

“Two Souls Dwell in the German Nation”: British Historians, the Two Germanies, and the Two World Wars

Samuel George Wainwright
Jesus College, University of Oxford

DPhil in History
Hilary Term 2025

Word Count: 99,969

Abstract

This thesis examines how British historians conceptualized Germany before, during, and after the Great War. Before 1914, British historians tended to view Germany favourably and often used their professional writing to encourage amiable relations between the two countries. Their ideas centred on a two Germanies thesis—an abstract framework that enabled British admiration for German cultural and intellectual achievements to exist in tension with fears about Prussianism. This literature informed semi-official views on Germany, which were anti-Prussian in orientation rather than anti-German. Even in wartime, some historians retained an unbroken admiration for German culture, education, and history. This conviction allowed them to maintain an overidealized view of Germany and, afterwards, to embrace and disseminate a more radical and revisionist interpretation of the war and its causes. The belief that all the Great Powers shared responsibility for the Great War appealed those seeking to revise the settlement, since this cast doubt on the claim that Germany alone was at fault in 1914—the moral foundation of the Treaty of Versailles.

This dissertation shows how the two Germanies thesis informed both academic and elite discourse in Britain in the era of the two world wars. It reveals that earlier literature on Germany directly inspired revisionist scholarship in the interwar era—and that this scholarship influenced debates and decisions in both Parliament and the Foreign Office. The historians discussed herein had an audience with the decision-makers and affected their mentalities and debates either directly or indirectly, as educators and advocates. These historians were not only viewed as academics and intellectuals, but also as advisers and emissaries. British historians certainly assumed diverse roles and used their social networks and connections to advance their revisionist views. Gradually, their discoveries provided the decision-makers with the intellectual and moral rationale for pursuing a moderate and conciliatory foreign policy towards the Weimar Republic and, later, Nazi Germany.

Long Abstract

Before 1914, British historians wrote tracts with the intention to reassure their readers that the new, modern German Empire was not a threat to Britain. Their works underscored the cultural, racial, and historical ties that linked the two countries. It was also at this time that British historians started to reflect on the notion that there were two Germanies, old and new, rustic and mechanical, ethereal and material. Thus, in 1908, W. H. Dawson could remark abstractly, “two souls dwell in the German Nation.” Old Germany, while necessitous in substance, was rich in ideals. The German Empire, while rich in material substance, had forfeited its earlier idealism. There is some room to believe that Dawson viewed the unified German Empire as an untoward aberration—an existential threat to Great Britain. However, his observations were neither intended to extol nor to condemn Germany, but rather to relate how the Germans had advanced from an industrial standpoint: “to describe their efforts ... [and] successes,” not to dishearten his readers but to reassure them.¹

Prewar British historians tended to view this industrial, modern, and mechanical Germany favourably, often using their professional writing to advocate amiable relations between the two countries. Their ideas centred on a two Germanies thesis—an abstract framework that enabled British admiration for German cultural, intellectual, and scientific achievements to exist in tension with fears concerning Prussianism. Such literature informed semi-official views on Wilhelmine Germany, which were anti-Prussian in orientation rather than anti-German. Even in wartime, some historians retained an unbroken admiration for Germany. This conviction allowed them to maintain an overidealized outlook of Germany and, afterwards, to embrace and disseminate a more radical and revisionist account of the war and its causes. This dissertation shows how the two Germanies thesis informed both academic and elite discourse in Britain in the era of the two world wars. It

¹ W. H. Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany* (London: T. F. Unwin, 1908), 8-12.

reveals that earlier work on Germany directly inspired revisionist scholarship in the interwar era—and that this scholarship influenced debates and informed decisions in both Parliament and the British Foreign Office. The historians discussed herein had an audience with the decision-makers and affected their mentalities and debates either directly or indirectly, as educators and advocates. These historians were not only viewed as academics and intellectuals, but consultants, advisers, and emissaries, too. Gradually, their revisionist discoveries provided British decision-makers with the intellectual and moral rationale for pursuing a moderate and conciliatory foreign policy towards the Weimar Republic and, later, Nazi Germany.

Contemporary historians have often treated British-German relations teleologically—and have assumed that conflict between the two countries was inevitable. This view has led some scholars to overlook the extent to which British historians tried to differentiate between Prussia and Germany. Despite turbulent diplomatic relations before 1914, British historians continued to concede a cultural, scientific, and intellectual indebtedness to Germany. This acknowledgement underpinned the notion of two Germanies—old and new. The former was imagined as carefree, ethereal, and rustic, a nation of artists and thinkers; while the latter was characterized as materialistic and authoritarian, a state devoted to material force.² Research on this topic is sparse. An earlier preoccupation with deteriorating diplomatic relations has led contemporary historians to assume that cultural and intellectual mentalities moved in line with other, broader trends—that diplomatic friction had a detrimental effect on how British historians viewed Germany. As a result, contemporary historians tend to conclude that the Great War era initiated an abrupt transformation in cultural and intellectual mentalities—with colonial, industrial, and naval rivalries reflected in a broader cultural antipathy that found expression in literature, journalism, and even academia. This

² Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, v-vi and 11-12.

conclusion, however, risks obscuring the important continuities that link pre-1914 historiography, wartime literature, and interwar revisionist scholarship.

This thesis seeks to correct this account and claims that international conflict did not precipitate a radical transformation in how British historians viewed Germany. This collective is relevant because its members affected the atmosphere around decision-making; indeed, it is evident that the decision-makers read their works and used their commentaries to rationalize their own attitudes and initiatives. Thus, historians were offered a forum from which to inculcate a charitable division between the Germanies before, during, and after the Great War. Their influence stemmed from the ease with which well-known historians could access influential statesmen. It should be noted that the historians discussed herein shared “certain values and assumptions, cultural and ethical, clear-cut and durable,” which informed their attitudes towards Wilhelmine Germany and, later, the Weimar Republic.³ Generally, these historians had received a public-school education and had undertaken some secondary studies in Germany. These historians acted within a cultural and intellectual framework that combined a scholarly pursuit of historical objectivity with a mental desire to create a coherent narrative—one that interpreted the past in ways that justified and anticipated a particular vision of the future.⁴ This internal tension produced a subjective reconstructive process that relied as much on expectation as it did on data or research.⁵ Necessarily, these historians did much to construct a usable past that would harmonize with their hopes for, and anxieties about, the postwar settlement. Expectation had a transformative effect on how these historians used evidence in their wartime writing. Past events were recast and even

³ Antony Lentin, *Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919-1940* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 85.

⁴ Martin Conway, Jefferson A. Singer, and Angela Tagini, “The Self and Autobiographical Memory: Correspondence and Coherence,” *Social Cognition* 22, no. 5 (2004): 491-492.

⁵ Endel Tulving and Martin LePage, “Where in the Brain is the Awareness of One’s Past,” in *Memory, Brain and Belief*, ed. Daniel L. Schacter and Elaine Scarry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 208-210.

reconstructed to accommodate and, indeed, forecast the future. Within this context, history was not merely an objective record of earlier events, but rather a narrative that was shaped by present circumstances and expectations of the future.⁶ These historians drew on the past to interpret the present and sought to anticipate and shape foreign policy outcomes. This reconstructive model was dynamic; yet, at the same time, its attendant discursive frame, the two Germanies, was perceived as relatively fixed.⁷ This duality enabled historians to draw conclusions and moral lessons from history. Once Prussia had been defeated militarily, this framework allowed historians to advocate a more charitable and rehabilitative settlement.

The tension between a mental desire for correspondence and that for coherence confirmed, for some historians, the sincerity of the protestations emanating from Weimar Germany. Forthwith, these historians saw as their task the need to shield and defend the embattled Weimar Republic from the unfair, discriminatory, and severe Versailles Treaty. This collective, to be sure, constituted only one section of a broader cultural and intellectual community. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to envision how a small circle and its influential allies could create an environment that favoured a particular interpretation.⁸ These historians objected to the settlement because it condemned a recently democratized nation that could not be held entirely accountable for the conflict. Their refusal to endorse the so-called *War Guilt* Clause (Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles) led them to embrace and disseminate more radical and revisionist interpretations. Henceforth, they reasoned that the war had resulted from militarization, colonial and economic rivalry, and a deficient international order that had divided the continent into two armed coalitions. Their discoveries

⁶ Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Historical Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 3-4.

⁷ Reinhart Koselleck, *Future Pasts: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 195-197.

⁸ Peter Lambert and Björn Weiler, introduction to *How the Past was Used: Historical cultures, c. 750-2000*, eds. Peter Lambert and Björn Weiler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 46.

indicated that a more stable and secure world could only be achieved after major modifications were made to the Treaty of Versailles. The notion that all the Great Powers shared responsibility for the Great War appealed to those seeking to revise the settlement, since this cast doubt on the claim that Germany alone was at fault in 1914—the moral foundation of the Treaty. There were, admittedly, numerous factors that coalesced to invalidate and weaken the settlement. Nonetheless, revisionist historians were among the most active in working to reverse British attitudes towards Germany. In doing so, these historians supplied the vocabulary through which decision-makers could frame and articulate interwar reconciliation. This, too, enabled embattled statesmen to search for innovative means by which to restore normal relations between Britain, France, and Germany.

Even after 1933, these historians continued to call for economic, territorial, and commercial concessions. The moral they tried to instruct was that revision would save the continent from another calamity. Over time, their research intimated that appeasement was both moral and sensible, and an effective means by which to avert another disaster. Revisionist historians stressed time after time the necessity of moral revision; insofar as concessions were framed as a moral imperative, they may be said to bear considerable responsibility. The historical lessons and moral truths advanced by this collective found a receptive audience among statesmen anxious to avoid another war with Germany. There can be little doubt that the decision to negotiate with and, later, to make concessions to, Nazi Germany (even after 1936) resulted in some measure from the charitable, conciliatory, and accommodative mood that historians had inculcated a decade or so earlier. Then, too, the two Germanies thesis validated appeasement because it endorsed the idea that there were unidentified forces of moderation even within Nazi Germany. Revision could thus be framed as a means of emboldening and sustaining these innominate democratic elements.

Finally, this dissertation will examine the transnational intellectual networks that connected

British historians with statesmen, decision-makers, and civil servants in Britain, the United States, and Germany. Prosopography enables the reconstruction of these networks and allows correlations to be drawn between individual case studies and shared activities, interests, and interactions, thereby revealing the intellectual, social, and cultural motivations and norms that fostered revisionist tendencies within this collective. The aim here is not to understand history through individuals alone, but rather to understand how individuals affect—and are themselves affected by—historical processes. Historical culture, moreover, provides a means of understanding “the cultural and intellectual framework within which” historical actors behaved, functioned, “and communicated with one another.”⁹ This approach offers a way of examining elite decision-making in relation to an intellectual discourse rich in references to culture and history. This thesis thus advances a collective model wherein individuals, intellectual networks, and mental frameworks interacted to inform and shape elite and educated attitudes before, during, and after the Great War. In doing so, it seeks to reframe the master narrative and contribute to the ongoing reassessment within the historiography.

This thesis is structured chronologically. The first chapter examines the value and authority that educated elites and decision-makers attached to history, while also accounting for the cultural, racial, and historical theories that anchored and framed British views of Germany. One means by which to explore these ideas is through an analysis of how historians treated and wrote about Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany. This chapter demonstrates that British historians generally viewed Germany favourably and used their professional writing to advocate amicable relations between the two countries. Their works informed demi-official views of Germany, which were anti-Prussian rather than anti-German. Historians not only influenced elite mentalities and debates

⁹ Peter Lambert and Björn Weiler, introduction to *How the Past was Used: Historical cultures, c. 750-2000*, eds. Peter Lambert and Björn Weiler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 46-48.

but also provided an interpretative framework for British-German relations more generally. The second chapter focuses on how British historians viewed Germany during the Great War. Even in wartime, some historians continued to acknowledge a cultural and intellectual indebtedness to Germany—an admission that led them to endorse the notion of two Germanies. These historians worked to construct a usable past that would harmonize with their desires for, and anxieties about, the postwar settlement. This focus illustrates that there were definite limits to wartime hostility and highlights the important continuities across periods of conflict and trauma.

Chapter three moves on to examine the official and unofficial intellectual study groups established to research and formulate war aims. It considers how the two Germanies thesis affected these circles, as well as the broader intellectual vision and strategy of the British Peace Delegation, situating this analysis within the context of the Paris Peace Conference. Chapter Four demonstrates how the two Germanies thesis allowed historians to retain an overidealized view of Germany, despite the disorderly, troublesome, and turbulent shifts and trends within the Weimar Republic. This section claims that revisionist historians supplied the vocabulary through which decision-makers could frame and articulate interwar reconciliation, thereby enabling statesmen to pursue innovative means of restoring normal relations between Britain, France, and Germany. Moreover, it examines the role historians assumed in dismantling and discrediting the Treaty of Versailles; particularly, through their refusal to accept the *War Guilt* Clause—a stance that initiated a shift towards more radical and revisionist perspectives. Notably, these views were embraced and acted upon by elite decision-makers intent on rehabilitating Germany.

The fifth and sixth chapters examine the extent to which revisionist literature influenced the decision to treat with and make concessions to Nazi Germany. They argue that the decision-making elite adhered to the revisionist interpretations inculcated by historians during the 1920s;

chiefly, that Germany had been mistreated at Versailles and that the grievances its leaders sought to address were reasonable, valid, and even lawful. While numerous factors coalesced to invalidate and weaken the Treaty, it was these historians who supplied the intellectual and moral framework for revisionism. The two Germanies thesis further reinforced this outlook by advancing the view that unidentified forces of moderation persisted even within Nazi Germany. The conclusion then looks forward, identifying new directions for future research.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Patricia Clavin. Her supervision, insightful feedback, and constant support were instrumental to the success of this project. Her patience and guidance were invaluable, and I remain deeply grateful for her mentorship.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Aleksandra Bennett; her belief in me preceded my own, and for that, I am truly thankful. I am equally grateful to Dr. Andrew Wallace and Dr. Andrew Johnston for their continued friendship, guidance, and encouragement.

I am indebted to Emily Labine for her kindness, perseverance, and unwavering support. She ensured that this process was both enjoyable and manageable. Her patience and generosity of spirit sustained me throughout.

This thesis would not have been possible without my wonderful parents, Maureen and David Wainwright. Thank you for your endless encouragement, love, guidance, and support. I owe this achievement to both of you.

Finally, I gratefully acknowledge that this thesis draws on research supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

For Melville Keith Thompson.

Table of Contents

Abstract	ii
Long Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	xi
Dedication	xii
Table of Contents	xiii
Introduction	1
1. “History is Past Politics, and Politics are Present History”: British Historians and the Practice of History before 1914	32
2. “Of the Two Germanys, the One which You and We Love is Not Responsible for this Wickedness”: British Historians in the Great War	88
3. “At Paris, Historians were as Thick as Bees”: The Role of the Historian at the Paris Peace Conference	130
4. “Grey Made the War and Wilson Ruined the Peace”: British Historians and the Issue of War Guilt	170
5. “I Love the Country and People as Much as Ever, But ...” British Historians and the Advent of Nazism	209
6. “It is Quite Hopeless; They Simply Don’t Understand”: Moral Revisionism, Historical Example, and the Road to Munich, 1938	238
Conclusion	272
Bibliography	281

List of Abbreviations

BUF	British Union of Fascists
CR	<i>Contemporary Review</i>
DBFP	<i>Documents on British Foreign Policy</i>
DIIB	Department of Information's Intelligence Bureau
GDN	Manchester Guardian Archive
GPP	G. P. Gooch Papers
HC	British House of Commons
FO	British Foreign Office
FRUS	<i>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States</i>
HDLM	The Papers of Sir James Headlam-Morley
LNU	League of Nations Union
LON	League of Nations
MG	<i>Manchester Guardian</i>
NPC	National Peace Council
ODNB	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i>
OUP	Oxford University Press
PID	Political Intelligence Department
SPD	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i>
SPSL	Society for the Protection of Science and Learning
UDC	Union of Democratic Control
WEA	Workers' Educational Association
WHD	William Harbutt Dawson Papers

Introduction

Before 1914, British historians tended to view Germany favourably and often used their professional writing to advocate amiable relations between the two countries. Conceptually, their works focused on a two Germanies thesis: an abstract framework that enabled British admiration for German cultural, scientific, and intellectual achievements to exist in tension with fears about Prussianism. Such literature informed semi-official views of Germany, which were anti-Prussian in orientation rather than anti-German. Even in wartime, some historians retained an unbroken admiration for German culture, education, and literature. This conviction allowed them to maintain an overidealized view of Germany and, afterwards, to embrace and disseminate a more radical and revisionist account of the war and its causes. This dissertation shows how the two Germanies thesis informed both academic and elite discourse in Britain in the era of the two world wars. It reveals that earlier literature on Germany directly inspired revisionist scholarship in the interwar era—and that this scholarship influenced debates and informed decisions in both Parliament and the British Foreign Office. The historians discussed herein had an audience with the decision-makers and affected their mentalities and debates either directly or indirectly, as educators and advocates. These historians were not only viewed as academics and intellectuals, but also as advisers and emissaries. British historians certainly assumed diverse roles and used their social networks and connections to advance their revisionist views. Gradually, their discoveries provided British decision-makers with the intellectual and moral rationale for pursuing a moderate and conciliatory foreign policy towards the Weimar Republic and, later, Nazi Germany.

Contemporary historians have often treated British-German relations teleologically—and have assumed that conflict between the two countries was inevitable.¹⁰ This view is reductive and

¹⁰ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 386-409.

has led some historians to miss the extent to which earlier academics and intellectuals tried to differentiate between Prussia and Germany. Despite turbulent diplomatic relations before 1914, British historians continued to concede a cultural and intellectual indebtedness to Germany. This acknowledgement underpinned the notion of two Germanies—old and new. The former was imagined as carefree, ethereal, and rustic, a nation of artists and thinkers; while the latter was characterized as materialistic and authoritarian, a state devoted to material force.¹¹ Research on this subject is sparse. An earlier preoccupation with deteriorating diplomatic relations has led contemporary historians to assume that cultural and intellectual mentalities moved in line with other, broader trends—that diplomatic friction had a detrimental effect on how British historians viewed Wilhelmine Germany. As a result, contemporary historians have tended to conclude that the Great War era initiated an abrupt transformation in cultural and intellectual mentalities—with colonial, industrial, and naval rivalry reflected in a broader cultural antipathy that found expression in literature, journalism, and academia. This conclusion, however, risks obscuring the important continuities that link pre-1914 historiography with wartime literature and interwar revisionist scholarship.

Manfred Messerschmidt, for instance, argues that a discernible transition occurred between 1894 and 1908, when British historians set out to vilify, demean, and criticize modern Germany.¹² Catherine Ann Cline, citing Messerschmidt, intimates that the bellicose, fiery, and hostile character of wartime literature had, in fact, been formulated before the outbreak of the Great War.¹³ Similarly, Panikos Panayi contends that, amongst historians, an earlier interest in Saxon England had been

¹¹ W. H. Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany* (London: T. F. Unwin, 1908), 8-12.

¹² Manfred Messerschmidt, *Deutschland in englischer Sicht: die Wandlungen des Deutschlandbildes in der englischen Geschichtsschreibung* (Dusseldorf: M. Triltsch, 1955), 67-70.

¹³ Catherine Ann Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 44-46.

substituted with the idea that the German Empire constituted an existential threat to Great Britain.¹⁴ Steven Siak likewise identifies a clear demarcation in 1914, severing the point at which a scholarly “pro-Germanism yielded to a distinct anti-German orientation.”¹⁵ This assessment harmonizes with Peter Firchow’s claim that the Great War marked a cultural watershed—a transformative shift in how British scholars viewed Germany. By 1915, he writes, “the German cousin was dead, never again to be resurrected except by cranks and Nazi-sympathizers.”¹⁶

Paul Kennedy, meanwhile, concludes that the “racial, cultural, and dynastic ties” which bound Britain together with Germany were irrelevant, since such affinities “counted for little in actual ... terms.” This interpretation leads him to argue that from 1880 to 1907 British-German relations shifted from ambivalence towards entrenched hostility. He claims that the cause of this dramatic shift in relations was economic: “historians wrestling with the overall alteration in ... relations have before anything else to confront the fact that whereas Britain produced over twice as much steel as [Germany]” in 1870, it manufactured less than half as much by 1907. Prudently, he nuances this argument with two additional factors. First, Germany’s expansion into the North Sea was seen as a direct threat to Britain’s national security. “It seems clear that there would have been far less agitation in Britain about German expansionism had this new, bustling, militarily efficient Reich been located at some safe distance away—say, in the Far East (like Japan) or the western hemisphere (like the USA).” Kennedy, correctly, notes that had German expansion been directed eastwards, it is doubtful whether it would have aroused such an immediate reaction from Britain.¹⁷ Certainly, British administrations in office both before and after 1914-1918 believed that

¹⁴ Panikos Panayi, *German Immigrants in Britain during the Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1995), 238.

¹⁵ Steven Siak, “‘The Blood that is in Our Veins Comes from German Ancestors’: British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 30, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 222.

¹⁶ Peter E. Firchow, *The Death of the German Cousin: Variations of a Literary Stereotype, 1890-1920* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1986), 178.

¹⁷ Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, 386-409 and 464-465.

Britain should remain a “disinterested *amicus curiae*” in Eastern Europe.¹⁸ The second factor was ideological. There existed a considerable divide “in ... sympathies and [customs]” between “Liberal” England and Prussia. Yet neither British Liberals nor Prussian *Junkers* desired a conflict in the North Sea. Over time, however, these hostile worldviews were mobilized in both countries to rationalize, on the one hand, British intervention to maintain the international *status quo*; and on the other, German truculence to break the artificial balance that existed in Western Europe.¹⁹

Moreover, the effects attendant with economic shift were not limited to *Realpolitik*. Indeed, the industrial working-class also made notable contributions to British-German relations. Most obviously, in Germany, where working-class unrest convinced troubled elites to seek out a solution in overseas expansion and, when this failed, to solve domestic issues with a continental war. More broadly, working-class dissent contributed to a rightward shift in the German middle class, which was then more inclined towards nationalist and imperialist reforms aimed at rejecting “the existing international *status quo*.” Meanwhile, labour unrest in Britain coincided with a downshift in its economic situation, contributing to a rightward electoral swing that emboldened the imperialist and interventionist factions in the Liberal Party. This shift ensured that any external rival would be received with more “suspicion than in an earlier, more self-confident era.” Of course, there existed other factors, too—such as the press and lobbies. These, however, were contributory, and lacked any independent motive force detached from these considerations.

Despite these additional factors, the overall thesis remains close to crude economic determinism. Indeed, Kennedy, in the end, concludes that British-German bitterness arose from the fact that German economic expansion threatened to interfere with British interests, and that

¹⁸ FO 371/11064/W1252/9/98, minute by Austen Chamberlain, 21 February 1925. Foreign Office Records, the National Archives, Kew.

¹⁹ Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, 464-467.

these economic shifts worried decision-makers “already concerned about ... the Empire.” Moreover, French independence came to be seen as vital to British national and imperial interests, and for this reason Britain had to resist any attack against France—and, here, resist is the operative word, because it was Wilhelmine Germany which was the dynamic factor in western Europe.²⁰ Responsibility is thus attributed to Germany: “had her leaders not been so determined to alter the maritime balance ... after 1897, and to unleash a westward strike [after] ... Sarajevo which with even more certainty would alter the balance, then ... conflict could well have been avoided.” Necessarily, war was unavoidable. Kennedy’s reliance on official records and economic data leads him to conclude that conflict was inevitable. Other alternatives are discounted: “the forces and personalities which determined events moved ... in a certain direction ... it is idle to speculate on the alternatives which were not chosen.”²¹ However, an alternative focus on cultural and intellectual evidence reveals 1914 as an aberration, “rather than a [coherent] culmination.”²²

Kennedy’s stated objective was to explain why Britain and Germany, whose cooperative traditions were reinforced by dynastic, economic, and cultural ties, went to war with each other in 1914.²³ The continued fascination with this contradiction—friendship to enmity—has incentivized historians to accentuate the escalation in hostilities between the two countries.²⁴ Richard Scully, however, contests the conclusion that anti-German sentiment was an essential factor for British mobilization in 1914. The notion that a universal Germanophobia imbued British discourse before

²⁰ David Stafford, “A Moral Tale: Anglo-German Relations, 1860-1914,” *The International History Review* 4, no. 2 (May 1982): 250-251.

²¹ Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, 466-467.

²² Richard Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admirability, Antagonism, and Ambivalence, 1860-1914* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 2012), 1-4.

²³ Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, 464.

²⁴ See e.g., R. J. W. Evans and H. Pogge von Strandmann (eds.), *The Coming of the First World War* (1990); Suzanne Y. Frederick, “The Anglo-German Rivalry, 1890-1914” (1999); James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War* (1984); Robert K. Massie, *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War* (1991); A. J. A. Morris, *The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament, 1896-1914* (1984); Jan R uger, *The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire* (2007).

the Great War is now being substituted with a more nuanced view that stresses fluctuation and ambivalence. Some historians have come to realize that cultural and intellectual attitudes shifted more gradually, “and often with a substantial delay, when compared to changes in [diplomatic] views.” However, “it has been difficult for historians [raised] on the older diplomatic version ... to abandon the notion that after 1890, there was ... an inexorable downturn in British attitudes towards Germany.”²⁵ Scully’s *British Images of Germany* traces this ambivalence in four sections, each focussed on a different material source. The first section offers some fascinating insight into the mutual collaboration that existed between British and German cartographers and geographers in the late nineteenth-century. Indeed, as with other academic fields, this transnational “network was based on shared values and expertise as much as economic interdependence.” Necessarily, there existed rivalry, but this did not hinder cooperative exchange, which had financial as well as intellectual benefits for both countries.²⁶ Particularly, in academia, this collaboration continued until the outbreak of war. Prewar British views of Germany were certainly much more nuanced, ambivalent, “and multifaceted than has hitherto been fully understood.”²⁷

Recent research on British-German relations has doubtless complicated earlier narratives. Some historians now contend that their mutual views were more nuanced, flexible, and diverse than has been claimed in earlier studies. Even when diplomatic bitterness reached its climax, there were still influential voices that continued to advocate reconciliation and friendship.²⁸ The cultural, intellectual, and ecclesiastical voices that were once dismissed as trivial have been revealed as much more influential.²⁹ It is thus difficult to discern a linear movement from ambivalence to

²⁵ Scully, *British Images of Germany*, 1-4.

²⁶ Jan Rüger, “Reviewed Work(s): *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism, and Ambivalence, 1860-1914*. (Britain and the World),” *The American Historical Review* 119, no. 3 (June 2014): 983-984.

²⁷ Scully, *British Images of Germany*, 316.

²⁸ Jan Rüger, “Revisiting the Anglo-German Antagonism,” *The Journal of Modern History* 83, no. 3 (September 2011): 589.

²⁹ See Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, 386-409.

enmity. Thomas Weber's research on *Elite Education in Britain and Germany* illustrates some current trends in the historiography. His work examines two elite universities—Oxford and Heidelberg—in the decades before 1914. This is a transnational as well as a comparative study. Weber compares the universities in reference to their faculties, student societies, militarism, nationalism, student sexuality, antisemitism, and their attitudes towards women. He maintains that Heidelberg did not differ much from Oxford. Frequently, he identifies similarities between the two institutions, and, at times, Heidelberg is revealed as more liberal and inclusive than is Oxford.³⁰

Weber uses the term transnationalism to claim that, while nationalism was robust, it was not necessarily directed against other countries. Moreover, German universities were not any more militarist or conservative than similar institutions in Britain. It was only after two world wars that such notions were reinforced. Weber submits that far too often historical studies have treated the decades before 1914 teleologically, “and have distorted history.” These studies have intensified conflict, tension, and friction, and have often dismissed institutional connections, cultural exchange, and mutual development. German Oxonians and British students at Heidelberg acted to recover and advance relations between their host countries. These students saw no contradiction in German or English nationalism and their desire to ameliorate relations between Britain and Germany. That some attitudes shifted after 1914 does not render them irrelevant.³¹ Prewar efforts to improve British-German relations should not be dismissed as theoretical historical alternatives that did not materialize.³² Rather, these efforts were crucial—indeed, decision-makers in both countries took decisive action to reduce tensions before 1914.³³

³⁰ Weber, *Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I*, 93-98.

³¹ Thomas Weber, *Our Friend “The Enemy”*: *Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 2-3, 12, 48-50, and 93-98.

³² Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, 386-409.

³³ Weber, *Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I*, 93-98.

Previous historical studies have described such efforts as trivial and frivolous, claiming that cultural and intellectual attachments were irrelevant since such affinities “counted for little in actual [decision-making] terms.”³⁴ However, Weber reveals that the efforts undertaken at Oxford and Heidelberg were much closer to the decision-making centres (London and Berlin) than has been indicated in earlier studies. Indeed, Weber shows that before 1914 there was a vital and vibrant British-German life, both in Oxford and at Heidelberg; and that the men who contributed to it were central to their national elite. Weber describes them as “cosmopolitan nationalists” who linked their own nationalism with a transnational identity, based on their belief in a racial hierarchy. Furthermore, he notes that both universities were hotbeds for future statesmen and leaders, which once more underscores how crucial were the fraternal connections formed between British and German students at Oxford and Heidelberg. He claims that rancour between British and German academics stemmed from, rather than initiated, the Great War. Thus, his examination reveals a fragile stability. Weber concludes that far fewer differences existed between Germany, Britain, and “the West,” than has been assumed, and that British and German elites at Oxford and Heidelberg were far more alike than different.³⁵

Similarly, Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth’s edited collection on *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain* maintains that new studies of their relations must now account for “cultural affinities, intellectual cross-fertilizations, social connections, and mutual admiration.” They argue that the traditional focus has obscured transnational, cultural, and intellectual affinities, emphasizing that these “cross-cultural encounters” were vital. Indeed, Britons and Germans embraced each other’s culture with an enthusiastic intensity, even in the moments when their diplomatic relations were at their most adversarial. Thus, the traditional focus overshadows their

³⁴ Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, 386-409.

³⁵ Weber, *Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I*, 2-3, 12, 48-50, and 93-98.

numerous cultural connections and fails to account for their mutual admiration. Without a doubt, their interactions were motivated by rivalry, hostility, and admiration.³⁶

Elsewhere, Marie-Eve Chagnon and Tomás Irish contend that academic, cultural, and intellectual “mobilizations ... and demobilizations” occurred in diverse forms, at different times, before, during, and after the Great War. Their work on the academic world in the Great War era claims that “transnational intellectual networks, institutions, and individuals” directed decision-makers and informed how humanitarian charities distributed their resources. Previous national case studies have assessed how individual nations mobilized their intellectual communities for war. Contrarily, this volume considers the interactions between the academic world, on the one hand, and the war, on the other, in a comparative and transnational way. By 1914, the academic world was incredibly networked and international, linking scholars transnationally. The Great War, too, was a worldwide conflict, “and these intellectual networks suffered as collaborators were recast as enemies.” However, breakdowns and mobilizations did not occur all at once. Rather, their occurrences were subject to numerous factors, such as an individual’s outlook, nationality, academic field, institutional affiliation, “and connectedness to sometimes numerous international networks.” Crucially, this method allows for individual, institutional, and intellectual agency.³⁷ Tara Windsor’s contribution to the collection indicates that decentralized efforts at transnational reconciliation were undertaken soon after the war and were tackled with a remarkable determination.³⁸

Yet, for all these new trends, scholars continue to dismiss any correlation between histories

³⁶ Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth, introduction to *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: Essays on Cultural Affinity*, ed. Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2-13.

³⁷ Marie-Eve Chagnon and Tomás Irish, introduction to *The Academic World in the Era of the Great War*, eds. Marie-Eve Chagnon and Tomás Irish (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 12-14.

³⁸ Tara Windsor, “‘The Domain of the Young as the Generation of the Future’: Student Agency and the Anglo-German Exchange After the Great War,” in *The Academic World in the Era of the Great War*, eds. Marie-Eve Chagnon and Tomás Irish (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 180.

issued before 1914 and interwar revisionist scholarship. Even Steven Siak, whose work contests the assumption that anti-German sentiment was entrenched in historical literature before 1914, overlooks any connection between interwar revisionism and an earlier Germanophilia. Hence, he observes that British-German academic solidarity, amity, and collaboration was severed after the Great War. Siak insists on a demarcation line drawn through 1914, when British academia took a definite and discernible turn at odds with Germany.³⁹ This assessment accords with Peter Firchow's claim that the war launched, with "tremendous force," an adverse shift in how British intellectuals viewed Germany.⁴⁰ Contemporary scholars conclude that Great War era initiated a transformation in how British cultural and intellectual communities viewed Germany. This elucidation discounts institutional, individual, and intellectual initiative and autonomy. Moreover, it also undervalues the influential cultural, intellectual, and ecclesiastical voices that continued to call for amity, fraternity, and reconciliation. Then, too, it overlooks the endurance, malleability, and resilience of the two Germanies thesis, and obscures how British historians actually viewed Germany. This thesis seeks to correct this account and claims that international conflict did not initiate a radical transformation in how British historians characterized Germany. This collective is relevant because its members affected the atmosphere around decision-making; indeed, it is evident that the decision-makers read their works and drew on their commentaries to rationalize their own attitudes and initiatives. Historians were thus offered a forum from which to inculcate a charitable division between the Germanies before, during, and after the Great War.

Contemporary scholars have dismissed the remarkable survival of such views in wartime works on Germany. Stuart Wallace, for instance, contends that the conflict irrevocably shattered the two Germanies thesis and initiated a bleak reorientation in how British cultural and intellectual

³⁹ Siak, "British Historians and the Coming of the First World War," 251-252.

⁴⁰ Firchow, *The Death of the German Cousin*, 178.

communities viewed Germany.⁴¹ This contention, however, overlooks countless wartime works that continued to cite and endorse the notion of two Germanies. Cline, too, notes that historians tended to believe in a two Germanies thesis, but she also dismisses its use after 1914 and claims that it exerted little influence on interwar attitudes towards Germany. Stefan Berger, by contrast, correctly identifies this abstraction as a framework through which earlier historians had come to account for economic, colonial, and naval rivalry. More than any other scholar, he draws attention to its effect on attitudes in interwar Britain. Indeed, his focus shows how it informed leftist ideas about Germany. Particularly, how Labour and radical-Liberal statesmen came to see as their duty the need to defend the new, liberal Weimar Republic after 1919.⁴² Nonetheless, Berger does not consider the formative role historians had in instilling, fostering, and inculcating this mindset. Remarkably, and somewhat curiously, no scholar has undertaken a sustained examination of the continuities that link nineteenth-century, wartime, and interwar historians' views of Germany.

Notably, numerous wartime historians continued to admire German culture, education, and literature, and used their wartime writing to endorse a moderate and balanced outlook. It should be noted that the historians discussed herein shared “certain values and assumptions, cultural and ethical, clear-cut and durable,” that informed their attitudes towards Wilhelmine Germany and, later, the Weimar Republic.⁴³ Generally, these historians had received a public-school education and had undertaken at least some secondary studies in Germany.⁴⁴ Moreover, most identified as Liberal; the term radical-Liberal is used here to denote those who dissented from their Party.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Stuart Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1988), 112.

⁴² Stefan Berger, “Between Efficiency and ‘Prussianism’: Stereotypes and the Perception of the German Social Democrats by the British Labour Party, 1900-1920,” in *Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German Relations*, ed. Rainer Emig (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 184.

⁴³ Antony Lentin, *Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919-1940* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 85.

⁴⁴ Moreover, these scholars often specialized in modern German history.

⁴⁵ Others, still, were to associate with the Labour Party.

These historians acted within a cultural and intellectual framework that combined a scholarly pursuit of historical objectivity with a mental desire to construct a coherent narrative—one that interpreted the past in ways that justified and anticipated a particular vision of the future.⁴⁶ This internal tension produced a subjective reconstructive process that relied as much on expectation as on empirical evidence.⁴⁷ Consequently, these historians contributed to the construction of a usable past that harmonized with their hopes for, and anxieties about, the postwar settlement. Expectation had a transformative effect on how evidence was selected and used in wartime writing. Past events were recast, and at times even reconstructed, to accommodate and forecast future outcomes. Within this context, history was not merely an objective record of earlier events, but rather a narrative that was shaped by present circumstances and expectations of the future.⁴⁸ These historians drew on the past to interpret the present and sought to anticipate and shape foreign policy developments. This reconstructive model was dynamic; yet, at the same time, its attendant discursive frame (the two Germanies thesis) was viewed as remarkably stable.⁴⁹ This duality allowed historians to draw conclusions and moral lessons from history and, once Prussia had been defeated militarily, to advocate a more charitable and rehabilitative settlement.

The tension between a mental desire for correspondence and that for coherence confirmed, for some historians, the sincerity of the protestations emanating from Weimar Germany. Forthwith, these historians saw as their task the need to shield and defend the embattled Weimar Republic from the unfair, discriminatory, and severe Treaty. This collective, admittedly, remained but one section within a broader cultural and intellectual community. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to

⁴⁶ Martin Conway, Jefferson A. Singer, and Angela Tagini, “The Self and Autobiographical Memory: Correspondence and Coherence,” *Social Cognition* 22, no. 5 (2004): 491-492.

⁴⁷ Endel Tulving and Martin LePage, “Where in the Brain is the Awareness of One’s Past,” in *Memory, Brain and Belief*, ed. Daniel L. Schacter and Elaine Scarry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 208-210.

⁴⁸ Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Historical Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 3-4.

⁴⁹ Reinhart Koselleck, *Future Pasts: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 195-197.

envision how a small circle and its influential allies could create an environment that favoured a particular interpretation.⁵⁰ More notably, their views could combine with radical-structuralist ideas about the war and its causes, and about the need to secure a more durable settlement. Revisionist historians objected to the settlement because it condemned a newly democratized nation that could not be held accountable for the conflict. Their refusal to endorse the so-called *War Guilt* Clause (Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles) initiated a shift towards a more radical and revisionist viewpoint. Henceforth, these historians reasoned that the conflict had resulted from militarization, colonial and economic rivalry, and a deficient international order that had divided the continent into two armed coalitions. This view insinuated that a more stable world could only be achieved after a radical transformation in international discourse. These historians thus called for a revised settlement that would amend and reform international relations and facilitate the rehabilitation of a chastened Germany.

Before, during, and after the Great War, historians held a central role as advisors, educators and advocates. British decision-makers, civil servants, and statesmen were often amenable and attuned to their ideas and recommendations because this class had either received an education in history or were themselves academic or amateur historians.⁵¹ Then, too, historians sometimes acted as advisors to eminent statesmen and leaders.⁵² During this era, historians often contributed to accessible media forms such as national dailies, weeklies and reviews, and, at times, dominated the editorial columns. Thus, historians were instrumental in moulding both educated and elite

⁵⁰ Peter Lambert and Björn Weiler, introduction to *How the Past was Used: Historical cultures, c. 750-2000*, eds. Peter Lambert and Björn Weiler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 46.

⁵¹ Some notable civil servants/statesmen to have obtained an education in history are H. H. Asquith, Stanley Baldwin, J. R. M. Butler, Lord Bryce, Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Lord James Gascoyne-Cecil, H. A. L. Fisher, Philip Kerr, G. P. Gooch, Lord Halifax, Sir Samuel Hoare, J. A. R. Marriot, and Sir Charles Trevelyan.

⁵² Donald Cameron Watt, "Every War Must End: War-Time Planning for Post-War Security, in Britain and America in the Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45. The Roles of Historical Example and Professional Historians." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 28 (1978): 159-173.

attitudes and mentalities. One means by which to determine their influence on elite decision-makers is to use individual case studies. The actors here introduced are central to this study, and since this work will refer to them at consistent intervals, it is beneficial to introduce them here briefly. H. A. L. Fisher offers a useful illustration in this concern.

Fisher was vice-chancellor at Sheffield University, when in December 1916, he was elected to Parliament as the Liberal Member for Sheffield Hallam. Lloyd George invited him to join his new coalition government as President of the Board of Education. His nomination was hardly unexpected since he was already well-known to Lloyd George. Moreover, he was familiar with the Liberal intelligentsia—men such as John Morley, Lord Haldane, and Gilbert Murray. However, the decision to nominate Fisher to serve as a senior minister in wartime was a shock, since his main concern was educational reform.⁵³ Indeed, he had little enthusiasm for the war. Previously, he had advocated for a mediated settlement, and he even tried to dissuade the Prime Minister from his declared objective—Germany’s unconditional defeat.⁵⁴ Fisher’s views on the war varied from moment to moment. There was much that he found abhorrent about war. It amounted to an assault on Liberalism: “a breakdown in rationality, a massive setback to ordered evolution, [and a disdain for correct] international behaviour.”⁵⁵ He witnessed with distaste the excessive nationalism flaunted in the more chauvinist dailies. Still, there was much that lifted his spirits. The nation it seemed had rediscovered its unity. He desired that this collaborative mood should be maintained after the war, and that the links formed in wartime, between the learned and the masses, could be used to better rebuild the nation. Hopefully, university-trained staff, with a newfound esteem for

⁵³ Lloyd George considered himself fortunate enough to have convinced Fisher to undertake the Presidency. “His tenure in that important office will ever constitute one of the most outstanding chapters in the annals of our educational history. No Minister since W. E. Forster has left such a mark on our system of education.” David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George* vol. 1 (London: Odhams Press Ltd, 1933), 642.

⁵⁴ A. Ryan, “Fisher, Herbert Albert Laurens (1865-1940),” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

⁵⁵ Dennis Dean, “The Dilemmas of an Academic Liberal Historian in Lloyd George’s Government: H. A. L. Fisher at the Board of Education, 1916-1922,” *History* 79, no. 255 (February 1994): 72.

the working-classes, would work to transform hostile attitudes towards education even in the most averse rural areas.⁵⁶ Doubtless, he concurred with his friend, Gilbert Murray, “that Liberal feeling ... should keep in touch with the war—not let Patriotism become identified with Toryism or Militarism.”⁵⁷ Fisher involved himself in war-work at Sheffield University. He motivated his staff to volunteer their skills to aid the war effort, and classrooms and laboratories were modified to assist with the conflict. Fisher also wrote tracts that commented on the war effort favourably.⁵⁸

However, his fervour for war-work soon diminished. Steadily, he became alarmed with the battlefield stalemate. Fisher believed that the longer the conflict continued, the less chance there was of a reasonable and durable settlement. Lloyd George considered his views valuable enough to invite him to discuss the future settlement. Fisher desired terms that would secure the needed conditions for reconciliation and economic recovery. Gradually, the Prime Minister seemed able to understand his viewpoint; and while Fisher disdained the war, he came to believe that Lloyd George would combat and diminish chauvinism in Britain.⁵⁹ Thus, he felt able to return to his work for educational reform. He toured the countryside in an effort to better understand the education infrastructure which, at the time, was administered and financed locally; and, as a result, it was in all areas underfunded. Fisher observed, after a visit to schools in London, that the imbalances between the best and worst schools was far wider than were the differences between the best schools and Eton or Winchester.⁶⁰ True, notable advances had been made in recent decades, but the structure was imbalanced and there remained woeful deficiencies. It was then notorious that teachers were not well remunerated. Their salaries were so insufficient as to make it difficult “for

⁵⁶ H. A. L. Fisher, *The British Share in the War* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1915), 23; and H. A. L. Fisher, *The Place of the University in the Life of the Nation* (London: 1918), 13.

⁵⁷ Gilbert Murray Papers 11 (special correspondence), 133, letter Gilbert Murray to H. A. L. Fisher, 10 August 1914, Gilbert Murray Papers, Bodleian Library.

⁵⁸ Dean, “H. A. L. Fisher at the Board of Education,” 72-73.

⁵⁹ Dean, “H. A. L. Fisher at the Board of Education,” 72-73.

⁶⁰ Ryan, “Fisher, Herbert Albert Laurens,” *ODNB*.

them to maintain and increase their efficiency.” There was a serious concern that male teachers would vanish from schoolrooms altogether, since educated men could not wish to maintain homes or families on such token salaries. The war exacerbated this situation as there was a substantial increase in basic costs. It was clear that the remuneration afforded to schoolteachers was distasteful and a cause for serious concern.⁶¹ More critically, the war and recruitment had revealed how common malnourishment was among the working-classes. The government’s failure to care for the welfare of working-class children was evident, and the most obvious means by which to correct this issue was the schoolroom, where children would sooner or later come under the influence of the state. Primary schools, further extended, could watch over future citizens from childhood to adolescence, “and secure their lives from becoming ... debilitated or stunted.” Finally, educational reform was seen as a critical condition to postwar reconstruction. Clearly, Britain’s educational structure needed to be reformed in advance, in readiness for demobilization.⁶²

Fisher brought to his task the ideal mindset. Remarkably, while the war continued to distract and consume the other Cabinet members, he introduced before the War Cabinet two memoranda on educational reform. The first addressed the remuneration of teachers; the second outlined an ambitious twelve-point programme. The Cabinet readily endorsed both memoranda and authorized Fisher to undertake certain matters raised in his initiative.⁶³ Fisher undertook a national tour to address concerns and to build consensus for his legislation. The so-called *Fisher Education Act* (1918) revolutionized the education framework in Britain. Fisher received universal

⁶¹ Lloyd George was himself a schoolmaster’s son and knew from painful experience how shabbily the profession was treated, “I have ... a painful recollection of the privation teachers’ families, prematurely stricken down, had to endure.” He was to recall that his father was paid an income “that a town scavenger would to-day have regarded as an insult to his trade.” David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George* vol. 2 (London: Odhams Press Ltd, 1933), 1988.

⁶² Lloyd George, *War Memoirs* vol. 2, 1989-1900.

⁶³ Lloyd George was instrumental to these new schemes. Fisher remembered his “strong and constant support, for which I can never be too grateful.” Fisher, *An Unfinished Autobiography*, 92.

acclaim for such fine and constructive statecraft. Lloyd George later recalled that the “war was not an end in itself”: Britain fought in order to secure a new and better world. What “Mr. Fisher did ... [for] our educational infrastructure” was wise, visionary, and shrewd.⁶⁴ The war made demands on all social classes alike, and “it was felt that to all should be accorded, so far as could be,” fair and even treatment.⁶⁵ Fisher’s work on the Education Act won him universal commendation. He was an esteemed figure in Lloyd George’s coalition government, “his sole link with the Liberal intelligentsia.”⁶⁶ The Prime Minister referred to Fisher in warm terms: “another Morley,” he told C. P. Scott, “most admired also and influential in the Cabinet, and a dedicated Liberal.”⁶⁷ The acclaim he won in wartime was to serve him well in Paris, where he advocated reconciliation, revision, and moderation. Keith O. Morgan identifies Fisher and Winston Churchill as the two most influential Liberal ministers in the coalition government. Fisher acted as an interlocutor between the Liberal intelligentsia and the Prime Minister. But he was far from a servile lieutenant. He remained a committed Liberal and served as a counter-blast to Lord Curzon and the Tories on issues such as disarmament, reform, and the Peace Treaties. Partly, he was the reason that Lloyd George “remained in some sense an active ... Liberal.”⁶⁸

Fisher was not the only historian to influence Lloyd George. William Harbutt Dawson, a sometime senior staff officer and civil servant, had an influential effect on Lloyd George when the latter served as President of the Board of Trade. Dawson was seen as an authoritative and valuable source for information on Bismarckian Germany. G. P. Gooch confirmed as much in a letter to Dawson that commended him for his exactness and productivity: “I have read every one of your

⁶⁴ Lloyd George, *War Memoirs* vol. 2, 1988-1904.

⁶⁵ Fisher, *An Unfinished Autobiography*, 94.

⁶⁶ Kenneth O. Morgan, “Lloyd George’s Stage Army: The Coalition Liberals, 1918-1922,” in *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays*, ed. A. J. P. Taylor (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 230-231.

⁶⁷ C. P. Scott, diary entry, 30 November-1 December 1919, *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928*, ed. Trevor Wilson (London: Collins Press, 1970), 379.

⁶⁸ Morgan, “The Coalition Liberals,” 230-231.

books on Germany ... and have learned more from them than from the writings of anybody else.”⁶⁹ Dawson’s *Evolution of Modern Germany*, first released in 1908, was reissued five times before 1914, and was acclaimed as “far and away the best book that has appeared in this country concerning modern Germany.”⁷⁰ J. W. Headlam-Morley, similarly, reviewed Dawson’s wartime study, *What is Wrong with Germany?* (1915), enthusiastically: “there is ... no one in England who has ... wider and more intimate information of modern Germany, than Mr. Dawson.”⁷¹ Elsewhere, Lord Haldane extolled Dawson for his work on the *German Empire*. Haldane commended him for his fairness, fluency, and internationalism.⁷² Haldane wrote to Dawson once more to congratulate him on the second volume, which he admired “even more than the first.” The conclusions drawn therein were “fair and temperate,” and the individual sketches were “excellent,” “just and true.”⁷³ Lastly, his status as an authoritative source for information on Imperial Germany is further established by a letter he received from Robert Donald, editor-in-chief at the *Daily Chronicle*. Donald asked Dawson to write “one or two articles on a German subject,” noting that Lloyd George himself had recommended Dawson “as the most competent authority to write them.”⁷⁴

Despite the acclaim he later received as an historian, writer, and commentator, Dawson first trained as a journalist. His father, John Thomas Dawson, founded and edited the *Craven*

⁶⁹ WHD 269: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 24 March 1915. W. H. Dawson Papers, 1871-1948, University of Birmingham, Cadbury Research Library and Special Collections, Birmingham.

⁷⁰ WHD 2152/163: review by W. A. Wilson, in *The Beacon*, February 1909. Moreover, Thomas Fisher Unwin noted that the work had received much acclaim and “interest ... in Germany.” Unwin established his own editorial firm in 1882 (T. Fisher Unwin Publishers); in 1892, he married Jane Catherine (whose father was the well-known radical statesman Richard Cobden). Unwin was an ardent liberal and internationalist. His interests are evident from his firm’s reference lists. The *Story of the Nations Library*, to which eminent historians contributed, reflected his interest in free trade, liberalism, and international affairs. Unwin was a keen mountaineer and often vacationed in Germany. WHD 194: letter T. Fisher Unwin to W. H. Dawson, 5 July 1910; WHD 197: letter T. Fisher Unwin to W. H. Dawson, 13 July 1910; and Julie F. Codell, “Unwin, Thomas Fisher (1848-1935),” *ODNB*.

⁷¹ J. W. Headlam, “New Books: Prussia and Germany,” *Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, UK), 16 March 1916.

⁷² WHD 418: letter Lord Haldane to W. H. Dawson, 10 February 1919.

⁷³ WHD 428: letter Lord Haldane to W. H. Dawson, 10 March 1919.

⁷⁴ WHD 205: letter Robert Donald to W. H. Dawson, 10 November 1910. When it was believed that Prince Bernhard von Bülow had suffered a fatal stroke in the Reichstag in March 1906, the *Manchester Guardian* wrote to Dawson to solicit an obituary notice. WHD 130: letter Editor of the *Manchester Guardian* to W. H. Dawson, 6 April 1906.

Pioneer—later the *West Yorkshire Pioneer*—a Liberal daily based in Skipton, North Yorkshire. Dawson thus trained for a career in journalism, and it was for this reason that he first travelled to Germany in 1885. However, once he arrived in Berlin, he cultivated an inexhaustible interest in German industrial and social reform. He soon left his position at a British-German firm to enrol as a student at Berlin University, where he studied under Friedrich Paulsen, Heinrich von Treitschke, Gustav Schmoller, and Adolph Wagner. His education stimulated in him an enthusiastic admiration for Bismarckian state socialism and industrial reform. This admiration led Dawson to describe German socio-economic institutions as commendable models from which other nations could learn.⁷⁵ Dawson relished his time in Berlin, and it was there that he met his first wife, Anna Clara Augusta Gruetz (1862-1912), whom he married in 1889.

When his father died suddenly, Dawson left Berlin and returned to Skipton to administer and edit the *Pioneer*.⁷⁶ He also started to contribute articles and editorials on German affairs to serials such as the *Fortnightly Review*. His close contacts with Paulsen, Wagner and, from 1897, the social reformer and scholar, Emil Muensterberg, ensured that these contributions were well informed. Muensterberg's influence on Dawson was considerable and, after Anna Clara's untimely death, Dawson married Muensterberg's daughter, Else, in 1912. It was at this time that Dawson first established himself as a reformer and local activist within the Liberal Party.⁷⁷ His information on German social welfare and industrial structure attracted the interest of the newly elected Liberal government (1905), which was about to embark on its own scheme of social reform. Dawson was thus invited to serve as a researcher at the Board of Trade in 1906, where he first met David Lloyd

⁷⁵ See e.g., *Bismarck and State Socialism* (1891), *The German Workman* (1906), *The Evolution of Modern Germany* (1908), *Industrial Germany* (1912), and *Social Insurance in Germany, 1883-1911* (1912).

⁷⁶ Jörg Filthaut, "Dawson, William Harbutt (1860-1948)," *ODNB*.

⁷⁷ Stefan Berger, "William Harbutt Dawson: The Career and Politics of an Historian of Germany," *The English Historical Review* 116, no. 465 (2001): 78.

George. Frederick Whitley Thomson, a former Liberal Member of Parliament, wrote to the future Prime Minister, in 1908, to introduce and commend his “old friend, Mr. W. Harbutt Dawson.” Thomson enclosed an address on social insurance and workforce redundancy, explaining that he did so “knowing how interested you are in issues related to the working classes.” He trusted “that the views there stated are such as are in accord with your own,” and noted that Dawson had drafted the address and had rendered him valuable service during his time in Parliament.⁷⁸

During his tenure at the Board of Trade, Lloyd George started to admire German industrial and social reform. His most influential source of information on German state socialism was Dawson, whose books, he noted, were written with the intent to understand “German thought, life, and character,” and to illuminate its social and industrial methods and customs.⁷⁹ Between 1908 and 1911, Dawson drafted reports and memoranda on Germany, wrote addresses for Lloyd George, and contributed to the framework of the National Health Insurance Act (1911). It seems likely, too, that he was involved in inviting Muensterberg to offer evidence on welfare administration to the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws.⁸⁰ He also used his senior consultative role to endorse the idea that there were two Germanies—old and new, ethereal and material, rustic and industrial. Dawson truly believed that “no wilful disturbance” should be looked for from Germany, since the economic success on which its “mind was set could only be achieved by [nonviolent] methods.” The German Empire had doubtless become an economic competitor, but there was no need for vilification, since its industrial evolution had been achieved through “means and methods” available to Britain. Thus, the only realistic manner in which to meet continental competition was to adopt a friendly attitude that combined an “inflexible good-humour ... with an equally inflexible

⁷⁸ WHD 167: letter Frederick Whitley Thomson to David Lloyd George, 17 November 1908.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Kenneth O. Morgan, “Lloyd George and Germany,” *The Historical Journal* 39, no. 3 (September 1996): 756.

⁸⁰ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 79.

determination not to abandon ingloriously” the entrepreneurial and industrial traditions that had secured the British Empire. Dawson used his innumerable studies to advocate friendship, amity, and cooperation between Britain and Germany.

These ideas appear to have influenced Lloyd George. Germany, he recorded, embodied social cohesion and industrial efficiency. When Henry Campbell-Bannerman stood down as Prime Minister in 1908, Lloyd George was transferred to the Treasury. Promptly, he began work on a scheme to introduce health and social insurance to Britain and decided to refine his views on social insurance and industrial reform with a visit to Germany. He arrived at Nuremberg and travelled through the southwest via Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, and Frankfurt, before he reached Hamburg. There, he was much enthralled by the commercial ties between Hamburg and Britain. This visit led him, for the first time, to enter into serious discussions on international relations and foreign policy.⁸¹ Previously, he had met with Count Paul Wolff Metternich, the German ambassador in London, to discuss a reduction in naval armaments and the need for improved relations.⁸² During his visit to Germany, he continued to call for naval disarmament. He sought a meeting with the German Chancellor, von Bülow, or Kaiser Wilhelm II, but instead received an interview with the vice-Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, whom he met in Berlin. The interview turned combative when Bethmann-Hollweg started to discuss the *ententes* between Britain and France, and between Britain and Russia. His favourable attitude towards individual Englishmen, or the fact that his son attended Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, counted for little as he fulminated against the “iron ring” that encircled Germany.⁸³ The interview introduced Lloyd George to a more militant

⁸¹ Morgan, “Lloyd George and Germany,” 757.

⁸² Lloyd George, *War Memoirs* vol. I, 11-28.

⁸³ Lloyd George recorded that von Bethmann-Hollweg exclaimed “England is embracing France. She is making friends with Russia. But it is not that you love each other; it is that you hate Germany!” Lloyd George, *War Memoirs* vol. I, 30.

bellicose, and stubborn Germany, and demonstrated the obstacles confronting any accord between Britain and Germany.⁸⁴

Thereafter, he became fascinated with the dualism that existed between the autocratic Prussian *Junkers* and the real, or authentic, Germany, which he identified with commerce, trade, creativity, efficiency, and social reform. Indeed, he remarked to his friend, C. F. G. Masterman and his wife, Lucy, “I like the Germans, but I hate [the] *Junkers*.”⁸⁵ Lloyd George appears to have embraced the idea that there were two Germanies. During an interview with C. P. Scott, the owner and editor of the *Manchester Guardian* (22 July 1911), he warned that the real threat “was Prussia really, not Germany.” He feared that Prussia “should seek a continental dominance not far removed from the Napoleonic.”⁸⁶ Nonetheless, he continued his efforts to decelerate the dreadnought construction schedule and to advocate improved relations with Wilhelmine Germany.⁸⁷ He lamented that civilized communities should feel to need to invest such exorbitant sums on national armaments to better “kill one another.” Moreover, he considered it shameful that two advanced and civilized societies, such as Britain and Germany, should be unable to establish a better understanding.⁸⁸ Even in July 1914, he felt confident that common sense, charity, and forbearance would win-out in Germany (and Britain).⁸⁹ He declared to the Commons (23 July) that relations between the two countries were “much better” even now than a decade before, and that their shared commercial interests would soon render armaments unnecessary.⁹⁰ Lloyd George shared with

⁸⁴ Morgan, “Lloyd George and Germany,” 758.

⁸⁵ Lucy Masterman, *C. F. G. Masterman: A Biography* (London: Nicolson and Watson Ltd, 1939), 199.

⁸⁶ C. P. Scott, diary entry, 22 July 1911, *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928*, 46-49.

⁸⁷ Morgan, “Lloyd George and Germany,” 758.

⁸⁸ “Mr. Lloyd George. Why Not an Anglo-German Understanding?” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, UK), 29 July 1908.

⁸⁹ “Mr. Lloyd George and the City,” *The Times* (London, UK), 18 July 1914.

⁹⁰ United Kingdom. HC Deb, 23 July 1914, volume 65, column 727-728 (Mr. Lloyd George). Earlier, he sat for an interview with the *Daily News* in which he commended the now “infinitely more friendly” relations between Britain and Germany. “Arms and the Nation,” *Daily News* (London, UK), 1 January 1914. Quoted in T. G. Otte, “Détente 1914: Sir William Tyrrell’s Secret Mission to Germany,” *The Historical Journal* 56, no. 1 (March 2013): 177.

Dawson the view that commerce would arrest militarist tendencies in Germany.⁹¹ He was convinced that naval disarmament would be secured once the influential financial centres “realise what a menace [armaments] are to capital, to property, to industry, and to prosperity,” and he felt confident because this movement transcended nationality.⁹² There is no reason to believe that Lloyd George was, at this moment, worried that Britain should need to intervene in a continental conflict to save France or Belgium. Doubtless, he would not have received such advice from Dawson. Rather, Dawson would have reassured him that Germany’s economic aims meant that there was no nation more contented or restful “than the Germans.”⁹³

Dawson worked for a decade or more to secure better relations between Great Britain and Germany. He believed that the naval arms race was the foremost obstacle that obstructed a restoration of mutual confidence. Accordingly, he wrote to the economist Dr. Adolph Wagner, in 1910, “in the hope that [Wagner] might ... use [his] influence in government circles,” to secure a conference on naval armaments limitation. This effort could well remove the uncertainties that thwarted Britain-German reconciliation.⁹⁴ Conceivably, Dawson also discussed with Lloyd George the need to coordinate a summit with Germany. Lloyd George was, in fact, inclined towards such an idea, having tried to direct confidential discussions with von Bülow in 1908.⁹⁵ Dawson insisted that the affairs “of every state must [out] of necessity advance from national standpoints.” Yet, at the same time, he did not believe that German or English nationalism need entail a confrontation between Britain and Germany.⁹⁶ On the contrary, their cultural, educational, and racial affinities

⁹¹ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 12.

⁹² United Kingdom. HC Deb, 23 July 1914, volume 65, column 727-728 (Mr. Lloyd George). See Bentley B. Gilbert, “Pacifist to Intervention: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an Issue?” *The Historical Journal* 28, no. 4 (December 1985): 863.

⁹³ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 12.

⁹⁴ WHD 204: letter W. H. Dawson to Dr. Adolph Wagner, 1 November 1910.

⁹⁵ F. W. Wiemann, “Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914,” in *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays*, ed. A. J. P. Taylor (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 71.

⁹⁶ Quoted Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 86.

should allow their statesmen to resolve the differences that existed between them. Needless to say, he was not alone in this conviction; indeed, these ideas were unremarkable in the decade or so before 1914.⁹⁷ The admiration and commendation which Dawson's numerous works and studies received leave little doubt as to his influence on educated and elite attitudes in Britain. Moreover, his correspondence demonstrates the esteemed role that historians held as advocates, emissaries, and advisers. Finally, it underscores the value that statesmen attached to history and to historical advisers.

Lastly, let us consider the historian George Peabody Gooch. Before the war, Gooch had been elected to Parliament as a Liberal Member (1906) but lost his seat in 1910. Soon afterwards, he became co-editor of the *Contemporary Review* (CR). Both as editor and lawmaker, he advocated a charitable division between the two Germanies. He often criticized the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, whether in Parliament or in the CR. He would in wartime use his editorial role to endorse a mediated settlement and the Union of Democratic Control (UDC); after the war, he worked with Dawson to revise what he bitterly termed, "a French Peace - a Clemenceau Peace."⁹⁸ Together, Gooch and Dawson formulated an outlook that was to become the established norm in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Their rationale for revision was twofold. First, they sought to shield Weimar Germany from the harsh, discriminatory, and unfair Peace Treaty. Dawson thus wrote of ruinous indemnities, continued abuses, and territorial affronts, which he feared would destabilize the Weimar Republic.⁹⁹ Thereafter, first Gooch and then Dawson, came to believe that the Great Powers all shared some responsibility for the Great War. Both men therefore refused to endorse the so-called *War Guilt* Clause, a refusal that marked a shift towards a more radical and revisionist

⁹⁷ Berger, "William Harbutt Dawson," 86.

⁹⁸ Quoted in Frank Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 314

⁹⁹ William Harbutt Dawson, "Germany and Spa," *The Contemporary Review* 118 (July 1920): 1-12.

viewpoint. The idea that all the Great Powers bore responsibility for the war appealed those who wished to revise the Treaty, since this undermined the claim that Germany alone was at fault in 1914—the moral foundation of the Versailles Treaty. Consequently, Gooch and Dawson concluded that the grievances the Germans sought to redress were fair, valid, and even lawful. Gooch, in turn, made the *CR* available to British and German scholars who decried war indemnities and France’s near-unilateral efforts to enforce their collection.¹⁰⁰ Naturally, he solicited “moderately-worded” articles and commentaries from contributors favourably inclined to this perspective.¹⁰¹ Dawson, in a 1920 article for the *CR*, reasoned that if Britain wished democratic Germany to survive, it would “have to meet her in a [friendlier]” and more tolerant mood.¹⁰²

During the 1920s, British decision-makers became increasingly familiar with revisionist interpretations. This was achieved because historians could access them with relative ease. Besides Lloyd George, Dawson was also in communication with Ramsay MacDonald, Arthur Henderson, and even Austen Chamberlain. Meanwhile, C. Raymond Beazley, Harold Temperley, and A. J. Toynbee each communicated, at one time or another, with MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin, and Neville Chamberlain.¹⁰³ More noteworthy, at least, with reference to influence, was the close association between Gooch and MacDonald.¹⁰⁴ MacDonald doubtless found in Gooch, whom he esteemed as “our [most able] historian,” the intellectual and moral rationale for his own moderate attitudes towards Weimar Germany.¹⁰⁵ MacDonald, like Dawson and Gooch, feared that internal extremism and virulent nationalism would destabilize the Weimar Republic. He thus embraced the

¹⁰⁰ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 51-52.

¹⁰¹ WHD 377: letter Gooch to Dawson, 1 July 1918.

¹⁰² Dawson, “Germany and Spa,” 8.

¹⁰³ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 52; and Keith Hamilton, “The Pursuit of ‘Enlightened Patriotism’: The British Foreign Office and Historical Researchers during the Great War and Its Aftermath,” in *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians through Two World Wars*, ed. Keith Wilson (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996), 203.

¹⁰⁴ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 52.

¹⁰⁵ F.O. 370/202, folio 46, Ramsay MacDonald to Sir Eyre Crowe, 15 August 1924.

idea that the settlement needed to be revised in order to secure a democratic Germany. MacDonald worked to normalize relations between Britain, France, and Germany, and lobbied to ensure that German officials were invited “to meet the Allies in Conference.”¹⁰⁶ He believed that a revised settlement, that incorporated advice from outside authorities, would have more “moral value than ... the Treaty of Versailles.”¹⁰⁷ Gradually, the settlement, which had once been viewed as “stern but ... just,” became to be seen as harsh, immoral, and inexcusable, and there was little interest in Britain to defend the Treaty.¹⁰⁸ These are necessarily short and succinct summaries; much more detail will be revealed later. Nonetheless, these concise case studies serve to show how individual historians could influence even the most influential decision-makers.

There were, admittedly, numerous factors that led to this disinterested, listless, and detached mood. For one, a deterioration in Franco-British relations tended to foster a more charitable and benevolent attitude towards Germany. Then, too, interwar economic difficulties made clear the need to bolster Germany, this was seen as an essential condition for financial recovery—not only on the continent, but also in Britain. J. M. Keynes did much to reinforce this view with his brilliant treatise on *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. More generally, his derisive caricatures and anecdotal remarks served to undermine the settlement and its “incompetent,” “slow and unadaptable” mediators.¹⁰⁹ Finally, vocal criticism from elite coteries, such as ecclesiastics, relief workers, and industrialists, contributed to an erosion of public support

¹⁰⁶ Ramsay MacDonald to Sir R. Grahame, 23 June 1924, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, vol. XXVI, eds. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1985), no. 493.

¹⁰⁷ Ramsay MacDonald to Edouard Herriot, Paris, 8 July 1924, *DBFP*, vol. XXVI no. 507.

¹⁰⁸ Lloyd George asked his fellow lawmakers at large “to point out in respect of any of these main conditions a single act of injustice.” United Kingdom. HC Deb, 3 July 1919, volume 117, column 1213-1214 (David Lloyd George). Indeed, there was limited official resistance to the Treaty. This is reflected in the fact that the second reading was limited to one day each in the Lords and Commons in contrast to the several weeks’ discussion in the French Chambers. F. S. Northedge, *The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers, 1916-1939* (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd, 1966), 121-122.

¹⁰⁹ John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1919), 43-45.

for the settlement.¹¹⁰ Nonetheless, it was revisionist historians and their fellow-thinkers who supplied the intellectual framework and moral rationale for interwar revisionism. This collective denounced the settlement as unfair because it condemned a recently democratized nation that could not be held accountable for the war. This view endorsed any action, unilateral, or otherwise, that would reverse the excessive, discriminatory, and harsh clauses of the Treaty.

British interwar attitudes towards the settlement took countless forms, often contradictory, but in most cases favourable to substantial revision. Numerous societies, associations, unions, and clubs advocated discussion of issues such as indemnities, territorial revanchism, and war guilt. Particularly, historians laboured to convince British decision-makers of the need to revise the Versailles Treaty. Granted, not all historians supported revision. Those who lobbied for a revised settlement were often radical-Liberals or Socialists, with ties to the UDC. The two most active historians within what may be termed the revisionist school were Dawson and Gooch.¹¹¹ Their influence was, at first, limited, but it was to increase after 1923. Gooch's bond with MacDonald doubtless assisted them, but so too did their interactions with other historical schools; most often structuralists, whether with a radical-UDC focus on demilitarization and democratic institutions, or more traditional historians, whose work advocated a renewed continental concert that would restore a contrite and rehabilitated Germany.¹¹² Gooch and Dawson's ideas could combine with either school, though their views more often resonated with the radical outlook. Certainly, their views harmonized with calls for demilitarization, democratization, and collective security. Yet, it was in their interpretation of the final settlement that their attitudes coalesced most decisively.

¹¹⁰ Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles," 43-44.

¹¹¹ Dawson and Gooch were both Germanophiles. This thesis will at times refer to a 'Germanophile school', and while not this outlook is not the same as the revisionist school, the two were linked inextricably.

¹¹² The term structuralist is used here to describe historians who stressed the underlying political, institutional, and societal frameworks that structured international relations. Structuralists viewed the postwar settlement and its revision not merely through the lens of diplomatic events or individual actors, but as outcomes deeply rooted in the evolution, transformation, or reinforcement of broader structural systems.

Both Germanophilia and radical-structuralism tended to foster moderation, restraint, and fraternity, and were therefore favourable to revision.

Not all historians shared this enthusiasm for revision. Nonetheless, by mid-1920s, the need to revise the settlement had become near-incontestable in internationalist, socialist, and radical circles. Liberal, Labour, and even internationalist Conservative statesmen, disillusioned with the Treaty, embraced revisionist interpretations in order to rationalize their own initiatives to reconcile Britain and Germany. Lord Curzon, MacDonald, and even Austen Chamberlain all made efforts towards translating revisionist commentaries into sustainable and robust solutions. Doubtless, these statesmen found in revisionist literature the intellectual and moral rationale for their own moderate attitudes and outlooks. Evidently, history—and broader ideas about national tradition—mattered to elected officials, decision-makers, and political elites. British historians thus had an audience with both educated and elite elements of society, affecting their mentalities and debates, either directly or indirectly. It can thus be reasoned that revisionist historians provided decision-makers with the vocabulary by which to frame and articulate interwar reconciliation with Germany. Over time, their research intimated that appeasement was both sensible and moral, and an effective means of averting another continental calamity. The historical lessons and moral truths which these historians tried to instruct found a receptive audience with statesmen anxious to avoid another war with Germany. Moreover, the two Germanies thesis validated appeasement because it endorsed the view that there were unidentified forces of moderation even within Nazi Germany. Revision could thus be framed as a means of strengthening and sustaining these otherwise innominate democratic elements.

Finally, this dissertation will examine the transnational intellectual networks that connected British historians with statesmen, decision-makers, and civil servants in Britain, the United States,

and Germany. Prosopography enables the reconstruction of these networks and allows correlations to be drawn between individual case studies and shared activities, interests, and interactions, thereby revealing the intellectual, social, and cultural motivations that fostered revisionist tendencies within this collective. The aim here is not to understand history through individuals alone, but rather to understand how individuals affect—and are themselves affected by—historical processes. Historical culture, moreover, provides a means of understanding “the cultural and intellectual framework within which” historical actors behaved, functioned, “and communicated with one another.”¹¹³ This approach offers a way of examining elite decision-making in relation to an intellectual discourse rich in references to culture and history. This thesis thus advances a collective model wherein individuals, intellectual networks, and mental frameworks interacted to inform and shape elite and educated attitudes before, during, and after the Great War. In doing so, it seeks to reframe the master narrative and contribute to the ongoing reassessment within the historiography.

This thesis is structured chronologically. The first chapter examines the value and authority that educated elites and decision-makers attached to history, while also accounting for the cultural, racial, and historical theories that anchored and framed British views of Germany. One means by which to explore these ideas is through an analysis of how historians treated and wrote about Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany. This chapter demonstrates that British historians generally viewed Germany favourably and used their professional writing to advocate amicable relations between the two countries. Their works informed demi-official views of Germany, which were anti-Prussian rather than anti-German. Historians not only influenced elite mentalities and debates but also provided an interpretative framework for British-German relations more broadly. The

¹¹³ Lambert and Weiler, introduction to *How the Past was Used*, 48.

second chapter focuses on how British historians viewed Germany during the Great War. Even in wartime, some historians continued to acknowledge a cultural and intellectual indebtedness to Germany—an admission that led them to endorse the notion of two Germanies. These historians worked to reconstruct a usable past that would harmonize with their desires for, and anxieties about, the postwar settlement. This focus illustrates that there were definite limits to wartime hostility and highlights the important continuities across periods of conflict and trauma.

Chapter three moves on to examine the official and unofficial intellectual study groups established to research and formulate war aims. It considers how the two Germanies thesis affected these circles, as well as the broader intellectual vision and strategy of the British Peace Delegation, situating this analysis within the context of the Paris Peace Conference. Chapter Four demonstrates how the two Germanies thesis allowed historians to retain an overidealized view of Germany, despite the disorderly, troublesome, and turbulent shifts and trends within the Weimar Republic. This section claims that revisionist historians supplied the vocabulary through which decision-makers could frame and articulate interwar reconciliation, thereby enabling statesmen to pursue innovative means of restoring normal relations between Britain, France, and Germany. Moreover, it examines the role historians had in dismantling and discrediting the Treaty of Versailles. Particularly, through their refusal to accept the *War Guilt* Clause—a stance that initiated a shift towards more radical and revisionist perspectives. Notably, these views were embraced and acted upon by elite decision-makers intent on rehabilitating Germany.

The fifth and sixth chapters examine the extent to which revisionist literature influenced the decision to treat with and make concessions to Nazi Germany. They argue that the decision-making elite adhered to the revisionist interpretations promoted by historians during the 1920s; chiefly, that Germany had been mistreated at Versailles and that the grievances its leaders sought

to address were reasonable, valid, and even lawful. While numerous factors coalesced to invalidate and weaken the Treaty, it was these historians who supplied the intellectual and moral framework for revisionism. The two Germanies thesis further reinforced this outlook by advancing the view that unidentified forces of moderation persisted even within Nazi Germany. The conclusion then looks forward, identifying new directions for future research.

1. “History is Past Politics, and Politics are Present History”: British Historians and the Practice of History before 1914

Before 1914, history served as a crucial vehicle for socialization, a means by which to inculcate civic-mindedness and nationalism.¹¹⁴ Gradually, history, and an awareness thereof, were seen as essential criteria for citizenship. The Oxford Regius Professor, E. A. Freeman, offered the axiom, “History is past Politics, and Politics are present History.” Sir John Seeley, Regius Professor at Cambridge, remarked wittily, “without History, Politics has no root, without Politics, History has no Fruit.”¹¹⁵ Albert Frederick Pollard, the first chairman for the Historical Association (1906), affirmed that historical information offers “a sound basis for Politics.” He asserted that “everyone has to be a citizen; and he cannot be an intelligent ... citizen” without history.¹¹⁶ History was thus seen to foster and inculcate virtue and civility.¹¹⁷ W. H. Webb, an elected fellow to the Royal Historical Society, called on administrative authorities to offer schoolchildren “a more thorough and comprehensive” education in history. He warned that unless our future leaders are taught more thoroughly, “Britain ... must be a declining Power.”¹¹⁸ Without a doubt, history mattered to educated elites and decision-makers alike—arguably more so than any other academic field—because it was seen to influence views about citizenship, duty, civic-mindedness, nationalism, and nationhood.

Of course, nationalism broadly, and ideas about responsible citizenship specifically, pre-date the late nineteenth century. Between the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, continental conflict, anti-Catholic bias, overseas imperialism, economic expansion, evangelicalism, liberalism

¹¹⁴ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 231-232.

¹¹⁵ Quoted in H. L. Withers, “The Teaching of History in England in the Nineteenth Century,” in *The Teaching of History and Papers*, eds. H. L. Withers and J. H. Fowler (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1904), 156.

¹¹⁶ A. F. Pollard, *On the Value of the Study of History*, Historical Association Leaflet no. 26 (London, 1911), 8-10.

¹¹⁷ *The Times Educational Supplement* (May 1887), p. 137. Report of a lecture by H. C. Bowen.

¹¹⁸ W. H. Webb, “History, Patriotism, and the Child: A Plea for the Fuller Teaching of British History in Elementary Schools,” *History* 2, no. 1 (January-March 1913): 53.

and scientific evolution combined with older ideas, alliances, and fidelities to create a *Greater Britain*.¹¹⁹ This new nationalism was certainly inclusive, in the sense that it was shared generally. Gradually, Protestantism and overseas economic interests linked the landed elite with the commercial community. However, *Greater Britain* was an invention created above all by conflict. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, continental war brought Britons into confrontation with the foremost Catholic Power—France. Conflict with Catholic France made it feasible for the different countries, social classes, and ethnic identities contained in Great Britain to share ideas in common—whether it was fear, hostility, or embattled Protestantism. This recurrent and drawn-out struggle distracted attention from internal divisions and drove Britons to define themselves as distinct from, and invariably against, France.¹²⁰ National identity, “like ethnic and communal identity, is contingent and relational”: almost as critical as the social, cultural, and territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish the collective self are their implicit negations.¹²¹ Britons thus came to define themselves in contrast to Catholic France, as it was envisioned to be: “superstitious, militarist, decadent, and unfree.”¹²² Protestant identity, imperial profitability, and success in war were all vital to state formation, and each contributed to a diffusion of nationalist ideals amongst the artisanal and middle classes.¹²³ However, new concerns and strains were soon to arise, as mass involvement in overseas conflict was seen to endorse demands for laws to enfranchise the urban working-class.

¹¹⁹ Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740-1830* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987); Keith Robbins, *History, Religion and Identity in Britain Modern* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1993), 85-104; Catherine Hall, “‘From Greenland’s Icy Mountains ... to Africa’s Golden Sands’: Ethnicity, Race and Nation in Mid-Nineteenth Century England,” *Gender & History* 5, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 224-228.

¹²⁰ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 5-6, 54, and 321-323.

¹²¹ Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 271.

¹²² Colley, *Britons*, 5-6.

¹²³ Stephen Heathorn, *For Home, Country, and Race: Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School, 1880-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 3-5.

During the mid- to late-nineteenth century, middle-class anxieties started to surface, first about the active role the masses would undertake in the nation's social and civic life, and second about the makeshift nature by which the masses had come to understand their national identity. The 1867 Reform Act extended the franchise to some urban working-class men. Doubtless, it was time to instruct the masses about their national and civic duties. Indeed, middle-class writers, social commentators, and educationalists came to see education as a vital "mechanism for moulding a ... self-aware citizenry."¹²⁴ The Congregational minister Revd. R. W. Dale delivered a lecture in November 1867 that was intended for the new and old electors of Birmingham. The new were to learn about their duties as citizens; "the old were to be reassured that the dramatic action which had been taken would [reinforce], not harm," the electorate. The 1867 Reform Act marked a critical moment in the national life as half a million subjects become citizens.¹²⁵ Dale claimed that voter extension would restore a robustness, vitality, and force to national life and would do much to reverse "effeminacy, ... indolence, and indifference." He reminded his audience about their "brilliant inheritance" and beseeched those who had been received into citizenship, "by your vehement enthusiasm in the cause to liberty ... to sustain ... the greatness of the country, which is now in every sense your own." Dale believed that honourable working-men had much to offer. Particularly, once they were better educated.¹²⁶

The Third Reform Act (1884) extended the same voting qualifications as in the towns and cities to the countryside, and the electorate was again increased considerably.¹²⁷ This extension, as before, caused unease amongst the artisanal and commercial classes. Concurrently, Britain's

¹²⁴ Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 4.

