Hellenism and Productivity in the Early Schelling

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This thesis explores F.W.J. Schelling's conception of philosophical productivity during his early period in the context of *Griechentum* or German Hellenism. Schelling is a German Hellene and grows under the influence of Johann J. Winckelmann, considered the father of *Griechentum*. That Schelling understands philosophy as productive, means that he conceives of philosophy as a matter of producing intellectual intuitions and *Hen kai Pan*; in fact, these two are inseparable. For the production of intellectual intuition is according to the ambit of *Hen kai Pan*. That he does so as a German Hellene means two things: first, he formulates this conception of philosophy out of a direct engagement with Ancient Greek philosophical texts, primarily Plato's; this is apparent especially in his early notes on Plato. In his engagement with the philosophical and religious doctrine of *Hen kai Pan*, Schelling inscribes himself in a tradition of philosophy that mostly consists of Ancient Greek philosophers; this doctrine informs his understanding of *Wissenschaft* and potencies. Second, this understanding of Ancient Greek philosophy is as philosophical as it is religious. Indeed, Hellenism undergirding Schelling's conception of philosophical productivity entails a serious engagement with Greek religion, specifically Greek Mystery religions. A historiographical revision of *Deutscher Idealismus* and *Jenaer Romantik*, two contexts in which scholars generally place him, arises, and reveals the portrait of Schelling as a philologist, or, at least, a philosopher heavily informed by philology.

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The idea of this thesis was born during my senior year at Brown University under Professor Thomas Lewis' tutelage, specifically the paper that I wrote for him and ended up publishing. It engendered the desire to engage with Schelling's early works in a philologically rigorous manner. I thank him for his support and encouragement along the way. I would like to thank Mansfield College for its support and atmosphere during the DPhil. I owe much to Professor Joel Rasmussen for his guidance, encouragement, and patience—especially patience. Professors Johannes Zachhuber and Robert Parker also deserve credit. The former introduced me to Schelling's *Methodologie*; the latter to Greek Mystery religions.

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mihi Delphica lauro cinge volens, Melpomene, comam

Table of Contents

Epagoge **1**

Chapter 1. Schelling: A German Hellene **15**

I. Winckelmann's *Griechentum* 16

II. Schelling's Philological Win(c)k at the Greeks 25

III. *Griechentumliche Romantik* 40

IV. Winckelmannian Continuations and Philological-Philosophy 52

Chapter 2. Philosophical Productivity: Intuition **60**

I. A Productive Perspective 61

II. Identity of Intuition and Production 66

III. Intuition and Production of Identity 84

Chapter 3. Exclusively Platonic **101**

I. Productive Greek Mysteries 104

II. Productive Platonic Precedent: Neither Taught nor Learned 121

III. Early-Tübingen Platonic Productivity 129

IV. Late-Tübingen Platonic Productivity 140

Chapter 4. Productive *Hen kai Pan* **151**

I. Parmenides' and Spinoza's Productive *Hen* 158

II. Leibniz's and Heraclitus' Productive Dualities 177

III. Pythagoras' and Plato's Productive *Pans* 181

Chapter 5. *Hen Kai* Potencies and *Wissenschaften* **193**

I. Pre-Potentialities 194

II. Potential Reflections 201

III. *Hen kai Wissenschaften* or *Wissenschaft kai Pan* 214

Telos **226**

Bibliography **247**

Literature is cited by the author-date system, except where modern scholarly editions exist. Ancient texts are cited by line number, book and section, or page number as appropriate, according to the most recent Oxford Classical Text. Primary and more significant texts are abbreviated.

All translations of Greek, German, Latin, and French are mine, which I place in the footnotes. These aim for lucidity at the expense of style. I do not place quotation marks around Greek text because they can be confused with rough and smooth breathings. Also, the Greek text is markedly different from the other languages in Roman type, so there will be no confusion when a Greek quotation begins and ends. The German quoted is as is except for my transliteration of texts available only in Fraktur.

Epagoge

Hellenism and productivity in the early Schelling refers to F.W.J. Schelling's conception of philosophical productivity in the context of *Griechentum* or German Hellenism during his early period, roughly the last decade of the 18th century to the first of the 19th.[1] This is the answer to the guiding question of the thesis: in his early period, how does Schelling understand philosophy in the context of *Griechentum*? Hellenism, to be clear, is an exclusively high estimation of and enthusiasm for the Ancient Greek language and its cultural productions in all genres. As part of this thesis will show, Schelling is a German Hellene, which traces back to Johann J. Winckelmann, considered the father of *Griechentum*.[2] That Schelling understands philosophy as productive, means that he conceives of philosophy as a matter of producing intellectual intuitions and *Hen kai Pan*, "One and All;" in fact, these two are inseparable for the production of intellectual intuition is according to the ambit of *Hen kai Pan*. That he does so as a German Hellene means two things: first, that he formulates this conception of philosophy out of a direct engagement with Ancient Greek philosophical texts, primarily Plato's; second, this understanding of Ancient Greek philosophy is as philosophical as it is religious. Indeed, Hellenism undergirding Schelling's

[1] From the beginning of his academic career in Jena till about 1809, Schelling actively published. After 1811, while still academically active, he avoided the public limelight, publishing little to nothing during this time; this period is usually called his *Schweigen*. In 1841 he officially returns to the public limelight in Berlin. To be clear, I use the term "early" to refer to the time period from Schelling's university days in Tübingen to 1811, not to some theoretical differentiation in Schelling's thought. This becomes clear below when discussing scholarship on philosophical productivity. Also, I use the terms "productivity" and "production" synonymously. Given the latter's economic associations, I tend more to use the former.

[2] For this thesis I prefer the spelling "Winckelmann" to "Winkelmann," but I leave the latter as is when quoted.

conception of philosophical productivity entails a serious engagement with Greek religion, specifically Greek Mystery religions.

The first chapter presents an intellectual biography of Schelling in the context of *Griechentum*; it highlights his early philological education whose focus is Ancient Greek, explores its continuity through his early period, especially *Jenaer Romantik*, and examines the influence of Winckelmann on some of his early works. The remaining chapters build on this base. Chapter two draws out philosophical productivity as intellectual intuition. The third discusses the reception of Plato during Schelling's time; elaborates on the context of Greek Mystery religions in which to situate philosophical productivity; takes up the notion of anthropological exclusivity that characterises the production of intellectual intuition; and then pursues a close engagement with Schelling's early notes on Plato. The fourth chapter elaborates on Schelling's own account of the philosophical and religious tradition of *Hen kai Pan* in which he situates his philosophy. Finally, the fifth demonstrates how Schelling's abstruse notion of potencies becomes translucent against the background of *Hen kai Pan*; it then elucidates his understanding of *Wissenschaft* and construction. In the telos, I offer a brief revision of *Deutscher Idealismus* considering Schelling's perspective of philosophical productivity grounded in Hellenism.

The approach of this thesis is historical and hermeneutic. On the one hand, it seeks to present an historically accurate picture of Schelling, namely, as a German Hellene; this has not been done before. On the other hand, this thesis engages with Schelling's texts as closely as possible by reading him in German, reading the Ancient Greek texts he read, and then evaluating the understanding of the Ancient Greek ideas in his German. In so doing, this thesis attempts to avoid anachronism and engage with the questions that Schelling asks in his early texts. The hermeneutic approach is primary; for the historical portrait draws from a close reading of his own texts. In a word, through its historical and hermeneutic approach this thesis takes up Paul Franks' challenge to develop what is distinctive about Schelling that goes beyond his familiar stereotype of

being "the proponent of an absolute in whose night all cows are black […]."[3] What emerges as distinctive is Schelling the philosophically productive German Hellene.

The remainder of this epagoge will attempt to situate this thesis more generally with respect to current scholarship that draws together philosophical productivity and *Griechentum* in Schelling. At this point, hardly any scholarship brings these two together. Walter Ehrhardt is an authority and rare perspective in German scholarship on Schelling. He weaves the two together, albeit in a limited way mostly in regards to the latter. This confluence finds expression in his own view of Schelling titled *Nur ein Schelling*, a perspective that points to an "Einheit seines [Schellings] Denkweges."[4] In what follows, I elaborate on Ehrhardt's notion of "only one Schelling" because not only does it lend itself to the view of Schelling in this thesis but provides the scaffolding on which to build. It is necessary here to note that it is not within the ambit of this epagoge or thesis to examine the myriad attempts at periodizing Schelling's intellectual development in his early period—and throughout, for that matter.[5] To touch this briefly and more substantially by

[3] Paul W. Franks, *All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2005). 12.

[4] Ehrhardt, Walter, "Nur ein Schelling," *Studi Urbinati*, Studi in Onore di Eric Weil, no. 1–2 (1977); also see Ehrhardt, Walter, "Schelling," in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, ed. Gerhard Krause, Gerhard Müller, and Horst Robert Balz, vol. 30, 38 vols (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976). 92-102.

[5] For a brief and most recent overview of Schelling scholarship, see Walter E. Ehrhardt, "Ergänzende Bemerkungen," in *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, 2. durchges. Aufl. Mit ergänzenden Bemerkungen von Walter E. Ehrhardt, Philosophische Bibliothek; 448 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2000). XLV-L; and Orzechowski, Axel, "Der Gegenwärtige Schelling," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 47, no. 2 (1993): 301–6; Braun, Hermann, "Ein Bedürfnis nach Schelling," *Philosophische Rundschau* 37, no. 3 (1990): 161–96; "Ein Bedürfnis nach Schelling: 2. Teil," *Philosophische Rundschau* 37, no. 4 (1990): 298–326. For a more recent review of scholarship on the early Schelling in English, see Watkins, Eric, "The early Schelling on the unconditioned," in Lara Oštarić, *Interpreting Schelling: Critical Essays* (Cambridge: University Press, 2014). 10-11. For older yet still useful reviews of Schelling scholarship, see Fuhrmans, Horst, "Dokumente Zur Schellingforschung," *Kant-Studien* 47 (56 1955): 182–91, 273–87, 378–96; "Der Ausgangspunkt Der Schellingschen Spätphilosophie (Dokumente Zur Schellingforschung)," *Kant-Studien* 48, no. 1–4 (57 1956): 302–23; "Dokumente Zur Schellingforschung, IV: Schellings Verfügung Über Seinen Literarischen Nachlaß," *Kant-Studien* 51 (60 1959): 14–26; Hermann Zeltner, *Schelling-Forschung seit 1954*, Erträge der Forschung; Bd. 42 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975); Schröter, Manfred, "Historische Übersicht über Die Schelling-Literatur," ed. Ernst Harms, *Jahrbuch für die Idealistische Philosophie* 1 (1934); a very erudite overview of the history of Schelling scholarship in German, French, and Italian can be found in the introduction and chapter one of Xavier Tilliette, *Schelling: une philosophie en devenir*. Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie. (Paris: JVrin, 1970); and O'Meara, Thomas Franklin, "F. W. J. Schelling: A Bibliographical Essay," *The Review of Metaphysics* 31, no. 2 (1977): 283–309. For Schelling's influence, see Pieper, Annemarie, "I. Schellings Wirkung im Überblick," in Hans Michael Baumgartner, ed., *Schelling: Einführung in seine Philosophie*, Kolleg Philosophie (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1975). 139-150.

addressing the change in Schelling's language throughout his career, Karl Jaspers, who reads "eine einzige große Einheit Schellingschen Denkens,"[6] provides an apt judgment:

> Feststellungen eines Erstmaligen von Worten und Sätzen . . . sind . . . keineswegs von endgültiger Bedeutung. Vielmehr bleibt immer noch die Frage, ob der Sinn nicht vorher in anderer Gestalt, ohne ausdrückliche Betonung, schon da war.[7]

Hence, while acknowledging the changes in Schelling's language throughout his early period, this thesis emphasizes the uniform sense beneath. The view of a unified Schelling may elicit surprise, incredulity, and dismissiveness in some of those familiar with German philosophy, so kindly I ask for their patience in reading this thesis. In short, Ehrhardt's thesis of *Nur ein Schelling* is a conception of Schelling's unity as organic. Such a unity "weder die Unbestimmtheit eines hermeneutischen Feldes noch die Fixierung eines theoretischen Oberbegriffs verlangt."[8] He further remarks that it is neither "ein theoretisch-allgemeingültiges System"—"[e]ine solche Einheit kann in seiner Philosophie von Anfang an nicht gesucht werden"—nor "das System, wie es in irgend eines Menschen Kopf sich zusammengefügt," nor "hermeneutische Transzendenz der Interpretation," nor "einer theoretischen Einheit."[9] Ehrhardt excludes these six possible explanations of Schelling's unity by appealing to Schelling's own understanding of organism: "Es scheint nicht unangemessen, diesen Begriff, der Schellings Denken überall durchwaltet, auch auf seine eigene Philosophie selbst anzuwenden und für sie die Einheit eines organischen Systems zu

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[6] Karl Jaspers, *Schelling: Grösse und Verhängnis* (München: R. Piper, 1955). 62. A single great unity of Schelling's thought.
[7] Jaspers (1955), 54. Statements of words and sentences used for the first time are in no way of ultimate significance. Rather the question always remains whether the sense was not already there before in a different form without explicit emphasis.
[8] Ehrhardt (1977), 113. [d]emands neither the indefiniteness of a hermeneutic field nor the fixing of an umbrella term.
[9] Ehrhardt (1977), 113. "a theoretical-universal system—such a unity cannot be sought in his philosophy from the beginning— the system as it is composed in some one's head, […] hermeneutic transcendence of interpretation, […] a theoretical unity." He begins the article noting that "Schellings Wirkung, verborgen oder offenkundig, die Berufung auf ihm und auch die Polemik gegen ihn, ist von Anfang an immer partiell und unvollständig gewesen und ist es heute noch. Daß sein Denken in unvergleichbarem Umfang alle Versuche scheitern ließ, von der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung mit dem richtigen Namen klassifiziert zu werden, hatte zur Folge, daß man sich allzu früh gewöhnte, Schelling aufzuteilen, frühe bis späte Schellinge [sic] zu unterscheiden und gegeneinander auf oder abzuwerten. Dadurch verminderte sich Schellings Wirkung beträchtlich." Ehrhardt treats some of these historiographical issues more generally in his *Philosophiegeschichte und geschichtlicher Skeptizismus* (Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1967); and Ehrhardt, Walter E., "Das Organismusmodell in Der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung," *Hegel-Jahrbuch*, (1997). For a critique of predominant trends in the history of Schelling scholarship, see the Einleitung to Barbara Loer, *Das Absolute und die Wirklichkeit in Schellings Philosophie: mit der Erstedition einer Handschrift aus dem Berliner Schelling-Nachlass*, Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie; Bd. 7 (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 1974). 1-27.

beanspruchen."[10] Ehrhardt asserts, quoting Schelling's 1799 *Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*, that since "alles Denken zuletzt auf ein Produzieren und Reproduzieren zurückkommt [where] dieselbe Tätigkeit, durch welche die Natur in jedem Moment sich neu reproduziert, im Denken nur durch das Mittelglied des Organismus reproduktiv sei."[11] Put simply, just as nature is productive so also is thinking. This organic productivity—for productivity cannot be otherwise—characterizes the unity of Schelling's thought. Chapter one mentions that the characterization of organic applies to Schelling's early education in the context of *Griechentum*. At the same time, "Wandlungen oder Gliederungen schließt Schellings Begriff des Organismus . . . keineswegs aus."[12] Hence, just as an organism still can retain its unity while changing through the organic processes of growth and decay, so also must one view Schelling's thought as having an organic abiding core to which Jaspers points above.

Ultimately, Ehrhardt identifies this core as freedom. He asserts that "das Höchste, was in der Philosophie *hervorzubringen* sei, sei ein System der Freiheit."[13] In other words, system in the special sense that Schelling has in mind is one of freedom, which, most importantly, must be produced; hence, the close relationship of freedom and production. System here is not a concatenation of abstract theorems that proceeds from assumptions to the concept of the Absolute. To be clear, the focus of this thesis is neither a system nor freedom in Schelling, but only inasmuch as the latter speaks to productivity.

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[10] Ehrhardt (1977), 113. It does not appear improper to apply everywhere this concept, which pervades Schelling's thought, even to his own philosophy itself and to claim for it the unity of an organic system.

[11] Ehrhardt (1977), 115. "[a]ll thinking finally refers to a producing and reproducing . . . [where] the same activity through which nature reproduces itself anew in each moment, in thinking it would be reproductive only through the intermediary of an organism." Ehrhardt quotes *SW* I/III.274.

[12] Ehrhardt (1977), 113. "Schelling's concept of organism by no means excludes changes or division." Ehrhardt distinguishes Schelling's notion of nature from Kant's and Fichte's.

[13] Ehrhardt (1977), 115. *Emphasis added.* "The highest what would be brought forth in philosophy would be system of freedom." Ehrhardt quotes this from the *Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (1836/37). *SW* I/X.36. This reading of freedom in Schelling is markedly different from Alan White's. The latter argues that "Schelling's development is to study his attempts to produce the antithesis to Spinoza's *Ethics*, his attempts to reconcile demands of system and the demands of freedom." See Alan White, *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1983). 6. Ehrhardt's understanding of freedom in Schelling also differs from Terry P. Pinkard's, who presents a protean Schelling as a romantic appropriator of Kant. He analyses Schelling into two periods: from 1795 to 1809 and then from 1809 to the end of his career. See Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy, 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 172.

Ehrhardt grounds this emphasis on freedom hermeneutically and on the history of Schelling scholarship. According to him,

> Daß in Hinblick auf dieses »Nur *ein* Schelling« gesagt werden muß, darf jetzt als gesichert gelten, da der glückliche Fund der »Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung« . . . in der markanten These »*Freiheit* is unser und der Gottheit Höchstes« unmittelbar Schellings Beharren bei der anfänglichen Forderung »Das A und O der Philosophie ist Freiheit« bezeugt. Die Forschung ist daher veranlaßt, die frühe Eigenständigkeit und Konsequenz im Werke Schellings viel stärker zu betonen als es 1957 für Walter Schulz möglich war.[14]

Ehrhardt reads the beginning of the hermeneutic thread regarding the theme of freedom from Schelling's declaration to Hegel in his February 4th, 1795, letter that the alpha and omega of philosophy is freedom—this letter is discussed in the telos. The end of the thread is Schelling's declaration that "Freedom is the highest for us and the gods" in the recent fortunate discovery of the *Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung*.[15] This marks Ehrhardt's hermeneutic justification for *Nur ein Schelling*. Such a reading finds further confirmation in Walter Schulz's own engagement with Schelling, primarily his work, *Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings*, in which Schulz observes that Schelling conceives of the limits of "der inneren Möglichkeit der Selbstkonstitution der reinen Subjektivität" through "die Wandlung des Selbstverständnisses der Vernunft" and thus completes *Deutscher Idealismus*, the intellectual movement proceeding from Immanuel Kant, Johann G. Fichte, Schelling, and Georg W. F. Hegel—examined in the telos.[16] Although the work focuses on Schelling's later philosophy, it argues that Schelling's thought is

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[14] Ehrhardt (2000), XLVI. That in view of this *Nur ein Schelling* it must be said, now it may count as secured since the fortunate discovery of the *Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung* . . . in the stirking thesis 'Freedom is ours and the divinity's highest [matter]' confirms Schelling's insistence with the initial demand 'The Alpha and Omega of philosophy is freedom.' Research therefore is prompted to emphasize more strongly the early independence and consistency in Schelling's work than was possible for Walter Schulz in 1957.

[15] Walter Ehrhardt's 1992 discovery of J. M. Wachtl's unadulterated manuscript of the lectures, *Philosophie der Offenbarung*, was published as Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. *Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung*. Edited by Walter E. Ehrhardt. 1st ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2004). It replaces Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von. *Philosophie der Offenbarung*: 1841/42. Edited by Manfred Frank. 5th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977). This latter edition is in Schelling's *Sämmtliche Werke*. Ehrhardt found evidence that K. F. A. Schelling, the main editor of this collection, tampered with this version of the *Philosophie der Offenbarung*. Moreover, this edition also combines H. E. G. Paulus version of these lectures, which he published against Schelling's wishes: H. E. G. Paulus, *Die endlich offenbar gewordene positive Philosophie der Offenbarung: oder Entstehungsgeschichte, wörtlicher Text, Beurtheilung und Berichtigung der v. Schellingischen Entdeckungen über Philosophie überhaupt, Mythologie usw.* (Darmstadt: C.W. Leske, 1843). For more on J. M. Wachtl's manuscript, see Ehrhardt's *Nachwort*: Schelling (2004), 729-742.

[16] Walter Schulz, *Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings*. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1955). 6. the inner possibility of the self-constitution of pure subjectivity [through] the change of reason's self-understanding […].

unified along the above lines. More pertinently, the impetus this work generated in the world of Schelling scholarship motivated Ehrhardt's thesis of *Nur ein Schelling*.

Ehrhardt's thesis draws on Melchior Meyr's short witness to philosophical productivity in Schelling; this will receive attention only here, for it speaks more generally about the centrality of philosophical productivity. Meyr is most explicit about production in Schelling. The poet and philosopher, according to Xavier Tilliette—the foremost French scholar on Schelling—was a "treue Schüler und Anhänger Schellings,"[17] and "einer der wichtigsten Zeugen aus Schellings Leben," according Ehrhardt.[18] In fact, Schelling recommends Meyr to King Maximillian II highlighting his "Gabe der Hervorbringung" of his objective "Darstellung[en] [welche] wahr und die Sache, wie sie ist, wiedergebend."[19] In other words, Schelling recognized that Meyr, too, possessed a productive ability that enabled him to bring forth objective representations, which reproduce the original accurately. Hence, Schelling deemed Meyr as one who truly understood his philosophy. This is important especially during this time in Schelling's career when his philosophy was subject to much distortion and attack.[20] In a critical response to an 1863 article, "Schellings philosophisches Testament," in the *Wiener Zeitung* by Stefan Djunkowsky, a former Jesuit and student of Schelling's in Berlin, Meyr discusses how Schelling formulated his first and second philosophies, negative and positive.[21] The focus of Meyr's critique is Father Stefan's misinterpretation of the implications of Schelling's philosophy for Christianity.[22] When exhorting the reader to consider these implications in relation to Schelling's first philosophy, Meyr asks "hat

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[17] Xavier Tilliette and Melchior Meyr, *Schelling im Spiegel seiner Zeitgenossen*, vol. 3, 3 vols, Philosophica varia inedita vel rariora 1 (Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1974). 8. [t]rue disciple and follower of Schelling.

[18] F. W. J. von Schelling, *Vorlesungen über die Methode (Lehrart) des akademischen Studiums*, ed. Walter E. Ehrhardt, 2nd ed., vol. 275 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990). xvii. one of the most important witnesses from Schelling's life.

[19] Maximilian II King of Bavaria, *König Maximilian II. von Bayern und Schelling: Briefwechsel* Herausg. von L. Trost Und F. Leist. (Stuttgart, 1890). Schelling an König Maximilian. (Berlin, den 16. April 1854). 259. [g]ift of producing . . . representations which [are] true and reproduce the matter.

[20] The already mentioned *Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung* replacing the *Philosophie der Offenbarung*: 1841/4 in Schelling's *Sämmtliche Werke* is an example. Cf. footnote 15.

[21] This distinction appears in his Berlin lectures of 1842/3, also known as *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Begründung der positiven Philosophie*.

[22] Stefan Djunkowsky, *Schellings philosophisches Testament*, aus den Notizen eines russischen Reisenden. Pravdoliubiwyi (Le Veridique), Zeme annee, N° 6, 15 Mars (1863). 22-23.

er, indem er diesen Versuch machte, eine Philosophie *fabriziert* oder hat er eine Philosophie *produziert*? Man sieht: *Auf die Beantwortung dieser Frage kommt alles an*."[23] Meyr draws a distinction here between "fabricating" and "producing" a philosophy. Deciding between these two is of utmost importance in interpreting Schelling's philosophy. A few sentences later Meyr rhetorically suggests that Schelling produced, not fabricated, his first philosophy: "Hat Schelling . . . seine erste Philosophie produziert, ist sie entstanden aus einem schöpferischen Geiste, in Folge einer innern Notwendigkeit."[24] If Schelling produced his first philosophy, he was driven by an inner necessity allowing this philosophy to arise from his creative intellect. Then on the next page Meyr confirms that "Schellings erste Lehre ist das Werk eines philosophischen Genies."[25] In other words, Schelling produced his first teaching or philosophy; it is a product of his philosophical genius, and all his philosophy must be considered so—in the third chapter, "genius" emerges as something productive of philosophy in the context of Plato. More relevantly, Meyr suggests that Schelling's philosophy in his early period is a matter of production.

Meyr criticizes Djunkowsky for not grasping what Schelling related to him. Quoting Djunkowsky's own account, Meyr emphasizes that "Schelling verweist ihn auf sein Buch über die 'Methode des akademischen Studiums' . . . vor 40 Jahren geschrieben […]."[26] While it seems that Djunkowsky did not possess the philosophical wherewithal to recognize that Schelling produced his philosophy, he at least seems to have ignored the textual source that refers to philosophical productivity. These lectures written almost half a century earlier are Schelling's 1803 *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, which he delivered for the first time in Jena in the winter of 1802.[27] Schelling referred to it as the *Methodologie*—used hereon—which emphasizes its

[23] Melchior Meyr, "Melchior Meyr über 'Schellings philosophisches Testament,'" in Schelling, (1990). 175. *Emphasis added.* As he made this attempt, has he fabricated a philosophy or produced a philosophy? One sees that everything depends on the answer to this question.
[24] Meyr (1990), 175. If Schelling . . . has produced his first philosophy, it arose from a creative intellect, as a result of an inner necessity.
[25] Meyr (1990), 176. Schelling's first teaching is the work of a philosophical genius.
[26] Meyr (1990), 170. Schelling points him to his book on the 'Method of academic Study' written 40 years ago […].
[27] Schelling, *SW* 1/V.209. In the foreword to the *Methodologie* Schelling writes that, "Diese Vorlesungen sind im Sommer 1802 auf der Universität zu Jena gehalten." For a comprehensive overview of the work, see Patrick Leistner's Editorischer Bericht in Schelling, *AA* I/14.3-50. Also see Walter Ehrhardt's Einleitung in Schelling (1990), VII-XVI.

centrality; and it is the hermeneutic fulcrum of this thesis. This moniker emerges in his correspondence with J. G. Cotta.[28] The work arises in a time of significant institutional transformation throughout German higher education. In parallel with and even precipitating the Stein-Hardenberg Reforms, significant reflections on the university structure emerge at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. In addition to Schelling, Kant, Fichte, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Wilhelm von Humboldt are some who contribute significantly to this reflection.[29]

A cursory glance at the *Methodologie*'s table of contents shows how Schelling's concept of academic study concerns philosophy and its institutional manifestation as the various faculties within the university. Of the fourteen total lectures, he spends the first seven setting up the metaphysical basis of the university and asserting the primacy of philosophy. Lectures eight through thirteen attend to the various *Wissenschaften* within the university: eight and nine concern theology; ten concerns history; eleven through thirteen concern nature; and finally, the fourteenth lecture is about art.[30] In the second lecture, Schelling reveals that

[28] Johann Friedrich Cotta was Schelling's publisher until 1832. Schelling's son, K. F. A Schelling worked with Cotta's son, Johann Goerg Freiherr Cotta von Cottendorf, during the years 1856 to 1861 to put together Schelling's first collected works, *Sämmtliche Werke*. For specific instances of the term "Methodologie" see correspondences between the years 1803 and 1813 in Fuhrmans, Horst, and Liselotte Lohrer, eds. *Schelling und Cotta Briefwechsel 1803 - 1849* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1965).

[29] For an analysis of the *Methodologie*'s context, see Zöller, Günter, "Die ‚Bestimmung alles Wissens'–Absolutes, Wissenschaft und Handeln in Schellings Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums," in Ziche, Paul, and Gian Franco Frigo, eds. *Die bessere Richtung der Wissenschaften*. Vol. 25. Schellingiana. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011). For Kant see *Der Streit der Facultäten* (1798) in *KGS* VII. For Wilhelm von Humboldt see *Theorie der Bildung des Menschen* (1793), *Antrag auf Einrichtung der Universität Berlin* (1809), *Über die innere und äußere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin* (1809) in *GS* I/1, and *GS* II/10, respectively. See Fichte's *Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten* (1794), *Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten* (1805), and *Deducirter Plan einer zu Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt* (1807) in *FSW* VI-VIII. For Schleiermacher see *Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn* (1808) in *KG* I/6; also see "Rezension von Schelling: Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums" in Schleiermacher, Friedrich, and Andreas Arndt. *Bibliothek der Philosophie: Schriften*. 1768-1834. (Frankfurt Am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996). 275-294. For a comprehensive source on materials concerning the founding of the University of Berlin see Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Michael Theunissen, and Wilhelm Weischedel, eds., *Idee und Wirklichkeit einer Universität: Dokumente zur Geschichte der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin* (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 1960).

[30] *Wissenschaft* differs from *Scienz* for Schelling. Although in Anglo-American scholarship *Wissenschaft* for the most part is translated as "science," such hermeneutic oversight ignores Schelling's own varied use of the German terms. *Wissenschaft* for now can be understood as literally the creating *-schaft* of knowledge *Wissen-*, which has significant implications for Schelling's understanding of philosophy as productive. See chapter five.

> Der Begriff des akademischen Studiums wies uns einerseits zu dem höhern Begriff eines vorhandenen Ganzen von Wissenschaften zurück […]; andererseits führt er uns auf die besondern Bedingungen, unter welchen die Wissenschaften auf unsern Akademien gelehrt und mitgetheilt werden.[31]

Academic study mediates between an existing whole of *Wissenschaften* and the particular conditions under which they are taught in the university. In this way, according to Günter Zöller, compared to most of the other similar works at the time, the *Methodologie* "sich direkt an die Studierenden wendet, denen er Orientierung in der Vielfalt der universitären Lehre und Anleitung zur 'allseitigen und unendlichen Bildung' geben will."[32] The whole of the *Wissenschaften*, however, seems to have more priority. For in the first lecture Schelling declares that "eine Methodenlehre des akademischen Studiums nur aus der wirklichen und wahren Erkenntniß des lebendigen Zusammenhangs aller Wissenschaften hervorgehen könne […]."[33] In other words, the conditions of conveying knowledge notwithstanding, the method of academic study proceeds only out of the living context of all *Wissenschaften*. This living whole produces the method, which points to an organic and productive understanding of the academic enterprise as the creation of knowledge. Theodore Ziolkowski confirms that "the scholar earns his place in the university . . . through a process of creative scholarship, contributing to knowledge […]."[34] Therefore, Schelling's method of academic study appears to be a matter of partaking of the living whole of *Wissenschaften*—this becomes clear in chapter five. The way to begin is to grasp the *Methodologie* as an outline of the entire landscape of *Wissenschaften*. At the end of the third lecture, Schelling discloses, "Gewissermaßen würde dieser Grundriß die Stelle einer allgemeinen Encyklopädie der Wissenschaften vertreten können."[35] To wit, Schelling understood the *Methodologie* as an outline or

[31] Schelling, *AA* I/14.68; *SW* 1/V.228. The concept of academic study points us back, on the one hand, to the higher concept of an existing whole of *Wissenschaften*; on the other hand, it leads to the particular conditions under which the *Wissenschaften* are to be taught and communicated in our universities.
[32] Zöller (2011), 67. applies directly to the students, to whom he will give orientation in the variety of university teaching and instruction in a "well-rounded and endless education."
[33] Schelling, *AA* I/14.56; *SW* 1/V.213. a methodology of academic study can proceed only out of the actual and true knowledge of the living context of all *Wissenschaften*.
[34] Theodore Ziolkowski, *German Romanticism and Its Institutions* (Princeton: University Press, 1990). 251.
[35] Schelling, *AA* I/14.84; *SW* 1/V.247. To a certain extent this outline would be able to substitute the place of a general encyclopaedia of *Wissenschaften*.

"general encyclopaedia." Jaspers highlights the significance of this outline throughout Schelling's life.

> In seinen Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums hat Schelling . . . einen Entwurf des Ganzen […]. Im Alter hielt er im Blick auf die großen Fortschritte aller Wissenschaften wahrend der Jahrzehnte seines Lebens an dem gleichen Gedanken fest.[36]

In keeping with his intention of furnishing an outline, Schelling highlights his condensed approach by clarifying that "ich werde vieles nicht sagen, was vielleicht gesagt zu werden verdiente, desto mehr aber mich hüten, etwas zu sagen, was nicht gesagt werden sollte."[37] That Schelling leaves out much that "deserves to be said" serves the pedagogical function of compelling the reader herself to produce the living whole of *Wissenschaften*. By taking this outline as a starting point, the reader should think through the various connections between the ideas in the work and make incursions into related works.

Schelling further clarifies his sense of "outline" by distinguishing it from "system." He forewarns that "[...] natürlich kein aus den höchsten Principien auf die strengste Art abgeleitetes System der Erkenntnisse [kann] hier erwartet werden. Ich kann, so wie überhaupt in diesen Vorlesungen, nicht darauf ausgehen, meinen Gegenstand zu erschöpfen."[38] In light of Ehrhardt's

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[36] Jaspers (1955), 118. In his *Lectures on the Method of Academic Study* Schelling has an outline of the whole. In old age he held to the same thought in view of the great advances of all *Wissenschaften* during the decades of his life.

[37] Schelling, *AA* I/14.85; *SW* 1/V.247. I will not say much that perhaps deserves to be said; the more, however, I take care not to say something that should not be said.

[38] Schelling, *AA* I/14.84; *SW* 1/V.247. "[…] naturally, no system of knowledge can be expected here, one that is derived from the highest principles in the most rigorous manner. As mainly in these lectures, I am unable to aim at exhausting my object." For Schelling's understanding of "system" during his early period, see his 1795 *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus* (*AA* I/3.74; *SW* 1/I.306-7); 1796 *Die Abhandlung zur Erläuterung des Idealismus* (*AA* I/4.126-7; *SW* 1/I.399-400, 402); and 1809 *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (*SW* I/7.334). Carl Ludwig Michelet, a right-Hegelian philosopher and historian at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, academically active around the middle of the nineteenth century, continues and expands Hegel's charge in his *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* that Schelling produced a series of incomplete works. Michelet attempts to substantiate this charge with Schelling's 1801 *Darstellung,* which he presents in his work *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, Zweiter Teil. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1837). To make his point he misquotes the introduction to *F. W. J. Schelling's Philosophische Schriften*. Vol. 1. (Landshut: Philipp Krüll, 1809). viii-ix. Here Schelling discusses the newly published *Freiheitschrift* with respect to both the *Darstellung* and 1804 *Philosophie und Religion*: „Da der Verfasser nach der ersten allgemeinen Darstellung seines Systems (in der Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik), deren Fortsetzung leider durch äußere Umstände unterbrochen worden, sich bloß auf naturphilosophische Untersuchungen beschrankt hat, und nach dem in der Schrift: Philosophie und Religion gemachten Anfang, der freilich durch Schuld der Darstellung undeutlich geblieben, die gegenwärtige Abhandlung das Erste ist, worin der Verfasser seinen Begriff des ideellen Teils der Philosophie mit völliger Bestimmtheit vorlegt: so muss er, wenn jene erste Darstellung einige Wichtigkeit gehabt haben sollte, ihr diese Abhandlung zunächst an die Seite stellen, welche schon der Natur des Gegenstandes nach über das Ganze des Systems tiefere Aufschlüsse, als alle mehr partiellen Darstellungen, enthalten muss." Michelet ventriloquizes Schelling to confess philosophical incompleteness. After comparing Michelet's quote of Schelling and Schelling's original quote, we are able to infer that for Schelling "the

remarks on the organic unity of Schelling's thought, therefore, one must not read the *Methodologie* as some enclosed system, but an "outline" of Schelling's general thought. Given the polysemy surrounding the term "system," Ehrhardt clarifies in this context the sense in which the *Methodologie* may be taken as a system. He tethers it to the notion of encyclopaedia. "System im enzyklopädischen Sinne zu ersetzen, traute Schelling nur seiner »Methodologie« zu, den »Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums«, in denen alle Wissensgebiete autonom zueinander geordnet sind."[39] Put simply, it is important to distinguish the format of this work from his other works which bear the title "system." Moreover, that Schelling trusted only the *Methodologie* indicates that he saw the work as furnishing a holistic view of his thought. This is not to say that the *Methodologie* exclusively furnishes such a holistic view, but that given its wide readership and reference compared to any other work, it makes for a good starting point.

Schelling was trying to convey this to Djunkowsky. In his own account of the conversation with the philosopher in Berlin, Djunkowsky recalls Schelling's explanation:

> Sie sehen in diesem Buch, dass meine Gedanken sich niemals veränderten, was mir die Hegelianer immer vorwerfen. *Das ist das wichtigste aller meiner Werke.* In ihm sehen Sie, dass ich immer konsequent war in meinen Gedanken.[40]

Schelling himself deemed the *Methodologie* his most important work that shows the consistency of his thoughts throughout his whole career. All to say, after presenting it in 1802 in Jena, lecturing on it until 1806 while in Würzburg, republishing it in 1813, 1817, lecturing on it again from 1827-8 in Munich, and then republishing it again in 1830, Schelling recommended the text to Djunkowsky in the early 1840s.[41] The *Methodologie*, therefore, offers a clear hermeneutic thread

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whole of the system" can be represented only partially, with some representations "more partial" than others. Nevertheless, each "partial representation" contains "information about the whole of the system," with the only difference that some possess "deeper" information than others. Therefore, one can have a complete representation of the whole in a part, but parts can differ to the extent that they present the same whole without the sense that either of them are incomplete. This refers to Schelling's understanding of potencies, which indeed is difficult to grasp, and points ultimately to the doctrine of *Hen kai Pan* (see last two chapters). Cf. Ehrhardt (1977).

[39] Ehrhardt (2000). XLVIII. "To make up for 'System' in the encyclopaedic sense, Schelling trusted only his 'Methodologie,' the 'Lectures on the Method of Academic Study,' in which all fields of knowledge are ordered together autonomously […]."

[40] Tilliette (1974), 281. *emphasis added.* You see in this book that my thought never changed, [of] which the Hegelians always accuse me. That is the most important of all my work. In it you see that I was always consistent in my thoughts.

[41] Christian Iber, *Das Andere der Vernunft als ihr Prinzip: Grundzüge der philosophischen Entwicklung Schellings mit einem Ausblick auf die nachidealistischen Philosophiekonzeptionen Heideggers und Adornos* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994). 406.

throughout Schelling's entire academic career, and thus is a good starting point for his early period. The perspective of philosophical productivity that the *Methodologie* articulates is apparent in works that Schelling published even prior to 1803. Therefore, it is the hermeneutic pivot for exploring philosophical productivity.

Finally, Ehrhardt bolsters his thesis by pointing to the more recent work of Michael Franz whose ground-breaking *Schellings Tübinger Platon-Studien* examines Schelling's early essays and notes on Plato. Franz's importance lies in identifying philosophical production as determinative of Schelling's whole career. He pointedly observes that "Die schöpferische Intelligenz . . . scheint das Thema gewesen zu sein, an dem schon der „kleine" Schelling leidenschaftlich interessiert war."[42] The theme of creativity or productivity of the intelligence, which Schelling explored in and with Plato, as part of his university studies, seized him, which the third chapter explores. Franz does not limit this observation only to Schelling's days in Tübingen but deems it as characteristic of Schelling's whole career. "[D]ie Frage nach dem ‚Schöpfen' . . . ist der Angelpunkt, um den sich alle Fragen Schellings drehen, vielleicht nicht nur des jungen."[43] He hints that the overarching perspective of philosophical creation or production is the pivot of Schelling's curiosity limited "not only" to "the young Schelling." For the purpose of this thesis, one can safely assume that Franz deems this perspective applicable to Schelling's early period.

In referring to Franz's work, Ehrhardt asserts that "Die bereits gewonnen Einblicke in die frühen Entwürfe aus Schellings Studienzeit zeigen deutlich genug, wie entschieden von eigenem Wollen geleitet Schelling von Anfang an seine Wurzeln in die Literatur treibt."[44] This observation gestures at Schelling's Hellenism insofar as his notes on Plato show a direct engagement with the Platonic corpus in Ancient Greek. While both Ehrhardt and Franz highlight Schelling's

[42] Michael Franz, *Schellings Tübinger Platon-Studien*, Neue Studien zur Philosophie 11 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996). 5. The creative intelligence appears to have been the theme in which the 'small' Schelling was passionately interested.
[43] Franz (1996), 282. [T]he question concerning "creating" . . . is the pivot around which all of Schelling's questions revolve, perhaps not only of the young Schelling.
[44] Ehrhardt (2000), XLVI. The already attained insights into the early outlines from Schelling's student days shows clearly enough how decisively led by his own will Schelling from the beginning drove his roots into the literature.

engagement with the Ancient Greek texts of Plato, they neither fully recognize nor expound on the broader and deeper significance of *Griechentum* for Schelling. This thesis attempts to fill this lacuna in a limited way. Hence, it finds company with works on the reception of classical antiquity in Germany, which are sparse in Anglo-American scholarship. There is Joshua Billing's erudite work, *Genealogy of the Tragic: Greek Tragedy and German Philosophy*, which examines Schelling, among other German intellectuals, and his philosophical take on tragedy that follows a history of the German reception of Greek tragedy, especially Sophocles.[45] There also is Constanze Güthenke's *Feeling and Classical Philology: Knowing Antiquity in German Scholarship* and Katherine Harloe's *Winckelmann and the Invention of Antiquity: History and Aesthetics in the Age of Altertumswissenschaft* both of which briefly mention Schelling.[46] These two receive further attention at the beginning of the first chapter. The point of bringing up these Anglo-American texts is that this thesis, too, is a work on the German reception of Greek antiquity in that it examines Schelling's conception of philosophical productivity from his attitudes and attention to Ancient Greek texts, mostly of Plato.

Franz perceptively grasps that Schelling's notes on Plato "ein neues Kapitel der intellektuellen Biographie Schellings in Aussicht stellen, dessen Auswirkungen auf die Darstellung der gesamten philosophischen Epoche noch nicht absehbar sind."[47] His conviction of the revolutionary potential of these notes for a new chapter of Schelling's intellectual biography is not misplaced. It only can be confirmed further by placing these notes in the broader context of *Griechentum*, which is the subject of the first chapter.

[45] Joshua Billings, *Genealogy of the Tragic: Greek Tragedy and German Philosophy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014).
[46] Constanze Güthenke, *Feeling and Classical Philology: Knowing Antiquity in German Scholarship, 1770-1920*, Classics after Antiquity (Cambridge: University Press, 2020); Katherine Harloe, *Winckelmann and the Invention of Antiquity: History and Aesthetics in the Age of Altertumswissenschaft*, Classical Presences (Oxford: University Press, 2013).
[47] Franz (1996), 6. [p]resent the prospect of a new chapter of the intellectual biography of Schelling, whose effects on the presentation of the entire philosophical epoch are not yet foreseen.

Chapter 1. Schelling: A German Hellene

This chapter establishes the context of *Griechentum* in which to consider Schelling's intellectual biography anew, specifically during his early period. This context is necessary background for understanding Schelling's notion of philosophical productivity and its religious character. The chapter asks: how does *Griechentum* illuminate Schelling's academic background and philosophical career, especially during his early period? The answer is that *Griechentum* explains Schelling's philological proclivity towards Ancient Greek and his praise of Winckelmann, introduced below. As this chapter will show, in a deep sense, Schelling is a German Hellene, and his Hellenism and reverence for Winckelmann are fundamentally intertwined. This is pronounced especially in Schelling's philological orientation throughout his early period. The chapter first briefly discusses Winckelmann in a general manner as the forerunner of *Griechentum* before analyzing the state of secondary scholarship on Schelling and *Griechentum*. The second section traces a heavy philological focus from Schelling's early education till his university studies at Tübingen. This analysis extends to his time in Jena and then to the end of his early period, the content of the third and fourth sections, respectively.

Winckelmann's *Griechentum*

Winckelmann is the fount of *Griechentum*. He grew up in modest means as a cobbler's son in Stendal, Saxony-Anhalt. From an early age he possessed an insatiable appetite for Greek antiquity gradually climbing to become a pioneering art historian and archaeologist.[48] His influence regarding all things Greek spilled into literature and philosophy. Two of his most influential works are *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst* published in 1755, with which he spearheads the revolution of *Griechentum*. The second is *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* published in 1763, which expands on the *Gedanken*. According to Helmut Holzhauer, with the *Gedanken* Winckelmann "[…] er [brach] einer neuen Kunstanschauung Bahn, die seine Freunde und Anhänger aufhorchen ließ."[49] This chimes with Eliza Marie Butler's view of the "tyrannical" influence of Ancient Greek ideas on German intellectual life. For she confirms that Winckelmann's thoughts on art are "contained in embryo in his first publication, *Thoughts on the Imitation*, 1755 […] which exerted such an overwhelming inspirational force on his literary contemporaries."[50] Its main subject, as seen from the title, is the imitation of Ancient Greek art, specifically painting and sculpture, in which context Winckelmann deliberates on nature, beauty, their relationship, and how this imitation informs the Renaissance artists, Raphael and Michelangelo. The *Geschichte* pioneered a historiographical approach into the sociological and geographical factors that elucidate a unified whole of Ancient Greek art. Alex Potts emphasizes that this "speculative history of the rise and decline of ancient Greek art was new […]."[51] "[I]t seems unlikely," Katherine Harloe affirms, "that anyone would have lauded Winckelmann as a

[48] For an authoritative biography on Winckelmann, see Carl Justi, *Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen*, Dritte Auflage. (Leipzig: Vogel, 1923). Also see Rudolf Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship from 1300 to 1850* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); and John Edwin Sandys, *A Short History of Classical Scholarship: From the Sixth Century B.C. to the Present Day*, vol. 3, 3 vols (Cambridge: University Press, 1908). 21-23.

[49] Helmut Holzhauer's introduction to Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, 1. Auflage., Bibliothek deutscher Klassiker (Berlin; Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1969). XXI. […] he broke [the path] for a new perception of art, which let his friends and followers listen attentively.

[50] E. M. Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Cambridge: University Press, 2011). 45.

[51] Potts, Alex, "Winckelmann, Johann Joachim," in *The Classical Tradition*, ed. Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, and Salvatore Settis, Harvard University Press Reference Library (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap, 2010). 985.

'new Columbus,' or remembered him as planting 'the seed from which the latest research into antiquity has developed,' had it not been for the *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums.*"[52]

Certainly, the growing influence of Ancient Greek art in 18th century Germany cannot be understood without its contrast with modern art. This points to the larger historical context that stretches into the seventeenth century *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes* among members of the *Académie royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.*[53] Ernst Behler explains that

> Winckelmann originated for German aesthetics what one has called the break with the 'cultural predominance of Roman humanism and its legitimate successor, French classicism,' in favor of a direct contact with the Greek mind . . . an immediate relationship between Germany and classical Greece.[54]

By casting off the shackles of "Roman humanism" and its continuation as Baroque art and French classicism more generally, Germany through Winckelmann forged a direct tie to Classical Greece. Potts explains that Winckelmann "envisioned the fully developed Roman tradition as merely a pale afterglow of the Greek one, with no distinctive character of its own."[55] Behler underscores further that "His absolute veneration of Greece contributed decisively to Germany's . . . separation from French classicism."[56] Therefore, Winckelmann's Hellenism is a response to the quarrel between the ancients and moderns. By emphatically siding with the former, he inaugurated a new intellectual climate in Germany suffused with the warm breeze of Ancient Greek antiquity.

Winckelmann's absolute veneration of Greece influenced many. It cannot be overstated that his singular influence precipitates and flows from the middle of the 18th century to the 20th century. It manifested institutionally and ritually in the annual "Winckelmannstag" in German academic institutions from the middle of the 19th- to the middle of the 20th century.[57] It forms

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[52] Katherine Harloe, *Winckelmann and the Invention of Antiquity: History and Aesthetics in the Age of Altertumswissenschaft*, Classical Presences (Oxford: University Press, 2013). 105.
[53] Rubin, D. L., "Querelle Des Anciens Et Des Modernes," in Roland Greene et al., *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, 4th ed. (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2012). Charles Perrault is a significant figure in this controversy. See Patricia Bouchenot-Déchin, *Charles Perrault* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2018).
[54] Behler, Ernst, "The Force of Classical Greece in the Formation of the Romantic Age in Germany," in Carol G. Thomas, ed., *Paths from Ancient Greece* (Leiden: Brill, 1988). 123. For more on the break of *Griechentum* from Roman Humanism and French Classicism, see Horst Rudiger, *Wesen und Wandlung des Humanismus* (Hildesheim, 1966).
[55] Potts (2010), 985.
[56] Behler (1988), 123.
[57] Esther Sophia Sünderhauf, *Griechensehnsucht und Kulturkritik: die deutsche Rezeption von Winckelmanns Antikenideal 1840-1945* (Berlin: Akademie, 2004).

the undercurrent of many intellectual developments in this period, which boasts figures such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Johann Gottfried Herder, and all the way to Friedrich Nietzsche. Behler emphasizes that "Winckelmann enjoyed a prestigious position in Germany second to none."[58] In their discussion of Walter Pater's engagement with Winckelmann, Stefano Evangelista and Harloe assert rightly that "Winckelmann is important because his passion is the spark that ignites German philhellenism."[59] Henry Hatfield affirms and explicates that

> Few men have had a greater impact on the culture of their native country than did Winckelmann. The 'Greek revival' which he initiated profoundly altered the course of German literature: many of its greatest writers from Lessing to our own times would have written differently without his precept and example. His style as well as his ideas were regarded as classic, in more than one sense of that word. His cult of Greek simplicity and grandeur affected music (in Gluck's operas) as well as literature; and of course sculpture, painting, and architecture. Indeed, it influenced the whole history of Western taste, not only in Europe: Thomas Jefferson knew of his ideas. Not only is he regarded as the founder of modern classical archaeology; he had, through Herder, a profound influence on the writing of history. In his view of a culture developing 'organically' through an irreversible series of periods he was halfway to the historicism of the nineteenth century.[60]

As we will see below, Schelling, too, finds himself awash in the waves of "profound alteration" of German literature, which Winckelmann precipitates through his "Greek revival." Hatfield then underlines *Griechentum* and its far ranging influence by declaring that "From Winckelmann to Rilke, from Goethe to George, the majority of the greatest German writers have been 'Hellenists' to some significant degree."[61] And "What unites them . . . is precisely the significance which Greece gained for their own tasks and their own time," adds Behler.[62] In his timeless work, *Griechentum und Goethezeit: Geschichte eines Glaubens*, Walter Rehm agrees that "Die geschichtliche Tat Winckelmanns . . . [ist] die Entdeckung und Erweckung des Griechentums aus deutschem Geist [...]."[63] A few pages earlier when discussing Goethe's consideration of the Greek past, Rehm notes that "hier im Lebenskreis der griechischen Welt, wenn auch nie in ihm allein, baut sich die deutsche

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[58] Behler (1988), 123.
[59] Evangelista, Stefano and Harloe, Katherine, "Pater's Winckelmann," in Charles Martindale, Stefano-Maria Evangelista, and Elizabeth Prettejohn, eds., *Pater the Classicist: Classical Scholarship, Reception, and Aestheticism*, Classical Presences (Oxford: University Press, 2017). 65.
[60] Henry Hatfield, *Aesthetic Paganism in German Literature: From Winckelmann to the Death of Goethe* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964). 5.
[61] Hatfield (1964), 5.
[62] Behler (1988), 123.
[63] Walther Rehm, *Griechentum und Goethezeit: Geschichte eines Glaubens*, 3. Aufl. (Bern: AFrancke, 1952). 22. Winckelmann's historical act [is] the discovery and awakening of the Hellenism out of the German spirit.

Welt damals seit Winckelmann tatsächlich auf."[64] In other words, German intelligentsia built itself into the Greek world that Winckelmann brought to life. After discussing the religious implications of Winckelmann's conception of art, Hatfield notes that "In Germany, the aesthetic orientation of Weimar 'classicists' and Jena 'romanticists' continued the Winckelmannian tradition," two contexts more immediately relevant for Schelling.[65] At this point, it is important to distinguish between *Griechentum* and *Weimarer Klassik*. The latter refers to the intellectual circle of Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Herder, and Christoph Martin Weiland based in Weimar, which then narrowed to the correspondences between the first two from the end of the 18th-century to the beginning of the 19th. *Weimarer Klassik* is narrower than *Griechentum*. To emphasize Hatfield's point, *Griechentum* contains and runs through *Weimarer Klassik*.

In this wave of influence, Winckelmann also initiates and shapes *klassische Altertumswissenschaft* or simply philology, understood as classical.[66] Friedrich Ast, in his 1808 work *Grundriss der Philologie*, furnishes a brief history of classical philology from the beginning of the Renaissance to the 18th-century.[67] According to Ast, the first of "die drei Heroen unserer künstlerischen und wissenschaftlichen Bildung" is "Winkelmann . . . welche[r] das Alterthum als das, was es ist, wieder erkannten und auffasten."[68] Ast defines philology as "das Studium der classischen Welt in ihren gesamten, künstlerischen und wissenschaftlichen, öffentlichen und besonderen Leben."[69] He makes sure to avert any misconceptions by noting that "Nichtig ist daher die Philologie, wenn sie entweder bloß als historische und antiquarische Gelehrsamkeit, oder als

[64] Rehm (1952), 18. Here in the life-circle of the Greek world, although not in here alone, the German world built itself up at that time since Winckelmann.
[65] Hatfield (1964), 14.
[66] Friedrich August Wolf is the first to speak and write about *Altertumswissenschaft*. See his "Darstellung der Altertums-Wissenschaft" in F. A. Wolf, *Kleine Schriften in lateinischer und deutscher Sprache* (Halle, Germany: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1869). For a comprehensive and most recent study on Classical philology in the German context see Güthenke (2020).
[67] For the remainder of the thesis, I take "classical philology" and "philology" to be synonymous. Both emphasize Ancient Greek.
[68] Friedrich Ast, *Grundriss der Philologie* (Landshut: Krüll, 1808). 5. heroes of our [German] artistic and wissenschaftlichen production [*Bildung*] [is] Winkelmann, who recognized and grasped again antiquity as what it is.
[69] Ast (1808), 1. The study of the classical world in its entire artistic and wissenchaftlichen production [*Bildung*], public and particular life.

gelehrtes Sprachstudium betrachtet wird."[70] In her recent study, Constanze Güthenke draws on Ast's work to explain that Winckelmann's "non-institutional" influence "continued to be a reference point for the developing discipline."[71]

Upon attempting to tie the significance of Winckelmann, *Griechentum*, and philology to Schelling, a paucity of secondary scholarship emerges. First deserving comment is the philosophical approach to Schelling from the angle of mythology. Representing this approach are Manfred Schröter, Hans Michael Baumgartner, and Adolf Allwohn all of whom recognize mythology as a unifying theme in Schelling, and hence pertinent throughout his early period.[72] The former's approach is rigorously hermeneutic but is limited to an abstract philosophical concept of mythology without engaging with, perhaps even overlooking, Schelling's Hellenism. Baumgartner, too, does not recognize Schelling as a German Hellene, but traces Schelling's early treatment of myth to Christian Gottlob Heyne, the classical philologist and Göttingen librarian, whose influence was tertiary to Winckelmann's.[73] Allwohn clearly argues that

> Die Beschäftigung mit der Mythologie zieht sich durch Schellings sämtliche Werke hindurch. Sie ist in den theologischen Jugendschriften der erste und in der Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung der letzte Gegenstand seiner Studien.[74]

In addition to mentioning Heyne, Allwohn also briefly touches on Winckelmann. "Schellings Neigung zum Klassizismus zeigt sich auch darin, daß er in der Formulierung der ‚Schönheit' von Winckelmann gelernt hat."[75] Nonetheless, by slotting Winckelmann under Klassizismus, which is

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[70] Ast (1808), 1. Philology is void if it is considered either merely as historical and antiquarian book-learning or as the learned study of language.
[71] Güthenke (2020), 36.
[72] Schröter, Manfred, "Ein Rückblick auf Schellings Mythologie," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 14, no. 2 (1960): 264–72; "Mythopoese," *Studia Philosophica (Bern)* 14 (1954): 202-210; Baumgartner, Hans Michael, "Anhaltspunkte zur Vorgeschichte von Schellings Philosophie," in Hans Michael Baumgartner, ed., *Schelling: Einführung in seine Philosophie*, Kolleg Philosophie (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1975); Allwohn, Adolf, "Der Mythos bei Schelling," *Kantstudien*. Ergänzungshefte 61 (Charlottenburg: Pan-Verlag, R. Heise, 1927).
[73] Baumgartner (1975), 27-28, 32-35. For Winckelmann's influence on Heyne, see Bursian, Conrad, "Heyne, Christian Gottlob," in *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, ed. Rochus Liliencron et al. (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1880). 375-378; Harloe, Katherine, "Winckelmann in the Perspective of 'Altertumswissenschaft': Christian Gottlob Heyne and Friedrich August Wolf," *Aufklärung* 27 (2015): 219–37.
[74] Allwohn (1927), 23. The preoccupation with mythology is present throughout all of Schelling's works. It is the first [matter] in his early theological texts from his youth, and the last object of his studies in the philosophy of mythology and revelation.
[75] Allwohn (1927), 48. Schelling's tendency to classicism is shown in that he learned in Winckelmann's formulation of "beauty."

synonymous with *Weimarer Klassik*, and characterizing Schelling's relationship thereto as a tendency, Allwohn betrays that he did not grasp the context of *Griechentum*.

The few sources that explore Winckelmann and *Griechentum* mention Schelling only in passing. When discussing "the ethereal glow which typified German Hellenism," Dirk Held refers to Schelling only once after "Schiller, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schleiermacher, [and] Hegel."[76] Güthenke mentions him twice as one whom both the Berlin philologist August Boeckh in his *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* and his student Wilhelm Dilthey in his *Leben Schleiermachers* quote, specifically the definition of the philologist from the *Methodologie*'s third lecture.[77] Georg Stefansky's admirable *Das hellenisch-deutsche Weltbild: Einleitung in die Lebensgeschichte Schellings* is no exception. While he devotes an entire book to Schelling presciently underscoring "die rationale Kunstansicht Winckelmanns und Lessings" as "der deutsche Hellenismus,"[78] he does not articulate explicitly that Schelling himself is a German Hellene nor evaluate Schelling's references to Winckelmann and his works. Instead, Stefansky limits Hellenism in Schelling to Ancient Greek mythology in its contrast with Christian mythology in the first part of Schelling's 1802/3 *Philosophie der Kunst*—more on this work below. One can infer this from the following passage: "Indem . . . Schelling seinen grundlegenden Vergleich des Griechisch-Antiken und Christlich-Modernen vollzeiht, entsteht das, was man sein hellenisch-deutsches Weltbild nennen kann."[79] Therefore, the Hellenistic-German worldview that is the title of the work and which characterizes Schelling's life for Stefansky focuses narrowly on Schelling's analysis of art, more broadly on the intellectual climate of the second half of the 18th century, and less directly on Schelling's Hellenism.

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[76] Held, Dirk t. D. "Conflict and Repose: Dialectics of the Greek Ideal in Nietzsche and Winckelmann," in *Nietzsche and Antiquity: His Reaction and Response to the Classical Tradition*, edited by Paul Bishop, (Boydell & Brewer, 2004). 417.
[77] Güthenke (2020), 119.
[78] Georg Stefansky, *Das hellenisch-deutsche Weltbild: Einleitung in die Lebensgeschichte Schellings* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1925). 51. [T]he rational view of art of Winckelmann and Lessing [as] German Hellenism.
[79] Stefansky (1925), 146. As Schelling completes his fundamental comparison of Greek-Antiquity and Christian-Modernity, what arises is what one can call his Hellenistic-German worldview.

Moreover, the little attention to Schelling's Hellenism that other scholars devote is due to his association with Hölderlin. Butler mentions him in passing when discussing Hölderlin's rooming arrangements at Tübingen.[80] Certainly, she allows the inference that like Hölderlin, Schelling is part of the second generation of German Hellenes or "writers and poets to whom Winckelmann's Greece was handed down as a living tradition," which traces "through Lessing, Herder, Goethe and Schiller."[81] Nevertheless, she does not flesh out Schelling's significance. Hatfield, too, mentions Schelling in conjunction with Hölderlin, noting him as a companion, fellow romantic, and interlocutor of *Deutscher Idealismus*.[82] Furthermore, while drawing out the pagan significance of Friedrich Schlegel, Hatfield mischaracterizes Schelling as one who "ranked Christian above heathen art," a mischaracterization to which Schelling's works on art attest.[83]

Next, Eduard Gerhard briefly affirms Schelling's Hellenism and tribute to Winckelmann in a pamphlet that celebrates the latter's influence. He mentions Schelling and Goethe's "unantastbaren Verehrung" of Winckelmann, specifically their respective works, *Über das Verhältniß der bildenden Künste zu der Natur* and *Winkelmann und sein Jahrhundert: in Briefen und Aufsätzen*.[84] Furthermore, while Rüdiger Bubner sees Schelling as an *Altertumswissenschaftler*, he acknowledges neither Winckelmann's significance for *Altertumswissenschaft* nor the context of *Griechentum*. According to him,

> Übrigens beginnt zu Anfang des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts ganz parallel zu Schellings Unternehmen in den Altertumswissenschaften bei Fr. Creuzer, G. Hermann, K. O. Müller u. a. sich das Interesse für die Mythologie der Griechen zu regen. Über Nietzsche wird die Botschaft weitergereicht.[85]

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[80] Butler (2011), 208.
[81] Butler (2011), 238
[82] Hatfield (1964), 143, 5, 165.
[83] Hatfield (1964), 183.
[84] Eduard Gerhard, *Winckelmann und die Gegenwart nebst einem etruskischen Spiegel. Sechzehntes Programm zum Winckelmannsfest der archäologischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin* (Berlin: Archäologische Gesellschaft., 1856). 4. [I]nviolable veneration.
[85] Bubner, Rüdiger, "Platon im Denken Schelling," in Rainer Adolphi et al., eds., *Das antike Denken in der Philosophie Schellings*, Schellingiana; Bd. 11 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2004). 45. "[S]tarting at the beginning of the 19th century the interest in Greek mythology stirs entirely parallel to Schelling's undertakings in Altertumswissenschaften with Friedrich Creuzer, Gottfried Hermann, Karl Otto Müller, among others. The message is passed on to Nietzsche." For a comparison of Winckelmann and Nietzsche see Held (2004); Müller, Enrico, "Zur 'Empfindung Des Schönen' Bei Winckelmann Und Nietzsche," *Nietzscheforschung* 24, no. 1 (2017): 83–98.

German literary heights were beholden to Greek mythology, especially in the literary productivity of Goethe and Schiller, although Bubner overlooks that this traces back to Winckelmann. He helpfully shows that one can understand Schelling in "parallel" as an *Altertumswissenschaftler* insofar as both his education and writings on art attest to the primary influence of Greek mythology. One may even say that despite his less technical focus, Schelling primarily is an *Altertumsforscher* and then a philosopher, which allows Bubner to class him with 19th-century German classical philologists like Creuzer, Hermann, and Müller, a lineage to which Nietzsche, too, belongs.[86]

Finally, of all the secondary scholarship, Peter Szondi and to some extent Rehm appear attuned, comparatively speaking, to Winckelmann's and *Griechentum*'s influence on Schelling. In his astute lectures, *Poetik und Geschichtsphilosophie*, the former reads Schelling's Hellenism during his early period in the more palpable and narrower context of *Goethezeit*. According to Hermann Korff, who coined the term, "Die Goethezeit ist indessen ebensosehr die Blütezeit der deutschen Philosophie wie der deutschen Dichtung […]. Und Dichtung und Philosophie gehören in dieser Zeit so eng zusammen […]."[87] Szondi's added virtue is reading Winckelmann as decisive of this intellectual period: "zu Beginn der Goethezeit, bei Winckelmann, abzulesen."[88] He explains that "[…] die Poetik der Goethezeit [kennzeichnet] . . . die intensive Beschäftigung mit der griechischen Kunst, zumal der bildenden. Diese Vertiefung ist Winckelmann zu danken."[89] Here, for Schelling "Griechen . . . bleiben . . . doch im Mittelpunkt der ästhetischen Konzeptionen."[90] Szondi also discusses *Griechentum* noting that "Kaum hat seine [Schelling's and others'] Verehrung für die Antike, die ihm zunachst als selbstverständliches Bidlungsgut eigen war, später widerrufen."[91] In

[86] For recent English scholarship that discusses these figures, see Güthenke (2020).
[87] Hermann A. Korff, *Geist der Goethezeit: Versuch einer ideellen Entwicklung der klassisch-romantischen Literaturgeschichte,* 3 vols. (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1966). 3. "Goethezeit is as much the blossoming of German philosophy as it is of German poetry. And poetry and philosophy belong in this time so closely together." Korff sets this epoch from 1770 to 1830. It comprises the three movements of *Sturm und Drang,* (*Weimarer*) *Klassik*, and *Romantik*.
[88] Peter Szondi, *Poetik und Geschichtsphilosophie*. 1. Aufl. Vol. 2. Szondi, Peter. Studienausgabe der Vorlesungen 2. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974). 20. the beginning of Goethezeit [is] to be read already with Winckelmann.
[89] Szondi (1974a), 18. The poetics of *Goethezeit* characterized the intense engagement with Greek art, particularly of the plastic [bildenden] [art], [which] intensification is thanks to Winckelmann.
[90] Szondi (1974a), 19. the Greeks . . . remain the focus of aesthetic conceptions.
[91] Szondi (1974a), 18. Hardly [Schelling and others] [...] later recanted their reverence for antiquity, which was first of all built into him as a self-understood general education.

other words, Schelling and his contemporaries stretching as far back as Goethe's generation possessed a "reverence for antiquity" inculcated into them from a young age.

Hence, a fitting moniker for the time period would be *Winckelmannzeit*, especially given Goethe's own reverence for Winckelmann. It is important to clarify the relationship between these two for both significantly influence Schelling. One perhaps can capture the reverence for Winckelmann in Goethe's recollection from *Aus Meinem Leben* that

> Bei allen Bemühungen jedoch, welche sich auf Kunst und Altertum bezogen, hatte jeder stets Winckelmann vor Augen, dessen Tüchtigkeit im Vaterlande mit Enthusiasmus anerkannt wurde. Wir lasen fleißig seine Schriften, und suchten uns die Umstände bekannt zu machen, unter welchen er die ersten geschrieben hatte.[92]

Although Hatfield explicitly declares Winckelmann's precedence over Goethe, he implies it by asserting that "Goethe's successors had taken very seriously his admonition that everyone should be a Greek in his own way: 'Jeder sei auf seine Art ein Grieche, aber er sei's.'"[93] Goethe, according to Butler, "was always to feel great respect for Winckelmann as a pioneer in the study of Greek art […]."[94] Even towards the end of the eighteenth century, "Winckelmann's conception of nature and the unique beauty of Greek art was still entirely his [Goethe's] own, and indeed he [Goethe] never abandoned it."[95] Implying continuity from the Renaissance to Winckelmann, Pater correctly intuits that "[t]he aim of a right criticism is to place Winckelmann in an intellectual perspective, of which Goethe is the foreground."[96] The significance that Winckelmann has for Goethe renders the former decisive for *Goethezeit*, which appears to dovetail with Szondi's understanding of *Goethezeit* and Schelling's significance therein.

Rehm, too, subscribes to the period of *Goethezeit*, and appears to recognize Winckelmann's precedence for Schelling, whom he draws occasionally into discussions of Goethe, Wilhelm

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[92] Goethe, *WBA* XIII.355. With all efforts, however, which related to art and antiquity, each person had Winckelmann before his eyes, whose capability was recognized with enthusiasm in the fatherland. We diligently read his writings and sought to make known to ourselves the conditions under which he had first written these [writings].
[93] Hatfield (1964), 5. Goethe, "Antik und modern," *WBA* XX.223.
[94] Butler (2011), 134
[95] Butler (2011), *emphasis added*, 132.
[96] Walter Pater, *Studies in the History of the Renaissance*, ed. Matthew Beaumont. New edition. Oxford World's Classics (Oxford University Press). (Oxford: University Press, 2020). 226.

Humboldt, Hellenized Christianity, and Hölderlin.[97] One example in the context of Humboldt, who translated German Hellenism into a political and institutional program of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, is worth mentioning. Rehm rightly argues that "Schelling selbst stand in seiner Frühzeit in unmittelbarer Nahe der deutsch-klassischen und deutsch-griechischen Bewegung, wie sie in Goethe, aber auch im jungen Friedrich Schlegel oder in Hölderlin verkörpert war."[98] This is partially correct insofar as Schelling's Hellenism lasted throughout his early period—even his entire life—as will be substantiated below. Rehm then proceeds to underscore that "er huldigt vor allem dem großen Winckelmann."[99] The choice of *huldigt* is a fitting term for Rehm recognizes that *Griechentum* is as much aesthetic as it is religious. The focus of Rehm's work is to explicate *Griechentum* as a religion, which is evident in the title: "History of a Faith [*Glaubens*]." While all these sources in some form acknowledge Schelling in the context of *Griechentum*, and fewer his relationship to Winckelmann, none give it primary focus. The remainder of this chapter attempts partially to fill this lacuna.

Schelling's Philological Win(c)k at the Greeks

Schelling received his education in the context of Winckelmann's precipitating influence on the growing field of philology. This is evident in the former's proclivity toward Ancient Greek—a love for, serious study of, and holding to the meaning in Ancient Greek texts as expressed in Ancient Greek—along with a veneration for Winckelmann. As a young boy, Schelling's philosophical ability buds in the soil of philology that the rise of *Neuhumanismus* characterized. According to Christopher Calenza, *Neuhumanismus* is a continuation of the Renaissance's "respect for the authoritative and exemplary status of the classical, Graeco-Roman world."[100] To a large extent it is a political and programmatic manifestation of *Griecehtum* that

[97] Rehm (1952), 175, 280-1, 301, 304, 311, and 376.
[98] Rehm (1952), 253. Schelling himself in his early years stood in direct proximity to the German-Classical and German-Greek movement, as it was embodied in Goethe, but also in the young Friedrich Schlegel or Hölderlin.
[99] Rehm (1952), 254. above all he [Schelling] revered Winckelmann.
[100] Calenza, Christopher, "Humanism," in *The Classical Tradition*, ed. Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, and Salvatore Settis, Harvard University Press Reference Library (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap, 2010). 462. For New Humanism see Güthenke (2020); Anthony J. La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit: Poor Students, Clerical Careers, and Professional Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge: University Press, 1988); Friedrich Paulsen, *Geschichte des*

transformed German pedagogy spurring the growing prominence and institutionalization of *Altertumswissenschaft*. Although he does not recognize Winckelmann's influence behind *Neuhumanismus*, Calenza describes that through this intellectual impetus:

> Philosophy became professionalized in university settings, and as the first modern histories of philosophy began to be written, it was the metaphysical style of philosophy, associated with the idealization of Platonism, which received the most emphasis. Late 18th- and early 19th-century humanism, or what is sometimes known as Neohumanism (*Neuhmanismus*) became, in effect, idealism.[101]

Hence, *Neuhumanismus* both as "late 18th- and early 19th-century humanism," programmatically organized by Wilhelm von Humboldt, speaks directly to Schelling's educational background and, in becoming "idealism," to his philosophical development, especially his penchant for Plato. Rehm elucidates that

> Allein der politische Philhellenismus hätte, wenigstens in Deutschland, nicht so rasch sich ausbreiten können, wäre ihm nicht vom ästhetisch-humanistischen der Boden bereitet worden, vom Philhellenismus Winckelmanns und Goethes.[102]

Specifically, Winckelmann's and Goethe's Philhellenism—I take it synonymously with Hellenism—spread very quickly in political form as *Neuhumanismus* putting forward a new pedagogical outlook.

Friedrich Paulsen indicates both that Winckelmann is the impetus behind the transformation of German pedagogy and the cause of difference in early education between Schelling and the previous generation. He states that "den Grundunterschied der beiden Zeitalter [ist] den Unterschied der Auffassungsweise ansehen, welcher durch die Wörter mechanisch und organisch bezeichnet wird."[103] Then briefly recounting "die allmähliche Entwickelung und Ausbreitung dieser neuen Anschauungsweise" of pedagogy, he reminds first "wie Winckelmann . . . die Augen der Zeitgenossen für Kunstwerke öffnete [...]" and how "indem er die Werke der

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gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf den klassischen Unterricht, Zweite (Leipzig: Veit und Comp., 1885); James Van Horn Melton, *Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria* (Cambridge: University Press, 1988); and Suzanne L. Marchand, *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750-1970* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[101] Calenza (2010), 466.

[102] Rehm (1952), 7. Political Philhellenism alone, at least in Germany, would not have been able to spread so rapidly were it not the soil of aesthetic-humanistic Philhellenism, the Philhellenism of Winckelmann and Goethe.

[103] Paulsen (1885), 513. the fundamental difference of the two ages [is] the difference of the manner of perception, which is characterized by the words "mechanical" and "organic."

griechischen Bildhauer deutete."[104] Paulsen, therefore, primarily acknowledges Winckelmann as the impetus behind the pedagogical transformation of 18th-century Germany. He then details that

> WOLF und KANT hatten eine mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Bildung; ihre ersten Schriften gehören diesem Gebiet an; ihre Philosophie ist auf diesem Boden gewachsen [...]. FICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL dagegen haben eine wesentlich historische Bildung. Sie haben den philologisch-theologischen Kursus . . . durchgemacht [...]. Ihr späteres Philosophieren wurzelt sichtlich in dem Untergrund dieser Vorbildung […].[105]

Around halfway through the eighteenth-century qualitative changes in school curricula take place. What originally was a mathematical-*naturwissenschaftliche* education, which the generation of Kant and F.A. Wolf received, becomes historical consisting more of philology and theology.[106] According to such a curriculum were Schelling and his contemporaries educated. Bernard Reardon equally observes that "The difference in method as in temper between Kant and his successors" in regard to "the diversity of their early work" is that the former "addresses himself to scientific subjects," while the latter's "early writings . . . are deliberately theological in their choice of theme."[107] Most importantly, Schelling's "later philosophizing" remains rooted in this philological soil, which he substantiates at the opening of his 1841 *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Begründung der positiven Philosophie*. "[H]at mich bis jetzt *vorzüglich das Studium der alten Sprachen* beschäftigt."[108] His return to the limelight was expected to produce the last decisive turn in philosophy, and drew an audience of luminaries such as Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Engels,

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[104] Paulsen (1885), 514. the gradual development and expansion of this new view . . . how Winckelmann opened the eyes of his contemporaries for works of art . . . he accordingly pointed to the works of Greek sculptors.

[105] Paulsen (1885), 525-6. Wolf and Kant had a mathematical-*naturwissenschaftliche* education [*Bildung*]; their first texts belong to this field; their philosophy grows on this soil […]. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel in contrast had an essentially historical education. They had completed the philological-theological course […]. Their later philosophizing is rooted visibly in the subsoil of this educational background.

[106] The polysemy of the *Bildung* requires clarification. "Bildung," Wolfgang Pfeifer et al., *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen* (1993). According to Pfiefer, it can have four meanings: (1) Entfaltung und Prägung der geistig-seelischen Anlagen des Menschen, Erziehung; (2) Ergebnis der Erziehung, Einheit von Haltung, Können und Wissen eines Menschen; (3) Entstehung; (4) Schaffung, Gründung; and (5) Gestalt, Form. The first two meanings touch on its pedagogical sense and are related insofar as the first denotes the process or *Entfaltung* and *Prägung*, while the second the result *Ergebnis*. The third and fourth are similar in that the former touches on "arising" and the latter on "creation." Henceforth, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. The last touches merely on "form." Also see "bilden," *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm*, digitalisierte Fassung im Wörterbuchnetz des Trier Center for Digital Humanities, Version 01/21, https://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemid=B07118. Henceforth, *Grimm Wörterbuch*.

[107] Bernard M. G. Reardon, *Religion in the Age of Romanticism: Studies in Early Nineteenth-Century Thought*, Cambridge Core (Cambridge: University Press, 1985). 17.

[108] Schelling, *SW* 2/XIII.4. *emphasis added.* [A]bove all until now the study of ancient languages has occupied me […].

Jakob Burckhardt, Leopold von Ranke, and A. von Humboldt.[109] To them Schelling reveals his high regard for the study of ancient languages, which had occupied him "until now," confirming his life-long philological preoccupation as heavily informing his philosophy—this is important to bear in mind when interpreting Schelling. His philological outlook stretches more than fifty years, even as far back as his early adolescence.

Schelling's familiarity with ancient languages began at a very young age. Manfred Frank notes that "Schelling bezieht seine Schulbildung zunächst in der deutschen Schule in Bebenhausen, wo er—ein außerordentliches Talent in den Sprachfächern—mit acht Jahren Griechisch und Latein erlernt."[110] During this period, his insatiable desire to learn manifested in his brilliant memory. G. L. Plitt elucidates that "seine zum Theil selbst ausgearbeiteten Observationen z.B. zu Pindar zeigen, fiel es seinem Gedächtnisse nicht schwer Parallelen der verschiedensten Art beizubringen."[111] He exercised his memory to such a degree that he could take Pindar's Greek lyric poetry and produce Latin equivalents and vice versa. These observations on Pindar indicate that Schelling's ability to philosophically penetrate and comment was in its fledgling phase. If it were not for his father's library, the young Schelling would not have easily fed his appetite for ancient languages. Joseph Friedrich Schelling was "ein im Ländchen durchaus angesehener Orientalist, der im Jahre 1777 Professor am Höheren Seminar des Klosters zu Bebenhausen (nahe Tübingen) wurde."[112] As Plitt points out, Schelling "durch des Vaters ansehnliche Bibliothek in seinen Studien unterstützt, sich eine tüchtige Belesenheit in sämmtlichen lateinischen und griechischen Prosaikern

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[109] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Philosophie der Offenbarung: 1841/42*. Edited by Manfred Frank. 5th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977). 9. "Mit großer Geste versprach er einem aus hohen Staatsbeamten, Militärs, Universitätesprofessoren, Hörern wie Bakunin, Kierkegaard, Engels, J. Burckhardt, Savigny, Steffens, Trendelenburg, Ranke, A. von Humboldt und vielen anderen glänzenden Namen zusammengesetzten Auditorium, eine Wende in der Philosophie herbeizuführen, welche die letzte, die alles entscheidende sein werde." Cf. footnote 15.

[110] Manfred Frank, *Eine Einführung in Schellings Philosophie*, 1. Aufl. edition (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985). 10. *Emphasis added.* Schelling obtained his schooling initially in the German school in Bebenhausen, where he—a prodigious talent in the discipline of languages—at eight years old mastered [*erlernt*] Greek and Latin.

[111] Gustav Leopold Plitt, *Aus Schellings Leben. In Briefen.*, vol. 1, 3 vols (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1869). BrPl.21. to show his own partly elaborated observations, for example, on Pindar, it was not difficult for his own memory to produce easily parallels of different types.

