P. M. Fraser

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS.

Studies in the history and epigraphy of Hellenistic Rhodes.

The work is not a full-scale history of Rhodes in the Hellenistic age, the materials for which do not exist. It is rather an analysis of the ancient literary tradition regarding Hellenistic Rhodes on the one hand, and on the other an attempt to analyse, classify and exploit the very large body of epigraphical evidence in so far as it relates to the external aspects of Rhodian life. The results of this scrutiny of the epigraphical basis, here undertaken on a far wider basis than has ever before been possible, are as disappointing as conclusions based solely on epigraphical evidence are apt to be. The first half of the work examines in detail the tradition regarding the political history of Rhodes from 408/7 B.C., the year of the foundation of the city, to 164 B.C., the year in which Rhodes concluded an alliance with Rome, and thereby lost, largely if not wholly, the freedom of action which she had until then retained.

The main conclusions arising from the examination of the early history of the city, are that the synoecism was effected, either by the Diagorid Dorieus himself, or by those in sympathy with him, because of the internal economic condition of the island, and that the history of Rhodes from that date until the submission of the city to Alexander the Great in 332 B.C. is not very different from that of other communities of the Eastern Aegean, though she remained perhaps even more closely than they, in the Persian, and later Hecatommid, camp. There is no indication, during this period of seventy-five years, of the city's future greatness.

The rise of Rhodes to political eminence, fully accomplished

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MS. D. Phil. d. 925

by the late fourth or early third century, was therefore directly due to the changes in the world effected by the campaigns of Alexander the Great. The first sign of her changed position in the world is her successful resistance to Demetrius the Besieger.

From this time onwards until 164 B.C. Rhodian policy seems to have been determined by the consideration that, for a polis to survive in a world of large and conglomerate monarchies in which the polis was but a subordinate unit, it was essential to be found on the winning side. Rhodes is thus found throughout the Hellenistic age, veering from side to side, as the rivals of the day wrested the mastery of the Aegean from each others' hands. After the siege of 305/4, good relations were formed with Demetrius the Besieger, but when his star began to set he was promptly abandoned for Ptolemy. Egypt in its turn was ruthlessly abandoned, and turned upon and defeated, when the outcome of the Chremonidean War and the battle of Cos, had shown Philadelphus' inability to maintain his transmarine foreign policy.

Rhodes was assisted in this policy by the possession of a highly efficient navy, the size of which at least in the late fourth century appears in our tradition to have been small, but the high quality of which was maintained both by skill in the employment of technical inventions and by the restriction of service in the arm to those who were by birth full citizens of Rhodes. This navy, since it played a major part in the Roman defeat of the Seleucid kingdom in the Antiochic War, has its place in world history.

By the third quarter of the third century the kingdoms of Egypt and Macedon were beginning to lose interest in the Aegean, and Rhodes began to

assume effective control. This authority was probably not expressed in formal terms until, in 200 B.C., Rhodes re-established on a slightly different basis, the Nesiotic League, which had proved a valuable organ of administration to Demetrius and to the Ptolemies. This League she retained until at least 167 B.C., the year in which Rome deprived the city of much of her considerable empire.

Relations between Rhodes and Rome are naturally of prime interest and stand in the centre of the picture from the time of the First Macedonian War onwards. It appears that until the eve of the Second Macedonian War Rhodian policy was one of hostility to Rome; her aim was to keep Rome out of the Greek East. Her motives for this cannot be determined beyond dispute, but it appears probable that she feared the loss of her position of pre-eminence in the Aegean. By the end of the third century there were no rivals in that field. The monarchs had seemingly acquiesced in her assumption of Aegean authority, and were for the moment, with the exception of Philip V, living harmoniously together. The irruption of Rome might seriously endanger not only the general peace of the Hellenistic East, but more particularly threaten the Rhodian thalassocracy.

And yet in 200 B.C. in the most serious war Rome had undertaken in the East, Rhodes is found on the side of Rome, and remains, with Pergamum, her most loyal associate until 177 B.C. The reason for this change of policy seems to lie in the alliance between Philip and Antiochus III, which, though it may have done no more than reaffirm existing and traditional ties between Antigonid and Seleucid, seems, partly perhaps because its precise terms were not divulgated, to have been misinterpreted as implying immediate joint action against Egypt, with whom Rhodes' relations were again

friendly. With Philip, one signatory, Rhodes was already at war. In this position Rhodes turned to Rome, whose power had been demonstrated by the outcome of the Second Punic War, and which was the only power which had no sentimental connections in the Hellenistic world. Rhodes therefore sought and achieved the intervention of Rome in the Eastern Mediterranean, and fought as her ally in the Second Macedonian War, and, more effectively, in the Antiochic War. At the Peace of Apamaea the fruit of collaboration was gathered. Rhodes was granted by Rome the possession of Lycia and of most of Caria.

This large grant was probably not entirely due to a desire to satisfy Rhodian aspirations. Antiochus had to be kept behind the Taurus, and Rome was apparently not prepared at this stage to consider the establishment of her own provincial administration. Rhodes, for her part, had acquired, in circumstances which are still obscure, in addition to her own 'Peraea', on the opposite coast, considerable stretches of Carian territory, ~~stretching~~ reaching up to and including Stratonicaea; she was therefore, provided her docility was assured, the obvious organ for the control of this territory.

Rome however still feared a coalition of the kings of the East, and signs of such a coalition in 197 B.C., between Perseus and Seleucus IV, to which Rhodes was obviously sympathetic, caused her to revoke the Rhodian control of Lycia. This led to war between Rhodes and the Lycian communities, but not to the freedom of Lycia.

Rhodes had not yet deserted her traditional policy of clinging to the stronger. The Third Macedonian War led [illegible] to a disastrous miscalculation. The good fortune of Perseus in the early stages of the

war, led to a sharp antagonism between the supporters of Rome and of Macedon within the city, and ultimately to the adoption of a policy of neutrality which was hostile to Rome. Rome, however, was not a declining Hellenistic kingdom to be thus abandoned, and Rhodes had to pay the penalty for her miscalculation, once the fate of the Macedonian kingdom was established. Along with the other neutral and dilatory powers she was shorn of her great position. She was deprived of her Lycian and Carian territories, other than the original 'Peraea' itself, and the establishment of Delos as a free port led to the commercial decline of Rhodes, and deprived her of the greatest single source of income, the revenues accruing from the harbour tax. Thus Rhodes was reduced to political insignificance by the power whom she had materially helped to acquire the authority over the East.

The political history of Rhodes is thus fairly clear for the period under review. When, however, we turn to discover what was happening in Rhodes during the same period the harvest is far poorer. An overriding consideration is that practically none of our evidence for the antiquities of the island is earlier than the third century, and much of it is of imperial date. Nevertheless certain features seems fairly certain.

The governing factor in the internal history of the island was the existence of three independent cities before the foundation of Rhodes. The new city was thus grafted onto an already well-founded social order, and must have continued that tradition in many ways. Nevertheless at the time of, or shortly after, the synoecism, a reorganisation of the social framework of the island was effected, perhaps under the inspiration of Athenian models. The old territorial divisions of the island were

relegated to a position of minor importance, and a fully developed deme-system was introduced, each of the territories of the three old cities being divided into approximately twelve demes. The survival among the normal demotics of what are evidently family names indicates that the old gentilicial attachments, which had developed in the centuries before the synoecism, were not wholly eradicated.

The survival of a strong gentilicial element in the life of the demes is accentuated by the existence of more than one hundred and fifty *koina*, both in the old cities and the new, many of which are based on family relationships.

This emphasis on the long-standing family ties in the constituent elements of the new state is in contrast to the status enjoyed by those who were citizens of Rhodos itself, but not of the old cities. These persons, perhaps more numberous than the demesmen, enjoyed some but not all of the privileges of citizenship, but there is much in their status which remains obscure. Apart from these half-citizens, if they may be so called, there also existed many gradations of foreign resident, from that of simple unprivileged foreigner, to a foreign resident on whom the status of 'Rhodian' had been conferred. It appears probable that full citizenship, including deme-membership, was only awarded in a very few instances. Rhodes thus seems to have protected herself against infiltration into the social and political life by the large number of foreigners who resided in the city on account of its commercial pre-eminence.

The constitution of Rhodes, or rather those isolated aspects of it of which both the spirit and the form can be recovered, the former from the narrative of Polybius, the latter largely from the evidence of inscriptions,

shows a most interesting fusion of classical democratic and Hellenistic elements, while her administration of subject territory reveals the extent of her debt to the contemporary world. Both these aspects of the Rhodian state indicate what is perhaps the most significant conclusion that may be drawn regarding Rhodian history -- that it was only by modifying democratic practice that Rhodes survived as a democracy in a world which had little room for autonomous poleis.

PREFACE.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND EPIGRAPHY OF HELLENISTIC RHODES.

By

P. M. Fraser.

[HT 1951]

PREFACE.

When, in 1945, I began to write this book I intended that it should be a 'History of Hellenistic Rhodes'. That it appears now with the more guarded title, 'Studies in the History and Epigraphy of Hellenistic Rhodes', is due to a realisation that a 'History of Hellenistic Rhodes', in the sense of a full-scale account of the social and political history of the island, cannot be written yet. On the other hand the publication of new evidence, the fruit of the Italian and Danish excavations in the island, has not only made earlier accounts antiquated, but has led to the accumulation of much unsorted epigraphical material. I have been content to analyse and classify this bulky and scattered material, and to draw as few conclusions as possible from it; this, it seems clear, must be a necessary foundation for any 'History of Rhodes' that may one day be written. To this analysis I have prefixed a full account of the political history of the island from the synoecism of Rhodos until the alliance with Rome, in an attempt to present the Hellenistic background in relation to which Rhodian affairs must be considered. Here I am conscious that I have sometimes treated in excessive detail matters not strictly Rhodian, but this is justified, I believe, by the nature of the evidence for Hellenistic history, incidents of which can rarely be treated in isolation.

The use of the word 'Studies' in the title indicates that some subjects are not discussed which in a full-scale history of Rhodes would demand an important place. In my omission of these topics I have been guided by various considerations. I have omitted any general account of

that King Charles' Head of Hellenistic economic history, Rhodian amphora-stamps, because it appears to be impossible to establish a reliable overall chronology for them, and until that is done no conclusions of any value can be reached. Miss Virginia Grace, of the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton, whom I have often, and invariably with profit, consulted regarding individual problems connected with the amphora-handles, hopes eventually to publish a corpus of these objects, and until that is done, the exploitation of the handles for historical purposes remains of dubious value. Two other aspects of Rhodian life, her tradition in the arts, particularly sculpture, and her pre-eminence in the philosophical world of the Roman republic, could hardly be omitted from a more general treatment; but they demand a different approach, and the employment of different, and to me unfamiliar, sources and fields of study; for this reason I have omitted them arbitrarily. Finally, the most obvious omission of the work in its present form is that there is no treatment of the Rhodian Peraea and the Rhodian Islands. I say 'in its present form', because this work originally contained a third part, dealing with that subject. This has now been suppressed, in view of the fact that my friend Mr. G.E.Bean, of the University of Istanbul, made important epigraphical discoveries in the Rhodian Peraea in the summer of 1948 which meant that the whole subject would have to be treated afresh. We have therefore pooled our resources, and it is hoped to produce shortly, in the Oxford Classical Monographs series, a joint work entitled 'The Rhodian Peraea; it s history and geography'. Similarly with the Rhodian Islands; there is much to be said for which I could find no room here. I hope therefore in the near future to publish an article, now complete, called 'The Rhodian Islands'.

Reference to both these works are made throughout this work by the abbreviated titles 'Peraea' and 'Islands'.

My obligations to previous writers of Ῥοδιακά are considerable. Principally I must acknowledge my debt to four scholars, all now dead: H. van Gelder(whose Geschichte der alten Rhodier has been for fifty years a standard work, and which is conspicuous for its sober and reliable judgment); Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, whose pre-eminence in the field of Rhodian history and epigraphy needs no elaboration; and the two Danish archaeologists, K.F.Kinch and C.Blinkenberg, to whom we owe the excavation of Lindos. The latter in particular, has put all students of Rhodian history in his debt by his admirable publication of the inscriptions of Lindos.

Italian scholars have done much for Rhodes, and to two of them, the late Mario Segre, and Professor Pugliese Carratelli I am conscious of a great obligation. Their writings are among the most important contributions to the understanding of Hellenistic Rhodes. Of the earlier generation of Italians who studied and published Rhodian inscriptions two names are outstanding, that of Maiuri and Jacopich. The former's Nuova Silloge, in spite of its many faults, is an essential work. The latter's various publications of inscriptions in Clara Rhodos are all marked by a prodigious ignorance of Greek, and an unexampled carelessness.

Personal obligations are few but deep. I must thank most warmly the Dean and Students of Christ Church for electing me to a Senior Scholarship in 1946, to enable me to continue my work, which would otherwise have been seriously interrupted; the Principal and Fellows of

Brasenose College for a generous contribution to the cost of setting up this work; and the Craven Committee for a grant of funds which enabled me to travel in Rhodes in 1948. My successive supervisors, Mr. M.N.Tod, Mr. J.P.V.D.Balsdon and Mr. H.M.Last all struggled with this intricate chaos and helped greatly in reducing it to whatever order it may have.

Peter Fraser.

Brasenose College,
Oxford.
29th March, 1950.

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Bibliography and Abbreviations.

This list excludes items given in the 'List of Abbreviations' at the end of the volumes of the Cambridge Ancient History, except in the instances in which a different abbreviation is used.

Works quoted only once are normally omitted.

*Prefixed to a book in the notes means that I have been unable to consult it.

A. Works of reference.

RE=Pauly-Wissowa, etc. Realencyclopaedie.

DS=Daremberg et Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines.

B. Periodicals (cf. also under Inscriptions (a) Rhodian)

Archiv=Archiv für Papyrusforschung

Athen.=Athenaeum.

AA=Archaeologischer Anzeiger (in JDAI).

BPW=Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift.

Bull.Soc.Arch.Alex.=Bulletin de la Société royale d'archéologie d'Alexandrie.

Hesp.=Hesperia.

Ἐφ.Ἀρχ = Ἐφημερὶς Ἀρχαιολογική.

P.P.=La Parola del Passato.

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Ferguson, Hell.Aths. = W.S.Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, Macmillan, 1911.

Flacelière, Les Aitoliens = R.Flacelière, Les Aitoliens à Delphes, Paris, 1937.

Focke, Demosthenesstudien = F. Focke, in Genethliakon Wilhelm Schmid (Tübinger Beiträge V, 1929) pp. 3-68

Griffith, Hellenistic Mercenaries = G.T.Griffith, Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World, C.U.P.1935.

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Tarn, AG= W.W.Tarn, Antigonus Gonatas, Oxford 1913.

Walbank, Philip V= F.W.Walbank, Philip V of Macedon, Cambridge 1940.

D. Miscellaneous.

W.Chrest= U.Wilcken, Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde, I, Leipzig 1912.

Sel.Pap. = A.S.Hunt-C.C.Edgar, Select Papyri, 2 vols.Loeb. Class.Lib.1932-4.

HGrEP. = H.von Gaertringen, Historische Griechische Epigramme, 1926 (Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen, 156).

HN² = B.V.Head, Historia Numorum, ed. 2. Oxford 1911

SB=F.Preisigke, etc. Sammelbuch griechischen Urkunden aus Ägypten.

E. Rhodian History, Topography and Archaeology (v.also, below Inscriptions, Rhodians).

(i) History :

Van Gelder, GdR= H. van Gelder, Geschichte der alten Rhodier, Haag, 1900.

von Hiller, Rhodos = F.Frhr.Hiller von Gaertringen, RE, Suppbd.v (1930), cols. 731-840, 'Rhodos'.

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(ii) Topography:

(a) Rhodes :

R.U.Inglieri, Carta archeologica dell' isola di Rodi, Firenze, 1936. (Istituto Militare).
(Items from this map, and from the accompanying letter-press are given in the notes to the present work by numbers within square brackets: e.g. [20], [34].

C.Newton, Travels and Discoveries in the Levant, I, London 1865

A.Maiuri, Rodi, (Il piccolo cicerone mod. nr.21) Rome 1921.
v.also, ii,p.25, note 103, and below, under Inscriptions, Rhodian, for Annuario, and Cl.Rh.

(b) The island :

Inglieri, as above, and the articles quote ii,p.249, note 83

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(Biblioteca di Bibliografia Italiana, Suppl.periodici a La Bibliofila, nr. xiv).

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Ath.Mitt. xx,1895, pp.222-229, 377-396.

Ath.Mitt. xxi, 1896, pp.39-66.

Ath.Mitt. xxiii, 1898, pp.390-403.

These three articles form a continuous publication; all the inscriptions are edited by Hiller von Gaertringen.

Ath.Mitt. xxv, 1900, pp.107-110.

SGDI= Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften, iii,1 nrs.3749-4351 (the Rhodian inscriptions, edited by H. van Gelder).

NS=A.Maiuri, Nuova Silloge epigrafica di Rodi e Cos, Firenze, 1925 (This work must be used in conjunction with the following reviews and discussions, which correct some, but by no means all, of the errors: A.Wilhelm, [illegible]

Ath.Mitt.li,1926, pp.1-13; G.de Sanctis, Riv.Fil; liv, 1926, pp.57-63; Hiller von Gaertringen, Gnomon, ii,1926, pp.103 ff).

Annuario=Annuario della (reale) scuola archeologica di Atene. Rhodian inscriptions occur in vol.ii, 1916, pp.125-131, 133-179; iv/v, 1922/3, pp. (Peraea); viii-ix, 1929, pp.313 ff.

Cl.Rh.=Clara Rhodos, Studi e materiali pubblicati a cura

dell'istituto storico-archeologico di Rodi. Inscriptions occur in, vols. ii, vi, viii, ix.

Mem.FERT= Memorie dell' istituto storico-archeologico FERT (Rodi).

Inscr. = Chr.Blinkenberg, Fouilles de Lindos, ii. Inscriptions, 2 vols., Berlin-Copenhagen, 1941.

Deuxième, etc. Rapport = Exploration archéologique de Rhodes, Fondation Carlsberg (Oversigt det Kgl.Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Forhandlinger), i-vi Rapports, Copenhagen 1903-1912, par Chr.Blinkenberg et K.F.Kinch (Rapports i-iv contain various matter; Rap.v consists of M.P.Nilsson's Timbres Amphoriques de Lindos; Rap.vi consists of the Lindian Chronicle: v.below)

Lind.Chron. ed[1]. = La Chronique du temple lindien, vi Rapport, Explor.arch. de Rhodes, v. preceding entry.

ed[2]. = Die lindische Tempelchronik, neu bearbeitet von Chr.Blinkenberg, Bonn 1915 (Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen, 131)

ed[3]. = Inscriptions de Lindos (v.above, Inscr.) i,nr.2.

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Stud.Ciaceri = G. Pugliese Carratelli, in Studi offerti a Emilio Ciaceri, Genoa, 1940, pp.254-260 'Note su epigrafe rodie dell' età imperiale'.

Scrinzi, Atti = A.Scrinzi, Atti del.r.Instituto Veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, lvii, 1898/9, pp.267 ff., 'Iscrizioni greche inedite di Rodi'. I have been unable to see this work. cf. F.Hiller von Gaertringen, BPW, xx,1900, cols.

(b) General.

ATL = Athenian Tribute Lists, ed.B.D.Meritt, H.T.Wade-Gery, M.McGregor, vols.i-ii, Harvard Univ.Press, 1939-1948.

LBW = Le Bas-Waddington, Inscriptions d'Asie Mineure.

H=E.L.Hicks, A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions, Oxford 1882.

GHI = M.N.Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions 2 vols. 1933-1948 (vol.i, 2nd.ed.1948)

BMI = Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum, i-v,1882-1916.

SGDI = Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften, ed. Collitz etc. 4 vols. 1884-1915.

OGIS = W.Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae, 2 vols. 1903-5.

Syll^{3} = W.Dittenberger, Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum, 3rd. ed. 1915-1924.

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M = Ch.Michel, Recueil d'inscriptions grecques, Brussels, 1900-1927.

G = van Gelder, Geschichte der alten Rhodier, Anhang, pp. 440-473.

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Choix, = F.Durrbach, Choix d'inscriptions de Délos, I, Paris, 1921.

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Inscr.Cos = W.R.Paton - E.L.Hicks, Inscriptions of Cos, Oxford 1891.

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I.von Olymp. = W.Dittenberger, Inschriften von Olympia (Ausgrabungen von Olympia, vol.V), 1896.

I.von Priene = F.Hiller von Gaertringen etc. Inschriften von Priene, 1906.

Milet, i, 3 = A.Rehm, etc. Ausgrabungen von Milet, i, 3, Das Delphinion, Inschriften.

N.B. 1. Rhodos = the city of Rhodes; Rhodes = the island of Rhodes in a general sense.

2. In the quotation of inscriptions of which two columns of text survive, r. and l. signify the right and left columns respectively.

INTRODUCTION.

The history of ancient Rhodes reaffirms the truth of the contention that the essential basis of the study of the history of a race or a community is a literary tradition. The fate and fortunes of a people become finally comprehenisble only when reflected in historical imagination. It fell to few societies in antiquity, other than Rome and Athens, to receive this treatment, and the islands of the Aegean are not among the few. Most of them, perhaps Rhodes above all, had their antiquarians and recorders, but these have perished, and left few and uninspiring memorials. It is only when Rhodes comes within the vision of the great historians, and particularly Polybius, that her history comes fully to life, and thus long stretches of Rhodian history remain either unrecorded or without dimensional reality.

Rhodes, then, suffers the common lot of peripheral societies in antiquity. Here indeed as elsewhere, the absence of a continuous literary tradition may be compensated by the existence of other evidence, that of inscriptions, of coins, of papyri and of archaeological items, such as pottery. The compensation, however, is only partial since the evidence from these sources, though relatively abundant (compared for instance with the evidence of many other Aegean islands), is singularly difficult to interpret.

A History of Rhodes cannot then be written in the same way that a history of Rome, of Athens, or even of Sparta, can be. The most that can be achieved is a rough sketch of the political development of the city based on the surviving historical material, together with some detailed studies of evidence which will only receive its full value when, if ever (and it does not seem a very probable event), a literary narrative is found to breathe life into the structure.

The purpose of this introductory section is to indicate the most important literary sources, and their possible origins, and to notice briefly some aspects of the epigraphical evidence.

1. Literary Evidence.

For the period from the foundation of the city (407 B.C.), to the battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.), the student of Rhodian history has at his disposal the main sources common to all Greek history of the period, and only those; namely, the Hellenica of the Oxyrhynchus historian probably to be identified with Cratippus, a writer of the early fourth century, the Hellenica of Xenophon, and Books xiv-xx of Diodorus Siculus. In all these histories except Book xx of Diodorus events at Rhodes play only the small part that is to be expected in histories with other themes-- the antagonisms between Athens and Sparta, the establishment and vicissitudes of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the rise of

Macedon under Philip II, the conquests of his son, the struggles of his son's successors. Rhodes in these years could lay no claim to pre-eminence which would occasion or justify recounting her detailed history. These historians certainly contain one or two incidents in Rhodian history which are described in detail; for instance the democratic revolution of 394 B.C. described by the Oxyrhynchus historian. But the incident is described from the Athenian standpoint, probably from an eye-witness account, and there is no need to suppose a written Rhodian source, in this, or similar passages.

Apart from the historians there are numerous references in other branches of fourth century literature: in Isocrates, in Aristotle, who on two occasions in the Politics illustrates characteristic developments of political life from events in Rhodes, and particularly in Demosthenes, who provides detailed information about the crisis at Rhodes after the Social War, in 353/1 B.C., in his speech On the Liberty of the Rhodians. But in these writers, as in the historians, there is no indication that Rhodian sources were employed, or that the writer or orator in question possessed more than the general knowledge of those living at the hub of affairs regarding peripheral events.

With the death of Alexander, in 323 B.C., the situation changes. Rhodes assumes a far greater political

importance and begins to appear far more frequently in historial writings. By the time of Polybius (c.200-after 133 B.C.) the city holds pride of place in the narrative alongside the Hellenistic Kingdoms, in his account of events of the Greek East.

The main historical source for the years 323-301 B.C. is Books xviii-xx of Diodorus, the basis of which is derived, either directly or otherwise, from the work of Hieronymus of Cardia, who, to judge from Diodorus and other writers who used him, was an objective and trustworthy historian, whose personal intimacy with the leading figures of the day gave him considerable opportunity to learn their motives, whether expressed or concealed.[1] In addition to Hieronymus there are signs of other sources, either drawn on directly by Diodorus himself, as appears most likely, or else whose narratives were already combined with that of Hieronymus in the intermediary source on which, on this hypothesis, Diodorus drew.[2] One such larger addition Diodorus found in Duris of Samos.[3] In general any detailed accounts of local history, such as would probably not have been incorporated in his political narrative by Hieronymus, will have been drawn from elsewhere.

The detailed accounts of certain events in Rhodian history belong to this category. The passages in question are:

(i), The account of the tidal wave of 316 B.C., in xix,45. This is inserted between two chapters of the continuous narrative of Antigonus Monophthalmus' activities in Media. Its insertion at this point is strange, and is not likely to have been due to Hieronymus. Diodorus may have derived it from his chronological source: its position in the middle of the record of a year does not exclude this: but the length of the passage and the detailed local knowledge revealed make it most improbable.[4] The notice clearly derives from an eye-witness account, and shows no signs of contamination from other sources. It is therefore probable that Diodorus drew it directly from a local Rhodian historian without mediation.

(ii), The account of the siege of Rhodes in 305/4 B.C. in xx,81-88, 91-1[illegible]. Hieronymus probably included an account of the siege in his history; the event was central to these years, and, more particularly to the career of Demetrius Poliorcetes, and could hardly be omitted. It is however very unlikely that he included it on the scale, or in the manner, in which the account is found in Diodorus. Here it occupies eighteen chapters of a book containing only one hundred and thirteen chapters, in which the events of eleven years are described over a very wide field. Such an emphasis on the siege in a general history written at a

time when Rhodes did not occupy the predominant position she acquired in the middle of the third century is improbable.

There are indications that the account is based on contemporary notices written into a narrative at a slightly later date. The tone of the whole narrative is extremely sympathetic to Rhodes: the energy and resourcefulness of its citizens are portrayed in glowing terms[5]; the reaction, the hopes and fears of the citizens, standing on the walls and watching the approaching armada 'which filled the sea between the island and the opposing shore with ships' is described with understanding[6]; the names of individual commanders of Rhodian squadrons are frequently recorded[7]; the proceedings of one meeting of the ecclesia is reported in some detail, and followed by a praise of the virtues of democratic government[8]; the reward bestowed at another meeting on a deserving mercenary=leader is reported[9]; the amount of corn and pulse sent by Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus to the city is also known[10].

On the other hand the passages devoted to activity on the side of Demetrius, when not actually engaged in the assault of the city, are couched in more general terms; 'Demetrius' stands for all the enemy on each occasion; the characterisation of the King[11], though it brings out his heroic qualities, is written with an objectivity which a member of Demetrius' suite, or a

historian of his following, could hardly have obtained; the detailed account of the Helepolis[12], which might appear to indicate a first-hand knowledge of its structure such as could only be acquired by someone on the side of Demetrius, is adequately explained by the statement, recorded elsewhere, that after the siege Demetrius left the Helepolis behind, in Rhodes[13], where it became a public monument, and, no doubt, an object of study. Finally, the story that the Demetrian troops counted the missiles discharged at them by the Rhodians, and found them to total over two thousand[14], is probably only a literary device by which to indicate the number fired, and does not imply any detailed knowledge of the calculations of Demetrius' working-parties.

The account of the siege is prefaced by a short passage describing the general condition of Rhodes at the time. This says the Rhodians possessed powerful naval forces, were the best governed of all the Greeks; were an object of dispute among the kings, all of whom sought to win the city's friendship; and that they foresaw from afar the most advantageous course to pursue, and retained the friendship of all, taking no part in the wars of the rival dynasts. For this reason they were honoured by the kings, and their strength had so greatly increased by this time that they

had undertaken the war against the pirates for the Greeks and had swept them from the seas. The account closes with the statement that Alexander had expressed his preference for the island by depositing his will there, and that the city maintained the closest relations with Egypt, since the bulk of its revenues came from merchants proceeding to Egypt, and, all told, 'the city was fed from the Ptolemaic Kingdom'[15].

The application of these circumstances to the late fourth century appears to be anachronistic:[16] the phrase 'ἰσχύουσα ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσι does not fit the period before the siege, though it was true a generation later; the assumption by Rhodes of the burden of the war on piracy likewise belongs mainly (though not entirely)[17] to the time after the middle of the third century, while the statement that the city was fed from Egypt would be nearer the truth for the reign of Philadelphus than for that of Soter. The statement about Alexander's deposition of his will belongs to the Rhodian stratum of the Alexander-Romance, and cannot be precisely dated[18].

The passage as a whole reveals a considerable bias in favour of Rhodes, and at the same time, puts the city's position in the late fourth century in false perspective. Whether this was due to incompetence: the failure to realize that the position

Rhodes enjoyed in the second half of the third century, and the first half of the second century, had not been attained before the siege; or to a deliberate attempt to magnify the Rhodian past, cannot perhaps be determined with certainty, but the presence of so much laudatory matter in the same context suggests that the distortion is deliberate.

The chapter with which the account of the siege concludes records honours paid by the Rhodians to the Kings, and in particular the story of the establishment of the worship of Ptolemy Soter at Rhodes[19]. Material of this sort might well have come from a general history of the period, since the occasion of the first establishment of the worship of Ptolemy by a Greek city, and particularly by one outside the Ptolemaic empire, would have been a fact of general interest. It need not be referred immediately to a Rhodian source. Apart from the Diodoran narrative of the siege, another account survives, which covers only a very small part of the whole. This is preserved on a papyrus fragment, which was apparently written in the second century after Christ, and is composed in the literary Ionic characteristic of that age[20]. The surviving narrative[21] is extremely close in content and wording to the version of Diodorus, and in some places the narratives are identical. The differences are slight, and, except in one instance, perhaps not important[22]. They suffice to indicate that

the author has not merely Ionised Diodorus, but the similarities are so great that it is extremely likely that both Diodorus and the papyrus go back to a common source.

To determine the name, or, more important, the date, of this source, would be of great value, but does not seem possible. The name of Zeno, the Rhodian historian mentioned by Polybius, has been suggested[23], but although he included events of the fourth century in his history[24], and doubtless also the siege, there is no positive ground for supposing that the surviving version of the siege is derived from him. There are numerous other historians of Rhodes, local antiquarians, from whom the narrative might have come[25]. It is particularly to be regretted in this respect that the end of the account in the Chronicle of the Epiphany at Lindus at the time of the siege is not preserved[26], and that its sources must also remain unknown.

For the period from the Battle of Ipsus until the opening of the History of Polybius, there exists no continuous narrative, other than the inadequate Epitome by Justin of the Philippica of Pompeius Trogus, for the history of the Hellenistic world, and only very few references to historical events in later literature. Rhodes shares the common fate of the Hellenistic world in this three-quarters of a century; uncertainty and conjecture. A picture of Rhodes in these years can only be obtained by the

combination of references in inscriptions and papyri with the few literary references there are. In this desert source-criticism can achieve nothing.

For the years from 220-164 B.C. our main source is Polybius, with the histories based on him, notably Livy, and Appian. Of the complete history of Polybius only five books are extant in their complete form, the rest surviving only in excerpts made κατὰ γένος in the Byzantine age, on the instructions of the Emperor, Constantine Porphyrogenitus (A.D. 912-959). It is on the passages contained in these excerpts that any account of Rhodian history in this period must be based; all other accounts, Greek and Latin, are subsidiary to them[27].

Polybius contains far more about Rhodes than any other single city state, other than Rome and Carthage, and in that part of his history which covered the years from 188-164 B.C.[28], so far as can be determined from the Excerpts, Rhodes was in the centre of his canvas. But any attempt to determine the sources of his information can be only partially successful, because of the ambiguous relation in which Polybius stands to all the events with which he was approximately contemporary. For example, Polybius, strictly speaking, was contemporary with the Antiochic War, since he was probably twelve or thirteen when it occurred;

but he cannot have been present in the campaigns of the war, and cannot be regarded as a contemporary source in the sense that Thucydides may be so described for the Peloponnesian war. There must therefore be an intermediate source for this war, as also for the First and Second Macedonian Wars. Further, even when events occurred in his own maturity, such as the Third Macedonian War, he cannot have had first-hand knowledge of the great mass of material which he ultimately, perhaps first in Rome, formed into a historical narrative. Thus a generation of historical writing of some sort or other-- local annals, reports of commanders, preserved in city-archives, perhaps even historical monographs - is lost between Phylarchus, whose narrative ended with the death of Cleomenes of Sparta in 221 B.C.[29], and the period after 188 B.C., when in some instances Polybius' narrative has the authority of a first-hand narrative. Of this lost generation, on whose works, traditions and memory he must have drawn in great detail, Polybius tells us very little[30]. Among the few names he mentions, or mention of which has survived in the Byzantine excerpts, are two Rhodian historians, Zeno and Antisthenes, whose work, and particularly that of Zeno he criticises in a long digression[31].

His criticism is directed to matters other than Rhodian; in addition to his criticism of their account of the Battle of Lade, in which the Rhodian fleet took part, he attacks their

interpretation and record of other events, which indicate that Zeno at least wrote a general history, which included much more than the history of Rhodes[32]. Since, however, Zeno was certainly an elder contemporary of Polybius[33], it is natural at first sight to suppose that he was Polybius' source for much of his knowledge of Rhodian events, though whether, as has been supposed[34], he may also be considered as a major source for Polybius' general history is clearly much more controversial.

However, the assumption that Polybius' Rhodian history is drawn from Zeno is not itself free from difficulty. Polybius gives no indication that any of his material is drawn from Zeno, and since no independent fragments of Zeno survive from which the tendency of his history can be determined, the use made of him by Polybius must remain a matter of conjecture. In spite of this, Polybius' use of Rhodian sources remains a certainty. In many passages he recounts Rhodian history in great and often disproportionate detail, in such a way as to make it quite clear that his narrative is drawn directly from a Rhodian source. In agreement with the detailed account of Rhodian history found in these later books is his inclusion of 'The rise of Rhodes', and 'The Rhodo-Byzantine War', among the subjects mentioned for especial treatment in the Proem to Book iii[35].

A distinction must be made between the two types of Rhodian narrative given by Polybius. In Books iv-v the Rhodiaca are

isolated insertions introduced in a chronological context; they could be removed without the sequence of the main narrative being in any way disturbed. In the remaining books on the other hand, the Rhodian narrative is integral to the general course of the history, and could not be detached from the surrounding narrative relating to the course of Aegean history.

The Rhodian episodes inserted in Books iv-v comprise the account of the Rhodo-Byzantine War of 220 B.C., the help given by Rhodes to Crete, and, shortly afterwards, to Sinope, and the reference to the Rhodian earthquake with the detailed list of subsequent donations. Of these passages the most instructive for Polybius' method of composition is the account of the Rhodo-Byzantine War[36]. This is prefaced by a long account of the position and commercial importance of Byzantium, a detailed and intricate description of the Pontus with particular reference to its tides and currents, based to some extent on Polybius' own impressions when he visited the area[37], and an account of the hardship endured by the Byzantines at the hands of their Thracian, and later their Gallic, neighbours.

This leads to the main subject, the war which developed as a result of the tax imposed by the Byzantines on shipping through the Bosporus, to enable them to satisfy the monetary demands of the Gauls of the Kingdom of Tylis[38]. From now on the narrative

reveals detailed knowledge of events both at Rhodes and at Byzantium. Thus proceedings in the Byzantine ecclesia are recorded in terms which indicate eye-witness testimony[39]; the names of Byzantine politicians are given[40], while the composition of the Rhodian fleet is also known in detail[41]. The general account of the war, the part played in it by Prusias, the ally of Rhodes, and Achaeus, the ineffective ally of Byzantium, shows equal knowledge of both sides[42]. The description of the campaigns of Prusias on the outskirts of Byzantium[43] is counterbalanced by the knowledge of the negotiations at Alexandria, between Rhodes and the Egyptian government over the fate of Achaeus' father[44]. The mediation of the Galatian king Cauarus, and the opening of the peace-negotiations also indicate access to sources from both sides[45]. The treaty by which the war was ended is recorded in terms which suggest that they were copied from a stele recording the original terms[46]. The document is dated by the Byzantine eponym[47].

Even if Byzantine elements appear to predominate in this narrative, it also contains plenty of Rhodian material. It is, in fact, clearly a fusion between two accounts. Who made this fusion? There are several possibilities. It may have been effected by a historian who had access to archives at both Rhodes and Byzantium, and who did not rely on any earlier historical

narrative. This may have been Polybius himself, who visited both Rhodes[48] and Byzantium[49]. Equally well Polybius may be reproducing a written account, which may in its turn have been written by a Rhodian or a Byzantine historian, or by a native of neither of these cities. The impartiality of the narrative (or, more precisely, its fluctuation from one camp to the other) suggests that the latter alternative is the most likely, if the fusion is not to be attributed to Polybius himself[50].

The second episode, the assistance given to the Cnossians[51], is in itself of little importance, though the mention of the event in immediate sequel to the Rhodo-Byzantine War, indicates that it derived its importance in Polybius' eyes from its relevance in Rhodian history. The consequent lengthy digression on Cretan affairs[52] is occasioned by the reference to the Rhodian assistance to Cnossus.

The third episode, the account of the assistance given to the Sinopians[53] is simple and straightforward. The help given by Rhodes, as a result of the appeal of the Sinopians, is described in great detail[54]. On the other hand the course of the war which prompted it is almost completely ignored. The list of gifts may have been copied from an inscription, which would certainly have been set up recording the gifts at Sinope, or from a Rhodian

document. The rest of the narrative suggests that in fact the information came from Sinope. The return of the Sinopian envoys is described[55], and to this is attached a detailed account of the site of Sinope[56], though the final result of the siege by Mithridates is not recorded. The description of Sinope points undoubtedly to a Sinopian source, and from the same source may come the list of gifts. The narrative, on the other hand, appears to contain nothing which could only have been learnt at Rhodes[57].

It is clear that the story of the ~~ae~~he lp given to Sinope, like that to Crete, owes its introduction at this point, to its close connection, in this instance both geographically and chronologically, with the Byzantine War. The existence of this small collection of Rhodiaca, all belonging to the same period, c. 220 B.C., testifies to a desire on the part of Polybius to exmphasise the history of Rhodes at this point, which he appears to have regarded as one of the climacterics of Rhodian development as well as an epochal date in general history. By this time Rhodes had become sufficiently powerful to stand forth as 'defendress of seafarers'[58], and it was in this capacity that she had embarked on the war with Byzantium. At the same time Polybius in treating of these events in Rhodian history, and in particular the Rhodo-Byzantine War, was careful to exercise an objective judgment, as he understood it. The narratives are not based exclusively on Rhodian material, and where conflicting interests

were at issue he carefully supports one side and then the other. But the events themselves would not have been recorded at all, but for their significance in Rhodian history, which was appreciated by Polybius.

The account of the earthquake at Rhodes, and the royal benevolence which followed it[59], is the only insertion in Books iv-v, the substance of which can be attributed to a Rhodian and only a Rhodian source. The earthquake itself is recorded only in passing. Polybius states only that it was in this earthquake that 'the great Colossus fell, and the majority of the walls and dock-sheds'[60]. Then follows considerable praise of Rhodian common-sense in making the most of their disaster[61]. Most space is however devoted to the detailed account of the donors and their gifts to the shattered city. This list may have been derived from a stele recording the gifts, and this a priori likelihood is strengthened by the simple serial way in which the gifts are recorded. If an intermediate literary source is presupposed, it clearly did little more than copy out such a record.

The plan of illustrating the rise of Rhodes to importance by single episodes could not be continued from the time of the First Macedonian War onwards, when Rhodes began to play a leading part in Aegean events, and became closely identified with the history of the Aegean. From now on events occurring at, or involving,

Rhodes are placed in their causal connection with other events. This is seen particularly clearly in the period from 188 B.C. to 164 B.C., where Rhodes occupies the centre of the stage. For this period, as has already been noticed, the question of Polybius' sources becomes acute. The whole narrative of these years might be based on a Rhodian source who wrote a general history embracing non-Rhodian material, as for instance Zeno appears to have done. Thus might be explained the marked partiality Polybius shows for Rhodes in these years; but clearly this may also be explained as arising from Polybius' own predispositions.

A particularly notable instance of material which may have been drawn from a Rhodian source, but need not have been, belongs to the First Macedonian War[62]. The progress of this war was marked by attempts at mediation between Philip V and Aetolia by non-belligerent powers, among them Rhodes. The last occasion of attempted mediation, 207 B.C., as described by Polybius, was notable for a lengthy speech by the Rhodian envoy[63]. This, if it is not a free composition of Polybius, may have been found in a written source; but that source clearly may not have been Rhodian.

For the history of the critical period from the Peace of Phoenice to the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, 205-

200 B.C.[64], little of the narrative of Polybius is preserved[65]. In particular the whole story of the deterioration of relations between Philip V and Rhodes cannot be recovered. The story of the ruse of Heraclides by which the Rhodian docks were burned[66] reflects use of a Rhodian source, though the biographical note and character-sketch of Heraclides is of a different origin[67]. The entry of Heraclides into the Rhodian ecclesia or Council-Chamber, and the fears of the Prytaneis are described from the Rhodian point of view; and the account of the damage done by Heraclides can only have come from a Rhodian[68]. This episode was however relevant to the main Aegean struggle, and may therefore have come from Zeno, or some other Rhodian author of a general history, rather than from a local chronicle. The episode of the appearance of Philip's envoy before the Rhodian ecclesia and the dramatic interruption of his speech with the news of the sack of Cius by Philip, is also clearly based on the evidence of an eye witness[69].

The events of the naval war between Philip and Rhodes and Pergamum derive from the same source. Here the possibility that Zeno is in fact that source is considerable, since it is in respect of Zeno's and Antisthenes' narratives of the battles of Chios and Lade that Polybius attacks Zeno for his partiality in calling Lade a Rhodian victory, though he admits that the account of the battle given by him was correct, even though he

displayed a natural partiality[70]. In this particular instance Polybius was able to refute the claim that the Rhodians had won the battle, by reference to a letter of the Rhodian admiral written after the battle, and seen by Polybius himself, some half century later, in the Rhodian archives[71]. However, although Polybius admits the correctness of Zeno's account of the battle of Lade it does not follow from this that he used it himself[72]. Clearly there would be a living memory of the battle in Rhodes fifty years afterwards, and Polybius would be able to obtain a verbal account based on autopsy. At all events since Polybius' own account of the battle of Lade is lost[73], the question of his dependence on Zeno cannot be answered.

The account of the Second Macedonian War in Polybius survives in only very small fragments, and for this reason an exact analysis of the sources used by him is not possible. Livy, though on the whole a safe guide to what Polybius wrote, has to be used cautiously in some matters, since he adds much of Roman origin. From both narratives it is clear that there is little that need be attributed to a specifically Rhodian source. Incidents such as the honours paid by the Athenians to the Rhodians, including the grant of Isopoliteia[74], and the departure of the Rhodians thereafter to the Cyclades[75], to re-establish the Nesiotic League, would naturally find a place

in any history; while the criticism of the inactivity of Attalus and Rhodes while Philip was at Abydus[76] shows the independence of Polybius from the Rhodian tradition. Similarly the account of the negotiations at Nicaea in 198/7 B.C.[77], though it names the Rhodian representative present names also the representatives of the other participants, while the demands of the Rhodians are not couched in greater detail than those of Attalus or the Aetolians. Attribution of this material to any particular source on the ground of any undue emphasis is therefore impossible.

The account of the negotiations preceding the Antiochic War belongs to the same category[78]. Rhodes is occasionally mentioned, but it is in the course of the general narrative and no particular significance can be attached to the references in respect of source criticism. The account of the war itself, on the other hand[79], preserved from Polybius in Livy, undoubtedly contains much material drawn from a Rhodian source. This is not only because of the important part played by the Rhodian fleet in the war; this was undoubtedly so well known at the time that no historian could fail to give it its due place. Apart, however, from this, many events are written from the Rhodian viewpoint. Of these the most striking is the dramatic story of the destruction of much of the Rhodian fleet in 190 B.C., by a trick of Antiochus' admiral, the exiled Rhodian Polyxenidas. This story and its consequences are narrated at considerable length[80].

The event itself was of importance in the general history of the war, but its greatest interest was for the Rhodians. Particularly significant in this respect is the account of the effect of the news of the destruction of the fleet at Rhodes. This includes some rhetorical writing, characteristically Livian in style, but also gives information which can only have been known to the Rhodians[81]: that many nobiles had been serving with Pausistratus: the number of ships fitted out and despatched to replace those lost, with an indication of the lapse of time between each despatch; and a shrewd characterisation of the new Rhodian commander.

A later episode of that year is also instructive; C. Livius, the Roman squadron commander, was ordered to proceed to Lycia from Samos, where the allied fleets were stationed, to help the Rhodians sieze the coastal towns. He was instructed first to go to Rhodes to inform the government there of his mission. Livy, from Polybius, records the reception he received there, and the steps taken to assist the design[82]. Similarly the account of the Rhodian preparations on the news of the approach of Hannibal and the Phoenician fleet is clearly written from a Rhodian viewpoint[83]; the reference to ships which constituted "The Caria Station", and to "The Peraea" (not "The Rhodian Peraea") seem to indicate this[84]. The account of the Battle of Side, in which the Rhodians played the leading part, might come from any general narrative of the war, but, at the

same time, it too has distinctive touches, which suggest either that the source used for the whole account was a Rhodian, or that Rhodian additions were subsequently made to the existing narrative either by Polybius himself, or by an earlier writer[85].

It is clear that here again the main problem of source-criticism is to attempt to discover the general nature of Polybius' knowledge of these events and the sources which may have been available to him, and that until this is done--and at the moment it is wholly impossible-- the nature of his reliance on specific and partial sources cannot be determined. Thus the presence of a large amount of Rhodian material in Polybius' account of the Antiochic War seems certain; how it arrived there cannot be determined.

There remain to be noted those books of Polybius which record events of the period between the Peace of Apamea, and 164 B.C., the year in which Rhodes became an ally of Rome[86]. It is these years which, as a result of Rome's gifts of territory to Rhodes, form the climax of that city's political history, and include also its rapid and conclusive fall from an independent status[87]. The part played by Rhodes in Polybius' narrative of these years is very considerable, and in some respects it is easier to determine the nature of the Rhodian source for this than

for the earlier period, since the material is more abundant.

In general the same possibilities exist as for the previous period: Polybius may have obtained his information from a written source, in which Rhodian material was already included, or he may have added it himself. In the latter eventuality he may either have drawn it from another written source, a history of Rhodes, or he may have gathered the information himself when in Rhodes, either orally, since Polybius is now writing of a contemporary events, or from scrutiny of public documents, or from both; or, perhaps the most likely contingency, he may have combined information drawn from all three sources.

Events at Rhodes are recorded in considerable detail, and the narrative is conspicuous both for its dramatic quality, which is particularly noticeable in the accounts of proceedings in the Rhodian ecclesia, and for the partisan passion in favour of Rome, which inspires it[88]. The passion is quite foreign to Polybius' method of writing history, and suggests that he is reproducing the opinions of one authority, whether written or not. This source has been identified with Zeno[89], but there exists little positive ground for the identification.

One or two examples of the peculiarly detailed knowledge possessed by Polybius in these books may be given. The vexed

question of the status of Lycia, and the possible relevance to it of source-criticism, is noted elsewhere[90]. Regarding this it is enough to note here, that, in recording the visit of the Lycian ambassadors to Rhodes in 188, Polybius describes their entry into the Rhodian ecclesia in the terms of an eye-witness[91]: "When the Lycians came into the ecclesia, they spoke about the alliance, and after them Pothion, the Rhodian Prytanis, stood up and made known the position of both sides, and censured the Lycians..... for (the Lycians) said: We will endure all rather than bow to Rhodes."

The events at Rhodes at the beginning of the Third Macedonian War testify best to the use of eye-witness accounts, and demonstrate the pro-Roman nature of the sources. In his account of one meeting of the ecclesia Polybius mentions the prytanis by name, and defines the semester of office, then names specifically the three leaders of the pro-Roman party, and the two leaders of the pro-Macedonian faction, Deinon and Polyaratus (whose fate at a later stage is recorded in wearisome detail) both of whose integrity is violently attacked[92]. The passage of the decree ordering the despatch of a squadron to assist the Romans is recorded, and the name of the commander of the squadron, as also of another single ship, is duly given[93]. The composition of the numerous Rhodian embassies to Rome is detailed, and on occasions

the patronymics are added[94]. He records the effect produced in Rhodes in 168 by the appearance of Genthius' vessels, and the public reception given to that King's envoys[95], and he knows of the secret pourparlers between Marcius Philippus and the Rhodian envoy in 169[96].

Finally events after the Battle of Pydna, and particularly the course of negotiations at Rome[97] are recorded with a wealth of detail and with a sympathetic appreciation of Rhodian policy which suggests the influence of a Rhodian source, though the central judgement of Rhodian policy may be Polybius' own[98]. The climax of the history from the Rhodian side is the long speech in which the statesman and orator, Astymedes, pleads successfully before the Senate for the admission of Rhodes to the Roman alliance[99]. The speech contains important details upon several matters of Rhodian economy, and some precise figures which indicate, what is indeed clear from the whole tenour of the speech, that it is reported by Polybius as delivered, or at least subsequently published, by Astymedes[100].

This analysis shows that these books are full of material which it is most natural to suppose were drawn from Rhodian sources. It unfortunately does not permit any closer determination of the precise relationship in which Polybius stood to these sources. Perhaps, all said, the most probable explanation is that the main written source used by Polybius for the general history of these

years was a Rhodian of Roman sympathies, who naturally put into his account a full measure of Rhodiaca; but to this narrative Polybius may well have added an indeterminate amount of material from personal investigation in the city. The main source was conceivably Zeno, the historian whom he criticises, but it is perhaps more likely to have been a historian whom he does not criticise, and whose name consequently is not recorded[101].

One other important literary document remains to be considered, the Lindian Chronicle. This, though inscribed on stone, is in fact the work of a pair of authors, and must be considered as literary work. The stone, now in Copenhagen, was discovered in the Danish excavations at Lindos in 1904, and has since been thrice published by Ch. Blinkenberg[102], who, with F.E.Kinch, was responsible for the excavations at Lindos. The stone consists of a single stele of Lartian stone, 2.37 m. high, .85 m. wide, and .23 m. thick[103], The top part of the stele is inscribed across the entire width of the stone, and contains a psephism of the people of Lindos, of the year 99 B.C., ordering that the Chronicle composed by Tharsagoras the son of Stratus, and Timachidas, the son of Hagesitimus, shall be erected in the precinct of Athana Lindia. The rest of the stele contains the Chronicle, inscribed in three columns, the matter of which is chronologically arranged from the top left, to the bottom right, corner of the stone. The first two columns contain dedications

to Athana from mythical times to the time of Philip V of Macedon, the third three Epiphanies which occurred at critical times in the history of the city, the first at the time of the Persian Wars, the second in the ~~middle of the~~ early fourth century, the third at the time of the siege of the city in 305/4 B.C.

The importance of this work lies not in the historical information it provides, which is not very great, but in the method of its composition. This can best be appreciated by a translation of the inaugural decree[104]:

'In the priesthood (of Athana Lindia) ~~th~~ of Teisulos, the son of Sosikrates (99 B.C.)[105], on the twelfth of Artamitios, it seemed good to the mastroi (i.e. Council) and Lindians: Hagesitimos, the son of Timachidas, Lindopolitan, proposed: Since the temple of Athana Lindia, being of great antiquity and honour, has been adorned with many fair dedications from oldest time, by reason of the Power of Manifestation of the Goddess, and since it happens that the oldest of the dedications, together with their dedicatory inscriptions have been destroyed by time: May Good Fortune attend! It has seemed good to the mastroi and Lindians, once this decree has been ratified, to elect two men; and the two elected shall cause to be constructed a stele of Lartian Stone according to the prescription of the Architecton, and they shall inscribe this psephism upon it, and they shall also inscribe from the letters and from the public archives, and from the other testimonies, whatever may be fitting concerning the dedications and the Power of Manifestation of the

Goddess; and they shall make the inscription in the presence of the Secretary of the Mastroi who is now in office. And the Treasurers of the Temple-Funds shall pay a fee, determined by Purgoteles the Architecton to those chosen for the construction of the stele and the inscription, not in excess of two hundred drachmae. And the Epistatae shall determine a site in the precinct of Athana Lindia, in which the stele shall be erected in the coming month of Agrianios. Whoever fails to carry out any of the items recorded in this decree shall pay five hundred drachmae to Athana Lindia. Chosen : Tharsagoras the son of Stratus, of the deme of Ladarma, and Timachidas the son of Hagesitimus, Lindopolitan.'

The antiquarian task set Tharsagoras and Timachidas was carried out with great learning, and reminds one that the latter probably was already, or became, a noted grammarian[106]. In the course of the fourth century the temple of Athana had been destroyed by fire, and it was mainly the dedications of a later date which survived[107]. For the earlier documents, from the mythical times onwards, the authors had to search earlier antiquarian works for evidence of such dedications. After each dedication are recorded the sources for it. There is thus preserved a very considerable number of authors' names with the title of their works, most of which have not survived elsewhere.

The dedications of the fourth century and later preserved by the Chronicle are those of Alexander, Ptolemy Soter, Pyrrhus,

Hieron II of Syracuse and Philip V of Macedon[108]. The names after that of Philip have perished. These dedications provide evidence for otherwise unknown contacts between the kings in.question and the Lindian sanctuary, but obviously great caution must be exercised in using these dedications as evidence for contacts between them and Rhodos, on a political level.

In fact the greatest importance of the Chronicle lies in the information it provides concerning local Rhodian historical writing, about which, thanks to this document, we are almost as well informed as about the similar antiquarian writers of Attica, the Atthidographers[109]. In many instances the names of authors are recorded of whom nothing else is known, for instance, Hagelochus, Hagestratus, Aielurus, Nicasylus, and Timocritus[110]. Of all these ~~in the instances of all~~ but Aielurus, the title given to their work, Χρονικὴ σύνταξις, suggests that it was an annalistic account of events, either of the mythical, archaic or Hellenistic periods. Men such as these doubtless confined themselves to the history of Rhodian cults and institutions, and general antiquarian work, and it is therefore not very likely that they exercised any influence on Hellenistic historiography. This is also true of writers of whom a little more is known, for example Gorgon[111], author of a work entitled 'On Rhodes', or 'On Rhodian Sacrifices', Ergias[112], Polyzalus[113], and Phaennos[114]; at a later date they are only referred to in connection with Rhodes. They were valuable books

of reference on Rhodian matters, but nothing more.

The Chronicle also contains two classes of writers, which indicate that the importance of Rhodes as a centre of historical study must not be underestimated, quite apart from the undoubted traces which Rhodian writers have left in Diodorus and Polybius. The first class is that containing the names of men of letters who, although not themselves Rhodians, wrote of Rhodian history and antiquities, and thereby, it may be supposed, gave a breadth to the Rhodian tradition which it would otherwise have lacked. Of this class the outstanding figure is Hegesias, of Magnesia ad Sipylum, who lived in the mid-third century B.C.[115]. The circulation of his writings at Rhodes is testified by another source; an inscription containing a list of books including three of Hegesias, in the Rhodian Library. His 'Praise of Rhodes' is quoted twice in the Chronicle for the mythical and epic periods[117]. The leader of the Asianic School could not claim to be a serious historian any more than could parallel figures at a later date, Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides; but his encomiastic work on Rhodes, like their exhortations to Homonoia, points to a lively interest in the Rhodian state. This, in the third century before Christ, before the perspective of time had brought out the importance of Rhodian history in the Hellenistic Age, is of some significance.

A second foreigner who wrote on Rhodian affairs was Myron of Priene[118]. He, like Hegesias, was a rhetor rather than a historian

and, like him, wrote a 'Praise of Rhodes'[119]. He arouses especial interest in that he appears to have been a friend of Chremonides[120], and may for that reason have been a source of Rhodian history not only for the early period for which he is quoted in the Chronicle, but also for the critical time in the middle of the third century in which the Rhodians defeated the Egyptian fleet under Chremonides.

Men of this type may clearly have exercised considerable, if in part unconcious, influence on the development of Rhodian historiography, by opening to the local antiquarian wider horizons than those with which he was familiar. No less significant for an understanding of Rhodian historiography are some authors mentioned in the Chronicle, who did not confine their history to Rhodian antiquities, and whose influence in general Hellenistic historical writing is unmistakeable. Of these the most important are the two Rhodian Zeno and Xenagoras.

Zeno, who is mentioned twice in the Chronicle[121], as a source for fourth and third century dedications, has already been mentioned in connection with Polybius as a possible source for some of Polybius' history, Rhodian and general[122]. It is a fact of considerable importance that of the matters on which Polybius takes up Zeno, only one is concerned with Rhodian history, while the rest belong to the general history of the Hellenistic world, and show that Zeno treated this in considerable detail[123]. He certainly included in his history an account of Pyrrhus, of the battle of Panion, and of Nabis' Peloponnesian activities. The correspondence by letter

between the two men, as well as the generally mild nature of the criticism Polybius directs at him[124] perhaps suggests that Zeno's influence on him, and hence on the 'vulgate' of Hellenistic history, may have been considerable.

Xenagoras is cited twenty-two times in the Chronicle[125], mainly for events of archaic history, for which he is the chief authority, and for no event later than the fourth century, though he himself may not have lived until the middle of the third[126]. He (there is no evidence that another historian of the same name existed) is referred to by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his account of the various Greek versions of the foundation-legend of Rome[127], among writers of the fifth and fourth centuries, as source for the version that Rome Antium and Ardea were founded by three sons of Circe and Odysseus. This strange version of a Hesiodic story[128], if it is to be attributed to the fourth century-- and the appearance of Antium and Ardea on an equal footing with Rome suggests a date before rather than after the Latin Peace of 338 B.C.[129]-- implies a knowledge of Western Italy, and in particular Latium, that is very unexpected, and perhaps lends some support to the statement of Polybius that contacts between Rome and Rhodes were established, though not perhaps maintained, from the end of the fourth century[130]. Even in the third century such knowledge is surprisingly advanced in a world which remained relatively ignorant of Rome (if not of Romans) before her political

minor importance such as the award of honours to deserving citizens.

This lack of inscriptions from Rhodos is due very largely to the historical evolution of the city in the mediaeval and later periods. Rhodos remained a city of importance from the Hellenistic period until the beginning of Ottoman rule, and particularly in the time of the Knights of St.John, large scale constructional work was carried out, which is now the glory of the island. In these constructions traces of the ancient city were inevitably destroyed, and this destruction was not confined to the demolition of existing buildings, but at Rhodos as elsewhere, marble stelai were used, en bloc, for insertion in walls and the like. It is therefore likely enough that underneath the remains of a later day there lie documents of the Hellenistic Age which, if at all, will only see the light of day by chance.

In one field alone has Rhodos yielded, and indeed continues to yield, a fair crop of inscriptions, namely tombstones. These inscriptions form over half of the entire epigraphical yield of Rhodes, and provide much precious material[132]. The epigraphical poverty of Rhodos is to some extent compensated by the finds at two other sites in the island, the cities of Lindus and, to a far less extent, of Camirus. Normal excavations have been carried out at these sites over a period of years, and numerous inscriptions from them published. However, the value of this material for a study of the civilisation of Rhodes is distinctly one-sided. These

intervention.

There is no positive indication that the views of Xenagoras found acceptance in Rome, or in the Greek world, but it seems clear that he was a pioneer in his account of the West, and thus a figure of considerable importance. It would be an exaggeration to claim for Rhodian historiography the same prominent position in ancient tradition that belongs by right to Rhodian philosophy and Rhodian rhetoric, and, in another sphere, Rhodian sculpture; but it is clear both that the island itself, was the object of considerable historical interest, and that in their turn, its writers affected the work of others, not only as regard their own local history, but also in the wider field of Mediterranean events.

II. Inscriptions.

The epigraphical evidence from Rhodes, though abundant, is disappointingly uninformative. For the period from the foundation of the city until the late Roman empire, not more than two or three texts, out of more than two thousand refer to events of any interest in the political sphere, and none is of any major importance. Thus the study of Rhodian inscriptions is not the rewarding task for the student of Hellenistic history, that, for example, the study of Delian, Milesian, or even Attic inscriptions of the same period is. Nor is this silence confined to political events. There are equally few documents of constitutional significance. Documents from Rhodos are few in number. The surviving number of psephisms passed by the Rhodian assembly does not total more than ten[131], and the majority of these are concerned with matters of

cities after the synoecism of 408/7 sunk to the status of demes, with their own local administration, but with no sovereignty beyond that. Consequently these documents can shed no direct light on the vital questions of Rhodes' relations with foreign powers and other matters which were determined at Rhodos. It is a natural consequence of the lack of effective sovereignty on the part of these communities that much of their public business was concerned with sacral matters, with the election of priests, with the proper recording of dedications to their patron deity, and with other aspects of temple life. It is these aspects of the life of these cities which is so abundantly illustrated by the inscriptions, but viewed as historical evidence for the rise of Rhodes, they are unsatisfactory material.

A few of the more important classes of inscriptions may be noted;

(a). Honorific statute bases are among the most common type of inscription, found both at Rhodos and in the old cities. These dedications of statues, which are accompanied by lengthy inscriptions, are normally dedicated either by a family, or by the state, that is 'The Rhodian People', or by a section of it, as 'The Lindians'. The inscriptions frequently record the public offices held by the honorand throughout his public career, and, in the case of the old cities, the local offices held are also given. From these documents much may be learnt concerning the normal sequence in which magistracies were held at Rhodes, and

this is of great value for the establishment of comparative chronology. In this respect they closely resemble Roman cursus inscriptions[133].

(b). Dedications to deities, most frequently to Athana Lindia at Lindos, made by Synarchiae, that is the magistrates of a single year of office, at its expiry. These record the name of each official above a certain level, together with his title. In these dedications the name of each member of a board is recorded, and thus may be determined the size of the various colleges[134].

Similar to the dedications by the magistrates of a year are those by the priests, συνιερεῖς. These are very common at Lindos, and at Camiros they form almost the entire bulk of the epigraphical material, but only very few from Rhodes have yet been published[135]. Such lists give the names of the eponymous priest of the year, and the name of the priest of each cult together with the name of the cult. We are thus in possession, over a period of centuries, of the names of all the cults practised at Lindos, and the date of their introduction.

