AGATHOKLES OF SYRACUSE:

SICILIAN TYRANT AND HELLENISTIC KING

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by

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis discusses Agathokles of Syracuse (r. 317-289), arguing that he should be understood in both the context of local Greek Sicilian traditions and contemporary Hellenistic developments, whereas previous studies have represented him as remaining apart from the Hellenistic world as a Sicilian dead end or embracing the Hellenistic world so enthusiastically that he abandoned his Sicilian context altogether. Thus this is a thesis about chronological continuity at the beginning of the Hellenistic period and geographical continuity between Sicily and the wider Mediterranean region.

The thesis is tripartite. The first part deals with literary and numismatic source material, arguing for a shift away from source criticism in order to emphasise the coherence and agency of the surviving literary texts and the relationship of characterisations of Agathokles to broader Greek representations of autocracy. I discuss the chronology, iconography, and circulation of Agathokles' coinage, as evidence for the combination of Sicilian and Hellenistic elements.

The second part discusses Agathokles' rulership style, arguing that the assumption of the royal title did not transform his rule and identifying substantial parallels with his predecessors and his contemporaries. This suggests that Sicilian tyranny and Hellenistic monarchy were aspects of a single Greek tradition of autocracy.

The third part of the thesis looks at Agathokles' interactions with Sicily, Carthage, Italy, Mainland Greece and the Diadochoi, identifying the dynamics which drove these interactions and showing how they continued older models of interaction and were shaped by contemporary developments. This demonstrates the degree to which Agathokles and his local Sicilian context were part of the wider Hellenistic world.

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24. Silver tetradrachm, Metapontion. Pegasi Numismatics 12, Lot 70, http://www.pegasionline.com/catalog.asp?sale=1&cat=3#null.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ael.Her.*Pros.*	=	Aelius Herodianus, *De Prosodia Catholica*.
Arr.*HSA.*	=	Arrian, *Historia Successorum Alexandri* = Phot.*Bibl.*92
Arr.*Ind*	=	Arran, *Historia Indica*
BMC	=	Poole, R.S., B.V. Head & P. Gardner. *British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins: Sicily*. London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1876.
BNJ	=	Worthington, I. *Brill's New Jacoby*. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing (http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/brill-s-new-jacoby)
CH	=	*Coin Hoards*
CL	=	Consolo Langher, S.N. *Contributo alla Storia della Antica Moneta Bronzea in Sicilia*. Milano: Giuffrè, 1964.
CNS	=	Calciati, Romolo. *Corpus Nummorum Siculorum : la monetazione di bronzo.* Milano : Edizioni G.M, 1987.
Didym.	=	Didymos, *In Demosthenem*, in *P. Berol.* 9780.
Gàbrici	=	Gàbrici, Ettore. *La Monetazione del bronzo nella Sicilia antica*. Palermo: Boccone de povero, 1927.
HN^{3}	=	Rutter, Keith. and Andrew Burnett. *Historia Nummorum: Italy*. London: British Museum Press, 2001.
Hunterian	=	MacDonald, George. *Catalogue of Greek coins in the Hunterian Collection : University of Glasgow.* Glasgow : James Maclehose, 1901.
IGCH	=	Thompson, M., O. Mørkholm, and C.M. Kraay. An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards. New York, NY: American Numismatic Society, 1973.
INC	-	International Numismatic Congress
KBo.	=	*Keilschriftexte aus Boghazköi*. Leipzig, Berlin.
Leu	=	Bank Leu AG, Numismatik. Auction Catalogues.
Mach.*Princ.*	=	Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince. Second Edition*, translated by Robert M. Adams. Norton Critical Edition. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.
McClean I	=	Grose, S.W. *Catalogue of the McClean Collection of Greek Coins: Volume I: Western Europe, Magna Graecia, Sicily*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923.
MS	=	Buttrey, T.V. *Morgantina Studies II: The Coins.* Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1989.
NCMA	=	North Carolina Museum of Art
OGIS	=	Dittenberger, Wilhelm. *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae: supplementum sylloges inscriptionum graecarum*. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1903-1905.
Pegasi	=	Calciati, Romolo. *Pegasi*. Mortara, Italia: Edizioni IP, 1990.
Polyaen.	=	Polyaenus, *Strategemata*.
SNG I.I	=	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume I, Part 2: The Collection of Capt. E.G. Spencer-Churchill, M.C., of Northwick Park; The Salting Collection in the Victoria and Albert Museum*. London: British Academy, 1931.
SNG I.II.	=	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume I, Part 2: The Newnham Davis Coins in the Wilson Collection of Classical and Eastern Antiquities. Marischal College, Aberdeen.* London: British Academy, 1936.

SNG II = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume II: The Lloyd Collection I-VIII*. London: British Academy, 1933-37.

SNG III = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume III: The Lockett Collection, I-V.* London: British Academy, 1938-49.

SNG IV = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume IV: The Fitzwilliam Museum: Leake and General Collections, I-VIII*. London: British Academy, 1940-71.

SNG V = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume V: The Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, I-IV, IX, XI*. London: British Academy, 1951-2008.

SNG VI = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume VI, Part I: The Lewis Collection in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge: The Greek and Hellenistic Coins (with Britain and Parthia).* London: British Academy, 1972.

SNG VII = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume VII: Manchester University Museum: The Raby and Güterbock Collections.* London: British Academy, 1986.

SNG VIII = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume VIII: The Hart Collection, Blackburn Museum.* London: British Academy, 1989.

SNG X = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume X: The John Morcom Collection of Western Greek Bronze Coins.* London: British Academy, 1995.

SNG XIII = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Great Britain, Volume XIII: The Collection of the Society of Antiquaries, Newcastle upon Tyne.* London: British Academy, 2005.

SNG Aarhus = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Denmark: Aarhus University, Part 1: SNG Aarhus. Collections of Herman Ernst Freund and William Larsen.* Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1986.

SNG Agrigento = Caccamo Caltabiano, Maria. *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Italy: Agrigento, Museo Archeologico Regionale: Fondo dell'ex Museo Civico e altre raccolte del Medagliere*. Palermo: Regione Siciliana, 1999.

SNG ANS 5.3 = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, USA: The Collection of the American Numismatic Society. Part 5: Sicily 3 (Syracuse - Siceliotes).* New York, NY: American Numismatic Society, 1988.

SNG Budapest = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Hungary: Budapest, Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum. Volume I: Hispania - Sicilia. Part 3: Sicilia.* Milan, 1993.

SNG Cop. = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Denmark: The Royal Collection of Coins and Medals, Danish National Museum.* Copenhagen*:* Munksgaard, 1942-1979*.*

SNG Delepierre = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, France: Bibliothèque National: Collection Jean et Marie Delepierre.* Paris, 1983.

SNG Dreer 1 = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Österreich: Klagenfurt, Landesmuseum für Kärnten, Sammlung Dreer. Part 1: Italien – Sizilien*. Klagenfurt, 1967.

SNG Evelpidis I = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Grèce 1: Collection Rena H. Evelpidis. Athenes. Premiere Partie: Italie - Sicilie - Thrace*. Athens, 1970.


SNG Fabricius = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Denmark: Aarhus University, Part 2: The Fabricius collection*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1987.

SNG Greece 3.1 = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Grèce 3: Musée numismatique d'Athenes, collection Antoine Christomanos: Premiere partie: Italie-Eubee*. Athens, 2004.

SNG Greece 7.1 = *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Greece 7: The KIKPE Collection of Bronze Coins, Volume I.* Athens, 2012.

SNG Leipzig 1	=	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Deutschland: Sammlung der Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig. Part 1: Autonome Griechische Munzen.* München, 1993.
SNG Munich 6	=	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Deutschland: München Staatlische Münzsammlung. Part 6: Sikelia. Punier in Sizilien, Lipara, Sardinia, Punier in Sardinien, Nachträge.* Berlin, 1980.
SNG Sassari 1	=	Guido, Francesco. *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Italy: Sassari, Museo Archeologico "G.A. Sanna". Part 1: Sicilia - Numidia*. Milan: Ennere, 1994.
SNG Sweden 1a	=	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Sweden I: Part 1: The Collection of His Late Majesty King Gustaf VI Adolf and the Fred Forbat Collection*. Stockholm, 1974.
SNG Sweden 1b	=	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Sweden I: Part 2: Sammlung Eric von Post.* Stockholm, 1995.
SNG Tübingen 1	=	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum, Deutschland, Münzsammlung Universität Tübingen. Part 1: Hispania-Sikelia.* Berlin, 1981.
Synes.*Ep.*	=	Synesius, *Epistolae*, in Hercher, R. *Epistolographi Graeci.* Paris: Didot, 1873.
Trog.*Prol*.	=	Pompeius Trogus, *Prologi*

FAMILY OF AGATHOKLES



INTRODUCTION

1. Agathokles of Syracuse and the Boundaries of the Hellenistic World

Agathokles of Syracuse ruled Sicily and southern Italy from 317/16 to 289/88 BC,[1] at the dawn of the Hellenistic Age. He campaigned everywhere between Africa and Albania and was remembered by subsequent generations for his daring and cruelty. But he rarely appears in modern works on the Hellenistic Age or on Ancient Sicily. For scholars of the Hellenistic world he is too western to be relevant; for scholars of Sicily he is too late. In this thesis, I argue that Agathokles was an important player in the Mediterranean world at a key moment in its history. His career has important implications for our definition of the Hellenistic world and its relationship to the western Mediterranean and to earlier Greek history. I demonstrate this by placing Agathokles in both his Sicilian context as part of a long line of Syracusan autocrats and in his early Hellenistic Mediterranean context as one of many warlords fighting for territory and prestige. Previous studies have chosen to emphasise one or the other of these two contexts, presenting Agathokles as either a Sicilian tyrant or a Hellenistic king. I seek to show that he was both at once, placing Agathokles in the context of his past and his present, of Sicily and the wider Mediterranean. Thus, this is a study of the co-existence of local with global and of continuity with change.

This approach challenges two problematic trends in scholarship on the ancient world. The first of these is the tendency to study the western and eastern halves of the Mediterranean entirely separately, especially in terms of political history down to the Roman Empire. This entirely unsatisfactory division obscures the interlinkages that crossed the ancient Mediterranean, which

[1] Unless otherwise noted, all three and five digit dates in this thesis are BC, all four digit dates are AD.

were intense and long-standing.[2] Thus, the Roman "entry into the Greek East" appears an entirely unprecedented novelty, requiring special explanation, rather than a development of earlier patterns of interaction. I use Agathokles to demolish this division in the early Hellenistic period, stressing his extensive and interconnected interactions with all parts of the Mediterranean, as developments of centuries of previous interactions. Not only does this explain Agathokles' behaviour, it also illuminates the way the early Hellenistic Mediterranean looked to other powers, especially the Carthaginians.

The second trend I challenge is the emphasis on the death of Alexander the Great in 323 as a moment of rupture between the Classical and Hellenistic Ages, the former stereotypically characterised by democracy and *poleis*, the latter by *basileis* and autocracy. Scholars have long emphasised that the Greek *polis* did not die at Chaironeia.[3] It is much less remarked, though equally true, that Greek autocracy was not born at Chaironeia. The continuity between the kings who followed Alexander the Great in the eastern Mediterranean and earlier Greek autocracy is difficult to study – the tradition about Alexander shines so brightly that it is difficult to see beyond him and his Macedonian predecessors are not well-known. By contrast, Agathokles' predecessors, the Deinomenids and the Dionysioi, are well-known. I emphasise how Agathokles followed the precedents laid down by these predecessors and the parallels between his rulership and that of his contemporaries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Agathokles was able to combine Sicilian traditions of tyranny with features of emergent Hellenistic kingship because both were manifestations of a Greek tradition of autocracy.

[2] Critiques: Prag & Quinn (2013) & Purcell (2013) 367-77; earlier Habicht (1959).
[3] Famously by L. Robert (1969) 42; recently, Ma (1999, 2000 & 2003); Billows (2003); Carlsson (2010); Strootman (2013); Wiemer (2013); Raynor (2014)

Thus, Agathokles demonstrates the importance of earlier history and the west for the development of two of the defining features of the Hellenistic period: the unification of the Mediterranean and Hellenistic kingship. Neither was entirely new and neither belonged entirely to the Diadochoi.

2. Structure of this Thesis

This thesis has three parts of unequal size. The first three chapters deal with representations of Agathokles in literary and numismatic source material; the second part is a single long chapter discussing Agathokles' rulership in relation to Sicilian tyranny and Hellenistic monarchy; the final part, chapters five to eight, deal with Agathokles' interactions with the regions around him, serving to demonstrate the interlinkages between them.

The first chapter deals with the literary sources for Agathokles, principally Diodoros, Justin, Polyainos, and Polybios, and the implications of these authors' projects for the interpretation of their accounts. One of the central focuses of research on Agathokles has long been the effort to discern the lost sources behind the narrative preserved for us by Diodoros, Justin and others. This *Quellenforschung* ('source-criticism') was first carried out on a large scale by Schubert in his *Geschichte des Agathokles*, the earliest scholarly work devoted entirely to Agathokles, which confidently assigned passages of Diodoros and Justin to the lost historians Timaios, Kallias and Douris.[4] While it is important to be aware of the material available to our own sources and how that may have shaped their own works, it is almost never justifiable to attribute a particular passage to a particular lost source. Moreover, the attempt to see through the texts in front of us to the lost sources behind them blinds scholars to the surviving texts. I show that each of the surviving sources has constructed their own coherent characterisation of Agathokles, shaped by their own larger agendas. Only then do I discuss what is known of the lost sources themselves, treating them as the raw material from which our surviving authors built their own characterisations. The wide range of

[4] Schubert (1887).

viewpoints represented by the lost sources encouraged the surviving authors to think carefully about how they characterised Agathokles, while the large amount of data that the lost sources presented enabled our sources to pick and choose in accordance with their own agendas. The findings of this chapter are critical for my interpretation of literary evidence in the rest of the thesis and have important implications for other studies using evidence from these authors.

The second chapter moves away from the individual sources in order to investigate the shape of the discourse on Agathokles as a whole and its relationship to the discourse on tyrants and Hellenistic monarchs. Many of the anecdotes about him are tropes, which could be used (with appropriate modifications) either to praise or to blame. Similar tropes are deployed by ancient Greek authors to discuss both Classical tyrants and the Hellenistic kings – showing that both were part of a single discourse on autocrats, into which Agathokles was incorporated. Several motifs associated with Agathokles have parallels in stories about his predecessors and successors, reflecting a Sicilian tradition within this general discourse on autocracy. The fact that Agathokles' contemporaries and successors saw him this way supports the overall argument of the thesis that Agathokles was part of a long tradition of Sicilian monarchs within a continuous tradition of Greek autocracy.

The third chapter deals with Agathokles' coinage. I use circulation evidence, which has never been fully collected before, to investigate the purpose of the complex range of denominations issued by Agathokles in various weight standards and metals. This demonstrates a complex system of links of varying intensity and quality, within and beyond Sicily. Additionally, I argue that the iconography of his coinage does not represent a switch from Sicilian motifs to Hellenistic Macedonian ones, as has been uncritically repeated for over a hundred years. Rather, Macedonian motifs are clear from his earliest issues and throughout they were chosen on account of their Sicilian resonances – reflecting an effort to adapt new developments in autocratic self-representation to the Sicilian context. The

coinage, then, allows me to place Agathokles simultaneously in a Sicilian, a Hellenistic, and a Mediterranean context and show how these contexts overlapped with one another.

The heart of the thesis is its second part, which deals directly with Agathokles' rulership and its relationship to the regimes of his Sicilian predecessors and Hellenistic contemporaries. This topic has attracted substantial interest in modern scholarship since Machiavelli, for whom Agathokles was the archetype of the prince who seizes and holds power through the effective deployment of evil means.[5] The discussion has been shaped in unfortunate ways by early contributions, particularly by the imposition of two unhelpful paradigms. The first of these is the paradigm of transition, introduced by E.A. Freeman, author of the foundational work, *The History of Sicily from Earliest Times*. Freeman was an outspoken political activist, deeply opposed to Napoleon III, whom he hated for his coup d'état of 1851 and always referred to as "the tyrant."[6] These views informed his characterisation of Agathokles. A key aspect of this parallel was the idea that Agathokles' career, like that of Napoleon III, was a gradual transition from republican and constitutional beginnings to an absolute autocracy: the "despot's progress". A similar transition in the legends of Agathokles' coins had played a central role in Barclay Head's determination of their chronology.[7] Freeman's son-in-law and literary executor, Arthur Evans, firmly soldered the numismatic evidence to the idea of the "despot's progress."[8] The paradigm of transition has stuck, even as the exact ideas about what he was transitioning from and towards have changed. I argue that this is not a useful approach to Agathokles. The literary source material for his career, which is mostly retrospective and is much richer for the earlier part of his reign than for the latter, means that the paradigm is easy to deploy but hard to substantiate, excessively teleological, and encourages overly stark dichotomies. The

[5] Mach.*Princ.* ch.8.
[6] Freeman (1891-1894); Hunt (1901) 249.
[7] Head (1874).
[8] Evans in Freeman (1891-1894) 4.489-91; Evans (1894).

second problematic paradigm that is relevant to this discussion is the dichotomy between Sicilian tyranny and Hellenistic monarchy. Scholarly opinions have varied over time. Freeman himself, and Moses Finley, were inspired by parallels drawn between Agathokles and Dionysios I by ancient sources, and placed Agathokles firmly in the context of Sicilian tyranny – as its culmination or its last gasp. [9] Other scholars used the paradigm of transition to understand Agathokles' relationship to these two styles of rule. Thus, Helmut Berve and especially Sebastiana Nerina Consolo Langher, whose publications on Agathokles are legion, presented Agathokles as abandoning classical tyranny in favour of a new, Hellenistic style of rule, which allowed Agathokles to transcend the Syracusan *polis* and convert his realm into a territorial state.[10] As will already be clear, my thesis is that the distinction between Sicilian tyranny and Hellenistic kingship has been presented far too starkly and parallels for most aspects of Agathokles' rule can be found with both his predecessors and his contemporaries, demonstrating the degree of continuity between Classical and Hellenistic autocracy.

The four chapters of the third part of the thesis treat Agathokles' relationships with Sicily, Carthage, Italy and the Adriatic, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Agathokles has tended to be absent from general works on the Hellenistic period, reflecting a problematic absence of Sicily from the mainstream of modern scholarship on Hellenistic history, and Greek history more generally.[11] My discussion demonstrates the intensity of Agathokles' interactions with the wider world – a powerful

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[9] e.g. Polyb.15.35; Diod.Sic.20.63.3, 20.78; Polyaen.5.3.2. Freeman (1891-1894) 4.489-91; Mossé (1969) 167-78; Finley (1979) 101-8.

[10] e.g. Zambon (2006); La Torre (2009) 191; Lanteri (2011); Raccuia (2011) 234-43; Santagati (2011), esp.57; also Berve (1967) 453. Contra Finley (1979) 101-8; Meister (1984) 411; Lewis (2006) 52-7.

[11] Sicily is absent from Rostovtzeff (1941); Will (1966); Walbank (1981); Mørkholm (1991). Exceptions demonstrate uncertainty about how to fit Sicily into the Hellenistic main narrative: the chapter by Meister on Agathokles in the *CAH* 7.1 (1984) is not placed with the other narrative chapters, but wedged between a chapter on town planning and one on the Syrian Wars; Shipley (2000) 51-2, where Sicily is discussed along with Bithynia and Pontos; Erskine (2003) excludes Sicily from its narrative chapters despite including a very good chapter on Italy and Sicily as an example of Hellenistic cultural interaction: Dench (2003). Prag & Quinn (2013b); Erskine (2013).

argument against this exclusion. Past scholarship on Agathokles has represented these interactions as a progressive discovery of the Hellenistic world over the course of his reign.[12] By contrast, my discussion demonstrates that Agathokles' relations with the world around him reacted to and developed long-standing dynamics of interaction. I do this by stressing the parallels between Agathokles' own actions and those of his predecessors over a long time period. This approach helps explain Agathokles' actions. It also clarifies the behaviour of the states and kings he interacted with, and the ways in which the Mediterranean state system operated at the beginning of the Hellenistic period.

In chapter five, I discuss Agathokles' interactions within Greek Sicily, where an exile dynamic had been operating for Agathokles' entire life, which tended to transform local civic conflicts into pan-Sicilian conflicts. This dynamic pushed Agathokles to take an expansionist policy in order to secure his rule in Syracuse against attacks from his exiled opponents, and also enabled Agathokles to pursue that expansionist policy by allowing him to treat interventions in other Sicilian communities as part of his domestic conflict. In chapter six, I deal with the Carthaginians, where the exceptional Greek bias of our evidence makes it difficult to understand their motivations and has created a stale dichotomy of aggression and passivism in modern scholarly discussions. By considering their past experience of earlier Syracusan tyrants and their overall commitments throughout the Mediterranean, I am able to move beyond this dichotomy and argue that the Carthaginians were not interested in eastern Sicily for its own sake, but conscious that it could threaten their holdings in western Sicily which were vital to the coherence of their entire empire. Agathokles was able to manipulate their response to this situation in the process of his rise to power; during his invasion of Africa he successfully targeted every systematic weakness of their empire, but was unable to

[12] Consolo Langher (2000); see n.546.

overcome their advantage at sea. In chapter seven, I move on to Italy and the Adriatic, where the fragmentary state of Diodoros' twenty-first book means that we are sadly under-informed about the nature and extent of Agathokles' involvement in the region. By looking at Syracusan interventions in Italy over a long period, I show how the contested nature of the Straits of Messina, the desire to prevent catastrophic invasions from the east, and other factors motivated Syracusan tyrants generally and Agathokles in particular to intervene in Italy. I also argue that previous debates have failed to understand the importance of control of movement, as opposed to control of territory, when analysing the significance of Agathokles' Italian domain. Chapter eight, the last of the section deals with the *poleis* and *basileis* of the Eastern Mediterranean. Where previous scholarship has presented interaction with this part of the world as solely a phenomenon of the late reign, I show how the Sicilian interests of Corinth and Sparta loomed large in Agathokles' calculations from his first seizure of power, and how the conflict among Alexander's successors gave Agathokles the freedom to engage in aggressive actions in Sicily and Africa. In his interactions with the *Diadochoi*, Agathokles sought both to keep them at arm's length and to assert himself as their equal. In so doing, he placed a firm western boundary on the wars of the Diadochoi and was thus partially responsible for modern scholarship's ideas about the shape of the Hellenistic World.

This thesis, then, sets out to show that Agathokles was heir to a long tradition and actively engaged in his contemporary world. There is no contradiction or paradox in this fact, no sharp rupture with the one for the sake of the other. In ancient discourse about Agathokles, in the coins he issued, in his interactions with the world around him, and in the way he ruled, this principle holds true. The failure to place Agathokles in both of these contexts has caused scholarship on him to grow stale and it has contributed to the development of an excessively deep separation between the western and eastern Mediterranean and between the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Sicily, the very centre of the Mediterranean, has been allowed to fall through the cracks and our picture of the Hellenistic World is the poorer for it.

3. The Life and Times of Agathokles

Given the thematic approach taken by this thesis, it is useful to present a holistic overview of his life and career here. The details of specific episodes and the chronology of specific events are taken up, where necessary, in later chapters, particularly those of the thesis' second part.

Agathokles was born in 361/60 BC, the year before Philip II became king of Macedon, in the Carthaginian city of Thermai Himeraiai. His father was from Rhegion; his homeland had been destroyed twenty-six years earlier by Dionysios I. The highly fictionalised sources for Agathokles' birth claim that he was exposed at birth but survived. At his birth, eastern Sicily and southern Italy were a single realm, the largest in the Greek world, ruled from the fortress-island of Ortygia in Syracuse by Dionysios II. When Agathokles was four, dynastic conflict tore this realm apart. Local dynasts established themselves in the cities of Sicily, the city of Syracuse was physically divided between warring factions. In this context, Agathokles' father brought him to Syracuse, reportedly to open a pottery workshop.[13] The warfare came to a sudden end in 344/43 with the arrival of a small force from Corinth, led by Timoleon, who made 'tyrannicide' his public persona, killed the faction leaders, killed the local dynasts, and killed the Carthaginians. Agathokles probably fought in his last campaign, and was among the thousands who received Syracusan citizenship from him in 339/38, when he was twenty-two. His entire early life had been defined by tyrants and ideas about tyrants.

Soon after, Timoleon died and the system that he had established broke down in ways that are not clear. In the 320s, Agathokles joined Syracusan armies fighting in Akragas. The Syracusan general, Damas or Damaskon, admired his prowess and took him under his wing; Agathokles ultimately married his widow and had two children with her, Archagathos and Herakleides. In the late 320s,

[13] Either 354/53 (under Dion) or 343/42 (under Timoleon).

the Syracusans led a military expedition to Kroton. Agathokles held a medium level command; his brother Antandros served as a *strategos*. In Italy, he quarrelled with the expedition's leaders, Sostratos[14] and Herakleides, accusing them of planning to establish a tyranny. He stayed in Italy; they returned to Syracuse and seized control, calling their regime the Six Hundred. For some time Agathokles fought in Italy as a mercenary and revolutionary, until the Six Hundred were expelled and he was invited to return, probably in 318/17.[15] Together with a Corinthian general, Akestorides, he fought against the Six Hundred in exile and their Carthaginian allies. Agathokles quarrelled with Akestorides and was expelled from Syracuse, fleeing into the Sicilian interior by night. A settlement restored peace: the Six Hundred returned to Syracuse as private citizens.

Agathokles remained an exile. At Morgantina, he gathered an army, then he struck, capturing Leontinoi and placing Syracuse under siege. A mediation took place, apparently involving the Carthaginian leader in Sicily, Hamilcar:[16] Agathokles returned to the city and swore the Great Oath to cause no further trouble. But soon after, he held a muster in the Timoleonteion for an expedition against Herbita. When the leaders of the Six Hundred arrived, his troops massacred them. Riots followed, at the end of which the people appointed him *strategos autokrator* without colleagues. It was 317/16, Agathokles was forty-four, and he would rule Syracuse for the next twenty-eight years. Those opponents of his who survived the bloodbath, including Sostratos and Herakleides, went into exile in Gela, Messana, and Akragas. Around this time Agathokles married Alkia, by whom he had a son called Agathokles and a daughter who would later be called Lanassa. After Agathokles led an attack on Messana in 315/14, which was rebuffed by a Carthaginian embassy, the exiles were

[14] Also referred to as Sosistratos.
[15] For the date, see n.987.
[16] There were two Hamilcars in charge of Carthaginian forces in Sicily in this period; Hamilcar the uncle of Bomilcar who was in command from sometime in the 320s until his death in 312/11 or 311/10 and Hamilcar the son of Gisgo who replaced him and continued in command until his execution in 309/08. I refer to the former as "Hamilcar" and the latter as "Hamilcar Gisgonis."

able to persuade Gela, Messana, and Akragas to go to war against Agathokles, with a Spartan prince, Akrotatos, in command and Tarantine support. This war effort collapsed in on itself after Akrotatos murdered Sostratos at dinner and Hamilcar mediated a peace agreement: the Carthaginian cities were Carthaginian; the Greek cities were *autonomoi*; Syracuse was the *hegemon*. This made almost everyone unhappy and solved nothing. Hamilcar died shortly thereafter.

Exercising his rights as *hegemon*, Agathokles conquered Messana, which continued to host Syracusan exiles, in 312/11 and then led his army to Akragas, where a Carthaginian fleet under Hamilcar Gisgonis appeared to oppose him. Agathokles responded by invading the Carthaginian part of Sicily. Hamilcar's fleet sailed into the Great Harbour, attacked the grain ships and left. The Syracusan exiles, now led by Deinokrates, were rebuffed at Kentoripa and defeated at Galeria. Hamilcar encamped on the ridge of Eknomos, but Agathokles prevented him from crossing the River Himera. The next year, Hamilcar returned to Eknomos with a much larger force; Agathokles was routed and fled Syracuse; the cities of Sicily defected to Carthage. Embarking his troops, Agathokles departed Sicily, destination unspecified, and landed in Africa at Latomiai in Cap Bon on the 20th of August 310.[17] He set his ships alight on the beach and marched on Carthage, defeating the Carthaginian generals Hanno and Bomilcar in battle, occupying the city of Tunis, putting Carthage under siege, and capturing the cities of Neapolis, Thapsos, and Adrymeis. In Sicily, Hamilcar Gisgonis attacked Syracuse, joined by the Syracusan exiles. In 309/308, Hamilcar attempted a second siege of Syracuse but his troops were destroyed in a night attack from the Euryalos. He was captured and decapitated; Deinokrates and the exiles escaped. The Akragantines,

[17] Or the 15th, according to Justin; the dating is based on an eclipse which took place on Julian date -309-08-15, 07:59 UTC according to www.skyviewcafe.com/skyview.php. This was about three and a half hours after dawn from Cape Bon (36°45'N 10°45E) and four hours after dawn in Syracuse (37°05'N 15°17'E).

under the command of Xenodokos,[18] took over opposition to both Agathokles and the Carthaginians on land, while the Carthaginian navy continued to blockade Syracuse. In Africa, Agathokles' army mutinied after his son Archagathos killed Lykiskos, one of the officers; Agathokles defused the mutiny by drawing his sword and threatening to fall on it.

In 308/07, after a costly campaign against the nomadic Zouphones, Agathokles reached out to Ophellas, Ptolemy's governor of Cyrenaica, who marched overland to join Agathokles with an army of mercenaries, mostly from Athens. Days after they rendezvoused, Agathokles murdered Ophellas and seized his troops and treasure for himself. While he was engaged in this, an attempted coup took place in Carthage; ancient commentators, scandalised by the murder of Ophellas, charged that the murder had cost Agathokles his chance to capture the city while it was in turmoil. In 307/06, Agathokles captured Utica and Hippo, then returned to deal with the situation in Sicily, leaving Archagathos in charge of Africa. He landed at Selinous, seized Herakleia, Thermai and Kephaloidion, but was repeatedly rebuffed in the Sicilian interior. Meanwhile, Xenodokos and the Akragantines had been knocked back in the eastern part of the island and Deinokrates proclaimed himself the new "protector of the common freedom." In Syracuse, Agathokles received news that Archagathos had completely lost control of Africa and was besieged in Tunis. With the help of eighteen Etruscan ships, he defeated the Carthaginian navy blockading Syracuse, while another of his armies defeated the forces of Xenodokos outside the walls of Akragas. Agathokles celebrated by massacring five hundred of his drunken opponents at a feast, then returned to Africa. But he did not stay long. After a major defeat, he fled from his mutinying troops in Africa in the middle of winter. The army killed his sons and surrendered to the Carthaginians, who settled them in Solous. The hold-outs were enslaved; their commanders crucified.

[18] Also referred to as Xenodikos.

Agathokles returned to Sicily, where he is meant to have massacred the allied city of Segesta, torturing the townsfolk for money and refounding the settlement as Dikaiopolis. The Syracusan relatives of his African army were led out to the beach and executed. In 306/05, Pasiphilos, one of Agathokles' most senior generals, defected to the exiles and Agathokles attempted to surrender his position and allow Deinokrates to return to Syracuse. Deinokrates refused, so he made peace with the Carthaginians instead, for a cash payment. The next year, the exiles massed at Torgion. Agathokles caught them there, riven by internal dissensions, and routed them. Deinokrates defected to Agathokles' service, conquering Gela, the last hold-out of the exiles, for him in 303/02. Agathokles conquered Lipara and thus brought the whole eastern part of Sicily under his control.

After this, events are less clear; there is no continuous ancient narrative. In imitation of the Diadochoi, Agathokles proclaimed himself *basileus*, probably in 304/03. Although he took their title, he did not assume the diadem, preferring to retain the wreath of his priesthood. Perhaps at the same time he married Theoxena, the step-daughter of Ptolemy I, with whom he had two further children, Archagathos and Theoxena. He carried out construction on Ortygia, building a Sixty-Couch Hall and fortifications around the small harbour, and dedicated paintings of himself fighting on horseback in the Temple of Athena. He demolished the ruins of Gelon's tomb and probably expanded the Euryalos fortress. Soon after his conquest of Lipara, he was invited into Calabria to support the Greek towns there against the Bruttii, an off-shoot of the Lucanians who inhabited the Calabrian interior. Thence he was summoned to Korkyra, where he thwarted an attempted invasion by Kassandros the Antipatrid King of Macedon. In 295/94, he married his daughter to Pyrrhos, making Korkyra the dowry and using the marriage procession as cover to conquer Kroton and make alliances with the Peuketians and Iapygians. His campaign against the Bruttii continued during these years – he was defeated at Ethai after massacring his own mercenaries when they demanded pay, but subsequently conquered Hipponion. The limited evidence suggests that he controlled the whole toe of Italy by the end of the 290s.

In 290/89, Agathokles' daughter Lanassa defected from Pyrrhos to Demetrios Poliorketes, taking Korkyra with her. Agathokles organised an alliance with Demetrios and prepared for a renewed war with Carthage. But the next year he was consumed by a flesh-eating disease or poisoned toothpaste. He decided to make Agathokles II his heir. His grandson, Archagathos, son of the Archagathos who died in Africa, was encamped below Mount Etna, in charge of the armed forces and assumed that he was the heir to the kingdom. Agathokles sent Agathokles II to relieve him of both the command and the assumption. Archagathos, predictably, killed him. Agathokles sent his wife and children back to Egypt and called an assembly where he restored *demokratia*, imploring the people to avenge him. Soon after he died, aged seventy-two. His descendants would be regents of Egypt, kings of Epirus, queens of Macedon, and eventually, for eleven months, kings of Syracuse once more, but Agathokles' own kingdom died with him. Archagathos was assassinated soon after, the Carthaginians invaded, the exiles were allowed to return, and Agathokles' Campanian troops were expelled from Syracuse. Within a decade of Agathokles' death there was a Roman garrison in Rhegion, while Greek Sicily was split into three parts: the realm of King Phintias at his homonymous city in the south, the domain of the expelled Campanians in the northeast, and Syracuse in the southeast administered by a series of strongmen who avoided the royal title. When Ortygia became a palace once more, it was the centre of a much smaller kingdom, founded with Ptolemaic money and preserved by Roman support, under Hieron II, the first Roman client king.

PART I: REPRESENTATIONS

1. HISTORIOGRAPHY

This first part of this thesis deals with the literary and numismatic source material for Agathokles. This is necessary in order to apply that material usefully to the study of Agathokles, in a manner which is not naïve. Since none of the evidence for Agathokles is new, novelty in the study of Agathokles can only be achieved through new approaches to the evidence. As we will see in the next few chapters, the evidence is overdue for such new approaches. Both the literary and the numismatic evidence for Agathokles will prove to benefit from placing them in their Hellenistic and his Sicilian contexts simultaneously. The importance of this dual contextualisation is a major argument of the thesis as a whole, which will be applied to Agathokles' international relations and his style of rulership in parts two and three respectively.

This chapter treats the literary source material for Agathokles, exploring how the surviving texts' characterisations of Agathokles are shaped by their own agendas. These agendas are not necessarily profound, but emphasis on them is essential for the use of these texts as evidence for Agathokles. The two main sources are two universal histories which suffer from generally poor repute: Books 19-21 of Diodoros' *Bibliotheke* and Books 22-23 of Justin's *Epitome of the Philippic History*. Additional information appears in book five of Polyainos' collection of military stratagems, which is even more poorly regarded. Polybios offers a number of evaluations of Agathokles, which are important for the impact they have had on subsequent ancient and modern discussions of Agathokles. There are scattered references in other Greek sources, such as Plutarch. Most of these sources traditionally have not been valued by classical scholarship and most effort, including in the context of Agathokles, has focussed on efforts to see through the texts we have to the lost accounts of Antandros, Kallias, Douris of Samos, and Timaios, all of whom were alive during Agathokles' reign. While it is important to understand our surviving sources as part of a tradition and to incorporate these lost sources into that understanding as much as possible, much less is possible than practitioners have tended to assume. Thus I will discuss these lost works in the latter part of

this chapter, but I am more interested in what they tell us about our surviving sources and about ancient discourse on Agathokles than in what our surviving sources tell us about them.

1.1. Diodoros

Diodoros offers by far the most detailed account of the life of Agathokles as part of his *Bibliotheke*; written between the 60s and 30s BC, it is also our earliest continuous account. The account begins when Diodoros' narrative reaches 318/17 BC at the beginning of book 19, with a flashback which recounts Agathokles' life and career up to that point. Aside from this initial account, Diodoros' account is strictly annalistic, so his account of Agathokles is interspersed with his narrative of the wars of the Diadochoi. Nevertheless, a lot of attention is given to Agathokles: about a quarter of book 19 and over half of book 20.[19] The account was continued in book 21, but this is sadly fragmentary, with only a few excerpts preserved in Byzantine digests.

Table 1: Breakdown of Diodoros' Account of Agathokles:

Reference	Date	Subject
19.1.1-1.5	–	Proem: *poleis* are often turned to monarchies by their greatest men
19.1.6-19.9	318/17	Account of Agathokles' birth through to his rise to power
19.65	315/14	Agathokles' invasion of Messina
19.70-72	314/13	Agathokles' war with Akrotatos
19.102-104	312/11	Agathokles' war with the Carthaginians in Sicily
19.106-110	311/10	Agathokles' defeat at the Battle of Eknomos
20.3-18	310/09	Agathokles' invasion of Africa; Hamilcar's siege of Syracuse
20.29-34	309/08	Defeat of Hamilcar; rise of Akragas; Lykiskos' mutiny
20.38-44	308/07	Battle in the land of the Zouphones; arrival and death of Ophellas; Bomilcar's coup

[19] The impact of this for our understanding of the Diadochoi is lamented by *inter alios*, Meeus (2013) 85.

20.54-72	307/06	Agathokles takes royal title; Akragas defeated; Agathokles' expedition to Sicily; Eumachos' expeditions in Africa; defeat in Africa; rape of Segesta
20.77-79	306/05	War with Sicilian exiles continues
20.89-90	305/04	Final defeat of Sicilian exiles
20.101	304/03	Agathokles' raid on Lipari
20.104-105	303/02	Kleonymos of Sparta's Italian expedition
21.1-8	290s[20]	Military expeditions in Korkyra and Southern Italy
21.15	289/88	Embassy to Demetrios
21.16	289/88	Succession dispute leading to assassination of Agathokles
21.17	----	Discussion of historiography of Agathokles

1.1.1. Diodoros' Sources

The level of detail in Diodoros' account is unmatched by any other, so an understanding of it is essential to this thesis as a whole. The career of Agathokles is by no means the only period for which Diodoros is an essential source. As a result, there has been much discussion of Diodoros in the last twenty years, focussing on his relationship with his source material. There are two approaches, which have serious implications for the assessment of the events described by him. The older approach sees Diodoros as working from a single source at a time, which he essentially epitomised, in which case his work provides access to otherwise lost, near-contemporary accounts of Agathokles. Researchers taking this approach focus on identifying and investigating these sources, a process called *Quellenforschung*.[21] The newer approach acknowledges that Diodoros often followed earlier sources closely, but argues that his selection of material, phrasing, focus and authorial comments reflect his own contemporary interests. In this case, Diodoros' narrative is

[20] On the dating of the events in these passages see chapter 7.3, with Table 6.

[21] E.g. Volquardsen (1868); Jacoby in FGrH 564; Meister (1967); Pearson (1987); Hornblower (1981), esp.27-32; Consolo Langher (1998a); Stylianou (1998). A whole range of second-tier authors are treated similarly, cf.Hicks (1950) xxix-xxx on Diogenes Laertios. I discuss other methodological issues related to this *Quellenforschung* below at p.39-40.

primarily his own creation, so overarching themes and ambiguities are his own work, making him a much less straightforward window into the periods he discusses. This approach is increasingly orthodox, particularly with scholars interested in studying Diodoros in his own right or in his Late Republic context.[22]

Between the two approaches there is a large amount of common ground. It is indisputable that Diodoros wrote in his own words. This was demonstrated by Jonas Palm over sixty years ago.[23] It is indisputable that Diodoros' forty book work, although very long, is shorter than many of his individual sources, despite covering a much longer time span, and that he must therefore have cut them down significantly.[24] It is also indisputable that Diodoros often followed earlier sources closely. In book three, where his account can be compared to that of Agatharchides, he can be seen to imitate him closely; even incorporating Agatharchides' cross-references into his own text, when it made sense for him to do so.[25] Other close parallels have been identified with the fragments of Poseidonios, P. Oxy 13.1610, and Polybios.[26] On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that consistent themes run through the work.[27] It has been demonstrated that the authorial comments that preface each book of the *Bibliotheke* are his own work.[28] When his text can be compared to that of Polybios, he can also be shown to have selected the aspects of Polybios' account which fit with his own moral purposes.[29] Thus, the old and new approaches are not in full contradiction; both

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[22] E.g. Drews (1962); Burton (1972) 35-7; Sacks (1990); Green (2006) 1-47; Yarrow (2005), esp.152-6; Sulimani (2011), esp.21-164; Scanlon (2015) 241-5.
[23] Palm (1955); see now Lévy (2001).
[24] Brunt (1980) 478. E.g. Diodoros' single book on Alexander is much shorter than earlier accounts, such as Kleitarchos' *Histories of Alexander*, which was around 15 books long: Prandi (2016).
[25] Hornblower (1981) 27; Rubincam (1989) & (1998a).
[26] Hornblower (1981) 28-9; but on Polybios, cf.Dudziński (2013) 75-6.
[27] Sacks (1990), esp.6: "Broadly moralistic, the central feature of the *Bibliotheke* is its call to peoples and nations to act clemently and with moderation." Wirth (1993); Sulimani (2011) 44. However, Hau (2009) is critical of the generality of the themes thus identified and does not consider his moralising consistent enough to be his own work.
[28] Nock (1959) 5; Drews (1962) 383; Sacks (1990) 9-22.
[29] Drews (1962) 384-5.

sides accept a continuum between dependence and creativity, but disagree about where Diodoros ought to be placed on it.

Where does Diodoros place himself on this continuum? There are two revealing sections from the beginning of the work. The first is Diodoros' opening preface, which praises history for offering practical instruction and inspiring people to good and great deeds, in order to justify his own project of universal history.[30] For Diodoros, history is superior to *mythologia*, which shares these improving aspects, because of its truth value.[31] But there were problems with the historiography of his own times, which spurred him to write the *Bibliotheke*:

> τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβαλλομένοις διεξιέναι τὰς τῶν τοσούτων συγγραφέων ἱστορίας πρῶτον μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐπορῆσαι τῶν εἰς τὴν χρείαν πιπτουσῶν βίβλων, ἔπειτα διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συνταγμάτων δυσκατάληπτος γίνεται τελέως καὶ δυσέφικτος ἡ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀνάληψις· ἡ δ' ἐν μιᾶς συντάξεως περιγραφῇ πραγματεία τὸ τῶν πράξεων εἰρόμενον ἔχουσα τὴν μὲν ἀνάγνωσιν ἑτοίμην παρέχεται, τὴν δ' ἀνάληψιν ἔχει παντελῶς εὐπαρακολούθητον.
>
> For, to those attempting to go through the histories of so many authors, firstly, it is not easy to get possession of the books which turn out to be necessary, secondly, on account of the inconsistency and the number of the compositions, the comprehension of events is difficult to fully attain and understand. But the treatment, with the deeds strung together, in the compass of a single composition, provides easy reading and makes comprehension entirely easy to maintain.
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> Diod.Sic.1.3.8[32]

[30] Diod.Sic.1.1-1.4.5; on the construction of the genre of universal history in this passage, see Sulimani (2011) 21-56.
[31] Diod.Sic.1.2.2.
[32] cf.Diod.Sic.1.3.3-4.

Diodoros thus stresses two connected issues: the number of sources available and the fact that they disagree with one another. The first could be solved by epitomising existing accounts, the second required Diodoros to provide synthesis. As a rule, Diodoros does not supply much evidence of how he carried out this synthesis, since that would violate the principles of user-friendliness and brevity which he has committed to. Instead, like many ancient historians, he offers a detailed demonstration early in his work and leaves the reader to assume he has followed the same procedure throughout.[33]

This demonstration is Diodoros' discussion of the sources and inundation of the Nile.[34] The fact that these topics were the focus of major debate in ancient literature made them an excellent choice for a demonstration of his working. The location of this passage at the end of the first part of his first book and his self-congratulatory final conclusion enhances this impression.[35] Helen Todd has drawn attention to the similarities between Diodoros' description of the Nile and his description of history: both the *Bibliotheke* and accounts of the Nile are worth reading because of their enormous scale, both the *Bibliotheke* and the Nile are supremely useful, both *Bibliotheke* and the Nile require extensive intervention to keep them manageable, both past events and the sources of the Nile are inaccessible.[36] Diodoros' discussion of the Nile's origins takes the form of an extended series of citations of a wide range of authors, which he refutes in detail one by one, until he concludes that, "Agatharchides the Knidian has come the closest to the truth…"[37] Most of the rejections are based

[33] Cf.Thuc.1.2-23 with Gribble (1998) 57; Suet.*Aug*.7, *Calig.*8.
[34] Diod.Sic.1.37-41.
[35] Diod.Sic.1.41.10: δυνάμενοι ποικιλώτερον ἀντειπεῖν πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἀρκεσθησόμεθα τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἵνα μὴ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν προκειμένην συντομίαν ὑπερβαίνωμεν
"we have been able to refute everyone, very intricately, and we will be satisfied with what has been said, so that we do not transgress the [principle of] conciseness outlined by us at the beginning"
[36] Todd (2014) 39-70, 127, 135; she makes some use of Muntz (2008), *non vidi*.
[37] Diod.Sic.1.41.4: ἔγγιστα δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ προσελήλυθεν Ἀγαθαρχίδης ὁ Κνίδιος. It is gratifying that the solution he endorses is correct.

on logical arguments, although his rejection of Ephoros relies partially on his personal autopsy.[38] The reader is left to assume that on every issue, Diodoros has had the same vast array of sources before him and has made the decision on the correct one by the same exhaustive consideration. Diodoros scatters reminders of this approach throughout the rest of the work, as when he offers variant numbers, when he cites sources explicitly, when he contributes to other matters of learned debate, and when he criticises earlier historians.[39] Of course, since the debate about the Nile is a showpiece, Diodoros probably put more work into it than he generally did, but it demonstrates that he considered himself to be engaging in a mindful exercise in which autopsy and reason were deployed in order to select from existing accounts the one which "has come closest to the truth." He gives no indication that he intended to produce radical revisions of accepted historical accounts in the way that Thucydides attacks the traditional narrative of the Trojan War.[40] Thus Diodoros found the elements of his narrative in earlier sources, but when they disagreed he chose between them based on what seemed most reasonable to him.

When he came to write about Agathokles, he did copy some episodes.[41] But, as I will discuss below, the sources on Agathokles were in desperate need of synthesis, because the two most important historians, Timaios and Kallias, were both extremely and obviously biased in opposite directions. Diodoros discusses this issue at the end of his account of Agathokles, criticising both authors:

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[38] Diod.Sic.1.39.11.
[39] Variant numbers: e.g. Diod.Sic.20.79.5; Diod.Sic.20.89.5. Citing sources: e.g. Diod.Sic.1.46.8 (Hekataios' account of the Ramesseum); Diod.Sic.21.16.5 (Timaios, Kallias and Antandros on Agathokles' death). Important debates: Diod.Sic.13.90.5-6 (Bull of Phalaris), see n.104. Criticism of earlier historians: Diod.Sic.1.37.4 (Ephoros).
[40] Thuc.1.2-22.
[41] See page 47.

> [Τίμαιος] τὰ πολλὰ κατέψευσται τοῦ δυνάστου διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχθραν... τὰς ἐσχάτας τῆς συντάξεως πέντε βίβλους… οὐκ ἄν τις δικαίως ἀποδέξαιτο.
>
> [Timaios] has falsified many things concerning the *dynastes* because of his hatred for him... no one could rightly accept the final five books of his work.
>
> Diod.Sic.21.17.1, 3
>
> [Καλλιας] ἀναληφθεὶς γὰρ ὑπ' Ἀγαθοκλέους καὶ δώρων μεγάλων ἀποδόμενος τὴν προφῆτιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἱστορίαν…
>
> [Kallias] was won over by Agathokles and his great gifts and sold out History, the Prophetess of Truth…
>
> Diod.Sic.21.17.4

Unfortunately, Diodoros' discussion of these historians is fragmentary, pulled from the entries on Timaios and Kallias in the *Souda*; we lack the introduction and conclusion to the discussion and do not know if Diodoros considered other authors. Even so, the fragments demonstrate that Diodoros remained committed to the principles that he outlined in his first book. In particular, the reference to history as the "prophetess of truth," recalls the justification of the value of history in Diodoros' preface.[42] He explicitly says that Timaios' account cannot rightly be accepted (δικαίως ἀποδέξαιτο). He is not saying that he did not make use of Timaios' work at all (at several points he explicitly did), but that he weighed his claims against other accounts. The point of Diodoros' digression on historians of Agathokles was presumably to draw attention to the fact that he had done this work of synthesis. Additionally, it establishes his narratorial authority over both earlier works by positioning himself as the moderate and in the field of history by demonstrating his ability to evaluate the quality of well-known earlier historiographers' work. A similar purpose has been perceived in Polybios' discussions of earlier historians.[43] Whether Diodoros synthesised Timaios

[42] Diod.Sic.1.2.2.
[43] Walbank (1962) 10-2; Baron (2013) 61-88.

and Kallias well is a subjective judgement and one that we cannot make without their texts, but if he had not synthesised them to his own satisfaction, drawing attention to the existence of the previous sources in this manner would have been dishonest, but also daft, since Timaios was well-known and easily accessible.[44] Thus, Diodoros drew the material for his account of Agathokles from a number of earlier sources and made an effort to correct for the bias that he perceived in them; his characterisation of Agathokles owes a lot to those sources, but is ultimately his own.

1.1.2. Diodoros' Characterisation of Agathokles

Diodoros' characterisation of Agathokles is dominated by three themes: emphasis on the significance of Agathokles as an example of the significance of Sicily; paradoxical reversals of fortune; and the paradoxical nature of his rulership.

The first theme, the significance of Agathokles, is clear from the sheer amount of space given to Agathokles, despite the important events in the Aegean which also had to be narrated in books nineteen to twenty-one. This is part of a larger theme of Diodoros' work. Throughout the *Bibliotheke*, Diodoros weaves Sicilian events into his annalistic structure, rather than dealing with them in an excursus or series of excurses, as previous universal historians, such as Ephoros and Theopompos, had done and as Pompeius Trogus and Appian subsequently did.[45] This structure was more work for him and risked making his work less accessible to his readers (which he took seriously).[46] That he nevertheless maintained it indicates its importance to him. Diodoros takes a similar approach with Italian events, and occasionally events in other locations, so the structure is partly a result of Diodoros' view that universal history ought to be universal in a geographic sense

[44] Brown (1958) 91-106; Baron (2013) 52-7.
[45] Ephoros: Parker (2011) II.B. Theopompos: Morison (2014). Trogus: Just.*Epit.Epit.*4 & 19-23.
[46] Accessibility as a guiding principle of the *Bibliotheke*: Diod.Sic.1.3.5 & 1.3.7; Rubincam (1989) & (1997) 132-6 on cross-references and tables of contents; Todd (2014) 69-70 on proportion (συμμετρία).

(as well as a temporal one).[47] But it is also motivated by a special interest in praising his home island, "the greatest and most beautiful of all islands."[48] In the surviving portions of the work, Sicily receives more extensive and consistent attention than any other region outside the Aegean area. Sicilian events are consistently juxtaposed with the highlights of Aegean history: the Persian Wars with Gelon's War in book 11, the Ionian War with the Carthaginian invasion in book 13, Dionysios with the Thirty Tyrants and the Spartan Hegemony in book 14,[49] Dion and Timoleon with Philip in Book 16. Diodoros often justifies the opening and closing dates of his individual books by important Sicilian events.[50] Alongside these general juxtapositions, which are a function of the structure Diodoros chose, Diodoros often emphasises the importance of Sicily specifically. For example, Diodoros argues that the enormous army Ktesias attributes to the ancient Assyrians deserves credence by comparing it to classic examples of large armies, like the forces of Dareios, Xerxes, and the Romans in the Second Punic War, but also those of Dionysios.[51] The Carthaginians too are inflated to match the stereotypical power of the Persians. So, Diodoros has Nikias advise the Athenians not to invade Sicily, "the greatest island in the inhabited world," because the Carthaginians although far more powerful than the Athenians, have never managed to conquer it.[52] Throughout his work, then, Diodoros emphasises the significance of Sicily.

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[47] Diod.Sic.1.1.3 & 1.3.6.

[48] Diod.Sic.19.1.7: τὴν μεγίστην καὶ καλλίστην τῶν πασῶν νήσων. Cf. 5.4.69, 12.83.6 & 16.5.4. Sacks (1990); Rood (2004) 358.

[49] Emphasised at 14.2. Note also the connection between his sack of Rhegion and the Gallic Sack of Rome: Diod.Sic.14.113.1 & 15.1.6. Diodoros probably draws on the synchronisms emphasised by Timaios, but they had subsequently become mainstream enough to be accepted by Apollodoros of Athens (Diodoros' explicit source for his chronological framework: Diod.Sic.1.5.1).

[50] Book 13, from the Syracusan Expedition to the second war between Carthage and Dionysios: Diod.Sic.13.1.3; Book 14 ends with Rhegion's enslavement by Dionysios: Diod.Sic.15.1.6; Book 19, from Agathokles' seizure of power to the Carthaginian victory at Himera: Diod.Sic.19.1.10.

[51] Diod.Sic.2.5.6.

[52] Diod.Sic.12.83.6.

Diodoros' presentation of Agathokles continues this theme. The structure means that Agathokles is juxtaposed with the Diadochoi throughout Books 19-21. He also makes the point explicitly. Diodoros' introduction to Book 19 justifies his treatment of Agathokles by the assertions that "the push towards monarchies prevailed most of all in Sicily before the Romans…"[53] and Agathokles' rule illustrates this trend "most exceptionally of all."[54] Agathokles' relevance as a subject of history is linked to the relevance of Sicily. Diodoros is quick to use instances when Agathokles and the Diadochoi came into contact to emphasise that Agathokles, as a Sicilian, was their equal. Agathokles' war in Africa takes him and his generals to exotic locations at the ends of the world, as Alexander's took him to India and leads him to face revolts like those Alexander faced in Asia.[55] Diodoros' description of Agathokles' victory over Kassandros at Korkyra provides a key example of this:

> … οἱ δὲ Σικελιῶται βουλόμενοι μὴ μόνον Καρχηδονίων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν βαρβάρων περιγενέσθαι δοκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα θεωρηθῆναι κρείττους ὄντες Μακεδόνων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην πεποιημένων δορίκτητον.
>
> … while the Sicilians wanted not only to be considered superior to the Carthaginians and the barbarians in Italy, but also to be beheld in Greece being stronger than the Macedonians who had made Asia and Europe their spearwon possession.
>
> Diod.Sic.21.2.2

Agathokles provided Diodoros not just with an example of Sicilian affairs being important in their own right, on the world stage, but of them being important in relation to the smaller, but culturally

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[53] Diod.Sic.19.1.5: μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ἐπεπόλασεν ἡ πρὸς τὰς μοναρχίας ὁρμὴ περὶ Σικελίαν πρὸ τοῦ Ῥωμαίους…
[54] Diod.Sic.19.1.6: ἰδιώτατα δὲ πάντων…
[55] Diod.Sic.20.58 & 20.33-34; see chapter 2.2.

privileged mainland Greek stage. While Diodoros could not provide an example of a Sicilian equivalent of Alexander, Agathokles was the next best thing: an equivalent of the Macedonians who had fought alongside him.[56] In chapters two and three I will argue that this emphasis on the importance of Sicily was a part of discourse on Agathokles more widely, probably going back to his own time, but Diodoros' development of this theme reflects his own particular interests.

Paradoxical reversals of fortune are a concern of Diodoros and Hellenistic historiography generally, but are particularly emphasised in Diodoros' account of Agathokles.[57] Diodoros stresses, like most ancient authors, Agathokles' surprising rise from potter to tyrant[58] and the paradox of Carthage being besieged by Syracusans while Syracuse was besieged by Carthaginians.[59] Diodoros' presentation also stresses that these changes were not simply random chance, but the punishment of the *daimon* for arrogance (ὑπερηφανία) and outrage (παρανομία).[60] The theme is clear in Diodoros' account of the African Expedition. To acquire money, Agathokles robs orphans and slaughters the rich, to maintain order in Syracuse he splits families, to keep morale in Africa he burns the ships, and so on.[61] These cunning, daring, unscrupulous acts bring success, but eventually reckoning. The central moment is the murder of Ophellas, for which Diodoros does not even offer a motivation apart from the fact that Ophellas was not expecting it.[62] But Diodoros immediately declares that the murder of Ophellas cost Agathokles his chance to capture Carthage, while it was occupied with Bomilcar's coup attempt:[63]

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[56] Cf.Livy's efforts to present victories over Philip V and Perseus as victories over Alexander by proxy: Liv.42.51.11, 42.52.14-16, 45.7.3, 45.9 and the alternate history at 9.17-19.
[57] Importance within Diodoros' work and Hellenistic historiography generally: Walbank (1945) 6-7; Sacks (1990) 38-9; Meeus (2013) 86-7.
[58] Diod.Sic.19.1.7-8 & 20.63.4-5; see chapter 2.1.2.
[59] Diod.Sic.20.13.3; Just.*Epit.*22.4.1-2, 22.6.11; Polyb.12.15.6-8; Plut.*Mor.*544b; Euseb.*Praep. Evang*.14.6.13.
[60] Cf. Diod.Sic.13.24.6, 13.27.5-6, 13.30.3; For Herodotean roots, see n.81.
[61] Especially, Diod.Sic.20.4.3-8 & 20.7.5; see chapter 2.2 on Agathokles and stratagems.
[62] Diod.Sic.20.42.
[63] Diod.Sic.20.43.3-6.

> οὔτε γὰρ Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἔγνω τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῆς τυραννίδος καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει ταραχήν, ἐπεὶ ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐκράτησε τῆς Καρχηδόνος… ὅ τε γὰρ Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἄνδρα φίλον μέλλων ἀναιρεῖν πρὸς οὐδὲν ἐπέβαλλε τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις συντελουμένων…
>
> For Agathokles did not know about his seizure of the tyranny and the disorder in the polis, since he would easily have conquered Carthage… For while Agathokles was preparing to kill a friendly man, he gave thought to none of the events among his enemies….
>
> Diod.Sic.20.43.4-6.

He returns to the same event in his authorial comments after Agathokles' final flight from Africa, where he attributes Agathokles' fortune to ἡ θεία προνοία, "the divine will."[64] When things had come to a low ebb in Sicily, he achieved success in Africa:

> … τῆς τύχης ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἐπιδεικνυμένης τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπηλπισμένων. εἰς τηλικαύτην δ' ὑπεροχὴν ἐλθόντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν Ὀφέλλαν φονεύσαντος, ὄντα φίλον καὶ ξένον, φανερῶς ἐπεσημήνατο τὸ δαιμόνιον ὡς διὰ τὴν εἰς τοῦτον παρανομίαν τῶν ὕστερον αὐτῷ γεγενημένων * τὸ θεῖον ἐπιστήσαι…
>
> … since *Tyche*, as if intentionally, demonstrated her particular power when things were hopeless. But when he had reached such a great pre-eminence and slew Ophellas, who was a friend and a guest, the *daimonion* clearly indicated that, due to his outrage against Ophellas, the divine was focussed [on him], from the things that happened to him subsequently…
>
> Diod.Sic.20.70.2-3

So Diodoros makes Agathokles' crimes the cause of failure through a somewhat mysterious divine justice. Elsewhere Diodoros shows he was alive to more prosaic reasons for the expedition's failure,

[64] Diod.Sic.20.70.1. Cf. Diod.Sic.1.1.3.

such as the lack of a navy capable of cutting off Carthage's access to grain from overseas;[65] but they were not relevant to the didactic point that he wanted his account of the African Expedition to make. Diodoros is consistent in this theme. In a digression discussing the prosperity of Syracuse after Timoleon in Book 16, he mentions that Agathokles' Sixty-Couch Hall was destroyed by lightening as punishment from the *daimonion* for exceeding the splendour of the gods' temples.[66] In similar terms, he describes how Agathokles' despoliation of the temples of Lipari is punished by a storm from Aiolos which sinks the ships carrying the Liparian treasure.[67] Diodoros finally makes this reckoning a major part of his account of Agathokles' death; Agathokles is poisoned by a Segestan as vengeance for his destruction of Segesta and burnt alive on a pyre as vengeance for despoiling Hephaistos' temple on Lipari.[68]

Diodoros opens his account of Agathokles at the start of Book 19, as I have said, by explaining why he is worth dwelling on: Agathokles is the ultimate example of the demagogue who starts with absolutely nothing and manages to make himself into a cruel tyrant.[69] This is the account that Diodoros found in Timaios (and perhaps other sources) and his own narrative is peppered with massacres, treachery, and impiety.[70] But there is a tension, which comes into focus already at the beginning of Book 19, immediately after Agathokles' seizure of power:

> ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων γενόμενος τοῦ μὲν ἔτι φονεύειν ἢ κολάζειν τινὰς ἀπέστη, μεταβαλόμενος δ' εἰς τοὐναντίον εὐγνωμόνως τοῖς πλήθεσι προσεφέρετο καὶ

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[65] Diod.Sic.21.16.1; see p.225-6.
[66] Diod.Sic.16.83.2.
[67] Diod.Sic.20.101.2-3: ὅτε δὴ πολλοῖς ἔδοξε θεῖον εἶναι τὸ ῥηθησόμενον, τῆς παρανομίας τυχούσης ἐπισημασίας παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου. "To many at that time what I am about to relate seemed to be divine, with the crime receiving a signal from the *daimonion*."
[68] Diod.Sic.20.101.3 & 21.16.2-5.
[69] Diod.Sic.19.1.1-8.
[70] Diod.Sic.19-20 *passim*, but especially 19.7-8 (violent seizure of power), 20.4.3-8 (stealing orphans' money and killing the rich in preparation for the African expedition), 20.42 (murder of Ophellas), 20.54.2-7 (human shields at the Siege of Utica), 20.69-72 (abandoning army in Africa, rape of Segesta, mass execution of Syracusans), 20.101 (despoliation of temples of Lipari).

> πολλοὺς μὲν εὐεργετῶν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δ' ἐπαγγελίαις μετεωρίζων, πάντας δὲ λόγοις φιλανθρώποις δημαγωγῶν οὐ μετρίας ἀποδοχῆς ἐτύγχανεν. ἔχων δὲ τηλικαύτην δυναστείαν οὔτε διάδημα ἀνέλαβεν οὔτε δορυφόρους εἶχεν οὔτε δυσεντευξίαν ἐζήλωσεν, ἅπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν σχεδὸν ἅπαντες οἱ τύραννοι.
>
> After these things, he avoided further slaughter or punishing anyone, but he changed to the opposite, behaving reasonably to the multitude and, since he was a benefactor to many, puffed up not a few with promises, and won over the whole *demos* with humane words, he received no little approval. Although he held a very great *dynasteia*, he did not wear a diadem, did not have bodyguards, and did not cultivate an air of unapproachability – these are things which almost all tyrants tend to do.
>
> Diod.Sic.19.9.6-7.

That is, once in power, Agathokles did not resemble the stereotypical image of the tyrant. This is one part of a larger problem that Agathokles was clearly one of the greatest military leaders that Syracuse ever produced and that his reign was generally agreed to have been part of the prosperous period ushered in by Timoleon.[71] It was an issue that Diodoros had to confront, since one of his sources, Kallias, had made this case forcefully,[72] and because Polybios had highlighted the conflict in his criticism of Timaios (which Diodoros took note of elsewhere).[73] In the course of his account, Diodoros explores this tension. His solution: Agathokles' apparent divergences from normal tyrannical behaviour had their roots in normal tyrannical vices like suspicion, lust for power, and vanity. This conclusion is first indicated in the prologue to book nineteen, in which Diodoros stresses deceit as the key characteristic of the Sicilian tyrant.[74] The theme is most explicitly

[71] Diod.Sic.16.83.2.
[72] See chapter 1.5.2.
[73] See chapter 1.4.
[74] Diod.Sic.19.1.5: αἱ γὰρ πόλεις ταῖς δημαγωγίαις ἐξαπατώμεναι μέχρι τούτου τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυροὺς κατεσκεύαζον, ἕως δεσπόται γένωνται τῶν ἐξαπατηθέντων. "For, until this point [i.e. the Roman conquest], the *poleis* were deluded by the demagogues and made weak men strong, so that they became masters of the deluded."

presented, however, at 20.63. In this chapter, Diodoros contrasts Agathokles' insistence on behaving as a regular citizen, his willingness to allow *parrhesia* against him and his lack of a bodyguard with Dionysios who was so distrustful that he refused to let anyone shave him, "demonstrating that the only security for tyranny is distrust."[75] But Diodoros undercuts the positive implication of this comparison and explains Agathokles' behaviour: Agathokles uses this openness to discover his opponents and carry out a purge. His openness is just a different manifestation of tyrannical distrust. So it is for all his other deviations from the tyrannical stereotype. I will argue in chapter four that understanding this characterisation is particularly important for interpreting Diodoros' representation of Agathokles' assumption of the royal title – a passage which impinges upon the central question of this thesis.[76]

In chapter two, we will see that most of these themes are part of a broader ancient discourse about Sicily, tyranny, and kingship. Diodoros was not the first person to discuss Agathokles in relation to this discourse; he built on an earlier tradition, adopting and adapting some aspects of it while discarding others. Exaggerating the importance of Sicily and Sicilian events, for example, is one of the things that Polybios criticises the historian Timaios for.[77] This theme can be traced all the way back to Agathokles himself, whose coinage shows that he sought to present himself as the equal of the Macedonian kings (as I will argue in chapter three).[78] The paradox of Agathokles besieging Carthage while the Carthaginians besieged Syracuse occurs in almost every ancient account of Agathokles and probably derives from contemporaries' observations.[79] The passage above in which Diodoros attributes the failure of the African Expedition to divine punishment for the murder of

[75] Diod.Sic.20.63.3: …μίαν ἀσφάλειαν τυραννίδος ἀποφαινόμενος τὴν ἀπιστίαν. cf.Hdt.5.92; Xen.*Hier.*2.7-2.11.
[76] See chapter 4.1.
[77] Polyb.12.23.6-7.
[78] See chapter 3.3.2 and 4.1.
[79] See n.59.

Ophellas is demonstrated by a synchronism: the murder of Ophellas and the death of Agathokles' sons occurred on the same date. Diodoros probably took this from Timaios, who was noted for synchronisms.[80] He may have found the idea about divine vengeance in Timaios with the synchronism; equally this may have been his own contribution. But in the latter case, he was still continuing an old historiographic trope: the presentation of historical reversals of fortune as the result of divine reckoning goes back to Herodotos.[81] The idea that Agathokles' rule was prosperous and mild despite being established with great cruelty appears in Polybios.[82] Diodoros' characterisation of Agathokles' rule as I have described it above can be seen as an application and development of that notion. But Diodoros did not adopt all the themes he found in his source material. Timaios, as I will discuss below, emphasised Agathokles' sexual deviancy,[83] but Diodoros has nothing to say about this. If Diodoros' themes are not entirely original, they are nevertheless his themes, which he deploys consistently, and which are essential for understanding his presentation of Agathokles.

1.2. Justin

Justin's account of Agathokles is part of his late second-century AD epitome of the work of Pompeius Trogus, written in the reign of Augustus.[84] Justin's account forms a continuous narrative, part of a substantial digression on Carthage and Sicily which begins after Pyrrhus first encounters the Carthaginians in book 18 with Dido and continues until it meets Pyrrhus once more in book 23. Agathokles receives all of book 22 and the first half of 23. This structure, in which the history of

[80] Baron (2013) 110.
[81] e.g. Hdt.1.13; Gould (1989) 89-92; Harrison (2000) 102-21.
[82] Polyb.9.23.2.
[83] See chapters 1.5.4, 2.3.3.
[84] On Justin generally, see: Alonso-Núñez (1987); Billows (1997) 348-51 on his unreliability; Consolo Langher (1998a) 199-234 occupied with determining which portions are accurate depictions of Trogus; Yardley (2003) & (2010) results of comprehensive statistical analysis; Yarrow (2005) 111-6 on Trogus as a product of the Late Republican context. On Justin's date, ignore Syme (1988) and see Yardley (2003) 113-87 & (2010) 470-3.

Sicily is placed within a digression from the main narrative, had already been employed in the lost histories of Ephoros and Theopompos – it was the default option. Thus, Justin and Diodoros both emphasise Agathokles' Sicilian context, but in different ways; Justin's account places Agathokles much more exclusively in a Sicilian context than Diodoros' and makes that context an offshoot of a grand narrative centred on the Greek mainland and the Macedonians, rather than a parallel narrative in competition with mainland Greece.

Table 2: Breakdown of Justin's Account of Agathokles

Reference	**Subject**
22.1	Agathocles' early life
22.2	Agathocles takes control of Syracuse with Carthaginian aid
22.3	Outbreak of war with Carthage
22.4-6	Agathocles' arrival and early successes in Africa
22.7	Ophellas' death and Bomilcar's attempted coup
22.8	End of the war in Africa
23.1-23.2.2	Agathocles attacks the Bruttii (mostly a digression on their history)
23.2.3-23.2.5	Agathocles consumed by a (natural) sickness, leading to dissension among his heirs
23.2.6-23.2.12	*Pathos*-filled departure of Theoxena; Agathocles' death

A central question is the relationship between the epitome and Trogus' original work. Justin's own preface provides a great deal of relevant information on what Justin thought he was doing:

> *seu aemulatione gloriae sive varietate et novitate operis delectatus vir priscae eloquentiae, Trogus Pompeius, Graecas et totius orbis historias Latino sermone conposuit, ut, cum nostra Graece, Graeca quoque nostra lingua legi possent… Et quae historici Graecorum, prout commodum cuique fuit, inter se gratiose occupaverunt, omissis quae sine fructu erant, ea omnia Pompeius divisa temporibus et serie rerum digesta conposuit. Horum igitur… cognitione quaeque dignissima excerpsi, et omissis his, quae nec cognoscendi voluptate iucunda nec exemplo erant necessaria, breve veluti florum corpusculum feci ut haberent et qui Graece didicissent, quo admonerentur, et qui non didicissent, quo instruerentur.*

> Enticed either by competition for glory or by the difference and novelty of the work, a man of pure eloquence, Trogus Pompeius, composed histories of Greece and the whole world in the Latin language, so that just as our history could be read in Greek, Greek history could be read in Latin… And everything that the Greek historians had occupied themselves with, according to what was convenient for each of them, Pompeius combined, omitting what was not fruitful, assigning all these things chronologically and organising them by the sequence of things. From this, therefore… with erudition, I have excerpted the most worthwhile bits and by omitting what was not pleasing for the joy of reading it or necessary as an exemplum I have made a summary, like a posy of flowers, so that those who have learnt Greek may have something to remind them and those who have not learnt it may have something to instruct them.
>
> Just.*Epit.Praef*.3-4.

Thus, Justin claims the work has value for the information it transmits to a Latin audience on Greek history and for the pleasure it gives in reading. There is no clear sign that Justin perceives a tension between these goals. Rather, the tension to be resolved is between the amount of this valuable material and the need for concision (*brevitas*). Justin presents this as Trogus' goal too, so (implicitly) his work perfects Trogus' work rather than appropriating it for a new purpose. We have no evidence that this is actually how Trogus himself justified his work and the speculative *seu… sive…* might suggest that Justin did not find this justification in Trogus' text. Only at one point – the speech of Mithridates – does Justin claim to report Trogus' exact words. He justifies that decision, in spite of the importance of *brevitas* to his work, on the grounds that the speech is *digna* and emphasises an unusual stylistic feature – Trogus' insistence that historians' speeches should be in *oratio obliqua*.[85] Thus, Justin's view of value is closely tied to language and style and the primary conflict he presents is between valuable material and concision rather than between different kinds of value.

[85] Just.*Epit.*38.3.11.

This influenced his use of Trogus. The manuscripts of Justin are accompanied by a list of the contents of each of Trogus' books, which corroborate what the preface states: Justin removed episodes and sometimes altered the book divisions in the pursuit of concision.[86] Yardley's statistical analysis of the work shows a mixture of vocabulary and phrases associated specifically with the Augustan period and with the second century AD throughout the work, indicating that Justin's interventions in what he chose to retain were extensive.[87] Probably because the criteria for inclusion were pleasure and value with a heavy emphasis on language, connecting narratives are reduced or omitted, while attention is focussed on amazing or dramatic events and speeches.[88] Thus Justin's account of Agathokles spends more time on Agathokles' dramatic arrival in Africa than on the actual war in Africa. The base account is much the same as Diodoros', though less detailed and with frequent divergences in numbers. Notable differences include: the stress put on Agathokles' initial alliance with Carthage and his use of it to take control of Eastern Sicily,[89] an extreme abbreviation of the years after the African War,[90] a prolonged excursus on the origins of the Bruttii,[91] and an entirely different account of Agathokles' death.[92]

Justin's attitude towards Agathokles is almost universally negative.[93] Although some of the massacres described by Diodoros also appear in his account, the focus is rather more on his sexual impropriety and his treacherous dealings with the Carthaginians – two themes almost entirely absent from Diodoros' account. For example:

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[86] Trog.*Prol.*21 indicates that Trogus narrated Agathokles' rise to power in his Book 21, for instance; Justin waits until his book 22.
[87] Yardley (2003), using the preface (pure Justin) and the speech of Mithridates (pure Trogus) as controls.
[88] Yardley (2010) 473-6.
[89] Just.*Epit.*22.2-3; hinted at, but never explicitly mentioned in Diodoros' account, see chapter 6.1. Also, Just.*Epit.*22.7.7-11.
[90] Just.*Epit.*23.1.1-1.2
[91] Just.*Epit.*23.1.3-1.16.
[92] Just.*Epit.*23.2.
[93] Mossé (1969) 175; Consolo Langher (1998).

> *siquidem forma et corporis pulchritudine egregius diu vitam stupri patientia exhibuit. Annos deinde pubertatis egressus libidinem a viris ad feminas transtulit. Post haec apud utrumque sexum famosus vitam latrociniis mutavit.*
>
> Since he was distinguished in form and beauty of his body, for a long time he openly maintained a life of sexual degredation. When he had left the years of puberty, he transferred his lust from men to women. After this, infamous with both sexes, he changed his life to one of banditry.
>
> Just.*Epit.Epit.*22.1.3-5

In the next chapter I will discuss the wider context of this theme of sexual impropriety, which recurs in Justin's narrative of Agathokles' defeat and finds close analogues among the fragments of Timaios.[94] But, assuming Trogus took this emphasis from Timaios, he did not do so mechanically. One of Timaios' fragments indicates that he represented Agathokles' wife Theoxena mourning his death by recalling their sex life.[95] Justin gives no hint of this and presents her as an *exemplum*, seeking to fulfil her duties to her husband at risk of her life.[96] The scene of the *crudelis discidii* "cruel separation" of husband and wife is one of unremitting *pathos* – it does not appear that Timaios' version was. If Timaios was an important part of Trogus' source material, Trogus nevertheless shaped his own account for his own purposes, and Justin then remoulded it to his own.

1.3. Polyainos

The most extensive other source on Agathokles is Polyainos' collection of military *Stratagems* written for Lucius Verus' Parthian expedition of AD 162.[97] The work lists stratagems of famous generals, ranging from Dionysos' invasion of India to Augustus (with an appendix on women).

[94] Timaios FGrH 566 F124=Polyb.12.15.2; F122=Ps.Long.4.5. Consolo Langher (1998a) 16-18, 174-6. Only the emphasis on treachery is explicitly attested for Trogus (Trog.*Prol.*22), but it seems likely that the sexual impropriety appeared in Trogus, since it appears in Timaios and in Justin.
[95] Just.*Epit.*22.8.5; Timaios FGrH 566 F124=Polyb.12.15.3.
[96] Just.*Epit.*23.2.6-9.
[97] Polyaen.*Praef.*

Generally each general's entry proceeds in chronological order, but in the case of Alexander,[98] he proceeds through the life in chronological order twice and in his entry for Agathokles, the episodes appear, bizarrely, to be in reverse chronological order. The first stratagem gives a clear indication of Polyainos' characterisation of Agathokles:

> Ἀγαθοκλῆς, Σικελίας τύραννος, ὀμόσας τοῖς πολεμίοις παρέβη τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ κατασφάξας τοὺς ἁλόντας ἐπιχλευάζων πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἔλεγεν 'δειπνήσαντες ἐξεμέσωμεν τοὺς ὅρκους'.
>
> Agathokles, tyrant of Sicily, swore an oath to his enemies and then broke the oaths and murdered the prisoners, saying to his friends flippantly, "we've had dinner, now let's vomit up our oaths."
>
> Polyaen. 5.3.1

Every single one of the following stratagems presents Agathokles as a duplicitous, murderous villain. Timaios has generally been identified as the source, because of the negative characterisation and the fact that Timaios' work covered all of Sicilian history and would therefore probably be the best work for an author seeking many stratagems in a hurry to consult. But he may simply have worked from an earlier collection of anecdotes. As we will see in chapter two, the idea of faithlessness was a major part of the ancient discourse on Agathokles. But an anecdote in another part of his work, concerning Megakles of Messana, presents Agathokles in a supporting role and characterises him entirely differently, as a king persuaded to exercise mercy by Megakles' boldness.[99] This demonstrates that Polyainos had a much wider variety of anecdotes available to him and that the focus on oath-breaking was a conscious decision on Polyainos' part, presumably because he thought this characterisation would provide his audience with useful food for thought

[98] Polyaen.4.3.
[99] Polyaen.5.15.

– does faithlessness pay for a ruler? Machiavelli presents a similar picture of Agathokles for the same purpose.[100]

1.4. Polybios & Others

Apart from these three texts, Agathokles appears only in passing in extant ancient literature. I have already mentioned the earliest and most significant of these: Polybios. He mentions Agathokles several times in comparison with Timoleon and Dionysios, mostly as part of his attacks on Timaios. He argues that Agathokles' achievements, even as described by Timaios, show that:

> μέγα τι γεγονέναι χρῆμα καὶ θαυμάσιον τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ πολλὰς ἐσχηκέναι ῥοπὰς καὶ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον…
>
> Agathokles had a great and amazing nature and a lot of poise and ability in affairs of state…
>
> Polyb. 12.15.8.

He also draws an extended positive parallel between Agathokles and Dionysios I, rather abruptly, during his account of the death of Ptolemy IV, expressing the same ideas in similar words.[101] This parallel between Agathokles and Dionysios I also appears in Justin and Diodoros; as I will discuss in the next chapter, it probably goes back to Agathokles himself.[102] In all cases, his view of Agathokles' rule is that it was essentially benevolent despite its violent beginnings.[103] This mixed view of Agathokles' rule, as I have said, is echoed in Diodoros, whose decision to emphasise his

[100] Macchiavelli (1513) ch. 8.
[101] Polyb.15.35.
[102] e.g. Diod.Sic.20.63.3 & 20.78; Just.*Epit.*22.1.2.
[103] Polyb.9.23 & 12.15.9.

independence from Timaios in his account of Agathokles implicitly responds to Polybios' criticism.[104]

Agathokles loomed large in Republican and early Imperial Rome.[105] This interest probably reflects the parallels between his expedition and the Punic Wars and perhaps also the efforts of Hieron II to magnify his predecessors and connect himself to them.[106] Subsequently, interest declined and Pompeius Trogus was the last Latin author to write about him until Orosius in the fifth century. In the Greek tradition he has a bit more of a presence through the Imperial period; Plutarch touches on him a few times in his *Pyrrhos* and his *Demetrios*,[107] but most references are to a small pool of illustrative anecdotes, which we will look at in chapter two. In all cases, these stories are told for their own sake rather than from interest in Agathokles. A couple of ostentatiously erudite references to Agathokles in Late Antique works indicate his obscurity by this period.[108]

1.5. Lost Sources

Behind the extant sources for Agathokles, loom the lost primary sources on which the surviving tradition ultimately drew. So far as we are aware they were four: Antandros, Kallias, Douris, and Timaios. A lot, possibly most, of the scholarship concerned with Agathokles is devoted to these four authors and is the sort of *Quellenforschung* in which passages of Diodoros and others are assigned to one of these four authors on the basis of the few hints we have about the nature

[104] Diodoros can also be seen responding to Polybios' criticisms of Timaios in his discussion of the bull of Phalaris at Diod.Sic.13.90.5-6. Notably, this falls in Diodoros' narrative for 406/05, well before he begins to rely on Polybios' account of events, which begins in 264, suggesting Diodoros had already encountered Polybios' views. See Dudziński (2013) 75-6 & 84.
[105] Polyb.15.35.6; Plaut.*Mostell.*775, *Men.*410; see n.312 and chapter 2.2.
[106] See n.204.
[107] Plut.*Pyrrh.*9 & 14.8-10; *Demetr.*25.7.
[108] Lib.57.52; Euseb.*Praep.Evang.*14.6.13; Synes.*Ep.*6; Lydus *Mag.*pg.18, *Mens.*1.21 (who believes Agathokles invented the *trabea*).

of their histories.[109] There are a number of problems with this procedure which render it nearly completely pointless. It relies on unsteady modern constructions of the lost authors, based on meagre evidence which mostly comes from their critics.[110] These constructions often beg the question, by using the passages attributed to a lost historian as evidence for the character of the lost historian.[111] The characteristics that they identify are often subjective features: positive or negative attitudes to historical figures or groups, realism, theatricality, naivety, specialism, etc.[112] The process either ignores the possibility of other, unknown, sources or (conversely) invents hypothetical sources as the argument requires.[113] To put it more briefly, the problem is that there is not enough data to attribute passages with any certainty. We actually have a papyrus fragment of a lost history of Agathokles, *P.Oxy*.24.2399, but modern scholars have been unable to firmly assign it to any of the lost sources – a sign of how subjective the *Quellenforschung* process is and how little we really know about the lost sources.[114] Beyond these practical issues, the approach is problematic because the effort to see past the surviving sources to the lost ones distracts from analysing the surviving sources on their own merits – our surviving sources are ripped up into fragments.[115] Internal contradictions and tensions, like Diodoros' depiction of Agathokles' relationship to the tyrannical stereotype, are not explained in terms of his own text but only in terms of his source use. The possibility of complex syntheses, such as the imposition of the characterisation of one source onto events described in another, is not compatible with *Quellenforschung*.

