general context of ascription to Jesus, each gnomic characterization is a self-
consciously understo{ed}, almost desperate metaphor in the force of opposition.

Thus Mk 2:17 parr is less metaphoric in relation to the latter context, of attribution to Jesus generally, than to the immediate context of its literary reception in a pericope not directly about physical healing. That is, Jesus' role as a healer must figure prominently in any historical description of his activity and, if the New Testament knows the difference between Jesus and an iatros (cf Mk 5:26), miraculous, magical and medical healing cannot always have been completely distinct. At the same time, though, the designation of Jesus as a physician is clearly qualified: the gnome itself stresses its primarily antagonistic potential, centred on the controversial distinction between the well and the ill and the specification of those groups rather than of the indefinite 'physician'. The contextualization of the gnome in Mk 2:13-17 parr correspondingly focuses not on Jesus' role as healer, though this is just below the horizon (cf Mk 2:1-12; 3:1-6), but rather on his contrasting relations with two conflicting groups and on the basis of their conflict in a difference of autodiagnosis. The point is not merely that the gnome in itself expresses the basic normative clash more clearly and plausibly than does the literary context with its confusion of institutional discipleship (akoloutheo 2:14, 15; kalesthai 17b) and social fraternization (sunanakeisthai/katakeisthai 15 parr). It is even more important that the gnome also implies a figurative distance between Jesus and the role of vocational healer slightly less noticeable than that between the 'sick' and the
"healthy", or between any combination of sinners, Pharisees or Jesus' disciples. In terms of Crépeau's typology of (universal, specific or optional) normative range, the specificity of the physician-role, especially where Jesus is the putative speaker, is much tempered by association with the individually optional group terms, either of which could, depending on the "physician", be accepted "par n'importe lequel membre de la société." Perhaps most important though, the tempering of normative specificity emphasizes the understatement of the physician-trope: the very option to identify with either the 'sick' or the healthy is universally normative on both literal and figurative planes. "Physician", by comparison, is too specific here to interpret literally the antagonistic, disintegrative and universal norms of sickness/health; a more universal, connotative meaning is demanded for the professional category to match the connotative scope of the rest of the gnome. The "physician" is the metonymic image of a normatively more complete persona, even without application to the unprofessionally charismatic healing career of Jesus.

Similar conclusions may be drawn from the other Synoptic physician-gnome, Lk 4:23. Intrinsically, the saying shows a degree of topical ambiguity, but is clearly a sharply specific normative challenge. The oddities of the Lucan literary context pretty accurately reflect the implications of bringing such a gnome within the field of Jesus' rhetoric while at the same time recognizing him as its most obvious implied addressee: the antagonistic, disintegrative function of the saying in relation to the optional categories of the healer's patients and of his challengers is made as explicit as possible by its prophetic attribution to the Nazarene audience without
diminishing the specificity of its understated, sarcastic application to an individual "physician". In the Jesuan context, a suitable "physician" is readily available, but not without the implication that the gnomic model is ironically not so adequate a description of the individual as might at first appear in either his helpfulness or his eventual helplessness. Lk 4:23 is primarily an individually imperative, specific norm; Mk 2:17 is collective, indicative and mainly optional, without diluting the specificity of the professional imagery; the EvTh version (31; pOxy 1.6), moreover, balances the specific role against the new optional category of "those who know him". Applied to Jesus they all involve (1) the only approximate adequacy of the medical analogy for his role and (2) the centrality of Jesus' ministry to a more-than-rhetorical conflict of norms: both gnomai turn upon conflicts among the optional categories of the "sick" and the "healthy" which challenge the healer's authority and identity.

Even without the parallelism of pOxy 1.6/EvTh 31 and the association of Lk 4:23 and 24, with all the consequent tradition-critical uncertainties and possibilities, the family resemblances between the physician-gnomai and the gnome of the prophet at home (Mk 6:4 parr) would be compelling. Within this broad similarity however, there are differences. So the normative specificity of the "physician" in Lk 4:23 is to some extent limited by juxtaposition with the optional classes of the "well" and the "unwell"; the designation "prophet" by comparison is just as individual but notably less specific, more optional, in the normative sense that anyone can in principle become one without definite social qualifications or even
recognition. This socially normative indefiniteness of the notion 
'prophet' (like that of 'the dead' in Mt 8:22!) makes it difficult to 
dismiss the gnome as metaphorical. Still, there is a discernible 
margin of figurative distance between Jesus and the prophet-title in 
the gospels' receptions. In John 4:44, the gnome is part of a 
christological strand which is scrupulously dropped in the second half 
of the gospel; in EvTh (31; pOxy 1.6) by contrast, the gnome need not 
refer to Jesus at all and anyhow implies the distance of symbolism in 
the physician-prophet parallel, as does the Lucan juxtaposition (4:23, 
24). Even the Marcan-Matthaean context places Jesus in a by no means 
clearly prophetic role (cf Mk 6:2 par).99 It is tempting then, though 
still a double non sequitur, to suppose from the gnome's very probable 
tradition-critical (proverbial) independence over/against this range of 
(metaphorical) literary reception that the saying was in its 
independence (a) non-figurative and (b) non-Jesuan, 'ganz sicher auf 
urchristliche Propheten zu beziehen'.100 But the gnome itself implies 
connotative (if not metaphoric, then metonymic) limitation of its 
social normativity in the image of the patris, which, indeed, EvTh and 
Mk feel the need to specify, and which is, as the Johannine reception 
implies (4:44 cf 7:52), deeply relative. If the vagaries of 'prophet' 
and 'hometown' are treated alike, much speculation is ruled out: in a 
general sense Jesus was prophetic and doubtless experienced rejection 
in one or other of his (Galilaean) home-towns as doubtless did no few 
of his most charismatic followers. Apart from the bare, but serious, 
possibility that Jesus used our gnome, what may be known about the 
saying of the prophet at home is (1) that as a personal reference it 
deliberately remains allusively open-ended except insofar as it (2) 
dramatizes the most fundamental of normative conflicts, between the
individual and his society, between revelation and tradition. That
the gnomic description of Jesus' situation is relatively non-
metaphoric only intensifies these essential points.

The gnome Mk 2:19a parr is less connotatively indefinite from at
least two points of view to which it will be necessary to return
below. In the first place, the topic of fasting brings us into a
whole new order of normative specificity, of socially-controlled,
explicitly, even legally, institutionalized roles, beside which the
essential imprecision of the 'physician' and 'prophet' is clear.
Secondly, the categories of the 'bridegroom' and the 'sons of the
wedding' have a singularly personal place (Mt 22:1-14, 25:1-13; Jn
2:1-11; 3:29) within the broad field of wedding-imagery, imagery which
is more basic to commonly shared eschatology than even the more
speculative notion of 'prophet' (eg Jn 4). The imagery of the
'bridegroom' and related roles is more clearly metaphorical than that
of either the 'physician' or the 'prophet'. In its more prosaic
sense, the 'bridegroom' is normatively quite optional: everyman may
aspire to the familiar role. In the eschatological perspective it
becomes, like 'prophet', less domestic in its connotations: any one
and no one can become or describe the groom. Impressively definite
in the structure of the saying itself, however, and apart from its
legal topicality, are the asymmetrical relationship of observant
loyalty to the groom and the temporal frame within the gnome is
directive. That is to say, the gnome is normative within an optional
but personal relationship, the setting for a specifically temporary
realization of the eschaton. And in spite of the usual historical
implausibility of idealized Synoptic contextualization, the literary reception of the gnome confirms this analysis: both intrinsically and in reception, (1) the saying’s primary point is with the normative conflict between the disciples and sociologically comparable groups. (2) Self-reference is partly viewed in eschatologically pregnant but personally optional imagery, but is nevertheless an unavoidable implication since party conflict is grounded here in the personal and temporal concreteness of the implied relationship between a central individual and his adherents. There is of course no way to prove that Mk 2:19a is an ipsissimae sermo Jesu, but it would be irresponsible not to observe that the gnome is (a) not redactional, (b) not entirely at home in its literary context, (c) not obviously churchly or (d) merely proverbial and (e) not readily intelligible as any one else’s utterance. Mk 2:19a parr is exemplary for an approach to the exegesis of Synoptic gnome also in that it embraces the proposed topical sub-categories of eschatology, personal reference, discipleship and legality. Above all it is paradigmatic for an approach which does not need fully to recover the original application of the saying in order to include it among gnomai which (1) are normatively more conflictive than integrative and which together, even more than separately, create a modestly impressive presumption of authenticity for a sub-pattern (2) of remarkably careful gnomic self-reference among Jesus’ speech-habits.

In the gnome, Mt 10:24f; Lk 6:40; 22:27; Jn 13:16; 15:20, personal self-reference is also subordinated to the topic of discipleship. It might be tempting in this case to fall back upon one of the strategies of ‘anti-proverbial’ exegesis discussed above.
Even viewed as a proverb, however, the saying cannot be confined to the Sitz im Leben of mnemotechnical pedagogics; certainly, as the supplementary imagery of the slave/master (Mt 10:24: Jn 13:16) and the anti-model of the blind leading the blind (Lk 6:39) confirm, none of its gospel uses hinges upon a view of discipleship as a means of preserving didactic tradition - the nearest approach would be Lk 6:40 where there is considerable scope for multiple intentions and where tradition to be kept is ironically the negative one of refraining from judgement. Nor is it worthwhile to insist upon a usually 'positive' sense of the slave/master proverb over against an allegedly 'negative' meaning of the disciple 'in der christlichen Tradition'. In each gospel reception of the gnome, (1) the analogy of Jesus and his disciples with more-or-less proverbial perceptions of discipleship is limited not only by the inevitable gap (the 'more-or-less') between gnomic model and social institution, (expressed in Mt by association of the disciple/teacher and slave/master and in Jn 13:16 of the slave/master and messenger/sender analogies) but also by a particular blurring of any unambiguously positive and negative associations. Thus (2) Lk sets the catastrophic possibility of following the wrong teacher in the foreground, and Mt the likelihood of sharing the master's fate, to which Jn adds the possibility of betrayal. Although the gnome has in the gospels an integrative normativity, that of the imitatio Christi, the principle of integration is not that literally suggested by the gnomic imagery, the teaching of a Master within the institution of school-discipline. Our rather various gospel receptions are unanimous in setting this limited compensatory tendency of the teacher/disciple norm toward integration clearly against its
sharply disintegrative implications for the socialization of Jesus' movement.

The exotic tone of Mt 11:25-27(30)/Lk 10:21-22 gives the identification of v.27d par as a gnome a special degree of exemplary interest: in spite of the saying's isolation within the Synoptics, its coherence with a more widely attested and collectively "authentic" normative category obliges us to treat it seriously as part of a subgroup of "self-referential" gnomai attributed to Jesus. The purpose is not to assert the authenticity of the saying or to essay the proverbiality of father/son knowledge, but only to notice here too that (1) christological self-identification is limited by the connotative openness of the sentence and that (2) normativity is not primarily integrative ("like father, like son") but oriented toward the exclusivity of revealed self-definition. In both respects the literary context of 27b does it justice: first, the generically definite "the son" is not carried beyond the bounds of the gnome into a really absolute designation of "the Son", in spite of the continuity of the Father-symbolism and of the theme of revelation. In Crépeau's terms, the symbols of "father" and "son" within the saying remain optional, especially if the final, apocalyptic clause of v.27 par is read as external to the gnome. In contrast, moreover, to Johannine synecdoche, the absoluteness of Jesus' Sonship is less the point than the surprising selectiveness of the revelation mediated by him. Second, the contextual opposition between revelation and concealment corresponds to conflict with the normal brokers of divine wisdom just as the exclusivity of the father/son intimacy within the gnome corresponds to the privilege of those to whom it is extended.
by the son. Thus whatever the thematic and tradition-critical peculiarities of Mt 11:27 par, probably exaggerated by preoccupation with the Johannine analogues, the saying is, in its normativity and limited personal specificity, of a piece with an important sub-set of Synoptic gnomai.

In fact, the description of those Synoptic gnomai which intrinsically (as well as receptionally) depend for their imagery upon individual personality may be all but concluded with passing reference to the contrasts between Mt 12:30 par and Mk 9:40 par and between Mk 13:31 par and Mt 5:18 par. The former pair is the most explicit Synoptic instance (cf Mt 10:8b, 10 par) of the sic et non widely tolerated, indeed cultivated in wisdom literature and, for that matter, classical rhetoric. Only Lk gives both versions (11:23; 9:50), but their deliberately contrasting reception in Synoptic tradition is, I think, suggested by the extreme topical similarity of the contexts. (1) The limitation of the speaker's self-reference is clear in the Q version even without contrastive illumination from the Marcan form, though it appears in the connotative indefiniteness of being 'with' Jesus rather than in the ambiguity of such figurative designations as physician, prophet, bridegroom, even teacher and son. (2) The predominantly conflictive normativity of Lk 11:23/Mt 12:30 is, again, evident even without the more evenly balanced Marcan counterpoint.

Of the other pair, the personal version (Mk 13:31/Mt 24:35; Lk 21:33) is mainly remarkable (1) for being a normative saying about
normative sayings, implicitly - and in Mt and Lk explicitly - in tension with scriptural normativity and so also in conflict with less novel evaluations (cf. Mt 5:18/Lk 16:17). Yet the tension is expressed in a true paradox rather than in a bald opposition: (2) symbols of permanence will vanish in the face of apparent ephemera attributed to Jesus, words which really do seem fragile in comparison and conflict with more established norms, so that again the clarity and force of even so immodest a self-reference is not unqualified. The saying is only secondarily about definition of Jesus' role. In fact, this connotative reserve, admittedly unlike that at work in the first six examples above, but having the same function of deflecting gnostic norms away from, as it were christological, speculation, is reflected in the gnome's literary reception into contexts which are also more about the continuity of revealed norms in eschatological perspective than about description (except negative, as in Mk 13:32 par!) of Jesus' authoritative function.

One remaining instance of a gnome which, in any Jesuan context would imply (partial) self-reference, Mt 8:20 par, has been noticed already and will be returned to in introduction to the only group of gnomai which though intrinsically ambiguous are specifically received in their Synoptic contexts as self-designations by Jesus. First, however, some initial conclusions should be drawn and their implications and limits drawn out. Above all, it should be clear that especially the first examples above (Mk 2:17a parr; 2:19a parr; Lk 4:23a; Mk 6:4 parr; Mt 10:24f parr; Mt 11:27b par) constitute a small and diverse, but still coherent gnostic sub-group. Semantically, all six - and less directly the two supplementary pronominal examples
(Mk 13:31 par; Mt 12:30 par) - are marked by a degree of connotive indefinitewhich is by no means accidental to their meaning as both putative self-designations of Jesus and predominantly disintegrative normative expressions. That is, physician, teacher, even master, bridegroom and son are not in (self-)reference to Jesus strictly metaphoric, though the last two have special symbolic independence, but rather metonymic and partial. Although, significantly, the designations and the gnoma do in fact cumulatively give a surprisingly good, theologically and historically plausible description a strong note of irony. Indeed as rhetorical self-reference this little group of gnoma shares an intrinsic, structural indirectness which corresponds to the actual literary contextualization of Lk 4:23a - each one represents the implied and not entirely sympathetic dialogue between the speaker's self-awareness and the categories and perceptions of this audience. These gnoma - and gnomic style generally to judge from the practical interest of the progymnasmats and the rhetoricians' theoretical interest in gnome as proof - are hardly esoteric speech. Rather they are a publicly nuanced distillation, often in normative conflict, of personally asserted socially disputed authority. Whence, although they are strongly conflictive in implication, their normative tone is directive or indicative - the force of the sarcastic imperative in Lk 4:23a. They are neither bluntly polemic nor ipse dixit pronouncements. Perhaps the most important historical characteristic of the 'personal' gnoma is therefore that they attribute to Jesus sayings which depend directly upon the character of their speaker for their authority without portraying him as a mystagogue and which
express serious normative conflict from that personal authoritative stand-point without assuming the official, objective forms of legal codification.

But can hints of historical significance as nuanced public self-reference and as a remarkable evocation of Jesus' role be taken seriously in so small a group of gnomai, not all of which are likely to be authentic and at least one of which (Lk :23) is only sarcastically attributed to Jesus? The question is one of relative probabilities. It is a central thesis of the present project that the gnomic style in early Christian rhetoric is one among a very few probably demonstrable elements of New Testament continuity (parable is another) with Jesus' own speech habits, and the only one also intensively documented in the wider rhetorical culture surrounding the tradition. Within such general probability the contrast between, on the one hand, the cohesion of those few gnomai which both intrinsically and in Synoptic reception are best understood as references to Jesus and their coherence with the gnomic style generally as emphatically connotative norms and, on the other, their formal, topical and tradition-historical diversity yields a dependent, but still formidable likelihood that the sub-species, too, authentically represents an aspect of Jesus' style.

As with gnomic style generally so also with the sub-category, stylistic authenticity does not absolutely depend on the authenticity of each or any example, even if such things were regularly demonstrable; the possibility of unusually faithful, successful imitation in Jesus' tradition as that of faithful individual
preservation. The likelihood that our sub-category too represents an authentic idiom is therefore increased, in my judgement, by the fact that it is distinguished from other gnomai by no difference of kind but by 'semi-metaphorical', allusive intensification of the personal quality in all rhetorical, especially gnomic normativity. In this our 'personal' gnomai (even Mk 13:31 parr and Mt 12:30 par) are absolutely distinct from such direct metaphorical predications as Mt 5:14 or Jn 8:12. That is, the relatively explicit individual personal imagery in a small sub-set of Synoptic gnomai is not only consistent with gnomic language in the Synoptics generally. Far more it epitomizes the usually even less explicit balance of subtly assertive personal authority and audience definition upon which gnomic (like parabolic) normativity rests, so that its authenticity as a stylistic sub-species is not necessarily limited by its statistical rarity compared with gnome throughout Jesus-literature. Certainly the importance of the semantic relationship between personally emphatic gnomai and their background of superficially less personal gnomic formulations is proportionally much greater than their simply quantitative representation in Synoptic literature would at first suggest; so also, it may be, with the historical relationship.

Indeed the semantic and probably historical relationship within which the 'personal' gnomai appear symbolically unusual but far from unrepresentative extends not only to the larger body of Synoptic gnomai but also further to the diffidently symbolic but nonetheless determinative element of personal self-disclosure in the whole of Jesus' rhetorical style, at least if E Fuchs' characterization still
...das Besondere an Jesu lehrender Verkündigung ist die analogische Kraft, mit welcher Jesus unausgesprochen sich selbst, seinen Gehorsam, zum Mass für die Besinnung seiner Jünger macht.\textsuperscript{113}

The implied role of the narrator in parable has received ample notice in historical exegesis.\textsuperscript{114} The Son of Man language in the Synoptics presents more resistant problems: it notably lacks the Synoptic gnome’s consistent style and wealth of immediately relevant background material. Still, the relatively explicit representation of Jesus’ self-disclosure in our “personal” gnomai and their confirmation of the historian’s theoretical understanding of gnome as a speech pattern which is personally authoritative but not authoritarian (ie, still argumentative), bear comparison with the as yet unexplained\textsuperscript{115} and haunting mixture of authoritative self-revelation, proverbial anthropology and higher eschatological symbolism in the Synoptic Son of Man. It is surely out of the question to undertake a history of the Son-of-Man idiom here. All the same, it is noteworthy that the otherwise conceptually and traditionally distinct\textsuperscript{116} symbolisms of the Kingdom of God overlap most impressively where they portray a Jesus who “refers to himself and his ministry in terms of his actions, conduct and unpromising personal circumstances,” or in other words, where the Jesus of these symbolic categories coheres most closely with the (still eschatological) Jesus of especially the most “personal” gnomai:

If the Son-of-Man sayings are authentic they also indicate that Jesus’ proclamation was very much bound up with his character.\textsuperscript{117}

In fact, this is indicated even by sayings of doubtful authenticity or
of proven inauthenticity (if any there be); whatever its history and however important the three-fold division of the actual sayings, the Son-of-Man symbolism in Synoptic reception indicates (and is partial historical evidence for) a pattern of explicit, yet deeply connotative self-reference by Jesus. Unfortunately, the probabilities here pretty resolutely elude historical control beyond the tantalizing facts of Synoptic unanimity (as to self-reference) and diversity (as to nuanced connotation). It becomes all the more important, then, to notice that the coherence of connotative self-reference in (at least the 'present'-Son of Man sayings with that in especially the most 'personal' Synoptic gnomai is manifest in actual overlap and repeatedly in close receptional juxtaposition.

We have already noted the Son of Man gnome Mt 8:20/Lk 9:58 and the imaginative possibility of reading here an anthropological generalization. Against such a reading, though, is the receptional evidence not only of the literary context, but also of the Greek Son-of-Man idiom itself which, whatever its background, is irredeemably personal as well as symbolic. The essential context, however, is that of bare attribution to Jesus. Once the saying is imagined, with the Synoptics, in Jesus' use, proverbiality recedes into irony before the association of the speaker with actual, if relative, homelessness and with an implicit sectarian normativity. As in other cases, it is not possible to demonstrate that Jesus did use this particular gnome. It is, however, possible and valuable to know that if he did speak thus, he did so with more than an accidental implication of self-reference as well as of practical normativity for the community which his
rhetoric defines.

The modesty of this interpretative thesis in relation to individual cases as well as its cumulative persuasiveness may be further illustrated in the semantic tension and unclear tradition-critical relationship between the personal Mk 14:21/Mt 26:24; Lk 22:22 and the universal Mt 18:7/Lk 17:1. The degree of semantic tension may, indeed, easily be overestimated along with the apocalyptic, speculative, cosmic aspect of especially the Q version. Even the universally indicative norm Mt 18:7 par culminates in an individually optional reference of more directive implication (v.7b par); in the historical or fictional context of Jesus' speech this gravitates toward biographical reception (Lk 17:1 cf 16:19-31) or toward an application to the narrowed universe of the disciples' community, which logically if not tradition-historically depends on the fate of Jesus, the Son of Man (Mt 18:7 cf 17:22f). However the saying may be imagined in Q (perhaps cf Mt 23:37f par), it belongs intrinsically (cf the singularity of the agent of scandals in v.7b par) and in both Matthaean and Lucan receptions within the same horizon of Jesus' fate which is explicit and emphatic in the Marcan Son of Man formulation. Conversely, the Son of Man form, however self-referential, cannot be stripped of more universally paradigmatic overtones. Above all, the symbolic self-reference is not made for its own sake alone but rather to sharpen the ironic analogy between the Son of Man's fate and that of his betrayer. That is, once again, personal, yet symbolic self-reference with wider, yet never fully universal (because essentially conflictive) normativity are the warp and woof of gnomic sayings attributed to Jesus.
We may compare the next clearest case of a gnome attested in both a Son of Man and a less emphatically self-referential version. As in the preceding example, so also in Mk 2:27 and 28 parr the tradition-historical connection between Son of Man saying and more general logion is not at issue. For the present it is rather the semantic relationship between the two which is of interest as an indication of the balance of personality and (in this case clearly legal) normativity in each. There is no simple equivalence between the two versions, as the Matthaean and Lucan texts fairly pointedly imply: the strongly personal grounding of v.28 parr and introduction of the specific kurios image make it the more acceptable qualification of the Sabbath-norm. The more universal gnome, v.27, is plainly not personal in the strongly self-referential sense of the examples which come before in the sub-section. It is to that extent all the better as an illustration of the essential basis of gnomic normativity in personal authority even where no out-spoken personal reference is made. Thus, argumentatively, Mk 2:27 is not presented even loosely as the logical outcome of the foregoing discussion, but instead as an authoritatively independent assertion relying ultimately on the credibility of the speaker. That the topic of Sabbath-privilege is one of deeply-felt legal as well as symbolic importance, makes this normative boldness doubly impressive. Here and elsewhere among the Synoptic gnomai self-reference yields to self-assertion as, in the end, equally personal bases for normativity in early Christian rhetoric.

The semantic relationship between Mk 10:43f parr and the Son of
Man saying, v.45 par, is perhaps not quite so close: the self-assertion of gnomic normativity, as in Mk 2:27, against conventional expectations is grounded in self-reference. This self-referential aspect is explicit in the Son of Man formulation, but still very strongly implicit in vv.43f, again, as soon as these are imagined as sayings of Jesus. As ever, it is not possible to tell surely whether the gnome was brought into the context of Jesus' rhetoric by Jesus himself or in subsequent imitation of his gnomic style. The theoretical distinction diminishes in historical significance, however before the coherence of the gnomic category and, in the present argument, before the organic relationship between predominantly conflictive normativity and the personal authority which shows itself in self-assertion as well as in self-reference. The disclaimer against excessive preoccupation with questions about the authenticity and tradition-history of individual sayings need not, however, distract from the frequent probability of gnomic tradition-critical priority in more complicated formal developments - where, exceptionally, these can be traced with any confidence. The attempt to sketch, for example, the history of shared tradition behind Mk 10, Lk 22 and Jn 13 in spite (or rather, with the leverage) of form-critical differences between the Marcan chria and the Johannine and Lucan meal-setting, points toward the fundamental importance of a gnomic core in oral as well as literary variation of a verbal analogy (diakonos/doulos; megas/meizon) and its background in Jesus' exemplary behaviour.

122

Der... für die Vorstufe von Mk und Lk angenommene Satz "gross ist, wer dient", ist in der Tat das erste gattungsmässig sicher anweisbare gemeinsame Element der Tradition (Lk 22, 26f.; Mk 10, 43b. 44a), da es sich - tro
aller Unterschiede im einzelnen - um Verhaltensanweisungen für besondere Fälle handelt (für Grosse bzw. Führer und für den, der gross sein will). 123

Moreover, that enquiry into the origin of shared tradition can scarcely choose between gnomic core and practical example, 124 underlines the inner continuity between gnome and narrative. In other words, the self-assertive and critical normativity of Mk 10:43, 44a demands and implies a paradigmatic grounding in the conduct of the speaker, even where the narrative is not fully acted out (as in the drama of Jn 13). The frequent priority of gnomai over narrative formulation does not imply a radical dissociation of gnomic from episodic memory in tradition; on the contrary, gnomai such as Mk 6:4 parr and 10:43 par embody normative gestures and experiences in permanent invitations to narrative expansion. From such gnomai we should surely invent episodes, even if the tradition did not narrate them for us; such inferred episodes would, moreover, have a considerable claim to historicity.