(d). Chronologically by far the most important inscriptions are the lists of eponymous priests. Of these three major lists have been found : (1) That of the eponymous priests of Rhodos itself, from the foundation of the city to a date in the middle of the fourth century, and again for part of the third century (this list is unfortunately still unpublished)[136]. The value of this list, great though it is, is considerably diminished by the fact that no Rhodian inscriptions of the fourth century exist, which

ight be precisely dated by reference to this inscription. For
he third century, it provides one or two possible points of
ontact with inscriptions of the old cities. (ii) That of the
riests of Athana Lindia, the eponymous priesthood of Lindos, which
is preserved almost in its entirety from the fourth century B.C. 3.
o the early Empire[137]. This is the key to the dating of all
Lindian inscriptions, nearly all of which bear the name of the
Lindian eponym. (iii) That of the Damiourgi, the eponymous priests
of Camirus, covering much of the third and second centuries[138].
Apart from these there are certain minor lists[139].

All these types of inscriptions are particularly valuable as establishing a reliable framework, be it of chronology, or of magistrates, or of priestly offices. There are in addition other documents of great value for the social history of the island. Of these the most important group is that of tombstones. These form the most numerous single class of inscription from Rhodes[140]. They are rarely found in the old cities or elsewhere in the island, probably largely because after the synoecism the old cities ceased to be residential centres of any importance[141]. The tombstones of Rhodes have either been found by chance at scattered points throughout the city, or else in the main sepulchres, especially from three Hellenistic and Roman necropoleis discovered in the southern suburbs of the city, in which, apart from numerous individual tombs, several well-constructed subterranean sepulchres, each consisting of

several loculi, have been found[142]. The value of tombstones for the economic and social historian is very considerable, since the inclusion of the city-ethnic or ethnic on the stone permits the determination, within very uncertain chronological limits, of the number of foreigners resident in Rhodes, and their place of origin[143]. Thus for a general appreciation of the life of ancient Rhodes they are perhaps more valuable than any other class of evidence than the fundamental literary narrative.

Also valuable for the social history of the island, and particularly for the development of the foreign communities of Rhodes, are the numerous inscriptions, mainly honorific decrees, either emanating from, or referring to κοιναί, Associations. ~~societies~~. Inscriptions up to the present afford evidence for the existence of more than one hundred and seventy κοιναί within the island[144]. These societies, which were partly religious and partly philanthropic, like a modern Masonic Lodge, enabled slave and free man, Rhodian metic and simple foreigner, to meet together on an equal footing, and thereby doubtless contributed very considerably to the contentment of these sections of the community which were not fully enfranchised[145].

Another helpful, but not very numerous, class of document is the subscription list[146]. These lists contain the names of persons contributing to a purpose declared at the head of the stone, such as the restoration of a temple, or a charitable institution,

together with the sum contributed by each individual or group of individuals. These lists, the majority of which come from Rhodes, sometimes consist of Rhodian citizens, (arranged either individually or as families or demes), sometimes, in subscription-lists of Κοινά, of foreigners only, and sometimes Rhodians and foreigners. The lists are usually recorded in detail, each member of a subscribing family being mentioned, and it thus is possible to estimate, with due reserve, both the size of families, and their relative prosperity. Light is also shed by these documents on the legal status of females and minors.

It will be noticed from a comparison of the two types of evidence, literary and epigraphical that they rarely encroach on each other. The literary evidence provides the fundamental narrative of events, without which no attempt could be made to write the history of Rhodes, while the epigraphical evidence relates almost entirely to matters of internal administration and the like, which are entirely ignored in the general narratives of the historians. The link between the two, which was originally supplied by the local antiquarians of whom traces remain in the Chronicle, is now broken, and the inner unity of Rhodian history is lost beyond recovery.

Chapter 1.

Introductory Note.

The purpose of the first half of this book is to attempt to recover the political history of the one great free city of the Hellenistic world. Though the early stages of the island's history are much discussed to-day, I have omitted the whole story of the island from Mycenean times onward to the epochal date in Rhodian history--408B.C.; for what comes after that date has little connection with what preceded it, even if the institutions of one period may cast a little light on those of the other. Politically the two stages of Rhodian history are wholly distinct.

A continuous tradition was, however, provided by the activity of one family, that of the Diagoreioi. This family dominates the scanty evidence for Rhodian history between the Persian wars and the Peace of Antalcidas. I therefore deal briefly with the years 479-408 B.C., in so far as it has particular reference to the fortunes of this family.

Rhodes from 479-408 B.C.

Before 408 B.C. Rhodes was not a single state, but comprised three separate independent communities, Lindos, Camirus and Ialysus[1].

During the Persian wars these cities like the other Dorian peoples of the South-East Aegean and the mainland of Asia Minor-Caria- had fought on the Persian side[2]. Herodotus tells us that after the battle of Mycale (479 B.C.), Samos, Chios and Lesbos and the other islanders who had fought against the Persians were received into the Greek alliance[3]. The Dorian islands and cities were naturally excluded from this, and the date of their subsequent absorbtion into the Delian League is uncertain. It may well be that it resulted from Cimon's Pamphylian campaign, and the victory of the Eurymedon (c. 467 B.C.)[4]. At all events, the earliest documents of Athenian tribute (454-451 B.C.) contain the names of the three cities of Rhodes, and of some minor communities on the island[5].

The quarter-century which had elapsed since the defeat of Persia had witnessed the rise to pre-eminence within the island of the House of the Diagoreioi, of the city of Ialysos, and of royal origin. Literary and epigraphical evidence alike attest to the splendour of this family in the years before the Peloponnesian war, when their athletic triumphs at Olympia and elsewhere

had made their name a byword[5A].

Pindar wrote one of his most brilliant odes, Olympia vii, in honour of the head of this house, Diagoras the son of Damagetus, for his victory in the boxing contest in 464 B.C.[6]. In the very first lines Pindar stresses the two predominant features of the house, its royal, even divine, origin, and its pure Dorian strain[7]. Diagoras was of Ialysus, and therefore particular praise is given this city, but the essential unity of the island is implied by the myth of the three brothers, Kameiros Ialysos and Lindos, of which Ialysos was the oldest[8]-- and therefore most fit to take the lead.

Pindar, however has an especial message for his Dorian patrons. The year was 464 B.C., and the lengthening shadow of Athens lay across the Eastern Mediterranean. The victory at the Eurymedon had brought little encouragement to hereditary rule in the Greek cities, while democratic forms of government, sure of Athenian favour, gained increasing hold[9]. Pindar encourages and consoles the lost cause. The winds of Fate, he says, will not blow for ever adversely[10]. It is clear that the power of this great house of the Dorian aristocracy is waning, but the general nature of the poem does not permit us to conclude that the island has already passed into Athenian control; perhaps if it had, Pindar would not have sung so freely[11].

The predominance of the family of Diagoras, which had been felt over the whole island[12], now faded as the Athenian empire

expanded. Diagoras had been a leader of men, the type of the Dorian aristocrat: in a changed world in which Athens, with the Ionian cities behind her, is mistress over Dorian peoples, his son, Dorieus, is only a malcontent and rebel.

Though such he appears when first we meet him, Dorieus is a figure of great importance. For thirty-seven years he dominates Rhodian history. Above all, as our evidence slowly accumulates, the conclusion that it was he who organised the synoecism and guided the city through its first difficult decade becomes increasingly probable.

Dorieus outshone his father and his scarecely less distinguished brothers as an athlete of international fame. In the late fourth century his name was used as representative of that class[13]. His victories at Olympia punctuate his turbulent political career[14].

The crash seems to have come for the Diagoreioi, led now by Dorieus, at, or shortly before, the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. In about 432 B.C. the Diagoreioi were apparently still strong enough to attract the attention of Athens, where thoughts of war, and measures of defence were in the air. We learn from a chance reference of Xenophon that Dorieus and his relatives were condemned to death and expelled from the island[15]. This probably occurred shortly after 432 B.C., and certainly before 428 B.C.[16]. The circumstances of this expulsion are unknown, but it is reasonable to see in it a measure of Athenian preparedness for war.

There is no trace in our admittedly scanty tradition of any general revolution on the island such as occurred on Euboea and Samos, which would have prompted and justified a death sentence on the entire family[17]. On the other hand Periclean strategy was awake to the need of securing reliable routes by which, in the event of war food supplies could reach the Peiraeus[18]. Rhodes played an important part in such calculations, since she was the half-way house between ~~Alexandria~~ Egypt and the Peiraeus[19]. It was therefore essential to ensure the loyalty of the island. What pretext, if one was needed, was discovered which enabled the prosecution to proceed in a lawful way, we do not know[20]. Once the Diagoreioi had fled the Athenians did not worry much about them. When the opportunity to carry out the sentence occurred some twenty-five years later, it was allowed to slip.

Dorieus and his kinsmen fled to Thurii in South Italy, which had been founded by the Athenians as a pan-hellenic colony in 444/3 B.C. The city was at this time probably hostile to Athens, and perhaps remained so until 413 B.C., and thus provided a convenient asylum[22]. Unfortunately, we know nothing of Dorieus' activities at Thurii, beyond the fact that he played an active part in affairs there[23]. He also made more than one visit to Olympia, and won his customary victories[24].

Whether his political activity in these years of waiting

was confined to Thurian affairs or directed to the formulation of plans and policies hostile to Athens we do not know, but it may be conjectured that he now developed the notion of a great Dorian Metropolis, the Syracuse of the East.

The Athenian disaster in Sicily (413 B.C.) was quickly followed by the open adhesion of Thurii to the Peloponnesian side[25]. In the following winter (412 B.C.) Dorieus arrived in Greek waters as commander of a detachment of Thurian ships under Spartan command[26]. His subsequent movements are uncertain; at no time does he hold the centre of the stage for more than a moment.

In Rhodes, Dorieus' ultimate goal, events took a sudden turn. The situation here was influenced by the general deterioration in Athens' position which had occurred in the summer of 412 B.C. On all sides her maritime allies in the war seceeded[27], and at the same time Spartan negotiations with Persia proceeded[28]. Many waverers inevitably fell away from Athens, the cities of Rhodes among them. The Spartans for their part were led to accept the opportunity for intervention afforded them, because of a rupture in their relations with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes.

The first move came from Camirus. The δυνατώτατοι of the town issued an invitation to the Spartans and the latter responded hoping to acquire thereby 'an island by no means weak in sailors and in foot-soldiers...and reckoning at the same time that they would be able to service their fleet from the alliance, without having to call on Tissaphernes'[29]. The Spartans landed at Camirus which was unwalled at the time, and the common people,

ignorant of the plot, fled[30]. The Spartans then called together the inhabitants of the three cities, 'and persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians. And Rhodes joined the Peloponnesians.'[31].

Rhodian motives in calling on the Spartans are clear. The temporary fall of Athens' fortunes either created a philo-Laconian party, or provided it with an occasion for action. It was this section of the population, or those who represented it in Camirus, who took the necessary action. What went on behind the scenes in the Spartan camp is more open to conjecture. The extent to which, as eighteen years later, action was co-ordinated between those on the island, and their supporters outside is unknown. But it may be noted that the Spartan fleet was based at this time on Cnidus, a short sail from Camirus, and that Dorieus was still in the area, though his precise whereabouts at the time of the revolution in the island are unknown[32]. It is possible that he had already crossed over into the island and that he engineered the revolt from within; at any rate it cannot be doubted that he had some sort of contact with the pro-Spartan elements in the island, and that he had Spartan approval.

The revolution was an indispensible condition of any further plans Dorieus may have had. Unfortunately no details of it are recorded by Thucydides. Thus we do not know whether the admission of Spartan forces represented a change in government; we hear

nothing of a preceding oligarchical revolution. It is possible that public opinion was sufficiently convinced of the hopelessness of the Athenian position, and sufficiently shocked by the Athenian use of Rhodian troops against her daughter city of Gela during the Sicilian expedition[33], that a widespread reversal of feeling occurred even among the democratic elements in the island. Doubtless the followers and emissaries of Dorieus exploited the ground won, even if they had not been instrumental in winning it.

The Spartans revealed yet again their characteristic hesitation and uncertainty in dealing with the prize that had fallen to them[34]. It is true that they took stringent financial measures without delay. They extracted thirtytwo talents from the island[35] which was approximately the amount the Athenians had levied as tribute; but they took no steps to secure the safety of the island, which the Athenians raided from adjacent Chalke[36].

In the summer of the same year (411 B.C.) trouble broke out in the island, and we are told that Dorieus was sent to quell it[37] It therefore appears that either Dorieus was not left in charge of the island at all, after its secession, or at the most only for a few months. There is however no hope of obtaining a connected account of Dorieus' activities in this year; he appears frequently in the narrative of events, but the reason for this or that particular move is seldom given. Therefore all that can be said is that Dorieus may have been on the island, in in close

touch with it, at the time of the revolt; that he may have stayed there for a month or two; but that he was back with the Spartan fleet at Miletus (less than a day's sail away) by midsummer, or soon after.

Dorieus is said to have composed this trouble, which is described as an attempt at revolution[38]. No details as to this counter-revolution are given, but it appears that a show of Spartan strength was required to quell it, since Dorieus was sent with the entire contingent of Thurian ships with thirteen ships[39]. It may be noted that a counter-revolution by exiles had a fair chance of success at Camirus, if the city was still unfortified, as it had been a few months earlier.

This counter-revolution, following close on the heels of the other, indicates the effect that the war had on many communities. It is noteworthy that the two periods of almost continuous strife in Rhodian history are the periods in which she was most heavily involved in the plans of powers stronger than herself--first Athens and Sparta, and then Rome; between lies the period of Eunomia.

Whether a desire to appease conflicting loyalties may be seen, along with motives of longer range, in the synoecism, is a matter of conjecture; if such a purpose existed it was not achieved, for the bitterest civil strife was yet to come. Unfortunately we are as ill informed as to the events leading up to the synoecism as to most other events in Rhodian history of this

period[40].

It seems clear however that the communities of the island did not progress from particularism and the enjoyment of full independence to fusion in the communal life of a single city in one bound. Evidence indicating a transitional stage of federalism is unmistakeable though slight. An inscription from Lindos[41], honours a certain Pytheas, perhaps an Aeginetan[42], resident in Naucratis, and employed there as an interpreter -- presumably to the Rhodian community -- with the title of πρό-ξενος Ῥοδίων πάντων. The expression Ῥόδιοι πάντες to express 'the whole Rhodian People' occurs only here; the normal phrase used in Hellenistic and later times is ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Ῥοδίων [43] or (in special cases) ὁ συμπας δᾶμος [44]. The use of πάντες indicates that the Rhodians have achieved some unity of action, but it certainly represents a different political form from that implied in ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Ῥοδίων, and, as the latter implies a complete democratic machinery (though not necessarily complete democracy), so the former suggests a looser organization in which there was no single body-politic which acted as one in all matters.

Corroborative evidence is supplied by an Arcadian inscription of the fourth century, in which an Athenian is honoured by the Arcadian league[45]. The honorand is called

προξενος και ευεργετης Αρκαδων παντων.[46] We may suppose that Rhodes, at the time of the passage of this proxeny-decree, enjoyed a similar federal constitution to that of the Arcadians. By way of illustration it may be noted that just as in the sole surviving proxeny-decree passed by the Rhodian Demos after the synoecism, the honorand is always termed προξενος των Ροδιων[47], not προξενος Ροδιων παντων, at Athens, for example, or Kos, the proxenos is not called προξενος Αθηναιων παντων or Κωιων παντων in any known instance, because in both instances evidence for the institution belongs to a date after the synoecism[48].

Little can be inferred from such meagre evidence. We are entitled to accept the existence of this federal body, but its significance is less certain. The federal government was doubtless of a very simple form. The only magistrates mentioned in the inscription are πρυτανεις[49]. There is no reference to any popular or semi-popular assembly, such as the Ten Thousand of the Arcadian League[50], the decree being passed by the βολα alone. This extreme oligarchy points to the influence of Sparta, and it may be hazarded that Dorieus was largely responsible; but to refer to this federal constitution as 'The constitution of Dorieus' implies a greater certainty than we possess[51].

The oligarchs' original intention, it has been urged, was to establish a federated state, but, finding this to be inadequate, it was decided in 408 B.C. to transform the federation into a synoecism[52]. Such a view implies, however a very short-sighted

policy which hardly accords with the majestic scope of the later synoecism. It must be borne in mind that the planning alone of a city of the size of Rhodes probably took a considerable time, while its construction must have taken several years.[53] ~~then a decade~~. It was therefore clearly necessary to provide a temporary constitution which would ensure a measure of unified control until such time as the new civil administration could be housed in the projected capital, and the organisation of the new city in tribes and demes should be complete. The federal constitution at the same time gave the inhabitants of three cities valuable experience in the art of living together, and initiated them gently into the new system. On this basis the federal constitution may have lasted for considerably more than three years.

The events of the last years of the Ionian war with one exception affected Rhodes but little. The island is seldom mentioned in the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus[54]. The latter in his account of the year 407 B.C. refers to the 'cities' of Rhodes as separate units[55], and this chance reference might mean that there had been as yet no centralization of control of the armed forces; but it more probably indicates only that naval forces still anchored in the harbours of Lindos, Camirus and Ialysus, because the new harbours had not yet been constructed[56], since the armed forces would have been centrally

controlled even in the federal period. The passage therefore cannot be used as evidence for the growth of the new city.

The exception was a personal misfortune that befell Dorieus. In summer 406, after an absence of four years from the stage, he reappeared in the Aegean, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Andros[57]. There is no record of how he got there, or what end he was pursuing so far from Rhodes. Here he was unfortunate enough to fall in with the Athenian commander Phanosthenes, who took him prisoner. He was apparently taken to Athens and brought before the ecclesia[58]. It is recorded that the Athenians were distressed to see so distinguished a man in such a plight, and that they consequently released him without even imposing a fine on him. The event is strange and doubtless true. At all events Athenian admiration for Dorieus did not produce what may have been the desired reaction. Rhodes remained hostile to Athens until the end of the war; Rhodian contingents were present at Arginusai[59] and again at Aigospotamoi[60]. On the latter occasion the Rhodian detachment was apparently commanded by two of the Diagoreioi: Dorieus' nephew Diagoras and a certain Timarchos[61]. The suggestion has been made that the absence of Dorieus from the last battle of the war was perhaps due to hostility between him and the Spartan commander[62]. But there is no trace of a connection between the two men, and it is perhaps easier to suppos e

that Dorieus did not desire to run the risk of possible re-capture -- he could not count on a repetition of that unexpected benevolence two years previously. What is important, however, is not Dorieus' absence but the presence of other Diagoreioi in command; this shows that the same family held the reins at home[63].

The sixty years which had passed since Pindar's Seventh Olympian had been sung for an earlier Diagoras had been years of triumph, of humiliation and exile. But the end had brought victory to the House, and to the spirit of opposition to Athens which it expressed. The greatest achievement of these years was undoubtedly the foundation of the new city through the synoecism of the old. We must now examine the mechanics of this operation more closely.

The synoecism of Rhodes belongs to that group of synoecisms of which the characteristic mark is that previously independent communities, poleis, lost this status and became subordinate members of a new political unit[64]. As such they survived alongside the new organisation, without power in political matters but retaining a measure of self-government in local affairs particularly in sacred administration. Constitutionally they became demes of the new polis[65]. The new political centre might arise in one of two ways. One of the old cities might be chosen as the new central authority of which the others should form demes or a new city might be built. The former method was that

adopted for example in regard to Halicarnassus[66]; the latter, far more frequent, procedure obtained in the instance of, among other cities, Thessalonice, Cassandria and Rhodos[67]. In Rhodes the three old cities ceased to be poleis, but all their κτοῖναι became δᾶμοι of the new city Rhodos[68].

So much is abundantly clear from evidence belonging to a period long after the synoecism. As is shown in detail elsewhere documents exist issued by the administration of the former poleis, which belong to the beginning of the Byzantine age; and the formulation of these documents shows that there was little or no change in the administration of these communities, for a period of seven hundred years or more.

There are however other very important matters, connected with the synoecism of which we can be far less certain. Synoecisms can be divided into two groups according to their origin, that is, according to whether the concentration was due to internal or external causes[69]. By the former is meant a common decision of the existing cities to form themselves into a single community with a single citizenship; to sacrifice, that is to say, their existing sovereignty, for the sake of a sovereignty built on a wider basis, from motives of defence or in the hope of increasing the prosperity of the whole, or for some other particular reason. An example of this class is provided by the foundation of Megalepolis; we are told that some communities

took part in the synoecism willingly, others under compulsion[70].

This brings us to the second group, those resulting from external pressure. This is a group to which almost all the synoecisms of the Hellenistic age, and particularly of the age of the Diadochi, belong[71]. The resettlement and fusion of Greek cities was practised on a large scale, particularly by Antigonus Monophthalmos and Lysimachus. The method was simple, and perhaps administrative convenience was the governing factor. The cities were not consulted. One community was instructed to abandon its own site and to move lock, stock, and barrel and join forces with its neighbour. The best-known example of this type of synoecism is that of Lebedos with Teos, of about 303 B.C.[72]. Such enforced synoecisms were not always permanent[73].

It is quite uncertain to which of these two groups the synoecism of Rhodes belongs. There remains one other major unknown quality: the extent to which the synoecism implied a wholesale movement of population. The survival of documents from the 'old' cities belonging to a date after the synoecism gives no indication of the amount of permanent habitation on the old sites. None of them were so far removed from Rhodos that they could not be reached in a few hours on important municipal occasions.

The synoecism of Rhodes went almost unrecorded in antiquity.

Only three authors refer to it and none of these is earlier than the closing years of the Roman Republic. First in time and importance is Diodorus, who records the synoecism of the city from his chronological source, under the year 408/7[74]. The trustworthiness of this statement need not be doubted: its precise meaning is another matter. Strabo corroborates the fact, and gives the date more roundly: κατὰ τὰ Πελοποννησιακά[75]. Finally approximately the same date is implied by Aelius Aristides who refers the event to the period just after Lysander[76]. This is all the information given by Diodorus and Strabo, though Aristides has more to say of very uncertain value.

As is natural, in view of his source, Diodorus records nothing but the bare event. His use, however, of the verb μετοικεῖν, meaning 'to move to another place' suggests an answer to the difficulty noted above, that it is uncertain how much actual movement of population there was. The source of this statement clearly supposed that part at least of the population of the old cities migrated to the new. More than this we cannot say. We have seen that the decrees of the old cities do not necessarily imply a fixed population as issuing authority. Probably, then, as now, there was a considerable number of, for example, Lindians living in Rhodes, whose ties with Lindos remained extremely close. The numerous tombstones of members of the old cities found in the

neighbourhood of Rhodos is adequate testimony to the fact that many Lindians, Camirans and Ialysians did in fact take up their residence there, and did not confine the exercise of their political rights in the new city to appearing in the assembly and council when necessary[77]. At the same time it has been noted above that the decrees of the old cities do not necessarily imply a considerable fixed population there. It is however assured by the remains of dwelling houses and by tombs, and by the references to 'inhabitants' of Lindos in the Hellenistic and Roman periods that the sites of the three old cities were inhabited at a later date[78]. The question is therefore whether there was a break in the tradition of habitation as Diodorus perhaps suggests. A priori it is unlikely that once a site such as Lindos, rocky and far from alluring to new settlers, had been abandoned it should be re-inhabited at a later date. Nor does the evidence require such a supposition.

It is true that only a few tombstones have been found in the neighbourhood of the old cities, and in the villages of the island[79], but this implies no more than a reduced population. On the other hand fields still remained to be tilled and seagoing men do not readily abandon familiar waters. There were, moreover, the temples to be tended. Even if the high eponymous officials of the Lindian and other cults were resident in Rhodos, the minor officials, temple guardians and so on must have resided in the old cities. Thus it seems most probable that the population of

the old cities was very considerably reduced, but that the cities in no sense became derelict: they became, as they have remained, backwaters. The words of Aelius Aristides in the middle of the second century after Christ, in which he speaks of the 'sites' of Ialysos and Camirus[80], do not prove that the old cities were uninhabited; they indicate only that their glories had departed.

Diodorus' chronological source gives the impression that the synoecism was effected in the one year. Naturally this cannot have been the case, and there is some evidence which suggests that it may have taken a good many years. Two inscriptions, concerned with relations between the individual Rhodians and Athens, dating from the first decade of the fourth century suggest that in some very important respects the new commonwealth was still in genesis. In both these documents private citizens of Rhodes are referred to by their old 'city-ethnics', Ἰηλύσιος[81] and Λίνδιος[82], instead of as Ῥόδιος. In one of these instances, the use of the old name may be due to the fact that the decree is primarily concerned with the father of the Ἰηλύσιος, who was made proxenos at Athens during the Peloponnesian war, and by the use of the old name a logical and uniform nomenclature is achieved[83]. However the combined weight of the two documents suggests very strongly that, at least in external affairs, the uniform Ῥόδιος was not always employed early in the fourth

century[84].

Diodorus' chronological source gives no indication of the time it took to complete the synoecism. He simply records the event under one year[85]. There must, in fact, have been several stages in the construction of the new communal life. First there was the construction of the actual buildings. On this point we have no information, but the assumption is reasonable that it took several years[86]. Next there was the establishment of new magistracies. These, as representative of the corporate dignity of the new state were undoubtedly created with all speed, even if they had to officiate in temporary offices and temples. For this we have good evidence in the unpublished list of the eponymous priests of Rhodos, the priests of Halios. The first name in this list belongs to 408 or 407[87]. Further, the other eponymous priesthoods of the old cities probably started a new reckoning from the same period the priesthood of Athana Lindia certainly did[88].

On the other hand the absorption of the new population may have taken longer. Innumerable problems connected with the transfer had to be solved. And in the field of foreign affairs, existing alliances presumably had to be rephrased, or cancelled, and all contacts with foreign states involving questions of sovereignty had to be undertaken on a new basis. It is shown

elsewhere that the ultimate division of the population of Rhodos into demes and tribes probably did not occur before the democratic revolution of 394[89]. But there must have been an earlier division though we do not know what it was, and this first stage must itself have taken some time. It is, however, extremely improbable that the use of the old 'city-ethnics' was allowed to continue except in special instances[90]. In brief, natural supposition and the scanty evidence at our disposal alike render probable the view that the constitution of the new city, along with its magistracies were functioning some time -- probably several years -- before the city was finally completed according to the architectural plan. No less considerable are the uncertainties connected with the original undertaking. What was the cause of the synoecism, and how far was it the work of one man?

Diodorus and Strabo say nothing on this point[91]. Diodorus' silence is the more aggravating in that in the parallel instance of the synoecism of Cos[92], he tells us both the cause -- stasis -- and the effect -- a great increase in prosperity. Equally Aelius Aristides, though he described in a rhetorical way the psychology of the first inhabitants, gives little hint as to its immediate cause[93]. The attempt of Otfried Müller to show from some passages of Aristotle that there had been trouble in the island previously is not satisfactory[94]. In fact the only

guide is general probability and the evidence of the one inscription of the federal period[95].

It has been suggested that the eventual synoecism of the old population was in the minds of those who organized the federal government. If that be so, then the second question is already answered: the synoecism like the federation originated either in the mind of Dorieus himself, perhaps in the years of exile at Thurii, or at least in that section of the population of which he was the most influential figure. And there is no reason against believing that both acts, the federation and later the synoecism were due in all essentials to Dorieus himself. It was the concluding act of that series which was opened by the revolt from Athens in 412/11.

There remains the more difficult question: what did Dorieus aim at achieving by the synoecism? Various motives have been suggested, mainly military and economic[96]. Dorieus aimed, it is said, at establishing a fortified and protected city, which, unlike the countryside, would be safe from Athenian raids. Or else he planned a great emporion such as Rhodes in fact became. The first solution leaves many difficulties unsolved. First, why build a city at all? If a strong defensive position was required the site of one of the old cities would suffice refortified. Rhodos rose from the naked earth, and was apparently planned from the beginning on substantial lines[97]. This does not

suggest an immediate military aim. Further, the first requirement of a fort or fortified city in Rhodes during war, was good harbour facilities, both to enable merchant-shipping to enter, and as a base for naval craft. The new city, Rhodos, had no harbours: those which played so considerable a part in the sieges of the city by Demetrius Poliorcetes and Mithridates were artificial constructions[98]. Lindos on the other hand, had, and has, an excellent natural harbour. In these circumstances it is extremely difficult to believe that those who conceived the new city had the military requirements of the day in mind. A more remote defensive role may have been planned for the city, against hypothetical future invaders, but this cannot have been the principle motive.

The economic motive is in more respects more satisfying. No doubt Dorieus desired that the island should put her opportune geographical position to good use. It was a reasonable idea, even though the middle of a war was not perhaps the best time to begin to put it into effect. A new city built on the most modern lines, such as Hippodemus had popularised a generation earlier, with artifical harbours, a broad agora and wide streets, would in time act as a magnet to much of the trade that passed from East to West, and even West to East across the Aegean. Perhaps Dorieus'

aim was to supplant the Peiraeus; this was not likely to happen until the economic priority, of Athens, based on political control of the Aegean, should decline, and he was not likely to build a city in anticipation of that day. If however his aim was more limited, if he aimed at creating what in fact eventually came to birth, an indispensible transit-centre for trade passing to and from the East, then his motives are reasonable, and his ideas on a comprehensible scale. The desire to construct this transit-centre played we may believe a very large part in Dorieus' intentions. Perhaps there is room for one other aim.

It is a striking fact that, whatever his motives, Dorieus did not content himself with rebuilding, on a greatly increased scale, one of the existing cities, in particular his own Ialysus. ~~Undoubtedly~~ These had valuable contacts with the external world, and Ialysus at least lay in a rich and most fertile region. It seems therefore as if Dorieus had seen the necessity of breaking up the old economy, and making a fresh start. A possible reason for this may be that by the end of the fifth century the general social and economic condition of the old cities was serious. Such a situation is readily understandable as regards Lindos. The excellent harbour of this city has been stressed. But the inhabitants needed an adequate supply of cultivateable land, and this the area of Lindos sadly lacks. The seafaring Lindians also needed fields but it may be suggested that the

population in the fifth century was too large to be able to support itself in that rocky and barren promontory. If the population had outgrown the productivity of the soil of Lindos, as it has done to-day[99], Dorieus may have realized the need to remove the pressure from the area, by establishing an urban centre elsewhere. Whether the same is likely to have occurred elsewhere is a matter of uncertainty. The soil of Lindian territory is far more rocky than that of any other inhabited coastal area of the island to-day. But whether or not the removal of population from the area of the old cities be regarded as a motive of Dorieus, there can be little doubt that the old cities profited in this respect from the synoecism. They remained able to support a small population on a partly agricultural economy for centuries.

To these two motives, the desire to establish a powerful commercial city, and the desire to better the existing economy of the island, may be added a third: the desire to found a city to form a centre for the Dorian communities of the Eastern Aegean such as Syracuse was in the West. The contrast between Dorian and Ionian had not yet died[100]. It was in part doubtless kept in life by the way in which the Athenians in their Empire ignored it: Dorian no less than Ionian communities were subject members of the Empire. In the West where Dorieus had spent his years of exile there already existed one pre-eminent Dorian city -

Syracuse, and at the time of the Sicilian Expedition it had led the enemies of Athens. In the Eastern Aegean no one city enjoyed pre-eminence, or had the prestige to lead a conflict[101]. This was a gap which Dorieus, exiled by the Athenians from Rhodes, may have felt the urge to fill. Perhaps in so doing he was guilty of anachronistic thought-- perhaps the Peloponnesian war largely destroyed this racial dichotomy. But nevertheless Rhodes remained for many centuries conscious, and proud, of her Dorian origin[102].

Finally a word must be said about the actual remains of the city of Dorieus. Rhodos boasts few ancient remains, and none of any great importance. In the last twenty years Italian archaeologists and architects have done their best to repair this omission in Rhodos no less than in Lindos and Camirus, but nevertheless the shape of the ancient town remains most uncertain. In particular the original city seems to have left no trace after two and a half millenia of almost continuous building activity. The remains of Hellenistic date are scarcely less rare, and buildings of the Roman period afford no evidence for the original city[103]. Any attempt to discover the shape of the classical city of Rhodes is in fact doomed to failure from the outset. The city was overwhelmed in the fourth and third centuries by a series of disasters which in the course of time must have destroyed almost all trace of the original town. Particular importance in this

respect must be attached to the earthquake of about 226 B.C.[104]. Of this event Polybius says that it caused the destruction of the greater part of the walls and of the harbours[105]. Since the main part of the city lay in the neighbourhood of the harbours[106], it may be assumed that most of the city apart from the Acropolis, which lay a mile away from the harbour on the other coasts, had to be rebuilt. It is true that such rebuilding does not necessarily imply replanning of the city, but it is extremely probable that the opportunity would have been taken to modernise much of the city. And there is no reason to suppose that the city would have been rebuilt on the old model, Perhaps as in the modern city of Corinth where it is possible to see at some points a few scattered buildings which survived the earthquake of 1924, and stand out incongruously in the new city, traces of the city of Dorieus may have been visible at a later date.

The damage to the city of Rhodes was not confined to the earthquake of 226 B.C. The forces of nature had taken ruthless toll even before this date. Three times within the first century of its existence the city was engulfed in a tidal wave, and on the last occasion in 315 B.C., of which we possess a graphic account in Diodorus drawn from a local source, the damage to property and life was considerable[107]. It is therefore likely that much of the same part of the city which suffered particularly in the earthquake, the Bazaar and Harbour area, had already been

rebuilt in the late fourth century. To these disasters must be added the damage caused by the siege of the city in 305/4 B.C., by Demetrius Poliorcetes[108]. Here again it was particularly the harbour area which suffered, but most of the lower part of the town was probably affected. Diodorus Polybius states that to procure material to build an inner wall the Rhodians demolished the enclosure of the theatre and the adjacent houses and some temples[109] And in one of his violent attacks from the landwards side Demetrius demolished whole stretches of wall.

Diodorus recounts the rebuilding undertaken by the Rhodians after the seige. 'They rebuilt the theatre', he writes, 'and the demolished sections of the walls and other areas, and made them far more beautiful than before'[110].

The earthquake of 226 B.C. undoubtedly caused the destruction of much of this city, of the subsequent rebuilding Polybius gives no details though. However even that city probably did not last undamaged for long. Another earthquake hit the city some twenty-eight years later[111], and others are recorded from the Roman imperial period[112].

It is clear then that little is to be learnt from the glowing accounts of the city preserved in Strabo[113] and Aelius Aristides[114]. The city they describe may have contained Hellenistic elements in it, but there are no grounds for

supposing that it contained, outside the Acropolis, elements of the classical period.

Tradition recorded that the city had been planned by Hippodamus, the Milesian architect who planned the Peiraeus. If this were true it would perhaps be possible to infer from it the form of the original city, since Hippodamus introduced urban construction on rectilinear lines, but though Strabo says 'the existing city was founded during the Peloponnesian War by the architect, as they say, who constructed the Peiraeus'[115], this does not seem possible since the most probable chronology of Hippodamus' life puts his birth at about the beginning of the century, and he is thus not likely to have participated in the foundation of Rhodes[116]. However, it remains possible that he was indirectly connected with the foundation of Rhodes. He is known to have planned the foundation of Thurii, and himself to have lived there; and it is possible that he was still there during much of Dorieus' exile, and if, as has been suggested, the construction of a new city was in the mind of Dorieus in these years, he may have discussed the matter with the architect[117]. At the same time, quite apart from any connection of Hippodamus with the foundation, the city may have been built in the 'Hippodamian way', as the survival of the tradition recorded by Strabo suggests. There is, however, little possibility of any material evidence having been available to Strabo[118].

It has been observed above that on all occasions in which

Rhodes suffered disaster the brunt seems to have fallen on the lower town, consisting of the harbours, warehouses and the bazaar, and some temples. On the other hand the Acropolis was used as refuge[119]. It may then be inferred that if any part of the city escaped the disasters, it was this area, and that here, and probably only here we may hope to recover some traces of the old city.

The Acropolis of the ancient town was the hill known as Mount Smith[120]. The site, apart from the excellent view to be obtained from it, has little to attract the visitor. The hill, consisting of two crests separated by a depression, runs roughly parallel to, and very near, the west coast. Its central elevation is thus approximately a mile away from the harbours, which lie on the East coast. It is also probable that there was an inner Acropolis lying in the northern part of the City of the Knights, since Mount Smith is remote from the harbour area where the main private dwellings in antiquity seem to have been[121], and though the slight traces of walls round the City of the Knights cannot be securely dated, and may belong to a later rebuilding, we know from Diodotus that this area of the city had its own wall at the time of the siege of 305/4[122].

The remains on the upper Acropolis are few and unimpressive. The temple of which a few untidy remains survive at the northern end, is identified by an inscription found on the site as that of Athana Polias and Zeus Polieus. It appears to date from the

early fourth century, and may therefore be reckoned among the original temples of the town[123].

On the lower terrace of the hill are the remains of a large temple which has been similarly identified as that of Apollo Pythios, a god whose cult is well attested in Rhodes. This temple also appears to date from the early years of the city[124]. The other buildings of this terrace, including a miniature theatre, are of later date, and may therefore be passed over here[125].

Of the aspect of the lower town in the fourth century we learn much from the passages of Diodorus in which he recounts the tidal wave of 315 B.C. and the siege of the city by Demetrius. These descriptions are probably also valid for the earliest period of the city, since the tidal waves before this date are stated not to have been particularly destructive of the buildings of the city, and there is therefore no reason to suppose that its appearance altered much before 315 B.C.[126].

Diodorus, who in both passages compares the shape of the city to a theatre[127], says that the lower parts of the city were flooded by the tidal wave[128]. He then describes the area so inundated, namely the entire area round the Deigma and the Dionysion[129]. The Deigma or wholesale market would naturally be found in the neighbourhood of the harbour[130]. The recent probable though not certain identification of the Dionysion with the Knight's chapel of Piossasco, just to the west of the Piazza dell' Arsenale, agrees with this general statement of Diodorus[131].

Next, we are told, the floods rose until they almost reached the Asclepieum[132]. This building is obviously to be sought on higher ground within the city of the Knights, but its precise position has yet to be established. The discovery in recent years of a sacred law concerning the Asclepieum in the moat near the Athanasian Gate of the city makes it probable that the site was not far from here[133]. This Gate, on the South side of the city of the Knights, again agrees with the general indication given by Diodorus.

The description of the ebbing of the flood through the way it had forced in the wall shows that at this time there was a wall separating the lower town from the harbour[134]. This corresponds with the remains of ancient peripheral walls found under the medieval walls at some points in the circuit of the city of the Knights, and under the medieval harbour wall[135]. These ancient walls appear to be of Hellenistic date[136], but Diodorus, confirmed by the existing remains, makes it clear that in antiquity, from the fourth century, as in the time of the Knights and to-day, there was an inner and an outer city, and that the area has not changed in this respect.[137] ~~At least in later times, the term denotes the inner city, while the whole~~ ~~of the city was called~~

The information supplied by Diodorus in his account of the seige is largely concerned with the harbours, which lay on the

east side of the island. The small, northerly, harbour now known as Mandraki, was the object of Demetrius' first attacks[138]. Ancient masonry beneath the existing moles both of Mandraki and of the Great harbour, lying to the south of it, show that the dimensions of the harbours were the same in antiquity as they are to-day[139].

It is probable that the small harbour lay within a wall[140]. A short stretch of these fortifications survives at the northern end of the harbour, some hundred yards inland[141]. It cannot be determined whether this wall was part of the inner wall surrounding the lower city, that is, an extension attached to it in some way or whether it was wholly separate. The Great Harbour lay just outside the city-wall as emerges both from the account of the tidal wave[142], and more clearly from Diodorus' narrative of the siege. Much of the fighting in the early part of the operation took place on the quay of the Great Harbour, from which the attacking troops attempted to scale the walls[143]. These walls, namely the wall of the inner circuit and the harbour walls of Mandraki and the Great Harbour, the latter of which was part of the circuit wall are possibly of much earlier date, as has been explained, and may legitimately, though with all caution, be regarded as among the early constructions of the city. On the other hand the various walls and counter-walls described by Diodorus are not of importance in this respect, since they were constructed during the siege[144].

To close this survey of the early city Rhodos mention may be made of the outer circuit wall. Remains have been found of a peripheral wall at widely separated points in the neighbourhood of Rhodos. Enough remains of it on the Acropolis, Mount Smith, to show that that feature was included in it, and further traces of it may be seen to the south of the city, on both the west and east coasts, at a distance of about one and three-quarter miles from the centre of the modern city[145]. These walls must have been part of the outer circuit of the city since there is no possibility that there was any other city in the neighbourhood. It is clear that everything within these walls was part of the city itself; that is, that we are not here dealing with the so-called 'city-land', the πολιτικὴ γῆ , which was territory owned by a city as a legal personality outside the city-walls[146]. The ancient city of Rhodes was thus very much larger than the modern. Unfortunately the date of these walls is uncertain. They apparently belong to the third or second century, but more exact chronology is not possible[147]. The question thus arises whether the city enclosed such a large area. A priori it seems improbable. Such a perimeter implies a very considerable population, and while Strabo speaks of surburbs to the south of the city[148] no reference to them survives from an earlier date[149]. The walls, it may be presumed, expanded with the population, and as is indicated elsewhere, there are good reasons for supposing that the population

of Rhodes remained small until at any rate the third century B.C.[150]. This large periphery is in that case to be regarded as a construction of the Hellenistic period, and is not relevant here. Two points are, however, to be noticed. First, Diodorus records that the reason why the first tidal wave which engulfed the city did little damage to life and property was because of εὐρυχωρία, that is to say, the population of the new city was widely dispersed[151]. This might indicate that the city's boundaries were already extensive, but can hardly be pressed. If the original population had been only one or two thousand, then the phrase would be applicable to a small city. Secondly, Rhodos belonged to that category of cities which possessed no city-land[152]. Once outside the city-walls you stepped onto Ialysian territory. Rhodos had no organisation of rural demes and no land. This was a natural result of the origin of the city, on the site of which there was no tradition of continuous previous habitation[153]. The resulting fact was that outside Rhodos much of the population of the city, those who had no ties with one of the three old cities, had no rights at all, will certainly have tended in the course of time to cause the new city to gain ground at the expense of the old. This process will have been helped, if not accelerated by absentee landlordism, on the part of the inhabitants of the old cities who had taken up residence in the new. These considerations suggest that we have not yet enough evidence to determine the extent of the original city of Rhodos.

Chapter II.

404-378: Years of Upheaval.

Rhodian history for the next quarter of a century is fairly abundantly recorded, but the sources are confused, and it is impossible to establish more than the barest outline of events. The confusion and uncertainty derive primarily from the fact that one of our two primary sources, Xenophon, sees history only from the centre, from the view-point of Athens or Sparta, and is not interested in events which lie outside the immediate world of those powers. In the particular instance of Rhodes he passes the island by with brief notices of revolutions. There was plenty of revolution and strife in the early fourth century in Rhodes, but this is not all the story.

Diodorus' narrative of the same period, and indeed throughout the first half of the fourth century, based on the history of Ephorus is far superior to that of Xenophon, in so far as the history of the Aegean, and of the Persian Empire is concerned. It is possible to construct a very fair picture of events in the Aegean, including the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, from Diodorus, but, he no less than Xenophon, is concerned with general history and glances only occasionally at Rhodes. What he does give is probably preferable to Xenophon's account of the same events.[1]

The anonymous Hellenica Oxyrhynchia[2], probably the work of

Cratippos, has long been recognized to embody a different tradition to that preserved by Xenophon. For Rhodian history of the early fourth century he provides one detailed extremely valuable piece of information, that of the revolt of 394, which differs considerably from the Ephoran account preserved by Diodorus[3].

Epigraphical evidence from Rhodes, and particularly from the capital, is almost wholly lacking. No documents of any sort from Rhodos relating to the fourth century before Alexander have survived except two entries in the Lindian Temple-Chronicle, and the still unpublished list of eponymous priests of the city, the priests of Halios[4]. This latter document contains valuable information. The list is complete from the foundation of the city for forty names. Among those who held the eponymous office before the revolution of 394 appears one certain member of the family of Diagoras. This confirms to some extent what was implicit in the narrative of the Oxyrhynchos historian, that the Diagoreioi remained masters of Rhodos until their expulsion in that year.

In general it is clear that this period labours under the difficulties common to Rhodian history until, in the last quarter of the third century, Rhodes plays a major part in affairs, and receives detailed treatment at the hands of Polybius: events in Rhodes are not germane to the main issue of the Greek world before Philip the Second, the struggle of the cities of mainland

Greece for supremacy.

The years immediately after Aegospotami are blank. After that battle Conon fled to Cyprus to join his friend Euagoras, king of Salamis[5]. Here he lived out of the public eye until in 398/7 he was chosen to command the Persian fleet against Sparta[6]. It was apparently in spring 397 that he crossed from Cyprus to Cilicia with forty ships, to prepare the remainder of his fleet. Thene he proceeded to Caunus where he was blockaded by the Spartan nauarch of 397/6, Pharax[8]. Probably in spring 396 Conon's reinforcements from Artabazos and Pharnabazos arrived, and Pharax was forced to retreat to Rhodes, whence he had started[9].

Such appear to have been the opening stages of what is referred to as the 'War around Rhodes'[10]. It was apparently early in 395 B.C. that Conon himself arrived in Rhodes[11]. It is possible that dissatisfaction with Spartan domination, exercised through the Diagoreioi had been growing, though as late as 398 or 397, that is at the beginning of the Rhodian War, the Diagoreioi were still in power. Diagoras, son of Damagetos, was eponymous priest in 398/7 B.C.[12], and striking though the absence of the name of Dorieus from this list may be, there can be little doubt that the family retained the ascendency which it possessed in 395. It is true that we do not know enough about Rhodian internal affairs to be able to state positively that the

eponymous magistrates in the years between 397 and 395, when the Diagoreioi were expelled, were their nominees rather than hostile to them; but it is much more probable that they were the former. Political opponents in difficult years were more often removed than tolerated.

It is therefore probable that opposition to the Diagoreioi was only latent. Philo-Athenians clearly existed, as events soon showed, but it is unlikely they raised their heads much before the Athenians arrived. It is impossible to determine the extent to which there was collusion between representatives of Conon and the philo-Athenian party. On the news of Conon's approach revolution broke out in Rhodos. Of this revolution the immediate consequence was the expulsion of the Diagoreioi, and the establishment of popular democratic government.

Diodorus says that Conon and his fleet went to the Rhodian Chersonese, and that the Rhodians, having expelled the Spartan fleet, admitted that of Conon[13]. The far more detailed account in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia gives a different story[14].

According to this version Conon's admirals, Hieronymus and Nicophemus[15] appear to have had free and unfettered use of the harbour of Rhodos for a short time before the revolution. They used the interval between their arrival and the outbreak of the revolution for a display of strength while Conon returned with his twenty triremes to Caunus and waited there. By now, if not

earlier, the plot had been carefully laid with supporters within. Conon, we are told, sailed away because he did not wish to be present at the downfall of the Diagoreioi[16]. His strange conduct, prompted by respect for so great a house, suggests that the issue of the revolution was not in doubt; it could be safely left to subordinates.

On the appointed day the Athenian troops were brought armed on to the quay, and marched to the agora[17]. Here they were met by those citizens who were accessory to the plot, who rushed to the rendezvous with daggers in their hands. In the agora the leader of the revolt, Dorimachus, called on the citizens for a swift attack on the town, and the people, spurred on by him, ran to the council-chamber, murdered the Diagoreioi, and summoned the other citizens to assembly. At this moment Conon, clearly well informed as to the course of events, returned from Caunus. His presence prevented much bloodshed. The Diagoreioi had been the leading house on the island for a century or longer (though for a period only on Athenian suffrance) and there were doubtless many debts to be paid. But no slaughter, other than that which occurred in the council-chamber, took place. The Rhodians established a democratic government, and drove a few citizens -- what remained of the Diagoreioi and their supporters -- into exile. 'Such an end had the revolution at Rhodes'[18].

This narrative suggests that the rule of the Diagoreioi was

a family affair. The eleven citizens who were killed with them in the council chamber appear to have been supporters of the house rather than elected magistrates[19]. This supports the interpretation of the list of eponymous priests given above. Clearly, democratic government, with the machinery of free election, did not begin until after the revolution.

The expulsion of the Diagoreioi made a break with a history far older than the synoecism. The break was complete. The Diagoreioi do not reappear in Rhodian history, though honours continued to be paid to the remote ancestor, Aristomenes of Messene, father-in-law of Damagetus, the first of the line, until a late date[20], and the names Diagoras and Dorieus are [redacted]common in later Rhodian prosopography[21]. Like the Alkmaeonidae, the Diagoreioi were driven from their homes more than once, but unlike them their ultimate fate was exile.

The expulsion of the Diagoreioi had wide repercussions. The revolution gave an impetus to an anti-Spartan movement throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. In this respect the revolution of 395 is of greater significance than that of 412/11. The earlier revolution simply followed a trend, the later originated one. The spirit or example of Rhodes' successful revolution is present at the battle of Cnidus eighteen months later.

Finally, with the fall of the Diagoreioi Rhodian foreign

policy changed rapidly. The first effect was to throw Rhodes into the arms of Athens. Subsequently, however, there were considerable and obscure fluctuations in policy, which it may be safely assumed, would hardly have occurred had the Diagoreioi remained in power.

With the fall of the Diagoreioi is linked the end of Dorieus himself. Pausanias records, on the authority of Androtion, that Dorieus was absent from Rhodes when the revolution occurred[22]. We have already noted that his name does not occur in the list of eponymous priests at all[23], and that not he but relatives of his were present at the battle of Aigospotamoi[24]. It is further recorded by Androtion that during his absence Dorieus went to 'the inland areas of the Peloponese' and that he was arrested by the Spartans and put to death. It is natural to connect these various aspects of Dorieus' last years and conclude that he was out of favour with Sparta in these years. A cause for his abandonment of the traditional policy of his house might be seen in the unexpected lease of life accorded him by the Athenian ecclesia in 406 B.C.[25]. It is possible, as has been argued by some historians, that Dorieus desired to see the new Rhodos which he had created exercising a foreign policy of her own, and not tied to the apron-strings of Sparta. Such arguments, and various developments of them, certainly explain adequately Dorieus' disappearance and unpleasant end[26]. But if

they be accepted, it must be borne in mind that both the narrative of the revolt of 395 as given by the Oxyrhynchus historian, and the list of eponymous priests show clearly that this hostility towards Sparta, or shown by Sparta, did not extend to other members of the Diagoreioi: it was a personal affair of Dorieus. And, further, it has yet to be shown why, if Dorieus was in disgrace with Sparta, he went, apparently as a free agent, to the Peloponnese. To do so was clearly to run the gravest danger. His conduct in this respect is more easily comprehensible if he was still the acknowledged friend of Sparta. Moreover his absence from such routine, though significant, positions as the eponymous magistracy may be explained as due to his pre-eminence in the state. Dorieus may have occupied a position such as nomothetes, and not have wished to hold a position in which he might be liable to defeat, and would certainly have to face rivalry. For these reasons it seems advisable to leave the cause of the obscurity of Dorieus' last year and of his death, unsettled.

After the adhesion of Rhodos to the Athenian cause Conon went up to Babylon to ask the Great King for money and supplies[27]. These were granted him, together with the authority to choose his own administrative officer. His choice fell on Pharnabazos, and after his return in the following year the two men were both together at Loryma in the Rhodian Peraea[28]. Here news reached

them that the Spartan fleet commanded by Peisander was further up the coast, at Cnidus. As they got under way to meet the enemy Peisander sailed out, and an engagement was fought off Cnidus (August 394)[29]. The victory of Conon and Pharnabazos was complete, and gave them immediate mastery in the Aegean. The fruits of revolt sown by Rhodes were now ripe; one after another the islands fell away from Sparta and joined Persia and Athens -- Cos, Nisyrus, Telos, Chios, and some of the cities of the Ionian seaboard[30]. Only in the Hellespont did the Spartan possessions remain loyal[31].

When Athens had collected the fruits of victory, she turned to the problem of controlling her new friends. An alliance was concluded between the islands and towns of Asia Minor on the one hand and Athens on the other. A reference to this alliance is preserved in an Athenian inscription recording thanks to the Eteocarpathians of Carpathus for their contributions to the rebuilding of the temple of Athena[32]. In this document other allies are mentioned: Cnidians and Rhodians[33]. These communities and the people of Carpathus may therefore be added to those mentioned above[34].

This alliance, however, did not last long. Some time before 391 B.C. Rhodes broke away from it. Strife broke out within the city the cause of which is extremely uncertain. The philo-

Athenian and philo-Laconian parties seem at this time to have been of fairly equal strength, and though the supporters of oligarchy seem to have remained on top, it was not without difficulty that they did so.

The two accounts which we possess of these events, those of Xenophon and Diodorus, are not, as is sometimes the case, complementary; they are in open conflict. The following version contains elements from both sources[35].

The philo-Laconian party succeeded in seizing power, but it seems to have lacked the means necessary to retain it. They therefore appealed to Sparta for assistance. This occurred either in or shortly before summer 391 B.C. The Spartans sent to the assistance of the Rhodian government the nauarch Ecdicus. He, on arrival in the neighbourhood, found that the democratic party had, in the interval, gained the upper hand[36]. He therefore decided to remain at Cnidus, the normal place from which to watch events in Rhodes. This dilatory policy does not appear to have found favour in Sparta. Ecdicus was recalled, and the successful Teleutias was sent to replace him[37].

Teleutias had a total of twenty-seven ships, including twelve brought from the Corinthian Gulf, where he had been operating previously[38]. After he had taken over from Ecdicus at

Cnidus (autumn-winter 391 B.C.), he sailed over to Rhodes. On this short journey he fell in with, and captured, ten Athenian ships which were sailing East to the assistance of Euagoras of Cyprus. He sailed back with these to Cnidus, and thence returned to Rhodes to assist the pro-Spartan element[39].

In spring 390 B.C. the Athenians, awake to the danger of a revival of Spartan influence in the area, sent Thrasybulus of Steiria to Rhodes with forty ships[40]. On arrival there he found himself unable to proceed against the oligarchical party since the latter had established themselves in a fort outside the city. On the other hand the democratic party held the cities, were superior in numbers and had gained victories in the field. The oligarchs had thus clearly improved their position in the year that had elapsed since Ecdicus had arrived. They were now able to hold their own in a fort and presumably they had the support of Teleutias' squadron, and could thus assure themselves supplies[41]. Their position resembled that of the Athenian democrats at Phyle in 404 B.C. Thrasybulus seeing that nothing could be done immediately sailed off in search of funds[42].

Events now become still more obscure. It is recorded that after the death of Thrasybulus at Aspendos the following spring (389 B.C.)[43], his subordinate officers returned post-haste to Rhodes. There they found a changed situation[44]. It seems that Teleutias and the oligarchs had succeeded in expelling the democratic party from the city, since we are told that the city

had revolted from Athens, and that, in their turn, the pro-Athenian exiles had captured a φρούριον . The Athenian commanders therefore gave assistance to the democrats[45]. The latter, however do not appear to have won the city back, since Hierax, who came out in the summer of 389 B.C. to take over command of the Spartan fleet from Teleutias, put in at once at Rhodos and did not, like his predecessors, sail first to Cnidus[46]. Moreover he was still at Rhodes when, at the end of his year of office, he handed over to Antalkidas[47].

After this detailed, but confused, narrative of the events of two years, Rhodes, in the manner characteristic of our evidence, disappears from historical record. It is clear that Teleutias' twenty-seven ships wholly changed the balance of naval power in the Eastern Aegean; neither Thrasybulus nor his trierarchs could alter that. Teleutias was responsible for many of Athens' difficulties, since it was he who had won control of the Corinthian Gulf from Athens in 391 B.C.[48]. His successful activity in the Eastern Mediterranean was one of a number of events which caused Athens to accept the terms of Peace of Antalcidas in 386 B.C.

By this peace Athens formally renounced her claim to the hegemony of the Aegean and the Greek cities of Asia Minor[49]. The lesson of the last few years, culminating in the peace of Antalkidas was that Athens was not yet strong enough to attempt a

restoration of her old empire. For Rhodes the lesson was equally unsatisfactory. The only reference to the city strongly implies that, as we would expect, she remained in the Spartan camp until the Peace of Antalkidas[50].

These years had shown that Rhodes was not yet strong enough to stand on her own feet. The contesting parties within the state had prevailed or otherwise according to whether they had external support or not; while the attention of foreign powers had apparently been directed towards the city, in connection with the conduct of war, and not out of any interest in the welfare of Rhodes[51].

These years had also shown to all parties the need of strong friends. The lesson was driven home by the Peace of Antalcidas, which abandoned Rhodes along with many other communities in Persia.

We have seen that the pro-Spartan party seems to have remained in power until that peace. The peace-terms must undoubtedly have damaged the prestige and prospects of that party. The city had been abandoned by those to whom the government owed its present position, and on whom the safety of the state depended. Unfortunately, the historians do not record the effect of the peace on affairs in Rhodes, and the interpretation of what evidence exists is not absolutely certain. The following interpretation seems to accord best with the general situation at the time.

The Persian Empire was, in the years after the peace,

entering on a series of conflicts with Cyprus and Egypt which seriously weakened her attacking power in the Aegean[52]. Athens for her part was very anxious not to take advantage of Persia's difficult situation, and more than one alliance signed in these years insisted on respect for the King'g Peace.[53] The communities of the Aegean had been declared autonomous by the terms of the peace; but autonomy carried obligations in a world from which Sparta and Athens were alike withdrawn. Support was necessary, and had now to be sought in their own united strength. Such a system of alliances was perhaps preceded by the expulsion of the pro-Spartan oligarchies which had previously been in power, though no trace of any such event survives in the literary tradition of these years. It is also possible that the league which was now established used the appeal of Democracy to recruit members.

This league is known only through the evidence of coins. Coins before the Hellenistic age can rarely be dated with absolute precision and it is therefore only natural that opinions should have differed as to the date at which these coins were struck. It has been suggested and widely accepted that they were struck immediately after the battle of Cnidus but this view is open to serious objections[54]. On numismatic grounds they are not likely to be earlier than the beginning of the fourth century, and a date later than the year 378/7 B.C., in which the second Athenian

Confederacy was established, seems excluded. On general grounds, then, a date between the Peace of Antalcidas and the foundation of the Confederacy seems most probable. This interpretation is supported by more precise arguments.

The coinage in question consists of a series of silver coins equivalent to tridrachms minted on the Rhodian standard. These coins are struck by a number of different states in Asia Minor and in the islands. In every instance the type represented on the reverse of the coins is the infant Heracles strangling the snake famous in legend, while the obverse bears the appropriate city-type and the letters ΣΥΝ(μαχία or μαχικόν). The issue is thus clearly due to a federal or allied organisation. Specimens of this coinage are known from Rhodes, Cnidus, Samos, Iasos, Ephesus, Byzantium and Cyzicus[55].

The aim or aims of this league, or confederation of cities, cannot be inferred from the coins themselves. The type of Herakles strangling the snakes appears to represent hostility to something: but not to a single specific object or power. The same type seems to have been used from the fifth century onwards to represent any fight against oppression[56]. Thus in different parts of the Greek world it has a different application, and though the coins here discussed are shown to belong to a single group by the uniform appearance of the legend ΣΥΝ, it cannot be assumed without more ado that the type represents a democratic movement. It

represents reaction against oppression, be it oppression from another Greek city or from a foreign power.[57] Thus the ΣΥΝ- group might have been issued by a federation hostile to Persia, to Sparta or to Athens. But the date, just after the Peace of Antalcidas, is of help here. Rhodes and the other cities of the ΣΥΝ- League had nothing to fear from Athens at this time; she had permitted them to be abandoned to Persia, and the cities might feel injured and indignant at this. But Athens could hardly be portrayed as a snake. This snake must be either Sparta or, what amounts to the same thing, the oligarchical form of government she encouraged, or Persia. But against whichever element the League was directed it seems necessary to suppose that Rhodes was fully independent. No Athenian-supported democracy, or Spartan-aided oligarchy would have tolerated the establishment of such a league. For this reason one must suppose a change of government after the Peace of Antalcidas, and the assumption of power by a party which pursued federation and imperialism abroad, and independence at home.

The fact that all members of this confederacy issued coinage on the Rhodian standard permits the assumption that Rhodes was the main inspiration of it. Unfortunately of the activities of the League in the politics of the day no trace remains, though signs of its subsequent disintegration are not lacking.

Its importance, which may never have been very great,

doubtless diminished towards the end of the decade when Athens began to re-acquire allies in the Aegean[58]. These alliances, on the basis of which the Second Athenian Confederacy was established, apparently began in 384/3 B.C. with the alliance with Chios[59] and continued in the following years, that with Byzantium being struck in 378 B.C.[60]. Such alliances must have been fatal to Rhodes' own system of alliances, since Athens could offer the constituent members a greater measure of security than could Rhodes.

It is noticeable that while some of the member of the Rhodian ΙΣΥΝ-League' are members of the Athenian Confederacy, others are not. The Confederacy was not aimed against Persia, and therefore the towns of Asia Minor which by terms of the Peace of Antalcidas returned to the Persian sphere, were not tampered with. Thus Cnidus, Ephesus, and Iasos which had been members of the Rhodian League naturally did not become members of the new Athenian Confederacy. But the absence of Samos[61] which was not excluded in advance like Ephesus and the other cities of Asia Minor, is conclusive proof that the eligible members of the Rhodian League did not join the new confederacy 'en bloc', and that the League, even if it had not completely dissolved, had by this time abandoned a common foreign policy.[62]

The entry of Rhodes into the Athenian confederacy forms a convenient vantage-point from which to look back over the ground covered since the end of the Peloponnesian war. In fact,

the new city had not made much progress in any field until the Peace of Antalcidas altered the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The period of almost twenty years which elapsed between the end of the Peloponnesian war and the Peace is inadequately recorded in our sources; but what can be made out speaks of domestic strife lasting for years. The new city was not able in this period to break away from the circumstances which had attended its birth. It had been born of hostility to Athens, and in the years that followed the city's fate was never wholly disentangled from that of Athens or Sparta. In this period there is no sign of an independent foreign policy; that policy war orientated towards either Athens or Sparta according to whether the democratic or oligarchical party was in power.

It is not until after the Peace of Antalcidas that there is any sign of an independent policy. The withdrawal of Athens and Sparta from the Eastern Mediterranean had left the communities of that area leaderless and friendless. The evidence suggests that Rhodes attempted to fill this gap, by forming some sort of political union with Carian and other cities. The purpose of this league is uncertain, its efficacy may be doubted; at least it was not strong enough to withstand the counter-attraction which the stronger arm of Athens could offer. Therefore at the end of this period Rhodes does not appear to be much more of a force in foreign

affairs than she had been before the Peace. Her entry into the second Athenian Confederacy like that of several other communities similarly placed, was effected unobtrusively and immediately.

