Between a Nation and a State:

The Politics of Donbas Displacement in Ukrainian and Russian State Media

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Abstract

This thesis examines how the millions of people displaced from Eastern Ukraine's Donbas region are represented in Ukrainian and Russian state media. Articles from Ukrainian Uriadovyi Kurier and Russian Rossiiskaia Gazeta are analysed with qualitative content analysis and ideological discourse analysis to determine their attitudes towards the displaced people and to suggest what representations of displacement in these papers achieve vis-à-vis the state. Media analyses previously conducted in both countries have detected attempts to connect the mass displacement to questions of nationhood and state capacity. Also, tensions between the involuntary migrants and communities in the regions receiving large numbers of displaced people have been noted.

Analysis of the newspaper articles finds that whereas the Ukrainian publication uses the issue of displacement to construct a new national identity based on political loyalty toward the central state, the Russian paper takes the occasion to emphasise Russian state capacity, but does not deploy the topic of displacement for advancing a nation-building agenda, contrary to expectations.

List of abbreviations

ATO – Anti-terrorist operation

DNR – Donetsk People's Republic (Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublika)

GCA – Government-controlled area

IDP – Internally displaced person

IM – Involuntary migrant

LNR – Luhansk People's Republic (Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika)

NGCA – Non-government controlled area

RG – Rossiiskaia Gazeta

UK – Uriadovyi Kurier

Note on transliteration

American Library Association and the Library of Congress (ALA-LC) standard is used without diacritics for transcribing both Ukrainian and Russian. Soft (') and hard signs (") are omitted for the sake of legibility.

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1. Introduction and research design

Over two years have passed since demonstrators occupied regional state administration buildings in the Eastern Ukrainian cities of Luhansk and Donetsk, triggering a series of armed clashes between Ukrainian government forces and local militias. The fighting soon escalated into a full-blown war, affecting at least 4.4 million people in total and killing more than 10,000 (situation in November 2016, UN OCHA 2016). The conflict has caused large-scale displacement both within Ukraine and in neighbouring countries, an issue not widely discussed in the international media. According to the UN OCHA Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 report, the Government of Ukraine has registered 1.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the country's eastern regions, collectively known as Donbas (portmanteau for Donetsk basin), and Crimea. Of these people, "[b]etween 0.8 and 1 million IDPs reside permanently in GCA [government-controlled areas], while others move frequently across the 'contact line'" to territories controlled by rebel fighters (UN OCHA 2016, 6). The latest UNHCR operational update from February 2017 estimates that the number of Ukrainian citizens in external displacement is nearly 1.8 million, the majority of whom are seeking asylum or other forms of legal residence in Russia, which hosts over 1.3 million displaced Ukrainians in total (UNHCR 2017, Library of Congress Legal Report 2016[1]). While the situation in Donbas remains unresolved, the issue of displacement is becoming chronic in both Ukraine and Russia. Armed clashes continue in Donbas through mid-2017, despite several cease-fire agreements and high-level negotiations.

Compared to many previous conflicts in the post-Soviet space, like the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 or the continuous clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh, the crisis in eastern Ukraine has been pronouncedly public. Especially in the beginning of the conflict, even the most minute changes on the battlefield were in the centre of international attention. The "information wars" surrounding the Ukraine crisis

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[1] https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/russianfederation.php

have been especially impassioned, with accusations, misinformation, and speculations flung by all sides. How Russia has used media in connection with the conflict is a hot topic in public discussions, and a quickly developing field of scholarly research (see e.g. Cottiero et al., 2015; Hansen, 2015; Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014). Various newsletters and independent websites combating Russian propaganda have been established, including Disinformation Review[2], Stopfake[3], and Bellingcat[4]. Ukrainian state media have been accused of downplaying the number of civil casualties and of one-sided reporting (Roman, Wanta, and Buniak 2017).

The media sphere around the Donbas conflict is thus rife with tensions. In this thesis, I analyse articles concerning Ukrainian refugees in Russia and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine, published in state-owned newspapers. The main research puzzle is how the displaced persons from Donbas are represented by the authorities of the two main receiving states that hold diametrically opposing views of the conflict. In his public address on the day of Crimea's annexation in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the Maidan revolution a coup and claimed that Russian-speaking Ukrainians were under the threat of repression (website of the President of Russia 18.03.2014[5]). Ukrainian authorities, in turn, have accused Russia of machinating the separatist rebellion in order to destabilise Ukraine (Reuters 08.04.2014[6]). Although Russia has vehemently denied any involvement in the Donbas crisis, both states are interested parties in the resolution of the conflict, not least as receivers of the majority of displaced people. While mass displacement from Donbas has not been such a salient topic in international media, in both Ukraine and Russia it was passionately discussed in the beginning of the crisis, until the issue started receding from the public eye in 2015 (Kuznetsova 2017, 12).

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[2] A weekly newsletter compiled by the EU's East StratCom Task Force: https://euvsdisinfo.eu
[3] A website founded by Ukrainian journalist students for fact checking claims published in Russian media regarding the conflict: http://www.stopfake.org
[4] A collaborative project with investigative journalists tracking Russian war machinery and vehicles using open source data: https://www.bellingcat.com
[5] http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
[6] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-protesters-idUSBREA370DO20140408

This thesis is interested in the way Russian and Ukrainian governmental media discuss displacement and represent the displaced persons in conditions where the conflict as a general topic has great salience. It would seem like an obvious assumption that the possibility of instrumentalising displacement for foreign policy goals is attractive especially for Russia which has been accused by the international community of inciting the conflict in the first place. There is positive PR potential for effectively managing displacement for both countries, because through inclusive policies both Ukraine and Russia could claim the rightful role of representing the interests of Donbas. However, as will become clear in the subsequent chapters, representation of involuntary migrants in public discourse has been far from uniformly positive, and managing the displacement has produced problems in both Ukraine and Russia. A quick look into official statements about the displaced people elucidates how they are portrayed as a cost and problem:

> "Each day of the war in Donbas costs us around 5 million US dollars that we could have invested into sustainable development. *And the crisis with internally displaced persons, 1.5 million people, is the biggest problem not only for Ukraine*, but also for the whole region."
> Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's address to the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit on 27 September 2014[7] (emphasis added).

> "The Belgorod, Rostov, Voronezh and Kursk regions are the boundary regions, where *Russia faces a lot of problems today because of Ukrainian citizens* fleeing the country amid the crisis in Ukraine."
> Chief of Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) Konstantin Romodanovsky in a speech at the assembly of the Russia-European Union Dialogue on Migration on 24 June 2014[8] (emphasis added)

Ukraine has been hard pressed by its Western partners to deal with displacement effectively, but was especially in the early days of the crisis unable to organise adequate shelter and ensure the IDPs' legal rights because of catastrophic shortfalls in budget and institutional weakness. After initial enthusiasm from the receiving communities in Russian border cities, some locals have expressed indignation at the Ukrainian refugees for expecting help and taking the jobs of locals (Mukomel 2017). The legal status of Donbas refugees in Russia is confusing: the majority of Ukrainian refugees in Russia have

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[7] http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-samiti-z-prijnyattya-cilej-sta-36032
[8] http://tass.com/russia/737526

neither applied for nor been granted refugee status or asylum. Instead, most are pursuing other forms of legal stay such as residence permits, or remain in Russia illegally (Kuznetsova 2017)**.**

The problem of Donbas displacement is thus distinctly connected to issues of state capacity and migration control. This highlights the connections between the (nation) state and displacement in general. At the very least, dealing with displacement is a task that befalls the states receiving displaced people, as states are obliged to help refugees by the international charters they have signed. Displacement and states are also connected at a much deeper level, however. Scholarly discussion on forced migration suggests that displaced people, instead of being essentially marginal to states, as they are often portrayed, in fact occupy a central place in relation to the state (Soguk 1999; Fassin 2015; Turton 2002). Nevzat Soguk argues that the figure of the refugee is "essential to statecraft, particularly at the intergovernmental level" (1999, 244). This is because the international system divides the surface of the earth into non-overlapping nation-states (typically) in full control of their territories, and assumes a relationship of representation between states and their citizens. Persons outside of their state or without state protection are an abnormality in urgent need of regimenting and controlling, so that the system of nation states itself can be protected. Forced displacement is thus, according to David Turton, "both a threat to, and a product of, the international system of nation-states" (2002, 20). Migration and citizenship are the last bastions of state authority: if the state cannot protect its territory from outsiders, it does not have a reason to exist (Turton 2002, 70).

1.1 Research questions and hypotheses

The implications of these observations will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Two, but for now they serve as a motivation to present a central assumption of the thesis: that the representations of displaced persons from Donbas can offer insights into the politics of nation-building in Ukraine and Russia. As Soguk argues, "refugees help remake the conventional language in which the tales of so-called citizenry, national community, and territorial states are told." (1999, 15). That is, refugeeness

(and, it could be argued, other types of displacement as well) makes visible the silent assumptions about citizenship and nation state. Further, Oxana Shevel (2011a) has specifically argued that the creation of refugee regimes in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine has been influenced by different understandings of the nation held by the political elites. Against this background, looking at how forced migrants are portrayed in Ukraine and Russia can bring us closer to understanding the ideology of these states regarding nations and their borders. What kind of assumptions become evident in the refugee/IDP representations? What kind of identities are created with these narratives? Are there differences in how Russian and Ukrainian media represent the displaced? If there are, what might cause these differences?

My hypothesis is that the displaced are portrayed more positively in Russian than Ukrainian media, since a positive representation is more consistent with Russia's policy approach towards its "compatriots". Ukraine, in turn, was ill-prepared to deal with the problem of displacement because of the political and economic crises the country is experiencing, and because the country's political life has been pervaded with ethnic, linguistic, and ideological divisions. This proposition, called here the nation-building hypothesis, rests ultimately on Oxana Shevel's assertion that Ukraine and Russia have treated in-migrating conationals differently because of different politics of national identity: while, according to Shevel, Russia and Ukraine are relatively similar in their degrees of ethnic homogeneity and ethnic affinity, only Russia created a refugee policy privileging coethnics (2011a, 10). However, in the case of Ukraine, "no such preferential policy toward either coethnics or the former Soviet citizens in general existed." (2011a, 5). According to Shevel, the "politics of national identity", that is, domestic contestation over the definition of a nation's boundaries, is the factor leading to this policy divergence. The logic is that "for a preferential state policy toward any refugee group to materialize, domestic political actors formulating and implementing refugee policies have to be in agreement that this group deserves to be privileged in state policy by virtue of being part of 'us.'" (2011a, 12). And vice versa: if political elites cannot agree on who is "us" and who is the

"other", preferential treatment of "us" and discrimination against "others" is less likely to appear (2011a, 13). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, "the equally high prominence but qualitatively different substance of the politics of national identity in Russia and Ukraine led to the emergence of a 'consensus' definition of the official nation in Russia, but only a 'compromise' one in Ukraine" (Shevel 2011a, 17–18). Based on this "consensus" definition, Russia was able to create a refugee policy that is more favourable to ethnic Russians than other migrants. Ukraine, in turn, created a non-dicriminatory policy.

I also hypothesise that as time passes, forced migrants come to be represented first and foremost as a problem in both receiving states. This happens despite the logically obvious policy of a positive inclusion based on ethnic or national solidarity. Put shortly, I expect the representations of displaced people in Ukrainian and Russian state media to differ at the beginning of the displacement crisis, with Russian representations being more positive than Ukrainian ones, and to converge toward the more negative representations as the displacement becomes chronic. This suggestion, named here the migration hypothesis, is informed by research on refugee representations and public discussion on migration. In liberal Western democracies, refugees are often portrayed as a problem or even a type of natural disaster: words such as "flood", "wave", and "stream" are often used to describe patterns of forced migration. For example, a 2013 study found that news coverage concerning refugees, by taking advantage of the uncertainty surrounding migration, has created a crisis mentality around the issue and dehumanised refugees in Canada and other Western countries (Esses, Medianu, and Lawson 2013).

Interestingly, negative representations have been shown to affect not only culturally distant refugees, but also those refugees who share the ethnicity or culture of the receiving communities. Jasna Čapo Žmegač argues that the "privilege" of "ethnically privileged migrants" exists only at the moment of displacement (2005, 14). Even coethnics "returning" to their historical homeland in the aftermath of war or population exchange are perceived negatively in the receiving communities, because they

disturb the established social order (ibidem). Negative attitudes towards refugees are thus not necessarily the result of racism or nationalist chauvinism, but reflect a universal sociological dynamic of antagonisms between established communities and newcomers. In a sociological study conducted in four Russian localities in 2014 and 2015, Leokadiia Drobizheva found that attitudes toward immigrants in general were more hostile in Russian cities and regions receiving large numbers of newcomers in a short period of time and in those localities with the most homogenous ethnic structure, such as Moscow and the Moscow region, which are dominated by Russians (Drobizheva 2016). Drobizheva concludes that experience with intercultural communication, such as a pre-existing complex ethnic structure, seems to facilitate host societies' adaptation to immigration. Other factors include the composition and professional qualifications of the immigrating population, and the situation with the labour market (2016, 385). It could thus be expected that tensions would arise especially in resource-poor localities suddenly receiving large numbers of displaced people.

Based on academic research conducted in the Russian regions and NGO-conducted surveys in Ukraine, there appears to be an empirical basis to the latter hypothesis. Societal attitudes and media narratives on IDPs in Ukraine have changed dynamically from positive interpretations of the displaced people as "our people" (svii/nash) to negative perceptions, influenced by negative stereotypes and rumours (Bulakh 2017). In Russian regions close to the border, tensions appeared by late 2014 between host communities and Ukrainian refugees over the allocation of scarce resources such as salaries, places in nurseries, and access to budget-funded studentships in universities, according to Vladimir Mukomel (2016; 2017). Local residents have expressed indignation toward the refugees' expectations of help and preferential policies hastily drafted by the regional authorities (Mukomel 2017). Some refugees have encountered negative stereotypes of Ukrainians and accusations of benefit dependency (Kuznetsova 2017).

1.2 Data and methods

I will look at representations of the displaced in Russian and Ukrainian state media in a comparative and longitudinal perspective. The first dimension of comparison looks at whether there are differences in representations of the displaced in Ukraine and Russia, and if there are, determining if the representations form systematic tropes. On the second dimension of comparison, I will determine whether the representations of displaced people change over time, starting from the beginning of the crisis, up to spring 2016. The data set is a collection of articles from Russia's official government newspaper Rossiiskaia Gazeta (RG) and the corresponding Ukrainian publication Uriadovyi Kurier (UK). These papers were selected because as official government publications they represent the types of discourse these governments want to promote to the outside, and can offer insights into the views of the authorities. The newspapers are also less likely to reflect conflicting interests in society the way commercial publications might do, and are readily comparable with each other. Rossiiskaia Gazeta and Uriadovyi Kurier, both founded in the 1990s, continue the tradition of Soviet era government newspapers Izvestiya in Russia and Izvestiya VUTsIK in Ukraine. In mid-2014, Rossiiskaia Gazeta was the third largest newspaper in Russia in terms of audience reach (TNS Russia 2014[9]). Uriadovyi Kurier is also among the top three newspapers by circulation in Ukraine, according to the paper's own website[10]. It should be noted that Rossiiskaia Gazeta and Uriadovyi Kurier are not newspapers primarily meant for the general public, but rather function as sources of information about government policy for regional level authorities and national media. Despite this, I treat them as credible sources about government ideology regarding the displaced people from Donbas. Even if the papers could be dismissed as technocratic information leaflets or pure propaganda, I would argue that these functions do not dictate the forms that the narratives on displacement assume. Instead, these forms are conditioned by ideological choices, the main object of interest in this thesis.

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[9] http://mediascope.net/services/media/media-audience/press/information/ratings/
[10] https://www.ukurier.gov.ua/uk/about/

Only articles with displacement from Donbas as their main topic were collected from the newspapers' online archives. The articles were stored as PDFs directly to the data analysis programme NVivo. The time frame for the collection of articles is from April 2014 until spring 2016 when data collection for this thesis began, so that broad-based comparison of the newspapers over time would be possible. After mid-2015, the number of articles discussing displacement began decreasing and by early 2016 articles on displacement were becoming few and far between. The opposite problem, a massive quantity of articles, appeared especially in the beginning of the collection period. Search query "pereselentsi" (migrants, settlers) from Uriadovyi Kurier alone returns over 600 results for the time frame April 2014 - April 2016. Not all of these hits are relevant to the research at hand, however, since some articles discuss displacement in other contexts or earlier in history. In any case, the total number of relevant articles numbered in the thousands. For qualitative data analysis, this amount is too large, as every article needs to be read and coded manually. This is why a number of data collection points was selected for scrutiny, and articles outside of these collection points were not incorporated into the data set. The time periods selected included three months directly following the onset of fighting in Donbas, the months preceding and following the first ceasefire in September 2014 (Minsk I), the months around the second Minsk agreement in February 2015, and early months of 2016. Practical issues with the data collection are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Three.

The data was analysed using qualitative content analysis and ideological discourse analysis. The aim of the content analysis is to simply compare what kind of topics are the most salient for the two publications, and whether there is any change in main topics or tone over time. NVivo allows for accurately counting instances of key terms appearing in the text and extracting analyses of code clusters across time and by publication. I also determined the overall tone of the articles towards displaced persons (positive/negative/neutral). For classifying the data, I followed the approach Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz developed for analysing the way ethnicity and race are represented in Russian media (2015). Hutchings and Tolz created a typology to structure the interpretative

framework used in a selected set of Russian television programmes: the main themes or "stories" are identified from the programme headline and content, and assigned to categories. Items that deal with more than one category are assigned to the predominant one, so that each item is coded only once. Hutchings and Tolz develop their typology in two stages, starting with a deductive approach before data collection and continuing with an inductive approach after data collection. In my research, deductive coding is informed by previous research on refugee representations (e.g. Gale 2004; Čapo Žmegač 2005; Parker 2015) and my background knowledge of the subject matter. I preliminarily identified eight themes: work, social support (welfare and/or benefits), crime and criminality, children, information for displaced persons, societal conflict, healthcare, and housing. I also coded the main terms that the articles use to refer to the displaced persons. These are "resettled people" (pereselentsy in Russian, pereselentsi in Ukrainian), "refugees" (bezhentsy/bizhentsi), IDPs (vnutrenne peremeshennye litsa /vnutrishnio peremisheni osoby), and "temporary migrants" (vremennye pereselentsy/tymchasovi pereselentsi). After importing all the articles to NVivo and coding them according to the deductive approach, I identified further categories from the articles in a more data-driven approach. Some of the initial themes wound up being merged with others while others were grouped together into thematic clusters. The codes and topic clusters are introduced in Chapter Three.

Discourse theory is especially useful for analysing text with political underpinnings because it allows for the consideration of discursive formations in context and deconstruction of ideological assumptions (Howarth 2000, 129). Especially the concepts of hegemony, empty signifiers, political frontiers and the construction of political identities, discussed by Ernesto Laclau (1996; 2007) are instructive in interpreting the data. After identifying the main topics and modes of representation from the data, discourse analysis was be used to understand what they achieve and what kind of ideological assumptions they reveal.

1.3 Questions of comparability

An obvious issue with comparing the representation of refugees in one country and of IDPs in another is whether we are in fact comparing like with like. On the definitional level, the difference between refugees and IDPs is that the former have crossed an international border to get to safety, while the latter have not (Shevel 2011a, 30). In international law, IDPs lack similar protection status as refugees bear, partially out of the reluctance of the international community to appear to be meddling in countries' internal issues. The UN only drafted its Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in mid-1990s, while the UN refugee convention was created in the aftermath of the Second World War in 1951. As a consequence, refugees and IDPs enjoy different legal statuses and levels of state protection. However, to avoid falling prey to "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Glick Schiller 2009) and prioritising the construct of national borders as something natural or inevitable, this thesis considers displacement as a phenomenon regardless of its location or direction. Furthermore, in this case, the national border between Russia and Ukraine has been quite amorphous and insignificant up until the conflict began. Even after displacement, some of the refugees have continued to cross the border regularly to check on their property and relatives, further challenging the distinction of displaced persons to refugees and IDPs.