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[109] e.g. Schubert (1887); Tillyard (1908); De Sanctis (1909); Consolo Langher (1976); Adele Cavallaro (1977); Consolo Langher (1998a, 2000); Santagatti (2011).
[110] Baron (2013) esp.12-4.
[111] See Wirth (1993) 5 on Diodoros' proems.
[112] Cf. e.g. on the subjectivity of the "dramatic" Walbank (1960) 230-1.
[113] E.g. Dolce (1960), 165-7.
[114] Turner (1957); Huß (1980); Berger (1988); Raffone (2001).
[115] Brunt (1980) 477-94; Pearson (1984) on Laqueur's analysis of Diod.Sic.13.

Nevertheless, the existence of earlier source material is a fact. I have said earlier that Diodoros' approach to his source material was to synthesise existing accounts, not to invent new stories.[116] Thus, while I do not believe that it is often possible to sort out which of the lost historians is responsible for which aspects of the surviving accounts of Agathokles, it is important to have a clear idea of these authors' relationships to the events they narrated, what sort of tone and agenda they might have had, and how long their works might have been in circulation, in order to build up a picture of the raw material that later sources had to work with, in general. In the remainder of this chapter, therefore, I treat the four known lost sources in broadly chronological order.

1.5.1. Antandros

Antandros (*FGrH* 565),[117] Agathokles' brother, was a *strategos* well before Agathokles' takeover[118] and served as his regent in Syracuse during the African War.[119] We probably[120] have only one fragment: in his discussion of Agathokles' age at death (seventy-eight), Diodoros lists a number of sources for corroboration, including "Antandros, the brother of Agathokles who was also an author."[121] He must therefore have written after Agathokles' death in 289/88 and probably soon after, since he must have been quite elderly himself. It seems reasonable to assume that the work was positively disposed to Agathokles and to Antandros himself. We might expect that the work would have been most useful for Diodoros' passages about affairs in Sicily while Agathokles was in Africa (Justin focuses almost entirely on Africa), but the entire thrust of the episodes in which he features in Diodoros reflect poorly on him, making him a coward who attempts to surrender the

[116] See chapter 1.1.1.
[117] FGrH and BNJ both use the same numbering system and it is often useful to consult both; I cite by FGrH number in recognition of the FGrH's continued importance and because the BNJ *is not* yet complete. Champion (2009) in BNJ excludes the only actual fragment of Antandros (Diod.Sic.21.16.5) in favour of some random comments of Diodoros about Kallias, whom he incorrectly presents as another brother of Agathokles.
[118] Diod.Sic.19.3.3.
[119] Diod.Sic.20.4.1.
[120] Manni (1966) and Raffone (2001) speculatively attribute *P.Oxy*.24.2399 (on which see n.114) to Antandros.
[121] Diod.Sic.21.16.5: Ἄντανδρος ὁ ἀδελφὸς Ἀγαθοκλέους καὶ αὐτὸς συγγραφεύς

city to the Carthaginians and a butcher who turns the sea red with the blood of old men and infants on his brother's behalf.[122] Since Diodoros only quotes him only once, alongside a number of authorities, it is possible that he found the citation in another source, rather than actually consulting his work at first hand.[123] It is possible that his work had already vanished – understandably, since it was competing for the same niche as Kallias'. Ultimately, little can be said about Antandros, but he should give us pause; if a lost source can be named only once, a source might not be named at all.

1.5.2. Kallias of Syracuse

Like Antandros, Kallias (*FGrH* 564) was a member of Agathokles' entourage who wrote a positive, eyewitness account.[124] Timaios' work was produced in the mid to late 260s BC,[125] so Kallias' work must have been completed and reached Athens by c.270.

Table 3: Fragments of Kallias[126]

FGrH#	Source	Title	Book#[127]	Subject Matter
F1	Macrob.*Sat.*5.19.25	Historia de Rebus Siculis	7	Geysers near Gela
F2	Ath.12.59	τῶν περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα ἱστοριῶν	8	Fertility of Panormos
F3	Ael.*NA*.16.28	τῶν περὶ τὸν Συρακούσιον Ἀγαθοκλέα λόγων	10	How the Psylloi cure snake bites
F4	Schol.Ap.Rhod. *Argon.* 3.42	τῶν περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα	10*	The eruption of one of the Aeolian Islands
F5a	Dion.Hal. *Ant.Rom.*1.72.5	τὰς περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέους πράξεις	–	Origin of Rome
F5b	Festus, *Gloss.Lat.* p.329	Agathoclis Siculi… res gestas	–	Origin of Rome
F6	Diod.Sic.21.6.5	–	22 (total)	Agathokles' age at death

[122] Diod.Sic.20.16.1; Diod.Sic.20.72.
[123] Consolo Langher (1998a) 168. The fact that Diodoros does not comment on Antandros' work as he does on Kallias' and Timaios' in 21.17 might support this argument, but this part of Diodoros is fragmentary.
[124] Contrary to Champion (2009) in the BNJ, there is absolutely no evidence or implication that he was the brother of Antandros or Agathokles: see n.117 above.
[125] See chapter 1.5.4.
[126] FGrH misleadingly includes Diod.Sic.21.17.4 as a seventh fragment.
[127] Asterisk indicates that the number is written in alphabetic numerals rather than words and therefore more liable to corruption by copyists.

The fragments indicate that Kallias' work remained extant for a long time – Macrobius wrote in the fourth century AD. There is no reason, therefore, why Diodoros' assessment of the work cannot reflect his personal impression and use of it.[128] But Consolo Langher goes too far when she interprets the cure for snake-bite in F3 and Diodoros' description of the suffering of Ophellas' followers on their journey across Libya as demonstrating that Diodoros sourced his account of the African Expedition from Kallias.[129]

Diodoros says that Kallias "wrote twenty-two books."[130] The fragments confirm this: F3 and F4 probably come from the African Expedition and the attack on Lipari in 304/03 BC, and, therefore from about the midpoint of Agathokles' career, are sourced from book ten.[131] The variety of titles attributed to the work shows that most of the excerptors saw Agathokles as the focus of the whole work. The random collection of anecdotes preserved in our fragments reflects their recorders' interest in fantastic stories and Rome's origins, but all could be digressions from Agathokles' activities in Sicily, Africa, Lipari, and Italy. Thus, Kallias' work was probably devoted entirely to an account of the life of Agathokles, at great length, with many digressions.[132] As an eyewitness, who had been in a position to talk with many of the important actors, Kallias was well-placed to write this kind of work.

We have seen above that Diodoros pilloried Kallias for flattering Agathokles.[133] On the basis of this Jacoby argued that Kallias was not just a member of Agathokles' court, but a court historian. Consolo Langher and Lehmler argue further that his work was designed to recast Agathokles on the

[128] Rather than being cribbed from Timaios per Roller (2011) sv.T3, Pearson (1987) 225-54.
[129] Contra Consolo Langher (1998a) 176.
[130] Diod.Sic.21.16.5: εἴκοσι δύο βίβλους συγγράψας.
[131] Contra Roller (2011).
[132] Jacoby in FGrH sv. 564.
[133] Diod.Sic.21.17.4

model of a Hellenistic king, inspired by works on kingship produced at Hellenistic courts.[134] This is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, the idea that the role of court historian was a Hellenistic innovation for propagating a specifically Hellenistic model of rulership is wrong. It was well-precedented: Philistos wrote histories at the court of the Dionysioi and the poets at the courts of archaic and classical tyrants also wrote works which represented their clients as ideal rulers.[135] This identification of common features of Greek autocracy as peculiarly Hellenistic will be considered further in chapter four. Secondly, as I argued earlier, Diodoros' comments are part of a polemic designed to establish his own narratorial authority, as the moderate historian charting a middle course between Kallias and Timaios.[136] It is fair to accept the claim that Kallias was at Agathokles' court and that he presented Agathokles positively (Josephus confirms the latter).[137] But his highly rhetorical denunciation of Kallias as a historian-for-hire should not be accepted uncritically. Thirdly, Kallias is cited as a source for Agathokles' age at death;[138] he must have completed his work after 289/88 and the demise of Agathokles' dynasty. Thus, the work is better understood as an *apologia*. In the confused period after Agathokles' death, retreating from political life and writing an exculpatory account of the dead king's deeds might have been the wisest course for someone associated with Agathokles' regime.

Jacoby emphasises that the work did not have much impact on Kallias' successors,[139] but this reflects Jacoby's focus on fragments as an index of influence.[140] As the first known account of

[134] Jacoby in FGrH 564; Consolo Langher (1998a) x-xii; Lehmler (2005) 235.
[135] On Philistos (FGrH 556): Sordi (1990); Vanotti (1994). On poets: Morgan (2015).
[136] See pp.22-4.
[137] Joseph.*Ap.*1.17.
[138] Diod.Sic.21.16.5.
[139] Jacoby in FGrH sv.564.
[140] Baron (2013) 9-12.

Agathokles' life and at such length, Kallias' work probably provided a lot of the raw material for the later accounts – including those that did not adopt his tone.

1.5.3. Douris of Samos

Douris of Samos (*FGrH* 76) is much more widely known than Antandros and Kallias because of his lost work on Philip, Alexander and the Diadochoi, which ancient citations refer to as "histories" or *Makedonika*, but he also wrote other works, including one on Agathokles, of which we have a few fragments.[141]

Determining Douris' dates is difficult. Pausanias reports that a Kaios, son of Douris the Samian, won the boxing contest for *paides* at Olympia during the Samian exile (365-322) and was tyrant of Samos after the exile, a position which Douris the historian inherited, which probably means that the historian was Kaios' eldest son, named after his grandfather. Kaios' childhood victory and the activities of Kaios' other children suggest a birthdate before 330 for Douris.[142] Douris' account of Agathokles could date from any time between 289 BC and his death, but it will have been more topical earlier.[143] His *Makedonika* has to date after 281 because it recounts Lysimachos' death; its twenty-three books will have taken time. [144] It is therefore probable that he wrote on Agathokles before the *Makedonika* and before Timaios, who probably published his work in the mid to late

[141] Key studies on Douris: Kebric (1977); Landucci Gattinoni (1997); Baron (2011); Naas & Simon (2015). Much discussion of Douris is tied up in questions about *mimesis* and "tragic history": Consolo Langher (1998a) 79-83 is typical; Gray (1987) is good; Halliwell (2002) 289-91 puts it in the wider context of thought on aesthetics.
[142] Kaios' victory: Paus.6.13.5-6. Barron (1962) 189-92 equates Kaios the boxer with Kaios the father of Lysagoras who proposed an honorific decree at Samos at the end of the fourth century (*IG* XII.6.1.38). These are the only two Kaioi attested from the ancient world. The decree is dated by the cutter's hand: Tracy (1990) 62. Douris' younger brother, Lynkeus, was a student of Theophrastos (Ath.4.1 & 8.18 with Dalby (1991)), who was head of the Lykeion from 323 to 284 BC (Diog.Laert.5.35 & 5.58), attended Demetrios Poliorketes' banquets while he was in charge of Athens (Plut.*Demetr.*27.2, between 307/06 and 288/87) and entered comic plays against Menander (*Suda* Λ776), who lived 342/1-290/1 (*IG* XIV.1184). This suggests Lynkeus was born between 330 and 320.
[143] Consolo Langher (1998a) 62.
[144] Plin.*HN* 8.143; Manni (1960) 172.

260s.[145] Presumably, given his lack of first-hand knowledge of Agathokles, he wrote after Kallias – though, as a wealthy dynast of a country in close contact with Sicily, he will have had ample opportunity to source alternative accounts.[146]

Jacoby identified 96 fragments of Douris. Six of these are explicitly from his work on Agathokles. Another five concern Italian or Sicilian matters and could conceivably be from the account of Agathokles.

Table 4: Fragments of Douris

FGrH#	Source	Title	Book#[147]	Subject Matter
F16	Ath.14.9	τῶν περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα	2*	Libyan *auloi*
F17	*Suda* Λ85	Λιβυκῶν	2	Lamia
F18	Ath.18.84	τῶν περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα ἱστοριῶν	3	Kleonymos takes hostages at Metapontion
F19	Ath.12.59	τῶν περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα	4*[148]	Grove near Hipponion
F20	*Suda* E.3718	τῶν περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα	4*	Companion of Odysseus
F21	Schol. Lycoph. *Alex.* 772	τῷ περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέους	–	Penelope mother of Pan
F56a	Diod.Sic.21.6.1.	–	–	Battle of Sentinum
F56b	Schol. Lycoph. *Alex.* 1378	–	–	Battle of Sentinum
F57	Ath. 1.35	–	–	Nymphodoros the magician on the Rhegines.
F58	Schol.Theoc.*Id.*6	–	–	Polyphemos' sanctuary of Galateia
F59	Steph.Byz. sv. Ἀκράγαντες	–	–	Etymologies of Sicilian cities

These fragments indicate the work was relatively short, presumably its point of difference from Kallias' doorstopper, and focussed entirely on Agathokles: F16 and F17 could be digressions from the African War, F18 belongs to Kleonymos' expedition in 303/02 and F19 to Agathokles' activities in Italy. F20 and F21 are harder to place, but might be connected to Agathokles' activities in Korkyra

[145] See p.49.
[146] Kebric (1975) 89.
[147] Asterisk indicates that the number is written in alphabetic numerals rather than words and therefore more liable to corruption by copyists.
[148] Jacoby revised the manuscript's δεκάτῃ to δ': FGrH 76 F19.

and Ithaka. F56 could represent a digression in the latter two books, if it was part of this work.[149] F17 on Lamia is particularly significant because Diodoros tells her story during his description of Ophellas' journey across Libya. Though the details differ, the two stories are probably not independent of one another.[150] F56 is a direct citation of Douris by Diodoros.[151] It is safe, therefore, to say that Diodoros employed Douris' account of Agathokles as a source.

Characterisations of Douris in ancient literature vary. Cicero calls him "a careful man in historical matters" and Pliny the Elder's bibliographies show that he used him extensively.[152] But Didymos accuses him of talking endlessly about marvels and Plutarch says that Douris "dramatizes" and "generally does not keep his narrative to the truth."[153] Several later authors criticise him for his poor style.[154] Photios records that Douris himself said in a programmatic statement:

> Ἔφορος δὲ καὶ Θεόπομπος τῶν γενομένων πλεῖστον ἀπελείφθησαν· οὐτε γὰρ μιμήσεως μετέλαβον οὐδεμιᾶς οὐτε ἡδονῆς ἐν τῶι φράσαι, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ γράφειν μόνον ἐπεμελήθησαν.
>
> Ephoros and Theopompos were far inferior to the events [they narrate], since they make no use of *mimesis* or sweetness in their phrasing, but only cared about the writing.
>
> Douris *FGrH* 76 F1=Phot.*Bibl*.176.121a-b

In combination, these references have been taken as supporting the idea that Douris introduced a new, more dramatic and "sensational" form of history.[155] For proponents of this perspective,

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[149] Consolo Langher (1998a) 65-6.
[150] Diod.Sic.20.41.3-6. Consolo Langher (1998a) 61, 70-1 & 172.
[151] Consolo Langher (1998a) 58, 61 & 174.
[152] Cic.*Att*.6.1.18: *homo in historia diligens*; Plin.*HN*.1.7-8, 1.12-13, 1.33, 1.36.
[153] Didym.12.50; Plut.*Per.*28.1: ἐπιτραγωιδεῖ… οὐδ'… εἰωθὼς κρατεῖν τὴν διήγησιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας
[154] Dion.Hal.*Comp.*4; Himer.*Or.*14.27; Phot.*Bibl.*121b3. Dionysios groups him with Polybios and the famously dull Hieronymos. This is difficult to square with the accusations of excessive dramatization and fantasy, unless the criticism is that he failed to write good Attic Greek (Schol.Hom.*Il.*21.262 notes a linguistic irregularity in Douris).
[155] e.g. Consolo Langher (1998a) 62-122; Erskine (2003a) 5.

statements in the sources which seem unbelievable or sensationalised can simply be attributed to Douris spicing up the narrative,[156] but, as I have said above, this probably is not a valid procedure. Ideas about what is 'sensational' are subjective and culturally specific,[157] the accusations of Didymos and Plutarch are made in the context of polemics about specific events, the lack of hard historical material in Douris' fragments reflects (as usual) the concerns of his excerpters, and Douris' statement on Ephoros and Theopompos may criticise their artificiality rather than their dullness.[158] Further, the supposed traits of Duridean historiography can be found in most Greek historiography: theatricality, stratagems, anecdotes, violence, significant names, mythic digressions, concerns about the narration of simultaneous events, knowledge of Euripides, interest in geography and ethnography.

Douris was an important part of the discussion of Agathokles in the third century BC and shows that Agathokles was of interest to people in the Eastern Mediterranean. We cannot mechanically attribute everything dramatic in our source material to Douris. Even if we could, we would not be justified in discarding them as his own inventions.

1.5.4. Timaios of Tauromenion

Timaios (*FGrH* 566) is by far the most studied of the four lost sources.[159] He was the son of Andromachos, the ruler of Tauromenion in the time of Timoleon. Agathokles banished him from Sicily, so he went to Athens, where he had been living for around fifty years by the time he wrote the thirty-fourth book of his history.[160] This exile is presumed to have happened at some point

[156] Originally Schubert (1877) 20 & (1914). E.g. Tillyard (1908), 113: the portent of owls in Africa; Consolo Langher (1998a) 61: the "particolare impegno descrittivo" of Diod.Sic.20.65-7.
[157] Walbank (1960) 228-34. See p.39-41.
[158] Gray (1987) 475-81.
[159] Key studies on Timaios: Brown (1958); De Sanctis (1958) 43-69; Pearson (1987); Vattuone (1991); Baron (2013).
[160] Diod.Sic.21.17.1; Timaios FGrH 566 F34=Polyb.12.25h.1.

between 317 and 310, during Agathokles' first round of empire building, in which case he wrote in the 260s or 250s.[161] Thus, Timaios is probably the last of the four lost sources and therefore had Antandros, Kallias, and Douris at his disposal. He could supplement these with the first-hand accounts of Sicilians, especially surviving exiles and Tauromenites, of the survivors of Ophellas' army, which included many Athenians,[162] and perhaps of individuals associated with Demetrios and Kassandros.

Table 5: Fragments of Timaios[163]

FGrH#	Source	Title	Book#[164]	Subject Matter
F1a	Ath.4.38	τῶν ἱστοριῶν	1	Etruscan slaves
F1b	Ath.12.14	–	1*	Etruscan slaves
F2	Diog.Laert.8.66	–	1 & 2	Empedokles
F3	Polyb.12.3.7-8	–	2	Corsica
F4a	Diog.Laert.1.114	–	2	Epimenides
F4b	Schol.Pind.*Nem.*9.95a	–	2*[165]	Gelon
F5	Ath.6.103	τῶν ἱστοριῶν	3	Corinthian slaves
F6	Diog.Laert.8.67	–	4*[166]	Empedokles' death
F7	Polyb.12.28.8-28a.3	–	6	Preface
F8a	*Suda* K.225	–	6*	Gamoroi
F9	Ath.12.58	–	6	Sybaris
F10	Ath.13.32	–	7	Persian Wars
F11a	Ath.6.86	τῶν ἱστοριῶν	9	Lokrians
F13a	Schol.$_T$ Pl.*Phdr.*279c	–	9*	Pythagoras
F14	Diog.Laert.8.54	–	9	Pythagoras & Empedokles
F15	Cyril.*Adv.Iul.*6.208	–	9	Sokrates
F16	Ath.4.56	τῶν ἱστοριῶν	9	Diodoros the Aspendian
F17	Diog.Laert.8.11	ἱστοριῶν	10	Pythagoras
F18	Schol.Pind.*Nem.*9.95a	–	10	Hippokrates & Gelon
F19a	Schol.Pind.*Ol.*5.19a	–	10	Kamarina & Gelon
F23	Ath.7.132	τῶν Ιστοριῶν	13*	Hykkaron Fortress
F24a	Ath.13.54-5	τῶν Ιστοριῶν	13	Lais from Hykkaron

[161] Brown (1958), 2-6 suggests he actually left to be educated c.335, was exiled in absentia c.317-314 and returned c.285. There is no evidence for this and two points against it: Polyb.28.6 says Timaios never left Athens, and Timaios' work extended beyond 285; Manni (1960) 170-1; Baron (2013) 18-22.

[162] Diod.Sic.20.40.5-7

[163] There are a lot of fragments of Timaios. I record here only the ones which give a specific book number, a title for the work, or mention Agathokles explicitly.

[164] Asterisk indicates that the number is written in alphabetic numerals rather than words and therefore more liable to corruption by copyists.

[165] Emended to 11 by FGrH and BNJ.

[166] Emended to 14 by FGrH and BNJ.

F20	Schol.Pind.*Pyth.*2.2	–	14*[167]	Carthage's tribute to Gelon
F26a	Diod.Sic.13.81.3-82.8	–	15	Gellias of Akragas (late 400s BC)
F26b	Diog.Laert.8.51	τῶν ἱστοριῶν	15	Empedokles
F29	Schol.Aeschin.2.10	–	16	Portent of Dionysios I
F30	Diog.Laert.8.60	–	18	Empedokles
F22 / F30b	Polyb.12.25k.2-26.8	–	21[168]	Conference at Gela
F31a	Polyb.12.25.7	–	21	Timoleon's speech
F32	Ath.6.56	–	22	Damokles & Dionysios
F 33	Ath.11.43	–	28	Timoleon
F 34	Polyb.12.25h.1	–	34	Autobiographical statement
F35a	*Suda* Ω263	–	38*	Democharis, nephew of Demosthenes
Explicitly titled, but no book number				
T96	Dion.Hal. *Ant.Rom.*1.6.1	ταῖς κοιναῖς ἱστορίαις	–	Rome's early history
F42a	Gell.*NA.*11.1.1	historiis quas oratione Graeca de rebus populi Romani composuit	–	Etymology of "Italy"
F43a	Antig.Car.1-2	τὰς Σικελικὰς ἱστορίας	–	Cicadas of Rhegion & Lokroi
F83	Parth.*Amat.Narr.*29.1	Σικελικοῖς	–	Daphnis
Fragments concerning Agathokles				
F124c	Polyb.15.35.2	–	–	Agathokles the potter & his migration to Syracuse
F 120	Diod.Sic.20.79.5	–	–	Peace with Carthage (306/5 BC)
F 121	Diod.Sic.20.89.4-6	–	–	Battle of Torgion (305/4 BC)
F123a	Diod.Sic.21.16.5	–	–	Agathokles' age at death (289/88 BC)
F123b	[Lucian], *Macr.*10	–	–	Agathokles' age at death (289/88 BC)
F122	[Longinus], *Subl*.4.5	–	–	Agathokles abducts his niece
F124	Polyb.12.15.2-3	τῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας	"at the end"[169]	Agathokles' sexual impropriety

[167] Emended to 11 by FGrH and BNJ.

[168] Emended to 12 by FGrH and BNJ

[169] Polyb.12.15.2: ἐν οἷς ἐπὶ καταστροφῇ τῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας…

Timaios' work was a different kind of work from the other three lost histories. It was not focussed entirely on Agathokles, but covered the whole of Italian and Sicilian history and, as the number of fragments shows, was highly influential in the way the history of the Greek West was conceived of subsequently. Diodoros says only the last five books discussed Agathokles and as mentioned earlier, Polybios might mean that Timaios took the narrative down a bit further, to 264/3 BC. It is generally taken that F34, where Timaios says that he had been in exile for fifty years, marked the introduction to this section.[170]

On Timaios' work and approach, Polybios and others provide us with a great deal of information. Unfortunately they do so as part of polemics. I have discussed how Diodoros aims to present himself as the moderate by identifying Kallias and Timaios as extremely pro- and anti-Agathokles. Nevertheless, he certainly used Timaios, explicitly citing him as a source for figures at various points.[171] Polybios devoted most of book 12 (which is fragmentary) to a blistering critique of Timaios for everything from using documentary evidence improperly, to being ignorant of Africa and making *ad hominem* arguments.[172] The central critique is that Timaios, not having experience of public or military affairs and not having seen the events in question, could not accurately write about them.[173] Polybios' claim to narratorial authority is his experience of public and military matters and autopsy of much of what he narrated, a claim which this polemic against Timaios reinforces. Much of it is not honest argument.[174]

Diodoros and Polybios both make clear that Timaios presented Timoleon very positively and Agathokles very negatively. This is not surprising given that his father was Timoleon's greatest

[170] Diod.Sic.21.17.3; Polyb.1.5.1; Brown (1958) 2-6; Baron (2013) 31, 36.
[171] Diod.Sic.20.79.5; 20.89.4-6; 21.16.5
[172] Polyb.12.10-11; Polyb.12.12b-15; Polyb.12.3.
[173] Polyb.12.28
[174] Baron (2013) 61-88.

supporter and he was a fugitive from Agathokles. The fragments support this, too. Timaios' figure for the number of Agathokles' victims at the Battle of Torgion are double that of Diodoros' unnamed other source(s), while his figure for the amount of money received from Carthage in the peace of 306 is half that of the other source.[175] Polybios lists a number of examples of Timaios presenting Agathokles as a "common prostitute, open to the immoderate, a jackdaw, a three-balled buzzard, who had gone in front to all who wished to take him from behind" a presentation which is confirmed by a quotation of Pseudo-Longinus, which is definitely verbatim since it is concerned with Timaios' writing style.[176] It is reasonable to see Timaios as the source of the negative tradition on Agathokles, responding to the more positive representation of earlier works, such as Kallias,[177] but it does not necessarily follow that he is responsible for every negative thing (or everything that appears negative to us) in the literary tradition. Nor does it follow that elements from the negative tradition are untrue. Further, the fragments also indicate that our ancient sources were alive to Timaios' bias – Diodoros signposts the fact that the casualty figure for Torgion given by Timaios was out of synch with the historical consensus. The anecdotes about Agathokles' sex life are almost entirely absent from Diodoros because he decided that they were not part of his historical project. The literary tradition is not irredeemably ruined by Timaios or by those who used him.

1.6. Conclusion

We know of three important lost sources: Kallias, Douris, and Timaios. The reference to Antandros as a historian is an indication that other, unknown sources may exist. The three historians can easily be fitted into niches: Kallias glorified, Douris summarised, and Timaios criticised, for example. But our ability to do this should be taken as a sign of our ignorance, not our

[175] Timaios FGrH 566 F121=Diod.Sic.20.89.4-5 & F120=Diod.Sic.20.79.5.
[176] Timaios FGrH 566 F124=Polyb.12.15.1-10: κοινὸν πόρνον, ἕτοιμον τοῖς ἀκρατεστάτοις, κολοιόν, τριόρχην, πάντων τῶν βουλομένων τοῖς ὄπισθεν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονότα; F122=[Longinus], *Subl.*4.5.
[177] Meister (1967); Consolo Langher (1998a) xii.

knowledge of them – no set of surviving historians can be categorised so simply. Nor was the approach of the surviving historians to their sources simple, as Diodoros 21.17 makes explicit. Therefore, assigning specific passages of our surviving sources to our lost ones is not practical. An awareness of the lost sources gives us an idea of the general range of perspectives and attitudes towards Agathokles that our surviving historians had to work with. Understanding that Diodoros is trying to find a middle ground between two sources biased in opposite directions is imperative to understanding his account of Agathokles. But the focus should remain on Diodoros and the impact of the lost sources on him, rather than on what his work can tell us about those lost sources.

Focus on our surviving sources shows that the presentation of Agathokles in those sources reflects their own purposes. This has implications for the interpretation of many individual passages as evidence for Agathokles – in chapter four, I will argue that Diodoros' account of Agathokles' assumption of the title of *basileus* has been shaped by his ideas about Agathokles' non-tyrannical behaviour, itself a result of his efforts to synthesise the positive and negative currents in the sources available to him. Beyond individual passages, awareness of our surviving sources as coherent literary works with their own agendas affects the core debate which this thesis seeks to transcend, the question of whether Agathokles ought to be seen as a Sicilian tyrant or a Hellenistic king. Modern scholars have been encouraged to see a mutually exclusive dichotomy, by the habitual division of the Mediterranean into eastern and western halves and perception of the Hellenistic period as marked by a novel break with the past, particularly with respect to autocracy. Diodoros and Justin have seemed to provide the raw material to confirm those expectations. But this raw material derives from our surviving sources' narrative concerns. In order to emphasise the importance of Sicily and Agathokles as an example of that importance, Diodoros often connects Agathokles with earlier Sicilian rulers, deploys tyrannical tropes to present Agathokles as the ultimate example of a tyrant (and therefore worth reading about), and contrasts Agathokles with the Diadochoi. Trogus' structural decision to place all Sicilian history in a digression emphasises Agathokles' connections to that Sicilian history; but it follows from Trogus' decision to make

Mainland Greece and Macedonia the central hub of his history, as a form of equal and opposite counterpart to Roman history. In the rest of this thesis, I will be arguing that Agathokles actively participated in the nascent Hellenistic world and that this participation reflected the continuation of earlier Sicilian participation in the Mediterranean world – not a novel engagement. Sicilian tyranny and Hellenistic monarchy were parts of a continuous Greek tradition of autocracy, rather than two distinct models of rule, especially in the early Hellenistic period.

2. TELLING TALES ABOUT THE KING

In the previous chapter I discussed the individual historians on Agathokles. In this chapter I look at what the anecdotes about Agathokles indicate about how he was categorised by discourse in his own time and the rest of the Hellenistic period.[178] By gathering the anecdotes into broad categories, I show that some anecdotes connect Agathokles to specifically Sicilian traditions, but most are part of a more general Greek discourse on autocracy and power, which was deployed to talk about mythological characters, mainland Greek tyrants, Sicilian dynasts, and Hellenistic kings, and Roman Emperors.

In chapter 1, I argued that Diodoros, Justin, and the other surviving sources selected, synthesised, and re-shaped the narratives of their predecessors for rhetorical reasons. We can occasionally see how these changing priorities led to a story being repurposed. Adele Cavallaro, for instance, argues that a story about Agathokles putting pottery cups beside golden ones was reshaped in the Roman period to make moral points about luxury and the value of appearances.[179] This discourse in surviving sources was the focus of chapter one.

In this chapter, I discuss the discourse that the surviving sources drew on. Agathokles was an important topic in his own right to the lost historians – Antandros and Kallias because they were important members of Agathokles' circle, Douris as a fellow statesman, and Timaios as one of the most distinguished of Agathokles' exiled opponents.[180] But the contemporary conversation about Agathokles was bigger than them. There were a lot of other people who had things to say about

[178] Similar studies: Muccioli (1999) & Lewis (2000) on the Dionysioi; Hazzard (2000) & Van Oppen (2013) on Ptolemy; Kosmin (2014), Visscher (2016) on the Seleukids.
[179] See n.188.
[180] Cf. Consolo Langher (1998a) 44.

Agathokles: exiled Syracusan oligarchs and dramatists, members of Agathokles' court, the Syracusan *demos*, supporters and exiles from other Sicilian and Italian centres, relatives of the Sicilian, Cyrenaican and Athenian soldiers abandoned by Agathokles in Africa, Agathokles' enemies in Carthage, Lucania and at Kassandros' court, his allies abroad, his Campanian mercenaries, the people of communities with traditional relationships with Sicily like Corinth, and Agathokles himself.[181] The discourse of this exceptionally diverse group of people was predominantly oral and sought to associate Agathokles with existing tropes of rulership in order to make positive and negative points about him.[182] It continued after Agathokles' death, when Agathokles was discussed by people who wished to claim his legacy: Pyrrhos' invasion of Sicily made use of his kinship with Agathokles and Hieron II took efforts to emphasise his relationship to previous Sicilian rulers, including Agathokles. This part of the discourse post-dates the major lost historians, but may have influenced our surviving sources.

This largely oral, contemporary and near-contemporary discourse about Agathokles in his own right is responsible for the later, largely literary discourse which used Agathokles as an exemplar, a source of entertainment, and a demonstration of their erudition. Thus, Agathokles and those who talked about him emphasised his relationship to Sicilian traditions and precedents,[183] providing the raw material for Diodoros' use of him as an example of Sicilian greatness. First, stories about Agathokles were adapted to established tropes, then Agathokles was used to discuss those tropes. The ease with which anecdotes were able to evolve to fit the different needs of different interlocutors was as important for its success in spreading through the diverse oral discourse in order to reach one of the literary sources, as it was for its subsequent re-use in the literary tradition.

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[181] The comic poet Boiotos' influence on Timaios is an example of the involvement of the lost historians in this wider discourse: Brown (1958) 192, Vattuone (1983) 15-22, Consolo Langher (1998a) 229 & 233.
[182] cf.Ogden (2011) 79.
[183] In this case corroborated by numismatic evidence, as discussed in chapter 3.3.

The anecdotes about Agathokles that have been transmitted to us had a number of different connotations which meant that they could be adapted to different parts of the discourse. Agathokles was characterised in similar ways to his contemporaries, the Diadochoi, but also using older tropes of Greek autocracy. Thus, Agathokles forms part of a continuous discourse on autocracy.

2.1. Birth of Agathokles

There are a number of stories about Agathokles' youth, which are all fantastical. They are told together in Diodoros, but there are three distinct parts:

- As a result of foreboding dreams and a prophecy from Delphi, Agathokles was exposed at birth, but he survived. He displayed amazing beauty and strength and when his survival was revealed to his father he took him back in.[184]
- Agathokles was the poor son of a potter.[185]
- Agathokles' future power was predicted by a swarm of bees which made its hive on the hips of a votive statue of him set up by his mother.[186]

Polybios reports that the story that Agathokles was the son of a potter appeared in Timaios as an insult.[187] This proves it was current in Agathokles' time, but not that Timaios invented it. Caecilius of Kale Akte's anecdote in which Agathokles continues using ceramic cups rather than gold show that the story could be spun positively.[188] This indicates that the same stories could be associated with Agathokles by his opponents and proponents, in different ways.

[184] Diod.Sic.19.1.2-5.
[185] Timaios FGrH 566 F124c=Polyb.15.35.2, Diod.Sic.19.2.7, Just.*Epit.*22.1.2
[186] Diod.Sic.19.2.9.
[187] Polyb.15.35.2.
[188] Caecilius FGrH 183 F2=Ath.11.15; Diod.Sic.20.63.5; Adele Cavallaro (1977).

The other two stories only occur in Diodoros and past scholarship has tended to attribute them to Kallias or Douris.[189] At the very earliest, they might have gained currency during his rise to power, but they would have had the greatest relevance once it was clear that Agathokles had actually come to greatness – in his life, or immediately posthumously. I cannot see any impetus for their creation once he had been dead for some time. Pelling has argued that childhood portents were an important part of encomium and invective, but that childhood was not an important part of Greek biographical or historical writing, because it was not valued by authors or readers as a tool for understanding the formation of individuals' personalities as it is in modern popular biography.[190] If he is right, then these stories about childhood would be expected in contemporary discourse on Agathokles, but later historians, like Diodoros, would not have felt any pressure to create information if none existed. It is not Diodoros' usual practice to tell us about the childhood of major figures (he says nothing about Alexander's youth), so it seems likely that he included the stories about Agathokles because they were in his source material, not because he felt Agathokles' youth was a gap which his readers would expect to be filled.

2.1.1. Agathokles Exposed

The story of Agathokles' exposure is an example of a common tale in Semitic and Indo-European myth and historiography.[191] Redford and Lewis identify two main types: a version in which the child is placed in a box on water and a version in which the child is exposed on land and suckled by animals. In Greco-Roman literature, the former version is rare,[192] while the latter is common in both

[189] Kallias via Douris: Consolo Langher (1998a) ix, xvii & 176. Kallias: Laqueur (1936) 1161; Douris: Meister (1967) 137-8; Vattuone (1983) 25 with bibliography.
[190] Pelling (1990).
[191] Tillyard (1908) 26; Berve (1953) 21; Vattuone (1983) 23-31; Consolo Langher (2000) 13-25. Rank (1964); Redford (1967); Gaster (1969) 224-30, 380-2; Lewis (1980).
[192] Hittite: KBo.22.2; Lewis (1980) 199; Assyrian: Lewis (1980) 98-106, Westenholz (1984) 74; Biblical: *Exodus* 2, Joseph.*Ant.Jud*. 2.9. Perseus: Apollod.*Bibl.*2.4.1; Telephos: Diod.Sic.4.33.7-12. Cf. Also Dionysos: Paus.3.24.3-5.

myth and historiography.[193] Some ancient authors considered these stories fantastic, as rationalisations of the stories of Romulus and Cyrus demonstrate,[194] but others were willing to recount completely fabulous accounts even for recent figures, like Ptolemy I and Hieron II.[195]

The story shows the divine favour enjoyed by the hero, who prevails even when powerless,[196] but also has negative implications, since the usual reasons for exposure were deformity and suspicions of illegitimacy.[197] Ogden argues expulsion narratives use the τέρας (abomination) as a metaphor for the ruler's uncontrollable power.[198] As for illegitimacy, the implication is transformed into the glory of divine birth when the story is fantastic, but becomes more tangible the more the story is brought down to earth. Diodoros' version of Agathokles' birth is far more on the latter side of the divide. The only fantastic element present is the reason for the exposure: ominous dreams and oracles. These recall Oidipous and Paris, both of whom bring disaster to their cities.[199] The foreboding dream is also a feature of Herodotos' account of Cyrus, a connection enhanced by Agathokles' return to his birth family after his father notices his beauty and strength while he is playing, much as Astyages notices Cyrus.[200] In ancient sources, Cyrus can be either an ideal ruler or an archetypal tyrant, so this is an ambiguous connection.[201] Another prominent exposure narrative is that of Kypselos of Corinth, which is different in many respects, but which also gives a prominent role to the infant's mother, as in Agathokles' exposure narrative. Kypselos' exposure narrative tends to emphasise the irregularity of his birth, as the child of a lame mother and a non-Bacchiad

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[193] E.g. Hippothoon, Poseidon's son, suckled by a mare: Hyg.*Fab*.187, 285; Kybele with leopards: Diod.Sic.3.58.1-3; Cyrus with a wolf: Hdt.1.108; Just.*Epit.*1.4; Ael.*VH*.12.42.
[194] Cf. Plut.*Rom*.3 with Rom.3.4; Ael.*VH*.12.42 with Hdt.1.108.
[195] E.g. *Suda* Λ25 on Ptolemy; on Hieron II, see n.204.
[196] E.g. Alonso-Núñez (1987) 68; Cohen (1992) 12; Ogden (2008) 19-23 & (2011) 79-110; Mitchell (2013) 59; Van Oppen (2013) 88-96.
[197] Patterson (1985).
[198] Ogden (1997) esp.147.
[199] Oidipous: Soph.*OT*; Paris: Apollod.*Bibl.*3.12.5.
[200] Diod.Sic.19.2.6; Hdt.1.114.
[201] Avery (1972); Nadon (2001).

father descended from the Lapiths. He is also an ambiguous figure once grown, bringing justice to Corinth by sweeping away the corrupt Bacchiad order, but gives birth to generations of bloody slaughter and oppressive tyranny.[202] This link is perhaps especially important given the importance of Corinth to Syracusan identity generally.[203] The story thus presages Agathokles' power, but Diodoros' version has stressed the negative or ambiguous connections of it rather than the positive ones. Justin provides a hint that more positive versions of the story existed, when he describes the fantastic birth and youth of Hieron II, a laudatory account that strives to make links to as many of his Sicilian predecessors as possible.[204] The hodgepodge includes a doublet of Gelon I's schoolyard encounter with a wolf,[205] a prodigy of bees recalling Dionysios and Agathokles, and an owl following him into battle which recalls an important episode in Agathokles' African campaign. In this account, the baby Hieron is exposed, recalling the exposure of Agathokles.[206] It seems unlikely that this highly laudatory account would have made this connection if the exposure of Agathokles was only known as a slander against him.

The story also employs the trope of prophetic dreams and oracles announcing the birth of great men. Notable parallels include Mainland Greek tyrants, like Kypselos, Peisistratos, and Orthagoras of Sikyon,[207] as well as Perikles,[208] and Hellenistic kings like Alexander the Great and Seleukos Nikator.[209] There are also parallels with Phalaris and Dionysios I. Herakleides Pontikos reported that Phalaris' mother dreamt that the household statue of Hermes welled up with blood and flooded

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[202] Hdt.5.92; Nikolaos FGrH 90 F57; Plut.*Mor.*163F; Paus.5.17.5. Salmon (1984) 186-230; Gray (1996); Ogden (1997) 87, 107.
[203] Cf. cf. e.g. Arist.*Pol*.1310b.16, in which Kypselids and Dionysios are compared and the link between Timoleon and Archias identified by Salmon (1984) 65-6.
[204] Just.*Epit.*23.4. Hieron II made similar efforts to link himself to his predecessors through marriages and creative genealogies and in his public building programmes: Portale (2011) 290-1.
[205] Timaios FGrH *566 F*95=Diod.Sic.10.29.1=Tzetz.*Chil.*4.132.269-281.
[206] Vattuone (1983) 39-45.
[207] Lewis (2000)
[208] Hdt.6.131.2; Vattuone (1983) 34-5.
[209] Plut.*Alex*.2.1-2.6; Just.*Epit.*15.4; Ogden (2011) 7-28, 79-110.

the whole house.[210] Philistos reported that Dionysios' mother dreamt she was going to give birth to a satyr.[211] Dionysios also appeared chained at Zeus' feet in the well-known dream of a woman of Himera.[212] This second dream is not connected to a birth narrative, but was famous enough to be casually referenced in an Athenian law court, and took place in Himera which as Thermai was the city of Agathokles' own birth. Ominous dreams about Agathokles might have suggested these earlier stories especially since Agathokles was frequently connected with both Phalaris and Dionysios, as we will see. These examples are also important because they pre-date Timaios, showing that the discourse on Agathokles interacted with an existing Sicilian tradition, rather than being Timaios' creation.

This story-type, then, was a widespread one, with positive and negative connotations, which created links between Agathokles and a wide range of figures, including mythic heroes, barbarian kings, Corinthian tyrants, his Sicilian predecessors, and his Macedonian contemporaries. The common theme thus emphasised is extraordinary power, characterised as something mysterious, supernatural and in some way pre-ordained, but also unnatural and abominable, capable of sweeping away the established order – a redistribution of the wealth and cancellation of debts – and instituting an entirely new order – a tyranny or a kingship. Like an exposed child the autocrat is not something society wants, like a child that survives exposure an autocrat's power seems to transcend society's desires and nature's laws. The story shows that contemporaries were able to fit Agathokles comfortably within the pre-existing tropes of the tyrant's myth, as an exceptional figure but not an unprecedented one.

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[210] Cic.*Div.*1.23.46.
[211] Philistos FGrH 556 F57a=Cic.*Div.*1.39; Val.Max.1.7.7; Vattuone (1983) 32-35 unnecessarily claims this similarity means that an exposure story was told about Dionysios too; Consolo Langher (1998a) 49 n.132.
[212] Val.Max.1.7.6; Aeschin.2.10; Timaios FGrH 566 F29=Schol.Aeschin.2.10; Sordi (1984).

2.1.2. The Potter's son

Both Diodoros and Justin claim that Agathokles' father was a potter – a claim that many later writers repeat for moralising purposes. Polybios tells us that this story was among Timaios' slanders against Agathokles.[213] The story is implausible: Agathokles' brother's service as a *strategos* and Agathokles' close relations with Damas in the 320s are incomprehensible if he came from such a background.[214] Accusations of low birth are a common part of many ancient accounts of tyrants; notable examples include Orthagoras of Sikyon, who was accused of being a *mageiros* and Dionysios I, who was supposedly a donkey driver.[215] It was also a stock form of abuse in Attic comedy and rhetoric, best known from Aristophanes' abuse of Kleon as a tanner.[216] Both Diodoros and Polybios identify this as the vein in which Timaios used the story.[217]

However, this sort of low origin did not have to be entirely negative. Two stories which use the story to this effect appear repeatedly in surviving Greek literature.[218] In the first Agathokles juxtaposes his own ceramic cups with gold ones to make a moral point about fortune and moderation. Exactly what this point is varies by author: in Caecilius of Kale Akte it is simply the contrast between Agathokles' prosperity and his humble origins, apparently responding to a trend in Tarentine and Sicilian pottery contemporary with Agathokles' lifetime;[219] in Diodoros it showcases Agathokles' pride in those origins as a sign of his achievement but also his continued accessibility and intercourse with the common people; in Plutarch it is only the former and is presented as a lesson Agathokles gave to his sons, which makes it more explicitly didactic; for

[213] Timaios FGrH 566 F124c=Polyb.15.35.2; Diod.Sic.19.2.7; Just.*Epit.*22.1.2.
[214] Finley (1968) 102, suggesting that the story might reflect ownership of a pottery workshop, just as Aristophanes' abuse of Kleon reflect his ownership of a tannery: Schol.Ar.*Eq.*44.
[215] Lib.57.52; Phot.*Bibl*.279.530a. Polybios is unaware of this story about Dionysios: 15.35.2.
[216] E.g. Ar.*Eq*.127-144, *Thesm*.443; Ober (1989) 272-277.
[217] Polyb.15.35.2.
[218] Consolo Langher (1998a) 106-9 attributes them to Douris due to their proverbial, anecdotal nature.
[219] See n.188.

Michael Apostolius it explains a proverb on remembering one's roots.[220] In the second, Agathokles' besieged enemies ask how a mere potter can pay an army and Agathokles wittily responds that he will have plenty of money when he captures their city.[221] These stories come down to us because of their rhetorical and moral value to the writers who record them,[222] and they demonstrate how the later tradition could reshape such stories for their own purposes, but also the degree to which writers respected the basic shape of a story. Although different authors modified these stories, their basic shape goes back to Agathokles' own time.

The astonishing amount of social mobility reported for the Diadochoi suggests that low birth was a common part of accounts of rulers at the beginning of the Hellenistic period – not just negative ones. Reportedly, King Antigonos was a peasant by birth,[223] Ptolemy was a common soldier whose father was a complete unknown,[224] Lysimachos was the son of a Thessalian slave,[225] Eumenes was the son of a wagoner or a piper,[226] Philetairos was a Paphlagonian eunuch,[227] Hieron II was exposed on account of the "low, even shameful" status of his mother's family,[228] and Sandrakottos was a commoner.[229] In some of these cases, there probably was something irregular about the king's origin – this has often been argued with respect to Ptolemy's paternity in particular.[230] But the example of Sandrakottos is particularly telling, because he is an idealised and largely imaginary figure;[231] this suggests that low birth was part of the archetypal idea of the dynast's rise to power

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[220] Caecilius FGrH 183 F2=Ath.11.15; Diod.Sic.20.63.4-5; Plut.*Mor.*176E, *Mor.*544B; Michael Apostolius, *Paroemiae* 16.70.
[221] Diod.Sic.20.63.4-5; Plut.*Mor.*176E, 458E.
[222] Polyb.12.15.5-7; Lib.57.52; Mach.*Princ.* ch.8.
[223] Diod.Sic.21.1; Ael.*VH.*12.43.
[224] Just.*Epit.*13.4; Plut.*Mor.*458A.
[225] Theopompos FGrH 115 F81=Ath.6.76.
[226] Plut.*Eum*.1.1; Ael.*VH*.12.43.
[227] Strabo 12.3.7-8, 13.4.1; Paus.1.8.1; Ath.13.38.
[228] Just.*Epit.*23.4: *sordidum atque adeo pudibundum*…
[229] Just.*Epit.*15.4.
[230] Collins (1997); Ogden (1999) 67-68; Bennett (2000-11) sv.Arsinoe, n.2, Ptolemy I, n.3.
[231] Fauconnier (2015).

and not necessarily a slur. There are earlier examples, many of which we have seen already in the discussion of exposure narratives (since these often allow lowly origins and noble ancestry to co-exist). An important precedent is Herodotos' presentation of Perdikkas, the first Argead king of Macedon as a goatherd and Gordios of Phrygia as a peasant.[232] If some people used lowly origins as a way of demeaning a ruler, then it was also well-established that they could be spun positively to demonstrate the leader's personal excellence by showing that their rise resulted from their own merits rather than inherited benefits. Like the exposure story it was capable of being used both to praise and impugn Agathokles (and the Diadochoi). Agathokles had been slotted into a conversation that predated him, which continued to be used for his contemporaries, and endured after him.

2.1.3. Bees

Stories of apparitions from the natural world indicating political leaders' future success are a commonplace in the Greco-Roman world and beyond.[233] In Greek religious thought, bees were important and positive symbols.[234] Priestesses and nymphs were often referred to as bees.[235] They are connected with several deities: most prominently Zeus who was fed by them as a new-born, but also Dionysos, Apollo/Hermes at Delphi, Artemis at Ephesos, Demeter and Kore as mystery goddesses, and the Muses.[236] The sweetness of honey, the fact that it is ready-to-eat, can be harvested without harming anything, and does not go off led to its association with prosperity,

[232] Perdikkas: Hdt.8.137-8. Archelaos of Macedon: Dio Chrys.*Or.*4.70-2; Gordias: Arr.*Anab.*2.3.
[233] E.g. Greece: Philostr.*VA.*1.5; Rome: Suet.*Aug.*94; China: Sima Qian *Shiji* 8.2.
[234] See generally: Cook (1895); Davies & Kathivithamby (1986) 64-72; Pownell (2014) *sv*.F58.
[235] Priestesses: Pind.*Pyth.*4.59-60.
[236] Zeus: Hsch.*sv*.Μελισσαῖος; Diod.Sic.5.70.5; Ant.*Pun.Met*.19; Moiro in Ath.11.80; Lactant.*Div.Inst*.1.22; Cook (1895) 2 notes Beazley #4330. Dionysos: Eur.*Bacch*.142-4; Diod.Sic.3.68. Delphi: *Hymn.Hom.Merc.*18.552-66; Scheinberg (1979); Larson (1995). Ephesian Artemis: Elderkin (1939). Demeter and Kore: Hesch.*sv*.Μέλισσαι; Porph.*De Antr*.*Nymph.*18. Muses: *Anth.Pal*.9.505.5-6; Philostr.*Imag*.2.8.5. Eloquence: Artem.5.83; Nonnus, *Dion*.41.28.

blessedness, health, and immortality (as νέκταρ/ἀμβροσία).[237] Skilled speakers, poets and politicians, were said to have honey on their lips.[238] The persistent idea that bees could be created from bovine corpses (*bougonia*), their similarity to depictions of the winged *psychai*, and the use of honey in funerary offerings suggests a connection with rebirth.[239] Thus bees were powerful indicators of divine favour and forthcoming prosperity – particularly apposite for Agathokles given the prolonged *stasis* which preceded his rule. Because of their busy, communal behaviour, and the positive feelings just discussed, political philosophy and other literature used bees as a metaphor for the ideal society.[240] Ancient authors regularly connected the king/queen bee with the tyrant or the king.[241] Thus, the portent of the bees made a claim about Agathokles' natural fitness for political power.

Agathokles was not the first to be portended by bees. Kypselos' namesake chest may have been a beehive.[242] But the most important precedent is Philistos' story, in which Dionysios' horse is lost in quicksand but returns to him with a swarm of bees in its mane, "which portent meant that he would begin to reign a few days later."[243] The presence of bees in the hodgepodge story about Hieron II's youth mentioned above demonstrates the relevance of this story to later Sicilian dynasts. Thus, Agathokles' bees reflect broad religious and philosophical ideas, but also a specific Sicilian

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[237] E.g. Moiro in Ath.11.80; Schol.Pind.*Pyth.*4.104; Lactant.*Div.Inst*.1.22. See also Arist.*Hist.An*.5.19.4.
[238] Johnston (2009) 111 for examples.
[239] Bougonia: Verg.*G*.4.295-314. *Psychai*: Soph.F693; Porph.*De Antr.Nymph.*18-9; Cook (1895) 16-7; Bodson (1978) 64. Funerary: Cook (1895) 1 & 19-22; Bodson (1978) 64, see also Hyg.*Fab*.136.
[240] Hom.*Il.*2.87-93, 12.167-72; Semon.7.83; Xen.*Oec.*7.32; Arist.*Hist.An*.5.19.2; Byl (1980) 320; Polleichtner (2005) 119-24.
[241] Xen.*Cyr*.5.1.24; Pl.*Plt.*301d-e; Plin.*NH.*11.16.50-1, 11.17.52-4; Ael.*NA*.1.10-1, 1.59 & 5.15; van Overmeire (2011) 34-8.
[242] Roux (1963); Herod.3.50.
[243] Philistos FGrH 556 F58=Cic.*Div*.1.73: *quod ostentum habuit hanc vim, ut Dionysius paucis post diebus regnare coeperit*.

tyrannical tradition – an important example of how local and Panhellenic discourses about autocracy co-existed rather than conflicting.

2.2. Agathokles the General

Military tales form a large part of all accounts of Agathokles. They stress his personal excellence and make parallels between him and Alexander. As we will see in chapter three, Agathokles' numismatic iconography places particular emphasis on his personal responsibility for victory and makes parallels between his own successes and those of Alexander. So this theme goes back to Agathokles himself. In chapter four, I will argue that Agathokles' generalship actually did have a lot in common with that of the Diadochoi,[244] but here I focus on the tropes the sources use to represent him as a general. This representation of Agathokles is part of a larger, pre-existing discourse which Agathokles had slotted himself into and which continued to be developed after his death. This reputation built on traditional Sicilian representations of their autocrats as military leaders in the conflict with the Carthaginians and other western barbarians.[245] Since the Deinomenids, this narrative had stressed that war against these western barbarians was just as perilous and just as important to the survival of the Greek world as the Persian Wars.[246] This encouraged Agathokles to place his achievements in Africa alongside those of Alexander in Asia. This comparison remained popular after his death, perhaps partially because of the efforts of Pyrrhos and Hieron II, but even more because it allowed the Romans to place themselves and their conflict with the Carthaginians on a par with all the most celebrated military achievements of the eastern Greeks. Thus, Roman discourse on power, generalship and monarchy drew strongly on Sicilian tyranny.[247] Polybios claims that Scipio Africanus identified Dionysios and Agathokles as the "men who were the most

[244] See chapter 4.2.4.
[245] Prag (2010); Morgan (2015) 25-45.
[246] Pind.*Pyth.*1.73-75; Harrell (2006); Morgan (2015) 337-40.
[247] Grimal (1980).

statesmanlike and most daring in resolve"[248] – his point presumably being that he had exceeded them both. Plautus makes the parallelism explicit when he has the slave Tranio say:

> *Alexandrum magnum atque Agathoclem aiunt maximas*
> *duo res gessisse: quid mihi fiet tertio,*
> *qui solus facio facinora immortalia?*
>
> They say that Alexander the Great and Agathocles are the two who achieved the greatest things. What will there be for me – the third – as I accomplish immortal deeds by myself?
>
> Plaut.*Mostell*.85-87[249]

If the joke is that the slave is saying something more appropriate to a general, then this corroborates Polybios' anecdote about Scipio Africanus. With the Roman achievements in the Late Republic, this parallel became much less necessary in order to assert Roman military superiority over the Greeks and there is no explicit statement of it in Justin or later Latin literature. For Diodoros, this parallelism between Alexander and Agathokles, which was present in his source material from the time of Agathokles, reflected broad trends in Sicilian self-representation, and reinforced by Roman discourse, dovetailed neatly with his own goal of emphasising the significance of Sicily, which I discussed in my first chapter.[250] The representation of Agathokles as a military leader thus provides a clear case in which we can trace relatively clearly how the discourse evolved between Agathokles' own day and the time of our surviving sources.

The accounts we have, therefore, provide products of an important discourse on generalship that goes back to Agathokles' own time. The key moment that characterised Agathokles' daring brilliance for later generations was the decision to invade Africa when he had been defeated in

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[248] Polyb.15.35.6: πραγματικωτάτους ἄνδρας γεγονέναι καὶ σὺν νῷ τολμηροτάτους…
[249] Cf. Plaut.*Mostell*.119.
[250] See p.24-5.

Sicily and the bold decision to burn his ships on arrival so that there was no going back. The story was popular with writers for the paradox that each side ended up with their capital besieged by the other. We saw in the previous chapter how Diodoros took this theme and used it to make points about the mutability of fortune. But he also takes the time to emphasise it as a brilliant, bold, and Machiavellian act – as do many other authors. Polybios emphasises it among the achievements that mean that Agathokles deserved better treatment than Timaios had given him.[251] The episode forms about a third of Justin's whole account and appears in Polyainos' set of stratagems even though it does not concern faithlessness, which is his main theme for Agathokles' career.[252] Memory of this episode endured in Late Antiquity, when authors like Eusebios could refer to Agathokles as a learned way of saying "to take the fight to the enemy."[253] The episode demonstrates a certain sort of boldness and ability to manipulate the morale of his troops which is favoured in Greek descriptions of generals generally. There are a number of parallels to the burning of the ships found elsewhere in Greek literature.[254] Diodoros explicitly attempts to equate it with Alexander's dismissal of his fleet at Miletos and his decision to place the river at his troops' backs in the Battle of the Granikos.[255] It was this act, then, that secured Agathokles his reputation for generalship for later generations; this, rather than the eventual defeat, was probably what Agathokles himself emphasised. Similar acts were attributed to the Roman commanders Fabius Maximus and Cato the Elder,[256] illustrating Agathokles' relevance to Roman discourse on generalship.

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[251] Polyb.12.15.7 & 15.35.5.
[252] Just.*Epit.*22.2-4; Polyaen.5.3.5.
[253] Euseb.*Praep.Evang.*14.6.13
[254] e.g.Thuc.3.85.3 (Korkyran exiles); Polyaen.5.25.1 (Timarchos of Miletos).
[255] Diod.Sic.17.23.2-3. The latter is unlikely to be an accurate representation of the Granikos: Hammond (1980) & Devine (1986), but what is important here is the idea that removing avenues of escape is good generalship.
[256] Fabius Maximus: Liv.9.23, Frontin.*Str.*1.11.21; Cato: App.*Hisp.*8.40.

However, Agathokles' reputation for generalship was not limited to this episode. Three short stratagems recorded by Diodoros give evidence for further discussion of him as a strategist, able to create the impression of forces that he did not actually have, in various ways. During an attack on Gela, Agathokles and his men are trapped in "a tight spot" (τινος στενοῦ τόπου). He fights brilliantly, but is wounded seven times and exhausted. He orders his men to blow trumpets in front of the surrounding parts of the wall, causing the Geloans to split their forces and enabling his troops' escape.[257] Agathokles' first battle in Africa sees him seriously outnumbered. He gives the unarmed men fake shields made from shield protectors stretched out with sticks, so that the force appears to contain more soldiers than it actually does.[258] While Agathokles was besieging Hadrumetum, his base in Tunis is attacked and he is called to relieve it. Marching by night into the mountains he lights large fires, convincing the Carthaginians at Tunis that he is on his way to relieve Tunis and the Hadrumetines that reinforcements are approaching.[259] The distance between Tunis and Hadrumetum (around 150 km) makes this seem extraordinary, but if the narrative has telescoped events somewhat it need not be impossible. The creation of fake armies using sound, costumes, and fire is a mainstay of Greco-Roman stratagems,[260] independently occurs in narratives elsewhere,[261] and is firmly attested in real life.[262] These events may have taken place. But there is also a clear literary dimension to these anecdotes. The first anecdote parallels the foolhardy bravery of Alexander, especially the assault on the Mallian citadel.[263] Similar stories are recorded for a large number of other generals, reflecting wider literary tropes of generalship, which emphasise stratagems.[264] A fourth stratagem describes how Agathokles protected his siege

[257] Diod.Sic.19.4.6-7.
[258] Diod.Sic.20.11.2.
[259] Diod.Sic.20.17.3-5.
[260] E.g. Polyaen.1.8; 1.32.3; 1.40.8; 1.46.1, etc. Fake shields: Frontin.*Str.*1.7.6 (Spartakos).
[261] E.g. Battle of Hingakaka, c.1807 in the Waikato: Sole (2005) 138.
[262] E.g. WWI evacuation of Gallipoli: Broadbent (2005) 260.
[263] Ar.*Anab.*6.4-10.
[264] Wheeler (1988), esp.93-110.

weapons from the defenders of Utica by nailing captured Uticans to them as unwilling human shields.[265] The picture that emerges from these anecdotes is of a conversation which universally acknowledged Agathokles' boldness and cleverness as a commander, but could be ambivalent about whether to view it as a product of brilliance or cruelty.

2.2.1. Mutinies

The other theme of the burning of the ships episode, Agathokles' ability to control his men's morale also appears elsewhere in narratives on him, particularly in the accounts of the mutinies which he faced in Africa. There are three mutiny accounts in the sources: two in Diodoros and one in Justin, corresponding to two events, one in 309/8 BC before the arrival of Ophellas and another in 307/6 BC, shortly before Agathokles left Africa for good. The divergence between the accounts suggests that they can be viewed as products of discussion about the success of the African War.

The first mutiny is recorded by Diodoros, after Agathokles' first successful year in Africa and before the Battle in the Zouphonian Country and the appeal to Ophellas.[266] According to Diodoros, Lykiskos, one of the commanders, became drunk and mocked Agathokles. He bore it in good humour, but the incident angered Agathokles' son Archagathos who confronted Lykiskos later in the evening and killed him with a hunting spear after he accused Archagathos of sleeping with his own step-mother. The other commanders staged a mutiny, but Agathokles appeared in front of them in the clothes of a private individual and delivered a speech which culminated in him unsheathing his sword as if to kill himself. The dismayed soldiers stopped him, make him put his "royal clothes" (τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐσθῆτα) back on and together they raided the unsuspecting Carthaginians. This episode is absent from Justin's account and most scholars have attributed this to Justin's reliance on a different source which did not include this episode – usually they attribute

[265] Diod.Sic.20.54.2-7.
[266] Diod.Sic.20.33-34.

the account of the mutiny to Douris.[267] But the absence may result from Trogus and Justin's desire to avoid superfluity, which I discussed in chapter 1 and might have led one of them to conclude that their account of Agathokles needed only the final mutiny that Agathokles faced.

That final mutiny is recorded by both Diodoros and Justin and plays an important part in both their accounts of Agathokles' final departure from Africa.[268] In Diodoros' account, Agathokles decides the war in Africa is no longer winnable and decides to leave, but is betrayed to the troops by his son Archagathos whom he had intended to abandon with the troops in Africa. When the troops see Agathokles in chains they feel sorry for him and let him go. The troops (inexplicably) kill Archagathos and his brother in anger at Agathokles' escape. Justin describes this mutiny somewhat differently, placing it after Agathokles' return to Africa, but before the final battle with the Carthaginians. This mutiny is resolved by Agathokles' "seductive words" (*blandis verbis*). Justin separates the mutiny from the departure from Africa, which he places after a final defeat in battle against the Carthaginians. He has Agathokles flee by night with Archagathos out of fear of the troops and says that Archagathos was captured and killed during the flight (which seems more logical than Diodoros' account).

All the mutiny accounts themselves showcase Agathokles' ability to master a situation using his cleverness and rhetorical ability. Such speechcraft was a central aspect of Greek and Roman representations of good generals, reflecting both the central place of rhetoric in Graeco-Roman culture and the importance of army morale to ancient armies, which were plagued by defection and desertion.[269] The theme can be taken back to the speeches of encouragement that the Homeric

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[267] Gsell (1921) 3.39, n.2; Consolo Langher (1998a) 102, 111: drawing especial attention to the costume change; Consolo Langher (2000) 155.
[268] Diod.Sic.28.68.3-69.3; Just.*Epit.*22.8.4-13.
[269] Van Wees (2004) 108-13. See e.g.Xen.*Anab.*1.3-4, 5.6-7. *Ages*.2.8. Cf.Polyaen.5.2.1; App.*Hisp.*7.34-6.

heroes give each other.[270] They are part of the broader depiction of Agathokles in accordance with general Greek and Roman ideas about generalship.

The narratives also make more specific connections. Agathokles' masterful handling of the mutinies compares favourably with Alexander's petulant tantrum before his army at Hyphasis which achieved nothing.[271] A connection with Alexander might be reinforced by the way the first mutiny breaks out. The way Lykiskos baits Agathokles and the way Archagathos responds – even the two stage nature of the encounter – suggests Alexander's murder of Kleitos the Black, which was already an important feature of accounts of Alexander.[272] Agathokles even surpasses Alexander, refusing to rise to Lykiskos' barbs. The final resolution of the episode, in which Agathokles steps into camp unarmed and promises to die if the soldiers wish it, recalls the famous episode, reported by Diodoros, Polyainos and Aelian, in which Gelon entered an armed assembly of the Syracusans after his victory over the Carthaginians without arms and invited the Syracusans to kill him if he had displeased them, who responded by acclaiming him as their leader.[273] Although the circumstances of the two events are different, the story forges a link at this critical juncture between Agathokles and the most positive military and political figure in Sicilian history. The way that the account places Agathokles within the broad literary model of the good general, while simultaneously linking him to the foremost representatives of both Hellenistic kingship and Sicilian autocracy, reflects the priorities of both Diodoros and the broader discourse on Agathokles of which he was a part. It is therefore difficult (and somewhat pointless) to establish whether the specific links identified here existed in earlier accounts or were created by Diodoros. What is

[270] E.g. Hom.*Il*.8.93-6, 12.310-30.
[271] Diod.Sic.17.93-5; Strabo 15.1.27; Curt.Ruf.9.2.1-3.19; Ar.*Anab*.5.25-29; Plut.*Alex*.62.
[272] Aristoboulos FGrH 139 F 29=Arr.*Anab*.4.8.9; Bosworth (1995) 2.51 suggests additional early sources.
[273] Diod.Sic.11.26.5; Polyaen.1.27.1; Ael.*VH*.6.11 & 13.37.

important is the way that this account illustrates how easily and seamlessly those different connotations could be placed alongside one another.

The different versions of the second mutiny suggest a specific debate centring on the circumstances of Agathokles' departure from Africa, which was significant for assessing the success or failure of the war as a whole.[274] Agathokles and his supporters presented the Carthaginian War as a victory which justified his power. Later in this thesis, I will present the numismatic evidence for this representation and I will argue that it was a major factor in his assumption of the royal title.[275] Such a presentation required that the war be viewed as an essentially defensive war, in which the actual result (the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*) was always the aim of Agathokles and the Syracusans. They could also stress the amount of money received from the Carthaginians at the conclusion of the peace, as I will argue Agathokles' coin iconography does.[276] If Agathokles' opponents wanted to undercut his legitimacy, they had to present an alternative perspective on the war. The conflict in his sources that Diodoros found about the size of the Carthaginian indemnity (three hundred silver talents of gold according to some unnamed source(s) or a hundred and fifty talents and two hundred thousand *medimnoi* of grain, according to Timaios) indicates that this is exactly what his opponents did. Quibbling about the size of the indemnity would not overturn Agathokles' presentation of the war, but it could form part of a wider revisionist account: if the African Expedition was presented as part of a war of conquest, then Agathokles' abandonment of it reflected a serious defeat. The death of Agathokles' sons could be made to support the argument that all had not gone according to Agathokles' plan. Because the African Expedition was the key example of their Agathokles' excellence, his supporters had to counter this representation without

[274] Consolo Langher (1998a), 44-52. Cf. Kosmetatou (2003), 175: "just as the qualities of leaders are constructed, so too are beliefs about the successes and failures of their policies."
[275] See p.142-3.
[276] See pp.121, 143.

downplaying the importance of the war as a whole. The easiest way to do that was to absolve Agathokles of responsibility for the departure. I think we can see this debate reflected in the divergent accounts of this mutiny. Thus, Diodoros' version has the army and Archagathos turn against Agathokles, excusing him for abandoning both of them. We have already seen that Diodoros' account also stresses Archagathos' responsibility for the first mutiny. The account also emphasises that the expedition's turn for the worse occurred under Archagathos' watch, while Agathokles was away in Sicily.[277] By contrast, Justin's order of events, putting the mutiny immediately after Agathokles' return from Sicily and making the turning point of the war the subsequent defeat of Agathokles' forces under his personal command, gives a different picture. These sort of broad narrative differences are the sort of thing that Diodoros and Justin are likely to have taken from earlier sources; it is tempting to try attributing them to specific authors, but for the reasons stated in the previous chapter, I am not going to.[278] More important than the specific authors that Diodoros and Justin took their accounts from is the evidence they furnish for a debate about the very nature of Agathokles' success as a military leader, going back to Agathokles' own lifetime, one that remained relevant after his death because of the importance of the African Expedition to his subsequent reputation.

2.3. Agathokles the Tyrant

Alongside his reputation as a great general, Agathokles also enjoyed a reputation as an abhorrent tyrannical monster. In chapter one, we saw that this was an important aspect of his representation by Diodoros, Justin, and Polyainos. We also saw that it predated them; many of the unique features of Diodoros' representation of Agathokles, in particular, reflected his efforts to synthesise this part

[277] Diod.Sic.20.55.5, 20.57.3-4 & 20.59-61. The vilification of Archagathos as an angry, power-hungry incompetent in an illicit relationship with his step-mother might have gained further currency from the role of Archagathos' son in the succession crisis which destroyed Agathokles' realm in 289.
[278] See p.39-40.

of Agathokles' reputation with the representation of him as a glorious general which I have just been discussing. Timaios' personal hostility played a major role in transmitting this reputation to the surviving sources, but he was not solely responsible for creating it. At the start of this chapter I pointed out the sheer number of enemies that Agathokles had during his lifetime. For some of these, like the Syracusan exiles and Agathokles' opponents in the other cities of Sicily, the presentation of a hostile narrative was a matter of life and death. It happens that Athenaios preserves a reflection of this discourse which is independent of Timaios, a comic fragment from Demetrios' *Areopagite*. Based on its internal references, this fragment belongs to the 280s or 270s. In it, a cook boasts of his association with tyrants:

> ὅσον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς τέχνης εἴργασμ' ἐγώ,
> οὐδεὶς ὑποκριτής ἐσθ' ὅλως εἰργασμένος.
> καπνιζομένη τυραννὶς αὕτη 'σθ' ἡ τέχνη.
> ἀβυρτακοποιὸς παρὰ Σέλευκον ἐγενόμην,
> παρ' Ἀγαθοκλεῖ <δὲ> πρῶτος εἰσήνεγκ' ἐγὼ
> τῷ Σικελιώτῃ <τὴν> τυραννικὴν φακῆν
> τὸ μέγιστον οὐκ εἴρηκα· Λαχάρους,
> ὅτ' ἦν ὁ λιμός, ἑστιῶντος τοὺς φίλους,
> ἀνάληψιν ἐποίησ' εἰσενέγκας κάππαριν.
>
> With my art I have achieved such things as no actor has ever achieved. This art is a smoky tyranny. I was sauce-maker to Seleukos; to Agathokles the Sicilian, I first served the tyrannical lentil soup. I have not said the greatest thing yet: when Lachares was hosting his friends, but was out of supplies, I came up with a solution by serving a caper.
>
> Demetrios II, F1 (KA)=Ath.9.70.

Beyond demonstrating that the discourse goes back beyond Timaios, this fantastic passage demonstrates a major contention of this chapter: the ability of contemporary observers to discuss

Sicilian autocrats, Hellenistic monarchs, and mainland Greek tyrants with the same tropes.[279] It uses the same association of the tyrant with food eaten for pleasure rather than sustenance (*opson*), which had such a long history in Athenian drama and literature, to characterise Agathokles in the west, King Seleukos in the east and the home-grown tyrant-demagogue Lachares in Athens.[280] This is the only case where it is possible to demonstrate the existence of this discourse in Agathokles' own time, but the rest of this section will show how many other tropes of tyranny, well-established before Agathokles' own time are represented in our surviving source material. I break these down into three major themes: oath-breaking, massacres, and physicality.

2.3.1. Oath-breaking

For Polyainos in particular, Agathokles' primary characteristic was his faithlessness. The first 'stratagem' he tells about him is:

> Ἀγαθοκλῆς, Σικελίας τύραννος, ὀμόσας τοῖς πολεμίοις παρέβη τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ κατασφάξας τοὺς ἁλόντας ἐπιχλευάζων πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἔλεγεν "δειπνήσαντες ἐξεμέσωμεν τοὺς ὅρκους".
>
> Agathokles, tyrant of Sicily, swore an oath to his enemies and then broke the oaths and murdered the prisoners, saying to his friends flippantly, "we've had dinner, now let's vomit up our oaths."
>
> Polyaen.5.3.1

Polyainos' presentation continues in this vein. It is a caricature, in which Agathokles has been reduced to a single characteristic and Polyainos was probably not concerned with whether it was an accurate representation of Agathokles so much as a useful lesson. But earlier examples of the same theme are numerous: Agathokles sends his men into Gela as if to serve as a garrison against

[279] Cf. Arist.*Pol*.1310b.16, 1311a.36, linking Kypselids and Peisistratidai with Dionysios and Philip II.
[280] On *opson*, see Davidson (1997) 3-35 & 278-305; on Lachares, see Habicht (1997) 82-7; Dreyer (1999) 17-110.

Hamilcar, then uses them to take over Gela;[281] Agathokles promises safety to the Messanians, then murders them all;[282] Agathokles announces all who wish to leave Syracuse rather than face Carthaginian siege may do so, then kills them all.[283]

Philip, Alexander and the Diadochoi were presumably duplicitous men and some similar stories are attached to them,[284] but not nearly as many. Dionysios too has a reputation for dealing in bad faith, for instance using supplies provisioned to him by Rhegion and Himera in order to take them.[285] On the whole, however, these stories have a different tenor – they stress Dionysios' cunning. Agathokles simply ignores promises without compunction. This characterisation probably entered the historiographical tradition with Timaios, who probably had abundant material to work with. Two points were defining: the coup d'état which began with the massacre of the Six Hundred in the Timoleonteion, in contravention of the Great Oath which Agathokles had earlier sworn,[286] and the murder of Ophellas.[287] The flight from Africa might be a third.[288] These breaches of faith had left a great number of victims, whose relatives and supporters had ample reason to stress Agathokles' faithlessness. Importantly, faithlessness is a common vein in Greek discourse about tyrants generally. In Greek thought, tyrants often rose to power by convincing the state to grant them a bodyguard or other special powers and then using that grant illegitimately in order to seize supreme authority. Prominent examples include Peisistratos, Deiokes the Mede, Plato's ideal tyrant.[289] But the trope was particularly strongly associated with Sicilian rulers. In the Sicilian

[281] Diod.Sic.19.107.4.
[282] Diod.Sic.19.102.4-6.
[283] Diod.Sic.20.4.6-7; Polyaen.5.3.5; differently, Just.*Epit.*22.4.3-4. Note general statement at Diod.Sic.20.89.5.
[284] e.g. Diod.Sic.18.7.8-9; Plut.*Eum*.12.
[285] Front. 3.4.3-4; Polyaen.5.2.10; see also 5.2.11.
[286] Diod.Sic.19.6.4; Polyaen.5.3.8; differently, Just.*Epit.*22.2.3-10.
[287] Diod.Sic.20.42.3-5; Just.*Epit.*22.7.5; Polyaen.5.3.4.
[288] Diod.Sic.20.69; Just.*Epit.*22.8.8-12
[289] Peisistratos: Hdt.1.59.4; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*14; Deiokes: Hdt.1.59.4, 1.96; Ideal tyrant: Plato.*Rep.*8.566.

context variations of the story are told of Phalaris, Panaitos of Leontinoi, Theron of Akragas, Tyndarides of Syracuse, and Dionysios I.[290] Agathokles' murder of the Six Hundred as he marshalled them for an expedition is a manifestation of the same trope and other examples of him breaking oaths emphasise this tyrannical illegitimacy. But we can also see an active effort to avoid being characterised in this way behind the report that Agathokles never took a bodyguard at all.[291] As we saw in chapter one, Diodoros feels a need to deal with this fact in order to maintain his characterisation of Agathokles as a tyrant. These stories about Agathokles' faithlessness thus reflect his placement within a Sicilian and mainland Greek discourse about tyranny which was highly theorised and stereotyped.

2.3.2. Massacres

Almost as much as faithlessness, accounts of Agathokles are characterised by vast amounts of blood. For example, when Agathokles learns that his children have been killed in Africa, Agathokles has his brother march the murderers' relatives down to the beach at Syracuse, where they are all killed, including senile old men and infants. The blood-red sea carries the story abroad.[292] I do not think it is necessary to belabour the fact that mass slaughter is negative. Here I look at two of these stories, the Rape of Segesta (Diod.Sic.20.71) and the party of the *krokotos* (Diod.Sic.20.63; Polyaen.5.3.3).

Diodoros records the Rape of Segesta after Agathokles' return from Africa. Because it is very unfavourable to Agathokles, the story is usually attributed to Timaios. According to Diodoros, Agathokles marched into Segesta, an allied city, and gruesomely tortured the population for money, cutting off the breasts of rich women and forcing them to miscarry, tying people to a white

[290] Phalaris: Arist.*Rh.*2.1393b, Polyaen.5.1.1; Panaitos of Leontinoi: Polyaen.5.42.1; Theron of Akragas: Polyaen.1.28.2; Tyndarides of Syracuse: Diod.Sic.11.86.4-5; Dionysios: Polyaen.5.2.2; Diod.Sic.13.92.
[291] Diod.Sic.19.9.7, 20.63.3.
[292] Diod.Sic.20.72.1-5.

hot bronze couch. All the men were killed and the other inhabitants were sold into slavery. Agathokles then refounded the city as "Dikaiopolis" for a group of "deserters" and reorganised the community in some way.[293] The goal of the story is clearly to portray Agathokles as an inhuman monster. Significantly, it achieves this by comparing him explicitly and unfavourably to Phalaris, the archetypal Sicilian tyrant. Diodoros says that Agathokles' bronze couch was worse than Phalaris' bull, since the latter at least gave its victim some privacy! Once again, Agathokles is associated with earlier Sicilian rulers.

The second episode takes place while Agathokles is in Sicily, during the war with Carthage. Determined to discover traitors, Agathokles holds a magnificent feast, encouraging conviviality and free speech. He recalls those who inadvertently reveal themselves to be traitors in their cups for another feast and slaughters them all.[294] Polyainos adds that at this feast he distracted the guests from their fate by entering dressed in a *krokotos*, wearing a *tarantinon*, playing the *kithara*, and dancing.[295] The incident thus ties in to the theme of faithlessness discussed above, but also recalls the stock image of the dancing tyrant. Douris says that, despite his high position, Polyperchon would put on a *krokotos* and Sikyonian shoes and dance when he was drunk.[296] Much later, Antiochos III is said to have been dissuaded from a dancing contest by the wit and Homeric scholarship of Hegesianax, and Ptolemy XII Auletes was criticised for staging and participating in dancing contests in the palace.[297] The significance of this image is clear from the story of Hippokleides, who danced his marriage away in Sikyon,[298] from the prominence of the effeminate

[293] Diod.Sic.20.71.1-5. There is archaeological evidence that Segesta was razed and rebuilt in the third century, but no certainty that this happened under Agathokles: Tusa (1991) 17; Camerata Scovazzo (1996) 88; Camerata Scovazzo (2008) 13.
[294] Diod.Sic.20.63.1 & 6. Consolo Langher (1998a) 109-10 attributes to Douris.
[295] Polyaen.5.3.3.
[296] Douris FGrH 76 F12=Ath.4.42.
[297] Demetrios of Skepsis in Gaede (1880) F7=Ath.4.155b; Strabo 17.1.11.
[298] Hdt.6.129.

krokotos,[299] and from the link with feasting and drinking. Polybios portrays exactly this sort of revelry as frivolity unbecoming in people of importance, with his story of Flamininus and Deinokrates of Messana.[300] The story thus recalls a common trope of the political leader who fails to give full attention to his duties. Furthermore, as a form of Bacchic frenzy, the dancing represents a lack of self-control and surrender to pleasure, which Greek discourse viewed as inappropriate and dangerous in any man but particularly in a ruler – not to mention that the source of Agathokles' pleasure in this case is shedding of the blood of his fellow citizens.[301] The widespread use of this trope, then, indicates the continued use of old tyrannical tropes to characterise Agathokles and the other Hellenistic kings.

2.3.3. Physicality

A final set of anecdotes and themes emphasise Agathokles' exceptional strength and appearance, his physical body and his indulgence of its desires. These anecdotes form a bridge between the depiction of Agathokles as a military leader and the depiction of him as a monstrous tyrant.

Diodoros reports that when Agathokles first entered military service he impressed everyone because he comfortably wore armour which was too heavy for other soldiers to bear.[302] The idea that rulers ought to be bigger, stronger, and more physically perfect than normal mortals is a natural one. Within the Greek tradition, Agathokles' massive armour instantly links to mythological heroes, whose arms are enormous and whose strength exceeds that of modern mortals.[303] The importance of athletics and athletic contest as a venue for the legitimation of archaic and classical Greek aristocrats is also related; note especially how Olympic victories entitled victors to greater

[299] Dover (1989) 75-6, (1993) 39-40.
[300] Polyb.23.5.4-13.
[301] Davidson (1997) 278-83.
[302] Diod.Sic.19.3.2.
[303] E.g. the Homeric ἀμφιβρότη ἀσπίς: *Il.*2.389; 11.32.

rights than ordinary citizens and, as the example of Kylon of Athens shows, greater ambitions.[304] The idea that kings are superhumanly strong continued to be a commonplace for the founding fathers of the Hellenistic period: compare Alexander, Pyrrhos and especially Seleukos, who was said to have wrestled an escaped bull to the ground.[305] It endures in descriptions of later rulers too, such as Hieron II and Augustus,[306] and is also prominent in the visual arts.[307] Great size and strength are thus strongly linked to ideas of the right to rule.