Chapter III.

Rhodes, Athens and Caria : 378-336 B.C.

The history of Rhodes from the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy to the battle of Chaeronaea is closely bound to that of Athens, while the link with Sparta wholly vanishes. At the same time the rise of Macedon as a political force in the Greek world barely effects Rhodes. Thus the study of the foreign relations of the city is thus to some extent simplified. A new factor has, however, to be considered. The years which witnessed the decline of Persian power and her failure to control her remoter satrapies saw also the growth to independence of the strongest of the satraps, Hecatomnus of Caria, and his son Maussollus. Inevitably Rhodes' contacts with this dynasty were frequent if not always friendly. In the middle of the period Rhodes is one of a number of communities of the eastern Mediterranean used by Maussollus in his attempt to break Athenian control in that area.

The sources for the period remain the same as for the earlier part of the fourth century, and they continue to suffer from the same defects. The narrative of Xenophon stops after the battle of Mantinea (362 B.C.) and, from that point until the battle of Chaeronea the only continuous historical narrative is provided by Diodorus XVI, the source of which was not, as for Books XI-XV, only Ephorus, but also one or more other historians whose identity

is in doubt[1]. For these years we also have another authority of the first importance, Demosthenes.

Many of the speeches of Demosthenes contain passing references to RHodian affairs, and to Rhodian relations with Athens. Of especial importance is his speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians, delivered in 351 B.C.[2] This gives us a detailed, though not necessarily veracious, account of the relations of Maussollus with the island.

Among the abundant inscriptions which enlighten the general history of the period and in particular the relations of the Athenians with members of the Confederacy, there are none, other than the 'Aristoteles-decree' itself, which refer to Rhodes. This gap in our knowledge is increased by the continuing absence of Rhodian inscriptions referring to historical events of the fourth century. Rhodian history in this, as in the preceding period, has to be written without the help of Rhodian documents.

Rhodes was one of the six foundation-members of the Second Athenian Confederacy. She had certainly joined that Confederacy by the time that the decree of Aristoteles, inviting other states to join the newly-founded league, was passed in February or March 377 B.C., since in that document the Rhodians along with the Chians, Thebans, Byzantines and others, appear inscribed in the same hand as the text of the decree. There is nothing to suggest

that, like Chios and Thebes, she had concluded a separate alliance with Athens, before the foundation of the league early in the year 378 B.C.[3].

The history of Rhodes in the Confederacy is unknown for the first fifteen years, and it may be assumed that, since Diodorus notes most later signs of disaffection, none occurred in these years. In this early period of the confederacy Athens respected the sovereignty of her confederates, and Rhodes, being among the remotest of the members of the league is not likely to have been much disturbed.

The impetus to discontent, or to an attempt at the assertion of full independence, was provided by events in mainland Greece. In 364 B.C., during the Theban hegemony, Epaminondas, the principle architect of that hegemony, looked beyond the coast of Greece, to the Athenian possessions in the Hellespontine area. Control of these, he may well have argued, would fulfil a double purpose; first, the route by which Persian money could reach him would be secured, and secondly Athens' supply-line to the Pontus would be cut. At the time Epaminondas lacked the prerequisites of this activity -- a fleet and the acquiescence of Byzantium. The latter he acquired, apparently without difficulty. For the second he applied to Rhodes, remembering perhaps that recent ties of friendship united Rhodes and Byzantium. In addition he made similar application to Chios[4].

The Theban application, or decision to apply, does not

necessarily mean that Rhodes had broken away from the Confederacy. It follows with some certainty from Diodorus' account of the Social War that Rhodes had not done so[5]; but the decision of the Theban Demos is fairly good evidence that Rhodes was known to be disaffected at this time. Had Epaminondas' operations borne fruit Rhodes would undoubtedly have joined Thebes in the anti-Athenian camp. As it happened, Epaminondas' achievements were negligible and ephemeral and nothing more is heard of Theban naval operations. Thus Rhodes, if she gave any undertakings, can only have prejudiced her position without making any corresponding gain. The chief interest of the incident lies in the evidence it provides for Rhodian discontent some years before the outbreak of the Social War.

There were adequate grounds for discontent in these years, and the feeling was not confined to Rhodes. Athens' Confederacy was showing signs of becoming an instrument of purely Athenian imperialism. In 365 B.C. the Samians had been driven out of their home, and an Athenian clerouchy installed[6]. No very valid objections could be raised to this action since Samos had never been a member of the Confederacy and recently a Persian garrison had been placed on the island, in violation of the Peace of Antalcidas; but it must have raised doubts as to the future conduct of Athens. Probably only a short time elapsed before Athens turned her attention to her allies. Athenian documents of the Social War show that, in contravention of her express

undertakings, Athens had placed garrisons on at least two of the islands -- Amorgos[8] and Andros[9]. These garrisons may have been a wartime measure, but the possibility exists that they were imposed in the years preceding the outbreak of war and may have accentuated the hostility between Athens and her allies. Moreover, continued exactions of money and the application of economic sanctions, of which we possess an example in the Athenian measures directed against the city of Iulis on the island of Ceos[10], must have aggravated, if they were not the cause of, much discontent.

Nevertheless, though there were general grounds for discontent there is nothing to suggest that any particular measures had been directed against Rhodes or those who were associated with her in the Social War[11]. It is thus possible that these cities were moved by more general political considerations. Athens had made herself unpopular, so now was the time to attack her, when allies could be won. This accords better with the background of the war, and especially of the part played in its origin, if not in its progress, by Maussollus of Caria.

The interests of Athens and of the Hecatomnid dynasty confronted each other in the neighbourhood of Rhodes. This dynasty was well established in Caria, ruling a virtually independent kingdom. Of the activity of the founder of the dynasty, Hyssaldomos, little is known[12]. His son Hecatomnus[13], who has given his name to the dynasty, appears in 390 B.C., when, as

satrap of Caria, he was sent by Artaxerxes against the rebellious Euagoras of Salmis, and held the post as admiral of the King's fleet[14]. In the later stages of this campaign Hecatomnus seems to have aided Euagoras in secret[15]. Similarly a campaign probably carried out by him against Cos speaks of independent action[16]. By the time of his death in 377 B.C. Hecatomnus must in fact have ceased to worry about the central authority, though the regnal year of the Great King was still recorded on official documents issued by the Greek cities in Caria, a practice which continued even under Maussollus and his successors[17].

Maussollus' great achievement within his Kingdom was the removal of the capital of the dynasty from Mylasa, the old Carian city, to Halicarnassus[18]. It is uncertain when this occurred, but a date before 362 is assured[19], and thus well before the outbreak of the Social War. Though Maussollus was probably guided mainly by a desire to establish himself in Greek eyes, and to give his subjects the impression that the dynasty belonged to the superior Greek civilisation, more direct political considerations may also have influenced his action. The move to Halicarnassus was perhaps the first step in the establishment of bases in the eastern Aegean[20]. Apart from his relations with Greek cities in central and southern Caria, in the years before the Social War[21] Maussollus extended his activities to embrace the Greek cities further to the west and north where at one stage he waged war on Miletos, and occupied Heracleia-on-Latmos[22]. After he had

successfully extricated himself from the Revolt of the Satraps in 362/1[23], he may have turned to the East, and annexed the territory of Perikles, tyrant of Limyra[24].

His subsequent conduct suggests that his aim was the establishment of his rule in the Eastern Aegean. This implied the destruction of the Athenian confederacy, or at least of its influence in that area. His next step was to acquire further bases in the islands and towards the Hellespont. To this end he applied himself to those members of the confederacy who lay within his orbit, namely Chios and Rhodes, and to Cos[25]. Contacts with Byzantium probably came through Rhodes or Chios.

In Rhodes, the democratic government was still in power[26]. It was nevertheless no longer friendly disposed towards Athens, for reasons already given, and it appears to have listened to Maussollus' approaches readily. This democratic government had apparently lost the confidence of many Rhodians in domestic matters[27], but the bitter fact remained that it was the democratic government which concluded the alliance with Maussollus, and thus made the breach which led immediately to the Social War.

Our sources for this war are scanty. Diodorus, our sole historical authority devotes only three chapters to it[28], while though a few inscriptions may be brought into connection with it[29], they shed little light on the actual course of events. A certain amount of information is contained in the speeches of

Demosthenes but much of this is tantalizingly vague.

The war broke out in the autumn of 357 B.C.[30], and from the start it seems to have been conducted without great energy on the part of the Confederates. Even before the main naval engagement of the war, the battle of Embata, (autumn 365 B.C.), they seem to have sent an embassy to Athens to enquire about terms[31]. The battle in which communities which were not themselves members of the Athenian confederacy, co-operated on the side of Rhodes and the other allies, was a victory for the rebellious communities.[32] Peace, however, was not concluded for another year (winter 355/4)[33]. By it the independence of the revolted communities was confirmed. Other details affecting the relations between the rebels and Athens, are not recorded. Nor is any mention made by Diodorus of the advantages which Maussollus derived from the victory of those whom he had supported.[34]

It is certain that in the war-years and those immediately following the Rhodian republic traversed the scale of Greek political forms. The order in which these various forms were experienced and the speed with which one gave place to another are alike disputed. It is certain that Rhodes was a democracy at the outbreak of the war, and no less certain that by the time of Demosthenes' speech <u>On the Freedom of the Rhodians</u> the government had changed and an oligarchy had taken the place of the democracy. Within these limits, or closely connected with the events are

probably to be placed some timeless references in Aristotle's Politics and a fragment of Theopompus.

Aristotle is giving examples to illustrate his statement that the insolence of demagogues often summons up resistance to them and causes their downfall. Between an example drawn from the history of Cos and another drawn from that of Heracleia Pontica, he gives an example from the history of Rhodes. He says that in Rhodes the demagogues used to provide μισθοφορά, and that they prevented the repayment of monies owed to trierarchs. The latter as a result became involved in law-suits and were compelled in their own interests to join together and overthrow the demos[37]. In another passage[38], using in part almost identical language, Aristotle says that in Rhodes the γνώριμοι banded together against the Demos because of the law-suits impending against them. And in the same context, a few lines later[39], he says that the Demos at Rhodes had fallen into disrepute because of maladministration, even before the revolution. Theopompus, in a fragment of his sixteenth book, which covered the years in the middle of the century[40], records the activity of a Rhodian tyrant named Hegesilochus who disgusted the Rhodians because of his immoral practices. No mention of this tyrant is found elsewhere.

The various statements of Aristotle probably refer to the same event

or series of events. The circumstances are similar, and at times he uses the same words. Since therefore these three passages are all close together, Aristotle was laying himself open to well-founded charges of ambiguity, if he was in fact referring to separate occasions. However there is no indication that he was so doing, and it may be assumed that he has the same series of events in mind throughout. Further Aristotle calls the revolution simply 'the revolution', which suggests either that the revolution was a very famous one, marking perhaps a great epoch in Rhodian history, comparable to that marked by the Greek Revolution of 1821, which is still universally called 'The Revolution' in Greece[41], or that the event was of recent occurrence at the time of the composition of the Politics, and therefore Aristotle did not need to define it in greater detail. There is no suggestion in the historical accounts of the fourth century of any major revolution other than that of the pro-Athenian party in 395 B.C., which is not in question here. The revolutions of the troublous years which followed the rising of 395 can hardly be considered epochal either; they were rather eruptions of a chronic condition of stasis. It is therefore natural to regard the revolution mentioned by Aristotle as having occurred shortly before the time of writing (c.336-3 B.C.)[42]. This revolution against the Demos was presumably the last instance of stasis at Rhodes known to Aristotle; had he known of another later rising against the

government he would again have had to define the one of which he was writing.

In brief, the anti-democratic revolution described by Aristotle probably occurred not more than twenty, perhaps considerably fewer, years before the date of composition of the Politics in c.336, and it was the last civil revolt at Rhodes known to Aristotle at that time. This is as precise as we can be.

Such a date certainly accords with that which is to be assigned to Hegesilochus if the passage of Theopompus in Book XVI in which he is discussed is in its normal chronological sequence. There is, indeed no stated connection between Hegesilochus and the revolution discussed above, but it is strongly implied by Theopompus that the basis of Hegesilochus' power lay in an oligarchical clique[43], so that the assumption -- it is no more -- that Hegesilochus led the γνωριμοί against the demos in the revolution recorded by Aristotle gains in probability[44].

Aristotle records that one cause of discontent was the failure of the democratic government to repay sums borrowed from trierarchs. This statement provides a faint clue to the occasion of the rising. Although it is known that at a later date the trierarchic liturgy was enforced in peace as in war[45], and the same practice may have existed in the fourth century, nevertheless the reference here to the failure of the state to

repay its creditors strongly suggests a time of crisis, such as a war. More precisely, the trierarchs were probably entitled to expect repayment after the war was finished. The revolution against the government will then probably have occurred shortly after the end of the war. But which war? The choice is limited, it may be assumed, to those wars in which the Rhodian fleet actively participated, and of these there were, as far as is known only two, the Social War and the naval campaign of 340 B.C. against Philip II of Macedon[46]. The latter occasion cannot be wholly excluded, but it is very unlikely. There is no evidence to suggest that there was any trouble at Rhodes at that time, and the campaign lasted only a year, and it is therefore less likely that the Rhodian government found itself in straits to repay loans. We may then suppose that the revolution to which Aristotle refers occurred just after the end of the Social war. The democratic government was expelled, and its place taken by an oligarchy which may have been led by the odious Hegesilochus.

Nothing in our sources connects the rule of Hegesilochus in any way with Maussollus, but if the date here assigned to the former be correct, some connection is probable. Maussollus died in 353/2 B.C.[47] and before he died a Carian garrison had been established in Rhodos[48].

At this point firm ground is reached. The course of events can be followed with some precision from the account given by

Demosthenes in his speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians. Towards the end of the brief reign (353-351 B.C.) of Maussollus' widow and successor, Artemisia[49], some Rhodians appeared in the Athenian assembly, and sought assistance against the Carian masters of their city. They were not however representative of the Rhodian government, but were members of the democratic party which had signed the alliance with Maussollus in 357 B.C. and were now in exile. They were consequently not well received by the Athenians. Demosthenes, for his part, vigorously urged the Athenians to assist the Rhodians.

The objections of the Rhodian democrats seem to have been rather to their oligarchic fellow-countrymen than to the Carian garrison on the Acropolis. Demosthenes emphasises the permanent enmity between the Democratic and Oligarchical ideas in theory and the practical enmity between states governed by these opposing forces[50], rather than the presence of Carian troops in the city[51], which was in itself a transgression of the Peace of 364 B.C. He pleaded that these men, who had caused Athens the loss of some of the most powerful members of the confederacy should, on grounds of policy, be restored to Rhodos[52].

The plea urged by Demosthenes was not regarded by the Athenians, who preferred to abandon Rhodes to the Hecatomnid

dynasty. It may be inferred however from two passages that Athenian policy was less careless than this suggests. The war over, Athens appears to have attempted to establish friendly relations with the Carian dynasty. In the lifetime of Maussollus himself Athenian envoys had visited Caria and requested him to abandon his aggressive policy in the islands[53]. It is clear that their efforts in this respect were not successful, but an Athenian honorific decree for a citizen of Halicarnassus passed in these years, suggests, if not very strongly, that Athens had adopted a policy of friendship with Caria[54]. Defections from the Confederacy of members other than those which had waged the Social War, namely the cities of Lesbos[55], and the important city of Chios[56] may imply a relaxation of Athenian efforts; if unavoidable, they doubtless contributed to the accommodating attitude of Athens at this time. An attempt to impose a democratic government on Rhodes could at this moment therefore bring nothing but harm: it would alienate the feelings of allies still loyal, and it would incur the hostility of Maussollus. The Rhodian democrats therefore, in spite of the logical speech of Demosthenes went away their object unachieved.[57]

At this point matters again become obscure. A story retailed by Vitruvius, if it is to be assigned to this juncture, shows that, whatever may have been the original

relations between the Rhodian oligarchy and the Carian dynasty, at or about this time they became very bad, and that a rapprochement between the exiled democrats and the oligarchical government may have occurred. According to Vitruvius[58], the Rhodians, indignant at being ruled by a woman, Artemisia, invaded Caria. By a strategem Artemisia captured the Rhodian fleet in Halicarnassus harbour, isolated the crews in the town, and then cut them down. She then set out in the captured Rhodian ships for Rhodes. The Rhodians, believing the returning ships to be manned by their own citizens, received the fleet joyfully. Once inside the harbour, Artemisia occupied the rest of the city, put to death the leading citizens, and established a trophy to mark her victory.

This story does not carry conviction. A Rhodian invasion of Caria, the existence of which is not otherwise testified, is in itself suspicious, even admitting Rhodian influence in the region adjacent to Halicarnassus. Moreover a garrison had been establish on Rhodos even before the death of Maussollus[59], and resistance to it which went as far as an independent military operation hardly seems probable. If we are justified in rejecting this, the story of Artemisia's strategem may probably be rejected also. Its ultimate source probably lies in the desire of Rhodian writers to paint a glorious picture of Rhodian resistance[60]. On the other hand the fact behind the story, the occupation of Rhodos in force and the execution of her leading politicians has a ring of

truth. It appears that Artemisia suspected or discovered disloyalty on the part of the Rhodian oligarchs, and decided to replace the garrison with a full-scale military occupation[61]. This is easily understood. Less easy to comprehend are the reasons for the change of policy in Rhodes.

Since there is no reference in Demosthenes' Rhodian Oration to any act of violence by Artemisia against Rhodes, it seems likely that the speech was delivered before the attack[62]. It is therefore possible that there was a rapprochement between the democrats and the oligarchs, that the former had been readmitted to the city, and that they had either succeeded in directing the opinion of the oligarchs to such an extent that they adopted a policy hostile to the ruler of Caria or that, once admitted, they formed public opinion against the government drove it out of power, and afterwards showed themselves openly hostile to Artemisia. It is equally possible that the democrats succeeded in driving out the oligarchical government by a direct attack from outside, without Athenian help. Or again the oligarchical government may have undergone a change of heart without any external influence or pressure. Of all these possibilities no trace remains in our tradition. We can only be certain that in the short period between the delivery of the speech for the Rhodians and the death of Artemisia late in 351 B.C. the island became wholly dependent on the power of Caria.

Subsequent events are equally uncertain. It is clear

that Rhodes is still the point of tension of a tug-of-war between Caria and Athens. Now, however, Athenian attention, and in particular that of Demosthenes, was turning away from the East to the North, where the danger from Macedon was growing. References to Rhodes are therefore fewer than in the period just traversed. The most important piece of evidence is a statement of Demosthenes in the speech On the Peace, delivered in 346 B.C.[63]. He urges Athens to accept the terms of the Peace of Philocrates, in view of dangers looming from elsewhere. We allow, he says, 'the Carian to occupy the islands, Chios Cos and Rhodes, and the Byzantines to empound our ships'. The point is immediately raised, is Demosthenes referring to the events after the Social War, when Maussollus established his influence in the islands of the Eastern Aegean, or is he referring to a more recent event? It seems certain that the event is recent, since he could hardly use the present tense of an event occurring almost a decade previously, even if he wished to stir up the Athenians. The same objection holds against identifying the occupation with that carried out by Artemisia, since five years had elapsed since that event. And, seemingly a conclusive argument, while on the earlier occasion, Chios had been given, or had adopted, an oligarchical government of Carian sympathies[64], there is no reason to suppose that the city had been garrisoned, whereas here the three islands are linked together as 'occupied'. It must therefore be presumed that

shortly before 346 B.C. a Carian garrison was imposed on Rhodes. From this it follows that the occupying troops established by Artemisia had been expelled, that a period of independence had followed, and that a garrison had again been put into the city. The events in question must have occurred between 351 B.C., the date in which Artemisia captured the city, and 346 B.C., the date of the delivery of Demosthenes' oration. Greater precision does not seem possible[65].

A fragment of Theopompus also appears to refer to this period[66]. In a speech put into the mouth of Philocrates, the statesman says : 'For we know that the Boeotians and the Megarians are hostile to us, and that some of the Peloponnesians are inclining towards the Thebans, and others towards the Macedonians, and that the Chians and Rhodians and their allies are on the one hand inimical to us, while on the other they are discussing with Philip about friendship.' Certainly this cannot refer to a date earlier than the social war, since Philip did not succeed to the throne until 357 B.C., and the most reasonable supposition is that the speech was inserted by Theopompus, or actually delivered, in connection with the Peace of Philocrates. Here again many combinations might be made to explain the statement, but beyond the fact that the Rhodian contacts with Macedon here described were the first between the two powers we cannot be certain of the occasion. Rhodes certainly appears to be a fully independent power, at least acting as such in this

particular instance, and it follows from this that the negotiations probably preceded the Peace of Philocrates, since at the time of the Peace, as the evidence of Demosthenes discussed above shows[67], the island was under Carian domination. It is possible that Philip was interested in securing the friendship of Rhodes when he made his alliance with Rhodes' old friend Byzantium in c. 351 B.C.[68], but this seems rather remote from the most probable occasion for the delivery of Philocrates' speech.

The re-imposed Hecatomnid domination of Rhodes, effected by 346 B.C., probably lasted on this occasion for some years. It is at all events not until 341 B.C. that Rhodes again achieves mention in our sources. In the Third Philippic Oration, delivered in April or May of 341 B.C., Demosthenes speaks of embassies sent to Rhodes and Chios to conclude alliances[69]. It cannot be inferred from this that Rhodes had thrown off the overlordship of Caria by this time, since in the same breath Demosthenes says that an embassy was also sent to the Great King[70]. It is also to be noted that Demosthenes here links Rhodes and Chios, which were the two islands which he had linked together in 346 B.C. as having been occupied by 'the Carian'[71]. If now they, and they alone, of the Islanders were visited by Athenian envoys, the most natural interpretation of this is that they were both still in identical situations, namely under Carian domination. Had they been freed, and on the same footing as the other islands, there seems no reason why they

should have been singled out for treatment. At least we are not justified in assuming on this evidence alone that Rhodes was fully independent[72].

Rhodes is found in essentially the same company in the following year, when she went to the help of Byzantion, beleaguered by Philip. The latter had opened the campaigning year of 340 B.C. by laying siege to Perinthus[73]. After the city had withstood the siege for some considerable time and was nearing the end of its power of resistance, the king of Persia stirred himself on the city's behalf, ordering the satraps of the coastal provinces to give the city all possible assistance[74]. The satraps sent a quantity of war- supplies and of mercenary troops, and were joined in this by the people of Byzantium[75]. This act constituted a very dangerous threat to Athenian interests, and was followed by a declaration of war against Philip on the part of Athens[76]. It also brought Rhodes on to the scene. Assistance, the nature of which is not specified, was sent by the Rhodians, Coans, Chians, 'and some other of the Greeks', Philip, surprised at the concurrence of forces on behalf of Byzantium, withdrew his troops and made peace with the Athenians and the other Greeks[77].

This episode shows that even if, Rhodes was not, as has been suggested above, still subject to Carian control, the policy she pursued was the same as that pursued by Persia, and probably also of the Carian dynasty. Moreover, the reappearance beside Rhodes, of Cos and Chios, suggests that the situation in

these islands had not changed much in recent years, and that, as in 346 B.C., they were still essentially under the domination of Caria.

Rhodes probably remained under Caria until Alexander took over control of the island, probably in 332 B.C.[78]. But the years immediately before and after Chaeronea are ill attested. The only light is shed by the speech of the Athenian statesman Lycurgus in prosecution of Leocrates. He accuses Leocrates of having gone to Rhodes after the battle of Chaeronea and spread the rumour that the city of Athens had fallen[79]. The Rhodians were pleased at this, and confiscated the ships in their harbours, with a cargo of corn for Athens[80]. The hostility of Rhodes to Athens at this juncture thus seems certain. This is perhaps at first sight surprising, since the two people, Athenian and Rhodian, had been on the same side in 340 B.C., but it must be borne in mind that the Rhodian tradition of hositility to Athens stretched back at least twenty years to the battle of Chaeronea, and that there is no other instance of co-operation between them. The fact that they were both opposed to Philip (there is nothing to suggest that they were allied) when he attacked Byzantium is sufficiently explained by the old friendship which united Rhodes and Byzantium, instances of which have appeared previously[81]. The action of the Rhodians had little significance, for shortly afterwards cargoes from Athens entered Rhodos harbour, and proved

the falsity of Leocrates' canard[82]. It is clear from a later passage in the same speech that even if Rhodes decided to take advantage of the supposed Athenian disaster, up till that time normal trade relations had existed between Athens and Rhodes[83], but this does not mean that politically the two powers were not hostile to each other, even supposing that Rhodes enjoyed full independence in foreign relations at this time.

A glance back over the years from 378 B.C. to 337 B.C., the period in which the Second Athenian confederacy rose and fell, shows that in so far as it concerns Rhodes, they fall into two halves, separated by the Social War. Up to the outbreak of the war, Rhodes was wholly in the camp of Athens. From the outbreak of that war until long after the battle of Chareonea she was more often than not -- that is as precise as one can be -- in the Carian camp. It is probable that she was under complete Carian suzerainty throughout the decade which preceded the battle of Chaeronea. It is therefore hardly possible through much of this century to speak of 'Rhodian' foreign policy. The city certainly had important foreign connections and alignments, particularly with the other islands of the Eastern Aegean, but we lack the evidence to determine to what extent that policy was dictated or formulated by the dynasts of Halicarnassus.

Particularly striking in this period is the similarity between the history of Rhodes and that of such cities as Byzantium, Chios and Cos. Not only are these cities politi-

cally closely connected, they seem to have evolved in forms of internal government in much the same way, and this evolution, or, more precisely, series of changes, was largely due to the cities' relations first with Athens and then with Caria. Rhodes and these other cities reflect the forces and tensions that were undoubtedly present in other cities of the Eastern Aegean and Asia Minor at this time.

If Rhodes is at this time politically in no way more advanced than her neighbours, in culture and intellectual progress she falls notably behind some of them. Thus the fourth century was a period of great enlightenment for the city of Cnidus, close to Rhodes on the opposite coast, and the scientific schools of Cos, established in the fifth century, continued to flourish in the fourth. But no echo of their achievements is heard in Rhodes[84]. To whatever cause this is to be attributed, be it preoccupation with civic matters resulting from the comparative newness of the city, or be it due more directly to political causes, in particular the years of Carian rule, the fact itself is of great importance in view of the subsequent development of Rhodes as a centre of philosophy and culture. As with her political greatness in the Hellenistic age, so her cultural importance at that time arises from causes which were not operative in the fourth century. The importance of this century lies above all in this negative consideration, that the causes of the greatness of Rhodes in the Hellenistic age are not to be sought in the earlier period.

Chapter IV.

Rhodes and Macedon : 336-323 B.C.

The evidence for the status of Rhodes from the formation of the League of Corinth to the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison on the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C. is even slighter than it is for some of the other island communities. The subject has received considerable attention of recent years but little agreement has been reached.

The islands of the eastern, unlike those of the western Aegean, were not members of the League of Corinth. There is no reason to suppose that Rhodes was an exception in this matter.[1] The other islands controlled by Persia were liberated by Alexander at different points after the battle of the Granicus (334 B.C.), and though we know little of the way in which Rhodes was permitted to achieve her freedom, it is certain that during the siege of Tyre Alexander received assistance from Rhodes. This is all the direct evidence that has survived[2]

The relations of the island with its Carian master, and ultimately to the central Persian administration, underwent a change as a result of the alterations in command introduced by the Persian king after the battle of the Granicus. At the time of Alexander's passage into Asia the satrapy of Caria was in the hands of Pixodarus, the youngest of the sons of Hecatomnus, who had expelled his sister Ada from her position as dynast in 340 B.C.[3] Pixodarus died in the year of

Alexander's crossing[4]. Darius however did not permit Ada to reassume charge of the satrapy, in the manner that had become traditional in the family, but placed a nominee of his own, Orontobates, the son-in-law of Pixodarus, in charge[5]. The territory controlled by Ada was restricted to the fortified city of Alinda in central Caria[6]. Alexander restored Ada to her position as satrap of all Caria, after he had captured Halicarnassus and subdued the remainder of Caria[7].

Darius' reorganisation of his Carian satrapy was not confined to the appointment of Orontobates. He also appointed the most gifted of his military commanders, Memnon, himself a Rhodian, to be 'commander of the entire fleet and of the whole of the Seacoast' in the hope that he would be able to carry the war into Macedonia[8]. This command doubtless included Rhodes, whose position on the sea-route between Asia Minor and Europe gave it military if not political importance. That the island was not in the reconstituted satrapy of Ada may perhaps be further inferred from the time which elapsed between the restoration of Ada to the satrapy of all Caria (autumn 334 B.C.)[9] and the appearance of Rhodians on the side of Alexander in 332 B.C. Had the island been included in the domains of Ada she would undoubtedly have levied ships thence at an earlier date on Alexander's behalf.

The nature of the authority exercised by Memnon in the Greek cities within his command is unknown. Equally uncertain is it whether these cities were garrisoned or not. The

fact that Mytilene, for example, was garrisoned after its capture by the Persian forces[10], offers no analogy, for Mytilene had been an ally of Alexander[11], while Rhodes had remained within the framework of the Persian Empire. At all events it is clear that Rhodes can have exercised no effectual sovereignty at this time.

The intricate question of the relations between Rhodes and Alexander must now be considered. The first point to be decided is the date at which Rhodes joined Alexander, and how this was brought about. The Alexander-historians differ on this point. Ptolemy apparently did not record the submission of Rhodes at all. The only reference to it in Arrian is oblique[12]. He simply says that some Rhodian vessels came to Alexander at Tyre. From this it may be inferred with some certainty that the formal act of surrender, by which Rhodes was required to contribute these ships, had been signed some time previously. The event was passed over in even more complete silence by Aristobulus and Cleitarchus, the sources of the surviving narrative of Diodorus. We are thus dependent on the least reliable of the Alexander-historians, Curtius Rufus[13] and Justin-Trogus[14]. Both agree that the submission to Alexander occurred without any show of violence[15]; and both agree in recounting the submission after the end of the siege, though whether they imply that the event actually occurred after the siege is less certain; if so, then their account is to be

rejected in view of the contrary indirect testimony of Ptolemy.

In view of the silence surrounding the surrender it is clearly unwise to dogmatise about changes this event may have brought at Rhodes. It has already been noted that a change of policy, even a change of masters, does not necessarily imply an internal change of government[16]. In this particular instance the absence of earlier contacts between Rhodes and Macedon may have meant that there was not a ready-made pro-Macedonian party ready to drive out the existing government whose policy had apparently been one of friendship with Persia, as earlier in the century there had always been a pro-Athenian and pro-Spartan party ready to take advantage of a momentary change of masters. It is therefore possible that the previous government may have remained in office. This is, however, an argument from silence and not a very strong one[17].

It is clear that we cannot tell what effect the submission of the city had in matters of internal administration[17A] But other isolated statements shed some light on the condition of the city and of the relations which developed between it and Alexander[18]. Curtius records that Alexander placed in 331 B.C. garrisons on Chios and Rhodes, and that both cities requested that the troops be removed. He also states that these requests were granted[19]. This episode is not recorded elsewhere, and against its authenticity may be set the fact that Diodorus records the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison from Rhodes in 323 B.C.[20]. The statement in Diodorus apparently comes from

his chronological source, whose general reliability is beyond doubt[21]. It is therefore to be preferred to that of Curtius[22]. The latter's narrative in this item bears a considerable resemblance to that of the Testament of Alexander, contained in some versions of the Alexander-Romance, from which it may well be derived[23]. There is therefore nothing to suggest that Alexander treated Rhodes with unusual clemency. The position of Rhodes was important enough to require some guarantee, since Alexander needed to maintain contact with Greece even after he had defeated the Persian king, and Rhodes occupied a vital point in his communications. In other respects, where no vital issue was at stake Alexander seems to have been benevolently inclined towards the Rhodians.

Alexander made a dedication at the shrine of Athana Lindia, the oldest and most important of the island's religious centres, after the battle of Gaugamela[24]. He appears in this dedication for the first time as 'Lord of Asia', Lord, that is, of the Persian Empire[25]. It is possible that the action of Alexander in dedicating an offering in Rhodes was prompted by the gift which the Rhodians had made him on an earlier occasion, perhaps when they requested him to remove the Macedonian garrison from the city (if that request was ever made)[26]. Plutarch records that at the battle of

Gaugamela he wore a cloak of ancient workmanship given him by the city of Rhodos[27]. But the importance of the shrine in itself adequately explains Alexander's appearance there as dedicant[28].

Alexander clearly had a considerable opinion of the ability of certain Rhodians, who are found in high positions in his administrative service[29], but this can hardly be used as evidence for his relations with the city itself. In the Hellenistic period there are many instances in which monarchs employ nationals of states with which they are in open conflict[30].

Perhaps the best testimony to the good relations which existed between Alexander and Rhodes is to be found in the good reputation enjoyed there by him after his death. The worship of Alexander was established in Rhodes by the late third century at the latest, and continued well into the Roman Imperial period[31]. Rhodian writers in the third century apparently took a considerable interest in him. Apart from the possibility that the author of the Herakleia which played an early part in shaping the historical tradition regarding Alexander's Indian campaign was a Rhodian, and a contemporary of Alexander[32], there is the much more important evidence concerning the earlier strata of the Greek version of the Alexander-Romance.

A full-scale investigation of this problem is not possible here, but certain salient facts, some well-known, some hitherto unobserved, may be pointed out. A general knowledge of the nature of the Romance is assumed[33]. The relevant texts are the Testament of Alexander and the Letter to the Rhodians, which are contained in the oldest Greek manuscript and in some versions deriving from the same original source. The Greek version records the Testament of Alexander, incorporating it in a letter addressed to the Boule and Demos of Rhodes: in a Latin version of the Romance, known as the Metz Epitome the same two documents appear, but in this version they are kept separate. Some confirmation is found in the Excerpta Latina Barbari[34]. Those clauses of the Testament which refer to Rhodes are, first, a provision that Olympias, if she so wishes, is to live in Rhodes provided the Rhodians agree[35]: and secondly, the declaration that the Islanders are to be free under the tutelage of the Rhodians[36]. In the Letter Alexander expresses his love for the city of Rhodes, and suitability of the Rhodians as 'guardians of the labours accomplished by me'[37]. Therefore he has ordered the garrison to be withdrawn from the city (?Acropolis), so that, in enjoyment of freedom of speech, they may preserve their liberty through the centuries, wishing too that the honour in which he is held may be preserved among the Rhodians[38]. 'For we know

that your city is grateful and worthy of remembrance; therefore we shall manifestly care for it not less than for our fatherland'[39]. Alexander then recounts the measures he has taken for the distribution of the wealth and produce of the Empire, and for the disposal of his body after death. Rhodes is to receive three hundred talents of gold to repair the city, and seventy-seven triremes, so that the Rhodians may preserve their liberty in safety, and to receive two-hundred thousand bushels of wheat annually from Egypt, free of charge, and the same amount from Asia through the agency of the 'oiko nomoi' and the lands close to Rhodes. Land is to be measured out for the Rhodians, so that they may in the future have sufficient cereals, and suffer from no want[40]. Alexander tells the Rhodians that he has given instructions for these measures to be put into effect to Craterus, regent of Macedonia, to Ptolemy, satrap of Egypt, and to Antigonus and Perdiccas in Asia. He finally tells the Rhodians that Ptolemy of Egypt will care for the city, and that they are not to suppose that he has entrusted his will to their keeping without forethought[41]. Diodorus also records that Alexander deposited his will with the Rhodians[42].

The question of the date at which the Testament of Alexander, and his letter to the Rhodians were composed, and the date at which they found their way into the Alexander-Romance were discussed many years ago by Ausfeld[43]. His conclusions,

though they have been disputed on several occasions, appear sound. Several documents of different periods and different worth are identifiable and each element in it may, indeed must, be judged by itself, without reference to surrounding pieces. Thus it is probable that the list of marriages of the Diadochi, given in the Testament issued originally from a source hostile to the Regent Antipater[44]. Similarly the statement that the Islanders were to be free under Rhodian protection, which was certainly not the case in the years after Alexander's death, was a fact from c. 228 B.C., and particularly from 200 B.C., until c. 166 B.C.[45]. This statement attributed to Alexander is therefore most likely to have been formulated at this time, or at least after about 260 B.C., the date at which the Rhodians fell out with Ptolemy Philadelphos, who was master of the Island League[46]. The statement may thus be either a claim by Rhodes to succeed the Ptolemies, or a justification of their own rule sixty or more years later[47].

The other passage in the Testament dealing with Rhodes, that in which, subject to Rhodian consent, Olympias is given the option of settling in Rhodes, clearly belongs to an earlier period. Nothing was to be gained by the invention of this story after Olympias' death, so far as can be seen. It must, surely, be connected, like much else in the Testament, with the time when Olympias was still a force, that is before

316/5 B.C. The purpose of this story is not clear. There are no known connections between Olympias and Rhodes, nor indeed does Rhodes seem to have been concerned in any way with the struggles that went on in Macedonia. There seems no motive for invention on the part of a Rhodian, but since there is still less for anybody else, the story must be ascribed to a Rhodian source contemporary with Olympias. It is clear that if some of the Testament may be assigned to the time of Antipater, there is no reason why this Rhodian piece was not interpolated at that time. On the other hand, though composed at this time, it may not have found its way to the Testament until the Rhodian who inserted the passage about the freedom of the Islands was at work. Perhaps the former solution is the more probable, since it remains a very pointless insertion to make at a later date[48].

The Letter to the Rhodians, in spite of the fact that it has been horribly confused with the Testament in the oldest Greek manuscript, is separate from it in the Metz Epitome, which represents an older version, and it may be treated as a single and coherent document[49]. The central considerations of the Letter are, firstly, the measures and donations ordered by Alexander on behalf of the city, and secondly, the emphasis laid in one striking phrase on the friendship between Rhodes and Ptolemaic Egypt. The latter point may be considered first. Ausfeld, in his classic discussion of the Testament and Letter, asserted that the statement 'Ptolemy will care for you' reflected

the assistance given by Ptolemy Soter to the Rhodians in 305/4 B.C., when the city was beseiged by Demetrius Poliorcetes, and he therefore concluded that this part of the letter or testament was necessarily later than that date[50]. However, the help given on that occasion by Ptolemy, in common with other powers, was only an episode in an older friendship, which certainly went back to the preceding decade, and perhaps to the years immediately after Alexander's death[51]. A lower limit can be set with some confidence. The most important event in Rhodian history in the third century was the breaking up of her good relations with the House of Ptolemy. Active hostility probably only existed between the two powers in the middle decade of the century, but relations though they became friendly again were never resumed on the old basis[52]. It is therefore unlikely that the passage was written after c.260 B.C.

The dispensations of Alexander cannot be dated on such positive grounds, but at least they contain nothing to oppose the time-limits given above[53]. The reference to an increase in territory certainly refers to the Rhodian Peraea, but the historical context is not clear[54]. It is to be noted that other instances exist in which communities attributed to Alexander gifts of certain territories of which they have possessed themselves or to which they felt entitled. For example, Hecataeus of Abdera, the third century writer of a history of the Jews, recorded that Alexander awarded Samaria to the Jewish people, to be held by them tax-free[55]. But there

is no chance of this being true. In the present instance referring to the Rhodian Peraea, it is wholly impossible to tell whether the claim to Alexander's sanction preceded or followed the acquisition of new territory. Such a claim might have been made at any point in the Hellenistic period, before the reputation and authority of Alexander had been obscured by Augustus or his successors.

Even if more precise information cannot be gathered from these documents they clearly indicate the considerable interest taken by Rhodes in the personality of Alexander, and the use to which they were prepared to turn his name in the early Hellenistic period. Of course, neither the elements of Rhodian composition in the Testament nor the Letter itself show that Rhodes or Rhodian writers had a hand in the construction of the Alexander-Romance, but only that there were documents of Rhodian authorship which were later adopted into the growing Romance.

There are, however, two facts which suggest that at some time Rhodian writers contributed their share directly to the Romance. It has already been mentioned that after the synoecism of the city of Rhodes the use of the old city-ethnics, Λίνδιος , Καμιρεύς , and Ἰαλύσιος , survived only in local documents. Outside of Rhodes all Rhodians were known as Ῥόδιοι , irrespective of the deme from which they came. The only real exception to this rule belongs to the first decade of the fourth century, when such a survival does not demand

especial explanation or justification[56]. It is therefore surprising to discover that the Romance contains two instances in which this rule is disregarded. The first is in the form of the ethnic Λίνδιος . In the list of those who participated in the Olympic festival with Alexander in his youth are recorded as Boeotian, a Corinthian and Achaean, and Olynthian, Phocaean, a Locrian, and a Lindian[57]. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this passage was written by a Rhodian, and in all probability by a citizen of Lindos.

The second passage is even more remarkable. The list of the native villages which Alexander found in existence on the site of the future Alexandria, are differently recorded in the various traditions[58]. Most of the versions contain a reference to 'this land' which is a certain indication that the core of the passage was written in Alexandria[59]. But the names of the villages themselves are a mixture of Greek and gibberish which, in the Greek version, cannot be sorted out. It is however worthy of note that the Syriac version[60], which has some affinities with the earliest surviving ~~the original form of the~~ Greek version[61], contains among a number of incomprehensible forms, the single Greek form Lindos[62]. By itself, and in view of the well-attested tendency among modern historians of the ancient world to discover what they are looking for in the Alexander-Romance, it would be unwise to press this word which may only resemble the Greek form of the word Lindos. But the Olympian victor from Lindos is there, and he is enough to raise suspicions. We are

justified in concluding that the same man who inserted 'Lindian' in the Olympic list, inserted the word Lindos in the Greek list of native Egyptian villages from which this Syriac list is eventually derived. And if he did so, then that can only have been because he was a native of that place himself. Just how this insertion was effected we can hardly decide. Possibly the Lindian was living in Alexandria and the insertion was nearly contemporary with the original list, or possibly it was made after the diffusion of the document, in Rhodes. The matter is not immaterial to our particular enquiry, but no evidence on the point is yet available. It is further to be noticed that Deinocrates, the architect of Alexandria, is called Ῥόδιος in the Romance, and only in that work,[63]

This activity on the part of Rhodians in connection with the story of Alexander after his death all suggests a friendly tradition, and there can be no doubt that this was predominant. It was perhaps assisted by the presence in Rhodian territory of the exiled Athenian orator Aeschines[64]. There are however also traces of a hostile tradition. This perhaps originally derived from the existence at Rhodes of a flourishing branch of the Peripatetic school, whose hostility to the memory of Alexander, from the time of the primacy within the school of Theophrastos, is well known[65]. Three Rhodians, Eudemus, Hieronymus, and Praxiphanes occupied important positions in the Academy in the time of Aristotle and Theophrastus[66], and the earliest of them, Eudemus, returned to

Rhodes and established a school there[67], at which, it may be surmised, at the end of the fourth century or early in the third, the young Hieronymus received his early training in ideas[68]. He it was who provided Theophrastus with some at least of the ammunition for the latter's attack on Alexander[69]. However it is impossible to determine the origin of Hieronymus' hostility to Alexander. Perhaps it did not develop until he came under the influence of Theophrastus, in which case influence from Rhodes is not likely.

Rhodes does not appear to have enjoyed a special status while under Macedonian domination. The city was certainly garrisoned, and there is no compelling reason to suppose that the garrison was withdrawn before Alexander's death. Apart from this normal precautionary measure, which was particularly desirable in view of the danger which would face his communications if the city turned against him, Alexander probably treated the city with consideration. In turn, it was not long before he was worshipped there. Almost immediately after his death Rhodian writers were active incorporating him into the city's historical tradition, and this work may have gone on for centuries. This literary production, though naturally composed ad maiorem Rhodiorum gloriam, presupposes a friendly tradition. There are also signs of an unfriendly tradition emanating from Rhodian writers, but it cannot be determined to what extent this tradition was the product of local influences and feeling.

Chapter V.

From the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison to the battle of Ipsos. (323-301 B.C.)

The period of twenty two years which lie between the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison from Rhodes, and the battle of Ipsos, the age, of the Diadochi, is one of the best attested of Rhodian history. It is also one of the most important.

Our main source for the history of this period is Diodorus[1], whose narrative of these years is derived, directly or at second hand, from the contemporary history of Hieronymus of Cardia, the statesman and historian, of the objectivity of whose work there is little reason to doubt[2]. There are several other, unidentifiable, sources present in Diodorus' narrative, and among them apparently a Rhodian historian, perhaps one of those whose names are recorded in the Lindian Chronicle. This supposition alone will account for the large amount of local Rhodian history present in Diodorus[3]. The detailed and circumstantial nature of these passages suggests that the information they contain is reliable. The existence of these details enables us to appreciate the spirit of Rhodian life and politics in the early Hellenistic Age in a way that is only again possible when we can use the account of Rhodian history given by Polybius.

Beside Diodorus stands the much briefer narrative of Arrian's Events after Alexander[4]. Very little of this work, which dealt only with the years immediately after Alexander's

death, has survived. If was written in such detail that it must have incorporated much material from other sources[5]. It is perhaps from one of these other sources rather than from Hieronymus that the statement regarding the war between Attalus, the general of Perdiccas, and Rhodes, is derived.

Apart from these general writings, there is a fragment of an account of the siege of Rhodes in 305/4, very similar to, but not identical with, the account in Diodorus[6]. This, like the account in Diodorus, was probably written by a Rhodian historian, though whether both accounts are or from the same original pen must remain an open question. They are also a few chance references from other sources.

The epigraphical evidence is again remarkably slight. Though there exist a few inscriptions from the 'old cities' in this period, very little survives from Rhodos, and we therefore get little help in regard to the city's foreign relations.

The arrival in Greece of the news of Alexander's death in the East led almost immediately to the outbreak of the so-called Lamian war, in which the states of Greece banded together to expel the Macedonian forces from the country[7]. In Rhodes news of the death of the King, their benefactor and friend, led to a similarly rapid revulsion against Macedonian rule. The Macedonian garrison was expelled[8]. In the narrative of Diodorus the events are so described as to suggest that there was a connection, even a co-ordination, between the rising on

the mainland and that at Rhodes. This does not, however, seem very likely[9]. There is no reference to Rhodian participation where it would be expected if she was a belligerent in the Lamian war, namely in the two naval engagements of the war, the Battles of Abydos and Amorgos[10]. Moreover, there is one positive indication that Rhodes was not sympathetic to the aspirations of the allied forces in the Lamian war, even if, like them, she would no longer countenance a Macedonian garrison A Samian decree, of which a copy has been found at Rhodes, records the thanks of the people of Samos for the kindness shown by a certain Akamas of Rhodes to Samian exiles who were living in Rhodes[11]. The Samians had been driven out of Samos by the Athenians before the Social war, and it is possible that Athens' action in this matter was one of the causes of that war[12] It was certainly one of several measures which created alarm. It is therefore not surprising to find that Rhodes, whose dissatisfaction with Athenian rule dated from an even earlier period[13], took pity on, and gave asylum to, Samian refugees. It was, however, on account of the status of Samos that Athens went to war in 323 B.C. The Samian exiles were entitled to return to their homes, under the terms of the letter addressed by Alexander to the members of the Corinthian league in 324 B.C.[14], and it was to avoid the execution of this order that Athens resorted to force, once the news of Alexander's death was known[15]. It was not therefore likely that Rhodes would

assist the Athenian cause, even though it was against Macedon. Moreover, the issue of the rising in Greece could not alter the position of cities such as Rhodes, which had previously been within the Persian Empire, and were thus not on the same footing as the Greek cities. If Rhodes was to attain her freedom, it could only be through her independent exertions.

The expulsion of the Macedonian garrison from Rhodes, of which nothing beyond the bare fact is recorded, does not conflict with the evidence already advanced to show that the relations between the Rhodians and Alexander were friendly[16], and that his name was honoured on the island after his death. The Rhodians desired to be masters in their own house, and events have shown time without number that the desire for full independence will override friendship and gratitude. The Rhodians perhaps appreciated the need for a garrison in time of war, but by 323 B.C. it had ceased to be necessary. The death of Alexander naturally gave a stimulus which was absent when he was alive.

The implications of this occurrence are, as usual, uncertain. It is possible that it was accompanied by a change in government but there is no evidence on the point. Some of the major changes in Rhodian policy were clearly not accompanied by any change of government, but resulted from a vote on a single issue in the ecclesia[17]; but whether the expulsion of the

Macedonians was or was not accompanied by such a change cannot be determined. Too little is known of Rhodes under Carian rule in the period before Alexander to enable us to speak with any confidence on this critical matter. At all events it seems probable that from this time the Rhodian government settled down to a stable form of administration in which the full machinery of democracy was employed, though modifications in its practice are noticeable. The government apparently remained unaltered in any important respects for two centuries or more[18].

Rhodes was faced with a trial of her newly-won independence in 321 B.C. The war between the Diadochi, or rather the first phase in that war, had begun. Rhodes was not connected with the main struggle for power, in the first ten years after the death of Alexander, and the incident in question was marginal. In 321 B.C. Perdiccas was killed by his commanders after the failure of his attempt to invade Egypt[19], where Ptolemy remained master of his satrapy. His death was followed by the conference at Triparadeisos, at which Antipater, the Regent of Macedon, reallotted the satrapies, and then returned to Europe with the nominal kings, Philip Arrhidaeus, the half-brother of Alexander, and Alexander IV, the newly born son of Alexander, by Roxane[20]. This was the point chosen by Arrian for the end of his extremely detailed history of the events after Alexander's death[21]. In the tenth

and last book of his history, he records[22] how after the death of Perdiccas, Eumenes, his lieutenant, and Alcetas and Attalus, the other leading members of the Perdiccan party, who, as we know from Diodorus, had been condemned to death by the Macedonian troops of Perdiccas, in absentia[23], prepared for war. While Eumenes prepared in Cappadocia the army with which he was to fight so well in the next five years, Attalus collected ten thousand foot, and [redacted] eight hundred cavalry. With this force he proceeded to attack positions in Caria, namely Cnidus and Caunus, both independent cities, and 'the Rhodians'. The Rhodians, commanded by the nauarch Demaratus, offered battle and defeated him[24]. The paraphrase of Arrian, in which this incident is reported, is very brief, and leave much unexplained; for instance, how much of Attalus' fleet was engaged; and whether the use of the term 'the Rhodians' rather than 'Rhodes', although the text has 'Cnidus' and 'Caunus', implies that Attalus did not attack the island itself, but its Carian possessions, all of which lay between Cnidus and Caunus[25]; and most of all what significance is to be attributed to the event. Does it mean that Rhodes had publicly proclaimed her attachment to the side of Antipater? There is no other indication in our sources, including the detailed narrative of Diodorus, that Rhodes was involved in these early struggles[26], and it therefore perhaps is wisest to suppose that the action of Attalus was probably unprovoked and due to a desire to acquire a good naval base for future operations, and the engagement with Rhodes

no part of his real plan.

The operation, if we had more details, would be of great value as enabling us to see the size and operational capacity of the Rhodian fleet, at the dawn of its greatness. ~~The decisive battle was fought here, and has connected with the impression that the Rhodian fleet was~~ It is conceivable that the Rhodian fleet may have been larger than estimates based on the figures of a slightly later period would lead one to suppose[27], and that Attalus' fleet may have been caught in narrow waters thus providing Rhodian ships with the circumstances in which at a later date they preferred to give battle[28], but there is nothing in Arrian's narrative to support these conjectures.

The years after the Conference at Triparadeisos saw great changes in the world. In 319 B.C. Antipater, the old marshal, died, and his title, though not the full weight of his authority, passed to Polyperchon.[29] In Asia war between Eumenes, the follower of Perdikkas, and the only survivor among Alexander's generals who believed in the unity of the empire under a Macedonian monarchy, and Antigonus Monophthalmus, who aimed at securing for himself the domination of Alexander's empire, was long and bitter. Eventually, in 316/5 Eumenes fell a victim to the disloyalty of his troops who handed him over on trivial grounds to his enemy[30]. The death of Eumenes left Antigonus incomparably the strongest figure of his day. But,

though master of Asia, he lacked a substantial fleet[31]. Moreover the death of Eumenes gave his rivals an opportunity to demand a redistribution of the satrapies, and a share of the considerable booty, under threat of war[32]. The ultimatum issued in 315/4 B.C. was subscribed by Ptolemy of Egypt, Cassander, the son of Antipater, and Lysimachus, King of Thrace. Antigonus rejected its terms, called the nations, ~~and~~ cities, and princes of his great kingdom to his aid[33], and turned to the construction of a fleet. The great shipbuilding cities of the Phoenician coast were independent, but closely linked to Ptolemy. To acquire these he inaugurated a land-campaign against Syria[34], while he sent ambassadors to negotiate with the maritime cities of Cyprus and Rhodes[35].

In the year of Eumenes' death Rhodes had suffered the last of those tidal waves to which reference has already been made[36]. It is probable that all trace of this disaster had not been removed the following year, when Antigonus requested through his envoys that the city, with which he had previously had no contacts, should assist him. Unfortunately, the precise nature of Antigonus' request is not recorded, though the reply of the Rhodian Demos is. Diodorus says that Antigonus had a shipyard at Rhodes, the Rhodian people having permitted him to construct ships there from imported timber[37]. Since the nature of Antigonus' demands are not recorded, it is difficult to build much on this. However, it seems unlikely that Antigonus would in the urgent circumstances make so modest a request, which

would retard the pace of naval construction, and it is reasonable to interpret the Rhodian reply as a stipulation. It appears probable that Antigonus would also be required to import labour, or at least to organise it himself as he had to do in the cities of Phoenicia[38]. This rather limited passive assistance given to Antigonus, may have been the result of practical prudence, a desire to remain aloof from the struggle of which the issue was uncertain. Rhodes, a few years later was unwilling to support Antigonus against Ptolemy, and it is possible that friendship for Ptolemy, later so marked, was already the cause of this unusual psephism. However, if this had been the case, it might be expected that Rhodes would refuse all assistance. It is possible that Rhodes was still suffering from the effects of the tidal wave, and that all labour was being used on reconstruction-work[39].

The years between 315 and 311 B.C. and of considerable importance in the history both of Antigonus himself and of the Aegean islands, and it is not surprising that in these years Rhodes plays a more prominent part than in those preceding. Much of the activity of Antigonus in these years was directed to persuading the cities of the Greek world that adherence to his cause would lead to the enjoyment of unqualified freedom by them. One means by which he sought to achieve his end was by the establishment of semi-independent koina[40], of which perhaps the most familiar is the League of Corinth[41], though this actually belongs to a later date. Another was the

League of Islanders or Nesiotic League, the κοινὸν τῶν Νησιωτῶν. This league had a long and eventful history of a century and a half, and for the last thirty five years of its existence it became, in a somewhat reconstituted form, the means by which the Rhodians controlled the Aegean communities[42]. The occasion of the formation of this League is not recorded in our literary sources, but its origin can be attributed to Antigonus and Demetrius the Beseiger with absolute certainty, since an inscription records the festivals in honour of the joint-kings, Antigonus and Demetrius, who can only be Monophthalmus and his son, whose period of co-regency covered the years 306-301 B.C.[43]. The most probable time for the establishment of the league is that now under consideration, about 315 B.C. Positive evidence supports this conjecture. Before Antigonus proceeded against Tyre in 315 B.C., he had already formed his minimum naval force from the first ships ready on the stocks at Rhodes.[44] Diodorus states that this fleet gave him mastery at sea, and enabled him to blockade Tyre[45]. Later in the siege further naval reinforcements arrived. Themison his admiral brought forty ships from the Hellespont, while Dioscorides brought another eighty from the Hellespont and Rhodes. These two contingents, added to those constructed in Phoenicia and those captured at the siege of Tyre, brought his fleet up to two hundred and forty sail[46].

Part of this fleet was now despatched by Antigonus

to the Aegean. Diodorus says 'He divided the fleet, and sent fifty ships to the Peloponnese, while he made Dioscorides, his nephew, admiral of the others, and ordered him to cruise round offering safety to the allies, and bringing over those of the allies who were not yet members of the alliance'[47].

Whether this refers to the foundation of the League is doubtful; what is here referred to seems to be not a federation but an alliance, and it may be supposed that this system of alliances preceded the federation. The earliest date for the federation will be then 315/4 B.C., and it is more likely to be a year or two later, since Delos was the centre of the new confederation, and it seems probable that this island was not liberated from Athenian control until after summer 314 B.C.[48]

The participant members in the time of Antigonus are not known, and inferences from the later period of Ptolemaic control are not necessarily valid. There can be no doubt, however, that at all times the kernel of the organisation was the Cycladic group, and that, until the period of the restored Rhodian Nesiotic confederacy, Delos was its centre, whether or not that island was an enrolled member of the League[49].

Antigonus' League, unlike the two Athenian Confederations which had dominated the Aegean through much of the fifth and fourth centuries, appears to have been confined to peoples of Ionian stock. For this reason certain members of the Cycladic group of Islands were excluded, and certain other

islands which lay slightly further afield, but could boast Ionian descent, were included[50].

None of the islands belonging to the East Dorian group, the Dodecanese of to-day, appears to have been members of the League in its early stage, and most of them doubtless never were. Rhodes, the most important island of the group, was certainly not a member, nor was Cos, second only in importance to Rhodes. Whether this absence is to be explained simply as due to Rhodes' relative remoteness from the Cyclades and Delos, or whether Antigonus calculated that it was better to leave the island independent, is uncertain. In favour of the latter interpretation is the fact that Rhodes had very close relations with Delos in the third century[51], when the League had passed under Ptolemaic control, and that such relations could have existed equally well under Antigonus. For this reason it is safer to conclude that Rhodes, and the islands adjacent to, and in some cases dependent on, her[52], were deliberately omitted from the League.

In 312 B.C. Antigonus gave clear expression of the regard in which he held Rhodes, by concluding with it a treaty of friendship and alliance[53]. The situation was dangerous for Antigonus. Ptolemy had consolidated his hold on Cyprus, and was preparing to move against Syria, where the son of Antigonus, Demetrius the Beseiger, as yet an untried youth, stood ready to receive him[54]. The alliance with Rhodes appears as one measure aimed at strengthening Antigonus' position in the area of Caria,

and the South-eastern Aegean. Another was his campaign in Caria, in 313 B.C. in the course of which he bestowed freedom on a number of cities, with considerable display of force[55]. The only surviving detail of the treaty with Rhodes makes it clear that friendship with Ptolemy played an important part in the city's calculation. Rhodes insisted on the insertion of a clause by which she was not required to assist Antigonus against Ptolemy[56]. Here for the first time is a clear indication of how Rhodes stood; she was willing to become a free ally of Antigonus, and to assist him when necessary in operations against certain of his enemies, but she reserved the right, which Antigonus was forced to concede, to remain true to Ptolemy, even though the two marshals were at war. Her friendship with Egypt even now, when reference to it first appears, had already become a major consideration. Evidence of the Rhodian desire, in the year s after 312 B.C., to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, is not confined to the terms of this alliance.

After conclusion of the treaty Antigonus took ten ships from Rhodes, 'to help the Greeks', that is, for his campaign against the Macedonian possessions in Greece[57]. This transaction probably resulted from an obligation contained in the new treaty, but Diodorus is not specific. Certainly Rhodes had become more closely attached to Antigonus by 312 than she

had been in 315 B.C.; in the latter year Antigonus, from whatever cause, had had to find his own crews for the ships built by him in the Rhodian harbours. Now he was provided with ships -- certainly a far smaller number -- ready manned. The picture of Rhodes struggling to remain on ever better terms with two mortal enemies has its entertaining side.

The Peace concluded between the marshals in 311 B.C. contained several clauses which threatened to lead to war[58]. In particular it made no provision for the Greeks of the islands. All Greeks, it had been agreed, were to be free, and this subsumes the islanders individually. But no mention was made of the fate of Antigonus' Nesiotic League. This was an ambiguity which the enemies of Antigonus might well exploit. For the present Antigonus clearly remained de facto master of the Aegean.

Hostilities were re-opened by Ptolemy in 310 B.C., on the pretext that Antigonus was not fulfilling the terms of the Peace by permitting the Greeks to become independent, but that he had garrisoned some cities[59]. The opening moves of Ptolemy's campaign took him to Asia Minor, where he won over the cities of Cilicia Tracheia[60]; he then turned his attention to Caria, where he occupied Caunus[61], and thence to the Aegean, where he reduced Cyprus to the condition of a dependency[62], and occupied Cos[63]. Ptolemy's aim was undoubtedly to clear Antigonus out of South-Western Asia Minor, and to deprive him of allies in the eastern Aegean. The absence of any attempt to

subdue Rhodes, by arms or diplomacy, clearly reflects the agreement between himself and Rhodes, the Rhodian side of which was evident in the saving clause in the treaty between the city and Antigonus. Rhodian independence had been quaranteed by Ptolemy in exchange for the city's neutrality in the war against Antigonus. This was no great sacrifice to Ptolemy. The independence of Rhodes would not hinder, would indeed assist, the close and growing commercial connections between Alexandria and Rhodes[64]. War, on the other hand, would interrupt, or greatly reduce the volume of trade passing through Rhodes, on its way to and from the Egyptian markets. Success moreover could not be assured, and an openly hostile Rhodes could be a great danger to Egyptian power in the Aegean, as events fifty years later showed[65]. Ptolemy's abstention from action against Rhodes is another landmark in the friendship which in the political no less than the economic field, was of the greatest importance to both sides, and the eventual rupture of which was the main factor in altering the whole balance of power in the Aegean in the middle of the third century.

Antigonus took no action against Ptolemy's aggressions for a long time, and between 310 and 307 B.C. no open conflict took place between the two dynasts. Both were however strengthening their positions elsewhere. While Antigonus had covered his rear by a successful campaign against Seleucus in Mesopotamia[66], Ptolemy invaded the sphere

of Greek politics. In 308 B.C. he set out from Myndus, on the Carian coast, not far from Halicarnassus, crossed to Greece, landed at Corinth, and published a declaration of freedom[67], similar to the manifesto he had issued in 314 B.C.[68]. On his way to Greece, he traversed the Cyclades, and detached one of them, Andros, from the side of Antigonus[69]. This isolated action[70], against one of the northern islands of the Nesiotic League, combined with his unopposed voyage with a large fleet across the Aegean, encountered no response from Antigonus, whose inaction in the last decade of his life is evident here, as elsewhere. There is no reason to suppose that Ptolemy won over any other members of the League at this time[71]. It was an isolated, successful, action, but it was pointless unless Ptolemy had ultimate designs against the whole of Antigonus' Aegean position, in the west as well as in the east, where he had already secured Cyprus and Cos, and had in Rhodes a close friend[72].

