INTERPRETING CONCEPTS AFTER THE LINGUISTIC TURN: THE EXAMPLE OF *CURIOSITÉ* IN *LE BONHEUR DES SAGES / LE MALHEUR DES CURIEUX* BY DU SOUHAIT (1600)

Neil Kenny
Churchill College, Cambridge

I. Concepts

The modern reader of any Renaissance text is consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly engaged in the interpretation of numerous concepts, whether abstract ("wisdom," "curiosity") or relatively concrete ("war," "food"). These classes of objects[1] may at first seem transparent and self-evident, needing only perhaps a gloss to prevent any possible anachronistic misreading. However, even our most automatic and natural-seeming readings of the apparently most simple and straightforward concepts may in fact be highly problematic, stumbling up against one particular gulf, or radical discontinuity: the linguistic turn that has characterized various currents of twentieth-century linguistics, philosophy, critical theory, and historiography.

On the far side of this gulf, the vast majority of Renaissance writers and readers considered that the concepts they wielded, as well as (for realists) the things to which those concepts corresponded,

I should like to thank Lorna Hutson, whose work and conversation have stimulated and informed much of what follows, notably VI. I am also grateful to Ian Maclean for introducing me to Veyne and Weber. When quoting from early modern works, I have distinguished between "i" and "j" as well as between "u" and "v," and I have resolved abbreviations.

existed independently of language. None of these concepts relied for their existence on the words that referred to them, none were considered epiphenomena of language; on the contrary, *res* were distinct from *verba*, thought and reality were prior to words.[2] By contrast, on the near side of the gulf, modern readers who position themselves after the linguistic turn might interpret concepts as purely linguistic effects of the relational play of differences between signs within the semiological system of language.

In the light (or perhaps darkness) of this gulf of understanding, it could be argued that the least anachronistic intellectual or literary historians will be those who, deliberately or by default, interpret the texts of this period through a Renaissance-style separation of words from concepts and things, thereby positioning themselves before the linguistic turn. This might involve any one of a range of interpretative strategies that have long and illustrious histories and continue to enjoy widespread currency among intellectual historians and literary critics. These strategies can be broadly and crudely described as involving either psychologism or sociologism or both. An example of psychologism would be a "history of ideas" that traces the history of, say, "curiosity" or "war" in a way that implies that these concepts had a mental existence outside language in the period studied. A more recent version of psychologism would be the kind of psychoanalytic reading of concepts that derives them from pre- or extra-linguistic drives, instincts and desires: for example, the concept of "curiosity" might be interpreted as a distorted expression (but an expression nonetheless) of the Freudian voyeuristic or scopophilic drive. On the other hand, sociologism in literary studies might involve reading texts as mimetic representations of social reality. Furthermore, scrutiny of the concepts employed in, say, a mimetic narrative might involve the claim to uncover an ideology that is expressed in the text (perhaps indirectly, via mystification): this would be a blend of sociologism and psychologism. However diverse these strategies, what they share is an assumption that the meaning of concepts is not autonomous but is rather an effect, representation or expression (however refracted) of mental, physical and/or social experience.[3] The meaning of texts and concepts is determined in one way or another by experiential contexts.

Whether one situates oneself before or after the linguistic turn is ultimately a matter of philosophical preference. Whatever the

philosophical rights and wrongs of the argument, however, what cannot be argued, in my view, is that Renaissance historians who seek to separate words from concepts are necessarily being less anachronistic simply because their approach echoes the period's *res/verba* distinction. For, once a concept such as "curiosity" is separated from signifiers such as *curiositas*, *curiosité* and so on, it may be possible to detect this concept lurking in texts from which those signifiers are wholly absent; conversely, actual occurrences of those signifiers may sometimes be considered not to belong to the concept of "curiosity" if they carry different senses. In other words, the historian, having separated words from concepts and so abandoned the hazy, unstable borders produced by the period's signs, has to invent borders of his/her own in order to construct a concept, an "idea" formed according to the rules of the history of ideas and so capable of being described coherently in, say, a monograph. My point is not at all that the history of ideas is therefore invalid, but merely that in seeking to minimize one kind of anachronism it inevitably creates others. The choice is not between anachronism and objectivity, but between different modes and relative degrees of anachronism.

On the other hand, for radical devotees of the linguistic turn, written texts lose the relative transparency that, for other historians, enables them to be connected to experience. Instead, they become opaque sites in which concepts are provisionally constructed but in an indeterminate, unstable way, since the meaning of those concepts is determined by innumerable contexts that can never be fully described, enumerated or delimited. (See Derrida; LaCapra 36–39.) The meaning of, say, *curiosité* or *sagesse* is so different in different contexts that it becomes difficult to group various occurrences together under the aegis of a "concept" at all. Moreover, even apparently experiential contexts (whether mental, physical and/or social) are textualized, considered as texts in themselves, consisting if not of printed words then of other verbal and non-verbal sign systems that transmit meaning and that are, in any case, now only accessible to us through written texts. This insistence on the textualization of historical context has perhaps had its most celebrated and fruitful manifestations in the "new historicism" of English Renaissance studies.

However, much work in intellectual history is now characterized by a recognition that the linguistic turn risks replacing one

form of reductionism with another. Instead of reducing meaning to experience (the danger inherent in psychologism and sociologism), it can reduce experience to meaning.[4] Indeed, it could be argued that since the only direct, physical contact between many historians and the past is through the manuscripts and early printed books that surround us in libraries, it is little wonder that some of us tend to see those objects as convenient textual paradigms for the understanding of a past society as a whole. Perhaps we *would* think that, given the remnants at our disposal, and perhaps this is as much a fantasy as that which interprets such extant written artifacts as transparent windows onto a non-textual past world of experience.

My aim is to investigate whether abstract Renaissance concepts can be interpreted, in the light of the linguistic turn, as linguistic effects that are not however *purely* linguistic effects. In other words, I shall be attempting to sustain the "dialectical unity of and difference between meaning and experience" (Toews 882). This is no doubt to swap one fantasy for another, but, if fantasies and anachronisms are always inescapable, they are at least also heuristic tools enabling us to get some lever on the past.

My investigation will focus on one "concept" already mentioned several times: "curiosity" or, more precisely, *curiosité*, since such cognate terms have differing value (in the Saussurian sense) in different languages. (See Saussure 150–69.) If, in the light of the linguistic turn, *curiosité* is not interpreted as a thing, a referent, then it is problematic to speak of people being for or against "it," of attitudes towards "it," of representations of "it." Indeed, given that this signifier's senses shift endlessly according to context, it is difficult to speak of a concept of *curiosité* at all. Indeed, to attempt a history of this Renaissance "concept" is not only to organize this amorphous textual movement into a stable, delimited object that is formed according to the rules of modern history-writing, but it is also to graft, tacitly, the Renaissance "concept" onto modern "concepts" of *curiosité*. This happens particularly with signifiers that are, like this one, still in widespread use. Not that such implicit grafting is somehow indefensible. On the contrary, it is what actually makes interesting to us a "concept" like this, which has indeed attracted much attention recently (e.g., Blumenberg; Céard; Defaux; Kenny), probably less for reasons of its objective importance in Renaissance culture relative to other concepts than because it resonates with

modern anxieties about *curiosité qua* an excessive desire for knowledge (a major theme in psychoanalysis and in current concerns with the ethics of science and technology). However scholarly one's approach, one cannot prevent oneself from making such connections, whether consciously or not, thereby interpreting the Renaissance "concept" and making a difference to it. My concern here will be less with *that* kind of conceptual instability than with the one that arises from the position of *curiosité* within historical and textual contexts. I will argue that this very instability is what opens up the "concept" of *curiosité* to experience.