However, size and strength could also be negative characteristics, correlated with unquenchable appetites and a refusal to bow to law and custom. Herakles and Polyphemos are obvious mythological examples.[308] The fact that the latter was associated with Sicily by the fourth century was significant. In Timaios' account of the dream of the woman of Himera, she sees Dionysios, "an enormous red-headed man," chained at Zeus' feet.[309] The drift of Timaios' words is that Dionysios is some kind of barbaric monster. Sanders similarly argues that Philoxenos of Kythera's lost *Cyclops* was a parody of Dionysios – again, great size taken to indicate brutish monstrosity, wildness, and uncontrollability.[310] Justin's opening remarks on Agathokles: "who followed the earlier Dionysius in scale,"[311] could be read as indicating great size, but it seems likely that scale (*magnitudini*) should be understood metaphorically as "significance" or "importance."

But that this theme of monstrosity and wildness was applied to Agathokles is suggested by another anecdote. Diodoros and Aelian claim that Agathokles was said to wear a wreath rather than a

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[304] Hdt. 5.71; Palmer (1982); Morgan (2015) 9-10, 69-86.
[305] Alexander: Plut.*Alex.*4.4; Pyrrhos: Plut.*Pyrrh.*8.1; Seleukos: App.*Syr.*9.57.
[306] Hiero II: Just.*Epit.*23.4.14; Augustus: Suet.*Aug.*79.
[307] Smith (1991) 19-20.
[308] On Herakles: Eur.*Alc.*747-72; Polyphemos: Hom.*Od.*9.110-550.
[309] Timaios FGrH 566 F29=Schol.Aeschin.2.10: πυρρός τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ μέγας; Cf. Val.Max.1.7.6; Sordi (1984).
[310] Vattuone (1983) 60; Sanders (1987) 15-7.
[311] Just.*Epit.*22.1.1: *qui magnitudini prioris Dionysii successit*.

diadem because it better hid his baldness.[312] Long, thick hair is an important feature in depictions of Alexander and the Diadochoi as kings – a late but frequently cited example is the Berlin Attalos statue, which received a stone 'wig' to supplement its rather thin head of hair when he took the kingship.[313] This depiction of kings with long, thick hair helped propagate a youthful, heroic-divine ideal, contrasting them with regular mortals who are depicted with short hair and associating them with the gods, generally depicted with long-hair.[314] It is significant that Agathokles is being held up to a Hellenistic royal standard. That he is found wanting is also significant, because it can be linked to charges of theatricality made against other monarchs, especially Demetrios Poliorketes, of seeking to imitate the appearance of Alexander/the royal ideal, without replicating his nature.[315] However the social premium on long hair was not a Hellenistic innovation. It had aristocratic implications already in the Classical period, when the Spartan *homoioi* and their Athenian admirers used it to mark themselves out from the masses; Aristotle interprets it as a mark of a leisure class.[316] Thus, Agathokles' baldness reinforces the story of his low birth. Finally, baldness had long been object of ridicule and disdain in Greek culture, associated with satyrs and their wild, uncontrollable appetites for food, wine, and sex.[317] In this sense, Agathokles' baldness opposed him not just to the royal ideal, but to the general Greek masculine ideal of *sophrosyne*.

The most clearly represented of Agathokles' appetites is lust and sex, which brings me back to the theme of physical excellence with which I began this section. Both Diodoros and Justin stress Agathokles' beauty.[318] Justin accuses Agathokles of generally engaging in *stuprum* and being "well-

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[312] Diod.Sic.20.54.1; Ael.*VH*.11.4. The story is re-appropriated for Julius Caesar in Suet.*Vit.Jul.*45.2.
[313] Smith (1988) 79-81; Ma (2003a) 178 quips "Hellenistic kingship is good for your hair."
[314] Smith (1988) 47.
[315] Plut.*Demetr.*41.3-5.
[316] Arist.*Rhet.*1.9.26; David (1992); Davidson (1997) 61-2. Cf. readings of the (generally long-haired) *kouros* as a symbol of aristocracy: Stewart (1997) 63-70; Quinn (2007).
[317] Ar.*Nub.*540; Pl.*Rep.*495e; *IG* IV^2 1.121; Dover (1989) 97, 102, 124; Ogden (1997) 75-9; Stewart (1997) 187-91, the "satyr is both a foil and a subhuman antitype to the tightly disciplined kouros"; Padgett (2000).
[318] Diod.Sic.19.2.6; Just.*Epit.*22.1.3.

known to both sexes".[319] Both Diodoros and Justin highlight Agathokles' sexual relationship with General Damas and his widow as the means by which he first rose to prominence.[320] The two sources preserve this in different versions (Justin's is more damning). Agathokles' closeness to Damas and marriage to his widow would almost inevitably lead to rumours of sexual impropriety.[321] Timaios had already made Agathokles' sexual impropriety a general theme, according to Polybios.[322] Two fragments of his work dwell on it. Polybios describes Timaios' accusations of sexual impropriety, which included having the mourning wife declare "What did not I do to you? What did not you do to me?"[323] Another fragment comes from Pseudo-Longinus, who was interested in critiquing Timaios' written style, so presumably reflects the substance of Timaios' account accurately:

> φησὶ γοῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοκλέους κατὰ τὴν ἀνεψιὰν ἑτέρῳ δεδομένην ἐκ τῶν ἀνακαλυπτηρίων ἁρπάσαντα ἀπελθεῖν· "ὃ τίς ἂν ἐποίησεν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κόρας, μὴ πόρνας ἔχων;"
>
> Indeed, he says about Agathokles that, when his cousin was being given to another man, he snatched her from the wedding ceremony and carried her off, "who could have done this with pupils/maidens in his eyes, unless they were whores?"
>
> Timaios *FGrH* 566 F122=[Longinus], *Subl.*4.5.[324]

These tales about sexual impropriety are negative illustrations of Agathokles' lack of restraint and the sort of scurrilous tales which perennially occupy popular discourse about the powerful. But they are more than just scurrility. Enthusiasm for sex in contravention of behavioural norms

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[319] Just.*Epit.*22.1.12: *utrumque sexum famosus…* cf.Suet.*Jul*.52; Diog.Laert.4.49.
[320] Diod.Sic.19.3.1; Just.*Epit.*22.1.3.
[321] Consolo Langher (1998a) xiii.
[322] Polyb.12.15.2-3 & 9; Diod.Sic.21.17 apparently reacts to the same thing; Consolo Langher (1998a) 17.
[323] Timaios FGrH 566 F124b=Polyb.12.15.2-3: τί δ᾽ οὐκ ἐγὼ σέ; τί δ᾽ οὐκ ἐμὲ σύ. Commentary: Vattuone (1983) 4-22, who also identifies one of Timaios' slurs (τριόρχης) as a learned reference to Aristophanes' *Wasps*.
[324] Text after Iahn, Vahlen & Blume (1967)

symbolises a general tyrannical refusal to be controlled by the norms of the community.[325] The seizure of women in contempt of other citizens' rights over them was a powerful act of *hybris*, in which Agathokles was shown asserting his status over the community by violently dishonouring it.[326] It also implied the tyrant's inability to control himself, which implied an inability to control others. All these elements are paralleled in Plutarch's representation of Agathokles' son-in-law, Demetrios Poliorketes. He commits *hybris* against the Athenian community when he requires them to pay for his concubines' unguents, like Persian subject cities support members of the royal court, and his debauchery on the acropolis actively endanger the community as well as insulting it. His sexual acts also demonstrate his lack of control over himself and incapacity to rule others: he is represented as "conquered" by the courtesan Lamia and his lust is compared to a sickness.[327] The stories of Agathokles thus conform to widespread tropes, which are also applied to his contemporaries. They were not new, as shown by the example of Alkibiades, whose sexual behaviour similarly leads him to violate Athenian norms and laws and whose lusts for Sokrates and others are represented as overwhelming his self-control.[328]

Stories like these emphasise the king's raw power while attacking its legitimacy by demonstrating the absence of two key virtues of a legitimate ruler: *sophrosyne* and *dikaosyne*.[329] Aristotle asserts that a good monarch would be in control of his own desires and act to protect the members of his community from *hybris*.[330] The same two virtues are emphasised by Isokrates, and his central piece of evidence for King Nikokles of Salamis' possession of these virtues demonstrates the importance

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[325] View of passive sexual role: Dover (1989) 67-8, 81-91, 102-6 (considering this passage); Davidson (1997) 175-81.
[326] Cohen (1991) 133-49; Fisher (1992) 27-31, 62-6, 128-9.
[327] Plut.*Demetr.*19.4-5, 27.1-2, 24. Ogden (1999) 266-9, evidence gathered at 280-1, discussion of methodological issues at 218-26.
[328] Alkibiades: Davidson (1997) 175-81; Gribble (1999) 134-5, 217-30. Evidence collected in Littman (1970).
[329] Ogden (1999) 266-9.
[330] Arist.*Pol.*5.1310b40-1311a7.

of sexual propriety in discussions of them: it is the fact that the king only has sex with his wife.[331] The stories of Agathokles' sexual impropriety thus belong to an important in strad in discourse on rulership. All of them can be paralleled in Plutarch's criticism of Agathokles' son-in-law, Demetrios. Thus, the stories of Agathokles' sexual impropriety repurpose narratives of Agathokles' physical beauty and superiority, in order to attack his authority, painting him as an enemy of the community rather than a protector and ultimately incapable of ruling himself or anyone else.

The discourse on Agathokles as a tyrant thus proves to be in close communication with the discourse on Agathokles as a military commander: aspects of his presentation as a strong, daring soldier could be reused to present him as a monstrous mass-murderer lacking control over his passions. Transmission in the opposite direction seems possible too; Polyainos' focus on Agathokles' faithlessness asks whether some tyrannical behaviours make a general better.

2.5. Conclusion

I have shown in this chapter that there was a discourse around Agathokles. This focussed on the types of the glorious general and the terrible tyrant, but these two poles were in contact with one another; ideas used to present him as the former could be repurposed for the latter characterisation and vice versa. Both parts of this characterisation went back to his own lifetime – the former to Agathokles' own self-representation, the latter to his enemies. Because the lost historians included elements on both sides of that contemporary divide, both perspectives became part of the historiography of Agathokles. This discourse was perpetuated in subsequent generations for a number of reasons. Some of these factors were historiographical, like Polybios' hostility to Timaios. Others were political, such as the Romans' use of Agathokles for talking about their own conflicts with the Carthaginians and the Macedonians and Hieron II's use of him as a

[331] Isoc.2.36-41.

precedent for his own authority. Additionally, the importance of the themes of generalship and tyranny in Greek and Latin discourse ensured that Agathokles continued to be discussed as an example of them both. Later historians, such as our main sources, Diodoros, Justin, and Polyainos, had to decide how to use this discourse to present a coherent view of Agathokles for their purposes. I described how this impacted on their presentation of him, in chapter one.

Over the course of this chapter, we have repeatedly seen that a number of links to Agathokles' Sicilian predecessors were embedded in the discourse about him, such as the motif of the bees which recalls Dionysios and Agathokles' presentation of himself in rags to his troops which recalls Gelon. These sit alongside the explicit connections and comparisons that our sources make with Phalaris and Dionysios.[332] The rulers of Syracusan rulers were regularly linked to one another in this way, as shown by Ps.Demetrios' explanation of historical analogy:

> ἐπειδὴ ἀηδῶς ἀκούουσιν οἱ δυνάσται καὶ δυνάστιδες τὰ αὐτῶν ἁμαρτήματα, παραινοῦντες αὐτοῖς μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας ἐροῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἑτέρους ψέξομέν τινας τὰ ὅμοια πεποιηκότας, οἷον πρὸς Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον κατὰ Φαλάριδος τοῦ τυράννου ἐροῦμεν καὶ τῆς Φαλάριδος ἀποτομίας· ἢ ἐπαινεσόμεθά τινας Διονυσίῳ τὰ ἐναντία πεποιηκότας, οἷον Γέλωνα ἢ Ἱέρωνα, ὅτι πατράσιν ἐῴκεσαν τῆς Σικελίας καὶ διδασκάλοις
>
> Since lords and ladies do not enjoy hearing about their mistakes, we will not tell them that they have diverged from the correct path when we advise them. Instead, we will censure other people for having done the same thing – so, in the presence of Dionysios the tyrant, we will speak against Phalaris the tyrant and Phalaris' savagery, or we will praise people who have done the opposite of Dionysios, such as Gelon or Hieron, because they appear to be the forefathers and instructors of Sicily.

[332] Polyb.15.35; Diod.Sic.20.63.3, 20.70.3, 20.78; Just.*Epit.*22.1.1 & 23.1.2; Polyaen.5.3.2; Liban.57.52; Hellad. FGrH 635=Phot.*Bibl.*279.530a.

[Demetr.] *Eloc.*292

The connections made between Agathokles and his predecessors are clearly embedded in this tradition, which became more established as time went on and the sequence of tyrants grew longer. Timaios himself played an important role in establishing it and Hieron II emphasised it further.[333] But the tradition already existed before Agathokles – it seems to have begun to deelop under Dionysios. Dionysios I's election as *strategos autokrator* in 404 was justified by the precedent of Gelon.[334] Writers on Dionysios drew connections between him and his Deinomenid predecessors too.[335] Philistos is criticised by later writers for glorifying tyrants generally, not just Dionysios,[336] while Xenophon's characterisation of Hieron also responds to the contemporary rule of Dionysios.[337] The links and connections that we have seen between Agathokles and his predecessors thus plugged him into a pre-existing Sicilian tradition, one which he responded to in his own behaviour and iconography in life, as we will see in chapters three and four.

In addition to his Sicilian predecessors, I have also shown in this chapter how the discourse on Agathokles drew on older Greek tropes about autocracy, and linked him to the Macedonian kings – both Alexander and the Diadochoi. These three traditions had their own idiosyncrasies, but the Sicilian and Macedonian discourses were subsets of the broader Greek one, as the fragment from Demetrios' *Areopagite* neatly illustrates. Mainland Greek discussions of autocracy had frequently been inspired by experience of Sicilian tyranny, as in the case of Plato.[338] Sicilian tyranny shared its origins with mainland Greek tyranny.[339] Macedonian kingship was heavily inspired by the Sicilian

[333] Timaios: see p.51; Hieron II, see n.204.
[334] Diod.Sic.13.94; Bearzot (1991).
[335] Lewis (2000).
[336] Plut.*Dion*.36.1; Pearson (1987) 19-20; Sanders (1987) 43-71.
[337] Sordi (1980).
[338] Pl.*Ep.*7.
[339] Harrell (2006).

tyrants, especially Dionysios, as well as Mainland Greek discussions of autocracy.[340] These discourses co-existed. The failure to realise this has encouraged scholars to assume that Agathokles had to be characterised as either a Sicilian tyrant or a Hellenistic king. This chapter has demonstrated that his contemporaries had no problem connecting him to both simultaneously. We will see that Agathokles himself did likewise, in the next chapter, which deals with his coinage. We will also begin to see what will be a major a theme of the rest of the thesis – that if we want to understand Agathokles and his place in the ancient Mediterranean world, then we too need to put him in both contexts.

[340] Brown (1967) 365-8; Hadley (1964) 124-38; Sanders (1991) 283-5.

3: COINAGE

The only truly contemporary source material that we have for Agathokles is his coinage. Although the numismatic evidence aligns with my main argument about Agathokles' place in history and could be integrated into the chapters that follow, I have decided to discuss it separately because numismatic evidence is distinct from the literary sources in that it is physical, non-narrative, and contemporary. Moreover, too often, synergising numismatic evidence with historical evidence has forced it into a supporting and affirming role, covering over the distinct stories that the numismatic evidence can tell.[341] We will see, for example, that the circulation patterns of Agathokles' coinage show that Syracuse's economic interactions with the wider world under Agathokles were similar to those which took place under his predecessor Dionysios.[342] None of our other evidence tells us about this sort of economic interaction, so this is valuable in itself. It also indicates that earlier patterns of interaction are relevant for understanding Agathokles' own interactions with the wider Mediterranean world – an underlying assumption in my treatment of his political and military interactions with the outside world in this thesis' second part. We will also see that the iconography of Agathokles' coinage shows the same effort to connect Agathokles to both his Sicilian predecessors and Macedonian contemporaries which I have discussed in the previous chapter. Finally, I will be arguing that many of the problems in modern scholarship on Agathokles which I identified in my introduction, such as the idea of a transition from tyrant to Hellenistic king, have their roots in discussions of Agathokles' coinage, particularly his coin legends. A few items are not discussed in this chapter:

[341] cf. Fischer-Bossert (2012) 143; Rutter (1993) on the misinterpretations of the so-called *Damareteion* resulting from scholars trying to force the numismatic evidence to fit the literary testimony.
[342] See Figure 15.

1. The total number of coins issued by Agathokles. I am convinced by the work of Buttrey and Esty that this is impossible to determine.[343]
2. The denominations and weight standards of bronze coins, about which no two studies agree.[344] Production methods and corrosion create vast variation in bronze coins' weights, which makes it difficult to assign issues to specific denominations and particularly to decide whether a given coin is a *tetras* (quarter) or a *trias* (third).[345] Moreover, even if it could be shown that Agathokles had changed the weight standard of his bronze coinage,[346] this would not be a fact of great significance because bronze coins only had token value.
3. The exchange rate between gold, silver, and bronze.[347]

The production of this chapter involved processing a substantial amount of data. From this I have produced a coin catalogue of individual coin types with numbers of the form G1, S1, B1, etc., which I will be referencing in this discussion, various graphs of coin weights and circulation maps. These can be consulted at the end of the thesis.

3.1. Chronology of Agathokles' Issues

The chronological arrangement of Agathokles' coins here argued for is illustrated by Figure 1. Like the mainstream reconstruction which derives from Head,[348] I treat the beginning and end of the war with Carthage as epochal moments for Agathokles' coinage. This rough periodisation probably sharpens a fuzzier reality, but there is not really enough data to date issues to the year, as Carroccio attempts to,[349] especially with the bronze coins. At any rate, the coins continued to circulate after

[343] Esty (1986); Esty & Carter (1991-92); Buttrey (1993, 1994). *Contra* de Callataÿ (1995).
[344] e.g. Gàbrici (1927) 88-90; Consolo Langher (1964) 293, 313; Holloway (1979); Carroccio (2004) 148-66. My weight data does not agree with any of them.
[345] Mørkholm (1991) 6 & 10.
[346] As Holloway (1979) argues.
[347] Head (1874) 43, 51, 74; Mollinari (1984).
[348] As modified by Gàbrici (1927); Jenkins (1968); Buda (1969-70); Ierardi (1995-6)
[349] Carroccio (2004) 78-82.

they were issued. Most hoards with Agathoklean gold or silver were deposited by the end of Pyrrhos' war in Sicily (278-276),[350] but Agathokles' bronze continued to be present during Hieron's reign,[351] so the degree to which we can attribute bronze material in particular to Agathokles with certainty, let alone to a specific year, on the basis of archaeological finds is very limited.

There are some definite fixed points for arranging the issues. G4, S4, G5 and B10 bear Agathokles' name, while G1-G2 and S1-S5 all bear the *triskelion*, whose association with Agathokles is corroborated by S4 which bears both name and *triskelion*.[352] G5 and B10 call Agathokles βασιλεύς, so they must have been produced after he took that title (c.304/03 BC).[353] G7 bears the name of Agathokles' successor Hiketas, and S6 and B20 have a nearly identical design, so all three probably belong to him. B10, B18 and B20 are frequently overstruck by B21, which was definitely minted (in great quantity) before Pyrrhos arrived on the island (279 BC).[354] B18 in turn overstrikes B10[355] and possibly B21.[356] S5 represents a significant reduction of the Syracusan *stater* and should therefore post-date S1-S4 which are on the Attic standard. These facts have to form the basis of any systematisation of the coinage of Agathokles.

Barclay Head's model breaks Agathokles' coinage into three periods: a first period marked by the use of ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ (317-310 BC), a second period marked by the use of Agathokles' name without

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[350] There are two exceptions, neither very significant. The contents of *IGCH* 2185b fit a date of 289, except for a single Roman *denarius*, but, as the hoard has been reassembled from auction catalogues, this is probably intrusive. *CH* 9.670 dates to 211 and contains one example of S2; the vast majority of the other 176 coins belong to Hieron and the post-Hieronian democracy: Burnett (1983).

[351] e.g. *MS* 3.27; 3.28; 3.33; 3.35a; *CH* 10.418; *CH* 10.425. Morgantina offers a few strata predating 289 BC and the Hellenistic quarter at Akragas probably will too, when published systematically: Carroccio (2004) 101-2

[352] Seltman (1933) 189's attempt to assign S1 to Dionysios is baseless: Christ (1957) 28-9.

[353] For the date, see p.138.

[354] Holloway (1962) 15-6.
Overstruck on B10: *CNS* 2.308.; BMC 483-485; SNG Cop.792; MS 341; SNG.ANS.3.785, 807, 825, 1205, etc.
Overstruck on B18: *CNS* 2.308; MS 341; SNG.ANS.793.
Overstruck on B20: *CNS* 2.307; BMC 489; SNG Cop.790.

[355] Gàbrici (1927) 272; Mini (1977) 228.

[356] *CNS* 2.294, with photo. If the overstrike is authentic, then B21 and B18 were simultaneous.

the royal title (310-306/4 BC), and a third period marked by the royal title (306/4-289 BC), with the electrum issues slotted into the middle period or after 306.[357] This periodisation has been implemented too strictly. Despite forming half Agathokles' reign, the third period contains no tetradrachms and only a single bronze denomination, while the first period and the few months between Agathokles' death and the rise of Hiketas are full of bronze denominations.[358] The assumptions which rest behind the periodisation – that coins in the name of Syracuse could not coexist with coins in the name of Agathokles and that all coins after Agathokles took the royal title must bear that title – are not valid.[359] In what follows, I will be arguing that the issues of period two continued to be minted alongside those of period three.

It is clear that Head's first series is correctly grouped together as Agathokles' first coins. The Camarina 1980 hoard (*CH* 7#59) contains over thirty examples of both G1 and G3 with over 150 examples of Carthaginian series IV electrum (c.320 BC) and no examples of other Agathoklean coins.[360] Likewise, the Pachino 1957 hoard (*IGCH* 2151) contains 642 coins, including 16 examples of S1 and none of S4, strongly suggesting that S4 was not yet circulating when it was deposited.[361] It is not clear that the start and end dates that Head assigned are correct. There is no hard evidence for when Agathokles began coining. Presumably S2 followed on continuously from the earlier Syracusan *pegasoi*, but the decision to begin minting tetradrachms was a major change, since they had not been minted in Syracuse for roughly fifty years.[362] This suggests an extraordinary expense beyond anything Syracuse had faced in the period since Timoleon. Possible candidates are the redistribution of property in 317/16 (but Timoleon accomplished a similar redistribution without

[357] Jenkins (1968) 152-3 vs Ierardi (1995-6) 35.
[358] To deal with this problem Holloway (1979) 92 postulates that Agathokles abdicated sometime in the 290s BC, contradicting the literary sources which make him a king until his death.
[359] See section 3.3.3.
[360] Series IV's dating: Jenkins (1977).
[361] Jenkins (1968) 151.
[362] Jenkins (1968) 151 distinguishes S1 and S2 on stylistic grounds.

needing to issue tetradrachms),[363] the attack on Messina in 315/14 (but this does not seem appreciably larger than the various post-Timoleontic expeditions in Italy and Sicily),[364] or the conflict with all the Greek Sicilian centres and the Syracusan exiles in 314/13. I prefer the last of these, but we do not know enough about Agathokles' financial situation to be sure. For determining the end of the first period – the date at which S1 was replaced by S4 – the key evidence is the aforementioned Pachino hoard, which was deposited before S4 began. It contains 444 Corinthian Ravel V *pegasoi*, including a single example from the A-Y series, the last to be issued before the Ptolemaic conquest of Corinth in 308 BC. This might suggest that the hoard was deposited fairly shortly after the start of the A-Y series, which ought to be a few years before 308 BC,[365] but we do not know how long it took for Corinthian pegasoi to reach Sicily and there is some indication that their flow west had already diminuated before the Ptolemaic conquest brought it to an end altogether. These pegasoi provide the only fixed point for dating but they only provide a *terminus post quem* – in roughly 310 BC, Agathokles' first set of tetradrachms were still being issued.[366]

S4 probably began to be minted during the war with Carthage. It has a vast number of die variants, including three different inscriptions, which Ierardi's die-study places in ten separate groups.[367] Each of these groups has a complex pattern of die links which probably indicates simultaneous minting and the division of these groups into two distinct stylistic classes (labelled as "fine" and

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[363] Plut.*Tim.*23.6.
[364] Expeditions are attested to Aitne: Just.*Epit.*22.1.11, Akragas: Diod.Sic.19.3.1 (possibly these two are the same), Kroton (on which, see chapter 7.1.), and Gela: Diod.Sic.19.4.4.-4.7.
[365] Ravel (1932); Jenkins (1968) 151; Brice (2011), 67-72.
[366] Ierardi (1995-6) 23-32 argues that the first period ended in 310, suggesting that as the hoard is not representative of Carthaginian issues, it may not be representative of Agathoklean issues. But the absence of the latest Carthaginian issues is explained by the hoard's deposition at Pachino in Syracuse's hinterland during war with Carthage. Ierardi calculates Agathokles' total production of S1 and S4 and his total expenses during the African War, concluding that S1 would have been used up within the first few months of the war. Neither of those calculations are valid on methodological grounds (see n.343) and they exclude S2, the Corinthian *pegasoi*, and the probability that Agathokles did not pay all his expenses (see n.417).
[367] Ierardi (1995-6) 7.

"barbarous") suggests two mints.[368] This suggests that the minting was carried out in a situation where Agathokles regularly required large amounts of new coinage. Further, while both S1 and S4 are tetradrachms on the Attic standard, their weights are not identical. S1 weighs an average of 16.91 grammes, clustering between 16.53-17.29 grammes. S4, by contrast, has an average of 16.81 and clusters around 16.41-17.24 grammes (see Fig. 2-3).[369] That is, the latter weighs less and has a greater variation. The one reflects the situation at the start of the war with Carthage, the other, the increasingly difficult situation as the war continued. It is usually assumed that the end of the war with Carthage in 306/05 or the assumption of the royal title around 304 marked the end of S4 and thus the end of tetradrachm issues. Since Agathokles was still at war with the Syracusan exiles until 303/02 and was campaigning in Italy with tens of thousands of troops until the end of his reign, it seems likely that he continued to issue tetradrachms even after peace with Carthage. The main reason Head's model places the end of S4 when it does is the absence of the royal title on them, but this does not seem decisive to me, since S4 did not easily have space for a longer inscription. Another example shows that old types could continue alongside new ones: G2 has the same design as G1 (of which it is the half), but it shares all of its monograms with G5 of the third period, indicating that it was minted alongside it. G4 is, to date, known from only three examples, all from a single set of dies. However, they demonstrate a clear link with S4. The dies of G4 originally had the legend ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ (genitive), in accordance with their Ptolemaic model. Subsequently, they were recut to read ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ (adjectival). The same transition occurs between earlier and later sub-types of S4.[370] Possibly the inscription was changed on both types at the same time. Even if not, it is hard to see why the change would have been made on G4 except to bring it into

[368] Head (1874) 48; affirmed by lack of die links: Ierardi (1995-6) 7-11.
[369] S1: mean: 16.91; SD: 0.38; sample: 295. S4: mean: 16.81; SD: 0.47; sample: 361.
[370] Ierardi (1995-6) 16-7. On G4, ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ appears on the Vienna museum example, and ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ on Leu 42 (1987) 133 and Cahn et al. (1988) 511; on S4, the former appears on his sub-type A, and the latter on sub-types B-H.

conformity with S4, which seems to suggest that it was issued while the latter was still being minted. I will shortly argue that G4 was probably minted at the same moment as the coins of the third period.

Head argued, reasonably, that the coins of the third phase with the inscription ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ (G5, B10) ought to have begun around the time when Agathokles assumed the royal title. This probably took place in 304, as we will see in chapter 8. This date of issue is independently suggested by the nature of the coins in the series, which contains an unusually large number of gold denominations, all operating on a single denominational system:[371] a two-thirds stater (G5), a one-third stater (G2), and a quarter stater (G6). A die study of G5 has demonstrated a very high number of die-links, showing that it was minted over a very short period of time.[372] This suggests that these gold issues were designed to put a large influx of gold into circulation quickly. The proliferation of denominations would be designed to enable the gold to be used for both large and (comparatively) small payments. The obvious source of this gold is the large sum of gold received from Carthage in the peace treaty of 306/05.[373] I suggest that G4 belongs to the same moment in time. As a full gold stater, it was the largest denomination ever minted at Syracuse and even a very small issue would have required a large supply of gold.[374] It was indeed a very small issue. The three examples so far known, despite appearing on the market at different times, all use the same dies. This suggests that these were the only dies ever used and that G4 was part of the short-term effort to coin the large influx of Carthaginian gold.

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[371] *Contra* Molinari (1984) 9-15.
[372] Bérend (1998).
[373] Diod.Sic.20.79.5: 300 silver talents worth of gold (or 150 according to Timaios). An Attic silver talent weighed 25.92 kg, assuming a gold to silver ratio of 1:10, this would represent 777.6 kg of gold.
[374] Stewart (1993) 269's suggestion of a limited issue during the war "to keep up spirits on the home front" is anachronistic.

To the third series are also assigned S5a-c, *pegasos* coins on a reduced stater, replacing S2. S5 represents a significant reduction of the stater from 8.4g to 6.8g, with implications for Agathokles' financial policies, which I discuss in the next section.[375] Cantilena's study of these coins has found that they come in three groups, two of which bear the *triskelion* (S5a, S5b). On S5c the *triskelion* is replaced by a thunderbolt, an eight-point star or no symbol at all, and the monogram Θ appears on the obverse.[376] Both symbols and the Θ monogram are characteristic of Hiketas' coins. S5 probably comes to an end with him, since Pyrrhos and Hieron lowered the standard further.[377] S5a and S5b therefore fall late in the reign of Agathokles (S5b probably preceding S5a), a conclusion supported by hoards and the close similarity between S5b and G5's busts of Athena.[378] Cantilena associates the weight reduction of the *pegasos* with the difference of weight between G4 and G5, identifying this as a matching reduction in gold. But I have argued above that G5 is part of the existing gold denominational system, not a weight reduction: Figure 4 shows that G5 and all Agathokles' other gold coins are multiples of 0.71g and are therefore part of the same system.[379] They are denominations designed to enable the use of gold coinage for smaller exchanges than usual. S5, by contrast, does not fit into the Attic weight system at all.[380] It is specifically designed to circulate above its actual silver value – in the next part of this chapter, we will see that circulation evidence confirm this. If so, both Attic-weight silver denominations (S1 and S4) probably came to an end when S5 began to be issued (though perhaps they continued to be used to pay troops in Italy). Their presence in our hoards probably reflects Gresham's law in action. Hiketas' tetradrachms (S6) have

[375] See p.104-5.
[376] Cantilena (1989a).
[377] SNG.ANS.5.3.828; SNG.ANS.5.3.868.
[378] *IGCH* 2185b & 2186a&b; Cantilena (1989a) 13-4.
[379] 0.71g had been the weight of the smallest denomination coin since the fifth century: cf.SNG.ANS.5.3.523; SNG.Munich.6.1132 and gold coins had been on its multiples since SNG.ANS.5.3.340-349.
[380] The only sign of a reduced tetradrachm is Sole (2002) #XIV.1, which weighs 13.9g; but is probably plated.

an average weight of around 12.5g, indicating the expansion of the system to higher denomination coins.

Beyond the silver and gold, there are four denominations of Syracusan electrum coins bearing Apollo (E1-E4), which come in four groups of declining gold content (in some cases the steps down coincide with a mintmark).[381] These probably belong to the period of the war with Carthage (310/09-306/05). They were originally considered to belong to Timoleon,[382] but Jenkins dated them to Agathokles' lifetime because E1's Artemis Soteira is similar to that on B10 and B11 and the largest portion coincide with Carthaginian electrum of period V (roughly c.310-c.290 BC) in terms of gold content and hoards.[383] On this analysis, E2-E4 came earliest ("high %"), were followed by a large amount of debased E2 alone (52-55%), and finally by E1 (22-36%).[384] Ierardi agreed with the attribution to Agathokles, but associated the majority of them with the reparations paid by Carthage in 304, which I have discussed above. He argues the Diodoros' reference to χρυσίον μὲν εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον τριακοσίων ταλάντων means the payment was made in electrum.[385] I do not think Diodoros' words can bear that meaning,[386] and the progressive debasement indicates that the electrum coins were issued over a long period of time. As I have said, my view is that G4-G6 and probably G2 account for the Carthaginian gold. Hoard evidence supports my placement of these coins: the Camarina, Sicily, 1980 (*CH* 7.59) hoard contains 280+ gold and electrum coins: 60+ examples of E1-E3, 60+ examples of G1-G3, and 150+ examples of Carthaginian electrum, exclusively of period IV (roughly c.325-310 BC). Together with the evidence for debasement, this suggests that the electrum coinage was a phenomenon of the war with Carthage – with the stylistic

[381] Jenkins (1968) 147-9.
[382] Head (1874) 26.
[383] Jenkins (1968) 150-1. *IGCH* 1945 & 1946.
[384] Jenkins (1968) 147-9.
[385] Ierardi (1995-6) 35-7; Diod.Sic.20.79.5.
[386] cf.Diod.Sic.1.49.2; Diod.Sic.16.56.6; [Arist.] *Oec.*1348b; Plut.*Eum.*3.11.

link between the heads of Apollo perhaps indicating that E1 and B7-B8 are broadly contemporaneous. On my interpretation, the electrum coinage would reflect the shortage of silver and then increasingly of gold during the war with Carthage, comparable to the gold coins issued by the Athenians at the end of the Peloponnesian War.[387] Another factor which may have exacerbated this shortage of precious metals at the same time was the end of the flow of Corinthian *pegasoi* into Sicily, following the conquest of Corinth by Ptolemy in May 307.[388] Agathokles may also have been influenced by the fact that the Carthaginians habitually issued electrum coinage may have made Agathokles' electrum more acceptable to mercenaries in the western Mediterranean since Agathokles and Carthage drew on many of the same sources of mercenary troops.[389]

Turning to the chronology of the bronze, the winged thunderbolts with Agathokles' name and title on them were presumably issued after he became king, at the same time as he issued G5, on which they are modelled. There are probably four rough sizes: very large (B11a), large (B10, B11b, B15), medium (B12a, B14), and small (B11c, B12b, B13).[390] Of these, B11a, B12a and B13[391] are too rare to say much about, B14 and B15 probably belong to the period after Agathokles' death on account of their inscription ΔΙΟΣ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΥ. B10 and B12b are both found at Morgantina in numbers which show that they were substantial issues (51 and 38 examples respectively).[392] Only B10 has the legend ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ; the rest are labelled ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, indicating that different legends co-existed on different denominations simultaneously. This supports the arguments above for multiple different legends co-existing on Agathokles' precious metal issues.

[387] Kraay (1976) 68-70; see p.167.
[388] For other aspects of this conquest, see pp.282 and 292.
[389] Fariselli (2002).
[390] The distinction between large and medium is particularly problematic.
[391] If B13 is not just a peculiarly corroded version of B12b.
[392] *MS* 328-330.

Aside from the thunderbolts, there are a number of other bronze coins which belong to Agathokles. B2 and B3 share G3's type (Kore/butting bull) so they should belong with it in the early part of the reign.[393] Stratigraphic finds at Morgantina and Gela support this dating,[394] while the vast array of symbols and monograms on these coins and their sheer quantity suggest that they lasted a significant amount of time. They might have begun before he came to power. A series of post-Timoleontic bronze *pegasoi*, B7-B8 look like they belong to Agathokles, since they share a large number of monograms with B3 – notably NI, which also occurs on S1 (and nothing subsequent). Stylistically, Apollo's long hair on B8 resembles S4, B21 and E1-E3, and the griffin on Athena's helmet (B7) is also found on S2, G5 and S5b (and is borrowed from Alexander's coinage), while the arrangement of the wings (B7, B8) is more like Agathokles' later silver *pegasoi* (S5) than Timoleontic *pegasoi*.[395] Finally, B8's frequency at Morgantina (113 examples) is completely out of line with all other Timoleontic types (17 examples total).[396] The stylistic agreements suggest that they might belong to the later reign, alongside B11-B14. B16-17 might belong to Agathokles too because Athena again has the griffin on her helmet.[397] The reverse, which is later used on Hieron's coins,[398] is derived from Demetrios Poliorketes' staters issued at Pella and Amphipolis from 291/90 BC (when Agathokles was receiving money from Demetrios).[399] Judging from their rarity at Morgantina, these were a small issue. They could just barely belong to the end of Agathokles' reign, but they might be more comfortable in the period after his death.

B4 features a club above the butting bull and the inscription IE in the exergue. It definitely belongs to Hieron, as its inscription suggests. Gàbrici originally argued for an Agathoklean date on the

[393] Hoard dated: CH7#59.
[394] *MS* 2.3.6-8, 2.3.17, 2.4.55 in pre-Hieron layers.
[395] SNG.ANS.5.3.694-6.
[396] *MS* 315-9 vs *MS* 307-311.
[397] Head (1874) 50.
[398] cf. SNG Cop.833-43.
[399] Newell (1927) 92-100, 108-13.

grounds that abbreviating Hieron to IE would have been somehow disrespectful.[400] Holloway followed him, interpreting IE as ἱερά and seeing that as a reference to the immersion sacrifice in the Syracusan spring of Kyane, instituted by Herakles.[401] However, Morgantina offers no examples from pre-Hieronian strata and supposedly conclusive evidence from Gela is not actually conclusive.[402] Moreover, their frequency in the Morgantina excavations (397 examples are reported) seems more in line with coins minted in the time of Hieron (252 and 1895 examples are reported for his other major bronze issues), than with the issues of Agathokles, of which only B3, B8, B10, and B12b are reported in substantial quantities (141, 113, 51 and 38 respectively).[403] Without them, Hieron's early period (276-269 BC) is surprisingly sparsely attested at Morgantina compared to his own later period and the reign of Hiketas.[404]

Thus, Agathokles issued B2-B3 from the beginning of his reign, added B7-B8 perhaps during the war with Carthage, minted the various thunderbolt coins after he proclaimed himself king after the war with Carthage, and perhaps minted B16-B17 at the end of his reign. B5, B14-B15 and B18-B21 belong to the period after his death, B4 to Hieron.[405]

3.2. Circulation

The circulation patterns of Agathokles' coins are important for understanding who handled them, who saw the images on them, and what their economic role was.[406] In this section I discuss the

[400] Gàbrici (1927) 91 & 175.
[401] Holloway (1979) 91; Diod.Sic.5.4.2; followed by Rutter (1997) 173.
[402] Gela: Griffo, De Miro, Orlandini & Adamesteanu (1955) 207 neither provide stratigraphic context, nor specify whether finds were B3 or B4 and report several explicitly Hieronian coins among their finds. Orlandini (1957) 71-3 only discusses silver coins. Conversely, an example of B4 appears inside a Roman-era Lilybaion tomb alongside Roman coins: Tusa Cutroni (1969-70) 311.
[403] *MS* 2.323-6, 328, 366-9.
[404] See also Carroccio (2004) 163 on grounds of weight; Frey-Kupper (2013)
[405] On stylistic and stratigraphic grounds, B5 goes with B18: Frey-Kupper (2013) 1.154. B6 is known to me only from Consolo Langher (1964) 556, who makes it a subdivision of B2 & B3.
[406] On Sicilian coin circulation in general, see Puglisi (2009), esp.370-4. On methodology: Howgego (1995) 88-95.

methodological issues inherent in trying to recover the circulation of Agathokles' coins. In light of that discussion I make some arguments about the way in which Agathokles' different issues circulated. The following discussion is illustrated by a number of maps (Fig. 6-14), which I have constructed using *Google Earth*, using hoard data from the *ICGH*, and *CH* series, and small finds from excavation reports and the "Vita dei medaglieri" sections of *AIIN* 1954-1998.[407]

On the maps, hoards and small finds are indicated with different symbols – a diamond and a circle respectively – because each requires different considerations. Hoards were deposited to safekeep large amounts of wealth, so gold and silver are over-represented. They indicate that the coins were valuable, not necessarily that they were in use.[408] Finally, hoards are generally the result of serendipitous finds, often by unsavoury individuals. Thus, of the 57-59 attested hoards with Agathoklean material, only 26-27 have been published in full, 11-12 in part, and 20 are seriously deficient. In five cases, provenance is unknown. Small finds, on the other hand, are mostly the result of stray losses; gold and silver are almost completely absent, since people bothered to scrounge around for them when dropped. Unlike hoards, small finds are almost exclusively reported from excavations, so areas that have received more archaeological attention, like the Gela plain and

[407] Additional hoards: Tusa Cutroni (1960-61); Holloway (1989); Boehringer (2009); Manenti (2013). Adriatic and Northern Italy: Gorini (1973); Gorini (1992); Gorini (1993); Ercolani Cocchi (1995); Gorini (2002); Akragas: de Waele & Guzzo (1980); De Miro (2000); Oteri (2003); Athens: Kroll (1993); Carthage: Visonà (1985); Castiglione di Paludi: Luppino, Parise & Polosa (1996-7); Polosa (1999); Corinth: Edwards (1933); Enna: Gentili (1969); Entella: Frey-Kupper (2000); Epeiros: Ugolini (1939); Hammond (1967); Etruria: Catalli (1988); Halikyai: Vecchio, Kolb, Mammina (2003); Herakleia Minoa: De Miro (1958); Issa/Vis: Kirigin & Marin (1988); Bonačić Mandanić & Visovà (2002); Kamarina: Lucchelli & Di Stefano (2004); Korkyra: Evelpidi (1963); Kroton: Mastelloni (1984) Laos: Cantilena (1989b); Lilybaion: Tusa Cutroni (1971); Lipara: Currò (1965); Bernabo Brea, Cavalier & Villard (2001); Lokroi Epizephyrioi: Barello (1992); Medma: Paoletti & Parra (1985); Messana: Pelagatti (1984-85); Carbè (2003); Monte Iato: Frey-Kupper (2013); Monte Sannace: Aryamontri (2001); Morgantina: *MS*; Nemea: Knapp & MacIsaac; Oppido Mamertina: Costamagna & Visonà (1999); Paestum/Poseidonia: Sallusto (1971); Cantilena, Pellegrino & Satriano (1999); Punta Stilo: Tomasello (1972); Ripatransone: Piattelli (1989); Salemi: Vecchio, Kolb & Mammina (2003); Segesta: Mammina (1997); Mammina (2008); Selinus: Kustermann Graf (2002); Mertens (2003); Mammina (2011); Syracuse: Gentili (1956); Lissi (1958); Taras: Travaglini (1982); Tauromenion: Pelagatti (1984-85); Torre del Mordillo: Colburn (1977); Troina: Militello (1961).

[408] cf.the Chiliomodi hoard (*IGCH* 85), full of pre-weight reduction Ptolemaic coins.

Morgantina, are over-represented, while the absence of Agathoklean coinage from other areas may reflect a lack of archaeological research. Neither form of evidence permits strong arguments about changes in the circulation of Agathokles' coins during his lifetime, since hoards are often the product of a long period of deposition and the continued circulation of earlier coins has probably obscured any changes over Agathokles' reign. Fig. 7 and 8 show that Agathokles' later bronze coins are found at more sites in Campania and the Po Valley, while his later silver has not been found in the westernmost part of Sicily. Otherwise the distribution is similar for early and late coins.

I have made no effort to indicate quantity of coins on these maps. The quantity of coins in one hoard or at one site is influenced by far too many factors to be easily compared to any other hoard or site. Most site finds are meagre: only Morgantina offers more than twenty Agathoklean coins. The 436 Agathoklean coins at Morgantina, out of a total of 9960, do tell a story, but it is more about Morgantina than Agathokles. Comparison of proportions between hoards, however, is probably valid and it tells us something important. In eastern Sicilian hoards of over 20 coins, Agathoklean material is generally below 30%, with the dominant position usually belonging to the *Pegasoi* coins. Many more hoards of the same date have only *Pegasoi* and they are by far the majority of all coins found on the island from this period.[409] In Italy, unsurprisingly, this dominant role is usually taken by the coins of the Magna Grecian centres and in western and central Sicily by Carthaginian and Siculo-Punic coins. In Calabria and East Sicily, Agathokles' coins also competed with Macedonian coinage, which entered the west from the reign of Alexander (see fig. 13). In the northeast of Sicily, a number of the remaining active mints in Sicily continue to produce coinage: Kephaloidion, Messana, Tauromenion, Tyndaris and Lipara.[410] So Agathokles' precious metal coinage circulates widely, but nowhere on its own. For bronze, proportions are much harder to judge, since the only

[409] Puglisi (2009) 371.
[410] Puglisi (2009) 88.

valid data point in eastern Sicily is Morgantina – it indicates a relatively even split between Agathoklean bronzes and Carthaginian coins.[411] Alongside these circulated the large coins of Dionysios depicting a starfish between two dolphins, and hippocamps, Timoleon's smaller coins with Zeus Eleutherios, and the bronzes of local centres. Key sites in Italy and West Sicily show that Agathoklean coinage was in the minority there.[412]

There is a definite concentration of finds of Agathoklean coins, especially precious metal coinage, around Syracuse and south-eastern Sicily. This is the only area in which gold coins of Agathokles have been found, for instance. In part, this must reflect the intensity of exploration of this area in modern times and the intensity of habitation in ancient times, but it also suggests that this area was the core area in which Agathokles' coinage circulated, which is not surprising. Other parts of the pattern of coin finds differ from the pattern of Agathokles' movements. For example, there is plenty of evidence for his coinage in Campania and the Po Valley, where he never went, but almost none in Africa, where he campaigned for several years. Possibly the absence of finds in Africa reflects lack of archaeological exploration. However, Kerkouane, which is near one of Agathokles' African bases, Aspis/Clupea, has been excavated back to Agathokles' time. It contains contemporary Carthaginian coinage, but none of Agathokles'.[413] Carthage has yielded only a single early bronze coin of Agathokles (B2), despite the presence of several pre-Agathoklean coins from Syracuse, but a large portion of the coins found in the Carthage excavations have disappeared without being recorded, so this may be an accident of evidence.[414] While hoards are rare in Africa, they do occur and, since much of Agathokles' army never left Africa, there were plenty of potential

[411] MS 2.431 & 436.
[412] For west Sicily, the main site is Monte Iato, but Frey-Kupper (2014) tabulates further sites. For Italy, the key sites are Castiglione di Paludi, Lokroi Epizephyrioi, and Paestum/Poseidonia. See n.407.
[413] Fantar (1986) 538-9.
[414] Visonà (1985) 674.

hoarders.[415] Thus the absence of hoards containing Agathokles' coins might have significance.[416] The literary sources for the African expedition consistently emphasise how short of cash Agathokles was – what money they do mention seems to be plunder or extractions from the African cities, so the literary sources do not require us to find an Agathoklean coinage in Africa.[417] More excavations may change things, but it appears that Agathokles never brought any money to Africa and did not mint any while he was there.

Agathokles' silver *pegasoi* almost never leave eastern Sicily and mostly cluster in the core area in the southeast (see Fig. 11a, 11b).[418] This has implications for understanding their purpose. It contradicts those who argue that the *pegasoi* were intended for paying Italian mercenaries.[419] Rather, they form part of the larger *pegasoi* phenomenon. In hoards, Syracusan and Agathoklean *pegasoi* come a distant third behind the thousands of *pegasoi* from Corinth and hundreds from Adriatic ports like Leukas and Thyrrheion.[420] This large flow of *pegasoi* from the east coast of the Adriatic into Sicily had been in progress for about a generation by Agathokles' time, but it peaked before his reign began and it was terminated after Ptolemy's conquest of Corinth in 309 brought their minting to an end. The phenomenon probably reflects the purchase of Sicilian grain and agricultural products, valuable at all times, but at a particular premium in mainland Greece during the famines of the 320s.[421] The long duration and geographical scope of the *pegasoi* phenomenon

[415] Diod.Sic.20.69.3-5; Liv.24.6.
[416] e.g. *IGCH* 2259.
[417] Pillage: Diod.Sic.20.8.6; army tempted by Carthaginian offers of pay: Diod.Sic.20.34.1; "ὠφελείας": Diod.Sic.20.39.2; non-cash payments and irregularity of payment: Trundle (2004) 42, 84-91.
[418] The one exception is found in a Tarentine tomb: Travaglini (1982) 73.
[419] Castrizio (1995).
[420] Calciati (1990) provides a useful tabulation of the hoards. On the phenomenon, see Jenkins (1958); Talbert (1971); Anello (1974); Kraay (1976); Holloway (1982) Tusa Cutroni (1987); Calciati (1990); Taliercio (1993).
[421] See n.1196.

favours this explanation. The Syracusan *pegasoi* would be intended to supplement the main coinage in circulation, as the influx from the east waned.

We saw above that later in his reign, Agathokles lowered the weight of his *pegasoi*. The silver content of these *pegasoi* was worth less than their face value – their value was a function of Agathokles' authority. This confirms that they were intended to circulate only within his realm. Looking to the wider Mediterranean context, similar drops in weight occurred in several Mediterranean centres in the early Hellenistic period. The most famous of these is Ptolemy's, which was executed in three steps, the first, bringing his tetradrachm down from 17.2g to 15.7g in c.305 BC following the Battle of Salamis and the last in 294 or 293 between the reconquest of Cyprus and the conquest of Tyre, bringing it down yet further to 14.27g.[422] With the final weight reduction, Ptolemy also reduced the weight of his gold to a notional drachm of 3.55g.[423] This venture profited by having the reduced coins function above their actual value, forcing merchants to exchange their full weight coins for the reduced coins in order to do business, and pocketing the difference.[424] It also helped to maintain the local silver supply, since people would avoid taking the underweight coins away with them. Probably the Syracusan reduction had the same goal; like Egypt, Sicily lacked silver of its own, but produced enough agricultural produce that merchants would not stay away. Silver was at a particular premium for Agathokles in the 290s because of the cost of his campaigns in Italy and military build-up for renewed war with the Carthaginians, plus the end of the flow of Corinthian *pegasoi* into Sicily. It would not be surprising if Agathokles was following the example of Ptolemy in this reduction, given the close ties between Agathokles and Ptolemy which I will discuss in chapter eight,[425] and the close financial connections between Egypt and Sicily that we

[422] Mørkholm (1991) 9-10 & 65-7; Lorber (2005), (2012b), (2012c) 212-213.
[423] Mørkholm (1991) 65-7; Lorber (2012b), (2012c) 213.
[424] Le Rider (1998) 789-92; Meadows (2014) 185-6.
[425] See chapter 8.2.2.

know existed subsequently, in the reign of Hieron II.[426] The reduced *pegasoi* suggest a tangible benefit of political union for the Sicilian economy. Reduced weight coins could only be forced on merchants attempting to buy Sicilian goods when all the eastern ports were controlled by a single authority. In periods of fragmentation, when the individual cities were independent (indeed at loggerheads), they would undercut each other to the merchants' benefit.

Agathokles' tetradrachms had a different circulation pattern to the tetradrachms of the Macedonian kings, which flowed into Sicily in roughly the same pattern as the Corinthian *pegasoi* (see Fig.12-13).[427] Unlike his other precious metals they even entered the western part of the island. In all cases where the type is specified, these are S1; they might reflect payments to the Elymians or military presence in western Sicily during the war with Carthaginians, or their visual similarity to the quadriga tetradrachms already circulating there.[428] Agathokles' tetradrachms also travelled to the Bruttii, as shown by *CH.*4.2 and 8.274 and the widespread imitation of his designs on Apulian, Campanian, and Bruttian coins for decades after his death.[429] This imitation might indicate they had travelled all the way to the Campanians (who reminted their coins for local use). The tetradrachms were even imitated by Seleukos, which implies that they were occasionally seen in the Near East,[430] again, probably brought by mercenaries. Finally, unlike the *pegasoi*, the tetradrachms' weight was not reduced, which suggests that the widespread acceptability that this weight ensured was valued by Agathokles.[431] The tetradrachms, then, were multi-purpose, used

[426] A Ptolemaic mint operated in Sicily at the start of Hieron II's reign: Wolf & Lorber (2011); the Lex Hieronica, the agricultural tax law under Hieron II has close similarities to that of the Ptolemies: Bell (2011).
[427] Williams & Burnett (1998) 380-3.
[428] cf.SNG.ANS.189; SNG.II.1580.
[429] e.g. SNG.ANS.648-50; SNG.Munich.135; SNG.ANS.30.
[430] Evans (1894) 242.
[431] But see n.380.

for paying Sicilians and foreigners, which makes sense, given the tetradrachm's international use and associations with military pay.

Agathokles' electrum is found in the core area in south-eastern Sicily too, but it is also well-represented in Calabria, where it had so much impact that later Rhegine coins imitate its designs. It is absent from western Sicily where it might have been expected to interchange with Carthaginian electrum (see Fig. 10).[432] I have argued above that this coinage was produced during the war with Carthage due to the shortage of silver and gold available to Agathokles at that time. In that case, its failure to circulate in the west would reflect the fact that this area was hostile to Agathokles while it was being issued. The preponderance of electrum in Calabria might reflect Calabrian factors: people in Calabria may have particularly willing to be paid in electrum; hoards show that they were accustomed to receive it from the Carthaginians.[433] Alternatively or additionally, the large amount of electrum in Calabria might indicate how heavily Agathokles relied on Italy for supplies during the war with Carthage, when the Syracusan exiles and the Akragantines controlled the Sicilian interior and Syracuse was frequently under siege. The presence of electrum in south-eastern Sicily shows that it was also used to pay Sicilians.

Agathokles' bronze circulates in a completely different pattern; throughout Sicily and Magna Graecia, but particularly in Agathokles' late reign it also shows up in Campania, the Adriatic, and the Po Valley – well outside the circulation area of any of his other coins. Granted that these are loose finds and therefore do not necessarily indicate a heavy circulation, their widespread distribution is unusual. Bronze coins have only token value, so they do not usually circulate far from their place of minting.[434] The bronze might have been intended primarily for the mercenaries; in

[432] *Contra* Puglisi (2009) 371.
[433] *IGCH* 1945 & 1946.
[434] Howgego (1995) 92.

other periods it has been suggested that the main purpose of bronze coinage was to give soldiers a way to interact in the economies of the towns they marched through or were garrisoned in because, as visitors, they could not participate in the cashless economy of goods, services, debts and credits.[435] From there it could either seep into regular circulation or travel home with the soldiers. In central Italy and Campania, bronze had long been the standard metal of value, which may have encouraged the return of Agathokles' coinage with Italian soldiers.[436] But non-military payments and circulation within Sicily must have been envisioned, since bronze had developed an indispensable role in Sicilian commerce under Dionysios, who had not issued small denominations in precious metals. Syracusan bronze had been important in the Adriatic under Dionysios, but had virtually disappeared after his fall, when it was largely overstruck by new Adriatic civic coinages.[437] The return of Syracusan coinage under Agathokles indicates a reconnection with old interests in the Adriatic and a revival of the economic pattern which had existed in the time of the Dionysioi.[438] This was not necessarily caused solely by Agathokles' conscious or unconscious actions, but it suggests, at the least, that Agathokles was interacting with this part of the world in similar ways to Dionysios and that the world was responding to him in similar ways to how it had responded to Dionysios.

Thus, the evidence indicates the importance of continuity alongside contemporary changes in the Mediterranean for understanding Agathokles. While the circulation of his bronze coinage in the Adriatic and the circulation of his *pegasoi* continue earlier phenomena, other aspects of his coinage, like the weight reductions at the end of his reign, are part of contemporary innovations in the eastern Mediterranean. The overall picture from the circulation evidence is of diversity and

[435] Puglisi (2011) 189.
[436] Burnett (2012) 299.
[437] Gorini (1993) 304-5; Gorini (2002).
[438] See Figures 6, 15.

wide impact; despite a core area around Syracuse, a number of different issues ended up circulating in different ways. This need not represent conscious decisions to direct coinage at specific areas of the world as part of a carefully planned, comprehensive system, but it must reflect the number of different uses to which Agathokles put his money and the number of different groups he interacted with.

3.3. Iconography

The iconography of Agathokles' coins is significant as a primary source for Agathokles' personal and official messages. Some modern numismatists, particularly in the English-speaking world, would be sceptical of that statement, for a number of reasons. It can seem dangerous to give too much importance to tiny images that people might have paid little attention to.[439] However, there is evidence that coin images were important to people in the Hellenistic period.[440] Moreover, the images on coins did not exist in isolation – they were one medium among many in which Agathokles propagated messages. As we will see in chapter four, Agathokles propagated messages in a variety of media, such as paintings, architecture, spectacles and events. Coins happen to be the most durable of these media.[441] Given how widely Agathokles' coins travelled and how many people handled them, their impact could be great even if only a small proportion of their users actually looked at them closely and it does Agathokles and other minters a disservice to presume that the utility of this never occurred to them.

A second factor which creates scepticism about discerning messages in numismatic iconography is the fact that, like all interpretations of visual media, it is subjective – a fact which sits uncomfortably

[439] Jones (1956) 15-6 compared them to postage stamps.
[440] e.g. Sestos' honorific decree for Menas: *OGIS* 339.44-5. Elkins & Krmnicek (2014) on coin iconography generally; Rutter (2000) shows correspondences between the way Sicilian centres are described by Pindar and the way they depicted themselves on their coinage; Meadows (2014) 171-3 on Alexander's coinage as a statement about empire.
[441] See p.143.

with the quantitative and scientific focus of much of the best modern numismatic scholarship.[442] Some previous interpretations of the iconography of Agathokles' coins have been idiosyncratic and overly ingenious.[443] The fact that there have been bad interpretations of coin iconography does not mean that any effort to interpret coin iconography is bad.

The final issue with interpreting coin iconography is the fact that the primary purpose of coins was economic, so the most important role of a coin's iconography was to ensure that the coin 'looked like a coin' and would be accepted as currency, which may militate against interpreting iconography in terms of other messages.[444] The ultimate example of this comes from early modern Africa and the Middle East, where the iconography of a number of European coinages, most notably the Maria Theresa Thaler, became frozen in place for several hundred years because the iconography was treated as a guarantee of their high silver content.[445] This is a particularly important factor in the case of iconography which imitates other coins, as much of Agathokles' coinage does. A central question in the interpretation of Agathokles' coinage therefore is the extent to which Agathokles' imitations were intended to communicate political messages about Agathokles rather than economic messages about his coinage.

In a 2005 chapter, Peter van Alfen discussed the reasons for imitation coinages and created a typology. On the whole, van Alfen argues, imitations were made for economic reasons, in order

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[442] Elkins & Krmnicek (2014) 12-3.
[443] e.g. Armagrande (2000)'s interpretation of the obverse of S4 as a depiction of Agathokles in the guise of Kore; Caccamo Caltabiano (2010)'s argument that a clothed Nike indicates a completed victory and a naked Nike indicates a victory still in progress and the Nike on S4 as representing a hierogamous marriage between Agathokles and Sicily.
[444] Martin (1985, 1995). Kroll (1976) 338 & van Alfen (2005) 328 emphasise the central importance of a coin's appearance in ancient Greek practice in judging its validity. Cf. Semple (2005) 104 on inspections of the Maria Theresa Thaler in African and Middle Easterns marketplaces, which concentrated on tiny details of appearance, such as the number of diamonds in Maria Theresa's crown and the number of pearls in a tiny broach on her shoulder.
[445] Semple (2005).

that the imitation might be as trusted in the marketplace as the prototype. Their prototypes would be expected to be widespread and trusted in the area in which the imitations were intended to circulate – hence the extensive imitations of Athenian owls and Alexanders. Two of van Alfen's types of coin imitation are relevant to Agathokles' coinage and reflect more complicated motivations: the "marked imitation" and the "artistic imitation."[446] These two types are distinct from other forms of imitation because they are intentionally distinguished from the prototype by the issuing authority.[447] The marked imitation resembles the prototype in design, metal, and weight so that it could be mistaken for the prototype, except for a legend or other symbol which identifies it as a product of a different issuing authority.[448] The motivation is clearly still primarily economic and the marking may either indicate that the authority of the issuer was expected to reinforce the coin's authority yet further or that the issuer's desire to advertise their existence trumped economic concerns. Of Agathokles' coinage S1 and S2 are of this type. Artistic imitations are looser; they take over some features of a prototype, but make no effort to suggest that the imitation is the same kind of coin as the prototype. Within this type he includes a number of degrees – from imitations which copy the entire iconography of a prototype, through cases in which only the obverse or reverse is imitated ("type imitation"), to instances where a single motif is imitated ("fashion coinage").[449] G4, G5, and probably G1 are of this type. These imitations may also have economic motivations – the desire to have the imitation 'look like a coin' rather than to be mistaken

[446] van Alfen (2005) esp.328-38.
[447] Contrast with "anonymous imitations," "debased/plated coins" and "counterfeits" in which the imitation appears identical to the prototype. The imitation Attic tetradrachms from fourth century Egypt are probably anonymous imitations, as are the *Thalers*: Buttrey (1982); Figueira (1998) 528-35; Ober (2008) 229-37.
[448] van Alfen's e.g.: Artaxerxes' silver tetradrachms, taking the form of Athenian owls, but featuring Demotic or Aramaic legends.
[449] van Alfen's e.g.: Pharaonic gold coins in the form of Athenian silver tetradrachms, imitation of Kimon's facing Arethousa obverse by various eastern Mediterrranean mints, appearance of a wreath on Hellenistic civic coinages (*stephanophoroi*). On "fashion coinage," see: Meadows (2001) 56-8.

for a specific coin. Van Alfen suggests, additionally, that they might have aesthetic motivations, while being critical of attempts to view the coins as indicating political alliance.

In the rest of this chapter I am largely in line with van Alfen, but I make three additional presumptions. Firstly, "aesthetic motivations" are not necessarily without political import. A design may be aesthetically attractive to imitators because it allows the communication of messages.[450] Secondly, the economic factor mostly explains iconographic conservatism; by the same token, iconographic changes from the prototype can be seen as significant decisions, where the desire to send a particular message overcoming the risk of undermining the coinage's value.[451] Thirdly, the economic motivation is about authority. The decision to imitate a particular prototype reflects a judgement that that prototype's appearance commanded acceptance in the marketplace and a decision of the imitator to coopt that authority. That authority was partially based on the market's past experience of the prototype, but also on confidence that the prototype's issuer was wealthy enough and scrupulous enough to create good coinage. Thus economic authority overlaps to a degree with political authority. The latter may be particularly significant in cases, like the *Philippeioi*, which itself emphasised the personal authority of the issuer and did not circulate in very substantial numbers in the area where the imitation circulated.

In this section, therefore, I seek to put coin iconography in the context of other iconographies and other evidence we have about Agathokles.[452] I will argue that it is useful and productive to identify the resonances which both Agathokles' original and imitative types may have had in the late fourth-

[450] e.g. coins of Hadrian were the prototype for depictions of Britannia in early modern Britain, reflecting the seventeenth century predilection for Graeco-Roman imagery, but also political ideas about Britain as strong, liberal, united, and nautical: Eustace (2016) esp.55-66.
[451] In [Arist.] *Oec.*1347a, changing the coin type entails a special meeting of the Athenian Assembly.
[452] Elkins & Krmnicek (2014) is helpful. Caccamo Caltabiano's analogy between motifs and words could be helpful if it were informed by lexical semantic theory.

century Sicilian context in which Agathokles deployed them.[453] In what follows, I explore what that contextual meaning might have been, stressing that the coins may have had multiple meanings (or none) and that these are likely to be general concepts, like 'victory,' 'freedom', and association with specific deities, rather than specific references to historical or mythological events. My major point in this section is that the idea that Agathokles' coinage primarily illustrates a transition from a traditional Sicilian iconography to a contemporary Hellenistic iconography is not sustainable. Instead, I will argue that the iconography of Agathokles' coins provides a particularly clear example of how Agathokles employed both Sicilian and Hellenistic influences for his own purposes.

3.3.1 Sicilian Influences

Some of Agathokles' coins continue business as usual. The prime example is his *Pegasoi*, which are a marked imitation of the Syracusan staters issued since the time of Timoleon. As can be seen at left, Agathokles only tinkered with these, switching obverse and reverse, adding a *triskelion* and updating Athena's helmet with a griffin (borrowed from Alexander's coinage).[454] That Agathokles put his own stamp on the *pegasoi* is significant given that they bore a widely-trusted and widely-circulating design. But to say that these changes show that Agathokles was trying to distance himself from Timoleon is unconvincing; the changes are too minor.[455] The wider context of the *pegasoi* is important for their interpretation. *Pegasoi* had become the main silver currency of Sicily over the course of the fourth century.[456]



Image 1 & 2: Timoleontic & Agathoklean Pegasoi (S2).

[453] Cf. Persian and Mesopotamian readings of Seleukid coinage: Erickson & Wright (2011) 163 & Iossif (2011) 257; and Arethousa re-interpreted as Tanit on Carthaginian coinage: Tusa Cutroni (1967) 75; more cautiously, Jenkins (1977) 12-3, 18.
[454] Williams & Burnett (1998) 383.
[455] *Contra* Consolo Langher (1964) 312.
[456] The influx occurred in the 340s, e.g. Talbert (1971), Kraay (1976), Holloway (1982), but some were probably already present in Dionysios' time, e.g. Anello (1974), Tusa Cutroni (1987).

Possibly the *pegasoi* once carried a message of special friendship with Corinth, but by Agathokles' time they were primarily a form that inspired confidence in the marketplace.[457] The iconography of Agathokles' *pegasoi* encouraged them to circulate in the same way as the Corinthian ones and thus to stay on the island. After he reduced their weight, the continuation of trusted iconography aided their continued acceptance within Sicily.

The bull which appears on Agathoklean bronzes might be another example of the continuation of a traditional type. Bulls are common on coins of South Italy and Sicily from the sixth century, particularly on the coins of Sybaris-Thourion and of Gela, where the man-faced bull explicitly depicts the River Gelas.[458] Likewise, Agathokles' bulls have regularly been interpreted as referencing a local water feature: the Syracusan spring of Kyane, where Herakles had instituted a sacrifice of bulls by immersion.[459] This interpretation is based on B4, which features a club and its variant B5, which has the head of Herakles on the obverse. I have argued above that these are Hieron's.[460] Of the butting bulls which are surely Agathokles' (B2-3) some feature an axe, others caducei and tridents and the majority feature dolphins. Thus, bulls can be associated with Poseidon, Apollo, Hermes, Kore, Arethousa, or water features more generically;[461] the vagueness might be intentional. The bull was also a traditional metaphor of value,[462] making it a reasonable motif to reinforce the currency of a token bronze coinage. Further, the butting bull had already appeared at a number of Sicilian minor mints in the fourth century, especially in the eastern part of the island; they are often associated with the arrival of Campanians.[463] By putting the butting bull on his

[457] Likewise, E4's cuttlefish is common on coins of 0.7-0.8g from the fifth century onwards.
[458] e.g. Thourioi: SNG.V.1.279-304. Gela: SNG Cop.251-79
[459] *Diod.Sic.*5.4.2; Holloway (1979) 91; Rutter (1997) 173.
[460] See page 99.
[461] cf.SNG Cop.1277-323 (Poseidonia); Carroccio (2004) 191.
[462] e.g.Hom.*Il*.23.703-5.
[463] Abakainon: *SNG.ANS.*900; Adranon: *CNS* 3.159 #4; Agyrion: *CNS* 3.130 #18; Enna: *SNG.ANS.*1335; Hippana: *CNS* 1.239 #1; Katane: *CNS* 3.94 #3; Tauromenion: *CNS* 3.210 #2-8.

coinage, Agathokles adopted a motif current in the inland centres of eastern Sicily, which had formed his central base during the civil conflict which preceded 317 BC. Pragmatically, then, this type allowed him (or the soldiers in his pay) to pay those centres in a type they were familiar with.[464] Agathokles' subsequent use of the *pegasos* on B7-B8 can be explained as the same use of a type already familiar as currency, but its adoption indicates that his payees were from an increasingly broad number of backgrounds and expected a more widely familiar type, which still retained a Sicilian flavour.

S1 revives, rather than continues, an old type: the combination of Arethousa and a racing quadriga which began at Syracuse under the Gamoroi and reached its peak with the signed tetra- and decadrachms of Dionysios I.[465] These had long been trusted forms of value and had therefore been adopted by many other Sicilian cities in the time of Dionysios and by the Siculo-Punic mints subsequently.[466] Syracusan tetradrachms were still in circulation in Agathokles' time.[467] S1 is thus an example of marked imitation ad presumably economic factors were paramount in the choice of type, but when Agathokles chose to revive the Syracusan tetradrachm, the only mints in Sicily producing tetradrachms of any sort were the Siculo-Punic mints of *ṣyṣ* and *rš mlqrt*. The act of minting tetradrachms thus made a claim to Syracuse's



Image 3 & 4: Decadrachm of Dionysios I & Tetradrachm of Agathokles (S1)

[464] Allowing soldiers to pay daily expenses was a major role of bronze in central Sicily: Puglisi (2011) 189.
[465] See SNG.III 867-991 for an illustration of the type's development over time.
[466] e.g. Gela: SNG Cop.277; Himera: SNG.ANS.189; Kamarina: SNG.II.864-5; Segesta: SNG.II.1199; Selinous: SNG.II.1271; Siculo-Punic: SNG.ANS.539; Jenkins (1971) 42-4, 53-7.
[467] Continued circulation of the worn old Syracusan coins is demonstrated by the following hoards: *IGCH* 2146, *IGCH* 2184/*CH*9.633, *CH.*4.30, 5.28, 6.21, 8.22, 8.274. Williams & Burnett (1998) consider the contemporary Punic coins a more important influence than the old Syracusan ones.

parity with Carthage and general resurgence under Agathokles' command, as a power generally and as a mercenary employer. The imagery of Arethousa and the quadriga may have been a contributing factor in the decision to return to this type rather than imitate one of the other types which have a greater presence in contemporary Sicilian hoards, such as Athenian owls, Corinthian *pegasoi*, or the tetradrachms of Alexander.[468]

The quadriga victory was the foremost symbol of excellence, especially in Sicily.[469] The tremendous expenditure involved in raising and training a successful chariot team demonstrated a person's power to engage in spectacular benefaction (*megaloprepeia*) generally.[470] Any victory in games demonstrated the capability of an individual; the chariot victory represented superiority over the most powerful and wealthy individuals in the world – a connection which was stressed on Dionysios' issues by the presence of Nike crowning the charioteer and by the armour in the exergue, labelled as AΘΛA. A specifically Olympic connection is made by Arethousa on the reverse, the freshwater spring on Ortygia, who was supposed to be connected to the river Alpheios in Elis and thus to link Olympia and Syracuse.[471] The chariot was also a powerful symbol of control, in a similar way to the metaphor of the ship of state; by personal skill and deft movements of the reins, the charioteer made powerful forces obey his will.[472] Although the specific types Agathokles was imitating were actually Dionysian,[473] they should probably be understood as referring to old autocracies generally and to the Deinomenids as much as to Dionysios. They were a powerful proclamation of Agathokles' personal excellence and the resulting revival of Syracuse.

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[468] Cf. imitation of Alexander tetradrachms by the Carthaginians in this period: Jenkins (1978) 5-35.
[469] Thuc.6.16.2; Antonaccio (2014) 198-200; Morgan (2015) 69-80; De Angelis (2016) 157-8.
[470] cf.Finley (2004); Kurke (1991) 171-82; Mitchell (2013) 57-80.
[471] Boehringer (1929) 96-102; Pind.*N*.1.1; Strabo 6.2.4.
[472] Morgan (2015) 175-7 on Pind.*Pyth.*2. Cf. Ar.*Vesp*.1022; Pl.*Phdr.*246a-54e. MacDowell (1995) 38 connects with the ship of state metaphor.
[473] So similar that numismatists previously tried to date his tetradrachms to Dionysios' reign: Seltman (1933) 189. Ierardi (1995-6) 3.

Agathokles' use of the symbol which we call a *triskeles* or *triskelion,* three legs emerging from a single point, which appears on almost all his coins may be an example of Agathokles giving a new and personalised meaning to a pre-existing motif. The *triskeles*' earlier appearance on post-Timoleontic coinage appears purely metrological, indicating that a coin was worth three *onkia*.[474] Elsewhere it is important on a few east Aegean coinages (notably Aspendos), deriving from a windmill-like design on the coinage of Lycian dynasts, which Wilson considers a solar symbol.[475] It was a common shield device on Athenian pottery down to the middle of the fifth century and similar motifs are found on the shields recovered from Olympia – presumably encouraging the speedy flight of the enemy.[476] On S3, the *triskeles* has a *gorgoneion* at its centre, as common on shield devices and indicating that it was being thought of as a shield device by the die cutters. On coins, it is Agathokles' personal badge.[477] This personal association is clear from its sudden appearance on his first issues and its complete disappearance from Syracusan coinage after his death. Many scholars argue that Agathokles' use of the *triskeles* also indicated a specific ambition to rule all Sicily and hence a declaration of hostility to the Carthaginians.[478] Sicily is triangular, and an alternative name for the island, Trinakria, shows the Greeks were conscious of this by the time of Thucydides, so the symbol may have been interpreted in this light.[479] However, it seems unlikely that this was a meaning that the symbol already had or its primary significance. All explicit evidence of the *triskeles* as a symbol of Sicily is much later than Agathokles, dating from Roman and Medieval

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[474] SNG.I.I.64. It coexists with a coin bearing a swastika (SNG.I.I.63), which is identified as a four *onkia* coin: Holloway (1969-70) 134-5, although the swastika and *triskelion* coins are roughly the same size and weight.
[475] Wilson (2000) 50. The original meaning of the Lycian symbol need not have been known to the Sicilians.
[476] e.g. Beazley #8007, #10723, #302083, #42143. Variants occur: #11932, #301887, #302028 with one leg; #5170 with four legs; #202186 with two legs and two wings; the *parasema* excavated at Olympia have three wings instead of legs: Koenigs-Philipp (1980) 108.
[477] Wilson (2000) 40; Caccamo Caltabiano (2010) 279. Spier (1990) on shield devices as personal symbols. Cf. the Seleukid anchor or the Augustan Capricorn.
[478] Buda (1969-70) 198; Borba Florenzano (2005) 27; Lehmler (2005) 63.
[479] Thuc.6.2.2; Diod.Sic.5.2.1; Strabo 6.2.1; a rationalisation of Θρινακία, the island of the Sun, in Hom.*Od*.11.107.

times.[480] If it was a symbol of Sicily, then it is strange that Pyrrhos and Hieron II did not use it.[481] Moreover, this representation presents Agathokles' aspirations as surprisingly limited, for someone whose interests in Italy were both early and intense, as we will see in chapter seven. We will see that the *triskeles* proliferated on Italian coinage in the third century BC.[482] The *triskeles* would probably not have been so popular if it was primarily seen as a symbol of Sicilian unity.

3.3.2. Hellenistic influences

Lehlmer sees the overall narrative of Agathokles' coinage as "den Übergang von einer lokalen Tyrannis in ein hellenistisches Königtum."[483] It is true that motifs borrowed from the Macedonian monarchies from the east become more common over time.[484] But Agathokles' coinage borrowed motifs from Macedon from the beginning of his reign and most of the Hellenistic types which were adopted by Agathokles had a local resonance alongside their international one.



Image 5 & 6: Stater of Philip II & Agathoklean hemistater (G1)

Agathokles' first series of gold coins, G1, imitate Philip II's gold *Philippeioi* (examples at left). Although very similar to the prototype, these are probably best understood as artistic imitations, since they are a distinct denomination and there are clear differences. For instance, the orientation of the obverse head has been switched, reflecting a Sicilian predilection for sinister heads on their coinage.[485] The decision to mint gold at all was a

[480] Wilson (2000) 41-6. Other examples of the symbol in Sicily include two archaic pots from Gela: De Miro (1962) 129, 132–3; Orlandini (1964) 13, and two Classical/Hellenistic sealings from Temple C at Selinous: Salinas (1883) tab.11, #351-2 (i.e. the symbol is rare in Sicily before the Roman period).
[481] See notes 1286 and 426.
[482] See chapter 7.4.
[483] Lehmler (2005) 61; see n.546.
[484] Williams & Burnett (1998) 385-6.
[485] I owe this point to Peter Thonemann.

conscious choice; gold coinage was associated with great powers (prototypically the Persian King).[486] Lehmler argues that the specific type, like the *Pegasoi*, was simply one that had currency.[487] Macedonian coinage did travel to the west, but intermittently and mostly after c.300,[488] so *Philippeioi* were not the only gold type available to Agathokles as a model. He could have imitated (in order from least to most common in the west): Alexander's Athena/Nike coins, the gold *pegasoi* issued by Timoleon, or the various Carthaginian designs.[489] No other gold-issuing state in the West imitated the *Philippeioi*.[490] The choice had a political element. Obviously their original meaning, the commemoration of Philip's chariot victory at Olympia,[491] had little resonance in Sicily, but the more general connotations of chariot victory matched S1. Moreover, as emphasised above, the economic authority of the *Philippeioi* was very closely tied to Philip's personal authority, compared to most other Greek coinages, as shown by their name, the fact that they commemorated Philip's personal victory at Olympia, and the fact that the legend continued unchanged even after Philip's death. Thus, just as the tetradrachms referred to Gelon and Hieron, so G1 and G2, as imitations of the *Philippeioi*, referred to Philip – the man who had recently raised Macedon from obscurity to the most important power(s) in the world. As Philip had done for Macedon, so Agathokles proclaimed he would do for Syracuse. The gold imitation enhanced, rather than overruled, the Sicilian messages invoked by S1.

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[486] Caccamo Caltabiano (2010) 278; Alram (2012).
[487] Lehmler (2005) 65-6.
[488] Five *Philippeioi* have been found in Sicilian hoards: *IGCH* 2185b; *IGCH* 2204; *CH* 7.59. Williams & Burnett (1998) 380-3.
[489] Athena/Nike: e.g. Price (1991) #163 (dozens of examples); Carthaginian: Jenkins & Lewis (1963) group IV (hundreds); the Timoleontic *pegasoi* are very rare, but of course the silver *pegasoi* they are modelled on are not.
[490] Neapolitan gold triobols imitate Agathokles' coins, not Philip's: Cantilena (1986) and see p.253.
[491] Plut.*Alex.*4.9.

There are other imitations of Macedonian motifs in the early coinage, such as the shape of Athena's helmet on S2,[492] but this imitation becomes more common among Agathokles' later coins. The most widespread image on Agathokles' later coinage is the winged thunderbolt. In the form with Athena, this is an imitation of Alexander's 1/8 stater.[493] Alexander's coin is extremely rare and has never been found in Sicily.[494] For him it seems only to have had the generic meanings associated with the weapon of Zeus.[495] In Agathokles' context, however, it had a number of resonances which would have made it an aesthetically attractive appropriation. Firstly it recalled the vertical thunderbolt of Zeus Eleutherios on the coins of Timoleon, whose cult commemorated the toppling of the tyrant Thrasyboulos in 465 (pictured bottom at right).[496] The connection is made clear from B14-B15, which bear the legend ΔΙΟΣ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΥ and his image on the obverse, whether they are Agathoklean or immediately postdate him. Tyrant-toppling Zeus Eleutherios might seem an unlikely reference for Agathokles, but he had presented himself as freeing the city from the oligarchs.[497] Moreover, Zeus Eleutherios was also associated with victory over barbarians.[498] Pindar invokes Zeus Eleutherios at the start of his praise of an athlete from Himera, because of the victory achieved there by Gelon.[499] The type was also familiar



Images 7-10: Alexander's 1/8 stater, Agathokles' 2/3 stater (G5a); stater of Alexander the Molossian; Timoleontic bronze

[492] Caccamo Caltabiano (2010) 280; probably to be seen as an example of "fashion coinage", see n.449.
[493] Price (1991) #166.
[494] Williams & Burnett (1998) 380-383.
[495] Lehmler (2005) 81.
[496] Pind.*Ol.*12.1; Diod.Sic.11.72; Lehmler (2005) 81; Caccamo Caltabiano (2010) 280; Hornblower (2011) 50-1.
[497] Rutter (1997) 168.
[498] Strabo 9.2.31; Paus.9.2.5-7, 10.21.5-6; *Suda* E804.
[499] Pind.*Ol.*12.1-2; Schol.Pind.*Ol.*12.1-2.

to the Greek West from the coins of Alexander the Molossian, which took inspiration from Philip II's coinage and Magna Grecian prototypes stretching back to the fifth century (pictured third at right).[500] Here again it was associated with victory over barbarians. All of this is significant given that Agathokles issued these coins after victory over the Carthaginians and while engaged in conflict with the Bruttii, ostensibly on behalf of the local Greeks.[501] Thus this generic Macedonian type took on a specific resonance when employed by Agathokles.