[112] Frank (1985), 9. a well-regarded orientalist in the county, who in 1777 became professor at the higher seminary of [the] Bebenhausen [Cistercian] Monastery (near Tübingen).

und Dichtern erworben."[113] Certainly, Schelling's historical circumstances were favorable for cultivating his philological proclivity by placing him in a household with convenient access to ancient texts. More marvelous is the fact that at such a young age he had read all Latin and Greek, which confirms Ehrhardt's comment that "Die bereits gewonnen Einblicke in die frühen Entwürfe aus Schellings Studienzeit zeigen deutlich genug, wie entschieden von eigenem Wollen geleitet Schelling von Anfang an seine Wurzeln in die Literature treibt."[114] In other words, Schelling directly drew his ideas from the main sources of Greek texts. Furthermore, Frank recounts that

> Er wechselt 1785 in die Lateinschule zu Nürtingen. Die dort gebotenen Möglichkeiten reichen schon bald nicht mehr hin, um den Wunderknaben zu fördern […]. und so beschließt der Vater, den Jungen wieder nach Bebenhausen zurüchzuholen und in Seminare zu stecken, die für ältere Schüler bestimmt sind. Er hat ihn nun unter persönlicher Obhut, bringt ihm Hebräisch und Arabisch bei (Sprachen, die Schelling noch im Alter perfekt beherrscht…) [...].[115]

At age ten, Schelling had a brief stint in the Latin School in Nürtingen. Such schools primarily emphasized Latin to prepare students for university study. But because of Schelling's profound facility with ancient languages, his father, was compelled to bring him back to Bebenhausen to matriculate him at the higher seminary of the Bebenhausen monastery while personally accommodating and teaching him new languages such as Hebrew and Arabic.

At the convent school in Bebenhausen both Schelling's father and his Greek tutor, Johann Friedrich Reuchlin, are important figures. According to Plitt, "Reuchlin . . . [war] der andere Klosterprofessor, der Kollege von Schelling's Vater [...]."[116] Wilhelm Jacobs explains the academic structure of Bebenhausen.

> Der Hauptinhalt der Studien an den Klosterschulen war das Studium der Sprachen Latein, Griechisch und Hebräisch. Der Tagesablauf war von morgens 5 oder 6 Uhr bis abends 20 Uhr hinaus genau geregelt. Unterricht, Privatstudium und religiose Ubungen wechselten miteinander ab.[117]

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[113] Plitt (1869), BrPl.21. Having been supported in his studies through his father's substantial library, he had acquired a proficient reading in all Latin and Greek prose writers and poets.

[114] Ehrhardt (2000), XLVI. The insights already obtained into the early outlines of Schelling's student days show clearly how decisively Schelling, led of his own will, drove his roots into the literature.

[115] Frank (1985), 10. In 1785 Schelling switched to the Latin school in Nürtingen. Soon enough the possibilities on offer there were no longer adequate to nurture the boy wonder. Thus, his father decided to take back again his boy and put him in seminars, which were designated for older students. He had him under his own personal care, taught him Hebrew and Arabic (languages, which Schelling in old age still mastered).

[116] Plitt (1869), BrPl.16. Reuchlin is the name of the other professor at the monastery, the colleague of Schelling's father.

[117] Wilhelm G. Jacobs, *Zwischen Revolution und Orthodoxie?: Schelling und seine Freunde im Stift und an der Universität Tübingen: Texte und Untersuchungen*. Vol. 12. Spekulation und Erfahrung. Abteilung II, Untersuchungen. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1989). 25. The main contents of study at the convent schools were the study of the Latin, Greek and

Besides the prescribed daily schedule, Schelling had "private Unterweisungen des Vaters und dessen Mitprofessors Johann Friedrich Reuchlin."[118] Jaspers confirms that Schelling was "früh vom Vater erzogen in philologischen Wissenschaften, und gründlich vertraut mit der klassischen Antike."[119] Reuchlin perhaps is more significant because he not only enabled Schelling's intimate familiarity with Classical antiquity, but also introduced Schelling to philosophy. Reuchlin embodies the first intersection of philology and philosophy in Schelling's early life. While Frank mentions that "Reuchlin sich des Griechisch-Unterrichts annimmt," Plitt elaborates further on Schelling's language curriculum.[120] "Bei Reuchlin lernte er vorzüglich griechisch, bei seinem Vater die orientalischen Sprachen, bei beiden lateinisch."[121] In response to one of Schelling's first Greek assignments, "Reuchlin . . . war sehr entzückt über diese erste Arbeit des Knaben, versprach sich schon Alles von ihm."[122] Proffering weekly observations, Reuchlin comments on one of Schelling's works regarding the productive import of philology.

> Im nächsten Hebdomadar begnügte sich der Knabe nicht mehr bloß mit Distichen, sondern fügte zu den Distichen, wechen eine lateinische und griechische Composition vorausging, mehrere sapphische Strophen hinzu. Beim dritten Hebdomadar findet sich eine metrische Uebersetzung nach Lowth (»Versio metrica Cap. XIV Jesajae in Hexametros ex Lowthii lyricis facta«).[123]

This catalogue reveals Schelling's deep engagement with Greek poetry and Greek and Latin prose composition.

Besides managing Schelling's Greek education, Reuchlin encouraged him to take up philosophy; his pedagogical approach, therefore, was first to establish Schelling in the Ancient Greek language before introducing him to philosophy. "Es war sein Lehrer und Gönner

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Hebrew languages. The daily routine was strictly regulated from 5 or 6am until 8pm. Instruction, individual study, and religious exercise alternated with one another.

[118] Jacobs (1989), 25. […] private tuition of his father and his fellow professor Johann Friedrich Reuchlin.

[119] Jaspers (1955), 15. Educated by his father in philological *Wissenschaften* early on, and thoroughly familiar with classical antiquity.

[120] Frank (1985), 10. Reuchlin attended to his [Schelling's] Greek instruction.

[121] Plitt (1869), BrPl.20-1. With Reuchlin he [Schelling] learned above all Greek; with his father [he learned] the oriental languages; with both [he learned] Latin.

[122] Plitt (1869), BrPl.16. was very delighted with the boy's work [and] promised [over to] himself everything of him [Schelling].

[123] Plitt (1869), BrPl.16. In the next week, the boy contented himself not merely with elegiac couplets, but added to the elegiac couplets, which [was] preceded [by] a Latin and Greek Composition, more sapphic Strophes. By the third week a metrical translation is found here according to Lowth ("Versio metrica Cap. XIV Jesajae in Hexametros ex Lowthii lyricis facta").

Reuchlin," according to Plitt, "der ihn im letzten Jahr seines Aufenthalts auch in die Philosophie einführte, indem er ihm philosophische Bücher zum Lesen gab."[124] Hence, "Uebrigens hatte er [Schelling] auch schon in Bebenhausen angefangen Philosophisches zu lesen. Platon ohnedieß; von den Neueren aber Mehreres von Leibnitz."[125] Thus, Schelling's first engagement with philosophy is Plato—to whom, as we will see in the third and fourth chapters, he appeals directly for his notion of philosophical productivity. In addition, Leibniz formed Schelling's more contemporary source of philosophy—chapter four will discuss Leibniz's influence on Schelling as it concerns the doctrine of *Hen kai Pan*. Plitt furnishes a valuable reflection of Schelling paying his respects to Reuchlin for encouraging him in philosophy.

> Schelling selbst beschreibt uns die Anfänge seiner philosophischen Lectüre in seinen nachgelassenen Schriften, da wo er von der Deutlichkeit in der Philosophie redet. »Es gibt, sagt er dort, eine Deutlichkeit in der Philosophie, die den Anfänger und gerade die besseren Köpfe in Verzweiflung bringt, wie ich von einem weiß, dem ein wohlmeinender Lehrer, als er glaubte, es sei nun Zeit, daß er sich auch mit Philosophie beschäftige, ein Hauptbuch der damaligen Popular-Philosophie, Feders *Logik und Metaphysik*, in die Hände gab, ein Buch, das ihn mit der tiefsten Betrübniß erfüllte, weil er es nicht zu verstehen glaubte; denn was er davon verstand, schien ihm zu trivial, als daß er es für den wirklichen Inhalt des Buches halten konnte, und wegen der zu großen Deutlichkeit des Buches gab er es auf je etwas von Philosophie zu begreifen. Als ihm aber derselbe Lehrer später die Leibnitzischen Aphorismen, die unter dem Namen *Theses in gratiam principis Eugenii* bekannt sind, in die Hand gab, da faßte er wieder Muth und glaubte von der Philosophie doch vielleicht noch etwas verstehen zu können.[126]

Schelling's introduction to philosophy is a story of despair and encouragement regarding the clarity it provides. He was incredulous at his being able to understand so lucidly Feder's work. It seems that he expected this book to be rather impenetrable, and perhaps fancied that philosophy consists merely of abstruse language. Reuchlin, as the "well-meaning teacher," corrected this assumption and reassured him that he could progress in philosophy. If it were not for Reuchlin, there is no

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[124] Plitt (1869), BrPl.25. It was his teacher and benefactor, Reuchlin, who in the last year of his residence introduced him to philosophy; accordingly, he gave him philosophy books to read.

[125] Plitt (1869), BrPl.25. Finally, he had also already begun to read philosophical books in Bebenhausen. Besides Plato, of the newer [philosophers] however [he read] more of Leibniz.

[126] Plitt (1869), BrPl.25. Schelling even describes to us the beginnings of his philosophical lectures in his posthumous writings, where he speaks of the clarity in philosophy. 'There is, he says, a clarity in philosophy, which brings the beginner and even the more clever one into despair, as I [Schelling] knew of one, for whom a well-meaning teacher, when he [Reuchlin] believed it would not be the time that he [Schelling] occupied himself even with philosophy, gave him a journal of contemporary popular philosophy, Feder's *Logic and Metaphysics*, a book that filled him with the deepest grief, because he believed not to understand it; for what he understood of that [book] appeared to him too trivial for him to be able to consider it the actual content of the book; and because of the extreme clarity of the book he discounted the fact that he understood something of philosophy. When later, however, the same teacher gave him the aphorisms of Leibniz, which are known under the name *Theses in gratiam principis Eugenii*, he plucked courage again and believed perhaps to be able to understand something of philosophy.'

telling whether Schelling would have been able to overcome his initial philosophical despair. Indeed, even till the end of his life, Schelling did not forget Reuchlin's influence.

Plitt goes on to detail a touching personal note that Reuchlin inserted into a philosophy book that he gave to Schelling. This note affirms the connection between philology and philosophy.

> Zu Schelling's ältesten Büchern gehörte ein philosophisches, das ihm Reuchlin als Andenken schenkte, es ist der *Recueil de diverses Pièces sur la Philosophie etc. par Messieurs Leibniz, Clarke, Newton et autres auteurs célèbres*, ein Buch, das Schelling sehr schätzte. Es stehen in dem Exemplar Schelling's von Reuchlin's Hand geschrieben die Worte: *Juveni praenobilissimi ingenii, literarum humaniorum gnarissimo et jam jam ad philosophiam laetissima spe aspiranti sui memoriam commendat – Reuchlin, Bebenh. 4. Maji 1791.*[127]

Reuchlin perceived early on a fruitful relationship between the sixteen-year-old philological genius and philosophy. Perhaps this is why he introduced him to philosophy earlier than Schelling thought fit. Reuchlin, who at this point was fully responsible for Schelling's Ancient Greek education, certainly identified the mastery of ancient language as his "remarkable genius." Such a quick mastery of Ancient Greek can only point to Schelling's burgeoning Hellenism as well. With this philological background secured, Reuchlin then deemed the young genius ready for philosophy. His pedagogy progressed from philology to philosophy, a sequence essential for understanding Schelling's philosophy as consisting of Hellenism and productivity. Schelling in turn trusted Reuchlin and found motivation for deeper philosophical investigations. Ultimately, the latter embodied for the former the synthesis of an acute knowledge of the Ancient Greek language and philosophy. For the remainder of his career, Schelling did not lay aside his knowledge of Ancient Greek to read philosophy in native German, as revealed in the confession to his Berlin audience in 1841.

[127] Plitt (1869), BrPl.25-6. Among Schelling's oldest books belongs a philosophy book, which Reuchlin gave him as a souvenir; it is the *Recueil de diverses Pièces sur la Philosophie etc. par Messieurs Leibniz, Clarke, Newton et autres auteurs célèbres*, a book that Schelling valued highly. In Schelling's personal copy the [following] words are written in Reuchlin's hand. 'To a young man of remarkable genius, by experience of refined books and by the most joyful [and] aspiring hope he always entrusts his memory to philosophy.' Reuchlin, Bebenh. 4. May 1791.

Upon gaining admission to the Tübingen *Stift*, Schelling continued and developed his philological approach to philosophy.[128] Rudolf Haym observes that "wie eifrig er seine philologischen Studien forttrieb."[129] Schelling's philological studies remained the object of his zeal. "Schon im Herbst 1790 brachte der Vater den noch nicht Sechszehnjährigen zu den ihm befreundeten Tübinger Professoren," Haym recounts vividly, "und bezeichnete ihn bei Gelegenheit dieser Aufnahme in's Stift als ein praecox ingenium [...]."[130] As a professor at the Bebenhausen monastery, and one of the foremost orientalists of his time, Joseph Schelling certainly maintained relationships with academic circles in Tübingen. To some members of these circles, he introduced his son Schelling as a "precocious genius" for entering the *Stift* at the young age of fifteen. Haym further observes that it was "Auf der Grundlage einer sicheren Beherrschung der alten Sprachen . . . entwickelte sich sein reichbegabter Geist zu einer ungewöhlichen, bald auch anderen wissenschaftlichen Aufgaben gewachsenen Starke."[131]

One example of Schelling's growing philological and philosophical facility is his *Timaios-Kommentar*—a more thorough introduction to the work is in chapter three. It offers a lucid instance of his philological approach to philosophy. Schelling focuses on crucial passages such as those concerning the demiurge, the creation of the world, the difference between the noetic and aesthetic, etc., and expounds on them with philological notes. In one passage, he observes that

> Deutlicher wäre es, wenn es hieße - 'ουδεν ανοητον του νουν εχοντος όλου όλον καλλιον εσεσθαι.' Allein Plato liebt solche Metathesen. Ficinus scheint seiner Übersetzung zufolge diesen Satz nicht verstanden zu haben.[132]

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[128] For an excellent and accessible historical overview of the Tübinger Stift, see the Vierter Abschnitt of Gerhard Schäfer, *Kleine württembergische Kirchengeschichte.* (Stuttgart: Silberburg-Verlag, 1964). 95-123. For a more detailed history, see Martin Leube, *Das Tübinger Stift, 1770-1950: Geschichte des Tübinger Stifts.* (Stuttgart: J.F. Steinkopf, 1954). 4-139.

[129] Rudolph Haym, *Die romantische Schule: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes* (Berlin: Rudolph Gaertner, 1870). 555. "how zealously he [Schelling] continued his philological studies [even here]." Indeed, Haym was a Hegelian which comes out in his analysis of Schelling, whom he takes primarily as a natural philosopher embodying the combination of Fichte and Goethe.

[130] Haym (1870), 555. Already in the autumn of 1790 the father introduced the not yet sixteen-year-old to Tübingen professors, who were friends with him, and characterized him at the occasion of his admission into the Stift as a *praecox ingenium.*

[131] Haym (1870), 555. On the foundation of a sure command of ancient languages [that] his [Schelling's] richly gifted intellect developed into an unusual strength that grew immediately also in other *wissenschaftlichen* tasks.

[132] Schelling, *AA* II/5.154; Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *"Timaeus"* (1794), Schellingiana; Bd. 4. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstsatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994). 28. "It would be clearer if it means 'no unintelligent whole will be more beautiful than a whole possessing intellect.' Plato alone loved such metatheses. Ficinus according to his translation appears not to have understood this sentence." Ficinus' Latin is "Cum igitur excogitasset, invenit, nihil eorum, quae secundum naturam aspectui subiecta sunt, si expers intelligentiae sit, intelligente alio, totum toto pulchrius unquam

From Plato's claim that the whole is something living insofar as it possesses intellect and is not just some lifeless agglomeration of material, Schelling infers that Plato loves broad metaphysical claims. He does not stop there but recognizes that Marsilio Ficinus did not understand this claim as reflected in his inadequate Latin translation. For he unsettles the definitiveness of the Greek predicate ανοητον by rendering it hypothetical, specifically as the protasis of a conditional, "si expers intelligentiae sit." Schelling, in other words, identified Ficinus' misunderstanding *via* translation. Ficinus produced these translations under the patronage of Cosimo de Medici at the beginning of the Renaissance. At the very least, we can infer that Schelling read and translated Plato's *Timaeus* in Ancient Greek and even took the effort to evaluate how Ficinus' Latin measured up to it. Schelling's attention to Plato was as philosophical as it was philological.

The environment of Tübingen certainly fostered Schelling's twined philosophical and philological endeavours. Its atmosphere was redolent of *Griechentum*, a mark of the province of Württemberg's intention to engage with and preserve ancient culture. In his long essay on Schelling's stint at Tübingen, Horst Fuhrmans observes that "Alles – Konsistorium, Stift und Universität – atmete darum den Geist alter Zucht und Überlieferung […]."[133] This environment and its spirit undoubtedly cultivated further Schelling's taste for Ancient languages. Gerhard Schäfer specifies that in Baden-Württemberg and Tübingen more specifically during "1781/1782 . . . die Begeisterung für das klassische Griechentum hat begonnen."[134] "Wenn überall das Alte fiel oder gefährdet war und seine Verteidigung kaum versucht wurde," Fuhrmans observes, "so sollte Württemberg und Tübingen zumal der Ort sein, wo versucht wurde, den »guten, alten Geist«

fore." Plato. *[Platōn] Platonis philosophi quae exstant*. Translated by Marsilio Ficino and Henri Estienne. Bd. 9 von 11 Bde. (Biponti: Ex Zweibrücken, 1787). 305. The English of the Greek is "no whole if it is without intelligence will ever be more beautiful than a another intellecting whole." The Greek passage can be found in J. Burnet, *Platonis opera*, vol. 4, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902 (repr. 1968): St III. 30b. Since the *Timaios-Kommentar* is a set of notes, Schelling employs German loosely, which for the remainder of this thesis I will retain as is and not employ *sic* to indicate mistakes.

[133] Fuhrmans, Horst, in "Schelling im Tübinger Stift Herbst 1790 – Herbst 1795," in Gerhard Kurz and Manfred Frank, *Materialien zu Schellings philosophischen Anfängen*, 2nd ed. (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975). 56. Everything—the consistory (a governmental gathering place), the monastery, and the university—breathed the spirit of ancient culture.

[134] Schäfer (1964), 122. In 1781/1782 the enthusiasm for Classical Greece began.

festzuhalten und ihn gegen ein »aufklärerisches Jahrhundert« zu retten."[135] The endeavour to secure the good ancient spirit ought to further colour our understanding of the educational milieu of Tübingen in which not only Schelling but also Hegel and Hölderlin developed intellectually. According to Haym, at Tübingen there was an "Einfluss, welchen die vertraute Beschäftigung mit dem griechischen Alterthum übte."[136] Naturally, "Mit Schelling theilten Hegel und Hölderlin die Begeisterung für . . . den Humanismus der Griechen."[137] "[…] doch Tübingen [war] eine jener Stellen," Fuhrmans further adds, "wo man sich dem Neu-heraufkommenden besonders verschloß, um bewußt das Alte zu pflegen[…]."[138] The emphasis on the Ancients was to such a degree that Tübingen at this time actively overlooked contemporary intellectual novelty. This speaks to its emphasis on direct immersion in ancient languages as a way of closing one's mind to the new and preserving the ancient spirit. In such a controlled environment, students were able to develop a taste for antiquity—it is important to recall this point in the telos. This is not to say that students like Schelling cultivated no familiarity with contemporary literature, but certainly in comparison to these, the texts of antiquity held higher esteem.

The influence of Winckelmann's interpretation of Ancient Greece upheld and even promoted this focus on and preservation of antiquity at Tübingen. Upon describing the many factors that shaped Tübingen's culture, Fuhrmanns underscores that

> Winckelmanns Wiederentdeckung der Antike ergriff viele. Überall schien das Neue sich groß anzukünden: ein Leben in Freiheit und Würde, ein neues helles Dasein in Harmonie und Schönheit, jener Harmonie, die Hellas einmal besessen zu haben schien. Das verzauberte die jungen Menschen.[139]

Tübingen's desire to maintain the old was to such an extent that ironically Winckelmann's rediscovery of antiquity, which is a continuation of *ad fontes* spirit of Renaissance humanism, and

[135] Fuhrmans (1975), 56. If everywhere the old had declined or been endangered and its defense was hardly attempted, then Württemberg and Tübingen especially should be the place where it was attempted to secure the 'good ancient spirit' and to save it from an 'enlightened century.'
[136] Haym (1870), 556. influence, which the intimate preoccupation with Greek antiquity exercised.
[137] Haym (1870), 556. Hegel and Hölderlin shared with Schelling an enthusiasm for the humanism of the Greeks.
[138] Fuhrmans (1975), 56. Tübingen was still one of those places, where one closed one's mind to what was new and up and coming, to maintain the old deliberately.
[139] Fuhrmans (1975), 587. Winckelmann's rediscovery of antiquity seized many. Everywhere the new appeared largely to announce itself: a life in freedom and grandeur, a new Greek existence in harmony and beauty, in that harmony which once the Greeks appeared to own. That [new Greek existence] bewitched the young men.

the possibilities it opened were considered new. To wit, *das Neue* does not indicate the latest philosophical ideas—which at this time would be Kant's philosophy—but a new possibility in the modern world of an Ancient Greek existence, "a life in freedom and grandeur." Schelling was one of the many young men seized and bewitched by Winckelmann's rediscovery. Here in 1793, the middle of his student days, Schelling publishes his examination, *Über Mythen, historische Sagen und Philosopheme der ältesten Welt*, in which he explores the extent to which "Geschichte und Philosophie in jenen Sagen zusammenfließen."[140] More strikingly, he publishes this work in the philosophical-theological journal *Memorabilien*, edited by Heinrich E. G. Paulus, an evangelical theologian and main representative of theological rationalism; early on he praised Schelling's philological and philosophical ability, but later opposed him and *Jenaer Romantik*.[141] Certainly, the title hearkens back to Xenophon's homonymous work. The desire to focus on and preserve the reverence for antiquity by emphasizing philology finds expression in the preface to this journal. When describing the first of the journal's three main concerns, Paulus emphasizes that

> Philologie ist . . . das unentbehrliche Mittel zur eigenen Ueberzeugung, das einzige Antidoton gegen das geistlose Nachsprechen, durch welches so viele genialische Alleswisser den Fortschritten der Vernunft Unehre machen und die einzig mögliche Grundfeste des Systems einer historisch begründeten Aufklärung.[142]

Indeed, this speaks to the importance of philology for a historically grounded enlightenment that is immune to spiritless repetition. At Tübingen, therefore, Schelling inhaled Hellenism that Winckelmann exhaled a generation ago.

A closer view of Schelling's social life in Tübingen shows more his penchant for Ancient Greek. Plitt notes that "[...] er . . . lebhaften Umgang mit einigen anderen [hatte], die nicht seiner

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[140] Schelling, *AA* I/1.195; *SW* 1/I.43. "philosophy and history coalesce in legends." For more background, see Wilhelm G. Jacob's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/1.185-91.

[141] For praise, see Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *F.W.J. Schelling Briefe und Dokumente*, ed. Horst Fuhrmans, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1962). H. E. G. Paulus an Minister Voigt, am 13.10.1797. 111-112. For opposition, one need only consider that in Schelling's return to the academic spotlight in Berlin, Paulus published his own notes on the former's *Philosophie der Offenbarung* (1841/42), which proved to be a heavily redacted and distorting version, without Schelling's permission. Cf. footnote 15.

[142] *Memorabilien, dem Bibelstudium und der morgenländischen Litteratur gewidmet* herausg. von H.E.G. Paulus. Erster Stück, (1791). 3-4. Philology . . . is the indispensable means to one's own conviction, the only antidote against the spiritless repetition through which so many brilliant know-it-alls dishonor the progressions of reason, and the only possible foundation of a historically grounded enlightenment.

Promotion angehörten, besonders mit Hauber, mit Hölderlin, mit Renz, mit Hegel . . . [die] sämmtlich um fünf Jahre älter als Schelling [waren]."[143] Schelling's Hellenism is especially lucid in his regard for Hölderlin and Renz. According to Plitt,

> sie doch schon von Nürtingen her mit einander bekannt waren, weil Nürtingen Hölderlin's Heimath war. Am meisten jedoch fand sich Schelling zu Hölderlin hingezogen durch dessen Liebe zum Alterthum und seine Vertrautheit mit den Griechen, besonders auch mit dem Kunstwesen und der Kunstgeschichte Griechenlands, einer Seite des Alterthums, für welche Schelling die größte Empfänglichkeit hatte.[144]

In other words, Schelling fed his Hellenism through his admiration of and interaction with Hölderlin because of the latter's "familiarity with the Greeks." This familiarity manifested as the grasp of "the essence of art and the art history of Greece." If on account of these two matters Schelling gravitated towards Hölderlin, then in one sense he admired Winckelmann through Hölderlin. Plitt recounts that "damals, es seien nur drei Studenten in Tübingen, welche griechisch verständen, Hölderlin, Schelling und Renz."[145] This is no small honor for Schelling since he is five years younger than the two. Plitt elaborates that

> Renz war der Primus in der Promotion Hegel's, welcher auch Hölderlin angehörte. Schelling setzte ihn in Bezug auf Talent und jede Vortrefflichkeit über alle seine Freunde und pflegte auch später zu sagen, daß er in seinem Leben nie einen talentvolleren Menschen gekannt habe.[146]

Given that Schelling's admiration for Hölderlin stems from the latter's own Hellenism, he perhaps admired Renz for his facility with Ancient Greek and familiarity with Greek antiquity.

Towards the end of his studies at Tübingen, the *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus* emerge. These contain expressions of Hellenism. He published the *Briefe* in 1795 (again in 1809) against dogmatic theological Kantians.[147] In the preface to his 1809 anthology, *F.W.J. Schelling's Philosophische Schriften*, he explains that

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[143] Plitt (1869), BrPl.69. he had lively social interaction with Hauber, Hölderlin, Renz, and Hegel . . . [who were] all together five years older than Schelling.

[144] Plitt (1869), BrPl.69. they [Hölderlin and Schelling] were already familiar with each other from Nürtingen because Nürtingen was Hölderlin's home. Schelling mostly found himself drawn to Hölderlin on account of his love for antiquity and his familiarity with the Greeks, especially even with the essence of art [Kunstwesen] and the art history of Greece, a side of antiquity for which Schelling had the most receptivity.

[145] Plitt (1869), BrPl.69. at that time there were only three students in Tübingen, who could understand Greek: Hölderlin, Schelling, and Renz.

[146] Plitt (1869), BrPl.69. Renz was the first in Hegel's doctoral cohort, to which Hölderlin also belonged. In regard to talent and every excellence Schelling placed him above all his friends and later used to say also that he had never known a man more talented.

[147] For more background, see Annemarie Pieper's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/3.5-44.

> Die Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus enthalten eine lebhafte Polemik gegen den damals fast allgemeingeltenden und vielfach gemißbrauchten sogenannten moralischen Beweis von der Existenz Gottes, aus dem Gesichtspunkt des damals nicht weniger allgemein herrschenden Gegensatzes von Subjekt und Objekt. Dem Verfasser scheint diese Polemik in Ansehung der Denkweise, auf die sie sich bezieht, noch immer ihre volle Kraft zu haben. Keiner von jenen, die bis jetzt auf dem nämlichen Standpunkte geblieben sind, hat sie widerlegt. Indessen sind die in dem neunten Briefe enthaltenen Bemerkungen über das Verschwinden aller Gegensätze widerstreitender Principien im Absoluten die deutlichen Keime späterer und mehr positiver Ansichten.[148]

This clearly shows that fourteen years later, Schelling did not see himself as having changed his philosophical position and deems this work as still possessing its full force. Haym adds that Schelling took issue with those who theologized Kant at Tübingen: "Ein theologisirender Kantianismus war hier, wie im Lager der Theologie überhaupt […]. Dieses [war] Compromiß zwischen Vernunft und Unvernunft […]."[149] In other words, Schelling found irksome the merging of reason and unreason in this theologising Kantianism. Hence, the *Briefe* "[…] in erster Linie die öffentliche Absage unsres Philosophen an jene theologisirenden Kantianer [sind]," who conflated dogmatism and Kantian criticism.[150] In the ninth letter, Schelling confirms this decoupling that the "Resultat unsrer ganzen Untersuchung" is that "Der Dogmatismus . . . kann so wenig als der Kriticismus das Absolute, als Objekt, durch theoretisches Wissen erreichen […]."[151] This main point, to be sure, does not show Schelling siding fully with Kantian criticism. Given that the goal is the Absolute, he pushes against both dogmatism and criticism. Lara Oštarić confirms that "Kant's Critical philosophy, just as the dogmatic philosophy of Spinoza or Leibniz, is unable to give the Idea of the Unconditioned its objective reality."[152]

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[148] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *F.W.J. Schelling's Philosophische Schriften* (Landshut: Bei Philipp Krüll, 1809). vi. *Die Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus* contain a lively polemic against the almost widely accepted and much misused so-called moral proof of God's existence at that time from the perspective of the not less generally prevalent opposition of the subject and object. This polemic appears to the author, in view of manner of thought, to which it [polemic] relates, still to have its full force. None of those who until now have remained on the now mentioned perspective have refuted it. Meanwhile the comments about the vanishing of all oppositions of conflicting principles in the Absolute contained in the ninth letter are the clear seeds of later and more positive views.

[149] Haym (1870), 559. "A theologising Kantianism [theologisirender Kantianismus] was here as mainly in the place of theology. This [was a] compromise between reason and unreason." For a more detailed account of this theologizng Kantiansim, see Dieter Henrich, *Grundlegung aus dem Ich: Untersuchungen zur Vorgeschichte des Idealismus, Tübingen—Jena (1790-1794)*. 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004).

[150] Haym (1870), 567. They are chiefly the public rejection of those theologizing Kantians.

[151] Schelling, *AA* I/3.103; *SW* 1/I.333. "result of our entire undertaking [is that] dogmatism no less than criticism can arrive at the Absolute, as an object through theoretical knowing [Wissen]." For this thesis, I translate *Wissen* as "knowing" and *Erkenntniß* as "knowledge." The former substantive signifies the present active action, while the latter a more static substantive.

[152] Oštarić, Lara, "Nature as the World of Action, Not Speculation," in G. Anthony Bruno, ed., *Schelling's Philosophy: Freedom, Nature, and Systematicity* (Oxford University Press, 2020). 12.

More pertinently, in the sixth and tenth letter, Schelling waxes Hellenistic. In the former, a footnote at the end reveals Schelling's etymological enthusiasm for the word "philosophy." "Philosophie, ein treffliches Wort!" he exclaims. "Mag man dem Verfasser eine Stimme einräumen, so stimmt er für Beibehaltung des alten Worts."[153] Schelling appreciated the Greek etymological significance of the word "philosophy" and observes its unique historical provenance. Both Jaspers and Stefansky make important observations on Schelling's linguistic and etymological bent. The former notes that

> Wenn nun Schellings Philosophieren die Sprache bewußt ergreift, so hält er sich an Worte. Das Geheimnis in den Wortwurzeln zu befreien und etymologische Erörterungen zur Bestatigung seines eigenen Denkens werden zu lassen, das entspricht zwar altem Brauch und Spiel in der Philosophie […].[154]

The latter insightfuly recognizes "Mit der sprachlichen Wortbildung und Begriffsverbindung bei ihm eine Wendung des Gedankens zusammengeht, an der grammatischen Verknüpfung eine Umstellung der Idee 'klebt'."[155]

In the tenth letter as well, we see a similar display of Hellenism. This letter is famous for offering a philosophical reading of tragedy, specifically about how it exhibits human freedom, and is the seed of Schelling's philosophy of art. Szondi has this letter in mind when he juxtaposes Aristotle and Schelling: "There exists a poetics of tragedy since Aristotle; since Schelling a philosophy of the tragic."[156] After articulating the gist of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*—which Schelling does not name but is recognizable by the plot he delineates—he declares that "Wie überall, so ist auch hier die griechische Kunst Regel. Kein Volk ist dem Charakter der Menschheit

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[153] Schelling, *AA* I/3.75; *SW*. 1/I.307. Philosophy, an excellent word! If one may allow the author a vote, he thus votes for retaining the ancient word.

[154] Jaspers (1955), 95. When Schelling's philosophizing consciously grasps language, he holds to the word. To free the mystery in the root words and to allow the etymological discussions to become a confirmation of his own thinking, this corresponds indeed to the ancient use and play in philosophy […].

[155] Stefansky (1925), 135. For him, a turn of thought grew together with the linguistic word formation and connection of conception, a transition to the idea "sticks" to the grammatical connection.

[156] Peter Szondi, *Versuch über das Tragische* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 1961). 7. "Seit Aristoteles gibt es eine Poetik der Tragödie, seit Schelling erst eine Philosophie des Tragischen." Szondi, unabashedly Hegelian, first articulates his thoughts on Schelling's conception of Greek tragedy in this work. He then develops them further in "Schellings Gattungspoetik" in Szondi, Peter. *Poetik und Geschichtsphilosophie*. 1. Aufl. Vol. 3. Szondi, Peter. Studienausgabe der Vorlesungen 2. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974).

auch hierin treuer geblieben, als die Griechen."[157] By *überall* Schelling refers to different genres of cultural production; by *hier* he refers specifically to tragedy. This implies that just as Greek tragedy is the standard by which to measure other tragedies, so also Greek art is the norm for evaluating other art.[158] Because even more than art, the Greeks uniquely exhibit the character of humanity, which echoes the *Neuhumanismus* and *Griechentum* of the time. In this section we have traced out Schelling's philological development from childhood through university, briefly touching on the philosophical import of these studies. From an early age, philology and concomitantly the penchant for Ancient Greek were inseparable from Schelling's philosophizing.

Griechentumliche Romantik

In 1798 Schelling obtained a professorship at Jena. While a full-fledged professor he did not set aside his philological proclivities but deepened them with an even wider facility with languages. Nevertheless, Ancient Greek remained preeminent. During this time, he partook of *Jenaer Romantik*, an intellectual movement comprising primarily Friedrich and August Schlegel who theorized about art and poesie, and its potential to unify philosophy and religion, among other disciplines. According to Gerhard Schulz, although "Schier unüberschaubar ist der Bedeutungsspielraum des Adjektivs „romantisch," it does mean "Archaisches, Altertümliches."[159] Hence, *Griechentum*, too, left its mark on *Jenaer Romantik*. Behler underscores that

> The cultural accomplishments of classical Greece assumed a decisive role in the formation of the romantic age or the age of Goethe in Germany toward the end of the eighteenth century and produced a 're-naissance' in the true sense of the term, i.e., a rebirth from the sources of Europe's cultural origins.[160]

This is evident especially in the first gathering of the *Romantiker* in Dresden in 1798 before Jena.[161] For this gathering can be seen as a response to Winckelmann's influential *Gedanken*. At the beginning of the pamphlet, Winckelmann declares that "Die reinsten Quellen der Kunst sind

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[157] Schelling, *AA* I/3.107; *SW* 1/I.337. As everywhere, so also here Greek art is the rule. Even here no group of people has remained truer to the character of humanity than the Greeks.
[158] For analysis see Szondi (1974a); Billings (2014).
[159] Gerhard Schulz, *Romantik: Geschichte und Begriff*, 3. Auflage., Beck'sche Reihe. Wissen 2053 (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2008). 7. Almost hardly comprehensible and understandable is the scope of meaning of the adjective 'romantic' […]. Archaic, ancient […].
[160] Behler (1988). 119.
[161] For the influence of *Griechentum* on *Jenaer Romantik* see Behler (1988) and Szondi (1974a).

geöffnet: glücklich ist, wer sie findet und schmeckt. Diese Quellen suchen heißt nach Athen reisen; und Dresden wird nunmehr Athen für Künstler."[162] The city at the heart of Classical Greece, in other words, contains "the purest sources of art," and speaks to the salience Classical Greece held for Winckelmann. Construed less physically, this means seeking out the significance of these works of art, which now have found a new home in Dresden. One discovered and tasted in Dresden the purest source of art in Athens. As Plitt recounts, "Ehe Schelling von Leipzig nach Jena übersiedelte, besuchte er Dresden der dortigen Kunstsammlungen wegen, und schon hier trat er in persönliche Beziehung zu dem Kreise, in welchem er dann während seines jenaer Aufenthaltes vorwiegend verkehrte."[163] Dresden's Ancient Greek and Rennaisance art collection prompted Schelling's visit before he relocated to Jena. The first thing Schelling mentions to his parents about Dresden is "wo ohnehin eine Menge Arbeiten auf meine Zeit Anspruch hatten! Ich habe alles, was in Dresden merkwürdig ist."[164] The first two things he found remarkable, which Heinrich Knittermeyer also mentions, were "die Galerie, wo die göttlichen Gemählde der Raphaels und Correggios aufbewahrt sind, die Antikensammlung, wo noch in lebendigen Statuen die alte Welt fortlebt."[165] The reference to Raphael and the collection of antiquities are direct reference to Winckelmann's *Gedanken*. The remainder of Schelling's early period certainly speaks to his deep reflections on these collections of art, which also drew other members of *Jenaer Romantik* such as August Schlegel's wife, Caroline, J. D. Gries, Novalis, and Fichte. Undoubtedly, upon reading Winckelmann's influential *Gedanken* Schelling and the *Romantiker* desired to taste the purest sources of art in Dresden, the Athens of the day. Tilliette emphasizes that "la rencontre de Dresde, pendant

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[162] Winckelmann (1969), 2. The purest sources of art have been opened; whoever finds and tastes them is fortunate. To seek these sources is called travelling to Athens; and Dresden henceforth becomes Athens for artists.
[163] Plitt (1869), BrPI.242. Before Schelling relcoated from Leipzig to Jena, he visited Dresden because of the art collections there, and here already he entered into a personal relationship with the circle, in which he then predominantly mingled during his Jena stint.
[164] Schelling, *AA* III/1.191; *F.W.J. Schelling Briefe und Dokumente*, ed. Horst Fuhrmans. Vol. 2. 3 vols. (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1973), 161. Schelling an die Eltern, 20 Sept. 1798. Where in any case a lot of works had claimed my time! I have everything that is remarkable in Dresden
[165] Schelling, *AA* III/1.191; Schelling (1973). 161. "The gallery where the divine paintings of Raphael and Correggio are preserved, the collection of antiquities where the ancient world still lives on in living statues." Quoted also by Heinrich Knittermeyer, *Schelling und die romantische Schule*, vol. 30, 31 vols, Geschichte der Philosophie in Einzeldarstellungen. Abt. VII, Philosophie der neuesten Zeit I (München: E. Reinhardt, 1929). 102.

l'été de 1798, qui a marqué pour ainsi dire le sacre de la jeune école romantique."[166] In other words, tasting the richest sources of Ancient Greek art in Dresden was the coronation or beginning of *Jenaer Romantik*.

Schelling's works on art during this period express Hellenism and Winckelmann's influence. Although it extends beyond this thesis to analyse thoroughly Winckelmann's influence on these works, it is worth discussing them briefly. The first is the 1800 *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*. Schelling completed the *System* in 1799, and in 1800 published it in Jena, which Schelling "als die höchste Poesie des menschlichen Geistes anerkannt."[167] Poesie here does not merely mean the composing of poetry, but "production," which is evident in the term's Ancient Greek etymology.[168] The work shows how both transcendental philosophy and *Naturphilosophie*, on which he had labored extensively in Leipzig, are productively intertwined in the philosophy of art, "das allgemeine Organon der Philosophie—und der Schlußstein ihres ganzen Gewölbes."[169] Schelling discusses the exemplarity of a product of art in the sixth main section of the *System* citing only Greek mythology. After explaining how an artist represents the synthesis of freedom and necessity, he continues that "Um uns *nur durch Ein Beispiel* deutlich zu machen, so ist die griechische Mythologie."[170] This specific section of the *System* is considered an earlier version of Schelling's philosophy of art. Given the long history of art, for him to declare that one needs "only one example," namely, Ancient Greek mythology, demonstrates his Hellenism. More relevantly, it

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[166] Xavier Tilliette, *Recherches sur l'intuition intellectuelle de Kant à Hegel*, Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie. Nouvelle série. (Paris: JVrin, 1995). 124. But the decisive start will have been the meeting in Dresden, during the summer of 1798, which marked, so to speak, the consecration of the young school of romantics.

[167] *Schellingiana rariora*. Gesammelt und eingeleitet v. L. Pareyson, Torino 1977, 597. "[h]e recognize [his System] as the highest poesy of the human intellect." For more background, see Harald Korten and Paul Ziche's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.3-14.

[168] ποίησις and ποιητική, Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Revised and augmented throughout by Sir Henry Stuart Jones with the assistance of Roderick McKenzie. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940). Henceforth, *LSJ*. In the *Philosophie der Kunst*, Schelling confirms that "[…] die Poesie [hat] vorzugsweise den Namen der Poesie, d.h. der Erschaffung behalten, weil ihre Werke nicht als ein Seyn, sondern als Produciren erscheinen" (*AA* II/6,1:322; *SW* 1/V.631-2).

[169] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.40; *SW* 1/III.349. the universal organon of philosophy – and the keystone of its entire arch. It will be important for latter to note that "organon" and "organ" denote production, as seen in their Ancient Greek etymology. The Ancient Greek ὄργανον—and by extension "organ"—can mean both an "instrument, implement, tool, for making or doing a thing" and a "product." ὄργανον, *LSJ*.

[170] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.320; *SW* 1/III.619. *emphasis added.* to make us clear only through one example, thus [we need only] Greek mythology.

verifies Winckelmann's influence. For Schelling asserts that "Der äußere Ausdruck des Kunstwerks ist also . . . der stillen Größe [...]."[171] Arguably the most influential maxim from Winckelmann's *Gedanken* is "Das allgemeine vorzügliche Kennzeichen der griechischen Meisterstücke ist endlich *eine edle Einfalt* und *eine stille Größe*, sowohl in der Stellung als im Ausdruck."[172] Schelling, in other words, avails himself of Winckelmann's well-known characterizations of Ancient Greek art in the *Gedanken* to describe the ideal product of art in his *System*. Guyer confirms that "still grandeur" is "an unmistakable allusion to Winckelmann's conception of the ideal of beauty."[173]

Hellenism and Winckelmann also find themselves in the *Methodologie*.[174] To take one example, in the fourteenth lecture Schelling, too, does not explicitly mention Winckelmann, but there are ineluctable traces. As it concerns the *Gedanken*, there is a more obvious reference to Winckelmann. In the middle of the lecture, Schelling discusses genius and how the philosopher is the only one equipped to penetrate the essence of art emphasizing that "Zu jeder Zeit hat man daher gesehen, daß die wahren Künstler still, einfach, groß und nothwendig sind in ihrer Art, wie die Natur."[175] The choice of adjectives here is a clear allusion to the two signature phrases of Winckelmann's *Gedanken*, "a noble simplicity" [*edle Einfalt*] and "still grandeur" [*stille Größe*]. The latter phrase matches Schelling's first and third adjectives while a part of the former is semantically identical with Schelling's second. The most excellent forms of Ancient Greek art as characterized by two of Winckelmann's phrases follow from the true artists who themselves exhibit these characteristics.

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171 Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.320; *SW* 1/III.620. The outer expression of a work of art is of rest and still grandeur.
172 Winckelmann (1969), 17-8. *Emphasis added*. The universal, excellent mark of Greek masterpiece is finally a noble simplicity and still grandeur both in disposition and in expression.
173 Paul Guyer, *A History of Modern Aesthetics*, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 48. Guyer observes this connection between Schelling and Winckelmann in passing; he reads Schelling outside the context of *Griechentum* and more as an outgrowth of Kant.
174 Cf. footnote 27 for background of this text.
175 Schelling, *AA* I/14.172; *SW* 1/V.349. At all times one therefore has seen that the true artists are still [*still*], simple [*einfach*], grand [*groß*], and necessary in their manner, as nature.

As it concerns Winckelmann's *Geschichte*, towards the beginning Schelling mentions "der vollständigen und ganz objektiven Ansicht der Kunst, auch der antiken […]."[176] One could take the adverb *auch* as denoting either addition or emphasis. The former would read "also of ancient art," while the latter would emphasize "ancient art." The latter lends itself more to Schelling's reading of Ancient Greek art as a whole, which points to Winckelmann's pioneering organic and holistic conception thereof; it implies that Ancient Greek art is all that there is further implying that modern art is merely an offshoot. A clearer reference to Ancient Greece as a whole work of art comes at the end of the lecture:

> […] wenigstens [müßte] das Alterthum daran erinnern, dessen allgemeine Feste, verewigende Denkmäler, Schauspiele, so wie alle Handlungen des öffentlichen Lebens nur verschiedene Zweige Eines allgemeinen objektiven und lebendigen Kunstwerks waren.[177]

Greek antiquity, in other words, is just one universal objective and living work of art. This unified and totalizing reading of Ancient Greek art certainly follows from Winckelmann's *Geschichte*.

Finally, there is Schelling's 1802/3 *Philosophie der Kunst*, which occupies a unique place in *Goethezeit* and leaves no doubt about the influence of Winckelmann. For it is rife with eulogies to him along with many expressions of Hellenism. In fact, compared to Goethe, Schiller, Friedrich August Wolf, and Friedrich Schlegel, Schelling cites Winckelmann the most for a total of twenty-six times. Schelling produced these lectures in two installments in Jena in 1802 and 1803. For the empirical substance Schelling draws on an earlier version of August W. Schlegel's 1809 *Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Litteratur*, his "Privatvorlesungen über schöne Literatur und Kunst."[178]

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[176] Schelling, *AA* I/14.170; *SW* 1/V.347. the complete and entirely objective perspective of art, even [*auch*] of ancient [art].

[177] Schelling, *AA* I/14.175; *SW* 1/V.352. antiquity must remind [us] that its general celebrations, immortalizing monuments, dramas, just as all action of public life were only various branches of one universal objective and living work of art.

[178] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Texte zur Philosophie der Kunst*, Universal-Bibliothek (Stuttgart, Germany); Nr. 5777 (Stuttgart: PReclam, 1982). 134. "private lectures on beautiful literature and art." *AA* III/2,1.468; Schelling (1973), 436-7. Brief an A. W. Schlegel, Jena, 3. September 1802. "Gewiß würde mir Ihr Manuskript vortreffliche Dienste leisten, um mich immer zu orientieren, und von dem Empirischen der Kunst, worauf sie nach Ihrem Plan mehr Rücksicht genommen haben, zum Intellektuellen zurückzuleiten – um mir manche Nachforschungen zu ersparen, die mich doch vielleicht nicht zum Ziel führen und auf jeden Fall an der Ausbildung des Spekulativen verhindern." The lectures that Schelling borrowed from A. W. Schlegel are a precursor to those the latter delivers for the first time in 1808 in Vienna, and publishes in 1809: August Wilhelm von Schlegel, *August Wilhelm von Schlegel's Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Litteratur*, ed. Eduard Böcking, Dritte Auflage (Leipzig: Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1846). VIII. For more background, see Christoph Binkelmann and Daniel Unger's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.3-91.

This is important to acknowledge because the work is primarily philosophical and intends to be neither technical nor encyclopedic. Szondi asserts that in the *Philosophie der Kunst* "die ästhetisch-philosophischen Reflexionen der Goethezeit zum ersten Mal als System integriert erscheinen."[179] He also gestures correctly at the centrality of Hellenism in this work insofar as "die Frage nach der Verschiedenheit von antiker und moderner Kunst," which perhaps is the fulcrum of these lectures, is "das Problem des Klassizismus."[180] Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik similarly argues that "Schellings Vorlesung Philosophie der Kunst . . . ist überhaupt der erste Versuch einer systematischen Einordung und philosophischen Durchdringung des Gesamtbereichs der Kunst und der Künste [...]."[181] The *Philosophie der Kunst* is the first of its kind; as such, it inhabits a central position in *Goethezeit* for drawing together philosophy and art in an unprecedented manner. As already mentioned, Szondi affirms that during *Goethezeit* "der Griechen . . . bleiben . . . im Mittelpunkt der ästhetischen Konzeptionen."[182] Hence, one must not overlook that for Schelling and his contemporaries "[...] die ästhetischen Konzeptionen [sind] dieser Verehrung [für die Antike] abgerungen," as precipitated by Winckelmann.[183]

The long sections allotted to painting and architecture in the second half of the *Philosophie der Kunst*, specifically the 87th to the 133rd sections substantiate further Winckelmann's influence. Regarding this section of the work, Rehm remarks that "schon seine [Schellings] „Philosophie der Kunst" vorzüglich dort, wo sie von der griechisch-plastischen Gestaltwelt spricht, ein Zeugnis für die Gegenwart der Griechen."[184] In the 87th section on painting, Schelling declares that

[179] Szondi (1974a), 216. [...] the aesthetic-philosophical reflections of *Goethezeit* appear integrated as a system for the first time.
[180] Szondi (1974a), 20. [T]he question about the difference of ancient and modern art, [is] thus the problem of classicism […].
[181] Schmied-Kowarzik, Wolfdietrich, "Kunst Zwischen Natur, Geschichte und Absolutem Bei Schelling und Hegel," *Hegel-Jahrbuch* 1999, no. 1 (January 1, 1999). 178. the first attempt of a systematic classification of philosophical penetration of the entire domain of art and the arts.
[182] Szondi (1974a), 19. the Greeks . . . remain the focus of aesthetic conceptions.
[183] Szondi (1974a), 18. [T]he aesthetic conceptions are extracted from this reverence [for antiquity].
[184] Rehm (1952), 253. *Philosophie der Kunst* already is excellent there where it speaks of the Greek-plastic world of forms, a testimony to the presence of the Greeks [...].

Winckelmann's "Ansichten noch jetzt die höchsten sind und es immer bleiben werden" before elaborating on his two signature phrases from the *Gedanken.*[185]

> Das Adäquate und Vollkommene der Vorstellungen drückt sich in dem Gegenstand durch dasjenige aus, was Winckelmann *die edle Einfalt* nennt, sowie jene ruhige Macht, die, um als Macht zu erscheinen, nicht nöthig hat, aus dem Gleichgewicht ihres Daseyns zu weichen, das ist, was Winckelmann als *die stille Größe* bezeichnet hat.[186]

Schelling takes the descriptors of "noble simplicity" and "still grandeur" as everlasting "insights" into art. These descriptors characterize the "adequate and complete," adjectives rendered into substantives, of representations. On the one hand, Schelling analyses "noble simplicity" as consisting of "the adequate and complete." On the other, he interprets "still grandeur" as "the equilibrium of existence." Hence, continuing from the *System*, the *Philosophie der Kunst* reflects the influence of Winckelmann in characterizing Ancient Greek art. Next, the 132nd section concerns sculpture; it deals with clothing or what Schelling calls the "architectonic part" of sculpture, and certainly harkens back to Winckelmann's treatment of the matter in the *Geschichte*. Beginning with an expression of Hellenism, "Wie kein Volk einen höheren Sinn für Schönheit hatte, als die Griechen," Schelling declares, "so war auch keines, welches von jener falschen und unkeuschen Scham, die sich Decenz nennt, entfernter."[187] This sentiment echoes his earlier one in the tenth letter of the *Briefe* regarding the uniqueness of the Ancient Greeks when it comes to art.

Winckelmann was no stranger to praise from other members of *Jenaer Romantik*. One can substantiate this not only by the fact that Friedrich Schlegel published on Greek poetry, but also that he, as the main editor, decided on the name *Athenaeum,* the literary magazine of *Jenaer Romantik*;[188] he most likely had in mind the Roman Emperor Hadrian's institution for the study of

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[185] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.264; *SW* 1/V.557. [Winckelmann's] insights are still the highest and always will remain so.
[186] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.264; *SW*. 1/V.557. *emphasis added.* The adequate and complete of representations expresses itself in the object through that what Winckelmann names the noble simplicity, as a tranquil force, which, to appear as a force, does not have the necessity to deviate from the equilibrium of its existence, which is what Winckelmann characterized as the still grandeur.
[187] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.318; *SW* 1/V.626. Just as no people had a higher sense for beauty than the Greeks, so also no [other people] was more distant from that false and incontinent shame, which calls itself decency.
[188] See John William Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe, 1790-1802: A Study in Early German Romanticism," *PMLA* 21, no. 1 (1906): 40–192.

Greek rhetoric and letters.[189] Friedrich observes in the 149th of the *Athenäums-fragmente* that "Der systematische Winckelmann, der alle Alten gleichsam wie Einen Autor las, alles im Ganzen sah, und seine gesammte Kraft auf die Griechen konzentrirte, legete . . . den ersten Grund zu einer materialen Altertumslehre."[190] In other words, Friedrich, too, acknowledges Winckelmann as the founder of the modern study of Ancient Greek antiquity for his erudition is historically unprecedented; no one prior read all the ancients as one author. Behler notes that "When Friedrich Schlegel decided in 1794 to begin his critical career with a thorough and comprehensive study of the course of Greek literature, he attached to his task the motto of being a 'Winckelmann of Greek literature' […]."[191] August, who collaborated with Friedrich in publishing the *Athenäums-fragmente*, similarly deems Winckelmann in the 310th fragment a "Kennern des Altertums."[192] And earlier in the 271st fragment, he speculates that "Vielleicht muß man um einen transzendentalen Gesichtspunkt für das Antike zu haben, Erzadern sein. Winckelmann hat die Griechen wie ein Grieche gefühlt."[193] Put differently, only by becoming a Greek himself as he studied Ancient Greece closely was Winckelmann able to arrive at a transcendental view of antiquity. The idea of becoming Greek hearkens to his signature maxim in the *Gedanken* that "Der einzige Weg für uns, groß, ja, wenn es möglich ist, unnachahmlich zu werden, ist die Nachahmung der Alten [...]"[194] The metaphor of veins of ore seems to indicate Winckelmann's status as a vein or channel that conveys the ore or treasures of Greek antiquity to the modern world. To become such veins is for Winckelmann to become Greek; only by doing so did he produce a pioneering view of Greek antiquity. That the leading *Romantiker* read Winckelmann in this way shows more that Schelling's

[189] Athenaeum, *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 2018. Henceforth, *OCD*. For Friedrich Schlegel's works on Greek poesy, see *Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie* (1797) and *Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer* (1798) in *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, E. Behler et al. (eds.), 35 vols., (Munich: F. Schöningh, 1958-).
[190] Schlegel, *KFSA* II/187-8. Frg. 149: The systematic Winckelmann, who read all the ancients as it were as one author, saw everything in a whole, and concentrated his collected power on the Greeks, laid . . . the first foundation for a material doctrine of antiquity.
[191] Behler (1988), 123.
[192] Schlegel, *KFSA*. II/217. Fr. 310: connoisseur of antiquity.
[193] Schlegel, *KFSA*. II/210. Frg. 271: Perhaps one must be veins of ore [*Erzadern*] to have a transcendental perspective for antiquity. Winckelmann felt the Greeks as a Greek.
[194] Winckelmann (1969), 2. The only way for us to be great, indeed, if it is possible, to become inimitable, is the imitation of the Ancients […].

further delving into art is less a direct consequence of him partaking of *Jenaer Romantik* and more that he along with them were all fascinated by Winckelmann.

This manifested further in their philological exploration of poetry, philosophy, literature, and religion. According to Frank,

> Im Romantiker-Zirkel in Jena hat er sich von der *Übersetzungswut* seiner-Freunde anstekken [sic] lassen und selbst Übersetzung von Dichtungen aus diesen Sprachen [Griechisch, Latein, Französisch, Englisch und Italienisch] angefertigt. Vom Sanskrit hatte er wenigstens Grundbegriffe—und die späten Aufzeichnungen zur Politik des Aristoteles kommentierte er gleich auf *Griechisch.*[195]

The *Übersetzungswut* Schelling experienced in Jena demonstrates that *Jenaer Romantik* is as much philological as it is poetic and philosophical; in fact, the poetry and philosophy cannot be considered apart from this philological dimension. Schelling's profound facility with languages found poetic expression. Haym indicates that "die dichterischen Bestrebungen des Kreises, in welchem er sich bewegte, auf ihn zurück."[196] The enthusiasm for poetry amongst the *Romantiker* and *Romantikerinnen* captured Schelling; this speaks to Friedrich Schlegel's well-known definition of Romanticism as "Die romantische Poesie" or "eine progressive Universalpoesie," a unified historical development of art in all its genres that does not exclude philosophy and religion.[197]

Moreover, the sequence of languages that Frank catalogues begins and ends with Greek, which is not random. This indicates that Ancient Greek was primary, not only for Schelling, but also the other *Romantiker*. Schelling, moreover, became such an authority in Ancient Greek that he could comment "in ancient Greek" on Aristotle's *Politics*. Far from being a mere passive reader, he also was an active writer of Ancient Greek, who produced both poems and commentaries in the language. This shows that Schelling continued his philological efforts even after his formal schooling.

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[195] Frank (1985), 10. *emphasis added.* In the Romantic Circle in Jena, he [Schelling] was bitten by the rage of translation amongst his friends and even prepared translations of poems from these languages [Greek, Latin, French, English, and Italian]. He [Schelling] possessed at any rate the foundational concepts of Sanskrit—and similarly he commented in Greek on the late notes of Aristotle's *Politics.*

[196] Haym (1870), 634. the poetic aspirations of the [Romantic] circle in which he moved rebounded on him.

[197] Schlegel, *KFSA* II/181. Frg. 116: romantic poesy [or] a progressive universal poesy.

Philology, therefore, is central to Schelling's conception of the university and academic study, which he articulates for the first time in Jena in his *Methodologie*.[198] In the fourteenth lecture, he asserts that "Philologie, ausdrücklich unter die Gegenstände des akademischen Vortrags gezählt."[199] This shows that philology is not dispensable from Schelling's conception of academic study. Elaborating on philology as a form of the philosophy of art, Schelling deems philology an "äußere Bedingung," which "fordert . . . nothwendig unmittelbare Anschauung der vorhandenen Denkmäler," and where "diese [Anschauung] in Ansehung der Werke der Dichtkunst allgemein möglich ist."[200] Present monuments or remnants of Greek antiquity should not be understood narrowly as sculpture for works of poetry also fall under this category. If philology took on an objective institutional manifestation in the university, it would be the external condition for hosting the immediate intuition of the present monuments.

Philology, in its form as the study of languages prior to academic study at university, is essential to Schelling's pedagogy. In the *Methodologie*'s third lecture Schelling emphasizes that "die Kenntniß der Sprachen, alter und neuer" is a requirement of academic study.[201] He insists that "Es ist überhaupt nöthig auf jeder Stufe zu verweilen, bis man das sichere Gefühl hat, sich auf ihr festgesetzt zu haben."[202] Facility with languages, then, is something that must grow prior to and throughout academic study. Schelling explains further that "Es gehört hieher überhaupt alles, was mehr oder weniger durch Gedächtniß aufgefaßt seyn will, da dieß im früheren Alter theils am

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[198] For particular works on philology by other authors around this time period see Friedrich Schlegel's 1796 *Philosophie der Philologie* and his notes "Zur Philologie" in *KFSA* XVI. 33-81; Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Friedrich Schleiermacher: Texte zur Pädagogik*. Kommentierte Studienausgabe, 2 vols., Michael Winkler and Jens Brachmann (eds.), (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000). F. A. Wolf, *Prolegomena Ad Homerum, Sive, De Operum Homericorum Prisca Et Genuina Forma Variisque Mutationibus Et Probabili Ratione Emendandi*. Edito Tertia / Qam Curavit Rudolfus Peppmüller. ed. Halis Saxonum: E Libraria Orphanotrophei, 1884; Wolf (1869); von Humboldt, Wilhelm, "On the Study of Antiquity," in *Sechs ungedruckte Aufsätze über das klassische Altertum*. Deutsche Literaturdenkmale Des 18. Und 19. Jahrhunderts; No. 58-62, Neue Folge N. 8-12. (Leipzig: G.J. Göschen, 1885). For an argument on the dependence of Schleiermacher on Friedrich Schlegel see Patsch, Hermann, "Friedrich Schlegels »Philosophie Der Philologie« Und Schleiermachers Frühe Entwürfe Zur Hermeneutik: Zur Frühgeschichte Der Romantischen Hermeneutik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 63, no. 4 (1966): 434-72.

[199] Schelling, *AA* I/14.168; *SW* 1/V.344. philology is counted explicitly among the objects of the academic lecture.

[200] Schelling, *AA* I/14.168; *SW* 1/V.344. external condition [which] requires necessarily an immediate intuition of present monuments. [T]his [intuition] is possible in light of the works of poetry generally […].

[201] Schelling, *AA* I/14.83; *SW* 1/V.245. the knowledge of languages, old and new […].

[202] Schelling, *AA* I/14.82; *SW* 1/V.244. it is absolutely necessary to linger at each step until one has the secure feeling of having established oneself on it.

schärfsten ist, theils am meisten geübt seyn will."[203] The study of languages, in other words, must begin at an early age when memory is most active.

More importantly, "früheres Studium der Sprachen . . . einen unabhängigen Werth in sich selbst hat."[204] The example he uses is Isaac Newton's relationship to Ancient Greek, whose meticulousness with the language allowed him to produce insights in physics. "Newton," Schelling writes, "las in zartem Alter die Elemente des Euklides wie ein selbstgeschriebenes Werk, oder wie andere unterhaltende Schriften lesen. Er konnte daher von der Elementargeometrie *unmittelbar* zu den höheren Untersuchungen übergehen."[205] In other words, Newton would not have been able to produce *Principia Mathematica* without a careful reading of Euclid's *Elements* in Ancient Greek. Such a thoroughness, on the one hand, is manifest in Newton's degree of familiarity with Euclid's work. It was as if Newton himself writing in Ancient Greek had produced the *Elements*; on the other, Newton's exercise of diligence in reading Euclid was not a matter of slaving-away, but entertainment. This coupling of deep familiarity and enjoyment illustrates the meticulousness Newton applied to Euclid to progress to higher investigations. Such progress was direct because he engaged with Euclid's geometry in Ancient Greek.

Finally, the main reason why philology is especially important for Schelling is because the philologist is a manifestation of the philosopher and artist. In the fourteenth lecture, Schelling asserts that "Philologie . . . ebenso sehr Kunst ist wie die Poesie, und der Philologe nicht minder als der Dichter geboren wird."[206] For philology to be *Poesie* is not to say that it is merely "poetic creation" but "production," as already shown above.[207] In other words, just as the poet is born with an ability so also is the philologist. In the third lecture, he includes the philosopher. The

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[203] Schelling, *AA* I/14.83; *SW* 1/V.245. Generally everything belongs here what more or less claims to be grasped through memory, because this partly is the sharpest during an early age, [and] partly desires to be most exercised.
[204] Schelling, *AA* I/14.83; *SW* 1/V.245. [T]he early study of languages . . . has an independent worth in itself.
[205] Schelling, *AA* I/14.82; *SW* 1/V.244, *emphasis added*. Newton at a tender age read the Elements of Euclid as a self-written work, or as reading other entertaining writings. Therefore, he was able to proceed directly from elementary geometry to higher investigations.
[206] Schelling, *AA* I/14.168; *SW* 1/V.344. Philology is as much art as it is poesis, and the philologist is not born lesser than the poet.
[207] Cf. footnote 168.

philologist, according to him, "[…] mit dem Künstler und Philosophen [steht] auf den höchsten Stufen, oder vielmehr durchdringen sich beide in ihm."[208] To be clear, the philologist is not a language teacher subordinate to the philosopher and artist but is in fact both a philosopher and artist. Boeckh quotes this passage confessing "Dies kommt dem Meinigen sehr nahe, im Geiste ganz, wenn auch nicht in der Ausdehnung."[209] Patrick Leistner confirms that "Einige Motive der Vorlesungen lassen sich mit Schellings Methodologie verbinden, auf die sich Boeckh bezieht."[210] Leistner also points out that "Schellings Philosophie wirkete auf die . . . Philologie Asts[,] [d]essen »Grundriß der Philologie« von 1808 scheint sich auf Ideen Schelling zu stützen, wie sie die Methodologie bietet."[211] Simply, Schelling's understanding of philology in the *Methodologie* influenced Boeckh and Ast, two seminal philologists, mentioned above.

Jenaer Romantik shared this understanding of philology and the philologist, as expressed in the *Athenäum*. Friedrich Schlegel, for instance, in the 404th fragment expresses similarly that "Zur Philologie muß man geboren sein, wie zur Poesie und zur Philosophie."[212] Therefore, Schlegel and Schelling understand similarly that the philologist, artist, and philosopher have a natural endowment.[213] Relatedly in the 391st fragment, he remarks that "Aus reiner Philosophie oder Poesie ohne Philologie kann man wohl nicht lesen."[214] Friedrich indicates a much more profound understanding of reading in this case. Similar to Schelling's mutual interpenetration of the philosopher and artists in the philologist, Schlegel's philological reading is able to access pure philosophy and poesis. Therefore, the philologist, like the philosopher and artist, is naturally

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[208] Schelling, *AA* I/14.83; *SW* 1/V.246. stands with the artist and philosopher on the highest rung, or much rather both penetrate each other in him.
[209] August Boeckh, *Encyclopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften*, ed. Ernst Carl L. Bratuscheck (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1877). 26. This comes very close to mine own [thoughts], completely in spirit, if not necessarily in extent.
[210] Schelling, *AA* I/14.39. Some motives of the lectures can be linked to Schelling's *Methodologie*, to which Boeckh refers.
[211] Schelling, *AA* I/14. 38. Schelling influenced Ast's philology, whose *Grundriß der Philologie* form 1808 appears to be based on Schelling's ideas as the *Methodologie* presents them.
[212] F. Schlegel, *KFSA*. 241. For philology one must be born, just as for poesis and philosophy.
[213] As we will see in chapter three, Schelling's understanding of philosophical and artistic productivity can be traced back to his early day at Tübingen, specifically his notes on Plato. Hence, Schelling did not simply borrow the idea of productivity from Friedrich Schlegel.
[214] F. Schlegel, *KFSA*. 239. Without philology one perhaps cannot read out of pure philosophy or poesis.

endowed. This section has shown that during his time in Jena and as part of *Jenaer Romantik*, Schelling continued to develop his philological proclivities and express his Hellenism.

Winckelmannian Continuations and Philological-Philosophy

Until the end of his early period, Schelling continued to praise Winckelmann and his understanding of art by referring both explicitly and implicitly to the *Geschichte* and *Gedanken*. His last major work on philosophy and art is *Über das Verhältniß der bildenden Künste zu der Natur* (called the *Akademierede*), a speech delivered in 1807 at the Academy of the *Wissenschaften* in Munich.[215] Before examining the work, it is important to note that Schelling became the secretary general of the Akademie der bildenden Künste—he returned to this position again in 1823.[216] He had become an authority on Ancient Greek plastic art interest in which Winckelmann had awakened with his *Gedanken* and *Geschichte*. Schelling published the *Akademierede* in 1809. Its main argument is that "das höchste Verhältniß der Kunst zur Natur ist dadurch erreicht, daß sie diese zum Medium macht, die Seele in ihr zu versichtbaren."[217] This relationship touches on the productive similarity of art and nature. Given the focus of art, the *Akademierede* overflows with Hellenism, especially in the context of praising Winckelmann. Otabe Tanehisa states that "[…] der Einfluss Winckelmanns [ist] deutlich zu erkennen."[218] In fact, Karin Leonhard suggests that in their treatment of art and nature, Schelling and Winckelmann "[…] einen ähnlichen Ton angeschlagen [hatten]."[219] What in the *Philosophie der Kunst* was scattered praise becomes a concentrated eulogy in the *Akademierede*; while in the former Schelling frequently cites Winckelmann's *Geschichte* as an authoritative textbook, in the latter he reflects more on Winckelmann's historical exceptionalism; as such, the *Akademierede* breathes the same spirit as Goethe's 1805 *Winkelmann und sein Jahrhundert: in Briefen*

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215 At the time of writing, the Editorischer Bericht, which would appear in Schelling, *AA* I/16.2, has not been published.
216 Scheiche, Walter, "Ziettafel," in Baumgartner (1975), 175-6.
217 Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.316. the highest relationship of art to nature is attained thereby that it [nature] makes this [art] into a medium for making visible the soul in it [art].
218 Tanehisa, Otabe, "Das ›Positive‹ und das ›Negative‹ in der Schönheit.Winckelmann und Schelling über das Verhältnis der bildenden Kunst zur Natur," in: *JTLA* 25 (2000), 5. Winckelmann's influence is clear to see.
219 Leonhard, Karin, "Konstruktion von Kunstgeschichte –Schellings Philosophie der Kunst und die Trennung der Disziplinen," in Frigo and Ziche (2011), 359. [...] strike a similar tone.

und Aufsätzen.[220] In this speech, Schelling emphasizes that "Er gab durch seine Lehre die erste Grundlage jenem allgemeinen Gebäude der Erkenntniß und Wissenschaft des Alterthums."[221] In other words, Winckelmann is the recognized father of *Altertumswissenschaft* or philology.[222] Rehm also observes the parallel between these two works highlighting their Hellenism.

> Ist schon seine „Philosophie der Kunst" vorzüglich . . . ein Zeugnis für die Gegenwart der Griechen, so noch deutlicher die Rede „Über das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zur Natur", die er in München gehalten hat, 1807, zwei Jahre nach dem Erscheinen von Goethes Winckelmann-Denkmal.[223]

In other words, Schelling's *Akademierede* is a tribute to Winckelmann that follows Goethe's own "monument" to him in 1805.[224] For their veneration of Winckelmann through these works Eduard Gerhard deems both Schelling and Goethe "die geistige Grösse."[225] Both works attest to their fascination with Winckelmann for realizing the presence of the Greeks.

Towards the beginning when discussing art as the imitation of nature, Schelling asserts that "indeß den sinnbegabten Hellenen, welche überall die Spur lebendig wirkenden Wesens fühlten, aus der Natur wahrhafte Götter entstanden."[226] By deeming the Greeks "gifted Hellenes" for whom true gods came from nature Schelling displays his Hellenism. Furthermore, when mentioning the unlimited universality of painting, he remarks that "In ihm [dem Alterthums] blühet das wahre goldene Zeitalter der Kunst, welches der Erde die sanfte Herrschaft des Kronos verlieh."[227] The reference to the Greek god "Chronos" lucidly indicates that by "antiquity" Schelling is not using the term in a general way, but has in mind specifically Greek antiquity whose historical precedence lies in it being witness to "the true golden age of art."

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[220] Goethe, *WBA* XIX.461-522.
[221] Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.298. Through his teaching he [Winckelmann] gave the first foundation of that universal structure of knowledge and *Wissenschaft* of antiquity [*Alterthums*].
[222] For an early articulation of Altertumswissenschaft see *Darstellung der Alterthums-Wissenschaft* in Wolf (1869).
[223] Rehm (1952), 253. If his *Philosophie der Kunst* already is a testimony for the presence of the Greeks, even clearer is the speech *Über das Verhältniß der bildenden Künste zu der Natur*, which he gave in Munich in 1807, two years after the appearance of Goethe's tribute to Winckelmann.
[224] For background, see Harloe (2013), 11.
[225] Gerhard (1856), 3-4. [...] spiritual giants.
[226] Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.294. For the gifted Hellenes, who everywhere in a living manner felt the trace of the operative essence, true gods arose out of nature.
[227] Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.319. In it [antiquity] the true golden age of art bloomed, which the gentle reign of Chronos bestows on the earth.

Schelling pays tribute to Winckelmann for his work on the art of classical antiquity by employing geographical metaphors in the style of Winckelmann.

> Sein Geist war unter uns wie eine von sanften Himmelsstrichen herwehende Luft, die den Kunsthimmel der Vorzeit uns entwölkte, und die Ursache ist, daß wir jetzt mit klarem Aug und durch keine Umnebelung verhindert die Sterne desselben erblicken.[228]

Winckelmann, in other words, is exceptional for blowing aside the dark clouds and fog of historical accretions—French classicism—in order that Greek antiquity's starry night sky might sparkle forth in modernity. "A soft balmy climate" recalls Winckelmann's own analysis in the *Geschichte* of Ancient Greece's climate. Schelling recognizes Winckelmann both for opening access to ancient art through his manner of examining it and for this very manner itself, which is unprecedented for modernity. He then heightens his praise in extolling that

> Und dennoch hat er so Großes gewirkt! Er gehört durch Sinn und Geist nicht seiner Zeit, sondern entweder dem Alterthum an, oder der Zeit, deren Schöpfer er wurde, der gegenwärtigen.[229]

Winckelmann, in plain terms, was so absorbed by Ancient Greek antiquity and absorbed it all the more that he is a modern exception for doing so. On the one hand, that Schelling would deem him as belonging to antiquity indicates the extent to which Winckelmann was breathing infectiously Greek classical antiquity; this is similar to Pater classifying Winckelmann under the Renaissance. Even more, that he is "the creator of the present time," on the other hand, shows Winckelmann's hand in allowing Greek antiquity to command towering influence over not just merely Classical Greek art, but German intellectual life more broadly.

Even during his quiet period [*Schweigen*], beginning in 1809, Schelling continued his Hellenistic reflections on the importance of philology, particularly its educational virtue and its inextricability from philosophy. These appear in a review from the *Jenaischen Allgemeinen Literaturzeitung* of Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer's *Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus*

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[228] Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.297-8. His spirit among us was as a wind wafting here from a soft balmy climate, which [wind] cleared away for us the clouds surrounding the art-heaven of the past, and is the cause, that now with a clear eye and hindered by no fog we behold the stars of [this art-heaven].

[229] Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.297-8. [S]o greatly has he exerted his influence! On account of sense and spirit he does not belong to his time, but either to antiquity, or to the time whose creator he became, the present time.

in der Theorie des Erziehungs-Unterrichts unsrer Zeit, Schelling's second review of the work.[230] This review speaks to his interest in contemporary pedagogy, specifically the reform of the Bavarian school system. Calenza points out that in this text "The word *humanism* was first used in a fully theorized way," and elaborates that while

> Philanthropism was a style of education developed in the middle of the 18th century in the German-speaking world that emphasized freedom in children's education, with a focus on sports and seemingly practical subjects. Humanism for Niethammer . . . reflected a love for classical languages, especially Greek, and a belief that the ancient, classical world was the most useful reference point for bringing the minds of the young learners to their fullest human potential.[231]

Towards the beginning of the review Schelling summarizes that "[…] die neue Pädagogik zur Welt [war] geboren, die alte, welche in obiger Schrift Humanismus genannt wird, mit der neuen oder dem Philanthropinismus in offenen Krieg versetzt."[232] He goes on to delineate that

> Der Unterricht knüpft sich deßhalb nicht nur nothwendig an das Wort an, selbst da, wo die Sache nicht vorgezeigt werden kann, sondern auch das Wort selbst und seine Form zum Gegenstand des Unterrichts erhoben, ist so wenig Wortkram, daß man vielmehr behaupten darf, der schlechteste Sprachunterricht rege noch immer mehr Geist an als der bloße Sachunterricht.[233]

Schelling, in other words, challenges a notion of instruction that focuses solely on conveying the matter while ignoring the importance of language. For the language which conveys the matter should itself be an object of instruction. The word itself and its form ought to be raised to the object of instruction. The underlying reason for the pedagogical focus on language is that the worst language instruction stimulates the intellect still more than mere instruction of the matter. To be sure, Schelling grounds this pedagogy in Hellenism. Although "Hellenen können wir doch nicht werden" he argues, "Eigenthümliche Bildung müßte erst allgemeiner verbreitet seyn, um die wahre Empfindung für das Alterthum voraussetzen zu dürfen," which specifically entails that "[wir

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[230] For more background, see Christian Danz and Michael Hackl's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/18.3-17. Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, *Der Streit Des Philanthropinismus Und Humanismus in Der Theorie Des Erziehungs-Unterrichts Unsrer Zeit*, 1. Auflage (Jena: Frommann, 1808).

[231] Calenza (2010), 462.

[232] Schelling, *AA* I/18.32; *SW* 1/VII.512. "the new pedagogy was born into the world with this [philanthropy]; the old [pedagogy], which in the above text [Niethammer's text] is called humanism, was placed in an open war with the new [pedagogy] or philanthropism." See Chapter 1 of Marchand (1996). 24-35.

[233] Schelling, *AA* I/18.45; *SW* 1/VII.527. Instruction is tied necessarily not only to the word—there itself where the matter cannot be shown—but even the word itself and its form are raised to the object of instruction; [instruction] is thus less the stuff of words [Wortkram] that one needs to emphasize [and] much more [that] the worst language instruction [Sprachunterricht] stimulates the intellect [Geist] still more than the mere instruction of the matter [Sachunterricht]

werden] die ewige und untheilbare Schönheit ihrer Werke empfinden, und den verwandten Heldengeist aus ihnen einsaugen."[234] Indeed, these pedagogical reflections mirror Schelling's own educational upbringing. Hegel expresses a similar notion around the same time in a letter to Niethammer:

> vielleicht aller philosophischer Unterricht an Gymnasien überflüssig scheinen könnte, daß das Studium der Alten das der Gymnasialjugend angemessenste und seiner Substanz nach die wahrhafte Einleitung in die Philosophie sei.[235]

While this is not to say that both read Ancient Greek in the same depth, both Schelling and Hegel recognized the importance of philology or the study of the ancients with respect to philosophy.

A few years later in 1811, Schelling underscores the inseparability of philology and philosophy. These thoughts appear posthumously in a proposal *apropos* of the goal of the philological-philosophical class of the *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*.[236] "Class" here refers to a division within the academy according to which members produce research. The historical and philosophical class were from the beginning of the academy in 1759.[237] In 1806, Schellling became an *ordentliches Mitglied* or "full member" of the physical class (as in physics), and then of the philological-philosophical class in 1807.[238] These two classes continued from the philosophical class. For in 1802 "Die Philosophische Klasse benannte sich um in 'Physikalische' Klasse."[239] Monika Soermer explains that "Die Klasse umfaßte nach der damaligen Terminologie vor allem die Naturwissenschafften."[240] Its name changed again in 1807 to "philological-philosophical class,"

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[234] Schelling, *AA* I/18.47-8; *SW* 1/VII.530-1. We are not able to become Greeks. A proper culture must first be more generally propagated to allow assuming the true sensibility for antiquity. We will sense the eternal and indivisible beauty of their works and imbibe from them kindred spirit of heroism.

[235] G. W. F. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, 4 vols., Philosophische Bibliothek 235 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1969).418-9. [P]erhaps all philosophical instruction in the Gymnasium could appear superfluous that the study of the ancients [das Studium der Alten] is most fitting for the youth of Grammar School and is according to its substance the true introduction into philosophy.

[236] Schelling, *SW* 1/VIII.455-65. *Vorschläge, die Beschäftigung der philologisch-philosophischen Klasse betreffend.* Datierung: München, den 11. Juli 1811 [in the *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*].