The remarkable discourse, Mt 11:16-19/Lk 7:31-35, particularly comparable in its gnomic aspect and episodic credibility with Lk 4:23, 24, 125 illustrates many of the same points: the virtual implication of the narrative and dialogue setting in the gnomai of vv.17 and 19b themselves; the implication in both gnomai of complex and serious normative conflict; and finally the implication of normative resolution based essentially on the personal authority of the speaker, even if, in contrast to Lk 4:23, 24, this is explicit more in the mediating Son of Man comparison, vv.33, 34, than in the gnomic imagery itself.
In a final example of a gnome given a self-referential character by association with a Son of Man saying, the association is more problematic: Mt 24:27, 28 brings the parousia of the Son of Man and the gnome of the corpse and carrion-birds together; Lk, however, gives them separately (17:24, 37b respectively). In defence of the Matthaean treatment it may be said that Mt 24:26, 27 are in some sense about location - and catastrophic, sky-borne signs of direction - whereas Lk must reintroduce the question, unmotivated after vv.22-35(36), of 'Where?' (v.37a). The greatest difficulty is that of the gnomic imagery itself which recalls in assertive inappropriateness the offensive challenge of Mt 8:22 par; Lk seems to solve the difficulty by isolating the gnome. In Mt the problem is not so much solved as aggravated in a reception which if not securely authentic is at least a more forceful clue to the possible significance of the puzzling gnome and, beyond, to the character of gnomic language as personal as well as as normative disclosure. Above all, the relationship between the Matthaean vv.27 and 28 emphasizes the connotative incompleteness of both disclosures: it is not even clear whether the ominous attraction of the birds of prey and the portentous career of the lightning are positively compared. Perhaps indeed the association is by way of contrast and the 'corpse' and its weirdly stable location signify rather the parousia of the false prophet than the elusive and sudden revelation of the Son of Man. Even as antitype of Jesus, though, the dead body carries an ironic self-reference to his eminently foreseeable fate, a fate which may quite authentically have stood in puzzling tension with some of the expectations associated by Jesus with the Son of Man symbolism. In Jesus' situation the
corpse is no more metaphoric than the contrary expectation of a celestial parousia. However inscrutable the gnome remains, then, its association with the Son of Man saying points receptationally toward its intrinsic character as (1) deeply conflictive norm and (2) ironical, ultimately not altogether metaphoric self-reference. Among gnomai closely associated with Son of Man sayings, Mt 11:19b/Lk 7:35, comes nearest to the intrinsically self-referential gnomai discussed earlier. At any rate, it typifies the implicitly self-assertive, personal and, at such a remove of time, almost solipsistic nature of Synoptic gnomai.

In all, the importance of the eight occurrences of Son of Man symbolism in, or in close association with, gnome is as a bridge between the self-reference of a comparative few and the self-assertive normativity of the bulk of Synoptic gnomic sayings. The principal benefit in recognizing the personal authority immanent even in less authorially self-referential gnomai and immanent specifically in their normativity is as a prophylactic against neglect of the concreteness of even the most intensely connotative language. For example, Mt 24:28 par as a whole is surely in some sense metaphorical (as well as obscure, which is not the same thing), but 'corpse' in the context of Jesus' tradition and life has a more direct implication. As well, though, the self-referential and Son of Man gnomai express relatively explicitly the disintegrative, conflictive tendency of early Christian rhetoric. The locus of normativity is the specific/optimal relationships of the community of discipleship around the gnome-speaker; Synoptic gnomai are seldom genuinely universal norms. Their function is rather to relate Jesus' authority as paradigm (or anti-
paradigm) in situations of controversy and discipleship. 128

V  Gnomai and the Norms of Discipleship

It can hardly be surprising that many of the gnomic sayings which most expressly invoke the authority of the speaker also rather clearly address the topic of discipleship, and vice versa. The personal authority of normative rhetoric attributed to Jesus, of which gnome is the most continuously documented category, has as its logical correlative and not only its accidental, receptional fate the normative requirements of a community of personal, discipular allegiance—especially in conflictive self-definition beside other, ideologically more mature and homogeneous groupings. The natural obverse of a rhetoric of normative self-assertion is a model of community, more personally than ideologically coherent.

Among the most obvious examples of gnomai in which both the topic of discipleship and the paradigmatic authority of the speaker are relatively directly addressed are the Wanderlogien Mk 9:35 etc and its analogues, Mt 10:24 par and Mk 10:31 etc. The normativity of such a saying-core can hardly function at all unless modelled (at least putatively) on the authority of a speaker who is both protos and diakonos, a fact underscored, as we have noticed, by the association of Mk 10:43f parr with the Son of Man saying v.45 par; on the other hand, the norm presupposes a context within which primacy and the humblest servility could be more concretely than metaphorically practised (cf Jn 13). Indeed Mk 9:35; 10:43f etc are less
figuratively meant than the more narrowly explicit Mt 10:24/Lk 6:40. That is, at least in gospel reception the tradition-technical aspect of the master/disciple relationship in the latter gnome is studiously ignored. Jesus' disciples are in no sense his apprentices. Discipleship here is at best a partially descriptive category, qualified not least by the unofficial, non-scholastic personal authority inherent in the mass of gnomai attributed to Jesus. The other related Wanderlogion, Mk 10:31 etc, is intrinsically much less specific, an open generalization in tragic and/or social-revolutionary eschatology. Its Synoptic receptions (Mk 10:31; Mt 19:30; 20:16 in relation to discipleship and Lk 13:30 to the respective places to Jews and Gentiles in the Kingdom) notably do not explore the gnome's wider possibilities, but remain focused on normative conflicts within the community of personal dependence upon Jesus. The slight normative tension between the Lucan reception and the better integrated Matthaeo-Marcan setting (with Mt 20:16 somewhere in between) is significant, then, as a possible symptom of the projection of personal (and personally conflictive) discipleship norms onto the less immediate level of Heilsgeschichte (and the particular only secondarily emergent problem of Gentile predominance in the community of salvation).

Again, both modern critical and Synoptic receptions of the gnomic triplet Mt 8:20, 22 par, Lk 9:62 emphasize their specific normative relevance to discipleship. In fact these sayings with their concentration on the call to discipleship and its implications (prominently including a homelessness shared with, e.g., Mk 6:7) identify
the point of contact between Jesus' circle and contemporary discipular institutions paradoxically rather better than the more explicit Mt 10:24 par., the technical-scholastic implications of which are receptionally denied. Perhaps indeed the repudiation of such technical-scholastic discipleship lies as much as anything else behind the polemically conflictive gnome, Lk 6:39/Mt 15:14; 23:16, 24. Jesus' paradigmatic self-assertion establishes as a voluntary but still narrowly imperative, in Crépeau's terms, specific norm the renunciation of potentially conflicting, normal relationships. The conflictive and personal, almost private, character of these three gnōmai is indirectly witnessed in their reception en bloc in Matthaean and Lucan composition. There is a significant hiatus between the direct exemplary normativity of these sayings for their putative, in these cases probably historic, primary audience and their extenuated, contextually isolated symbolic normativity in our literature, a normative discontinuity not to be glossed over by reference to the mediation of Q or its community: these gnōmai are not quite equally relevant to each of Jesuan discipleship and Christian discipleship.

A similar hint of gradual discontinuity within general rhetorical and normative continuity in gnome may be read behind Mk 6:4 par.: its quite hypothetical but likely direct, professional relevance to Christian prophets and its general, increasingly metaphorical bearing on Christian mission experience are normatively distinct from its metonymic application to Jesus. This is something more than the largely formal tension between self-referential and ecclesial normativity in Mt 12:30 par and Mk 9:40 par respectively. The concept 'prophet' and its relation to different individuals have had
to suffer considerable adjustment from, if the saying belongs at all in Jesus' rhetoric, initial self-reference and implied paradigmatic bearing on the disciples' expectations. The gnome does not represent Jesus as the originator of a prophetic school! And positively, as in Mk 2:19a par or, for the matter, Mt 11:27 par (among the more self-referential gnomai), the relationship between Jesus and his disciples is defined in terms of personal intimacy and eschatological rather than scholastic or partisan adherence.

The overlap between gnomai which are innately self-referential and those which refer most directly to aspects of discipleship, though impressive, is not complete, although even the next example, Mt 19:12, may well reflect one side of a Wanderakkalismus shared by Jesus with his immediate companions. Certainly Matthaean reception emphasizes the gnome's reliance upon the authority of Jesus' word, somewhat in contrast to the more complicated argument about marriage to which it is appended. As with many gnomai, it is a question here, "wie weit das Logion wörtlich zu nehmen ist," but the question is one of hyperbole rather than of metaphor, since those made eunuchs for the Kingdom's sake are distinguished not only from biologically natural but also from artificial eunuchs. Here as generally it is worthwhile to stress that especially Synoptic gnomai are typically figurative to an internally and not only contextually limited degree: figuration and symbolism are used to enhance impact and to allow, perhaps positively to assert a flexible, connotative normativity — not to obscure relevance. Notwithstanding, we should once again probably detect a significant shift in normativity from the range of meanings imaginable
for the unit "hors de tout contexte," the gnome is again normatively conflictive, in self-conscious opposition to the values of the wider society. Moreover, like Lk 9:62, the eunuch-gnome mobilizes a community which is not simply that of technical discipleship, but which is nevertheless radically (i.e. conflictively) oriented to the Kingdom.

One of the least figurative, best attested and, by the way, most proverbial-sounding Synoptic gnomai is Mt 10:10b/Lk 10:7b. Here once more, something less than discipleship in a narrow, especially a technical, sense is addressed and yet also something more, in personal commitment and in institutional character, than mere casual affiliation with Jesus. In this case, at the rather basic level of subsistence, the integrative tendency in gnomic normativity predominates. Even so, the notion of "workers" here and in the more plainly (or rather figuratively!) eschatological Mt 9:37/Lk 10:2a is optional not universal in normative range: a differentiation of roles is implied even within the movement, toward goals which more or less disintegratively define it over against the otherwise neglected field of labour.

Beyond these gnomai, inherently, intentionally relevant to Jesuan discipleship and particularly to its non-technical, yet by no means wholly metaphorical definition, we should notice also a number of gnomic sayings which though topically less precise are received by
the Synoptics as norms for Christian discipleship. Many more of the sayings gathered into Mt 10 figure here, notably Mt 10:26, 27. Its strong missionary imperative differs from the eschatological indicative of the Marcan parallel and, more subtly, from the Q version in Lk 12:2, 3 which, though syntactically indicative, implies a negative ethical imperative. Similarly in Mk 13:31b parr (including Mt 10:22) a universal eschatological indicative is received (this time unanimously) as an implicit imperative with its application in the experience of the persecuted circle of discipleship. More than expressing a mere topical ambiguity, such gnomai embody an historic ambivalence and normative dissonance in the movement: (a) the presence in the tradition of such topically imprecise, but loosely discipular gnomai and (b) their reception (largely literary) in better defined, but often to that extent churchly contexts suggest respectively (A) a necessary element of normative continuity between discipleship proper, however informal, and more casual adherence to Jesus and (B) a partial and gradual blurring of the distinction in the post-Easter situation.

The most impressive Synoptic reception of a gnome otherwise more widely applicable is that of Mk 8:35 parr:

There is no doubt that the tradition remembered the saying about losing and finding life in the definite context of the challenge to become a disciple. Mark (8:34-35) and most probably Q as well (Matt 10:38-39; Luke has a different order) associates this saying with the one about taking up one's cross.135

The gnome's conflictive aspect as a corporate norm is documented in Beardslee's survey of the motif of (roughly) immortality through self-sacrifice: such language functions most typically in crises of
community survival. The normative self-assertiveness of Synoptic gnome, that is, the inherent problem of personal or social authority behind so challenging a rhetorical norm, surfaces not only in the self-reference discerned by post-Easter hindsight, but also more intrinsically in the saying's paradoxical logic, especially vivid in contrast with the more consistent message of Mk 13:13b parr. Beardslee in fact (characteristically) overstates the tension between this 'phenomenological' emphasis on the paradoxical nature of the saying and the historical-comparative result which identifies similar motifs elsewhere. Among the parallels which he cites, none is as baldly paradoxical as the Synoptic logion; within each a metaphorical wedge is readily available with which to prise apart the terms of an apparent paradox. In Mk 8:35, by contrast, (both historical, and phenomenological), although there is room for difference between the life that is lost and that to be gained, there is no reason to suspect any conscious metaphor.

For the remaining receptionally discipular gnomai it need only be noticed that none is as thematically appropriate as Lk 12:48. The application in Synoptic reception of each of Mt 10:8, 16b, 29/Lk 12:6; 10:42; Mk 10:27 parr to discipleship is a mild surprise; they are a useful reminder of the intended (programmatic) continuity, in spite of the conflicts of self-definition, between the normativity of Jesus’ milieu and that of the larger society. The reminder is more outspoken in a small group of gnomai which recall — and not only receptionally — the situation of the Jesus-movement within aspirations toward the renewal of Israel and only consequently of Israel's world. Thus in
the minimal context of association with Jesus’ conversation, the gnome
about the City (Mt 5:14) is, once again, not simply a visual metaphor,
but rather far more an essentially non-figurative extension of the
symbolic, paradigmatic centrality of Jerusalem (cf Isa 2:2-4; Mt 4:1-
2), the topographical correlative of Jesus’ own self-assertion and
destiny. This is the context also, not just eschatological but
incipiently ecclesial, of the oligoi/polloi sayings, Mt 22:14 and
Mt 7:13/Lk 13:24, though the tension between the Matthaean and Lucan
forms and receptions of the latter points again to the inevitable
shifts in normativity especially of gnomai which touch most directly
upon the self-understanding of the community and its relations with
the larger world. Thus Lk 13:24 relates the gnome apparently to
Jewish obstinancy, while the Two Ways (and Two Cities) of Mt 7:13 make
a nobler and normatively more universal application. Whatever the
saying’s original normative scope, its separation of the few is
clearly agonistic (Lk 13:24) and disintegrative. Something of the
nuance given to this separation for renewal is captured in the gnome
Lk 16:8b, appended to the Parable of the Unjust Steward. The
normative opposition of the Sons of the Light to those of this age,
which so forcefully recalls the sectarian self-definition of the
Qumran society, is filled with an irony which often seems to have been
characteristic of Jesus’ attitude: the sons of this age as such
are positively paradigmatic for the Sons of the Light. This saying is
not strictly paradoxical, nor is it hyperbolic: the sons of this age
really are smarter... It is, on the other hand, sharply conflictive
as well as essentially self-assertive in the idiosyncratic light in
which it discloses the eschatological conflict. This gnome is
normative and authoritative not as the distillation of a common-place
view (though it might have such a role in modern, secularized reception), but as the expression, authentic in its content and style, of an intensely personal revelation.

It is as difficult to defend the historicity of Mk 7:24-30 par as it is to see the Jesus of 7:27 par the enlightened founder of a world religion. The catch is that here, as elsewhere among strongly gnomic apophthegms, the arguments which cast doubt on the authenticity of the whole do not bear with equal relevance on the central gnome. In this case the slim and equivocal results (basically Mt 8:5-13 and Mk 7:24-30) of the evangelists' efforts to associate Jesus' ministry with Gentiles suggest (a) that our authors were impressively unprepared to cut the required material from whole cloth and (b) that the 'atrocious saying' (v.27) particularly is at least traditional and prior to the Synoptic story. The point is not that the gnome is prior to any apophthegmatic framing, since the association of two gnomai (vv.27, 28) already implies episodic recollection in dialogue and narrative, but only to emphasize yet again the combination of tradition-critical resilience with a gnome of unexpected thematic clarity and conflictive self-assertion. It will be necessary to treat more intensively the widespread phenomenon of normative dissonance/shift - in this example, normative reversal - between gnome and apophthegm in contexts of 'legal' topicality. Suffice it for the present to notice the coherence of Mk 7:27 par, its imagery and uncomfortable but all the more plausibly authentic anti-Gentile implications, with Mt 7:6: in spite of quite different form- and tradition-critical situations both gnomai attribute to Jesus a
sharp affirmation of the sacral distinction between Israel and the Gentiles, an affirmation which, if authentic, would not have precluded, but would scarcely have facilitated a subsequent Gentile mission.

VI Conclusions

Before taking up the complex question of 'legal' topicality in and around gnomic normativity, it will be in order to draw together a few intermediate conclusions. As well, it may be helpful to clarify the exegetical logic at work in both the preceding and the following examples. In view of the Synoptics' attribution of the *gnomai* to Jesus, with only minimal (Mk 7:28 parr) or partial (Mt 3:10 par, cf 7:19f; Lk 4:23; Mt 11:17 par; 16:2f/Lk 12:54f) exceptions, and within the categorical authenticity of attributing to Jesus a gnomic style, an approach to individual *gnomai* should begin from the special possibility of their authenticity. Such possibility, based on gnomic identification with a larger category, is clearly not convertible into a criterion of individual authenticity, though it may be confirmed or qualified by more conventional tradition-critical evidence to make a more or less probable case. This modesty, *in singulis*, of the approach's tradition-historical pretensions is compensated (1) generally by a degree of freedom from standard problems of criteriology and (2) specifically by a relative freedom in relation to the difficulties of particular written contexts and their *gnomai*: gospel contexts may not, of course, be ignored, but their relevance is primarily as historic receptions, *ie* as literary and/or traditional
realizations of selected aspects of their *gnomai*, and only secondarily as possibly integral and authentic in their own right. (The still considerable importance of even this secondary, tradition-critical relevance, with all its uncertainties, still shows itself in reference, eg, to association of *gnomai* together and with other sayings in "commentary" relationships\(^{146}\) and especially with Son of Man sayings\(^{147}\), to the development of Gnomic Qu\(\text{u}^\text{FvWtof Gm}\text{onic QuaJr}^\text{^o}\text{}'\(^{148}\), and to the existence of Gnomic Dialogues, apophthegms grounded in more than one *gnome*\(^{149}\)).

Roughly, then, since Jesus very probably did speak in *gnomai* often and memorably enough to bias his subsequent tradition, it is fair to ask of individual Synoptic *gnomai*, "If Jesus did say this, what would its possible meanings have been? How could it have functioned in discourse?" In all but the most exceptional instances this strategy is exegetically tendentious and historically exceedingly precarious. Cumulatively, however, applied to the large numbers of *gnomai* available in the Synoptics, the arbitrariness of piecemeal exegesis is corrected where collective profiles emerge. However uncertain the perspicuity and authenticity of individual *gnomai* (and the former is too easily underestimated) or the histories of their certainly literary, but sometimes also more deeply traditional, characteristics attested by a plurality of Synoptic *gnomai*, derive thence the most probable claim to authenticity available, namely as that category of sayings which is *a priori* the most probable bridge between successive phases and modes of tradition, which is in fact as broadly and continuously attested as our critical tools can ascertain and which in the event bids fair to be the most representative sample
possible of the sayings tradition, as tradition.

The sayings themselves are, indeed, not quite as intractable as
might be expected. Though gnomai make themselves memorable and
evocative by a richness and flexibility of connotation, this is
sensibly bounded in most cases by a balancing of figurative with more
concrete and circumstantial references, a normative Ausgangsebene
integral to the gnomic analogy. Because gnomic connitivity is
ultimately at the service of rhetorical normativity, its scope is
never unlimited, which may indeed account for the relative
unhelpfulness of eschatology as a category in gnomic
interpretation, though pervasive in varying degree among Synoptic
gnomai, eschatology is the general context, not the ultimate content
of their normativity. The most prevalent, though still not universal,
aspect of Synoptic gnomai is thus rather the conflictive,
disintegrative tendency of their normativity, a character which has as
its correlatives the sometimes explicit, often implied assertion of
personal authority and the reflex toward compensatory normative
integration of the socially sectarian community of discipleship and
renewal.

This authorially self-referential and self-assertive side of
gnomic norms in Jesus' tradition suggests the (incipiently
christological and certainly psychological) inference that the
eschatological and sapiential moods (and a fortiori their literary
associations) are normatively secondary to the relationship between
speaker and audience in oral performance. Eschatology and proverbial
wisdom are both to a degree constitutive of gnomic normativity, but neither is essential to it in the Synoptic sample. At any rate, the problem of authority and of authoritative immanence in normativity would seem to underlie the choice -by Jesus- of a gnomic as well as parabolic and (in the Son of Man and Kingdom of God idioms) symbolic style. Although Synoptic *gnomai* do not quite achieve *jene angst-freie Atmosphäre* of the parables, the marriage of connotation to normative outspokenness does temper the arbitrariness and inflexibility while preserving the personal force of self-assertion.

The relatively concrete normative fields of discipleship and communal renewal provide important confirmation of this suggestion that connotivity is cultivated in Jesus' rhetoric in order to express a nuanced, magisterially authoritative but not authoritarian normativity: discipleship and other communal institutions are vital to Jesus' movement, but neither the content of the *gnomai* nor the technical informality of a sayings-tradition which is so heterogeneous in even its most consistent aspects (*gnome*, *parable*, *etc*) supports the assumption of a scholastic or mnemotechnical discipline. Allowing that Jesus should have had some practical programmatic motive for gathering disciples, the Synoptic *gnomai* permit only its negative description.

In two essentials - conversationally informal, but ethically radical discipleship and challengingly conflictive gnomic rhetoric, by far the best available analogy is from Cynicism - though systematic comparison is hampered by the very much wider popularity and longevity and unrestricted literary diffusion of more-or-less Cynicizing *gnome*-
traditions in antiquity. Cynicism remains doubly important, moreover, not only as the least limited analogy to discipleship and gnome-use in Jesus' circles but actually as a direct environmental influence, even though individual gnomai ascribed to Jesus are not to any appreciable degree directly dependent upon Cynicizing gnomai apparently in contrast with Rabbinic chriic and gnomic borrowings.

In a context of Rabbinic apophthegmatic tradition, Fischel concluded with astonishment "that the gnomic parts of the Hillel chriae still show many traces of the original Greek patterns", to the extent that Cynic gnomic core-patterns are preferred even where suitable Old Testament gnomic models are readily available. Still, in his most thoroughly worked-out example of a Cynicist gnomic chria ascribed to, among many others, Hillel, Fischel is embarrassed by the unique seriousness of the Hebrew version and specifically by "the heavy" (ie legal and eschatological as well as stylistically sombre) "terms of the gnome". At any rate, gnomai which touch on the most sensitive areas of social normativity - areas often regulated by legal and eschatological as well as sapiential sanctions - are more common and less metaphoric in Jesus' than in Cynicizing (including Hillel's) tradition. Thus, for example, the Cynic "Men were not created for the sake of horses, but horses for the sake of men", shows its kinship with the Marcan Sabbath-gnome and its Son of Man complement (2:27f) and, we might add with the Paulo-Corinthian I Cor 6:13. At the same time the normative stakes are clearly higher and the threateningly unsarcastic demand for actual normative adjustment all the more imperative in the saying attributed to Jesus.
Finally, the Synoptic reception of gnomai on discipleship raises again the question of continuity in gnomic normativity. That is, the repeated likelihood of a normative dissonance between the intrinsic possibilities of gnomic sentences and their receptional applications underlines the probability of normative shift in the course of time: despite remarkable social and rhetorical continuities, the meaning of discipleship and of its norms underwent probably inevitable adjustment in altered circumstances. That gnome is a medium of traditional continuity in Jesus' normative language, makes it an all the more useful opportunity to detect and interpret discontinuities in reception and practice. In addition, the phenomenon of normative shift in the reception of gnomic sayings is an important confirmation of their frequent tradition-historical priority. In relation to those gnomai which show a degree of 'legal' topicality, recognition of normative dissonance between gnome and reception may, moreover, provide a strategy toward more nuanced assessment of Jesus' relation to Jewish legality.
CHAPTER SIX: Gnomic Normativity and Law in Synoptic and in Pauline reception

I Balancing and Testing a Gnomic Approach to Jesus’ Spoken Tradition

In arguing for the comprehensive importance of Cynicism as an analogy to Jesus’ movement and tradition, FG Downing has recently reminded us of the requirement for both ‘scope’ and ‘power’ in historical explanation. From this point of view, the impressive scope of the classical form-critical perspective could not compensate for its embarrassing lack of force at key junctures (e.g. the correspondence of Form to Sitz im Leben).\(^1\) Downing is wise enough to recognize that scope and power are not independent variables in social-scientific and historical explanation: a comprehensive insight, no matter how shallow, has some power.\(^2\) The warning that especially explanations of ambitious historical scope should be testable and should be tested for specific penetration as well as general coverage is, however, doubly relevant here, because of the affinity between a gnomic approach to Synoptic tradition and the form-critical, sociological and historic (e.g. Rabbinic) models which Downing rejects\(^3\) and because of the relationship between gnomic rhetoric and the broadly Cynicizing background which he emphasizes instead.\(^4\) Both the scope and the general force of an approach through gnome to the analysis of Jesus’ tradition are anticipated in the basic data of (1) the distribution and conscious cultivation of gnome throughout Hellenistic
rhetorical and educational practice (perhaps especially in popular Cynicizing philosophy) and (2) the distribution of gnomai across every sort of critical boundary in early Christian and, a fortiori, Synoptic literature. Still, in the nature of a study the scope of which is relatively apparent and the power of which depends upon a cumulative impression from many, in principle separable exegeses, some specific attention to 'the ratio of "scope" to "force"' will be a useful preparation for a treatment of topically legal gnomai, the gnomic sub-category which offers the best opportunity for testing the explanatory penetration of a gnomic approach to Jesus' tradition.