Significantly more creative are Agathokles' second series of tetradrachms, with the female head of Kore on the obverse and Nike nailing up a military trophy on the reverse. The reverse's message of victory is clear.[502] The motif was almost new to coinage, appearing earlier on a rare issue of mid-fourth century Lampsakene staters (some of which made it to a hoard in Sicily, but their realisation of the motif is quite different). Slightly later, the same motif appeared on an emission of Seleukos from Susa.[503] However, it was a common motif in Greek art generally, appearing on fifth century Athenian pottery,[504] on the balustrade of the Temple of Athena Nike on the Acropolis,[505] and on a number of seals.[506] Rather than identifying any of these as the model, it is better to see them as evidence of a widespread motif which Agathokles drew upon and unsubtly associated with himself by the addition of the legend and *triskeles*. The female obverse is also very explicit. A female head had been a common Sicilian type for centuries,



Image 11: Tetradrachm of Agathokles' second series (S4)

[500] BMC 1. Predecessors: e.g. SNG.ANS.994-5; SNG.ANS.333.
[501] Just.*Epit.*23.3-4.
[502] Lorber (2005) 77-80.
[503] Lampsakos: Jenkins (1972) 127 & 288, *IGCH* 2124; Seleukos: *SC*.173-5.
[504] e.g. Beazley #230977, #230978.
[505] Kekulé (1881) pl.3 H.
[506] Onatas Gem: *BM*.1865.0712.86; *NCMA*, Intaglio ring: #2008.7; Ashmolean, Intaglio ring: AN1918.62.

sometimes signifying Artemis, local springs like Arethousa, Kore or Demeter.[507] The replacement of Arethousa, strongly associated with Syracuse, with Kore, who was explicitly pan-Sicilian and closely associated with previous anti-Carthaginian autocrats,[508] was a political statement about the nature of Agathokles' rule. Agathokles' tetradrachm allows no ambiguity: the new head's design borrows from the contemporary depiction of Demeter on Metapontine coinage,[509] and is clearly different from the usual female head on all earlier Sicilian issues. From the second sub-issue onwards, it is labelled as ΚΟΡΑΣ so that it cannot be misidentified. Kore was important to Agathokles' war effort more generally.[510] Meanwhile the Nike on the reverse would speak clearly to anyone Agathokles paid, regardless of where they were from. The coin definitely represents a widening of Agathokles' focus, but the local context and local traditions remain a central part of its iconography.

The most striking of Agathokles' coins is a rare gold stater G4, which is a close imitation of Ptolemy's second set of tetradrachms (pictured below at left). This is an artistic imitation; the imitation is in a different material and denomination from the prototype, which never circulated in Sicily.[511] Once again, the fact of reuse itself created meaning: it shows Agathokles' efforts to present himself as the peer of the Diadochoi as a result of his successes in Africa and to emphasise his close link with Ptolemy.[512] I will focus here on the former theme – Agathokles' connections with Ptolemy are discussed in chapter 8.2; if G4 was minted shortly after 306, then it cannot be associated with any known event in their relationship, but I will argue in chapter 8.2 that Agathokles and Ptolemy had already come into close contact by this date as a result of the Ophellas affair and Ptolemy's

[507] Zisa (1993) 85-7.
[508] See n.723.
[509] e.g.*SNG ANS*.503; *SNG Cop.*1223.
[510] See p.168.
[511] Svoronos (1904) pl 4, 23.
[512] Evans (1894) 240-2; Consolo Langher (1993) 80; Williams & Burnett (1998) 385-6; Consolo Langher (2000) 190; Caccamo Caltabiano (2010) 279.

conquest of Corinth.[513] Even if we had a fuller record of interactions between Ptolemy and Agathokles, it is an open question whether coin imitations should be linked to specific diplomatic events.[514]

Ptolemy's tetradrachms had a complicated ideological programme of their own. The obverse replaced a portrayal of Herakles/Alexander-in-the-guise-of-Herakles with an unambiguous portrayal of a divine Alexander, as shown by the horn of Ammon and the *aigis* on his back. The horn recalled the specific link between Alexander and Ptolemy's own satrapy of Egypt – a link that helped to justify Ptolemy's seizure of Alexander's body.[515] The elephant scalp recalled Alexander's victories in India and claim to world empire, but probably also recalled Ptolemy's personal victory over the elephants of Perdikkas at the Battle of the Fort of Camels.[516] The engraver of the Ptolemaic tetradrachm took care to incorporate a diadem into the depiction of Alexander, because it had already become an important symbol of Alexander and his kingship, which the Diadochoi were quick to employ in order to link their own kingship to that of Alexander when they finally assumed the royal title.[517] The depiction



Images 12-13: Ptolemaic tetradrachm & Agathoklean gold stater (G4)

[513] See Chapters 2.2 and 8.2.1-2.
[514] van Alfen (2005) 341 is sceptical.
[515] Hadley (1964) 6-37.
[516] Smith (1988) 41; Mørkholm (1991) 63; Lorber (2012a) 212, claiming additionally a specific resonance with Thutmosis IV; Diod.Sic.18.34.
[517] Smith (1988) 34-8.

of Athena on Ptolemy's reverses, with the distinctive archaising swallowtail drapery appears to draw from Athenian prize amphorae and depictions of Athena as a subsidiary symbol on Alexander's coins. Havelock suggests that the former might reflect a message of victory, spear-won land, and Ptolemy's claim to be defender of the Greeks, while Brett connects the latter to Macedonian identity, as Athena Alkidemos, patron goddess of Pella.[518] The eagle standing on a thunderbolt at Athena's side is one of the the most prominent symbols of Ptolemy's coinage. Ptolemy's tetradrachm thus created close connections between himself, Alexander, Egypt, the Macedonians, and Greek freedom.

These specific Ptolemaic messages did not really fit Agathokles and a number of the most important details of Ptolemy's tetradrachms are absent from Agathokles' staters. Agathokles' coin omits both the horn of Ammon, with all its specific Egyptian connotations, and the diadem, with its specific connection to Alexander's kingship.[519] Athena's swallowtail drapery is less archaising and largely hidden by the addition of wings. The Ptolemaic eagle beside Athena is transformed into a tiny owl. These changes might be explained as simple indifference to tiny details of the Ptolemaic prototype, which would itself be a significant sign of Agathokles' own priorities, given how potent these symbols were for Ptolemy. They might also be explained as active decisions. The absence of the diadem, for instance, might reflect the fact that that Agathokles linked his rulership with a different piece of headgear, the *stephanos*, as we will see in chapter four.[520]

However, the imagery as a whole was an attractive appropriation for Agathokles because it was capable of advertising the significance of his victory over the Carthaginians in Africa, a particularly appropriate message if my argument above that G4 was minted with the gold received

[518] Brett (1950), 59-61; Havelock (1980); Lehmler (2005), 71.
[519] Ierardi (1995-6) 18; Alonso Troncoso (2013) 259.
[520] See chapter 4.1.

from Carthage in the Peace treaty of 306/05 is accepted.[521] The addition of wings to Athena on the reverse, emphasises her as Athena Nike and, whether we accept that the small owl beside Athena refers to the omen of the owls before Agathokles' first battle in Africa or not, it is clear that from the anecdote's existence and from the equestrian portrait which Agathokles set up in the Temple of Athena in Syracuse, that Agathokles sought to link his Carthaginian war with Athena, just as earlier Syracusan autocrats had.[522] The elephant was also fitting, since it was already common knowledge in Agathokles' time that elephants were found in Africa.[523] In the Roman Period, the figure of a woman wearing an elephant scalp represents the divine personification of Africa (as well as Alexandria and Egypt), but it is unlikely that G4 represents an example of this personification, because she is not otherwise attested until the first century BC and because the figure on G4 is male.[524] Just as Alexander's coinage shows Herakles as conqueror of the Nemean Lion and Ptolemy's coinage depicts Alexander as conqueror of India, G4 depicts the conqueror of Africa. This makes it likely that G4 was intended to depict Agathokles himself, an interpretation that would fit with the connections drawn between Agathokles and Alexander in the literary tradition, as discussed in other areas in chapter two.[525] Thus G4 was not a straightforward imitation of its Ptolemaic prototype – the motif was adapted for his own purposes, removing extraneous Ptolemaic symbolism and focussing attention on Agathokles' African victories. In the process, Agathokles did

[521] See p.94.
[522] Owls: Diod.Sic.20.11.3; Head (1874) 47; Hadley (1964) 147 & Lehmler (2005) 71 (sceptical). Athena: Diod.Sic.11.26.2, Cic.*Verr.*2.4.124-125; On Athena, see pp.143 and 169-170.
[523] Elephants in Africa: Hdt. 4.191; Arist.*Cael.*298a points to elephants as evidence that Africa and India were connected. Gościwit Malinowski suggests to me that G4 may reflect autopsy of the African elephant, which has larger ears than the Indian elephant. Agathokles may have seen elephants in Africa, but he did not fight them, because Carthaginian military did not yet use them: Hoyos (2010) 162-3.
[524] Leglay (1966), p.1239; *LIMC* I sv.Africa, Aigyptos, Alexandria. A Classical and Hellenistic personification of Libya is known from Cyrene, but looks quite different: a Berber woman with ringlets and a heavy cloak: Paus.10.15.6; Robinson (1927), pp.ccxlviii-ccl; Catani (1986).
[525] See chapter 2.2.

something quite innovative – if G4 does depict Agathokles himself, then Agathokles would be the first Hellenistic ruler to depict himself on his coinage, by roughly a decade.[526]

Rather than illustrating a transition from a traditional, civic, and Sicilian style of rule to a new, autocratic, and Hellenistic style, Agathokles coinage illustrates the large amount that Agathokles had in common with the Diadochoi throughout his reign. The fact that Agathokles could appeal to Gelon and Philip at the same time with two very similar images, and Alexander and Timoleon with one and the same coin shows that Sicilian and Hellenistic models were not diametrically opposed for Agathokles. He did not have to disavow one for the other; both could be drawn on simultaneously to achieve his monetary and political purposes.

3.3.3. The Despot's Progress

Throughout his reign, then, Agathokles' coins combined local and international resonances to varying degrees. They spoke generically to, say, mercenaries and merchants, but also specifically to Syracusan and Sicilian concerns. This is quite different from the narrative usually spun from them, in which they illustrate Freeman's idea of the "despot's progress" from private individual, through constitutional ruler, to absolute monarch, which has been reinterpreted by Consolo Langher, Lehmler and other recent scholars as a transition from Sicilian tyrant to Hellenistic monarch.[527] This reinterpretation is based on an assumption which I question throughout this thesis: the idea that Hellenistic kingship was so different from Sicilian tyranny that the two were incompatible. Specifically, the reinterpretation is enabled by the idea that a Hellenistic king's authority was more personal than a Sicilian tyrant's and transcended the *polis* in a way that the latter's did not.

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[526] For the chronology of Diadoch coinage portraits: Thonemann (2005) 18-22.
[527] e.g. Head (1874); Buda (1969-70) 204-5; Consolo Langher (2000) 159-68; Lehmler (2005) 62; Zambon (2006) 80-2. *Contra*: Ierardi (1995-6); Boehringer (2009).

We have seen already that the interpretation of the iconography of Agathokles' coinage in this way oversimplifies a more complex process in which Macedonian and Ptolemaic motifs were incorporated into a Sicilian context.[528] In addition to iconography, Freeman, Consolo Langher and Lehmler point to the changing inscriptions of Agathokles' coins over time. As we saw in the discussion of chronology, Agathokles' earliest coins mostly bear the legend ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, while S4 and G4 use ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ, and the latest coinage uses ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ. It is supposed to indicate Agathokles' slow aggregation of personal power by salami tactics, appropriating Syracuse's right to mint first gold, then silver, and finally bronze.[529] The identification of this phenomenon is problematic, since the legends were also the main piece of evidence used by Head to create the chronology of Agathokles' issues in the first place. This creates a circular argument, where the transition of the legends is made to appear complete and absolute because the chronology has begun from the assumption that it was. As I have argued above, the transition does exist as a general tendency, but other evidence shows that it was much less absolute and total. Some of Agathokles' last coins used the legend ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, such as G6 and B11-B12; ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕ(Ι)ΟΣ and ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ probably appeared simultaneously on different denominations of bronze, electrum and gold; and on G4 and S4, ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ preceded ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ.[530]

Even if these chronological issues did not exist, the idea of the despot's progress makes a number of assumptions about the significance of legends which are not sustainable. It is assumed that starting with gold and adjectival forms and eventually moving to bronze and genitive forms would disguise a power grab.[531] It is not clear why this should be so. Placing the personal name of the ruler on coinage was a novel act whether it was an adjective or a genitive. The distinction between the

[528] Lehmler (2005) 65-68.
[529] Head (1911) 181-2; Caccamo Caltabiano (2010) 279.
[530] See pp.94, 98.
[531] Ierardi (1995-6) 20.

gold and bronze relies on the idea that bronze penetrated a wider cross-section of society. But it seems unlikely anyone would remain unaware of the appearance of Agathokles' name on the precious metal coinage if it actually represented a controversial power grab. But why should it? Agathokles appropriated private assets and carried out mass-slaughter from his election as *strategos autokrator* in 317. There were a number of historical precedents which indicated that from that point on his authority was absolute. I discuss this in more detail in chapter four, but it is unbelievable that, despite this, the Syracusans were unaware that he controlled the mint.[532] Moreover, the ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ coinage remained in circulation, so the Syracusans would have seen an introduction of coinage with Agathokles' name, not a replacement of their coinage with his. So the change would not have seemed as total as the arrangement of the coins in chronological series in a cabinet makes it seem. Finally, the assumption that the Greeks closely connected minting rights and sovereignty has been strongly attacked by Thomas Martin, who argued instead that coin attributions were primarily economic and practical decisions.[533] The assumption is particularly difficult to sustain in Agathokles' Sicily. Most of the Sicilian *poleis* fought against Agathokles in the name of freedom, but many of them no longer issued coinage at all.[534] The entire island had mostly made use of foreign coinages instead – Corinthian and (to a lesser degree) Carthaginian for decades. Syracuse had a special relationship with the Corinthians, but it was not under Corinthian control.[535] The Carthaginian coinage was used in areas that certainly were not considered part of the Carthaginian *eparcheia*, including Syracuse itself. In this context, a close association between coinage and sovereignty would be surprising. Thus, the removal of ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ would not

[532] See chapter 4.2.1. Cf. various anecdotes about Dionysios I's control of coinage: Arist.*Pol.*1313b26; Polyaen.5.2.4, 5.2.19.
[533] Martin (1985); independenly, Mørkholm (1991) 84. On the application of the concept of 'sovereignty' to the ancient Greek context, see Davies (1994).
[534] See chapter 5.3.
[535] On this relationship, see chapter 8.1.1.

necessarily have disturbed the Syracusans, while the assumption of absolute power would not have required Agathokles to put his name on his coins.[536]

Finally, the whole narrative is informed by a parallel narrative told about the assumption of kingship by the Diadochoi (especially Ptolemy), in which their coinage is seen to illustrate a gradual and tentative journey to claiming royal power.[537] This is a false parallel. For the Diadochoi, putting their names on their coinage represented a step from claiming links with Alexander to claiming parity with him, rule over his empire and, therefore, superiority over the other Diadochoi. While Philip III and Alexander IV were alive, this was dangerous because enemies could present appropriation of power as rebellion – as Perdikkas did to Ptolemy in 321/20.[538] These accusations did not just generate *casus belli*, they were also taken seriously by lower-ranking administrators like Xenophilos in Susa and by the rank and file troops.[539] That is, appearing to appropriate royal authority also threatened the Diadochoi's relationships with their subordinates. Agathokles did not have to worry about being accused by rivals or subordinates of appropriating the authority of the Argead monarchs or their regents. In fact, Agathokles placed his name on his own coinage long before the Diadochoi, who did not generally do so until the 290s.[540]

Why then did Agathokles put his name on his coinage? Presumably, there was, as in his coinage generally, an important element of simple self-aggrandisement. Placing his name on the coinage put himself on the same level as the limited number of other people who had issued coinage in

[536] The appearance of personal names on Diadoch coinage is not linked to the assumption of power either: most of them did not place their own names on their coins until the 290s, long after they had all claimed the kingship: Thonemann (2015) 19-22, while Eupolemos Potalou may have minted coinage in his own names in the 310s, despite being a subordinate of Kassandros respectively at the time: Descat (1998) 170-4.
[537] Zervos (1967) 9-10; Mørkholm (1991) 64.
[538] Diod.Sic.18.29.1.
[539] Diod.Sic.19.15.5, 19.41.
[540] See n.536.

their own name: Philip, Alexander, Alexander of Epeiros.[541] This is part of the same phenomenon as the appropriation of motifs from the east, which I have argued should be viewed as additive rather than transformative. Secondly, Agathokles' name indicated the role that his military activity had played in acquiring the wealth that the coins represented (jointly with Kore, on the tetradrachms).[542] They thus continue and emphasise the theme of Agathokles' personal responsibility for victory over the Carthaginians and the bounty that flowed from it – a claim which was actually highly contested, as I argued in chapter two.[543] Thirdly, the presence of Agathokles' name stressed to the recipients of his cash, both soldiers and community, that he had made substantial benefactions to them. They were in his personal debt.[544] They could also expect further pay from him since he had already demonstrated himself to be both willing and capable of doing so. The intention to activate ideas about reciprocity helps to explain the fact that the legend appears most consistently on the most valuable coins. On Agathokles' earlier issues, the *triskeles* had sent similar messages; the shift to a legend can be seen partially as a desire to assert parity with the Diadochoi, as just mentioned, and perhaps also a response to the increasing numbers of soldiers in Agathokles' service who had been employed by Alexander and other Macedonian dynasts and were used to receiving coins labelled with personal names.

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[541] A vast number of other dynasts issued named coinages in the fourth century BC, including the Illyrian kings, Patraos and Audoleon: SNG ANS 1040 & SNG V 3370; a large number of Persian satraps: Pharnabazos in Phrygia, Tissaphernes, Autophradates, Orontas, and Spithridates in western Asia Minor, Datames and Ariarathes at Sinope, Tiribazos, Pharnabazos, Datamas, and Mazaios in Cilicia, Sanballit and Bagabates in Samaria, Sabakes and Mazakes in Egypt, Stasan- in the far east; similar issues continue under Alexander, with Mazaios and Mazakes at Babylon and Balakros in Cilicia: Alram (2012) 74-80; as well as the Hekatomnids in Caria and Dionysios of Herakleia Pontika: *SNG Cop*.421. Minor cases, in bronze only, are Thibron in Cyrenaica, Aspeisas in Susiana and Eupolemos Potalou in western Asia Minor: Picard (1989) 682-3; Robinson (1921); Descat (1998). It is not clear to me how familiar these issues would have been in Sicily.

[542] Deities are usually labelled in the nominative, e.g. *SNG Cop*.276.

[543] See p.73.

[544] Trundle (2004) 42-4, drawing on Xen.*An*., on the importance of personal relationships with mercenaries; see n.1282 on gift-based relationships.

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate the nature of Agathokles' coinage: when it was issued and where it went. At the same time, I have also sought to use it to explore the major theme of this thesis: Agathokles' simultaneous relationships to his past and present, to the local Sicilian context and to the wider Mediterranean. I have argued for a chronology which largely conforms to the outline laid down by Barclay Head over a century ago, but somewhat messier, with some overlaps rather than a strict three period system. This more complex system allows us to move beyond the simple narrative of transformation from a peculiarly Sicilian past to a shared Hellenistic future that has been constructed from Agathokles' coinage to date.

In the next part of this thesis, I will be arguing that Sicily was not isolated from the wider Mediterranean before Agathokles and that previous patterns of interaction between Sicily and the wider world played an important role in shaping Agathokles' own interactions with the other powers in the Mediterranean, alongside the novel circumstances at the beginning of the Hellenistic Age. The evidence for the circulation of Agathokles' coinage provides support for this, which is particularly valuable for being independent of the literary evidence. The circulation patterns show that Agathokles was involved in long-established phenomena, like the drift of Sicilian bronze coinage into Italy and the Adriatic, and the reliance on foreign sources for much of the island's silver. The same circulation patterns also show that changes in the eastern Mediterranean, like the end of the Corinthian *Pegasoi*, impacted on Agathokles' Sicily, requiring him to adopt some innovations from the Diadochoi, like the reduced weight *pegasoi*, and some innovations from elsewhere, like the electrum coinage.

I further argued that the iconography of Agathokles' coins tell a more complex story than hitherto argued. They unquestionably show that Agathokles was engaging with the iconographic innovations of his eastern rivals, but rather than a simple replacement of Sicilian motifs with Hellenistic ones, I argued for an active selection and re-shaping of elements to suit his particular

context. Obviously, this argument, like all interpretations of iconography, has an element of the subjective to it, but it is important to demonstrate that an alternative interpretation to the straightforward transformation, which has hitherto been argued, is possible. My interpretation of the coinage iconography does not stand alone, either. It forms part of my broader argument that Sicilian and Hellenistic contexts should not be seen as adversarial and incompatible. They had their idiosyncrasies, but also a lot in common. As a result, Agathokles could easily adapt practices of the Diadochoi in his Sicilian context. I have already made that argument in relation to the literary tradition in the previous chapters. In chapter 8, I will return to the theme in my examination of Agathokles' rulership style. We have already seen that the changing legends of Agathokles' coinage do not provide evidence for a fundamental change in the presentation of Agathokles' authority and we will see that a similar pattern of careful incorporation rather than wholesale transformation can be seen in all aspects of Agathokles' rulership and self-presentation – not just his representation of himself on coinage.

PART II: RULERSHIP

4. TYRANNOSICULUS REX

Around 304 BC, Agathokles took the title of *basileus*. He did this in response to the assumption of the title by the various successors of Alexander in the east. For many modern scholars, this moment marks a fundamental transformation of the kind of ruler that Agathokles was – the development into a more absolute ruler, transcending the *polis*, and somehow more Hellenistic. Consolo Langher says that with Agathokles' assumption of the kingship, "*la trasformazione istituzionale fece insomma della Sicilia un regno unitario, in cui le minori città greche e i centri siculi e sicani erano collegati direttamente al* basileus," distinct from earlier Sicilian autocracies in its degree of institutionalisation and emphasis on hereditary succession.[545] This picture has been reiterated by scholars since.[546] The central argument of this thesis is that that representation is wrong and that Agathokles does not represent a decisive break with the Sicilian past, but the continued development of earlier trends. In chapter two I emphasised how ancient sources' tropes of tyranny and Hellenistic kingship overlapped and were both applied to Agathokles. In chapter three, I argued that Agathokles' coinage shows the continued importance of the traditional Sicilian context even when Agathokles adopted innovations from the Diadochoi. In Part III of this thesis, I will emphasise how Agathokles' interactions with the wider world followed earlier patterns, which he adapted when necessary, but mostly remained logical responses even in the changing circumstances of the early Hellenistic period.

In this chapter I deal specifically with Agathokles' rulership and self-representation, arguing for the importance of Sicilian precedents throughout his reign. Agathokles developed these precedents for his own purposes. When it suited him, he also adopted innovations of the Diadochoi

[545] Consolo Langher (2000), 261-81 (quote at 271).
[546] Zambon (2006); La Torre (2009) 191; Lanteri (2011); Raccuia (2011) 234-43; Santagati (2011), esp.57; also Berve (1967) 453. Contra Finley (1979) 101-8; Meister (1984) 411; Lewis (2006) 52-7.

for his own context. But when he did this, he was not borrowing from a separate and alien system of autocracy. Agathokles and the Diadochoi were both part of an existing tradition of Greek autocracy. I demonstrate these assertions by examining Agathokles' assumption of the royal title. I then look at the aspects of Agathokles' rule after his assumption of the royal title which have been identified by Consolo Langher and others as "Hellenistic," demonstrating that they were part of Agathokles' rule before his assumption of the royal title, that each had precedents in Agathokles' predecessors in Sicily, and that they overlapped with the practices of (some of) the Diadochoi.

4.1. The Royal Title

That Agathokles used the royal title is demonstrated by the legend ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ on his third series coinage and by authors who refer to him as a king, including Cicero, Justin, Polybios, and Plutarch. But only Diodoros describes an event at which the title was adopted. He presents it (incorrectly)[547] under the year 307/06 BC, immediately after his account of the coronation of the Diadochoi after the Battle of Salamis, as follows:

> Ἀγαθοκλῆς γὰρ πυθόμενος τοὺς προειρημένους δυνάστας ἀνῃρημένους <διάδημα> καὶ νομίζων μήτε δυνάμεσι μήτε χώρᾳ μήτε τοῖς πραχθεῖσι λείπεσθαι τούτων ἑαυτὸν ἀνηγόρευσε βασιλέα. καὶ διάδημα μὲν οὐκ ἔκρινεν ἔχειν· ἐφόρει γὰρ αἰεὶ στέφανον, ὃν κατὰ τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῆς τυραννίδος ἔκ τινος ἱερωσύνης περικείμενος οὐκ ἀπέθετο περὶ τῆς δυναστείας ἀγωνιζόμενος· ἔνιοι δέ φασιν αὐτὸν ἐπιτετηδεῦσθαι τοῦτον ἐξ ἀρχῆς φορεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ λίαν αὐτὸν εὐχαίτην εἶναι.[548]
>
> For, since Agathokles learnt that the aforementioned *dynastai* had taken <the diadem> and he considered that he did not lag behind them in forces, in land, or in deeds, he declared himself *basileus*. And yet he decided not to have a diadem, since he always wore a *stephanos*, which he had had when he seized

[547] See p.138.
[548] Cf. Ael.*VA*.11.4.

> the tyranny on account of a priesthood and did not take off while he was striving for the *dynasteia*. But some people say that he was accustomed to wear this from the beginning because he did not have a very full head of hair.
>
> Diod.Sic.20.54.1

On the face of it, the passage provides ample justification for the idea that this moment marked the adoption of Hellenistic kingship with some adjustments to fit the Sicilian context; the virtues justifying Agathokles' kingship (forces, territory and deeds) match those that the *Diadochoi* point to in the preceding passage of Diodoros, while the use of the *stephanos* rather than the *diadema* represents the adaptation of the new style of rule to fit the local context of Sicily (or the even more local context of his personal vanity). The wider context of the passage within Diodoros' work suggests that this is not his point. He has no interest in presenting this as a transformative moment.

In fact, Diodoros uses the episode to elaborate the themes in his characterisation of Agathokles which I discussed in chapter one: Agathokles as an example of the importance of Sicily, Agathokles as an example of the reversal of fortunes, and the paradoxical nature of his rulership.[549] The nature of the passage allows Diodoros to place Agathokles on par with the Diadochoi and Sicily on par with the Macedonians. He has manipulated chronology to do this, placing Agathokles' assumption of the kingship immediately after Diadochoi assume the diadem, making the abundant verbal correspondences between the two passages readily apparent. 20.54 clearly continues that trend; Agathokles' forces, territory and deeds can only be as significant as those of the Diadochoi if Sicily is as important as Greece, Asia Minor or Egypt and the Carthaginians as fearsome as the Persians. As for the theme of paradoxical reversals of fortune, the passage opens an extended piece of continuous narrative on Agathokles' activities in 307/06 BC and explicitly marks this as the acme of Agathokles' achievements in Africa: Utica was taken shortly thereafter, the exiles appeared

[549] See chapter 1.1.2.

defeated in Sicily, and Agathokles' troops in Africa reached exotic lands at the ends of the Earth.[550] All this emphasises the extent of the disaster when the African expedition completely collapses, costs Agathokles both his sons' and nearly his own life. Thus, this passage prepares the ground for the fall which follows, which links into Diodoros' wider ideas about divine justice. Finally, the passage also contributes Diodoros' exploration and characterisation of Agathokles' tyranny. As I argued in chapter one, Diodoros explains Agathokles' deviations from the tyrannical stereotype by showing that they are ultimately motivated by stereotypical tyrannical vices. When Diodoros stresses that Agathokles retained the *stephanos* rather than taking the diadem, he is presenting another case of Agathokles appearing to avoid tyrannical behaviour.[551] Diodoros' attitude towards the diadem is made clear from his incorrect claim that it was not an innovation of Alexander and the Diadochoi, but an accoutrement of the Persian kings, originally invented by the *trypheros* Dionysos in order to ward off hangovers.[552] As in the other cases, Diodoros demonstrates that this apparently non-tyrannical behaviour actually had its roots in Agathokles' tyrannical nature, using the anecdote about Agathokles' baldness to show the avoidance of the diadem derived from his vanity.

Thus, Diodoros does not describe Agathokles drastically transforming the nature of his rule. On the contrary, he uses the assumption of the royal title in order to continue themes which run through his whole account of Agathokles. To see the assumption of the royal title as a fundamental change in Agathokles' rule is to read Diodoros against the grain. That does not prove that it is wrong, of course; the next two sections will look at the assumption of the kingship as a historical rather than a literary moment, arguing that when Agathokles took the title, he was responding to immediate

[550] Diod.Sic.20.54-8. Cf. Diod.Sic.17.90; Arr.*Anab.*7.13.
[551] cf.Diod.Sic.19.9.7.
[552] Diod.Sic.4.4.4, 17.77.5, 17.83.3. On the origins and history of the diadem: Smith (1988) 34-8.

circumstances and making a claim about his regime's successful past, not a programmatic statement about its future form.

To begin with, when did Agathokles take the royal title? Diodoros says it happened when Anaxikrates was archon at Athens (307/306), after the Diadochoi had crowned themselves kings following the Battle of Salamis, and immediately before Agathokles besieged Utica.[553] This cannot be correct. Agathokles left Africa for good, at the setting of the Pleiades in the middle of Anaxikrates' archon year (in winter 307/06).[554] At 20.54, Diodoros has jumped back to the beginning of Anaxikrates' archon year in order to narrate the large number of things Agathokles did in that same year.[555] If he is followed, Agathokles proclaimed himself king in response to the Diadochoi before the Battle of Salamis, which is absurd. Further, although Diodoros (and all other Greek historians) present all the Diadochoi taking the kingship in a single moment – in response to Antigonos' assumption of the title immediately after the Battle of Salamis – more detailed evidence has made it clear that this is a simplification. Cuneiform tablets show that Seleukos took the royal title after March 305 and before 16 April 304; Boiy argues that this occurred on the Babylonian New Year (14 April 305).[556] Ptolemy still appears as a satrap in Theban demotic papyri from January 304. The *Parian Marble* and the *Ptolemaic Canon* indicate that he took the title between November 305 and July 304.[557] Thus, the basilification of the Diadochoi was a multi-year process, which Diodoros

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[553] Diod.Sic.20.53-4.
[554] Diod.Sic.20.69.3.
[555] Agathokles' African Expedition cannot be downdated; the dates are fixed by the eclipse of August 310 and by the arrival of Ophellas in 308/07.
[556] Boiy (2011).
[557] Gruen (1985) 258, proposes that Ptolemy took the title in response to the Antigonid defeat at Rhodes in spring 304 and Bennett (2000-11) sv. Ptolemy I, suggests the start of the new Macedonian year on 4 June 304.
There is no evidence for the other Diadochoi. Saitta and Lund assume Lysimachos took the title at the same time as Ptolemy: Saitta (1955) 74 n.12; Lund (1992) 66, 156-7. The tradition preserved by Plut.*Demetr.*18.2 that Kassandros did not take the royal title at all is disproven by numismatic and epigraphic evidence: *Syll*^{3} 332 (=SEG 38.620), 362; SEG 34.620, 47.940; Gruen (1985) 268 n.43; Landucci Gattinoni (2003) 133-137; none of this evidence allows Kassandros' assumption of the title to be precisely dated.

has squashed down into a single year. It seems unlikely that Agathokles took the title immediately after Antigonos and Demetrios and before all the other Diadochoi. I doubt he took the title before Ptolemy.[558]

Numismatic evidence also stands against Diodoros; the royal title is absent from coins minted during the African Expedition. But other evidence offers the possibility of dating the event. Firstly, as we've seen, Agathokles' attachment to his *stephanos* strongly attracts Diodoros' attention and he specifies that Agathokles did not remove it "while he was contending for his *dynasteia.*"[559] Probably the stress on this means that Agathokles took the royal title before he had finished off the Syracusan exiles with the conquest of Gela in 303/02.[560] Secondly, I argued in chapter three that Agathokles' gold octobols, which bear the legend ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ and were therefore minted after he took the royal title, were minted after the peace settlement with Carthage at the end of 306/05 BC, with the reparations paid by the Carthaginians.[561] This suggests that Agathokles took the kingship soon after peace with Carthage. Taking the title at this point would follow the example set by Antigonos and Demetrios after Salamis, and also the public affirmation of Gelon I's position after his war with the Carthaginians.[562] There are no literary records of victory celebrations for the African War as a whole, but victory celebrations of some sort surely occurred: there is an account of small scale victory celebrations after a victory over Akragas in 307/06[563] and there are many anecdotes of Agathokles feasting which have no chronological context.[564]

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[558] Beloch (1912) iv.2.252
[559] Diod.Sic.20.54.1: ὃν κατὰ τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῆς τυραννίδος ἔκ τινος ἱερωσύνης περικείμενος οὐκ ἀπέθετο περὶ τῆς δυναστείας ἀγωνιζόμενος…
[560] Diod.Sic.20.90.2
[561] Diod.Sic.20.79.5.
[562] Diod.Sic.11.26.
[563] Diod.Sic.20.63.
[564] See pp.156-7, 166-7.

The accounts of the assumption of the kingship emphasise the title of king as a form of address, rather than as an office. Polybios provides a particularly neat example; as he says, Agathokles *became* (ἐγενήθη) master of Sicily and was *called* (προσαγορευόμενος) king.[565] Diodoros' account of the coronation of the Diadochoi is similarly replete with words for "called" or "named."[566] The fact that *basileus* is a title lies behind the two main reasons for Agathokles' assumption of the royal title.[567] Firstly, the assumption of the title was part of an ongoing effort by Agathokles to assert himself as equal in rank to the Macedonian dynasts. Secondly, the title formed part of Agathokles' representation of himself as a victor in the years after the war with Carthage.

Agathokles stressed his parity with the Macedonian rulers consistently from the beginning of his rule, as shown by the way he recycled coin imagery that had been used by Philip II and Ptolemy in his coinage before 305 BC.[568] The painting of Agathokles on horseback, set up by him in the Temple of Athena invites comparison with portraits of Alexander and the Diadochoi.[569] We do not know what this painting looked like, but a number of small votives of late fourth and early third century date, like the one at left, found in Syracuse and now on display in the Paolo Orsi Museum might be indicative of the way cavalry battles were being depicted in Agathokles' Syracuse and are very similar to equestrian battles as depicted on the Alexander sarcophagus and



Image 14: Museo Paolo Orsi #839, Achradina, E 3rd C BC

[565] Polyb.12.15.7, 15.35.3-4.
[566] Diod.Sic.20.53.2-4.
[567] cf.Lewis (2006) 53.
[568] See chapter 3.3.2.
[569] Cic.*Verr*.2.4.122; Ath.11.462; Coarelli (1982); Lehmler (2005) 111-6; Portale (2011) 290-312. Cf. Plin.*HN*.35.192 (Apelles' painting of Alexander in Temple of Ephesus), Plin.*HN*.35.96 (Apelles' paintings of various other dynasts); Smith (1988) ; Stewart (1993) 123-57, 191-228.

the Alexander mosaic. So Agathokles was probably depicted in this painting in a manner very similar to Alexander and the Diadochoi. This presentation culminated with the marriage connections which Agathokles made to the Diadochoi in the 290s, which are discussed in chapter eight.[570] That the assumption of the royal title also played this role is strongly stated in the account of Diodoros that I have just discussed, and is corroborated by the use of coin types modelled on those of Alexander on the coins which announced his kingship.[571] An anecdote from the late third century historian Phylarchos, which is preserved in Athenaios and Plutarch, provides further evidence which bridges the gap between the numismatic evidence and Diodoros.[572] Phylarchos' account mocked Demetrios as haughty and arrogant for refusing to refer to the other early Hellenistic monarchs as kings in dinner conversation, with the implication that the members of this group were usually recognised as similar in status by each other and by outside observers. It is significant, then, that Phylarchos included Agathokles in the privileged group, emphasising that he saw Agathokles as part of the same group of dynasts as the Diadochoi and that the royal title was an important aspect of that perception. For Agathokles, asserting his parity with the Diadochoi was important on the international stage; the appearance of weakness could have encouraged attack from the east.[573] In the domestic context, the idea that Agathokles was of equal rank to the Macedonian rulers must have been a reassuring one for his subjects, particularly his soldiers, promising that he was as skilled a general and as reliable a paymaster as they were, especially as he came into increasingly direct conflict with other kings in the 290s.[574] The desire to be seen as the equal of the best in Greece had been an important part of Sicilian rulership for a long time, motivating the Deinomenids and

[570] See chapter 8.2.2-2.3.
[571] See p.120.
[572] Phylarchos FGrH 81 F 31=Ath.6.78; Plut.*Demetr.*25. Hauben (1974) on the anecdote; Pédech (1989) 391-493 on Phylarchos generally.
[573] See chapter 8.
[574] Cf. Plut.*Demetr.*41, 44, *Pyrrh.*8.1, 11 on the defection of Demetrios' soldiers to Pyrrhos in 289 BC - only Pyrrhos appeared to truly imitate the model of Alexander the Great.

Dionysios to spend large amounts on the erection of monuments to themselves in the Panhellenic sanctuaries and competition in the Panhellenic games.[575] The same competitive urge had played a role in Gelon's demand for a commanding role in the Greek resistance to the Persians in 480 and in Dionysios' provision of troops to the Spartans in 369/68 and 368/67.[576] When the Diadochoi took on the royal title, they made a statement about relative status; Agathokles could not allow himself to be left behind.

The second aspect of Agathokles' assumption of the title also responds to the coronation of the Diadochoi. They seem to have taken the title in celebration of military successes. This is only explicit in the case of Antigonos and Demetrios after Salamis, but Ptolemy's assumption of the title may have followed the Siege of Rhodes, and Seleukos took it, "having recently gained the upper satrapies."[577] The title had an honorific sense, which implied that its bearer had done something worth honouring. In Agathokles' case, the evidence for dating discussed above makes it safe to associate the assumption of the title with celebrations of victory over Carthage. The war with Carthage was the sort where it was not entirely clear who the victor was – his exiled opponents could easily paint it as a defeat: Agathokles had lost his entire army and both his sons in Africa; many Syracusans had lost their relatives; Carthage was unconquered. As a military leader, such a defeat severely undermined his authority. He could counter the negative evaluation of the war by presenting it as a defensive war, claiming he had never intended to conquer Carthage and proclaiming he had won freedom for the Greeks of Sicily. But the point is that, because the result of the war was not clear cut and because Agathokles was still fighting a group that were keen to

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[575] Bonanno (2010) 127-57; Morgan (2015) esp.23-132. Lys.33; Diod.Sic.14.109.
[576] Hdt.7.158-62 and see n.1189.
[577] *Marm.Par.*124; Diod.Sic.20.53.2-4 (προσφάτως τὰς ἄνω σατραπείας προσκεκτημένος…); Plut.*Demetr.*17; Ptolemy: Gruen (1984) 258, 267, Bennett (2001-11) sv.Ptolemy 7 (dating disputed and discussion predicated on the assumption that the kingship followed a military victory of some sort); generally, cf. *Suda* B147. I have emphasised the importance of presentation as a victor and the 'constructed' nature of Agathokles' victory at p.73. See also p.215.

undermine the bases of his power, it was necessary for him to strenuously and publically make the case that it had been a victory. In various media, we see Agathokles announcing his victory. His silver tetradrachms show Victory herself setting up a trophy for his African War, surrounded by ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ. His gold coins, minted rapidly in order to propagate them as quickly as possible, show the thunderbolt of Zeus Eleutherios. As we saw in chapter three, the message is that Agathokles is a victor, just like his predecessors and just like the Macedonians.[578] In the Temple of Athena, which Gelon had built with the indemnity paid by the Carthaginians after the Battle of Himera, Agathokles had himself depicted fighting on horseback (and presumably winning).[579] The assumption of the kingship was part of this case, helping to create the impression of successful military achievements and make his somewhat shaky situation seem more unassailable to opponents and would-be opponents in Sicily and abroad. Thus, when Agathokles took the royal title, it did not represent a fundamental change in the way his rule worked, nor a change in where sovereignty was believed to lie. The assumption of the kingship did not announce a dramatic change in Agathokles' regime; it sought to ensure its continuation.

4.2. Agathokles' Regime

In the preceding section, I have offered explanations for Agathokles' assumption of the royal title and for Diodoros' representation of it which do not involve a drastic transformation of Agathokles' rulership style. I now discuss the rulership style itself. As I have said, according to Consolo Langher and others, Agathokles created a new type of state which transcended the *polis* and centred on an autocrat whose power was untrammelled and expressly hereditary.[580] But this supposedly new and

[578] See chapter 3.3.1-3.2.
[579] See p.140.
[580] See n.545.

Hellenistic style of rule was already characteristic of his regime before he took the royal title and was also characteristic of many of the earlier autocrats in Sicily.

4.2.1. Absolute Power

The title of *basileus* is meant to have made Agathokles' authority absolute and removed any form of constitutional oversight.[581] But Agathokles was already an absolute ruler. From a legal point of view, he had been appointed *strategos autokrator* without colleagues in 317/16 BC.[582] Dionysios I had earlier used the same title, and apparently propagated the idea that it had previously been held by Gelon.[583] Legally, this office had absolute, unchecked authority.[584] In Agathokles' specific case, Diodoros says that the Syracusan mob gave him the title because they wanted him to "accept responsibility (ἐπιμέλειαν) for all things (τῶν ὅλων)."[585] *Epimeleia* implies rule on behalf of another.[586] Diodoros has Agathokles insist on holding this office alone (μοναρχεῖν), so that he should not be subject to punishment for colleagues' *paranomia*,[587] thereby emphasising the possibility of punishment and removal from office in theory, but he acknowledges the unlimited nature of this authority in practice, "thereafter he was plainly master and took responsibility for the *polis*."[588] Dionysios II's succession had been affirmed by the Syracusan assembly, which subsequently granted the title to Dion and then altered it several times, showing that they

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[581] Consolo Langher (2000) 268-71.
[582] *Marm.Par.*B17; Diod.Sic.19.9.4.
[583] Dionysios: [Plat.] *Ep*.8.383a-b; Diod.Sic.13.94.5-95.1, 16.10.4, 16.20.6; Plut.*Dion*.3.3. Gelon: Diod.Sic.13.94.5; Polyaen.1.27.1, with Dunbabin (1948), 428 and Bearzot (1991).
[584] Berve (1967) 237-8, 446; Bearzot (1991). Cf. Demosth.18.235 on Philip II; Diod.Sic.20.79.2, Deinokrates unwilling to come to terms with Agathokles because "he was called general of the exiles, but in fact had regal eminence, with the power of an *autokrator*" αὐτὸν μὲν καλεῖσθαι τῶν φυγάδων στρατηγόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ βασιλικὴν ἔχειν ὑπεροχήν, τῆς ἐξουσίας οὔσης περὶ αὐτὸν αὐτοκράτορος"; DH.2.14.2 "For the Lakedaimonian kings were not *autokratores* who could do whatever they liked; rather, the *gerousia* had total power over communal things." οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς αὐτοκράτορες ἦσαν ὅ τι βούλοιντο πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἡ γερουσία πᾶν εἶχε τῶν κοινῶν τὸ κράτος.
[585] Diod.Sic.19.9.3: προσδέξασθαι τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιμέλειαν…
[586] See n.634 on the *epimeletes*.
[587] Diod.Sic.19.9.4.
[588] Diod.Sic.19.9.4: τὸ λοιπὸν φανερῶς ἐδυνάστευε καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιεῖτο…

considered themselves to have the power to grant and rescind the position of *strategos autokrator*.[589]

On the other hand, it is unlikely that this office was a particularly important part of these earlier rulers' justification of their exercise of absolute power. The Deinomenids did not have any official title.[590] Whether Dionysios I continued to hold the title in the latter part of his rule is uncertain. It is not mentioned in accounts of Dionysios II's succession, which focus on his inheritance of power, emphasised by his conduct of his father's funeral.[591] The difficulty determining the titles of the Dionysioi indicates that they did not primarily derive power from such titles at all; it was primarily charismatic.[592] The exception is Dion, whose appointment, removal, and reappointment as *strategos autokrator* are thoroughly recorded – because he was in the process of establishing his authority in the face of challenges from all sides.[593] Votes about his office were an indicator of the mood of the people – their significance was not that they conferred legal authority upon him but that they indicated the acceptance of his charismatic authority. Similarly, Agathokles' original assumption of power shows that his authority was also primarily charismatic and absolute from the beginning. His assumption of power followed a massacre of the Six Hundred and of the Syracusan elite generally, followed by a cancellation of debts and redistribution of land.[594] The conferral of the office indicated the Syracusan *demos*' acceptance of his pre-eminence; it did not create it. After Agathokles' assumption of power, Diodoros never again mentions the title. In 310/09 Agathokles seized the property of Syracuse's orphans and killed the *euporotatoi* of Syracuse after granting

[589] Dionysios II: Diod.Sic.15.74.5 and Muccioli (1999) 113-8; Dion: Diod.Sic.16.10.3, 16.17.3, 16.20.6; Plut.*Dion* 29.4, 37.6, 48.4 and Sordi (1983) 19-24.
[590] Dunbabin (1948) 427; Bearzot (1991).
[591] Dionysios I: Caven (1990) 156; Dionysios II: Muccioli (1999) 113-8; Frisone (2015) 179-88.
[592] Concept: Weber (1954) 1.212-301. Dionysioi: Caven (1990) 156; Muccioli (1999) 459-70.
[593] See n.589.
[594] Diod.Sic.19.6-9; Meister (1984) 410.

them free passage out of the city.[595] In 307/06, he had the Syracusan relatives of his lost African army executed on the beach.[596] Like Macedonian kings, Sicilian tyrants had "precisely what rights and powers they could get away with"[597] and *de facto*, Agathokles' absolute power was entirely clear.

One might counter that the very existence of a legal title, granted by the Syracusan assembly, implied that the people could theoretically rescind his authority. But *basileia* would not change that. The *eunoia* of their subjects was an essential part of all Greek autocrats' justification of their power, whether titled king or not. The Hellenistic kings were usually acclaimed at their succession, implying their Macedonian subjects played a role in affirming their authority.[598] In 288/87 BC, when Demetrios Poliorketes' army, fed up with his failure to exercise his authority in the way they expected him to, decided to defect to Pyrrhos, the fact that he bore the title of *basileus* was no obstacle to them.[599] Greek communities acknowledged Hellenistic kings' authority by giving them honours, thereby claiming the right to judge their rulership.[600] According to Xenophon and Isokrates, the whole point of royal splendour and regalia is to generate this popular support.[601] Xenophon has Simonides tell Hieron that he should cease to rule through the fear of his mercenaries, and instead rule through esteem and gratitude for his virtue and benefactions – but both of these options assume that his authority flows from the consent of his subjects, not from

[595] Diod.Sic.20.4.5-7.
[596] Diod.Sic.20.72.
[597] Badian (1968) 198.
[598] Plut.*Demetr.*18.1 on Antigonos; Fraser (1972) 53 on Macedonian bodyguard and the Ptolemies; App.*Syr.*61 on Antiochos I.
[599] Bosworth (2002) 253-9. cf.Ptolemy XI: App.*BC.*1.102; Paus.1.9.3.
[600] See n.628.
[601] Xen.*Cyr*.8.3.1; Isoc.1.36.

any legal position.[602] While instructing King Nikokles of Salamis to reign virtuously, Isokrates tells him:

> Φυλακὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἡγοῦ τοῦ σώματος εἶναι τήν τε τῶν φίλων ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν εὔνοιαν καὶ τὴν σαυτοῦ φρόνησιν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ σώζειν τὰς τυραννίδας μάλιστ' ἄν τις δύναιτο.
>
> Consider the surest protection of your person to be the excellence of your friends, the good will of the citizens and your own wisdom, for it is by these things most of all that one may gain and preserve tyrannies.
>
> Isoc.2.21.

The source of authority is presented as personal excellence and the support of the people which flows from it.[603] In political thought at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, then, all autocrats received their authority from the people they governed; the distinction between *tyrannos* and *basileus* was the subjective judgement that the latter deserved their authority, while the former had acquired it inappropriately, through lies or fear.

Consolo Langher also claims that a key novelty of *basileia* was the presumption of hereditary succession. For a number of reasons, this does not work. Firstly, all previous autocracies in Sicily had been hereditary (except Timoleon), as had Greek tyrannies generally.[604] Pindar clearly considers dynasty a pre-eminent concern to both the Emmenids and the Deinomenids.[605] The importance of hereditary succession is demonstrated most clearly by extreme cases: such as the succession of infants, which occurred at Gela at the death of Hippokrates and at Rhegion on the death of Anaxilaos,[606] or the numerous marriage links forged by Dionysios I with relatives of

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[602] Xen.Hier. *esp.*7.9.
[603] Cf. Isoc.5.68.
[604] Mitchell (2013) 35-41, 91-111
[605] e.g.Pind.*Ol.*2.6-7, *Ol.*3.38-9, *Pyth*.1.58-9., *Pyth*.6; *Isth*.2, F124. Mafodda (1996) 88-9
[606] Hippokrates: Hdt.7.155; Anaxilaos: Diod.Sic.11.48.2.

Hermokrates at the start of his reign.[607] The alliance between Dionysios and Athens of 368/67 purports to bind both Dionysios and his descendants, but not the Syracusans, showing that it was assumed that Dionysios' preeminent position would be inherited by his children in perpetuity.[608] The importance of hereditary links in these cases is really an extension of the general importance of family ties in Greek political life generally. Thucydides has Alkibiades defend his standing in Athens by his exceptional ancestry first and then his own achievements.[609] Kingship had no monopoly on hereditary succession. Moreover, Agathokles' rule was clearly a family affair from the start: his brother was put in charge of Syracuse during the African campaign, his sons went with him on the African campaign and his eldest son Archagathos was given authority over the army in Africa when Agathokles went back to Sicily.[610] All of this predates the assumption of the kingship and resembles the behaviour of Dionysios I, who leaned heavily on his brothers Leptines and Thearidas,[611] and of Dionysios II who entrusted Ortygia to his son Apollokrates.[612] Billows emphasises the importance of Demetrios Poliorketes in Antigonos' decision to proclaim himself king and in fact almost all the Diadochoi had heirs who had just come into adulthood around the time they took the kingship.[613] When Agathokles assumed the royal title, however, he had no adult heirs at all. Archagathos and Herakleides died in Africa.[614] His son Agathokles II was an infant or a twinkle in his eye and his grandson Archagathos must also have been young. Succession cannot therefore have been a high priority for Agathokles at the moment when he became king. The

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[607] Diod.Sic.13.96.3; possibly Polyaen.5.2.4
[608] *IG* II^2 105+523.10 (=*RO* 34); Lucca (1994).
[609] Thuc.6.16.
[610] *P.Oxy*.24.2399; Diod.Sic.20.4.1, 20.11.1, 20.57.4, 20.69.3; Just.*Epit.*22.5.1, 22.8; Polyaen.5.3.4.
[611] *IG* II^2 18 (=*RO* 10); Diod.Sic.14.47.3, 14.53-5, 14.59.7, 14.60.4, 14.64.1, 14.72.1, 14.102, 14.103.2-3, 14.109, 15.17.1-2.
[612] Plut.*Dion* 37.4
[613] Demetrios was 31: Plut.*Demetr.*52.3; Lagos and Leontiskos were adults: Athenaeus 13.576e; Antiochos I about 18: Arr.*Anab.*7.4.6; Philip IV about 15: Diod.Sic.19.52.1; Agathokles son of Lysimachos about 15: Dmitriev (2007) 136 n.3.
[614] A third son, Agatharchos, mentioned at Diod.Sic.21.3 is probably an error for his grandson Archagathos.

bungled succession at the end of his life suggests that it was not something that he gave serious thought to later, either.

4.2.2. Transcending the City-State

I stressed at the beginning of the chapter that Consolo Langher argues that, when Agathokles took the royal title, he transcended the single city of Syracuse and transformed Sicily into a unitary state.[615] Lewis has argued against this, saying, "The idea that Agathocles could step outside Syracuse and rearrange his power as monarch ignores the fact that the city was the locus of his power."[616] Both scholars present Hellenistic kingship as representing an entirely new way of interacting with the *polis*, they only disagree on whether Agathokles adopted this new model or stayed with the old. This reflects a general understanding in scholarship that the Hellenistic period represents a wholly new phase in the history of the Greek *polis* related to the development of unequal relationships with the Hellenistic kings. But I submit that Agathokles had transcended the *polis* well before he assumed the kingship. Although Syracuse was Agathokles' central base, Agathokles created his autocracy in the first place by stepping outside the *polis* and rearranging his power, in Italy and the Sicilian interior during his exiles. His original centre of support lay outside the city of Syracuse.[617] His first act on taking power was to murder and exile his opponents, his second was to redistribute the land, to cancel the debts – that is, to rearrange Syracuse for his own purposes.[618] Later on he made his Campanian mercenaries, the future Mamertines, citizens of Syracuse.[619] I will argue in chapter 5.3 that Agathokles' early expansionist policy was based on the fact that secure control of Syracuse required secure control of all of the Sicilian cities – this interdependence meant that Agathokles' power had to transcend the city-state. Immediately

[615] See n.545.
[616] Lewis (2006) 52.
[617] Sudano (2011), esp.81-8.
[618] Diod.Sic.19.7-8, 19.9.5.
[619] Diod.Sic.21.18.1.

before war broke out with Carthage, he was in control of several cities, including large ones like Messana.[620] The fact that Agathokles was able to spend three years campaigning in Africa and much of the 290s in southern Italy further indicates the degree to which he was able to move beyond the city of Syracuse.

Stepping outside Syracuse was not new, either. Agathokles' predecessors in Sicily had not been bound to a single city. The Deinomenids had moved, merged and massacred communities throughout the eastern half of the island. Gelon had shifted his entire base of power from Gela to Syracuse, which he then completely reshaped for his own purposes.[621] Hieron I's actions had been even more dramatic, relocating vast numbers of people in order to establish Aitne, for reasons that transcended Syracuse: the desire to break down the dichotomy between Chalkidians and Dorians in order to make the whole region more governable and the desire to enhance his personal prestige on a Panhellenic level.[622] Dionysios I had relocated almost all the Sicilian Greeks to Syracuse, redistributed the land and houses to his friends and mercenaries, enrolled freedmen as *neopolitai* and established Ortygia as a fortress against the city,[623] while ruling over an empire which included southern Italy and parts of the Adriatic. His son Dionysios II relocated his base of operations from Syracuse to Italy in 356 BC and from there he continued to control that empire for a decade.[624] Both Deinomenids and Dionysioi were sometimes described by contemporaries as rulers of Sicily rather than Syracuse.[625] Timoleon, too, relocated and reshaped whole communities and made treaties with the Carthaginians on behalf of all Greek Sicily.[626] There were plenty of local precedents for

[620] Diod.Sic.19.72.1.
[621] Demand (1990) 46-50; Purcell (1990) 47; Mafodda (1996) 70, 158-60; Bonanno (2010) 39-40.
[622] Demand (1990) 50-2; Bonanno (2010) 127-57 identifies parallels with the Kypselids and Peisistratids.
[623] Diod.Sic.14.7, 14.63.4; Souza (2014) 4-16, 34-48.
[624] See n.1161. Note Muccioli (1999)'s argument that, until 353/52 BC, Dionysios II had no single Italian base, but rotated his time between various centres.
[625] e.g. Pind.*Ol.*1.12-13; *IG* II^2 18.6-7, 103.19-20, 105+523.7-8 (=*RO* 10, 33, 34); Isoc.5.65.
[626] Diod.Sic.16.82-83; Plut.*Tim*.34.2, 35; Demand (1990) 105-106; Talbert (1974) 146-161; Smarczyk (2003); Souza (2014) 16-17

autocracy which transcended the city-state. Thus Franco De Angelis divides Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily's history into alternating periods of multi-ethnic, centralised, territorial states and fragmentation into autonomous city-states.[627]

4.2.3. Managing the City-State

If Agathokles' realm is to be seen as a territorial state, then, like the earlier Sicilian empires and the contemporary Macedonian ones, it was a territorial state in which a large amount of effort was devoted to balancing the central power's desire for control with the individual cities' universally recognised right to autonomy. The scholarly literature on this phenomenon in the Hellenistic kingdoms is vast,[628] thanks to the ancient literary sources' concern with the way the balance was struck in mainland Greece and the rich epigraphic corpora of Asia Minor. As a result, the balancing act can appear unique to the Hellenistic kingdoms. Aspects of how the balance was struck are unique to the Hellenistic period, to individual rulers, even to individual cities, but the balance itself is not. The clash between local autonomy and the centralising power occurred almost everywhere there were *poleis* in the fifth and fourth century: most of the conflict in mainland Greece from the Persian Wars onwards revolved around disputes about the how the balance between hegemonic control and local autonomy should be struck; in Asia Minor, the Achaemenids' relations with the Greek cities prefigure those of the Macedonian kings.[629] In Sicily, the evidence for the balancing act is sparse. Epigraphic material analogous to the Hellenistic royal letters of Asia Minor does not really exist. The literary source material deals mostly with tyrants' exceptional and outrageous acts, usually undertaken in wartime, rather than how things worked day-to-day. It is also almost exclusively concerned with tyrants' relations to Syracuse. But the fact that Syracuse was the centre

[627] De Angelis (2016), *passim* but esp.101-33.
[628] Recently, Ma (1999) & (2003b) 179-91; Billows (2003); Carlsson (2010) 111-8; Strootman (2013); Raynor (2014), with much further bibliography.
[629] Dmitriev (2011) 15-66; Rhodes (2007); Ma (1999) 138, 160.

of their power should not distract from the fact that it was also a local context and that the tyrants invested significant efforts in balancing their control against the city's autonomy.

Under Agathokles' rule, the Syracusan assembly operated and he attended it, like a private citizen. This was a modification of the practice of the Dionysioi, which was to hold assemblies but attend them with bodyguards.[630] Specific assemblies are only reported to us when something extraordinary happened at them. Thus, one might argue that the assembly of 317/16 at which Agathokles was elected *strategos autokrator* and that of 289/88 at which he resigned all power are unrepresentative of ordinary practice. Thus, the record of an assembly in *P.Oxy*.24.2399 is particularly valuable, since it comes from an early third century source and since it is not reported because the assembly itself was an extraordinary event, but because an extraordinary event took place at it: Diognetos the Whale's speech, which enables parallels with the speeches of Thersites against Agamemnon and Theodoros against Dionysios.[631] The author's generic temporal clause, "while the Syracusans were holding an assembly about the war in progress," indicates that the assembly itself was a commonplace event.[632] More generally, Diodoros mentions Agathokles' jokes in the assembly and the fact that he attended without a bodyguard,[633] which imply that assemblies were a general and regular feature of civic life in his time. Conversely, Agathokles took steps to ensure his control of the city. When he was away in Africa, "he appointed his brother Antandros as *epimeletes*, with a sufficient guard," which included Akragantine troops, and he gave Antandros a *synedros*, Erymnon, who was apparently not a Syracusan but an Aitolian.[634] The troops, like

[630] Diod.Sic.20.63.3; Plut.*Dion*.33; cf.Timoleon: Plut.*Tim*.38.5-7.
[631] See n.114.
[632] *P.Oxy*.24.2399.41-5: ἐκκλησιαζόντων τῶν Συρακοσίων ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ παρεστῶτος…
[633] Diod.Sic.19.9.6, 20.63.2-3, see p.29-31 on the reasons for this representation.
[634] Diod.Sic.20.4.1: τῆς μὲν πόλεως ἐπιμελητὴν Ἄνταν δρον τὸν ἀδελφὸν κατέστησε μετὰ τῆς ἱκανῆς φυλακῆς; Diod.Sic.20.32.1, 20.16.1. On *epimeletes*, cf.19.9.3; Diodoros uses the same word to describe Perdikkas as regent (18.2.4), Demetrios of Phaleron (18.74.3, 20.45.2), Damis of Megalopolis (19.64.1), Antigonos' governor of Sardis (20.37.5); but also Perikles as controller of construction on the Acropolis (12.39.1-2), Thearides as leader of Dionysios' delegation to the Olympic Games (14.109.2) and Hieronymos of Cardia as

Dionysios' garrison, included substantial numbers of Campanian mercenaries, whose loyalty was to their paymaster rather than the community – after Agathokles' death, they were driven out of the city and became the Mamertines.[635] At least some of these troops were probably based on Ortygia – Lehmler has argued that the focus of Agathokles' monumental construction on this area indicates that it was a locus of his power, as it had been under the Dionysioi.[636] These authorities and troops were perhaps presented as a defence against Syracuse's many external threats, but they were also there to control the city.

So both civic autonomy and institutions of control existed. Clarifying how they were balanced is not easy. Diodoros usually presents decisions briefly, being made by Agathokles or his circle, without reference to the city of Syracuse.[637] It is never made clear how or whether Agathokles' various massacres or seizures of property were justified to or rubberstamped by the city of Syracuse.[638] *P.Oxy*.24.2399 is more helpful once more. The author of this papyrus, as I have said, reports that Diognetos stormed up to the dais and made an inappropriate speech. His actual words are in a lacuna, but context indicates that he calls for some sort of surrender to the Carthaginians or

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leader of the Nabatean expedition (19.100.1). The common element is that the authority (however limited or expansive) is exercised on behalf of another. Cf.Hornblower (2011) 248.

The term appears in Entella tablet IV: ἐπειδὴ Τεβέριος Κλαύδιος Γαίου υἱὸς Ἀντιάτας ἐπιμελητὰς ταχθεὶς εἰς τὰμ πόλιν τὰν ἀμὰν πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας χρείας παρίσχηται τῶι κοινῶι καὶ γεγόνει ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἰς τὸν συνοικισμὸν τᾶς πόλιος κατὰ πάντα καιρόν, δεδόχθαι πρόξενον εἶμειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ τέχνα αὐτοῦ τοῦ δάμου τῶν Ἐντελλίνων... "Since Tiberius Claudius C.f. Antias, who was appointed *epimeletes* for our *polis*, has rendered many great services for the community and has been a good man for the *synoikismos* of the *polis* on every occasion, it has been decided that he will be a *proxenos* of the *damos* of the Entellines (and his children too).": Nenci (1993) 40. The date of the tablets is unknown and some scholars have proposed that they are Agathoklean, but they probably date to after the First Punic War because many tablets refer to a recent successful war with the Carthaginians, which the Entellines did not enjoy until that time and the *epimeletes* in this tablet is a Roman (The presence of Geloans in tablet II is no problem, since that community continued to have an official existence after they were relocated to Phintias in 282: *IG* XIV.255b.30, XIV.259). Even so, the tablet shows that the title was current in Sicily for people exercising authority over communities on someone else's behalf.

[635] Polyb.1.7.1-5; Diod.Sic.21.18. Cf.Xen.*Hier*.5.3, 6.5, 10.

[636] Lehmler (2005) 106-19.

[637] Diod.Sic.20.16.1 is the clearest example of a decision made behind closed doors.

[638] Diod.Sic.19.9, where a *post facto* approval of the carnage of Agathokles' rise to power is implied, might be an exception, but is also an exceptional situation because it marks his full assumption of power.

readmission of the exiles.[639] It would have been unacceptable if the assembly had endorsed this proposal; autonomy and control had come into conflict. Then, "Antandros stood up and began to remove Diognetos from the assembly, but he stopped himself and wanting first to see the [response?] from the people…"[640] This shows that negotiations of the contradiction between autonomy and control were *ad hoc*, resolved as they arose by the whims of Agathokles and his agents. The papyrus describes the response from the people as follows:

> τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων καταπεπληγμένων ἐπὶ τῆι τἀνδρὸς τόλμηι καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐπιθορυβούντων αὐτόν, τῶν δὲ κελευόντων λέγειν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφασίαι τινὶ συνεσχημένων καὶ διευλαβουμένων, μὴ τις ἥι κίνησις περὶ τὴν πόλιν...
>
> And since the people were stunned at the daring of the man and some were shouting him down, while others were calling on him to speak, and many more were afflicted with speechlessness and were on their guard in case there was a revolution in the *polis*….
>
> *P.Oxy*.24.2399 *l.*60-71.

This description suggests that, often, the community would keep itself in line for the sake of security and out of respect for the potential use of the institutions of control. The tension, then, between control and autonomy often flared up from the actions of the ruler and the ruled, but was just as often doused by the circumspection of both sides.

The evidence for Agathokles' and his predecessors' careful interactions with Syracuse cannot be paralleled for most of the Diadochoi. There is surprisingly little evidence for how the kings related

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[639] Berger (1988) 95.

[640] *P.Oxy*.24.2399 *l.*71-9. ἀναστὰς Ἄντανδρος ἐνεχείρησεν μὲν τὸν Διόγνητον ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἀπαγαγεῖν, κατασχὼν δ' αὐτὸν καὶ βουλόμενος πρότερον εἰδῆσαι τ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπ[ων… The subject of κατασχὼν is not preserved; I assume it is Antandros on account of the placement of the μὲν, but some editors read αὐτὸν, presumably understanding a different subject.

to the newly-founded centres in which they spent much of their time. These cities were so new that it is not clear whether they yet had a sense of identity separate from their relationship to the monarch in their midst. Recently, Ben Raynor, investigating Antipatrid Pella, has described the relationship between city and king encoded in the urban plan (essentially a phenomenological approach). A visitor to the city would pass through fortifications guarded by royal soldiers, along the broad processional way to the agora, whose position at the centre of the city indicated its activity and importance to civic life. But to reach the true locus of power, the visitor would have to continue past the agora and up to the royal palace which loomed over the city, "both omnipresent and removed" from the civic space. The visitor accessed the palace by passing through the whole city, which thus became a monument to the power of the king. But the king himself could enter the palace by another entrance – he was not beholden to his city, but operated independently of it.[641] This analysis maps neatly onto the Syracuse of Agathokles and his predecessors, in which the visitor passed by the fortresses of Euryalos or Ortygia to enter the city, and the seat of the autocrat on Ortygia was separated from the main agora in Achradina and assembly area in Neapolis and could be accessed independently from them.[642] This analysis is corroborated by what our sources have to say about Dionysios' tyranny, which reveals a strong association with place. Diodoros says that it was when Dionysios pitched his tent in the shipyards, that his tyranny became apparent.[643] Subsequently he describes the transformation of Ortygia into a stronghold:

> θεωρῶν δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὴν Νῆσον ὀχυρωτάτην οὖσαν καὶ δυναμένην ῥᾳδίως φυλάττεσθαι, ταύτην μὲν διῳκοδόμησεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως τείχει πολυτελεῖ, καὶ πύργους ὑψηλοὺς καὶ πυκνοὺς ἐνῳκοδόμησε, καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς χρηματιστήρια καὶ στοὰς δυναμένας ὄχλων ἐπιδέχεσθαι πλῆθος. ᾠκοδόμησε

[641] Raynor (2014) 196-201. Cf. the transition from civic to royal space in Attalid Pergamon as one ascends to the Acropolis: Strootman (2014) 83-8; Eumenes I presented himself as institutionally separate from the city, writing to it as he might to any other *polis* of his kingdom: *OGIS* 267.
[642] Lehmler (2005) 98-120.
[643] Diod.Sic.13.96.2.

δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πολυτελῶς ὠχυρωμένην ἀκρόπολιν πρὸς τὰς αἰφνιδίους καταφυγάς, καὶ συμπεριέλαβε τῷ ταύτης τείχει τὰ πρὸς τῷ μικρῷ λιμένι τῷ Λακκίῳ καλουμένῳ νεώρια.

But, seeing that the island was the most secure part of the city and could be guarded easily, [Dionysios] walled it off from the rest of the *polis* with an expensive wall and fortified it with tall, close-packed towers, and in front of it, offices and stoas capable of accommodating a multitude. Then he built on it an expensively fortified *akropolis* for refuge in emergencies and linked up the shipyards on the little harbour (which is called "the Cistern").

Diod.Sic.14.7.2-3

This account hits most of the points made by Raynor in his analysis of Pella's palace: the separation of the ruler's area from the civic space, the splendour of the area in front of it, the need to pass through and leave behind the areas of civic business to reach the true locus of power and the existence of an alternative route allowing the ruler to enter and exit without passing through the civic space.[644] In the case of Syracuse, the ruler's ensconcement on Ortygia also associated him with (or allowed him to hold hostage) the city's sacred places, its historical roots, and its past rulers. The intensity of the place's association with the Dionysian tyranny was such that by maintaining it, Dion lost and, by destroying it Timoleon gained the good will of the Syracusans.[645] Agathokles re-engaged with this tradition and based himself on Ortygia. His Sixty-Couched Hall, where he hosted large banquets, was placed there and he built towers around the small harbour decorated with his name.[646] I have already mentioned the paintings of him fighting on horseback in the Temple of Athena.[647] Thus Agathokles closely associated Ortygia, the traditional seat of power, with himself.

[644] Cf. Pl.*Ep.*7.347e-348b.
[645] Plut.*Dion*.53.2; Plut.*Tim.*22.1-3: Timoleon is nevertheless meant to have retained its status as the seat of Syracusan sovereignty by building law courts on top of the old citadel.
[646] Diod.Sic.16.83.2; Lehmler (2005) 106-11; Portale (2011) 273-86.
[647] See pp.143.

The Sixty-Couched Hall advertised the fact that he, unlike Dionysios, was accessible as master of Ortygia. But the attention to the small harbour suggests that he had also ensured his ability to come and go from the Island as he wished and regular invitations to the feast hall allowed him to emphasise his control of access if he wished. The emphasis on feasting and hosting as an element of monarchy is thus usefully linked to the banqueting tents of the Hellenistic kings and their use to assert status and hierarchies.[648] Yet the link between access to state banquets and political power was also an important part of the Athenian democracy and civic culture in the West.[649] Once again, Agathokles partakes in a Hellenistic trend with deep roots in earlier Greek practice and the local Sicilian context.

Far less is known about other cities under Agathokles' control, but I will argue in the next chapter that Agathokles' control of them was based on two factors: the ability to take advantage of internal factionalism and a system of garrisons studded throughout the island. As at Syracuse, much of the institutional machinery probably continued to function as normal.[650] This continued activity of civic institutions balanced with *ad hoc* mechanisms of control, both at Syracuse and in other Sicilian cities – can be paralleled for Agathokles' predecessors to varying degrees. For the Deinomenids and other archaic tyrants, it is regularly assumed that civic institutions remained active, but we know so little about those institutions (if that is even the right word) that it is difficult to be sure.[651] The usual way of controlling another city, however, is clear: putting someone they could rely on in charge of it, a relative, a close friend, or a beholden local.[652] Apparently, the local concerns of the

[648] Nielsen (1994) 21-3.
[649] Miller (1978) 4-13, 56-60; Schmitt-Pantel (1990); Nielsen (1994) 79-80.
[650] See chapter 5.3-5.4.
[651] Mafodda (1996) 67-71.
[652] Relatives: Gelon installing Hieron at Gela (Hdt.7.156), Hieron I installing Polyzelos at Gela (Adornato (2008)) and Deinomenes at Aitne (Pind.*Pyth.*1.61-62), Theron installing Thrasydaios at Himera (Diod.Sic.11.48.6). Friends: Chromios at Aitne (Schol.Pind.*Nem.*1); Locals: Hippokrates' confirmation of Skythes at Messana (Hdt.6.23). Dunbabin (1948) 384.

poleis were so important that it was necessary to have someone on site at all times to deal with them. Under the Dionysioi, the continued activity of civic institutions is clear – both the Assembly and magistracies are attested at Syracuse.[653] The institutions of control balanced against this autonomy are clearer too. There were troops on Ortygia, ready to act if the Syracusans revolted, and Dionysios I attended the Assembly with an armed bodyguard.[654] Dionysios II succeeded to his father's power by calling an assembly of the people and then holding his father's funeral at the "royal gates" of Ortygia – a sign of the importance of both the assembly and the army to his power in Syracuse.[655] The system of garrisons, which I discuss in the next chapter, already existed in the time of Dionysios.[656] Diodoros says that after Dionysios' defeat at Tauromenion in 394/93, "The Akragantines and Messanians banished the partisans of Dionysios, grabbed hold of their freedom and renounced their alliance with the tyrant."[657] This suggests that Dionysios' control of the other communities of the island took advantage of the internal conflicts within individual *poleis*; I will argue in chapter five that Agathokles' unification of Sicily relied on the same approach.[658]

None of the Diadochoi had to deal with something quite like Syracuse: a centre of power which was also an established *polis*. They were generally mobile or based in a city of their own foundation, interacting with established *poleis* from a distance. This is the point of Lewis' comment cited above about stepping outside the *polis*.[659] Kassandros' Pella, as the discussion above shows, is the closest analogue. In this respect, Agathokles can be seen as ahead of the game rather than behind the times – later Hellenistic kings had to deal with the fact that their *basileia* were already established

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[653] *IG* II^2 105+523.35-7 (=*RO* 34); Caven (1990) 159; Muccioli (1999) 459-60.
[654] See 196-7.
[655] Diod.Sic.15.74.5; Frisone (2015) 179-88.
[656] Diod.Sic.14.78.5, 19.108.1-2. La Torre (2009).
[657] 14.88.5: Ἀκραγαντῖνοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι τοὺς τὰ Διονυσίου φρονοῦντας μεταστησάμενοι, τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς τοῦ τυράννου συμμαχίας ἀπέστησαν.
[658] See chapter 5.3.
[659] See n.616.

poleis, marked by many predecessors. But the Diadochoi were engaged in the same balancing act of autonomy and control as Agathokles and his predecessors, and they struck the balance in a similar place to that struck by Agathokles at Syracuse. Civic autonomy was an important part of all the Diadochoi's propaganda, necessary for winning the cities and their manpower over to their individual causes, and their realms were too large and too violently contested for them to ignore cities' wishes. The institutions of existing cities were not terminated, new cities were given similar institutions, and in their instructions, kings strove to present themselves as authoritative arbitrators rather than despotic dictators.[660] The preservation of existing institutions and the studied ambivalence about the autocrat's relationship to those institutions is similar to the Sicilian experience. On the other hand, the use of the language of international relations as a tool for reconciling the contradictions between autonomy and control is not attested for Agathokles, though this may be a symptom of our lack of epigraphic evidence. Almost all the Diadochoi installed garrisons in cities subject to themselves, when they felt security concerns demanded it – even those who were particularly involved in the rhetoric of Greek freedom, like Antigonos. If new foundations of the Diadochoi represent their ideal city, it is notable that those of which we are well-informed were equipped with strong garrisons from the beginning. Alexandria had both a palace bodyguard, and a larger garrison force, primarily composed of Gauls and Cretans.[661] Each of the cities of Seleukos' Tetrapolis was built with a strong fortress, somewhat detached from the city; Antioch's garrison on Mt Sipylos was unassailable from the city, but fairly vulnerable to attack from without, which is telling. Like Ortygia, these were garrisons which defended royal power against challenges from within the *polis* as much as from elsewhere.[662] The "fetters of Greece" which the Antipatrids

[660] Fraser (1972) 93-101 on Alexandria; Lund (1992) 119-46 on Lysimachos in Asia Minor; Billows (1997) 189-236, esp.213-4 on Antigonos and the synoikism of Teos and Lebedos; Ma (1999) on the discourse of euergetism.
[661] Fraser (1972) 69-70, 106-7.
[662] Downey (1961) 16-7; Grainger (1990a) 62, 87.

and Antigonids used to control mainland Greece functioned similarly to Agathokles' system of garrisons, which I discuss in the next chapter. Both systems focussed on permanently controlling a few key points, in order to tie up an enemy forces in an emergency and ideally prevent enemies from attempting to create emergencies in the first place.[663] Many of the methods by which Agathokles sought to control a territory full of *poleis* were similar to those employed by the Diadochoi, not because he was copying their system (or vice versa), but because hegemons in Greece and Sicily for centuries had confronted the same problem and had drawn from precedents on both sides of the Adriatic to solve them for centuries.

4.2.4. The Army

Hellenistic monarchy was fundamentally a military monarchy, particularly in the time of the Diadochoi, who enforced and legitimated their power by feats of arms and spent their entire reigns at war.[664] Agathokles was also a military leader – for most of the attested part of his career, primarily a military leader. Many aspects of his military leadership can be traced back to Dionysios I and thence to Gelon, or seen as part of the broader trends of Greek generalship. But his generalship is also similar to that of his Macedonian contemporaries. It is impossible to separate this testimony concerning Agathokles' behaviour as a general from our sources' use of Agathokles to discuss ideals of generalship, which I discussed in chapter 2.2 – the former provided the raw material for the latter, the latter remoulded the former. Here I focus on what Agathokles is meant to have done to make his soldiers follow him and how it compares to what other generals did, whereas in the earlier chapter I focussed on how people talked about it.

Agathokles' army was large, heterogeneous, and incorporated a large mercenary component. When Diodoros gives troop numbers, Agathokles' forces are usually around ten thousand, but

[663] Gabbert (1997) 36-40; Dixon (2015) 46-74.
[664] Walbank (1984); Austin (1986); Baker (2003) 375-6; Chaniotis (2005) 57-77; Murray (2012) 202-7.

reach thirty thousand at times. The breakdown of these troops is consistent: about half of his infantry force were mercenaries; about half of his mercenaries were Greek and the other half were "Samnites, Tyrrhenians and Celts."[665] In the 290s, in Italy, he employed Ligues and Tyrrhenians.[666] For an uncertain amount of time before his death, he employed the Campanian mercenaries who would become the Mamertines.[667] The Carthaginians employed many of the same peoples. Both were taking advantage of the displacement of Italic peoples resulting from Roman expansion.[668] Agathokles' army also followed the model of Dionysios, who is charged with disarming the Syracusans and relying on Campanian and other foreign mercenaries to fight his battles and maintain his rule.[669] Although Agathokles' heterogeneous army with its large mercenary component conformed to the Sicilian norm, it was also similar to the armies of Alexander and the Diadochoi. These were also large, composed of multiple different Greek and non-Greek groups, and contained large mercenary components.[670] The Greek mercenaries that Agathokles employed, especially those acquired from Ophellas, came from the same pool as the men employed by the Diadochoi. Like the Macedonian armies, Agathokles' forces usually operated far from home for long periods of time. Agathokles' army was similar to those of his predecessors and contemporaries and so his generalship was similar to theirs too.

The size and heterogeneity of the army meant that Agathokles could not appeal to a common cause. For the Syracusan citizens in his army, the survival of Syracuse (and their families) was important.[671] But his mercenaries and allied forces were presumably more interested in whether

[665] African War: Diod.Sic.20.11.5, 20.64.2.
[666] Diod.Sic.21.3.1.
[667] Polyb.1.7.2; Diod.Sic.21.18.1; Cass.Dio.9.40.8.
[668] Fariselli (2002); see p.239.
[669] Pl.*Ep.*7.348a-b; Diod.Sic.16.10.1; Polyaen.5.2.14. Cf. Xen.*Hier.*10.
[670] Baker (2003) 377-9; Plut.*Pyrrh.*8.1; *Demetr.*41.3.
[671] Diod.Sic.20.4.3-4 puts this the opposite way round.

Agathokles could pay them and whether he was competent enough to keep them alive.[672] Particularly while on campaign, the stakes were high and desertion tempting.[673] If morale collapsed, the soldiers would not fight, the officers would eliminate the commander, and the army would melt away. Even more than in the city, Agathokles had to continuously justify his command by demonstrating his personal excellence, which our sources describe him doing in three ways.

Most important for maintaining control of the army in the most stressful moments (that is, when on campaign) was the conspicuous display of military prowess. This involved activities about the camp. For instance, Agathokles is meant to have gone about the camp in an extremely heavy panoply.[674] It also involved ostentatious participation in the front lines of battle.[675] Agathokles is meant to have been heavily wounded while executing a stratagem to save his troops during a siege of Gela in the 320s and to have been in the frontlines routing the Carthaginians in the battle in the land of the Zouphanes in 308/07.[676] Nearly every successful commander in the ancient world did this, including Alexander, the Diadochoi and Dionysios I.[677] On the one hand, the general thereby shared the danger faced by the other soldiers; on the other he took personal responsibility for the victory, by placing himself at the crucial spot for the outcome of the battle as a whole. The risks were real, as is shown by the number of wounds suffered by successful generals, but there was also an ideological and cultural factor in the determination of which spot was the riskiest and most crucial to victory. In Archaic and Classical Greek armies, it had been the right wing in the hoplite

[672] Note Diod.Sic.20.68.4.
[673] Diod.Sic.20.18.3, 20.34.7, 20.66-67, 20.77.2. Messer (1920); Trundle (2004) 91, 102-3.
[674] Diod.Sic.19.3.2. See p.80. cf.Diod.Sic.18.42.5 (Eumenes shares the soldiers' rations during siege of Nora)
[675] Wheeler (1991); Hornblower (2011) 198.
[676] Gela: Diod.Sic.19.4.6; Zouphones: 20.38.7.
[677] Diadochoi: see n.680 below. Dionysios I: Diod.Sic.14.72-3, 14.88.3, 14.108.6, 15.17.1-2. Later examples: Scipio running off into battle on his own at Carmone: App.5.27; even the cautious and unmilitary Augustus engaged in (and stressed his engagement in) daring behaviour at the siege of Metulus (sourced from his own memoirs): App.*Ill*.4.20. Cf.Keegan (1976) 94 on Agincourt; Austen (1986) 464.

phalanx.[678] Over the fourth century, the cavalry grew more and more important.[679] For Philip, Alexander, and his successors, the key spot was at the head of a cavalry charge.[680] These facts and the importance of military prowess to justifying Agathokles' rule generally mean that Agathokles' actions in this sphere have been heavily shaped by the literary tradition, as discussed in chapter two. But two points suggest that that tradition reflects Agathokles' practice. Firstly, when Agathokles had himself depicted in battle on the walls of the Temple of Athena, he was shown on horseback in the heart of battle.[681] If this is how he wanted the Syracusans to imagine him in battle, he probably tried to appear thus in battle. Secondly, the importance of personal presence on the front lines to the relationship with the army is reflected in the fact that, whenever possible, the Diadochoi commanded their armies personally, or entrusted them to relatives or their closest friends.[682] The relationship between the army and its commander, born from battle and day-to-day experience was the key factor in its overall loyalty. Agathokles too commanded personally whenever possible. As discussed in chapter six, this pressure to command personally everywhere was one of the reasons for the failure of the African campaign.[683] Otherwise, Agathokles entrusted commands to a limited circle, initially consisting of his friends Pasiphilos and Leptines and his son Archagathos, and later of his friend Deinokrates and his grandson Archagathos. Even when he did entrust a task to these trusted individuals it tended to be the least important task. Agathokles'

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[678] Hdt. 9.26-28.1 (dispute over the left wing as the *second* most honourable position before the Battle of Plataia); the point is demonstrated by the lack of prestige given to light troops, despite their overall military significance: Van Wees (2004) 61-65; Trundle (2010).