Antigonus sent his son Demetrius to Athens in 307[73], an operation which secured him the adherence of Athens but could not alter the gravity of the threat from Ptolemy. Perhaps in realization of this Antigonus recalled Demetrius from Greece, to assist him in an assault on Cyprus[74].

Demetrius crossed to Caria at the close of 307 B.C., and requested the Rhodians to assist him in the war against Ptolemy. The Rhodians refused, as they were entitled to do by

the terms of the treaty of 312 B.C.[75]. The refusal was fatal for the future history of Rhodes. From this moment relations worsened, and led in a very short time to the siege of Rhodes by Demetrius. The Rhodian government, whether out of regard for the pledged word, or from a calculation of Antigonus' chances, refused to strike out the protective clause in favour of Ptolemy, and thereby automatically transferred themselves to the Egyptian camp. The considerations which led to this changed attitude were probably as much commercial as political.

The advantages of the Alexandrian trade route were by now so considerable that it was worth facing a frontal attack by Antigonus. Ptolemy for his part was doubtless still prepared to respect Rhodian sovereignty. It is further possible that the assistance rendered by Ptolemy to Rhodes at the time of the seige[76] may have resulted from undertakings given when Rhodes broke from Antigonus, but they may equally have been spontaneous. But whether or not a formal alliance was concluded between the Rhodians and Ptolemy, from now until the eve of the Chremonidean war, Egypt and Rhodes were closely associated in peace and war.

The immediate sequel to the Rhodian refusal to assist Demetrius boded ill; Demetrius inflicted a crushing naval defeat on the forces of Ptolemy off Cyprian Salamis, and largely destroyed the Egyptian navy[77]. Rhodes was thus left in a

perilous situation, estranged from Antigonus and unable to fall back on Egyptian support.

The isolation of Rhodes made her an obvious target. The Kings' land campaign against Egypt which ended in humiliating failure[78], made a quick success elsewhere desirable. Both general and particular grounds for complaint could be adduced against the city by Antigonus and his son. Apart from the refusal to assist in the Cypriot campaign against Ptolemy, Rhodes had aggravated Antigonus in another way. Antigonus, on receipt of the Rhodian refusal had ordered ships sailing from Rhodes to Egypt to be seized and their cargoes impounded[79]. When the Rhodians resisted the officer of Antigonus charged with the execution of this order, Antigonus threatened to lay siege to the city[80]. This probably occurred during the Cyprian campaign, or at least before the disaster of the Egyptian expedition, since the Rhodians adopted forthwith a conciliatory attitude[81]. They decreed honours to the King, and sent envoys to him, requesting him not to force them into war with Ptolemy, which would be a contravention of the terms of the alliance of 312 B.C. between Antigonus and themselves. Antigonus was not satisfied with this. He had decided on war[82]. Apparently early in 305 B.C. after the end of the Egyptian expedition, and when he had returned to Syria, he sent his son with a threatening force of men and siege equipment to Loryma[83], the Carian port opposite Rhodes, and itself part of

incorporated Rhodian territory[84].

Rhodian fear at this juncture was clearly considerable Envoys were sent across the straits to inform Demetrius that the city would assist Antigonus against Ptolemy, Demetrius, however, wished for more than assistance from the Rhodians; he was now determined to destroy the city's independence. He therefore demanded that an hundred of the leading citizens should be handed over as hostages , and that the Rhodians should accept his fleet in their harbours[85]. With this demand Demetrius abandoned any intention of negotiation. He perhaps realised that Rhodes was so far in the Egyptian camp by this time that it could only be won by violence. The Rhodians for their part determined on resistance to the demands, and began putting the city in a state of siege[86].

The Rhodian attitude to the demands of Antigonus clearly reflects the uncertainty of her position. The vacillations in her attitude, prompted by the fluctuating course of Antigonus' campaign, the desire to avoid an open breach, are readily understandable, as is her final decision to resist the exorbitant demands of Demetrius. An occupation of Egypt by Antigonus and Demetrius could now be excluded, and this was to Rhodes a fact of vital importance. Alexandria, unravaged by war, would continue to export the products of Egyptian industry, and the transport-trade of Rhodes would suffer no diminution. All that was necessary was to hold the fort until Ptolemy had

recovered from the blow he had received at Cyprian Salamis.

Antigonus' determination to force an issue with Rhodes was perhaps rash, so soon after his unsuccessful Egyptian venture, but in one way it was in his interests to fight now, rather than later. If he waited, Rhodes might help Ptolemy to rebuild his fleet, just as she had helped Antigonus in 315 B.C. and thus enable Ptolemy to take further his attempt to acquire the hegemony of the Aegean. The account of the siege of Rhodes in Diodorus is an excellent piece of descriptive writing which, if it were less technical, would be brilliant. The detailed course of the siege does not need repetition in a Rhodian history; its wealth of technical detail, some of it far from clear, is suited only to a handbook on poliorcetics. Nevertheless the narrative, when analysed, sheds light on many aspects of Rhodian life, especially on the social customs of the people, and on the organisation of the armed forces. The Rhodian preparations are described in detail[87]. Incidentally much valuable information is disclosed. Once the Rhodians had decided on war, they turned to the task of increasing the establishment of their armed forces. At this time the total number of citizens able to bear arms did not exceed six thousand men[88], and the need to supplement this meagre total was imperative. To some of the foreigners resident in the town the opportunity of bearing arms was offered[89]. A thousand of them proffered their services. Freedom at a price was offered to any slave who distinguished himself in the siege[90]; un-

fortunately no indication of the number of these slaves is given, and there is no basis on which it can be calculated.

Provision was also made for the next of kin of those who fell in defence of the city to be supported by χορηγίαι from the common treasury, and bereaved daughters were to be given dowries by the state[91]; measures which recall Athenian practice[92]. The rich, in accordance with the universal custom of Greek democracies, paid their liturgies[93]. The 'craftsmen' probably slaves[1a], were put to the manufacture of weapons[94]. All these provisions, admittedly the outcome of a critical situation, reflect the broad democratic tendencies of the Rhodian government, and thus provide a valuable picture of the progress of the city in the first generation of the Hellenistic age.

Demetrius conveyed his forces to the island in a large fleet of transports, accompanied by ships of the line[95]. His fleet totalled altogether nearly four-hundred sail, excluding the craft of his allies, the pirates, who joined him out of hostility to Rhodian efforts to curb their activities[96]. He landed at the northern tip of the island, probably in the spring of 305 B.C., and constructed a new harbour on the other side of the island to that on which lay the Rhodian harbours[97]. Traces of this Demetrian construction are perhaps observable[98].

Demetrius' first aim was to secure control of the Rhodian harbours which were protected by walls covering the harbour arms[99]. Once his ships could enter these it would be

possible for him to attack the city-walls with siege-engines which he had mounted on his heavy craft. Bad weather prevented Demetrius from forcing an entry into the Small Harbour, but a dark night enabled him to slip round to the south and enter the Great Harbour[100]. Here he siezed and fortified the end of the mole nearest the sea, disembarked troops, and raised a barricade. From this point he launched his attacks against the wall of the city, about one hundred and sixty yards distant. Next day he towed his siege-equipment into the harbour, and bombarded the city-walls. This first assault achieved little, and Demetrius withdrew his engines. The Rhodians, for their part, caused considerable damage to the retreating equipment and to some static machinery constructed by Demetrius in the harbour, by the use of fire-ships[101].

Demetrius continued his indecisive assaults on the city-wall from the seaward side for over a week, and this was followed by a period of bitter, but again indecisive, close fighting on and round the walls, where Demetrius had succeeded in forcing a breach at the weak point[102]. He lost several of his transports at this stage. They were forced to beach themselves, and were rendered unfit for refloating by the Rhodians, and subsequently fired by them[103]. This period, of uncertain length, ended with the retreat of Demetrius to his own harbour, while the Rhodians buried their dead, repaired their walls and dedicated the captured arms and the ships' stern-posts to the gods[104].

After a week of preparation Demetrius sailed out against the harbour again, his aim being to cut off Rhodian corn-supplies[105]. A considerable naval engagement followed, in which some of Demetrius' artillery was destroyed, and some Rhodian ships were sunk[106]. Subsequently the Rhodians sallied forth in some strength from the city-wall and attacked Demetrius' troops on the quay. This resulted in the surrender of some four hundred of the latter[107].

The chronology of this fighting is obviously exceedingly compressed. The correct duration has probably been given for individual engagements, but the length of periods of preparation and rest have mostly to be conjectured. Whether, however, Diodorus is correct in regarding the events described above in outline as having occupied most of a year, may be doubted. At all events, he now breaks off, and only returns to his theme with the beginning of the following year, 304/3 B.C., and this date at least seems approximately correct[108].

The operations of the second year[109] differ fundamentally from those of the first, in that Demetrius has given up the use of his naval arm, and concentrates on beleaguering the city by land. To this end he constructed a siege-weapon to which he gave the name Helepolis, the largest machine he had to date constructed[110]. This consisted of a large frame, some fifty cubits square, mounted on eight wheels. The main structure

revolved on pivots which enabled it to describe a circle without the base being moved. The machine was divided into nine stories, the platform of the lowest being forty-three square, the highest nine square[111]. Three of the four sides were covered with steel plates, and each side was furnished with windows agreeing in size with the size of missile to be discharged. There was an internal arrangement of ladders, two to each platform, both controlled by one-way traffic regulations.

After all this it is rather a disappointment to learn that the whole machine had to be shoved from behind, and that the man-power required for this operation was three thousand four hundred. The total complement required to man and feed the entire artillery equipment was close on thirty thousand[112].

This apparition not unnaturally caused the Rhodians some alarm. Their retort was to construct further internal walls, and to intensify the sea-war on Demetrius' supply-vessels. Demetrius, meanwhile, proceeded to undermine the walls and had nearly completed the task when information was brought to the Rhodians by a deserter from the ranks of the enemy. To combat this they constructed yet another wall, while Demetrius tried to bribe the commander of part of the defence[113].

The necessary preparations had now been made for the use of Helepolis. This, with all its subsidiary equipment, was now brought in position, while Demetrius' naval detachments, and infantry were placed so as to be able to assist and take advantage of the attack, which was now launched.

The weight behind this assault caused the walls to shake violently, and Demetrius succeeded, after an interval in which some Cnidian envoys attempted unsuccessfully to arbitrate, in destroying the strongest of the defence-towers on the northern perimeter of the wall[114].

Supplies run in from Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus did much at this stage to raise the spirits of the besieged. They determined on an assault on the enemy's siege equipment, and to this end mounted their own various artillery on the walls. At night a surprise artillery attack was launched on the enemy encampments outside the wall, and a notable success was achieved. Considerable casualties were inflicted on Demetrius' troops, and the Helepolis was so badly damaged by fire, that the equipment had to be withdrawn out of range of the enemy's artillery. Demetrius was compelled to halt his attack while he repaired the damage and buried the dead[115]. The Rhodians took advantage of the interval to construct yet a third wall, or crescent shape, which enveloped all the damaged portions of the earlier wall. They also carried out further successful naval operations, against supply ships in the neighbouring waters[116].

His repairs effected Demetrius returned to the assault with increased vigour. He demolished two curtains, and a continual fight ensued in this area, in which the Rhodians suffered numerous casualties including a general[117]. Rhodes

now received further supplies and reinforcements from Egypt, while at the same time envoys arrived from Athens and other Greek cities, attempting to put an end to the war. A truce was arranged, and parleys were held, but no agreement could be reached. The envoys sailed away with nothing accomplished and Demetrius applied himself to the final reduction of the city[118].

A night attack at the breached point of the wall effected entry, and ground inside the city was soon held, as far as the theatre[119]. A Rhodian counter-attack was launched but at first light Demetrius delivered supporting attacks from all sides. This was the supreme test of the siege, but the Rhodians managed to beat off the enemy, who was eventually forced to retreat outside the perimeter wall leaving many men behind in dead and captured[120].

Demetrius was preparing to renew his siege when a letter arrived from his father, who was disturbed at the damage his cause was suffering meanwhile in Mainland Greece, instructing him to sieze the most suitable occasion for making peace[121]. At the same time advice of a similar nature was transmitted to the Rhodians by Ptolemy. 'All turned towards peace'[122].

Peace was concluded between the two parties on the following terms:[123] Rhodes was to be autonomous and ungarrisoned, and to have its own revenue. The city was to assist Antigonus as an ally, except against Ptolemy, and to surrender

to Demetrius an hundred hostages of his own choosing, the magistrates being excluded.[124]

The peace concluded Demetrius sailed to Greece where a deteriorating situation demanded his attention[125]. The Rhodians turned to the tasks of reconstruction, and of expressing gratitude to their benefactors. The extent of material reconstruction now carried out cannot be assessed from archaeological remains[126], but the narrative of Diodorus gives an impression of considerable activity: 'They rebuilt the theatre and those parts of the walls which had fallen in, and the other parts (of the city) which had been destroyed, and made them far more beautiful than before'[127]. The absence of any reference to the colossus, which later tradition recorded to have been erected in thankfulness for the successful outcome of the siege, is rather remarkable since Diodorus is clearing using a Rhodian source[127a].

A spirit of confidence was justified by the successful resistance to the besieger, and the demonstrations of goodwill which this resistance had provoked, even if largely the result of selfish calculations, will undoubtedly have seemed a good omen for the city[128]. Rhodian gratitude for these benefactions was expressed in a striking way. Some time before the siege of the city the Rhodians had set up εἰκόνες , statues, of Antigonus and Demetrius. The occasion of this is not recorded, but it is natural to think of the time when the alliance was signed, in

312 B.C. and at all events before the Cyprian campaign of Demetrius, the point from which relations began to deteriorate. This shows that the Rhodians, like many other Greek communities which were more immediately under the domination of one of the Diadochi, paid very considerable respect to the persons of Antigonus and his son[129]. It does not, of course, imply that they worshipped them as gods. During the second year of the siege a motion was brought before the assembly to the effect that these statues should be taken down from their present position, since it was not desirable that those who were now besieging the city should receive the honours due to benefactors[130]. The behaviour of the Rhodian Demos on this occasion was strange: the motion was rejected and its proposers censured. The Rhodian source of Diodorus approved this unaccountable procedure on the grounds of policy. He says: 'For the magnanimity and steadfastness of judgement in democracy won praise from others, and change of heart from the besiegers: for they who had liberated the cities of Greece, which had shown no good will to their benefactors, were now clearly going to enslave that city which had been revealed through trial as the most constant in the expression of its thanks. In addition, as a guarantee against the fickleness of fortune, if the city should be captured there was left to them the remembrance of the friendship now preserved to speak in their favour. The Rhodians then acted prudently in this matter'. Whatever we may think of this

peculiar explanation, it is clear that the Rhodians regarded the honours which they paid, and were determined to continue to pay, to their foe, as quite compatible with the exercise of that freedom for the sake of which they were now enjoying a siege.

Given these preliminaries, it is not surprising to find that the Rhodians expressed their gratitude to Cassander and Lysimachus, both of whom had rendered assistance by sending convoys during the siege, in a similar way. Statues of them were established, of which we hear nothing more[131]. Gratitude to Ptolemy took a more extreme form. Envoys were sent to the shrine of Zeus Ammon at Siwa to ask whether the city should worship Ptolemy as a god. The oracle approved the suggestion, and the Rhodians built a sanctuary for the new god in the city, and enclosed its four sides with porticoes a stade in length[132]. With this must be combined the statement of Pausanias that the Rhodians were the first to call Ptolemy 'Soter', which most naturally refers to the same occasion[133]. Pausanias' statement is not wholly correct as it stands, since a text of earlier date from Egypt survives[134]. But it may well be that Rhodes was the first Greek community to establish the worship of Ptolemy Soter as an official cult. The worship of Ptolemy, and the existence of a separate priesthood of his cult, is testified in an inscription of the third century before Christ, in which, rather surprising-

ly, the cult-title Soter is omitted[135]. There is, therefore, no reason to doubt the essential truth of the statements both of Diodorus and Pausanias.

It is a fact of very great significance that one of the earliest known example of the worship of kings should come from the one indisputably and absolutely free community of the Hellenistic world, which had already at this early period established its independence outside the shifting framework of the realms of the Diadochi. Rhodian gratitude for the assistance given by Ptolemy may well have been extreme, and justified, but that is not in point here. The Rhodians, as they had made clear by the terms of their agreements with Ptolemy and Antigonus, had no intention of surrendering their complete freedom. It would therefore clearly be an error to suppose that this instance of ruler-worship proceeded from a sense, or acceptance, of subservience. It must be sought rather in that spiritual crisis, that lack of faith, which was characteristic of the later fourth century, and of which the most illuminating illustration is the Hymn of Hermocles in honour of Demetrius Poliorcetes[136], in which the absence of the unhearing Olympians is lamented, the real presence of the true god Demetrius, the Sun, welcomed. The Rhodian honours to Ptolemy, like the hymn of Hermocles, reflect the mood and tendencies of the age[137]. Later these tendencies were encouraged by the Hellenistic rulers, who naturally saw the advantages to

be derived from this spontaneous worship, but it would be unwise to interpret the earliest examples of this worship as of political rather than religious significance.

The siege of Rhodes had caused the eyes of the world to be centred on it. It is possible that news of this event even travelled to the west and was heard in Rome. Polybius, in describing the negotiations between Rhodes and Rome after the third Macedonian war, gives a general picture of earlier Rhodian policy. He says that for almost one hundred and forty years the Rhodians had shared with the Romans in the most glorious and fairest deeds, but that in accordance with their policy of neutrality, they had never made an alliance with Rome[138]. The negotiations which prompted this observation occurred in 167, so that the original connection must, according to the text, have been formed soon after 307 B.C. That there existed a continuous contact between Rome and Rhodes throughout the third century, to which no other reference has survived in our sources, is in the highest degree unlikely. Polybius' statement cannot then be accepted. It remains either to explain it, to reject it, or to emend it. The solution of Holleaux may well be right. He proposed to excise the words meaning 'an hundred', and leave 'and forty', thereby reducing the period of Rhodian and Rhodian co-operation to its certain limits[139]. It is possible however that the narrative of Polybius contains as it stands more than

a grain of truth. There are other indications that Rhodes established some sort of contact with Rome at the end of the fourth or early in the third century, and it may be conjectured that the occasion for the establishment of the contact was the successful defence of the city, which ended in 304/3, and thus almost one hundred and forty years before 167 B.C.[140]. At Rome at this time the leading families of the Ogulnii and the Fabii, the same families from which came the Roman representatives who visited Egypt some thirty years later, pursued a policy which aimed at the introduction into Rome of certain elements of Greek political and religious life[141]. It is possible that, in the furtherance of this end, contact was established with the one surviving democracy of the Greek world, which had just acquitted itself so valiantly.

This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the earliest appearance of a Roman citizen in the eastern Mediterranean occurs at Rhodes, and that the date cannot be very much later, if at all, than 300 B.C. A bilingual dedication to Athana Lindia records an offering made by a someone who is probably a member of the gens Olia[142], which at a later date appears frequently in the East. It would be exceedingly rash to build any general conclusions on relations between Rome and Rhodes on this single inscription, but its priority over other inscriptions recording Roman citizens in the Greek world cannot

be doubted[143].

The course of events in the period between the end of the siege of Rhodes and the battle of Ipsos, which saw the downfall of the empire of Antigonus, and his death, and was followed by yet another distribution of the empire, is without significance in the history of Rhodes, but the battle, which demonstrated that the career of Alexander could not be re-enacted, is a landmark in ancient history, and serves as a point from which to assess the rise of Rhodian fortunes in the preceding years. The particular interest of the years after the death of Alexander lies in the startling rise to pre-eminence of the city. There appears to be no natural continuity between the Rhodes of the fourth century and that of the late third, while, on the other hand, political history of Rhodes in the third century follows without interruption from circumstances first recognizable in the age of the Diadochi.

What turned Rhodes from a second-rate into a first-class power? It has already been observed that the cause of this change, whatever it was, must be sought in conditions which did not exist in the earlier period. Two factors appear predominant, one political, one primarily economic.

Politically the mainland of Greece lost in importance rapidly after the death of Alexander, and its subsequent inclusion in the Macedonian Kingdom. It is indeed true that

much of the propaganda of the Diadochi was directed to persuading the Greeks of the mainland that they would restore to them the liberties one of their number had taken from them, and that this fact alone testifies that the opinion of the Greek cities could not be ignored. But nevertheless the main events of the wars of these years occur in Asia Minor and the Aegean. Rhodes, midway between Asia and Egypt, thus stood at the centre of affairs, in a way that she had not done in the fourth century. The importance she might be expected to assume depended on the city's ability to retain its independence. This, in its turn, depended on two factors: the spirit of the people and its material resources. Direct ancient testimony as to the former is worth little, since it may be based on partial and unreliable evidence, or, as for instance in the Rhodian orations of Aelius Aristides, be purely rhetorical and historically worthless[144]. However, the apparent absence of internal political strife, stasis, in the whole of the Hellenistic age, in marked contrast with its continual occurrence in the fourth century, and its reappearance in an acute form, expressed in terms of loyalty to Rome or loyalty to Macedon, in the second century[145], indicates that a settled form of government, acceptable to all sections of the franchise, existed in the present period. And such a settled government is a necessary background of the measures taken at the time of the siege. It is this condition to which Strabo refers when he speaks of the city's Eunomia[146]. This doubtless contributed more than any other single item to the maintenance of the city's courage, and was the most important material factor governing

rise to greatness in these years.

Consideration of the city's resources at this time implies an examination of her relations with Ptolemaic Egypt, from commerce with which much of the prosperity of Rhodes at this time was derived. The political aspect of these relations has already been noticed[147]. That these political relations were largely the product of commercial community of interest might be assumed from the relative geographical positions of the two powers, even if precise information on this point did not exist.

The rise to commercial and political eminence of Rhodes coincides with the foundation and early years of Alexandria. To this foundation no less than to the transfer of the main centres of political activity, referred to above, must be attributed the sudden rise of Rhodes. This is attested by Diodorus, in his account of the political relations of the city which he prefixes to his description of the siege[148]. Some of this account is open to the charge of being an anachronistic picture, illustrating the fourth century from conditions which existed only in the third[149], but that part of it which refers to the city's relations with Egypt, though doubtless exaggerated in the light of subsequent events, certainly has considerable basis in fact.

Diodorus says that the Rhodians maintained friendly

relations with all the dynasts, but that they held Ptolemy in particularly friendly esteem. 'For it happened that the majority of their imports came from merchants who sailed to Egypt, and altogether the city was supplied from this kingdom[150]. There is no archaeological evidence from Rhodes to confirm this statement none of the characteristic products of the Egyptian markets have been found at Rhodes[151], but this is in no way exceptional. Practically no imported ceramic material of the Hellenistic period has been found at Rhodes, and therefore the absence of evidence is not significant. It is doubtless partly due to the fact that, apart from the necessities imported for local consumption, much of the Rhodian trade was of a transit nature[152].

On the other hand among the innumerable handles of amphorae of Rhodian manufacture found in Alexandria some have been found in the earliest graves of the Macedonian period[153]. This testifies, together with the evidence of Diodorus, to a reciprocal trade movement, of sufficient volume to explain the Rhodian desire, in signing her alliance with Antigonus, not to impair her relations with Egypt.

Throughout the years from the death of Eumenes to the battle of Ipsos Antigonus was politically by far the strongest force in Asia and the Eastern Aegean. The problem set Rhodian diplomacy was how to accommodate itself to two rivals, one of whom she could not afford to ignore, on political

grounds, and the other of whom was the main source from which the island drew her vital supplies. The siege of Rhodes, with its waste of men and material, is a clear indication that Rhodes did not solve this problem satisfactorily. In the next century there are signs of a more positive policy which proved more successful.

Chapter VI

From the battle of Ipsus to the break with Egypt (301-C.258 B.C.)

1. To Demetrius' loss of his fleet. (286 B.C.)

The years from the battle of Ipsus until the end of Demetrius' career form a clearly-defined interlude, after which events take a wholly different turn. This short period is one for which our information is extremely slight, slighter probably than for any other part of the Hellenistic age. Literary sources fail us almost completely. The Byzantine excerpts of Diodorus to which, on the eve of the battle of Ipsus, his continuous narrative gives place, apart from one or two isolated statements as to the movements of Demetrius, in all only a few lines, have nothing to say of this or any other period of Hellenistic history in the eastern Mediterranean; all the other examples of virtues and vices are drawn from the history of the western Greeks, and from that of the Roman Republic.

The place of Diodorus as the main source for these years is taken by Plutarch's Life of Demetrius and by the end of Book Fifteen, and the beginning of Book Sixteen, of Justin, the former of which certainly depends, though less directly than does Diodorus in his Books Eighteen to Twenty, on Hieronymus[1]. Justin's account in Book Sixteen, drawn from an unidentified source, is concerned only with events in Macedonia, of which he provides a most valuable, because unique, picture, but he does not touch on Aegean or Asian history.

This dearth of information in our literary sources is not compensated by an abundance of epigraphical evidence. The great wealth of Delian documents, particularly the accounts of the Hieropoioi, which constitute the most valuable single body of evidence for the history of the Aegean for the half-century after the death of Demetrius, are available for these years only in very small fragments which do not provide much historical material. In the place of this vast if controversial repository of information we have only a few isolated inscriptions, the context of which in almost every instance has to be guessed.

This absence of evidence from the outside world is reiterated in the continued absence of inscriptions dating from this period from Rhodes itself. Not only are there no inscriptions from Rhodos, but the three old cities have left equally little evidence relating to these years.

First in importance is the fact that, in the few documents that survive there is no trace of any contact between Rhodes and Ptolemaic Egypt, while a connection with Demetrius Poliorcetes is recognizable.

Secondly, and doubtless as a result of her contacts with Demetrius, Rhodes' attention seems in these years to have been directed less to the Aegean, than to the opposite coast of Asia Minor.

The most important indication of Rhodian activity which

survives from these years is contained in the Prienian inscription of the early second century B.C., which records the final Rhodian arbitration between the Prienians and the Samians in their interminable dispute regarding their common frontier[2]. In the account there given of earlier stages of the litigation[3], mention is made of a period of three years in which the democrats of Priene took refuge from the bloodthirsty tyrant Hieron[4], in the Carium, a fort on the north side of Mt.Mycale. During this interlude the Prienian democrats appealed to the Rhodians for help, in arms and money, and seem to have been granted the former, though probably not the latter[5]. The three years in question were certainly between 306 and 296 B.C., and were probably 300-297 B.C.[6]

Rhodes however was not the only power to which Priene appealed. She appealed to Ephesus[7], the city which remained loyal to Demetrius after Ipsus, and she appealed to Demetrius himself and to Lysimachus[8]. This suggests that immediately after Ipsus Rhodes was closely associated with Demetrius, and that the alliance signed after the siege had not become a dead letter. There are other signs of close contact during these years with Ephesus, and with Demetrius. The basis of these associations may well have been that after the siege of Rhodes, when Demetrius removed the Rhodian hostages, he deposited them in Ephesus, where they remained until released by Prepelaus the

year before the battle of Ipsus[9]. It may be conjectured that these Rhodians laid the foundation for profitable business and other contacts between the two communities, and established a modus vivendi with the old enemy of Rhodes.

Soon after Ipsus the Diadochi, their common purpose achieved, split into separate and potentially hostile camps. Ptolemy and Lysimachus formed an alliance, which led to the very surprising result that Seleucus, fearing isolation, turned to his previous enemy Demetrius and formed an alliance with him[10]. This cynical procedure was cemented by the marriage of Seleucus himself to Stratonice, the daughter of Demetrius by Phila (299 B.C.). The alliance, from which both parties might hope to gain much, was celebrated with considerable pomp at Rhosos, in northern Syria[11]. It lasted but a short time, but one document referring to joint action by the kings is of interest. An inscription found at Ephesus[12] records the gratitude of the Boule and Demos of the Ephesians to a certain Nicagoras of Rhodes, the son of Aristarchus, who was sent to the town as an emissary of the two kings, to assure it of their continued friendship for it[13]. No further details of this matter are recorded, or known from elsewhere, but it is surely more than fortuitous that the kings' envoy should be a Rhodian.

Another Ephesian inscription[14], probably of the early third century, records the decree by which proxenia was conferred on another Rhodian, Agathocles, son of Hegemon, who sold the Ephesians corn at a low rate when the market-price was

abnormally high[15].

The link Ephesus--Demetrius--Rhodes in these years appears fairly well established. The more precise aspects of this relationship are not clear. That Rhodes was an independent power follows from the treaty of 304, but the position of Ephesus is uncertain. Whether the city had an independent foreign policy, or was regarded as Demetrius' capital, is open to conjecture; the latter alternative is certainly possible[16].

Demetrius' control of the sea continued until his last expedition to Asia Minor in 287 B.C., and in this period Ptolemy Soter appears to have remained in the background[17]. There is throughout this period no trace of Rhodian contact with Egypt, and it may be conjectured that this silence corresponds to a real reduction of contacts between Rhodes and Egypt, in the political sphere. The battle of Ipsus had failed in one vital respect to be an absolute victory -- Demetrius had escaped and his fleet remained intact. Egypt therefore was unable, if it may be supposed that she desired, to assume control of, or hegemony in, the Aegean. Thus the natural development in relations between Rhodes and Egypt, which had begun long before the siege[18], could not be effected. Rhodes was unwilling to abandon her friendship with Demetrius, now that her interests were safeguarded by a treaty the terms of which, such was the fame of the struggle which preceded it, must have been known to the whole Greek world.

This situation was immediately altered by the defection of Demetrius' admiral Philocles to Egypt, taking with him Demetrius' entire fleet in 286 B.C.[19]. This gave Egypt unchallenged control of the sea until the Chremonidean war. (c.267-2 B.C.) Moreover this change in the balance of naval power had been effected without the loss of a single ship or a single sailor[20]. Ptolemy, who had never won a sea battle yet, became master, in fact or by implication, of the Aegean.

2. Rhodes and Egypt: the years of friendship (286-c.260).

The quarter of a century after the death of Demetrius the Besieger was critical for the development of Rhodes into a wholly independent power, without ties in the field of foreign affairs. At the beginning of this period she was content to subordinate her foreign policy to that of a power stronger than hereself; at the end of it she threw off her policy of expansion under the aegis of Egypt, and proceeded on her own way.

The absence of any continuous literary narrative for this period and the extremely uncertain interpretation to be accorded to much of the epigraphical evidence, together with the central position occupied by Rhodes in the history of the Mediterranean in these years means that the details of many events not necessarily directly connected with Rhodes must be taken into account.

The main body of evidence is to be found in the inventories and accounts of the Delian hieropoioi, the officials

responsible for the safe-keeping of offerings and dedications on the island[21]. From these documents we learn much of a positive nature regarding Rhodes' position in the Aegean, but unfortunately the lists are scanty and fragmentary before 279 B.C. and therefore cannot be used for instituting a comparison between her position now and that which she held in the years between the establishment of an independent Delos in 314 B.C., and 286 B.C., the year in which Demetrius lost his fleet. Thus though it can be shown on the evidence of the hieropoiic accounts alone that Rhodes occupied an important position in the Aegean in these years, absence of similar evidence prevents certainty about her position in the preceding years. Indications from other sources however, suggest that Rhodes, in the years after Ipsus, still retained a close contact with Demetrius, and that for this reason her attention was more directed towards the cities of Asia Minor.

It so happens that the beginning of the series of complete, or nearly complete hieropoiic accounts almost coincides with the assumption by Egypt of the suzerainty of the Aegean. However, such traditiones necessarily contain items repeated from earlier lists, and thus the earliest fairly complete list, that of 282 B.C.[22], contains entires of dedications made before that date. Unfortunately, in these particular dedications the date of original dedication is not recorded, and

so, in the absence of earlier lists, this date must remain uncertain.

The earliest reference to Rhodian theoroi at Delos occurs in the payments made by the hieropoioi in 282 B.C. for torches for the Χόροι held in honour of the Coan and Rhodian theoroi[23]. The inventories of 279 B.C. record a similar payment. The list of 279 B.C. contains in addition the record of several relevant dedications transmitted by the hieropoioi of 280 B.C. Three phialai deposited by Rhodian architheoroi are catalogued in the inventory of treasures in the Artemisium, while in the fore-chamber of the temple of Apollo there are eight dedications by Rhodians of which six are by official representatives of the State, architheoroi, while the remaining two are by private citizens. Alongside the Rhodian offerings occur others from Cos and Calymnos, closely linked with, though independent of, Egypt for many years past[24]. There are as yet very few dedications by other Greek communities, such as occur frequently at a later date[25], and it thus appears that these islands, under the protection of Egypt, were in specially close contact with Delos, though it would be rash to infer from this that, like the Cyclades, they were members of a league presided over by Egypt. There is no indication of the date of these dedications, as has already been noted, and there is no proof that they did not occur at different times in the fourth century Nevertheless it seems almost certain that they occurred in a direct sequence and in the years immediately after the control

of the Aegean, the Nesiotic league and Delos passed to Egypt. First, it is to be noted that all the offerings came in groups[26] whereas those belonging to earlier dates are scattered about the lists, apparently at random[27]. Secondly, the number of Rhodian public offerings in the temple of Apollo is six, and this corresponds exactly to annual dedications of a single phiale from 286/5 B.C., the year in which control of the Aegean passed to Egypt, to 280 B.C., the year of the inventory[28]. It is then a reasonable supposition that the Rhodian dedications recorded in the list of 279 B.C. were all made after the fall of Demetrius.

The accounts of the following years testify to the continued appearance of Rhodian envoys at Delos. Public dedications recorded from 276 B.C. and the following years, total five, most of which occur before 270 B.C.[29] Of the other Greek communities Cos alone approximates to Rhodes in her attendance at Delos, and, as before, the dedications of the two peoples are found side by side.

The impression of close contact between Rhodes and Delos is heightened by an examination of the Delian proxeny decrees. There survive sixteen Delian proxeny-decrees for Rhodians for the whole period from 314 B.C. to 166 B.C.[30]. This is a total far in excess of that achieved by any other state[31], which shows that the official relations existing

between the two states was supplemented by a genuine tradition of friendship. Most of these proxeny-decrees belong, however, to the period following the collapse of Ptolemaic naval power, when Rhodes hereself was preparing to assume in her turn the role of suzerain. In spite of this at least three of these decrees may be dated to the years between the establishment of Ptolemaic control and the Chremonidean war[32].

The close connection in these years between Rhodes and Delos, under Egyptian protection, certainly carries with it the implication of an increase of Rhodian interest in the affairs of the Aegean generally. To speak of a Rhodian Protectorate over the Aegean at this time is undoubtedly an anachronism, but it need not be doubted that the Rhodian hostility to piracy for the sake of which the island had endured the hostility of Antigonus Monophthalmos and Demetrius[33] had not diminished, and that effective action against that menace was encouraged by Egypt. It is perhaps to these years that early documentary evidence of this concern on the part of Rhodes is to be assigned. In the years after the death of Alexander the chief danger lay in the activities of 'Tyrrhenian' pirates, freebooters from the West and not necessarily of Etruscan origin[34]. At, or shortly after, the assumption of Aegean hegemony by Egypt, this scourge seems to have decreased markedly. For this apparent reduction in piratical activity

more than one explanation may be found. There is no doubt that the commercial policy of Ptolemaic Egypt necessarily implied a measure of responsibility for the safety of the seas, and evidence of this is to be found in the honour bestowed on the Ptolemaic naval officer, Zenon, by the grateful Athenians[35]. An important cause of the decline may also be the defeat inflicted on the Etruscans by the Romans at about this time[36]. At the Aegean end of the line there can be little doubt that the Ptolemaic policy was materially assisted by the collaboration of Rhodes, evidence of whose participation exists in more than one document of the period.

The most interesting testimony to Rhodian activity against pirates in the early third century is in an inscription which can only be dated approximately, on the letter forms, to the first half of the third century[37]. This document records a decree of the Rhodian people honouring the officers and men of various naval and land units, who took part in an expedition against the island of Aigila, the modern Cerigotto, off the southern tip of Peloponnese[38]. The nature of this expedition is not recorded, and the presence of military as well as naval personnel might suggest a normal 'combined operation', and not a naval expedition against pirates which would normally be confined to sea[39]. It is however, difficult to conceive of a situation in which Rhodes would need or desire to invade this remote appendix to Laconia, and the most probable explanation is that the island was being used as base by pirates[40]. If this explanation is correct, it is striking that Rhodes' interest in the safety of the seas took her so far beyond her own waters.

This impression of considerable activity is confirmed by another, scarcely less enigmatical, inscription[41], commemmorating the death of three brothers, sons of a certain Timocrates of Casara, in the Rhodian Peraea[42]. One of the three brothers is among those honoured in the inscription concerning the expedition to Aigila, which probably falls considerably before the sepulchral inscription[43]. The fragmentary condition of the stone does not permit any certainty of the exact circumstances in which the first of the brothers died, but the second is stated to have died in action against the 'Tyrrhanoi' , and the third against 'pirates'. Of course the mention of 'Tyrrhanoi' does not mean that the engagement took place in the western mediterranean, into which there is nothing to suggest that Rhodian naval craft penetrated in the Hellenistic age, but the mention of these western pirates on the one hand, and the Rhodian expedition on the other create a picture of considerable Rhodian activity, doubtless, as has already been suggested, under the general supervision of Egypt, whose navy was stronger and whose commercial interests were wider than those of any other power in the second quarter of the third century[44].

The further effect of this subordination to Egyptian policy may be seen in Asia Minor and in Greece proper. It has been noted that in the years after the battle of Ipsus, when Demetrius was still master at sea and in parts of the Ionian and Carian coast, there are signs of Rhodian interests in that

quarter, which are very probably to be connected with the city's relations with Demetrius[45]. In the period now under consideration there are no indications of any further contacts, political or private, between Rhodes and the Greek cities of this region, while on the other hand for the first time there is evidence of Rhodian contacts with the Greek cities of Lycia. This is of interest since Lycia had probably been Ptolemaic since the reign of Ptolemy Soter[46], and it is therefore possible that Rhodian interests in the region were the result of, or were encouraged by Ptolemaic policy. [illegible]

An decree of the eleventh year of Philadelphus (275/4 B.C.)[47], issued by the Demos of the city of Lissa, in western Lycia, records honours, including that of citizenship, bestowed on a Rhodian, Hagepolis, the son of Lampon, and his descendants. The reasons for these marks of gratitude are left annoyingly and characteristically vague: reference is made to his services to the community at large and to particular individuals, in stereotyped phraseology, but what they were cannot be determined.

The same years show a marked interest in the affairs of the mainland. This is a trait in Rhodian policy which does not appear to have manifested itself again until the time of the first Macedonian war. Expression of it is found in an 'Argive decree recording various stages of a financial trans-

action between Argos and Rhodes[48]. At some previous stage the Rhodians,'kinsmen' of the Argives, had lent the Argives one hundred talents free of interest, for the repair of the city-walls and 'for the Horse'. There had been considerable delay in repayment and the Rhodians had sent an embassy to Argos, emphasising the city's past and future regard for Argos. The Argives consequently decreed that the city of the Rhodians should be crowned by the city of the Argives with a gold crown worth an hundred gold pieces (that is, staters). Measures are then recorded by which knowledge of the decree shall be transmitted to the Rhodians on the occasion of their Dionysia.

No date is given in the document for any stage in this transaction, and any conclusions based on letter forms alone would allow a very considerable margin, even if a photograph of the stone had ever been published. As it is it can only be inferred from the fact that the editor saw no difficulty in discussing the possibility that the decree might belong either to the first quarter or the second half of the third century, that the lettering is of the normal Hellenistic type, and that any date between the late fourth and mid-second centuries is possible. A lowest possible date may be conjectured. After 228 B.C., when Argos joined the Achaean League, decrees of the city like those of other cities in the League, might be supposed to have included the name of the Achaean strategos in

the prescript, and the absence of this official from the document perhaps permits the supposition that the final stage of the transaction and the document itself are earlier than 228 B.C.[49].

An upper limit is less easily found, in view of the general uncertainty regarding chronology for the middle of the century, and especially because of the difficulty of establishing a relative chronology between events in the Aegean and those on the mainland. There is moreover the particular uncertainty regarding the course of Argive history during the period of the tyranny, before the city's entry into the Achaean League[50]. The assumption of the first editor that it is necessary to find a time when Rhodes and Argos were in the same political camp, since otherwise the Argives would not have asked Rhodes for assistance needs qualification[51]. Even if such an occasion could be established with certainty, it would not exclude other occasions, since in view of the traditional ties which bound Rhodes to the mother city of the Argolid, and to which reference is made in this inscription[52], ties of friendship may well have continued even when the two cities were formally in different alignments. A real clash of interests between the two cities, Rhodes with her interests and her future in the Aegean, and the declining provincial city of Argos, can never have been a serious consideration. Therefore, even if it can be established that at

a certain period Rhodes and Argos were both under the protection of the same power, this does not enable us to exclude the possibility of other dates.

However, though Argos might have made such an appeal to Rhodes at any time, it is doubtful if Rhodes would have responded to it after the middle of the third century when she was so fully occupied in the Aegean. There is no trace of Rhodes' influence elsewhere on the mainland, after the middle of the century, except for the presence of Rhodian theoroi at Delphi[53], and, much later, of Rhodian arbitrators at the same place[54]. On the other hand, the fact that Egypt was active in the Peloponnese may have modified Rhodes' attitude, even though she did not open the negotiations which led to the loan[55]. This view is perhaps supported by the fact that Pyrrhus of Epirus, Ptolemy's close friend in Greece, made an offering to the temple of Athana Lindia in these years[56]. Here again, no direct political relations between Rhodes and Epirus are likely. Pyrrhus' gesture to this Aegean shrine -- it is to be noted that there are no traces of dedications by Pyrrhus at Delos, where in the fourth and third centuries, almost all of the leaders of the political life of the Greek mainland made offerings -- is probably to be explained as a gesture made to a community closely attached to Egypt.

Other contacts of Rhodes with the mainland are found in these years. Several Rhodians are found at Delphi, both

before and after it passed under Aetolian control. The uncertainty of Delphian chronology in the early third century does not permit the determination of the exact date, but several pieces of evidence, mostly in the form of Delphian proxeny-decrees for Rhodian citizens probably belong to the early third century[57]. Relations between Rhodes and Aetolia were not indeed confined to Delphi in these years: honours were also paid to three Rhodians at Thermon, in 262 B.C.[58], and in about the middle of the century we find an Aetolian named as proxenos at Rhodes[59]. This, like the decrees from Thermon, implies earlier contacts. It will be recalled that Aetolia was according to the most reliable account, the mediating power between Rhodes and Demetrius in the negotiations which preceded the end of the siege of Rhodes in 304 B.C.[60]

This activity of Rhodes, or Rhodians, in Delphi and Aetolia, is noteworthy because here it cannot be claimed that, as in the Peloponnese, Rhodes was establishing areas of interest for herself under the aegis of Ptolemaic Egypt, since there is no sure sign of Ptolemaic interest at Delphi, or in Aetolian territory, before the reign of Euergetes the First[61]. These Rhodian contacts moreover continue through the period when the city's relations with Egypt were hostile[62].

The years in which Rhodes lived in close friendship with Egypt were clearly years of material progress, of prosperity, and of increased political influence, notably in the Aegean, where within a few years she was to hold the leading position, but also in the Greek Mainland. The full

measure of that progress can only be taken when subsequent events are considered.

The period from about 265 B.C. until the end of the reign of Philadelphus in 247/6 B.C. saw the great struggles for power between the leading powers of the day, the Macedonian kingdom, the Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt, the Seleucid dynasty of Asia, and the republic of Rhodes. It also saw the final reduction of Athens to the status of a provincial community, and the rise of Rhodes to a position of no less symbolic eminence. In fact at this stage the history of Rhodes bears a striking resemblance to that of Athens: just as the latter reached full maturity through the ordeal of the Persian invasions in the fifth century, so Rhodes won her spurs when in the waters of Ephesus harbour she defeated the Egyptian fleet. Further west, the contemporary defeat of Carthage foreshadows a later stage in events.

In the Aegean the part played by Rhodes is central, and the whole history of these years, or more precisely, all of it that can be recovered, needs to be considered, for a proper understanding of Rhodian policy.

Unfortunately our sources for this period are very inadequate, and suffer from a peculiar defect. Though the number of documents which may refer to historical events, is quite considerable, there are very few which can be proved to do so. The result is that this period, more than any other of the Hellenistic age, has remained a battle-ground of specialists

arguing over the relevance of this or that document.

The literary evidence for these years is so slight as be almost an embarrassment. It consists of a few continuous sections of Pausanias, of Justin's epitome of Trogus, and of the relevant prologue of Trogus himself. Apart from this, there are only a few odd sentences of Plutarch, of Diogenes Laertius of Polyaenus, of Lucius Ampelius, and the author of the Letter of Aristeas[63]. Most of these passages have been suspected of corruption by some scholars, and one or two of them are manifestly corrupt. Others may contain errors of the author or of his source. There are also some obvious contradictions between some of these passages.

So much for the scanty direct evidence. The indirect evidence, of disputable relevance, is from inscriptions. Several documents contain references to events which, in the opinion of some scholars, could only have happened if certain of the occurrences mentioned in the literary evidence had already occurred, or had not occurred. These inscriptions are largely concerned with the status and allegiance of the cities of Ionia and Caria, notably Ephesus and Miletus. Another very important type of inscription is that of the Delian hieropoiic accounts, already familiar from the use made of them in the preceding chapter. In this period they supply new evidence, in connection with the so-called Vase-Festivals at Delos. The precise significance of the evidence is much debated. The evidence from papyri is slight and straightforward.

For the first time Rhodian inscriptions play some

part in the creation of the general picture of events, and of Rhodian history in particular.

It follows from the nature of the evidence as here given that the evidence is largely interdependent. The Rhodian evidence cannot be separated from the Milesian, the Athenian from the Delian, and all must be interpreted in the light of texts of which the true reading can on occasions not even be conjectured.

The logical starting point for a discussion of the great wars of the middle of the century is the first of the wars between Egypt and the Seleucid kingdom which occurred shortly after the accession of Philadelphus and Antiochus Soter, and which set the pattern for the wars of the next thirty years, except the Chremonidean war, which proceeded from different causes.

The war which broke out between the newly enthroned kings of Egypt and Asia is commonly known as the First Syrian war, though in antiquity its course was not sufficiently clearly marked for it to receive the special distinction of a name. Its cause was inevitable hostility between two powers which had a common frontier in Northern Syria, and adjacent seaboards at various parts of Asia Minor. The same cause lay behind each of the subsequent outbreaks of war, though on each occasion some particular cause is also to be found.

The first Syrian war, which falls into two distinct parts, separated by a peace of brief duration, lasted from 280-

279 B.C., and from 276 to 273 or 272 B.C.[64]. The result of this period of eight years' fighting was that Egypt won a considerable portion of the coast of Asia Minor, and thereby laid the seed of future wars[65]. There is no indication that Rhodes took any part in this war. Her relations with Ptolemy were good, her relations with the Seleucid are unknown at this period but are not likely to have forced her to take the field. Rhodes would undoutbedly have been a most suitable base for operations against Seleucid territory, but there is no suggestion, at this or any other time, that the island was so used. The main Ptolemaic naval concentrations in the Aegean were probably already kept at Samos[66]. That this failure, if failure it was, to use Rhodes is to be attributed to a desire not to prejudice the neutrality of Rhodes in the eyes of the world may be doubted. Rhodes had wholly thrown in her lot with Eygpt, and in these years was not pursuing the policy of neutrality which so much commended itself to later writers on Hellenistic Rhodes.

The conclusion of the Syrian war enabled Ptolemy to turn to Greece proper, with the aim of reducing Macedonian power outside the boundaries of Macedonia. Egypt had indeed always held a card in reserve for use in Greece, in the person of Pyrrhus who had old attachments cemented by marriage, to the house of Ptolemy[67]. But in the year before the first Syrian war ended Pyrrhus met his end in an engagement in Argos[68]. Ptolemy repaired the breach to his continental system of alliances by allying himself with Sparta and Athens. At

the same time, as has already been suggested, Rhodes may have played her part in the construction of an Egyptian zone of influence by turning a ready ear to the request of Argos for financial aid.

Sparta, in these years, was enjoying one of those bursts of activity not uncommon during her decline, [illegible] Her King, Areus, saw beyond the boundaries of Laconia, and perhaps had visions of a restored Peloponnesian League. By 267 B.C. he had formed an alliance with Athens, and, more ominously, with Eygpt[69].

This activity of Philadelphus in Greece, and the ready support he found there and particularly in Peloponnese, threatened the careful system of control which Antigonus Gonatas had erected there with the help of local tyrants, either installed by, or sympathetic to, him[70]. At the same time the Egyptian alliance with Athens threatened the centre of Macedonian power in Greece, and the cultural capital of Antigonus' kingdom[71].

The first overt move came from the anti-Macedonian party now in power in Athens. The leading spirit of the philo-Egyptian party, Chremonides, secured in autumn 267 B.C.[72], the passage of a decree which provided for the inscription of the membership of the new alliance and a laudatory account of the policy and intentions of Ptolemy, but which was so positively hostile to Macedon as to make an invasion of Attica by

Macedonian forces inevitable. This occurred in the spring of the following year[73]. The same season saw the arrival of the Egyptian fleet, and the advance of the Egyptian allies from Peloponnese[74].

The attitude of Rhodes to this dangerous enterprise of Philadelphus is not known. There is no indication that she rendered any help, but the whole tradition of the Chremonidean War is so slight that nothing can be inferred from the silence[75].

After the appearance of Patroclus and the Egyptian fleet in the opening campaign of the war, there is no further sign of the fleet. Patroclus probably took it back to Egypt in the winter of 266 B.C., and it does not appear to have taken any further part in the war[76]. Gonatas thus completed the reduction of Athens unmolested[77].

The Chremonidean War ended in 261 B.C., a year in which a Delian choregic inscription records 'Peace and Prosperity'[78]. The siege of Athens had already been successfully accomplished two years before. The defeat of the philo-Egyptian element in Athens, and elsewhere in Greece, must have shaken considerably the authority of Philadelphus not only over communities of which he was suzerain, such as the Nesiotic League, which he had inherited from Demetrius the Besieger, but also over friendly powers, including Rhodes. The war had revealed the inability of Philadelphus to implement his large designs in Greece, and had indicated a seeming weakness at sea, though the Egyptian fleet had not actually been defeated.

It is clear, however, that, if it was now that Rhodes broke away from Egypt, it was not because the city disapproved of the intentions of Philadelphus. His intention, as expressed in the Decree of Chremonides, was to liberate the oppressed peoples of Greece[79], and Rhodes who apparently had had no contact with Macedon had no reason to disbelieve the statement or to disapprove of it. Ptolemy was to all appearances fighting the same battle in Greece that Rhodes fought later in the Aegean If therefore Rhodes now deserted Ptolemy it was because she calculated with characteristic shrewdness, that there was a real weakness in the Ptolemaic Empire, and that now was the moment to desert.

Such a policy does indeed little credit to the Rhodian sense of loyalty, but it is characteristic of the republic. Perhaps the sudden transfer to the Egyptian camp in the wake of Philocles, in 286 B.C., should not be condemned out of hand, since the city owed much to the help of Soter, but the fidelity exhibited to the cause of Demetrius in the preceding years can only be explained as arising from a belief in his ultimate victory. Similarly, when Rome entered the field of Hellenistic politics, Rhodes was among the forefront of those who opposed her interference in the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean[80]; but in little more than five years she found occasion to join the Roman cause.

Whether, in fact, the great break from the policy which had been so successful for a quarter of a century occurred now or, a year or two later, after the battle of Cos,

when the naval weakness of Egypt could no longer be doubted, cannot, as has already been observed, be determined.

The battle of Cos was fought in the waters of the eastern Aegean and it was a victory for the Macedonian fleet. Its most probable date is perhaps 262 B.C.[81], that is to say, the year between the fall of Athens and the final signature of peace between Macedonia and the allies opposed to her, the year of 'regency' as it has been called.[82] It may be seen as an attempt by Antigonus to carry the war into the enemy's camp, with the aim either of annihilating the enemy's fleet or of acquiring some of his Asiatic possessions. The latter aim seems less probable since any such action would imply an eventual hostility to Antiochus Soter, the reigning Seleucid, with whom on the whole Gonatas seems to have preserved a steady friendship[83].

This battle, fought in the waters near Cos, was perhaps the efficient demonstration to the Rhodians that Antigonus may have hoped it would be. From this moment may be dated the secession of Rhodes from the Egyptian camp.

The evidence for this secession must now be considered.

3. Rhodes and Egypt: years of hostility: c.258-245 B.C.

Polyaenus records a battle fought in Ephesus harbour between the Rhodian and Egyptian fleets[84]. He recounts a defeat of the Egyptian navy which was commanded by Chremonides, but since he is concerned only with the strategem by means of which the victory was won, he gives no information about the size of

the fleets engaged.

The Lindian Chronicle records a dedication by the Rhodian People of a shield to the tutelary deity of Lindos, as the result of an oracle which, when consulted, foretold that the war between Rhodes and Ptolemy Philadelphus would end if the shield were dedicated[85]. The authority for this statement is given as the Chronike Syntaxis of Timocritus, an Hellenistic writer on Rhodian antiquities known only from the Chronicle[86].

A Rhodian inscription of the late third century B.C. records the names of some Rhodian priests. Among these are the priests of the cult of the Ptolemies. A priest of Ptolemy Soter and another of Ptolemy Euergetes are recorded. There is no priest of Ptolemy Philadelphus[87].

Other, less direct, evidence also exists and will be discussed in its place.

The date for the battle of Ephesus is roughly fixed by the reference in the tale of Polyaenus to the Ptolemaic admiral Chremonides. This notable figure was expelled from Athens along with other nationalist leaders at the time of Antigonus' reorganisation of the town, after the reduction of the city in 263/2 B.C.[88], referred to above. A lower limit can be fixed only by the death of Philadelphus[89], if it be supposed that the war referred to in the Lindian Chronicle is to be identified with that in which the battle of Ephesus was fought. In view of the clear chronological link between the two notices -- in the one the Egyptian fleet is led by Chremonides whose active career most naturally falls into the

reign of Philadelphus, in the other Philadelphus is stated to be the enemy -- there is little difficulty in accepting the identity, and the battle of Ephesus can therefore be placed with considerable, though not absolute, certainty in the period between 262 and 247/6 B.C.[90]

Within these limits a date nearer the upper than the lower limit is desirable, if the reconstruction suggested above, of Rhodian re-actions to the battle of Cos be accepted[91]. Yet more precision can probably be achieved. The summary of the acta of the Delian year 255 B.C. contains, like that of 261 B.C. in addition to the customary reference to Health and Plenty, a reference to Peace[92]. It follows from the exceptional nature of this addition that the years 261 B.C. to 255 B.C. were war years. This period agrees with the approximate date fixed on other grounds for the resumption of hostilities between the Seleucid King, Antiochus Theos, who had succeeded his father in 262/1 B.C. and Philadelphus. These hostilities are commonly referred to as the Second Syrian War.

Little is known of this war, [redacted] It appears that it started in the form of a revolt of one of the Ptolemaic governors in Asia Minor, Ptolemaeus the governor of Ephesus[93]. Antiochus took advantage of the confusion caused by this event to attack the Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor, and to drive Ptolemy from all his Asiatic holdings except Lycia and Caria[94]. The possibility that Rhodes co-operated with

Antiochus in these events, and that the sea-battle between Rhodes and the Egyptian fleet off Ephesus occurred on this occasion is clearly considerable. It appears from Polyaenus that the shore of Ephesus harbour was friendly to Rhodes, that is, that Antiochus was already in possession of Ephesus, that the Egyptian fleet had arrived to attack the city from the sea, and that it was caught by the Rhodian fleet commanded by Agathostratus, and defeated[95].

The interpretation which sees in the battle of Ephesus one aspect of co-operation between Rhodes and Antiochus is borne out by a passage of Frontinus which records an attack by Antiochus on Ephesus[96]. Frontinus says that Antiochus captured Ephesus by a strategem which he effected with the help of Rhodian troops. Which Antiochus is in question is not stated. Nor is it clear whether the troops are mercenaries or allied troops, but the fact that there is no instance from the Hellenistic age of Rhodians serving as a city-group as mercenaries[97] suggests very strongly that they are allied troops in Ephesus in accordance with a treaty of alliance.

In fact there can be little doubt that the Antiochus in question is Antiochus Theos, and it thus becomes almost certain that Rhodes was in practical terms an ally of the Seleucid House during the Second Syrian war, as she certainly was not long after, and that the battle of Ephesus was the fruit of that collaboration[98].

The evidence of the Lindian Chronicle indicates that the early stages of the war against Philadelphus were adverse to Rhodes[99].

Otherwise the advice of the oracle would probably not have been sought. It is therefore conceivable that the battle was not fought until the latter part of the war[100].

The Rhodian action in opposing Ptolemy pre-supposes the Macedonian victory over Egypt at Cos[101]. Rhodes thus turned no less in the direction of Macedonia than towards the Seleucid Kingdom. There is very little evidence for Macedonian policy in the Aegean after the Chremonidean War, but the friendship with the Seleucids was a constant factor of these years, whether or not we suppose that Antiochus gonus intervened actively on the side of Antiochus in the Second Syrian war[102]. It follows from this grouping of forces that Rhodes, by joining Antiochus and Antigonus, had left Egypt isolated.

Egypt however had a great navy, and perhaps could afford to lose Rhodes, while there are no indications that either Macedon or the Seleucid kingdom could boast a permanently equipped fleet[103]. It is therefore not very surprising to find that Egyptian sea-power was not finally broken, and that a decade or so later issue was again joined at sea between Macedon and Egypt. For Rhodes, however, the break with Egypt was complete. The name of Philadelphus was damned, and the priesthood of his cult was disestablished, and not re-established even after normal, though not intimate, relations between the two powers were reassumed towards the end of the reign of Euergetes, perhaps forty or so years after the battle of Ephesus, perhaps

rather less[104]. The termination of the cult of Philadelphus probably does not indicate the same degree of abomination that is implied in the Imperial damnatio memoriae but that it does represent a dramatic and irrevocable change of policy is suggested by the conduct of the Athenians in 200 B.C. Impelled by gratitude for Attalus I of Pergamum, on the eve of the second Macedonian war, they discontinued the tribes called after Demetrius the Beseiger and Antigonus the One-Eyed, which carried implications of subservience to Macedon and instituted the tribe of Attalis[105].

That Rhodes had no inclination to admit her debt to either Macedon or Antiochus may be gauged from the fact that no cult of either of Antiochus or Antigonus or their successors ever existed at Rhodes[106]. From now on Rhodes was not content to be autonomous under the patronage or shadow of a greater power; she pursued a wholly independent policy, and if she did form alliances with other powers they were to serve her own aim, which gradually took a highly individual trend, namely that of being protecting power to the minor Aegean communities.

It must not be assumed that this change of policy affected the mercantile connections between Egypt and Rhodes. In this respect both powers needed each other badly. Egypt needed Rhodes as a transit centre, and port of call, all the more since she had lost many of her Levant ports in the Second Syrian war[107], and still needed to maintain contact with her

possessions in Caria and Lycia. Rhodes, for her part, was dependent for much of her revenues on customs-dues she exacted from shipping in transit, and nothing could alter the fact that the bulk of that trade passed to and fro between Alexandria and the Mediterranean[108]. Reminders of the continuity of Rhodian mercantile relations with Egypt regardless of changes in the political field are to be found in two papyri of which one certainly, and both probably belong to a date after the Syrian War[109]. The commonly reproduced picture of Rhodian policy being entirely subordinate to her mercantile interests will not stand examination.

It is now necessary to retrace our steps a little, to see how the relations of Egypt with the main instrument of her authority in the Aegean, the Nesiotic League, had developed, and to what extent she lost control of that League as a result of the two naval defeats inflicted on her in close succession, and finally what happened to that League after it passed out of Egyptian control.

It has been noted, in discussing the evidence for the origin of the Nesiotic League, that very little information survives from its early days[110]. A further restriction must be noted. Our evidence for the composition and organisation of the League in the period when Rhodes exercised suzerainty over it is fairly adequate[111]. It must not be assumed however that communities which were members of the League under Rhodian control, between 200 and 166 B.C. were members of it earlier,

though many of them doubtless were. The fact that Rhodes transferred the centre of the League from Delos to Tenos is itself an indication of the possible changes that may have been made in other directions. It is essential, then, that the evidence for the middle of the third century be taken from contemporary sources.

The earliest document of the period after the League had passed from the hands of Demetrius to those of Ptolemy Soter belongs to a time soon after the death of the latter. It is a decree[112] calling on the League to send representatives to the forthcoming isolympic festival of Ptolemy Soter at Alexandria, shortly after 281 B.C. It refers to a meeting of the Synedroi of the League, to be called to discuss the question at Samos[113]. This does not necessarily mean that Samos was a member of the League, and in fact the history of the island throughout the third century shows that it was part of the Ptolemaic Empire, like Thera, or Itanos in Crete, and not a member of the Nesiotic League[114]. Several other islands may be regarded with varying degrees of certainty as having been members of the Nesiotic League in the reign of Philadelphus. Few of the inscriptions in which reference to the particular island's relations with Egypt are described can be dated with complete precision, but they all belong to the reign of Philadelphus, and most to the early part of it. The decree already referred to as being the earliest League document records at the end the names of three theoroi, whose names

have disappeared, but whose 'city ehtnics' survive: they are Κύθνιος, Νάξιος, Ἄνδριος [115]. These three islands were, then, members of the League at the beginning of the reign of Philadelphus. There is also satisfactory evidence that Ios, Ceos, Mykonos, Naxos, Siphnos and Amorgos and probably Heraclea and Paros all were members of the League years before the Chremonidean War[116].

There is no evidence that any other islands were members of the Ptolemaic League of the Islanders in the years before the great naval defeats of Cos and Ephesus. There is equally no evidence for any contact of any of these islands other than Delos with Egypt after the middle of the third century. Control of the garrisoned and subject islands, Thera Samos and Astypalaea, and the east Cretan city of Itanus and perhaps the city of Koresia, renamed Arsinoe, on Ceos, continues down into the second century[117]. This is not in itself conclusive evidence that the League of the islanders passed out of the control of Philadelphus at almost precisely the date which, it has been suggested, witnessed the great sea-battles of Cos and Ephesus, but it is strong negative evidence.