It could also be claimed that any differences evident in the representations of displaced persons in Ukraine and Russia stem from the fact that these regimes are different on the authoritarian-liberal axis, rendering comparisons along other lines difficult. Russia is now ranked an authoritarian regime, while Ukraine is a hybrid regime with somewhat functional democratic institutions (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2016[11], Freedom House 2017). An analytical framework built on the difference between authoritarianism and democracy certainly has its merits in this case, but it does not explain the specific forms that the discourse on displacement takes in these two publications; even if one or both of the publications was essentially propaganda dictated from the top, it uses certain expressions

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[11] http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index

and thematic tropes for a reason. As will be argued later, rhetorical devices are not just a decoration glued on top of content, but, citing Ernesto Laclau, "[f]ar from being a parasite of ideology, rhetoric would actually be the anatomy of the ideological world." (2007, 12–13). Therefore, I do not see a problem in comparing the cultural products of an authoritarian regime with those of a hybrid one, even if the possibility of manipulation is more present in the former than the latter.

The issue of authoritarianism versus democracy is also relevant for media freedom. On the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, Ukraine is ranked 102nd out of 180 countries, while Russia is 148th (2017[12]). Russia's problems with freedom of press are well-known, from increasing government control of the most important media outlets to violence against independent journalists. During data collection and analysis, it became clear that RG articles are more uniform and univocal than UK ones, which often display multivocality and even some critical interpretations of government policy. This is the case even though RG, following Russia's federal structure of government, has a number of regional editorial desks and many of the articles included in the data set are from these regional redactions. On the one hand, this makes it easier to detect a unified ideological background in RG articles, but also complicates understanding what the government line on displacement is in Ukraine. The differences in reporting caused by different degrees of press freedom are considered further in the analysis chapter.

Finally, it should be made clear what this thesis does not attempt to do: try to understand displacement as an objective phenomenon through the newspaper articles. The main argument of constructivism is that representations as such do not say much about the thing being represented, but they do say a lot about the party doing the representing. Hence, the news articles are here taken as discursive constructions in the business of building political identities according to the ideological convictions of the publishers. An overview of the Donbas conflict and subsequent displacement is provided in

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[12] https://rsf.org/en/ranking

Chapter Two, but that is the extent of practical information on displacement that this thesis can provide.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

After the introduction, I will discuss the background of the Donbas crisis and displacement in Chapter Two, in which I will also map the context of Ukrainian and Russian refugee and IDP regimes and what the states have done so far to accommodate the needs of the displaced. Domestic contexts of the discourses on displacement are also described. In Chapter Three, the data as well as the analytical categories used to interpret them will be introduced. Chapter Four presents the findings of the qualitative data analysis, showing that the nation-building hypothesis is confirmed, while only partial evidence was found to support the migration hypothesis. Chapter Five analyses the findings through ideological discourse theory and shows that the picture is, in fact, more complicated than the nation-building hypothesis assumes. The final chapter includes a summary of the findings and discuss their implications for comparative refugee studies and research concerning Ukrainian and Russian refugee policies.

2. Background and literature review

This chapter will begin with a short timeline of the events leading to the war in Donbas before moving on to describe the situation with displacement and domestic contexts of media discourses. Finally, the theoretical framework of the thesis will be presented. The timeline of events presented here is compiled from the Center for Strategic and International Studies interactive timeline[13], the European Parliament news archive[14], BBC[15], and Wood & al, (2016). As the focus of this thesis is Donbas, events in Crimea are largely omitted despite their importance as setting a precedent for some events in Donbas.

In early April 2014, Ukraine's new authorities declared an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in response to rebels declaring them autonomous people's republics and their plans to hold elections like the one organised in Crimea in the previous month. On the same day, demonstrators occupied government offices in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv, eliciting a response from the Ukrainian army. In May, fighting escalated in Mariupol and a fire in the trade union building in Odesa killed over 40 people following clashes between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian groups. In June, a presidential peace plan was announced and a week-long ceasefire declared. According to UN estimates at the time, there had been over 400 casualties since April. The fighting however continued despite the ceasefire, and in July the rebels shot down the passenger plane MH-17 over Donbas. Western sanctions against Russia were tightened in response to reports that the equipment used to shoot down the plane was delivered from Russia. The first official truce was negotiated between Ukrainian government and the rebel fighters in Minsk, and later named the first Minsk agreement. Ukraine's early parliamentary elections held in October excluded Crimea, rebel-held areas in Donbas, and IDPs who lacked registration documents. West-oriented parties dominated the new Rada (Ukraine's parliament), while former president Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions

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[13] http://ukraine.csis.org/
[14] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20140203STO34645/ukraine-timeline-of-events
[15] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275

disappeared completely, and the Communist Party of Ukraine gained no seats for the first time in independent Ukraine's history. The Communist Party was later banned altogether.

According to NATO reports from late 2014, Russia kept sending weapons and other equipment to the Ukrainian border. The Minsk ceasefire was repeatedly violated by both sides as fighting heated over the Donetsk airport and civilians were killed in the shelling of the city of Mariupol. Following this escalation in fighting in early 2015, negotiations in Minsk between leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France resulted in another ceasefire agreement known as Minsk II, on February 12. The new deal held better than the first Minsk agreement, but continued fighting has been reported in Donbas up to 2017. Several reports have alerted the international community to the sporadic intensification of fighting in Eastern Ukraine, with the latest flare-up taking place in late January 2017. The scale of operations has generally decreased, however, and the positions of Ukrainian army and rebel militias have somewhat solidified. The conflict is far from resolved, as Russia seems reluctant to either provide the rebel militias with sufficient firepower to defeat the Ukrainian army, or to withdraw all support. Ukrainian politicians claim that it is in Russia's interest to maintain a frozen conflict, which might give it an opportunity to influence Ukraine's domestic policies.

2.1 Donbas displacement: state response, reception, and integration

The largest instances of mass displacement from Donbas took place in August-September 2014 and in late January 2015, following intensification in fighting and rapid changes in battle dynamics (Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska and Palaguta 2017, 6–7). Targeted evacuation missions have been organised by Ukrainian authorities, rebel militias, Russia, and foreign states such as Poland, but most displaced persons have sought refuge outside of the battle zone independently. As mentioned in the introduction, most of those fleeing war in Donbas have ended up in either Russia or other regions of Ukraine, mainly in regions close to the combat zones. According to various local and international organisations working with the displaced from Donbas, state response to managing the issue of displacement has been inadequate in both Ukraine and Russia. At the onset of the crisis, the Ukrainian

government lacked institutional and procedural mechanisms for dealing with the consequences of the anti-terrorist operation (Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska and Palaguta 2017). Displaced persons have lacked access to housing, healthcare, and education, and have failed to receive their pensions. Delivering humanitarian aid to the afflicted areas has been hampered by both the Ukrainian government and the rebel leadership. Ukraine has at times restricted movement of displaced persons between the government-controlled area and non-government controlled area (Calabia and Gabaudan 2015). IDPs were not able to vote in the elections of 2014 because they lacked registration documents in their new place of residence (Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska and Palaguta 2017). In Russia, Ukrainian refugees have similarly had trouble finding housing and employment, and they have become targets of negative rumours (Mukomel 2017). Some who arrived to Russia without official documents have struggled to legalise their status, enroll in education and gain legal employment (Kuznetsova 2017).

The situation with mass displacement has been a shock for Ukraine as it struggles to cope with economic crisis and the reorganisation of the country's political structure. According to Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik, "in 2015 Ukraine found itself among the five countries in the world with the highest number of IDPs associated with conflict and violence (…) and ranks first in Europe" (2017, 26). Host-migrant relations in Ukraine have been characterised by dynamic change from overly welcoming reactions and keenness to help IDPs to increasingly suspicious attitudes (Bulakh 2017, 51). While explicit discrimination and negative attitudes toward IDPs are relatively rare in Ukraine, some relatively salient negative stereotypes about former Donbas residents have already formed in the societal imagination. IDPs from the east are suspected of being criminals and bringing destability to other regions of the country. These stereotypes tend to manifest in discrimination especially in the housing and job markets: advertisements for rented apartments in Kyiv for example often explicitly tell displaced people not to bother (Bulakh 2017, 54). Interestingly, IDPs from Donbas are often classified as a social threat, while those who fled from Crimea are revered as victims of political oppression (Bulakh 2017, 49–50). This is motivated by the idea that Donbas IDPs are somehow

complicit in the conflict in Ukraine's eastern regions. According to Ivashchenko-Stadnik, "local people's escape from the conflict zone often provokes moral stigma. In a sense, they are seen as both victims and perpetrators" (2017, 28).

IDPs in Ukraine can face a large variety problems in their daily lives, ranging from registering, finding accommodation and work, continuing their education, and placing their children in daycare. NGOs cited problems with registration and obtaining IDP status as especially acute in the beginning of the conflict, but later decrees have been issued to facilitate these procedures (Ferris et al. 2015; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016). Nevertheless,

> "some of the registered displaced persons have not been resettled: they applied for IDP status to claim their social welfare payments in Ukraine (...), but have been either unable to rent accommodation or unwilling to abandon their dwellings in the occupied territories. As a result, they move back and forth with no endeavour to integrate into a new community."

(Ivashchenko-Stadnik 2017, 28). A government decision criticised by several NGOs in 2014 was the introduction of Resolution number 637, which stipulates that payment of state benefits are conditional on registration and residence in government-controlled areas (GCAs) (Ferris et al. 2015, 12). This has forced some pensioners and other benefit recipients unable to move permanently to GCAs to go back and forth across the contact line to receive their benefits. According to both Ukraine's own pension legislation and international agreements signed by Ukraine, claiming benefits should not be dependent on place of residence (IDMC 2016, 5). It can be claimed that this rule was the direct cause behind the widely-discussed suspicions of benefit fraud, as some IDPs living in NGCAs began traveling to GCAs to collect benefits to which they strictly speaking were not entitled, as will be explored in the subsequent chapters. It also directly caused a wave of internal displacement from the rebel-held areas, as especially pensioneers were forced to leave their homes in order to receive their pensions (Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska and Palaguta 2017, 7).

In Russia, the first wave of refugees from Donbas settled in regions located close to the border, especially Rostov, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Crimea (Mukomel 2017, 109). According to interviews conducted with refugees, reasons for going to Russia included ties to relatives or friends there,

evacuation missions organised by Russian humanitarian organisations, economic motives, considerations of personal security (fear of trial in Ukraine, fear of discrimination), and possession of Russian citizenship by a family member (Kuznetsova 2017, 10). Some refugees recount that their relatives in other parts of Ukraine refused to help them out of suspicions and negative attitudes toward Donbas residents (ibidem, 10-11). In order to alleviate pressure on the border regions, Russian authorities "organised migrants' movement to other areas, up to the Far East, the Kaliningrad exclave, the Volga basin and to the Urals. At the same time, a ban on accommodating refugees in the near-border regions, Moscow, Saint Petersburg and some other areas was imposed" (Mukomel 2017, 109).

Several legal projects were initiated in Russia in 2014 and 2015 for facilitating registration and granting of residence permits for citizens of Ukraine. Importantly, only 688 Ukrainian citizens have been granted the status of refugee between 2014 and 2016 (Kuznetsova 2017, 10). Most Ukrainians initially applied for "temporary asylum" and subsequently for residence and work permits, or for Russian citizenship (Kuznetsova 2017, 9). As the situation in Donbas remains unstable, many refugees are afraid of returning to Ukraine, and up to 80 percent of them are planning to stay in Russia (Kuznetsova 2017, 9–11).

Sociological research has found that while relations with host communities and refugees from Ukraine are mostly amicable in Russia, tensions have appeared in the border regions over the allocation of scarce resources (Mukomel 2016; 2017). According to Vladimir Mukomel,

> "The first migrants from Ukraine were received with a genuine enthusiasm on the part of Russian citizens, which was fed by vigorous propaganda spread by state media. With Ukrainian refugees arriving to other regions of Russia, the enthusiasm of Russian citizens has decreased."

(Mukomel 2017, 109). Residents of Russian border cities have criticised the refugees' assumptions that host communities are obliged help them. Some refugees interviewed by Irina Kuznetsova similarly commented that they have encountered negative stereotypes, and even xenophobia about "khokhly" (a Russian slur for Ukrainians) living on state benefits and doing nothing. However, some

refugees have been received very warmly by locals, who have helped them without reservation (Kuznetsova 2017, 12).

In both countries, the issue of displacement has thus provoked similar initial reactions and dynamic development of attitudes toward the displaced people. Initial expressions of solidarity with displaced people gradually gave way to tensions and negative stereotypes, providing evidence for the migration hypothesis presented in Chapter One. The next section will examine how the Donbas conflict and displacement are discussed in Ukraine and Russia.

2.2 Domestic context of the discourses on the Donbas conflict and displacement

In order to evaluate the representations of forced migrants in UK and RG, it is crucial to understand the discursive contexts of displacement in Ukraine and Russia. In Russia, the discourse on Ukrainian refugees takes place in conditions of the Russian nation-building project, a process that has intensified under President Putin (Hutchings and Szostek 2015, 188). The project has manifested in the domestic media sphere as anti-Westernism, especially in relation to the crisis in Ukraine. A common argument in this discourse has been that the EU or USA are not really interested in helping Ukraine, but simply use the country as a pawn in their attempt to undermine Russia. Mukomel argues that the discourse on Ukrainian refugees in Russia has been solely a utilitarian one, subordinate to the media wars surrounding the Ukraine conflict: "For all parties involved in the dispute the issue of refugees was just a pretext to influence the public" (Mukomel 2017, 108). The number of news articles in Russian media discussing Ukrainian refugee rose sharply in summer 2014 and faded as quickly after October of the same year (ibidem).

The most important theme in Russian media regarding the Ukraine conflict is a concern for vaguely defined Russian compatriots: "The pretext for Russia's actions in Crimea, and later for both its tacit and its explicit support for the separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine, focused on the protection of its 'compatriots' (sootechestvenniki)" (Hutchings and Szostek 2015, 190). The fighting in Donbas, often

dubbed civil war in Russian media, is interpreted as a struggle for self-determination and autonomy of Ukraine's Russian-speaking population in the southeast regions against the (potentially) oppressive government in Kyiv (Mukomel 2017, 107). According to Mukomel, media discourses on Ukrainian refugees in Russia have been split between demonising the Kyiv government as an enemy of the Ukrainian people on one hand, and demonstrating Russian success in accommodating the forced migrants on the other (ibidem).

The inclusion of citizens of Ukraine to the notion of Russian compatriots is premised on the widespread idea that Ukrainians and Russians are not a separate people. According to Tor Bukkvoll, Ukrainian independence has been hard to accept for many Russians, including the country's political elite (2001, 1142). This affects the way refugees from Donbas are discussed in Russia. In official contexts, such as public statements by president Vladimir Putin or his former Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov, the necessity to help Ukrainian refugees as a "fraternal people" (bratskii narod) is emphasised (Kuznetsova 2017, 11). Various charity organisations, in turn, have framed the calls to help Ukrainian refugees specifically as a duty to help Novorossiia, the area encompassing parts of south-eastern Ukraine and southern Russia, thought by some to belong to Russia in its entirety (ibidem). Interestingly, a media monitoring led by Vladimir Mukomel found that civic activity groups both involved in helping forced migrants from Ukraine and vocally opposing Ukrainian refugees have appeared in Russian social networks (2017). The groups opposed to refugees seem to accuse them of benefit parasitism and scamming, similarly to Ukrainian media, as will be discussed below. These sentiments have not, however, found much support in wider public discussion in Russia. Despite the Donbas conflict remaining unresolved, the topic of Ukrainian refugees in Russia began receding from headlines already in 2015. According to Mukomel, this was connected to a change in state policy toward the forced migrants: "special privileges [for Ukrainian refugees] were abandoned and the requirements to legalise a refugee's stay in the territory of Russia were made more stringent. As a result, the continuation of a propaganda campaign was no longer needed." (2017, 108).

Further, Russian state broadcasters and groups on social media platforms have paid extensive attention to the civil victims of the war (Roman, Wanta, and Buniak 2017; Makhortykh and Sydorova 2017). This corresponds to the Russian government's official position that the conflict is a civil war and that the Ukrainian army bears the main responsibility for civilian casualties. In Ukraine, the conflict is understandably discussed in a different tone. Instead of pointing to the cost of the conflict in terms of displacement or loss of civilian lives, mainstream Ukrainian media mostly advertise the operations of the Ukrainian army and the army's role as a protector of the nation. Ukrainian news outlets have been criticised for one-sided reporting of the conflict, especially of attempts to downplay the number of civilian casualties. For example, Roman, Wanta, and Buniak found that the Ukrainian TV channel 1+1 featured fewer reports about civilian deaths than American NBC and Channel One Russia (2017). Instead, 1+1 featured more interviews with Ukrainian army officials and soldiers and used emotionally loaded terms to discuss the conflict (ibidem).

> "The Ukrainian channel often called separatists by such negative terms as 'terrorists,' 'gunmen,' and even 'enemies.' At the same time, it used neutral or even positive labels for Ukrainian defense forces. Journalists sometimes referred to Ukrainian troops as 'our guys' and 'heroes,' building striking contrast between us (Ukraine's defenders) and them (separatists)."

(Roman, Wanta, and Buniak 2017, 373). That is, reporting on the conflict followed typical logic of war propaganda, designed to unify the nation and "other" the enemy.

Internally displaced people have been discussed especially in Ukrainian regional media, likely because of the visibility of the issue in localities receiving large numbers of displaced people. The IDPs are just one of the challenges to Ukrainian state capacity created by the war, adding to the economic crisis and the burden of mobilising an army on a diminishing state budget. The increasing number of displaced people is seen as problematic and fear-provoking especially in Kyiv. According to Ivashchenko-Stadnik, "In the public discourse, a displaced person is usually seen as a representative of a victimised group with a descending social mobility associated with lost status,

who demonstrates desperate patterns of behaviour and brings high risk of instability to the host neighbourhood." (2017, 31).

Ukrainian researchers and NGOs working with displacement have paid attention to how negative representations of IDPs appeared in Ukrainian media already in 2014: "In summer 2014 the first cases of discrimination of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and media publications that negatively characterize IDPs were recorded in Ukraine" (Andreyuk 2015, 3). A media monitoring carried out by a Ukrainian NGO called CrimeaSOS in 2015 found that "[p]ublications in the mass media about IDPs mainly contain neutral or statistical information; neutral context dominates, positive context is less popular." (Andreyuk 2015, 3). While articles with negative or outright discriminatory content were found to be rare, there were nevertheless some trends that reinforce negative stereotypes and stigmatization of IDPs, "such as presentation of IDPs as passive recipients of aid, IDPs as a cause of rising prices and unemployment" (Andreyuk 2015, 6). CrimeaSOS found that most articles about IDPs in Ukrainian regional media contained statistics and information about legal procedures introduced to facilitate IDP registration (ibidem).

Negative tropes include suspicions of IDPs abusing benefits and exhibiting anti-Ukrainian sympathies. Especially after it became evident that the conflict in the eastern regions was stalling and that displacement was to be a long-term issue, "the overall decreasing quality of life and well-being in Ukraine became more frequently blamed on IDPs. Thus, a so-called 'return of the 90s' is now often framed as IDPs' fault." (Bulakh 2017, 55). Comments about increase of criminality in host communities, supposedly a consequence of Donbas's criminal culture following the IDPs, have been widely circulated in the Ukrainian media. Reporting on IDPs has been more balanced in Ukrainian regions than the capital, where the media has published unchecked facts about IDPs (Bulakh 2017, 55). Tania Bulakh found that these media representations guided the attitudes of mid-level state employees whose job it is to deal with IDPs, possibly affecting the drafting and implementation of state programmes (2017, 56).