II. Du Souhait

My exploration of these questions will be through a case study of a forgotten pair of texts by a slightly less forgotten writer. The point is to demonstrate that the problem of interpreting concepts characterizes apparently simple, straightforward, dogmatic, non-canonical texts as much as ones that reveal a more explicit, sophisticated and "modern" awareness of the vagaries of signification (by Rabelais, Montaigne or Shakespeare, for example). At the same time, I also have the tangential aim of contributing to knowledge of the works of one François du Souhait.

A *gentilhomme* from Champagne, Du Souhait was one of the few early seventeenth-century French noble writers who were successful and prolific enough to live at least partly by their pen: others included Nicolas de Montreux, Vital d'Audiguier, Antoine de Nervèze.[5] Virtually nothing is known about Du Souhait's life outside the period in which all his works were published, 1599–1614. Having spent the turn of the century in a frenetic search for patronage, judging from the multiplicity of his dedicatees (Serroy, "Carrière" 24), he struck lucky and became one of several intellectuals to find refuge at the Court of Lorraine after the Wars of Religion. (See Cullière 339–40.) His principal allegiances in the years to come were to this House and its post-*Ligue* politics. In 1600 he became *secrétaire ordinaire* to Charles III, the duc de Lorraine et de Bar, not on the payroll but receiving honors and immunities in return for various services. In 1611 he was *secrétaire* to Charles's most ambitious son François II, the comte de Vaudémont. (See Cullière 340; Serroy, "Carrière" 25.) His habit of systematically selecting as dedicatees the most powerful and important members of the House suggests a fine nose for

opportunism. (See Serroy, "Carrière" 25.) Much of his time seems to have been divided between Lorraine and (probably increasingly) Paris; in 1614 he was banished from France by the Parlement of Paris for helping to publish seditious writings, and he got a last mention in the Lorraine registers in 1616 before disappearing into extra-archival oblivion. (See Cullière 343; Serroy "Carrière" 25.)

Du Souhait published over thirty works, most in Paris, some in Lyon, and one each in Nancy and Rouen.[6] These texts were largely directed at a noble readership that did not necessarily have Latin; indeed all were in French. Du Souhait himself was certainly no humanist scholar, as has been demonstrated by a comparison of his popular but nonchalantly inaccurate 1614 "translation" of the *Iliad* with more erudite contemporary versions. (See Hepp 177–204, 233–36.) He also wrote moral and political treatises on his rank and that of his masters (*La Vraye Noblesse*, 1599; *Le Vray Prince*, 1599; *Le Parfait Gentilhomme*, 1600),[7] a controversial tract urging against war on Spain in 1604 (as one would expect, given his Lorraine allegiances),[8] various *romans sentimentaux* that sometimes include chivalric elements,[9] moralizing novella-like narratives (to be discussed below), occasional pieces, a devotional treatise,[10] a tragedy,[11] and (more surprisingly) a volume of *Histoires comiques* (1612).[12] It is difficult to generalize about the sex of his intended readership: while the *romans sentimentaux* and his 1600 *Pourtraicts des chastes dames* may have been intended partly or even largely for noblewomen (see Lever 14; Reynier 219n), some of his texts seem aimed above all at fashioning male nobles, as I will argue. What contributed perhaps above all both to his success and also to his rapid fall from grace was his frequent recourse to the asianic, *pointu*, highly ornamental style that enjoyed such favor in *romans* and (partly under Jesuit influence) in modernizing, relatively non-scholarly Court and noble circles at this time—the kind of rhetoric that would eventually be ridiculed and indeed misrepresented as *le style Nervèze*, *le style galimatias* or *le parler phébus* in the climate of French neoclassicism, as indeed in much modern criticism.[13]

III. Le Bonheur des sages / Le Malheur des curieux

Du Souhait published several works in 1600, among them two moralizing prose narratives that probably have barely been read at all for almost four hundred years (Figures 1 and 2).[14]



Figure 1. Title-page of *Le Bonheur des sages.*
Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. Reproduced by permission.


LE
MALHEVR
DES CVRIEVX.

A LYON,
PAR IEAN PILLEHOTTE,
à l'enſeigne du nom de IESVS.

M. D C.
Auec Permiſſion.

Figure 2. Title-page of *Le Malheur des curieux.* Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. Reproduced by permission.

Designed as a symmetrical pair (running to 91 and 81 pages), they were published in duodecimo format by Jean Pillehotte in Lyon.[15]

Each alternates between three distinct narrative modes:
(1) direct moralizing comment by the narrator
(2) narrative of events
(3) direct speech by protagonists.

The crude plot summaries that follow give little indication of the alternation between these modes.

Le Bonheur des sages is set in late sixteenth-century Germany, while the recently ended wars were raging in France. An unnamed prince has inherited his deceased father's worldly goods. He also wishes to acquire his father's "vertus" (11) and to this end consults his guardian, an old kinsman who advises him to go to Mainz to acquire sound knowledge of "bonnes lettres" or "humanitez" (18); but he should not be "curieux d'une science cachee" (21). The prince obeys and lodges with the most celebrated pedagogue in Mainz, where he befriends six young noblemen (all named) who are his co-students. One of these declares that they will only attain outstanding academic excellence if they go incognito to another university, where they will be treated according to merit rather than status. After lengthy debate (23–51) they agree that, rather than disobediently departing without permission, they will wait until their fathers come to Mainz for an assembly of the States and then ask them if they can go to Paris. The prince puts the request to the fathers and mothers; the mothers defer to the fathers who say yes. The young nobles go to Paris, where they are educated by the Jesuits. Two or three years later they are the top students and, after revealing their status, they are presented to the French king. A young man at Court sidles up to the prince and offers him some magical secrets. The prince not only refuses to be "curieux" (72) but also helps redeem the young man by sending him to college where he studies natural (instead of diabolic) science, eventually becoming a professor at Louvain and then the King of Spain's ambassador to Persia. The prince and his six friends receive similar recompense for their virtue. First, the baron de Vienne la Roche is made heir to his Flemish uncle's estate, thereby solving the difficulties arising from his status as a younger brother; he also marries the uncle's wife's niece (the courtship considerably aided by his hard-won knowledge of languages). Secondly, the prince is selected to be King of the Russians, who have heard about him from his old friend

the Spanish ambassador to Persia. The prince accepts on condition that the Russians become "Chrestiens" (86) (by which is presumably meant non-Orthodox). Next, the marquis d'Ousbec becomes (through the prince) King of the Armenians, who are also coming round to the true faith. The duc de Galatie becomes Archbishop of Vienna and Deacon of Mainz. The vicomte d'Hasbourg is made Constable of the Holy Roman Emperor and also Imperial Ambassador to the Vatican. The comte de Hectemberc becomes Germany's *maître de camp*. Finally, the vicomte d'Harocourt becomes Imperial Governor of Hungary. Thus are the wise rewarded.

