

Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky – A Political and Personal Duel

ABSTRACT

This article describes the political and personal duel between Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky. In 1973, the two Socialist statesmen of Jewish origin clashed over the issue of Palestinian terrorism directed against Jewish transit via Vienna, triggering an almost decade-long bilateral crisis between Israel and Austria. For the purpose of better understanding the roots of their animosities, this paper traces and compares the biographies and mind-sets of the two heads of state, arguing that it was the Inner-Jewish divide between Zionist and Diaspora Jews that led to bitter personal and political conflict between Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky.

“THE ZIONIST LIONESSE AND THE LAST HABSBURG EMPEROR”: INTRODUCTION

IN THE 1970S, GOLDA MEIR DID NOT FIT EVERYONE’S IDEA OF A HEAD of state, yet her powerful beliefs and charisma turned her into an Israeli leader and an icon of her time. The same is true for one of her contemporaries from another small country: the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. Both Meir and Kreisky fundamentally influenced their nations’ history and their fame and power stretched far beyond the borders of their countries. Their personal styles not only transformed them into political leaders, but also earned them various nicknames: “The Iron Lady” of the Middle East was referred to as a “Zionist Lioness” or the only “man” in David Ben-Gurion’s cabinet,¹ whereas Kreisky was often described as the “Sun Chancellor” or even “the last Habsburg emperor”.² What these labels also suggest is that both statesmen were known for their firm political commitments and their strong-mindedness rather than their emotionality; yet

when they actually had to deal with one another directly in 1973, the situation escalated into an emotional and personal conflict that brought their countries to the brink of bilateral crisis.

The article takes a closer look at, what I term, a political and personal “duel” between Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky. After explaining the details of the incident that sparked this duel, it argues that it was the Inner-Jewish divide between Zionist and Diaspora Jews that derailed the two leaders from their usual diplomatic pragmatism, and that led to bitter conflict between the two politicians and their countries. For the purpose of better understanding the roots of Meir’s and Kreisky’s apparent animosities, I trace and compare the mind-sets of the two heads of state until they finally met and clashed.

“SHE THINKS SHE IS THE BIBLE”:
A POLITICAL AND PERSONAL DUEL
BETWEEN KREISKY AND MEIR


At the beginning of the 1970s, Israel and Austria were both being governed by socialists of Jewish origin: in Israel, the Labor Party under the leadership of Golda Meir was in power, in Austria, the Social Democratic Party formed a minority coalition under Bruno Kreisky. By the time Kreisky became Chancellor of Austria in 1970, the two heads of state were already familiar with one another: Both had met several times at the UN in their previous capacities as foreign ministers, and both were active participants in the Socialist International,³ an international political organization composed of socialist, social democratic, and labor parties throughout the world.⁴ During June 1972, Meir spent 11 days in Austria as part of the Socialist International meeting in Vienna. As the Austrian ambassador in Tel-Aviv pointed out with satisfaction, Meir had never spent that much consecutive time in any other foreign country apart from the US. The ambassador listed Meir’s special appreciation of the persona of Kreisky as a reason. It was this close personal link between the two leaders, in addition to Austria’s key role as a transit hub for Eastern Jewish emigrants and its diplomatic support for Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War of 1967 that had improved the relationship between the two countries to new levels.⁵ In 1972, the *Jerusalem Post* optimistically described Austria-Israel relations as being at their “best ever” state,⁶ referring to an interview Kreisky gave to *Davar* in which he called bilateral relations “excellent”.⁷ However, just a year later, the hostage crisis surrounding the Jewish transit camp in Schönau would lead to a

diplomatic faux-pas that consequentially triggered an almost decade-long bilateral crisis between the two countries.

“A QUESTION OF POLITICAL MORALITY”:
THE HOSTAGE CRISIS SURROUNDING
THE SCHÖNAU TRANSIT CAMP

One of Golda Meir’s top priorities during her premiership was the active facilitation of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to Israel.⁸ Especially since the Soviet Union’s break of diplomatic relations with Israel during the Six-Day War, the organization of *aliyah* for Russian Jews posed a rather difficult and delicate endeavor. It was in this context that Austria became of strategic interest to Israel: Austria’s neutral position between the Eastern and Western blocs made the country an important transit stop for Eastern European and Soviet Jews on their way to Israel. For the purpose of facilitating the transit of these emigrants, the Jewish Agency had set up special camps. At these stops, people were prepared for the lives that awaited them in Israel: security scans and health checks took place, and the future Israeli citizens received an introduction to their new home country. One of the most important such transit camps was situated in Schönau castle near Vienna. By 1973, 164,638 Jewish emigrants from the communist bloc had passed through Austria, 70,000 of whom were channeled through the Schönau camp.⁹

Controlled and run by the Jewish Agency, Austria cooperated tacitly. However, both Israel and Austria had an interest in keeping the matter as much out of the public eye as possible, so as not to endanger the endeavor. Over time, Schönau nevertheless became a symbol of Jewish immigration and – to Austria’s open discontent – high-level Israeli politicians came to visit the camp: Prime Minister Golda Meir paid a visit in 1972, Foreign Minister Abba Eban in 1973.¹⁰ The more publicity Schönau garnered, the more it began to pose a security risk to Austria, as well as to Israeli emigrants themselves. At the same time as Jewish transit via Austria was peaking, Palestinian-Arab terror groups began to threaten the undertaking. By the beginning of the 1970s, the emerging Palestinian terror directed against Israel and its Western supporters had already reached Europe and Austria’s borders: on 5 September 1972, the Palestinian terrorist group Black September attacked the Israeli Olympic team at the Munich Summer Olympics, eventually killing all of their hostages.¹¹ While the shock of the attack in Munich still loomed large, anonymous messages by



Anonymous message warning from imminent Palestinian-Arab terror attacks sent to the Austrian Embassy in Beirut on 8 February 1973.

Source: Austrian State Archives.

Palestinian-Arab terrorists began to threaten the Austrian government.¹² Their target was the Jewish transit camp in Schönau.