¹²⁵ Hall, "Ethnicity, Race and Nation in Mid-Nineteenth Century England," 226.

¹²⁶ R. W. Dale, *The Politics of the Future* (Birmingham: Hudson and Son, 1867), 1-2, 16-17, and 20.

¹²⁷ The Third Reform Act (1884) extended the same concessions from the boroughs to the countryside. This increased the electorate considerably; in the 1880 general election, the last before the new legislation was enacted, 3,040,050 voters were registered, while in the next general election (1885), that number had nearly doubled (5,708,030). Fred W. S. Craig, *British Electoral Facts, 1832-1987* fifth ed. (Aldershot: Parliamentary Research Services, 1989).

economic lead was seen to be under threat from new competitors. Britain's market share was still considerable, but its increase rate and industrial excellence were being contested.¹²⁸ Political commentators and educationalists soon identified a connection between commerce, wealth, and economic accumulation, on the one hand, and the need for national schooling, on the other.¹²⁹ "The nation itself is a [schoolroom]; and the more our rulers and legislators, administrators and executive officers have the scientific spirit, ... the more able shall we be, thus armed at all points, to compete ... with other countries [successfully]." Sir Norman Lockyer, an advocate for scientific and technical training, and a scientist himself, claimed that education was "the battlefield" in the "new warfare" between states. Britain needed to reorganize its national educational system in order to counter international competition.¹³⁰ Surely, Britain's economic lead was under threat due to its competitors having "greater educational *Geist*."¹³¹ Reform was advocated, as it was believed "that the rise in economic competition, notably, from Germany, was due to its [advanced] state-run education machinery." This added further fuel to the debate about the need for an enhanced national education.¹³² H. T. Mark reasoned "that the nation which rises the highest in and through its schools will be the invincible nation in the future."¹³³ Some commentators even warned that without a reformed education structure, Britain would not be able to retain its Empire. Notably, educationalists took Germany as a model for educational reform in Britain.¹³⁴

Accordingly, a new curriculum was formulated in reaction to "concerns about social unrest, economic decline, and political volatility."¹³⁵ Ultimately, the aim was to assist each individual to

¹²⁸ R. Haldane, *Education and Empire: Addresses on Certain Topics of the Day* (London: John Murray, 1902), 83-87.

¹²⁹ Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 4.

¹³⁰ Sir Norman Lockyer, *Education and National Progress: Essays and Addresses, 1870-1905* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1906), 178-179.

¹³¹ Haldane, *Education and Empire*, 84-85.

¹³² Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 27.

¹³³ H. T. Mark, *Modern Views on Education* (London: The Nation's Library, 1914), 33-34.

¹³⁴ Haldane, *Education and Empire*, 84-87 and Mark, *Modern Views on Education*, 32-33.

¹³⁵ Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 4-5.

contribute something to the social whole/nation.¹³⁶ The fact that all students were to travel through the schoolroom “on their road to full rights and responsibilities” as citizens, meant that more time and care needed to be allocated to education, training, and “having sound views” no matter their social status, or class.¹³⁷ J. G. Fitch, an educationalist, social commentator, and schoolmaster, insisted that while some room should be left for schoolchildren to evolve individual character and intellect, it should be remembered that: “there are times in life for asserting our individuality, and there are times for effacing it. And ... [the schoolmaster] should offer means whereby it may be seen when and how we may do both.”¹³⁸ Fitch’s comments underscore the context in which education was being considered at the time: schooling was seen as a means to create “community-oriented” citizens—that is, individuals well-attuned to their duties to the social whole.¹³⁹ Similarly, Michael E. Sadler, an historian and educationalist, “felt that a systematic effort should be made to foster ... national obligation.” Then, too, there was a need for a more exhaustive “moral instruction” to better mould the “the social whole into a dutiful citizenry.”¹⁴⁰ The educationalist, social commentator, and author R. E. Hughes observed that the schoolroom was a civic institution created to cultivate and disseminate “national ideals.” Primarily, its aim was to manufacture and cultivate “citizens.”¹⁴¹

Social commentators and educationalists used the term citizenship to describe the various social relations between individuals, the civic community, and the state. Particularly, citizenship differed from the earlier term subjecthood in that the former embraced limited electoral

¹³⁶ F. J. C. Hearnshaw, “The Place of History in Education,” *History* 1, no. 1 (January 1912): 36.

¹³⁷ F. H. Hayward, *The Primary Curriculum* (London: Ralph, Holland & Co, 1909), 433.

¹³⁸ Sir Joshua Girling Fitch, *Lectures on Teaching: Delivered in the University of Cambridge during the Lent Term, 1880* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1898), 97-98.

¹³⁹ Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 5.

¹⁴⁰ M. E. Sadler, introduction to *Moral Instruction and Training in Schools: Report of an International Inquiry* v. 1, ed. M. E. Sadler (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1908), xxvi-xxv.

¹⁴¹ R. E. Hughes, *The Making of Citizens: A Study in Comparative Education* (London: The Walter Scott Publishing Co, 1907), 4; and Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 6.

autonomy.¹⁴² British educationalists were ever more concerned with the need to inculcate in working-class schoolchildren the fundamental ideas about citizenship and its corollary, nationalism. Schoolroom readers and teaching manuals were soon crowded with references to citizenship. That the term citizen and not subject was used in these texts is notable. Certainly, these authors would have been familiar with the considerable franchise limitations that existed before 1918. The lecturer, educationalist, and merchant H. Osman Newland cautioned students to this effect in his 1907 reader *The Model Citizen*. British subjects were called citizens, as a rule, he noted, because all British subjects shared liberties and duties in common, but only those with an electoral vote could be considered to have full citizenship.¹⁴³ Newland was rare in his decision to accentuate the differences between social and civic duty. Other authors made clear the benefits, liberties, and duties that resulted from citizenship in a manner that elided any discussion about voter enfranchisement. Naturally, most texts endorsed a civic inclusivity—however, coded within such discourse was a social subtext about class identity, education, and masculinity.¹⁴⁴

Notably, the debate about citizenship through education was masculinist. Thus, the model citizen was believed to be male, and to some extent citizenship was seen as a framework for an idealized masculinity. Doing one's duty, being faithful and trustworthy, but in a modest manner, was seen as noble and manly.¹⁴⁵ James Welton, an educationalist and lecturer at Leeds University, noted in 1907 that the model citizen "is he who does his [duties] manfully." Such men did not search out self-exaltation or "ostentatious advertisement."¹⁴⁶ Reginald Brabazon, Earl Meath,

¹⁴² Even after the Third Reform Act (1884) and the Redistribution Acts (1885), only about half the male population was entitled to vote. Chris Cook and John Stevenson, *The Longman Handbook of Modern British History, 1714-2001* fourth edition (London: Routledge, 2014), 81.

¹⁴³ H. Osman Newland, *The Model Citizen: A Simple Exposition of Civic Rights and Duties, and a Descriptive Account of British Institutions, Local, National, and Imperial* (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1907), 14.

¹⁴⁴ Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 24-25.

¹⁴⁵ Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 24-25.

¹⁴⁶ James Welton, *Principles and Methods of Teaching* (London: W. B. Clive, 1907), 227-228.

associated citizenship with “hard work, thrift, self-denial, endurance, and indomitable” valour and bravery.¹⁴⁷ Citizenship came to symbolize “duty, discipline, reserve, [and] ... obedience—values essential to the later-Victorian middle- and upper-class masculine code”—and was introduced to working-class schoolchildren through education. However, whereas in educating the elite the masculine code had been meant to create leaders for the nation, its intent was less clear for working-class schoolchildren. Probably, it was intended to direct social value and national duty.¹⁴⁸ Educationalists and social commentators believed that the best means by which to inculcate these values was to instruct working-class schoolchildren in English history. If ever there was a nation “for which a man” could contribute with honour “it is ours [England],” wrote Baron Avebury.¹⁴⁹ James Welton, too, believed that schoolchildren were keen to hear stories about heroic/national achievements and that there was a bias towards “true stories [over] fiction.” History, he claimed, could rouse a real interest in schoolchildren. When instructed satisfactorily, these children would receive “an enduring formative influence on [their] thought and life.”¹⁵⁰

Educationalists, historians, and social commentators were keen to determine the function and role that history, and its instruction, should “fulfil in life.”¹⁵¹ The historian and ecclesiastic William Stubbs defined it as subject-matter “second to none.” History, he lectured, was more than information, it was “the adventures, the development, the changeful career, the varied growths, the ambitions, aspirations, and, if you like, the ... destinies of mankind.”¹⁵² More coherently, it “should

¹⁴⁷ James Brabazon, Earl Meath, “Duty and Discipline in the Training of Children,” in *Essays on Duty and Discipline*, eds. Meath et al. (London 1910), 8.

¹⁴⁸ Stephen Heathorn suggests that schools were inclined to reward working-class schoolchildren “deemed ‘of talent’ with scholarships.” Other, less worthy, students were instructed in loyalty, obedience, and national duty. Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 26.

¹⁴⁹ John Lubbock, Baron Avebury, *The Use of Life* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1906), 95-96.

¹⁵⁰ Welton, *Principles and Methods of Teaching*, 224-225.

¹⁵¹ Welton, *Principles and Methods of Teaching*, 225.

¹⁵² William Stubbs, *Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History and Kindred Subjects* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1887), 85.

aid the individual to understand the human world in which he lives so far as it is organised into states and smaller, but in some respects similar, corporations.” History, therefore, situated the individual within society, and allowed him to understand “himself more fully.” Moreover, he was now better able to direct his own life, and, at the same time, he was made surer as to its direction.¹⁵³ Thus, an instruction in history would enable citizens to contribute to their society, and to take their share in determining their nation’s evolution.¹⁵⁴ Necessarily, history should be both ethical and nationalist. But its instruction should not aim to inculcate either, for to do so would be to distort facts; ostensibly, the main aim was historical objectivity. Doubtless, there was much to be fretted about in any nation’s history, but educationalists and historians thought it unwise to dismiss or distort such facts. Rather, the aim was “to discover the noblest ideas which have been effective in the national life.” Thus, the true citizen was he who did his duties manfully, not he who craved shameless celebration for his nation.¹⁵⁵

Educationalists were confident that those who studied their history, that is, English History, would doubtless “develop this true Patriotism.”¹⁵⁶ English history, educationalists claimed, was, in contrast to other nations, rather bloodless. John Lubbock, Baron Avebury, told his readers to reflect with satisfaction “that our soldiers are everywhere located not as enemies, but as friends and defenders.” The British Empire had increased steadily, and “this Generation,” he wrote, owed it to their forefathers to hand it down to the next, not only intact, but enhanced and fortified. When Englishmen looked back on their history, “it is not, I think, too much to argue that our nation has exercised its great trust in a wise and liberal spirit.”¹⁵⁷ This narrative was doubtless crafted to

¹⁵³ Welton, *Principles and Methods of Teaching*, 225.

¹⁵⁴ Hearnshaw, “The Place of History in Education,” 36-37.

¹⁵⁵ Welton, *Principles and Methods of Teaching*, 227-228.

¹⁵⁶ Welton, *Principles and Methods of Teaching*, 228.

¹⁵⁷ Lubbock, Baron Avebury, *The Use of Life*, 96.

inculcate in the reader the loftiest ideals. Robert MacDonald has described the central historical narrative introduced to schoolchildren at this time as the “Island Story.” History, in this sense, had little to do with fact, “but a great deal to do with metaphorical or imaginative reality.” Thus, like any story, it had a start and an end, crises, victories, villains, and naturally, heroes “whose characters tended to fuse into a single persona, reflecting the heroism of the nation.” History was a stage on which individuals “made their entrances, conducted their heroics, and exited.” This narrative was teleological and took as its starting point Saxon England, and as its first national hero, King Alfred. The English race was able to absorb the Normans, and was to burst forth under Elizabeth I, and since then, the course to nationhood seemed inevitable. This narrative used heroic names to establish and endorse the imperial project.¹⁵⁸ Britain had been successful because this was its destiny.¹⁵⁹ British scholars served this narrative faithfully. The English had been assigned two tasks in world history: first, the industrial task to make habitable some half the world and, second, to share, “in some ... enduring manner,” their free institutions, elective franchise, and democratic assembly.¹⁶⁰

This narrative was no humble story, free from ideology. It was meant to demonstrate to schoolchildren national excellence. “It justified a competitive Britain in a race with other Powers for control [and] domination.”¹⁶¹ Concurrently, academic historians were beginning to formulate new ideas about nationalism, the empire, and Englishness. Most notably, J. A. Froude, William H. Lecky, Thomas Macaulay, J. R. Seeley, and E. A. Freeman.¹⁶² However, there is little doubt that

¹⁵⁸ Robert H. MacDonald, *The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880-1918* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 50-51.

¹⁵⁹ Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 146.

¹⁶⁰ Thomas Carlyle, “Chartism,” in *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays: Collected and Republished* (1st time, 1839; final, 1869) vol. IV (New York: John W. Lowell Company, 1869), 90 and 113.

¹⁶¹ MacDonald, *The Language of Empire*, 51.

¹⁶² Educationalists encouraged schoolteachers to familiarize themselves with the new literature and to read the best books to better understand the “spiritual forces” which accorded real meaning and significance to history. Welton, *Principles and Methods of Teaching*, 222-224.

from amongst this class the most influential was Seeley.¹⁶³ His work on *The Expansion of England* (1883) furnished educationalists and liberal imperialists with an intellectual rationale for empire.¹⁶⁴ Carefully, he dissociated himself from earlier, more bombastic narratives. History, he announced, was a moral force that could furnish nations with conviction and direction.¹⁶⁵ It was a means to distract from social conflict and a route to a national consciousness, which he dated to 1588. The Elizabethan era had launched an incredible overseas expansion, “never since intermitted, into Greater Britain.”¹⁶⁶ England was invested with a *Geist* which had its origins in “race, language, and right moral authority.” He criticized earlier histories for their insularity; “new historical categories were necessary.”¹⁶⁷ Earlier traditions had focused on England, the island so-called, and not on the “union named after the island,” which now covered “half the Globe.” England, he claimed, will be wherever Englishmen “are found, and we shall look for its histories in whatever areas witness the occurrences most fundamental to Englishmen ... even when the scene is as remote as Canada, or as India.”¹⁶⁸

Seeley’s work shifted the focus from institutional and constitutional matters to a sea-faring narrative about colonial affairs and a Greater Britain. He imagined two different empires, the white settler-colonies, and India.¹⁶⁹ He modelled the former on the United States. Britain was a colonizing country, and it should now receive the white-settler colonies into a new union—Greater

¹⁶³ J. M. MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 179.

¹⁶⁴ Remarkably, the work sold over 80,000 editions in its first two years and continued to be reissued in the decades that followed. H. John Field, *Toward a Programme of Imperial Life: The British Empire at the Turn of the Century* (Oxford: Clio Press, 1982), 78.

¹⁶⁵ Peter Burroughs, “John Robert Seeley and British Imperial History,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 1, no. 2 (1973): 192.

¹⁶⁶ MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*, 179; and MacDonald, *The Language of Empire*, 51.

¹⁶⁷ Robert Colls, “Englishness and Political Culture,” in *Englishness: Politics and Culture, 1880-1920* 2nd Ed., eds. Robert Colls and Philip Dodd (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 67-68.

¹⁶⁸ J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1890), 121-123.

¹⁶⁹ His empire largely ignored Africa and Asia.

Britain. This colonial empire, so-called, was closer to a world federation—modern mechanisms (that is, steam and electricity) meant that the seas that had once divided the colonies from the centre now mattered less.¹⁷⁰ This union looked towards the future and was modern.¹⁷¹ The Indian Empire, meanwhile, was a duty, a responsibility—a charitable desire to “end ... enormous evils.” Britain had already achieved one enormous advancement. Mainly, it had ended anarchy, lawlessness, and disorder, and had substituted these with order, efficiency, and civilization. Seeley believed that Britain derived no discernible benefits from its association with India.¹⁷² However, it could not now extricate itself; it needed to fulfil its duties decently.¹⁷³ Besides, Greater Britain was a fact, and overseas intervention was its inheritance.¹⁷⁴ Seeley’s rationale and conclusions were useful to both educationalists and social commentators, and were to influence how schoolteachers taught English history.¹⁷⁵ Certainly, these ideas seem to have filtered down successfully. Robert Roberts, who was a schoolchild in the 1900s, and who recorded his childhood reminiscences in the 1970s, remembered these lessons vividly.¹⁷⁶

This is all to demonstrate the influence, authority, and eminence that educationalists, theorists, and social commentators attached to history and its instruction before the First World

¹⁷⁰ Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 121-123, 296-300, and 310.

¹⁷¹ MacDonald, *The Language of Empire*, 55.

¹⁷² To these benefits could be added Christianity, sanitation, common law, and modern technology (steam, electricity, and locomotion). Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 121-123, 296-300, and 305-310.

¹⁷³ Colls, “Englishness and Political Culture,” 68; and MacDonald, *The Language of Empire*, 55.

¹⁷⁴ Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 298.

¹⁷⁵ MacDonald, *The Language of Empire*, 55. See also, Pamela Horn, “English Elementary Education and the Growth of the Imperial Ideal, 1880-1914,” in *Benefits Bestowed? Education and British Imperialism*, ed. J. A. Mangan (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 44; and Bernard Potter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 200.

¹⁷⁶ Robert Roberts, *The Classic Slum: Salford Fife in the First Quarter of the Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971), 112. This account is corroborated in other working-class memoirs. See Arthur Newton, *Years of Change: Autobiography of a Hackney Shoemaker* (London: Hackney Workers’ Educational Association, 1974), 47: “The population of the country had been schooled in the glories of the British Empire and the deeds of her victorious armies”—which is why working-class recruits had calculated a short war in 1914. For a consideration on how imperial nationalism suffused the culture in Public Schools see J. A. Mangan, *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of Diffusion of an Ideal* (London: Frank Cass, 1998); and J. A. Mangan, “‘The Grit of Our Forefathers’: Invented Traditions, Propaganda, and Imperialism,” in *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, ed. John M. MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 113-139.

War. It also identifies a shift in ideas about nationalism, which was a reaction to the new social, economic, and civic strains that arose in mid- to late-nineteenth century. These strains necessitated that scholars and theorists reconstitute nationalism, and this could best be achieved through a school curriculum that stressed race, language, and cultural identity (over earlier classifications such as morality, social hierarchy, and constitutionalism). By 1904, history was already listed in the Board of Education's *Code of Regulations* as an essential subject in school instruction.¹⁷⁷ The code maintained that teachers should inculcate deference, industrious habits, self-control, and a readiness for self-sacrifice. To achieve this object, students should receive an education about the notable individuals "and events in English History."¹⁷⁸ History inculcated a communal sense and delimited troublesome social identities, such as class, gender, and rank. To construct an idealized national community, schoolroom curriculums stressed racial inheritance and a shared cultural tradition. Teachers and educators were invited to examine socially inclusive classifications—like racial inheritance—in order to create and reinforce communal solidarity. Schoolroom curriculums and lessons accentuated ideas about citizenship and nationhood that were filtered through cultural boundaries—such as faith, race, and tradition—that excluded divisive ideas about social hierarchy. Nationhood was thus constructed as an inclusive social classification that combined cultural considerations with racial attributes that could be traced backwards to the Anglo-Saxons.¹⁷⁹

Schoolroom readers were filled with references to racial and national characteristics, and the conviction that theirs was a superior identity. These ideas harmonized well with late-Victorian imperialism. Indeed, theorists used racial distinction as a means to account for England's notable

¹⁷⁷ History, in fact, was made an essential subject in schoolroom instruction in 1900. Heathorn, *Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School*, 41.

¹⁷⁸ Board of Education, *1904 Code of Regulations for Public Elementary Schools* (London: Wyman and Sons Ltd, 1904), 1-2.

¹⁷⁹ Stephen Heathorn, "'Let Us Remember That We, Too, Are English': Constructions of Citizenship and National Identity in English Elementary School Reading Books, 1880-1914," *Victorian Studies* 38, no. 3 (Spring 1995): 396-397.

success in overseas colonization. For working-class children, who seldom travelled outside their own county, the “empire could only be an abstraction.”¹⁸⁰ Nonetheless, their lessons and school textbooks advised them to associate the overseas colonies with a Greater Britain.¹⁸¹ Oscar Browning told his readers confidently, “Englishmen have received as their inheritance not only a British Kingdom but a British Empire.”¹⁸² These ideas invited working-class children to celebrate solidarity, but not unity, with those who directed the imperial mission. Thus, overseas colonization, soldiery, and colonial administration were cast as duties to which all classes could (and should) contribute. Schoolroom readers formulated ideas about nationhood that sought to “transcend class and social stratification” with references to race, language, and culture.¹⁸³ This was often achieved with reference to the world task that Englishmen had inherited from the Anglo-Saxons.¹⁸⁴ Namely, to colonize, control, and make habitable some half the world. The English (it was believed) were best suited for this task because their race was so constituted as to be able to thrive wherever in the world.¹⁸⁵ J. M. D. Meiklejohn stated simply, “the story of the growth of the British Empire is the story of the expansion of the Anglo-Saxon race.”¹⁸⁶ It was from these ancient tribes that modern Englishmen had inherited their love for sea-faring adventure and discovery, wrote H. O. Arnold-Forster.¹⁸⁷ The vitality, bravery, and endurance that the English had received from their ancestors

¹⁸⁰ Heathorn, “Constructions of Citizenship and National Identity in English Elementary School Reading Books,” 407-408.

¹⁸¹ H. O. Arnold-Forster, *The Citizen Reader* (London: Cassell & Company Ltd, 1885), 14.

¹⁸² Oscar Browning, *The Citizen: His Rights and Responsibilities* (London: Blackie & Son Ltd, 1893), 174.

¹⁸³ Heathorn, “Constructions of Citizenship and National Identity in English Elementary School Reading Books,” 395.

¹⁸⁴ Then, too, schoolroom readers identified distinct racial traits that (supposedly) connected the modern English with their ancient forebears. Arnold-Forster informed his readers that “most of the Anglo-Saxons had light hair and blue eyes. I expect, if you look round your school, you will see that most of the girls and boys have got light hair and blue eyes. That is because they too are Anglo-Saxons.” H. O. Arnold-Forster, *Things New and Old, or Stories from English History* Vol. I (London, 1893).

¹⁸⁵ Browning, *The Citizen*, 174.

¹⁸⁶ J. M. D. Meiklejohn, *The British Empire: Its Geography, Resources, Commerce, Land-ways, and Water-ways* 6th Ed. (London: Alfred M. Holden, 1899), 6.

¹⁸⁷ H. O. Arnold-Forster, *Things New and Old, or Stories from English History* Vol. III (Montreal: F. E. Grafton & Sons, 1896), 54,

enabled them to make habitable, lawful, and remunerative nations less civilized than their own.¹⁸⁸ Wherever “the Englishman” settled he carried “with him law, order, and science.”¹⁸⁹ The English had been blessed with industry, tenacity, and skill, and these characteristics formed their racial inheritance. Stephen Heathorn notes that contained within “these racial character justifications was [the idea] that imperial expansion was inevitable and necessary.” The English were not only “fitted to travel and to colonize, and to direct ... [other] nations,” but such efforts were in fact essential to ensure that the race did lose its “characteristic drive.”¹⁹⁰ Colonization was thus thought to be beneficial because it served to:

Keep us healthy, and active in mind, it increases our self-respect and conduces to public morality, it prevents us from becoming narrow-minded and self-seeking, and from sinking into ... idleness and vice ... It stimulates [us] to seek service for ... loftier qualities and tends to bring those ... qualities into existence.

This rhetoric was inclusive because it made clear that colonization was beneficial to all classes. Britain contained more inhabitants than it could feed, shelter, and remunerate—additionally, as the foremost commercial nation, it needed to find new markets. Naturally, overseas colonization was seen as a favourable outlet for such concerns.¹⁹¹

Schoolroom readers often connected overseas colonization with the innate racial traits and characteristics that the English had inherited from the Saxons.¹⁹² The Saxons, being industrious and restless, had left their own shores to discover and colonize new lands.¹⁹³ The Elizabethans having been invested with a similar ethos had launched their own overseas adventures which had

¹⁸⁸ Browning, *The Citizen*, 174.

¹⁸⁹ Quoted in Heathorn, “Constructions of Citizenship and National Identity in English Elementary School Reading Books,” 409.

¹⁹⁰ Browning, *The Citizen*, 174; and Heathorn, “Constructions of Citizenship and National Identity in English Elementary School Reading Books,” 409.

¹⁹¹ Browning, *The Citizen*, 174.

¹⁹² This idea is also referred to in J. R. Seeley’s *The Expansion of England*. Seeley, similarly, saw a connection between certain innate racial characteristics, overseas colonization, and nationality.

¹⁹³ Arnold-Forster, *Things New and Old*, 54.

since continued unabated. The Saxon love of adventure, having been muted under the Normans, was said to have burst forth once more under Elizabeth. Certainly, it was no coincidence that England's seafaring heroes were all to be found in the sixteenth century.¹⁹⁴ Frequently, schoolroom readers described this era as a time in which all classes were united, "England was truly ... Merrie."¹⁹⁵ The Elizabethan era was thus seen to have initiated England's march towards national excellence. That these narratives relocated this formation from the Glorious Revolution to Elizabethan England confirms how essential the connection was between Englishness and ideas about Anglo-Saxonism. The idea that Britain and Germany shared a common ancestry formed the basis for cultural and racial Anglo-Saxonism, a tale that first surfaced in the sixteenth century, and reached its zenith in the late nineteenth century.¹⁹⁶ The English Reformation stimulated an interest in Saxon England. Particularly, amongst religious reformers who sought to demonstrate that England was returning to older, holier rites, traditions, and customs that dated from before the Normans. During the Civil War, concerns about faith were subordinated to an interest in civic institutions. Parliamentarians doubtless found in Saxon England a material basis for their resistance to the Monarchy. These earliest efforts carried to the forefront various sources that could be used to construct a distinct historical consciousness and ensured that a well-defined lore was available to future scholars. Specifically, that the freedom-loving Anglo-Saxons had established representative assembly, civic institutions, and a basic democracy. Despite acclaim for such institutions, there was little interest at the time in the distinct racial characteristics or intellectual

¹⁹⁴ Heathorn, "Constructions of Citizenship and National Identity in English Elementary School Reading Books," 410.

¹⁹⁵ Schoolroom readers made sure to reference social inclusion in their narratives: "noble and merchant, seaman and ploughboy, were all ready to do their part ... The whole nation awakened suddenly." *Chambers's National History Readers* (London, 1897).

¹⁹⁶ Siak, "British Historians and the Coming of the First World War," 227.

attributes that could differentiate these nomads from other tribes. However, there was a distinct accent on the cultural and racial ties that linked the Saxons to their kinfolk in Germany.¹⁹⁷

These ideas were later taken and disseminated with a renewed drive during the Romantic Era. Sharon Turner helped to revitalize a romantic and nationalist interest in Saxon England. His four-volume *History of the Anglo-Saxons* (1799-1805) combined traditional lore with serious scholarship and was thus more advanced than earlier studies.¹⁹⁸ Its release date was timely, as it coincided with the French Empire and the Napoleonic Wars. This lent credence to the idea that Saxon England was in marked contrast to Norman France. The English could read in their history the source and reason for their democratic institutions, social order, and common law.¹⁹⁹ Turner claimed that the continent was divided into three distinct tribes or races, “the Kimmerian and Keltic race ... the Scythian, Gothic, and German tribes ... [and], most recent, ... the Slavonian and Sarmatian nations.” The Kimmerian and Keltic tribes bore traits that Turner would have associated with the French: refinement, artistry, and subtly, but also avarice, voracity, effeminacy, superstition, and absolutism. The Germanic tribes in contrast embodied the characteristics that Turner claimed for England: initiative, individual freedom, and liberty.²⁰⁰ Turner thus added a new note to Anglo-Saxonism.²⁰¹ Rather than devalue “the Scythian, Gothic, and German tribes” as backward and brutish barbarians, his account revealed them as noble and unsullied nomads, “from whose minds, institutions, and manners, all that we now hold in civilization, ... has been ...

¹⁹⁷ Reginald Horsman, “Origins of Racial Anglo-Saxonism in Great Britain before 1850,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37, no. 3 (July-September 1976): 387-388.

¹⁹⁸ Donald A. White, “Changing Views of the *Adventus Saxonum* in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century English Scholarship,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32, no. 4 (October-December 1971): 585-586.

¹⁹⁹ H. R. Loyn, “Turner, Sharon (1768-1847),” *ODNB*.

²⁰⁰ Sharon Turner, *The History of the Anglo-Saxons from the Earliest Period to the Norman Conquest* 6th ed. vol. I (Paris: W. Galignani and Co., 1840), 3-11.

²⁰¹ Robert Boyce, “The Persistence of Anglo-Saxonism in Britain and the Origins of Britain’s Appeasement Policy towards Germany,” *Histoire@Politique* 15, no. 3 (2011): 111-112.

derived.”²⁰² Turner’s work combined a reverence for institutional excellence with the new Romanticism. This artistic and intellectual movement shifted focus from institutions to individuals, and to an esteem in race and national identity.²⁰³

The next scholar to make a major contribution to Anglo-Saxonism was the historian and classist John Mitchell Kemble, whose *Saxons in England* (1849) furnished the academic foundation for a racial affiliation between Britain and Germany. Because he had studied in Germany, Kemble was well-versed in Germanic philology, a rare attainment in early-Victorian Britain. His skillset ensured that his work would serve as the new standard. Kemble looked to Saxon England to elucidate Britain’s democratic institutions and its common law. The introduction to his treatise, written amidst continental revolution, noted that while other societies convulsed, “domestic contentment” reined in Britain, its inhabitants well-satisfied with the institutions that offered them law, social order, freedom, and structure. Kemble believed that these institutions were introduced from Germany and matured “in isolation in Britain.”²⁰⁴ Thus, Britain’s traditions—its common law, democratic institutions, and social order—were inherited from its nomadic forebears. The British owed nothing to the “degenerate Greeks and enervated Romans.”²⁰⁵ These ideas resonated with his fellow-thinkers, and it became routine to extol Saxon England and to attribute to it anachronistic structures consistent with English Liberalism.²⁰⁶ While Kemble’s main focus was institutional excellence, he also stressed the ancestral connection between the Saxons and the Teutons, and their shared destiny: as the sun set on Rome, the German race loomed like a Colossus, “enormous, terrible,” and indescribable—destined to reconstruct and revive society.²⁰⁷

²⁰² Turner, *The History of the Anglo-Saxons*, 3-6.

²⁰³ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 227.

²⁰⁴ White, “Changing Views of the *Adventus Saxonum*,” 587.

²⁰⁵ John M. Kemble, *Codex Diplomaticus Aevi Saxonici* vol. I (London: Sumptibus Societatis, 1849). iii.

²⁰⁶ White, “Changing Views of the *Adventus Saxonum*,” 587.

²⁰⁷ John M. Kemble, *The Saxons in England: A History of the English Commonwealth till the Period of the Norman Conquest* vol. I (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1849), 5.

The *Edinburgh Review* offered an even more robust summation: their “true mission ... was to renovate and re-structure the western world.”²⁰⁸

Gradually, the Romantic ethos led scholars to rank racial characteristics above institutional definitions. During this era, comparative philologists and ethnologists began to link language with race and national identity. Moreover, an attendant shift in scientific interest from a universal human species to its comparative classification made it possible for scholars to establish racial hierarchies and to ascribe distinct racial characteristics and traits to the different races, with superior capacities ascribed to the Anglo-Germanic peoples. These “discoveries” were used to provide “a definite racial cast to Anglo-Saxonism.” Necessarily, historians started to attribute “a far more complex, vigorous, and noble historical heritage” to the Germanic tribes. By the mid-nineteenth century, ideas about race and racial inheritance were inviolable to how scholars understood Anglo-Saxonism. Earlier ideas about institutional excellence were now melded with ideas about racial superiority, imperialism, and destiny. Reginald Horsman notes that while some scholars resisted racialist doctrines, “an increasing number were swept away.” Racial Anglo-Saxonism received further nourishment from imperialists; indeed, this was an age in which Britain “seemed ready to dominate the entire world.”²⁰⁹ Anglo-Saxonism could thus be used as a self-serving myth to encourage Britons to look towards imperial expansion “to support a vibrant domestic society.”²¹⁰ These ideas soon entered historical discourse and were to find articulate, able, and influential advocates.²¹¹

By the late nineteenth-century, ideas about Anglo-Saxonism had altered considerably.

²⁰⁸ *The Edinburgh Review* 89 (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, January-April 1849), 157.

²⁰⁹ Horsman, “Origins of Racial Anglo-Saxonism in Great Britain,” 390-399.

²¹⁰ Hugh A. MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons* (Montreal: Harvest House, 1982), 129-130.

²¹¹ Horsman, “Origins of Racial Anglo-Saxonism in Great Britain,” 399.

Previous formulations which had extolled the Anglo-Saxons for their representative assembly, primitive democracy, and freedom, had made room for ideas that stressed racial inheritance, superiority, and characterization. Earlier ideas melded with historical determinism, and ideas about racial superiority, to create a narrative that encouraged “men to look beyond their shores to other continents ... to build a world empire.”²¹² Britons and Germans were held to have been from the same ancestral stock and were thus believed to share a common destiny. This myth was to have an enduring hold on late-Victorian Britain, and it was common to believe that England’s greatness was somehow inherited from Germany. Consequently, British historians began to cultivate a more symbolic narrative—one which focused on socially constructed ideas about race and racial inheritance.²¹³ Of all academics, none endorsed racial Anglo-Saxonism more so than historians.²¹⁴ Certainly, one cannot overlook the active role that historians took in encouraging both racial and institutional Anglo-Saxonism. William Stubbs, Regius Professor for Modern History at Oxford, was confident that everything that was best about English culture was in origin Germanic,

It is to ... Germany that we must look for the earliest traces of our forefathers, for the best part of almost all of us is originally German: though we call ourselves Britons, the name only has a geographic significance. The blood that is in our veins comes from German ancestors. Our language, diversified as it is, is at the bottom ... German; our institutions have grown into what they are from the common basis of the ... institutions of Germany.²¹⁵

Stubbs was sure that there was little difference between the English and their ancestral kinfolk in Germany.²¹⁶

Without a doubt, the idea that Britons and Germans were from a common racial stock imbued the educated and elite classes in Britain. Doubtless, it was this idea that led the Unionist

²¹² MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 129-130.

²¹³ Heathorn, “Constructions of Citizenship and National Identity in English Elementary School Reading Books,” 395.

²¹⁴ MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 91.

²¹⁵ William Stubbs, *Lectures on Early English History*, ed. Arthur Hassall (London: Longmans & Co. 1906), 3.

²¹⁶ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 229.

Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, in an address delivered in Leicester (1899), to advocate for an alliance between Britain, the United States, and Germany. Chamberlain called for racial solidarity; there was little difference in racial character between the Britons and Germans. Moreover, he intimated that Britain, Germany, and the United States shared a common destiny—that a union between the three nations would be a formidable factor in world affairs.²¹⁷ This conviction also led Cecil Rhodes to establish his scholarship scheme at Oxford, which came into effect in 1903.²¹⁸ The awards were created in order to allow “the whole Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic world to learn their lessons at” Oxford. Rhodes set out to strengthen ties between the “three Great Powers,” which in his view were Britain, Germany, and the United States—in fact, his decision to award five scholarships to German candidates was taken after he had met with Kaiser Wilhelm II. Directly, he became convinced that educational ties would forestall any future conflict between Britain and Germany.²¹⁹

Chamberlain and Rhodes were certainly not the only influential Britons to subscribe to ideas about racial affinity. Sir John Lubbock, Lord Avebury, declared in 1905 that Britons and Germans “belong to one race; have one common origin, kindred laws and kindred faiths.”²²⁰ This statement was addressed to a crowd at Caxton Hall, which had convened to discuss conciliation between Britain and Germany. Sir John Kennaway, the Unionist Member from Honiton, cited common blood and faith in his resolution that neither economic nor diplomatic interests should alienate Britain from Germany. Sir Herbert Maxwell, the Unionist Member from Wigtownshire, likewise referenced a kindred blood and faith in his resolution for an Anglo-German Friendship

²¹⁷ J. L. Garvin, *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Volume III, 1895-1900: Empire and World Policy* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1934), 507-508.

²¹⁸ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 226.

²¹⁹ George R. Parkin, *The Rhodes Scholarships* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912), 96-98 and 106.

²²⁰ Anglo-German Friendship Committee, *The Inaugural Meeting in Caxton Hall* (London, 1906), 7. Quoted in Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 226.

Committee.²²¹ The signatories to the committee's inaugural address included eminent scholars, ecclesiastics, businessmen, and lawmakers.²²²

By 1900, racial Anglo-Saxonism had reached its zenith, and contained four basic tenets. First, the Germanic peoples, thanks to their unmixed racial origins and universal civilizing mission, were worthier and more advanced than all others, "both in individual character and in their institutions." Second, Englishmen were in origin Germanic. Third, English institutions—said to be the freest in the world—were an inheritance from their forebears. Finally, the English, better than any other Germanic people, embodied their forefathers and thus carried a considerable burden in leading the world community.²²³ The above themes or their variants exerted a considerable influence on how historians formulated a distinct English/British historical consciousness, but not in a simple way.²²⁴ Certainly, numerous ideological systems influenced British perceptions of other peoples, not least national characteristics.²²⁵ Scholars and educated elites attached great weight to race and national characteristics, but these concepts took numerous permutations, as ideas and viewpoints. Some Britons defined race in genetic terms, with rigid and fixed outcomes. Most scholars, however, used the word race as a euphemism for the nation. These scholars relied on concepts, such as national characteristics, to describe and explain behavioural patterns in other peoples and nations. Besides race, these scholars noted that other influences were involved in national character and its formulation.²²⁶ Generally, these characteristics were viewed as constant but could also alter over time. Between 1870 and 1945, Britons believed that numerous western

²²¹ Steven Wai-Meng Siak, "Germanophilism in Britain: Non-Government Elites and the Limits to Anglo-German Antagonism, 1905-1914," PhD diss. (London School of Economics and Political Science, 1997), 32-37.

²²² For a list of the most eminent signatories see Siak, "Germanophilism in Britain," 35-37.

²²³ MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 2-3.

²²⁴ During this era, the term race defied an exact definition; though, in its main sense it was used to refer to common biological origins.

²²⁵ Of the other theories, imperial anthropology, racism, paternalism, and cultural ethnocentrism are most notable.

²²⁶ See Ernest Barker, *National Character and the Factors in its Formation* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1927).

and some non-western peoples had changed their national characteristics.²²⁷ These concepts underpinned all liberal ideas about civilization and the British Empire and, for that matter, racial Anglo-Saxonism.

During this time, history became an independent academic discipline in Britain.²²⁸ History was first introduced at Oxford University in 1853 as a combined subject with law. The Law and History School was first established to offer idle gentlemen “a valuable educating influence.”²²⁹ Between 1853 and 1872, seven hundred and ninety-seven students graduated from the integrated curriculum. Then, in 1872, the combined curriculum was dissolved, and two independent schools emerged. The Modern History School exceeded its limited expectations; student enrolment soon surpassed *Literae Humaniores* (Greats).²³⁰ Cambridge University, meanwhile, arranged a special Tripos in History in 1873, and held its first examinations in 1875. By 1904, George Prothero, then President for the Royal Historical Society, could write with confidence that the Modern History School at Cambridge was “flourishing” with student registration “improving” each term.²³¹ The prewar generation instructed in Modern History (at Oxford and Cambridge) received a moralistic education that idealized civic virtue, patriotism, and self-sacrifice. The Honours History Schools provided future decision-makers with an astonishing confidence in their nation’s remarkable past and its enduring future. The academic staff concentrated on objective moral lessons that would prepare their students to lead the nation into a future congruous with its historic past. For all the scepticism and mistrust that followed from the Great War, interwar decision-makers educated at

²²⁷ See John Ferris, “‘Worthy of Some Better Enemy?’: The British Estimate of the Imperial Japanese Army, 1919-1941, and the Fall of Singapore,” *Canadian Journal of History* 28, no. 2 (August 1993).

²²⁸ Siak, “Britain Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 232.

²²⁹ Quoted from the evidence of Montague Burrows and Frederick York Powell to the Select Committee on Higher Education, 1867, XIII (23 July 1867), 410, 414. Quoted in Reba Soffer, “Nation, Duty, Character and Confidence: History at Oxford, 1850-1914,” *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 1 (March 1987): 77.

²³⁰ Soffer, “History at Oxford, 1850-1914,” 77-78.

²³¹ Letter George Prothero to Oscar Browning, 1 February 1904. The Papers of Oscar Browning, King’s College Modern Archive Centre, University of Cambridge, Cambridge.

Oxford and Cambridge clung to the universal truths received during their schooldays.²³²

Modern History faculties and their staff often encourage pro-German sympathies. Seeley, for instance, affirmed that “as a rule, good works are in German.”²³³ After a vacation to Dresden, to be become well-found in the German-language, Seeley returned with a lifelong admiration for Germany. Particularly, he was drawn its scientific approach to history.²³⁴ This admiration was not uncommon and imbued his fellow historical practitioners at Oxford and Cambridge.²³⁵ German scholarship was held in high regard for its academic research and scientific spirit. Seeley, for one, noted that German academics pursued original research more “methodically” than their colleagues at Oxford or Cambridge.²³⁶ H. A. L. Fisher, meanwhile, noted that German universities “enjoyed a wide reputation for freedom, courage, and learning.”²³⁷ Their stature can be attributed to the “new ferment” that first emerged in German higher learning in the mid-nineteenth century, during which the “ideal of *Wissenschaft* was extended beyond the confines of a few innovative universities to become the leading principle in German universities.”²³⁸ Directly translated as science, “*Wissenschaft* has a greater connotation in meaning,” and implies a scientific method to “acquiring knowledge, rational understanding, and personal fulfilment.” This ethos had a tremendous impact in Britain, and “it is no coincidence that the impetus for educational reform” increased at this time.²³⁹ More crucially, this “knowledge revolution” led to the professionalization of several academic disciplines, not least history.²⁴⁰

²³² Soffer, “History at Oxford, 1850-1914,” 102-104.

²³³ John R. Seeley, *Lectures and Essays* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1870), 214.

²³⁴ R. T. Shannon, “Seeley, Sir John Robert (1834-1895),” *ODNB*.

²³⁵ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 222.

²³⁶ Seeley, *Lectures and Essays*, 185-186.

²³⁷ Fisher, *An Unfinished Biography*, 79.

²³⁸ Charles E. McClelland, *State, Society, and University in Germany, 1700-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 152.

²³⁹ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 222.

²⁴⁰ Sheldon Rothblatt, *Tradition and Change in English Liberal Education: An Essay in History and Culture* (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), 157-164.

German scholarship enjoyed a preeminent position in British higher learning before 1914. The names “Ranke and Mommsen, ... Wilamowitz and Lotze,” resounded in lecture-rooms at Oxford and Cambridge. Fisher would later reminisce that “to sit at the feet of some great German professor, absorbing his publications, listening to his lectures, working in his seminar, was regarded as a valuable, perhaps as an essential passport to the highest ... academic career.” Regularly, British students “would repair to Berlin and Heidelberg, to Göttingen and Bonn, to Jena and Tübingen ... to read the classics, and to venerate ... this superlative and indispensable race.”²⁴¹ The historian, ecclesiastic, and social reformer Alexander Carlyle affirmed in 1911 that students who showed any promise were bound to pursue further education in Germany, due to its leading “position ... in philosophy, science, and literature.”²⁴² James Bryce, Regius Professor for Civil Law at Oxford and the British ambassador to the United States (1907-1913), noted that German universities “led the world ... in their teaching organization” and in their research facilities, thereby setting “an example to [Britain].” He extolled their staffs as the most learned in the world.²⁴³ Fisher recorded that from his earliest days Bryce had imbibed “German literature and historical science.” He counted amongst his most cheerful recollections, “those student days in Heidelberg, in that delightful, old, idealistic Germany, which had been so ... hospitable and so intent upon the things that minister to the higher needs of man.”²⁴⁴

G. P. Gooch, meanwhile, summarized his own attitude in an autobiographical piece written in 1949, “though I should not, like my old friend Lord Haldane, describe Germany as ‘my spiritual home’—for I have several spiritual homes—I have always regarded it as my second country.”²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Fisher, *An Unfinished Biography*, 79-80.

²⁴² Reported in the *Times Educational Supplemental*, 16 June 1911, 91.

²⁴³ James Bryce, *University and Historical Addresses: Delivered during a Residence in the United States as Ambassador of Great Britain* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1913), 156-157.

²⁴⁴ H. A. L. Fisher, *James Bryce, Viscount Bryce of Dechmont, O. M.*, vol. II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), 126-127.

²⁴⁵ Quoted in Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 32.

Gooch, like Haldane and Bryce, was both emotionally and intellectually attached to Germany. German learning, he wrote, was an “inexhaustible treasure-house,” and its “intensive exploration” was his life’s most “rewarding vocation.”²⁴⁶ Gooch, as well as Bryce, Fisher, A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley, John Kirkpatrick, W. A. Phillips, and Lord Acton, all eminent individuals in the historical establishment, had studied in Germany.²⁴⁷ Other historians who had done likewise included J. B. Bury, W. H. Dawson, H. W. C. Davis, Ramsay Muir, Robert Seton-Watson, and William J. Ashley, the last was an economic historian who came to know Adolf Wagner and Gustav von Schmoller while at Göttingen. He would later record, “like ... other ... Englishmen, it was in Germany, I first caught the infection for the scientific spirit.”²⁴⁸ Then, too, it was not only historians who undertook their studies in Germany; numerous scholars in theology, philosophy, philology, classics, and economics sought training in Germany.²⁴⁹

At times, connections with Germany went further than educational interest and training. Gooch, Prothero, Headlam-Morley, and Dawson were all married to Germans, as was Charles Hereford. W. A. Phillips, meanwhile, received his childhood education in Weimar, Germany, where his mother had a friend in Otilie von Goethe, daughter-in-law to the famous writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.²⁵⁰ Lord Acton, described as one of the foremost minds in modern history, embodied the German influence amongst historians in Britain.²⁵¹ Born John Emerich Edward Dalberg, to Sir Ferdinand Richard Edward Acton, Baronet, and Marie Louise Peline de Dalberg,

²⁴⁶ G. P. Gooch, *Under Six Reigns* (London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1958), 39-40

²⁴⁷ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 223.

²⁴⁸ W. J. Ashley, “The War and Its Economic Aspects,” *Oxford Pamphlets 1914*, no. 44 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), 3.

²⁴⁹ For a more complete list of the British academics (from all fields) who studied in Germany before 1914, see Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany*, Appendix 1: German Education of British Scholars, 227-228.

²⁵⁰ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 223-224; and T. G. Otte, “Phillips, Walter Alison (1864-1950),” *ODNB*.

²⁵¹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 2nd ed. Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 46-47.

Acton was heir to his grandfather's estate in Herrnsheim, Germany.²⁵² Acton's cosmopolitanism is further revealed in his education. He first studied in Paris (1842) under the ecclesiastic Félix Dupanloup, before he moved to Oscott College in 1843, which was then under the future cardinal Nicolas Wiseman. Then, in 1848, he studied in Edinburgh until, in 1850, he went to Munich to work under the renowned scholar Ignaz von Döllinger. It was here that he first trained as a scientific and critical historian, and that he was first introduced to the eminent German historians Barthold Niebuhr and Leopold von Ranke.²⁵³ During this time, he became fired with an enthusiasm "for the scientific study of history," and he was thereafter motivated to return to England to share with his fellow compatriots the wonderful lessons that he had learned while in Germany.²⁵⁴ He was to later summarize an attitude common amongst British historians, that different races maintained their national characteristics across time and location even when confronted with moral and material influences.²⁵⁵

Given the influential position that German higher learning enjoyed in Britain, and the academic importance attached to factors such as race and racial inheritance, pro-German sympathies amongst liberal historians was doubtless ordinary. The historian John Kirkpatrick's letters to the German-born Cambridge don Dr. Karl Breul are instructive in this matter. Kirkpatrick informed his colleague in 1912, "I have always loved Germany and the Germans." He invoked his love for *Biederkeit* and *Gemütlichkeit*, to claim that, in his estimation, the French were far behind

²⁵² After Sir Ferdinand's early death (1837), Marie Louise married (1840) Granville George Leveson-Gower, Lord Leveson, later second Earl Granville, a Liberal statesman, best remembered for his service as Foreign Secretary.

²⁵³ Siak, "British Historians and the Coming of the First World War," 224; and Josef L. Altholz, "Acton, John Emerich Edward Dalberg, first Baron Acton (1834-1902)," *ODNB*.

²⁵⁴ Curiously, for a Catholic, Acton revealed himself as an Anglo-Saxonist, and assumed that the English race had descended from the Teutons—to believe otherwise was, to him, unthinkable. MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 109-110.

²⁵⁵ John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, first Baron Acton, *Historical Essays and Studies*, eds. John Neville Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1907), 341-342.

the English and the sociable and amiable Germans.²⁵⁶ Certainly, there are more instances that could be cited here, but another means by which to examine how the historical establishment viewed Germany across time is to consider how that nation was treated in pre-1914 academic writing. The history textbook assumes noteworthiness as a source because it was and still remains a tool to disseminate values, ideas, and worldviews.²⁵⁷ “Of all school subjects,” history, most obviously, was a vehicle to transmit the values and attitudes that its teachers deemed most valuable to society.²⁵⁸ To write history, moreover, is to communicate, whether or not intentionally, one’s own values and biases. Certainly, as an academic endeavour it is not an exact science; rather, it is an attempt to attribute meaning to “human affairs,” and thus bias intrudes as an inevitable factor.²⁵⁹ History, then, made room for various ideas about culture, race, and identity, and because these ideas were embedded in a traditional and often emotive narrative, students and their teachers were more liable to receive them.²⁶⁰

Previous studies have used textbooks to demonstrate that British historians maintained a favourable attitude towards the German Empire until the First World War.²⁶¹ However, no initiative has undertaken to demonstrate how these views continued to receive nourishment thereafter. Nor, has there been any effort to consider how British historians framed the two Germanies. It is thus worthwhile to consider how historians treated the German Empire before 1914. Particularly, how scholars tackled German unification. There can be little doubt that unification, as a constructive

²⁵⁶ *Biederkeit* can best be translated in this context as honesty, trustworthiness, and decency. John Kirkpatrick to Karl Breul, 8 March 1912, and 26 January 1912, Institute for German Studies, London, Karl Herman Breul MSS. Quoted in Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 224.

²⁵⁷ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 232.

²⁵⁸ Valerie E. Chancellor, *History for their Masters: Opinion in the English History Textbook, 1800-1914* (Bath: Adams & Dart, 1970), 8.

²⁵⁹ G. M. Trevelyan, *An Autobiography and Other Essays* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1949), 68.

²⁶⁰ Chancellor, *History for their Masters*, 8.

²⁶¹ See Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War;” and Richard J. Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

influence, was a dominant theme in this literature. This is certainly the view of Steven Siak.²⁶² British historiography, then, ran counter to other trends in that historians tended to celebrate the newly unified and formidable German Empire. Prewar historians, favourable towards Germany, often described France as the traditional troublemaker in Europe. France, indeed, was the offender against whom countless continental coalitions had been formed. Scholars often attributed blame for the Franco-Prussian War to France, an envious Great Power anxious to confront and humiliate Prussia/Germany.²⁶³ Plainly, the one discernible theme dominant in this literature is that “France forced war on Germany.” The new rank to which Prussia had risen, stimulated resentment and frustration in Paris. This new rancour manifested itself into a confrontational desire “for a war which should humble” Prussia.²⁶⁴

The historian James Sime summarized the French attitude as a refusal to heartily accept the new continental situation. Prussian successes had aroused alarm and unease within the Second French Empire. Sime wrote that Napoleon III, anxious to restore national esteem, looked for an occasion to confront Prussia. Early in July 1870, Leopold, Prince Hohenzollern, was made a candidate to the Spanish Throne. Napoleon III seized on this event to humiliate the Prussian Crown—not only did he insist that the candidature be declined but he ordered Wilhelm I to offer an assurance that it would not be renewed. This was too much for King Wilhelm, and his refusal excited and alarmed the French. Napoleon drew on this frenzied excitement to foment a continental conflict. Sime made sure to remind his readers that the succession crisis was only a pretext for armed conflict, “it must not be assumed that the miserable ... contest had really whatsoever to do with the war.” France in fact mobilized in order to maintain its status in Europe. Napoleon III,

²⁶² Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 250.

²⁶³ J. W. Headlam, *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire* (London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1899), 315.

²⁶⁴ Emily Hawtrey, *A Short History of Germany* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1903), 240-246.

misinformed as to the situation in Germany, believed that Bavaria and Württemberg would remain neutral. But the southern monarchs, “true to their word,” declared for Prussia. Napoleon’s recklessness and haste helped to achieve the object which he had refused to accept: a reconstituted German Empire.²⁶⁵

By all accounts, the war motivated a desire for a closer union between the Southern German States and the North German Confederation. Southern and northern kinsfolk alike thought “how small” were the differences that divided them compared to the considerable interests which united “all Germans.” This sentiment secured for Prussia a closer contractual union with the Southern German States. By these treaties, the North German Confederation was transformed into a German Confederation and, later, its President—King Wilhelm—was bestowed with a new title, German Emperor. The conflict unified Germany and recovered for it Alsace and Lorraine. Sime defended their annexation because henceforth these territories would form a defensive bulwark against the French. Besides, annexation was taken as a natural and welcome evolution—a means by which to unite the various states and cities of Germany. Sime’s work was intended as a classroom reader and constituted a volume in the *Historical Course Series*. Still, a review attached to the textbook recommended it to an older audience as a source of exact information not accessible elsewhere.²⁶⁶

Notably, Sime’s volume was revised by A. W. Ward, “than whom England can supply no one better fitted to deal with matters of German History,” as E. A. Freeman claimed in his foreword to the revised edition.²⁶⁷ Ward was a well-known Germanophile—indeed, T. F. Tout affirmed that “all through his life, he [Ward] was anxious to do all that was in his power to emphasize friendly

²⁶⁵ James Sime, *History of Germany* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1874), 256-265.

²⁶⁶ Sime, *History of Germany*, 265-267 and 284.

²⁶⁷ E. A. Freeman, introduction to *History of Germany* edition adapted for American readers, ed. E. A. Freeman (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1884), i-ii.

relations between the land of his birth and that of his early education.”²⁶⁸ Ward was born in 1837 to Caroline (*nee*. Bullock) and John Ward. His father was a British consul, and, in 1841, the family relocated to Leipzig. Necessarily, Ward was educated in Germany. His education stimulated within him an admiration for German culture, science, and intellect; his esteem never waned. He returned to England in 1853, and, in 1855, he entered Peterhouse, Cambridge. Ward left with first-class honours in 1859 and took a chair in History and English Literature at Owens College, Manchester, in 1866. While his earliest works focused on English literature, his translation, issued in five volumes as the *History of Greece* (1868-73), of Ernst Curtius’s work, marked him out as a serious historian and reflected his admiration for Germany.²⁶⁹ Ward remained in Manchester until 1897—thereafter, he settled in London. His lecture series at Oxford University on *Great Britain and Hanover* was followed with a volume on *The Electress Sophia and the Hanoverian Succession*. He had already started work on *The Electress Sophia* when he was recalled to Peterhouse as Master in 1900. His return to Cambridge ensured his involvement in *The Cambridge Modern History*.

Ward, as editor-in-chief, with George Walter Prothero and Stanley Leathes, carried through this immense task in a little over a decade (1901-1912). Of his own contributions, which were issued in seven of the twelve volumes, the most notable were his two sections on the *Revolution ... in Germany*. He selected the historian and military correspondent Frederick Maurice to write the section on the *Franco-German War* (1870-71). Maurice was keen to instil in his readers the view that an envious France had aimed to overthrow Prussia as the first-rate power on the continent. Napoleon was conscious that his tenure as monarch rested on his acclaim as a military commander. Prussia’s battlefield successes stirred in him discomfort. Still, he refused to admit the

²⁶⁸ T. F. Tout, “Memoir,” in *A Bibliography of Sir Adolphus William Ward, 1837-1924*, ed. Augustus F. Bartholomew (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), xxvii.

²⁶⁹ G. P. Gooch, “Ward, Sir Adolphus William (1837-1924),” revised by R. J. W. Evans, *ODNB*.

new continental situation and schemed “to obtain some benefit” over Prussia. His efforts to enhance and extend his eastern frontier and to involve allies against Prussia were met each time and countered. These schemes created an adversarial mood between the two countries. Curiously, Maurice noted that both France and Prussia realized that Britain, although busied with domestic reforms, would not tolerate their forces or influence in Belgium.²⁷⁰

Maurice thereafter described in detail the actions and counteractions that culminated “in the stupendous catastrophe at Sedan.” While the work is technical, the reader can still detect in his summation an attitude favourable towards this new Prussianized Germany. The defensive alliances by which the southern states had bound themselves to Prussia established a firm basis on which unification could be built solidly. The “blood shed by north and south” on numerous a victorious field, showed that unification rested on “solid foundations.” The world saw for the first time not several well-coordinated armies, “but a nation-in-arms.” Moreover, German victories were not won by fortuitous action but had resulted from a drilled and national monomania. “Confident in ... their leaders,” the united forces decorated themselves in “laurels fresher and more wonderful than those won at” Königgrätz (1866). The most vital honour, however, was not won on the battlefield nor included in the surrenders. Since 1862, Bismarck had worked towards unification. The southern monarchs had consented readily enough to place themselves in a position subordinate to Prussia. However, it was made clear that while France still held Strasbourg, the future benefits of closer relations with the northern confederation were less real than was confrontation with a humiliated and resentful France. Bismarck thus “set himself to face a conflict with France” as the means by which to achieve his objective. French foolishness had made “Germany a united nation,”

²⁷⁰ Frederick Maurice, “The Franco-German War, 1870-1,” in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, *The Growth of Nationalities*, eds. A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 576-577.

which from its unification could “claim to be the [first-rank Power] in the World.”²⁷¹

Prewar British historians cited bitter resentment and unfit command as the main causes for the Franco-Prussian War. G. Barnett Smith, for instance, concluded that no nation had ever rushed “so headlong upon its fate.” Indeed, a frenzied belligerence had seized the citizenry, “as much so, it must be confessed as ... Napoleon III.”²⁷² Smith authored several influential biographies, including *William I and the German Empire*. He treated his biographical subject kindly—King Wilhelm was strong, considerate, and courageous, and he had an “unostentatious demeanour.”²⁷³ This description is in stark contrast to the verbiage he used to describe Napoleon III. Truly, Napoleon was vain, arrogant, rash, and excitable. Public opinion would never have reached such a frenzied state had it not been for the emperor and his servile ministers. Since Königgrätz (1866), Napoleon had pursued a reckless and aggressive position aimed to provoke a confrontation with Prussia to re-establish France’s hegemonic position in Europe. This deliberate program engendered a “belligerent feeling” among the entire population and ensured that the feverish excitement which seized the crowds was impossible to arrest. Napoleon, “with singular recklessness and culpability,” believed that he was destined to march on Berlin. His rashness thus ended the Second French Empire.²⁷⁴

Barnett’s work differed from other studies insofar as he selected Wilhelm I as his foil to Napoleon III. Prewar historians tended to juxtapose the Emperor with the Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck was certainly cast in radiant terms—alternately, he was a creator, restorer, and conqueror. He was lauded for his expansionist ideas and credited for having achieved pan-

²⁷¹ Maurice, “The Franco-German War,” 576-612.

²⁷² G. Barnett Smith, *William I and the German Empire: A Biographical and Historical Sketch* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1887), 166-169.

²⁷³ Smith, *William I and the German Empire*, 2-3.

²⁷⁴ Smith, *William I and the German Empire*, 166-168.

German unification. The historian L. Cecil Jane cast him as a “god-fearing hero,” who restored “unity to a long-divided race.” Napoleon III, meanwhile, was deceptive and dishonest; his rule had been “founded upon deceit and maintained by fraud.” Jane intimated that should an instructive moral lesson be drawn from their confrontation it was one that stressed modesty. Neither man, admittedly, was above dishonesty. Bismarck, however, was more cautious, and he was rewarded for his discretion and humility. Truly, he “appeared well to merit ... the plaudits ... [and] the honours showered upon him.”²⁷⁵ Graham Burrell Smith adopted a similar tone in his *Scenes from European History*. Here, Napoleon was blamed for the Franco-Prussian War and Bismarck was hailed as “the last of the Makers of History.” Once more, unification is here characterized as a favourable and commendable outcome.²⁷⁶

James Wycliffe Headlam, later made Headlam-Morley (1918), likewise stated that France, with “growing discontent and suspicion,” had sought a confrontation to reassert its continental hegemony. The French believed that their position on the continent was under threat from Prussia. Duly, France opposed pan-German unification and wished to see the southern states kept in semi-isolation. “This could not long continue,” Headlam wrote, since the people “were looking forward to the time when the Southern States should join with the North.” There were, admittedly, factions in Austria and Bavaria that still resisted unification. However, Napoleon’s unprovoked declaration was “so ... without reason or excuse,” that it swept away “all minor ... differences,” and helped that nation to achieve its unification.²⁷⁷

From 1894 to 1900, Headlam taught ancient history at Queen’s College, London.

²⁷⁵ L. Cecil Jane, *From Metternich to Bismarck: A Textbook of European History, 1815-1878* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1910), 247-254.

²⁷⁶ Graham Burrell Smith, *Scenes from European History: A Companion to English History for the Middle Forms of Schools* (London, 1911), 196.

²⁷⁷ Headlam, *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire*, 315-317.

Thereafter, he joined the Board of Education and remained there until the Great War. Even after he transitioned into foreign policy, he retained a keen interest in educational issues. His work in education led him to develop an interest in social reform and industrial organization, which in turn led him to write *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire* (1899).²⁷⁸ There is little in the book to indicate that the German Empire was a threat to Britain. Headlam's interest in Bismarckian reform led him to treat Bismarck in fulsome terms: "Bismarck was no Napoleon; he had determined that war was necessary, but he did not go to the terrible arbitrament with a light heart ... It was his strength that he never forgot that he was working, not for himself, but for others." Headlam described Bismarck as benevolent and honourable: "he was not a man who from personal ambition would order thousands ... to their death or bring ruin to his country."²⁷⁹ Headlam also reflected on how the new German Empire would conduct itself; would it use its irresistible force for fresh annexations—"this is what Frenchmen had done under similar circumstances." Bismarck, however, was not a man to imitate their mistakes, "crimes and blunders." Rather, he favoured reconciliation and compromise; his peace initiatives secured for the German Empire "all the prestige it had gained," and enabled him to soothe old jealousies.²⁸⁰ Given the role that Headlam would serve after 1918, his views held notable influence.²⁸¹

John Holland Rose, like Headlam, stressed France's traditional role as an aggressor in Europe: "if we look at the past, we find that our forefathers dreaded France far more than the wildest alarmists now dread Germany." Since Louis XIII, British efforts had been directed towards constructing coalitions against France. Rose even claimed that France was still better positioned

²⁷⁸ Erik Goldstein, "Morley, Sir James Wycliffe Headlam- (1863-1929)," *ODNB*.

²⁷⁹ Headlam, *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire*, 251 and 315.

²⁸⁰ Headlam, *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire*, 379-383.

²⁸¹ Notably, Headlam participated at the Paris Peace Conference, and acted an interlocutor between the foreign office and prime ministerial secretariat. He was also involved in the day-to-day work through his service on numerous official and *ad hoc* committees. Thereafter, the foreign office retained his services, and he was designated to act as its historical advisor. Erik Goldstein, "Morley, Sir James Wycliffe Headlam- (1863-1929)," *ODNB*.

“for an attack on England.” To observe its numerous “harbours and extensive littoral was a task far harder than that which would await” in any future war with Germany. Like Sime, Rose justified the decision to annex Alsace-Lorraine because it served to secure Germany: “we who live behind the rampart of the sea know little (save in times of panic) of the fear that besets a state which has no natural frontiers.” Moreover, the annexation constructed “a barrier against” France. Certainly, it was only natural that the German Empire should wish to secure itself from future hostility. Rose was confident that Britain would have done the same in a similar position. He explained German naval expansion with reference to its geographical vulnerability: “by sea she is less vulnerable; but there she labours under a great disadvantage.” Mainly, “that her oceanic commerce has to pass through ... the English Channel,” and there it was vulnerable to “the French and British fleets at Brest, Plymouth, Cherbourg, Portsmouth, and Dover.” This, he charged, “is what makes her nervous about her mercantile fleet,” and “what makes her build [an extensive battle] fleet.” To elicit support for Germany, the reader is once more reminded, “were we in her situation we should do the same.”²⁸²

Notably, Rose regarded German unification as a “wonderful work” that would contribute to “world peace.” The German Empire served to secure the unguarded continent from expansionist conflicts, “which had so often lured France into false courses in the previous centuries.” To Rose, France was an unstable instigator; the German Empire, meanwhile, was a beneficial presence that had maintained peace for forty-one years. This peaceful interlude had allowed the German Empire to develop its political capacities and institutions. German unification “effected at one stroke what Great Britain, with all her expenditure ... had never been able to effect.” Chiefly, a continental equilibrium so balanced that future conflict would be a vain and futile endeavour. Indeed, the new

²⁸² J. Holland Rose, “The Political History,” in *Germany in the Nineteenth Century: Five Lectures*, ed. J. H. Rose, C. H. Herford, E. C. K. Gonner, and M. E. Sadler (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1912), 16-21.

balance would impose caution on even the most unrestrained and ambitious autocrats. Like Headlam, Rose commended Bismarck, whose expansionist policies were seen to have unified a “long divided people.” Since Bismarck had no viable alternative, the reader is encouraged to sympathise with his defensible actions, not least, because he secured for his nation a fortified western frontier. Besides, his aims were “on the whole peaceful.” Rose was confident that the German Empire would refrain from any deliberate interference with continental pacification, since it was already contented with all that it had won. Liberal historians viewed unification as a natural and welcome development; that Bismarck had “accomplished [this] wonderful work” was seen to demonstrate his benevolent and noble virtues.²⁸³

Rose’s contribution featured in an edited collection, *Germany in the Nineteenth Century*. The edition contained five lectures on German modern history. Rose contributed the address on political history. His fellow contributors were Charles H. Herford, the economist E. C. K. Gonner, and the educationalist M. E. Sadler. Herford contributed the chapters on intellect and literature, while Gonner and Sadler wrote about economics and education. Educated in Berlin, Herford had an enthusiasm for German Romanticism and had helped to found the English Goethe Society.²⁸⁴ Of Goethe, he wrote, “we find... all the traits” that foretold “the German Nineteenth Century.” Namely, a “passion for truth ... and fidelity,” “profound self-consciousness,” and “the demand for action, for service, and for duty.” Gradually, German theories had hardened, and an earlier idealism and aesthetical criticism ceded to transformative and creative energies. Whereas “ideas had failed to fashion the German State in 1848, blood and iron and masterful will succeeded in 1871; and masterful will was for that generation the saving formula, the guiding clue, in politics, in history, in science.” Still, this masterful will never “sought to emancipate itself from thought.” Herford

²⁸³ Rose, “The Political History,” 16-22.”

²⁸⁴ Alan Shelston, “Herford, Charles Harold (1853-1931),” *ODNB*.

cautioned his readers against the idea that the average German was less free than his counterpart in Britain: “German freedom is a positive and complex ideal, achieved by the individual in and through” his active participation in “the organised state.” Generally, Herford’s two-part chapter is favourable, and he took care to condition his criticisms. Thus Germany, while “more and more” absorbed with its material conditions, was still the nation to whom “we turn for an assurance that the thought which wanders through eternity, and wrestles, however vainly, with the enigmas in the universe, is a permanent factor in civilisation.”²⁸⁵

Michael Sadler, writing about education in Germany, stressed the transnational ties that linked Britain and Germany: “Berlin, Jena, Marburg, Frankfort-on-Main, and Munich have each, in a remarkable degree, influenced the recent educational thought in this country.” Sadler observed that both educational systems were rooted in a similar tradition and history; and were far more compatible than was either “to the current educational system in France.”²⁸⁶ Even in education one can detect an intellectual tradition that viewed France as foreign and in conflict with Britain and Germany.²⁸⁷ Britain and Germany, meanwhile, are seen as sharing a common culture that thread together noble ideas about life, self-sacrifice, and duty. That Sadler viewed himself as an advocate is evitable from his recommendation that “German and British education have much to gain from a closer understanding.” Certainly, there was great value in intimacy. This would permit a constant exchange in ideas, experience, and knowledge, and help to build and strengthen relationships between scholars in Britain and Germany.²⁸⁸ Sadler’s sympathetic attitude doubtless stemmed from his Germanophilia. During the prewar period, he wrote numerous reports for the Board of

²⁸⁵ C. H. Herford, “The Intellectual and Literary History,” in *Germany in the Nineteenth Century: Five Lectures*, ed. J. H. Rose, C. H. Herford, E. C. K. Gonner, and M. E. Sadler (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1912), 37 and 75-77.

²⁸⁶ Michael E. Sadler, “The History of Education,” in *Germany in the Nineteenth Century: Five Lectures*, ed. J. H. Rose, C. H. Herford, E. C. K. Gonner, and M. E. Sadler (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1912), 124-127.

²⁸⁷ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 241.

²⁸⁸ Sadler, “The History of Education,” 126-127.

Education that expounded the educational system in Germany.²⁸⁹ Sadler often visited Germany, both for leisure and in an official capacity, to inspect schools and observe educational experiments. His own research was given to comparative study, and this is best exemplified in an address he delivered on *England's Debt to German Education* in 1912 at Frankfurt-am-Main.²⁹⁰ The main difference between their educational systems was the degree to which each had utilized state authority. England had used that power with reluctance and had rejected any comprehensive plan for national organization. Germany, meanwhile, had exercised state control admirably, and without any serious resistance from its electorate.²⁹¹ Even in wartime, he retained an unbroken admiration for “the educational achievement of Germany.”²⁹²

J. A. R. Marriott's *The Remaking of Modern Europe, 1789-1878* (1909) drew attention to the role that Prussia and Bismarck fulfilled in pan-German unification. Bismarck undertook to Prussianize Germany, though the reader is left uncertain as to whether this evolution should be lauded. Nonetheless, Prussia's victorious action in 1871 is treated as an historical necessity—an event that would serve to secure Europe. Marriott dismissed any notion that the Second French Empire should be collated with the modern German Empire. “The Bonapartist Empire was born in dishonour,” he wrote, and its demise was seen as beneficial. The German Empire, on the other hand, was commended as “the long-delayed consummation in an historical evolution”; its creation consonant with “a genuine national necessity.” Henceforth, the noble and dignified Teutons would be united “on such solid foundations” as race, language, and historical tradition.²⁹³ Marriott would

²⁸⁹ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 241.

²⁹⁰ J. H. Higginson, “Michael Sadler and the German Connection,” *Oxford Review of Education* 16, no. 2 (1990): 245.

²⁹¹ The conclusion from his address repeated almost verbatim a section included in *Germany in the Nineteenth Century*. Sadler, “The History of Education,” 113-114.

²⁹² Michael Sadler, “The Strength and Weakness of German Education,” in *German Culture: The Contribution of the Germans to Knowledge, Literature, Art, and Life*, ed. W. P. Paterson (London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1915), 306.

²⁹³ J. A. R. Marriott, *The Remaking of Modern Europe: From the Outbreak of the French Revolution to the Treaty of Berlin, 1789-1878* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1909), 228-231.

soon lecture on *The Problem of German History* (1911). Once more, he commended the events that led to unification, declaring that “the long-delayed but splendidly achieved consummation of German unity by the national uprising of 1871” was “the crown and climax of German History ... At last, Germany has attained to nationhood; at last, the Germans have a common *Fatherland*.”²⁹⁴ Largely, Marriott’s works relied on translated German sources and often embodied little, if any, new research.²⁹⁵

Born to Francis Marriott, a solicitor from Manchester, John Marriott obtained a second from New College, Oxford in 1882, where he was to remain as a lecturer before he was elected as a fellow at Worcester College in 1914. However, his main contribution to education dates from 1886, when he was recruited as an extension lecturer for the University. Marriott took to his work immediately. He was a natural orator, able to enthral most crowds, and was remembered for his characteristic flourishes.²⁹⁶ His influence on individuals, such as Vera Brittain, who wrote about him in her *Testament of Youth* (1933), was often transformative.²⁹⁷ Thereafter, he was elected to Parliament in March 1917 as the Conservative Member for Oxford City. Since he was fifty-seven when he entered Parliament, he was deemed too old for a ministerial office; however, he was an effective backbencher, and he served on several influential committees. Marriott was above all an historian. His work owed much to his career as an extension lecturer. Thus, he was able to communicate intricate ideas to an educated but non-academic audience. Mostly, his learning was obtained at second hand, and he undertook little archival research.

²⁹⁴ J. A. R. Marriott, *The Problem of German History: An Introductory Lecture* (Oxford: Horace Hart, 1911), 8.

²⁹⁵ Evans, *British Historians and the European Continent*, 103.

²⁹⁶ Lawrence Goldman, “Marriott, Sir John Arthur Ransome (1859-1945),” *ODNB*.

²⁹⁷ Brittain felt indebted to Marriott, having convinced her father to allow her to enter Oxford University. Of Marriott, Brittain wrote, “For me, Sir John remains and always will remain the kindly, stimulating teacher in whose genial presence obstacles hitherto insuperable melted away like snow in April. ... To him I owe ... the university education which for all its omissions did at long last equip me for the kind of life that I wanted to lead. It is a debt that I acknowledge with humble gratitude and can never hope to repay.” Vera Brittain, *Testament of Youth* (New York: Seaview Books, 1980), 60-61.

“Historians,” he remarked in his memoir, “may be divided into two classes: expositors and researchers, those who devote themselves to investigating the sources, and those who popularize the results thus obtained ... Circumstances have combined with my inclinations to make me an expositor rather than a research worker.” Marriott could read and converse in French and German and he travelled numerous times to Germany, but only ever as a tourist. He also ran a successful summer school for international students in Oxford, at which two hundred Germans were in attendance in July 1914. Naturally, this caused him some embarrassment and anxiety, but he was able to secure their safe transit back to Germany.²⁹⁸ This, combined with his continental vacations, was about the extent to which he interacted with Germany.²⁹⁹ Nonetheless, he claimed for himself “lucidity, and [historical] accuracy.” He was convinced that history, and its instruction, was “of high political utility, and that [history] cannot perform that service unless it be approached in a scientific spirit ... If we can trace effects to their causes, we ought to get some guidance in the conduct of contemporary affairs.”³⁰⁰ Yet remarkably, his works made little effort to draw lessons from history. Marriott embodied the well-established view that the historian should remain objective, neutral, and unbiased. Thus, his 1915 collaboration with C. Grant Robertson, *The Evolution of Prussia*, made little reference to the conflict during which it was written.³⁰¹

German historians were seen to have devised the rules for modern history, stressing fact-based evidence and historical objectivity.³⁰² British historians were determined to emulate their

²⁹⁸ J. A. R. Marriott, *Memories of Four Score Years: The Autobiography of the Late Sir John Marriott* (London: Blackie & Son Ltd, 1946), 107-108, 141-149, and 227-229.

²⁹⁹ Evans, *British Historians and the European Continent*, 103-104.

³⁰⁰ Marriott, *Memories of Four Score Years*, 228-229.

³⁰¹ The authors claimed that the decades before 1914 could not “yet be treated scientifically.” The events were still too controversial and the material available for their discussion was insufficient. Then, too, any claims there made, would need constant revision as new material was made available. Regardless, this was not work for the historian. J. A. R. Marriott and C. Grant Robertson, *The Evolution of Prussia: The Making of an Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915), 424; Evans, *British Historians and the European Continent*, 104-105.

³⁰² Ranke’s celebrated dictum that the historian must write *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist* (exactly as it happened, or as it actually was), influenced all historians who thereafter identified themselves with historical objectivity. E. H. Carr,

methods and show themselves worthy, but their resources were more limited.³⁰³ Before 1914, foreign office correspondence and memoranda were subject to obstructive censorship. Keith Wilson explains that “no correspondence later than 1780 could be seen without restriction and censorship; correspondence between 1780 and 1850 was open to inspection, and could be copied, but only under special permit issued by the secretary of state, and these permits imposed certain restrictions on ... any notes taken, or abstracts or copies made.”³⁰⁴ H. A. L. Fisher claimed that archival research in the Foreign Office was futile given the restrictions imposed on access to the public records. He opined that any information derived from research in the Foreign Office archives was “for the most part unimportant”; almost everything that was “really important” came “out in memoirs or ... state papers.” Thus, he proposed that the authorities should institute a fifty-year rule in order that as each year passed new documents should be made available to researchers. Naturally, certain documents “should be held back longer than others,” but the current system was unsuited for academic research. Fisher cited a review from J. W. Headlam which implied that Germany/Prussia had gained much from opening its archives to researchers, and that other countries must follow its example, “countries that kept their archives closed were really at a disadvantage as compared with countries that kept theirs open.”³⁰⁵ Headlam explained as such, statesmen and diplomats “rather gain than lose when a brighter light is turned on the motives for their action.” Conversely, these motives could be made to look nefarious should “the light come from” unfavourable correspondence or diplomatic papers published in “rival and hostile

What is History? 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), 8-9. Ranke’s contemporary, the historian Herbert Baxter Adams, described him as the master whose critical method had inaugurated modern historical studies. H. B. Adams (ed.), *Papers of the American Historical Association* Vol. III, No. I (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1888), 105.

³⁰³ Evans, *British Historians and the European Continent*, 102.

³⁰⁴ Keith Wilson, “Introduction: Governments, Historians, and ‘Historical Engineering’,” in *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians Through Two World Wars*, ed. Keith Wilson (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996), 15.

³⁰⁵ *Royal Commission on Public Records* vol. I, part III [Cd. 6396], “Minutes of Evidence” (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1912), 78-79.

countries.” Headlam noted that as the German Empire continued to allow freer access to its public records, other nations will be “compelled to do the same in self-defence.”³⁰⁶ Fisher certainly agreed; German historians, who were far from the most impartial, had, he claimed, received the Prussian view from “the Prussian documents.”³⁰⁷

Thus, there existed a belief that the Foreign Office was less generous than its continental rivals in its transactions with researchers.³⁰⁸ Routinely, historians based their studies on translated texts, or foreign documents. British historians working on Germany, for instance, undertook little archival research themselves, but being fluent in German, were able to bolster their own studies with translated texts from Germany. Predictably, this work was uncritical and celebrated pan-German unification and the German Empire.³⁰⁹ Eyre Crowe, then a senior official at the Foreign Office, could thus lament that “so little original historical work is at present done in this country.” Crowe concluded that there was a need for scholars to have freer access to the public records and departmental correspondence, “we have nothing to lose as a nation, and a good deal to gain, by the widest possible publication being given to our transactions with foreign countries.”³¹⁰ Crowe, however, was not anxious to see this system removed; in fact, he thought that the Foreign Office should retain its licence “to withhold any particular volumes or documents, whether relating to the period before or after 1837.” Nonetheless, he was inclined to move forward the date at which documents could be consulted from 1850 to 1861, having convinced himself “that nothing ... from our archives relating to the Crimean War, could ... have any political effect on our present relations

³⁰⁶ J. W. Headlam, review of *Geschichte Europas seit den Verträgen von 1815 bis zum Frankfurter Frieden von 1871*, by Alfred Stern, *The English Historical Review* 10, no. 39 (July 1895): 593-596.