Le Malheur des curieux is set in Spain in the same period. The comte d'Aite, highly accomplished in letters, is approached by a Señor Aria who first offers him alchemical and other secrets (which are rejected), before eventually undertaking to show him a demon that dwells in the underground cisterns of Salamanca and that could teach d'Aite more in a minute than he could learn in a century. D'Aite agrees to go (ostensibly to check whether it is a good demon) and to take some friends, as instructed by Aria, so that they will be a cabal of seven. All have become prey to "curiosité," laments the narrator (21). D'Aite asks the demon for its secrets. The demon insists that one of the seven be sacrificed as the price. They agree, then each learns what they wish to know: d'Aite acquires the secrets of rejuvenation and of how to construct a perfect building. He finds himself chosen as the sacrificial payment but craftily manages to give the devil the slip and escape from the cavern, thinking he is now safe. But all seven are heading for the gruesome ends they deserve. First, Aria is strangled by the devil as he seeks to pick a magical mandrake (an act widely considered to be fatally dangerous). Secondly, Dom Alphonse, a lawyer who chose to learn perfect eloquence from the demon, is beaten to death by someone who realizes the devil is speaking through him. Thirdly, Dom Federic, whose chosen secret was geomancy, is murdered on the orders of a prince whom he had offended by refusing to make a prediction for the prince's son. Fourthly, Señor Infortunio foresees through his own magic that he will be hanged and so decides that he might as well get it over with immediately. The next member of the cabal, Fœlicio, seems luckier, being still alive; but the devil has only delayed, not postponed, the debt that Fœlicio will eventually have to pay off for the iatrochemical secrets he has learned. The sixth friend, Dom

Amorado, acquired the knowledge of how to make any woman fall in love with him; one woman abandoned by him kills herself and, struck by remorse, he follows suit. Last comes the downfall of the comte d'Aite, narrated at greatest length (48–81). He entertains Philip II of Spain in two magically built castles, so perfect that they make the Escorial look like a shepherd's hut. The King, suspicious, exhorts him to abandon such arts, but in vain. Seeking rejuvenation, d'Aite then commands his *maître d'hôtel* to cut his (d'Aite's) throat, keep the blood, chop up his body, then bury it all in a bottle deep inside a dung-heap. Nine months later, his theory goes, you will find me there as a baby; and twenty days after that, I will be a twenty-year-old. The hapless steward eventually obeys and, having confessed to Philip II, is tortured and executed for his trouble, not without having first repented. Thus is "curiosité" punished (79).

With their numerous antithetical symmetries, then, the two narratives seem to be constructing a single, simple and clear concept of "curiosité" that draws heavily on medieval and Renaissance traditions condemning *curiositas,* and that is paralleled in, say, Palma-Cayet's 1598 French translation of the Faust story, which also features the concept prominently and may possibly have provided the broad inspiration of *Le Malheur*, plus a few narrative details.[16] As constructed in Du Souhait's narratives, *curiosité*, while grounded in a passion that can also produce a good, moderate desire for knowledge (*Bonheur* 9), goes beyond the boundaries of that desire, notably aiming at occult and super- or anti-natural rather than natural knowledge. (*Bonheur* 74; *Malheur* 11, 48.) It is always sinful, always punished. And although people can become or stop being *curieux*, at any given moment they either clearly are *curieux* or else clearly are not. In other words, this human characteristic, or referent, depends neither on language nor on perspective for its objective existence. In what might be described as a collusive reading of the text, *curiosité* becomes a universal temptation, to which one half of humanity succumbs: "ces passions qui nous jettent ou au bien, ou au mal" (*Bonheur* 9). This first-person plural constantly constructs the concept as universally applicable.

However, the apparent referential and universal solidity of the concept evaporates as soon as one considers how Du Souhait may have intended the text to be read, in other words to what genre(s) it belongs.

IV. Genre

Generic signals do not function as transparent labels but as indications of how to read texts and also concepts. The generic instability that characterizes so much late Renaissance French writing can therefore involve tension between various reading strategies and so, by extension, a certain fluidity in the status of concepts.

Du Souhait's *Bonheur* and *Malheur*, which are not given any generic label, seem part treatise and part narrative. On the one hand, the titles suggest treatises, with the four simple, abstract, moral concepts of the type that this author deployed so often in titles and in his writing in general. (See Berthaud, "*Glorieux*" 354.) This contrasts with the particular humans who feature in the titles of works that he labels *romans*[17] and also in the titles of the *histoires tragiques* that *Le Malheur* resembles. Furthermore, also in contrast to *histoires tragiques*, both *Le Bonheur* and *Le Malheur* begin with a general moral preamble rather than with the narrative proper, and *Le Bonheur* even ends not just morally, but with a rhetorical peroration and a prayer. On the other hand, neither text actually contains any treatise-like definition and sub-division of *bonheur* or *malheur*, *sagesse* or *curiosité*. And in many ways the texts resemble novellas, as opposed to *romans* (recent settings; references to real historical events and persons; absence of chivalric adventures and battles; lack of intercalated intrigues).

This generic tension is also one between two ideological strategies: universalization and naturalization. Whereas moral treatises universalize virtues and vices as timeless and characteristic of all humanity, while remaining silent about social relations, on the other hand narratives naturalize a particular social order, "showing" how virtues and vices operate in it. In the first case, the reader's work is deductive, involving analytical understanding first of general definitions and then of how the brief *exempla* illustrate those definitions; in the second case, it is inductive, moving from the extended *exemplum* that is the narrative to an understanding of how it illustrates moral concepts. In hybrid texts like this pair by Du Souhait, both processes are combined. The reader must engage in a constant back and forth movement between definition and example, universal and particular: the "concept" emerges from this interaction, rather than directly from any abstract, treatise-like definition.

However, although the harnessing of universalization to naturalization is, potentially, a remarkably powerful ideological strategy, it is also problematic. For the gestures made towards defining *curiosité* in universalizing terms turn out to be quite at odds with the social, naturalized construction of the concept that emerges from the narrative. This conceptual instability does not necessarily incapacitate the texts, but it does point beyond them; it suggests that their purpose is not actually to provide a logically flawless construction of *curiosité* (or of any other concept) but rather to help produce and maintain certain social relations. Before examining how the texts do this through readers, it is worth establishing exactly what social construction of *curiosité* is naturalized in these narratives or, in other words, what power relations are concealed by the "universal" concept of *curiosité*.

V. *"se regler par une regle paternelle"*[18]

These texts promote not one monolithic ideology, but an interconnected array of ideological and political interests.[19] They seek to maintain and renew the power and patriarchal structure of the hereditary nobility after the ravages of the Wars of Religion. Moreover, given Du Souhait's Lorraine allegiances, it is not surprising to find them also promoting ultramontanism and the interests of the Holy Roman Empire rather than gallicanism or exclusively French patriotism.