Positive evidence that Ptolemy lost control of the League of the Islanders and that he had no voice in decisions taken at Delos, and that decisions taken there were in fact prompted by a feeling of hostility to the Egyptian government,

that Delos, that is to say, far from being neutral, as has been maintained, became, voluntarily or by compulsion, the centre of an anti-Ptolemaic policy, is not lacking[118]. Two pieces of evidence demonstrate this [illegible]. First is the base of a statue erected by the League of the Islanders, and set up at Delos. It bears the inscription: 'The League of the Nesiotes (dedicate the statue of) Agathostratos, the son of Polyaratus, Rhodian, to all the Gods. Phyles of Halicarnassus made (it)[119].' It needs no great hardihood to identify the Agathostratus here honoured with the Rhodian admiral who defeated the Egyptian fleet in Ephesus harbour. The possibility that he might be a different person is removed by another inscription, this time from Rhodes, which refers to Agathostratus the son of Polyaratus as a naval officer[120]. The inscription refers to an earlier stage of his career than the battle of Ephesus, since he is only a trierarch, but it shows him already embarked on a naval career[121]. There can then be little doubt that the League of the Islanders, whether prompted by prudence or a genuine pleasure at release from a suzerainty which had become irksome, welcomed the victor over the Egyptian fleet on the morrow of the battle of Ephesus. This is a very significant fact; it shows beyond doubt that the effect of this battle was to alienate the loyalty of the League.

That measures against Egypt did not stop at this can be seen from the fact that three dedications bearing testimony to the loyalty of the Nesiotes to the House of Ptolemy -- the base of a statue of Philadelphus erected by them[122], the base

of another statue of his Nesiarch, or Viceroy of the Cyclades, Bacchon[123], and a third in honour of his nauarch, Callicrates, whose period of office probably ended in 266 B.C.[124]. -- were carefully erased at a date which cannot be precisely determined, and were re-engraved at a considerably later date[125].

This evidence, combined with the epigraphical material already noted, appears to show that after the battle of Ephesus, if not after that of Cos, the hegemony of the Aegean communities passed out of the control of Egypt. The dedication of the League in honour of Agathostratus shows that the League continued to exist for some time, perhaps only a very short time, after the battle of Ephesus. The questions remains: did the league continue to function in the future, and if so under whose protection? And again, if there is no trace of the League, what was the general condition of the Aegean in these years?

Before turning to discuss this aspect of Aegean history, a brief summary of the preceding discussion may be given.

After the apparently close contact between Rhodes and Egypt, reflected most clearly in the Delian hieropoiic records, the relationship between the two powers becomes uncertain in the decade before the Chremonidean War. Whether Rhodian policy was profoundly altered as a result of that war, is uncertain, but the general tenour of Ptolemaic propaganda on the eve of the war makes it unlikely. A more probable cause of the break, which itself is the best authenticated event in Rhodian history

in the first seventy-five years of the third century, lies in the realization on the part of Rhodes that the issue of the Chremonidean War showed that the future in the Aegean did not lie with Egypt. Rhodes break with Egypt was therefore the result of a sober and worldly calculation, which future events were to justify. The most probable occasion for the actual break, is after the battle of Cos, whether that battle be regarded as having occurred in 262 B.C. or 258 B.C. It appears to have been the same battle, combined with the subsequent and closely connected battle of Ephesus, in which a Rhodian fleet, perhaps covering a Seleucid land-operation against the city, defeated the Egyptian navy which deprived Philadelphus of the suzerainty of the Nesiotic League. There is, at least, no trace of Ptolemaic influence in the previous members of that League after the Chremonidean War. On the other hand the islands which appear to have been part of the Ptolemaic Empire, and which sustained Egyptian garrisons until, in some cases the middle of the second century, particularly Thera and Samos, remained in Ptolemaic hands, and tenure of them was apparently unaffected by the catastrophic events of the middle of the century.

Chapter VII

From 258 B.C. to the war with Byzantium (220 B.C.).

The Nesiotic dedication in honour of Agathostratus the successful Rhodian admiral[1], as a result of whose victory at Ephesus the Ptolemaic control of the Nesiotic League, which by this time may have become burdensome to the Islanders, lapsed, might be supposed, and has been supposed[2], to mark the transference of Aegean hegemony to Rhodes. Equally the preceding victory Cos might have transferred that hegemony to Macedonia. In fact, though the suzerainty of the League passed from Egyptian hands there is no adequate proof that it was picked up by either of these two powers. The Aegean appears to have enjoyed or endured an interregnum, until a decade later Philadelphus again assumed control for a few years. The Nesiotic League appears to have been connected intimately in the minds of contemporaries with Ptolemaic imperialism and perhaps for this reason among others, its existence ceased when Egyptian authority vanished. When resurrected by Rhodes at the turn of the third century, it became under them a no less efficient weapon of imperial control, but its structure was greatly altered.

The League of the Islanders certainly existed after the battle of Ephesus, as Agathostratus' statue clearly shows, but other evidence for its existence in the middle decade of the century is not forthcoming. Lack of a master appears to have led, if not to its dissolution, at least to its temporary

suspension.

A considerable number of Delian decrees in honour of Rhodians exist which apparently belong to the middle and second half, of the third century[3], but apart from the statue base of Agathostratus not one contains a reference to the Nesiotic League, and one in particular shows clearly that the League was not in existence[4]. Taken as a whole they show that Rhodians had free access to Delos, which suggests very strongly that there was no Ptolemaic influence in the island, but they do not indicate either that Rhodes controlled Delos, or that Delos was the centre of a Nesiotic League. To whatever date we refer them they show only that Rhodes had free access to, and was popular at, Delos. And that might very well be the situation in a period when Delos enjoyed independence.

No less inconclusive is the evidence for an alleged Macedonian protectorate in the Aegean after Antigonus had defeated the Egyptian fleet. There is no doubt that Antigonus had, like Rhodes, free access to Delos such as would have been impossible had the hostile power of Egypt still 'protected' the island and the Nesiotic League, but there is no proof that Macedon protected the League, or that the League even existed, either after the battle of Cos, or after Andros.

In fact, the decade was full of war for Macedon. The Second Syrian War ended in 255 or 253 B.C.[5], and even if Macedon was not involved in that war, it must have disturbed the Aegean very considerably. It was probably in the course of

the war that Philadelphus found a further opportunity for causing trouble for Macedon in Greece by supporting or instigating the revolt of Alexander the son of Craterus, the Macedonian commander of Corinth. This revolt perhaps prevented Antigonus' participation, in the Second Syrian War, on the site of Antiochus, and possibly even after the war was over deprived him of his most valuable harbour[6]. Such circumstances, apart from any other considerations, were not auspicious for the establishment of a new hegemony in the Aegean.

In 253 B.C. Antigonus took advantage of the absence of Ptolemaic control from Delos to establish two vase festivals there, an Antigoneia, and a Stratonikeia, the latter to commemorate the marriage of his son Demetrius with Stratonice, the daughter of Antiochus Theos[7]. It is to be noted that the marriage between Berenice, the daughter of Philadelphus, and Antiochus Theos[8], which cemented the Peace which followed the Second Syrian War was marked by no such Delian commemoration: there are no Berenikeia. This is a strong negative indication of the exclusion of Philadelphus in these years.

In 250 B.C. Antigonus dedicated a gold crown at Delos, and this dedication is the last that can be attributed to Antigonus for half a decade[9]. It is followed by a new Ptolemaic dedication in the following year[10].

If these dedications by Antigonus do not imply exclusive control of Delos, no more is there any evidence to show that Antigonus controlled or occupied any of the other islands.# Inscriptions referring to Antigonus' control over some of the islands appear to belong rather to the later period, after the battle of Andros: those which can be securely dated belong to the reign of Demetrius the Second.#

The period between the end of the Chremonidean War, or if it succeeded rather than preceded that event, the battle of Cos, and 249 B.C. was then one in which the Aegean communities were without a protecting power. Whether, after the first raptures which led to the erection of the statue of Agathostratus were passed, this condition appeared to the islanders themselves more satisfactory than their previous one cannot be determined.

It remains to determine the cause for this singular break in continuity in the Aegean. One cause has already been suggested: the desire on the part of Rhodes and Macedon to disassociate themselves from the policy which had perhaps brought Philadelphus into disrepute. The third century, no less than the Age of the Diadochi, was one in which political gestures counted for a great deal. A more substantial reason also existed. There is no indication that either Macedon[12] or Rhodes had at this time a permanent fleet, such as the Ptolemies had, and Rhodes certainly had in the early second century.

Macedon, in particular, appears to have built, or fitted out, fleets only as the need arose. Unlike Philadelphus, Antigonus had no overseas possessions contact with which had to be maintained by means of naval forces. His great naval effort over, after the Chremonidean War, Antigonus had no need of a large fleet. It is therefore possible that he was in no position to exercise the hegemony of the Aegean, even had he felt so inclined. The few dedications made by him were enough to keep in the memory of the islanders the man to whom no less than to Agathostratus their present independence was due.

The Rhodians for their part, even if they possessed a fleet large enough to control the Island Communities, which is in itself very unlikely at this date, were probably anxious to go slowly, and not to encounter rivals or invoke hostility so soon after their break with Egypt. This decade must have been a time of cautious progress towards the goal reached by 220 B.C., speaking of which Polybius could later say that at that time Rhodes was 'protectress of seafarers'[13]. Later still she became Mistress of the Sea-faring Communities. But in the decade after the battle of Ephesus there is no evidence to suggest that both goals were not far distant.

The modality of the reassumption of power by Ptolemaic Egypt would be more easily understandable if some details had survived regarding the revolt of Alexander of Corinth[14]. As it is, it can only be noted that by 249 B.C. Ptolemy had recovered his control of the Aegean, and that to mark that event he

established a new vase festival[15]. Whether at the same time he re-formed the Nesiotic League cannot be established beyond doubt. But the inscription which records the territories inherited by Euergetes suggests that he may have. Ptolemy Euergetes succeeded his father at the beginning of 246 B.C. and it is stated that his inheritance included the Cycladic isles[16] The inaccuracy contained in other items of the same testimony does not necessarily invalidate this piece of information, which corresponds with the information given by the Delian inventories. Apart from the dedication of Philadelphus of 249 B.C., already referred to, which shows that he regained control of Delos before he died, a third phiale-festival dating from 246 B.C.[17] indicates that Euergetes in the first year of his reign re-affirmed his possession of the island, and perhaps his suzerainty of the Nesiotic League.

His fortune, however, was far greater on land. The third Syrian war, in which he was almost immediately involved on behalf of his sister, whom his father had married to Antiochus Theos, gave him unprecedented successes against his Seleucid rival[18]. Seleucia and Pieriam fell to him, through the assistance of his sister's party in the town, and remained Ptolemaic for nearly a generation[19]. Euergetes subsequently turned towards the Upper Seleucid satrapies, beyond Mesopotamia, and subdued up to the borders of Bactria[20]. These immense

conquests were indeed ephemeral, since Euergetes soon returned home across the deserts of Asia, perhaps to suppress a rising in the valley of the Nile[21], but they were an indication of great resources and energy. It can only be supposed that the enterprise exhausted the kingdom, for this series of victories by land was apparently closely followed by a consummating defeat at sea.

The battle of Andros is the most obscure of the three naval battles of the middle of the third century, and its precise date cannot be established by direct evidence. The only literary testimony is a passage in which Plutarch tells of a sea battle 'about Andros' the same story that he tells in two other places about the battle of Cos, and a hopelessly corrupt passage of a prologue of Trogus[22]. The latter, cannot be used to determine the victor in the battle, nor does he give the name of the battle[23]. Moreover, since the items contained in the prologues of Trogus are not necessarily in chronological order, no inference can be drawn concerning the date of the battle from this passage[24]. However, yet again assistance is provided by the Delian temple-inventories. They indicate that in 244 B.C. Antigonus dedicated two new phiale-festivals at Delos, called significantly enough, not after himself or a member of his family, but Paneia, after his especial tutelary deity, and Soteria[25]. It follows that between 246 B.C. the date of the last Ptolemaic dedication, and 244 B.C. the hegemony of Delos passed again out of the hands of Egypt, the change was

effected by a Macedonian naval victory, and the most natural explanation of Gonatas' dedications is that the battle, since it falls within this period, must be regarded as an incident of the Third Syrian War.

The defeat of Euergetes by the aged Gonatas indicates that in the Syrian War Seleucus Callinicus, the present Seleucid king, had the active support of Antigonus. That he also had the support of Rhodes is probable but cannot be proved.

First, it is possible that if the passage of Frontinus in which he refers to Rhodians as assisting an Antiochus in the capture of Ephesus refers to the Second Syrian War[26], an alliance may have existed from that time. Antiochus III referred after the Second Macedonian War to old ties between his kingdom and the Rhodians, and it would not be surprising if these stretched back fifty years[27]. More precise than these possibilities are two others. The flourishing city of Stratonicaea, the Seleucid foundation in western Caria, was given by Seleucus and his brother, and subsequent enemy, Antiochus Hierax, to Rhodes perhaps as a mark of gratitude, for as the result of a bargain, for services rendered by Rhodes in the Syrian War[28]. It is difficult to believe that the cession of an important Greek city, a Seleucid foundation, with a dynastic name, was entirely voluntary. Perhaps a further mark of friendship between Rhodes and Seleucus Callinicus is to be found in the story that the Rhodians befriended Mysta, the mistress of Callinicus, when she was unlucky enough to find

hereself in the Rhodian slave-market, but the story is from Phylarchus and worth little[29].

These are the only pieces of evidence which might be used to show that Rhodes and Seleucus Callinicus were closely connected, perhaps co-operating at the time of the Third Syrian War: they are hardly enough to prove that Rhodes actually participated in that war[30].

The battle of Andros repeated in more drastic form the verdict of the battles of Cos and Ephesus. Egypt could no longer maintain her system and method of control in the Aegean. The course of the years which follow the defeat of Euergetes are hardly less obscure than those which precede it, but an outline of the relations of the three interested powers, Macedon Rhodes and Egypt, to the Aegean communities, can be recovered.

It has already been noted that Egypt retained certain of her Aegean dependencies after she had lost her control of the Nesiotic League and of Delos. The evidence for this is mostly from the late third or early second centuries B.C., and need not be repeated here. It may be noted, however, that no further vase-festivals are established by Egypt at Delos after this period, and this alone suffices to show that this time there was no resurrection of Egyptian power. Only one decree in honour of a servant of the Egyptian government can be attributed with certainty to these years. It is in honour of Sosibius[31], the statesman, who was honoured by numerous communities, including

Cnidus, Tanagra and Orchomenus[32]. He was an international figure, and no doubt acted considerably on his own account, as Apollonius the dioicetes of Philadelphus did in Caria[33]; a decree in his honour can not therefore be regarded as a sign of Ptolemaic control of Delos, though it suggests that the controlling power, if such existed, felt it could afford to permit a decree in honour of a Ptolemaic notability, without danger to its own position.

The evidence for Macedonian influence at Delos and in certain of the Cyclades, in the last years of Gonatas' reign, and in those of his successors, Demetrius II (239-229 B.C.) and Antigonus Doson (229-221 B.C.) is fairly plentiful. It does not however amount to a proof of a general Macedonian 'protectorate' over a group of islands, in any way comparable to the earlier Ptolemaic, or later Rhodian, Nesiotic League[34]. It resembles rather the Ptolemaic control of Samos and Thera. The islands appear to have been absorbed within the Macedonian kingdom. It is, however to be observed that the Antigonids retained Delos as a centre in which decrees passed by other islands were erected. It is possible that a central administration for the islands under Macedonian control was established at Delos. This clearly does not in any way affect the issue whether there did or did not exist at the time a Nesiotic League. Three inscriptions from Amorgos testify to this state of affairs[35]; their date is uncertain, but they certainly belong to the reign of an Antigonus

and appear to have been inscribed in the second half of the century; they may therefore belong either to Gonatas' closing years, or to the reign of Doson. A decree of the people of Syros in honour of a certain Eumedes of Clazomenae, a representative of an Antigonus, either Gonatas or Doson, who was appointed by Antigonus to arbitrate in some private suits, indicates considerable Macedonian interest in this island[36]. The possibility that, as so often in protracted legal proceedings, the litigants had themselves requested the external intervention prevents the assumption that the king had imposed his authority here, but the language of the inscription and its form of expression make it abundantly clear that the island was within the orbit of Macedonian influence[37]. The most complete instance of submission to Macedonia occurs in an inscription of the city of Poiessa, on the island of Ceos[38]. Demetrius here orders the people of the city to pay their taxes; not their tribute, but their local , municipal taxes. Evidence for Macedonian control of other of the Cycladic islands is either fragmentary or ambiguous[39].

The examples given above suffice to show that Macedonia controlled several of the Aegean islands, certainly after the death of Gonatas, perhaps even during his latter years. There is no reference in any of these documents to the Nesiotic League, and there appears to be no reason for supposing that it existed after the extinction of Ptolemaic sea-

power[40]. Clearly it is in precisely such documents that mention of the Nesiotic League would be expected, had it existed, and it is also clear that the Nesiotic League was not the only instrument by which the strongest power in the Aegean might exercise its authority.

Apart from the decrees of Cycladic communities which provide that copies of documents are to be set up in the temple of Apollo in Delos, there are other indications of Macedonian control of the island. In 238 B.C. Demetrius established a vase festival, perhaps on his accession[41], while at the close of the period under consideration Doson commemorated his victory over Cleomenes of Sparta, at the battle of Sellasia, by a dedication on the island[42]. The latter shows that Ptolemaic authority was not restored by the close of Doson's reign, since the defeat of Ptolemy's ally Cleomenes could hardly have been celebrated in an island where Egypt had any authority[43].

In addition to these two vital pieces of evidence information of a more general kind is provided by the numerous decrees of Delos itself, which stress the excellent relations existing between Delos and communities within the Macedonian kingdom. The relations between Delos and Thessalonice appear to have been exceptionally close, just as in the heyday of Ptolemaic authority Alexandrian <u>theoroi</u> frequently appear in the hieropoiic lists[44]. Honorific decrees passed by the Delians in honour of servants of Demetrius II make it quite clear that the king was master of the island[45], and the absence of Ptolemaic

documents shows that he was undisputed master.

The part played by Rhodes in this altered Aegean, from which Ptolemaic influence was largely absent, was probably less modest than would be supposed from the existing information on the subject. A firm point is supplied by the statement of Polybius that in 220 B.C. Rhodes was considered the protectress of sea-going men in the Aegean[46], and that it was by reason of this fact that the Aegean communities appealed to Rhodes when Byzantium imposed a toll on all traffic through the straits. The years between the Chremonidean War and the death of Doson and more particularly the years after the battle of Andros conceal the causes for this pre-eminence. The precise details of its establishment cannot be recovered, but a general, rather uncertain, outline may be seen. Perhaps the most important development of these years for Rhodes, and indeed eventually for much of the population of western Asia Minor, lies in the acquisition of further territory in the Rhodian Peraea[47], that is, on the mainland opposite the island. This event had however only a delayed importance in the general history of the period, and did not effect in any way the main struggles for power in the Hellenistic world, until the breach with Philip V and the intervention of Rome.

The most important indication of Rhodian policy and activity in these years is contained in a Delian inscription, probably to be assigned on prosopographical grounds to the period between 250 and 220 B.C.[48]. It records honours paid to

a certain Antigenes, the son of Theoros, who is described as ἀρ̣ε̣θεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμο[υ] τοῦ Ῥοδίων ναύ[α]ρχος ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τ[ῶν] νήσων κα[ὶ] ἐπὶ σωτηρίαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων

With him are honoured his three trierarchs. The appointment of an admiral 'for the defence of (the islands)' suggests that at this time the Rhodians possessed a permanent fleet, or, more probably, squadron, with duties of general supervision of the islands, and of protecting them against piratical raids. There is no suggestion that the islanders themselves were required to contribute to this service, in contrast to the period of the Rhodian Nesiotic League, after 200 B.C., when they had to provide contingents themselves for this duty[49]. It is noteable that there is no mention in the decree of any victory or campaign, and this too suggests that Antigenes' duties were of a defensive and probably routine nature.

This inscription testifies to one of the climacterics of Rhodian policy. The development from the days of the Ptolemaic suzerainty of the Aegean, when Rhodes undoubtedly flourished, but flourished under the paternal protection of Egypt, is unmistakeable.

Unfortunately we know little about the protection offered to the islanders by the Rhodians. It is clear from the inscription referred to above that practical measures were taken to see that the protection offered was real and valuable, but other important questions remain unsolved. Thus it cannot be determined which islands were thus protected. Did this

protection extend to all the Aegean communities, regardless of their political affiliations? Or did it exclude islands which were within the Macedonian sphere of influence? Were islands such as Thera, which were Ptolemaic possessions, but which could no longer expect adequate protection against chance marauders from the Egyptian fleet, also protected by the Rhodians? To none of these questions can any answer be given, and thus the question fundamental to all these, namely whether Rhodian policy in these years was dictated by a genuine desire to establish the safety of the seas, regardless of the political allegiance of this or that community, or whether it is simply to be regarded as yet another effort to secure mastery in the Aegean, must also remain unanswered.

There thus appear to have been three forces present in the Aegean in the quarter century between the battle of Andros and the death of Antigonus Doson. The effect of this must undoubtedly have been not to increase but to decrease the general security of the Islanders. Even if Rhodes was able to offer protection against immediate threats of danger, the material for an explosion between the major powers was present. It is true that their interests did not appear to clash: Egypt was exhausted, Rhodes was, it may be supposed, primarily interested in maintaining her commercial interests, and particularly her Egyptian trade, while the Macedonian power was not interested in the commercial life of the Aegean; but the opportunities for

friction must have been endless, and the fear of war unremitting. It is possible that some of the documents which record alliances and agreements between Aegean and north Aegean communities, such as those between the Aetolian League and the islands of Ceos, Tenos, and Delos, in which the grant of 'safety from the Aetolians' is made by the Aetolians, and agreements between Tenos and Phaestus, and Paros and the Allariotae, reflect the general uncertainty of these years, though some are, and others may be, a few years older[50].

It has been noted that Rhodians, particularly Rhodian naval commanders, are frequently the object of honours bestowed on them by the Delians. At the same time it is noticeable that fresh Rhodian dedications, so frequent in the period of Ptolemaic ascendancy, hardly occur in the hieropoiic inventories of these years[51]. This may be due to several causes. It might indicate that Macedonia, though her relations with Rhodes were essentially friendly, did not welcome Rhodians at Delos. This is perhaps unlikely, since clearly no check was placed on the passage of decrees in honour of Rhodians. A second possibility is that Delos was itself losing its general importance. This too does not seem probable when the number of fresh offerings made by other communities, including the King of Macedonia, is borne in mind. The most likely explanation appears to be that Rhodes no longer took the interest in Delos which she had done earlier in the century. This conjecture receives support from the certain fact that when, in the following century, Rhodes controlled the Nesiotic League, the centre of that league was

not Delos but Tenos[52], which was even further from Rhodes, and not central to the Cyclades, while Delos lay in the midst of them. There must then have been a very real desire to break away from the Delian connection at that time, whatever the reason may have been, and it is therefore possible that, in the years now under consideration, as Rhodian authority increased, the city already gave signs of this attitude.

The history of the Aegean in the twenty-five years before the accession of Philip V of Macedon may be briefly summarised. There is no indication that the Nesiotic League existed in these years. The Aegean and the Cyclades in particular did not enjoy an uniform administration, some of the islands probably being wholly independent, others which had been incorporated in the Ptolemaic kingdom at an earlier date remaining Ptolemaic, others, perhaps the majority of the Cyclades, were under direct Macedonian control. This control appears to have been exercised in a variety of ways, but the impression gained from one or two documents is that Macedonian control was very considerable, extending in certain instances even to intervention in local financial administration. It is probable that the Macedonian authorities retained Delos as an administrative centre. The position of Rhodes is less certain. Her policy does not appear to have changed from what it had been after the battle of Ephesus. Nor was there any reason why it should have. The situation after the battle of Andros was not

essentially different from that which had existed after the earlier Ptolemaic defeats. The difference was that the way was clearer for an intensive policy of expansion, now that there was no fear of a renewal of Egyptian aggression. The Rhodians appear to have concentrated on securing the safety of the Aegean for seafarers. To this policy the friendship of Macedonia was a desirable, if not a necessary, prelude, and there is no reason to doubt that relations between the two powers were good, though of quite a different type from those which had existed twenty-five years earlier between Rhodes and Philadelphus the then master of the Aegean; for now Rhodes could justly claim that she no less than Macedon had contributed to the new Aegean situation. Her present parity in the Aegean was doubtless facilitated by the fact that the Antigonids did not pursue an active or continuous naval policy, and were therefore probably not unwilling to delegate some Aegean responsibility to Rhodes. Thus the Delian decrees in honour of Rhodians testify indirectly to the good relations between Rhodes and Macedon. At the same time the absence of Rhodian theoroi from the Delian hieropoiic accounts foreshadows a later stage in which Rhodes as mistress of the Aegean breaks away from the holy Island.

The future foretold for Rhodes would reasonably have been one of continued development. But about 226 B.C.[53] there occurred a catastrophe which might have retarded Rhodian life for many years. An earthquake occurred which virtually

demolished the town[54]. It has been noted that this event probably more than any other is responsible for the almost total absence of information regarding the material civilisation of Hellenistic Rhodes[55]. Conversely the narrative of the event given by Polybius is an extremely valuable document, since it indicates the position occupied by, and the respect felt for, Rhodes not among the Aegean communities, but among the great powers.

The actual account of the damage caused by the earthquake given by Polybius is not detailed, since the chief interest felt by the historian in the event was the light it shed on Rhodian psychology and on the position held by Rhodes at the time. Of the event he says simply, but comprehensively, 'The earthquake in which the large colossus fell, and the greater part of the docks and the walls'[56].

The Rhodian action after this disaster is made a text by Polybius for a sermon on the virtue of a practical attitude to affairs. The Rhodians immediately turned their misfortune to their advantage. Such was the dignity of their bearing that they enlisted the sympathy of cities and kings alike. They therefore received gifts in abundance, and the donors thereby incurred a debt of gratitude. This attitude Polybius characterises as 'sensible and practical', words, it may be supposed, which Polybius' Rhodian source used as best describing

the Rhodian character in adversity[57]. The historians own judgement is less favourable. At the end of the digressions he says that, considering the excellent geographical position enjoyed by Rhodes, the quantity of imports, and the complete prosperity enjoyed by the city, their progress after the earthquake seemed slightly disappointing[58].

The main value of Polybius' narrative lies in the list of subscribers to the Rhodian earthquake-fund which he gives. The most conspicuous characteristic of this list is its universality. So many states, cities, kings and dynasts are mentioned that the mere fact of inclusion in the list does not permit the inference that a certain donor was on the best of terms with Rhodes. Quite apart from the popularity enjoyed by subscriptions, and subscription-lists in the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman world, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean and Caria and Ionia[59], it is clear that the Greek communities, and, still more, the monarchs, took the opportunity offered by this calamity to attempt to outshine each other. The judgement of the modern historian who called it 'The greatest demonstration of solidarity which the Hellenistic world ever made'[60] is perhaps over-charitable.

The interests of several of the subscribers are immediately apparent. Hieron of Syracuse, and Gelon his son and co-regent, and Seleucus Callinicus bestowed on merchants of the damaged city, the right of <u>ateleia</u>[61], which, however desirable in itself, will not have helped to rebuild the walls. It is

not fanciful to see in this grant an attempt to profit by the existing situation by winning part of the Rhodian trade from Egypt. Ptolemy, for his part, could not offer a general freedom from customs-duties, which formed an essential part of the rigid Ptolemaic economic system, but it seems that he counter-bribed in other ways. Rather than relax the tariffs by which the royal monopoly was protected, he chose to help Rhodes by gifts in cash[62].

The most interesting and significant aspect of the donations lies however, not in those items in which a covert rivalry may be suspected, but those which testify beyond doubt to the common interest felt by all in the maintenance of the Rhodian fleet. The great powers here pursued a common end. Euergetes, whose father had lost dominion at sea at least in part through the agency of the Rhodian navy, contributed forty thousand cubits of pine planks, sufficient for the construction of ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, three thousand talents of tow, three thousand sheets of sailcloth, and twenty thousand artabae of rations[63]. Antigonus Doson provided ten thousand planks for ship-building, five thousand rafters, one thousand talents of pitch, and one thousand metretae of crude pitch, all essential items in dockyards[64]. Finally, Seleucus, who possessed only a small fleet if any at all, and only slender resources in shipbuilding material, contributed ten fully equipped quinqueremes, ten thousand cubits of timber and one thousand talents each of resin and hair for ropes and hawsers[65].

This general munificence indicates very graphically the value which the Hellenistic kings attached to the Rhodian navy[66]. It clearly was not regarded by any of them as a threat to their own security: not even Euergetes seems to have thought this. The use of this small fleet is indeed indicated by the inscriptions already discussed. It maintained the safety of the Aegean sea, and enabled the subjects of the great communities to trade in the Aegean ports without fear to life or limb. By this policy it absolved the kings from the necessity of themselves undertaking this unprofitable though necessary task. Such a dispensation was well worth the outlay involved. It is noteworthy that even Egypt did not fail to avail herself of the opportunity of re-equipping the Rhodian fleet.

The subscription-list thus confirms the picture of Rhodian policy at this time which may be derived from other sources. In these last years before her position was put to the test when the islanders called on her to face Byzantium on their behalf, Rhodes had clearly acquired a moral ascendency in the Aegean, even if she did not control any islands in the way that Macedon and Egypt did. The gifts of the kings are a striking testimony to the fact that none had anything to fear from Rhodes. This stage in her evolution forms a complete contrast with her policy when she enjoyed a considerable empire under Roman patronage in the following century.

By the year 220 B.C. Rhodes had recovered from the

'happy calamity' of the earthquake, and was again able to assert her moral leadership in the Aegean. In that year Demetrius of Pharus, the Illyrian brigand-prince, made his mysterious raid with lemboi on the Cyclades and levied tribute from them. The raid was beaten off by the Rhodians, who chased him back to Cenchreae, where Philip's own general received him, and transferred his lemboi to the Corinthian Gulf for use against Aetolia[68]. This sugg sts very strongly, what is confirmed from other quarters, that Philip had altogether abandoned an Aegean policy, adherence to which had dwindled since the days of Gonatas, and was even prepared to support a brigand in those waters. Thus Polybius says that Philip in 218 B.C. collected the Achaean and Macedonian navies in Lechaeum and there proceeded to train his military forces in the use of oars[69]. A shortage of ships is also emphasied in Polybius' account of the preliminaries to Philip's projected invasion of Italy in 216 B.C.[70]. It is probable that this decline, so marked in the beginning of Philip's reign began in the time when Doson was pre-occupied in the Peloponnese, and it may further be supposed that no steps were taken to improve the situation because Rhodes was now on her feet again and could be trusted to carry out efficiently her task of policing the seas. That the abandonment of an Aegean policy on the part of Macedonia was largely voluntary follows not only from the munificent gifts of ship-building material which Doson made to Rhodes, material which, had

he so wished he could have converted to the improvement of his own navy, but also by the fact that when he crossed to Caria in 228 B.C., he must at least have possessed a considerable number of transports, even if the peaceful condition of the Aegean relieved him of the necessity of fitting out men o' war[71].

It seems probable, then, that the penultimate stage of Rhodian evolution, which perhaps began after the battle of Ephesus, and culminated in the years between 230 and 220 B.C., was marked in its latter stages by a recognition by the great powers of the Hellenistic world that Rhodes was able satisfactorily and with danger to none to carry out those tasks in the Aegean which their own weakness or pre-occupations did not permit them to do, and that eventually Macedon yielded to Rhodes her remaining interests and responsibilities in that area. The first signs of a reversal of this policy, of the adoption of a hostile attitude to Rhodes, comes with the change in Philip V's policy after the Peace of Pheonice.

Chapter VIII

From the Rhodio-Byzantine War to the Peace of Apamea (220-188 B.C.)

With the accession of Philip V to the Macedonian throne in 221 B.C., a new era in Hellenistic history begins. One aspect of this altered world is provided by the sources which now become relatively abundant and of high quality. The literary evidence is dominated by the history of Polybius, supplemented by Livy, who preserve, in varying degrees of detail, the record of events in Italy, Greece and Asia, in a manner which makes the separation of fact from invention a far easier task than it is in the earlier third century. The evidence for Rome's conquest of the eastern Mediterranean, which was effected within the period now under discussion, is, in fact, so considerable, even if controversial, that the history of a small unit such as Rhodes, which becomes increasingly involved in the struggle between Rome and the East, has to be treated in more isolation than is ideally desirable; the picture of the whole has, to some extent, to be sacrificed for practical reasons. Thus, in this chapter, no attempt is made to discuss in detail the Roman campaigns in the East, but only those phases of them which directly affect the policy and history of Rhodes. Little or no space is devoted to the Roman land-campaigns, while the naval campaigns are treated in greater detail.

Apart from the bulky literary evidence there is also a marked increase in non-literary evidence. Inscriptions become

more plentiful from a variety of sources. Considerable light is shed on Aegean history in the last lustrum of the third century by a number of inscriptions, some emanating from the communities of the Eastern Aegean, some from Philip's own chancery. Rhodes too contributes her share of epigraphical texts, though these shed light less on the general course of events than on the history of Rhodes in particular.

For Rhodes the history of these years is divided sharply by the events of 201-200 B.C. The same is perhaps true to a greater or less extent of all Aegean communities, since these years brought to them all the prospect of submission to Rome. But Rhodes was particularly affected, since thanks to her development in the previous half-century, she was still strong enough and free enough to react positively to the new situation. She developed, with the realism and calculation characteristic of all her political decisions about which we possess enough evidence to be able to formulate a judgement, a new policy, which was, in the situation which evoked it, a betrayal; but which might not have surprised Demetrius Poliorcetes or Ptolemy Philadelphus had they been present to observe the course of events.

The events of 201 B.C. were the cause of the rise of Rhodes to its greatest importance and of its eventual destruction as a significant political force. Thus from the year 200 until 166 B.C. the main focus of Rhodian history lies in the relations of the city with Rome, while in the period

from 188 to 166 there is the additional interest of the history of her mainland possessions. On the other hand from 220 to 200 B.C. activity still centres round the regions which dominated the history of the third century, the Aegean, and Rhodes' relations with it, Egypt and the Seleucid Kingdom.

In the year 220/219 B.C. in which Rhodian authority in the Aegean was demonstrated by her ejection of Demetrius of Pharos from that Sea[1], trouble developed at the other end of it, at Byzantium. This city had retained its independence since early in the third century when it had seemed a desirable prize to more than one Hellenistic king[2]. It had, however, in recent years only preserved its independence with great difficulty. One branch of the Gallic tribes which invaded Greece in 280/79 under Brennus had separated itself from the main body and established itself on the north shore of the Hellespont. Here they remained, organised as the Kingdom of Tylis, for more than fifty years, extorting a considerable Danegeld from the Byzantines to whom they were adjacent. The annual figure of this tax eventually reached eighty talents, levied by the last Thracian king, Kauaros. To meet this enormous burden, the people of Byzantium were forced, after unsuccessful attempts to enlist the practical support of the Greeks, to impose a transit-tax on all traffic passing through the Straits[3].

The resulting situation is described by Polybius, in

an excursus[4], drawn perhaps equally from Rhodian and Byzantine sources[5], both epigraphical and literary. Our fragmentary knowledge of Hellenistic Byzantium does not enable us to examine Polybius' narrative in the light of other sources, but where any control is possible, it appears that Polybius has produced an impartial account.

The seafaring communities of the Aegean, seeking redress and protection turned to the Rhodians, 'because they were manifestly protectors of seafarers'[6]. It was this appeal which led to war. Rhodes' own position was probably rather delicate. She had close commercial links in the Black Sea, both in the Crimea, and on the Bulgarian coast, and inland with the trading stations on the lower Danube[7]. The Byzantine levy affected Rhodes no less than cities nearer at hand. At the same time to initiate a war with Byzantium was a considerable step, since even if it was successful Rhodes might forfeit her good-will in the area, and suffer severely on that account. Polybius' narrative of the war shows that Rhodes was anxious not to prosecute it too vigorously.

Rhodes first associated her allies with her in an embassy to Byzantium with a request that the toll be lifted. Through the influence of the chief magistrates of the city the Rhodian and allied appeal was rejected, and the ambassadors returned to Rhodes, their mission unfulfilled. War was decreed

by the Rhodian assembly without delay[8].

Rhodes' efforts were first directed towards acquiring allies more suitably placed than herself for operations against Byzantium. She found a willing collaborator in Prusias of Bithynia whose hostility to Byzantium had been aroused by the part that city had played in ending the war between Achaeus, the rebel ruler of Seleucid Asia Minor, and Attalus, as a result of which Attalus' possessions in Asia Minor had been notably reduced, and thereby a very desirable buffer between Prusias and the Seleucid Kingdom been removed. He also complained that the Byzantines had slighted him by not having sent representatives to sacrifice at his Soteria, though they had sent them to the festival of Athena at Pergamum[9]. Prusias arranged with the Rhodian envoys that he should be responsible for land operations while Rhodes should conduct the war at sea[10].

The Byzantine retort to this alliance was to conclude a similar arrangement with Achaeus himself, most powerful of all the princes of western Anatolia[11]. It was clearly the opportunity thus offered for a blow at Prusias which induced Achaeus to join in a struggle in which, if he had any interests at all, they must have rested with the opponents of Byzantium, among whom will have been numbered the Greek cities of his own Ionian seaboard. The Byzantine government also summoned Zipoetas, the uncle of Prusias from Macedonia, where he lived in exile, in the hope of stirring up dynastic trouble for Prusias[12].

The war which threatened to envelop many powerful kings and communities in fact came to very little. Achaeus gave no immediate aid, and Prusias was enabled to advance on the city and sieze the strategic island of Hieron, on which stood the temple of Zeus Urios, at the mouth of the Bosporus, and to detach from Byzantium much of her territory in Mysia[13]. Rhodes, meanwhile, carried out her share in the undertaking by despatching a squadron of six Rhodian and four allied vessels, under command of Xenophantus. The Rhodian purpose, however, was still neogitation, and not war. The vessels were stationed at Sestus as a precautionary measure to prevent vessels passing beyond that point, while Xenophantus, in his flagship sailed on to Byzantium, to see if the Byzantines were now prepared to negotiate[14]. The latter again refused, and Xenophantus sailed away with his squadron down to Rhodes[15]. This was the end of active participation in the war by Rhodes, which now turned to diplomacy to achieve her end. Contact was made with Egypt, where Achaeus' father, Andromachus, was held as a hostage[16].

That the good relations between Rhodes and Egypt, which had been broken through much of the reign of Philadelphus, had been restored during the reign of Euergetes, is perhaps indicated by some of his gifts at the time of the earthquake[17]. Polybius expressly tells us that Philopator had a great attachment for the Rhodians[18]. For this reason he handed over Andromachus to them for return to Achaeus though he had been keeping him up his sleeve for his own purposes[19].

Andromachus once in Achaeus' hands, all hope of help

from him the Byzantines may have had vanished. Zipoetas, moreover, had died on his way to Byzantium from Macedonia, and thus hope of causing trouble in Prusias' rear had greatly diminished[20] Prusias for his part prosecuted the war with greater energy than before, operating himself on the Asiatic mainland, while Thracian mercenaries in his pay blockaded the city on the European side[21]. The Byzantines, unable to withstand these assaults, looked for a dignified method of obtaining peace, and found it in the Gallic King Kauaros, whose excessive demands had first impelled them to war[22]. From a defeated Byzantium clearly nothing was to be expected, while a negotiated peace might secure him certain privileges[23]. He therefore acted as intermediary between Prusias and the Byzantines, who both accepted the terms proposed by him[24]. Rhodes, on hearing the news, sent an ambassador, by name Aridices, rapidly to secure their own demands, and with him, either as a belated gesture to Prusias or to cow the Byzantines, a small squadron of ships under Polemocles[25].

At this point the narrative of events becomes very singular. Rhodes, it is clear, had taken no active part in the war. Her activity had been limited to procuring the person of Andromachus, an achievement which doubtless weighed in the final issue, but which was not to be compared with the considerable military effort expended by Prusias. It could indeed be said with complete justice that the war had been won by Prusias, and

not by the Rhodians on whom the Aegean seafarers had called.

In view of this the peace terms need some explanation. They are recorded very formally by Polybius[26], in the form in which they were prepared on the Byzantine side; that is, the date is given in terms of the Byzantine eponym, the hieromnamon,[27] and the language of the entire document corresponds with that found in numerous inscriptions recording similar peace terms[28]. It is, in fact, clear that we have here a verbatim or nearly verbatim reproduction of the stele on which the peace terms were recorded in Byzantium[29]. They can then hardly be questioned, but they must certainly be explained.

After the prescript, the treaty begins with the words: 'towards the Rhodians, simple (i.e. non-reciprocal) terms: the Byzantines are not to exact a toll on any traffic sailing into the Pontus, and the Rhodians and their allies, if this is observed, are to keep the peace with the Byzantines.'[30] Thus Rhodes achieved at one blow what she had originally demanded on behalf of the communities, to whom by this peace she now vindicated her position in the Aegean, without having taken any naval action whatever. This may be taken perhaps to indicate the extent to which Byzantine resistance had been broken by the activity of Prusias, but it is doubtful if this explanation is satisfactory. Prusias, the real victor, won the following terms for himself: 'Towards Prusias, these were the terms: peace between Prusias and the Byzantines for all time: the Byzantines shall not in any way make war upon Prusias, nor Prusias upon

the Byzantines: Prusias shall return to the Byzantines the lands and the forts and the serfs and the able-bodied men(?), without ransom, and in addition the ships which were taken at the beginning of the war, and the missiles captured in the forts, and equally the timber and the masonry, and the earthenware vessels which were in the place (called) Hieron, and Prusias is to compel those Bithynians who have taken objects from Mysian territory subject to Byzantium to restore it to the cultivators[31].'

Prusias, then, who was the victor of the war, who had possessed himself of much of the Byzantine chora, who had forced the city to capitulate, won precisely nothing. The terms he received were those which might be imposed on a vanquished foe. For her part Byzantium only promised not to attack Prusias, a thing she was not likely to wish to do. What is the explanation of this? The document can hardly be suspected of partiality towards Rhodes; it is clearly very closely based on an official document. The terms must be accepted, and the contradiction they express with the narrative of the war itself cannot be explained as due to partiality in the narrative any more than in the peace document itself[32]. It therefore seems necessary to postulate an omission of some seemingly non-essential material from the narrative of Polybius, and that material must have been relevant to Prusias. Something, it may be concluded must have occurred which threatened or weakened Prusias' position, and caused him to accept these humiliating terms. What that was, whether it was

a foreign invasion or a threat to his personal position must remain unknown for the present.

From the point of view of Rhodian history Prusias' dilemma was a great advantage. Rhodes was able to take advantage of the military victories he scored, and the effect they caused on the Byzantines, to secure an end for which she had shown that she was not really willing to go to war.

Rhodian authority was again called into action in the year of the peace with Byzantium, and again in the North. Sinope, the old Milesian colony, threatened by Mithridates of Pontus, appealed to Rhodes for aid[33]. Sinope was the natural object of attack by the Pontic kings since it was the most important of the independent cities of the Pontic coast, and on the landward side marched with territory subject to the kings of Pontus[34]. Like Rhodes Sinope did a considerable export trade in domestic pottery, the handles of which, bearing the mark of the Sinopian magistrate, the astynomos, are found even more frequently on northern sites than Rhodian or Thasian ones[35]. The city's appeal at this juncture to Rhodes indicated that concurrence and not rivalry marked the commercial relations of the two cities in the north[36]. Vast, unexplored, or at least commercially unexploited, areas, gave ample opportunity to all comers.

The Sinopian plea for assistance was heard favourably by the Rhodian assembly which appointed a committee of three to

determine what form the assistance should take up to a maximum expenditure of 140,000 drs. The stores brought with this sum and dispatched to Sinope through the now re-opened Bosporus, consisted of 10,000 jars of wine, and much war-material[37]. The list of stores bears a close resemblance to the supplies given to Rhodes herself by the monarchs after the earthquake about seven years previously; it included three hundred talents weight of treated hair, one thousand panoplies, siege-weapons and specialist troops to use them. Added to this imposing list were three thousand gold staters[38].

Unfortunately Polybius does not recount what occurred at Sinope subsequently. We are told that the Rhodian supplies reached the city, and then, after an account of the defensive earthworks thrown up by the Sinopians, the narrative ends abruptly with the words 'And such was the affair of Sinope'[39]. No historian, it may safely be said, would leave a story in mid-air in this manner; nor even a local historian attempting to conceal a disaster. There can be little doubt that Polybius is here transcribing, or, less probably, copying at second hand, a Sinopian inscription or archive which recorded the official list of stores and monies sent by Rhodes, and added to that certain details drawn from autopsy or local sources[40]. The result does not make a properly rounded narrative any more than the narrative of the Rhodio-Byzantine War, with its seemingly

inconsequential peace-treaty.

However unsatisfactory the narrative of Polybius may be, the story of the help given to Sinope, together with the story of the Rhodio-Byzantine war emphasises the importance of Rhodes of her northern connections, at the very time that her influence and authority in the Aegean was reaching its peak. Her interests in these areas are confirmed by the discovery of Rhodian amphora-handles in the area, as mentioned above.

An apparent consequence of the half-hearted attack on Byzantium was a new political attachment between the two cities. From this date for a generation Rhodes and Byzantium stood together on several important occasions, both in diplomatic negotiations, and in war[41]. Along with them appears Chios. Thus the old allies of the fourth century, who had stood together in the Social War, again found need of each other, in the superficially much altered world of the last quarter of the third century. The history of Chios in the third century is little known; the island clearly remained prosperous, and there are signs of Chian imports in Alexandria at this time; while Chian inscriptions recording the right of proxeny granted to citizens of Byzantium, Lampsacus, Cyzicus and even Panticapaeum, point to considerable connections in that area.[42]

At this date then Rhodes appears to have been

developing connections with the remaining independent Greek cities of the eastern Meditteranean, and of the Asiatic Mainland. Her activities in the Aegean perhaps had the same goal, the creation of a system of alliances to guarantee the peace and safety of the sea. At least the fragment of one alliance survives which may belong to these years, that between Rhodes and the island of Ios[43], of which we possess only indirect knowledge. The alliance with the cities of the Lesbian κοινόν probably belongs to the early years of the second century[44].

The new king of Macedon, Philip V, did not inherit from Doson an active Aegean policy. Doson, it has been noted, seems to have abandoned such a policy, though he maintained his ascendancy at Delos, and there are signs early in the reign of Philip that the Macedonian navy was less prepared than usual to put to sea[45]. Philip's early preoccupations with the Social War also forced upon him a limitation of interest, and a renunciation of any plans he may have had for trans-Aegean conquest or Aegean hegemony. Philip began shipbuilding in earnest only during the First Macedonian War, in the year 208 B.C., when he laid the foundations of a fleet at Cassandria, and even in 205 B.C. he seems to have had little naval strength[46].

Philip's interests in the Aegean in these years were in fact limited to Delos. The vase-festival called the Philippieia, first testified from 216 B.C.[47] probably represents a foundation made at his accession, as his father Demetrius had

founded the Demetrieia on his accession[48], while the erection of Philip's Portico and other dedications testify to a continued interest[49]. Clearly such dedications no longer represent, as they do in the period of great Aegean rivalries, a generation earlier, a control over the Aegean Sea, and a political control over some of the islands. The task of policing the Aegean had fallen into Rhodian hands, as the raid of Demetrius of Pharos and the Rhodio-Byzantine War had shown. Moreover, in Egypt the accession of Philopator led to a lack of interest in Aegean affairs, and an absence of any positive naval policy[50]. Philopator, therefore, was unlikely to dispute Philip's claim to Delos, even though Philip, had he been challenged, could have done little to defend it.

Rhodes, the only power in the Eastern Mediterranean which could have effectively challenged Philip's position at Delos, had no need or inclination to do so. Her relations with Philip appear to have been harmonious, and her own interest at Delos, after her period of close friendship with Philadelphus, and after the Ptolemaic loss of Delos, slight. The re-born Nesiotic League of the Rhodians was centred not on Delos, but on Tenos[51], and references to the Dorian strain of Rhodes in contemporary literature suggest that Rhodes may have been anxious to emphasise this aspect of her origins[52]; and in that case Delos with its essentially Ionian religious background will not have interested her much[53].

Philip, then, in these years appears to have been in the position of the tenant of a house nobody else wished to

occupy, and his occupation of it constituted neither a danger nor a threat to the other Aegean communities. In confirmation of the fact that he had no designs against Rhodes, Philip chose to dedicate an offering at the shrine of Athana Lindia, the last of a long series. The precise occasion of this dedication is uncertain, but it certainly came before the rupture of friendly relations after the Peace of Phoenice[54].

The unsuccessful attempts made by Rhodes to arbitrate between Philip and Aetolia in the Social War do not necessarily reflect this friendliness, since they appear to have been prompted less by anxiety on Philip's behalf (for which there was little need) than by a genuine desire to see an end of hostilities. The interest of these two attempts, made in 218 and 217 B.C.[55], lies in the powers who were associated with Rhodes, namely Byzantium, Chios, and Egypt. The initiative for these embassies seems to have come from Rhodes[56]. The appearance of Byzantium and Chios, it has been suggested, was due to a new departure in Rhodian policy, following the Rhodio-Byzantine war; the appearance of Ptolemaic envoys recalls the statement of Polybius that Philopator was extremely attached to the Rhodians[57]. The old wounds had healed, and for the next few years Egypt and Rhodes stand together in efforts to stop the First Macedonian War. Further evidence of the restored relations between Egypt and Rhodes comes from the prelude to the fourth

Syrian War described by Polybius. In 219 B.C., the ministers of Philopator, Sosibius and Agathocles, bent on delaying the outbreak of hostilities until the new Egyptian army was equipped and trained, decided to appeal to a committee of arbitrators, to negotiate between Egypt and Antiochus III. The states to whom the appeal was made were Rhodes, Cyzicus and Byzantium, and surprisingly, the Aetolian League[58]. It cannot be doubted that the communities here mentioned were those from whom Egypt might expect justice, even partiality, if possible; and must therefore have been her closest friends. This proposal was made very shortly after the conclusion of the Rhodio-Byzantine war[59], and shows how quickly normal or improved relations developed in the North. The presence of Aetolia was doubtless due to the development of good relations between Egypt and Aetolia in the reign of Euergetes I[60].

The picture of the Aegean on the eve of Roman intervention thus takes shape. Antiochus III, bent on the recovery of the 'ancient framework of the kingdom'[61] stood aloof from Aegean entanglements, though the old alliance with Rhodes perhaps subsisted[62]; Philopator, or rather his energetic ministers, had withdrawn from the pursuit of a policy of conquest and expansion in the Aegean which had long since lost any chance of being effective, and was making sure of more limited, more effective, ends. Egypt's main activities were conditioned by her relations with the Seleucid kingdom. Philip, the Social War successfully

accomplished, was temporarily at a halt; his interest in the Aegean was slight, and remained so until after the First Macedonian War; Rhodes had taken over the supervision of the Aegean, but had not yet expressed that supervision in terms of formal sovereignty, though there exist possible indications that she was pursuing a policy of separate alliances with other islands. More important was her northern policy in which it appears that she had the sympathy of Egypt; this policy apparently consisted in forming close ties for common diplomatic action in the Aegean. The cities of Byzantium and Chios are found frequently pursuing a joint diplomatic goal with the Rhodians. Finally the bad relations between Rhodes and Egypt had been improved. Egypt clearly now looked upon Rhodes as her equal, and apparently preferred to follow where Rhodes led. Here again their policy was one of common diplomatic action. The creation of military alliances does not seem to have been envisaged at this stage.

This world clearly had maintained its inner unity to a surprising degree. The danger-spot was Macedon, but there was as yet no reason to suppose that Philip's interests would overstep the boundaries of mainland Greece. This relatively peaceful and harmonious situation persisted in the Aegean a few years later when Roman troops first appeared in its waters.

It has been suggested that Rhodes had connections with Rome which, if not continuous, at least probably had their origin at the date recorded by Polybius, namely the very end

of the fourth century[63]. Such contacts, if they continued at all after the original event, will have been so tenuous as to have no significance in the formation of Rhodian policy at the end of the third century. The same is perhaps true to a less extent of Ptolemaic Egypt, whose contacts with Rome in the earlier third century were probably more frequent than those of Rhodes[64]. At all events, when the time came to take a stand towards Rome both powers stood manifestly against her. Whether it may be inferred from this that trade connections between Rome and the east were so slight that no material loss would ensue to Rhodes and Egypt from adopting a hostile attitude is very doubtful, since it is based on the improbable assumption that at such a crisis in Mediterranean history, a crisis of the nature of which the Greeks were well aware, both powers were actuated by motives which are not even an evidence at more normal times.

The First Macedonian War between Rome and Philip V of Macedon broke out in 211 B.C. after the signature of the alliance between Rome and Aetolia at Naupactus[65]. The military operations of this war are not of any great importance for the student of Rhodian history. It has however an indirect importance in that it saw the last attempts of Rhodes and her associated powers to apply the method of negotiation, in the hope of preserving the frame of the old world and excluding Rome from the eastern Mediterranean. It also brought to the front of the stage the Kingdom of Pergamum, which rapidly developed a leading position as a Roman client, and forestalled the Rhodians by some years in

their acceptance of that position. The first-fruits of this privileged position were rapidly gathered. Aegina fell to Sulpicius Galba in 210 B.C., and was sold to Attalus by the Aeginetans, to whom it had been transferred by the Romans in accordance with their alliance with Rome, for thirty talents[66]. It remained a Pergamene possession until the final extinction of the Kingdom.

In the third year of the war envoys came to Philip in his camp in Thessaly. They represented the same states which had sent envoys to him in 218 and 217 B.C.: Egypt, Rhodes and Chios, and with them for the first time appeared Athens, the faithful friend of Egypt[67]. At a meeting held shortly afterwards at Aegium at which Philip, the Aetolians, and the envoys of the interceding communities were present, the aim of the latter was expressed; they desired to end the war, so that neither Rome nor Attalus should have a pretext for entering the mainland[68]. This attempted negotiation between the contestants came to nothing, when news of the arrival of the Romans at Naupactus and of Attalus at Aegina was received[69]. The following year the Rhodian and Egyptian envoys again tried to negotiate a peace, this time beginning from the Aetolian camp[70]. From here they were passed on to Philip, who, however, was too busy to attend to them, and whose fortunes had recently been improved by an attack made by Prusias of Bithynia, perhaps by agreement with

Philip, on the domains of Attalus, which caused that nervous prince to return home rapidly[71]. He did not reappear in Greece during the war. Philip dismissed the envoys with polite expressions which made it clear that he had no desire to continue the war, but that his demands must be satisfied before he would consent to abandon hostilities[72].

At the end of 208 the Romans withdrew from the scene of hostilities and did not reappear for two years[73]. This withdrawal led to increased efforts on the part of Rhodes and the other powers to secure a negotiated peace. In 207 a considerable muster of states appealed to Aetolia to come to terms with Philip[74]. In addition to Rhodes and Egypt there were representatives from Chios, Byzantium and Mytilene. The account of the meeting of the envoys with the Aetolians given by Polybius was remarkable for the speech put into the mouth of the Rhodian delegate, Thrasycrates[75]. He portrayed in dramatic but commonplace metaphors the horrors of war, how it recoils on its instigators and destroys innocent and guilty alike. Thrasycrates therefore bade the Aetolians consider that the Islanders and the Greeks of Asia were present and prayed for the cessation of the war: a war which had it been glorious, though unprofitable, might have been excused, but which was in fact bound to lead to the enslavement of Greece; such a consequence being implicit

in the terms of the alliance concluded between Aetolia and Rome, by which the bodies and properties of vanquished communities passed into the discretion of Rome, while the cities and their lands fell to Aetolia. By this treaty Greeks had been handed over to Barbarians, as could be seen from the treatment to which the Oreitans and the Aeginetans had recently been exposed -- they had been captured by the Romans and Attalus, and their fate had been decided on the terms just outlined by Thrasycrates -- Moreover, there could be no doubt of the future developments; once Hannibal had been finally defeated in Italy Rome would direct all her strength against Greece, professedly to assist Aetolia against Philip, but in fact to subjugate the entire land for herself. Finally Thrasycrates urged the Aetolians once again to think carefully before continuing on this ruinous course, and concluded with the satisfying reflection that he had said all that he ought to have said.

The policy conceived in this speech is clear. Aetolia, whatever the nature of her quarrel with Philip, had no right to introduce Rome on to the soil of Greece; the Romans were barbarians, and it was the duty of Greeks to solve their own problems. It is, however, not possible to be certain of the historical value of the speech; does it represent the actual words of the Rhodian envoy, or is it largely a product of Polybius' imagination, or is it taken by him in good faith

as historical from a Rhodian historian who, following a custom unfortunately not uncommon in Rhodes, had added some touches ad maiorem Rhodiorum gloriam? It is not really possible to accept this speech as a fair statement of Rhodian policy until these questions have been answered, and it is doubtful if any conclusive answer could be given to any of them[76]. It seems a priori probable that Polybius, on whom the influence of Rhodian historiography was considerable, may have drawn this speech from a local source, and that for this reason alone its absolute historicity cannot be relied on. However, since there is no reason to doubt that the embassies were made in this year it may be presumed that the general tenour of the speech was remembered and recorded not long after the event. It is therefore probable that the Rhodian historian who wrote Thraymachus' speech had guidance as to the main points in the speech of the Rhodian envoy, and that what Polybius reproduces here, has a basis of truth, even if the high moral tone is an addition. It is at least fair to assume that the Rhodian envoy spoke out in sharp opposition to Rome at this time, and that the policy of his government was aimed at destroying the alliance between Aetolia and Rome[77].

This policy remained apparently unaltered until 201 B.C. What was the reason for it, if we reject the idealistic version given by Thrasycrates in Polybius' narrative? It has been supposed that fear of damage to Rhodian commerical

interests was the main factor[78], and this certainly must have been an element in the city's calculations. All states with considerable trading connections such as Rhodes had have a natural dislike and fear of war. But it may be doubted whether this was the main reason. Rhodes certainly acted as transit centre for much of the eastern Mediterranean, from Alexandria to the Crimea, but this area was not likely to be affected by a war in mainland Greece.

In Greece proper, to judge from surviving published remains, Rhodes had few trading connections outside Athens, where her interests were indeed considerable. It is, however, true that this period, from 220-180 B.C. represents the peak of Rhodian trade with Athens, and that there was always a danger that the war would engulf Attica, even though at the moment, Athens, like Rhodes, was a neutral and mediating power[79].

More important than the commercial calculation was probably the political one. The notion that Rome did not belong to the Greek world, and should be excluded from it as 'barbarian' may well have been a factor in Rhodian calculations, for more severely practical reasons than those put into the mouth of Thrasycrates. The political condition of the Eastern Mediterranean was delicately balanced at this time, and on the whole balanced favourably to Rhodes. Ptolemaic influence in the Aegean was limited to a few isolated holdings, Philip was

fully occupied on land, and had not shown any interest either in the Aegean or in Asia Minor, while the master of the Seleucid Kingdom, Antiochus III, was away in his Eastern satrapies. Moreover Rhodes was, as has been already observed, on good terms with both Philip V and Ptolemy Philopator[80]. Not less excellent probably were her relations with Antiochus, though less attention is paid to them in the tradition of the period. The probable ties linking Rhodes and the Seleucid House at an earlier period have been noted[81]; Antiochus referred to them in 197 B.C. as 'of long standing'[82]. His own regard for Rhodes in the last two decades of the third century is testified by the numerous Rhodians he employed[83] -- it cannot be assumed that all were disaffected exiles like Polyxenidas -- and by his exertions to put a stop to the dangerous war between Rhodes and the Cretan communities before the Second Macedonian War[84]. There is good evidence to show that Rhodes took advantage of this situation; in fact her history in these years, from the Rhodio-Byzantine war, is an indication of how she did so. It was a disturbance of this condition that Rhodes feared; the entry of a fresh body into the complex Aegean situation, with ultimate damage to her own political interests. If Rome proved herself immeasurably the stronger she could indeed cross into the Roman camp; as on previous occasions she had deserted the weaker, or the falling, for the stronger; but this time there

would be a difficulty. Would she, if she did so, be able to carry the Greek communities with her? Such calculations probably lay at the bottom of the policy to which, if we may put even limited faith in the words, put into his mouth by Polybius, the Rhodian envoy gave expression in 207 B.C.

The mediators were, however, no more successful on this than on previous occasions, and the war continued until the next year, when Philip was enabled to penetrate into Aetolia, and sack the League capital, Thermon, and when, even after the success at the Metaurus, Rome sent no help, so that Aetolia made peace with Philip and the Hellenic Symmachy, without the assistance of Rhodes and the other powers[85]. The need for action thus became evident to Rome, and in the following year a force of ten thousand foot, on thousand horse, and thirty five ships crossed to Illyria, commanded by P.Sempronius Tutidanus[86]. Philip and the Romans alike avoided battle and the Epirots took advantage of the obvious unwillingness of both sides to force action, to mediate[87]. A conference was held at Phoenice, the Epirote capital, between Philip and Sempronius, and a treaty was concluded by the terms of which Rome secured her release from any obligations to defend her Greek allies, while Philip, freed from a burdonsome and, now that all hope of assistance from Carthage had vanished, unprofitable war, was able to turn in other directions[88].

Once the Peace of Phoenice was signed and ratified

by the Senate in 204 B.C. Philip was free to turn to the east, which had not been the object of Macedonian interest since the campaign of Doson in Caria, over twenty years earlier[89]. Philip thus completely abandoned the course of his earlier policy, so that for several years to come the whole effort of Macedonian arms was to be expended in the east. No doubt by so doing he hoped to satisfy his considerable appetite and ambition without infringing his treaty obligations, and without running the danger of Roman intervention. Perhaps he desired to forestall Antiochus' inevitable march into western Asia Minor, now that he had returned from the Upper satrapies. Further he may have desired to emulate, and to surpass, Doson's achievements in Asia Minor.

Such a policy, pushed further than Doson appears to have pushed it, would inevitably mean that Philip's activity would, at least concern, at worst serious affect, Rhodes. And Philip by deciding to turn his attention to the Aegean and Asia Minor must have reckoned with this fact, and decided he could afford to face the prospect of hostilities with Rhodes.