On 28 September 1973, the day of the Jewish New Year, Austria, for the first but not for the last time, became the stage for Middle Eastern terrorism. Two Palestinian attackers boarded a train in the Lower Austrian town of Marchegg, taking hostage three Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union, as well as an Austrian border guard. In broken English, the terrorists declared that their attack was directed against Jewish immigration to Israel: “We the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, declare our responsibility about this operation. We have one mission, because our feeling that the immigration of Soviet Union Jews form a great danger on our cause.”¹³

The two terrorists managed to escape with the hostages to Vienna Schwechat Airport, where they requested the closure of the transit camp Schönau and free passage to the Middle East. Chancellor Kreisky – in close consultation with the Egyptian, Libyan, Lebanese, and Iraqi ambassadors,

as well as psychological counsellors – began to negotiate with the terrorists.¹⁴ After 13 hours of long and bitter bargaining, Kreisky had agreed to the terrorists' requests and closed Schönau in order to save the hostages' lives. On 29 September, all hostages were freed and the two terrorists were flown to the Libyan capital of Tripoli. The Austrian hostage drama, in contrast to the one in Munich, had ended bloodlessly. Unlike German authorities a year before, Kreisky ignored international and Israeli advice to take a tough stance and a policy of zero-negotiation when it came to terrorists.¹⁵ Instead, he acted solely upon his political morals, which followed the imperative of saving human lives.¹⁶ In his memoirs, he further noted:

Whether a government has the right to endanger the lives of hostages by retaining a tough stance regarding terrorists' requests, or taking measures of force against terrorists, is a question of political morality. I think that no government has such a right.¹⁷

“NOT EVEN A GLASS OF WATER”:
GOLDA MEIR'S MEETING
WITH KREISKY IN VIENNA

Kreisky's decision to close Schönau triggered a storm of international and Israeli criticism. The lynchpin of this critique was not the closure of the camp but rather the issue of surrendering to terrorists:¹⁸ “Austria is in the eye of a hurricane . . . we simply cannot have governments, small or large, give in to international blackmail by terrorist groups,”¹⁹ stated US President Richard Nixon. Meir was shocked by what she called in her memoirs the “devastating news” from Austria:

To our astonishment and horror, the Austrian cabinet, led by Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, gave in at once, to the tune of loud rejoicing both from the gunmen . . . and from the entire Arab press, which could hardly contain its glee at what it called “the successful commando blow to the movement of Russian Jews emigrating to Israel”.²⁰

As such, Meir requested an immediate personal meeting with Kreisky in Vienna. Kreisky, however, was hesitant: in order to see whether he and Meir had any common grounds for discussion on the matter, he wanted to wait and hear Meir's scheduled speech in front of the Council of Europe first, agreeing to meet her only on her way back from Strasbourg.²¹ In Strasbourg, Meir scrapped her planned speech to the Council, and delivered

an hour-long jeremiad against terrorism.²² In an attempt to lobby her European colleagues, she made her standpoint about the Schönau incident crystal clear: “No deals with terrorists; no truck with terrorism.”²³ Austria, she argued, had created a dangerous precedent that would only encourage further terror attacks:

What happened in Vienna is that a democratic government, a European government, came to an agreement with terrorists. In so doing it has brought shame upon itself. In so doing it has breached a basic principle of the rule of law, the basic principle of the freedom of the movement of peoples – or should I just say the basic freedom of the movement of Jews fleeing Russia? Oh, what a victory for terrorism this is!!²⁴

After this message to the Council, Meir was on her direct way to Vienna. A close colleague of Kreisky’s, Hans Thalberg remembered the encounter between Kreisky and Meir in his memoirs:

Surrounded by a group of security officers, Golda appeared and, sure of victory, stepped into Kreisky’s office. Just under an hour later she left the chancellery raging, and her press conference was cancelled without any further explanation. She had not succeeded in convincing Kreisky to reverse his decision.²⁵

In what Kreisky called a “brusque tone”, Meir had demanded that the closure of Schönau should be undone immediately. Kreisky, however, rejected this as an “impermissible interference in Austrian domestic affairs”.²⁶ He would not allow Austria to be turned into a secondary theatre of the Middle Eastern conflict. However, he assured Meir that the Jewish transit through Austria would nevertheless continue without interruption. Instead of the Jewish Agency’s transit camp at Schönau, Austria would open an alternative transit camp under Austrian or international supervision.²⁷ Meir was too angry at the time to believe Kreisky and the meeting between the two heads of state escalated into a diplomatic dispute that was triggered not only by political but also personal differences. In an interview with the British journalist David Yallop, Kreisky recalled that Meir began to bang her fists on his desk. The noise she was making was so loud that it was impossible for him to understand any of what she was saying. When he refused to reopen Schönau, Meir began calling his behavior anti-Semitic. Now it was Kreisky who banged his fists on the table, loudly reminding Meir of his own Jewish roots.²⁸

While Kreisky used his Jewish roots to reject the accusation of anti-Semitism, for Austria's sake as much as his own, Meir began to revolt against Kreisky's notion of Judaism, and the situation escalated along the lines of the Inner-Jewish conflict between Zionist and Diaspora Jews: "You and I have known each other for a long time," said Meir softly, only to continue in a harsher tone: "And I know that, as a Jew, you have never displayed any interest in the Jewish State. Is that correct?" "That is correct," replied Kreisky, adding: "I have never made any secret of my belief that Zionism is not the solution to whatever problems the Jewish people might face."²⁹

While attempting to retain a diplomatic attitude on the outside, Meir began to boil up on the inside. She thanked Kreisky for Austria's cooperation in the Jewish transit, especially because of his apparent opposition to Zionism. However, once Meir realized that Kreisky would not revoke his decision to close Schönau, what – according to Yehuda Avner – had begun as conflicting views between opponents was now becoming a nasty cut and thrust duel between antagonists: "You have opened the door to terrorism, *Herr* Chancellor. You have brought renewed shame on Austria. I've just come from the Council of Europe. They condemn your act almost to a man. Only the Arab world proclaims you their hero."³⁰ Kreisky, despite looking uncomfortable, answered in an expressionless tone: "Well, there is nothing I can do about that." With a hint of a shrug, he added what would pierce Golda Meir to the heart: "You and I belong to two different worlds." – "Indeed we do, *Herr* Kreisky," answered Meir while rising from her chair: "You and I belong to two *very* different worlds."³¹

Offended and angry, Kreisky and Meir walked out of his office to a scheduled press conference. When Kreisky held the door open to the room where journalists had already gathered, Meir refused. Kreisky's comment on the different worlds had apparently reduced her to silence. Israeli Ambassador to Vienna Yitzhak Patish later remembered that Meir appeared "muted and withdrawn" and no one had "the courage to disturb her."³² Instead, Meir went straight to the airport, where she demonstratively boarded an airplane that contained several Soviet Jewish emigrants. At the same time, Austrian Jews protested in front of the Chancellor's office holding up signs that read: "You were also a refugee once!"³³

Upon arrival at Ben-Gurion Airport, Meir announced in front of a group of journalists: "I think the best way of summing up the nature of my meeting with Chancellor Kreisky is to say this: he didn't even offer me a glass of water."³⁴ In his memoirs Kreisky called Meir's story about the glass of water "a total fabrication", and added: "She left my office in a rage, I had more reason to be annoyed by displays of tactless behavior than she



Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky during their meeting in Vienna in 1973.
Source and Copyright: IMAGNO/Notava.

had.”³⁵ As Kreisky’s personal secretary Margit Schmidt had to re-emphasize again and again in front of outraged journalists, this was of course meant metaphorically, in the sense that “he hadn’t made any concessions”. The office of the Federal Chancellery had apparently even prepared afternoon coffee and cake; however, the brevity and emotionality of the meeting hindered Austria’s hospitality.³⁶ Israeli Ambassador Patish, who was present throughout the entire visit, confirmed this: “The air was tense and nobody thought about water or coffee. It was a very brief meeting.”³⁷ The encounter had nevertheless escalated into a diplomatic incident that left both statesmen angry and Meir personally offended: “I felt as though my mouth were filled with ashes. *We* belonged to different worlds? The things that Kreisky had said to me just went round and round in my head.”³⁸

“TWO DIFFERENT WORLDS”: THE BACKGROUNDS OF MEIR AND KREISKY REVISITED

Two remarkably pragmatic and usually quite reserved statesmen had lost their tempers over the incident in Schönau. Against all expectations, and despite their mutually shared Socialist and Jewish backgrounds, Meir and

Kreisky were unable to find common ground: politically and personally. What at first sight looks like a rather surprising puzzle, becomes clearer with a closer look at their respective biographies. Meir was born in Kiev in 1898; the child of a carpenter and housekeeper, her family's living conditions were poor. She later stated that hunger was the overriding memory of her Kiev period.³⁹ "I was always a little too cold outside and a little too empty inside."⁴⁰ Part of why life was hard for the Mabovitch family resulted from them being Jewish. Jews in Russia at the time were regarded as a separate ethnic minority with a different religion and traditions; in short, they were considered the "Other" and her first traumatic memory was of rumors of a pogrom in the city where she was born.⁴¹

Bruno Kreisky, on the other hand, was born into a Viennese bourgeois family in 1911. The son of a rich textile manufacturer, he described his family as very typically Austrian, coming from the area of what nowadays belongs to Czechoslovakia. As such, Kreisky always emphasized his Austro-Hungarian (Bohemian-Moravian) background rather than his Jewish heritage. His forebears, as he always proudly claimed, had since centuries served their home country as judges, lawyers, factory-owners, and politicians. In short, they were what were termed "assimilated Jews".⁴² Kreisky had thus from his adolescence considered Eastern European Jews (*Ostjuden*) as inherently different: "*Ostenjudentum* represented a completely foreign world for the assimilated Jews, as foreign perhaps as the British high aristocracy is for wealthy Americans."⁴³ In Kreisky's understanding, the bourgeois, Germanized Czech Jews served their country, whereas the non-assimilated Jews of Galicia lived in ghettos and remained attached to Jewish religious rituals.⁴⁴

While her Jewishness was detrimental for Meir's choices to emigrate first to the USA in 1906 and then to Palestine in 1921,⁴⁵ Kreisky grew up in a very secular family environment in which being Jewish was considered a purely personal and cultural preference. As a consequence of their upbringings, Meir looked to her Jewish roots as a determinant factor in fashioning her personal and political goals, whereas Kreisky instead looked to his Austrian roots. Socialism, democracy, secularism, and an overarching Austrian patriotism therefore best describe Kreisky's political mind-set,⁴⁶ whereas for Meir, the creation of a peaceful homeland for the Jewish people was what made up the essence of her Labor Zionist faith.⁴⁷ While Meir dedicated her life to the cause of the Israeli people, Kreisky had according to Meir placed himself in the service of a country whose population willingly subjugated itself under Hitler. As a result, Meir regarded Kreisky with a "complete lack of sympathy" and as outright "abnormal", as he wrote later.⁴⁸ From there,

she underestimated the power of the specific context in which Kreisky's political mind-set had been formed.

For the young socialist Kreisky, the main enemy was Austro-Fascism rather than National Socialism, and his hatred for Dollfuss was bigger than his apparent fear of Hitler.⁴⁹ It was as such that Kreisky's Austrian patriotism remained untouched by the *Anschluss* of 1938, and he viewed himself as a political rather than a racial refugee during his wartime exile in Sweden.⁵⁰ While Kreisky found himself temporarily prevented from returning to his homeland due to his Jewish origins, Meir experienced first-hand the powerlessness of the *Yishuv* under the British Mandate in Palestine during the war years: "When our helplessness was so tragically revealed to us, then the argument among us about the goals of Zionism ceased." Viewing the White Paper as the "iron wall between us and the victims of Hitler," Meir, formerly an opponent of partition, began to regard a Jewish state as the only solution to the problems created by the Holocaust.⁵¹ At the same time, Kreisky in exile promoted Austria's independence and supported Austrian refugees who were fleeing the *Wehrmacht*. As such he started to regard his exile as a form of Austrian political resistance.⁵²

Fascinated by the Swedish Western model of democracy, he further began to explicitly distance his own socialist beliefs from communism; by his return to Austria after the war, he had crafted his very own understanding of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*,⁵³ becoming convinced that a democratic mind-set alone would lead the Austrian people back "into a democratic morality".⁵⁴ Hence, while the Holocaust led Meir to the belief that a Jewish state was the only solution to the problems facing the Jews, Kreisky's albeit brief personal encounter with the brutalities of National Socialism merely reinforced his political convictions that the fulfillment of his socialist and democratic ideals would create a better world.⁵⁵

With the UN Partition Plan, which Meir called the "monstrous map of 1947",⁵⁶ Meir's longing for a safe Jewish homeland came a significant and practical step closer to reality. Meir throughout strongly believed in the right of the Jews to the Land of Israel and in the establishment of the State of Israel as the national home for the Jewish people: "We need every corner of the Land of Israel ... since it is important for our development."⁵⁷ While Meir helped to found and build up the new Jewish nation, Kreisky always rejected Zionism as a nationalistic excess similar to Hitler's "*Blut-und-Boden-These*". There exists – as Kreisky wrote later – no scientifically proven Jewish race, only a Jewish religious community. As an agnostic, he therefore neither felt a religious, national, ethnic, nor emotional connection to Israel:⁵⁸ "Try as I may, I cannot see why the land of my real

ancestors should be less dear to me than a strip of desert with which I have no ties.”⁵⁹ Meir, of course, rejected Kreisky’s notion of nationalism as a contradiction. Once asked what the difference was between an Israeli and an Israelite foreign minister, she answered: “That can be illustrated by two individuals. Foreign Minister Kreisky is a minister of Israelite descent, and I am an Israeli.”⁶⁰

While Meir had become an ardent Zionist in Palestine, Kreisky who remained in the Diaspora had become a fervent anti-Zionist, and it was this the essential gulf that had divided their worlds by the time they actually met in person.