One immediate context for *Le Bonheur* and *Le Malheur* was Du Souhait's intense campaign for patronage and favor. These texts and others, such as *La Vraye Noblesse* (1599), functioned as signs both of his writing ability and also of his ideological credentials. His decision to try his luck in Lyon (until 1594 a bastion of the Ligue) was probably another sign. Indeed the publisher of *Le Bonheur* and *Le Malheur*, Jean Pillehotte, had earlier been an official *libraire* of the Ligue and had a similar association (probably still in 1600) with the Jesuits.[20] *Le Bonheur* was dedicated to Antoinette de Daillon, who had in 1598 become Madame de la Guiche by marrying Philibert de la Guiche, the Governor of Lyon since 1595. If choosing her was also a gesture to her husband, then the choice combined support for Henri IV with, possibly, ex-*ligueur* sentiments: Philibert was popular with the king and yet had also tried to persuade Henri III not to murder

the duc de Guise.[21] *Le Malheur* was dedicated to Antoine Emmanuel Chalom, the Official Principal of the Archbishop of Lyon. Chalom's name appears among those giving approbations to Jesuit works printed in Lyon at this time, and at least one Jesuit work was dedicated to him.[22]

In the dedications, Du Souhait grafts this social context onto his textual constructions of *curiosité* and *sagesse* : Madame de la Guiche and Monsieur Chalom explicitly become paradigmatic *exempla* of "sagesse" (guiding Du Souhait's good protagonists), and Chalom even becomes a good *curieux* as opposed to the bad type exhibited in the narrative. (*Bonheur* [5]–[6]; *Malheur* [3]–[4].) Within the narratives, similar grafting of political contexts occurs. In *Le Bonheur*, the Holy Roman Empire becomes a cause which can be served by those who are *sages* and avoid *curiosité*. An unnamed Jesuit establishment in Paris (presumably the Collège de Clermont) becomes the place where non-*curieux* education is to be had.[23] In *Le Malheur*, Philip II is grafted onto the recurring conceptual antithesis, being a "Roi[...] religieux" who praises "Les sages" (52) and chastises his erring subject for being "trop curieux" (51).

A noblewoman, an Official Principal, a few Jesuits, a Catholic king and the Holy Roman Empire are thus lined up against pernicious *curiosité*. But its most systematically constructed Other in Du Souhait's two texts are noblemen who are truly noble and masculine, especially those from houses and dynasties close to Du Souhait's political allegiances, such as the Habsburgs and the Lorraine House of Haraucourt, represented by two of the virtuous protagonists (the vicomte d'Hasbourg and vicomte d'Harocourt).[24] Far from being a universal, socially neutral vice, *curiosité* is constructed as ignoble and effeminate, associated with inauthentic noblemen, their social inferiors, and women of any rank.

The true nobleman's non-*curieux* desire for knowledge is constructed linguistically in the text by a fixed, recurring vocabulary that insistently circumscribes that desire within the bounds of obedience to patriarchal authority. "Desir" or "envie" are syntagmatically combined at several points with "obeïr," "commandemens," "lois" and their cognates: the young nobles will ask their fathers' permission to go to Paris "à fin que nous satisfassions a leurs commandements et a nostre envie."[25] On the level of the plot of *Le Bonheur*, these desires and commands are constructed as coinciding

completely: we eventually learn the fathers had in fact already secretly thought of sending their sons to France to study (57). This might make both desire and authority seem redundant: surely the young men could just have followed their desires without heeding authority, or the fathers could just have imposed their authority without heeding their sons' desires, and the outcome would have been the same? No, because filial desire and paternal authority rely on each other for their legitimation. On its own, filial desire would be *curieux*. Indeed Du Souhait makes sure he gives father-figures to protagonists who lack fathers: the *curieux* comte d'Aite, who disobeys Philip II, and the unnamed *sage* prince of *Le Bonheur*, who actively seeks out and obeys his old guardian.[26] Other authority figures setting the bounds of (the concept of) *curiosité* lurk on the borders of the text: readers who are parents (including, for once, mothers), plus teachers: "Vous peres et meres, Jettez l'œil sur la curiosité de vos enfans, qu'elle ne passe pas la commune et licite curiosité, Vous maistres ne donnez tant de franchises a vos disciples" (*Malheur* 79). Another is Chalom, the dedicatee of *Le Malheur*, who was after all the presiding judge of the Archbishop's canon law court. On the other hand, paternal authority without filial desire and initiative would invalidate the ideology according to which one sign of the superiority of nobles, including young ones, is their love of "liberté" (24): "une telle ambition est loüable aux Princes de ma sorte" (13). Moreover, it is made clear that the seven friends freely choose to request permission to go to Paris rather than being forced to ask; their submission is voluntary. But, so the fantasy goes, such free obedience is the paradoxical road for Catholic noblemen to eventual political and religious hegemony at the extremes of Empire (over the Protestant nobles of Royal Hungary) and beyond (over Russians and Armenians).[27]

Du Souhait is also grafting the late Renaissance controversy about the education of the nobility onto his textual construction of legitimate as opposed to *curieux* desire. He is arguing that the nobility should be educated not only in arms but also in letters; he includes a dig at ignorant nobles (*Bonheur* 24) who, as he stated in his *Parfait Gentilhomme* (1600), risk seeing their dominant roles taken over by more knowledgeable people from lower ranks. (See Reynier 265–66n.) Nonetheless, any knowledge that goes beyond the bounds of a grounding in the humanities, rhetoric and philosophy is not "bien

seant à un grand" (*Bonheur* 19; compare La Primaudaye 2^{r-v}), because it will not enable him to serve the common good (or, to gloss it less mystifyingly, to maintain power), whereas for example rhetoric will enable him to frighten his enemies and reassure his friends.[28] On the other hand, the *curieux* comte d'Aite spectacularly transgresses these limits of decorum and so is noble by birth but not by merit. His downfall begins not with conscious evil but with the apparently innocuous and open-minded desire to check whether the demon is good or not. "Tousjours faut il voir pour apprendre" are his fateful words (*Malheur* 18). Not for Du Souhait the more open boundary between good and evil knowledge that Pantagruel suggests with similar words ("Que nuist sçavoir tousjours et tousjours apprendre...?" [Rabelais 124]). On the other hand, Du Souhait's concept of legitimate knowledge is in at least one sense broader than that of a more celebrated promoter of noble education, La Primaudaye, in whose conceptual topography the boundaries separating legitimate knowledge from pernicious "curiosité" coincide with the national ones separating France from abroad (La Primaudaye *1^{v}–2^{r}, 81^{v}*).

Du Souhait's two texts construct *curiosité* as the desire to possess knowledge that is not only unnecessary to a noble but also procures money or power that will serve the individual's private ends, as opposed to the common good. The young man at the French court expects remuneration for the magical secrets he offers to the prince (*Bonheur* 73); Señor Aria initially makes money from his fatal mandrake, as does Dom Fœlicio from his alchemical preparations (*Malheur* 29, 37). And conversely, the seven *curieux* have to pay the devil with their lives in return for their demonically gained knowledge: this transaction is persistently described through economic metaphors, notably as usury (*Malheur* 24, 25, 27, 34, 37–38). By contrast, the constant transactions in which the perfect nobles engage in their pursuit of knowledge are resolutely non-economic, in keeping with traditional strictures against noble money-making: "Vous aurez de la gloire, et moy de l'utilité," declares the virtuous prince to his guardian to seal their reciprocity (*Bonheur* 21), which structurally parallels the antithetical one between the comte d'Aite and the devil.[29] Although d'Aite's case indicates that some flawed nobles can be *curieux*, the texts show that it is certainly easier for nobles than for poorer people to *avoid* being *curieux*. This is quite explicit in the case of the young man peddling secrets at the French

court. When urged by the prince to study natural rather than supernatural science, the young man retorts that "je n'avois pas la commodité de continuer la longueur des estudes" (74), to which the prince responds by financing his education and his path to *sagesse*. So, despite the texts' silent mystification of the actual sources of noble wealth, their naturalized social representations of *curiosité*, by revealing the concept to be partly a socio-economic construct, conflict with its universalization and thereby perhaps point dimly beyond pure textuality to the nexus of money, knowledge and sheer physical survival in the period.