Among the most important consequences of recognizing the gnomic element in Synoptic literature is the evidence which it provides for a basic continuity between Synoptic tradition and the rest of Hellenistic rhetorical and educational culture with its widely taught and widely practised models for communication and tradition. The scope of this claim is implicitly very great. Its power is in its theoretical, but testable potential as evidence for a model of Jesus' sayings tradition which is neither the ill-defined folkloric model of older form-criticism nor the much more consistent, but to the Synoptics irrelevant mnemo-technical model in Rabbinic literature. That is, a rhetorical tradition impregnated with gnomai, gnomai associated with other sayings types in argumentative discourses, gnomai associated with parables, gnomai associated with episodic memories or even with narratives (not the same thing!) is a far cry from Riesner's not unjustified parody of form-critically modelled 'wild wuchernde volkstümliche Überlieferung'. On the other hand, such
a tradition of gnomic rhetoric is 'bewusst gepflegt' without a commitment to the scribal forms and narrowly textual transmissional goals (seldom in evidence in the gospels) of mnemotechnical 'Lehrtradition'. Recognition of the significance of gnome in Synoptic literature, together with a knowledge of its importance to precisely the most accessible - and oral - levels of educational, rhetorical and philosophical practice, makes very probable a model of pre-Synoptic oral tradition which shows a conscious and careful interest in Jesus' strongly oral rhetoric but which develops only gradually a relatively literary interest in more than gnomic, parabolic and episodic 'core' textuality. Recognition of gnomic continuity throughout Synoptic oral and written tradition - and of the rarity of such demonstrable continuity - is thus not only evidence (scope), it is the essential prerequisite (power) for a theory of oral tradition which can emphasize both the distinctiveness of oral sensibility and the apparent ease of the Synoptic accommodation to a respectably literate Hellenism - without, by the way, any appreciable mediation of Semitic mnemotechnical scribality.

Furthermore, the uniqueness of gnomic continuity, quantitatively greater than parabolic continuity and qualitatively more convincing than continuity between form-critical categories and alleged Sitz im Leben, makes Synoptic gnomai the best available sample of the sayings tradition as a diachronic whole linking Jesus and the evangelists. The importance of the gnomic sample is thus not only its coverage of the sayings material, but also its forceful coherence as a semantic category in spite of great variety in the reception formulation of the individual units. As an example, Downing affirms the value of
sociological approaches to the history of the New Testament. At the same time he doubts the force of sociological explanations inasmuch as they depend upon and are limited by assumptions of general and special continuity between social currents and (often subsequent) documentation. The social-historical exegete may rightly claim both a macrosociological (between pre- and post- Easter situations) and microsociological (between discipleship circle and Easter-movement) continuity between Jesus and his tradition within which to bracket questions of the individual authenticity of normative sayings. Within the sayings material, however, only the continuity of normative rhetoric in gnome really provides a data set which is both tradition-historically secure enough, and functionally well enough defined to legitimate such bracketing and still support historical judgements about social normativity in Jesus' circle.

In addition to providing the basis in the exceptional continuity between Synoptic orality and literacy for a more nuanced, though still incomplete, model of oral tradition and a more secure basis in the continuity between rhetorical and social normativity for interpretation of community relationships in Jesus’ movement, gnome provides a ground for specific comparisons between Synoptic tradition and both Semitic and Hellenistic "backgrounds" and even more urgently between Synoptics and other early Christian literature, Pauline, Johannine, etc, between canonical and extra-canonical and between gospel and epistolary literatures. Here again, explanatory 'scope' is more in evidence than penetrative power. But especially the latter relationships, within the early Christian literary foreground, offer
an essential opportunity to test the load-bearing capacity of the gnomic bridge. In principle the gnomic language of the Fourth Gospel might serve best as a comparative sample - outside the original Synoptic data set, yet closely related to it - but the role is pre-empted by Pauline gnomology and for two reasons: first, the likelihood of extensive or direct literary interaction between Pauline and Synoptic traditions is less than that of Synoptic literary influence on the Fourth Gospel. Second, because the problems of continuity between rhetorical and social normativity (or between rhetorical and social conflict) and of continuity between Jesus' rhetoric and that of his followers, key problems to the reassessment of which a gnomic approach seeks to contribute in the Synoptics, are most urgently reflected in the corpus Paulinum (and its critical reception) - and in its problematic kinship with the Synoptic sub-category of topically legal gnomai, to which we return presently. In addition, the serviceability of Pauline gnome-use and of Pauline legality as a test-bed for the explanatory power of a much more gnomic account of Jesus' sayings-tradition and its quasi-legal normativity has been greatly enhanced by the current availability of a range of quite closely complementary studies of the perennial question of Pauline allusions to Jesus' sayings and of related problems of traditional (dis)continuity: Paul may very well have known and echoed more sayings of Jesus than he actually cites (he certainly cites little enough and quotes only the liturgical words, I Cor 11:24f), but study of his relation to Synoptic tradition must begin with the extraordinary combination of traditional reverence and normative diffidence in the handling of the tiny kernel of Paul's sure citations (I Cor 7:10 and 9:14), a combination which has only the
fewest analogues in the Pauline corpus\textsuperscript{14} (perhaps I Thess 4:14f; I Cor 7:25; Rm 14:14).

Although the investigation of Paul's gnomic sentences remains a desideratum of New Testament scholarship\textsuperscript{15} a phenomenological continuity in gnome-use between Jesus and Paul and some of its limitations are not difficult to sketch:

Auch Paulus liebt es, in seine Erörterung scharf formulierte Sentenzen einzuflechten. Solche sentenzartigen Zusammenfassungen sind z.B. Röm. 14,7f-17f.; 1 Kor. 5, 6; 8,2f.; 10,24; 13,13 (durch die Neigung zu solchen Formulierungen überhaupt erst verständlich); 14,33; 2 Kor. 4,18b; 7,10; 9,6f.; 13,13; Gal. 2,6; 5,9; 6,7f.; 1 Thess. 5,7. Darunter können gewiss manchmal für uns nicht mehr erkennbare geläufige sprichwörtliche Wendungen sein, wie z.B. Gal. 5,9.\textsuperscript{16}

A significant minority of Pauline gnoma\textsuperscript{i} is explicitly eschatological (eg I Cor 15:42b-44a cf Gal 6:7b; I Thess 5:7; Rm 13:12) and at least some of the apostle's gnoma are almost certainly proverbial (eg Gal 4:16, 18; 5:9; 6:7 bis).\textsuperscript{17} On the other hand, although Paul is almost over-fond of strong, almost paradoxical juxtapositions (eg Gal 6:7b, etc), there is little to approach Synoptic antiproverbiality and self-assertion, unless it be intensely personal, experiential, yet also christological gnoma like Gal 2:21 or Phil 1:21 or the oracular II Cor 12:9. Perhaps correspondingly, the categories of discipleship and legality have largely converged into the more universal norms of richly gnomic ethical parenesis (eg Gal 5:25-6:10;\textsuperscript{18} Rm 12:9-21 cf Lk 6:27ff) with conflicting normative consequences for the category of apostleship (cf I Cor 9:2, 9, 14).\textsuperscript{19}

Indeed the Corinthian correspondence impressively documents the
conflictive potential of gnomic rhetoric, though, significantly, the
challengingly dis-integrative tone which we associate with the most
distinctive Synoptic gnomai is most marked in gnomai with which Paul
does not unreservedly identify himself, which indeed are often
critically attributed to his correspondents and/or opponents (I Cor
6:12/10:23; 6:13; 6:18b; 7:1, 8:1,4; 8:8);\(^2\) whatever the origin of
the more radical gnomic slogans, the balance in each context of
radically disintegrative and eirenically qualifying gnomai places the
author on the side of ecclesial integration. This difference between
Paul's normative situation and that prevailing in Synoptic tradition
(and a fortiori in Jesus' gnomic speech) is confirmed by the
speculative and inferential rather than personally authoritative logic
of Paul's Corinthian gnomai (eg I Cor 6:13 cf Mk 2:27).

Furthermore the Corinthian material gives the clearest
indications that the similarities and dissimilarities of gnomic style
in Paul and in the Synoptics are functions not only of
phenomenological relationship (scope) but also of tradition-historical
continuities and conflicts (power). Thus, specifically in the strong
case of I Cor 9:5-14, we may point to a conjunction of ethical/legal
normative conflict and apostolic self-legitimation in strongly gnomic,
partly scriptural style (cf 9:2, 7, 9, 10,14) with a uniquely explicit
reference and characteristic non-citation of a dominical saying,
itsel a gnome of legal implication (cf Mt 10:10/Lk 10:7; I Tim 5:18;
Jas 5:4; Did 13:1,2). This collision of gnomic style and legality
goes decisely beyond both the extreme general reluctance of New
Testament epistolary literature to cite sayings tradition\(^2\) and the
general Hellenistic interest in gnome. In spite of the paucity of

303
clear Pauline references to sayings attributable to Jesus, then, or rather because of their extreme allusiveness and selectivity, Pauline gnome-use feeds back into leading questions of Synoptic gnome-study: the description of oral traditional processes and their relation to New Testament literature; rhetorical normativity and its changing social reception; and the particular question of Jesus' and the earliest tradition's attitudes to especially Jewish legality. More frequent consideration of Pauline analogues to Synoptic gnomai will therefore add a further dimension of explanatory force to the discussion of a topical sub-category of gnomai which seems on the whole to divide Jesus and Paul, though with significant ambiguities.

As well, the marginality of any sub-category of legal gnomai in Paul's rhetoric and the complex normative shifts of which it is symptomatic between Paul's situation and that of the earliest movement raise again the question of what is meant here by legal or virtually halakic topicality in Synoptic gnomai. In the first place, notions of legal normativity in the ancient world correspond only very loosely to more modern concepts of law: differentiation amongst sacral, civil, and ethical law, or amongst politics, religion and law cannot be pressed. Less obviously, the single term 'law' in antiquity covers a plurality of competing and/or complementary normative systems among which Jewish legality in the period of the Second Temple (1) was obliged to adapt to a variety of situations (hence a large part of Paul's distinctiveness over against the Synoptic literature and its antecedents) and (2) was itself a deeply variegated and controversial mixture of tendencies defining changing sectarian, partisan and ethnic
relations. The very possibility of translating Torah with nomos betrays the breadth and fluidity of both concepts and their irreducibility to practically legal categories. In a discussion of Synoptic gnomai, the overlap between biblical and legal language is inescapable: the former gives the latter its urgency for the study of Christian origins. Still, legal topicality will be indicated for our purpose by traces of language which might probably have had a specialized relevance to the definition and control of practical disputes about rights and duties, without prejudice to the relationship of such law to the Law, ie to Torah. Even within a Rabbinic literary context, legality admits of only alarmingly provisional definition; though to the following might well be added some reference to the normative authority implicit in formal specialization, and in traditional/literary consistency:

A legal, or halachic tradition is a saying or story about the way something is to be done, a statement intended to have practical effect and carry normative authority, or an inquiry into the logic or legal principle behind such a role.

Limited knowledge of Judaism as a context for legal speech and the great dangers of anachronism or misrepresentation of the "Constraint of Law" mean that any invocation of 'legal' or 'halakic' categories must be diffidently heuristic, as Philip Alexander's warning against misappropriation for New Testament studies of such distinctively Rabbinic terminology as 'halakah' implies.

All that said, however, the content of some Synoptic gnomai (most notably of Mk 2:19 parr, 27f parr; 7:15, 27; 12:17 parr; Mt 7:6; 19:12; 6:24 par; 10:10 par) does still compel topical comparison with
Biblical, Rabbinic, Qumranic- and Hellenistic-legalities. That the analogy is not simply 'misleading and question-begging,' depends upon its almost exclusively topical character: biblical laws, halakot and their Qumranic analogues are by no means typically expressed in gnomic style; though such 'laws' may well be based on analogical reasoning, they are almost never formulated as analogically autonomous sentences. Gnomai can embody legal principles, more juristically than casuistically significant (eg Jub. 6.7 cf Gn 9:4,9). Moreover, Rabbinic tradition can produce legally topical gnomai, such as that which disturbed Fischel's analysis of Hillelite chrias. In contrast with the Synoptic situation, however, is not only the rarity of such quasi-legal sayings but also their marginality beside a tradition of formally specialized and normatively more perspicuous legal sayings.

In Jewish Greek, where this departs from Old Testament forms, the Pauline practice is typical, in which topicality appears in gnomai mainly where the topic is Law as a whole (in this sense cf Gal 2:21; Mt 5:18 par) or within contexts of apologetic or parenetic epitome of Torah (cf. Gal 5:14; Mt 7:12 par; Mk 12:28ff parr (less gnomic); Josephus Ap. 2, 190-219; Philo Hypothetica in Euseb. PE 8.7, 1-9; de Spec. Leg. passim; Ps-Phocylides passim.) To describe certain Synoptic gnomai as virtually legal or halakic expresses, then, a quite limited analogy; gnomai in general are argumentative (even about law or the Law) rather than legislative. As Quintilian notices, gnomai resemble public resolutions and decrees (IO 8.5.3), but are nevertheless essentially other. Synoptic gnomai, however, seem often calculated to exploit both this similarity and the nuance of difference in form and, above all, authority by which it is limited,
in order to pre-empt more recognizably legal argumentation.

The hexameter sentence-collection written under Phocylides' name includes very many items which have a legal (Old Testament) reference. In spite of the collection's title, many of its parts are not gnomai: they are either not syntactically separable in their contexts or not analogically structured, instead simply adopting Old Testament legal forms to Greek verse and taste. In any case legal topicality appears in pseudo-Phocylides' gnomai essentially as ethicizing summary or paraphrase: no autonomous, self-assertive normative authority is implied. Thus, for example, pseudo-Phocylides' injunction to give the hireling his wage and not to oppress the pauper (1. 19) at once recalls Mt. 10:10 par, etc. The essential difference between the two, however, (passing over ps-Phocylides' ethicizing tendency) is that the Synoptic gnome, intrinsically and certainly in literary reception, expresses a more specific as well as more connotative to Jesus is formally argumentative rather than legal; it is nonetheless an authoritative intervention in a specific (though not intrinsically specified!) aspect of community life. Both units show a more or less legal topicality; only the Synoptic gnome asserts legal normativity in its own right, however. The distinctively 'legal' quality of Synoptic gnome-use is thus in the normative force as much as in the relative frequency with which these generally non-legislative sayings nevertheless raise topics which in Biblical, Rabbinic, Qumranic or, for that matter, Synoptic or Pauline literature are (or could be) given more coherently legal regulation.

307
To state this conjunction of Synoptic gnome with Synoptic legality as an hypothesis to be tested in exegesis and, where relevant, with reference to Pauline parallels and analogues, we may notice, first, that Synoptic legal gnomai are themselves only seldom 'laws' in the sense of enforceably authoritative texts (for which they often lack perspicuity) or even 'legal principles' (for which most are at once too connotative and too concrete). Synoptic gnomai turn to legal or potentially legal topics on the whole norms in adjacent literatures and with surprisingly little competition from less equivocally legal material in Jesus' tradition. There is, to be sure, no need to put too fine an edge on the formal aspect of this distinction between gnomic and legal rhetoric: they share, after all, a continuum of normativity, especially where 'law' is defined more pragmatically than textually. But the point of such negative form-criticism, that gnomai appear instead of laws in much of Synoptic tradition, corresponds to a much more general impression of gnomic language in Jesus' tradition, that it represents a deliberately unsystematic encroachment of the speaker's personal authority into realms of social normativity. Perhaps the special contribution of legal topicality to this impression is the sharpened probability that normative conflict has an historic as well as poetic focus in Jesus' gnome-use.

The notion of quasi-legal gnomai thus focuses on a peculiarity of normative authority as well as of formal styles in the literature of Jesus' tradition when compared at the very least with the literary deposits of Qumran and the Rabbis: the relative thinness of formally specialized legislative and caustic material together with its
preference for (and ascription to Jesus of) the special pleading of self-assertive gnomic analogies. On one level of explanation this difference may be referred to a difference (once again) of oral and literary sensibilities. That is, the Synoptic Jesus' use of *gnomai* in relation to legal topics is perhaps more nearly comparable to the juridical use of proverbial rhetoric widely documented in societies where 'law' is rather a nexus of rhetorical/social institutions than a body of verbatim reproducible, typically professionally controlled, texts and interpretations. Such dramatized gnomic dialogues as Mt 11:16ff par, Mk 6:1-6 par, 7:24-30 par and Lk 12:54ff par may rightly illustrate the quasi-juridical use of *gnomai* - and sometimes of specifically, though in our special sense, informally legal *gnomai* (eg Mk 7:27). Indeed the heady mixture of conflictive self-assertion and connotative elusiveness in Synoptic *gnomai* corresponds closely with the very widely perceived role of proverbial rhetoric as a means of managing and manipulating dangerous conflicts whether legal, diplomatic or personal, though it is important to recall that the conflictive mood of Synoptic *gnomai* is by no means confined to those which show legal topicality. Even more important for comparison with the Synoptics' and, I am convinced, Jesus' self-assertive and conflictive use of *gnomai* is that proverbs may quite as effectively be used to provoke as to mollify in legal and diplomatic (*cf.* Jg 8:21; I Kg 20:11) to say nothing of prophetic conflicts (*eg* I Kg 18:21). In any case, the irregularity of Synoptic legal *gnome*-use may be partially explicable in the socio-psychological terms of the relatively oral sensibility of the Jesus-movement, a possibility which should help to guard against exaggerating the gnomic dissimilarity.
between legal normativity in Synoptic rhetoric and in Rabbinic, Qumranic and even Biblical literacy into a self-conscious attitude to the Law in all its dimensions. Notwithstanding, such an account is unnecessarily reductionist unless extended by a recognition that the gnomic style and gnomic legality of the Synoptics, like their relatively oral poetics, are not accidental characteristics of that literature and its foregoing tradition, simply the products of conflicting communicative sensibilities, but relate to the pattern of personal normative authority in rhetoric ascribed to Jesus. Given the availability of a tradition of specialized, unambiguously legal and legal-exegetical forms, the prominence instead of somehow legally normative yet disconcertingly informal gnomai must be treated, at least hypothetically, as a significant and programmatic (if not systematic) option in Jesus' tradition.

II Legal Topicality in Gnomai: a Collective Interpretation

The rough edges of our legal sub-category of Synoptic gnomai may be indicated at once. On one margin are the gnomic reflexions about the Law as a whole, Mt 5:18 par and 7:12; their normativity is so purely argumentative and ideological as scarcely to impinge on the realm of legal behaviour, in spite of their topicality. A fuzzier margin is marked by the singularity of Mt 5:36, the only instance I have noticed of an intrinsically non-legal (and non-Old Testament) gnome being received in a pretty strictly legal context within the Synoptics. It is difficult not to see this case, with its Old Testament parallels in vvv.34, 35, as a product of the curious economy of
the Matthaean antithesis with emphatically aural reception of Old Testament literacy (ekousate hoti errethe...) and curious mixture of Old Testament textuality with less recognizable material (vv. 21, 43). In the present context this gnome is of interest rather as a solitary exception proving the important rule that only intrinsically (quasi-)legal gnomai are accorded legal reception in the Synoptics. There is no a priori reason why intrinsically non-legal gnomai should not have been used in juridical situations or received into legalizing contexts (v. contra I Sam 24:13, 14); the category of 'legality', however admittedly vague, has therefore some ground in the correspondence between intrinsic topicality and contextual reception in the Synoptic texts. In addition, though, this singularity of Mt 5:36 as an attempt to ground Synoptic legality in a non-legal gnome (though see, perhaps, Ac 20:35!), suggests that even in tradition, quasi-legal gnomai had a privileged relation to legalizing inference in Jesus' movement. This does not mean, of course, a correspondence between gnomic legality and a legal Sitz im Leben, even if our rule-of-thumb notion of legality could support more than loose association with very broadly typical rhetorical situations. Thus several intrinsically legal gnomai are received non-legal in their Synoptic contexts.

Mt 26:52 in particular is intrinsically more than the restatement of a universal sacral and legal principle (Gn 9:6). Rather the topic of the sword gives the gnome a recognizably more casuistic specificity in the general situation of first-century Palestine as clearly as in the Matthaean literary context, where nonetheless the legal and
political aspects of the saying's normativity are not explicitly developed: presumably the rhetoric of the normative obviates such development.

Other cases of apparently non-legal reception of intrinsically legal gnomai are complicated more by intrinsic metaphorical than by external, especially normative, possibilities. Thus the gnome against judging, Mt 7:1f par, intrinsically and in its gospel receptions mocks distinctions between legal topicality, eschatological mood and common sense. The saying's chief interest here is therefore as an instance of the quasi-legality of gnomai, their aoristic character in comparison to properly legal forms such as, in this case, the Kirchenordnung in Mt 18:15ff. It is impossible to prove an allusion to our gnome in the opening of Rm 2, but it is worth noticing that such extreme allusiveness would be appropriate not only to Paul's argument, where a direct dominical command would be pointless, but also to the complex normativity compounded of eschatology, ethics and ill-defined legality which does link Jesuan gnome to Pauline diatribe. At any rate such speculation is licensed by the normative tension between the Pauline gnome (Rm 2:1b), which like Mt 7:1f par has a prudential interest in neighbourship, and the argument of 2:1c ff on the inevitability and universality of eschatological judgement: Paul's use of a gnome on reciprocal judgement, in its context sufficiently malapropos to have been called a gloss,$^{40}$ is at least a more plausible ground for suspecting a common (gnomic) traditional denominator than mere verbal similarity.
The closely related metric gnome, Mk 4:24 parr, is an instance of cited legality. That is, a saying with proverbial currency (at least in Ptolemaic Egypt) as a legal/commercial formula is given in Synoptic reception (and probably in Jesuan rhetoric generally) additional eschatological and ethical weight. Intrinsically the saying is, exceptionally, a true law, the only gnome I can think of in or around Synoptic tradition which in spite of its wider connotative possibilities is in itself a fully coherent legal prescription. Synoptic reception, however, emphasizes rather its connotations, so that Matthew actually treats it as a legal principle rather than a free-standing rule: metric parity is related to judicial parity (Mt 7:2) in a way which evades the absolute and anarchical prohibition of Mt 7:1 par. In Mk and Lk, however, the gnome of measurement remains, on the one hand, a presumably active commercial/legal norm and, on the other, an ethical and eschatological rather than legal principle.

In the Quatrain, Mt 6:24/Lk 16:13, another legal proverb, ie neither a law nor a general legal principle but a typical case, is extended, this time quite metaphorically, into a theological warning which is only very generally ethical, let alone legal. Despite its poetic reception, however, the gnome itself is typical of our 'legal' sub-category: clearly intended to affect legal relationships, but most irresponsibly indifferent to means and ends or to identification with a recognizably legal authority or corpus.

The Quatrain Mt 7:6 is in much the same way the extended, legally
less specific, reception of a gnome which is a more-or-less-intrinsically legal norm, but which is at the same time rather too connotative to be qualified simply as a 'law' - even in its more specifically legal reception in the churchly context of Did.9.5. The saying's close relationship with Mk 7:27 par, in fact, casts considerable light on the notion of gnomic quasi-legality. The two gnomai have in common an inescapable relevance to the uncomfortably strong normative distinction between Israelite and Gentile (and to its sacral and eschatological content). They do not, however, alone or together make a sufficient basis for the inference of a complete and coherent attitude to the Gentiles nor is their normativity clearly delineated. Thus the reference(s) of to hagion (Mt 7:6) and ho artos ton teknon (Mk 7:27) are not fully specified; there is, moreover, room in Mt 7:6a/Did 9.5 for eventual redefinition of the 'dogs' and in the Marcan saying (even without proton) for their eventual rehabilitation. This combination of an overwhelmingly conflictive tone with the bare logical or prophetic possibility of (eschatological) adjustment probably brings us as close to an 'attitude to the Gentiles' as the pre-Easter movement itself came, but its implications are more 'legal' than its perspicuity.

Four further gnomai have in common that each contains vocabularly/imagery from one legal topic which is, however, applied figuratively only to a second, also intrinsically legal topic. That is, Mt 19:12 is not about eunuchs, 8:22/Lk 9:60 is not about burial. Mt 10:8b (in Matthaean reception, though see Ac 20:35) is not about alms-giving and (at least in Synoptic and related receptions) Mt 10:10/Lk 10:7 is not about labour justice. All four are indeed
about discipleship, an institution which, even in its non-scholastic orientation to Jesus, might be expected to be a focus of legal or analogous regulation. In fact, even the least figurative and least authoritatively personal of the three, Mt 10:10 par, leaves open and dependent on the authority and context of the gnome-user not only the identity and function of the 'worker' but even more the conditions under which and the persons from whom he was to receive his keep.

The explanatory usefulness of an emphasis generally on the gnomic aspect of Jesus' sayings-tradition and of recognition of both the frequently specific legal bearing and also of the essentially non-legal quality of Synoptic gnomai can be tested with unusual precision in comparison between Mt 10:10 par and the Pauline passage I Cor 9:1-14. It is as difficult for us to give unequivocal answers to Paul's rhetorical questions about the status of his apostolate as it may have been for his original correspondents. The legal character of the central questioning and of the closing appeal to dominical authority (v.14) are, however, clear. Ex hypothesi, it is hardly surprising that the obvious reference in Synoptic sayings material is to a gnome; much more surprising from this point of view is Paul's failure simply to cite when he is so exceptionally willing so clearly to allude.