To generalise, media analyses indicate that the topic of forced displacement from the Donbas region evokes both positive and negative reactions in Ukraine and Russia, and that the bulk of media reporting on the issue is neutral in tone. Initially welcoming attitudes have changed to suspicion, especially where tensions about the allocation of resources are more acute. The conflict in general has been connected to nation-building agendas and to questions of state capacity in both countries. Equipped with this background knowledge, we can now turn to reviewing the theoretic frameworks and analytic tools used in this thesis.

2.3 Theoretical framework and analysis

The thesis combines insights from studies of (forced) migration, nationalism, anthropology of the state, and studies on representation (discourse). I will briefly discuss the central ideas behind studying representations before moving on to reviewing relevant scholarship on the connection between the state, nation, and displacement. Representation here is treated as an aspect of state policy toward displaced people, especially as it is the policy-drafting actors doing the representing. As I am interested in the state ideology as it manifests in the representations of displaced people, an appropriate analytical tool for interpreting the findings of the data analysis is ideological discourse analysis (IDA). Discourse analysis in general is based on the principles of constructivism and anti-essentialism: the idea that political identities or agents as discursive elements "do not pre-exist the relational complex but are constituted through it." (Laclau 2007, 68).

Furthermore, discourse theory emphasises the need to consider the construction of meaning in specific historical and social contexts (Howarth 2000, 129). According to Jacob Torfing, the gist of discourse theory is a relationalist, contextual, and historicist view of identity formation (2005, 14). Discourse analysis does not seek to uncover "the true underlying meanings of texts and actions, which are deliberately concealed by ideological practices or discourses" (Howarth 2000, 129), but rather aim to explain how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, discourses are constructed, contested and change (ibidem, 131). I attempt to show what the discourse on displacement achieves,

or what kind of purpose it serves. Soguk speculates vis-à-vis refugee discourses in general, that "[p]erhaps the refugee discourse is instrumental in the constitution of the very hierarchy in relation to which it appears as secondary and that the refugee, in much the same way, is productive or constitutive of the citizen from which he inscribed to be an aberration." (1999, 243). That is, the form of refugee representations is not accidental but conducive for maintaining the "national order of things" (Malkki 1995).

2.4 State, nation, and displacement

This leads us smoothly to exploring the nexus between (nation-) states and displacement. Bulakh argues that shared citizenship was a chief motivation for showing solidarity with the IDPs in the beginning of the displacement crisis in Ukraine (2017). Assumed shared experience of the dysfunctional Ukrainian state with IDPs justified including them into a category of "our people" (svii), a common Soviet identity produced by "shared experience with an oppressive state apparatus", of bonding "together against 'them,' the enemy, the state and its institutions" (Wanner 1998, 9; Bulakh 2017). This is just one example of how displacement, citizenship, and the state are intimately interconnected. Also, as discussed above, displacement policies can arguably be influenced by ideas of nationhood (Shevel 2011a). The idea that forced migration is tied to questions of nationality or statehood is hardly new: the link was suggested by Hannah Arendt in 1948 (2004) and consequently explored in scholarly writing regarding involuntary migration (Malkki 1992; Malkki 1995; Pilkington 2002; Robinson 2002; Turton 2002). Furthermore, it has been argued that the contemporary state can be best captured and comprehended at its margins, comprised at once in terms of populations, territories, and policies (Fassin 2015, 3). That is, the state arguably becomes most visible in the way that it treats its marginal populations, including refugees and other migrants, because they reveal the tensions between a punitive and welfare orientation at the heart of the state. In policing populations at its perceived borders, the state constructs those exact borders.

Specifically, scholarship has made an explicit connection between refugees and a salient aspect of statehood, nation-building. Harris Mylonas defines nation-building or national integration as "the process through which governing elites make the boundaries of the state and the nation coincide" (2012, xx). In his view, there are three nation-building strategies: accommodation (granting minority rights), assimilation, and exclusion; these three processes produce minorities, co-nationals, and refugees, respectively. Mylonas's argument focuses on the importance of international and geostrategic concerns for nation-building policies: variation in nation-building policies is the result of interaction between host states and external powers rather than non-core groups and host states (2012, 5). That is, the foreign policy goals of the host state and relations with external powers drive a host state's choices of nation-building policies toward non-core groups, whether they be accommodation, assimilation, or exclusion. It could be expected that these strategies are relevant to the ways Ukraine and Russia handle the issue of displacement; on the other hand, policy choices like these can be said to be the causes of displacement.

As discussed above, Shevel identifies two features, the "politics of national identity", that is, debates over the boundaries of the nation, and the influence of international refugee-assisting organisations, especially the UNHCR as the main determinants of refugee policies in post-Communist countries (2011a, 2). Shevel's key finding is that "when national identity is highly contested, and thus there is no consensus on which group should receive preferential treatment in state policies by virtue of belonging to 'us,' a political space for a receptive and nondiscriminatory refugee policy opens up." (ibidem). In Russia, those arriving from former Soviet republics, in particular ethnic Russians, received preferential treatment, while in Ukraine, no such preferential policy towards coethnics emerged. Russian attitudes to the displaced are further conditioned by the Russian compatriot policy, vowing to protect the rights of vaguely defined "compatriots" outside of the borders of Russian Federation (Zevelev 2008) on the one hand, and the principle of non-interference into other state's internal affairs on the other. The compatriot policy was, on the rhetorical level, the main justification

behind Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Official website of the President of Russia 18.03.2014[16]).

Of course, in the spirit of constructivism, nations in this thesis are not understood as something natural or objectively existing outside of social interactions. In a well-known formulation, Benedict Anderson has called nations "imagined communities" (2006 [1983]), tracing the apparition of nation states to the advent of print capitalism. According to Ernest Gellner, nationalism is the product of the modern world, and nations are not naturally inevitable entities, but require specific conditions to appear (2006 [1983]). The basis of nationalism is the thought that political and national units should coincide, in other words, that every nation should have its own state. According to this principle, ethnic or national borderlines should not run through political territories nor between rulers and the ruled (Gellner 2006, 1). Nationalist conflicts result from violations of this principle. In Gellner's analysis, nationalism is functional for the preservation of states, because it offers an ideology which justifies sacrificing oneself to defend the nation state's borders. Like ethnicity, nationality is a fully relational concept. An isolated ethnic group or nation is an oxymoron, as ethnic and national differences are constructed in interactions between groups.

No piece of research on nationhood in the post-Soviet space can escape making reference to Hans Kohn's division of states into civic versus ethnic nations (1944). In Kohn's view, Western European countries were built on the model of civic nationalism, meaning that these are primarily political nations, while Eastern European countries tend to rest on ethnic solidarity. The civic-ethnic divide has been a longstanding bone of contention among scholars of Eastern European state formation, especially right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was seen as a result of nationalist mobilisations. The division has been criticised however from a purely empirical point of view (Shulman 2002; Shevel 2011b) as well as for its value-laden assumptions about eastern Europeans

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[16] http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

being less rational or politically savvy citizens. For example, according to Katherine Verdery, "people in Eastern Europe see things differently; they see 'nation' as having to do with ethno-cultural homogeneity and as having at best a tenuous relation to the territorial limits of polities." (Verdery 1994, 3). Nations and countries do not necessarily have much to do with each other in Eastern Europe.

From the preceding paragraphs, a view emerges of forced migration as a phenomenon inextricably tied to the system of nation-states. However, anthropologists and migration scholars have also questioned the relevance of exclusively interpreting forced migration through a framework of the nation-state (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Glick Schiller 2009; Dzenovska 2012). According to Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002), the social sciences in general and migration studies in particular have fallen prey to methodological nationalism, an assumption that interprets migration as something unusual and problematic, while seeing the existence of nation-states natural, and sedentary life normal. However, according to them, this is not a necessary conclusion, as migration has been an integral part of modernity rather than an anomaly. I hope to further the discussion about migration, methodological nationalism, and host-migrant relationships by looking at a region where nationality and borders have been relatively insignificant for the citizens and national economies of the states involved. As argued earlier, antipathy towards newcomers can be a general type sociological phenomenon, and can affect even coethnics moving to their "historical homelands" (Čapo Žmegač 2005). Thus, analysing tensions between migrants and host communities need not be motivated by nationalist assumptions. Furthermore, as the question of nationhood is extremely politicised in Russo-Ukrainian relations, it is important to be sensitive to the historical legacies of the region.

Literature on the topic of displacement thus suggests that there is some merit to analytically linking nations, states, and displacement, but also that we should be careful with interpreting displacement solely through this framework. In a way, the nation-state refugee nexus is built into the research design, as the task of this thesis is to explores the possible connections between representations of displacement and politics of nation-building in Ukraine and Russia. I attempt to do this without

making assumptions about the type of nation they might be building, be they ethnic, civic, or outside of this framework. In fact, it is highly unlikely that either UK or RG would attempt to represent the displaced people in ethnic terms, because this would preempt Ukraine's war effort and force an inconveniently stringent definition of compatriots on Russia. These conundrums will be explored in the final chapters. Next, I present the articles collected from the online archives of UK and RG and the typology of key topics constructed from the data.

3. Data and methods

This chapter will describe methods of data collection, classification of the data, and principles used for coding. I will also provide an outline of the articles by publication and across time. The data collection period spans two years from the beginning of the armed clashes in Donbas in early April 2014 to the end of April 2016. The number of articles published in Rossiiskaia Gazeta (RG) and Uriadovyi Kurier (UK) in this period amount to thousands of relevant items, which is more than can be meaningfully analysed through qualitative text analysis. This is why I have chosen shorter collection periods from the beginning, middle, and end of the two-year time span. The first collection period is from the beginning of April to the end of June 2014, when displacement from Donbas was becoming a mass phenomenon for the first time. Two natural data collection points in the middle of the collection period are around the Minsk agreements, first in September 2014 and then in February 2015. As ceasefires negotiated in both Minsk meetings failed to definitively stop hostilities, it is likely that there is more reporting concerning involuntary migrants from Donbas around these dates. The final collection period is from the beginning of January to the end of April 2016, after which the situation has remained at a deadlock with little development either way. The two-year collection period should be enough to refute or confirm the migration hypothesis about the appearance of negative attitudes towards the migrants.

Overall, the data set contained 177 articles: 86 UK articles and 91 RG articles. The articles are listed by publisher and date in the bibliography. For all but one data collection period, all relevant articles were included in the data set. However, for data collection period two, that is around Minsk I in autumn 2014, there were over four times more articles in RG than in UK. To maintain a rough balance in the number of articles between the publications, about a fourth of the RG items from this time period were selected into the data set using a random number generator, and the rest deleted. Because of these exclusions, the data set cannot be treated as a wholly representative sample. However, as the

task of this study is not to make statistically robust conclusions, but to illustrate and compare the development of reporting in these publications, the selection of articles is considered admissible. Furthermore, even in the second data collection period, the relative shares of main topics for RG and UK are remarkably similar despite the omissions, as will be later discussed.

The articles were found on the web archives of RG and UK using the search function on the newspapers' websites. Search queries used included words like refugees (bezhentsy in Russian, bizhentsi in Ukrainian), settlers (pereselentsy/pereselentsi), involuntary migrants (vynuzhdennye pereselentsy/vymusheni pereselentsi) and IDPs (vnutrenne peremeshchennye litsa/vnutrishnio peremishcheni osoby) and their derivatives. When on a few occasions the search function on RG's page was not working, I used targeted Google search to access the articles instead. The articles were saved as PDF files into the data analysis software NVivo for coding.

Before data collection, I developed a deductive set of codes based on my research questions and hypotheses, and proceeded with identifying further codes from the text. The main deductive codes included the tone of the article towards the displaced persons (either positive, neutral, or negative), the displacement keyword used to address the displaced persons (settlers/migrants, refugees, IDPs, or other), and some of the themes in category later named "necessities of life" (for example employment, healthcare, and education). While reading the articles, I developed new codes and ways to group previously appointed codes. One especially important set of codes obtained as a result of inductive coding is the Actors category, identifying the main active subject dealing with the issue of displacement. These include the involuntary migrants themselves (code titled "self-help"), regional administration, state or presidential administration, volunteers, friends and relatives, foreign states, migration services, and others. The articles were read and coded to see in what kinds of contexts relevant keywords appear, and whether there are any systematic trends in how the codes appear over time or by publication.

The main theme or topic of the articles was identified from the headline and content and coded into a main topic category. When an article contained several themes, the more prominent one was selected so that each article was coded only once. Coding produced three parent categories: Crisis Management, Politicisation of Migration, Society-Migrant Relations, and the category Other for articles that did not neatly fit with any of the main categories. Below are the parent categories and descriptions of the topic codes included in them.

Crisis Management

1. Central State Policy: articles discussing e.g. legal, financial, and social policies planned or enforced by the central state, presidential administration or central government to address problems displaced people face and to alleviate the burden of regions receiving large numbers of migrants.

2. Evacuation: A cluster of articles discussing evacuation of the civilian population from the active combat zone after the second Minsk agreement in early 2015.

3. Information for IMs: articles including information aimed at displaced persons, such as contact details of coordination centres, practical advice, and information about applying for benefits.

4. International Cooperation: articles discussing state- or local-level cooperative projects with various international actors, for example the Red Cross or foreign governments. Often the articles emphasise funding received from foreign partners and how this takes pressure off regional and state budgets.

5. Region Receives IMs: articles about settlement of IMs in the regions from the regional authorities' and residents' point of view. The articles often discuss accommodation of IMs and specific policies planned and implemented for their adaptation.

6. Statistics: the main content is facts and figures about involuntary migration in general or in a specific region, without mentioning what kind of policies are in place or planned.

Politicisation of Migration

1. Compatriot Resettlement Programme: articles mentioning regional implementations of state-sanctioned resettlement programmes for vaguely determined "compatriots"; these articles only appear in RG as Ukraine does not have a corresponding policy.

2. Evading Conscription: stories about Ukrainian men allegedly moving to Russia in order to avoid being drafted into the armed forces.

3. Fake Involuntary Migrants: news pieces about people abusing state benefits by pretending to be displaced persons. Also, stories of the plight of "real" displaced persons attempting to establish their status are included in this category. The articles often include cautionary tales about scammers who got caught and the punishments they received. Most of these articles were published in UK.

4. IMs as Political Capital: stories where involuntary migrants are only mentioned or addressed to prove some point external to the discussion on displacement. Often very little news value.

5. International Attention: articles reporting what foreign media outlets have published about the Donbas crisis and involuntary migrants.

Society-Migrant Relations

1. Access to Education: articles about bureaucratic facilitation, sanctioned by the central state or regional administration, to allow IM children and students to enroll in local schools and universities while living outside of their home regions.

2. Charity or Volunteering: stories about how the society attempts to help displaced people through charitable collections, volunteering, or NGO work.

3. Employment: articles discussing the problematics of finding employment for displaced people, both from the point of view of state/regional actors and the IMs themselves.

4. Life in Displacement: Generic stories about how the IMs are living in their new places of residence, including comments about reception, adaptation and future plans. Often long and descriptive pieces with many interviews.

The articles were also systematically coded according to their tone towards involuntary migrants. The tone was determined from the headline, main content, and sentences directly referring to IMs. In this way, articles about "fake IMs" would mostly be coded as negative, as they tend to represent the migrants' claims to benefits as fraudulent and discuss displacement in the framework of criminal activity. However, for example in cases where the author expresses sympathy to the IMs who have wrongfully lost their benefits as a result of large-scale fraud investigations, the articles were coded as positive. Any articles mainly discussing facilitation of bureaucratic procedures or any kind of help to the IMs were also coded as positive. In some cases, the tone of the articles is more ambivalent: for example, an article published in UK on 15 March 2016 discusses delivering humanitarian aid to IMs, which as a theme would seem fairly positive. However, whenever the IMs are mentioned in this article, they are represented first and foremost as a cost and a burden to the local administration. This and similar articles were coded to class "ambivalent or neutral", together with articles with neutral tone towards the migrants, especially those purely discussing statistics.

An issue worth noting is that some of the stories are very time-dependent: for example, education as a topic is more relevant in September as the school year starts, and evading conscription is only relevant around Minsk II, when the fourth wave of mobilisation to the Ukrainian army took place. Also, some words or topics quite naturally do not appear in articles on the other side, such as compatriot resettlement programme in UK, as Ukraine does not have a corresponding programme to Russia's. In Russia, most of the refugees from Ukraine have not been registered as refugees, but as

temporary asylum seekers. Thus, the lack of fake IM stories in RG should not come as a surprise: without refugee status, the IMs cannot be accused of exploiting targeted benefits.

3.1 The story as it develops

In the following sections, I will briefly describe the main gist of the articles published during each data collection period, starting with UK articles, then moving to RG articles and finally comparing the publications.

3.1.1 Spring 2014: From Crimea to quantifying Donbas displacement

From April to June 2014, there were 23 relevant articles published in UK and 32 in RG. The disparity in numbers is balanced by the length of the pieces: especially in June 2014, most articles published in RG were very short situation updates from regions receiving involuntary migrants, while articles in UK were longer and more descriptive. Furthermore, as the purpose of this research is not collecting a representative sample but describing a story told in the publications, I did not seek additional materials from other Ukrainian publications to match the number of Russian-language articles.

The main category for UK articles at this time is perhaps unsurprisingly Crisis Management. Several articles simply contain emergency information for IDPs such as hotline phone numbers (e.g. 05/06/2014). Articles coded to the category Central State Policy discuss government plans to manage displacement on a larger scale by for example creating databases of IDPs and drafting policies on healthcare provision and benefits allocation. Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk is quoted as urging the authorities to create a unified database for IDPs including information about housing and employment, saying that the government needs a long-term strategy to cope with the issue of displacement. Yatseniuk also instructed Minister of Regional Development, Construction and Communal Living Volodymyr Groisman (later the Prime Minister of Ukraine) to involve local-level organisations in solving displacement issues. Yatseniuk seems to want to push the responsibility for accommodating IDPs to the municipalities and to other ministries (UK 12/06/2014.) The rest of the

articles in this category report from the regions receiving IDPs and describe local efforts at accommodating the newcomers.

The focus of the UK articles in this period changes from discussing Crimean IDPs to addressing the unravelling conflict in the eastern regions. The articles published in April and May all address issues faced by people who fled from Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland. The first article mentioning displaced persons from other parts of Ukraine appeared on May 25. Even after this, many articles mention Crimean refugees alongside description of the situation of involuntary migrants from the Donbas region. UK's tone about the displaced is mostly neutral, except for one article describing a congress of Crimean refugees organised by involuntary migrants themselves. Andriy Ivanets, a representative from the Department for Temporarily Occupied Territory and Social Adaptation of the Population under the Presidential Administration is quoted as saying "I am very impressed that you wish to preserve your Crimean identity and residence as we also work on this issue. I wish we all meet in this, or an expanded composition, in Crimea under the flag of Ukraine" (UK 27/05/2014). In these early articles, mentioning displaced persons clearly has a political intent: the stories of displacement appear in contexts discussing occupation, lack of freedom of conscience, and calls to return Crimea to Ukraine. In June, the focus of the articles moves toward addressing the worsening situation in eastern Ukraine. In general, many of the articles published in June are reports from regions receiving displaced people and include information about regional administrations' plans to cope with the situation and explicit assurances that they will.