Curiosité is constructed as the Other of masculinity as well as of nobility. Although there are no *curieuses* among the protagonists, women, like usury, are used as a metaphorical resource to represent a vice that the noble male must avoid. "La curiosité" is "une folle femme qui assagit toutes les autres a son dommage"; it is described by an enumeration in which eight consecutive sentences begin with the pounding anaphora "Elle" (*Malheur* 9–10). As so often in Renaissance and later discourse, *curiosité* (whether in the sense of desire or affectation) and femininity are linked because both are constructed as supplement, surface, ornament, deceit. One of the seven perfect noblemen exhorts his friends to use truthful rhetoric: "Qu'on y juge plus de fermeté et d'asseurance que de curiosité.... Convions plustost le monde à escouter noz masles raisons, que noz discours de femmes, ou il y a plus de parade que de solidité" (*Bonheur* 67–68). Although the dedicatee is Madame de la Guiche, her sex seems excluded from the kind of nobility, wisdom and rhetoric the text promotes.

However flagrantly socio-economic and gendered are these constructions of *sagesse* and *curiosité*, the texts still seek to universalize these concepts. The narrative device of the noblemen's superlative achievement while incognito, followed by satisfactory revelation of their rank, was a commonplace way of promoting the belief that the superiority of hereditary nobles was an inner quality, not dependent on external status. (See Bannister 28–29.) The device rests on a myth of temporary egalitarianism: education is a horse that will throw its rider regardless of rank (*Bonheur* 23). But the metonymy (noble/horse) lurking beneath the apparent metaphor again problematizes the universalism: not everyone even has a horse. The myth does point to a central anxiety and paradox of noble ideology:

the need constantly to earn one's status, to become what one already is, to attain a "rarité" and "perfection" that one already possesses.[30] Being a nobleman was therefore not a state but a never-ending performance. Writers like Du Souhait not only represented that ideological performance but facilitated it in noble readers. Their texts were not purely autonomous constructions of meaning, but were also orientated towards experience and action.

VI. Reading for the Concept

Although these two texts involve representation, it would be highly anachronistic to read them as primarily mimetic, as crude and primitive attempts to paint a *vraisemblable* psychological picture of *sagesse* and *curiosité*. The contingent, accidental fact that they were printed in 1600 rather than, say, 1599 renders such a reading more tempting, since it makes them seem more like instances of that pale category constructed by literary history: the precursor of the modern novel. In other words, century divisions lead us to impose retrospective interpretative grids on texts. And since scholarship on the seventeenth-century novel has sometimes postulated a slow march of increasing mimesis, *vraisemblance* and realism, a royal road leading to Madame de Lafayette, Du Souhait's texts could easily be misread as a first fumbling step on the way.

It is more appropriate to read many late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century narratives as rhetorical rather than mimetic. (See Reynier 313–40; Zuber.) They were designed to induce certain patterns of behavior and thought, not merely by representing idealized versions of them, but above all by training readers in those patterns and providing them with the rhetorical means to implement them. Renaissance humanists had developed the Ciceronian parallel between prudence and oratory into an actual identification of reading as a form of prudence. (See Kahn.) For Aristotle, the prudent person is one who has the practical wisdom and judgment required to deliberate in the contingent realm of the probable (concerning ethical and political matters that can only be decided by common opinion, not scientific demonstration) before taking appropriate action. By extension, for many humanists, interpreting a text was conceived as "the exercise of the reader's judgment and invention in the selection

and transformation of elements of the text into *exempla* applicable to future occasions for the production of persuasive discourse."[31] Lorna Hutson has brilliantly demonstrated how, in late sixteenth-century English novellas, this translated into a "reading for the plot," whereby male readers were shown how to imitate prudent protagonists and writers in deliberatively foreseeing and plotting certain courses of action in keeping with the exigencies of the spatio-temporal occasion (decorum), in contrast to knights in chivalric romances who are buffeted by the blows of fortune.[32] *Le Bonheur* and *Le Malheur* polemically graft such reading for the plot onto an aristocratic ideology, perhaps implying that the nobles' traditional scorn of prudence as unheroic (see Bannister 54–63) will prevent them from attaining positions of power such as those won by the seven protagonists of *Le Bonheur*. Moreover, in generically hybrid texts such as these, part narrative and part treatise, reading for the plot merges with a similarly prudential *reading for the concept.*

Le Bonheur and *Le Malheur* are designed to enable their young male readers (who, along with fathers and mothers, apparently constitute the intended aristocratic readership) to become true noblemen by desiring *sagesse* but not *curiosité*, by being able to identify both concepts in the world outside the text, and by acquiring the prudence and rhetoric necessary to plot courses of action that will exemplify one and not the other. It may therefore seem surprising that neither of these fundamental concepts is given a systematic, treatise-like definition. However, such definitions would be be superfluous to and distracting from Du Souhait's purposes. He wants his readers not to understand *curiosité* analytically but to desire to flee it. Hence the extraordinary barrage of asianic demonstrative rhetoric with which *Le Malheur* begins:

> Qu'appellez vous plus grand malheur que la curiosité, qui oste le frein des honnestes et licites desirs pour les faire courre jusques aux illicites, et qui pour toute limite ne prend que son malheur mesme?... La curiosité est une miniere qui pour le proufit d'autruy cherche sa ruine, une fornaise qui se laisse eschauffer, pour servir autruy a ses despens, et une folle femme qui assagit toutes les autres a son dommage. ([9]–10)

And so the enumeration continues. As in the narrative as a whole, "curiosité" is here defined either metonymically (what it does and what its effects are) or metaphorically (what it is like), but never directly (what it is). The rhetoric of *pathos* continues in the lengthy exhortations and apostrophes addressed by narrator and protagonists either directly to the reader or else to protagonists (and so indirectly to the reader).[33] Indeed, approximately two thirds of the texts are taken up by the protagonists' direct speech and the narrator's moralizing, with only one third devoted to narrative.

Just wanting to avoid *curiosité* (or to achieve any goal, for that matter) is not enough, however. One needs provision, *prevoyeance* (part of prudence) to plot a chain of actions that will not have undesired consequences or lead one into vice.[34] Du Souhait repeatedly employs various key terms that add up to a paradigmatic process of decision-making and action-taking. His virtuous protagonists have a "desir" that they then formulate into a "dessein" and a "resolution" by ruminating with "prevoyeance," "jugement," and "deliberation," taking account of the "opinions" of other men; finally, they produce the appropriate "occasion" that enables them to execute the "entreprise."[35] To master this process is to be masculine: women are explicitly excluded. Or rather, to mystify this exclusion as a voluntary rather than an enforced one, Du Souhait represents the fathers as kindly offering the mothers a chance to decide whether the sons should go to Paris, only for the mothers to vacillate because of their inferior faculties and refer the decision back to the fathers (*Bonheur* 60–61). So radical is the exclusion that the mothers' speech is represented only indirectly, in contrast with the mens' pages-long, directly reported deliberations.