“YOU MUST NOT TALK LIKE THAT TO US”: KREISKY AND MEIR SPARK A BILATERAL CRISIS

In line with Meir’s and Kreisky’s diverse backgrounds and ideological outlooks, their familiarities led to highly personalized and emotional animosities rather than the expected bond of solidarity and friendship. Given this context, it is unsurprising that Meir’s attempts of invoking a quasi-“Jewish” solidarity between herself, Israel, and Kreisky was entirely unsuccessful: “I am Chancellor of Austria, not of the Jewish State, and I therefore conduct politics for Austria. You cannot expect that I do something that is good for the interests of Israel and bad for the interests of Austria.”⁶¹

In his role as Austrian Chancellor, Kreisky decidedly rejected Meir’s Zionist assertion that expects unconditional help from Diaspora Jews while ignoring their sense of loyalty to their home country. It is exactly this notion of Israel’s centrality to Jewish identity that often ideologically divides Zionist and Diaspora Jews: While Zionists view Israel as central, thus aiming to “ingather the exiles” from the Diaspora, Diaspora Jews, if they are secular and non-Zionist in their outlook, reject the “centrality-of-Israel” thesis and the relevance of Zionism, and view their lives in the diaspora neither as temporary nor as “being in exile”.⁶² In Meir and Kreisky’s case, this ideological gap was looming too large to be bridged, and Meir, together with the Israeli public, reacted fiercely to the “traitor”. For the time being, Israel seemed to have only one enemy: Bruno Kreisky.

The Israeli public viewed the closure of Schönau not just as a capitulation to terrorist blackmail, but as a deliberate, anti-Semitic attempt to create an obstacle for Jewish immigration. Parallels between Schönau and Austria’s Nazi past popped up in anti-Austrian demonstrations in Tel-Aviv and Haifa



Cartoon of Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky by IRONIMUS.
 Source: Die Presse, 4 October 1973. IRONIMUS Archiv, Wien.

that featured slogans such as: “The Austrians sold out to murders in 1938 and in 1973” or “Austrians, don’t make another pact with the devil”. At the Austrian Embassy in Tel-Aviv, protestors arrived aboard a bus which bore the legend “KreiSSky” with the two majuscule Ss stressing the perceived connection between Kreisky and Nazi policies.⁶³ The newspaper *Maariv* described Austria as “the preserver of the Nazi spark”⁶⁴ and called for an outright boycott of Austrian products,⁶⁵ while *Ha’aretz* observed Austrian insult added to Israeli injury.⁶⁶ Protest letters that kept flooding the Austrian Embassy in Tel-Aviv testified of a similar logic openly voicing fear that history might be about to repeat itself.⁶⁷ For Israel, Schönau was much more than a rational political decision: it touched upon the deep-rooted, emotional issues of Jewish existence and identity. In short, Kreisky’s Jewish roots and personality had for the first time – but not the last – triggered confusion and outright anger among Israelis. Correspondingly, Kreisky, “the traitor and hater of Israel”, was accused of suffering from a range of psychological issues, from “Jewish minority complexes” to an outright “Jewish self-hatred”⁶⁸ or Jewish Anti-Semitism that led to frequent comparisons between Kreisky and Hitler.⁶⁹

While this hail of criticism from Israel continued, reactions within Austria were largely in favor of Bruno Kreisky's decision to close the Schönau transit camp. Letters addressed to the chancellor mainly credited Kreisky for having saved peoples' lives by avoiding an Austrian "Munich". Israeli and international critique was furthermore perceived as an unjustified attack on Austria and an interference with Austria's sovereignty that fostered strong patriotic feelings of "we, the Austrians" against "the rest of the world".⁷⁰ It was however also in the course of the Schönau crisis that the Austrian public seemed to have discovered a way out of this perceived stand-off with Israel: their very own Jewish Chancellor would absolve them from the "curse" of the past. The public had realized that only a person like Kreisky could have taken this decision.⁷¹ On the right wing of Austrian politics, the resultant avowal of sympathy for Kreisky took on a somewhat different tone: "Kreisky has now proven that he is an Austrian and not a Jew."⁷²

Kreisky's personal decision to not derive a specific loyalty to Israel from his own Jewish roots hence triggered very diverse domestic reactions in Israel and in Austria. While "the person Kreisky" stirred up animosities with Israel, his actions and attitudes gave rise to a different phenomenon within Austria itself: Kreisky, the Jew who criticized Israel, ultimately stabilized the Austrian grand delusion of having been Nazi Germany's first victim. Kreisky for many Austrians moreover began to signify a somewhat symbolic exoneration from their past.⁷³ Hence, Kreisky, the Jewish victim and Austrian patriot, became the quintessential incarnation of Austria's national narrative. His chancellorship was used as evidence for the dubious claim that Anti-Semitism was nonexistent in today's Austria, in addition to providing the country with its new secret weapon to disperse criticisms and doubts raised by the Israeli public.

Kreisky himself called the Israeli reaction to his Schönau decision "dastardly",⁷⁴ and his Justice Minister Christian Broda added with indignation: "You must not talk like that to us!"⁷⁵ Kreisky instead capitalized on the notion of external interference with Austria's sovereignty in order to get his way regarding Schönau.⁷⁶ In letters to Western governments, he placed the blame for the Schönau crisis fully on Israel: the Israelis had deliberately exacerbated the security threat that the Jewish transit posed for Austria when politicians like Golda Meir started to visit the transit camp as if it were a tourist attraction. Austria, moreover, was not "a war-minded country like Israel", and therefore was obliged to adhere to humanitarian principles above all. As such, the official line was that Austria had done more for refugees in the past decades than any other country and now simply could not bear any further the costs and risks of Jewish immigration all by itself.⁷⁷

In his memoirs, Kreisky added another reason for his firmness regarding the closure of Schönau: “I admit: the activities of the Jewish Agency in Austria had already been a thorn in my side. Its representatives became ever more demanding, as if the camp in Schönau was extraterritorial. . . .” An additional thorn in Kreisky’s flesh was the Jewish Agency’s apparent imposition of Israel’s will on the emigrants: whenever Jewish migrants wished to settle in a different country than Israel, Kreisky observed that obstacles were put in their way.⁷⁸ In line with his personal enmity against Zionism, Kreisky instead insisted on every refugee’s right to freely choose his or her destination.