³⁰⁷ *Royal Commission on Public Records* vol. I, part III [Cd. 6396], “Minutes of Evidence,” 78-79; and Keith Hamilton, “The British Foreign Office and Historical Researchers During the Great War and Its Aftermath,” 192-194.

³⁰⁸ Hamilton, “The British Foreign Office and Historical Researchers During the Great War and Its Aftermath,” 192-194.

³⁰⁹ Evans, *British Historians and the European Continent*, 102-103.

³¹⁰ FO 370/16, L40126/16761/B, memorandum by Eyre Crowe, 17 November 1908.

with Russia.” He did however think it advisable to limit access to any documents from what he “described as the Bismarck era in foreign politics.” Then, too, he cautioned that any access accorded to researchers after the endorsed date should be subject to strict conditions, “that the actual text of anything proposed to be published must be submitted for the censorship of the Secretary of State and that on publication being authorised, the original notes, abstracts, or copies ... are handed over to him.”³¹¹ Eventually, it was decided that researchers with ministerial authorization could view documents dated from 1837 until 1860. Crowe’s recommendation that some historians be allowed to view documents from an even later date was not embraced, and any further extensions would have to wait until after the Great War.³¹²

British historians were undeterred and, in fact, the decade or so before 1914 witnessed an increase in the writing, revision, and reissuing of texts on German history.³¹³ Sime’s *History of Germany* (1874) was reissued as a second edition in 1909, and an additional section (written by R. P. Mahaffy) was added to deal with recent events. The chapter could hardly have been more favourable in characterizing Kaiser Wilhelm II as a “truly remarkable sovereign.” Mahaffy touched on naval and commercial rivalry, but these subjects were treated sparingly and were tempered with reference to other influences. The Germans are revealed as industrious, numinous, and friendly.³¹⁴ That the second edition was reissued at the same time as a naval scare in Britain (1909), should not be overlooked. Certainly, some works were issued with the intent to lessen tensions between the two countries. Particularly, after the naval crisis (1909). Thus, rather than contribute to the strain in diplomatic relations, these historians sought to affect a *détente*.³¹⁵ A. W. Holland drew

³¹¹ FO 370/16, L40126/16761/B, memorandum by Eyre Crowe, 17 November 1908; and Wilson, “Governments, Historians, and ‘Historical Engineering’,” 6-7.

³¹² Hamilton, “The British Foreign Office and Historical Researchers during the Great War and Its Aftermath,” 194-195.

³¹³ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 237.

³¹⁴ James Sime, *History of Germany* second edition (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd, 1909), 265-307.

³¹⁵ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 237-238.

attention to Britain and Germany's common racial inheritance in *A Short History of Germany to the Present Day* (1912). The work was distributed by the British-German Friendship Society, the successor organization of the Anglo-German Friendship Committee, and the direction in which the work intends is made clear in its introduction. Britons and Germans, Holland claimed, "belong to the same race, to a race which ... we call Teutonic, or Germanic." Thus, it would be unnatural for there to exist "any serious or lasting estrangement between" the two countries since their citizens share a common ancestry. The reader is informed that Britons are allied through blood, ancestry, and inheritance to their kinfolk in Germany. The fact that the book first examined ideas about race and racial inheritance before it undertook to consider its titular object is noteworthy. Certainly, these ideas were used in order to endorse reconciliation and a close mutual association between Britain and Germany.³¹⁶

Holland's irenic aims were further extended under the chapter headings "The Germans as a Commercial People" and "Germany's Place 'In the Sun'." The Germans, we are reminded, are "first and foremost" a commercial and industrial people. "Their prime interests are neither naval nor military, nor colonial, nor even educational, but commercial." Holland commended Germany's economic growth: "the extent to which" it had increased since unification was an incredible achievement not soon to be imitated. Here, then, its increase in industrial and commercial output was held as something to be celebrated. Necessarily, "as a commercial nation," Germany was "a peaceful nation." Its naval policy, too, resulted from commercial considerations rather than from any other; its conviction being that it should have sufficient forces available to secure its overseas trade and commerce. Holland did not believe that the Germans intended to use their forces for a renewed conflict. Prussia had attained the role which it sought, and Germany, under its direction,

³¹⁶ Arthur William Holland, *A Short History of Germany to the Present Day* (London: The British-German Friendship Society, 1912), 3-8 and 151; Siak, "British Historians and the Coming of the First World War," 238.

“has now no need to fight unless it is to protect her great commercial interests, a right which she retains in common with all other civilized Powers.” Holland’s defence was carried even further when he declared that the German Empire had to defend itself from external threats (that is to say, Russia). Whilst its vast expenditure on armaments was regrettable, the reader is asked to consider the issue from an outlook sympathetic to Germany: “we, who have carried our commerce ... [around] the globe, and settled there our colonies, cannot blame the Germans for” their desire to secure their commercial liberty. Previously, “Prussia and [the] other German states” had been forced “to ask Great Britain” to defend their sea-going and overseas commercial interests. It was only natural that the Germans, now able, should wish to undertake this task themselves. This desire was not something that should alarm Britain. Especially, when one considered the common origins that tied Great Britain to Germany.³¹⁷

Briefly, Holland touched on the educational system in Germany. Englishmen had “long admired” its structure and had themselves tried to emulate it; “its actual influence in this nation” was indubitable. Then, too, its universities were famous, and their staff were amongst the most learned scholars in the world. Naturally, our best “students [often] finish their education with a course at some German University.” But then, it should be noted that German students had been made welcome at Oxford, Cambridge, and at other universities in Britain. Predictably, Holland enumerated the academic fields in which Britain owed a debt to Germany; in fact, any serious scholar in history, philosophy, theology, philology, literature, or the sciences was destined to know and read German. Holland took as his illustration for further elucidation modern history. “Several eminent German historians,” he wrote, “have devoted themselves to ... English History.”³¹⁸ To

³¹⁷ Holland, *A Short History of Germany to the Present Day*, 6-7 and 121-136.

³¹⁸ Holland here referenced Leopold von Ranke, J. M. Lappenberg, Reinhold Pauli, Moritz Brosch, Felix Liebermann, Onno Klopp, and Wolfgang Michael.

such the extent, that few British “historians would refuse to own their indebtedness to Germany.” British theologians, philosophers, and philologists, too, owed their learning to “masters who [were] German.” Holland invoked such names as Kant, Hegel, Johann Friedrich Herbart, Schopenhauer, Georg Heinrich August Ewald, and Friedrich Christian Baur to demonstrate Britain’s intellectual “indebtedness to Germany.” Holland’s conclusion once more reiterates the “links between England and Germany.” Neither naval nor commercial rivalries receive much attention. Certainly, this sketch was meant to advertise the numerous ties that bound Britain to Germany.³¹⁹

Holland’s work was reissued as a second edition in 1913. Notably, the author, social commentator, and internationalist, Norman Angell, wrote a foreword for the new edition. He extolled the work for its impartiality, and asked the reader to consider the historical, commercial, and geopolitical issues that had necessitated naval expansion in Germany.³²⁰ Besides this addition, there were a few lines added on the differences between Prussia and Germany. Germany, the reader was told, was not identical to Prussia, to confound Prussian institutions, culture, and character with similar institutions and ideas in Germany, was to blunder. Finally, the revised edition included a new conclusion. Once Holland had enumerated the academic and cultural fields in which Britain owed a debt to Germany, he insisted “we shall have said enough if these few remarks cause our readers to reflect on the strength and number of the links which bind together the two nations—the English and the Germans.” Both nations belong “to the same great race, [are] endowed with the same spirit, the same love for nature, and the same outlook upon life, it would be strange indeed if they were to be anything but friends and allies in the days which are to come.”³²¹ Both editions included a recommended reading list; however, the works selected were far from unbiased and

³¹⁹ Holland, *A Short History of Germany to the Present Day*, 121-136.

³²⁰ Norman Angell, foreword to *Germany to the Present Day: A Short History* 2nd edition, ed. A. W. Holland, (London: Thomas Murby & Co, 1913), i-vii.

³²¹ Holland, *Germany to the Present Day* 2nd edition, 6-7 and 156.

include several titles heretofore examined.³²² Clearly, the second edition was issued in order to introduce the reader to an outlook charitable to Germany, and to encourage amity, reconciliation, and affinity. Holland's work certainly casts doubt as to his impartiality—and indicates that some historians did not see themselves as educators only, but as advocates, emissaries, and analysts, too.³²³ Steadily, historians took roles for themselves that were outside academia, whether formally, as civil servants, elected officials, or consuls, or informally, as advocates, advisors, and unofficial mediators.

This view is further illustrated with reference to W. H. Dawson. Dawson often used his senior consultative position to promote the idea that there were two Germanies—spiritual and material; pastoral and industrial. Dawson truly believed that “no wilful disturbance” should be anticipated from Germany, since “the economic conquest upon which [its] mind was set could only be achieved by peaceful methods.”³²⁴ Both Dawson and A. W. Holland trusted as axiomatic the view that commerce had a civilizing effect on industrializing nations. Radical-Liberals identified progress as the gradual movement from militarism to industrialism and were thus inclined to stress the relationship between commerce and tranquillity.³²⁵ Predominantly, these views aligned with Cobdenism—the idea that free trade and *laissez-faire* internationalism would create global prosperity and thus would encourage international goodwill and harmony.³²⁶ Cobdenism certainly

³²² The titles there mentioned include Headlam's *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire* (1899), G. Barnett Smith's *William I and the German Empire* (1897), W. H. Dawson's *The Evolution of Modern Germany* (1908), J. H. Rose, C. H. Herford, E. C. K. Gonner, and M. E. Sadler's *Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (1912), W. W. Tulloch's *Story of the Life of the Emperor Wilhelm* (1888), and Marriott's *The Problem of German History* (1911).

³²³ Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 239.

³²⁴ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 12.

³²⁵ P. J. Cain, “J. A. Hobson, Cobdenism, and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 1898-1914,” *The Economic History Review*, New Series 31, no. 4 (November 1978): 565-566.

³²⁶ The social theorist and economist, J. A. Hobson, described free trade as the “social evolution by which, on the one hand, militarism is displaced by industrialism, and, on the other hand, political limits of nationalism yield place to an effective internationalism based upon identity of commercial interests.” J. A. Hobson, “Free Trade and Foreign Policy,” *The Contemporary Review* 74 (July 1898): 168.

influenced how some historians and economists viewed modern Germany. In 1913, the economist J. A. Hobson was invited to address the Cobden Club on the “German Panic.” Hobson emphasized that conflict with Germany, with whom Britain’s commercial and financial connexions grew “stronger and more numerous all the time,” was irrational. He deviated somewhat to suggest that British-German antagonism was attributable to contracted firms “whose able, well-informed directors” inflamed national animosities to maintain a vast expenditure on national armaments.³²⁷

Dawson, meanwhile, insisted that “there is no more pacific nation in Europe than the Germans.” He believed that commerce would arrest any expansionist or militarist tendencies in Germany. Indeed, its economic aims could not be achieved through conflict or violence. Curiously, his prewar studies largely ignored diplomatic considerations; instead, he sought to delineate Germany’s economic and industrial transformation. His reflections were intended to neither extol nor diminish Germany, but to relate how the Germans had advanced from an industrial outlook, “to describe their efforts, energies, [and] successes,” not to discourage his readers but to reassure them. Furthermore, Britain could learn from Germany; above all, in areas such as socio-economic reform, industrial efficiency, and national social insurance.³²⁸

Dawson viewed German unification as an achievement in “sagacious statesmanship and racial tenacity.” Bismarck had transformed Germany/Prussia into a united German Empire, “rich in all the material resources, with commerce in every sea, and territory on almost every continent.” Dawson reassured his readers that it was only natural that Germany had come to control a world empire; indeed, this was in accord with its “inevitable destiny.” Then, too, it was worthwhile to remember that Germany, like Britain, had outgrown its economic and territorial limits in Europe, and it needed to find new markets in which its manufactured wares could be traded for foodstuffs.

³²⁷ J. A. Hobson, *The German Panic* (London: The Cobden Club, 1913), 20-30.

³²⁸ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, v-vii and 12.

Needless to say, it was reasonable to view such ambitions with distrust, but “the candid student” should dismiss untoward motives because economic considerations alone could shed light as to Germany’s desire for overseas territories and markets. Dawson dismissed the armaments race as incidental because neither nation stood to benefit from an armed conflict with the other. He did however condemn Prussia’s Germanization scheme *vis-à-vis* the Polish minorities in the East.³²⁹ Yet, even here, he had no doubt as to “the beneficial effects of German colonization” in Eastern Europe and he was sure that German culture was more advanced and worthier than was Polish.³³⁰ Overall, German political ideas and institutions were crude, immature, and underdeveloped, but this was due to its relative immaturity. Given time, its institutions would evolve and mature more fully. German frailties were, above all, faults attributable to its inexperience, “and in that fact lies hope for the future.”³³¹

Dawson’s *The Evolution of Modern Germany* is an illustrative case in how historians came to think about and to formulate the two Germanies. Citing the neo-Kantian thinker, Friedrich Paulsen, Dawson remarked abstractly that “two souls dwell in the German Nation.” He claimed that old Germany, while necessitous in substance, was rich in ideals. The German Empire, meanwhile, was rich in material substance, but it had forfeited its earlier idealism. Previously, Germany had been home to “artists and thinkers”; more recently, however, it was a nation filled with “masterful combatants.” Since 1860, Germany had “devoted its undivided strength” to mastering the material realm and to achieving its national “ascendency.” Dawson still admired German cultural and intellectual achievements, but he located these more in the recent past than in the present. “We know what old Germany gave to the world, and for that gift the world will ever

³²⁹ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, vi, 1-2, 16, 334-336, and 496.

³³⁰ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 84.

³³¹ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, vi, 1-2, and 16.

be grateful: we do not know what modern Germany ... has to offer beyond its materialistic science and its merchandise.” Be that as it may, he still believed that higher education was “nowhere held in greater regard, learning ... nowhere cultivated more resolutely, and for its own sake,” than in Germany. Dawson was mindful not to arrive at universal conclusions, since Germany implied not one people but many, “with different cultures and different ... political and social institutions.” He thought it fruitful to divide the nation into two distinct regions: southwestern Germany (and the Thuringian States) and Prussia. Generally, this lateral demarcation line marked a division between liberalism and conservatism. Prussia was home to the most conservative forces and influences in the German Empire. These same forces and elements continued to dominate the imperial legislature and to determine the main tendencies in domestic and foreign policy. Thus, whenever Britons condemned German foreign policy, their scorn was actually directed towards Prussia, and—consciously or not—commentators ignored “the fact that in but few things” could Prussia be seen to reflect Germany.³³²

Dawson was anxious to educate his readers about the numerous differences that divided Prussia from the other German States. Politically, Prussia was much more reactionary, inelastic, and conservative than were the southern states, which were “altogether more modern and realise in far greater fullness the representative principle.” Prussia’s bureaucracy, social, political, and civic institutions, and officialdom were “far behind the smaller States in the South.” Prussian ministers, however, did not need to concern themselves with democratic issues since the constitution ensured their continued dominance in the *Bundesrat*. Even after half a century, the conservatives continued to stifle democratic rule in order to bolster the Prussian Crown. Later, when constitutional movements were reviewed, it would be revealed how different in thought and

³³² Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 1-2 and 12-19.

organization were the southern states from Prussia. Such differences were not limited to civic structure and organization: even “in its entire culture,” Prussia differed from the southern states. Prussia was severe, inflexible, and austere. This was in definite contrast to the southern states which were described as urbane, cultured, and easy-going. There was a fundamental distinction in character which divided the whole race as by an inviolable line: Germans were *Gemütlich*, Prussians were not *Gemütlich*.³³³ Overall, “social life is [more restful] in the South” than in Prussia. Thankfully, institutional structures existed to ensure that Prussia did not wield too much influence over the internal affairs of the other states.³³⁴

Similarly, James Sime tried to calm concerns that Prussia would come to dominate the southern States: “some fear lest Prussia should become too powerful, and the various German States be moulded too much after one pattern. But influences remain to prevent such a result.” Sime claimed that Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg remained to a large extent autonomous and still regulated their own internal affairs. The states each maintained “a certain individuality,” whose roots were historical and inviolable. Even though unification had been achieved, there would “always be unity in variety.” Prussia might be inclined towards autocracy, but Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, and the other minor states, would continue to obstruct its more ambitious continental designs. Sime made sure to extol German cultural and intellectual achievements, to which all the states had contributed—even Prussia. The German Empire had maintained its excellence “in science, literature, and art ... No other nation has an intellectual life so rich and [varied].” Germany, moreover, was unrivalled in art, literature, thought, music, and science. Britain was forever indebted to this Germany. Sime was more clement than Dawson in how he treated the

³³³ *Gemütlichkeit* is best described as a mood; to be *Gemütlich* is to be good-natured, comfortable, friendly, affable, and easy-going.

³³⁴ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 19-22.

semi-absolutist tendencies in Germany. Whereas Dawson at least admitted their existence, Sime dismissed them entirely. Besides, Germany's faults and foibles were trivial when measured against the contributions it had made to culture, intellect, and science.³³⁵

The two Germanies thesis took form in the late-nineteenth century, as Germanophile scholars tried to account for colonial competition and naval rivalry. Their arguments centred on three consonant and, at times, interchangeable themes: one cultural, another geographical and, the other, temporal.³³⁶ The cultural variant stressed Germany's intellectual and scientific achievements and contrasted these with its administrative/political immaturity. Then, the geographical model sought to distinguish Prussia from Germany. Finally, the temporal variant differentiated between old Germany—associated with idealism and romanticism—and the new, mechanical, modern, and up-to-date German Empire. Old Germany, which Dawson associated with Greece, was identified as daydreaming and pastoral, a nation filled with thinkers and learned scholars.³³⁷ The German Empire, meanwhile, was characterized as materialistic and authoritarian, a realm devoted to force and the material world. Yet, Dawson claimed there was “no more pacific nation in Europe than the Germans.”³³⁸ Potentially, one might conclude that some historians viewed the recently unified German Empire as a negative aberration, but that is to discount their continued admiration for cultural Germany—sometimes associated with their encounters at idyllic universities such as Heidelberg, Freiburg, and Marburg. The division between old and new, idealistic and material, enabled British admiration for German cultural and intellectual achievements to exist in tension with fears concerning militarism and naval rivalry. The resultant literature informed semi-official views on Germany, which were anti-Prussian in orientation rather than anti-German.

³³⁵ Sime, *History of Germany*, ed. E. A. Freeman, 266-270; Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 1-16.

³³⁶ To this, other variants were later added.

³³⁷ This Germany was home to Goethe, Schiller, Fichte, and Kant.

³³⁸ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 1-12.

This theme was evoked in *Modern Germany* by the historian and journalist Otto Julius Eltzbacher, who was to change his name to J. Ellis Barker in 1914. Born in Cologne, Eltzbacher was naturalized as a citizen in 1900. Published in 1905, *Modern Germany* was reissued several times before 1914. The fourth edition, issued in 1912, examined the old-new dichotomy, and identified the older, western states as idealistic and sentimental, inhabited by “philosophers, poets, composers,” languid officials, and “backwards peasants.” Modern Germany, meanwhile, was characterized as “hard-headed, calculating, cunning, business-like ... and very up-to-date.” Barker maintained that these two temporal expressions were different countries. The German Empire was disagreeable because it was nothing more than an aggrandized Prussia. Its emperor, capital city, officialdom, bureaucracy, and administrators were Prussian. Kaiser Wilhelm I is here reported to have said, “somewhat contemptuously,” that the German Empire was “an enlarged Prussia.” Old Germany continued “to vegetate and to dream dreams,” but under different names and banners: in the Rhineland, and in the South, in Holland, Switzerland, and Austria. Barker made sure to remind his readers that the eminent individuals most often associated with German Romanticism “were non-Prussians.”³³⁹ Thus, he associated idealism, sentimentality, and reverie with the old Germany. The German Empire, itself a bloated and more robust Prussia, is described as dominant, ebullient, and militaristic.³⁴⁰

Given this interpretative framework, one might conjecture that Barker viewed the German Empire with outright disapproval. However, he remarked favourably on its science, education, and industry. Britain’s scientific and industrial sectors could certainly “learn much from” similar

³³⁹ Barker’s list included Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Wieland, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Uhland, Lenau, Hegel, Fichte, Beethoven, Mozart, and Haydn.

³⁴⁰ J. Ellis Barker, *Modern Germany. Her Political and Economic Problems, Her Foreign and Domestic Policy, Her Ambitions, and the Causes of Her Success*, 4th ed. (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1912), 12.

industries in Germany.³⁴¹ It should be noted that the first edition did not feature any exposition on the old-new dichotomy. Rather, it aimed to explain how the German Empire had become a world factor in maritime trade, “politics, commerce, and industry.”³⁴² *Modern Germany* was revised and reissued in 1915. The fifth edition contained several additional sections, including one titled “How the Military Rules Germany.” The new instalment starts with an immediate reference to the two Germanies: “there are two ... currents in Germany, an autocratic and a democratic one.” The war had revealed to the wider world the internal conflicts within Germany, “between [militarism] and the civil authorities ... between reaction and progress, between might and right, between absolutism and democracy.” The Prusso-German war faction is blamed for the conflict and is said to have instigated it without any approval from the civilian authorities. Many Germans, Barker conceded, were doubtless peaceful. “German merchants, clergymen, and working-men [did] not wish for war.” Regrettably, between the electorate and military, “militarism had been victorious.” Barker concluded with a discussion on the “great difference between democratic and autocratic Germany, a difference which is not ... appreciated in other countries.”³⁴³ His continued reliance on this dichotomous framework, even in wartime, is illustrative.

The above exercise has been constructive in that it has demonstrated the extent to which Germanophilia imbued the historical establishment in Britain before 1914. Then, too, it has shown how historians came to formulate the two Germanies. Prewar literature is important because it directly inspired revisionist writing in the interwar period and—in an era in which the academic sphere overlapped with high politics and diplomacy—influenced decision-making and informed

³⁴¹ Barker, *Modern Germany*, 4th ed., 644.

³⁴² Otto Julius Eltzbacher, *Modern Germany. Her Political and Economic Problems, Her Policy, Her Ambitions, and the Causes of Her Success* (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1905), 1.

³⁴³ J. Ellis Barker, *Modern Germany. Her Political and Economic Problems, Her Foreign and Domestic Policy, Her Ambitions, and the Causes of Her Successes and of Her Failures*, 5th ed. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1915), 798-799.

debates on issues such as territorial claims, indemnities, and war guilt. Notably, historians had an audience with the decision-making elite and affected their mentalities and debates. Indeed, historians were not only viewed as academics but as political analysts and diplomatic emissaries, too. Scholarship on this topic remains sparse. An earlier concern with deteriorating diplomatic relations has caused some contemporary historians to overlook a direct correlation between prewar intellectual Germanophilia and interwar revisionist scholarship, and to dismiss the value of the two Germanies as a discursive framework. Moreover, this interpretation underrates the endurance, malleability, and resilience of the two Germanies. Even in wartime, historians were to add new variants to this framework in an effort to accommodate their own sympathies. Some scholars, such as Dawson, were to stress the oppositional currents in political culture. Others, still, noted a shift in the values which governed educational institutions and the officialdom.

The next chapter will continue to examine this dichotomy—and will consider how Britain's mobilization affected educated attitudes and mentalities in relation to Germany. Currently, it is assumed that wartime historians rallied to defend their country, and worked to condemn, vilify, and even insult Germany.³⁴⁴ However, in truth, their attitudes were more intricate, ambivalent, and nuanced than has hitherto been demonstrated in the historiography. Then, too, individual attitudes evolved as the war unfolded; at different times, and in critical moments, an individual could be more or less conciliatory. The one constant, though, is the framework that historians used in order to communicate their views and attitudes. Notably, historians continued to differentiate between the Germanies. Even the Bryce Report on *Alleged German Outrages*, a notable statement for semi-official views in wartime Britain, differentiated between the affable citizen-conscript and the ruling

³⁴⁴ See e.g. Siak, "British Historians and the Coming of the First World;" Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles;" Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany*; Firchow, *The Death of the German Cousin*; and Peter Buitenhuis, *The Great War of Words: British, American, and Canadian Propaganda and Fiction, 1914-1933*.

militarist elite.³⁴⁵ That such views survived the war is notable and demonstrates that there were definite limits to wartime antagonism.

³⁴⁵ James Bryce, et. al., *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages* (London: Macmillan & Co, 1915), 44.

2. “Of the Two Germanys, the One which You and We Love is Not Responsible for this Wickedness”: British Historians in the Great War

Symbolically, on 1 August 1914—the day on which Germany mobilized against Imperial Russia—nine academics submitted a formal protest in *The Times* against armed intervention.³⁴⁶ The editorial endorsed a racial motif to claim that Germany was “so near akin to our own,” that “war upon her in the interest of Servia and Russia” would be “a sin against civilization.” Germany, the signatories declared, led the world “in arts and sciences”; all had “learnt and [were] learning from” its scholarship.³⁴⁷ Gilbert Murray and G. M. Trevelyan, meanwhile, signed their names to a circular which quoted ministerial addresses that made clear that no national obligations existed between Britain and France.³⁴⁸ Murray declared that he was confident that the government would forestall Britain from becoming involved in a continental war, while Trevelyan stressed that “the ultimate danger must come from Russia ... I suggest that we should look both foolish and criminal if we now ruined our own civilization ... to help Russia more completely to ruin the kindred civilization of Germany.”³⁴⁹ During the few days which preceded the outbreak of war, countless circulars and editorials were issued with the intention to lessen hostilities and to exhort neutrality. The document to which Murray and Trevelyan had lent their names was circulated by the British Neutrality Committee.³⁵⁰ This liberal working-group dismissed the idea that to intervene was in the national interest, “no fact has been disclosed which would make it otherwise than disastrous,

³⁴⁶ The nine signatories were: C. G. Browne, Professor of Arabic, Cambridge; F. C. Burkitt, Professor of Divinity, Cambridge; J. F. Carpenter, Principal of Manchester College, Oxford; F. J. Foakes-Jackson, Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge; H. Latimer Jackson, Rector of Little Canfield, Essex; Kirsopp Lake, Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Harvard; W. M. Ramsay, Regius Professor of Humanity, Aberdeen; W. B. Selbie, Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford; and J. J. Thomson, Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics, Cambridge.

³⁴⁷ “Scholars’ Protest Against War with Germany,” *The Times* (London, England), 1 August 1914.

³⁴⁸ “Public Opinion and War: England’s Duty. Chorus of Vehement Protest,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, England), 3 August 1914.

³⁴⁹ Quoted in Martin Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 13.

³⁵⁰ The other signatories were Leonard Courtney, Lord Courtney of Penwith, J. Ramsay MacDonald, A. G. Gardiner, Graham Wallas, L. T. Hobhouse, J. A. Hobson, Francis W. Hirst, J. L. Hammond, and Basil Williams.

both to the domestic and ... the imperial interests of the United Kingdom.”³⁵¹ This informal committee brought together journalists, lawmakers, and academics—all advocates of the liberal view.

Radical-Liberals mustered various arguments, “which, in less hysterical times, would have commanded wide attention.”³⁵² Great Britain had last marched to war in Europe to check Russia, but intervention now would help to further its continental ambitions, “making her [Russia] the dominant ... Power in Europe, ... dictator in this continent and in Asia.” The *Manchester Guardian* circulated a manifesto that stressed that “the *Entente Cordiale* was certainly never intended ... as a war alliance, but as an expression of goodwill,” and that if war broke out, and Britain were involved, it would be impossible for London “to remain the financial centre of the world,” so that this almost inestimable benefit would pass permanently to the United States.³⁵³ Norman Angell, meanwhile, maintained that should Britain refrain from war, “while other nations are torn and weakened,” it would be in a position to act as an “arbiter ... to useful ends.”³⁵⁴ One tract asked bluntly: “which is the greater peril to this country, 65 million civilized Germans, of our own race and blood, ... or 140 million Russians, the slaves of a corrupt autocracy, ... trained to the use of force alone?”³⁵⁵ Likewise, Angell considered whether an autocratic and uncivilized Slavonic Federation would “be a less dangerous factor ... than a dominant Germany, ... highly civilized and mainly directed to the arts, ... trade and commerce?”³⁵⁶ British-German similarities were stressed time after time. Germany was endowed with a culture, moral ideals, and a commercial and industrial life that resembled Britain’s. Meanwhile, Russia was barbarous, uncivilized, and

³⁵¹ “Public Opinion and War: England’s Duty. Chorus of Vehement Protest,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, England), 3 August 1914.

³⁵² Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 13.

³⁵³ “England’s Duty. Neutrality the One Policy,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, England), 3 August 1914.

³⁵⁴ Norman Angell, “Menace of War,” *The Times* (London, England), 2 August 1914.

³⁵⁵ Quoted in Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 13.

³⁵⁶ Norman Angell, “Menace of War,” *The Times* (London, England), 2 August 1914.

dangerous.³⁵⁷ Finally, there was one further appeal produced after Germany had invaded Belgium, “a curious mixture of expediency and morality,”³⁵⁸

if Great Britain refrains from wasting her resources during the war and is the one great European Power that remains unexhausted ... she will be at the close in the best position to exercise her influence for the protection of Belgian interests, to see that justice is done, and to act as arbiter in the general interest.³⁵⁹

These arguments were to no avail. Curiously, as war fever swept across the nation, some noninterventionists became convinced that Britain “had no choice” but to oppose Germany, as Murray wrote to his wife, Lady Mary Howard.³⁶⁰ The British Neutrality Committee was thus dissolved, as was reported in the *Manchester Guardian* on 6 August.³⁶¹ Its one-time members went on to follow diverse wartime careers. Some, such as Trevelyan and Murray, were recruited as propagandists and polemicists.³⁶² Others, however, would continue to advance radical, dissentient, and pacifist views.

Murray’s volte-face ensured that he was invited to discuss how best to counteract enemy propaganda in neutral countries. Trevelyan attended the meeting, too; as did A. H. Hawkins, Sir Owen Seaman, and H. G. Wells. The meeting resolved that an information bureau should be established, and that an official writers’ manifesto should be made available for signature, to evince support for the war.³⁶³ Certainly, an earlier desire to prevent a general outbreak of war did not necessarily preclude support for the war effort once hostilities had commenced. During the summer, it would have been difficult to forecast the attitudes of individual historians towards an

³⁵⁷ These arguments used the traditional British Liberal distaste for Russia to defend Germany, and to garner support for non-intervention. “England’s Duty. Neutrality the One Policy,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, England), 3 August 1914.

³⁵⁸ Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 13.

³⁵⁹ “England’s Duty. Neutrality the One Policy,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, England), 3 August 1914.

³⁶⁰ Duncan Wilson, *Gilbert Murray, OM, 1866-1957* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 219.

³⁶¹ “The British Neutrality Committee Dissolved,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, England), 6 August 1914.

³⁶² Notably, neither Murray, nor Trevelyan, had played any active part in the movement to democratize foreign policy.

³⁶³ Charles A. Carpenter, “Shaw and Bertrand Russell versus Gilbert Murray on Britain’s Entry into World War I: The Inside Story,” *Shaw* 33, no. 1 (2013): 30-31.

outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany. Mostly, these attitudes were contingent upon the circumstances in which the war broke out.³⁶⁴ Murray, for instance, was swayed towards intervention by a single speech from Grey, his sincere and honest address to Parliament on 3 August 1914.³⁶⁵ Murray, who was in attendance, was reminded of “honour, obligation,” and international agreement.³⁶⁶ The German decision to invade neutral Belgium in order to better attack France made an enormous impression on Murray, and he became convinced that war was a lesser evil than non-intervention.³⁶⁷ Close friends, among them H. N. Brailsford, J. L. Hammond, Bertrand Russell, and John Morley, disagreed with this *casus belli*, but he was not dissuaded from his view that continental intervention had been the correct decision. The Government White Paper, released thereafter, confirmed the impression made on him by Grey: “it leaves me convinced that we had no choice.”³⁶⁸ That numerous friends and associates thought differently, was enough to prevent him from adopting a crude and chauvinistic attitude. Murray expressed his earliest views to Lady Mary:

I have hours in which I feel as you do, utterly abased, and crushed by the misery of the war, feeling that the death and maiming and starving of Germans and Austrians is just as horrible a thing as the same suffering in Englishmen. But mostly I feel strung up and exalted by a feeling of the tremendous issue and the absolute duty that lies upon us to save Europe and humanity. We did not know until war revealed it what this German system meant.³⁶⁹

Murray’s wartime views were not uncommon amongst his contemporaries, and his reversal in opinion offers an illustrative case study.

Previously, Murray had corresponded with J. A. Hobson, who had asked him to proofread and comment on his radical classic *Imperialism: A Study*. Hobson expressed gratitude to his friend,

³⁶⁴ Wilson, *Gilbert Murray*, 217-218.

³⁶⁵ Carpenter, “Shaw and Bertrand Russell versus Gilbert Murray on Britain’s Entry into World War I,” 29-31.

³⁶⁶ United Kingdom. HC Deb. 3 August 1914, volume 65, column 1810 (Sir Edward Grey).

³⁶⁷ Wilson, *Gilbert Murray*, 217-218.

³⁶⁸ Gilbert Murray MS 462 41, letter Gilbert Murray to Lady Mary Henrietta Howard, 13 August 1914.

³⁶⁹ Gilbert Murray MS 462 74, letter Gilbert Murray to Lady Mary Henrietta Howard, 7 September 1914.

for reading the proof-sheets and for his “valuable suggestions and corrections.”³⁷⁰ Murray commented on the work favourably—but queried its “view that class government makes for ... antagonism” between nations. Hobson explained in response that imperialism encouraged a “spirited foreign policy” as a distraction from domestic grievances.³⁷¹ Murray, too, remained close with Brailsford, whose own work suggested economic imperialism as a cause of international tension.³⁷² While these arguments did not persuade Murray, his close friends—Hammond, Hobson, and Russell—had serious reservations about armed intervention.³⁷³ Even John Morley, his former political mentor, was opposed to war between Britain and Germany. His staunch pro-German sympathies and aversion towards Tsarist Russia, led him to resign from the Cabinet in protest against armed intervention in August 1914.³⁷⁴

Morley remained defiant, and warned Prime Minister H. H. Asquith that “to swear ourselves to France is to bind ourselves to Russia.”³⁷⁵ Thereafter, he wrote a *Memorandum on Resignation*, but it was not released until after his death in 1928. Morley warned his colleagues and friends that if the Central Powers were defeated, “it is not England and France who will emerge pre-eminent in Europe. It will be Russia.” He thus opposed armed intervention and did not find *casus belli* in the German invasion of Belgium. Many Liberals felt a certain unease with the *Entente Cordiale* because it had led Britain to negotiate international agreements with Tsarist Russia. Shortly before these agreements were ratified, *The Times* published an editorial signed by established journalists, parliamentarians, and manufacturers that condemned any arrangement with

³⁷⁰ J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1902), xxvii.

³⁷¹ Quoted in Martin Ceadel, “Gilbert Murray and International Politics,” in *Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre, and International Politics*, ed. Christopher Stray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 222-223.

³⁷² H. N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace* (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd, 1914).

³⁷³ Wilson, *Gilbert Murray*, 218.

³⁷⁴ David Hamer, “Morley, John, Viscount Morley of Blackburn (1838-1923),” *ODNB*.

³⁷⁵ Letter John Morley to H. H. Asquith, 4 August 1914. Quoted in John, Viscount Morley, *Memorandum on Resignation. August 1914* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1928), 31.

Russia.³⁷⁶ Radical-Liberals identified the tsardom with imperialism, oppression, and absolutism. To cooperate with Tsarist Russia meant collaboration with a brutal and autocratic regime.³⁷⁷ That this aversion was commonplace amongst Liberals is indicated by the appeal to English Liberalism made by the German journalist and newspaper editor, Theodor Wolff. In 1914, Wolff warned that should Britain continue to accommodate the Russian Empire, “English Liberals will find themselves with no alternative but a close alliance with Russia.”³⁷⁸ Accordingly, radical-Liberals found it difficult to endorse armed intervention wholeheartedly.

Despite their overt Germanophilia—and in some cases unrestrained Russophobia—some Liberal scholars acknowledged that there was a definite limit to their radical dissent: “if by ... honourable obligation, we be ... involved in a war [with Germany], patriotism might still our mouths, but at this juncture we consider ourselves justified in protesting against being drawn into a struggle with a nation ... with whom we have so much in common.”³⁷⁹ The inherent difficulties for intellectual wartime dissent had its antecedents in the South African War. The conflict split the Liberals, and divided opinion amongst the intelligentsia.³⁸⁰ Mainly, what determined these divisions were ideological and personal factors.³⁸¹ This is well documented with reference to the moral philosopher Henry Sidgwick. Sidgwick had opposed as immoral ministerial indifference towards the atrocities committed during the Bulgarian Uprising (1876). However, he found governmental criticism less congenial with regard to the conflict in South Africa. Certainly, South

³⁷⁶ The signatories included J. Ramsay MacDonald, George Bernard Shaw, Arthur Sidgwick, John Hobson, and George Cadbury. “The Proposed Anglo-Russian Agreement,” *The Times* (London, UK), 11 June 1907.

³⁷⁷ Andreas Rose, *Between Empire and Continent: British Foreign Policy before the First World War*, trans. Rona Johnston (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2017), 368.

³⁷⁸ From Our Correspondent (Berlin), “British Navy & Russia. German Appeal to English Liberals,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, UK), 4 June 1914.

³⁷⁹ “Scholars’ Protest Against War with Germany,” *The Times* (London, England), 1 August 1914.

³⁸⁰ David Boucher, “‘Sane’ and ‘insane’ imperialism: British idealism, new liberalism, and liberal imperialism,” *History of European Ideas* 44, no. 8 (2018): 1190.

³⁸¹ David Boucher, “British Idealism, Imperialism and the Boer War,” *History of Political Thought* 41, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 326.

Africa was a question which affected national and imperial interests directly. Sidgwick tried to give due consideration to both ethical ideals and national exigencies; still, he did not think it right to lend his name to a protest petition circulated at Cambridge in March 1899. He was uncertain about how to reconcile imperial interests “with effective independence for the Boers,” but troubled, too, by his “personal connection with the Government.”³⁸² Earlier, Sidgwick had written that even the most “thoughtful and moral” intellectual should silence their political opposition during wartime, and now events had confirmed this view. Once war had commenced, it was “doubtless right for ... all men to side with their nation unreservedly,” since not even the most censorious scholar “should keep coldly aloof from patriotic sentiment.” Only before hostilities had broken out could such “moral persons” be expected “to make an earnest” attempt at impartially, and wrestle with “the points at issue.”³⁸³

Without a doubt, intellectual factors and one’s earlier encounters contributed to whether an individual favoured continental intervention. Like Murray, Lord Bryce believed that Germany’s intrusion into Belgium amounted to *casus belli*, as he told the editor and author J. A. Spender.³⁸⁴ This event was decisive in determining his attitude towards the war, “but his commitment was reluctant, hesitant, and with foreboding.”³⁸⁵ Bryce held no aversion towards the German Empire; in fact, he still delighted in the intellectual discoveries that he had made as a student “in that delightful, old, idealistic Germany.” Indeed, he had established himself as a serious scholar with a treatise on German history; this won for him new friends and close contacts in Germany, which he was always keen and careful to maintain. Moreover, he admired German historiography, theology,

³⁸² His brother-in-law was Arthur Balfour, then, first lord of the Treasury. Henry Sidgwick, letter to Professor James Sully, 29 March 1899 in *Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir*, ed. Arthur Sidgwick and Eleanor Sidgwick (London: Macmillan, 1906), 581-582.

³⁸³ Henry Sidgwick, “The Morality of Strife,” *The International Journal of Ethics* vol. 1 (October 1890): 14.

³⁸⁴ Lord Bryce to J. A. Spender, 31 July 1914, Spender MSS., British Library, Add. MSS. 46392.

³⁸⁵ Keith G. Robbins, “Lord Bryce and the First World War,” *The Historical Journal* 10, no. 2 (1967): 255.

and literature, which he ranked as worthier than similar fields in France.³⁸⁶ Certainly, his attitudes towards Germany were formed before its unification, when it was still reasonable to believe that its citizens were the most unworldly, immaterial, and idealistic in Europe.³⁸⁷ Bryce also believed in “Teutonic freedom”—an idea which he shared with fellow academics.³⁸⁸ He never cared to define the term exactly, but he believed it to bind together Britain and Germany. His time as British ambassador to the United States (1907-1913) confirmed him in his conviction that Germany, the United States, and Britain, shared certain innate traits and characteristics that made them natural allies and friends. “Certainly, there were differences between them and features which each found distasteful in the other, but these were ... disagreements within the family.”³⁸⁹ Likely, Bryce would have endorsed non-intervention had it not been for the German attack on Belgium. However, he believed that international treaties were sacrosanct; Britain thus had a mandate to defend and secure international law and morality.³⁹⁰

Contemporary scholars insist that wartime historians rallied to the cause and carried out their nationalist duties; and while the aforementioned case studies endorse this view, reactions to the war were incredibly varied.³⁹¹ Remarkably, most historians continued to use the two Germanies thesis to frame their research and wartime commentaries. Curiously, modern scholars tend to overlook this incredible detail, despite the fact that new variants were added to this framework as historians tried to accommodate and, indeed, work out their own wartime sentiments. Surely, its stubborn survival and its use as both a literal and abstract expression indicate continuity. This

³⁸⁶ Fisher, *James Bryce*, vol. II, 126; and Robbins, “Lord Bryce and the First World War,” 255.

³⁸⁷ Melvin Richter, *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 90.

³⁸⁸ James Bryce, *Impressions of South Africa* (New York: The Century Co, 1897), 495.

³⁸⁹ Robbins, “Lord Bryce and the First World War,” 255.

³⁹⁰ Robbins, “Lord Bryce and the First World War,” 255-256.

³⁹¹ Siak, for instance, notes that whereas Germany/Prussia had once been viewed favourably, “she was not treated with ... hostility.” Steven Siak, “British Historians and the Coming of the First World War,” 246.

section endeavours to reassess the claim that historians embraced the war effort with fervour, blindness, and zeal. Rather, their views were more intricate, conflicted, and nuanced than has hitherto been demonstrated in the historiography. Furthermore, individual attitudes evolved as the war unfolded; at different times, and in critical moments, an individual could be more or less conciliatory. The one constant, however, is the framework that historians used to communicate their views and attitudes. “Of the two Germanys,” the educationalist Michael Sadler wrote to a friend, “the one which you and we love it not responsible for this wickedness, except so far as it has not had the moral ... courage enough to jab its Junkers in the face.”³⁹² The continued reliance on the two Germanies as a discursive frame is crucial because it allowed wartime historians to retain an overidealized outlook. Then, too, more than a few historians retained an unbroken admiration for the cultural, literary, and educational excellence of Germany.

Previously, the two Germanies framework had enabled British admiration for German culture, education, and science to exist in tension with fears concerning militarism and economic rivalry. During the war, historians continued to use this framework to differentiate between Imperial Germany/Prussia and the more affable cultural Germany—sometimes associated with their student encounters at idyllic universities such as Heidelberg, Freiburg, and Marburg.³⁹³ British historians also drew a distinction between the “admirable” citizenry, on the one hand, and the bellicose and militaristic elite, on the other³⁹⁴ Published works on war aims used these views to endorse a charitable attitude towards Germany. Despite their familiarity, authority, and topical

³⁹² Letter Michael E. Sadler to J. Harvey, 9 August 1914. Quoted in Michael Sadleir, *Michael Ernest Sadler, 1861-1943: A Memoir by his Son* (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1949), 270.

³⁹³ William Percival Crozier, then editor at the *Manchester Guardian*, wrote to Dawson in September 1914 to solicit an article “on the relationship of the southern German states towards Prussia.” He asked Dawson to consider “how far, for instance, if Germany were to be badly beaten in this war, is it likely that the southern states would exhibit discontent with Prussia ...?” WHD 254: letter W. P. Crozier to W. H. Dawson, 18 September 1914. See also Weber, *Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I*.

³⁹⁴ William Sanday, “The Deeper Causes of the War,” *Oxford Pamphlets*, no. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), 5.

expertise, the conflict came as an immense shock to most historians. James Bryce, for instance, had remained pro-German right until August 1914—as Michael Sadler would recall: “the outbreak in hostilities between Britain and Germany [on 4 August] came to [him] as a true shock.”³⁹⁵ Britain’s involvement “struck us with [astonishment] as the thing it is, an anachronism, an obsolete barbarity, a blot on civilization,” wrote the historian, journalist, and writer H. N. Brailsford.³⁹⁶ G. Lowes Dickinson remembered “a shock of incredulity, then a feeling, ‘Never again! This must be the war to end all war’.”³⁹⁷ G. P. Gooch, meanwhile, suffered a nervous breakdown and was unable to work or entertain for several months.³⁹⁸

Like Dawson, to whom he candidly wrote, Gooch was married to a German. Curiously, he viewed the conflict as a “civil war,” a view which he shared with his wife and most intimate friends. Prothero, too, was inclined to view the conflict as “a ... civil war.”³⁹⁹ Both men, however, were dutiful, devoted, and civic-minded, and, as such, both would endorse the war effort. Gooch’s decision to back armed intervention resulted from the German decision to violate Belgian neutrality, “of course I agree with you [Dawson] that no one alive can ever forget or forgive the attack on Belgium.”⁴⁰⁰ Dawson, too, favoured continental intervention for this reason.⁴⁰¹ However, like Gooch, he never turned Germanophobe. Indeed, Gooch would later commend him for his detached views, “moderate [tone] and clear vision.”⁴⁰² Generally, Dawson’s views remained

³⁹⁵ Quoted in Weber, *Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I*, 229.

³⁹⁶ Britain’s attention had been absorbed elsewhere in July 1914; to the extent that British liberals were more concerned with events in Ireland than in Sarajevo: “so little was our mood attuned to strife [on the continent] that” events in Sarajevo “stirred in us only horror and sympathy.” H. N. Brailsford, *A League of Nations* (London: Headley Bros. Publishers Ltd, 1917), 1-2.

³⁹⁷ G. Lowes Dickinson, “The Basis of Permanent Peace,” in *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, ed. Charles Roden Buxton (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1915), 11.

³⁹⁸ WHD 269: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 24 March 1915.

³⁹⁹ Quoted in Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany*, 29.

⁴⁰⁰ WHD 269: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 24 March 1915.

⁴⁰¹ Indeed, Norman Angell noted that the German decision to violate Belgium was accepted by “ninety-nine Britons out of a hundred ... as the reason why we entered the war.” Quoted in Martin Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 188.

⁴⁰² WHD 347: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 28 October 1917.

balanced; thus, he wrote to Gooch in 1914 to condemn the German decision to invade Belgium as an inexcusable atrocity.⁴⁰³ Nonetheless, he never disseminated vicious wartime rhetoric, and, for that reason, Gooch often solicited “moderately-worded” commentaries from him, “I need hardly say, that I do not want any ... invective, and that is why I [write] to you.”⁴⁰⁴

Dawson retained an unbroken admiration for cultural Germany. Even in wartime, he admitted an intellectual indebtedness to that nation. This is evident in his introduction to Heinrich von Treitschke’s *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*. The war, ironically, initiated a renewed interest in German history; Treitschke’s *History* was thus translated and issued in six volumes in 1915.⁴⁰⁵ Dawson’s introduction illustrates the bifurcated nature of the two Germanies. He condemned Treitschke for his vicious nationalism, favouritism, “and biased advocacy,” and for his failure to remain objective. Yet, Treitschke’s *History* remained a *tour de force*, “the foremost contribution ... to the historical science.” That it took over three decades to translate this incredible “achievement” was regrettable, almost shameful.⁴⁰⁶ Given the time and context, these remarks can certainly be viewed as conciliatory. Dawson even admitted a steadfast admiration for Treitschke:

even at this distance of time the instincts of loyalty and gratitude refuse to be overborne, and I confess that I, for one, am still so unredeemed that, were I required to throw stones at ... Treitschke, I should wish my stones to be pebbles, and when I had thrown them, I should want to run away.⁴⁰⁷

Certainly, his attachment was intimate. Dawson had attended Treitschke’s lecture series on German history in March 1887. The historian recorded favourably, “and how he preached it!” Dawson thus felt unable to join his compatriots in their captious criticism, “I for one find [that I am] unable to

⁴⁰³ WHD 269: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 24 March 1915.

⁴⁰⁴ WHD 377: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 1 July 1918.

⁴⁰⁵ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 88.

⁴⁰⁶ William Harbutt Dawson, introduction to *Treitschke’s History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* vol. 1, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul (New York: McBride, Nast, and Company, 1915), v-x.

⁴⁰⁷ WHD 2144/81: William Harbutt Dawson, “Some Personal Memories of Treitschke,” *Nineteenth Century* (January 1915), 158.

join in the hue-and-cry.”⁴⁰⁸ Gooch, too, had been in attendance to hear Treitschke. He noted his “conviction, and his incomparable eloquence”; however, he did not hesitate to indict Treitschke and the “German Theories,” which he held in no small measure as accountable for the war. Fichte, Treitschke, Bernhardt, and Delbrück were all seen to have inculcated a distasteful adoration for a “soulless realism” that denied individual liberties and freedoms and renounced international charity. The transformation “from the old Germany, to the new,” was clearly reflected in their theories. Particularly, the transition from idealism to chauvinistic nationalism.⁴⁰⁹

The introduction to Dawson’s 1915 treatise *What is Wrong with Germany?* ended on a melancholic note, with the author reflecting: “this is the first book on Germany which I have written without [fulfilment].” Echoing Sidgwick, Dawson admitted the duties entrusted to academic commentators: “had I not believed that it would serve a [useful function] I should have shrunk from the mental strain which the effort has cost me.”⁴¹⁰ The subject was difficult for him since he had striven for a decade or more to facilitate reconciliation between Britain and Germany.⁴¹¹ However, like Sidgwick’s “thoughtful and moral intellectual,” Dawson embraced his civic duties.⁴¹² Nonetheless, he continued to differentiate between the militaristic caste and honest and affable citizenry:

official Germany, military Germany, and to some extent financial and industrial Germany, in other words, the ruling classes, have long been bitterly hostile to us, but to the last there were large sections of the population which were earnestly endeavouring to bring about a good understanding between the two countries and contemplated the possibility of armed conflict with horror and dread.

Moreover, there were still millions then resident in the Reichsland, in Polish Prussia, Schleswig-

⁴⁰⁸ William Harbutt Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915), 89-90.

⁴⁰⁹ G. P. Gooch, “German Theories of the State,” *The Contemporary Review* 107 (January 1915): 743-753.

⁴¹⁰ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, xi.

⁴¹¹ See WHD 204: letter W. H. Dawson to Adolph Wagner, 1 November 1910.

⁴¹² Sidgwick, “The Morality of Strife,” 14.

Holstein, and old Hanover, that “cannot be [treated] as our enemies save in a formal sense.” It should be added, too, that Englishmen would forever remain amiable with those who resided in southwestern Germany.⁴¹³

Dawson’s treatise set forth to account for the transformation that had occurred in Germany; chiefly, how a nation with such a notable record in education, science, and culture had come to steer the civilized world into so calamitous a conflict. Dawson advised his readers to look at the last half-century, a time “more fateful for Germany ... than any since the Reformation.” He noted that a shift had occurred in German national life when, in the mid-nineteenth century, Prussia had at last achieved dominance over Germany. It was then that “a new and virile influence [militarism] ... entered into [the] national life.” Prussia, whose culture and civilization were less mature than those in southwestern Germany, and “lacked also its refinement and suavity, was to assert itself in an irresistible form.” Prussian *Kultur* did not at all resemble the old idealism which Dawson associated with von Goethe. Then, too, it would be amiss not to mention the other intellectuals who influenced that era: in thought, there was “Kant, Herder, Fichte, and Hegel”; in literature, “Wieland, Lessing, [and] Schiller.” Sadly, “the influences which moved German thought in those times find little echo in ... German culture ... to-day, materialized and militarized, [German *Kultur*] as Prussia has made it.” It must also be remembered that Germany’s cultural ambassadors were non-Prussian: “Lessing, Fichte, and Wagner were Saxons; Holbein and Dürer were Bavarians; Goethe was a Frankforter; Wieland, Schiller, and Hegel were Swabians; Beethoven was a Rhinelander; Bach a Thuringian.”⁴¹⁴ Prussia had little time for these thinkers; their lessons, at least, for now, “have ... been cast aside.” Indeed, materialism and militarism were the twin

⁴¹³ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, ix-xi.

⁴¹⁴ Dawson went as far as to claim that while Immanuel Kant was, indeed, born in East Prussia, his ancestors were Scottish. Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, 195.

influences which dominated modern Germany.⁴¹⁵

Dawson identified militarism as a “Prussian institution,” which had been forced onto the other states autocratically. When Imperial Germany was defeated militarily, these states would come to resent Prussia. Certainly, defeat would discredit and weaken militarism—as an institution—and could well motivate the better elements to overthrow the war faction in Berlin. Dawson asked his readers “to discriminate, for though the whole nation” suffered from militarism, it did not share the militarist ethos. Militarism was indeed Prussian; no one would ever think to discuss militarism in Bavaria, Saxony, or Württemberg. Presently, Germans were rallied behind their nation’s war effort and some even celebrated its successes, but this was “an aberration which time ... [would] cure.” While recent events hinted at a different conclusion, Dawson was sure that, in the near future, Germany would not suffer “to tolerate this menace [militarism] to its liberties” unless under duress. Particularly, this was true in the southern and western states, “where militarism has never been truly acclimatized, but is still an alien and discordant element in the national life.” Thus, nowhere would its downfall be cheered more than in these states, which still suffer under its continual menace and harmful influence. Dawson did not mean to intimate that the nation had not rallied behind the army, but militarism should not be confused with universal service nor the nation-in-arms.⁴¹⁶ Rather, Prussian militarism was a deviant abstraction that endorsed international conflict as a lawful activity, rather than as “a terrible abnormality.” The author here narrowed his focus to condemn the Prussian *Junkers*, a chauvinistic and ultra-conservative social class, which had made “constitutionalism a mockery.” The Prussian *Junkers* had worked to stifle democratism and had left Germany/Prussia without any veritable democratic assembly. Evidently, Prussia was to blame for the current conflict—for though the whole nation was united in arms, it

⁴¹⁵ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, 1-21 and 195.

⁴¹⁶ Curiously, the illustration offered here is Switzerland, and not Britain. Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, 114.

did not share Prussia's brutality, avarice, or barbarity.⁴¹⁷

Frankly, no one who had shared in extended intercourse with the Germans could fail to note the salient moral, social, and cultural differences that divided north and south. Dawson believed that these differences created a racial animosity, that had in recent times been accentuated rather than minimized; "for in whatever direction one looks"—in education, culture, and statecraft—its existence and its fruits are evident. Truly, Prussia was a turbulent influence, "it was no mere ... accident" that the south and central German states had deferred their union with the North German Confederation. Even now, there is no more blatant "fiction extant than the idea that the German states are" united contentedly, "excited to out vie each other in individual self-effacement for the common cause." Prussia alone was to blame for this disunity; from the start, its "undue influence, its arrogance," and its continued efforts to erode federalism, had aroused "resentment and created ... alarm." The cause of this inveterate discord was evolutionary: while warriors and colonists were still trying to establish themselves in Prussia, the southwestern states had already achieved civilization. These areas had continued to evolve and now acted as nurseries for moral, intellectual, and cultural advancement. Naturally, the southern states viewed Prussia as barbarous and uncivilized; Prussia, on the other hand, abhorred the smaller states for their erudition and cultural refinement. Prussian bitterness had forced the other states into a discordant union with the *Iron Kingdom*. Primarily, the smaller states abided this union in order to secure themselves from a future confrontation with Prussia.⁴¹⁸

Truly, Dawson believed that there were two Germanies; his wartime research leaves little room for doubt. He relied more and more on this framework in order to accommodate his own wartime sentiments. Dawson never turned anti-German, nor did his work advocate shameless

⁴¹⁷ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, 113-115, 129-130, and 219.

⁴¹⁸ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, 1-21 and 192-197.

chauvinism.⁴¹⁹ Rather, he made a concerted effort to sever Prussia from Germany. First, he made sure to reference the distinctive locational features and landmarks that divided north and south.⁴²⁰ Then, he set about to dissociate militarism from cultural Germany; and because militarism was irreconcilable with his redolent narrative, he attributed it to Prussia. Persistently, Dawson stressed the need to differentiate between Germany's intellectual and cultural life and its bellicose statecraft and uncouth foreign policy. Notably, Germany's cultural, intellectual, and scientific achievements were accredited to its central and southwestern states: to Hesse, "Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden." Needless to say, this was all done in order to dissociate Prussia from the older, more authentic Germany. German bellicosity, immaturity, and chauvinism, its desire for *Weltmacht*, were all ascribed to Prussia—a state whose main contribution to unification was authoritarian statism; a feature antithetical and "alien to the South." Finally, a notable feature of Dawson's wartime work is his attention to the rival currents in German national and electoral life. Dawson believed that the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (the Social Democratic Party, SPD) was the only nationwide affiliation that had the fortitude and resolve to combat constitutional autocracy.⁴²¹ The fact that the Social Democrats had embraced "the national cause" and had voted for additional war credits was not meant as an indictment. Dawson was more interested in their value as a future counterbalance to the current coalition.⁴²² Crucially, the Socialists had disavowed Wilhelmine *Weltpolitik* and had even hinted that this rancorous and malicious worldview had

⁴¹⁹ WHD 347: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 28 October 1917.

⁴²⁰ For Dawson, this was the Elbe River.

⁴²¹ Dawson believed that there were still more than a few within the educated and commercial classes that remained affable towards Britain. However, the only social class which had not become delirious with resentment was the working-class, "which knows too well that liberty, [democracy, and freedom come] from the West." This awareness ensured that the working-classes did not abuse Britain, "a nation whose . . . institutions have been its envy, hope, and inspiration for over a generation." Dawson associated this social class with the SPD and felt that this union offered the best alternative to the current administration. Dawson, *What Is Wrong with Germany*, 186.

⁴²² Nor was he the only scholar to think in this direction. See also G. Lowes Dickinson, "The German Socialists and the War," *War and Peace*, 1 August 1915, 168-169.

contributed to the war.⁴²³

Despite his advocacy, Dawson still believed that the SPD needed assistance from outside forces in order to enact the constitutional amendments that would reform and rehabilitate German national character. The German Socialists were too obedient and docile to overthrow the dictatorial war faction; indeed, subversion was unsuited to their reformist identity.⁴²⁴ Whilst Dawson did not condemn their decision to endorse the national war effort, he did believe that it indicated a certain inertia, and, for that reason, he insisted that the victorious allies should influence or at least oversee constitutional reform in Germany. It was natural to believe that the Germans should amend their own institutions, but in fact there was no mechanism for domestic constitutional reform since the constitution as written could not be altered “without the ruler’s consent.” Finally, it should be remembered that the SPD had failed to react with revulsion to the government’s decision to violate Belgian neutrality. Without a doubt, Dawson’s main wartime concern was constitutional reform, and this was a condition which the allies had to ensure.⁴²⁵

Evidently, the two Germanies thesis found creative expression in wartime scholarship. Scholars, too, saw themselves as educators and, for that reason, the historian G. W. Prothero advised that an association be formed to affect non-elite wartime mentalities. The submitted association would “send qualified speakers to working-class constituencies to explain” and endorse the war effort. Prothero feared that in some areas the war was “not regarded with wholehearted approval.”⁴²⁶ Indeed, he voiced these concerns in a letter to Dawson: “it has been said—I fear too frequently—by [working-class] Englishmen, when asked to join the army, that they would

⁴²³ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, 52, 113, 185-186, 195-196, and 209.

⁴²⁴ Anthony Wright, “Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism” in *Contemporary Political Ideologies* 2nd edition, eds. Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright (London: Continuum, 1999), 87-90.

⁴²⁵ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, 227.

⁴²⁶ G. W. Prothero, “A Fight to a Finish,” *The Times* (London, UK) 20 August 1914.

be no worse off under the Kaiser than under King George. It is objections of this sort which it seems desirable to answer.”⁴²⁷ The Oxford historian Sir Foster Cunliffe countersigned this “excellent suggestion.”⁴²⁸ Similarly, the historian C. Grant Robertson declared the need to educate the “working classes and other audiences” as to “the causes of the war.”⁴²⁹ John Holland Rose endorsed these sentiments and advocated for more effective education efforts, “let us who know the facts better than ... [others], undertake to explain them.” Rose offered to lecture, free at any town (not far distant from Cambridge), on the war’s immediate causes⁴³⁰ He was soon inundated with invitations to the extent that he was forced to share the work with several students. The demand was such that he invited “all applicants to address themselves henceforth to the central committee” being formed to coordinate the several committees and associations hitherto involved in similar work.⁴³¹ The committee claimed to have received officials from several extramural associations, such as the Workers’ Educational Association and the Oxford University Extension Delegacy. In addition, MPs from the Liberal, Unionist, and Labour Parties were to lend their assistance. While the constituent associations were to retain their autonomy, it was decided that a central committee could better coordinate schedules, lecturers, and literature, to meet “the special conditions and needs of particular districts and industries.”⁴³²

Despite their advocacy, these historians believed that wartime lectures should be sombre,

⁴²⁷ Prothero asked Dawson to write a short tract that set forth the “main differences between British and German systems of Government, especially from the point of view of Political Liberty.” WHD 268: letter G. W. Prothero to W. H. Dawson, 15 March 1915.

⁴²⁸ Foster H. E. Cunliffe, “The Work Before the Nation,” *The Times* (London, UK), 21 August 1914.

⁴²⁹ C. Grant Robertson, “Instructing the Nation,” *The Times* (London, UK), 26 August 1914.

⁴³⁰ John Holland Rose, “Instructing the Nation,” *The Times* (London, UK), 27 August 1914.

⁴³¹ John Holland Rose, “Instructing the Nation,” *The Times* (London, UK), 3 September 1914.

⁴³² The Central Committee for National Patriotic Organizations was formed in September 1914. The committee took as its chairman the editor and sometime MP Henry Cockayne Cust. Prothero was selected as vice-chairman; other notable names associated with the committee were Asquith, Rosebery, Balfour, and William Waldorf Astor. G. W. Prothero and Henry Cust, “Instructing the Nation,” *The Times* (London, UK), 5 September 1914; WHD 268: letter G. W. Prothero to W. H. Dawson, 15 March 1915; and Damian Atkinson, “Cust, Henry John Cockayne [Harry] (1861-1917),” *ODNB*.

“serious and dispassionate.”⁴³³ Prothero maintained that such addresses should be neither “bitter nor inflammatory.” Rather, the aim was to set “forth the truth—that is, that we have to deal with an unscrupulous [and] ... an aggressive military caste.”⁴³⁴ The economist Alfred Marshall affirmed that jingoistic lectures would only “inflame passions” and do nothing but increase “the slaughter on both sides.” Lecturers should remember that working-class Germans “are averse to exploitative wars, but, like similar classes at home, are exasperated with insults to” their homeland.⁴³⁵ Marshall conceded that there were two Germanies: “those who know and love Germany, even while revolted at the hectoring militarism which is more common there than here, should insist that we have no cause to scorn them.” Hence, “I believe them to be ... conscientious and upright, sensitive to ... duty, tender in their familial affections, true and trustful in friendship.”⁴³⁶ Marshall attributed the crimes committed in Belgium to Prussia, “and not ... the German People.”⁴³⁷ Marshall’s mentee the economist Arthur Cecil Pigou likewise warned against “undiscriminating hatred.” He based this observation on the conviction that there were two Germanies: “it is incumbent on us to recollect that direct responsibility for German ... warfare lies [with but] ... a few men, by whom the Empire is controlled, and not upon ... the People.”⁴³⁸ Notably, the two main influences on Pigou were Sidgwick, whose lectures on ethics he had attended, and Marshall.⁴³⁹ These charitable and concerned sentiments were disseminated widely, and soon influenced educational imitations; namely, at Oxford.

Between 1914 and 1915, the Oxford University Press (OUP) solicited popular pamphlets on topical wartime themes from renowned classicists, economists, historians, and theologians. The

⁴³³ C. Grant Robertson, “Instructing the Nation,” *The Times* (London, UK), 26 August 1914.

⁴³⁴ G. W. Prothero, “A Fight to a Finish,” *The Times* (London, UK) 20 August 1914.

⁴³⁵ Alfred Marshall, “A Fight to the Finish,” *The Times* (London, UK) 26 August 1914.

⁴³⁶ Alfred Marshall, “A Fight to the Finish,” *The Times* (London, UK) 22 August 1914.

⁴³⁷ Alfred Marshall, “A Fight to the Finish,” *The Times* (London, UK) 26 August 1914.

⁴³⁸ Quoted in Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany*, 145.

⁴³⁹ Pigou went on to volunteer to drive for the Friends’ Ambulance Unit at the front during the Great War.

project culminated in eighty-seven booklets that were collected and released in a series set in 1916. Following Prothero's suggestion that an association be formed to address the less motivated "working-class constituencies," the Oxford Regius Professor H. W. C. Davis initiated the *Oxford War Pamphlet Series*.⁴⁴⁰ Davis found a willing collaborator in scholar Charles Cannan. The two men convened historians and other eminent scholars to educate the nation on the war and its issues. The object of this enterprise, as Davis explained to the historian and journalist Sir Valentine Chirol—whom he recruited to write a booklet—was to provide "the intelligent working man" with useful information on all "questions connected with the present conflict." Davis was anxious to confirm the electorate in their "present admirable attitude towards the war."⁴⁴¹ He intended the pamphlets for the working-class, whom he believed could not afford to purchase referential textbooks but desired exact information. Thus, the pamphlets were affordably priced and written in a simple and uncomplicated prose—the average length being between six and eight thousand words.⁴⁴² The challenge, as Davis perceived it, was to persuade the artisan to purchase and read a viewpoint that was "not his own." Accordingly, he contacted "various labour organizations" with the view to solicit their assistance—to help him to devise the questions and subjects which the pamphlets would address.⁴⁴³

The first pamphlets were concerned with international law, war guilt, and morality.⁴⁴⁴ The initiative received positive reviews; indeed, an article printed in an armed forces magazine applauded the enterprise as a national service. The pamphlets were admirably written, "interesting

⁴⁴⁰ G. W. Prothero, "A Fight to the Finish," *The Times* (London, UK) 20 August 1914.

⁴⁴¹ Oxford University Press Archive, CP71/17: letter H. W. C. Davis to I. V. Chirol, 14 September 1914. Hereinafter, the Oxford University Press Archive will be cited as OUP.

⁴⁴² OUP CP71/22: letter H. W. C. Davis to P. V. M. Benecke, 15 September 1914.

⁴⁴³ OUP CP71/43: letter H. W. C. Davis to Baron Kilbracken, 18 September 1914.

⁴⁴⁴ The later pamphlets dealt with more specific topics such as, "The Action off Heligoland," "The Stand of Liege," and "British and German Steel Metallurgy."

and informative,” and gave “a fair and ... impartial view.”⁴⁴⁵ Davis recruited the theologian and biblical scholar William Sanday to write the inaugural address. Sanday, like his contemporaries, made sure to differentiate between the ruling-caste and the “peace-loving people.” He was convinced that the average citizen was “quite prepared to live on good terms with his neighbours.” The war faction which controlled Berlin was “Prussian rather than German.” Since Prussia was “the dominant power” within the German Empire, it could impress its intolerant “spirit upon the whole nation.” By sheer force and volume, the militarists had silenced the masses and, “without their ... assent,” had committed them to an expansionist war. Despite his disapproval, Sanday was restrained in his criticism towards this “Prussianized Germany.” Surprisingly, he even admitted a certain respect for Bismarck, confessing that unification had been achieved “in a masterful and impressive manner.” Indeed, unification was an admirable project, it “was only natural” that Germany should aim to overcome its territorial and political divisions. Regrettably, Prussia had come to dominate this process, and its undue influence had soured and envenomed the unification project. Prussian statesmen, administrators, and educators had preached, “for some time past,” militarism, imperialism, and expansionism, and it was upon these principles that the present war had resulted.⁴⁴⁶

The second pamphlet proceeded from a written communication between Davis and the ecclesiastical historian Cuthbert Turner. Turner had written a pointed response to a theological document being circulated overseas and addressed to international evangelical Christendom. The document in question was a collaborative appeal that had received signatures from various scholars and theologians tenured at universities in Germany. The appeal explained the war effort from a

⁴⁴⁵ The review selected several titles for special mention: C. R. L. Fletcher’s “The Germans, their Empire, and What They Covet,” H. E. Egerton’s “The War and the British Dominions,” and Sir Valentine Chirol’s “Serbia and the Serbs.” OUP CP71/137: newspaper review, *The United Services Magazine*, November 1914.

⁴⁴⁶ Sanday, “The Deeper Causes of the War,” 5-11.

perspective sympathetic to Germany, “who [was] ... declared to be guiltless.”⁴⁴⁷ Davis wrote to Turner to inquire as to whether the latter might allow his “remarks on the ... theologians [to] appear in a pamphlet.”⁴⁴⁸ Turner collected twenty-five signatures from the ecclesiastical and professorial staff at Oxford. The signatories were quick to express their confidence in the sincere “protestations and disclaimers” which appeared in the original address. The co-signers acknowledged a special bond between themselves and their continental colleagues. Despite their academic attachment, the signatories noted a temporal shift in the values that governed education in Imperial Germany. A significant change had passed over the professoriate. The Prussianized German government, which nominated the professorial chairs, refused to tolerate academic dissent. Hence, the professoriate had become more jingoistic and imperialist in tone. Curiously, the signatories noted that such attitudes were more common at the greater universities in northern and eastern Germany. Nonetheless, the contributors were more interested in rejecting the defensive arguments that their counterparts offered than with condemning the German Empire. Their stated purpose was to examine, with “self-restraint and impartiality,” the documentation submitted in the foreign address. Truly, the *Oxford War Series* pamphleteers regarded themselves as impartial investigators, “whose business it [was] to sift evidence and to look below the facts for their causes.”⁴⁴⁹

Despite this claim, the contributors often approached their subject from a rigid perspective that emphasized oppositional binaries—the scholars “differentiated between Prussia and the other German states, the ruling caste and the ordinary, peace-loving German, the military and civilian

⁴⁴⁷ Oxford Signatories, “To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America: A Reply from Oxford to the German Address to Evangelical Christians Abroad,” *Oxford Pamphlets 1914*, no. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), 3.

⁴⁴⁸ OUP CP71/99: letter H. W. C. Davis to Cuthbert Turner, 24 September 1914.

⁴⁴⁹ Oxford Signatories, “To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America,” 3-17.

circles.”⁴⁵⁰ The authors worked within a cultural and intellectual framework that fused a scholarly commitment to objectivity with a desire to construct a coherent, teleological narrative—one that reconciled the past with an anticipated future. Their extrapolations from experience to projected outcomes drew upon a conceptual framework whose parameters and structure seemed stable and self-evident. This reconstructive process was not necessarily tied to any political or ideological affiliation.⁴⁵¹ The historian C. R. L. Fletcher, an imperialist and ardent conservative, believed that the militaristic course upon which Imperial Germany was set did “not all at represent ... the German People,” as he had known them. If the average citizen now supported the conflict, it was because the ruling classes controlled the newspapers and the schoolrooms. State-sponsored censorship and a penchant for implicit obedience meant that the private citizen was a passive instrument. Nonetheless, Fletcher extolled the citizenry for its “domestic virtues,” “patriotism,” and “sentimentality.” Moreover, he readily acknowledged German cultural and intellectual excellence, noting that in historical and philosophical thought, literature, and science, Germany could “claim equality with,” if not “superiority to, any nation in the world.” Fletcher’s approbation led him to encourage a sympathetic division between Prussian and Germany. He identified the “peaceful and prosperous” principalities with culture, democratic rule, and free trade. Conversely, Prussia was uncivilized, brutish, and autocratic—a kingdom that coveted “riches alone.” Fletcher opposed retributive violence since the private soldier was an innocent instrument. Punishment should fall directly on those few who had ordered the “systematic destruction” by which to humiliate and terrorize civilian populations.⁴⁵²

⁴⁵⁰ Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, “The Role of British and German Historians in Mobilizing Public Opinion in 1914,” in *British and German Historiography, 1750-1950: Traditions, Perceptions, and Transfers*, ed. Benedikt Stuchtey and Peter Wende (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 352-355.

⁴⁵¹ OUP CP71/17: letter H. W. C. Davis to I. V. Chirol, 14 September 1914.

⁴⁵² C. R. L. Fletcher, “The Germans, their Empire, and how they have made it,” *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 6 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), 3-22.

The Hon. Gerard Collier, a conscientious objector and tutor with the Workers' Educational Association (WEA), convinced Davis that what was needed were not tracts "to explain why this war is necessary, but rather the more general question, why any war should ever be necessary?" Davis wrote to Gilbert Murray, to solicit a short treatise on this subject.⁴⁵³ The arguments stated therein were facile, conventional, and unremarkable. Murray appealed to honour and morality: that to resist injustice "is in itself a victory." Despite his pro-interventionist views, he made sure to include several lines that differentiated between the Germanies. He referred to a war faction and a conspiracy. Regrettably, the militarists had outmanoeuvred the diplomats, "for one fatal week, and [had] managed to drag their countries after them." Previously, it had "seemed wiser and more statesmanlike to meet provocation with good temper," to strive with "persistent friendliness to encourage" the more liberal and reasonable elements in Germany. This approach was viable until the July Crisis. Suddenly, it was discovered that the militarists had arranged a devious plan to strike while their enemies were distracted with internal matters. Murray inveighed against the militarists, "conspirators and public malefactors," but he did not wish to condemn the "soldiers, peasants and working-men." Indeed, "it is impossible to believe that the German nation would have backed up the plot, if it had understood it."⁴⁵⁴

Even the Bryce Report, an important source for demi-official wartime views, distinguished the "good-natured" people from the ruling militarist elite.⁴⁵⁵ On 4 December 1914, Lord Bryce was invited to chair a committee on the alleged outrages committed in Belgium. The decision to select Bryce, a highly regarded politician, scholar, and internationalist, as the committee chairman,

⁴⁵³ OUP CP71/44: letter H. W. C. Davis to Gilbert Murray, 18 September 1914.

⁴⁵⁴ Gilbert Murray, "How Can War Ever Be Right?" *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 18 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), 3-27.

⁴⁵⁵ James Bryce, et. al., *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages*, 44.

seemed to guarantee both a well-considered judgment and a receptive transatlantic audience.⁴⁵⁶ Despite its mandate to report on alleged atrocities, the committee continued to discriminate between the cruel and obedient officer-class and the private combatant.⁴⁵⁷ The “Prussian officer” deified violent force—to him war was a “sacred mission ... the highest function of the omnipotent State.” The Prussian Kingdom, “itself as much an armed force as a State,” encouraged viciousness, deference, and obedience. “Morality and sentiment” vanished in its presence and were replaced with a doctrine that justified all “means that [could] conduce success.” The militaristic elite legitimized and endorsed brutishness because it promised territorial conquest. Significantly, this principle was not “a national doctrine,” for it was antithetical and alien to the general population, as it has “heretofore been known to other nations.” Rather, it was a martial creed, a conviction which animated the dominant caste. This false doctrine, disguised as allegiance to the imperial state, had been used to pervert and debase German national character.⁴⁵⁸

The Bryce Committee argued that the present outrages had not resulted from any special brutishness amongst the “kindly and good-natured” soldiery. Moreover, the cruelties perpetrated in Belgium were “too widespread and too uniform in character to be mere sporadic outbursts.” Rather, these violent episodes were contrived “to strike terror into the civilian population” and were directed from Berlin. Such atrocities were designed to “dishearten the Belgian troops,” to crush their resolve, and to extinguish their resistance. This view pervaded the general staff and had engendered the conviction that martial exigencies justified excessive cruelty, “and upon this principle ... the Prussian officers acted.” Despite its propagandistic purpose, the report continued

⁴⁵⁶ Trevor Wilson, “Lord Bryce’s Investigation into Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-15,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 3 (July 1979): 370-371.

⁴⁵⁷ The committee included James Bryce; the historian and politician H. A. L. Fisher; the eminent jurist and legal historian Sir Frederick Pollock; three distinguished lawyers: Sir Edward Clarke, Sir Alfred Hopkinson, and Sir Kenelm Digby; and Harold Cox, editor-in-chief of the *Edinburgh Review*.

⁴⁵⁸ Bryce, et. al., *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages*, 42-45.

to promulgate the notion that there were two Germanies, old and new; affable and brutal. The committee noted that “those who [could] recall” the Franco-German War, would “remember that no charges resembling ... these were then established.” Old Germany, the committee claimed, would not have committed such barbarities. Modern Germany had developed an unacceptable adoration for martial strength and territorial conquest. The undue influence that Prussia enjoyed within the German Empire was the only explanation for this unpalatable and lamentable development. Indeed, the committee noted a temporal shift in the principles that guided Germany. The idealism that had once produced such intellectuals as Goethe, Fichte, Hegel, Schiller, and Kant had been replaced with a brutal and violent doctrine. This doctrine was not a national standard; more truly, it was a perversion—a false doctrine that emanated from the military caste.⁴⁵⁹ The decision to absolve the private, non-Prussian combatant from wrongdoing indicates that the committee members continued to support a sympathetic and, indeed, geographical division between Prussia and Germany.

In a review of J. H. Morgan’s *German Atrocities: An Official Investigation*, Lord Bryce repudiated the argument that the general population shared the guilt ascribed to its government. The “ferocious language” which appeared in the German press should not be taken as evidence that the entire nation endorsed unrestrained militarism. The German mind had been supplied with nothing but fabrications and falsehoods ever since the war had started, “and it now believes ... that it is the innocent victim.” Occasionally, when a voice was raised to proclaim the truth and to plead for goodwill and restraint, it was “instantly silenced.” Bryce believed that after the war, when “the facts, hitherto concealed from the people,” had become known and were “reflected on with calmness,” there would be widespread condemnation for the brutalities committed in Belgium and

⁴⁵⁹ Bryce, et. al., *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages*, 43-45.

France. His review was appended to the publication, but he refused to contribute an introduction because the author endorsed retributive violence. This practice was intolerable to Bryce; first and foremost, because he believed that the peasant conscript was an innocent instrument.⁴⁶⁰ Even in his introduction to Arnold Toynbee's *Belgian Deportations* (1916), a treatise that addressed forced labour and relocation—a practice which Bryce described as “virtual slavery”—he exonerated the common soldier.⁴⁶¹ Certainly, Bryce believed that the general population which, to him, included private combatants, did not bear the same guilt as the militaristic elite.