The problem of Paul's extreme allusiveness to the, in principle, nonetheless revered authority of dominical sayings is, of course, general and standard and the suggestion that such sayings were 'largely, at that time and in Paul's eyes, "in enemy hands"' is
substantially persuasive, above all for the Corinthian correspondence. We have already noticed that the Synoptic mood of gnomic challenge is strongest in those Pauline gnomai in which the apostolic writer is most probably ethopoetically mimicking the rhetoric of his correspondents and/or opponents. In this instance Paul appears almost among his own opponents, securing for himself an apostolic privilege, the not necessarily optional normativity of which, even in his own almost biblical and sacral gnomic reference to law (v.13) and in his own legalizing citation of dominical order, he cannot easily escape without loss of credibility. But an important pre-condition for normative conflict is clarified on the assumption, exceptionally probable in view of Mt 10:10 par and its wider attestation, that the tradition of dominical pronouncement common to Paul and his correspondents is gnomic in style, specifically gnomic in its quasi-legality. If Paul and other parties influential in Corinth all attributed to Jesus a saying indubitably relevant to the maintenance of his emissaries, but not at all transparent as a basis for legally normative interpretation, or, in other words, if Mt 10:10 par and its wider attestation, that the tradition of dominical pronouncement common to Paul and his correspondents is gnomic in style, specifically gnomic in its quasi-legality, If Paul and other parties influential in Corinth all attributed to Jesus a saying indubitably relevant to the maintenance of his emissaries, but not at all transparent as a basis for legally normative interpretation, or, in other words, if Mt 10:10 par represents at least the type of common normative tradition alluded to by Paul here, there is ample room for bona fide differences of opinion and practice - in this example in the ambiguity both of normative tone, imperative

316
(Mt/Lk) or indicative (Paul’s not unambiguous tendency) and of
normative specificity to a particular but undefined class of
‘worker’.48 In this crucial instance, then, the centrality of gnomai
to Jesus’ tradition, particularly where legal topicality is broached,
accounts, if not for positions of individual parties, then for the
rhetorical-traditional basis and form of normative conflict and for
Paul’s own astounding willingness simultaneously to reject and assert
the normative relevance of a dominical saying which is, after all,
essentially non-legal.49 Assumption of a gnomic style explains, at
least in this example, how dominical tradition could be at once
recognizably non-legal and recognizably relevant enough to be used on
all sides “in a legalistic way.”50 Even Paul’s reluctance to quote
Jesus and substitution of more plainly legal formulations (vv.13, 14),
tendencies not limited to I Cor, may in the end reflect frustration
not only with opponents but also with the limited regulatory
perspicuity of a nevertheless authoritative tradition.

Paul’s apologetic reference to his apostolic colleague’s wives in
I Cor 9:3-6 makes a curious topical bridge not only to the material in
I Cor 7 but also to the similarly conflated treatment of marital
separation and celibacy in Mt 19:3-12. Prima facie, these three texts
would seem to hold little promise for the identification of essential
common, putatively dominical tradition in a gnome like Mt 19:12. In
the first place, Paul and quite plausibly the Corinthians have another
gnome which gives much more clearly the same normatively indicative
(i.e. elective) gist, I Cor 7:1b, 26b, without the rather daunting
imagery of the ‘eunuch’. Indeed the Paulo-Corinthian saying is only
marginally identifiable as *gnome*: only the open-ended indicative suggests an analogous, but opposing norm which is also 'good'. Secondly, if Paul was as unusual among 'apostles' in upholding one clear dominical norm (Mt 19:12) as he apparently was in ignoring another (Mt 10:10 par), we might expect at least an allusion to the fact. Finally, Paul himself explicitly denies having a dominical precept about celibates (I Cor 7:25 cf v.6).

In fact, the singular forcefulness of Paul's denial requires clearer explanation; he particularly emphasizes that what he does not have is a *legal* tradition on dominical authority (*epitage*, in this sense unique to vv.6,25 in Paul's *corpus*) about (in v.6 temporary) celibacy, an emphasis absent from the disclaimer of v. 12. In my view, Paul's emphasis on his lack of a legal model is enough to suggest, as a more complete silence about dominical tradition would not, the surmise that our writer's advice (*suggnome* v.6/*gnome* v.25!) is consciously inspired (*hos eleememos hupo tou kuriou pistos einai*) by a tradition which is intrinsically inappropriate as a source of congregational law - but which is by the same tokens (topicality and attribution to Jesus) susceptible, even actually subject, to legalizing misuse.51 Within the context of a greater recognition of the gnomic aspect in sayings tradition in Jesus' name and of the tendency of gnomic normativity to slide equivocally toward legality, such a surmise becomes a reasonable working hypothesis: I Cor 7:25 is not just an indication that Paul was very aware of 'the difference between halakhoth of the Lord and his own',52 he was conscious also that the Lord's sayings were intrinsically not *halakot* at all. The attestation of an appropriate oracular *gnome* in Mt 19:12 accords our
hypothesis a measure of hitherto unavailable probability.

The Matthean gnome above all fits the Pauline requirements in being very plausibly pre-Matthaean, at least to judge from its minimal argumentative emphasis and (catchword) integration into a basically non-Matthaean context. Indeed the gnome intrinsically and in its formal Matthaean contextualization has radically different senses in a striking case of normative dissonance between a legally topical gnome and its legalizing eisegesis in Synoptic apophthegmatic context.

In addition, the hyperbolic image of the 'eunuch' and the triplet form of the gnome mark it clearly as a non-legal text in spite of its practical implications: the saying is in no sense an epitage. Moreover, even without probable associations with ritual purity as a dangerously un-Pauline motive to celibacy (cf Wisd Sol 3.13f), the gnome's harsh language is imaginably not such as to commend it to Paul, to his audience or to his opposition. At the very least, then, recognition of the specifically gnomic internalization of tension between legal and oracular, personally and eschatological authoritative normativity enormously strengthens the probability that the gnome Mt 19:12 and the fact or fear of its abuse underlie Paul's strangely nuanced language in I Cor 7:6,25; this complex gnome is at any rate more than just one which Paul ought to have known, but did not.

A gnomic approach to Synoptic sayings also sheds light on the nature of traditional continuity amongst Paul, the Synoptics and Jesus in the (for Mt and Paul) adjacent subject of marital separation.
Paul's allusion in I Cor 7:10 to dominical authority is comparable only to that in 7:25 for explicitness; it is all the more challenging, then, that it too is an allusion, especially in view of the embarrassing richness of comparable (and comparably legal) discussion in our Synoptic texts (Mk 10:2-12/Mt 19:3-9; Lk 16:18; Mt 5:27-32). On the one hand, Paul's specificity of allusion would seem to demand an element not only of general but also of textual, verbal continuity with the tradition of Jesus' opposition to divorce. On the other, the complexity of the Synoptic argumentation and, after all, the uncertainty of its relation to prior tradition of Jesus' language, make identification of textually common tradition enormously difficult.

The most conspicuous point of commonality among the Synoptic materials on divorce is, curiously, an equally conspicuous point of discontinuity with Paul: "All the synoptic passages...are determined by the view that divorce leads to adultery." This and Paul's (prior) interest in the possibility of the wife initiating separation makes the saying, Mk 10:11, 12, an unlikely candidate as the bridge between Synoptic and Pauline receptions of tradition. In itself this does not entail the inauthenticity of the Synoptic saying. Its secondary character in at least the central pericope, Mk 10:2-12/Mt 19:3-9, is confirmed, however, by the normative dissonance between the concluding saying, prohibiting remarriage as adulterous, and the preceding scriptural argument, prohibiting separation as a contradiction of the very nature of marital union. The latter argument is expressed in two scriptural citations (Gn 1:27 and 2:24) (vv.6-8) and a culminating gnome (v.9). Its logic and one each of the
biblical quotations are paralleled in the Covenant of Damascus, CD 4.21, and, more to the point, I Cor 6:16; it is not fanciful, then, to notice that the only distinct verbal parallel between I Cor 7:10 and the Synoptic analogues is with the extraordinary vocabulary of central gnome, Mk 10:9 par.

C'est à ce logion de Mt 19 6b et Mc 10 9 que Paul fait allusion en 1 Co 7 10s., comme à un ordre reçu de Seigneur (même verbe "séparer"), et non au logion de Mt 19 9 et par.59

The hypothetical expectation that, if gnome-use is a major (by the way, authentic) factor in the structuring of Jesus' sayings tradition, it should also be recognizable bridge between Synoptic and Pauline sayings reception, is substantially confirmed by comparison between the Synoptics and Paul on divorce. The comparison has implications (explanatory force) beyond the bare confirmation of common gnomic tradition, however. The close association, in the Synoptics contextual and in Paul topical, between scripture citation and gnome60 and the actual citation of Gn 1:27 in Mk 10:6 par and of Gn 2:24 in I Cor 6:16 as (again non-legal) gnomai, are a vital reminder that a (largely) gnomic tradition need not be inimical to the recollection of quite complicated argumentation, any more than in other contexts (eg Mk 6:1-6 parr) gnomic tradition is incompatible with plausible episodic memory.

Furthermore, the probability that a gnome, particularly Mk 10:9b par, underlies Paul's allusion in I Cor 7:10f may help to penetrate the veil of his allusiveness in relation to sayings tradition.
generally. The particularity of this allusion in the Corinthian context is that there is no hint of self-justification: Paul himself is unthreatened by the norm and ideologically unreserved as to its validity - though he hastens to provide legally for its violation! Paul’s relative self-assurance may explain his retention of one of the Jesuan gnome’s very distinctive verbs. Still, his general allusiveness is not dropped and it and the unseemly haste with which he and the Synoptics independently turn from gnomic prohibition of divorce to formally legal regulation of its consequences suggest again the essential non-legality of gnome. Paul’s allusiveness, even in exceptionally outspoken appeal to Jesus’ authority, even here where such an appeal is ideologically and personally least likely to draw fire onto Paul himself, is most explicable on the assumption that Paul’s tradition was intrinsically unsuited to his task. If Paul’s tradition was in fact the gnome, Mk 10:9b par, we may credit him for distinguishing between the normativity of an unenforceable ideal and that appropriate to the written pastoral judgements which it inspires. More generally, if only Paul’s tradition, like pre-Synoptic tradition, was probably substantially (and authentically) gnomic, Paul’s extreme allusiveness was justified, at least in legalizing contexts, by the nature of his material, even if not by its actual normative abuse. In gnomai legal topicality simply does not mean applicability as law.

Finally Paul’s very probable use of legal gnomai in his most explicit references to Jesus’ sayings and his consequently probable reservations about their legally normative applicability raise the in any case unavoidable question of Jesus’ or his earliest imitator’s intentions in spawning such a brood. If, as seems most probable,
Jesus actually spoke in terms like those of the quasi-legal gnomai reported in his name, it would seem derivatively unlikely that he did so in innocence of their mixture of legal topicality and the ad hoc authority of personal assertions. Moreover, the forcefulness of the legal imagery, and the seriousness of the implied topics and their frequent relevance to the mobilization of the discipleship group imply that the use and conversation of legal gnomai had programmatic as well as tactical value. Tactically, Jesus and his immediate continuators may well have cultivated the legal gnome as a means of asserting his personal authority in the face of opponents more committed to the rigorous coherence of legal norms and legal forms; programmatically, legal gnomai represent in the first place not so much a critical analysis of the Law as the extension into the most sensitive fields of social normativity of the same assertiveness disclosed in (the overlapping category of) Jesus' most explicitly personal gnomai.

Apart from I Thess 4:15ff and I Cor 11:23ff, both of which are as exceptional from a Synoptic point of view as from a Pauline, these comparisons with Synoptic quasi-legal gnomai exhaust Paul's notoriously few explicit allusions to sayings attributed to Jesus. While the possibility, grounded in the apostle's very allusiveness, of further, more hidden references must be borne in mind, the questions of the Pauline 'test-case' will recede somewhat in importance in exegesis of the remaining legal gnomai, all of them, by the way, Marcan.

The Wanderlogion Mk 9:35 parr, 10:43 parr is unusual among the
Synoptics' quasi-legal gnomai in two respects. It is notable (1) for the degree to which it spans our exegetical sub-categories of personal reference, discipleship and legal topicality. Like Mt 10:10 par, Mt 9:35 etc are received as a practical model for leadership and rank within the community of discipleship, far more than as a prophetic model for wider social transformation. But precisely as a, for gnome, typically non-legal framework for resolving the incipiently legal problems of hierarchy among the disciples, the primacy saying depends concretely on the example as well as the verbal authority of Jesus. This imprecision of the intrinsic character of the gnome is confirmed (2) by K Berger's investigation, exemplary in both intention and result, of gemeinsame Tradition behind Mk 10:35-45, Lk 22:24-30 and Jn 13:1-17. Berger's conclusions emphasize (a) the tradition-critical priority behind Mk 10 and Lk 22 of an orally transmitted sentence on the pattern, 'gross ist, wer dient,' (b) the probable association with this gnostic core-tradition of an (authentic) episodic recollection of Jesus' practical example and (c) the impossibility and illegitimacy of defining the continuum of oral tradition beyond this double, gnostic and episodic, core. Apart from being a reminder (like Mk 6:4) that the importance of gnostic core within strongly oral tradition does not by any means exclude more or less intimately connected episodic reminiscences, Berger's discussion of the gnome represented in Mk 10:43 par underlines the expression of personal authority, extending even to the implication of virtually biographical narrative, as the origin of normative force. The aggressive, if connotatively veiled, extension of such personal and non-legal authority into even more objective and public fields of (legal) normativity is the task of the main body of topically legal gnomai.
Particularly in relation to the gnome, Mk 7:15 par, an entire literature has grown up around the standard questions of our gnomic exegesis, "Could Jesus have said this?" and (especially, but not only, if 'yes') What could it have meant? As with every gnomic saying in the Synoptics so here, the present discussion seeks to contribute only the one basic insight that gnomic sayings constitute a rhetorical class in Synoptic literature and tradition the cumulative profile of which (eg its frequently personal and quasi-legal aspects) is semantically and historically more significant than the (in)authenticity and (limited) perspicuity of the individual units.

The implications of this single insight, be it ever so fundamental for a better appreciation of the argumentative structure and development of Synoptic tradition and the literature under its influence, are not likely to sever the Gordian knot binding tradition and criticism in Mk 7:1-23. The tangle may be loosened, however, in several aspects. Thus the question of historically possible meanings, so particularly urgent, is bound up, not only with the unending pursuit of an 'original wording' but more especially with the need to recognize the saying's generic character. S Westerholm has shown the way here, in his general thesis that the most probably authentic aspects of topically legal pericopa in the Synoptics are not actually statutory, ie formally legal, and in his specific recognition that the mashal, Mk 7:15, belongs to a non-legal order of normative rhetoric.66

Hence the "rule" which Jesus stated here with regard to true purity is left open, paradoxical, capable of providing

325
guidance but lacking the precise applications of halakhah. That is, the vocabulary of defilement and purity which gives the saying its unavoidable legal topicality also invests it with a legally intolerable ambiguity: the same gnomic core could be cited in illustration of dialectically opposed attitudes to purity (inward and outward vs inward instead of outward).

The Synoptic contextualization, moreover, falls well short of resolving the inner normative ambiguity of the gnome; the Marcan and to a moderated extent the Matthaean contexts are above all characterized by such argumentative and topical fragmentation as effectively to isolate the gnome for historical exegesis. In one direction, no amount of tinkering with the gnome's 'original wording' can make it a sensible response to the initial challenge about unwashed eating or to the subsequent excursus about Korban. As v.17 stands it is clearly about the third distinct topic, food. Even stripped of the participles relating unequivocally to food, however, the gnome is about the possibility of incurring impurity through deeds, a possibility of which the disciples' accusers seem already keenly aware. Certainly, what follows in Mk 7:17-23 commits the pericope to the basic contradiction of a question about handwashing and an eventual answer contrasting food with immorality as sources of uncleanliness. In other words, as Berger has noticed, the relations of Mk 7:15 and 10:9 to their contexts are essentially similar: they are both indeed unusually complicated instances of the widespread normative dissonance between gnome and apophthegmatic context, a dissonance which is very typically defined by the tension between intrinsically non-legal, though topical gnome and more or less
plausibly legalizing Synoptic receptions.

This tradition-critical as well as semantic separation of Mk 7:15 from its Synoptic context does not, however, establish the saying’s authenticity or even that more limited and therefore more demonstrable potential authenticity which is of equal relevance to a study of the collective significance and historicity of Synoptic gnomai. Again, even on the unsupportable supposition that the gnome originally excluded specially food-related participial qualifiers, its potential relevance to questions of Torah-observance should have made it a focus of debate well beyond the development in Mk 7 par:

The problem remains that, if Jesus is the source of the mashal in v.15, it is difficult to understand the controversies in the early church related to table fellowship with Gentiles...and the eating of meat offered to idols.73

The point of the saying, in fact, is so clear that the positions of the ‘false brethren’, Peter and James become impossible to understand if the saying be considered authentic.74

The simplest explanation of Mk 7:15 thus assumes its inauthenticity as a saying of Jesus.75 From the point of view of the saying’s inclusion among Synoptic quasi-legal gnomai, however, we may wonder whether a more comprehensive account is not available without incurring unacceptable complexity. Certainly a better ratio of scope/force is desirable in explanation of a saying which, on Synoptic tradition-critical grounds has a plausible claim to authenticity.76 One preliminary point is clear: unlike the church, Jesus and his associates can have had little or no occasion radically to question, let alone to abrogate or violate biblical food-laws as such.77 The
saying’s only imaginably authentic context is in relation to (in Jesus’ day minority, controversial and probably unsystematized) projects toward the affectation of priestly purity norms by laymen. Under such circumstances users of our gnome could be forgiven for hearing less its legal implications than the arrogation of authority by its speaker, who is, after all, albeit ferociously, upholding a normal practical position of conscientious but unprogrammatically biblical observance. If it is generally true that our gnome ‘macht einen durchaus torakritischen Eindruck’ in its Marcan, and its modern, context, it does so much less in Matthaean reception, and may in fact have produced a much less abstractly and much more personally authoritative voice and in a Jewish environment to which principled, calculated rejection of biblical Torah as a whole must have been largely alien. After all, Mk 7:15 does not give the impression of criticism exactly: either it rejects Torah absolutely (and scatologically) or it is primarily about something else. The hypothesis that legally topical gnomai including Mk 7:15 are, as gnomai, essentially and, in principle, recognizably non-legal despite their topicality takes the latter option seriously: while the saying clearly is about some sort of problem of attitudes toward food and purity, it absolutely does not tell anyone what they should or shouldn’t eat, whether or how much they should care about purity or, above all, what rules or what approach to legal exegesis to follow. That is, this gnome, like the other legal gnomai reviewed thus far, is neither legislation nor a coherent principle for legislation; it certainly abolishes nothing except the most mechanically ideological attitude to purity laws - and the possibility of indifference to the personal authority of the gnome-speaker who presumes to pronounce.
rather than to infer purity and impurity. Viewed in this way Mk 7:15 coheres with the other quasi-legal sayings and with the rhetoric of gnomai generally in Jesus tradition, not as a coherent critique of food laws, with fairly immediate implications for an 'attitude to the law', but as an assertion of personal authority and a pointed, topically controversial expression of latent conflict between Jesus' mission of renewal and programmes for Israel's systematic, gradual purification. The gnome's potential authenticity as (1) representative of Jesus' rhetoric and (2) not demonstrably inauthentic, is indicated not just by its tradition-critical detachability from its legalizing apophthegmatic reception in Mk 7, but more especially legal application; attribution of Mk 7:15 to Jesus is historically possible and interesting not because it abolishes laws, but because it gnomically confounds all possible (certainly Marcan) jurisprudence.

This example, like Mk 10:9 is moreover, an actual instance of the possibility envisaged in explanation of Paul's reticent use of gnomai attributed to the Lord, namely that of abusing legally topical gnomai despite their intrinsic unsuitability as directly legal texts. Thus Mk 7:17ff in the strongest terms represent Jesus' mashal as an effective and general abolition of biblical food laws, though even the Marcan context implies the saying's legal unclarity in the disciples' need for clarification. In stressing the intrinsic and original non-legality of even those Synoptic gnomai which have a legally topical reference, the forced misconstruction of legal topicality as legal applicability is not ignored. Rather its severe limitation, even in

329
Synoptic and Pauline literatures with their serious and legitimate need for legally authoritative norms and for normative self-definition, is explained by an essentially correct recognition by at least some tradents of the more personally nuanced character of even the most topical gnōmai and by the intractability of the gnōmai themselves in legal application. Matthew's sanitized parallel (Mt 15:11) and, above all, his omission of Mark's antinomian conclusion (Mk 7:19), thus reflect the indelible legal ambiguity if not the whole conflictive force of the most basic category of legal sayings in Jesus' tradition.

This tension, certainly in redactional tradition and very probably in oral recollection of Jesus' rhetoric too, between the unavoidably legal relevance of a gnome such as Mk 7:15 and the double edgeness of a norm which may legitimately be construed either to abolish practically all legal normativity or at least (and potentially authentically) to constrict in the strongest possible terms rational projects for the reconstruction of Israel around consistent application of biblical legality, brings us once again, though even more tentatively, to Paul. Doubts of the potential authenticity of the food-purity gnome are essentially grounded in the apparent contradiction between its topical importance for the specifically post-Easter politics of the early Church and its apparent neglect by all parties. The appearance of neglect is, however, relative, particularly to the probability, quite variously assessed, that Paul's remarkable insistence on dominical authority in Rm 14:14 may conceal an allusion to sayings tradition. Any attempt to relate Rm 14:14 to Mk 7:15 must overcome not only (1) the general difficulty of Paul's
allusiveness and/or very modest knowledge in relation to Jesus' sayings but also (2) his special failure (even more than in relation to Mt 19:12) to exploit fully a gnome which, if even plausibly authentic, should have allowed him triumphant settlement of a deeply divisive Church fight and (3) his use (v.14) of a formula rather of inner pneumatic conviction than of objective verbal allusion.81

I have already argued in connection with earlier examples that Paul's striking refusal to quote Jesus' words is related not only to limited knowledge and interpretive competition from more plausible or more authoritative tradents, but also to an imbalance between Paul's legalizing and theologically sensitive normative requirements in dominical citation and the volatile mixture of legal topicality with non-legal, personal authority in generally authentic sayings tradition dominated, ex hypothesi, by gnomai. As to the more particular problems of this case, moreover, the peculiarly loaded ambiguities of Mk 7:15 - semantically relating to Jesus' sovereignty either to accommodate observance without abrogating its biblical demands or the radical abrogation of law in its most characteristically Jewish aspect - make a plausible background for the equally peculiar nuance of Paul's appeal to Jesus' authority in Rm 14:14. This is especially so, if we recognize the likelihood that a relatively conservative, observant reception of the food-gnome must have had a diminishing plausibility as the Church moved beyond its origins in Jesus' situation toward the large-scale incorporation of Gentiles; Matthew's redactional disavowal (Mt 15:11, 17) of Mk 7:19 is to that extent already a rear-guard. Even so Paul's own rhetorical position in Rm 14
as in I Cor 8 is that of an arbitrator\textsuperscript{82} and not by any means unequivocally that of committed advocate of the radical cause. Instead his quite concessionary and qualified acceptance of (his nearest and dearest opponents'?) formulae relevant to food-laws (Rm 14:20; I Cor 6:13; 10:23 \textit{cf} 6:12), formulae also on the border between law and \textit{gnome}, implies that if Paul knew Mk 7:15, he would not have been unequivocally happy with its explanation in terms as absolute as those of Mk 7:19.

In general, then, Rm 14:14 coheres, though inevitably circumstantially, with the hypothetical expectation that Paul, diatribist and professed ex-Pharisee should be more than usually, or perhaps more than Synoptically, sensitive both to the stringencies of formally legal normativity and to the connotative possibilities of \textit{gnome} as a rhetorical means for transcending argumentative, especially legal, rigour. But the recognition in Mk 7:15 of a \textit{gnome}, and of a \textit{gnome} which characteristically combines or confuses legal reference with non-legal ambiguity and implicitly personal authority, helps clarify Rm 14:14 by providing Paul with an important ground for wariness in using even so tempting a tradition. In fact two such grounds are provided. First, is the serious possibility in the abstract and in both Rm 14 and I Cor 8-10, that a \textit{gnome} such as ours would be the object of divergent appropriation by competing interpretive communities within Paul's constituency\textsuperscript{83} - to say nothing of the larger Church. Second, though, is the intrinsic difficulty of Mk 7:15 particularly for Paul himself, caught between the \textit{gnome}'s implied internalization of law and its implied abrogation of the same. In Mt 7:15 Paul may well have had a command, on the highest speakable
authority, not to worry about food-laws. But the same gnome by itself - and tradition-criticism of Mk 7 suggests that the saying was originally transmitted in substantial hermeneutical isolation\textsuperscript{84} - or with the explanatory formula Mk 7:19; Rm 14:20\textsuperscript{85} does not yield Paul's rather delicately nuanced positions in Rm 14 and I Cor 8-10, certainly not without the possibility of authoritative contradiction, on from abrogationist and cautious tendencies alike. That is, the gnome could not tell him how not to worry about the (im)purity of foods.

Here again, it is impossible positively to demonstrate Pauline knowledge of a dominical gnome. It is important, however, to notice here again the correspondence between the intrinsic difficulty, indeed dangers, of a Synoptic quasi-legal gnome and Pauline diffidence in citing the Lord's authority for his own legal rulings. Indeed the particular difficulty and topical urgency of Mk 7:15 correspond especially to the case of Rm 14:14. The Synoptic gnome in fact leaves its would-be interpreter in quite precisely the necessity witnessed by Paul's formula in Rm 14:14, a formula not of objectively confident citation, but instead of inner conviction in personal identification with Jesus' authority.\textsuperscript{86} More than most sayings, though not uniquely, Mk 7:15 is mute or, rather, offensively equivocal except to the interpreter who knows already its speaker's mind; that Paul identifies himself as just such an interpreter at the one juncture where he speaks of the personal internalization of food impurity (koinos Rm 14:14, cf Mk 7:15) and, less positively, of the abolition of impurity (panta kathara 14:20, cf Mk 7:19), makes a deliberately cautious reference to gnomic tradition impressively likely. Once
again, and more to the point, a Pauline non-allusion exactly illustrates, be it accidentally or (as I think) deliberately, (1) the non-legality of even topically legal gnomai such as Mk 7:15 (2) their coherence with other Synoptic gnomai as a rhetoric of personal, not inferential authority (cf Rm 14:14 en kurio Iesou). As well, the intelligibility of Paul's at most marginal and cautious allusion to Mk 7:15 in Rm 14 as a reasonable response to the saying's intrinsic and, judging from the Synoptics, receptional volatility as a prescriptive norm (3) greatly diminishes the essential obstacle to the gnome as at least potentially authentic. Recognition of the saying's characteristically gnomic difficulty allows us, on one hand, to see Paul's non-development of an apparently ultimate weapon in inner-Christian debate as wise forbearance and not only ignorance. On the other hand, the same recognition places the purity-gnome in a rhetorical context of sometimes quite radically personal though relatively latent (i.e. mainly verbal and in any case symbolic and connotative) normative challenge, a context in which, if the present argument avails at all, the historical Jesus was at home. Within this broadly authentic context, the present gnome may be seen to be in some sense, 'ein hellenistisches Logionweisheitlicher Art in apokalyptischer Tradition' without being therefore inauthentic or unrepresentative in attribution to Jesus. 87

As K Berger has most explicitly noticed, all of the four remaining Marcan legal dispute-pericopae have the same essential literary and tradition-historical character as Mk 7:1-23 and 10:2-12: in each an older, gnomic, quasi-legal and potentially authentic saying (Mk 2:19, 27; 3:4b; 7:15; 10:9; 12:17) is set in a certainly idealized
and more or less likely secondary, if not wholly fabricated, biographical setting. Furthermore, in each the probable tradition-critical differential between saying and setting is reflected more or less vividly in dissonance between the intrinsic non-legality of gnome and the evangelist's legitimate need for normative perspicuity.