It is at this time that Heraclides of Tarentum, the individual who forms one of the main links between Philip and Rhodes, appears on the scene[90]. He took a leading part in the councils of Philip, occupying the chair left vacant by the death of Demetrius of Pharus at Messene in 214 B.C.[91] Philip,

ever ready to listen to stimulating advice, gave his new adviser a position of power and authority which his earlier record hardly justified. Born at Tarentum he soon won distinction in that city of doubtful morals by his immorality. He possessed however many qualities which marked him out for advancement: he was hard-headed, a bully and a born toady[92]. Before finding asylum at Philip's court he had been banished from Tarentum for suspected treachery during the Roman siege of the town, and had found refuge with the Romans. Subsequently he was forced to flee from Rome on suspicion that he was in communication with the Tarentines and Hannibal. He then made his way to Macedonia. There, in the years following the Peace of Phoenice, his influence grew so great that Polybius wrote of him that he was almost the most responsible for the destruction of that great monarchy[93]. Philip made especial use of Heraclides to further his plan of Aegean and Anatolian conquest.

Philip's aim from 205/4 B.C. onward appears to have been to force an issue with Rhodes, to enable him to drive her fleet off the sea and thus secure for himself safe passage across the Aegean, when he was ready for an attempt on the shores of Asia Minor. For this he needed a fleet, which he lacked.

The moment was now ripe for action against Rhodes, since The island was heavily engaged in a war with Crete.

Rhodian relations with the communities of Crete are uncertain largely because of the confused nature of Cretan affairs in the third century. When Eastern Crete was considerably under the influence of Egypt. Rhodians were welcomed at least in that part of the island[94]. Later, just after the Rhodio-Byzantine war, Rhodes was requested by the Cnossians to send a naval force to assist her in the Lyttan war, in which Cnossus was then involved[95]. The squadron dispatched under Polemocles, who had also held a command at the end of the war with Byzantium, incurred the hostility of the people of Eleutherna who suspected that one of their leading citizens had been handed over to the Cnossians by the Rhodians. As a result of this the Eleutherнians declared 'rights of reprisal', and subsequently war, on the Rhodians[96]. The affair seems however to have petered out; at least Polybius had no more to say about it[97].

The war which now broke out was the direct outcome of Cretan piracy, which had succeeded the earlier manifestations of that scourge, which had occupied the attention of Rhodes earlier in the century. The prelude to the war is not recorded, and has to be imagined: the complaints of smaller communities, the threats to property, the unexpected descents on isolated islands, with abduction of livestock and humans; all the characteristics of piracy in the Aegean throughout the centuries. Diodorus, who records the outbreak of the war, says that the trouble was entirely due to seven ships, and that their activity caused the merchants to lose heart, while the Rhodians for their part, fearing that the menace would eventually reach

home to them, went to war with the Cretans[98]. As an explanation of the causes of the war this is not very satisfactory. Against whom did the Rhodians declare war? The various cities of Crete were independent, some, it may be supposed, in the light of the incident of 220/19 B.C. mentioned above, friendly disposed to Rhodes, others no doubt hostile to her. Rhodes is thus not likely to have declared war on all 'the Cretans'. More probably she announced that she reserved freedom of action to deal with Cretan freebooters, and that, in principle at least, this would apply to all Cretan communities who supported or tolerated pirates[99]. Operations were therefore necessarily sporadic, as is indeed clear from the traces of the hostilities which have survived in inscriptions. Most of our information comes not from Rhodes itself but from the neighbouring islands of Cos, Calymna, and Nisyros[100]. Two inscriptions refer to the 'Cretan War', which one of them contrasts with 'the existing war' which is envisaged as following very closely upon the 'Cretan War'[101]. It seems clear that the latter war is that in which Philip and Rhodes were openly at war, while the former is the war whose outbreak is noted by Diodorus, and which appears to have been not a war against Crete so much as a war against Cretan pirates. Evidence that this war was in fact concluded by a separate peace, and is not to be identified with the war against Philip, is perhaps provided by the reference in one of the decrees of the Cretan cities concerned with the grant of <u>asylia</u> to Teos. This refers to a peace achieved through the

agency of Antiochus III[102]. What 'peace' this is, is not stated but there is no sign at this time, the end of the third century B.C., of an internal war in Crete, and the view which identifies this peace with that which closed the war between Rhodes and Crete is probably right[103].

If this be correct, two operations, or series of operations, have to be distinguished; first, the Rhodian war ag inst the Cretan pirates, which appears to have begun in 204 B.C., and to have ended in 201 B.C.[104]; Philip was in fact closely but not directly involved in this war; and secondly, the Rhodian war with Philip which began in 201 B.C. and the later stages of which merge with the Second Macedonian War.

The nature of Philip's intervention in the first of these two wars must now be considered more closely. This intervantion was affected through two agents, the Heraclides already mentioned, and a certain Dicaearchus. Philip's opening move in 205/4 was to send envoys to Crete to stir the Cretans to further efforts[105]. Simultaneously Dicaearchus, whose title is given as 'commander of the whole fleet and charged with the whole affair', was given twenty ships, and ordered to exact tribute from the islands and assist the Cretans in their war against the Rhodians[106]. At a slightly later date Heraclides was despatched to Rhodes in the guise of a suppliant to 'reveal' Philip's secret naval plans and activities directed through the Cretans at Rhodes[107]. Heraclides won the confidence of the suspicious Board of Magistrates, who already surmised that

Philip's hands were not clean in respect of the Rhodio- Cretan war, by posing as having fled from Macedonia and by reading a letter purporting to be from Philip to the Cretans, in which he assured them of his help against the Rhodians[108]. Once admitted into Rhodian confidence Heraclides managed to gain access to the closely guarded Rhodian dockyards, and carried out a brilliant act of sabotage, burning thirteen sheds, and the triremes in them, undetected[109]. He returned home to Macedonia unmolested.

It is remarkable but beyond dispute that in spite of this crushing blow, which probably deprived the Rhodians of much of their fleet not actually at sea, the war continued for some time, apparently a year or two, longer. And the peace signed in 201 B.C. was seemingly the outcome of other causes than exhaustion on the part of Rhodes[110].

This war, of which so little trace remains in the surviving historical literature, seems from the inscriptions in which it is described[111] to have been a very characteristic pirate-war; an irregular, intermittent fight, depending on surprise and strategem by sea and land alike. But that it did considerable damage is clear from the same documents. Measures of Home defence, akin to the Home Guard defence force of a more recent day, were organised by the islanders to protect their property from sudden incursions by pirates landing from light swift craft. It is much to be regretted that no Rhodian

inscriptions throw light on the effect the war had on that island, the communities of which, outside Rhodes, may have been up to that time without any means of defence. It is possible, though by no means certain, that it was this situation which led the Rhodians to maintain garrisons in such towns as Lindos, as a security measure. There is at least no indication that such forces existed before about 200 B.C.[112]

The war with Crete, after its opening stages, was only the superficial aspect of a more dangerous struggle. It was clear that, if Rhodes succumbed, Philip's road east to further conquest would be open.

After the operations of Dicaearchus and Heraclides Philip seems to have left the Aegean alone in 204 and 203; his activity in the northern part of his kingdom was perhaps intended to seal off those frontiers preparatory to his passage into Asia Minor[113].

In Asia Minor itself, however, his intrigues continued. A series of inscriptions from the Carian city of Iasos, outside, but close to, the northern boundary of the Rhodian Peraea and an ally of Rhodes indicates his interest in that area[114]. They deal with the activities of a dynast called Olympichus, of the Carian city of Alinda, perhaps to be identified with, perhaps the son of, the tyrant of that name who had sent gifts to Rhodes at the time of the earthquake twenty years earlier[115].

Olympichus, apparently working under Philip's orders, had instructed a subordinate commander named Podilos to attack Iasos[116]. The Rhodians perceiving, it appears, the significance of this attack, complained to Olympichus, and in substantiation of their demand that the city should not be molested, produced a letter written by Philip to the Rhodians, containing instructions to that effect to be passed on to Olympichus[117]. The wording of the last of the documents, in which the Rhodians transmit Philip's communication makes it clear that Rhodes, while determined to take any measures to defend the liberty of the Iasians, had no desire of clashing with Philip[118]. It is equally obvious that Philip here was pursuing the same policy which he had followed in the Aegean, that of using agents whom he could at will disown or even punish. Unfortunately the precise date of these documents is not certain. They are certainly earlier than Philip's sack of Cius in 202 B.C., since after the news of that event had reached Rhodes, the Rhodians considered themselves at war with Philip. But otherwise any date after 205 is possible[119].

It is at this stage that the other great powers of the Hellenistic world reappear. Egypt feared an attack not from Philip, but from her secular enemy, the Seleucid empire. The Egyptian court, dominated since the death of Philopator by the minister Sosibius, who had until now concealed the death of the king[120], sought to obtain immunity from possible invasion by

effecting a marriage with Philip[121]. It was proposed that Epiphanes, still regarded as the heir to the throne, and not yet, between autumn 204 and 203 B.C., announced as the new king, should marry one of Philip's daughters. The negotiations for this marriage were probably still in progress when Sosibius died, and shortly after Agathocles, his colleague, was compelled to announce Philopator's death[122]. He then sent Sosibius' son Ptolemaeus, to Macedonia to hurry on negotiations[123]. Philip received the envoy politely, kept him a full year at his court, and avoided making any decision about the marriage[124].

The turn of Antiochus came next. Apparently while negotiations between Philip and the Egyptian court were still in progress, he offered Philip something better; an alliance the aim of which should be the dismemberment of the Egyptian empire at home and overseas. The terms, the purpose, even the very existence of this 'secret pact' are disputed, and it does in fact appear to be one of the crucial events of the diplomacy of these years, the record of which would quickly be perverted[125]. When due allowance has been made for exaggeration, both deliberate and unintentional (such as necessarily would surround the terms of a treaty the terms of which were kept secret for sometime), the treaty appears to have made provision for assault by Philip on Caria, Samos and the remaining Aegean possessions of Egypt, while Antiochus undertook for his part to invade Coele-Syria and Phoenicia[126]. It is possible that the

treaty also contained provision for an attack on Egypt itself, Cyprus and Cyrene, the core of the extra-Egyptian domains of Egypt[127]. There can be little doubt that the formal expression of this treaty as aimed at the dismemberment of the Egyptian empire was due to misrepresentation. Probably it did not differ from previous treaties between the Antigonids and Seleucids, was perhaps only a re-affirmation of the obligations which had brought Gonatas to the side of Seleucus II, in the third Syrian war[128], and perhaps even earlier to the side of Antiochus I, at the time of the Battle of Cos[129]. The distribution of territories proposed in the 'secret pact' would be the natural distribution envisaged in any such alliance directed against Egypt.

It remains to determine what led Antiochus to propose, and Philip to accept, the formulation or renewal of such a treaty at this precise moment. Antiochus, clearly, had all to gain, and nothing to lose. His aim was the detachment of Coele-Syria from Egypt, and there is nothing, except the more dubious version of the pact, to suggest that his immediate ambitions extended beyond this. If he could win the support of Philip for this project, so much the better.

Philip for his part no doubt calculated that Rhodes would no longer oppose him at sea, and that the time had come for his expedition to Asia Minor. A desirable prelude to that end was that he should have assurances that his operations

against Pergamene, Ptolemaic, or Rhodian territories would not be interrupted by Antiochus III, who had an inherited, and therefore in contemporary eyes, a valid, claim to the Asiatic coast[130]. It would also permit him to achieve undisturbed the subjugation of more peripheral areas, such as the Thracian territories of Egypt.

The pact appears to have been signed late in 203 B.C. At the opening of the campaigning season of 202 B.C. Philip turned to the Hellespontine and Propontic regions, towards those states which were now allied with the Aetolian League. He forced Macedonian garrisons on Lysimachia and Chalcedon, and made unequal treaties with them; next he occupied Perinthus, and finally he passed to Cius, thenunder siege from his kinsman Prusias of Bithynia[131].

Philip was engaged in the assault on Cius when ambassadors arrived from certain neutral states to plead for the inhabitants of the town. The composition of the embassy is not known, since Polybius refers to them as coming from 'the afore-mentioned cities', and the passage in which the names of the cities was given is not preserved[132]. Rhodes, however, takes a prominent part in the negotiations which followed, and was doubtless one of the interceding cities. Possibly the cities who had co-operated with Rhodes in the attempted mediations of the Second Macedonian War again joined her. Philip prosrastinated, and bamboozled the envoys, and himself sent an envoy to Rhodes, whose mission was to expose the calumnies of Philip's opponents, and to demonstrate his own

friendly feeling for the city[133]. Philip's envoy was interrupted in the middle of his speech by the arrival of a member of the Board of Prytaneis who had just heard from an eye-witness recently come from Cius, of the sack of the city[134]. From that day, says Polybius, the Rhodians considered Philip to be an enemy of the state[135].

Rhodes' final break with Philip was in the issue a momentous event in the history of the eastern Mediterranean. To it can be traced the permanent establishment of Rome in the East, and for this reason, if for no other, the cause of this break needs to be carefully examined.

Undoubtedly the causes were complex. Rhodes had in the person of her ambassadors suffered a considerable humiliation through Philip's conduct at Cius, and the dignity of the Rhodian assembly had doubtless been affronted by the cynical behaviour of his envoy at Rhodes. Both these episodes showed clearly the depth of his animosity to Rhodes. There was thus the direct affront, which will have weighed in the Rhodian decision. Moreover, Rhodes' authority had been challenged. Just as, less than twenty years earlier, she had been compelled to take up the cudgels on behalf of the Islanders against Byzantium, so now her interests in the Northern area hardly permitted her to remain idle. Philip's method of treatment of Rhodes was a challenge and had to be answered.

More material considerations also existed. Rhodes' interests in the north were considerable, and some perhaps were

of fairly recent development. Her friends in that area, notably Byzantium, which had so often co-operated with Rhodes since the war between the two states in 220 B.C. were threatened. Nearer home the cause for the continuation of the war with the Cretan pirates could no longer be in doubt. Philip's hand had been exposed in this matter. Finally a glance at the wider political horizon must have shown that Philip would go on until he was stopped.

All these reasons doubtless contributed to the conclusive mood which the Rhodians had now reached. For the moment, it was true, the decision could not be implemented. Rhodes had not the strength at any time to engage Philip for long elsewhere than in the Aegean, and for the moment, before the news of the pact between Antiochus and Philip indicated their common hostility to Egypt, the world was lacking in allies. Though Rhodes took no immediate steps against Philip, by the following spring (201 B.C.) she was ready to oppose him. She appears to have committed herself to war with Philip before the Rhodio-Cretan war had ended. The negotiations to which reference is made in several Cretan inscriptions indicating that a peace was effected through the agency of an envoy of Antiochus III, seemingly refer to the negotiations which ended the war between Rhodes and the Cretan communities, and these negotiations probably belong to the period after the battle of Chios and Lade[136]. There is however no difficulty in supposing that the first steps towards ending the war were taken in 202 B.C., since there are indications that both sides were

beginning to weary of the struggle. On the one hand Cos probably withdrew from the war in the autumn or winter of that year[137], while, on the other, there are signs in the Cretan documents of a cooling-off in the loyalty of the Cretan communities to Philip[138].

The need to engage Philip with all speed faced Rhodes with the necessity of finding a strong ally. It has been stressed that before the announcement of the offensive alliance between Philip and Antiochus there was no open cause for hostility between the major powers. Relations between Egypt and Macedonia, the weakest point in the Mediterranean, were superficially good, and Antiochus had not yet revealed his intention of invading Coele-Syria. The past had, however, taught Rhodes the need of powerful allies. To that consideration all others had to be subordinated. Philip, the Rhodians could argue, would meet the reward he deserved for his rejection of normal standards of conduct at Cius.

The method adopted by Rhodes to combat the danger in which she stood from Philip was to summon Rome to her assistance, the one power which was not involved in the dynastic relationships of the Hellenistic kings, and which had effectively intervened in the Greek mainland, a few years before. By the terms of the Peace of Phoenice, Rome had however made it clear that she had no intention of becoming the arbiter, of Greek destinies[139], and there could therefore be no assurance that she

would provide the required assistance. Moreover, unless Philip had broken any of the terms of the Peace, Roman intervention against him would be hard to justify[140].

There were moreover difficulties, on the Rhodian side, which stood in the way of any approach to Rome. Rhodes had opposed Rome vigorously in the diplomatic field in the first Macedonian war, and, if trust may be put in the speech put into the mouth of Thrasycrates by Polybius, the basis of the Rhodian case at that time had been that Rome was a barbarian power, whose presence in the Greek world was both unnecessary and undesirable[141]. This policy had to be abandoned, and public opinion had to be trained and prepared to recognise in Rome the saviours of civilisation against the barbarities of Philip. The need to formulate such a policy may indeed have meant that Rhodes underwent considerable internal disturbances, though the play of parties in the ecclesia at this time is wholly unknown.

The need to solve these various problems of policy was doubtless responsible for the delay in asking for Roman assistance. Meanwhile another power had adopted the same policy. Aetolia, whose interests in the Propontic area had been so rudely handled by Philip, appealed to the senate shortly after the sack of Cius (autumn 202)[142], and the Rhodian government appears to have preferred to await the outcome of this embassy. In the interval relations with Attalus were put on a new basis. The Pergamene kingdom, as has been noted, had welcomed Rome in the First Macedonian War, and had thereby

incurred the disfavour of Rhodes and the other neutral powers[143]. The policy of the government, whose spokesman at this stage was Theophiliscus, the commander the next year at the Battle of Chius, was to secure an alliance with Attalus, as a prelude to an alliance with Rome, seems to have met with considerable opposition in Rhodes itself. Polybius records the achievement of Theophiliscus in achieving a rapprochement between Rhodes and Pergamum in terms which suggest that the Rhodians were unwilling to join Attalus, and the latter unwilling to embark on war[144]. There could however be no doubt that, if the ultimate aim was to secure the military assistance of Rome the co-operation of Attalus would be of considerable help.

Aetolia, meanwhile, which had suffered most directly from Philip's activities in that summer of 202 B.C., apparently felt better placed as regards Rome. She had been an ally of Rome in the past, and the separate peace she had signed with Philip in 206 had been the direct outcome of Rome's abandonment of the eastern theatre, in spite of her obligations[145]. The Senate could therefore hardly blame her for this, and a request to Rome for assistance against Philip was reasonable. The envoys of Aetolia found however on arrival that they had to face a Senate determined not to forgive that separate peace, or at least to use it as a reason for not intervening at Aetolia's request in the East[146]. The rebuff was direct, but its severest repercussions came later.

When the spring of the new year opened (201 B.C.) Philip clearly had little cause for alarm. The reception given at Rome to the Aetolian appeal

for help suggested that Rome would be slow to act, the Rhodian alliance with Pergamum was still unsecured, and the Rhodio-Cretan war had not ended. Philip might therefore deem a journey across the Aegean not unduly hazardous. At the worst he would have to meet the Rhodian fleet, and perhaps only scattered units of it. He therefore planned to cross the Aegean, seize the masterless Cyclades before help from Rhodes could reach them, and thus secure for himself a second line of communication across the Aegean, in addition to that he had already by way of the Hellespont. In fact the number of islands taken over by Philip is not certain[147]; when in the following year Rhodes took over the Cyclades in her turn it is stated that Macedonian garrisons were only on Paros, Andros, and Cythnos[148], but it seems unlikely that Philip limited his garrisons to these islands. It is quite possible that he withdrew his garrisons from the rest of the islands when he returned from Asia Minor at the end of 201 B.C. The fact that he garrisoned the insignificant Cythnus and Paros suggests that the larger and more important islands were also garrisoned, and since neither of those islands lay on his direct line of communications, it follows that his ephemeral conquest of the Cyclades had a political no less than a strategical motive.

From the Cyclades Philip passed on to Samos[149]. The capture of this island was tantamount to a declaration of war by Philip on Egypt, since the island was the oldest Ptolemaic possession in the Aegean, and her most important naval base, though it did not necessarily betray the existence of a pact

directed against Egypt, privately concerted by Philip and Antiochus[150]. Tactically, Philip's occupation of Samos was critical for Rhodes, since it cut the sea-route between Rhodes and Pergamum[151].

It was now that Rhodes directly opposed Philip. It may have been the action over Samos which provided the final spur, or it may have been some knowledge of the concerted plan of action against Egypt. The alliance with Attalus was certainly effected before the Battle of Chios with which the campaign probably opened, and that too doubtless influenced Rhodian policy at this stage. On the debit side of the account had to be set the fact that there appeared, to judge by the Senate's attitude to Aetolia, to be less hope of securing the assistance of Rome.

The sequence of events at this critical point, becomes extremely conjectural, and it does not appear that there is sufficient unequivocal evidence to justify any one view at the expense of any other, any more than there is in regard to the battles of Cos and Andros. Each view is open to certain objections, which one must face even though the scanty evidence does not permit the return of a certain answer[152].

After occupying Samos Philip apparently proceeded to sail north to Chios, to which he laid siege[153]. The siege seems to have been lengthy, and Philip was still engaged in it when the Rhodian and Pergamene fleets accompanied by a Byzantine detachment appeared from the north[154]. An engagement followed

in the straits between Chios and the mainland, of which Polybius preserves a fairly detailed but far from clear account[155]. The battle fell into two halves; on one wing the Rhodians won the day, while on the other the Pergamene fleet was put to flight and elements captured[156].

After the battle Attalus, his ships lost to Philip, returned to Pergamum[157]. Philip, taking advantage of the temporary weakness of the Rhodians, decided to sail back to Samos[158]. By a skilful manoeuvre, however, the Rhodians sailed round the Macedonian fleet, which lay to the south of their own, and stood next day blocking Philip's route to Rhodes and Alexandria[159]. Philip gave battle off the island of Lade, and, through an act of stupid seamanship rare in the annals of the Rhodian navy, [redacted] was left master of the day, while the Rhodians sailed back to their home bases[160].

Philip now turned to the Asiatic mainland. He landed at Miletus[161] as his great-grandfather had done on his last voyage to Asia, nearly ninety years before[162], and [redacted] prepared for a campaign to revenge himself for the part Attalus had played in the recent naval engagement. (June 201 B.C.)[163]. For the next two months he was engaged in the vicious and pointless operations against the Pergamene capital and neighbouring territory against which he found it necessary to disarm Athenian criticism[164]. It appears that Philip moved from Miletus to Pergamum by land, as might be expected, and that his fleet meanwhile operated against the Rhodian islands[165].

In about August 201 B.C. Philip was back from his

Pergamene campaign and ready to turn his attention to Rhodian Caria[166]. The campaign opened with an attack on territory adjacent to the Rhodian Peraea, namely the city of Cnidus[167]. The attack was unsuccessful, and Philip drew off to attack some small villages, the names of which are not recorded[168]. After the destruction of these he proceeded along the north shore of the Ceramic Gulf, where he reduced Prinassus, near Cedreae , by a strategem[169]. After this Philip proceeded against the main centre of the extended Rhodian Peraea[170], namely Stratonicea, Panamara, Tendeba and Astragon (the latter apparently insignificant villages in the chora of Stratonicea); Alabanda, never incorporated in the Rhodian territories, also fell to him[171]. Evidence for the defence of the Rhodian Peraea exists in an inscription, recording thanks to a Rhodian official for his services in this respect[172]. Much of The Rhodian Peraea thus conquered, Philip turned to the west, to the Carian Coast, north of the Rhodian Peraea. In September of 201 B.C. he attacked Iasus and Bargylia, the former of which he had instructed Olympichus of Alinda not to molest a year or two previously. While he besieged the two towns, his fleet lay by in the Bargylietic Gulf, supporting him[173]. It was during this siege that Attalus rejoined the Rhodian fleet[174]. The junction of the two fleets meant that active operations could again begin against Philip after a lapse of five months. The Rhodian commanders however, seem to have had no offensive plan; they contented themselves with sitting down and blockading Philip[175].

The siege was undoubtedly irksome, or worse, to Philip's troops, and the life they were forced to lead is dramatically portrayed by Polybius[176]. Nevertheless the period, bad though it was for the Macedonian forces, lost Rhodes valuable time, and brought no corresponding advantage.

It was probably during the blockade of Philip that the Rhodians heard more of the project of Philip and Antiochus, some suspicion of which must have been raised by Philip's occupation of Samos[177]. The form taken by the information they received can only be conjectured; undoubtedly the pact lost nothing in the telling, through having been concealed for two years. It probably appeared more threatening to Rhodian interests than it really was[178]. Her main problem, how to drive Philip from Caria and how to maintain authority in the islands near her, would not be greatly affected by the pact. Antiochus was away beyond the Taurus, campaigning in Coele-Syria, and past relations between the Seleucid House and Rhodes did not suggest that Antiochus would operate, or assist Philip to operate against, Rhodes. Nevertheless, such reasonable calculations were probably not heard; the island had been at war almost continuously for five years, and was ready to listen to irrational prophecies. It appears to have been supposed that the treaty contained a pledge by Antiochus to assist Philip in his conquests, against whomsoever they might be directed, though in fact, as later historians knew, its operation was limited to an attack on

Egyptian possessions.

In the face of such a threat assistance from Rome became more than ever necessary. In achieving this Attalus would clearly play an important part,but his general reluctance to plunge into hostilities suggests that the first move was taken by Rhodes.

A joint embassy from Rhodes and Pergamum visited Rome while Philip lay blockaded in the Bargylietic Gulf[179]. The story told by this embassy is not recorded by our primary authorities, Polybius and Livy, but is preserved by Appian who is ultimately dependent on Polybius, though his writing is contaminated by Roman sources[180]. According to Appian the Rhodians announced to the Romans the pact concluded between Philip and Antiochus. This fact of central importance need not be doubted. Whether the historicity of the pact is accepted or not there can be little doubt that the story of the pact was recounted by the Rhodians to the Romans.

Announcement of the pact led to a profound change of policy at Rome. The earlier policy of withdrawal from responsibility in Greece, a policy the continuation of which had been very brusquely indicated to the Aetolians the previous year[181], was now put aside. Rome accepted the request of the Rhodians and Pergamene envoys, and was thereby launched on the policy which led to the total subjugation of the Greek world. The motives of this change of heart are disputed[182]. Among the most probable factors may be reckoned the fear of Philip, whose energy and determination Rome had experienced in the First

Macedonian war. To this fear might be added a fear of Antiochus, certainly an unknown quantity in the political field, but one whose military strength and skill could not go in doubt. Perhaps there was also a fear of an invasion of Italy by Philip, who was known to have aimed at such an invasion in the Social War, when he was less formidable in himself and without the support of Antiochus. These fears were doubtless to some extent compensated by other considerations, which pointed no less towards intervention. First a natural feeling of confidence after the close of the Hannibalic War; secondly, the need for the Senate to maintain the prestige of the Roman name, in spite of the war-weariness of the Roman people; thirdly, recognition of the fact that the Peace of Phoenice could not be the permanent instrument of relations between the east and the west; its terms were too mild or too strong.

In spite of these and perhaps other calculations the Senate maintained its calm[183]. It informed the envoys that the matter must be considered[184], and despatched three legati, who carried out a series of missions both in Greece itself and in the Eastern Aegean[185]. In Greece, after passing through the west of the country where they recited the ultimatum they intended to deliver to Philip[186], they arrived in Athens in April 200 to find that Attalus with his fleet lay at his base at Aegina[187], while the Rhodians had arrived at Peiraeus after an attack by Rhodian and Pergamene vessels on Macedonian raiding-craft[188]. In early spring 200 B.C. Philip had slipped through the blockading vessels in the Gulf of Bargylia and made

straight for Macedonia pursued by the hostile fleets[189]. Once safely home, he had answered the appeal for help made to him by the Acarnanians, who had been outraged by the Athenian murder of two Acarnanian youths who had attended performance of the sacred rites of Demeter at Eleusis[190]. He sent some troops to assist them, and appears also to have sent some naval craft which raided the Paralia of Attica[191]. It was these craft which the Pergamene and Rhodian ships had attacked. At this stage the sequence of events becomes highly uncertain.

Attalus himself now received a very warm welcome from the Athenians[192] and it was he who played the decisive part as mediator between Athens and Rome. The precise status of Athens at this time is unfortunately uncertain; it appears likely that up to the year 200 B.C. Rome and Athens were politically strangers to one another[193]. If that be correct then Athens was probably just one more port of call for the Roman legates; they went to Athens to read out the ultimatum to Philip, just as they had read it elsewhere. Athens, indeed, was still a city of the first importance because of the prestige she derived from her past history, and it was therefore desirable for the Senate to know how the city would react to the probability of the return of Roman troops to Greece.

The situation was, however, extremely complex. Philip's troops were ravaging the vicinity of the city, while Attalus and the Rhodians, both at war with Philip, were also outside on the other side. It was, moreover, as a result of Rhodian and Pergamene action that there were Roman envoys in the city. Rome

however, was not at war with Philip yet, and, if he accepted the terms of the ultimatum which they had broadcast, might never be. Nevertheless, the adhesion of Athens would be welcome, both for the authority Rome would acquire by claiming Athens as among her first allies in Greece, and also for the excellent port which Rome would thereby acquire on the East coast of Greece. A solution of this problem was found in the intervention of Attalus who had just been received by the Athenians with a fulsomeness reminiscent of the praises showered on Antigonus the One-Eyed and Demetrius by Athens a century before. After some delay, Attalus requested the Athenians to join the alliance already existing between himself, the Rhodians and the Romans.[194]

The immediate effect on the Rhodians of this exhibition of solidarity against Philip seems to have been to encourage them in the pursuit of their own aims, rather than the common prosecution of the war. The Rhodian envoys, and the ships which had pursued Philip from Caria sailed out of the Saronic Gulf, into the Aegean, where they received the Cyclades into alliance[195]. Thus there sprang into life again the Nesiotic League, which appears to have fallen into abeyance after the great naval battles of the Chremonidean and Second Syrian wars. It is possibly on this occasion also that an alliance was concluded with the cities of the newly

formed Lesbian κοινόν, though these were of course not included in the Nesiotic League of the Cyclades[196].

The event clearly marks a new and important development in Rhodian policy. Until now Rhodes had been content with the exercise of a moral sovereignty over the Cycladic islanders. She protected them and on important occasions she spoke in their name, but there is no suggestion before 200 B.C. that the islands stood in any juridical relationship to her. Now, apparently at a critical moment, when the main necessity was to preserve energy for the struggle with Philip, she took on these new responsibilities.

This move was largely dictated by circumstances. It has already been noted[197] that one of the main problems facing Rhodian diplomacy should the city finally join Rome, was how to carry with her into the Roman camp, the communities of the Aegean over which for the previous half century she had exercised a considerable authority, and which had, at least until 220 B.C., been closely, and apparently willingly, associated with Macedonia[198]. Rhodes' task was to swing the islands over as quickly as possible. In some instances Philip's conduct had already achieved this end, especially in the Southern Sporades; elsewhere diplomacy or force was needed. It was this task which Rhodian envoys now undertook. The moment was clearly the most advantageous at which to impress the islanders with the force of the new

alliance; Rhodes, Pergamum and Rome, and, now, Athens. There was also the need to forestall action by other interested parties, notably Attalus and Rome. The danger of renewed Macedonian activity probably appeared to be over.

With the Rhodian action the last period in the history of the Aegean islands as independent communities begins. For about forty years the islands stand under the aegis of Rhodes[199], as they had stood three-quarters of a century earlier under the protection of Egypt. Rhodes imposed herself on the islanders a good deal more than Egypt had ever done, probably because as an Aegean power herself she knew what obligations were necessary: but nevertheless within certain limits, the islands were still free in a way that, for instance, the inhabitants of Rhodes' Carian and Lycian territories never were.

Important though the event in Rhodian and Aegean history undoubtedly was, in the fast-gathering climax of events it may well have passed unnoticed. Following the Athenian adhesion to the side of Rome, Philip sent his general Nicanor to devastate Attica[200]. The Roman envoys, still in the town, were therefore compelled, however much they may have wished to preserve their discreet silence (which was itself so different from their blatant display of the Senate's ultimatum to Philip in the towns of west Greece)

to read the ultimatum to Philip's general[201], after which, in an extraordinarily inconsequential manner, they sailed away to Rhodes, to mediate between Ptolemy Philopator and Antiochus III[202].

Philip's reaction to the Roman ultimatum was characteristically violent. He despatched Heraclides with his fleet to attack Maroneia, the Ptolemaic possession on the Thracian coast, while he hurried in the same direction with two thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry[203]. His conquests in this area were brief and complete, and by late summer 200 B.C. he had crossed the Hellespont and begun the siege of the independent city of Abydus[204].

Rhodes, at this juncture, appears to have played an ambiguous game. Although she had considered herself at war with Philip since the sack of Cius two years previously, and although she now belonged to a coalition actively opposed to Philip, the active measures she took were negligible: on the request of the Athenian envoy Cephisodorus, she sent three quadriremes to the help of Athens, but since that city was being besieged by land, they can have done little more than sit in the Peiraeus[205]. Attalus was of more assistance since he sent foot-soldiers[206].

Rhodian policy in the north was even more equivocal. The Rhodian fleet was despatched to Tenedos, whence it could watch the Macedonian fleet, which was presumably cruising in

Thracian waters, and keep a distant eye on Philip at Abydos; but all the active help she sent to that sorely-tried city was a single quadrireme[207]. Polybius censures the inactivity of the Rhodians and Attalus, who sent only three hundred troops, and accuses them of 'laziness'. He implies that, had they been ready to help the city, it might have been saved[208]. Apologists have sought to explain and justify the Rhodian and Pergamene attitude. It has been suggested that both were exhausted by their efforts of the previous season, and by the winter watch at Bargylia[209]. However the last action in which Rhodes had been engaged was the battle of Lade in April 201 B.C., from which she might be supposed to have recovered, while the winter watch at Bargylia cannot have placed men or ships under a very great strain. The Gulf lay close to Rhodes, and the navy controlled the sea, and therefore could not be regularly relieved. Moreover, if the fleet was exhausted, why did it not stay at home, instead of going to Tenedos? It seems clear that the decision not to operate against Philip was a political one. Its cause cannot be determined. Perhaps Rhodes had instructions from the Roman envoys now in the island to take up their position at Tenedos, whence traffic through the Hellespont could be controlled, if need arose, but not to engage in hostilities until the new ultimatum, now being concocted at Rhodes by the

Romans, had been presented to Philip, and all possibility of a peaceful settlement had vanished[210].

Whatever the cause of the Rhodian action in taking her fleet up as far as Tenedos, and from there sending only a single vessel on to Abydos, it is clear that the main responsibility for the tragic end of that city must rest with Rhodes and Attalus, and primarily the first.

Before the final scenes were enacted at Abydos, the Roman envoy M. Aemilius Lepidus arrived from Rhodes at Philip's camp, with the Senate's indictio belli directed against Philip[211]. The period since the ultimatum had been delivered to Nicanor at Athens had seen the approval by the Centuries at Rome of the declaration of war against Philip[212], and the terms now offered to Philip were considerably harsher than those of a few months earlier. Two additional clauses were inserted by the envoys, perhaps at Rhodian instigation, to the effect that Philip should not attack territory belonging to Egypt, and that a tribunal should assess the restitution due from Philip to Attalus and the Rhodians[213]. Philip, however, aware that the activities of Dicaearchus and Heraclides constituted no ground for war as infringements of the Peace of Phoenice, since no certain proof existed of his complicity in them, maintained that the Rhodians had been the aggressors in Spring 201 B.C. The Roman envoy ignored the strict interpretation of the Peace, and demanded whether the same held good for Athens, Cius and

Abydus, all victims of Philip's aggressions[214]. It was thus clear that Rome's ultimatum rested not on the foundation of the Peace of Phoenice, but on the premise that Rome had a position as defendress of any Greek city, regardless of whether it had treaty relations with Rome. Philip, recognizing the situation, told Lepidus that he would fight if attacked in contravention of treaty-obligations assumed by Rome at the Peace of Phoenice[215].

The two views were irreconcileable, as Rome doubtless meant they should be, and as, ten years later, similarly irreconcileable views led to war between Rome and Antiochus.[216] Rome declared was on Philip, thereby becoming technically the aggressor, and Philip, after he had finished off the siege of Abydos, returned post-haste to Macedon to prepare for war[217].

At Rhodes, meanwhile, an attempt was made by the neutral Achaean League to prevent an outbreak of hostilities by mediating between Rhodes and Philip.[218] However while the Achaean envoys were in Rhodes, the Rhodian ambassadors who had been sent to Rome the previous year, and who had pressed for complete adhesion to the Roman cause, returned from their successful mission. The Rhodian Demos therefore determined 'to adhere to the Romans, and keep their friendship in view'.[219]

The juridical nature of the obligations Rhodes

assumed by joining Rome were probably not formally expressed at this stage. As usual when the issue hinges on the translation into Greek of certain phrases of Roman international usage, such as foedus, societas, amicitia and so on, it is impossible to be certain that both parties regarded the terms translated as equivalent, as having identical content; the historical background behind each set of terms was widely different, and the use, for instance, of the Greek word symmachia to translate the latin foedus can be regarded at best only as an approximation. However, when due regard is made for this particular difficulty, the question of Rhodes' status in the Roman international world is not very difficult to determine[220].

From the events during and after the Third Macedonian war[221] it is clear that neither side considered that an alliance entailing the subjection of Rhodes' foreign policy to that of Rome existed before that period. The latin expression for this subject-alliance was foedus societatis which appears to have been normally translated by the Greek Symmachia[222]. This latter word is not used to describe the relations between Rhodes and Rome before the Third Macedonian War. The word consistently used from 200 B.C. onwards is φιλία , and Livy, in his version of Polybius, refers to the amicitia which existed between the two states[223]. Amicitia may be used in latin to convey the existence of a foedus, a foedus amicitiae, but the term is not

necessarily so used, but may refer to relations which lack a juridical basis. Such it is clear was the nature of the attachment now formed between Rhodes and Rome; 'friendly relations', and not 'a treaty of friendship'. There is nothing in the evidence which suggests that a foedus of any sort existed at this time. It is striking that Rome should have been satisfied with a relationship which depended on the maintenance of good-will, the continuation of which was not secured in a treaty, as the basis for her intervention in the East, since a strong current of popular opinion might thus suffice to endanger Rome's position, as occurred at the time of the third Macedonian war[224]. That she was prepared to enter into these far-reaching commitments on the slender basis of amicitia is an indication of the anxiety felt in influential circles in Rome to intervene in the East.

The insignificant part played by Rhodes in the Second Macedonian War contrasts strongly with the vital role she played in the diplomatic relations just discussed. For the remainder of the year 200 B.C. Rhodian activity was limited to some minor operations, undertaken by the three ships which had been sent to Attica together with some Roman ships against Macedonian possessions in Euboea[225]. In the course of the following winter Roman envoys arrived in Rhodes with the request 'that they should take part in the war'. This remark, made after war had begun and after Rhodes had actually participated to a limited degree, appears to indicate

Roman dissatisfaction with the Rhodian effort[226]. This inactivity may have been due in part to the final settlement of Rhodian affairs in Crete[227].

In the following year Rhodian activity was again slight. That of Attalus rather greater. Early in the year the combined Roman and Pergamene fleet entered Peiraeus and in Athens decrees were passed dishonouring the memory of the Antigonids[228]. From Peiraeus the united fleet sailed on to Andros, still garrisoned by Macedonian troops. After a brief resistance the city surrendered, and the population and garrison was transferred to Delium in Boeotia[229]. The city of Andros was given to Attalus, the booty the Romans kept for themselves[230]. Thus one of the few islands of which it can be said with certainty that it was at this time, in summer 199 B.C., outside the Rhodian Nesiotic League, was transferred by force of Roman arms from Macedonian to Pergamene rule, without Rhodes, the power primarily concerned, being in any way consulted. There can be little doubt, that deliberately or otherwise, Rome had prejudiced the Rhodian cause. The centre of the Rhodian Nesiotic League was not Delos, but Tenos[231], and that island was separated from Andros only by a narrow, unnavigable, channel. Rhodes might reasonably feel that Andros, if it was to be awarded as a prize, should go to her; and, in any case, the presence of a foreign power on the very doorstep of the centre of the new

League could only lead to friction.

As if stimulated by this unfortunate event twenty Rhodian vessels now arrived in the western Aegean[231], and continued to operate until the end of the year. The part they played was small, largely perhaps because their ships were not carrying foot-soldiers who could be used in the siege of coastal towns, such as Oreus, held by Macedon. At the end of the season, in which Rhodes had done little to assist materially in the prosecution of the war, the contingent, under its admiral Agesimbrotus, returned home[232].

The year had thus hardly been satisfactory at sea. Rome appeared anxious to favour Attalus, and had done so markedly on two occasions; whether in so doing she hoped to sow suspicion among her two major allies may be doubted. Such Machiavellism, characteristic of Roman policy though it may at times be, was out of place in the opening stages of a war in the East against a dangerous foe. What cannot, however be attributed to Roman cunning, must be attributed to her no less considerable diplomatic stupidity. By her misplaced generosity towards Attalus she laid the seeds of dissension between Rhodes and Pergamum, which remained a threatening point of weakness in the alliance for many years.

In 198 B.C. while Titus Quinctius Flamininus and Philip struggled and negotiated in Albania[233], the war in the Aegean continued its undistinguished course. The Roman naval commander, Lucius Flamininus, brother of the consul,

met the Rhodian and Pergamene detachments at Eretria in Euboea[234]. The Rhodian contingent was the same as in the previous year, and still commanded by Agesimbrotus. After a series of combined operations against the philo-Macedonian towns Eretria and Carystus, both of which surrendered, the fleet of the allies put into Cenchreae as the campaigning season drew to an end[235]. The land war, meanwhile, offered more prospect of an issue. Flamininus had found a way round Tepeline-pass and was crossing Sterea Ellada, in an attempt to re-establish communications with his fleet. In Phocis, Elateia, on the edge of the hills that flank the north-eastern sides of the plain of Phocis, resisted him[236]. While besieging the city he heard of indications that the Achaean League might be willing to throw in her lot with Rome and her allies[237]. His brother Lucius, with representatives of Athens, Rhodes and Pergamum, was despatched to a special meeting of the Achaean League, at which Philip's envoy, Cleonaeus, was also present[238]. On the second day of the meeting the assembly ratified an alliance with Rhodes and Pergamum, while the question of an alliance with Rome was left in abeyance until envoys should be sent to Rome, to confirm it[239]. Subsequently the whole Achaean levy moved out to attack Corinth, but the siege had to be abandoned on the appearance of Macedonian relieving troops on the Perachora peninsular[240]. Rhodian forces did not take part in this operation, doubtless because, as in the previous year, they

were not carrying troops for land operations[241]. Since, however, Agesimbrotus represented Rhodes at the Conference of Nicaea in the following winter[242], he, with some of his fleet, probably remained in Greek waters, and did not return to Rhodes until after that conference.

The most considerable achievement of the year had undoubtedly been that of Titus, who had forced the back door of Macedonia in Epirus, and brought over many cities in central Greece. South of the Corinth canal the main event was the inclusion of the Achaean League in the alliance; compared with these happenings the war in the Aegean was but an unimportant side-issue, and the part played in those events by Rhodes was, even so, a minor part.

The following winter a conference was called at Philip's request, at Nicaea on the Maliac gulf[243]. Philip came from Demetrias, with Cycliadas the exiled leader of the pro-Macedonian party in the Achaean League, and among the representatives of Rome and her allies was Agesimbrotus, the nauarch[244]. The Roman demands were that Philip should evacuate all Greece, restored the prisoners and deserters to their original ranks, and hand over to Rome those places in Illyria which he had acquired since the Peace of Phoenice[245]. The Rhodians demanded the cession of all the Peraea now in Macedonian hands, the evacuation of Iasus, Bargylia and Euromus, the re-establishment of the sympolity between

Perinthus and Byzantium, and the abandonment of Sestos, Abydos and all ports and harbours of Asia[246].

Such demands were reminiscent of the Roman ultimatum at Abydos in 200 B.C.; they had no basis whatever in treaty, and were completely irresponsible. Rhodes, who wanted Philip expelled from Asia, could doubtless justify her claims to herself on the grounds that she was protecting the Asian communities, as she had for years protected the Aegean ones[247]; but the difference was considerable. Rhodes was not the leading power of the Asiatic mainland, and was not in a position to maintain the position she arrogated to herself. Such a task, if it was to be fulfilled at all, was clearly the responsibility of Attalus, whose territories extended over these areas, though the Greek cities were still independent of him. The special interest taken in the affairs of Byzantium is perhaps in a different category. The city had numerous old ties with Rhodes which had been intensified in recent years; in particular, Byzantium had been the first ally of Rhodes and Attalus in 201 B.C., and was thus entitled to preferential treatment.

Philip promptly rejected the Rhodian terms, other than that referring to the retrocession of the Peraea, to which he announced his willingness to agree[248]. On the second day of the conference Philip, while he announced his agreement to withdraw from the Peraea, refused to remove his garrisons from Iasos and Bargylia[249]. After the rejection of the allies' terms the conference broke up, on the under-

standing that there should be a truce of two months in which Philip was to send an embassy to Rome to discuss the differences outstanding between himself and the allies[250]. No Rhodian was included among the envoys who now proceeded to Rome[251], and from this point onwards Rhodes ceases to take any part in the war, the last year of which was confined to land operations. In addition Rhodes was just at this time compelled to shift her attention to Asia Minor where the situation in and near the Rhodian Peraea was developing unfavourably for her[252].

After the battle of Cynoscephalae[253] a meeting-place was fixed for conference at the entrance to the Vale of Tempe. Here a preliminary conference, to discuss the demands which should be laid before Philip, was held between Flamininus and the allied leaders, and the next day Philip was introduced to the concilium[254]. The terms which the allies required were the same as those which had been formulated the previous winter at Nicaea. Philip accepted them without hesitation, and agreed to submit to the Senate's decision all questions not included in the earlier terms. He was granted in return a truce of four months and ordered to pay an immediate indemnity of 200T to Flamininus; to send his son Demetrius, together with some of the Macedonian Friends, to Rome as hostages, and to send an embassy to Rome for final discussion[255].

Rhodes had thus achieved what she had no right to

expect -- the full satisfaction of the claims of the previous year, and her policy had received its justification. Even if, on the eve of these events, she could not claim to speak for the free communities of Asia, the fact that she had now so spoken, and that her demands had been met, meant that from the morrow she would inevitably speak for them. Nobody could now deny Rhodes' right to speak for the independent Greek cities of Asia. The greatly increased prestige thus won was the Rhodian harvest of this war.

This diplomatic victory came at a time when Rhodes was in need of some good news. The war itself had not been long or arduous, but Rhodes had not gained any new territories, during or as a result of it, while in another theatre, the Rhodian Peraea, it is clear that events were far from satisfactory.

Rhodes had been maintaining another war here continuously, since Philip's first invasion in 201 B.C. The Rhodian troops were commanded for four successive years by the Lindian Nicagoras, who left more than one record of his achievement[256]. In these dedications he records the areas he recovered for Rhodes; they are all in the further parts of the Peraea, in territory not long since subjugated, north and east of the Ceramic Gulf, and they do not indicate that Philip penetrated to the heart of the old incorporated territory[257]. The reference to these places nevertheless indicates the wide scope of operations, and suggests that

considerable forces were employed. This notion is confirmed by what we hear about Pausistratus, Nicagoras' successor in the Peraea. Among the troops which Pausistratus commanded were villagers from the territories recaptured by Nicagoras, and numerous Achaean troops. some mercenaries, some apparently sent in accordance with the obligations of the Achaean-Rhodian alliance of the previous year (198 B.C.). The Achaean troops included some cavalry[258]. With these troops Pausistratus continued the gradual successes of his predecessor. He captured a village in the neighbourhood of Stratonicea, and after the withdrawal of the Macedonian troops to Bargylia, other forts and villages fell to the Rhodians[259]. Large scale reconquest of territory does not appear to have occurred before the final stage of the campaign in which the Rhodian forces were assisted by those of Antiochus III[260].

Before the campaign for the reconquest of the Peraea was concluded the situation was greatly changed by the defeat of Philip at Cynoscephalae and by the altered situation in Asia Minor, whither Antiochus had now turned his attention.

Antiochus' victory at Panion in 200 B.C. marked the turning-point of the Fifth Syrian war[261]; the conquest of Coele-Syria and Palestine was however not finally completed until 198, and in the autumn of this year he returned to Antiocheia for the winter[262]. The next spring he appeared in Asia Minor[263]. This apparent change of policy, when an advance on Egypt might have been feasible, was in fact in

keeping with Antiochus' policy throughtout his reign; his aim was to restore the empire of his ancestors, and once the limits of that empire had been reached in any direction he had no ambition to conquer beyond it[264]. Therefore Sinai and Egypt to which none of his ancestors had ever laid claim, or attempted to invade, lay outside his programme. The conquest of Coele-Syria and Palestine, accomplished by autumn 198 B.C. represented the achievement of his aims as far as southern expansion went. Before him lay a further stage of reconquest, that of Asia Minor which had fallen to Seleucus Nicator after the Battle of Cyropedium[265]. This territory had passed out of Seleucid control at varying times and in varying degrees, during the previous eighty years, in a manner which still defies final comprehension; part had been lost through the establishment of independent communities, such as Galatia, part through the rebellions of Seleucid governors and viceroys, part through the agency of Egypt, always anxious to establish her power on the coast of Asia Minor, and part yet again through the gradual expansion of the Rhodian Peraea. Much of this territory had been recovered by Antiochus III himself, earlier in his reign, when he had suppressed the revolt of Achaeus, but to achieve that he had been compelled to submit to the retention by Attalus of some of the Greek cities of Asia Minor[266], while others were still held by Egypt. It was certain, then, that his attempt to restore the boundaries of the original Seleucid empire would bring

him into conflict with more than one power. Livy represents his action first as directed against Egypt, and secondly as a delayed fruit of the pact between the two kings[267], but it is clear that by this time Antiochus was working on his own plans and timetable, and no longer needed the treaty except to use it as a convenient pretext.

The appearance of Antiochus III off the coast of Cilicia affected directly the future of Rhodian possessions in Caria, and was bound to influence immediately the military situation there. His arrival may well have disconcerted the Rhodians, excellent though their relations normally were with the Seleucid House. His unexpected presence, combined with the dangerous situation in which Philip now found himself, provoked the conclusion that Antiochus had come west to honour that treaty, fear of which had led Rhodes to summon Rome from the west. Rhodian reaction now was, in miniature, not unlike what it had been a year or two before, when the first inklings of the pact were abroad. There was in fact no likelihood that Antiochus wished to be embroiled with Rhodes: his own naval arm was as yet untried[268], and the Rhodian fleet was a formidable arm against which to launch inexperienced crews. Moreover the wider repercussions of a break with Rhodes might be disastrous, since it might lead to conflict with Rome and Pergamum. Of such a struggle the issue could hardly be in doubt. The Rhodians, however, in their alarm did not calculate Antiochus' prospects objectively; they saw the

threat advancing and decided to oppose it.

Antiochus was engaged in the siege of Coracesium, in Pamphylia, when Rhodian envoys reached him[269]. Their demand was simple: let Antiochus not pass beyond the Chelidonian Isles, which lay off the Lycian Promontory; otherwise they would oppose him, not from any hatred, but to prevent his junction with Philip, which would hinder the Romans in their task of liberating Greece[270]. Antiochus answered tactfully: he would send ambassadors to Rhodes with instructions to renew the old ties between his House and the Republic; they were not to be alarmed at his approach which boded ill neither to them nor their allies; nor did he intend to disturb relations between himself and Rome, relations which were extremely friendly, as his recent embassy to Rome, and the decrees voted in his honour by the Senate, showed[271].

Ambassadors from Antiochus were duly sent to Rhodes in June of that year, and were in the midst of negotiations when news arrived of the defeat of Philip at Cynoscephalae[272]. The effect of this news was to banish from Rhodian minds the spectre of a coalition between Philip and Antiochus, fear of which had dominated her policy for half a decade. Rid now of the danger of her challenge being answered and war being forced upon her, Rhodes turned the situation to her own profit, by increasing her reputation as defendress of free cities against Antiochus. The negotiations with Antiochus were apparently broken off, and Rhodes hurriedly rendered help to

the remaining Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor, which Egypt no longer had the strength to protect herself and which were threatened by Antiochus' advance[273]. By the despatch of troops and by timely advice concerning Antiochus' intentions, Rhodes enabled Caunus, Myndus, Halicarnassus and Samos not to fall victims to the Seleucid[274]. Antiochus apparently agreed to these measures which amounted to these cities passing under Rhodian control, in fact if not in name, in return for Rhodian concurrence in his advance into Asia Minor, beyond Coracesium. It is probable that Antiochus also engaged to assist the Rhodians in expelling the remaining Macedonian garrisons from the Rhodian Peraea. In particular it is recorded that the important city of Stratonicaea, which Pausistratus had failed to retake in 198 B.C. returned to Rhodes through the agency of Antiochus[275].

Antiochus' advance into Asia Minor made war between him and Rome for the first time a concrete possibility. When, in the spring of 196 B.C.[276], he set off from Ephesus towards the Hellespont, and later crossed into Europe, and rebuilt the recently destroyed city of Lysimacheia, he was still within his ancestral kingdom[277], but he made that conflict inevitable, even though several years were to elapse before its outbreak.

From now until the outbreak of the Antiochic War in autumn 192 B.C. Rhodes attempted to maintain her friendship for two powers both far stronger than herself, which were

moving into conflict with each other. The tradition of these years is however poor, and the part Rhodes played can only be inferred from occasional references. Fundamental to these years must have been the agreement of 197 B.C. between Antiochus and Rhodes, which had given the latter greatly increased power in the cities of the Carian coast, and had enabled Antiochus to continue his advance westward. Other actions of Antiochus show that Rhodes enjoyed his confidence to an outstanding degree. At the conference at Lysimacheia late in 196 B.C. between Antiochus and the Roman commissioners, the former offered to submit to Rhodian judgment the vital dispute over the status of Smyrna and Lampsacus[278]. Rhodes had by this time won a considerable reputation in the sphere of international arbitration[279], and it is possible that Antiochus' suggestion is a reflection of that reputation, but it is more probably a token of the confidence Antiochus felt that any Rhodian judgment would go in his favour; he could not risk an adverse arbitration at this stage. The Romans refused to accept Antiochus' proposal, and nothing more is heard of it.

In 193 B.C. negotiations between Antiochus and Rome, the continuation of those of the previous winter in Rome, took place at Ephesus[280]. In the course of these discussions Antiochus offered, through his spokesman Menio, to guarantee the autonomy of the Rhodians, Cyzicenes and Byzantines 'and all the other Greeks of Asia', if agreement should be reached

between himself and Rome. This statement is only recorded by Appian[281], and the absence of any reference to this guarantee in Livy's more detailed narrative has led to its rejection[282]. It seems, however, to be perfectly reasonable. The collocation of the three cities which, though geographically so distant from each other, had yet co-operated on so many occasions[283], suggests a well-informed source. Moreover, the utterance accords well with Antiochus' policy; all three cities which he specifically mentions were, and had been, since the battle of Cyropedium, wholly free[284]; therefore in guaranteeing their freedom, Antiochus was not abandoning his claim to a foot of the antiqua imperii formula[285].

Grateful though Rhodes must have been to Antiochus for his material assistance in the reconquest from Macedonia of her Carian territory, the profits which she owed to him were largely of local significance. Her debt to Rome was greater, and could not be set summarily on one side. First and foremost it was through Rome that Philip had been driven from the Aegean, and all his intrigues in that area been nullified; it was through the patronage of Rome that Rhodes had been enabled to stand forth as the spokesman of the Greeks of Asia, and the peace terms imposed on Philip had confirmed that right. Moreover it was probably clear to Rhodes, as to others, by this time that Rome had entered the Mediterranean for good; that she was likely to remain the arbiter of Grecian destinies; in fact, that Rome was in the

ascendent, Antiochus in the decline. Rhodes was well fitted by her traditional policy to deal with such a situation; Antiochus would have to be abandoned, as Demetrius Poliorcetes and Ptolemy Philadelphus had in turn been abandoned when their stars began, or seemed to begin, to set; the only question was, when should the break be made?[286]. It is difficult to determine when it was in fact made, but there are signs in the years immediately preceding the Antiochic War that Rhodes was bent on helping Rome to the utmost. Thus in the war between Rome and Nabis of Sparta the Rhodians rendered considerable help to the Romans,[287] stimulated perhaps by the memory of the part Nabis had played a few years earlier in the Rhodio-Cretan War[288]. Her naval contribution in this war was indeed scarcely, if at all, smaller than her contribution to the Second Macedonian War, where her own interests had been closely affected[289]. The signatories to the peace which concluded the war were Nabis on the one side, and Rome, Eumenes of Pergamum and Rhodes on the other. The terms were markedly advantageous to Rhodes. Nabis was compelled to give up all cities he held in Crete, and was deprived of the power both of making alliances with, and waging war against, Cretan communities.[290] He was thus cut off from his old friends the Cretan pirates[291]. Rhodes could feel that the war had been justified by the peace and that this new feather in her cap was a further justification of the government's adherence to a pro-Roman policy. The fact that the cities of Crete were to be virtually given

to Rome did not alter the excellence of the bargain from the Rhodian standpoint, since the Rhodians had no territorial ambitions in the island[292].

The complex series of events which preceded the arrival of Antiochus in Greece in October 192 B.C. did not effect Rhodes in any way, since they largely developed round the hostility of the Aetolian League to Rome[293]. It was the League which, by the capture of Demetrias, finally induced Antiochus to undertake the hazard of an invasion of Greece[294].

The war did not begin for Rhodes until the first stage, the campaign in Greece, was over. In April 191 B.C. Antiochus was defeated at Thermopylae and fled to Chalcis in Euboea, and thence to Asia[295]. Once back in home waters, [redacted] on the advice of Hannibal, he took measures for the defence of Asia Minor. He went in person to the Thracian Chersonese to strengthen his garrison there against a possible invasion through Thrace; he ordered Polyxenidas, the Rhodian exile who commanded his fleet, to refit his ships; and sent out reconaissance units round the islands[296]. It seems possible, that if we are to understand by the 'islands' those of the central Aegean rather than the innumerable small islets which lie off the Asiatic coast, [redacted] Antiochus' intention here was to discover the disposition and plans of the hostile Rhodian fleet, which up till now had not put in an appearance.

In late summer of 191 B.C. Gaius Livius, the new

commander of the Rhodian fleet, reached Peiraeus and took over command from Aulus Atilius. From Peiraeus he sailed to Delos, where he was held up by Etesian winds for several days[297]. On hearing of the arrival of the Roman fleet Polyxenidas urged in conference at Ephesus that it was imperative to give battle before the Rhodian and Pergamene contingents should join the Roman[298].

The absence of the Rhodian fleet in this first campaign of the war is surprising. It is possible that it reflects a certain reluctance on the part of the Rhodian government to commit the city to open hostilities before effective naval help was forthcoming. Antiochus had collected quite a substantial fleet before crossing to Europe[299], and Polyxenidas had been busy increasing and repairing it since his return[300]. It is thus possible that Rhodes felt it necessary to wait for allies. Once the Roman naval contingent appeared there is no sign of any hesitation on the part of Rhodes. The only engagement of this year was the Battle of Cape Corycus, and here, it is true, the Rhodians failed to take part. The Rhodian contingent of twenty-five cataphracts arrived after the battle was over, when Polyxenidas had already been driven into Ephesus harbour[301]. This delay may have resulted from purely natural causes, such as the adverse winds, which blow in the Aegean at this time and which had already held up C. Livius at Delos, and there is no reason to see in the absence of the Rhodians further indications

of an unwillingness to commit themselves. By fitting out and despatching their fleet they had already showed that they were ready to join their allies.

After the combined fleets had stood off at the mouth of Ephesus harbour for some time, the Roman commander dismissed the Rhodian and Pergamene contingents, which returned home, while the Roman fleet made preparations for wintering at Canae, on the Aeolic coast, opposite the south-east corner of Mytilene. This marked the end of the first naval campaign[302].

The absence of the Rhodian fleet was interpreted by Antiochus, doubtless correctly, as unintentional, and he considered it essential to increase his fleet in view of the threat of increased numbers against him the coming spring. He was sure, says Livy, that they would not be late a second time[303]. He therefore sent Hannibal to Syria to bring over the Phoenician fleet, and ordered Polyxenidas to prepare for a new naval campaign. He himself wintered in Phrygia[304].

The Rhodian fleet of thirty-six ships, probably comprising four squadrons, set sail from Rhodes in March 190 B.C. to join the Roman fleet[305], part of which still lay at Canae, while a contingent under Livius was besieging Abydos, The personal hatred of Polyxenidas for the Rhodian commander Pausistratus caused, however, the almost complete annihilation of the Rhodian fleet off Samos. Pausistratus, lulled by

Polyxenidas' false promise that he would surrender the King's fleet to him, was caught in a trap at Panormus, a harbour on Samos, and, on attempting to escape, his fleet was captured with the exception of five Rhodian and two Coan ships, and he himself killed[306]. The effect of this disaster was considerable. It reduced Rhodian fighting strength to practically nothing at one blow, and its immediate effect on the strategy of the war was considerable; Livius, who was still engaged in the siege of Abydos, fearful for the safety of the remainder of the fleet drawn up at Canae, abandoned the siege and returned down the Aeolic coast, but finding the gates of Phocaea closed against him, turned his course to Samos[307].

In Rhodes, meanwhile, the arrival of the news of the disaster[308] had been followed by a period of intense activity. Ten ships were sent forthwith under Pausistratus' successor, Eudamus, whose more cautious temper would, it was hoped, compensate for his inferiority to Pausistratus in the more warlike virtues[309]. This squadron joined the Romans at Samos, and the combined fleet sailed towards Ephesus, in the hope of forcing a battle on Polyxenidas who lay there. Little was achieved, however, beyond some ineffectual land operations and the Allied fleet returned to Samos[310]. Here Livius detached two Rhodian and two Italian triremes under the command of Epicrates, to guard the Strait of Cephallenia, which was temporarily shut to Roman convoys because of the

activity of Cephallenian pirates. Epicrates, however, never reached the Ionian Sea, since at Piraeus he met the new Roman naval commander, L.Aemilius Regulus, who learning of the recent disaster at Samos, and being unwilling to disperse his strength, ordered Epicrates to return with him[311].

On their return to Samos a council-of-war was held[312]. Livius, the out-going Roman commander, proposed that shipping should be sunk across the mouth of Ephesus harbour, thus immobilising Polyxenidas' fleet. This was opposed by Eumenes, who feared the effects on the countryside of the enforced presence of the Seleucid fleet; he also point out that the Roman and allied fleets would have to sit out the winter at sea, exposing themselves to wind, rain and wave. Eudamus, though Rhodian nauarch, said nothing; his subordinate Epicrates suggested that a part of the fleet should be sent to Lycia to bring Patara into the alliance. Thus, said Epicrates, 'with the lands opposite their island pacified, the Rhodians would be able to bring their whole strength to the single struggle, and the enemy fleet, now being assembled in Cilicia would be prevented from joining Polyxenidas'[313]. This suggestion, so obviously advantageous to Rhodian interests, met with general approval.