[679] Worley (1994) 123-52. The fact that it was easier to flee a defeat on horseback and the cultural prestige of horse ownership are also relevant to this shift: Spence (1993) 34-120, 164-230; on military historiography: Woodman (1988) 15-23; Hornblower (2007) esp.39-47.

[680] e.g. Alexander at the Granikos: Arr.*Anab.*1.15; Krateros, Eumenes and Neoptolemos: Diod.Sic.18.30-31; Antigonos at Ipsos: Plut.*Demetr.*29.3-4.

[681] See p.143.

[682] The Diadochoi often sent a relative to act as chiliarch (head of the general's bodyguard) in armies operating under generals who were not bound to them by ties of kinship, e.g. Diod.Sic.29.2: Perdikkas sends his brother Alketas to Eumenes, Diod.Sic.18.39.7: Antipater sends his son Kassander to Antigonos.

[683] See p.228.

campaign into the African interior in 308/07 is a good example: he left Archagathos in charge of Tunis, while "he took the strongest men" for the more important task of preventing the Carthaginians from regaining control of the revolting Libyans.[684]

A second means of justification was literally justifying himself to the army assembly. Such assemblies are well-discussed, especially in connection with Xenophon and Alexander's *Anabaseis*.[685] Similar gatherings occur in the *Iliad* and in Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition.[686] Hornblower argues that they reflect a general assumption in ancient Greek armies that the soldiers could hold their general to account.[687] Closer to home, this holding to account would take place inside civic institutions.[688] On long term campaigns, especially those in which the troops were not all members of the civic community, that outlet was not available to the general or his troops, so these *polis*-like events had to occur in the camp. Perdikkas provides a negative example: his failure to stem the disgruntlement of his soldiers in Egypt after heavy losses attempting to ford the Nile in 321/20, led his own officers to assassinate him.[689] Agathokles did better. At the height of the first mutiny in Africa in 307/06 BC, he assembled the troops in order to make penance before his soldiers and successfully restored their loyalty.[690] These meetings were also occasions for the general to test and fix the morale of their troops pre-emptively – like Agamemnon in the *Iliad*. Eumenes provides a good example; when a letter from Antigonos reached his army, he gathered the troops together immediately and told them a fitting fable to get them back on side.[691] Similarly, Agathokles held an assembly on making land-fall in Libya at which he

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[684] Diod.Sic.20.38.1: αὐτὸς δ' ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς κρατίστους…
[685] King (2010) 384-8; Lee (2007).
[686] Hom.*Il*.2.84-441; Thuc.7.60-4, 7.72.
[687] Hornblower (2007) 32-34, with van Wees (2004) 108-13.
[688] e.g. dismissal of the Syracusan generals in 415/14: Thuc.6.103.4; trial of the Athenian generals after Arginousai: Xen.*Hell.*1.7, challenge to Dionysios in the assembly in 404: Diod.Sic.14.64.5-70.3.
[689] Diod.Sic.18.36.5.
[690] Diod.Sic.20.34. Cf. Just.*Epit.*22.8.4.
[691] Diod.Sic.19.25.5-7.

burnt his ships and addressed the troops. The speeches reported by Diodoros and Justin are later confections, but his purpose is clear: to steel the army's resolve by impressing on them both their good prospects and the lack of reasonable alternatives to following him.[692] In both the mutiny and the landing, the assembly reflects the expectation that the general would justify his orders and actions to the soldiers.

The third aspect of the general's relationship to the army was provision.[693] Regular payment in a manner and medium that emphasised the commander's personal responsibility for the existence of payment. This was important not just on campaign, but also for troops in garrisons and in reserve, who would not necessarily see Agathokles often. Coinage was the gold standard. As discussed in chapter three, Agathokles struggled to pay his troops during the African Expedition.[694] As a result, he faced mutinies which were partially responsible for the failure of the expedition.[695] When he was able to pay, the iconography of his coinage – especially the highest value gold and silver – was designed to make his personal responsibility for it clear to his payees, among which his troops were the most important group.[696] But the focus on cash can obscure the fact that other forms of benefaction were also deployed. After a disastrous month campaigning in Mesopotamia in 317/6, Antigonos faced a seriously disgruntled army, like that which had assassinated his erstwhile rival Perdikkas five years earlier. He resolved the situation by sending people out to collect food, pack animals and horses from the local area and distributing them to the troops. There is no indication that any money was distributed at all.[697] There is no anecdote this detailed for Agathokles, but Diodoros' description of the Syracusan army's first sight of the wealth of Carthage

[692] Diod.Sic.20.70; Just.*Epit.*22.6; Polyaen.5.3.5.
[693] Xen.*Mem.*3.1.6; Austen (1986) 464-6; Hornblower (2011) 198.
[694] See p.103.
[695] See p.226-7.
[696] See p.130.
[697] Diod.Sic.19.20; for Perdikkas see n.689; for the date, see Wheatley (2015).

focusses on agricultural wealth: vines, olives, fruit, cattle, livestock and horses. These were the signs of wealth that led the soldiers to conclude that victory was worth the risk.[698] Three years later, when the Carthaginians finally defeated the invaders, they had turned this into a wasteland.[699] Presumably they had eaten everything.

A special sub-type of the non-monetary gift was the banquet, which interacted with the military assembly above – an opportunity for the general to display his competence to and raise the morale of the whole army. I have already discussed how this was important for the management of the city, but the opportunity to create gratitude and hierarchy which banquets offered was equally important on campaign.[700] In 316/15 as Peukestes and Eumenes competed for control of their army in Persia, they attempted to win their troops over by spectacular banquets. Peukestes' banquet at Persepolis successfully recalled Alexander's feast there many years previously and impressed the soldiers so much that Eumenes felt it necessary to take action against him and his friends.[701] Eumenes' own banquet was an immense success, which backfired when the resulting hangover left him visibly incapacitated for days afterwards at a critical moment in the campaign.[702] There are a number of anecdotes about Agathokles at banquets, but the setting of most of them is vague. The only one known to have occurred on campaign is part of the account of the first mutiny in Africa, which resulted from a drunken argument between Agathokles' son and Lykiskos, which started at dinner.[703] The meal is described as a *deipnon* and a *potos*, to which Lykiskos had been invited (παραληφθεὶς) and there was enough of an audience that Agathokles considered it necessary to treat Lykiskos' insults light-heartedly. Lykiskos was "one of those appointed to the *hegemonia*," a

[698] Diod.Sic.20.8.4-5.
[699] Diod.Sic.20.69.5: ἐξηγρίωσαν…
[700] See p.156; Xen.*Cyr*.2.1.30.
[701] Diod.Sic.19.21-2.
[702] Diod.Sic.19.24.5.
[703] Diod.Sic.20.33.3-4.

rank held by "many," so presumably the sort of officer who interacted with the rank and file on a daily basis.[704] The episode thus suggests a practice of inviting these officers to Agathokles' dinner table – a way of forging a personal link between himself and the troops under his command.

Agathokles' generalship thus proves similar to that of the Diadochoi in many respects. This may reflect direct borrowing, as in the case of coinage iconography (which was probably designed with soldiers particularly in mind). But the similarities also reflect the fact that both Diadochoi and Agathokles spent long periods on campaign far from any kind of home base – that is that they faced similar circumstances – and the fact that both drew on the same pool of general practice.

Large mercenary armies were expensive. Unlike, Dionysios, who had rewarded soldiers with land, Agathokles sought to meet the costs of his mercenaries completely in cash.[705] Unlike the Diadochoi, Agathokles did not have bottomless Persian treasuries to finance this. I argued in chapter three that the numismatic evidence suggests that the African campaign was financed by its own booty, and that Agathokles left many debts unpaid when he fled Africa.[706] Further money was received from the Carthaginians in the peace deal of 306/05 and perhaps more was received from Ptolemy as a dowry when Agathokles married Theoxena.[707] But the other costs of his extensive warfare had to be exacted from the wealthy citizens and sanctuaries of Syracuse and the other Sicilian and Italian centres.[708] This money ultimately derived largely from the export of agricultural produce.[709] While Sicily was proverbially wealthy from these exports which were in high demand in mainland

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[704] Diod.Sic.20.33.3: τις τῶν ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ τεταγμένων. Cf. 20.7.1, 20.33.7.
[705] For Dionysios' mercenaries, see n.763; the mercenaries of Agathokles' African expedition ended up at Solous, but this was done by the Carthaginians: Diod.Sic.20.69.3.
[706] See p.104.
[707] See chapter 8.8.2.
[708] Diod.Sic.19.107.4: gold and uncoined silver at Gela; 20.4.5-7: orphans and wealthy at Syracuse; 20.71: Segesta; 20.101.1-2: Lipara. The Lokrian tablets attest this process in detail, but are probably not Agathoklean in date: see chapter 7.4.1.
[709] De Angelis (2006), arguing against a grain monoculture.

Greece in the late fourth century due to the repeated famines there,[710] this cannot have compared with the resource bases which most of the Diadochoi could draw on.[711] We have seen that the strain of these expenses and the declining supply of silver after the Ptolemaic conquest of Corinth ended the production of *pegasoi,* probably explains Agathokles' electrum coinage and reduced-weight *pegasoi*.[712] The fact that Agathokles nevertheless managed to support large forces, on campaign, for most of his reign, while also spending money on feasts and civic improvements and gaining a reputation for prosperity, indicates the importance military activity held for him – as for his predecessors and for the Diadochoi.

4.2.5. Royal Cult

A much-discussed aspect of Hellenistic kingship is the royal cult. Most of Agathokles' contemporaries in the eastern Mediterranean received divine honours in his lifetime.[713] There were a number of precedents for such worship going back over the preceding centuries.[714] One important precedent was the cult of the *oikistes*, which had been used by several of Agathokles' predecessors to buttress their power, especially Hieron and Timoleon.[715] Thus there were local

[710] See n.1196.
[711] cf.Ierardi (1995-6) 30-1.
[712] See pp.96, 104.
[713] e.g. *OGIS* 6: 311/0, Skepsis: *temenos* for Antigonos; Diod.Sic.20.46.2: 307/6, Athens: altar of the *Soteres* for Antigonos and Demetrios, new tribes of Demetrias and Antigonis, annual games for them with sacrifice, pictures weaved into Athena's peplos; Diod.Sic.20.100.2-3: 304/3, Rhodes: Lysimachos and Kassandros get *eikones*; ask Oracle of Ammon whether Ptolemy should be ὡς θεὸν τιμῆσαι, then build a *temenos*; Diod.Sic.20.102.2-3: 303/2, Sikyon: for refounding the *polis,* Demetrios receives *timai isotheoi*, they rename the city Demetrias and organise annual sacrifices, festivals and games for him. *IG* XI.2.154a: 296, Delos: *Antigoneia* festival: Meadows (2013) 21 n.6. Ath.6.62-63=Democh. FGrH 75 F2, Douris FGrH 76 F13: 289/88, Athens: Ithyphallic hymn to Demetrios. On Hellenistic ruler cult, see Chaniotis (2003); Iossif, Chankowski & Lorber (2011).
[714] Homeric heroes: Hom.*Il*.2.335; Lysandros: Plut.*Lys.*18; Philip: *IG XII.*2.526 (= *RO* 83); Diod.Sic.16.92.5; Alexander: Badian (1981). Hadley (1964) 124-5; Mondi (1980); Hornblower (2011) 305-7.
[715] *Oikistes*: McGlew (1993) 8-9, 173-82; Hornblower (2011) 215-216; Hieron: Diod.Sic.11.49.2, 11.66.4; Schol.Pind.*Nem*.1a; Bonanno (2010) 132-157; Timoleon: Diod.Sic.16.90.1, Plut.*Tim*.39 (posthumous); Muccioli (2014). Sanders (1991) attributes the invention of ruler cult to Dionysios I, based on Dio.Chrys.37.21, but I think what he has identified is ruler spectacle more than ruler cult.

precedents which Agathokles could have used to justify following the example of the Diadochoi. Yet there is no evidence that Agathokles ever did this.

Instead, Agathokles' religious posturing focussed on emphasising his relationships to various deities. He constantly wore a *stephanos* as a sign of a priesthood which he held from 317/16.[716] He emphasised a special relationship with Demeter and Kore, "the goddesses who possess Sicily".[717] The burning of the ships on arrival in Africa in 310 was ostensibly as a thank offering to them for their safe passage from Sicily.[718] We saw in chapter three that Agathokles' second set of tetradrachms explicitly associated himself and his victory in Africa with Kore – her name which appears in the genitive case, suggesting that she is in some sense the source of the victory commemorated on the reverse.[719] Agathokles also linked himself with Athena. Diodoros records the story that before his first victory in Africa, owls swooped down and landed on the shields and helmets of the troops.[720] After the war was over, he dedicated the aforementioned painting of himself fighting on horseback in the Temple of Athena.[721] Relationships to Zeus Eleutherios, Apollo, and Artemis are attested only in coinage.[722]

All of these deities were important deities at Syracuse before Agathokles and had been cultivated by Agathokles' predecessors. The Deinomenids had emphasised their ancestral priesthood of Demeter and Timoleon was meant to have been accompanied on his journey to Sicily by Demeter

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[716] Diod.Sic.20.54.1.
[717] Caccamo Caltabiano (2010) 288-94 argues that this represents a sacred marriage between Agathokles and Sicily itself, which exceeds the evidence.
[718] Diod.Sic.20.7.2: ταῖς κατεχούσαις Σικελίαν θεαῖς…
[719] See p.122; note Diod.Sic.20.7.3: τὰς θεὰς διὰ τῶν ἱερῶν προσημαίνειν νίκην τοῦ σύμπαντος πολέμου, "[Agathokles said that] the goddesses foretold victory in the whole war for the sacrifices [of the ships]."
[720] Diod.Sic.20.11.3-4: he claims (implausibly) that Agathokles manufactured this omen. This claim would not exist unless there was another version of the story which presented it as a genuine omen.
[721] See p.143.
[722] See p.120

and Kore.[723] The temple of Athena had been built by Gelon with the indemnity from his victory over the Carthaginians.[724] I have discussed Zeus Eleutherios' associations with Timoleon and victory over barbarians above.[725] Apollo and Artemis had had temples on Ortygia at the heart of civic life since soon after Syracuse's foundation and the centre of power under the Dionysioi and Agathokles, as discussed above.[726] Their close association with the island is indicated by the fact that Ortygia was an alternative name for Delos, their birthplace. Artemis was identified with the sacred spring of Arethousa, whose connection to Olympia was so important to Syracuse's Greek identity.[727] The presentation of the autocrat as an agent of the gods is a feature of historiographic narratives of Douketios, Timoleon, and (later) Antiochos Eunous.[728] The much more extensive evidence for Hieron II suggests that he focussed on the same deities as Agathokles and his predecessors, which is striking since there is much more evidence for Hieron and ruler cult was a firmly established part of kingship by his time.[729] So we see that Agathokles' religious policy linked him closely to the traditional cults of Syracuse and Sicily – apparently this was a more effective way of associating his rule with the divine than seeking divine status for himself. Syracuse already had a place for an autocratic ruler – it did not need to promote him to divine status to explain him, and his predecessors had ensured that support for autocracy was already built into the traditional civic cults.

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[723] Hdt.7.153; Pind.*Nem*.1.13-15, *P*.12.2; Diod.Sic.11.26.7; Cic.*Ver.*2.4; Plut.*Tim.*8; Van Compernolle (1957); White (1964) 261-279; Hinz (1998) 21-30, 231.
[724] See n.579.
[725] See p.57.
[726] Fischer-Hansen (2009). See p.156.
[727] Pind.*Nem.*1.1; See n.471.
[728] Douketios: Diod.Sic.11.88.6; Maniscalco & McConnell (2003) 170-176; Timoleon: Diod.Sic.16.66.3-5, Plut.*Tim*.esp.12-13, 16, 36.5-6; Antiochos: Diod.Sic. 34/35.2.11-15, 34/35.2.4b; Flor.2.3.4-2.3.6.
[729] Lehmler (2005) 122-155; Serrati (2008) argues for a ruler cult of Hieron – the only evidence is a private altar inscribed Διὸς Σωτῆρος Ἱέρωνος which Jonathan Prag tells me may be a forgery. That altar is about 5cm long; Hieron's altar to Zeus is 200m long. If the former is evidence for a royal cult, the difference in size might be an indication of its relative importance.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter has been arguing against the idea that Agathokles dramatically changed the style of his rule when he assumed the royal title. The idea that this was a transformative moment is a creation of modern historiography: Diodoros' narration of the event seeks to make an entirely different point. Moreover, the facets of Agathokles' rule which Consolo Langher and others have identified as Hellenistic innovations are not uniquely Hellenistic. They have focussed on the legal nature of his power and the way he interacted with his subjects in Syracuse and Sicily, arguing that the assumption of the kingship transformed the legal basis of his rule into a more unlimited and absolute form of authority and that Hellenistic kingship allowed Agathokles to transcend the *polis*. But Agathokles claimed unlimited authority that transcended the *polis* before he assumed the royal title, using the models of the Deinomenids, Dionysioi and other Sicilian autocrats to do so. He responded to innovations of the Diadochoi, like the assumption of the royal title and their self-representation, but this did not mean the wholesale rejection of Sicilian traditions: as in previous periods, Sicily developed in conversation with the wider Greek world.

PART III: INTERACTIONS

5. SICILY

In this second part of my thesis, I investigate Agathokles' involvement in the world around him, focusing in turn on his interactions with Sicily, Carthage, Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean. Previous characterisations of Agathokles' relationship to his world have either presented him as a largely isolated figure, relevant only to Sicily and the western Mediterranean, or they have presented him as gradually coming into contact with a new Hellenistic world over the course of his reign, drawing Sicily into a closer relationship with the outside world than previously existed. I argue that both of these characterisations are wrong. Agathokles and Sicily were deeply embedded in the wider Mediterranean world from the beginning of the Hellenistic period. Their exclusion from most accounts of the period mischaracterises them and the Mediterranean in the Hellenistic Period. I further argue that Agathokles' engagement with the world continued, resumed, and responded to earlier patterns of interaction. This continues the major theme of the thesis which is that Agathokles' participation in Hellenistic phenomena was not a dramatic shift, but a continuation of previous Sicilian engagement with the Mediterranean. Thus, this part of the thesis will illustrate two of my central points about Agathokles' relevance to our wider understanding of the ancient world. Firstly, we will see that the modern historiographical division of the pre-Roman Mediterranean into two largely independent eastern and western halves conceals widespread and long-standing interactions. Secondly, the tendency to draw a line in the sand at 323 BC conceals the degree of continuity between earlier Mediterranean history and the Hellenistic World. Connectivity does indeed emerge as a characteristic of Agathokles' world, but not as a novel characteristic. Finally, a running theme throughout this part is the effort to construct models in order to explain the forces which drove Agathokles into contact with the wider world. Through these efforts, I seek to explain why Agathokles interacted with the world around him in the ways he did and what it means to say that Agathokles (or anyone else) was part of the Hellenistic World.

In this chapter, I focus on Agathokles' involvement in eastern and central Sicily. Agathokles found his start in this area and throughout his reign it was the core of his domain. I will be arguing that Agathokles rose to power largely from conflicts particular to the domestic situation in Syracuse after Timoleon, but that a powerful process, the exile dynamic, meant that Agathokles' rise to power in Syracuse impacted on the entire island. His exiled Syracusan opponents found refuge in cities throughout Sicily and attempted to gain their hosts' aid to regain control of Syracuse by force. Earlier examples of this same dynamic indicated that to defeat his exiled opponents, Agathokles had to eliminate the strongholds throughout the island where they could regroup and attack. Thus his domestic security encouraged him to adopt an expansionist policy. The various domestic conflicts within the individual *poleis* of Sicily became ever more closely linked to one another and to the conflict between Agathokles and his opponents. The result was conflict throughout Sicily, and eventually the restoration of a territorial state with its capital at Syracuse. This process dramatically transformed Sicily, but it also impacted on Agathokles, causing him to adopt the self-representation which we have seen in chapters two and three, which advertised his power and presented his conflict with the Carthaginians as a victorious defence of Sicilian freedom. The driver of Agathokles' establishment of a large kingdom in Sicily was not primarily the example of the Diadochoi in the east; it was the interlocked nature of civic conflict in Sicily and the model for dealing with this provided by earlier Sicilian history.

The process took place in three stages, mostly derived from the detailed narrative of Diodoros.

1. From the 320s until 317/16 Agathokles was mostly in exile from Syracuse.[730] His opponents, Sostratos and Herakleides had the support of the Geloans (and presumably other Sicilian

[730] For the date, see n.987.

cities),[731] and of Akestorides, a *strategos* summoned from Corinth, [732] but not of the whole Sicilian interior,[733] where Agathokles found his support.

2. From 317/16 until 306/05, Agathokles' control of Syracuse and eastern Sicily was contested, ultimately unsuccessfully by exiles from Syracuse, the other major centres of the island, and the Carthaginians. There are three distinct sub-periods:
    a. From his violent seizure of power in 317/16 until 312/11, Agathokles controlled Syracuse and extended his power throughout eastern Sicily by force, eliminating opposition factions wherever he could. Gela, Akragas and Messana were the main centres of opposition, hosting, then quarrelling with, Agathokles' exiled opponents.
    b. From the Battle of Eknomos in 311/10 until the defeat of Hamilcar at Eknomos in 309/08 BC, the Syracusan exiles and most Sicilian centres were aligned with Carthage against Agathokles.
    c. From 309/08 until 307/06, Akragas under Xenodikos (or Xenodokos) attempted to liberate the island from Syracusans and "barbarians." Agathokles' supporters and exiles from Akragas thwarted this, while Agathokles captured most of the island's coast. The exiles were restricted to Gela and (probably) its hinterland, then crushed, after peace with Carthage in 306/05 BC.
3. From 306/05 until Agathokles' death in 289/88, we do not have much information, but the strong impression from references to the prosperity of Sicily under his reign[734] and his ability to campaign in Italy is that Sicily was firmly under his control.

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[731] Diod.Sic.19.4.3-7.
[732] Diod.Sic.19.5.1-2
[733] Just.*Epit.*22.1.12-2.1.
[734] Chiefly Polyb.9.23, but also Diod.Sic.17.2.3

Agathokles thus was opposed by three major groups: the Syracusan exiles, the elites of the other Sicilian centres and the Carthaginians. All three opposition groups were imperfectly aligned,[735] but nevertheless deeply intertwined. In this chapter, I focus only on Agathokles' interaction with the first two groups, the Syracusan exiles and the other Sicilian centres (and their relationships with each other). This relationship was not independent of his relationship with Carthage, which I will take up in chapter six, so this focus is artificial, but allows valuable insights on the dynamics of exile in eastern Sicily which would be obscured if I attempted to deal with everything at once.[736] Therefore, this chapter focusses, firstly, on the nature of the conflict in Syracuse; secondly, how it interacted with interstate conflicts in eastern Sicily; and thirdly, how Agathokles brought it to an end. It will become clear how closely Agathokles' domestic Syracusan context and his regional Sicilian one were interlinked. In order to retain control of Syracuse, Agathokles had to pay close attention to his wider Sicilian context. He could not discard Sicilian traditions and precedents lightly.

5.1. Origins and Nature of Conflict at Syracuse

Where did the conflict which brought Agathokles to power come from? How was it linked to the internal conflicts in Sicily in the fourth century? A specific and certain answer to those questions is difficult because the meaning of the opposition to Timoleon at the end of his life is so forcefully suppressed by our source material and because we have no information at all for the period between the death of Timoleon and Agathokles' rise to power.[737] This has not prevented scholars

[735] As can be seen for example, from the failure of the coalition between Gela, Akragas, Messana and the Syracusan exiles in 314/3 (Diod.Sic.19.70.6-71.5), or the anti-Carthaginian rhetoric deployed by the Akragantines between 309/8 and 307/6 (Diod.Sic.20.31.3).

[736] Diod.Sic.20.43.7: ταύτῃ δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν καταμέμψαιτο, θεωρῶν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ βίου πολλὰς καὶ διαφόρους πράξεις συντελουμένας κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρόν, τοῖς δ' ἀναγράφουσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχον τὸ μεσολαβεῖν τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τοῖς ἅμα συντελουμένοις μερίζειν τοὺς χρόνους παρὰ φύσιν…
"For this, one might criticise historiography, observing that in real life many different events happen at the same time, but writers must interrupt the narrative and unnaturally assign multiple times to things that happened simultaneously…"

[737] Opposition to Timoleon: Nep.*Tim.*5.2-3; Plut.*Tim*.37.1-3.

from offering answers. Consolo Langher interprets Diodoros' narrative as indicating a class conflict, in which Agathokles the "*capoparte*" (party head) supported labourers, indebted farmers, small-scale traders, dockworkers, artisans, and agricultural workers against an oligarchic elite.[738] I will return to this below. Tokarczuk points to "inequalities and division between citizens" and the "need for personal advancement" in an atmosphere of fraught aristocratic competition as the source of Agathokles' rise.[739] This is surely right, but true everywhere, so not particularly informative.

I find it useful to divide factionalism in the Greek *polis* into three ideal causes: individuals, ideologies, and identities.[740] Charismatic individuals and personal ties to them played an important role, which is clear from the attention that the sources give to faction leaders in most (but not all) cases. But the numbers involved in a faction preclude all participants being personal friends or relatives of their leaders; leaders needed to connect their personal conflicts to ideologies and identities in order to motivate large groups to follow them. By ideology, I mean something very broad: any appeal to a principle or an idea. Within this definition, ancient accounts of *stasis* often present factions as having ideological positions, though they are often highly stereotyped contrasts between oligarchy and democracy or generic calls for freedom. Gray's recent study has proposed that literary and epigraphic accounts of *stasis* show the influence and importance of differing ideas about the nature of the *polis* community, ranging along a spectrum from "Nakonian" idealist communitarianism to "Dikaiopolitan" competitive individualism.[741] Finally, group identity was key to stasis, which is almost always presented as conflict between clear groups of citizens. Sometimes

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[738] Consolo Langher (2000) 27-44. "Capoparte" evokes the Guelfs and Ghibbelines, and, through Levi (1933), Octavian.
[739] Tokarczuk (2012) esp.155.
[740] On the causes and nature of stasis in ancient Greece, see: Brunt (1969) 245-7; Berger (1992); Austin (1994) 528-35; Hansen (2004).
[741] Gray (2015), theorised at 35-78, applied at 197-291. These categories match up concerningly closely with the modern division between socialists and libertarians. Gray sees Agathokles employing a Nakonian posture at 264.

these groups were created by the conflict itself and defined by the leader they followed or ideological demands, but often they were based on pre-existing categories.[742] This example highlights the fact that stasis usually resulted from the conjunction of these factors. In 411, the importance of the group identities involved in the conflict was connected to ideological views about citizens' involvement in government.

In the Sicilian context, ethnic identity and the division between old and new citizens were repeatedly relevant to factional conflict.[743] The fall of the Deinomenids had been accompanied by the expulsion of the new citizens added to the community by Gelon and Hieron. Dionysios' redistribution of land and incorporation of manumitted slaves into the citizen body provoked the last internal revolt against his rule, while Dion's conflicts with Herakleides revolved around the payment (and status?) of his mercenaries. Agathokles' own death would be accompanied by the forceful expulsion of the Mamertines.[744] Therefore it is significant for the development of factionalism at Syracuse in the 330s and 320s that, like the Deinomenids and Dionysios, Timoleon had added a large number of new citizens to the Syracusan community. According to Athanis, Timoleon seized all property in the city and sold it indiscriminately to former residents and new settlers. These settlers consisted of ten thousand Corinthians and Mainland Greeks, including former Syracusans, and fifty thousand of "whoever else wanted" citizenship from Sicily and Italy.[745] Apparently separately, he also incorporated the leftovers of the Dion-Hipparinos-Nysaios-Hiketas

[742] Athens offers the well-known example of the cavalrymen in defending the Thirty in 404/03: Xen.*Hell*.2.4.2-10, 2.4.24-7, 2.4.31-2; [Arist.] *Ath.Pol.*38.2, with Arist.*Pol.*1321a5; Spence (1993) 164-230; Low (2002); Steiner (2005). Cf. Diod.Sic.13.112.3-113.

[743] On Sicilian *stasis* and forced movement, see: McKechnie (1989) 35-45; Demand (1990) 45-58, 98-106; Berger (1992) 57-105; Lomas (2006); Souza (2014).

[744] Post-Deinomenid expulsions: Diod.Sic.11.76, Strabo 6.2.3; Dionysios: Diod.Sic.14.7.4-9.8.; Dion and Herakleides: see n.783; Mamertines: Polyb.1.7-11; Diod.Sic.22.13.2; Strabo 6.2.3.

[745] Athanis FGrH 562 F2=Plut.*Tim*.23.6, cf.Diod.Sic.16.82.2-5, 19.2.8. On the Timoleontic resettlement, see: Talbert (1974) 146-60; Sordi (1983) 67-70, 73-81; McKechnie (1989) 41-2; Souza (2014) 17-9; Costa (2015) F2.

faction who had been in residence at Leontinoi and many of the followers of the "tyrants."[746] These groups and this history ought to be relevant to the three factions that developed in the 330s and 320s.

The first of these factions was Agathokles' opponents, who called themselves "the Six Hundred noblest men," the same name as the group traditionally celebrated for expelling the citizens incorporated by the Deinomenids.[747] They had a heavy emphasis on collegiality, as shown by their name, by their dual leadership, first held by Sostratos and Herakleidas, later by Peisarchos and Diokles, and by their eventual organisation as a *hetaireia*.[748] Several of their leaders have names which had been borne by prominent members of the Syracusan elite as far back as the fifth century BC.[749] This supports Diodoros' representation of them as an aristocratic group committed to an oligarchic ideology, perhaps representing Syracuse's pre-Timoleontic citizens.

The second group are Consolo Langher's "moderate democrats," who toppled the Six Hundred in 318/17, while Agathokles was still in exile in Italy.[750] Insofar as they can be connected with an ideology, they were committed to the legacy of Timoleon and to the construction of a broad tent. The first point is supported by their appointment of Akestorides the Corinthian as *strategos autokrator* in accordance with the constitutional rules laid down by Timoleon.[751] The latter is shown by their attempts at conciliation: they invited Agathokles back after they overthrew Sostratos and

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[746] Diod.Sic.16.82.6.
[747] The name appears in full at Diod.Sic.19.4.3: τῶν ἑξακοσίων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων. They appear with this name when in charge of the state as a *synedrion* before Agathokles' first exile, and immediately before Agathokles took power, when they were a *hetaireia*: Diod.Sic.19.4.3, 19.5.6, 19.6.4-5, 19.9.1. As the name of the group that toppled the Deinomenids: Diod.Sic.11.76.2.
[748] Diod.Sic.19.3.3, 19.4.2, 19.6.4.
[749] Sostratos: Pind.*Ol.*6; Herakleidas: Thuc.6.73.1, 6.103.4, Pl.*Ep.*3.318c-319b, 4.321b, 7.348b-349e, Plut.*Dion* 12, 32-3, 37-8, 45, 47-9, 53; Diokles: Diod.Sic.13.19.4, 13.33-5, 13.59.9-61, 13.75.2-5.
[750] Diod.Sic.19.4.3. For the date see n.987.
[751] Diod.Sic.19.5.1-2.

Herakleidas, and later they welcomed the Six Hundred back too.[752] Diodoros mostly refers to them as "the Syracusans" or "the *demos*", giving the impression that they were simply the mass of people who did not fall into the other two factions and that they had little sense of a factional identity. They probably included the Corinthians and other settlers who owed their homes to Timoleon, but there must have been many people of all sorts who had more to gain from an established *status quo* than from violent civil strife. Aside from Akestorides, there is no sign that they were arranged around any key personalities. To the extent that this group was a faction at all, it was based on ideological appeals to the system established by Timoleon.

The third faction was that led by Agathokles. As far as ideology goes, Agathokles' faction were strongly defined against the Six Hundred and their oligarchy. After his takeover, Diodoros presents Agathokles claiming to have "cleansed the *polis* of those who tried to rule it."[753] This implies that he made an appeal to democracy and broader participation in the state. But the main ideological position that Agathokles is represented as making is an appeal for the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of land. This is a call that had become common in the Greek world generally over the fourth century.[754] Diodoros' stress on the poverty of Agathokles' followers confirms the importance of economic arguments in his rise to power, with the caveat that it also conforms to the stereotypical representation of the supporters of Greek tyrants as poor and powerless.[755] In the context in which Diodoros mentions the poverty of Agathokles' supporters, they are serving Agathokles as an army. Probably their armour was their own, probably their success fighting for Agathokles means that they had significant military experience. If they were poor, then, their

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[752] Diod.Sic.19.4, 19.5.4.

[753] Diod.Sic.19.9.1: καθαρὰν δὲ φήσας τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι τῶν δυναστεύειν ἐπιχειρούντων, with Gray (2015) 264; cf.Diod.Sic.19.3.5 : Agathokles charges the Six Hundred with aspiring to a tyranny.

[754] Fuks (1974); Austin (1994) 533.

[755] Diod.Sic.19.6.1-3. Consolo Langher (1976) & (2000) 33-47, 63-4 emphasises this factor, in her characterisation of Agathokles revolution as essentially a class struggle.

poverty was relative, compared to those who had done well out of the Timoleontic settlement and its aftermath, rather than absolute. Agathokles' call for economic change might have been couched as a restoration of Timoleon's legacy, but Agathokles' eventual appointment as *strategos autokrator* violated the Timoleontic constitution, which might have made a self-presentation as its protector difficult.[756] Sudano argues that Agathokles' economic ideology was the reason for the support he found in the Sicilian interior, suggesting hypothetically excessive Syracusan taxation of the area predisposed the locals to rebellion.[757] We cannot find evidence of actual poverty and economic oppression in pre-Agathoklean Sicily, but this is not actually necessary, since a call to improve economic conditions would appeal to peoples' perceptions of their economic hardship. These perceptions need not have been straightforwardly connected to economic realities. The fact that Agathokles actually did redistribute land and cancel debts once he gained power is decisive evidence that the perception of economic hardship did exist and that the ideological arguments predicated on it which Agathokles deployed were important to Agathokles' rise.[758]

Sudano has further argued that the people of the interior were now "*totalmente greche*" and that ethnic factors were therefore irrelevant to the decision to support Agathokles.[759] This gives excessive weight to archaeological remains of material culture as an indicator of cultural identity.[760] Agathokles made his base at the town of Morgantina,[761] which had been the major centre of the Sikel leader Douketios in the mid-fifth century BC.[762] If the region was suffering from economic exploitation by Syracuse then Agathokles' decision to base himself here was a significant

[756] See n.1192.
[757] Sudano (2011). Cf. Diod.Sic.19.6.1. Sudano also points out that the ample resources of the area enabled Agathokles to raise and equip his army.
[758] Diod.Sic.19.9.5; cf.Just.*Epit.*22.2.11.
[759] Sudano (2011) 81.
[760] cf.Bhabha (1994) esp.145-74.
[761] Diod.Sic.19.6.2; Just.*Epit.*22.2.1.
[762] On Douketios, see Diod.Sic.11.76.3, 11.78.5, 11.88.6, 11.90-2; Galvagno (1991); Jackman (2006).

statement. The region was also inhabited by Campanians, whose grandparents had been brought to Sicily by the Athenians, Carthaginians and Dionysios and whose parents had included leaders like Marcus Mamercus of Catania who were removed from power as tyrants by Timoleon.[763] Their association with Dionysios and their settlement at Aitne may have enabled the Six Hundred to present them as the latter-day equivalents of the Deinomenid loyalists which had held out at Aitne and other centres in the period after the fall of Thrasyboulos.[764] The reality of the interior was heterogeneous and hybrid, with Campanian, Sikel, and Greek clashing and co-existing within individual communities and individual people.[765] Agathokles had to unite a diverse range of different group identities behind him – not appeal to a single shared identity.

In these circumstances, the personal leadership of Agathokles presumably played a significant role in binding the faction together. Diodoros emphasises this personal dimension. According to him, Agathokles' rebellion was initially motivated by the fact that the Six Hundred had withheld honours from him; with similar effect, Justin emphasises a general lust for *imperium*.[766] The slaughter of the leaders of the Six Hundred in the Timoleonteion which marked the beginning of Agathokles' seizure of power began, according to Diodoros, with a claim that the Six Hundred were plotting against him personally.[767] This representation culminates in the Assembly begging him to take power as *strategos autokrator* and lead them.[768] For both these authors, emphasising Agathokles' personal stake in the conflict allows them to present him in a negative light as a tyrant, which is an important

[763] Xen.*Hell*.7.1.20-22; Ephoros FGrH 70 F68=Steph.Byz.*sv*.Ἔντελλα; Diod.Sic.13.44.1, 13.80.4, 14.8.4-9.9, 15.70.1, 16.69.3; Plut.*Tim*.34; Frederiksen (1968); Tusa Cutroni (1970); Tagliamonte (1994) 124-63.
[764] Diod.Sic.11.76.3.
[765] The aforementioned Mamercus is said to have written poems and tragedies and to have made a dedication of the shields taken from Timoleon's troops with a Greek epigram recalling Greek rhetoric about the victory over the Persians, using and inverting Greek idiom to express his distinction from his Greek enemies, not his identification with them: Plut.*Tim*.31.1; cf. Dench (2003) 300.
[766] Diod.Sic.19.3.4-5; Just.*Epit*.22.1.14-16.
[767] Diod.Sic.19.6.4;
[768] Diod.Sic.19.9.

part of both authors' presentation of him. This does not mean that they are wrong to emphasise it as a factor. I have just argued that Agathokles' followers did not have much of a group identity to unite them – being supporters of changes to the arrangement of wealth and followers of Agathokles had to provide unity instead. Additionally, Agathokles' followers included many people who had previously campaigned under him, for whom he will already have been a rallying figure.[769] Whether Agathokles himself was actually motivated primarily by personal factors, as the sources claim, is irrecoverable. But it is the case that his personal safety and dignity became important to his followers.

5.2. The Syracusan Exile Dynamic

In the preceding discussion, I have tried to emphasise that the Syracusan factions were *ad hoc*, bound together by fragile combinations of ideology, group identity and personalities. The broad terms in which their ideology can be defined are partially a result of the minimal evidence, but also reflect the need for a broad ideology in order to unify diverse groups into a power base. A pre-existing group identity is discernible for the Six Hundred, but even then it may have been largely constructed in opposition to (parts of) Agathokles' group; Agathokles' faction does not seem to have had a group identity at all. Finally, Agathokles himself is a powerful indicator of the degree to which individuals' personal connections could cut across factional boundaries. His first wife was the widow of a probable member of the Six Hundred, his brother Antandros had served as a *strategos* alongside Sostratos and Herakleidas, and he was personal friends with the future leader of the exiles, Deinokrates.[770] Between the two better defined groups sat an amorphous group whose

[769] Diod.Sic.19.6.2.
[770] Diod.Sic.19.3.2-3; Diod.Sic.19.8.6; Just.*Epit.*22.1.12.

members had attempted to collaborate with both the Six Hundred and Agathokles at various points. For many people it will not have been clear which faction they belonged to.

After Agathokles' victory in 317/16 and the expulsions that followed it, this will theoretically have changed. Those who had participated in the extra-legal violence and/or the legal assembly and land redistributions that followed were equated with everyone who remained in the city. Everyone who was exiled or who fled was now an opponent. The second faction ceased to exist and all members of it were considered members of one of the other two factions depending on whether or not they continued to live in Syracuse.[771] The exiles were assimilated into the Six Hundred, as shown by the fact that Sostratos and Herakleidas remained their leaders. They could also rally around the common goal of returning home. When Sostratos was killed in 314/13, this common goal was strong enough that they were able to maintain their cohesion under a new leader, Deinokrates. On the other hand, the people remaining in Syracuse included a large group who had no particular ties to Agathokles and his supporters or who had equally strong ties with his opponents. They had no reason to support him other than fear of force. As the city came under siege, strong reasons to oppose him emerged. *P.Oxy.*24.2399, a papyrus fragment of a Hellenistic history illustrates this issue.[772] The scene is set at Syracuse, while Agathokles was in Africa:

> Διόγνητος ὁ Φαλαίνιος ἐπικαλούμενος διεφθαρμένος ὑπ' Ἀμίλκου καὶ τῶν φυγάδων καὶ παρεσκευασμένος ἂν δύνηται μεταστῆσαι τὴν πόλιν. ἐκκλησιαζόντων τῶν Συρακοσίων ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ παρεστῶτος ἐξαίφνης ἀναστὰς καὶ προανακρουσάμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος, ὅτι βούλεται περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων διαλεχθῆναι τῶι δήμωι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν περὶ...
>
> [lacuna of 5 lines]

[771] I have found Bhabha (1994)'s concept of the hybrid useful here, especially illustration at 145-74.
[772] On *P.Oxy.*2399, see n.114.

> αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ λόγους πλείους διετίθετο. των δ' ανθρώπων καταπεπληγμένων ἐπὶ τῆι τάνδρὸς τόλμηι καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐπιθορυβούντων αὐτόν, τῶν δὲ κελευόντων λέγειν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφασίαι τινὶ συνεσχημένων καὶ διευλαβουμένων, μὴ τις ἦι κίνησις περὶ τὴν πόλιν...
>
> Diognetos, nicknamed "the Whale", was corrupted by Hamilcar and the exiles and made preparations however he could to betray the *polis*. When the Syracusans were holding an Assembly about the ongoing war, he suddenly stood up and pushed his way to the speaker's platform, saying that he wished to speak to the *demos* about expedient things and about the men with [Deinokrates?]…
>
> He himself was ready and was trying to say more. But, since the people were stunned at the daring of the man and some were shouting him down, while others were calling on him to speak, and many more were afflicted with speechlessness and were on their guard in case there was a revolution in the *polis*….
>
> *P.Oxy*.24.2399, *l*.32-52, 58-75.

The actual speech is lost in a lacuna, but he probably speaks in favour of surrender to the Carthaginians, based on the reactions of the Syracusans. Huß understood multiple factions within Syracuse on the basis of this passage, but Berger argues cogently that the passage shows a member of the community speaking in favour of the exiles in the hope of carrying out a coup in their favour.[773] The reactions of the Syracusans (and of Antandros) show that there was a sizeable body of people who at this moment were receptive to this argument. Agathokles' efforts to discover disloyal Syracusans on his return from Africa and his multiple massacres of them show that this was an ongoing issue.[774] As long as foreign exiles existed in Sicily, unity and security within Syracuse was improbable, because any new opposition within the city could look to them for support. Thus, to

[773] Huß (1980); Berger (1992)
[774] Diod.Sic.20.63, 20.72.

secure his control within Syracuse, Agathokles had to act against the exiles and their hosts throughout eastern Sicily. Syracuse's domestic conflict became a regional one.

The dynamic at play in the interaction of the exiles and the Sicilian centres is what Forsdyke calls the "politics of exile."[775] In this model, intra-elite competition within a *polis* leads to one faction gaining ascendancy and sending its opponents into exile, where they regroup, gather allies and attempt to return in force. The result is a sustained see-saw effect within the *polis* and the conversion of internal disputes into regional ones. Forsdyke's work explores the nature of the phenomenon in archaic Greece: her case studies are Mytilene, Megara, Samos and Corinth and her focus is the conflict between the Peisistratidai and the Athenian democracy. But the phenomenon is by no means limited to the archaic period; comparable phenomena occur in fourth-century Greece, Cyprus, and, most pertinently, Syracuse.[776] It is the key to understanding the expansion of Agathokles from ruler of Syracuse to ruler of Sicily.

In Syracuse, the dynamic appears repeatedly and was made especially intense by the existence of unassailable strongholds whither opposing camps could retreat when expelled from Syracuse.[777] The first example is the conflict between the Gamoroi and the Kyllirioi which led to the conquest of Syracuse by Gelon, whose control of all eastern Sicily prevented the continuation of the pattern.[778] The Syracusan campaigns in eastern Sicily in the 460s after the fall of the Deinomenids represent an effort to proactively destroy strongholds of the remaining Deinomenid supporters, while the institution of *petalismos* after Tyndarides' failed coup attempt (453/52) might be an effort

[775] Forsdyke (2005) 30-78. See also the works cited in note 740.
[776] Greece: Brunt (1969); Austin (1994); Lewis (2009) 76; Hornblower (2011) 91. Cyprus: Isoc.9.27-32.
[777] Most of the Syracusan *staseis* catalogued by Berger (1992) 34-53; Lomas (2006) table 7.1 are part of the phenomenon.
[778] Hdt.7.155.

to avoid the dynamic.[779] There is little evidence for the latter half of the fifth century, except for Alkibiades' claim in Thucydides that "the Sicilian poleis are populated with mixed crowds and find exchanges and influxes of citizens easy."[780] The dynamic returns clearly to view with the conflict between Diokles and Hermokrates (409/08-408/07),[781] continued in subdued fashion, despite the death of Hermokrates and the emergency of the Carthaginian invasion, until terminated by Hermokrates' follower and relative Dionysios I. The dynamic re-emerges with the exile of Dion (367/66 or 358/57).[782] Under the guise of liberation, Dion, then his nephews Hipparinos and Nysaios, and finally his follower Hiketas engaged in a dynastic conflict with Dionysios II, while a third group under Herakleides and then Kallippos apparently sought the dissolution of the Dionysian autocracy altogether.[783] This conflict was sustained for so long by the existence of the strongholds of Leontinoi and Ortygia, which served as safe, unassailable bases for the friends of Dion and Dionysios II respectively. Timoleon brought the dynamic to an end again by destroying both bases between 344/43 and 339/38.[784] So, the dynamic was a recurrent feature of Syracusan history and on the four occasions that it had been halted, it had been accomplished by destroying or seizing the strongholds which enabled exiles to regroup and counter-attack.

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[779] Post-Deinomenid restructuring: esp.Diod.Sic.11.76.3-6. On *petalismos*: Diod.Sic.11.86-7, with Forsdyke (2005) 285-7.

[780] Thuc.6.17.2: ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμείκτοις πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥᾳδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς; Dover (1965) ad loc. sees this as largely a memory of the 460s; Lomas (2002) 180 suggests it reflects contemporary realities.

[781] Diod.Sic.13.63, 13.75. On Hermokrates: Westlake (1969); Sordi (1981).

[782] Pl.*Ep*.7.329c; Diod.Sic.16.6. Orsi (1994)

[783] Westlake (1983); Sordi (1983) 15-45; Westlake (1994), 693-706.
Herakleides and Kallippos neatly demonstrate continuities in Syracusan politics. Herakleides son of Lysimachos (IG IV(1)^2 95.40) was presumably the grandson of the Herakleides son of Lysimachos who served as general alongside Hermokrates in 415/4 BC (Thuc.6.73.1), and thus suggests continuity in the Syracusan elite from the time before Dionysios. Kallippos was an Athenian companion of Dion, who became his assassin and apparently dubbed himself a tyrannicide: as an outsider justifying his rule by an appeal to liberty he thus prefigures Timoleon.

[784] Diod.Sic.16.70.4, 16.82.7; Plut.*Tim*.22.1-3; on Timoleon: Westlake (1952), Sordi (1961), Talbert (1974), Sordi (1983) 46-65; on the role of Leontinoi as a refuge for exiles: Berger (1991) 140. On these strongholds generally see pp.196-197.

Agathokles' conflict with Sostratos and Herakleides and then with Deinokrates clearly continues or revives this dynamic. In Period 1 above, he was in exile twice, with a power base analogous to Leontinoi at Morgantina and they were in exile at Gela once.[785] After his final seizure of power in 317/16, his opponents were again based in Gela and Akragas. Thus we see the same use of external bases and the same see-saw effect, generating the same expansion of internal Syracusan conflict throughout the whole eastern Sicilian region and beyond.

5.3. The Sicilian Exile Dynamic

Thus far, I have treated the exile dynamic in Sicily as a Syracusan phenomenon. Berger has said that "all of Sicily [was] the arena of Syracusan *stasis*"[786] and as the largest and most powerful city of Greek Sicily, Syracuse's exiles had a powerful regional impact. But it would be more correct to say that all *stasis* in Sicily was interlinked; a similar dynamic prevailed at other *poleis*. Most of these examples are little-known, but the three *poleis* of Akragas, Messana and Gela offer just enough information to show the importance of the dynamic there.

The situation in Akragas between 317/16 and 306/05 BC is (comparatively) clear and the pattern is similar to the course of events in Syracuse.[787] Like Syracuse, Akragas had received a massive influx of new and returning citizens at the time of Timoleon.[788] Akragas was attacked by Syracuse in the 320s,[789] but in 314/13 it admitted Agathokles' opponents and agreed to join them in a war against Syracuse. This provoked rumblings of internal instability which led them to seek an external leader, the Spartan prince Akrotatos, just as the Syracusans had called in Akestorides a little earlier.[790]

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[785] Diod.Sic.19.3.3-8.8; Just.*Epit.*22.1.16.
[786] cf.Berger (1992) 98.
[787] On Akragas in this period: Berger (1992) 18.
[788] Plut.*Tim*.35.2. Archaeological evidence shows clear signs of habitation (on a reduced scale) between 406 and 339; the city was never uninhabited: Fiorentini (2009) 65-66. The literary sources support this: Diod.Sic.13.114.1; 14.88.5, 15.17.5, 16.9.5.
[789] Diod.Sic.19.3.1.
[790] Diod.Sic.19.70.2-3.

Around 311/10, a single dominant individual, Xenodikos, rose to power, a large body of Akragantine exiles took up residence in Syracuse, and Akragas began to pursue a vigorously expansionist policy, opposed to the Syracusans, the Syracusan exiles and the Carthaginians.[791] Just as the security of Agathokles' power in Syracuse required him to install friendly governments throughout eastern Sicily, so Xenodikos' security pushed him to overthrow Agathokles' regime which was providing a base for his domestic opponents. This pressure existed, of course, alongside other causal factors, like the long-standing Akragantine conflict with Syracuse and a general desire for hegemony.[792] As the conflict turned against him, internal opposition to Xenodikos grew and he carried out some kind of coup. This demonstrates the close relationship between the external situation and Xenodikos' own domestic supremacy. With Syracusan military victory, the independent policy was brought to an end, Xenodikos was expelled, and, presumably, the Akragantine exiles who had been at Syracuse were reincorporated.[793] Thus, it seems that, as at Syracuse, the exile dynamic exacerbated Akragas' internal conflict and intensified its involvement with the wider regional conflict.

The case of Messana illuminates another aspect of the exile dynamic. Agathokles first attacked the centre in 315/14 and finally took it in 312/11.[794] There, resistance to Agathokles was drawn out, even made possible, by the assistance of the Syracusan exiles. When the Messanians surrendered they were required to hand over the most important exiles for execution and to keep an eye on the rest. Additionally, the Messanians were required to allow their own exiles to return and the most important opponents of Agathokles in these communities were themselves killed or exiled. It is not

[791] Diod.Sic.20.31-2.
[792] Diod.Sic.20.31.2-3.
[793] Diod.Sic.20.62. Given that the Akragantine exiles had earlier been campaigning on behalf of the Syracusans, their return to Akragas seems certain; compare Agathokles' earlier actions at Messana in note 794.
[794] Diod.Sic.19.65, 19.102.5-7. On Messana: Consolo Langher (2002). Not in Berger (1992).

clear whether Agathokles moved on Messana because the Syracusan exiles were there or vice versa, but what is clear is that the exile dynamic meant that he was able to reframe whatever internal disagreements had led to some Messanians being in exile in terms of support or opposition to himself. Messana shows how the exile dynamic allowed the wider regional conflict to be mapped onto the internal conflicts of individual Sicilian settlements.

The final case, Gela, further demonstrates the complexity of these interactions.[795] Gela also received a substantial body of colonists under Timoleon.[796] In the 320s it played host to the Six Hundred when they were first exiled from Syracuse and in 314/13 it joined other cities in their war on Agathokles.[797] When the war with Carthage began in 311/10, Gela was on Agathokles' side, but he nevertheless launched a coup, executed four thousand people and installed a garrison. Diodoros presents several possible factors behind this decision: the fear or knowledge that the Geloans planned to switch sides, the need for money, and "the false accusations of the exiles."[798] Here then, the Geloan exiles were able to present their internal conflict in terms of Agathokles' regional one and thereby get him to support them in that internal conflict. The existence of these exiles can probably be connected to Gela's earlier support for the Six Hundred and opposition to Agathokles. Gela next appears being captured by Xenodikos with the help of his *idioxenoi* in 309/8.[799] Thereafter it became the diehard core of the resistance to Agathokles, playing host to Xenodikos after his fall in 307/6 and to the last of the Syracusan exiles in 305/4.[800] The Geloan *polis* and its surviving elite had a long-standing opposition to Agathokles at this point, exacerbated by the massacre he carried out in 311/10. Their continued opposition is understandable, but was enabled and prolonged by

[795] Not in Berger (1992).
[796] Plut.*Tim*.33.2. Archaeological evidence: Orlandini (1956) 161-74.
[797] Diod.Sic.19.4.4-7, 19.70-1.
[798] Diod.Sic.19.107.4
[799] Diod.Sic.20.31.4.
[800] Diod.Sic.20.62.5, Diod.Sic.20.90.2.

the support of the Akragantine and Syracusan exiles. All the domestic conflicts in Sicily had become aligned with one another.

Most other *poleis* with which Agathokles interacted are only mentioned a few times and we know nothing about their domestic politics. But the massacres Agathokles carried out in several Sicilian centres might result from similar processes of interaction between intra-*polis* conflicts and the larger regional conflict.[801] The more powerful Agathokles became, the more attractive he became to the disaffected as a potential supporter in their *stasis*, and the more pressure, encouragement and pretexts he had for intervening in ever more communities. So the appeals of exiles to Agathokles encouraged and enabled his expansionism ever further afield. This may have continued to be true in his later interventions in Italy. Moreover, every time he conquered a new community and awarded victory to one group in the local internal conflict, the losers in that local conflict either lost their lives, made their peace, or fled to join the Syracusan exiles, just as Xenodikos did in 307/6. Xenodikos is a valuable case in point, because while Akragas had been briefly ascendant, he was not friendly with the Syracusan exiles.[802] As time went on and Agathokles grew more powerful these other divisions became less and less sustainable and the alignment of smaller conflicts with the war against Agathokles became more and more perfect. Thus, the forces of the exiles actually grew: at the battle of Galeria in 314/13, Deinokrates commanded 3,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry; a decade later at the Battle of Torgion in 305/04, his forces numbered 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.[803] The growing internationalism of the exile force is reflected in Deinokrates' depiction of himself in these final years as *prostates* of the *koine eleutheria*.[804] This representation is a long way from the original desire of the Six Hundred to reclaim control of the city of Syracuse and re-establish

[801] Tauromenion: Diod.Sic.19.102.6; Kentoripa: Diod.Sic.19.103.2-4; Apollonia: Diod.Sic.20.56.4; Segesta: Diod.Sic.20.71.
[802] Diod.Sic.20.31.3; they had once commanded an expedition against Akragas: Diod.Sic.19.3.1-2.
[803] Diod.Sic.19.104, 20.89, cf.20.61.5.
[804] Diod.Sic.20.57.1.

their moderate oligarchy; it responds to the ideology deployed by Xenodikos and the Akragantines.[805] All opposition to Agathokles in Sicily had gathered itself together under Deinokrates and Deinokrates had reshaped himself into the representative of pan-Sicilian opposition to Agathokles.

5.4. The End of the Exile Dynamic

The question of how Agathokles brought the exile dynamic to an end has a clear answer. The ancient literary sources record a vast number of massacres carried out by Agathokles, which are concentrated in the period between his return from Africa and the end of all resistance in 303/02. These accounts are (one hopes) highly elaborated, but it is rash to reject them altogether. Slaughter was the key tool in Agathokles' final establishment of control. As we will see, however, this bald statement can be nuanced.

Diodoros' account of the process is as follows. Agathokles returned to Sicily in 307/06, by which time the Akragantine bid for power had been suppressed and all opposition groups had gathered together under Deinokrates, whose area of support included some portion of the Sicilian interior and Gela. Diodoros describes two senseless massacres, one of the entire population of Segesta and one of all Syracusan relatives of the soldiers who had been left behind in Africa.[806] These stories are both overwrought and dramatized; it is hard to know what to do with them. Subsequently, Diodoros generalises thus:

> … Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐπῆει τὰς ὑπ' αὐτὸν πόλεις ἀσφαλιζόμενος φρουραῖς καὶ χρήματα πραττόμενος· σφόδρα γὰρ εὐλαβεῖτο μήποτε διὰ τὰς γεγενημένας περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχίας ὁρμήσωσιν οἱ Σικελιῶται πρὸς τὴν αὐτονομίαν.

[805] Cf. Diod.Sic.20.31.3.
[806] Diod.Sic.20.71-72.

> Agathokles came upon the *poleis* under him, fortified them with garrisons and extracted money for himself. For he was particularly concerned that because of the bad luck that had happened to him the Sicilians might seek *autonomia*.
>
> Diod.Sic.20.77.1.

That is to say, that the events in Africa had shaken Agathokles' charismatic authority. But it is also another sign of the way the Syracusan exiles had become associated with the cause of Sicilian freedom. Shortly after the passage above, Agathokles' main general, Pasiphilos, lost faith in Agathokles' abilities and defected to the exiles.[807] Like the episode with Diognetos the Whale, this defection demonstrates how the exiles' existence gave Agathokles' subjects and supporters the option of becoming his opponents and the ideological justification for doing so. Beyond attempting to suppress his opponents by force, Agathokles reacted by attempting to portray the events in Africa as a victory in a number of ways, which I have discussed in chapter four.[808] Agathokles' increasingly Pan-Sicilian representation of himself, which we saw in the iconography of his coinage in chapter three, especially S4, which replaces the Syracusan Arethousa with the Pan-Sicilian Kore, may respond to this ideological challenge to his authority, by attempting to (re)-appropriate the cause of Sicilian freedom for himself.[809] Thus, part of Agathokles' response to the threat represented by the exiles was to alter his self-representation in order to emphasise his victory over the Carthaginians as a battle for the freedom of all Sicily.

There were three problems for the exiles, which ultimately led to their defeat. Firstly, they lacked external allies, since the Carthaginian army in Sicily had been crushed by Agathokles' forces in 309/08, the Carthaginian navy apparently suffered a similar fate in 307/06, and all Carthaginian

[807] Diod.Sic.20.77.2.
[808] See pp.142-3.
[809] See pp.121.

support came to an end in 306/05 when the Carthaginians made peace with Agathokles.[810] The second issue was the fact that the exiles were increasingly united and gathered together. At the height of the African War, Agathokles faced opposition from the Syracusan exiles, Xenodikos' Akragantines, the Carthaginians, communities like Gela which had thrown off his yoke, and disaffected inhabitants of Syracuse. In 305/04 there were more opponents than ever marshalled against him at Torgion.[811] But they were all marshalled in the same place and Agathokles was therefore able to decisively defeat all of them at once (he killed four or seven thousand).[812] Thirdly, although the exiles were united in their opposition to Agathokles, they were not united in anything else. For example, Deinokrates and many of the Syracusan exiles had taken part in Hamilcar's siege of Syracuse in 310/09,[813] while Xenodikos and his Akragantine followers had fought against the garrisons Hamilcar had left behind.[814] Another cleavage was apparently even more important. In 306/05, Deinokrates refused Agathokles' offer to surrender. Diodoros claims:

> οὗτος γὰρ μοναρχίας ὢν ἐπιθυμητὴς τῆς μὲν ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσσαις δημοκρατίας ἀλλότριος ἦν, τῇ δὲ ἡγεμονίᾳ τῇ τότε οὔσῃ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐαρεστεῖτο
>
> For, since he aspired to sole rule, [Deinokrates] was hostile to the *demokratia* of Syracuse and preferred the *hegemonia* which he held at that time [i.e. as leader of the exiles]
>
> Diod.Sic.20.79.2

Diodoros (or his source) is extrapolating, but insightfully. Deinokrates, the former member of the Six Hundred, had spent a long period of time as an opponent of the Syracusan democracy, even if

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[810] Diod.Sic.20.29-30, 20.61, 20.79.5; Just.*Epit.*22.7.2, 22.8.3, 22.8.15.
[811] See n.803.
[812] Diod.Sic.20.89.2, 89.6
[813] Diod.Sic.20.16.6, 20.29.5.
[814] Diod.Sic.20.31.3, 32.2.

he now presented himself as the *prostates* of the *koine eleutheria*. This division proved fatal at the Battle of Torgion in 305/04, when two thousand of the exiles decided that they hated Deinokrates more than Agathokles and switched sides.[815] The exiles' problem was similar to that faced by the opponents of Dionysios II some fifty years earlier. His opponents had rapidly discovered that they did not share a vision for Syracuse's future: Dion wanted to continue the Dionysian system with himself as autocrat, Herakleides wanted to establish an oligarchy or democracy of some sort, and the mercenaries just wanted to be paid.[816] Agathokles' offer to surrender, the degree of difference between the various members of Deinokrates' coalition and the sheer amount of time that the exiles had been fighting caused these divisions to become apparent sooner in Deinokrates' case. Eventually Deinokrates himself defected to Agathokles' service; he personally eliminated the last hold-outs of the opposition at Gela in 303/02.[817] The isolation, concentration, and variation of the exiles had led to their destruction.

After this, opposition ceased. Sicily was quiet and prosperous for the last fifteen years of Agathokles' rule.[818] There is very little evidence for how Agathokles kept these *poleis* under control, since Diodoros breaks off shortly after the suppression of the exiles and, even before that, the *poleis* are generally mentioned only when they were conquered or lost, which is to say, in moments of crisis when the usual rules did not apply. As a result, even if we accept, for instance, Polyainos' report that after Agathokles defeated the Leontines, he appeared before their assembly, oversaw a vote to accept whatever he thought best and then announced that he thought it best to kill everyone, the anecdote tells us little about how Agathokles usually interacted with the cities under his control.[819] There is one example of him appointing an *epimeletes* over a community: his trusted

[815] Diod.Sic.20.89.2.
[816] See n.783.
[817] Diod.Sic.20.91.1-2.
[818] Polyb.9.23.2, 15.35.3, cf.Diod.Sic.19.9.9, 16.83.2.
[819] Polyaen.5.3.2.

general Leptines at Kephaloidion in 307/06.[820] No mention is made of whether a replacement was appointed when Leptines was reassigned to lead the war against Akragas later the same year.[821] There is more evidence for garrisons, which are reported to have existed in many cities, including Gela, Kroton, and Hipponion.[822] On occasion, these were used to eliminate opposition, as at Gela in 311/10, when he used his garrison to execute his opponents in the city, seize their money and install a more friendly government.[823] There were other garrisons, referred to as *phrouria, erymata*, *choria ochyra*, dotted throughout Sicily and Agathokles' troops held many of these at times.[824] The fortress excavated at Monte Bubbonia might be one example and La Torre has brought together evidence for more, including many that would subsequently develop into large *poleis*.[825] The use of one of these strongpoints, Echetla (the "panhandle"), in 309/08 demonstrates how these sites enabled control over nearby settlements: first it was used by Akragantine exiles to put Leontinoi and Kamarina under threat, then its capture by Xenodokos of Akragas put the Syracusans in a state of terror.[826] From a single spot (presumably somewhere in the Hyblean mountains) it was possible to threaten most of the *poleis* of south-eastern Sicily, without necessarily exercising any formal control over the *poleis* themselves. Like the garrisons inside the cities, the forces in these *phrouria* did not necessarily need to be able to overcome the forces of the *poleis* such as they were. In an emergency, it was enough for them to limit the ability of the *poleis* to manoeuvre until a large army could be brought to bear. Thus, Xenodokos, busy dealing with strongpoints like Echetla, never had the chance to advance against Syracuse. Ideally, the fear of these garrisons led subject communities to keep themselves in line, without emergencies ever arising. But if the central power was removed,

[820] Diod.Sic.20.56.3; see n.634.
[821] Diod.Sic.20.61.5.
[822] Gela: 19.107.4-5; Kroton: 21.4.1; Hipponion: 21.8.1; General references: 20.77.1, 20.90.2.
[823] Diod.Sic.19.107.4-5.
[824] e.g. Diod.Sic.19.107.1, 20.56.2, 20.79.4, 20.90.2.
[825] Adamesteanu (1957) 168; Panucci (1992); La Torre (2009).
[826] Diod.Sic.20.32.1-2.

the same system of *phrouria* allowed rebels and exiles to retreat and regroup, thereby deepening and perpetuating fragmentation.[827]

5.5. Conclusion

The rapid collapse of Sicilian unity at Agathokles' death indicates how important he himself was for the maintenance of peace and stability in Sicily. The collapse arose not from failure to control the tensions which had brought him to power, but from a crisis of his own making: the dispute for the succession between Archagathos his grandson by his first wife and Agathokles II his young son by his second wife. It was a very standard succession dispute resulting from personal conflicts between Agathokles' heirs, of the sort which Daniel Ogden has termed "amphimetric."[828] Agathokles bungled things badly and dropped dead,[829] but it seems clear that the dispute could have been avoided entirely had Agathokles not acted so extraordinarily incautiously.[830] The personal role of Agathokles in maintaining the unity of his realm is strikingly illustrated by the number of conflicts which immediately emerged from this catastrophe. The Carthaginians suddenly revived their opposition to Syracuse.[831] A Segestan, Menon, appeared, desiring vengeance for the massacre of the Segestans in 307/06.[832] A large group of Campanian (or Siculo-Campanian) origin whom Agathokles had settled in Syracuse were disenfranchised and expelled.[833] Many people under Agathokles' rule were clearly angry about many different things. Yet during his life, these different sources of opposition had not been able to unite with each other. The clash with Archagathos

[827] However, these same garrisons enabled the perpetuation of *stasis* in the fourth century BC, see p.187.
[828] Cf. the disputes which destroyed the Dionysian realm in the mid-fourth century and Lysimachos' Thracian kingdom in 281/80 and which Ptolemy's kingdom managed to survive in 282/81: Ogden (1999); Péré-Noguès (2013).
[829] Diod.Sic.21.16; Just.*Epit.*23.2.4-6.
[830] Ptolemy's successful replacement of his original heir Ptolemy Keraunos with Ptolemy Philadelphos demonstrates that this was possible: Just.*Epit.*16.2.7; App.*Syr.*62; Paus.1.6.8; Ogden (1999) 70-1.
[831] Diod.Sic.21.18.1; Just.*Epit.*23.2.13.
[832] Diod.Sic.21.16.6.
[833] Polyb.7.2-5; Diod.Sic.21.18; Strabo 6.2.3; Cass.Dio.9.40.8.

changed this. Archagathos himself did not survive long, but the different conflicts began to link up with one another once more. Within a year Menon and Carthage were in alliance and the leaders of Messana were inviting exiles from Syracuse into their homes…

The years between 303/02 and 289/88 thus represent a striking deviation from a pattern of disorder and conflict which had existed before Agathokles came to power and resumed as soon as he was removed. It is hard to provide a definitive explanation for how Agathokles maintained this period of peace, since Diodoros' account breaks off shortly after the establishment of peace in Sicily, while Justin's epitome skips the period between the end of the war with Carthage and Agathokles' death. If they had survived, these sources' focus on warfare would probably not enlighten us very much. Epigraphic evidence would be much more helpful but it is sadly absent. Several factors are important, however. One of these was the end of Carthaginian opposition to Agathokles, which I mentioned above as a factor in the isolation and defeat of Agathokles' Sicilian opposition and which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter. This removed a potential support for new opponents of Agathokles, but as the Carthaginians' quick intervention after Agathokles' death shows, a credible opposition to Agathokles could have drawn them back into Sicilian affairs. Thus, another factor was the lack of a credible opposition and the reason for this, as I have said, was the fact that Agathokles had eliminated so many of his opponents. A third factor was Agathokles' self-representation. I discuss this in chapter 8, arguing that Agathokles' self-presentation as a monarch was crucial for maintaining control over his domains. He emphasised his personal excellence: victor over barbarians, benefactor to the *poleis*, the equal of the Diadochoi and his predecessors, but not a tyrant. Thus, he was too formidable to defeat and too good to oppose. The fact that this self-representation was born out of Agathokles' internal conflicts in Sicily means that that self-representation ought to be seen in its Sicilian context, as well as its Hellenistic one – as I argue throughout this thesis. A fourth and final factor in Agathokles' retention of power was the use of a foreign policy which sought to kept foreign powers and the remaining exiles – people like Timaios – at arm's length so that they could not interfere in Sicily. The extreme fragility

of the order Agathokles had established in Sicily explains the high priority he put on this in his dealings with the wider Mediterranean world and we shall see that this factor recurs repeatedly in the next three chapters.

6. CARTHAGE

Having reviewed Agathokles' relationship within eastern Sicily, I now turn to his interactions with the Carthaginians, who were a constant presence in Agathokles' life throughout his reign. In this chapter I seek to understand the relationship between Agathokles and the Carthaginians as part of a long term historical process and a wide-ranging pan-Mediterranean system of interaction. This is in accordance with my general emphasis in this thesis on the importance of both the local Sicilian context and the wider contemporary context for understanding Agathokles in particular and the early Hellenistic Mediterranean more generally.

I discern three phases in the relationship between Agathokles and Carthage. The first, running down to 312/11 BC, continued the relationship between Carthage and Syracuse before Agathokles came to power. During this period, Carthaginian forces under Hamilcar were active in Eastern Sicily,[834] intervening to maintain a status quo between and within the eastern *poleis*. The reasons for this policy of active intervention without conquest are a major focus of this section. Moving beyond the tired dichotomy between aggression and pacifism which has dominated previous discussions of the Carthaginians' motivations,[835] I argue that eastern Sicily was simply a low priority for the Carthaginians which they preferred to nullify rather than occupy. At the end of the fourth century in particular, events elsewhere in the Mediterranean meant that they were even less eager to commit to a large scale intervention in eastern Sicily than usual. Although Syracuse played a limited role in Carthage's aims and motivations, Carthage played an enormous role in Syracusan internal politics; the cumulative precedents of Gelon, Dionysios, and Timoleon meant that fighting the Carthaginians had become a central justification for autocracy in Syracuse, which encouraged

[834] The first of the two Hamilcars active in late fourth century Sicily, to be distinguished from Hamilcar Gisgonis.
[835] See n.882.

Agathokles to take an assertive attitude towards the Carthaginians and also encouraged them to view expansionist acts within eastern Sicily – such as those which his conflict with the Syracusan exiles required – as the prelude to a massive invasion of the western part of the island.[836] The policy of peace through intervention clashed with Agathokles' own policy of peace through consolidation, discussed in the previous section, and this clash led to war. That war, running from 312/11-306/05 BC, is the second phase in Agathokles' relationship with Carthage. I focus on how Agathokles' invasion of Africa took advantage of structural weaknesses in the Carthaginian state, but was doomed by key weaknesses in his own position. The third phase, running from 306/05 BC until Agathokles' death in 289/88 BC, is poorly attested and I focus on trying to understand how the new situation impacted both parties. The warfare that broke out in 289/88 indicates how delicate a balancing act this was.

6.1. The Road to War (317/16-312/11 BC)

The events of this early period have been discussed extensively in the previous section, so I will here recap only the events involving Carthage. During Agathokles' initial conflict with the Six Hundred in the 320s BC, the Carthaginians supported the latter with military force against both Agathokles and the Syracusan government led by Akestorides the Corinthian, until the Six Hundred were allowed to return to Syracuse, at which point they made peace and Akestorides disappears.[837] Agathokles, who was hostile to both the Syracusan government and the Carthaginians at this point, raised a force at Morgantina, captured Leontinoi and put Syracuse under siege. The situation was resolved peacefully, but Diodoros and Justin differ in the degree of Carthaginian involvement.[838] Diodoros says:

[836] Cf. Prag (2010); Ameling (2011).
[837] Diod.Sic.19.4.3; 19.5.4.
[838] Diod.Sic.19.5.3-6; Just.*Epit.*22.2.1-8.

> γενόμενος δὲ φοβερὸς οὐ μόνον τοῖς πολίταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἐπείσθη κατελθεῖν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα καὶ παραχθεὶς εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ὤμοσε μηδὲν ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ.
>
> Since he had become frightening not only to the citizens [of Syracuse] but also to the Carthaginians, he was persuaded to return to his fatherland; he was led into the Temple of Demeter by the citizens and gave an oath not to oppose the democracy.
>
> Diod.Sic.19.5.6.

Diodoros' account thus raises the Carthaginians, but gives them no special role in persuading Agathokles to abandon his siege. Everything subsequent is controlled by the citizens, takes place in Syracusan civic space and is presented as an internal Syracusan matter. Justin's account is different:

> *Sed Agathocles cum videret fortius defendi urbem quam oppugnari, precibus per internuntios Hamilcarem exorat ut inter se et Syracusanos pacis arbitria suscipiat, peculiaria in ipsum officia sui repromittens. Qua spe inpletus Hamilcar societatem cum eo mutuae potentiae iungit, ut quantum virium Agathocli aduersus Syracusanos dedisset, tantum ipse ad incrementa domesticae potentiae reciperet. Igitur non pax tantum Agathocli conciliatur, verum etiam praetor Syracusis constituitur. Tunc Hamilcari expositis insignibus Cereris tactisque in obsequia Poenorum iurat.*
>
> But when Agathocles saw that the city was more bravely defended than besieged, then he beseeched Hamilcar with prayers sent by intermediaries to undertake the arbitration of a peace between himself and the Syracusans, promising his personal services to him for this. Filled with hope, Hamilcar formed an alliance of mutual advantage with him, undertaking that he would receive as many men for the expansion of his own domestic power as he gave to Agathokles for use against the Syracusans. Thus not only was peace procured for Agathocles, but he was even promoted to *praetor* of Syracuse. Then the symbols of Ceres were shown to Hamilcar, taken up, and Agathocles swore obedience to the Carthaginians.
>
> Just.*Epit.*22.2.5-8.

Justin gives Hamilcar, elsewhere referred to by him as the *dux poenorum,* the driving role in events and turns the Great Oath into a promise of *obsequia*. According to Justin, Agathokles immediately seized control of Syracuse using "Africans" supplied by Hamilcar. Thus in Justin's account, Agathokles got his start as a Carthaginian client ruler.[839] Diodoros says instead that after further *stasis* Agathokles took control without Carthaginian involvement, using the same troops with which he had earlier assaulted Syracuse.[840] It is probably right to derive Justin's version from Timaios, as many have. Diodoros' account is often attributed to Kallias or Douris, but could equally reflect his own explicit efforts to chart a middle course.[841]

The two accounts do broadly agree: both describe a military threat to Syracuse, an arbitration, and a reconciliation sanctified by Demeter. The emphasis on Demeter does not rule out Carthaginian involvement, since she had been venerated at Carthage since 396/95.[842] However, both sources seem to describe the Syracusan Great Oath and thus give the reconciliation a Syracusan civic context.[843] The major disparity, then, is the involvement of the Carthaginians in the process: Diodoros only vaguely hints at their involvement; Justin makes their Sicilian commander the prime mover of events. Justin's account is problematic. It is hard to see why the Syracusans would agree to an arbitration that made them Carthaginian vassals.[844] The insidious secret pact between Agathokles and Hamilcar cannot ultimately have a reliable source behind it, since it is meant to have been secret. A number of groups would have benefitted from inventing it.[845] It is hard to

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[839] Also in Trog.*Prol.*22.
[840] Just.*Epit.*22.2.9; Diod.Sic.19.6
[841] Meister (1967) 139; Pearson (1987) 234-5; Consolo Langher (1998a) 21-3, 207-8; Consolo Langher (2000) 58; See chapter 1.1.1.
[842] Diod.Sic.14.77.
[843] The Great Oath: Plut.*Dion*.56.4-6; Hinz (1998) 97-8; Wareh (2007). Symbols of Demeter: Hdt.7.153; Diod.Sic.11.25.
[844] Hans (1983) 80-1; Huß (1985) 178.
[845] i.e. Agathokles' enemies, in line with their efforts to undercut his self-representation as a victorious conqueror of the barbarians; see p.73. The Carthaginians could also use the story to blame Agathokles' rise

square the contingent of African troops in Justin with the much more detailed account of the coup provided by Diodoros, which gives their role to the troops Agathokles had already assembled at Morgantina – who simply vanish from Justin's account after Hamilcar's arbitration.[846] It seems unlikely that Hamilcar played such an independent and controlling role as Justin represents. But even Diodoros' account has the Carthaginians looming around the edges of the reconciliation – not out of mind, even if he is not clear whether they were in sight. On Diodoros' own account, Carthaginian intervention would not be unprecedented or surprising, since he himself claims that they had been involved in the conflict between the Six Hundred and Akestorides shortly before.

After he took power, Agathokles quickly began absorbing the other eastern Sicilian communities, as detailed in the previous chapter.[847] According to Diodoros, Carthaginian envoys intervened when Agathokles attacked Messana in 315/14 BC and forced him to abandon his siege.[848] In 314/13, Hamilcar (mentioned by Diodoros for the first time) organised a treaty which brought an end to the war which had broken out between Agathokles and the alliance of Akragas, Gela, Messana and the Syracusan exiles.[849] The Carthaginians rebuked Hamilcar for the treaty and Diodoros says that Agathokles began to prepare for war at this point.[850] In 312/11, the situation escalated rapidly. Agathokles attempted to seize Akragas, but when a Carthaginian fleet of sixty ships appeared offshore, he attacked "the land under Carthaginian control" instead.[851] Simultaneously, the exiles from Syracuse and the other eastern Sicilian centres who were still at war with Agathokles made common cause with Carthage.[852] At this point, Agathokles and the Carthaginians were at war and,

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to power on a rogue commander rather than a serious miscalculation on their part, see Just.*Epit.*22.3, 22.7.10.

[846] Diod.Sic.19.6.

[847] See chapter 5.3.

[848] Diod.Sic.19.65.5.

[849] Diod.Sic.19.71.6.

[850] Diod.Sic.19.72.2.

[851] Diod.Sic.19.102.8: τὴν χώραν τὴν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίους…

[852] Diod.Sic.19.103.1.

as we will see below, this course of events allowed both sides to be represented as the aggrieved party.

Justin has few of the details just outlined. He folds the period between 317/16 and 312/11 together by saying that the *civitates sociorum* of the Carthaginians were attacked by Agathokles immediately after he took power and complained to Carthage that Hamilcar had treacherously failed to protect them, leading the Carthaginian senate to vote to dismiss him. Justin has merged the arbitrations of 317/16 and 314/13 and is short on details – the identity of the *civitates sociorum* for example.[853] The vote at Carthage has been represented as reflecting a conflict between hawk and dove parties at Carthage, but the passage cannot be pushed very far. The information Justin offers on internal divisions at Carthage is confusing. He says that Hamilcar Gisgonis had already been dispatched at the time when the vote took place, but that its result was hidden in an urn and was not to be revealed until after Hamilcar Gisgonis (not the Hamilcar being charged) returned from Sicily.[854] This is bizarre and sounds like it was invented *post facto*. There would be plenty of cause for such a fabrication; all reports about Hamilcar available to Justin's sources will have been coloured by his indirect responsibility for Agathokles' invasion of Africa and by his nephew Bomilcar's attempted coup in 308/07. At any rate, the information that he provides is enough to enable a great deal of speculation, but our knowledge of Carthaginian internal politics is so minimal that it is hard to falsify or corroborate any of it. Better attested situations suggest that internal conflicts about foreign policy are rarely simple choices between war and peace.[855] The change in Carthaginian policy can be over-stated anyway – the arrival of Hamilcar Gisgonis with his sixty ships represents an escalation, but is similar to the earlier intervention against Agathokles at Messana in 315/14. While

[853] The Phoenician cities of Sicily: Consolo Langher (2000) 87 n.26; the Greek cities: Hans (1983) 82.
[854] Just.*Epit.*22.3.1-6.
[855] cf.Hornblower (2008) 329 pointing out that the conflict between Alkibiades and Nikias at Thuc.6.10.5, which is often presented this way, is actually a conflict between two different policies of aggression.

Justin does not offer us much that we can rely on, he complements and reinforces Diodoros' account, insofar as he stresses the active involvement of the Carthaginians in east Sicilian affairs and their dissatisfaction with Hamilcar's response to Agathokles' consolidation of eastern Sicily. The two sources demonstrate Carthaginian involvement in eastern Sicily. The next two sections will clarify the diplomatic and strategic motivations that lay behind this motivation.

6.2. Diplomatic Relationships

It is the diplomatic relationship that has received the most attention hitherto, since we are well supplied with reports of treaties between Syracuse and Carthage. During Agathokles' rise to power the treaty signed by Timoleon in 339/38 was probably still in force.[856] Its terms are summarised by Diodoros and Plutarch as follows:

> ταῦτα τῶν Καρχηδονίων διαπρεσβευσαμένων καὶ πολλὰ δεηθέντων [Timoleon] συνεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τὴν εἰρήνην ὥστε τὰς μὲν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἁπάσας ἐλευθέρας εἶναι, τὸν δὲ Λύκον καλούμενον ποταμὸν ὅριον εἶναι τῆς ἑκατέρων ἐπικρατείας· μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ Καρχηδονίοις βοηθῆσαι τοῖς τυράννοις τοῖς πολεμοῦσι πρὸς Συρακοσίους.
>
> After the Carthaginians sent embassies and begged a lot, [Timoleon] granted them peace on the terms that all the Greek *poleis* be *eleutherai*, that the river called the Lykos be the border of the two dominions, and that the Carthaginians would not be allowed to aid the tyrants who were hostile to the Syracusans.
>
> DS.16.82.3.
>
> ἐκ δὲ τούτου Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς αὐτὸν [i.e. Timoleon] δεηθέντες, ὥστε τὴν ἐντὸς τοῦ Λύκου χώραν ἔχειν, τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξ αὐτῆς

[856] Huß (1985) 180 n.28. On this treaty: Talbert (1974) 83-5.