No articles on RG talk about refugees or migrants from Crimea, for obvious reasons. Instead, the items in spring 2014 address the stream of involuntary migrants arriving from Ukraine's eastern regions to various localities in Russia. The dominant theme in RG articles is Crisis Management, even to a larger extent than in UK, mainly because of the preponderance of "Region Receives IMs" type of stories, which tend to be very short reports with information about numbers of refugees and measures planned to accommodate them. In several articles, representatives of regional or municipal

administration express hopes that migration from Ukraine could compensate for natural population loss in the regions. For example, in an article from June 20, representatives from the Penza region are interviewed saying that the region is prepared to support refugees from Ukraine who are willing to move to the region permanently and employ themselves in the budgetary sphere (education, healthcare, and cultural institutions). These necessary workers will be given priority in finding accommodation. The willing refugees will be bussed to Penza from Rostov, where the region has sent a representative from the regional ministry of labour (RG 20/06/2014.) The funding and conditions of various compatriot resettlement programmes are also often mentioned in this context. Most of the regional authorities emphasise the need for attracting qualified workforce. Many of the RG articles in early spring also contain social statistics about numbers and destinations of Ukrainian citizens arriving in Russia, as well as concrete information for involuntary migrants such as hotline phone numbers. For example, Tatiana Melikhova, a regional representative from Russia's Federal Migration Service (FMS, dissolved in 2016 and its tasks transferred under the Ministry of Internal Affairs), is quoted describing the numbers and types of people arriving to the Nizhniy Novgorod region. The newcomers are urged to apply for refugee status, as this grants the migrants more rights, including the possibility to apply for citizenship after a year of residence in Russia, and receiving material help (RG 20/06/2014.)

In both UK and RG, the tone toward IMs is mostly positive or neutral, with the articles mainly discussing first responses to the situation and assistance provided to the IMs. On average, RG's tone is slightly more positive than UK's. One story in RG about fake refugees scamming money from pensioners in the Kuban region was coded as negative. This is the only instance of fake IM stories appearing in RG. One of the main differences between reporting on involuntary migrants in RG and UK in spring 2014 is that many articles in UK contain interviews with displaced persons, while these are almost completely absent from RG at this time. Most RG articles are news or interviews with

authorities or migration experts, and the newspaper's emphasis is often on statistics of migration and migration control.

3.1.2 Minsk I: Professionalisation of crisis management

The overall number of articles was 17 in UK and 20 in RG around the first Minsk agreement in autumn 2014. Again, UK articles were longer on average. As mentioned earlier, the RG articles for this collection period were selected randomly from a larger pool of articles. Despite this, the ratio of coded main topics as well as tone in RG is remarkably similar to UK in this time period: both publications have mainly Crisis Management and Society-Migrant Relations stories, and tone of the articles is mostly positive or neutral. RG's tone is again slightly more positive than UK's, and both publications discuss the IMs in a relatively more positive light than in the spring.

There were only Crisis Management and Society-Migrant Relations stories published in UK. Politicisation of migration stories are missing; however, several articles that were coded to the group "Life in Displacement" had rather political overtones. Involuntary migrants loyal to the Ukrainian state are described in these articles as being harassed and persecuted in the NGCA; representation of these IMs is saccharinely patriotic. For example, a long interview article with an IM family that moved to Rivne from Luhansk describes how the family began speaking Ukrainian out of respect to their hosts. Halyna (Galina), the head of the family, praises Rivne as a more civilised, hospitable, and kind environment than Luhansk. She says they have become enemies to many in their native Lysychansk, where acquaintances now see them as traitors. To Halyna and her family, Rivne has become a second home (23/08/2014.) Another similar article introduces a family from Kramatorsk, Donetsk region, trying to build a new life in Ternopil, from the point of view of the family's 9-year-old daughter Diana. Her stepfather, a Ukrainian teacher in a technical college in Kramatorsk, was also an activist in a pro-Ukrainian organisation before the war began. When the DNR separatists got

hold of the personnel records of the organisation, he couldn't be spared from persecution and the family had to flee west (02/09/2014.)

In addition to these articles, the Society-migrant relations category contains one story about access to education in connection with the beginning of the school year on 1 September, two on charity and two on IM employment. Specific attention is given to facilitating the employment of IDPs with socially valuable professions, such as teachers. It is reported that the state employment agency is not coping with the challenge of finding employment for thousands of IDPs (02/09/2014). The tone toward IMs is ambivalent in articles about employment: it is for example mentioned that some employers have a negative attitude to job-seekers from Donetsk and Luhansk amid reports of IMs being drunk, thieving and not respecting host communities. Employers are known to refuse work solely on the basis of the applicant's IDP status. Volunteers of an alternative employment centre in Kyiv work actively to dispel stereotypes like these; many IMs are hardworking and industrious, willing to support their families. At the same time, the head of the centre tells how some of the job-seekers lie about their qualifications and experience. Because of this, the centre conducts interviews with the IMs (02/09/2014.)

Crisis management stories in this time contain information about central state policies and reports from regions receiving IDPs. Many articles from the regions describe the difficulties that local authorities face in coping with the sudden influx of IDPs from neighbouring regions. In the government-controlled Luhansk region, new problems with managing displacement arise daily and the regional authorities lack experience in dealing with these issues. Tent camps are getting too cold during the night; some empty sanatoriums and schools in the region could accommodate over 1000 people in total, but most need some kind of renovations. Funding for the renovations is uncertain (12/09/2014).

Furthermore, many articles feature mentions about children and childbirth: some describe the plight of pregnant women to escape the conflict and some present statistics of children being born to IMs

(e.g. 12/09/2014). An article from 28 August 2014 tells how a pregnant young woman swam across the Siverskyi Donets river to get to safety, and gave birth the very next day. "In just four days after the city [Sieverodonetsk] began hosting people from the neighboring cities, five children were born in the city hospital." (28/08/2014). This is interesting, as childbirth in individual families has direct relevance to questions concerning the reproduction of the nation.

Around Minsk I, most stories in RG were coded to Society-Migrant Relations and Crisis Management categories, with two stories being about Politicisation of Migration. The Crisis Management stories are mostly articles about regions receiving migrants and statistics. Most of the reports from the regions are short, contain statistics of the numbers and types of people arriving and information where they are placed. None of the articles contain interviews with refugees. Several articles from the regions discuss the problems brought on by the closure of tent camps ahead of the cold season and intensifying flow of refugees from Ukraine. There are stories both from regions close to the border such as Rostov, Lipetsk, and Tver, and very far from the border area, like Novosibirsk, Iamal, Iakutsk, and Magadan. Some articles mention IMs planning to return to their homes and consequently their reluctance to be sent forward from Rostov.

Articles coded to Migrant-Society Relations mainly deal with access to education, employment, and charity. Like in UK, several stories discuss the start of the school year. It is worth mentioning that the word refugee, involuntary migrant, or similar terms are not used in these articles; instead, the IMs are referred to as "students from Ukraine" or "Ukrainian graduates." As only a couple of these articles are written by the same person, while the rest are all by different authors, this observation is not just a question of individual style. An article from 4 September reports that the Ministry of Culture has prepared a list of vacancies for refugees working in the cultural section, such as in libraries, museums, philharmonic orchestras, theatres, and culture palaces. Especially musical instructors, library workers and employees of cultural-leisure centres are sought after. The author notes that employees of the culture sector cannot expect high salaries in Russia: for example, a choir conductor with higher

education would get 11,000 roubles per month in the Vladimir region. Russian citizens would get just as much. Also, almost nowhere can the employers help with housing or acquiring Russian citizenship (RG 04/09/2014.)

The stories coded to the Politicisation of Migration category both concern the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). The first article justifies the decision of a refugee to go back and fight with the rebel militia, while the second article, discussing the wish of some refugees to return to Luhansk, represents LNR as a legitimate actor for dealing with IM issues. Another article reporting from a meeting of a refugee issues committee at the Federation Council also quotes Oleg Tsariov, the speaker of Novorossiia's parliament, an unrecognised confederation of rebel-held areas in Luhansk and Donetsk regions that existed from May 2014 to May 2015. Tsariov urges for the creation of a union of Ukrainian refugees in Russia, which he argues, should be responsible for solving issue with documentation and placement of refugees in Russian regions (18/09/2014.)

Again, RG articles contain fewer interviews with forced migrants than do UK articles in this time period. Most of the actors that are directly quoted in RG are politicians, representatives of regional administration, experts, and people working with migration. Consequently, the articles appear more distant and technical. Comparatively, there is more unity in RG reporting during this time period, whereas the UK articles are more varied and some writers are somewhat critical of the authorities, for example admitting that the state employment service is so overburdened that it cannot help all IDPs (02/09/2014). Another article reports that the Ministry of Education informed that students from eastern regions will not get any kind of privileges in university entrance, in contrast to arrangements made with Crimean students earlier. According to the author, this creates insurmountable problems for those who cannot get their transcripts from NGCAs (03/09/2014).

3.1.3 Minsk II: Differentiation of reporting increases

Around the second Minsk ceasefire in early 2015, there were 27 articles in RG and 30 in UK. The main thematic categories in UK were again Society-Migrant Relations and Crisis Management, with some Politicisation of Migration stories also appearing. Employment is an important theme during this time. Various state and regional level programmes for facilitating employment of IMs are reportedly planned. These programmes often include the goals to create more jobs, to retrain and educate IMs, to create incentives for employers to hire IMs, and to relax bureaucratic requirements for IMs registering and opening a business. An article from 16 January 2015 reports that only a fifth of IMs have been successfully employed in the Cherkassy region. The newcomers are not satisfied with the level of salaries in the region. An IDP from Donetsk says employers in Cherkassy pay significantly less than in Donetsk. It is also mentioned that not everyone has settled down for good; some IDPs may delay accepting work in hopes of returning home. Finding work matching the IMs' education is also difficult: 40 percent of IMs have higher education and would like to work in their real professions, but people with technical qualifications are more in demand. Some IMs are suspected of working illegally without registration so as to not become identified with Central Ukraine (16/01/2015). The Minister of Social Policy Pavlo Rozenko is quoted as saying that the state employment service has been working unsatisfactorily. According to him, "Only 10% of IDPs looking for work have been employed through employment services," and that this is why the head of the State Employment Service was fired and replaced (06/02/2015.)

UK's Life in Displacement stories include remarks about adaptation issues and prejudice of the local populations. These stories are generally very long and contain several interviews with IMs. The tone of the articles can be very ambivalent, expressing both empathy and suspicion toward the forced migrants. The quote below is a good example.

> "People who long lived in incredibly difficult conditions under fire, of course, deserve sympathy and help, but some of them, it often happens, get offended on purpose, blaming everyone for their troubles except themselves. 'They are angry at everyone,' a volunteer, pastor of the Assembly of God Church Sergei Kosiak shares his observations. 'Often, both

DNR and legal authorities are scolded, and everyone else, because they threw the IDPs to the wolves. Often we have to literally persuade them to leave their cellars and to pity the children who are suffering there with them. Recently, we brought 100-120 people from Horlivka daily, more than a thousand of Horlivka residents, and almost half of them [are] children.'" (07/02/2015).

In the Crisis Management category, there are a lot of stories about international cooperation: several articles report on a module town built for IMs in Kharkiv with German assistance (on 16, 17, and 28 January 2015). Other articles in this category are about humanitarian aid and financial assistance promised or delivered from Europe. European Union actors are quoted at length:

"The European Union is here now, with you, where it is needed. And I am here to show that the solidarity of the European Union is strong and palpable. We have been with Ukraine from the very beginning of the humanitarian crisis. We will not leave Ukraine," said Hristos Stilianidis, European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, handing over the [humanitarian aid] cargo to the heads of the Dnepropetrovsk regional administration. They assured that every object of assistance will reach those who need it" (29/01/2015).

Exact sums of foreign assistance are often mentioned, as well as the targets or conditions set by the donor, for example to incentivise decentralisation. The stories coded to category Politicisation of Migration discuss fake IMs, refugees suspected of evading military mobilisation in Russia, and international attention.

For RG, the share of politicised stories clearly increases and the tone towards displaced persons turns even more positive around Minsk II. The main category is still Crisis Management, with Politicisation of Migration being the second biggest category. There are still some Regions Receive IMs and Statistics stories, as well as news about residence permit and citizenship facilitation. Several news pieces discuss the increased flow of refugees caused by the intensification of fighting in Donbas. The influx of people is causing trouble for regional administration which has to find winterised accommodation for the newcomers. Most of these stories are from the Rostov region, which as a border region has taken the main responsibility for receiving IMs. A new category of stories, evacuation from active combat zone, is introduced. The Ukrainian side is accused of stalling the evacuation of civilians for political gains, and LNR and DNR are portrayed as legitimate actors in these articles.

There is also a small category of "meta news": news stories about news stories on refugees in the Rostov region, shot by TV crews from foreign countries, YLE from Finland and NHK from Japan. These articles clearly attempt to show to the domestic audience that the issue is internationally noted and that the interpretations of these foreign media outlets correspond to Russia's view. In the YLE story the correct interpretation made by the foreign media is emphasised: "It should be noted that in their report the journalists did not call the militiamen 'separatists'" (04/02/2015).

The most common theme in the articles coded to Politicisation of Migration at this time is using the involuntary migrants as political capital. In one of these articles, IM celebrity Ivan (Vania) Voronov's story is recounted: During a shelling of residential neighbourhoods by Ukrainian security forces, a shell fell into the yard of the Voronov family. Shrapnel killed Vania's younger brother, who was barely five years old, and his stepfather on the spot. Survivor Vania received serious injuries and was taken to a local hospital where a group of television journalists from Russia's Channel 1 saw him and made a story about him. Having seen the report, the article recounts,

> "the best doctors in Moscow decided to help Vania and a moment was decided to transfer him to the Russian side. 'The boy endured the travel bravely and held a small cross in his remaining hand all the way.' He was met by doctors directly after the border crossing and rushed to the airport in Rostov-on-Don." (21/01/2015).

The article is less concerned about recounting facts of the conflict or displacement than promoting a specific viewpoint of the Ukrainian army and government through emotionally appealing imagery of injured children.

Another article from 21 February 2015 draws conclusions a year after the start of Maidan, interviewing IMs: "That day, I was at an anti-Maidan rally together with my husband in Lugansk," Galina Bogozinskaia is quoted. She is living for the eighth month in a camp near Tsimliansk. Galina reminisces that

> "[t]here were a lot of people in the streets. People opposed the coup. There was a procession for the salvation of Ukraine. We knew what was happening in Kyiv. Many went there to speak against the Maidan. Then they began to attack us with text messages containing threats. So, we decided to flee. We could not even imagine to what the events on the Maidan would lead.

Everyone hoped for the victory of common sense, but instead a bloody and senseless war began." (21/02/2015.)

Both of the articles introduced above use displacement to affirm Russia's claims about the Donbas conflict being a civil uprising against a government that does not represent the people. Other articles in Politicisation of Migration category report that Ukrainian draft-age men are fleeing to Russia to evade military mobilisation into the Ukrainian army, emphasising the same conclusion.

The differences in RG and UK reporting increase during this time. UK featured fewer Crisis Management stories but more of its articles were coded to the categories of Politicisation of Migration and Society-Migrant Relations. The tone in UK is more positive than in RG, mostly because of International Cooperation stories. The articles published in RG had a higher degree of politicisation, visible in explicit support to DNR and LNR, and mentioning displacement and especially refugee children in a political framework.

3.1.4 Early 2016: Fake IDPs and foreign help

Articles published in UK in January and February 2016 are all either news about cooperative projects with foreign donors designed to stabilise the situation in Donbas and help involuntary migrants, or cautionary tales of what happens to fraudsters and "defectors" who abuse the IDP support system. Consequently, the tone and main topics of the stories from this time are more polarised than before. The stories about international cooperation are emphatically positive, save for the odd mention of local corruption hindering the implementation of cooperative projects. Reports about fake IDPs have an overall negative tone toward the forced migrants.

An initiative with German development corporation GIZ is described in two articles, and another project with the Embassy of Japan in Ukraine and International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is discussed in one. The role of regional actors and local NGOs is emphasised in solving the issues involuntary migrants face, while the central state or government is barely mentioned in these articles. Several rather dramatic headlines catch the eye immediately, such as "No one likes defectors", and

"Real IDPs have nothing to fear". The first of these discusses the case of 17-year-old gymnast Romanova, a prospective member of Ukraine's national olympic team in Rio, who lived in the occupied Luhansk region until her parents suddenly took her to Russia. Outraged statements from the Minister of Sports and the head of Ukraine's Gymnastics Federation are quoted, saying Romanova's move has caused serious moral and material damage and amounts to Russia's attempt at undermining the Ukrainian gymnastics team. The costs of training a professional athlete for years are calculated. The family's motivations for moving to Russia are not discussed (24/02/2014.)

In addition, many of the articles published in UK in early 2016 condemn the activities of fraudsters who have withdrawn state support meant for IDPs, using dishonest means. Scamming strategies are discussed: according to one article from 27 February 2016, thousands of people have been registered in a handful of addresses in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts (exact addresses are even given). As a consequence, about 350,000 involuntary migrants are being investigated for fraud. In most cases, registration of fictitious documents on pension and social payments were performed by officers from the social insurance services, the State Migration Service, and the Pension Fund without the actual presence of IDPs who have permanent residence in the territory controlled by Ukrainian authorities. Twenty-four criminal investigations related to these misdemeanours are underway (UK 27/02/2016.) Because Fake IM stories were such a large share of UK reporting on displacement in early 2016, there is more negative content and discussion of criminal activities in at this time than there was in the beginning of the crisis.

On 20 January 2016, RG published two articles in which it is gleefully reported that Germany has refused to grant asylum to Ukrainian citizens. The articles mention that Ukrainians will be deported back their country, as the situation in Ukraine does not qualify them for the status of refugee. "The Old World shows that residents of Ukraine are not particularly expected there" (20/01/2016). Other articles from this time discuss changes in legislature granting Ukrainian refugees easier access to permanent residence permits and citizenship in Russia, and also budget allocations from the central

state to the regions. Compatriot resettlement programmes are again mentioned often in the context of Russian regions' hopes that Ukrainian migrants might help reverse negative population trends.

The number of articles decreases by this time: only 16 UK articles and 12 RG articles were found over a 3-month period, which probably attests to the fact that displacement as a topic was receding from the public eye. The share of stories with political content increased dramatically in UK (fake IDPs) and stayed approximately on the same level in RG. In both publications, Society-Migrant Relations stories disappeared almost completely. The large number of Crisis Management stories in RG is explained by articles reportin on legislation passed to cement the rights of Ukrainian refugees and to facilitate residence permit and citizenship procedures, as well as short news pieces about allocation of resources to the regions to help them cope with displacement. The main difference between the publications is in the tone of the articles. For RG, the tone of the articles is polarised: the share of articles with positive tone increased slightly, while neutral or ambiguous articles disappeared completely, giving way to a few negative articles (on the German asylum refusal). For UK, the share of negative stories increased sharply and the share of positive and neutral ones diminished.

4. Qualitative content analysis

The question whether there is a different approach to IMs in Ukraine and Russia can now be addressed. To iterate, the relevant research questions for this chapter are: How are the refugees and IDPs represented in government media and why? Are there differences in how Russian and Ukrainian media represent the displaced? If there are, what might cause these differences? To answer these questions, two hypotheses were suggested. The first, nation-building hypothesis suggested that the representation of displaced people would be more positive in Russia than Ukraine because Russian political elites have a more coherent view of who is a conational. The alternative, migration hypothesis, posited that the representation of displaced people becomes more negative in both locations as time passes, because antipathy toward newcomers, conationals or not, is a general type sociological phenomenon.

The hypotheses thus explore whether (co)ethnicity or nation-building policies matter more than social dynamics. As the data analysis presented below shows, the first hypothesis is confirmed: the overall tone of the articles is more positive in RG than UK. In partial confirmation to the alternative hypothesis, the tone toward forced migrants in UK does become more negative as time passes. However, there is no clear convergence of the tones of main stories in RG and UK; the tone does not become markedly more negative in RG over time. I will present the results of the qualitative content analysis first, before moving to ideological discourse analysis (IDA) in the next chapter.

4.1 Main themes: expectations versus reality

The thematic categories explored in the previous chapter are compiled in the table below, with analytical expectations informed by the hypotheses and literature review presented in the third column.