Kreisky’s clear rejection of Meir’s and Israel’s verbal attacks against him was, however, not only informed by his different ideological outlook on Zionism, but also by the apparent historical divide between *Ostjuden* and German Jews. Kreisky, in holding up the stereotype of Eastern European Jews “having no manners and too much *chutzpah*”, persistently tried to moderate Meir’s tone. When Meir, for instance, during their meeting in Vienna had asserted betrayal of Jewish émigrés on Kreisky, he exclaimed: “I cannot accept such language, Mrs. Meir. I cannot.”⁷⁹ His direct response to Israel’s criticism of the Schönau decision followed a similar logic: “I consider it necessary that Israel refrains from striking such a tone. . . .”⁸⁰

At the same time as the Israeli public debate about Schönau was escalating into attacks on Kreisky’s person and Austria’s Anti-Semitism, the Israeli government soon realized that a stand-off with Austria would only do more harm to the cause of Jewish migration. Especially Golda Meir herself showed restraint and a great deal of hesitation when it came to drawing parallels to Austria’s Nazi past. Earlier documents already reveal that Meir – in line with Israel’s official rhetoric – had always made a strict difference between Nazi Germany and “its first victim” Austria.⁸¹

While the Israeli Ambassador to Vienna Yitzhak Patish spoke of the Jewish transit as “settling a historic debt”⁸² between the two countries, Meir in the end only announced herself to be “very, very sad” on the grounds of Austria breaking a humanitarian principle. A severance of diplomatic relations would however “not serve its purpose”.⁸³ Israeli officials instead were advised to cooperate with Austrian officials behind the scenes, in order to silence the public’s outrage and in a joint effort turn the debate away from emotions and back to facts.⁸⁴ This endeavor, however, only bore fruits once it became clear that the Jewish transit via Austria would indeed continue uninterrupted.

While the Schönau camp was closed on 12 December 1973, the Austrian Red Cross set up a new camp in Wöllersdorf. In 1974 alone, 20,000 Jewish

migrants passed through Austria.⁸⁵ This fact came to be appreciated by Israel only retrospectively, as Meir at the time of the incident always refused to believe Kreisky: “In the following months, she had to recognize that she had been wrong,”⁸⁶ noted Kreisky later with satisfaction, in addition to boasting of being the only politician in Europe that Meir couldn’t blackmail.⁸⁷ In her memoirs, Meir admitted: “To be quite fair, I must note that although I don’t believe there is ever a good enough excuse for knuckling under to terrorism, the Austrian decision was not altogether unreasonable.”⁸⁸

“ONE CANNOT ARGUE WITH THE BIBLE”:
THE OUTCOME OF THE DUEL
BETWEEN MEIR AND KREISKY

“I can honestly say that I was never affected by the question of the success of an undertaking. If I felt it was the right thing to do, I was for it regardless of the possible outcome.”⁸⁹

Following these personal standards that Golda Meir had set for herself, she certainly can be said to have stayed committed to her ideals throughout the Schönau hostage crisis and its connected issue of Jewish transit. Kreisky on the other hand could claim the success of the outcome of the duel with Meir all to himself. In confronting Meir, he not only won the verbal argument but also built up his public credibility and steadiness. In the end, the most serious consequence of the Schönau dispute for Israel would neither be the temporary closure of the Schönau transit camp, nor Kreisky’s submission to terrorism, but the missed opportunity for Israel to turn its attention towards its real enemy.

Whether deliberately planned by the Palestinian terrorists or not, the Schönau crisis can certainly be said to have diverted Meir’s and Israel’s mind away from the mounting security tensions at its very own borders.⁹⁰ Kreisky himself always claimed that he had received cryptic hints about an imminent war from Ismael Fahmi who should soon become Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s foreign minister.⁹¹ Yet, due to the “poisoned atmosphere” and lack of confidence between Meir and himself, Kreisky never transmitted the message to Israel.⁹² The Yom Kippur War broke out on 6 October 1973, only a week after the Schönau hostage crisis, taking both Meir and Israel by surprise.⁹³

Despite Israel’s ultimate victory, it was this same war that tragically revealed the country’s vulnerability and contributed significantly to Golda Meir’s retreat from politics. Her failure to see the Yom Kippur War coming

would become one of her most disputed legacies. She herself remained personally racked with guilt, describing the war as “a near disaster, a nightmare that I myself experienced and which will always be with me”.⁹⁴ While the war led to the end of Meir’s political career, the irony of history had it that it was the very same war that paved the way for Kreisky’s rise from an Austrian politician to a Middle East peace broker and bridge-builder between Europe and the Arab world.

One of the most immediate international consequences of the Yom Kippur War was the first oil crisis, which hit the heavily oil-dependent Western European economies hard. Under the umbrella of the European Community and the Socialist International, ever more European countries began to talk about the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. “Arabs are using oil as a political weapon,” and “we are paying the price to keep Europe, the USA and Japan supplied with oil ...,” countered an outraged Golda Meir at a Socialist International meeting in London. “The legitimate rights of the Palestinians which the nine EC countries call upon imply the destruction of Israel – I hope that they do not know what they are talking about.” However, Western European leaders, first and foremost among them Bruno Kreisky, had by that time already profoundly disagreed with Meir: “I don’t think that Israel is doomed if one talks with the Palestinians.”⁹⁵ Enticed by the threat of the oil shortages, Western Europe slowly moved its support away from Israel and towards the Arab-Palestinian cause, leaving the Jewish state in a forever altered international environment, and the committed, lifelong Labor Zionist Meir deeply disappointed in her fellow Socialist comrades.⁹⁶

For the purpose of building lasting political and economic ties with Arab countries, the Socialist International began to send frequent fact-finding missions to the Middle East. Kreisky became the head of these missions, which ultimately enabled him to not only investigate possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but to also develop personal friendships with Arab leaders like Anwar Sadat and Yasser Arafat.⁹⁷ It was in fact Sadat himself who urged Kreisky to meet the chairman of the PLO in Cairo. Already a day later, on 11 March 1974, Arafat opened the talk with Kreisky by exclaiming: “Israel must vanish from the map!”, whereas Kreisky responded: “Mister Chairman, if Israel vanishes, you will vanish too; but, there is enough space for both of you in Palestine ...!”⁹⁸ Unlike Sadat, whom Kreisky always regarded as a “man of peace”, Arafat had left no significant first impression on him.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, when Kreisky reported to Meir and top Israeli Labor Party officials on his visits to Egypt and Syria, he was received very critically: “Meir, in particular, was extremely

skeptical and expressed her doubts and disagreement with that inimitable, ironical shaking of the head that is so characteristic of Jews from Eastern Europe,” remembered a cynical Kreisky in his memoirs.¹⁰⁰ The age-old tension between *Ostjuden* and German Jews still informed the confrontation between Kreisky and Meir, just as much as their diverging views on the Middle East conflict did.