For indeed, deliberative rhetoric is the medium in which the noblemen plot their "entreprises" (foreseeing in the conditional tense their fathers' likely reactions to their request, for example [*Bonheur* 29]), persuade each other of their validity, then execute them by persuading their fathers. Du Souhait's readers are intended not just to sit back and admire such enabling rhetoric but to extract it from the text for use on future occasions. Their invention will be enriched by his strings of *sententiae* and metaphors, which often read like (and perhaps are) extracts from commonplace books. To continue quoting from the opening "definition" of "curiosité" in *Le Malheur*: "C'est une fondriere qui peu à peu cherche son precipice. Elle esleve

son envie pour procurer sa cheute, elle dresse son vol au ciel, pour s'ensevelir sous terre. Elle se passionne de son bien, pour perdre soy, son bien, et sa passion" (10). And so on. These are persuasive things that readers can learn to say about "curiosité." In the same way, the discrete, grammatically unconnected commonplaces reeled off by protagonists in the long debate about whether or not to go to Paris lend themselves nicely to selective extraction by readers whose *inventio* is rather thin on travel: "Il est vray que ce n'est tout de changer de pays. Il faut changer d'esprit. Les voyages ne parfont pas l'homme s'il ne se parfaict de luy mesme. Ce n'est pas le moyen de subtiliser sa rusticité, que comme la boule rouler en diverse contree" (*Bonheur* 25). The list then continues. In this debate, it is not a question of inherently true arguments being lined up against inherently false ones. Rather, the protagonists constitute the sides of an *in utramque partem* argument that can only be resolved in the context of the present time and place. The "defeated" arguments (such as those just cited) could be used positively by readers in another context.

Readers' invention is enriched above all by the text's *exempla*, not just the few simple, classical and Aesopic *exempla* illustrating *curiosité* and other concepts that Du Souhait provides,[36] but especially the positive and negative examples of the two main plots themselves. "Apprenez par nɔs exemples," pleads the condemned *maître d'hôtel*. (*Malheur* 79; see also [7], 38, 80.) Yet the mode of learning is different from that engendered by a straight treatise or a novella. For this hybrid treatise/novella form encourages Du Souhait's readers to learn rhetorically from examples by reading for the concept as well as for the plot. The narrative amplification of examples immerses readers in the page-by-page process by which protagonists deliberate as to what course of action would be *sage* and what *curieux*, successfully in the case of the seven virtuous noblemen deciding whether to ask for their fathers' permission, and unsuccessfully in the case of the comte d'Aite deciding (unwisely on his own instead of communally) whether to visit the demon. Protagonists and readers learn about the two opposed concepts by recognizing not abstract, treatise-like definitions but two antithetical causal lines of events which, if foreseen, can be avoided if appropriate. Once embarked on one of these lines, protagonists may not be able to go back, even if they foresee their dire end (*Malheur* 22). The lines are represented

in irreducibly spatio-temporal terms by both Du Souhait's stock metaphors (such as the path of virtue) and his plots. Male *sagesse* involves waiting in the right place (Mainz, Paris) for the right time (till your father arrives, till you have finished two or three years of study) until you reap the reward by expanding into space (Empire and beyond) for ever (the virtuous characters are not represented as dying). On the other hand, *curiosité* involves transgressing this decorum, going to the wrong place (the demon's cistern) in order to skip time (acquire a century's learning in a minute, become young again, foresee the future by magic) until you are punished by losing your space (ending up in a bottle) and your time (premature death).[37]

Sagesse and *curiosité* are therefore constructed not as abstract concepts but as lines of actions and consequences, as narrative. Even when Du Souhait steps outside the plot and summarizes *curiosité*, it is still as an irreducible narrative. For example, the enumeration of metaphors at the start of *Le Malheur* represents it not as an autonomous act or desire but as an inextricable nexus of cause and effect: "Elle esleve son envie pour procurer sa cheute, elle dresse son vol au ciel, pour s'ensevelir sous terre. Elle se passionne de son bien, pour perdre soy, son bien, et sa passion" (10). This parallel syntax is repeated eight times. Or again, even the insistent syntagmatic coupling of "ruine" with "curiosité" (and its cognates) within single sentences is an elliptical narrative representing "curiosité" as irreducibly bonded to its gruesome metonymic consequences.[38] However, only extended narrative can draw readers into the gradual process whereby protagonists recognize and apply the crucial conceptual labels to such metonymic lines, thereby teaching readers how to do the same in their own experience. Renaissance treatises and novellas also facilitate rhetorical and ideological performances, but not quite in the same way: treatises slot examples into conceptual pigeonholes immediately, while most novellas are less obsessively and schematically concept-oriented. The hybrid form adopted by Du Souhait shows readers how to fit *exempla* into categories, how to read for line and label, for plot and concept.

VII. "Ces concepts ne sont pas des concepts dignes de ce nom"[39]

Where does this leave the concept of *curiosité*? On the one hand, these texts represent it as an objective, universal, moral category

that corresponds to an extra-linguistic desire.[40] Yet, on the other hand, it is not defined analytically but can only ever be identified through a consensus arrived at by collective, prudential deliberation in a particular, contingent, spatio-temporal context. It is at once rigid and flexible, semantically stable and unstable. A closer look at Du Souhait's uses of the term confirms its instability.

Curiosité and its cognates occur a total of fifty times in the two works, almost always in a pejorative sense. Although the term seems to be guaranteed firm semantic boundaries by the sustained, emphatic binary opposition with *sagesse* and other terms, these boundaries become rather porous at one point towards the end of *Le Malheur* when, astonishingly enough after what has gone before, Du Souhait switches to the well-known distinction between *bona* and *mala curiositas* by implying that not all *curiosité* is pernicious after all: fathers and mothers are urged to ensure that the "curiosité" of their children "ne passe pas la commune et licite curiosité" (79).[41] It is no coincidence that this occurs in an extra-diegetic gesture as the narrative is closing and extra-textual contexts beckon. Indeed, in the still further removed context of the liminaries, Du Souhait could even declare to the dedicatee Chalom, "Vous avez esté curieux, non pas comme ces Curieux.... Ils estoyent curieux au mespris de Dieu, et vostre curiosité ne tend, qu'à son respect, et à sa gloire" ([3]–[4]). (See also *Malheur* [7].) Du Souhait is not only allowing himself to construct the concept inconsistently, he is playfully and wittily flaunting that inconsistency. Indeed, the constant recourse to oxymoron, chiasmus and wordplay in his highly ornate rhetoric does put pressure on the stable meanings of words, making semantics seem secondary to rhetorical pattern. The dedication to Chalom shows that different semantic rules apply in different contexts, that the meaning of even an apparently rigid concept like *curiosité* can change with a new context. And if even broader contexts are finally considered, those of other discourses and writers in France at this time, then the concept appears still more unstable. In 1600 *curiosité* was well on its way to becoming a predominantly positive term in some discursive contexts (natural sciences, collecting, travel) but not others (ethics, theology), having previously been predominantly (but not exclusively) pejorative. If *curiosité* turns out to be elusive even in two dogmatic and didactic aristocratic texts, the problems of describing any "late Renaissance concept of *curiosité*" are even more obvious.