Main category	Subcategories	Analytical expectations
Crisis management	1. Central State Policy 2. Evacuation 3. Information for IMs 4. International Cooperation 5. Region Receives IMs 6. Statistics	• The category is relatively larger in UK than RG • The relative importance of the category diminishes over time
Politicisation of Migration	1. Compatriot Resettlement Programme 2. Evading Conscription 3. Fake IMS 4. IMs as Political Capital 5. International Attention	• Stories especially in this category link displacement to nation-building, but the tropes used in UK and RG are different (displacement is not politicised in the same way) • The relative importance of the category increases over time in both publications
Society-Migrant Relations	1. Access to education 2. Charity or volunteering 3. Employment 4. Life in displacement	• Articles about adaptation of IMs to receiving societies can also be used for nation-buildin purposes • The relative importance of the category increases over time as the importance of crisis management decreases

First, it would seem to make sense to assume that Crisis Management stories would be more important for UK than RG because of the focus on state capacity in Ukrainian domestic media, and because of the challenges the displacement crisis poses for the state's institutions undergoing rapid change. The relative weight of the category could logically be expected to diminish over time in both publications as the states become more experienced in managing displacement. Conversely, following the second hypothesis and previous research into media discourses in Ukraine and Russia, it is likely that the Politicisation of Migration and Society-Migrant Relations categories would become more important as time passes and displacement becomes a permanent phenomenon. The issue of displacement can be used to advance nation-building agendas, for example by using it as proof or mistreatment of

civilians to argue against opponents, as we saw in the previous chapter. The newspapers may also attempt to show the domestic public that the situation is under control by discussing how the involuntary migrants are being integrated into society. Further, I assume that the way that the publications politicise migration will be different, and thus the main codes in the Politicisation of Migration category will not be the same ones for UK and RG.

4.2 Shifts in main topic clusters

Next, I will discuss observed changes in the publications' reporting. In Uriadovyi Kurier, the thematic focus of the articles moves from Crisis Management and Society-Migrant Relations to Politicisation of Migration (see Graph 1). In the beginning of the crisis, active crisis measures such as publishing information for displaced persons, reporting from the regions close to the active combat zones, as well as articles about employment and stories of life of the forced migrants dominate UK's reporting on displacement. By 2016, international cooperation and fake IMs were the main story types. During the first months of the crisis, the articles address mainly Crimean refugees in a political framework, using their experiences as proof of persecution in Russian-held Crimea. Some similar stories about Donbas refugees with political sympathies toward the Ukrainian central state do appear in the middle of the data collection period, but they disappear completely by 2016.

During the first three observation periods, UK features many articles about employment, life in displacement, charity efforts to help IMs, and stories about access to education, that is, articles about integrating IMs into society. These types of stories are completely absent from the last data collection period. At the same time, the articles become more distant from the experience of displacement as they contain fewer interviews with IMs and the regional actors involved in assisting them. The role of volunteers and local NGOs in managing displacement diminishes over time, while the EU, international organisations, and foreign states are mentioned more and more frequently. Central state agencies and ministries remain important actors throughout the four observation periods. As the share of Politicisation of Migration stories increases, the way that migration is politicised changes in UK.

While the first articles present Crimean IDPs as victims of persecution, in the last articles, the IDPs suspected of benefit fraud are blamed of financing terrorism by transferring money to rebel-held areas. If in 2014 and 2015 the perceived enemy is external, Russian occupants, in 2016 it is partly internal to the society: professional scammers and potential terrorist financiers from the conflict zone.


Uriadovyi Kurier: share of main topic clusters by time period

Legend: Crisis management | Politicisation of migration | Society-migrant relations | Other

Time period	Crisis management	Politicisation of migration	Society-migrant relations	Other
Spring 2014	61 %	4 %	30 %	4 %
Minsk I	59 %		41 %	
Minsk II	43 %	10 %	43 %	3 %
Winter 2016	44 %	56 %		

Graph 1: Main topic clusters in UK

Change in the relative importance of the main topic clusters in RG seems slightly less coherent than in UK, as Graph 2 below shows. The Society-Migrant Relations category as a whole is less common than in UK, except around Minsk I, when the relative share of these stories is nearly half. The RG articles in this category all address employment, access to education, or charity and volunteering efforts. Interestingly, the share of Crisis Management stories first decreases around Minsk I and Minsk II, only to increase again for the last observation period. In 2014, most Crisis Management stories were short reports from the regions, news about central state policy and some mentions of compatriot resettlement programmes. Later, statistics of IMs received in various localities and reports about evacuation become more important. In early 2016, all Crisis Management stories were about

central state policies introduced to facilitate the procedure for obtaining Russian residence permits for Ukrainian citizens.

The weight and composition of stories coded to the Politicisation of Migration category also fluctuate over time in RG; as a generalisation, politicisation becomes more important in the latter half of the observation period. While around Minsk II in early 2015, the articles making up this category are rather varied and include themes like evading conscription, involuntary migrants as political capital, and international attention, in winter 2016 all the articles are about using IMs as political capital. Thus a similar development occurs as in UK: in the beginning of the crisis, there is a multiplicity of themes that gets reduced to a couple of salient topics by 2016. Also, as in UK, the relative importance of different actors changes over time. Both Crisis Management and Politicisation of Migration become more state-led as the main actors involved in migration management change from regional authorities to central state officials.


Graph 2: Main topic clusters in RG

As is evident from the graphs above, the largest thematic category for both publications is Crisis Management. Looking at the overall numbers of articles in both publications (below), the similarity in the shares of main topic clusters in RG and UK is revealed. The main difference is that there are more stories coded to the Society-Migrant Relations cluster in UK, while Politicisation of Migration and Crisis Management are relatively larger categories in RG. One reason for the large number of Crisis Management stories may be that RG has more regional desks, in accordance with Russia's federal structure, and can report simultaneously from several regions at once. This may have resulted in a large number of Regions Receiving IMs articles, as happened around Minsk I. It is unclear whether UK has permanent presence in the regions. RG in general seems more professional and better funded than UK, judging by the papers' visual layout and quality of reporting. For example, many RG articles contain photo reportages of refugees, sometimes by RG's own reporters, sometimes reprinted from other well-known news outlets such as RIA Novosti. If UK articles featured any photos, they were often generic stock photos.

Graph 3: Numbers of articles, both publications

In confirmation to the first, nation-building hypothesis, the tone toward the forced migrants is generally more positive in RG than UK, save for Minsk II, when the share of positive articles was relatively larger in UK (see Graph 4 below). The differences between the publications are not massive, however. In RG, the tone of the articles gets more positive, if not somewhat polarised, towards the end, opposite of what the migration hypothesis would suggest. For UK, the tendency is for the tone to become more positive until the last observation period, when the tone gets sharply more negative. The migration hypothesis that migrants come to be represented as a problem in the receiving state is thus only confirmed for UK. The surprisingly large share of articles with a negative tone in 2016 is explained by the proliferation of stories about fake IDPs in Ukraine. The two negative stories in RG at the same time are about Germany refusing to grant asylum to Ukrainian refugees.

Graph 4: Tone toward involuntary migrants in both publications

A notable difference between the publications is the use of terminology for addressing the involuntary migrants. RG uses the word refugee (bezhenets) more often than UK, in which the word "settler" or "migrant" (pereselenets) is more often used. In some RG articles the involuntary migrants are simply called "those arriving from Ukraine" (pribyvayushchie iz Ukrainy) or "Ukrainian citizens"

(grazhdane Ukrainy). Similarly, UK sometimes addresses the IMs as "easterners" (skhidni liudy) or citizens from the anti-terrorist operation zone or occupied territories. "Temporary migrants" (timchasovi pereselentsi) is sometimes used, but the officialese IDPs (vnutrishnio peremishcheni osoby) very rarely. It should be noted that articles not containing any of the search queries or tags related to displacement would not be included in the data set. Importantly, the IMs are never addressed as Russians in either publication, or even as Russian-speakers. Their formal belonging to the Ukrainian state is not challenged in this regard, and both publications often refer to the forced migrants as citizens of Ukraine.

In general, women and children are often discussed as main subjects of state and regional policies in both publications, which has direct relevance to questions of nation-building. Notably, pregnant women are often specifically mentioned as a category of forced migrants. Also, especially in the case of reports from the regions, the absolute majority of actors and people cited in the articles are women. Vulnerable groups such as pensioners and orphans are often mentioned, but Roma people only once, despite the fact that thousands of Roma people have been affected by the conflict (IDMC 2016).

The assumption that the Crisis Management category would be relatively larger in UK than RG is thus refuted: Crisis Management stories are a more dominant category in RG. The assumption that the relative importance of the category diminishes over time holds true for UK but for not RG. Further, the assumption that the relative importance of the Society-Migrant Relations category increases over time as the importance of Crisis Management decreases is only somewhat true for UK, and not true at all for RG. The relative importance of the Politicisation of Migration category does increase over time in both publications, and the tropes used in UK and RG are different, that is, displacement is not politicised in the same way. These observations will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter.

After obtaining these results, I suspected that they may have been the result of arbitrary coding decisions. Perhaps including the theme International Cooperation in the Crisis Management category

might be the reason for the mismatch in the relative importance of this category? As most of these articles seemed to emphasise the political aspect of the cooperation rather than crisis relief, perhaps more stories in RG would appear in the Politicisation of Migration category if International Cooperation stories were moved there from Crisis Management? As a test, I moved all the International Cooperation articles into the Politicisation of Migration parent category. This test showed that instead of reducing the differences between UK and RG it rather accentuated them: Politicisation stories gained an even more prominent role in UK reporting, and the share of Crisis Management articles decreased. For RG, the test caused no change in distribution of stories into the main categories. This leads me to conclude that the initial interpretation of the data holds true: crisis management as a theme is more important in RG than UK, against my expectations.

What do these findings mean from the point of view of the hypotheses? The biggest news is the near absence of Society-Migrant Relations stories in RG, as literature on the depiction of migration in Russian media has shown that stories about societal harmony, usually between different religious groups, is an important trope (Hutchings and Tolz 2015). I was expecting more reporting on the way the Russian society receives and integrates the migrants, in an attempt to show its tolerance and flexibility. However, most of the articles dealing with Society-Migrant Relations in RG present the state and its institutions as the main actors instead of the receiving communities or the migrants themselves. Articles discussing the refugees' access to education are a case in point: the articles present statistical data about school and university age youth from Ukraine, legislative actions and other regulations ratified to facilitate their access to education, but no interviews with refugee students. The closest RG articles come to discussing the societal impact of Donbass displacement is in a couple of stories describing charitable actions initiated by professional organisations (artists and teachers) in the regions (RG 22/08/2014 and 09/09/2014).

The next chapter will address these slightly puzzling results using ideological discourse analysis. Also, the findings are compared and contrasted to domestic discourses on Donbas displacement, presented in Chapter Two.

5. Ideological discourse analysis

In this chapter, the articles published in UK and RG are analysed with the interpretive tools of ideological discourse analysis, such as hegemony, political frontiers, and empty signifiers. The added value of conducting both qualitative content analysis and ideological discourse analysis with the same data is that while the first approach identifies salient themes and the main difference between the publications under comparison, the latter shows *how* exactly these discourses work, and what is being achieved through them. For example, I will strive to answer the questions of why fake IDPs are such a salient theme in Uriadovyi Kurier, but negative representations of refugees are largely absent in Rossiiskaia Gazeta. Also, why do crisis management stories remain so important in RG's reporting, despite the assumption that their importance should decline over time?

Put in the language of discourse analysis, the case at hand involves two ideological entrepreneurs addressing a group of people radically affected by a conflict in which both of these actors are interested parties. As discussed in Chapter Two, in the Ukrainian public sphere, the discourse on the Donbas conflict revolves evokes questions of criminality, state capacity and national unity. For Russia, the discursive field of the Donbas conflict is structured by tropes of fraternal nations and claims of oppression of Russian-speakers by the "Kyiv junta", and tied to the broader context of the state's nation-building agenda. The displaced persons from Donbas are discursive objects caught between these narratives, signifiers ready to be used by the two regimes.

While the first, nation-building hypothesis concerning the tone toward IMs is confirmed from a purely quantitative point of view (the number of articles with positive tone is higher in RG than UK), the conclusion to our second, migration hypothesis, seems more ambiguous. To reiterate, the migration hypothesis predicts that attitudes towards newcomers turn more negative as time passes irrespective of their ethnicity, because newcomers of any sort disrupt established social order, be they complete foreigners or "our people". Conforming to tendencies in Ukrainian domestic media, the portrayal of displaced people clearly does become more negative in UK, following the large number of reports

about fake IDPs in the last data collection periods. Also, the tendency in Ukrainian media sphere to glorify IDPs from Crimea as victims of oppression, but to increasingly classify IDPs from Donbas as a social threat, observed by Bulakh (2017) and Ivashchenko-Stadnik (2017), is also evident in UK's reporting. Meanwhile, even though the existence of negative stereotypes of Ukrainian refugees in Russian localities receiving forced migrants has been noted (Mukomel 2016; 2017), negative representations are almost completely absent from RG's reporting.

Why does the Russian paper diverge from public discourse more than the Ukrainian one? An obvious answer is that because of lowers levels of media freedom in Russia, content in RG is more strictly managed from above and bears little relation to objective developments in society, whereas UK reporters enjoy more press freedom and can report even on unpleasant themes. This may very well be true, but claiming that RG's reporting is simply propaganda, intended to present the Russian state in a positive light does not explain the specific tropes used by the paper, and assumes that the Ukrainian paper is not engaged in similar reputation management. As assessing the editorial processes of these papers is out of the scope of this research, I will concentrate on the specific forms the papers use to talk about displacement instead.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Crisis Management stories, with obvious implications to anxieties about state capacity, is a larger category in RG than UK. Emphasising Russian state capacity, with explicit or implicit comparisons to the Ukrainian state and its Western partners, is a dominant trope in RG reporting. It should be noted that Crisis Management stories are in absolute numbers the largest category in UK as well, but other categories were relatively more important in UK than RG (especially the Society-Migrant Relations category). This, in comparison with RG, seems to suggest a somewhat stronger emphasis on migrant integration through employment and education in UK. However, this observation only arises in a comparative perspective, that is, had this case study been concentrating only on Uriadovyi Kurier, the conclusions of my analysis would be quite different. This remark should be kept in mind throughout the following analysis. In the next

section, I will first review some of the central concepts of discourse theory, before moving on to analyse the specific discourse on displacement in UK and RG.

5.1 Discourse theory: searching for the building blocks of political identities

Ideological discourse analysis is a theory of identity construction in politics. Politics in this case is understood in a very broad sense as any practice concerned with dynamics of power in human societies, not just parliamentary politics or the operation of political institutions. The concept of discourse itself here refers to not only textual forms of communication, but any "relational systems of meaning and practice that constitute the identities of subjects and objects" (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 9). In this sense, the structure of a party system or the social dynamics of a classroom can constitute a type of discourse. The case at hand is of course more traditional as I am analysing text produced by two rather overtly political actors. What I concentrate on, however, is not so much the referential content of the political messages these newspapers produce, but the kinds of political identities they are attempting to construct.

A central concept for the creation of political identities in ideological discourse analysis is the *empty signifier* (Laclau 2007, 70–71). The operating logic of this concept is based on Ferdinand de Saussure's assertion that language, and in Laclau's view, any signifying system, is fundamentally a system of differences. Linguistic identities, or values, are purely relational, and the totality of language is involved in each single act of signification (Laclau 1996). In a system like this, the only possible relations between items of a signifying system are equivalence or difference, which are mutually exclusive relationships. Either two items are different and separate, or they are equivalent and essentially the same. Each element of the system has an identity only so far as it is different from the others. Herein lies a dilemma, however: there can only be a coherent system of elements if there is something that is outside of that system, that is, if something is excluded. In human interactions, limitless systems of relation, as exemplified by the concept of an infinite universe in physics, are impossible. This is where empty signifiers come in: as markers of the "outside", they reveal the unity

of the system. The exclusion of an element grounds the system as such: "Only if the beyond becomes the signifier of pure threat, of pure negativity, of the simply excluded, can there be limits and system" (Laclau 1996, 38). This necessary distinction between the in- and out-group can be articulated with the help of empty signifiers (Laclau 1996.)

This idea can be illustrated with the example of ethnicity. Anthropologists have long claimed that ethnicity is not the inherent quality of any individual or group of individuals as such, but a purely relational concept (Barth 1969). A secluded ethnic group is an oxymoron, as ethnicity only appears in the interactions between groups. This explains why some ethnic groups, which to an outsider would seem to be more similar to than different from each other, tend to the most insistent on showing that they are separate[17] (ibidem). The "objective" differences between groups, or the attributes of ethnicity, are less important in the practice of ethnicity than their use as tools of political differentiation.

The main requirement for an empty signifier is, as the concept suggests, notional emptiness. An empty signifier lacks a signified. According to David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, "the articulation of [any] political discourse can only take place around an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point. In other words, emptiness is now revealed as an essential quality of the nodal point, as an important condition of possibility for its hegemonic success." (2000, 13). For example, the notion of "the people" is a commonly used empty signifier especially among populist movements: political actors often make extensive reference to "the people", but never define or interpret the concept. It can mean whatever the audience wants it to mean, which can be as many things as there are people in the audience. Because the notion is emptied of all particular meaning, it can function as a unifying node, as the success of various populist movements attests. However, populist movements do not have a monopoly on using empty signifiers, as political identity projects of all kind are necessarily built

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[17] One could point to the difference between Ukrainians and Russians as one such example.

around empty signifiers (Norval 2000, 220). Further, populism, the practice of creating political identities around empty signifiers, is the very act of constituting the unity of a group, not simply the mobilisation of an already existing group (Laclau 2007, 73). Thus, "'the people' is not something of the nature of an ideological expression, but a real relation between social agents." (ibidem). Empty signifiers do not summon pre-existing social groups, they create them.

Further, empty signifiers are the condition of *hegemony*, which in ideological discourse analysis is understood as a "relation by which a particular content becomes the signifier of the absent communitarian fullness" (Laclau 1996, 43). That is, hegemonic struggles attempt to craft a particular difference into assuming the representation of universality (Laclau 2007, 70). For example, the particular philosophical and social construct of European rationalism became a universalised particular during Europe's imperialist expansion (Laclau 1996, 24). According to Jacob Torfing, "discourse is constructed in and through hegemonic struggles that aim to establish a political and moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of meaning and identity" (2005, 15). For our purposes, it is important to understand that like empty signifiers, hegemony is something emerging from the political interaction between groups, not the application of a pre-given organisational principle (Laclau 1996, 44).

Torfing further argues that "hegemonic articulation of meaning and identity is intrinsically linked to the construction of social antagonism" (2005, 15). That is, construction of social divisions, or othering, is crucial for the stabilisation of the discursive system. Such social antagonism shows itself through the production of *political frontiers*: political division lines built between a united inside and an excluded outside, articulated with the help of the empty signifier. "Social antagonism involves the exclusion of a series of identities and meanings that are articulated as part of a chain of equivalence, which emphasize the 'sameness' of the excluded elements." (Torfing 2005, 15). Example of a political frontier could be the use of the terms patriotism and fascism in contemporary Russian political discourse: the terms are understood as mutually exclusive, and the former is discursively

equated with positive features while the latter is a strictly negative concept. Fascism was prolifically used as a political delegitimation tool especially in mid-2000s in Russia. During the Ukraine conflict, the new Ukrainian authorities have been accused of being Jews, gay, and fascists in Russian social media sites and internet publications[18]. When a political frontier exists, elements on the same side of the frontier become equivalent to each other, as the unlikely equation of fascists and Jews shows.

I will use the concepts of empty signifiers, political frontiers, and hegemony in the analysis of IM representations in UK and RG. These concepts are specifically useful for the Ukrainian case, because they expose the way political identities are constructed through equation and exclusion. Ukrainian authorities are in a difficult position because, on the one hand, alienating the residents of Donbas from Ukrainian nation would pre-empt the war effort, but on the other hand, the situation offers the perfect opportunity for nation-building through exclusion of the separatists. At the same time, Russian authorities need to tread a fine line between including Ukrainians into the concept of the Russian nation on the one hand, and respecting a country's right to self-determination on the other.