Normative dissonance between a gnome which in its putative context forbids fasting and a more tolerant setting is relatively near the surface in Mk 2:18-22, in an incongruity only slightly moderated in Mt and Lk by the absence of a parallel to Mark's temporizing v.19b. Indeed the incongruity is underscored in all three Synoptics by the implication of the concluding parabolic material (vv.21 par.) that the narrative innovation of v.19a is neither reversible nor compatible with the old order. For the present it scarcely matters whether the dissonance is to be put down, as v.20 suggests, to normative shift over time or to variation amongst competing groups within the movement. It is sufficient here to notice once more that the equivocation of the pericope as a whole is grounded in the ambiguity and positively non-legal, incipiently christological character of the central gnome. Against Schille's well-meaning proposal that both Mk 2:19a and the contrary, Mt 6:17f, 'simplifizieren die Sache,' the Marcan saying embodies without wider reference the whole scope of the problem of relating Jesus' authority to the practice of fasting - though reference could be made to the complementary gnomic tradition of Mt 11:16-19 par. Thus no privileged, legally abstract or generally valid criticism or abrogation of fasting is implied, despite its slim warrant in biblical law, rather the normal order is unconditionally
transcended and to that extent implicitly affirmed by the joyful demands of the Bridegroom's immediate presence. But such transcendent presence was hardly so unconditionally available even to Jesus' pre-Easter adherents. At any rate, the gnome itself and the symbolism of the Wedding even without the intrusive v.19b imply not only eschatological fulfillment but also its temporal limitation in human (and the disciples' foreseeable) experience.

Certainly, the gnomic assertion of personal rather than of legal authority is clear in the Bridegroom saying; it is almost as clearly expressed in the association of gnome and Son-of-Man saying in Mk 2:27, 28 parr. Without absolutely ruling out the possibility of an authentic episodic kernel behind the pericope Mk 2:23-28, the implausibility of its scenario, the suspiciously ecclesial role of the disciples and the doubtful relevance of the Davidic exemplum (vv.25-26 parr) once again tend effectively to isolate the concluding gnomic sayings from their Synoptic context as material for historical exegesis. Normative dissonance in this context is so complete as to be almost unnoticeable: neither the gnome nor the biblical exempla (Mk 2:25f and Mt 12:5f) excuse the disciples' alleged misbehaviour, but the gnome does so least of all as it emphasizes the intimate connexion between human nature and revelation as well as the teleological subordination of the latter - a fact which the replacement of Mk 2:27 with Mt 12:7 seems to acknowledge.

As very notably in relation to Mk 7:15, so also here, such relative isolation of the gnomic saying as historically integral, if not therefore authentic tradition has led to an impasse of conflicting
critical judgements of (in)authenticity and - intimately, though inconsistently linked - of (dis)similarity. Perhaps the most important consequences of continuing disagreements on the content and dissimilarity of the gnome is the implication that the ambiguity which makes estimations of dissimilarity insecure is potentially original, intended and authentic: once again the legal applicability of a topically legal gnome is confounded by the nature of the saying itself.

It has been shown that the radical meaning is not the only possible and that the logion could function in more than one direction. This reservation remains true with regard to objections raised against the authenticity of Mk II,27.

Recognition that this saying, too, is to be heard as one of a set of gnomai which are topically legal but which by no means have coherent legal regulation as their primary object does, however, open a wider horizon of 'coherence with other sayings of Jesus.' Above all, the question of dissimilarity is disallowed already in the selection of a gnomic style: this saying, like the others reviewed here, is not structured to guide the perplexed conscience toward either Torah observance or non-observance; the gnome's essential normative function, doubtless most striking in contexts where observance is normal, is to institutionalize normative perplexity and to subordinate it wholly to the more-than-legal authority of the speaker. This example, like the other quasi-legal gnomai, does not tell, as a properly legal rule would, how Jesus' circle actually should have behaved (let alone, did behave) in the given legal context (in this case Sabbath). Instead the gnome places the whole weight of
normative perplexity on the implied, probably never exhaustively describable, understanding between speaker and audience.

In this regard the Matthaean formula (Mt 12:6) and more immediately the Son-of-Man saying (Mk 2:28 parr) are impressively accurate explications of the force of the gnomic norm, though they soften the urgency of its language. The Son-of-Man question has so effectively sabotaged tradition-criticism of the sayings involved as to make any guess about the pre-Synoptic relationship between Mk 2:27 and 28 imponderable. But v.28 at least expresses the ultimate dependence of the more absolute language of the preceding gnome upon a personal authority more basic than either its universal scope or its legal topicality. That said, however, v.28 is also a reminder that personal authority is not asserted in either gnome without impinging upon other claims to normativity, notably those of systematic exegesis of biblical Sabbath norms, which are at once affirmed and profoundly relativized on the legally intangible criterion of the speaker’s credibility. Mk 2:27, 28 are thus sublimely unhelpful as directives for Sabbath behaviour or as models for an attitude to Law in relation to other sources of social or religious normativity. The function of these gnomai and, in coherence with other gnomic sayings, their intention is to subject even the most numinous and perplexing norms to the unpredictable, uncodifiable demands of the Kingdom in Jesus’ voice.

Many of the same remarks might be made concerning the following Marcan context (3:1-6) and its central gnome (3:4). Once more, normative dissonance and the artificiality of the story show
themselves in the poor fit of the presumed infraction, legally as
trivial and dubious as it is historically contrived, to the absurdly
high tone of the gnomic double question. Once again, Matthaean
sensitivity betrays the incongruity: double question becomes a single
statement preceded by intelligible argumentation (Mt 12:11f) - only
radical surgery succeeds, and only partially, in making laws from
Sabbath-gnomai. The Matthaean truncation of the Marcan gnome also
alerts the synoptic reader to a singularity of Mk 3:4 among quasi-
legal gnomai in Jesus' name: the second gnomic question actually
presents an applicably coherent legal consideration, that life-saving
takes priority over Sabbath-observance, a consideration which the
Matthaean pericope rightly leaves out as irrelevant to the context of
elective healing. More important in the present essay on the
essential non-legality of even topically legal gnomai, is the
analogue juxtaposition of life-saving/killing and doing-good/ill,
hardly comparable alternatives, certainly not in their relation to
Sabbath duties, a juxtaposition which is more concretely related to
the character of Jesus' words and acts than to their hypothetical
coincidence with the Sabbath. It is difficult to imagine a legal
standpoint from which a non-laborious and divinely sanctioned
miracle, life-saving or not, could be seen to violate Sabbath;101 that
a more ordinary good work or a more laborious miracle, such as might
constitute a trivial violation could acquire a greater salvific, life-
saving meaning and so transcend the legitimate demands of Sabbath-rest
is, however, far more the wholly non-legal possibility to which
Jesus' word in Mk 3:4 points in defiance of the banal legalism of its
Synoptic contexts. That is, comparison of good behaviour generally
with the exceptional urgency of life-saving is legally worse than pointless - as is the asking of rhetorical questions. The collapse of ordinary normativity, whether legal or ethical, into transcendent though not yet abstractly soteriological and christological categories, corresponds, however, precisely with the structure and implied intention of gnomic rhetoric generally in Jesus' tradition. Despite its unusual interrogative tone, then, Mk 3:4 is typical of its gnomic kind in - risky - non-legality and - in Jesuan usage, preternormal - assertion of personal authority.

The last Marcan dispute-passage (12:13-17) and its climactic gnome (v.17) is remarkable in several ways. First of all, the conversational setting is not intrinsically implausible: the legal question is serious, controversial and dangerous enough to elicit the cunning response of the gnome. Secondly, the pericope as a whole accepts with only minimal legal rationalization the non-legal ambiguity of a gnome which is in such telling contrast to Jesus' reported verdict on the Temple-tax (Mt 17:27 ad fin.). The normative dissonance between this gnome about Caesar and its application to head-tax is all but negligible. Thirdly, the saying, alone among those reviewed here, actually expresses an 'attitude to the Law' as such in terms which might still have legally practical consequences (contrast Mt 5:18 par; 7:12c par). Notwithstanding the saying's implications for taxation and related topics, its primary - and only intrinsic - legal topic is the whole normative system of Roman imperium. For most purposes of New Testament study this is, of course, the wrong Law.102 That Jesus or his immediate tradition could so succinctly express an attitude to it, underscores by contrast the
piecemeal and elusive bearing of Synoptic quasi-legal gnomai, including this one, on Jewish Law viewed as whole normative system.

Topically legal gnomai in the Synoptics are, to be sure, a plausibly representative sample of legal topics in Judaism, so that, were such a project not systematically thwarted by gnomic connotivity, an attitude of Jesus to Torah might be inferred. Or a partial attitude might well be inferred from each of the Law-gnomai, Mt 5:18 par and Mt 7:12c par, but the result would be reflection on the specifically non-legal aspects of biblical Torah as revelation. Suffice it for the present to note that the inference is not drawn in the bulk of Jesus' language as it is reflected in the practical, casuistic topicality of Synoptic gnomai: the critical distance shown here in relation to Imperial law as a source of actual normative demands is, after all, unsurprisingly, not shown in direct relation to biblical operative in Jesus' own Judaism.

Notwithstanding this attitudinal clarity in relation to a recognizably alien legal system, a gnomic clarity which surely accounts for the exceptional qualities of the pericope as a whole, the gnome is entirely typical in its non-legal equivocation: do the taxes get paid or not? Neither gnome nor pericope really tells. Instead the saying permanently embodies the non-legal, the more-than-legal question of the relationship between apparently autonomous claims of social normativity and especially of laws and states and the prior but indeterminate claims of God. It is of historical and not only homiletical significance that the gnome (unlike the story) does not even hint at what God might leave to Caesar, or Caesar to God.
Thus we find here yet another gnome treating its legal topic not as an occasion for coherent regulation or for reflection on Law as such, but as an advertisement of Jesus' prerogative authority in precisely those normative fields from which such apparently idiosyncratic self-assertion would seem to be most firmly excluded, either by God or by Caesar.

This unusual combination in Mk 12:17 of an attitude, typical in Synoptic gnomai, of non-legal, personally assertive ambivalence with an almost objective critical distance is mirrored in the curiously free-standing parenesis of Rm 13:1-7 and its concluding gnome. Sadly, the extension of gnomic connotivity into a topic of such clearly non-parochial urgency has made the reception of Rm 13 and of Mk 12:13-17 into a weather-vane of political folly, the turnings of which are nevertheless permitted if not condoned by the determinedly gnomic non-legality of both gnomai, Rm 13:7 and Mk 12:17 parr. Both express and, deliberately, neither overcomes the permanent irrelation between the ruler's due and the subject's duty; both define the question to which neither prescribes a legally binding answer. This parallelism between the duty-gnome in Rm 13 and the Synoptics' Caesar-gnome is limited by the dramatic clarity of the latter's simplistic reference to the emperor's personal authority. The advice to the Romans naturally bespeaks the more nuanced and less sovereign attitude of diminished cultural distance, but the two gnomai are alike not only in their shared imperative (apodote) but also in its indefinite qualification by an unavoidable but impossible task of relative evaluation. Here as in the preceding gnomai, the degree of
dissimilarity attributable to Jesus' tradition should therefore not be overestimated. The peculiarity of (especially) the quasi-legal gnomai ascribed to Jesus is less the uniqueness of their individual formulation than the forcefulness of their conflictive expression and its consistency throughout the gnomic category in Jesuan use. The interest of Rm 13:7 as a bench-mark from which in this instance to control the limited dissimilarity of Jesus' gnomai is enhanced by the complete absence from Paul's instruction of any hint of an allusion to dominical authority. Whether Paul is aware of a parallel with Jesus-tradition or (more probably) not, the independent character of Rm 13:1-7 within the composition of Paul's letter suggests a closer connection with generally Jewish (especially Diapora) tradition than with Jesus. Over against such a close parallel, then, the significance of Mk 12:17 par is in its urgency of comprehensive and conflictive address without assuming a purely theoretical character (cf Mt 5:18 par; 7:12 par) yet also without losing practically puzzling non-legal force.

Indeed, because it addresses a whole legal system and from a critical distance hardly available in relation to biblical law, because (unlike Mt 5:18 par; 7:12c par on biblical law) it remains in contact with actual questions of legal normativity (eg taxation), and because it coheres in its essential non-legality and implicit dependence on its speaker's authority with gnomai on biblical topics, Mk 12:17 is, ironically, the best available paradigm for constructing an attitude to Torah which might claim Jesus' relatively direct historical inspiration. The collective attitude of Jesus' gnomai, if probably not consciously of Jesus himself, toward the Law may thus be
imagined, by analogy with the more explicitly expressed attitude to Caesar's law, neither as an abrogation nor as a fulfillment of one authority by another, superior and therefore commensurable, but as a permanently two-edged deconstruction, recognizing the inevitable legitimacy of social order and its norms yet at the same time implying their ultimate existential inadequacy and, above all, by the very act of (always equivocal, connotatively qualified) recognition exposing legal normalcy to the vocal assertion of a prior intrinsically uncodifiable authority in Jesus' language and behaviour. Mk 12:17 parr is in this way paradigmatic in the stark incommensurability of its analogically compound relations: as the gnome's Synoptic application to tribute payment, whether authentic or not, correctly implies, the 'things of Caesar' is an inevitably legalizing, institutionalizing category. The 'things of God', by contrast, not only surpass, inclusively or exclusively, the just and unjust demands of the state, they, in addition, are of a wholly different order. Thus 'what pertains to Caesar' may designate the whole Roman commonwealth, but 'what pertains to God' in Jesus' world and in his saying transcends even the glories of revealed Law. The gnomic tradition's - ultimately Jesus' - selection of controversial legal topics and its complementary interest in the gnomic speaker's connotative but unavoidable self-reference and self-assertion are consequently no more an abrogation of the Law or of legality in general than the cultivation of gnome itself (and, by the way, of parable) is an abrogation of rhetorical norms. Rather, these choices collectively signal the absolute denial of autonomy, of independent legitimacy to the principles of, in the broadest and most
authoritative senses, legal and controversial order. That is, legal topicality and personal self-reference, indeed all aspects of the gnomic style in Synoptic tradition, are collectively precursors of soteriological and christological insight and not of an attitude to Jewish religion or legality as such: in principle Jesus' gnomai say much more about the character of the covenantal relationship than about the status (to that extent sharply relativized) of law and rhetoric inspired by it.

III Conclusions: the Non-legality of Gnomic Tradition

All this begs, of course, the questions of practical (il)legal behaviour to which in contrast with the Law as an abstract whole Jesus must have had consciously held and functionally expressed attitudes. Did Jesus' practical example match his gnomic rhetoric in relation to legal topics? and, if so, how? In the first place, and on general historical grounds, Jesus' behaviour and his normative prescriptions cannot have been so decisive as to prejudice or obviate the normative struggles of the apostolic movement. Recognition that a very large number of the most important Synoptic sayings on legal topics cohere as a sub-category with the larger set of gnomai allows explanation of this limitation of decisive normative influences as a deliberate and consistent aspect of Jesus' rhetorical style. That is, although the quasi-legal gnomai document an aggressive willingness in Jesus' tradition to address controversial and practical questions of legal topicality, they also, and above all practical implications, set the demand for response to Jesus' personal authority over against any
more objective and casuistic properly legal, considerations. Individually and collectively the topically legal gnomai share as their essential characteristic a direct refusal simply to prescribe behavioural norms which can be followed in effective independence of Jesus' personal authority; selection of pointedly legal topics is an emphatic projection of this refusal even into the most important areas of Law-observance. Consequently, the gnomai themselves deliberately and pointedly beg the question of what to do in order to assert the normative authority of Jesus' word and presence. Whatever the tradition-historical relationship between Rm 14:14 and Mk 7:15 par, then, the Pauline formula of intuitive normative certainty 'in the Lord Jesus' perfectly expresses the more-than-legal response sought by gnomic quasi-legality in relation to Jesus' spoken authority.

Exegetical and historical collation of the legally topical gnomai does, moreover, diminish the urgency of the behavioural question to the extent that it relativizes the apparently anti-nomian overtones of the sayings. That is, realization that even these suspiciously radical-sounding traditions cohere very closely within a larger stylistic category which has collectively strong claims to authenticity imposes the duty of exploring, however hypothetically, the conditions of their potentially authentic normativity. The topically legal gnomai perform surprisingly well from this hypothetical point of view: taken together and with other gnomai, the very ambiguities which mark their inapplicability as laws demand reception simultaneously as affirmations of legal norms and 'christological' qualifications of their autonomy and coherence. Just
as ‘antiproverbial’ gnomaI subvert ‘the topical proverbial stance of making a continuous project of our life’ without implying a negative, or even a conscious general attitude to proverbial wisdom, so also the quasi-legal gnomaI subvert the project, in full swing at Qumran and probably in Pharisaic akribeia, of building a coherent legal system on the foundation of biblical Law, without entailing a distinctive parti pris in relation to the latter. Against Berger’s otherwise persuasive study of the most important quasi-legal gnomaI, their oft-alleged ‘dissimilarity’ is not such as to demand ‘einen frühnachchristlichen-hellenistischen Ursprung’ if the quasi-legal gnomaI imply a frustrating and aggressive hostility to someone else’s attitude to the Law, the ad hominem hostility is much less the sayings’ point than the assertion of Jesus’ quite non-legal authority, none of which seems obviously inauthentic. Finally, there are aspects of gnome and of some quasi-legal gnomaI which do suggest behavioural consequences for Jesus’ and his followers’ lifestyle. In the first place, the rhetorical strategy of gnomic brinkmanship, which gives Synoptic gnomaI generally much of their special intensity, and which is especially palpable in the quasi-legal gnomaI where the ‘brink’ is relatively well-defined in the possibility of saying something really blasphemous, disloyal or antinomian, does have a behavioural counterpart. This is again most conventionally illustrated in the safely non-biblical case of Mk 12:17 parr; rhetorically, Jesus’ nearness to the brink is implied as strongly as possible in the Marcan context and in the accusations of Lk 23:2. One suspects, moreover, that it took more than one such gnome to bring him practically to the brink of attracting ultimately fatal police action. An action against the Temple (Mk 11:15-19 parr), isolated and individual enough to be
clearly more symbolic than programmatic might effectively bring out some of the more dangerous possibilities of talk about God and Caesar. In less dangerous normative fields, the relationships between gnomic sayings and Jesus' behaviour are less speculative. Thus Berger's discussion of Mk 10:43 par/9:35 par emphasizes with considerable probability the saying's tradition-historical as well as logical correspondence with Jesus' symbolic behaviour in the concrete situation of the meal (Lk 22:24-30; Jn 13:1-20). Other aspects of Jesus' gnomic language presuppose behavioural adjustments (Mk 2:19 par; Mt 11:16-19 par on not fasting, Mt 19:12 on celibacy; Mt 8:20 par on homelessness and 8:22 par on filial impiety), none except the last of which need to have induced actual violation of biblical law and which as behaviour might mark Jesus or his imitator as 'only one more 'am ha-arets among many'. The combination of such behaviour with such rhetoric would, however, have the more positive implication of a grounding not in necessity or in an observance of the minimal obligations of biblical law, but in the private, legally unargued, authority of Jesus' word and example. Again, such talk and such behaviour need not represent either a critical attitude to the Law on any substantial violation of biblical norms; they do, however, seem to involve a deliberate exploitation of the sacral character of social and legal norms in Judaism to make Jesus' assertion of transcendent authority threateningly palpable in a deliberate exploration of the grey areas between voluntary social marginality and illegality.

In the second place, Synoptic gnōmai, very much including those which express legal topicality, construct their normative brinkmanship
out of the tension between legal and social institutions and Jesus' personal authority and example. That is, gnomic normativity in Synoptic tradition depends very closely on Jesus' presence. It is only this presence and immediate call which lends the hearer the authority and intuitive capability of 'obeying' gnomic normativity in its irrational confutation of normal ethical and legal inference. As usual the extreme cases are clearest: Jesus' call in Mt 8:22 par and the breach of legal duty which it demands from the hearer simply have no obvious normative force apart from Jesus' presence; so also most clearly in Mk 2:19 par the freedom to omit customary fasts is directly tied to the presence of the Bridegroom. In relation to the more universal normative range of the majority of Synoptic quasi-legal gnomai, the fine balance between often diametrically opposed normative possibilities and in every case between conflictive self-assertion and avoidance of flagrant violation is only maintainable where saying and deed remain in Jesus' actively interpretive and authoritative presence. The interruption and transformation of that presence and especially its relation to verbal tradition are the occasion and (against Kelber's 'oral hermeneutic') legitimation of the New Testament writers' experiments with theories of the Law's fulfillment, radicalization, supercession and of their halting, often inconsistent attempts to realize a new legality of congregational order and ethics in the biographical and normative aporia left by the tradition's partial and inevitable dissociation of Jesus' gnomic rhetoric from its origin in Jesus' attempt to centre in his own personality normative conflicts more or less latent in Judaism. In the nature of gnomic conflictive, connotative highly personal normativity, then, it may not be possible to answer fully the question of Jesus' behavioural
standards. On the other side, however, it is also clearly not possible to deny that the quasi-legal gnōmai did not have some practical relation to Jesus' life-style to the extent that they attest a general strategy of brinkmanship and social marginality, a willingness to redefine latent conflict in non-legal terms of personal attitude to himself and a certain kēnek rhetorical and probably practical for managing the consequences. Such an assessment is unavoidably speculative; here, however, it is at least informed by the intense cultivation in Jesus' immediate tradition of the haunting gnomic combination of often specific topically connotative elusiveness and conflictive, disintegrative normativity.

Much less speculative is the perception of a normative dissonance, variable in kind and degree, but constant in its interposition, between legally topical gnōmai recorded in Jesus' name the texts which incorporate them. WD Davies' generalization may well be re-applied to such gnōmai in the Synoptics and Paul:

> these radical words begin to take on a regulatory character, that is, they become used as guides for the actual business of living, the point d'appui of an incipient Christian casuistry.

That is, the dissonance between intrinsic gnomic normativity and Synoptic or Pauline receptions of Jesus' sayings suggest the tradition-historical importance of this chapter's basic descriptive thesis, that topically legal gnōmai attributed to Jesus are essentially and recognizably (by Paul and sometimes by Matthew cf Mt 12:5-8 vs Mk 2:27f; 12:12 vs 3:4; 15:11 vs Mk 7:15) non-legal. That legal topics in rhetoric attributed to Jesus are so largely
dominated by such gnomai, some of them poetically brilliant provocations and all of them memorable without mnemotechnical manipulation, very largely accounts (1) for the serious and early lack of unanimity in the early movement on the normativity of Torah-observance and preconditions for the incorporation of Gentiles, (2) for the (in Paul, all but) complete absence outside the gospels of appeals to particular sayings of Jesus in relatively legal contexts,¹¹⁷ and (3) for the paucity there, in comparison even with the gospels, of casuistically legal argumentation. Positively, this last is reflected in widespread paralleled quasi-legality, that of ethicizing paranesis with its strong, often gnomic links to pagan and Jewish tradition and -anonymously- with the large number of less topical, less ferociously personal gnomai attributed with some cumulative authenticity to Jesus (cf Rm 12:14, 21; Mt 5:44, 39 par or Rm 13:8-10; Gal 5:14; Jas 2:8; Mk 12:30 parr).¹¹⁸

Beyond the semantic fact of normative dissonance in literary contexts which incorporate or allude directly to legally topical gnomai lies the very high probability in practically all cases of their tradition-historical priority¹¹⁹ and the lesser but still impressive likelihood that the clearest Pauline references and non-allusions to Jesus' words are again to such gnomai. Relative to our insistence on the importance of a collective profile, not dependent on the authenticity or representativeness of any single gnome, the scarcity of the Pauline evidence limits it to the subsidiary role of a test-case. Still, the test hypothesis, that Paul's knowledge, however limited, of Jesus' sayings should reflect the importance of gnomai and especially of topically legal gnomai, is not only borne out by the

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topicality and form of the apostle’s most probable references to Jesus as normative speaker: in addition the striking peculiarities of Paul’s appeals and non-appeals to Jesus’ verbal authority are greatly illuminated with reference to the availability in Jesus’ name of an authentically, noticeably, indeed obtrusively non-regulatory, yet topically legal tradition.

In this sense, recognition that the gnomic category is without peer as a basic aspect of sayings tradition attributable to Jesus or his direct inspiration, even in Paul’s cryptic attestation, is not just an appeal to the lowest common denominator of the literary tradition. Quasi-legal gnomai (and their problems) are central to better explanation of Paul’s attitude to Jesus, and Jesus’ self-understanding as a public speaker. They, and gnomai generally, are moreover central, and not only as stumbling-blocks, to the architecture of their literary contexts, above all as the responsible literary embodiment of a prior conversational orality and not only its legalizing, institutionalizing betrayal. The retention of the non-legal language of gnome with all its difficulties authenticates and legitimizes the emergence of New Testament normativity by placing at its heart strategically and collectively authentic fragments of Jesus’ de-constructively personal rhetoric.