[237] Ulrich Thürauf and Monika Stoermer, *Geist und Gestalt: biographische Beiträge zur Geschichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften vornehmlich im zweiten Jahrhundert ihres Bestehens* (München: Beck, 1984). IX.

[238] Thürauf and Stoermer (1984), 128. For more on the history of the *Bayerische Akademie Der Wissenschaften*, see Christian Kruse, ed., *Helle Köpfe: die Geschichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1759 - 2009* (Regensburg: Pustet, 2009).

[239] "Chronik: Bayerische Akademie Der Wissenschaften," https://badw.de/geschichte/chronik.html. The philosophical classwas renamed into the 'Physical' class.

[240] Thürauf and Stoermer (1984), IX. The class comprised above all the *Naturwissenschaften* according to the terminology of the time.

which remained till 1823.[241] These changes reflect perhaps the institutional transformation of philosophy.[242] As one of the first members of the philological-philosophical class, Schelling played a significant role in clarifying its aims to which his proposal speaks.

From the content of the proposal, it appears that he desired to restore a broader understanding of philosophy, one broadened by philology. "[D]ie Meinung ist nicht," Schelling elucidates, "daß die Klasse ausschließlich an philosophische Gegenstände gebunden sey. Als *philologisch-philosophische* stellt sie vor, was in andern Anstalten die Klasse der Literatur."[243] In other words, the philological-philosophical class is literary in nature. This literary aspect directly touches philology. Schelling seems to be pushing against a narrow understanding of the philological-philosophical class as concerned only with "philosophical objects," against a pedagogical conception that treats philology as tertiary and not essential to the philosophical enterprise. In that vein, he refutes a conception of philosophy concerned solely with logic and analysis:

> Hätte die Philosophie kein anderes als dieses logisch-analytische Geschäft, so wäre überhaupt nicht zu begreifen, wie sie noch für wichtig genug gehalten würde, unter die Gegenstände einer Akademie gerechnet zu werden.[244]

Put simply, if philosophy were just a matter of logic and analysis, it would not be as important in the academy. Rather, philosophy must be broader, which speaks to his aforementioned sentiment that philology be "ausdrücklich unter die Gegenstände des akademischen Vortrags gezählt."[245] More than both philosophy and philology individually, their connection is central to the academic enterprise. According to Schelling, "Eine philologisch-philosophische Klasse darf schon an sich das Verdienst der Composition, der Darstellung und der Sprache nicht von dem des Inhalts

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[241] Thürauf and Stoermer (1984), IX.
[242] Cf. footnote 101.
[243] Schelling, *SW* 1/VIII.462. *emphasis added*. The opinion is not that the class exclusively be connected to philosophical objects. As philological-philosophical [*philologisch-philosophische*] it presents what in other institutions is the class of literature.
[244] Schelling, *SW* 1/VIII.457-8. If philosophy had none other than this logical-analytical concern, so mainly it would not be understood how it [philosophy] would still be considered important enough to be counted among the objects of an academy.
[245] Schelling, *AA* I/14.168; *SW* 1/V.344. […] counted explicitly [*ausdrücklich*] among the objects of the academic lecture.

trennen."[246] In clearer terms, a rigorous engagement in philosophy cannot do without the philological topics of composition, presentation, and language. Regarding the first, Schelling seems to have in mind Greek and Latin Prose composition.

As a testimony to his Hellenism and the influence of Winckelmann in this context, Schelling emphasizes the Ancient Greek focus of his idea of philology. This emerges in his taking synonymous philology and *Altertumswissenschaft* in a shorter essay attached to the above proposal.[247] He begins the section by reemphasizing a metaphysical understanding of language: "Die Sprache an sich ist ein vollendetes Ganze und bis in jeden Theil organisch gebildet."[248] The metaphysical unity or oneness, in other words, is analogous to completeness and wholeness; just as reason possesses such a metaphysical unity so also does language. This understanding of wholeness and completeness then carries into philology, which, if art and language are understood in a broader sense, can be grasped as an intersection of art and language or the conception of language as art. Here, philology, art, and *Altertumswissenschaft* intersect.

> Denkt man aber Philologie als Erklärung, Beurtheilung und Auslegung alterthümlicher Denkmäler, es sey der redenden oder bildenden Kunst, so hat sie hier den Vortheil eines schon an sich abgeschlossenen Gegenstandes. Aber auch als Alterthumswissenschaft, es sey, daß sie das öffentliche Leben, oder Staats-Verfassungen, Gesetze, Sitten, oder religiöse Formen der alten und besonders der classisch gebildeten Völker untersuche, schließt sich ihr alles in einzelne Kreise ab, in denen sie sich der Vollständigkeit – nicht des Wissens, aber doch des Gebrauchs der vorhandenen Mittel vollkommen versichern kann.[249]

Here, Schelling renders philology and art contiguous insofar as the former as explanation, judgment, and exegesis takes the latter as the object. This contiguity of philology and art speaks to the *Methodologie* almost ten years prior where he juxtaposes philology and the philosophy of art.

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[246] Schelling, *SW* 1/VIII.458. A philological-philosophical class by itself already need not separate the benefit of composition, of presentation, and language from the benefit of content.

[247] *Noch ein Wort über die wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten der philologisch-philosophischen Klasse*. According to K. F. A. Schelling, "Dieser kleine Aufsatz hat das Datum 6. Juni 1818; der Gleichartigkeit seines Inhalts mit dem vorhergehenden wegen ist er diesem hier angehängt"(*SW* 1/VIII.277).

[248] Schelling, *SW* 1/VIII.468. "Language by itself is a complete whole and is formed/produced organically down to each part." "Bilden," *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, Vb. "formen, gestalten, hervorbringen […]." While *bilden* can mean *formen* and *gestalten*, in some instances it is better translated as *hervorbringen*. Given the focus on productivity in Schelling, *bilden* and its cognates are better translated as "produce." Cf. footnote 106.

[249] Schelling, *SW* 1/VIII.468. If one however reckons philology as explanation, judgment, and exegesis of ancient expressions of thought [*Denkmäler*], whether it be of speaking [redenden] or productive [bildenden] art, thus here it [philology] has the advantage of an already enclosed object by itself. However, even as Alterthumswissenschaft, it may be that it [philology] investigates public life, or the constitution of the state, laws, moral, or religious forms of the ancient and especially classically educated people, it encloses everything for itself in particular circles in which it [philology] can secure completeness—not of knowing [*Wissens*], but of the use of the available means completely.

Thus, the object of the three philological tasks is art limited not only to ancient texts. Schelling indicates this broad understanding of art with the phrase *alterthümlicher Denkmäler* or literally "ancient paintings of thought," where painting takes on a metaphorical sense. While painting, certainly, falls under the category of art, it points to something broader than art, which becomes more apparent by focusing on the adjective "ancient" or *alterthümlicher*. Not only does Schelling mean entirely Ancient Greek art, but more broadly Ancient Greece as a historical phenomenon, which becomes apparent in his rendering philology as *Altertumswissenschaft*. Its objects extend beyond what usually is taken to fall under art since they include public life, the constitution of the state, laws, morals, and religious forms of ancient and classically educated people. One would not normally count these objects as art. The above objects of art speak to the unique way in which philology as *Altertumswissenschaft* takes Greek antiquity, especially classical antiquity, in its entirety to be a phenomenon of art. Most certainly, this understanding echoes Winckelmann's *Geschichte*, as we saw in the *Methodologie*. This renders more precise the understanding of philology in Schelling's philological-philosophical class. It is occupied entirely with Ancient Greek antiquity.

In this chapter we have traced Schelling's Hellenism, and concomitantly Winckelmann's influence, through his philological education and philosophical works on art. A more historically accurate account emerges of Schelling as a German Hellene. Therefore, the primary context in which to make sense of Schelling's thought, especially in his early period, is *Griechentum*. Again, while certainly *Deutscher Idealismus* and *Jenaer Romantik* are significant contexts and conversations in which Schelling finds himself, these two are tertiary when placed next to *Griechentum* and the influence of Winckelmann—the telos will take up *Deutscher Idealismus*. With this foundation of *Griechentum*, the next chapter begins to unfold philosophical productivity as intellectual intuition.

Chapter 2. Philosophical Productivity: Intuition

In the first chapter, we saw the significant influence of *Griechentum* and Winckelmann. They are indispensable background for Schelling's understanding of philosophy. The main argument of this chapter is an answer to the question: How does Schelling understand philosophy as productive? *In nuce* Schelling conceives of philosophical productivity as intellectual intuition, a productive and direct knowing of the Absolute or God. He also does so as *Hen kai Pan*, a philosophical and religious doctrine of Egyptian provenance, which will be the subject of chapters four and five. Taken together, philosophy is productive insofar as intellectual intuition is produced and produces according to the scope of *Hen kai Pan*. Moreover, this understanding of philosophy becomes transparent in the context of Greek Mystery religions; this will appear, however, in the next chapter after elaborating on intellectual intuition here. Because Schelling's understanding of philosophical productivity has received little to no attention, it is necessary to proceed in this manner.

This chapter has three sections. The first discusses Schelling's perspective of philosophical productivity generally. Then it highlights intellectual intuition as central to this perspective by showing its close relationship and near identity with production. Finally, the third section articulates how this close relationship and identity of intellectual intuition and production points to the heart of Schelling's metaphysics, namely, the Absolute or God. It does so first by showing how both intellectual intuition and production engage in the action of identification touching on

Schelling's method of construction along the way; and then how this action points to the Absolute or God as the absolute identity.

A Productive Perspective

For Schelling to philosophize is to produce; this equivalence undergirds the idea of academic study in the *Methodologie*, a work, to emphasize again, that serves as an outline of Schelling's thought. In the third lecture, he touches on the productive ability and its religious dimension. Learning essentially is a matter of creation or production.

> Lernen ist nur negative Bedingung, wahre Intussusception nicht ohne innere Verwandlung in sich selbst möglich. Alle Regeln, die man dem Studiren vorschreiben könnte, fassen sich in der einen zusammen: Lerne nur, um selbst zu schaffen.[250]

Schelling's idea of academic study straddles the contrast between "learning" and creating or producing oneself. This allows the inference that the latter is "true intussusception." He pushes against the assumption that learning is to take in knowledge. Instead, intussusception or literally "taking in" is possible only through inward transformation implying that to "create" or produce oneself is an inward matter. Learning as a negative condition, then, merely clears aside hindrances that prevent one from producing oneself, the focus of Schelling's concept of academic study. He confirms further that "Nur durch dieses göttliche Vermögen der Produktion ist man wahrer Mensch, ohne dasselbe nur eine leidlich klug eingerichtete Maschine."[251] Only a "true man" possesses the "divine ability of production." That such an ability, more importantly, bears a religious connotation insofar as it is "divine" indicates that philosophical productivity is religious, and cannot be understood as something purely secular. In contrast, without the productive ability one is machine-like. An anthropological distinction emerges here, which will become clearer in the next chapter when discussing the context of Greek Mystery religions.

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[250] Schelling, *AA* I/14.80; *SW* 1/V.241. Learning is only the negative condition; true intussusception is not possible without an inward change in oneself. All rules, which one could prescribe for studying, sum themselves up in this one [thing]: learn only to create yourself.

[251] Schelling, *AA* I/14.80; *SW* 1/V.241. Only through this divine ability of production is one a true man, without this only an average, clever, equipped machine.

Philosophy as a matter of production emerges in other parts of the *Methodologie*. Schelling asserts in the sixth and central lecture that "in der Philosophie Kunst und Produktion . . . wenig . . . getrennt seyn können."[252] This passage is at the heart of the *Methodologie*; it elucidates the distinction through which Schelling understands philosophy. The distinction between art and production is inessential for the two are inseparable. Namely, in philosophy art is productive and production is artistic—to focus on production, however, this thesis will, as much as possible, bracket art. Then, in a footnote to this sentence, Schelling discloses that "Produktivität des Geistes also erste Bedingung und zwar aller ächten Wissenschaft überhaupt, aber fürnehmlich der Wissenschaft alles Wissens."[253] In other words, productivity of the intellect as philosophical productivity is the first condition of philosophy as the *Wissenschaft* of all knowing.[254] This entire thesis pivots on this claim. The productivity of the intellect is the *sine qua non* of philosophy. Franz further illuminates the translation of "intellect" by stating that "'Geist' wird . . . nämlich zunächst mit der Tradition des Platonismus al seine göttliche Kraft verstanden […]."[255] Indeed, Plato's notion of "divine power" speaks to the intellect's productivity and religious sense—I explore this more in the next chapter.

The centrality of philosophical productivity also emerges in Schelling's 1801 *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, which takes after the geometric style of Spinoza's *Ethica*,[256] and 1802 *Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie*, which consists of seven sections.[257] Schelling takes these two works as one, which is apparent not only from the title and section references in the

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[252] Schelling, *AA* I/14.101; *SW*1/V.267. [I]n philosophy, art and production less are able to be separated.
[253] Schelling, *AA* I/14.102; *SW* 1/V.267. Productivity [*Produktivität*] of the intellect [*Geistes*] therefore [is] the first condition in fact of all genuine *Wissenschaft* mainly, but especially of the *Wissenschaft* of all knowing [*Wissens*]
[254] Cf. Schelling, *AA* I/14.57; *SW* 1/V.214, der Wissenschaft aller Wissenschaften, der Philosophie. Similarly, *AA* I.14.91,102,113; *SW* 1/V.255, 267, 280. "die Wissenschaft alles Wissens, demnach die Philosophie.... Philosophie sey eben Wissenschaft des Urwissens;" "Wissenschaft alles Wissens;" "Wissenschaft des Urwissens." These different examples show that Schelling understands philosophy as a *Wissenschaft*. I elaborate on these in the fifth chapter.
[255] Michael Franz, *Tübinger Platonismus* (Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 2012). 7. 'Geist' is understood . . . namely above all with the tradition of Platonism and ist divine power […].
[256] *Die Zeitschrift für speculative* Physik, zweiten Bandes, zweiten Heft (1801). For more background, see Manfred Durner's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/10.24-76. The consideration of how transcendental idealism relates to Schelling's 1801 *Darstellung* can be brought to bear on the confusion regarding the notion that Schelling had many systems. Cf. footnote 38 for Schelling's understanding of "system."
[257] *Die neue Zeitschrfit für speculative Physik*, ersten Bandes, erster Stuck (1802). For more background, see Paul Ziche's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/2.1.13-76.

latter, but especially the substance of philosophical production. At the end of the *Fernere Darstellungen*'s first section Schelling explains that the primary goal of the work is "die Natur der absoluten Erkenntnißart oder der intellektuellen Anschauung . . . vor dem Leser zu entwickeln und darzulegen."[258] Intellectual intuition—which I begin drawing out in the next section—is central to the perspective of philosophical production. Schelling takes pains to emphasize this perspective at the beginning of the *Darstellung* to set himself apart from Fichte's standpoint of reflection.[259] He first does this in the context of clarifying misunderstandings surrounding his 1800 *System*.

> Es versteht sich von selbst, daß ich z.B. für das wirkliche ausgeführte System des Idealismus nur das halte, was ich unter diesem Namen aufgestellt habe, denn hielte ich etwas anderes dafür, so würde ich dieses andere aufgestellt haben; ebenso, daß ich dem Idealismus keine andere als gerade diejenige Bedeutung gebe, die ich ihm in jener Darstellung gegeben habe [...]. [D]er Idealismus z.B., welchen Fichte zuerst aufgestellt, und welchen er auch jetzt noch behauptet, eine ganz andere Bedeutung hätte, als jener [...]. Fichte könnte sich mit dem Idealismus auf dem Standpunkt der Reflexion halten, ich dagegen hätte mich mit dem Princip des Idealismus auf den Standpunkt der *Produktion* gestellt.[260]

Schelling explicitly indicates that his philosophical perspective is that of production. The emphasis on productive idealism is in contrast to Fichte's reflective idealism. To wit, while Fichte holds to the "standpoint of reflection," Schelling in contrast holds to that of "production." Although not explicitly referring to this passage, Meyr, as we saw in the epagoge, reads philosophical production as central to Schelling's philosophical career *en toto*.[261] Other scholars, too, have touched on productivity in Schelling. Within the ambit of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*, Naomi Fisher and

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[258] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.102; *SW* 1/IV.361. to develop and present before the reader the nature of the absolute manner of knowledge or intellectual intuition […].

[259] For analyses of the differences between Schelling and Fichte, see Ingtraud Görland, *Die Entwicklung der Frühphilosophie Schellings in der Auseinandersetzung mit Fichte*, Philosophische Abhandlungen ; Bd. 44 (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1973); Reinhard Lauth, *Die Entstehung von Schellings Identitätsphilosophie in der Auseinandersetzung mit Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre (1795-1801)* (Freiburg (Breisgau), München: Alber, 1975); Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (1801)*, in *WZB* II; for the English translation, see *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy: An English Translation of G. W. F. Hegel's Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie* (SUNY Press, 1977).

[260] Schelling, *AA* I/10.111; *SW* 1/IV.109. *emphasis added.* "It is self-evident that I, for example, consider the actual explained system of idealism only that which I have established under this name, for if I considered something else as such, I would thus have established this other thing; likewise, that I gave to idealism none other than precisely such a meaning, which I have given it in that representation [*System of Transcendental Idealism*] […]. [T]he idealism . . . which Fichte originally established, and which he even now still claims, could have an entirely different meaning than that [in the *System*] […]. Fichte is able to hold himself with idealism on the standpoint of reflection; I, in contrast, had positioned myself with the principle of idealism on the standpoint of production." For the account of the correspondence between Schelling and Fichte see Lauth (1975).

[261] See Meyr (1990).

Michael Rudolphi identify such productivity.[262] In addition to Fisher, Manfred Baum and Lara Oštarić observe the idea of productivity in Schelling's early notes on Plato.[263] Nevertheless, neither of them develops the perspective of philosophical productivity, not to mention its context of *Griechentum*.

By distancing his philosophy from reflection, Schelling clarifies that central to it is neither derivation nor deduction. In the *Fernere Darstellungen*'s fourth section, he elucidates that

> Wie die Erkenntniß, daß die Philosophie im Absoluten sey, so ist auch das ganze Geschäft und Werk der Philosophie durch das Bisherige so weit ins Licht gesetzt, daß der Irrthum der Vorstellungen eingesehen werden kann, welche dieses überhaupt [a)] in ein Ableiten, es sey aus dem Absoluten oder welchem andern Princip sonst, oder [b)] in ein Deduciren der wirklichen, erscheinenden Welt, als solcher, oder der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung setzen.[264]

It is an error to represent philosophy as a derivation or deduction. For such representations overlook and distort its productive nature. Christian Danz rightly asserts that "Dem Identitätssystem, welches sich 'auf den Standpunkt der Produktion' (*SW* IV, 109) stellt, geht es gerade nicht um eine Ableitung oder Deduktion der endliche Dinge aus dem Absoluten."[265] The *Darstellung* is not the first time Schelling asserts his perspective of philosophical productivity. For in his *System*'s introduction, he emphasizes that "alle Philosophie produktiv ist."[266] Schelling, therefore, reaffirms the productive perspective of the *System*, a perspective on which he grounds the *Darstellung* and *Fernere Darstellungen*. He emphasizes again at the beginning of the *Darstellung* that

> Denn es ist, um das absolute Identitätssystem, welches ich hiermit aufstelle, und welches sich vom Standpunkt der Reflexion völlig entfernt, weil diese nur von Gegensätzen ausgeht und auf Gegensätzen

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[262] See Fisher, Naomi, "Freedom as Productivity in Schelling's Philosophy of Nature," in Bruno, G. Anthony, ed. *Schelling's Philosophy: Freedom, Nature, and Systematicity*. (Oxford University Press, 2020). 52-70; Michael Rudolphi, *Produktion und Konstruktion: zur Genese der Naturphilosophie in Schellings Frühwerk*. Schellingiana; Bd. 7. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001)

[263] Fisher, Naomi, "The Philosophical Significance of Schelling's Plato Notebooks (1792–1794)," *Kabiri* 3, no. 0 (5 April 2022). 46-57; Baum, Manfred, "The Beginnings of Schelling's Philosophy of Nature," in Sally Sedgwick, *The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel*. (Cambridge: University Press, 2000). 199-215; Oštarić, Lara, "Absolute Freedom and Creative Agency in Early Schelling," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 119, no. 1 (2012): 69–93.

[264] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.133; *SW* 1/IV.396. As the knowledge that philosophy is in the Absolute, so also is the entire concern and work of philosophy set so far in the light on account of what [has been discussed] up till now, that the error of representations can be considered, which place this [the entire concern and work of philosophy] mainly [a)] in a derivation, it would be out of the Absolute or which other principle otherwise, or [b)] in a deduction of the real appearing world, as such, or the possibility of experience.

[265] Danz, Christian, "Schellings Wesensbestimmung des Christentums in den Vorlesungen über Die Methode des akademischen Studiums," in Ziche, Paul, and Gian Franco Frigo, eds. *Die bessere Richtung der Wissenschaften*. Vol. 25. Schellingiana. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011). 159. The system of identity, which sets itself 'on the standpoint of production,' is precisely not a matter of derivation or deduction of finite things out of the Absolute.

[266] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.41; *SW* 1/III.351. all philosophy is productive.

> beruht, in seinem Innern zu fassen, äußerst nützlich, das Reflexionssystem, welchem jenes entgegengesetzt ist, genau kennen zu lernen.[267]

Having already established his philosophical standpoint of production, Schelling drives the wedge further by declaring twice in the space of this one sentence that his system of absolute identity fully distances itself from the standpoint of reflection and that his system is opposed to the system of reflection. Identity, here, is not simply a mathematical equation, but productivity—I limit my discussion of identity only to its relationship to productivity. He elucidates that the standpoint of reflection is limited to "oppositions" because it both begins and ends with them. Moreover, Schelling's larger point is to encourage his readers not to remain ignorant of the system of reflection, but to become acquainted with it for the purpose of comprehending the inside of the system of absolute identity. Hence, one cannot lose sight of this overall productive understanding of philosophy on which Schelling's system of absolute identity rests; it is not enough to consider the concepts of reflection and production. Clarifying this distinction through examples or citing reasons does not suffice because the act of doing so applies only in the realm of reflection, while production itself is its own demonstration—this becomes clear when we discuss construction below and anthropological exclusivity in the next chapter. Jaspers insightfully comprehends that "Man darf sich auf intellektuelle Anschauung nicht berufen als auf einen Grund, sondern kann nur in den Raum der geistigen Mitteilung setzen, was aus ihr hervorging."[268] That philosophy is productive implies that it is not something that can be explained through the discursive movement between oppositions, causal logic, deduction, or abstraction. As it will become clearer, one must produce to understand productions, which applies to intellectual intuition—I further discuss the relationship of Schelling and Fichte in the telos.

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[267] Schelling, *AA* I/10.115; *SW* 1/IV.113. To grasp the inside of the system of absolute identity—which I hereby establish, and which fully distances itself from the standpoint of reflection, because this [reflection] proceeds only from oppositions and is based on oppositions—it is extremely useful to get to know precisely the system of reflection, to which that [system of absolute identity] is opposed.

[268] Jaspers (1955), 86. One must not appeal to intellectual intuition as a reason but can place what proceeds out of it [intellectual intuition] only in the space of intellectual impartation.

Identity of Intuition and Production

Philosophical productivity, more precisely, is a matter of producing intellectual intuitions. In fact, production and intellectual intuition are intimately intertwined, if not, identical in some cases. Certainly, the discussion of intellectual intuition is not unique to Schelling. It flows from Spinoza to Lessing and then sprawls through *Deutscher Idealismus* and *Jenaer Romantik*.[269] Although Schelling thinks through intellectual intuition with Fichte and largely with Spinoza—the latter becomes clearer in the fourth chapter—he understands it in an Ancient Greek manner, specifically as arising similarly to virtue in Plato's account, as we will see in the next chapter.[270] Despite the many perspectives on intellectual intuition, when discussing the Tübingen theologians, Nietzsche curiously reads it as characteristic of Schelling. "Vor Allem ein Vermögen für's ‚Übersinnliche': Schelling taufte es die intellektuale Anschauung [...]."[271] The notion of "ability" *Vermögen* implies production, which can be confirmed etymologically, and will be taken so for Schelling throughout this thesis.[272]

Indeed, the defining feature of intellectual intuition for Schelling is its productivity pointing more generally to the productivity of philosophy. This understanding of intellectual intuition pervades his early period. Although the language surrounding intellectual intuition changes, even beyond its early Fichtean precedent, that it is productive remains the same. This is not to say that only the language of production remains—I will say more on the difficulty surrounding Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition in the next chapter. Texts discussing intellectual intuition range

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[269] For an excellent overview of Schelling's more immediate context of intellectual intuition, see chapter 6 in Franks (2005). For Kant on intellectual intuition, see *WIK* III/267-307; also see *WIK* X/358-64. For Fichte's perspective, see *FSW* 1/III.3-25; also see *FSW* 1/I.519-534. For a thorough and authoritative overview of intellectual intuition see Tilliette (1995). See the third chapter, "Der Grundgeanke der Schellingischen Frühschriften," in Frank (1985), 48-60; also, see relevant sections from Beiser (2002); Andrew Bowie, *Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 1993); Pinkard (2002); and Alan White, *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1983).

[270] For a reading of Spinoza and Fichte's influence on Schelling regarding intellectual intuition, see Jakob Barion, *Die intellektuelle Anschauung bei J.G. Fichte und Schelling und ihre religionsphilosophische Bedeutung*, Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und Pscyhologie der Religion 22 (Würzburg: C. J. Becker Universitäts-Druckerei, 1929). For an examination of Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition in the context of his *Naturphilosophie*, see Rudolphi (2001). I employ *das Ich* instead of the translated "*I*" because of the complex semantic baggage of the former.

[271] Friedrich Nietzsche, *KGW* VI-2.19/5.25. Above all an ability for the "transcendental:" Schelling called it intellectual intuition […]

[272] "vermögen," *Grimm Wörterbuch*. https://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemid=V02804. verb. zu stande bringen

from his days in Tübingen until his post in Würzburg; in between in Jena, he expounds on it extensively. Intellectual intuition as part of his general understanding of philosophy emerges in his *Naturphilosophie*, idealism, and philosophy of art. It "remained with Schelling for his whole life," Terry Pinkard observes correctly.[273] Tilliette affirms that "elle est partout présupposée."[274] The intimate association of intellectual intuition and production should already be evident in relationship of the *Darstellung* and the *Fernere Darstellungen*, as mentioned above. Since Schelling grounds the former on the perspective of production and expounds on the nature of intellectual intuition in the latter, both production and intellectual intuition are inseparable.

In the eighth section of Schelling's 1804 *System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere*—henceforth *Gesammten*—published posthumously but composed while in Würzburg, he explains how he understands the adjective "intellectual" in intellectual intuition.[275]

> Die Erkenntnißart des Absoluten also, wenn sie eine absolute ist, ist auch eine contemplative. – Jede unmittelbare Erkenntniß ist überhaupt = Anschauung, und insofern ist auch alle Contemplation Anschauung. Da aber die Vernunft hier das Erkennende ist, so ist diese Anschauung eine Vernunft-, oder, wie auch sonst genannt, eine intellektuelle Anschauung.[276]

Intellectual intuition as contemplation is the way the Absolute is known. Intuition, on the one hand, denotes immediate knowledge. Knittermeyer comprehends that "Der einzige Vorzug der philosophischen Anschauung liegt in der Unmittelbarkeit […]."[277] On the other hand, insofar as reason performs the action of knowing is the intuition an intuition of reason or intellectual intuition.[278] Though grammatically different, the noun "reason" and the adjective "intellectual" are

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[273] Pinkard (2002), 176.
[274] Tilliette (1995), 188. […] it is presupposed everywhere.
[275] For background on the *Gesammten*, see Binkelmann and Unger's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* II/7.3-50.
[276] Schelling, *AA* II/7.; *SW*1/VI.153-4. The manner of knowing of the Absolute therefore, if it is an absolute [manner of knowing], is even a contemplative [manner of knowing].— Each immediate knowledge is mainly = intuition, and insofar is even all contemplation intuition. However, because reason here is the one that recognizes, thus is this intuition an intuition of reason, or, as is otherwise called, an intellectual intuition.
[277] Knittermeyer (1929), 325. The only advantage of philosophical intuition lies in its immediacy […].
[278] It is important to mention, but beyond this thesis to elaborate, that for the most part reason and the *Einbildungskraft* are equivalent for Schelling. In the *Methodologie*'s sixth lecture, Schelling asserts that "Von dem innern Wesen des Absoluten . . . ist in der erscheinenden Welt ein Ausfluß in der Vernunft und der Einbildungskraft, welche beide ein und dasselbige sind, nur jene im Idealen, diese im Realen" (Schelling, AA I/14.102; SW 1/V.267). Reason, put simply, is the productive ability in the realm of the ideal, while *Einbildungskraft* is that in the realm of the real. Despite this distinction, they are identical. He makes the same point in the *Darstellung*. "Einbildungskraft bezieht sich auf die Vernunft, wie Phantasie auf den Verstand. Jene produktiv, diese reproduktiv" (Schelling, AA I/14.117; SW1/IV.115).

equivalent in qualifying intuition. Hence, "intellectual" signifies belonging to reason, and an intellectual intuition arises from reason. In the first two sections of the *Darstellung*, Schelling establishes the equivalence of production, reason, and the Absolute. After having already mentioned the perspective of production, he asserts in the first section that "Der Standpunkt der Philosophie ist der Standpunkt der Vernunft."[279] Then commenting in the second section, he underscores that "Es gibt keine Philosophie, als vom Standpunkt des Absoluten, darüber wird bei dieser ganzen Darstellung gar kein Zweifel statuirt: die Vernunft ist das Absolute [...]."[280] That philosophy is only from the perspective of the Absolute or that of production points to the Absolute as productive—I discuss this more below. That reason itself is the Absolute means that reason also is productive. Intellectual intuition, therefore, is produced by reason as the productive Absolute. Both Oštarić and Dalia Nassar correctly read that intellectual intuition is productive for Schelling. The former aseerts that "the vehicle of philosophical production is intellectual intuition,"[281] while the latter that "intellectual intuition is productive."[282] Given that intellectual intuition, reason, and the Absolute transcend the distinctions in the realm of reflection, they are in one sense identical.

Admittedly, one may find confusing the many synonyms of intellectual intuition. Jaspers aptly points such a reader to the apophatic register of intellectual intuition.[283]

> Was hier vergegenwartigt werden soll, scheint nie endgültig bestimmbar, sondern sich in den Namen und Darstellungen verwandelnd zu zeigen. Was Schelling meint, ist nur mit Ausdrücken zu umkreisen, die für

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In the same way that reason is productive, so also is Einbildungskraft. Both have precedence over the "imagination," which in this context is *Phantasie*, and the understanding, respectively. Schelling uses the German terms *Einbildungskraft* and *Imagination*; he uses the latter much less frequently. In some instances, Schelling uses both *Einbildungskraft* and *Imagination* interchangeably to mean a lesser ability that concerns sense- perceptibility. In these instances, I also translate *Einbildungskraft* into the English "imagination." See Schelling, *AA* I/2.122 and I/13.122; *SW* 1/I.195 and 1/IV.383.

[279] Schelling, *AA* I/10.117; *SW* 1/IV.115. The standpoint of philosophy is the standpoint of reason.

[280] Schelling, *AA* I/10.117; *SW* 1/IV.115. There is no philosophy other than from the standpoint of the Absolute […]. Reason is the Absolute […].

[281] Oštarić, Lara, "Creating the Absolute: Kant's Conception of Genial Creation in Schlegel, Novalis and Schelling," *Kant Yearbook* 8, no. 1 (2016): 82.

[282] Nassar, Dalia, "From a Philosophy of Self to a Philosophy of Nature: Goethe and the Development of Schelling's Naturphilosophie," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 92, no. 3 (2010): 312.

[283] To clarify, I use the term "apophatic" merely analogously and am not drawing the connection between Schelling and the Patristic tradition of apophatic theology. For a broad overview of apophasis, see William Franke, ed., *On What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature, and the Arts*, 2 vols (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).

> unseren Verstand provozierend sind, weil sie im Sinne rationaler Objektivitat Unverständlichkeiten oder nichts zu sagen scheinen.[284]

Schelling's explanations of intellectual intuition can fall on a variety of soil. On the one hand, those limited to understanding and reflection are bound to find them confusing. It is as if Schelling says something "incomprehensible" or "nothing" at all. On the other, those in possession of intellectual intuition realize that these expressions merely "provoke" the understanding to gesture at something that essentially is not nameable, the Absolute or God, but no less graspable.

Intuition as immediate, contemplative, and intellectual directly concerns the Absolute or God. Schelling explains that

> Es ist nur die Folge des nothwendigen Wesens der Vernunft als der unmittelbaren Affirmation der Idee Gottes, daß die Erkenntniß des Absoluten eine unmittelbare, eine contemplative, eine intellektuell-anschauende ist. So wie denn auch umgekehrt aus dem Wesen einer contemplativen, einer unmittelbar anschauenden Erkenntniß der Vernunft gefolgert werden kann, daß der Gegenstand einer solchen nur das Absolute seyn könne, und nichts außerdem.[285]

Intellectual intuition as "immediate knowledge" of the Absolute follows from the fact that reason's necessary essence is an immediate affirmation of the idea of God. Hence, in the *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling notes the synonymity of "der absoluten Erkenntnißart oder der intellektuellen Anschauung."[286] Although Schelling displays a penchant for the term "the Absolute" and employs it more throughout his early works, here the equivalence of the Absolute and the idea of God emerges. For both are in an immediate relationship to reason, the distinction between knowing and affirming notwithstanding. This equivalence is important because it indicates the religious understanding of intellectual intuition. That Schelling takes the knowledge of the Absolute to be immediate, contemplative, and intellectually-intuiting indicates the

[284] Jaspers (1955), 74. What should be realized here appears never finally determined but reveals itself as changing into names and representation. What Schelling intends is only to be circled with expressions that are provocative for our mind because in the sense of a rational objectivity they appear to say incomprehensible things or nothing.
[285] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.117-8; *SW*1/VI.153-4. It is only the consequence of the necessary essence of reason as the direct affirmation of the idea of God, that the knowledge of the Absolute is an immediate, a contemplative, and intellectual intuiting. For just as equally contrariwise, out of the essence of a contemplative, an immediate intuiting knowledge of reason can be inferred that the object of one such [knowledge] can only be the Absolute, and nothing besides.
[286] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.102; *SW* 1/IV.361. the absolute manner of knowledge or intellectual intuition […].

synonymity of these three qualifiers. Therefore, in addition to belonging to reason, "intellectual" also connotes immediacy and contemplation in relation to the Absolute or God.

Moreover, as something separate from concepts, intellectual intuition concerns a self-relationship that transcends empiricism. Shortly after his time in Tübingen, Schelling wrote the 1796 *Abhandlung zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre*, a long essay published in Niethammer's *Philosophisches Journal*.[287] The work reflects Schelling's early enthusiasm for Fichte in its extensive discussion of Kant, Karl Reinhold, and Jacob Sigismund Beck. It emphasizes the productivity of the intellect [*Geist*] and the free production of intellectual intuition as the basis of idealism. He defines intellectual intuition as follows:

> [...] der Geist [wird] seiner selbst unmittelbar inne, oder er hat eine intellektuale Anschauung seiner selbst. Anschauung heißt diese Erkenntniß, weil sie unvermittelt, intellektual, weil sie eine Thätigkeit zum Objekt hat, die weit über alles Empirische hinausgeht und durch Begriffe niemals erreicht wird.[288]

Intellectual intuition signifies an intellect's self-awareness. "Intellectual" denotes "unmediated," namely, its object is an activity that transcends the empirical and never can be grasped through concepts; this activity is the "self," so to speak, of the intellect. The aspect of self-awareness certainly hearkens to René Descartes' *Cogito* and that the self is activity to Fichte's *das Ich*.

With these characteristics in view, intellectual intuition is necessary for philosophy. Schelling emphasizes that "Gäbe es in uns kein intellektuales Anschauen, es gäbe . . . keine Philosophie, weder theoretische noch praktische."[289] Furthermore, he stresses the importance of intellectual intuition in the *Methodologie*'s fourth lecture, where he compares it to the pure mathematical intuitions of space and time. "Ohne intellektuelle Anschauung keine Philosophie!"[290] Quoting this passage, Tilliette affirms that intellectual intuition is "un présupposé absolu […]."[291] In the *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling emphasizes similarly that "[…] dem Philosophen [ist] . . . die

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[287] For more background, see Walter Scheiche's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/4.3-55.
[288] Schelling, *AA* I/4.128; *SW*1/I.401. the intellect becomes aware of itself, or it has an intellectual intuition of itself. Intuition is called this knowledge [*Erkenntniß*] because it is immediate, intellectual, because it has an activity for an object, which transcends far above everything empirical and can never be attained through concepts [*Begriffe*].
[289] Schelling, *AA* I/4.128; *SW*1/I.401. If there was no intellectual intuiting [*Anschauen*] in us . . . there would be . . . no philosophy, neither theoretical nor practical.
[290] Schelling, *AA* I/14.92; *SW* 1/V.255. Without intellectual intuition [there is] no philosophy!
[291] Tilliette (1970), 409. an absolute presupposition […].

intellektuelle oder Vernunftanschauung etwas Entschiedenes […]. Sie ist das, was schlechthin und ohne alle Forderung vorausgesetzt wird [...]."[292] As "something decisive" intellectual intuition is that which a philosopher neither can do without nor remain unsure whether he or she possesses it or not, nor even less remain content dealing merely with concepts. Hence it is "assumed . . . absolutely and without all requirement."

Intellectual intuition is identical with production. There is a nuance to their identity, however, that in one sense renders the distinction between the two null since production is wrapped up in intellectual intuition. In the *System*, Schelling elaborates further on transcendental thinking that

> es [*das transscendentale Denken*] setzt ein Vermögen voraus, gewisse Handlungen des Geistes zugleich zu produciren und anzuschauen, so daß das Produciren des Objekts und das Anschauen selbst absolut Eines ist, aber eben dieses Vermögen ist das Vermögen der intellektuellen Anschauung.[293]

On the one hand, more simply, transcendental thinking assumes the ability of intellectual intuition. More complexly, on the other, intellectual intuition as an ability can produce and intuit simultaneously. Here lies the nuanced identity of intuition and production. For while it makes sense that intellectual intuition would consist entirely of the act of intuiting, to render both producing and intuiting as absolutely one in the ability of intellectual intuition, however, disrupts this smooth inference. For intellectual intuition as an ability, hence, consists of both production and intuition. The fact that Schelling seems to suggest one can overlook the distinction between producing and intuiting indicates the intimate relationship of the two. While production and intuition are nominally separate, however, intellectual intuition carries them out as absolutely one, and hence produces their identity. This demonstrates a nuanced equivalence of production and intellectual intuition.[294] Moreover, Schelling takes *Vermögen*, ability, as the productive ability insofar

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[292] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.102; *SW* 1/IV.361. intellectual intuition or an intuition of reason [*Vernunftanschauung*] is something decisive for the philosopher […]. It [intellectual intuition] is that which absolutely and without all requirement is assumed.

[293] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.60; *SW* 1/III.369. it [transcendental thinking] assumes an ability to produce and intuit simultaneously certain actions of the intellect so that the producing of the object and the intuiting itself are absolutely one, but even this ability is the ability of intellectual intuition.

[294] See a close parallel of distinction between *Anschauung* and *Gefühl* in Schleiermacher (2001).

as it is "an ability to produce." Production receives further emphasis given that *Vermögen* alone connotes production, as seen above.

Examining intellectual intuition as a productive ability itself allows the nuances of the equivalence between intellectual intuition and production to arise. First, it is important to note the centrality of intellectual intuition as a productive ability, which comes out in the 1797 *Einleitung zu: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur als Einleitung in das Studium dieser Wissenschaft* (second edition 1803).[295] It consists of a lengthy introduction and two books, which address various matters of physics and chemistry. The introduction addresses more general philosophical issues concerning the *Naturphilosophie*. In the preface to the 1797 edition, Schelling explains that "Mein Zweck ist . . . die Naturwissenschaft selbst erst philosophisch entstehen zu lassen, und meine Philosophie ist selbst nichts anders als Naturwissenschaft."[296] The underlying question of this work presented in the introduction is "Wie eine Welt außer uns, wie eine Natur und mit ihr Erfahrung möglich sey[?] […]."[297] The answer appears towards the end.

> Was ist denn nun jenes geheime Band, das unsern Geist mit der Natur verknüpft, oder jenes verborgene Organ, durch welches die Natur zu unserm Geiste oder unser Geist zur Natur spricht? Wir schenken euch zum voraus alle eure Erklärungen, wie eine solche zweckmäßige Natur außer uns wirklich geworden […]. [D]enn wenn ihr annehmt, daß zwischen beiden eine vorherbestimmte Harmonie stattfinde, so ist ja ebendas der Gegenstand unserer Frage.[298]

It is the hidden productive ability or "hidden organ" that renders nature and spirit opposite sides of the same coin.[299] Put simply, the productivity of nature outside mirrors the productivity of spirit within. In this work, Schelling famously quips that "Die Natur soll der sichtbare Geist, der Geist

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[295] For background to both editions, see Manfred Durner's Editorische Berichte, Schelling, *AA* I/5.3-58, and I/13.3-43. Compared to the first, the second edition is more explicit about philosophical productivity and *Hen kai Pan*.
[296] Schelling, *AA* I/5.64; *SW* 1/II.6. my goal is . . . to allow the *Naturwissenschaft* itself to arise only philosophically, and my philosophy is itself nothing other than *Naturwissenschaft*.
[297] Schelling, *AA* I/5.70; *SW* 1/II.12. How is a world outside of us, and how is a nature and with it experience possible[?].
[298] Schelling, *AA* I/5.106-7; *SW* 1/II.55. What then is that secret bond, which joins our spirit with nature, or that hidden organ [*verborgene Organ*], through which nature speaks to our spirit or our spirit speaks to nature? […] [I]f you assume that between both [nature outside oneself and nature within oneself, or simply, nature and spirit] occurs a preestablished harmony, so is the very object of our question indeed.
[299] Cf. footnote 169.

die unsichtbare Natur seyn,"[300] whose productive implications are glossed over if one does not heed the conception of the Absolute itself as productive.

In the 1803 *Ideen*, Schelling asserts that "Jenes Vermögen der Anschauung zu üben, muß der erste Zweck jeder Erziehung seyn."[301] Stefansky acknowledges that Schelling "in freilich anderem und einleuchtendem Sinne, zu sagen gewagt hatte, die intellektuelle Anschauung sein ein Vermögen […]."[302] This idea, in conjunction with its discussion in the *Methodologie* as we saw above, reveals that the divine ability of production is an ability of intuition the exercise of which is the first goal of education. Therefore, intuition and production find themselves in a religious context—again. The productive ability is capable of certain actions which depend on the actualization of its possibility. It can either be stunted or progress infinitely in whom it is present. In the *Methodologie*'s sixth lecture, Schelling argues that "Das produktive Vermögen läßt sich, wo es ist, bilden, erhöhen und ins Unendliche durch sich selbst potenziiren: es läßt sich im Gegentheil auch im Keim ersticken oder wenigstens in der Entwicklung hemmen."[303] He qualifies the description of the productive ability with "where it is," implying that it is not universally present, and instead points to its rarity and anthropological exclusivity, which I explain in the next chapter. Moreover, he qualifies the actions of this ability by possibility *läßt sich* which demonstrates that the proper realization of the productive ability is not inevitable. Equally the productive ability can fail to develop in whom it is present. Knittermeyer recognizes these possibilities by asserting that "dies Vermögen . . . kann gehegt und geübt werden, wo immer es sich regt."[304]

Elaborating on the possibility of nourishing and exercising the productive ability, Schelling lists five actions that it can perform two of which contrast. These are to choke off in development and to create. For the former, Schelling employs the organic metaphor of a seed, specifically the

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[300] Schelling, *AA* I/5.107; *SW* 1/II.56. nature should be the visible spirit, [while] the spirit invisible nature.
[301] Schelling, *AA* I/13.257; *SW* 1/II.223. To exercise that ability of intuition the first goal must be that education.
[302] Stefanksy (1925), 138. had dared to say, certainly in another and obvious sense, [that] intellectual intuition is an ability […].
[303] Schelling, *AA* I/14.102; *SW*1/V.268. The productive ability is able, where it is, to create, increase, and potentiate through itself *ad infinitum*. In contrast, it is able also to choke off or at the very least hamper in development.
[304] Knittermeyer (1929), 326. This ability . . . can be nurtured and exercised where it arises.

idiom "to choke off" [*im Keim ersticken*], which literally means "to blight in a seminal state." In the same way a seed fails to develop due to some irregularity in nature so also can the productive ability. In the introduction to the *System*, Schelling explains how the productive ability is destroyed. Upon mentioning the universality and productivity of the philosophical and poetic sense, he indicates that "durch Gedächtnißwerk . . . nichts tödtet unmittelbarer das Produktive […]."[305] This is not to say that memory is against philosophizing, but that the sole focus on its exercise "kills" the productive ability "directly," which at least clarifies that memorizing is not producing intellectual intuitions. Moreover, production is exponential insofar as it "increases and potentiates." The latter refers to producing and reproducing itself as a form of the Absolute—this becomes clearer upon discussing Schelling's understanding of potencies in chapter five.

The philosopher is capable of producing intellectual intuitions by virtue of possessing the organ that is the productive ability. In the same passage of the *Methodologie*, Schelling declares that "Man kann sie in sich bilden."[306] Intellectual intuition, to be clear, is a product insofar as it "can" be "produced."[307] Subsequently, "in dem Philosophen muß sie gleichsam zum Charakter werden, zum *unwandelbaren Organ*, zur Fertigkeit alles nur zu sehen, wie es in der Idee sich darstellt," Schelling avers.[308] The three illustrations of "character," "organ," and "readiness" illuminate intellectual intuition. First, that intellectual intuition "must become" the "character" of the philosopher implies that producing intellectual intuition is a deep part of the philosopher; this is more than just possessing some thoughts or grasping logical chains. That intellectual intuition "becomes" character implies that producing it engenders a process of reconstituting the philosopher's inward nature, which points to intussusception. The third illustration is a "readiness to see everything as it is represented in the idea." Intellectual intuition is not only a view of

[305] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.41; *SW* 1/III.351. through the exercise of memory . . . nothing kills that which is productive more directly […].
[306] Schelling, *AA* I/14.92; *SW* 1/V.256. One can produce it [intellectual intuition] in oneself.
[307] Cf. footnote 106.
[308] Schelling, *AA* I/14.92; *SW*1/V.256. *emphasis added.* in philosophy it [intellectual intuition] must as it were become into a character, an unchangeable organ, a readiness only to see everything as it is represented in the idea.

everything with respect to the idea, but also a readiness for such a view— chapter four touches on how an idea is productive. Such a readiness implies that after a while of producing intellectual intuitions the philosopher begins to anticipate a metaphysical view of everything, which further implies the awareness to distinguish such a view from sense-perception and concept.

Of the three, the second illustration of "unchangeable organ" is more decisive in explaining intellectual intuition as productive; this illustration also appears in other works of Schelling, thus testifying to its effectiveness in illustrating the productivity of philosophy. In the context of this metaphor, Schelling emphasizes the necessity of intellectual intuition. This appears in the *Fernere Darstellungen* at the beginning of the second section. "Die intellektuelle Anschauung nicht nur vorübergehend, sondern bleibend, als *unveränderliches Organ*," according to him.[309] As an organ, intellectual intuition is not "temporary" and sporadic but lasting and "unchangeable"—or at least it should become so. This also is evident in the *System*, where in a short space Schelling repeatedly highlights this illustration. "Die intellektuelle Anschauung ist das Organ alles transscendentalen Denkens [...]. Das transscendentale Philosophiren muß also beständig begleitet seyn von der intellektuellen Anschauung."[310] Schelling explains that "das transscendentale Denken geht eben darauf, sich durch Freiheit zum Objekt zu machen, was sonst nicht Objekt ist."[311] In other words, "transcendental thinking" is a matter of producing "itself" freely as an object, which "otherwise is not an object." Nassar correctly notes that "intellectual intuition does not concern an already given object, but the act of producing an object."[312] This does not allow the inference, however, that simply what is produced is merely the subject.

[309] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.103; *SW* 1/IV.362. *emphasis added.* Intellectual intuition is not only temporary, but lasting, as an unchangeable organ.
[310] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.60; *SW* 1/III.369. Intellectual intuition is the organ [*Organ*] of all transcendental thinking […]. Transcendental philosophizing therefore must constantly be accompanied by intellectual intuition.
[311] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.60; *SW* 1/III.369. transcendental thinking proceeds in a way that makes itself into an object through freedom, what otherwise is not an object.
[312] Nassar (2010), 312.

As an organ, intellectual intuition is so fundamental that "Ohne diese Anschauung hat das Philosophiren selbst kein Substrat, was das Denken trüge und unterstützte."[313] This emphasizes the point above that there is no philosophizing without intellectual intuition. "Eine intellektuelle Anschauung liegt allem philosophischen Denken zu Grunde," Jaspers affirms.[314] Schelling echoes this point four years earlier in the *Abhandlung* when he confesses that "Ich glaube nicht, daß leicht jemand leugnen werde, alle Zuverlässigkeit unseres Wissens beruhe auf der Unmittelbarkeit der Anschauung."[315] If philosophizing consists of both thinking, transcendental and otherwise, and intuition, the latter is the foundation not only of the former but also especially of all reliability of knowledge. For Schelling, philosophizing, therefore, is not purely a matter of thinking, which is similar to it not being solely a matter of reflection. Hence, it requires the organ of intellectual intuition. Valerio Verra has the right idea when explaining that

> Pour Schelling il est en effet évident que les concepts philosophiques peuvent démontrer qu'ils ne sont pas de vaines chimères ou qu'ils ne sont pas du tout arbitraires. Il suffit pour cela qu'on puisse les construire intuitivement.[316]

While construction receives more attention below, the point is that intellectual intuition is necessary because it enables and establishes philosophical concepts.

Furthermore, the metaphor of organ duly reflects production as analyzed into both producer and product, which speaks to the distinction between active and passive. "Organ," as we have seen previously, can mean an "instrument, implement, tool, for *making* or doing a thing" and a "product."[317] This means that intellectual intuition, as an "unchangeable organ," is both the philosophical "product" itself and "instrument" for producing itself; it simply is an implement for self-production, so to speak. Perhaps this finds a biological analogy where an organ contributes to

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[313] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.60; *SW* 1/III.369. Without this intuition philosophizing has no substratum that would carry and support thinking.
[314] Jaspers (1955), 78. An intellectual intuition underlies all philosophical thinking.
[315] Schelling, *AA* I/4.103; *SW* 1/I.376. I do not believe that anyone easily will deny that all reliability of our knowing [*Wissens*] is based on the immediacy of intuition.
[316] Verra, Valerio, "La 'construction' dans la philosophie de Schelling," in Guy Planty-Bonjour, ed., *Actualité de Schelling*, Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979). 35. For Schelling, it is indeed evident that the philosophical concepts can demonstrate that they are not vain chimeras or that they are not at all arbitrary. It suffices for that that we can construct them intuitively.
[317] Cf. footnote 169.

the overall production and reproduction of an organism and hence itself. On the one hand, the *Methodologie* presents the philosopher as one who produces intellectual intuition, which means that intellectual intuition is a passive product. In the *Abhandlung*, on the other hand, intuition itself is active and productive. When discussing what is immediate and insurmountable in knowledge, Schelling asserts that "Die Anschauung ist völlig thätig, eben deßwegen *produktiv* und unmittelbar."[318] "Productive" here implies that intellectual intuition actively produces. Schelling synthesizes "active," "productive," and "immediate" as what constitutes intellectual intuition. In either case, whether active or passive, intellectual intuition both produces and is produced.

This productively active understanding of intuition also appears in the *System* in the context of freedom. From the angles of both active and passive, then, intuition freely produces; and to produce intellectual intuitions, simply, is freedom.[319] In the first main part of the *System*, Schelling claims that "Anschauung . . . überhaupt frei producirend [...]."[320] And on the next page, he asserts that "[…] intellektuelle Anschauen selbst [ist] ein absolut freies Handeln […]."[321] As an absolute free action, intellectual intuition is active. In contrast, he states in the *Gesammten*'s eighth section that "[…] die intellektuelle Anschauung [wird] nothwendig eine absolut-freie seyn" where it is "Anschauung eine durch Freiheit hervorgebrachte sey […]."[322] Here, Schelling employs a passive construction to show that intellectual intuition is brought forth through freedom. Jaspers affirms that "Philosophie wurde als Freiheit bestimmt. Wenn ihr Ursprung intellektuelle Anschauung ist, so muß diese selbst wesentlich Freiheit sein. lntellektuelle Anschauung ist ein Akt der Freiheit."[323]

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[318] Schelling, *AA* I/4.106; *SW* 1/I.379. *emphasis added.* Intuition is completely active, [and] for this reason productive and immediate.

[319] Robert Pippin has argued that the problem of freedom is the distinctive question of modern philosophy from Idealism forward. See Robert B. Pippin, *Idealism as modernism: Hegelian variations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); *Modernism as a philosophical problem: on the dissatisfactions of European high culture*, 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 1999).

[320] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.59; *SW*1/III.369. intuition . . . mainly freely produces […].

[321] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.59; *SW*1/III.370. intellectual intuiting itself is an absolutely free action [...].

[322] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.118; *SW* 1/VI.154. intellectual intuition necessarily will be an absolutely-free intuition [where it] is an intuition produced through freedom […].

[323] Jaspers (1955), 79. Philosophy was defined as freedom. If its origin is intellectual intuition, so must this [intellectual intuition] itself be freedom. Intellectual intuition is an act of freedom.

He explains that it is such an act "der sich in ihr [Freiheit] entfaltet."[324] And moreover, "Freiheit . . . ist in der . . . intellektuellen Anschauung."[325] Therefore, intellectual intuition as an act of freedom both unfolds in freedom and freedom is in it. From these passages, we see that intellectual intuition is essentially a matter of freedom regardless of whether it is viewed actively or passively.

In order further to clarify intellectual intuition, Schelling discounts its wrong conceptions by distinguishing it from sense-perceptible intuition. In the second main section of the *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling presents two of such conceptions. In the first case,

> jede Anschauung, sie werde übrigens bestimmt wie sie wolle, in welcher der Gegensatz des Endlichen und Unendlichen nicht absolut vertilgt, in der also von dem empirischen Subjekt oder dem Ich in irgend einem andern Sinne, als insofern es allgemeine Form, reines Subjekt-Objekt ist, außer dieser Form etwas zurückbleibt […].[326]

In this wrong conception of intellectual intuition there "remains behind" "the opposition of the finite and the infinite." Similarly, in the eighth section of the *Gesammten*, Schelling also states that "Die intellektuelle Anschauung ist nichts Besonderes, sondern gerade das ganz Allgemeine."[327] To have an intuition of *das Ich* as an empirical subject, on the one hand, is to be beholden to this opposition. As "universal form" or "pure subject-object," on the other hand, intellectual intuition is not limited by the opposition. Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition is closely intertwined with his understanding of *das Ich*, which points to the intellect's self-relationship. The second case is

> eine Anschauung, welche nur auf die Identität des subjektiven Subjekt-Objekts in dem Anschauen seiner selbst (wobei sich die intellektuelle Anschauung von jeder empirischen nur dadurch unterscheiden würde, daß hier etwas vom Subjekte Verschiedenes angeschaut wird, in ihr aber Anschauendes und Angeschautes identisch sind) geht, nimmermehr intellektuelle Anschauung genannt werden könne.[328]

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[324] Jaspers (1955), 86. […] which unfolds itself in freedom.
[325] Jaspers (1955), 74-5. Freedom is in intellectual intuition.
[326] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.111; *SW* 1/IV.371. "each intuition, anyway it be determined as it wishes, in which the opposition of the finite and the infinite is not removed absolutely, in which [intuition] therefore of the empirical subject or *das Ich* in some sense other than insofar as it is universal form, pure subject-object, besides this form, something remains behind." Schelling's thoughts on the infinite and finite, απειρον and περας, point back to Plato's *Philebus* as mentioned in the *Timaios-Kommentar*. Schelling *AA* II/5.183-92; (1994), 67-70.
[327] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.118.; *SW* 1/VI.154. Intellectual intuition is nothing particular, but precisely the universal entirely.
[328] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.111; *SW* 1/IV.371. an intuition nevermore can be called intellectual intuition, which only opens the identity of the subjective subject-object in the intuiting of itself (whereby intellectual intuition would differ from each empirical [intuition] only in the manner that here something different from the subject is intuited, in it [intellectual intuition] however intuiting and the intuited are identical).

So long as an intuition is confined to subjectivity, it cannot "be called intellectual intuition," no matter how much it speaks of the "subject-object." To wit, Schelling is pushing against an oversimplified opposition of intellectual intuition as subjective, which intuits itself as something subjective, and empirical intuition, which intuits itself as something "different from the subject." He asserts the same in the *Gesammten*:

> Gegenstand einer intellektuellen Anschauung kann also weder ein äußeres, sinnliches Objekt, aber ebensowenig das empirische Selbst oder irgend ein anderer Gegenstand des inneren Sinns seyn […]. Also nur ein Unendliches, ein durchaus Unbegrenztes, von sich selbst Affirmirtes, kann Gegenstand einer intellektuellen Anschauung seyn.[329]

In either case, he wants to emphasize that intellectual intuition is a matter of the identity of "intuiting and the intuited" and is without limitation. As we will see below, intellectual intuition characteristically produces this identification.

Furthermore, in both cases, Schelling draws a sharp distinction between the intellectual and the empirical. What distinguishes the former is that it is produced. Schelling first discusses this distinction at the end of his Tübingen days in the eighth letter of the *Briefe*. He argues that "Sie [intellektuelle Anschauung] unterscheidet sich von jeder sinnlichen Anschauung dadurch, daß sie nur durch Freiheit hervorgebracht [...]."[330] Indeed, intellectual intuition and "sense-perceptible" intuition differ insofar as the former is freely produced or "brought forth." Schelling argues similarly in his well-known 1795 essay, *Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen*—henceforth, *Ichschrift*—in which he continues to build on Fichte's notion of *das Ich*. This work is definitive of Schelling's early period since he republishes it in 1809, and, as we will see in the next chapter, it is an important witness to Schelling's understanding of the close relationship between philosophy and the Greek Mysteries.[331] Schelling explains the goal of the

[329] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.118; *SW* 1/VI.154. Object of an intellectual intuition therefore can neither be an external sense-perceptible object, however even less the empirical self or some other object of the inner sense. Therefore, only an infinite, a thoroughly unlimited, affirmed by itself, can be an object of an intellectual intuition.
[330] Schelling, *AA* I/3.87; *SW*1/I.318. It [intellectual intuition] differs from each sense-perceptible intuition in that it is brought forth only through freedom […].
[331] Schelling (1809). For background, see Hartmut Buchner's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling *AA* I/2.5-65.

work in 1796 issue of the *Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung* in response to a critic. This response is titled *Antikritik*.

> Der Zweck des Verfassers war . . . die Philosophie von der Erlahmung zu befreien,. . . . zu beweisen, daß wahre Philosophie nur mit freien Handlungen beginnen könne, und daß abstrakte Grundsätze an der Spitze dieser Wissenschaft der Tod alles Philosophirens seyen [...]. Indem er die Philosophie für reines Produkt des freien Menschen, gleichsam für Einen Akt der Freiheit hält [...].[332]

Put simply, philosophy is productive and "a pure product" of freedom. Jaspers elucidates this passage correctly.

> Schelling wehrt daher ab, was mit der Freiheit auch die intellekruelle Anschauung bedroht und zerstort. Hier haben Hypothesen und Beweise kein Recht. Er wendet sich auch gegen die in seiner Zeit unter dem Namen »Grundsatzphilosophie « auftretende Denkungsart. Geht die Philosophic von einem ersten Grundsatz aus, so muß sie durch solche unglücklichen Untersuchungen erlahmen. Abstrakte Grundsatze sind der Tod alles Philosophierens. Die Frage, von welchen Grundsatzen die Philosophie anfangen müße, erklart er für eines freien Mannes, der sich selbst fühlt, unwürdig.[333]

Philosophy, therefore, begins through "free actions" that are free productions of intellectual intuition. Simply, to begin philosophizing from precepts is not to produce freely intellectual intuitions.

In the eighth section, Schelling touches on the difference between intellectual and sense-perceptible intuition.

> Wo Objekt ist, da ist sinnliche Anschauung, und umgekehrt. Wo also kein Objekt ist, d.i. im absoluten Ich, da ist keine sinnliche Anschauung, also entweder gar keine, oder intellektuale Anschauung.[334]

Objects, in other words, are associated mostly, if not entirely, with sensible intuition. In the case where "there is no object . . . either there is no intuition or intellectual intuition." This hypothetical suggests the possibility between there being no object and hence no intuition, or there being no object and hence intellectual intuition. This shows that Schelling is not fully committed to removing the language of object from intellectual intuition. He, however, certainly leans more

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[332] Schelling, *AA* I/3.192; *SW*1/I.242. "The goal of the author was to free philosophy from languishing, . . . to prove that true philosophy can begin only with free actions and that abstract propositions on the fore of this *Wissenschaft* would be the death of philosophizing […]. Accordingly, he [a free man] considers philosophy a pure product [*reines Produkt*] of the free man, [of] an act of freedom as it were […]." For background, see Buchner's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling *AA* I/3.179-88.

[333] Jaspers (1955), 81. Schelling wards off what threatens and destroys even intellectual intuition with freedom. Here, hypotheses and proofs have no right. In his time, he opposed the manner of thinking that appeared under the name of "philosophy of precept." If philosophy begins from a first precept, thus it must languish through such unfortunate investigations. Abstract precepts are the death of all philosophizing. The question, from which precepts must philosophy begin, he explains for a free man who feels himself unworthy.

[334] Schelling, *AA* I/2.106; *SW*1/I.181. Where therefore there is no object, i.e., in the absolute *Ich*, there is no sensible intuition, therefore either there is no intuition or intellectual intuition.

towards conceiving of intellectual intuition beyond the binary distinction that arises through the object. Again, given that intellectual intuition is fully commensurate with the Absolute, the distinction between subject and object does not hold and instead is merely illustrative of the Absolute's nature of identity. Schelling confirms in the *Darstellung*'s 24th section that "Die Form der Subjekt-Objektivität ist nicht actu."—illustrative ontology is another matter.[335] Nassar correctly interprets that

> Schelling contrasts intellectual and sensible intuition, explaining that while the latter concerns itself with objects outside of ourselves, which we do not produce but which are already given, the former only concerns itself with its own products.[336]

The difference between intellectual and sensible intuition boils down to the source of the object. The former produces itself as an object, as we saw above, while the latter assumes the existence of external objects. Moreover, in contrast to sense-perceptible intuition, intellectual intuition also appears as something produced. To be produced and to appear to be produced is a crucial distinction. Schelling in the *System* asserts that, on the one hand, "Die intellektuelle Anschauung ist etwas, das man fordern und anmuthen kann."[337] On the other hand, "die sinnliche [Anschauung] . . . nicht als Produciren ihres Objekts erscheint," and he adds that "das Anschauen selbst vom Angeschauten verschieden ist […]."[338] An intellectual intuition, hence, "appears as a producing of its object." It is both a production and appears as a free producing of itself as union or identity. This section thus far has not only shown that intellectual intuition is productive and a product, but also analysed the degree to which it is identical with production.

It is significant that most, if not all, more recent scholars on Schelling note but do not elaborate on the relationship between intellectual intuition and production, not to mention the perspective of philosophical production itself. This is alarming given how central this perspective is for Schelling. Oštarić and Nassar touch on the relationship of intellectual intuition and

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335 Schelling, *AA* I/10.126; *SW*1/IV.124-5. The form of subject-objectivity is not actual.
336 Nassar (2010), 312.
337 Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.66; *SW*1/III.376. Intellectual intuition is something that one can demand and [make] appear.
338 Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.59; *SW*1/III.369. sense-perceptible [intuition] . . . does not appear as a producing of its object . . . the intuiting and the intuited are different.

production, short of developing this perspective. Baum alludes to it, though he remains in the ambit of narrowly reading Schelling's *Timaios-Kommentar*—this work is properly introduced in the next chapter—and does not draw out the broader implications for Schelling's philosophy.[339]

The majority of other scholars do not discuss in detail production and intellectual intuition even while quoting Schelling or mentioning intellectual intuition and production. For one, Fisher correctly recognizes productivity in Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* by noting his "conception of freedom as productivity" and that "human freedom is conscious productivity."[340] But she does not explicitly mention intuition in this relationship despite quoting a passage that discusses it.[341] She, however, touches on the Socratic genius as a precedent of intellectual intuition—more on this in the next chapter.[342] Next, Pinkard observes that

> [T]o be led to the point where conceptual knowledge is of no more value Schelling concluded, is to be led 'into a region where I do not find firm ground but must *produce* it myself to stand firmly upon it.' The construction of such 'firm ground' cannot be given to us but must be freely, spontaneously *brought forth* by us.[343]

Pinkard recognizes that Schelling heeds a distinction between "conceptual knowledge" and intellectual intuition as firm ground. He quotes from the sixth letter of the *Briefe* and translates correctly *hervorbringen* as "to produce" reemphasizing that intellectual intuition must be brought forth. His analysis, nonetheless, leaves off explaining the relationship of intellectual intuition and production or even elaborating more on the latter. Bowie writes similarly claiming that "Intellectual intuition . . . is the source of the *I* in the highest sense, 'to the extent that it is its own *product*, is simultaneously what *produces* and what is *produced*.'"[344] *Das Ich*, as Bowie correctly points out, is constituted of intellectual intuition, and is both producer and product. However, he does not develop this thought any further, but instead turns to *Naturphilosophie* and Schelling's use of *das Ich.*

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339 Baum (2000).
340 Fisher (2020), 53-54, 62. She quotes from the 1797 *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*.
341 Fisher (2020), 62. She cites the following passage from Schelling's 1797 *Ideen*: 'As soon as man sets himself in opposition to the external world [. . .] the first step to philosophy has been taken. With that separation, reflection first begins; he separates from now on what Nature had always united, separates the object from the intuition, the concept from the image, finally (in that he becomes his own object) himself from himself' (AA I/5: 71).
342 Fisher (2022). 53.
343 Pinkard (2002), 176-7. *emphasis added.* He quotes from Schelling, AA I/3.79; *SW*1/I.311. in eine Region, wo ich nicht schon festes Land finde, sondern es selbst erst hervorbringen muß [...].
344 Bowie (1993), 46. *emphasis added.* He quotes Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.62; *SW*1/III. 372.

Tilliette overlooks the relationship of production and intellectual intuition. He mentions in passing Schelling's "febrile production" in the introduction, and "l'intuition productive" a few times throughout the work.[345] Even more, he quotes the passage from the *Darstellung*, cited above, where Schelling distinguishes his perspective of production from Fichte's reflexive; the analysis that follows focuses narrowly on the contrast of the philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy, and there is neither mention nor further discussion of production in Schelling.[346] Frank quotes the following passage from the *System* to define intellectual intuition:

> Nun ist aber dieses intellektuelle Anschauen selbst ein absolut freies Handeln, diese Anschauung kann also nicht demonstrirt, sie kann nur gefordert werden; aber das Ich ist selbst nur diese Anschauung, also ist das Ich, als Princip der Philosophie, selbst nur etwas, das postulirt wird.[347]

While certainly this passage underscores that intellectual intuition is a free act and that it cannot be demonstrated, what is more illustrative is what Frank leaves out. He overlooks on the same page three preceding definitions of intellectual intuition as a "producing." One is in the immediately preceding sentence;[348] and two in a previous paragraph.[349] Finally, Jaspers mentions "der Geist in seiner Produktivität"[350] and "Schelling in der Wucht seiner Produktion"[351] without further elucidation. These examples cover recent and major secondary scholarship on Schelling in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany. All reflect the broader trend of Schelling scholarship that does not pay adequate attention to the significance of the relationship between production and intellectual intuition, and more generally the perspective of philosophical production. This section has drawn out the centrality of intellectual intuition for Schelling's conception of philosophy as productive. It elaborated on its defining characteristics showing its

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345 Tilliette (1970), 11. feverish production; 228. productive intuition . . . aesthetic production. Cf. 442.
346 Tilliette (1970). 242-3. He cites Schelling, *AA* I/10.111; *SW* 1/IV.109.
347 Frank (1985), 88. This is from Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.61; *SW* 1/III.370.
348 Cf. Schelling's *AA* I/9,1.61; *SW* 1/III.370. Das Ich ist nichts anderes als ein sich selbst zum Objekt werdendes Produciren, d.h. ein intellektuelles Anschauen.
349 Cf. Schelling's *AA* I/9,1.60; *SW*1/III.370. (1) es ist ein beständiges intellektuelles Anschauen; da dieses sich selbst Producirende; (2) des sich selbst zum Objekt habenden Producirens, d.h. der intellektuellen Anschauung.
350 Jaspers (1955), 45. The intellect in its productivity.
351 Jaspers (1955), 51. Schelling in the power of his production.

contiguity with the Absolute and reason. Especially as an organ or productive ability, intellectual intuition is both product and that which produces.

Intuition and Production of Identity

Upon further analysis, intellectual intuition and/as production engage(s) in an act of identification, which constitutes the heart of Schelling's system of absolute identity, and hence his metaphysics as a productive Absolute. I first discuss the capability of intellectual intuition and production in making opposites identical before delving into Schelling's understanding of the absolute identity as productive. The point is to show that intellectual intuition relates fundamentally to the center of Schelling's conception of metaphysics. Intellectual intuition and production themselves are identical insofar as they concern the rendering identical of opposites more broadly. In the fourth chapter of the 1803 *Ideen*, Schelling asserts that "das Wesen der Anschauung, das, was die Anschauung zur Anschauung macht, ist, daß in ihr absolut-entgegengesetzte, wechselseitig sich beschränkende Thätigkeiten vereinigt sind."[352] Put simply, intuition entails uniting opposed activities. Schelling asserts in the *Fernere Darstellungen* that "sie [intellektuelle Anschauung] ist das Vermögen überhaupt, das Allgemeine im Besonderen, das Unendliche im Endlichen, beide zur lebendigen Einheit vereinigt zu sehen."[353] Intellectual intuition more precisely is the active ability for perceiving the identity or "living unity" of the universal and particular, of the infinite and finite. This identity or "living unity" is not a static synthesis, but a constant, generative oscillation or *Schweben* between the members of the pair. Schelling reiterates this point in his 1804 *Philosophie und Religion*, a work produced in Würzburg—more on this work in the next chapter.[354] "[N]ur das Zusammengesetzte ist durch Beschreibung erkennbar, das Einfache aber will angeschaut seyn."[355] The intuited living unity is simple. An

[352] Schelling, *AA* I/13.256; *SW* 1/II.221. The essence of intuition, that which makes intuition intuition, is that in it absolutely opposed activities limiting each other reciprocally are united.
[353] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.362; *SW*1/IV.362. "it [intellectual intuition] is the ability [*Vermögen*] mainly to see the universal in the particular, the infinite in the finite, both united into a living unity." Regarding the finite and infinite, see footnote 326.
[354] For more background, see Leistner's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/14.221-71.
[355] Schelling, *AA* I/14.286; *SW*1/VI.26. only that which is composed is recognizable through description, the simple [*das Einfache*], however, desires to be intuited.

intellect simply sees or "intuits" this simple identity. To a lower or deformed faculty such as vulgar knowing [*Das gemeine Wissen*] such an identity appears fragmented.[356] For an intellect, universal and particular, and the infinite and finite, are not originally separate. It is not of the intellect to synthesize these pairs; instead, it grasps them as they truly are, as identity—admittedly, speaking about them as separate creates the illusion that they originally are so.

Schelling proffers two definitions of intellectual intuition that highlight identification in the *Fernere Darstellungen*. Both terms separately, "intellectual" and "intuition," speak to identification. "[I]ntellektuelle Anschauung [wird genannt] Anschauung; denn alle Anschauung ist Gleichsetzen von Denken und Seyn und nur in der Anschauung überhaupt ist Realität."[357] Schelling focuses on "intuition" in this definition of intellectual intuition. Of the two parts to this definition, one is the "identifying" or literally "setting as the same" of "thinking and being." In other words, Schelling sees the capacity to make identical as something essential to the term "intuition." Second, it is intuition because it is the sphere of reality, which suggests that outside intuition there is no reality. The next definition a few sentences later, which recaps the first, also highlights the matter of identification. "Vernunft-Anschauung ist . . . als Erkenntniß zugleich absolut eins mit dem Gegenstand der Erkenntniß."[358] Here he touches on identification insofar as intellectual intuition is "knowledge" that "simultaneously [is] absolutely one with the object of knowledge." This indicates identification between intellectual intuition and its object. Schelling explains in the *System* that "*Das Ich* ist nichts anderes als ein sich selbst zum Objekt werdendes Produciren, d.h. ein intellektuelles Anschauen."[359] Although we will not draw out Schelling's conception of *das Ich*, it suffices to mention that he understands it as a progressive intellectual intuiting where the distinction between subject and object are fluid—how intellectual intuition can

[356] Cf. Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.83-8.; *SW*1/IV.339-44
[357] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.109; *SW*1/IV.368-9. Intellectual intuition . . . [is called] intuition for all intuition is the identifying of thinking and being, and only in intuition mainly is reality.
[358] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.109; *SW*1/IV.369. [...] intuition of reason is. . . as knowledge simultaneously absolutely one with the object of knowledge.
[359] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.61; *SW*1/III.370. nothing other than a producing, which becomes an object for itself, i.e., an intellectual intuiting.

be said to have an object has been touched on above. Here *das Ich* can continually become an object for itself or produce itself into an object only for itself.[360] Intellectual intuition as knowledge and object of knowledge are one because it "becomes an object for itself" by producing itself as "a producing."

Intellectual intuition and identity cannot be grasped without production, which also engages in the act of identification. Schelling brings all three together confirming that in intellectual intuition "das Producirende mit dem Producirten eins und dasselbe ist."[361] The notions here of identity and identification bring together both intellectual intuition and production; here intellectual intuition simply is the produced identity of that which produces and that which is produced. In the *Methodologie*'s third lecture, Schelling confirms that production by itself also is concerned with making opposites identical.

> *Alles Produciren* ruht auf einer Begegnung oder Wechseldurchdringung des Allgemeinen und Besonderen. Den Gegensatz jeder Besonderheit gegen die Absolutheit scharf zu fassen, und zugleich in demselben untheilbaren Akt jene in dieser und diese in jener zu begreifen, ist *das Geheimniß der Produktion*.[362]

Schelling employs, in addition to the distinction of universal and particular, the more abstract cognates of absoluteness and particularity, whose simultaneous indwelling points to the mystery of production; namely, the identity of particularity and absoluteness continually come forth due to this mutual indwelling. "Mystery" here points to the context of the Greek Mystery religions.[363] For the purpose of illustration, one can suppose two parts to this same undivided act of identification. The first is non-identity which entails determining sharply how each particular opposes Absoluteness. The second is simultaneously grasping each particularity in Absoluteness and

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[360] Cf. Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.56; *SW*1/III.366. Das Ich ist gar nicht vor jenem Akt, wodurch das Denken sich selbst zum Objekt wird, es ist also selbst nichts anderes als das sich Objekt werdende Denken, und sonach absolut nichts außer dem Denken [...].

[361] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.59; *SW*1/III.369. the producing one [*das Producirende*] and what is produced are one and the same.

[362] Schelling, *AA* I/14.80; *SW*1/V.242. *emphasis added.* All producing rides on the encounter or mutual interpenetration of the universal and particular. The mystery of production is to grasp sharply the opposition of each particularity against the Absoluteness, and simultaneously in the same undivided act to grasp [each particularity] in this [Absoluteness] and this [Absoluteness] in those [particulars].

[363] While this passage of the *Methodologie* and context, which will receive attention in the next chapter, points to Sophocles, this thesis brackets him because he leans more towards art in the inextricable unity of art and production in philosophy.

Absoluteness in those particularities, which is identity. Here, neither absoluteness nor particularity have the metaphysical upper hand, but both mutually indwell one another. This mutuality, although it is a contradiction according to the logic of empirical space, is the key to the phenomenon of production—this points to *Hen kai Pan*, which receives attention in chapter four. To synthesize, then, this act of grasping the reciprocal and mutual indwelling of particularity and absoluteness is simultaneous with grasping the sharp opposition between them. Through this constant, "undivided act" the identity or production of the two comes forth. This example from the *Methodologie* shows that production is identical to intellectual intuition because it makes opposites identical. Notwithstanding the differences between the pairs, the rendering of an identity is common to both intellectual intuition and production.

Identification of universal and particular is central to Schelling's philosophical method of construction. While it is beyond the space of this section to analyze fully this method, it significant here because Schelling identifies it with producing. His 1803 article, "Über die Construktion in der Philosophie," published in the *Kritische Journal der Philosophie*, evaluates Kant and Fichte's formulations of construction. Towards the end, he states plainly that "alle Construktion ein Produciren ist."[364] "Auf diesem Streit zwischen dem schlechthin Allgemeinen, das insofern nichts Besonderes enthält, und dem Besonderen, das insofern dem Allgemeinen nicht adäquat ist, beruht alle Construktion," he writes earlier.[365] Construction consists of "Gleichsetzung" where "absolute Einheit in jeder einzelnen Construktion als das Allgemeine ganz und ungetheilt im Besonderen ausgedrückt sey."[366] Verra brilliantly grasps construction as identification writing "Il représente une vive tension entre termes opposés qui subsistent seulement dans leur rapport réciproque, dans leur indifférence et différence à la fois [..]."[367] He expounds further that "Un tel point de vue fait

[364] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.512; *SW* 1/V.150. "all construction is a producing." For more background, see Paul Ziche's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.477-87.
[365] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.503; *SW*. 1/V.139. All construction is grounded on this conflict [*Streit*] between the absolutely universal, which insofar contains nothing particular, and the particular, which insofar is not adequate to the universal.
[366] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.503; *SW* 1/V.139. identification [where] absolute unity in each particular construction would be expressed in a particular as the universal entirely and undivided.
[367] Verra (1979), 38. It represents a lively tension between opposing terms that subsist only in their reciprocal relationship, in their simultaneous indifference and difference […].

comprendre que le rapport universel particulier devient plus riche, plus complexe et plus concret que la simple distinction logique ou réfléchie entre concept et intuition."[368] Put differently, in construction one cannot reduce the distinction between universal and particular to that between concept and intuition in the realm of reflection.

Schelling further establishes that construction is production. "Construktion . . . Der Akt der Subjekt-Objektivirung . . . pflanzt sich in den besonderen Formen fort," he asserts in the *Methodologie*'s eleventh lecture.[369] Construction as procession from the subject is equivalent to production insofar as what comes forth objectively is reproduced in particular forms. The organic metaphors indicate that Schelling conceives of construction within the context of Ancient Greek physics. In the *Philosophie der Kunst*'s 42nd section, he points to construction's precedent in ancient conceptions of nature.