An assumption behind the thesis is that because the involuntary migrants from Donbass are both literally and discursively "between" Russia and Ukraine, their representation in state media can show where the states attempt to erect the borders of their nations through a hegemonic struggle. I want to show that this demarcation is not done in ethnic terms in these government-owned publications. Not only would an ethnic framing be unfounded because the origins of the Donbas conflict are not rooted in ethnic grievances (see e.g. Bukkvoll 2016; Kuzio 2017; Wood et al. 2016), but also because it would not be politically expedient for either country. For Russia, taking an explicitly ethnic stance to Donbas displacement would be problematic because it would force the interpretation of the "Russian nation" to a more ethnic ground and close some policy doors that Kremlin wants kept open (Shevel 2011b; Laine 2017). In the case of Ukraine, drawing exclusionary lines in ethnic terms would

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[18] See e.g. The Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10661617/Vigilante-units-to-defend-Crimea-city-against-fascist-threat-from-Kiev.html and Kharkiv Human Rights Protection group: http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1422974633

instantly justify Russia's intrusion into Eastern Ukraine and possibly enrage Ukraine's Western partners, especially Brussels. These conundrums will be explored more throroughly in Chapter Six. In the current chapter, I will examine the ways political frontiers are drawn in these publications without referring to ethnicity. In the following sections, I will review the main thematic tropes and clusters presented in the previous chapters, using the tools of ideological discourse analysis explained above.

5.2 Uriadovyi Kurier: National unity threatened by fake IDPs

In this section, I discuss how UK presents the political loyalties of the IMs and the way their representation changes over time. UK articles in the Life in Displacement category describe the IMs largely in a positive manner and often mention how their political outlook has changed from agnosticism to active support of the Ukrainian nation as a result of the conflict. For example, a long story from June 2014 describes how those fleeing the war do not complain about anything and are only grateful for help: "The main thing is being alive; Dnipropetrovsk people have greeted us so well," says Liudmila, an IDP from Donbas (UK 27/06/2014). Almost without exception, the involuntary migrants interviewed in these stories were or had recently turned into proponents of the Ukrainian central state.

In 2014, UK articles feature several mentions of alleged repression of pro-Ukrainian people in Donbas and occupied Crimea, and calls to strengthen national unity. An article from 27 June 2014 recounts the story of Tetiana from Kramatorsk and her family, who were forced to leave their house after the referendum about DNR's status held in May, as Tetiana's husband was a member of the well-known Dnipro battalion in the Ukrainian army and her son a scout in a (nationalist) scout organisation. Tetiana says that after their departure from Kramatorsk, her son's scout friend was arrested and questioned about him. She says her family did not realise they were pro-Ukrainian until the recent events (UK 27/06/2014.) One article, commenting on procedures of accepting IDP students to

universities in September 2014, ends with a moralistically coloured lecture about national unity and the inadmissibility of giving in to enemy propaganda among students:

> "[The problem] is about dividing [people] into one's own and others (podil na svoyikh ta chuzhikh). Of course, it is difficult to find yourself in the regions which are opposed to you, according to enemy propaganda. But we must remember that this is a lie, that we are all one people. Residents of the East sometimes face a prejudiced attitude of people from other regions, laid down on the soil prepared by propaganda. Usually they are blamed for what happened, or for an atrophied sense of patriotism. There is only one solution here – do not play into the hands of the enemy, do not succumb to provocations." (UK 3/09/2014)

This concern with ensuring national unity by urging IDPs and those encountering them to surpass the false notion of an internal division in the Ukrainian society, created by Russian propaganda, amounts to a hegemonic struggle for identity (Torfing 2005). The division between east and rest is rejected in exchange for the idea of unified nation. The author argues that newcomers from the east need to be patiently explained how volunteers are helping at the front and through various organisations, so that the IDPs too can understand the importance of student unity (UK 3/09/2014.)

In 2014 at least, there was thus a clear attempt to politically integrate IDPs from Donbas into the Ukrainian political community. This is further exemplified by the themes of employment and adaptation issues discussed in 2015. These topics evoked both sympathy and suspicion towards the IDPs, who were seen both as victims of unfair stereotypes and sometimes dishonest about their qualifications and prone to blame others for their problems. The rather positive representations of IMs as politically loyal to the Ukrainian central state thus gives way to more negative and ambivalent representations over time.

By 2016, the trope of "fake IDPs" as funders of terrorism emerges as dominant, alongside with articles about engaging foreign governments and aid organisations in managing the IDP issue. As NGOs argue, the problem of fake IDPs in Ukraine is a direct result of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers resolutions 505 and 637 introduced in 2014, which establish residence and registration in government-controlled areas as a prerequisite for claiming any kind of benefits (IDMC 2016; Ferris et al. 2015). The resolutions created new IDPs and forced people remaining behind the contact line

and either unable or unwilling to permanently move to GCAs to shuttle back and forth across the contact line to claim their pensions and other benefits, and often to use the services of semi-legal middlemen to obtain registration documents in the GCAs. To curb these practices, in February 2016 the government suspended the payment of social benefits to 150,000 people and implemented a verification procedure for IDPs' registration documents as a condition for continuing payments (IDMC 2016).

These investigations were eagerly discussed in UK in early 2016. Ukraine's difficult state budget situation, hampered by the conflict, was often mentioned. The alleged fake IDPs themselves are never interviewed in UK, nor are their motivations discussed or interpreted. In a couple of articles the authors express sympathy with those wrongfully included on the lists of people whose benefit payments have been suspended because of fraud investigations. For example, an article from March 2016 reports that IDP pensioners are contacting the offices of the state Pension Fund en masse to resume their pension payments, which has resulted in massive queues. According to local activists, every morning hundreds of elderly people queue at the door before opening hours, in frost, with nowhere to sit, and guards only let a few people inside the office at once. Local activists are trying to defend the elderly people's right to queue indoors (UK 30/03/2016.) At the same time, other articles on the topic discuss the clever methods of misappropriation used by the fraudsters, who appear as nothing short of hardened criminals. The criminals are said to cooperate with corrupt officials in regional branches of state institutions. According to the Minister of Social policy Pavlo Rozenko, huge criminal schemes have been built on distributing assistance to IDPs, with multibillion sums in circulation. Rozenko claims that some of these funds from the Ukrainian budget and Ukrainian taxpayers flow into the pockets of corrupt officials, terrorists and Russian invaders (UK 19/04/2016.) A careful differentiation is thus anxiously crafted between the fake IDPs and "real" ones in actual need of help.

The image of IDPs in this discourse can be interpreted as a floating signifier, that is, a signifier without a singular, unambiguous signified: the signifying relationship between IDPs and the group of people it refers to is contested. Perhaps this is the reason why the legalistic term IDP (vnutrishnio peremisheni osoby) appears so rarely in UK articles, and more vague words like migrant or settler (pereselentsi) are used instead. The UN definition of an IDP includes everyone displaced from their habitual place of residence without crossing an internationally recognised state border, regardless of their new place of residence (UNHCR 2004). In UK, this inclusive definition is contested: only people living in government-controlled areas are counted as IDPs, and those who have been displaced inside rebel-held areas are demonised as fake IDPs. A representative from the state security service of Ukraine (SBU), commenting on the investigations into alleged benefit fraud, stated in February 2016: "Now that Ukraine is at war with an aggressor, in our state budget every penny is important. I responsibly emphasize: we do not threaten *decent people* (poriadny liudy) who migrated from the occupied territories to safe areas and actually live there" (UK 27/02/2016, emphasis added). The implications of this statement are evident: those IDPs conforming to the state definition are honest, decent people, who can be included in the national unity of Ukraine, while false IDPs staying in rebel-held areas are not.

The figure of the fake IDP, in turn, can be seen as a constitutive myth in the hegemonic struggle to identity in UK's discursive system. As argued above, no coherent identity can exist without the exclusion of something else, which thus articulates the limits of that identity. For a national unity of Ukraine to exist, and for the IDPs to be included in that unity, some elements have to be excluded. This is where the empty signifier of fake IDPs comes in handy: the category of the fake IDP absorbs all politically suspicious migrants from the combat zone. Furthermore, a chain of equivalence is constructed between fake IDPs, professional criminals involved in organising the benefit fraud schemes, corrupt officials, and finally the "terrorists" directly or indirectly benefiting from the money flows to NGCAs. For example, an article from 2015 reports that employees of the Pension Fund and

the Labour and Social Protection Department of the Markivskiy district ensured the re-registration of pensions and social benefits to persons who allegedly moved to the district from territory controlled by "terrorists", for a compensation of 200 hryvnias (UK 13/02/2015). Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik seems correct in her argument that "in a state-sponsored war, civilians living in the enemy camp, even if they are not engaged in hostilities, are conceived by the other side as 'failed citizens'." (2017, 27).

In conclusion, the above analysis shows that what matters in UK reporting on IMs is their political loyalty towards the Ukrainian central state. If in the beginning of the crisis, people fleeing from Crimea and Donbas are portrayed mostly positively as victims of oppression who made the conscious decision of aligning themselves with the unitary Ukrainian state, later on UK's reporting concentrates solely on fake IDPs and foreign help in dealing with displacement. A political frontier is constructed between Ukrainian national unity, exemplified by selfless volunteers and "honest, hard-working" IDPs who fled to GCAs (and stayed there) on the one hand, and the thieving fake IDPs, corrupt officials, and Russian occupiers, on the other. Unfortunately for the IDPs living in NGCAs, they are the constitutive outside of the political identity that UK constructs.

5.3 Rossiiskaia Gazeta: showcasing Russian state capacity

If UK is thus keen to draw a dividing line between decent, honest people supporting the central state on the one hand, and fake IDPs on the other, RG articles are characterised by a careful avoidance of drawing any lines between people. In fact, applying the analytical tools of ideological discourse analysis on the Russian data proved quite difficult; it seems like RG is not using the topic of displacement to engage in an identity construction project like UK. Most of the articles on RG are reports with rather technical characteristics and few interviews with displaced people themselves. The main actors in RG's reporting on Donbas displacement are the Russian state and regional authorities in their capacity as executives of policy. As mentioned earlier, Crisis Management remains the main category of articles throughout the data collection periods. While UK articles suddenly become very

politicised with the flashy fake IDP stories in 2016, RG articles, in contrast, seem to become more bureaucratic and technical towards the end of my observation period. The involuntary migrants themselves figure surprisingly little in RG's reporting about displacement. Instead, the articles bring to the fore the Russian state and its sublime capacity both to secure societal peace and stability despite mass-scale immigration, and to provide for the refugees.

As discussed in Chapter Two, several salient themes, for example the trope of fraternal nations and Novorossiia, are available in Russian public discourse for interpreting the Donbas displacement in identarian terms. However, RG makes very little use of these tropes. Even when the fraternal nations trope appears, it is subordinate to emphasising Russian state capacity. For example, in a June 2014 report about the speaker of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko's visit to the city of Vladimir, where some Ukrainian refugees were settled, Matvienko is quoted as saying that Russians and Ukrainians living in Ukraine are "our family" (rodnye nam liudy). Matvienko takes the chance to express solidarity with the residents of Luhansk and Donetsk, and to accuse Ukraine of using anti-Russian propaganda to hide the fact the Ukrainian state is not coping with the situation. Russia, on the other hand, is capable of receiving all Ukrainians in need of help, according to Matvienko (RG 20/06/2014.)

Similarly, compatriot resettlement programmes, which could easily be used to evoke identarian interpretations of the crisis, are mainly discussed as solutions to economic problems in Russian regions. Compatriot resettlement programmes were frequently mentioned in spring 2014 and a few times in 2016. For example, RG reported in May 2014 that the regional administration of Smolensk oblast is expecting a sharp increase in interest for the region's compatriot resettlement programme following the events in Ukraine. The region hopes to the reverse the trend of natural population decrease in its agricultural areas by attracting qualified professionals into the resettlement programme. It is noted that the region is not prepared to receive just any kinds of compatriots, however: factors such as insufficient proficiency of Russian language, inability to work or to

independently solve questions of housing are listed as reasons for not accepting applications (RG 14/05/2014.) Thus, the compatriot, an educated, Russian-speaking refugee with useful skills was an anticipated actor in 2014.

However, the compatriots themselves remain silent in 2014 and later. In 2016, a few articles comment on numbers of Ukrainians who have received Russian citizenship through the resettlement programmes from a rather technocratic viewpoint. An article from April 2016 reports that more than one million Ukrainian citizens have arrived to Russia following the events in Donbas. About 325,000 of them have applied for asylum in Russia and 120,000 Ukrainians have applied for participation in the state resettlement programmes. The article mentions that the overwhelming majority of the participants of resettlement programmes are between the ages of 18 and 60, that is, able-bodied population (RG 22/04/2016.) In a similar vein, the head of the presidential administration Sergei Ivanov is quoted in 2015, urging the heads of Russian regions to alleviate the burden of refugee flows on the Rostov region, saying "[t]hese are our brotherly Slavs with good professions, they will help us both with the demographic situation and with improving the situation in the labour market" (RG 29/01/2015). In this way, even if some of the RG articles make explicit reference to "brotherly Slavs" or Russian-speaking compatriots, it is in connection with their potential to reverse negative population trends and provide the Russian labour market with capable workforce. I would argue that any comments about their possible coethnicity with Russians are subordinate to their instrumental role in the economy. Any participants of the resettlement programmes are not interviewed.

The Russian ability to handle large-scale immigration is also related to questions of geopolitical orientation: Russian state capacity to deal with the influx of displaced people from Donbas is compared with and contrasted to Ukraine and its Western partners. In a long interview following news reports on unprecedented numbers of refugees arriving to Europe, the head of Federal Migration Service (FMS) Kontantin Romodanovskii fantasises about streams of Europeans, disappointed with multicultural policies, moving en masse to Russia. Romodanovskii mentions the nearly "2 million

Ukrainian refugees in Russia" as a demonstration of Russia's ability to receive and integrate migrants. According to him, most of those who have arrived from Ukraine have received legal status, work, and accommodation, and Russians have not been bothered by them in the least (RG 28/02/2016.) Also, in an article about a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization[19] in Minsk, CSTO's general secretary Nikolai Bordiuzha says that Ukrainian refugees do not pose any problems for Russia or Belarus. According to him, the 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees[20] in Russia have been employed, do not riot or organise demonstrations, and "do not require social guarantees and excessive attention to themselves." In Bordiuzha's view, this is a result of the Russian authorities' work, as they have done everything possible to prevent tensions, hinting that European authorities have not been as successful in handling the refugee situation (RG 5/02/2016.)

A political frontier of sorts is thus drawn between Ukraine and EU countries on the one hand and the Russian state on the other. The actors with the most negative portrayal in the RG articles are the Ukrainian government and military. For example, an analytic piece drawing conclusions about the year since the Maidan revolution quotes a refugee from Mariupol: "It was hell there. The degree of people's hatred toward the authorities in Kyiv has grown a lot. Those who were against the authorities were repressed. (...) They caught people and tortured them, like in the movies" (RG 21/02/2015). The article questions whether the government and authorities of Ukraine truly represent the will of the people. The "Kievan authorities" are most directly criticised in articles about refugees avoiding conscription into the Ukrainian army, a topic that was especially relevant right before the second Minsk agreement when Ukraine declared a mobilisation campaign. The articles note the changing gender and age composition of the refugee groups arriving to Rostov oblast: in early 2015, there were proportionately more young men than earlier. Their decision to leave Ukraine in face of draft to the

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[19] CSTO; Ukraine is not a member state

[20] Notable in these citations is not only that the authorities cite differing numbers of Ukrainian refugees in Russia within the same month, but also that their estimates are remarkably higher than independent estimates of the numbers of displaced people in Russia. According to UN estimates, in early 2016 they numbered about 1.1 million (UNHCR 2016).

army is interpreted with sympathy. The fugitives state that they do not want to fight against their own people: one article quotes Sergei, a fugitive from Donbas, who says that conscription is fratricide (RG 29/01/2015.)

In another article, the journalists interview 40-year-old Valery, who came from Donbas with his son, a student, who nearly became an army recruit. Valery says that on DNR territory, mobilisation is voluntary while in Ukraine it is compulsory. "Residents of the part of the Donbas controlled by Ukraine have a hard time, because people are especially zealously taken into the army there, 'to conquer [back] their [own] territory'. They send soldiers after [their own] brothers or parents with machine guns." It is mentioned that most of those evading draft come from the eastern regions of the country, perhaps implying that conscripts from the western or central regions of Ukraine are less concerned with moral dilemmas about fratricide (RG 3/02/2015.) "We left for the sake of our wives and children. It was hell there, they bombed everything. We are not relevant (my ne otnosimsya k) to Kyiv, it is not our mobilisation," says Ruslan, 30. "But if the [Ukrainian] security forces clamp down on DNR, I will leave my wife and children here, and I will go to defend my land" (RG 5/02/2015.)

The articles discussing draft evasion thus exemplify the starkest social antagonism evident in the data: illegitimate Kievan authorities against the *people* of Donbas, refusing to fight their brothers. However, the Russian state is conspicuously absent from these stories. Another division is apparent in the RG articles between the Russian state and Ukrainian authorities with their Western partners, but involuntary migrants, in turn, are largely absent from this act of demarcation as active subjects, save for those refugees who chose to flee to EU countries. The naivety of those who applied for asylum in Germany but were denied it is ridiculed. Connecting these two division lines into an unbroken political frontier is hindered by the lack of an empty signifier that could unite all the actors and phenomena under the discourse of Russian state capacity, for example. Potential candidates for empty signifiers include the fugitives fleeing conscription into Ukrainian army, the refugees themselves, the Russian state, and the people opposing the Kievan authorities. However, most of

these categories have some kind of referential meaning, and none of them appear in both articles addressing relationships between Kyiv and "the people" and those discussing Russian state capacity in comparison with Ukraine and the West.

Applying the concepts of ideological discourse analysis to the RG data thus seems tendentious. No apparent empty signifiers were detectable in the data, and the refugees themselves figure very little in the discussion about displacement, except when their experience has direct political import, as in the case of draft evasion. Instead of forcibly cramming the data to into my analytic model, I concede that the choice of analytic tools is unsuitable for RG articles.

5.4 National identity versus state capacity

Analysis of the articles thus reveals that whereas UK does use the theme of displacement for identity construction, RG deploys the master narrative of Russian state capacity and engages in identity forging only sporadically. In UK reporting, the Ukrainian national unity is delimited with the figure of the fake IDP, who is separate from honest, "real" IDPs, and who is equated with terrorists, corruption, and Russian occupants. This act of social othering is not articulated in the language of ethnicity, language choice, or religion, but is determined by political loyalties.

The discussion on displacement in UK maps neatly on the IDA concepts presented in the beginning of this chapter. That is, the IDPs are relevant to the way the Ukrainian state attempts to negotiate its relationship to a nation. As was expected, this relationship is not based on ethnic differentiation, but rests on political loyalty. What UK discusses less in connection with the displacement crisis is the state's capacity to manage it, in contrast to RG, which devotes a lot of attention to this. The articles about foreign states and aid organisations seem to be the most direct attempts at referencing this topic in UK: state and regional authorities appear together with representatives of foreign states (most often Germany) in sites where targeted assistance to IDPs is organised. Exact sums of assistance are often mentioned, highlighting the beneficial impact of Western partnership to the Ukrainian state budget.

In fall 2014 there were a few mentions about the state and regional authorities' struggle to cope with the inflow of displaced people from the east. Stories about international cooperation start appearing in winter 2015 and dominate UK's reporting by 2016, together with the fake IDP stories.