Thus the preponderance of the Marcan witness to legally topical gnomai need not unsettle our findings: whatever their attraction for the gospel writer, precisely these sayings stand over against their Marcan contexts as tradition-critically prior and as such best
account for Paul’s usage of Jesus’ words. In addition we may notice some argumentative and topical parallels between Marcan and non-Marcan gnomai or legal topics, parallels which strengthen the claim for the traditional as well as literary cohesive of the legal sub-category. Argumentatively, Mk 4:24 parr and the Quatrain Mt 6:24/Lk 16:13 have in common the selection of an almost certainly proverbial gnome from economic life and its dramatic re-application to the transformed normativity of the community of discipleship. Topically and for dourness of mood, we may furthermore compare Mk 7:27 par with another Quatrain-gnome, Mt 7:6, or Mk 10:9 par with, as the Matthaean composition implies, Mt 19:12. Whatever its literary interest in Mark, the Marcan predominance in quasi-legal gnomai is thus only one aspect of an embracing and prevenient, gnomic and topically legal continuum.

Paul’s use of quasi-legal gnomai probably from pre-Synoptic tradition is also important as a reminder of some theoretical conditions of falsification which attend the logic of a largely gnomic model of oral tradition behind gospel literacy. Paul’s half- and non-allusions to Jesus’ rhetoric are better explained with reference to the quasi-legal gnomai alone than with reference to the Synoptic argumentative and/or narrative contexts more largely; if it were otherwise, the probability would be gravely reduced that gnomai were structurally fundamental to oral tradition from Jesus. Not that gnomai are to be radically dissociated from more extended argumentative or episodic recollections but gnomic cores represent the most common element of verbal continuity attributable to pre-Synoptic oral tradition. Thus, among legally topical examples, the
gnome Mk 7:15 may well have been associated in oral tradition with a radically and legally less ambiguous interpretive slogan like that of Rm 14:20b (cf Mk 7:19 ad fin.); Marcan and Pauline use of such a constellation of gnomic core and antinomian slogan from shared oral tradition is still a decisively simpler and orally more plausible account for common features than a reference to 'the whole context'. Rather similarly it is quite plausible, and certainly it is impossible to disprove, that the gnome against marital separation (Mk 10:9 par) was associated in oral tradition with the rather gnomic and quite non-legal citations of Gn 1:27; 2:24. Finally there is no a priori reason why Mk 10:43 par should not have been associated with concrete memories of Jesus' servanthood at the Last Supper (Lk 22: 24-27 cf Jn 13:1-20). But this picture of an oral tradition structured very largely around gnomaı and their associations, argumentative or episodic, verbal or gestural, is far from an oral tradition conceived of on form-critical or mnemotechnical models of texts and contexts. If Paul (or anyone else) showed knowledge, then, of tradition-critically basic, topically legal units cited in Jesus' name and even as textually well-defined as the liturgical tradition of I Cor 11:23ff, which for a liturgical tradition of such importance is only minimally fixed in form (cf Mk 14:22ff par), the validity of a primarily gnomic model of oral tradition would be seriously qualified. In fact, however, practically all topically legal texts in the Synoptics have at their heart and, as well, most probably at their tradition-historical origin, above all, legally unassimilated gnomaı with their non-legal connotations and associations (though there are several topically legal Parables, eg
that of the Good Samaritan Lk 10:29ff). Moreover, if the interpretive emphasis here on the deliberate, calculated non-legality of gnomai, in addition to its traditionally fundamental role, is correct, then gnomai are not only a basic rhetorical and transmisional device in Jesus' tradition, they are also Jesus' principal, practically exclusive vehicle for expression of his views on legal topics. This is a point of striking - and strikingly well-attested - dissimilarity in Jesus' rhetoric. It furthermore explains the availability of authentic Jesus-tradition as a basis for apostolic canons of Church-order.

The picture of Jesus which emerges from the topically, but not at all argumentatively, legal gnomai is thus a continuous extension of that provided by the, of course, overlapping sub-categories of self-referential and discipular gnomai. Above all the quasi-legal gnomai show us a Jesus who is not at all coy about addressing controversial, even dangerous, topics in Law: the canniness of Jesus' gnomic language is not aimed at concealing its topical relevance but rather at asserting Jesus' sovereignty and autonomy over against the ideological coherence of legal conventions and legal traditions. Such gnomic self-assertion is not itself an 'attitude to the Law', however; it is rather an effective protest against the pretensions and ultimate (eschatological) dubiety of all such 'attitudes'. Certainly the prevalence of gnomai in Jesus' tradition attests not just his failure to establish a legal or scholastic tradition, but his conscious and repeatedly expressed refusal to do so. This refusal is, at any rate, not based in an abstract critique of Law or the Law, so that, by the way, the development of a Christian casuistry with the
non-legality of gnomic tradition deconstructively intact at its heart
need not be seen as an inevitable, but sad declension. Rather the
refusal to express mere legality is the consequence of Jesus' rhetorical self-assertion, of a personal authority which declines to
disguise itself as Law or as Wisdom. On the other hand, the authority asserted in gnomai and especially in topically legal sayings is not
simply bald egoism. Instead it is an authority qualified by the assumption of unlimited freedom and insight in the gnome-audience as well as in
the gnome-speaker, a freedom to respond to the immediacy of Jesus' word in the actually controversial situations of legal topicality, without the clarification of legal or proverbial tradition. Gnomic authority is the authority of relative linguistic immediacy between speaker and hearer to which the selection of legal and controversial topics adds conflictive urgency and seriousness.
The immediacy in gnomic address, the speaker's expectant trust in at least some of his hearers' capacity to receive and apply his assertion of concrete but unargued authority over their existence, is perhaps the final argument against misrepresentation of Jesus as in any programmatic sense a Teacher. That Jesus' rhetoric is not didactic is nowhere more clearly shown than his quasi-legal gnomai.
CONCLUSION

There remains now only the task, more delicate than onerous, of summarizing the most important conclusions from the foregoing discussion. They may in fact be listed without too much injustice to the flow of argument as a series of plain theses, a format which accurately reflects the intermediate status of results which, though remarkably firm among studies of sayings-tradition, nevertheless await refinement and extensions, eg, through coordination with parable-research and with studies of episodic tradition. Finally, though, and beyond the development of historical and rhetorically descriptive theses, the authentication here of Synoptic attribution to Jesus of a characteristically - not just occasionally - gnomic style highlights the personally as well as historically authoritative challenge of Jesus' self-expression. Put simply, the Jesus of whose language the demands to let the dead bury their own and to give what is due to Caesar and to God are both stylistically and semantically characteristic, places at the heart and source of Christian tradition a verbal riddle worthy of the mysteries of the cross and of the resurrection. A concluding postscript will therefore be less an indulgence than an absolutely minimal gesture of response to a voice which certainly - especially in gnomai - claims relevance beyond the narrower questions of literary and historical criticism.

1) Even our most basic thesis, that gnome is a bridge, rare in its historical and poetic concreteness, between orality and literacy,
has important philosophical, as well as tradition-historical implications. The former, indeed, are anticipated already in the Aristotelean discussion of gnome not as an interesting Gattung among others, but rather with paradeigma as the argumentatively basic modes of rhetorical proof. The historicity of the bridge is, however, of more immediate relevance to Synoptic studies: the cultivation of gnome at the most basic levels of Hellenistic education, on the very threshold of literacy and in an educational culture of which effective public speech was always the central goal, corresponds both to its prominence in popular literature (gnomology and chria-collections) and rhetoric (eg diatribe and homily) and to its cross-cultural affinity with equally basic patterns in Ancient Near Eastern Wisdom, an affinity confirmed, eg, by actual Rabbinic adoption of Hellenistic gnomai. In particular, within the general context of such educationally aggressive, basic widespread cultivation of gnome in speech as in literary composition, the sheer availability of gnomic style creates the strongest possible presumption of relevance as a descriptive category (a) for New Testament literature and (b) for the continuity and discontinuity of sayings (ie historical) tradition from Jesus to the gospel writers.

In fact, a definition of gnomai, constructed from the prescriptions, definitions and examples of the Hellenists, isolates in the Synoptic gospels a category of sayings hitherto all too easily dismissed as 'proverbs' or 'maxims', or lumped together with other 'logia' as 'Wisdom' language. Our second thesis (2) is to protest against the unreflective assimilation of gnomic language - not only in
the gospels - to expectations formed by Wisdom-literary genres:
Wisdom literature, Hellenistic and Ancient Near Eastern, is often marked by intensive use (collection) of gnomic language, but this does not mean that use of gnomai is a sufficient or unambiguous index of sapiential genre in literature or tradition. The significance of gnome in literary compositions, apart from its contextually immediate argumentative point, is as a more-or-less fictive reference to the immanence of speech in writing; this referential requirement may well be especially urgent in Wisdom literature, but it is not unique there.

That gnome is not reducible to an aspect of Wisdom-literary form is a special case of the larger thesis (3) that gnome is not a 'form' at all in any sense analogous to that required by Form-Criticism: gnomai, even individual gnomic cores, may take a variety of forms and may be included in an even greater variety of formal contexts. Indeed, its only specifically formal marker is the tenuity of its contextualization: gnome is always potentially separable from its context, though it always appears in contingent, performantial relation to specific situations. Rather its argumentative, semantic characteristics of analogical connotation and normativity define the contextual and traditional flexibility of the gnomic style. It is this form-critical subliminality, this freedom from any definable social Sitz im Leben which is the semantic basis of the gnome's privileged continuity across cultural and traditional-historical barriers such as that between oral and literary modes of tradition.

Specifically, (4) gnome is not only descriptive of an important phenomenon in the texture of Synoptic Literature, it also identifies a
large category of sayings tradition within which a stylistic continuity between Synoptic literacy and Jesus' actual conversation is extraordinarily probable. This very high probability of categorical, stylistic authenticity of the Synoptic's extensive attribution of gnomai to Jesus also adds weight to the quite variable probabilities that some individual gnomai may in addition represent verbally authentic tradition. Without losing sight of this latter implication of gnomai continuity, then, it is the authenticity of the collective characteristics of Synoptic gnome which is of greatest historical interest as evidence for Jesus' rhetoric. In this respect, gnomai, because of their greater syntactical separability within literary contexts, surpass even parables as data for discerning and interpreting categorical continuity in Synoptic sayings tradition. Most broadly (5) the frequency and importance of gnomai in Synoptic literature and the very high probability of gnomic continuity between Synoptic literacy and prior oral tradition of Jesus' conversation imply the need for adjustment of contemporary critical models of oral tradition. The detection of large-scale continuity of gnome-use between oral and writing traditions is thus a serious blow not only to arbitrary form-critical association of literary forms and oral Sitze im Leben but also to descriptions of Synoptic tradition as mnemotechnical. A N Wilder's judgement on parables applies a fortiori to the gnomic category:

No doubt the felicity of form made them memorable. But the motive for their speech-form was not a matter of mnemonics; it was a matter of the most effective immediate and free dialogue.

Furthermore, recognition of (on the whole, untraumatic) gnomic
continuity between oral and literary tradition qualifies emphases on oral-literary discontinuity and even opposition: the degree and range of Synoptic – indeed Hellenistic and Near Eastern – interest in gnome is an important sign of the complex interaction (in early Christian experience) of relatively technical (eg competing languages and writing systems) and more social/psychological factors (ie aesthetic and cognitive sensibilities). At any rate the prevalence of gnomai in Synoptic literature goes far toward suggesting how Synoptic oral tradition could have functioned self-consciously and successfully within the limits of its interest in the gist of Jesus’ rhetoric and without conforming to either form-critical or mnemotechnical models. The centrality of gnomai to the rhetoric of Synoptic oral tradition also largely accounts for the surprisingly untraumatic accommodation of sayings tradition to the forms and conventions of Synoptic (and Q) literacy.

More particularly, (6) gnomai constitute a much better set of data for historical investigation of pre-Synoptic oral tradition (including Jesus) than is available in any collection of ‘core sayings’ authenticated on grounds of dissimilarity. This is (a) in the first place so because the authenticity of collective
Characteristics of Synoptic gnomai does not depend upon the authenticity, or rather the authenticability, of individual gnomai. Characteristics shared by a plurality of gnomai across source-, form-, and tradition-critical boundaries are probably authentic in spite of the impossibility of demonstrating that each gnome is singly authentic. In addition, though, (b) gnomai are a better data-set than any such reconstructed 'core' of authentic dissimilarity since they may seriously claim to be representative of rhetoric in Jesus' tradition: gnomai are not selected on any criteria of authenticity, let alone the notoriously solipsistic criterion of dissimilarity, nor is gnome-use restricted a priori to a definite Sitz im Leben or to a particular range (e.g., sapiential) of themes.

Profiles emerging from Synoptic gnomai collectively thus have the strongest available claim to historical probability. Among these, the clearest (7) is that of a public speaker whose rhetoric was cast in recognizable and intelligible, though still connotative patterns and the gist of whose language was in fact adequately continued by the bearers of his tradition. That gist is clearest in the tension, not least though not only in the gnomic challenge to discipleship, between outspoken, assertively personal authority and a connotative diffidence implied in the cultivation of specifically analogical normative language. Many Synoptic gnomai are simply good advice; many more, however, depend heavily upon the authority of their speaker for normative relevance, even intelligibility. In all, they attest a Jesus whose almost Johannine willingness dramatically to stress his own authority is coupled with an unwillingness definitely to qualify
authority relative to the conventions of power. This is not a novel picture of Jesus, but it is a picture to which Synoptic gnoma give its most consistent and original colours.

Still, this recognition behind Synoptic style of Jesus' almost mannered, certainly quite individual cultivation of gnome as well as of the centrality of gnomic language to the inferable economy of oral tradition need not prejudice the traditionality of other styles of recollection. (8) If the Synoptic formulation of parable narrative and discourse is, like gospel use of the Son-of-Man idiom, more specifically literary than is Synoptic appropriation of the gnome, the often intimate, sometimes unavoidable association of gnomic with parabolic, episodic, dialectical and idiomatic language confirms their traditionality and possible authenticity as genres of memory if not as specifically literary forms. The uniqueness of gnome is in the privileged continuity between its oral/rhetorical enactment and its literary reception.

(9) We must, however, notice one fairly dramatic limitation of the probably considerable general continuity between gnoma and other styles of traditional recollection which receive literary formulation in the Synoptics. Those gnoma which show the most urgently specific normative topicality, those namely which make normative assertions on typically legal topics are received into Synoptic contexts conditioned by remarkable tension. This tension is characteristically between the contextual drive toward legal (or antinomian!) per cuity and the connotative stubbornness of gnoma which are indeed typically legal but which, so far from providing legal or juridical guidance, remain
authoritative stumbling-blocks to the enunciation of coherently legal attitudes (or of attitudes to the Law!). That this tension between the assertive non-legality of topically legal gnomai and the natural tendency to self-regulation, was an active force in oral tradition as well as in literary formulation and redaction seems to be confirmed by Paul's rigorously allusive references to Jesus' verbal authority in contexts which correspond to the topicality of Synoptic gnomai but in which the quasi-legality of the latter would be most disturbing to the apostle's argument. In fact the deliberate and authentic tension between legal topicality and the essentially non-legal connotivity of the gnomic medium suggest a hitherto unappreciated motive for the (not only) Pauline ambivalence toward Jesus' normative language: its calculated unsuitability as ammunition in legal controversy.

Finally, (10) the unusually clear (because always problematic for Jesus' movement) centrality of gnomai to authentic tradition of his attitude to legal normativity and the paradoxical non-legality of this his primary chosen medium of expression on legal subjects, imply together the limited historical coherence of questions about Jesus' attitude to Torah. Although Jesus, to the decisive extent that his speech is accurately reflected in Synoptic gnomai, spoke freely and forcefully on legal topics, the very fact of his preference for gnomai indicates the thrust of his self-expression away from projects of legal or even theological abstraction and towards the urgent challenge of his own unaccountably personal authority. Like proverbial wisdom, legality, with all its sacral overtones, defines a 'field of intensification', which is implicitly affirmed in order to be
explicitly transcended in the most characteristic Synoptic gnomai, but Law per se never assumes the foreground. To be sure, this and its provocative, self-conscious working-out in quasi-legal gnomai might well imply the possibility of a more abstract 'attitude', but in Synoptic gnomai and, for all we may know, in Jesus' thoughts and behaviour, the implications remain undrawn. If Paul's attitude to the Law may be more or less satisfactorily captured in the gnomic hint 'that it is not Christ', Jesus' attitude, cannot on gnomic evidence - the best available - be inferred or construed beyond the obliquely partial sic et non between his own numinous speech (Mk 13:31 par) and a Law which also shall not easily pass away (Mt 5:18 par).

This conclusion, that even the most aggressively legal of Synoptic gnomai are not about the law leaves room and need only for the briefest of postscripts to point beyond the gains in historical probability and intelligibility through a gnomic approach to gospel sayings-tradition. After every consideration of tradition-history, we have in the permanent voice of Synoptic gnome a semantic balancing act of rare virtuosity and boundless import. In gnome we are confronted by a self-assertion which appears overweening in its normative range yet escapes egotism by the diffidence of its refusal simply to accept the categories of conventional authority, trusting instead to the connotative insight of those who hear more than words. Even more than the poetic grandeur of self-assertion and the aggressive diffidence of analogical appeal even to revealed law, Jesus' gracious reliance upon the response of those he addresses is the essence of the gnomic challenge. This means that just as the gnomai of Jesus' tradition vigorously address the particularity of law and, by implication, the
universal possibility of legally pretentious normativity, yet without implying any ideologically or even behaviorally consistent attitude to Torah as specifically revealed legality, so also no 'gnomic christology' is directly implied. That is, the gnomic Jesus' willingness to talk about himself and to urge his own authority - even as physician, teacher, slave-master, bridegroom and son - is always nuanced by the diffidence as well as the transcendence of rigorous connotivity; the most self-referential of Synoptic gnomai do not express the fast achievement of a christological self-understanding, though, as remarkably intuitive as well as authoritative essays, they are neglected data for the hindsight of faith. In the end, this gnomic rhetoric is emphatically not the doctrine, the legislation or the self-understanding of even the wisest Teacher; it is the careful echo of the voice of wisdom's self, faith's occasion and not its reason.
NOTE ON ABBREVIATION

The abbreviations of the Theologische RealEnzyklopädie, Abkürzungsverzeichnis ed. by S Schwertner (Berlin; New York, 1976), have been used throughout the Notes and Bibliography.
APPENDIX: A Catalogue of Synoptic Gnomai

The following handlist of Synoptic gnomai could doubtless be added to, but is inclusive enough to reflect the proposed criteria of separability, analogy and normativity. As a partial check on arbitrary selection, each instance of Gnome/Sentenz clearly identified as such by K Berger (Formgeschichte; 'Gattungen') has been examined and, in the event, included (Berger's examples are marked here by a preceding 'b'), along with all of CE Carlston's 'maxims' and most of his 'Wisdom material not sententious in form [sic]' ('Wisdom' 108-111). The selection below has also been compared with M Küchler's list 'die weisheitlichen Logien Jesu bei den Synoptikern' (Küchler 572ff) of which it has been found to be a sub-set: gnomai figure in Küchler's list as parts of larger, specifically sapiential, units. Comparison with L Perdue's form-critical catalogue 'The Wisdom Sayings of Jesus' (Perdue 3-35) may also be of interest.

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- 19:12
- b22:14
- b26:52

**Lk alone** (see also Ac 20:35)

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- 7:47b
- 9:62
- b10:42a
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


5. See below ch 1 at n 90.


NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


2. Ibid. 202, 279 and n 43.

3. Ibid. 260-264 and nn.

4. RJ Banks Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition, MSSNTS 28 (Cambridge, 1975) 182ff; Sanders Jesus 260ff.

5. Banks 184.

6. Ibid. 185.

7. Ibid. 186 cites Mt 7:10 as an example from the teaching of Jesus of the 'formulation of the thesis in two sections.' See Berger Einführung 117ff for a possibly oral antithesis-form in which both propositions are scriptural.

8. Banks 186.


11. Ibid. 74; see below ch 3 at nn 47ss.


13. Bultmann Geschichte 77-84.


374
15. Ibid. 110.
16. Ibid. 110.
17. WA Beardslee 'Uses of the Proverb in the Synoptic Gospels' Interpretation 24 (1970) 61-76.
18. R Bultmann 'Allgemeine Wahrheiten und christliche Verkündigung' ZThK 54 (1957) 244-254.
19. Ibid. 248.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. 66, 67.
23. Ibid. 70.
24. Ibid. 71.
27. Carlston 'Proverbs' 89, 103-104.
28. Ibid. 104.
29. Ibid. 91.
30. Ibid. 98, 99.
31. JD Crossan In Fragments: The Aphorisms of Jesus (San Fransisco, 1983) 65f.
33. Bultmann Geschichte 48f; for criticism of Bultmann's exegetical predisposition and the improbable model of oral tradition on which
it rests, see below at nn 39ss and Berger Formgeschichte 84.


35. Ibid. 156.

36. Ibid. 139f.

37. JD Crossan In Fragments and 'Kingdom and Children: A Study in the Aphoristic Tradition' Semeia 29 (1983) 75-96, 79f.

38. Cf HA Fischel Rabbinic Literature and Greco-Roman Philosophy, StPB 21 (Leiden, 1973) 35-50 on influence from Epicurean sententiae on Talmudic tradition.


40. Against the models of both R Bultmann and B Gerhardsson see W Kelber 'Oral Tradition' 7-20 and The Oral and the Written Gospel 2-11, 32 who exaggerates the discontinuity, and above all Gütgemanns Offene Fragen 69-153 who rightly weighs both the importance and the difficulty of the problem: 'Das letzte Wort zu diesem schwerigen Komplex ist jedenfalls noch nicht gesprochen.' 135.


45. Ong 40; Kelber The Oral and the Written Gospel 38; Berger Einführung 109ff; see below ch 2 at 79, 80.


47. See n 45 above, esp. Berger.


50. EA Havelock Prologue to Greek Literacy (Cincinnati, 1971) 7ff; Origins 26-38.


52. See below ch 2 at nn 94-96.


55. Theißén Soziologie 12 and n 4.

57. The form if not the name of chria occurs in Plato Resp A. 329b-c and is already common in Xenophon Memorabilia. Chria-collections, so entitled, rapidly came into lasting favour among Stoics and Cynics (see Diogenes L. 2. 84f, 4.40, Aristippos; 6.33, Metrocles; 6.91, Zeno; etc. The earliest mention of progymnasmata does not mention chria, see below n 80. For a chronological overview of chria-literature see HA Fischel 'Studies in Cynicism and the Ancient Near East: The Transformations of a Chria' in Religion in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of ER Goodenough ed. by J Neusner (Leiden, 1968) 372-411, 376f; cf RF Hock 'General Introduction' in Hock and O'Neil 1-60, 3.

58. 'N' is more often the author of the collection than the putative historical hero of the chrias, who is nonetheless named in each case. See Athenaeus 6.119; Diogenes L. 2.84; 6.33, 91; 7.36, 172 for references to XPEIAI.

59. A late exception such as the chria collection attributed to Clitarchus (ed. by Chadwick The Sentences of Sextus: A Contribution to the History of Early Christian Ethics (Cambridge, 1959) 76-83 rather proves the rule, since the collection is in form and literary connections a gnomologion and unlike either progymnasmatic or literary XPEIAI. The word here is more than a pretentious synonym for gnomai.

60. M Dibelius From Tradition to Gospel transl. by BL Wolf (London, 1934) 57 esp. n 1.


62. Rutherford cited in FH Colson 'Quintilian I.9 and the 'Chreia' in Ancient Education' CL 35 (1921) 150-154, 150.

63. RA Spencer A Study of the Form and Function of the Biographical Apophthegms in the Synoptic Tradition in the Light of their Hellenistic Background (doctoral dissertation pub. by
University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1979) 90 cited by Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 77.

64. Eg Aphthonius, ed. by L Spengel and C Hammer Rhetores Graeci I/2 (Leipzig, 1894) 23.18-25.6.

65. ROP Taylor 76.

66. L Spengel ed. Rhetores Graeci II (Leipzig, 1854) 96.19-106.3; transl. in ROP Taylor 83.

67. BL Mack and E O'Neil 'The Chreia Discussion of Hermogenes of Tarsus' in Hock and O'Neil 155-191, 158f.

68. Spengel II 5.25-7.23.

69. ROP Taylor 76.

70. Spengel II 7.24-8.28.

71. Ibid. 8.26, 27, 13.

72. Ibid. 8.12.

73. Ibid. 98.23-27.

74. Spengel III (1856) 458.30-463.23 on chria; 463.24-466.4 on gnome.

75. Ibid. 464.3-5.

76. Spengel II 23.1-27.23.

77. See above nn 72, 73.

78. Spengel-Hammer 8-104, 44.5-45.2 on gnome.


80. Rhet. ad Alex. 20 in Spengel-Hammer 65.3.

81. Spengel-Hammer 44.5; cf EM Cope An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (London; Cambridge, 1867) 425 ad loc.

82. See above nn 71, 72, 76.

83. See above at nn 17-26.
84. Spengel-Hammer 44.14, 22; 45.1, 12.


86. Cf Plato Phaedrus 267c.


89. Berger 'Gattungen' 1059-1066.


91. (Tübingen, (1930) 1968); cf Berger Einführung 13-90; D Segal 'Introduction' in Patterns in Oral Literature ed. by H Jason and D Segal (the Hague; Paris, 1977) 3ff.


94. M. Fabi Quintilliani Institutionis Oratoriae lib. I (Cambridge, 1924) 117-119 n ad loc. Colson's third criterion, that the form, 'be concerned with "dicta"', depends on an understanding of 'dicta' in the following phrase (subiectis dictorum rationibus) which seems strained. Surely the 'dicta' are the orator's words whether in the form of gnome, chria or aetiologia, and not the logion of
some other presumed speaker - which may or may not be cited in the use of these forms.
The obvious sense of 'rationes subjicietae' would then be that of the elaboration prescribed for each exercise, the *exploitio*.


96. Such as that proposed by Colson 'Quintilian I.9' 151 n 2, or EN O'Neil's much better, but still unnecessary suggestion, Hock and O'Neil 127f.