Similarly, the other academics on the Bryce Commission opposed retributive violence. H. A. L. Fisher stressed that whatever the Prussians might do, it was for the British “to show the world how ... gentlemen conduct the most arduous and terrible business in life.”⁴⁶² The eminent jurist and legal historian Sir Frederick Pollock warned “let there be no wild discussion on reprisals.” Justice, to be sure, demanded retribution, but a retribution that fell upon “the true culprits.” Pollock identified the perpetrators as “Prussian militarists,” whose “calculated wickedness” exceeded any crime committed since the Thirty Years’ War. Differently, the British would continue to observe moral law and “civilized warfare.”⁴⁶³ The archaeologist and classicist Sir Arthur Evans shared this assessment and referred to the ruination at Louvain as a “Prussian holocaust.”⁴⁶⁴ Fisher, like Evans and Pollock, denounced Prussian militarism for the outrages committed in Belgium, “for it is Prussia, not Germany, which is at the root of this evil.” Fisher, too, exonerated the “common folk,” since the war had been presented to them as a defensive act against an autocratic Power—Tsarist Russia. “The man in the street” could not be blamed for the decision to crush an “innocent and

⁴⁶⁰ The Rt. Hon. Viscount Bryce, “A Review of German Atrocities,” in *German Atrocities: An Official Investigation*, ed. J. H. Morgan (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1916), 188-192.

⁴⁶¹ James Bryce, introduction to *The Belgian Deportations*, ed. A. J. Toynbee (London: Fisher Unwin, 1917), 5.

⁴⁶² H. A. L. Fisher, *The War: Its Causes and Issues* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914), 30.

⁴⁶³ Frederick Pollock, “Letters on the War,” *The Times* (London, England), 1 September 1914.

⁴⁶⁴ Arthur Evans, “The Moral of the Holocaust,” *The Times* (London, England), 1 September 1914.

unoffending State.” The average citizen, then, like the private combatant, was not culpable for the excessive barbarities committed in Belgium.⁴⁶⁵ Bryce and his colleagues doubtless agreed, Prussia, but not Germany, was responsible for the wickedness carried out against civilian populations.

Scholars at the time tended to argue that Prussia—the real antagonist—was “German in little save language.”⁴⁶⁶ The Oxford historian H. E. Egerton, citing an anonymous author, explained away “everything intolerable in modern Germany [as] Prussian dominance.”⁴⁶⁷ The anonymous source noted that the average citizen was “docile to authority”—he accepted, indeed, he demanded state guidance. Prussia had plunged Europe into the most terrible war, “and only war [had] revealed how powerful and ... demoralizing” its influence had been upon Germany. Once again, the passive conscript was absolved from wrongdoing—the atrocities committed against civilian populations were attributed to the militarist elite.⁴⁶⁸ Prussia was presented as alien. Morgan noted that the Prussians were not Teutonic.⁴⁶⁹ “Even the word ‘Prussia’ is not German,” wrote the historian J. W. Allen. The Prussians were either “Germanised Slavs” or, at most, “a mixture between Slavs and Germans.” Like Egerton, Allen argued that Imperial Germany was insufferable because its “ruling and directing force” was Prussia. Allen differentiated between the Prussians and the “real” Germans—those who resided “in the Rhineland, or in the South and in Holland and Switzerland.” Both Allen and Morgan envisioned a geographical division between Germany and Prussia. For Allen, the Elbe River demarcated the division between civilization and barbarism. Despite their prewar enthusiasm for pan-German unification, most wartime scholars argued that

⁴⁶⁵ Fisher, *The War*, 24-30.

⁴⁶⁶ A. F. Pollard, *The War, Its History, and Its Morals: A Lecture* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915), 13.

⁴⁶⁷ H. E. Egerton, “The British Dominions and the War,” *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 21 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), 20.

⁴⁶⁸ The Round Table, “Germany and the Prussian Spirit,” in *British and German Ideals: The Meaning of the War*, ed. Members of the Round Table, a Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Empire (London, 1915), 85-87.

⁴⁶⁹ J. H. Morgan, *German Atrocities: An Official Investigation* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1916), 42-45.

Prussia was Slavonic.⁴⁷⁰ Previously, racial commonality had been used to applaud unification; now, scholars applied racial motifs to dissociate Prussia from Germany and used the traditional British Liberal distaste for Russia to defend the authentic Germany.

British historians expected their nation to succeed militarily. Fletcher, for one, envisioned a victorious battlefield campaign in which the rapacious imperial armies were driven “back ... over the Elbe.”⁴⁷¹ This expectation meant that scholars and public intellectuals had to address two interconnected themes: Britain’s wartime aims and its objectives for the eventual Peace Treaty. This led them to contemplate a future settlement that would, on the one hand, punish the militarists in Berlin and, on the other, rehabilitate a repentant Germany. Duly, Bryce anticipated a restored international concert in which a reformed Germany would “join in the efforts ... to regulate and mitigate” future conflicts.⁴⁷² Dawson, meanwhile, thought it prudent to differentiate “between the constitutionally hostile and the naturally friendly elements” within Germany. Certainly, these elements would prove themselves helpful when it was time to conduct negotiations for a peace settlement.⁴⁷³ Primarily, historians were concerned with how to reform the political system of Germany. This led to a scholarly debate about the conditions Germany would have to fulfil in order to receive a moderate peace settlement. Dawson believed that democratization was the principal precondition for a just and equitable peace. Gooch thus wrote to him in October 1918, “I think things are going very well there and your old demand for a democratized Prussia ... seems likely to be realized in large measure.”⁴⁷⁴ The scholarly debate about peace aims found an increasingly receptive audience amongst radical-Liberal officials and Socialist-UDC intellectuals.

⁴⁷⁰ J. W. Allen, *Germany and Europe* (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 1914), 46-47.

⁴⁷¹ Fletcher, “The Germans,” 17.

⁴⁷² Bryce, “A Review of *German Atrocities*,” 190.

⁴⁷³ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, x.

⁴⁷⁴ WHD 393: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 29 October 1918.

Whereas radical-Liberal scholars were nearly unanimous in arguing that the Prussianized German government—*but* not its “peace-loving” people—had caused the war, the crusading journalist E. D. Morel proposed an alternative explanation.⁴⁷⁵ Morel had received an incomplete education and was not altogether convinced, nor intellectually familiar, with the cultural interpretation that dominated academic debate. Besides, he had already formulated his own explanation for the conflict well before its occurrence. His radical journalism had engendered in him a deep distrust of the British Foreign Office and of the officialdom in France. This suspicion led him to vocally criticize the British-French *entente*. In 1912, he published an admirably researched study, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, which contained a fully developed criticism of the *Entente Cordiale*. Morel drew conclusions from his assembled facts that were clear-cut and conclusive.⁴⁷⁶ While Britain and France were described “as having been Machiavellian,” German actions, “if sometimes clumsy,” were “logical and straightforward.”⁴⁷⁷ Morel’s criticism was not necessarily aimed at France’s efforts to establish a protectorate in Morocco; rather, he condemned its failure to gain the same approval from Germany, as had already been secured from Britain and Spain.⁴⁷⁸ Indeed, even as France and Britain publicly professed their intention to maintain the independence of Morocco, secret treaties had already been concluded between them by which to dissolve the Sultanate. Germany, as a Great Power, was well within its legal rights to demand a return to the *status quo*. Certainly, the Algeciras Act (1906), to which it was a signatory, secured its right to be consulted in future negotiations about Morocco.⁴⁷⁹

The Second Moroccan Crisis furnished Morel with sufficient evidence to support his earlier

⁴⁷⁵ Sanday, “The Deeper Causes of the War,” 5.

⁴⁷⁶ Catherine Ann Cline, *E. D. Morel, 1873-1924: The Strategies of Protest* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1980), 92-93.

⁴⁷⁷ E. D. Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy* (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1912), xiv-xx, 116-117, and 126.

⁴⁷⁸ Cline, *E. D. Morel*, 92-93.

⁴⁷⁹ Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, 125-128.

convictions about “the dangers implicit in the *entente*.” Here, Morel seized on an issue which, although it did not arouse much concern in 1912, would in time prove politically expedient. Foreign policymaking had largely been excluded from the democratization process “that had transformed control in domestic affairs.” Given the public importance attached to issues such as war and peace, it would later prove difficult to refute the argument that foreign policymaking should be subject to greater democratic oversight.⁴⁸⁰ “Secret diplomacy,” which first emerged as a major theme in Morel’s interpretation of the successive crises in Morocco, was to provide the object of his attack against intervention in 1914.⁴⁸¹ During the July Crisis, he campaigned for non-intervention and, when this failed, he pointed to his earlier work as evidence that the *entente* had contributed to the international antagonism that had preceded the crisis.⁴⁸² Morel was convinced that the war had resulted from secret diplomatic negotiations and a deficient international system. Consequently, he worked throughout the war to eradicate what he described as “the legend that Germany” alone was responsible for the war.⁴⁸³ Morel, together with the social campaigner and politician Charles Philips Trevelyan, formed the dissident organization the Union of Democratic Control (UDC). The pair soon recruited Ramsay MacDonald, the politician Arthur Ponsonby, and the journalist and historical author Norman Angell.⁴⁸⁴

Morel, MacDonald, Trevelyan, and Angell appended their signatures to a circular letter that was sent to various correspondents and prospective collaborators. The letter, addressed from 14 Great College Street, Westminster, the residence of Trevelyan, stated that the signatories were anxious to take measures to democratize foreign policy, formulate fair-minded and equitable peace

⁴⁸⁰ Cline, *E. D. Morel*, 92-94.

⁴⁸¹ Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, 73; Cline, *E. D. Morel*, 92-94.

⁴⁸² Cline, *E. D. Morel*, 98-100.

⁴⁸³ E. D. Morel, *Truth and the War* (London: National Labour Press Ltd, 1916), 104.

⁴⁸⁴ F. M. Leventhal, “Union of Democratic Control, 1914-1924,” *ODNB*.

terms, and establish direct contact with democratic unions and parties in Europe. This private letter was soon published in a paper hostile to the group, together with an editorial that insinuated that the signatories had taken their initiative from the German government. Thus, it was deemed advisable to make the movement public and, accordingly, a second letter was submitted to the press.⁴⁸⁵ The UDC held its inaugural meeting on 17 November 1914. Besides the founders, there were twenty-two other attendees—amongst them were Arthur Henderson, J. A. Hobson, and Bertrand Russell. Other notable men such as G. Lowes Dickinson, John Maynard Keynes, Philip Snowden, Leonard Woolf, and G. P. Gooch either become members or were to associate with the organization closely.⁴⁸⁶ Despite temperamental and ideological differences, the founders worked together to legitimize the organization and formed its first executive committee.⁴⁸⁷ Gradually, Angell withdrew from active participation to focus on internationalist propaganda. Meanwhile, Trevelyan, Ponsonby, and even MacDonald were content to delegate organizational control to Morel—under whose secretaryship the UDC evolved from a radical-Liberal association into a broader coalition of the Left.⁴⁸⁸

Morel emerged as the driving force within the UDC and used his new platform to denounce annexationist war aims, as well as the British Foreign Office. These preoccupations soon drew invective from the jingoist press as defeatist and pro-German. Duly, Morel shifted his attention from governmental criticism to advocating for a durable peace settlement. First, he indicated that the war should be concluded successfully. More critically, however, it was imperative, that while hostilities continued, preparations be made for a democratic peace. Morel articulated “four cardinal

⁴⁸⁵ Ponsonby joined Morel, MacDonald, Trevelyan, and Angell as a signatory. H. M. Swanwick, *Builders of Peace, Being Ten Years' History of the Union of Democratic Control* (London: Swarthmore Press Ltd, 1924), 30-33.

⁴⁸⁶ Harry Hanak, “The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War,” *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 36, no. 94 (1963): 170-171.

⁴⁸⁷ J. A. Hobson and Barbara Mackenzie were likewise elected to the executive committee.

⁴⁸⁸ Leventhal, “Union of Democratic Control,” 1-2.

points” that would secure “a new course [in foreign] policy,” and render safe future generations from a similar calamity: 1) no province or sovereign state shall be transferred from one government to another without popular consent; 2) no settlement shall be entered upon without democratic agreement; 3) the alliance system shall be replaced with concerted action under an international council; 4) a drastic reduction in national armaments and the nationalization of arms production.⁴⁸⁹ To this code was added, at the suggestion of the economist and social theorist J. A. Hobson, a fifth point—that the Powers should promote and preserve “free international commerce between all nations.”⁴⁹⁰ This addition underscored a division within the membership between those who ascribed the war to secret diplomacy, and anti-imperialists who pointed to the intrinsic economic and imperial motives for the conflict. Then, too, there were those who believed that the war had resulted from irrational thought.⁴⁹¹ Nonetheless, there was unanimous agreement on the need to ensure democratic control in foreign policy.⁴⁹²

Radicals had for some time been worried about an alliance system concluded in secret, since such commitments were believed to contribute to international conflict directly. The alliance system was therefore as contemptible as secret diplomacy. The UDC took issue with both practices because such institutions and habits were unstable, and thus difficult to control. The executive, and its fellow-thinkers, believed that international politics needed radical reorganization—this received tangible expression in the idea for an intergovernmental organization to regulate international conflict. The UDC saw in concerted action a means by which to neutralize and counteract selfish aims; common action could unite the Great Powers towards a common goal. The

⁴⁸⁹ The foregoing is a paraphrase. For the complete text see E. D. Morel, *The Morrow of the War* (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1914), 1-14.

⁴⁹⁰ F. Seymour Cocks, *E. D. Morel: The Man and His Work* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1920), 224-225.

⁴⁹¹ Leventhal, “Union of Democratic Control” 1-2

⁴⁹² Morel, *The Morrow of the War*, 1.

executive believed that their program ran counter to all previous peace treaties, in that those settlements were armed truces rather than democratic agreements. Still, this was neither a pacifist nor an extremist program, and numerous non-UDC intellectuals could subscribe to its broader points. In fact, the first point was to some extent a concession to the liberal belief in national sovereignty.⁴⁹³ Even so, the background to these ideas was more radical, for Morel and the UDC hastened to inform the public that Germany and Austria were by no means more responsible for the war than were the Allied Powers. “It takes two to a make quarrel,” wrote Charles Trevelyan, “even if one of the two is the more quarrelsome.”⁴⁹⁴

The most influential historian to share these views was the Cambridge don, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, whose work, *The European Anarchy* (1916), likewise argued that no single nation was culpable for the conflict.⁴⁹⁵ Dickinson disputed the view that Germany had for decades past pursued an aggressive and expansionist position, “while all the other Powers had [pursued] ... peace.”⁴⁹⁶ He presented his views in an article for the publication *War and Peace* titled, “The German Socialists and the War.” Dickinson noted that there were two oppositional currents “struggling for control” in Germany: the militaristic Prussian *Junkers* and the “good-natured” and peaceable Social Democrats. The Socialists repudiated “all annexation” and were determined to establish a permanent peace, “based upon an equal consideration for all nations.” Predictably, Dickinson supported a settlement that would not isolate, threaten, nor starve a democratized Germany. He believed that constitutional reform and democratization would embolden and rehabilitate the citizenry. Hence, he was determined to discriminate between the democratically

⁴⁹³ Hanak, “The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War,” 170-171.

⁴⁹⁴ Quoted in Hanak, “The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War,” 171.

⁴⁹⁵ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 46-47.

⁴⁹⁶ Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917), 128-131.

compatible and the constitutionally hostile elements within Imperial Germany.⁴⁹⁷ Then, too, it was certainly worthwhile to know how far the constituent political parties might remain united behind the imperial government should the Allied Powers offer a negotiated settlement. Dickinson believed that a moderate settlement would democratize the constitution and reform and rehabilitate national character. Moreover, he was convinced that the SPD was overwhelmingly at one with foreign critics in acknowledging that militarism was not an honourable doctrine.⁴⁹⁸ Dickinson argued that the failure to conclude an expedient military campaign had alienated the German people from militarism and its institutional embodiment—the Prussian Crown. Like Dawson, he believed that the Social Democrats represented the peace-loving people and did not at all harbour the expansionist ambitions that animated the militarist elite. For them, it was important to determine which elements could be expected to work towards postwar constitutional reform and democratization. Their belief that the SPD desired greater democratic organization and control in governmental affairs was somewhat uncritical and reflected their hopes for postwar Germany. Doubtless, both men believed that the Social Democrats would repudiate militarism and fulfil their promise to democratize Germany.⁴⁹⁹

Despite disagreeing with Morel and Dickinson on the war guilt issue, most wartime scholars were quick to adopt their pronouncements on the future peace settlement. Dickinson argued that the war and future settlement would “bring no lasting peace to [the continent] unless it [brought] a radical change both in the spirit and in the organization of international politics.”⁵⁰⁰ He believed that any potential peace settlement should include a guarantee from the Great Powers

⁴⁹⁷ Dickinson, “The German Socialists and the War,” 168-169.

⁴⁹⁸ G. Lowes Dickinson, “A German on the War,” *New York Times Current History*, 1 December 1915, 508-509.

⁴⁹⁹ Berger, “Stereotypes and the Perception of the German Social Democrats by the British Labour Party,” 182-183.

⁵⁰⁰ Dickinson, *The European Anarchy*, 136-137.

to submit their future disagreements to an international tribunal for arbitration.⁵⁰¹ This conviction led him to agitate for an academic study-group to assist with plans for the future settlement. Accordingly, he drew together like-minded educators, politicians, and publicists, including Hobson and Ponsonby. Dickinson saw as imperative the need to frame a specific program to rebut the terms demanded in the jingoist press.⁵⁰² Hence, he wrote to Bryce,

What is not done at the peace will hardly have a chance after it, in a fresh era of competition, fear and revenge. What I believe ought to be done, and might be done, is to have instead of terms imposed by victors or vanquished, a general congress including the neutral powers, and of course ... the United States.⁵⁰³

Bryce encouraged him to devise a detailed program for an international council to arbitrate future conflicts but advised him against propaganda or public agitation. Consequently, the so-called Bryce Group was not a public organization to be compared with the UDC. Its members did not share a common view of the origins of the war or of the precise form of the postwar settlement.⁵⁰⁴ Despite this, the group members still shared moral values; above all, the goal to prevent future international conflict.⁵⁰⁵

Dickinson endorsed a settlement based upon reconciliation, international law, and a peace league equipped with a coercive sanction to ensure that all future conflicts were referred to arbitration before military action.⁵⁰⁶ Likewise, Dawson encouraged a “just and equitable” peace settlement—one which would consider “all claims and interests.”⁵⁰⁷ On 1 July 1918, Gooch wrote to Dawson to request an article on opinion within Germany.⁵⁰⁸ Gooch reminded Dawson, “you

⁵⁰¹ Dickinson, “The German Socialists and the War,” 168-169.

⁵⁰² Martin David Dubin, “Toward the Concept of Collective Security: The Bryce Group’s ‘Proposals for the Avoidance of War,’ 1914-1917,” *International Organization* 24, no. 2 (Spring 1970): 290.

⁵⁰³ Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Lord Bryce, 20 October 1914, MS. Bryce.

⁵⁰⁴ Robbins, “Lord Bryce and the First World War,” 257-258.

⁵⁰⁵ Sakiko Kaiga, “The Use of Force to Prevent War? The Bryce Group’s ‘Proposals for Avoidance of War,’ 1914-15,” *Journal of British Studies* 57 (April 2018):314.

⁵⁰⁶ Dubin, “Toward the Concept of Collective Security,” 290-291.

⁵⁰⁷ W. H. Dawson, “The Fifth Year of the War,” *Contemporary Review* 114 (1 July 1918): 124.

⁵⁰⁸ Gooch often wrote to Dawson when he desired exact information about sentiment in Germany. Thus, in October

know my view—that only moderate demands from the Allies can strengthen the forces for moderation in Germany.” Gooch certainly never condemned the entire country, and he continued to believe that moderation and good sense would prevail in Germany. He regarded as useful a recent speech from the German Foreign Minister, Richard von Kühlmann, in which he stated that the Central Powers were now unable to achieve an absolute end militarily, and that a compromise peace might have to be considered: “it will give his countrymen furiously to think.”⁵⁰⁹

The article that followed from this correspondence was temperate and fair-minded. Like Gooch, Dawson believed that a new spirit animated the officialdom in Germany. The Kühlmann address was evidence that not all of the nation was imbued with the truculent chauvinism that dominated the militarist elite. Dawson noted that those who had once endorsed militarism “are today to be ranked amongst its severest critics.” More importantly, he claimed that the Social Democrats had demanded a cessation in hostilities and had refused “to vote new war credits.” Granted that, it “would be unwise to over-estimate” the anti-militarist forces at present, there was evidence that the better elements were “earnestly striving to regain their lost” confidence.⁵¹⁰ Germany, therefore, had to be assured that British war aims were neither vindictive nor expansionist. Punitive and ill-considered terms would only strengthen the forces which the Allies sought to eradicate. Dawson thus called for “co-operation, union, [and] fellowship,” built on a generous and tolerant spirit. The settlement must depart from earlier traditions and create new precedents—there was no room for “diplomatic triumphs.” If the settlement were to survive, it had to provide “even-handed justice,” and exonerate those innocent citizens who had themselves been

1914, he recommended Dawson for an article on wartime liberalism in Germany, “Mr. Gooch has suggested that you might perhaps be willing to write us an article ... on the chances of a liberal movement in Germany as the result of defeat. From your intimate knowledge of the German people, Mr. Gooch feels sure you could indicate in which direction we should look.” WHD 258: letter Evelyn M. Bunting to W. H. Dawson, 30 October 1914.

⁵⁰⁹ WHD 377: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 1 July 1918.

⁵¹⁰ Dawson, “The Fifth Year of the War,” 117-125.

passive victims.⁵¹¹ Gooch, as expected, was delighted with the opinion-piece, “I thought your article excellent—firm on the essentials and moderate in details.”⁵¹²

Evidently, Dawson believed that the only precondition that Germany had to fulfil to receive a generous peace settlement was to reform its hitherto autocratic political system. Fortunately, this was a condition that the Allies could ensure through moderation and conciliation. Dickinson, too, believed that a fair and impartial settlement could expedite democratization and constitutional reform. Differently, though, he did not advocate for direct intervention in that nation’s political life, as did Dawson. Overall, Dawson sympathized with internal pressure for constitutional reform, but he insisted that such reform required Allied supervision.⁵¹³ Dickinson, meanwhile, noted that as a foreign import democratization would not be acceptable to most Germans. Both men, however, agreed that no wilful disturbance to peaceful relations should be expected from a truly democratic Germany.⁵¹⁴

Events soon overtook this debate; the German Revolution confirmed Dickinson in his view that the people had repudiated militarism and the political system in which that doctrine had been ineradicably embedded. Gooch was jubilant, as he wrote to Dawson: “events are thrilling, and I think hopeful for a better world.”⁵¹⁵ Dawson, too, hailed democratization as “a new beginning in [the] national life.” The new constitution secured for the people a freedom not hitherto known and swept away “the entire paraphernalia of the past semi-absolutism.”⁵¹⁶ It should be noted that such enthusiastic exclamations were not limited to Dawson and Gooch. Even James Headlam-Morley believed that the revolution was “as thorough, complete and sincere as any revolution of which

⁵¹¹ Dawson, “The Fifth Year of the War,” 118-125.

⁵¹² WHD 383: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 9 August 1918.

⁵¹³ W. H. Dawson, “The New Orientation in Germany,” *The Contemporary Review* 112 (July 1917): 616-619.

⁵¹⁴ Dickinson, *The European Anarchy*, 147.

⁵¹⁵ WHD 393: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 29 October 1918.

⁵¹⁶ W. H. Dawson, “The Constitution of New Germany,” *The Fortnightly Review* 627 (March 1919): 321.

there is any record.”⁵¹⁷ Headlam-Morley carried this conviction with him to Paris, where served on the British Peace Delegation, acting as an interlocutor between the foreign office and prime ministerial secretariat.

These enthusiastic statements indicate a certain emotional and intellectual imbalance about Germany.⁵¹⁸ The constant tension between a desire for correspondence and that for coherence confirmed to some British historians the sincerity of the protestations emanating from Germany. Seemingly, the revolution demonstrated what these scholars had claimed during the war. Mainly, that the autocratic and militaristic elite did not at all represent the admirable and peace-loving people. Then, too, it emphasized the oppositional currents in political culture. The fact that Social Democrats had emerged so strong from the resultant election as to form the principal faction in the new coalition government was seen as confirmation of the honest and democratic convictions of Weimar Germany. Moreover, it indicated that the electorate had repudiated *Junker*-conservatism. So, too, had the constitutional draftsman, Dr. Hugo Preuss. Preuss was known to Dawson, with whom he had previously corresponded on democratic reform. Of Preuss, Dawson noted that he was an “erudite and honourable man”—his aspiration for reform was sincere and honest.⁵¹⁹ Surely, there could be no justification for “withholding from reformed Germany and her constitutional rulers our sympathies and practical encouragement.”⁵²⁰ Their main concern for democratization having been achieved, historians saw as their new task the need to protect the nascent republic from punitive peace terms. Gooch thought this “of such importance” that he requested an opinion

⁵¹⁷ James Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, ed. Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant, and Anna Cienciala (London: Methuen Publishers, 1972), 164: letter James Headlam-Morley to A. C. Headlam, 25 June 1919.

⁵¹⁸ Antony Lentin, “‘Appeasement’ at the Paris Peace Conference,” in *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Peace without Victory?* ed. Michael Dockrill and John Fisher (New York: Palgrave, 2001): 59-60.

⁵¹⁹ Dawson, “The Constitution of New Germany,” 322-325.

⁵²⁰ Dawson, “Germany and Spa,” 5.

piece from Dawson, who returned to him an article that called for an “impartial, even-handed, and clean” settlement.⁵²¹

Previously, Dawson had written with optimism as when he wrote to Preuss, “I do not believe that the danger and the obstacle to future peace will lie in the settlement itself ... The settlement ... can only be based upon a just balance of all rightful national interests and claims.”⁵²² However, the 1918 British election alarmed him, as it did his fellow-thinkers. Of serious concern, were the vehement outbursts of anti-German rhetoric that received constant nourishment in the conservative press. Lloyd George certainly contributed to the hostility, but electoral promises to collect ruinous indemnities and to punish the militarists were expedient and doubtless captured the public mood generally.⁵²³ Privately, Leo Amery noted that the “British people are not in the least interested in Social Reform or Reconstruction, but only in making the Germans pay for the War and Punishing the Kaiser.”⁵²⁴ More crucially, the Prime Minister was beholden to a conservative majority that refused to accept the redemptive narrative advanced in liberal dailies, such as the *Manchester Guardian*. Both Dawson and Gooch tried to leverage their political connections to affect the atmosphere around decision-making, but the only political organization inclined to listen to their advice was the Labour Party. Dawson had already established a profitable correspondence with Arthur Henderson and ghost-wrote a memorandum on the peace settlement for him, which Henderson sent to David Lloyd George, “almost ... [verbatim].”⁵²⁵ Dawson advised his political correspondents to formulate a settlement in accordance with the high-minded principles as

⁵²¹ WHD 393: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 29 October 1918; and W. H. Dawson, “The End and the Beginning,” *The Contemporary Review* 114 (July 1918): 641.

⁵²² WHD 378: letter W. H. Dawson to Hugo Preuss, 4 July 1918.

⁵²³ Greg S. Parsons, “British Conservative Opinion and the Problem of Germany after the First World War,” *The International History Review* 35, no. 4 (August 2013): 864-866.

⁵²⁴ J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), *The Leo Amery Diaries*, vol. 1, 1896-1929 (London: Hutchinson, 1980), 246.

⁵²⁵ WHD 410: letter Arthur Henderson to W. H. Dawson, 20 December 1918.

articulated in the Fourteen Points.⁵²⁶ Henderson found himself at one with Dawson and agreed to influence “the National Labour Committee to commence at once a great public campaign [for] a [Wilsonian] Peace.”⁵²⁷ Without delay, Dawson and Gooch moved to mobilize their political contacts in order to amend the armistice provisions most egregious to their moderate viewpoint. Surely, Britain had not been delivered from this great conflict so that it could “wreak vengeance upon fallen foes.”⁵²⁸

The two Germanies thesis had a notable effect upon how some wartime historians conceptualized and, indeed, romanticized Germany. This dichotomous framework doubtless encouraged radical-Liberal and Socialist-UDC scholars to endorse a sympathetic division between Prussia and Germany, and between the militarist elite and the amiable citizenry. Even the Bryce Report, an important public statement for demi-official wartime views, readily distinguished the “good-natured” citizen conscript from the militarist elite.⁵²⁹ That such views survived the war intact is significant and demonstrates that there were definite limits to wartime antagonism. Then, too, it suggests the endurance, resilience, and malleability of the two Germanies. During the war, new means by which to frame this conceptualization were formulated as historians tried to accommodate their own wartime sympathies. Some scholars, such as Dawson and Dickinson, stressed the oppositional currents in political culture. Others, still, noted a shift in the values which governed educational institutions and the officialdom. This realization reinforced a temporal division between old and new. The continued reliance on this framework is significant because it allowed historians to retain an overidealized view and, afterwards, to embrace and disseminate more radical and revisionist viewpoints. More importantly, it provided interwar historians with a

⁵²⁶ WHD 409: copy of memorandum from W. H. Dawson to David Lloyd George, 19 December 1918.

⁵²⁷ WHD 410: letter Arthur Henderson to W. H. Dawson, 20 December 1918.

⁵²⁸ Dawson, “The End and the Beginning,” 641.

⁵²⁹ Bryce, et. al, *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages*, 44-45.

usable past—which in turn allowed them to dismiss the conflict as an historical aberration. This process constituted a dynamic intellectual practice that depended as much on expectation as it did on experience. Thus, historians inferred from previous experience to accommodate and indeed anticipate the future. The inference from experience to anticipated future relied on a conceptual framework whose parameters and structure seemed stable and self-evident. Precisely because this structure was seen as fixed and constant, was it possible for scholars to draw instructive moralistic lessons from the past for the future.⁵³⁰ Once Prussia had been defeated militarily, this framework allowed historians to advocate for a generous and rehabilitative settlement.

⁵³⁰ Koselleck, *Future Pasts*, 197.

3. “At Paris, Historians were as Thick as Bees”: The Role of the Historian at the Paris Peace Conference

British scholars arrived at the conference with measured enthusiasm. Militarist Germany, that is to say, the officialdom in Germany, should be treated harshly; nonetheless, the settlement should be moderate and fair-minded. One thing was certain—honesty, fidelity, and candour were essential. G. Lowes Dickinson summarized this sentiment in a wartime letter to C. P. Scott: “it becomes more and more imperative to keep before the public the principles that must govern any Peace that is not to be merely a prelude to a new War.”⁵³¹ More succinctly, for the settlement to survive, it had to deviate from earlier traditions and establish new standards; democratic consent was essential to its success.⁵³² Socialist-UDC, radical-Liberal, and internationalist scholars all demanded a “high-minded and statesmanlike” settlement—a covenant devoted to reconciliation. Increasingly, their attention was directed across the Atlantic to President Woodrow Wilson. As Gilbert Murray would later write, the President invited internationalist scholars to envision a fair-minded and restorative settlement. It seemed, at least, for a short interval, that Wilson would defend and sustain “the banner for ultimate reconciliation.”⁵³³ The American President, in that moment, embodied the liberal-internationalist ideals—free trade, international collaboration, and national self-determination—that had animated wartime scholars. Since British statesmen were themselves determined to fight to the finish, President Wilson seemed to historians as a saviour—the statesman destined to eradicate militarism and autocracy.⁵³⁴

⁵³¹ The Manchester Guardian Archive, the University of Manchester, the John Rylands Library, Manchester: GDN A/D33/7a: letter G. Lowes Dickinson to C. P. Scott, 12 July 1916. Hereinafter, the Manchester Guardian Archive will be cited as GDN.

⁵³² Dawson, “The Fifth Year of the War,” 118-125.

⁵³³ Gilbert Murray, *The Problem of Foreign Policy: A Consideration of Present Dangers and the Best Methods for Meeting Them* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1921), 21-22.

⁵³⁴ P. M. Kennedy, “Idealists and Realists: British Views of Germany, 1864-1939,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (1975): 149.

Even C. P. Scott was forced to admit that his friend and confidant, Lloyd George, was more closely allied to *Realpolitik* than to “Wilson’s idealism which we are meant to share.”⁵³⁵ Scott thus valued American intervention “as much for its influence on ... the final settlement as for its material aid.”⁵³⁶ Notably, President Wilson embraced the ideas that had excited wartime radical-Liberal and UDC scholars. Indeed, the views of Norman Angell “interested [him] very much,” as he wrote to the social reformer Florence Jaffray Harriman.⁵³⁷ Then, too, the writer and activist John Reed wrote to J. Patrick Tumulty, the Presidential Secretary, with an enclosed article in which he claimed Woodrow Wilson shared in common similar ideas “with ... Angell.”⁵³⁸ The President’s 1916 address to the League to Enforce Peace at Washington had, in some measure, been readied with assistance from the British Radical. Angell had been on a lecture tour in the United States when he heard that Wilson intended to address the League. He suggested to Colonel House that the President use a tactic that he had introduced to the UDC. Namely, to cite the idealistic declarations which the Allied statesmen had made in 1914.⁵³⁹ President Wilson embraced this recommendation to explain his appeal: “repeated utterances from leading [Allied] statesmen ... have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that ... public right must henceforth take precedence over ... [individual national] interests.” The President presented himself, much as radical intellectuals envisioned him, as an arbitrator—a guarantor for an “even-handed and

⁵³⁵ Quoted in Marvin Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 134.

⁵³⁶ Scott, *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928*, 313.

⁵³⁷ Woodrow Wilson letter to Florence Jaffray Hurst Harriman, 16 August 1915, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* vol. 34: July 21-September 30, 1915, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 216-217. Previously, Harriman had sent to Wilson an article which Angell had written for the *New Republic*. Florence Jaffray Hurst Harriman letter to Woodrow Wilson, 8 August 1915, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* vol. 34.

⁵³⁸ John Reed letter (with enclosed) to Joseph Patrick Tumulty, 30 June 1914, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* vol. 30: May 6-September 5, 1914, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 236.

⁵³⁹ Angell furnished House with selected lines from Asquith, Grey, Balfour, Lloyd George, and others, extracts from the London *Times*, and Lord Bryce’s article, “America’s Traditional Isolation.” E. M. House to Woodrow Wilson, 19 May 1916, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* vol. 37: May 9-August 7, 1916, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 77-78; and Laurence Martin, *Peace without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 109-110.

impartial” settlement.⁵⁴⁰ Nor was radical influence confined to direct communication. Editorials and articles printed in the *New Republic*, as well as more general propaganda, had much influence over Wilson and his trusted advisor, Colonel House.⁵⁴¹ Doubtless, both men drew from radical editorials the idea that the United States could no longer evade its role in world affairs.

Previously, Wilson had believed that nonparticipation would better serve the international community. Gradually, he came to amend this view. On 2 September 1916, he stated, “no nation can any longer remain neutral as against [a] wilful” aggressor. The conflict had encroached on international public life and could “no longer be confined” to far-off battlefields. Surely, the United States could not remain neutral while international law was flouted unashamedly.⁵⁴² These remarks were not made into an ideological void, “but as a contribution to an international cause.” Such ideas could be found in Bryce’s legalistic wartime pamphlets and the editorials of the UDC. However, the exact words that Wilson used originated not with Bryce (nor with the Bryce Group), but with Angell. Certainly, the editor of the *New Republic* believed as much, “the words used by the President are Mr. Angell’s own words.”⁵⁴³ Angell doubted whether the United States could truly remain neutral given the recent attacks against its commerce. Duly, he called for the United States (and other neutrals) to join with the Allies to form an international council to control “the world’s [resources]” in order to withhold “them from Germany.” The administrative body so created might prove “the beginnings of the world organization of our common [social, economic, and political] resources ... for the purpose of dealing with a recalcitrant member of international society, by other than purely military means.”⁵⁴⁴ Angell identified in the wartime alliance against

⁵⁴⁰ Woodrow Wilson, *Address to the League to Enforce Peace at Washington*, 27 May 1916.

⁵⁴¹ Martin, *Peace without Victory*, 110.

⁵⁴² Woodrow Wilson, *Speech of Acceptance to National Democratic Convention*, 2 September 1916.

⁵⁴³ “What Norman Angell Did,” *The New Republic* (16 September 1916): 151.

⁵⁴⁴ Norman Angell, “A New Kind of War,” *The New Republic* 3, no. 39 (31 July 1915): 328.

the Central Powers a would-be model for future international collaboration and intervention. These views certainly reached Wilson, and “interested [him] very much.”⁵⁴⁵

Angell arrived in the United States on a semi-official lecture tour in 1915 and was soon in communication with circles close to the President. By then, he had abandoned neutrality for a doctrine that stressed international intervention.⁵⁴⁶ Despite his recent neutralism, he had started to see the war as a means by which to reform the international order. He condemned as ill-defined and formulaic the statements from various Allied statesmen on the issue of war aims. The ambiguity of these statements had been used to promote the view that the war was “one of self-defence on the part of [Germany].” The refusal to define an aim such as the destruction of militarism was made to look in Germany as a means to render that nation “helpless again as in centuries past ... [victim to] her neighbours’ lust for Power.” This narrative bound together the people and their government and made the Allied military operation immeasurably more difficult. The absence of any common vision for future continental security—sufficiently defined—made the conflict seem to the German public “as a war of national defence for their vital rights and interests.” Such an appeal had “deeper material and traditional roots in Germany, than in any other country.”⁵⁴⁷ Indeed, this was the view of J. W. Gerard, the American ambassador to Germany (1913-1917):

We are engaged in a war against ... a people whose country was for so many centuries a theatre of devastating wars that fear is bred in the very marrow of their souls, making them ready to submit their lives and fortunes to an autocracy which for centuries has ground their faces, but which has promised them as a result of the war ... security.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁵ Woodrow Wilson letter to Florence Jaffray Hurst Harriman, 16 August 1915.

⁵⁴⁶ Martin Ceadel, “Angell, Sir (Ralph) Norman (1872-1967),” *ODNB*.

⁵⁴⁷ Norman Angell, “The Inter-Allied Conference,” *The New Republic* 12, no. 145 (11 August 1917): 37-39.

⁵⁴⁸ James W. Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1917), ix.

If Germany were to be democratized and its citizens made to see the wickedness of their despotic government, it must be made clear that Allied war aims offered to them greater security and stability than did militarism.⁵⁴⁹

Thus, there was no value in the Allies reaffirming their interest in a fair-minded and even-handed settlement; in truth, war aims, when stated generally, looked the same for the Allies as for the Central Powers. British war aims needed to take sufficient structure so as to form a coherent and workable strategy. Essentially, what was needed was a transnational assembly, created in order to ensure international security, national self-determination, and economic stability. Angell called for a wartime conference to discuss this initiative freely, with full summaries in the neutral press, with the intention that these summaries should reach the liberal and socialist elements in Germany. “Thus, although the conference would make no formal communication to the [German Empire] its decisions would in fact constitute communications to the German People.” This structure would ensure that after the war ended, when it came time to deal with Germany, its conference delegates would be socialists and liberals, and not militarists “and Prussians.” By this fact, “we should ... have democratized Germany,” not least, “in her international relations ... and it is those relations ... with which we are [most] concerned.” Angell, like Gooch and Dawson, was sure that there were two Germanies; indeed, he saw a clear division between its more democratic elements (the liberals and socialists) and the militarist autocracy. The war, in his mind, had been carried out in order to abolish militarism and to make the world safer for democracy. Both Britain and the United States needed to make this clear to the democrats in Germany; their fight was not with Germany, as such, but rather with its militarist government.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁹ Angell, “The Inter-Allied Conference,” 37-38.

⁵⁵⁰ Angell, “The Inter-Allied Conference,” 37-39.

President Wilson seems to have taken much from Angell. Thus, in his address to Congress, on 2 April 1917, he claimed that the Kaiser's government, lacking any demonstrated consent from its electorate, was illegitimate, and that its citizens were treated as little more than tools to be used for nefarious and wicked ends. He harboured no ill-will towards the citizenry; his main concern was their liberty. Indeed, in calling the nation to arms, he desired to make the world "safe for democracy," to secure small nations, and to liberate "the German Peoples."⁵⁵¹ Remarkably, it seems that Wilson came to believe in a territorial division between the Germanies, which he intended to use in order to stir the south Germans from their subservience to Prussia.⁵⁵² Wilson's views received constant nourishment from his numerous contacts, friends, and advisors. Particularly, from Colonel House, who was in close contact with British Radicals.⁵⁵³ House reminded the President to stress the idea that the Allied and Associated Powers had entered into conflict with a militarist autocracy, and "not ... the German People."⁵⁵⁴ There can be little doubt that such sentiments would have excited British Radicals, not least Gooch and Dawson. Indeed, these widely known sentiments would have encouraged such historians to count on a fair-minded, restorative, and moderate settlement. Britain still needed to win the war, but British Radicals were confident that the settlement to come would restore and revive Germany.

With American mobilization finally confirmed, the British government saw fit to establish numerous committees associated with peace terms. British historians were themselves concerned

⁵⁵¹ Woodrow Wilson, "Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War Against Germany," 2 April 1914, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson* vol. 41: January 24-April 6, 1917, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 77-78 519-527; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 35-36.

⁵⁵² Sir Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to the British Foreign Office, 6 March 1917, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson* vol. 41, 349.

⁵⁵³ See Edward Mandell House to Woodrow Wilson, 25 June 1916, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* vol. 37, 294-295.

⁵⁵⁴ Edward Mandell House to Woodrow Wilson, 5 June 1917, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* vol. 42: April 7-June 23, 1917, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 456.

about their country's *ad-hoc* measures and submitted their own initiatives for consideration.⁵⁵⁵ At some future date, the war would end; while no one could divine when and how it would end, Britain had to be readied for that eventuality. With this in mind, the historians Arnold Toynbee and Alfred Zimmern submitted a memorandum to the War Cabinet Secretariat, calling for a new intelligence section.⁵⁵⁶ Its exact remit was "to collect, organize, and present all the relevant facts" about the territories that would come under discussion at the future Peace Conference. It was an exercise in evidence-based decision-making: "Whichever [nation] is in possession of the most detailed knowledge regarding the economic and political facts, the plans of the enemy, and the bearing of these facts on their own, will have a formidable advantage over its opponents in making Peace."⁵⁵⁷ At the same time, an historian in Military Intelligence, Harold W. V. Temperley, introduced a similar scheme to Leo Amery, then a Parliamentary Secretary in Lloyd George's coalition government.⁵⁵⁸ Amery noted that "Temperley came in with a suggestion that we should have a small historical staff to look into the ... history of some of the debatable questions ... which will come up at the Peace Conference."⁵⁵⁹ Temperley, at any rate, seems to have concluded that a more fact-based method was necessary, "the political side of strategy requires a knowledge which cannot be improvised and is based on the study of history and a considerable acquaintance with contemporary politics, economics, and diplomacy."⁵⁶⁰

Amery, too, saw a clear distinction between "debate in committee and actual research into

⁵⁵⁵ Erik Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 15-19.

⁵⁵⁶ T. G. Otte, "'The Light of History': Scholarship and Officialdom in the Era of the First World War," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 30, no. 2 (2019): 261.

⁵⁵⁷ Arnold J. Toynbee and Alfred Zimmern memorandum, "Peace-Terms Intelligence: Suggestions for a Peace Terms Intelligence Section to be Added to the Existing Intelligence and Propaganda Departments," n.d. [late January 1917], Cabinet Records, The National Archives, Kew (CAB), 21/62/f15/E1. See also Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 18-26.

⁵⁵⁸ Otte, "Scholars and Officialdom in the Era of the First World War," 261.

⁵⁵⁹ Diary, Leo Amery, 3 February 1917, *The Leo Amery Diaries* vol. 1, 141.

⁵⁶⁰ Harold Temperley, "War Notes: Montenegro—Strategy," n.d. [1915-1916], Temperley MSS [Private]. Quoted in Otte, "Scholarship and Officialdom in the Era of the First World War," 261.

facts.”⁵⁶¹ It was for this reason that he approached Maurice Hankey, a Senior Cabinet Secretary, with the idea to establish a small research committee to collect “all the information that could be ... required about any country, ... that could possibly come under discussion.” Hankey endorsed the scheme, and so Amery turned to Admiral Reginald Hall, the remarkable Director for Naval Intelligence.⁵⁶² Amery made clear to Hall that what he desired was exact information on all the territories that would come under discussion at the Peace Conference. Hall acted on this directive and created an Historical Section; this section was to write manuals “on the various countries and issues involved in the war, on which, in some cases, no suitable work [then] existed.” To direct and monitor this work, Hall recruited to his staff the historian George Prothero, then editor of the *Quarterly Review*. Prothero was an ideal candidate; his numerous contacts in academia showed invaluable when the time came to find writers to draft the handbooks.⁵⁶³ Amery endorsed these actions, but worried that the section had no clear mandate as to what was needed. The Foreign Office shared his concern and soon evolved its own solution.⁵⁶⁴

Lord Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was keen to assert his own claim to this new machinery. Between 1910 and 1916, Hardinge served in British India as Viceroy. When he returned to the Foreign Office in 1916, he found its former influence much

⁵⁶¹ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 21.

⁵⁶² L. S. Amery, *My Political Life, Vol. Two: War and Peace, 1914-1929* (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd, 1953), 103.

⁵⁶³ Born in 1848, Prothero was educated at Eton and King’s College, Cambridge, where he received a first in Classics (1872). After a short time as assistant master at Eton, he studied at Bonn University (1873-1874), under the esteemed German historian Heinrich von Sybel. When he returned to Cambridge in 1875, he worked tirelessly to elevate the newly-created History School. Elected as the first Professor for Modern History at Edinburgh University in 1894, he left in 1899 to succeed his brother Rowland as editor for the *Quarterly Review*. When war was declared, he helped to form the “Central Committee for National Patriotic Organizations” in order to educate working-class constituencies about the reasons for the war. His own contribution to this cause was a treatise on *German Foreign Policy before the War* (1916). Erik Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy: G. W. Prothero and the Experience of the Foreign Office Historical Section, 1917-20,” *Historical Research* 63, no. 151 (June 1990): 196; C. W. Crawley, “Sir George Prothero and His Circle: The Prothero Lecture,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 20 (1970): 101-127; G. W. Prothero, *Our Duty and Our Interest in the War* (London: John Murray, 1914), 1-17; and Cecil Algernon and Peter R. H. Slee, “Prothero, Sir George Walter (1848-1922),” *ODNB*.

⁵⁶⁴ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 21-31.

diminished.⁵⁶⁵ Lloyd George in truth distrusted traditional institutions and his Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, was determined not to clash with the Prime Minister. Hardinge thus busied himself with schemes for the eventual Peace Conference.⁵⁶⁶ Once he had a basic framework in mind, he set about to collect under his control any other section then involved in such war work. Thus, the Historical Section was transferred at his instance to the Foreign Office. Finally, in order to better coordinate his efforts, he created the Political Intelligence Department (PID). Hardinge installed the career diplomatist Sir William Tyrrell as the PID's director, and to staff his new creation, he moved "with bureaucratic ruthlessness" to secure the talents of the Department of Information's Intelligence Bureau (DIIB).⁵⁶⁷ The DIIB was a small body, divided into six territorial sections: Germany, East and Central Europe, Russia, the Balkans, the Near and Middle East, and France, Spain, and Italy. Its main function was to consider internal conditions, attitudes, and tendencies in foreign countries, and to submit succinct memoranda on matters that could arise therein.⁵⁶⁸ The DIIB's small staff was incredibly talented and contained several notable historians: J. W. Headlam-Morley, Arnold Toynbee, R. W. Seton-Watson, Edwyn Robert Bevan, and Lewis Namier.⁵⁶⁹ Its members were the exact sort that Hardinge wanted for his new Section.⁵⁷⁰

Eventually, ten DIIB members moved to the Foreign Office. Only Seton-Watson refused to transfer to that Ministry, convinced as he was that the PID's director, Tyrrell, "was too wedded

⁵⁶⁵ Hardinge had already served one term as the permanent under-secretary (1906-1910).

⁵⁶⁶ Hardinge always believed that the conference would mark the moment when the Foreign Office would re-establish its influence over British foreign policy. Roberta M. Warman, "The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916-1918," *The Historical Journal* 15, no. 1 (March 1972): 159. For the internal debates see Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 9-39.

⁵⁶⁷ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 26 and 59.

⁵⁶⁸ "Office Orders" of IB, 1 June 1917, in FO 395/148, 117714/85465.

⁵⁶⁹ Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of the New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1981), 207.

⁵⁷⁰ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 59.

to the old diplomacy.”⁵⁷¹ Then, too, he feared that the move could detriment his dual role as editor and contributor to *The New Europe*, a weekly review dedicated to international affairs.⁵⁷² The *New Europe* aimed to cultivate in Britain a real interest in continental affairs, to foster a “European ... consciousness,” and to convince Britons “that foreign affairs did not lie outside their horizon.”⁵⁷³ Particularly, its editors wanted to instil in their readers’ minds the need to liberate the subjected nationalities of “central and south-eastern Europe.”⁵⁷⁴ The views which Dawson and Gooch endorsed could combine with the emotional idealism advocated in the *New Europe*. Yet, the *New Europe* initiative was established in order to counteract the more radical ideas which found ready-reception in liberal dailies, such as the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Daily News*, and the *Westminster Gazette*.⁵⁷⁵ Neither Dawson nor Gooch ever endorsed anti-war radicalism; however, both favoured a mediated settlement.⁵⁷⁶ The *New Europe* group, on the other hand, believed that only an all-out victory could secure a durable peace. Its adherents would not tolerate a mediated settlement, such as was demanded in radical dailies. For them, an inconclusive stalemate would count as a success for Germany, since it would leave the German Empire as the dominant Power in central and south-eastern Europe. This would be to its benefit as it could then consolidate a multi-ethnic empire that would stretch from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. Moreover, such a settlement would bound the German nation closer to militarism and to the institution of the Prussian Crown.⁵⁷⁷

Meanwhile, Dawson and Gooch came to rather a different conclusion. Both men believed that a mediated settlement would in fact weaken militarism in Germany. The failure to conclude

⁵⁷¹ Instead, he transferred to Northcliffe’s new Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 62. See also Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, 253.

⁵⁷² Alan Sharp, “Some Relevant Historians—the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 1918-1920,” *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 34, no. 3 (1988): 360-362.

⁵⁷³ Hanak, “The New Europe,” 375.

⁵⁷⁴ Quoted in Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, 179.

⁵⁷⁵ Hanak, “The New Europe,” 369.

⁵⁷⁶ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?*, 213-227.

⁵⁷⁷ R. W. Seton-Watson, “The Passing of the Status Quo,” *New Europe*, 3 January 1918.

the war militarily, had already eroded militarism and alienated the citizenry. Even now, “there is no greater ... fiction extant than the idea that the [German People]” are united contentedly, “eager to out vie each other in individual self-effacement for the common cause.”⁵⁷⁸ Indeed, the soon-to-be liberated electorate was now in accord “with foreign critics in [viewing] ... militarism” as a discredited doctrine.⁵⁷⁹ Gooch was much heartened with German Foreign Secretary, Richard von Kühlmann’s address to the German *Diet* on 24 June 1918, in which he stated that the German Reich should consider a mediated settlement.⁵⁸⁰

Dawson, too, took note of the address and wrote that it indicated a new mood in official Germany, a mood which the Allies would do well to motivate with moderate terms. Both Gooch and Dawson believed that moderate terms would stimulate the democratic elements within Germany, which were “earnestly striving to regain their lost [confidence]”.⁵⁸¹ As Gooch reminded Dawson, “you know my view ... only moderate demands from the Allies can strengthen the forces for moderation in Germany.”⁵⁸² Only months before the November Armistice, Dawson, in an article for the *Contemporary Review*, demanded a moderate settlement, that would consider “all claims and interests.” He called for mutuality, solidarity, and union, based on toleration: “all for each and each for all.” Truly, “it is no less our interest, than our duty, to encourage this new spirit that is finding voice in Germany ... This can be done best by answering moderation with moderation.” Neither Dawson nor Gooch believed in a vindictive all-out victory, this would only strengthen the forces which the Britain wished to eradicate.⁵⁸³ Gooch was delighted with the opinion piece and was in accord with its conclusion: that an insistence on total defeat would only

⁵⁷⁸ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, x and 192.

⁵⁷⁹ Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany*, 130.

⁵⁸⁰ WHD 377: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 1 July 1918.

⁵⁸¹ Dawson, “The Fifth Year of the War,” 118-125.

⁵⁸² WHD 377: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 1 July 1918.

⁵⁸³ Dawson, “The Fifth Year of the War,” 118-125.

harden the militarist faction and extend the “war ... [indefinitely].”⁵⁸⁴

The *New Europe* group dismissed this claim. Their main concern was to establish on sure foundations a new order in Europe; this meant a radical transformation. Seton-Watson claimed that the *New Europe* had “been founded to offer material for definite schemes of reconstruction, and to suggest ... the broad lines on which” the continent should be rebuilt.⁵⁸⁵ The war was a revolution: it was irrational to think that the continent could survive unscathed and return, as it were, to the prewar *status quo*. The first edition—which was issued on 19 October 1916—set out to further consolidate the *entente* between Britain and the other allied Powers, and to confirm and secure the solemn oaths and commitments which British statesmen had made towards various subject nationalities of Europe. Concurrently, Seton-Watson established the Serbian Society, an association formed to advocate closer relations with Serbia. This double event caused rather a sensation which the editor and historian H. Wickham Steed described, “when we founded the *New Europe* and the Serbian Society, we hardly realized what a hornets’ nest we were about to stir or how viciously the hornets would buzz and sting throughout ... the war and during the Peace Conference. We had touched pro-Germanism, active and latent, conscious and unconscious, at its most sensitive point.” Steed worked in close association with Seton-Watson and was convinced that he and “Seton-Watson ... alone had enough first-hand knowledge to ... explain ... the Austrian Question” effectively. Together, the two men would formulate an outline for reconstruction in Europe. Their aim was to dissolve Austria-Hungary, and to secure nationhood for the Poles, “Czechoslovaks, and the [Southern Slavs].”⁵⁸⁶ Such a radical transformation was intolerable to radical-Liberals, such as Dawson and Gooch.

⁵⁸⁴ WHD 383: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 9 August 1918.

⁵⁸⁵ R. W. Seton-Watson, “The Reorganization of Europe,” *New Europe*, 9 November 1916.

⁵⁸⁶ H. Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A Personal Narrative* vol. II (London: William Heinemann, 1924), 128-131.

Gooch objected to territorial dismemberment for two reasons. First, he detested anarchic ethnonationalism and violent disorder; instead, he favoured incremental constitutional reform.⁵⁸⁷ Second, he refused to countenance any action that could extend the war. Gooch set out his views in a 1917 treatise on *The Races of Austria-Hungary*.⁵⁸⁸ Therein, he considered the economic, historical, and social issues that confronted the multi-ethnic state; as well, he made some effort to assess its future viability. Gooch believed that its subject nationalities were now fit to take a more active role in their own administration. Granted that, some territories were more well-suited for immediate self-rule than were others. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, until recently, had been administrated under Ottoman Turkish rule, needed to be treated differently: “in 1882, Kallay, ... was made Governor, and during the following years he achieved the same ... success that Lord Cromer was winning in Egypt. ... It was an enlightened despotism, well suited to ... a neglected Province.” Gooch was sure that once economic conditions were stabilized and lawful rule was restored, the authorities would allow their subject inhabitants more autonomy. Without a doubt, Gooch understood the difficulties that faced the Dual Monarchy, and he did not hesitate to innumerate its constitutional defects. Yet, he ascribed the most harsh and undemocratic features to the Magyars, whose racial intolerance undermined the entire structure.⁵⁸⁹ Governance in German Austria was treated much more favourably. Gooch’s analysis relied much on Seton-Watson, whom he cited frequently. He did, however, differ from Seton-Watson on at least one critical issue: Gooch believed that the Austro-Hungarian Empire would survive the war. The dual system would transition into a tripartite federation, and Emperor Karl would enact extensive constitutional

⁵⁸⁷ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 268-269.

⁵⁸⁸ Notably, Gooch wrote the treatise for the Union of Democratic Control.

⁵⁸⁹ Particularly, he condemned the assimilation laws enacted in the Arch-kingdom of Hungary: by which a cruel and abusive regime had endeavoured to assimilate “twelve-million [inhabitants].”

reforms that would allow his subject nationalities more control in their internal affairs.⁵⁹⁰ True to his nature, this model combined constitutional reform with the utmost continuity.

It would be convenient to claim that Gooch tended towards blatant pro-Germanism. Yet, he was not mistaken to innumerate the difficulties to which dismemberment could lead. First, he doubted whether the new nation-states would inherit the vital conditions for economic stability. Secondly, he wondered whether the newly enfranchised nationalities would treat their national minorities with moderation, charity, and restraint. Finally, he considered whether Italian chauvinism would insist on northern Dalmatia in direct defiance to Yugoslav self-determination.⁵⁹¹ For all his pro-German tendencies, Gooch was a serious scholar. His mental framework was certainly burdensome, but his work always remained scholarly. Then, too, he was not one to dismiss alternative views without consideration: in fact, he remained in routine contact with Seton-Watson, whom he esteemed highly.⁵⁹² Gooch did however have serious reservations to make about the *New Europe*, and he declined Seton-Watson's invitation to contribute his name to the new weekly. Truthfully, he rated the articles highly, but he considered their content to be "[too] violent."⁵⁹³ The *New Europe* owed much to Tomáš Masaryk, the first President of Czechoslovakia. Thanks to Seton-Watson, Gooch was able to meet with Masaryk, whom he admired greatly: "[Masaryk] knew too much about German culture to join in the shrill denunciations of 'the Hun', and too much about the rottenness of Tsarist Russia to seek salvation in the East."⁵⁹⁴ Gooch was much taken with Masaryk, but he could not endorse the course advocated by Seton-Watson and

⁵⁹⁰ G. P. Gooch, *The Races of Austria-Hungary* (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1917), 9-21.

⁵⁹¹ Gooch, *The Races of Austrian-Hungary*, 21.

⁵⁹² Gooch was thrilled with Seton-Watson's claim that "the war ... was made in Budapest as much as in Berlin." Moreover, he made sure to differentiate between "our ... uninstructed instructors" and Seton-Watson, whose "facts and recommendations deserve careful study." G. P. Gooch, "The Near East," *The Contemporary Review* 110 (July 1916): 527-529.

⁵⁹³ G. P. Gooch to R. W. Seton-Watson, 31 October 1916, Seton-Watson (Professor Robert William) Collection, SEW. Quoted in Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 260.

⁵⁹⁴ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 177-178.

Masaryk that “aimed at an all-out victory.”⁵⁹⁵ This course would not only extend the war indefinitely but would doubtless lead to the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, still then a more beneficial than harmful “force in the Danubian Lands.”⁵⁹⁶

Differences aside, Gooch shared his earnest concern when he heard that Seton-Watson had been drafted into the Royal Army Medical Corps, and he was relieved to learn that Seton-Watson had been transferred to the DIIB.⁵⁹⁷ Gooch himself received notice that he had been retained for desk-work (Class C), when the third service act (1918) extended the draft to married men as old as fifty-one, but thereafter he received no further instructions. His war service was thus limited to his work with Prothero’s Historical Section.⁵⁹⁸ Prothero and his staff continued with their work at a measured rate and, as the war neared its end, new recruits were found to assist with the workload. The War Office seconded Bernard Henderson, an historian from Oxford, as well as the historian E. L. Woodward.⁵⁹⁹ Woodward, who assisted with the editorial work, would later recall,

I was given the work of editing some of the Near and Middle Eastern books ... I found the editorial work interesting. We had asked the most learned authorities to write for us. I did not always find it easy to convince them ... they were not composing scholarly monographs at their leisure but were compiling handbooks against time for an *ad hoc* purpose.⁶⁰⁰

Prothero recruited Dawson to write manuals on German Colonization, Heligoland, and the Kiel Canal. Indeed, Dawson later claimed that he had written several of these “informative handbooks.” The intent, as he understood it, was to make available reference material and to offer some actionable recommendations.⁶⁰¹ Gooch, too, was enlisted as a contributor and editor. Chiefly, he

⁵⁹⁵ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 260.

⁵⁹⁶ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 178.

⁵⁹⁷ G. P. Gooch to R. W. Seton-Watson, 21 April 1917, SEW; and G. P. Gooch to R. W. Seton-Watson, 27 August 1917, SEW. Quoted in Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 261.

⁵⁹⁸ G. P. Gooch Papers, University of Calgary Library Archives, Frank Eyck Fonds GPP 76: letter Lord Hardinge of Penhurst to G. P. Gooch, 3 June 1919. Hereinafter, the G. P. Gooch Papers will be cited as GPP.

⁵⁹⁹ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 35-38 and 62.

⁶⁰⁰ E. L. Woodward, *Short Journey* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1942), 101.

⁶⁰¹ W. H. Dawson, *Germany under the Treaty* (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1933), 30-31. See also, WHD 331: letter G. W. Prothero to W. H. Dawson, 19 July 17; WHD 336: letter G. W. Prothero to W. H. Dawson.

dealt with French claims in the Levant, and he also co-authored a brochure on the Franco-British condominium in the New Hebrides.⁶⁰² Their task was “to [write], not elaborate books, but sketches,” on the issues, concerns, and matters foreseen to arise in Paris.⁶⁰³ Prothero issued his contributors with *Instructions for Historical Writers*, which reminded them to “remember that their readers” would not have “time to waste on matter not ... important for the work in hand.”⁶⁰⁴ Prothero warned Dawson that his seventy-five-thousand-word treatise on *German Colonization* was too drawn-out “to include in the series.”⁶⁰⁵ The work was admirable; indeed, an external reviewer had commended the treatise as “excellent, well-informed, and well-written.”⁶⁰⁶ Still, Prothero recommended that Dawson submit an abbreviated version, “not exceeding ... fifteen-thousand words in length.” This, he admitted, would be mundane work, but hard-pressed negotiators would not have time to read such an exhaustive text.⁶⁰⁷

The Historical Section eventually issued one hundred and seventy-four referential manuals. These handbooks ensured that conference officials had reliable reference material close at hand. Prothero even advised his authors to draw conclusions “from the facts referred to in their narratives” and “to make [recommendations].”⁶⁰⁸ These recommendations were included with each handbook and ensured that expert opinion was readily available to the conference attendees.⁶⁰⁹ More than eighty-five authors collaborated on the work. Some contributors were

⁶⁰² Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 261.

⁶⁰³ Cecil Papers, British Library: letter George Prothero to Lord Robert Cecil, 11 November 1918. Quoted in Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy,” 195.

⁶⁰⁴ G. W. Prothero, *Instructions for Historical Writers* (London, 1918).

⁶⁰⁵ WHD 363: letter G. W. Prothero to W. H. Dawson, 14 March 1918.

⁶⁰⁶ WHD 362: report on Dawson’s manuscript, 12 March 1918.

⁶⁰⁷ WHD 363: letter G. W. Prothero to W. H. Dawson, 14 March 1918

⁶⁰⁸ Prothero, *Instructions for Historical Writers*.

⁶⁰⁹ Moreover, it ensured that each author was able to influence the conference in his own, however trivial way. Each manual included an appendix with relevant treaties as well as an additional reading section. See e.g. “Russian Poland, Lithuania, and White Russia,” *Peace Handbooks* vol. VIII, ed. G. W. Prothero (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1920).

well-known to Prothero (such as Dawson and Gooch) while others were recruited from the Directorate for Military Intelligence, M.I.2(e), and the Foreign Office. The Directorate seconded the historian C. K. Webster to the Historical Section in 1918, so that he could write a treatise on the Vienna Congress, “about which no thorough account had then been written.”⁶¹⁰ The manual was considered invaluable reading for delegates about to convene “at the first major conference on reordering the international system” since the early-nineteenth century.⁶¹¹ Once he had read it, Harold Nicolson “knew ... what mistakes had been committed by the misguided, reactionary, and after all [feeble] aristocrats who had represented Great Britain in 1814.”⁶¹² Woodward (in addition to his editorial work) wrote a handbook on the Berlin Congress (1878). His work received acclaim from Balfour, which satisfied him, “since ... Balfour had attended the Congress as Salisbury’s ... Secretary.”⁶¹³ Prothero also recruited writers from the PID: A. W. A. Leeper and Toynbee both wrote manuals for the Historical Section, the former on Bessarabia, while Toynbee contributed to works on the Near and Middle East.⁶¹⁴

The Historical Section reflected a broader transition from late nineteenth- to twentieth-century diplomacy, an evolution that saw expert advisors become indispensable to how countries conducted foreign affairs.⁶¹⁵ During a debate on war aims, on 13 February 1918, the Liberal MP Noel Buxton (Norfolk North) exhorted the Foreign Office to authorize “the most eminent authority ... on German opinion and institutions in this country, Mr. Harbutt Dawson,” to examine how best “to divide the masses of the German People from their Government.” To study, no doubt, what

⁶¹⁰ C. K. Webster, *The Study of International Politics: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth on Friday 23 February 1923* (London, 1923), 14.

⁶¹¹ Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy,” 202-203.

⁶¹² Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919: Being Reminiscences of the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1933), 30-31.

⁶¹³ Woodward, *Short Journey*, 101.

⁶¹⁴ The Arnold Toynbee Papers, Bodleian Library, Special Collections, Oxford University. Letter: Charles Hardinge to Arnold Toynbee, 3 June 1919; and Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 40.

⁶¹⁵ Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy,” 202-203.

kind of mental and emotional reaction certain terms would cause in Germany. Buxton was certain that “the Noble Lord” (Robert Cecil) was already “familiar with the [work] of ... Mr. Harbutt Dawson,” and that it would be in the best interest of the Foreign Office to turn to “the minds of eminent authorities like [Dawson]” in order to consider what demands could reasonably be made of Germany.⁶¹⁶ Noel Buxton’s brother, the humanitarian and sometime MP, Charles Roden Buxton, wrote to the historian directly: “I feel, if I may say so, that you [will] have a very important part to play ... and pretty soon, I think. ... What you say about Germany ... [carries] very great weight.”⁶¹⁷ Buxton, who was a founder member of the UDC, asked Dawson to use his influence to moderate the Prime Minister.⁶¹⁸ Dawson also received a letter from the Labour MP Walter Hudson, who claimed that he had “twice mentioned” Dawson’s name in the House, “in urging that the Government should seek [his] advice” on Germany.⁶¹⁹ Evidently, history and broader ideas about national tradition mattered to elected officials, decision-makers, and elites, alike. British historians had an audience with both educated and elite elements in society, affecting their mentalities and debates, either directly or indirectly; indeed, that a retired civil servant and historian was invited to offer his advice, more than illustrates this conviction.

British historians travelled to Paris with diplomats, journalists, and statesmen, not “merely to end the war, but to establish a new order in Europe.”⁶²⁰ C. K. Webster would later write that “at Paris, historians were as thick bees.” He noted that historians were increasingly associated with the every-day “conduct of affairs, as the area of conflict broadened, and the men of action were confronted with new [crises].” At Paris, historians were crucial members of the British Peace

⁶¹⁶ Lord Robert Cecil, Minister for the Blockade, was in attendance on behalf of the Foreign Office. United Kingdom. HC Deb, 13 February 1918, volume 103, column 199-200 (Mr. Noel Buxton).

⁶¹⁷ WHD 328: letter Charles Roden Buxton to W. H. Dawson, 12 June 1917.

⁶¹⁸ WHD 334: letter Charles Roden Buxton to W. H. Dawson, 3 August 1917.

⁶¹⁹ WHD 358: letter Walter Hudson to W. H. Dawson, 20 February 1918.

⁶²⁰ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 31-33.

Delegation, “much used by the Diplomatist.”⁶²¹ Prothero clearly understood his mandate when he instructed his authors to write “not elaborate books, but sketches” that would be useful to inundated officials in need of referential material; and this was the exact role that his section fulfilled admirably.⁶²² Both Nicolson and Robert Vansittart studied the conference manuals carefully.⁶²³ Lord Hardinge believed that the handbooks had “not only earned [an enthusiastic] testimony,” but had been of tremendous benefit.⁶²⁴ Nicolson found them to be of the utmost utility: “should any historian doubt ... our readiness, I should urge him to obtain the whole collection.”⁶²⁵ Vansittart, too, considered them “admirable ... nothing had been overlooked.”⁶²⁶

However, this enthusiasm was not shared universally. Sir Lancelot Oliphant was said to have found them useless. Lord Edward Gleichen, who acted on the behalf of Prothero while the latter was in Paris, contested this assessment bitterly, writing to Headlam-Morley, “Foreign Office members like Oliphant say they’re [the Peace Books] all rot—but then I consider Oliphant as belonging to that type of matter himself.”⁶²⁷ Clearly, the conference manuals were used in Paris, “though inevitably, those who were the busiest ...” had little time for them.⁶²⁸ Sir Eyre Crowe claimed to “have only” examined “one or two” briefly.⁶²⁹ Predictably, it was the minor officials at Paris who found them more useful than did their section heads or even the Prime Minister. This follows naturally, since it was these officials who would have been ordered write memoranda on

⁶²¹ Webster, *The Study of International Politics*, 7 and 10-11.

⁶²² George W. Prothero to Lord Robert Cecil, 11 November 1918. Quoted in Erik Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy,” 195.

⁶²³ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 31; Robert Vansittart, *The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart* (London: Hutchinson, 1958), 201.

⁶²⁴ Lord Hardinge to A. F. H. Wiggin, 3 June 1919. Quoted in Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy,” 209.

⁶²⁵ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 27-31.

⁶²⁶ Vansittart, *The Mist Procession*, 201.

⁶²⁷ HDLM 6/3/1: letter Lord Edward Gleichen to J. W. Headlam-Morley, 7 February 1919. The Papers of Sir James Headlam-Morley, Churchill Archives Centre, University of Cambridge, Cambridge.

⁶²⁸ Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy,” 209.

⁶²⁹ Quoted in Goldstein, “Historians Outside the Academy,” 209.

the matters under discussion and who would have had the greatest need for a reliable reference source.⁶³⁰ The Historical Section ensured that these officials were well-versed on the issues under consideration at Paris; and while there is no reason to believe that the Prime Minister ever read the conference manuals himself, it is certain that those who informed his outlook would have studied, and in some cases contributed to, the Peace Conference Books.

The British Peace Delegation and its staff started to arrive in Paris after New Year's Day, 1919. The British mission recruited authorities from the wider intellectual world. These individuals collected, collated, and assembled the data and material which the officials would use to base their decisions.⁶³¹ Lord Hardinge invited Prothero to attend the conference as the historical advisor to the British Delegation. Other academic authorities were soon sent over to assist with this work. Toynbee, for instance, collaborated with Robert Vansittart, who commented, "I understood from him that European Turkey should [be transferred] to Greece, and that the Straits should be run by a Commission."⁶³² A. W. A. Leeper, meanwhile, assisted Nicolson with memoranda on national boundaries in central and southeastern Europe. His incredible fluency—he knew Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, Flemish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Latin, Norwegian, Romanian, Russian, Serbo-Croat, Spanish, and Swedish—was considered invaluable to their task.⁶³³ Their connection was crucial to determining the borderlines in eastern Europe. Leeper, as an esteemed technician, took an active role in settling numerous frontier questions. Headlam-Morley wondered, in March 1919, whether the inhabitants involved would ever be consulted, writing that, "self-determination is ... *démodé*. Leeper and Nicolson determine for them what they ... wish, but they

⁶³⁰ Goldstein, "Historians Outside the Academy," 209.

⁶³¹ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 109.

⁶³² Robert Vansittart, *The Mist Procession*, 217.

⁶³³ Erik Goldstein, "The Foreign Office and Political Intelligence, 1918-1920," *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 4 (October 1988): 278.

do it very well.”⁶³⁴ Yet, Nicolson would later recall that neither he nor Leeper “moved an inch without previous consultation with ... Dr. Seton-Watson.”⁶³⁵ Crucially, some academics did more than act as advisors to the officials that headed their sections: Headlam-Morley, for instance, carved out a role that allowed him to act with much more autonomy.⁶³⁶

Dawson’s renown as a reliable source for information on Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany led Prothero to invite him to review any other conference manual concerned with Germany. This offer ensured that Dawson and Gooch were able to influence and inform how the conference attendees understood the issues discussed in Paris. Both Dawson and Gooch made a concerted effort to ensure that the British mission was furnished “with as much information as feasible ... to help it counter [extremist] demands.”⁶³⁷ Thus, Gooch sent to the author tasked with the manual on German Austria a treatise written by Dawson. He also forwarded a memorandum from Dawson on the Rhineland, which he considered as “forcible and timely,” in order that it might “help to avert a [terrible injustice].”⁶³⁸ Nicolson, for one, seems to have been imbued with the two Germanies, noting that his attitude towards that nation was one which combined “fear, admiration, sympathy, and distrust.” He admired German cultural and scientific achievements and the fortitude with which its “civilians ... had withstood the [naval] blockade.” However, he hated the militarist elite “for their ruthlessness ... [and] political ineptitude.”⁶³⁹ This attitude used the same claims that Germanophile historians had set out much earlier in articles, treatises, and lectures. Mainly, that the admirable citizenry was not to blame for the excessive cruelties committed by the militarist elite. This view soon attracted other members of the British Peace Delegation; nonetheless, it

⁶³⁴ Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 44.

⁶³⁵ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 126.

⁶³⁶ D. B. Kaufman, “‘A House of Cards Which Would Not Stand’: James Headlam-Morley, the Role of Experts, and the Danzig Question at the Paris Peace Conference,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 30, no. 2 (2019): 230-231.

⁶³⁷ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 314.

⁶³⁸ WHD 415: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 6 January 1919.

⁶³⁹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, 31-34.

remained a marginalized view. Directly, Dawson and Gooch tried to mobilize their most influential contacts in an effort to affect the atmosphere around decision-making.

Lord Bryce, for instance, notified Dawson that he would gladly submit before the Cabinet “any ideas or suggestions” which Dawson, with his intimate familiarity, “might have to make.”⁶⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Lord Haldane, the former and future Lord Chancellor, wrote to Dawson in February 1919 to thank him for his recent work on the *German Empire*.⁶⁴¹ Haldane commended Dawson for his fairness, clarity, and internationalism—such a fair-minded character was needed in Paris.⁶⁴² Haldane wrote to Dawson again in March to congratulate him on the second volume, which he admired “even more than the first.” He only wished that Dawson was in Paris, “to leaven the ... conference with [his] knowledge.”⁶⁴³ Three weeks later, C. P. Scott received authorization from Lloyd George to send Dawson to Paris as an expert advisor and special correspondent.⁶⁴⁴ Scott recorded that Dawson had received an interview with Lloyd George and that the historian had convinced the Prime Minister to “fight for the right policies both in regard to Danzig and ... the West.”⁶⁴⁵ Thereafter, Dawson wrote a memorandum for Lloyd George on “German Territorial Questions.” He warned therein that “territorial measures” would doubtless influence Germany’s future attitude “towards the settlement and the Peace.” Moreover, he cautioned that an artificially-bloated Poland would “not live long and that while it lives it will be a [constant] ... danger to [the peace of] Europe.”⁶⁴⁶

Dawson, more than Gooch, adhered to the notion that Germany was a benevolent colonizer

⁶⁴⁰ WHD 376: letter Lord Bryce to W. H. Dawson, 27 June 1918.

⁶⁴¹ W. H. Dawson, *The German Empire, 1867-1914 and the Unity Movement*, two volumes (London: Macmillan and Co., 1919).

⁶⁴² WHD 418: letter Lord Haldane to W. H. Dawson, 10 February 1919.

⁶⁴³ WHD 428: letter Lord Haldane to W. H. Dawson, 10 March 1919.

⁶⁴⁴ GNA/A/D22/9: telegram C. P. Scott to David Lloyd George, 31 March 1919.

⁶⁴⁵ Scott, *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott*, 373.

⁶⁴⁶ GNA/A/D22/13a: memorandum addressed to David Lloyd George, 14 April 1919.

in the East. His conviction led him to adopt an anti-Polish attitude. Thus, he recalled a conversation he had with Lloyd George in Paris: “I said that I did not expect much [from] the new Poland, which would be an expensive luxury ... for the Allies ... I added, that ... I distrusted their political capacities. [Poland has] invariably acted fast and loose with friends and foes alike, and I for one, do not trust them.”⁶⁴⁷ Dawson doubted whether a Polish state, in any form, would last and believed that its only chance for survival was to reconstitute itself on terms amenable to Germany. It was for this reason that he advised the Prime Minister not to cede Danzig to Poland.⁶⁴⁸ In truth, the debate over Poland’s new frontiers divided the British Delegation—none more so than the critical decision over Danzig. The Historical Section handbook on East and West Prussia reaffirmed the German nature of Danzig, commenting that two decades earlier it was not unreasonable for one “to inhabit [Danzig] ... without becoming aware that [there even existed] ... a Polish Question.”⁶⁴⁹ Sir Charles Oman, an historian at Oxford, likewise recommended to the Foreign Office that Danzig remain German.⁶⁵⁰ Thus, the initial decision was to leave Danzig to Germany. However, Sir Esme Howard, the British official whose main task in Paris was to help re-establish Poland, came to believe that Danzig should be handed over to a robust Poland.⁶⁵¹ Both Hardinge and Crowe felt differently. This clash led the Foreign Office to invite Prothero to offer his views and, in a masterful memorandum, he outlined the risks involved in ceding Danzig to Poland.⁶⁵² Within a short time,

⁶⁴⁷ WHD 2158: memorandum of a conversation with David Lloyd George, 3 April 1919.

⁶⁴⁸ GNA/A/D22/13a: memorandum addressed to David Lloyd George, 14 April 1919.

⁶⁴⁹ “East and West Prussia,” *Peace Handbooks* No. 39, ed. G. W. Prothero (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1920), 32.

⁶⁵⁰ FO 371/4354/f46/PC46, Sir Charles Oman, “The Practicable Western Boundary for the New State of Poland,” 14 November 1918.

⁶⁵¹ Gradually, Howard came to believe that a robust Poland was essential to securing a favourable balance in the Baltic. B. J. C. McKercher, *Esme Howard: A Diplomatic Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 222; and B. J. C. McKercher, “Howard, Esme William, first Baron Howard of Penrith (1863-1939),” *ODNB*. Earlier, Howard had advocated for a medium-sized Poland. However, released from his PID staff, his views shifted considerably, and Headlam-Morley wrote to Namier that “what we both anticipated has in fact, I think, undoubtedly happened, and Howard has been more and more falling under the influences of Paris and drifting away.” Headlam-Morley to Lewis Namier, 10 February 1919. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 25.

⁶⁵² FO 608/141/477/1/6/2523, G. W. Prothero, ‘Future of Danzig and West Prussia’, 20 February 1919.