In RG, there is little emphasis on nation-building, despite the salience of nationality questions in the Russian society and the nation-building project that has accelerated during Putin's third term. RG emphasises Russian state capacity and contrasts it with that of Ukraine and its partners, but does not display coherent attempts at identity construction. Consequently, applying the concepts of ideological discourse analysis on the Russian data proved to be rather difficult. The assumption that the newspapers would be concerned with identitarian issues only applies to UK. It is clear that for UK, the discourse on displacement is predominantly one of nationhood, while for RG, it is primarily about the state's resources and capabilities, and only secondarily about identity. In the next chapter, I turn to discussing the consequences of these findings to the original hypotheses and research design.

6. Aspects of the state

In this chapter, I will summarise the findings of the data analysis presented in Chapters Four and Five and discuss their theoretical consequences. The analysis in Chapter Four showed that the involuntary migrants are portrayed more positively in RG than UK, and mapped the main topics present in the publications. Against my expectations, Crisis Management remained a salient topic in RG reporting, while its importance declined in UK over time, although it was the second largest category in UK even in 2016.

In Chapter Five, we found that UK attempts to construct Ukrainian national unity by drawing a political frontier between "real" and "fake" IDPs. Similar identity constructions projects were largely absent from RG, which seems much more preoccupied with proving Russian state capacity in connection with the displacement crisis. In this chapter, I will discuss the importance of both the issues that were and were not found in the data, the shortcomings of the analysis, and what needs to be researched further. I will begin with addressing the puzzle presented in the end of the previous chapter, namely that while UK clearly does use the figure of the displaced person for building political identities, RG does not, despite readily available discursive tools in the public sphere.

6.1 Statehood versus statecraft

The discourse on displacement in both publications does appear to relate to the state, but from different angles. In Ukraine, the internally displaced are eagerly attached to the discourse of Ukrainian nationhood. Looking at the articles across the two-year observation period, it is evident that the Donbas crisis expedites the process of Ukrainian nation-building. The initially fuzzy categories slowly change into a more and more solid political division into Ukrainian national unity and its enemies, embodied in the figure of the fake IDP. This finding is consistent with other recent research on the conflict. For example, Greta Uehling argues that "after the conflict with Russia in the east and the occupation of Crimea in the south, there is a clearer sense of what it means to be Ukrainian emerging." (2017, 70). Indeed, as Rogers Brubaker argues, high levels of group consciousness may

be the result of ethnic conflict, rather than the other way around (2004, 19). My analysis of UK reporting reinforces these conclusions and shows how exactly this emerging "groupness" is discursively constructed.

However, I failed to find a similar identity construction project in RG. In the Russian paper, the crisis evokes assurances of Russian state capacity, but few attempts to engage the displaced people in an act of demarcation. This potentially awkward conclusion can be explained by paying attention to two different aspects of "stateness" that UK's and RG's reporting on displacement highlight. Stef Jansen, discussing his informants' desires for "normal lives" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, argues for analytically distinguishing between two aspects of the state: state*hood* and state*craft* (2015). According to Jansen, questions of statehood relate to what the state is, claims to be, and should be: they explore the legitimacy of a polity and its administrative-territorial anatomy, for example, questions of sovereignty and representation in identitarian terms (2015, 12). Statecraft, in turn, is concerned with what the state does, claims to do, and should do; in a word, state capacity. Key concerns of statecraft are the provision of material conditions and temporal structures for the unfolding of 'normal lives' (ibidem). Against this analytical background, it is quite clear that Uriadovyi Kurier articles on Donbass IDPs mostly deal with statehood, while Rossiiskaia Gazeta essentially discusses statecraft through its representation of Ukrainian refugees.

What is interesting is that these newspapers emphasise opposite aspects of the state, despite high salience of the other aspects in society. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Two, media analyses from Russia and Ukraine indicate that the representation of forcibly displaced persons from Donbas has been connected, among other issues, to questions of state capacity in Ukraine and to the nation-building agenda in Russia. In the case of these governmental newspapers, the situation appears to be completely reversed.

The issue of state capacity, especially in relation to corruption, is a persistent topic of political discussion in Ukraine. It is odd indeed that the Ukrainian paper devotes much less attention to

questions of statecraft than RG does, even though the Ukrainian "revolution of dignity" started out as a protest against corruption, clearly a question of statecraft, rather than provoked by identarian questions. True, the developments in Ukrainian society since 2014 have been interpreted in nationalist terms not only in Ukrainian domestic discourse, but also in the international press and Russian media. According to Richard Sakwa,

> "The Association Agreement offered by the EU in the framework of the Eastern Partnership proposed a lifeline to break out from the corruption and economic degradation in which Ukraine had been mired for so long. The original idealism of the Maidan protests was based on the profound repudiation of the failures of the past, but its idealism was not rooted in a substantive real political constituency. It was not able to sustain a political formation that could institutionalise its idealism" (2015, 269).

Instead, the Maidan protest movement became radicalised along the lines of Ukrainian nationalism (ibidem). This shows how easily nationalist rhetoric can mobilise people and demobilise alternative politics (Jansen 2015, 10). The reporting on displacement in Uriadovyi Kurier seems to attempt to make even the question of corruption into an issue of nationhood by equating corrupt officials with the separatists and excluding them from Ukrainian national unity.

The reasons for determinedly ignoring questions of statecraft in the Ukrainian publication can be only speculated here, but many journalists and analysts have paid attention to the new government's failure to curb corruption after the Maidan revolution. Former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was appointed the governor of Odesa in May 2015 has publicly complained that Ukraine's government is not even trying to change corrupt institutions and that in fact both central and regional level politicians actively resist anti-corruption measures (New York Times 16 November 2016[21]). Thomas de Waal, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, notes that "the Ukrainian public is increasingly frustrated and cynical, perceiving that much of the old predatory political class has survived into the post-2014 era and that the fundamentals of the old system remain unchanged." (2016[22]).

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[21] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/opinion/why-ukraine-is-losing-the-war-on-corruption.html?_r=0
[22] http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/04/18/fighting-culture-of-corruption-in-ukraine-pub-63364

Also, IDPs themselves have lamented the state's scant resources for assisting displaced people. While the crisis has contributed to the development of a civic Ukrainian identity, "there is deep disenchantment [among Crimean IDPs] with the Ukrainian state that manifests itself most strongly in feelings of having been abandoned and betrayed by the government." (Uehling 2017, 63). According to Uehling, the government's failure to implement an effective policy response to internal displacement has effectively made IDPs second class citizens by depriving them of voting rights, access to state-funded education and sometimes to their own funds in Crimean banks (2017, 67). The government is no doubt aware of these shortcomings and popular mood regarding persistent corruption. The reluctance to discuss corruption or state capacity in UK does not need to be motivated by a conscious attempt to deflect attention away from the issue, but at the least it is obvious that it may be an inconvenient topic in an era of institutional change.

Meanwhile, questions of statehood, especially the role and borders of the nation, have been politically important themes in Russia for years, but they are little explored in RG. It is quite surprising that the publication chooses not to use displacement for advancing the goals of president Putin's nation-building project. There may be several reasons for this, the deliberate ambiguity of the concept of the Russian nation itself being the main one. Oxana Shevel has argued that below the surface of the "consensus" definition of the nation, which serves as the basis for Russia's refugee policy, the definition of the Russian nation has been both legally and discursively ambiguous, because this has served the interests of Russian foreign policy and especially its relations with its "near abroad" (Shevel 2011a; 2011b). Specifically, while there is a consensus between Russia's main political actors that the Russian nation extends beyond the current borders of the Russian federation, there are disagreements about how far it extends. Are all Belarusians and Ukrainians included? What about Russian-speakers in Soviet successor countries? Shevel notes that the 1999 law on Russian compatriots, by function of being extremely fuzzy, legally institutionalises the ambiguity of the nation's boundaries and relieves the state from the problems any stringent definition would inevitably

contain (Shevel 2011b, 193). At its broadest, the term compatriot could include any post-Soviet citizen and their descendants, while the narrower understandings require at least native language level knowledge of Russian, if not Russian ethnicity.

Even more recently, despite Kremlin's increasing willingness to define the Russian nation in more ethnic terms, the Russian society and political elites seem far from having a consensus on the exact attributes of the nation. While there is social demand for a narrower legal interpretation of the nation in Russia, ethnically exclusive definitions of the nation in a multi-ethnic federal state inevitably lead to a political dilemma (Laine 2017). According to Marlene Laruelle, even defining "what is to be understood as 'nationalism' in Russia is challenging, as several traditions compete–some limiting it to ethnonationalism, some including references to the imperial past or Soviet identity, and some insisting on a civic or legal definition" (Laruelle 2015, 88). The Kremlin has attempted to reign in the most radical manifestations of Russian ethnonationalism and to promote a more moderate version of nationalism, less fraught with xenophobic overtones. The deepening cooperation between the Russian orthodox church and the state would appear to suggest a conception of Orthodox faith as a shared attribute of Russian nationhood, but this is again problematic, as multi-confessionality is institutionalised in Russia's constitution.

Further, the Ukraine crisis has had a definitive impact on the discursive field of national unity in Russia (Laine 2017). First, the war in Donbass has deflected attention away from the issue of immigration from Central Asia, the radical nationalist groups' main base of political support in society. Second, the crisis had made the Kremlin warier of the radical opposition, as it now deems it a threat to the country's stability (ibidem). The conflict has thus led to more determined attempts to eliminate oppositional ethnonationalist movements in Russia. Radical nationalists have also become divided over the Ukraine question: while some have advocated annexation of whole of Novorossiia into Russia, some have questioned Russia's participation in the conflict, and some have even called

for respecting the nationhood of the Ukrainian people. Thus, while the Donbas crisis has expedited nation-building in Ukraine, it may have indirectly had the opposite effect in Russia.

One possible reason for emphasising state capacity in Rossiiskaia Gazeta is to reassure the domestic audience in conditions of severe economic downturn. This is the main idea of the social contract explanation of why there is seemingly so little protest in Russia. The Russian social contract, the argument goes, emerges as the population concedes acquiescence in exchange for stability and material wellbeing (for the mechanism of this social contract, see e.g. Treisman 2011; Guriev and Treisman 2016). This delicate balance has been threatened by the economic recession caused by falling oil prices and exacerbated by Western sanctions from summer 2014 onwards. According to this logic, the state may be anxious to show that it has control of the situation, and that the newcomers from Ukraine will make a net contribution to the Russian economy. Furthermore, as the economic base of this social contract crumbles, some claim that Kremlin is moving its focus from the state as a provider of material wealth towards geopolitical status (see e.g. Baunov 2016[23], Guriev 2016[24]). The Russian operations in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria are, in this view, simply attempts to extend Russian geopolitical power as its economic prospects become exhausted. It would also partially explain why the displacement crisis brings out such a strong emphasis on the state and its capacity in RG especially in contrast to Ukraine and EU countries.

The explanations outlined above for the discrepancies between themes salient in public discourse in Ukraine and Russia on the one hand, and the reporting on displacement in UK and RG on the other, indicate the possible danger zones of the topic of Donbas displacement in these societies. I have claimed that the inability to curb corruption in Ukraine and the dilemmas inherent in the definition of the nation in Russia at least partially explain why these government newspapers choose to emphasise statehood and statecraft in their reporting on displacement, respectively. Systematic research into

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[23] http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=60401
[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/opinion/in-russia-its-not-the-economy-stupid.html

other state-owned media in these countries could clarify whether this is just a feature of UK and RG reporting on the topic, or if for example state TV channels convey a similar picture.

Ultimately, the analytical distinction to statehood and statecraft demonstrates the insufficiency of the original nation-building hypothesis and the limits of ideological discourse analysis. Concentrating only on one aspect of statehood, the nation-building process, the migration hypothesis ignores issues of statecraft, and is unable to analyse data that lacks a strong identarian drive. The assumption that RG's attitude towards IMs is more positive than UK *because* of a nation-building agenda cannot thus be confirmed, as RG lacks a clear nation-building agenda, unless the obsession with state capacity is interpreted as one. In fact, while a nation-building drive was found in the UK articles, their tone was in aggregate more negative towards the involuntary migrants than in RG, because it was necessary to exclude some of them from the Ukrainian national unity. The expectation that any nation-building policy would a priori be fully inclusive of the displaced people was thus misinformed.

6.2 What about ethnicity?

Further, the findings of the analysis show that nationality in both publications seems to be a question of political choice, not of essentialist characteristics such as ethnicity or native language. In RG, the trope of fraternal peoples was referenced only a few times, always subordinate to the state capacity discourse. In contrast to Russian public discourses on the Donbas conflict and the subsequent displacement, the articles in RG do not extensively rely on the trope of fraternal people or explicitly question the existence of Ukrainians as a nation separate from Russians. The refugees are most often addressed as "Ukrainian citizens" rather than Russian-speakers or ethnic Russians. Similarly, in UK, the IDPs (even fake ones), are not addressed through an ethnic framework. It is sometimes mentioned that the "good IDPs" have switched to using Ukrainian language as a result of their political choice to align themselves with the Ukrianian state, thus hinting that Ukrainian language is an integral part of the newly forged national unity.

Recent literature on the Donbas conflict and the displacement it has caused also affirms the conclusion that ethnicity in this case may not be that useful as a nation-building tool. Michael Gentile, for example, comments on the possibility that interethnic hostilities might develop into a war in Ukraine, that "such an intervention would have to exploit actually existing divisions, and because cultural, ethno-national or linguistic divisions have little to offer in this sense, geopolitical orientations are the only viable alternative." (2017, 9). Indeed, choosing Ukraine's geopolitical reference group was one of the most important factors behind the Euromaidan in the first place. In both UK's and RG's reporting on Donbass displacement, political frontiers are not drawn along ethnic lines but along political loyalties, including geopolitical orientation. Choosing where to flee thus appears as the moment legitimising one's inclusion into either the in- or out-group, not some essentialist characteristics of the displaced people such as ethnicity or native language. Of course, political loyalty to a state has been characterised as one of the features of a civic nationalism.

The critique of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), that is, of interpreting migration solely in the framework of nation-states, appears justified in the case of Donbas displacement. Wimmer and Glick Schiller argue that "because we have come to take for granted a world divided into discrete and autonomous nation-states that we see nation-state building and global interconnections as contradictory" (2002, 301). Indeed, migration and nation-building in this case are mutually constitutive. I would however maintain that migration is, at least in this case, very much a question of stateness. As Didier Fassin would predict (2015), fundamental questions relating to the state were discovered at seeming margins of state practice. This is no doubt because of the state-centric research design of the current study; research concentrating on the views of the displaced persons themselves or on the work of non-governmental organisations might come to rather different conclusions.

Does this mean that Ukraine has become a wholly civic nation? Probably not. It is hard to generalise, based on this data, that ethnicity plays no role in Ukrainian politics in general or this conflict in

particular. On the ground, ethnicity or language choice might matter, as has been shown for attitudes to federalism in Ukraine (Chaisty and Whitefield 2017). It is thus necessary to distinguish between causes of the war, responses to the conflict, and framing of the conflict (in the West, Ukraine, and Russia). Far from claiming that primordial ethnicity constitutes the main social cleavage in the region, most scholars understand that ethnicity and language choice are used instrumentally by political actors in the region.

Further, it should be emphasised that my findings concern rhetorics rather than policy; even if it is likely that the these aspects of state practice are mutually informing, it is impossible to conclude that state policy towards IDPs in Ukraine has no ethnic underpinnings. On the rhetorical level, the Ukrainian authorities would be quite shortsighted to exclude ethnic Russians from Ukrainian national unity, even if it was politically expedient. Fighting for control of the eastern regions would be rather futile if their residents were not even seen as Ukrainians. An exclusion in ethnic terms would also immediately prove Russia's claims that ethnic Russians are in danger of being repressed in Ukraine. This is why ethnonationalist nation-building is logically less attractive than civic nationalism. In fact, finding attempts at ethnonationalist nation-building in Ukraine would have been rather surprising. For RG, explicitly referring to the refugees in ethnic terms would raise the stakes of its involvement in Eastern Ukraine and make an exit more difficult.

Finally, regarding the migration hypothesis, it should be clarified how local level antipathies would translate to government media representations. In fact, it turns out that level of press freedom affects the extent to which such representations are produced: despite negative accounts of Ukrainian refugees existing in the Russian media sphere, they are almost absent from RG reporting, while increasingly negative reporting on IDPs is a clear development in UK and Ukrainian media in general. The differing degrees of media freedom thus likely influenced how the dynamics predicted by the migration hypothesis appeared in the publications. In UK, the dynamic appears as the hypothesis predicted, but not in RG.

7. **Conclusion**

This thesis began with questions related to differences between the two publications under scrutiny, the newspaper of Ukraine's central government Uriadovyi Kurier, and Russian governmental newspaper Rossiiskaia Gazeta. Concentrating on their representations of people displaced by the armed conflict in Donbas, I asked what kind of assumptions become evident in the refugee/IDP representations; what kind of identities are created with the narratives; are there differences in how Russian and Ukrainian media represent the involuntary migrants, and if there are, what might cause these differences.

My hypothesis was that the displaced people would be portrayed more positively in the Russian than Ukrainian newspaper, since a positive representation is more consistent with Russia's policy approach towards its "compatriots" and refugee policy that favours coethnics. This nation-building hypothesis was informed by Oxana Shevel's research showing that Ukraine and Russia have treated in-migrating conationals differently because of different politics of national identity (2011a). A consensus conception of the Russian nation, held by Russian political elites, led to the Russian state creating a refugee policy privileging coethnics over more ethnically foreign refugees. Meanwhile, the contested nature of Ukraine's national identity in the 1990s created conditions favourable for a non-discriminating refugee policy. Thus, Ukraine does not favour conationals or coethnics over other types of refugees (Shevel 2011a.) It was assumed that these policy choices would somehow manifest in the way Ukraine and Russia relate to the involuntary migrants from Donbas, and that the attitudes of the states could be detected in the state newspapers.

I also suggested that as time passes, forced migrants might come to be represented first and foremost as a problem in both receiving states. The reasoning behind this is that negative attitudes towards newcomers is a general type social phenomenon, and affects even coethnics (Čapo Žmegač 2005). This was dubbed the migration hypothesis. Combining the two hypotheses, I expected that the representations of displaced people would differ at the beginning of the displacement crisis, with

Russian representations being more positive than Ukrainian ones, and that they would converge toward the more negative representations as the displacement becomes chronic.

According to a quantitative description of the data, the first hypothesis seemed to be confirmed: the overall tone of the Russian newspaper was more positive than the Ukrainian one. Also, the migration hypothesis was confirmed for UK but not for RG: the tone of the articles did become more negative in UK over time, but the same did not take place in RG. Further, against expectations, the Russian paper discussed crisis management measures more than the Ukrainian one, despite my assumption that Ukraine's budget shortfalls and problems with institutional design would make the questions of state capacity more salient in UK.

To explain these findings, ideological discourse analysis was used to explore the identity construction projects I assumed were behind the newspapers' reporting on displacement. However, a closer look revealed that Rossiiskaia Gazeta does not use displacement as a topic to advance the nation-building agenda of the state, despite the salience of this topic in Russian public discourse. Instead, it concentrates on aspects of Russian state capacity, especially in contrast to Ukraine and its Western partners. Tropes for interpreting the displacement crisis in identarian terms, available in the Russian public sphere, were used sparingly, and always subordinate to the master narrative of Russian state capacity.

Uriadovyi Kurier, in turn, was found to discuss displacement in a nation-building framework: the newspaper's reporting on the topic changed from overall positive representations of displaced people as victims of Russia's repressive practices and supporters of the Ukrainian central state to a more polarised discourse on international cooperation to help "real IDPs" and cautionary tales of "fake IDPs" attempting to scam benefits. It was suggested that this focus on fake IDPs was employed to build a political frontier between the separatists, their Russian backers, corrupt regional officials and fake IDPs on the one hand, and real IDPs, the Ukrainian state, and its Western partners on the other. The negative portrayal of the fake IDPs was necessary to delineate Ukrainian national unity.