The operation was, however, a failure. Livius, who was given command, took two Roman quinqueremes, four Rhodian quadriremes, and two light Smyrniot vessels. He was instructed to call at Rhodes and inform the Rhodian government

of the plan[314]. Here three quadriremes were added to his command by the Rhodians, and with them he set out for Patara[315]. A swell arose and carried the ships beyond Patara to Phoenicus, two miles to the east. A surprise attack on the town failed, and with it the expedition, since the alarm had been given[316]. The squadron therefore sailed to the gulf of Telmessus, and split up, the Rhodians returning home, and Livius to [illegible] Greece[317]. Aemilius, however, was determined to succeed where Livius had failed, so, shortly after the return of Livius to Italy, he too sailed to the coast of Asia Minor, putting in at the Bargylietic Gulf[318]. Here Iasus was held by a Seleucid garrison, and Aemilius began the siege of the city, but was induced to abandon it on Rhodian and Pergamene intercession[319]. The fleet then sailed down to Loryma, in the Rhodian Peraea[320]. Here a council-of-war was held, and it was decided to abandon the whole expedition, in view of a rumour that the enemy fleet had sailed out of Ephesus. Thus the Rhodian attempt to remove the focus of the naval war away from the Hellespontine, and central Aegean, area failed. The whole episode indicates, however, the extent to which Roman officials listened to specious and plausible stories put to them by their Greek allies.

At the same time Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, who had been left by the latter in charge of Aeolis, took

advantage of the absence of Eumenes in Lycia to undertake the siege of Pergamum itself[322]. Eumenes returned post-haste from Samos, but did not dare to offer a general engagement[323]. Meanwhile his fleet which lay at Elaea, was joined by the Rhodian and Roman contingents, the crews of which were landed. Antiochus, in view of this and the information he had received of the approach of the Scipiones with an army through Macedonia, decided to treat for peace[324]. His offer found the allies divided: Rhodes, which had not so far had a very successful war, had nothing to gain by a continuation of hostilities, and favoured peace. But the opinion of Attalus, who feared that he was going to be left to face Seleucid hostility alone, and earnestly pleaded for a continuation of the war, prevailed[325].

The Rhodian fleet, together with a contingent of her allies, was shortly recalled to meet the new menace of the Phoenician fleet, to collect which Hannibal had previously been despatched by Antiochus[326]. In meeting this danger the Rhodian government showed considerable energy. From the home fleet thirteen ships, under the command of Pamphilidas, were sent to meet the enemy fleet as it coasted round Pamphylia[327]. Three days later these were followed by the ships of Eudamus which had just arrived from Samos, to which were added six more vessels[328]. Eudamus overtook Pamphilidas at the island of Megiste, the most easternly possession of the Rhodians, off the southern tip of the Lycian coast, and from here the combined fleet sailed east as

far as Phaselis, a Rhodian colony and the finestlook-out point on the whole coast[329]. A severe outbreak of marsh fever caused Eudamus and Pamphilidas to move their fleet further east to the mouth of the Eurymedon. Here news was received that Hannibal with his newly assembled fleet had reached Side, a few miles east of Aspendus[330]. Simultaneously Hannibal received news of the presence of the Rhodian fleet, and next day the two fleets sailed out of their respective harbours, ready to give battle[331].

In spite of the numerical superiority of the Syrian fleet[332], the battle ended in complete victory for the Rhodians, who showed far greater naval skill, courage and endurance than their opponents. (August 190 B.C.)[333]. Hannibal was for the present at least prevented from passing into the Eastern Aegean, and the possibility of his immediate junction with Antiochus was excluded[334]. The Rhodians took the additional precaution of stationing twenty ships under Chariclitus, one of the commanders of the Battle of Side, at Patara and Megiste[335]. Eudamus, the victor of Side, was meanwhile ordered to return to Samos, to try and interest the Romans in yet another Lycian venture, to relieve Patara.[336] The Roman commander was sympathetic to the Rhodian argument, but the fear of an attack by Antiochus on the maritime cities of Ionia and Aeolis, forbade any distant enterprises on a large scale. Only four ships were despatched with Pamphilidas to join the Rhodian detachment off Patara[337].

Antiochus, now at Ephesus, apparently believing that far less of the Rhodian fleet was at Samos, than in fact was, decided that the moment had come for him to reassert the command of the sea which he had lost the previous year. Apart from the absence of the Rhodians, Eumenes was also absent, having moved with his fleet to the Hellespont, to prepare for the crossing of the Scipiones into Asia[338]. L. Aemilius, drawn out of Samos harbour by the news that Antiochus was laying siege to Notium, moved towards Chios to provision himself. On the way he put in at Teos to conduct a punitive expedition against the Teians who had been supplying the king's forces. While his fleet lay in the eastern harbour of Teos news was received that the fleet of Polyxendias was at Macronisi opposite Myonnesus promontory. The Roman and Rhodian crews were hastily collected and embarked, and the ships put to sea. The opposing fleet met half way between the promentories of Myonnesus and Corycus[339].

The battle, the most decisive of the war, which finally drove Polyxenidas from the sea, was very largely a Rhodian victory, and in particular owed much to the skill and initiative of Eudamus. At the beginning of the battle the right-wing of the Roman fleet was in danger of envelopment from the far longer Syrian line, and that this was avoided was due to Eudamus' own initiative in bringing up the rear-guard he commanded. Once the two lines were engaged it was again the Rhodian contingent that caused the greatest damage,

both moral and material, by its employment of fire weapons. The Romans, once they had broken the enemy's line, turned in his rear and attacked that section of the line which was broken off from the main body and sunk. Thereupon the right wing fled back to Ephesus. The Syrian loss in ships was considerable, forty-two vessels in all, of which thirteen were captured by the Romans, the rest burnt or sunk. The Roman fleet lost two ships, with several damaged; the Rhodians one only[340].

The battle of Myonnesus marked the end of the Seleucid attempt to regain naval superiority, and equally precluded any further attempt by Antiochus to contain the Roman land-forces at the Hellespont. He returned to Sardis and devoted his attention to a continuation of the war in Asia[341]. The victorious Roman and Rhodian fleets proceeded to the Hellespont, the prize of the year's campaigning, and assisted the passage of the Roman troops from Europe to Asia. That task completed the Rhodian fleet returned home, having vindicated beyond dispute the policy of the government[342]. In the remaining months of the war, before the battle of Magnesia, the Rhodians played no part.

Scipio, after the victory of Magnesia, imposed temporary terms on Antiochus at Sardis[343]. They were similar in substance to the terms which had been offered to Heraclides of Byzantium, Antiochus' envoy, a month or two previously[344].

They were: abandonment of all claims in Europe, the evacuation of Cistauric Asia, the payment of 15,000T (Euboic) indemnity to Rome, 400T to Eumenes, together with a quantity of corn, and the delivery of twenty hostages among them Hannibal, Thoas of Aetolia and some other less important personages. These terms were accepted by Antiochus' ambassadors, who went to Rome along with ambassadors from all the states of Asia including Rhodes, and Eumenes himself[345].

These ambassadors arrived in Rome in early summer 189 B.C. Eumenes, the first Greek king to appear in Rome, was received with the highest honours by the Senate, and he addressed the Senate first. His speech, like that of the Rhodians which followed it, revealed the profound distrust which existed between the two co-belligerants. Shorn of its verbiage and falsehood, ~~the proposals of Eumenes~~ it contained the proposition that, if Rome did not choose to annex Asia Minor, which ~~he~~ Eumenes regarded as the most satisfactory solution, he hoped they would award it to him, and ignore the plea which the Rhodians would make for the autonomy of the cities of Asia Minor, a plea which, he could assure them, would only be disguise for imperialistic ambitions[346]. In their turn the Rhodian ambassadors advised the Romans to consummate their work for the freedom of Greece and ignore the proposal of Eumenes that the cities of Asia Minor should be handed over to him, a move, they foretold, which would only bring shame

on the Romans[347].

The Senate proved itself quite equal to pleasing both parties. Caria, south of the Maeander river, and Lycia were assigned to Rhodes, the rest of Cistauric Asia to Eumenes; explicit stipulations were made regarding the Greek cities in these areas. Within this general outline the details and application of clauses were to be worked out by the Ten Commissioners who travelled to Asia to join the consul, Manlius Vulso[348]. In summer 188 B.C. the Ten Commissioners reached Ephesus and sat down to dispose of Cistauric Asia in accordance with the Senate's terms[349].

A review of Rhodian history in the thirty years from the Byzantine War to the eve of the Peace of Apamea, shows Rhodes almost continually at the centre of events. The period is clearly divided into two by the Aegean campaign of Philip, which quickly led to the Rhodian summons to Rome. The characteristic of the first fifteen years in Rhodian policy was that Rhodes strengthened her contacts and relations with the independent Greek communities of the North Aegean and the Hellespont. Some explanation of this new relationship may be found in common commercial interests, but it is clear that these contacts were also political. There are undeniable instances of common action between Rhodes and these Northern powers in these years, and with them are associated Egypt and Athens. All these powers have a common policy in the period of the First Macedonian War, a policy of which the essence was

that they themselves remained neutral, and tried to compose the quarrel betwe n Philip and Aetolia, which had brought Rome and Pergamum on to Greek soil, in such a way as to exclude those powers from any say in the destinies of Greek communities. Perhaps this is not a policy of 'Greece for the Greeks', since it does not appear to have had a racial basis: Pergamum, against which Polybius makes the Rhodian spokesman speak most forcibly, was, by adoption, pure Greek, even if Paphlagonian blood ran in the veins of Attalus, and the objection to that king was not that he was a barbarian. But if not a policy of 'Greece for the Greeks' it was a policy based on the common belief that the communities of Greece proper and of the Aegean formed a single world which should live at peace, and which should be able to settle its own problems. The basis of this belief was probably political as far as Rhodes was concerned, the conviction that the entrance of foreign powers would upset the existing world in one corner of which, the Aegean, Rhodes had so carefully established her authority. Thus in the first fifteen years after the Rhodio-Byzantine War Rhodes and other powers were seeking a solution of current problems which would have preserved the old world unaltered. This policy might, if successful, have postponed for many years the entry of Rome into the arena of the eastern Mediterranean, by removing the pretext for such an innovation.

Philip's changed strategy after the Peace of Phoenice

led to the adoption of a widely different policy. The part played by Philip in the Rhodio-Cretan War, indicated clearly his intentions against Rhodes, while, at least in the opinion of the Rhodians, his agreement with Antiochus, revealed at a slightly later date, showed the wider trend of his policy. The situation was complicated by the fact that all, or almost all, the Hellenistic kings were superficially on the best of terms with each other, allied by marriage or political agreement. Rhodes therefore, to preserve her own security was compelled to enlist the aid of Rome, the only major power not involved or compromised in the Eastern Aegean at the time. In so doing Rhodes was justified in that she was the victim of aggression, but at the same time it showed that the calculations which had prompted her stand against Rome during the First Macedonian War had been political, and not based on the high principles which Polybius puts into the mouth of Thrasycrates.

From the start the fruit of Rhodian co-operation with Rome was such that a reversal of that policy might well have met opposition at home. One important benefit that fell to Rhodes was that the island was enabled to re-establish, on a new basis of subjection to Rhodes, the old Nesiotic League. Through this League Rhodes controlled the Aegean for well-nigh forty years. A second, far more important benefit was that after the war with Antiochus a large tract of Asia Minor came under Rhodian sway.

The other main direction of Rhodian policy resulted from the activity of Antiochus. This king, with the vigour

characteristic of his House, had set out to re-establish his ancestral empire. In the course of this he had formed an alliance with Philip, of uncertain import[illegible], and had wrested Coele-Syria and Palestine from the control of Egypt. His determination to achieve his aim in Asia Minor brought him face to face with Rhodes, with whom his house had a long tradition of friendship. A conflict was avoided by the defeat of Philip at Cynoscephalae, which removed the danger of a junction of these two monarchs. Rhodes and Antiochus compromised and Antiochus went on his way.

Nevertheless when hostilities broke out between Antiochus and Rome, Rhodes chose the stronger side, though she owed the weaker the reconquest of her Peraea. In so doing Rhodes was not fulfilling any treaty obligations, since at this stage she had none with Rome. She was acting in accordance with her familiar policy, by which she clung firmly to the strongest power of the day, and deserted it when its political decline, or extinction, was apparent. So she had deserted Demetrius Poliorcetes, and transferred her loyalties to Ptolemy, and so, when even that vast power showed signs of cracking, after the battle of Cos, she transferred herself to the Seleucid and Macedonian camp; and now, when Antiochus was faced with the victor of Hannibal and the more recent victor of Philip V, she abandoned her friendship for the Seleucid house, which had but recently been cemented, and remained true to Rome.

This is Rhodian policy throughout the Hellenistic

Age, and right at the end it was an error of judgment in pursuance of the same policy which cost Rhodes so dearly. Certainly it was only by the pursuance of such a cautious and wordly policy as this that a small independent community could hope to survive in the midst of the great powers. The Peace of Apamea was a token of how successful, and how justified in the result, that policy had been.

CHAPTER IX

From the Peace of Apamea to the alliance with Rome (188-164 B.C)

The history of Rhodes between the Peace of Apamea and the entry of Rhodes into the Roman symmachy (164 B.C.), is of all periods the best testified. Rhodes occupies very much the centre of the stage in this quarter-century, and little that happened in the east in these years left her unaffected or disinterested. Polybian excerpts give us numerous pictures of events in Rhodes and provide us with what is lacking for every other period of Rhodian history, namely accounts of sessions in the Rhodian ecclesia. These accounts are undoubtedly drawn directly from a Rhodian source[1]. We are thus enabled to clothe with life the dry bones of the lists of magistrates and the like, preserved in the few inscriptions which refer to Rhodes, and not to one of the three old cities. At the same time Polybius has much precious information regarding the Rhodian possessions in Caria and Lycia, and their administration; and this information, amplified by inscriptions from Rhodes and from Asia Minor, enables us to penetrate still further into the nature of Rhodian government.

In spite, however, of the relatively abundant information available, difficulties remain; in particular the nature of the surviving portions of Polybius' history,

excerpts made κατὰ γένος in the Byzantine age, makes itself more felt in this than in the earlier periods. The excerpts are, on the whole, short, and since their context is sometimes uncertain, it is not always possible to ascertain the sequence of events recorded in different excerpts. The main defect of this period is, in fact, a considerable amount of minor chronological uncertainty, which however does not seriously hamper the general appreciation of events.

With the arrival of the commissioners accompanied by Eumenes, in early summer 188 B.C.[2], the stage was set for the final settlement of the terms of the Peace that had been signed the previous year at Rome. By the territorial clauses of the treaty Antiochus was required to evacuate those parts of Cis-Tauric Asia which he held, and to renounce his claims to the whole[3]. The territory of which the Seleucid Kingdom was deprived by this clause came under Roman disposal, in conformity with the arrangement made with Eumenes and Rhodes at Rome in 189 B.C. The larger part of it went to Eumenes; in Asia, Hellespontine Phrygia, Phrygia properly so called, Mysia, Lycaonia, the Milyas, and Lydia, together with the towns of Tralles, Ephesus, and Lycian Telmessus; in Europe, the Thracian Chersonese, Lysimacheia, and the neighbouring forts and territories which had previously belonged to Antiochus[4].

Rhodes was awarded Caria, south of the Maeander

River, and Lycia[5]. Thus, the Greek cities apart[6], Cis-Tauric Asia was divided, with a few unimportant exceptions, between Rhodes and Pergamum, in reward for their fidelity in the recent wars. There appear, however, to have been a significant difference between the gifts Rome thus awarded her allies, other than the mere difference in area between the vast domains now acquired by Pergamum, and the more modest areas which fell to Rhodes. It is clear, though it is nowhere expressly recorded, that the control of Eumenes over the territories he now acquired was regarded as absolute. Whether indeed his relation to the land he thus acquired was ever expressed in juridical language in precise terms may be doubted, but that all concerned regarded his tenure of it as irresponsible seems certain. His control of it was never questioned, either by subject-communities or by Rome herself. On the other hand the gift to Rhodes, at least of Lycia, became the subject of acute controversy, soon after the Peace. The difficulties in which Rhodes found herself as a result of this uncertainty are vividly portrayed by Polybius[7].

In addition to a grant of territory, Rhodes, unlike Pergamum, profited by economic measures in her favour. All houses which had previously belonged to Rhodians or to the allies of Rhodes, were confirmed in Rhodian possession, all debts owed to Rhodians within the kingdom were to be paid, and all moveable articles taken from their property were to

be restored to them[8]. Finally, the immunity from taxation which had been granted to Rhodian merchants within Seleucid territory by Seleucus Callinicus after the earthquake of 226 B.C.[9] was to be restored to them[10].

Perhaps the most striking clause affecting Rhodes was that by which the city and territory of Lycian Telmessus was given to Eumenes[11]. This gift placed the Pergamene king in an excellent position to dominate, and if necessary invade, Rhodian Caria and Lycia, regions which, by his occupation of Telmessus, he now separated. It seems probable that Roman policy aimed at establishing a look-out post from which Eumenes, the devoted friend of Rome, could keep watch on Rhodian activities, and it must be considered at least probable that Rome by this juxtaposition of powers with differing interests hoped to maintain or enflame the friction which existed between Pergamum and Rhodes. This friction had found notable expression only the previous year, when the speeches of the Pergamene and Rhodian ambassadors had not only revealed the fundamental jealousy which existed between the two powers, but had also emphasised the widely differing principles of government which, in the near future, would actuate their respective governments in the new territories to be administered[12].

Another possible cause of friction lay in the treatment of enemy equipment and war-machinery. By the terms of the

Peace Eumenes was awarded all the elephants taken from Antiochus[13]. With this decision no-one could quarrel, since Eumenes had become the major land power of the Asian continent and might be required to defend Rome's interests against other Hellenistic powers. Rhodes, for her part, might reasonably have hoped that a substantial portion of the Seleucid fleet, which the courage and bravery of her sailors had defeated in the Antiochic War, would be allotted to her. But here the decision of the Commissioners was perverse and decisive. They forbade the Seleucid fleet to sail beyond Cape Sarpedon in eastern Cilicia, and limited the navy to ten ships; the rest of Antiochus' fleet, fifty cataphracts, they ordered to be burned in Patara harbour[14]. Thus at one blow Roman policy deprived the power most able to protect her interests at sea of a very valuable reinforcement of naval strength, and emphasized the difference in the treatment meted out to Pergamum and Rhodes.

The various items of the Peace suggests that Rome, though willing to reward Rhodes for her services, was no less anxious to keep a check on the city. The wisdom of her policy seems doubtful. Rhodian hostility, as Roman diplomacy recognised a few years later, could not be dismissed as of no importance; it might influence the whole course of events in the newly conquered eastern Mediterranean. Her influence in favour of the preservation of peace on the Roman terms might be no less vital. As the strongest Greek naval power in the Hellenistic world Rhodes was marked to fulfil a double

purpose in the Aegean and Asia Minor, once Roman units were withdrawn; she could maintain order in the Aegean, and for this a strong Rhodian fleet and Rhodian control over the islands were essential; and also, provided there was sufficient motive for her to do so, she could act as a check on Antiochus, should he in the future again turn his attention westwards into Asia Minor. By the grant of Caria and Lycia, Rome recognised the importance of interesting Rhodes in the maintainance of Roman and Rhodian authority in Asia as a check to Antiochus, but the desire to draw the teeth of friend as well as foe, which led to the measures described above, shows not the cleverness but the bankruptcy of Roman notions of international relations at this time.

The economic clauses in favour of Rhodes are most easily explained as due to a special application by the Rhodians, and therefore do not constitute an index of Roman policy towards Rhodes. The Rhodian desire for a speedy restoration of her normal economic relations with Asia Minor, which had been interrupted by the Antiochic War, was perfectly natural. The Senate could, undoubtedly, have refused permission for these clauses to be included in the Peace, but there would have been little advantage in so doing, since although the clauses[1a] represented the restoration of Rhodian preferences, these preferences had already been in existence in the Seleucid Kingdom for nearly forty years, and

in no way affected Rome's own commercial interests which did not yet extend to the eastern Mediterranean[15].

It was probably at about the time that the redistribution of territories occurred that Rhodes purchased the Carian city of Caunus[16]. The city had been taken under Rhodian protection in 197 B.C., at the time of Antiochus' advance into Asia Minor, together with other Carian cities; there is, however, nothing to suggest that the city was purchased on this occasion, and the language of Livy, in recording the incident suggests an unofficial relationship, rather than dependence or subjection[17]. The cities mentioned probably came under Rhodian influence at this time, but that is all. A more precise indication of the occasion of the purchase is provided by the statement of Appian that the Caunians became tributary to the Rhodians 'after the war with Antiochus'[18]. There is no evidence to the contrary, and consequently no reason why the statement should be rejected. Since the city was already in revolt against Rhodes in 167 B.C.[19], the purchase may fairly be attributed to the period of the Peace of Apamea, rather than a later date[20].

The decisions of the Commissioners mark the beginning of the last and greatest period of Rhodian history. In this period the island controlled much of western Asia Minor, and through the Rhodian Nesiotic League dominated the Aegean Sea, and she played an important part in the major political events

of the age. While reserving for special and detailed treatment the question of the nature of Rhodian rule in Asia Minor[21], and of the constitution of the Nesiotic League[22], a survey of Rhodes' political contacts in these years and particularly of her relations with Rome, and their melancholy end, and of the sway of feeling in Rhodes itself, is of particular interest as revealing both the inability of the Senate to reconcile itself to the survival of friends who desired to retain their independence, and the continuation of the Rhodian policy which had been so successful since the time of the Diadochi, and had led her to the top of the contemporary world; desert falling friends. Rhodes' downfall is perhaps due in part to the misapplication by her government of just that principle, to its failure to realise that Rome was not another Ptolemaic Egypt, or Seleucid Kingdom to be discarded, when the right moment arose.

Almost immediately after the Peace trouble arose as to the status of Lycia. While the commissioners were still in Apamea, two representatives of the Rhodian government, Theaedetus and Philophron, arrived on an embassy to request that Lycia, the future status of which had clearly not been settled in the earlier stages of the negotiations, should be handed over to them as a gift, that is, unconditionally[23]. The request was opposed by envoys from Ilium, who had come to plead the Lycians' case for them, on the ground that the people of Lycia were linked to those of Ilium by ties of

kinship; they pleaded that the Lycians should not be punished for their previous error in siding with Antiochus[24]. Polybius says that the Commissioners attempted to please both parties as much as possible. They therefore took no 'ruinous measures' against the Lycians, but at the same time gave Lycia to the Rhodians as a gift[25] -- which was exactly what the Rhodians had wanted, and was indeed ruinous, and what the Lycians were trying to avoid. The contradiction is clear, but cannot be explained satisfactorily. On this evidence alone, no clear answer can be given to the question 'Was Rhodes given undisputed control, on a juridical basis, of Lycia?' Subsequent events show that the Rhodian behaved as if they believed they were undisputed masters of the region while the Lycians held that they were only allies of Rhodes, and the same view was taken by the Roman Senate in 177 B.C.[26], in direct contradiction to what, according to Polybius, the Commissioners had said in 187. It is therefore not very likely that a wholly acceptable explanation of this confusion can be found.

It is possible that Polybius here records a version that was in circulation at Rhodes: namely that the Lycians were handed over as a gift to the Rhodians; if that be so, however, the statement that the Commissioners had tried to please both sides would surely have been suppressed, as implying that Lycia had some claims to autonomy, which was

denied by the Rhodians. It is moreover clear that the uncertainty existed in fact from the very moment of the award. Polybius records that after the meeting between the Ilian ambassadors and the Roman commissioners, the former, journeying through the Lycian cities after leaving Apamea, announced that it was through their good offices that freedom had been restored to the Lycians[27]. It does not seem at all likely that the Ilian ambassadors would have said this publicly if it had been false. It would have involved them and their city in considerable trouble both with Rhodes and Rome. Again, the Lycians, in the belief that they were autonomous allies of Rhodes, sent an embassy to the city to conclude the formal alliance, while the Rhodians for their part sent out some officials to organise Lycia and Caria in the required manner[28] The Lycian request for an alliance was rejected in the ecclesia, and Pothion, the chief prytanis[29], administered a public rebuke to the envoys, whose answer, in turn, to the unexpected rebuff, was 'to endure all rather than carry out the orders of the Rhodians'[30]. It is clear from these events that both sides earnestly believed they were in the right, and that the cause of this undoubted confusion must lie in the words spoken, but not, unfortunately, recorded, by any surviving source, by the Roman commissioners at Apamea, who by trying to please both sides, satisfied neither[31].

The question thus arises, whether the ambiguity of the Roman envoys on this occasion was deliberate or accidental.

On our answer to this hinges our judgment of Rome's Eastern foreign policy at this time. Was it cynical and calculated, as may have been its attempt to maintain the hostility between Rhodes and Pergamum, or was it simply blundering and incompetent?

There are two reasons, one precise and one general, for supposing that the ambiguity was either directly inspired by the Senate, or subsequently approved by it. First, in 177 B.C., when the Romans desired to administer a lesson to Rhodes, the Senate told the Rhodians that they had examined the Acta of the Commissioners, and found that they stated that the Lycians had been made allies of the Rhodians[32]. The matter, as is clear from the two passages already noticed, was not as simple as that; there was a least a case to be made out for Rhodes' claim, as the words preserved by Polybius show. The Senate by refusing to admit this indicated her own partiality, and it is probable that the original ambiguity may have been a deliberate design to retain the means of humiliating Rhodes if it should become necessary in the future.

Secondly, if the ambiguity was unintentional, it has to be explained as due to the inability of Rome's representatives, and their staff, to express themselves in an unequivocal manner in Greek, whether in speech of on paper. This is very difficult to believe. Rome had been in almost continuous diplomatic contact with one part or another of the Greek East (quite apart from Sicily and Magna Graecia) for a quarter of

a century, and during that period had occasion to frame diplomatic documents such as the terms of the Peace of Phoenice and the peace concluded with Philip V in 197, which required a considerable knowledge of Greek.

It therefore seems reasonable to assume that Rome's ambiguity was deliberate. Perhaps not the least surprising aspect of the matter is the failure of the Rhodian representatives to protest against the decision, whether it was vocal or written. But this must remain a mystery, since we have no knowledge of the precise wording employed by the Commissioners.

The decision of the Lycians after the failure of their embassy to Rhodes to resist Rhodian rule to the uttermost, found expression in the following years in almost continuous guerilla warfare, which was fomented by Rome and, on one occasion, by Pergamum. This warfare forms the background of the Rhodian administration of Lycia, and explains in some measure the harshness of Rhodian rule.

The wars, or phases of the war are recorded only in passing by Polybius, and their precise chronology cannot be established beyond doubt[33].

Astymedes, the Rhodian statesman, complained before the Roman Senate in 164 B.C. of the effect of the Roman decision of 167 B.C. by which Rhodes had been deprived of Lycia, and those parts of Caria which she had acquired by the terms of the Peace of Apamea[34]. Of the loss of those provinces he says: '(The Rhodians) have lost Caria and Lycia, on which they expended from a start a considerable amount of

money, having been compelled to fight three wars.' Only one of these wars, the last in order of time, was fought against Carian communities[35], while the two first were undertaken in Lycia. The first period of disturbance, stasis, in Polybius' words[36] 'war' in those of Astymedes, doubtless followed quickly after the refusal of the Rhodians to accept the Lycians into the alliance; Polybius says that the latter determined to resist from that moment. How long the period of revolt lasted cannot be determined exactly. It appears to have continued at least until 180 B.C., since in that year Rhodes asked Eumenes, who was established in Telmessus, between Caria and Lycia, for assistance[37]. In 177 B.C. envoys from Xanthus, the Greek city in Lycia, came to Rome to protest against the harshness of Rhodian rule[38]. These ambassadors stopped on their way to Rome at Achaea, and it is recorded that they had left Lycia 'some considerable time before'[39]. It may then be supposed that they had left Lycia in 178 B.C. When they finally arrived in Rome in late summer of 177 B.C. resistance in Lycia had already ended.[40] Later in the same year the second period of unrest, or war began[41]. Since in all there were only two wars against Lycia, it follows that the war which ended in 178 B.C., just before the Xanthians arrived in Rome, was regarded as a continuation of that which began shortly after the peace of Apamea. The first war will then have lasted for about ten years, from c. 187 to 178/7 B.C.

It is clear that the revolt of a whole province,

which included several important Greek cities, even before the new administration had taken over, can have left little time for activities elsewhere. Nevertheless Rhodes was not inactive, in other regions. It is also in these years that the main issue in Rhodian politics took shape, since by 178 B.C., Rome was forced to recognise its existence; that issue, which split the Rhodian assembly into two antagonistic halves, was: for Rome, or for Macedon.

In Macedonia, Philip V had showed little desire, after the Antiochic War, to come to an open breach with Rome, preferring perhaps to wait until the reconstruction of his kingdom was effected, and his preparations for a final struggle with Rome completed[42]. Death intervened on his plans, and it was not until the accession of Perseus in 179[43] that a more positive foreign policy directly aimed against Rome, was inaugurated, and the opponents of Rome, in Rhodes as in many other parts of the Greek world, found a new object for their admiration and aspirations in the young king. The existence, or re-appearance of an active hostility to Rome did not indeed become a major issue until this time, since it did not find a leader until then, but it must be rekoned with as a growing force in the years after the Peace of Apamea.

In these years Rhodes was almost as active in the Black Sea area as she had been at the time of the Rhodio-Byzantine War, nearly half a century previously[44]. In 183/2 B.C. Rhodes was compelled to interest herself in the war

between Eumenes and Pharnaces, king of Pontus, which was disturbing the commercial life of the Black Sea and Northern Asia Minor[45]. Shortly before this date Sinope had been captured and sacked by Pharnaces with considerable slaughter[46]. Polybius, recording the embassies that reached the Senate in the winter of 183/2, mentions that an embassy from Rhodes arrived, having come 'on behalf of the misfortune of the Sinopians'[47]. Eumenes, at the same time, appealed for assistance from Rome against Pharnaces. The Senate was however unwilling to assist him[48], so that the king of Pergamum was forced to adopt more drastic measures against his enemy whose capture of Sinope foreshadowed his further expansion along the Black Sea coast. His first act was to close the route through the Hellespont, an act which brought on him the wrath of Rhodes[49]. The sequel to these moves is not recorded and can only be conjectured. It seems clear from the absence of any mention of Sinope in the treaty which concluded the war, the text of which is preserved by Polybius[50], that the city remained in the control of Pharnaces who now made it his capital instead of Amasia[51].

Polybius states that Rhodes prevented Eumenes from closing the Hellespont[52], but does not say how this was done. Perhaps, as in 220 B.C.[53], ships were despatched to the mouth of the Hellespont, and this display of force sufficed to cause Eumenes to give up his project. It appears unlikely that Rhodes and Pergamum went as far as open hostilities,

since the very next year Eumenes assisted Rhodes in her Lycian operations[54]. This in its turn indicates that the existence of the Pergamene enclave had not yet led to a deterioration of relations between Rhodes and Pergamum.

The main interest of Rhodes' protest against Pharnaces' capture of Sinope, and Eumenes' attempt to close the Hellespont lies in the unmistakeable evidence it provides that Rhodian policy in the area had not changed since 220 B.C. The later episode is almost a replica of the first with the characters on one side changed. Rhodes could not ignore disturbed conditions in the area of Byzantium and the Black Sea now any more than on the earlier occasion. It may be noted in this context that most of the archaeological and epigraphical evidence for Rhodian commercial interests in the North come from the second and first, rather than the third century before Christ[55]. The episode, as the previous one, is also important as indicating that Rhodes had a persistent mercantile policy, which determined her actions in the political field. But it is also clear that this policy operated primarily or only in the north, and that there is no evidence to suggest that mercantile considerations determined the main trends of Rhodian policy, the relations of the city to Seleucids and Ptolemies in the third century, its relations to Rome and Macedonia in the second.

In 178 B.C., the year after the accession of Perseus, serious developments occurred in the eastern Mediterranean.

Seleucus IV, the successor of Antiochus III, saw in the new king a partner in a coalition against Rome, and offered Perseus the hand of his daughter Laodice[56]; while Prusias, king of Bithynia, had begged and received the hand of Perseus' sister[57]. Such combinations, initiated by the son of Antiochus III, and carried forward by the son of Philip V, expressed the intention of both kings clearly, and cannot have been welcome to Rome[58].

The bride of Perseus was escorted from Antiochia to Pella, in ceremonial style, by the Rhodian fleet, and the occasion was marked by a full-scale naval review, which the Rhodians held[59]. Perseus, for his part, to express his gratitude, or establish a credit balance on which he might later call, marked the event by the gift to Rhodes of a quantity of timber for shipbuilding, and as a mark of honour he decorated each aphract which had taken part in the nymphagogia with a golden stelgis, or band[60]. It was shortly after news of this display of dynastic affection, and Rhodian naval preparedness reached Rome, that the envoys of the city of Xanthus, on the Lycian coast, appeared in Rome[61]. The Xanthians had only recently decided to join the fight against Rhodes, in support of the Lycian communities, and before doing so, had despatched an embassy to Achaea and Rome to solicit assistance[62]. Unfortunately, [redacted] the end of Lycian resistance came while the envoys were still on their travels, and when they arrived at Rome, the struggle was over[63]. They did not however fail to evoke considerable sympathy by their lively portrayal of

their sufferings and of Rhodian brutality[64]. The Senate sent envoys to Rhodes to announce that the Acta committed to writing by the Commissioners had been studied, and that they revealed that the Lycians had been over over to the Rhodians, not as a gift, that is unconditionally, but to have the status of 'friends and allies', that is, to retain, at the very least full municipal independence[65]. Whether this decision was consonant with existing Roman theory regarding the ownership of conquered territory, or not, the motives which prompted it were purely political[66].

Polybius analyses these motives. He says that many at Rome were dissatisfied; it may be supposed because the measure was too mild. The Romans, he explains, clearly wished to pit Rhodes and Lycia against each other, in the hope of exhausting Rhodes' financial reserves[67]. This desire, in its turn, was due to the news of the naval occasion, which had recently taken place. The Senate clearly interpreted the participation of Rhodes as an expression of her approval of the union of the Antigonid and Seleucid dynasties, while Rhodes had significantly used the occasion of the nymphagogia as an opportunity to demonstrate her naval strength. Since there can be no doubt that both Seleucus and Perseus aimed at the resumption of hostilities against Rome, Rhodes' position was unequivocal. Her government had [redacted] decided that the combined forces of Macedonia and Syria might achieve in unison what they had separately failed to

accomplish; the expulsion of Rome from the eastern Mediterranean. There was indeed one important factor. Seleucus' had no fleet worth speaking of; the Seleucid fleet had gone up in flames at Patara ten years before. But without a fleet which could ensure the establishment and maintenance of communications between Greece and the regions beyond the Taurus, and Syria, the whole project would undoubtedly fail, since the kingdom of Eumenes, as yet still friendly to Rome, interposed itself by land and made contact impossible. Rhodes with her experienced and skilful fleet was thus an essential item in the plan of the coalition, and Perseus' gift of shipbuilding material was designed to give Rhodes naval supremacy from the start of hostilities.

The appeal of Perseus throughout Greece was to the distressed and needy, slaves, debtors, and bankrupts[68], and the alignment of Rhodes with Macedonia probably implies a political victory for this element of the population there, though the change can also be explained as representing a change of policy without a change of government. Here, as almost invariably in Rhodian history, we can see that a policy has changed, but we cannot determine whether that change resulted from a change of government, from the arrival of new men at the helm, or from a change of course on the part of those already in power. Since, however, there is no doubt that less than a decade later there existed in the state two almost equiparent parties, one in favour of,

and one violently hostile to, continued co-operation with Rome, and since it is clear from the description of events by Polybius that power passed from one to the other with remarkable speed, it is reasonable to interpret the present manifestation of anti-Roman activity as due to the passage of the political initiative from the followers of Rome to the followers of Syria and Macedonia, and, in view of general trends elsewhere, this in its turn may be interpreted as a victory for the radical democratic element in the state. This prompts a comparison with the growth of that political element at Athens. It is a well-established fact that radical democracy at Athens developed in the Peiraeus, among the naval crews and fitters[69]. Perseus' gift of ship-building timber may have had a double purpose; first to ensure Rhodian supremacy at sea, and secondly to establish Perseus and Macedonia in the favour of that same element which worked in the dockyards, and could wield great influence in the state.

The arrival of the Roman ambassadors with their unwelcome message, had one immediate effect. The Lycians, who had just submitted after a decade of struggle, revolted without delay, and, sure now of Roman support, were ready to endure all to the bitter end, 'for autonomy and freedom'[70]. Thus the decision of the Senate achieved its aim without difficulty. The reaction of the Rhodians, as recounted by Polybius, was that they had been cheated by the Roman

decision[71]. They had understood that Lycia had been given them as a gift, and now ten years after the event they learned that it should from the start have enjoyed the status of a dependent ally. Their surprise as recorded by Polybius was doubtless largely simulated, since the issue between the Rhodians and Lycians since the Peace of Apamea had been precisely this, and the one side can hardly have remained ignorant of the claims of the other. It is, however, true that this was the first unequivocal statement by the Roman government on the point. The Rhodians, Polybius says, thinking that the Romans had been tricked by the Xanthians, forthwith appointed an embassy to visit Rome and to explain the facts to the Senate[72].

The measures taken by Rome were sufficient to prevent any immediate co-operation by Rhodes with the kings, and the danger of a new eastern war against a combination of Syria and Macedon receded on the death of Seleucus IV in 176/5[73]. He was succeeded, after an obscure interval of dynastic strife[74], by his brother Antiochus Epiphanes, whose accession led to a change of policy. Antiochus had lived as a hostage at Rome, and appreciated the power of Rome[75]. His policy indeed brought him within a few years into sharp conflict with Rome, but it was in Egypt, a region where Rome had not previously interfered, and where Antiochus might not expect to be faced with Rome. Certainly his operations against

Egypt were not aimed at Rome. Antiochus' seems rather to have regarded the western half of his empire as for ever lost, and to have aimed, first, at the conquest of Egypt, and, secondly at the re-establishment of Seleucid power in the eastern, trans-Euphratic satrapies, some of which had already developed into independent principalities[76]. He had certainly no sympathy with an attempted coalition against Rome, whose institutions he admired and whose strength, which he had seen at first hand, he feared.

The combinations of 178/7 thus came to nothing. Perseus was left to face the hostility of Pergamum, while Rhodes had compromised herself badly in the eyes of Rome, and had won no corresponding advantages beyond some shipbuilding material, regarding the use of which Rome would no doubt show great interest, while she was again embarrassed by war in Lycia.

This war, which began in 177 B.C., so shortly after the resistance of the province had been suppressed[77], continued for several years. It was certainly still in progress in 174 B.C.[78], while it may have been over by 171 B.C.[79]. The main feature of this phase of the struggle lies in the part played by Eumenes. In the first war, Eumenes, in spite of an earlier tension between himself and Rhodes, had used his position as master of Telmessus to assist Rhodes[80].

Now his policy had changed. He seems to have encouraged the Lycians when their hopes were fading, and at the same time he attempted to divert the attention of the Rhodian troops by carrying out raids against the countryside and fortified places of the eastern Peraea[81]. For just such a contingency as this Eumenes had received the territory of Telmessus.

The change in Pergamene policy is important. It corresponds with the change in Roman policy following the attempted Hellenistic coalition of 178/7, and can hardly be disassociated from it. Eumenes was still the faithful friend of Rome, and could be trusted to carry out the wishes of the Senate.

Rhodes did not abandon hope of winning a reversal of the Senate's decision. The embassy under Lycophron, which was sent in 177 B.C., ostensibly to inform the Senate as to the nature of the original reward made by the Commissioners in 187 B.C., apparently pleaded also for a reversal of the senatusconsultum. The Senate, however, postponed a reply and the war went on[82].

The effect of Rome's attitude must have been to increase anti-Roman sentiments in Rhodes, and to prepare the way for another accommodation like that of 178 B.C. Rhodes, certainly, was weaker than she had been in 178 B.C., and Perseus, who still nourished the idea of a war of revenge against Rome, could hope for no assistance from Antiochus

Epiphanes. Nevertheless a combination of Macedonia and Rhodes could be a considerable embarrassment, if not a deadly danger, to Rome. Perseus' own activities in winning favour for himself continued to be a source of alarm to Eumenes of Pergamum, and in 172 B.C. the king journeyed to Rome to inform the Senate of the danger of Greece becoming united under Perseus' hegemony[83].

An embassy from Rhodes also appeared at the same time, to counter the charges which, it was felt, Eumenes would undoubtedly bring against Rhodes while coupling the city's name with that of Perseus[84].

The speech of Eumenes, as recorded by Livy, which contains a catalogue of the activities of Perseus since his accession and particularly of the alliances and agreements he had concluded with states in, or bordering on, Greece, contains no reference to Rhodes, but the presence, unasked, of the Rhodian ambassador in Rome to answer charges of philo-Macedonianism, suggests strongly that Rhodes, though not openly committed against Rome (since in that event there would have been no reason to defend the city against Eumenes' charges) had approached still nearer to Perseus. The speech of the Rhodian envoy is paraphrased by Livy. It apparently consisted of one precise charge against Eumenes, namely that he had incited the Lycians against Rhodes, and one general charge, that his rule was more burdensome to the

peoples of Asia than that of Antiochus III had been. The speech, Livy says, was 'unwelcome to the Senate and of no use to himself or the people he represented'[85]. In the same year to mark unmistakeably their break with Eumenes, the home government rejected a theoria sent by Eumenes to the celebration of the Rhodian Halieia[86].

In winter 172, war was imminent, but the Senate, anxious to verify Eumenes' version of events, and to obtain first-hand information as to the situation in the east, despatched three legati, Tiberius Claudius Nero, Spurius Postumius and Marcus Iunius, to make a tour of Asia and the Aegean islands, and particularly to visit Crete and Rhodes, to discover whether they had listened to the approaches of Perseus[87].

When the legati arrived they found that the pro-Roman party was uppermost, that is to say the chief prytanis was in favour of co-operation with Rome[88]. The chief prytanis, and his colleagues, were elected semestrially, and during his term of office he possessed great influence in the ecclesia[89], and it is clear from the events of these years that the appointment of a new prytanis, whether made by lot or by vote, might lead to a complete change in foreign policy. The chief prytanis was, in fact, no mere administrative official, but a politician. Hagesilochus, the present prytanis, was a man of pro-Roman sympathies, and in 169 B.C.

[Continue on p. 346. p. 345 was omitted by error in typing]

was sent on a mission to Rome[90]. Even before the envoys had arrived in Rhodes it had been clear to Hagesiolochus that war between Rome and Perseus was inevitable, and he had counselled the Rhodians to throw in their lot with Rome, and to fit out forty ships for service, so as to be ready in the event of an emergency[91]. When the Roman legati arrived he was able to show them the preparations, and send them off home full of praises for the city[92].

The strength of the Macedonian party was, as previous events had already shown, considerable. It was led by two men who figure frequently in Polybius' account of these years, Polyaratus and Deinon. Polybius' source for the struggle for power in Rhodian politics in these years was a warm supporter of Rome[93], and the characterisation of these two men may be biassed, but it is striking that they both correspond, in character, fortune, and achievement, very closely to the type of person on whose support Perseus relied throughout the Greek world; Polyaratus was a bankrupt, while Deinon is described as a money-grabbing blusterer[94]. There can be little doubt that support for Perseus followed in Rhodes the general course that it took elsewhere. The record of the next few years shows, more than once, that it was the bulk of the dissatisfied and needy population which looked to Macedonia, and resisted the policy of collaboration with Rome advocated by the wealthy.

The success of Hagesilochus in persuading the

Rhodians to assist Rome in the coming struggle led to a renewal of effort by the opposing element. It was doubtless to establish direct contact with his supporters that Perseus, after his meeting with Q. Marcius Philippus in winter 172 B.C.[95], sent two ambassadors, Antenor and Philippus, to Rhodes bearing with them a copy of the open letter which the king had addressed to all the Greek states from whom he had hopes of assistance[96]. This letter was handed to the board of prytaneis by the ambassadors, and a few days later they appeared in person before the Assembly and requested the Rhodians to take no action while the issue of peace and war hung in the balance, and, if hostilities broke out, to attempt to mediate between Macedonia and Rome. Perseus required, however, the support not only of his followers, but of the whole community. His ambassadors therefore appealed to national sentiment and pride; they referred to Rhodes' role as defendress of the freedom of all Greeks, and to the Rhodians' love of liberty and freedom of speech[97]. Polybius says that their words found favour with all, but the Rhodians asked Perseus, through his ambassadors, not to request them to undertake any task which would involve them in action contrary to Rome's interests, and it does not appear that they accepted the proposals of Perseus as put by the ambassadors. It is, however, quite clear, and indeed is specifically stated by Polybius, that the envoys were received in a very friendly manner[98].

It appears, then, that political feeling veered markedly in the period, at most a month or two[99], between the reception by Hagesilochus of the Roman legati, and the welcome given to the envoys of Perseus. It seems, on the other hand, very unlikely that the followers of Rome, who had just induced the Rhodians to join Rome, and take an active part in the threatened war, should receive Perseus' representatives with such marks of favour, and adopt what was, in effect, a policy of neutrality favourable to Macedonia. It therefore seems necessary to assume that there had been a radical change of policy in the interval, though how this was effected cannot be determined. At the same time, it is clear that those now in control were not yet prepared for an open break with Rome; they were, says Polybius, already pledged to maintain friendly relations with Rome.

The first campaign against Perseus began in Spring 171 B.C.[100], and in the summer of that year Gaius Lucretius, the Roman naval commander for that year, arrived at Cephallenia to take over the mixed fleet of allied and Illyrian vessels concentrated there[101]. While there he renewed contacts with Rhodes on the basis that the Roman legati had agreed with Hegesilochus the previous winter; namely that Rhodes should provide ships against Perseus. Lucretius sent a personal servant, Socrates, with a letter to

the people of Rhodes[102]. The latter found himself faced, on arrival, with a superficially simple situation. The bulk of the people were now prepared to assist Rome, and the new chief Prytanis himself, Stratocles, carried on a policy of co-operation with Rome[103]. Socrates might therefore reasonably hope to meet with success. However, the request of the Romans for assistance brought the antagonism between the rival sections to the front again. Three leading members of the pro-Roman party, declared immediately for war against Perseus[104], while the members of the pro-Macedonian party changed their tactics. They abandoned their direct attack on Rome, and transferred their attention to Eumenes, in hostility to whom Rhodian opinion was almost unanimous[105].

The method of attack chosen by the Macedonian party was not very subtle, but in view of the tension and passion of the time probably it did not need to be. Its spokesman asserted that the letter carried by Socrates was not written by Lucretius but that it was a composition of Eumenes, whose purpose was to embroil Rhodes in further war, involving her in expenses and losses. The discreditable manoeuvre was a failure, and Stratocles, after a speech in which he assailed Perseus, and praised Rome, encouraged the assembly to ratify the motion regarding the despatch of ships to the assistance of Rome[106]. It appears, however, that public opinion led to a reduction in the size of the squadron. Hagesilochus had

shown the Roman legates forty ships ready for sea, but only five ships were sent to join the allied fleet at Chalcis, while one was also sent to Tenedos[107]. The force that was sent to Chalcis found on arrival that no naval action was contemplated, and it therefore returned home together with the other Greek naval units[108]. The ship sent for some untold reason to Tenedos, the Rhodian naval base in the Northern Aegean[109], had better luck. The vessel in which Diophanes, an envoy of Perseus, on his way to the court of Antiochus Epiphanes, was passenger, was siezed, and though Diophanes himself eluded caputre, his crew was haled off[110].

This was all the naval assistance given to Rome by Rhodes in the Third Macedonian War, and even if the Rhodians were responsible for only sending five ships, when they had let it be understood that they would send forty, they cannot be blamed because the Romans had no naval policy, and neglected throughout the war to make use of this arm.

Though no breach with Rome had occurred, and the pro-Roman party still held power, party-strife grew no less, and Polyaratus and Deinon attempted to block all proposals issuing from the pro-Roman section of the ecclesia. In the winter of 171/0 B.C. disagreement arose over the question of the prisoners captured by the ship that had gone to Tenedos during the preceding campaign[111]. The name of the chief Prytanis of the first semester of 171/0 is not

recorded, but the part played by two of the staunchest advocates of friendship with Rome, Philophron and Theaedetus, shows that those who advocated that policy still held the ascendency. These two men had years of public service behind them. In 188 B.C. they had been sent together as envoys to the Roman Commissioners, in regard to the Lycian question[112]. In the interval, nothing is heard of them, but it is a period for which we have few details. However, Theaedetus appears to have held the eponymous priesthood of Halios the city in about 180 B.C.[113], and now at the age of eighty his authority in the state was paramount[114]. For some years to come now he and Philophron together with Astymedes[115], another experienced politician, play a leading part in the assembly. On this occasion Philophron and Theaedetus were unwilling to allow Perseus to ransom his prisoners, since they had no wish to become involved in the affairs of Perseus[116], but it was a sign of the growing power of the Macedonian party that the wish of the pro-Roman party was overruled, and instructions were sent to Perseus with respect to the ransom[117].

At this point Rhodes was distracted from the major issue by the eruption of war in Egypt. The Sixth Syrian War, which was the latest phase of the traditional enmity between the houses of Seleucus and Ptolemy, broke out in the late spring or early summer of 170 B.C.[118]. The disorganisation of the economic life of Egypt to which the

invasion of Egypt led, appears to have effected the Rhodian corn-supply from that country. For this reason ambassadors were sent to Rome to renew friendship, and to apply for permission to import wheat from Italy[119]. The Senate decreed a gift of ten thousand medimni of Sicilian cereal, which has been estimated at a third of the Sicilian tithe[120]. Rome, undoubtedly, could afford to make this gift, since the acquisition of Sicily had brought her to the fore of cereal-producing powers. There are, nevertheless surprising aspects to this episode. First, it is surprising that Rhodes, in need of cereals, did not apply to the main grain-producing centre of the ancient world, in the Hellenistic no// less than in the classical period, namely the Pontic regions. Her commercial relations with that area were of the closest, both in the third and second centuries. Secondly, in view of the exceedingly confused state of Rhodian politics, with the anti-Roman and pro-Roman parties struggling for ascendency, Rome's help came at a very opportune moment. In other words, the Rhodian government which sent the embassy, and the Romans themselves, may alike have aimed at strengthening the hand of Rome in the affairs of the island, and in particular, since the wheat-shortage would primarily affect the lower classes, who probably had no reserves of cereals, at winning the disaffected sections of the population from their allegiance to Macedon. Such gifts of corn, made from a political motive,

are common throughout antiquity, particularly in the fourth century[121].

The same summer (170 B.C.) saw an attempt on the part of the Rhodians to negotiate between Antiochus, and Ptolemy Physcon, who had been proclaimed king by the beleaguered Alexandrians[122]. When the Rhodian embassy under Praxion reached Alexandria, Antiochus was encamped before the city[123]. The envoys were brought into his camp and given audience. The ambassadors said all they could say in the circumstances, but the king had so nearly reached his goal in so short a time that few arguments were likely to appeal to him. The Rhodians based their case on their own good relations with both the contesting powers, on the blood-relationship between Antiochus and the two Ptolemies, and on the practical advantages to be derived from the conclusion of peace[124]. It was, however, to Antiochus' advantage to continue the war, but not wishing to hurt the Rhodians' feelings unduly he adopted the common formula which had been frequently employed by Philip V during the First Macedonian War[125], of saying that he was willing for peace provided it was on his terms: namely that the Alexandrians should take back and restore to the throne Ptolemy Philometor, in place of his younger brother, who now reigned in Alexandria. The negotiations were broken off, and the ambassadors returned to Rhodes[126].

The excerptors have dealt hardly with Polybius' narrative of this incident[127], and the details of the attempt

at mediation are unrecorded. The Rhodian aim in seeking to end the struggle can, however, hardly be in doubt in view of the contemporaneous dispatch of envoys to Rome seeking corn. The two embassies were clearly both part of the same action taken by the Rhodians to forestall or lessen a very serious crisis in food supply in the island. Whether or not the negotiations at Rome were successful in this respect, Rhodes could not remain for ever an economic dependent of Rome, and the re-establishment of normal trade relations, with the regular flow of foodstuffs, was clearly a prime necessity, and, though unsuccessful on this occasion, Rhodes tried again the following year, when the situation in Egypt had changed greatly in favour of Egypt.

In the winter of this year, 170/169 B.C., the Senate was forced to take measures against the continued harshness of Roman military commanders in Greece. A Senatusconsultum was issued in which it was stated that no heed should be given to requests for supplies made by generals in the field on their own authority, but that only instructions contained in senatusconsulta should have the force of law[128]. This benevolent decision made a considerable impression on Rhodes, where it was used by Philophron and Theaedetus as an occasion to strengthen the bonds between Rome and Rhodes by dispelling any clouds of suspicion which existed as to Rhodes' loyalty. In spring 169, they proposed a motion that ambassadors should be dispatched to Rome, to Q.Marcius

Philippus the consul of 169 B.C., now in the field, and to Gaius Lucretius, the commander of the fleet[129]. The motion was passed after opposition, and the same ambassadors were sent to Rome as had journeyed thither the previous summer[130], Hagesilochus, Hagesias' son, Rome's faithful friend, Nicagoras, and Nicander. Hagepolis, Ariston and Pasicrates were sent to Philippus and Lucretius. The purposes of all envoys were the same: to renew friendship with Rome, and to defend Rhodes against the calumnies that were being spread concerning her loyalty as a result of the strong support given to Polyaratus and Deinon. The envoys to Rome were also instructed to discuss the corn position as they had done the previous year[131].

The Rhodian embassy, consisting of Hagepolis, Ariston and Pancrates, which was sent to the camp of the Roman naval and land commanders reached Philippus, the army commander, while he was camped at Heraclion[132], after his difficult march across the pass of Olympus from Thessaly into the coastal strip of Macedonia[133]. The express purpose of the embassy was quickly disposed of; the consul said that he did not listen to rumours against Rhodes, and requested the envoys to listen to none against Rome. He also addressed a letter to the Rhodian demos on the same subject[134]. So far all is clear. What next happened is perhaps less so. According to Polybius the friendly reception Philippus gave the envoys had the desired effect. Hagepolis lent a willing ear to some private counsel the Roman had for him. Philippus,

according to Polybius, said 'he wondered why the Rhodians did not try to put an end to the existing war, since that was particularly their domain'[135]. Why Philippus said this, and what he meant, is not clear, was not indeed clear even to Polybius, who gives two alternative explanations and says that he cannot decide between them[136]. He suggests that either Philippus was afraid lest, if the war with Perseus should drag on, and Antiochus should at some time make himself master of Alexandria, he (Antiochus) would become a 'dangerous second adversary' to Rome[137]; or that he saw the war with Perseus was progressing favourably, and therefore hoped to compromise Rhodes with Rome by involving her in mediation, so as to give the Senate a ground for later action[138]. Of these two view Polybius preferred the latter, because what later happened to Rhodes supports that view[139].

Philippus' real motives are still disputed. The view that he was 'in a corner' and hoped to induce the Rhodians, by mediating, to get him out of it, does less than justice to his military position[140]. He had, in fact, every reason to be satisfied with the campaign which he had just finished. He had accomplished the supremely difficult task of crossing the Olympus range, although it was defended against him; he had, by so doing, transferred the focus of the campaign into Macedonia; and he had re-established contact with his fleet. The achievement was considerable, and by no means negatived by the possible weakness of his

tactical position, and the vulnerable length of his lines of communication and supply. It does not, then, seem likely that Philippus was led by the gravity of his immediate position to approach the Rhodians. Nor was it, as Polybius thought, a desire to harm Rhodes which prompted him; for, assuming that the Senate was not accessory to Philip's move -- and Polybius does not suggest that it was[141] -- the first person on whom the blame for the attempt at mediation would have fallen, had the Senate wished to find a scapegoat afterwards, would have been Philippus himself[142]. There remains the first reason put forward by Polybius, and this, though Polybius did not favour it himself, is the only explanation which supplies both an adequate motive on the part of Philippus, and an explanation of Rhodes' future conduct. Philippus, according to this theory, feared lest Alexandria should fall in the future, since it would leave Antiochus free to turn his attention to Greece, and enable him to take his place in the struggle against Rome, should he so wish.

This view seems justified by a more general consideration of Philippus' position. He had no immediate cuase for alarm since he had achieved his first objective, by entering Macedonia. On the other hand his supply position might very well become difficult in the months ahead, when storm and snow would block the passes of Olympus. At such a time the intervention of Antiochus might prove decisive.

Philippus may not have been a general of high calibre, but it is his tactical ability rather than his common sense which are open to criticism.

Philippus therefore decided on his own initiative to take out an insurance policy against possible stalemate or isolation in the winter. By so doing he inevitably ran the risk of displeasing the Senate, but he was the 'man on the spot' and doubtless felt that, if need arose, he could defend his action. His choice of the Rhodians as mediators was reasonable; they had arrived opportunely. They were in addition noted for their work in the field of arbitration, and it might be supposed that any attempt they might make to intervene would be undertaken honestly. Moreover, if the Rhodians should feel inclined to intervene again in the Sixth Syrian War, their good relations with Antiochus Epiphanes and their attempted mediation in Egypt the previous year made them very suitable agents[143].

The Rhodian ambassadors proceeded from the camp of Philippus to that of Gaius Marcius Figulus. Here the reception they received was even more friendly than that they had found at the hands of Philippus[144]. There is no mention on this occasion of any suggestion that the Rhodians should try and stop the war, and that is another reason, if not a very strong one, for supposing that Philippus had acted on his own initiative.

The return of the ambassadors to Rhodes was the signal for an outbreak of partisan feeling. The pro-Roman

party were overjoyed at the philanthropia which the Romans had shown towards Rhodes, while the Macedonian party inferred, from the excessive nature of these philanthropiai that there must have been some good reason for it, and, consequently, that things were not going as they ought to for Rome[145]. This latter view was strengthened by the statement of Hagepolis, made in private to a few friends, that he had 'instructions' from Philippus to the Council in which he requested the Rhodians to mediate in the Persean War. On hearing this the supporters of Perseus came to the conclusion that the Romans were 'in great straits'[146].

Polybius says that after this envoys were sent to Alexandria to try and arrange a settlement between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philometor[147]. In view of the preceding negotiations, the Rhodians might have been expected to send envoys to Perseus, to sound his willingness, but hardly to Alexandria, where the two Ptolemies and their sister ruled together. It seems a non sequitur, and may represent a compromise. The Rhodians realized that if they could settle the Sixth Syrian War which, now in its second season, was hanging fire badly, from Antiochus' point of view, Philippus' position would be safe; the Senate would have no cause to pick a quarrel with Rhodes since the affair was outside Roman control, and the interests of Rhodes would be best served. Thus

the one intervention would serve the same purpose as the other, and Rhodes had less to fear[148]. Moreover it might be more easy to accomplish: the Ptolemies, united now and safe within the walls of Alexandria, stood only to gain from peace, while Antiochus had little to lose beyond Pelusium.

Unfortunately the fate of this embassy is unknown. It is not mentioned again in the very brief excerpts of Polybius, perhaps because the excerptors, faced with an embarrassing abundance of embassies, confused those of 170 and 169. But the events of the following year, when Antiochus again attacked Egypt in force, shows rather unexpectedly that it met, like its predecessor with no success, for reasons unknown to us[149].

Polyaratus and Deinon were not slow to take advantage of the apparent deterioration of Rome's offensive, and also perhaps of the failure of the embassy to Egypt, and entered into negotiations with an emissary of Perseus, Metrodorus by name, who arrived in Rhodes at this time. He was informed that the Rhodians were not ripe for active intervention against Rome[150]. Certainly the Macedonian party would not have made this statement, on the basis of which Perseus might at any moment require it to act, had there not been a substantial basis of fact to it. It is thus from this moment that we can speak of the de facto supremacy of the Macedonian party.

Genthius, the king of Illyria, had now been induced by

a bribe to ally himself to Perseus[151], and now the two allies decided to send a joint embassy to Rhodes with a view to concluding a triangular alliance[152]. Thus just a decade after the dynastic alliance between Seleucus IV and Perseus, which had set in train the events which were even now occurring, but which itself had had so short a life, Perseus achieved an alliance with another king; but the distance between Seleucus and Genthius emphasised the increasing isolation of Perseus. On Rhodes, which had originally been planned to add weight at sea to the alliance of Seleucid and Antigonid, Perseus was now forced to repose his main hopes.

The ambassadors set sail from Thessalonice, where they had joined Metrodorus, Perseus' courier, who was now ready to return to Rhodes[153]. On arrival there they found a somewhat disordered situation[154]. A meeting of the Council and Assembly was held, at which the envoys of Genthius and Perseus were welcomed. These had apparently been instructed to make an impression, for the effect produced on Rhodians of Roman sympathies by the appearance, with the ambassadors, of a force of Illyrian lemboi belonging to Genthius, is especially stressed by Polybius, who attributes the final defeat of the pro-Roman section of this meeting of the ecclesia above all to 'the tergiversation of Genthius[155]', and his followers spoke openly in favour of Perseus, and no dissenting voice was heard[156]. No decision to intervene actively on the side of Macedonia and Illyria was taken, but it was agreed to assist them to the extent of trying to negotiate a favourable peace for them. A decree was passed which recorded the goodwill felt by the Rhodians for both kings, and the decision to mediate in the war[157].

After this fateful decree had been passed the ambassadors of Genthius were

received in a public ceremony at the Common Hearth, the centre of Rhodian life[158].

The ecclesia decided at the same session to send two separate embassies, one to go to Rome, and one to visit both Aemilius Paullus, the Roman commander of 168 B.C., and Perseus[159]. Those delegated to go to Rome were Hagepolis, who had led the mission to Philippus in 169 B.C., Diocles and Cleombrotus[160]. The first of these was a noted adherent of the Roman cause, and the choice was a wise one, and shows that the Macedonian party was willing to use its political enemies when it suited its book. Neither of the two others are known to have been employed previously in such work. The envoys to Aemilius Paullus also included new names, which are given as Damon, Nicostratus, Agesilochus and Telephus[161]. Ambassadors were also sent to Crete to renew existing friendship, and to conclude an offensive alliance with the Cretan cities[162].