> Das Princip der Construktion ist, in einem andern und höhern Sinn, das der alten Physik, daß die Natur einen Abscheu vor der Leere hat. Wo demnach im Universum eine leere Stelle ist, füllt sie die Natur aus. Weniger bildlich ausgedrückt: keine Möglichkeit ist im Universum unerfüllt, alles Mögliche ist wirklich. Da das Universum Eins ist, untheilbar, so kann es sich in nichts ergießen, ohne sich ganz darein zu ergießen.[370]

The precedent of ancient physics, that nature abhors "emptiness," is the principle of construction. Perhaps Schelling has in mind Aristotle's *Physica*, specifically his discussion of void and movement, and other even more ancient Ionian conceptions of nature.[371] That he appeals primarily to Ancient Greek physics demonstrates his Hellenism in that he draws the substance of his philosophical method of construction from the Ancient Greeks.

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368 Verra (1979), 38. Such a point of view makes comprehensible that the relationship of universal [and] particular becomes more rich, complex, and concrete than the simple logical or reflective distinction between concept and intuition.

369 Schelling, *AA* I/14.152; *SW* 1/V.325. act of the subject becoming objective that reproduces itself in particular forms.

370 Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.155; *SW* 1/V.419. 'The principle of construction is in another and higher sense, that of ancient physics, that nature holds emptiness in abhorrence. Where accordingly in the universe is an empty place, nature fills it up. Less illustratively expressed: no possibility is unfulfilled in the universe, everything possible is actual. Because the universe is one, indivisible, thus it can pour into nothing without pouring itself entirely into it.' For an account of construction from Schelling's early works on *Naturphilosophie*, see Rudolphi (2001).

371 Aristotle, *Aristotelis Physica*, ed. W. D. Ross, Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxonii: e typographeo Clarendoniano, 1950). See discussion from 214a21-217a11. See works by and on Ionian philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Anaximenes in Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: griechisch und deutsch*, 6th ed. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951); W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and Malcolm. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*. 4th ed. (London: Black, 1945).

While both construction and intellectual intuition are a matter of production, which entails the identification of universal and particular, they differ in some respects. First, as identification construction consists not only of production, but more explicitly also negation. When discussing the construction of art in the fourteenth lecture of the *Methodologie*, Schelling asserts that "Construktion allgemein Aufhebung von Gegensätzen ist [welche sind] durch Zeitabhängigkeit […]."[372] It is important to bear in mind that these oppositions do not map on neatly to that between particular and universal. While overlooking the fact that construction is a producing for Schelling, Szondi correctly identifies that "*Construktion* ist für Schelling *allgemein Aufhebung von Gegensätzen*."[373] Verra, in contrast, grasps accurately construction's "les deux aspects essentiels: l'un négatif, critique, l'autre positif, spéculatif."[374] While the limits of this thesis do not allow a foray into Schelling's understanding of speculation, it suffices to note that construction as production is speculative.[375]

Second, compared to intellectual intuition, construction is subordinate insofar as it primarily is a matter of representation. "Darstellung in intellektueller Anschauung ist philosophische Construktion," which Schelling discloses in the *Methodologie*'s fourth lecture.[376] Construction's primarily representative function is evident in its equivalence with demonstration. In the *Fernere Darstellungen*'s fourth section, Schelling establishes that "beydes ist Eins und unzertrennlich."[377] Verra catches on to this asserting that "la construction étant l'unique forme authentique de demonstration."[378] Since both concern representation, they hearken to the art-side of philosophy—as noted above, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Daniel Whistler is correct to the extent that he notes intellectual intuition is "a primary insight, which employs construction

[372] Schelling, *AA* 1/14.173; *SW* 1/V.351. construction is generally the negation [*Aufhebung*] of oppositions . . . [which are] through dependence on time […].
[373] Szondi (1974a), 230. *Author's emphasis*. Construction is for Schelling generally the negation of oppositions.
[374] Verra (1979), 36. The two essential aspects: the one negative, [is] critical, the other positive, [is] speculative.
[375] In the *Methodologie*'s sixth lecture, Schelling discusses speculation, which consists of the relationship between production and reflection in the matrix of *Hen kai Pan*, or, more concretely, potencies.
[376] Schelling, *AA* I/14.92; *SW* 1/V.255. Representation in intellectual intuition is philosophical construction.
[377] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.143; *SW* 1/IV.407. both are one and inseparable.
[378] Verra (1979), 35. Construction being the unique, authentic form of demonstration.

as a secondary means of clarifying and communicating this insight."[379] Furthermore, construction takes place within intellectual intuition. Therefore, the former is narrower, so to speak, than the latter. This difference is evident in that unlike intellectual intuition, which proceeds from reason as the Absolute, construction proceeds from the subject. Therefore, Whistler inaccurately argues that "intellectual intuition was subordinated to the method of construction" and that "Construction is not posterior to intuition but the overarching methodology within which intuitions are produced."[380] This partly stems from his mistranslation. He renders the above passage from the *Methodologie* as follows: "'Philosophical construction interprets what is grasped in intellectual intuition.'"[381] In contrast, Franks reflects accurately that "Schelling sometimes seems to suggest that what he means by 'construction' is nothing more than 'exhibition' *(Darstellung)* in intuition— in other words, the demonstration of the universal in the particular."[382] When Schelling discusses the identification of universal and particular, he has in mind both intellectual intuition and construction. I discuss construction further in the last chapter as it relates to *Wissenschaft* and *Hen kai Pan*.

Intellectual intuition as production is a matter of immediately grasping or producing the Absolute, which reveals the limits of reflection. Intellectual intuition, simply, grasps it by producing it. The previous section discussed that intellectual intuition is the immediate knowledge of the Absolute where such knowledge amounts to reason as the Absolute producing. Here, the emphasis is on the Absolute being the product. Schelling details this in the *Fernere Darstellungen*, specifically the beginning of the fourth main section on construction. Recapping the previous sections, he reveals that

[379] Daniel Whistler, *Schelling's Theory of Symbolic Language: Forming the System of Identity*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 134. While I disagree with certain portions of Whistler's of construction and intellectual intuition, he presents an insightful history of the former in the sixth chapter of this text.
[380] Whistler (2013), 132, 134.
[381] Whistler (2013), 134.
[382] Franks (2005), 373.

> das Absolute weder als Denken noch als Seyn und doch zu denken, entsteht für die Reflexion ein Widerspruch, da für diese alles entweder ein Denken oder ein Seyn. Aber eben in diesem Widerspruch tritt die intellektuelle Anschauung ein und *producirt* das Absolute.[383]

The Absolute, on the one hand, is a contradiction for reflection, the realm of concepts; for intellectual intuition, the realm of immediate cognition of the Absolute, on the other, it is something to be produced. The inadequacy of reflection is an opportunity for intellectual intuition to produce the Absolute. Commenting on this passage, Whistler precisely shows that "What the method of construction produces . . . is . . . the absolute itself."[384] Therefore, the immediate knowledge of the Absolute is equivalent to producing it. Tilliette realizes that "l'intuition intellectuelle . . . éclate en se détachant de l'étroitesse réflexive,"[385] and later affirms that "Production . . . [comme] l'intuition accède à l'absolu […]."[386] Stefansky waxes more colorfully that "um dieses Absoluten, das wir nicht denken können, doch mächtig zu werden, müssen wir unsere inner Kräfte zur . . . der intellektuellen Anschauung, anspannen, in der das Absolute uns beschattet und gütig sich in uns niedersenkt."[387] Simply, one can metaphorically grasp the producing of the Absolute through intellectual intuition as the Absolute covering and sinking into oneself.

Schelling confirms this thought in *Philosophie und Religion*, where he contrasts reflection and intellectual intuition.

> [A]lle möglichen Formen, das Absolute auszudrücken, sind doch nur Erscheinungsweisen desselben in der *Reflexion*, und hierin sind sich alle völlig gleich. Das Wesen dessen selbst aber . . . kann nicht durch Erklärungen, sondern nur durch — *Anschauung* erkannt werden.[388]

"Reflection," in other words, is limited to the sphere of "explanation." It does not suffice for grasping the essence of the Absolute itself. Only intuition can do so. Intellectual intuition when

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[383] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.129; *SW*1/IV.391. *emphasis added.* to think the Absolute neither as thinking nor as being, a contradiction arises for reflection, because this everything is either a thinking or a being. However, in this contradiction intellectual intuition enters and produces the Absolute.
[384] Whistler (2013), 128.
[385] Tilliette (1970), 409. Intellectual intuition . . . bursts open when it detaches itself from reflexive narrowness.
[386] Tilliette (1995), 59. Production . . . [as] intuition reaches the Absolute […].
[387] Stefansky (1925), 140. In order for this Absolute, which we cannot think, to become forceful, we must strain our inner powers into intellectual intuition in which the Absolute shadows us and graciously descends into us.
[388] Schelling, *AA* I/14.286; *SW* 1/VI.25-6. *Emphasis added.* [A]ll possible forms to express the Absolute are yet only ways of appearing of the Absolute in reflection, and in this they are completely like each other. The essence of the Absolute itself however . . . can be recognized not through explanations, but only through intuition.

produced engages in an act of making identical the Absolute's form and essence. Schelling expounds in the *Fernere Darstellungen* that "indem sie das Absolute formell ausdrückt, zugleich Ausdruck seines Wesens wird."[389] An intellectual intuition is the "simultaneous" expression or identification of the form and essence of the Absolute. Perhaps a helpful illustration for reflection—albeit not complete because it omits simultaneity—is that intellectual intuition begins from the side of form but becomes essence upon the form mirroring the essence. In this way, Tilliette can affirm that "Elle [intuition intellectuelle] est de plain-pied avec l'Absolu."[390] This analysis of the identity between the form and essence of the Absolute does not suggest a sequence, causality, or intermediary between intellectual intuition and the Absolute.

It is important here to affirm the abiding centrality of the Absolute and its productivity that stretches across Schelling's early period. In the introduction to the *Philosophie der Kunst*, he adamantly asserts that "Es ist . . . in der Philosophie überhaupt nichts als Absolutes, oder wir kennen in der Philosophie nichts als Absolutes – immer nur das schlechthin Eine, und nur dieß schlechthin Eine in besonderen Formen."[391] Therefore, any talk of production, identification, and intellectual intuition is inescapably intertwined with the Absolute. Then Schelling states most explicitly that "Das Absolute ist seiner Natur nach ein ewiges Produciren, dieses Produciren ist sein Wesen."[392] To be sure, the presentation of the Absolute as productive is not limited to Schelling's philosophy of art, but appears in his more general *Methodologie*. In the seventh lecture, he underscores that "die Philosophie die Idee des Absoluten hergestellt."[393] In the eleventh,

[389] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.109.; *SW*1/IV.369. as it [intuition] expresses the Absolute formally, simultaneously [*zugleich*] [it] becomes the expression of its essence.
[390] Xavier Tilliette, *L'Absolu et la philosophie: essais sur Schelling*, 1re éd, Epiméthée (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1987). 22. it [intellectual intuition] is on the same footing with the Absolute.
[391] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.113; *SW* 1/V.367. There is in philosophy . . . mainly nothing than the Absolute or in philosophy we are aware of nothing than the Absolute—always only the absolute One, and only this absolute One in particular forms.
[392] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.206; *SW* 1/V.482. According to its nature the Absolute is an eternal producing [*Produciren*], this producing is its essence.
[393] Schelling, *AA* I/14.111; *SW* 1/V.278. Philosophy produces the idea of the Absolute.

Schelling declares that "Gott [ist] produktiv."[394] Both point to an equivalence of the Absolute and God in the context of production.

These thoughts also appear in the context of *Naturphilosophie*. In the 1799 *Erste Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* Schelling mentions twice the "absolut Productive."[395] He explicates that

> (was kein Substrat mehr hat, sondern Ursache alles Substrats ist), ist das absolut-hemmende aller Analysis, zu welchem aber ebendeswegen die Analysis (die Erfahrung) nie gelangen kann. Es muß das schlechthin in der Natur gesetzt warden, und es ist erstes Postulat aller Naturphilosophie.[396]

In other words, the "absolutely Productive" is the foundation of the *Naturphilosophie* that limits reflection or analysis. Only after one grasps the "absolutely Productive" as productive and not as some empty abstraction can one then take it as the "first postulate of *Naturphilosophie*."[397] Next, in the 1803 *Ideen*, Schelling similarly emphasizes three times that, "Das Absolute ist ein ewiger Erkenntnißakt, welcher sich selbst Stoff und Form ist, *ein Produciren*,"[398] "sein Wesen ein Produciren ist,"[399] and "Das Absolute producirt aus sich nichts als sich selbst, also wieder Absolutes."[400] Therefore, in his thoughts on art and nature, and more generally on academic study, the Absolute or God is productive.

The Absolute also is known as the absolute identity because of the process of identification through and as intellectual intuition and production. The two pairs of distinctions that emerge in this account are the universal and particular, and the real and the ideal. These illustrate the Absolute as the metaphysical and epistemological foundation. The absolute concept of *Wissenschaft* contains two assumptions, which as two identities make up the one Absolute.[401] The first concerns *Wissen* or "knowing," specifically the identity of subject and object or the particular and universal where

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394 Schelling, *AA* I/14.145; *SW* 1/V.318. God is productive […].
395 Schelling, *AA* I/7.67; *SW* 1/III.5. "This absolutely Productive." For more background, see Jacob and Ziche's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/7.3-62.
396 Schelling, *AA* I/7.67; *SW* 1/III.5. (what has no more substrate, but is the cause of all substrates), is the absolutely-obstructing of all analysis, to which, however, for this reason analysis (experience) cannot reach. It must be set absolute in nature and is the first postulate of all *Naturphilosophie*.
397 For Schelling's specific understanding of postulate, see the *System*, *AA* I/9.61-7; *SW* 1/III.371-6.
398 Schelling, *AA* I/13.101; *SW* 1/II.62. *emphasis added.* The Absolute is an eternal act of knowledge, which itself is matter and form, a producing […]."
399 Schelling, *AA* I/13.102; *SW* 1/II.62-3. Its [the Absolute's] essence is a producing […].
400 Schelling, *AA* I/13.103; *SW* 1/II.64. The Absolute produces out of itself nothing other than itself, therefore again the Absolute.
401 Cf. footnote 30.

the former dissolves into the later; this identity, although produced, is not productive. The second and conceptually higher assumption concerns *Wissenschaft*, specifically the identity of the real and the ideal. Here, there is the reciprocal opening of the real into the ideal and transformation of the ideal into the real. This identity, in contrast to the first, is productive because of reciprocity. In both these assumptions identification is at play, and hence in different degrees points to the production of intellectual intuition and intellectual intuition as production. In view of this, the following analysis, again, is merely illustrative; this applies as well to the distinctions within and between each assumption. In fact, then, both assumptions are the Absolute and the Absolute is each one. The distinctions between the universal and particular, and the real and ideal find center stage in the *Methodologie*'s first lecture, "Concerning the Absolute Concept of *Wissenschaft*," where about halfway through, Schelling asks of his Jena audience:

> Lassen Sie mich alles, was doch bloß Einleitung, Vorbereitung seyn könnte, abkürzen und gleich unmittelbar zu dem Einen gelangen, wovon unsere ganze folgende Untersuchung abhängig seyn wird, und ohne das wir keinen Schritt zur Auflösung unserer Aufgabe thun können. Es ist die Idee des an sich selbst unbedingten Wissens, welches schlechthin nur Eines und in dem auch alles Wissen nur Eines ist, desjenigen Urwissens [...].[402]

The bedrock of the entire *Methodologie* is this "one" that is an absolute and unconditioned "knowing." It contains "all knowing," and hence all knowing [*Wissen*] rests on this one absolute knowing. It also can be called the "Urwissens," which on the next page Schelling confirms is synonymous with the "erste Wissen."[403] To be clear, then, Schelling takes as the same "unconditioned knowing by itself," "proto-knowing," and "first knowing." He elaborates further that

> Als das Wissen alles Wissens muß es dasjenige seyn, was die Forderung oder Voraussetzung, die in jeder Art desselben gemacht wird, aufs vollkommenste und nicht nur für den besondern Fall, sondern schlechthin allgemein erfüllt und enthält.[404]

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[402] Schelling, *AA* I/14.58; *SW*1/V.215. "Allow me to abbreviate everything that could be merely introduction, build-up, and equally to arrive directly at the one on which our entire following investigation depends, and without which we are unable to make any progress towards the resolution of our task. It is the idea of an unconditioned knowing by itself, which absolutely is only one and in which also all knowing is only one, [the idea] of such a proto-knowing […]." The distinction between *Wissen* as "knowing" and *Erkenntniß* as "knowledge" is important here for he employs both in this passage. Cf. footnote 151.

[403] Schelling, *AA* I/14.59; *SW*1/V.216. Proto-knowing . . . first knowing.

[404] Schelling, *AA* I/14.58; *SW*1/V.215. As the knowing of all knowing it must be such that it fulfils and contains the requirement or assumption, which is made in each manner of this [knowing], in the most complete manner and not only for the particular case.

The absolutely one knowing, in other words, "fulfils and contains" all the "requirements of assumptions" made of all other knowing; in this sense it is the "knowing of all knowing," requirement of all requirements, the assumption of all assumptions. "Man mag nun diese Voraussetzung," according to Schelling, "als Uebereinstimmung mit dem Gegenstände, als reine Auflösung des Besondern ins Allgemeine oder wie immer ausdrücken […]." [405] The distinction between knowing or subject and object is in apposition to that between universal and particular, which implies an equality. Namely, the agreement of knowing and object is the "pure dissolution of the particular into the universal." These two are absolutely one as is evident in the synonymity of "pure dissolution" and "as always." Namely, universal and particular are always one as the absolutely one knowing; there has not been a time when the particular is not fusing into the universal. Insofar as the absolutely one knowing is assumed in all other knowing, it is this pure fusion of the particular into the universal. The directionality of this "pure dissolution" indicates that the particular is brought towards and dissolves into the universal; not the other way round.[406] This implies that the illustrative focus is less on conceiving the particular as being brought into the universal and more that its dissolution is the appearance of the universal as the Absolute.

This assumption of dissolution broaches in turn the "higher assumption," the identity of the real and ideal; it is productive because of the mutuality of these two. Again, the difference between the lower and higher assumption is not essential, but conceptual, which is substantiated by the subject matter of the lecture as concerning the "Absolute Concept of *Wissenschaft*." Schelling delineates that

[405] Schelling, *AA* I/14.58; *SW*1/V.215. One may now express this assumption as agreement with the object, as the pure dissolution or as always of the particular into the universal.
[406] Cf. Schelling, *AA* I/14.58; *SW* 1/V.215. "Sie wollen, daß das Concrete und das in besondern Erscheinungen Undurchdringliche sich für sie in die reine Evidenz und die Durchsichtigkeit einer allgemeinen Vernunfterkenntniß auflöse." Schelling indicates here a wrong and vulgar conception of how the particular and universal relate. Because this absolutely one knowing or proto-knowing is a potency it is important to observe the directionality of the relationship between universal and particular. Cf. *AA* I/12,1.154-5; *SW* 1/IV.420.

> diese weder überhaupt noch in irgend einem Falle ohne die höhere Voraussetzung denkbar, daß das wahre Ideale allein und ohne weitere Vermittlung auch das wahre Reale und außer jenem kein anderes sey.[407]

Indeed, it seems contradictory that there is a higher assumption in light of the fact that the assumption of dissolution is made in all knowing, which implies that this higher assumption must be something beyond knowing. Upon comparing the two assumptions, Zöller deems the higher assumption "eine tiefer liegende, inhaltlich spezifizierte und letzte Voraussetzung [...]."[408] Tilliette recognizes accurately that "Le mot de passe, ou un des mots de passe, de la philosophie de l'identité . . . l'unité originaire de l'idéal et du réel. La loi suprême de l'identité énonce que l'idéal - le possible - est le réel."[409]

This higher assumption displays two characteristics of the identity of the ideal and real. First, it is metaphysically totalizing insofar as "there is no other." Second, it is immediate; namely, there is no "mediation" between the real and ideal. While one can grasp the lower assumption both as the particular being brought into the universal or as these two always being one, in the higher assumption solely the real has always been the ideal and the ideal the real; in one sense, the distinction between real and ideal is as good as nothing. Schelling confirms that the real and the ideal are an "Identität oder dieses gänzliche Aufgehen des Realen im Idealen [und umgekehrt die Möglichkeit der gänzlichen Umsetzung des Idealen ins Reale] […]."[410] Identity, therefore, is both an "entire coming open" and "entire transformation." The former signals a process that begins from the real, the latter from the ideal; again, these are merely illustrative insofar as both are one "without further mediation." According to Zöller,

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[407] Schelling, *AA* I/14.58; *SW*1/V.215. this [assumption of the dissolution of particular into universal] neither mainly nor in any case is conceivable without the higher assumption that the true ideal alone and without further mediation is also the true real and that besides that there is no other.

[408] Zöller, Günter, "Schellings Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums," in Gian Franco Frigo and Paul Ziche, eds., *Die bessere Richtung der Wissenschaften*, vol. 25, Schellingiana (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011). 73. a deeper lying, content specific, and final assumption […].

[409] Tilliette (1970), 393. The password or one of the passwords of the philosophy of identity is . . . the original unity of the ideal and the real. The supreme law of identity states that the ideal—the possible—is the real.

[410] Schelling, *AA* I/14.58; *SW*1/V.215. […] identity or this entire coming open [*Aufgehen*] of the real into the ideal [and vice versa the possibility of the entire transformation [*Umsetzung*] of the ideal into the real] […].

> Das Ideale und das Reale sollen nämlich nicht allererst durch ein Drittes ins Verhältnis gesetzt werden, etwa durch die Relation der ‚adaequatio' (‚Übereinstimmung') oder durch den Vorgang der ‚dissolutio' (‚Auflösung').[411]

He accurately analyses that the identifications of the higher assumption are more immediate than the "agreement" of subject and object and "dissolution" of particular into universal, and that there is no "third" element involved. As Schelling confirms, "das Absolute auch jene oberste Voraussetzung des Wissens und das erste Wissen selbst ist."[412] Zöller continues that "das Ideale bloß als solches (‚allein und ohne weitere Vermittlung') ineins das Reale, und umgekehrt soll gelten, daß es Reales nur im Idealen gibt (‚außer jenem kein anderes') […]."[413] On the one hand, Zöller quotes Schelling correctly regarding the identification of the real and ideal; on the other, his paraphrastic use of the preposition "in," namely, "the ideal is *in* one the real" and "there is a real only *in* the ideal," betrays a failure to grasp the pure identity between the two. For "in" still suggests there are two insofar as one can be "in" another, which perhaps is why Schelling does not use the preposition. Zöller confirms his misreading of the higher assumption by arguing that "Ideales und Reales sind damit als alternative und komplementäre Seiten eines Einen zu sehen, dessen zwei Hauptmanifestationsformen sie darstellen."[414] Indeed, grasping the absolute and pure identity of the real and the ideal is no easy matter since it is difficult to avoid a lingering duality.

Concomitantly, Zöller shows that he does not observe the proper distinction between the two assumptions. To support his claim that the ideal and real are "complementary sides of the One," he cites, without any elaboration, a passage from the seventh lecture of the *Methodologie* in which Schelling explains how both assumptions come together in a conception of a productive Absolute.

> Dieselbe identische Wesenheit ist in dem, was wir die objektive Seite jenes *absoluten Producirens* nennen können, als Idealität in die Realität, und in dem, was die subjektive, als Realität in die Idealität *gebildet*, so daß

411 Zöller (2011), 73-4. The ideal and the real should namely be set in relationship not first of all through a third, as it were through the relation of *adequatio* ('agreement') or through the procedure of *dissolutio* ('dissolution').
412 Schelling, *AA* I/14.59; *SW* 1/V.216. the Absolute is also that highest assumption of knowing and the first knowing itself.
413 Zöller (2011), 74. the ideal purely as such is ('alone and without further mediation') in one the real, and conversely it should be held that there is a real only in the ideal ('besides that no other') […].
414 Zöller (2011), 74-5. "Ideal and Real are thus to be seen as alternative and complementary sides [*Seiten*] of the One whose two main forms of manifestation they represent." He furnishes a footnote pointing to (*AA* I/14.114; *SW*1/V.281) to prove that the real and ideal are "sides." But this is a misreading.

> in jeder von beiden die gleiche Subjekt-Objektivität, und in der absoluten Form auch das ganze Wesen des Absoluten gesetzt ist.[415]

First, there is the "absolute producing" as the metaphysical center and which the two assumptions and their respective distinctions illustrate. This demonstrates that Schelling has a productive understanding of the Absolute as the center of his metaphysics; at no point in his early career is his conception of the Absolute merely a concept. On the one hand, the "objective side" is "ideality produced into reality." This points to the lower assumption's element of "object" and the higher assumption's transformation of the ideal into the real. On the "subjective side," on the other hand, is "reality produced into ideality." This indicates the other element of the "lower assumption" and the higher assumption's opening up of the real into the ideal. Both, in fact, are the same, for they possess the "same subject-objectivity," which renders identical the objective side of ideality being produced into reality and the subjective side of reality being produced into ideality. More precisely then, and contrary to Zöller's reading, the "ideal" is not the side, but the "objective," and the "real" the "subjective." By overlooking this distinction, he overlooks the conceptual difference between the two assumptions, and even more importantly the productivity of the Absolute. One notices further that Schelling qualifies these explanations with "we are able to call," which implies that the designation "sides" is a possibility only for illustrative purposes and not actually; indeed, he does this to avoid construing fixed objective and subjective sides to the absolute producing. Schelling seems to indicate, moreover, that these two sides are analogous to the "absolute form" as the identical subject-objectivity itself is to "the entire essence of the Absolute."

Schelling presents another picture of his productive metaphysics where he uses the distinctions of universal and particular, and prototypical and antithetical in the *Fernere Darstellungen*. Despite the differences from the account in the *Methodologie*, a productive Absolute emerges as the only reality. In Schelling's conception of the depths of metaphysics there is an endless production

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[415] Schelling, *AA* I/14.80; *SW*1/V.242. *emphasis added*. The same identical essentiality is in that which we are able to call the objective side of that absolute producing, as ideality produced into reality, and that which [we are able to call] the subjective [side], as reality produced into ideality, that in each of the two sides the same subject-objectivity is placed, and in the absolute form also the entire essence of the Absolute is placed.

of the identity of universal and particular. Here identity is productive, and the production is of identity. In the fourth main section, Schelling states that "weder das Besondere noch das Allgemeine für sich würde eine Realität haben, wenn nicht im Absoluten beides in eins gebildet, d.h. beides absolut würde."[416] To be "produced into one" is synonymous with being absolute. The particular and universal, in other words, each possess "reality for itself" and are absolute only insofar as they are "produced into one in the Absolute." It is important to avoid the temptation of assuming that universal and particular are separate. Schelling notes further that "In dieser Gleichheit oder gleichen Absolutheit der Einheiten, die wir als das Besondere und Allgemeine unterscheiden."[417] Both the particular and universal each are absolute unities; the universal does not subsume the particular, nor does one depend on the other to be absolute truly.

Moreover, neither the particular nor the universal are the Absolute in this case. Instead, their "sameness" is the "similar absoluteness of unities." In that both are absolute unities, both are the same, and are one metaphysically. Schelling establishes that "Allgemeines aber und Besonderes . . . reell sind . . ., jedes für sich, Einheit des Allgemeinen und Besonderen ist."[418] Only through intellectual intuition are both the particular and universal individually able to be conceived as an absolute unity of the universal and particular. To be precise, then, universal and particular each are an absolute unity of universal and particular. Schelling confirms later that "Im Absoluten, als solchen, aber ist die ideelle Bestimmung oder das Besondere und das Wesen oder das Allgemeine selbst wieder gleich, so daß jedes für sich gleiche Einheit des Allgemeinen und Besonderen (als ideeller Gegensatze) ist [...]."[419] He groups "the ideal determination" and "the particular" on one side, on the other, "the essence" and "the universal." Each, nevertheless, is "for itself the same

[416] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.131.; *SW*1/IV.394. [N]either the particular nor the universal would have a reality for itself, if both were not produced into one [*in eins gebildet*] in the Absolute, i.e., both were absolute.
[417] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.131.; *SW*1/IV.394. In this sameness or similar absoluteness of unities we differentiate as the particular and universal […].
[418] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.141.; *SW*1/IV.405. […] universal and particular as real . . ., each is for itself, unity of universal and particular […].
[419] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.149; *SW*1/IV.414. In the Absolute as such . . . is the ideal determination or the particular and the essence or the universal itself again the same so that each for itself is the same unity of the universal and particular (as an ideal opposition) […].

unity of the universal and particular." This indeed appears to be an absurd contradiction for it defies logic that the universal and particular by themselves each are an absolute identity of the universal and particular. Nonetheless, this double absolute identity simultaneously is the singular Absolute through which contradiction the Absolute is productive of itself—further clarification of dual absolute unities will emerge in the fourth chapter on *Hen kai Pan*. As seen above, a contradiction is merely an opportunity for intellectual intuition to produce the Absolute as the absolute identity. This is a picture of the heart of Schelling's metaphysics. More broadly, this chapter explained Schelling's perspective of philosophically productivity by explicating the productivity of intellectual intuition, its action of identification, relationship to construction, and how it produces the Absolute, which as the absolute identity itself is productive. An explanation of its anthropological exclusivity, namely, that only a few are capable of intellectual intuition, arises in the context of Greek Mystery religions, which points to Plato as the primary precedent. This is the subject matter of the next chapter.

Chapter 3. Exclusively Platonic

This chapter asks the following question: considering his Hellenism, what is the Ancient Greek precedent of Schelling's understanding of intellectual intuition, and philosophical productivity more generally? The answer is Plato, the Classical Greek philosopher and disciple of Socrates, in the context of Greek Mystery religions. Concomitant with intellectual intuition's productivity is its anthropological exclusivity, namely, only a small fraction of human beings partakes of it. This idea is as religious as it is philosophical, which intersection points primarily to Plato, but also Pythagoras, the Samian polymath and inventor of the famous eponymous geometrical theorem. I begin with a short synopsis of the historical context for Schelling's reception of Plato. There are two main contexts. Rüdiger Bubner mentions first "So hatten die Florentiner Humanisten den ästhetisch-erotischen Platon wiederbelebt."[420] Schelling read Ficino's edition of the Platonic dialogues, which demonstrates the historical influence of Italian Renaissance Platonism. One may also include Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. The next context is

[420] Bubner (2004), 29. "the Florentine Humanists [who] had revived the aesthetic-erotic Plato." Bubner furnishes more background in "The Endtdeckung Platons durch Schelling und seine Aneignung durch Schleiermacher," in Rüdiger Bubner, *Innovationen des Idealismus*, vol. 8, Neue Studien zur Philosophie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995). 9-12**.** For a more recent overview of the sources of Platonism during Schelling's university days in Tübingen, see Michael Franz, *Tübinger Platonismus* (Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 2012). 21-32, 40-71. For more on Italian Renaissance Platonism see James Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, 2 vols. (Brill, 1991).

"Die Gruppe der Cambridge Platonists um Whichcote und Cudworth hatte mit Hilfe Platons die Theologie gegen den Vormarsch des englischen Empirismus verteidigt."[421] Both Benjamin Whichcote and Ralph Cudworth sought the philosophical resources of Plato for theological purposes, namely, to push against the growing influence of empiricism represented by figures such as Thomas Hobbes. While there is no direct textual reference to the Cambridge Platonists in Schelling's early works, their work on Plato shaped the Enlightenment into which atmosphere Schelling was born. Jan Assmann remarks concerning Cudworth's 1678 *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* that "There is no doubt that his book became one of the foundational texts of the Enlightenment."[422] In his early period, Schelling certainly was not the only one immersing himself in Plato. In his more immediate context, François Hemsterhuis, the Dutch philosopher;[423] Amalie von Gallitzin, a German intellectual in Münster, who hosted an influential salon; and in *Jenaer Romantik*, Friedrich Schlegel and Schleiermacher, all engaged with Plato during Schelling's early period.[424] Moreover, Bubner accurately judges that for Schelling and his contemporaries

> *Wiederentdeckung Platons* nicht das vertraute Amalgam der Überleiferung aus platonischen, neuplatonischen und christlichen Momenten in anderer Kombination aufgreift, sondern erstmals die Quelle selber zum Sprechen bringst. Eine gewisse Roll mögen dabei die Anfänge der philologischen Gesinnnung gespielt haben.[425]

"The Platonism of Schelling's milieu," Fisher helpfully adds, "predates the historical-critical methods of the nineteenth century, and the corresponding dismissal of Neoplatonic readings of Plato."[426] While Fisher does not specify what she understands by "Neoplatonic readings," she seems to mean the approach of "treating the entirety of Plato's corpus . . . as a unity," which

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[421] Bubner (2004), 29. "the group of Cambridge Platonists around Whichcote and Cudworth [who] had with the help of Plato defended theology against the advance of English empiricism." For immediate influences like Cudworth and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann on Schelling's reception of Plato see Baum (2000). For more on Cambridge Platonism see C. A. Patrides, *The Cambridge Platonists* (Cambridge: University Press, 1980). Also see the more recent work by Douglas Hedley and David Leech, eds., *Revisioning Cambridge Platonism: Sources and Legacy*, Archives Internationales d'histoire Des Idées 222 (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019).

[422] Assmann, Jan, "Egypt," in *The Classical Tradition*, ed. Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, and Salvatore Settis, Harvard University Press Reference Library (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap, 2010). 301.

[423] In the *System*, Schelling refers to Hemsterhius when discussing his conception of material (*AA* I/9,1.149; *SW* 1/III.453).

[424] Bubner (2004), 30.

[425] Bubner (1995), 11. Plato's rediscovery did not take up the familiar amalgam of tradition from Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Christian elements into another combination, but for the first time brought the source itself to speak. The beginning of a philological disposition may have played a certain roll with that.

[426] Fisher (2022), 56.

Schelling's notes on Plato confirm, and less reading the Platonic corpus through Plotinus.[427] In any case, Platonism during Schelling's early period is less a matter of subscribing to historical accretions and more of directly engaging with Plato's Ancient Greek. This direct engagement falls in with the broader and more definitive strain of *Griechentum* and Humanism of this time whose decisive influence escapes both Fisher and Bubner. Both, nonetheless, in passing concede its influence. The latter says that the prevailing "philological disposition" "plays a certain roll" in Plato's rediscovery. The former has the added virtue of underscoring the religious dimension of such a disposition. "[T]his early formation in the classical philosophical and theological traditions with an emphasis on the divine is important to Schelling's overarching philosophical orientation and development."[428] Although Fisher certainly is correct, both "philological disposition" and "classical philosophical and theological traditions" hardly touch on *Griechentum* and its import for Plato's reception. Christopher Calenza fills the gap by stating that for Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe "The centrality of the classical Hellenic world meant largely an idealization of Plato and the creation of Plato as predominantly a metaphysical rather than a dialogical thinker."[429] Indeed, Winckelmann's influence illuminates Schelling's direct engagement with Plato. The focus on "the classical Hellenic world" for these thinkers and their influence on Schelling meant a privileging of Plato.

Such an early immersion in Plato led Schelling to develop a deep reverence for the philosopher. In the *Methodologie*'s fourteenth lecture, when discussing his conception of holy art in the context of the *Res Publica*, Schelling refers to "der göttliche Plato."[430] Even more, such veneration turned into imitation as he himself earned the name of "Plato." Schelling was so taken by Plato throughout his early career that his characterization as Plato became common currency. Reminiscing about his student days in Jena, the journalist Henry Crabb Robinson vividly recalls

[427] Fisher (2022), 56.
[428] Fisher (2022), 47.
[429] Calenza (2010). 465-6. Schelling positions himself as an authentic interpreter of Plato is primary and unmistakable.
[430] Schelling, *AA* I/14.169; *SW* 1/V.345. the divine Plato.

when hearing "Schelling lecture on Speculative Philosophy" that he was "animated by the sight of 130 enthusiastic young men, eagerly listening to the exposition of a philosophy which in its pretensions is more aspiring than any publicly maintained since the days of Plato."[431] K. F. Bachmann, a student of Hegel when in Jena, makes a more explicit comparison between Schelling and Plato, and Hegel and Aristotle, in his review of Hegel's *Phänomenologie* in an 1810 issue of the *Heidelbergische Jahrbüchern der Literatur*. According to Wolfgang Bonsiepen, "Berühmt geworden ist sein [Bachmanns] Vergleich Schellings mit Platon, Hegels mit Aristoteles."[432] The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: the first section highlights the context of the Greek Mystery religions for philosophical productivity; then taking up intellectual intuition, the second section discusses its anthropological exclusivity; the final two sections analyze Schelling's early notes on Plato.

Productive Greek Mysteries

Schelling understands philosophical productivity primarily in the context of the Greek Mystery religions, which proceeds from his Hellenism. This context is important to bring out especially since it illuminates the anthropological exclusivity characteristic of intellectual intuition and philosophical productivity. Greek Mystery religions mostly refer to the Greek Mysteries of the Eleusinian, Orphic, and Pythagorean varieties. They fall under Greek religion more broadly, which, according to Robert Parker, is "an ancient polytheism" with a pantheon of twelve gods: Zeus, Hera, Athena, Apollo, Artemis, Poseidon, Aphrodite, Hermes, Hephaestus, Ares, Demeter, and Dionysius.[433] He specifies that "The most important mysteries were those of Demeter and

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[431] Henry Crabb Robinson, *Diary, Reminiscences and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson*, vol. 1, 3 vols., Cambridge Library Collection (Cambridge: University Press, 2011). 128-9.

[432] Wolfgang Bonsiepen, "Einleitung," in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ed. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont, Mit einer Einleitung von Wolfgang Bonsiepen, 448 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988). LVIII. His [Bachmann's] comparison of Schelling with Plato, [and] Hegel with Aristotle, became famous.

[433] Parker, Robert, "Greek Religion," in Boardman, John, Jasper. Griffin, and Oswyn. Murray. *The Oxford History of Greece and the Hellenistic World.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 306. For an authoritative and detailed account of Greek religion see W. Burkert, *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2011, second edition); also see R. Parker, *Polytheism and Society at Athens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 387–95; R. Parker, *On Greek Religion* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 84–98; H.S. Versnel, *Coping with the Gods* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); J.N. Bremmer, "Introduction: The Greek Gods in the Twentieth Century," in J.N. Bremmer

Persephone at Eleusis near Athens, which promised a better lot in the afterlife . . . while for non-initiates 'everything there would be bad.'"[434] The distinction between the initiated and profane is characteristic of all Greek Mystery religions, and it applies especially to philosophical productivity, intellectual intuition as anthropologically exclusive. Schelling reads Plato, and to a lesser extent Pythagoras and Sophocles, as part of the tradition of philosophy intimately intertwined with the Greek Mysteries.[435] Of these three, Plato is the most important for Schelling, who, at least in his early period, highlights him as primarily trafficking in the Eleusinian Mysteries. The overarching context of the Mysteries is Ancient Greece, but not exclusively so. What follows is by no means a detailed treatment of the relationship of Plato, Pythagoras, and Greek Mystery religions, but largely Schelling's own understanding of their relationship.[436] This is to show that his reading of Plato and Pythagoras is couched in such religion, which, because of its near identity with philosophy, is at the heart of his conception of philosophical productivity.

Before delving into Schelling's understanding of the Greek Mysteries and their philosophical character, it is important to note that his taking seriously Greek Mystery religions is an expression of his Hellenism. He esteems the Greeks for their belief in their gods. When discussing the identity of reality and ideality of the gods in the 29th section of the *Philosophie der Kunst*, Schelling asks rhetorically

> Wer noch fragen kann, wie so hoch gebildete Geister als die Griechen an die Wirklichkeit der Götter haben glauben können, wie Sokrates Opfer anbefohlen, der Sokratiker Xenophon als Heerführer bei dem berühmten Rückzug selbst habe opfern können u.s.w., – wer solche Fragen macht, beweist nur, daß er selbst

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and A. Erskine (eds.), *The Gods of Ancient Greece. Identities and Transformations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 1–18 at pp. 15–17; J.N. Bremmer, *Greek Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[434] Parker (2001), 321-2.

[435] The extant Pythagorean corpus is slim, but his influence is apparent in Plato; Sophocles also is significant for the context of productivity and the Greek Mysteries, but given his leaning towards art, this thesis will bracket him.

[436] For more on the relationship of Plato and the Orphic and Eleusinian Mysteries see chapter 1 of Christoph Riedweg, *Mysterienterminologie Bei Platon, Philon Und Klemens von Alexandrien* (Berlin; New York: W. de Gruyter, 1987); Casadesús, Francesca, "The Transformation of the Initiation Language of Mystery Religions into Philosophical Terminology," in Martín-Velasco, María José, and María José García Blanco. *Greek Philosophy and Mystery Cults* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 1-26. Also, see M. Louis, *Doctrines religieuses des philosophes grecs* (Paris, 1909), 3-50; and chapter 4 of Gross, Jules. *La Divinisation Du Chrétien D'après Les Pères Grecs*; *Contribution Historique à La Doctrine De La Grâce*, (Thèse--Univ. de Strasbourg, 1938). For the English translation, see Jules Gross, *The Divinization of the Christian According to the Greek Fathers*, ed. Paul Onica and Kerry Robichaux (Anaheim, Calif.: A & C Press, 2002).

> nicht auf dem Punkt der Bildung angekommen ist, auf dem eben das Ideale das Wirkliche und viel wirklicher als das sogenannte Wirkliche selbst ist.[437]

Put simply, Schelling praises the Greeks as "highly educated intellects." Here he has in mind Plato and Xenophon, and their representations of Socrates. Schelling took seriously that Socrates believed in the reality of the Greek pantheon and by implication Plato and Xenophon as well.[438] To use a recent characterization by Andrea Nightingale, Schelling does not view Plato's belief in the gods "as mere 'window dressing.'"[439] Such a low view of Greek religion is far removed from *Griechentum*, and a hermeneutical barrier, to say the least. "To understand his [Plato's] philosophy," Nightingale perceptively asserts, "we need to locate his ideas in the context of Greek religious discourses and practices."[440] For not only can "One . . . not overemphasize the level of religious activity in ancient Greece," but also "If we ignore this aspect of his philosophy, we lose an essential part of his thinking."[441] Nightingale aptly and refreshingly observes that "given our secular mode of thinking, we tend to pass over Plato's . . . theological ideas."[442] She elucidates further that

> Although it is difficult if not impossible to get outside of the Enlightenment opposition between reason and religion, we must remember that this is a relatively recent cultural construct. Certainly, the ancient Greeks did not conceive of philosophy as opposed to religion.[443]

Such a view of Plato and his relationship to the Greek Mysteries illuminates Schelling's understanding of philosophical productivity. Unfortunately, the predominant Enlightenment opposition between reason and religion hinders one from engaging earnestly with Schelling's Hellenistic approach that does not pass over the religious dimension of Greek philosophy as mere "window dressing." Returning to Schelling's passage above, it becomes clear that he exposes the

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[437] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.133; *SW* 1/V.391. Whoever is able to ask how can the so highly educated intellects as the Greeks have been able to believe in the reality of the gods, how Socrates urged a sacrifice, the Socratic Xenophon as a general of the famous anabasis itself could have sacrifices, etc.,—whoever asks such question proves only that he himself has not arrived at the point of education, at the point even [where] the ideal is the actual and more real than the so-called real itself.

[438] Hölderlin expressed such seriousness about the Greek gods as well. For instance, in the poem "Die Scheinheilegen Dichter," composed during his time in Frankfurt, he expresses anger for lack of belief in the gods: Ihr glaubt nicht an Helios, / Noch an den Donnerer und Meergott/ Todt ist die Erde, wer mag ihr danken? —see Friedrich Hölderlin, *SW* I/1.257. Relatedy, see Schiller's "Die Götter Griechenlands," whose fourth stanza is on Dionysiac religion. Friedrich Schiller, *SW* I/1.184-190.

[439] Andrea Nightingale, *Philosophy and Religion in Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 6.

[440] Nightingale (2021), 8.

[441] Nightingale (2021), 8.

[442] Nightingale (2021), 7.

[443] Nightingale (2021), 7.

lack of education of someone wondering how highly educated Greeks like Plato and Xenophon can believe in the reality of the gods; this lack of education concerns the relationship between the ideal and the real. Schelling illustrates the peak of a philological education as one where the ideal is even more real than the "so-called" real by which he seems to mean empirical reality. Therefore, we can bring to bear on his understanding of Greek Mystery religions that "In dem höheren Sinne waren sie [die Götter] den Griechen reeller als jedes andere Reelle," a view that bespeaks Schelling's Hellenism.[444]

Undoubtedly, this is the view from *Griechentum* through which one must study Schelling's understanding of Greek Mystery religions and their philosophical nature, which, in his early period, he explains primarily in two works. The first is his 1802 dialogue *Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge*. In his introduction, Manfred Durner elucidates that Bruno represents Schelling, Lucian stands for Fichte, Anselmo embodies the system of Leibniz, and Alexander the hylozoistic standpoint, which corresponds to the perspectives of the historical Giordano Bruno.[445] From the title, the work concerns the divine and natural principle of things, which Schelling through the mouth of Bruno concisely explains in the context of the broader discussion of the finite, infinite, and the eternal, and how things are ordered according to these three categories:

> Dieses [*natürliche Prinzip*] zwar erscheint als leidend, jenes [göttliche Prinzip] aber als thätig. Weßhalb die Materien z.B. wegen ihrer leidenden und empfänglichen Natur dem natürlichen Princip anzugehören, das Licht aber wegen seiner schaffenden und thätigen göttlicher Art scheint.[446]

Throughout this work Schelling does not employ the term "thing" to refer to some lifeless and inorganic entity.[447] Such things are led by two principles, the natural and the divine, although not in the same manner and to the same degree. The former principle concerns the passive and

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[444] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.133; *SW* 1/V.391. In the higher sense were they [the gods] for the Greeks more real than each other real thing.

[445] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge: Ein Gespräch*, ed. Manfred Durner, Philosophische Bibliothek 564 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2010). XXXIV.

[446] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.425; *SW* 1/IV.305. "[T]he latter [natural principle] indeed appears as passive, the former [divine principle] however [appears] as active. Therefore, the materials, for instance, because of their passive and receptive nature [appear] to belong to the natural principle, light however because of its creative and active [nature] appears [to belong] to the divine type." For more background, see Durner's Editorischer Bericht, *AA* I/11,1.261-333.

[447] One window into how Schelling grasps "thing" is in the *Methodologie*'s seventh lecture where he speaks of "die Dinge oder Ideen" (*AA* I/14.115; *SW* 1/V.282).

receptive nature of things, while the latter the creative and active. In the beginning, Anselmo broaches for Lucian the relationship of truth and beauty, which sits in the context of the Greek Mysteries: "Willst du uns wiederholen, o Lucian, was du gestern, als wir von der Einrichtung der Mysterien sprachen, über die Wahrheit und Schönheit behauptet?"[448] In fact, the whole dialogue begins and ends with an allusion to the Mysteries. That the work is a dialogue is a clear reference to Plato. Franz suggests that "Schelling zur Zeit der Arbeit an seinem Bruno auch seine alten Studienhefte (mit dem Timaeus-Kommentar) wieder in Augenschein genommen hätte haben können," a fact that speaks to the significance of these notes in demonstrating Schelling's concern with philosophical productivity—I take these up below.[449]

The second work stitching together Greek Mysteries and philosophy is the already mentioned 1804 *Philosophie und Religion*.[450] In the opening lines of the introduction, Schelling observes that "Die allgemeine Sage des Alterthums nennt die frühesten Philosophen als *Urheber der Mysterien*, wie die trefflichsten unter den späteren, Plato vornehmlich, gern von ihnen ihre göttlichen Lehren ableiteten."[451] In identifying Plato—one also may include Pythagoras—as one of the philosophers who drew his divine teaching from the Mysteries, Schelling exhibits a Hellenism that is able to perceive the religious nature of antiquity. More importantly, that these philosophers derive their teachings from the Mysteries sets the tone of their intimate relationship throughout the work.[452] As early as 1796 in his *Abhandlung*, Schelling asserts similarly that "In den herrlichsten Staaten der alten Welt hatten die ersten Stifter, d.h. die ersten Weisen derselben, die

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[448] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.341; *SW* 1/IV.217. Do you wish to repeat for us, O Lucian, what you asserted about truth and beauty when we spoke of the institution of the Mysteries?

[449] Franz (1996), 262. At the time of his work on the *Bruno* Schelling could have had in sight again his old student notebook (with the *Timaeus-Kommentar*).

[450] *Bruno* and *Philosophie und Religion* are respectively the first two parts of the triptych that includes the 1809 *Freiheitschrift*.

[451] Schelling, *AA* I/14.278; *SW* 1/VI.16. *emphasis added.* The general saga of antiquity called the earliest philosophers "originators" of the Mysteries, as the most excellent among the later [philosophers], especially Plato, gladly derived their divine teachings from them.

[452] Schelling employs the terms of "Lesser" (τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια) and "Greater Mysteries" (τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια) when discussing the relationship of negative to positive philosophy. Cf. Schelling, *SW* 2/XIII.155. "Bekanntlich wurden bei den eleusinischen Weihen die kleinen und die großen Mysterien unterschieden, die kleinen galten als eine Vorstufe der großen. Schon die Neuplatoniker nannten die aristotelische Philosophie die kleinen, die platonische die großen Mysterien der Philosophie."

Wahrheit vor den Profanen, d.h. Unwürdigen, durch Mysterien zu verbergen gesucht."[453] Hence, the Mysteries through which the first wise men hid the truth from the profane or unworthy, were later consulted by wise men such as Plato, who drew his philosophical teachings therefrom. Jaspers correctly reads Schelling that "Die Philosophie begann gleichsam mit der Enthüllung der Mysterien."[454]

In the first third of the *Bruno*, Schelling discusses the Mysteries more generally. Anselmo reveals that "Die Mysterien seyen deßhalb vorgestellt worden als eine Anstalt [...]."[455] This already appeared in the beginning when he referred to them as an *Einrichtung*. Although private in nature, the Mysteries and the benefits they conferred were publicly acknowledged; as an institution, it inhabited a particular place in the Ancient Greek cultural landscape. Parker confirms that "Eleusinian cult was famed throughout the Greek world . . . and incorporated into the public religion of the Athenian state."[456] Then, repeating what Polyhymnio said during an imagined yesterday, Anselmo indicates plainly that "dem Inhalt der Mysterien" includes "heiligere Lehren oder bedeutendere Symbole und Zeichen [die] in den alten gelehrt und vorgestellt worden seyen."[457] He repeats this point lucidly tethering philosophy to the Greek Mysteries. "[D]ie Lehre der Mysterien nichts anderes als die erhabenste, heiligste und vortrefflichste, aus dem äußersten Alterthum überlieferte Philosophie gewesen […]."[458] The Mysteries, simply, are teachings in the form of signs, symbols, and accompanying rituals that were taught and presented among the Ancients. In fact, that the Mysteries and initiation concern teaching is clear in the Ancient Greek verb μυέω, which can mean "initiate into the Mysteries" and/or "teach, instruct."[459] The

[453] Schelling, *AA* I/4.145; *SW* 1/I.418. In the most glorious nations of the ancient world, the first founders, i.e., the first wise men of these nations, had tried to hide the truth from the profane, i.e., the unworthy through Mysteries.
[454] Jaspers (1955), 71. Philosophy began, as it were, with the unveiling of the Mysteries.
[455] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.356; *SW* 1/IV.233. The Mysteries have been represented as an institution […].
[456] Parker (2001), 322.
[457] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.356; *SW* 1/IV.233. content of the Mysteries [includes] holier teachings, or meaningful symbols and signs that have been taught and represented amongst the Ancients.
[458] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.357; *SW* 1/IV.233-4. Because now the sublime philosophy consists in the knowledge of the eternal and unchangeable, thus the teaching of the Mysteries became nothing other than the most sublime, holy, and excellent philosophy handed down from the most distant antiquity […].
[459] μυέω, *LSJ*.

Mysteries, in other words, are philosophy translated from the most distant antiquity. Anselmo then concludes normatively that "die Einrichtung der Mysterien . . . den Philosophen überlassen werden sollte."[460] As teachings consisting of deciphered philosophy, the Mysteries ought to remain under the supervision of the philosophers.

This Greek religious understanding of philosophy undergirds the entire *Methodologie*. One can infer this from the descriptions of philosophy in both the first and last lectures. In the former, Schelling shares an anecdote about Pythagoras minting the term "philosophy."

> Von Pythagoras erzählen die Geschichtschreiber der Philosophie, daß er den bis auf seine Zeit gangbaren Namen . . . σοφία, zuerst in den der φιλοσοφία, der Liebe zur Weisheit, verwandelt habe, aus dem Grunde, weil außer Gott niemand weise sey.[461]

Pythagoras is the originator of Pythagoreanism, a more antisocial Mystery religion compared to the Eleusinian Mysteries.[462] In this etymological episode, God does not occupy some ostensibly pure theological discourse, one separate from philosophy, but has a close relationship to philosophy. Schelling takes *Wissenschaft* for wisdom; perhaps because the etymology of *Wissen-* bears a religious and mystical sense and points to wisdom.[463] This allows the inference that philosophy is not only the love of *Wissenschaft*, but also the love of God, who alone is wise—it will be important not to forget this understanding of *Wissenschaft* for the last chapter.

Schelling introduces the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato as involving initiation in the fourteenth lecture.

> Von Pythagoras an und noch weiter zurück bis auf Plato herab erkennt sich die Philosophie selbst als eine exotische Pflanze im griechischen Boden, ein Gefühl, das schon in dem allgemeinen Trieb sich ausdrückte, welcher diejenigen, die entweder durch die Weisheit früherer Philosophen oder die Mysterien in höhere Lehren *eingeweiht* waren, nach dem Mutterland der Ideen, dem Orient, führte.[464]

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[460] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.357; *SW* 1/IV.234. the implementation of the Mysteries should be left . . . to the philosophers.
[461] Schelling, *AA* I/14.60; *SW* 1/V.217. "Historians of philosophy recount of Pythagoras that he first changed the name that passed for *Wissenschaft*, σοφία, into that of φιλοσοφία, the love for wisdom, for the reason that because besides God no one is wise." Cf. Burkert, W., "Platon oder Pythagoras? Zurn Ursprung des Wortes 'Philosophie,'" *Hermes*, 88 (1960), pp. 159-177; Burkert analyzes Heraclides Ponticus' anecdote and its contested details amongst Diogenes Laertius' *Vitae Philosophorum*, Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes*, and Iamblichus' *De Vita Pythagorae*.
[462] For more on Pythagoras, see Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972).
[463] "WISSEN, n., adj.," *Grimm Wörterbuch*, https://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemid=W23974. mhd. ist wizzen, n., nur in der mystik öfter bezeugt, wird jedoch über dieses gebiet hinaus nicht üblich.
[464] Schelling, *AA* I/14.169-70; *SW* 1/V.346. *emphasis added*. From Pythagoras and still farther back until Plato, philosophy recognizes itself as an exotic plant in Greek soil, a feeling, that already expressed itself in the universal drive, which leads such ones, who had been *initiated* either through the wisdom of early philosophers or the Mysteries in higher teaching, to the motherland of ideas, the Orient.

First, Hellenism emerges in the affirmation that philosophy is Ancient Greek, which Schelling signifies by employing the notion of "Greek soil" and citing Pythagoras and Plato. In addition to this notion, the analogy of exotic plant suggests that philosophy is productive. It expresses itself as "the universal drive." Budding philosophers, whether they have been initiated through the wisdom of earlier philosophers or the Mysteries in higher teachings, possess this drive. Initiation applies to both wisdom and the Mysteries indicating a conception of Ancient Greek philosophy fundamentally intertwined with the Greek Mystery religions. Both wisdom and the higher teachings of the Mysteries are the same; both enable initiation. William Greene, in his insightful and philologically attentive analysis of Plato's understanding of poetry, aptly observes that, "the philosopher is, of the many wand-bearers at the mysteries, one of the few inspired."[465] The universal drive of philosophy leads those, who possess it, to the source or motherland of ideas, the Orient. While undoubtedly this indicates an historical and cultural context of philosophy longer and wider than Ancient Greece, the specific mention of "Pythagoras," "Plato," and "Greek soil" highlights Schelling's primarily Greek conception of philosophy.[466]

Philosophy as initiation appears in Schelling's other major early works. One instance, already mentioned in the previous chapter, is the *Fernere Darstellungen*. At the end of the first section, Schelling explains the goal of the entire work.

> die Natur der absoluten Erkenntnißart oder der intellektuellen Anschauung, dann aber die hauptsächlichsten Lehrsätze und die innere Construktion des in ihr gegründeten Systems der Philosophie, mit beständigen kritischen Beziehungen, genäherter auch dem Verständniß der noch weniger Eingeweihten, vor dem Leser zu entwickeln und darzulegen.[467]

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[465] Greene, William Chase, "Plato's View of Poetry," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 29 (1918). 25.

[466] By the "Orient," Schelling appears to have in mind Indian and Persian religion and philosophy. See the *Methodologie*'s lectures eight and nine, and sections 42 and 112 in *Philosophie der Kunst*. In the former section, Schelling asserts the decisiveness of Paul's zeal in spreading Christianity. In this context, he asserts that "Es war nothwendig, daß die orientalischen Ideen in den occidentalischen Boden verpflanzt wurden." Schelling's contemporary and interlocutor in *Jenaer Romantik*, Friedrich Schlegel, also engaged closely with Indian philosophy and religion. See Friedrich von Schlegel, *Ueber Die Sprache Und Weisheit Der Indier*, 1. Auflage (Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer, 1808).

[467] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.102; *SW* 1/IV.361. to develop and present before the reader the nature of the absolute manner of knowledge or intellectual intuition, then, however, the most primary tenets and the inner construction of a system of philosophy grounded in it [intellectual intuition], with enduring critical relations, closer even to the understanding of those less initiated.

In other words, the goal of the work is to "develop" and "explain" the nature of intellectual intuition, and the main tenets and inner construction of a system of philosophy grounded in intellectual intuition. This development and explanation, more relevantly, is "closer to the understanding of those still less initiated." In that vein, Tilliette precisely affirms that "l'intuition intellectuelle . . . est . . . exactement coextensive à l'initiation philosophique."[468] Therefore, Schelling composes the work with a particular anthropology in view, potential philosophers who are yet to be initiated into intellectual intuition.

Before drawing out the further significance of Plato in relation to the Greek Mysteries, it is helpful to see that the equivalence of the Mysteries and philosophy in Schelling appears shortly after his time in Tübingen. We already saw it emerge in the *Abhandlung*, but this equivalence appeared earlier in a revealing letter to the philosopher and physician, Jacob H. Obereit, on March 12, 1796. Schelling reverently expresses "Ebenso sehr bin ich Ihnen für die Bemerkungen über meine Schrift und die historischen Notizen, mit welchen Sie dieselbe begleiteten, verbunden."[469] Reference here is to the *Ichschrift*, which, as we have already seen in the last chapter, discusses intellectual intuition. Schelling proceeds to note the vast amount of philosophical literature being published at the time and remarks that "die besseren Schriftsteller können daher nichts thun, als ihrer Darstellung so viel Würde, Strenge und Erhabenheit des Vortrags geben, daß jedes Blatt dem Profanen zuruft: procul, procul esto!"[470] The Latin is from the sixth book of Virgil's *Aeneid* whereupon leading Aeneas into the underworld, Deiphobe, the Cumaean Sibyl, a priestess of Apollo and Diana, prevents his companions from following suit. This points to a separation between the initiated, Aeneas, and the profane, his companions. A version of this phrase appears later that year in Schelling's *Antikritk*. Lamenting "Die unglückliche Philosophie!" because the

[468] Tilliette (1970), 409. Intellectual intuition . . . is . . . exactly coextensive with philosophical initiation.
[469] Schelling, *AA* III/1.46; *F.W.J. Schelling Briefe und Dokumente*. Edited by Horst Fuhrmans. Vol. 2. 3 vols. (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1973). Schelling, F. W. J. von, "An J. H. Obereit," März 1796. 85. I am very thankful to you for the comments on my text and the historical notes with which you accompanied it.
[470] Schelling, *AA* III/1.47; Schelling (1973), 86. the better writers therefore cannot do anything other than give their expositions so much worth, strength, and sublimity of discourse that each page shouts to the profane person: away, you will be away!

reviewer did not grasp that philosophy is a product of freedom, Schelling expresses that "Der einige Trost dabey ist, doch etwas gefunden zu haben, was die Profanen früher oder später für ihr: procul o procul esse! erkennen werden […]."[471] This explains his misunderstood claim that a free man "hielt . . . am allerwenigsten . . . auf die allgemeingültige Philosophie."[472] A version of this appeared a year later in the 1797 *Ideen*: "eine allgemeingültige Philosophie . . . ein ruhmloses Hirngespinnst."[473] By pinning these claims to Schelling's "indifference"—dispositional, not philosophical—Franks betrays that he does not grasp the distinction between the initiated and profane through which Schelling understands philosophy.[474] This same sentiment appears in the *Abhandlung*, where Schelling argues that philosophy "nicht jedermanns Ding sein […]. Sie muß in ihrem ersten Postulat schon etwas enthalten, was gewisse Menschen auf immer von ihr ausschließt. Sie muß in ihren ersten Principien schon intolerant sein."[475] In other words, exercising intolerance when its first principles are not grasped, philosophy, as something not for everyone, excludes the vulgar crowd.

In applying this distinction to the publishing world of his time, Schelling reveals that the initiated can distinguish themselves by the quality of their works' presentation. The larger context is Schelling's confession that "Ich glaube, daß zu einer Nationalerziehung Mysterien gehören, in welche der Jüngling stufenweise eingeweiht wird."[476] This view of national education as a matter of being initiated into the Mysteries reveals two things. First, it permits the inference that Schelling considers intellectual intuition in the context of the Mysteries in his *Ichschrift*. Walter Jaeschke confirms this link. He observes the religious significance of the work, specifically the angle of Greek Mystery religions, by indicating that "[g]egenüber Obereit bezeichnet Schelling sie [*Ichschrift*]

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[471] Schelling, *AA* I/3.194. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Schellingiana rariora*, ed. Luigi Pareyson, Philosophica varia inedita vel rariora 4 (Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1977). 58. The only consolation for this is to have found what the profane will recognize sooner or later for it [philosophy]: to be away o away!
[472] Schelling, *AA* I/3.193; *SW* 1/I.243. held . . . least of all . . . to a generally valid philosophy.
[473] Schelling, *AA* I/5.69; *SW* 1/II.11. a generally valid philosophy [is] . . . an inglorious chimera.
[474] Franks (2005), 328.
[475] Schelling, *AA* I/4.144; *SW* 1/I.417. is not everyone's thing […]. It must already contain something in its first postulate that excludes certain people from itself forever. It must already be intolerant in its first principles.
[476] Schelling, *AA* III/1.47; Schelling (1973), 86. I believe that the Mysteries belong to national education into which the young person gradually is initiated.

als einen Beitrag . . . ja zu den «Mysterien [...], in welche der Jüngling stufenweise eingeweiht wird».”[477] Hence, Jaeschke demonstrates that Schelling conceived of intellectual intuition in his *Ichschrift* in the context of Greek Mystery religions. Secondly, that a national education should be a matter of being initiated into the Mysteries dovetails with Schelling's idea of academic study. Such study requires a divine productive ability, which is in the context of the equivalence of philosophy and the Greek Mysteries.

A Latin expression of the Mysteries also appears in the *Methodologie*'s fifth lecture. Schelling deems philosophy's “natürlicher Wahlspruch . . . Odi profanum volgus et arceo.”[478] This motto paints philosophy in a religious light. The poet acting as a priest of the Muses and expressing disdain towards and avoiding the profane and vulgar crowd embodies philosophy. Paul Shorey explains that “profanes” “is applied to . . . [the] uninitiated, of the multitude who were not in a position to profit by the poet's teaching.”[479] Jaspers comments on this passage that “[…] die Verachtung des Philosophiebetriebes [geht] derer, die Philosophie durch Verstand allein, durch zweckhafte Absicht für erreichbar halten, der Zorn gegen die Unphilosophie.”[480] Indeed, the profane are those who treat philosophy as a business, using it for intended goals, and are limited to their understanding, the realm of reflection. Jaspers, one of few scholars who recognizes this understanding of philosophy in Schelling, explains that “Im Grunde bleibt ihm Philosophie eine vornehme Angelegenheit. Sie gehört nicht auf die Straße”[481] and summarizes “Kurz, Philosophie ist eine Sache Auserwählter.”[482] Even in a work not directly on Schelling, Jaspers declares that “Die

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[477] Walter Jaeschke, *Die klassische deutsche Philosophie nach Kant: Systeme der reinen Vernunft und ihre Kritik, 1785-1845*, 1. Aufl. (München: C. H. Beck, 2012). 80. [t]o Obereit Schelling characterizes it [*Ichschrift*] as a contribution . . . indeed to the 'Mysteries . . . in which the young man is gradually initiated.

[478] Schelling, *AA* I/14.97; *SW* 1/V.261. “natural slogan . . . I hate and avoid the vulgar crowd.” The Latin is the opening line of the third book of Horace's *Carmina.* Horace, *Opera*, ed. E. C. Wickham and H. W. Garrod, Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford: University Press, 1901).

[479] Horace, *Odes and Epodes*. Edited with commentary by. Paul Shorey. revised by. Paul Shorey and Gordon J. Laing. (New York. Benj. H. Sanborn and Co. 1910). 3.1.1

[480] Jaspers (1955), 69-70. The contempt of the bustle of philosophy is of those who consider philosophy attainable through the understanding alone, through purposive aims, the anger against non-philosophy.

[481] Jaspers (1955), 71. Basically, philosophy remains for him a noble matter. It does not belong on the street.

[482] Jaspers (1955), 69. In short, philosophy is a matter of the chosen ones.

Philosophie ist Einweihung […]."[483] These examples in Schelling point to the relationship of philosophy and the Mysteries. Although Schelling gives Latin expression to this relationship, that should not take away from the primarily Greek character of the Mysteries, which filtered into the Roman Hellenism of Virgil and Horace.

The relationship of catharsis, or purification in the register of the Greek Mysteries, and intuition renders equivalent philosophy and the Greek Mysteries, specifically Plato's teaching in the *Phaedo*. The dialogue concerns Socrates' final conversation with Simmias and Cebes before he imbibes hemlock, and features Pythagoreans in a supporting role. Schelling draws on this dialogue in the second section of *Philosophie und Religion* and the latter half of his 1802 essay, *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie überhaupt*, published in the *Kritischen Journal der Philosophie*, which Hegel helped edit.[484] Schelling produced this essay to correct misunderstandings of his philosophy and *Naturphilosophie*. He articulates the goal of the essay at the beginning: "Naturphilosophie. . . entweder inwiefern ihre Idee auf etwas, das man für Philosophie hält, bezogen, oder inwiefern sie, in ihrer Absolutheit, als integranter und nothwendiger Theil der ganzen Philosophie betrachtet wird."[485] He explores these two possibilities in the three parts of the essay. The first discusses *Naturphilosophie* as the proper realism that complements idealism; the second, religion as Christianity; and the third, identity of morality and intellectual activity. In *Philosophie und Religion*, Schelling elaborates "Nur durch den Abfall vom Urbild läßt Plato die Seele von ihrer ersten Seligkeit herabsinken und in das zeitliche Universum geboren werden, durch das sie von dem wahren losgerissen ist."[486] Following this account is the practical teaching that "die Seele . . . so viel möglich von der Beziehung und Gemeinschaft des Leibes abgezogen und

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[483] Karl Jaspers, *Von der Wahrheit*. Philosophische Logik; Bd.1. (München: Piper, 1947). As quoted in Schröter, Manfred, "Mythopoese," *Studia Philosophica* (Bern) 14 (1954): 203. Philosophy is initiation.
[484] For more background, see Ziche's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.449-55.
[485] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.460.; *SW* 1/V.108. *Naturphilosophie*. . . either insofar as its idea relates to something that one considers philosophy, or insofar as it, in its absoluteness, is considered as an integral and necessary part of the whole of philosophy.
[486] Schelling, *AA* I/14.297; *SW* 1/VI.38. Plato allows the soul only through its fall from the archetype to sink away from its first blissful state and be born into the temporal universe through which it has been torn away from the true [universe].

gereiniget werden müsse [...]."[487] Schelling explains that "Die nämliche Lehre findet ihr im Phädo auf allen Blättern verzeichnet."[488] When discussing the moral aspect of philosophy towards the end of *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie,* he quotes an episode from the *Phaedo* where Socrates dialogues with Simmias.

> »Die Reinigung, sagt Plato (Phaed. p. 152 (67c-e), besteht darin, die Seele so viel möglich von dem Leib abzusondern und zu gewöhnen, sich in sich selbst von allen Seiten aus dem Leib zu sammeln und zurückzuziehen und nach Vermögen in sich selbst zu wohnen. Tod heißt eine solche Lösung der Seele von dem Leib. Am meisten streben nach dieser Lösung die wahrhaft Philosophirenden.« In diesem Streben nach Reinigung begegnen sich also die Sittlichkeit und die Philosophie.[489]

In other words, catharsis is the extrication of the soul as much as possible from its relationship to the body, which means death. In *Bruno*, catharsis saliently emerges in the context of the Greek Mysteries. Anselmo elaborates further.

> […] in den Mysterien die Menschen [haben] zuerst gelernt, daß außer den Dingen, welche unaufhörlich verändert werden und vielgestaltig sich verwandeln, etwas Unwandelbares, Eingestaltiges und Untheilbares sey, und daß dasjenige, was dem Göttlichen und Unsterblichen am ähnlichsten, die Seele, das aber, was dem Vielgestaltigen, Theilbaren und immer Veränderlichen am meisten gleicht, der Körper sey.[490]

Catharsis, as taught in the Greek Mysteries, is becoming aware of the distinction between variability and immutability. The body and things related are subject to change, on the one hand; on the other, the soul like the divine and immortal does not change and is indivisible. Schelling makes this same point in the aforementioned letter to Obereit. "Die älteste und heiligste Idee der Philosophie war ohne Zweifel das allem Existirenden zu Grunde liegende unwandelbare Sein."[491] This fundamental unchanging being is the most ancient and holiest idea of philosophy. Growing into the realization of this distinction appears to be cathartic. Hence, Schelling points out that in

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[487] Schelling, *AA* I/14.297; *SW* 1/VI.39. the soul as much as possible must be removed and purified from the relationship and fellowship with the body.
[488] Schelling, *AA* I/14.297; *SW* 1/VI.39. You all will find the identical teaching in the *Phaedo* noted down on all pages.
[489] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.473; *SW* 1/V.123. "Purification, Plato says, 'consists in separating and habituating the soul as much as possible away from the body, to gather and retract itself into itself from all sides out of the body and to live in itself according to ability. Such a separation of the soul from the body is called death. The only truly philosophizing at most strives after this separation." In this striving for purification therefore morality and philosophy intersect.
[490] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.356; *SW* 1/IV.233. [M]en have learned first in the Mysteries that besides the things, which are changed ceaselessly and transform themselves variedly, there is something immutable, uniform, and indivisible, and that such a thing, which is most similar to the divine and immortal, the soul; that however, which is most like the protean, divisible, and always changing, is the body.
[491] Schelling, *AA* III/1.46; Schelling (1973), 85. The most ancient and holiest idea was undoubtedly the immutable being undergirding everything existing.

the *Phaedo* "true" philosophizing is the practice of death, which touches on moral philosophy. In the *Methodologie*'s seventh lecture, Schelling clarifies morality and its relationship to philosophy. "Philosophie ist . . . mit der Sittlichkeit innig eins, nicht durch Unterordnung, sondern durch wesentliche und innere Gleichheit."[492] The latter "ist Gottähnliche Gesinnung, Erhebung über die Bestimmung durch das Concrete ins Reich des schlechthin Allgemeinen."[493] In this case, the concrete is the object of catharsis, which results in a rising into the kingdom of the absolutely universal.[494]

Immediately after mentioning Plato's *Phaedo* in *Philosophie und Religion*, Schelling emphasizes that "Besonders scheint in den Eleusinischen Geheimnissen dieselbe durch die Geschichte der Demeter und des Raubs der Persephone symbolisch vorgebildet worden zu seyn."[495] He draws out this account in *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie*, which, in like manner, also follows the discussion of Plato's *Phaedo,* by analyzing two stages of the soul "durch welche sie zur Läuterung gelangt."[496]

> Das Erste, was sie erfährt, ist die Sehnsucht; denn die Natur, um in sich den Abdruck des unsterblichen Wesens zu empfangen, ist nothwendig zugleich das Grab der Vollkommenheit. Die Seele, welche den Verlust des höchsten Gutes gewahr wird, eilt, der Ceres gleich, die Fackel an dem flammenden Berg zu entzünden, die Erde zu durchforschen, alle Tiefen und Höhen zu durchspähen, umsonst, bis sie ermüdet endlich in Eleusis anlangt.[497]

"Ceres" is the Roman name for "Demeter." She performs an exhaustive search throughout the earth to find her daughter, Persephone.

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[492] Schelling, *AA* I/14.110; *SW* 1/V.276. Philosophy is . . . intimately one with morality, not through subordination, but through an essential and inner similarity.
[493] Schelling, *AA* I/14.110; *SW* 1/V.276. is a godlike disposition, an elevation over the determination through the concrete into the kingdom of the absolutely universal.
[494] Certainly, there is a Hegelian ethical parallel here, see Hegel *WIZ* VII.
[495] Schelling, *AA* I/14.297; *SW* 1/VI.39. "The same [teaching] especially appears to have been symbolically prefigured in the Eleusinian Mysteries through the account of Demeter and the rape of Persephone." For an authoritative account of the Eleusinian Mysteries see Graf, Fritz. "mysteries, Eleusinian." *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. For ancient sources on the account of Demeter and the rape of Persephone see the Homeric hymn to Demeter in T.W. Allen, W.R. Halliday, and E.E. Sikes, *The Homeric Hymns*, 2nd edn., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936). 2-20; Hymns 18 and 41 in W. Quandt, *Orphei hymni*, 3rd edn., (Berlin: Weidmann, 1962) (repr. 1973); R. Wagner, *Apollodori bibliotheca. Pediasimi libellus de duodecim Herculis laboribus* (Mythographi Graeci 1. Leipzig: Teubner, 1894): 29; and K.T. Fischer (post I. Bekker & L. Dindorf) and F. Vogel, *Diodori bibliotheca historica*, 5 vols., 3rd edn., (Leipzig: Teubner, 1906) (repr. 1964): 5.2.3—5.5.1.
[496] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.474; *SW* 1/V.124. […] through which it attains purification.
[497] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.274; *SW* 1/V.124. The first, that it experiences, is the longing; for nature, to receive in itself the imprint of the immortal essence, is necessarily simultaneously the grave of perfection. The soul, which becomes aware of the loss of the highest good hastens like Ceres to kindle the torch on the flaming mountain, to search the earth, to scout through all depths and heights, in vain, until fatigued it finally arrives in Eleusis.

> Dieses ist die zweite Stufe; allein nur die allsehende Sonne offenbart den Hades als den Ort, der das ewige Gut vorenthält. Die Seele, welcher diese Offenbarung widerfährt, geht zur letzten Erkenntniß über, sich zum ewigen Vater zu wenden: die unauflösliche Verkettung zu lösen, vermag auch der König der Götter nicht, aber er verstattet der Seele, sich des verlorenen Guts in den Bildungen zu freuen, welche der Strahl des ewigen Lichts durch ihre Vermittlung dem finstern Schooß der Tiefe entreißt.[498]

The two stages of the soul, as illustrated by Ceres, are first "searching the earth" and "arriving at Eleusis," and then receiving a revelation regarding Hades. This revelation allows the soul "to turn itself to the eternal father." Both these stages embodied in this mythology are an allegory of the soul's purification, its separation from the body, or death.

Intellectual intuition appears in this account as the "ray of eternal light." Anselmo establishes "daran [die Mysterien] Theil nehmen, durch Reinigung der Seele zur Wiedererinnerung an die vormals angeschauten Ideen des an sich Wahren, Schönen und Guten […]."[499] Catharsis, simply, enables the recollection of previously intuited ideas of the true, beautiful and good. In *Philosophie und Religion*, Schelling mentions identically that "sie [die Seele] dem Sinnenleben absterbe, das absolute [Leben] wieder zu gewinnen und der Anschauung des Urbildes wieder theilhaftig zu werden."[500] The soul's purification, in other words, allows it to partake again of the intuition of the archetype or idea. Jaspers perceives insightfully that "Die Philosophie soll im Menschen erwecken und dann reinigen, was verborgen in ihm bereit liegt."[501] Nightingale's observation is fitting:

> Plato drew on the Greek notion that gods appeared to humans in epiphanies, but he recast this idea in terms of intellectual vision. He reached for the phenomenon of epiphany because it featured an immediate encounter with the divine.[502]

The intellectual and immediate character of experiences of the gods gestures at intellectual intuition. Furthermore, the goal of the Mysteries is this intuition. "Der Zweck aber aller Mysterien

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[498] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.274; *SW* 1/V.124. This is the second stage: only the all-seeing sun reveals Hades as the place which withholds the eternal good. The soul, to which this revelation occurs, proceeds to the last knowledge to turn itself to the eternal father: even the king of the gods is unable to solve the ceaseless concatenation, but he allows the soul to rejoice over the lost good in productions [*Bildungen*], which the ray of eternal light through its intervention wrests away from the dark womb of the deep.

[499] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.356; *SW* 1/IV.233. taking part [in the Mysteries] is through the purification of the soul to the recollection of the ideas intuited beforehand of the true, beautiful and good by itself […].

[500] Schelling, *AA* I/14.297; SW 1/VI.39. [...] the soul must die away from the life of the senses to gain again the absolute life and to participate again in the intuition of the archetype.

[501] Jaspers (1955), 72. Philosophy should awaken and then purify in man what lies hidden in him.

[502] Nightingale (2021), 4.

ist kein anderer, als den Menschen von allem dem, wovon sie sonst nur die Abbilder zu sehen gewohnt sind, die Urbilder zu zeigen," according to Anselmo.[503] The Mysteries as teachings, signs, and symbols induce a catharsis from customary images that allows the initiate to intuit again the forms or ideas. All this confirms that in deeming the Platonic teaching as having emerged from the Mysteries, Schelling reads a close similarity, if not identity, between Plato's teaching about philosophy as presented in the *Phaedo* and the Eleusinian Mysteries as symbolized in the myth of Demeter and Persephone along the lines of the relationship between catharsis and intuition. The Greek Mysteries certainly are the context of philosophical productivity as intuition.