> μετοικεῖν πρὸς Συρακοσίους χρήματα καὶ γενεὰς ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ τοῖς τυράννοις ἀπειπάμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν.
>
> After this, the Carthaginians made peace with him [i.e. Timoleon] by begging, on the terms that they have the territory within the Lykos, that they surrender the money and families of anyone who wanted to emigrate from that territory to Syracuse, and that they renounce their alliance with the tyrants.
>
> Plut.*Tim.*34.2

The closely similar reports show that both are ultimately reporting the same treaty, but neither has reported the whole thing – only those terms that interested them. The Lykos River which formed the boundary is probably the Platani River, which enters the Mediterranean at Herakleia.[857] When the Carthaginians intervened against Syracuse on behalf of the Six Hundred, mediated the settlement between Agathokles and the city, and intervened against Agathokles at Messana, they acted on the grounds that this treaty required/allowed them to intervene to maintain the freedom of the east Sicilian *poleis*. The intervention at Messana in 315/14 demonstrates this:

> καθ' ὃν δὴ χρόνον ἦκον ἐκ Καρχηδόνος πρέσβεις, οἳ τῷ μὲν Ἀγαθοκλεῖ περὶ τῶν πραχθέντων ἐπετίμησαν ὡς παραβαίνοντι τὰς συνθήκας, τοῖς δὲ Μεσσηνίοις εἰρήνην παρεσκεύασαν καὶ τὸ φρούριον ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποκαταστῆσαι τὸν τύραννον ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην.
>
> At this time, envoys came from Carthage, who first criticised Agathokles for his deeds, as transgressing the treaty, then arranged peace for the Messanians, forced the tyrant to restore the fortress [of Mylai, which he had taken] and sailed away to Libya.
>
> DS.19.65.5

[857] Gulletta (2006) 410; De Vincenzo (2012) 24-6; contra Talbert (1974) 83 n.3.

The Carthaginians present themselves as intervening in accordance with law, on behalf of the Greek communities and their freedom, and they exercise a light touch – sending diplomatic envoys rather than troops and quickly leaving once things have been put right. This sort of intervention has parallels perhaps with Common Peaces in mainland Greece, where the Persians, Spartans, Athenians, Thebans and Macedonians all used the rhetoric of peace, freedom, and international law to justify intervening to break up power blocs in order to assert control or prevent the rise of threats.[858] This will have been familiar to the Carthaginians who were in close contact with both Athens and the Persians.[859]

The settlement organised by Hamilcar in 314/13 BC to bring the war between Agathokles and the alliance of Akragas, Gela and Messana to an end is also reported by Diodoros:

> ἦσαν δὲ τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν συντεθέντων τοιάδε, τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν Ἡράκλειαν μὲν καὶ Σελινοῦντα καὶ πρὸς ταύταις Ἰμέραν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίοις τετάχθαι, καθὰ καὶ προϋπῆρχον, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας αὐτονόμους εἶναι, τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων Συρακοσίων.
>
> The main points of the agreement were these: Of the Greek *poleis* in Sicily, Herakleia, Selinous, and also Himera would be placed under the Carthaginians, just as they were before, but all the rest would be *autonomoi* , with the Syracusans having the *hegemonia*.
>
> Diod.Sic.19.71.7

The treaty was instantly controversial with both the Sicilian cities and the Carthaginian Senate.[860] Why? How had it changed the situation? Once again, it is a summary and so caution must be exercised. The treaty's terms are essentially the same as the 339/38 treaty. The novelty was not

[858] cf.Hammond & Griffith (1979) 2.624; Dmitriev (2011) 15-66.
[859] ML 92; Diod.Sic.11.1.4, 17.41.1-2.
[860] Diod.Sic.19.72; Just.*Epit.*22.3.2-7.

the terms of the agreement, but the fact that the Carthaginians had accepted Agathokles as the legitimate representative of the Syracusans, which had been the whole point of the war. The Carthaginian allies' complaints and the Carthaginian senate's misgivings about this treaty would then derive from the fact that Hamilcar had recognised an untrustworthy and aggressive individual's rule over eastern Sicily.[861]

But some scholarship has seen this treaty as substantially different from the earlier one and viewed the negative response to the 314/13 treaty as a response to its terms. Two changes have been identified. The first is the return of Herakleia (which had a Carthaginian governor before Timoleon, but is on the east bank of the Platani) to Carthaginian control.[862] But this transfer is probably an illusion. Diodoros explicitly says the three named towns are "just as the [Carthaginians] ruled before," which naturally means "before this treaty," not "twenty-five years ago, before Timoleon," as Consolo Langher interprets it. If the text suggests that the Carthaginians received any new territory in 314/13, it is Himera, but it belonged to the Carthaginians after 339/38 BC.[863] There is no suggestion that the Carthaginians were not in control of Selinous, the third city named in the treaty, between 339/38 and 314/13. Probably, Herakleia had remained under Carthaginian control in 339/38, but was left out of Plutarch and Diodoros' summaries of the 339/38 treaty, because it did not gel with their (and their sources') eulogistic representation of Timoleon. It is not strange that a city on the east bank of the Platani remained under Carthaginian control. When other preserved Carthaginian treaties set borders, they are limits on navigation – a role which rivers were well suited for, since they were often used as marine navigation markers.[864] There are no Carthaginian fleets reported east of the Platani until the beginning of Agathokles' war with

[861] Warmington (1969) 120.
[862] Carthaginian governor: Plut.*Dion* 25.11-4. Consolo Langher (2000) 84-5.
[863] Diod.Sic.19.2.2.
[864] Quinn (2014) 175; Golden (2015) 207-14.

Carthage in 312/11. If the 339/38 treaty made the Platani a navigation limit, it was reasonable for the Carthaginians to have retained and expanded the port there. De Miro argues, alternatively, that Herakleia was not Carthaginian after 339/38, that Timoleon expanded the settlement, and that Carthage regained the city in the 320s.[865] But if the Carthaginians had been actively snatching territory in southern Sicily, Akragas and Gela probably would not have sought Carthaginian mediation in 314/13. The territory the Carthaginians held in Sicily under the treaty with Agathokles was probably the same as that that they had held since the time of Timoleon.

The second change seen between these treaties is the shift in the status of the Sicilian *poleis* from *eleutheria* to *autonomia* under Syracusan *hegemonia*.[866] Again it is important to emphasise that we have a summary of the terms, not a transcription of the treaty. Although *eleutheria* and *autonomia* were formally distinct concepts, they had a lot of overlap by the later fourth century and even more by the time Diodoros wrote.[867] In any case, the practical change seems small. In the 339/38 treaty, Timoleon, as representative of Syracuse, took on the right to determine the legitimate governments of all east Sicilian centres and to dictate which Sicilian centres the Carthaginians could interact with. He felt secure enough in this role to re-found two cities (Akragas and Gela), to enrol new citizens in another two (Agyrion and Kamarina), and to depopulate another (Leontinoi).[868] Carthage was no longer to support Sicilian cities in allying against Syracuse, but had to allow the regimes hostile to Timoleon's Syracuse to be put down by force.

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[865] De Miro (1958) 77-81. His evidence for a Timoleontic settlement is the archaeological evidence for the settlement's expansion in the late fourth century and coins with the legend ΕΚ ΚΕΦΑΛΟΙΔΙΟΥ ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΩΤΑΝ - he reads these as indicating a community at Herakleia settled by people from Kephaloidion, but Consolo Langher (1961) demonstrates the coins were minted c.400 BC in Kephaloidion.
[866] Hans (1983) 80-1; Huß (1985) 181; Consolo Langher (2000) 84-85.
[867] Bosworth (1992); Hansen (1995).
[868] Diod.Sic.16.82.2-7. Plut.*Tim*.35.2.

The recognition of Syracusan *hegemonia* in 314/13 had exactly the same purpose – Agathokles had faced an alliance of Sicilian cities allied with his domestic opponents against him. On behalf of Carthage, Hamilcar agreed that that was not permitted and that Carthage would not support such things. Agathokles' subsequent action against the Sicilian centres, especially Messana, which still hosted exiles and had refused to agree to Hamilcar's treaty,[869] will have been justified as restoration of this *hegemonia*. Presumably Agathokles justified his final march on Akragas in the same way. On the other hand, because the cities under Syracusan *hegemonia* still had to be *autonomoi* under the new treaty, the Carthaginians retained the right/obligation, which they had been exercising hitherto, to intervene in eastern Sicily if the Syracusan government's interventions in the east Sicilian centres overstepped (apparently undefined) bounds. The Sicilian communities clearly thought the Carthaginians retained this power when they complained at Carthage about Agathokles' actions.[870] When Agathokles marched into Akragantine territory in 312/11 and the Carthaginians sent sixty ships to defend the place,[871] they showed that they considered themselves to have this power too. At this point, peace had ceased to be acceptable to either party. In a sense, then, the contradiction between the *hegemonia* clause and the *autonomia* clause were responsible for the war. But that contradiction certainly predated the treaty of 314/13.

6.3. Carthaginian Motivations for intervention

These legal factors have received a lot of attention. Given the weakness of international law in antiquity, however, the legal situation should probably be seen not as forcing parties to do things they would not otherwise have done, but as providing excuses for things they were inclined to do anyway.[872] The question that needs to be answered is why the parties were so keen to enforce the

[869] Diod.Sic.19.72.1, 19.102.1; Just.*Epit.*22.3.1.
[870] Diod.Sic.19.103.1; Just.*Epit.*22.3.2-7.
[871] Diod.Sic.19.102.8.
[872] Macintosh Turfa (1977) 374; Eckstein (2006) esp.12-4, 37-42.

clauses of this treaty. In the previous chapter I argued that Agathokles was powerfully motivated by the exile dynamic, which pushed him to seek control over all east Sicilian centres in order to prevent existing and new opponents within Syracuse from seeking outside support against him. This was a large part of why he was so keen to take advantage of the *hegemonia* clause. But why were Hamilcar, Hamilcar Gisgonis, and the Carthaginian senate back home all unified in their eagerness to intervene on behalf of the rights of eastern Sicilian centres?

The reason is that the Carthaginians sought to maintain a dominant situation in Sicily and prevent attacks from the eastern part of the island by keeping the eastern Greek states divided.[873] These priorities arose out of the Carthaginian experience in Sicily in the fourth century and Sicily's place in the wider Carthaginian view of the Mediterranean. The serious issue with trying to talk about the Carthaginian experience in Sicily and the Carthaginian view of the Mediterranean is that the historical sources for Carthage are overwhelmingly Greek, are entirely focussed on Carthage's role in Sicily, and even then are only interested on those occasions when war broke out. Even when the Carthaginians are centre stage in Greek accounts, it is in the role of largely irrational barbarians lusting for conquest, with tropes freely borrowed from descriptions of the Persians.[874] The main evidence we have for Carthaginian self-representation are the treaties with Rome, preserved in Greek translation from the Latin originals by Polybios. These are problematic evidence because they are negotiated documents – but it is often argued that the inequality of the treaties shows

[873] In IR Realist terms, Carthage at the time of Agathokles' rise to power was a status quo state, aiming to prevent Sicily developing from a unipolar system into a bipolar system, since experience indicated that that development could lead to a power transition crisis and hegemonic war. The Carthaginians did this by encouraging the eastern states to engage in "classic balancing" against Syracuse but they tried to prevent actual military conflicts which might lead to unpredictable changes in power dynamics. Throughout the next three chapters, I share the Realist assumptions that state actors are motivated by short-term self-preservation and that state behaviour cannot be understood apart from the decentralised system of interaction between states. For the concepts: Eckstein (2006) 14-29, 65-9; Low (2007) 7-32. cf.Manni (1966) 144-54; Hans (1983) 80-4, 105-13.

[874] Talbert (1974) 78. Prag (2010) 51-66 on the role of the Sicilian tyrants in producing this discourse.

that the Carthaginians played a controlling role in their phrasing. Then it is important to remember that as external formal representations they might differ significantly from the internal colloquial views of the Carthaginians about themselves. At any rate they represent a contrast to the representation of the Carthaginians in Greek historiography. One key passage is this clause of the second Roman-Carthaginian treaty, probably signed in 348/47 BC:[875]

> ἂν ἔκ τινος χώρας, ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν, ὕδωρ ἢ ἐφόδια λάβῃ ὁ Ῥωμαῖος, μετὰ τούτων τῶν ἐφοδίων μὴ ἀδικείτω μηδένα πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία ἐστὶ <Καρχηδονίοις>
>
> Should any Roman take water or supplies from any territory which the Carthaginians control, he shall not wrong anyone who has peace and friendship <with the Carthaginians> with these supplies.
>
> Polyb.3.24.8.

This clause assumes that Romans could come to Sicily only as small scale raiders or traders, unable to supply themselves without Carthaginian help. Such piracy is the only threat the treaties acknowledge to the ordered Carthaginian world and the only help they expect from the Romans is the promise not to engage in it themselves. Thus Carthaginian self-representation was as a dominant but generous state working to regulate trade and piracy on behalf of those they had peace or friendship with.[876] This had implications for their presentation of the situation in Sicily. In the same treaty, they referred to Σικελίᾳ ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσι, "Sicily which the Carthaginians control."[877] In his discussion of the treaties, which is devoted to disproving the existence of the 'Philinos Treaty', Polybios interprets this as referring only to the part of Sicily which

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[875] Huß (1985) 149-55.
[876] Whittaker (1978) 80-5 (with references at 82) takes this stance seriously; Scardigli (2011) analyses it as a tactic for maintaining hegemony.
[877] Polyb.3.24.8, 24.13. The same phrasing appears in the 509 treaty: 3.22.10. Whittaker (1978) 63 dismisses this as "preposterous," but this reflects a modern legalistic approach to treaties and territories which need not have applied.

the Carthaginians ruled,[878] but the texts of the treaty as he presents them could equally read as a claim to the whole island in a purposefully vague statement, which elided the divided and contested nature of the island. If these treaties can be used as evidence for self-representation, Carthage appears keen to represent itself holding unrivalled supremacy but using it benevolently for the general good of its friends.

There is other evidence for close interaction between Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily in peacetime, although downplayed by ancient historiography.[879] The Carthaginians were perfectly capable of maintaining friendly relations with Greeks – both distant *poleis* like Athens, and nearby *poleis* like Akragas.[880] Carthaginian military involvement in Sicily tended to take the form of reactive expeditions with limited goals. Thus, most expeditions began with requests for aid from third parties (Segesta in 410/09, Syracuse in 345/44, Katane and Leontinoi in 341/40 BC) which then developed into larger scale conflicts. The large expeditionary forces regularly took a year to gather after conflict had begun – which implies that conflict on a scale that required them was not premeditated. These forces were usually heavy in mercenaries and siege equipment;[881] thus, the expeditions' cost required and their design ensured that they would act rapidly and decisively. In this respect the 410/09–404/03 campaigns represents the 'ideal' expedition: demilitarising and imposing tribute on western and then eastern Sicily, but making no attempt to end the individual

[878] Polyb.3.23.5: "ὅσα τῆς Σικελίας ὑπὸ τὴν Καρχηδονίων πίπτει δυναστείαν"; 3.24.15: "περὶ δὲ Σικελίας τἀναντία προσδιασαφοῦσι, περὶ τῆς ὑπ' αὐτοὺς ταττομένης." Polybios had ways to express this idea more clearly and chose not to use them in his translation of the treaties themselves. On the Philinos Treaty, see Eckstein (2010), with 406 n.3 for earlier bibliography. Cf.Maras (2007).
[879] e.g. Diod.Sic.13.81.4-5: Carthage importing oil and wine from Sicily; Diod.Sic.14.1.3: Carthaginian artisans living in Syracuse aid Dionysios' preparations c.400 BC; Diod.Sic.14.46.1-3: Carthaginians living in Syracuse are victims of Dionysios; Diod.Sic.14.53.4 : Greeks in Motya fighting against Dionysios; Diod.Sic.16.9.4-6, Plut.*Dion* 25.12: Dion's close personal ties with members of the Carthaginian elite. See Günther (2004), cf.Palmer (1997) 12 on similar issues in the depiction of the relationship between Carthage and Rome.
[880] Athens: *IG* I^3 123; Akragas: De Vincenzo (2012) 28-30.
[881] Fariselli (1999).

poleis' political autonomy and incorporate them into some form of administration. Conquest of eastern Sicily was not a Carthaginian goal.[882]

In large part because of the Greek experience of that 'ideal' expedition, a key aspect of the Carthaginian experience in fourth-century Sicily was consistent and exceptional aggression from Syracuse. As will be discussed in Part Three of this thesis, hostility to the Carthaginians became a central part of Sicilian autocratic rulership. The ancient sources praise both Dionysios I and Timoleon for fighting the Carthaginians, while Hiketas' collaboration and Dionysios II's peace with the Carthaginians are roundly criticised.[883] On the other hand, although Dionysios I was praised for his hostility to the Carthaginians, he was strongly criticised for his failure to bring the Carthaginian conflict to a conclusion. [884] The people wanted rapid and total victory. But such a total Syracusan victory was possible only before the Carthaginians brought their full forces to bear, as with the Sack of Motya in 398/97. Even then they failed to block the Carthaginians' return. In every war, once the Carthaginians landed a full expedition, the Syracusans inevitably had to go on the defensive, seeking to bar the Carthaginians' passage into eastern Sicily.[885] The consistency of this pattern has two causes. Firstly, the Carthaginians had a larger resource base; they could afford bigger, better expeditionary forces. Secondly, the Syracusans had more to lose in Sicily: if the Carthaginians captured eastern Sicily, Syracuse was crippled; if the Syracusans captured western Sicily, Carthage

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[882] This restricted view of Carthaginian imperialism is endorsed by Whittaker (1978); Hans (1983); Huß (1985); De Vincenzo (2012) 14-30 and is a reaction to much older scholarship which accepted the Greek sources' view uncritically. It can go too far - Eckstein (2006) 158-76, the reaction to the reaction, criticises the now common representation of the Carthaginians as passive and peaceful victims. See also Fariselli (1999). My view here is that the Carthaginians could be aggressive too - but uninterested in conquest as such.

[883] Dionysios I: Pl.*Ep*.8.353a; Dionysios II: Pl.*Ep.*2.319c, 7.331e-333a, Diod.Sic.16.5.2; Hiketas: Plut.*Tim*. 2.3-4, 7.3-8; Timoleon: *SEG* 11.126a; Diod.Sic.16.80.4-81; Plut.*Tim.*29-30. See Prag (2010).

[884] Diod.Sic.15.74.3.

[885] eg. Return of Carthaginians after Motya (397/96): Diod.Sic.14.55.5-7, Chrysas (393/92): Diod.Sic.14.95-96.2, Kabala (383/82): Diod.Sic.15.15.3, Kremissos (340/39): Diod.Sic.16.77-81; Nep.*Tim.*20.2.4; Plut.*Tim*.27-30.

could simply send another force. Thus, a Syracusan leader was under strong internal and self-inflicted pressure to engage in a war that he was incapable of winning.

This had two results. Firstly, as I will discuss in the next chapter, attempts were made to expand Syracuse's resource base in Italy and further north. Secondly, Dionysios' peace treaties with the Carthaginians rarely lasted long and his attacks often sought to imitate his success at Motya by being massive and unexpected.[886] In other words, any strong power in eastern Sicily was likely to attack the Carthaginian territories in great force without warning and regardless of previous agreements.[887] *Syracusana fides* could not be trusted. Anello and De Vincenzo have argued that the increasingly formal Carthaginian control of the western portion of Sicily developed slowly over the course of the fourth century due to the conflict with Syracuse.[888] This took the form of garrisoned fortifications,[889] regular minting,[890] but also the continued cultivation of allies to act as buffers: the Elymians inland, and Akragas and Thermai on the coasts.[891] The conflict also pushed the Carthaginians to become increasingly active in eastern Sicily. Thus in 357/56, despite having been consistently at peace with Dionysios II, the Carthaginians in Africa and in the *Eparcheia* supported Dion's attack on Syracuse.[892] The situation that developed after this was a patchwork of small states with their own leaders, all apparently on good terms with the Carthaginians and opposed to Syracusan expansion. I think this was the Carthaginian ideal situation, regardless of whether they intended it to develop this way. Timoleon the Corinthian's arrival in 344/43 and establishment of himself in charge of Syracuse reinforced the Carthaginian impression of Syracusan tyrants as hostile

[886] Motya in 398/97 BC: Diod.Sic.14.44-46; Dionysios seeking war in 383/82: Diod.Sic.15.15; sudden attack in 368/67 BC: Diod.Sic.15.73. See n.894 below on "path dependency".
[887] Sordi (1983) 20.
[888] Anello (1986); Anello (2002); De Vincenzo (2012) 14-20.
[889] Diod.Sic.19.102.8; Fariselli (1999) 63; De Vincenzo (2012); Cf. above, p.196.
[890] Manfredi (1999) 70-2; De Vincenzo (2012) 21-3.
[891] Elymians: Gallo (1992) 323-326; Akragas: De Vincenzo (2012) 28-30; Thermai: Fariselli (1999) 63.
[892] Diod.Sic.16.9.4-6; Plut.*Dion* 25.

when he invaded their territory. He also perhaps demonstrated to them that vicious civil war in Syracuse tended to lead to the creation or importation of further hostile tyrants.[893]

Hamilcar's actions at the beginning of Agathokles' reign fit into this same pattern, representing a return to this support for local autonomy. When Sostratos and his oligarchs were expelled and appealed to Carthage for help, while the Syracusans summoned Akestorides from Corinth to be their *strategos autokrator*, Hamilcar faced a situation very similar to that faced by his predecessor Mago in 344/43. And he defused it. He supported the exiles' return with some force, until it was possible to organise a peaceful settlement that saw the Corinthian general Akestorides leave Sicily without repeating Timoleon's invasion of the West. Then, when Agathokles attempted to capture Syracuse, Hamilcar avoided military confrontation and encouraged his reintegration into the Syracusan *polis*. After Agathokles had nevertheless managed to consolidate power in Syracuse, this approach began to fall apart. Efforts to prevent the unification of eastern Sicily by blocking Syracusan expansion at Messana and to organise a lasting peace with the treaty of 314/13 failed, in large part because of the exile dynamic operating on Agathokles, as discussed in the first half of this chapter. Agathokles had come to look a lot like a new Dionysios and the Carthaginians switched to a harder line, dispatching Hamilcar Gisgonis against Agathokles in 312/11 BC, which led him to declare war.

6.3.1. Sicily in Carthaginian Perspective

If the Carthaginians were motivated by fear of the resurrection of a hostile Syracusan empire, then why did they not invade the east much sooner and why did they not incorporate it into the *epikrateia* while it was divided? One answer is the concept of path dependency: states tend to follow courses of behaviour and seek power arrangements that have worked in the past, rather

[893] Talbert (1974) 78-86, esp.86 "As long as the cities of the Greek zone were not strong, united and hostile, but remained autonomous and peaceful, Carthage was content."

than innovating.[894] At the other end of the theoretical spectrum, there might be a personal factor – Hamilcar. Although Justin's claim that he was a traitor seems unlikely and *ex post facto*, he was responsible for the initial peaceful settlement in the 320s BC and his subsequent mediations can be interpreted as repeated attempts to save that settlement and his own reputation with it. Importantly, the most aggressive action against Agathokles before the war – the intervention at Messana in 315/14 – is attributed to envoys from Libya, not Hamilcar. The contrast with Hamilcar Gisgonis reveals the personal impact of the first Hamilcar on Carthage's relations with Syracuse. But Hamilcar was in charge of Carthaginian forces in Sicily for around a decade. Throughout that period and even in 312/11, many of Carthage's leaders must have agreed that Hamilcar's approach was the right one.

The chief reason why occasional intervention seemed better than active incorporation, however, is that, although the Greek and Latin literary sources put Sicily at the centre of the Carthaginian world, it was not really.[895] The centre of Carthaginian focus was surely their own city – where a lot was going on. A poorly understood transition from a poorly understood monarchy to a poorly understood republic had probably taken place over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries.[896] It seems reasonable to conclude that in the fourth century, Carthage's internal politics were fraught. The evidence in support of this is patchy but telling: a Libyan revolt and strange civil disturbance in 379/78, continuing or renewed disturbance in 368/67 leading to the burning of Carthage's dockyards, a reference to a coup attempt by Hanno around 350, Justin's strange story about the secret ballot in the Carthaginian senate to condemn Hamilcar (if true), a note that Hanno and Bomilcar were appointed joint *strategoi* in 310/09 because of fears that a single *strategos*

[894] Eckstein (2006) 32-3. This is also an important factor in the repeated attempts of Dionysios to replicate Motya.
[895] Picard (1994); Bondì (1999).
[896] Picard (1994), esp.361; Lancel (1995) 111-20.

would attempt a coup, and finally Bomilcar's attempted coup during Agathokles' invasion of Africa.[897] All this suggests that extremely tense divisions at home, about which we know almost nothing, played a major role in Hamilcar's dismissal specifically and in Carthaginian relations with the world generally.

Beyond Carthage's walls was Africa. Transport amphorae show that large scale exploitation of the African hinterland began in the fifth century.[898] The Carthaginians were apparently already fencing the Tunisian Sahel off from outsiders in the treaty with Rome in 509 BC.[899] Over the fifth and fourth centuries, institutional control in Africa was extended and intensified.[900] As Ameling puts it, "The African territory, the taxes gathered there, its agricultural production and the possibilities it offered for recruitment were the basis of all Carthaginian rule."[901] This is what Agathokles found when he landed on Cap Bon in 310/09.[902] It is of course why he sailed there. All Carthage's Sicilian expeditions were marshalled in Africa before being dispatched. Fariselli suggests this was so that mercenaries from elsewhere could be trained in safety.[903] More likely, expeditions were marshalled there because there were always substantial forces available in North Africa, to keep the Libyans in check. Diodoros mentions revolting Libyans in 396/95, 379/78, 368/67; whether they were continuously or intermittently revolting is unclear.[904] Although we know little about these Libyan matters, they must have dominated Carthaginian grand strategy throughout the century. The Libyans were just as keen to revolt when Agathokles arrived in Africa in 310/09. The Carthaginians'

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[897] 379/78: Diod.Sic.15.24.2-3; burning dockyards: Diod.Sic.15.73.1-3; Hanno's coup: Just.*Epit.*21.4, 22.7.10; secret ballot: Just.*Epit.*22.3.6-7, see above page 205; joint appointment: Diod.Sic.20.10.1-2; Bomilcar's coup: Diod.Sic.20.43-44, Just.*Epit.*22.7.7-11.
[898] Bechtold & Docter (2010) 95.
[899] Polyb.3.22; Huß (1985) 86-90; Scardigli (1991) 69-71.
[900] Manfredi (2003) 409-21, 488-9.
[901] Ameling (2011) 48.
[902] Diod.Sic.20.8.3-4.
[903] Fariselli (1999) 61.
[904] Diod.Sic.14.77; 15.24.2-3; 15.73.1

initial inability to deal with them or Agathokles is linked to the fact that their forces were concentrated in Sicily. Thus, expeditions to Sicily meant decreasing the forces available to deal with disturbances back home in Africa. This was another factor militating against large-scale, long-term military commitments in Sicily.

Furthermore, Sicily was not fourth century Carthage's only concern outside Africa, either. In Sardinia, control had already been apparently established over the Phoenician settlements of the south and western coasts; in the fourth century it became a key territory. The island is the richest source of silver and gold in the central Mediterranean.[905] Almost half of the imported Punic amphorae in fourth-century Carthage came from Sardinia and it was also a major source of troops.[906] Diodoros identifies it, along with Sicily, as Carthage's source of grain.[907] But archaeological evidence shows wall-building activities in the coastal settlements and a proliferation of fortifications in the centre of the island, which imply intense and delicate interactions, regardless of who their builders were (which is controversial).[908] Armed conflict is reported in 379/78 and a similar flare-up much later led to the loss of the island in 238/37.[909] In the Carthaginian treaties with the Romans, Sardinia is placed alongside Libya as a part of the Mediterranean entirely closed off from outside travel and settlement.[910] Usually travel from Carthage to Sardinia was via west Sicily, not direct.[911] Aubet proposes Sardinia could also be reached by following the currents along the west Italian coast up to Latium.[912] Arnaud's data by contrast suggests it would be more normal

[905] Dyson & Rowland (2007) 43; Cassard, Bertrand et al. (2012).
[906] Bechtold & Docter (2010) 96-7; Fariselli (1999) 62.
[907] Diod.Sic.21.16.1, see below, page 231.
[908] Conquest: Just.*Epit.*18.7; Lancel (1995) 81-3; Acquaro (1988); Bondì (1999) 42-4; Dyson & Rowland (2007) 112-26.
[909] Diod.Sic.15.24.2-3; Polyb.1.79.1-5, 1.88.8-12; App.*Pun.*1.5.
[910] Polyb.3.22, 24.
[911] Arnaud (2005) 158, 160, but note 14: if necessity demands, sailors can overcome natural constraints.
[912] Aubet (1993) 156-8, esp.Fig 26 & 27

to go from Africa to Sardinia, then cross to Latium and coast south along the Italian coast.[913] Either way, there was an easy link between Sardinia and Central Italy. There the Carthaginians had long maintained close relations with Rome and the Etruscans, particularly Caere, which continued in the fourth century.[914] Elba and Populonia were the key centres of iron mining and smelting in the western Mediterranean from the fifth century BC until the Imperial period.[915] A new treaty was made with Rome c.348 BC, which is often understood to indicate the changing role of Rome in Italy, but equally indicates an active Carthaginian presence – it is mostly concerned with regulating Carthaginian raids for money and slaves in the area.[916] Further south, the Carthaginians refounded Hipponion in 379/78 BC.[917] Archaeological evidence suggests that these are just traces of activity all along the west Italian coast.[918] The treaty with Rome also bans the Romans from raiding or traveling beyond Tarseian Mastia, that is, into Phoenician Iberia.[919] What exactly this means is highly debated, but it suggests that Carthage was taking an active interest in this part of the western Mediterranean which had formerly stood somewhat apart from its Tyrrhenian sphere.[920] Carthage had a lot on, then, throughout the western Mediterranean. Although this Carthaginian presence had a significant economic component,[921] this trade was also important for Carthaginian military ventures: the wider western Mediterranean was the source of Carthaginian mercenaries, the iron

[913] Arnaud (2005) 164, 169-70. In this region, the Roman date of most of his data might be problematic for understanding earlier periods - all sea routes may not yet have led to Rome at the beginning of the Hellenistic.
[914] Arist.*Pol*.1280a36-8; MacIntosh Turfa (1977); Scardigli (1991) 22-4; Scardigli (2011); Fentress (2013) 165-6.
[915] Minto (1954); McCann, Bourgeois & Will (1977), esp.277-8.
[916] Polyb.3.24. See Huß (1985) 149-55 for the interesting but unprovable theory that the treaty responded to raids by Dionysios II. Scardigli (2011) 31-2, emphasising the degree of Carthaginian coercion implicit in this treaty.
[917] Diod.Sic.15.24.1. The town's name might be derived from the same Punic root as Hippo
[918] Greco (1979) esp.26: Archaeological evidence for penetration of Punic amphorae deep into the Italian interior via the Tyrrhenian coast in the fourth and third centuries.
[919] Unless Maras (2007) and Dudziński (2014) are right in arguing that Tarseian Mastia was actually in Calabria.
[920] Treaty: Polyb.3.24; Distinctiveness of Phoenician Spain: Aubet (1988); Peserico (1999). Evidence for presence in Mauretania is sparse: Papi (2014).
[921] Whittaker (1978) 85-8.

for their weapons and the silver for paying them.[922] Without solid control of these territories, Carthage would struggle to maintain control of its own hinterland – as proved the case after the First Punic War. Within this western Mediterranean sphere, western Sicily was a key territory – the currents and winds of the Mediterranean meant that it was an important lay-over point on voyages from North Africa to Sardinia, western Italy, southern Gaul and Spain.[923] Eastern Sicily on the other hand was not on the western Mediterranean circuit. It existed within a largely distinct system of currents and sea trade, which linked it to southern Italy, the Adriatic, Epirus and western Greece. These places were important to the Carthaginians, but less important than the western Mediterranean circuit.[924] If necessary, they could be accessed from North Africa without visiting eastern Sicily, by travelling across the Syrtis, through the straits of Messana, or via Malta.[925] In a busy world, eastern Sicily – except Messana – was off the Carthaginians' main sea routes. As I have discussed above, its primary significance was the threat that it appeared to pose to the key territories in western Sicily.[926]

Nor was eastern Sicily the only place off the Carthaginians' main sea routes which demanded their attention. In the fourth century Carthage had expanded beyond the Tunisian Sahel and trade across the Syrtis had taken off.[927] By 324-322 they were involved in the internal conflicts of Cyrenaica, aiding Cyrene's oligarchs in their conflict with the Spartan adventurer Thibron.[928] Their failure resulted in Cyrenaica coming under Ptolemaic control. In the 310s, Huß has suggested that this may

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[922] Fariselli (1999, 2002) on mercenaries.
[923] See n.912.
[924] Harpster (2014): preliminary presentation of important work using the provenance of items in ancient Mediterranean shipwrecks and literary references to sea travel to identify Mediterranean circulation areas. Note the absence of Illyrians or east Italians in Carthaginian mercenary service: Fariselli (2002).
[925] Arnaud (2005) 174-83, 188-92. About regular travel across the Syrtis, Arnaud is dubious, but see next note.
[926] This is not to say that trade and interaction between Carthage and eastern Sicily did not exist, which is obviously false; the point is that eastern Sicily was not important for getting to other places and vital resources in the same way that western Sicily was.
[927] Quinn (2011); Wilson (2013).
[928] Diod.Sic.18.19-21.

have led to conflict with the Ptolemaic government of Cyrene and further expansion of Ptolemaic control to the west.[929] The Carthaginian concern at the expansion of Ptolemy's Macedonian armies along the African coast will have provoked even more concern because only a decade earlier those same troops had destroyed Tyre – Carthage's mother city. Relations between the two cities were close. The Carthaginians regularly sent a sacred embassy to the temple of Melqart in Tyre,[930] probably referred to themselves as "Tyrian" in treaties, like that of 348,[931] and may even have offered the city (limited) support during Alexander's siege of the city in 332/31.[932] Presumably, the subsequent sack loomed large in the Carthaginian imagination.[933] Thus, these Cyrenaican disturbances, broadly contemporary with the deterioration of the situation in eastern Sicily, may have looked as serious a threat to Carthaginian security as the rise of Agathokles. With such an uncertain situation in the eastern Mediterranean, the late fourth century was no time for Carthage to divert troops from its African heartland to a war over eastern Sicilian territories which the Carthaginians had no real need to control. Better to try and maintain the peace by mediation and support for local autonomy. But this very system of local autonomy, intended to prevent the unification of eastern Sicily under an aggressive autocrat, created the exile dynamic which caused Agathokles to seek to unify eastern Sicily under himself and brought him into direct conflict with Carthage, threatening western Sicily and thus the Carthaginian empire's supply lines. Hamilcar's efforts to maintain peace in Sicily had brought about the very war the Carthaginians had sought to prevent.

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[929] See p.294 for discussion of this theory.
[930] Diod.Sic.20.14.1-2.
[931] Polyb.3.24.1. But there is a textual issue; see Huß (1985) 151 n.5, Scardigli (1991) 102-104 with Polyb.7.9.5.
[932] Diod.Sic.17.41-2; Arr.*An*.2.24.5; Curt.4.2.10, 3.19 with Bosworth (1980) 254-5.
[933] Huß (1985) 169-70. Jonathan Prag suggests to me that the synchronism of Timaios FGrH 566 F106=Diod.Sic.13.108.4-5 is contemporary evidence linking Carthage and the sack of Tyre.

6.4. War with Carthage (312/11-306/05)

Agathokles may not have fought too hard against this turn of events – as emphasised earlier, there was heavy pressure on Syracusan leaders to engage in anti-Carthaginian wars. But war had clearly come too soon, for he was outmatched. As discussed in the previous section, past practice of Syracusan tyrants in wars with Carthage had been to make a sudden and unexpected attack and then attempt to block passage into eastern Sicily by means of a set-piece battle. Agathokles took this approach too. But his attack in 312/11 apparently did not achieve much and his attempt at blocking failed catastrophically at Eknomos in 311/10.[934] The failure of precedent to solve the crisis forced Agathokles to develop the idea of the rapid and unexpected attack in a new way – invading Africa.

This was one of several moves which took advantage of weaknesses in the Carthaginian empire as discussed in the previous section. Obviously, the invasion itself solved the problem that Syracuse had hitherto had much more to lose from a Sicilian war than Carthage. As a result of the invasion, Carthage's resource base was put under just as much pressure as Syracuse's, and its superiority in numbers was reduced by forcing it to split those forces between Africa and Sicily.[935] The substantial threat that the Libyans posed to Carthage's security in Africa was rapidly activated by Agathokles' efforts to bring them into rebellion. He also benefitted significantly from the internal political disputes of Carthage, themselves exacerbated by the alarm his arrival had created. They culminated

[934] This section does not otherwise discuss individual battles. I cannot improve on Diodoros' account of events more than Tillyard (1908) 103-87, Meister (1984) 395-400; Huß (1985) 187-201; and Consolo Langher (1994), (2000) 145-58, 175-250 have, nor on Müller (1928)'s work to locate the individual battle sites. Additionally, I do not think that any individual battles were that important to the course of the African Expedition on the strategic level at which I am discussing it here. Although the Carthaginian victory in 307/06 played a key role in bringing the invasion to an end and a similar victory could have done so much earlier, Agathokles' victories only delayed what broader strategic factors made inevitable.

[935] Diod.Sic.20.18.1.

in Bomilcar's coup attempt.[936] Having brought the Sicilian conflict to Africa he managed to drag in the Cyrenaican threat too.

Nevertheless Agathokles encountered four problems. Most significantly, as Diodoros himself emphasises, the Carthaginians remained in charge of the seas.[937] This made it almost impossible to reinforce his force in Africa or even to communicate with Sicily. It also meant that cutting Carthage off from Africa required him to take control of all the other coastal cities. Even then he could not prevent them from supplying the city by sea from Sardinia and elsewhere. This last issue was probably a motivation for his return to Sicily in 307/06, which was a limited success: he broke the Carthaginian buffer system in western Sicily by conquering Herakleia, Selinous and Thermai.[938] Later he even converted Segesta (apparently already his ally) into a personal foundation.[939] But he did not capture Lilybaion, Eryx, Panormos or Solous. The Carthaginians could continue to draw on west Sicilian resources to some degree and the normal route to Sardinia was not disrupted at all.[940] As a result, Carthage retained a large resource base and at the end of the war was able to maintain more forces than he could.[941] When the Romans repeated Agathokles' African strategy in the First Punic War, they only did so after establishing naval superiority and they found themselves in an unsustainable position when the Carthaginians regained it.[942] Agathokles was never in a position to resolve the naval issue. With a fleet of thirty-four ships, mostly Etruscan allies, Agathokles achieved a victory over the Carthaginians in 307/06, which Diodoros presents as a key turning point,[943] but actually cost the Carthaginians only five ships. If Diodoros is right that Agathokles' later fleet-

[936] Diod.Sic.20.10-12, 42-4.
[937] Diod.Sic.20.16.1. Quoted below, page 231. Tillyard (1908) 183-4.
[938] Diod.Sic.20.56, 62
[939] Diod.Sic.20.71.
[940] See n.911.
[941] Diod.Sic.20.59-60, 64.
[942] Polyb.25.7-36.4; App.*Pun.*1.3-4.
[943] Diod.Sic.20.61.5-61.1.

building in the 290s BC was directed against the Carthaginians, then it indicates the scale necessary to threaten Carthaginian control of the seas – two hundred ships.[944]

Secondly, Agathokles struggled to create a united anti-Carthaginian front in Africa.[945] Capturing the sea coast took four years and numerous sieges; expeditions deep into the interior were required to gain control of Libyan communities.[946] Keeping the rebels in rebellion was also difficult. Diodoros presents the Libyans in particular as quick to defect back to Carthage.[947] The reasons for this are clear. Firstly, the various groups in Africa were in no way a single political community. Each group had to be separately prevailed upon to rebel and could be convinced to return to the Carthaginian fold separately.[948] Secondly, rebellion was costly. Presumably Agathokles demanded some form of contribution from the African cities that came onto his side. There will also have been passive costs: the cities must have been heavily dependent on trade with Carthage,[949] while the seasonal nomads will have found the prolonged campaigning extremely costly to their livelihoods. Finally, all the African groups would have to remain in Africa after all was said and done and live with the long term consequences of their revolt. As it became clear that Agathokles would never burn Carthage to the ground, the pressure to return to Carthaginian rule while it still counted as favour to Carthage must have been immense. The last holdouts of Agathokles' campaign, by contrast, were crucified.[950] The difficulty of maintaining rebellions throughout Africa was a major factor in

[944] Diod.Sic.21.16.1. Cf. the 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes built by the Romans to challenge Carthage in the First Punic War: Polyb.1.20.9; or the 1000 ships larger than triremes in Alexander's supposed last plans: Diod.Sic.18.4.4 with Badian (1968) 192.
[945] Consolo Langher (2000) 206.
[946] Diod.Sic.20.38-39, 57.3-58.
[947] Diod.Sic.20.18.3, 38.1-2, 38.5, 66-7.
[948] e.g. Diod.Sic.20.38.2, 64.5.
[949] See n.898.
[950] Diod.Sic.20.69.4-5.

Agathokles' defeat, since the successful Carthaginian counter attack in 307/06 took advantage of the fact that his forces were spread so thinly throughout Africa.[951]

Connected to Agathokles' difficulty maintaining the rebellion was his difficulty maintaining his own army.[952] As the end of the African Expedition showed, even many of these could be convinced to defect. The original contingent had not expected to campaign in Africa, or for four years. It is telling that Agathokles felt the need to burn the ships they arrived on to maintain their loyalty.[953] The reinforcements that he received from Cyrenaica in 308/07 had signed up to be commanded by Ophellas – many because of Ophellas' personal marriage tie with the Athenian community.[954] They cannot have been overjoyed to serve under their commander's murderer, especially after he sent their camp followers and families away. Additionally, we have seen that Agathokles struggled to actually pay his army.[955] The army's discontent erupted into mutiny at two key moments and eventually cost Agathokles his sons' lives.[956]

The last of the problems Agathokles was unable to solve was the one that drew him into the war in the first place – the enemies in eastern Sicily. It was not possible for Agathokles to fight both wars at once.[957] In fact, as discussed in an earlier section, the war increased the danger from this quarter by enabling rumours that he was dead,[958] by increasing the number of people in Syracuse who were unhappy with Agathokles' rule,[959] and by allowing his enemies to count on extensive Carthaginian support. Managing two theatres of war simultaneously was not as severe an issue for the

[951] Diod.Sic.20.59-60. Cf. Hannibal's experience in Italy a century later.
[952] Consolo Langher (2000) 206.
[953] See n.254 for parallels.
[954] Diod.Sic.20.40.5-6.
[955] Diod.Sic.20.33.8; Consolo Langher (2000) 219.
[956] Diod.Sic.20.33-34, Just.*Epit.*22.7.7 in 309/08; Diod.Sic.20.68-9, Just.*Epit.*22.8.4-10 in 307/06.
[957] Consolo Langher (2000) 247.
[958] Diod.Sic.20.15
[959] *P.Oxy.*24.2399 with Berger (1988); Diod.Sic.20.15, 20.77; see p.184-6.

Carthaginians. Their naval supremacy meant that communications were easier and that they could supply their troops better.[960] Additionally, the fact that their state was a republic made it easier for them to split commands – by contrast, the Sicilian system of military dictatorship meant that Agathokles attempted to command both wars personally.[961] If it is true that Agathokles' final departure from Africa, which led to the mutiny of his entire army and the end of his African campaign, had been intended simply as a trip back to rectify the Sicilian situation and get reinforcements,[962] then Agathokles' need to physically split himself between Africa and Sicily was the final nail in the African Expedition's coffin.

These problems were heavily interlinked. The lack of naval superiority meant Agathokles had to seek to maintain this vast anti-Carthaginian coalition in Africa, while making it more difficult to fund his army or communicate with Sicily. The need to fund his army from booty while keeping the rebels on side led him to undertake expeditions deep into the African interior, which scattered his forces still more widely.[963] The discontent in Agathokles' army latched particularly onto his son Archagathos,[964] but Agathokles' need to split his time between Sicily and Africa meant that Agathokles nevertheless entrusted him with command and increased the army's discontent further. Thus each problem exacerbated the others and doomed the expedition.

6.5. After the war (306/05-289/88)

Having returned to Sicily, Agathokles committed to ending one of his two wars diplomatically. In the end the Carthaginians were more willing to negotiate with him than the exiles. This is not surprising, given the priorities of the Carthaginians as discussed above, since they thereby regained

[960] e.g. Diod.Sic.20.18.1, 20.18.3.
[961] cf.Eckstein (2006) 245-6 on Rome in the Greek east.
[962] As Michael Ierardi has suggested to me.
[963] Diod.Sic.20.17.6-18.1, 57.4-58, 60; Consolo Langher (2000) 197-206, 219.
[964] Diod.Sic.20.33.4-7.

their lost territories in Sicily without a fight and could devote themselves to putting Africa back in order.[965] The terms are summarised by Diodoros:

> τὰς πόλεις κομίσασθαι τοὺς Φοίνικας πάσας τὰς πρότερον ὑπ' αὐτοὺς γεγενημένας· ἀντὶ δὲ τούτων ἔλαβε [i.e. Agathokles] παρὰ Καρχηδονίων χρυσίον μὲν εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον <ἀναγόμενον> τριακοσίων ταλάντων, ὡς δὲ Τίμαιός φησιν, ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα, σίτου δὲ μεδίμνων εἴκοσι μυριάδας
>
> That the Phoenicians carried off all the *poleis* which were under them previously; in exchange for them, [Agathokles] received three hundred silver *talants* worth of gold (but Timaios says one hundred and fifty), and two hundred thousand *medimnoi* of grain.
>
> Diod.Sic.20.79.5

In addition (unmentioned) the Carthaginians ceased to support the Syracusan exiles or the other Sicilian *poleis*, thereby allowing Agathokles to finally crush them all. Thus, the legal situation was a return to the *status quo ante bellum* (including Carthaginian control of Herakleia).[966]

But in practice, the situation was significantly different, since Agathokles' control over eastern Sicily was now unassailable. The bipolar situation that the Carthaginians had set out to prevent now existed. They could not return to maintaining their security in the western half of the island through a policy of limited but active intervention in eastern Sicilian affairs and they were even less willing to face a military showdown. Perhaps the gifts of gold and grain were part of the response to this – they mollified Agathokles, allowing him to satisfy his ego and public opinion by presenting himself as the war's victor.[967] However, the Carthaginians also maintained a heavy military presence in the west, ready to act when possible – as shown by the speed with which they intervened against

[965] Huß (1985) 202; Consolo Langher (2000) 249. For the pressures on the exiles not to make peace, see Diod.Sic.20.79.2-3 and chapter 5.4.
[966] van Compernolle (1954) with Diod.Sic.22.10.2.
[967] On Agathokles' self-presentation as a victor, see chapters 3.3 and 4.1.

Syracuse in the disputes that broke out after Agathokles' sudden death.[968] A key aspect of this was the Carthaginian settlement of the people who probably hated Agathokles most in the world – the army he had abandoned in Africa – at Solous.[969] Beyond these actions in Sicily, the Carthaginians reached out to affirm links elsewhere, as we know from Livy, who reports that the Carthaginians renewed their treaty with the Romans in 306 BC.[970] They did not ask the Romans to aid them in any future war in Sicily, which would have substantially changed the way the Carthaginians presented their relationship with the world, as discussed on page 213. Requesting Roman help with a potential rival would have meant publically acknowledging that Carthage had a potential rival. Moreover, the Carthaginians did not need outside support in Sicily, they needed their opponents not to have it. Syracusan reliance on Italians during the invasion of Africa had been extensive, and the most serious threat that the Carthaginians had faced to their naval supremacy during the war with Agathokles had resulted from the arrival of eighteen Etruscan ships on his side.[971] It was far better for the Carthaginians that the Romans continued to fight against Etruscans, Samnites and Celts in Italy than to give them the obligation (or opportunity) to fight the same peoples in Sicily. Finally, the agreement did not prevent the Carthaginians from hiring troops or seeking Roman support in a future emergency if they needed it – as they did in 279/78 during the war with Pyrrhos.[972] For the Carthaginians, the important thing about the treaty was not getting practical foreign support, but asserting internationally that the *status quo* had been restored and they had Sicily under control again.

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[968] Diod.Sic.21.18.
[969] Diod.Sic.20.69.3-4.
[970] Liv.9.43.26. I accept the arguments of Eckstein (2010) that this treaty renewed the terms of Polybios' second Rome-Carthaginian treaty.
[971] Diod.Sic.20.11.5, 61.6-62.1, 64.2.
[972] Polyb.3.25; Liv.*Per.*13; Val.Max.3.7.10-11.

East of the Lykos, it has often been argued that Agathokles' policy was dominated by plans to renew the war as soon as he could.[973] The evidence is this passage of Diodoros:

> Ἀγαθοκλῆς ὁ βασιλεὺς πολὺν χρόνον εἰρηνεύων πρὸς Καρχηδονίους, μεγάλην ἐπεποίητο παρασκεύασιν ναυτικῶν δυνάμεων· διενοεῖτο γὰρ πάλιν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην διαβιβάζειν στρατόπεδα, καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν εἴργειν τοὺς Φοίνικας τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν Σαρδῶν καὶ Σικελῶν σιτοπομπιῶν. καὶ ἐν τῷ προγεγονότι κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πολέμῳ θαλαττοκρατοῦντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι διέσωσαν ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων τὴν πατρίδα. εἶχε δὲ ναῦς Ἀγαθοκλῆς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐξηρτυμένας διακοσίας τετρήρεις καὶ ἑξήρεις· ὅμως εἰς πέρας τὴν προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἤνεγκε…
>
> King Agathokles was at peace with the Carthaginians for a long time, during which time he had prepared massive naval forces. For he intended to transport an army over to Libya once more and to use the ships to cut the Phoenicians off from their sources of grain in Sardinia and Sicily. In the previous war in Libya, the Carthaginians had controlled the seas and thereby saved their fatherland from danger. But King Agathokles had ships fitted out – two hundred quadriremes and hexaremes. Yet he did not bring his plans to completion…
>
> Diod.Sic.21.16.1.

There is some reason to be cautious about this claim, just as with Alexander's last plans. The idea that Agathokles was planning a rematch with his old foe at the time of his death is an attractive story, which also parallels Dionysios I's death just after he had launched another war against Carthage.[974] This might indicate a rhetorical invention. But there is nothing impossible about the story. Agathokles was seventy-two in 289 BC, but Seleukos I and Lysimachos were still campaigning

[973] Hans (1983) 111, Huß (1985) 202-3; Meister (1984) 408; Vattuone (1987-8) 68-71; Consolo Langher (2000) 283-4.
[974] Diod.Sic.15.73-74.

in their late seventies and Antigonos I died in battle at eighty-one.[975] The shipbuilding ought to have been a verifiable fact. Agathokles' self-presentation as a victor over the Carthaginians in the model of earlier Sicilian autocrats meant that further warfare against the Carthaginians was a natural path for him. The continued presence of a Carthaginian military force in western Sicily might also have looked threatening to Syracusan security – as indeed it proved to be at his death. Finally, additional evidence of a planned campaign is shown by the fact that Agathokles had an army in the field in eastern Sicily (under his grandson's command) at the time of his death.[976] There certainly was extreme war readiness and it seems difficult to believe that this did not involve some kind of plan for an offensive strike on Carthage if Agathokles felt that the situation called for it. As I have said before, the precedents of Gelon, Dionysios, and Timoleon created a strong expectation that Agathokles would direct himself to warfare against the Carthaginians.[977] We will see in the next chapter that this was one motivating factor for Agathokles' expansion into Italy and interactions with the Diadochoi.

6.6. Conclusion

The relationship between Carthage and Agathokles began as an exceptionally unequal one – Carthage was a power with important interests throughout the Mediterranean, Agathokles was initially focussed on very local concerns. Both sides' interactions were heavily shaped by patterns of behaviour that had developed over the preceding century. The exile dynamic and military nature of Syracusan autocracy pushed Agathokles to unify eastern Sicily; experience of Dionysios taught the Carthaginians that if a Syracusan autocrat unified eastern Sicily, his next move would be to attack the Carthaginian territories in western Sicily which played such a vital role in supplying their

[975] [Lucian]. *Macr.*11
[976] Diod.Sic.21.16.2-3.
[977] See pp.142, 215.

capital with metals, grain and troops. This pushed the Carthaginians to try and break up the East. War was the result. The Carthaginian Empire was able to bear the brunt of Agathokles' assault, since its sea links remained intact. But the relationship between Agathokles and Carthage became more equal – both now commanded large forces and maintained interests far afield. Both stayed out of the other's sphere. Both eyed the other suspiciously. As soon as one of them slackened, the situation collapsed into war once more. Agathokles' relationship with Sicily and with Carthage proves to be a valuable example of how changes within individual communities had political impacts across the whole Mediterranean and the way in which even dramatic changes in the relations between powers flowed out of long-term patterns of interaction. The processes that we have been looking at so far – the exile dynamic and the different forms of peace desired by Agathokles and the Carthaginians – had a powerful impact beyond Sicily and Italy too. In the next two chapters I will argue that they played a role, alongside other new and old dynamics, in the increasingly active role Agathokles assumed in his interactions with Italy, Greece, and the Diadochoi.

7. ITALY

Agathokles' activities in Magna Graecia and the rest of Italy are unfortunately obscured by the fact that Diodoros' account breaks off just as Agathokles gets involved in this region. With such uncertainty, it is no surprise the scholarly interpretations of Agathokles' goals in Italy and the Adriatic vary. There are, essentially, three streams. The first, the weak view, put forward by Cary in the original *Cambridge Ancient History* argues that Agathokles only made "occasional forays" which were "even less political and more piratical than those of Dionysios."[978] In modified form, this view was subsequently supported by Vattuone, who saw Agathokles' activities as nothing more than the bare minimum required to protect himself from military interventions from Italy.[979] This shades into the second view, supported by Manni and Meister, that Agathokles was actively building up an empire in the north, but only so that he could attack Carthage.[980] The third view, supported by Marasco, Consolo Langher, and others, also sees the active construction of an empire, but for its own sake. This perspective stresses the importance of Adriatic trade, the need to defend against invasions from Italy or the Greek Mainland, and the importance of empire for Hellenistic monarchs' prestige.[981] These different views make a major difference to how one views Agathokles' relationship with the nascent Hellenistic world; the first and second viewpoints stress his distance and indifference to it, while the third stresses his political and ideological links to it.

Throughout this thesis, I have been arguing that Agathokles is best seen in both Sicilian and Hellenistic contexts simultaneously. In this chapter, I look at his relations to Italy in this way, much as I did for Carthage in the previous chapter. In this chapter, then, I first present what we know

[978] Cary (1928) 634; Cary (1932) 167-173.
[979] Vattuone (1987-8).
[980] Manni (1966); Meister (1984) 406-9.
[981] Berve (1953) 64-7; Gianelli (1974) 369-80 (mostly in this camp); Marasco (1984a); Landucci Gattinono (1999); Consolo Langher (1995) 99, (2000) 283-4.

about Agathokles' adventures in the region. I reconstruct a chronology for his activities in the region, with two focuses. Firstly, I show that, although Agathokles was most active in Italy in the later part of his reign, the region was an important part of his worldview from well before he took power himself. This contrasts with scholars who see Agathokles' activity in Italy after 302 as part of his transformation into a Hellenistic monarch. Secondly, I emphasise the degree to which the source material means that our knowledge of the most intensive phase of Agathokles' activities in Italy, the period after 302, will always be patchy. After that, I move to the numismatic evidence, which is mostly iconographic and therefore subjective, and the Lokrian tablets, whose connection to Agathokles is uncertain. On the whole, this evidence supports the impression of regular and widespread activity in southern Italy, but gives us little evidence for building even the broad outlines of how and why Agathokles intervened in Italy.

Given the limited evidence for the specific course of events, an approach which stresses long-term patterns of activity is helpful. I therefore move on to look at the background of Syracusan involvement in Italy and the Adriatic in the centuries before Agathokles. Syracusan autocrats from Gelon onwards had regularly expanded into southern Italy under specific circumstances and with specific goals, which Agathokles' interactions with Italy continue. This procedure conforms to this thesis' overall emphasis on the importance of viewing Agathokles' actions in terms of his Sicilian context which once again proves helpful for understanding how he interacted with the early Hellenistic Mediterranean. The contemporary Hellenistic context is also relevant; Agathokles' activities in Italy and his interactions with Mainland Greece and the Diadochoi were interlinked. One sign of this is the difficulty of deciding whether Agathokles' activities in Korkyra and Epirus should be treated in the chapter on Italy or the chapter on the Diadochoi, since they are relevant to both. For the sake of clarity, I treat the chronology of these activities in this chapter, but I reserve

full treatment of them until chapter eight, when I deal specifically with Agathokles' relationships to mainland Greece and the Diadochoi.[982]

7.1. Agathokles and Italy to 303/02

Agathokles was active in Italy well before his rise to power. Diodoros recounts his involvement in a number of undated disturbances in the cities of Magna Graecia.[983] He first arrived in Italy sometime after 323 BC, as a *chiliarch* in an expedition, led by the future oligarchs Herakleides and Sostratos, to support the city of Kroton, which was at war with the Bruttii.[984] Agathokles argued with Herakleides and Sostratos at the end of the expedition and remained in Italy with a substantial number of supporters. He attempted to seize control of Kroton, perhaps in conjunction with the democrats under Menedemos who later became tyrant of Kroton and an ally of Agathokles.[985] But he failed and fled to Taras. There he was enrolled in the "corps of the mercenaries," but he was expelled on suspicion of fomenting revolution.[986] Thereafter, he gathered together the exiles in

[982] See esp.8.2.3.

[983] Diod.Sic.19.3.3-4.2.

[984] On the date: At 19.3.3 and 19.10.3, Diodoros claims that he dealt with the expedition in book 18. Material on the Greek west is missing from that book, but since book 18 begins with the death of Alexander, the intervention must have taken place after that.

[985] Diod.Sic.19.10.3-4, 21.4, see p.248.

[986] This has sometimes been connected with Strabo 6.3.4, which includes Agathokles among the *xenikoi strategoi* of the Tarantines (on whom, see below, page 241): e.g. Lomas (1993) 42.
Points against this: (1) Diodoros' phrasing does not indicate that he was in a position of supreme command (ταχθεὶς δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Ταραντίνοις ἐν τῇ τῶν μισθοφόρων τάξει), (2) Strabo lists Agathokles after Kleonymos, who was their *strategos* in 303/02, and (3) all the other *xenikoi strategoi* were Spartan princes or Epeirote kings who had a far higher rank and greater resource base than Agathokles did in the 310s BC, but also more beholden to the Tarantines in Italy, since they lacked any local powerbase. (4) While the symbols of Pyrrhos and Alexander of Molossos both appeared on Tarentine coinage during their tenure, Agathokles' *triskeles* is absent from all Tarantine coinage.
Others link Strabo's statement with various aspects of Agathokles' interventions in Italy after 303/02, such as: an unattested war on the Lucanians: De Sanctis (1907) 369, Beloch (1925) 4.1.203, an intervention in Apulia, connected to the agreement with the Iapygians and Peuketians mentioned in Diod.Sic.21.5 and dated to c.295: Gianelli (1974) 375-6; Agathokles' attack on Hipponion mentioned in Diod.Sic.21.8 and Just.*Epit.*23.1-2: Freeman (1891-1894) 4.483. These alternatives resolve issues (1) and (2), but they are speculative, they do not resolve issues (3) and (4) and why would the Tarantines, who had already suspected Agathokles of fomenting revolution in the early period, have trusted Agathokles in the 290s when he was much more powerful? Probably, Strabo is mistaken: Gianelli (1974) 372; Marasco (1984b) 101.

Italy into an army, which he used to support Rhegion (which Diodoros claims to have been his father's birthplace) against an invasion by the Syracusans under Sostratos and Herakleides. Presumably, he was successful in this venture, since in the aftermath Sostratos and Herakleides' oligarchy was overthrown and Agathokles was able to return to Sicily. This probably occurred in 318/17 BC.[987]

Once he took power in 317 BC, Agathokles was occupied with affairs in Sicily and Africa and did not return to Italy until 304/3 BC. Throughout this period, however, Agathokles made heavy use of Italian troops. When Agathokles landed in Africa in 310, a quarter of his force consisted of three thousand Samnite, Etruscan and Celtic mercenaries.[988] In his final African battle, three years later, these troops had doubled to more than six thousand.[989] Earlier that year, the Carthaginian blockade of Syracuse had been decisively broken by Agathokles and "eighteen ships from Etruria which had sailed down to him in order to help."[990] Diodoros mentions a mutiny of more than two thousand Ligurian and Etruscan mercenaries during Agathokles' campaigns against the Bruttii in the 290s.[991] The large amount of Agathokles' bronze coinage found in Campania might have been brought there by veterans of Agathokles returning home.[992] All of this reveals an ongoing relationship with Italy, reinforced continually over the course of the African War.

Attempts have been made to link the employment of these mercenaries, especially the arrival of the Etruscan ships in 307/06 with Rome's fourth-century wars in central Italy. Nedu is a recent and typical proponent, arguing that the Etruscans allied with Agathokles after their defeat in the war

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[987] Diod.Sic.19.10.3 reports that the Krotonian democracy exiled the group responsible for the alliance with Sostratos and Herakleides in 318/17 BC. This probably occurred after Sostratos and Herakleides lost power in Syracuse, leaving a year for the complex series of events of Diod.Sic.19.4-19.9.
[988] Diod.Sic.20.11.1.
[989] Diod.Sic.20.64.2.
[990] Diod.Sic.20.61.6: ἐκ Τυρρηνίας αὐτῷ κατέπλευσαν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ναῦς ἐπὶ βοήθειαν.
[991] Diod.Sic.21.3.1. See p.247.
[992] See p.107.

concerning Sutrium in 308 and their realisation that the Romans' ties with the Carthaginians were now stronger than their own.[993] These sorts of close political links seem unlikely. Granted that the evidence for fourth-century Roman political history is not perfect, had Agathokles come into conflict with the Roman Republic, even by proxy, some hint of it would have come down to us. We saw in chapter two that the Roman elite which produced the annalistic tradition had a high opinion of Agathokles. Subsequent historiography was keen to record points of political contact between early Rome and the Greeks.[994] Livy seeks to represent fourth-century Rome as threatened from all sides.[995] It is difficult to believe that he would omit a threat to the Roman Republic from Agathokles if even the hint of one had existed. Finally, there is no evidence that any of Agathokles' Italian forces fought with him as allies; they are always referred to as *misthophoroi*. The eighteen ships are simply referred to as "from Tyrrhenia"; there is no reason to interpret them as a contingent from a particular Etruscan city, rather than pirates.

The idea that the Etruscans responded to fear of Roman hostility by committing themselves to a large naval expedition to Sicily is not probable either. Alliance with the Samnites, Celts and other Italic peoples was a more immediate way of threatening Roman power. This is the path that they actually took, culminating in the defeat at the Battle of Sentinum in 295. By contrast, Agathokles was not an obvious ally against Rome, entangled as he was in a war in Africa and Sicily which it was not clear that he would survive. Furthermore, the coastal Etruscans – the only ones capable of sending ships to Agathokles – were not very involved in the war with the Romans. Livy and Diodoros' descriptions of the Etruscan war of 312-308 are both focussed on Sutrium, the Ciminian Forest, Perugia, and Volsinii, with a brief Roman attack on Tarquinia.[996] The individual Etruscan

[993] De Sanctis (1907) 368, 372; Nedu (2006); contra Meister (1984) 407.
[994] e.g.Liv.4.52, Dion.Hal.*Ant.Rom.*7.37.3.
[995] Oakley (2005) 345.
[996] Diod.Sic.20.35.1-5, 20.44.9; Liv.9.29.1-5, 32, 35-37, 39, 40.18-41.20. On the war see Cornell (1990) 373-7; Bradley (2000) 107-13; Oakley (2005) 451-60, 528-30.

cities' participation in the war varied significantly: Livy describes the victorious Romans making separate peace treaties with Perugia, Cortona and Arretium;[997] subsequently, both he and Diodoros mention two separate treaties: a longer one with Tarquinia and a shorter one with other Etruscans.[998] Of the coastal cities, only Tarquinia was involved in the war with Rome at all. [999] Tarquinia never went to war with the Romans again,[1000] so if they sent the ships to Agathokles, it seems unlikely that they did so as part of an anti-Roman plot. Involvement with the Roman Republic is not required to explain Agathokles' other Italic forces either; the recruitment of Campanian, Celtic and Etruscan mercenaries had begun during the Athenian invasion of Sicily and both Syracuse and Carthage had continued it throughout the fourth century.[1001] There is an indirect relationship: the intense warfare in central Italy, which the Romans were partially responsible for, created a surfeit of displaced men trained in the art of war and ready to sign up for military service in faraway lands. But that Agathokles' interactions with Italic peoples were directly connected to the Republic is unattested, implausible, and unnecessary to explain his employment of Italic troops.

Throughout the war with Carthage, Italy and Italians were relevant to Agathokles, but he did not personally intervene in Italy. The first evidence for a more active approach to the world beyond the Straits of Messana comes in 304/03 with Agathokles' invasion of Lipara, while his forces were still occupied in mopping up the last of his exiled opponents around Gela.[1002] According to Diodoros:

> … Ἀγαθοκλῆς, εἰρήνην ἀγόντων τῶν Λιπαραίων, ἐπιπλεύσας αὐτοῖς ἀπροσδοκήτως εἰσεπράξατο τοὺς μηδ' ὁτιοῦν προαδικήσαντας ἀργυρίου τάλαντα πεντήκοντα

[997] Liv.9.37.12.
[998] Diod.Sic.20.44.9; Liv.9.41.5-8.
[999] Cornell (1990) 373.
[1000] Oakley (2005) 531.
[1001] See n.763. If Entella tablet IV is of Agathoklean date, then it attests to a Roman *epimeletes* of Entella under (presumably) Agathoklean control, but it probably post-dates the First Punic War, see n.634.
[1002] Diod.Sic.20.90.2.

> Although the Liparians were behaving peacefully, Agathokles sailed to them unexpectedly and extracted fifty talents of silver from them who had never wronged him before.
>
> Diod.Sic.20.101.1

They were forced to use dedications to Aiolos and Hephaistos to pay, and Diodoros' account focusses on the divine retribution inflicted upon Agathokles for this act.[1003] As I discussed in chapter one, this focus is in accordance with Diodoros' broader interest in establishing that Agathokles' extreme daring which refuses to be bound by any moral norms was only temporarily successful and ultimately punished by divine forces.[1004] Thus, he has a broader interest in representing the attack as entirely unprovoked and the Liparians as entirely innocent. This representation should be placed alongside Lipara's location on an important Carthaginian route and the Liparians' reputation for piracy.[1005] Diodoros' presentation (combined with the fact that his connected narrative breaks off shortly after) makes the attack on Lipara appear as an isolated raid rather than part of any broader movement. The close relationship of the islands to the Straits of Messana and north-western Sicily mean that none of Agathokles' subsequent interventions in Italy would have been possible if he had not pacified the Liparians.[1006] The attack on Lipara represents the first step in the pursuit of a much more assertive engagement with Italy, taken before Agathokles had even achieved final victory over his domestic opponents in eastern Sicily.

[1003] Diod.Sic.20.101.2-4.
[1004] See p.27.
[1005] Carthage: see p.220-2. Piracy: Diod.Sic.14.92.5, 14.93.3-5; Liv.5.28.1-5; Plut.Cam. 8.4-5; Val.Max.1.1.4; Ogilvie (1965) 689-90.
[1006] Straits: see p.271. Holm (1906) 177 hypothesised an anti-Agathoklean alliance between Tyndaris and Lipari from a coin bearing both communities' names, but this is probably a bad overstrike: Mastelloni (1999) p.28-9 n.9. It may still indicate close commercial ties between the two communities.

7.2. Kleonymos and the Tarentines

The most significant development in Italy in the period of this first step back into Italy was the arrival of the Agiad prince Kleonymos in Taras.[1007] Kleonymos was the brother of Akrotatos, who had led the war against Agathokles in 314/13, and he had been passed over as Agiad king in favour of Akrotatos' son Areios in 309/08 to his great displeasure.[1008] With the permission of the ephors, Kleonymos accepted a Tarantine invitation to serve as their *strategos* against the Lucanians and the Romans, and crossed over to Italy with a force of mercenaries from Tainaron. From the Spartan perspective, Kleonymos thus became the last major participant in the Spartan tradition of western intervention, which I will discuss in chapter eight.[1009] Exactly when this occurred, and particularly, whether it came before or after Agathokles' attack on Lipara is unclear. Diodoros recounts all of Kleonymos' activity under 303/02 BC, but gives him a lot to do in one year; it is possible that some of his account is a flashback. But it cannot be a long one; speculative attempts to place Kleonymos' crossing earlier than 304/303 do violence to Livy, who records three episodes, which broadly correspond to Diodoros' account, under the consulships of Livius Denter and Aemilius Paulus (302/01 BC).[1010]

Kleonymos was the latest example of the *xenikoi strategoi* recruited by the Tarantines in order to help fight Italic peoples.[1011] The practice was similar to that which brought Timoleon to Sicily. The first example had been Archidamos who was summoned to Italy sometime after the end of the Third Sacred War in 346/45 and died in battle in 338/37.[1012] He had been replaced in 334/33 with

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[1007] Diod.Sic.20.104-5; Liv.10.2; [Arist.], *Mir.Ausc.*78; Trog.*Prol*.15; Douris FGrH 76 F18=Ath.13.605e; Polyaen.8.19. Meloni (1950); Gianelli (1974); Marasco (1980) 38-48; Marasco (1984a); Braccesi (1990); Urso (1998) 69-104; Coppola (2004); Oakley (2005) 48-52.
[1008] Diod.Sic.20.29.1; Paus.3.6.2.
[1009] See chapter 8.1.2.
[1010] De Sanctis (1907) 345 n.1, Urso (1998) 73-88, 98-101; Oakley (2005) 49-50.
[1011] Strabo 6.3.4; Urso (1998). See n.986 on why it is unlikely that Agathokles was one of these *strategoi*.
[1012] Diod.Sic.16.61-64. Diod.Sic.16.88.3-4; Plut.*Agis* 3.2; Theopompos FGrH 115, F20=Ath. 536C; Gianelli (1969); Nafissi (2004).

Alexander the Molossian, who ranged over a much wider area, before his death at Pandosia in Bruttium in 331/30.[1013] Kleonymos' arrival revived the practice, which would be repeated once more with the invitation to Pyrrhos after Agathokles' death. From the Tarantine perspective, these leaders provided extra manpower and technical military skill,[1014] which enabled the Tarantines not only to protect themselves against (perceived or real) pressure from their Italic neighbours, but also to assert themselves throughout the region. The patchy record supplies a number of incidents which indicate this assertion was a Tarentine goal in the second half of the fourth century: the intervention of the Tarentines at Naples in 326,[1015] the attempted arbitration between Romans and Samnites at Caudine Forks in 320,[1016] and the decision to support Akrotatos and the Sicilians in their war against Agathokles in 314/13. Morel has stressed the archaeological evidence for the great breadth of Taras' trade connections.[1017] At the same time, these *xenikoi strategoi* theoretically had no local powerbase in the western Mediterranean and, lacking ships, had limited power to draw on their home powerbases in Epirus and Sparta without Tarantine support.

When Kleonymos arrived in Italy, according to Diodoros' account, he quickly forced the Lucanians to make peace. With their help he brought the Metapontines under control. Then, suddenly, he seized the island of Korkyra.[1018] Demetrios Poliorketes and Kassandros both sought an alliance with him. At this point the Tarantines and "some of the others" revolted. Kleonymos returned to Italy, landed perhaps at Metapontion, marched overland towards Taras, took an unnamed *polis*

[1013] Just.*Epit.*12.2; Liv.8.3.6-7, 8.17.9-10, 8.24; Strabo 6.1.5, 6.3.4; Plin.*NH*.3.15.11; Arr. 3.6.7; Gell.*NA* 17.21; Gianelli (1969); Mele (2004).
[1014] Mele (2004) 285-7.
[1015] Liv.8.25.7-8; Dion.Hal.*Ant.Rom.*15.5.2-3.
[1016] Liv.9.14.7.
[1017] Morel (2002).
[1018] Douris FGrH 76 F18=Ath.13.605e; Diod.Sic.20.104; Trog.*Prol*.15. Polyaen.8.19, describing Kleonymos' efforts to acquire Apollonia and Epidamnos from the father of one "Titos" belongs to this context. Marasco (1984a) 45 argues that the father must be Glaukias of Illyria, who had gained control of both cities from Korkyra in 312/11: Diod.Sic.19.78.1, 19.89.1.

garrisoned by *barbaroi* and an unlocatable one called Triopion, but received two fairly small setbacks and retired to Korkyra.[1019] This second trip seems identical to the events Livy records under the consulship of Livius Denter and Aemilius Paulus (302/01), which identifies the unnamed town as *Thuriae urbs in Sallentinis*, which is probably Monte Sannace,[1020] and attributes Kleonymos' departure to either a military defeat at the hands of Aemilius Paulus or fear at the approach of the Dictator Junius Bubulcus. Livy and Trogus recount that Kleonymos then led an expedition all the way up the Adriatic to Patuvium, where his force was almost completely destroyed.[1021] He is not attested in the western Mediterranean again.[1022] Trogus apparently recounted how he was removed from Korkyra after his failed Adriatic Expedition, but this did not make it into Justin's account and the next time Korkyra appears in the surviving sources, Kleonymos is already gone.[1023]

Kleonymos appears to have been in the process of establishing an Adriatic kingdom of the sort that Pyrrhos would temporarily construct in the 280s.[1024] It is – and presumably was – unclear where he intended to direct his energies had he got Italy under control. But Diodoros suggests one possible target which is relevant to this thesis. Describing Kleonymos at the height of his power, before the conquest of Korkyra, he says:

> ἐπεβάλετο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν Σικελίαν στρατεύειν, ὡς τὴν τυραννίδα μὲν καταλύσων τὴν Ἀγαθοκλέους, τὴν δ' αὐτονομίαν τοῖς Σικελιώταις

[1019] Diod.Sic.20.105.
[1020] Sirago (1980).
[1021] Liv.10.2.4-15.
[1022] In 293/92, he provided some insubstantial aid to the Boiotians in their revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes: Plut.*Demetr.*39.1-2. By the early 270s he had returned to Sparta, since he participated in the Spartan war with the Messenians in 279 BC: Paus.4.28.3. Subsequently, he and the Eurypontid king Eudamidas captured Troezen from the Antigonids despite arguing amongst themselves: Polyaen.2.29.1; Front. 3.6.7. He continued to crave the kingship; by 274 he was serving with Pyrrhos at the siege of Aigai: Polyaen.2.29.2. Pyrrhos' fatal invasion of the Peloponnese in 272/71 was ostensibly aimed at placing Kleonymos on the Spartan throne: Plut.*Pyrrh*.26-7; Paus.3.6.3, 3.6.7, 3.24.1.
[1023] Trog.*Prol.*15; Diod.Sic.21.2.3. See p.245.
[1024] De Sanctis (1907) 346; Purcell (1994) 392-3.

> ἀποκαταστήσων, ὑπερθέμενος δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ταύτην τὴν στρατείαν ἔπλευσεν εἰς Κόρκυραν καὶ κρατήσας τῆς πόλεως…
>
> For he was going to attempt to invade Sicily, in order to destroy the tyranny of Agathokles and restore *autonomia* to the Sikeliotai, but putting this invasion off for the moment, he sailed to Korkyra and then took control of the *polis*…
>
> Diod.Sic.20.104.4

It is not clear whether the plan to invade Sicily is more than a guess on the part of Diodoros or his source, but it would not be a surprising decision. The Spartans had a traditional claim to Sicily, which I will discuss in the next chapter.[1025] Furthermore, the opportunity to exceed his brother Akrotatos' dismal achievements in Sicily would have been welcome to Kleonymos in light of his dynastic squabble with Akrotatos' son. Urso, as part of his general effort to redate Kleonymos' expedition, has argued that if Kleonymos did conceive this plan, he must have done so during Agathokles' war with Carthage and the exiles, on the grounds that Agathokles was too firmly entrenched in 303/02 to be attacked.[1026] But the exiles were still fighting Agathokles until 303/02 BC and then Sicily was still recovering from years of intensive warfare.[1027] If Diodoros' presentation of the order of events is correct, then Kleonymos could have presented Agathokles' attack on Lipara in 304/03 to his Italian allies as a threatening act.[1028] Moreover, historical experience indicated that even small invasion forces were capable of toppling Syracusan tyrants.[1029] An invasion of Sicily was by no means an irrational plan for Kleonymos to make, regardless of how firmly entrenched Agathokles was.

[1025] See chapter 8.1.2.
[1026] Urso (1998) 92-3.
[1027] See n.817.
[1028] If Urso is right in moving some of Kleonymos' actions back in time, then the invasion of Lipara might instead be a response to Kleonymos' success in Italy; Kleonymos' decision to move on Sicily would probably still fall in 303/02, since the fleet intended for Sicily was used to attack Korkyra in that year.
[1029] See p.186.

Instead, Kleonymos invaded Korkyra. Diodoros claims that Kleonymos took this action "intending to use [Korkyra] as an anchorage and to keep watch over affairs in Greece."[1030] The embassies from Demetrios and Kassandros indicate that they too thought he intended to use the island to intervene in Greece, which suggests that it was a response to Demetrios' success in the northern Peloponnese in 303/02. Demetrios had been campaigning against Kassandros' forces in Greece on behalf of his father since 304/03, when he had taken control of Chalkis and allied with Boiotia and Aitolia. In 303/02 he seized Corinth and the northern Peloponnese.[1031] This was obviously the prelude to an invasion of Macedon. The situation was ripe for Kleonymos to secure the Spartan kingship. Diodoros' subsequent account makes Kleonymos' decision not to ally with either Macedonian monarch the result of the sudden revolt of Taras rather than any unwillingness to intervene on the mainland.[1032] Much like Pyrrhos twenty years later, Kleonymos' western realm dissolved as he flitted from one emergency or opportunity to another. For a moment, though, he had been poised to topple Agathokles' rule. This must have played on Agathokles' mind.

7.3. Chronology of Agathokles in Italy (302-289 BC)

Immediately after Kleonymos' rebuff from Italy, Diodoros' continuous narrative breaks off. As a result, we sadly lack a continuous account of Agathokles' activities once he was the dominant power in Southern Italy. To determine what Agathokles actually did in the north and when, it is necessary to rely on the fragments of Diodoros preserved in Constantine VII's anthologies and the *Eclogae Hoeschelianae*, the abbreviated account of Justin, and some scattered references in later sources. Those matters concerning Pyrrhos and Demetrios are put in their chronological context here, but their wider implications will be discussed in chapter 8.[1033] There is a table at the end of

[1030] Diod.Sic.20.104.4: διανοούμενος ὁρμητηρίῳ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ χρήσασθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πράγμασιν ἐφεδρεύειν
[1031] *Marm.Par.*125; Diod.Sic.20.100.5-6; 102.2-103.
[1032] Diod.Sic.20.105.1.
[1033] See section 8.2.3.

this section, summarising the chronology. I will discuss the reasons for Agathokles' activities at the end of the chapter, using long-term trends to do so.

Trogus and Justin both state that Agathokles entered Italy to fight the Bruttii.[1034] The Bruttii appear in the literary tradition as an off-shoot of the Lucanians who had been inveterate enemies of the Greek cities – usually Kroton or Thourioi – from the time of Dionysios II. They occupied settlements in the Calabrian peninsula's interior and on the western coast. Strabo lists their coastal conquests: Temesa, Terina, Cosentia, and Hipponion. Diodoros, who places their rise in 356/55, adds Thourioi.[1035] Agathokles had fought against them early in his career, since they were the target of the Syracusan expedition to Kroton in the 320s which had led to his first exile.[1036] After that, their reported relations with the Greek cities and with Agathokles appear friendly, so this campaign represents a shift back to an older hostility.[1037] This occurred after Agathokles' attack on Lipara in 304/03. Since he had brought the war to a conclusion by the time he attacked Korkyra, the invasion of Italy probably took place shortly after that of Lipara.

Agathokles had already completed this war with the Bruttii when he became involved in the conflict between Korkyra and Macedon which had been in progress for over a decade.[1038] We have seen that Kleonymos occupied the island in 303/02,[1039] but he was removed at some point after his campaign in the Adriatic.[1040] Kassandros attacked Korkyra (I will consider his motivations in chapter

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[1034] Trog.*Prol*.23; Just.*Epit.*23.1.17; cf.Diod.Sic.21.2.2 (when Agathokles clashed with Kassandros' forces, οἱ δὲ Σικελιῶται βουλόμενοι μὴ μόνον Καρχηδονίων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν βαρβάρων περιγενέσθαι δοκεῖν...) with Vattuone (1987-8) 59.
[1035] On the Bruttii, see: Diod.Sic.12.22.1, 16.15, 16.82.2, 19.10.4; Just.*Epit.*23.1.3-17; Strabo 5.3.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.4-5; Plut.*Tim*.16.4, 19.2, 30.2, *Mor*.326B; Arr.*Anab.*7.15.4; Ael.Her.*Pros.*3.1.288, 292, 364; Guzzo (1984); Arslan (1989); De Sensi Sestito & Mancuso (2011).
[1036] Diod.Sic.19.3.3.
[1037] Diod.Sic.19.10.3-4, 20.71.5.
[1038] See p.302.
[1039] See n.1031.
[1040] Trog.*Prol*.15. Note that Trogus described this as part of his narrative of the wars of the Diadochoi and entirely separately from his account of Agathokles, which fell in books 22 and 23.