These findings were analysed as exemplars of Stef Jansen's (2015) distinction between two aspects of the state, statehood and statecraft. The reporting in UK, with its emphasis on nation-building, was evidently more engaged with questions of statehood, whereas RG reporting clearly evoked features of statecraft, especially state capacity. Both did include instances of the other aspect of the state, but usually as a secondary theme. Further, the conclusions of the discourse analysis were interpreted in light of recent research on the Donbas conflict, which suggested that the respective governments may have reasons to emphasise some aspects of the state and subdue others. Ukraine's continued struggle with corruption and ineffective state institutions makes questions of statecraft inconvenient topics of discussion in a governmental newspaper. Similarly, the (purposeful) ambiguity of the Russian nation would have made explicit identity forging vis-à-vis the involuntary migrants from Ukraine potentially problematic for RG.

The analysis thus showed that the original migration hypothesis and assumption that both newspapers are engaged in identity construction turned out to be misguided: identarian issues represent only one side of the discourse on Donbas displacement. This, however, demonstrates the value of combining various analytical methods. Had the analysis stopped after the qualitative content analysis, this conclusion would not have emerged. Also, even though ideological discourse analysis could not fruitfully dissect the RG data lacking a strong identarian agenda, it did provide useful tools for analysing the Ukrainian data, and ultimately led to the present conclusion differentiating between the two aspects of the state.

7.1 Limitations of the research

In addition to the last argument, a few remarks about the limitations of the research have to be made. As already mentioned, this thesis can only speculate for the reasons UK and RG chose to concentrate on identarian issues and questions of state capacity, respectively. The previous chapter presented some educated guesses as to why this might be. Further, as this research cannot access the editorial policies of these two newspapers, determining the scope of their reporters' freedom to publish what

they want is limited. The uniformity of RG articles on the one hand and the occasional multivocality and critical approach of UK reporting, on the other, would seem to suggest that the editorial process in RG is more strictly controlled, despite Russia's federal structure.

An obvious objection to the research setting is that the research does not compare like with like, as IDPs and refugees have different legal status. This may have in fact affected coding of the articles, as most of the negatively coded stories in UK discussed fake IDPs. The lack of stories about "fake refugees" in RG is not surprising, knowing that the majority of Ukrainian refugees in Russia have not applied for refugee status, and cannot claim any targeted benefits as a consequence. Reports from Russian border regions have however included references to skirmishes over scarce resources between refugees and locals, showing that negative representations could have appeared in RG as well. Looking more closely at regional newspapers and their reporting on displacement might shed light on the question whether the absence of such reports in RG is deliberate or not.

Furthermore, the mechanism behind the second, migration hypothesis is slightly obscure: how would local level attitudes translate to government media? Why would they? In the Russian case, it may well be that the second hypothesis is not relevant at all, as Russia has a stronger central state apparatus than Ukraine. Even if some forms of antipathy to newcomers does exist in Russia (Mukomel 2016; 2017), the Russian power vertical might ensure that these antipathies never get represented in the state media. This is a conclusion I will have to accept. However, as argued in previous chapters, even propaganda has a specific form and uses particular language for a reason. This thesis has attempted to show that we cannot assume a priori how political actors will mobilise representations of a particular event or group; even when an opportunity exists to deploy them in identity construction, the actors involved may choose to not to. Future research should also look at other factors of identity, such as class, and the differences between economic winners and losers. Also, determining whether these divergent attitudes to displacement result in different treatment of involuntary migrants in Ukraine and Russia is a task for further studies.

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15/05/2014 Grazhdane Ukrainy reshili perebratsia na Kolymu

16/05/2014 V Volgogradskuiu oblast pereekhali 57 grazhdan Ukrainy

05/06/2014 Rossiiane mogut pomoch bezhentsam s Ukrainy pri pomoshchi SMS

11/06/2014 Glava FMS: Kolichestvo ukraintsev, priezzhaiushchikh v RF, uvelichilos v 5 raz

16/06/2014 V Rostovskuiu oblast pribylo bolee 109 tysiach zhitelei Ukrainy

16/06/2014 Kvoty na migrantov mozhno budet peresmatrivat v techenie goda

17/06/2014 V Kaluge bezhentsam s Ukrainy oplatiat oformlenie dokumentov

17/06/2014 V Mordovii gotoviat bazy dlia bezhentsev s Ukrainy

18/06/2014 Na Kubani razmestili 3300 bezhentsev s Ukrainy

20/06/2014 V Penzenskoi oblasti bezhentsam s Ukrainy pomogut s zhilem

20/06/2014 Nizhegorodskoe UFMS ezhednevno prinimaet sotni bezhentsev s Ukrainy

20/06/2014 Matvienko: Rossiya smozhet priniat vsekh bezhentsev s iugo-vostoka Ukrainy

23/06/2014 Pod Simferopolem otkryt palatochnyi lager dlia bezhentsev

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24/06/2014 V Iaroslavle na kazhdogo bezhentsa s Ukrainy vydeliat 120 tysiach rublei

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24/06/2014 Deti ukrainskikh bezhentsev budut uchitsia v donskikh shkolakh

24/06/2014 Kostroma predlozhila ukrainskim bezhentsam rabotu

24/06/2014 Iaroslavskaia oblast primet 450 bezhentsev s Ukrainy

25/06/2014 Rostovskaia oblast poluchit 240 mln rublei dlia bezhentsev s Ukrainy

25/06/2014 V Voronezhe priiutili eshche 124 bezhavshikh s Ukrainy zhenshchin i detei

25/06/2014 Putin poruchil pravitelstvu pomoch ukrainskim bezhentsam

26/06/2014 Pochti 100 tysiach bezhentsev iz Ukrainy obratilis v FMS Rossii

26/06/2014 Stavropol podgotovilsia k priemu bezhentsev

26/06/2014 V Iaroslavskuiu oblast pribyli 110 ukrainskikh bezhentsev

26/06/2014 Na Kubani lzhebezhentsy pokhitili u pensionerok 100 tysiach

26/06/2014 V Severnuiu Osetiiu pribyli 188 bezhentsev iz Ukrainy

26/06/2014 V Kalmykiiu pribyli sto bezhentsev s Ukrainy

27/06/2014 Proekt: Bezhentsy iz Ukrainy poluchat grazhdanstvo RF

22/08/2014 Pod Voronezhem khudozhniki sobrali v shkolu ukrainskikh detei

23/08/2014 V Bashkiriiu pribyli eshche 400 bezhentsev

27/08/2014 V shkoly TsFO poidut vosem tysiach detei iz Ukrainy

27/08/2014 V Rostovskoi oblasti priniali 57 zhenshchin i detei, spasshikhsia iz Donetska

27/08/2014 V Iakutsk i Magadan pribyli 380 bezhentsev s Ukrainy

27/08/2014 Opolchenets rasskazal, pochemu voiuet protiv kievskoi vlasti

29/08/2014 Pervye ukrainskie bezhentsy dobralis do Iamala

29/08/2014 Zavod v Pervouralske obespechil zhilem i rabotoi bezhentsev s Ukrainy

02/09/2014 OON: Chislo liudei, pokinuvshikh doma na Ukraine, prevysilo 1 mln chelovek

02/09/2014 Ukrainskie bezhentsy v Novosibirske poluchat matpomoshch

02/09/2014 Rossiiskie vuzy prodolzhat priem abiturientov s Ukrainy

03/09/2014 Rossiia razvernula pochti tysiachu punktov dlia bezhentsev

04/09/2014 Minkultury prigotovilo spisok vakansii dlia ukrainskikh bezhentsev

05/09/2014 Ukrainskie bezhentsy ne zhelaiut uezzhat iz Rostovskoi oblasti

05/09/2014 Ukrainskim abiturientam prodliat sroki priema v rossiiskie kolledzhi

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09/09/2014 LNR: Do 2,5 tysiachi bezhentsev ezhednevno vozvrashchaiutsia v Luganskuiu oblast

09/09/2014 Ukrainskikh bezhentsev primut v rossiiskie kolledzhi po uproshchennoi skheme

10/09/2014 V Lipetskuiu oblast pribyla novaia gruppa bezhentsev s Ukrainy

18/09/2014 V Rossii mozhet poiavitsia soiuz ukrainskikh bezhentsev

8/01/2015 Deti s Donbassa pobyvali na elke v Kremle

12/01/2015 Ukraintsam razreshat vezd v Rossiiu po vnutrennim pasportam

12/01/2015 V Rostovskoi oblasti rezko vyroslo chislo ukrainskikh bezhentsev

19/01/2015 Iaponskii telekanal snimet dokumentalnyi film o bezhentsakh na Donu

21/01/2015 V Moskve Vane Voronovu iz ukrainskogo Shakhterska stalo luchshe

22/01/2015 Na Donu otkroiut dva novykh lageria dlia bezhentsev

22/01/2015 OBSE: Za vremia konflikta v Donbasse pogibli svyshe 5 tysiach chelovek

23/01/2015 FMS: Chislo obrashchenii za ubezhishchem v RF v poslednee vremia udvoilos

24/01/2015 Opolchenie DNR pomozhet bezhentsam vernutsia domoi v osvobozhdennye raiony

25/01/2015 Na Donu novyi lager dlia bezhentsev zapolninsia za neskolko dnei

29/01/2015 V Rostovskuiu oblast bezhali okolo 150 ukrainskikh prizyvnikov

29/01/2015 MChS: Potok bezhentsev s Ukrainy ne izmenilsia s nachala goda

29/01/2015 Sergei Ivanov: Ukrainu ispolzuiut kak taran, chtoby rassorit RF i ES

02/02/2015 Na Donu otkrylis tri novykh lageria dlia ukrainskikh bezhentsev

03/02/2015 V Rostovskuiu oblast pribudut novye trudovye migranty

03/02/2015 Kak zhivut ukrainskie bezhentsy v lagere pod Rostovom

04/02/2015 Finskie zhurnalisty rasskazali pravdu ob ukrainskikh bezhentsakh v Rossii

05/02/2015 Ukrainskie prizyvniki stali skryvatsia ot mobilizatsii v Rossii

06/02/2015 V DNR i LNR otkryli gumanitarnye koridory

09/02/2015 LNR: Siloviki ne vypuskaiut mirnykh zhitelei iz Chernukhino

09/02/2015 Bezhentsy v donbasskoi Makeevke poprosili pomoshchi u rossiian

09/02/2015 Na Donu ne ostalos mest dlia ukrainskikh bezhentsev

17/02/2015 Opolchentsy DNR nachali evakuatsiiu mirnykh zhitelei iz Debaltsevo

18/02/2015 V Rostovskoi oblasti zarabotal ukrainskii zavod

18/02/2015 MChS predlozhilo pomoch bezhentsam i saperam v Donbasse

21/02/2015 Ukrainskie bezhentsy: Sobytiia na Maidane stali nachalom vsekh bed

25/02/2015 Iz Rostova v Moskvu vyletel samolet MChS s detmi iz Donbassa

19/01/2016 Germaniia otkazala tysiacham ukraintsev v predostavlenii ubezhishcha

20/01/2016 Germaniia otkazala v ubezhishche tysiacham ukraintsev

28/01/2016 Regiony poluchat 3 mlrd rublei na obustroistvo ukrainskikh bezhentsev

05/02/2016 Strany ODKB provedut spetsoperatsii po presecheniiu nelegalnoi migratsii

21/02/2016 Ukraintsam na Dalnem Vostoke sozdadut komfortnye usloviia

28/02/2016 Glava FMS ne iskliuchil uvelicheniia chisla migrantov iz Evropy

29/02/2016 Bezhentsam iz Ukrainy uprostiat obustroistvo v Rossii

24/03/2016 Pravitelstvo RF vydelilo regionam 736 mln rub na bezhentsev s Ukrainy

25/03/2016 V RF uprostiat vydachu vida na zhitelstvo bezhentsam s Ukrainy

14/04/2016 Pochemu pereselentsy uezzhaiut iz Primoria

22/04/2016 Bezhentsam iz Ukrainy uprostili vid na zhitelstvo

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08/04/2014 Iaknaishvydshe povernutysia dodomu

16/04/2014 Utikachi z okupovanoho pivostrova

17/04/2014 Uchorashni krymchany: pivostriv maie buty ukrainskym

19/04/2014 Dlia pereselentsiv z Krymy robotu znaidut

24/04/2014 Ponad 100 krymskykh studentiv vyviavyli bazhannia navchatysia u vuzakh Dnipropetrovshchyny

14/05/2014 Krymskykh pereselentsiv konsultuiut i na vokzali

25/05/2014 Liudmyla Denisova: U Derzhreiestri vybortsiv zareiestrovano 13 tysiach pereselentsiv z Krymu, Luhanskoi i Donetskoi oblastei

27/05/2014 Iak zhyty na okupovanii terytorii i poza neiu

04/06/2014 No Volyni likuiut poranenykh pid Volnovakhoiu i shukaiut blahodiinu dopomohu dlia zemliakiv

05/06/2014 Do vidoma pereselentsiv z Krymu: telefon sotsialnykh fondiv, Chervonoho Khresta, hromadskykh orhanizatsii, volonteriv, medikiv

12/06/2014 Arsenii Iatseniuk: ”Nasha propozitsiia bula, ie i zalyshaietsia tiieiu samoiu: zminy do kontraktu.”

12/06/2014 Pereselentsiam zi skhodu pensii vydavatymut za sproshchenoiu systemoiu

12/06/2014 Zhiteli skhodu ne zalyshylys bez medychnoi dopomohy

14/06/2014 Shevchenkiv krai pryimaie pereselentsiv

19/06/2014 Bizhentsi z Donbasu: ”U nas usim zapravliaiut znakhabnili bandyty”

19/06/2014 Pereselentsi bez roboty ne zalyshatsia

21/06/2014 Cherkashchany dopomohaiut pereselentsiam

21/06/2014 Iak pereselentsiam znaity svoie mistse u myrnomu zhytti

26/06/2014 Denys Hrechko: "Liudy pryizhdzhaiut u stani hlybokoho shoku"

27/06/2014 "A chomu ty ne poikhala zvidsy?"

27/06/2014 Tymchasovi pereselentsi: "Holovne, shcho zhyvi"

27/06/2014 Dobrota bez kordoniv i terminy tryvalosti

27/06/2014 Spodivaiutsia povernutysia dodomu

22/08/2014 Pedahohy-pereselentsi otrymaiut robotu za sproshchenoiu systemoiu

23/08/2014 "U Rivnomu nasha druha domivka"

28/08/2014 Iak zhive vyzvolennyi Sieverodonetsk

29/08/2014 Serhii Radutnyi: "My stvoryly vsi umovy, shchob pereselentsi zi skhodu mohly bezpereshkodno vidnovyty pasporty"

30/08/2014 Sproshcheno protseduru nabuttia statusu bezrobitnoho dlia pereselentsiv iz Krymu ta zony ATO

02/09/2014 "Uriadovyi kurier" diznavavsia, kudy doklasty pratsiu ruk svoikh vymushenym pereselentsiam iz Krymu to skhodu

02/09/2014 Chislenna rodyna z Kramatorska oblashtovuie svoie zhyttia v Ternopoli

03/09/2014 Vyzvolenyi Lysychansk ohovtuietsia pislia boiv, pryimaie chyslennykh pereselentsiv i vymahaie ziasuvaty doliu ukrainskoi humanitarnoi dopomohy

03/09/2014 Ia znaiu, shcho vy robyly tsoho lita!

04/09/2014 Vidnyni dlia perevedennia pensiinykh sprav do novykh mists prozhyvannia potribni lyshe osobyste zvernennia ta zaiava

05/09/2014 Kharkivshchyna maie 48 vilnykh dlia pereselentsiv

06/09/2014 Do novoi shkoly – z novym portfelem

10/09/2014 Novyi navchalnyi rik postavyv dodatkovi zavdannia

11/09/2014 Pereselentsiv prosiat vchasno reiestruvatysia u Kyievi

12/09/2014 Naperedodni kholodiv potribno znaity pomeshkannia dlia maizhe 15 tysiach pereselentsiv na Luhanshchyni

12/09/2014 Zhyttia tryvaie: u pereselentsiv narodzhuiutsia dity

19/09/2014 Aby otrymaty znizhku na liky, pereselentsiam potribno zareiestruvatysia

14/01/2015 Ponad milion ukraintsiv vyikhalo z Donbasu – OON

14/01/2015 Mama iz zony ATO

14/01/2015 Navchannia prodovzhytsia na myrnii terytorii

16/01/2015 Robota ie – bulo b bazhannia!

16/01/2015 Vidkladeni vkhodyny

16/01/2015 Zhyty v okupovanomy Donbasi nemozhlyvo

17/01/2015 Nimechchyna pikluietsia pro pereselentsiv

20/01/2015 Podillia i Krym: spilkuvannia movoiu kultury

24/01/2015 Pereselentsi pokhyloho viku vdiachni za pidtrymku

28/01/2015 Rosiiskyi ahresor spokushaie ukraintsiv ukhyliatysia vid mobilizatsii

28/01/2015 Pereselentsiam dopomozhut rozpochaty vlasnu spravu

28/01/2015 Mistechko z modulnykh budynochkiv dlia pereselentsiv z Donbasu vidkrylosia u Kharkovi

29/01/2015 Ievropa zbilshyt dopomohu na 15 milioniv ievro

29/01/2015 PARIe zvynuvatyla Moskvu u finansuvanni separatystiv

06/02/2015 Derzhsluzhba zainiatosti pratsiuie nezadovilno

07/02/2015 Im dosi snytsia temne pidzemellia

07/02/2015 Biznes v umovakh viiny

07/02/2015 Robochi mistsia pereselentsiam z Donbasu

10/02/2015 Vahon ochikuvannia

10/02/2015 Pidpryiemtsi Donbasu reiestruiut biznes na Kharkivshchyni

13/02/2015 Luhanshchyna: za dvoma… pensiiamy?

13/02/2015 Cherkasy: pereselentsi prybuvaiut shchodnia

13/02/2015 Chomu ukraintsi Donbasu ne zavzhdy pochuvaiutsia svoimy u ridnii kraini

14/02/2015 Pereselentsi maiut povernutysia dodomu

17/02/2015 Pavlohrad pryimaie pereselentsiv

19/02/2015 Zamist adresy – zona ATO

24/02/2015 Uriad proponuie zbilshyty vytraty na bizhentsiv u shist raziv

25/02/2015 Dopomoha pereselentsiam: liudske hore vymirialy u hroshsakh

26/02/2015 Rynok pratsi: zamist zvilnennia zaproponuiut perenavchannia

28/02/2015 Mykolaivtsi zbyraiut hroshi na likuvannia pidlitka z ridkisnym zakhvoriuvanniam

06/01/2016 Pereselentsiam dopomahaiut nimtsi

04/02/2016 Dvatsiat proektiv dopomozhut bizhentsiam i malozabezpechenym

09/02/2016 Sotsialna dopomoha pereselentsiam – prerohativa derzhavy

19/02/2016 Hranty spryiaiut rozvytku hromad na Donechchyni

24/02/2016 Perebizhchykiv nide ne liubliat

27/02/2016 Realnym pereselentsiam nichoho boiatysia

03/03/2016 Nove zhytlo dlia vymushenykh pereselentsiv

15/03/2016 Frantsuzka bilyzna dlia vnutrishnikh pereselentsiv

16/03/2016 Bila omela na derzhavnomu biudzheti

29/03/2016 Iz 250 tysiach pereselentsiv Luhanskoi oblasti pereviriat polovinu

30/03/2016 Pensionery Luhanshchyny pidtverdzhuiut status pereselentsiv

05/04/2016 Perekrittia zlochynnykh skhem tryvatyme i nadali

18/04/2016 Sotsvyplaty na okupovanii terytorii vidnovliat pislia vykonannia minskikh uhod – P. Rozenko

19/04/2016 Derzhava navodyt lad sered pereselentsiv

21/04/2016 Na Sumshchyni znaishly "lypovykh" pereselentsiv

21/04/2016 Na Zaporizhzhi pereselentsiam nadaiut zhytlo