There is a difference between philosophy and religion, nonetheless, but although it is qualitative it is not essential. At the end of the introduction of *Philosophie und Religion*, Schelling explains that religion entails "eine unerwartete Harmonie . . . als Glück, als Erleuchtung oder als Offenbarung zu erscheinen, tritt es vor die Seele."[504] He adds, however, that "kaum ist jene Harmonie gestiftet, so kann die Reflexion eintreten, und die Erscheinung flieht."[505] Put simply, religion entails representations in the soul that vanish upon reflection. Hence, "Religion in dieser vorübergehenden Gestalt ist demnach ein bloßes Erscheinen Gottes in der Seele, sofern diese auch noch in der Sphäre der Reflexion und der Entzweiung ist."[506] "[D]agegen ist Philosophie," Schelling explains,

> nothwendig eine höhere und gleichsam ruhigere Vollendung des Geistes; denn sie ist immer in jenem Absoluten, ohne Gefahr, daß es ihr entflieht, weil sie sich selbst in ein Gebiet über der Reflexion geflüchtet hat.[507]

The difference between religion and philosophy, therefore, comes down to the difference between reflection and that which is "above reflection." The former is a sphere of rupture where

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[503] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.356; *SW* 1/IV.233. The goal of all Mysteries is none other than to show human beings the archetypes away from everything whose images they are accustomed only to see.
[504] Schelling, *AA* I/14.281; *SW* 1/VI.19. an unexpected harmony appearing as felicity, illumination, or revelation; it comes before the soul.
[505] Schelling, *AA* I/14.281; *SW* 1/VI.19. hardly is that harmony brought about, so reflection can enter, and the appearance flees.
[506] Schelling, *AA* I/14.281; *SW* 1/VI.19. Religion in this passing form is accordingly a mere appearing of God in the soul, insofar as this is also still in the sphere of reflection and rupture.
[507] Schelling, *AA* I/14.281; *SW* 1/VI.19-20. In contrast philosophy necessarily is a higher and as it were more restful completion of the intellect; for it is always in that Absolute without the danger that it escapes her [philosophy] because it [philosophy] has taken refuge in a region above reflection.

appearances of God are fleeting, while the latter a more restful completion of the intellect that is in constant possession, so to speak, of the Absolute. Schelling also draws out this contrast in the *Methodologie*'s seventh lecture when addressing conceptions of philosophy that attempt to conceive of it as a procession out of the Absolute. "Daß die Philosophie ihrem Wesen nach ganz in der Absolutheit ist und auf keine Weise aus ihr herausgeht [...]. Sie kennt vom Unendlichen zum Endlichen keinen Uebergang [...]."[508] In religion, by contrast, there is "Reflexion und ein Heraustreten aus der Identität."[509] Hence, while philosophy entirely and absolutely remains in the Absolute, religion presupposes reflection and rupture, which can be understood as a procession out of the absolute identity. Nevertheless, this difference between philosophy and religion is qualitatively inessential for both encounter God or the Absolute.

On that note, Schelling's conception of philosophy always is religious. He emphasizes this point in the second part of his *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie*. After discussing "den Eleusinischen Geheimnissen" and "die Geschichte der Demeter und des Raubs der Persephone" therein,[510] he elucidates that

> Nur ein gänzliches Mißkennen der Richtung unserer Philosophie kann daraus, daß wir die religiöse und sittliche Beziehung, welche der Philosophie in den bisherigen Systemen gegeben wird, absolut verwerfen müssen, den Schluß ziehen, weil wir eine Philosophie, die nicht in ihrem Princip schon Religion ist, auch nicht für Philosophie anerkennen.[511]

Schelling here reveals that he faced the charge that his philosophy is non-religious and even despises religion. Philosophy, however, that is not *ab initio* religion is not philosophy for Schelling. Tilliette grasps that "la philosophie ne revendique pas la place de la religion […]."[512] This understanding of philosophy makes sense mainly in the context of Greek Mystery religions received in the context of *Griechentum*.

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[508] Schelling, *AA* I/14.111; *SW* 1/V.278. That philosophy according to its essence is entirely in absoluteness and in no way proceeds out of it […]. It is familiar with no passage from the infinite to the finite […].
[509] Schelling, *AA* I/14.111; *SW* 1/V.278. Religion . . . a reflection and a procession out of the identity.
[510] Schelling, *AA* I/14.297; *SW* 1/VI.39. the Eleusinian Mysteries . . . the account of Demeter and the rape of Persephone.
[511] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.467-8; *SW* 1/V.116. It can only be an entire misunderstanding of the direction of our philosophy to draw the conclusion that we must absolutely reject the religious and moral relationship, which is given to philosophy in previous systems, because we do not even recognize a philosophy for philosophy that is not already religion in its principle.
[512] Tilliette (1970), 388. Philosophy does not claim the place of religion.

This section has sought to elaborate on the context of Greek Mystery religions familiarity with which speaks to Schelling's Hellenism. This context undergirds his conception of philosophical productivity and specifically intellectual intuition. In returning to these matters, it is fitting to conclude with Schelling's following observation of the Greek Mysteries. "[D]ie ganze Hellas zu den Mysterien gelangen konnte [...]."[513] Anselmo recounts that all Greeks were allowed to attain the Mysteries. This did not translate, however, into most Greeks participating in them, which hearkens to the distinction between the initiated and the profane. After quoting a fragment from Sophocles and a portion from Aristophanes' *Frogs*, Anselmo confirms further this distinction.

> […] sie [hörten] doch nicht auf Geheimnisse zu seyn und als solche geehrt und streng beobachtet zu werden, woraus wir schließen müssen, daß in ihrer Natur etwas gewesen, welches, obgleich einer großen Menge mitgetheilt, doch nicht entweiht werden konnte.[514]

It is not that the vulgar remained uninitiated because they had no access to the Mysteries. Instead, these were resilient against their profanation by and in large crowds. The Mysteries in permeating crowds and attempting to find initiates displayed an anthropological exclusivity in that only a few were initiated.

Productive Platonic Precedent: Neither Taught nor Learned

Intellectual intuition only proves itself and hence points to the anthropological distinction between the initiated and vulgar; again, both the productivity of intellectual intuition and this distinction find themselves in the context of a Plato who traffics in Greek Mysteries. Intellectual intuition, and hence philosophy, only demonstrates itself, and Schelling seems to indicate a circle of intellectual intuition, production, and the Absolute into which one must enter by leaving the circle of reflection and concepts. In the *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling declares that "Die Philosophie führt eben . . . zugleich ihren Selbstbeweis (*sie kann nur sich selbst beweisen* [...])."[515] Since one must have intellectual intuition to grasp intellectual intuition, and since philosophy is a matter

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[513] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.355; *SW* 1/IV.232. [T]he entirety of Hellas could attain to the Mysteries […].
[514] Schelling, *AA* I/11,1.356; *SW* 1/IV.232. [T]hey cease not being Mysteries and honored and observed strictly as such from which we must conclude that in their nature something occurs, which, although communicated to a great multitude, yet could not be profaned.
[515] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.111; *SW* 1/IV.371. *emphasis added*. Philosophy in this way conducts even . . . its self-evidence simultaneously (it can only prove itself […]).

of producing intellectual intuitions, philosophy as such can prove only itself being its own self-evidence. Schelling declares in the 1797 *Ideen* that "die Idee von Philosophie nur das Resultat der Philosophie selbst[…]."[516] He also echoes this thought earlier in the *Abhandlung* when discussing intellectual intuition, "Freiheit aber wird nur von Freiheit erkannt […],"[517] which Jaspers affirms verbatim: "Freiheit ist nur für Freiheit verständlich."[518] It also emerges in *Philosophie und Religion* where he mentions how one ought to grasp the Absolute: "Das Wahre kann nur an der Wahrheit, das Evidente an der Evidenz erkannt werden; die Wahrheit und Evidenz selbst aber sind von sich selbst klar, und müssen daher absolut und das Wesen Gottes selbst seyn."[519] Freedom, truth, and evidence for Schelling are only self-grasping and self-comprehending, which applies to intellectual intuition. Producing intellectual intuitions is in one sense entering the Absolute's self-grasping and self-knowing. In short, intellectual intuition can be recognized only by intellectual intuition. This means that no amount of analysis through hermeneutic causality or otherwise allows one to arrive at it.

Parallel with intellectual intuition's paradoxical quality of being its own evidence is that it cannot be taught or learned, a point sprinkled throughout a good number of Schelling's early works. In the *Methodologie*'s fourth lecture, Schelling elaborates that "Wer sie [intellektuelle Anschauung] nicht hat, versteht auch nicht, was von ihr gesagt wird; sie kann also überhaupt nicht gegeben werden."[520] That it "cannot be given" implies that intellectual intuition cannot be acquired or learned. From this it can be inferred that the very questioning after its proof indicates not possessing intellectual intuition. Jaspers accurately notes that "Die Philosophie kann dem Menschen nicht etwas geben, das er nicht schon hatte."[521] Similarly, in the *Fernere Darstellungen*,

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[516] Schelling, *AA* I/5.69; *SW* 1/II.11. the idea of philosophy is only the result of philosophy itself.
[517] Schelling, *AA* I/4.128; *SW* 1/I.401. Freedom . . . is recognized only by freedom […].
[518] Jaspers (1955), 81. Freedom is understandable only for freedom.
[519] Schelling, *AA* I/14.287; *SW* 1/VI.27. The true can only be recognized by the truth, the evident by evidence; the truth and evidence themselves are clear by themselves and must therefore be absolutely and the essence of God Himself.
[520] Schelling, *AA* I/14.92; *SW* 1/V.256 Whoever does not have it [intellectual intuition], also does not understand what is said of it; it therefore mainly cannot be given.
[521] Jaspers (1955), 72. Philosophy cannot give something to a man that he did not already have.

Schelling indicates that "worüber [die intellektuelle Anschauung] kein Zweifel statuirt oder Erklärung nöthig gefunden wird."[522] He suggests that intellectual intuition is absolutely certain and self-evident; no explanation is necessary. "Daß sie nichts sey, das gelehrt werden könne, ist klar; alle Versuche sie zu lehren sind also in der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie völlig unnütz," Schelling emphasizes on the same page.[523] Knittermeyer agrees that "dies Vermögen kann zwar nicht im gemeinen Sinn erlernt […]."[524] For a *wissenschaftliche* philosophy or one that traffics in the notion of whole and part—this becomes clear in the last chapter—intellectual intuition is necessary. In such a philosophy, however, all attempts to learn intellectual intuition are completely useless implying that one must already possess it. One, therefore, can neither acquire nor transmit it.

This notion finds itself in the *System*. In the first main part Schelling asserts that, "[…] dieses intellektuelle Anschauen selbst [ist] ein absolut freies Handeln, diese Anschauung kann also nicht demonstrirt, sie kann nur gefordert werden," and a few pages later, "Die intellektuelle Anschauung ist etwas, das man fordern und anmuthen kann."[525] He seems to suggest that the indemonstrability of intellectual intuition is because it is a free action. Therefore, one must directly experience or produce intellectual intuition. In attempting to unfold his understanding of transcendental idealism for his reader, Schelling requires and expects that she have intellectual intuition; again, it is not optional because it is the *sine qua non* for philosophizing. This point also appears in *Philosophie und Religion* and naturally so given its context of the Greek Mysteries. "Das einzige einem solchen Gegenstand, als das Absolute, angemessene Organ ist eine ebenso absolute Erkenntnißart, die nicht erst zu der Seele hinzukommt durch Anleitung, Unterricht."[526] Intellectual intuition, in other words, is the only organ, as we saw in the previous chapter, equivalent to the

[522] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.102; *SW* 1/IV.361. concerning . . . [intellectual intuition] no doubt is laid down or explanation found necessary.
[523] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.103; *SW* 1/IV.361. That it [intellectual intuition] is nothing that can be learned is clear; all attempts to learn it are therefore completely useless in *wissenschaftlichen* philosophy [...].
[524] Knittermeyer (1929), 326. This ability indeed cannot be learned in the vulgar sense.
[525] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.61; *SW*1/III.370. [...] intellectual intuiting itself is an absolutely free action, this intuition therefore cannot be demonstrated, it can only be demanded; *AA* I/9,1.66; 1/III.376. Intellectual intuition is something that one can require and expect.
[526] Schelling, *AA* I/14.286; *SW* 1/VI.26. The only organ commensurate with such an object as the Absolute is thus an even absolute manner of knowledge, which does not accrue to the soul through guidance, instruction.

Absolute; the soul does not acquire this organ "through guidance" or "instruction." Tilliette correctly interprets that "l'intuition intellectuelle . . . ne peut être ni prescrite, ni enseignée, ni intentionnée. Elle est un droit et un présupposé absolu […]."[527]

Assuming that his reader does not have intellectual intuition yet may have it potentially, Schelling furnishes some clues. In the *Methodologie*, he hints that "Eine negative Bedingung ihres Besitzes ist die klare und innige Einsicht der Nichtigkeit aller bloß endlichen Erkenntniß."[528] One who possesses intellectual intuition, in other words, is privy to the "nothingness" of finite knowledge. This implies both cognizance of the distinction between finite and infinite knowledge, and possession of the latter. With this, Schelling can assert in *Philosophie und Religion* that "alle Anweisung zur Philosophie, die jener Erkenntniß vorhergeht, nur negativ seyn kann, indem sie nämlich die Nichtigkeit aller endlichen Gegensätze zeigt und die Seele indirekt zur Anschauung des Unendlichen führt."[529] "Finite knowledge" and "oppositions" are "negative" and do not furnish directly intellectual intuition, but have the potential to hint at it. Schelling elucidates in the *Fernere Darstellungen* that "Anleitungen zu ihr . . . können in der strengen Wissenschaft nicht gesucht werden."[530] Therefore, he acknowledges the existence of such hints, but does not specify them nor where one can find them. Either this is to Schelling's discredit or the virtue of his pedagogical intention.

Next, even from an early age Schelling was not unaware of the denial of both the existence and possibility of intellectual intuition. He displays this awareness in the *Abhandlung*, specifically the context of elaborating on Beck's *Standpunktslehre* which focuses on an original representation

[527] Tilliette (1970), 409. Intellectual intuition . . . cannot be prescribed, taught, or intended. It is a right and absolute presupposition […].
[528] Schelling, *AA* I/14.92; *SW* 1/V.256. A negative condition of its possession is the clear and inner insight of the nothingness of all merely finite knowledge.
[529] Schelling, *AA* I/14.286-7; *SW* 1/VI.26-7. all instruction for philosophy, which precedes that knowledge [of the Absolute], can be only negative, as it namely shows the nothingness of all finite oppositions and leads the soul indirectly to the intuition of the infinite.
[530] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.103; *SW* 1/IV.361. hints to it [intellectual intuition] . . . are unable to be sought in a rigorous *Wissenschaft*.

to explain idealism. Jacob Beck, a proponent of Kant, was professor of philosophy at Rostock. Schelling entertains the following hypothetical:

> Vielleicht fragt man: wie kommt es aber, daß so viele versichern, ihnen sey jene Anschauung etwas völlig Unbekanntes, ja Unbegreifliches? – Darauf haben wir nicht zu antworten, sondern diejenigen, die fragen, damit sie nicht gefragt werden. Uns, denen jene Anschauung ganz klar ist, und die sich keiner Schwärmerei bewußt sind, uns kommt es zu, euch zu fragen: warum ihr jene Anschauung (ohne welche ihr eurer selbst, als moralischer und intelligenter Wesen, gar nicht bewußt seyd) noch nicht zum klaren, hellen Bewußtseyn erhoben habt.[531]

It is important to distinguish anthropologically between the many who do not possess intellectual intuition and those who wonder why intellectual intuition "is something fully unknown, indeed incomprehensible" to the many. Stefansky recognizes that Schelling "zu sagen gewagt hatte, die intellektuelle Anschauung sein ein Vermögen, das nicht jeder Mensch besitze."[532] Schelling confirms this view of *the many*—another term for the vulgar and profane crowd—around five years later in the *Fernere Darstellungen*. "Die meisten verstehen unter intellektueller Anschauung etwas Unbegreifliches, Geheimnißvolles […]."[533] In contrast, the latter of group of people, to whom Schelling speaks directly in this passage, seem to possess intellectual intuition by virtue of their question regarding the inability of *the many*. Put simply, the ones who are curious about the fact that *the many* cannot grasp intuition actually themselves possess intuition by virtue of asking such a question. They, however, have not yet raised this intuition into a clear, bright consciousness despite unwittingly possessing it.

Moreover, Schelling indicates that by virtue of intellectual intuition one is a moral and intelligent being, thus hinting to the latter group of individuals that if they consider themselves moral and intelligent beings, such an awareness is contingent on possessing intellectual intuition

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[531] Schelling, *AA* I/4.147-8; *SW* 1/I.420-1. "Perhaps one asks: how come so many assert that for them intuition is something fully unknown, indeed incomprehensible? We do not have to answer this, but [to] such ones, who ask, so that they are not asked. Rather, to us, for whom intuition is entirely clear, and who are aware of no enthusiasm, we are obliged to ask you: why have you not raised that intuition (without which you all would indeed not be aware of yourselves as moral and intelligent beings) into a clear, bright consciousness." See Jacob Sigismund Beck, *Erläuternder Auszug aus den kritischen Schriften des Prof. I. Kant, auf Anrathen desselben* (zwei Bände, Riga 1793/1794). Also see George Di Giovanni, *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, (SUNY Press, 1985). 36-8.

[532] Stefanksy (1925), 138. had dared to say that intellecution is an ability that not every person possess.

[533] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.109; *SW* 1/IV.369. "The many understand under intellectual intuition as something incomprehensible, full of mystery […]." In translating "Die meisten" into "the many" I remain true to the Ancient Greek social and anthropological category, οἱ πολλοί. "Majority," a less fitting translation, bears political and not anthropological connotations.

to a certain degree. Schelling attempts to clarify in the *Fernere Darstellungen* that the consideration of intellectual intuition as something mysterious and ungraspable is "mit nicht mehr Grund, als jemand die Anschauung des reinen Raums als etwas Geheimnißvolles dächte, unerachtet alle äußere Anschauung nur in jener Anschauung und durch sie möglich ist."[534] Intellectual intuition, in other words, makes possible other intuitions, which mix with sense-perceptible phenomena, like those of the intuitions of space and time. Schelling seems to touch on these with the hope that those readers familiar with these lower-level intuitions may then raise themselves to intellectual intuition.

At this point, it is apparent that intellectual intuition concerns an anthropological distinction between those who can and those who cannot understand and/or produce intellectual intuition. For if the possession of intellectual intuition is unique, then it points to an anthropological distinction between those who have it and those who do not. Schelling illuminates this distinction in *Philosophie und Religion* with a helpful metaphor

> Wie auch das Licht, in Bezug auf die Natur, einzig richtig als ein Ideales beschrieben werden könnte, das als solches real ist, ohne daß der Blindgeborene dadurch eine Erkenntniß desselben erlangte, so kann die Absolutheit im Gegensatz gegen die Endlichkeit nur auf ähnliche und keine andere Weise beschrieben werden, ohne daß damit gesetzt wäre, daß der geistig Blinde dadurch eine Anschauung des wahren Wesens der Absolutheit habe.[535]

Just as a person born blind will never know what light is through the immediacy of sight, despite hearing a description of it and forming an understanding through the words and sounds conveyed, so also only intellectual intuition is able to grasp "absoluteness" and "the true essence of the Absolute." A few years earlier, in the first main part of the *System*, Schelling also emphasizes that "wer das Vermögen einer solchen nicht hat, sollte es wenigstens haben."[536] He here not only broaches the anthropological distinction between those who possess and those who do not possess

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[534] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.109; *SW* 1/IV.369. not with more reason than anyone would consider the intuition of pure space as something full of mystery, not considering that all outward intuition [is] only in that intuition [intellectual] and possible through it.

[535] Schelling, *AA* I/14.286; *SW* 1/VI.25-6. As even also light, in regard to nature, solely can be described correctly as an ideal, which as such is real, without the one having been born blind thereby attaining knowledge of it, in this way absoluteness in contrast to finitude can be described only in a similar way and no other, without hence being set that the spiritually blind person thereby has an intuition of the true essence of the Absolute.

[536] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.66; *SW* 1/III.376. who does not have the ability of such [an intellectual intuition], should at the very least have it.

the "ability" of intellectual intuition, but seems to be prescribing normatively that those who do not possess such an ability "should at the very least have it" because it is the minimum requirement to philosophize. Tilliette goes a step further and deems those who lack this ability as possessing "infirmité mentale irremédiable."[537] This anthropological distinction perhaps explains why Stefansky states that "Kein Begriff ist vielleicht soviel mißdeutet und so sehr mißverstanden worden wie Schellings intellectuelle Anschauung."[538]

Intellectual intuition, as productive and anthropologically exclusive, is a modern iteration of Platonic philosophy. This Platonic and, hence, Ancient Greek philosophical perspective informs Schelling's own understanding of intellectual intuition, thus highlighting that *Griechentum* fundamentally constitutes his thought.[539] Undoubtedly, intellectual intuition and its exclusivity is a point of contention in *Deutscher Idealismus* and has largely been shaped by Hegel's reception of the idea from Schelling. In his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Hegel denies its possibility and mocks "die wie aus der Pistole aus ihrer . . . intellektueller Anschauung usw. anfangen [...]."[540] By situating this critique in the context of *Griechentum* in which both Schelling and Hegel were raised, we find that Hegel is not the first to express frustration at a conception of philosophizing that entails something similar to intellectual intuition—more on Hegel in the telos. Such frustration Kleitophon expresses to Plato's Socrates. In the eponymous fragment of a dialogue, considered a protreptic to the *Republic*, after summarizing Socrates' own arguments *apropos* of the virtue of justice and the general aspiration for virtue, Kleitophon concludes frustratedly, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι σε ἢ οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν.[541] Kleitophon draws the inference that either Socrates does

[537] Tilliette (1995), 187. […] irremediable mental disability […].
[538] Stefanksy (1925), 138. Perhaps no concept has been so much misinterpreted and very misunderstood as Schelling's intellectual intuition.
[539] For the manner in which intellectual intuition as non-discursive thinking deviates from the Platonic tradition see Gersh, Stephen, "Plato and Platonism," in *The Classical Tradition*, ed. Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, and Salvatore Settis, Harvard University Press Reference Library (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap, 2010). 734-40.
[540] Hegel, *WIZ* V,65-6. who as from the pistol begin from their . . . intellectual intuition […].
[541] Plato, *Platonis Opera*, vol. 4, 5 vols., Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909). *Clitopho* 410c. "One of two things: either you do not know, or you do not wish to share it with me." For the modern text-critical reception of the dialogue please see Geffcken, Johannes. "Das Rätsel Des 'Kleitophon.'" *Hermes* 68, no. 4 (1933): 429-39

not know how virtue arises or that he does not wish to share it. This finds explicit parallel with Hegel's frustration with intellectual intuition and substantiates Stefansky's claim that "Nicht allen war es möglich, ihm [Schelling] durch die Mysterien, die er aufschloss, zu folgen."[542]

In the second main section of *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling furnishes a clear parallel between Platonic virtue and his own intellectual intuition to demonstrate how he conceives of the latter as anthropologically exclusive.

> Beinahe möchte man von ihr fragen, was bei Platon von der Tugend gefragt wird: kann sie gelehrt werden oder nicht, wird sie durch Uebung erlangt, oder ist sie vielleicht weder durch Unterricht noch durch Fleiß zu erwerben, sondern von Natur angeboren, oder dem Menschen durch ein göttliches Geschick verliehen?[543]

This demonstrates clearly that Plato's understanding of how virtue arises is the precedent for Schelling's understanding of intellectual intuition. Noting the parallel with Plato, Fisher deftly observes that Schelling "compares intellectual intuition to virtue in its teachability," and confirms that "intellectual intuition . . . refer[s] to something that irrevocably is inaccessible to the one who does not already possess it."[544] Virtue and intellectual intuition are not entirely different insofar as both are a kind of knowledge. Plato makes this clear in the *Protagoras*, where towards the end of the dialogue the eponymous interlocutor indicates that νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν.[545] This shows that more than thinking through intellectual intuition primarily from an Ancient Greek philosophical standpoint, Schelling self-consciously draws constructively upon this Platonic conception in a new philosophical context. Schelling's understanding of intellectual intuition as anthropologically exclusive maps on to a similar exclusivity in Ancient Greek philosophy. The line of questioning

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[542] Stefansky (1925), 127. It was not possible for everyone to follow him through the Mysteries which he unlocked.
[543] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.102-3; *SW* 1/IV.361. One may almost ask of it [intellectual intuition] what is asked of virtue with Plato: can it [intellectual intuition] be learned or not, is it obtained through exercise, or is it perhaps neither acquired through instruction nor through studiousness, but is inborn by nature, or bestowed on man through a divine fortune?
[544] Fisher (2022), 53.
[545] Plato, *Protagoras* 361b. "if now virtue entirely is knowledge, as you promote zealously, Socrates, it will be wondrous if this whole is not teachable." For more on the unity of virtue and its relationship to knowledge see Vlastos, Gregory, "The Unity of the Virtues in the 'Protagoras," *The Review of Metaphysics* 25, no. 3 (1972): 415–58; Penner, Terry, "The Unity of Virtue," *The Philosophical Review* 82, no. 1 (1973): 35–68; Devereux, Daniel T., "The Unity of the Virtues in Plato's Protagoras and Laches," *The Philosophical Review* 101, no. 4 (1992): 765–89.

recalls that of philosophy and the productive ability at the beginning of the *Methodologie*'s sixth lecture, where he asks, "Kann Philosophie erlernt, kann sie überhaupt durch Uebung, durch Fleiß erworben werden; oder ist sie ein angeborenes Vermögen, ein freies Geschenk und durch Schickung verliehen?"[546] Synthesizing these rhetorical questions with the above passage, Schelling clearly indicates that philosophy to a great extent is "an innate ability" "conferred by an act of God." Hence, producing intellectual intuitions is a religious phenomenon that cannot be taught.

Early-Tübingen Platonic Productivity

At the beginning of this chapter was the historical context of Plato's reception during Schelling's early period. Here unfolds the context and substance of Schelling's personal engagement with Plato. This engagement reveals the early precedent of philosophical productivity as intellectual intuition and its anthropological exclusivity. The investigation into the influence of Plato on Schelling began in the 1970s. In his book *Platonismus und Idealismus*, Werner Beierwaltes is perhaps the first to explore this influence more recently noting that "[…] sie [die realen Implikate des ‚Platonismus'] einen für die Konstitution und Explikation idealistischen Denkens wesentlichen Aspekt [zeigt]."[547] He is right to the extent that looking to Platonism "der Goethe . . . mitumfaßt, erscheint mir sinnvoller als ein bei Fichte ansetzender."[548] For as we have seen in the first chapter and as we will in the telos, compared to thinkers like Fichte, who are outside the ambit of *Griehcentum*, Goethe—arguably the second face of *Griechentum* after Winckelmann—specifically his Hellenism, and hence his reading of Plato, has a far more decisive influence on Schelling. Beierwaltes conceives of Platonism, however, as "originär neu-platonisches Denken oder dessen Umformung in christliche Theologumena der Patristik und des Mittelalters reprasentiert."[549] Hence, he does not draw on the notes on Plato to analyze how Schelling understands Plato.

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[546] Schelling, *AA* I/14.101; *SW* 1/V.266. Can philosophy be learned; can it be attained mainly through exercise, through diligence? Or is it an innate ability, a free gift and conferred by an act of God?

[547] Werner Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus*. Bd. 40. Philosophische Abhandlungen. (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1972). 2. […] they [the real implications of Platonism] reveal an essential aspect for the constitution and explication of idealistic thought.

[548] Beierwaltes (1972), 3. [...] that wrestles with Goethe appears more meaningful than one beginning with Fichte.

[549] Beierwaltes (1972), 2. original Neo-Platonic thinking or whose recasting in Christian theologumena of the Patristics and Middle-Ages.

In contrast, Dieter Heinrich was the first to observe the potential of these notes in transforming the reception of Schelling writing that "Die Kenntnis von Schellings Platonauslegung laßt die Rolle des Platonischen Denkens bei der Ausbildung der spekulativ-idealistischen Philosophie im Allgemeinen auf neue Weise auffällig und verständlich werden."[550] Heinrich illuminatingly observes that "Schellings früher Platonauslegung voraus liegt eine ausgedehnte Platonliteratur," and that this extensive literature

> […] die für Kant selbst wesentliche Berufung auf Platon in der Ideenlehre in eine Platonexegese [hatte] umzusetzen [versucht], die Platon als Zeugen für die Wahrheit der Kantischen Philosophie im Einzelnen aufzurufen erlauben würde.[551]

Nevertheless, to place Schelling within the ambit of such literature would be to overlook Ehrhardt's correct historical evaluation, substantiated further by the context of *Griechentum*, that "Die bereits gewonnenen Einblicke in die frühen Entwürfe Schellings Stuidenzeit zeigen deutlich genug, wie entschieden von eigenem Wollen geleitet, Schelling von Anfang an seine Wurzeln in die Literature treibt," that is, into Ancient Greek texts, as we saw in the epagoge.[552] Put simply, Schelling's Hellenism prompted a direct engagement with Plato and other Ancient Greek texts for their own sake. To read Schelling's engagement with Plato as merely instrumental for his engagement with Kant is to overlook his Hellenism. Plato, not Kant, is Schelling's philosophical reference point. Adding to this, Baum observes that in view of the *Timaios-Kommentar* "Schelling's later reputation as the Plato of his time . . . now gains at least some plausibility" by accounting for "his youthful attempts to interpret and transform Plato's thought."[553]

Schelling began with Plato's Greek while in Bebenhausen. These studies intensified in Tübingen where, according to Franz, "Schelling die Platonischen Schriften . . . kommentiert und

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[550] Heinrich, Dieter, "Der Weg des spekulativen Idealismus," in Jakob Zwilling, *Jakob Zwillings Nachlass, eine Rekonstruktion: mit Beiträgen zur Geschichte des spekulativen Denkens*, ed. Dieter Henrich and Christoph Jamme, Hegel-Studien. Beiheft. 28 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1986). 88. "Knowledge of Schelling's interpretation of Plato allows the role of Platonic thought to be striking and understandable in a new way for the development of speculative-idealistic philosophy in general." Heinrich expands this article into the two-volume work Henrich (2004).

[551] Heinrich (1986), 88. an extensive literature on Plato precedes Schelling's early interpretation of Plato . . . had already sought to transform the connection, essential for Kant himself, to Plato in the teaching of the ideas into an exegesis of Plato, which would allow to deem Plato as a witness of the truth of Kantian philosophy in particular.

[552] Schelling (2000), XLVI. The insights already gained into the early outlines from Schelling's student days show clearly enough, how decisively led by his own will, Schelling from the very beginning drove his roots into literature.

[553] Baum (2000), 199.

auslegt."[554] Here, the perspective of philosophical productivity and its anthropological exclusivity comes forth. "[E]st première et indubitable," Tilliette confirms "[que] Schelling se pose en interprète authentique de Platon."[555] Bubner establishes further that "[…] man [kann] festhalten daß Schellings Denken von früh an im Zeichen Platons stand. Der schwäbische Pfarrerssohn liest im blutjungen Alter bereits Platon im Original [...]."[556] More than reading Plato in the original Greek at a very young age, Schelling interpreted the Platonic corpus, according to Fisher, "including what we now consider (possibly) apocryphal dialogues, as a unity."[557] She explains that "This entire corpus is rendered intelligible and cohesive by a framework of interpretation developed throughout the classical tradition, especially in Neoplatonism."[558] Certainly, reading the Platonic corpus as a whole dovetails with the wider intention of *Griechentum* to read all of Ancient Greek art as a whole. While Fisher is correct to attribute this to the "classical tradition," she categorically errs in slotting under it "Neoplatonism," which falls outside the purview of Classical Greece. As pointed out above *apropos* of Fisher, it is one thing to read Plato directly in Ancient Greek and produce a unity thereby; another to read this unity through Plotinus.

There are three specific sites of Schelling's intense engagement with Plato: (1) the 1792 "Vorstellungen der alten Welt über Verschiedne Gegenstände, gesammelt aus Homer, Plato u.a.," subtitled, "Über Dichter, Propheten, Dichterbegeisterung, Enthusiasmus, Theospneustie, und göttliche Einwirkung auf Menschen überhaupt"—*Vorstellungen-Notizen*, henceforth; (2) the 1792 "Über den Geist der Platonischen Philosophie"— *Geist-Notizen*; and (3) the 1794 commentary on the *Timaeus*—*Timaios-Kommentar*. They speak to the close connection of Hellenism and productivity, namely, Schelling's idea of philosophical productivity as grounded in Classical Greek antiquity, specifically Plato. Franz prefaces his book on these notes that "Die Wahrheiten, die

[554] Franz (1996), 5-6. [...] Schelling commented on and translated the Platonic texts [...].
[555] Tilliette (1970), 397. Is primary and indubitable [that] Schelling set himself as an authentic interpreter of Plato.
[556] Bubner (2004), 31. [O]ne can hold firm that Schelling's thought from an early age was characterized by Plato. The son of the Swabian pastor reads Plato in the original already at a very young age [...].
[557] Fisher (2022), 56.
[558] Fisher (2022), 56.

Schelling sucht haben mit jenem Teil der menschlichen Fähigkeiten zu tun, der über das Reproduzieren hinausgeht."[559] "His notes and texts on Plato resonate," according to Fisher, "in . . . his commitment to a higher capacity in the human being which enables access to something which cannot be rendered in conceptual or discursive form."[560] These notes, she illuminatingly adds, "inform . . . [his] distinction between intellectual intuition and theoretical philosophy in his early essays and the corresponding distinction between reason and reflection in the early 1800s […]."[561] Schelling's interest in human abilities points to his early interest in productivity, especially philosophical. In other words, the concern with "human abilities" behind the production of, for instance, ancient poetry and philosophy, drove him to investigate production beyond just mere "reproduction." Schelling's engagement with Plato's Greek certainly was not merely just to reproduce a translation. His curiosity about the productive ability directed him. "Die schöpferische Intelligenz (vom „Enthusiasmus" des Dichters bis zum „sokratischen Dämonion" des Philosophen) als Phänomen," Franz confirms, "scheint das Thema gewesen zu sein, an dem schon der ‚kleine' Schelling leidenschaftlich interessiert war."[562] Simply put, the interest in "the productive intelligence" drove Schelling's engagement with Plato's Ancient Greek; this was Schelling's interest during his teenage years. Although limited to an overly Kantian reading, Oštarić concludes from these notes that Schelling's unique philosophical solution is his "conception of creative reason."[563]

In the *Vorstellungen-Notizen*, Schelling takes up the question of how virtue arises in a few of Plato's dialogues besides the *Clitopho*. As Fisher confirms, Schelling juxtaposes the above passage in the *Fernere Darstellungen*, that intellectual intuition arises similar to Platonic virtue, with passages from Plato's *Meno*.[564] Towards the end of this dialogue, after discussing the difference between

[559] Franz (1996), 5-6. The truths, which Schelling sought have to do with that part of human abilities that goes beyond reproduction.
[560] Fisher (2022), 47.
[561] Fisher (2022), 49.
[562] Franz (1996), 5-6. The productive intelligence (from 'the Enthusiasm' of the poet to 'the Socratic Daemon' of the philosopher) as a phenomenon . . . appears to have become the subject in which the 'small' Schelling was passionately interested.
[563] Lara (2012), 71.
[564] Fisher (2022), 53.

δόξα ἀληθὴς and ἐπιστήμη, Socrates summarizes for Meno that ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε **φύσει** οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ **θείᾳ μοίρᾳ** παραγιγνομένη […].[565] Schelling repeats and comments: "So sagt er [Plato] in Menon: Tugend kann nicht gelehrt (also durch empirische Mittel bewirkt, und in ihrem Fortschritte empirsch bemerkt) werden, mithin ist sie göttliches Geschenk."[566] Teachability, Schelling reads, is an empirical matter and perceived empirically in its progress. Most striking about these passages is "divine lot" or "divine gift." Fisher explains that "Schelling separates out various activities—poetry, divination, prophecy, rhapsody, the development of virtue, and genius more generally—as . . . divine dispensation (θεία μοῖρα [theia moira]) […]"[567] "[I]t is a human capacity [that] lacks a natural explanation" and "names something that cannot be effected in an empirical way . . . thus requir[ing] something beyond nature or ordinary empirical means to bring it about," she further analyzes.[568] As it is becoming apparent, divine lot belongs not only to the poet, but also the philosopher. Simply, virtue as untaught arises in the philosopher from a divine lot, which transcends empirical means.[569] If "divine lot" and the productive ability are the same, then the productive ability itself bears a religious connotation as something divine, as already indicated in the previous chapter.

A few passages later in the *Vorstellungen-Notizen*, Schelling comments on the same matter in Plato's *Apologia*. In this dialogue, Socrates recounts that ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ **ποιοῖεν** ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ **φύσει τινὶ** [...].[570] Schelling remarks that

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[565] Plato, *Meno* 99e-100a. **Emphasis added**. "virtue would be neither by nature nor teachable but is gained by a divine lot [...]." I refrain from translating ἐπιστήμη into 'knowledge' because in German it can be taken as *Wissenschaft* in addition to *Erkenntniß*.

[566] Schelling, *AA* II/4.21; Franz (1996), 290. Thus says Plato in the *Meno*: Virtue cannot be taught (therefore effected through an empirical means, and perceived empirically in its progress), thus it is a divine gift.

[567] Fisher (2022), 49.

[568] Fisher (2022), 49, 51.

[569] For a clearer declaration of this, see Diotima's speech in Plato, *Platonis Opera*, vol. 2, 5 vols., Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909). *Symposium* 208e-9e.

[570] Plato, *Apologia* 22bc. **Emphasis added**. I knew this therefore even suddenly concerning poets that not by wisdom do they produce what they produce, but by some nature […].

> Merkwürdig ist es in dieser Stelle, daß Platon den Ausdruck φύσει τινὶ gebraucht, wo er sonst gewöhnlich θεία μοίρα gebraucht, zum deutlichen Beweiß, daß er durch das lezte bloß überhaupt eine Kraft bezeichnen will, die man weiter zurük in keinen empirischen Zusammenhang mehr bringen kann, so wie man sagt.[571]

From reading through the Platonic corpus, Schelling noticed in many other passages that Plato employs the term "divine lot" to explain that which enables the production of both artistic and philosophical insights. "Produce" here is more accurately "poetically create" with more emphasis on the neutral act of producing *sans* literary connotations. The Ancient Greek ποιέω confirms this etymologically.[572] Schelling finds strange this passage because instead of indicating "divine lot" as the source of production, Plato employs "nature" whose etymology touches on "production."[573] Therefore, Schelling infers that "divine lot" refers to production, which he deems "power" or "ability" [*Kraft*]. The divine lot is the productive ability or intellectual intuition.

Moreover, a contradiction emerges from comparing these two passages of the *Meno* and the *Apologia*. Virtue does not come about through "nature," yet poets who produce do so by "some nature." One difference *prima facie* is that the former is definite and the latter indefinite, which renders it something analogous to nature and broadens its meaning to something other than nature. Second, the former must mean empirical nature. By confirming that "virtue cannot . . . be effected through empirical means," Schelling seems to equate "empirical means" with the former use of "nature." The latter use of "nature," then, is equivalent to "divine lot" allowing its religious and perhaps transcendental significance to emerge. Thinking with Kant, Oštarić analyses accurately that

> If, for Plato, a genius's "natural talent" is theia moira, then the source of a genius' talent transcends her own subjectivity. […] [T]he definition of poetic production as a talent that is "natural" suggests that the meaning

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[571] Schelling, *AA* II/4.22; Franz (1996), 291. It is noteworthy in this passage that Plato uses the expression φύσει τινὶ, where he otherwise usually uses θεία μοίρα, for the clear proof that he wishes to characterize the latter mainly as an ability [*Kraft*], which one can no more refer back into an empirical context, as one says.

[572] ποιέω, *LSJ*. Schelling confirms this etymological understanding in *AA* II/6,1.322; *SW* 1/V.631-2. Deßwegen hat die Poesie vorzugsweise den Namen der Poesie, d.h. der Erschaffung behalten, weil ihre Werke | nicht als ein Seyn, sondern als Produciren erscheinen. Though he misses its philosophical significance, Charles L. Griswold has the right idea when explaining that "The word 'poetry' in Platonic Greek comes from the word 'to make' (poiein), a fact upon which Socrates remarks in the *Symposium*." (Griswold, Charles L., "Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/plato-rhetoric/>.)

[573] Φύσις and φύω, *LSJ*.

> of "nature" is not nature in its phenomenal sense, i.e., empirical nature, but rather nature in its noumenal sense.[574]

Both "divine lot" and "nature" in this context of Plato and Schelling's reading thereof indicate something transcendental and "noumenal." Schelling explains further that "diß und das ist von Natur so, d.h. es läßt sich weiter kein Grund angeben, daß es da ist, als daß es die Natur so gewollt hat. Genie eines Menschen ist eine Kraft [...]."[575] To say that the productive ability is there by nature points to the limits of causal analysis and the simple recognition that it is present.

Productive ability, more significantly, as "eine Kraft" is genius, which anthropologically is exclusive. "[P]hilosophy . . . admits of genius," which belongs only to "a few extraordinary individuals," says Fisher.[576] Perceiving the anthropological exclusivity of genius, she accentuates it as follows:

> Like genius, the one who does not possess it can never understand it. It is not merely that the insight is one that the non-genius does not yet understand because it is not yet incorporated into a system, but rather is one that they will never understand because they do not possess it.[577]

In other words, there is a strict divide in philosophy between the initiated and profane as it concerns genius. The former are privy to it; the latter are not. Genius' anthropological exclusivity articulated "in these early notebooks," according to Fisher, is "a defining feature of Schelling's philosophical orientation" since it "is a crucial feature of Schelling's philosophical perspective throughout his life […]."[578] Furthermore, the productive philosophical import of the term "genius" lies in its Ancient Greek etymology. While the Latin roots are "GEN, gigno," they refer to the Greek γίγνομαι meaning "to come into being" or "to be produced."[579] According to Franz, "die Begeisterung des "Genies" [ist] verständlich als das *Schöpferische* eines mit der Kraft göttlichen Verstandes gesegneten formative *Einbildungsvergmögens*."[580] One can observe the productivity of

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[574] Oštarić (2012). 73.
[575] Schelling, *AA* II/4.22; Franz (1996), 291. this and that is of nature thus, namely, no further reason can be given that it is there than that nature intended it. Genius of a man is an ability.
[576] Fisher (2022), 51
[577] Fisher (2022), 52.
[578] Fisher (2022), 53
[579] γίγνομαι, *LSJ*
[580] Franz (2012), 7. The enthusiasm of genius [is] understandable as that which is creative of a formative ability to produce that has been blessed with the power of the divine understanding.

genius in the enthusiasm it generates, a product effected through "the power of a divine understanding." Genius, to be clear, as the productive ability and intellectual intuition is higher and differs from the understanding, the realm of reflection, teaching, and learning. In whom genius is present, however, the understanding is uplifted. Briefly Schelling furnishes concrete manifestations of production through the understanding by explaining that "der, der sich einer solchen Kraft in sich selbst bewußt ist, über manches Werk des menschlichen Verstandes, über die unerwartete Verbindungen und Combinationen, die kühne Schlüße und Wendungen deßelben staunt […]."[581] In other words, an understanding uplifted by genius produces unexpected connections and combinations, and bold conclusions—especially hermeneutically. To be sure, the understanding itself is not productive, but only so because philosophical genius is present. Understanding and reflection in relation to genius point to Schelling's notion of speculation, which, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, is beyond the ambit of this thesis.

The *Geist-Notizen* elaborate further on genius in Plato. They disclose that Schelling reads Plato's emphasis on the productivity of philosophy and its accompanying anthropological exclusivity in both the *Theatetus* and *Theages*.[582] The former is a dialogue on the nature of knowledge that Socrates draws out with the help of the young and intellectually promising Theatetus; Schelling interprets it as the hermeneutic key of the whole Platonic corpus. The latter dialogue concerns Theages, a young man who strongly solicits Socrates' help to fulfil his ambition of becoming wise. Franz underscores the importance of the *Theatetus* for understanding Schelling's primary approach to Plato by drawing attention to the second of four sections, whose title is "'λογος μαιευτικος,'" or literally "speech skilled in midwifery."[583] In choosing this title, "[…] Schelling [gibt] den locus classicus für die sokratische Technik der Maieutik an: den langen Exkurs im Theaitetos," Franz

[581] Schelling, *AA* II/4.19; Franz (1996), 288. [H]e who is aware of such a power in himself is amazed at many a work of the human understanding, at the unexpected connections and combinations, the bold conclusions and turns of the same [understanding] […].
[582] For an insightful discussion of Plato's understanding of the philosopher and the importance of the *Theatetus* see Mary Louise Gill, *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue* (Oxford: University Press, 2014). 1. in fact the *Philosopher* is the missing final member of a tetralogy opening with the *Theatetus* […].
[583] Schelling, *AA* II/5.133; Franz (1996), 307. „λογοι μαιευτικος;" Λογος and μαιευτικος, *LSJ*.

explains.[584] The Socratic art of μαίευσις or midwifery emphasizes the productive nature of philosophy where Socrates as a philosophical midwife helps budding philosophers give birth to virtue. Schelling emphasizes that "Er [Platon] führt die Vergleichung seiner Methode mit der EntbindungsKunst ganze durch."[585] Franz, therefore, concludes that "Die ‚mäeutische Rede' hält Schelling offenbar für das Charakteristische der Platonischen Dialoge überhaupt."[586] In this reading Schelling understands all Platonic dialogues as "maieutic" or capable of eliciting the production of virtue in the reader. This hermeneutic key of philosophical productivity forms the heart of Schelling's understanding of the Platonic corpus as a unity.

The anthropological distinction enters in this context because virtue cannot be taught or learned. Before embarking on the investigation of ἐπιστήμη, Socrates offers Theatetus a propaedeutic regarding his midwifery that draws up religious elements.

> οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ **συγγιγνόμενοι** τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον **ἐπιδιδόντες**, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὑτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ **τεκόντες**.[587]

Socrates simply does not teach anything to those who "associate" with him; and to them it is clear that they have never learned anything from him, when it comes to virtue. This point also emerges at the end of the *Theages* where Socrates relates Aristides' first-hand account of his experience of associating with Socrates. At one point, Aristides confesses that Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ . . . ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπιστον μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀληθὲς δέ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον μὲν παρά σου οὐδὲν πώποτε, ὡς αὐτὸς οἶσθα.[588] In divinely sanctioned, prolonged association with Socrates, nevertheless,

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[584] Franz (1996), 223. Schelling cites the *locus classicus* for the Socratic art of μαίευσις: the long excursus in the *Theatetus*.
[585] Schelling, *AA* II/5.133; Franz (1996), 307. He [Plato] entirely effects the comparison of his method with the art of childbirth [*EntbindungsKunst*].
[586] Franz (1996), 224. Schelling mainly considers the maieutic speech evident for the characteristic of the Platonic dialogue.
[587] Plato, *Theatetus* 150de. **Emphasis added.** Those who associate with me, on the one hand, at first some seem ignorant even by all means, but as our association continues, everyone, to whomever the god allows, advances amazingly, as they seem to both themselves and others. And this is clear that they never have learned anything from me but themselves have discovered and birthed many beautiful things from themselves.
[588] Plato, *Theages* 130d. I will tell you . . ., Socrates, by the gods! an unbelievable yet true matter. For I never yet learned anything from you as you yourself know.

associates such as Aristides remarkably "advance" or literally "give besides, bestow."[589] Aristides further confesses: "ἐπεδίδουν δὲ ὁπότε σοι συνείην […]."[590] Socrates, then, elucidates the source of such philosophical progress: ταῦτα δὴ πάντα εἴρηκά σοι, ὅτι **ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου** καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ συνδιατριβόντων τὸ ἄπαν δύναται.[591] Socrates indicates his "genius" in the masculine, singular, genitive form of τό δαιμόνιον.[592] This shows the religious source of production, whose analogue in the *Theatetus* is ὁ θεὸς, who governs Socrates' associations by exercising the power to permit or forbid. Fisher rightly sees that τό δαιμόνιον "cannot be communicated through teaching," and as "'divine power' is only [sic] passed on only to those whom the God favors, i.e., those who also possess this divine power inchoately."[593] In instances where God allows the association, a growth and advance results through the Socratic genius. This growth is manifest not only "to themselves" but also "others." Socrates further analyzes the notion of "advance" into "discovering" and "birthing" "many beautiful things from themselves." To advance philosophically in the Platonic sense [ἐπιδιδόναι], then, is both to give birth to and discover beautiful things within oneself. Franz highlights that in the *Theages*

> […] es [geht] (vorerst) nur um das berühmte ‚Daimonion' des Sokrates, und damit knüpft Schelling erneut an seinen Versuchen an, dem Phänomen der Kreativität gerecht zu werden. Diese Verknüpfung wird daran deutlich, daß Schelling sich den *Theages* als Primärquelle für die Darstellung der Vorstellung vom Sokratischen Daimonion wählt.[594]

Schelling, in other words, reflected on the *Theages* as an opportunity "to do justice to the phenomenon of creativity" or productivity in Plato. The daimonion is the source of philosophical productivity. In Schelling's reading, then, to a large extent τό δαιμόνιον and θεία μοίρα are

[589] ἐπιδίδωμι, *LSJ*.
[590] Plato, *Theages* 130d. I would advance [ἐπεδίδουν] whenever I associated with you [...].
[591] Plato, *Theages* 129e. **Emphasis added**. I have said all these things to you because this power of this genius is completely capable in regard to associations of those who spend time with me.
[592] Δαιμόνιον, *LSJ*; "δαιμόνιον" in: *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*, edited by Franco Montanari.
[593] Fisher (2022), 55.
[594] Franz (1996), 226. [...] a matter of the famous 'daimonion' of Socrates, and hence Schelling attaches anew to his attempts to do justice to the phenomenon of creativity. This attachment becomes clear in that Schelling selects for himself the *Theages* as the primary source for the representation of the image of the Socratic daimonion.

synonymous by virtue of their religious connotation and productivity—this point is important to bear in mind especially when reappraising *Deutscher Idealismus* in the telos.

Socrates brings out some wrong ways to associate with him that would hinder his disciple's philosophical productivity. According to him,

> τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὧδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἤδη τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων πεισθέντες ἀπῆλθον πρῳαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά τε λοιπὰ **ἐξήμβλωσαν** διὰ πονηρὰν συνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ **μαιευθέντα** κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι […].[595]

A premature association with Socrates results in aborting the productive issue therefrom. The religious dimension of philosophical productivity lies in God being the cause of philosophical production. Although he does not specify the adequate duration of association, Socrates certainly indicates that leaving him early and turning to "falsities and phantoms" results in miscarriage and ruin. The productive philosophical import of this passage is evident in its language of "midwifery," "giving birth," and "miscarry." Schelling draws out this understanding in the *Geist-Notizen* that

> Wer nicht seinen Geist auffaßen konnte, der hörte ihn umsonst, wer was auswendig lernen wollte, für den hatte Sokrates nichts. Philosophie konnte bei ihm nicht lernen, aber philosophiren. Dazu gehörte aber mehr als ihm nur zuzuhören. Viele blieben an der Schale der Sokratischen Lehre, so lang sie bei ihm waren, ἐδόξαν τι, weil sie an seinen Weg einmal gewohnt waren. Aber in sie selber gieng sein Geist nicht über.[596]

Schelling observes an anthropological distinction between those whose ability is limited to "learning by rote memorization" or are "unable to grasp Socrates' spirit" and those who are. He repeats the tautology associated with intellectual intuition and philosophy that "philosophy cannot be learned with" Socrates because "philosophy [only] can philosophize," which entails "more than listening to him." Many at one point grasped Socrates' spirit insofar as "at one time they had lived his way." They, nevertheless, failed to grasp Socrates' teaching "remaining on" its "shell" since

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[595] Plato, *Theatetus* 150de. **Emphasis added.** Both the god and I are the cause of this midwifery. And this is clear that many indeed having not been aware of this even blame themselves, and having despised me, they themselves or persuaded by others go away earlier than necessary and having gone they miscarry what remains because of bad company, and they are ruined because of nourishing poorly things brought forth through my midwifery, since they have considered falsities and phantoms greater. […].

[596] Schelling, *AA* II/5.142; Franz (1996), 317. Whoever is unable to grasp his [Socrates'] spirit, he hears him in vain; whoever wanted to learn by rote memorization, for him Socrates had nothing. Philosophy cannot be learned with him, but [philosophy can] philosophize. To this, however, belongs more than listening to him. Many remained on the shell of the Socratic teaching, as long as they were with him, they seemed to be something, because at one time they had lived his way. His spirit, however, did not pass into them.

Socrates' spirit did not enter into them and remain.[597] Fisher grasps the anthropological exclusivity here noting that "Schelling emphasizes, not everyone has the capacity to learn to philosophize, since not everyone has access to the divine power which is essential to that activity."[598] To sum up this section, Schelling's conceiving of intellectual intuition as Platonic virtue is to deem the former as effected neither by nature nor teaching, but through a divine lot or genius, which one can understand as the anthropologically exclusive productive ability; this points to the Classical Greek interlacing of philosophy, art, and religion.

Late-Tübingen Platonic Productivity

The centrality of philosophical production and its anthropological exclusivity also emerges in Schelling's later notes of the *Timaios-Kommentar*. Speaking to the context of philosophy in Greek Mystery religions whose foremost figures are Plato and Pythagoras, Hélène Védrine observes that "L' Antiquité avait «pythagorisé Platon» et considéré le *Timée* comme une œuvre presque divine."[599] In this commentary, Schelling raises various cosmogonic matters such as the nature of ideas, the world as a living being, material, eternity, time, and towards the end he takes an excursus into the *Philebus* drawing on it to explain the *Timaeus*. Wilhelm Tenneman, Friedrich Victor-Lebrecht Plessing, and Dietrich Tiedemann emerge as contemporary interlocutors.[600] Assessing the hermeneutic substrate of the work, Franz observes that, "Schelling bemüht Platonische und Kantianische Ingredienzien, um ein eigenes ‚Menue' anzubieten."[601] Even less, traces of Reinhold

[597] Cf. Bubner (2004), 31. Diese Eigenart, das Philosophieren im konkreten Durchgang durch Themen vorzuführen, aber in keiner authentischen Gestalt vor die Leser aller Zeiten mit dem Anspruch des Endgültigen hinzustellen, zeigt eine bemerkenswerte Parallele zur Differenz zwischen Esoterik und Exoterik, die jeder Platonleser und Platonforscher im Bewußtsein halten muß.
[598] Fisher (2022), 55.
[599] Hélène Védrine, *La Conception de la nature chez Giordano Bruno.*, De Pétrarque à Descartes, 14 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967). 237. Antiquity had 'pythagorized Plato' and considered the *Timaeus* as an almost divine work.
[600] Schelling cites Dietrich Tiedemann's *Dialogorum Platonis argumenta.* (Ex Typographia Societatis, 1786); Wilhelm G. Tenneman's "Ueber den göttlichen Verstand," in »*Memorabilien*. 1. Stück. (Leipzig (Crusius) 1791); and Friedrich Plessing's *Versuch zur Aufklärung der Philosophie des ältesten Alterthums* published in 1788 and 1790. For more on these thinkers, see Sandkaulen-Bock, Birgit. *Ausgang vom Unbedingten: über den Anfang in der Philosophie Schellings*. Neue Studien zur Philosophie; Bd. 2. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990). 19; and Baum (2000).
[601] Franz (1996), 242. Schelling makes use of Platonic and Kantian elements to offer his own menu.

emerge insofar as Schelling employs the term *Vorstellungsvermögen*. Yet, Schelling gives pre-eminence to Plato. When discussing the existence of ideas, he extols

> Plato, der so tief in den menschlichen Geist selbst, sei es auch nur durch Ahndung – doch immer tief genug - eingedrungen war, Plato, der die Vernunft, insofern sie Mutter der Ideen ist, tiefer durchschaut hatte, als irgend ein andrer Philosoph des Altertums […].[602]

This is telling of Schelling's Hellenism and his particular penchant for Plato. No other thinker receives similar praise in the commentary. Schelling even mentions both intellectual intuition and reason here. When examining Plato's inspiration regarding the harmony of the essences of nature, Schelling remarks that "eben diese begeisternde Anschauung eines über alle Sinnlichkeit erhabnen Princips war die Ursache, daß er sich über das Wesen deßelben, über seine so weit von allem Materiellen entfernte Reinheit ausdrükte."[603] While Schelling does not deem this intuition intellectual, his description of it as "raised above all sensuousness" and whose "purity" is "so far removed from everything material" speaks to its non-empirical character. Then when discussing the idea of the world a few pages later, he asserts that "die Vernunft die Idee der Welt subjektiv erzeugt."[604] The qualifier of "subjective" perhaps speaks to Schelling's understanding of construction as a production from the subject, as we saw in the second chapter, but also Kant's influence at that time. In either case, Schelling does not limit philosophical productivity to subjectivity.

The commentary's two main passages directly touch on this matter. After commenting on two kinds of ideas in Plato, Schelling introduces the key passage of the commentary, so called because he writes that,

> Der Schlüßel zur Erklärung der ganzen Platonischen Philosophie ist die Bemerkung, daß er überall das subjektive auf's objektive übertrügt. Daher entstund bei Plato der (aber schon lange vor ihm vorhandne) Satz, daß die sichtbare Welt nichts als ein Nachbild der unsichtbaren sei. Aber auf diesen Satz wäre keine Philosophie gekommen, wenn er nicht seinen philosophischen Grund in uns selbst hätte. Insofern nämlich die ganze Natur, so wie sie uns erscheint, nicht nur ein Produkt unsrer empirischen Rezeptivität, sondern eigentlich ein Werk unsres *Vorstellungsvermögens* ist, insofern es reine, ursprüngliche in sich selbst gegründete

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602 Schelling, *AA* II/5.168; Schelling (1994), 44. Plato, who had penetrated so deeply into the human intellect itself, whether it was only through intuition [*Ahndung*]—yet always deep enough—Plato, who had seen deeper through reason, insofar as it is the mother of ideas, compared to any other philosopher of antiquity.

603 Schelling, *AA* II/5.159; Schelling (1994), 34. Even this inspired intuition of a principle raised above all sensuousness was the reason that he expressed himself so strongly and powerfully concerning its essence, concerning its purity so far removed from everything material.

604 Schelling, *AA* II/5.163; Schelling (1994), 39. Reason produces the idea of the world subjectively.

> Formen (der Natur) enthält, insofern gehört die Welt in der Vorstellung einem *höhern Vermögen*, als der bloßen Sinnlichkeit an, und die Natur wird als Typus einer höhern Welt dargestellt, welcher die reine Gesetze dieser Welt ausdrükt.[605]

At this early stage of his education, Schelling was already familiar with the Platonic distinction between "visible world" and "invisible world." He appears to read this category as corresponding to that between the subjective and objective, which certainly hearkens to Kant. The key to Plato's philosophy, simply, is bearing "the subjective on the objective," the invisible on the visible, a kind of allegorical interpretation. Commenting on this passage, Franz curiously notes that Schelling uses "Die ‚Typologie', [welche] ist eine offenbar genuin neutestamentliche, bzw. Originär eine Paulinische Denkform," evident in Schelling's commentaries on his epistles to the Roman and Galatian saints.[606] This means that the objective and visible are not by themselves, but types of the subjective and invisible; the former are able to point to the latter. The implications of philosophical productivity in this conclusion are that visible, objective, sense-perceptible nature points to an invisible, subjective "nature" as a type of a higher world, which type expresses the pure laws of this world.

Schelling's conclusion in turn hinges on three caveats: (1) that "nature entire" is the product "of our ability of representation," which is the idealist argument; (2) this ability of representation "contains pure, original forms (of nature) grounded in themselves," which indicates subjective access to something noumenal—the language here also rings of Kant; and (3), which speaks most clearly to philosophical productivity, "the world in its representation belongs to a higher ability than mere sense-perception." This "higher ability," which is the productive ability, produces nature. That this ability concerns "representation" renders nature an objective

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[605] Schelling, *AA* II/5.156-7; Schelling (1994), 31. *Emphasis added*. The key to the explanation of the entire philosophy of Plato is the observation that everywhere he bears the subjective on the objective. Therefore, with Plato the principle (however already present long before him) emerged that the visible world is nothing other than an after-image of the invisible world. No philosophy however would have attained this principle if it had not set its philosophical ground in us ourselves. And nature is represented as a type of a higher world, which [type] expresses the pure laws of this world, namely inasmuch as nature entire, as it appears to us, is not only a product of a empirical receptivity, but actually a work of our ability of representation inasmuch as it contains pure, original forms (of nature) grounded in themselves, inasmuch as the world in its representation belongs to a higher ability than mere sense-perception.

[606] Franz (1996), 251. "'typology' [which] evidently is a genuinely New Testament, respectively Pauline form of thought." For Schelling's 1793 *Kommentar zum Galaterbrief*, see Schelling, *AA* II/4.245-290. Also see his 1793 *Stellensammlung zu Paulus*, in Schelling, *AA* II/4.291-300.

representation of this ability's subjective activity; and because this ability is subjective it is higher "than mere sense perception." Taken together, the subjective, invisible world, and the ability of representation produces the objective, visible world, or nature.

In bringing this key passage to bear on the second key passage, which is the key to the *Timaeus*, Schelling reads the demiurge as the symbol of the productive ability and its anthropological exclusivity. Beginning his cosmogonic speculations, Timeaus asserts that τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν·[607] Preceding this quote is the opening line of the commentary: "Den Grundsaz nach dem man die Darstellungsart im Timäus beurteilen muß giebt Platon."[608] Schelling interprets this passage in the *Timaeus* as the key to understanding the dialogue's "manner of presentation." In other words, the *Timaeus*, a dialogue about cosmogony, hinges on the source of the cosmos, who is the demiurge. Philosophical productivity emerges in the demiurge's anthropological exclusivity. It is "impossible to discover him," and if discovered, impossible "to declare" or communicate him to others. Put simply, only a few select human beings can "discover" this "poet and father" of the whole. Therefore, anthropological exclusivity enshrouds the demiurge. And since the productive ability is anthropologically exclusive, it follows that the demiurge most especially signifies the productive ability.

This becomes lucid by applying the above key of bearing the invisible on the visible, the subjective on the objective. Objectively and mythologically, there is a "father," "poet"—more etymologically accurate, he is a "producer"—or "demiurge" who "produces" the beautiful "whole." Then, by allegorically interpreting this account, Schelling intuits that the producer and production of the whole more than just denoting objective production, actually connotes subjective production as the productive ability. Schelling, put simply, would interpret this objective

[607] Plato, *Timaeus* 28c. It is impossible then both to discover the poet [ποιητὴν] and father of this whole and having discovered him to declare him to all.
[608] Schelling, *AA* II/5.149; Schelling (1994), 23. Plato gives the fundamental principle according to which one must judge the manner of presentation in the *Timaeus*.

demiurge, who is the source of the cosmos, as his own productive ability. The demiurge bears a religious character like the Socratic daimonion and divine lot. On a more secondary though related note, the demiurge is the precursor to Schelling's conception of a total and unified *Wissenschaft* that is the single, overarching form of philosophy in his 1794 *Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt*—I introduce this work in the last chapter when discussing *Wissenschaft*—and that continues into his conception of *das absolute Ich* in his 1795 *Ichschrift*. Franz, Sandkaulen-Bock, and Oštarić touch on this continuity.[609] More importantly, the *Timaios-Kommentar* reveals the maieutic effect of the Platonic dialogue dovetailing with Schelling's *Geist-Notizen* a few years earlier.

Scholars' analyses of the *Timaios-Kommentar* touch on philosophical productivity according to varying degrees. The majority read Schelling more as a Kantian and overlook the context of *Griechentum*. Dieter Heinrich recognizes Plato's influence, but overlooks philosophical productivity. According to him, "Es ist Schellings Absicht zu zeigen, daß Platon im Gewand einer Rede von Weltursprung und von ewigen Ideen die Kantische Konzeption von Begriffen entfaltet [...]."[610] He is mistaken in reading the elaboration of Kantian philosophy as the primary goal of the commentary. Next, Hermann Krings reads the *Timaios-Kommentar* as a source of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* that points back to both Kant and Plato; although he seems unresolved as to who is the more decisive influence, he seems to lean towards the former. He concludes as follows: "neben Kant Platon der andere Inspirator der Naturphilosophie Schellings gewesen ist und daß

[609] Franz (1996), 260. "Wir haben also gesehen, daß die im Timaeus-Kommentar keimenden Grund gedanken in der Form-Schrift systematisch ausgearbeitet werden und noch in Vom Ich an strategisch wichtigen Punkten des jungen ‚Systems' auftauchen. Das läßt sich auch von der anderen Seite her sehen: die Konzeption der „Form eines höchsten Verstandes", in dem die „Urformen des Wissens" stattfinden, ist schon im Kern und in der Skizze das, was nachher das voll ausgerüstete „absolute Ich" sein wird." Sandkaulen-Bock (1990), 21. "[…] können Schellings Überlegungen in der *Formschrift* nicht mehr überraschen.... Obwohl hier die Konzpetion oder Philosphie als System aus einem Prinzip noch gänzlich fehlt, stellt doch die kategoriale Grundlegung als Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Synthesis einen Überstieg des rein faktischen Geschehens dar, die Schelling in der *Formschrift*—nach Fichtes Anregung—mit Leichtigkeit als „Urform des Wissens" identifizieren kann." Oštarić (2012), 84. "[…] Schelling's own interpretation of Plato's Demiurge continues to be a significant influence on Schelling's conception of the "absolute I" in his *Vom Ich, als Princip der Philosophie* (1795)."

[610] Heinrich (1986), 86. Schelling's intention is to show that Plato unfolds the Kantian conception of concepts in the form of a speech about the origin of the world and eternal ideas [...].

Schelling der platonischen Inspiration die neue protophysische Dimension der Frage nach der Natur verdankt."[611] A few pages earlier he asserts that

> Eine maßgebende Quelle ist ohne Zweifel Kants Naturphilosophie gewesen. […] Wenn Schelling sich mit seinen Schriften zur Naturphilosophie auch kritisch von Kant absetzt, so bezeugt er doch immer wieder, daß Kants dynamische Auffassung der Materie der bedeutendste Einschnitt in der Naturphilosophie seiner Zeit und für ihn, Schelling, ein entscheidender Anknüpfungspunkt gewesen ist. Kants Naturphilosophie wird von Schelling zeitlebens hochgeachtet.[612]

Krings, however, provides no citations of such encomia to Kant in the Schellingian corpus. Next, Sandkaulen-Bock presents a Schelling largely influenced by Jacobi and Kant. She highlights that "Sein Anliegen in diesem Kommentar ist zu zeigen, daß Platons Rede von der Weltschöpfung in Wahrheit nichts anderes meint als die Kantische Konzeption der Erkenntnis."[613] She elaborates more that "Was Platon . . . in der Vorstellung einer göttlichen Weltschöpfung objektiviert hat, ist in Schellings Augen in der Tat nichts anderes als die Beschreibung des subjektiven Erkenntnisaktes, wie er von Kant aufgefaßt wird."[614] Nevertheless, she obliquely points to philosophical productivity by reading the key passage in conjunction with the commentary's opening passage as showing "Erkenntnisakt als Weltschopfung."[615] Insofar as she sees the demiurge's "creation" as "the act of knowing" she unwittingly hints at philosophical productivity.

Bubner, in contrast, prioritizes Plato over Kant. According to him, "Es handelt sich . . . um eine ganz unbefangene Aufnahme Platons durch den wachen Geist des jungen Schelling, der der Kantischen Problemlage mit naturphilosophischen Ideen eine thematisch notwendige Ergänzung hinzugefügt hat."[616] Instead of reading the *Naturphilosophie* as an outgrowth of Kantian

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[611] Krings, Hermann, "Genesis und Materie — Zur Bedeutung der »Timaeus-Handschrift für Schellings Naturphilosophie," in Schelling (1994). 155. next to Kant Plato was the other inspirer of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* and that Schelling owes the new protophysical dimension of the question about nature to Platonic inspiration.

[612] Krings (1994), 152. A decisive source with a doubt has been Kant's philosophy of nature. […] If Schelling with his writings on *Naturphilosophie* even critically removes himself from Kant, he yet always testified that Kant's dynamic concept of material was the most meaningful turning point in the philosophy of nature of his time and for him, Schelling, a decisive starting point. Kant's philosophy of nature was venerated by Schelling through his life.

[613] Sandkaulen-Bock (1990), 19. His [Schelling's] concern in this commentary is to show that Plato's dialogue about the creation of the world in truth means nothing other than the Kantian conception of knowledge.

[614] Sandkaulen-Bock (1990), 20. What . . . Plato has made objective in the representation of a divine creation of the world is in Schelling's eyes actually nothing other than the description of the subjective act of knowledge as it was conceived of by Kant.

[615] Sandkaulen-Bock (1990), 20. The act of knowledge as the creation of the world.

[616] Bubner (2004), 35. It concerns . . . a completely unbiased reception of Plato through the growing intellect of the young Schelling, who adds a thematically necessary expansion to the Kantian problem-situation with ideas of the philosophy of nature.

philosophy, Bubner reads it as an augmentation through a direct engagement with Plato. The key passage for him shows "Die Welt der Erscheinungen, die unser Verstand a priori nach Gesetzen ordnet, wandelt sich zum Abbild eines vorgängigen Urbilds."[617] With this in view, he asserts that "Im menschlichen Geist liegen *die gestalterischen Kapazitäten*, die sich am Objektiven bewähren."[618] Bubner, in other words, sees the transfer from the subjective to the objective as a matter of creation or production. The intellect's productivity proves itself by its products. Along these lines, he recognizes correctly that Schelling's allegorizing of "Der Demiurg Platons erweist sich als Metapher für die substantielle Gestaltungskraft des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens."[619] Nevertheless, Bubner grasps philosophical productivity in the *Timaios-Kommentar* with a limited acknowledgement of the context of *Griehentum*, as mentioned above. Next, though Baum affirms "divine reason . . . [as] an intelligence producing concepts and ideas and a power of action," this for him is more "a faculty of representation."[620] Regarding the key passage in the *Timaios-Kommentar*, he observes that Schelling "unveils the secret of the Demiurge," that is, "The author and father of this world, who is so difficult to find and who, when found, cannot be revealed to the people, is nothing but the human faculty of representation itself."[621] By observing the parallel of the demiurge and the faculty of representation, Baum transfers onto the latter the former's anthropological exclusivity that it is "difficult to find" and impossible "to reveal to people," and thereby shows the latter as anthropologically exclusive.

Too Kantian in her reading, Oštarić offers a similar interpretation with the added virtue that she draws on Schelling's other set of notes as well. She hypothesizes

> that Kant's account of genius is what served Schelling as a paradigm and led him to think of nature, i.e., 'the visible world,' as an 'image or a copy of the invisible world.' Plato's Demiurge, just like Kant's genius artist,

[617] Bubner (2004), 35. The world of appearances, which our understanding ordered *a priori* according to law, transforms itself into a reflection of a previous archetype.
[618] Bubner (2004), 35. *Emphasis added.* In the human intellect lay the creative capacities that prove themselves objectively.
[619] Bubner (2004), 35. "Plato's demiurge shows itself as a metaphor for the substantial creative power of the human ability to represent." Schelling's reading of the Platonic demiurge seems to be according to the allegorical method of Theagenes of Rhegium.
[620] Baum (2000), 206.
[621] Baum (2000), 211.

> transfers the subjective to the objective insofar as the objective, i.e., the world for the Demiurge and the work of art for Kant's genius artist, are both expressions of spirit, i.e., the subjective.[622]

Oštarić's emphasis on Kant's account of genius as an analogue of the Plato's Demiurge shows that she grasps the parallel of the two as productive — she is prescient insofar as she indirectly points to the relationship of genius and philosophical productivity. Furthermore, she correctly identifies the centrality of philosophical productivity by asserting that

> the Timaeus-Kommentar continues to explore the issues central to Schelling's early Tübingen studies of Plato, that is, Schelling's conception of creative subjectivity and the special kind of knowledge that is requisite for its creative production.[623]

Certainly, at this point in his studies, Schelling associates philosophical productivity more with subjectivity, but that mainly is because he reads it as corresponding to the invisible world as seen in Plato. Moreover, Oštarić gestures at philosophical productivity by touching on anthropological exclusivity or a "special kind of knowledge." Speaking from the perspective of the genius' creation of art, she elucidates that "Schelling emphasizes in the Timaeus-Kommentar and his Essay on Poets, this knowledge [to create] is available to a privileged few and is a rare occurrence in history."[624] Hence, it is correct that just as artistic genius is anthropologically exclusive, so also is philosophical productivity.

Franz, finally, most clearly highlights philosophical productivity in Schelling's commentaries and, too, grasps anthropological exclusivity; he proceeds a step ahead of Baum by seeing it in the context of Greek Mystery religions. The allegorical approach in the key passage of the *Timaios-Kommentar* shows that Schelling "in ihr eine Analogie zum transzendentalen Verfahren (der Deutung der Erscheinungen durch die Bedingungen ihrer Möglichkeit) sieht."[625] As pointed above, Franz speculates that Schelling carries into the *Timaios-Kommentar* the apostle Paul's allegorical approach.[626] He concludes the section on a Kantian note: "Es ist damit nicht mehr nur

[622] Oštarić (2012), 80.
[623] Oštarić (2012), 73.
[624] Oštarić (2012), 84.
[625] Franz (1996), 253. sees in it an analogy for the transcendental method (the interpretation of appearances through the conditions of their possibility).
[626] Franz (1996), 251.

ein Schlüssel ‚zur Erklärung der ganzen Platonischen Philosophie,' sondern auch ein Beitrag zu einer Konstruktion des Verhältnisses zwischen Subjektivem und Objektivem."[627] The chapter, however, emphasizes philosophical productivity for the whole commentary. First, Franz asserts that "Nach allem, was uns erhalten geblieben ist, hat Schelling zunächst solchen Phänomenen sich genähert, die für eine Theorie des ‚Geistes'von vorrangiger Relevanz sind, allem voraus die Be-Geisterung, die die Produktionen des Geistes überhaupt erst möglich macht."[628] The "phenomena" in the *Timaios-Kommentar*, simply, gesture at the productive intellect. On the next page he affirms that "'Theorie des Geistes' als Theorie des Schöpferischen im psychischen Prozeß des einzelnen Subjekts wie im Vorgang der Weltentstehung im Ganzen, das war es, was die Gedanken Schellings im Zusammenhang hielt."[629] The phenomenon even of "cosmogony" entire is for displaying the intellect as creative.

The focus on the creative or productive intellect Franz further confirms by observing its anthropological exclusivity. He points out that

> Und das den Timaeus-Kommentar als „Grundsaz nach dem man die Darstellung im Timäus beurteilen muß" eröffnende Platon-Zitat über den „Schöpfer und Vater des Alls, den zu finden schwierig, ihn aber, habe man ihn gefunden, für alle auszusprechen, unmöglich" sei, - dieses gewichtige Wort wird im Bruno auch wieder bemüht: „[...] ein solches Gesetz <sc. das Gesetz, ‚nach welchem auch nur für sich selbst die Seele sich absondert und zum Daseyn bestimmt scheint,'> [sic] zu finden, ist eben so schwer, als es für alle auszusprechen unmöglich". Damit sind also alle Formeln, die sich als geeignet für „liturgische" Zwecke erwiesen hatten, erneut aufgeboten.[630]

The demiurge as "the creator and father of all," in a word, symbolizes the productive intellect. It is anthropologically exclusive because, as others have repeated, it "is difficult to find" and "impossible" for those who have discovered it to communicate it to others. By observing the

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[627] Franz (1996), 253. It is no longer only a key 'to the explanation of the entire philosophy of Plato,' but also a contribution to a construction of the relationship between the subjective and objective.

[628] Franz (1996), 280. According to everything that has been preserved for us, Schelling first has approached such phenomena, which are of primary relevance for a theory of the 'intellect;' above all the inspiration, which mainly makes possible the productions of the intellect.

[629] Franz (1996), 281. 'Theory of the intellect' as a theory of what is creative in the psychic process of the particular subject as in the process of the cosmogony altogether; that is what held the thoughts of Schelling in context.

[630] Franz (1996), 263. Plato's quote, which opens the commentary on the *Timaeus* as the proposition according to which one must judge the representation in the *Timaeus*, about the "creator and father of all, who is difficult to find, whom however, if one has found him, would be impossible to express to all" —this important word is used again in *Bruno*: "[…] to find one such law [the law, according to which also the soul only for itself appears separate and determined to exist], is even so difficulty as it is impossible to express to all." (*AA* I/11,1.405; *SW* 1/IV.284). Therefore, all these are formulas, which had proved themselves as suitable for 'liturgical' purposes, are called up anew.

parallel and similar language in *Bruno*, Franz indicates that Schelling read the *Timaeus* also in the context of Greek Mystery religions whose distinction between the initiated and vulgar points to anthropological exclusivity for both religion and philosophy. Schelling's adoption of the language of the *Timaeus* in the *Bruno* touches on the "liturgical purposes," a gesture at Greek Mystery religions, which, however, Franz does not confirm explicitly.

Finally, Franz extrapolates that philosophical productivity is central not just for the young Schelling, but across his entire career. On the last page of the chapter, he describes the order of a series of nine questions that Schelling jots down on the manuscript of the *Timaios-Kommentar*. He notes that "In der genauen Mitte dieses Neun-Fragen-Katalogs, der sicher nicht unbedacht dahergekritzelt worden ist, steht die Frage nach dem ‚Schöpfen'. Sie ist der Angelpunkt, um den sich alle Fragen Schellings drehen, vielleicht nicht nur des jungen."[631] From his reading of the *Timaios-Kommentar*, Franz implies that philosophical creativity or productivity is the pivot of Schelling's entire philosophical career, as already mentioned in the epagoge. This, however, is not to deny the Kantian conceptual repertoire evident in Schelling's analysis with the distinction of "subjective" and "objective," as well as Kantian transcendental idealism insofar as the ability of representation is responsible for objective and sense-perceptible nature—I will take up Kant again in the telos.

In this chapter, we have drawn out the significance of Plato for Schelling's understanding of philosophical productivity, both the production of intellectual intuition and its anthropological exclusivity, specifically in the context of Greek Mystery religions; to be clear, this context speaks to the religious dimension of philosophical productivity. Schelling's early notes on Plato substantiate this reading of philosophical productivity. The previous chapter began with the question of how Schelling understands philosophy as productive. The answer is intellectual

[631] Franz (1996), 282. In precisely the middle of this catalogue of nine questions, which certainly had not been rashly scribbled, stands the question of 'creating.' It is the pivot around which all of Schelling's question turn, perhaps not only of the young [Schelling].

intuition that not only is productive, but also anthropologically exclusive. This, however, is only part of the answer. The other part is *Hen kai Pan*, which we take up in the next two chapters.