Headlam-Morley set forth, as an alternative, the creation of a free city-state, “which would allow the inhabitants to rule themselves, but would meet Poland’s desire not to allow [Danzig] to Germany.”⁶⁵³

Headlam-Morley was unable to come to terms with idea “of handing over a city such as Danzig to an alien Power, completely disregarding the wishes of its inhabitants.” He believed that the ideal solution was “to be found in the conception of [an] autonomous and ... semi-independent city-state.”⁶⁵⁴ When the Polish Committee submitted its report on territorial matters to the Supreme Committee, Lloyd George alone voiced his concerns about including two million Germans within the new Poland. Precisely, the same detail worried Headlam-Morley, as it did Dawson and Gooch. Erik Goldstein claims that while “there is no definite evidence that Headlam-Morley influenced the Prime Minister, [this] seems likely, as he was already in close contact with Philip Kerr, who did have direct access to Lloyd George.”⁶⁵⁵ Philip Kerr, later Lord Lothian, exerted considerable influence over the Prime Minister.⁶⁵⁶ Lord Milner had Kerr transferred to Lloyd George’s Private Secretariat (often referred to as ‘Garden Suburb’) in December 1916. Initially, Kerr’s task was to summarize and advise on the abundant material submitted to the Prime Minister’s office, but he was soon called to act as an advisor and intermediary. While it is difficult to evaluate his wartime

⁶⁵³ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 263.

⁶⁵⁴ Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 40.

⁶⁵⁵ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 261-264.

⁶⁵⁶ Born in 1882, Kerr matriculated at New College, Oxford in 1900, where his tutors were a keen influence on him. Particularly, H. A. L. Fisher with whom he formed a durable friendship. Kerr left Oxford in 1904, but not before he earned a first-class degree in Modern History. He travelled to Pretoria in February 1905 and was soon a core member of ‘Milner’s Kindergarten’, an informal club of colonial administrators in southern Africa. Initially, conceived as a close-knit fraternity, the club allowed Kerr to interact with such individuals as Lionel Curtis, Geoffrey Dawson, Leo Amery, and John Buchan. After the union of South Africa (1910), most of its members returned to Britain. Reunited with Milner, the Kindergarten formed the core of the Round Table Movement, which advocated closer relations between Britain and its Dominions. Kerr was selected to edit the movement’s influential review on international affairs, *The Round Table*. He was to continue as its editor until December 1916. Alex May, “Kerr, Philip Henry, eleventh Marquess of Lothian (1882-1940), *ODNB*”; Alex May, “Milner’s Kindergarten (act. 1902-1910), *ODNB*”; Alex May, “Curtis, Lionel George (1872-1955),” *ODNB*; and Erik Goldstein, “The Round Table and the New Europe,” *The Round Table* 346 (April 1998): 177-189.

influence exactly, when the conference commenced, he had already assumed the role of trusted advisor to Lloyd George on foreign affairs, a function he often exercised to the detriment of the Foreign Office.⁶⁵⁷ Notably, Kerr was a member of the Round Table ‘Moot’, an influential initiative with a marked interest in the Peace Conference. Lloyd George later observed that the ‘Moot’ was “a very powerful combination—in its ways perhaps the most powerful in the country. Each member ... brings to its deliberations ... definite and important qualities, and behind the scenes they have much [reach] and influence.”⁶⁵⁸ Lloyd George would certainly have known this, as he had one member in his Cabinet and two in his Secretariats. Kerr indeed exerted considerable influence over Lloyd George. Particularly, over his war and peace aims. Then, too, his close contact with the Prime Minister allowed him to steer his master informally.⁶⁵⁹

Without a doubt, the main issue for historians in Paris was how to communicate their recommendations to the decision-makers. The Prime Minister’s decision to act in the first instance without advice from the Foreign Office made informal networks all the more important. These networks ensured that otherwise minor voices were made more influential. Headlam-Morley’s access to Kerr, for instance, meant that he had back-channel to the Prime Minister. This ensured that he had some influence over high-level decision-making in Paris. Kerr shared the same mistrust that his chief felt towards the Foreign Office, and this led him to foster ties with technical experts, not least historians. Besides Headlam-Morley, he was in close contact with Lewis Namier, Seton-Watson, and Alfred Zimmern. These bonds had been formed earlier, either at school or in wartime, when the lines between academia, journalism, and information work blurred considerably. Kerr,

⁶⁵⁷ FO 608/13/46/1/12/9953, Eyre Crowe, minute to “Memorandum by Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame,” 23 May 1919.

⁶⁵⁸ Lord Riddell, *Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 1918-1923* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1933), 329-330.

⁶⁵⁹ Goldstein, “The Round Table and the New Europe,” 177-180; Kaufman, “James Headlam-Morley and the Danzig Question at the Paris Peace Conference,” 228-232.

who had earlier edited the influential review, *The Round Table*, mixed in the same circles as Seton-Watson's *New Europe* group.⁶⁶⁰ Zimmern, too, moved in similar circles and contributed articles to both reviews. Notably, he also wrote for the *New Republic*.⁶⁶¹ Eventually, Zimmern came to act as a crucial link between the 'Moot' and Seton-Watson.⁶⁶²

However, he was not the only PID officer to contribute to both initiatives; in fact, there was a remarkable confluence between these two movements and the PID.⁶⁶³ Possibly, this is best illustrated with an anecdote. When Namier was excluded from the British mission in Paris, after having clashed with Roman Dmowski's exiled Polish National Committee, Headlam-Morley secured him access to Kerr. Headlam-Morley wrote to Kerr once the conference was underway:

As you know, he [Namier] is not altogether *persona grata*, and it is I think increasingly difficult for him to get a hearing ... I am sure that his knowledge and his point of view deserve attention. I am, at his request, sending you privately and unofficially, some of the letters and papers which I have received from him. I can feel little doubt from what I hear from other sources that in his main contention he is right.⁶⁶⁴

Namier continued an almost daily communication with Headlam-Morley, advising him on Polish and Ruthenian affairs. His tone was often anti-Polish and these filtered views, as Headlam-Morley did not endorse them uncritically, were communicated to Kerr, and then, more selectively, to the Prime Minister.⁶⁶⁵ It was through "individuals rather than institutions" that historians were able to exercise some influence over the decision-makers in Paris.⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶⁰ Kaufman, "James Headlam-Morley and the Danzig Question at the Paris Peace Conference," 228-232.

⁶⁶¹ Otte, "Scholarship and Officialdom in the Era of the First World War," 260; and D. J. Markwell, "Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On," *Review of International Studies* 12, no. 4 (October 1986): 280; and D. J. Markwell, "Zimmern, Sir Alfred Eckhard (1879-1957)," *ODNB*.

⁶⁶² Previously, he had collaborated with Seton-Watson to write a citizens' manual on "the ... causes and issues of the war." Zimmern made a clear distinction between Prussia and "the real Germany," an "integral part of the civilization of Western Europe," whose citizens were "very similar in character to their neighbours of kindred stock." R. W. Seton-Watson, *et al.*, *The War and Democracy* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1914), viii and 90-91. Goldstein, "The Round Table and the New Europe," 178.

⁶⁶³ Kaufman, "James Headlam-Morley and the Danzig Question at the Paris Peace Conference," 232.

⁶⁶⁴ HDLM 688/2: J. W. Headlam-Morley to Philip Kerr, 25 January 1919.

⁶⁶⁵ Kaufman, "James Headlam-Morley and the Danzig Question at the Paris Peace Conference," 232.

⁶⁶⁶ M. L. Dockrill and Zara Steiner, "The Foreign Office at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919," *The International History Review* 2, no. 1 (January 1980): 86.

Plainly, informal networks and close social ties ensured that even those without official credentials were often able to influence the deliberations in Paris. Seton-Watson from the first shared “close and cordial ... contacts with ... members of the British Peace Delegation.”⁶⁶⁷ Harold Nicolson would later record that he never moved an inch without first “[consulting] with Dr. Seton-Watson,” who was then in Paris. Nicolson arrived at the Conference imbued with the doctrines of the *New Europe*, to which he had devoted a careful “and fervent study.”⁶⁶⁸ This was likewise true for Allen Leeper, with whom Nicolson worked in close association on the countries which most interested Seton-Watson. Leeper’s letters and diaries from this time reveal how extensive were their “consultations with ... Seton-Watson.”⁶⁶⁹ The two men were in fact close friends, with Seton-Watson often visiting Leeper’s flat to discuss the situation in eastern Europe. Both Allen and his brother Rex wrote for Seton-Watson’s weekly: Allen under the assumed name ‘Belisarius’; while Rex signed his articles on Russian affairs as ‘Rurik’.⁶⁷⁰ The third member with whom Seton-Watson “enjoyed a constant exchange of views” was Headlam-Morley, who “became increasingly convinced that frontiers should be drawn according to nationality.” He succeeded in his efforts to have Seton-Watson sent to Czechoslovakia, where “he would ... communicate with us ... freely.”⁶⁷¹ Headlam-Morley’s interactions with Seton-Watson led him to believe that the Czechs and Masaryk “could be trusted to treat their minorities justly;” and that a multicultural nation-state could be established successfully.⁶⁷² Dawson, too, leaned on his close contacts in order to influence mentalities in Paris. However, his influence was more direct. C. P. Scott was able to secure for

⁶⁶⁷ Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, *The Making of the New Europe*, 340.

⁶⁶⁸ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 33 and 126.

⁶⁶⁹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 126; and Erik Goldstein, “New Diplomacy and the New Europe at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: The A. W. A. Leeper Papers,” *East European Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (January 1988): 399.

⁶⁷⁰ Goldstein, “New Diplomacy and the New Europe at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,” 394-399.

⁶⁷¹ J. W. Headlam-Morley minute addressed to Sir William Tyrrell, 24 February 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 34-35.

⁶⁷² Agnes Headlam-Morley, introduction to *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, xxv-xxvi.

Dawson an audience with the Prime Minister: “will you allow me to send W. H. Dawson to Paris. ... He is anxious to see you, and could I think render important service at this juncture.”⁶⁷³

Lloyd George seems to have taken the advice that he received from authoritative sources and to have fused it with his own ideas about how best to secure a durable peace.⁶⁷⁴ From Headlam-Morley, he seems to have internalized the idea that Germany’s frontiers needed to be treated as a whole, rather than left to the numerous subcommittees created to advise on territorial matters.⁶⁷⁵ Headlam-Morley’s concerns were confirmed when he reviewed Esme Howard and R. H. Lord’s recommended frontiers for a robust Poland, which included Danzig.⁶⁷⁶ Surely, Headlam-Morley was correct to assume that this decision would doubtless “arouse the most bitter animosity.” Clearly, the whole matter would have to be reconsidered “in connection with the other demands to be made on Germany.”⁶⁷⁷ Lloyd George shared this view—indeed, it was due to his objections that the draft was returned to the Polish committee for further consideration. Yet, the committee held firm with its recommendations.⁶⁷⁸ Lloyd George raised the matter in council, and the issue was referred to the American Medievalist Charles Haskins and Headlam-Morley. Goldstein writes that Haskins and Headlam-Morley took their lead from Lloyd George directly. But from whom did the Prime Minister take his advice on Poland. Goldstein is sure that it was from Headlam-Morley, but it stands to reason that he also received critical advice from Dawson.⁶⁷⁹ Previously, Lloyd George had worked with Dawson while President at the Board of Trade. Dawson had acted as a trusted

⁶⁷³ GNA/A/D22/9: telegram C. P. Scott to David Lloyd George, 31 March 1919.

⁶⁷⁴ Denis Clark, “Poland in the ‘Paris System’: Self-Determination, Stereotypes, and Decisions in 1919,” *Nations and Nationalism* 25, no. 4 (2019): 1372-1373.

⁶⁷⁵ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 260-261; and Headlam-Morley memorandum, 6 February 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 21-23.

⁶⁷⁶ See Harold I. Nicolson, *Land and Power: British and Allied Policy on Germany’s Frontiers, 1916-19* (London: Routledge, 1963), 148-150.

⁶⁷⁷ Headlam-Morley memorandum, 6 February 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 21-23.

⁶⁷⁸ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 261-264.

⁶⁷⁹ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 264-265.

advisor and was reliable source for information. His advice then as now was pro-German.⁶⁸⁰ If the settlement fell short of Dawson's desired outcome, he did not blame "the British Prime Minister [who] did more than any other [official]" to reduce in number and harshness the defects of the Treaty.⁶⁸¹ Headlam-Morley, too, consulted with Dawson on Danzig and the Polish Corridor.⁶⁸² He seems to have taken from Dawson the abortive idea that the new city-state should be called the *Freie Hansastadt Danzig*.⁶⁸³ Headlam-Morley esteemed Dawson highly—in a 1916 book review, for the *Manchester Guardian*, he noted that "no one in England" was more well-informed on German subjects than was Dawson.⁶⁸⁴

For all his vital familiarity, credibility, and informal influence, Dawson left the conference frustrated and embittered—his ideas largely overlooked. Gooch shared his frustration. He objected to the terms concerning the Saar, the Polish Corridor, and "the cruellest thing," the decision to forbid a union between German Austria and Weimar Germany.⁶⁸⁵ Both Dawson and Gooch tried to draw on their contacts and informal networks in order to amend the Treaty. However, those who were inclined towards their outlook were either isolated in the coalition government or were members of the Labour Party.⁶⁸⁶ With their allies sidelined, Dawson and Gooch were unable to revise the features that were most antithetical to their moderate sensibilities. Headlam-Morley, meanwhile, remained in Paris. He continued in his efforts to counter and revise the most extreme demands of the French and Polish. His close relations with Kerr meant that he held the confidence of Lloyd George, and he was able to draw on this resource to alter and amend the more extreme

⁶⁸⁰ Morgan, "Lloyd George and Germany," 756; and Berger, "William Harbutt Dawson," 79-80 and 92.

⁶⁸¹ Dawson, *Germany under the Treaty*, 87-88.

⁶⁸² WHD 1916: letter J. W. Headlam-Morley to W. H. Dawson, 14 April 1919; HDLM 6/3/1: letter W. H. Dawson to J. W. Headlam-Morley, 5 April 1919; and HDLM 6/3/1: letter W. H. Dawson to J. W. Headlam-Morley, 8 April 1919.

⁶⁸³ Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 69.

⁶⁸⁴ J. W. Headlam, "New Books: Prussia and Germany," *Manchester Guardian*, 16 March 1916.

⁶⁸⁵ G. P. Gooch, from the minutes of the Rainbow Circle, 8 October 1919.

⁶⁸⁶ WHD 410: letter Arthur Henderson to W. H. Dawson, 20 December 1918.

terms of the Treaty.

For instance, Headlam-Morley succeeded in his efforts to revise the Polish frontier with Germany. Remarkably, he achieved this feat in the face of fierce resistance from “all of the other [committee] members.”⁶⁸⁷ His actions much reduced the number of German nationals transferred to Poland. Indeed, he resisted calls for Marienburg to be handed over to Poland and worked with Lloyd George to secure that district for Germany.⁶⁸⁸ He scored several other victories for British moderates keen on reconciliation with Germany. Early on, he warned about the “serious trouble ... [of] assigning [the population of Upper Silesia] which has been German for over five hundred years to Poland.”⁶⁸⁹ He worried that the Prime Minister had not “understood the situation,” and thus decided to advise him on the matter.⁶⁹⁰ Lloyd George seems to have taken from Headlam-Morley and Dawson the idea that when feasible German nationals should not be transferred to the rule of other nationalities. He was thus convinced to renegotiate the fate of Upper Silesia.⁶⁹¹ Lloyd George’s ultimate success in this matter relied somewhat on Headlam-Morley, who once more offered critical advice. Eventually, their combined efforts secured a fairer and more balanced solution.⁶⁹² Consistently, Headlam-Morley tried to achieve borders in accordance with national ethnicity; where this was not feasible, he recommended the use of Minority Protection Treaties.⁶⁹³ However, he objected to the idea that Germany, too, should be humiliated in this way.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁸⁷ Extract from diary, J. W. Headlam-Morley, 19 June 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 152.

⁶⁸⁸ Alan Sharp, “James Headlam-Morley: Creating International History,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 9, no. 3 (1998): 273; and J. W. Headlam-Morley, 25 June 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 172-173.

⁶⁸⁹ J. W. Headlam-Morley to Arthur Headlam, 11 May 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 103-104.

⁶⁹⁰ J. W. Headlam-Morley to George Saunders, 12 May 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 105.

⁶⁹¹ Alan Sharp, “Holding Up the Flag of Britain ... with Sustained Vigour and Brilliance or ‘Sowing the Seeds of European Disaster’? Lloyd George and Balfour at the Paris Peace Conference,” in *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?* eds. Michael Dockrill and John Fisher (London: Palgrave, 2001), 45-46.

⁶⁹² Sharp, “James Headlam-Morley,” 273-274; and Sharp, “Lloyd George and Balfour at the Paris Peace Conference,” 45-46.

⁶⁹³ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 231-232 and 242.

⁶⁹⁴ He reasoned that it would be immoderate and invidious to insist that Germany undertake commitments which would not be demanded of any other Great Power. E. H. Carr, *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 166.

Headlam-Morley was likewise influential in finding a solution to the issue of the Saar. The subject first arose in March when Clemenceau demanded French annexation of the Saar Basin. Wilson denied his claim flatly; he would, however, allow for coal deliveries from the district. The British tried to mediate between the French and the American President, and so Lloyd George and Balfour called on Headlam-Morley to assist in their efforts. Headlam-Morley dismissed French claims to the Saar Basin; instead, he recommended that France should obtain control over its coalfields, at least, temporarily. Lloyd George and Balfour concurred, and a commission was soon established to finalize the details. Headlam-Morley, André Tardieu, and Charles Haskins met in committee to establish the future administrative structure of the Saar. Headlam-Morley aimed to limit Franco-German friction, and the solution reached was one of the most “effective [solutions] of the conference.” It was decided that the League of Nations (LON) should administer the Saar, while the French were to receive control over its coalfields for a limited term. Thus, France would receive its “desired economic compensation,” while Britain had succeeded in its efforts to restrict France’s territorial ambitions, at least, in the Saar.⁶⁹⁵ The crucial factor behind this fair and balanced solution was once more Headlam-Morley, who recorded in his diary, “for the general conception of this scheme, I am, I believe, originally responsible. ... Eventually, I had an opportunity of drawing the Prime Minister’s attention, together with that of Mr. Balfour, to this solution, and [they] took it.” Thereafter, it was decided that Headlam-Morley should direct the creation of a Saar Valley Commission. He resisted Tardieu’s contention that the Germans be made to “buy back the coalmines” from France: “this was [certainly] indefensible.” The final scheme was “a sound one,” he later reflected. Particularly, because it removed French territorial ambitions in the Saar Valley.⁶⁹⁶ More notably, it took into consideration the “obvious wishes” of the local

⁶⁹⁵ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 233-235.

⁶⁹⁶ Extract from diary, J. W. Headlam-Morley, 25 June 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 166-167.

inhabitants.⁶⁹⁷

At once, he was in communication with Sir Eric Drummond, then Secretary-General of the LON, about the selection “of a [German] representative for the Saar Valley ... Commission.” It was obvious that a sound and reliable individual was needed, someone who was well-trusted in the community; for that reason, “he must be a ... *good* German, though not a Prussian or Pan-German, a Chauvinist or a Bolshevik.”⁶⁹⁸ Preferably, he would be from the area and would have commercial interests in the Saar Basin, but would not be an industrialist, since that sort was more offensive than were the militarists. Crucially, he would be “German *but* not Prussian.”⁶⁹⁹ Without a doubt, Headlam-Morley believed that there were two Germanies. The fact that someone so close to the Prime Minister, as was Headlam-Morley, not only embraced this idea but also referred to it in confidential communication is noteworthy. Truly, this all but confirms the idea that British historians used their academic authority, familiarity, and informal influence to advocate for an even-handed, fair-minded, and moderate settlement that would renew Germany.

With Prussia defected, their new concern was now to rehabilitate and restore that other, more idealistic Germany. Surely, this conviction contributed to Headlam-Morley’s efforts to refuse the transfer of Marienburg, Allenstein, and Upper Silesia to Poland. Headlam-Morley’s record at the conference serves as an excellent case study. It indicates the influence, informal or otherwise, that historians were able to exert at the Paris Peace Conference. Headlam-Morley’s circumstances were certainly remarkable, but he was not the only historian to exercise some influence over the decision-makers in Paris. Dawson, Gooch, and E. H. Carr were all able, at one time or another, to inform how the decision-makers understood the issues under consideration. While it would be

⁶⁹⁷ Goldstein, *Winning the Peace*, 235.

⁶⁹⁸ HDLM 6/3/1: J. W. Headlam-Morley to Sir Eric Drummond, 24 June 1919.

⁶⁹⁹ HDLM 6/3/1: J. W. Headlam-Morley to Sir Eric Drummond, 9 May 1919.

inaccurate to claim that these historians achieved more successes than setbacks, their efforts did in fact curb some of the more excessive demands of the French and Polish.

Be that as it may, Headlam-Morley was shocked when he saw the draft terms *in toto*. He wrote to his brother, Rev. Canon A. C. Headlam, “I do not think it is a [defensible] treaty.” He bemoaned the economic and financial clauses, which “are, as far as I can understand, in their cumulative effect ... [unfeasible].”⁷⁰⁰ He believed that these clauses were “of such a [deleterious] nature that revision will be almost inevitable.”⁷⁰¹ Publicly, it was J. M. Keynes who did the most to discredit and undermine the Treaty, with his brilliant work on *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. But while his work distilled his own disenchantment with the Treaty, his “strictures,” as Elisabeth Glaser states neatly, were “more excessive than others only in that he ... [made] them public.”⁷⁰² Clearly, Dawson and Gooch felt in a similar way; soon, others added their voices to this chorus. The South African General Jan Smuts time after time exhorted the Prime Minister to “revise our attitude towards Germany.”⁷⁰³ Smuts was sure that the Germans should be treated more fairly, and more in line with the Fourteen Points.

Meanwhile, Nicolson soon became disillusioned with Wilson when he discovered that the President did not intend to enforce his earlier idealism at Paris. Partly, it was this disillusionment that led to informal discussions about how to institutionalize international affairs and, on the 30 May, at the Hotel Majestic, was founded the British Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), an institution that became increasingly critical of the Peace Treaties. Lionel Curtis

⁷⁰⁰ J. W. Headlam-Morley to Rev. Canon A. C. Headlam, 11 May 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 103-104.

⁷⁰¹ J. W. Headlam-Morley to George Saunders, 12 May 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 104-105.

⁷⁰² Antony Lentin, “‘Appeasement’ at the Paris Peace Conference,” 52; and Elisabeth Glaser, “The Making of the Economic Peace,” in *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years*, eds. Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 381.

⁷⁰³ General Jan Smuts, 26 March 1919, *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, vol. IV, *November 1918-August 1919*, eds. W. K. Hancock and J. Van Der Poel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 87.

conceived of the scheme, receiving an endorsement from Lord Cecil, who stated as a fact: “There is no single person in this room who is not disappointed with the terms that we have drafted.”⁷⁰⁴ Nicolson echoed this sentiment a week later: “There is not a single person ... here who is not unhappy and disappointed at the terms.”⁷⁰⁵ Three weeks later, Headlam-Morley all but confirmed the common verdict of the Treaty, “I have not found one single person here who approves of it as a whole.”⁷⁰⁶ Nicolson shared this view, “now that we see” it as a whole “we realize that [it is] much too stiff.” The terms were not only “stern, but actually punitive.”⁷⁰⁷ It was not until the draft terms were submitted to the Germans on 7 May, that the victors were able to view the clauses as a whole. This caused shock and alarm and led to calls for a radical revision. H. A. L. Fisher recorded in his diary: “we all condemn the treaty and agree that it should be modified.”⁷⁰⁸

The British Cabinet authorized Lloyd George to advocate revisions on Germany’s eastern frontier and to allow for Germany’s immediate admission to the LON. Mostly, these last-minute efforts were unsuccessful, and the Prime Minister’s failure to achieve radical revision led to a final near-crisis at the conference. Smuts dismissed these eleventh-hour concessions as insufficient, and threatened to not endorse the Peace Treaty, and while he did so in the end, he issued a formal statement, which in effect renounced the document to which he had set his name:

I have signed the Peace Treaty, not because I consider it a satisfactory document, but because it is imperatively necessary to close the war; because the world needs peace above all, and nothing could be more fatal than the continuance of the state of suspense between war and peace. The six months since the armistice was signed have, perhaps, been as ... unsettling, and ruinous to Europe as the previous four years of war. I look upon the Peace Treaty as the close of those two chapters of war and armistice, and only on that ground do I agree to it.

⁷⁰⁴ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 353.

⁷⁰⁵ Harold Nicolson to Arthur Nicolson, 8 June 1919. Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 359.

⁷⁰⁶ J. W. Headlam-Morley to Rev. Canon A. C. Headlam, 25 June 1919, Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 161.

⁷⁰⁷ Harold Nicolson to Arthur Nicolson, 8 June 1919. Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 359.

⁷⁰⁸ Diary entry, 31 May 1919, H. A. L. Fisher Papers 8A, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

This was all said, “not in criticism, but in faith; ... because I feel that the real work of making Peace will only begin after [we have signed] this Treaty.” Smuts called for charity, humanity, and tolerance; these alone could secure a “new international order, and a fairer, better world.” He looked forward to when this new internationalist mindset would act as a solvent for the vexatious issues “which the statesmen have found too hard at the Conference.” The Peace Treaty/Conference did at least achieve two successes: “the one is the destruction of Prussian militarism; the other is the institution of the League of Nations.” The LON had much work before it: “there are territorial settlements that will need revision,” securities “laid down which [are]” now at variance “with the unarmed state of our former enemies,” and the ruinous indemnities “which it will be in the interests of all to render more tolerable and moderate.” However, Smuts was confident that the LON could be trusted to deal with these issues fairly.⁷⁰⁹

Smuts was steadfast in his commitment to reconciliation, but he was not the only senior official to call for radical revision. Other like-minded senior decision-makers included Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil, George Barnes, Edwin Montagu, and H. A. L. Fisher. Lord Milner “had shown his colours even before the armistice,” when his calls for moderation and restraint were attacked in the Northcliffe Press. Crucially, Smuts acted as a conduit between the minor officials such as Keynes, Nicolson, and Headlam-Morley, and the more senior decision-makers such as Milner and Robert Cecil. Smuts often circulated his memoranda and letters to other officials to better foster discussion and debate.⁷¹⁰ Headlam-Morley wrote to him in acknowledgement, “I hope you will allow me to say how glad I am that someone has said what many are thinking.” Indeed,

⁷⁰⁹ General Jan Smuts, “A Statement issued by General Smuts after the Signature of the Peace Treaty,” 29 June 1919, in *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* vol. III: *Chronology, Notes and Documents*, ed. H. W. V. Temperley (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1920), 74-76.

⁷¹⁰ Lentin, “‘Appeasement’ at the Paris Peace Conference,” 56-57.

he too felt that the Treaty, “in its [current] form is indefensible and cannot in fact be carried out.”⁷¹¹ Headlam-Morley, more than Smuts or even Keynes, serves as an accurate measure for British attitudes at Paris. He had no illusions about German war guilt, on which he had written the official account for the Foreign Office.⁷¹² However, he was “rational, detached,” and fair-minded.⁷¹³ Antony Lentin writes that Headlam-Morley is, in his own way, a better barometer “than Keynes or Smuts ... because of his calm sobriety,” his aversion, in the words of E. H. Carr, “from any emotional indulgence.”⁷¹⁴ Moreover, he was in and of the establishment, not an outsider as were the other two. Certainly, he was much less emotional and inconsistent than was Keynes—who could “be written off ... as Bloomsbury;” while Smuts was liable to irritate some with his “holier than thou” demeanour.⁷¹⁵

Finally, Lloyd George must be considered for his belated if somewhat insincere efforts to revise the Treaty. Michael Graham Fry notes that the Prime Minister was torn “between the necessities of revisionism and a stubborn desire to defend his creation.”⁷¹⁶ Eventually, he came around to the idea that some tactical revisionism was necessary; however, he did not embrace the drastic course recommended by Smuts, “that the treaty should be recast and transformed.”⁷¹⁷ Nonetheless, he was anxious to revise Germany’s eastern frontiers with Poland, “for he admired the Germans more as a race” than he did the Poles, whose ambitions and artifice he found irritable and tiresome. Fisher, meanwhile, endorsed the Prime Minister’s new course over Poland and, like Headlam-Morley, advised territorial revisions in favour of Germany.⁷¹⁸ He believed that there

⁷¹¹ J. W. Headlam-Morley to General Jan Smuts, 19 May 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 118.

⁷¹² Lentin, “‘Appeasement’ at the Paris Peace Conference,” 56-57.

⁷¹³ Agnes Headlam-Morley, introduction to *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, xxx.

⁷¹⁴ Carr, *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays*, 166.

⁷¹⁵ Lentin, “‘Appeasement’ at the Paris Peace Conference,” 56-57.

⁷¹⁶ Michael Graham Fry, “British Revisionism,” in *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years*, eds. Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 566.

⁷¹⁷ Smuts, 26 March 1919, *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, 216.

⁷¹⁸ Fry, “British Revisionism,” 570-572.

should be a certain “elasticity in relation to [its] eastern frontiers.”⁷¹⁹ The concessions that were secured left the moral revisionists frustrated and embittered. While the term pro-German is crude and unconstructive, it was used at the conference to denounce the moral revisionists. Lloyd George went as far as to chastise the British Delegation for having “erred rather on the side of consideration for the enemy;” while Balfour warned them not to fix their minds “on the lamentations ... [and] misfortunes” of the enemy.⁷²⁰ Balfour noted as an element of that fixation the uncritical conviction “that Germany was repentant—that her soul had undergone a conversion and that she was now absolutely a different nation.”⁷²¹ Then, too, there is Keynes’s famous admission that in the course of their face-to-face encounters he had fallen “in a sort of way ... in love with” his German counterpart, Dr. Melchior.⁷²² Certainly, so intense a reaction was far from the norm. Yet, those in direct contact with the defeated enemy, found it difficult to continue to view them as such.⁷²³

The moral revisionists shared in common at least two convictions. The first was an acute unease about the blockade. German destitution could not be denied since it was attested by military intelligence officers (not inclined towards pro-Germanism), by General Plumer, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, and by Foreign Office officials like, George Saunders.⁷²⁴ Saunders and the other German experts, Headlam-Morley, Edwyn Bevan, and Zimmern, were left unsettled and distressed. Headlam-Morley was adamant, “at this moment, ... the thing that matters most is

⁷¹⁹ David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* vol. I (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1938), 718.

⁷²⁰ 1 June 1919, *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*. Part II, *From the First World War to the Second*, Series I, *The Paris Peace Conference of 1919*, vol. IV, eds. M. L. Dockrill, Kenneth Bourne, and D. C. Watt, (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989), 108.

⁷²¹ 1 June 1919, *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 107.

⁷²² Quoted in Antony Lentin, *Guilt at Versailles: Lloyd George and the Pre-History of Appeasement* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1985), 142.

⁷²³ Lentin, “‘Appeasement’ at the Paris Peace Conference,” 59-60.

⁷²⁴ Notably, Saunders was married to a German national, Gertrude, with whom had five children; his father-in-law was the Berlin banker and art collector, Oscar Hainauer. His main concern at the conference was to advise caution against the imposition of a vindictive Peace Treaty. Linda Brandt Fritzing, “Saunders, George (1859-1922),” *ODNB*.

to deliver some food into Germany.” Otherwise, “there will be no” German nation left with which “to make Peace.”⁷²⁵ Robert Cecil was likewise disturbed by the enemy’s deprivation, and in early-April he exhorted the Prime Minister to remove “all artificial restrictions such as the blockade” and to conclude an “immediate ... Peace.”⁷²⁶ Smuts and Nicolson saw the famine first-hand while on a mission to Vienna. Nicolson beseeched his father to use his influence to secure famine relief, “as it is the one way in which we can mitigate the moral responsibility for the blockade.”⁷²⁷

The other conviction held in common was, if not an aversion to, at least, a marked distrust of the French. Smuts was the most hostile: “there’s far too much of the French demands in the [Peace Treaty].”⁷²⁸ Lentin writes that here, too, Headlam-Morley, is a reliable measure for British attitudes in Paris. He also believed that Britain “depended far too much on French opinion and whatever merits the French may have, that of understanding Germany does not seem to be included among them.”⁷²⁹ The French were selfish, avaricious, and vindictive. “They seem completely defective in all sense of justice, fair play, or generosity.”⁷³⁰ Like Headlam-Morley, Dawson believed that the French were to blame for the most objectionable features of the Versailles Treaty. Predictably, he had earlier warned Lloyd George that French narrow-mindedness would ruin the Peace.⁷³¹ The final insult for the moral revisionists was the spectacle in the *Galerie des Glaces*. The whole scene was farcical and ill-advised, wrote Headlam-Morley. The French, it seemed, desired above all else to humiliate Germany—to exact retribution for 1871.⁷³²

⁷²⁵ J. W. Headlam-Morley to Philip Kerr, 5 March 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 42.

⁷²⁶ Lord Cecil to David Lloyd George, 4 April 1919. Quoted in Douglas Newton, *British Policy and the Weimar Republic, 1918-1919* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 381-382.

⁷²⁷ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 270.

⁷²⁸ 1 June 1919, *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 98-99.

⁷²⁹ J. W. Headlam-Morley to Edwyn Bevan, 5 March 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 43.

⁷³⁰ J. W. Headlam-Morley to John Bailey, 10 May 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 103.

⁷³¹ GNA A/D22/13a: memorandum W. H. Dawson to David Lloyd George, 14 April 1919.

⁷³² Lentin, “‘Appeasement’ at the Paris Peace Conference,” 57-58; and J. W. Headlam-Morley to Mr. Koppel (Foreign Office), 30 June 1919, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 178-179.

Dawson and Gooch set about to harness these emotional reactions in order to advance their own ideas about reconciliation, revision, and leniency. Their main concern after 1919 was to secure a real reconciliation between Britain and Germany; and this seemed uncertain unless the settlement were revised considerably. Both men refused to endorse the so-called *War Guilt Clause* (Article 231). This refusal occasioned a shift towards a more radical and revisionist viewpoint. Thereafter, the historical scholars with whom Dawson and Gooch most often interacted were radical structuralists. Certainly, Dawson and Gooch's views harmonized well with the shared guilt thesis. However, it was in how each came to view the final settlement that their attitudes were most in harmony. Radical structuralists maintained that the conflict had resulted from secret diplomacy, economic and colonial rivalry, and a deficient international order which had divided the continent into two armed coalitions. Their discoveries indicated that a more stable and secure world could only be constructed through a radical transformation in international discourse. Radicals contested, "with full conviction," the view that only Wilhelmine Germany had embraced a warlike foreign policy before 1914, "while all the other Powers had [set out to achieve] ... Peace."⁷³³ This objection was not intended to absolve Germany. Rather, it was meant to illustrate that all the combatant nations shared some blame, whether or not equally, for the Great War.⁷³⁴ Surely, Britain too had contributed to the hostile atmosphere that had characterized the decade or so before 1914.⁷³⁵ These revelations tended to foster moderation, restraint, and fraternity. Thus, the settlement should aim at reconciliation: the defeated nations must be restored into a reformed international concert.

This view was tolerable to both Dawson and Gooch, whose own research endorsed a

⁷³³ Dickinson, *The European Anarchy*, 128-131.

⁷³⁴ E. D. Moral, *Truth and War* (London: National Labour Press Ltd, 1916), 104.

⁷³⁵ Dickinson, *The European Anarchy*, 128-131.

moderate, fair, and even-handed settlement. Gradually, Dawson and Gooch came to embrace the radical outlook—that an anarchic international order had caused the war. Gooch echoed this sentiment when he set out his own views in his *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*. The conflict, he wrote, had arisen from fear and envy. “The Old World had degenerated into a powder-magazine,” which, when lit, “was almost certain to create a [vicious] conflagration.” The Great Powers had inherited an anarchic international order and had done “little to abate” the imminent calamity. Surely, it would be a mistake to attribute exceptional “wickedness” to Germany, for it had not “desired to set the world ablaze.” Rather, the combatant nations had “stumbled ... into war,” and for this the Great Powers bore mutual blame.⁷³⁶ Dawson, too, declared that the alliance network was the fundamental cause for the conflict in 1914.⁷³⁷ His numerous contributions to the British press were filled with bleak forecasts about the Peace Treaty, “the fact remains that the first and most urgent of the treaties of peace is vitiated by excessive regard for the past, and in its present form contains the certain menace of new rancour and contentions.”⁷³⁸ Revisionism became Dawson and Gooch’s main concern in the 1920s and 1930s; which is well reflected in their letters, memoranda, and scholarship.⁷³⁹ Indeed, Dawson and Gooch were to formulate a viewpoint that was to become the established norm in the later 1920s and early 1930s; but in the war and its aftermath only a few individuals were inclined to listen to their objections about the harsh, discriminatory, and unfair Peace Treaty.⁷⁴⁰

⁷³⁶ G. P. Gooch, *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy* (London: The British Institute of International Affairs, 1923), 212-214.

⁷³⁷ W. H. Dawson, introduction to *German Colonization Past and Future: The Truth about the German Colonies*, ed. Dr. Heinrich Schnee (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), 41-42.

⁷³⁸ W. H. Dawson, “The League and the Peace,” *The Fortnightly Review* 106 (1 September 1919): 333.

⁷³⁹ See e.g., W. H. Dawson, “The Liabilities of the Treaty,” *The Fortnightly Review* 106 (1 July 1919): 1-13; and W. H. Dawson, “The Treaty and the Future,” *The Fortnightly Review* 106 (1 August 1919): 161-173.

⁷⁴⁰ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 92-93.

4. “Grey Made the War and Wilson Ruined the Peace”: British Historians and the Issue of War Guilt

Radical-Liberal and Socialist-UDC scholars considered the final settlement a deliberate subversion of their moderate, conciliatory, and internationalist ideals. The archaeologist, classicist, and historian, Sir William Mitchell Ramsay, recounted wittily, “Grey made the war, and Wilson ruined the Peace.” Ramsay, in fact, attributed the remark to a letter that he had received from C. P. Scott, and claimed that the note was one that he still treasured dearly.⁷⁴¹ The Versailles Treaty, as described in one editorial, constituted “a breach of faith with a beaten enemy.” Germany had laid down its arms in anticipation that the Peace would emulate the Fourteen Points. But instead, the terms imposed “fresh ... burdens upon a beaten people,” and reduced them “to economic servitude.”⁷⁴² Gooch declared the terms unnecessarily harsh. The settlement, he claimed, was “a French Peace.”⁷⁴³ Dawson shared his frustration and disclosed his vexation in several articles and editorials. The settlement accorded excessive consideration for earlier offences, and in its current form it was sure to create “new rancour and contentions.”⁷⁴⁴ Publicly, he warned that the territorial clauses would lead to future instability.⁷⁴⁵ Dawson and Gooch’s rejection of the war guilt clause led them to endorse a more radical and revisionist viewpoint.

Previously, Dawson had determined that the fundamental cause for war in 1914 was the semi-absolutist structure of Germany. Before 1914, Dawson had already detected the faults in this model, but his Germanophilia, based on his admiration for that nation’s culture, education, and social welfare, overshadowed his concerns.⁷⁴⁶ The German Revolution confirmed to him, and to

⁷⁴¹ GNA A/R5/40a: letter Sir William Ramsay to C. P. Scott, 17 October 1925.

⁷⁴² “The Peace Treaty,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, England), 24 May 1919. Arthur Henderson, Gilbert Murray, H. G. Wells, and Leonard Woolf were among the signatories.

⁷⁴³ G. P. Gooch, from the minutes of the Rainbow Circle, 8 October 1919.

⁷⁴⁴ Dawson, “The League and the Peace,” 333.

⁷⁴⁵ Dawson, “The Treaty and the Future,” 167.

⁷⁴⁶ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 111.

some others, that the electorate had renounced militarism and the institution in which that doctrine was ineradicably embedded. Gooch was jubilant, as he wrote to Dawson: “events are thrilling, and I think hopeful for a better world.”⁷⁴⁷ Dawson also hailed democratization as a new start “in [the] national life.” The Weimar constitution secured for its citizens a freedom hitherto unknown.⁷⁴⁸ Forthwith, revisionist historians viewed it as their task to revise the settlement in order to secure Weimar Germany from social turmoil and economic instability.

This collective, admittedly, remained but one section within a broader cultural/intellectual community. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to envision how a select cohort and its influential allies could create an environment that favoured a particular interpretation.⁷⁴⁹ More notably, these views could combine with radical-structuralist ideas about the war and its origins, and about the need to secure a more durable settlement. Notably, the *New Statesman* had already reviewed Dawson’s *Problems with the Peace* favourably, stating that “Dawson’s moderation is above suspicion.”⁷⁵⁰ By 1918, Dawson was in communication with both MacDonald and Henderson, and it looked like he was about to take a more active role in the Labour Party.⁷⁵¹ As he reflected bitterly, “Liberalism has *Versagt*.”⁷⁵² Certainly, this drew him closer in thought, if not in action, to the Left and to the UDC.⁷⁵³ Curiously, no concrete action seems to have come from Henderson’s offer “of talking over with you the possibilities of further active work in the Labour Movement.”⁷⁵⁴ Nonetheless, he remained in contact with Henderson and MacDonald, as well as with Philip Snowden (the

⁷⁴⁷ WHD 393: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 29 October 1918.

⁷⁴⁸ Dawson, “The Constitution of New Germany,” 321.

⁷⁴⁹ Lambert and Weiler, introduction to *How the Past was Used*, 46.

⁷⁵⁰ WHD 2152/205: *New Statesman*, 23 February 1918.

⁷⁵¹ See WHD 235: letter Ramsay MacDonald to W. H. Dawson, 3 December 1912; WHD 236: letter Ramsay MacDonald to W. H. Dawson, 9 December 1912; and WHD 793: letter W. H. Dawson to Ramsay MacDonald, 3 April 1924.

⁷⁵² Letter W. H. Dawson to Lord Haldane, 15 January 1920, in Haldane Papers, National Library of Scotland, MS. 5914, folio 190.

⁷⁵³ WHD 1054: letter from George Aitken (of the Union of Democratic Control) to W. H. Dawson, 9 August 1929.

⁷⁵⁴ WHD 577: letter Arthur Henderson to W. H. Dawson, 10 May 1921.

Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer). More noteworthy, at least, with reference to influence, was the close association between MacDonald and Gooch.⁷⁵⁵ Both men had been active in social work in London. Moreover, Gooch had immense admiration for MacDonald's wife Margaret (*née*. Gladstone) and showed a keen interest in her work as a social reformer.⁷⁵⁶ During the Second Boer War, Gooch established a close association with MacDonald. Gooch, like MacDonald, was critical of the war and thus found a warm welcome in MacDonald's flat in Lincoln's Inn Fields.⁷⁵⁷ The two men were to serve together in Parliament, and met in smaller associations like the Rainbow Circle and, later, the UDC.⁷⁵⁸ MacDonald often visited Gooch at his home in Kensington.⁷⁵⁹ Gooch's biographer, Frank Eyck, notes that MacDonald admired Gooch, and that "the two men respected and trusted each other." Moreover, Gooch and MacDonald shared in common a desire to secure better international cooperation and reconciliation.⁷⁶⁰ MacDonald doubtless found in Gooch, whom he esteemed as "by far and away our ablest historian," the intellectual and moral rationale for his own moderate attitudes towards Weimar Germany.⁷⁶¹

Despite their close associations with Labour, neither Dawson nor Gooch ever abandoned Liberalism. Indeed, Dawson was always ready to defend Lloyd George's record at Versailles, "I have never doubted ... those who represented [Britain] in the Supreme Council in Paris."⁷⁶² Dawson was certain, the Prime Minister had done more than any other statesman to reduce in number and extent the defects of the Treaty.⁷⁶³ Gooch was more restrained in his assessment,

⁷⁵⁵ Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles," 52.

⁷⁵⁶ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 63.

⁷⁵⁷ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 81-82.

⁷⁵⁸ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 330.

⁷⁵⁹ William Rothenstein, *Men and Memories: Recollections of William Rothenstein, 1900-1922* (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1932). 369.

⁷⁶⁰ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 329-330.

⁷⁶¹ Ramsay MacDonald to Sir Eyre Crowe, 15 August 1924, Public Record Office, F.O. 370/202, folio 46. Quoted in Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 339.

⁷⁶² Dawson, "Germany and Spa," 1-12.

⁷⁶³ Dawson, *Germany Under the Treaty*, 87.

although he appreciated Lloyd George's opposition to the more extreme demands of France and Poland. Gooch never warmed to Lloyd George, as did Dawson, and he remained distrustful of the Prime Minister. Particularly, as his tenure became more and more conditional on conservative forces.⁷⁶⁴ Of Asquith, Gooch was crestfallen that he had failed to summon "his countrymen to work for a moderate Peace." Gradually, his views conformed to radical-Liberalism. He shared close relations with Haldane and John Morley, as well as with MacDonald. Certainly, he was concerned about ethical socialism; however, he "never felt the slightest temptation to join ... Labour," and thus was critical of Haldane's decision to endorse Labour in 1923.⁷⁶⁵ There can be little doubt that Dawson and Gooch continued to affect the mentalities and debates of the Liberal Party. Gooch, in fact, maintained an uninterrupted friendship with H. A. L. Fisher, a senior minister in the coalition government. Fisher esteemed Gooch as "one of our most distinguished living historians," confiding to the artist and writer William Rothenstein that "if he wanted a clear light on any subject, he consulted Gooch."⁷⁶⁶ Dawson, meanwhile, continued to communicate with Lloyd George and, in 1921, he offered to act as mediator between the Prime Minister and eminent industrialists and officials in Germany.⁷⁶⁷ His offer reveals once more that historians not only viewed themselves as educators but also as advocates, emissaries, and advisers.

Thus, Dawson travelled to "Berlin, Westphalia, and the Rhineland to sound ... ministers, industrialists, and bankers as to the directions in which an agreement for reparation in kind might be made with this country [Britain]." Notably, he met with the German Foreign Minister Friedrich Rosen and the Minister for Reconstruction, Walter Rathenau.⁷⁶⁸ Gooch wrote to him on his return

⁷⁶⁴ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 316-317.

⁷⁶⁵ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 184-197; G. P. Gooch, "Lord Haldane," *The Contemporary Review* 134 (July 1928): 430.

⁷⁶⁶ H. A. L. Fisher, introduction to *Germany*, ed. G. P. Gooch (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), v; and Rothenstein, *Men and Memories*, 369.

⁷⁶⁷ WHD 595: memorandum W. H. Dawson to David Lloyd George, 4 November 1921.

⁷⁶⁸ WHD 595: memorandum W. H. Dawson to David Lloyd George, 4 November 1921.

to solicit an article, “as the subject is so topical.”⁷⁶⁹ Dawson claimed that the war and the revolution had “led to an entire reorientation” in industrial, social, and civic life. The revolution confirmed to him his wartime thesis—mainly, that the autocratic and militaristic elite did not at all represent the admirable and sociable citizenry. Germany, he wrote, would emerge from its current trials “not weaker but stronger, first in moral, then ... in material strength: not a lesser but a greater factor in civilization than heretofore.” Germany had been freed from its earlier unlawful ambitions and was now clearer about its true role in the international community. Cultural Germany seemed restored, “I see undiminished and unimpaired the old eagerness for education, the old devotion to learning, [and] the old admiration for science.” Dawson only hoped that the ruinous Treaty was amended, and that Germany’s former enemies returned to it “the indispensable conditions” needed to restore its spiritual and material strength. Thus, he issued a heartfelt call to morality.⁷⁷⁰ This was to become a common theme in the efforts to undermine the Treaty of Versailles. Indeed, to the extent that revision was rationalized on a moral basis, Dawson, Gooch, and their fellow-thinkers can be said to have borne considerable responsibility.⁷⁷¹ Revisionist historians were certainly concerned with moral renewal and saw the revolution and war as having revived an older, more idealistic Germany.

However, this transformation was still unfinished, and Dawson and Gooch feared that extreme demands would unsettle Weimar Germany. Their concern with revision arose not from any careful consideration but from alarm about the events and conditions within Germany. Both Dawson and Gooch feared that extremism and anarchic ethno-nationalism would destabilize and weaken the Weimar Republic.⁷⁷² Revisionist historians attributed these unfortunate features to the ruinous and burdensome Treaty. “Nationalism in the old sense was weak and, in some measure,

⁷⁶⁹ WHD 594: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 30 October 1921.

⁷⁷⁰ W. H. Dawson, “The Outlook in Germany,” *The Contemporary Review* 120 (July 1921): 727-736.

⁷⁷¹ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 54-57.

⁷⁷² Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 51.

discredited,” as were extremism and militarism. However, the settlement had emboldened these forces and had restored their lost confidence.⁷⁷³ Gooch wrote to Dawson in June 1920 to ask for an article on “recent [events] and current tendencies in Germany.” Precisely, he wanted Dawson because “the situation needed a careful” and considerate hand.⁷⁷⁴ Dawson returned to Gooch an article that called for conciliation, moderation, and leniency. Surely, there could be no rationale for “withholding from reformed Germany and her constitutional rulers our sympathies and ... encouragement.” Since 1919, relations between the Allies and Germany had been marked “by humiliations, slights, and pin-pricks.” These injudicious occurrences had weakened internal confidence in the new government. Dawson called for common-sense and magnanimity, as “the best specifics ... against political disorder.” The settlement was unfair because it punished a newly democratic nation that could not be held liable for the war. Besides, the allied and associated Powers had made continued assurances during the war that their conflict was with the militaristic elite. Since these rulers had been overthrown, “common justice ... and prudence, [demanded] a generous attitude” towards the inhabitants and their elected officials. The citizenry, “did not make and did not want the war; their whole record ever since ... [has been] a protest against the political system which made the war possible.” Dawson reminded his readers that there were two currents in Germanies, and “we must do our best ... to [reassure] the moderate forces in [that] society.”⁷⁷⁵

Dawson was convinced that Britain had no reason to fear a truly democratic Germany. However, as a close observer, he noted that ruinous indemnities, continued abuses, and territorial affronts threatened to weaken and undermine Weimar Germany. For this unfortunate situation, Dawson had no compunction in assigning full blame to France. The French had abused their

⁷⁷³ G. P. Gooch, “The German Mind since the War,” *Transactions of the Grotius Society* vol. 10: Problems of the Peace and War, Papers Read before the Society (1924): 53-58.

⁷⁷⁴ WHD 504: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 1 June 1920.

⁷⁷⁵ Dawson, “Germany and Spa,” 1-12.

influence in the Saar Basin and were “now claiming a mortgage on the Ruhr.” Dawson referred to the absurd “notion, still current in France,” that in “bullying her sufficiently, countless millions ... can be extorted from Germany.” The same conceit that had “lured Napoleon III to his doom ... still exercises an evil fascination on France.”⁷⁷⁶ Increasingly, this theme was used to discredit the settlement. France was to resume its role as the traditional troublemaker in Europe. Revisionist historians held that France was the main obstacle to increased international cooperation, economic recovery, and continental stability.⁷⁷⁷ Indeed, French attitudes and actions were seen to undermine reconciliation and recovery, and to irritate and humiliate the Weimar Republic. If this continued, these commentators feared that chauvinism, militarism, and extremism would resurface in Weimar Germany. Dawson and Gooch had believed that defeat would eradicate militarism and see restored an older, more idealistic Germany. However, the unfair settlement threatened to undermine this restorative course. British historians thus called for a new direction in international affairs and turned their attention to two interconnected themes: the future world order and the circumstances and causes that had led to the Great War.

German officials noted their distress and identified them as the collective that would be most helpful in their efforts to discredit the war guilt clause. The so-called war guilt clause was intended as the legal basis for reparations rather than as a moral indictment. Indeed, the clause did not mention guilt, unilateral or otherwise. The American John Foster Dulles intended it to establish liability—and to limit it—but the clause was later altered, and this modified version came to stand for the unfair Treaty.⁷⁷⁸ Both Dawson and Gooch objected to the clause and worked to revise its inclusion. Without delay, their unease about the settlement was noted in Germany. Dawson and

⁷⁷⁶ Dawson, “Germany and Spa,” 1-12.

⁷⁷⁷ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 94.

⁷⁷⁸ Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 59.

Gooch were amongst the earliest invitees to visit Dr. Friedrich Sthamer when the German Embassy reopened in 1920, and Dawson's conversation dealt with revisionism. The German Foreign Office soon dispatched the industrialist Albert Dufour-Feronce to assist Sthamer in London. Gooch hosted a reception for Sthamer and Dufour-Feronce—and invited MacDonald: “the newcomers made an excellent impression on all who met them.”⁷⁷⁹ Gooch welcomed German and Austrian visitors into his home, and invited them to meet with his friends and contacts, including William Rothenstein, who recorded, “there were few homes where Germans were welcomed, their social relations were not then comfortable, but Gooch, a true European, was cordial to all men.”⁷⁸⁰ Sthamer wrote to Dawson, thereafter, with an introduction from “our mutual friend, Mr. G. P. Gooch,” to extend an invitation to take tea with him.⁷⁸¹ Dawson was also in communication with Dufour-Feronce. The former industrialist furnished him with introduction letters, “to whomever you might wish [to visit] in our country,” and made sure to issue him with the most recent German works on subjects such as indemnities and reconstruction.⁷⁸²

German officials reasoned that if international sentiment ceased to believe that Germany alone had caused the war, then the reparation clauses and, indeed, the entire settlement could be contested. The German Foreign Office dismissed direct, mass propaganda as a method since this had had limited effect during the war.⁷⁸³ The Reich Chancellor Joseph Wirth wrote:

It seems more advisable to wait until the movement which has come to light among the intelligentsia in the enemy countries against the sole German guilt will have developed further. ... Until then a serious scientifically grounded program of enlightenment as well as objective discussions between German and foreign personalities are to be encouraged in

⁷⁷⁹ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 214-215.

⁷⁸⁰ Rothenstein, *Men and Memories*, 369.

⁷⁸¹ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 317; WHD 509: letter Dr. Friedrich Sthamer to W. H. Dawson, 16 August 1920.

⁷⁸² WHD 587: letter Albert Dufour-Feronce to W. H. Dawson, 19 September 1921; WHD 631: letter Albert Dufour-Feronce to W. H. Dawson, 4 February 1922.

⁷⁸³ Herman J. Wittgens, “War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s,” *Historical Papers* 15, no. 1 (1980): 231.

every way, especially through the screening and publication of historical materials and the release of new sources.⁷⁸⁴

Precisely, this was course that successive administrations followed over the next decade. Thus, a War Guilt Section (*Kriegsschuldreferat*) was established in the German Foreign Office, whose task was to invalidate Article 231. Primarily, this office sought to affect and influence academic communities in Britain, France, and the United States.⁷⁸⁵ The War Guilt Section soon created several unofficial offices, including the Central Office (for Research into the Causes of the War). The Central Office furnished the *Kriegsschuldreferat* with a clearinghouse for desirable views on the war guilt issue. More crucially, it served as a clandestine link between domestic and foreign scholars, on the one hand, and the War Guilt Section, on the other. Their most notable collaboration was *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, an historical journal founded to research the war guilt issue. The journal was not intended to endorse intellectual discourse; rather, it was a forum for revisionist writers, meant to offer material for their articles and to further disseminate the official view.⁷⁸⁶

Possibly, the *Kriegsschuldreferat*'s milestone achievement was *Die Grosse Politik* (1922-1927), a forty-volume collection which contained extensive materials from the German Foreign Office from 1871 to 1914. The collection included memoranda, memoirs, and official documents. Mostly, these documents originated in the defeated nations—Germany, Austria, and Russia. The decision to examine such an extensive time period was calculated to shift attention away from the more contentious issue of the war's origins to a less sensitive debate about international affairs, more broadly. Preferably, the editors for this collection would have to be esteemed scholars with no direct ties to the Foreign Office. The first two candidates selected were Albrecht Mendelssohn-

⁷⁸⁴ Joseph Wirth to Dr. von Preger, 26 November 1921. Quoted in Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles," 48.

⁷⁸⁵ Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles," 48.

⁷⁸⁶ Wittgens, "War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s," 232-234.

Bartholdy, an expert on international law, and Johannes Lepsius, a theologian and humanist with a special interest in the Near East. Eventually, Friedrich Thimme was selected as the third and final editor of the series, and soon afterward he was entrusted with overseeing the entire collection. The German Foreign Office attached to the three editors a senior official who was to evaluate the documents selected for circulation. The War Guilt Section thus held the final say: the individual volumes, the selection of documents, and the footnotes were all prepared with careful attention to their intended effect in foreign countries. Officially, the entire endeavour was treated as secret in order to conceal administrative involvement.⁷⁸⁷ Publicly, the editors asserted their intellectual autonomy, and claimed, however dishonestly, that their work was free from official influence or control.⁷⁸⁸ Published between 1922 and 1927, *Die Grosse Politik*, in the words of Herman Wittgens, “established an early [reliance] of all students ... on [the] German materials,” and it lent “the credence to the German demand” that the other Great Powers make available their own state records and official documents.⁷⁸⁹

The idea was to issue revisionist scholars in Britain, France, and the United States with documents, commentary, and material which would raise serious doubts about the war guilt clause. Their efforts were soon rewarded. Charles Seymour’s *The Diplomatic Background of the War* included an extended footnote on the new evidence when it was reissued in 1923. “The German Foreign Office,” he wrote, “is absolved from [the indictment]” that it alone started the Great War. Still, he insisted that its actions before 1914, made it difficult to “[maintain] Peace.”⁷⁹⁰ Thimme and his associates were already at work on this era. Predictably, the volumes on the decade before

⁷⁸⁷ Wittgens, “War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s,” 231.

⁷⁸⁸ Holger H. Herwig, “Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War,” in *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians Through Two World Wars*, ed. Keith Wilson (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996), 95-96.

⁷⁸⁹ Wittgens, “War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s,” 231.

⁷⁹⁰ Charles Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923), 287.

the war included more and more editorial footnotes which aimed to make the case from an outlook favourable to Germany. The demands made on the editors were numerous. Indeed, materials that could undermine relations with friendly neutrals could not be included. Then, too, there were concerns about the effect that materials from that era could have on statesmen still in office. The editorial communication reveals several instances in which the editors tried to reconcile historical truth with national interests. Nonetheless, the editors endeavoured to maintain their independence and asked that the Foreign Office continue, as it had, to endorse the editorial staff. Thimme referenced the esteem with which the project was held in Britain and the United States. He was convinced that this admiration would increase, on the condition that the editors could assure their complete independence from official control. Truly, the initiative was useful to the War Guilt Section only insofar as foreign audiences were convinced that the editors were free to act without outside interference.⁷⁹¹

Die Grosse Politik was the most extensive and, undoubtedly, the most valuable collection bearing on the war guilt issue then available to scholars. Lewis Namier wrote to C. P. Scott, “this is a standard work, indeed a monumental work, such as no other Government has so far released. I have not seen it reviewed in the M.G. [*Manchester Guardian*]; but it deserves more than a simple, short write-up.”⁷⁹² Dawson, meanwhile, reviewed the collection in an article for the *Contemporary Review*. He hailed its release as a momentous event and claimed that the material was of distinctive value “for historical research.” More notably, it marked the first real “attempt made ... by any Government” to break with coercive statecraft.⁷⁹³ Indeed, the initiative was seen as a radical break from secret diplomacy, and it lent credence to the view that Germany’s role in the July Crisis

⁷⁹¹ Raymond J. Sontag, “The German Diplomatic Papers: Publication after Two World Wars,” *The American Historical Review* 68, no. 1 (October 1962): 59-61.

⁷⁹² GDN A/N2/7: letter Lewis Namier to C. P. Scott, 9 March 1923.

⁷⁹³ W. H. Dawson, “German Diplomacy Revealed,” *The Contemporary Review* 122 (July 1922): 451-459.

“could never be resolved until all [the] other” Powers had made available their own official documents.⁷⁹⁴ This view harmonized with liberal attitudes more broadly. Previously, German officials had called for a neutral commission “to examine the [causes] of the war,” as a means of removing “the walls of hatred” that hindered reconciliation.⁷⁹⁵ However, the Allied and Associated Powers dismissed this idea, since Germany’s “responsibility ... for the war” had already been established incontestably.⁷⁹⁶ Dawson dismissed this claim, believing that the new materials served as a remarkable lead for other governments, and he wondered whether the other Powers would likewise emulate Weimar Germany.⁷⁹⁷ When the British government initiated its own scheme, it was to Gooch whom MacDonald turned to co-edit the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*.

Without a doubt, the two historians who worked the hardest to understand these new documents and to determine their value were Dawson and Gooch. Accordingly, Gooch wrote to Dawson in September 1923 to exclaim his enthusiasm for the new material. Gooch received each new volume with excitement and examined them carefully.⁷⁹⁸ Before now, he had come to doubt that Germany alone was at fault for the war, and the new material confirmed his convictions. The documents were structured to divert attention from the July Crisis and to focus it onto the day-to-day conduct of the Foreign Ministry. This framework tended to exonerate the *Wilhelmstrasse*.⁷⁹⁹ That the material was ordered thematically, rather than chronologically served to sanitize it and to

⁷⁹⁴ Wittgens, “War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s,” 231.

⁷⁹⁵ Dr. Hans Sulzer to Robert Lansing, 2 December 1918, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference* volume II, eds. Joseph V. Fuller and Tyler Dennett (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942), no. 763.72/12485, 71. Hereinafter, the *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* will be cited as FRUS Papers.

⁷⁹⁶ Acting US Secretary of State (Frank Lyon Polk) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, 6 January 1919, FRUS Papers, vol. II, no. 763.72/9, 73.

⁷⁹⁷ Dawson, “German Diplomacy Revealed,” 458.

⁷⁹⁸ WHD 761: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 3 September 1923.

⁷⁹⁹ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 49-50.

make it more difficult for historians to reconstruct the July Crisis.⁸⁰⁰ When framed this way, the German Foreign Office no longer seemed singularly wicked. Particularly, in view of the recent revelations concerning the ambitions of France and Russia. The War Guilt Section thus released to the press, made available in its official journal, and in collections, official documents from Tsarist Russia. These documents were either secured from former officials or had been issued elsewhere already.⁸⁰¹ The German Foreign Office also remunerated former Russian and Serbian officials to write articles harmful to their erstwhile governments.⁸⁰² These works were certainly detrimental to Russia, Serbia, and France and were thus used propagandistically. The result was to shift blame from Germany and to redirect it towards its former enemies.⁸⁰³

Each volume was released with much media attention in order “to create and sustain interest” in the initiative.⁸⁰⁴ Thus, Dufour-Feronce wrote to Dawson in 1924, when six volumes were issued under the heading, “The New Orientation, 1890-1898,” with an enclosed article “summarizing their outstanding contents.”⁸⁰⁵ The German Embassy certainly took satisfaction in sending to Dawson and Gooch recent works on subjects such as indemnities, reconstruction, and war guilt.⁸⁰⁶ Dufour-Feronce made sure to forward Dawson the most recent “*Vorkriegsakten*,” and wondered whether other countries would follow “Germany’s example.”⁸⁰⁷ Gooch maintained his freedom in these interactions, but Dawson soon started sending his articles for review to the staff at the German Embassy. Hence, he was instructed to forward to the Foreign Office in Berlin an article on the Saar Basin: “The Foreign Office ... would very much like to see it because, after all,

⁸⁰⁰ Herwig, “Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War,” 97.

⁸⁰¹ Wittgens, “War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s,” 231-232.

⁸⁰² Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 48.

⁸⁰³ Wittgens, “War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s,” 231-232.

⁸⁰⁴ Wittgens, “War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s,” 231.

⁸⁰⁵ WHD 783: letter Albert Dufour-Feronce to W. H. Dawson, 6 January 1924.

⁸⁰⁶ WHD 766: letter Albrecht von Bernstorff (of the German Embassy) to W. H. Dawson, 12 October 1923.

⁸⁰⁷ WHD 631: letter Albert-Dufour-Feronce to W. H. Dawson, 4 February 1922.

the question is rather a complicated one, and perhaps they might find small corrections to make.”⁸⁰⁸ Dawson and the historian Raymond Beazley would later receive financial remuneration for their efforts from Margarete Gärtner’s *Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft*, a semi-official entity, whose remit was to disseminate the German case against the territorial clauses of the Versailles Treaty.⁸⁰⁹ Gärtner established an extensive network in Britain: she had contacts in Westminster, the British press, and with most British associations then involved in efforts to achieve reconciliation, such as the UDC. She met with Morel in 1921 and offered him material to assist in his efforts to counteract French maneuvers in the Rhineland. Moreover, she furnished documents and other resources to revisionist historians, like Gooch and Dawson.⁸¹⁰ This new evidence, as it became available, was to inform and influence how revisionist historians understood the issues, crises, and events that were follow over the next decade.

Dawson and Gooch set forth their views in articles, lectures, and letters-to-the-editor. Their works were often met with admiration in Weimar Germany.⁸¹¹ Beazley, meanwhile, contributed to the *Berliner Monatshefte*, the successor to *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*. British historians were also amongst the intellectuals to add their names to the “Appeal to Conscience,” a document which attacked the war guilt clause and called for an impartial court to re-evaluate Germany’s liability.⁸¹² The War Guilt Section translated this document and circulated it domestically. Curiously, British scholars “seemed oblivious to the fact that their activities worked to ... benefit” the militarist, reactionary, and chauvinistic “forces they [most] feared.”⁸¹³ Indeed, revisionist historians often

⁸⁰⁸ WHD 614: letter C. Roediger (of the German Embassy) to W. H. Dawson, 12 December 1921.

⁸⁰⁹ WHD 1134: letter Margarete Gärtner to W. H. Dawson, 3 January 1931; WHD 1497: letter Margarete Gärtner to W. H. Dawson, 17 December 1935.

⁸¹⁰ D. C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co Ltd, 1965), 121-122.

⁸¹¹ GPP 474: letter Hermann Lutz to G. P. Gooch, 31 January 1925.

⁸¹² Those who set their names to the document included Gooch, Dickinson, A. J. Grant, J. L. Hammond, Gilbert Murray, R. H. Tawney, and Pollard.

⁸¹³ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 53.

found themselves at one with German ultra-nationalists in their view that until “we have ... [made clear] the chief causes [of the war] and have made them known to the world there cannot be the right spirit for a real understanding ... and the so much needed reconciliation.” Hermann Lutz, a German civil servant and writer, went as far as to commend Dawson in his efforts to “search for the truth.” Lutz took care to send Dawson “valuable material for” any student “of German history.”⁸¹⁴

Lutz also coordinated with Gooch to arrange for the translation of Gooch’s works into German.⁸¹⁵ Particularly, his recent work on *European Diplomacy*, which tended to shift blame from Germany. “The Old World had” turned into a tinderbox, which, when lit, was certain to create a “conflagration.” The Great Powers had inherited an anarchic international order and had done “little to abate” the imminent calamity. Neither Bethmann-Hollweg, nor his master, Kaiser Wilhelm II, had wanted to drown the world in blood. There was no more reason to blame Germany, than to blame France, Austria, or Russia. The German attack on Belgium was only the “occasion” for Britain’s entrance into the war; the real “reason was [its] ties to the *Entente*.” The fundamental cause for war, in fact, was an international order that divided the continent into two armed coalitions. Given this situation, the actions of each state were “natural.” Surely, it would be a mistake to attribute monstrous “wickedness” to Germany, for it had “not desired to set the world ablaze.” Rather, the combatant nations had “stumbled ... into war,” and for this the Great Powers bore mutual blame.⁸¹⁶

Other studies from this time reached similar conclusions. Dickinson’s extended and revised edition, *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914* (1926), used the new German documents to bolster

⁸¹⁴ WHD 711: letter Hermann Lutz to W. H. Dawson, 16 November 1922.

⁸¹⁵ GPP 474: letter Hermann Lutz to G. P. Gooch, 31 January 1925.

⁸¹⁶ Gooch, *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*, 212-214.

his earlier thesis about shared war guilt. Dickinson concluded that Germany and Austria were less at fault than were Russia and Serbia but dismissed this fact as irrelevant. The real cause for conflict was an anarchic international order, in which states armed and counter-armed, made alliances, and conducted “relations in secret.” The Great Powers had all contributed to this climate, and while some were less at fault than were others, all bore some blame for the Great War.⁸¹⁷ Dawson, who had earlier identified Prussian militarism as the root cause of the war, likewise declared that the alliance network was the fundamental *casus belli* in 1914.⁸¹⁸ He would later claim that France’s desire for continental domination was far more at fault than Germany’s ambitions in 1914.⁸¹⁹ Beazley, in a text favourable to Germany, claimed that “Germany ... had not desired a war, and had made sincere, though belated and ill-organized efforts to avert it.”⁸²⁰

While British historians can be said to have taken the lead in formulating this revisionist viewpoint, their ideas received constant nourishment from their collaborators in the United States. The American historian Sidney Bradshaw Fay maintained that Germany did not want war in 1914, and did make belated efforts to “find a feasible solution.”⁸²¹ Fay’s thesis was well received in Britain. Gooch confirmed as much in a favourable review, “Sidney Fay ... has mastered the whole evidence,” and he delivers his verdict “with serene impartiality. He ... is out for truth alone.”⁸²² To Gooch’s evident satisfaction, Fay declared that Germany did not want war, “and made sincere,” albeit “belated efforts, to avert one. She was the victim of her [alliances] ... and of her own folly.” Austria “was her only reliable ally. ... She could not throw her over, as otherwise she would stand

⁸¹⁷ G. Lowes Dickinson, *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914* (London: The Century Company, 1926), 464-471.

⁸¹⁸ Dawson, introduction to *German Colonization Past and Future*, 41-42.

⁸¹⁹ Dawson, *Germany Under the Treaty*, 396-397.

⁸²⁰ Raymond Beazley, *The Road to Ruin in Europe, 1890-1914* (London: J. M. Dent, 1932), 86.

⁸²¹ Sidney B. Fay, “New Light on the Origins of the World War, II: Berlin and Vienna, July 29 to 31,” *The American Historical Review* 26, no. 1 (October 1920): 51-52.

⁸²² G. P. Gooch, “Book Review: The Origins of the War,” *Contemporary Review* 135 (1 January 1929): 395-396.

isolated between Russia ... and France.”⁸²³ Fay, like Dickinson, believed that Serbia and Russia were more to blame than were the Central Powers in 1914; indeed, his verdict was unfavourable to Serbia. Then, too, it is here declared that “Russia’s ... mobilization made war inevitable.”⁸²⁴ Finally, he condemned the alliance networks, “which divided the continent into two hostile [coalitions].” This tense situation was made worse by “economic rivalry, nationalist ambitions ... and [other] incitement.” Still, it is doubtful whether these elements alone would have led to war, “had it not been for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.” This incident consolidated the other factors, and for that, he blamed Serbia. The verdict reached at Paris, “is [now] unsound. It should therefore be revised.”⁸²⁵ Like Fay, British historians claimed that the war guilt clause had no moral or historical validity.

These conclusions were reinforced in the collective mind by statements from those closest to the events in 1914.⁸²⁶ David Lloyd George confided to Gooch that the “more one reads” about the events “before ... August 1914, the more one realizes that no one ... meant war.” The conflict was a disaster into which the continental Powers had drifted, “or rather ... stumbled.”⁸²⁷ Publicly, he reiterated Britain’s right to defend Belgium and to honour its commitments to France. Nonetheless, he was sure that not even the “most ... far-seeing statesmen” could have foreseen in the early summer that the autumn would find the “world interlocked in the most terrible conflict.” Dawson and Gooch’s influence is evident: after he had read the new material about the war’s issues and causes, the effect left on his mind was “utter chaos, confusion, feebleness, and futility,” a stubborn refusal to face the imminent crisis.⁸²⁸ Sir Edward Grey was clear as to why the conflict

⁸²³ Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War* vol. II: *After Sarajevo: Immediate Causes of the War* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), 552.

⁸²⁴ Gooch, “The Origins of the War,” 396.

⁸²⁵ Fay, *The Origins of the World War* vol. II, 558.

⁸²⁶ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 51.

⁸²⁷ Quoted in G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925), 559.

⁸²⁸ Lloyd George, *War Memoirs* vol. 1, 32-34.

had started, “the moral is obvious: it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war.” This was a vicious circle by which countries armed and counter-armed; each rearmament misunderstood as evidence of hostile intent.⁸²⁹ Grey was certain that the decision-makers had been mistaken to have inserted a war guilt clause into the Treaty; at least, he disclosed this much to Gooch, “it was a ... bad mistake to attribute ... the war to [Germany].”⁸³⁰ Kerr likewise denounced the settlement and called for its revision, despite his influential role at Paris.⁸³¹ MacDonald, meanwhile, called for a new settlement—one that would take into consideration expert advice.⁸³² Thus, Gilbert Murray could attest, in 1925, “without too much [overstatement],” that the elite now held this view more broadly.⁸³³ Hardly, “any reasonable [decisionmaker] in England,” he assured his German friend, “continues to talk about Germany as solely responsible for the war.”⁸³⁴ There can be little doubt that radical-Liberal and Labour decision-makers used revisionist commentaries to rationalize their own moderate attitudes towards Weimar Germany.

Public disillusionment led British decision-makers to embrace revisionist interpretations that endorsed radical modifications to the Peace Treaty. MacDonald, like his trusted friend Gooch, feared that internal disorder would destabilize Weimar Germany. He was therefore amenable to the revisionist view that only a truly revised settlement could save democratic Germany. His core objective was to draw Weimar Germany into a reformed continental structure that would enhance the security of both France and Germany. The issue most detrimental to this object was that French

⁸²⁹ Viscount Edward Grey, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916* vol. 1 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925), 89-92.

⁸³⁰ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 230.

⁸³¹ J. R. M. Butler, *Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), 1882-1940* (London: Macmillan, 1960), 121-122.

⁸³² Ramsay MacDonald to Edouard Herriot, Paris, 8 July 1924, *DBFP* First Series, vol. XXVI, no. 507, 52-53.

⁸³³ Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 25.

⁸³⁴ Gilbert Murray to Secretary of the Fichte-Bund, 18 August 1925, Gilbert Murray Papers, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. This changed view of Germany affected cinema and literature, too. Propagandist wartime films had their contents altered or were removed from distribution entirely. The nation’s readers took a similar turn towards tolerance, “for while [John] Buchan’s novels recounting Red plots against the British Empire sold well, William Le Queux’s suddenly dated tales of German spies now made no impact.” John Ramsden, *Don’t Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890* (London: Abacus, 2007), 144-145.

forces still overran the Ruhr. MacDonald was thus inclined to view France as the major obstacle to continental stability.⁸³⁵ “France must have another chance,” he wrote, but whilst he would offer cooperation, it must be reasonable and “cease [its] policies of selfish vanity. This is my first job.”⁸³⁶ Doubtless, there were issues on both sides that would have to be resolved before he could achieve some advancement in interwar Franco-German relations.⁸³⁷ Shortly after taking office, he wrote a note to the French Premier, Raymond Poincaré, in which he voiced his sincere desire that France and “Britain can advance together to establish Peace ... in Europe.” He was determined to find solutions to any unsettled issues that would be to “our mutual benefit.”⁸³⁸ Poincaré answered with “cordial ... wishes,” and a vow to do his utmost to resolve any unsettled issues “to our mutual benefit.”⁸³⁹ This communication was said to have made a favourable impression in Paris, “the chief importance ... is the effect it will have on public opinion.” Doubtless then, “a better atmosphere [had] been created.”⁸⁴⁰ Indeed, it seemed like the first move had been taken towards a real and substantive improvement in relations with France.

MacDonald saw as his foremost task the need to normalize relations between Britain, France, and Germany. To achieve his objective, he advocated for multilateral talks that would include Germany. Previously, Lloyd George had offered a bilateral defensive alliance with France (in January 1922), in order to secure its endorsement of his more moderate attitude towards Germany. MacDonald, however, had no such interest in a bilateral accord.⁸⁴¹ Indeed, “a guarantee given to

⁸³⁵ Carolyn J. Kitching, “Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary: The Dual Role of James Ramsay MacDonald in 1924,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 1411.

⁸³⁶ Quoted in Kitching, “Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary,” 1411.

⁸³⁷ Kitching, “Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary,” 1411.

⁸³⁸ Letter from J. Ramsay MacDonald to Raymond Poincaré, 26 January 1924. “The Entente. Text of MacDonald-Poincaré Letters,” *The Times* (London, UK), 4 February 1924.

⁸³⁹ Letter from Raymond Poincaré to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 28 January 1924. “The Entente. M. Poincaré’s Reply,” *The Times* (London, UK), 4 February 1924.

⁸⁴⁰ Our Correspondent, “Impression in Paris. The Desire for Friendship,” *The Times* (London, UK), 4 February 1924.

⁸⁴¹ Frederick G. Stambrook, “‘Das Kind’: Lord D’Abernon and the Origins of the Locarno Pact,” *Central European History* 1, no. 3 (September 1968): 235.

one nation alone” could not “make for Peace. Therefore, any attempt made to calm public fears by giving securities must include ... Germany.”⁸⁴² The foremost hindrance to this framework was the unlawful intervention in the Ruhr. The trouble first started in January 1923, when France refused to consent to a two-year moratorium on reparations. Britain had been inclined to accept this request, but France favoured actionable assurances and, on 11 January, French and Belgian forces marched into the Ruhr Valley. The German workforce answered with nonviolent resistance, but the incursion led to hyperinflation and a demise of the German *Papiermark*.⁸⁴³ The incident marked a nadir in interwar Franco-British relations, “there have been few occasions upon which public opinion has been as united as it has been on this question of the French invasion of the Ruhr Valley.” Gooch featured an article in the *CR* that declared vehemently, “public opinion ... throughout the civilised world, is almost unanimous in deprecating the French action in advancing into the Ruhr Valley.”⁸⁴⁴ Beazley, Dawson, Dickinson, Gooch, and Pollard all contributed articles and editorials that condemned France and sympathized with Germany. These historians and others were instrumental to the discourse on the invasion and often wrote vitriolic commentaries that denounced the armed incursion and France.

The French invasion infuriated radical-Liberal historians and Socialist-UDC intellectuals, alike. Dawson claimed that France, “was reorganizing and increasing her armed forces at great cost ... with resources that would be far better, and for the continent more safely, used in ... work for national reconstruction.” Notably, Dawson here cited treaties and testimonies from *Die Grosse Politik* to substantiate his claim.⁸⁴⁵ Pollard, meanwhile, likened the recent Franco-Belgian invasion to the Napoleonic Wars, “French officers and others now ... talk about going to Berlin. But, alas,

⁸⁴² United Kingdom. HC Deb, 23 July 1923, volume 167, column 86 (Mr. James Ramsay MacDonald).

⁸⁴³ Kitching, “Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary,” 1411-1412.

⁸⁴⁴ Lord Beauchamp, “France and the Ruhr,” 273-280.

⁸⁴⁵ W. H. Dawson, “France and the Ruhr,” *The Times* (London, UK), 22 January 1923.

it was because the French went to Berlin in 1807 that the Germans came to Paris in 1814 and 1870 and were hardly barred ... from getting to Paris again in 1914 and 1918.” Then, too, it should be remembered that French treatment under Napoleon had forced militarism on to Prussia/Germany. Pollard forewarned that Franco-Belgian adventurism would drive Berlin to discuss closer relations with Bolshevik Russia.⁸⁴⁶ Gooch feared that the unlawful intervention would embolden extremism and nationalism. Of more moral relevance, the invasion was in direct violation of international law and the Versailles Treaty.⁸⁴⁷ Dawson wrote a furious retort to a letter-writer in *The Times* who claimed that the decision to annex Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 was the *casus belli* for war in 1914. For Dawson, French hostility, enmity, and bitterness, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries “forward to ... Napoleon III,” was to blame for the Franco-Prussian War.⁸⁴⁸ This was to become a central theme in the effort to discredit the Peace Treaties.⁸⁴⁹ France was once again cast as the traditional troublemaker in western Europe—the malcontent against whom continental coalitions had been formed constantly. Germany was, to some extent, exonerated for its recent indiscretions because militarism and adventurism had been forced on it.