97. Cf Quintilian IO V. 10.1ss.; VIII. 5.9; Cicero Topica 13.55.

98. This is substantially the solution offered also by RP Robinson 'Ethologia or Aetologia in Suetonius de Grammaticis c. 4 and Quintillian i.9.' *CP* 15 (1920) 370-379.

99. Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 79, 80.

100. The *Institutio Oratia* of Quintilian transl. by HE Butler, LCL (London; New York, 1921) I ad loc.

101. Colson IO I 118.

102. Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 80.

103. See above at nn 70-77.

104. See above at nn 82 and 87.

105. Spengel II 96 (Theon); 5, 6 (Hermogenes): 23 (Aphthonius); III 459 (Nicolaus).

106. Berger 'Gattungen' 1093.

107. Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 79, 80.

108. See above n 97 and Aristotle *Ars Rhet.* B. 21.

109. Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 80.

110. *Idem*.

111. See above at n 87.
112. See above at n 83 for Rhet. ad Alex. and at n 87 for Aristotle.

113. Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 80.

114. See below ch 4 § V.


117. See Publicazioni della Società Italiana: Papiri Greci e Latini I (Florence, 1912) 157f, #85; transl. by ROP Taylor 82; cf Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 77.

118. Berger 'Gattungen' 1049-1051.

119. Cf M Fuhrmann 'Cäsar oder Erasmus?' Gymnasium 87 (1974) 399ff; Bonner 172-177; H-I Marrow Geschichte der Erziehung im Klassischen Altertum transl. into German by C Baumann (Freiburg i.B., 1957) 229 and n 9; E Ziebarth Aus der antiken Schule: Sammlung griechischen Texte auf Papyrus, Holztafeln, Ostraka, Kleine Texte 65 (2nd edn., Bonn, 1913) 6-9, 21ff, 24ff.

120. This is not the place to enter into all the problems of diatribe-style, but on the importance of gnome in diatribic contexts see R Bultmann Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-strische Diatribe (Göttingen, 1956) 59ff, 61, 85ff, 103; Betz Galatians 291f and nn 6, 7; cf SK Stowers The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans, SBL Dissertation Ser. 57 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1981).

121. See above nn 116 and 120; also S Lieberman

122. See below ch 3.

123. See Lieberman 330, 340f; Fischel Rabbinic Literature 35-50; 'Story' 443-472 esp. 449-457; cf rev. by J Neusner The Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees Before 70 I (Leiden, 1971) 330f; also Fischel 'Transformations' 398ff, 409 on the chriic gnome in a Rabbinic context.


125. Cf Thyen 85ff.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. See above ch 1 at nn 88-92 and below passim; also Berger Einführung 69 on the 'structure' of an example gnome (Mk 12:17) and 132f on rhetorical/semantic instead of or as well as grammatical, philological (ie word-field) and/or tradition-criticalGattung-definitions.

2. See above ch 1 at n 86.


5. Formgeschichte 16, 17; 'Gattungen' 1036ff, 1056f.


7. Ibid. 23; 'Gattungen' 1296-1299, see above ch 1 n 116.

8. 'Gattungen' 1040; see above ch 1 nn 38, 117.

9. Formgeschichte 11-13; 'Gattungen' 1034-1040;
Exegese 111, 128, 132; see above more generally 'Introduction' n 6 and ch 1 at nn 38, 39.

10. 'Gattungen' 1037.

11. Formgeschichte 23f.

12. Ibid. 21f.

13. Ibid. 63; contra Bultmann Geschichte 84-86.

14. Ibid. 84; see above ch 1 at n 33.

15. Ibid. 12.

16. Ibid. 13-16; contra Schmithals 'Kritik' 149-185.

17. Formgeschichte 15.


19. Formgeschichte 13f.

20. 'Gattungen' 1056f.

21. Ibid. 1049-1074.

22. Ibid. 1056.

23. Ibid. 1057.

24. First distinguished in Aristotle Ars Rhet. A.3 0 1358a 36ss; see Cope Introduction 118-123.

25. Nicolaus the Sophist (4th century AD) in the procarium to his Progymnasmata makes a rather clumsy and, so far as I know, unique attempt to co-ordinate systematically the tria eides rhetorikes with the (usually seven) mere; neither his nor anyone else's discussion of gnome shows any influence of such an assignment of gnome to the sumbouletiken eidos.

26. Formgeschichte 16f.

27. 'Gattungen' 1055; Formgeschichte 156, 2(d);
see above at n 9.

28. See, eg, Formgeschichte 65 'Apologetische Funktion haben die epideiktische Sentenzen Lk 4, 24, Mt 12, 7...' (Berger's emphasis).

29. See Berger Einführung 173 for a partial defence.

30. Formgeschichte 62f.

31. Ibid. 82f., 85, 89.

32. Ibid. 13, 67.

33. Ibid. 67.

34. Ibid. 64.

35. Ibid. 51, 64.

36. Ibid. 50; on A Jolles see below at n 179.

37. See below n 42.

38. Beardslee 'Uses' 63.


40. Berger Formgeschichte 14f.

41. Ibid. 15; see K Berger Die Auferstehung des Propheten und die Erhöhung des Menschsohnes: Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Deutung des Geschicks Jesu in frühchristlichen Texten, StUNT 13 (Göttingen, 1976) 222, 630f.

42. Formgeschichte 50f, 63; see also above at nn 34-36.

43. Formgeschichte 62, 156.

44. Ibid. 121-155, esp. 155.

45. Ibid. 121ff and 156; for the major gnomologia see 'Gattungen' 1049ff and JS Kloppenborg The Literary Genre of the Synoptic Sayings (PhD. dissertation, University of St. Michael's College/Toronto School of Theology, 1984), appendix.
46. **Formgeschichte** 63-66.

47. See below at nn 64-72.

48. **Formgeschichte** 156ff.


50. If 6:1-18 are parenesis (Berger **Formgeschichte** 127; definition of parenesis 121ff), so surely are vv. 19-24.

51. Berger **Formgeschichte** 65f, 82-90, 117.

52. *Ibid.* 122; see below at nn 65, 66.

53. See below from n 175 ad fin.

54. Berger **Formgeschichte** 13, 67; *Einführung* 120f.

55. *Einführung* 121f.

56. See below ch 4.

57. See below ch 3.

58. Berger **Formgeschichte** 16 (§ 8).

59. Beardslee 'Uses' 70; see above ch 1 at n 23.

60. Berger **Formgeschichte** 156; 'Gattungen' 1059; see also M Lichtheim *Late Egyptian Wisdom Literature in the International Context*, OBO 52 (Freiburg, Schweiz; Göttingen, 1983); H Chadwick (ed.) *The Sentences of Sextus: A Contribution to the History of Early Christian Ethics* (Cambridge, 1959); PW van den Horst (ed.) *The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides*, StVTP (Leiden, 1978); and above ch 1 n 123.

61. M Küchler *Frühjüdische Weisheitstraditionen: Zum Fortgang weisheitlichen Denken im Bereich des frühjüdischen Jahweglauben*, OBO 26 (Freiburg, Schweiz; Göttingen, 1979) 319-413.

62. **Formgeschichte** 67.

63. See above n 14.
64. See below ch 4 § V.
65. Formgeschichte 121-4.
66. Ibid. 122.
67. Ibid. 80-82.
68. 'Gattungen' 1049-1074.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.; Formgeschichte 63-67 on the 'inhaltliche Kennzeichen' of Sentenzen.
71. Formgeschichte 117; see above at nn 16-52.
72. Ibid. 51, 66.
73. Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 75-95 esp. § 4.25; In Fragments: The Aphorisms of Jesus (San Francisco, 1953) 37-66.
74. See above ch 1 § III.
75. Pace B Gerhardsson, (see below n 96); see W Kelber The Oral and the Written Gospel 8; also M Smith 'A Comparison of Early Christian and Early Rabbinic Tradition' JBL 82 (1963) 169-176.
76. H Köster Synoptische Überlieferung bei den Apostolischen Vätern, TV 65 (Berlin, 1957); Gerhardsson Memory 194-207; Berger Einführung 120; Kelber 'Mark and Oral Tradition' 38f.
77. Crossan In Fragments 40.
78. Kelber passim.
79. Cf ch 1 n 45. In relation to such criteria, individual gnomai may be seen as partially exceptional anticipations of literate textuality on a scale compatible with oral transmission and imagination and with a minimum of conceptual abstraction; they are, as it were, oral writing.
81. Ibid. 115-129.
82. Formgeschichte 13 on Sentenzen in oral tradition, already 'als solche Texte' (Berger's emphasis).

83. Crossan In Fragments 37-40; cf NA Barley 'A Structural Approach to the Proverb and Maxim with Special Reference to the Anglo-Saxon Corpus' Proverbium 20 (1972) 74ff on the possibilities and limits of restructuring and variation in proverbs, narrowly defined.

84. In Fragments 40-54.

85. Ibid. 41, 54-66.

86. Ibid. 40.

87. Ibid. 75.

88. See above ch 1 after n 39.

89. For a developed essay into the variation of a gnomic core as the basis of 'gemeinsame Tradition' see Berger Einführung 227ff, esp. 233, on Mk 10:43parr.


92. Ibid. 137-152.

93. Kelber The Oral and the Written Gospel 32.

94. In this respect, if not in many others, Goulder's position on Synoptic 'midrash' resembles the scribal models urged by esp. B Gerhardsson.

95. Eg Theißén Soziologie.

96. See B Gerhardsson Memory and Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity, ASNW 22 (Upsala, 1961) esp. 1-22; Tradition and Transmission in Early Christianity, CNT 20 (Lund; Copenhagen, 1964) esp. 5ff; Die Anfänge.

97. See above ch 1 at n 45.

98. Goulder 92.

99. From this perspective, Goulder's unequivocal conclusion, 115, is wholly unjustified by his argument, which is probative only on the stylistic level.

100. Havelock Prologue 28ff.

101. Havelock Origins 34.

102. Ibid. 37f.

103. See below from n 175.


105. Ibid. 115.

106. For difficulties counting gnomai see below n 133. More important for reapplying Goulder's test for imagery-distribution is the difficulty of knowing how Goulder assigned particular images to his arbitrary sub-categories. For example, does a reference to the 'blind' (Mt 15:14/Lk 6:39) belong with 'body parts' or 'professional' imagery or neither? Almost a quarter of Synoptic gnomai did not fit Goulder's sample image-categories, so that recording distribution-figures here seems unnecessary.


108. Goulder 70.

109. For a recent example, see G Schwarz "Und Jesus Sprach: Untersuchungen zur aramaischen Urgestalt der Worte Jesus, WANT 6 (Stuttgart, 1985).

110. Crossan In Fragments 67.

111. Goulder 70.

112. Ibid.

113. See below from n 175.
114. Goulder 70.
115. See above ch 1 § II, and at n 112.
117. Ibid. 70.
118. Ibid. 71.
119. Ibid. 70.
120. Ibid. 81ff.
121. Ibid. 94.
122. Ibid. 89.
123. Ibid. 90 (tote).
124. Ibid. 93.
125. Ibid. 77.
126. Ibid. 97ff. and App. 114f; see above n 106.
127. Ibid. 92.
128. Ibid. 72f.
129. Ibid. 72, 90.
130. Ibid. 73.
131. Ibid. 74, 92.
132. Ibid. esp. 92.
133. The ratios actually found are 45:80 and 69:81 respectively. Some imprecision occurs in counting gnomai, because it is not always clear whether repeated variations of a gnomic 'core' within a single limited context should be construed as only one or several instances (eg Mt 7:16-20) and more generally because gnomic language in parenesis can obscure the particularity of individual units (eg Mt 7:7-11par.). The latter problem emphasizes the importance of relative syntactical separability as a criterion for selecting historically interesting gnomai. The same considerations
and the desire for comparability with Goulder's findings make it desirable to count each instance of gnome rather than each gnome, that is, each variation rather than each gnomic 'core'.

134. Goulder 72.

135. Ibid. 93. The assignment of Mt 10:26 to 'R', i.e., redactional material, while Lk 12:2 is placed with 'Q' rhythms is, by the way, hardly a use of the conventional symbols 'without prejudice to ... the source-document hypothesis' (73).

136. Ong 40.

137. See T Zahn Das Evangelium des Lucas, KNT 3 (Leipzig, [1906]) 349 n 19.


139. Ibid. 72.

140. E.g., grammatical/lexical redundancy and aggregative syntax as in, heneken emou kai tou euaggeliou (Mk 8:35).

141. Of the kind proposed by the Scandinavians, see above n 96 and ch 1 n 44.

142. Goulder 92.

143. Ibid. 89.

144. For an appeal that 'wisdom' sayings in Q be taken seriously as a vehicle of Q's theology and for listings of Q 'sayings' and 'admonitions' see RA Edwards 'An Approach to a Theology of Q' JR 51 (1971) 258-261 and CE Carlston 'Wisdom and Eschatology in Q' in Logia - les Paroles de Jésus - the Sayings of Jesus ed. by J Delobel, BEThL 59 (Leuven, 1982) 101-119.

145. See above ch 1 § II.

146. Goulder 92.

149. Ibid. 34.
151. Ibid. 28.
152. See above § I.
153. See above ch 1 at nn 40ss; further esp. Havelock Origins 34ff, also Theißen Miracle Stories 189-194; Crossan In Fragments 37-42; Kelber esp. The Oral and the Written Gospel 32.
155. Ibid. 19-37, 438f.
156. Ibid. 37ff, 406.
157. See above § III.
158. Steinhauser 19ff, 406.
159. 16/19 Doppelbildworte actually used contain gnomai.
160. Steinhauser 182f, 439f.
161. Ibid. 32ff.
163. Steinhauser 20ff, 407.
164. Ibid. 37.
165. Ibid. 21.
166. Ibid. 406ff.
167. Ibid. 33ff et passim.
168. Ibid. 32.
169. Ibid. 38f.
170. Ibid. 55, 79, 136, 158, 215, 313, etc.
171. Ibid. 113, et passim; cf 38f.
172. Ibid. 63, 209, 302, etc.
173. Cf Sanders Jesus 13ff.
175. Crossan In Fragments esp. 37-40.
176. See above § I.
177. Berger Formgeschichte 16.
178. See also the methodology of Theißen Miracle Stories 1-25.
180. Ibid. 153; see also H-J Hermisson Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit, WMANT 28 (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1968) 29f.
182. A Taylor The Proverb and an Introduction to the Proverb (Copenhagen, 1962) 3, cit. by O Blehr 'What is a Proverb?' Fabula 14 (1973) 243.
185. Ibid. 309f.
186. Ibid. 309.
187. Ibid. 312.
l'armature des locutions proverbiales:
Essai de taxonomie sémantique' L'Homme 9/3
(1969) 49-70.

189. 'Armature' 69.

190. On sources for such ambiguity see B
Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 'Toward a Theory of

191. For criticisms 2, 3 and 4, see A Dundes
'On the Structures of the Proverb' Proverbiun
25 (1975) 963f; and on 3 and 4 see P Crépeau
'La Définition du proverbe' Fabula 16 (1975)
289-291 and Barley 743.


193. Ibid. 246.

194. Ibid. 245.

195. Dundes 'Structures' 965.

196. Ibid. n 23; see also YM Sokolov Russian
Folklore (New York, 1950) 285; also Barley
743 and ref.

197. See above n 182.


199. Ibid. 286.

200. See above n 181.

201. Crépeau 286.

202. Ibid. 287 see also above n 184.

203. Ibid. 287 and ref. there to T Todorov
Literature et signification (Paris, 1967)
51; also Greimas 309f.

204. Crépeau 290; see above n 191.

205. Ibid. 291f. An analogy can, of course, be
construed with three terms by placing one
term in two different relations as a
tertium comparationis (A:B::A:C); Crépeau
notes that this is logically a special
case of the general pattern (296).

206. Ibid. 297.

207. Ibid. 291f.

208. Ibid. 292f, against F Rodegem 'Un Problème de terminologie: Les locutions sentencieuses' Cahier de l'institut de linguistique 1 (1972) 677-703; on metaphor see Barley 737f.

209. Crépeau 297. In his sample of four thousand five hundred Rwandan proverbs, metaphorical sayings predominate over metonymic.

210. Ibid. 295.

211. See, eg, Sanders Jesus 253ff and nn.


213. Ibid. 8-12.

214. Ibid. 11.

215. Ibid. 4.

216. Ibid. 12-16.

217. See below chs 5 and 6.

218. Theißen Soziologie 38 and n 13.

219. Eg Theißen Soziologie.

220. See above at n 192.

221. Crépeau 300ff.

222. Pace Banks 97.

223. Crépeau 287 (Crépeau's emphasis); see also on Jolles at n 180.

224. See ch 1 above.


226. Barley 741.

227. On such fixity see Crossan In Fragments 67.
228. Barley, where the 'traditional saying' is subdivided into potential proverb, proverb, maxim, potential and temporary maxims, riddle, etc. This complex division is all the more interesting as it is based upon historical survey of sayings in a literary tradition of strong oral residue (that of Anglo-Saxon gnombologies).

229. Crépeau 303f for summary.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


2. Witness the almost exclusive interest of New Testament critics in the chria among the progymnasmata; see above 'Introduction' n 6 and ch 1 n 56.

3. For examples see C Fontaine Traditional Sayings in the Old Testament, Bible and Literature 5 (Sheffield, 1982) 24, 74f; 'Performance'; Hermisson 38-52; O Eißfeldt Der Maschal im Alten Testament, BZAW 24 (Gießen, 1913) 45f; and below.

4. Fontaine 'Performance' 91.


6. Fontaine 'Performance' 88; cf GT Sheppard Wisdom as a Hermeneutical Construct, BZAW151 (Berlin; New York, 1980) 1-12.
8. See above ch 1 § I and n 11.
9. See Jolles on Volk ch 2 nn 179, 180.
11. Hermisson 41 and ref.
12. Ibid. 40.
13. Ibid. 44 n 4.
15. Cf W Rudolph Hosea, Kat 13/1 (Gütersloh, 1966) 112; Hermisson 44 n 4; and n 119 below.
17. For a full listing see Eißfeldt 45-48 or Fontaine 'Performance' 90 for the same in tabular form.
18. Eißfeldt 47; Hermisson 18ff.
19. Fontaine Traditional Sayings 7 n 14 and ref. there; also Collins 4.
22. Fontaine 'Performance' 100.
24. Fontaine Traditional Sayings 54f and R Dorson


27. Fontaine Traditional Sayings 6; cf Hermisson 46ff.


29. Fontaine's structural analysis, based upon P Seitel's field-work, focuses on aspects of performance situation into which, at least in Jesus' case, biblical texts give little direct insight seems compatible with those behind Crépeau's discussion. See below at nn 121-123.

30. See above ch 2 § V.

31. Watson 97-113 and ref. there.

32. Ibid. 130-143.

33. Ibid. 107-109, 119-159.

34. Ibid. 114-119 and 119-159.

35. See above n 28.

36. Watson 137 and n 61.


38. Watson 101 and n 51.
39. Ibid. 113.


41. Watson 335.


44. Traditional Sayings; 'Performance'.

45. See above ch 2 § III.

46. See above ch 1 § III.

47. See above ch 1 § I and n 11; Bultmann Geschichte 73f; also Küchler 159; Schick 160. Dibelius Formgeschichte 247f and n 1 prefers to distinguish imperatival forms altogether from the 'Weisheitswort (Sentenz, Gnome)'; cf Zeller Mahnprüche 12 n 6.

48. Küchler 158.

49. Bauckmann 43; Fontaine Traditional Sayings 80 n 28 and ref. there.


51 Hermisson 36f, 188f.

52. Zimmerli 184; Zeller Mahnprüche 23 n 74.

53. Zimmerli 185f.

54. Greßmann 298; Hempel 175; Zimmerli 186.

56. G v Rad 'Die ältere Weisheit Israels' KuD 2(1956) 54-72, 63.

57. Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' 458-460 and n 58; see McKane 3-10; KA Kitchen 'The Basic Literary Forms and Formulations of Ancient Instructional Writings in Egypt and Western Asia' in Studien zu altägyptischen Lebenslehren ed. by E Hornung and O Kee, OBO 28 (Freiburg, Schweiz; Göttingen, 1979) 235-282; P Nel The Structure and Ethos of the Wisdom Admonitions in Proverbs, BZAW 158 (Berlin; New York; 1982).

58. W Richter Recht und Ethos: Versuch einer Ortung des weisheitlichen Mahnspruchs, StANT 15 (Munich, 1966) 144.


60. W Richter 67, 145.

61. Ibid. 189f.


63. W Richter 120, 144f; on the distinction between 'Commandment' and 'Prohibitive' see 88-115.

64. Ibid. n 190.

65. Hermisson 84; see W Richter 52, 67, 144f.

66. W Richter 120, 190.

67. Hermisson 84f.

68. W Richter 39; 'Heisendes Präsens' 38.

70.  Ibid. 353-57.
71.  Ibid. 361.
72.  W Richter 120, 144f, 190f.
74.  W Richter 144f.
75.  McKane 1-10 (esp. 5f on W Richter and Gerstenberger) and passim.
76.  Zeller Mahnsprüche.
77.  Ibid. 22.
78.  W Richter 144f.
79.  Zeller Mahnsprüche 147ff.
80.  Küchler 163.
81.  Ibid. 16-20.
82.  Zeller Mahnsprüche 147ff.
83.  Ibid.
84.  See above n 52.
85.  See above ch 2.
86.  Zeller Mahnsprüche 23f and n 82.
87.  See above ch 2 at n 221 and below ch 5 from n 41 on.
88.  Zeller Mahnsprüche 17.
89.  Ibid. 31f.
90.  Ibid. 11.
91.  See above ch 1 §II.
92.  Zeller Mahnsprüche 11.
93.  See above n 87.
94. See below ch 6.

95. Zeller Mahnsprüche 47.

96. See below n 100.

97. Zeller Mahnsprüche n 142.

98. Ibid. 152.

99. See below at nn 169ss.


101. See above nn 57, 75.

102. Zeller MahnSprüche 54-143 and below at n 170 on MahnSprüche in Abot.

103. Ibid. 76f.

104. Ibid. 94ff.

105. Ibid. 93f.

106. Ibid. 82ff.

107. Ibid. 31.

108. W Richter 48, 54, 118; see also Bjorndalen 357.

109. See above ch 1 at nn 67ss, 97, 108.

110. Perdue 18f (§ 1.8).

111. Ibid. 19ff; Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' 458; n 57 above.


113. Zeller MahnSprüche 11.

114. See above § I.


116. See above ch 2 § V.
117. See above at n 12.

118. Fontaine Traditional Sayings 81.

119. Ibid. 80f.

120. W Rudolph Micha-Nahum-Habakuk-Zephaniaja, KAT 13/3 (Gütersloh, 1975) 223.

121. See above ch 2 n 133.

122. 57-60, 75f; also 'Performance' 94ff following P Seitel 'Proverbs: A Social Use of Metaphor' Genre 2 (1969) 143-161.

123. Cf Fontaine's three headings with Crépeau's (following Todorov and Barthes) analysis of the three-fold structure of the proverb as a connotative performance, Crépeau 287-289; the principle advantage of Crépeau's approach for the present study is his orientation toward sayings of which the performance situation may be imperfectly documented, culturally or historically obscure. On connotative poetics generally see Erhardt Güttgemann's "Generative Poetics" ed. by NR Peterson, Semeia 6 (1976).

124. See above ch 2 after n 210.

125. See above ch 2 after n 210.

126. See Zimmerli 183f for listing.

127. Cf G Fohrer Das Buch Hjob, KAT 16 (Gütersloh, 1975) 1-4.

128. Cf G Fohrer Das Buch Hjob, KAT 16 (Gütersloh, 1975) 1-4.

129. Ibid. 54f on Sprichwörte in Qoh.

130. Ibid. 54f on Sprichwörte in Qoh.

131. JT Sanders Ben Sira and Demotic Wisdom, Society of Biblical Literature Monog. Ser. 28 (Chico, Calif., 1983) 11 (Sanders' emphasis), see also 3-12.


133. Ibid. 14f, 6-9 and ref. there.

134. Ibid. 15f and ref. there.

135. Ibid. 13 and n 44.
136. Ibid. 14 and n 50.

137. Ibid. 26-59 on Hellenistic literacy influence, but note that use of gnome need not at all have been based on written models.

138. Ibid. 61-103.

139. 'Ahiqar' transl. by JM Lindenberger in Charlesworth II 479-507.

140. Ibid. 483; Küchler 403-410.

141. Küchler 358; compared to approximately 110 sayings in the Aramaic, the Oriental versions contain some 200; Lindenberger 480.

142. Lindenberger 491 n 79; Küchler 403-410.

143. Küchler 411.

144. For a conservative selection see Küchler 358-363 and, further, Lindenberger 498-507nn ad loc.


146. Ibid. 365.

147. Ibid. 411.


149. See above ch 2 following n 142.

150. Zeller Mahnsprüche 46.

151. Cf BK 91a and BM 97a, which adapts a saying in which Fischel detected influence from Epicurean sententiae, Rabbinic Literature 36ff. For the close relationship between these and other analogical norms see A Strikovsky 'Proverbs, Talmudic' EJ 13 (Jerusalem, 1972) 1274.

152. Küchler 207f.

154. Ibid. I 68.
155. Ibid. I 69.
156. Ibid. I 70.
157. For a partial exception see below nn 174-175.
158. Neusner I 70.
159. For Neusner on oral transmission and composition see I 143ff, esp. 146ff on Gerhardsson's proposals. Cf Güttgemanns Offene Fragen 119-153.
160. Neusner I 84.
161. Ibid. 72.
162. See LH Schiffman's note on the forms of Sabbath-Law in the Zadokite Fragments, The Halakah at Qumran, SJLA 16 (Leiden, 1975) 80ff.
163. Neusner I 82; for a historical exegesis of the early Rabbinic preference for the present participle 'of correct practice' in legal norms and for the total absence of this legal form from Abot see D Daube The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (London, 1956) 90-105.
164. Neusner I 72.
165. Ibid. 82.
166. Ibid. 64f for summary.
167. Ibid. 5-43. Of the three hundred or so laws cited by Neusner, I have checked only those (the majority) cited from Mishnah, among which I have found no formally independent, analogically structured norms; see n 163 above.
168. Ibid. 78-88, 312-364 on Bultmann's methods.
169. Ibid. 84.
170. Zeller Mahnsprüche 44 and n 241 citing Gerhardsson Memory 136ff; see also above at nn 102ss on New Testament Mahnsprüche.
171. Zeller Mahnsprüche 44.
172. See above at nn 95ss.