Chapter 4. Productive *Hen kai Pan*

The production of intellectual intuitions is, so to speak, one side of philosophical productivity; the other is *Hen kai Pan*, which Assmann defines as "the conviction that the one is the all and the all is the one."[632] That both are a side of philosophical productivity should point to "side" as a metaphor. There is no intellectual intuition without *Hen kai Pan* and vice versa. "La philosophie suscitée par le Hen Kai Pan," Tilliette perceptively observes, "a pour origine et pour organe l'intuition intellectuelle, qui est irrécusable."[633] The *Hen* and the *Pan* are a perfect unity produced by and as the organ or productive ability that is intellectual intuition. Philosophical productivity, therefore, as the production of intellectual intuitions is not mere shooting in the dark, unless by dark one means the ambit of *Hen kai Pan*. This relates to intellectual intuition inasmuch as it forms the total sphere in which intellectual intuition is produced and produces itself; one can understand *Hen kai Pan* as the contour of the endless productive paradox of intellectual intuition coming forth. In a word, intellectual intuition unfolds as *Hen kai Pan*. This is the short answer to this chapter's question: how does Schelling understand *Hen kai Pan* as productive?

There is an endlessly productive contradiction between Ἕν and πᾶν, in which emphasis can fall towards one or the other without ever separating the two. Tilliette has the right idea in

[632] Assmann, (2010). 301.
[633] Tilliette (1970), 409. The philosophy generated by *Hen kai Pan* . . . has for its origin and organ intellectual intuition, which is undeniable.

illustrating this relationship as an "oscillation."[634] But, this illustration runs the risk of hypostatizing the *Hen* and *Pan*, when, in fact, they are an "l'indissoluble équivalence […]."[635] This is difficult yet important to grasp. On the one hand, it is difficult because one must not assume that this metaphysical scheme finds accurate expression through an empirical understanding of numbers or predication. On the other hand, the indissoluble equivalence of *Hen kai Pan* is necessary to comprehend because weaving in this contradiction allows one to see Schelling in a fair light.

Undoubtedly, the philosophical and religious tradition of *Hen kai Pan* is fundamental for Schelling because he understands his philosophy as participating in it. *Hen kai Pan* gains prominence towards the end of the 18th century through Baruch Spinoza, Gotthold E. Lessing, and Friedrich H. Jacobi, but even traces back to Plato and Pythagoras among others, explored more below.[636] It by no means has a simple history. This chapter limits itself to Schelling's brief account of the doctrine, which he analyses into three pairs of thinkers not chronologically: (1) Parmenides and Spinoza; (2) Leibniz and Heraclitus; and (3) Plato and Pythagoras. Each section will touch on the productivity of *Hen kai Pan*, which manifests through its equivalence with intellectual intuition. The last section will draw out Schelling's understanding of an idea as productive.

Hen kai Pan is the ultimate authority of Schelling's philosophy. Tilliette confirms that "Schelling . . . contemple toutes choses dans la paix et la splendeur de l'universelle harmonie, del'Un et Tout."[637] In that vein, Krings recognizes Schelling's treatment of *Hen kai Pan* as that which sets him apart from his philosophical contemporaries.

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634 Tilliette (1970), 392. […] oscillation.
635 Tilliette (1970), 392. the indissoluble equivalence […].
636 Assmann, Jan, "Hen kai pan. Ralph Cudworth und die Rehabilitierung der hermetischen Tradition," in Monika Neugebauer-Wölk, ed., *Aufklärung und Esoterik*, vol. 24, Studien zum achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Meiner, 1999). This article situates Spinoza and *Hen kai Pan* with respect to Ralph Cudworth's *The True Intellectual System of the Universe. The First Part Wherein All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism Is Confuted and Its Impossibility Demonstrated,* Early English Books Online (London: Printed for Richard Royston, 1678).
637 Tilliette (1987), 22. Schelling . . . contemplates everything in the peace and splendor of the universal harmony, of the one and all.

> Dieses . . . Konzept [von des Einen und Alles], mit dem sich Schelling von Kant und seiner strengen Trennung von Natur und Freiheit ebenso unterscheidet wie von Fichte mit seinem rein transzendentalphilosophischen Konzept, hat in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie keine Parallele.[638]

Schelling's unique philosophizing according to *Hen kai Pan*, therefore, allowed him to see the identity of nature and freedom, unlike Kant, and to account for the philosophical significance of nature, unlike Fichte—the implications of philosophical productivity for the narrative of *Deutscher Idealismus* appear in the telos. Moreover, of the many vibrant colors of Tübingen's atmosphere during the student days of Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel, Schäfer paints that "der Rationalismus wird hier in lebendiger, unmittelbarer Hinneigung zum Unendlichen, unter der Losung des *Hen kai Pan* überwunden."[639] Bracketing the overcoming of rationalism, we see that *Hen kai Pan* was currency among the young theologians, especially the two in the context of *Griechentum*. After his time in Tübingen, Hölderlin asks in his novel *Hyperion* "[…] den Namen des, das Eins ist und Alles? —Sein Name is Schönheit."[640] Surely, Hölderlin's literary appeal to *Hen kai Pan* as beauty is in the context of *Griechentum*. As we have seen in the first chapter, such expressions of Hellenism regarding beauty in Ancient Greek art also are not alien to Schelling. What follows is a brief overview of *Hen kai Pan* in some prominent texts from Schelling's early period.

In the twelfth section of the *Ichschrift*, when discussing *das Ich* as substance, he declares that in it "[…] die Philosophie [hat] ihr Ἓν καὶ πᾶν gefunden, nach dem sie bisher als dem höchsten Preise des Siegs gerungen hat."[641] Tilliette deems this "la phrase de manifeste" and "une clef."[642] Not only does *Hen kai Pan* undergird and manifest as Schelling's *das Ich*, but even more it is the highest prize of philosophy. Furthermore, Schelling understands his *Ichschrift* as speaking to an idea of national education that is equivalent to the Mysteries, mentioned in the previous chapter. This

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[638] Krings (1994), 154. This concept [of *Hen kai Pan*] . . . with which [concept] Schelling distinguished himself from Kant and his strong separation of nature and freedom just as from Fichte with his pure transcendental-philosophical concept, had no parallel in contemporary philosophy.
[639] Schäfer (1964), 122-3. Rationliams here was overcome in a living direct leaning towards the infinite under the solution of *Hen kai Pan*.
[640] Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke*. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, begonnen durch Norbert von Hellingrath, fortgeführt durch Friedrich Seebaß und Ludwig v. Piegenot. II, 151.
[641] Schelling, *AA* I/2.119; *SW* 1/I.193. philosophy has found its *Hen kai Pan* for which as the highest prize of victory it [philosophy] has wrestled until now.
[642] Tilliette (1995), 58. the sentence of the manifesto [and] the key […].

establishes that *Hen kai Pan*, as with intellectual intuition, is couched in the ambit of the Greek Mysteries. Jaeschke's observation that the *Ichschrift* is a contribution to the Mysteries applies also to *Hen kai Pan*.[643] Similarly, the *Methodologie* touches on *Hen kai Pan*. To return to the same context of intellectual intuition and production in the act of identification to produce the Absolute, as explored in chapter two, *Hen kai Pan* becomes apparent in the lower assumption of the absolute concept of *Wissenschaft*. This assumption concerns the "unconditioned knowing by itself," known also as "proto-knowing" and "first knowing," "welches schlechthin nur Eines und in dem auch alles Wissen nur Eines."[644] *Wissen*, in other words, can manifest *Hen kai Pan*.[645] Schelling confirms this again a few paragraphs later by asserting that "*alles* Wissen nur *Eines* ist."[646] In the seventh lecture, then, Schelling describes philosophy as "der obersten Wissenschaft" in which "[...] alles [ist] eins,"[647] and as an ideal "unmittelbare Darstellung" where hypothetically "sie begriffe Alles wirklich als Eines […]."[648] *Hen kai Pan*, moveover, is evident in the beginning of the 1801 *Darstellung*. In the second section, Schelling elucidates that "[I]n dem Folgenden gezeigt werden muß, wie alles, was ist, der Vernunft dem Wesen nach gleich und mit ihr Eines ist."[649] In other words, throughout the whole *Darstellung* and, by extension, the *Fernere Darstellungen* Schelling assumes that one inhabits the perspective of *Hen kai Pan* in that the *Pan* is essentially similar to reason and one with reason as the *Hen*. In the first corollary to the twelfth section and in the comment to the 28th section, Schelling asserts that "Alles, was ist, ist an sich Eines," and "alles, was ist, Eines," respectively.[650]

Hen kai Pan also gives birth to Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*. In the 1803 *Ideen*, Schelling pushes against a mechanical understanding of nature characterized by causality and asserts, instead,

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643 Jaeschke (2012), 80.
644 Schelling, *AA* I/14.58; *SW* 1/V.215. which absolutely is only one and in which also all knowing is only one [...].
645 This is why I translate *Wissen* as knowing and pin *Erkenntniß* to knowledge.
646 Schelling, *AA* I/14.60; *SW* 1/V.218. *emphasis added.* all knowing is only one [...].
647 Schelling, *AA* I/14.113; *SW* 1/V.279-80. the highest *Wissenschaft* [in which] all is one […].
648 Schelling, *AA* I/14.113; *SW* 1/V.280. direct representation . . . it grasps the All actually as One […].
649 Schelling, *AA* I/10.117; *SW* 1/IV.115-6. There is no philosophy [other] than from the standpoint of the Absolute, concerning no doubt is expressed in this entire exposition [*Darstellung*]: reason is the Absolute […]. [I]n the following it must be shown how everything that is, is similar according to the essence of reason and one with it [reason].
650 Schelling, *AA* I/10.120; *SW* 1/IV.119. All that is, is by itself one; *AA* I/10.127; 1/IV.126. all that is, [is] one [...].

that in the universe things mutually inhering one another are "durch die allgemeine prästabilirte Harmonie verbunden, kraft welcher Alles Eins und Eins Alles ist."[651] Tilliette deems Schelling as part of a "culte de la Nature" that itself is a religion.[652] He asserts "Cette religion, a un nom, c'est le Hen Kai Pan."[653] In his considerations of nature, *Hen kai Pan* was a religion for Schelling. *Hen kai Pan* also finds itself in the context of art, namely, chaos and the intuition of the Absolute in the *Philosophie der Kunst*'s 65th section on sublimity and beauty. "Das innere Wesen des Absoluten," according to Schelling, is that "worin alles als eins und eins als alles liegt […]."[654] More significantly, in fourth section he shows that God, according to *Hen kai Pan*, is absolute identity and totality: "Gott . . . ist nicht einzig im numerischen Sinn, er ist auch nicht bloß der Eine, sondern er ist die absolute Einheit selbst, nicht alles, sondern die absolute Allheit selbst, und dieß beides unmittelbar als eins."[655] God or the Absolute, put simply, is *Hen kai Pan* insofar as He "immediately as one" is "absolute unity," "absolute allness," and these both as one. A similar idea appears in the *Gesammten*'s 24th section. Here, Schelling makes explicit that *Hen kai Pan* illuminates his understanding of God. "Gott auch = dem All, und es ist kein Gegensatz, sondern nur absolute Identität zwischen beiden. Nun ist erst die Bedeutung klar, in welcher Alles Eins und Eins Alles."[656] Then in the following two sections, he claims that "Alles ist Eins, oder das All ist schlechthin Eines" and "Eins ist Alles."[657] It is striking that "only" *Hen kai Pan* in a non-numerical sense can illuminate the absolute identity of God and the All, which pushes against a simple reading of pantheism—more on this in the next section.

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[651] Schelling, *AA* I/13.235; *SW* 1/II.199. connected through the universal preestablished harmony by virtue of which all is one and one is all.
[652] Tilliette (1970), 388. Cult of nature.
[653] Tilliette (1970), 388. This religion has a name, it is *Hen kai Pan.*
[654] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.193; *SW* 1/V. 465. The inner essence of the Absolute in which all lies as one and one lies as all […].
[655] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.121; *SW* 1/V. 375. God . . . is not one in a numerical sense, he is even not merely the one, but he is the absolute unity itself, [He is] not all, but the absolute allness itself, and these both immediately as one.
[656] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.134; *SW* 1/VI.175. God = the All, and there is no opposition, but only absolute identity between the two. Now the meaning is only clear in which All is One and One is All.
[657] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.134; *SW* 1/VI.175. All is one, or the All is absolutely One; *AA* II/7,1.135; 1/VI.176. One is All.

Finally, *Hen kai Pan* also emerges in the 1809 *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände*—henceforth, *Freiheitschrift*. In this work, Schelling frames the investigation between "den richtigen Begriff" of freedom and "den Zusammenhang dieses Begriffs mit dem Ganzen einer wissenschaftlichen Weltansicht."[658] These poles structure his discussion of pantheism, idealism, God, evil, will, and the ground of existence. When commenting on the role of freedom in contemporary philosophy, Schelling asserts that

> [d]er Gedanke, die Freiheit einmal zum Eins und Alles der Philosophie zu machen, hat den menschlichen Geist überhaupt, nicht bloß in Bezug auf sich selbst, in Freiheit gesetzt und der Wissenschaft in allen ihren Theilen einen kräftigern Umschwung gegeben als irgend eine frühere Revolution.[659]

Put simply, freedom having been "made into *Hen kai Pan*" has bestowed two prospective benefits on philosophy. The first is to place the human intellect in freedom, and the second is to breathe new life into *Wissenschaft*, which, as we will see in the next chapter, is couched in *Hen kai Pan*. This brief and by no means meticulous overview of some of Schelling's early works shows the significance of *Hen kai Pan.* Jochem Hennigfeld agrees that in the Schellingian corpus "Einheit und Vielheit des öfteren thematisiert wurden."[660]

The doctrine of *Hen kai Pan* is as philosophical as it is religious and has a long history. On one end, it predates Ancient Greece; on the other, it manifests in the thought of Leibniz and Spinoza. Hence, it stretches from Egypt all the way to modernity. When discussing the pantheism controversy Beiser gestures at the broad significance of *Hen kai Pan* by implying that "Lessing and Spinoza were only symbols, which had a much wider cultural and philosophical meaning."[661] The teaching of *Hen kai Pan*, Assmann confirms,

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[658] Schelling, *AA* I/17.111; *SW* 1/VII.336. the correct concept […[. The context of this concept with the whole of a *wissenschaftlichen* world view.

[659] Schelling, *AA* I/17.124; *SW* 1/VII.351. "The thought of making freedom someday into the One and All of philosophy, has placed the human intellect mainly in freedom, not merely in regard to itself, and given to *Wissenschaft* in all its parts a more powerful turnaround than any earlier revolution." For more background, see Thomas Frisch's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/17.31-108.

[660] Jochem Hennigfeld, "Einheit und Vielheit als grundlegendes Problem in Schellings Systementürfen," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 14, no. 2 (1989). 1. "unity and multiplicity have often been discussed." Hennigfeld's hermeneutic vantage point is narrowly Hegel's *Differenzschrift*.

[661] Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1987). 48.

> was believed to be the nucleus of a great tradition that started in Egypt and was handed down to modernity . . . triggering a new phase of Egyptomania that was characteristic of the last quarter of the 18th century and centered on the idea of mystery.[662]

This suggests that *Hen kai Pan*'s Egyptian provenance bore a religious and philosophical sense, which then carried into Ancient Greece. Schelling articulates his historical understanding of *Hen kai Pan* in the fourth section of the *Fernere Darstellungen*. After he discounts empirical and analytical approaches to philosophy, he considers the sublimity of *Hen kai Pan*.

> [E]ine so hohe Erkenntniß nicht der zufälligen Einsicht überlassen werden müsse, und daß, nachdem sie einzeln und in mehr oder weniger allgemeinen Formen in vielen hohen und vortrefflichen Geistern jederzeit gewesen ist […].[663]

This is an important passage. The sublime or "very high knowledge," simply, is *Hen kai Pan*. In the history of philosophy, it "has occurred" to others, the "lofty and sublime intellects." He declares that "Die vortrefflichsten aller Erkenntnisse werdet ihr leicht unter den Bruchstücken der ältesten Weisheit entdecken."[664] *Hen kai Pan*, in other words, is the most excellent of all knowledge that appears among the fragments of ancient wisdom.

Furthermore, though of Egyptian provenance, *Hen kai Pan* primarily is Greek for Schelling, and he inscribes his philosophy in this tradition. That he describes it as "ancient" mostly means Ancient Greek; he confirms this by presenting four Greek thinkers of six total. Schelling first mentions together Pythagoras and Plato; then Heraclitus, Leibniz, and finally Parmenides and Spinoza together.[665] Assmann confirms Schelling's Ancient Greek cadre of *Hen kai Pan* by elucidating that the "idea of *Hen kai Pan* [came] to Greece, where it informed the philosophies of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, [and] Plato."[666] It is strange that Schelling included the 17th

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662 Assmann (2010), 301-2. For a broader context see chapter 16, "Goethe und die Romantik - «Hieroglyphisch Denken»," of Erik Hornung, *Das esoterische Ägypten: Das geheime Wissen der Ägypter und sein Einfluss auf das Abendland* (München: Beck, 1999). 133-145. As it concerns Schelling, in order to square Hellenism with Egyptomania, one must look to the precedent of Winckelmann. For the Hellenism he generated was in the context of a close engagement with the art of other ancient cultures. This is clear in his *Geschichte* whose second chapter treats Egyptian, Phonecian, and Persian art; third Etruscan; and fifth Roman art. For Winckelmann, Greek art is preeminent among these. This specific attitude towards antiquity, which venerates Ancient Greece while engaging with other ancient cultures, certainly came to Schelling, as can be inferred from the first chapter of this thesis.

663 Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.137; *SW* 1/IV.400. [S]uch lofty knowledge must not be left to an accidental insight, and that, after it has occurred always individually and in more or less general forms in many lofty and sublime intellects […].

664 Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.138; *SW* 1/IV.401. The most sublime of all knowledge you will easily discover among the fragments of the most ancient wisdom.

665 Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.138; *SW* 1/IV.401.

666 Assmann (2010), 301.

century philosophers, Spinoza and Leibniz, among these Greek philosophers from the 5th and 6th centuries BC. But because they partake of *Hen kai Pan*, Schelling deems their philosophy as belonging to the most ancient wisdom. With that understanding, he situates his own philosophy in this tradition. According to Tilliette, in this "armorial de philosophes . . . [c]hacon contribue pour un élément à la philosophie de l'Un et Tout, et Schelling est leur héritier, le moissonneur de la tradition."[667] In this way, Schelling understood himself as part of an Ancient Greek tradition of philosophy consisting of Pythagoras, Plato, Heraclitus, Leibniz, Parmenides, and Spinoza. All these thinkers present different pictures of the same philosophical doctrine.

Parmenides' and Spinoza's Productive *Hen*

Both Spinoza and Parmenides occupy a unique position in Schelling's brief history of *Hen kai Pan* insofar as their formulation of the doctrine includes the rest."[D]ie Lehre, die dieß alles begreift, von der Einheit, die ungetheilt allem gegenwärtig und die Substanz aller Dinge ist werdet ihr von Spinoza und Parmenides zurückgehend, soweit die Geschichte der Philosophie und der menschlichen Erkenntniß reicht, sicher antreffen," Schelling asserts.[668] He deems both Spinoza and Parmenides as part of a broader tradition that stretches as far as the history of philosophy reaches. In the introduction to *Philosophie und Religion*, Schelling elucidates that "Die letzten Anklänge alter, ächter Philosophie wurden durch Spinoza vernommen."[669] In this way, Schelling takes Spinoza to be a true Ancient philosopher in the company of Parmenides; that he claims this in *Philosophie und Religion* shows that he reads Spinoza in the context of Greek Mystery religions. This further establishes the religious dimension of *Hen kai Pan*.

Both Spinoza and Parmenides articulate the most sublime of all knowledge as an all-encompassing teaching, which concerns "unity" as the omnipresent "substance of all things." They

[667] Tilliette (1995), 188. armorial of philosophers […]. [e]ach contributes for an element to the philosophy of *Hen kai Pan*, and Schelling is their heir, the reaper of the tradition.
[668] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1,138; *SW* 1/IV.401. [T]he teaching, which grasps all these, of the unity, which indivisible is present to everything and the substance of all things you certainly will encounter going back from Spinoza and Parmenides as far as the history of philosophy and human knowledge reaches.
[669] Schelling, *AA* I/14.278; *SW* 1/VI.17. The last echoes of ancient genuine philosophy were heard through Spinoza.

emphasize the *Hen* of *Hen kai Pan* in such a manner that this *Hen* is present to all *Pan* to the extent that it is *Pan*. Karen Gloy grasps this too narrowly, which she betrays by highlighting only Spinoza in this part of the *Fernere Darstellungen* and not accounting for the other variations of *Hen kai Pan*.[670] Her focus on the unity of the *Hen* is in the realm of reflection and overlooks its productive contradiction with *Pan*.

The Parmenidean formulation of Being as absolute and Spinoza's God or substance underscore the distinction between intellectual intuition and imagination or truth and opinion, respectively. God or the Absolute and the distinction between intellectual intuition and truth, on the one hand, and imagination and opinion, on the other, runs through the remainder of this section. As Schelling emphasizes at the beginning of the *Darstellung*, a work he models after Spinoza's *Ethica*, "Es gibt keine Philosophie, als vom Standpunkt des Absoluten, darüber wird bei dieser ganzen Darstellung gar kein Zweifel statuirt."[671] Indeed, grounding both the *Darstellung* and *Fernere Darstellungen*, even all his other works, is the "standpoint of the Absolute" from which intellectual intuition proceeds. Necessarily concomitant is an anthropological distinction between opinion and truth, and imagination and intellectual intuition. The Eleatic philosopher Parmenides is often considered the first philosopher of Being; Plato represents him in the eponymous dialogue, where he compares how Parmenides and Zeno handle *Hen kai Pan*. Socrates says to Parmenides

> σὺ μὲν . . . ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχῃ καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἓν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἑκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταὐτά […].[672]

Plato's Socrates indicates explicitly Parmenides' poem in which the *Pan* is *Hen*. This differs from Zeno's account that the *Pan* is null or that "the many do not exist." Therefore, in one sense the many occupy an intermediary position between the One and All. Socrates' further remark at the

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[670] Karen Gloy, *Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit* (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 1981). 2.

[671] Schelling, *AA* I/10.117; *SW* 1/IV.115.There is no philosophy [other] than from the standpoint of the Absolute concerning which no doubt at all will be laid during this whole presentation.

[672] Plato, *Parmenides*, 128ab. On the one hand . . . in your poems you say that the All is one and you correctly furnish proof of these. But this one [Zeno] says that the many do not exist, and himself furnishes very many and great proofs. One therefore says that it is one, the other that it is not many, and in this way, each speaks with the result that while you both say the same things you seem to have said none of these things […].

end of the passage is instructive for Schelling's brief history of *Hen kai Pan* insofar as different thinkers "say the same things" yet appear "to have said none of these" same things. All these six thinkers, in short, partake of the tradition of *Hen kai Pan* although each expression of the doctrine appears to be different from the other as if they have nothing in common.

Socrates mentions Parmenides' poems; but currently no work of Parmenides survives except excerpts of his poem on nature quoted by other ancient authors. In this poem is the unity of being and the distinction between truth and opinion. A goddess teaches the protagonist about Being and non-Being, specifically the impossibility of the latter, thus asserting that there can only be Being. This highlights the religious provenance of *Hen kai Pan*. She prefaces her account with the admonition that χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι /ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ / ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.[673] The distinction here between "truth" and "opinions of man" points to the anthropological distinction.

> Εἰ δ᾽ ἄγ᾽ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,/αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·/ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,/Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος - Ἀληθείῃ γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ / ἡ δ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,/ τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν·/ οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν - οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν -/οὔτε φράσαις.[674]

Parmenides inserts a clear wedge between Being or "it is" and non-Being or "it is not." The former "follows truth" while the latter is an unclear path since non-Being cannot be known nor indicated. Since it is impossible for Being not to be, it is the omnipresent unity and substance of all things, both the *Hen* and the *Pan*. This understanding of Being is intimately intertwined with the distinction between truth and opinion; the former recognizes the sole existence of Being and the impossibility of speaking about non-Being, while the latter makes room for discourse about non-Being.

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[673] Diels and Kranz (1951), Frag. 2. "It is necessary that you learn that all things are of well-rounded truth with respect to an unshakeable heart, and opinions of man, belief in which is not true." For another English translation see Burnet (1945).

[674] Diels and Kranz (1951), Frag. 2. Come on! I will speak, you having heard it carry away the story, these paths are inquiry alone to intellect [νοῆσαι]. The first, how it is [ἔστιν] and how it is impossible not to be, is the way of persuasion – for it follows truth; the other, how it is not [οὐκ ἔστιν] and how it is necessary not to be, this I point out is an utterly inscrutable path. For neither would you be able to know nor indicate what does not exist—for it is not brought about.

Schelling observes *Hen kai Pan* in Spinoza according to the same manner; he takes as central to Spinoza's philosophy both the one eternal substance and the distinction between imagination and intellectual intuition. Although Schelling's language of intellectual intuition is largely Fichtean, his understanding thereof clings more to Spinoza. In his analysis of intellectual intuition, Jacob Barion confirms that "Neben Fichte haben wir . . . schon häufiger auf Einflüsse von Spinoza hingewiesen."[675] A few pages later, he declares that "Seine [Schellings] Bestimmungen stehen in enger Beziehung zu den Gedanken Spinozas."[676] Schelling reads the equivalence of intellectual intuition and *Hen kai Pan* primarily in Spinoza's *Ethica*. This work is the comprehensive presentation of Spinoza's philosophy in five parts according to the form of Euclidean geometry.[677] Central is the *Hen* or conception of God as the absolute and eternal substance expressed in the two attributes of thought and extension. The work also examines the human mind, the distractions through bodily affections, and human freedom or the power of the intellect. If the title is any indication, all these matters together speak to Spinoza's understanding of ethics.

Spinoza and *Hen kai Pan* gained prominence amongst the German intelligentsia towards the end of the 18th century. More specifically, he occupies the middle of the *Pantheismusstreit* as documented in Jacobi's 1785 publication, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*; and, indeed, Schelling's reception of Spinoza is *via* Jacobi.[678] This text recounts the controversy between Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn regarding Lessing's purported confession that Spinoza's philosophy is the true philosophy. The *Pantheismusstreit* proved truly ground-

675 Barion (1929), 75. Next to Fichte, we have often indicated the influences of Spinoza.
676 Barion (1929), 77. His determinations closely relate to Spinoza's thoughts.
677 For an account of Schelling shaping his *Darstellung* after Spinoza's *Ethica* see Melamed, Yitzhak, "Deus Sive Vernunft," in G. Anthony Bruno, ed., *Schelling's Philosophy: Freedom, Nature, and Systematicity* (Oxford University Press, 2020).
678 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*, ed. Klaus Hammacher and Irmgard Maria Piske, Philosophische Bibliothek 517 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2004). See also Heinrich Scholz, *Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn*, (Berlin 1916); Folkers, Horst, "Das immanente Ensoph. Der kabbalistische Kern des Spinozismus bei Jacobi, Herder und Sendling," in Eveline Goodman-Thau/Gert Mattenklott/Christoph Schulze (Hgg.): *Kabbala und Romantik*, (Tübingen 1994). Altmann, Alexander, "Lessing und Jacobi. Das Gespräch über den Spinozismus," in: *Lessing Yearbook* 3 (1971). For historical background, see chapter 2 in Beiser (1987); also see the general introduction to "Absolute Idealism," the third of part of Frederick C. Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2002).

breaking. As Beiser reports, it "completely changed the intellectual map of eighteenth-century Germany."[679] As it concerns Schelling, who reads the relationship between intellectual intuition and *Hen kai Pan* in Spinoza, Tilliette specifies that "Pour le destin de l'intuition intellectuelle pendant la grande décennie, l'intervention de Spinoza, supplantant Kant . . . est capitale."[680] While this is not to deny the Kantian language of intellectual intuition which Schelling employed, this underscores the philosophical priority of Spinoza.

Schelling received Spinoza with this controversy in the background and referred to him throughout his career. In the *Briefe*, specifically the ninth letter, he pushes against a common interpretation of Spinoza of the time, which reads the conception of God in the *Ethica* as pure necessity. He argues this in the context of asserting that "Absolute Freiheit und absolute Nothwendigkeit sind identisch."[681] In the footnote that follows, he observes

> Für manchen, der Spinozas Lehre auch aus dem Grunde verwerflich findet, weil er voraussetzt, Spinoza habe Gott als ein Wesen ohne Freiheit gedacht, ist es nicht überflüssig zu bemerken, daß gerade er auch absolute Nothwendigkeit und absolute Freiheit als identisch dachte.[682]

This common misinterpretation of Spinoza manifests in Alan White's claim that "To study Schelling's development is to study his attempts to produce the antithesis to Spinoza's *Ethics*, his attempts to reconcile demands of system and the demands of freedom."[683] While White is correct that Schelling attempted to produce a philosophy that is a complement to Spinoza's—more on this below—he reads too strictly the distinction between necessity and freedom without realizing that Schelling already put forth a conception of absolute identity insofar as he read Spinoza's

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[679] Beiser (1987), 44.
[680] Tilliette (1995), 61. For the fate of intellectual intuition during the grand decade, the intervention of Spinoza, supplanting Kant, . . . is momentous.
[681] Schelling, *AA* I/3.101; *SW* 1/I.331. Absolute freedom and absolute necessity are identical.
[682] Schelling, *AA* I/3.101; *SW* 1/I.328. "For some, who find the teaching of Spinoza objectionable for the reason that because he assumes Spinoza considered God as an essence without freedom, it is not redundant to remark that precisely he thought even absolute necessity and absolute freedom as identical." For a similar understanding of Spinoza's substance, see Cramer, Konrad: "Über die Voraussetzungen von Spinozas Beweis für die Einzigkeit der Substanz," in: *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 12 (1977), 1-8. He pushes against primarily Hegel's reading of Spinoza's substance.
[683] White (1983), 6. White's interpretation rests too much on the notion of "antithesis" without giving proper philological attention to the German equivalents. In the passages White cites, Schelling uses both *Gegenstück* in *Vom Ich* (1/I.159) and *Gegenbild* in *Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (2/X.36). While the later means "antithesis" the former means more "complement" and does not bear a sense of opposition.

Absolute as that in which both absolute freedom and absolute necessity are "identical." Schelling substantiates this understanding with a few passages from the *Ethica*. First, he cites the seventh definition of the first book, "Ea res libera dicitur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur."[684] Paradoxically, God is free because He "exists only by the necessity of His nature." Such an understanding of freedom and necessity transcends the mere concept of each. The next passage is the seventeenth proposition, "Deus ex solis suae naturae legibus – agit, unde sequitur, solum Deum esse causam liberam."[685] Hence, contrary to Spinoza's God exhibiting only necessity, for Schelling He is not "an essence without freedom."

In his letter to Obereit, Schelling also offers a clarification of Spinoza's substance touching on its historical influence. He reveals that

> Die älteste und heiligste Idee der Philosophie war ohne Zweifel das allem Existirenden zu Grunde liegende unwandelbare Sein. Erst als Spinozas vermeinter Atheism Theologie und Philosophie aufschreckte, nahm man in der Philosophie seine Zuflucht zu einem Gott ausser allem Existirenden, dessen Idee nun nichts mehr als ein Compositum allgemeiner Abstraktionen war.[686]

Spinoza's formulation of the Absolute, an immutable being that underlies all existence was that of the most ancient and holiest idea of philosophy. Unfortunately, it was perceived as atheism, by whom Schelling does not specify. Moreover, Spinoza's formulation precipitated a philosophical conception of God beyond being, but which in fact was nothing other than a composition of general abstractions. Schelling continues that

> Diese Idee (durchs Christenthum und seine sinnliche Darstellungsart unterstützt) hatte sich so sehr aller Köpfe bemächtigt, daß man weder die alten Philosophen, Plato und Aristoteles, noch die später lebenden, Cartes (der doch schon unter den Scholastikern einige Vorgänger hatte), seinen Schüler Spinoza, Malebranche, und späterhin den besten Ausleger Spinozas, Jacobi, und Kant verstand.[687]

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[684] Benedictus de Spinoza. *Ethica*, in *Spinoza Opera*, im auftrag der Heidelberger akademie der wissenschaften herausgegeben. Edited by Carl Gebhardt. vol. 2, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1925). 46. Pars I, def. 7: That thing is said to be free [*libera*] which exists only by the necessity of its nature and determined to action by itself alone.

[685] Spinoza, *SO* II, 61. Pars 1, Prop. XVII: God acts from only the laws of his nature, from which it follows that God alone is a free cause.

[686] Schelling, *AA* III/1.46; Schelling (1973), 85. The most ancient and holiest idea of philosophy was undoubtedly the immutable being underlying everything existing. Only as Spinoza's supposed atheism startled theology and philosophy, one took his refuge in philosophy in a God beyond everything existing, whose idea now was nothing more than a composition of general abstractions.

[687] Schelling, *AA* III/1.46-7; Schelling (1973), 85-6. This idea (bolstered by Christianity and its sense-perceptible manner of representation) had very much captured all minds that one understood neither the ancient philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, nor the later living [philosophers], Descartes (who yet already had some predecessors among the Scholastics), his student Spinoza, Malebranche, and later the best translator of Spinoza, Jacobi, and Kant.

This idea of an ineffable God, which Schelling claims was supported by Christianity's sense-perceptible manner of representation, became so influential that it hindered one from understanding ancient philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, and even modern philosophers. Therefore, Schelling implies here that Spinoza's substance was misperceived, which resulted in the veiling of other philosophers, both ancient and modern. Schelling, furthermore, shows that Spinoza's substance as immutable being underlying all existence does not consist of general abstractions.

This defence of Spinoza's substance gestures at pantheism against which Schelling also defended his philosophy.[688] What follows is an excursus into Schelling's take on pantheism. Pantheism is a matter of *Hen kai Pan* insofar as it concerns the relationship of the One and the All. In other words, how can God be All? How can all things be in God? Or how can things be free in God? These three questions boil down to the relationship of the One or God and the All. In keeping with his reading of Spinoza, Schelling's solution is a non-empirical understanding of God and the All as productive that entails intuition and revelation. In his early period, Schelling approached pantheism in three ways. The first two are negative because they highlight the non-empirical understanding of God and the All. The third is positive because it also underscores God and the All as productive through intuition and revelation. In the 27th section of the *Gesammten*, Schelling asserts that "Gott ist nicht die Ursache des All, sondern das All selbst."[689] This is the barest form of pantheism, so to speak, that renders equivalent God and the All. It pushes against an ontological causality from God to the All. Schelling follows this with the rhetorical question: "So ist, wird man sagen, dieses System Pantheismus?"[690] His answer is that

[688] At the beginning of the second decade of the 19th-century, Schelling and Jacobi found themselves in the *Streit um die göttlichen Dinge*. Schelling's 1812 *Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen* (*AA* I/18.129-230; *SW* 1/VIII.19-136) is a response to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Schriften zum Streit um die göttlichen Dinge und ihre Offenbarung*, Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 1743-1819. Works. 1998; Bd.3 (Hamburg: Stuttgart: Meiner: Frohmann Holzboog, 2000). See Lewis S. Ford, "The Controversy Between Schelling and Jacobi," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 3, no. 1 (1965): 75–89.
[689] Schelling *AA* II/7,2.135; *SW* 1/VI.177. God is not the cause of the All, but the All itself.
[690] Schelling *AA* II/7,2.135; *SW* 1/VI.177. Thus, one will say, is this system pantheism?

> die Vorstellung, nach welcher die Allheit Gottes so verstanden wird, als ob Alles, d.h. alle sinnlichen Dinge zusammengenommen, Gott wären, aber von diesem ist bei uns überall nicht die Rede, und weit entfernt zu sagen, daß es Gott ist, behaupten wir vielmehr, es sey eben nur sinnlich, weil Privation Gottes.[691]

Schelling does not reveal "the allness of God," but proffers only a clarification that "all sense-perceptible things taken together" are not God, and that God in such a distorted understanding is at best sense-perceptible. Schelling also defends his *Naturphilolosphie* against the charge of pantheism. Equivalent to the claim that God as the All has nothing to do with sense-perceptible reality is that "[…] die Naturphilosophie [hat] die absolute Nicht-Realität der gesammten Erscheinung aufs klarste behauptet und von den Gesetzen, welche nach Kant ihre Möglichkeit aussprechen […]."[692] Schelling asserts this in the *Philosophie und Religion*. Simply stated, the *Naturphilosophie* demonstrates the "non-reality" of all appearances and the laws according to which they are possible. It is a negative solution because it is another way of discounting sense-perceptible reality. In this case, such a reality is equivalent to all appearances and the laws of their possibility.[693] Tilliette aptly clarifies that "Sous sa forme vulgaire, idolâtrique, certainement [ce n'est] pas, et il semble superflu de le dire" Schelling's philosophy is pantheism.[694] He elucidates further that "c'est un panthéisme philosophique, par l'équation qu'il établit entre Dieu et l'Univers, la Nature naturante."[695] Vulgar and philosophical pantheism are two very different things, which point to the anthropological distinction. Schelling's philosophy may be deemed philosophical pantheism. By negating the possibility that sense-perceptible reality is God and the All, such pantheism makes room for a proper conception of God and the All. Tilliette, however, mistakenly asserts that in philosophical pantheism "L'idée de création est proscrite."[696] This is surprising because he accurately indicates the equivalence of God and the universe as *natura naturans*, whose Latin

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[691] Schelling, *AA* II/7,2.136; *SW* 1/VI.177-8. The representation, according to which the Allness of God is thus understood, as if the All, that is, all sense-perceptible things taken together, are God, but the discussion with us is not mainly about this, and far from saying that it is God rather we claim it is even only sense-perceptible because it is a privation of God.

[692] Schelling, *AA* I/14.306; *SW* 1/VI.49. *Naturphilosophie* has most clearly asserted the absolute non-reality of all appearance and of the laws, which according to Kant expresses their possibility.

[693] For this latter claim he refers to his *Fernere Darstellungen*: Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.134; *SW* 1/IV.397

[694] Tilliette (1970), 393. Under its vulgar, idolatrous certainty not, and it seems superfluous to say so.

[695] Tilliette (1970), 393. It is a philosophical pantheism, by the equation that he established between God and the universe, *natura naturata*.

[696] Tilliette (1970), 393. The idea of creation is proscribed.

etymology emphasizes production.[697] Therefore, he unwittingly touches on production, but fails to recognize its significance for Schelling's understanding of pantheism. For the distinction from sense-perceptible reality is only a part. More crucial is the understanding of God and the All as productive.

The solution, so to speak, of productivity is in the *Freiheitscrift*, which contains Schelling's most extensive discussion of pantheism, and in which he builds off of Spinoza. This has received hardly any attention if none at all. Therefore, in order to draw this out, this analysis brackets the discussion of good and evil, the will, and the ground of God, themes that generally receive treatment in this text of Schelling.[698] That God and the All are productive is intimately tied to intuition and revelation, specifically God engaging in the acts of intuition and revelation as they directly concern the All, which hinges on an Ancient Greek conception of likeness to God. The approach to pantheism here is *via* freedom, the theme of the work. Schelling's motivating question is "Wie kann nun die Lehre [des Pantheismus] nothwendig mit der Freiheit streiten, welche so viele in Ansehung des Menschen behauptet haben, gerade um die Freiheit zu retten?"[699] In other words, how is pantheism compatible with freedom when many appeal to pantheism to save freedom? While Schelling does not specify who makes these appeals, his question points to the relationship of God and individual freedom. In simpler terms, how can human beings be free in God? To draw out his answer, it is fitting first to see his conclusion: "So wenig widerspricht sich Immanenz in Gott und Freiheit, daß gerade nur das Freie, und soweit es frei ist, in Gott ist, das

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697 "Nascor," *A Latin Dictionary,* Founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin dictionary revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten by Charlton T. Lewis, Ph.D. and Charles Short, LL.D. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1879. Henceforth, *Lewis*.

698 For a discussion of these topics and other takes on pantheism in the *Freiheitschrift*, see Martin Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1971); Olli Pitkänen, "Schelling's Pantheism and the Problem of Evil," *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology* 78, no. 4–5 (2017): 361–72; G. Anthony Bruno, "Schelling on the Possibility of Evil: Rendering Pantheism, Freedom, and Time Consistent," *Sats* (Aarhus) 18, no. 1 (2017): 1–18; Markus Gabriel, "Schelling's Ontology in the Freedom Essay," *Sats* (Aarhus), (2014); and Markus Gabriel, *Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift*, Bonner philosophische Vorträge und Studien 25 (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2006).

699 Schelling, *AA* I/17.114; *SW* 1/VII.340. How now can the teaching of pantheism necessarily clash with freedom, which so many in view of man have claimed precisely to save freedom?

Unfreie, und soweit es unfrei ist, nothwendig außer Gott."[700] Quite simply, only the free are in God, and the extent to which they are free are they in God, on the one hand; this hints at a possible gradation of freedom and being in God. The opposite applies to those not free, on the other hand.

To establish this, Schelling indicates that "Einen viel höheren Standpunkt gewährt die Betrachtung des göttlichen Wesens selbst, dessen Idee eine Folge, die nicht *Zeugung*, d.h. Setzen eines Selbständigen ist, völlig widersprechen würde."[701] In other words, "the higher viewpoint" is non-empirical and considers a "thing" as a divine being in relation to God, whose quality of "divine" indicates a likeness to Him. Such a being cannot be reduced to something sense perceptible. In this regard, Tilliette correctly comprehends that "Les choses, non en tant qu'elles sont finies et sensibles, mais en tant qu'elles sont fondées et fondues dans la totalité, sont immanentes à Dieu […]."[702] The proper sense of immanence and freedom from the higher perspective is not of finite and sense-perceptible things.

Most importantly, Schelling implies that the relationship of the divine being's idea to God is begetting [*Zeugung*] or production, which has an ancient precedent. In *Philosophie und Religion*, Schelling articulates that "die alte Welt nach ihrer sinnlichen Weise nur durch das Bild *der Zeugung* auszudrücken wußte, indem das Gezeugte von *dem Zeugenden* abhängig und nichtsdestoweniger selbständig ist."[703] He deems this "die wahre transcendntale Theogonie."[704] Put simply, the image of "begetting" among gods is a paradox of dependence and autonomy. The begetter is as autonomous as the begotten because the latter has the same capacity of production as the former. Martin Heidegger sees this to a certain extent in asserting that "Gott selbst [ist] nicht ein

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[700] Schelling, *AA* I/17.120; *SW* 1/VII.347. Immanence in God and freedom so little contradicts itself that precisely only the free, and insofar it is free, is in God, the not-free, and insofar as it is not free, necessarily outside God.
[701] Schelling, *AA* I/17.120; *SW* 1/VII.346. *emphasis added.* The consideration of the divine being itself affords a much higher perspective, whose [the divine essence's] idea the issue, which is not begetting, that is, a positing of an independent [being], would completely contradict.
[702] Tilliette (1970), 393. Things, not in as much as they are finite and sensible, but are grounded and melted into the totality, are immanent in God […].
[703] Schelling, *AA* I/14.294; *SW* 1/VI.35. *emphasis added.* '[T]he ancient world knew to express sense-perceptibly only through the image of begetting, accordingly the produced is dependent of and no less autonomous than the producer.' Schelling perhaps has in mind Hesiod's *Theogony* and other accounts of gods being born.
[704] Schelling, *AA* I/14.294; *SW* 1/VI.35. the true transcendental theogony.

Mechanismus und eine mechanische Ursache, sondern schöpferisches Leben […]."[705] Yet, the begotten is dependent on the former. Schelling makes this point clearer in the *Philosophie der Kunst* in which work, as shown in the second chapter, the Absolute or God emerges as productive. In the 36th section, specifically, when discussing the relationship between the Greek gods, he elucidates that

> Das Verhältniß der Abhängigkeit unter Göttern kann nicht anders denn als Verhältniß der Zeugung vorgestellt werden (Theogonie). – Denn Zeugung ist die einzige Art der Abhängigkeit, bei welcher das Abhängige gleichwohl in sich absolut bleibt.[706]

Production as theogony, in other words, characterizes the relationship amongst the gods, which is marked by a dependence that simultaneously admits of absoluteness in oneself. Thus, a particular god can be God. While it is natural to conceive of Athena as begotten of Zeus, the former is no less eternal and divine than the latter. In the *Philosophie der Kunst*'s 28th section, Schelling confirms that "Jede Idee ist . . . = Gott, aber ein besonderer Gott."[707] The All are gods. Hence, the idea of the divine being as produced is free in God and is a god; the divine being is autonomous and absolute in herself but dependent on God. To Schelling's fault, he does not articulate the nature of this dependence, but also certainly does not revert to ontological causality. Instead, holding to autonomy he in one sense disrupts such a causality.

Heidegger's treatment of this paradox shows that he does not grasp *Hen kai Pan* and productivity more generally. His limited approach to this paradox is manifest in thinking more from the side of dependency. According to him,

> eine Abhängigkeit [muß] gedacht werden, die in sich Raum für Selbständigkeit des Abhängigen gibt, sondern die in sich - wohlgemerkt als Abhängigkeit - wesensmäßig vom Abhängigen fordert, daß es in seinem Seyn frei, d. h. eigenständig kraft seines Wesens sei.[708]

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[705] Heidegger (1971), 150. God Himself ist not a mechanism or a mechanical cause, but a creative life.
[706] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.144; *SW* 1/V.405. The relationship of dependence among gods cannot be represented other than as the relationship of begetting (theogony). — For begetting is the only manner of dependence with which the dependent as it were remains absolute in itself.
[707] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.133; *SW* 1/V.390. Each idea is . . . = God, but a particular god.
[708] Heidegger (1971), 150. A dependency must be considered which gives room in itself for the independence of the dependent, but in itself –as dependency, mind you – essentially demands of the dependent that it in its being be a free, i.e., independent by virtue of its essence.

He is correct that Schelling's conception of dependence is one that must make room for independence in itself. But he errs in insisting that the dependence itself calls for independence. Moreover,"Das abhängige Unabhängige . . . ist nicht widersprechend," he insists, but then he deems such a being "die »derivierte Absolutheit«."[709] In deeming the latter "so wenig widersprechend" and "der Mittelbegriff der ganzen Philosophie," Schelling's tone is one of concession and not complete agreement.[710] Heidegger overlooks Schelling's attitude of conceding; instead, he emphasizes too strongly the derived absoluteness imposing a scheme of derivation of the divine beings from God, of the *Pan* from the *Hen*, thus overlooking *Hen kai Pan*.

Begetting or production translates into both revelation and intuition in the *Freiheitschrift*. More specifically, God reveals Himself in and as the divine beings or things and intuits these things. Revelation and intuition essentially are the same though they differ qualitatively, as noted in the third chapter. In the former, Schelling makes explicit the Ancient Greek principle of likeness to God that enables this productive understanding of God and the All. Regarding revelation,

> Die Folge der Dinge aus Gott ist eine Selbstoffenbarung Gottes. Gott aber kann nur sich offenbar werden in dem, *was ihm ähnlich ist*, in freien aus sich selbst handelnden Wesen; für deren Seyn es keinen Grund gibt als Gott, die aber sind, sowie Gott ist.[711]

Things, in other words, are produced out of God as "a self-revelation of God." These things exist in the same way God does for God produces Himself in things only like Himself, which are free acting beings or gods. The notion of likeness hearkens back to a key passage at the beginning of the text.

> Es kommt auf die Bestimmung des Princips an, mit welchem der Mensch überhaupt erkennt; […] wer . . . wisse, daß es eine ganz alte Lehre sey, daß Gleiches von Gleichem erkannt werde (welche angeblich von Pythagoras herkomme, aber bei Platon angetroffen werde, weit früher aber von Empedokles ausgesprochen worden sey), werde verstehen, daß der Philosoph eine solche (göttliche) Erkenntniß behaupte […].[712]

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[709] Heidegger (1971), 151. The dependent independent being, the 'derived absoluteness,' is not contradictory.
[710] Schelling, *AA* I/17.120; *SW* 1/VII.347. thus, hardly contradictory . . . the middle term of the whole of philosophy […].
[711] Schelling, *AA* I/17.120; *SW* 1/VII.347. *emphasis added*. The issue of things out from God is a self-revelation of God. God, however, can only manifest himself in that which is similar to him, in free beings acting out from themselves; for such beings there is no [other] reason than God, and they exist just as God exists.
[712] Schelling, *AA* I/17.111-2; *SW* 1/VII.337. It depends on the determination of the principle with which man mainly knows […]. [W]hoever . . . proceeds and knows from the physical theory that it is an ancient teaching that like is recognized by like (which reportedly comes from Pythagoras, but is also found in Plato, but had been expressed much earlier by Empedocles), will understand that the philosophy claims such a (divine) knowledge, because he alone, in keeping the understanding pure and untarnished by evil, comprehends with God in himself the God outside of him.

Schelling quotes here *Adversus Grammaticos* of Sextus Empiricus, a Pyrrhonist Sceptic and medical doctor, to emphasize the principle of "like being recognized only by like."[713] Sextus attributes this principle to the Ancient Greek philosophers Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles.[714] This principle means that only a divine being recognizes the divine God. Moreover, the ability to recognize God depends on possessing divine knowledge that is in the province of the philosopher. In quoting Sextus, Schelling not only displays his Hellenism, but also implies that he conceives of the philosopher as divine, and, even more, godlike. To Heidegger's credit he seems to grasp this by noting that "Gott ist der Mensch."[715] The divine knowledge makes the philosopher a divine being in whom God reveals Himself and as whom God reveals Himself—the limited ambit of this thesis prevents a deeper exploration of the implications of deification and theosis here.

Heidegger, however, does not comprehend fully this understanding of revelation. For he argues that "Wenn Gott als Grund in dem von ihm Gegründeten sich offenbart, so kann er nur sich selbst darin offenbaren."[716] Schelling does not use the language of grounding in this passage. By doing so, Heidegger betrays that he cannot escape an ontological causality between the ground and the grounded. The focus in this passage is revelation as a matter of begetting. The things or divine beings that come out from God are a revelation of God. Schelling presents intuition similarly. "Gott schaut die Dinge an sich an. An sich ist nur das Ewige, auf sich selbst Beruhende, Wille, Freiheit."[717] God's intuition of the ideas or the things in themselves is a matter of begetting. God produces the things in themselves or divine beings by intuiting them as they are, that is, as free and eternal.

This productive conception of God and the All allows the latter to be free by being in the former where the latter are no less God. In a non-empirical sense, God can be All insofar as He

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[713] Sextus Empiricus, *OCD*.
[714] Cf. Empiricus Sextus, *Sexti Empirici Opera*, ed. Hermann Mutschmann and Jürgen Mau, vol. 3, 4 vols, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Lipsiae: B. G. Teubneri, 1958). 1-82.
[715] Heidegger (1971), 151. The human being is God.
[716] Heidegger (1971), 150-51. If God as the ground reveals Himself in that which is grounded by Him, thus he reveals only Himself in it.
[717] Schelling, *AA* I/17.120; *SW* 1/VII.347. God intuits things by themselves. By itself is only the eternal, what is based on itself, will, freedom.

reveals Himself as or in the All; likewise, God can be the All insofar as he intuits the All. This is Schelling's solution to pantheism. While it highlights God's actions of intuition and revelation, it should be remembered that insofar as the divine beings are like God, and even are God, they also engage in such actions in the same absolute manner. To wit, with a divine knowledge, the philosopher engages in the act of intuition, as we have seen in the second and third chapters. In this way, the All or divine beings are productive—this receives further attention in the last section. Human freedom, therefore, is a divine being's partaking of God's intuition of things that are like Him. Markus Gabriel gestures at this in asserting that "philosophical theorizing is itself an expression of freedom."[718]

The proper conception of God, therefore, points to the need to grasp Him with the commensurate faculty, namely, intellectual intuition. Schelling's *Ichschrift* unfolds the synonymity of intellectual intuition and *Hen kai Pan* first by sharpening the distinction between the former and imagination. At the end of the preface, Schelling famously notes that " […] ich [darf] es [hoffen], daß mir noch irgend eine glückliche Zeit vorbehalten ist, in der es mir möglich wird, der Idee, ein Gegenstück zu Spinozas Ethik aufzustellen, Realität zu geben."[719] And insofar as Schelling sees the complement as intellectual intuition, his 1802 *Fernere Darstellungen*, published seven years after the *Ichschrift*, fulfills this intent. For it elaborates on "die Natur . . . der intellektuellen Anschauung."[720] Tilliette is correct in this respect that "Il maintient l'Un et Tout, mais il le vise autrement que Spinoza."[721] As already mentioned above, in the *Ichschrift*, Schelling emphasizes that "Ἑν καὶ πᾶν . . . [ist] nach dem sie bisher als dem höchsten Preise des Siegs gerungen hat."[722] The "the highest prize of victory" is the "most sublime of all knowledge" of philosophy mentioned in the *Fernere Darstellungen*. Schelling, therefore, attributes these two qualifiers to *Hen kai Pan*.

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[718] Gabriel (2014), 77.
[719] Schelling, *AA* I/2.80; *SW* 1/I.159. I may hope that for me some happy time is reserved in which it becomes possible to give reality to the idea of establishing a complement to Spinoza's *Ethica*.
[720] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.102; *SW* 1/IV.361. the nature . . . intellectual intuition.
[721] Tilliette (1970), 390. He maintains *Hen kai Pan*, but he aims at it differently than Spinoza.
[722] Schelling, *AA* I/2.119; *SW* 1/I.193. *Hen kai Pan* . . . [is] the highest prize of victory according to which it [philosophy] until now has wrestled.

Then, in the *Ichschrift*'s ninth section, which contains the assertion that "Das Ich ist schlechthin Einheit," Schelling reads intellectual intuition and its sharp distinction from the imagination as the center of Spinoza's *Ethica.*[723] According to him, "Spinoza . . . erklärt, daß, wer Gott im empirischen Sinne Einen nenne, oder für ein bloßes Abstraktum halte, keine Ahnung von seinem Wesen habe."[724] This points to the negation of an empirical God. Schelling follows this with a hefty footnote that draws on Spinoza's different works, but mostly the *Ethica.* First, he quotes from Spinoza's letter to Ludovico Meyer:

> Cum multa sint, quae nequaquam in imaginatione, sed *solo intellectu* assequi possumus, qualia sunt Substantia, Aeternitas et al. si quis talia ejusmodi notionibus, quae duntaxat *auxilia imaginationis* sunt, explicare conatur, nihilo plus agit, quam si det operam, ut sua imaginatione insaniat.[725]

Spinoza highlights here the importance of the intellect and awareness of its distinction from the imagination. To explain substance or eternity by auxiliaries of the imagination, which Spinoza implies are mere concepts, is insanity. Schelling confirms that "um diese Stelle zu verstehen, wissen, daß er die abstrahirten Begriffe für bloße Produkte der Einbildungskraft hielt."[726] Therefore, one cannot take for granted the ontological status of an abstract concept, but must become aware that it is a product "of the imagination," and as such differs from intellectual intuition.[727]

This distinction between imagination and intellectual intuition emerges in the 40th proposition of the *Ethica*, specifically the second scholium, which Schelling also cites in this footnote. Spinoza, in this proposition, catalogues sources from which one can form universal notions: (1) *cognitio ab experientia vaga*; (2) *opinio* or *imaginatio*; (3) *ratio*; (4) *scientia intuitiva.*[728] It is

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[723] Schelling, *AA* I/2.107; *SW* 1/I.182. *Das Ich* is absolutely unity.
[724] Schelling, *AA* I/2.110; *SW* 1/I.185. explains that whoever calls God 'one' in the empirical sense, or considers [Him] a mere abstraction, has no idea of his essence.
[725] Spinoza, *SO* IV, 57. *Emphasis added.* "Because there are many things, which are not in the imagination, but by the intellect alone we are able to understand, such things are substance, eternity, etc. If anyone attempts to explain such things of this sort with notions, which are merely auxiliaries of the imagination, he does nothing more than if he takes pains in order that he acts crazily by his imagination." As quoted in Schelling, *AA* I/2.110; *SW* 1/I.185. "Noch gehören zu diesen mehrere andere, vorzüglich Eth. L. II, Prop. XL. Schol. und S. 467 seiner Briefe."
[726] Schelling, *AA* I/2.110; *SW* 1/I.185. to understand this passage, one must know that he [Spinoza] considers abstract concepts as mere products of the imagination [*Einbildungskraft*].
[727] Cf. footnote 278.
[728] Spinoza, *SO* II, 122. (1) knowledge from wandering experience; (2) opinion or imagination; (3) reason; (4) intellectual intuition.

striking that Spinoza numbers the first three together, while he mentions *scientia intuitiva* on its own. This shows its uniqueness and the need to separate it strictly from the other three epistemological types. Schelling appears to interpret *scientia intuitiva* as equivalent to *intellektuale Anshauung* or "intellectual intuition." The adjective "intuitiva" corresponds to the German noun *Anschauung* or "intuition;" the noun "scientia," which means "science, intelligence, or knowledge"—see chapter five—speaks to the adjective *intellektuale* or "intellectual" taking from the Latin "intellectus," which can signify "understanding, and knowledge."[729] Spinoza, on the one hand, defines the imagination as that by which "ideas formemus similes" to recalled sense-perceptions, "per quas res imaginamur."[730] Opinion or imagination, in other words, proceeds from the memory of certain sense experiences to form analogies of them, which then further spurs the imagination. On the other hand, Spinoza defines intellectual intuition as a "cognoscendi genus procedit ab adaequata idea essentiae formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum."[731] Put differently, intellectual intuition is movement within ideas from the form of God to His essence. In the *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling holds to this understanding as it concerns the Absolute's form and essence.

> Denn die intellektuelle Anschauung ist absolut, d.h. in derselben ist das Absolute, aber nur als Erkennen, d.h. formell, und so, daß diese formelle Absolutheit immer noch der Absolutheit an und für sich selbst entgegengesetzt werden könnte.[732]

Intellectual intuition as the formal Absolute is absolutely one with "absoluteness by and for itself." Again, one must not reify the difference. That Schelling qualifies this with *könnte* shows that this opposition is merely possible, not necessary. With this distinction in view, Schelling declares that

> Die niedrigste Stufe der Erkenntniß ist ihm bloße Imagination der einzelnen Dinge, die höchste – reine intellektuale Anschauung der unendlichen Attribute der absoluten Substanz, und die dadurch entstehende adäquate Erkenntniß des Wesens der Dinge. Dieß ist der höchste Punkt seines Systems. Bloße verworrene

[729] "Scientia," *Lewis*; "intellektuale," *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*.
[730] Spinoza, *SO* II, 122. […] we form ideas similar. . . through which we imagine things.
[731] Spinoza, *SO* II, 122. type of knowing [that] proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of a certain attribute of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.
[732] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.116; *SW* 1/IV.376. For intellectual intuition is absolute, namely that in which is the Absolute; however, it is only as recognition, namely formal, and in a way that this formal absoluteness always is able to be opposed to the absoluteness by and for itself.

> Imagination ist ihm Quelle alles Irrthums, intellectuale Anschauung Gottes Quelle aller Wahrheit und Vollkommenheit im ausgedehntesten Sinn des Worts.[733]

Schelling emphasizes that the "highest point" of Spinoza's system is the distinction between "imagination" and "intellectual intuition," which repeats the point from his letter. For imagination, the source of concepts, also to be "the source of all error" underscores that intellectual intuition of God is the source of all truth and completeness. This further implies that the distinction between imagination and intellectual intuition cannot be grasped merely by a concept, but only intellectual intuition itself. Simply put, the highest point in Spinoza's system for Schelling is that intellectual intuition, as the true and complete source of knowledge, is aware of itself and its distinction from imagination. Only in this way can one be sure to have the proper grasp of notions like "substance" and "eternity."

Moreover, Schelling confirms in the *Fernere Darstellungen* that Spinoza "die intellektuelle Anschauung als alleiniges Princip der höchsten Erkenntnißart und selbst mit einer Klarheit erkannt hat, wie wenige vor ihm und beinahe keiner nach ihm."[734] Similarly, in the eighth letter of the *Briefe* Schelling argues that "Ihm ist intellektuale Anschauung des Absoluten das Höchste, die letzte Stufe der Erkenntniß, zu der ein endliches Wesen sich erheben kann, das eigentliche Leben des Geistes."[735] Distinguishing intellectual intuition from imagination, therefore, is not a one-time event with the grasp of a concept, but a process of "raising oneself to" such intuition to live by it. In this context, Schelling follows with a footnote.

> Alle adäquaten, d.h. unmittelbaren Erkenntnisse sind nach Spinoza Anschauungen göttlicher Attribute, und der Hauptsatz, auf dem seine Ethik (insofern sie dieß ist) beruht, ist der Satz: *mens humana habet adaequatam cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei. Eth. L.* II, *Prop.* 47.[736]

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[733] Schelling, *AA* I/2.111; *SW* 1/I.185. The lowest rung of knowledge [*Erkenntniß*] for him [Spinoza] is the mere imagination of particular things, the highest — pure intellectual intuition of the infinite attributes of the absolute substance, and the adequate knowledge [*Erkenntniß*] of the essence of things arising from there. This is the highest point of his system. Mere confused imagination is for him the source of all error, intellectual intuition of God [is] the source of all truth and completeness in the broadest sense of the word.

[734] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.96; *SW* 1/IV.354. has recognized intellectual intuition as the sole principle of the highest manner of knowledge and even with a clarity itself as few before him and nearly no one after him.

[735] Schelling, *AA* I/3.86; *SW* 1/I.317. For him [Spinoza] intellectual intuition of the Absolute is the highest, the last step of knowledge, to which a finite being [*Wesen*] can raise itself, the actual life of the intellect.

[736] Schelling, *AA* I/3.86; *SW* 1/I.317. All adequate, that is, direct knowledge [*Erkenntnisse*] is intuitions of a divine attribute according to Spinoza, and the main principle on which his *Ethica* is based (insofar as it is this), is the sentence: the human mind has adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Spinoza's *Ethica*, in other words, is grounded on the notion that the human mind possesses intellectual intuition. To what extent each mind realizes this fact, Spinoza does not say. In a more encompassing sense, then, the existence of the distinction between imagination and intellectual intuition is equivalent to the possibility of intellectual intuition in the human mind.

Schelling then immediately follows his conclusion in the *Ichschrift* by adding a passage from the scholium of the *Ethica*'s 43rd proposition to show the equivalence between intellectual intuition and *Hen kai Pan*.

> »Quid, sagt er im zweiten Buch seiner Ethik Prop. XLIII. Schol., quid idea vera clarius et certius dari potest, quod norma sit veritatis? Sane, sicut lux se ipsam et tenebras manifestat, ita veritas norma sui et falsi est«. – Was geht über die stille Wonne dieser Worte, das Ἑν καὶ πᾶν unsers besseren Lebens?[737]

For Schelling to follow the statement that "intellectual intuition of God is the source of all truth and completeness" with "the standard of truth" demonstrates that intellectual intuition itself is this very standard and only it gives "a true idea." The following analogy of light and darkness illustrates that just as one can behold light and simultaneously darkness, so also with truth and falsity: one not only knows truth but also by awareness of it becomes certain of falsity. The same carries over into intellectual intuition and imagination. Schelling repeats this same point nine years later in the hefty eighth section of the *Gesammten*: "Es ist eine unmittelbare Erkenntniß Gottes oder des Absoluten."[738] In the context of the relationship between the form of absolute affirmation, as intellectual intuition, and the Absolute, Schelling remarks that as the former "[…] das Licht [ist] in dem wir das Absolute begreifen."[739] He then employs the same analogy: "Wie die sinnlichen Dinge für das sinnliche Auge nicht sich selbst affirmiren, sondern durch das Licht affirmirt werden, dieses dagegen sich selbst affirmirt und sowohl sich selbst als die Finsterniß offenbart."[740] Tilliette, too,

[737] Schelling, *AA* I/2.111; *SW* 1/I.185. "'What,' he [Spinoza] says in the second book of his *Ethica* Prop. XLIII. Schol., 'is able to give a true idea clearer and more certain than the standard of truth? Certainly, as light reveals itself and darkness, in this way truth is the standard of itself and falsehood [*veritas norma sui et falsi est*].' What compares to the quiet delight of these words, the *Hen kai Pan* of our better life?" Schelling quotes from Spinoza, *SO* II, 124.
[738] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.115; *SW* 1/VI.150. There is a direct knowledge of God or the Absolute
[739] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.118; *SW* 1/VI.155. is the light in which we grasp the Absolute.
[740] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.118; *SW* 1/VI.155. As the sense-perceptible things for the sense-perceptible eye do not affirm themselves, but are affirmed through light, this in contrast affirms itself and reveals both itself and darkness.

reads "l'intuition intellectuelle . . . [comme] une lumiere qui s'eclaire elle même et les tenebres."[741] This is the main point in this passage from the *Ichschrift*: intellectual intuition allows the identification of itself and simultaneously the awareness of imagination and other lesser epistemological forms. In this way one is not unwittingly beholden to one's concepts, mistaking them for clear and distinct knowledge.

More importantly, the "quiet delight" in the process of producing intellectual intuition and clarifying it from imagination is "the *Hen kai Pan* of our better life." "[L]a volupté calme," according to Tilliette, is where this production and clarification are "d'une expérience enivrante" that "Schelling voit dans les théorèmes de l' *Ethique*."[742] Schelling implies by the rhetorical question that *Hen kai Pan* emerges as the process of producing intellectual intuition; more nuanced, it is a coming to realization of intellectual intuition and its difference from imagination. Ehrhardt affirms that "das ἕν καὶ πᾶν . . . von Schelling gebunden wird an Spinozas Satz: veritas norma sui et falsi est."[743] Therefore, *Hen kai Pan* is the ambit for the endless producing of intellectual intuitions; by constantly weaving between the One and the All, intellectual intuition produces itself in the One and the All, and as the One and All. Tilliette confirms that "par transfert au mythique Ἓν καὶ πᾶν, elle [l'intuition intellectuelle] beneficie de leur polyvalence et s'enrichit de significations."[744] While intellectual intuition and *Hen kai Pan* are identical, the latter differs to the extent that it touches on the differentiation of the former from imagination. This, however, does not mean that imagination is a part of *Hen kai Pan*; it is intellectual intuition through and through. In that vein, Beiser correctly observes that "the term "absolute" among the romantics" has as "its cognate "the one and all" (*Hen kai Pan*)."[745] Moreover, he is right that for Schelling the Absolute as the universe points to a kind of "vitalism: that the single universal substance is an organism, which is in a constant process

[741] Tilliette (1970), 409. Intellectual intuition . . . [as] a light which illuminates itself and darkness.
[742] Tilliette (1995), 58. calm lust . . . an intoxicating experience . . . Schelling sees in the theorems of the *Ethica.*
[743] Ehrhardt (2000), XLVI. the *Hen kai Pan* . . . is connected by Schelling to Spinoza's sentence: *veritas norma sui et falsi est.*
[744] Tilliette (1995), 55. […] by transfer to the mythical Ἓν καὶ πᾶν, it [intellectual intuition] benefits from its [Ἓν καὶ πᾶν] polyvalence and enriches itself with significations.
[745] Beiser (2002), 352.

of growth and development."[746] Such vitalism points to an understanding of the Absolute as *Hen kai Pan* and intellectual intuition as productive, which affirms that Schelling considers synonymous *Hen kai Pan* and intellectual intuition. In any case, although the discussion largely has been on Spinoza's understanding of intellectual intuition and its distinction from imagination, it is important to realize that Schelling takes both of these matters to be equivalent to *Hen kai Pan*. Simply, there is no *Hen kai Pan* without intellectual intuition and the process of intellectual intuition distinguishing itself from imagination, and vice versa. With regard to Spinoza, the confluence of intellectual intuition and *Hen kai Pan* is salient, which establishes more clearly the productivity of the later. The remaining account of the history of *Hen kai Pan* assumes intellectual intuition.

Leibniz's and Heraclitus' Productive Dualities

Continuing along the brief history of *Hen kai Pan*, Schelling makes a stop at Leibniz and Heraclitus.[747] Both emphasize the *Pan*, specifically *Pan* as two, which two also are no less the *Hen*. According to Schelling,

> Die gedoppelte Einheit aller Dinge, und wie jedes ursprünglich in seiner Besonderheit absolut und in seiner Absolutheit besonder sey, werdet ihr leicht in der Monadenlehre des Leibniz erblicken, deren Ursprung ihr selbst wieder in eine unbestimmbare Ferne verfolgen könnt.[748]

In Schelling's reading of Leibniz, *Hen kai Pan* emerges as a "double unity," which dovetails with the mutual interpenetration of "particularity" and "absoluteness" insofar as both are fully by themselves the Absolute, as seen in chapter two. Both *Hen* and *Pan* are the same. Put simply, both speak to "Leibniz's doctrine of Monads." In a letter to the German theologian Wilhelm Bierling, Leibniz defines "Monas seu substantia simplex in genere continet perceptionem et appetitum, estque vel primitiva seu Deus, in qua est ultima ratio rerum, vel est derivativa, nempe Monas

[746] Beiser (2002), 352.
[747] For a study of the relationship between Schelling and Leibniz, see Anton Brenner: *Schellings Verhältnis zu Leibniz. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Wiedererwachens der echten Leibnizschen Philosophie (nach der Herrschaft der Wolffischen Schule) und zur Entwicklung der Schellingschen Philosophie*, Diss. Tübingen 1937.
[748] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.138; *SW* 1/IV.401. The doubled unity of all things, and how each originally is absolute in its particularity and particular in its absoluteness, you will easily see in Leibniz's doctrine of Monads, whose origin you yourself are able to follow again into an indefinite distance.

Creata."[749] As a simple substance, a monad can be "God" who is *Hen*, or a "created monad," which is *Pan*. In either case, the meaning of "unity" mostly shines through. For as Leibniz explains etymologically in his essay, "Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, fondés en raison," "Monas est un mot Grec, qui signifie l'Unité, ou ce qui est un."[750] He elaborates further that "Les Monades, n'ayant point de parties, ne sauroient être formées ny défaites."[751] Hence, they are simple and eternal. In regard to the latter, Leibniz notes further that "Elles ne peuvent commencer ny finir naturellement, et durent par consequent autant que l'univers, qui sera changé, mais qui ne sera point détruit."[752] In one sense, Schelling takes monads to be productive like ideas, as also expressed in the teaching of ideas by Pythagoras and Plato—more on this below. In the *Methodologie*'s eleventh lecture, where he defines nature in terms of the ideas, Schelling explains that

> *das Produciren Gottes* [ist] eine *Einbildung* der ganzen Allgemeinheit und Wesenheit in besondere Formen, wodurch diese, als besondere, doch zugleich Universa und das sind, was die Philosophen Monaden oder Ideen genannt haben.[753]

Monads, in other words, are contradictorily particular Universa or the *Pan*. In this way the monads are a double unity. As individual and particular a monad is a unity, and as a universe it is a unity. Schelling elucidates this in his 1804 *Propädeutik der Philosophie*, published posthumously.[754] He argues that "Die Monaden sind Seelen; jede derselben ist eine Welt für sich und ein lebendiger Spiegel des Universum."[755] The monads reflect the double unity of being a "world for itself" and simultaneously "a living mirror of the universe." They, in turn, exist and are based on the producing of God, the *Einbildung* or literally "producing into one," which is one side of the mutual interpenetration of the universal and particular.[756] Since this is an absolute producing, it cannot be

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[749] Leibniz, *DPS* VII, 484. a monad or simple substance in kind [as that which] contains perception and appetite, and is either first or God, or is derivative, [which are] certainly created monads.
[750] Leibniz, *DPS* VI, 598. 'Monad' is a Greek word, which signifies unity or that which is one.
[751] Leibniz, *DPS* VI, 598. Monads do not have the aspect of parts, nor could they know to be formed or undone.
[752] Leibniz, *DPS* VI, 598. They are not able to begin or end naturally, and accordingly they last as long as the universe, which will change, but which will not be destroyed.
[753] Schelling, *AA* I/14.145; *SW* 1/V.317. *emphasis added.* the producing of God is an *Einbildung* of the entire universality and essentiality into particular forms, through which, these as particular yet simultaneously are Universa, and are that which the philosophers have called monads […].
[754] Cf. footnote 275. The text shares the same Editorischer Bericht with the *Gesammten*.
[755] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.77; *SW* 1/VI.104. The monads are souls; each of these is a world for itself and a living mirror of the universe.
[756] Cf. footnote 106.

understood purely by itself, but simultaneously implies the producing of the particular into the universal. As seen in the second chapter, production is a matter of the mutual interpenetration of the universal and particular. This shows that Schelling interprets Leibniz's monads as a formulation of *Hen kai Pan* and as productive.[757]

Schelling also reads the iteration of *Hen kai Pan* as dual unities in the writings of Johannes Kepler, a fellow native of Leonberg. In the *Methodologie*'s twelfth lecture, Schelling asserts that

> Die Gründe der Keplerschen Gesetze lassen sich, ohne allen empirischen Zusatz, rein aus *der Lehre von den Ideen* und den *zwei Einheiten* einsehen, die an sich selbst Eine Einheit sind, und kraft deren jedes Wesen, indem es in sich selbst absolut, zugleich im Absoluten ist, und umgekehrt.[758]

Schelling's analysis of physics, particularly through the work of Kepler, entails identifying how his law of the elliptical character of planetary orbits speaks to the doctrine of *Hen kai Pan*. Particularly, there are two forms of the doctrine at play in this reading, which points to their essential identity with their difference being only a matter of perspective. One is the "teaching of the ideas," which we bracket for now and save for the next section; the other is "Two unities" or Leibniz's double unity. Namely, each planet is a unity with its own elliptical orbit around the sun; simultaneously, all solar planets form a unity insofar as one can characterize their orbits as elliptical, and all are with respect to the same sun. Schelling, to be certain, is not arguing that Leibniz influenced Kepler. Rather, Kepler's reflections on physics show these metaphysical underpinnings.

Furthermore, in the seventh lecture, Schelling touches on the duality to which Leibniz's teaching of monads is amenable. In the context of observing the dualism inherent in modern philosophy, with Spinoza as the exception, Schelling mentions that "Leibniz seine Lehre in einer Form aussprach, die der Dualismus sich wieder aneignen konnte."[759] Schelling, to be clear, does

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[757] For Schelling's comparison of Leibniz and Spinoza, cf. Schelling, *SW* 1/VI.104. Man muß diesen Atomismus im Gegensatz gegen den Spinozismus betrachten, um ihn ganz klar zu erkennen. Spinoza sagt: es ist nur Ein Universum und Eine Substanz; Leibniz: es sind so viel Universa und so viel Substanzen als Monaden sind. Die absolute Substanz wird durch die Vielheit nicht getheilt, denn sie ist in jeder Monas ganz; nur auf diesem sich selbst-gleich-Seyn beruht die Einheit der Substanz; sie ist nicht numerisch, sondern dem Begriff oder der Idee nach Eine, und hört daher auch durch die Vielheit der Monaden nicht auf absolut Eine zu seyn.

[758] Schelling, *AA* I/14.154; *SW* 1/V.329. *emphasis added.* The reasons of Kepler's laws are, with all empirical addition, able to be perceived purely from the teaching of the ideas and the two unities, which by themselves are one unity themselves, and by virtue of which [unity] each essence, in that it is absolute in itself, simultaneously is in the Absolute, and vice versa

[759] Schelling, *AA* I/14.107; *SW* 1/V.273. Leibniz expressed his teaching in a form which dualism could adopt again.

not take dualism and the dual unities of *Hen kai Pan* to be synonymous.[760] In the latter, monads cannot be pinned as either a particular or the whole universe, but are simultaneously and productively both, and in which both unities are actually one. Schelling confirms this understanding in the *Propädeutik* when transitioning away from Cartesian dualism. He mentions "einer höheren Auslegung" of the monads in which

> [e]s bestehen zwei wirklich verschiedene Substanzen, Seele und Leib, nebeneinander, aber beide wissen nichts voneinander und haben keinen direkten Einfluß aufeinander, sondern stimmen miteinander überein bloß kraft einer von Ewigkeit prästabilirten Harmonie.[761]

In other words, soul and body illustrate the dual unities by being two absolute unities; from the absolute standpoint they are absolutely one.

In the *Fernere Darstellungen*'s short account of *Hen kai Pan*, Schelling then moves on to Heraclitus, who simply had a productive conception of opposition as a form of *Hen Kai Pan*. Schelling avers that "Die Einheit in der Entgegensetzung (Identität in der Duplicität) als allgemeine Form des Universums hat auch Heraklitus nicht zuerst erkannt."[762] A theme running through this brief history of *Hen kai Pan* is that ancient yet indeterminable precedents exist for each form of *Hen Kai Pan*. That Heraclitus was not the first to recognize this doctrine implies its pre-Greek provenance. The "unity" or *Hen* is grasped in the *Pan* or "opposition," which Schelling deems in apposition to "identity" or *Hen* in "duplicity" or *Pan*. This, as is becoming apparent, can speak to all forms other than the *Hen*.

The early Christian theologian, Hippolytus of Rome, provides a clear testimony of Heraclitus and *Hen kai Pan*. In the ninth book of Hippolytus' Φιλοσοφούμενα ή κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων ἔλεγχος or in Latin, *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium*, a bountiful source on what appeared

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[760] In the fourth section of the *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling discusses the wrong strictly materialist interpretation of Leibniz's monads. Cf. Schelling, *SW* 1/VI.104. Die erste dem Materialismus entsprechende Form des Idealismus ist die eines intellektuellen Atomismus, als welche ich die Leibnizische Monadenlehre bestimme. Ich sage intellektuellen Atomismus; denn es ist ein vollkommenes Mißverständniß, wenn man die Monaden des Leibniz als physische Atomen verstanden hat, obgleich dieß sehr allgemein geschehen ist. Leibniz selbst definirt die Monas als reine vorstellende Kraft, und läßt alle Materie selbst nur in den Vorstellungen der Monaden existiren.

[761] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.67; *SW* 1/VI.91. a higher interpretation . . . there are two actual different substances, soul and body, next to one another, but both know nothing of the other and have no direct influence on each other but agree with each other merely by virtue of a harmony preestablished from eternity.

[762] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.138; *SW* 1/IV.401. Even Heraclitus did not first recognize the unity in opposition (identity in duplicity) as a universal form of the universe.

to Hippolytus as opposing doctrines to Christian orthodoxy, he quotes Heraclitus as saying that οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἶναι.[763] Simply, Heraclitus deems it wisdom that "the one is all." Diogenes Laertius' *Vitae Philosophorum* furnishes a more lucid example of Heraclitus in which *Hen kai Pan* comes forth as the dual unities. According to Laertius, the philosopher judged that γίνεσθαί τε πάντα κατ' ἐναντιότητα καὶ ῥεῖν τὰ ὅλα ποταμοῦ δίκην, πεπεράνθαι τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἕνα εἶναι κόσμον.[764] In this account, Heraclitus refers to opposition, the all or *Pan*, and the one or *Hen*. The *Pan* is produced through opposition, which exhibits an understanding of *Hen kai Pan* as productive. Laertius employs the analogy of a river whose rivulets are wholes that flow justice. This illustrates unity and plurality in which all streams or wholes essentially are part of one river of justice. The understanding of opposition here speaks in one sense to Schelling's own insofar as they are resolved in the one world of the All and the One. This form of *Hen kai Pan* speaks to production as the identification of universal and particular, and real and ideal. For in each of these pairs are the two fully and completely the Absolute, which indicates a productive weaving between duality and unity. This section has explored *Hen kai Pan* as it manifests as dual unities in both Leibniz and Heraclitus.