While the political and personal relationship between Kreisky and Meir deteriorated, Kreisky and Arafat slowly approached one another, both politically and personally. In frequent letter exchanges between 1978 and 1990,¹⁰¹ they aimed to approximate their political positions in the jointly stated hope of “contributing to a just peace in the Middle East”.¹⁰² Throughout all his letters, Kreisky always made a deliberate effort to render Arafat’s political agenda more moderate and constructive. He furthermore fully condemned Palestinian terror and was not afraid to say it directly to Arafat: “I must confess that I am shocked and disheartened by this self-defeating activity. . . . these senseless acts of terror, should they continue, will rob the Palestinian cause of the sympathy it has acquired in recent years and might even cause a reversal of European positions.”¹⁰³ Throughout his time as chancellor, Kreisky nevertheless remained fully convinced that the fight against Palestinian terror could only be won via an objective and factual discussion with the Palestinian leader.¹⁰⁴

In this broader context, the animosities that were sparked between Meir and Kreisky, and consequently also between Israel and Austria, in the wake of the Schönau crisis, had more far-reaching consequences than could have been anticipated by Golda Meir at the time. Instead of using Kreisky’s good contacts and network in the Middle East to its own advantage, Israel became more and more isolated within the increasingly pro-Arab Socialist International. Meir had lost ground, as Kreisky saw it, by hindering him in reaching out to the Palestinians and Kreisky had lost all patience with Meir: “She thinks she is the Bible, and one cannot argue with the Bible.”¹⁰⁵ By the time Kreisky submitted the final report on his Middle East missions, his views of the Palestinian issue were even more divergent from Meir’s: Kreisky openly promoted the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as the only durable solution to the conflict.¹⁰⁶

Meir on the other hand remained committed to her lifelong conviction that the Arab nations sought nothing less but Israel’s destruction, forcing Israel to ever more rely on military force for its survival. Coming nowhere close to Kreisky’s forward-thinking stance on the creation of a Palestinian state, Meir stood fully against the return of territory conquered in 1967. “To her every square inch of the territory of Israel had been nourished by the

blood of her children,” remembered US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his memoirs: “The idea of returning territory was almost physically painful to her. She demanded ironclad guarantees of security in return, and it was hard to imagine what guarantees she could possibly consider more secure than physical possession.”¹⁰⁷ Hereby, Meir’s approach however was never religiously or historically motivated but – like Kreisky’s – purely practical, albeit leading to directly opposed convictions: while Kreisky believed in the Arab states’ readiness for peace in return for land and their willingness to acknowledge Israel’s right to existence, Meir reckoned that the Arabs were inherently hostile to Israel, and that returning territory would never be able to bring the desired peace.¹⁰⁸

Meir’s and Kreisky’s diverse mind-sets had thus ultimately not only triggered bitter misunderstandings and a personal and political crisis between the two statesmen regarding the issue of Jewish transit, but also further divided them on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Kreisky’s embrace of the Arab world allowed him to develop progressive views on the Palestinian issue, which would become one of his most crucial legacies. Although he did not live to see it, all the essentials for Middle Eastern peace that Kreisky promoted already in the 1970s would be included in the Oslo Peace Process of 1993. Meir on the other hand did not recognize the importance of Palestinian rights and instead insisted – like many others of her generation – that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian”.¹⁰⁹ The respective formation of their ideological mind-sets, dependent on their specific upbringing, had not only forged the duel between Meir and Kreisky but also ultimately settled its legacy. While the Jewish transit continued uninterrupted, the onset of the Yom Kippur War had shifted the focus to the more imminent issue of an eventual peace settlement with the Arabs, and ultimately also with the Palestinians. It was in this context that Kreisky seized the moment and leaped far ahead of his time while Golda Meir was left behind.

CONCLUSION

It is only in the light of longer-term considerations that we can really judge the outcome of what I termed the personal and political duel between Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky. The duel had started as a verbal exchange between the two in the wake of the hostage crisis surrounding the Schönau camp. Rather than solving the issue of Jewish transit in a pragmatic way, the debate spiraled into an emotionally-driven outburst between the two statesmen that reflected political and normative differences stemming from

their respective biographies as Eastern European and German Jews, as well as from the apparent ideological divide between Zionist and Diaspora Jews. It is therefore only with the help of their diverse backgrounds that we can understand what divided the expected “Jewish bond” between Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky into two very different worlds indeed.

NOTES

I would like to thank the Israel Institute for its generous support of my research.

1. Elinor Burkett, *Golda Meir: The Iron Lady of the Middle East* (London, 2008); Judd Vadid, “Israel’s Iron Lady Unfiltered: Golda Meir Quotes on Her 117th Birthday. The wise, the whimsical and the downright polemical,” *Ha’aretz*, 3 May 2015.

2. Wolfgang Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky – The Biography* (St. Pölten-Salzburg, 2010), 10.

3. The Socialist International was founded by Karl Marx in London in 1864. Its purpose was to strengthen relations between affiliated parties and organizations and to co-ordinate their political attitudes by consent. See Socialist International document, Kreisky Archive, VII. 4, Nahost, Box 17, “The Socialist International: Background Information to the forthcoming Socialist International Bureau Meeting in Oslo, 12–13 June, 1980”.

4. Golda Meir, *My Life* (London, 1975), 349.

5. See Austrian Embassy in Tel-Aviv documents in the Austrian State Archives, 1970–1972: ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 86741/6_70, “Assessment of the relationship with Austria and other European countries”, 26 May 1970; 162498/6_72, Agstner to Foreign Ministry in Vienna, “Bilateral relations Austria-Israel, In retrospect and future prospects”, 31 August 1972; *Israel Government Yearbook 1969–70*.

6. “Austria-Israel relations – ‘best ever’,” *Jerusalem Post*, 25 July 1972. Quoted in Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 233.

7. Dan Pattir’s Interview with Kreisky, 23 June, *Davar*, 27 June 1972 [Hebrew].

8. Susan Hattis Rolef, “Meir (Myerson, Née Mabovitch), Golda,” in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit, 2007), 777–9.