Dawson certainly had no moral hesitation in ascribing full blame to France for its reckless intervention in the Ruhr, “France more than any other nation is causing us to lose the Peace.”⁸⁵⁰ Earlier, Dawson had returned to the familiar theme (of Germany) with the definite aim of revising the settlement. He felt that no time could be more suitable than now to revise the Versailles Treaty. Clearly, “compulsion and chastisement” had failed to achieve any moral or material benefit. Thus, he recommended a new tactic: “appeasement and reconciliation.” Dawson feared that Britain’s

⁸⁴⁶ A. F. Pollard, “France’s Policy. Some Historical Analogies,” *The Times* (London, UK), 19 January 1923.

⁸⁴⁷ G. P. Gooch, “The German Mind since the War,” 55-58.

⁸⁴⁸ WHD 1892: letter W. H. Dawson to *The Times*, 3 October 1923.

⁸⁴⁹ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 94.

⁸⁵⁰ Quoted in Else Pickvance (ed.), *William Harbutt Dawson, 1860-1948. Biographical Memoir by Else Muensterberg Dawson and William Siegfried Dawson* (Birmingham, 1998), 33.

continued association with France would diminish its international status with neutral countries immeasurably. Particularly, he worried about the United States—a nation whose cooperation was invaluable “in the financial and economic reorganization of Europe.” He called for benevolence and honesty and warned that a retreat from these admirable traditions would cause considerable moral and material loss. Truly, what was needed were reconciliation and charity, the settlement “must be enforced in a new ... spirit ... marked by a desire to sacrifice such clauses as can be shown to” irritate and humiliate Germany, “while offering no [sustained benefit].” Presently, Dawson did not desire a complete breach with France. He therefore advocated that “our business” should be to convince the French to embrace the new conditions. France would in fact benefit from this reorientation, “no nation can hope to secure more valuable results than [France] in access to” moral authority, material benefit, and national security.⁸⁵¹ MacDonald shared this sentiment, and claimed that a return to normal diplomatic relations and a new settlement, which included technical advice, “would have ... more moral value than the ... Versailles Treaty.”⁸⁵²

Dawson’s anti-French sentiments were not unusual in interwar Britain. Curiously, British decision-makers feared that the settlement had made France too dominant—at least, *vis-à-vis* Germany.⁸⁵³ Many British statesmen, MacDonald included, viewed France as the major obstacle to continental reconciliation and as a real threat to international stability. To ward off a revived and irredentist Germany, France incited division in the Rhineland, concluded defensive alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia, insisted on exorbitant reparations, and maintained a bloated air force and army. Its insistence on the need to conserve and bolster its armed forces threatened the consensus on international disarmament, a critical issue for MacDonald. This was both an obstacle

⁸⁵¹ W. H. Dawson, “Can France and Germany be Reconciled?” *The Fortnightly Review* 667 (1 July 1922), 16-17.

⁸⁵² Ramsay MacDonald to Edouard Herriot, Paris, 8 July 1924, *DBFP* First Series, vol. XXVI, no. 507.

⁸⁵³ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 94.

to continental reconciliation and a hindrance to the economic and financial renewal of Germany, the latter much desired in Britain. Quite so, British efforts, at this time, were directed towards reviving international trade and economic confidence. If these twin ambitions were to be translated into real outcomes, an insurmountable obstacle would have to be overcome. Chiefly, French insecurities *vis-à-vis* Germany.⁸⁵⁴ MacDonald believed that French actions reinforced and carried on wartime hostilities. He noted that “the worst form of German nationalism” had resulted from its treatment since Versailles.⁸⁵⁵ He desired to find a solution that would secure economic recovery, continental stability, and universal disarmament. It stands to reason that MacDonald sought to translate revisionist commentaries into a viable settlement between Britain, France, and Germany.

Central to any new continental settlement was the troublesome issue of war indemnities. Indeed, it was this very issue that had led France to intervene in the Ruhr. The nonviolent resistance that followed from the invasion resulted in the collapse of the German *Papiermark*. To ameliorate the situation and to restore financial stability, the Reparations Commission appointed two sub-committees to draft proposals to counter the economic crisis. The Reparations Commission had, in fact, taken its initiative from Charles E. Hughes, the United States Secretary of State. Hughes was keen to foster a transatlantic economic community, that would include not only Britain and France, but also the “now democratized, and capitalist, Germany.” Thus, Hughes submitted an alternative to armed intervention in the Ruhr. To avert an imminent crisis between France and Germany, and to ensure continued transfers and deliveries, he unveiled a scheme that would enlist economists, industrialists, and financial technicians in an objective review.⁸⁵⁶ He called for an economic conference to consider “the reparation question,” to determine the total sum to be settled,

⁸⁵⁴ Stambrook, “Lord D’Abernon and the Origins of the Locarno Pact,” 234.

⁸⁵⁵ Ramsay MacDonald to Mr. Knox, 6 May 1924, *DBFP*, vol. XXVI, no. 462, 681.

⁸⁵⁶ Patrick O. Cohrs, “The First ‘Real’ Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States, and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925,” *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 1 (February 2003): 9-11.

and the most effective means “to obtain [collection].”⁸⁵⁷ Hughes understood that his government would not be able to recover war debts from Britain and France unless sufficient sums were secured from Germany.⁸⁵⁸ Thus, he clarified that he “had no desire to relieve the German Government from its just obligations.”⁸⁵⁹ Rather, he aimed to treat the issue as a non-political matter, and to entrust it to independent financial advisors, who were to recommend a viable solution. To Hughes, “this seemed the only realistic way” forward.⁸⁶⁰ Eventually, in November 1923, the United States turned its focus back to Europe, after Hughes issued a directive, on 25 October, to the Chargé in France, E. S. Whitehouse, “that the time has come for a constructive financial policy.”⁸⁶¹ This directive denoted that Hughes and the United States were now inclined to endorse American involvement in an expert-led commission, as earlier recommended. The most notable advisors appointed to this commission were the financier—and future Vice President—General Charles C. Dawes, and the industrialist Owen D. Young.⁸⁶²

Neither Hughes, nor his administration, wished “to become a dictator or arbitrator in [the] reparations question.” Once the expert deliberations had commenced in December 1923, the US communicated its official desire to return to neutrality.⁸⁶³ Dawes was selected to chair the more senior expert committee. Besides Dawes and Young, there were two informal experts each from Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy. The British representatives were the statistician and business administrator Sir Josiah C. Stamp and the merchant banker Sir Robert M. Kindersley. Dawes

⁸⁵⁷ Charles E. Hughes to Edwin Sheldon Whitehouse (Chargé in France), 24 October 1923, *FRUS* 1923, vol. II, no. 53, 79-83.

⁸⁵⁸ Patrick O. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain, and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919-1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 88-89.

⁸⁵⁹ Charles E. Hughes to E. S. Whitehouse (Chargé in France), 24 October 1923, *FRUS* 1923, vol. II, no. 53, 80.

⁸⁶⁰ Cohrs, “Britain, the United States, and the Accords of London and Locarno,” 11.

⁸⁶¹ Charles E. Hughes to E. S. Whitehouse (Chargé in France), 25 October 1923, *FRUS* 1923, vol. II, no. 54, 83-84.

⁸⁶² Cohrs, “Britain, the United States, and the Accords of London and Locarno,” 10-11.

⁸⁶³ Charles E. Hughes to Myron T. Herrick (Ambassador in France), 6 January 1923, *FRUS* 1923, vol. II, no. 158, 202-203.

commended their “constructive influence” and industry, “no two men upon the committee put a greater tax upon their time or strength.”⁸⁶⁴ Curiously, both men would later join the Anglo-German Fellowship (1935), an association whose stated objective was to advocate “fellowship between ... Britain and Germany, and their respective citizens.”⁸⁶⁵ Within the Dawes Committee, serious differences arose between the British and their collaborators from France, Belgium, and Italy.⁸⁶⁶ The British were keen to resolve the economic crisis rather than to maximize indemnities. The French, with the backing of Belgium and Italy, wanted to achieve such maximization and to secure a settlement in close accord with Versailles.⁸⁶⁷ During the conference, Stamp wrote to his wife in considerable detail, and his letters chronicle such differences. His Franco-Belgian workmates were at various times described as dangerous, intolerable, and irritable.⁸⁶⁸ The Americans, as it turned out, were often needed to mediate between the two factions. Young reminded his collaborators that the alternative to a collective decision was “economic chaos.”⁸⁶⁹ Predictably, Dawes described these deliberations as “a compromise between economic principles and political necessities.” The committee thus served as a device to secure the ideal balance between “economic and [national] considerations.”⁸⁷⁰

Finally, a carefully worded outline was drafted that satisfied the Reparations Commission. The framework constituted a delicate balance—an “irreducible maximum” of concessions that the

⁸⁶⁴ From Our Own Correspondent, “Work of the British Experts. General Dawes’s Tribute,” *The Times* (London, UK), 11 April 1924.

⁸⁶⁵ The Anglo-German Fellowship was founded in 1935 and would continue advocate friendship with Nazi Germany until its suspension in October 1939. See e.g., Charles Spicer, *Coffee with Hitler: The British Amateurs Who Tried to Civilise the Nazis* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2022). Our London Correspondent, “International Friendship: Anglo-Russian and Anglo-German Societies,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, UK), 29 November 1935.

⁸⁶⁶ Their main disagreements concerned reparation annuities and productive guarantees.

⁸⁶⁷ Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I*, 137.

⁸⁶⁸ See Sir Josiah Stamp’s letters, cited in J. Harry Jones, *Josiah Stamp, Public Servant: The Life of the First Baron Stamp of Shortlands* (London: I. Pitman, 1964), 215-230.

⁸⁶⁹ Quoted in James A. Logan to the State Department, 14 April 1924. U.S. 462.00R 296/268.

⁸⁷⁰ Dawes Essay, intended as a preface for *A Journal of Reparations* (London, 1939), “Reparations, 1924-29” file, *Dawes Papers*. Quoted in Stephen A. Schuker, *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adaption of the Dawes Plan* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 174.

interested Powers could make without “further embittering ... Franco-German and Franco-British relations.”⁸⁷¹ Nonetheless, the outline did not offer a conclusive solution to the indemnities issue, nor did it revise the total sum fixed at the 1921 London Conference. Rather, it crafted a workable framework that would involve a substantial revision of the Versailles Treaty. The United States reset the rules with its insistence that France either embrace the recommendations or forfeit American involvement in Europe. Thus, Poincaré’s bid to retain France’s dominance on the basis of 1919 was thwarted indelibly. Remarkably, this shift would also lead to the normalization of relations between Britain, France, and Germany. “This could only be achieved because US [financial] efforts” harmonized with Britain’s self-interested decision to mediate “between the United States, France, and Germany.” It fell to MacDonald to translate the Dawes Report into a viable settlement capable of reconciling France and Germany. Patrick O. Cohrs observes that “MacDonald’s direction of Britain’s external relations in 1924 ... marked a watershed moment in the evolution of [Britain’s]” relations with France and Germany. Indeed, MacDonald set out to include the United States in his efforts to resolve the contentious issues that still existed between the two countries. Yet the most distinctive feature of his approach to international affairs was his determination to normalize relations between the former adversaries of the disastrous war.⁸⁷²

MacDonald’s attitude owed much to the French incursion into the Ruhr. He had earlier criticized Lord Curzon’s inaction and advocated a forceful British intervention to counter France. He warned that unless Britain restrained France, the crisis would only benefit those who wished to undermine “Weimar’s democratic Government.” Cohrs asserts that while MacDonald’s “long-term objective remained that of turning the LON” into an effective and flexible mechanism for collective security, in the short-term, he focused on two clear objectives. First, he endeavoured to

⁸⁷¹ Quoted in James A. Logan to the State Department, 14 April 1924. U.S. 462.00R 296/268.

⁸⁷² Cohrs, “Britain, the United States, and the Accords of London and Locarno,” 11-13.

secure American involvement in a transatlantic multilateral treaty/conference on war debt and indemnities. Second, he entered into discussions, first with Poincaré, then with his socialist successor Edouard Herriot and Gustav Stresemann, in an effort to normalize relations between France and Germany. His dual objectives led him to orchestrate the 1924 London Conference, the first real effort at interwar reconciliation. MacDonald viewed the eventual accord, as “the first Peace Treaty, because we endorse it with a feeling that we have turned our backs on the terrible ... war mentality.”⁸⁷³ The accord ratified in London involved a substantial revision of the Versailles settlement and attests to MacDonald’s commitment to translating revisionist interpretations into a workable framework for reconciliation between Britain, France, and Germany.

MacDonald’s diary from the conference reveals his frustration with the French. France was “as near to being [unbearable] as it can well be,” having seemed “to have been taught nothing.” Clearly, it was still committed to force, intimidation, dishonesty, and narrow-minded economics.⁸⁷⁴ The Germans, too, irritated him, above all when one or another of them fixated on a meticulous detail or launched into a tiresome, drawn-out lecture.⁸⁷⁵ Nonetheless, he embraced the revisionist view that Weimar Germany was the underdog in its conflict with France, and warned that French obstruction and truculence would destabilize democratic Germany. This was a concern that the historian H. A. L. Fisher had raised earlier in a debate in the Commons.⁸⁷⁶ MacDonald came to see men such as Hans Luther, Stresemann, Friedrich Ebert, and Wilhelm Marx as the “moral elite,” sincere characters “who were truly democratic.”⁸⁷⁷ His resolve to accommodate this new elite drew

⁸⁷³ J. Ramsay MacDonald concluding speeches, 16 August 1924, Proceedings of the London Reparation Conference July and August 1924 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1924), no. 8, 95.

⁸⁷⁴ Diary entry, Ramsay MacDonald, 23 July 1924. Quoted in Kitching, “Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary,” 1412.

⁸⁷⁵ Diary entry, Ramsay MacDonald, 5 August 1924. Quoted in Kitching, “Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary,” 1412.

⁸⁷⁶ Fisher worried that the invasion would alienate moderate liberals in Weimar Germany and that this action would see militarist Germany restored; that the invasion, “so far from bringing France security, is [liable] to bring her ... the reverse.” United Kingdom. HC Deb, 23 July 1923, volume 167, column 117 (Mr. H. A. L. Fisher).

⁸⁷⁷ Our Correspondent, “Mr. MacDonald and France,” The Times (London, UK), 16 Feb. 1924.

from the revisionist view that economic turmoil, territorial insecurity, and civil unrest would destabilize Weimar Germany and would lead to its substitution with an anti-democratic, militarist authority. Brilliantly, MacDonald turned a financial scheme into a revised settlement. This had been his aim from the outset; moreover, he had secured Germany's attendance, "not in order to be confronted with a document definitely settled but to meet the allies in conference."⁸⁷⁸ The London Conference set Franco-German (and, in a broader sense, Euro-Atlantic) relations on a new course. Dawson and Gooch hailed the new settlement, and there can be little doubt that MacDonald found in their revisionist commentaries the intellectual and moral rationale for his own moderate attitude towards the "embattled" Weimar Republic.⁸⁷⁹

Without a doubt, there were other influences that affected MacDonald's mentality. His wartime association with the UDC had led him to attribute the war to militarization, economic rivalry, and secret diplomacy. This conviction led him to endorse multilateral treaties discussed and debated freely. Then, too, he was determined to secure an accord on universal disarmament. Yet his actions while in office were often contradictory. Consider, for instance, his decision to cancel the Singapore naval base, because he was convinced that its construction would result in an arms race in East Asia: "Once ... commenced circumstances would inevitably contrive to build-up a military situation in the East until we reached a state similar to that in the North Sea in 1914."⁸⁸⁰ His decision to halt construction of the naval base was intended to demonstrate his anti-war credentials.⁸⁸¹ Indeed, he claimed that he could not move forward with this initiative, since it "would exercise a most detrimental effect on our ... foreign policy."⁸⁸² However, he did not

⁸⁷⁸ Ramsay MacDonald to Sir R. Grahame, 23 June 1924, *DBFP*, vol. XXVI, no. 493.

⁸⁷⁹ Cohrs, "Britain, the United States, and the Accords of London and Locarno," 12-17.

⁸⁸⁰ Quoted in John Ferris, "James Ramsay MacDonald, 1866-1937," in *British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1850-1990: Aspects of the Evolution of British Foreign Policy*, ed. Antony Best and Hugh Cortazzi (London: Renaissance Books, 2018), 148.

⁸⁸¹ Needless to say, his decision was overturned when the Conservatives were returned to office in October 1924.

⁸⁸² Quoted in Kitching, "Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary," 1413-1414.

interfere with the air rearmament initiative undertaken by Baldwin's ousted government. This, he believed, was a defensive act; and while MacDonald did achieve a measure of *détente* with Herriot's government, his administration remained determined to create an effective aerial deterrent to counter any potential threat from France. MacDonald reasoned, incorrectly, that the British electorate would naturally view France's one thousand aircraft "against our eighty ... as a menace."⁸⁸³ There can be little doubt that Britain's unease over France's air force contributed to a deterioration of the *Entente Cordiale*. Gradually, the "continental air menace" was seen to sour and undermine Britain's relations with France and was to exacerbate tensions between the former allies. Accordingly, MacDonald was reluctant to commit material resources to France's continental security. He offered kind words and warm assurances, but "behind the façade of cordiality," the division between the two countries was as wide as ever.⁸⁸⁴ MacDonald could thus be distrustful and critical of France without necessarily being pro-German. Yet these tendencies made him more attentive to revisionist historians and their interpretations.⁸⁸⁵ He was certainly amenable to their claims about shared war guilt and the need to reduce Germany's liabilities. It can therefore be reasoned that these historians furnished him with the vocabulary by which he could frame reconciliation with Germany.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, MacDonald's successor at the Foreign Office (1924-1929), also used historical research to inform his attitudes towards Germany. He had shown himself interested in a "Peace with honour" in 1919 and was doubtless familiar with revisionist theories, as he was in communication with Dawson, whose letters continued to endorse an anti-French sentiment.⁸⁸⁶

⁸⁸³ Quoted in John Ferris, "The Theory of a 'French Air Menace', Anglo-French Relations and the British Home Defence Air Force Programmes of 1921-1925," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 1 (1987): 72.

⁸⁸⁴ Hines H. Hall III, "British Air Defence and Anglo-French Relations, 1921-1924," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 4, no. 3 (1981): 271-284.

⁸⁸⁵ Indeed, he was to nominate Gooch to edit the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*. Keith Hamilton, "The British Foreign Office and Historical Researchers during the Great War and its Aftermath," 219.

⁸⁸⁶ Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 79; and WHD 929: letter Dawson to Austen Chamberlain, 29 August 1926.

Chamberlain valued insights derived from history and often adjusted his views accordingly. His outlook was, in some measure, conditioned by his time as a student at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he studied History.⁸⁸⁷ Whereas Lord Curzon advocated neutrality and MacDonald favoured arbitration and collective security, Chamberlain's ideas were rooted in a desire to maintain balance and ensure continental stability. He looked to build on older traditions in order to restore a "western-oriented European Concert." Primarily, he wished to readmit Weimar Germany on terms acceptable to France. He believed that the most effective means of achieving this was a multilateral accord that would secure the Franco-German border.⁸⁸⁸ This, as he told Lord D'Abernon, would "remove the acute fears which distort French [attitudes], and which hinder any improvement in Franco-German relations."⁸⁸⁹ Chamberlain searched for an alternative to the Geneva Protocol, which MacDonald had negotiated with Herriot. He wanted to achieve a similar effect, but with a multilateral covenant that did not constrain Britain, nor force it to underwrite Franco-German security.⁸⁹⁰ His idea was an unorthodox attempt to recreate the old order.⁸⁹¹

The Versailles settlement was intended to establish a new international order to succeed the old *Balance of Power*. Even at the time, there were voices which doubted whether the new order constituted a desirable substitute for traditional international relations.⁸⁹² Headlam-Morley, for one, observed that, "it is to be regretted that public opinion appears to countenance the idea that the doctrine of the Balance of Power can be neglected. It is, and will remain, a fundamental point

⁸⁸⁷ D. J. Dutton, "Chamberlain, Sir (Joseph) Austin (1863-1937)," *ODNB*.

⁸⁸⁸ Cohrs, "Britain, the United States, and the Accords of London and Locarno," 22.

⁸⁸⁹ Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 18 March 1925, *DBFP*, vol. XXVII, no. 255, 398.

⁸⁹⁰ Gaynor Johnson, "Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924-1929," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 17, no. 4 (2006): 755.

⁸⁹¹ Erik Goldstein, "The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact, 1924-1925," in *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950*, ed. Michael L. Dockrill and Brian J. C. McKercher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 123.

⁸⁹² Goldstein, "The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact," 122-123.

just as much after the establishment of a League of Nations as it has been before.”⁸⁹³ Eyre Crowe, with whom Chamberlain was to associate closely, recommended a return to earlier traditions to construct and maintain a sustainable continental order that would contain Germany.⁸⁹⁴ Harold Nicolson would later recall that, at Paris, “Beneš taught me that the Balance of Power was not necessarily a shameful, but ... a scientific thing. He showed me that only on the firm basis of such a balance could the fluids of ... amity [flow] without interruption.”⁸⁹⁵ By 1925, Nicolson believed that a restored continental framework would create the right conditions for modifications to the settlement, “although in the current mood ... it would be useless even to mention revision. ... Yet if the concert of Europe can thus ... be recreated saner councils will win out.”⁸⁹⁶

Headlam-Morley continued to advocate for a new continental concert. Between 1924 and 1925, he carried on a brisk communication with Lord D’Abernon, the British ambassador in Berlin, on the subject; and in an influential memorandum (1925), he made the case for its benefits over the new international order.⁸⁹⁷ He restated the common rationale for continental involvement:

Our island is so close to the continent that we cannot afford to ignore what goes on there, and so we get the next fundamental requirement, that the opposite shores of the Channel and North Sea should never be brought under the control of a single Great military and naval Power.⁸⁹⁸

His ideas drew attention to the similarities between contemporary events and post-Napoleonic British foreign policy. These ideas resonated with Chamberlain, who admitted that he was

Much struck with an observation made by Mr. Headlam-Morley ... that the first thought of Castlereagh after 1815 was to restore the Concert of Europe and that the more ambitious peacemakers of Versailles when they framed the Covenant, still left a gap which only a new Concert of Europe can fill.⁸⁹⁹

⁸⁹³ FO 371/4353/f23/PC55 James Headlam-Morley memorandum, 15 November 1918.

⁸⁹⁴ Patrick O. Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order: The Transformation of International Politics, 1860-1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 443.

⁸⁹⁵ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 210.

⁸⁹⁶ FO 371/11065/W2035/9/98 Harold Nicolson memorandum, 26 January 1925.

⁸⁹⁷ Goldstein, “The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact,” 123

⁸⁹⁸ FO 371/11064/W1252/9/98 James Headlam-Morley memorandum, 21 February 1925.

⁸⁹⁹ FO 371/11064/W1252/9/98, minute by Austen Chamberlain, 21 February 1925.

Chamberlain was so taken with this idea that he recommended C. K. Webster's volume on *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh* to the German ambassador, Dr. Friedrich Sthamer.⁹⁰⁰ He advised Sthamer that he intended to follow a similar strategy. First, he meant to secure the settlement; once this was achieved, he desired to normalize relations with Weimar Germany. "Lord Castlereagh had achieved this object, with the result that ... the Powers almost at once recovered themselves on new lines as new problems required their attention." He reminded Sthamer, whom he esteemed, "that it was sometimes useful to recall the past."⁹⁰¹ Chamberlain certainly viewed the interwar era in similar terms to those which had followed the Napoleonic War. Readily, he drew similarities between himself and Lord Castlereagh, whose actions and rhetoric he "adapted to the twentieth century."⁹⁰² Later, he would insist that Castlereagh's likeness be exhibited to the member Powers when the Locarno Treaties were signed in London in 1925.⁹⁰³

Chamberlain became convinced that Britain should restore and oversee the traditional continental balance. This reorientation owed more to Chamberlain, Headlam-Morley, and Crowe than to cabinet unanimity. Baldwin's Cabinet was much divided as to what role Britain should have in Europe. Churchill and Leo Amery, the Colonial Secretary, viewed the Empire as Britain's foremost concern and favoured continental aloofness until a natural balance "had re-established itself between France and Germany." The Little Englander School was likewise at odds with continental commitments and instead advocated domestic retrenchment.⁹⁰⁴ Chamberlain and

⁹⁰⁰ C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822. Britain the European Alliance* (London: G. Bell, 1925).

⁹⁰¹ Austen Chamberlain, letter to Lord D'Abernon, 2 April 1925, *DBFP*, vol. XXVII, no. 283, 437; and Austen Chamberlain, letter to Lord D'Abernon, 15 May 1925, *DBFP*, vol. XXVII, no. 325, 509-510.

⁹⁰² Austen Chamberlain, letter to Ida Chamberlain, 28 November 1925, in *The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters: The Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with His Sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916-1937*, ed. Robert C. Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 284-286.

⁹⁰³ Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, K.G., P.C., M.P.* vol. II (London: Cassell and Company, 1940), 154-155.

⁹⁰⁴ Cohrs, "The First 'Real' Peace Settlements after the First World War," 23.

Crowe, meanwhile, devised and enacted a new school that aimed to revive Britain's commitment to Europe.⁹⁰⁵ Chamberlain's object was to reassert Britain's traditional role as the "honest broker" between France and Germany. Britain, he claimed, "has it in her control, at this moment," to restore continental stability. To achieve this end two conditions were essential: first, Britain needed to reassure France.⁹⁰⁶ Chamberlain feared that without a commitment from Britain, French leaders could be inclined to revisit Poincaré's disastrous course in the Ruhr, and Britain would be "dragged along, unwilling, impotent, in the wake of France towards the Armageddon."⁹⁰⁷ Second, Britain should facilitate the readmission of Germany into a renewed continental concert.⁹⁰⁸ Chamberlain wished to foster orderly reform rather than "violent revision." This would limit any undesirable alliances and would ensure a careful balance between France and Germany.⁹⁰⁹ Moreover, this would reduce any threat to Britain. Historically, Britain only intervened in continental affairs to ensure that no Great Power could attain western ascendancy. The current borders drawn in 1919, satisfied Britain's desire for balance in western Europe. The French, however, continued to threaten this harmony. Germany, too, was seen as a threat to continental stability: having signed the settlement under duress, it might, in the future, endeavour to revise it. Predictably, Britain expended considerable effort to stabilize the situation.⁹¹⁰

Thus, Headlam-Morley advised that for more than five centuries "our statesmen and rulers have ... held that we had a dominant interest in this area of the continent of Europe, and that they have never failed to use every means ... to assert this interest."⁹¹¹ Curiously, on 5 March 1925, in

⁹⁰⁵ Goldstein, "The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact," 135.

⁹⁰⁶ FO 371/110756/C3539/3539/18, minute by Austen Chamberlain, 19 March 1925.

⁹⁰⁷ FO 371/11064/W362/2/98, minute by Austen Chamberlain, 4 January 1925.

⁹⁰⁸ FO 371/110756/C3539/3539/18, minute by Austen Chamberlain, 19 March 1925.

⁹⁰⁹ Cohrs, "The First 'Real' Peace Settlements after the First World War," 24.

⁹¹⁰ Goldstein, "The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact," 124.

⁹¹¹ FO 371/11065/W2070/9/98, James Headlam-Morley, "The Problem of Security: England and the Low Countries," 10 March 1925. Reprinted in James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1930), 156-171.

a debate in the Commons, Chamberlain echoed this exact sentiment; he claimed that “we are far too near the continent to rest indifferent to what occurs there. ... No nation can live, as we live, within twenty miles of the shores of Europe and remain indifferent to [its] ... security.” History, he affirmed, had shown him that it was more critical “than ever before that we should not believe ourselves” so secure and isolated from the continent, “as to remain indifferent to ... its misfortunes, ... and callous and deaf” to its calls for assistance.⁹¹² Different from Dawson and Gooch, however, his concerns stemmed less from an emotional attachment to Germany and more from an interest in continental stability. This, too, was the rationale behind Headlam-Morley’s recommendation that Britain should seek to influence and direct the continental balance and foster sustainable structures in western Europe.⁹¹³ Chamberlain was amenable to this idea and believed that Britain should act as an arbiter in Europe, to balance France and Germany, because either was liable “to upset the apple-cart.”⁹¹⁴ Elsewhere, it has been claimed that Chamberlain’s Francophilia defined his continental strategy.⁹¹⁵ However, he demonstrated a willingness to accommodate Germany and expressed admiration for the individual Germans with whom he worked—he later referred to Stresemann as his “dear friend.”⁹¹⁶ Chamberlain endeavoured to emulate Castlereagh, and desired to see Britain restored as the “honest broker” in Europe.⁹¹⁷ He understood that a durable settlement demanded that Britain accord the same status to France and Germany.⁹¹⁸ This is not to refute that

⁹¹² United Kingdom. HC Deb, 5 March 1925, volume 181, column 715 (Sir Austen Chamberlain).

⁹¹³ Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, “Reappraising Diplomacy: Structural Diplomacy and the Case of the European Union,” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 4 (2009): 146.

⁹¹⁴ Austen Chamberlain to Lord D’Abernon, 2 April 1925, *DBFP*, vol. XXVII, no. 283, p. 437.

⁹¹⁵ See Douglas Johnson, “Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Agreements,” *University of Birmingham Historical Journal* 8, no. 1 (1962): 62-81; and David Dutton, *Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics* (Bolton: Ross Anderson Publications, 1985), 259-299.

⁹¹⁶ Austen Chamberlain to Lindsay, 2 May 1928. Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 55/312. Quoted in Johnson, “Austen Chamberlain and Britain’s Relations with France, 1924-1929,” 762.

⁹¹⁷ FO 800/257/483, letter Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe, 2 April 1925.

⁹¹⁸ Richard Grayson, *Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy, 1924-29* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 45.

Chamberlain was a Francophile; rather, it is to demonstrate that he intended to work with Germany. He was not beholden to France, and his objectives are better viewed as Eurocentric rather than as pro-French. Indeed, he was inclined towards reconciliation with Germany. Doubtless, revisionist commentaries influenced his understanding of the continental balance and the need to rehabilitate Weimar Germany.

Chamberlain's approach was premised on the idea that Britain should influence and direct affairs in western Europe. He was far less concerned about balance in the East. Memorably, he told Lord Crewe: "No British Government would ever risk ... a single grenadier" to defend the Polish Corridor.⁹¹⁹ Chamberlain wished to restrict Britain's commitment to western Europe. He desired that Britain should cooperate with France and Germany but believed that Britain should remain a "disinterested *amicus curiae*" in eastern Europe.⁹²⁰ Historically, British interest in eastern Europe was limited to its use as a territorial offset to maintain balance in the West. Thus, the new nation-states in eastern and central Europe did not much register on the British mental map of continental Europe. Moreover, there was concern as to whether the new states would survive. Chamberlain was therefore disinclined "to become involved in any new arrangements ... in eastern Europe."⁹²¹ Accordingly, he wrote to Lord D'Abernon, in April 1925, "I think the less that is said about the east the better."⁹²² Those associated with the *New Europe*—notably, Nicolson, Seton-Watson, and Headlam-Morley—took an alternative view. Headlam-Morley warned that the "danger point in Europe is not the Rhine, but the Vistula, not Alsace-Lorraine, but the Polish Corridor."⁹²³ Thus, he took issue with the decision to sever east from west. German expansion in the east would certainly

⁹¹⁹ Austen Chamberlain, letter to the Marquess of Crewe, 16 February 1925, *DBFP*, I, vol. XXVII, no. 200.

⁹²⁰ FO 371/11064/W1252/9/98, minute by Austen Chamberlain, 21 February 1925.

⁹²¹ Goldstein, "The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact," 125-126.

⁹²² Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 2 April 1925, *DBFP*, vol. XXVII, no. 283, p. 437

⁹²³ FO 371/11064/W1252/9/98, memorandum by James Headlam-Morley.

undermine the continental balance. Indeed, any increase in German strength in eastern Europe would disrupt the careful balance between itself and France.⁹²⁴ Curiously, Headlam-Morley was able to foresee the scenario that would lead to the next conflict. He described as an “improbable” situation, “Austria rejoined Germany; that Germany, using the discontented minorities in Bohemia, demanded a new frontier far over the mountains, including Carlsbad and Pilsen, and at the same time, in alliance with Germany, the Hungarians recovered the southern slopes of the Carpathians.”⁹²⁵ Thus, Headlam-Morley warned against any settlement that did not take into consideration eastern Europe.⁹²⁶

Erik Goldstein notes that Chamberlain was rather taken with the historical advice that he received from Headlam-Morley. Born on 24 December 1863 to Revd Arthur William Headlam, and his wife, Agnes Sarah, Headlam-Morley studied in Germany—first at Göttingen, and later at Berlin under Heinrich Treitschke and Hans Delbrück. There he met Elizabeth Henrietta Ernestina Charlotte Sonntag (Else), whom he married in 1893. He derived from their union a steadfast admiration for German culture, literature, and history. Curiously, “his wife never learnt ... fluent English, and remained an impenitent ... nationalist.”⁹²⁷ From 1894 to 1900, he held a chair in ancient history, at Queen’s College, London. Then, in 1902, he joined the Board of Education, where he remained until the First World War. Sir Claud Schuster soon invited him to join a new information department, headquartered at Wellington House.⁹²⁸ The German decision to invade Belgium to better attack France had an enormous effect on Headlam-Morley. Readily, he justified continental intervention and maintained that Britain would not have intervened had it not been for

⁹²⁴ Goldstein, “The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact,” 126.

⁹²⁵ FO 371/11064/W1252/9/98, memorandum by James Headlam-Morley.

⁹²⁶ Goldstein, “The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact,” 126-127.

⁹²⁷ Carr, *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays*, 165.

⁹²⁸ Erik Goldstein, “Morley, Sir James Wycliffe Headlam- (1863-1929),” *ODNB*.

the attack on Belgium.⁹²⁹ Germany, to be sure, was responsible for the war, but he believed that individuals or small circles had caused the conflict, and that their guilt would be revealed in the official documents.⁹³⁰ During the war, he contributed to several journals, wrote various treatises, and drafted an account of the July Crisis, later issued as *The History of the Twelve Days*.⁹³¹ The treatise set out to assess the abortive and miscarried discussions that failed to avert continental conflict, and it was based on the documents then available. Notably, the text referred to a small but active war faction and a cabal, intended to undermine continental security.⁹³² Headlam-Morley never joined the UDC, and he would have criticized their more extreme manifestations; however, he shared with its members the view that the war had resulted from a deficient international order and anarchic diplomacy. Similarly, he believed that the best solution to these issues was to establish more robust structures to better control and order international relations.⁹³³

Chamberlain had not arrived at the Foreign Office with set views, but from December 1924 to March 1925, he and Crowe, consolidated the various concerns of their Office into a tentative outline, which would later “become the basis for the Locarno Pact.” Previously, Chamberlain had favoured an alliance with France, but as new information was made available, he set out to move towards Headlam-Morley’s idea that Britain should include in any new settlement both France and Germany. Goldstein writes that Headlam-Morley’s memoranda as adviser are classic case studies “not only of diplomatic history, but of the elucidation through ... history of [current dilemmas].” Chamberlain was fascinated with what he received from Dawson and Headlam-Morley, and this doubtless contributed to his desire to emulate Castlereagh. His conviction led him to formulate the

⁹²⁹ James Wycliffe Headlam, *The History of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 4th, 1914; Being an Account of the Negotiations Preceding the Outbreak of War Based on the Official Publications* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915), 340.

⁹³⁰ Carr, *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays*, 167.

⁹³¹ Goldstein, “Morley, Sir James Wycliffe Headlam- (1863-1929),” *ODNB*.

⁹³² Headlam, *The History of Twelve Days*, xvii-xviii and 43-44.

⁹³³ Carr, *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays*, 167.

multilateral Locarno Treaties in October 1925. The Locarno Pact realized the recommendations made in revisionist scholarship. The Pact secured the Franco-German border, ensured Germany's admission to the LON, contained a covenant that the member Powers would refrain from armed conflict for a ten-year term, and undertook to hasten efforts to find a solution to international disarmament.⁹³⁴ These moderate ideas had received constant nourishment in revisionist literature and in radical-Liberal dailies, such as the *Manchester Guardian*. Dawson and Gooch's influence was more limited here than elsewhere, but their close association with historians such as Headlam-Morley, Carr, and C. K. Webster ensured that their interpretations of history were made available to Chamberlain. Precisely because he wished to set Franco-German relations on a new course, their revisionist commentaries were valuable to Chamberlain and his Office. Curiously, the only advice he seems to have dismissed without much consideration was that which he received about the need to include countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia in the Locarno Pact.⁹³⁵

Largely, Chamberlain embraced the historical advice he received, whether that information came from official channels or more informally, in letters or other communications. Political elites valued history and used it to better inform their views. The conviction that nations would act in accordance with their history and tradition led statesmen to consider as self-evident the historical and moralistic truths which they received from revisionist and structuralist historians. These views received additional nourishment from the two Germanies thesis, which allowed for an immediate reorientation of interwar attitudes towards Germany. It stands to reason that these historians furnished decision-makers with a framework for interwar reconciliation. Between 1919 and 1933, reconciliation acted as a driving force; indeed, successive administrations tried to influence continental affairs in order to ameliorate the tensions that still existed between Britain, France, and

⁹³⁴ Johnson, "Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924-1929," 755.

⁹³⁵ Goldstein, "The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact, 1924-1925," 115-135.

Germany. British statesmen doubted whether the Treaties of 1919 could ever truly secure the continent; thus, reviews were undertaken to consider what revisions could realistically be made to avert any future conflict between France and Germany. For the next decade, successive decision-makers undertook to revise the settlement. Curzon, MacDonald, and Chamberlain all made efforts towards translating revisionist interpretations into viable and durable solutions. There can be little doubt that these statesmen found in revisionist literature the intellectual and moral rationale for their own moderate attitudes, visions, and strategies. Thus, reconciliation seemed not only morally justifiable—being preferable to rearmament, sanctions, and war—but also entirely feasible.

5. “I Love the Country and People as Much as Ever, But ...” British Historians and the Advent of Nazism

Martin Gilbert believes that appeasement was seen as a noble idea, rooted in Christianity; in truth, the rationale for appeasement changed constantly.⁹³⁶ Those who worked to ameliorate relations between the two countries did so for several reasons, but four stand out most clearly. First, there still existed an admiration for Germany. Then, too, there was the belief in a kindred association between Britain and Germany, which dated from when the Saxons “set off in their wattle boats from the ... Rhine, and paddled with the tide towards the Humber, the Wash, and the Thames.” This legend had been strengthened in recent times through shared religious and dynastic ties, a close cultural association, and a mutual admiration for the arts, science, and education.⁹³⁷ Secondly, there was a conviction that all the warring states shared responsibility, whether or not equally, for the Great War. The shared guilt thesis received constant nourishment from British historians and the German Foreign Office in Berlin.⁹³⁸ British decision-makers were forced to consider what alternatives could have been taken in 1914, and some sought a means by which to avert any future clash between Britain and Germany. Third, as a corollary, the shared guilt thesis encouraged the view that the grievances which Germany sought to redress were legitimate since the settlement had been concluded under the misapprehension that it alone was responsible for the war. Predictably, Nazism was seen as an inevitable reaction to the unfair Treaty. To the extent that reconciliation was rationalized on a moral basis, revisionist historians can be said to have borne

⁹³⁶ Gilbert maintains that as an international doctrine, “appeasement had everything in its favour. It was Christian to love one’s neighbour, and sound business to encourage his prosperity. It was common sense to seek an end to war passions, and courageous to try to build a working partnership upon the foundations of such reconciliation.” Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 88.

⁹³⁷ Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, xi, 88, 142-143, and 185.

⁹³⁸ Dawson and Raymond Beazley both received financial remuneration for their efforts from Margarete Gärtner’s *Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft*, a private propaganda organization which sought to influence public opinion on the war guilt issue. WHD 1134: letter Margarete Gärtner to W. H. Dawson, 3 January 1931; WHD 1497: letter Margarete Gärtner to W. H. Dawson, 17 December 1935.

considerable responsibility.⁹³⁹ Finally, appeasement arose from the fear that too close an alliance with France would commit Britain to an unfavourable continental strategy: that France would use Britain and its eastern allies to maintain an artificial hegemony—until Germany, in desperation, mobilized in an effort to break free from this encirclement. Gilbert notes that to these arguments was added the need to halt communism—an issue that made a strong impact in Britain.⁹⁴⁰

Thus, Dawson explained to his British audience in September 1932, Nazism had its roots in both the failure to create a national consensus and as a rejection of the discriminatory, unfair, and harsh Treaty. He did not hide his own sympathies: “I regard [the Nazis] as a source for hope. For behind this revolt ... there is a large fund of deep and elevated patriotism and of genuine idealism.” More crucially, this movement would save the nation “from [its] lawless elements.”⁹⁴¹ Dawson was more exact as to these elements in another article when he identified them as the “Communists ... who in Germany, as in other countries, would pull to the ground the entire fabric of our far from perfect civilisation, and give one incalculably worse in its place.”⁹⁴² In 1933, he defended Hitler’s decision to withdraw from the disarmament conference and the LON because Britain and France had failed to conciliate Nazi Germany.⁹⁴³ Together with Beazley, Dawson worked to see the Saar reunited with the German Reich.⁹⁴⁴ Like Beazley, Dawson objected to the idea that there could be no cordial relations with Hitler’s Germany. He believed that such relations were achievable and, in fact, desirable. What was needed was a campaign to better inform both the

⁹³⁹ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 56-58

⁹⁴⁰ Gilbert draws a useful distinction between the “old” and “new appeasement.” The older variant, to which this work has devoted much time, was confident, self-assured, and moralistic. The newer variant was fearful, defeatist, and Hobbesian: Britain should tolerate Nazism because, “however horrible,” there was no other alternative (at least, not one that would forestall war). Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 142-143 and 185.

⁹⁴¹ WHD 2144/95: W. H. Dawson, “Why Young Germany Follows Hitler,” *Everyman*, 22 September 1932, 262.

⁹⁴² WHD 2144/35: W. H. Dawson, “Germany’s Psychological Crisis,” *Today and Tomorrow*, Spring 1932, 242.

⁹⁴³ WHD 2146/11: W. H. Dawson, “Mit englischen Augen,” *Der Tag*, 3 December 1933.

⁹⁴⁴ See WHD 1331: letter C. Raymond Beazley to W. H. Dawson.

news media and the men in Whitehall.⁹⁴⁵ Indeed, Dawson condemned British journalists for “baiting ... Germany,” and told the German-born scholar Hermann Georg Fiedler that our press “is cowardly beyond words.”⁹⁴⁶ He was convinced that such newsmen lacked even a basic understanding of Germany and considered it essential to educate them about Germany’s curious traditions, customs, and history.

What attracted Dawson to National Socialism differed little from what other close observers commented on so favourably. Indeed, there seemed to be a new vitality, energy, and charisma about Germany. National Socialism had revitalized Germany and had restored its national self-worth. Naturally, this would contribute to a more stable and secure Peace. Hitlerism was, above all, a rejection of the reviled Versailles Treaty. Hence, Nazism did little to alter Dawson’s views about the settlement of Germany. Dawson was not alone in his belief that there was a constructive, even noble, core to Nazism, and that its distasteful side was in fact a natural reaction to the Treaty. Once revision was achieved, Nazism would become a much more reasonable force in Germany. There existed much admiration for Nazism amongst the business and landed classes, at least until 1938. The *Daily Mail*—whose readers were in the main either middle class or wealthy—was consistent in its admiration for National Socialism.⁹⁴⁷ Lord Rothermere dictated its content; his son, the Hon. Esmond Harmsworth, would later succeed his father when Lord Rothermere retired in 1937.⁹⁴⁸

Rothermere’s main international concern before 1933 had been Miklós Horthy’s Hungary, whose revisionist ambitions he had embraced with a relentless intensity. Of the three treaties that

⁹⁴⁵ WHD 2144/12: W. H. Dawson, “Englische Urteile über deutsche Probleme,” *Deutsche Rundschau* (1934): 2-5.

⁹⁴⁶ Letter W. H. Dawson to H. G. Fiedler, 24 June 1934, contained in the Fiedler Papers, Taylor Institute Library, University of Oxford.

⁹⁴⁷ F. R. Gannon notes that the *Daily Mail* was the only interwar (daily) circular whose readers were in the main affluent and wealthy. F. R. Gannon, *The British Press and Germany, 1936-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 32.

⁹⁴⁸ Rothermere was a former minister of aviation and was an ardent anti-Communist conservative. Besides the *Daily Mail*, he owned (or had an interest in) several other national dailies.

reordered central and eastern Europe, “the last and most ill-advised was ... Trianon.” Rightly, Rothermere noted that the borders now drawn were uneconomic and arbitrary. Yet, he went further and warned that the settlement had created new “racial minorities” who were determined to set in motion another continental crisis. He advised that the Great Powers should award various Hungarian-inhabited territories in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania to Hungary. These “reasonable rectifications” would be beneficial and conciliatory.⁹⁴⁹ His crusade for border revision soon led him to defend and even endorse Nazi Germany.⁹⁵⁰ Rothermere’s editorials were beset with a vicious anti-Bolshevism—in fact, he feared a communist takeover in Britain, against which he bought vast estates in Hungary.⁹⁵¹ Partly, these fears led him to embrace Hitler. Rothermere welcomed National Socialism because he believed that it would establish an additional barrier against Bolshevism and would forever eliminate the threat that communism might succeed in Germany. Hitler would restore and revive Germany, as Mussolini had done in Italy.⁹⁵² Rothermere believed that dictatorial rule was, in some cases, desirable. Indeed, he believed that fascism was much more robust, asserting that “the so-called democratic states had rendered soft-fibred. The dictatorships were high-mettled.”⁹⁵³

Rothermere’s editorial from 10 July 1933 at once established what would become the *Daily Mail*’s attitude towards Nazi Germany.⁹⁵⁴ His article defended and even celebrated Hitler’s internal achievements under the dateline, “Youth Triumphant.” Rothermere stated confidently,

⁹⁴⁹ Lord Rothermere, “Hungary’s Place in the Sun. Safety for Central Europe,” *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 21 June 1927.

⁹⁵⁰ Andrea Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 154-158.

⁹⁵¹ Gannon, *The British Press and Germany*, 25-6 and 34; Orzoff, *The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe*, 156-157; and Harold Harmsworth, Viscount Rothermere, *Warnings and Predictions* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939), 118-124.

⁹⁵² Lord Rothermere, “A Nation Reborn,” *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 24 September 1930.

⁹⁵³ Rothermere, *Warnings and Predictions*, 13.

⁹⁵⁴ Gannon, *The British Press and Germany*, 32.

as a sexagenarian myself, I welcome the example that has thus been set to the world. I maintain that youth has a right to rule. Mussolini succeeded to supreme authority in Italy at the age of 39. His collaborators were even younger. Together, they have made their country the best-governed State in Europe.

I ... expect to see similar results achieved for Germany by Hitler, who has come to power at the age of 43.

Rothermere had no time for “the old women” who filled other editorial columns with their letters about unsubstantiated abuses in Nazi Germany. Hitler had reclaimed Germany; he had wrested control from what he described as its harmful and alien elements, the “Bolsheviks, Communists,” and “Israelites.” If excesses existed, “the minor misdeeds of individual Nazis [would soon] be submerged by the immense benefits that the new regime is already bestowing upon Germany.”⁹⁵⁵ Rothermere’s attraction to Nazism and Hitler arose in some measure from his belief that insecurity, instability, and enervation would leave the continent and Britain vulnerable to Bolshevism. His fears led him to move further right and to endorse, albeit briefly, Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF).⁹⁵⁶ Rothermere in another editorial described the BUF as “a well-organized Party, ready to take over responsibility for national affairs with the same directness of purpose and energy of methods as Hitler and Mussolini.”⁹⁵⁷ Both men fascinated him; specifically, their decision to rule without a burdensome, onerous, and inefficient elected assembly. Without a doubt, Rothermere favoured the continental dictators to “our pinhead pacifists.”⁹⁵⁸

Rothermere was anxious to avert a war between Britain and Nazi Germany; such a conflict would only benefit the Soviet Union.⁹⁵⁹ He abhorred communism and welcomed the Nazi regime as a bulwark against Bolshevism.⁹⁶⁰ Rothermere was not alone in his desire to forestall conflict

⁹⁵⁵ Lord Rothermere, “Youth Triumphant,” *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 10 July 1933.

⁹⁵⁶ Stephen Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Vol. 2: The Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 533.

⁹⁵⁷ Lord Rothermere, “Hurrah for the Blackshirts!” *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 15 January 1934.

⁹⁵⁸ Rothermere, *Warnings and Predictions*, 13 and 78-79.

⁹⁵⁹ George Boyce, “Harmsworth, Harold Sidney, first Viscount Rothermere (1868-1940),” *ODNB*.

⁹⁶⁰ Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Vol. 2*, 547.

between Britain and Germany, nor were his views on the Soviet Union novel or unusual in interwar Britain. G. Ward Price, for instance, celebrated Hitler as the man to save western civilization in an editorial for the *Daily Mail* (21 September 1936).⁹⁶¹ However, Rothermere was a case unto himself and, as such, his record demonstrates how diverse, contradictory, and inconsistent were the ideas that motivated Nazi sympathizers in interwar Britain.⁹⁶² Paradoxically, Rothermere

combined [an] awareness of the danger to Britain implicit in German re-armament with a belief that a re-armed Britain could be firm friends with a re-armed Germany. He saw Hitler as a sincere man who had defeated communism in his own country, and whose programme was now to reverse the *diktat* of Versailles. He did not see him as a conqueror whose ambitions for world power inevitably mean, if not conflict with, then hostility to, the British Empire.⁹⁶³

A. J. Cummings, the assistant editor of the *Daily News*, took a much more critical view. “There is nothing in modern politics—not even in German politics—to match the crude confusion of the Rothermere mentality as revealed in the Rothermere Press,” he wrote in an editorial on 31 August 1937. “It blesses and encourages every swashbuckler who threatens the peace of Europe—not to mention direct British interests—and then clamours for more and more armaments with which to defend Britain, presumably against his Lordship’s [favourite] foreign bully.”⁹⁶⁴ Certainly, the inherent contradictions were evident, but Rothermere was too restless and emotional to notice them.

Naturally, there were numerous scholars, observers, and intellectuals who saw Nazism as a destructive and abhorrent force; nevertheless, a readiness to tolerate Hitler was, at least in 1933,

⁹⁶¹ G. Ward Price, “This New Germany,” *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 21 September 1936. Ward Price worked at this time as a foreign correspondent for the *Daily Mail*, and in this role carried out several interviews with Hitler and Mussolini. He claimed that his interviews were unbiased and objective, but Wickham Steed denounced him as “the lackey of Mussolini, Hitler and Rothermere.” Quoted in Dan Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 118.

⁹⁶² Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Vol. 2*, 547; and Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 46-47.

⁹⁶³ “Lord Rothermere’s Warnings,” *Sunday Times* (London, UK), 26 March 1939.

⁹⁶⁴ *News Chronicle*, 31 August 1937.

not an uncommon attitude in Britain.⁹⁶⁵ Dawson's views did however lead to a slow deterioration in his relations with Gooch, as the latter insisted that he would not tolerate National Socialism.⁹⁶⁶ Gooch travelled to Berlin in July 1933 in order to examine for himself the conditions in this new Germany. At once, he noticed a black-out in the news media. The *Berliner Tageblatt* had been forced to amend its liberal content and Theodor Wolff, its talented Jewish editor, had fled to France. Gone, too, were the socialist and communist dailies. Gooch believed that the least biased feature in Berlin at that time was the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, a conservative daily. The *Deutsche Allgemeine* then had as its editor a Dr. Silex, whom Gooch had met in London, where the former had worked as a columnist and writer, having written a book on Ramsay MacDonald. When Dr. Silex called on Gooch at his hotel in Berlin, the two men shared a tense interview. Silex, albeit not himself a Nazi, dismissed Gooch's unease and anxiety, telling his host: "you will get used to [dictatorial rule] ... and then we shall be able to do business." Gooch considered his comments to be indelicate and told him as much; so far as he was concerned, he would never trust nor tolerate Hitler.⁹⁶⁷

Gooch next travelled to Zittau, in Saxony, his wife's old home, and from there he crossed the frontier into Czechoslovakia. When Edvard Beneš learned that Gooch had arrived in Prague, he invited him for an interview at the Hradčany. The two men discussed Nazi Germany, and Gooch wondered as to whether Czechoslovakia would ever consent to territorial adjustments favourable to Berlin. Beneš, for one, did not believe that concessions would occur without war, since small modifications would be ineffectual, and more substantial alterations would never receive electoral

⁹⁶⁵ Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 1933-9* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 141-142.

⁹⁶⁶ WHD 1606: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 19 November 1936; see also WHD 1424: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 19 January 1935.

⁹⁶⁷ Silex was not the only individual to call on Gooch at his hotel in Berlin. Gooch also recorded that he had received several visits from Jewish historians who had been forced to abandon their academic chairs and who now desired to flee Nazi Germany. Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 282-283.

assent. Remarkably, Beneš struck Gooch as somewhat carefree; he seemed unworried about events in Germany. During his stay, Gooch set out to discover the internal conditions of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak Germans, he observed, had varied views on National Socialism. The Socialists, needless to say, had found a new reason for contentment with their dual identity, which secured for them basic civil rights; however, “the German districts in the north, being the most industrialized, had suffered more from the” economic downturn, and, as a result, attitudes towards Nazism were more divided in Bohemia than in Moravia-Silesia.

From there, Gooch travelled on to Poland. He arrived first in Katowice before he continued to Warsaw, where he addressed the International Historical Congress.⁹⁶⁸ Thereafter, he travelled north to Danzig and the Polish Corridor, the focus of much Polish-German animosity. Danzig was a curious mishmash in 1933. The Nazis held control, as evidenced by the massive Swastika that defiled the *Marienkirche*. Still, numerous elements remained hostile to this new ideology.⁹⁶⁹ Sadly, these factions never coalesced; nonetheless, in 1933, Gooch trusted that the better and more moderate elements could marshal their constituents to vote out or even overthrow the National Socialists. Gooch, admittedly, never denounced nor scrutinized the Danzig statute. Mainly, because he could not formulate a solution that would be tolerable to both Poland and Germany. Certainly, he understood the resentment at Danzig having been severed from the Reich. Yet, the Polish case was also forceful, for had not Gdansk been a Polish town for centuries before it had been transferred to Prussia during the Second Polish Partition.⁹⁷⁰

Gooch left Poland “rejoicing in its liberation but anxious about its security.” For all its coal and timber, it was destitute. Moreover, it was enmeshed between two irredentist and hostile states.

⁹⁶⁸ Curiously, Gooch’s contribution was an address on Thomas Hobbes; happily, the sole advocate amongst “British thinkers of the totalitarian State.” Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 287.

⁹⁶⁹ Namely, Conservative Nationalists, Socialists, and Liberals.

⁹⁷⁰ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 285-288.

Gooch's interview at a German custom-house in Breslau indicated the strained relations between Poland and Germany. His suitcase underwent a strict examination, "for a dozen books were taken out and scrutinized." The summaries that he had made at the Warsaw Historical Congress seemed to excite mistrust and alarm, and the customs official took considerable time to search the abstracts "for ... contraband." Finally, his continental tour ended in blissful Baden-Baden, in southwestern Germany. Gooch was cheered to find that the old divisions between north and south still existed, at least, in Baden-Baden. The historic town had retained its liberal tradition, and he concluded that its citizens had rejected Hitler's anti-Semitism. Gooch illustrated this detail with an anecdote about the town's celebrated orchestra, whose conductor was Jewish. "We learned with horror that he was under notice to leave, and I shall never forget his farewell concert." The hall was flooded with well-wishers and the thunderous acclamation "amounted to a political demonstration ... words were unnecessary." Gooch had seen enough to vow that he would never return to Nazi Germany: "innocent men were being tortured and murdered ... and the Secret Police, an abominable arrival from Russia, were at work." He felt that he had no choice but to abandon all social contact with officials in Germany, and when he was later invited to dine at the German Embassy, he "had to ... decline."⁹⁷¹

Gooch burned his boats with an article in the *Contemporary Review*, a decision he took after the Night of the Long Knives. The initial title, "The Butchers of Berlin," was abandoned in draft as unsuitable because Gooch deemed it as undignified, and he contented himself with "The Terror in Germany."⁹⁷² The Nazis had at last revealed their true nature. Their international reputation, which had already started to wane before the massacre, had vanished overnight, and Gooch forecasted a violent end to National Socialism. However, he warned that any outside

⁹⁷¹ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 287-289.

⁹⁷² Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 289.

interference, economic or otherwise, “would not only be indefensible in itself,” but that it would restore Hitler’s credibility. If Nazism was to be overthrown, it must come from the malcontent voters who, in the last election, had contributed to its success.⁹⁷³ Still, Gooch refused to associate the German nation with its criminal rulers or with National Socialism. Moreover, he exonerated the electorate because democratic rule had been established under harsh and extreme conditions. The voters had become disillusioned with ineffective coalitions, constant dissolutions, economic stress, and a succession of short-lived chancellors. Hitler had arrived at the exact moment when national self-confidence was at its lowest and his vows to restore confidence, esteem, and self-worth were received with exaltation. His followers believed that he was a “heaven-sent reformer” who would abolish malfeasance, override vested commercial interests, and breakdown class barriers. However, the latest convulsion was evidence that, rather than saviours, the men now in control were brutish criminals. Gooch trusted that the illusion was now over: “when a revolution begins to devour its [own] children,” it seldom ends “with the first mouthful.” The social reforms hitherto associated with Nazism would now be abandoned, as Hitler moved to secure the ultra-nationalist *Reichswehr*. Gooch asked his readers to not associate National Socialism with the venerated and affable German nation, this would best assist that country, as would maintaining “our own ... free institutions to which, under better” leaders, Germany “will return joyfully.”⁹⁷⁴

The 30 June 1934 massacres shattered the Anglo-German Society. Since Hitler’s arrival, the association had lain low, although some members believed it was a mistake to snub the new regime. Sir Ian Hamilton took this view at what was to be the association’s final assembly. Gooch listened to his address attentively. No one had worked harder to restore amicable relations between

⁹⁷³ Truthfully, Hitler had failed to win an electoral majority; in fact, he had only been able to secure control in coalition with the Nationalists.

⁹⁷⁴ G. P. Gooch, “The Terror in Germany,” *The Contemporary Review* 146 (1 July 1934): 129-136.

the two nations than Hamilton, and his address carried considerable influence. Hamilton was keen for the association to resume its activities and even indicated that Nazi officials should be invited to dine with the Society.⁹⁷⁵ Harold Nicolson and Gooch offered a rebuttal to Hamilton. The current masters in Berlin were so cruel and uncivilized that to endorse them would be dishonourable; nothing should be done to enhance their international standing—“as admirers of the better Germany, temporarily submerged by the raging flood, we felt we must not let our old friends down.”⁹⁷⁶ Even now, Gooch was convinced that there were two currents in Germany, and to endorse the Nazis would be a death knell to that better, older, more idealistic Germany. He still believed that the more moderate elements in German social and civic life would coalesce to defeat Nazism. Nevertheless, he decided that he had no alternative but to sever official contacts with the German Embassy. This decision caused him some consternation; in any case, the staff that he knew and trusted were soon withdrawn.⁹⁷⁷

Directly, Gooch received a letter from his old friend Albert Dufour-Feronce, who was then living in retirement in Berlin. Dufour-Feronce wrote to introduce Baron Werner von Rheinbaben, whom Gooch had heard at Chatham House. Rheinbaben was to visit London and desired a heart to heart with Gooch. “He was not a Nazi, I was told, but he wanted us to be friends with the new team. He fortified himself with a second introduction from Lord Lothian.” Previously, Rheinbaben had served as Germany’s consul to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, but he had since retired from the Foreign Office. Nonetheless, Gooch was confident that he was still in close contact with the *Wilhelmstrasse*, and that their conversation would be recounted in Berlin. Although, it was well known then that Gooch was an anti-Nazi, Rheinbaben tried to convince him that the

⁹⁷⁵ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 289-290; Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 132-133; Ian Kershaw, *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry, the Nazis, and the Road to War* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 53-58.

⁹⁷⁶ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 289-290.

⁹⁷⁷ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 416.

Germans were better off under the new rule: “take a car and drive about the country, and you will see for yourself.” When Gooch mentioned Nazi crimes as an obstacle to cordial relations, his visitor dismissed his concerns and referred to Germany’s curious traditions and history. Politically, Germany was simply less mature than Britain. Gooch refused to tolerate this assessment. He made no illusions about his disdain for Hitler and National Socialism, and he refused to overlook their crimes, as did others who admired Germany.⁹⁷⁸

Indeed, Gooch was resolute in his objection to Nazi brutality, and he was tireless in his work to assist its victims. He worked with the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (SPSL) to assist exiled German academics to either settle in Britain or to find work in the United States.⁹⁷⁹ However, his efforts were not limited to his official involvement in the SPSL. Exiled Germans soon flooded into his home in Kensington, London. There is no overstatement in the claim Gooch made in his autobiography: “Few Englishmen, I imagine, received more of these unhappy victims, whose affairs henceforth claimed a considerable share of my time.”⁹⁸⁰ Gooch not only assisted German exiles, but he befriended them. “He felt for them, indeed with them.”⁹⁸¹ Meanwhile, Stefan Berger notes that there is no evidence that Dawson either assisted the SPSL or had contacts with exiled Germans in Britain. Dawson’s refusal to assist German exiles seems rather cruel when one considers that his revered mentor and father-in-law Dr. Emil Muensterberg was Jewish—albeit a convert to Protestantism. Britons certainly did not embrace exiled communities with much enthusiasm in the 1930s. Britain’s Jewish community, for instance, had to assure the British government that it would meet all the costs associated with resettling Jewish exiles from

⁹⁷⁸ Curiously, Rheinbaben wrote two articles for the *Contemporary Review*. Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 290-291.

⁹⁷⁹ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 101.

⁹⁸⁰ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 297-298.

⁹⁸¹ The German-born historian Frank Eyck remembered with fondness an interview with Gooch, when the latter asked him about conditions in Germany, after Eyck had arrived in Gooch’s home in 1936. Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 414-415.

Nazi Germany.⁹⁸² As Panikos Panayi notes, “exiles ... faced much hostility.” Certainly, anti-Semitism and anti-alienism combined “to limit the numbers which entered the country.”⁹⁸³ Thus, what appeared to Gooch as charitable solidarity was to Dawson and others excessive concern for unwelcome outsiders.⁹⁸⁴

Like Beazley, Dawson worked to dismiss concerns about National Socialism. His tendency, even before the war, to trust in an immutable national character led him to miss the ideological “break which had occurred in 1933 and made him [advance] rather artificial continuities.”⁹⁸⁵ Certainly, Dawson believed in “national souls,” and his own work as an historian arose in no small measure from his desire to understand them so as to better advance “civic morality.”⁹⁸⁶ Clearly, civil liberty, democracy, and constitutionalism did not feature in Dawson’s construction of a German national soul/identity. Instead, his earlier fascination with anti-democratic forces, such as Treitschke and Bismarck, continued to inform how he viewed Germany. From Treitschke, Dawson took his admiration for German national efficiency, state authority, “and his belief that democratic self-government was not suited to Germany.” Meanwhile, he ranked Bismarck, to whom he had sent his book on *State Socialism* and whom he had visited at Friedrichsruh in 1892, as the ablest and most talented statesman of contemporary history.⁹⁸⁷ Party factionalism in Weimar Germany contrasted unfavourably, at least, for Dawson, with Bismarck’s adroit statecraft. This factionalism had in fact made state authoritarianism necessary, and Dawson commended the new rule as “wise

⁹⁸² Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 101.

⁹⁸³ Panikos Panayi, “Germans in Britain’s History,” in *Germans in Britain since 1500*, ed. Panikos Panayi (London: Hambledon Press, 1996), 10.

⁹⁸⁴ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 102.

⁹⁸⁵ See WHD 234: letter Edgar Gardner, Hon. Secretary, Ethnological Society, to W. H. Dawson, 10 October 1912. By 1933, Dawson had come to believe that authoritarianism (akin to Bismarckian Germany) was a suitable model for Germany’s curious traditions and history. Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 105.

⁹⁸⁶ W. H. Dawson, *Problems of the Peace* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1918), 344.

⁹⁸⁷ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 112.

and humane.”⁹⁸⁸ Dawson believed that the Nazis had saved their kinfolk from ruin, confusion, and moral decay. For that reason, he was inclined to overlook brutish criminality, state violence, and vicious intimidation. By then, he had come to believe that authoritarianism was better suited to Germany’s internal conditions, history, and tradition than was democracy.⁹⁸⁹ Beazley, even more than Dawson, could be blamed for having endorsed Nazism. He was a constant visitor to National Socialist Germany, where he was ever keen to meet and dine with influential Nazis.⁹⁹⁰ He even went so far as to denounce statements about concentration camps as “slanderous.”⁹⁹¹ Beazley believed that it was only natural that Britain should have cordial relations with Germany. The Germans and British were kinfolk, and the Germans constituted “the finest, most virile and valuable [stock] on the continent.” Of Hitler, he commented: “with such a man, and with such a force as Germany ... we cannot maintain our [indifferent] attitude.”⁹⁹²

Dawson’s attitude seems enigmatic in light of his own “Liberal credentials and his wartime insistence on a democratized Germany.”⁹⁹³ Between 1915 and 1919, he argued that constitutional reform and democratization would revitalize and rehabilitate Germany. Indeed, democratic reform had been his main concern during the war. Moreover, in March 1919, he had hailed the Weimar Constitution as “a new beginning in [the] national life.” The new constitution secured for its citizens a degree of freedom not hitherto known and removed “the entire paraphernalia of the past semi-absolutism.”⁹⁹⁴ Once his main concern for democratization had been achieved, he saw as his new task the revision of what he believed was an unfair, discriminatory, and excessive Treaty. This

⁹⁸⁸ WHD 2144/12: W. H. Dawson, “Englische Urteile über deutsche Probleme,” *Deutsche Rundschau* (April 1934): 8

⁹⁸⁹ WHD 2144/12: Dawson, “Englische Urteile über deutsche Probleme,” 8.

⁹⁹⁰ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 103.

⁹⁹¹ WHD 1418: letter C. Raymond Beazley to W. H. Dawson, 1 January 1935.

⁹⁹² Reported in the *Anglo-German Review*, January 1938. Quoted in Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 278.

⁹⁹³ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 104.

⁹⁹⁴ Dawson, “The Constitution of New Germany,” 321.

obsession would soon override other concerns, and his earlier insistence for constitutional reform and democratization were to alter considerably.⁹⁹⁵

Stefan Berger notes that after 1933, British attitudes towards Nazi Germany were divided between those who believed that other nations should embrace democracy, and those who conceded that other states might chose different, even authoritarian governments should those be better suited to their traditions and history.⁹⁹⁶ By 1933, Dawson had come to believe that an authoritarian government was better suited to the internal conditions of Germany: “in Germany, unlike in Britain, [democracy] has never developed any firm roots, so that its dissolution ... only means adapting to [different] conditions.”⁹⁹⁷ Dawson condemned the former government as “a house divided against itself.” Its decision-makers had been more faithful to their ideologies than to Germany. Surely, Nazism would reverse this trend and would rank before all else national well-being and revisionism.⁹⁹⁸ Nazism made little difference to Dawson’s views; in fact, to him the regime seemed to be doing something constructive to redress these grievances.⁹⁹⁹ Hitler was confident, determined, “and ... bold.” His intervention had “saved Germany,” and he might well still save Europe. Actually, what attracted Dawson to National Socialism differed little from what fascinated Beazley. Mainly, ideas about self-sacrifice, duty, and dedication, the view that the Nazis would restore Germany, anti-Bolshevism, and above all the idea that the National Socialists could secure revisions to the Versailles Treaty.¹⁰⁰⁰ Moreover, Dawson was attracted to Nazism because

⁹⁹⁵ Richard Griffiths notes that after 1919, Dawson became obsessed with the injustice he saw as having been done to Germany, and that his views on revision exceeded most other revisionist writers. Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 142.

⁹⁹⁶ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 104.

⁹⁹⁷ WHD 2144/12: W. H. Dawson, “Englische Urteile über deutsche Probleme,” *Deutsche Rundschau* (April 1934): 8.

⁹⁹⁸ WHD 2144/95: W. H. Dawson, “Why Young Germany Follows Hitler,” 262.

⁹⁹⁹ Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 142.

¹⁰⁰⁰ WHD 2144/38: W. H. Dawson, “Hitler’s Challenge,” *The Nineteenth Century and After* (April 1936); and Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 142.

he believed that Hitler's methods, at least, in international affairs, could secure a more favourable, less vindictive Treaty.

It seemed to Dawson, Beazley, and other likeminded observers, that National Socialism had restored to the Germans their self-worth, dignity, and confidence. To them, Nazism looked "as moral regeneration which would lead to a [more] stable," orderly, and affluent Germany.¹⁰⁰¹ Dawson's views on Nazi Germany would eventually lead to a breach with his more liberal-minded friends, such as Gooch, who refused to condone or tolerate National Socialism.¹⁰⁰² Gooch was steadfast in his objection to Nazi brutality and devoted considerable effort to assisting its victims. Yet, like Dawson, Beazley, and others, he continued to endorse German claims for territorial revisions to the Versailles Treaty, even under the Nazis. To that effect, he commissioned an article from Dawson in March 1933. He asked his contributor to "deal not only with Versailles, but with the other parts of the settlement, as well ... I feel that the claim of the Little Entente to keep their frontiers is as great a difficulty as Germany's demand for a change in the Polish Corridor."¹⁰⁰³ Gooch realized the numerous obstacles that hindered revision. Even so, he believed that any effort made in this direction would be worthwhile, even if such a course would benefit Nazi Germany. His attitude was based on a distinction between the regime and the citizenry. Moreover, he retained the conviction that reason might eventually disarm barbarity—that reconciliation and revision could strengthen the more moderate forces within Germany.¹⁰⁰⁴

Dawson's article, which was issued in July, was rather more favourable to the Nazis and their claims than the situation warranted, and like enough went too far for Gooch. Still, Gooch saw

¹⁰⁰¹ Berger, "William Harbutt Dawson," 102.

¹⁰⁰² WHD 1606: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 19 November 1936; see also WHD 1424: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 19 January 1935 and WHD 1567: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 4 May 1936.

¹⁰⁰³ WHD 1272: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 30 March 1933.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Largely, these forces remained unidentified. Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 410.

fit that it should be made available for distribution. Dawson condemned Sir Austen Chamberlain for having led a discussion in the Commons “on the Nazi excesses in Germany.” Especially, since the latter had failed to denounce Poland for having committed similar crimes against Polish Jews and denationalized Germans.¹⁰⁰⁵ What Dawson found most regrettable was that some members seemed to delight in, and even welcome, the idea that recent events might be used to forestall treaty revision. He doubted whether these members had ever considered the ideas, origins, and motives behind Nazism. Directly, the movement dated from the unfair, discriminatory, and inimical Versailles Treaty. Nazism, he claimed, was less about any definite ideas or aims than an expression of distress, misery, and national discomfort “due to the crushing territorial [annexations] and economic” fines and sanctions enforced on Germany.¹⁰⁰⁶

Gradually, the National Socialists had rallied the malcontent to their cause and seized control. Presently, “we see in office” an authoritarian regime, “the republic threatened, [and] the moderate elements ... everywhere silenced and overridden.” The main issue now was to understand the causes that had created and emboldened Nazism. Thus, the moral was “not that a rational revision ... would be dangerous,” but that it was the only means by which to secure continental security. Dawson then enumerated the annexations and territorial re-adjustments that the allied Powers had been forced on Germany. Chiefly, these had benefited France and Poland, but also Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Belgium, and Denmark, while in addition to this Germany’s colonies had been seized and divided between the victorious Powers. Regrettably, in his view, influential Nazis had threatened “violent measures” in order to breakdown “the restraints which encircled and disarmed their country.” Yet how did this differ from other national “liberation

¹⁰⁰⁵ Dawson took notable offence with Sir Austen Chamberlain. W. H. Dawson, “The Urgency of Treaty Revision,” *The Contemporary Review* 144 (July 1933): 15.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Dawson, “The Urgency of Treaty Revision,” 15-18.

movements?” Doubtless then, blame for recent untoward events did “not fall altogether on one side.”¹⁰⁰⁷

Dawson’s monograph *Germany Under the Treaty*, published in 1933, indicated ten areas in which territorial revision was necessary. The work was a systematic effort to discredit and condemn the settlement. The conference itself was denounced for its restrictive, secretive, and obstructive negotiations. The French were determined to surround Germany with “hostile states, old and new, all augmented at its expense,” and united in their desire to constrain “the fallen titan ... permanently.” Correctly, Dawson identified the motive behind this determination—to shift future German aggression from western to eastern Europe, an arrangement that was advantageous to France. The French, however, did not abandon their new eastern allies, and Clemenceau without hesitation endorsed all Polish territorial claims “to German lands made during the Conference.” The evidence used to sustain these claims was “one-sided and inaccurate,” and some documents were even falsified deliberately. Dawson was convinced that had Lloyd George not intervened, Poland would have annexed eastern Germany. Fervently, Dawson defended Lloyd George’s record in Paris, “the British Prime Minister did more than any other [delegate] to reduce in number and” harshness the defects of the Treaty. Lloyd George went to Paris with the intention to make “what reasonable, forward-looking” individuals would have then considered a fair and even-handed Peace Treaty. If the final result did not realize this intention, fault should not be attributed to Lloyd George. Rather, Dawson directed his ire at Clemenceau and André Tardieu. The settlement ranked as a masterful achievement for France and Poland, and as a “defeat for ... “fraternity,” charity, and reconciliation.”¹⁰⁰⁸

¹⁰⁰⁷ Dawson believed that it was in the east that the annexations were “felt to be most intolerable.” Dawson, “The Urgency of Treaty Revision,” 15-18.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Dawson, *Germany under the Treaty*, 30-35 and 87-88.

Thereafter, Dawson justified, one-by-one, the German claims to the territories it had lost under the Treaty. Doubtless, the most urgent matter was to readjust Germany's borders in the East. Briefly, he took no issue as such with the new States created under the Treaty, nor the arrangements concerning Alsace-Lorraine, Posen, and North Schleswig; but, on the other hand, the Corridor as far south as the Netze line should be returned to Prussia, "subject to territorial and economic concessions to Poland," and Danzig, likewise, should be restored to the German Reich. Silesia remained an unsettled issue and here the author recommended arbitration as a viable solution. Dawson endorsed referendums for all the other contested territories: these being conducted under "drastic conditions" to ensure "freedom from illicit influences."¹⁰⁰⁹ Dawson believed that voting should be restricted to inhabitants "who were resident or domiciled in these territories" between 1914 and 1918—he meant to exclude all later settlers. Germany, as well, should once more be a colonial Power. Finally, Dawson offered a crude solution for the minorities issue, "not only in the Corridor but wherever else minorities exist, when all that is feasible has been done to reduce their numbers," accommodation should be made to transfer national minorities to their kin-state, as had been done in Greece and Turkey.¹⁰¹⁰

Germany under the Treaty was released mere months after Hitler had consolidated his control in Germany, and while some reviewers commented on the fact that it would be difficult to come to any arrangement with the National Socialists, most commended "so established an authority ... on German affairs as Mr. Dawson."¹⁰¹¹ Readily, reviewers noted that Dawson's recent visit to the eastern frontier rendered his views more valuable than other such works on treaty

¹⁰⁰⁹ The contested territories being the Saar Valley, Eupen and Malmedy, Hultschin Land, and Memel.

¹⁰¹⁰ Dawson, *Germany under the Treaty*, 407-411.

¹⁰¹¹ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, "Germany under the Treaty by W. H. Dawson," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 12, no. 5 (September 1933): 677. See also WHD 2152/132: *Week-End Review*, 24 June 1933.

revision.¹⁰¹² From May to June 1931, Dawson toured Germany, collecting the data and information that he would use as evidence in his survey. Dr. Gärtner was instrumental in arranging Dawson's visit to eastern Germany, and she assisted him in writing *Germany under the Treaty* in 1931 and 1932. She read and edited his drafts and offered her own ideas for his consideration. Moreover, she forwarded Dawson's drafts for comment to the German Foreign Office. Later, when the book failed to secure an English publisher, the German Foreign Office subsidized its publication; thereafter, a further subsidy, allowed for a second edition in 1934. However, this time, the author was asked to include certain additions that were favourable to the National Socialists.¹⁰¹³ Dawson was inclined to accommodate this solicitation and offered a straightforward defence for Nazi Germany:

Since that coming to Power of the National Socialist Government, an epoch-making event which history will date from [30 January 1933], Germany has passed through the first stages of a political, social, and moral change so fundamental that it can almost be said that the nation is being born again.¹⁰¹⁴

Stefan Berger identifies five reasons for Dawson's readiness to accommodate Nazism, but two stand out most clearly. First, his single-minded concern for revision, which meant that he could not differentiate between his earlier commitment to constitutional reform and a fascist autocracy; and second, his belief that *Deutschtum* was a cultural curiosity, rather than an extremist doctrine even in Nazi Germany. Dawson believed in an immutable German national character, and this belief led him to construct national attributes abstracted from his reading of German history. In fact, the only time when his worldview came under serious strain was during the Great War, when he insisted on constitutional and democratic reform. However, his interwar obsession with revision

¹⁰¹² John W. Wheeler-Bennett thought that the value of Dawson's work was "enhanced by the fact that it [was] based on" his recent tour of eastern Germany. Wheeler-Bennett, "German under the Treaty by W. H. Dawson," 677.

¹⁰¹³ Berger, "William Harbutt Dawson," 97-98.

¹⁰¹⁴ Quoted in Berger, "William Harbutt Dawson," 98.

led him to abandon his earlier calls for democratization. There are several additional reasons for his volte-face. First, Dawson never really embraced a German Republic, and doubted whether “this form of government is suited to the genius of the national character, as it is certainly not conformable to national traditions.” Second, he criticized “the multiplicity of Parties” as “the great misfortune in German Political Life,” since it offered no basis for either an electoral majority or even a stable coalition.¹⁰¹⁵ Finally, Dawson started to question whether democratic rule was suited to other societies, which in turn led him to doubt its universality. Steadily, he came to see democratic rule as irreconcilable with Germany’s distinctive customs, traditions, and history. To Dawson, National Socialism better embodied “German tradition ... than [did] the Weimar Republic which had always remained alien to German national character.”¹⁰¹⁶

Dawson’s reversion from sometime critic to an uncritical advocate owed much to his unbroken belief in a fixed German national character (or, Germanness). Indeed, he came to see National Socialism as the rightful successor to Bismarckian Germany. In this respect, his conclusions were not far removed from the German emigre historians, or of British historians, such as A. J. P. Taylor and Wickham Steed, whose work treated Nazism not as an “evanescent” aberration but as a culmination rooted in an aggressive ideology traceable in German history since the time of Frederick the Great.¹⁰¹⁷ The latter came to condemn Germany for having diverted from a track so well-travelled—that is, autocratic absolutism to liberal democracy. Dawson’s Germany, however, could assert its difference brashly. Dawson came to believe that national efficiency, which he associated with dictatorial rule, was worthier than the “democratic amateurism” at work

¹⁰¹⁵ Dawson, “The End and the Beginning,” 637-639; and Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 111.