Pythagoras' and Plato's Productive *Pans*

The first and primary thinkers for Schelling in this brief history are Pythagoras and Plato. Schelling avers that "die Lehre von den Ideen findet ihr schon bei Pythagoras und noch mehr bei Plato als Ueberlieferung."[765] As seen in the third chapter, these two thinkers speak directly to Schelling's notions of intellectual intuition and *Hen kai Pan* in the context of Greek Mystery religions. It is worth noting that Schelling *prima facie* juxtaposes "the unity in opposition" of Heraclitus with Pythagoras' and Plato's "teaching of ideas," as signified above by the adverb

[763] Diels and Kranz (1951), Frag. 50. It is wise that those having heard not me, but the account confess that the one is all.
[764] Diogenes Laertius (1964), Bk.9, sec.8. "All things are produced according to opposition and the wholes flow forth justice from a river; both the all and the one [ἕνα] are fulfilled and are one world." This also appears in Diels and Kranz (1951), Frag. 1.50.
[765] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.138; *SW* 1/IV.401. You find the teaching of the ideas already with Pythagoras and still more with Plato as translation.

"Even." This confirms that both these teachings are different aspects of *Hen kai Pan*. In the *Methodologie*'s seventh lecture, Schelling expounds that

> Daß die Philosophie ihrem Wesen nach ganz in der Absolutheit ist und auf keine Weise aus ihr herausgeht, ist eine vielfach ausgesprochene Behauptung. Sie kennt vom Unendlichen zum Endlichen keinen Uebergang, und beruht ganz auf der Möglichkeit, die Besonderheit in der Absolutheit und diese in jener zu begreifen, welches der Grund der Lehre von den Ideen ist.[766]

Philosophy as the teaching of the ideas holds to the productive contradiction of absoluteness and particularity like Leibniz's and Heraclitus' productive dualities, a possibility that recognizes no passing from the infinite to the finite. This allows philosophy to dwell entirely in absoluteness. On the one hand, the teaching of the ideas emphasizes the plurality of ideas as one in the Absolute. As many, the ideas are between the All and the One and are not two. This implies that they can inhabit the *Pan*. On the other hand, the teaching of the ideas underscores that each idea itself is the Absolute. This is the productive metaphysical contradiction that is the teaching of the ideas. Tilliette exclaims that "Et pourtant, nonobstant l'unité intrinsèque de l'Idée, il y a une pluralité d'idées."[767]

Regrettably, the paucity of the Pythagorean corpus prevents us from substantiating his holding to *Hen kai Pan* as the teaching of the ideas. One indirect testimony, however, recounts that after studying in Egypt, Pythagoras τὴν γὰρ μονάδα ἀρχὴν ἁπάντων λέγων καὶ ταύτην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων αἰτίαν εἶναι, δι᾽ ἀλληγορίας ἕνα τε καὶ μόνον διδάσκει θεὸν εἶναι.[768] On the one hand, the "monad" can be taken as the *Hen* and "everything" as the *Pan*, which is a veiled reference to the teaching of the ideas. "God" as "the one and alone" also can be understood as the *Hen*, on the other hand, which implies the ideas.

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[766] Schelling, *AA* I/14.111; *SW* 1/V.278. That philosophy according to its essence is entirely in absoluteness and in no way proceeds out of it, is an often-expressed claim. It is familiar with no passage from the infinite to the finite and is based entirely on the possibility of grasping particularity in absoluteness and this in that, which is the basis of the teaching of the ideas.

[767] Tilliette (1970), 395. And yet, notwithstanding the intrinsic unity of the idea, there is a plurality of ideas.

[768] H. Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period*, (Abo: Abo Akademi, 1965). 186. This comes from an indeterminable but purported source: Pseudo-Justinus Martyr, *ΠΑΡΑΙΝΕΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΑΣ*, or in Latin, *Cohortatio ad gentiles* in J.C.T. Otto, *Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi*, vol. 3, 3rd edn., (Jena: Mauke, 1879). 18-126. "saying that the monad is the principle of everything [he] even [teaches] that this is the cause of all good things. Moreover, through allegory he teaches that the one and alone is God."

The Platonic corpus makes clear references to the teaching of the ideas as *Hen kai Pan*. When comparing dialectic and the arts for Glaucon at the end of the sixth book of *Res Publica*, Socrates elaborates that

> ἵνα μέχρι **τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου** ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ, αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' **εἴδεσιν** αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη.[769]

Reason's anabasis to the Absolute or literally "unable to be hypothesized" as the principle of everything requires forms without anything sense perceptible. Ideas or εἴδεσιν are the neuter, dative, plural of εἶδος, which can mean both idea and form; in any case, both connote sight.[770] Plato's theory of the ideas occupies the place of the many. The direct connection between the Absolute and the ideas is apparent in reason reaching the Absolute through the ideas. The ideas here are primary insofar as reason's anabasis is not the end but precedes its katabasis to the ideas again.

More pertinently, in the *Philebus*, Plato is most explicit about *Hen kai Pan*, which Schelling cites in his *Timaios-Kommentar*. Plato describes *Hen kai Pan* as follows:

> Φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεί, καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὥς τινα σοφίας ηὑρηκὼς θησαυρόν […].[771]

Hen kai Pan, in other words, in an endless, ageless, and immortal process of the interweaving of the All and the One. It concerns philosophy in that it is a "treasure of wisdom." Schelling cites this passage upon asserting that "Die allgemeine Begriffe mußten in 1r. höhern Intelligenz vorhanden seyn, weil sie Bedingung der Möglichkeit des allgemeinen Gesezes war, nach dem die

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[769] Plato, *Res Publica*, 511bc. **Emphasis added**. in order that coming as far as the Absolute [ἀνυποθέτου], to the principle of everything, once having grasped it [principle], again while holding those which hold it [principle], in this way [reason] comes down to the conclusion, by no means availing oneself of a sense-perceptible [αἰσθητῷ], but the ideas [εἴδεσιν] themselves through them unto them, and to end at the ideas.

[770] εἶδος, *LSJ*.

[771] Plato, *Philebus* 15de. We say that the same are the one and the many things becoming because of reasons, [which] run around everywhere according to each of the things reasoned always, both long ago and now. And this neither ceased at any time nor both long ago and now. And this neither ceased at some time nor began now, but is such, as it appears to me, something immortal of the reasons themselves and some ageless experience in us. He who first having on each occasion tasted it of the new things, is pleased to have discovered some treasure of wisdom […].

Menschen ihre empirische Untersuchungen anstellen."[772] The empirical investigations of nature are according to a universal law that is grounded on universal concepts of a higher intelligence. Schelling suggests that this universal law is the endless process of *Hen kai Pan*. He confirms this a page later upon quoting the following passage from the *Philebus*: οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους.[773] Simply, the gods have bestowed on man *Hen kai Pan* to conduct investigations and education. This shows that Schelling through his reading of Plato conceives of *Hen kai Pan* as religious. He cites this passage to emphasize that

> Die Idee von Verbindung der Einheit u. der Mannigfaltigkeit oder Vielheit ist 1ne bei Plato durchaus herrschende Idee, die er nicht nur logisch, sondern . . . auch als Naturbegriff anwendet, u. überall als 1ne Form betrachtet, die die ganze Natur umfaße [...].[774]

The "idea of connection" of *Hen kai Pan* is the "reigning idea for Plato," which the gods teach. This idea is "considered as the first form," which encompasses all of nature. Schelling notes that Plato applies it both "logically" and as a "concept of nature." In other words, Plato brings *Hen kai Pan* to bear on empirical reality. But as a gift from the gods, one should not take *Hen kai Pan*'s provenance to be such a reality. Learning from Plato, Schelling, too, applies *Hen kai Pan* to nature. Krings verifies that

> Diese Idee von Natur als einem umfassenden, lebendigen Ganzen entsprach ganz dem Wort vom Hen kai Pan, einem Leitwort des Tübinger Freundeskreises. Diese Idee leitete Schellings Rezeption des naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungsstandes.[775]

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[772] Schelling (1994), 35. 'The universal concepts must be present in a higher intelligence, because they were the condition of possibility of the universal law, according to which men undertook empirical investigations.' Diß sagt Plato selbst deutlich genug Philebus p. 217. »Wir bemerken, sagt er, daß diese Form, der Einheit in der Mannigfaltigkeit, überall in allen Reden u. Untersuchungen von jeher bis auf unsre Zeit geherrscht hat. Diese Form zu denken wird niemals aufhören, u. hat auch nicht jetzt erst angefangen, sondern sie ist eine ewige niemals alternde Eigenschaft jeder Untersuchung. Der Jüngling, der zuerst diese Form des Philosophirens findet, freut sich als ob er einen Schaz von Weisheit gefunden.«

[773] Plato, *Philebus*, 16de. in this way, the gods grant to us to examine and learn and teach one another.

[774] Schelling (1994), 36. The idea of connection of unity and multiplicity or plurality is a thoroughly reigning idea for Plato, which he applies not only logically, but also as a concept of nature, and mainly as considered as a form, which encompasses nature entire.

[775] Krings (1994), 154. This idea of nature as a comprehensive living whole corresponded entirely to the word of Ἓν καὶ πᾶν, a motto of the circle of friends at Tübingen. This idea led Schelling's reception of the *naturwissenschaftliche* state of research.

Therefore, *Hen kai Pan à la* Plato occupied Schelling's early investigations into nature—this receives brief attention again in the telos. Schelling held to a conception of nature grounded in *Hen kai Pan*. For in the *Methodologie*'s 11th lecture, he deems "die Natur als die allgemeine Geburt der Ideen."[776]

Essentially, an idea is a metaphysical contradiction. Striking in Schelling's discussion of an idea and ideas is that he occasionally examines an idea by itself, while generally treats ideas in the plural as the teaching of the ideas. This shuttling back and forth certainly speaks to the fact that one cannot numerically grasp the ideas. Thus, when Schelling discusses ideas in the plural, he is not doing so with a number in mind; this metaphysical plurality transcends empirical reality. Tilliette agrees that just as "L'Absolu ne se partage pas" so also "Les idées ne font pas nombre."[777] This, however, does not prevent the fact that it can be applied empirically. For clarity's sake, the following discussion assumes the distinction between singular and plural ideas for the sake of analysis.

In the *Gesammten* Schelling argues that "[…] die Idee [ist] absolut Eines, so ist sie nothwendig auch wieder Alles."[778] This clearly demonstrates that Schelling understands an idea through the lens of *Hen kai Pan*, specifically as a contradiction of both *Hen* and *Pan*. A few pages later, he states that "[d]ie Idee . . . ist die unendliche Position des Besonderen, und daher eigentlich weder Allgemeines noch Besonderes, sondern absolute Identität."[779] The contradictory nature of an idea also transposes onto other distinctions. According to Verra, "l'idée est principe unitaire d'infini et de fini, d'universel et de particulier."[780] Indeed, the opposition of the infinite and finite also falls in the purview of the idea. Because it is "the infinite position of the particular," an idea sits more on the side of the *Pan*. It is identical, nevertheless, to the "absolute identity," since it is

[776] Schelling, *AA* I/14.145; *SW* 1/V.317. nature as the universal birth of ideas […].
[777] Tilliette (1970), 395. The Absolute does not share itself. The ideas do not make a number.
[778] Schelling, *AA* II/7.; *SW* 1/VI.190-1. If . . . the idea is absolutely one, thus it necessarily again also is all.
[779] Schelling, *AA* II/7.; *SW* 1/VI.193. The idea . . . is the infinite position of the particular, and hence actually neither the universal nor particular, but absolute identity.
[780] Verra (1979), 38. The idea is the unitary principle of the infinite and finite, of the universal and particular.

"neither the universal nor the particular," which is the same as their mutual interpenetration. This is productive, as seen in chapter two. An idea's contradictory nature allows it simultaneously to be both identical to and different from the Absolute.

Production nuances the comparison of the singular idea and plural ideas, on the one hand, and the Absolute, on the other. This production is religious and philosophical insofar as a god and the gods correspond to a singular idea and plural ideas, respectively. Schelling draws out in different philosophical contexts the productivity of the plural ideas. Concerning his *Naturphilosophie*, in the *Methodologie*'s 11th lecture, Schelling states simply that "[…] sie [Ideen], gleich Gott, produktiv [sind] [...]."[781] Their productivity is their likeness to God. As already mentioned above in the *Philosophie der Kunst*'s 28th section, "Jede Idee ist . . . = Gott, aber ein besonderer Gott."[782] Nightingale touches this equation by arguing that for Plato "When the philosopher contemplated the Forms, then, each with its own essence, he also encountered divinity."[783] That an idea as a god also is productive comes out in the 62nd section. When discussing genius, Schelling asserts that "es ihr [der Idee] Wesen ist zu produciren; [sie ist] überhaupt produktiv."[784] "Seule brille l'Idee, avec sa creativite éternelle," asserts Tilliette, although he is not clear that an idea is a god.[785] The productivity of an idea, therefore, emerges in the context of art, which adjoins religion. In this latter context alone, specifically *Philosophie und Religion*, Schelling affirms in both singular and plural that "[…] immer die Idee [bleibt] Das Producirend […]"[786] and "[D]ie Ideen sind nothwendig . . . produktiv."[787] Thus, an idea and ideas are philosophically productive.

The difference between plural ideas and the Absolute becomes more salient in terms of being a product. But they are the same through production itself, which exhibits *Hen kai Pan* in

781 Schelling, *AA* I/14.145.; *SW* 1/V.318. they [ideas] are, like God, productive […].
782 Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.133; *SW* 1/V.390. Each idea is . . . = God, but a particular god.
783 Nightingale (2021), 3.
784 Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.189; *SW* 1/V.459. it is its essence to produce; [it is] mainly productive.
785 Tilliette (1970), 399. Only the idea shines, with its eternal creativity.
786 Schelling, *AA* I/14.299; *SW* 1/VI.41. The idea always remains the producing one […].
787 Schelling, *AA* I/14.294; *SW* 1/VI.35. [T]he ideas necessarily . . . are . . . productive.

rendering these two as one. In the same text, Schelling explains that ideas "produciren nur Absolutes, nur Ideen, und die Einheiten, die aus ihnen hervorgehen […]."[788] On the one hand, ideas are products of themselves; this emerges partially as early as the *Timaios-Kommentar* where Schelling avers that "er [Platon] die Ideen auch als Produkte einer göttlichen Intelligenz darstellte [...]."[789] Ideas also produce the Absolute and other unities. On the other hand, the Absolute produces only the Absolute, as we saw in the second chapter. Hence, there seem to be two kinds of philosophical production. In *Philosophie und Religion*, Schelling clarifies that

> Das Absolute würde in dem Realen nicht wahrhaft objektiv, theilte es ihm nicht die Macht mit, gleich ihm seine Idealität in Realität umzuwandeln und sie in besonderen Formen zu objektiviren. Dieses zweite Produciren ist das der Ideen, oder vielmehr dieses Produciren und jenes erste durch die absolute Form ist Ein Produciren.[790]

With the fundamental metaphysical distinction between the Real and Ideal, Schelling draws out the two "producings" first by contrasting the Real and the Absolute. The first producing of the Absolute is "to transform its ideality into reality," which we saw as part of the higher assumption in the second chapter. Its second producing is "to make objective its ideality into particular forms." Schelling then postulates a tentative distinction between these two producings by attributing the second one or that of objectifying one's ideality into particular forms strictly to "the ideas." This draws substance from the fact that an idea can relate to a particular object, as we will see below; in contrast, Schelling does not discuss how an Absolute relates to an object. Hence, there seems to be the possibility of attributing the first producing to the Absolute; Schelling, nevertheless, averts this inference by declaring that in fact both producings are just "one producing," which unity is "through the absolute form." Productivity unifies the ideas and the Absolute. What seems to be two producings are in fact one. Therefore, production expresses itself as *Hen kai Pan*.

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[788] Schelling, *AA* I/14.294; *SW* 1/VI.35. [T]he ideas necessarily . . . are in the same way productive; even they produce only the Absolute, only ideas, and the unities, which proceed from them [ideas], conduct themselves towards these [ideas] even in this way, as they conduct themselves to the original unity.

[789] Schelling, *'Timaeus' (1794)*. 43. he [Plato] represented the ideas also as products of a divine intelligence [...].

[790] Schelling, *AA* I/14.294; *SW* 1/VI.35. The Absolute would not truly become objective in the Real, it [Absolute] does not share its power with it [Real] to transform its ideality into reality and to make objective it [its ideality] into particular forms. This second producing is that of the ideas, or rather this producing and that first one is one producing through the absolute form.

For a clear illustration, an extension of the analysis of pantheism from the perspective of the divine beings, which are the ideas, will suffice. Schelling asserts in the *Philosophie der Kunst*'s 36th section that "Die Zeugungen der Götter auseinander sind wieder ein Sinnbild der Art, wie die Ideen ineinander sind und auseinander hervorgehen."[791] In other words, the ancient accounts of gods being born out of each other not only emphasize the paradox of dependency and absoluteness in oneself, but also hint at the ideas. A god is equivalent to an idea. On the one hand, as each god is God, so also each idea is the Absolute or God Himself insofar as it is produced and produces; all ideas are the Absolute or God Himself insofar as they are produced and produce, on the other hand. This is the teaching of the ideas illustrated as theogony. This theogonic chain, in a word, translates into a mutual inherence of productive ideas, which, as we saw above, entails the production of intellectual intuition and revelation.

A singular idea has the capacity to represent the Absolute. This touches on both the former's difference from and similarity to the latter. In the 39th section of the *Philosophie der Kunst*, Schelling states that "Darstellung des Absoluten mit absoluter Indifferenz des Allgemeinen und Besonderen im Allgemeinen = Philosophie – Idee."[792] An idea, simply, is different from the Absolute insofar as it represents it. Such a representation entails the relationship of the universal and particular within the universal. Verra observes this in asserting that "l'idée est principe unitaire . . . d'organisation des parties dans le tout et *d'articulation* du tout dans les parties."[793] Stefansky asserts similarly, although regarding plural ideas, that "[…] die Ideen Ineinsbildungen des Allgemeinen und Besonderen [sind], Abbildungen also der absolute Identität […]."[794] Moreover, characterizing this relationship is "indifference," which is the mirror image of contradiction. It is indifference because it is a matter of representation—this will receive attention in the next chapter.

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[791] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.144; *SW* 1/V.405. The productions of the gods from out of each other are again a symbol of the manner in which ideas are in one another and proceed from out of one another.
[792] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.145; *SW* 1/V.406. a representation of the Absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and particular in the universal = philosophy — idea.
[793] Verra (1979), 38. *Emphasis added.* The idea is the unitary principle . . . of the organization of parts in the whole and of the articulation of the whole in the parts.
[794] Stefansky (1925), 118. The ideas are producings-into-one of the universal and particular, [they are] representations, therefore, of the absolute identity.

When comparing the Absolute to an idea as a matter of representation, the former can be understood as the One and the latter as the many. This comparison holds, however, only by simultaneously assuming that the representative capacity of an idea creates no ontological divide. For, again, each idea is the Absolute, and the Absolute is (in) each idea. This ontological similarity is evident in the fact that just as the universal and particular are identical in and through the Absolute *per* intellectual intuition, as we saw above, so also in and through the idea. "Ihr [Idee] Allgemeines ist das Absolute, aber ihr Besonderes auch," Schelling confirms, "da es das ganze Absolute in sich aufnimmt und eben in der vollkommensten Besonderheit wieder ganz absolut wird."[795] Both the universal and particular, each as the Absolute, become identical in the idea, which is relevant in the case of construction—this will receive more attention in the last chapter. Schelling can conclude that "Die Idee also ist immer und nothwendig absolut, da in ihr Allgemeines und Besonderes nothwendig gleichgesetzt sind."[796] Tilliette observes accurately that "chaque Idée est, comme l'Absolu, un absolu, une unité et totalité; et par le fait même elle est dans l'Absolu, inséparable de l'Absolu."[797]

The idea becomes clear also by its comparison to a concept. In the fourth section of the *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling explains that "Die Idee, könnte man sagen, ist endlich, da sie sich nothwendig auf einen besonderen Gegenstand bezieht. Allein hier wird der Begriff dem Objekt entgegengesetzt, welches in der Idee nicht der Fall ist."[798] The idea is analogous to the concept insofar as both "relate to a particular object." This relationship renders the former "finite," while the latter "alone" or by itself. This is the difference. Schelling further explains that "Jeder besondere Gegenstand ist in seiner Absolutheit die Idee, und darnach die Idee auch der absolute

[795] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.141; *SW* 1/IV.405. Its [idea's] universal is the Absolute, its particular however also is [the Absolute] because it [particular] receives into itself the entire Absolute and even in the most complete particularity becomes again entirely absolute.
[796] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.141; *SW* 1/IV.405. The idea therefore is always and necessarily absolute, because in it universal and particular are necessarily made identical […].
[797] Tilliette (1970), 395. each idea, like the Absolute, is absolute, a unity and totality; and by this very fact it is in the Absolute, inseparable from the Absolue.
[798] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.141-2; *SW* 1/IV.405. The idea [*Idee*], one can say, is finite, because it necessarily relates to a particular object. Alone here the concept [*Begriff*] becomes opposed to the object, which is not the case in the idea.

Gegenstand selbst, als das absolut Ideale auch das absolut Reale."[799] One can view each particular object to which a concept corresponds from the perspective of "absoluteness," this speaks to the higher perspective in the discussion of pantheism above. From this perspective, the object or thing is equivalent to the idea. Therefore, unlike the referential space between a concept and an object, between the latter and an idea there potentially is none. This potential, in turn, points to the identity of an idea and the Absolute, namely, that an idea always is potentially "the absolute object" as that which is both "the absolute ideal" and "the absolute real."

The contradictory nature of the plural ideas and their inextricable relationship to the Absolute enables certain metaphysical possibilities. First, the ideas serve a mediating metaphysical function. In the eleventh lecture of the *Methodologie*, Schelling observes that,

> Es wird in der Philosophie ausführlicher gezeigt, daß die Ideen die einzigen Mittler sind, wodurch die besonderen Dinge in Gott seyn können, und daß nach diesem Gesetz so viel Universa als besondere Dinge sind, und doch, wegen der Gleichheit des Wesens, in allen nur Ein Universum.[800]

As "intermediaries" ideas enable "particular things . . . to be in God." The contradiction of this metaphysical possibility manifests in there being as "many universes as particular things" and the same "one universe" being "in everything." Tilliette perspicaciously perceives that "L'univers dans l'idée est un, et toutes Les idees ne forment qu'une seule idée […]. "[801] Schelling articulates further that,

> Obgleich nun die Ideen in Gott rein und absolut ideal sind, sind sie doch nicht todt, sondern lebendig, die ersten Organismen der göttlichen Selbstanschauung, die eben deßwegen an allen Eigenschaften seines Wesens und in der besondern Form dennoch an der ungetheilten und absoluten Realität theilnehmen.[802]

The ideas, in other words, as intermediaries are "living organisms," which gestures at productivity. As such, they enable "divine self-intuition" in particular forms; this is another form of God

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[799] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.141-2; *SW* 1/IV.405. Each particular object is in its absoluteness the idea, and thereafter the idea also [is] the absolute object itself, as the absolute ideal also the absolute real.
[800] Schelling, *AA* I/14.145; *SW* 1/V.317. It is shown explicitly in philosophy that the ideas are the only intermediaries through which the particular things are able to be in God and that according to the same law there are so many universes as particular things, and yet, because of the sameness of essence, in everything [there is] only one universe.
[801] Tilliette (1970), 395. The universe is one in the idea, and all ideas form into only one idea.
[802] Schelling, *AA* I/14.145; *SW* 1/V.317-8. Although now the ideas are purely and absolutely ideal in God, they are yet not dead but living, the first organisms of the divine self-intuition [*göttlichen Selbstanschauung*], which for this very reason participate in all the characteristics of his essence and in the particular form however [they] participate in the undivided and absolute reality.

intuiting the things in themselves and is the flipside of particular things being in God. As intermediaries, ideas are the bridge that allow particular things to be in God and for God to intuit Himself. Hence, the contradictory nature of ideas, which is central to the teaching of the ideas, becomes apparent here again. One is that they are not particular whereby they "participate in all the characteristics" of God's essence; they are equivalent to God because they do not lack His essence in any way. In their second or "particular form," however, they are still equivalent to God because "they participate in the undivided and absolute reality." This seems paradoxical, indeed, according to an empirical logic of material space.

Ideas also make difference possible. Schelling argues in *Philosophie und Religion* that "In den Ideen . . . sind die bloßen Möglichkeiten der Differenzen, und keine wirkliche Differenz, denn jede Idee ist ein Universum für sich, und alle Ideen sind als Eine Idee."[803] The ideas are a unique location for being simultaneously the "possibilities of difference" and "not actual difference," which points again to their contradictory nature. This corresponds to their being "a universe for itself" yet "all ideas" being "one idea." That difference ultimately traces down to this metaphysical contradiction underscores its ontological nullity. This points to the absolute identity and potencies, as we will see in the next chapter.

This section has examined *Hen kai Pan* as it manifests in the theory of ideas of Pythagoras and mostly Plato. It has attempted to draw out the distinction between a singular idea and plural ideas and show both as philosophically productive. This chapter has shown that both intellectual intuition and *Hen kai Pan* are in fact inextricable. Both form Schelling's perspective of philosophical productivity. While this is most salient in Parmenides and Spinoza, it also runs through Leibniz, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Plato, all of whom make up Schelling's cadre of members partaking of the ancient religious and philosophical doctrine of *Hen kai Pan*. Of all the

[803] Schelling, *AA* I/14.293; *SW* 1/VI.33-4. In the ideas . . . are the bare possibilities of differences, and no actual difference, for each idea is a universe for itself, and all ideas are one idea.

members, Schelling takes most to last two's teaching of the ideas. This is evident in Schelling's abstruse notion of potencies, which is the main subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 5. *Hen Kai* Potencies and *Wissenschaften*

This chapter traces *Hen kai Pan* through Schelling's early formulations of potencies, *Wissenschaft*, and to a lesser extent construction. It asks two related questions. How does *Hen kai Pan*, and more broadly Schelling's conception of philosophical productivity, illuminate his notion of potencies? And how do potencies speak to his understanding of *Wissenschaft* and construction? As this chapter will demonstrate, potencies are grounded on and illustrate the productive contradiction of *Hen kai Pan* in its different forms. While appearing in the realm of reflection, potencies are not subject to its laws, but display the contradictory, and hence productive nature of *Hen kai Pan*. Second, philosophical productivity in and through potencies also manifests in *Wissenschaften* and construction. This demonstrates that Schelling understands these latter two in a philosophically productive manner as well. In a word, this chapter establishes that potencies, and correspondingly *Wissenschaft* and construction, make sense only in light of Schelling's commitment to *Hen kai Pan*. This chapter unfolds in three parts. First, it delineates some general features of potencies. Then it demonstrates how potencies manifest the different iterations of *Hen kai Pan* proceeding from unity to multiplicity while expounding on the triplicity of potencies along the way. Finally, this analysis then carries over into *Wissenschaft*, and takes up construction secondarily insofar as it proceeds from *Wissenschaft*.

Pre-Potentialities

Schelling introduces potencies in the early years of the 19th-century. While he mentions potencies perhaps for the first time in the 1800 *System*, he articulates it in the context of *Naturphilosophie*, specifically the 1803 *Ideen*, and his 1802 *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie*. He also explicates potencies in his general understanding of philosophy in the *Darstellung, Fernere Darstellungen*, and the *Gesammten Philosophie*; and his philosophy of art in *Philosophie der Kunst*—texts which I have not introduced before will receive attention below. Schelling's understanding of potencies generally has remained perennially abstruse.[804] He himself admits to their opacity in the *Fernere Darstellungen* after an extensive discussion at the end of the fifth main section.

> Habe ich von dieser wechselseitigen Durchdringung aller Einheiten im Absoluten nicht aufs klarste geschrieben, so liegt die Ursache hievon großentheils in dem Gegenstand selbst, dessen labyrinthische und fast undurchdringliche Verwickelungen nur mit Mühe bezeichnet werden können.[805]

Potencies are unities in the Absolute and they are the cause of their own obscurity. Upon deeper examination, this matrix devolves into an almost impenetrable intricacy. The abstruseness seems to stem from their reciprocal penetration in the Absolute, a reciprocity, as we will see, that transcends mere causality indicating the productive contradiction of *Hen kai Pan*. Having reviewed the history of secondary scholarship on Schelling, Tilliette in 1970 noticed "le systeme mal elucide des Potenzen."[806] Writing four years later, Odette Laffoucrière agrees that "L'essence de la puissance qui s'exprime dans le concept du pouvoir-étre a été méconnue."[807]

From the above, it is clear that potencies exist in view of the Absolute. Yet, their existence is complex insofar as they are ontologically null, which comes to light against the background of

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[804] Relatively recent work on Schelling's potencies is sparse. In Anglo-American scholarship there is: Edward Allen Beach, *The Potencies of God(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology*. SUNY Series in Philosophy. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994); Tritten, Tyler, "Schelling's Doctrine of the Potencies: The Unity of Thinking and Being," *Philosophy, Theology* 24, no. 2 (2012): 217–53. In German scholarship there is Schwarz, Justus. "Die Lehre von Den Potenzen in Schellings Altersphilosophie," *Kant-Studien* 40, no. 1–2 (1935). In French, Laffoucrière, Odette, "Schelling et les Puissances," *Les études philosophiques*, no. 2 (1974): 171–86. However, all these texts deal with potencies in Schelling's later works.

[805] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.157; *SW* 1/IV.423. If I have not written in the clearest manner of this reciprocal penetration of all unities in the Absolute, thus the cause of this lies for the most part in the object itself whose labyrinthine and almost impenetrable complexities can be characterized only with difficulty.

[806] Tilliette (1970), 50. The poorly elucidated system of potencies.

[807] Laffoucrière (1974), 176. the essence of the potency which expresses itself in the concept of the power to-be has been misunderstood.

the Absolute as singular and indivisible. This characterizes their contradictory nature. It is important not to forget that the idea of the Absolute here—and throughout Schelling's early period for that matter—is productive and not a mere concept. In the introduction to the *Philosophie der Kunst*, Schelling takes pains to emphasize that the

> was man verschiedene philosophische Wissenschaften nennt, ist entweder etwas ganz Schiefes, oder es sind nur Darstellungen des Einen und ungetheilten Ganzen der Philosophie in verschiedenen Potenzen oder unter verschiedenen ideellen Bestimmungen.[808]

He elaborates further that "Sie verändern schlechthin nichts am Wesen, dieses bleibt immer und nothwendig dasselbe, deßwegen heißen sie ideelle Bestimmungen."[809] The same idea emerges at the begeinning of *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie*.

> [E]s ist nur Eine Philosophie und Eine Wissenschaft der Philosophie; was ihr verschiedene philosophische Wissenschaften nennt, sind nur Darstellungen des Einen und ungetheilten Ganzen der Philosophie unter verschiedenen ideellen Bestimmungen, oder, daß ich gleich den bekannten Ausdruck brauche, in unterschiedenen Potenzen.[810]

Both this text and the *Philosophie der Kunst* demonstrate the correspondence of *Wissenschaften* and potencies the former of which I bracket for now. Schelling explains a potency as an ideal and not a real determination, which creates a difference in or ideally marks the Absolute, the one and undivided whole of philosophy. But it alters utterly nothing in it. Schelling's notion of "ideal" here seems to signify a difference that bears no ontological weight; thus, a potency is an apparent, but non-existent difference. He confirms in the 57th section of the *Gesammten Philosophie* that "Die Potenz ist keine Bestimmung des Dings an sich oder des Wesens, sondern vielmehr des Nicht-Wesens."[811] Potencies, then, create difference, but only in and for non-existence—I discuss this more below when examining how potencies illustrate *Hen kai Pan*.

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[808] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.111-2; *SW* 1/V.365. what one calls different philosophical *Wissenschaften* is either something entirely lopsided, or there are only representations of the one and undivided whole of philosophy in various potencies or under various ideal determinations.
[809] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366. They [determinations] change absolutely nothing in the essence [*am Wesen*]; this [essence] always and necessarily remains the same, for which reason they are called ideal determinations.
[810] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.459; *SW* 1/V.106. [T]here is only one philosophy and one *Wissenschaft* of philosophy; what you call different philosophical *Wissenschaften* are only representations of the one and undivided whole of philosophy under various ideal determinations, or, that I use the same well-known expression, in various potencies.
[811] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.161; *SW* 1/VI.211. "The potency is no determination of the thing by itself or essence, but much rather of the not-essence." Sections 42 to 49 of the first part or "General Philosophy" are devoted to Schelling's understanding of potency.

Schelling illustrates this point by discussing the different types of philosophy, which arise from this understanding of potencies:

> das, was wir in der Geschichte oder der Kunst erkennen, ist wesentlich dasselbe mit dem, was auch in der Natur ist: jedem nämlich ist die ganze Absolutheit *eingeboren*, aber diese Absolutheit steht in der Natur, der Geschichte und der Kunst in verschiedenen Potenzen.[812]

Put simply, nature, history [*Geschichte*], and art are all different potencies. While nature and history are the real and ideal sides, respectively, art unites the two in itself. These three forms of philosophy are prominent in Schelling's early period. That they are ideal determinations means that one should not empirically conceive of them. In one sense their differences do not matter since each as a particular potency represents the same Absolute. This allows the inference that difference always implies a sameness without which difference would be impossible. Differences as represented by potencies, therefore, do not bear ontological weight on their own. In the 325th section of the *Gesammten*, Schelling explains further the three potencies of the real and ideal world, which correspond to nature and art, respectively.

> Wie es eine und dieselbe Natur und unendliche Substanz ist, die in der Schwere, im Licht und im Organismus erscheint, und wie sie in jedem von diesen dennoch für sich absolut ist, so ist es ein und dasselbe Göttliche, das in Wissenschaft, Religion und Kunst lebt.[813]

On the one hand, within nature as a potency there are the potencies of gravity, light, and organism. Here, gravity is the real, light the ideal, and organism the union of the two. Each is "absolute for itself." Even though nature as a whole is a potency that fully represents the Absolute and, so to speak, contains the potencies gravity, light, and organism, each of these three is no less the Absolute entire. On the other hand, this phenomenon also carries into the ideal where the divine is expressed in the three potencies of *Wissenschaft*, religion, and art. Corresponding to nature of the real world is the divine of the ideal world. One perhaps may conclude that the real and ideal, each of which itself is a potency, and whose absolute unity forms the higher assumption of the one

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[812] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366. *emphasis added.* that which we recognize in history or art is essentially the same with that which also is in nature: namely into each one the entire absoluteness is born [*eingeboren*], but this absoluteness stands in nature, history [*Geschichte*], and art in different potencies.

[813] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.441; *SW* 1/VI.575. Just as it is one and the same nature and infinite substance, which appears in gravity, in light, and in organism, and just as it [one and the same nature and infinite substance] is in each of these however absolute for itself, so it is one and the same divine, which lives in *Wissenschaft*, religion and art.

absolute knowing in the *Methodologie*, have precedence over other potencies like organism and religion. But to assume that this is actually and ontologically so is to miss the nature of potencies.

Potencies' ontological nullity speaks to their primary function of representation. This point is difficult yet important to grasp. In the *Freiheitschrift*, potency represents non-being, which mostly comes out in its contrast with action. When discussing different periods of revelation, Schelling employs a Johannine reference noting that "das schaffende Wort . . . das im Grunde verborgene Leben aus dem Nichtseyn erlöst, es aus der Potenz zum Actus erhebt."[814] Potency occupies the realm of non-being out from which the creative or productive Logos saves life hidden at root. This same equation appears in his discussion of the possibility of the coexistence of evil and God's love. According to Schelling, "das Böse ist nur bös, inwiefern es über die Potentialität hinausgeht; auf das Nichtseyn aber, oder den Potenzzustand reducirt, ist es, was es immer seyn sollte, Basis, Unterworfenes […]."[815] He seems to imply that evil should remain in the realm of potentiality. In such a state, it is something subdued, reduced "to non-being or the state of a potency."

Then a year later in his 1810 *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen* published posthumously, Schelling touches on the relationship between the ontological nullity of potencies and their capacity to represent. This work is a series of three lectures concerning the general character of a system, the relationship of nature to God, and the mutability of nature in spiritual life, respectively. The third discusses man, freedom, evil, the state, and the church—it seems to continue themes from his *Freiheitschrift*. Here, Schelling examines "des menschlichen Geistes . . . nach seinem inneren Wesen und nach den Kräften und Potenzen, die auch im Einzelnen liegen."[816] He applies potencies to the intellect noting that "Auch im menschlichen Geist als solchem sind wieder drei Potenzen oder Seiten."[817] This demonstrates the flexible representability of potencies; they concern less

[814] Schelling, *AA* I/17.168; *SW* 1/VII.404. the creative Logos . . . saves out of non-being life hidden in principle, raises it out of potency into action.
[815] Schelling, *AA* I/17.169; *SW* 1/VII.405. Evil is only evil insofar as it goes beyond potentiality; reduced to non-being, however, or the state of a potency, its s what it always should be, base, subdued […].
[816] Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.465. the human intellect . . . according to its inner essence and according to the power and potencies, which also lay in particular.
[817] Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.465. Even in the human intellect as such are again three potencies or sides.

metaphysics *per se*, but the representation thereof; less the Absolute *per se*, but its appearance.[818] This becomes clear in *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie*, wherein Schelling delineates that the potency as a particular "[…] [als eine] Darstellung selbst [ist] Philosophie."[819] And a bit earlier he mentions that "Die vollkommene Erscheinung der Philosophie tritt nur in der Totalität aller Potenzen hervor."[820] Potencies, therefore, are a matter of representation and appearance of philosophy—again, this points to the significance of art for Schelling's conception of philosophy, which we have to bracket for this thesis. If potencies allow philosophy to appear, this mutually implies the invisible nature of philosophy.

Furthermore, potencies are eternal and simultaneous. In the 44th section of the *Darstellung*, Schelling elaborates that

> Alle Potenzen sind absolut gleichzeitig. Denn die absolute Identität ist nur unter der Form aller Potenzen. Sie ist aber ewig, und ohne alle Beziehung auf die Zeit. Also sind auch auch alle Potenzen ohne alle Beziehung auf Zeit, schlechthin ewig, also auch unter sich gleichzeitig.[821]

Like the absolute identity, in other words, potencies also are eternal and in tandem simultaneous. This simultaneity is crucial to grasp for it takes away a tendency to trace a causal connection between them. Schelling confirms that among these potencies "Alle Causalableitung ist dadurch abgeschnitten."[822] Potencies, in other words, fall outside the perimeter of temporal and causal logic. For causality assumes that there are at least two ontologically distinct entities, one of which affects or reacts to the other. To bring such causality to bear on potencies and the Absolute is to violate the indivisibility of the Absolute.

To synthesize thus far, a potency concerns the representation of the Absolute as productive and reveals a paradox of equivalence and indifference between the productive Absolute

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[818] Schelling does not abandon potencies, but employees them even in his later philosophical works. For instance, see his *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Begrundung der positiven Philosophie. SW* 2/III.3-174.
[819] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.460; *SW* 1/V.107. is . . . [as a] representation itself philosophy.
[820] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.459; *SW* 1/V.106. The complete appearance of philosophy comes forth only in the totality of all potencies.
[821] Schelling, *AA* I/10.136; *SW* 1/IV.135. §. 44. All potencies are absolutely simultaneous. For the absolute identity is only under the form of all potencies. It is eternal, and without any relationship to time. Therefore, even all potencies are also without any relationship to time, absolutely eternal, and therefore also among themselves simultaneous.
[822] Schelling, *AA* I/10.136; *SW* 1/IV.135. All deduction of causality [*Causalableitung*] is truncated.

and its appearance. Equivalence, because each potency as an appearance or form of the Absolute is equivalent to and no less than the Absolute, the Absolute is equivalent to its appearance as all the potencies, and each potency is equivalent to each other individually and *en toto*; indifference, for the Absolute remains so when doubled as a potency and as all potencies, where in either case the unity and absoluteness of the Absolute remains unaffected by this doubling; and each potency is indifferent to every other insofar as each represents the whole Absolute. These intricate and contradictory relationships between the Absolute and potencies indeed are tortuous and almost inscrutable.

That a potency concerns philosophical productivity is evident in its Latin etymology "potential," whose German equivalents are *vermögen* and *zeugungskraft*.[823] This etymology allows us more critical purchase on the productive ability's action of potentiating. In the *Methodlogie*'s sixth lecture, as noted in the second chapter, "Das produktive Vermögen läßt sich, wo es ist . . . ins Unendliche durch sich selbst potenziiren."[824] That the productive ability can "potentiate" means that it can take on or produce itself as an infinite number of forms or potencies. Productivity's relationship to appearance, simply, is that of potentiation. As such, a potency denotes philosophical productivity.

Potencies as productive are a matter of intuition. That is, they are grasped by intuition. Knowing the concept of a potency does not suffice. In the preface to the *System*, Schelling states clearly the *raison de devenir* of the *System*

> Was den Verfasser hauptsächlich angetrieben hat, auf die Darstellung jenes Zusammenhangs, welcher eigentlich eine Stufenfolge von Anschauungen ist, durch welche das Ich bis zum Bewußtseyn in der höchsten Potenz sich erhebt, besonderen Fleiß zu wenden, war der Parallelismus der Natur mit dem Intelligenten, auf welchen er schon längst geführt worden ist […].[825]

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[823] Potenz, f., *Grimm Wörterbuch*, https://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemid=P06749. 1) aus lat. *potentia*, ital. potenza (franz. puissance) macht, vermögen, zeugungskraft; plur. (wie im romanischen) mächtige körperschaft, gewalthaber […].

[824] Schelling, *AA* I/14.102; *SW* 1/V.268. The productive ability is able, where it is . . . to potentiate [*potenziiren*] endlessly through itself.

[825] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.25; *SW* 1/III.331. What mainly has driven the author to apply particular diligence to the presentation of that context, which actually is a sequence of steps of intuitions, through which *das Ich* raises itself to consciousness in the highest potency, was the parallelism of nature with intelligence, to which [parallelism] he has been driven already for a long time.

By "that context," Schelling refers to the *System* as a progressive history or sequence of intuitions. This progression and sequence match an arrangement of potencies, which demonstrates the equivalence of the nature and history, and hence the productivity of potency. *Das Ich* intellectually scaling up a higher potency and eventually up to the highest potency is to move up the sequence of intuitions. Most important is the "parallelism" of nature with intelligence which had driven [*geführt*] Schelling for a long time. The participle *geführt* indicates that Schelling was exercising his productive ability, as seen in the third chapter in the religious context of Plato and Pythagoras. This ability impelled Schelling through different potencies to arrive at the productive parallel of nature with intelligence. Schelling confirms their parallel further in light of the relationship between potencies and intuition by noting "daß dieselben Potenzen der Anschauung, welche in dem Ich sind, bis zu einer gewissen Grenze auch in der Natur aufgezeigt werden können."[826] Potencies, therefore, are a matter of and belong to intuition. Verra insightfully points this out when contrasting Schelling and Hegel.

> [O]n a une sorte de phenomenologie specifique de la conscience scientifique […]. [C]ontraire ment à ce qu'il advient dans la phenomenologie hegelienne, le passage ascensionnel entre les differents moments est regle par la « potentiation» au lieu de l'etre par développement dialectique-speculatif.[827]

In reading Schelling's account of progressive potencies of self-intuition in the *System*, Verra correctly observes its parallel with the Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* that entails spirit's ascent to higher forms of self-consciousness—this work briefly is discussed in the telos. The connection of potency and intuition also emerges in the 1803 *Ideen*. Schelling touches on his general understanding of potency in the context of magnetism. "Dieselbige Einbildung des Subjektiven ins Objektive, welche im Idealen, als Potenz angeschaut, Selbstbewußtseyn ist […]."[828] Here, Schelling makes clear that a potency as one-producing [*Einbildung*] can only be intuited as such.

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[826] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.25; *SW* 1/III.332. that these potencies of intuition, which are in *das Ich*, can be shown in nature up to a certain limit […].
[827] Verra (1979), 36. We have a type of specific phenomenology of the scientific conscience […]. [C]ontrary to what happens in the Hegelian phenomenology, the ascending passage between the different moments is regulated by 'potentiation' instead of being by dialectical-speculative development.
[828] Schelling, *AA* I/13.199; *SW* 1/II.164. The same producing [*Einbildung*] of the subjective into the objective, which in the ideal, intuited as a potency is self-consciousness […].

This notion of producing points us back to the heart of Schelling's conception of metaphysics as productive, which consists of the real and the ideal, the finite the infinite, produced into each other and vice versa. Schelling uses the distinction between subjective and objective here to illustrate the same metaphysical depth. Producing of subjectivity into objectivity manifests as self-consciousness, while the contrary is nature. This section has attempted to explain some key features of Schelling's notion of potencies: their ontological nullity, atemporality, simultaneity, and ability to represent endlessly. It also has touched on how potencies concern philosophical productivity.

Potential Reflections

Potencies, simply, make visible *Hen kai Pan*. Laffoucrière has the right inkling that the "Le point de départ de la réflexion de Schelling . . . est toujours l' «Hen Kai Pan» de Tübingen […]."[829] In the *Philosophie der Kunst*, Schelling elucidates similarly that a potency "bezieht sich auf die allgemeine Lehre der Philosophie von der wesentlichen und innern Identität aller Dinge und alles dessen, was wir überhaupt unterscheiden."[830] The general teaching of philosophy is *Hen kai Pan*: the *Hen* of the essential and inner identity and the *Pan* of all things differentiated. That *Hen kai Pan* forms the context for the potencies, Schelling insists "es wichtig ist daß er verstanden werde."[831] This teaching concerns how to understand difference in light of and without compromising the absoluteness of the identity.

First, potencies speak to the indivisibility and unity of the Absolute or the *Hen apropos* of Spinoza and Parmenides. This points to how *Hen kai Pan* as an absolute substance underlies potencies. For the Absolute and the potencies mutually imply each other; in this way, they point to an endless productive contradiction of *Hen kai Pan*. Just to clarify, while this portion of the section will repeat some points from the previous, which discussed general features of potencies,

[829] Laffoucrière (1974), 172. the point of departure of Schelling's reflection . . . is always the '*Hen kai Pan*' of Tübingen […].
[830] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366. […] refers to the general teaching of philosophy of the essential and inner identity of all things and everything of which what we mainly differentiate
[831] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.365-6. […] it is important that it be understood.

the angle here is *Hen kai Pan*. Schelling underscores that "Es ist wahrhaft und an sich nur Ein Wesen, Ein absolut Reales, und dieses Wesen als absolutes ist untheilbar, so daß es nicht durch Theilung oder Trennung in verschiedene Wesen übergehen kann."[832] As we saw in the previous section, in both the *Philosophie der Kunst* and the *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie*, Schelling reasserts this unity of philosophy as mutually implicating the plurality of potencies: "Es ist nur Eine Philosophie […]."[833] The Absolute is one and undivided—similar to philosophy, which confirms that for Schelling philosophy is always and only about the Absolute. He explains this equivalence as follows: "Es ist also in der Philosophie überhaupt nichts als Absolutes, oder wir kennen in der Philosophie nichts als Absolutes – immer nur das schlechthin Eine […]."[834] To emphasize, the Absolute is always only the absolutely one with no division or separation therein. Undoubtedly, Schelling is aware how his audience may lose sight of this point; accordingly he admonishes them as follows: "Diesen Begriff von der Ungetheiltheit der Philosophie wünsche ich, daß Sie sich insbesondere fest gegenwärtig erhalten, um die ganze Idee unserer Wissenschaft zu fassen."[835] Moreover, Schelling explains this indivisibility as mutually implicated with potencies: "da es [Philosophie] untheilbar ist, so ist Verschiedenheit der Dinge überhaupt nur möglich, insofern es als das Ganze und Ungetheilte unter verschiedenen Bestimmungen gesetzt wird."[836] In a word, the permanence of the Absolute implies ideal determinations or potencies and vice versa, which points to the logic of *Hen kai Pan*: an absolute *Hen* implying the *Pan* of potencies and vice versa without any hierarchical notion or ontological dependence governing the two.

Second, *Hen kai Pan* as a duality also speaks to potencies, specifically the absolute identity-point and the indifference-point. Indeed, indifference and indifference-point are new terms that

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[832] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366. There is truly and by itself only one essence, one absolutely real, and this essence as absolute is indivisible so that it is unable to change into a different essence through division or separation.
[833] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.111; *SW* 1/V.365. There is only one philosophy […]; *AA* I/12,2.459; 1/V.106. es ist nur Eine Philosophie und Eine Wissenschaft der Philosophie.
[834] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.113; *SW* 1/V.367. There is therefore in philosophy mainly nothing [other] than the Absolute, or in philosophy we are aware of nothing but the Absolute – always only the absolutely one […].
[835] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.111; *SW* 1/V.365. I wish that you hold especially firmly and presently this concept of the indivisibility of philosophy to yourself to grasp the entire idea of our *Wissenschaft*.
[836] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366. because it [philosophy] is indivisible, the difference of things thus mainly is possible only insofar as it as the whole and undivided is posited under different determinations.

Schelling introduces into his philosophy after 1800, which should not distract from his understanding of philosophy as unified and productive. The absolute identity-point and indifference-point, put simply, are contradictions of the sum of all the potencies and none of them. Through contrast with the Absolute, each one's particular features emerge. In the *Philosophie der Kunst*, Schelling explicates the parallel of the absolute identity-point as the principle of philosophy and the indifference-point. "Im Absoluten als solchen, und demnach auch im Princip" which he "nenne dieses Princip . . . den absoluten Identitätspunkt der Philosophie."[837] Here, Schelling juxtaposes "the Absolute" and the principle of philosophy as the absolute identity-point. He, to be sure, is not making an equivalence. As eternal, atemporal, and beyond the realm of reflection, the Absolute cannot be a beginning, which is the meaning of "principle" here. This is implied in Schelling's use of *demnach*, which does not point to a causality from the latter to the former, but merely indicates the latter as an imitation of the former. Thus, the latter as the principle or beginning is the formal Absolute, which is identical to the Absolute itself. Next, Schelling deems the absolute identity-point and the indifference-point identical. Following the above sentence, he begins the next with: "Dieser Indifferenzpunkt […]."[838] By this Schelling implies that the indifference-point is equivalent to the absolute identity-point.

As they relate to potencies, the absolute identity-point and the indifference-point are identical, according to Schelling. Yet, he does not describe them similarly. The absolute identity-

[837] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366. In the Absolute as such, and thus also in principle […]. [c]alls this principle . . . the absolute identity-point of philosophy.

[838] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366-7. "[…] the Absolute as such, and accordingly the principle [which he] call[s] the absolute identity-point of philosophy […]. […] indifference-point […]." A more technical account can be found in the 23rd section of the *Darstellung*: (*AA* I/10.125-6; *SW* 1/IV.124) "Da es in dem Satze A=A ein und dasselbe A ist, was an die Stelle des Prädicats und an die des Subjekts gesetzt wird, so ist ohne Zweifel durchaus keine Differenz, vielmehr absolute Indifferenz beider gesetzt, und Differenz, mithin Unterscheidung beider, könnte nur dadurch möglich werden, daß entweder überwiegende Subjektivität oder überwiegende Objektivität gesetzt würde, wodurch dann das A=A in ein A=B (B als Bezeichnung der Objektivität gesetzt) überginge; es möchte nun seyn, daß diese oder ihr Gegentheil das Ueberwiegende sey, denn in beiden Fällen tritt die Differenz ein. Wenn wir dieses Uebergewicht der Subjektivität oder Objektivität durch Potenzen des subjektiven Faktors ausdrücken, so folgt, daß A=B gesetzt auch schon eine positive oder negative Potenz des A gedacht werde, und daß A°=B soviel als A=A [=1] selbst, d.h. Ausdruck der absoluten Indifferenz seyn müsse. Anders als auf diese Weise ist schlechthin keine Differenz zu begreifen."

point or principle of philosophy "weil es keiner besonderen Potenz gleich ist . . . alle begreift."[839] To elaborate, the absolute identity-point is not similar to any particular potency, which enables it to grasp all potencies. Secondly and contradictorily, "weil es alle Potenzen begreift, keine Potenz, und hinwiederum nur, inwiefern in ihm keine Potenz ist, sind in ihm alle enthalten."[840] Simply, there is no potency in the absolute identity-point, and the absolute identity-point itself is not a potency. Therefore, it contains all the potencies, which exhibit a logic of all or nothing. To clarify, the absolute identity-point is able to grasp all potencies because it is not like a potency, not a potency, and contains no potency. According to *Hen kai Pan*, the *Hen* of the absolute identity-point complements the *Pan* of the potencies, which must be *Pan* or none. The Absolute itself, similarly, "[…] außer aller Potenz [ist], oder es ist schlechthin potenzlos," Schelling indicates in the *Gesammten*'s 59th section.[841] Thus, while the Absolute is "beyond" or "outside" all potencies or is absolutely potencyless, the absolute identity-point approximates this in that by grasping all potencies it neither is a potency nor has one in it. This shows that the absolute identity-point, unlike the Absolute, is implicated in potencies.

Schelling illustrates the absolute identity-point in both the real and ideal world as that which simultaneously contains three potencies or is potency-less in the 325th section of the *Gesammten*. On the one hand, "in der Natur die Substanz selbst, die alle jene Potenzen trägt und in sich begreift, noch als diese, als die potenzlose, objektiv wird im Weltkörper und im Weltbau" where "die Schwere, das Licht, der Organismus nur Attribute des Weltkörpers sind."[842] On the other hand, "das Göttliche, welches gesondert in Wissenschaft, Religion und Kunst, obgleich in jedem absolut lebt, durch den Staat" where these three do not have "eine andere Objektivität als

[839] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366. because it is similar to none of the particular potencies [it] grasps them all […].
[840] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.366. because it [principle of philosophy] grasps all potencies, [is] no potency, and however only, insofar as no potency is in it, are all contained in him.
[841] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.162; *SW* 1/VI.212. The Absolute is outside all potencies, or it is simply potency-less.
[842] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.441-2; *SW* 1/VI.575. […] in nature the substance itself, which bears and grasps in itself all those potencies, yet as this, as the potency-less, becomes objective in the heavenly body and in the constructed world [where] gravity, light, and organism are only attributes of the heavenly body.

im Staat."[843] Both the heavenly body and the state illustrate the absolute-identity point insofar as they contain their three respective potencies while simultaneously are themselves not a potency. While three potencies illustrate *Pan*, one must not infer that three is the maximum number of potencies.

The indifference-point exhibits a similar contradiction. Upon introducing this contradiction, Schelling first describes that the indifference-point "schlechthin eins, untrennbar, untheilbar ist."[844] This shows that it is similar to the Absolute. Schelling then asserts that it "[…] nothwendig wieder [ist] in jeder besonderen Einheit (so auch Potenz zu nennen)."[845] To be clear, unlike the absolute-identity point, the indifferece-point is in every potency. Next, Schelling asserts that "dieß ist nicht möglich, ohne daß in jeder dieser besonderen Einheiten wieder alle Einheiten, also alle Potenzen wiederkehren."[846] The omnipresence of the indifference-point, in other words, is possible only if all potencies recur in each and every potency. This is the contradiction of the indifference-point. Tilliette seems to grasp the latter half of this contradiction in asserting that "une puissance comprend les autres puissances."[847] According to *Hen kai Pan*, the *Hen* of the indifference-point is present in every *Pan* as the potencies only insofar as every *Pan* is in every *Pan*.

To elucidate, the indifference-point and the potencies are the illustrative possibilities of the Absolute. First, the matter of representation distinguishes the indifference-point from the Absolute. In the 53rd section of the *Gesammaten*, Schelling observes that "Um . . . zu beweisen, daß *nur* die Indifferenz dargestellt werde, so muß zuvor erklärt werden, wie sich absolute Identität und Indifferenz unterscheiden."[848] He implies that only indifference is represented, not the absolute identity, and that the latter appears as the former. Schelling further details that "Die absolute

[843] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.442; *SW* 1/VI.575. the divine, which [is] separated into *Wissenschaft*, religion, and art, yet lives in each one absolutely, [becomes objective] through the state […]. [A]nother objectivity than in the state.
[844] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112; *SW* 1/V.367. is absolutely one, inseparable, and indivisible […].
[845] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.112-3; *SW* 1/V.367. is necessarily again in every particular unity (thus also to be called potency) […].
[846] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.113; *SW* 1/V.367. this is not possible without all the unities, therefore all the potencies, recuring again in each of these particular unities.
[847] Tilliette (1970), 395. one potency grasps all the other potencies.
[848] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.160; *SW* 1/VI.209. *emphasis added.* In order . . . to prove that only indifference is represented, thus it must be explained beforehand how the absolute identity and indifference differ.

Identität ist die Gleichheit des Wesens, oder sie ist wesentliche, qualitative Einheit. Indifferenz ist bloß quantitative Einheit, quantitatives Gleichgewicht."[849] The similarity of essence that is the absolute identity parallels the quantitative equilibrium that is indifference. Schelling conceives of the distinction between "qualitative" and "quantitative" more as that between essential and non-essential. Schelling is not pointing to a particular number by using the adjective "quantitative." It appears that while the indifference-point is a matter of being in every potency and every potency recurring in every potency, indifference characterizes the relationship of these potencies to one another.

Schelling implies that the absolute identity-point and the indifference-point are identical. This means that the former, which as *Hen* is identical to none of the *Pan* or potencies yet contains all of them or none, is the same as the latter, which as *Hen* is in every potency or *Pan* only insofar as every potency is in every potency, every *Pan* in every *Pan*. The former hypothesizes that *Hen* may exist by itself; the latter that *Pan* may exist by itself. Therefore, the absolute identity-point emphasizes the *Hen*, while the indifference-point the *Pan*; and this confirms the dual logic of *Hen kai Pan* that the one is the all and the all the one. The same equivlanece of the absolute identity-point and the indifference-point emerges in *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie*, where Schelling notes that "das Princip der Philosophie selbst hat deßhalb, als die Identität aller, nothwendig keine Potenz; aber dieser Indifferenzpunkt der absoluten Einheit liegt wieder in jeder besonderen Einheit für sich, so wie in jeder sich alle wiederholen."[850] In this way, the indifference-point is absolutely identical with the principle of philosophy and thus exhibits the form of *Hen kai Pan* of two absolutely identical dual unities. This means that both, not as two, either contain all the potencies or none at all, and that both are in every potency insofar as every potency recurs in every potency. This is the contradiction of *Hen kai Pan*. When discussing Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* in

[849] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.160; *SW* 1/VI.209. The absolute identity is the sameness of essence, or it is the essential qualitative unity. Indifference is merely quantitative unity, quantitative equilibrium.
[850] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.459; *SW* 1/V.106-7. The principle of philosophy itself has therefore as the identity of everything, necessarily no potency; this indifference-point of absolute unity, however, lies again in each particular unity for itself just as all [unities] repeat themselves in each [unity].

the context of hylozoism, the doctrine that matter is alive, Beiser seems to grasp this point when explaining that "The absolute is . . . the potency of all potencies; […] it is that in which all potencies are extinguished, the point of indifference that is potencyless."[851]

Moreover, the triplicity of potencies that Schelling so characteristically employs emerges only in the background of dual unities or Absolutes where the distinction between the real and ideal operates. In this set of three, each potency exhibits an iteration of *Hen kai Pan*. Schelling articulates the triplicity of potencies concisely in the *Gesammten*'s 56th section. "Triplicität der Potenzen ist nothwendige Erscheinungsweise des realen All als realen, ebenso des idealen als idealen."[852] In other words, the real *Pan* appears as real and the ideal *Pan* as ideal through the triplicity of potencies. The real and ideal as a duality speak to the three kinds of potencies. Schelling elaborates on this in the *Fernere Darstellungen*'s fifth main part.[853] He wonders

> wie in jeder der beyden Einheiten dieselben Potenzen zurückkehren, die in Ansehung des Ganzen durch sie selbst und durch die Einheit, durch welche sie in eins verbunden sind, bezeichnet werden, sondern auch . . . jede Potenz dadurch, daß sie in einer andern Einheit steht, auch andere Gestalt annehme, wie z.B. dieselbe in der einen leibliches Wesen, in der andern geistiges oder Wissen *gebäre*.[854]

Schelling wants to explore two matters regarding the nature of potencies. The first is how they recur in the two unities of the real and ideal where these potencies are characterized by two things: an independence through themselves in regards to the whole and a unity through which they are joined into one. The second is how each potency "stands" in another unity and takes on another form, which is to give birth [*gebäre*] to this form. This means that these potencies are productive of appearance. He illustrates that "the same potency" that dons the form of "corporeal essence" in the real world dons the "spiritual essence or knowing" in the ideal world.

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[851] Beiser (2002), 563.
[852] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.161; *SW* 1/VI.210-11.Triplicity of potencies is the necessary manner of appearance of the real All as real, even so of the ideal [All] as ideal.
[853] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.147; *SW* 1/IV.412. §. V. Of the Contrast of the Real and Ideal Series and Potencies of Philosophy.
[854] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.153; *SW* 1/IV.419. *emphasis added.* how in each of the two unities the same potencies return, which in view of the whole are characterized through themselves and through and through the unity, through which they [potencies] are joined into one, but also . . . each potency in that it stands in another unity, assumes even another form [*Gestalt*], as, for instance, the same [potency] in one gives birth [*gebäre*] to a corporeal essence, in another [it gives birth] to a spiritual [essence] or knowing [*Wissen*].

Moreover, it is not that the real, ideal, and the unity of these two correspond simply to the three potencies, but rather are elements so to speak that constitute each of the three potencies differently. In the 1803 *Ideen*, Schelling spells out that

> Das Absolute würde sich wahrhaft theilen, wenn es nicht auch in der realen Einheit mit dieser zugleich die ideale und die, worin beide eins sind, abbildete, denn nur diese ist das wahre Gegenbild von ihm selbst.[855]

Put simply, for the Absolute to reproduce a "counter image of itself" it must carry out two representations involving the three potencies. The first is the ideal unity in the real unity with the real unity simultaneously. The second representation is the unity in which both the ideal and real unity are one. In these two representations, the three potencies are the real unity, the ideal unity in the real unity with the real unity, and the unity of both the ideal and real unity. In this triplicity there is a progression appearance-wise where the second and third potencies are based on the previous potency and potencies, respectively. One must not conflate the causality within appearance for ontological causality. Schelling explains this progression or hierarchy in the 56th section of the *Gesammten*.

> Aus der Indifferenz folgt . . . in herabsteigender Folge das Affirmirende oder Ideale im relativen Uebergewicht über das Affirmirte oder Reale, und das Affirmirte oder Reale im relativen Uebergewicht über das Affirmirende oder Ideale.[856]

In the "triplicity of potencies" there is a "hierarchy" or "descending order" of "indifference," "ideal," and "real." This hierarchy is evident also in the "preponderance" of the "real" over the "ideal." The lower two rungs, so to speak, seem interchangeable. Again, ideal and real cannot be taken separately and always mutually imply one another. The language of "preponderance" highlights the fact that each potency is always at base the absolute unity of real and ideal, only that in the first potency the expression of the Absolute weighs more towards the real, and in the second towards the ideal. The language of preponderance is that of difference and does not indicate

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[855] Schelling, *AA* I/13.260; *SW* 1/II.225. The Absolute would truly divide itself if it did not also represent the ideal [unity] in the real unity with this unity simultaneously and the [unity] in which both are one, for only this is the true counter image [*Gegenbild*] of it itself.

[856] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.161; *SW* 1/VI.211. [I]n descending order that which affirms or the ideal follows from indifference in relative preponderance over that which is affirmed or real, and that which is affirmed or real in relative preponderance over that which affirms or the ideal [...].

something ontologically substantial. One must not lose sight of the fact that the hierarchy of potencies is only according to expression and not essence.

Schelling analyses in detail the three potencies according to *Hen kai Pan* in both the 1803 *Ideen* and *Fernere Darstellungen*. In the 1803 *Ideen*, Schelling states that "Die erste Potenz . . . der Identität ist, wie gesagt, die der Einbildung der Einheit in die Vielheit [...]."[857] Each potency is not some static concept, but a "producing." Here the first potency is a matter of producing the *Hen* or "unity" into the *Pan* or plurality. Schelling articulates further in the *Fernere Darstellungen* that

> Die erste Potenz, welche wir . . . überhaupt die der Reflexion nennen können, ist dieselbe in Ansehung dessen, was wir die reelle, und was wir die ideelle Welt nennen. Denn sie ist in Ansehung beider durch die Aufnahme des Unendlichen in das Endliche, der Einheit in die Vielheit gesetzt.[858]

In addition to being a production of unity into plurality, the first potency is the confluence of universal and particular, which certainly speaks to philosophical productivity. This relationship of universal and particular, unique to the first potency, renders it the "potency of reflection." In terms of *Hen kai Pan*, this potency is a reflection on the *Pan* or plurality whereby the *Hen* or unity enters in to make sense of the former. Moreover, the first potency is as such "in view of both" the real and ideal world.

The second potency, according to Schelling in the 1803 *Ideen*, is "Einheit innerhalb der absoluten Einbildung des Unendlichen in das Endliche, welche das Zurückstreben aller Besonderheit in die Allgemeinheit, aller Differenz in die Identität [...]."[859] More simply, while the first potency is the absolute producing of the infinite into the finite, the second is the unity within. It expresses an opposing metaphysical force insofar as "all particularity" or difference strives "to return" "into absoluteness" or identity, all *Pan* into the *Hen*. In the *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling elucidates further that,

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[857] Schelling, *AA* I/13.209; *SW* 1/II.175. The first potency . . . is of identity, as it is said, the [identity] of the producing [*Einbildung*] of unity into plurality […].
[858] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.152-3; *SW* 1/IV.418. The first potency . . . we mainly are able to call the [potency] of reflection because in reflection the universal is added to and sought in the particular; [it] is the same in consideration of that which we call the real [world] and what we call the ideal world. For in view of both, it [first potency] is set through the incorporating of the infinite into the finite, of unity into plurality.
[859] Schelling, *AA* I/13.209; *SW* 1/II.175. unity within the absolute producing [*Einbildung*] of the infinite into the finite, which [is] the striving to return [*Zurückstreben*] of all particularity into absoluteness, of all difference into identity […].

> Wie die erste Potenz die der Einbildung des Wesens in die Form ist, so bezeichnet die in dem Wesen leuchtende und ihm eingestaltete Form die zweite Potenz, welche wir, da die Einbildung der Form in das Wesen durch die Aufnahme des Endlichen in das Unendliche bedingt ist, im Gegensatz gegen die erste die der Subsumtion nennen werden.[860]

The second potency is the form illuminating in the essence, which is the first potency, namely, the producing of the essence into form. As such an illuminating form, the second potency marks an added representative function over the first potency. The second potency also is a "producing," but the converse of the first while within the first. To elaborate, within the producing-into-one of essence into form is the producing-into-one of form into essence. This marks the progression inward, so to speak. Because of the reverse direction, the second potency is that of subsumption. On the one hand, reflection denotes a top-down movement from universal to particular, from unity or *Hen* into plurality or *Pan.* Subsumption, on the other hand, denotes a bottom-up movement from "finite into the infinite," and, to infer, from the particular to the universal, from plurality or *Pan* into unity or *Hen.* The movement of the second potency, simply, is that of a return.

The third potency consists of the unity of the first and the second. According to Schelling, "Die Substanz, das Wesen der absoluten Einheit . . . die dritte Potenz bezeichnet."[861] This is the Parmenidean One or Spinoza's Substance, the *Hen* present in and throughout the *Pan.* Schelling delineates further that,

> Von der ersten ist die im Endlichen oder Realen, von der andern die im Unendlichen oder Idealen ausgedrückte Ineinsbildung der beiden Einheiten das Abbild, wovon jene in der realen, diese in der idealen Welt die dritte Potenz bezeichnet, welche wir, als Einheit der Reflexion und der Subsumtion, als die Potenz der absoluten Gleichsetzung des Endlichen und Unendlichen und demnach der Vernunft bezeichnen werden.[862]

While all three potencies are producings or *Einbildungen*, the first two potencies simply are such producings. In stark distinction, the third uniquely is a producing-into-one or *Ineinsbildung.* The

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[860] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.154-5; *SW* 1/IV.420. As the first potency is the first [potency] of the producing [*Einbildung*] of essence into form, thus the form illuminating in the essence and appointed to it characterizes the second potency, which, because the producing [*Einbildung*] of form into essence through the incorporation of the finite into the infinite is conditioned, in contrast to the first [potency] we will call the [potency] of subsumption.

[861] Schelling, *AA* I/13.210; *SW* 1/II.176. The substance, the essence of absolute unity . . . characterizes the third potency.

[862] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.156; *SW* 1/IV.422. Of the first [producing-into-one (*Ineinsbildung*)] expressed in the finite or the real, of the other, the producing-into-one expressed in the infinite or the ideal, is the image of the two unities, of which the former characterizes the third potency in the real [world], the latter characterizes the third potency in the ideal world, which [potency] we are able to name [as] the unity of reflection and subsumption, as the potency of the absolute making equivalent [*der absoluten Gleichsetzung*] of the finite and infinite and according to reason.

added prefix of *In-* seems to connote a deeper sense of the producing of unity. In this regard, Tilliette is right that "Le mot de passe . . . de la philosophie de l'identite, est l'Ineinsbildung[…]."[863] Here, as in the first two potencies, there is an expression in the real and ideal world. The third potency in the real world, on the one hand, is "the producing-into-one expressed in the finite or the real." "[T]he producing-into-one expressed in the infinite or ideal," on the other hand, is the third potency in the ideal world. In either case, both are a unity of reflection and subsumption. Of the three potencies, the third expresses the depth of productive metaphysics insofar as it is the potency of absolute equalization. If we recall from the second chapter, the depths of the Absolute consist of the making equivalent the particular and universal in both iterations of the former into the latter, and the latter into the former. I discuss this more below in the context of construction.

Each of the three potencies is the entire Absolute. Schelling confirms that "jede Potenz, es sey in der reellen oder ideellen Reihe, jede für sich, wieder absolut sey […]."[864] To wit, the absoluteness of each potency applies not only to its triplicity, but also its manifestation in the real and ideal world or sequence; put simply, each potency is the Absolute, which highlights the manifestation of *Hen kai Pan* even through the triplicity of potencies. Again, this is difficult to grasp merely from the realm of reflection, which limitedly insists on there being conceptually one Absolute that contains numerically all the potencies, and thereby excludes any of the potencies from being the Absolute. It, however, is the contradiction of each potency being entirely the Absolute that results in production. Schelling continues,

> daß also in jeder nicht nur alle Potenzen sich wiederholen, sondern auch, weil zwischen Einheit und Einheit kein Unterschied ist, und die Einbildung des Unendlichen ins Endliche und dadurch des Wesens in die Form, wenn sie absolut, nothwendig auch die des Endlichen ins Unendliche, der Form in das Wesen begreift, und umgekehrt, daß aus diesem Grund in jeder Potenz für sich wieder die ganze Indifferenz des Wesens und der Form ausgedrückt sey.[865]

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[863] Tilliette (1970), 393. The password . . . of the philosophy of identity is *Ineinsbildung* […].
[864] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.154; *SW* 1/IV.419. […] each potency, be it in the real or ideal sequence, each for itself, again is absolute […].
[865] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.154; *SW* 1/IV.419-20. [...] that therefore in each [potency] not only do all the potencies repeat themselves, but also, because between unity and unity there is no difference, and the producing [*Einbildung*] of the infinite into the finite and thereby [the producing] of the essence into the form, if it [form] absolutely necessarily even grasps the [producing] of the finite into the infinite, of the form into the essence, and vice versa, that for this reason in each potency for itself again the entire indifference of essence and form is expressed […].

Since each potency is the Absolute, "all potencies" are able to "repeat themselves" in each one. This hearkens to the notion of the indifference-point expressed above. Within the scheme of this description of the triplicity of potencies, the third potency functions as the entire indifference of essence and form, while the second as the producing of the essence into the form, and the first the producing of the form into the essence. Schelling seems to highlight the first two potencies as the same unities by noting that "between unity and unity there is no difference," perhaps anticipating readers who will misread potencies. In that vein, Gary Dorrien does well to recognize the hierarchy of potencies. According to him, "Schelling's doctrine of potencies pictured a hierarchy of necessary structures that facilitate this process of unification with difference."[866] He, however, seems to grasp the triplicity of potencies too rigidly without recognizing their philosophically productive basis of *Hen kai Pan* that can accommodate their contradictory nature. Dorrien, to be fair, seems to touch on *Hen kai Pan* insofar as he mentions that these potencies "facilitate the process of unification with difference." He elaborates further that "The primordial point of union is the Absolute, the Parmenidean One" which "divides into three potencies […]."[867] Again, while Dorrien perceives partially the significance of *Hen kai Pan* for Schelling's potencies inasmuch as he mentions the "Parmenidean One," he captures too rigidly and limitedly only the movement from *Hen* to *Pan*, one to three, and thus overlooks the productive contradiction of *Hen kai Pan*. Nor does he realize that each potency is the Absolute itself. Moreover, Schelling, to be sure, employs three potencies as a way to represent the whole and not just merely "unification with difference."

Finally, shifting away from the triplicity of potencies and taking each one as a particular is to observe potencies as the *Pan*. To treat a potency as a particular cannot be other than to do so as the Absolute. A potency, hence, would receive such attention because it potentially expresses the Absolute. This speaks to the iteration of *Hen kai Pan* as the teaching of ideas where insofar as

[866] Gary J. Dorrien, *Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). 171.
[867] Dorrien (2012), 171.

each idea is the Absolute or God, so also is each potency the appearance of the Absolute or God. Schelling explains in the *Philosophie der Kunst* that

> Philosophie geht – ich bitte Sie, dieß streng aufzufassen – überhaupt nicht auf das Besondere als solches, sondern unmittelbar immer nur auf das Absolute, und auf das Besondere nur, sofern es das ganze Absolute in sich aufnimmt und in sich darstellt.[868]

In light of the Absolute being its sole concern, philosophy deals with a particular insofar as it is a potency or ideal determination. A potency, in other words, is in one sense an indirect way of handling the Absolute, it is a special particular that receives into itself and represents in itself the entire Absolute. That Schelling qualifies this assertion with "I beg you to grasp this rigorously" indicates that he was aware of the difficulty of grasping potencies. In *Über das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie*, Schelling asserts similarly that "Ihr könnt die einzelne Potenz herausheben aus dem Ganzen und für sich behandeln; aber nur insofern ihr wirklich das Absolute in ihr darstellt […]."[869] Admittedly, it is difficult to identify the Absolute through or as the different potencies or forms while not unwittingly conferring ontological substance simultaneously on these potencies. For it defies logic how potencies are able to represent the Absolute simultaneously without taking away anything ontologically from one another and even from the Absolute. According to Schelling,

> das Construiren der Philosophie geht . . . in jeder nur auf Darstellung des Absoluten, so daß jede für sich wieder das Ganze ist. Das Verhältniß der einzelnen Theile in dem geschlossenen und organischen Ganzen der Philosophie ist wie das der verschiedenen Gestalten in einem vollkommen construirten poetischen Werk, wo jede, indem sie ein Glied des Ganzen ist, doch, als vollkommener Reflex desselben, wieder in sich absolut und unabhängig ist.[870]

While we take up the matter of construction as production below, here it suffices to note that the organic metaphor recurs again because only here can each part be understood as the whole. Indeed, this points to the logic-surpassing and productive teaching of the ideas where each part is the whole and the whole consists of all the parts. Beiser has the right idea, expressed in the context of

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[868] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.113; *SW* 1/V.367. Philosophy—I beg you to grasp this rigorously—mainly does not realize the particular as such, but directly always only the absolute, and [it realizes] the particular only insofar as it [the particular] receives into itself and represents in itself the entire Absolute.

[869] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.460; *SW* 1/V.107. You could pull out each potency from the whole and treat it for itself; but only insofar as you actually represent the Absolute in it […].

[870] Schelling, *AA* I/12,2.459-60; *SW* 1/V.107. The constructing of philosophy . . . in each [potency] proceeds only to the representation of the Absolute, so that each for itself again is the whole. The relationship of particular parts in the closed and organic whole of philosophy is as that of various forms in a completely constructed poetic work, where each insofar as it is a member of the whole, yet, as a complete reflection of it, again in itself is absolute and independent.

Naturphilosophie, that "Schelling's theory of potencies . . . [r]ather than giving priority to the material parts of an organism and seeing the whole only as their product, it regards the whole as prior to its parts […]."[871] Indeed, in that a single potency represents the whole Absolute, it gives priority to the whole. On a more general note, it is fitting here to mention that as a particular, a potency can take on quite different names as long as it represents the entire Absolute. Nothing of the underlying philosophical conception of potencies changes; only that their manifestations can be myriad given their inessentiality, which indeed is very protean of Schelling's philosophy. This section has demonstrated how potencies are non-essential markers of difference that exhibit *Hen kai Pan* in its different iterations.

Hen kai Wissenschaften or *Wissenschaft kai Pan*

This section argues that *Hen kai Pan* is present in *Wissenschaft* and construction. Therefore, both of these are couched in philosophical productivity. In the first section, the correspondence of *Wissenschaft* and potency emerged, which the *Methodologie*'s sixth lecture further substantiates. When discussing speculative philosophy, Schelling states that

> weil alles in allem wiederkehrt und auf allen möglichen Stufen dieselbe Identität nur unter verschiedenen Gestalten sich wiederholt, diese an einem untergeordneten Punkt der Reflexion aufgefaßt und in der besondern Form, in der sie auf diesem erscheint, zum Princip der absoluten Wissenschaft gemacht werden kann.[872]

Although potencies are not explicit, they are evident in that "everything recurs in everything." As shown above, in that all the potencies represent the Absolute do they constitute as "everything," and it is helpful to repeat again from the *Fernere Darstellungen* that "in jeder . . . alle Potenzen sich wiederholen […]."[873] Further, that the same identity repeats itself only under various forms gestures at both the one and indivisible Absolute represented in various forms or potencies. This background of potencies makes it possible for the absolute identity to be grasped on a subordinate

[871] Beiser (2002), 549.
[872] Schelling, *AA* I/14.106; *SW*. 1/V.272. because everything recurs in everything and the same identity repeats itself on all possible steps only under various forms, this [identity] can be grasped on a subordinate point of reflection and can be made into a principle of the absolute *Wissenschaft* in a particular form in which it [identity] appears on this [subordinate point].
[873] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.154; *SW*. 1/IV.419-20. In each [potency] all the potencies repeat themselves […].

point of reflection. Schelling, therefore, does not deny that reflection can represent the Absolute, but that it is the provenance and sphere of the Absolute. To represent the Absolute in reflection without such a background of potencies is to handle an empty concept of the Absolute. Nature, history [*Geschichte*], and art, for instance, as potencies can serve as the "principle of the absolute *Wissenschaft,*" which literally and oxymoronically means an "absolute limited philosophy," but more precisely the move to absoluteness from limitation. The same Absolute recurs in all three potencies and *Wissenschaften*. This, however, does not mean that there are three separate beginnings of philosophy even less three Absolutes. Such a form as the principle is subordinate because while it is the Absolute, it is so to speak not so purely—this seemingly contradictory logic speaks to the productive contradiction of *Hen kai Pan*.