9. Of these 164,638 Jewish emigrants, 72,078 came from the Soviet Union, and the rest from Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. See Thomas Riegler, *In the Crosslines: Austria and Middle Eastern terrorism 1973 to 1985* (Göttingen/Vienna, 2011), 114 [German].

10. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 31055/II_73, Magrutsch: “Official visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban; Information on behalf of Section

II Letter to the General Secretariat”, Vienna, 20 February 1973; Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 114.

11. Inge Deutschkron, *Israel and the Germans. A Difficult Relationship* (Köln, 1983), 356–8 [German].

12. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2/7, Gz. 30378/6_73, Backes to Foreign Ministry: “Anonymous warning about imminent Palestinian terror attacks in Austria”, Beirut, 8 February 1973.

13. Original document, quoted in Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 119. The original document says “Svoeit” instead of “Soviet”.

14. For a description of the negotiations, see Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 216–8; Matthias Dahlke, *Democratic State and Transnational Terrorism. Three Pathways towards Intransigence in Western Europe 1972–1975* (München, 2011), 200–14 [German]; Elisabeth Röhrlich, *Kreisky’s Foreign Policy – Between Austrian Identity and International Agenda* (Göttingen, 2009), 303 [German].

15. George Lavy, *Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest* (London, 1996), 174–5.

16. “Declaration of the Government,” *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 30 September 1973 [German]. ORF Interview with Chancellor Kreisky, 29 September 1973, quoted in Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 173.

17. Oliver Rathkolb, *Bruno Kreisky: Memories. The Legacy of the Politician of a Century* (Graz, 2007), 432 [German]. Translated by the author.

18. For more on international and Israeli critique on Kreisky’s Schönau decision see Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 175–85; and Röhrlich, *Kreisky’s Foreign Policy*, 304.

19. US President Richard Nixon at a press conference, 3 October 1973, quoted in Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 177.

20. Meir, *My Life*, 349.

21. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2/7, Gz. 30379/4_73, US Ambassador Humes to the Austrian Chancellor: “Terror in Schwechat on 28 September 1973; US Ambassador Humes’ audition with the Chancellor on 1 October 1973”, Vienna, 5 October.

22. See Burkett, *Golda Meir*, 314; Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 179.

23. Yehuda Avner, *The Prime Ministers* (New Milford, CT, and Jerusalem 2010), 221.

24. *Ibid.*, 221.

25. Hans J. Thalberg, *On the Art of Being Austrian: Memories and Diary Entries* (Wien/Graz, 1984), 419 [German]. Translated by the author.

26. Bruno Kreisky and Matthew Paul Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria: Bruno Kreisky on Peace and Social Justice* (New York-Oxford, 2000), 473.

27. See Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 179–83; Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 218; Avner, *The Prime Ministers*, 219–24.

28. British journalist David Yallop interview with Bruno Kreisky quoted in Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 180.

29. Avner, *The Prime Ministers*, 222.

30. *Ibid.*, 223.

31. *Ibid.*
32. Interview with Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Patish 2001, quoted in Dahlke, *Democratic State and Transnational Terrorism*, 229.
33. In German: “*Auch Du warst einmal ein Flüchtling!*”; Röhrlich, *Kreisky’s Foreign Policy*, 304; Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 219.
34. Avner, *The Prime Ministers*, 224.
35. Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 472.
36. Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 182–3; Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 219.
37. Interview with Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Patish 2001, quoted in Dahlke, *Democratic State and Transnational Terrorism*, 228.
38. Meir, *My Life*, 352.
39. Golda Meir, Radio Interview in Hebrew, 1969, in Marie Syrkin, *Golda Meir Speaks Out* (London-Jerusalem, 1973), 15–37, 15.
40. Anna Claybourne, *Golda Meir* (London, 2003), 6.
41. Yechiam Weitz, “Golda Meir, Israel’s Fourth Prime Minister (1969–74),” *Middle Eastern Studies* 43.1 (2011): 43–61.
42. Röhrlich, *Kreisky’s Foreign Policy*, 361–2; Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 437–8.
43. Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 416.
44. Robert Wistrich, *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: The Case of Bruno Kreisky* (Jerusalem, 2007), 8–9.
45. Syrkin, *Golda Meir Speaks Out*, 9.
46. See Röhrlich, *Kreisky’s Foreign Policy*, 360; Pierre H. Secher, “Kreisky and the Jews,” in *The Kreisky Era in Austria*, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick-London, 1994), 14.
47. Avner, *The Prime Ministers*, 202.
48. Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 453.
49. After the Austro-Fascist seizure of power in 1934, Kreisky was active in the clandestine Socialist Party and was arrested in 1935. He spent two years in prison where Socialists formed bonds with the National Socialists against their common enemy, the Christian-conservative authoritarian government under Engelbert Dollfuss and later Kurt Schuschnigg. See Secher, “Kreisky and the Jews,” 11; Rathkolb, *Bruno Kreisky: Memories*, 216.
50. For more on Kreisky’s Swedish exile during World War II see Rathkolb, *Bruno Kreisky: Memories*, 141, 201; Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 43, 83.
51. Meir, “Why we need a Jewish State”, Statement in Yiddish at the 22nd Zionist Congress in Basel, December 1946, printed in Syrkin, *Golda Meir Speaks Out*, 59.
52. Röhrlich, *Kreisky’s Foreign Policy*, 363–7.
53. The German term, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* – “the process of coming to terms with the past”.
54. Rathkolb, *Bruno Kreisky: Memories*, 83, 334.
55. Secher, “Kreisky and the Jews,” 13.
56. Yossi Goldstein, “Israel’s Prime Ministers and the Arabs: Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin,” *Israel Affairs* 17.2 (2011): 186.

57. Meir, Protocol of the XVII Zionist Congress, 3–12 August 1937, quoted in Goldstein, “Israel’s Prime Ministers and the Arabs,” 183.

58. See Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 437; Röhrlich, *Kreisky’s Foreign Policy*, 355. Kreisky’s private secretary Thomas Novotny confirmed Kreisky’s attitude towards Israel in an interview with the author, 29 December 2016.

59. Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 434.

60. Meir, quoted in Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 437.

61. Kreisky to *Yediot Aharonot* journalist Yeshiahu Ben Porath, quoted in Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 221. Translated by the author.

62. William Safran, *Israel and the Diaspora: Problems of Cognitive Dissonance* (Oxford, 2012), 6, 25; Yehezkel Dror, “Diaspora-Israel Relations: A Long-Term Perspective,” *Israel Studies* 17.2 (2012): 86–91, here 88; Anthony D. Smith, “Zionism and Diaspora Nationalism,” *Israel Affairs* 2.2 (1995): 17.