Du Souhait uses concepts to try to maintain the social power of one group, the hereditary nobility, by training its young males in patterns of domination and obedience while virtually denying reading positions to other groups (inferior ranks; women, except as mothers). Yet, although his universalization and naturalization of the concept for these ends was in many ways typical of the period, its very instability meant that it could be and indeed was also inflected differently, for other ideological aims, by other writers. Not that I have exhausted the infinite contexts that could be used to interpret Du Souhait's concept of *curiosité*. For instance, while I have focused primarily on ideology, one could also speculatively relate (but not reduce) *Le Bonheur* and *Le Malheur* to a psychological need (transcending the interests of any single social group) for boundaries between licit and illicit knowledge.

In the light of the linguistic turn, abstract concepts are indeed textual constructs and effects, the meaning of which differs endlessly according to context. But that is not all that they are. Precisely *because* they were porous, unstable and (in the case of much narrative) undefined in analytical terms, in the Renaissance they could be flexibly wielded by readers to interpret experience, to textualize or rhetoricize it, and to act. To the extent that Renaissance reading was a prudential extraction, transformation and reapplication of *exempla*, concepts like *curiosité* were inextricably bound up with specific configurations of time and space, particular lines of actions and events. So *curiosité* functioned for contemporaries not as a fixed, objective category, but more as a heuristic device for shaping experience with meaning. It therefore seems similar to those concepts that Weber calls ideal types, which historians and sociologists use to understand the past and the present. (See Burger.) However, unlike Weberian ideal types, the Renaissance "concept" of *curiosité* did not even have internal, logical, consistency and coherence. *Curiosité* of the kind constructed by Du Souhait (leading to damnation) was more like what Paul Veyne calls "un résumé d'intrigue[s]" (82), that is, the sum total of all the spatio-temporal lines that were labelled *curiosité* in the period, so diverse that they exceeded any analytical summary. Veyne is actually using this phrase to describe the concepts used not by historical agents but by modern historians studying the past. And indeed there are similarities between the two. Modern historians of any concept ("curiosity," "revolution," "the town") themselves

constantly change that concept by classing under it new texts and lines of events, new "intrigues." Although their modes of interpretation are different from the rhetorical ones practised by Renaissance readers, modern historians too wield concepts that are loose, composite, often inconsistent, heuristic representations, always open to future revision and reinterpretation.[42]

Notes

[1] See *Oxford English Dictionary*, "concept."

[2] The question whether or not a few Renaissance writers (e.g., Lorenzo Valla) did see language as constitutive of human knowledge of reality has recently provoked intense controversy. An affirmative answer has been put by Waswo, only to be vigorously challenged by Maclean (esp. 3–4, 146–47, 203–14) and Monfasani.

[3] On the implications of the linguistic turn for the notions of meaning and experience see Bouwsma; Toews (a review article to which my discussion is greatly indebted).

[4] Toews's article is devoted entirely to this problem.

[5] See Lever 20; Reynier 264–66. On Du Souhait see Cullière; Petit (whose thesis I have been unable to consult); Serroy, "Carrière."

[6] Bibliographies are included in Celce-Murcia's edition of the *Histoires comiques* and in Petit. See also Arbour.

[7] See Baustert 257, 260.

[8] See Serroy, "Carrière" 29.

[9] See Reynier 179–80, 260, 270–71, 273–74, 313, 349.

[10] See Berthaud, "*Glorieux*."

[11] See Berthaud, "*Châtelaine*"; Dabney.

[12] See Serroy, *Roman* 23–62.

[13] On this misrepresentation see Zuber. See also Fumaroli 673–85, esp. 674–75; Reynier 318–40.

[14] With the possible exception of Petit (see n. 9 above), no critic or historian has discussed them, so far as I am aware.

[15] Each narrative has its own title-page and pagination, but the two texts are bound together in the four known extant copies (Bibliothèque Mazarine, Bibliothèque Municipale de Bordeaux, two copies in the Bibliothèque Nationale). Baudrier (2: 362) cites a global "faux-titre" at the start of the volume: "LE BONHEUR | DES SAGES ET | MALHEUR DES CURIEUX." Each text consists of: a dedication; an address to the readers (followed in the case of *Le Malheur* by a liminary sonnet to the dedicatee); the narrative.

[16] The anonymous *Faustbuch* was first published by Spiess in Frankfurt in 1587. The full title of Palma-Cayet's translation ("où est monstrée la misere des esprits curieux") is echoed in Du Souhait's title *Le Malheur des curieux*. Narrative similarities include: the magic château/ fortress built by Faust (Palma-Cayet 156–59); the seven students who accompany Faust for a while (160–67); the old man who seeks to save him (189–92), echoed by Du Souhait's King figure; Faust's final dismemberment (211), loosely echoed by d'Aite's fate. Overall, however, *Le Malheur* is very different from the Faust narrative.

[17] For example, his *Chastes Destinees de Cloris, ou Roman des histoires de ce temps*, 1609.

[18] *Bonheur* 53.

[19] I am using the slippery term "ideology" in the sense of "ideas and beliefs (whether true or false) which symbolize the conditions and life-experiences" of "a dominant social power," promoting and legitimating its interests (Eagleton 29). On aristocratic ideology in early modern French narrative see Bannister; DiPiero pt. 1 chs. 1–3.

[20] See Baudrier 2: 137–47, 224–364, 440–43, esp. 224–25.

[21] See Michaud 18: 98; La Chenaye-Desbois and Badier 10: 75–76. Also Mathieu.

[22] See Baudrier 2: 358–59; 4: 98–99; 5: 124–25.

[23] The young nobles present letters from the Jesuits of Mainz to those of Paris, "d'ont l'instruction estoit alors en vogue" (71). The Collège de Clermont had opened in 1563. Du Souhait seems to be advocating the return of the Jesuits to France, from where they had been expelled by Henri IV in 1595, and where some would be allowed to return on probation by the 1603 Edict of Rouen. See Huppert 107–08; Scaglione [111].

[24] On the House of Haraucourt see La Chenaye-Desbois and Badier 10: 266-82.

[25] *Bonheur* 31–32. See also [6], 20, 32, 36, 39.

[26] "Il luy supplie, s'il ne luy peut estre pere d'essence, qu'il luy soit d'instruction." (11–12).

[27] In the case of Russia, the fantasy was perhaps fed by the fact that 1598 had seen the end of a dynastic line and the advent of a new Tsar, Boris Godunov, whose position was insecure due to his weak genealogical credentials.

[28] On the commonplace justification of rhetoric as necessary to nobles for haranguing troops, see Supple 113.

[29] The other main noble transaction is the friendship between fathers and sons, e.g. *Bonheur* 65-66. On the noble ideology of male friendship as exchange of duties, services and gifts, and on that ideology's transformation in the sixteenth century, see Hutson, *Usurer's Daughter*.

[30] See *Bonheur* 11, 16, 40, 41, 48, 57–58, 62.

[31] Hutson, *Usurer's Daughter*, 31. On this process see also Cave; Grafton and Jardine; Hampton.

[32] See Hutson, "Fortunate Travelers" and *Usurer's Daughter* ch. 3.

[33] For example, *Malheur* 21–22, 24–25, 26–29, 36–37, 51–52, 66–67, 78–81.

[34] On provision see Hutson, "Fortunate Travelers" 89.

[35] For these terms and their cognates see *Bonheur* 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, 44, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 63, 66, 70, 89, 90; *Malheur* 15, 18, 20, 21, 71. By contrast, "prudence" is only used once (*Bonheur* 90), perhaps because controversial in noble ideology.

[36] *Bonheur* 61; *Malheur* 12, 24, 27, 63, 64–65.

