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Efficiency of trade equilibria in the world oil market

Subtitle:
OIES paper: EE6
Abstract:
This paper formulates a trading game in a productive natural resource like oil. Though simple, the model developed here will highlight the role of binding long-term agreements and will show that in their absence equilibria are inefficient. Clifford and Crawford (1987) have recently emphasized this point in the context of trade in natural resources. A related issue to which I draw attention here is that of the dynamic inconsistency or “subgame imperfection” of precommitment equilibria.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Reviewed (other)
Version:
Publisher's version

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Research group:
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
Publisher:
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Publisher's website
Publication date:
1988
URN:
uuid:53904bfb-4225-4cfd-a3a3-d26664f47a2e
Local pid:
ora:10224
ISBN:
0-948061-27-8

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