¹⁰¹⁶ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 104-111.

¹⁰¹⁷ H. Wickham Steed, “From Frederick the Great to Hitler: The Consistency of German Aims,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 17, no. 5 (September-October 1938): 672-673; A. J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945); Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 55; Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 112.

in Britain. Berger concludes that his concern with moral “degeneration and social dissolution before 1914 turned in the First World War to an obsession with moral renewal, which he ... defined in terms of authority, discipline, and hard work.” Then, too, his anti-Bolshevik, anti-Slavic, and “anti-Semitic sentiments also revealed ideological affinities to Nazism.” Thus, it was more than a mere desire for treaty revision that drove Dawson to endorse National Socialism. Indeed, fellow conciliators such as Gooch could be fervent anti-Nazis.¹⁰¹⁸

Dawson’s anti-Communism was then well known, but it is evident that he was also anti-Slavic and anti-Semitic. Notably, he never condemned the National Socialists for their wanton anti-Semitism. Instead, he derided British statesmen, editors, and columnists who condemned anti-Semitic violence in Germany while failing to censure Poland for the abuse and ill-treatment by which denationalized Germans and “Polish Jews still suffer to-day.”¹⁰¹⁹ Later, besides, he wrote an article entitled “Cromwell and the Jews,” in which he narrated Jewish settlement in Britain from their banishment in 1290 down to 1656, when Oliver Cromwell rescinded this edict during the Interregnum. Dawson recounted the controversies that Cromwell’s action caused and detailed the discrimination that would unfold over the next few centuries.¹⁰²⁰ Berger is correct to assume that the lesson here is all too clear: the historic treatment of Jews in Britain “had been none too honourable, and hence one should not be too harsh on the Germans.”¹⁰²¹ Dawson wrote to the *Manchester Guardian* in May 1934 to once more condemn the British news media for having distorted and fabricated events in Germany, arguing that had the Germans been “treated by our Press with understanding, if not with sympathy, I am convinced that even the Jewish Question would not have been raised in the way we know.” He referred his readers to two articles that he

¹⁰¹⁸ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 108-113.

¹⁰¹⁹ Dawson, “The Urgency of Treaty Revision,” 15.

¹⁰²⁰ WHD 2144/9: W. H. Dawson, “Cromwell and the Jews,” *The Quarterly Review*, dxxii (October 1934): 269-286.

¹⁰²¹ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 108-109.

had written for *Deutsche Rundschau*,

In which I deal quite frankly with the Jewish Question. I told the editor that I could not write on the subject unless free to do so, and he agreed ... Not a word has been omitted or modified, and the only reason is that I refrained from ill-informed recrimination and presented the German government decently.¹⁰²²

Berger reveals that the German censor did not need to cut much from Dawson's articles because his views differed little from what was then the official line in Nazi Germany. Dawson would have certainly endeared himself to his German audience when he claimed that the "Jewish Question" was "a domestic concern for Germany," and that the issue should be discussed in an "unemotional way." He even went so far as to claim that the Jews had exercised an undue influence in Germany, and that this had been detrimental to the national well-being. Besides, it was only natural that an authority, "whose highest aim is national unity," should exclude unassimilated minorities.¹⁰²³

Dawson offered a few mild criticisms, but he did not include any text that contested anti-Semitic conventions in Nazi Germany. Hans Grimm, a German writer, whose 1926 novel, *Volk ohne Raum*, was used as a call to action in Nazi Germany, wrote an introduction to the first article in which he hinted that Dawson's views "could in fact serve as a basis for [an] ... understanding between Britain and Germany." Britons and Germans shared "the same blood," racial inheritance, and achievement, and thus were destined "to dominate the world." Grimm believed that the two nations were burdened to retain their racial character amid "the ever-growing masses."¹⁰²⁴ There still remained more than a few Britons who believed in a shared cultural inheritance, and Grimm's views would not have been dismissed lightly. Nor would his social Darwinism have been

¹⁰²² WHD 1353: letter W. H. Dawson to the *Manchester Guardian*, 25 May 1934.

¹⁰²³ Berger, "William Harbutt Dawson," 109-110; WHD 2144/12: article W. H. Dawson, "Englische Urteile über deutsche Probleme," *Deutsche Rundschau* (April 1934).

¹⁰²⁴ Berger, "William Harbutt Dawson," 109-111; WHD 2144/13: article Hans Grimm, "Begleitworte eines Deutschen zu 'Englische Urteilen über deutsche Probleme,'" *Deutsche Rundschau* (April 1934).

considered too outlandish in interwar Britain.¹⁰²⁵ Many Britons would still have understood the nation, nationality, and citizenship in racialist terms.¹⁰²⁶ Moreover, there existed a social anti-Semitism, well-established within the aristocracy, churches, and universities. Yet this sentiment was not limited to these institutions. As the satirist and broadcaster, Malcolm Muggeridge would write: “anti-Semitism was in the air: an unmistakable tang.”¹⁰²⁷ British Jews faced discrimination in advertisements and were often excluded from social clubs and athletic associations; anti-Semitic characters and clichés were common in commercial media.¹⁰²⁸

The British establishment shared in this informal and furtive anti-Semitism. Harold Nicolson once confessed: “although I loathe anti-Semitism, I do dislike the Jews.” Later, he recorded a conversation in which Lady Astor was said to have told a rival: “only a Jew like you would *dare* to be rude to me.”¹⁰²⁹ Sir Horace Rumbold, British ambassador to Germany (1928-1933), stated bluntly: “I hate Jews.”¹⁰³⁰ As Berger notes, while anti-Semitism doubtless afflicted fashionable society, “it was largely unobtrusive.”¹⁰³¹ Colin Holmes is blunter, in truth “there were individuals ... who could embrace anti-Semitism without becoming ... debilitated or turned inside-out emotionally.” Thus, the British establishment refused to tolerate civil disorder or violent anti-Semitic outbursts. Indeed, while the National Socialists were enacting the Nuremberg Laws, which excluded Jews from the German nation, Whitehall introduced the Public Order Act (1936)—a measure designed to curb fascism and its attendant features, such as active anti-Semitism, which

¹⁰²⁵ Richard Weikart, “The Role of Darwinism in Nazi Racial Thought,” *German Studies Review* 36, no. 3 (October 2013): 537-556.

¹⁰²⁶ Caroline Knowles, *Race, Discourse, and Labourism* (London: Routledge, 1992), 66-67; Colin Holmes, “Anti-Semitism and the BUF,” in *British Fascism: Essays on the Radical Right in Inter-War Britain*, ed. Kenneth Lunn and Richard C. Thurlow (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980), 114-115, 124-125.

¹⁰²⁷ Malcolm Muggeridge, *The Thirties: 1930-1940 in Britain* (London: H. Hamilton, 1940), 243.

¹⁰²⁸ Gisela C. Lebzelter, *Political Anti-Semitism in England, 1918-1939* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), 32-34.

¹⁰²⁹ Harold Nicolson, *Diaries and Letters, 1930-1939* (London: Collins, 1966), 53 and 327; and Harold Nicolson, *Diaries and Letters, 1939-1945* (London: Collins, 1967), 469.

¹⁰³⁰ Martin Gilbert, *Sir Horace Rumbold: Portrait of a Diplomat, 1869-1941* (London: Heinemann, 1973), 49.

¹⁰³¹ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 110.

was seen as “a menace to democratic freedom.”¹⁰³²

The fact remains that the British establishment never saw fit to enact anti-Semitic laws, as in National Socialist Germany, even though “some individuals within its elite shared in the casual, non-theoretical anti-Semitism which [then existed] in Britain.” As a result, there was no formal mandate in Britain that barred Jewish settlers from entry, no statute that denied British Jews their nationality, and no official directives that restricted the careers or vocations available to Jews. When overt anti-Semitism started to threaten the established order in the 1930s, through its link with fascism, it is little wonder that the British state mobilized all “its resources to contain [and remove that menace] it all its manifestations.”¹⁰³³ Yet establishment figures, such as Dawson and Beazley, continued to find excuses for Nazi anti-Semitism. As noted above, some commentators insisted that the Jews exercised excessive influence over German society, while others rationalized anti-Semitic measures with reference to the numerous unassimilated Jews then resident in eastern Germany.¹⁰³⁴ Moreover, those who excused Nazi abuses often contrasted favourably anti-Semitic discrimination in the Third Reich with “the far worse atrocities” being committed in Soviet Russia.¹⁰³⁵ This focus allowed observers to belittle Nazi anti-Semitism. Indeed, anti-Semitism was never condemned in the same harsh terms as the atheistic Soviet crimes directed against Christians.¹⁰³⁶ Finally, such commentators remarked that the ‘Jewish Question’ was an internal matter for Germany, and that Britain should neither advise nor censure the National Socialists.¹⁰³⁷

Gooch took a strikingly different view. Germany’s state structure was not his concern, “that

¹⁰³² Holmes, “Anti-Semitism and the BUF,” 124-125; and Lebzelter, *Political Anti-Semitism in England*, 42.

¹⁰³³ Holmes, “Anti-Semitism and the BUF,” 124-125.

¹⁰³⁴ Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 71 and 339.

¹⁰³⁵ Berger, “Williams Harbutt Dawson,” 110; and Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 76. See also Lord Winterton, letter to *The Times* (London: UK), 13 January 1936. Winterton asked Wickham Steed why he did not condemn “the terrible cruelties ... in Soviet Russia” as he did in Nazi Germany.

¹⁰³⁶ Brian Stanley, *Christianity in the Twentieth Century: A World History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 157.

¹⁰³⁷ “Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 110.

was its own affair.” He cared little for whether it was a democracy, constitutional monarchy, or a dictatorial autocracy. What disturbed him was the fact that Germany had become unmoored from civilization, society, and lawful reality. Nazism was a direct threat to *Whig* historiography.¹⁰³⁸ Gooch was certain that history was the account “not merely, and indeed not chiefly, of the change from [absolute rule] to liberty, but of the advance from crude methods of violence to the reign of law.” The Nazis were a threat to liberty, freedom, and society, “not because they disbelieve in democracy, but because they are fundamentally uncivilized.” Gooch viewed Nazi anti-Semitism as a foul stain and counted the Nazi attacks on Jews as the first object-lesson that a fanatical totalitarianism “had been installed in Berlin.”¹⁰³⁹ While Gooch was not misled about the cruelties being committed in Germany, it took him some time to realize the scale of Hitler’s true intentions for Europe. In June 1934, he reviewed a book entitled *Hitler over Europe*, in which the author envisioned Nazi bomber aircraft over Britain.¹⁰⁴⁰ Gooch thought that the work “suffered from exaggeration.” He believed, at least, initially, that the National Socialists were justified in their efforts to revise the Treaty. However, he failed to see that any concessions made to Germany after 1933 were bound to bolster the Nazis. As late as July 1935, Gooch stated at the National Peace Congress in London that territorial revision was the reason for rearmament in Germany.¹⁰⁴¹ The Germans wanted to be secure and solid when the time came the “for [such] revision.”¹⁰⁴² Frank Eyck is sure that while this was correct, “it did not tell the whole story,” since revision was but one reason for rearmament.¹⁰⁴³ Gooch would later criticize his own earlier outlook: “a few shrewd

¹⁰³⁸ Michael Bentley, *Modernizing England’s Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 156.

¹⁰³⁹ Gooch, “The Terror in Germany,” 131.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 417; Ernest Henri, *Hitler over Europe* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1934), 237-238.

¹⁰⁴¹ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 417.

¹⁰⁴² “National Peace Congress: Dr. Gooch and Sir N. Angell on Treaty Revision; Lord Allen on Collective Security,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, UK), 2 July 1935.

¹⁰⁴³ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 417.

observers sensed that [remilitarization] was the first step towards German domination in Europe, as we now know it to have been, but I was not among them.”¹⁰⁴⁴

In the meantime, Gooch continued to commission articles on revision for the *CR*. Mostly, because he was determined to discriminate between the brutal regime and its citizenry, even those who had in recent elections voted for the National Socialists. Surely, a substantial number of electors were idealists whose sole aim was to see their nation restored.¹⁰⁴⁵ Gooch’s efforts to secure revision attracted attention from the officialdom in Nazi Germany. Partly, because he endured in his efforts to effect treaty revision, but also in order to silence or at least neutralize his criticism, the Nazis continued with their initiatives to win his endorsement. For a second time, he received Werner, Baron von Rheinbaben at his home in London in July 1936. Rheinbaben was once more unable to convince Gooch, but he was invited to outline his case in the *Contemporary Review*.¹⁰⁴⁶

Sometime between his two interviews with Rheinbaben, Gooch was introduced to an even more notorious figure, Konrad Henlein, leader for the Sudeten German Party. Henlein wrote to Gooch in December 1935, to thank him for his kindness and for his interest in the “Sudeten-German Question.” He looked forward to future communications and wondered whether he could write to Gooch in the New Year.¹⁰⁴⁷ Henlein wasted little time and two months he later wrote to Gooch to solicit his counsel on how best to deal with a recent bill introduced in Czechoslovakia. He was sure that the new measure was unconstitutional and wanted Gooch’s advice before he submitted a formal petition to the LON.¹⁰⁴⁸ Gooch was careful to balance his desire for revision with his aversion for the domestic situation in Nazi Germany. This is where he differed most from

¹⁰⁴⁴ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 290.

¹⁰⁴⁵ G. P. Gooch (ed.), *In Pursuit of Peace* (London: Methuen and Co Ltd, 1933), 1-15.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Werner, Baron von Rheinbaben, “German Foreign Policy,” *The Contemporary Review* 150 (July 1936): 394-406. Gooch received an introduction from Dufour-Feronce dated 27 June 1936, and one from Lord Lothian on 9 July. He met with Rheinbaben sometime after 11 July.

¹⁰⁴⁷ GPP 358: letter Konrad Henlein to G. P. Gooch, 19 December 1935.

¹⁰⁴⁸ GPP 359: letter Konrad Henlein to G. P. Gooch, 9 February 1936.

fellow revisionist historians such as Dawson, Toynbee, and Beazley. Now more than ever, he sensed that there were two Germanies. His distinction between Germany, on the one hand, and the Nazis, on the other, was carried so far that he exhorted the Jewish-German banker Paul von Schwabach, during his last visit to Berlin in 1933, not to abandon his country. Schwabach recalled Gooch's remark in a letter to him in December 1934 and added: "I was struck and moved and did ... not give a clear-cut answer. I may do so now; my answer is simple: I have lived as a German, and I shall die as a German."¹⁰⁴⁹

Gooch stated his attitude most clearly in his letters to Dawson, with whom he had ceased to see eye-to-eye on Germany.¹⁰⁵⁰ Ostensibly, Gooch declined an article from Dawson on German affairs in January 1935 because the subject was well-treated in the next two issues:

If you can wait a bit and then write for the C.R., I must ask you to abstain from vindication or palliation of the misdeeds of the Nazis. I cannot allow the C.R. to suggest approval of the German and Italian tyrannies, as it has always stood and stands today for political and intellectual liberty. I do not suggest you would defend wrong, but I think it best to say how I feel in order that you may know in good time.¹⁰⁵¹

Steadily, Gooch was to introduce a much stricter line at the *Contemporary Review*. Nonetheless, he still continued to feature articles on revisionism. Particularly, articles and reviews submitted from abroad, such as from Germany. Dawson's situation was a little different, "as he was an old contributor ... and was known to have close ties with Gooch."¹⁰⁵² When Dawson received a doctorate *honoris causa* from the Universität Königsberg in 1936, Gooch sent him "warm congratulations" on a "great and well-deserved honour."¹⁰⁵³ Dawson's German contacts tried hard to convince him that he should attend the conferment ceremony.

¹⁰⁴⁹ GPP 751: letter Paul von Schwabach to G. P. Gooch, 22 December 1934.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 418-419.

¹⁰⁵¹ H. Powys Greenwood was invited to write on nationalism in France and Germany; and Beazley submitted an article on "The Saar." WHD 1424: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 19 January 1935.

¹⁰⁵² Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 418-419.

¹⁰⁵³ WHD 1518: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 5 February 1936.

Albert von Brackmann offered to coordinate a lecture series in Berlin, and Gärtner vowed to do her utmost to schedule visit with Hitler.¹⁰⁵⁴ Nonetheless, Dawson hesitated as to whether he should travel to East Prussia, and he asked Gooch for advice about a visit to Germany. Gooch once more commended his old friend, but wrote that he found it difficult to offer him favourable counsel on this matter:

I love the country and people as much as ever, but, as you know, I detest the crimes of the Nazis. There is a great desire in England to be on good terms with Germany and a growing recognition that Versailles was a tragic mistake. But there can never be full trust and friendship while the outlawing of the Jews, the concentration camps, and other abominations continue. If you, as a *persona gratissima* in Germany, can do anything to civilize the Nazis, your journey would be a blessing to the world. Personally, I could not go to a country and make speeches in which I could not say what I thought.¹⁰⁵⁵

Certainly, German efforts to woo Dawson, Gooch, and others like them did not start in 1933, but were, undoubtedly, intensified thereafter.¹⁰⁵⁶ Gooch in a final letter on the subject was forceful and direct: “I love Germany as much as ever and as much as you do and want fair play—but [there can be] no intimacy with the men now in Power.”¹⁰⁵⁷

¹⁰⁵⁴ WHD 1517: letter Albert von Brackmann to W. H. Dawson, 4 February 1936; WHD 1538: letter Margarete Gärtner to W. H. Dawson, 2 March 1936; and WHD 1563: letter Margarete Gärtner to W. H. Dawson, 20 April 1936.

¹⁰⁵⁵ WHD 1567: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 4 May 1936.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Dawson received several official invitations to visit Nazi Germany: to attend a summer school at Greifswald University in 1935, to a Nuremberg Rally (1935), and to Göttingen University’s bicentenary. WHD 1392: letter Professor Brüskeyi to W. H. Dawson, October 1934; WHD 1470: letter Elwin Wright to W. H. Dawson, 4 September 1935; WHD 1667: letter W. H. Dawson to the Registrar of Oxford University, 23 March 1937. Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 107; Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 417-421; and D. C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies*, 119-123

¹⁰⁵⁷ WHD 1606: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 19 November 1936.

6. “It is Quite Hopeless; They Simply Don’t Understand”: Moral Revisionism, Historical Example, and the Road to Munich, 1938

After 1935, efforts at reconciliation and revision accelerated, as historians and statesmen were forced to react to numerous international crises. Politicians were forced to make swift decisions, which, at different moments, meant that there was little time to consult advisors. Nonetheless, historians such as Dawson, Temperley, Gooch, Beazley, and Toynbee were still in contact with the decision-makers and often affected their mentalities, sometimes even directly. It was in order to secure charity, lenity, and fairness for Germany that led Gooch to serve as President for the National Peace Council (NPC) from 1933 to 1936. This office ensured that he was once more in close contact with the decision-making elite. However, the task he undertook was not without its difficulties. The Council weld together countless affiliated societies, whose activism was the main force that united them.¹⁰⁵⁸ Gooch shared affinities with at least three member institutions: the UDC, with which he had been in contact during the Great War; the Friends Peace Committee, due in some measure to his admiration for the Quakers; and the League of Nations Union (LNU), on whose executive committee he served after an invitation from his old friend Gilbert Murray.¹⁰⁵⁹

Frank Eyck notes that Gooch was much in the news during his Presidency. Particularly, each summer when the National Peace Council held its annual Congress. Gooch delivered the keynote address in 1933 on the situation in Europe.¹⁰⁶⁰ He criticized Clemenceau and Poincaré for having dictated a “Carthaginian Peace” which had created the conditions that enabled Nazism, “the worm was bound to turn.” While he refused to condone the National Socialists, he was careful

¹⁰⁵⁸ Nonetheless, these interests could best be divided into three main areas: Christian Pacifism, the LNU, and anti-war Marxists. Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 292; and Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 411.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 294.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 411.

not to condemn the citizenry, even those who had voted for the Nazis in March. Moreover, he still advocated for revision, but even that been dealt a serious blow: what sane statesman would now see fit to transfer territories, not to mention their inhabitants, to a brutish, vile, and malevolent administration. Nonetheless, Gooch did not wish to see a renewed arms race, which he believed “could only have one end. Drastic limitation with [real] control, however difficult to attain, remains the wisest and safest course for us all.”¹⁰⁶¹

The conference was not without its drama. Dr. Wolfgang Schwarz, a former leader-writer for the SPD-news-sheet *Vorwärts*, asked for and obtained leave to address the assembly. He then went on to defend Nazi anti-Semitism in Germany, which the assembled crowd “received with indignation.” The most astute rebuttal to this anti-Semitic outburst was an address from the former Socialist minister Rudolf Breitscheid, now exiled in Paris.¹⁰⁶² Gooch was so fair-minded that he included both addresses in his edited volume *In Pursuit of Peace*.¹⁰⁶³ The annual conference served as a showcase event for the NPC, and Gooch was to rub shoulders with Sir Arthur Salter, Hugh Dalton, Sir Frederick Whyte, Lord Cecil, Lord Ponsonby, Vera Brittain, George Lansbury, Sir Norman Angell, Arthur Henderson, and Lord Lothian. Similarly, Gooch’s close affiliation with the LNU allowed him to collaborate with other like-minded intellectuals. The executive committee, on which he served, met weekly: there were similar associations in other countries, but none could match their energy, idealism, and confidence. The LNU had as its chairman Gilbert Murray, and at his side sat Lord Cecil, “the most impressive figure in any company.” Lord Dickinson, Lord Rhayader, better known as Leif Jones, David Davies, and Angell were amongst the more senior members. Sir Geoffrey Mander, MP for Wolverhampton East, made sure that any concerns raised

¹⁰⁶¹ Gooch (ed.), *In Pursuit of Peace*, 11-14.

¹⁰⁶² Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 292-294.

¹⁰⁶³ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 413; see also Gooch (ed.), *In Pursuit of Peace*, viii-ix.

in the executive were introduced for debate in Parliament.¹⁰⁶⁴ The local branches, the itinerant lecturers, the summer schools, and town halls, all ensured that this ambitious initiative remained before the country.¹⁰⁶⁵

Between 1934 and 1935, the LNU coordinated an innovative trial in radical democracy. British householders were mailed a survey, which invited them to answer five binary-questions. Eleven and a half million Britons, cast their votes in the “National Declaration on the League of Nations and Armaments,” or to use its less cumbersome title, the “Peace Ballot”. The Peace Ballot afforded the British electorate a chance to communicate to the National Government their views on collective action, disarmament, and the LON. Large majorities favoured universal disarmament, collective security, and economic sanctions; a smaller majority, too, reaffirmed its commitment to coercive action. The results were disclosed to Stanley Baldwin and his foreign secretary, Samuel Hoare, at the Foreign Office in July 1935.¹⁰⁶⁶ The intention behind the famous Peace Ballot was to reaffirm Britain’s commitment to collective security, disarmament, and the LON. It was feared within the LNU that the failure to deliver international disarmament at the Geneva Conference had discredited the LON, and that this frustration could lead the National Government to either reduce or abandon its commitment to the Covenant.¹⁰⁶⁷ The ballot was launched as a bid to revive internationalism, but also to test, and indeed to demonstrate, mass endorsement for the LON.¹⁰⁶⁸

The massive turnout astonished even the LNU, who hailed the ballot as “a constructive democratic

¹⁰⁶⁴ The other members that Gooch took care to mention were the sometime MP and future Nobel Laureate Philip Noel-Baker; the former missionary, abolitionist, and sometime MP John Hobbes Harris; Dorothy Mary (née Paget), Lady Gladstone; the author, diplomat, and Zionist Blanche Dugdale (née Balfour); and the Labour MP Megan Lloyd George.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 291-295.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Helen McCarthy, “Democratizing British Foreign Policy: Rethinking the Peace Ballot, 1934-1935,” *Journal of British Studies* 49, no. 2 (April 2010): 358-360.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Martin Ceadel, “The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934-5,” *English Historical Review* 377, no. 95 (October 1980): 810-811; and McCarthy, “Rethinking the Peace Ballot, 1934-1935,” 358-360.

¹⁰⁶⁸ J. A. Thompson, “The Peace Ballot and the Public,” *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 13, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 381.

experiment of major importance” and “a notable vindication of British democracy.”¹⁰⁶⁹ The notable attention that the LON received from all three Parties in the lead-up to 1935 election was viewed as a testament to ballot’s influence.¹⁰⁷⁰ Moreover, it has even been suggested that the ballot determined the National Government’s reaction to Italian adventurism in 1935.¹⁰⁷¹

Mussolini’s decision to invade Abyssinia in October 1935 caused a major crisis in Europe. British decision-makers had to contend with their nation’s desire to see coercive action against Italy, and their own wish to minimize a breach with France.¹⁰⁷² The 1935 election, scheduled for November, hindered any detailed discussion about the crisis whilst cabinet members canvassed in their constituencies.¹⁰⁷³ British ministers knew that a hard-line against Italy was a vote-winning strategy.¹⁰⁷⁴ Indeed, Leo Amery noted that “it seemed evident that the whole thing figured in [Baldwin’s] mind as a useful aid to the General Election.”¹⁰⁷⁵ It was therefore decided on 11 November that no new efforts should be made towards a settlement until after the election. Even so, this stance was weaker towards Italy than liberal intellectuals would have wished from their government. Gilbert Murray wrote to Baldwin in October, to advocate for collective naval action in order to sever communications between Ethiopia and Italy, and to see whether the cabinet had ruled out this contingency.¹⁰⁷⁶ The government had in fact dismissed this outcome because—like League advocates in Britain—British decision-makers sought only collective action, which in this

¹⁰⁶⁹ Adelaide Livingstone, *The Peace Ballot: The Official History* (London: V. Gollancz Ltd, 1935), 5 and 19.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Remarkably, the League was the most mentioned issue in election addresses. See Tom Stannage, *Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition: The British General Election of 1935* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), app. 4, 291.

¹⁰⁷¹ Ceadel, “The Peace Ballot, 1934-5,” 810.

¹⁰⁷² Andrew Holt, “‘No More Hoares to Paris’: British Foreign Policymaking and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 1383.

¹⁰⁷³ Samuel Hoare, Viscount Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years* (London: Collins, 1954), 176.

¹⁰⁷⁴ R. A. C. Parker, “Great Britain, France, and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-1936,” *The English Historical Review* 89, no. 351 (April 1974): 311.

¹⁰⁷⁵ L. S. Amery, *My Political Life Vol. III: The Unforgiving Years, 1929-1940* (London: Hutchinson, 1955), 176.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Quoted in Parker, “Great Britain, France, and the Ethiopian Crisis,” 312.

context meant coming to an arrangement with a recalcitrant France.¹⁰⁷⁷ Since the government believed that such an agreement was unattainable, it sought first to review the actions available to it through the Covenant. However, electioneering in October and November meant that there was “little or no time for full ministerial discussions” about what sanctions should be enforced on Italy. Nonetheless, “there was strong opposition” to any sanctions that might lead to war between Britain and Mussolini.¹⁰⁷⁸

In December, Sir Samuel Hoare arrived in Paris, to consult with the French Premier Pierre Laval, in order to finalize an offer to Mussolini. Their conversations resulted in the ill-fated Hoare-Laval Pact, to which the British Cabinet assented on 9 December. Eden warned the Cabinet that the scheme would be distasteful to the League, but the Cabinet chose to trust, rather than to disown, Hoare. Baldwin believed that if he disowned Hoare, the French would be resentful, “so we backed him. We did not like it at all, but the alternative seemed to us to be worse.”¹⁰⁷⁹ However, the scheme was soon condemned universally. The liberal establishment was horrified, and the electorate was “indignant and ashamed.” It was felt that the government had won the election less than month earlier on the basis of false claims, and members were soon inundated with indignant letters from their constituents.¹⁰⁸⁰ Rarely, at least in Britain, has there ever been such unified indignation towards a cabinet decision.¹⁰⁸¹ Generally, it was felt that Mussolini should be offered less after his brazen attack against Ethiopia; more would be a reward for aggression.¹⁰⁸² Geoffrey Dawson voiced the nation’s anger in several leading articles. He called for “justice between the disputants,”

¹⁰⁷⁷ Parker, “Great Britain, France, and the Ethiopian Crisis,” 312-313.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years*, 176-177.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Thomas Jones, *A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 159.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Anthony Eden, *Facing the Dictators* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), 344. See also, G. M. Young, *Stanley Baldwin* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1952), 217.

¹⁰⁸¹ John Buchan, Baron Tweedsmuir, wrote from Ottawa, “I don’t profess to understand exactly what happened ... but what seems plain is that public opinion suddenly took a hand in directing the game, which is a most interesting phenomenon and proves that after all we are a genuine democracy.” Quoted in Young, *Stanley Baldwin*, 217.

¹⁰⁸² Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, *Baldwin: A Biography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 886.

and an assurance from the government that “force shall not be” rewarded, nor allowed “to defeat reason.” Clearly, the government had failed to forecast attitudes in Britain. Precisely, “the same voices” were being “heard throughout the Empire.” Dawson insisted that any scheme which rewarded violence would cause “bitter disillusionment and resentment at home” and would be injurious internationally.¹⁰⁸³ Thereafter, he received a letter from Cosmo Lang, the Archbishop of Canterbury, declaring that the editorial articulated “all that I feel—and strongly: I trust that it will have its influence on the Government.” The Primate was bewildered as to how the government could have abandoned its honour for such humiliation, unless somehow the French were involved, an outlook “which I do not want to entertain.”¹⁰⁸⁴ Similarly, Dawson believed that Britain had sacrificed too much “in [its] effort to reach common ground with France.”¹⁰⁸⁵

Baldwin was soon inundated with critical, condemnatory, and virulent letters. He was at a loss, “feeble, toneless, and unhappy.”¹⁰⁸⁶ The backbenches were close to revolt as members continued to receive irate letters from their constituents. Neville Chamberlain told Hoare that he doubted whether the Cabinet could maintain his agreement with Laval.¹⁰⁸⁷ It was readily agreed in Cabinet that the government should make clear that it was under no obligation to accept the terms negotiated in Paris. Baldwin was able to recover himself and Hoare was made to resign as Foreign Secretary.¹⁰⁸⁸ Eden succeeded him at the Foreign Office, in the move that demonstrated to domestic and foreign observers that Britain had not abandoned collective security nor the LON. Laval soon followed Hoare and announced his resignation on 22 January. However, his successor at the French

¹⁰⁸³ Geoffrey Dawson, “The Way Out,” *The Times* (London, UK), 13 December 1935.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Letter Cosmo Lang to Geoffrey Dawson, 13 December 1935. Quoted in John Evelyn French, *Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times* (London: Hutchinson, 1955), 327.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Dawson, “The Way Out,” *The Times* (London, UK), 13 December 1935.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Young, *Stanley Baldwin*, 217.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Holt, “British Foreign Policymaking and the Abyssinian Crisis,” 1395.

¹⁰⁸⁸ The ministers who called for Hoare’s resignation were Lord Halifax, J. H. Thomas, Walter Elliot, Eustace Percy, and William Ormsby-Gore.

Foreign Ministry, Pierre-Étienne Flandin, adopted a similar line to Laval and continued to obstruct the British government's efforts to meet its electorate's demand for collective action.¹⁰⁸⁹ The crisis further eroded Franco-British relations and even led some to advance fantastical, accusatory theories of Franco-Italian collusion—an emotional narrative that resonated with certain sections of opinion in Britain.¹⁰⁹⁰

The French economist Émile Mireaux observed that British sentiment was clear about France's role in the failure to coerce Italy. The British were convinced that only through French connivance could the Italians have achieved success in Ethiopia.¹⁰⁹¹ France's more muted reaction to Italian adventurism stemmed from its desire to foster amiable relations with Italy. Winston Churchill was more direct: France feared Germany, and it needed Italy.¹⁰⁹² However, its dilatory, half-hearted, and lukewarm reaction to the Italian-Abyssinian war further eroded its relations with Britain. Cecil was convinced that the French had been "short-sighted."¹⁰⁹³ Had France thrown its resources behind the LON, the League could have "succeeded in restraining Italy." The follow-on effect would have been to restrain, or at least limit, German ambitions *vis-à-vis* France. Instead, French actions alienated Britain and offended Italy. Moreover, these actions had weakened the LON.¹⁰⁹⁴ Truly, France had "fallen between two stools."¹⁰⁹⁵ For Gooch, the crisis confirmed "the fatal connection between dictators and [militancy]."¹⁰⁹⁶ Laval's determination to accommodate Mussolini left Gooch disillusioned and downcast, and he bemoaned his own government's decision not to institute sanctions sooner or more forcefully.¹⁰⁹⁷ Nonetheless, he remained steadfast in his

¹⁰⁸⁹ Parker, "Great Britain, France, and the Ethiopian Crisis," 325.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Émile Mireaux, "Anglo-French Relations," *The Nineteenth Century and After* (July 1936): 2.

¹⁰⁹¹ Mireaux, "Anglo-French Relations," 2.

¹⁰⁹² Winston S. Churchill, "France and the League," *The Times* (London, England), 20 April 1936.

¹⁰⁹³ Lord Hugh Cecil, "Britain, France, and Italy," *The Times* (London, England), 16 April 1936.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Lord Hugh Cecil, "Mr. Churchill's Letter," *The Times* (London, England), 23 April 1936.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Cecil, "Britain, France, and Italy," 16 April 1936.

¹⁰⁹⁶ WHD 1477: letter G. P. Gooch to W. H. Dawson, 7 October 1935.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Gooch, *Under Six Reigns*, 292-293.

commitment to concessions and arbitration, ever confident that reason could disarm barbarity. Gooch certainly had his reservations, but he was determined to mediate non-violent solutions and wished to see all unresolved claims addressed fairly. His main concern now was to establish new international machinery to arbitrate claims and to achieve solutions well before tensions escalated and war became inevitable.¹⁰⁹⁸ Others, meanwhile, used the crisis to condemn the outdated and defunct international “and economic *status quo*.”¹⁰⁹⁹ Crucially, the event counted as another setback in interwar Franco-British relations, and revealed how far the two nations had drifted—a fact made clear in March 1936.

British historians continued to view themselves as emissaries whose task it was to mediate better relations between Britain and Germany. This motive counted in Toynbee’s decision to visit with Hitler in 1936. Toynbee had been ensconced at Chatham House since 1926. While his earlier enthusiasm for self-determination had faded, it was for this exact reason that he condemned the Treaty, since the settlement had excluded countless ethnic Germans from Weimar Germany. This familiar line was the exact one that the Germans had used ever since 1919.¹¹⁰⁰ Hitler’s takeover did little to deter Toynbee’s revisionism, and in early 1936, he received an invitation from Fritz Berber to address academic audiences in Bonn, Berlin, and Hamburg.¹¹⁰¹ His address on territorial and colonial revision was well received in Berlin. He informed his audience that the time had come to re-examine whether its former colonies should now be returned to Germany. Daily, serious

¹⁰⁹⁸ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 421.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Lord Lothian, “The League and War,” *The Times* (London, England), 21 April 1936.

¹¹⁰⁰ Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 326.

¹¹⁰¹ Berber was selected to direct the Hamburg *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* in 1934. His treatise on *Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit* earned him an invitation to a conference on collective security at the Royal Institute. Here, he met Toynbee and invited him to address a lecture series in Germany. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s ambassador-at-large, would later serve as an advocate/patron for Berber. Likely, von Ribbentrop found useful his close association with England. Geoffrey Carnall, *Gandhi’s Interpreter: A Life of Horace Alexander* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 113-116.

conversations were being had about what adjustments should be made “between the haves and the have-nots.”¹¹⁰² Toynbee did not see this scheme as a tacit defence for revanchism. His aim was to avert conflict, not to condone it.¹¹⁰³ The civil servant and one-time colonial administrator, Tracy Phillips, informed Toynbee: “your lecture was an eager topic for discussion everywhere. ... Particularly, among businessmen with foreign connections.”¹¹⁰⁴ The address also attracted attention from the Nazi Party.¹¹⁰⁵

Toynbee arrived in Berlin at a tense moment in 1936. Hitler was about to order his forces into the Rhineland, which had been demilitarized since 1919. He certainly understood the risk he was about to undertake with remilitarization. His rearmament initiative was far from finished. To make humiliation less likely, Hitler took measures to conciliate and confuse attitudes in both France and Britain. His first effort to influence opinion came on 26 February, when he granted an extended interview to the French futurist and economist, Bertrand de Jouvenel.¹¹⁰⁶ During their meeting, Hitler made an emotional claim for a Franco-German *rapprochement*. When de Jouvenel asked why he had not revised certain sections of *Mein Kampf*, that seemed inconsistent with this call, Hitler reminded him that the work dated from the Ruhr Crisis and claimed that he was not a writer concerned with correcting his work for a new edition. Should he succeed in securing a Franco-German *rapprochement*, that correction would be well worth his effort. Hitler ended the interview with a statement that indicated that continental reconciliation rested with France:

Today, France can, if she will ... end for ever ... that “German Peril” which your children, from generation to generation, learn to dread ... You have before you a Germany ... whose

¹¹⁰² William H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 171.

¹¹⁰³ Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 328.

¹¹⁰⁴ Tracy Phillips letter to Arnold J. Toynbee, 29 March 1936. Bodleian Library, Toynbee Papers.

¹¹⁰⁵ Berber noted that in one of Toynbee’s lectures, of which he had a transcript, Toynbee commended the national consensus which had been achieved in Nazi Germany. Carnall, *A Life of Horace Alexander*, 115.

¹¹⁰⁶ McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee*, 171-172.

People have complete confidence in their leader, and this leader says to you: “let us be friends.”¹¹⁰⁷

F. R. Gannon tells us that in Britain “reaction to this interview varied from critical [disillusionment] to boundless enthusiasm.”¹¹⁰⁸ The *News Chronicle* advised the French, “who stand the most to lose,” to embrace reconciliation and to trust Hitler.¹¹⁰⁹ However, France was certain to dismiss this offer and thus was doomed to be seen—at least in certain circles—as having behaved churlishly.¹¹¹⁰

Toynbee received a two-hour interview with Hitler on 28 February and returned convinced of Hitler’s “sincerity in desiring peace in Europe and a close friendship with England.” He shared his views with the civil servant and educationalist Thomas Jones, who coordinated for him to submit a memorandum to Baldwin and Eden. Toynbee was with Jones that fateful weekend, when Hitler marched his forces into the Rhineland. Both men reacted naively, and neither seemed too concerned with the new reality.¹¹¹¹ When Toynbee returned to Chatham House, the German-Jewish scholar, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, heard at firsthand how enthralled the British historian was with Hitler, and he was horrified.¹¹¹² Bartholdy, frustrated with Toynbee, and others like him, remarked: “It is quite hopeless; they simply don’t understand.”¹¹¹³ Indeed, the crisis did not deter revisionist historians, who used the occasion to state their views more forcefully. The fact remains that the British had already come to terms with the idea that Germany would in time take action to

¹¹⁰⁷ Quoted in Arnold J. Toynbee and V. M. Boulter, *Survey of International Affairs, 1936* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), 257. Hitler’s interview with Bertrand de Jouvenel was published in the journal *Paris-Midi* on 28 February. Originally, M. de Jouvenel (and Hitler) intended that the interview should be published on 27 February, in time to exert some influence over the French deputies who were about to cast their vote for (or against) a Franco-Soviet Pact. Toynbee and Boulter, *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, 257.

¹¹⁰⁸ Gannon, *The British Press and Germany*, 92.

¹¹⁰⁹ First Leader, *News Chronicle*, 2 March 1936.

¹¹¹⁰ Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 199.

¹¹¹¹ Jones, *A Diary with Letters*, 181.

¹¹¹² Jonathan Haslam, *The Spectre of War: International Communism and the Origins of World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022), 258.

¹¹¹³ Felix Gilbert, *A European Past: Memoirs 1905-1945* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 169-170.

alter its status in the Rhineland. The reasons for the demilitarization clause—French security and a desire to avoid an increase in armaments on the Rhine—were either dismissed or overlooked, and the clause that forbid German soldiers in Cologne or Mainz was seen “in itself as irritating as [would be] an exclusion to move English soldiers to Colchester or Chatham.” Besides, it was felt that the disarmament clause was now obsolete since the Allies had abandoned their own assurances to disarm.¹¹¹⁴ Hoare remembered that the overall attitude towards the remilitarization crisis was indifference. “What justification could there be for a ... war to uphold an out-of-date clause of the Versailles Treaty, and why should not the Germans have full sovereign rights in some of the most German territories of the Reich?” This attitude was “almost universal,” and “the Government would have had little or no backing” should it have tried to call for coercive action against Nazi Germany.¹¹¹⁵

Publicly, there was no interest in a conflict with Germany. Besides, the demilitarized zone was seen as beneficial to France, and thus its remilitarization did not arouse much concern in Britain. It was often difficult for the British to understand French concerns, even in 1919. Moreover, France’s near unilateral action in the Ruhr had alienated certain sections in Britain. Recently, that alienation had become more intense, as the French were seen to have undermined Britain’s efforts to sanction Italy.¹¹¹⁶ Necessarily, the Rhineland remilitarization led to high-level discussions about Britain’s commitments to Europe. Largely, this was because the remilitarization crisis shifted the continental balance unfavourably. Previously, the French could have advanced uncontested into western Germany, which to some extent had restrained Germany’s ambitions in

¹¹¹⁴ Lord Charnwood, “To the Editor of the Times,” *The Times* (London, UK), 18 March 1936. (Godfrey Rathbone Benson, first Baron Charnwood, had been a Liberal MP for Woodstock, Oxfordshire in the 1890s).

¹¹¹⁵ Templewood, *Nine Trouble Years*, 201.

¹¹¹⁶ Despite the technical difficulties involved in implementing an oil embargo (and these were numerous), the British Cabinet continued to endorse “the idea for domestic political reasons.” That the French were seen to have undermined these efforts was to further strain Britain’s relationship with France. G. Bruce Strang, “‘The Worst of all Worlds’: Oil Sanctions and Italy’s Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935-1936,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 210-235.

the East. A remilitarized Rhineland constituted an increased threat to eastern rather than western Europe.¹¹¹⁷ Lord Cranborne, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, recorded as much in a minute on British commitments in Europe, “without a demilitarized zone, France cannot in fact ... fulfil her obligations in Central and Eastern Europe.”¹¹¹⁸ Germany’s unilateral decision to violate the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno initiated a debate within the British Foreign Office over how Britain should treat central and eastern Europe.¹¹¹⁹

Orme Sargent, the assistant under-secretary, argued, at this time that Britain should not commit itself to assisting France should a Franco-German war arise from conflict between France’s eastern allies and Germany. More radically, he believed that Britain should insist that France free itself from its eastern alliances “and be content [with]... the Covenant.”¹¹²⁰ Similarly, Cranborne claimed that France should be made to dissolve its commitments in the East. Particularly, because these commitments could not be maintained without material assistance from Britain. France, he continued, should limit its interests to western Europe and North Africa. Germany, inevitably, was destined to a “the Great Power.” Thus, Germany should receive “a free hand, insofar as her and our” commitments allow “further East.” Britain’s main objective was to stabilize the situation between France and Germany.¹¹²¹ Sargent and Cranborne feared that in reaction to the Rhineland crisis Britain would be drawn into closer relations with France and, inadvertently, to its allies in central and eastern Europe.¹¹²² Indeed, Cranborne warned that Britain should not undertake any

¹¹¹⁷ Robert Manne, “The Free Hand in the East? British Policy towards East-Central Europe, between ‘Rhineland’ and the Anschluss,” *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 32, no. 2 (1986): 245.

¹¹¹⁸ Lord Cranborne minute on British Commitments in Europe, 17 March 1936, *DBFP, 1919-1939 Series 2*, Vol. 16, no. 122, C 2086/4/18.

¹¹¹⁹ Manne, “British Policy towards East-Central Europe,” 245.

¹¹²⁰ FO 371/19895, C 2134/4/18, minute by Orme Sargent, 16 March 1936.

¹¹²¹ Lord Cranborne minute on British Commitments in Europe, 17 March 1936, *DBFP Series 2*, Vol. XVI, no. 122, C 2086/4/18.

¹¹²² Manne, “British Policy towards East-Central Europe,” 245-246.

new commitments to France and that it should remain disinterested in the East.¹¹²³ Possibly, in reference to the closed-door negotiations at Versailles, Cranborne recommended that any new issues that should arise between Britain, Germany, and France be discussed freely, “on balanced terms, round a table.” Robert Vansittart, however, considered it vital that Britain maintain the established order; he believed that it would be reckless for Britain to ask France to sever its connections in the East.¹¹²⁴

Vansittart had no illusions about Nazism and from the outset he was clear about what would befall Europe should Britain not check German aggression: the Germans “will ... loose off another War.”¹¹²⁵ The Labour economist and future minister, Hugh Dalton, concurred with this assessment. Dalton had visited Berlin in April 1933 and met with Emil Lederer, a former associate at Humboldt University, who had stayed with the Daltons while in England.¹¹²⁶ Lederer, who was Jewish, told Dalton that the Nazis had ransacked his flat, stealing money, other valuables, and books. Dalton also visited the educationalist Kurt Hahn, who told him about violence, executions, and internment camps.¹¹²⁷ As a result, his old anti-German animosities were re-awakened. “Germany is horrible,” he wrote on his return, and at a time when Labour favoured unilateral disarmament, a continental “war must be counted now among the probabilities of the next ten years.”¹¹²⁸ Despite these statements, and others like them, most British observers remained naïve about Hitler and the

¹¹²³ Lord Cranborne minute on British Commitments in Europe, 17 March 1936, *DBFP* Series 2, Vol. 16, no. 122, C 2086/4/18.

¹¹²⁴ Robert Vansittart minute on British Commitments in Europe, 17 March 1936, *DBFP* Series 2, Vol. 16, no. 122, C 2086/4/18.

¹¹²⁵ Minutes of 6 May 1933, Vnst 2/3, Vansittart MSS. Quoted in Norman Rose, “Vansittart, Robert Gilbert, Barson Vansittart (1881-1957),” *ODNB*.

¹¹²⁶ Lederer had been sacked from his chair at the University.

¹¹²⁷ W. A. C. Stewart, *Progressives and Radicals in English Education, 1750-1970* (New Jersey: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972), 317-322.

¹¹²⁸ Quoted in Ben Pimlott, *Hugh Dalton* (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 1985), 226-227.

legalized barbarism central to Nazism.¹¹²⁹ Thus, after meeting Hitler in 1936, David Lloyd George commended the Führer as “the greatest living German.”¹¹³⁰

Lloyd George had first visited Germany twenty-eight years earlier, in 1908. Now, as then, his ostensible motivation was to examine social institutions “and economic conditions, [and] on this occasion to see for himself the radical measures that” had been enacted in an effort to solve economic inefficiency. Predictably, he welcomed a meeting with the man who, in short order, had transformed interwar Germany.¹¹³¹ But above all, he desired to discuss a closer collaboration between Britain and Germany, which had been the real object of his earlier mission, when, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he had sought to meet von Bülow or Kaiser Wilhelm II but had instead received an interview with the vice-chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg.¹¹³² Surely, his effusions in the British press on his return, of Hitler as “the George Washington of Germany,” indicate how naïve British statesmen were about Nazi Germany.¹¹³³ His statements were in fact toned down in draft.¹¹³⁴ Germany, he wrote, did not wish to invade any other country. Moreover, there was a sincere “desire for ... better and friendlier [relations] with” Britain, for whom there existed a genuine admiration in Germany.¹¹³⁵ Hitler was determined to avoid a conflict with Britain, and he vowed to take measures to prevent a reoccurrence of the dire circumstances that had led to war two decades earlier.¹¹³⁶

¹¹²⁹ Keith Robbins, *Present and Past: British Images of Germany in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and their Historical Legacy* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1999), 37.

¹¹³⁰ Quoted in Detlev Clemens, *Herr Hitler in Germany. Wahrnehmung und Deutungen des Nationalsozialismus in Grossbritannien 1920 bis 1939* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1996), 404.

¹¹³¹ Lentin, *Lloyd George and the Lost Peace*, 89-90.

¹¹³² Lloyd George, *War Memoirs* vol. I, 30.

¹¹³³ Lloyd George claimed that Hitler was “as immune from criticism as a king in monarchical country. Yet, he is something more. He is the George Washington of Germany—the man who won for his country independence from all her oppressors.” David Lloyd George, “I Talked to Hitler,” *Daily Express* (London, UK), 17 September 1936.

¹¹³⁴ Peter Rowland, *David George Lloyd: A Biography* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Ltd, 1975), 734-735.

¹¹³⁵ Lloyd George, “I Talked to Hitler,” *Daily Express* (London, UK), 17 September 1936.

¹¹³⁶ “Mr. Lloyd George on Germany: ‘Hitler a Great Man’,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester, UK), 22 September 1936: 5.

Lloyd George blamed the Soviet Union for the animus that existed between it and Nazi Germany, and he claimed that anti-Semitism was an excrescence from Russia—since German national character was neither discriminatory, nor inclined to maltreatment or abuse.¹¹³⁷ Lloyd George in an interview with A. J. Cummings defended Germany's right to rearm, asserting that its rearmament was "for defence and not for attack." He denied that Hitler intended war with Russia and scoffed at the idea that he coveted *Lebensraum* in the East: "he has no desire to absorb millions of Slavs, whom he abhors and would consider an offence to ... [his racist] doctrine." Naturally, Hitler wanted Memel and Danzig, "which are as German as Hull is English, and much more so than Cardiff is Welsh." Lloyd George was convinced that Britain could come to favourable terms with Nazi Germany—terms that would be neither excessive nor dishonourable, but that would ensure continental security. Germany, he continued, had to be allowed to resolve its internal issues in its own way. Cobden and Gladstone had insisted on this view in their attitude towards Napoleon III, and Lloyd George intended to build on this tradition to foster better relations between Britain and Nazi Germany.¹¹³⁸

Churchill would later claim that "no one was more ... misled than Mr. Lloyd George," whose effusions make for "odd reading to-day."¹¹³⁹ Yet this masterful verdict came almost a decade after the event, and "another world war away." Even Churchill could not foretell with absolute conviction which course Hitler would choose in 1936.¹¹⁴⁰ Nazi Germany's unilateral decision to

¹¹³⁷ "Opinion. What He Did Not See," *Daily Express* (London, UK), 17 September 1936. Cf. David Lloyd George letter to Philip Guedalla, 6 November 1934. Quoted in Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 39 and 431-432.

¹¹³⁸ Rowland, *David Lloyd George, 735-737*. Frances Stevenson claimed that Lloyd George's copy of *Mein Kampf* was a modified version which omitted any suggestion that Hitler intended to invade Soviet Russia. Frances Lloyd George, *The Years that are Past* (London: Hutchinson, 1967), 230.

¹¹³⁹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Volume 1, *The Gathering Storm* (London: Penguin, 2005), 224-225.

¹¹⁴⁰ Lentin, *Lloyd George and the Lost Peace*, 90; and Winston S. Churchill, *Great Contemporaries* (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd, 1937), 261; see also James W. Muller, introduction to *Great Contemporaries: Churchill Reflects on FDR, Hitler, Kipling, Chaplain, Balfour, and Other Giants of His Age*, ed. James W. Muller (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2012), 30-33.

remilitarize the Rhineland should have aroused concern and alarm in Britain, especially because it was a blatant attack on Versailles.¹¹⁴¹ However, the settlement, once viewed as “stern but ... just,” had come to be seen as harsh, immoral, and inexcusable, and there was little interest in Britain to defend the Treaty.¹¹⁴² There were, admittedly, numerous factors that led to this disinterested, listless, and detached mood. For one, a deterioration in Franco-British relations tended to foster a more charitable and benevolent attitude towards Germany.¹¹⁴³ Then, too, interwar economic difficulties made clear the need to bolster Germany, which was seen as an essential condition for financial recovery—not only on the continent, but also in Britain. John Maynard Keynes did much to reinforce this view with his brilliant treatise.¹¹⁴⁴ Finally, vocal criticism from elite coteries, such as ecclesiastics, relief workers, and industrialists contributed to an erosion of public support for the settlement.¹¹⁴⁵ Still, it was Germanophile/revisionist historians who offered the intellectual framework and moral rationale for interwar revisionism. This collective denounced the settlement as indefensible because it condemned a newly democratized nation that could not be held accountable for the Great War. This view endorsed any action—unilateral or otherwise—that reversed the unfair, discriminatory, and harsh clauses of the settlement.

There can be little doubt that this view shaped British attitudes towards the remilitarization crisis, which initiated a dramatic shift in moderate views. *The Times*, for instance, found it difficult to find sufficient anti-German editorials to balance its letters-to-the-editor section.¹¹⁴⁶ Harold Nicolson, meanwhile, noted a momentous shift in the Commons, which was now “terribly pro-

¹¹⁴¹ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 43.

¹¹⁴² Northedge, *The Troubled Giant*, 121-122.

¹¹⁴³ Certainly, this was observable during the Ruhr Crisis (1923). Lord Beauchamp could thus write with confidence, “there have been few occasions upon which public opinion has been so united as it has been on this question.” Lord Beauchamp, “France and the Ruhr,” 273.

¹¹⁴⁴ Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, 43-45.

¹¹⁴⁵ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 43-44.

¹¹⁴⁶ See letter from Barrington-Ward to Kennedy, 4 April 1936. Quoted in Gannon, *The British Press and Germany*, 99.

German.”¹¹⁴⁷ Indeed, debates in the Commons from this time overflow with references to the “obsolete,” “unfair,” and detestable Treaty.¹¹⁴⁸ The National Peace Council, of which Gooch was President, issued a censorious statement that insisted that the crisis be used to create a new settlement.¹¹⁴⁹ British historians used the crisis to reaffirm their views boldly. Dawson, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, welcomed the recent shift towards Germany, and commended Hitler’s unilateral move as the first real bid to revise the obsolete Treaty.¹¹⁵⁰ Gooch likewise continued to exhort revisions to the Versailles Treaty. He admonished British and French officials to return its former territories to Germany, still confident that it would then return to the LON.¹¹⁵¹ It was for this reason that he added his name to an editorial dated from 1 August 1936, which called for a new settlement to address unresolved territorial claims.¹¹⁵²

Gooch and his collaborators felt that the issue was twofold: there was no desire on the one side to consider what alterations were needed and to secure these before the other side resorted to violence; nor was there a desire on the other side to refrain from violence until some effort had been made to arbitrate through the LON. Presently, any alterations that had come about had been made under threat and coercion; too often, concessions had been made to the dictatorial states

¹¹⁴⁷ Nicolson, *Diaries and Letters, 1930-1939*, 254: entries for 23 March 1936 and 26 March 1936.

¹¹⁴⁸ United Kingdom, HC Deb, 26 March 1936, volume 310, column 1462 (Sir Archibald Sinclair); United Kingdom, HC Deb, 26 March 1936, volume 310, column 1482 (Mr. Lloyd George); United Kingdom, HC Deb, 26 March 1936, volume 310, column 1495 (Mr. Robert Boothby); United Kingdom, HC Deb, 26 March 1936, volume 310, column 1501 (Mr. Morgan Price); United Kingdom, HC Deb, 26 March 1936, volume 310, column 1509 (Brigadier-General Sir Edward Spears); United Kingdom, HC Deb, 26 March 1936, volume 310, column 1532 (Mr. Clement Attlee).

¹¹⁴⁹ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 421-423.

¹¹⁵⁰ WHD 2144/38: W. H. Dawson, “Hitler’s Challenge,” *Nineteenth Century and After* (April 1936): 401-415.

¹¹⁵¹ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 54-55; Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 422.

¹¹⁵² The other signatories were Lord (Clifford) Allen of Hurtwood, Norman Angell, Harold MacMillan, the civil servant and cabinet minister Arthur Salter, Viscount (Robert) Cecil, the Nobel Laureate F. Gowland Hopkins, Gilbert Murray, the economist and editor Walter Layton, the minister and educationalist J. Scott Lidgett, the internationalist Julian Huxley, the feminist and international M. Corbett Ashby, Ernest Barker, the trade unionist Arthur Pugh, the radical-Liberal MP H. Graham White, the trader union leader John Bromley, the social reformer Eleanor Florence Rathbone, the economic historian and social critic R. H. Tawney, the economist and social reformer J. J. Mallon, the industrialist and Liberal MP Geoffrey Le M. Mander, the civil servant and Conservative MP Hugh Molson, the social reformer and industrialist Seebohm Rowntree, the social activist and astronomer Henry Brinton, Alfred Zimmern, and the colonial administrator Victor Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl Lytton. “A Peace Plan,” *The Times* (London, UK), 1 August 1936.

which, instead, “should have been made to democracy.” Gooch believed that the British were war-weary and were not inclined to embrace intervention in Danzig, Memel, or Czechoslovakia.¹¹⁵³ He insisted that to resist Hitler’s territorial demands would be foolhardy, “those claims would have to be met.” Besides, it had already been well-established that the settlement “was too severe.” Britain could not as before resist revision since the Powers who were not satisfied—Germany, Italy, and Japan—were now well enough armed “to show their dissatisfaction effectively.” However, he was confident that Hitler was “as anxious to avoid another war with Britain,” as Britain was “to avoid war with Germany.” Finally, Gooch believed that the main discord in international affairs was between satisfied and dissatisfied Powers, as he told the Devonshire Club.¹¹⁵⁴ Revisionist historians made sure that their readers understood what was at stake in the Rhineland—and to understand was to excuse much.¹¹⁵⁵

The desire to forestall conflict between Britain and Germany led Dawson and Beazley to address a memorial to the Prime Minister; enclosed with it was a handwritten letter from Dawson to Baldwin. The note reaffirms that historians viewed themselves as intermediaries whose task was to foster better relations between Britain and Germany:

It falls to me to send this memorial to you. It is due to a deep conviction that these questions hold the key not only to friendship with Germany but to the peace of Europe. I have known Germany intimately for over fifty years—from my student days in Berlin, when [Austin] Chamberlain simultaneously matriculated there ... [I] have closely followed the colonial movement and have written in *The Times* without number. I know, therefore, how intensely, even passionately, the Germans feel on this subject, but I know, too, how strongly they trust [our] generosity. I believe they would respond wonderfully to a decision in the service of this memorial ... I have tried to serve my country and the course of international peace for over half a century, and my quest is to help avoid our drift into another catastrophe like of that 1914-19.¹¹⁵⁶

¹¹⁵³ “A Peace Plan,” *The Times* (London, UK), 1 August 1936.

¹¹⁵⁴ “Dissatisfied Powers,” *The Times* (London, UK), 19 November 1937.

¹¹⁵⁵ “The German Choice,” *The Times* (London, UK), 21 December 1936.

¹¹⁵⁶ W. H. Dawson’s Note Accompanying the Memorial to Stanley Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Stanley Baldwin’s Private Papers*, Baldwin 89, ff., F2.

Baldwin's secretary, Mr. Myers, attached a scribbled note to the memorial before he forwarded it to the Prime Minister; in it, he described Dawson, whom he knew "very well," as a close observer and avid student of Germany. He had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the information included in the memorial.¹¹⁵⁷ Indeed, Dawson and Beazley were valued as expert sources, a status that Dawson attributed to their "special study and personal contacts" in Germany. The memorial reflected their collective "knowledge of German opinion" and was motivated by their "sense of responsibility." Dawson and Beazley believed that the return of Germany's confiscated colonies could be used as a tool to incentivize Hitler—to restrain his continental ambitions and redirect them overseas. Indeed, their central claim was that Nazism could still be moderated through strategic acts of conciliation.¹¹⁵⁸

Dawson, Beazley, and Toynbee all maintained that there was a noble core to Nazism and that its distasteful side was a natural reaction to the Versailles Treaty. Once revision was achieved, Nazism would become a much more reasonable force in Germany. Yet German revanchism and Mussolini's territorial ambitions further increased continental instability and led to demands that Britain re-arm.¹¹⁵⁹ Even Stanley Baldwin, who had hitherto been concerned about the economic strain that rearmament would cause in Britain, called for an increase in air defence outlay.¹¹⁶⁰ He avowed before the Commons (8 March 1934) that in air strength Britain would not be inferior to any nation "within striking distance."¹¹⁶¹ He warned that Britain's defensive frontier was not as

¹¹⁵⁷ Mr. Myers Note Attached to the Memorial to Stanley Baldwin, 15 April 1937, Baldwin 85.

¹¹⁵⁸ W. H. Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Stanley Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 89-90, ff., F2.

¹¹⁵⁹ Mark Connolly, *Reaching for the Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 9.

¹¹⁶⁰ Notably, Baldwin chaired the cabinet disarmament committee during the Geneva Conference (1932-1934). Stuart Ball, "Baldwin, Stanley, first Earl Baldwin of Bewdley (1867-1947)," *ODNB*.

¹¹⁶¹ United Kingdom. HC Deb, 8 March 1934, volume 286, column 2078 (The Lord President of the Council, Mr. Stanley Baldwin).

before the English Channel, but rather the Rhine.¹¹⁶² This led him to announce a substantial increase to the Royal Air Force (RAF) in July 1934, which was followed with further increases in May 1935, February 1936, and February 1937.¹¹⁶³ Baldwin was not alone in his concern about air defence. Rothermere had a near-obsession with aerial rearmament. His concern with Britain's air strength started with an editorial on 7 November 1933 under the headline, "We Need 5,000 War-Planes."¹¹⁶⁴ Thereafter, he founded the National League for Airmen (1935) and financed a test craft which he later donated to the RAF for evaluation as an advanced bomber aircraft—the 'Britain First'.¹¹⁶⁵ Rothermere was convinced that Britain needed at minimum five thousand aircraft in order to defend itself from aerial bombardment. Curiously, the two nations that he identified as the most serious threats to Britain's aerial defence were France and Germany. France had the foremost air fleet and Germany, with its resources and massive industry, could soon match or even exceed the three thousand attack craft then in service with the French. If Britain failed to correct this numerical imbalance, it might soon be confronted with a difficult decision between "a humiliating ultimatum and [its] virtual annihilation from the air."¹¹⁶⁶

Rothermere was far from alone in his belief that modern warfare would be conducted through "aerial action alone."¹¹⁶⁷ The air was, according to contemporary theorists, a vast and "undefensible frontier." This fundamental idea dominated interwar strategic thinking and

¹¹⁶² Baldwin reminded Liberal dissenters that a decade earlier Asquith had demanded a greater financial commitment to the air service. United Kingdom. HC Deb, 30 July 1934, volume 292, column 2339 (The Lord President of the Council, Mr. Stanley Baldwin).

¹¹⁶³ Ball, "Baldwin, Stanley," *ODNB*.

¹¹⁶⁴ Lord Rothermere, "We Need 5,000 War-Planes!" *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 7 November 1933.

¹¹⁶⁵ D. Boyce, "Harmsworth, Harold Sidney," *ODNB*; Harmsworth, Viscount Rothermere, *Warnings and Predictions*, 59-62.

¹¹⁶⁶ Rothermere, "We Need 5,000 War'-Planes!" Rothermere believed that Britain had to earn Hitler's esteem and consideration through a forceful demonstration, which in his mind meant a massive initiative to rearm the RAF. Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Vol. 2*, 547-548.

¹¹⁶⁷ Rothermere was convinced that aerial bombardment alone could mean defeat for Britain. France, for instance, could overwhelm Britain without ever needing to win a land or naval engagement. Consequently, Rothermere advised that all naval construction be intermitted until the air force had increased its size at least threefold. Rothermere, "We Need 5,000 War'-Planes."

influenced how statesmen envisioned the next conflict.¹¹⁶⁸ The foremost air theorist in interwar Britain was Sir Hugh Trenchard, who in 1918 had commanded a force tasked with bombing infrastructure in Germany. The limited raids that were mounted convinced him that mass aerial bombardment could shatter civilian morale and cause civil unrest.¹¹⁶⁹ Indeed, air raids introduced a new element to modern warfare, as Trenchard identified in a letter to the air minister dated from 1 January 1919. Trenchard reflected that his own attacks on residential centres had caused serious civilian distress, “as no town felt safe.”¹¹⁷⁰ Trenchard was not the only interwar air theorist to submit for consideration the detrimental effects that aerial bombardment could have on civilian morale. The most influence interwar air theorist was Giulio Douhet, who commanded Italy’s first aviation battalion in the Great War. Douhet believed that localized defensive units were ineffective against bomber aircraft. Moreover, since aerial warfare admitted no defence, “we must ... resign ourselves to the offensives [that our enemies inflict] on us,” all the while striving “in inflict even heavier ones on him.”¹¹⁷¹ This idea came to dominant how Britain as a nation came to think about any future war. Baldwin, for instance, announced before the Commons that “the bomber will always get through.” Pointedly, he declared that “the only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children [more quickly] than the enemy should you want to save yourselves.”¹¹⁷²

This vivid illustration was fixed in the collective mindset. Since 1908, at which time H. G. Wells had written his novel *The War in the Air*, there came to exist a fear about aerial bombardment

¹¹⁶⁸ Connelly, *A New History of Bomber Command in World War II*, 8-9.

¹¹⁶⁹ Trenchard believed that his force had carried out its mission “splendidly.” However, he criticized its “administrative services” and believed it to have been overstaffed. Nonetheless, he noted that the force had doubtless “caused unrest in Germany.” Quoted in H. Montgomery Hyde, *British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918-1939* (London: Heinemann, 1976), 44-45.

¹¹⁷⁰ Quoted in Max Hastings, *Bomber Command* (New York: The Dial Press, 1979), 46.

¹¹⁷¹ Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann Inc, 1942), 23 and 55.

¹¹⁷² United Kingdom. HC Deb, 10 November 1932, volume 270, column 632 (The Lord President of the Council, Mr. Stanley Baldwin).

in Britain. The Great War had exacerbated this fear considerably. Eventually, these fears were made manifest in cinema, literature, and newsreels.¹¹⁷³ Possibly, the most well-known film to deal with aerial bombardment was Alexander Korda's 1935 film, *Things to Come*.¹¹⁷⁴ The feature was an ambitious collaboration between Wells, Korda, and the director and set designer William Cameron Menzies.¹¹⁷⁵ The film envisioned a world bombed into chaos and anarchy; the near constant warfare causes civilization to fall into decay. This decline leads to a cruel and vicious tribalism, as chieftains make war with one another in order to obtain material resources. Ultimately, salvation comes from the skies: a scientist-aviator returns to his hometown to restore civilization and to outlaw war. However, this was not the vision that would have stuck with the audience; rather, it was the indiscriminate air raids and constant warfare.¹¹⁷⁶ These fears made conciliation seem both sensible and moral, and an effective means by which to avert another conflict with Germany. Indeed, the desire to shield Britain from indiscriminate aerial warfare made some statesmen more amenable to revisionist aims.¹¹⁷⁷

British historians continued to link extremism and rearmament with a failure to alter the settlement sufficiently. Dawson, Gooch, and their fellow-thinkers were remarkably successful in their efforts to convince others that Nazism stemmed in some measure from Britain's failure to revise the Treaty.¹¹⁷⁸ Moreover, it was clear to them that Britain had a moral commitment to restore Germany. Paradoxically, Nazism removed the most forceful case for moral revision—the need to strengthen Weimar Germany domestically. While Gooch and Dawson continued to write about the

¹¹⁷³ Connelly, *A New History of Bomber Command in World War II*, 7-8.

¹¹⁷⁴ The film was an adaptation of another of H. G. Wells's novels, *The Shape of Things to Come* (1933).

¹¹⁷⁵ "Mr. H. G. Wells and Films," *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 25 January 1934; and Seton Margrave, "'Air Raid' on a Film City," *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 16 July 1933.

¹¹⁷⁶ "Mr. H. G. Wells and his New Film," *Daily Mail* (London, UK), 29 October 1935; and Connelly, *A New History of Bomber Command in World War II*, 7-8.

¹¹⁷⁷ During the Sudeten Crisis, for instance, British statesmen referred to the threat from air attack in their decision-making. A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963), 234-235.

¹¹⁷⁸ Butler, *Lord Lothian* (Philip Kerr), 197.

need to animate unidentified forces of moderation in Germany, some decision-makers seemed to realize that this chance had been lost permanently.¹¹⁷⁹ Still, calls for revisions to the settlement continued unabated fuelled “as much by fear ... as a desire to” restore Germany.¹¹⁸⁰ Gooch, for one, was not blind to the barbarities being committed in Germany. Yet, like others, he believed that his own initiatives could elicit concessions from Hitler. Gooch, to this end, co-authored a letter to *The Times* (in 1936) about the need for charity, benevolence, and kindness towards Germany.¹¹⁸¹ He and his fellow collaborators exhorted Hitler to restore individual liberties and to renounce anti-Semitism.¹¹⁸² These revisionist historians had a naïve confidence in their dual role as “moral arbiters” and non-official emissaries.¹¹⁸³ Their idealism and conviction were Gladstonian; in that, it came from an earlier, more self-confident era. Dawson and Gooch had an almost Victorian-like faith in Britain’s role as a moral authority, ever confident that Britain could still dictate terms to other countries, to France, and Germany. Their rationale for interwar revision rested on five interrelated factors: first, moral considerations and concerns; second, a sense of racial affinity; third, the conviction that all the combatant nations bore some accountability—whether or not equally—for the Great War; fourth, fierce resistance to the unfair, discriminatory, and harsh Treaty; and finally, mistrust about France’s ambitions *vis-à-vis* Germany.¹¹⁸⁴

It is critical to note here that not all historians shared these views. Cline notes that after 1933 the shared guilt thesis started “to lose its [influence] within the historical community.”

¹¹⁷⁹ Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 410; The Conservative Member Robert Boothby, later Baron Boothby, tackled this issue directly: “there was a chance,” after Locarno to make a sincere offer to Stresemann, but “it was not until the economic crisis ... that we began, when it was too late, to take steps which, earlier, might have stabilized” Weimar Germany. United Kingdom, HC Deb, 26 March 1936, volume 310, column 1495 (Mr. Robert Boothby).

¹¹⁸⁰ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 54.

¹¹⁸¹ The other signatories were Gilbert Murray, the politician and peace campaigner Lord Clifford Allen, the physicist Ernest Rutherford.

¹¹⁸² “To the Editor of *The Times*,” *The Times* (London, UK), 20 March 1936.

¹¹⁸³ Griffiths, *British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, 150-151.

¹¹⁸⁴ Berger, “William Harbutt Dawson,” 99.

Indeed, as Hitler's Germany first threatened the Versailles Treaty and then set about to dismantle it, some historians started to view the settlement more favourably. These historians offered an alternative account to Gooch and Dawson.¹¹⁸⁵ R. C. K. Ensor faulted the uncritical use which other historians had made of *Die Grosse Politik*. He believed that the German General Staff held inordinate influence over Berlin in 1914, and that to use civilian sources to calculate the extent to which each nation had contributed to the war crisis was foolhardy. Nonetheless, he did note a dualism in the German government in 1914, "as between the civilian [section] and the military." Prewar British officials had failed to note this duality, at least, sufficiently; he cautioned his fellow historians not to make a similar mistake.¹¹⁸⁶ E. L. Woodward, too, criticized the German work for its biased notes and dishonest commentary. Moreover, he believed that insufficient documents had been selected to warrant so inclusive a title as *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*.¹¹⁸⁷ H. Wickham Steed, meanwhile, delivered a lecture at Chatham House in 1938 in which he treated Hitler's annexationist aims not as an "evanescent outcome," but as an indelible worldview traceable to Herder and Fichte, which ran unaltered through to Hitler. This worldview had led to the Great War, "and it is a line that will again lead to war should the direction in which it runs be not understood, and blocked, in time." Steed endorsed the idea that there were two Germanies, but it was clear to him as to which was in the ascendency.¹¹⁸⁸

Gooch took issue with the lecture, as he made clear in his rebuttal. Steed, he claimed, failed to understand the difference between thought and action. Before Hitler, no German ruler had ever defended pan-Germanism: that idea had been limited to "dreamers and writers ... contained in

¹¹⁸⁵ Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles," 55-57.

¹¹⁸⁶ Ensor believed that in 1914 most liberals were, "in effect, pro-German and anti-French; and had not the Germans violated Belgium," then the Foreign Minister would have failed to secure either the Cabinet or the Party, when a decision was needed on whether to assist France. R. C. K. Ensor, *England, 1870-1914* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), 569-572.

¹¹⁸⁷ E. L. Woodward, preface to *Great Britain and the German Navy* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935).

¹¹⁸⁸ Steed, "From Frederick the Great to Hitler," 655-675.

books and in the Press, ... but there had never been a pan-German at the helm before Today.” The Kaiser had never been pan-German, nor had Bismarck, who believed in “limited liability.” Indeed, Bismarck’s self-restraint and moderation were what made him such a remarkable and famed leader. Toynbee, too, offered a retort and said much the same as Gooch. Surely, racial nationalism was neither exclusive to the Germans, “nor their invention. Probably, the English and French had had ... more to do with it than the Germans.” Finally, he took issue with Steed’s claim that Hitler’s annexationist aims were a German tradition that dated from Frederick: before 1870, France had constituted the foremost threat to continental security, not Prussia. The discussion continued with a contribution from the Canadian-born historian William John Rose, who recalled Burke’s famous statement: “you cannot bring an indictment against a whole nation.” Sadly, Hitler’s influence was such that the liberal elements “were unable to make themselves felt.”¹¹⁸⁹

Steed was invited to offer a final remark. Readily, he avowed “that there was another Germany.” Then, too, it was true, “one could not” indict “a whole People”—in fact, he was confident that more than half the German nation scorned Hitler. Yet Hitler’s authority, influence, and control were such that no German dared to resist him. While Gooch was correct to note that eminent Germans had earlier criticized the baser ideas in Fichte and Hegel, it must be remembered that these doctrines directed the current German government. Steed believed that the situation was still salvable, but he did not advocate concessions—like Gooch, Dawson, and Toynbee. Britons must unite “their own minds with the truth,” both historical and moral, about German aims, and refuse to be “bamboozled or hoodwinked.” Whereas Gooch, Dawson, and Toynbee believed that further concessions could aid the more moderate forces in Germany, Steed harboured no such

¹¹⁸⁹ Steed, “From Frederick the Great to Hitler,” 675-681.

illusions: the only means by which to save that “other Germany” was to confront Hitler and refuse his demands, territorial or otherwise.¹¹⁹⁰

Geoffrey Malcolm Gathorne-Hardy, acting as chair, closed the discussion with a measured remark: there were now two viewpoints from which Britons could read recent German history. The first attributed Nazism to the Versailles Treaty and considered that, once its objections were settled, Germany would be amendable—at least to Britain. The other, darker outlook viewed the National Socialist revolution as a culmination, rather than an aberration: a “nightmare . . . come true in which Versailles was but an incident.”¹¹⁹¹ Those who advocated this second, darker view concluded that further revisions were useless, since the Nazis would never be satisfied: the National Socialists believed that war was not only inevitable, “but that it was a desirable institution.”¹¹⁹² Britons would remember that this view was earlier associated with Prussia; indeed, historians noted numerous similarities between Prussia and Nazi Germany.¹¹⁹³ Thus, Britain must rearm and for better or worse it needed to stand firm with France.¹¹⁹⁴ Readily, historians from these two schools acted to influence decision-makers. Each new international crisis brought forward advocates from both schools; indeed, at times historians dominated the editorial columns. Eventually, the debate reached its climax in 1938 with the Sudeten Crisis.¹¹⁹⁵

When German armies invaded Austria in March 1938, revisionist historians lost their main asset: morality. While Hitler’s aims might still have appeared defensible, his methods were now condemnable. Nonetheless, J. A. R. Marriott, Harold Temperley, and Gooch all viewed Germany’s

¹¹⁹⁰ Steed, “From Frederick the Great to Hitler,” 675-681.

¹¹⁹¹ Steed, “From Frederick the Great to Hitler,” 680.

¹¹⁹² H. Wickham Steed, *Hitler, Whence and Whither?* (London: Nisbet and Co Ltd, 1934), 176.

¹¹⁹³ E. L. Woodward, “Germany To-Day,” *The Times* (London, England), 27 March 1933; Steed, *Hitler, Whence and Whither*, 176-186.

¹¹⁹⁴ Steed, *Hitler, Whence and Whiter*, 187-188.

¹¹⁹⁵ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 56.

annexation as inevitable and any reaction as futile.¹¹⁹⁶ Marriott's letter-to-the-editor is illustrative:

I should be the last person to defend the manner in which the union between Austria and the German Reich has been accomplished. But while the [Peace] Treaties ... were in the making, I maintained that what has now happened was inevitable, and that to prohibit the *Anschluss* was even more unfair to Austria than to Germany.¹¹⁹⁷

With Austria settled, Hitler now directed his attention to Czechoslovakia and its three and a half million denationalized Germans.

The British were alert to this situation, but Neville Chamberlain, now Prime Minister, believed that he could win over Hitler; he also believed that the Germans had a valid claim to the Sudetenland.¹¹⁹⁸ The Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey, observed in March 1938, "The P.M. is a cold, clear-sighted, very determined man, rather narrow in outlook at times ... He came into office determined to ... [achieve] terms with Germany."¹¹⁹⁹ Chamberlain, and Sir Nevile Henderson, his ambassador in Berlin, believed that it was unwise to view continental conflict as inevitable. Both saw appeasement as a means to avert war with Germany and believed that Britain had a moral commitment to revise the Versailles Treaty.¹²⁰⁰ As Chamberlain made clear to the Commons in April 1938:

Our policy is not one of dividing Europe into two opposing *blocs* of countries, each arming against the other amidst a growing flood of ill-will on both sides, which can only end in war. That seems ... to be a policy which is dangerous and stupid. You may say we may not approve of dictatorships [but] ... We have to live with them ... We should take any and every opportunity to try to remove any genuine and legitimate grievance that may exist.¹²⁰¹

Moreover, British officials still believed that there were moderate forces in Germany. Thus, Nevile Henderson wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, "I believe moderate elements intend to

¹¹⁹⁶ J. A. R. Marriott, "Austria's Fate," *The Times* (London, England), 15 March 1938; Harold Temperley, "To the Editor of the Times," *The Times* (London, England), 15 March 1938; Eyck, *G. P. Gooch*, 423.

¹¹⁹⁷ Marriott, "Austria's Fate."

¹¹⁹⁸ Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 190 and 198.

¹¹⁹⁹ Maurice Hankey letter to R. Hankey, 1 March 1938, Hankey Papers, 3/43 Churchill College, University of Cambridge.

¹²⁰⁰ Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 169.

¹²⁰¹ Quoted in Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 169.

[direct] Hitler [towards] ... toleration.”¹²⁰²

Henderson was installed in Berlin in late-April 1937, and was convinced that he “had been selected, under Providence, ... to avert another world war.” He had stood in dreaded silence when the last war was concluded in the *Galérie des Glaces*; he recalled then that the settlement was no more than an armed truce that had left the Germans “bitter and resentful.”¹²⁰³ There is certainly evidence that Henderson was pro-German; time after time, in his letters to the FO, Halifax, and Chamberlain, he stressed both the need for revision and the merit of German objections to the Treaty. He believed that Czechoslovakia was unviable and blustered about its “national artificiality ... Czechoslovakia suffered from one fatal defect: her minorities, Polish and Hungarian no less than German, were situated on her ... frontiers, and [bordered] the nations which claimed them as their own subjects.”¹²⁰⁴ He considered the Czechs a stubborn and obstinate race, and deemed their cause to be neither worthwhile nor moral; in his view, the Germans had a far better claim to the Sudetenland.¹²⁰⁵ He was convinced that there could “never be appeasement in Europe so long as Czechoslovakia remains the link with Moscow and hostile to Germany.”¹²⁰⁶ Chamberlain, too, came to see the Sudetenland and its denationalized Germans as the final obstacle to continental reconciliation.