[37] On temporal decorum see *Bonheur* 32–35, 39–43, 56; *Malheur* 13, 15–16, 25, 37. The predication of masculinity on appropriate action within time as well as space has been explored by Lorna Hutson in an unpublished paper "Unlocking Shylock," delivered at a conference "Purchasing Power: Trade and Traffic from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment" (Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, June 1994).

[38] See *Bonheur* 21; *Malheur* [7], 19, 24, 31, 51, 66.

[39] Veyne 90.

[40] For a clear indication that desire is conceived as extra-linguistic see *Malheur* 21.

[41] At least two other occurrences are ambivalent (*Bonheur* 27, 39).

[42] See Veyne 81–96, esp. 89–91.

Works Cited

Arbour, Roméo. *L'Ère baroque en France: Répertoire chronologique des éditions de textes littéraires*. 4 pts. Pt. 1. Geneva: Droz, 1977.

Bannister, Mark. *Privileged Mortals: The French Heroic Novel, 1630–1660*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Baudrier, le Président, and Baudrier, J. *Bibliographie lyonnaise: Recherches sur les imprimeurs, libraires, relieurs et fondeurs de lettres de Lyon au XVIe siècle*. 12 vols. Lyon: Brun, Brossier; Paris: Picard, 1895–1921.

Baustert, Raymond. "Un aspect de l'honnêteté en France et à l'étranger: Le thème de la passion." *Horizons européens de la littérature française au XVIIe siècle*. Ed. Wolfgang Leiner. Tübingen: Narr, 1988: 257–65.

Berthaud, Madeleine. "Sur *Le Glorieux Contentement des ames* de Du Souhait." *Prose et prosateurs de la Renaissance. Mélanges offerts à M. le Professeur Robert Aulotte*. Paris: SEDES, 1988: 353–64.

———. "Une *Châtelaine de Vergi* au crépuscule du XVIe siècle: La *Radegonde* de Du Souhait." *Amour tragique, amour comique de Bandello à Molière*. Ed. Madeleine Berthaud and A. Labertit. Paris: SEDES, 1989: 29–50.

Blumenberg, Hans. *Der Prozeß der theoretischen Neugierde*. Rev. ed. Frankfurt a M: Suhrkamp, 1973.

Bouwsma, William J. "Intellectual History in the 1980s: From History of Ideas to History of Meaning." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 12 (1981): 279–91.

Burger, Thomas. *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types*. Rev. ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 1987.

Cave, Terence: *The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

Céard, Jean, ed. *La Curiosité à la Renaissance*. Paris: CDU; SEDES, 1986.

Cullière, Alain. "Du Souhait en Lorraine: à propos d'une thèse." *XVIIe siècle* 154 (1987): 339–45.

Dabney, L. E. "A Sixteenth-Century French Play Based on the *Chastelaine de Vergi*." *Modern Language Notes* 48 (1933): 437–43.

Defaux, Gérard. *Le Curieux, le glorieux et la sagesse du monde dans la première moitié du XVIe siècle: L'exemple de Panurge (Ulysse, Démosthène, Empédocle)*. Lexington: French Forum, 1982.

Derrida, Jacques. "Signature événement contexte." *Marges de la philosophie*. Paris: Minuit, 1972: 365–93.

DiPiero, Thomas. *Dangerous Truths and Criminal Passions: The Evolution of the French Novel, 1569–1791*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Du Souhait, François. *Le Bonheur des sages / Le Malheur des curieux*. Lyon: Jean Pillehotte, 1600.

———. Histoires comiques *du Sieur Du Souhait*. Ed. Daniel Celce-Murcia. Paris: La Pensée Universelle, 1978.

Eagleton, Terry. *Ideology: An Introduction*. London: Verso, 1991.

Fumaroli, Marc. *L'Age de l'éloquence: Rhétorique et "res literaria" de la Renaissance au seuil de l'époque classique*. Geneva: Droz, 1980.

Grafton, Anthony, and Jardine, Lisa. "Studied for Action: How Gabriel Harvey Read his Livy." *Past and Present* 129 (1990): 30–78.

Hampton, Timothy. *Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Hepp, Noémi. *Homère en France au XVIIe siècle*. Paris: Klincksieck, 1968.

Huppert, George. *Public Schools in Renaissance France.* Urbana: U of *Illinois P, 1984.*

Hutson, Lorna. "Fortunate Travelers: Reading for the Plot in Sixteenth-Century England." *Representations* 41 (1993): 83–103.

———. *The Usurer's Daughter: Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth-Century England.* London: Routledge, 1994.

Kahn, Victoria. *Rhetoric, Prudence and Skepticism in the Renaissance.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Kenny, Neil. "*Curiosité* and philosophical poetry in the French Renaissance." *Renaissance Studies* 5 (1991): 263–76.

LaCapra, Dominick. *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

La Chenaye-Desbois, and Badier. *Dictionnaire de la noblesse.* Rpt. 19 vols. Nendeln: Kraus, 1969.

La Primaudaye, Pierre de. *Academie francoise... Edition troisiesme.* Paris: Guillaume Chaudiere, 1580.

Lever, Maurice. *Le Roman français au XVIIe siècle.* Paris: PUF, 1981.

Maclean, Ian. *Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Matthieu, Pierre. *L'Accueil de Madame de la Guiche à Lyon le lundy vingt-septiesme avril M. D. XCVIII.* Ed. P. Allut. Lyon: Perrin, 1851.

Michaud, ed. *Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne.* 2nd ed. 45 vols. Paris: Desplaces, 1843[–65].

Monfasani, John. "Was Lorenzo Valla an Ordinary Language Philosopher?" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50 (1989): 309–23.

Palma-Cayet, Pierre-Victor. *L'Histoire prodigieuse du Docteur Fauste.* Ed. Yves Cazaux. Geneva: Droz, 1982. (Transl. of the 1587 *Faustbuch*).

Petit, Marie-Christine. "Du Souhait, polygraphe du début du XVIIe siècle." Diss. Université de Strasbourg II, 1986.

Rabelais, François. *Le Tiers livre* . Ed. M. A. Screech. Geneva: Droz, 1964.

Reynier, Gustave. *Le Roman sentimental avant "L'Astrée".* Paris: Colin, 1908.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Cours de linguistique générale.* Ed. Tullio de Mauro. Paris: Payot, 1972.

Scaglione, Aldo. *The Liberal Arts and the Jesuit College System.* Amsterdam: Benjamin, 1986.

Serroy, Jean. "La Carrière de Du Souhait." *Du Baroque aux Lumières: Pages à la mémoire de Jeanne Carriat.* Mortemart: Rougerie, 1986: 24–31.

———. *Roman et réalité: Les histoires comiques au XVII^e siècle.* Paris: Minard, 1981.

Supple, James. *Arms versus Letters: The Military and Literary Ideals in the "Essais" of Montaigne.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Toews, John E. "Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience." *American Historical Review* 92 (1987): 879–907.

Veyne, Paul. *Comment on écrit l'histoire; suivi de Foucault révolutionne l'histoire*. Rev. ed. Paris: Seuil, 1979.

Waswo, Richard. *Language and Meaning in the Renaissance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Zuber, Roger. "Grandeur et misère du style Nervèze." *L'Automne de la Renaissance 1580–1630*. Ed. Jean Lafond, and André Stegmann. Paris: Vrin, 1981: 53–64.