8.2.3) and Agathokles became involved. Two fragments of Diodoros recount that Korkyra was "rescued" (ἐρρύσθη) by Agathokles when he (somehow) set Kassandros' entire navy on fire. He set up a trophy, but did not move against Kassandros' army as he could have.[1041] Diodoros' fragment ends here but it is generally assumed that Agathokles' intervention put an end to Kassandros' attack, since Diodoros says that Korkyra was rescued and Agathokles was later able to deliver Korkyra to Pyrrhos as a dowry.[1042] Presumably, then, Agathokles burnt Kassandros' ships on the mainland opposite Korkyra and thereby thwarted his invasion but left his army largely intact. Plutarch tells anecdotes about the Korkyrans and Ithakans complaining that Agathokles had raided their islands in which Agathokles represents these actions as vengeance for Odysseus' treatment of Polyphemos.[1043] Beloch believed that this anecdote implied that Agathokles had conquered Leukas and thus moved well into north-western Greece, but Ithaka is not Leukas and I suspect the raid on Ithaka may have been invented for the sake of the witticism. [1044]

In the next fragment of Diodoros, Agathokles returns to Italy μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κερκύρας ὑποστροφήν, which would tend to suggest retreat and repulse, though it might simply refer to the direction of sail "after turning about." On his return to Italy, Agathokles found his 2,000 Ligurian and Tyrrhenian mercenaries revolting against his son Agatharchos and killed them.[1045] For some reason, this caused the Bruttii to become hostile to him and he unsuccessfully besieged them at Ethai (location

[1041] Diod.Sic.21.2.
[1042] Plut.*Pyrrh.*9.1, on which, see p.304.
[1043] Plut.*Mor.*176f, 557b-c
[1044] Beloch (1927) 4.2.377-8; Consolo Langher (2000) 303-4. The arguments in support are that many Leukadian *pegasoi* are found in Sicily, and that Leukas had expelled a Macedonian garrison in 312/11 with Korkyran help: Diod.Sic.19.89.3, so might have followed Korkyra at this time too.
[1045] Diod.Sic.21.3.1; *LSJ* sv. ὑποστρέφω. Agatharchos is otherwse unattested and perhaps a mistake for Agathokles' grandson Archagathos.

unknown)[1046] before returning to Syracuse. It is not explicitly stated whether he left a garrison behind and it is not clear whether this was a local set-back or a complete withdrawal from Italy.

The *Eclogae Hoeschelianae* show that Diodoros placed the battle for Korkyra after the Battle of Ipsos (301/00).[1047] Kassandros would not have embarked on a western campaign in that year before Ipsos. After Ipsos, Demetrios' ships were active in the Aegean for some time, even carrying out an attack on the Thracian Chersonese, before he headed off to Cilicia, where he eventually came to an agreement with Ptolemy and Seleukos.[1048] Thus, Kassandros might not have felt comfortable sending ships through the Aegean and around Cape Malia until a year or more after Ipsos. The *ante quem* is Kassandros' death from sickness in Artemision II, 298/97 (April/May 297). The latest the attack can have occurred is the preceding summer.[1049] No more specific date seems possible.[1050]

There is then a gap, until Agathokles overthrew his ally Menedemos of Kroton and installed a garrison, while transporting his daughter to Epirus to marry Pyrrhos.[1051] At the same time (on the same journey?) Agathokles made a deal with the Iapygians and Peuketians, which Diodoros presents as sponsorship of their piracy.[1052] The *Eclogae Hoeschelianae* show that Diodoros placed

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[1046] Consolo Langher (1995) 99 tentatively suggests Castiglione di Paludi.

[1047] Diod.Sic.21.1. The *Eclogae Hoeschelianae* were excerpted in strict order, as the scribe moved through the work. The chronological value of this can be overstated, since Diodoros makes no effort to indicate the relative chronology of events in different parts of the world within the same year, often digresses, flashes forward or back and is sometimes wrong.

[1048] Diod.Sic.21.1.4a; Plut.*Demetr.*30-2; Plut.*Pyrrh.*4.3.

[1049] Hammond & Walbank (1988) 208 n.3: Anon. *Olympic Chronicle* FGrH 257a F3=*P.Oxy.*17.2082, Porph. FGrH 260 F3=Euseb.*Chron*.p.231.

[1050] Fortina (1965) 119 and Hammond & Walbank (1988) 207 simply offer the date range. Marasco (1984b) 99 places it in 299/8 BC.

[1051] Diod.Sic.21.4.

[1052] Gianelli (1974) 374 reads πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμόρους βαρβάρους καὶ Ἰάπυγας καὶ Πευκετίους συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο as "he made an alliance with the neighbouring barbarians and the Iapygians and the Peuketians" and thus includes the Bruttii in the alliance too. But the Bruttii are not pirates.
[Arist.] *Mir.Ausc*.840b reports that a *helix* in the temple of Artemis among the Peuketians, had been found by Agathokles around the neck of a deer and placed in the temple of Zeus (*sic*; where this temple was and how the *helix* was transmitted to the temple of Artemis is not stated). The episode is set before he became king, probably set during his time in Taras as an exile; it might indicate that Agathokles publically associated himself with Apulia.

the attack on Kroton and marriage before the Battle of Sentinum (295/94) and Antipatros' murder of Thessalonika (294/93);[1053] he must have placed the capture of Kroton in 295/94. The link to the marriage of Lanassa confirms this dating. Plutarch says that Pyrrhos only married Lanassa after the death of his first wife, Antigone the daughter of Ptolemy.[1054] Antigone's son, also called Ptolemy, was fifteen when Pyrrhos invaded Italy in 280/79, so she gave birth to him in 295/94, presumably dying during childbirth. Lanassa's son by Pyrrhos, Alexander II, was probably born in 294/93, which confirms this date.[1055]

The next event recorded by Diodoros is Agathokles' expedition against the Bruttii, which focussed on Hipponion, which is probably the same expedition recorded by Justin.[1056] Diodoros reports a force of thirty thousand troops and three thousand cavalry. If these numbers are correct, then this was the largest force ever led by Agathokles. Having captured Hipponion and received the surrender of the Bruttii, he returned to Syracuse. Diodoros says that the Bruttii recaptured Hipponion almost immediately thereafter, but the harbour installation implies that Agathokles was in control of the city for some time and Diodoros may have anticipated a reconquest which occurred after Agathokles' death.[1057] The *Eclogae Hoeschelianae* and Constantinian *Excerpts* show that Diodoros recorded this after the death of Alexander V in Autumn 294/93,[1058] but before

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On Apulian piracy: Dell (1967).

[1053] Diod.Sic.21.6-7.

[1054] Plut.*Pyrrh.*9.1.

[1055] Just.*Epit.*18.1.3; Lévêque (1957) 124; Garoufalias (1979) 250-1; Kondis (1992) 78; Bennett (2000-11), *sv*.Antigone. Klotzsch (1911) 181, offered an additional argument for 295 BC: Just.*Epit.*18.1.3 says that Lanassa's son Alexander II was a *parvulus* in 280 but Just.*Epit.*18.2.12 has him old enough to be left in charge of Lokroi in 278. On analogy with the fifteen year old Ptolemy, Alexander would have been born in 293/92 or earlier.

[1056] Diod.Sic.21.8; Trog.*Prol.*23; Just.*Epit.*23.2.1-2; Strabo 6.1.5.

[1057] Gianelli (1974) 378-9, arguing also that Trog.*Prol.*23: *omnibus (Brutiis) subactis, rex… interiit*… indicates the Bruttii were subjects at Agathokles' death.

[1058] Autumn 294: Porph.FGrH 260 F3=Euseb.*Chron*.p.232 places this 3 years and 6 months after the death of Kassandros, for which, see n.1049.

Lysimachos' defeat by Dromichaites, usually dated to 292/91.[1059] Therefore Agathokles' expedition set out against the Bruttii between 294/93 and 292/91.

The final two known events of Agathokles' foreign policy were the transfer of Korkyra from Pyrrhos to Demetrios and the embassies which led to the alliance with Demetrios.[1060] The details of these events are discussed in chapter 8.2.3. The transfer took place after the Pythian Games of 290/89, shortly before the Eleusinian Mysteries of 290/89.[1061] The alliance between Agathokles and Demetrios came soon after. Its dating is straightforward, since Demetrios' envoy Oxythemis, sent in response to Agathokles' embassy, was still in Syracuse at Agathokles' death in 289/88 BC, which Diodoros narrated immediately after the embassy.[1062]

Two miscellaneous items of evidence remain. Strabo's inclusion of Agathokles after Kleonymos in a list of the Tarentine imported commanders cannot be dated and I have already provided reasons why it seems likely that Strabo has mistakenly interpreted Agathokles' activities on his own behalf in Italy as the actions of a foreign commander.[1063] A papyrus scrap of a chronicle of the years around 296/95 contains the words [Θ]ούριοι, [χ]ώραν, [Ἀγ]αθοκλῆ[ς] between several lacunae and illegible

[1059] Beloch (1927) 248; Hammond & Walbank (1988) 220; Saitta (1955) 126, 154 and Lund (1993) 95. The fixed point is the Pythian Games held in Metageitnon 290/89, after the conclusion of the Second Theban Revolt, which itself probably came about a year after Lysimachos' capture: Plut.*Demetr.*40.4.
[1060] Plut.*Pyrrh.*10.7; Diod.Sic.21.15 & 21.16.5.
[1061] Dating based on: (1) the conclusion that the transfer occurred at the end of the war between Pyrrhos and Demetrios, which I discuss on page 307; (2) the conclusion that the transfer was undertaken at Lanassa's initiative and that Agathokles' embassy to Demetrios followed this, which requires the transfer to have preceded Agathokles' death in 289/88; (3) the need for a period between the end of Pyrrhos' invasion and Demetrios' expulsion from Macedonia, in which Demetrios recruited his Asian invasion force, the other Diadochoi learnt of its existence, joined together, recruited Pyrrhos, assembled forces and invaded. Demetrios was expelled in spring 288/87: Plut.*Pyrrh.*10.4-5; Plut.*Demetr.*43-4; Porph. FGrH 260 F3, F31=Euseb.*Chron*.p.232-3, 242's placement of this ten years (3.5 years + 6.5 years) after the death of Kassandros, for which, see n.1049.
[1062] Diod.Sic.21.15-6: Agathokles' death is dated by Diodoros to 28 years after the beginning of his reign in 317/16.
[1063] See n.986.

letters.[1064] The editor cautiously suggests that it might belong to the same time as the conquest of Kroton, which is possible. Nothing can be done with it.

Table 6: Summary of Italian Chronology (303/02-289/88)

	Event	Citation	Post quem	Ante quem
A	Agathokles enters Italy	---------	303/02	B
B	Battle for Korkyra	Diod.Sic.21.2=*H.Ex*.489-90W/*C.Ex*.4.344-5 Plut.*Mor*.557B-C	301/00	298/97
Γ	Mutiny in Italy and rebuff at Ethai	Diod.Sic.21.3=*H.Ex*.490W/*C.Ex*.2(1).252-3	Same time as B	
Δ	Sack of Kroton	Diod.Sic.21.4=*H.Ex*.490W	295/94	
E	Agreement with the Iapygians and Peuketians	[Aristot.] *Mir. Ausc.* 840b Diod.Sic.21.4=*H.Ex.*490W	Same time as Δ	
F	Marriage of Lanassa	Diod.Sic.21.4=*H.Ex*.490W Plut.*Pyr.*9.1	Same time as Δ	
Z	Attack on Hipponion	Diod.Sic.21.8=*H.Ex*.490-1W Strab.6.1.5. Just.*Epit*.23.1.2-2.3.	294/93	c.292/91
H	Korkyra transferred to Demetrios	Plut.*Pyr*.10.5	Spring 290/89	
Θ	Embassies of Agathokles II and Oxythemis	Diod.Sic.21.15=*H.Ex*.491W	289/88	
I	Death of Agathokles	Diod.Sic.21.15-6	289/88	

7.4. South Italian Numismatic Evidence

Various stylistic correspondences with Syracusan coins have been seen as evidence of alliance or conquest. In a 1912 article C.T. Seltman noticed the presence of the *triskeles* on coins from Hipponion, Terina, Velia, and Metapontion and suggested that they indicated Agathokles' control over the cities, concluding that "Agathocles had Magna Graecia, outside the Tarentine sphere, in

[1064] *Olympic Chronicle* FGrH 257a F5=*P.Oxy*.17.2082

his power."[1065] This argument relied on the assumption that the *triskeles* was Agathokles' personal sigil.[1066] Subsequently, the presence of these correspondences with Syracusan coins was often used to date the Magna Grecian coinages, making the argument somewhat circular. In an appendix to his 1977 article on chronological links between early Roman coinage and Magna Grecian coinages, Andrew Burnett strongly criticised Seltman's proposal.[1067] His argument had three feet. Firstly, the *triskeles* appears on coins outside of Agathokles' time frame. Secondly, it appears outside his known area of operation. Thirdly, it does not appear on the coinage of Kroton, which is the one Magna Grecian city that Agathokles is known to have conquered. He concludes "It seems easier to regard the triskeles as only one of the stock of symbols and types available to Italian artists… and without exact chronological significance."

However, Seltman's theory has remained alive in Italian scholarship and has been argued in other contexts too: most recently by Louis Brousseau at the 2015 Numismatic Congress.[1068] There are several reasons for this revival. Firstly, the chronology of Magna Grecian coins is now much clearer (though much remains to be done), which reduces the danger of a circular argument. Secondly, Burnett's emphasis on the chronological and geographic spread of the *triskeles* fails to acknowledge that there is a definite clustering of *triskele* on early third-century Magna Grecian coinage. Thirdly, the argument that the literary sources do not attest interaction between Agathokles and many of the Italian centres identified by Seltman et al. fails to acknowledge how patchy our literary evidence for Agathokles' activities in Italy are. An argument from silence in this context holds even less weight than usual.

[1065] Seltman (1912), quote from 8; Giesecke (1928) 98-9 added Lokroi, Taras and Neapolis.
[1066] See chapter 3.3.1.
[1067] Burnett (1977) 119-21. See also Pareti (1952) 1.744; Manni (1966) 158 n 57; Gianelli (1974) 376-7.
[1068] Consolo Langher (1995) 102-5; Caccamo Caltabiano (2000). I heard Brousseau's as yet unpublished paper at *INC* XV.

It thus seems necessary to review the stylistic and metrological correspondences mint by mint, in order to evaluate their significance. I start with Suessa and travel along the coast to Apulia. There is a table of the coins which I am about to discuss, with images, on page 259.

Suessa: The *triskeles* appears on the obverse of a didrachm with long-haired Apollo/Dioskouroi, which is however usually dated to the First Punic War.[1069] Suessa was a Roman *colonia* from 312/11,[1070] so probably not politically connected to Agathokles.

Neapolis: A triobol imitates Agathokles' gold Apollo/biga coins, including the *triskeles*.[1071] Neapolis did not otherwise mint triobols and it has been argued that this denomination was intended to enable easier exchange with Syracusan coinage.[1072] At the same time, the Neapolitans added a frame of four dolphins to their bronze coins and their silver didrachms, imitating the obverse of Agathokles' tetradrachms.[1073] These coins of Neapolis are more clearly modelled on Agathokles' coinage than most of the others in this list, but they cannot indicate a political connection, since Neapolis came under Roman control in 326/25.[1074] This suggests that close commercial relationships were sufficient to cause iconographic imitations of Agathokles' coinage. Such relationships might be sufficient to explain the other iconographic borrowings in this list too.

Poseidonia: Bronze coins depicting Poseidon on the obverse and a bull on the reverse with a symbol were circulating from c.310 onwards according to evidence from tomb excavations.[1075] Most of the symbols are common signs like dolphins, octopodes, and caducei. Grunauer's issues xxvi and xxvii

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[1069] Sambon (1870) #853; Burnett (1977) 120.
[1070] Liv.9.28.7-8.
[1071] Giesecke (1928) 98; Burnett (1977) 120. The *triskeles* is off the flan at top right in the example depicted in the table below; a version with the *triskeles* can be seen in Cantilena, Giove & Rubino (1986) Tav.V #13.
[1072] Cantilena, Giove & Rubino (1986) 127-8; Consolo Langher (1995) 102-5.
[1073] Cantilena, Giove & Rubino (1986) 127; Rutter (1997) 86-7.
[1074] Liv.8.25.5-26.
[1075] Prisco (1980-81) 42-3; cf.Kraay in Grunauer (1973) 43.

bear a *triskeles* and EΨ and are followed by issues with a thunderbolt and a club. She connects the former confidently and the latter tentatively with Agathokles.[1076] Louis Brousseau's argument for associating the *triskeles* on Italian coins with an Agathoklean alliance rests heavily on a weight change in this issue. Given that the bronze coins are poorly preserved token coins, I doubt the significance of this weight change. Since the other symbols on the Poseidonian butting bulls belong to a standard repertoire, I wonder whether the *triskeles* was chosen for issues xxvi and xxvii for political reasons, or simply as a common symbol.

Velia: Agathokles' Italian activity coincides with Williams' Period VII didrachms, the Philistion group, which depict Athena in an Attic helmet on the obverse, and a lion on the reverse.[1077] Williams dates this group to c.305-290 using hoard evidence and divides it into thirteen "sections," distinguished by symbols placed prominently above the lion on the reverse and by monograms which probably indicate mint magistrates on the obverse. The relative order of these sections is based on stylistic changes to Athena's helmet and is not entirely certain. The sections themselves consist of two or three die-linked "sequences." The symbols of most of the sections, including cicadas, pentagrams, dolphins, corn ears, grapes and tridents have no obvious political import, but two of them seem more significant. The first is #74, which bears a prominent *triskeles* on the reverse and K on the obverse. This section was first connected to Agathokles by Seltman, who has been followed by several subsequent authors.[1078] It is one of the smaller sections in the Philistion group, with four obverse and five reverse dies. This is markedly smaller than the surrounding series.[1079] The second is #76, which bears Π on the obverse and the reverse is modelled on

[1076] Grunauer (1973) 39; Cantilena & Carbone (2015) 60 are carefully vague about the significance of this.
[1077] Williams (1992) 93-105.
[1078] Seltman (1912) 7; Mangieri (1986) 61; Williams (1992) 103-4.
[1079] #71 (Θ-cicada) 3 sequences: 6 obverse/13 reverse dies; #72 (Δ-pentagram) 3: 19/11; #73 (A-dolphin) 3: 13/13; #75 (ΑΤΛ monogram) 3: 8/14.

Carthaginian series IV electrum, complete with the *phoenix* palm behind the lion.[1080] Section #76 is the second smallest of the entire group, consisting of a single sequence of two obverse dies and one reverse. Williams suggests that it was issued in a moment of Velian support for the Carthaginians, but they quickly recanted and replaced it with #77, whose reverse design is the "inoffensive grapes" and whose obverse shares the same monogram (Π) as #76.[1081] This seems plausible and strengthens the impression that the Velians were accustomed to use the reverse symbol to make political statements. It is possible, therefore, that the *triskeles* on #74 reflects a political relationship with Agathokles. But if these symbols are taken to have political significance, the Velians chose to express a political relationship with Agathokles for only a single section and soon replaced it with one which expressed a relationship to the Carthaginians. Thus, #74 would indicate a relationship undertaken, expressed, and rejected on the Velians' own terms, not dominance by Agathokles.

Terina: Regling and Seltman emphasised the importance of the *triskeles* on the silver staters of the final Group G.[1082] All Terina's staters have a nymph's head on the obverse and a winged victory holding a regularly changing symbol on the reverse. Group G, uniquely, features a *triskeles* on the obverse, behind the nymph's head, in a space occupied by the city's legend on previous issues. The *triskeles* endures over several dies, while the symbol on the reverse changes. Both factors speak for seeing it as a politically significant feature of the iconography rather than a mint mark. There is a bit of circularity in the interpretation, since the reason Regling dated these coins to Agathokles' time is the presence of the *triskeles*. The previous Group F is usually made to end with the Bruttian conquest in 356/55. Since Groups F and G are nearly identical, a fifty or sixty year gap between

[1080] Jenkins (1977) 24.
[1081] Williams (1998) 102.
[1082] Regling (1906) 56-7; Seltman (1912) 5-6; Holloway & Jenkins (1983) 117.

them is difficult to defend, unless Group F was minted partially under the Bruttian rule.[1083] There is also a single example of a *pegasos* from Terina, which forms Group H by itself; stylistically, this appears pre-Agathoklean.[1084] Terina produced a number of bronze issues, whose chronology is poorly understood; some employ the lion-scalp motifs of Rhegion, others the *pegasos*.

Hipponion: In the late fourth and early third century, Hipponion minted bronze coins with Athena ΣΩΤΕΙΡΑ/ female winged figure (Nike or the local nymph Pandia) ΕΙΠΩΝΙΕΩΝ.[1085] Seltman attempted to connect the entire series to Agathokles for unconvincing reasons; there is no reason why it should not have been minted when the Bruttians ruled the city.[1086] On one issue, however, Nike/Pandia crowns a small warrior or trophy with a tiny *triskeles* on his shield (the resolution of the image below unfortunately renders this nearly invisible).[1087] Although this is a small detail, its sudden appearance might indicate its significance, since on all other issues this is blank space. Given that Agathokles did control the town in the 290s, this type probably responds to his capture of the town or a subsequent success against the Bruttii. However, the miniscule size of the *triskeles* suggests that it was an incidental detail, not the minters' focus.[1088] There is another bronze issue with Athena/thunderbolt, which Montesanti associates with Agathokles on stylistic grounds.[1089] Hipponion also minted *pegasoi* from c.320 onwards, some of which closely correspond to Agathoklean types; all are full weight.[1090]

[1083] Regling (1906) 56.
[1084] *SNG V*.1649; Calciati (1990) 2.591.
[1085] Montesanti (2007) Group III, Series IX.
[1086] Seltman (1912) 4-5: the use of the term ΣΩΤΕΙΡΑ, the occasional labelling of Nike in Doric, the style of Athena's helmet. In favour of Bruttians: Rutter (1997) 78; Montesanti (2007) 205, 207.
[1087] Montesanti (2007) 199.
[1088] Cf. Wigg-Wolf (2014) on the tiny chi-rho on Constantine's helmet on RIC 36.
[1089] Montesanti (2007) 199.
[1090] Calciati (1990) 2.595; Montesanti (2007) 206.

Rhegion: Despite the large number of symbols on late fourth century Rhegine coins, there are no *triskele*.[1091] The long-haired Apollo which appears on Period I silver and bronze from Rhegion is identical to that found on many Agathoklean coins (e.g. E1-E3) and similar to the long-haired Kore of Agathokles' later tetradrachms. But Rhegion Period I dates to the second half of the fourth century. Silberstein Trevisani Ceccherini places the start date with the refoundation of the city by Dionysios II in 356. Issues I.8 and I.9 of this period are sometimes overstruck on Timoleontic coins, confirming the fourth century date.[1092] This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it illustrates that the assumption that iconographic similarities between Syracuse and Italian centres cannot be presumed to indicate Syracusan influence on the latter; we have already seen that this is frequently done. Secondly, Agathokles must have had tight control over Rhegion. If he had not, it would have been difficult for him to securely hold Messana and to undertake his attested expeditions to Hipponion.[1093] Despite probable Agathoklean presence, there is no clear Agathoklean influence on coin iconography.

Lokroi: There are no *triskele*. Seltman noncommittedly raised the possibility that the silver staters of Group III, which depict an eagle eating a hare/thunderbolt, might have borrowed the thunderbolt from Agathokles.[1094] A number of bronze issues show similarly vague stylistic correspondences.[1095] Castrizio and Filocamo's work has aimed to connect the archon years of Lokrian Tablets with the monograms of Lokrian coinage and use them to date one another. There are problems with this procedure, which I will discuss in the next section, but if Castrizio and Filocamo are correct, then these types do belong to roughly the time of Agathokles – but so do the Lokrian bronze coins depicting an eagle on a thunderbolt, which correspond to a large post-

[1091] Lists of symbols in Campolo (2008) 67-9; Silberstein Trevisani Ceccherini (2014) 18-9, 64-6, 99, 115-30.
[1092] Silberstein Trevisani Ceccherini (2014) 100-1, 111.
[1093] *Pegasoi* hoards in the hinterland have been connected with Syracusan garrisons: Castrizio (1995) 127-30.
[1094] Seltman (1912) 8.
[1095] Pozzi Paolini (1977) 288-91.

Agathoklean issue.[1096] Lokroi also produced a lot of *pegasoi*; their third series has stylistic correspondences to Agathokles' first series.[1097] This is another case where Agathokles was probably present, but his impact on coin iconography was minimal.

Kroton: As already stated, the *triskeles* is entirely absent from Krotoniate coinage. Seltman himself noted that this was odd, given that Agathokles conquered the city in 295 and maintained close relations with it before that, and Burnett based his rejection of Seltman's theory on this fact.[1098] Thus the case is much like the situation at Rhegion and Lokroi.

Metapontion: Seltman focussed on two issues. In both cases, his conclusions are questionable.[1099] The first is Johnston D.4 (Leukippos ΔI/Barley, with META, a symbol, ΦI); on D.4.4-4.6, the symbol is a *triskeles*. However, Johnston makes Group D the final full weight coinage of Metapontion and places its start date in 280, using hoard evidence.[1100] Thus D.4.4-4.6 are too late to be Agathoklean. Additionally, the fact that the *triskeles* is only one of several symbols appearing in the role of a mint mark, which are otherwise generic symbols, makes it questionable whether the symbol should be expected to bear a political significance at all. The second issue is Johnston C.10, a Demeter/Barley issue with an unclear subsidiary inscription on the reverse. Seltman was convinced that this was Punic זוע (*ʿwz*) which he identified with an unattested Hebrew root meaning "refuge," which he argued was Punic for Σώτειρα. Seltman's argument, followed by Consolo Langher, was that these

[1096] Castrizio & Filocamo (2014) 232, 274.
[1097] Calciati (1990) 2.571-8; Pozzi Paolini (1977) 223-5; Castrizio & Filocamo (2014) 221.
[1098] Seltman (1912) 5; Burnett (1977) 120.
[1099] Seltman (1912) 3-4; Johnston (1990) 3-4.
[1100] Johnston (1990) 58: *IGCH* 1959, 1980 (all 280 or later), *IGCH* 1958 (285-280). Caccamo Caltabiano (2000) proposes that the long-haired Kore on Metapontine coins is a politically significant imitation of Agathokles' Kore tetradrachms, discarding Johnston's categorisation and ignoring the hoard evidence to do so. She then presumes the imitation she has argued for had political significance, without argument.

two issues represented periods of Agathoklean and Carthaginian control of Metapontion. However, the Punic inscription is certainly a retrograde ΔΕΞ or ΔΕΧ.[1101]

Taras: Giesecke saw various stylistic connections between Tarantine and Syracusan coins (mostly hairstyles and helmet shapes), which are all very weak.[1102] There are no *triskele* at Taras, which is significant, since identifiable symbols do appear on Tarentine coins minted while Alexander the Molossian and Pyrrhos of Epeiros were serving as *xenikoi strategoi*.[1103] This supports my arguments above that Strabo was incorrect in claiming that Agathokles had been a *xenikos strategos*.[1104]

Apulia: Daunian and Peuketian centres generally borrow iconography from Tarentine, Metapontine and Velian types at the beginning of the third century.[1105] An Arpian coin which imitates the Velian reverse to the extent of retaining the mint symbol on the reverse is typical.[1106] The weight standard is generally Tarentine. The few examples of links with Syracusan coins are not notably Agathoklean (e.g. short-haired Kore, laureate Zeus, free horse).[1107] All of these imitations can be interpreted as the use of a trusted type for its significance as an indicator of the coin's trustworthiness.[1108] They align with archaeological finds in indicating that Syracusan coins circulated in Apulia.

[1101] Suggested by Evans in Seltman (1912) 13; See the examples at Johnston (1990) C.10 for confirmation.
[1102] Giesecke (1928) 99.
[1103] Brauer (1986) 71-2, 160-3.
[1104] See n.986.
[1105] D'Andrea (2008); D'Andrea & Tafuri (2009)
[1106] *HN*[3] #639, p.76.
[1107] *HN*[3] #633-6.
[1108] See p.445.

Table 7: South Italian Coins with Triskele:

Image #	Mint	Image	Mass (g)	Reference
15	Suessa		5.76	Sambon 853
16	Neapolis		~1.5	Sambon 555-6
17	Poseidonia		~5.1	Grunauer xxvi
18	Velia		7.3	Williams 7.74
19	Velia		7.3	Williams 7.76
20	Terina		2.1	Holloway-Jenkins Group G
21	Hipponion		~7.5	
22	Rhegion		16.14	Silberstein I-1

23	Metapontion		7.41	Johnston D4.4-6
24	Metapontion		7.83	Johnston C.10

The evidence, then, is sparse and its interpretation is not straightforward. Clearly Agathokles did not impose the *triskeles* on communities, given its absence from the coinage of Kroton, Lokroi, and Rhegion, all of which he exercised control over, and given the lack of uniformity in the location and design of the *triskeles* between mints that do bear it. We can rule out the possibility that coins bearing the *triskeles* were used to pay Agathokles or his troops, since they are mostly low value bronze and none of them have been found in Sicily.[1109] Thus it was the mint communities that chose the designs and they chose them for their own purposes. This makes the *triskeles* poor evidence for the extent of Agathokles' empire.

However, communities may have placed the *triskeles* on their coins as an expression of their esteem for Agathokles. This is particularly likely in the cases of Terina and Hipponion, where the symbol appears in a location where there was no symbol on other issues. At Poseidonia and Velia, where the *triskeles* appears as a mint symbol, the symbol may have been chosen by the mint magistrate (or mint administration) at random from the repertoire of numismatic symbols. There was more evidence that mint symbol was customarily used to express political messages at Velia

[1109] Buttrey (1989) 70-6; Frey-Kupper (2013) 1.363-4; *IGCH* 2185b (Camarina environs 1928) is the only contemporary Sicilian hoard with Italian coins: 9 from Taras, Herakleia, and Lokroi, out of 261 total coins.

than at Poseidonia. If it was chosen to express esteem for Agathokles, it may have been enthusiastically shared by all the citizens or limited to one group/faction. The mint magistrate did not have a completely free rein; as the Carthaginian palm on the Velian coins indicates, a politically inappropriate design might be changed. It is striking that all examples of the *triskeles* which seem likely to belong to Agathokles' own time derive from the Tyrrhenian coast, from Hipponion northwards. The Hipponion coin, with the *triskeles* depicted on a little warrior being crowned by a female winged figure (Nike or Pandia) clearly celebrates, or looks forward to, a victory. It is tempting to associate it with Agathokles' Hipponion campaign. This case is strengthened by the fact that all the *triskeles* issues were fairly brief. That campaign, then, was viewed by the communities of western Italy as an important event.

Claims of iconographic influence are even more uncertain than arguments based on the *triskeles*. Rhegion and Lokroi, in particular, influenced Agathokles' coinage more than the other way around. The clearest imitations of Agathokles' coin motifs appear on Bruttian coinage from decades after Agathokles' death, which demonstrates the impact that Agathokles' coinage had had on the Bruttii and shows again that iconographic imitation does not need to indicate direct political control.[1110] Many of the iconographic links emphasised by Seltman et al. concern common motifs, such as bearded Zeus, long-haired Apollo/Kore, and the thunderbolt, or subtle changes to common motifs, such as the appearance of a second wing on a *pegasos* or a crest-holder on Athena's helmet. Rather than a political motivation in these cases, these probably result from common fashion (perhaps influenced by the increased circulation of Syracusan coins in Italy under Agathokles).[1111] This view is strengthened by the fact that the Italian centres regularly borrowed iconographic elements from other Italian centres, like the lion scalp on Terinan bronze, the appearance of the Rhegine long-

[1110] e.g. *SNG.Cop.*1647-53.
[1111] See n.1113.

haired Apollo on coinage of Cales, Taras, and Syracuse, and the shared decorations of Athena's helmet.[1112]

There is independent evidence for intense financial interaction with the cities of Magna Graecia in the time of Agathokles. This includes the circulation data discussed in chapter 3.2, which shows extraordinary amounts of Syracusan coinage travelling all over Italy and the Adriatic, resuming a pattern seen under the Dionysioi which continued under Hiketas and Hieron II.[1113] A series of weight reductions in Magna Graecia have been linked to weight reductions that took place in Sicily under Agathokles and continued after his death.[1114] Rather than indicating political links between Agathoklean Sicily and Italy, this evidence demonstrates the economic links between the Sicilian and Italian monetary systems. The strength and importance of these economic ties explain similarities between the iconography of Italian and Sicilian coinage. A final example of this are the *pegasoi* coinages which many Italian communities produced in the late fourth and early third centuries, with examples attested from Hipponion, Medma, Terina, Rhegion, Lokroi and Kroton.[1115] The iconography of these *pegasoi* mimicked the changing details of Corinthian and Syracusan *pegasoi*, updating Athena's helmet and the arrangement of *pegasos*' wings for example, showing continual interest in maintaining the trusted type. Castrizio associates the high production of *pegasoi* by Italian centres in the 300s and 290s with their contributions to Agathokles' war against the Bruttians.[1116] But there are no *triskele* on these *pegasoi*. If Castrizio is correct, then an

[1112] e.g. Skylla appears as a decoration on the bowl of Athena's helmet at Taras, Herakleia, Meatponton, Thourioi, Velia.
[1113] See Figure 6, 15.
[1114] Buda (1969-70) 230-231; Taliercio Mensitieri (1989); Consolo Langher (1995) 102-5. Buda placed this during Agathokles' life, but it has since been down-dated: Cantilena (1989a) 15-6.
[1115] Calciati (1990) 2.569-602.
[1116] Castrizio (1995) 126-9.

iconography which was trusted in the marketplace was more important than one which bore Agathokles' special symbol.

Scholars who have sought to trace Agathokles' empire in Italian coinage have been too quick to assume that numismatic iconography indicates political relationships. Stylistic interactions could result from the regular economic interaction between Sicily and Italy, while direct political interactions could leave no iconographic traces at all. Whatever control Agathokles exercised over these communities and whatever economic influence Syracuse had on southern Italian coinage, the situation was much more complicated than Seltman's theory about the *triskeles* presumes. Ultimately, the most important message of the south Italian coinage is the intensity of this regular economic interaction, which was an important part of the close relationship between Sicily and Italy which led Agathokles to cross the Straits of Messana.

7.4.1. The Lokrian Tablets

The Lokrian tablets are a set of thirty-nine bronze sheets inscribed with financial records of the Temple of Olympian Zeus in Lokroi, mostly concerning loans from the sanctuary to the city, which were found in a stone theca near the temple.[1117] The tablets belong to the late fourth – early third century on palaeographic and historical grounds and cover a period of about fifty years. Unfortunately, the tablets are dated by eponymous magistrate, making their relative and absolute chronology unclear. Some years there are several tablets, some tablets mention years for which we have no tablets. This may indicate that the corpus is incomplete or that relevant financial transactions did not take place every year. Five tablets contain a formula like this:

[1117] There are two editions: De Francescis (1972); Costabile (1992a), both using the same numbering system for the tablets. See also SEG 29.950. On the discovery, De Francescis (1972) 58-60, with figg. 43-7.

> Αστ- ἐπὶ Μενάλκεος ἀ πόλις ἐχρήσατο πὰρ τῶ θεῶ | δόγματι βωλᾶς ἐν τὰν συντέλειαμ βασιλεῖ…
>
> When Menalkes [of the deme of] Ast- [was eponymous magistrate], the *polis* borrowed from the god, by decree of the council, for the contribution to the *basileus*… [the following sums, listed by month]
>
> De Franciscis (1972), #1, *l.*1-2[1118]

These tablets, along with a couple of others that belong to the same period are referred to as Group K. Most of the tablets in Group K do not mention a *dogma*, as the example quoted above does, some of them specify whence the Temple sourced the instalments. The sums are substantial; the contributions in the tablet just cited total over 2686 talents and the total sum is over 9,000. However, the Lokrians never identify the *basileus* by name (which was very inconsiderate of them). Three candidates have been proposed: Agathokles, Pyrrhos, or a civic magistrate equivalent to the Athenian *archon basileus*. This last option can be dismissed.[1119] All other magistrates in the tablets are named, with title, demotic and (usually) their patronymic. The word συντέλεια is not used for any other expenditures referred to in the tablets. Evidence from orthography, dialectical features, and prosopography indicate that the tablets mentioning the *basileus* all belong to a short period of time. Thus the *basileus* was a transitory phenomenon rather than a long-term feature of the Lokrian constitution.

Pyrrhos has tended to be the preferred candidate for the Lokrian *basileus* because the literary sources make clear that Lokroi was one of his main bases in Italy.[1120] The tablets mentioning the *basileus* can be fitted into the period of his sojourn in Italy and Sicily as a continuous series,

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[1118] The other tablets are #13, #23, #30, #31. There is also #25, which describes a loan taken by the city to finance work on fortifications, part of which is paid in silver and part in τῶ σίτω τᾶς ἐνάτας τὰν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔλαβε τιμὰν T "the grain of the ninth, which the king got, to the value of 1 talent."
[1119] But see Costabile (1992b) 139-50.
[1120] Diod.Sic.22.8.2; Just.*Epit.*18.1.9, 18.2.11; Dion.Hal.*Ant.Rom.*20.9.

preserving the (hypothetical but reasonable) rotation of the eponymous magistracy between the three Lokrian tribes.[1121] The negative case against Agathokles rests on the fact that no particular interactions between him and the Lokrians are attested,[1122] which is weak, given how poor the evidence for Agathokles' Italian escapades is, and how close relations between Syracuse and Lokroi had been historically.[1123] The rest of the Lokrian tablets probably post-date the *basileus* tablets, so those arguing that the *basileus* is not Pyrrhos need to explain why he is absent from the later tablets.

Castrizio and Filocamo have most recently and most persuasively made the case for Agathokles as *basileus*.[1124] Their case rests on four points. First, they argue that the eponymous magistrates of the tablets and the monograms on Lokrian coinage are to be equated.[1125] The coins and tablets are then used to date one another. This is unsatisfactory. It results in a substantial period in which Lokroi minted on two weight standards simultaneously,[1126] plus the *pegasoi* minted on the Corinthian standard. Almost none of the monograms appear on both the silver and the bronze. Some years in which Lokroi had heavy expenditure according to the tablets (e.g. Menalkes, #1) have no coins. This suggests that the association of these monograms with the eponymous magistrates of the tablets is incorrect. Furthermore, many of the monograms are single letters (N, Δ, Φ, Γ, A) or common letter combinations (EY, AP AΓ), so equating them with specific eponymous magistrates is speculative, particularly given that the tablets are not a comprehensive list of all the eponymous magistrates who held office in Lokroi. Castrizio and Filocamo's counterargument to these concerns is *SNG ANS* 562, a bronze coin which bears EY on the obverse and a monogram they interpret as

[1121] De Francescis (1972) 75-90. On the rotation, see Lewis (1970) 249-51; Fuda (1992) 203-8.
[1122] van Compernolle (1987).
[1123] See the next section, especially notes 1132, 1136, 1143, 1155, 1160.
[1124] Castrizio & Filocamo (2014).
[1125] Building on Fuda (1992) 208-9.
[1126] Pozzi Paolini (1977) groups III and II, weighing 6.17-7.91 and 7.03-7.79g respectively.

ΑΓΚ on the reverse, which they argue demonstrates that the coin was minted in the year of Euphrainetos of the deme ΑΓΚ (#4, 5, 22). But this would be the only time that a demotic appears on a Lokrian coin and actually, it looks like a normal ΑΓ monogram. The second limb of Castrizio and Filocamo's argument is the acceptance of Caccamo Caltabiano's arguments that the final Lokrian silver issue, the Roma *pistis* coins, were produced during the Roman occupation of Lokroi between 282 and 280, rather than after the departure of Pyrrhos.[1127] Caccamo Caltabiano's main argument is that the head of Zeus on the obverse of the *pistis* coins has stylistic similarities with the tetradrachms minted by Pyrrhos at Lokroi and she thinks it impossible that the Lokrians would reuse the type of an enemy of Rome for a proclamation of their loyalty to Rome. I doubt this is sound. If Castrizio and Filocamo's first point is correct, then this second point would require the tablets to predate Pyrrhos' arrival. Thirdly, Castrizio and Filocamo identify the gold *dekakorinthioi*, *pentakorinthioi*, and *pentekaiikosilitra* of tablets 8 and 35, which belong to the period of the *basileus*, with Agathokles' electrum issues (E1, E2, E3). If correct, this provides a *terminus post quem* for the tablets in Agathokles' reign, not a dating; the coins did not vanish (especially not from a temple treasury) on Agathokles' death. Fourthly, the loans in the tablets are exceptionally irregular sums (in those cases where the tablet is complete enough to produce a total), but Castrizio and Filocamo find that when multiplied by 2.45, the sums delivered to the *basileus* in tablets #13 and 23 and the sum spent on fortifications in #25, give nearly round numbers. They suggest that there were 2.45 Lokrian talents in a Sicilian talent and that the irregular sums of the tablets are the expression in the Lokrian weight standard of sums requested in Sicilian talents. There are two problems. Firstly, #1 and 30 do not give round numbers when multiplied by 2.45.[1128] Secondly,

[1127] Caccamo Caltabiano (1978) 101-16. cf.Liv.29.18.4, Just.*Epit.*18.1.9, Zon.8.6; Head (1911) 103-4. The only hoard evidence is the San Martino in Pensilis hoard, discovered intact at a site north of the Gargano river mouth in Apulia, deposited in the 240s BC or later. This is not very helpful for dating purposes; it includes several worn fifth and fourth century coins and a lot of early third century coins. Ceglia (1999); Burnett (2006) 39.

[1128] #31 is lacunose.

Pyrrhos required Sicilian talents himself during his invasion of Sicily, so this point does not rule Pyrrhos out either. The *basileus* of the Lokrian tablets, then, is probably Pyrrhos. Nevertheless, the system of extraction testified in the tablets may continue earlier forms of extraction and indicates how profitable control of the Italian centres could be.

7.5. Syracuse in Italy from c.500-317 BC

My investigation of literary, numismatic, and epigraphic material in this chapter so far has emphasised the limits of our ability to reconstruct the shape and development of Agathokles' Italian realm in detail. Instead, in this last section, I put the material that we have in the broader context of Syracusan interventions in Italy and the north over the long term. I give a quick overview of Syracusan activities in Italy before discussing how what we know of Agathokles' behaviour suggests that he was following in his predecessors' footsteps.

The first evidence for Syracusan involvement in Magna Graecia is the note by Douris that Gelon built something called "Amalthea's horn" at Hipponion.[1129] But until the Battle of Himera in 480, Syracusan involvement in the north must have been limited by the fact that the straits were controlled by Anaxilaos, who along with Terillos of Himera was hostile to Syracuse and Akragas. After the Battle of Himera, there are a number of signs of expanded Syracusan control of the Straits of Messana and expansion into Italy.[1130] Soon after Hieron I came to power in 478/77 BC, he both pushed and was pulled into closer alliances with the Greek cities of southern Magna Graecia.[1131] He intervened on Lokroi's behalf in their long term conflict with Anaxilaos around 477.[1132] This drew him into conflict with their enemy Kroton, as indicated by the Sybarite request for Hieron to

[1129] Douris FGrH 76 F18=Ath.13.84; De Sensi Sestito (1981) 620-1; Mafodda (2002) 297; Montesanti (2007) 108-15.
[1130] SEG 24.303 and Kunze (1991) 129 #12; Hdt.7.165; De Sensi Sestito (1981) 618-20.
[1131] Bonanno (2010) 75-102.
[1132] Schol.Pind.*Pyth*.2.36 & 38; De Sensi Sestito (1981) 623; Morgan (2015) 173 n.8.

intervene against Kroton in 476/75.[1133] Another call for help brought Hieron to Cumae against the Etruscans in 474/73 BC.[1134] In 467/66, Hieron intervened to replace the ruler of Zankle and Rhegion, Mikythos, with his own nominees, the young sons of Anaxilaos who were related to him by marriage.[1135] When the Deinomenid tyranny fell in 466/65, Thrasyboulos departed for Lokroi with Syracusan assent – apparently the latter trusted the Lokrians to keep him out of mischief and the former trusted them not to kill him.[1136] In 455/54 the Syracusans sent two expeditions against the Etruscans in Elba and Corsica to deal with "Tyrrhenian pirates".[1137] They and the earlier Battle of Cumae indicate an ongoing conflict, seen again when Etrurian cities aided the Athenian Expedition of 415.[1138] During the 420s, Syracuse and Lokroi were engaged in a conflict with Leontinoi and Rhegion, which the Athenians intervened in.[1139] There was a close friendship, if not alliance, with Taras, demonstrated by their (predicted and actual) support of the Syracusans during the Sicilian Expedition[1140] and by the contingent of ships which they dispatched to fight with the Syracusans, Selinountians, Lokrians, and Thourians in the Ionian War.[1141]

With Dionysios I, however, the Syracusans entered Italy on an unprecedented scale.[1142] In the 390s BC, Dionysios occupied Messina to prevent the Carthaginians from using it as a base for land or naval attacks. The disputes with Rhegion resulting from this action led him to revive the earlier

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[1133] Timaios F 93=Schol.Pind.*Ol.*2.29; Diod.Sic.11.48.1-5; De Sensi Sestito (1981) 628-33. The Scholion and Diodoros associate this with Hieron's attempt to eliminate his brother Polyzelos, but disagree about whether Polyzelos and the Syracusan army actually went to Sybaris.
[1134] *SEG* 11.1206, 33.328; Pind.*Pyth.*1.71-75; Diod.Sic.11.51. Mafodda (2002) 296-7 reconstructs an enmity between the Etruscans and Deinomenids dating back to before the Battle of Himera. There is little evidence for this.
[1135] Diod.Sic.11.66; Schol.Pind.*Pyth*.1.112.
[1136] Diod.Sic.11.68.4 & 68.7. Later parallels, Douketios in 451 and Dionysios II in 344 had to be sent to Corinth: Diod.Sic.11.92.4; Plut.*Tim.*13.8-14.
[1137] Diod.Sic.11.88.4-5.
[1138] Thuc.6.88, 6.103.2, 7.53.2, 7.57.
[1139] Thuc.3.86.
[1140] Thuc.6.34 & 6.44.
[1141] Thuc.8.26, 8.84, 8.91.; Xen.*Hell*.1.1.18-31, 1.3.13.
[1142] On Dionysios in Italy and the Adriatic, see: Woodhead (1970); Braccesi (1977) 185-246; Anello (1980); Caven (1990) 124-53; Lewis (1994) 144-8; De Sensi Sestito (2002).

alliance with Lokroi. With the aid of the Lucanians, Dionysios fought against a collection of Italiote Greek cities which were led by Kroton and had the exiled Syracusan Heloris as their commander-in-chief. Dionysios defeated them and destroyed Kaulonia, Hipponion and finally Rhegion.[1143] Skylletion was transferred from Kroton to his Lokrian allies. Thus he focussed on controlling the isthmus between Hipponion and Skylletion – Strabo reports that he attempted to build a wall across it.[1144] One important aspect of this expansion was the wood of Bruttium, useful for ship-building.[1145] In 383/2, the Carthaginians were able to convince unspecified Italiotes (presumably the Krotoniates again) to attack Dionysios' possessions,[1146] and in 379/78 BC they refounded Hipponion.[1147] Further afield, Dionysios may have been allied with Taras.[1148] Syracuse became involved in the Adriatic for the first time. Lissos was founded an uncertain time before 385 BC,[1149] and Dionysios was probably involved in Numana, Ancona and Adria too.[1150] In 385/84 he allied with the Illyrians and attempted to restore his associate Alketas to the Molossian throne; Diodoros attributes these actions to a desire to control the sea route to Western Greece in order to despoil Delphi.[1151] He did not abandon interest in the area, since he sent ships to Korkyra in 373/72 BC to support his Spartan allies against the Athenians; apparently the threat to Korkyra struck a nerve.[1152] In the Tyrrhenian Sea, Dionysios also led an expedition against Pyrgi and Corsica in 384/83 BC, apparently an offensive raid like the expedition of 455.[1153] Interests did run deeper, however, since his mercenaries were sourced in

[1143] Diod.Sic.14.40, 44-6, 87, 90.4-7. 91.1, 95-6, 100-7; Strabo 6.1.6, 6.1.8, 6.1.10, Dion.Hal.*Ant.Rom.*20.7; Sordi (1978) offers a speculative re-dating; De Sensi Sestito (2002) 390-391; Wonder (2012).
[1144] Strabo 6.1.10. cf.Plut.*Crass.*10.4.
[1145] Diod.Sic.14.42.3; Cf. Hieron II's *Syrakosia*: Ath.5.43; Vattuone (1987-8) 67-8.
[1146] Diod.Sic.15.15.2-3; Dion.Hal.*Ant.Rom.*20.7.3.
[1147] Diod.Sic.15.24.1.
[1148] Lomas (1993) 36.
[1149] Diod.Sic.15.13.5; Braccesi (1977) 185-210 & 226-231; Vanotti (1991).
[1150] Numana: Plin.*HN.*3.111-2; Ancona: Strabo 5.4.2 & Plin.*HN.*3.112; Adria: *Etym.Magn*, s.v.Ἀδρίας; Tzetz. *Schol. ad Lycoph*.631. Braccesi (1977) 211-25; Caven (1990) 152.
[1151] Diod.Sic.15.13.1-3.
[1152] Xen.*Hell*. 6.2.3, 6.2.33-6; Diod.Sic.15.47.7. Caven (1990) 203.
[1153] Diod.Sic.15.14.3-5; Strabo 5.2.8; Polyaen.5.2.21.

part from the west. In 369/68, for example, the troops he sent to support the Spartans against Thebes were Celts and Iberians.[1154] The picture is thus one of prodigious activity and involvement in all directions.

Dionysios II, the son of Dionysios' Lokrian wife,[1155] was also active in Magna Graecia, fighting an enigmatic war with the Lucanians and restoring Rhegion.[1156] He maintained some form of alliance with Taras under Archytas.[1157] He also established two cities in Apulia, reportedly to curb Adriatic piracy,[1158] and had a fleet stationed off the Iapygian coast which forced Dion's invasion force of 357/56 to make a dangerous crossing on the open sea.[1159] These acts required tacit Tarentine support and thus affirm the existence of an alliance. Dionysios had entrenched himself so securely in Bruttium that he was able to relocate there after Dion besieged Ortygia.[1160] He remained in power there for a decade, despite losing Rhegion.[1161] He was probably responsible for the Greek fleet which raided Latium in 349,[1162] and was able to return and retake Syracuse in 346/45.[1163] After the collapse of the Dionysian regime, there is no hint of Syracusan involvement in Italy,[1164] until the Syracusan expedition with which I began this chapter, in which Antandros, Herakleides and Sostratos were sent to save the Krotoniates from the Bruttii.

[1154] Xen.*Hell*. 7.1.20-22; Diod.Sic.15.70.1.
[1155] Diod.Sic.16.6.2; Plut.*Dion*.3.5.
[1156] Pl.*Ep*.3.317a; Diod.Sic.16.53.3; Strabo 6.1.6. Lucca (1995); De Sensi Sestito (2002) 400-1; Silberstein Trevisani Ceccherini (2014) 17-8.
[1157] Strabo 6.1.8; Pl.*Ep.*7.338c, 339a, 339d, 350b.
[1158] Diod.Sic.16.5.3.
[1159] Plut.*Dion*.25, 26.1, 35.2. This is exactly the tactic suggested by Hermokrates in Thuc.6.34.
[1160] Diod.Sic.16.17.2; Plut.*Dion.*37.1-4.
[1161] Diod.Sic.16.13; Diod.Sic.16.45.9; Strabo 6.1.8; Plut.*Dion*.37.4; Plut.*Tim.*1; Ath.12.58. Muccioli (1999) 333-400; De Sensi Sestito (2002) 401-3.
[1162] Liv.7.26.15; Huß (1985) 154-5; Lucca (1996); Oakley (1998) 250-1.
[1163] Plut.*Tim*.1.4.
[1164] Plut.*Tim*.16.4, 30.3 are slight exceptions.

7.6. Implications for Agathokles

The dynamics of Syracusan involvement in the north are helpful for understanding Agathokles' own movements into Italy – as our sources suggest when they claim that Agathokles' intervention in the north was modelled on the actions of Dionysios.[1165] Agathokles did not follow in his footsteps because he was stuck in the past, but because they remained logical responses to the contemporary Mediterranean world. The physical geography of the central Mediterranean and the ideology of Syracusan autocracy were as relevant to Agathokles as to his predecessors. The similarities between the distribution of the coins of Dionysios in the wider Mediterranean and those of Agathokles indicates that the broader systems of economic interaction were operating in a similar way under both rulers. It is valid to understand Agathokles' activities in Italy in the context of this long-term relationship. Political, economic, and kinship relationships tied Sicilian and Italian centres to one another at all times, but aggressive intervention was an intermittent rather than a constant phenomenon. Four key factors drove this intervention: the ideology and abilities of Syracusan tyrants, the lack of a clear border at the Straits of Messana, the pull of internal Italian conflicts, and the desire to have a forward defence against invasion from Mainland Greece.

Syracuse's most intense interventions in Italy took place when ruled by tyrannies. This reflects the tyrants' greater ability to organise large-scale, long-distance military expeditions, but also the need for the situation in Sicily to be safe before embarking on expeditions further afield. The Syracusan tyrants tended to build empires in Sicily and this meant that they often had that local security. But, when internal Sicilian affairs deteriorated, tyrants withdrew from Italy, as shown by Hieron's inability to save Sybaris in 476/75 and by Dionysios' failure to prevent Carthaginian activities in Italy during his wars against them. When not the capital of a tyrant's empire, Syracuse usually had to

[1165] Polyb.15.35.4; Just.*Epit.*23.1.2.

focus its energies on wars much closer to home. When the situation seemed secure in Sicily, the Syracusans were willing and able to intervene in Italy and further abroad without a tyrant, as shown by the expeditions against the Tyrrhenian pirates in 455/54, Syracuse's prolonged involvement in the Ionian War, and Sostratos and Herakleides' expedition to Kroton. But, while Syracusan interest in Italy and abroad was a constant over time, autocrats like Agathokles were particularly likely to turn that interest into a programme of military intervention. The same ideology of autocracy which provoked Syracusan leaders to take an aggressive approach to the Carthaginians.[1166] When war with them was out of the question, then the Italic peoples provided a convenient alternative target, allowing tyrants to continue to present themselves as powerful defenders of the Greeks against the barbarian. In this way, they demonstrated their military prowess and also their justice, thereby securing their position with respect to their Sicilians subjects and the wider Greek world.[1167] Justin's representation of the Bruttii as brave, rich and unjustly threatening to their Greek neighbours indicates that he thought this was a major factor for Agathokles.[1168]

When military intervention took place, it focussed on the Straits of Messana first. As Alkibiades is meant to have observed, the Straits of Messina were in no way a natural boundary, but the gateway between Eastern Sicily and the Tyrrhenian Sea.[1169] Once Syracuse was involved in northeastern Sicily, they were involved in Rhegion too,[1170] as shown by the experiences in turn of Anaxilaos, Hieron, and Dionysios. We have seen already how Agathokles' first intervention at Lipara shows that he was moving to gain firmer control of both sides of the straits. The clearest defensive point after the Straits is the isthmus of Catanzaro (the line between Hipponion and Skylletion), which is

[1166] See pp.142, 214.
[1167] Pind.*Pyth.*1.71-75's representation of Hieron I's victory at Cumae is the most obvious manifestation of this tendency.
[1168] Just.*Epit.*23.1.3-4.
[1169] Thuc.6.48; De Sensi Sestito (2002) 391-3; Spigo (2002); Zahrnt (2006); Fischer-Hansen (2009) 224-7.
[1170] Observed by Strabo 6.1.6.

narrow and low enough to permit easy communication between the two coasts.[1171] Thus, Syracusan leaders were drawn further into Italy. By Agathokles' time, the isthmus of Catanzaro was under Bruttian control, so his conflict with them, particularly around Hipponion, can be partially understood as an effort to gain control of this same strategic point.

However, the Italiote centres had political concerns of their own which tended to draw tyrants further into Italy. Foremost of these were: factional *stasis* similar to that of Sicilian cities and a (real or perceived) threat from non-Greek inland groups. As we saw in chapter five, the nature of factional *stasis* was to turn internal conflicts into international ones; the role of the Syracusan Heloris in the Italiote league's conflict with Dionysios, Timoleon's exiles' activities in Bruttium, and Agathokles' youthful roving in Italy all show that the Sicilian and Italian exile dynamics were interlinked. A strong ruler in Sicily was likely to be called upon for support by friends from the Italian cities and a strong presence in Italy was increasingly necessary for a Sicilian ruler's domestic security from his exiled opponents. The threat from Italic peoples is constantly stressed by the literary source material,[1172] and its presentation as a conflict between Greek and barbarian made such interventions ideologically convenient for Syracusan tyrants, as I mentioned above. Thus the conflict between Kroton, Lokroi and the Bruttii for control of Calabria repeatedly drew Syracusan forces into Italy (or gave them an excuse for intervening). In many ways it resembles the process that Gruen perceives in the Roman conquest of Greece.[1173] It is reasonable to connect this to Agathokles' own activities around Hipponion in conflict with the Bruttii. There were limits to this phenomenon, however. The Tarentines actively averted this dynamic. We never hear of them calling on Syracusan tyrants to be their foreign generals. Instead, they called on Spartan and Epirote royalty. The freedom of action of these individuals was circumscribed by the fact that they had no

[1171] Caven (1990) 131. Cf. Plut.*Crass*.10.4-6.
[1172] Polyb.2.39; Strabo 6.1.2; Ath.14.632a; Erskine (2013) 24-34.
[1173] Gruen (1984).

stake in Magna Graecia, were usually reliant on Tarentine naval power for transport and supplies and on Tarentine troops and money for the bulk of their forces. The Tarentines would have had none of these checks on a Syracusan tyrant, so they never called upon one to help fight their enemies.[1174]

Finally, Syracusan interest in Italy was motivated by the crucial role of the Italian cities in the success or failure of invasions from abroad. The western side of this was hinted at in the previous chapter: the potential for Carthaginian (or conceivably Etruscan) use of the straits, Lipara, and Hipponion in order to cut off eastern Sicily from outside help and attack it from the north.[1175] This was balanced by threats from the east. The first Athenian expedition to Sicily in 427/26-424/23 used Rhegion as a base,[1176] while Thucydides emphasises this cold reception the Athenians received from the Italiote cities in 415/14 as a major factor in the expedition's struggles.[1177] Once the Athenian army was invested outside Syracuse, it was sustained by regular provisions from Italy (according to Thucydides' Nikias).[1178] Because Dion could not travel via the Italian cities, his expedition had to be limited to three ships and had to make a crossing on the open sea, which was nearly fatal. The contrast with the easy crossing of Gylippos in 414/13 and of Timoleon in 344/43 BC with the support of the Adriatic and Italian cities is striking.[1179] We have already seen how the Tarantines supported the two Spartan princes, Akrotatos and Kleonymos, when they threatened Agathokles.[1180] Support from the Italian cities was thus a crucial aspect in the success or failure of military expeditions against Sicily. Agathokles always had to be aware of the attitudes of the string of *poleis* between Rhegion and Taras towards him. As the first Italian stop in the sea journey to Sicily, the Tarentines'

[1174] See p.242 and n.986.
[1175] See p.221.
[1176] Thuc.3.86-88, 3.90, 3.99, 3.103, 4.1, 4.24-5, 4.48, 4.58-65, 5.4-5.
[1177] Thuc.6.44, 7.33; Diod.Sic.13.3.4-5; Hornblower (2010) 459-61 & 608-9.
[1178] Thuc.7.14.
[1179] Thuc.6.104, 7.1; Diod.Sic.16.66; Plut.*Tim.* 8.4-10, 16.3-4, 19;
[1180] See also chapter 8.1.2.

attitude was particularly crucial to invading forces. From the time of Dionysios, the Syracusans had cultivated good relations with them. There is little evidence for Agathokles' relationship to Taras in his later years; I have argued already that relations between Agathokles and the Tarantines were probably characterised by (justified) mutual suspicion. During his Italian exile, the Tarantines had expelled Agathokles from their city on charges of intending to overthrow the government and nothing he had done since then had disproved those suspicions. From Agathokles' perspective, the Tarentines' support for Akrotatos and Kleonymos showed that they were keen to overthrow him by force. These poor relations explain why Agathokles' efforts in Korkyra and Epirus were more sustained than those of the Dionysioi; since he could not rely on Taras to serve as an advance guard, he needed to have firmer control of points beyond them.[1181]

Like Dionysios, Agathokles' involvement in Magna Graecia followed his final acquisition of Messina and the Straits. The attack on Hipponion and the investment represented by the construction of the harbour there suggests that he was trying to use the isthmus there as a chokepoint in the same way that Dionysios had. His attacks on Kroton and the Bruttii were part of an effort to dominate the other powers which had a stake in the area around the isthmus. Agathokles' treaty with the Iapygians and Peuketians, the marriage of Lanassa to Pyrrhos and his action in Korkyra matched Dionysios II's foundations in Apulia, Dionysios I's attempted restoration of Alketas and his support for the Spartans at Korkyra. Not only did Agathokles focus on the same points, but he approached them in the same way, concentrating on amicable relations, strong points and occasional interventions rather than direct control. This was not the only way to control southern Italy, but it was a way that had worked before. The Syracusan imperial tradition was not focused on direct control of territory, but on control of movement. By holding, allying with, or neutralising strong

[1181] Contra Vattuone (1987-8) 71.

points, Agathokles maximised his own power to move around Italy, while limiting the ability of his opponents to do so. I have already argued that the *phrouria* show a similar strategy for the control of Sicily itself.[1182] It can be seen as an outgrowth of the importance of controlling movement within the *polis* to the tyrants' control of Syracuse itself, which had been so skilfully developed by Dionysios on Ortygia.[1183] Those who reduce Agathokles' activities in Italy to "raids" ignore the importance of control of movement and the fact that Agathokles had established a system in which he and his proxies were the only ones who could carry out raids. Agathokles was able to travel east on multiple occasions, to Korkyra, Apulia and Epirus. Although Timaios attacked Agathokles in Athens with his pen, he was never able to follow in the footsteps of Dion and Timoleon, cross the Adriatic, and attack Agathokles in Sicily with his sword. Control of Korkyra and Apulia meant that Agathokles had the ability to access the Adriatic and the ability to prevent others from accessing it; as I showed in chapter three, his coinage certainly flowed into the Adriatic.[1184] But, through his Italian activities, Agathokles also acquired the power to intervene in Mainland Greece. In the next chapter, I will argue that throughout his reign, Agathokles had his eyes firmly fixed on the chaotic conflict between the Diadochoi in Mainland Greece and the wider Eastern Mediterranean.

[1182] See p.196.
[1183] See p.155.
[1184] See chapter 3.2.

8. MAINLAND GREECE AND THE DIADOCHOI

In this chapter, I deal with Agathokles' relations with the cities of Mainland Greece and the Macedonian warlords. My purpose is to show, firstly, that the ties with mainland Greece were already deep at the start of Agathokles' reign – he did not suddenly discover the eastern Mediterranean while on campaign in Africa. On the contrary, relationships to Corinth and Sparta in particular had been of key importance during his original seizure of power. Some of this has already been touched on in my discussions of Corinthian *pegasoi* and the Brothers Agiad, Akrotatos and Kleonymos.[1185] Here I bring these threads together and emphasise that these were not isolated or sudden intrusions from across the sea, but the continuation of ongoing relationships, which were of particular significance for the role that they played on both sides of the Adriatic in the construction of identity.

My second aim is to elucidate Agathokles' role in the Wars of the Diadochoi. Agathokles took a keen interest in the activities of the Macedonian warlords, in order to keep them as far away from himself as possible, while watching for opportunities to take advantage of their strife. The actions he took to achieve these goals influenced the course of the war of the Diadochoi as a whole and the political structure that resulted from them. The Diadochoi were playing for high stakes and were quick to grab hold of any ideology, technology, resource, tactic or alliance to gain the advantage over their foes. It is no surprise, therefore, that several Diadochoi strove to forge links with Agathokles, often employing the old links between Sicily and the *poleis* of Greece to do so. I focus on three key moments of contact: the expedition of Ophellas in 308, Agathokles' marriage to Ptolemy's step-daughter Theoxena in the early 290s, and his involvement in the conflict between Pyrrhos and Demetrios at the end of that decade.

[1185] On pegasoi, see pp.104; on Agiads, see chapter 7.2.

8.1. Mainland Greece

The structure of Diodoros means that Agathokles' interactions with the eastern Mediterranean seem to fall predominantly in the later part of his career, which appears separate from the Eastern Mediterranean, until the encounter with Ophellas.[1186] It is true that the embassy to Ophellas marked the first known interaction between Agathokles and a Macedonian warlord, but the Eastern Mediterranean was important to him before this. The mainland Greek *poleis* were deeply involved in the Syracusan and Sicilian political scene throughout Agathokles' life and he was therefore conscious of the Diadochoi and their conflict in Greece.

8.1.1. Corinth

When Agathokles was young, Corinth had been the most important of the *poleis* of mainland Greece to Syracuse. Archias of Corinth had founded Syracuse in the eighth century. This fact should not be seen as irrelevant to Syracusans of the fourth century. The moral importance attached to these kind of kinship ties in ancient Greek diplomacy and identity has been greatly stressed in recent scholarship.[1187] In Syracuse's case the importance of these ties are clearly evident. When the Syracusans had been defeated at the Eloros by Hippokrates of Gela in the early fifth century and were at his mercy, when the Syracusans needed to get rid of Douketios in 450/51, when Syracuse was threatened by the Athenian Expedition in 415, when Himilkon's army had Syracuse under siege in 396/95, when Dion needed help revising the Syracusan constitution, when Dionysios II and the Carthaginians threatened in 344/43, it had been Corinth they appealed to.[1188] The Syracusans were

[1186] Consolo Langher (2000) 125-44.
[1187] e.g. Jones (1999); Stickler (2010) 265-292; Fragoulaki (2013), esp.1-32 and 62-99; *Contra* Salmon (1984) 388-91.
[1188] Eloros: Hdt.7.154; Douketios: Diod.Sic.11.92; Athenian Expedition: Thuc.6.8.7; Himilkon: Diod.Sic.14.62.1, 14.75.4-5; Dion: Plut.*Dion*.53.2-4; Timoleon: Diod.Sic.16.65.1, Nep.*Tim.*20.2.1-2, Just.*Epit.*21.5.1, Plut.*Tim*.2. Note, also, Corinthian announcement of Salamis victory: Diod.Sic. 11.26.5; Nikoteles the Corinthian's role in resisting Dionysios' rise: Diod.Sic.14.10.3; Dionysios inspired to shipbuilding by the example of the Corinthians: Diod.Sic.14.42.3; Dionysios sends Dion to Corinth: Nep.*Dio.*10.4.1; the suggestion that one of

eager to maintain this relationship, as shown by the contingents Dionysios sent to protect Corinth from the Thebans in 369/68.[1189] In Agathokles' own lifetime, Timoleon had repeated Archias' act of foundation, at Syracusan request.[1190] After Timoleon's death, the Syracusans treated Timoleon as an oikist, emphasising the similarities between him and Archias, holding annual games in his honour, and making his burial place in the *agora* into a *gymnasion*, which was used for training the citizen youth, for marshalling Syracusan citizens and perhaps other civic functions.[1191] They also legally reserved the position of *strategos autokrator*, the most powerful position in their state and the former office of Gelon, Hermokrates, and Dionysios, for a Corinthian.[1192] The relationship to Corinth thus had a central place in Syracusan public life. That relationship had a practical manifestation: most of the silver in Sicily, the ubiquitous *pegasoi*, came from Corinth and reflects the importance of trade with Corinth to Syracuse's prosperity.[1193] Thus, Agathokles grew up and came to power in an era in which the Corinthians had tremendous moral, legal, and economic influence over Syracuse (and by extension eastern Sicily). As the *stasis* with the Six Hundred heated up in the early 310s, this was clearly still true, as demonstrated by the fact that the people duly summoned Akestorides of Corinth to serve as their *strategos autokrator*.

This close relationship was reinforced by continuity at Corinth. When Corinth surrendered to Philip II in 338 and he installed a garrison on the Acrocorinth, the city came under the domination of Philip's friends Demaratos and Deinarchos. These two had brought the Corinthian reinforcements

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the two original oikists of Kamarina was a Corinthian: Cordano (1987) 121-7 on Thuc.6.5.3. Hornblower (2011) 224-5.

[1189] Xen.*Hell*.4.5; Xen.*Hell*.7.1.15-22; Diod.Sic.15.68-70; Paus.9.15.4. Dionysios sent troops to aid the Spartans again in the next year: Xen.*Hell*.7.1.28-32; Diod.Sic.15.72.3; Plut.*Ages*.33.3.

[1190] Plut.*Tim*.23; Fragoulaki (2013) 81.

[1191] Salmon (1984) 65-66: noting parallelism between Archias' murder of Aktaion and Timoleon's murder of Timophanes. Games: Plut.*Tim*.39.5. Timoleontion: Diod.Sic.19.6.1-6; Nep.*Tim.*20.5.4; Plut.*Tim*.39.6.

[1192] Plut.*Tim*.38.4. This replaced the law of Diokles which reserved the position for Syracusan citizens, Corinthians dwelling in the *metropolis* and the leading Spartiates: Diod.Sic.14.69.5; on Gelon's *strategeia* see nn.583, 584.

[1193] See p.104.

to Timoleon in 342/41, taken part in his final victory at Syracuse and led the initial invasion of Carthaginian territory.[1194] Their involvement in Timoleon's expedition sat alongside their friendship with Philip as a source of their prestige at home. The expedition was memorialised by a statue group in the centre of the city and by civic dedications at Delphi, which used the expedition to advertise Corinth's excellence and its leadership over the old Corinthian colonies of western Greece.[1195] The relationship with Sicily was also of key importance during the 330s and 320s when Greece, including Corinth, suffered from severe famine and Sicily played an important role in covering the shortfall.[1196] Demaratos accompanied Alexander into Asia and died in 327/26,[1197] but Deinarchos stayed home and was responsible for Corinth's conspicuous loyalty to the Macedonians during Agis' War and the Lamian War.[1198] When the Syracusans appealed to Corinth to send them a new *strategos autokrator*, their envoys appealed to a man the Syracusans knew well. Corinth's decision to send Akestorides to Sicily will have been coloured by the fact that Deinarchos relied on the Corinthian link to Syracuse as a source of his own prestige and on the importance of peace in Sicily for feeding Corinth. Corinth and the Corinthian elite had a stake in maintaining the Syracusan *status quo*.

But after the Macedonian regent Antipatros died in 319/18, Kassandros and Polyperchon contested the regency. Polyperchon executed Deinarchos and took control of the Corinthian garrisons.[1199] For

[1194] In Sicily: Plut.Tim.21.3, 24.4 27.6; Talbert (1974) 68. As Philip's friends in Corinth: Demosth.18.295; Diod.Sic.17.76.6; Salmon (1984) 391; Heckel (2006) 106-7; Dixon (2014) 18-50. Whether Demaratos and Deinarchos' dominance was contested within Corinth is unclear; Dixon stresses the consistent record of loyalty to Macedon as evidence for a united pro-Macedonian elite.
[1195] *Corinth* 8.3.23 (= *SEG* 52.294); *SEG* 52.536. Talbert (1974) 49-51.
[1196] The famine: *SEG* 9.2; Camp (1982), esp.14-16; Garnsey (1988) 150-64; Dixon (2014) 33-6; Importance of Sicilian grain: Demosth.32.4, 18-21; [Demosth.] 56.9; Theoph.*HP*.8.4.5; Talbert (1974) 165-6 associates the influx of *pegasoi* with this trade; Zimmerman Munn (2003) 197 n.18 offers a full list of literary sources for the Corinthian grain trade.
[1197] Plut.*Alex.*1.15.6, 37.7, 56.1-2.
[1198] Demosth.Ep.6.1; *Suda* Δ433; Dixon (2014) 24-6, 47-9.
[1199] Plut.*Phoc*.33.3-5, 37.1; *Suda* Δ433; Dixon (2014) 50-3.

several years, Corinth lay at the centre of the contest among the Diadochoi.[1200] This was the context in which Agathokles successfully convinced the Syracusan assembly to ignore the law and appoint him *strategos autokrator*. I have discussed the Syracusan factors behind this in chapter five, but the Corinthian dimension is also significant.[1201] Agathokles' rise to power and his subsequent behaviour made his regime vulnerable to many charges of illegitimacy, one of which was the fact that his official position as *strategos autokrator* was reserved for a Corinthian. Not only was it a challenge that struck at the core legal basis of his authority, but it offered Corinth a duty or a right to intervene against him – their proper role in their colony had been slighted. While he was alive, Deinarchos could not allow this slight to pass and his long-term connections in Pella might have enabled him to seek Macedonian assistance in restoring the Timoleontic settlement. But, with him dead and hostile armies marching through the Isthmos annually, this threat receded. Agathokles could focus on Sicily and Carthage in the knowledge that nobody was in a position to repeat Timoleon's feat.

Corinth's significance did not disappear, however. Throughout the wars of the Diadochoi, Greek *poleis* called on the kings to help them settle scores with other *poleis* and, when it suited them, the kings granted their requests. For instance, the famous ithyphallic hymn to Demetrios implored him to aid the Athenians against the Aitolians in a dispute over dedications at Delphi. Demetrios agreed to do so both for the sake of the Athenians and for his own sake.[1202] In a similar manner, whoever courted Corinth was a potential threat to Agathokles. While Polyperchon, his son Alexandros and the latter's widow Kratesipolis in turn struggled to maintain their foothold in Corinth against Kassandros, this was not an issue. But sometime before May 307, Ptolemy I took control of Corinth

[1200] Dixon (2014) 53-7.
[1201] See chapter 5.1-5.2.
[1202] Plut.*Demetr.*13.1-3; Habicht (1997) 92-4; Wehrli (1968) 178-9; Hammond, Griffith & Walbank (1988) 220-4.

and temporarily toyed with launching a large scale campaign in Greece; I will return to the significance of this for Agathokles' simultaneous encounter with Ophellas in the second half of this chapter.[1203] This conquest also marked the end of Corinth's production of *pegasoi.*[1204] It is not clear how substantial the impact of this was, since the old *pegasoi* continued to circulate in Sicily and the Syracusans continued to profit from the export of agricultural produce down to the time of Hieron II. But, although Diadoch coinage came to Sicily during the early third century and there was significant Ptolemaic investment in the Sicilian economy from the 270s onwards,[1205] there was no new influx of silver on the scale of the *pegasoi* – a major factor in the devaluation of Syracusan *pegasoi* by Agathokles discussed in chapter three.[1206] Ptolemy's conquest of Corinth thus had a major impact on Agathokles' financial administration. After Ptolemy abandoned his plans in Greece, Corinth came under Kassandros' control, whose expansion into north-western Greece, which brought him into conflict with Agathokles, would have gelled with the Corinthians' interest in asserting their position as founders of the *poleis* in that region.[1207] In 303/02, Corinth passed to Demetrios Poliorketes who remained comfortably in charge of the city for the rest of Agathokles' life.[1208] Demetrios' control of Corinth was relevant to Agathokles' conciliatory behaviour towards him after the Korkyra affair.[1209] In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss Agathokles' interactions with the Diadochoi in more detail and we will see that Corinth was only one factor

[1203] Diod.Sic.20.37.1-2; Polyaen.8.58; *Suda* Δ431; Will (1964) 332; Will (1979-82) 1.153-208; Dixon (2014) 57 n.60; Lane Fox (2015) 180-5.
[1204] *IGCH* 85; Ravel (1938).
[1205] See *CH*.6.21 and note 426.
[1206] See p.104.
[1207] On Kassandros in the northwest, see: pp.302-4. On the Corinthian attitude, see Salmon (1984) 270-280; d'Andria (1995); Stickler (2010) 265-92; Fragoulaki (2013) 59-88. Cf.Dixon (2014) 59-64 & 65's assessment of Kassandros' utilitarian attitude towards Corinth.
[1208] Dixon (2014) 60-5, 75-9.
[1209] See chapter 8.2.3.

among many, but it is an important factor, which indicates the degree to which events of mainland Greece impinged on Agathokles directly.

8.1.2. Sparta

There was another *polis* which considered itself to have rights and duties in Sicily. Sparta had a long and bloody history of interventions in the island.[1210] At the end of the sixth century, the prince Dorieus had died attempting to establish a colony of Herakleia at Eryx. A story still circulated that the land was the birth right of the Spartan kings as descendants of Dorieus and Herakles.[1211] At the end of the fifth century, Sparta's dispatch of Gylippos had saved Syracuse from the Athenian expedition.[1212] Thucydides' account emphasises the importance of Dorian identity in rhetoric of the Syracusans and Spartans during the Expedition and the Spartans had great prestige on the island in the following years.[1213] The Akragantines placed Dexippos the Lakedaimonian in charge of their resistance to the Carthaginians in 406/05, who had been in Gela with an army of 1,500 mercenaries and "had high repute on account of his fatherland."[1214] In the same period, Aretas and Pharakidas of Sparta played important roles in solidifying Dionysios I's rule over Syracuse.[1215] Thereafter, the Spartans had maintained close, increasingly dependent ties with Dionysios I throughout his life.[1216] During the war between Dion and Dionysios II, two Spartans arrived at Syracuse in 356/55, claiming the right to arbitrate – first, Pharax, in favour of Dionysios II and subsequently Gaisylos in favour of an equitable settlement. Dion rebuffed them on the grounds that he himself had received Spartan

[1210] Hornblower (2008) 6-9, (2011) 222-4.
[1211] Hdt. 5.43-6; Diod.Sic.4.23.2; Paus.3.16.4. Malkin (1994) 192-218.
[1212] Thuc.7.1-2.
[1213] e.g. Thuc.6.76-80; Fragoulaki (2013).
[1214] Timaios FGrH 566 F27=Diod.Sic.13.85.3: …ἔχων ἀξίωμα διὰ τὴν πατρίδα.
[1215] Diod.Sic.14.10.2-3, 70.1-3.
[1216] Sicilian support at Korkyra in 373/72: Xen.*Hell*.6.2.4, 6.2.33-6; Diod.Sic.15.47.1-7; at Corinth in 369/68: Xen.*Hell*.7.1.15-22; Diod.Sic.15.68-70; Paus.9.15.4; in the Peloponnese in 368/67: Xen.*Hell*.7.1.28-32; Diod.Sic.15.72.3; Plut.*Ages*.33.3; Isoc.6.63, 6.73. Caven (1990) 202-6.

citizenship and could therefore exercise Spartan rights in Sicily.[1217] Thereafter, for some time there is no further record of Spartan interest in Sicily. Between the collapse of the Spartan hegemony, the Third Sacred War and the various conflicts with the Macedonians, it is not surprising that Sparta found little time for the West.

In 314/13, however, this link was reactivated by Agathokles' opponents. As discussed in chapter three, in this year Diodoros recounts that the Syracusan exiles convinced Akragas to launch a war on Agathokles and to appeal to Sparta for a commander, rather than risk giving an Akragantine citizen the power to establish a tyranny. In Sparta, the exiles found Akrotatos the son of the aged Agiad Kleomenes II. Akrotatos was unpopular in Sparta because of a political stance he had taken fifteen years earlier and he was therefore eager to campaign overseas. He left Lakonia without seeking the permission of the ephors, with enough ships and troops that he was able to break the Illyrian king Glaukias' siege of Apollonia. At Taras, he made use of his family name to get them to contribute forces to the war, but on arrival he achieved nothing and became so extravagant "that he seemed to be a Persian not a Spartiate" – a *topos* in literary treatments of Spartiate commanders. Over dinner one night he killed the leader of the Syracusan exiles, Sostratos, and was forced to flee the island.[1218] He is not heard of again.[1219]

Akrotatos' expedition was not an act of the Spartan government. With Macedonian armies regularly campaigning in the Peloponnese, the Spartans were in no position to get involved in the West at this date and Diodoros stresses that Akrotatos acted without the permission of the Spartan ephors. [1220] Spartan royalty were accustomed to act as they thought best, irregardless of their legal

[1217] Plut.*Dion* 48.7-49.7; Zorat (1994) 165-75.
[1218] Diod.Sic.19.70-71.5.
[1219] Paus.1.13.5, 3.6.2 & Plut.*Agis* 3.4 indicate that he died before the death of his father in 309/8 BC. Modern treatments of Akrotatos: Marasco (1980) 23-4; David (1981) 117-9; Cartledge & Spawforth (1989) 27.
[1220] Manni (1964) 154; cf.Cartledge & Spawforth (1989) 24-7.

system. There was great allure for both prince and state in the long tradition of Spartan princes earning glory by fighting overseas, going back to the aforementioned Dorieus and, ultimately, Herakles. After the battle of Leuktra, there was further encouragement, both because there were fewer opportunities to fight on behalf of Sparta and because it was the clearest path to the sort of income necessary to revive Sparta itself.[1221] Success in Sicily in particular had often been dramatic and unexpected. The incident indicates how attractive campaigning in the West was to Spartiates and the degree to which a Spartan prince could serve as a rallying point for the Greeks of the west and potential threat to Agathokles' regime. But the Spartan government regularly disclaimed controversial acts by saying that they had been done without the permission of the ephors.[1222] If they failed to notice Akrotatos slipping out of Lakonia with a small navy and enough troops to intervene at Apollonia, then they were wilfully blind. A few years later, when envoys arrived from Taras, the Spartan government was happy to send Akrotatos' brother Kleonymos off, as I discussed in chapter 7.2.