63. Helga Embacher and Margit Reiter, *Tightrope Walks: The Bilateral Relations Between Austria and Israel under the Shadow of the Past* (Wien, 1998), 170 [German].

64. *Maariv*, quoted in “Only a second Fürstenfeldbruck would be irreparable. Foreign press reports on the decision of the Austrian government during the hostage drama: After initial critique came approval,” *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 2 October 1973 [German].

65. *Maariv*, 4 October 1973 [Hebrew].

66. *Ha’aretz*, quoted in “Only a second Fürstenfeldbruck would be irreparable,” *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 2 October 1973 [German].

67. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2/7, Gz. 30379/6_73, Raphael Kotlowitz, Chairman of Herut - Hatzohar World Executive to Johanna Nestor, Tel-Aviv, 2 October 1973.

68. Self-hating is a standard epithet for any Jew who does not conform to the Zionist party line. See David J. Goldberg, *This Is Not the Way: Jews, Judaism and Israel* (London, 2012), 5.

69. Kreisky Archive, VII. 1, Israel, Box 3 and Box 4, Collected press articles from Israeli newspapers on Kreisky; VI. 8, Schönau, Box 25, Protest letters to Kreisky from Israel.

70. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2/7, Gz. 30379/6_73, Hans Thalberg, Office of the Federal Chancellor to the Foreign Ministry: “Closure of the Schönau camp; letters and telegrams”, Vienna, 28 November; Letters to the editor: “AZ interviewed Austrians on their opinion about Kreisky’s solution,” *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 30 September; Elfie Lichtenberg, “Opinions of AZ Readers: We, the Austrians, should consider ourselves happy that our government values human lives,” *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 3 October 1973; Margit Reiter, *Under the Suspicion of Anti-Semitism: The Austrian Left and Israel after the Shoah* (Innsbruck, 2001), 257 [German].

71. Manfred Scheuch, “It was all about human beings,” *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 30 September 1973 [German].

72. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 October. Translated by the author. See also, “Dear God, open Austria’s heart,” *Der Spiegel*, 8 October 1973 [German].

73. Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 86; Röhrlich, *Kreisky's Foreign Policy*, 314.
74. Kreisky to *Sozialistische Korrespondenz*, 2 October 1973, quoted in Embacher/Reiter, *Gratwanderungen*, 174. Translated by the author.
75. Christian Broda, quoted in "You must not talk like that to us!" Broda rejects foreign accusations against the Austrian government," *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 2 October 1973 [German]. Translated by the author.
76. On how the Israeli critique was perceived by Kreisky and his officials see Thalberg, *On the Art of Being Austrian*, 419; Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 458.
77. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2/7, Gz. 30379/4_73, Foreign Ministry in Vienna: "Language regime: Palestinian terror attack in Marchegg, closure of the Schönau camp", Vienna, 3 October; US Ambassador Humes to the Austrian Chancellor: "Terror in Schwechat on 28 September; US Ambassador Humes' audition with the Chancellor on 1 October 1973," Vienna, 5 October.
78. Bruno Kreisky, *In the Current of Politics. The Second Part of the Memoirs* (Wien, 1988), 322 [German]. Direct quote translated by the author.
79. Avner, *The Prime Ministers*, 223.
80. Bruno Kreisky, quoted in "Worries about the pilots – Landing in Libya? Kreisky: We are not a theater of war," *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 30 September 1973 [German]. Translated by the author.
81. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 511095_56, documents such as: Enderl to Foreign Minister in Vienna: "Meeting with the new Foreign Minister Golda Meir", Tel-Aviv, 4 October 1956. The letter reveals that Meir in her meeting with the Austrian Ambassador Enderl stated that placing the first victim Austria on the same level with the aggressor Germany is as unjust as comparing the aggressor Jordan with the victim Israel.
82. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 49545/6_73, Yitzhak Patish's remarks were originally made to the Austrian news magazine *Profil*. "Antisemitism in Austria," *Profil*, 9 November [German], quoted in Internal document by Magrutsch: "Statements by Israeli Ambassador Patish according to 'Profil,'" Vienna, 16 November 1973.
83. "Golda Meir: Differences with Vienna remain," *Die Presse*, 4 October; "Golda Meir: No cut of diplomatic relations," *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 4 October 1973 [both in German]. Translated by the author.
84. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2/7, Gz. 30379/6_73, Internal document by Steiner: "The Israeli Ambassador dropped in on the Director of Section II", Vienna, 5 October 1973.
85. Riegler, *In the Crosslines*, 177–8.
86. Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 473.
87. Burkett, *Golda Meir*, 315.
88. Meir, *My Life*, 349.
89. Golda Meir, quoted in Burkett, *Golda Meir*, 385.
90. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston-Toronto, 1982), 463.

91. Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 458–9; Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 221–2; ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 30379/6_73, A telegram from the Austrian Embassy in Cairo, 1 October 1973, informed Kreisky about Ismail Fahmy's imminent travel to Austria on 2 or 3 October 1973 for the purpose of personally transmitting a message from President Sadat.
92. Dahlke, *Democratic State and Transnational Terrorism*, 230.
93. Goldstein, "Israel's Prime Ministers and the Arabs," 186.
94. Meir, *My Life*, 353.
95. Golda Meir and Bruno Kreisky at the Socialist International meeting in London, 11 November 1973, quoted in Thalberg, *On the Art of Being Austrian*, 303. Translations by the author.
96. Avner, *The Prime Ministers*, 253–5.
97. For more on Kreisky's Middle East policies and the fact-finding missions of the Socialist International see Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 231; Röhrlich, *Kreisky's Foreign Policy*, 317; Rathkolb, *Bruno Kreisky*, 442–3.
98. Hans Janitschek, Secretary General of the Socialist International and later Viennese journalist, quoted in Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 228.
99. Thalberg, *On the Art of Being Austrian*, 305; Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 228–9.
100. Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 470.
101. Kreisky Archive, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2, Letter exchange between Bruno Kreisky and Yasser Arafat, 1978–90.
102. *Ibid.*, Kreisky to Arafat, Vienna, 20 June 1979.
103. *Ibid.*, 4 May.
104. Petritsch, *Bruno Kreisky*, 229.
105. Kreisky, quoted in Thalberg, *On the Art of Being Austrian*, 419; Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 450.
106. Kreisky Archive, VII. 4, Nahost, Box 17, Bruno Kreisky, Final Report of the Socialist International Fact-Finding Mission to the Middle East, London 1977.
107. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 220.
108. Goldstein, "Israel's Prime Ministers and the Arabs," 183–4; Kreisky and Berg, *The Struggle for a Democratic Austria*, 463, 470.
109. Claybourne, *Golda Meir*, 54.

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