The next few months saw the crisis escalate from initial demands for self-rule to union with Germany. These demands resulted from the Sudeten Nazi leader Konrad Henlein’s incitements and

¹²⁰² Nevile Henderson to Viscount Halifax, 16 March 1938, *DBFP, 1919-1939* Third Series, vol. 1, no. 88, R 2978/137/3.

¹²⁰³ Sir Nevile Henderson, *Water Under the Bridges* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1945), 94 and 209.

¹²⁰⁴ Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940) 130-131; and Peter Neville, *Appeasing Hitler: The Diplomacy of Sir Nevile Henderson, 1937-39* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 5-6.

¹²⁰⁵ Nevile Henderson to Viscount Halifax, 26 July 1938, *DBFP, 1919-1939* Third Series, vol. 2, no. 551, C 7678/1941/18.

¹²⁰⁶ Nevile Henderson letter to Sir Alexander Cadogan, 22 July 1938, *DBFP, 1919-1939* Third Series, vol. 1, no. 534, C 7868/1941/18.

Hitler's connivance and were sanctified by continued German reference to the need to redress the settlement and to establish a new international order based on nationality.¹²⁰⁷ Chamberlain's aim was not to restrain Germany, rather it was to exact concessions from Czechoslovakia. The main obstacle to this end was Czechoslovakia's alliance with France. Britain could not be seen to undermine France and, therefore, it undertook to solve the Sudeten Crisis. Chamberlain remained confident that an arrangement could be reached with Nazi Germany, and that democratic and totalitarian states could achieve agreement through mediation:

If only we could find some peaceful solution to this Czechoslovakian Question, I should myself feel that the way was open again for a further effort for a general appeasement—an appeasement which cannot be obtained until we can be satisfied that no major cause for difference or dispute remains unsettled. ... [The Anglo-German Naval Treaty] stands as a demonstration that it is possible for Germany and ourselves to agree upon matters which are vital to [us both]. Since agreement has already been reached on that point, I do not think that we ought to find it impossible to continue our efforts at understanding, which, if they were successful, would do so much to bring back confidence.¹²⁰⁸

Chamberlain was thus resolved to come to terms with Hitler.

Generally, historians believe that any alternative course “would have had to overcome almost insurmountable obstacles.”¹²⁰⁹ Roy Douglas concludes that Chamberlain did about as well as any statesman could have done, “and the criticisms levelled against him were only credible because the administration was unable to make its own best case in reply.”¹²¹⁰ Others, too, have reached similar conclusions. Anthony Adamthwaite maintains that appeasement, “far from being rooted in fear, delusion, and ineptitude, was a realistic search for ... *détente*.” Necessarily, there were both realist and idealist reasons for mediation. British military-economic overstretch left the

¹²⁰⁷ John D. Fair, “The Chamberlain-Temperley Connection: Munich's Historical Dimension,” *The Historian* 48, no. 1 (November 1985): 8.

¹²⁰⁸ United Kingdom. HC Deb, 26 July 1938, volume 338, column 2960 (The Prime Minister).

¹²⁰⁹ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, foreword to *The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement*, eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (London: Routledge, 1983), xii.

¹²¹⁰ Roy Douglas, “Chamberlain and Appeasement,” in *The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement*, eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (London: Routledge, 1983), 86.

administration with little “choice but to conciliate the dictators and gain time for rearmament.” Moreover, there was a conviction that Nazi Germany had real objections that needed to be redressed, not least the Sudetenland.¹²¹¹ Chamberlain was certainly motivated to secure time to rearm, but this was never his first motive at Munich. Rather, Munich was a deliberate move to demonstrate to Hitler that he could attain through negotiation his territorial aims—that he did not need to resort to violence, coercion, or armed intervention. Moreover, it should be noted that the Chamberlain’s objective was more than a calculated move to redirect Hitler’s attention towards the Soviet Union.¹²¹²

There exists little evidence about what external influences came to bear on Chamberlain when he made his decision to settle at Munich.¹²¹³ D. C. Watt maintains that “he was in no sense a [creative] or original thinker.” Instead, he seems to have taken his ideas from friends and other correspondents; in the critical weeks before Munich, he was much influenced by the historian Harold Temperley.¹²¹⁴ Indeed, he revealed this much in a letter to his sister, Ida, on 11 September, in which he insisted “we should be wrong to allow the most vital decision ... as to peace or war, to [shift from] our hands [to] another country.” His decision to seize the initiative had been fortified in his mind after he had read “a very interesting book on the foreign policy of Canning.”¹²¹⁵ John D. Fair notes that while numerous scholars have cited these lines, few have ever considered the historical dimension to Chamberlain’s conduct at Munich.¹²¹⁶ Temperley, first through *The Times*

¹²¹¹ Anthony Adamthwaite, “War Origins Again,” *The Journal of Modern History* 56, no. 1 (March 1984): 106.

¹²¹² Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 234-235.

¹²¹³ John D. Fair notes that “historians in search of motivation are frustrated by the fact that during the Munich period, owing to the flux of events, there were virtually no diary entries and only a few pieces of personal correspondence. Chamberlain remains in posterity, as he was in life, a very private person.” Fair, “The Chamberlain-Temperley Connection,” 6.

¹²¹⁴ D. C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies*, 163.

¹²¹⁵ H. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of George Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World War* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1925). Letter Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 11 September 1938. Quoted in Keith Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1947), 360.

¹²¹⁶ Fair, “The Chamberlain-Temperley Connection,” 4-6.

and, later, in written communication, drew Chamberlain's attention to the historical similarities that seemed to make clear his own situation in history.¹²¹⁷ Chamberlain took from these sources a new clarity, and he became convinced that his ideas were rooted in tradition and history. What Temperley outlined for Chamberlain was a ready-made framework for Britain's relations with Nazi Germany. Canning's own strategy, as related to Chamberlain, was based on the idea that England's continental affairs should coincide with the nation's wishes, "and that any intervention on the continent should occur only when vital interests were at stake."¹²¹⁸ Chamberlain became convinced that Munich did not deviate from tradition, but rather conformed with this earlier strategy.¹²¹⁹ The lesson was clear, "Britain should exercise the utmost caution in its dealings with the continent, [conserve] its resources, and interfere only after it had established" a moral basis for armed intervention.¹²²⁰

Thus, Chamberlain recalled his Cabinet to London on 30 August, to inform his ministers about German measures to invade Czechoslovakia. The discussion before the Cabinet was whether Britain should caution Germany against an invasion as it had done on 21 May. Both Chamberlain and Lord Halifax refused to endorse a new ultimatum. Halifax reiterated the now familiar reason that Britain was unable to intervene militarily. Chamberlain added to this that "no state ... certainly no democratic state ought to [threaten war] unless it was ... ready to carry it out." He claimed that to overlook this lesson would only lead to "unfortunate results."¹²²¹ Temperley's treatise doubtless influenced Chamberlain, "a man with his own inner light, and one nearer to his father's era than

¹²¹⁷ Harold Temperley, "The Example of Canning," *The Times* (London, England), 28 July 1938. See also Neville Chamberlain, "Chamberlain and Canning," *The Times* (London, England), 29 July 1938.

¹²¹⁸ Fair, "The Chamberlain-Temperley Connection," 4-6.

¹²¹⁹ Paul W. Schroeder, "Munich and British Tradition," *The Historical Journal* 19, no. 1 (March 1976): 224.

¹²²⁰ Fair, "The Chamberlain-Temperley Connection," 10.

¹²²¹ Quoted in Larry William Fuchser, *Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the Politics of History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1982), 136-137.

his own in that he was ... a moralist, and an intellectual.”¹²²² Indeed, as the crisis reached its climax in mid- to late-August, Chamberlain “cut himself off from [most] outside contacts while he studied Temperley’s book on ... Canning.”¹²²³ What he read seems to have bolstered his decision to reach a settlement with Hitler.¹²²⁴ To his sister, Ida, he wrote: “over and over ... Canning lays it down that you should never menace unless you are in a position to carry out your threats.”¹²²⁵

Evidently, Temperley’s work confirmed to Chamberlain that Britain “was neither militarily nor morally [braced] for war and that non-intervention” was the only realistic course available to him in 1938. Fair concludes that with the added influence of Temperley’s “exhortations this is exactly the course Chamberlain followed when he devised and invoked Plan Z which set in motion ... [the] events that led directly to Munich.”¹²²⁶ Dawson hailed the settlement at Munich as “the revival in this country of realist statesmanship in the best sense.” Chamberlain had successfully secured Czechoslovakia, “which from the ... moment of its creation by a violent act of aggression, has lived under the menace of destruction.” Chamberlain’s realist statecraft had liberated the “disaffected and unassimilable” Sudeten Germans. Dawson claimed that frontier revision had made “Czechoslovakia really, and truly, Czechoslovakia,” and he invited it to take its “rightful and honourable place in the European comity of Nations.”¹²²⁷ Dawson and Beazley also lent their names to an editorial that celebrated the Munich Agreement as “a rectification of one of the most flagrant injustices of the Peace Treaties.” Chamberlain’s “courageous ... [foreign] policy” marked “the end of a ... period of lost opportunities,” and, at last, Britain and Germany could look forward

¹²²² Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*, 121.

¹²²³ Fair, “The Chamberlain-Temperley Connection,” 21.

¹²²⁴ Fuchser, *Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement*, 137.

¹²²⁵ Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 11 September 1938. Quoted in Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*, 360.

¹²²⁶ Fair, “The Chamberlain-Temperley Connection,” 21.

¹²²⁷ W. H. Dawson, “Czechoslovakia: To the Editor of the Times,” *The Times* (London, UK), 5 October 1938.

to an era of genuine “friendship and cooperation.”¹²²⁸

The conference at Munich was meant to mark a new era in Britain’s affairs with Germany. The Versailles Treaty was not only dead but buried: a new order based on self-determination and “mutual confidence between” the two nations, “was to [succeed it].” The most formidable barrier to reconciliation had been surmounted successfully. Chamberlain had acted with honest intent to show Hitler that his territorial ambitions could be achieved non-violently. The other element that factored into his calculations was morality. British statesmen cited numerous reasons for the settlement—the threat from an air attack, the backwardness of their rearmament, and the logistical difficulties in assisting Czechoslovakia, but these influences “were used to reinforce morality, not to silence it.”¹²²⁹ Revisionist historians had stressed, time after time, the need for moral revision; whenever concessions were framed as moral imperatives, these historians can be said to bear considerable blame. The notion that all the Great Powers shared responsibility for the Great War suited those who wished to revise the settlement, since it cast doubt on the idea that Germany alone was at fault in 1914—the moral basis of the Treaty. This argument raised serious doubts about whether the Germans were still bound to honour the settlement. Public disillusionment with the Treaty convinced decision-makers to embrace this new, revisionist history.¹²³⁰ A. J. Grant and Temperley could note with satisfaction in 1938 that the Treaty of Versailles had ceased to be the public “law of Europe.” The idea that a nation, so rich in manpower, energy, and material resources as Germany, could be held down was an absurdity; “and it is because that idea was entertained and

¹²²⁸ Sydney Arnold, Bernard Acworth, Raymond Beazley, C. E. Carroll, J. Smedley Crooke, W. H. Dawson, Barry Domville, A. E. R. Dyer, Lord Fairfax of Cameron, Lord Hardinge of Penhurst, Edward Inglefield, F. C. Jarvis, Douglas Jerrold, John Latta, A. P. Laurie, Lord Londonderry, V. B. Molteno, Baron Mount Temple, A. H. M. Ramsay, Wilmot Nicolson, Baron Redesdale, G. Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers, Arthur Rogers, Arthur Solly-Flood, Nesta Webster, and Bernard Wilson, “To the Editor of the Times,” *The Times* (London, UK), 12 October 1938.

¹²²⁹ Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 234.

¹²³⁰ Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 57-58.

promoted by the Treaty ... that that instrument has become impotent.”¹²³¹ This outcome was due, in no small measure, to their own efforts and to those of their fellow historians.¹²³²

¹²³¹ A. J. Grant and Harold Temperley, *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 1789-1938* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1938), 686.

¹²³² Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” 58.

Conclusion

Before 1914, British historians wrote tracts with the intention to reassure their readers that the new, modern German Empire was not a threat to Britain. Their works underscored the cultural, racial, and historical ties that linked the two countries. It was also at this time that British historians started to reflect on the notion that there were two Germanies, old and new, rustic and mechanical, ethereal and material. Thus, in 1908, Dawson could remark abstractly, “two souls dwell in the German Nation.” Old Germany, while necessitous in substance, was rich in ideals. The German Empire, while rich in material substance, had forfeited its earlier idealism. There is some room to believe that this outlook would indicate that British historians, here Dawson, viewed the unified German Empire as an untoward aberration before 1914, as an existential threat to Great Britain. However, Dawson’s observations were neither intended to extol nor to condemn modern Germany, but rather to relate how the Germans had advanced from an industrial standpoint: “to describe their efforts ... [and] successes,” not to dishearten his readers, but to reassure them.¹²³³

Prewar British historians tended to view the new, modern Germany favourably, often using their written works to advocate amiable relations between the two countries. Their ideas focused on a two Germanies thesis—an abstract framework that enabled British admiration for German cultural and intellectual achievements to exist in tension with fears concerning Prussianism. Such literature informed semi-official views on Wilhelmine Germany, which were anti-Prussia in orientation rather than anti-German. Even in wartime, some historians retained an unbroken admiration for Germany. This conviction led them to maintain an overidealized view of Germany and, afterwards, to embrace and disseminate a more radical and revisionist interpretation of the war and its causes. Their discoveries indicated that a more stable and secure world could only be

¹²³³ Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, v-vi and 11-12.

constructed through a radical transformation of international discourse and relations. Gradually, their ideas informed how British decision-makers understood relations between Britain, France, and Germany. At the same time, interwar disillusionment led embattled statesmen to pursue a revision of the Peace Treaties. Indeed, Germanophile and revisionist historians achieved their widest resonance when their views coincided with broader trends and currents in society.

Between 1914 and 1923, Germanophile and revisionist historians remained a small but active coterie. However, the deterioration of Franco-British relations after 1919 alarmed decision-makers in Britain. This trend bolstered their influence, as did other, external events such as the Ruhr Crisis and the Locarno Pact. There were, admittedly, numerous factors that coalesced to invalidate and undermine the Versailles Treaty. Nonetheless, it was revisionist historians who worked the hardest to reverse British attitudes towards Germany. This collective is relevant because its members affected the atmosphere around decision-making; indeed, it is evident that the decision-makers read their works and used their commentaries to rationalize their own attitudes and initiatives. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that this collective contributed the intellectual and moral framework for revisionism. Their views were sometimes nuanced and intricate. Gooch's work on the *British Documents on the Origins of the War* was certainly objective and scholarly. His editorial work indicated that the German Empire had done more than Britain to harm their relations before 1914, and that German actions during the July Crisis had further eroded its relations with Britain.¹²³⁴ However, this did not alter Gooch's overall attitude towards revision, which continued to rise in influence, as too did the view that all the Great Powers had contributed to the outbreak of the Great War. The idea that all the Powers shared blame for the conflict suited those who wished to revise the Treaty, since it undermined the notion that Germany alone was at

¹²³⁴ G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, two volumes (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1927).

fault in 1914—the moral foundation of the Versailles Treaty. Dawson, Beazley, Dickinson, and even Gooch contributed to the narrative that Germany “had not ... desired a war, and had made real,” if belated, efforts to avert it.¹²³⁵ These views found favour with the decision-making elite because revisionist historians had fostered intimate relations with notable statesmen a decade or two earlier.

Moreover, these historians used their intellectual skills to fulfil various roles in academia, war work, and the civil service. Their work across different fields broadened their social networks and enhanced their credibility. Indeed, their influence, informal or otherwise, was connected to the bonds and conduits that their diverse roles afforded them. Their social mobility, career versatility, and education enabled them to form solid bonds with eminent statesmen and lawmakers. Their influence was further increased by their involvement with various associations, such as the UDC, the NPC, and the LNU. These bodies accentuated their visibility, authority, and credibility, and meant that historians influenced how the decision-makers understood the critical issues under consideration. Their influence increased at different times, especially when their ideas resonated with broader trends in society. With little delay, revisionist historians noted how indemnities and territorial losses fuelled German resentment towards the Treaty of Versailles. This, in turn, conditioned their early advocacy. When disillusionment with the settlement eventually seized the electorate, embattled statesmen embraced revisionist ideas that endorsed radical modifications of the Treaty. Precisely because these historians were viewed as credible sources of information, their commentaries and recommendations were treated as reliable and trustworthy. Their concern for constitutional reform and democratization led them to advocate for revision; indeed, these historians claimed that the Peace Treaty, and its associated *War Guilt* Clause, would destabilize

¹²³⁵ Beazley, *The Road to Ruin in Europe*, 86.

and weaken Weimar Germany. This concern electrified an interest in the interaction between history, contemporary events, and the future.

This collective was conditioned by a cultural and intellectual framework that combined a scholarly pursuit of historical objectivity with a mental desire to create a coherent narrative—one that interpreted the past in ways that justified and anticipated a particular vision of the future.¹²³⁶ Expectation had a transformative effect on how these historians used evidence in their writing. Past events were recast and sometimes even reconstructed to accommodate and, indeed, forecast the future. Necessarily, these historians did much to construct a usable past that would harmonize with their hopes for the postwar settlement. Within this context, history was not merely an objective record of earlier events, but rather a narrative that was influenced by present context and expectations of the future.¹²³⁷ These historians drew on the past to interpret the present and sought to anticipate and shape foreign policy outcomes. This reconstructive model was dynamic. Yet, at the same time, its attendant discursive frame—the two Germanies—was seen as somewhat fixed. Because the inference from past experience towards a presumed historical direction made use of a framework whose structure was stable, revisionist historians were able to draw conclusions and moral lessons from history.¹²³⁸ Once Prussia had been defeated militarily, this framework allowed historians to advocate a more charitable and rehabilitative settlement.

The tension between a mental desire for correspondence and that for coherence confirmed to some historians the sincerity of the protestations emanating from Weimar Germany. Forthwith, these historians saw as their task the need to shield and defend the nascent Weimar Republic from the supposedly discriminatory, unfair, and severe Treaty. This collective, admittedly, remained but

¹²³⁶ Conway, *et. al.*, “The Self and Autobiographical Memory,” 491-492.

¹²³⁷ Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Historical Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 3-4.

¹²³⁸ Koselleck, *Future Pasts*, 195-197.

one section within a broader cultural and intellectual community. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to envision how a small circle and its influential allies could create an environment that favoured a particular interpretation.¹²³⁹ Revisionist historians objected to the settlement because it condemned a recently democratized nation that could not be held accountable for the conflict. Their refusal to endorse the so-called *War Guilt* Clause (Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles) led them to embrace and disseminate more radical and revisionist interpretations of the war and its causes. Henceforth, these historians reasoned that the war had resulted from militarization, colonial and economic rivalry, and a deficient international order that had divided the continent into two armed coalitions. Their discoveries indicated that a more stable and secure world could only be constructed after major modifications were made to the Treaty of Versailles. Notably, these views were embraced and acted on by British decision-makers who intended to rehabilitate Germany.

Even after 1933, revisionist historians continued to call for economic, territorial, and commercial concessions. Because Nazism had resulted from the territorial losses and economic sanctions “enforced ... at Versailles,” it was believed that a “rational revision” of the settlement would avert another world war and stabilize the continent.¹²⁴⁰ Thus, the moral that these historians tried to instruct was that revision would save the continent from another calamity. Revisionist historians stressed time after time the need for moral revision; insofar as concessions were framed as a moral imperative, these historians may be said to bear considerable responsibility. Their calls for revision revolved around two factors: first, a determination to reverse the unfair and restrictive settlement; and second, a desire to forestall another international conflict. Their reactions to the disorderly, troublesome, and often turbulent events in Weimar and, later, Nazi Germany, reveal the “relentlessness with which moral considerations were stressed” over other, material factors. French

¹²³⁹ Lambert and Weiler, introduction to *How the Past was Used*, 46.

¹²⁴⁰ Dawson, “The Urgency of Treaty Revision,” 16-17.

insecurity, for instance, was dismissed. Moreover, these historians overlooked the balance shifts that occurred when the Rhineland was remilitarized, and then too when Czechoslovakia lost the Sudetenland. The idea that all the Powers contributed to the Great War endorsed the view that the Germans had been mistreated at Versailles, and that the insults their leaders wished to redress were in fact reasonable, valid, and even lawful. The historical lessons and moral truths that these historians tried to instruct found an attentive audience among statesmen anxious to avoid another war with Germany. There can be little doubt that the decision to treat with and make concessions to Nazi Germany, even after 1936, resulted in some measure from the charitable, conciliatory, and accommodative mood that revisionist historians had inculcated a decade or so earlier.¹²⁴¹

This thesis demonstrates that the cultural and intellectual voices that modern historians have sometimes dismissed as trivial were indeed influential. While their influence could not avert the Great War, these historians did inform how the decision-makers came to understand that conflict and thus influenced their reactions to later events. Then, too, this thesis indicates that intellectual views mattered to decision-makers. It demonstrates that both before 1914 and then in the 1920s and 1930s, historians fostered pro-German, anti-French sentiment among the educated elite, which did affect the mood around decision-making. The voices which had called for *détente*, friendship, and moderation before 1914, were the same that advocated reconciliation after the Paris Peace Conference. Prewar cultural and intellectual voices were thus crucial. British historians had direct access to the decision-makers, before, during, and after the Great War. Their influence was minimal both before and during the war, but its existence demonstrates that there were definite limits to enmity, rivalry, and conflict. During the Great War, these historians did not turn anti-German, as has been claimed elsewhere, nor were their works hostile or vitriolic. Rather, most

¹²⁴¹ Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles," 43-57.

historians continue to use the two Germanies framework to differentiate between Germany, on the one hand, and Prussia, on the other. This allowed them to discriminate between the electorate and enlisted soldiers, which were identified with old Germany, and the militarist elite and Prussia. Contemporary historians have often dismissed the remarkable survival of such views in wartime works on Germany. Precisely because these historians had retained an overidealized outlook, their views shifted towards reconciliation with a restored and contrite Germany. Revisionist historians thus contributed the vocabulary by which statesmen and decision-makers could frame and articulate interwar reconciliation. This, too, allowed embattled statesmen to search for innovative means by which to restore normal relations between Britain, France, and Germany.

Curiously, the two Germanies thesis survived into the Second World War. In 1944, the Ministry of Information conceived of an exhibition entitled, “Germany—The Evidence,” for distribution across Britain. The intent behind the exhibition was to show civilians the destructive nature of National Socialism. The collection included visuals of influential officials, scenes of destruction and desolation, as well as boards with extracts and quotations from senior officials and Hitler. The board that would have welcomed visitors to the exhibit declares forcefully, “there are two Germanies”: one has enriched the world with its achievements in music, science, the arts, literature, and learning, but “this exhibition tells of the other Germany—the Germany that seeks world domination”—the one that has caused sorrow, starvation, and death. The installation does not differentiate between old and new, as such, but between culture and barbarity. Thus, the left-hand board lists: Holbein, Bach, Beethoven, Goethe, Ehrlich, and Einstein; while the opposite side records: Friedrich the Great, Bismarck, Ludendorff, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Hitler, and Göring.¹²⁴² It is remarkably illustrative that the two Germanies thesis survived well into the Second World War.

¹²⁴² United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of Myriam Sanfuentes, *British Official Photograph: “The Evil We Fight”*, distributed by The Ministry of Information, 1 November 1944, London, United Kingdom.

Indeed, its inclusion in such an exhibition demonstrates not only its utility but also its salience to how Britons framed and understood Germany.

This thesis deviates from earlier studies on British-German relations in the Great War era because it concentrates on how educated elites—here, historians—actually viewed Germany. This alternative focus indicates continuity. The Great War did not initiate a radical transformation in how British historians viewed or even understood Germany. This awareness contributes context to revisionist scholarship, which became much more influential after 1923. This reassessment raises several new areas for future research. Possibly, the most curious matter would be to research the role that the two Germanies had on the decision to divide Germany after 1945. Remarkably, the areas left to “the West” were in line with earlier, theoretical divisions between the Germanies. This framework could also contextualize Britain’s relations with West Germany in the immediate decade or so after the Second World War. Then, too, how did British efforts to revise the settlement after 1919 affect German attitudes towards Britain? For instance, did these efforts contribute to a belief that Britain would not enter into conflict with Nazi Germany—a conviction that was doubtless reinforced by the activities of other, sometimes well-meaning, individuals, unions, and organizations in the 1930s. Moreover, the historians discussed herein often communicated with eminent Germans, both before and after the Great War. These interactions have been overlooked, and it remains uncertain, and to what extent, these relations affected how influential Germans viewed Britain. Finally, the two Germanies thesis as a discursive framework demands further research. Did British elites default to duality, dichotomization, and contrast in their relations with other Great Powers, such as France, the United States, or Russia?

The aim here has not been to understand history through individuals, but to understand how individuals affect—and are themselves affected by—history. Structural forces are important, but

individual actors act within or subvert cultural norms.¹²⁴³ Hence, this thesis offers a collective model wherein individuals, institutions, intellectual networks, and mental frameworks informed and affected elite mentalities before, during, and after the Great War. This thesis reframes the master-narrative and contributes to the current reassessment in the historiography. Indeed, it shows how British historians acted to ensure a reversal in attitudes towards Germany. This collective at first worked to reconcile Edwardian Britain with Wilhelmine Germany, and contributed to the cultural, racial, and historical theories that anchored and framed British views of Germany. Still, later, it aimed to inform and influence wartime attitudes and mentalities, and to offer ideas about war aims and the future settlement. Then, in time, it contributed the vocabulary by which decision-makers could frame and articulate reconciliation with Germany. The charitable, conciliatory, and accommodative mood that was thus inculcated, certainly contributed to Britain's decision to treat with and make concessions to Hitler's Germany. Doubtless, the two Germanies thesis endorsed appeasement because it advanced the idea that there were unidentified forces of moderation even within Nazi Germany. Thus, revision could be framed as a means of emboldening and heartening these otherwise innominate democratic elements. Finally, this research reveals both the allure and hazards of a binary discursive frame in foreign relations. Today, it is not hard to envision a nation-state as a nexus of two irreconcilable, antithetical forces. The two Germanies thesis, with its dichotomization and clear-cut dualism, offers an historical lens through which to examine modern political, social, and cultural discourse. Our inclination towards contrast, distinction, and oversimplification is rooted in recent history. This thesis is thus timely, offering an historical case study that can inform, frame, and contextualize contemporary debates.

¹²⁴³ Robert I. Rotberg, "Biography and Historiography: Mutual Evidentiary and Interdisciplinary Considerations," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 40, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 305.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archives

Archive of Gilbert Murray, Gilbert Murray Papers. Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. Oxford.

Archive of H. A. L. Fisher, H. A. L. Fisher Papers. Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. Oxford.

Cabinet Papers. The National Archives. Kew.

CAB 21/ Registered Cabinet Office Files: Miscellaneous Papers.

Foreign Office Records. The National Archives. Kew.

FO 370/ General Correspondence: Library.

FO 371/ General Correspondence: Political.

FO 395/ General Correspondence: News.

FO 608/ Paris Peace Conference of 1919-20: Correspondence.

FO 800/ Private Collections.

FO 800/257 Austen Chamberlain Papers.

Correspondence, Papers, and Notebooks of J. B. S. Haldane. National Library of Scotland Archives and Manuscripts. Edinburgh.

George Peabody Gooch Papers, 1896-1983. University of Calgary Library Archives. Calgary.

Hermann Georg Fiedler Papers. Taylor Institute Library, University of Oxford. Oxford.

Letters to J. A. Spender. British Library, Manuscript Collection. London.

Oxford University Press Archive. University of Oxford. Oxford.

The Arnold Toynbee Papers. Bodleian Library, Special Collections, Oxford University. Oxford.

The Manchester Guardian Archive. The University of Manchester. The John Rylands Library, Manchester.

The Papers of Oscar Browning. King's College Modern Archive Centre, University of Cambridge. Cambridge.

The Papers of Sir James Headlam-Morley. Churchill Archives Centre, University of Cambridge. Cambridge.

The Political Papers of Stanley Baldwin Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, University of Cambridge. Cambridge.

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of Myriam Sanfuentes. *British Official Photograph: "The Evil We Fight"*. Photograph. The Ministry of Information. Produced by the Display & Exhibitions Division. 1 November 1944, London, United Kingdom.

W. H. Dawson Papers, 1871-1948. University of Birmingham, Cadbury Research Library and Special Collections, Birmingham.

Government Documents

A History of the Peace Conference of Paris Volume III: *Chronology, Notes and Documents*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1920.

Board of Education. *1904 Code of Regulations for Public Elementary Schools*. London: Wyman and Sons Ltd, 1904.

British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II, From the First World War to the Second, Series I, The Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Volume IV, edited by M. L. Dockrill, Kenneth Bourne, and D. C. Watt. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989.

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Volume I. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1927.

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Volume II. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1927.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First Series, Volume XXVI. Edited by W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1985.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First Series, Volume XXVII. Edited by W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1986.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Second Series, Volume XVI. Edited by E. L. Woodward, Rohan d'Olier Butler, and W. N. Medlicott. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume I. Edited by E. L. Woodward, Rohan d'Olier Butler, and J. P. T. Bury. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947-1984.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume II. Edited by E. L. Woodward, Rohan d'Olier Butler, and J. P. T. Bury. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947-1984.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference Volume II, edited by Joseph V. Fuller and Tyler Dennett. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, Volume II, edited by Joseph V. Fuller and Tyler Dennett. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

Proceedings of the London Reparation Conference July and August 1924. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1924.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 23 July 1914. Volume 65, Column 727-728.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 3 August 1914. Volume 65, column 1810.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 13 February 1918. Volume 103, Column 199-200.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 3 July 1919. Volume 117, Column 1213-1214.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 23 July 1923. Volume 167, Column 86-117.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 5 March 1925. Volume 181, Column 715.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 10 November 1932. Volume 270, Column 632.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 8 March 1934. Volume 286, Column 2078.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 30 July 1934. Volume 292, Column 2339.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 26 March 1936. Volume 310, Columns 1462-1532.

United Kingdom. House of Commons Debate. 26 July 1938. Volume 338, Column 2960.

Newspapers

Daily Express. London, United Kingdom, 1936.

Daily Mail. London, United Kingdom, 1927-1936.

Daily News. London, United Kingdom, 1914-1924.

Manchester Guardian. Manchester, United Kingdom, 1914-1936.

News Chronicle. London, United Kingdom, 1936-1937.

The Edinburgh Review. Edinburgh, United Kingdom, 1849.

The New Europe. London, United Kingdom, 1916-1918.

The Sunday Times. London, United Kingdom, 1939.

The Times. London, United Kingdom, 1907-1938.

The Times Educational Supplement. London, United Kingdom, 1887-1911.

Autobiographies and Memoirs

Amery, Leopold Stennett. *My Political Life, Volume II: War and Peace, 1914-1929*. London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd, 1953.

Amery, Leopold Stennett. *My Political Life Volume III: The Unforgiving Years, 1929-1940*. London: Hutchinson, 1955.

Amery, Leopold Stennett. *The Leo Amery Diaries Volume 1: 1896-1929*. Edited by John Barnes and David Nicholson. London: Hutchinson, 1980.

Brittain, Vera. *Testament of Youth*. New York: Seaview Books, 1980.

Fisher, H. A. L. *An Unfinished Autobiography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940.

George, David Lloyd. *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George Volume 1*. London: Odhams Press Ltd, 1933.

George, David Lloyd. *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George Volume 2*. London: Odhams Press Ltd, 1933.

Gerard, James W. *My Four Years in Germany*. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1917.

Gooch, G. P. *Under Six Reigns*. London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1958.

Grey, Edward (Viscount Grey). *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 Volume 1*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925.

Headlam-Morley, James. *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*. Edited by Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant, and Anna Cienciala. London: Methuen Publishers, 1972.

Henderson, Nevile, Sir. *Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940.

Henderson, Nevile, Sir. *Water Under the Bridges*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1945.

- Hoare, Sameul (Viscount Templewood). *Nine Troubled Years*. London: Collins, 1954.
- Jones, Thomas. *A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- Nicolson, Harold. *Diaries and Letters, 1930-1939*. London: Collins, 1966.
- Nicolson, Harold. *Diaries and Letters, 1939-1945*. London: Collins, 1967.
- Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking 1919: Being Reminiscences of the Paris Peace Conference*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1933.
- Norton, Charles Edward (Editor). *The Correspondence of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1834-1872* Volume I. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co, 1883.
- Riddell, George (Baron Riddell). *Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 1918-1923*. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1933.
- Roberts, Robert. *The Classic Slum: Salford Fife in the First Quarter of the Century*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971.
- Rothenstein, William. *Men and Memories: Recollections of William Rothenstein, 1900-1922*. London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1932.
- Scott, C. P. *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928*. Edited by Trevor Wilson. London: Collins Press, 1970.
- Sidgwick, Henry. *Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir*, edited by Arthur Sidgwick and Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick. London: Macmillan, 1906.
- Trevelyan, G. M. *An Autobiography and Other Essays*. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1949.
- Vansittart, Robert. *The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart*. London: Hutchinson, 1958.
- Woodward, E. L. *Short Journey*. London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1942.

Articles, Monographs, and Pamphlets

- “What Norman Angell Did.” *The New Republic* 8, no. 98 (16 September 1916): 150-152.
- Allen, J. W. *Germany and Europe*. London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 1914.
- Angell, Norman. “A New Kind of War,” *The New Republic* 3, no. 39 (31 July 1915): 326-330.

- Angell, Norman. Foreword to *Germany to the Present Day: A Short History* 2nd Edition, i-vii. Edited by A. W. Holland. London: Thomas Murby & Co, 1913.
- Angell, Norman. "The Inter-Allied Conference," *The New Republic* 12, no. 145 (11 August 1917): 37-39.
- Arnold, Thomas. *Introductory Lectures on Modern History Delivered in Lent Term, MDCCCXLII, with the Inaugural Lecture Delivered in December MDCCCXLI* 4th Edition. London: B. Fellowes, 1849.
- Arnold-Forster, H. O. *The Citizen Reader*. London: Cassell & Company Ltd, 1885.
- Arnold-Forster, H. O. *Things New and Old, or Stories from English History* Volume I. London, 1893.
- Arnold-Forster, H. O. *Things New and Old, or Stories from English History* Volume III. Montreal: F. E. Grafton & Sons, 1896.
- Ashley, W. J. "The War and Its Economic Aspects." *Oxford Pamphlets 1914*, no. 44. London: Oxford University Press, 1914.
- Barker, Ernest. *National Character and the Factors in its Formation*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1927.
- Barker, J. Ellis. *Modern Germany. Her Political and Economic Problems, Her Foreign and Domestic Policy, Her Ambitions, and the Causes of Her Success*, 4th Edition. London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1912.
- Barker, J. Ellis. *Modern Germany. Her Political and Economic Problems, Her Foreign and Domestic Policy, Her Ambitions, and the Causes of Her Successes and of Her Failures*, 5th Edition. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1915.
- Beauchamp, Lord. "France and the Ruhr," *The Contemporary Review* 123 (1 January 1923): 273-280.
- Beazley, Raymond. *The Road to Ruin in Europe, 1890-1914*. London: J. M. Dent, 1932.
- Brabazon, James (Earl Meath). "Duty and Discipline in the Training of Children." In *Essays on Duty and Discipline*, edited by Meath et al., 4-16. London 1910.
- Brailsford, H. N. *A League of Nations*. London: Headley Bros. Publishers Ltd, 1917.

- Brailsford, H. N. *The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace*. London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd, 1914.
- Browning, Oscar. *The Citizen: His Rights and Responsibilities*. London: Blackie & Son Ltd, 1893.
- Bryce, James (Viscount Bryce). "A Review of German Atrocities." In *German Atrocities: An Official Investigation*, edited J. H. Morgan, 181-192. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1916.
- Bryce, James et. al. *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages*. London: Macmillan & Co, 1915.
- Bryce, James. *Impressions of South Africa*. New York: The Century Co, 1897.
- Bryce, James. Introduction to *The Belgian Deportations*. Edited by A. J. Toynbee. London: Fisher Unwin, 1917.
- Bryce, James. *University and Historical Addresses: Delivered during a Residence in the United States as Ambassador of Great Britain*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1913.
- Carlyle, Thomas. "Chartism." In *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays: Collected and Republished* (1st time, 1839; final, 1869) Volume IV, 88-120. New York: John W. Lowell Company, 1869.
- Carlyle, Thomas. *On Heroes and Hero Worship and the Heroic in History*. London: Robson and Sons, 1840.
- Carr, E. H. *What is History?* 2nd Edition. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964.
- Chamberlain, Austen. *The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters: The Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with His Sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916-1937*. Edited by Robert C. Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Chambers's National History Readers*. London, 1897.
- Dalberg-Acton, John Emerich Edward (Baron Acton). *Historical Essays and Studies*, edited by John Neville Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1907.
- Dale, R. W. *The Politics of the Future*. Birmingham: Hudson and Son, 1867.

- Dawson, William Harbutt. *Bismarck and State Socialism: An Exposition of the Social and Economic Legislation of Germany since 1870*. Second Edition. London: S. Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "Can France and Germany be Reconciled?" *The Fortnightly Review* 667 (1 July 1922), 1-17.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "German Diplomacy Revealed." *The Contemporary Review* 122 (July 1922): 451-459.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "Germany and Spa." *The Contemporary Review* 118 (July 1920): 1-12.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *Germany Under the Treaty*. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1933.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *Industrial Germany*. London: Collins, 1912.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. Introduction to *German Colonization Past and Future: The Truth About the German Colonies*, 9-46. Edited by Dr. Heinrich Schnee. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1926.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *Problems of the Peace*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1918.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *Social Insurance in Germany, 1883-1911: Its History, Operation, Results, and a Comparison with the National Insurance Act, 1911*. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The Constitution of New Germany." *The Fortnightly Review* 105 (March 1919): 321-330.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The End and the Beginning," *The Contemporary Review* 114 (July 1918): 631-641.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *The Evolution of Modern Germany*. London: T. F. Unwin, 1908.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The Fifth Year of the War." *The Contemporary Review* 114 (1 July 1918): 117-125.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *The German Empire, 1867-1914 and the Unity Movement*, Two Volume. London: Macmillan and Co., 1919.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *The German Workman: A Study in National Efficiency*. London: P. S. King & Son, 1906.

- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The League and the Peace," *The Fortnightly Review* 106 (1 September 1919): 329-341.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The Liabilities of the Treaty." *The Fortnightly Review* 106 (1 July 1919): 1-13.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The New Orientation in Germany." *The Contemporary Review* 112 (July 1917): 610-619.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The Outlook in Germany." *The Contemporary Review* 120 (July 1921): 727-736.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The Treaty and the Future." *The Fortnightly Review* 106 (1 August 1919): 161-173.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. "The Urgency of Treaty Revision." *The Contemporary Review* 144 (July 1933): 15-23.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *What is Wrong with Germany?* London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. "A German on the War." *New York Times Current History*, 1 December 1915.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. "The Basis of Permanent Peace." In *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, edited by Charles Roden Buxton, 11-38. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1915.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. "The German Socialists and the War," *War and Peace* (1 August 1915): 168-169.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914*. London: The Century Company, 1926.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. *The European Anarchy*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917.
- Douhet, Giulio. *The Command of the Air*. Translated by Dino Ferrari. New York: Coward-McCann Inc, 1942.
- Egerton, H. E. "The British Dominions and the War." *Oxford Pamphlets* 1914 no. 21. London: Oxford University Press, 1914.
- Eltzbacher, Otto Julius. *Modern Germany. Her Political and Economic Problems, Her Policy, Her Ambitions, and the Causes of Her Success*. London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1905.

- Ensor, R. C. K. *England, 1870-1914*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936.
- Fay, Sidney B. "New Light on the Origins of the World War, II: Berlin and Vienna, July 29 to 31." *The American Historical Review* 26, no. 1 (October 1920): 37-53.
- Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. *The Origins of the World War* vol. II: *After Sarajevo: Immediate Causes of the War*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.
- Fisher, H. A. L. Introduction to *Germany*, v-vii. Edited by G. P. Gooch. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.
- Fisher, H. A. L. *The British Share in the War*. London: T. Nelson & Sons, 1915.
- Fisher, H. A. L. *The Place of the University in the Life of the Nation*. London: 1918.
- Fisher, H. A. L. *The War: Its Causes and Issues*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914.
- Fitch, Sir Joshua Girling. *Lectures on Teaching: Delivered in the University of Cambridge during the Lent Term, 1880*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1898.
- Fletcher, C. R. L. "The Germans, their Empire, and how they have made it." *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 6 (1914): 3-27.
- Freeman, E. A. Introduction to *History of Germany* Edition Adapted for American Readers, i-ii. Edited by E. A. Freeman. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1884.
- Gooch, G. P. "Book Review: The Origins of the War." *Contemporary Review* 135 (1 January 1929): 395-396.
- Gooch, G. P. "German Theories of the State." *The Contemporary Review* 107 (January 1915): 743-753.
- Gooch, G. P. "Lord Haldane." *The Contemporary Review* 134 (July 1928): 424.
- Gooch, G. P. "The German Mind since the War." *Transactions of the Grotius Society* Volume 10: *Problems of the Peace and War, Papers Read before the Society* (1924): 47-60.
- Gooch, G. P. "The Near East." *The Contemporary Review* 110 (July 1916): 527-529.
- Gooch, G. P. "The Terror in Germany." *The Contemporary Review* 146 (1 July 1934): 129-136.
- Gooch, G. P. (Editor). *In Pursuit of Peace*. London: Methuen and Co Ltd, 1933.

- Gooch, G. P. *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925.
- Gooch, G. P. *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*. London: The British Institute of International Affairs, 1923.
- Gooch, G. P. *The Races of Austria-Hungary*. London: Union of Democratic Control, 1917.
- Gooch, G. P. and Harold Temperley (Editors). *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, Two Volumes. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1927.
- Grant, A. J. and Harold Temperley. *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 1789-1938*. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1938.
- Haldane, R. B. *Education and Empire: Addresses on Certain Topics of the Day*. London: John Murray, 1902.
- Hawtrey, Emily. *A Short History of Germany*. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1903.
- Hayward, F. H. *The Primary Curriculum*. London: Ralph, Holland & Co, 1909.
- Headlam-Morley, James. *Studies in Diplomatic History*. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1930.
- Headlam, J. W. "Geschichte Europas Seit Den Verträgen von 1815 Bis Zum Frankfurter Frieden von 1871." *The English Historical Review* 10, no. 39 (July 1895): 593-596.
- Headlam, J. W. and Paul Mantoux, "The Effect of the War on the Teaching of History." *History* 3, no. 9 (April 1918): 10-24.
- Headlam, James Wycliffe. *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire*. London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1899.
- Headlam, James Wycliffe. *The History of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 4th, 1914; Being an Account of the Negotiations Preceding the Outbreak of War Based on the Official Publications*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.
- Hearnshaw, F. J. C. "The Place of History in Education." *History* (London) 1, no. 1 (1912): 34-41.
- Henri, Ernest. *Hitler over Europe*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1934.
- Herbert B. Adams (ed.). *Papers of the American Historical Association* Volume III. No. I. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1888.

- Herford, C. H. "The Intellectual and Literary History." In *Germany in the Nineteenth Century: Five Lectures*, edited by J. H. Rose, C. H. Herford, E. C. K. Gonner, and M. E. Sadler, 23-77. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1912.
- Hobson, J. A. "Free Trade and Foreign Policy." *The Contemporary Review* 74 (July 1898): 167-180.
- Hobson, J. A. *Imperialism: A Study*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1902.
- Hobson, J. A. *The German Pani*. London: The Cobden Club, 1913.
- Holland, A. W. *A Short History of Germany to the Present Day*. London: The British-German Friendship Society, 1912.
- Holland, A. W. *Germany to the Present Day: A Short History* 2nd Edition. London: Thomas Murby & Co., 1913.
- Hughes, R. E. *The Making of Citizens: A Study in Comparative Education*. London: The Walter Scott Publishing Co, 1907.
- Jane, L. Cecil. *From Metternich to Bismarck: A Textbook of European History, 1815-1878*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1910.
- Kemble, John M. *Codex Diplomaticus Aevi Saxonici* volume I. London: Sumptibus Societatis, 1849.
- Kemble, John M. *The Saxons in England: A History of the English Commonwealth till the Period of the Norman Conquest* Volume I. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1849.
- Keynes, John Maynard. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. London: Macmillan, 1919.
- Livingstone, Adelaide. *The Peace Ballot: The Official History*. London: V. Gollancz Ltd, 1935.
- Lloyd George, David. *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* Volume I. London: V. Gollancz Ltd, 1938.
- Lockyer, Sir Norman. *Education and National Progress: Essays and Addresses, 1870-190*. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1906.
- Lubbock, John (Baron Avebury). *The Use of Life*. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1906.
- Mark, H. T. *Modern Views on Education*. London: The Nation's Library, 1914.

- Marriott, J. A. R. and C. Grant Robertson. *The Evolution of Prussia: The Making of an Empire*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915.
- Marriott, J. A. R. *Memories of Four Score Years: The Autobiography of the Late Sir John Marriott*. London: Blackie & Son Ltd, 1946.
- Marriott, J. A. R. *The Problem of German History: An Introductory Lecture*. Oxford: Horace Hart, 1911.
- Marriott, J. A. R. *The Remaking of Modern Europe: From the Outbreak of the French Revolution to the Treaty of Berlin, 1789-1878*. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1909.
- Maurice, Frederick "The Franco-German War, 1870-1." In *The Cambridge Modern History*, Volume XI, *The Growth of Nationalities*, edited by A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes, 576-612. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909.
- Meiklejohn, J. M. D. *The British Empire: Its Geography, Resources, Commerce, Land-ways, and Water-ways* 6th Edition. London: Alfred M. Holden, 1899.
- Mireaux, Émile. "Anglo-French Relations." *The Nineteenth Century and After* (July 1936): 1-9.
- Morel, E. D. *Morocco in Diplomacy*. London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1912.
- Morel, E. D. *The Morrow of the War*. London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1914.
- Morel, E. D. *Truth and the War*. London: National Labour Press Ltd, 1916.
- Morgan, J. H. *German Atrocities: An Official Investigation*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1916.
- Morley, John (Viscount Morley). *Memorandum on Resignation*. August 1914. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1928.
- Muggeridge, Malcolm. *The Thirties: 1930-1940 in Britain*. London: H. Hamilton, 1940.
- Murray, Gilbert. "How Can War Ever Be Right?" *Oxford Pamphlets* no. 18 (1914), 3-27.
- Murray, Gilbert. *The Problem of Foreign Policy: A Consideration of Present Dangers and the Best Methods for Meeting Them*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1921.
- Newland, H. Osman. *The Model Citizen: A Simple Exposition of Civic Rights and Duties, and a Descriptive Account of British Institutions, Local, National, and Imperial*. London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1907.

- Newton, Arthur. *Years of Change: Autobiography of a Hackney Shoemaker*. London: Hackney Workers' Educational Association, 1974.
- Oxford Signatories. "To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America: A Reply from Oxford to the German Address to Evangelical Christians Abroad." *Oxford Pamphlets* 1914, no. 2. London: Oxford University Press, 1914.
- Parkin, George R. *The Rhodes Scholarships*. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912.
- Peace Handbooks*, edited by G. W. Prothero. London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1920.
- Pollard, A. F. *On the Value of the Study of History*, Historical Association Leaflet no. 26. London, 1911.
- Pollard, A. F. *The War, Its History, and Its Morals: A Lecture*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.
- Prothero, George Walter. *Instructions for Historical Writers*. London, 1918.
- Prothero, George Walter. *Our Duty and Our Interest in the War*. London: John Murray, 1914.
- Rose, J. Holland. "The Political History." In *Germany in the Nineteenth Century: Five Lectures*, edited by J. H. Rose, C. H. Herford, E. C. K. Gonner, and M. E. Sadler, 1-22. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1912.
- Sadler, M. E. Introduction to *Moral Instruction and Training in Schools: Report of an International Inquiry* volume 1, xiii-l. Edited by M. E. Sadler. London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1908.
- Sadler, Michael E. "The History of Education." In *Germany in the Nineteenth Century: Five Lectures*, edited by J. H. Rose, C. H. Herford, E. C. K. Gonner, and M. E. Sadler, 101-127. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1912.
- Sadler, Michael E. "The Strength and Weakness of German Education." In *German Culture: The Contribution of the Germans to Knowledge, Literature, Art, and Life*, edited by W. P. Paterson, 301-314. London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1915.
- Sanday, William. "The Deeper Causes of the War," *Oxford Pamphlets*, no. 1. London: Oxford University Press, 1914.

- Seeley, J. R. *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures*. London: Macmillan and Co, 1890.
- Seeley, John R. *Lectures and Essays*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1870.
- Seton-Watson, R. W. et al. *The War and Democracy*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1914.
- Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1923.
- Sidgwick, Henry. "The Morality of Strife." *The International Journal of Ethics* 1, no. 1 (October 1890): 1-15.
- Sime, James. *History of Germany* Second Edition. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd, 1909.
- Sime, James. *History of Germany*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1874.
- Smith, G. Barnett. *William I and the German Empire: A Biographical and Historical Sketch*. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1887.
- Smith, Graham Burrell. *Scenes from European History: A Companion to English History for the Middle Forms of Schools*. London, 1911.
- Smuts, Jan. *Selections from the Smuts Papers* Volume IV: *November 1918-August 1918*, edited by W. K. Hancock and J. Van Der Poel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- Steed, H. Wickham. "From Frederick the Great to Hitler: The Consistency of German Aims." *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939) 17, no. 5 (September-October 1938): 655-681.
- Steed, H. Wickham. *Hitler, Whence and Whither?* London: Nisbet and Co Ltd, 1934.
- Steed, H. Wickham. *Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A Personal Narrative* Volume II. London: William Heinemann, 1924.
- Stubbs, William. *Lectures on Early English History*, edited by Arthur Hassall. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1906.
- Stubbs, William. *Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History and Kindred Subjects*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1887.
- Swanwick, H. M. *Builders of Peace, Being Ten Years' History of the Union of Democratic Control*. London: Swarthmore Press Ltd, 1924.

- Temperley, Harold. V. *The Foreign Policy of George Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World War*. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1925.
- The Round Table. "Germany and the Prussian Spirit." In *British and German Ideals: The Meaning of the War*. Edited by Members of the Round Table (A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Empire), 62-93. London, 1915.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. *A Study of History*, 2nd Edition, Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. and V. M. Boulter. *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937.
- Webb, W. H. "History, Patriotism, and the Child: A Plea for the Fuller Teaching of British History in Elementary Schools." *History* 2, no. 1 (January-March 1913): 53-54.
- Webster, C. K. *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain the European Alliance*. London: G. Bell, 1925.
- Webster, C. K. *The Study of International Politics: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth on Friday 23 February 1923*. London, 1923.
- Welton, James. *Principles and Methods of Teaching*. London: W. B. Clive, 1907.
- Werner, Baron von Rheinbaben, "German Foreign Policy," *The Contemporary Review* 150 (July 1936): 394-406.
- Wheeler-Bennett, John W. "Germany under the Treaty by W. H. Dawson." *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939) 12, no. 5 (September 1933): 677.
- Wilson, Woodrow. *Address to the League to Enforce Peace at Washington*. 27 May 1916.
- Wilson, Woodrow. *Speech of Acceptance to National Democratic Convention*. 2 September 1916.
- Wilson, Woodrow. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* Volume 30: *May 6-September 5, 1914*, edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Wilson, Woodrow. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* Volume 34: *July 21-September 30, 1915*, edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Wilson, Woodrow. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* Volume 37: *May 9-August 7, 1916*, edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Wilson, Woodrow. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* Volume 41: *January 24-April 6, 1917*, edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Wilson, Woodrow. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* Volume 42: *April 7-June 23, 1917*, edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Withers, H. L. "The Teaching of History in England in the Nineteenth Century." In *The Teaching of History and Papers*, edited by H. L. Withers and J. H. Fowler, 139-164. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1904.

Woodward, E. L. Preface to *Great Britain and the German Navy*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935.

Secondary Material

Adamthwaite, Anthony. "War Origins Again." *The Journal of Modern History* 56, no. 1 (March 1984): 100-115.

Bentley, Michael. *Modernizing England's Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870-1970*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Berger, Stefan. "Between Efficiency and 'Prussianism': Stereotypes and the Perception of the German Social Democrats by the British Labour Party, 1900-1920." In *Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German Relations*, edited by Rainer Emig, 172-186. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000.

Berger, Stefan. "William Harbutt Dawson: The Career and Politics of an Historian of Germany." *The English Historical Review* 116, no. 465 (2001): 76-113.

Boucher, David. "'Sane' and 'Insane' Imperialism: British Idealism, New Liberalism and Liberal Imperialism." *History of European Ideas* 44, no. 8 (2018): 1189-1204.

Boucher, David. "British Idealism, Imperialism and the Boer War." *History of Political Thought* 41, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 325-348.

Boyce, Robert. "The Persistence of Anglo-Saxonism in Britain and the Origins of Britain's Appeasement Policy towards Germany." *Histoire@Politique* 15, no. 3 (2011): 110-129.

Buitenhuis, Peter. *The Great War of Words: British, American, and Canadian Propaganda and Fiction, 1914-1933*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987.

Burroughs, Peter. "John Robert Seeley and British Imperial History." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 1, no. 2 (1973): 191-211.

- Butler, J. R. M. *Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), 1882-1940*. London: Macmillan, 1960.
- Cain, P.J. "J. A. Hobson, Cobdenism, and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 1898-1914." *The Economic History Review* 31, no. 4 (1978): 565–584.
- Carnall, Geoffrey. *Gandhi's Interpreter: A Life of Horace Alexander*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.
- Carpenter, Charles A. "Shaw and Bertrand Russell versus Gilbert Murray on Britain's Entry into World War I: The Inside Story." *Shaw* 33, no. 1 (2013): 25-54.
- Catherine Ann Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 20.1 (Spring 1988): 43-58.
- Ceadel, Martin. "Gilbert Murray and International Politics." In *Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre, and International Politics*, edited by Christopher Stray, 217-238. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Ceadel, Martin. "The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934-5." *English Historical Review* 377, no. 95 (October 1980): 810-839.
- Ceadel, Martin. *Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Chagnon, Marie-Eve and Tomás Irish. Introduction to *The Academic World in the Era of the Great War*. Edited by Marie-Eve Chagnon and Tomás Irish. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Chancellor, Valerie E. *History for their Masters: Opinion in the English History Textbook, 1800-1914*. Bath: Adams & Dart, 1970.
- Churchill, Winston S. *Great Contemporaries*. London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd, 1937.
- Churchill, Winston S. *The Second World War, Volume 1, The Gathering Storm*. London: Penguin, 2005.
- Clark, Denis. "Poland in the 'Paris System': Self-Determination, Stereotypes, and Decisions in 1919." *Nations and Nationalism* 25, no. 4 (2019): 1362-1385.
- Clemens, Detlev. *Herr Hitler in Germany. Wahrnehmung und Deutungen des Nationalsozialismus in Grossbritannien 1920 bis 1939*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1996.
- Cline, Catherine Ann. "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles." *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 43-58.

- Cline, Catherine Ann. *E. D. Morel, 1873-1924: The Strategies of Protest*. Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1980.
- Cohrs, Patrick O. "The First 'Real' Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States, and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925." *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 1 (February 2003): 1-31.
- Cohrs, Patrick O. *The New Atlantic Order: The Transformation of International Politics, 1860-1933*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
- Cohrs, Patrick O. *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain, and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919-1932*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Colley, Linda. *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Colls, Robert. "Englishness and Political Culture." In *Englishness: Politics and Culture, 1880-1920* 2nd Edition, edited by Robert Colls and Philip Dodd, 53-84. London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- Connelly, Mark. *Reaching for the Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II*. London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001.
- Conway, Martin, Jefferson A. Singer, and Angela Tagini. "The Self and Autobiographical Memory: Correspondence and Coherence." *Social Cognition* 22, no. 5 (2004) 491-529.
- Cook, Chris and John Stevenson. *The Longman Handbook of Modern British History, 1714-2001* 4th Edition. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Cowling, Maurice. *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Craig, Fred W. S. *British Electoral Facts, 1832-1987* 5th Edition. Aldershot: Parliamentary Research Services, 1989.
- Crawley, C. W. "Sir George Prothero and His Circle: The Prothero Lecture." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 20 (1970): 101-127.
- Dean, Dennis. "The Dilemmas of an Academic Liberal Historian in Lloyd George's Government: H. A. L. Fisher at the Board of Education, 1916-1922." *History* 79, no. 255 (February 1994): 57-81.
- Dockrill, M. L. and Zara Steiner. "The Foreign Office at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919." *The International History Review* 2, no. 1 (January 1980): 55-86.

- Douglas, Roy. "Chamberlain and Appeasement." In *The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement*, edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, 79-88. London: Routledge, 1983.
- Dubin, Martin David. "Toward the Concept of Collective Security: The Bryce Group's 'Proposals for the Avoidance of War,' 1914-1917." *International Organization* 24, no. 2 (1970): 288-318.
- Dutton, David. *Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics*. Bolton: Ross Anderson Publications, 1985.
- E. H. Carr, *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.
- Eden, Anthony. *Facing the Dictators*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962.
- Evans R. J. W. and H. Pogge von Strandmann (Editors). *The Coming of the First World War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.
- Evans, Richard J. *Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Eyck, Frank. *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*. London: Macmillan, 1982.
- Fair, John D. "The Chamberlain-Temperley Connection: Munich's Historical Dimension." *The Historian* 48, no. 1 (November 1985): 1-23.
- Feiling, Keith. *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1947.
- Ferris, John. "'Worthy of Some Better Enemy?': The British Estimate of the Imperial Japanese Army 1919-41, and the Fall of Singapore." *Canadian Journal of History* 28, no. 2 (1993): 223-256.
- Ferris, John. "James Ramsay MacDonald, 1866-1937." In *British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1850-1990: Aspects of the Evolution of British Foreign Policy*, edited by Antony Best and Hugh Cortazzi, 143-152. London: Renaissance Books, 2018.
- Ferris, John. "The Theory of a 'French Air Menace', Anglo-French Relations and the British Home Defence Air Force Programmes of 1921-1925." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 1 (1987): 62-83.
- Field, H. John. *Toward a Programme of Imperial Life: The British Empire at the Turn of the Century*. Oxford: Clio Press, 1982.

- Firchow, Peter E. *The Death of the German Cousin: Variations of a Literary Stereotype, 1890-1920*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1986.
- Fisher, H. A. L. *James Bryce, Viscount Bryce of Dechmont, O. M.*, Volume II. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927.
- Frederick, Suzanne Y. "The Anglo-German Rivalry, 1890-1914." In *Great Power Politics*, edited by William R. Thompson, 306-366. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999.
- Fry, Michael Graham. "British Revisionism." In *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years*, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, 565-602. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Fuchser, Larry William. *Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the Politics of History*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1982.
- Gannon, Franklin Reid. *The British Press and Germany, 1936-1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
- Garvin, J. L. *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Volume III, 1895-1900: Empire and World Policy*. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1934.
- George, Frances Lloyd. *The Years that are Past*. London: Hutchinson, 1967.
- Geppert, Dominik and Robert Gerwarth. Introduction to *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: Essays on Cultural Affinity*. Edited by Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Gilbert, Bentley B. "Pacificist to Intervention: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an Issue?" *The Historical Journal* 28, no. 4 (December 1985): 863-885.
- Gilbert, Felix. *A European Past: Memoirs 1905-1945*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988.
- Gilbert, Felix. "Leopold von Ranke and the American Philosophical Society." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 130, no. 3 (1986): 362-366.
- Gilbert, Martin. *Sir Horace Rumbold: Portrait of a Diplomat, 1869-1941*. London: Heinemann, 1973.
- Gilbert, Martin. *The Roots of Appeasement*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.

- Glaser, Elisabeth. "The Making of the Economic Peace." In *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years*, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elizabeth Glaser, 371-400. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Goldstein, Erik. "Historians Outside the Academy: G. W. Prothero and the Experience of the Foreign Office Historical Section, 1917-20." *Historical Research* 63, no. 151 (June 1990): 195-211.
- Goldstein, Erik. "New Diplomacy and the New Europe at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: The A. W. A. Leeper Papers." *East European Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (January 1988): 393-400.
- Goldstein, Erik. "The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact, 1924-1925." In *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950*, edited by Michael L. Dockrill and Brian McKercher, 115-135. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Goldstein, Erik. "The Foreign Office and Political Intelligence 1918-1920." *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 4 (1988): 275-288.
- Goldstein, Erik. "The Round Table and the New Europe." *Round Table* (London) 87, no. 346 (1998): 177-189.
- Goldstein, Erik. *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Grayson, Richard. *Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy, 1924-29*. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
- Griffiths, Richard. *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 1933-9*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Hall, Catherine. "'From Greenland's Icy Mountains ... to Africa's Golden Sand': Ethnicity, Race and Nation in Mid-Nineteenth Century England." *Gender & history* 5, no. 2 (1993): 212-230.
- Hall III, Hines H. "British Air Defence and Anglo-French Relations, 1921-1924." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 4, no. 3 (1981): 271-284.
- Hamilton, Keith. "The Pursuit of 'Enlightened Patriotism': The British Foreign Office and Historical Researchers during the Great War and Its Aftermath." In *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians through Two World Wars*, edited by Keith Wilson, 192-229. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996.

- Hanak, Harry. "The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War." *Historical Research: The Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 36, no. 94 (1963): 168–180.
- Harmsworth, Harold. *Viscount Rothermere, Warnings and Predictions*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939.
- Harrold, Charles Frederick. *Carlyle and German Thought: 1819-1834*. London: Archon Books, 1963.
- Haslam, Jonathan. *The Spectre of War: International Communism and the Origins of World War II*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022.
- Hastings, Max. *Bomber Command*. New York: The Dial Press, 1979.
- Headlam-Morley, Agnes. Introduction to *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, ix-xl. Edited by Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant, and Anna Cienciala. London: Methuen Publishers, 1972.
- Heathorn, Stephen. *For Home, Country, and Race: Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School, 1880-1914*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
- Heathorn, Stephen. "'Let Us Remember that We, Too, Are English': Constructions of Citizenship and National Identity in English Elementary School Reading Books, 1880-1914." *Victorian Studies* 38, no. 3 (1995): 395-427.
- Herman J. Wittgens, "War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry during the 1920s," *Historical Papers* 15, no. 1 (1980): 228-247.
- Herwig, Holger H. "Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War." In *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians Through Two World Wars*, edited by Keith Wilson, 87-127. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996.
- Higginson, J. H. "Michael Sadler and the German Connection." *Oxford review of education* 16, no. 2 (1990): 245–253.
- Holmes, Colin. "Anti-Semitism and the BUF." In *British Fascism: Essays on the Radical Right in Inter-War Britain*, edited by Kenneth Lunn and Richard C. Thurlow, 114-134. London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980.
- Holt, Andrew. "'No More Hoares to Paris': British Foreign Policymaking and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 1383-1401.

- Horn, Pamela. "English Elementary Education and the Growth of the Imperial Ideal, 1880-1914." In *Benefits Bestowed? Education and British Imperialism*, edited by J. A. Mangan, 24-52. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
- Horsman, Reginald. "Origins of Racial Anglo-Saxonism in Great Britain before 1850." *Journal of the history of ideas* 37, no. 3 (1976): 387-410.
- Hyde, H. Montgomery. *British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918-1939*. London: Heinemann, 1976.
- Iggers, Georg G. and James M. Powell (eds.). *Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical Discipline*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990.
- Johnson, Douglas. "Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Agreements." *University of Birmingham Historical Journal* 8, no. 1 (1962): 62-81.
- Johnson, Gaynor. "Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924-1929." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 17, no. 4 (2006): 753-769.
- Joll, James. *The Origins of the First World War*. London: Longman, 1984.
- Jones, J. Harry. *Josiah Stamp, Public Servant: The Life of the First Baron Stamp of Shortlands*. London: I. Pitman, 1964.
- Kaiga, Sakiko. "The Use of Force to Prevent War? The Bryce Group's 'Proposals for the Avoidance of War,' 1914-15." *The Journal of British Studies* 57, no. 2 (2018): 308-332.
- Kaufman, D. B. "'A House of Cards Which Would Not Stand': James Headlam-Morley, the Role of Experts, and the Danzig Question at the Paris Peace Conference." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 30, no. 2 (2019): 228-252.
- Kennedy, P. M. "Idealists and Realists: British Views of Germany, 1864-1939." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (1975): 137-156.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1982.
- Kershaw, Ian. *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry, the Nazis, and the Road to War*. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
- Keukeleire, Stephan, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert. "Reappraising Diplomacy: Structural Diplomacy and the Case of the European Union." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 4 (2009): 143-165.

- Kitching, Carolyn J. "Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary: The Dual Role of James Ramsay MacDonald in 1924." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 1403-1422.
- Knowles, Caroline. *Race, Discourse, and Labourism*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. *Future Pasts: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985.
- Koss, Stephen. *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Volume 2: The Twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984.
- Lambert, Peter and Björn Weiler. Introduction to *How the Past was Used: Historical cultures, c. 750-2000*. Edited by Peter Lambert and Björn Weiler. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Lebzelter, Gisela C. *Political Anti-Semitism in England, 1918-1939*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978.
- Lentin, Antony. "'Appeasement' at the Paris Peace Conference." In *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Peace without Victory?* edited by Michael Dockrill and John Fisher, 51-66. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Lentin, Antony. *Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919-1940*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.
- Lentin, Antony. *Guilt at Versailles: Lloyd George and the Pre-History of Appeasement*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1985.
- MacDonald, Robert H. *The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880-1918*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994.
- MacDougall, Hugh A. *Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons*. Montreal: Harvest House, 1982.
- MacKenzie, J. M. *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
- Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Mangan, J. A. *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of Diffusion of an Ideal*. London: Frank Cass, 1998.

- Mangan, J. A. "'The Grit of Our Forefathers': Invented Traditions, Propaganda, and Imperialism." In *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, edited by John M. MacKenzie, 113-139. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986.
- Manne, Robert. "The Free Hand in the East? British Policy towards East-Central Europe, between 'Rhineland' and the Anschluss." *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 32, no. 2 (1986): 245-262.
- Markwell, D. J. "Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On." *Review of International Studies* 12, no. 4 (1986): 279-292.
- Martin, Laurence. *Peace without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.
- Massie, Robert K. *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War*. London: Vintage, 2007.
- Masterman, Lucy. *C.F.G. Masterman: A Biography*. London: Nicholson and Watson Ltd, 1939.
- McCarthy, Helen. "Democratizing British Foreign Policy: Rethinking the Peace Ballot, 1934-1935." *Journal of British Studies* 49, no. 2 (April 2010): 358-387.
- McClelland, Charles E. *State, Society, and University in Germany, 1700-1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- McKercher, B. J. C. *Esme Howard: A Diplomatic Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- McNeill, William H. *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Messerschmidt, M. *Deutschland in englischer Sicht: die Wandlungen des Deutschlandbildes in der englischen Geschichtsschreibung*. Dusseldorf: M. Triltsch, 1955.
- Middlemas, Keith and John Barnes. *Baldwin: A Biography*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang J. Foreword to *The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement*. Edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker. London: Routledge, 1983.
- Morgan, Kenneth O. "Lloyd George and Germany." *The Historical Journal* 39, no. 3 (September 1996): 755-766.

- Morgan, Kenneth O. "Lloyd George's Stage Army: The Coalition Liberals, 1918-1922." In *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays*, edited by A. J. P. Taylor, 225-256. New York: Atheneum, 1971.
- Morris, A. J. Anthony. *The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament 1896-1914*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.
- Muller, James W. Introduction to *Great Contemporaries: Churchill Reflects on FDR, Hitler, Kipling, Chaplin, Balfour, and Other Giants of His Age*, 13-43. Edited by James W. Muller. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2012.
- Neville, Peter. *Appeasing Hitler: The Diplomacy of Sir Neville Henderson, 1937-39*. London: Macmillan, 2000.
- Newman, Gerald. *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740-1830*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987.
- Newton, Arthur. *Years of Change: Autobiography of a Hackney Shoemaker*. London: Hackney Workers' Educational Association, 1974.
- Newton, Douglas. *British Policy and the Weimar Republic, 1918-1919*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- Nicolson, Harold I. *Land and Power: British and Allied Policy on Germany's Frontiers, 1916-19*. London: Routledge, 1963.
- Northedge, F. S. *The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers, 1916-1939*. London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd, 1966.
- Orzoff, Andrea. *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Otte, T. G. "'The Light of History': Scholarship and Officialdom in the Era of the First World War." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 30, no. 2 (2019): 253-287.
- Otte, T. G. "Détente 1914: Sir William Tyrrell's Secret Mission to Germany." *The Historical Journal* 56, no. 1 (March 2013): 175-204.
- Panayi, Panikos. *German Immigrants in Britain during the Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914*. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1995.
- Panayi, Panikos. "Germans in Britain's History." In *Germans in Britain since 1500*, edited by Panikos Panayi, 1-16. London: Hambledon Press, 1996.

- Parker, R. A. C. "Great Britain, France, and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-1936." *The English Historical Review* 89, no. 351 (April 1974): 293-332.
- Parsons, Greg S. "British Conservative Opinion and the Problem of Germany after the First World War." *International History Review* 35, no. 4 (2013): 863-883.
- Pedersen, Susan. *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Petrie, Charles. *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, K.G., P.C., M.P.* Volume II. London: Cassell and Company, 1940.
- Pickvance, Else (Editor). *William Harbutt Dawson, 1860-1948. Biographical Memoir by Else Muensterberg Dawson and William Siegfried Dawson*. Birmingham, 1998.
- Pimlott, Ben. *Hugh Dalton*. London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 1985.
- Potter, Bernard. *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Ramsden, John. *Don't Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890*. London: Abacus, 2007.
- Richter, Melvin. *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.
- Robbins, Keith. *History, Religion and Identity in Britain Modern*. London: The Hambledon Press, 1993.
- Robbins, Keith G. "Lord Bryce and the First World War." *The Historical Journal* 10, no. 2 (1967): 255-278.
- Robbins, Keith. *Present and Past: British Images of Germany in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and their Historical Legacy*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1999.
- Rose, Andreas. *Between Empire and Continent: British Foreign Policy before the First World War*. Translated by Rona Johnston. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2017.
- Rotberg, Robert Irwin. "Biography and Historiography: Mutual Evidentiary and Interdisciplinary Considerations." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 40, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 305-324.

- Rothblatt, Sheldon. *Tradition and Change in English Liberal Education: An Essay in History and Culture*. London: Faber and Faber, 1976.
- Rowland, Peter. *David George Lloyd: A Biography*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Ltd, 1975.
- Rüger, Jan. "Reviewed Work(s): British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism, and Ambivalence, 1860-1914. (Britain and the World)." *The American Historical Review* 119, no. 3 (June 2014): 983-984.
- Rüger, Jan. "Revisiting the Anglo-German Antagonism." *The Journal of Modern History* 83, no. 3 (September 2011): 579-617.
- Rüger, Jan. *The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Sadleir, Michael. *Michael Ernest Sadler, 1861-1943: A Memoir by his Son*. London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1949.
- Sahlins, Peter. *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989.
- Schroeder, Paul W. "Munich and British Tradition." *The Historical Journal* 19, no. 1 (March 1976): 223-243.
- Schuker, Stephen A. *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adaption of the Dawes Plan*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976.
- Scully, Richard. *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism, and Ambivalence, 1860-1914*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 2012.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson. *The Making of the New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary*. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1981.
- Seymour Cocks, F. Seymour. *E. D. Morel: The Man and His Work*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1920.
- Sharp, Alan. "James Headlam-Morley: Creating International History." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 9, no. 3 (1998): 266-283.
- Sharp, Alan. "Holding Up the Flag of Britain ... with Sustained Vigour and Brilliance or 'Sowing the Seeds of European Disaster'. Lloyd George and Balfour at the Paris Peace Conference."

- In *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?* edited by Michael Dockrill and John Fisher, 35-50. London: Palgrave, 2001.
- Sharp, Alan. "Some Relevant Historians-the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 1918-1920." *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 34, no. 3 (1988): 359-368.
- Siak, Steven Wai-Meng. "Germanophilism in Britain: Non-Government Elites and the Limits to Anglo-German Antagonism, 1905-1914," PhD dissertation. London School of Economics and Political Science, 1997.
- Siak, Steven. "'The Blood that is in Our Veins Comes from German Ancestors': British Historians and the Coming of the First World War," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 30, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 221-252.
- Soffer, Reba. "Nation, Duty, Character and Confidence: History at Oxford, 1850–1914." *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 1 (1987): 77–104.
- Sontag, Raymond J. "The German Diplomatic Papers: Publication after Two World Wars." *The American Historical Review* 68, no. 1 (October 1962): 57-68.
- Spicer, Charles. *Coffee with Hitler: The British Amateurs Who Tried to Civilise the Nazis*. London: Oneworld Publications, 2022.
- Stafford, David. "A Moral Tale: Anglo-German Relations, 1860-1914." *The International History Review* 4, no. 2 (May 1982): 249-263.
- Stambrook, Frederick G. "'Das Kind': Lord D'Abernon and the Origins of the Locarno Pact." *Central European History* 1, no. 3 (September 1968): 233-263.
- Stanley, Brian. *Christianity in the Twentieth Century: A World History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.
- Stannage, Tom. *Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition: The British General Election of 1935*. London: Croom Helm, 1980.
- Steiner, Zara. *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Stewart, W. A. C. *Progressives and Radicals in English Education, 1750-1970*. New Jersey: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972.

- Stone, Dan. *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge von. "The Role of British and German Historians in Mobilizing Public Opinion in 1914." In *British and German Historiography, 1750-1950: Traditions, Perceptions, and Transfers*, edited by Benedikt Stuchtey and Peter Wende, 335-372. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Strang, G. Bruce. "'The Worst of all Worlds': Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935-1936." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 210-235.
- Swartz, Marvin. *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
- Taylor, A. J. P. *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945.
- Taylor, A. J. P. *The Origins of the Second World War*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963.
- Thompson, J. A. "The Peace Ballot and the Public." *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 13, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 381-392.
- Tout, T. F. "Memoir." In *A Bibliography of Sir Adolphus William Ward, 1837-1924*, edited by Augustus F. Bartholomew, xx-xxxii. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926.
- Tulving, Endel and Martin LePage. "Where in the Brain is the Awareness of One's Past." In *Memory, Brain and Belief*, edited by Daniel L. Schacter and Elaine Scarry, 205-218. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Turner, Sharon. *The History of the Anglo-Saxons from the Earliest Period to the Norman Conquest* 6th edition, Volume I. Paris: W. Galignani and Co., 1840.
- Wallace, Stuart. *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918*. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1988.
- Warman, Roberta M. "The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916-1918." *The Historical Journal* 15, no. 1 (1972): 133-159.
- Watt, Donald Cameron. "Every War Must End: War-Time Planning for Post-War Security, in Britain and America in the Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45. The Roles of Historical Example and Professional Historians." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 28 (1978): 159-173.

- Watt, D. C. *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co Ltd, 1965.
- Weber, Thomas. *“Our Friend ‘the Enemy’”: Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I*. Stanford University Press, 2008.
- Weikart, Richard. “The Role of Darwinism in Nazi Racial Thought.” *German Studies Review* 36, no. 3 (October 2013): 537-556.
- White, Donald A. “Changing Views of the Adventus Saxonum in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century English Scholarship.” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32, no. 4 (1971): 585–594.
- Wiemann, F. W. “Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914.” In *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays*, edited by A. J. P. Taylor, 71-94. New York: Atheneum, 1971.
- Wilson, Duncan. *Gilbert Murray, OM, 1866-1957*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
- Wilson, Keith. “Introduction: Governments, Historians, and ‘Historical Engineering’.” In *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians through Two World Wars*, edited by Keith Wilson, 1-28. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996.
- Wilson, Trevor. “Lord Bryce’s Investigation into Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-15.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 3 (July 1979): 369-383.
- Windsor, Tara. “‘The Domain of the Young as the Generation of the Future’: Student Agency and the Anglo-German Exchange After the Great War.” In *The Academic World in the Era of the Great War*, edited by Marie-Eve Chagnon and Tomás Irish, 163-187. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Winter, Jay. *Remembering War: The Great War between Historical Memory and History in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.
- Wright, Anthony. “Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism.” In *Contemporary Political Ideologies* 2nd Edition, edited by Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright, 78-99. London: Continuum, 1999.
- Young, G. M. *Stanley Baldwin*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1952.

Databases

***Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Oxford University Press.**

- Altholz, Josef L. "Acton, John Emerich Edward Dalberg, first Baron Acton (1834-1902), Historian and Moralist." October 2009.
- Atkinson, Damian. "Cust, Henry John Cockayne [Harry] (1861-1917), Politician and Journalist." January 2011.
- Ball, Stuart. "Baldwin, Stanley, first Earl Baldwin of Bewdley (1867-1947), Prime Minister." January 2019.
- Boyce, D. George. "Harmsworth, Harold Stanley, first Viscount Rothermere (1868-1940), Newspaper Proprietor." January 2011.
- Codell, Julie F. "Unwin, Thomas Fisher (1848-1935), Publisher." May 2015.
- Filthaut, Jörg. "Dawson, William Harbutt (1860-1948), Journalist and Civil Servant." October 2009.
- Gooch, G. P. and R. J. W. Evans. "Ward, Sir Adolphus William (1837-1924), Historian." September 2004.
- Goldman, Lawrence. "Marriott, Sir John Arthur Ransome (1859-1945), Educationalist and Politician." September 2004.
- Goldstein, Erik. "Morley, Sir James Wycliffe Headlam- (1863-1929), Historian." January 2011.
- Hamer, David. "Morley, John, Viscount Morley of Blackburn (1838-1923), Politician and Writer." January 2008.
- Leventhal, F. M. "Union of Democratic Control (*act.* 1914-1924)." September 2006.
- Loyn, H. R. "Turner, Sharon (1768-1847), Historian." January 2015.
- May, Alex. "Curtis, Lionel George (1872-1955), Writer and Public Servant." May 2006.
- May, Alex. "Kerr, Philip Henry, eleventh Marquess of Lothian (1882-1940), Writer and Politician." January 2011.
- May, Alex. "Milner's Kindergarten (*act.* 1902-1910)." September 2005.
- Otte, T. G. "Phillips, Walter Alison (1864-1950), Historian." September 2004.
- Ryan, A. "Fisher, Herbert Albert Laurens (1865-1940), Historian and Politician." September 2004.

Shannon, R. T. "Seeley, Sir John Robert (1834-1895), Historian." September 2004.