174. Neusner I 78, 84.

175. Ibid. 70; Zeller Mahnsprüche 44f.

176. Neusner I 78; compare other Wisdom-literary numerical formulae eg the 'three-four' pattern of Prv 30:15ff, Sir 26:5.

177. Ibid. 21.

178. Küchler 177ff and ref. there esp. 180 n 11a; see also AJ Saldarini The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan, SJLA 11 (Leiden, 1975).

179. Küchler 178f on Schechter's documentary and Finkelstein's more oral-traditional emphases.

180. See above § IV.

181. Pace Gerhardsson who in the face of criticism rightly emphasized the analogy between sayings of Jesus and those of the Rabbis, but who fails to establish the analogy in the aspect most vital to his thesis by providing examples of authentic sayings of Jesus which show signs of mnemotechnical design, Tradition 22-37.

182. See Watson 136ff and ref. there.

183. Crépeau 285.

184. See above after n 169.

185. Something of this sort may lie behind the curiously qualified sapiential genre of Q (see below ch 4 from n 100 ad fin.).

186. See above nn 9-41.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' 458. The basic unit of the 'Instruction' is, in turn, the 'Admonition' (Mahnspruch/Mahnwort) n 59; cf
Perdue 18-25 and ref. 19 n 32.


4. Carlston 'Wisdom' 116 and n 77.

5. See above ch 1 § II.

6. See above ch 2 § III.


8. Ibid. 50f.


10. On the social-historical significance of such Wanderlogien see Berger Formgeschichte 64, 66f and Exegese 106.


12. Ibid. 226.

13. 'On est étonné de cette accumulation de logia,
chez Mc où ils sont rares...' M-E Boismard
_Synopse des quatre évangiles en français
avec parallèles des apocryphes et des pères 3

14. See above ch 1 at n 45 and ch 3 after n 182.
15. _Pace_ Boismard 152, 189.
17. See above ch 2 after n 139.
18. See above ch 2 after n 146.
19. See Berger _Formgeschichte_ 83f for this
and Quintilian's slightly different division;
also Crossan 'Kingdom and Children' 78.
20. VK Robbins 'Pronouncement Stories and Jesus'
Blessing of the Children: A Rhetorical
21. _Ibid._ 49f; contra Theon in _Rhetores Graeci_
ed. by C Walz (Stuttgart etc, 1832; rpr.
22. Spengel-Hammer I/1 (1885) 62; _cf_ Bonner
253; ML Clarke _Higher Education in the
Ancient World_ (London, 1971) 38n 177.
23. Robbins 69, 62f and n 33.
24. _Ibid._ 68f.
25. _Ibid._ 73f.
27. _Cf_ E Schweizer _Das Evangelium nach Markus_
28. See below ch 5 between nn 119, 120 and ch 6
at nn 94-100 on Mk 2:27.
29. 14/58=24%; the ratios for Marcan and 'Q'
gnomai are not significantly different.
30. See below § III.
31. J Dupont 'Dieu et Mammon (MT 6,24 : LC 16,13)'
in _Études sur les évangiles synoptiques_ II
32. Ibid. 557.
33. Ibid. 557ff.
34. See, eg, that by Aphthonius, Spengel II 26.7-27.23.
35. Dupont 'Dieu et Mammon' 555ff.
36. Kelber The Oral and the Written Gospel 201; see above ch 1 at n 54, On oral genres in a multilingual setting marked by conflict between scribal and imperialistic literacies, see J Lewis 'Literacy and Cultural Identity in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Case' in The Written Word: Literacy in Transition (Oxford, 1986) 133-149.
38. See above on Abot and AdRN, ch 3 at nn 150-181 and more generally on B Gerhardsson's characterization of Rabbinic literacy see above ch 1 at n 44, 2 at n 96, and 3 at n 181.
39. See below after n 45 on Mt 7:6.
40. Boismard 278.
41. See n 9 above and ch 5 at nn 81-84.
42. See below after n 45 and ch 5 at nn 52, 81.
44. Ibid. 7ff.
45. See above following n 28.
46. Boismard 152f, 296f; S Schulz Q: Die Spruchquelle der Evangelisten (Zürich, 1972) 459ff on Lk 16:13.

48. Goulder 101f; cf Küchler 325ff on Tierfabeln in the Ahiqar-tradition.

49. See above following n 14.


51. See above ch 3 § II.


54. Cf Boismard 178f.

55. Pace Boismard 90f, 212f.

56. Eg Fitzmøyer 527f.

57. Cf Berger Formgeschichte 50.

58. See also above ch 2 at nn 47-56.

59. See above ch 2 § V.

60. See above ch 1 at n 33, ch 2 n 14.

61. See n 60.

62. H Köster 'Formgeschichte/Formkritik' TRE XI (Berlin; New York, 1983) 29; even here a possible exception is immediately noticed.

63. Cf Robbins 44.
64. See Berger Formgeschichte 227ff, esp. 233f (§§7.2, 7.5) on Mk 10:43f; also below ch 6 n 62, 63.

65. See above at nn 55, 56.

66. Berger Formgeschichte 66f.

67. Ibid. 85, 89f.

68. See above ch 1 at n 33, and before n 113, ch 2 at nn 57-58.

69. Aristotle Ars Rhet. 1394b ad fin.; see above ch 1 at nn 85-87.

70. Berger Formgeschichte 86f.

71. See above ch 1 § IV and below ch 6 passim.

72. Berger Formgeschichte 80ff lists 55 chrias of which 22 contain an (apophthegmatic) gnomai. 7/22=33.8% of these apophthegmatic or chriic gnomai are on probably halakic topics. When a list of chrias/apophthegms is abstracted from Bultmann Geschichte 8-73 and Köster 'Formgeschichte' 291-293, a slightly different group of 22 apophthegmatic gnomai is obtained, 8/22=36% of which are on legally interesting topics.

73. Berger Formgeschichte 89f.


75. See above ch 1 at n 33, ch 2 at nn 12, 13 and between nn 57, 58.

76. Bultmann Geschichte 40; cf Berger Formgeschichte 84.

77. See the criteriology of S Westerholm Jesus and Scribal Authority, CB.NT 10 (Lund, 1978).

78. Cf Sanders Jesus 264-267.
79. See below chs 5 and 6.

80. Robbins 74f.


82. See above at nn 31-42 and following n 45.

83. See above at nn 63-73.

84. Robinson 'Collections' 389-394.

85. W Schenk Synopse zur Redenquelle der Evangelien (Düsseldorf, 1981). If, disregarding reconstructional questions, and begging questions of the unity of Q, we simply count gnomai from non-Marcan material shared by Mt and Lk, the figures are 44 and 5 or 6 respectively.

86. P Vassiliadis 'The Nature and Extent of the Q Document' NT 20 (1978) 66, 68. At least this procedure illustrates the contention that gnomai are, barring literary-critical or oral-hermeneutical prejudice, a bridge between oral and literary tradition.

87. See above n 43.

88. W Schmithals Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien (Berlin; New York, 1985) 410-421.


92. H-W Kuhn Ältere Sammlungen im Markusevangelium, SUNT 8 (Göttingen, 1971); cf Robinson 'Collections' 390.

93. See above n 72 for the overall average.
94. Kuhn 129ff and n 28.
95. See above between nn 10 and 19.
96. See above n 82.
97. See above n 27 and text.
98. Robinson 'Collections' 390; Schweizer Markus 111f.
99. For an instance of such incautious equivocation, see Wenham 367ff and rev. by JR Michaels JBL 106 (1987) 132-134, 133.
100. For ref. and comments see Schmithals Einleitung 328ff, 399ff, 222ff respectively; also Vassiliadis 49-73.
101. Vassiliadis 86, against which see Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' 456ff, with gnomai at each successive stage of Q's documentary development.
103. Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' 449.
104. Ibid. 448f and above ch 1 at n 54.
105. Cf Goulder's detection of rhythmic similarity between Q and Matthaean poetic styles, above ch 2 at nn 120-153.
106. Vassiliadis 50-60 on the 'Nature' of Q and Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' passim.
108. See above n 100 and Schmithals Einleitung 224ff, 228ff.
109. See above n 2.
110. See above at nn 1-3.
112. Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' 445f and ref.
there; cf Perdue 18-25 on Admonition
(Mahnspruch) and Instruction (Lehrrede).
113. Schmithals Einleitung 224ff for bibillog.
116. Both Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' and
Jacobson passim.
117. Kloppenborg 'Formation of Q' 446.
118. 'Formation of Q' and The Literary Genre of
the Synoptic Sayings (dissertation, University
of St. Michael's College/Toronto School of
Theology, 1984).
458 and nn there.
120. Ibid. 460 and n 59.
121. See above ch 3 at nn 52-113 esp. 75.
122. Zeller Mahnsprüche 160-184, esp. 177ff.
124. Carlston 'Wisdom' 112, also 107 and above n 2.
125. See above ch 1 § II.
126. See above ch 1 at nn 17-24 esp. n 24.
127. Carlston 'Wisdom' 112.
129. Carlston 'Wisdom' 107 n 42.
130. Ibid. 111f, 116f.
131. Ibid. 101-107.
132. Ibid. 'maxims or proverbs' 101, 107-113.
133. Cf Berger Formgeschichte 156 ($2(d)).
134. Carlston 'Wisdom' 116.
135. All of Carlston's 26 'Maxims', 'Wisdom' 108f, and 8/20 of his 'Wisdom Material not Sententious in Form', 109ff, are gnomai.

136. See above ch 3 passim.

137. See above ch 3 passim.

138. See above ch 3 at n 57; also H Gese Lehre 31.

139. See above ch 3 at nn 97, 98; also Zeller Mahnsprüche 142, 152.

140. Cf M Sato Q und Prophetie, WUNT 29 (Tübingen, 1988) 202ff for the prophetic Mahnwort distinguished from the Wisdom Mahnspruch very largely by the former's tendency to plural address.


142. Carlston 'Wisdom' 112f, eg Lk 10:2/Mt 9:37; Lk 12:54f/Mt 16:2f; cf Edwards 'Approach' 259ff.

143. Ibid. 112-116.

144. Ibid. 116 n 77.

145. The former are a sub-set of our gnome; the latter are a much more miscellaneous collection, see above n 29.

146. Carlston 'Wisdom' 107 n 42.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. See above ch 1.

2. See above ch 4.


5. See above ch 2.
6. See above ch 1.
7. See above ch 3.
8. See above ch 4.
9. Minus some typically sapiential themes, see above ch 1 n 30.
10. See above ch 1 at n 15.
11. See above ch 1 at nn 22, 23.
12. E Biser 'Weisheit' in Herders Theologisches Taschenlexikon VIII (Freiburg i.B. etc, 1973) 128-134, 128.
13. See above ch 2.
16. See, eg, Bultmann Geschichte 103; W Schille 'Was ist ein Logion?' ZNW 61 172-182, 175ff; Carlston 'Wisdom' 175ff; Sanders Jesus 17-18.
18. Edwards 'Eschatological Correlative'.
19. See above ch 1.
21. See above ch 4 at nn 57ss.
23. For the 'criterion of pregnant speech' see Westerholm 6.
24. See above ch 2 at nn 34-38.
25. See above ch 4 at nn 61-64.
27. See above ch § II.
28. See above ch 4 n 10.
29. M Hengel Nachfolge und Charisma: Eine exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche Studie zu Mt 8, 21f. und Jesu Ruf in die Nachfolge, BZNW 34 (Berlin, 1968) 3 n 6; Sanders Jesus 132f and n 38.
30. Sanders Jesus 133.
31. Hengel 5f.
32. See above ch 4 at nn 71-73.
33. See above ch 2 at nn 210-228.
34. Sanders Jesus 252-255; Hengel 9ff.
35. For the notion of 'antiproverb', see WA Beardslee 'Saving One's Life By Losing It' JAAR 47 (1979) 57-72; for the phenomenon, see Hengel 6, 9.
37. Carlston 'Proverbs' 103.
38. See below at nn 113-128.
40. See above ch 1 §§ IV, V, ch 2 § V.
41. Crépeau 300ff; see above ch 2 at n 221.
42. See above ch 4 at nn 142-147.
43. Hengel 53.


45. Berger Formgeschichte 41.

46. Sanders Jesus 129.

47. E Bloch Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt, 1959) 1491.

48. See below at nn 120-124.


50. See below at nn 120-124.


52. See above ch 4 at nn 30-42 and 46, 47; and below at nn 80-84.

53. Recently, Perdue.

54. See above ch 1 n 15.

55. See below § V.

56. Beardslee 'Uses' 61-73; 'Saving' 57-72.

57. '...there is no absolute break between the generalized statement and the existential challenge.' Beardslee 'Uses' 73, cf 68.


59. See above n 33.

60. Crépeau; see above ch 2 § V.

61. Ars Rhet. B 21.12-14 (1395a); see above ch 1 at n 87.

63. Schulz Q 472 and n 533.
64. Beardslee 'Saving' 58.
65. Beardslee 'Uses' 68.
66. **Ibid.** 66f; 'Saving' *passim*.
68. Beardslee 'Saving' 61ff.
69. **Ibid.** 62ff; see below at nn 136-137.

70. Against Beardslee 'Uses' 68, I cannot see Mt 8:22 as 'hyperbole': there is no hint of exaggeration in Jesus' characterization of recusants as 'dead' (cf Mk 12:27par, somewhat rationalized in Lk 20:38); see above n 33.

71. Beardslee 'Uses' 68f.
72. See above at n 61.

73. AD Leeman Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators, Historians and Philosophers 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1963) I 301f; Quintilian IO 8, 5, 12-25; see above ch 1 at n 111.

74. Boismard 152.
75. Lindeskog 129-189.
76. **Ibid.** 132, 162-165; see above ch 4 n 10.
77. Theißen 'Wandrerradikalismus' 264.
78. Noorda 459-467.
80. See above ch 4 at nn 30-32, 34.
81. See below at n 149.
82. See above ch 4 n 9.
83. Boismard 278.
84. Beardslee 'Uses' 69.
For a further example of misuse, see Steinhauser 187 and n 16, and below at nn 104-106.

Beardslee 'Uses' 68.

Steinhauser 115 and n 250.

See above ch 1 n 28.


Theißen Soziologie 89: 'Unterscheidet man zwischen religionsoziologischen Integrations- und Konflikttheorien, so ist festzustellen, daß für eine Analyse der Jesusbewegung eine Konflikttheorie eindeutig besser geeignet ist.' Cf n 94.

For 'disfunctionality' cf G Theißen 'Theoretischen Probleme religionsoziologischer Forschung' NZSTh 16 (1974) 35-56, 40f.

Ibid. 41.

Crépeau, for his less historical purpose of comparative anthropology, barely marks the distinction between rhetorical normativity in proverbs and social normativity, 299f.

Theißen 'Probleme' 45; see above n 90.

See below n 149.

Cf Sanders Jesus 4ff, 157ff.

Crépeau 300.

See above at nn 78, 79.


Theißen 'Wanderradikalismus' 250 n 14 citing E Hänchen Der Weg Jesu (1966) 220; cf Gräßer 13 and n 65; see below at n 133.

420

102. 19b and 20parr seem effectively to reverse the implication of 19a.

103. Sanders Jesus 207.


106. Steinhauser 187 and n 16.


108. Carlston 'Wisdom' 103 and n 19.


110. Cf Prv 10:10ff; 26:4, 5.

111. For a parallel to the gnomai, but in immediate contextual juxtaposition, cf Cicero pro Ligario 32.

112. Cf Berger Formgeschichte 38f.


Fuchs 'Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus' 
Zur Frage des historischen Jesus (2nd edn., 
Tübingen, 1965) 155.

115. PJ Achtemeier rev. of S Kim The 'Son of Man' 
as Son of God and B Lindars Jesus Son of Man 
JBL 105 (1986) 332-335, 335 cit. by Schweizer 
'Jesus' 713; cf Sanders Jesus 324 and n 8.

116. See above at n 39.

117. Stanton 156, 165.

118. Ibid. 156-167.

119. See above at n 36.

120. Berger Einführung 227ff esp. 233f (§ 7).

121. Ibid. 234 (§ 7.5).

122. Ibid. 230.

123. Ibid. 233f (§7.2).

124. Ibid. 229, 233f (§§ 7.1, 4).

125. See above at nn 78, 79 and below at n 149.

126. Cf Sanders Jesus 145ff on the neighbouring 
tradition of Mt 24:30f/16:27f/I Thess 4:15-17.

127. Cf Wilder Parables 97f; E Jüngel 'Metaphorische 
Wahrheit' in Entsprechungen: Gott - Wahrheit - 
Mensch, BETh 88 (Munich, 1980) 103.157, esp. 
108ff.


129. See above at nn 104-106.

130. Hengel passim; Theißen 'Wanderradikalismus' 
249ff.

131. See above at n 100.

132. See above at nn 110, 111.

133. Theißen 'Wanderradikalismus' 250 n 13.

134. Boismard 309.
135. Beardslee 'Saving' 60.
136. Ibid. 61f.
137. Ibid. 64ff.
138. Cf Sanders Jesus 47-49, 95, 116-119, 222ff; Theißen Soziologie 9, 104-106.
139. Boismard 132f.
140. Cf Sanders Jesus 174-211 on 'The Sinners'.
141. Ibid. 218ff esp. n 36.
143. Beare invents a chauvinistic Christian prophet to take the blame for Jesus, Ibid. 344.
144. See below at n 149.
145. See below n 148.
146. See above at nn 22-26.
147. See above at nn 45-50, 113-127.
148. See above ch 4 at nn 31-42, 46, 47; ch 5 at nn 52, 80-84.
149. On Mk 7:24ff, see above at nn 141ss. The last three instances bear comparison with the 'prophetic disputation speeches' treated by A Graffy A Prophet Confronts His People, An Bib 104 (Rome, 1984). See above ch 4 n 140.
150. See Berger Formgeschichte 42 on the Ausgangsebene and Bildebene in parable: the integration of the two in gnome is even more intimate, and the distinction even more preferrable to a forced distinction between Sache and Bild.
151. See above § II ad fin.
152. Theißen Soziologie 98.
153. Hengel 80-94; Sanders Jesus 224f.
154. Theißen 'Wanderradikalismus' 255f; Hengel 6, 31f, 35, 37; more recently FG Downing 'Cynics and Christians' NTS 30 (1984) 584-593; 'The Social Contexts of Jesus the Teacher' NTS 33 (1987) 439-451, although the dangers of describing Cynicism and, a fortiori, Cynic rhetoric too monolithically are also apparent, cf Downing 'Contexts' 446.

155. Downing 'Contexts' 446 and n 21.

156. Ibid. 447-450; also J Corbett 'The Pharisaic revolution and Jesus as embodied Torah' SR 15 (1986) 375-391 on Cynicism, Pharisaism and Jesus as responses to revolutions and tensions in Hellenistic literacy. See also ch 1 nn 120, 121 on diatribe style.

157. Though this may also reflect the literary artificiality of the canon of gnomai designated 'Cynic' among Hellenistic 'propagators of the ideal of the Noble Cynic', Fischel 'Transformations' 373 n 4.

158. See above ch 1 n 123.

159. Fischel 'Transformations' 409 and n 4.

160. Ibid. 398 n 4.

161. Ibid. 399.


163. See above, eg, at nn 130-132.

164. Fischel 'Transformations' 373 and n 4, citing Diogenes L. 6.20 and 71.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. FG Downing 'Contexts' 439.

2. Ibid. 440.


4. Ibid. 445ff.
5. Ibid. 440.

6. Cf the short list of examples, I Cor 11:23ff; 15:3-8 and the gnome Ac 20:35 in B Gerhardsson 'Der Weg der Evangelien-tradition' in Das Evangelium und die Evangelien ed. by P Stuhlmacher, WUNT 28 (Tübingen, 1983) 79-102, 80.


8. Downing 'Contexts' 440.


10. Cf Berger Formgeschichte 156 (e) and (f).


12. The uncertain and ambiguous possibility of Q-type tradition in Corinth barely modifies this judgement; cf C Tuckett '1 Corinthians and Q' JBL 102 (1983) 607-619.


16. R Bultmann Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die Kynisch-stoischen Diatribe (Göttingen, 425
18. Ibid. 291ff.
23. Cf Berger Formgeschichte 121ff.
24. J. Neusner III 5; cf 43 on 'aggadic tradition'.
25. Harvey Constraints 36-65 for a still problematic survey; also Downing 'Contexts' 441f.
27. Ibid.
29. Cf Zeller Mahnsprüche 45f and above ch 3 31ff.
30. See above ch 5 n 124, 125.
31. Cf Berger Formgeschichte 123; Gesetzesauslegung 38ff.
32. Betz Galatians 274ff ad loc.
34. Ibid. 222ff.
35. Ibid. 236ff.

36. PW van der Horst The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, SVTP 4 (Leiden, 1978) 89.

37. Synoptic and Pauline pericopae about divorce, Mk 10:2ff parr; Mt 5:27ff; I Cor 7:10-16, and about comportment of missionaries, Mt 10:5ff etc; I Cor 9:5-14, are among the few and partial exceptions important for gnome-study. For formally specialized legal texts cf Mt 5:21 ad fin.; 18:15ff; and the Didache; also Berger Formgeschichte 214ff.

38. Cf R Finnegan Oral Literature in Africa (Nairobi, 1970) 408-413; S Roberts Order and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology (Oxford, 1979) 147ff, 174; J Blenkinsopp Wisdom and Law in the Old Testament: The Ordering of Life in Israel and Early Judaism (Oxford, 1983) 80. Several of the 'proverbs' isolated by Eissfeldt in the Old Testament are intrinsically (II Sam 5:8; 20:18) or receptionally (Jg 8:21; I Sam 24:13, 14) legal apart from the large number of prophetic sayings which extend juridical proverb-use into the Covenant-relationship, cf C Fontaine 'Performance' 5.


41. See above ch 5 n 50.

42. See above ch 5 n 54.

43. Cf Sanders Jesus 212-221 on 'The Gentiles' in which, curiously, these sayings barely figure.

44. See above ch 5 §§ I and V.

45. Wedderburn 'Problem of Continuity' 190.

46. See Nierynck 'Sayings' n 51 for bibliog.

47. See above n 18.

427
48. For the latter ambiguity cf Theißen 'Legitimation' passim.


50. See above n 45.

51. Pace Q Quesnell "Made Themselves Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven" (Mt 19,12)' CBQ 30 (1968) 335-358, 341 n 10.

52. Dungan 100.

53. Cf Boismard 308f; Berger Gesetzesauslegung 572f.

54. Boismard 309, following Quesnell 341ff and passim; Berger Gesetzesauslegung 573.


56. Sanders Jesus 14f.

57. Ibid. 256.

58. Boismard 307; Berger Gesetzesauslegung 534f, 574f.


60. Cf Sanders Jesus 257ff.

61. Dungan 146ff.


63. Ibid. 233f.

64. See above ch 4 at n 58.

66. Westerholm 81ff.
67. Ibid. 84.
68. Cf Philo de Spec.Leg. 3.208-209.
69. Sanders Jesus 266.
70. Pace Booth 67f, 215.
71. Gesetzesauslegung 534.
73. Westerholm 81 and n 114.
74. Sanders Jesus 266 and n 79.
75. Räisänen 482f.
76. Westerholm 80f.
77. Harvey Constraints 39ff.
78. Räisänen 439.
79. See above nn 73, 74.
80. Booth 99f; Westerholm 81; contra Räisänen 480ff.
81. Räisänen 480f and n 21.
82. Harvey Constraints 39; Käsemann Romans 374 ad loc.
83. Käsemann Romans 374.
84. Berger Gesetzesauslegung 463ff; pace Booth esp. 74, 83-90, hermeneutical isolation seems to me to be the consequence even of regarding our saying and the handwashing question (v.5) as the original unit of tradition.
85. Räisänen 481.
86. Ibid.
87. Pace Berger Gesetzesauslegung 465ff, quoting 469.
88. Ibid. 576-580.
89. Ibid. 578 (§ 10).
90. Ibid. 578 (§ 11); G Schille 177ff; Bultmann Geschichte 17; JB Muddiman 'Jesus and Fasting (Marc 2,18-29)' in Jésus aux origines de la christologie ed. by J Dupont, BEThL 40 (Leuven, 1975) 271-281.
91. Schille 178.
92. Ibid. 181.
93. Sanders Jesus 401 n 85.
94. Ibid. 265.
95. Ibid. 266; Bultmann Geschichte 16.
97. Over against an unusually interesting range of parallels, see Mekhilta ad Ex 31:13, 14; II Baruch 14:18b; II Macc 5:19; cf ch 5 at n 126 and Neirynck 'Sabbath' 246ff.
98. Neirynck 'Sabbath' 269.
99. Ibid. 270.
100. See above ch 5 between nn 119, 120.
101. Cf Sanders Jesus 266 and n 82, 83.
102. Harvey Constraints 36f.
104. Ibid. 259ff.
106. Käsemann Romans 352.

108. Sanders Jesus 268 and nn 86, 87.

109. See above ch 5 § III esp. nn 62, 84.


112. Bruce 262f.


114. Sanders Jesus 252-255, 267-269.

115. Ibid. 291.


117. P Stuhlmacher 'Das Evangelium und die Evangelien' 18f.

118. Berger Formgeschichte 121ff.


120. Berger Gesetzesauslegung 576ff and Einführung 233ff.

121. See above ch 4 at nn 50.56 and, on 5 at nn 124, 125, 149.

122. Räisänen 481.

123. Sanders Jesus 14f, 257ff.

124. See above n 113.

125. Sanders Jesus 14f.
NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION


2. Hengel 90.


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