There were three factors in the dispatch of these Spartan princes. The first was the toxic relationships that both Akrotatos and Kleonymos developed with the Spartan government, which meant that they were particularly eager to depart and that the Spartans were particularly keen to send them away. This reflects an internal tension in Spartan society between the Spartans' emphasis on equality and the Spartan royals' expectation of special status. The second factor was the presence of the mercenary camp at Tainaron, which meant that troops were always available to the Spartans. It was the third factor – the long-term relationship discussed in this section – which led to the Spartan princes travelling west towards Sicily. Agathokles twice faced a major threat to

[1221] Agesilaos in Egypt, Archidamos in the Sacred War and in Italy. David (1981) 117-123; Cartledge & Spawforth (1989) 10-5, 26-7; Nafissi (2004).
[1222] e.g. The occupation of the Kadmeia in 382/81: Xen.*Hell*.5.2.25-34, Diod.Sic.15.20; Sphodrias' invasion of Attica in 379/78: Xen.*Hell.*5.4.23-4, Diod.Sic.15.29.5-6; the mission of Pharax in 356/55: Plut.*Dion* 48.7-49.7; funding the Phokians during the Third Sacred War: Diod.Sic.16.24.2.

his regime because of the desire of the Spartans generally and the Spartan royals in particular to use old ties to the West to restore their standing in a world that was rapidly passing them by.

8.2. The Diadochoi

Despite the links to Corinth and Sparta, Agathokles was able to proceed with his takeover of Syracuse and his invasion of Africa confident that there would be limited intervention from mainland Greece, while it was convulsed by the warfare between Alexander the Great's generals. This conflict had its roots in the fact that, in the absence of a strong heir, none of Alexander's generals was obviously pre-eminent and not all of them were present for the negotiations that followed his death.[1223] It continued for over forty years, fuelled by the massive Achaemenid treasuries, the apparently inexhaustible manpower reserves of Macedon and Greece, and the ambition and sense of entitlement of the Diadochoi. Additionally, like the conflict in Sicily, the war's perpetuation and intensification was partially a result of the way that various conflicts were progressively superimposed on one another. The original conflict resulted from distaste with Perdikkas' performance as regent, especially his treatment of Alexander's sisters Kynnane and Kleopatra, and could therefore have ended with his untimely assassination in Egypt. But, while Antigonos continued this original conflict by pursuing Eumenes across Anatolia and into Persia on the grounds that he was a creature of Perdikkas, a second succession dispute opened up with the death of the new regent Antipatros in 319/18, between his son Kassandros and his designated successor Polyperchon. Two further conflicts fed into this one: a court dispute between Eurydike as wife of Philip III and Olympias as grandmother of Alexander IV, and an ideological dispute about the status of the Greek *poleis* within the Macedonian kingdom. Polyperchon favoured Olympias and proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks; Kassandros therefore took the opposite positions. Even

[1223] Good recent accounts of the Wars of the Diadochoi are Shipley (1999); Bosworth (2002); Braund (2003); Carney (1988) for Alexander's sisters; Billows (1997) for Antigonos; Boiy (2007) for chronology.

small local conflicts took on a significance in light of the whole war. For example, Pyrrhos' father, Aiakides of Epirus faced opposition to his rule in the Epirote kingdom, which coalesced around a rival branch of the royal family. Because Aiakides supported Olympias at this time, Kassandros supported the other branch. The full impact of this structure can be seen with Antigonos. On his return from the east in 315/14 he clashed with Seleukos over the finances of the Satrapy of Babylonia and Ptolemy, Lysimachos and Kassandros declared war on him. At that moment, he found himself aligned with various causes which he had had no relationship to up to this moment, such as Polyperchon's regency, Pyrrhos of Epirus' claim to the throne, and the ideology of the freedom of the Greeks. These interlocked conflicts allowed the war to reshape itself, over and over again, in ways that would be unpredictable for those at its fringes, like Agathokles.

The conflict had a great deal of relevance for Agathokles. On the one hand, the massive forces operating in the Eastern Mediterranean were led by a rapidly shifting gallery of unpredictable individuals. It was easy to imagine one of the Diadochoi leading a force into Sicily on behalf of the Syracusan exiles, or the ambitions of Taras, or the claims of Corinth. In chapter four, I stressed the impact that this had on Agathokles' self-representation as he sought to prevent people at home and abroad from thinking that he could be toppled. In chapter seven, I discussed how the memory of interventions from the east influenced the behaviour of Agathokles and his predecessors in Italy. Thus, the chaos in Greece and the eastern Mediterranean shaped Agathokles' foreign ventures and self-representation. It also represented an opportunity. So long as Agathokles kept the conflict at arm's length, the Diadochoi could remain too busy with each other to invade his part of the world. By luck and skill, Agathokles generally achieved this – he faced rogue Spartan princes rather than massive Macedonian invasions. Had Alexander's world empire remained intact, Agathokles would have had far less space to manoeuvre. Additionally, the vast resources of the *Diadochoi* offered an opportunity. Thus, at various points in his career, Agathokles reached into the maelstrom and attempted to use the Diadochoi's conflict for his own ends. When he did, the multifarious, interlocked character of the conflict meant that his actions implicated him in the war as a whole.

As a result, Agathokles was consistently aligned with Ptolemy and chiefly concerned with the status of Korkyra and Epirus. There are three major points of interest, which will form the central focus of this chapter: his murder of Ophellas in 308/07, his incorporation into Ptolemy's dynastic marriage network around 300, and his alliances with Pyrrhos and Demetrios in the late 290s.

8.2.1. The Expedition and Death of Ophellas

Agathokles' murder of Ophellas is reported by Diodoros, Justin, Polyainos and the *Souda*.[1224] In 309/08 BC, Agathokles ran short of troops and money in Africa, so he sent an envoy to propose an alliance to Ophellas son of Seilenos, who was ruling Cyrene. Ophellas, whose wife was from the family of Miltiades,[1225] gathered troops from Athens and other parts of Greece. He set out from Cyrene with them in 308/07, marching across Libya in the autumn of 308 despite great hardship and rendezvoused with Agathokles' army at the beginning of winter 308.[1226] At first the two dynasts appeared on good terms; Agathokles gave his younger son into Ophellas' care – or pimped him out, according to Polyainos. But after a few days, Agathokles announced to his soldiers that Ophellas was plotting against him, led his troops into his camp, killed Ophellas and took control of his army.

None of the sources appear to have known or cared why Ophellas died; they simply present the murder as duplicity. It is not at all clear whether the murder was premeditated or undertaken on the spur of the moment. Perhaps Ophellas was indeed plotting against Agathokles or the size of his force made Agathokles fear that he would. Diodoros and Justin say that during earlier negotiations Agathokles proposed to take Sicily for himself and leave Africa to Ophellas. They both claim that an

[1224] *Marm.Par.*120; Diod.Sic.20.40-2; Just.*Epit.*22.7.3-5; Polyaen.5.3.4; *Suda* Δ431, O994. Will (1964) determines the chronology.
[1225] Her father, also called Miltiades, was the proposer of *IG* II^3 1370, which proposed the establishment of an Athenian colony in the Adriatic: Ravazzolo (1996) 121.
[1226] Will (1964) 322, based on Diod.Sic.20.69.3 & 20.70.3 (Ophellas died at the same time of year as Agathokles' final abandonment of Africa).

African empire was exactly what Ophellas had in mind.[1227] Diodoros' account emphasises the number of Ophellas' camp followers, which were so great that "the army seemed to be a colony."[1228] Perhaps the murder occurred because Agathokles did not actually want to replace Carthage with an Athenian colony ruled by Ophellas. But a number of other examples from the period demonstrate how difficult it was for dynasts to co-exist in close quarters for any length of time without clashing with the other.[1229] Most dynasts were sensitive to slights to their status and were quick to suspicion. The result of Ophellas and Agathokles' meeting is perhaps not overly surprising.

A larger problem is the place of Ophellas' expedition within the wider context of the wars of the Diadochoi. In particular, debate has centred on Ophellas' relationship to Ptolemy. A large number of scholars have argued that Ophellas was in rebellion or behaving as an autonomous dynast in this period.[1230] At the other extreme, some scholars see him as a loyal vassal of Ptolemy and see his expedition as an unsuccessful attempt to bring Carthage under Ptolemaic control.[1231] More cautious scholars talk instead of Ophellas as being a subordinate of Ptolemy, but portray Ptolemy as equivocal about the expedition – neither opposed to it taking place, nor particularly fussed at its failure.[1232] My view sits between the second and third of these points of view.

[1227] Diod.Sic.20.40.1: περιεβάλετο ταῖς ἐλπίσι μείζονα δυναστείαν; Justin.22.7.4: *spe inproba regnum totius Africae*.
[1228] Diod.Sic.20.41.1: ἐμφερῆ τὴν στρατιὰν ὑπάρχειν ἀποικίᾳ…
[1229] Seleukos flees Antigonos: Diod.Sic.19.55; Pyrrhos kills Neoptolemos II: Plut.*Pyrrh.*5; Demetrios I kills Alexander V: Plut.*Demetr.*36.5-6; Ptolemy Keraunos kills Seleukos: App.*Syr.*62.
[1230] Will (1964) 330-2; Huß (1979) 127, (2001) 179-80; Caroli (2007) 75-6. Coins with the legend ΔAMO KYPENAION, once linked to Ophellas' rebellion, have been redated to the rebellion of 313: Mørkholm (1980).
[1231] Laronde (1971).
[1232] Horat Zuffa (1971/2); Bagnall (1976) 26.

Although Ptolemy is completely absent from all accounts of Ophellas' expedition, there can be no doubt that Cyrene was Ptolemy's city: he had sent Ophellas to take it from the Spartan adventurer Thibron and the Cyrenaican democrats, probably in 322/21.[1233] Diodoros leaves no room for doubt:

> Ὀφέλλας δὲ καταπολεμήσας τὸν Θίβρωνα καὶ ζωγρήσας, ἔτι δὲ τῶν πόλεων ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος παρέδωκε τάς τε πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ. οἱ μὲν οὖν Κυρηναῖοι καὶ αἱ περιοικοῦσαι πόλεις τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποβαλοῦσαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ὑπὸ τὴν Πτολεμαϊκὴν βασιλείαν ἐτάχθησαν.
>
> But, once Ophellas had defeated Thibron and captured him and also taken possession of the *poleis*, he transferred the *poleis* and the territory to Ptolemy the King. Thus the Cyrenaeans and neighbouring *poleis* lost their *eleutheria* and were placed under the Ptolemaic kingdom.
>
> Diod.Sic.18.21.9

The anachronistic references to Ptolemy's kingship and kingdom show this is a teleological account, and might be slightly overemphasising the extent of Ptolemy's control at this stage. But the city was definitely part of his zone. Probably at this time, Ptolemy imposed a constitution on Cyrene, which is epigraphically preserved. It reserves one of the community's six *strategiai* for himself forever and allows certain convicts to appeal to him directly, indicating an intention to maintain control permanently.[1234] This control was accepted at Triparadeisos, when Ptolemy was granted possession of Cyrene, neighbouring Libyan territories and whatever else he might conquer to the west.[1235] A rebellion in 313 had seen the Ptolemaic garrison, which was presumably commanded by Ophellas, besieged by Cyrenaican rebels, but control was restored by troops and ships sent from

[1233] *Marm.Par.*111; Arr.*HSA.*1.16-19.
[1234] *SEG* 9.1.27 & 41 (= Austin (2006) 29); Larsen (1929) 358.
[1235] Arr.*HSA.*1.34.

Alexandria.[1236] The outcome of this rebellion had affirmed Ptolemaic overlordship and Ophellas' dependence on that overlordship only a few years before his march west.

However, when describing the arrival of Agathokles' envoys, the sources are ambiguous about Ophellas' status: the *Souda* calls him a *dynastes*; Justin calls him *rex*; Diodoros says he was "in control of the cities around Cyrene and of a solid force" and emphasises his status as a friend of Alexander the Great, though he may expect the reader to recall his account of Ophellas' installation two books earlier.[1237] None of them mention Ptolemy or any contribution on his part to the expedition. In particular, the absence of ships is notable. Diodoros' reports of the terrible march across the Syrtis are probably exaggerated, but surely it would have been easier to go by boat. Subsequently, the inability to blockade Carthage by sea was a major cause of the African Expedition's failure.[1238] Ptolemy's absence is probably attributable to his invasion of the Aegean which he launched in 309/08. Over the course of the summer, he personally conquered most of southwestern Anatolia from Antigonid forces. He wintered at Kos, where he made an attempt to marry Alexander's sister Kleopatra.[1239] Agathokles' envoy must have arrived at Cyrene as Ptolemy was organising this expedition, possibly even after Ptolemy had left. Ophellas' message will have reached Athens sometime after that and found Kassandros' protégé, Demetrios of Phaleron, still in charge of it. The Athenians surely would not have sent troops off to Africa if there was a threat to the city close to home, which there was, when Ptolemy invaded mainland Greece in order to remove Kassandros in 308/07. Ptolemy seized Corinth in time to celebrate the Isthmian Games in

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[1236] Diod.Sic.19.79.1-3; Arr.*HSA*.1.19.

[1237] Diod.Sic.20.40.1: κυριεύων δὲ τῶν περὶ Κυρήνην πόλεων; Just.*Epit.*22.7.4: *Cyrenarum rex*; *Suda* Δ431: τοῦ Κυρηναίου δυνάστου. It is tempting to connect κυριεύων with the legal role of the *kyrios* and see Diodoros' phrasing as implying control exercised on behalf of another, but this is not attested and mischaracterises the *kyrios* as a "trustee" rather than a "man with authority": Just (1991) 26-7.

[1238] Discussed at p.225.

[1239] *Marm.Par.*120; Diod.Sic.20.27. Ptolemy II was born on Kos during this expedition; if the birthday celebrations on 12 Dystros 268/67 in *SEG* 27.1114 are for his actual birthday, then Ptolemy I had secured Kos by February 308. Carney (1988) 403; Lane Fox (2015) 183.

May 307. There he announced plans for a massive expedition to free the Greeks, but subsequently he abandoned this venture and returned home when the Peloponnesians failed to provide the troops and supplies they had promised, which must have taken at least a month to become apparent.[1240] By this time Ophellas was dead, as is confirmed by the *Souda*'s statement that after this:

> Λιβύης πάσης ἐκράτησεν, Ὀφέλλα τοῦ Κυρηναίου δυνάστου πρὸς Ἀγαθοκλέους κατὰ Σικελίαν ἀναιρεθέντος δόλῳ…
>
> He conquered all Libya, since Ophellas the *dynastes* of Kyrene had been killed by Agathokles near Sicily by a trick…
>
> *Suda* Δ431

It is thus likely that Ptolemy's absence from the negotiations and failure to contribute forces to the expedition is explained by the fact that he was busy in the Aegean throughout the period.

As already stated, Ptolemy could not allow Cyrenaica to drift out of his orbit. The response to the rebellion of 313 demonstrates Ptolemy's ability and willingness to reconquer the region if ever he felt it necessary. It seems unlikely therefore that Ophellas could have broken with Ptolemy before the invasion of the Aegean. On the contrary, Ptolemy's decision to lead that expedition personally and to winter in the Aegean implies that he felt that Egypt was secure. Will and Lane Fox have argued that the decision to march west was itself the act of rebellion, taken while Ptolemy was absent in the Aegean; Will argues that Ptolemy's sudden attack on Greece in 308/07 was intended to stop Ophellas' recruitment for the expedition. But by the time Ptolemy attacked, it was clearly too late for that, since Ophellas already had a force; an attack on Cyrene itself would be more logical.[1241] Moreover, Ophellas' main source of troops was Athens, while Ptolemy's campaign

[1240] Diod.Sic.20.37.1-2; *Suda* Δ431.
[1241] Will (1964); Will (1979-82) 69; Horat Zuffa (1971) 108-9.

focussed on Corinth and the northern Peloponnese. Lane Fox argues that Ptolemy's sudden abandonment of the same attack on Greece was inspired by news that Ophellas had "defected."[1242] But the response to the rebellion of 313 shows that Ptolemy had no need to intervene personally in Cyrenaica in order to restore control and Diodoros provides a rational reason for his departure in terms of the situation in Greece: the lukewarm response of the Greeks to Ptolemy's Isthmian proclamation. On either reconstruction, it is difficult to believe that Ptolemy could have remained in the dark about Ophellas' recruitment of troops and economic preparations (which included the production of a large amount of gold coinage).[1243] It is hard to read Ptolemy's behaviour as indicating that he perceived Ophellas as being in rebellion.

On the other hand, Ophellas' western expedition accords with Ptolemy's western policy. The Triparadeisos settlement granted Ptolemy the right to whatever he could conquer in the west of Egypt – a clause presumably inserted at his insistence. Strabo says that the western border of Cyrenaica under Ptolemy was Euphrantas Pyrgos (west of the earlier and later border at the Altar of the Philenoi).[1244] Huß has suggested this indicates western expansion under Ptolemy, undertaken in order to capture control of the Mediterranean termini of the Saharan gold and gemstone routes.[1245] He is almost certainly wrong to believe that these trans-Saharan routes existed in this period, and the most that can be said for an economic justification for western expansion is that shutting down the Carthaginian port at Charax, which was used for smuggling *silphium* out of Cyrene, and thus taking full control of the *silphium* trade might have been worthwhile.[1246] So the

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[1242] Consolo Langher (1998b); Lane Fox (2015) 185.
[1243] Günther (2011) 92; gold coinage: Robinson (1927) lxxv-vi; Mørkholm (1980) 150-1; Laronde (1987) 356. This coinage includes reverses with the *silphium* and the Carthaginian palm standing alongside one another; Ophellas was not expecting to lose control of Cyrene, which suggests he was not in rebellion.
[1244] Strabo 17.3.20
[1245] Huß (1979) 128, (1985) 171-3, (2001) 102-4.
[1246] MacDonald (2011)'s survey of Sub-Saharan archaeological evidence decisively demonstrates that trans-Saharan trade routes did not exist until the late third century AD. Huß's evidence is extrapolated from hints in literary sources, mostly Roman. Charax: Strabo 17.3.20.

west was more significant to Ptolemy as a threat than as an opportunity. As discussed in chapter six, Carthage had long contested the Cyrenaican border and in the period immediately before the Ptolemaic takeover, their forces had actively aided the Cyrenaican oligarchs against Thibron.[1247] Since the Cyrenaican elite repeatedly showed itself to be unhappy with Ptolemaic rule, these connections to Carthage were a threat to the stability of Ptolemy's western border. Ophellas' march west would disrupt Carthaginian power and prevent them from intervening in Cyrenaica. That contributed to Ptolemy's overall grand strategy: the creation and maintenance of an unassailable Fortress Egypt.[1248] The apparent success of that grand strategy was what had enabled Ptolemy to take the uncharacteristically aggressive step of invading the Aegean in 309/08 in the first place and one factor in that was that Agathokles' invasion of Africa made Carthaginian intervention in Cyrene impossible. Thus Ptolemy had a general interest in sustaining Agathokles' invasion, which was particularly acute at the time of the Ophellas affair because of his Aegean campaign.

Finally, it was a consistent feature of Ptolemy's foreign policy to send high-ranking subordinates off into enemy territory and leave them to their fate. In 312/11 he sent his admiral Seleukos off in the direction of Babylon with two hundred horsemen and eight hundred foot soldiers.[1249] By 309, it was already clear that that had been a tremendous success. Around 297, he similarly returned Pyrrhos to Epirus, with such meagre forces that Pyrrhos was unable to actually dethrone his cousin Neoptolemos II.[1250] This approach enabled military intervention in places where Ptolemy could not afford to intervene himself but which might prove threatening if left unchecked. It also allowed Ptolemy to transform dangerously prestigious associates into distant, indebted allies. Both

[1247] See pp.222-3.
[1248] See n.1260 and compare the analysis of Agathokles' behaviour in Italy, discussed in chapter 7.6, and the kings of Macedon, below, p.302.
[1249] Diod.Sic.19.90.1.
[1250] Plut.*Pyrrh.*5.1.

Seleukos and Pyrrhos had connections to Alexander which gave them a claim to power independent of and comparable to Ptolemy's own claim: Seleukos had been commander of the Hypaspists; Pyrrhos was Alexander's cousin.[1251] Ophellas did not rank as highly as either of these, but he had been a friend of Alexander's and had held a trierarchy during the Indian campaign.[1252] He was a more homeopathic version of the same dangerous mixture of distinction and ambition. So Ptolemy let him depart on a venture which accorded with his grand strategy. Having set off, he was on his own. He was not intending or intended to retain his position at Cyrene, but to establish a capital of his own in the Carthaginian territory. This is made clear by the colonial nature of his expedition and probably by the references to him desiring a kingdom of his own.[1253] Had he succeeded, Ptolemy would probably have expected the same good relations and deference that he subsequently desired from Seleukos with respect to Syria.[1254] This reconstruction explains the sources' insistence on treating Ophellas as a free agent, while avoiding the problems that arise from positing that Ophellas had rebelled.

This model also makes it easier to understand the close ties between Agathokles and Ptolemy which existed subsequently. Had Ophellas been in rebellion, it is hard to believe that Ptolemy would have soon forgiven Agathokles' collaboration with him. From Agathokles' point of view, reaching out to a rebellious Ptolemaic governor would have brought himself into conflict with Ptolemy. Even granting the fact that Agathokles was desperate, this would be difficult to understand, since of all the Diadochoi Ptolemy was at this time the most able to intervene in Agathokles' affairs. At this particular moment, Ptolemy was busy in the Aegean, but that really meant that he had an unusually large force active outside Egypt. Agathokles would have been making a powerful enemy and he

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[1251] Seleukos: Arr.*Anab.*5.13.1 with Heckel (2006) 246-7; Pyrrhos: Diod.Sic.16.72.1; Plut.*Pyrrh.*1; Just.*Epit.*17.3 (incorrectly making him a first cousin); Paus.1.11.4-7. Bosworth (2002) 212-5.
[1252] Diod.Sic.20.40.1; Arr.*Ind.*18.3.
[1253] Diod.Sic.20.40.5-41.1; Just.*Epit.*22.7.4; Günther (2011) 92.
[1254] Grainger (2010) 51.

had too many powerful enemies already. He would also have been losing a powerful ally, since, as we have seen, Ptolemy already had hostile relations with the Carthaginians. This was not true of any of the other Diadochoi. In terms of wider Diadoch politics, making an enemy of Ptolemy would have aligned Agathokles with Antigonos, which seems a poor deal, because Antigonos was too far away to be helpful. There is no evidence for any relationship between him and Agathokles. But there was no enmity, for Agathokles emerged from the Carthaginian War as a close ally of Ptolemy. This demonstrates the degree to which Agathokles was useful for Ptolemy's grand strategy, as I will discuss in the next section, but it also affirms the looseness of the relationship between Ophellas and Ptolemy. Had Ophellas been serving as a Ptolemaic general, as part of a wider western war effort, it seems unlikely that Ptolemy would have been so quick to forgive his murder. Had Ptolemy had a serious interest in western expansion, he could have made use of Ophellas' murder to justify further intervention, in the same way that he and his successors employed the agreement made before the Battle of Ipsos to justify generations of conflict over Koile Syria.[1255] After Ptolemy captured Corinth in May 307, he could have sponsored another Corinthian expedition to Sicily, like those of Timoleon and Akestorides, discussed earlier in this chapter. He chose not to. If instead we presume, as I have argued here, that Ptolemy's goals in the Ophellas affair were simply the elimination of a powerful and prestigious subordinate and the prevention of the Carthaginians from threatening his territories, then Ptolemy had accomplished his goals regardless of whether Ophellas lived or died. As for Agathokles, his situation was too desperate in 308/07 for him to pass up further Ptolemaic support, if it was forthcoming. He must have been confident that no more help was coming from Egypt regardless of whether Ophellas lived or died.

[1255] Grainger (2010) 51.

Although the encounter with Ophellas does not represent a first encounter with Ptolemy, it demonstrated to Agathokles the viability of seeking Diadoch aid against Carthage. In subsequent years, he developed a relationship with Ptolemy, from which he would eventually benefit more than Ophellas ever had.

8.2.2. Theoxena and Ptolemy

In Justin's account of Agathokles' death, mingled with the *pathos* of his illness and his fear for the future of his kingdom and his family in the face of his grandson's rebellion, an unexpected wife appears:

> *… desperatis rebus uxorem suam Theoxenam genitosque ex ea duos parvulos cum omni pecunia et familia regalique instrumento, quo praeter illum nemo regum ditior fuit, navibus inpositos Aegyptum, unde uxorem acceperat, remittit…*
>
> … since things had become hopeless, [Agathokles] put his wife Theoxena and his offspring by her – two small children – on board ships, with all his money, domestic property and regalia, in which he was richer than any king before him, and sent them back to Egypt, whence he had got his wife…
>
> Just.*Epit.*23.2.6

Epigraphic evidence confirms the existence of Theoxena and her children, whose descendants held high positions in Egypt for generations, probably culminating with Ptolemy V's mistress Agathokleia and his regent Agathokles.[1256] There is no explicit evidence for Theoxena's parentage, but she is usually believed to be a step-daughter of Ptolemy's second queen, Berenike, by her first husband, an undistinguished Macedonian called Philippos. This would make Theoxena a full sister of Magas,

[1256] *IG* XIV.727; *P.Oxy*.37.2821; Polyb.14.11, 15.24-34; Walbank (1957-1979) 2.438; Moretti (1965) 173-9; Bagnall (1976) 195. Bennett (2000-11) with exhaustive bibliography, is an invaluable source for Ptolemaic genealogy and chronology.

Ophellas' successor as governor of Cyrene, and of Antigone, who married Pyrrhos. Some think she was a full daughter of Ptolemy and Eurydike.[1257] Either parentage would make her an Antipatrid on her mother's side.[1258] The possibility that she was a daughter of one of Ptolemy's other wives, Thais and Artakama, or a concubine cannot be ruled out. Since Agathokles had a wife, Alkia, during the African campaign and since Justin refers to Theoxena's children as *parvuli*, the marriage cannot have taken place long before Agathokles' death. Most of the Diadochoi's dynastic marriages took place after the Battle of Ipsos and the marriage is often dated to the same time as Pyrrhos' marriage to either Antigone or Agathokles' daughter Lanassa, but with the sparse evidence available nothing more can be said than that the marriage probably took place between c.300 and c.295.[1259]

Regardless of the exact details of who the bride was and when the wedding took place, the marriage represents a close association between Agathokles and Ptolemy. Both benefitted directly from such an association. Ptolemy ensured that he had a strong ally to keep the Carthaginians from disrupting his Mediterranean activities.[1260] This allowed him to focus his attention on the brewing conflict with Seleukos, which was the greatest threat to Ptolemy's kingdom after the Battle of Ipsos.[1261] There were a number of benefits for Agathokles. He could expect support from Ptolemy against the Carthaginians and against anyone who might seek to cross the Adriatic from mainland

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[1257] Bennett (2000-11) *sv*.Theoxena, with full bibliography. The argument for Berenike rests on four slightly unsteady supports: (1) our sources probably would have mentioned it explicitly if Theoxena was a full child of Ptolemy, (2) five or six children of Ptolemy and Eurydike born in the early 320s are explicitly attested, making it difficult to fit Theoxena in, (3) that the other two Ptolemaic scions sent to the west were children of Philip and Berenike (Magas and Antigone) so it would be tidy if Theoxena was a child of Magas too, (4) Plut.*Pyrrh.*4.7 states that Pyrrhos λαβεῖν Ἀντιγόνην γυναῖκα τῶν Βερενίκης θυγατέρων, ἣν ἔσχεν ἐκ Φιλίππου πρὶν ἢ Πτολεμαίῳ συνοικεῖν; if Theoxena was not a daughter of Berenike and Philip then Antigone's sister is not known.

[1258] Schol.Theoc.*Id.*17.61; Paus.1.6.8.

[1259] Alkia: Diod.Sic.20.33.5; Ipsos as a nuptial watershed: Cohen (1974). c.300 BC: Meister (1984) 408; Bennett (2000-11) *sv*.Theoxena n.2. 297 BC: Landucci Gattinoni (1999) 127; 304-300 BC: Consolo Langher (2000) 301. Dynastic marriages are often the result of long negotiations and conflicting biological and diplomatic imperatives can lead to long engagements, so the wedding date is probably not overly important.

[1260] Berve (1953) 67; Will (1964) 325-7 n.3; Huß (1985) 174, (2001) 203; Günther (2011) 106-9.

[1261] Ellis (1994) 47-9; Grainger (2010) 41.

Greece, such as Kassandros, whose attack on Korkyra is discussed elsewhere.[1262] It seems unlikely that Ptolemy could be expected to commit a large number of troops to the far west and Agathokles' response to the arrival of Ophellas suggests that he was not too keen to have a Ptolemaic army in his midst, so Ptolemy's support was probably primarily financial. He may have contributed to the enormous navy of two hundred triremes and hexaremes which Agathokles had built up by the time of his death.[1263] By the 270s, a Ptolemaic mint was active in Sicily, bankrolling Hieron II's rise to power.[1264] That intensity of economic involvement in Sicilian affairs is unlikely to have come from nowhere; perhaps it has its origins in Agathokles' time.

For both Agathokles and Ptolemy, however, the marriage and alliance also had value because it linked them in to wider networks. This is particularly clear in the case of Ptolemy, who had made a number of marriage alliances in the period after Ipsos. I have already mentioned that he married his step-daughter Antigone, who was probably Theoxena's full sister, to Pyrrhos in the early 290s.[1265] Ptolemy also engaged his daughter by Eurydike, Ptolemais, to Demetrios Poliorketes soon after the Battle of Ipsos; Eurydike's other daughter, Lysandra, was married to Kassandros' son Alexander after he had become king in opposition to his brother (c. 296).[1266] Ptolemy's daughter by Berenike, Arsinoe, who was Ptolemy II's future queen and probably Theoxena's half-sister, was married to Lysimachos of Thrace in this same period.[1267] One gets the impression of an arachnid Ptolemy spinning a web of alliances across the Mediterranean to entrap Seleukos and the Antipatrids, who are notably absent from his marriage ties. In this light, the marriage to Agathokles, like that to Pyrrhos, forms part of the system, flanking Macedon from the west.[1268] Alongside the

[1262] See pp.246-7., 302-4.
[1263] Diod.Sic.21.16.1.
[1264] See n.426.
[1265] Plut.*Pyrrh.*4.4-5.1.
[1266] Ptolemais: Plut.*Demetr.*32.6 & 46.5-6; Lysandra: Euseb.*Chron.*231.
[1267] Just.*Epit.*24.3.1-5.
[1268] Günther (2011) 106-9.

military implications of Ptolemy's web there are ideological ones. All of the marriages put Ptolemy in the superior position of father-in-law.[1269] They thus represent part of a claim to pre-eminence throughout the Mediterranean. From this perspective, Agathokles' distance from Egypt gave the marriage significance as a demonstration of the extent of Ptolemy's influence. Membership in this network was valuable for Agathokles too. It created a link between himself and Pyrrhos, who was relevant to Agathokles' activities in Italy, as we will see in the next section. The importance of this link is shown by the fact that he reinforced it after Antigone's death by marrying Lanassa to Pyrrhos.[1270] More intangibly, but equally importantly, the marriage reinforced his position as a member of the royal club of the Diadochoi. As I argue elsewhere in the thesis, this was a status which Agathokles sought to assert in a number of ways, including his assumption of the royal title.[1271] The marriage also reflects the increasingly settled nature of the Hellenistic state system in this period – up till this point, a marriage alliance with a Diadoch would have required Agathokles to commit solidly to one side of the succession conflict.[1272] After the Battle of Ipsos, committing to Ptolemy was apparently less of a risk.

8.2.3. Korkyra, Epirus, and Macedon

The final set of relationships that I intend to discuss in this chapter are the relations between Agathokles, Kassandros, Pyrrhos, and Demetrios. These relationships revolved around the island of Korkyra and thus represent a meeting point between Agathokles' concerns in the Adriatic, in Mainland Greece and in the new Hellenistic state system. So it is fitting that they be discussed last. The chronology of these events has already been discussed at length in chapter 7.3.[1273] Here I put

[1269] cf.Plut.*Pyrrh.*6.7. Ptolemy's own fathers-in-law were Artabazos the son of Artaxerxes III, the otherwise unknown Magas and Antipatros who were probably all dead.
[1270] See p.304.
[1271] See chapter 4.1.
[1272] An additional factor, rarely acknowledged, is completely contingent: few of the Diadochoi had children of marriageable age until c.300.
[1273] See p.246.

these events into their wider context, in which Agathokles' desire to safeguard the route across the Adriatic and flex his muscles drew him deep into Diadoch politics, playing a role in the establishment of Pyrrhos in Epirus and the downfall of Demetrios Poliorketes in Macedon.

In chapter 7.3 I discussed how Kassandros tried to conquer the island and Agathokles came to the rescue between the Battle of Ipsos and May 297.[1274] I reserved discussion of the event's place in the context of the Diadochoi until now. Kassandros' attack on Korkyra can be understood as part of his efforts to control Epirus and north-western Greece, which had begun when King Aiakides chose to support Polyperchon against him in 319/18 and was made more urgent by the Aitolians' support for Polyperchon from 310/09.[1275] By maintaining firm control of this area, Kassandros resumed the Argead kings' efforts to control the approaches to Macedon itself from all directions, and especially the close relations with the Epirote royal family which Philip II had established by his marriage to Olympias.[1276] The continuity of approach is shown by the fact that Kassandros' favoured candidate for the Epirote kingship was Neoptolemos II, the last scion of Olympias' branch of the family.[1277] Korkyra actively challenged Kassandros' control of Epirus and north-western Greece, removing his garrisons from Apollonia and Leukas in 312/11 and supporting Glaukias of Illyria's interventions in Epirus on behalf of his own candidates for the Epirote throne, Aiakides and then Pyrrhos.[1278] Either the appearance or the fall of Kleonymos may have further motivated Kassandros' attack on Korkyra.[1279] Beyond these immediate concerns, Kassandros may have nurtured Transadriatic ambitions too. Agathokles' reasons for intervening in Korkyra have already been covered in the previous chapter and can be linked to his desire to control movement along the

[1274] Diod.Sic.21.2.
[1275] Diod.Sic.19.67, 20.20.4.
[1276] Raynor (2016) 160.
[1277] Diod.Sic.19.74.3-6; Paus.1.11.4.
[1278] Diod.Sic.19.78.1, 19.89.3; cf.the conflict between Korkyra and Corinth for control of the same area at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War: Thuc.1.24-30; and Pyrrhos: Paus.1.11.6.
[1279] Diod.Sic.20.105.1; Polyaen.8.19; Marasco (1984a) 45.

route from Greece to Sicily, especially in light of Agathokles' poor relations with Taras and Kleonymos' activities in Italy.[1280] In his description of the battle between Agathokles and Kassandros, Diodoros suggests another motivation:

> οἱ δὲ Σικελιῶται βουλόμενοι μὴ μόνον Καρχηδονίων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν βαρβάρων περιγενέσθαι δοκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα θεωρηθῆναι κρείττους ὄντες Μακεδόνων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην πεποιημένων δορίκτητον.
>
> … but the Sicilians wanted not only to be considered to have overcome the Carthaginians and the barbarians in Italy, but also to be witnessed in Greece, as stronger than the Macedonians, who had won Asia and Europe with their spears.
>
> Diod.Sic.21.2.2

This passage needs to be used with caution, since it imputes a mental state and reflects the desire of Diodoros and his predecessors to emphasise the historical importance of Greek Sicily, as discussed in chapters one and two. It sets up a coda (partially lost), in which Agathokles' caution allows the Macedonians to slip through his fingers, which could be connected to the negative tradition's efforts to downplay Agathokles' achievements and to Diodoros' interest in paradoxical reversals.[1281] Nevertheless, the desire to match or exceed the Macedonians in Greece should not be rejected as a contributing factor in Agathokles' intervention in Korkyra. I have mentioned already the importance to Agathokles of demonstrating parity with the Diadochoi. The appeal of the Korkyrans gave Agathokles the opportunity to engage in the same sort of posturing. This ideological element is not independent of the strategic aspects stressed above. Agathokles' intervention was a major benefaction, the gift of freedom and salvation, which served to

[1280] See chapter 7.2, 7.6; Marasco (1984b) 105-10.
[1281] Diod.Sic.21.2.3.

demonstrate Agathokles' status, but it also created an unequal relationship between himself and the Korkyrans, which indebted them to Agathokles as long as he did not let the relationship lapse.[1282] This meeting of strategy and ideology made the intervention attractive to Agathokles, but it also committed him to maintain his interest in Korkyra in the years that followed.

The next interaction known to us came in 295, when Pyrrhos married Agathokles' daughter, who adopted the Molossian mythic name, Lanassa.[1283] Plutarch reports that she brought Korkyra with her as a dowry, while Pausanias claims that Pyrrhos' first military expedition immediately after his accession was the conquest of the island with the help of the Tarantines.[1284] This has caused a great deal of confusion. Bearzot proposes that Pausanias is correct and that the marriage of Lanassa represented Agathokles' support for Pyrrhos' conquest of the island (whether before or after the fact).[1285] The dowry does not need to be understood as indicating that Agathokles held Korkyra as a fief before this and was a possession of Pyrrhos thereafter, it should be understood in terms of the relationship of debt just discussed. In Greek marriages, the dowry was administered by the husband, but remained the property of the bride's family, which they could resume if the marriage failed to fulfil its purpose. [1286] Thus Pyrrhos could appeal to the Korkyrans' debt to Agathokles to get them to do what he wanted, while Agathokles retained his own claim to the island – as subsequent events were to show. Like the marriage to Theoxena, the marriage also allowed

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[1282] Xen.*Hier*.7.9; Ober (1989) 226-30; Bringmann (1993), (2001); Mitchell (1998) 148-66; Ma (1999) 180-93.
[1283] Diod.Sic.21.4, 22.8.2; App.*Samn*.11.1; Plut.*Pyrrh.*9.1; Lanassa was the name of the wife of Neoptolemos the son of Achilles: Plut.*Pyrrh.*1.2. Cross (1932) 102 argues the opposite: that the wife of Neoptolemos was named after Pyrrhos' queen; I find this unlikely.
[1284] Plut.*Pyrrh.*9.1; Paus.1.11.6, 1.12.1. His second conquest in Pausanias' account is Macedon in 288/87.
[1285] Bearzot (1994) 257-8. Landucci Gattinono (1999) 116-20 puts forward an alternative: that Pausanias is mistaken, arguing that Just.*Epit.*25.4.2, which mentions that Ptolemy son of Pyrrhos once captured Korkyra with 60 men, proves that Pausanias has misdated a later conquest, since Ptolemy was born in 295/94. But Pyrrhos might well have captured Korkyra more than once. Paus.1.12.1 reports that the Tarantines justified their request for Pyrrhos' assistance against the Romans by the assistance they had provided to him in his war with Korkyra. Pausanias had read Pyrrhos' memoirs, so it would be surprising if he were mistaken about this: Paus.1.12.2.
[1286] Just (1991) 70-5. Cf. Pyrrhos' later use of family law to claim Sicily as his son's maternal inheritance: Just.*Epit.*23.3.1-3.

Agathokles to assert his status as a peer of the Diadochoi. Further, the wedding procession, which travelled by ship all the way along the south Italian coast, sent a clear message about Agathokles' power to all the communities along the route to Epirus – even before he used it to conquer Kroton.[1287] Like Agathokles, Pyrrhos was eager to emphasise his membership of the royal club, since his state was a small one and he had seized control of it in the face of significant internal opposition. Further, his branch of the Epirote royal family was not as closely associated with the Argeads as the branch that he had displaced when he reclaimed the throne.[1288] Thus, the marriage to Lanassa was valuable to Pyrrhos, too, to demonstrate his membership of the royal club, alongside actions which emphasised his dynastic link to Ptolemy and his descent from Achilles.[1289] An agreement on the status of Korkyra was essential to both parties for the strategic reasons already discussed. The marriage prevented these conflicting goals from leading to actual conflict. Agathokles gained an ally who would protect the passage across the Adriatic and was on friendlier terms with the Tarantines than himself, and prevented further Antipatrid pushes towards the Adriatic. Pyrrhos gained an ally with significant naval power, which freed him to pursue his wars in Macedon without worrying about an attack from the sea. A final point is the impact of the marriage on Ptolemy. The marriage can be considered from the point of view of Ptolemy's web,[1290] tying Pyrrhos more closely into his network in the aftermath of his daughter Antigone's death, but this grants Ptolemy an extraordinary amount of control over Agathokles' domestic affairs. Conversely, the relationship can be analysed as a slight move away from Ptolemy, who no longer brokered the relationship between Pyrrhos and Agathokles. The fact that the marriage can be explained in terms of the bilateral

[1287] See p.248.
[1288] Neoptolemos II, whom Pyrrhos had recently murdered, was the son of Olympias' brother Alexander and her daughter by Philip, Kleopatra: Garoufalias (1979) 188.
[1289] Plut.*Pyrrh.*4.4: marriage to Antigone. Plut.*Pyrrh.*6.1: foundation of Berenikis named after Antigone's mother, first-born son named Ptolemy. On links to Achilles, see n.1283 on Lanassa; Plut.*Pyrrh.*9 on Pyrrhos' third son Helenos.
[1290] Bearzot (1994) 257-8; Consolo Langher (1998a) 159;

relationship between Agathokles and Pyrrhos, suggests this was more important than the Ptolemaic connection.

Pyrrhos soon clashed with his former comrade and brother-in-law, Demetrios, over the collapsing Antigonid realm, invading Macedon in 290/89 BC.[1291] Demetrios had been sick, but recovered and quickly drove Pyrrhos out, made an agreement with Pyrrhos, and began plans to invade Asia. Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Seleukos resolved to pre-empt the invasion of Asia by attacking him. Pyrrhos was persuaded to join them in a renewed assault on Macedon and it was largely because of Pyrrhos' attack, which Demetrios had not anticipated, that Demetrios was expelled from Macedon in 288/87.[1292] According to Plutarch, Pyrrhos was persuaded to join the coalition by the fact that he had recently (ἔναγχος) lost Korkyra. He goes on to explain:

> ἡ γὰρ Λάνασσα μεμψαμένη τὸν Πύρρον ὡς μᾶλλον προσέχοντα ταῖς βαρβάροις γυναιξίν, εἰς Κέρκυραν ἀπεχώρησε, καὶ δεομένη γάμων βασιλικῶν ἐκάλει Δημήτριον, ἐπισταμένη μάλιστα τῶν βασιλέων εὐκόλως ἔχοντα πρὸς γάμους γυναικῶν. ἐκεῖνος δὲ πλεύσας τῇ τε Λανάσσῃ συνῆλθε καὶ φρουρὰν ἐν τῇ πόλει κατέλιπε.
>
> Since Lanassa was offended that Pyrrhos paid more attention to his barbarian wives, she ran off to Korkyra and, in need of a royal marriage, she summoned Demetrios, since she knew that, of all the kings, he was especially willing to take women in marriage. Then he sailed over, met Lanassa, and left a garrison in the *polis*.
>
> Plut.*Pyrr.*10.7

[1291] Plut.*Pyrrh.*10.1-3, *Demetr.*43.1. Dated by the fact that it followed the Pythian Games of 290/89; see n.1059. Hammond & Walbank (1972) 210-24; Bosworth (2002) 252-3.
[1292] See n.1061.

Plutarch thus makes Lanassa the prime mover of events. Some scholars have found this unlikely,[1293] but female court politics often caused shifts in power during the Hellenistic period, especially when there were multiple male heirs by different mothers, as was the case in the Epirote court.[1294] Agathokles was in the process of planning an expedition against Carthage;[1295] he had no interest in disrupting the existing relationship with Pyrrhos. If Lanassa had been acting on instructions from her father or Demetrios, it is hard to see how these instructions would have been delivered to her without endangering her life. She probably acted on her own initiative and the exchange of envoys between Demetrios and Agathokles immediately before the latter's death, which is discussed below, followed.[1296] I argued in chapter seven that the transfer took place shortly before the Eleusinian Mysteries of 290/89, immediately after Demetrios recovered from his illness and drove Pyrrhos out of Macedon. I reserved discussion of the wider political context that follows from this date until now.[1297] This context explains why Demetrios accepted Lanassa's offer, why Pyrrhos accepted the peace agreement so readily, and why Demetrios had such faith in that agreement that he felt able to invade Asia. By gaining control of Korkyra, Demetrios had outflanked Pyrrhos and forced him to submit. At any later date, the acquisition of Korkyra would have been a provocation to Pyrrhos and a distraction from his planned invasion of Asia and therefore difficult to explain. The famous ithyphallic hymn was sung at Athens on Demetrios' return from Korkyra. Its opening invocation of Demeter refers to Lanassa's Sicilian roots, just as a later mention of the stars refers to Demetrios' *philoi*.[1298] The Athenians rightly noted her importance. Her use of the concept

[1293] Marasco (1984b); Landucci Gattinono (1999) 126; Funke (2000) 210;
[1294] Carney (1988); Ogden (1999). Pyrrhos had three sons: Ptolemy by the deceased Antigone, Alexander by Lanassa, and Helenos by Birkenna, and a daughter, Olympias. Any of these could be viable heirs; Plut.*Pyrrh.*9 has Pyrrhos tell his children that his successor will be the one with the sharpest knife.
[1295] Diod.Sic.21.16.1.
[1296] Dreyer (1999) 132.
[1297] See n.1061.
[1298] Ath.6.62-63=Democharis FGrH 75 F2, Douris FGrH 76 F13; Scott (1928) 232; Habicht (1997) 92; Thonemann (2005) 85; *contra* Marcovich (1988) 9-11.

of the dowry to transfer the ownership of the relationship between the Korkyrans and Agathokles had allowed the sudden, bloodless transfer of Korkyra from Pyrrhos to Demetrios.

Shortly before Agathokles' death, while Demetrios was still in charge of Macedon and (on my argument) following his acquisition of Korkyra and marriage to Lanassa, Agathokles sent his young son, Agathokles II, to Demetrios as an envoy "to establish friendship and alliance."[1299] Diodoros' phrasing implies that no such relations existed hitherto. The transfer of Korkyra and Lanassa to Demetrios was probably the reason Agathokles established these links. From his perspective, the key benefit of a link to Pyrrhos – the knowledge that Korkyra was in friendly hands – now lay in a link with Demetrios. Since 303/02, Demetrios had also controlled Corinth, whose ideological importance to Agathokles, as Syracuse's metropolis was discussed earlier in the chapter.[1300] Demetrios received his new brother-in-law Agathokles II munificently, gifting him a royal robe and sending his *philos* Oxythemis to Syracuse ostensibly as a hostage, but, according to Diodoros, actually as a spy.[1301] This reception is not localised by Diodoros; on my reconstruction of events above it might have taken place in Athens while Demetrios was enjoying the ithyphallic hymn and celebrating the Eleusinian mysteries there. Oxythemis was still in Sicily shortly after this when the succession conflict erupted between Agathokles' heirs and Agathokles died.

[1299] Diod.Sic.21.1: φιλίαν συνθέσθαι καὶ συμμαχίαν... Diodoros' phrasing contradicts Landucci Gattinoni (1999)'s argument that the friendship between Demetrios and Agathokles was of long standing, perhaps dating back to c.302 (!) and that Agathokles' friendship with Pyrrhos had only ever been a function of the friendship with Demetrios. There is no convincing evidence *for* Landucci Gattinoni's thesis: she points to Agathokles' inclusion in the royal toast of Demetrios reported by Phylarchos (Phylarchos FGrH 81 F 31=Athen. 6.78; Plut.*Demetr.*25), but this episode need not have actually occurred and implies the opposite of friendship, and the fact that Athens imported Sicilian grain in *IG* II^2 499 (302/01), but Athens always imported Sicilian grain. If Demetrios had really been Agathokles' best friend in Greece from an early date, it is surprising that he did not marry Lanassa to Demetrios in the first place.

[1300] See chapter 8.1.1.

[1301] cf.Kassandros in Antigonos' army; Diod.Sic.18.39.7.

As with the interactions discussed earlier in this chapter, the treaty with Demetrios had both strategic and ideological motivations for both parties. In strategic terms, the key factor for Agathokles was once again Korkyra. I have already discussed why this was of strategic importance for Agathokles, but the alternative to recognising the transfer would have been armed intervention, and that would have been a distraction from the expedition against Carthage that Agathokles was then planning.[1302] For Demetrios too, the strategic advantage of the alliance was the fact that Agathokles justified the control of Korkyra and offered a further control on Pyrrhos and the mainland Greeks and perhaps also the prospect of material support, such as grain.[1303] Diodoros suggests another motivation when he says that Demetrios used the alliance and the dispatch of Oxythemis to scout out Sicily, implicitly in preparation for a future conquest.[1304] But this cannot be given much credence, given that Demetrios was preparing to invade Asia at the time. As we have seen, this alliance between Agathokles and Demetrios was made shortly before a coalition of all the Diadochoi united against Demetrios and it was already clear that they were hostile to Demetrios when Agathokles concluded the alliance with him. Meister therefore thought that this alliance represented a major shift in Agathokles' relationship to Ptolemy.[1305] But there is no sign that this was actually the case: the presence of Theoxena in Syracuse at his death and her safe return to Egypt suggests the opposite, while Agathokles' planned attack on Carthage could not possibly have benefited from splitting with Egypt.[1306] The implication of a split arises from viewing the agreement too exclusively from an eastern Mediterranean perspective. For Agathokles, it probably was not a foregone conclusion that Ptolemy and Demetrios would actually clash. Ptolemy and Demetrios had been on good terms before and the rapid speed with which alliances between the Diadochoi shifted

[1302] Diod.Sic.21.16.1, see p.231-2.
[1303] Marasco (1984b) 111-2.
[1304] Diod.Sic.21.15.
[1305] Meister (1984) 408.
[1306] Marasco (1984b) 111-2.

meant that Agathokles might have expected that Ptolemy and Demetrios would patch up their differences. Demetrios and Ptolemy both considered Seleukos to have wronged them and Demetrios had been engaged to a Ptolemaic princess for almost a decade. In fact, the two did reconcile the year after Demetrios' expulsion, in 287/86.[1307] It was plausible for Agathokles to think that links to Ptolemy and Demetrios were compatible and when we consider the ideological reasons why the alliance appealed to Agathokles it becomes clear why he chose to think this way.

These ideological elements of the alliance with Demetrios are of course not entirely separable from the strategic ones – we have already seen how the claim to Korkyra was the product of a combination of both. There were a number of other ideological elements to the agreement beyond Korkyra, though. Agathokles once again reached out to the Diadochoi, asserting and receiving confirmation of his membership in the royal club. International recognition was valuable for Demetrios too. His status as a king was not in question at this time, since he commanded a large army and controlled the Macedonian homeland, but he had tended to be a pariah. At this date, his only other marriage connection was Seleukos – with whom he had quarrelled.[1308] The coalition of Ptolemy, Lysimachos, Seleukos, and Pyrrhos that drove Demetrios out of Macedon in 288/87 demonstrates how dangerously isolated Demetrios was. The fact that Demetrios' gifts were recorded for posterity shows that both parties sought to advertise the relationship that existed between them. The embassy also had important dynastic implications. Additionally, this embassy was particularly important for establishing the royal standing of the young Agathokles II. Agathokles would soon attempt to appoint Agathokles II as his heir, instead of his grandson Archagathos (son of the Archagathos who had died in Africa), who was older than Agathokles II and commanded Agathokles' troops.[1309] Agathokles II had little advantage over his nephew which could justify his

[1307] Plut.*Demetr.*46.3.
[1308] Plut.*Demetr.*32-33.1.
[1309] Diod.Sic.21.16.3.

elevation to the position of heir, aside from his father's favour, except for his better international connections, for Lanassa was his full sister.[1310] The embassy to Demetrios served to emphasise these superior international connections (his next step in his efforts to solidify Agathokles II's claim was to send him to the army to replace Archagathos in command, which proved a fatal misjudgement). It was in Demetrios' interests to support the installation of Agathokles II as heir too, because Agathokles was now in his seventies and especially since the claim to Lanassa's dowry would pass to Agathokles' heir on his death. These dynastic politics and the desire to assert parity with the Diadochoi provide a background to this alliance that transcends its 'practical' strategic implications.

8.3 Conclusion

We have seen in this chapter that Agathokles' relations with Mainland Greece and the Diadochoi were driven by practical and ideological factors which are not easily separable. Some of these continued old patterns. Agathokles' interest in Korkyra and Corinth parallels that of Dionysios. For both of them, these ties were useful for safeguarding against invasion from the east and dovetailed with Syracusan kinship ties. Another factor was the desire to be recognised as a peer of Alexander's successors. We saw how important this was for Agathokles' authority at home in chapter four.[1311] It was probably also important for his ego. The sources are full of examples of Agathokles' desire to equal and exceed the achievements of his predecessors and his contemporaries. Agathokles could assert that he had done so and his subordinates certainly agreed enthusiastically when he

[1310] Agathokles II a full-brother of Lanassa: to be a νεανίσκος capable of carrying out an embassy in 289/88, he ought to have been born around 305, while Lanassa must have been born a little before 310 in order to be of marriageable and childbearing age in 295 (see n.1055). Both children were therefore probably born to Alkia, Agathokles' wife at the time of the African war, who was not the mother of Agathokles' first two children, Archagathos and Herakleidas: Diod.Sic.20.33.5.
[1311] See pp.140-2.

said so.[1312] But it was a Greek commonplace that praise from subordinates was flattery and not trustworthy.[1313] Alliances, marriages, and royal gifts were independent recognition of status.

Marriages were particularly important because they demonstrated the other party recognised Agathokles' parity and provided an opportunity for spectacular proclamation of that recognition.[1314] Whereas Agathokles' marriage to Damas' widow had allowed him to assert his membership of the Syracusan elite, he subsequently passed up the opportunity to form ties with other Syracusan families in favour of alliances with the Diadochoi.[1315] The members of the Syracusan community were no longer treated as his equals and it was no longer appropriate for him to engage in competition with them. This might be interpreted as a decisive break with the past, the transformation of *polis*-based tyranny into Hellenistic *basileia*, which this thesis has been arguing against. But the marriages of the archaic tyrants show that this was not new, and Dionysios' failure to engage in similar marriage alliances might be attributed to the fact that, in his time, the dominant powers of the Greek world had no autocrats that he could make marriage alliances with.[1316] Agathokles' predecessors had similarly sought this independent recognition from poets and from the Greeks at large, especially through Panhellenic games and sanctuaries.[1317] As the network of Hellenistic kings took shape, Agathokles took advantage of this new opportunity to demonstrate his status, making it an important part of his foreign policy.

The paradoxical result was that Agathokles simultaneously sought to keep the eastern Mediterranean at arm's length and to integrate himself into its dynastic politics. He spent over a

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[1312] Diod.Sic.21.17.4 on Kallias.
[1313] e.g. Xen.*Hier*.1.15; Isoc.2.28; Ar.*Ach*.628-58.
[1314] Bell (2004); Lehmler (2005) 191-2.
[1315] His second wife, Alkia, mentioned at Diod.Sic.20.33.5, during his account of the African expedition as the step-mother of Archagathos is otherwise unknown. She was presumably a member of the Sicilian elite.
[1316] Dionysios' marriage of his daughters to members of his own immediate family represented a similar transcension of the Syracusan elite: Péré-Noguès (2013) 122.
[1317] See p.141.

decade ending the exile dynamic that gave foreign communities a lever with which to intervene in domestic politics and then contracted marriage alliances which gave foreign dynasts claims to his kingdom.[1318] He called on Ophellas for help and killed him for giving it. He sought to maintain alliances with both Demetrios, as controller of Corinth and Korkyra, and with Ptolemy, the hub of Diadoch politics, even as they stared each other down. Insofar as the conflict between Archagathos and Agathokles II was a conflict between the local power-base of the former and the international connections of the latter, the collapse of Agathokles' kingdom resulted from his failure to resolve this clash.

In the long term, this failure was Agathokles' greatest legacy to the course of Hellenistic history, because it set the stage for the unification of the Mediterranean under the Romans. There are two aspects to this. Firstly, Agathokles successfully separated Sicily and Italy from the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean: Alexander had supposedly planned to conquer Carthage; the task had been handed to Ptolemy at Triparadeisos; he passed it on to Ophellas; Agathokles put a stop to it; Kleonymos' invasion of Italy failed and Agathokles made Magna Graecia his own. He thereby prevented the establishment of Hellenistic kingdoms in Africa and southern Italy. This achievement is striking, when compared to the success of the Diadochoi in expanding and entrenching Macedonian control in other directions.[1319] It is also significant because the period of the Diadochoi established the disputes which the Hellenistic kingdoms would spend the next century or more contesting. The only one of these which involved the Greek West was Pyrrhos' claim to Agathokles'

[1318] When Pyrrhos invaded Sicily in 278/77, he did so, ostensibly, on behalf of Lanassa's son: Diod.Sic.22.8.2; Just.*Epit.*23.3.3. The role of marriages in inheritance law and the consequences of the archaic tyrants' marriages mean that Agathokles would have been aware of this possibility: Bonanno (2010) 114-6.

[1319] Lysimachos in Thrace: Lund (1992) 19-50; Eumenes and Antigonos in central Asia Minor: Billows (1997) 41, 238-42; Seleukos in the east: Grainger (1990b) 95-113. Other factors are also responsible for the failure of expansion to the west in the long term, including the collapse of Epirus and the marginalisation of the Greek *poleis* that had traditionally claimed the right to intervene in Sicily. But these factors were important because Agathokles had prevented the development of new kingdoms better placed to intervene in the central Mediterranean.

defunct kingdom arising from the marriage to Lanassa. This represented a substantial change from the Classical Period, when Sicily's history had been characterised by the same conflict between Dorians and Ionians as the Mainland and by Corinthian, Athenian, and Spartan claims to overlordship.[1320] Agathokles' actions also limited the outlet for Greeks seeking to escape mainland Greece. Movement of settlers and armies from Greece to the west had been a constant of Greek history since the Archaic Period. Over the fourth century a large number of people who needed to move elsewhere had built up;[1321] some of these had flowed into Sicily after Philip II's conquest of Greece and they attempted to do so again during the wars of the Diadochoi, but Agathokles did not allow them to stay. The Athenians sent settlers to Libya with Ophellas and had earlier planned to settle on the Adriatic; they ended up contributing settlers to Alexandria and Antioch instead.[1322] The mass of mercenaries that built up at Tainaron in the 320s could have followed Kleonymos to Italy; instead they too probably ended up settled in new foundations in the east.[1323] There is even some evidence for the reverse – people moving from Greek Sicily to the Eastern Mediterranean.[1324] Just when the conquests of Alexander had opened up the possibility of movement to the east, Agathokles closed off the possibility of expansion to the west, making him partially responsible for the movement of the Greek world's centre of gravity to the east in the Hellenistic Age, which left the Greek West further from the focus of the Hellenistic kings than it had been from Classical Athens and Sparta.

Conversely, the second aspect of Agathokles' legacy was the creation, resumption, and maintenance of the ties between Sicily and the wider world which have been the topic of Part III.

[1320] Erskine (2013), esp.14-9.
[1321] McKechnie (1989) 22-8.
[1322] Adriatic: *IG* II^3 1370 (= *RO* 100; 325/24 BC); Alexandria: Fraser (1972) 62-70; Antioch: Malalas, 8.201.
[1323] Badian (1961) 29 n.90.
[1324] Theoc.*Id.*15.90-5; Heichelheim (1925) 64-5, Fraser (1972) 65, 309, 672-3; Bonacasa (1995); Mueller (2006) 165-73; Souza (2014) 94, with further references.

We saw in chapter seven that Agathokles was responsible for reactivating links between Sicily and Italy in order to control the latter. With the collapse of his kingdom in Sicily, these ties could instead be used to reach into Sicily, as shown by first Pyrrhos and then the Romans. Since Agathokles' success had left no strong powers in southern Italy, there was limited resistance to the expansion of Pyrrhos and the Romans towards Sicily until they collided with the Carthaginians. At that point, Agathokles once again provided a model which they could step into: the role of the defender of the Greeks against barbarians that he had perpetuated.[1325] As we saw in chapter two, the Romans of the Middle Republic looked to Agathokles as a model and they took up his rhetoric and strategy accordingly, prosecuting their own invasions of Africa. Because they were able to build up a navy and because their government structure allowed them to conduct campaigns in multiple theatres without destabilising the domestic political order, they were able to overcome the challenges which I argued in chapter six were responsible for the failure of Agathokles' own efforts. Having successfully detached Sicily from the conflicts of the Diadochoi and tied the central Mediterranean together under his control, Agathokles had left a roadmap for its unification under the Romans. Agathokles' interactions with the Hellenistic kings laid down models for his successors, with political consequences, like Pyrrhos' brief sojourn in Sicily and the Ptolemies' economic role in the regime of Hieron II, and cultural consequences, like the proliferation of the cult of Isis in Sicily and the adoption of aspects of Hellenistic monarchy by Phintias, Hieron II, and Antiochos Eunous.[1326] Agathokles had ensured that Sicily developed as part of the Hellenistic cultural and economic sphere, so that, by the time the Romans had reached the end of Agathokles' roadmap and brought the central Mediterranean under their control, they were already implicated in the Hellenistic World.

[1325] Prag (2010) 67-71.

[1326] Isis: Sfameni Gasparro (2006) 259-314; Phintias: Zambon (2008) 56-69; Hieron II: Lehmler (2005); Antiochos Eunous: Diod.Sic.34/35.2.8-24b, 34/35.2.41-46. Generally: Erskine (2013) 19-23.

SICILIAN TYRANT AND HELLENISTIC KING

Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised that Agathokles is best understood by putting him in the context of both his Sicilian predecessors and his Hellenistic contemporaries, emphasising that Agathokles participated in the changes going in on his world, while also continuing many earlier patterns and practices. Agathokles represents both continuity and change, was both a local and Panhellenic phenomenon.

In the first part of the thesis I focussed on the literary and numismatic material which are our only sources of information on Agathokles. In chapter one I argued that ancient historiography, which forms our main source of access to Agathokles' rulership and interactions with the world, was powerfully shaped by the specific narrative purposes of our surviving authors. These include using Agathokles as part of broader themes, as an opportunity to demonstrate their narratorial authority, and as a source of entertainment for the reader. These surviving sources represent, I argued in chapter two, the final products of broader discourse on a number of interlinked topics, which Agathokles' contemporaries had fitted him into and which subsequent generations used him to continue. One of these was specifically Sicilian, the idea of a continuous tradition of Sicilian rulers stretching from Gelon I to Hieronymos, but most of them were discourses about concepts like generalship and rulership, which discussed Agathokles in the same ways that they discussed both Hellenistic kings and Classical tyrants. In chapter three, I turned to the numismatic evidence, whose complicated series of issues in all four metals responded to Agathokles' rapidly changing contemporary circumstances, whose iconography shows the continual synthesis of traditional Sicilian and contemporary Hellenistic imagery, and whose circulation patterns show the revival of old patterns.

The second part of the thesis, chapter four, argued that Agathokles did not transform from a Sicilian tyrant into a Hellenistic monarch. In the first part I showed that the assumption of the royal title as described in Diodoros is not a moment of transition, but part of a continuous characterisation of

Agathokles employed throughout the work, and I argued that Agathokles assumed the title in order to emphasise his military success and to assert parity with the Diadochoi, not to signal a transformation in the nature of his rule. In the second part of the chapter I discuss Agathokles' rulership in terms of his relationship to the *polis*, the army, and religion. Many aspects of Agathokles' rule can be paralleled by both his Sicilian predecessors and the Diadochoi, indicating the degree to which both were part of a single Greek model of autocracy, rather than two distinct models.

In the third section, I discussed, in turn, Agathokles' interactions with Sicily, Carthage, Italy, Mainland Greece, and the Diadochoi. I emphasised how these interactions continued earlier patterns while adapting to novel circumstances. The exile dynamic in Sicily encouraged Agathokles to seek control of eastern Sicily and left his regime vulnerable to destabilisation by external intervention. Carthaginian efforts to prevent the unification of eastern Sicily, in order to protect the important possessions in the western half of the island, clashed with this goal. Expansion into Italy reflected the desire to control movement between east and west, and the lack of a natural boundary between Sicily and Italy. Relations with the Mainland Greece and the Diadochoi were motivated by a desire to prevent intervention from the old *poleis* and the new dynasts, while also engaging with them in order to assert parity to, if not superiority over, them.

These three broad contexts into which I have divided my discussion – source material, rulership style, and his interactions with the world around him – were heavily interlinked. Thus, the source material is the means of access to the other two, but was also largely shaped by them. Thus interpretation of Agathokles' assumption of the royal title requires an awareness of Diodoros' efforts to resolve the divergence between positive and negative sources on Agathokles and the impact of those efforts on his wider characterisation of Agathokles. Conversely, his use of Agathokles to further the theme of Sicilian exceptionalism goes back to Agathokles' own emphasis on his Sicilianity and his parity with the Diadochoi, as seen in numismatic iconography, for example.

Agathokles' rulership style and his interactions with the world around him were also interlinked. Traditional Sicilian expectations of autocrats encouraged certain approaches to the wider world, such as aggression against the Carthaginians and Italians and emphatic assertions of status in Mainland Greece. Conversely, relations with the outside world impacted Agathokles' rulership style, prompting him to take the royal title, for example. These interlinkages are the reason why it is important to see Agathokles in both a Sicilian and a broader Hellenistic context.

Understanding Agathokles as both Sicilian tyrant and Hellenistic king has implications for ancient history more broadly. It brings us more closely into line with the perceptions of our literary sources. It allows us to move beyond the idea of the dawn of the Hellenistic Age as a moment of rupture, in order to see important continuities in Sicilian rulership and Sicily's interactions with the wider Mediterranean world, as well as in rulership and interaction more globally. Conversely, it allows us to move beyond the idea of Greek Sicily as a historical cul-de-sac, isolated from the wider world and perpetuating an Archaic form of tyranny, passive in the face of waves of invaders. Agathokles becomes one in a long line of Sicilian rulers who openly and assertively engaged with and participated in developments beyond Sicily's shores.

APPENDIX I: COIN CATALOGUE

GOLD			# of e.g.s	# with weights	Low	Mean Weight	High	SD
G1		Obv. laureate Apollo l., to the right a symbol Rev. Fast *biga* r. with *triskelion* ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ	19	19	3.75	4.25	4.35	0.13
G2		Obv. laureate Apollo l. Rev. Fast *biga* r. with *triskelion* ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, in exergue monogram.	9	9	2.8	2.85	2.9	0.03
G3		Obv. Kore l. Rev. Butting bull l. ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ	18	17	1.18	1.39	1.48	0.06
G4		Obv. Young male in elephant scalp, wearing *aegis* r. Rev. Winged & Armed Athena r., owl at right ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ	3	3	8.42	8.47	8.55	
G5		Obv. Athena in Corinthian helmet with a griffin and crest Rev. Winged thunderbolt, ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ, monogram	42	39	3.94[1]	5.64	6	0.30

G6		Obv. as above Rev. as above, but ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ and no monogram	1	1		2.17		
G7		Obv. Kore l., to the right a symbol Rev. Nike, driving *biga* r. above: • 8 point star, moon, thunderbolt and a symbol	62	62	3.25[1]	4.23	4.38	0.15
	SILVER							
S1		Obv. Arethousa l. with three dolphins and monogram: • NI, NK, ΦI and AAN(?) Rev. Fast *quadriga* l. charioteer with crop in r. hand and reigns in l. *Triskelion* above. In exergue: ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ and AN monogram.	362	295	13.45[1]	16.91	18	0.38
S2		Obv. Athena in Corinthian helmet with a neck flap, crest, and a griffin r., sometimes at right a symbol Rev. Pegasos in flight l. *triskelion* above or below its front legs, sometimes an ear of grain. ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ	49	46	7.45	8.37	8.78	0.26

S3		Obv. laureate Apollo l. ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ sometimes trophy at right Rev. *Triskelion* with gorgon's head at centre and winged feet	1	1		3.82		
S4a		Obv. long-haired Kore l. or r. ΚΟΡΑΣ Rev. At l. Winged victory nailing helmet to a trophy at r., *triskelion* at varying location, ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ. In exergue, sometimes, AN monogram	85	71	15.89	16.86	17.37	0.28
S4b		Obv. As above Rev. As above, but ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ	336	277	12.89[I]	16.80	17.95	0.51
S4c		Obv. As above, but ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ Rev. As above, but ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ	14	13	16.5	16.84	17.22	0.22
(S4 total)			435	361	12.89[I]	16.81	17.95	0.47

S5a		Obv. Athena in Corinthian helmet with a neck flap, l. or r. at right a symbol Rev. *Pegasos* in flight l. or r. with *triskelion*	31	31	6.23	6.68	6.97	0.19
S5b		Obv. As above, but griffin on the helmet, a crest, and no neck flap. Rev. As above	3	3	6.22	6.55	6.74	
S5c		Obv. As above, but blank helmet and no neck flap, behind head an owl, trident or Θ Rev. As above, but 8-point star and thunderbolt.	27	27	6.38	6.69	6.87	0.13
(S5 total)			64	63	6.22	6.68	6.97	0.19
S6		Obv. long-haired Kore l., at right a bee Rev. Nike driving a quadriga l., above an 8 point star, in exergue ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ	14	14	11.61	12.51	13.03	0.34

BRONZE								
B1		Obv. Apollo l., sometimes with *oinochoe,* trophy, AΓ, AI, or Λ at right and AN below, ΣYPAKOΣIΩN Rev. *Triskelion* with gorgon's head at centre and winged feet	32	30	4.92	6.34	7.32	0.66
B2		Obv. Kore l. ΣYPAKOΣIΩN, at right a symbol Rev. Butting bull l., two dolphins, monogram	186	141	3.24	9.50	12.3	1.64
B.3a		Obv. Kore l. ΣYPAKOΣIΩN, at right a symbol Rev. Butting bull l., dolphin above, in exergue monogram, sometimes within a wreath	83	57	2.10	3.32	4.32	0.36
B3b		Obv. as above Rev. as above, but trident above	19	12	2.61	3.21	3.65	0.32
B3c		Obv. as above Rev. as above, but axe above, in exergue ΣΩ	21	19	2.90	3.40	3.95	0.28
B3d		Obv. as above	7	7	2.86	3.64	6.00	1.07

		Rev. as above, but club above[1327]						
B3e		Obv. as above, at right a flower Rev. as above, but caduceus, in exergue A	5	5	3.00	3.41	3.64	0.24
B3f		Obv. as above Rev. as above, but star, Nike or blurry blob	9	9	1.31	3.41	7.35	2.09
B3g		Obv. as above Rev. as above, but nothing above[1328]	247	109	1.48	3.58	10.67	1.13
B4a		Obv. Kore l., ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, at right a symbol Rev. Butting bull l., club and monogram above, in exergue IE (Hieron II)	497	185	3.17	5.56	7.02	0.68
B4b		Obv. as above Rev. as above	122	36	2.26	3.74	4.83	0.60

[1327] Some or all of these are probably examples of B4, with worn exergue.
[1328] Many of these are extremely worn

B5		Obv. Herakles? r., diademed ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ Rev. Butting bull l. or r., club above	5	5	4.2	5.29	5.81	0.65
B6		Obv. Athena in a Corinthian helmet r. Rev. Butting bull r.	1	1		1.38		
B7		Obv. Athena r. in a Corinthian helmet with griffin, at right a trophy, ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ Rev. Pegasos in flight l. Trident below, sometimes a Σ	30	28	4.9	10.00	11.88	1.22
B8		Obv. long-haired Apollo, l., ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, at right a symbol Rev. Pegasos in flight, l.	349	223	0.57	4.70	6.57	1.04
B9		Obv. Male head (Anapos?), facing Rev. Pegasos forepart, l. or r,	25	23	1.92	2.68	3.7	0.53
B10		Obv. Artemis with quiver l. or r. ΣΩΤΕΙΡΑ Rev. Winged thunderbolt, ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ, continuous border	285	230	5.4	8.50	12.16	1.15

B11a		Obv. as above Rev. as above, but ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ	1	1		21.41		
B11b		Obv. as above Rev. as above	19	16	6.47	8.08	9.8	0.88
B11c		Obv. as above Rev. as above	11	11	1.68	2.28	2.88	0.35
B12a		Obv. Athena in Corinthian helmet l. Rev. as above	2	2	6.05	6.97	7.88	
B12b		Obv. Athena in Corinthian helmet l. or r. Rev. as above	79	38	1.06	2.06	3.08	0.34
B13		Obv. Athena in Corinthian helmet r. Rev. quiver, ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ	1	1		1.9		
B14		Obv. Artemis with quiver l. ΣΩΤΕΙΡΑ Rev. Winged thunderbolt ΔΙΟΣ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΥ	17	13	5.72	7.27	8.46	0.94
B15		Obv. Zeus Eleutherios, l. ΔΙΟΣ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΥ	16	11	6.45	8.19	10.14	0.99

		Rev. Winged thunderbolt, ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ						
B16		Obv. Athena r. in a Corinthian helmet with griffin Rev. Horseman in Phrygian cap riding r. ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, sometimes triangular monogram	31	21	6.62	8.55	10.79	1.05
B17		Obv. As previous, sometimes owl Rev. As previous, sometimes A or Φ	21	20	1.47	3.41	4.37	0.59
B18		Obv. Diademed Herakles l. or r. ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, at right a symbol Rev. lion with left paw raised r., a club above, in exergue a monogram or a symbol	121	93	2.82	7.66	10.40	1.71[3]
B19		Obv. Apollo laureate l. ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ Rev. Dog looking at a snake / its tail, monogram above or in exergue	25	14	1.46	1.77	2.20	0.22

B20		Obv. long-haired Kore, l. or r. ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, at right a symbol Rev. Nike, driving *biga* r. above 8 point star, below a symbol	208	157	2.13	9.28	15.69	2.13[1329]
B21		Obv. youthful Zeus laureate, l. or r. ΔΙΟΣ ΕΛΛΑΝΙΟΥ, at right a symbol Rev. Eagle standing on thunderbolt, l. ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, sometimes 8 point star or A at left	590	376	3.12	8.05	12.98	2.27[3]
	Electrum							
E1		Obv. Long-haired Apollo laureate l., ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, at right symbol Rev. Artemis with quiver r., ΣΩΤΕΙΡΑ, at l. same symbol as obverse	15	14	6.45	6.68	6.89	0.17

[1329] B18, B20 & B21 each presumably contain multiple denominations, but drawing the dividing line is essentially impossible.

E2		Obv. Long-haired Apollo laureate l., at right a symbol Rev. Tripod, ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ	126	123	2.95	3.55	3.89	0.11
E3		Obv. Long-haired Apollo laureate l. Rev. Lyre, ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ	48	46	1.39	1.78	1.88	0.08
E4		Obv. Kore? Arethousa? r. Rev. octopus	12	11	0.67	0.71	0.74	0.02

Coin Catalogues Consulted

BMC	*British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins: Sicily*. London: Trustees of the British Museum, (1876).
Pegasi	Calciati, *Pegasi*. (1990).
CL	Consolo Langher, *Contributo alla Storia della Antica Moneta Bronzea in Sicilia* (1964)
CNS	Calciati, *Corpus Nummorum Siculiorum* (1987)
Gàbrici	Gàbrici,*La Monetazione del bronzo nella Sicilia antica* (1927).
Hunterian	*Greek Coins in the Hunterian Collection* (1901)
McClean I	*Catalogue of the McClean Collection of Greek Coins: Volume I: Western Europe, Magna Graecia, Sicily*. (1923)
MS	*Morgantina Studies II: The Coins* (1989)
SNG I.I	*The Collection of Capt. E G Spencer-Churchill; The Salting Collection* (1931)
SNG I.II.	*The Newnham Davis Coins* (1936)
SNG II	*The Lloyd Collection I-VIII* (1933-7)
SNG III	*The Lockett Collection, I-V* (1938-49)
SNG IV	*The Fitzwilliam Museum: Leake and General Collections, I-VIII* (1940-71)
SNG V	*The Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, I-IV, IX* (1951-2007)
SNG VI	*The Lewis Collection in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, I-II* (1972, 1992)
SNG VII	*Manchester University Museum: The Raby and Güterbock Collections* (1986)
SNG VIII	*The Hart Collection, Blackburn Museum* (1989)
SNG X	*The John Morcom Collection of Western Greek Bronze Coins* (1995)
SNG XIII	*The Collection of the Society of Antiquaries, Newcastle upon Tyne* (2005)
SNG Aarhus	*Aarhus University Denmark* (1986)
SNG Agrigento	*Agrigento: Museo Archeologico Regionale: Fondo dell'ex Museo Civico e altre raccolte del Medagliere* (1999)
SNG ANS 5.3	*USA, The Collection of the American Numismatic Society. Part 5: Sicily 3* (Syracuse - Siceliotes). (1988).
SNG Budapest	*Hungary, Budapest, Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum. I . Hispania - Sicilia. Part 3: Sicilia.* (1993).
SNG Cop.	*Copenhagen. The Royal Collection of Coins and Medals. Danish National Museum*. 1942.
SNG Delepierre	*France, Bibliothèque National, Collection Jean et Marie Delepierre*. (1983).
SNG Dreer 1.	*Österreich, Klagenfurt, Landesmuseum für Kärnten, Sammlung Dreer. Part 1: Italien - Sizilien*. (1967)
SNG Evelpidis I	*Greece. Collection Rena H. Evelpidis. Athenes. Premiere Partie: Italie - Sicilie - Thrace* (1970)
SNG Fabricius	*Aarhus University, Part II, The Fabricius collection* (1987)
SNG Greece 3.1	*Musée numismatique d'Athenes, collection Antoine Christomanos: Premiere partie: Italie-Eubee* (2004)
SNG Greece 7.1	*The Kipke Collection of Bronze Coins: Volume I* (2012)

SNG Leipzig 1 *Deutschland, Sammlung der Universitaetsbibliothek Leipzig, 1: Autonome Griechische Munzen* (1993)

SNG Munich 6 *Deutschland, München Staatlische Münzsammlung. Part 6: Sikelia, etc.* (1980).

SNG Sassari 1 *Sassari. Museo Archeologico "G.A. Sanna". Volume 1: Sicilia - Numidia*. (1994)

SNG Stockholm 1a *The Collection of His Late Majesty King Gustaf VI Adolf and the Fred Forbat Collection*. (1974)

SNG Stockholm 1b *Sammlung Eric von Post* (1995)

SNG Tübingen 1 *University of Tubingen, 1*.

List of Images

G1: Gorny & Mosch Giessener: Auction 219, Lot 67

G2: Ira & Larry Goldberg: Auction 14, Lot 2296

G3: Ira & Larry Goldberg: Auction 26, Lot 2078

G4: Numismatica Ars Classica: Auction 64, Lot 738

G5a Classical Numismatic Group: Auction 96, Lot 14

G6: SNG.VII.519

G7: Stack's Bowers and Ponterio: Sale 185, Lot 242

S1: Ira & Larry Goldberg: Auction 14

S2: SNG I.II.82

S3: British Museum BM 1853,0405.27,

S4: SNG I.I.71

S5a: Stack's Bowers and Ponterio: Sale 185, 241.

S5c: SNG.VIII.230.

S6: Numisbids: Auction 93, Lot 80

B1: SNG X.728

B2: Pecunem Gitbud & Naumann: Auction 12, Lot 39

B3a: SNG X.735

B4a: Numismatik Lanz München: Auction 158, Lot 67

B4b: ArtCoins Roma: Auction 9, Lot 200.B7: Münzen & Medaillen Deutschland GmbH: Auction 40, Lot 107

B8: Classical Numismatic Group: E Auction 329, Lot 15

B9: SNG X.746

B10: Pecunem Gitbud & Naumann: Auction 20, Lot 26.

B11b: Classical Numismatic Group: E Auction 326, Lot 16.

B12b: Classical Numismatic Group: E Auction 327, Lot 591.

B16: Pecunem Gitbud & Naumann: Auction 19, Lot 42.

B17: Classical Numismatic Group: E Auction 327, Lot 584

B18: Classical Numismatic Group: E Auction 327, Lot 585

B19: Roma Numismatics Ltd: E-Sale 10, Lot 89.

B20: Münzen & Medaillen Deutschland GmbH: Auction 40, Lot 110.

B21: Roma Numismatics Ltd: E-Sale 7, Lot 97.

E1: Stack's Bowers and Ponterio > Sale 185, Lot 235

E2: Stack's Bowers and Ponterio > Sale 185, Lot 235

E3: Roma Numismatics Ltd: E-Sale 9, Lot 92

E4: SNG I.II.76

APPENDIX II: FIGURES

Figure 1: Proposed Chronology




Figure 2: Frequency table of S1 weights




Figure 3: Frequency table of S5 weights




Figure 4: Average Gold Weights




Figure 5: Average Silver Weights




Figure 6: Circulation of Agathokles' Coins (+ Interface)




Figure 7: Agathokles' Early Coins




Figure 8: Agathokles' Late Coins




Figure 9: Agathokles' Gold



Figure 10: Agathokles' Electrum



Figure 11a: Agathokles' Full-weight Pegasoi



Figure 11b: Agathokles' Reduced-weight Pegasoi



Figure 11c: Pegasoi from all mints (red dots indicate mint locations)


N
Image Landsat
Data SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO
Google earth

Figure 11d: Pegasoi from Mainland Greek mints



Figure 11e: Pegasoi from Italian and Sicilian mints



Figure 12: Agathokles' Tetradrachms




Figure 13: Macedonian Coins in the West



Figure 14: Agathokles' Bronze





Figure 15: Circulation of Syracusan Bronze over time



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