This becomes clearer in *Wissenschaft*'s productivity and in its distinction from *Scienz*.[874] Although in Anglo-American scholarship *Wissenschaft* for the most part is translated as "science," such hermeneutic oversight at the very least ignores Schelling's own varied use of the German terms *Wissenschaft* and *Scienz*. These two are not synonymous for him. From an etymological perspective, the former signifies production not only denotatively, "research activity in a field that *creates* new knowledge," but also etymologically given its *-schaft* affix, which is related to the verb *schaffen* meaning to create or produce.[875] *Wissenschaft*, simply means to produce knowing [*Wissen*], which, as we saw in the third chapter, is associated with religion and wisdom.[876] This is important for grasping philosophical productivity since Schelling understands philosophy as a *Wissenschaft*. *Scienz*, in contrast, comes from the Latin "scio," "to know," and the Ancient Greek κεάζω, "to split or cleave."[877] Thus, it bears a more analytical meaning. These etymologies show significant

[874] For a brief history of *Wissenschaft*'s relationship to philosophy, and Newton's influence on Kant regarding the use of these terms, see Herold, Norbert, "Philosphieren lernen—und was ein Philosophiestudium dazu beitragen kann," in *Philosophie: Studium, Text und Argument*, 19-20.) *Wissenschaft* as something organic is productive and possesses a dual nature of being simultaneously the universal whole and contextualized part. This characteristic of *Wissenschaft* enables it to express in a productive manner the philosophical doctrine of *Hen kai Pan*.

[875] Wissenschaft, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, emphasis *added*, forschende Tätigkeit auf einem Gebiet, die neue Erkenntnisse *schafft*; -schafft, Abstraktbildungen zu dem unter schaffen (s. d.) abgehandelten starken Verbum.

[876] Cf. footnote 463.

[877] Respectively, (1) 'scio,' *Lewis*; (2) κεάζω, *LSJ*.

differences between *Wissenschaft* and *Scienz*, which speak to the philologist Schelling. While the latter seems purely analytical in the sense of "splitting" without a definite notion of producing knowledge, this is not to say that *Wissenschaft* does not signify analysis, but that its primary meaning carries a productive sense.

The difference between *Wissenschaft* and *Scienz* is evident in the *Methodologie*, where Schelling understands the former as that which can be whole and part, and thereby exhibit *Hen kai Pan*. In the first lecture, Schelling discusses how one ought to carry out academic study, which unavoidably entails attending to *Wissenschaft* primarily as a whole, as seen in the epagoge. "[D]er einer untergeordneten und beschränkten Wissenschaft seinen übrigens rühmlichen Fleiß widmet, nicht geeignet, sich zur Anschauung eines organischen Ganzen der Wissenschaft zu erheben."[878] The distinction between "a subordinate and limited *Wissenschaft*" and an "organic whole of *Wissenschaft*" indicates *Hen kai Pan*; Schelling underscores the latter as implied in his criticism of an instructor who overly focuses on a particular *Wissenschaft* while ignoring the whole. Such an instructor is not at fault for his diligence, but the misplacement thereof. For it does not issue in an intuition of the organic whole. An ideal instructor, therefore, "[…] selbst vom Geist des Ganzen [muß] ergriffen, seine Wissenschaft als organisches Glied begreifen und ihre Bestimmung in der sich bildenden Welt zum voraus erkennen."[879] The whole has precedent over the part insofar as an instructor does not engage a particular *Wissenschaft* without the spirit of the whole. In this way, the particular *Wissenschaft* emerges as an organic member that already exists in the whole, which is a "self-producing world." Schelling, hence, understands *Wissenschaft* as something that is an organic and productive particular that simultaneously is both a part of an organic, productive whole, and the very whole itself. Jaspers recognizes accurately that "In jeder Wissenschaft wiederum drängte er

[878] Schelling, *AA* I/14.57; *SW* 1/V.214. [H]e, who devotes his remaining laudable diligence to a subordinate and limited *Wissenschaft*, is not suited to raise himself to an intuition of the organic whole of *Wissenschaft*.
[879] Schelling, *AA* I/14.57; *SW* 1/V.214. must be grasped even by the spirit of the whole to comprehend successfully his *Wissenschaft* as an organic member and to recognize beforehand its distinction in the self-producing world.

auf das Ganze, auf die Prinzipien."[880] The contradictory ability to be part and whole simultaneously points to the teaching of the ideas, the principles that are the whole.

In contrast, he takes *Scienz* as an uncontextualized particular that does not acknowledge a whole. In the twelfth lecture, Schelling asserts that

> Die Construktion der chemischen Erscheinungen gehört nicht einer besonderen Scienz, sondern der allgemeinen und umfassenden Wissenschaft der Natur an, in der sie nicht außer dem Zusammenhang des Ganzen und als Phänomene von eigenthümlicher Gesetzmäßigkeit, sondern als einzelne Erscheinungsweisen des allgemeinen Lebens der Natur erkannt werden.[881]

Wissenschaft here is "universal and comprehensive" and "recognizes the whole." This is Schelling's primary understanding of *Wissenschaft*, which stands in contrast to "one particular science." He implies that *Wissenschaft* can signify a whole unlike science. To wit, Schelling's idea of chemistry entails studying "chemical appearances," which can apply to the way certain aspects of nature appear on the molecular level. To study these chemical appearances is to situate them in the "comprehensive *Wissenschaft* of nature," of which they are considered "particular modes of the appearance of the universal life of nature." Indeed, Schelling's conception of nature is one that is living and that appears in "particular modes." "Science" then is an attempt to study and explain chemical appearances without a larger context. Schelling takes the difference between *Wissenschaft* and *Scienz* seriously, and the former cannot and should not be translated simply as "science." More pertinently, the former appears as productive and organic, while the latter something inert and inorganic. Building off this understanding of *Wissenschaft*, it will become more apparent below how it embodies *Hen kai Pan*.

As a further example, when explaining the *Wissenschaft* of art, the productive sense of *Wissenschaft* as an organic whole consisting of parts emerges. In the introduction to the *Philosophie der Kunst* Schelling explains plainly that "to have *Wissenschaft* about art" is to have

[880] Jaspers (1955), 117. In each *Wissenschaft* he pressed towards the whole, the principles.
[881] Schelling, *AA* I/14.159; *SW* 1/V.334. The construction of chemical appearances does not belong to one particular science, but to the universal and comprehensive *Wissenschaft* of nature, in which they [chemical appearances] are recognized not outside the context of the whole and as a phenomenon of a peculiar regularity, but as particular modes of appearance of the universal life of nature.

> die Fähigkeit, die Idee oder das Ganze so wie die wechselseitigen Beziehungen der Theile aufeinander und auf das Ganze und hinwiederum die des Ganzen auf die Theile aufzufassen, in sich ausgebildet zu haben. Aber dieses eben ist nicht möglich anders als durch Wissenschaft und insbesondere durch Philosophie.[882]

For *Wissenschaft* to be a whole involves the following matters. First, that one grasp "the reciprocal relationship of the parts to one another and to the whole;" second, the "whole to the parts;" finally, one "develop" or more precisely produce this whole with its parts and mutual relationships "in oneself." The reciprocity here is key for it pushes against rigid causality. Namely, the productive sense of *ausgebildet* lies in its suffix *-gebildet*, which can mean to produce or "bring forth," as we have seen before.[883] When coupled with the prefix *aus-* the participle literally means to "produce out of oneself." Thus, the *wissenschaftliches* whole must be produced out of oneself in oneself. Schelling emphasizes that such a whole is "possible" only through *Wissenschaft* and philosophy as a *Wissenchaft*. Realizing all these relationships of parts to whole and vice versa and to produce all of this out of oneself in oneself requires the anthropologically exclusive productive ability or *Fähigkeit*.[884] All of this points to the producing of intellectual intuition according to *Hen kai Pan*.

Schelling elaborated on his notion of *Wissenschaft* during his student days in Tübingen. The 1794 *Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie*—henceforth, *Formschrift*—is his first major publication produced under the spell of Fichte for it discusses *das Ich*. It marked his first official entrance onto the German philosophical scene. [885] The work implies that philosophy is essentially something invisible, imperceptible, and without form, but can appear as *Wissenschaft*.[886] Schelling confirms this in the use of *Möglichkeit* in the title. He argues that

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[882] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.105; *SW* 1/V.357. the capacity [*Fähigkeit*] to grasp the idea or the whole just as the reciprocal relationships of the parts to one another and to the whole, and in turn the [relationships] of the whole [*des Ganzen*] to the parts, to have [the idea or the whole just as the reciprocal relationships of the parts to one another and to the whole, and in turn the relationships of the whole to the parts] developed [*ausgebildet*] in oneself. This however is not even possible other than through *Wissenschaft* and especially through philosophy.
[883] Cf. footnote 106.
[884] fähig, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, "Fähigkeit f. 'Vermögen, Imstandesein' (Anfang 17. Jh.)."
[885] For more background, see Jacobs's Editorischer Bericht, Schelling, *AA* I/1.249-62.
[886] For a good overview of different forms of philosophy see Gabriel, Gottfried, "Formen des Philosophieren," in *Philosophie: Studium, Text und Argument*, ed. Norbert Herold and Sibille Mischer, 2. Auflage, vol. 2 (Münster: LIT Verlag Münster, 2003).

> die Philosophie *muß*, *wenn* sie überhaupt eine Wissenschaft seyn *soll*, durch einen schlechthin absoluten Grundsatz bedingt werden, der die Bedingung alles Inhalts und aller Form enthalten *muß*, *wenn* er sie wirklich begründen *soll*.[887]

The statement is in an entirely hypothetical register. Schelling employs the modes "must" and "should" and two conditionals, all of which emphasize the "absolutely absolute foundational proposition" that grounds "all content and all form." In other words, "if" philosophy "should be a *Wissenschaft*," it "must" have such a foundational proposition, whose foundational character is by virtue of the mutual grounding of the entire content and form. All this hypotheticality implies that Schelling is not talking about some actual particular *Wissenschaft* or of its principle as currently existing, but the possibility thereof. The point of drawing this out is to show that Schelling took *Wissenschaft* to signify a unified whole that ideally is so, not empirically. Schelling establishes this by arguing for the unconditionality and then absolute causality of the foundational proposition, which forms the main thread of the argument. He explains that "Wissenschaft überhaupt – ihr Inhalt sey, welcher er wolle – ist ein Ganzes, das unter der Form der Einheit steht."[888] This comes about only through an "obersten Grundsatz" that "[...] nur dadurch [kann] entstehen, daß sein Inhalt und seine Form einander wechselseitig begründen."[889] It is important to note that philosophy has such a principle only insofar as it is in the form of a *Wissenschaft*. This, indeed, points to something hypothetical because the reciprocity of form and content is an ideal. Most importantly, for this foundational proposition "ein schlechthin unbedingter Inhalt nur eine schlechthin unbedingte Form haben kann, und umgekehrt […]."[890] Unconditionality as non-empirical points to productivity just as the mythological demiurge in the *Timaeus* forms the backdrop to Schelling's conception of an unconditioned productive principle—see chapter three.

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[887] Schelling, *AA* I/1.273; *SW* 1/I.92. *emphasis added.* philosophy *must*, *if* it mainly *should* be a *Wissenschaft*, become conditioned through an absolutely absolute principle, which *must* contain the condition of all content and all form, *if* it [absolutely absolute principle] actually *should* ground it [philosophy].

[888] Schelling, *AA* I/1.269; *SW* 1/I.90. *Wissenschaft* mainly—whatever its content may be—is a whole that stands under the form of unity.

[889] Schelling, *AA* I/1.280.; *SW* 1/I.97. highest principle . . . can arise only in that its content and form reciprocally ground each other.

[890] Schelling, *AA* I/1.273; *SW* 1/I.92. an absolute unconditioned content can have only an absolute unconditioned form, and vice versa […].

Then through a complex series of arguments that deals with hypotheticals, Schelling renders the one foundational proposition into three through which one can trace unconditionality.

> Von diesen drei Grundsätzen ist der erste schlechthin, seinem Inhalt und seiner Form nach, der zweite nur seiner Form nach unmittelbar, der dritte nur seinem Inhalt nach unmittelbar unbedingt. Durch diese drei Grundsätze ist aber auch aller Inhalt, alle Form der Wissenschaft erschöpft.[891]

Each of these three propositions that exhaust the whole form of a *Wissenschaft* have a particular relationship to unconditionality. The first is according to its content and form; the second according to its form; and the third according to its content. These three foundational propositions of *Wissenschaft* appear again in the *Methodologie*'s seventh lecture.

> Ihr [Philosophie] nothwendiger Typus ist: den absoluten Centralpunkt gleicherweise in den beiden relativen und hinwiederum diese in jenem darzustellen, und diese Grundform, welche im Ganzen ihrer Wissenschaft herrschend ist, wiederholt sich nothwendig auch im Einzelnen.[892]

Philosophy's necessary type parallels the *Formschrift*'s account. Philosophy as *Wissenschaft* has the basic form of three which includes the two relative unities and the absolute central point, which trace back to the three foundational propositions in the *Formschrift*, where the first proposition is analogous to the absolute central point, and so on, respectively. Moreover, the basic form of *Wissenschaft* appears as corresponding to the three potencies above.

These features of *Wissenschaft* also carry into construction; both are intimately intertwined through production. Simply, *Wissenschaft* is productive because it engages in the act of construction; and as the second chapter examined, construction and intellectual intuition are philosophically productive actions. "Die Wissenschaft erklärt nicht; unbekümmert, welche Gegenstände aus ihrem rein wissenschaftlichen Handeln hervorgehen mögen, construirt sie," Schelling argues.[893] Here seem to be two simultaneous actions of *Wissenschaft*. It "constructs" and has a "pure *wissenschaftlichen* action." The former establishes the connection and identity of *Wissenachaft* and construction

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[891] Schelling, *AA* I/1.284-5; *SW* 1/I.100. Of these three foundational propositions is the first absolute unconditioned according to its content and form, the second only immediately through its form, [and] the third only immediately through its content. Through these three foundational propositions, however, all form of *Wissenschaft* is exhausted, even all content.

[892] Schelling, *AA* I/14.115; *SW* 1/V.282. Its necessary type is to represent the absolute central point in the same way in the two relative [unities] and again these in that [central point]; and this basic form [*Grundform*], which is prevailing in the whole [*im Ganzen*] of its *Wissenschaft*, repeats itself again necessarily also in the part [*im Einzelnen*].

[893] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.154; *SW* 1/V.418. *Wissenschaft* explains nothing; it [*Wissenschaft*] constructs unconcerned which objects are able to come forth from its pure *wissenschaftlichen* action.

insofar as the former engages in the act of construction; moreover, the act of constructing appears to contrast with explaining nothing, which confirms Schelling's view of construction as demonstration or an absolute manner of knowing, discussed in the second chapter. Furthermore, the "pure *wissenschaftlichen* action" appears to be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of construction. In the first case, the issue of the "pure *wissenschaftlichen* action" is constructed. In either case, *Wissenschaft* produces since to construct is to produce. Verra observes astutely that the "concept schellingien de construction a fait ressortir . . . la transformation radicale du concept de science, en privilégiant la catégorie de nécessité prise, à la fois, comme polarité et potentiation."[894] Although Verra does not cite further literature, he asserts insightfully that Schelling's notion of construction "radically transforms" the notion of *Wissenschaft*, which certainly differentiates Schelling's use of the term from his contemporaries. Verra grasps production correctly insofar as the act of construction comes out of necessity that entails both polarity or oppositions. In the same way, the three-part structure of *Wissenschaft* and the triplicity of potencies contain an opposition, and "potentiation" or production. Verra, therefore, indicates the close relationship of construction and potencies as well. Both oppositions and potentiation point to *Hen kai Pan.*

Indeed, construction embodies *Hen kai Pan* as the teaching of the ideas, which comes out further in its three-part structure that mirrors *Wissenschaft*. Just as with potencies and *Wissenschaft*, so also construction "ist ihrer Natur nach Lehre von den Ideen," Schelling underscores in the fourth section of the *Fernere Darstellungen.*[895] Verra and Helga Ende accurately grasp this connection. According to the former, "la doctrine des idées [est] par rapport au concept de construction philosophique […]."[896]According to the latter, Schelling's notion of construction

[894] Verra (1979), 39. the concept of Schellingian construction . . . brought out the radical transformation of the *Wissenschaft* in privileging the category of necessity taken simultaneously as polarity and potentiation.
[895] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.144; *SW* 1/IV.408-9. "according to its nature is the teaching of the ideas […]." Cf. *AA* I/14.110; *SW*. 1/V.277. "Die Sittlichkeit wird in der allgemeinen Freiheit objektivirt, und diese ist selbst nur gleichsam die öffentliche Sittlichkeit. Die Construktion dieser sittlichen Organisation ist eine ganz gleiche Aufgabe mit der Construktion der Natur und ruht auf speculativen Ideen." Both constructions of morality, as religion, and nature are grounded on *Hen kai Pan* or "speculative ideas."
[896] Verra (1979), 38. The doctrine of ideas [is] in relation to the concept of philosophical construction […].

> […] durch den bewußten Rückgang auf Ideen [entsteht], die zum alleinigen Konstruktionsprinzip werden, aus dem alle Evidenz abzuleiten ist und zu denen jeder Beweis zu führen hat […].[897]

The ideas as an expression of *Hen kai Pan* ground construction. To a lesser extent, Whistler perceives this relationship in noting that construction "consists in the production of ideas."[898] Moreover, the three-part structure of construction relates to the teaching of the ideas. When discussing the nature of an organic body and its living movements in the *Methodologie*'s twelvth lecture, he elucidates that "die Einheit der Idee im Seyn zu drei Dimensionen sich ausbreitet" which consist "in demselben Typus und durch drei Formen." He notes further that "Durch diese Construktion ist [es] . . . gewiß, daß es nur diese drei Formen" which are "das allgemeine Gesetz […]."[899] This shows clearly that construction in its expression of three forms expresses "the unity of the idea," which mirrors the three-part structure of *Wissenschaft*; and this manner of expression is a "universal law."

Schelling elaborates in the fourth section of the *Fernere Darstellungen* that "beides [das Allgemeine und das Besondere] . . . die gleiche Einheit des Endlichen und Unendlichen, und die Einheit, die zwischen beiden, eine reale und wesentliche ist."[900] Hence, three unities arise in the productive act of construction. The third unity as a real and essential one between the particular and universal makes sense. But that both the particular and universal are each the same unity of the finite and infinite does not. This contradiction points to *Hen kai Pan* in construction. Schelling explains that "keines . . . von beiden weder eines noch vieles in der Entgegensetzung, sondern jedes für sich eines und vieles in der absoluten Einheit […]."[901] In other words, in their opposition

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[897] Helga Ende, *Der Konstruktionsbegriff im Umkreis des deutschen Idealismus*, Studien zur Wissenschaftstheorie; Bd. 7 (Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1973). 57. Arises through the conscious regression to ideas, which become the sole principles of construction from which all evidence is to be derived and to which each proof has to lead […].

[898] Whistler (2013), 128. arises through the conscious return to ideas, which become the only principle of construction from which all evidence is to be derived and to which every proof has to lead.

[899] Schelling, *AA* I/14.158; *SW* 1/V.333. the unity of the idea spread in Being into three dimensions . . . in the same type and through three forms […]. Through this construction [it] is . . . certain that there are only these three forms . . . the universal law.

[900] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.131; *SW* 1/IV.393. both, therefore, [are] the same unity of the universal and particular, and the unity which is between them is a real and essential [unity].

[901] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.131; *SW* 1/IV.393. none of these two is neither one nor many in opposition, but each for itself is one and the many in the absolute unity.

both particular and universal are neither one nor many, or each is not a *Hen kai Pan*. Simultaneously, however, in the absolute unity each is one and many, or each is a *Hen kai Pan*. Ende misses this point by asserting that "Das Einzelne ist selbst nichts anderes als Aspekt dieses Allgemeinen."[902] Schelling certainly does not take the particular to be merely an aspect of the universal in construction. The space of this thesis permits only this brief analysis of these two unities in construction that ultimately issues from *Wissenschaft*.

With the above in view, it becomes clear how philosophy is a unique kind of *Wissenschaft* in that it contradictorily can be and not be a *Wissenschaft*. Insofar as it is, it occupies the place of *Pan*; insofar as it is not, *Hen*. When discussing the correspondence between the three potencies and three ideas in the sixteenth section of the *Philosophie der Kunst*, Schelling observes that

> Philosophie . . . über der Wahrheit ebenso wie über der Güte und über der Schönheit schwebend, dennoch den Charakter der Wissenschaft trage, und ihr Höchstes die Wahrheit sey, so ist zu bemerken, daß die Bestimmung der Philosophie als Wissenschaft bloß ihre formelle Bestimmung ist.[903]

The true, the good, and the beautiful, to be clear, are the three ideas, which certainly have Platonic heritage.[904] Philosophy paradoxically "hovers" over all these three, but as a *Wissenschaft* it is a matter of the "truth" alone. That philosophy as a *Wissenschaft* retains its identity as truth is philosophy's formal determination, on the one hand. Schelling explains further

> Sie ist Wissenschaft, aber von der Art, daß in ihr Wahrheit, Güte und Schönheit, also Wissenschaft, Tugend und Kunst selbst sich durchdringen; insofern ist sie also auch nicht Wissenschaft, sondern ein Gemeinsames der Wissenschaft, der Tugend und Kunst. Dieß ihr großer Unterschied von allen andern Wissenschaften.[905]

Philosophy is not a *Wissenschaft*, on the other hand, insofar as it is the "common factor" of the three ideas and their corresponding manifestations of *Wissenschaft*, virtue, and art, where the latter two correspond to the ideas of the good and the beautiful, respectively. Philosophy is both the absolute identity-point and indifference point here. It is the former as neither *Wissenschaft*, virtue,

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[902] Ende (1973), 54. The particular is itself nothing other than an aspect of this universal.
[903] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.126; *SW* 1/V.382-3. philosophy hover[s] over truth even also over the good and over the beautiful, yet bears the character of *Wissenschaft*, and its highest is truth; thus, it is to remark that the determination of philosophy as *Wissenschaft* is merely its formal determination.
[904] Plato, *Phaedrus* 246de.
[905] Schelling, *AA* II/6,1.126; *SW* 1/V.383. It is *Wissenschaft*, but in the manner that in it truth, the good, and the beautiful—therefore, *Wissenschaft*, virtue, and art itself—penetrate each other; insofar therefore it also is not *Wissenschaft*, but a common [factor] of *Wissenschaft*, virtue and art. This is its great difference from all other *Wissenschaften*.

and art; it is the latter as simultaneously being in all three. That all three recur in *Wissenschaft* speaks to indifference. The ability of philosophy to be contradictorily a particular *Wissenschaft* concerned solely with truth and simultaneously to be *Wissenschaft*, virtue, and art speaks to *Hen kai Pan*.

Schelling employs different titles for philosophy as a *Wissenschaft*, as mentioned in the second chapter, which speak to its contradictory uniqueness. Although confusing at first, they become clear through *Hen kai Pan*. In the *Methodologie*'s first lecture, Schelling deems philosophy "der Wissenschaft aller Wissenschaften […]."[906] This title emphasizes the *Pan* insofar as all these *Wissenschaften* are grounded in philosophy as the one *Wissenschaft*. Here philosophy as a *Wissenschaft* is common to all the *Wissenschaften*. Next, in the fourth and sixth lectures, Schelling deems philosophy "die Wissenschaft alles Wissens," which also underscores the "all" or *Pan*.[907] This, too, is another form of philosophy not being a *Wissenschaft* since it is common to *alles Wissen*. Then in the fourth and seventh lectures, he underscores the *Hen* in calling philosophy the "Wissenschaft des Urwissens."[908] Unlike the former titles, this has a temporal connotation, and speaks to the unified development of *Wissenschaften* "in den ganzen unermeßlichen Baum der Erkenntnis […]."[909] This development takes institutional shape as an academy and has a historical dimension—this must be explored in a separate work.

With this understanding of *Wissenschaft*, and philosophy as such, it is fitting to return to the beginning of this thesis whose epagoge broached Schelling's understanding of the method of academic study. This method proceeds only out of "der wirklichen und wahren Erkenntniß des lebendigen Zusammenhangs aller Wissenschaften […]."[910] *Hen kai Pan* as a productive contradiction illuminates this living context of all *Wissenschaften*. The life of this context stems from such a contradiction or endless production. Schelling's intention is to provide an outline or

[906] Schelling, *AA* I/14.57; *SW* 1/V.214. the *Wissenschaft* of all *Wissenschaften* […].
[907] Schelling, *AA* I/14.91, 102; *SW* 1/V.255, 267. the *Wissenschaft* of all knowing, demnach die Philosophie; *Wissenschaft* of all knowing.
[908] Schelling, *AA* I/14.91,113; *SW* 1/V.255, 280. *Wissenschaft* of original-knowing.
[909] Schelling, *AA* I/14.58; *SW* 1/V.215. into the entire immeasurable tree of knowledge […].
[910] Schelling, *AA* I/14.56; *SW* 1/V.213. a methodology of academic study can proceed only out of the actual and true knowledge of the living context of all *Wissenschaften*.

encyclopedia of these *Wissenschaften*. Perhaps this lively contradiction of all *Wissenschaften* is the circle of education that Schelling desires each student to enter with the expectation that each possess a productive ability that upon development is capable of producing intellectual intuitions and handling *Hen kai Pan*. In conclusion, this section has explored how *Hen kai Pan* carries into *Wissenschaft*, which, too, is productive. *Wissenschaft*, indeed, is intimately twined with construction and is productive insofar as it constructs. Taken with the previous chapter, this one has demonstrated how Schelling incorporates *Hen kai Pan*, a philosophical and religious doctrine, into his philosophical notion of potencies, *Wissenschaft*, and construction. The following telos will take up Schelling's significance in *Deutscher Idealismus* in light of his philosophical productivity as grounded in Greek antiquity.

Telos

Schelling's Hellenistic understanding of philosophical productivity, the anthropologically exclusive production of intellectual intuition according to *Hen kai Pan*, has significant implications for the narrative of *Deutscher Idealismus*. In this narrative, commonly understood as *von Kant bis Hegel*, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel attempt to unify Kant *à la* Spinoza in the wake of the *Pantheismusstreit*.[911] The following analysis focuses on this narrative because Schelling is associated with it, not because it is the primary context in which to situate his philosophy. To reiterate from chapter one, the key context in which to situate Schelling is *Griechentum*, which becomes apparent in his letters to Hegel below. This telos attempts a cursory reappraisal of Schelling's significance in *Deutscher Idealismus* focusing mostly on Kant and touching on Fichte and Hegel. It engages with scholars who overlook Schelling's Hellenism.

Deutscher Idealismus begins with Kant, specifically his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. This work transformed the philosophical scene by providing a revolutionarily thorough architecture of subjectivity. It brings about such a Copernican revolution by considering the fundamental question, "Wie sind synthetische Urtheile a priori möglich?"[912] He asks this question in order "entweder unsere reine Vernunft mit Zuverlässigkeit zu erweitern, oder ihr bestimmte und sichere Schranken zu setzen."[913] Kant divides the *Kritik* into the "Transzendentale Elementarlehre" and

[911] This phrase comes from the title of a two-volume work by the Hegelian historian of philosophy, Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*. Grundriss der Philosophischen Wissenschaften. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921); Other works that examine *Deutscher Idealismus* in the same manner: Jaeschke (2012), Beiser (2002), and Pinkard (2002).
[912] Kant, *WIK* III.B20. How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?
[913] Kant, *WIK* III.B23. either to expand pure reason with reliability or to set for her definite and certain boundaries.

the "Transzendentale Methodenlehre." The bulk of the work is in the former, which he analyses further into three parts. Its introduction, which is the first part, Kant calls the "Transscendentale Ästhetik." It treats "Sinnlichkeit" by formulating the "reine Anschauungen a priori, Raum und Zeit."[914] The second and third parts fall under the title of "Die Transscendentale Logik," the first of which is "Transscendentale Analytik." It concerns "die Elemente der reinen Verstandeserkenntniß, und die Principien, ohne welche überall kein Gegenstand gedacht werden kann […]."[915] It consists most strikingly of the "Deduction der reinen Verstandesbegriffe," which one can understand as the response to Humean skepticism; Kant especially highlights this deduction in the preface to the first edition.[916] The last part is "die Transscendentale Dialektik," which is "eine Kritik dieses dialektischen Scheines."[917] He explains this as

> eine Kritik des Verstandes und der Vernunft in Ansehung ihres hyperphysischen Gebrauchs, um den falschen Schein ihrer grundlosen Anmaßungen aufzudecken und ihre Ansprüche auf Erfindung und Erweiterung, die sie bloß durch transscendentale Grundsätze, zu erreichen […].[918]

Towards the end of Transzendentale Methodenlehre Kant explains his understanding of *Kritik* as that which "das Vermögen der Vernunft in Ansehung aller reinen Erkenntniß *a priori* untersucht […]."[919]

Insofar as the narrative concerns Schelling, *Deutscher Idealismus* begins by highlighting his letter to Hegel on Epiphany 1795. Schelling remarks that

> Wer mag sich im Staube des Alterthums begraben, wenn ihn der Gang seiner Zeit alle Augenblicke wieder auf- und mit sich fortreißt. Ich lebe und webe gegenwärtig in der Philosophie. Die Philosophie ist noch nicht am Ende. Kant hat die Resultate gegeben: die Prämissen fehlen noch.[920]

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914 Kant, *WIK* III.B73, 87. sense-perceptibility . . . pure *a priori* intuitions, space and time.
915 Kant, *WIK* III.B87. The elements of the pure knowledge of the understanding, and the principles without which no object can be thought anywhere.
916 Kant, *WIK* III.AXVI. Deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding.
917 Kant, *WIK* III.B88. a critique of the dialectical appearance.
918 Kant, *WIK* III.B88. a critique of the understanding and reason in view of their hyperphysical use to unveil the false appearance of their groundless presumptions and to obtain their claims to discovery and expansion, which [are] merely through transcendental principles.
919 Kant, *WIK* IV.B869. examines the ability of reason in view of all pure *a priori* knowledge […].
920 Schelling, *AA* III/1.16; Schelling (1973), 57. Who is able to bury oneself in the dust of antiquity when the course of his time at all moments sweeps him along to and with itself. I live and weave presently in philosophy. Kant has given the results: the premises are still lacking. And who can understand the results without the premises? And who can understand results without premises? — A Kant perhaps, but what should the great horde do with it. Fichte, when he was here the last time, said, one must have the genius of Scorates to penetrate Kant. Daily I find it truer. — We have to go further with philosophy!

From this, Oštarić concludes that Schelling thought "of himself as a true Kantian […]."[921] She, however, does not remark on the first two sentences, which gesture at Schelling's Hellenism and philosophical productivity. The first can be read as a rhetorical question; its modal verb *mag* can indicate ability or mean "wish" or "would" as Oštarić and Fisher translate, respectively.[922] In either case, it concerns both the pull of contemporary intellectual events one of which is the Kantian Copernican revolution, and the deep immersion in the texts of antiquity or "burying oneself" in its "dust," which hints at Hellenism. That Schelling found himself "swept along" by the former does not mean that he completely cast off his engagement with Ancient Greek philosophy to become "a true Kantian." For he confirms a few sentences later the "daily" experience of grasping Kant *via* the Socratic genius—I draw this out below. Fisher appears to miss these traces of Hellenism, as well as the broader context of *Griechentum*—already mentioned in the second chapter—by insisting that Schelling "only really abandons his studies in . . . classics and devotes himself to the new philosophy after meeting Fichte in May of 1794."[923] This is not true, as shown in the first chapter.

The second sentence points to philosophical productivity. In the *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen*'s second lecture when discussing chemistry in terms of the Ancient Greek conception of four elements, Schelling remarks that "Das Producirende nun oder das Band, wenn es in der Einigkeit mit dem Produkt ist, ist in der That nichts anderes als das innerliche Leben und Weben […]."[924] The unity of the producer and product, in other words, is "the inner life and weaving." This permits the inference that Schelling towards the end of his time at Tübingen was aware of himself as producing philosophically as he immersed himself in Ancient Greek texts.

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[921] Lara Oštarić, *Interpreting Schelling: Critical Essays* (Cambridge: University Press, 2018). 1; Hans Baumgartner presses this passage in his article, "Das absolute Ich und die Kategorien," in Jantzen, Jörg. *Die Realität des Wissens und das wirkliche Dasein: Erkenntnisbegründung und Philosophie des Tragischen beim frühen Schelling.* Vol. 10. Schellingiana. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1998). 69; Horstmann, Rolf-peter, 'The Early Philosophy of Fichte and Schelling', in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, ed. Karl Ameriks, (Cambridge: University Press, 2000). 168.
[922] Oštarić (2018), 1; Fisher (2022), 46.
[923] Fisher (2022), 46.
[924] Schelling, *SW* 1/VII.448. The producing [one] now or the band, if it is in unity with the product, is actually nothing other than the inner life and weaving […].

Moreover, the two sentences following the reference to Kantian premises in the Epiphany letter also indicate philosophical productivity and Hellenism. The first reads "Ein Kant wohl, aber was soll der große Haufe damit?"[925] In Schelling's estimation, Kant's philosophy is anthropologically exclusive insofar as "the great horde" would be unable to engage with its premises, were he to provide them; this points to the fact that Schelling to a certain extent identifies philosophical productivity in Kant. In this limited respect, Oštarić is right that Schelling's philosophical productivity points back to Kant. She correctly estimates that Schelling's "unique conception of creative reason" aims to wed the Kantian divide between theoretical and practical reason.[926] In a more recent article that interprets the *Briefe*, she argues that "for Schelling, a truly practical reason, the one that is thoroughly free, is . . . one that determines the will to creation."[927] She then traces this back to the second book of the "Die transzendentale Dialektik" of the first *Kritik*, specifically the "Die Architektonik der reinen Vernunft." Here Kant distinguishes between an "das nachbildende Vermögen" and a "das erzeugende."[928] Oštarić concludes that "For Kant, only a creative, not an imitative, reason, can develop a philosophical system that is original, is critical, and breaks the normative authority of existing, traditional philosophical systems."[929] She, however, does not furnish an exhaustive account of how Schelling may have read productivity in Kant. For instance, she overlooks the other place where Kant shows that "Vernunft die Ursache ist . . . zu erzeugen," which is in the "Erläuterung der kosmologischen Idee einer Freiheit in Verbindung mit dem allgemienen Naturnotwendigkeit."[930] Certainly, this shows that Kant touched on a productive conception of reason in the first *Kritik*.

Oštarić, furthermore, does not distinguish between reason and the *Einbildungskraft* as two manifestations of the same productive ability, as seen in the second chapter.[931] By ignoring this

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[925] Schelling, *AA* III/1.16; Schelling (1973), 57. A Kant perhaps, but what should the great horde do with that?
[926] Oštarić (2012), 71.
[927] Oštarić, Lara, "Nature as the World of Action, Not of Speculation," in "Bruno, G. Anthony, ed. *Schelling's Philosophy: Freedom, Nature, and Systematicity.* (Oxford University Press, 2020). 24.
[928] Kant, *WIK*, Bd. IV. B864. The imitative ability ... the productive [ability] [...].
[929] Oštarić (2020), 24.
[930] Kant, *WIK*, Bd. IV. B578. reason is the cause . . . for producing.
[931] Cf. footnote 278.

distinction, Oštarić overlooks that Schelling accords merit to Kant for philosophical productivity when it comes to the *Einbildungskraft*. He confirms in the *Briefe*'s ninth letter that

> Man darf hoffen, daß die Zeit . . . auch jene Keime, welche Kant in seinem unsterblichen Werke, zu großen Aufschlüssen über dieses wunderbare Vermögen, niederlegte, pflegen und selbst bis zur Vollendung der ganzen Wissenschaft entwickeln werde.[932]

In other words, Kant planted the "seeds" of the "wonderful" productive ability, which as "Die Einbildungskraft bringt aktiv ein Objekt," but did not develop them.[933] Schelling, hence, seems very hopeful in watering these seeds through his immersion in Plato. He perhaps has in mind the first *Kritik*'s third section of the main portion, "Von der Deduction der reinen Verstandesbegriffe," where Kant explicitly discusses the "die productive Synthesis der Einbildungskraft," which "die transzendentale Einheit der Apperzeption" assumes for der "Grund der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis, besonders der Erfahrung."[934] In other words, all concepts of the understanding that are brought to bear on experience are contingent on the "transcendental unity of apperception," which in turn assumes the "productive synthesis of the *Einbildungskraft*."

Loock's *Schwebende Einbildungskraft* begins with this passage and unfolds a close reading of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling along the lines of what can be understood as the productive ability as the *Einbildungskraft* and how it concerns freedom. He summarizes his comparison of Kant and Schelling that

> Anders als die schematisierende Einbildungskraft der Apperzeption . . . kann die tragische Einbildungskraft Schellings als eine grundsätzliche Besinnung auf das Problem gelesen werden, ob es überhaupt möglich ist, Freiheit und bewusstlose Produktivität in einem Vernunftprinzip zusammenzudenken.[935]

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[932] Schelling, *AA* I/3.102-3; *SW* 1/I.332. One must hope that time . . . will cultivate even those seeds, which Kant set down in his immortal work, for the great information about this wonderful ability, and develop itself unto the completion of the entire *Wissenschaft*.

[933] Schelling, *AA* I/3.102; *SW* 1/I.332. The *Einbildungskraft* actively produces an object [...].

[934] Kant, *WIK*, Bd. III. B117-8. The productive synthesis of the *Einbildungskraft* […] the transcendental unity of apperception [...] the reason [*Grund*] of possibility of all cognition [*Erkenntnis*], especially experience.

[935] Reinhard Loock, *Schwebende Einbildungskraft: Konzeptionen theoretischer Freiheit in der Philosophie Kants, Fichtes und Schellings*, 1st ed. (Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann, 2007). 20. 'Other than the schematizing *Einbildungskraft* of apperception . . . the tragic *Einbildungskraft* of Schelling can be read as the fundamental consideration of the problem whether mainly it is possible to think together freedom and unconscious productivity in a principle of reason.' Unfortunately, Loock's analysis includes neither the *Methodologie*, *Darstellung*, nor *Fernere Darstellungen*.

Indeed, Schelling's productive ability points to the intimate relationship between philosophy and art, especially tragic art.[936] Schelling's account of the productive ability, hence, differs insofar as it contains pure original forms of nature grounded in themselves and is not merely for the understanding to relate to sense-perceptible experience. This demonstrates in a limited fashion that, on the one hand, Schelling is like Kant not only in that he borrowed philosophical concepts from him, but also along the lines of a productive understanding of the *Einbildungskraft*, which he then extends beyond the sense-perceptible realm *via* his reading of Plato. Therefore, insofar as Kant conceives of the *Einbildungskraft* as a synthesis concerned primarily with experience, he and Schelling differ. This thesis has brought into question Schelling's relationship to Plato and Kant, and shown, in the third chapter, that he proceeds from the former into the latter and not vice versa—more on this below. Plato remains primary, which recalls the famous quote by Alfred North Whitehead that "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."[937] Kant, therefore, is less the precursor of philosophical productivity, and more one who helps pave the way for its modern iteration.

More significantly, Loock and Oštarić overlook the context of *Griechentum* by insisting that philosophical productivity traces back more to Kant. Schelling substantiates his Greek philosophical approach towards Kant by reminding Hegel in the Epiphany letter that "Fichte, als er das letzte Mal hier war, sagte, man müsse den Genius des Sokrates haben, um in Kant einzudringen" confessing that "Ich finde es täglich wahrer."[938] First, the direction of philosophizing is from the Socratic genius toward Kant, not the other way around. Schelling was not working within Kant to make sense of Plato but experienced the genius of Socrates as his own productive ability, which allowed him progressively to "penetrate into" Kant's abstruse critical

[936] This points to Sophocles, who will have to receive treatment in another book on philosophical productivity from the angle of art. Cf. footnotes 252 and 435.
[937] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, Corrected, Gifford Lectures (New York: London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1978). 39.
[938] Schelling, *AA* III/1.16; Schelling (1973), 57. Fichte, when he was here the last time, said that one must have the genius of Socrates to penetrate into Kant. Daily I find this truer

philosophy. Schelling has this in mind when asserting that he "lives and weaves presently in philosophy." In one sense, then, the Socratic genius is the lacking premise of philosophy whose results Kant furnished. The importance of this genius for Schelling dovetails with the fact that his Greek tutor in Bebenhausen, Reuchlin, had already introduced him to Plato well before Tübingen. Franz agrees that for "Der kleine Schelling . . . einen ‚Genius des Sokrates' . . . das Rätsel Schritt für Schritt (‚finde es täglich wahrer') auflöst."[939] Admiration for the Socratic genius and esteeming it over Kant substantiates Schelling's Hellenism.

Second and relatedly, Schelling gestures at the Ancient Greek text in which he immersed himself that aided in penetrating Kant. Later during the early period, he specifies the specific passage that enabled the intellectual growth in order to decipher the critical philosophy. This emerges in the *Gesammten* when evaluating Kant's philosophy as beholden to reflection. While in the 1795 *Briefe* Schelling deemed Kant's critical philosophy as planting the seeds of the productive ability, this did not mean that he took it as impervious to the limitations of reflection. For in the 291st section of the 1804 *Gesammten*, Schelling nuances his judgment of Kant's philosophical contribution by clarifying that his reference of evaluation is Plato.

> Ich habe mir das Verhältniß Kants *immer* durch ein Beispiel Platos erläutert. Plato stellt den Zustand des gemeinen Wissens vor als einen Zustand von Menschen, die in eine finstere Höhle eingeschlossen sind, die nur Eine Oeffnung hat, durch welche das Licht hereinfällt. Die Menschen sind aber nicht gegen das Licht, sondern nur gegen die gegenüberstehende Wand gekehrt, auf der sie die Schattenbilder der außen befindlichen oder vorübergehenden wahren Dinge sehen, und sie für die wirklichen Dinge halten. Kant ist mehr oder weniger mit in der Höhle gewesen: er sah jedoch ein, daß die Schattenbilder nicht die wahren Dinge seyen, und merkte das Licht. Aber er näherte sich ihm nur rückwärts, so daß er eigentlich immer noch die Scheindinge im Auge behielt und nie in den Besitz des Lichts selbst kam, noch genau wissen konnte, ob er aus der Höhle heraus sey oder nicht.[940]

[939] Franz (1996), 228. The young Schelling . . . a 'genius of Socrates' . . . gradually solves the mystery [of Kant's critical philosophy] ('I find it truer daily').

[940] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.402-3; *SW* 1/VI.524. *emphasis added.* I *always* have clarified to myself the relationship of Kant through an example of Plato. Plato represents the condition of vulgar knowing as a condition of men, who are enclosed in a dark cave, which has only one opening through which the light falls in. The men, however, are not turned towards the light, but towards the opposite wall, on which they see shadow images of the things situated externally or temporarily real and consider these as the actual things. Kant has been more or less in the cave. He however realized that the shadow images are not the real things and noticed the light. However, he drew closer to it [light] backwards, so that he actually always still kept in view the things of appearance and never acquired the light itself, nor was he precisely able to know whether he was outside the cave or not. Cf. Plato, *Res Publica*, 514a-517a.

This reflection confirms that from an early age Schelling had "always" situated himself in Plato, specifically, the allegory of the cave in the *Res Publica*, or frequently revisited this passage in order to penetrate into Kant. Therefore, it illuminates the textual source through which he especially experienced the Socratic genius as mentioned in the Epiphany Letter. In evaluating him according to this allegory, Schelling deems that Kant "realized that the shadow images are not the real things," which is the critical import, and "noticed the light." This is to accord Kant philosophical merit. However, in drawing "closer to the light backwards," Kant's critical philosophy falls short in two ways. First, it focuses only on the "shadow images" and not the "light itself." Second, its foundation is uncertain for it is not clear whether it "is outside the cave or not." Hence, the focus on shadow images and the unclear foundation reveals that the critical philosophy inhabits primarily the perspective of reflection, which unwittingly does not lack *en toto* the light of intellectual intuition.

In arriving at this evaluation of Kant, Schelling situates the critical philosophy as an intermediary between "die Philosophie, welche zu Kants Zeiten die herrschende," which is of "Der gemeine Verstand" that "[…] auch ganz nach diesen Begriffen [philosophirt]" and "durch Begriffe zurückzuschließen aufs Absolute," and "Platos, Spinozas, Leibnizens."[941] This distinction between the "vulgar understanding," on the one hand, and "Plato, Spinoza, and Leibniz," on the other, indicates the anthropological distinction. The former traffics only in concepts, while the latter produce intellectual intuitions—as we saw in the fourth chapter. In this context, according to Schelling,

> Kant hat das Unmögliche einer solchen Philosophie eingesehen, und die ganze kritische Seite seiner Philosophie hat nur bewiesen, was sich eigentlich von selbst versteht, nämlich daß alle diese bloßen Verstandes- oder Reflexionsbegriffe auf das Absolute oder das An-sich gar keine Anwendung leiden. Kants Philosophie war daher bloße Kritik, und nicht Kritik der Philosophie im absoluten Sinne, sondern Kritik der zu seiner Zeit herrschenden Philosophie. Gerade die Philosophie aber ist bei dieser Kritik leer ausgegangen.[942]

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[941] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.402; *SW* 1/VI.523-4. The dominant philosophy of the time [which is of] the vulgar understanding [that] philosophizes entirely according to concepts [and that] concludes back to the Absolute through concepts . . . Plato, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

[942] Schelling, *AA* II/7,1.402; *SW* 1/VI.524. Kant has realized the impossible [*das Unmögliche*] of such a philosophy and has proven only the entire critical side of his philosophy, what actually understood itself by itself, namely that all these mere concepts of the understanding or reflection experience [*leiden*] no application at all on the Absolute or the by-

Kant's *Kritik*, in other words, is "criticism of the philosophy prevailing in his time," and is critical in the sense that it "understood itself by itself" or that the "mere concepts of the understanding or reflection" understood their limitations, namely, having "no application at all on the Absolute or the by-itself." In contrast to his earlier optimism in the *Briefe*, here Schelling laments that philosophy has proceeded emptily with Kant's *Kritik*. Put differently, philosophy has remained chained to reflection even after the revolutionary potential of Kant's *Kritik*. Schelling was able to produce this evaluation of the critical philosophy by continued experience of philosophical production through the Socratic genius, specifically in Plato's *Res Publica*.

Even though Oštarić is correct to observe that Kant's "concepts of intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding" in the 76th and 77th sections of the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* are present in the *Timaios-Kommentar*, she misjudges the source of Schelling's understanding of philosophical productivity as intellectual intuition. It is fitting to introduce Kant's third *Kritik*. In this work, he examines

> Ob nun die Urtheilskraft, die in der Ordnung unserer Erkenntnißvermögen zwischen dem Verstande und der Vernunft ein Mittelglied ausmacht, auch für sich Principien a priori habe; ob diese constitutiv oder bloß regulativ sind (und also kein eigenes Gebiet beweisen), und ob sie dem Gefühle der Lust und Unlust, als dem Mittelgliede zwischen dem Erkenntnißvermögen und Begehrungsvermögen, (eben so wie der Verstand dem ersteren, die Vernunft aber dem letzteren a priori Gesetze vorschreiben) a priori die Regel gebe: das ist es, womit sich gegenwärtige Kritik der Urtheilskraft beschäftigt.[943]

In Kant's tripartite subjective mechanics, the power of judgment stands "between the understanding and reason," and is the focus of the third *Kritik*. This work carries out a threefold investigation into (1) whether the power of judgment "has *a priori* principles for itself" or those beyond the realm of experience; (2) the nature of these principles, "whether these are constitutive or merely regulative;" and (3) whether these principles furnish "*a priori* rules to the feeling of

itself. Kant's philosophy therefore was merely criticism, and criticism of philosophy in the absolute sense, but criticism of the philosophy prevailing in his time. Precisely philosophy however has proceeded emptily with this criticism.

[943] Kant, *WIK*, Bd. X. BV-VI. Whether the power of judgment, which constitutes a member in the order of our faculty of knowledge [*Erkenntnißvermögen*] between the understanding and reason, has *a priori* principles for itself; whether these [principles] are constitutive or merely regulative (and therefore prove no region of its own), and whether they [principles] give *a priori* rules to the feeling of pleasure and aversion, as the intermediary member between the faculty of knowledge [*Erkenntnißvermögen*] and faculty of desire [*Begehrungsvermögen*]: that is what the present critique of the power of judgment occupies itself with.

pleasure and aversion." Kant divides this *Kritik* into that of the aesthetic and teleological power of judgment, where in the former part he describes his understanding of taste, which has exerted significant influence on modern aesthetics. Taste, he asserts, is "das Vermögen, die Mittheilbarkeit der Gefühle, welche mit gegebener Vorstellung (ohne Vermittelung eines Begriffs) verbunden sind, a priori zu beurtheilen."[944] Such a representation "theilt sich . . . nicht als Gedanke, sondern als inneres Gefühl eines zweckmäßigen Zustandes des Gemüths, mit . . . wo Einbildungskraft in ihrer Freiheit den Verstand erweckt, und dieser ohne Begriffe die Einbildungskraft in ein regelmäßiges Spiel versetzt."[945] This idea of taste as a free play of the *Einbildungskraft* with the understanding is concerned mostly with describing the subjective experience of beauty and of the sublime. Oštarić mistakenly argues that "by intellectual intuition Schelling has in mind the understanding," and she provides no textual proof thereof.[946] For as we have seen above and in the second chapter, it is a matter of reason.

Furthermore, while Oštarić also traces "Schelling conception of genius" to "Kant's" in the third *Kritik*, the context of *Griechentum* again escapes her because she discusses neither the Socratic genius in this letter nor how it may tie to his notion of philosophical productivity.[947] As seen in the third chapter, the notion "genius" is inextricably bound with and less superficially understood as a type of religiously motivated production. Schelling, thus, not only viewed Socrates as productive, but also one whose productivity can be acquired. Only such Ancient Greek philosophical productivity can "penetrate into Kant." Therefore, the way to evaluate Schelling's reading of Kant is through his Hellenism in which context is philosophical productivity. It cannot be overlooked that Schelling found "daily truer" that his growing familiarity with Socrates increased his clarity about Kant. Schelling read and translated Plato frequently, as evident from his two commentaries.

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[944] Kant, *WIK*, Bd. X. B161. the ability to judge *a priori* the communicability of feelings, which are joined with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept).
[945] Kant, *WIK*, Bd. X. B161. communicates itself not as a thought, but as an inner feeling of a purposeful condition of disposition . . . where the *Einbildungskraft* in its freedom awakens the understanding, and this [understanding] relocates the *Einbildungskraft* in a free play.
[946] Oštarić (2020), 25
[947] Oštarić (2012), 71.

Hence, although it is not the focus of the critical philosophy, Kant mentions production in his *Kritik*. And Schelling having identified philosophical productivity in Plato perhaps expands this into Kant; but to be certain, the appearance of Kantian terms in the *Timaios-Kommentar* that are lacking in the earlier set of notes demonstrates that Schelling discovers philosophical productivity first in Plato and then explores it further through Kant.

One must not anachronistically overstate Kant's influence on Schelling at the expense of the Socratic genius. Jaspers tempers the emphasis on Kant by indicating that

> es fragt sich, ob man 1795 bei Schelling überhaupt noch von einem Kantianismus sprechen kann. Schelling jedenfalls glaubte, über Kant hinausgegangen zu sein. Es hat seine eigene Ironie, daß Schelling in dem Augenblick der Kantischen Manier beschuldigt wurde, wo er - angestachelt durch die Tübinger Kantrezeption - Kants Philosophie über sie selbst hinausgeführt zu haben dachte.[948]

As the analysis of the Epiphany letter has shown thus far, attempting to label Schelling a Kantian is to overlook his clear reference to the precedent of Socrates. Through a serious engagement with his comments on the Socratic genius, and his Hellenism more generally, one is more likely to avoid the irony of insisting that Schelling is a Kantian precisely when he indicates his intent to go beyond Kant by discovering the premises. Fisher refreshingly takes Schelling's comments on the Socratic genius seriously, correctly explaining that

> Schelling . . . treats Socrates' genius as something internal to him. […] [O]ne can see how this view of Socrates' daimon resonates with later central features of Schelling's philosophy under the concepts of intellectual intuition, reason, true philosophy, and absolute cognition.[949]

In other words, the Socratic genius in Schelling's notes develops into intellectual intuition and reason; this is not a post-Kantian development. Martin Leube, too, provides a sober account of Kant's influence during this time period.

> Man muß sich aber gegenwärtig halten, daß um 1790 und 1795 noch nicht von einer Herrschaft Kantischen Philosophie im Stift gesprochen werden kann. Einzelne kenne sie, andere machen sich gelegentlich ihre Schalgworte zu nutz.[950]

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[948] Jacobs (1989), 55. It is questionable whether one can speak of a Kantianism with Schelling in 1795. Schelling at all events believed to have gone beyond Kant. It has its own irony that Schelling was accused of Kantian manner in the moment when he—spurred by the reception of Kant in Tübingen—thought to have lead Kant's philosophy beyond itself.

[949] Fisher (2022), 54.

[950] Leube, Martin, "Die geistige Lage im Stift in den Tagen der französischen Revolution," *Blätter für württembergische Kirchengeschichte*. 39 (1935). 153. One must, however, keep present to oneself that around 1790 and 1795 one cannot speak of an authority of Kantian philosophy in the *Stift*. A few individuals were acquainted with it; others occasionally made use of its slogans.

Kantian philosophy certainly gained momentum during this time, but perhaps not as swiftly in Tübingen given its reverence for antiquity. Therefore, a more accurate evaluation of Kant's influence at the Tübingen *Stift* during Schelling's time requires a close engagement with *Griechentum*.

In that vein, a comment by Goethe helps illuminate the relationship between Kant and Schelling. Goethe displays his high regard for scholars of Greek antiquity in his tribute to Winckelmann, *Winkelmann und sein Jahrhundert*. To be sure, Goethe regarded Winckelmann more highly than Kant, as expressed in this work, which can be understood as a "public expression of a debt."[951] By dint of Winckelmann's heavy influence on Goethe, as seen in chapter one, the latter felt obliged to honour him. The title alone suggests that he deems the 18th-century as belonging to Winckelmann. The three-part work consists of some of Winckelmann's letter-exchanges, "An Outline of Art History of the 18th Century," and "Sketches for a Depiction of Winckelmann." The latter is a joint work by Goethe, Johann Heinrich Meyer, and Friedrich August Wolf, and contains fragments arranged topically. The fragment on philosophy is especially elucidating of Schelling's philosophy and its Hellenistic underpinnings, for it reveals the priority of Ancient Greek philosophy over Kant. Goethe reflects that

> […] indem uns die Ereignisses der neuren Zeit vorschweben, eine Bemerkung hier wohl am rechten Platze [steht], die wir auf unserem Lebenswege machen können, dass kein Gelehrter ungestraft jene grosse philosophische Bewegung, die durch Kant begonnen, von sich abgewiesen, sich ihr widersetzt, sie verachtet habe, ausser etwa *die ächten Altertumsforscher*, welche durch die Eigenheit ihres Studiums vor allen anderen Menschen vorzüglich begünstigt zu sein scheinen.[952]

The "events of recent time" refer to Kant's death in 1804, which occasions Goethe's juxtaposing him with Winckelmann. Quite rightly, Goethe deems Kant's philosophical achievement as something that no scholar without impunity can reject, resist, or disdain. Kant's great influence on modern philosophy is felt even today. The ultimate standard of philosophy, however, is not Kant, but Ancient Greece. Goethe clearly implies that only the true scholars of antiquity, who by their

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[951] Butler (2011), 133.

[952] Goethe, *WBA* XIX.426. *Emphasis added.* [...] as events of recent time are on our mind, a remark here probably is in the right place, which we are able to make on our way of life that no scholar without impunity can reject, resist, or disdain that great philosophical movement, which has begun through Kant, except perhaps the true scholars of antiquity, who splendidly through the singularity of their study appear to be favoured above all other men.

immersion in Ancient Greek works, can reject, resist, or even disdain Kant's philosophical achievement. Goethe most certainly considers Winckelmann as one of those "favoured above all other men" because of the singularity of his study of Ancient Greek art. Beiser helps us see that

> Winckelmann had recognized something that Kant's architectonic did not allow him to appreciate that the justification of aesthetic judgment depends on its interpretation, which ultimately must be based upon a specific cultural context.[953]

Goethe's estimation of the "favoured" Winckelman, however, refers to more than the latter possessing knowledge of "a specific cultural context." And certainly, Goethe similarly conferred this high estimation of a scholar of antiquity on Schelling, evidenced not only by support, but a close reading of Schelling.[954] This high estimation is most lucid in Goethe's letter to Christian Gottlob von Voigt, a poet and colleague of Goethe, on May 29th, 1798. Schelling "hat mir in der Unterhaltung sehr wohl gefallen. […] scheint er in jedem Sinne maßig und gebildet."[955] That Goethe deems Schelling a true scholar of antiquity is evident in this remark that Schelling was "educated in every sense." Thus, through Goethe one may conclude that Schelling's philosophy finds context primarily in *Griechentum* that interacts secondarily with Kantian philosophy.

The second letter cited in *Deutscher Idealismus* attempts to tether Schelling to Kant and Fichte, even Spinoza. It is Schelling's letter to Hegel on February 4th, 1795. To be certain, this letter discusses "Der eigentliche Unterschied der kritischen und dogmatischen Philosophie" and

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953 Frederick C. Beiser, *Diotima's Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing* (Oxford: University Press, 2011). 187.

954 Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Schelling occupied himself with the study of nature, and is perhaps one of the reasons why Goethe brings him to Jena in 1798. Winckelmann himself touched on the relationship between nature and art that perhaps spurred Goethe's interest in Schelling's own work on nature. Hans Jörg Sandkühler recounts that prior to the conversation at the end of May, Goethe "schon zuvor hat er von der *Weltseele* und den *Ideen* Schellings Kenntnis," both of which Schelling published in 1798 (Sandkühler (Hans Jörg Sandkühler, ed., *F. W. J. Schelling*, vol. 311 (Stuttgart: Sammlung Metzler, 1998), 9). Sandkühler meticulously notes that "Schelling wird ihn auch weiter interessieren; vom 12. November 1798 an notiert Goethe in seinen Tagebüchern, er lese Schellings Naturphilosophie; im Oktober 1799 findet sich die Notiz: 'Prof. Schelling, Einleitung zu seinem Entwurf der Naturphilosophie bis pag. 33 zusammen durchgegangen.'" (Sandkühler (1998), 9). Manfred Frank affirms that "war nie ein Zweifel an Schelling »Genialität« . . . ein von Goethe hochgeschätzter Kenner der Natur." (Schelling, "Vorbemerkung des Herausgebers" by Manfred Frank. *Ausgewählte Schriften*). This judgment did not merely rely on hearsay but on Goethe's own engagement with Schelling and his texts. That Goethe asked "Professor Schelling" to read his works with him elicits the image of the latter tutoring the former; that Goethe, twenty-six years older than Schelling, would confer such esteem on the latter is a marvelous historical fact that makes sense only in light of Schelling's deep engagement with Greek antiquity *via* Winckelmann. For a helpful account see Nassar (2010); also see Knittermeyer (1929), 139-40.

955 Goethe, *Goethes Briefe an Christian Gottlob von Voigt* (Leipzig: G. Hirzel, 1868). 213-4. Jena am 29. Mai 1798. In our conversion he was very pleasing to me. […] he appears measured and educated in every sense.

uses the categories of "theoretische Vernunft" and "praktische Vernunft," which also appear in the *Briefe*.[956] Schelling also asserts that "wir reichen weiter noch als zum persönlichen Wesen. Ich bin indessen Spinozist geworden!" Here, Schelling appeals to Spinoza for the Absolute.[957] And his confession "Mir ist das höchste Princip aller Philosophie das reine, absolute Ich" is a clear allusion to Fichte. But the letter's central philosophical claim is "Das A und O aller Philosophie ist Freiheit," a point which Schelling repeats in the *Ichschrift*.[958] As the second chapter has shown, freedom is a matter of philosophical productivity, producing intellectual intuitions according to *Hen kai Pan*; Ehrhardt cites this claim for his thesis *Nur ein Schelling*, as shown in the epagoge. Referring to Schelling's notes on Plato, Ehrhardt observes that "Ergiebiger als das traditionelle Interpretationsraster Spinoza-Fichte scheint nach heutiger Quellenlage der Hinblick auf Plato und Kant zu sein [...]."[959] This is not to say that Schelling did not draw from Fichte and Spinoza, but that his primary source is Plato upon whom he brings to bear Kantian concepts.

Fichte in the Epiphany Letter emerges as one in tune with Schelling's Hellenistic approach to philosophy. For he discusses with Schelling that philosophical productivity *via* Socrates penetrates into Kant. Fichte did not introduce but confirmed this experience of Socrates' genius when he visited Tübingen for a second time in May of 1794, at which point Schelling had already composed his two commentaries on Plato.[960] In other words, Fichte assured Schelling that his reading of Plato's philosophy as productive is correct, which Schelling's *Vorstellungen-Notizen* and *Geist-Notizen* confirm, as we saw in chapter three. Even more, traces of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* and philosophical productivity in his *Timaios-Kommentar* show that it is not a response to Fichte, another line of explanation in *Deutscher Idealismus*. Hence, the attribution of the *Naturphilosophie* to

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[956] Schelling, *AA* III/1.22; Schelling (1973), 65. The actual difference of critical and dogmatic philosophy . . . theoretical reason . . . practical reason.

[957] Schelling, *AA* III/1.22; Schelling (1973), 65. 'We reach farther still than a personal essence. Meanwhile I have become a Spinozist!' Ehrhardt (2000) points out that Schelling is being ironic here.

[958] Schelling, *AA* III/1.22; Schelling (1973), 65. For me the highest principle of all philosophy is the pure absolute *Ich*. […] The Alpha and Omega of all philosophy is freedom. Cf. Schelling *AA* I/2.101; *SW* 1/I.177. Der Anfang und das Ende aller Philosophie ist – Freiheit!

[959] Ehrhardt (2000), XLVII. According to today's body of source material the reference to Plato and Kant appears to be more fruitful than the traditional grid of interpretation of Spinoza-Fichte […].

[960] Baum (2000), 202. Schelling's commentary [on the *Timeaus*] was written before May 1794.

Schelling's independence from Fichte fails to account for Schelling's early notes on Plato. Based on the *Timaios-Kommentar*, Bubner argues that

> Größte Wichtigkeit kommt indes der philosophiehistorischen Korrektur zu, die das Manuskript zum Timaios uns abnötigt. Bisher hat man den philosophischen Beginn Schellings in der Nachfolgeschaft Fichtes gesehen. Der Weg vom Fichte-Schüler in die dann entwickelte Naturphilosophie erschien als die eigentliche Emanzipation Schellings aus der Abhängigkeit vom Vorgänger zu dem Thema, das ihm gedankliche Originaität und eine unerschütterliche Position im Entwicklungsgange des Idealismus sicherte. Wir erkennen nun, daß Schelling die naturphilosophischen Intentionen schon besaß, bevor er überhaupt in Kontakt mit der innovativen Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes treten konnte, die erstmals in einer Programmschrift von 1794 die Öffentlichkeit erreichte.[961]

Schelling's *Timaios-Kommentar*, in other words, already possesses clear vestiges of the *Naturphilosophie* that sets him apart from Fichte. The *Naturphilosophie*, therefore, does not render him philosophically independent from Fichte. This estimation is in line with Krings that Schelling's idea of nature as a whole that embodies *Hen kai Pan* rendered him unique among his contemporaries and set him apart from Kant and Fichte.[962] Franz, too, reads "die Krings'sche These" as affirming that "der Timaeus-Kommentar bereite die ‚Naturphilosophie' vor."[963]

Even after the Epiphany letter, Schelling reflects on the philosophical trajectory from Kant to Fichte, reaffirming the primacy of Plato. In the *Methodologie*'s seventh lecture, when discussing the division between the subjective and objective in modernity, Schelling furnishes a brief overview of this trajectory.

> Diese Subjektivität vollkommen bis zur gänzlichen Verneinung der Realität des Absoluten geltend zu machen, war der erste Schritt, der zur Wiederherstellung der Philosophie geschehen konnte und durch die sogenannte kritische Philosophie wirklich geschehen ist. Der Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre hat nachher diese Richtung der Philosophie vollendet. Der Dualismus nämlich ist auch in dem letztern unaufgehoben zurückgeblieben.[964]

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[961] Bubner (2004), 34-5. The greatest importance is due for the correction of the philosophy of history, which [importance] the manuscript concerning the *Timaeus* compels us. Until now one has considered Schelling's philosophical beginning in the discipleship of Fichte. The way from a student of Fichte into the then developed *Naturphilosophie* appeared as the actual emancipation of Schelling from the dependence on his predecessor concerning the subject, which secured for him originality of thought and an unshakeable position in the development of Idealism. Now we recognize that Schelling already possessed the intention of *Naturphilosophie*, before mainly he was able to come into contact with Fichte's innovative *Wissenschaftslehre*, which first reached the public in a 1794 manifesto.

[962] Cf. footnote 775.

[963] Franz (1996), 247. Kring's thesis . . . the commentary on the *Timaeus* prepared the *Naturphilosophie*.

[964] Schelling, *AA* I/14.107; *SW* 1/V.273-4. To make this subjectivity completely valid until the entire negation of the reality of the Absolute, was the first step, which could occur towards the renewal of philosophy and actually has occurred through the so-called critical philosophy. The idealism of the *Wissenschaftslehre* afterwards completed this direction of philosophy. The dualism, namely, has also remained in the latter.

Kant's critical philosophy, in establishing the architecture of subjectivity negated the reality of the Absolute—in a Wolffian rational sense—which Schelling deems a "step . . . towards the renewal of philosophy." Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, next, with its notion of *das Ich*, then proceeded to the entire negation of the reality of the Absolute. However, even this effort is still beholden to the dualism of subject and object, which is to philosophize from the perspective of reflection, as seen in chapter two. Albert Toscano correctly observes that Schelling's perspective of philosophical productivity "implies . . . the definitive abandonment of any project maintaining itself within the strictures of Kantian dualism, even in terms of thinking difference from an original polarity of subject-object […]."[965]

Schelling's assertion of his productive stance in contrast to Fichte's reflexive in the *Darstellung* was not a new claim. Bubner with an eye towards Schelling's presentation of the *Naturphilosophie* in his *Timaios-Kommentar* avers that

> Der Philosoph hat das [Im menschlichen Geist liegen die gestalterischen Kapazitäten, die sich am Objektiven bewähren] nur zu entdecken. Damit öffnet sich bereits der Weg zur Identitätsphilosophie Schellings ab 1800.[966]

Indeed, the seeds of Schelling's *Identitätsphilosophie* lie not in his engagement with Fichte, but in his understanding of Plato's philosophy as productive and religious that emerged from his early musings in Tübingen. Fichte's perspective of reflection, in contrast, was totalizing to such an extent that he evaluated even Schelling therewith. As Danz emphasizes, "Dem Identitätssystem, welches sich ‚auf den Standpunkt der Produktion' stellt, geht es gerade nicht um eine Ableitung oder Deduktion der endliche Dinge aus dem Absoluten."[967] Yet, "Fichte [hat] . . . gedeutet und dann konstatiert, daß Schelling aus dem als Indifferenz gefaßten Prinzip die Ableitung und Begründung des Besonderen nicht gelungen sei."[968] In his 1801 review, *Zur Darstellung von Schelling's*

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[965] Toscano, Alberto, "Fantacism and Production: On Schelling's Philosophy of Indifference," *Pli* 8 (1999): 57.
[966] Bubner (2004), 35. The philosopher only has to discover that [creative capacities in the intellect prove themselves objectively]. Therefore, the way already opens to Schelling's *Identitätsphilosophie* from 1800.
[967] Danz (2011), 159. The system of identity, which sets itself 'on the standpoint of production,' is precisely not a matter of derivation or deduction of finite things out of the Absolute.
[968] Danz (2011), 159. construed and then established the system of identity as a program of deduction that Schelling did not work out the deduction and grounding of the particular out of the principle grasped as indifference.

Identitätssysteme, published in *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik*, Fichte reveals his limitation to the reflective perspective by deeming Schelling's *Darstellung* an "ganze Deduction."[969] And then a few pages later when commenting on the *Darstellung*'s tenth section that asserts "Die absolute Identität ist absolut unendlich," he argues that "Hier liegen überhaupt noch tiefe Unklarheiten vorzüglich in dem Begriffe des Folgens von Bestimmungen aus dem Absoluten."[970] Hence, not only did Schelling deem Fichte to philosophize from the perspective of reflection, but Fichte himself embraced it and evaluated Schelling's *Darstellung* therefrom. Franks confirms indirectly that Fichte "tries to guard against the creativist misunderstanding of his thesis […]."[971] In this regard, Tilliette's observation about Fichte carries weight.

> [S]on intuition de soi n'est jamais vraiment sortie de l'intuition empirique, elle ne mérite pas d'être appélee intellectuelle . . . car ells [La réflexion et les philosophies de la réflexion] brisent le rayon pur de la connaissance absolue, en la réfractant sur le sensible.[972]

The inability to leave the standpoint of reflection betrays a hidden empiricism that renders intuitions from such a standpoint non-intellectual. To be clear, Schelling is not against reflection *per se* but challenges its recognition as the highest epistemological standpoint to the detriment of production, as touched on in the previous chapter.

Given the thread of *Deutscher Idealismus*, Hegel deserves some mention, who in his own way is limited to the realm of reflection given his privileging of concepts. As seen in chapter three, for Schelling the reality of anthropological exclusivity means that there are some who can produce intellectual intuitions to grasp the Absolute and some who cannot. In the *Abhandlung*, he states that "wer überhaupt nur von Begriffen lebt, und mit Begriffen spielt – wessen

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[969] Fichte, *FSW*, 1/XI. 371. [...] "the entire deduction." Originally published in the *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik* Herausg. von Schelling. II.Bd. 2.Heft. (Jena: Gabler, 1801).
[970] Fichte, *FSW*, 1/XI. 376-7. The absolute identity is absolutely infinite […]. [H]ere still lay mainly deep opacities especially in the concept of the result of determination from the Absolute
[971] Franks (2005), 358.
[972] Tilliette (1995), 190. His intuition of the self never really came out of empirical intuition, it does not deserve to be called intellectual . . . because they [Reflection and the philosophies of reflection] break the pure ray of absolute knowledge in refracting it on the sensible.

Anschauungsvermögen längst . . . ertödtet ist […].”[973] In the 1802 *Fernere Darstellungen*, Schelling anticipates Hegel’s critique in the 1807 *Phänomenologie*. According to Schelling,

> die meisten sehen in dem Wesen des Absoluten nichts als eitel Nacht, und vermögen nichts darin zu erkennen; es schwindet vor ihnen in eine bloße Verneinung der Verschiedenheit zusammen, und ist für sie ein rein privatives Wesen, daher sie es klüglich zum Ende ihrer Philosophie machen. [...] [I]ch in dem ersten Theil, den ich als eine Vormauer gegen diejenigen gestellt habe . . . [die] den Eingang in die wahre Wissenschaft nicht kennen, sie selbst mit endlichen Begriffen und Bedingtheiten verfälschen [...].[974]

Schelling deems the vulgar crowd or *the many* those who “see into the essence of the Absolute” only “an empty night.”[975] Hegel’s charge that Schelling’s Absolute is like “die Nacht . . .worin . . . alle Kühe schwarz sind,” places him in this anthropological category.[976] Comparing these passages, both Verra and Tilliette confirm this anticipation. According to the former, “Schelling exprime deja dans «Fernere Darstellungen», en des term es analogues à ceux qui deviendront célèbres avec la «Phénoménologie» hégélienne, que cette unité court le danger de saisir l’absolu simplement comme «nuit vide».”[977] The latter notes more briefly that “Schelling . . . a prévenu les critiques du bord hégélien.”[978]

Furthermore, that the end is actual only through explication substantiates Schelling’s claim that those who lack intellectual intuition “cleverly” make the Absolute the end of their philosophy “distorting” it “with finite concepts.” Hegel verifies this in the *Phänomenologie.* “Das Wahre . . . ist das Werden seiner selbst, der Kreis, der sein Ende als seinen Zweck voraussetzt und zum Anfange hat und nur durch die Ausführung und sein Ende wirklich ist.”[979] Simply, Hegel puts off to the end the realization of the Absolute, which ought to have been produced in the first place; what

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[973] Schelling, *AA* I/9,1.60; *SW*. 1/I.353. whoever mainly lives only by concepts and plays with concepts – their ability of intuition . . . has long been dead […].

[974] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.140; *SW*. 1/IV.403-4. the many see in the essence of the Absolute nothing other than empty night and are able to recognize nothing in there; it disappears before them in a mere negation of difference altogether, and is for them a purely privative essence, hence they cleverly make it the end of their philosophy. [...] I in the first part have placed as an outer wall against such ones, who . . . do not recognize the entrance into true *Wissenschaft*, [and] falsify it with finite concepts and conditions [...].

[975] Cf. footnote 533.

[976] Hegel, *WZB* III, 22. The night in which . . . all cows are black.

[977] Verra (1979), 34. Schelling already expresses in *Fernere Darstellungen*, in terms analogous to those which will be famous with the Hegelian *Phenomenology*, that this unity runs the danger of knowing the Absolute simply as ‘empty night.’

[978] Tilliette (1987), 23. Schelling . . . warned the critics of the Hegelian side.

[979] Hegel, *WIZ* III, 23. [T]he true . . . is the becoming of itself, the circle, which assumes its end as its goal and has it at the beginning and only through explication and its end is actual.

has always been at the beginning becomes apparent: Hegel's Absolute is an empty "concept" [*Begriff*].[980] This points further to the distinction between the conceptions of the Absolute of Hegel and Schelling. Schelling declares that

> [u]nsere Meinung ist . . . nicht, daß die Gegensätze nur überhaupt in einem allgemeinen Begriff zur Einheit gebracht werden, denn eine solche Einheit wäre wiederum nur formaler Art, sondern daß in allem, was sich ideell entgegengesetzt ist, die Wesenheit eins, und alles nicht bloß durch das äußere Band des Begriffs, sondern der inneren Substanz und gleichsam dem Gehalt selbst nach identisch sey.[981]

The level of concept is merely the outer band. To recognize the absolute identity requires looking past this outer band and into the inner substance and form itself. This is self-evident only for one "der uns bisher mit einigem Sinn gefolgt ist."[982] This self-evidence, in other words, indicates the possession of intellectual intuition, which Hegel rejects, as we saw in the chapter three. Hence, he grasps Schelling's "das Identitätssystem . . . [a]ls ein Deduktionsprogramm," according to the Danz.[983] Tilliette, therefore, emphatically places Hegel in the camp of "La réflexion et les philosophies de la réflexion."[984]

Certainly, Hegel deserves a more thorough treatment. At the very least, one no longer should explore the debates between him and Schelling assuming that they read Ancient Greek similarly—an assumption that has remained unquestioned for most of the history of scholarship between these two. There is enough in this brief analysis, nevertheless, to suggest that if one takes seriously Schelling's Hellenism, or put differently, if one attempts to read closely the texts that he himself and his peers zealously read, his views of intellectual intuition and the Absolute perhaps are less likely to seem aberrant compared to Hegel's. In a more precise sense, the misunderstanding of Schelling reflects more a superficial reading and misunderstanding of Plato on Hegel's part—

[980] Cf. Bhatti, Yashua, "Schelling's Nonconceptual Grounding," *The Review of Metaphysics* 67, no. 3 (2014): 543–82.
[981] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.146; *SW*. 1/IV.411. Our position is . . . not that the oppositions only mainly are brought together into unity in a universal concept, for such a unity would again only be of a formal kind, but that in everything, what is opposed ideally, the essentiality is one, and everything is identical not merely through the outer band of the concept, but according to the inner substance and as it were the form itself.
[982] Schelling, *AA* I/12,1.146.; *SW*. 1/IV.411. [...] followed us until this point with his own mind [...].
[983] Danz (2011), 159. The *Identitätssystem* . . . as a program of deduction […].
[984] Tilliette (1995), 190. Reflection and the philosophies of reflection […].

as seen in the first chapter, Schelling in addition to Renz and Hölderlin (both of whom were of the same year as Hegel) were considered the three best readers of Ancient Greek in Tübingen.

Admittedly, this analysis of Schelling's relationship to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel is unfairly concise, since each relationship warrants a book or two. This will suffice, however, for untangling Schelling's distinctive understanding of philosophy as productive in the context of *Deutscher Idealismus*. It is important to highlight here that this understanding of philosophy makes sense only in light of a Schelling who is a German Hellene immersed directly in Plato, in addition to other Ancient Greek authors; this is not merely to parrot Plato's idea of the forms in a translation. Hence, the context of *Griechentum* is decisive for realizing Schelling's conception of philosophy as productive. To a certain extent philosophical productivity forms an Archimedean point of Schelling's early works. Admittedly, this thesis' close hermeneutic approach to Schelling's works alone may be construed as furnishing such a point, but that is not the primary upshot. Instead, this thesis aims to guide the reader to realize that engaging with Schelling's work only in German, not to mention English, leaves much to be desired.

In that vein, one of the main reasons why Schelling's perspective of philosophical productivity has remained obscure, and why Schelling in general has long been misunderstood, is because of a lack of philological historicism, specifically, the willingness to engage with Ancient Greek antiquity as he did—which points to Winckelmann. Chapter one has shown the centrality of philology for Schelling's philosophy that makes sense only by conceiving of him as a German Hellene. As this thesis implies, those who settle for translations of Schelling and the Ancient texts that inform his thought certainly will be prone to misinterpretation because certain exegetical insights come about only through a direct immersion in these texts. In other words, a cursory familiarity with mere translations is insufficient to grasp the depth to which Ancient Greek texts took root in Schelling—and the other German Hellenes for that matter. Such a familiarity regretfully encourages the view that the Ancient Greek background is, to use Nightingale's phrase,

merely "window dressing" that enshrouds the presumedly "real" philosophical logic underneath showing the way to the Absolute. The context of *Griechentum* pushes against such an assumption.

This thesis does not claim to exhaust the hermeneutic implications of Schelling's immersion in Ancient Greek texts, but points to the need to reconsider the relationship between philosophy, religion, and art through an express engagement with these very texts. On that note an investigation into Schelling's understanding of art, especially as a part of philosophy, remains.[985] Therefore, this thesis points simultaneously to the need for a deeper and closer reading of how Schelling draws on Winckelmann and directly from Ancient Greek texts. This will allow one to see how Schelling invites us to reimagine the disciplinary boundaries between philosophy, religion, especially Christianity, and art.

[985] Schelling, *AA* I/14.101; *SW* 1/V.267.

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