The embassies set out from Rhodes in April or May 168 B.C.[163]. Those sent to Greece arrived at Aemilius' camp on the south bank of the Enipeus river in early June[164], probably about ten days before the battle of Pydna which was fought on 22nd June[165]. Their reception by the army was not promising, and some of Aemilius' advisers were of the opinion that they should be driven out of the camp without receiving a reply regarding the proposed mediation. Aemilius, however, preferred to see how his plan of campaign worked out before dispensing altogether with the Rhodians, and postponed his reply for a fortnight[166]. At the same time, to indicate publicly his lack of interest in the Rhodian proposal, he proceeded apace with his preparations for battle. Shortly afterwards, the withdrawal of Perseus from the line of the Enipeus, followed by Paullus' pursuit march up the coastal plain of

Macedonia, led swiftly to the decisive battle south of Pydna[167], and the Rhodian embassy had no further opportunity to press its proposal.

The battle of Pydna decided the fate of Rhodes at the same time as that of the Macedonian kingdom. This was made immediately clear by the reception given to Hagepolis and his colleagues when they reached Rome. They had arrived before the battle of Pydna had been fought, but as was customary at Rome, they had been kept waiting a considerable time, and they were received by the Senate only after the news of the victory had reached it[168].

Had it been possible the Rhodians would doubtless have preferred to return home, once they heard the news, but once they had lodged the intention to address the senate this was probably impossible[169]. The only alternative lay in an attempt to make the Romans accept the view that it wa s the general commercial interest of Rhodes which had prompted the attempted intervention, and not hostility to Rome and a desire to save Perseus. Hagepolis who had favoured a policy of co-operation of Rome might hope that his own presence would lend some weight to this view. The argument he brought forward was that war was unprofitable to all, and that it was for this reason that the Rhodians wished to put a stop to it. He professed satisfaction that the war had been brought to a conclusion in a manner agreeable to Rome, and congratulated the senate on the outcome[170]. The senate, however, did not react in the anticipated manner. Certain now of its supremacy in Greece it was able to take revenge on Rhodes for her numerous semi-hostile vacillations, in the last decade, and for her unequivocal hostility in the later stages of the war. It decided therefore to make an example of the city. It was

pointed out that if the Rhodians were really anxious for peace in the interests of Greece they should have made their application for mediation at a time when Perseus had been in Thessaly for two years, that is in 171 to 170 B.C., thus demonstrating the interest they had in a free Greece, and not now, when the king had little hope of salvation; and that the occasion chosen for their embassy showed clearly that their only motive lay in saving Perseus from destruction. The embassy was therefore warned that Rhodes could expect no indulgence[171].

At Rhodes, meanwhile, news of the Roman victory had arrived, and it was decided to try to convince C. Popilius Laenas, one of the Senate's legates to Antiochus Epiphanes[172], of Rhodes' good intentions. Laenas, who happened to have stopped on his way to Egypt, for a reason unknown, at Loryma, the small port in the Rhodian Peraea, opposite Rhodes, was visited by Rhodian officials who requested him to cross to Rhodes to assure himself of the true state of affairs in the city[173]. The decision to summon Popilius was doubtless taken on the spur of the moment since it is hardly in line with the recent actions of the government, which had done nothing to conceal its hostility to Rome. It seems possible that the unexpected presence of the Roman inspired the hope that the people of Rhodes might find in him a powerful advocate at Rome, should need arise. Popilius had left Rome before the Rhodian embassy had reached there, and thus, not knowing of the Senate's rebuke, might be leniently disposed towards her.

Popilius, persuaded after some difficulty, crossed to Rhodes, where he delivered a harsh and threatening speech[174]. Another of the Roman envoys, in the company of Laenas, adopted a milder tone, and expressed the view that

the recent expression of anti-Roman feeling had been due only to the influence of a few concitores vulgi[175]. The result was inevitable: the Macedonian party, still at the moment in power, could only seek to refute Popilius' charges, which, in view of the concrete evidence which existed for the agreement with Perseus and Genthius, was useless labour; while the now hopeful pro-Roman party seized on the reply of Decimius with its suggestion that the few responsible, in his opinion, for the present situation, should be made to pay for their evil-doing, si sana mens populo foret. The government was expelled and the pro-Roman party procured the passage of a psephism that 'qui pro Perseo adversus Romanos dixisse quid AUT FECISSE CONVINCERENTUR, CAPITIS CONDEMNARENTUR'[176]. Many of the pro-Macedonian party had already fled and others, on the passage of the decree, committed suicide[177]. Of those that were left few can have escaped the knife of their political opponents, since no more is heard of opposition to Rome in the remaining years of Rhodian independence. Of Polyaratus, the leader of the party, we learn more from Polybius, who describes at length his adventures, following his flight from Rhodes on the arrival of Popilius Laenas. He was eventually brought to Rome, after he had made many fruitless attempts to avoid that fate[178]. The expulsion and murder of the philo-Macedonian party, under Roman instigation, recalls that other revolution caused by external influences; the anti-Spartan revolution of 394 B.C., which resulted in the expulsion of the Diagoridae, and the establishment of Athenian influence in the city[179]. The interval of over two centuries was one of peace and vast material developments. The emergence of Rome as a political rival to the old powers of the Hellenistic world, had, in Rhodes as elsewhere,

the effect of stirring up political passions, which, as the history of the Hellenistic world had demonstrated, the Greeks, if left to themselves, had largely outgrown.

Polybius uses the occasion of his account of the three types of politician who found themselves in trouble with Rome during the Persean War[180] to discuss the policy of the pro-Macedonian party at Rhodes, and in particular of Polyaratus and Deinon who belonged to the second of his three categories of those who displeased Rome: those who were glad to see the issue settled and wished Perseus to win, but were unable to induce their fellow citizens and co-nationals to ally themselves with the king[181]. The remarks about the two leaders are clearly taken, probably almost unaltered, from the violently pro-Roman Rhodian historian on whom the whole account of events at Rhodes in these years is based[182]. They show a personal and rancourous dislike of the two men, and underestimate the achievement of their party. It is, of course, true that in Rhodes the adherents of Macedonia did not induce the Assembly to conclude an alliance with Perseus. Nevertheless, they did succeed in introducing important modifications into Rhodian foreign policy, and forced the pro-Roman magistrates to yield concessions. Moreover, from the events of the year 168 B.C., before the battle of Pydna, it may be inferred that feeling for Perseus and Genthius was so strong that had either the pro-Macedonian party or the envoys of Macedonia and Illyria considered it necessary for Rhodes to intervene in the war as an active ally of Macedon there would have been little difficulty in persuading the assembly that such was the course dictated by the interest of Rhodes. It therefore appears probable that the conclusion of an offensive alliance with Rome was not part of the Macedonian party's programme, and that the purpose of the Macedonian

and Illyrian envoys was, as Polybius says, to try to arrange for Rhodes to mediate in the war, and nothing more. Indeed for Rhodes to be involved in war with Rome, on the side of Perseus, would have been a very hazardous undertaking and it may be doubted whether, even if negotiations had continued, and finally broken down, that Rhodes would have entered the struggle on the side of Perseus.

The murder, flight, or suicide of most of its opponents left the way open for a complete restoration of the pro-Roman party, who, now that the issue was settled, regained some power of decisive action, and attempted to repair the damage done through Polyaratus and his colleagues in the confused months before the battle of Pydna. On the return of the embassy from Rome in autumn 168 B.C., with the news that the Senate had not responded to Hagepolis' arguments, further embassies were at once sent to cool the Senate's temper[183]. The first was sent early in the winter of 168 B.C., the second shortly afterwards. The first embassy, led by Philocrates[184], does not appear to have been received in audience by the Senate at all, for Polybius recounts the reception given to the second embassy only, that led by Philophron and Astymedes[185]. The unofficial reception given to these latter envoys was extremely hostile. The praetor M'. Iuventius Thalna, relying on the support of the people, openly urged the comitia to declare war against Rhodes[186]. On their public appearance before the senate, however, the Rhodians found support from two of the tribunes M. Antonius and M. Pomponius, who interposed a veto on Thalna's motion[187], and from Cato, who spoke in their favour,[188] with the result that the embassy was eventually allowed to speak[189]. Astymedes' speech apparently did not make a good impression on Greeks, in Italy and in Greece, since in it he minimised the cooperation given to Rome

by other states and exaggerated that previously given by Rhodes, and endeavoured to make the faults of Rhodian policy appear insignificant by the side of the errors of other states[190]. In the Senate's reply no mention was made of any penalty, but a severe rebuke was administered. The Rhodians were thus delivered from the fear of war with Rome[191].

The senate's answer was brought back to Rhodes by the embassy of Philocrates, the earlier of the two missions which had been sent to Rome[192], while the second embassy, that led by Astymedes, remained in Rome with a watching-brief against any other embassy that might arrive and speak against Rhodes[193]. The effect caused in Rhodes by the reply was considerable. The senate's reception of the embassy of Hagepolis had caused grave forebodings as to the reception that would be given to the other embassies, even though a violent change of heart and policy had since then occurred. Astymedes' oratory had now procured for Rhodes if not complete freedom from anxiety, at least a removal of the threat of war[194]. In a premature fit of gratitude it was decided to send to Rome a yet further embassy, with a gift of a crown of ten thousand gold staters. In early summer 167 B.C. the aged Romanophile Theaedetus, invested with the plenipotentiary powers of a nauarchus, and an embassy led by Rhodophon, travelled to Rome to deliver the crown, and to make an effort to secure an alliance with Rome[195].

This is the first sign that Rhodes was willing, even eager, to abandon the position of a wholly independent amicus of Rome, which she had enjoyed for more than a generation, and accept the status of a socius, with all the obligations and duties that that inferior status implied[196]. The desire for security, and for quiescence, after the political strife of the last decade,

were perhaps contributory factors to this decision, but practical and worldly calculations were doubtless not absent. Rhodes could now be sure that the future of the eastern Mediterranean lay with Rome. The last Hellenistic king to oppose Romes (other than Mithridates Eupator) had been humiliated, and Rhodes could purchase the advantages deriving from an alliance with Rome, without fear that the issue would be reversed in a few years. This calculation explains the peculiar ineffectiveness of the pro-Roman party in the years of dissension; though almost continually in power it never succeeded in stilling opposition, and was seldom able to give clean and untrammelled expression to the policy of cooperation with Rome. The reason, it cannot be doubted, lay in indecision in the inner councils of the followers of Rome. Until Pydna there was always a chance that Rome would fail, or only achieve a partial victory, and that Perseus, like Philip, his father, would live to fight another day. Neither the fate of Perseus nor the completeness of the Roman victory permitted that assumption any longer. Rome was and would remain mistress, and the pro-Roman statemen in Rhodes, inheritors of the traditional Rhodian policy, of siding with the strongest, once it was certain he was the strongest, which had enabled the city, alone of the small communities of the Hellenistic world, to maintain its independence and advance to a front position among the powers, now pursued that policy to its logical and disastrous conclusion. For not only was an alliance with Rome a sign of external submission, but Roman policy had aimed for years at the destruction of the old soveriegn powers of the Hellenistic world, and of these Rhodes, partly by Roman benefaction, was one. She could, then, quite apart from the recent exhibitions of disloyalty, hardly escape

the common lot.

On the other hand an optimistic appraisal of Roman policy doubtless suggested to the Rhodian government that Rome would be willing to accept Rhodes' request for an alliance, and that Rhodes' possession of her mainland territories, acquired after the Peace of Apamea, would be undisturbed. This clearly was a matter of crucial importance for Rhodes, and perhaps explains why Theaedetus was invested with plenipotentiary powers. By these powers Theaedetus was enabled to conclude an alliance in the name of Rhodes, but at the same time Polybius expressly says that if necessary the activities of the nauarchus could be disowned[197]. It is indeed a strange act of statecraft which appoints a plenipotentiary official so that his activities can be disowned, but such appears to have been the case. It is possible that Rhodes feared that, if the request should be rejected, and that rejection became public knowledge, it would be the signal for the Carians and Lycians to raise their heads and expel Rhodian rule. It was desirable therefore to be able to state that the refusal given to Theaedetus did not involve the state since he had been acting on his own initiative, and that requests made by, and answers given to, him were therefore not binding on the whole state. The Romans in fact took away the ground from under the feet of Rhodes, by first depriving the city of its mainland territories, and only then admitting it to alliance.

The Rhodian government had also under-estimated the effect on the subject communities of the difficult position in which Rhodes found itself. These communities, if they wished to revolt, had nothing to gain by waiting. If the Rhodian plea for an alliance was rejected, Rhodes could not, in the event of a rising, expect help from Rome, but even if the alliance was

concluded such help was very far from certain, and the precedent of Rhodes' first war with Lycia, when the relations between Rhodes and Rome had been good, and yet Rome had not assisted in the suppression of Lycian resistance suggested that in fact such help would not be forthcoming. On the other hand there was a danger that if the alliance was concluded, the treaty would confirm the Rhodians in their possession.

The Carian communities, therefore, which had remained peaceful subjects of Rhodes for twenty years, revolted in Summer 167 B.C.[198]. Their neighbours the Lycians did not join them, just as the Carians had not assisted the Lycians in their earlier struggles. It may be conjectured that Eumenes' enclave at Telmessus served its purpose yet again, by making communication between Caria and Lycia difficult and slow. And in addition the Rhodians had probably dealt with Lycian resistance during the second Lycian War, which had ended about six years previously, so effectively that the Lycians had little fight left in them.

This war against Caria is the third of the three wars to which Astymedes referred in 164 B.C.[199] The rising was apparently started by the inhabitants of Caunus[200], who were assisted by the Cibyrates[201]. This force displayed remarkable activity. It reduced the Caunians and Cibyrates, and in a swift campaign marched the length of Caria, and brought to battle and defeated the combined forces of the Mylasians and Alabandians (the latter, though not subject to Rhodes, were assisting in the struggle of the subject communities for independence), which were threatening Orthosia, a loyal city in the plain south of the Maeander[204].

The campaign was probably still in progress when the news came through that the senate had unconditionally deprived Rhodes of the territory

which she had been awarded at the Peace of Apamea[205]. This decision had been taken by the senate before the arrival of Theaedetus and his colleagues, and had therefore presumably been communicated to the embassy led by Astymedes, which had remained in Rome since the previous year[206]. Consideration of the full implications and this and the other measures may for the moment be postponed.

When therefore Theaedetus arrived in Rome the decisive step against Rhodes, in its way more serious than the dreaded declaration of war which never came, had been taken. It was for just such a contingency that Theaedetus had been appointed nauarch. Theaedetus decided that an alliance with Rome was still desirable, and there can be no doubt that his decision was correct. Rhodes had other interests at stake than the territory of Caria and Lycia. She had the incorporated Peraea, and she had the Islands, and she had her commercial interests throughout the Mediterranean. If Rhodes, outraged by the deprivation of Caria and Lycia, abandoned her attempt to secure an alliance the reaction at Rhodes would have been a resurgence of the anti-Roman party, which would still possess a nuisance-value in local politics, even if it had no wider aspirations or hopes, and did not bring down on the city the hand of Rome. Theaedetus therefore pleaded for an alliance[207]. The Senate, however, postponed a decision, and before the answer was given Theaedetus died[208], before being aware of the further measures which the power which he had for so long supported, and whose interests he had furthered, intended to take against his country.

Shortly after Theaedetus' death refugees from Caunus and Stratonicea arrived in Rome with complaints about their treatment at Rhodian hands[209]. Neither of these cities had been included in the lands transferred

to Rhodian control by the Roman authorities at the Peace of Apamea; the former had been purchased at about that time by the Rhodians from Egypt,[210] the latter had been given to Rhodes in the third century by the Seleucids[211]. Thus whatever justification Rome might be able to adduce for her action in regard to Lycia in 178, and to Caria and Lycia on the present occasion could not possibly apply to these cities. When, therefore, the Senate now ordered that Rhodians forces should evacuate Caunus and Stratonicea, it was simply a decision based on force majeure[212]. The Rhodian ambassadors submitted to this intolerable decision without protest, and scuttled back to Rhodes, fearful lest the Rhodians should neglect to carry out the Roman instructions and bring fresh disaster on all[213].

By these measures the Senate had satisfactorily destroyed the political supremacy of Rhodes in South-West Asia Minor. Rhodes, however could not be kept down unless the main source of her prosperity, the fact that she lay on the main trade-routes from north to south, and east to west, and was a port of call for merchantmen from the four corners of the world, could be neutralized. To alter trade-routes is a far more difficult task than to alter political boundaries, and it speaks highly of the acumen of the senate and its advisers that it was able to conceive a plan so effective and as that which was now put into effect. The Athenians, who had remained faithful to Rome since 200 B.C. sent an embassy to ask the Athenian share in the spoils, after the battle of Pydna. The embassy appeared before the Senate in 167 B.C. and asked for, and was granted, the territories of the ancient Boeotian city, Haliartus, and succeeded in regaining possession, after a lapse of approximately one hundred and fifty years, of Lemnos and Delos[214]. On the Senate's orders the native Delians were expelled from the island, which

was resettled as an Athenian cleruchy[215]. Moreover, to the gift of the island to Athens was attached the condition that the port of Delos should be a free harbour[216], that is, that vessels should be permitted to enter and leave it without the payment of a harbour-due, such as the Rhodian levied, and which was one of the main sources of her wealth. The effect of this on Rhodian economy can be guaged by the statement of the Rhodian Astymedes two years later, that the loss in annual revenue directly due to the immunity from taxation provided by Delos was 850,000 drachmae[217].

There can be no doubt that the aim of the Senate was not only to destroy Rhodes as a political force, but to reduce her whole scale of life by destroying her commercial supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes ceased immediately to be the centre of the Mediterranean transit trade. It would however be a mistake to infer from this that Rhodian commerical activity, such as the export of commodities, also declined very markedly. The natural effect of the Roman measure, which, by itself, would have such grave conseqqences, would be to stimulate the Rhodians to an immensely increased production for export. This fact is not always sufficiently borne in mind when attempts are made to date the amphorae of Rhodian make found scattered throughout the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Levant and the Black Sea area[218].

Nevertheless, the situation was extremely serious. Of all Rhodes' empire all that remained to her outside the incorporated islands and Peraea, which were not effected, was her control of the Aegean, in the form of the Nesiotic League, which appears to have existed for a few years longer. The Rhodians, broken by an iron hand, bowed before the storm, and continued to strive for the coveted <u>societas</u>.

During 167-6 B.C. the Senate's orders were faithfully carried out, and

in summer 165 B.C. the now powerless community sent a further embassy to Rome under Aristoteles, to report that all necessary measures had been taken to ensure that the Senate's instructions had been fulfilled, and to request again to be allowed to join in an alliance with Rome. The Senate, however, again refused, and Aristoteles returned to Rhodes, his mission unfulfilled[219].

The following year another attempt was made. Astymedes was again sent to Rome, where on this occasion embassies from many other states were also present[220]. His speech was more tactful than that which he had made in 168 B.C. He emphasised the severity of the punishment the city had received and recounted seriatim the losses suffered[221]; the loss of territory, the loss of Lycia and Caria, for the retention of which the Rhodians had fought three wars; the loss of Caunos, which had cost two hundred talents, and of Stratonicea and the combined revenues of those cities which he estimated at one hundred and twenty talents; and, 'greatest loss of all', the creation of Delos as a free port, with the accompanying loss to Rhodes of eight hundred and fifty thousand drachmae[222]. All this they had suffered, said Astymedes, not because of the disloyalty and treachery of the whole nation, but because of a few men most of whom had already been killed by their own compatriots. Gone too, lamented, Astymedes, (and here his lamentation seems to have been barbed) were those cardinal political requirements, Parrhesia and Isologia[223]. In view of all this, he besought the Senate to abandon its hostility to Rhodes, so that the whole world might see that the Senate had laid aside it wrath, and that the old relations of friendship between the two states had been restored. For that,

said Astymedes, was what the city needed now, a demonstration before the world that the Senate was no longer wrath, rather than alliance[224].

Tiberius Gracchus, who had just returned from a tour of the East, in the course of which he had delivered a speech in Greek to the Rhodian assembly[225], gave evidence in support of Astymedes' statement that all those guilty of hostility to Rome had been condemned to death, and that all the items of the Senate's terms had been carried out[226]. His influence was sufficient to win the day at last for Rhodes, though not without some considerable opposition. Rhodes was now accepted as a 'civitas foederata'

It would be interesting to know what Astymedes meant when he said that freedom of speech was suppressed in the island. Unless he was play-acting for the sake of winning Senatorial sympathies (and it also must be remembered that Astymedes' speeches were intended for publication, and he may have surrendered to the temptation of an eloquent phrase[227]), we must accept the very surprising fact that the Rhodian stood up in the Senate and gave this account of political conditions under the government whose representative he was. Since it is not very likely that he was condemning it out of hand, it appears that Astymedes was referring to some emergency legislation, or measures, which the government had been compelled to introduce, but unwillingly, at a critical time. Perhaps the life of the island had been so upset by the experiences of the last few years, with its massacres, and political betrayals, that the government had had to assume such dictatorial powers to enable it to carry through the task of rehabilitation. But it must be admitted that the significance of the phrase is uncertain, and thus no satisfactory estimate can be made of the domestic policy of the government which signed the alliance with Rome, and thereby brought to an end her

history as an independent power.

A discussion of the relations between Rome and Rhodes in these years must finally seek to provide an answer to that most difficult question; why did Rome treat Rhodes with such unexampled harshness, since the city had not even participated in the war on the side of Perseus, and had on the other hand a long record of cooperation with Rome, and had virtually won for her her most vital Eastern war against Antiochus? Was it [illegible], as Polybius thought, simply a disproportionate punishment for Rhodian vacillations over the previous decade? Was it simply exasperation, the final exhaustion of the patience of the Senate? Was it part of a general 'commercial policy'? Or were there deeper causes more consistent with the heaviness of the punishment? Was it a punitive or a preventive measure, or both? To some extent it was certainly punitive. Rhodian policy had been weak, and fluctuating, and until the massacre the pro-Roman party could hardly hold its own in the town. On the other hand there is no reason to suppose that Roman commercial interests had any influence in the decision, since the development of Roman trade in the East did not begin for another generation or more[228].

The most probable explanation of the extremely heavy [illegible] punishment is that it was meted out with an eye to the future. The Senate had a fear of eastern coalitions. This was shown not only in 201 B.C., when fear of the result of the alliance between Philip V and Antiochus III caused her to embark on the Second Macedonnian War[229], but also in 178, when her action against Rhodes had been aimed at forestalling her share in a possible coalition between Perseus and Seleucus IV[230]. Again in 172 B.C.

Eumenes had finally moved the Senate to action by postulating the possibility of a further coalition, and although he was largely talking of past history, and ignored the changed situation due to the death of Seleucus IV and the accession of Antiochus Epiphanes, the ruse, if such it was, worked[231].

Rome's action against Rhodes may therefore have been taken with a view to rendering any further coalition impossible. That such a coalition was extremely improbable the senate must have been aware; Perseus was in Italy, his kingdom dismembered, Antiochus had accepted the implications of Roman domination in the Near East, and turned away from the west. By breaking Rhodes Rome was destroying the last possibility of a recurrence of the events which had so often shaken the senate, and her punishment, vicious and unexampled though it was, must be considered in the light of the dismemberment of the kingdom of Macedonia, to which it forms an exact parallel[232]. In general, then, the measures against Rhodes are not to be distinguished from those inflicted on the other Hellenistic powers, and they were part of that final settlement by which Rome imposed on the Hellenistic world an ordered system favourable to herself.

P A R T II.

Antiquities.

Chapter 1.

Gentilicial and territorial divisions of the Island.

(1) The gentilicial organization of the old cities.

The evidence for the social and territorial groupings in the old cities before the synoecism depends almost entirely on information derived from inscriptions. This constitutes at once its weakness and its strength; its strength because no allowance need be made for inaccurate statements, inferences, drawn by writers influenced by the practice of their own day; its weakness is one which it shares with all epigraphical evidence, namely that the institutions are referred to only casually, instead of being subject to the analysis of an historian or antiquarian. Our interpretation of these institutions thus depends wholly on the conclusions which are alleged to follow from these incidental references; and such conclusions are necessarily to some extent subjective. The situation is thus comparable on a small scale to that which exists in regard to the Delphian and other manumission documents, which, although extremely abundant, are often of very uncertain meaning, mainly because no abstract statement of the process of manumission has been recorded by any Greek writer. With this position may be contrasted that which obtains in regard to Attic antiquities, which were studied with great care from the time

of the Atthidographers and the Peripatetic antiquarians, who provided in their turn a substantial foundation for the later lexicographers such as Harpocration. Rhodian antiquities fall between these two extremes: the inscriptions are in no way so abundant as are those of, for instance, Delphi -- they are in fact extremely scanty -- nor were the old cities of Rhodes considered of sufficient importance in later antiquity to require the special historical studies which were made of Attic antiquities.

Rhodian institutions labour in addition under a particular difficulty, which afflicts the study of the old cities before the synoecism. None, or virtually none, of the evidence is earlier than the synoecism, and the bulk of it belongs to the late Hellenistic and Roman periods. Thus even though tribal organisation takes far longer to die, or suffer a major change, except when this is imposed by an external force, than a political institution, the fact remains that the historian is compelled by the nature of his evidence to argue from what are but survivals, and to allow for possible, though never demonstrable, changes in tribal and gentilicial organisation.

Though the available evidence is not sufficient to enable us to determine with certainty even the broadest outlines of the social and tribal organisation of the old

cities, the importance of the subject is great. It is the gentilicial organisation of the old cities that provides the essential continuity between the life of the island before and after the synoecism. It has been observed in another context that, in the political field, the synoecism provides an absolute break with the past; the political development of the new city was not, so far as we can tell, in any way influenced by the policies and experience of its far smaller predecessors. Quite different is the position in regard to the social life of the new city. Its foundation did not create new characteristics and new potentialities in the life of the Rhodians, even if these will have developed under the pressure of new circumstances. Basically, the determining factors of the Rhodian character, as of any national character, lay far back in the early history of the people, and their first attempts at social organisation. The citizens of the old cities were, if not in number at least in authority, the weightiest portion of the population of the new city, and they carried with them the inheritance of an old environment which centuries could not obliterate. For this reason it is no exaggeration to say that the secret of the new Rhodes lies in the history of the old.

The number of terms, apparently of gentilicial significance, which survive in documents of the Hellenistic

and Roman periods, suffice, even though the meaning of few of these terms can be established beyond doubt, to indicate that the tribal and family groups were highly developed in the old cities. Of the largest of these groups based on kinship, the tribe or φυλαί there is little that can be said with certainty. A priori it is reasonable to assume that in Dorian Rhodes, as other Dorian communities, there existed the three old Dorian tribes, the Ὑλλεῖς , the Πάμφυλοι and the Δυμᾶνες . Moreover, since Lindos, Camirus and Ialysus, were before the synoecism wholly independent communities, it is natural to suppose that the three tribes existed in each of the three cities, if they existed at all. The presumption that this was so is so strong that it may be accepted as a hypothesis, but there is little or no evidence to support it.

The Homeric Catalogue of the Ships, our only early evidence, refers in rather vague terms to Rhodes[1]. It says that the island was divided διὰ τρίχα and that the Ῥόδιοι sent nine ships to Troy. The latter number, if it be not a coincidence, suggests that each city may have been divided into three tribes, and that each tribe contributed a single ship[2]. This interpretation is supported by the reference, a few lines later on, to the population of the island being 'divided into three, and living by tribes'. By itself, the latter phrase could be understood as meaning that the popula-

tion was divided into three, and consisted of three tribes in all, that is, that each city possessed only one tribe, but such an interpretation even if the existence of only one tribe in a city would not be unparallelled[3] is a priori unlikely[4], and is contrary to what appears to be the most probable interpretation of the nine ships provided by the island.

It is, however, clear that the evidence of the Catalogue cannot be pressed, and even if it were certain that the author envisaged three tribes, they are not named. Evidence that the three Dorian tribes existed in the Rhodian cities may however be found in the existence of one of them in a single city which derived ultimately from Rhodes. Colonies normally continued the same system of tribal arrangement and gentilicial organisation that existed in the mother city, and there is no reason to suppose that Rhodian customs and tribes were not continued in her colonies. The value of the particular instance, the existence of the φυλὰ τῶν Ὑλλέων at Acragas[5] is hardly weakened by the fact that Acragas was not itself a daughter of one of the old cities, but was a colony of Gela, a Lindian colony[6], since the Rhodian element in Acragantine religious cults, and in the pottery imported to the site, is very considerable[7]. The evidence from Acragas is in fact the strongest positive evidence for the existence of the old tribes at Rhodes, and

combined with the strong a priori probability that such was the case, justifies the assumption that the tribes did exist.

When, however, we turn to the study of Rhodian monuments, we find that in contrast to the absence of any reference to the old tribes, there exist references to several tribes unknown from elsewhere, and which have to be fitted, if possible, into the Rhodian system of tribes. Of these the most remarkable is certainly the complete tribal system recorded in the Lindian Chronicle. This records[8] as dedicants of a 'very ancient platter', each one of three tribes, which are called respectively, Ἁλιέων φυλαί, Αὐτοχθόνων φυλαί and Τελχείνων φυλαί. These names are apparently the result of learned investigation by Rhodian scholars; the first is itself sufficient to indicate that the names are of no great antiquity, but arise from speculation as to the prehistoric population of the island[9]. The purpose of the invention is indeed not clear, although it is possible to conjecture that it arose from a desire to distinguish Rhodes from the normal run of Dorian cities, and was probably a product of the period of Rhodian greatness. In a historical investigation these names may probably be ignored.

There are however others, both in the old cities, and in Rhodes itself. The latter are extremely simple. After the synoecism each of the three old cities became a tribe of the new city, and this constitutionally was the only position enjoyed by them. They existed, vis-a-vis Rhodes, as

φυλὰ Λινδία, φυλὰ Καμειρίς, and φυλὰ Ἰαλυσία [10]. Further details of this simple change are found elsewhere[11].

More important is the question, what happened to the old tribes of the old cities after the synoecism. Here our evidence is deplorably scanty, and any conclusion can be only tentative. All that can be stated with certainty is that at Lindos there existed a tribe called Ἀργεία [12], and that at Camirus there was very probably one called Ἀλθαιμενίς [13]. No other tribe-names survive from the old cities. It therefore cannot be immediately determined whether, for example, the tribe Ἀργεία was added to the existing old Dorian tribes, making a total of at least four tribes, or whether the three old tribes were replaced by new ones, of which Ἀργεία is one. It cannot further be determined whether the same new, or additional, tribes existed in each of the three old cities. In regard to the latter point it is perhaps significant that the name Ἀργεία is particularly of Lindian colour, since a Lindian demotic Ἀργεῖος, referring to a locality on the island, is met very frequently[14]. At the same time, the hero Althaemenes has particular associations with Camirus[15]. There are thus clearly some grounds for supposing that the tribe-names were peculiar to each city, though the question cannot be decided at present.

The first question, whether the old tribes survived, and new ones were added to them, or whether the old tribes

were abolished and others substituted is of far-reaching importance, and though here again the matter cannot be brought beyond the stage of probability, the historical consequences need detailed examination.

The supposition that the three old tribes survived after the synoecism, and that there also existed other tribes is perhaps the simplest explanation[16], if one modification be made. It does not seem likely that the extra tribes would have been added after the synoecism when the general absence of evidence indicates a decline in the importance of the tribe. There is, on the other hand, no difficulty in supposing that the additional tribes existed before the synoecism, perhaps from a very early date; for this procedure in Dorian cities there would be numerous parallels, of which perhaps the most noted is Argos, while in the eastern Aegean the same expansion in tribes occurred on the island of Calymnus[17]. Certainly the absence of any reference to the old tribes after the synoecism cannot be used, in the inadequate state of the evidence, as a basis for assuming that they did not continue to exist. A slight argument against this view is perhaps that in the Catalogue of the Ships it is clear that only three, or multiples of tribes are envisaged, but this evidence is itself of doubtful value.

It is also possible that at some time the old tribes either fell into abeyance, or, more probably, were suppressed by an outside agency, and their place taken by tribes with

different names, constituted either on the same gentilicial basis, or on the wholly different basis of territorial grouping. To such a social revolution as is implied in the latter alternative an obvious parallel is provided by the Cleisthenic reforms at Athens. It is however difficult to suppose that such a far-reaching reform occurred in Rhodes, without any evidence to support the supposition. There is, moreover, one very serious objection to this view. Such a reform would necessarily lead to the establishment of a close relationship between the φυλαί and the δᾶμοι out of which it was, either directly or at a remove, formed. In fact, in the lists of demes from Lindos, and to a lesser extent in the evidence from the other cities, in which the names of the demes are preserved, there is not a single reference to a tribe[18]; this indicates beyond doubt that the demes were not an organic part of the φυλαί as they were at Athens, for example, and the most obvious explanation of this is that the φυλαί remained after, as they had been before, the synoecism, constituted of gentilicial sub-units. We are thus left with two alternatives: either it was merely the names of the old tribes that were altered, their constitution remaining unchanged; or the old tribes were abolished and new gentilicial tribes with new names were established. The latter alternative seems excluded because new gentilicial groups could not be suddenly

formed: they were of old standing, whether they formed an organ of society or not. It is clear then that the most satisfactory explanation is that only the names of the old tribes were changed. The nature of all the new names cannot be divined from the surviving two, since one reflects local, the other gentilicial, origin. But in general it is clear that local legend and tradition were drawn upon in place of the racial traditions reflected in the old Dorian names. This fact perhaps gives an indication as to when the change of names occurred. The most likely occasion appears to have been in 394 B.C. when the philo-Athenian party at Rhodes drove out the Dorian aristocrats, the Diagoreioi, and established the government, with Conon's help[19]. This revolution resulted in a new if not permanent, orientation of Rhodian policy, and it seems by no means impossible that the alteration of deme-names may reflect a desire to destroy or weaken the hold of the old Dorian traditions, and substitute for them local Rhodian interests.

To compensate for the uncertainty as to the history of the Rhodian φυλαί, there is considerable evidence to show smaller gentilicial subdivisions survived to a later date. Of these subdivisions the most familiar at Rhodes is the πάτρα[20], the principle evidence for which is contained in a Camiran inscription of the early Hellenistic age[21]. This consists of two stones, the preserved portions of which record in three columns the names of some gentilicial units and sub-units, doubtless those of Camirus, and within

Camiran territory, both on the island, and, probably, in the Peraea as well. The stones are broken at top and bottom, and consequently the nature of the grouping contained in the lists is in some respects far from certain[22]. The first column contains the names of some patrai, grouped under a larger unit described as -- ων πάτραι, then the word Ἀλθαιμενίδος, then more patrai under two different, larger groups. The stone breaks off in the middle of the second of these two lists of patrai. The preserved portion of the second column begins with other patrai, similarly grouped, followed again by the word Ἀλθαιμενίδος, followed by more patrai, grouped, as before, under larger headings. The third column, which is preserved on a separate stone, in its present state records only patrai and the larger unnamed sub-units of which they form part. It cannot therefore be determined whether these units belonged to Ἀλθαιμενίς or not.

The heading Ἀλθαιμενίδος, with its characteristic termination -- ίς is indicative of a tribe, and it may be supposed that Ἀλθαιμενίς was a Camiran tribe. The relation of the patrai and the intermediate groups to this tribe is, however, not clear. The appearance, in both of the first two columns, of Ἀλθαιμενίδος, followed in both instances by lists of patrai under larger groups which are in both columns in the same order, so far as can be determined, might suggest that the repetition of the tribe in the second column is in connection with a totally different occasion from

that referred to in the first; but, although the larger groups follow in the same order in both columns, it is clear from the fact that the patrai which form the larger divisions are in many instances different, and that the second column is not merely a repetition of the first[23]. Thus in the first column the rubric Ἀμφικλέων πάτραι[24] is followed by the names of seven patrai, four of which bear the same name Θωιάδαι, while in the second column the same entry, Ἀμφικλέων πάτραι, is followed by six patrai, none of which are the same as those in the other entry, and all of which bear different names. In other instances certain patrai are repeated in different larger groups; thus the patrai of the Kretiniadai occur twice under the rubric Χυτριείων πάτραι and once under the rubric Βουκολείων πάτραι.

Leaving for the present the question of the identity of the central group[25], it is clear that the patrai here recorded externally at least differ little from gentilicial sub-groups elsewhere in the Greek world. The names of the patrai are of two types, according to whether their termination is formed in -ᾶδαι or -ειοι. Whether, as has been supposed[26], this distinction extends beyond the bare name, and indicates a difference in dialect is open to doubt. It is natural to suppose that the terminations in -ειοι implied, here as elsewhere, less a close relationship than a connection now based on relationship, as for example, οἱ Σελεύκειοι are 'the followers', or 'the troops', of Seleucus, and

not "The descendants of Seleucus', who are οἱ Σελευκίδαι, [27]. Similarly the termination -τται, the pure patronymic termination, will indicate an immediate relationship, based on blood. This explanation is not without its difficulties, of which the most serious is that the patrai of the first class would (though perhaps only at a very early date) labour under a social disadvantage, since they could not claim direct descent from their eponym; but the alternative explanation, according to which the different terminations reflect a different dialect does not seem very probable[28].

The size of the individual patra cannot be determined, but the inscription indicates that there were at least about sixty of these groups in Camirus and very probably many more, while the tribe Ἀλθαιμενίς will, for its part, have contained at least fifteen patrai and probably many more.

While the information regarding the Camiran patrai is relatively full that relating to the patrai of the other cities is very deficient. They are only mentioned incidentally among lists of religious bodies, such as κοιναί, or among those honouring prominent citizens, and thus their arrangement cannot even be conjectured. From Lindos the names of seven are known[29], from Ialysus perhaps one[30]. While, however, the evidence from these two cities is slight, that from Lindos is of some value as indicating the context in which the patra is commonly found, namely as a group primarily active in making

religious dedications, and honouring notable citizens[31]. That it remained a secular family-group, and was not in itself a religious corporation appears to be indicated by the existence of the members of a patra, the patriotai, as a κοινόν , which presumably refers to the patra carrying out its religious practices[32].

The gentilicial groups other than the patra are less well attested. The Camiran list of patrai contains, as has been noted, a larger group to which no distinctive title is given, but which is obliquely described as 'the patrai of the x'. It is at least certain that these x-groups are not demes, the fundamental territorial division of Rhodes, because the names of most, if not all, of the Camiran demes are known.[33] None of them occurs among the names of these groups. Moreover, since these groups stand between the gentilicial formations of the πάτρα and the φυλά , it is a priori probable that they too are gentilicial. Further, the terminations of the larger groups in the inscription, in -ειοι and -- εῖς are closely akin to those of the patrai themselves, and this too suggests a gentilicial organization.

Assuming, then, that the group beneath the phylae is gentilicial, the question of its name remains to be answered. According to the normal gentilicial divisions the larger unit than the patra would be the phratria[34], and doubtless in substance, if not in name (as the first editor supposed[35]) the

unit in the inscription is identical with the phratria. The name phratria is, however, practically unknown at Rhodes[36], and there is thus no positive reason for supposing that the larger gentilicial group was so-called, though it is perfectly possible[37].

Of recent years inscriptions have come to light containing mention of what appears to be another gentilicial group, called a συννομά[38]. This word, as applied to a division of the population, is exclusively Rhodian, so far as is known, and since its nature is not defined, it can only be conjectured from the context in which it stands, and from the meaning of the word, which is itself a subject of dispute[39]. The most likely interpretation of the word is that it means 'a grazing together'[40], but clearly this could refer by extension no less to the neighbourhood in which the pasture lies, than to those who share the pasture land; in the first case, the division would be geographical, in the latter gentilicial. There is, however, one strong argument in favour of understanding the word in a gentilicial sense. In two of the three instances[41] in which the word is found it appears in association with undoubtedly gentilicial groups, namely the patra and the diagonia. This, together with the complete absence of any mention of a synnoma in the very numerous inscriptions referring to demes, is perhaps adequate ground for supposing the synnoma to have been a gentilicial group, but unfortunately there is no indication of the relation of

the patra to the synnoma; there is thus no reason why the synnoma should not have been smaller than the patra. This possibility is at least not lessened by the fact that in one of the instances in which it occurs[42] it is found in the company of the diagonia alone, the patra not being mentioned, and since the diagonia was a smaller family group than the patra, if the synnoma was larger than the patra, the ommision of the intermediate stage, the patra, is rather difficult to understand. For this reason, it is clearly preferable, while granting that the synnoma represents a family-group, to leave the question of its relation to the patra and of its possible identification with the large r family-group appearing in the Camiran patra-inscription, unanswered.

With the synnoma in one inscription, in another with the patra, and on other occasions by itself, occurs the term diagonia[43]. The general significance of this term is fortunately not open to doubt, though the precise meaning is not certain. That it was a gentilicial division is shown by its use as an attribute of a family-name. We thus find reference to the diagoniai of the Oibalidai, a Lindian patra[44]. It is clearly indicated by two inscriptions that the diagonia was a subdivision of the patra: one speaks of honours paid by 'the koinon formed of the diagoniai of the Aristokleioi and Kudagoreioi, (who are) of the patriotai of the Haliatadai'[45]. Another records honours paid 'by the Astuchronteioi, the Stasioneioi and the Autostheneioi, the diagoniai of the (patra of the) Haliatadai'[46]. From these

references it is that the diagonia was not simply a religious body formed by the patra, was not, that is to say, the patra in its performance of religious ceremonies, since in one instance the koinon of the diagonia is mentioned[47]; thus it, in its turn, had its own religious organisation. It is clear from a comparison of the inscriptions that the number of diagoniai in a patra might vary. In one instance, that of the πάτρα of the Διβαλίδαι, the patra consists of only one diagonia, and the name of the diagonia is not recorded, in other πάτραι, as those quoted above, the diagoniai, not less than three, perhaps five[48], are identified by family-names ending in --ειοι, similar to the patra-names.

The evidence, as it stands, does not permit more than the establishment of the gentilicial nature of the diagonia, and the fact that it was smaller, or at least no larger, than the patra. There is no obvious explanation of why there should be only one diagonia in some patrai, but it strongly suggests that the diagonia is not to be regarded simply as a subdivision of the patra, akin to the common Greek genos, since in that case there would always be more than one diagonia in the patra[49]. It is perhaps to be explained as a body containing a few of the most aristocratic families within the individual patra, deriving their name from the leading family among them; but the normal Greek, and particularly Rhodian, practice would be to name the diagonia after all the constituent families[50]. It is clear that in the present state of our knowledge the matter

must be left undecided.

By way of summary of the tribal and gentilicial organisation of the old cities, both before and after the synoecism, it may be said that it is a priori probable that the three old Dorian tribes, the Dumanes, Hylleis and Pamphyloi, existed in each of the three cities, though there is little positive evidence on the point. The different tribe names which have survived are perhaps to be explained as reflecting simply a change of name, and not a change in the nature or structure of the phylae. It is possible that the reformers of 394 were responsible for this change of names. The tribes appear to have had little or no importance in civic, as opposed to religious, affairs after the synoecism, and there is no indication that they were in any way connected with the deme-system which was the central organisation in the social system Rhodian [illegible].

Of the gentilicial subdivisions of the phylae the best attested is the patra, which stood at one remove from the phyla. Of this stratum of family-group we are particularly well informed for Camirus, but the same group and name existed in the other cities. Although all our evidence for these groups, as for the phylae, comes from after the synoecism, there is no reason to doubt that they were survivals from the earlier period, and that the evidence of the later period is in general valid for the earlier.

Apart from the patra, other gentilicial groups were

the synnoma and the diagonia. Of the first little can be said. It may have been a larger unit than the patra, but there is no positive evidence in support of this. The diagonia, on the other hand, is evidently to be regarded as part of the patra, but it is not possible to determine what part. Little though we know of these various divisions of the old cities, it is clear, both from the names, as well as from the relative frequency with which they occur, that the gentilicial organisations continued to play a considerable role in Rhodian life long after the synoecism.

(2) The territorial organisation of the old cities before the synoecism.

The area occupied before the synoecism by the gentilicial groups discussed above was probably slightly different from that which the demes occupied in the centuries after the synoecism. As usual, however, when dealing with the history of the island before the synoecism, there is little or no contemporary evidence from the island. There is, however, one very valuable source of information, for the geography of the island in the fifth century B.C., namely the tribute-lists of the Athenian Empire. These lists, uncertain and full of lacunae as they are, show quite clearly that the political geography of the island of the period of the Athenian Empire at least differed considerably from that of a later date.

Apart, however, from possible changes in the boundaries of the old cities, which may have been smaller before the synoecism, than they were afterwards, there is also to be considered the question of the establishment of the deme-system, and what relation, if any, it bore to any preceding system of local division.

After the synoecism, the whole island consisted of two main elements, the territory of the old cities, which was itself divided into so many demes, and Rhodos, which lay outside the deme system, and itself possessed no territorium outside the city, and no demes within it. Apart from these two elements there may have existed one or more areas of common land, κοινὰ χώρα , mentioned in one, as yet unpublished inscription, upon which either all the cities, or else two contracting members of an agreement, had rights[51]. This system appears to have existed unchanged for many centuries, from the fourth century B.C., to the Byzantine period[52]. There is, however, evidence in the Athenian tribute-lists to suggest that in the fifth century there may have existed other groups, which appear to have enjoyed some form of autonomy. These communities are of two kinds; those which are defined as being within (or if not so defined nevertheless were within) the territory of one of the old cities, and those which are stated to be 'in Rhodes'.

To the first class belong the Λινδίων Οἰκῆται , who

appear in the tribute-lists from 454/3 to 452/1 B.C.[53], after which they were apparently absorbed for purposes of payment with the parent Lindians. The locality of this community may be tentatively identified; an inscription of the time of the Mithridatic war, recording the honours awarded to an outstanding Rhodian, mentions those bestowed on him 'by the koinon of the patriotai of the Euthalidai who live in Oiai'[54]. Evidently there were members of the Euthalidae who lived elsewhere, but it may be supposed that the home of the patra was not far from Oiai. The home of the Euthalidae is in its turn located by an inscription[55] which records a decree of the patra honouring a demesman of the deme.Netteia, and states that the decree was to be set up in Netteia, in the shrine of Zeus Patroos, the patron of the patra. Netteia then was either the centre of the patra, or of one group of it, and Oiai may, with due reserve, be place in that neighbourhood. The territory of Netteia lay in the lower valleys on the western slopes of Mt. Skiathi[56].

To the same class belong the πεδιῆς ἐλ λίνδοι, 'the Lindian Plain-Dwellers' who appear in the tribute-lists from 448/7 to 415/4. The name of the Plain-Dwellers survived throughout antiquity as that of a Lindian deme, the πεδιεῖς, which clearly occupied the same area as that of the πεδιῆς ἐλ λίνδοι. The only considerable plain in Lindian territory is the coastal belt which stretches south from Lindos in the direction of Cattavia[57], and there can be

no doubt that the northern part of this was the home of the Lindian Pedieis, both in the fifth century and later.

Also to this category belongs the community whose name in the Tribute lists from 429/8 (?) to 415/4, appears as Βριγινδάριοι . That they lived within the territory of Ialysus is not evident from the lists, which in no instance contain more than the word Βριγινδάριοι [58], but the later Ialysian deme of the Βρυγινδάριοι located in the neighbourhood of Aphando Bay[59], is clearly derived from them, and it is therefore likely that they were in Ialysian territory before the synoecism, although there is nothing intrinsically impossible in the supposition that like the Diakrioi, shortly to be considered, they were only enrolled in a city territory at about the time of the synoecism.

These two, probably three, communities, were clearly not wholly independent, or were not so regarded by Athens, since if they had been they would not have been described in the possessive genitive as for example, Λινδίων Οἰάται or Πεδιῆς ἐλ Λίνδοι . What then was their status, both vis-à-vis the city, Lindos or Ialysus, and vis-à-vis Athens? Their separate assessment was probably not simply a matter of administrative convenience to Athens; they were all near enough to their city-centres, Lindos and Ialysus, to be able to bring in their tribute, to be sent to Athens with the

Lindian. There was thus no need for a separate assessment from the Athenian point-of-view, and the reason for their separate assessment must be sought in the relation of the communities to Lindos. We know too little of Lindos at this stage of her history to answer questions regarding possible intermediate status occupied by some communities, but the analogy of other tributaries of Athens is suggestive. Particularly so is the appearance of the same genitive form as Λινδίων Οἰκῆται in the assessments of the Erythraean peninsula, where we meet, for example, Πτελεούσιοι and Σιδουσίοι Ἐρυθραίων [60]. The two types of community, Rhodian and Erythraean, are clearly either identical or very similar, and since it is specifically stated by Thucydides that these Erythraean sites were not 'cities', but 'fortified places', τείχη [61], while Stephanus of Byzantium calls one of them, Sidusa, a κώμη, 'village' and not a πόλις [62], it is evident that at Erythrae, and probably, by analogy, on Rhodes also, the villages within a polis-territory were regarded by the Athenians as individual, though not wholly independent, communities. There is nothing to suggest that Athens was herself responsible for the semi-independence of these villages within the polis-boundaries, and such active intervention in the social as opposed to the political, life of a tributary does not seem likely[63]. It is simpler to suppose that in the early period of Lindian history some of the outlying areas had not been brought into complete

dependence on Lindos, were not, that is to say, in a situation similar to that of a deme, and that the Athenians found a few remnants of this earlier order still in existence.

The tribute-lists show that the Λινδίων Ὀϊάται were absorbed for purposes of assessment in the city of Lindos after the first assessment period, and it is possible that this corresponds to a real change of status of the vis-à-vis Lindos, though it may equally well be simply a reflection of a simplification of Athenian accountancy. The Πεδιῆς continued to be separately assessed down to 415/4, and it is possible that they retained their privileged status until the synoecism, or the democratic revolt of 394, and became a deme subsequently.

Of the second class, those communities which are stated to be 'in' or 'from' Rhodes, the only certain representatives are the Διάκριοι ἐκ Ῥόδου 64. These, it is clear, must be distinguished, in so far as concerns their political status, from the foregoing class. The Diakrioi are expressly stated to be 'from Rhodes', and not 'in' one of the old cities[65]. It thus follows that they were a wholly independent community, a fourth sovereign body beside the three old cities. Their geographical position is not known, but it may be inferred from the analogy of similarly named communities elsewhere, for instance in Euboea[66], also occurring in the tribute-lists, that they

dwelt in some mountainous region, remote from the old cities. Such a locality is hard to envisage in Rhodes, which boasts no mountain-ranges, and where the summit of even the highest mountain, Mount Atabyrion, can be reached from sea-level in a few hours, but Atabyrion itself is almost equidistant from Camirus and Lindos, and may thus have supported a small independent community. Whether the κοινὰ χώρα, mentioned in an unpublished inscription[67], is to be identified with Atabyrion, as has been supposed with some reason, and further whether the Diakrioi are to be regarded as the inhabitants during part of the fifth century of that 'common land'[68], cannot at present be determined.

The Diakrioi do not appear in the tribute-lists until 430/29, but since the preceding lists are fragmentary, the date of their first assessment cannot be decided, though it is certain that they were not assessed in 442/1 or 441/0. Their comparatively late appearance, along with the Brigindarioi, contrasts with the early assessments of the Lindian villages, but is probably of no great significance. It is possible that the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, and the resultant need for more money, provided the necessary incentive to cause the Athenians to extract money from this community. The matter, like most questions connected with the history of the three cities before the synoecism, must be left unanswered.

The above discussion, inconclusive though it

necessarily is, shows clearly that the boundaries of the old cities probably differed slightly before and after the fifth century. In general there is a possibility that the whole island was not rigidly under the control of the old cities, and divided between them as it was, with the exception of Rhodos, after the synoecism. This is what might be expected. Each city was a sovereign state, and in each of them must have existed the possibility of disobedience and secession on the part of distant and disaffected communities. After the synoecism, relations between the cities were petrified, and any variations in regard to frontiers, would result from decisions taken at Rhodos.

3. The internal territorial divisions of the old cities before the synoecism.

Nothing is known from direct evidence of any internal divisions of the old cities before the synoecism, although for the period after the synoecism our knowledge of the then existing deme-system is reasonably complete. In view of this lack of evidence it is possible that the developed deme-system which we know from the later period may also have existed in the earlier. [redacted] There is, however, one strong reason for believing that the demes are themselves creation of the period of the synoecism or of the subsequent democratic revolution. This reason lies in the occurrence in several

inscriptions of the word κτοῖνα , which, it has been suggested, refers to the internal territorial units of the old cities before the synoecism, subsequently superseded by the deme-system. Both by reason of its intrinsic importance and because of the appearance of new evidence, the significance of this word needs re-examination. The word κτοῖνα , which is not testified outside of Rhodian territory, occurs in inscriptions ranging from the fourth century before Christ to the Roman Imperial period[69]. Although the etymology of the word is uncertain[70], it is clear from these inscriptions that the term referred to a territorial division independent of the deme[71], the inhabitants of which were called κτοινᾶται or κτοινέται[72]. The problem lies in the relation of this unit of territory to the deme with which it is often mentioned in inscriptions recording dedications by the two bodies. These instances[73], in which the ktoina and the deme appear as two separate and parallel institutions, indicate that the ktoina was independent of, and not subordinate to, the deme, and was not an integral part of the deme-system[74]. That they were, however, very similar, is indicated by an inscription which contains a law referring to 'those who sacrifice in advance in connection with (?) the ktoina and the demos'[75].

On the other hand the numerous lists of demes from Lindos, and the other cities[76], which record the official

attachment of citizens to their demes, never refer to the ktoina, and this suggests that the ktoina in the Hellenistic and Roman periods was without civil significance in the State. It cannot, in fact, be proved that it ever did possess civil significance, any more than it can or cannot be proved that the deme-system existed before the synoecism, and it is possible either that it was a very early division of the people for religious purposes, or that, having originally possessed a civil function, it subsequently ceased to exercise it, its place being taken by the deme-system. Between these two alternatives it is difficult to make a choice since the word ktoina does not occur in documents of the period before the synoecism. The entry of the lexicographer Hesychius, who appears to define the ktoina as 'a division of ancestral worship, or a deme, divided up'[77], for what it is worth, leaves either interpretation open; he knows that the ktoina was a territorial division smaller than the demos, and that its activity was religious, but nothing can be inferred as to its origin from the passage. The word ktoina, however, appears in a fourth century document referring back to the time of the synoecism, which makes no mention of demes[78], and appears to refer to a well-established organisation existing both in the island and in the Peraea. It is thus probable that the ktoina was established before the synoecism, and that the deme-system was introduced subsequently, but whether the ktoina was at that time fulfilling a religious or a civil function, or both, cannot be

determined. There is no independent evidence to show whether the three old cities before the synoecism possessed, in addition to their gentilicial divisions into tribes and patrai, a division of the population into territorial groups, and the example of pre-Cleisthenic Attica, shows that such need not have been the case. If however the ktoina in the period before the synoecism was of civil significance occupying the place subsequently occupied by the deme, there is nevertheless some reason to think that in these local units, gentilicial elements were predominant, so that a clear cut distinction between territorial and gentilicial is hardly possible[79].

It has already been observed that there is a complete absence of evidence as to whether the demes existed before the synoecism. It is possible therefore to argue that the demes were introduced after the synoecism, perhaps at the time of the democratic revolution of 394, in the same way as, it had been suggested, the tribal names were perhaps altered then. Such a procedure would be in tune with the pro-Athenian sentiments of the authors of that revolution, and there exists no evidence contrary to this view, but also, it should be remembered, none in favour of it.

It is these demes which we must now consider.

4. The Deme-system.

(a) Deme-Topography.

The above discussion indicates that the date of

the introduction of the Rhodian system of demes must remain uncertain. There is, in fact, abundant evidence for the Rhodian demes, but in common with most other evidence from the island, it belongs to the Hellenistic and later periods, and the possibility always exists that there were some slight modifications in the system. Nevertheless it is clear that from the fourth century, if not earlier, until the Byzantine period, the system remained in all essentials the same.

A few general points may be made in advance:

(1) By no means the entire population of the island, excluding slaves and metics, enjoyed full citizenship. There were one, if not more categories, such as the Ῥόδιοι, who were citizens of Rhodos, by grant, and were in no way connected with the old cities, and were not members of any deme. These were all foreigners. Only true Rhodians, deriving on both sides from citizens of the three old cities, were members of demes[80].

(2) The entire territory of the island was divided into demes with the exception of Rhodos, which comprised no demes[81].

(3) The demes were all formed from the territory of the three old cities, which appear to have absorbed the komai within their territory, known from the Athenian tribute-lists, by the time of, or at, the synoecism.

(4) Demesmen were citizens both of the city in whose territory the deme lay and of Rhodos; that is, citizenship

of the old cities continued uninterrupted after the synoecism, when a double citizenship was introduced, both based on the same determining factor, membership of a deme of the old cities.

(5) The exact number of demes is not known in every instance; it was twelve at Lindos, and may have been the same elsewhere

(a) Lindian Demes.

The city of Lindos was situated on the broad promontory which projects into the sea from the centre of the south-east coast of the island. In the centre of the promontory, dominating the large modern village of the same name, rises the Acropolis of Lindos, the source of the great majority of the Lindian inscriptions. The inhabitants of Lindos were known after the synoecism by the demotic Λινδοπολῖται. The other eleven demes were rural demes, which covered a wide area, in all approximately half the island, to the north, south and west of Lindos.

A full list of the twelve Lindian demes is preserved on several inscriptions, not always in the same order. A typical list, of the year 42 B.C.[82], is as follows :

στεφανωθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν δάμων τῶν ἐν Λινδίᾳ πόλει
Λαδαρμίων Βρασίων Καττα[β]ίων Πεδιέων
Λινδοπολειτῶν Καμυνδίων Παγίων Νεττιδᾶν
Κλεονίων Ἀργείων Βουλιδᾶν Δρυειτᾶν

The most usual method of locating the deme-areas is by the provenience of the inscription on which the demotic

is recorded, although such a method is by no means free from danger of error, owing to the ease with which small stones such as tombstones, our most prolific source of information, can be moved from place to place on the back of a mule. Another method, not free from a rather different sort of error, is from the survival of ancient demotic in a modified form, in a modern place-name[83].

The first deme in the list reproduced above is that of the Λαδάρμιοι . Their deme-locality seems to survive in the modern Ἀλάερμα or σ' Ἀλάερμα , in the high ground in the centre of the island, almost due west of Lindos[84]. In this neighbourhood the tombstones of several Λαδάρμιοι have been found[83].

The Βράσιοι cannot be located with certainty, but that area was probably in the neighbourhood of the modern Siana, the high village on the west of the island, on the eastern slope of Mt. Akramiti[85].

The Καττάβιοι lived in the neighbourhood of the modern Cattaviá, at the extreme southern tip of the island, in the corner of a barren plain. The area has not, however, yielded any material evidence relating to the Καττάβιοι [86].

The Πεδιεῖς have already meen mentioned in connection with the appearance of Πεδιῆς ἐλ Λίνδοι in the Attic tribute-lists, and their probable area, South of Lindos, discussed[87].

There is no reason to doubt that the same community survived with the same name after the synoecism.

The Λινδοπολῖται have already been noted as being demesmen of the city-deme[88].

The Καμύνδιοι belonged to the deme of Κάμυνδα, a name preserved as a local epithet of Apollo[89]. Their locality may have been near the modern Vati, an inland village, halfway between Lindos and Cattavia[90].

The Πάγιοι have been identified with the region reputedly known as τοὺς Πάγους, between the roads from Alaerma to Apollona, and from Hagios Isodoros to Embona and Salako[91]. If this identification be correct, and the shrine of Artemis ἐν Κεκοίᾳ [92] is to be identified with the now derelict monastery, τὸ Ἀρταμίτι, near which is a feature now called Ἐρημοκέκοια [93], this shrine will have fallen within the deme boundaries of the Πάγιοι [94].

The Νεττίδαι inhabited the area of the modern Apollachia, on the west coast of the island, some three hours walk north of Cattavia. The deme-area is identified by two inscriptions, already mentioned[95], in which provision is made for the stones to be set up 'in Netteia, in the shrine of Zeus'. Both were found in the church of Hagia Eirene, just outside the village. It was the same neighbourhood, which, in the fifth century, was the home of the Lindian Oiatai.

The position of the Κλάριοι is uncertain. The identification with the modern Kalathó, the small village,

north of Lindos, is not very probable[96].

The Ἀργεῖοι , if only because of the name they bear, are of especial interest. Their locality is, fairly certain. A Rhodian inscription[97] speaks of a shrine of Asclepius ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς ταῖς ἐν Ἄργει , and it is probable that the modern Sklepió, a village south-west of Lindos, retains the name of the ancient shrine[98]. At the mouth of the river Sklepianó, which flows past the village, there are a few signs of ancient habitation[99].

The locality of the Βουλίδαι is unknown. The appearance of Βουλίδαι in a list of Camiran koina[100] and demes, possibly the only Lindian community represented[101], is perhaps a slight reason for locating the deme of the west of the island rather than in the immediate neighbourhood of Lindos[102].

The Δρυῖται also occupied an unknown area. The most obvious etymology of the name suggests a wooded area[103], but the only well-wooded area, that of the modern Mt.Salako, lay close to Camirus.

These twelve demes comprised Lindian territory inside the island, and constituting the kernel of that territory, acted as a single group in making the dedications which record their names. There existed, however, other Lindian demes, both in the Rhodian islands, and in the Rhodian Peraea. These are discussed elsewhere[104].

(b) Camiran demes.

Our knowledge of the deme-system of the cities of Camirus and Ialysus (particularly the former) is far more scanty, than of that of Lindos, since no documents similar to the deme-dedications from Lindos, survive. For Camirus our main source of information lies in various lists of Camiran priests, in some of which demotics are recorded[105].

The site of Camirus was on the west coast of the island, near the modern Galavarda. The acropolis area, excavated by the Italians, is probably the most interesting archaeological site in the island, since the area was eventually used for private dwellings, whole streets of which survive[106]. The religious buildings also yielded a fine series of inscriptions, mostly dedications by annually elected sacral officials[107].

It appears that the total area of Camiran territory was smaller than that of Lindos and Ialysus. It consisted, so far as can be determined, of the western part of the island, from approximately Monolitho, in the south-west to the neighbourhood of Phané, in the north. Inland it had only a small extent, being bounded by the high-ground of Mts. Atabyrion and (the modern) Miasto. Behind these two features lay Lindian territory. In fertility the area of Camirus falls far behind that of Ialysus, even though some of its produce was exported as early as the fifth century B.C.[108].

The number of Camiran demes known is ten, excluding those of the Peraea and islands[109], and of

these ten one or two may belong to the Peraean territory of Camirus. The demes already located on the island are the Λέλιοι, Ῥογκίδαι, Κυμισαλεῖς : the location of the other seven is unknown.

The Λέλιοι probably inhabited the area of the modern locality known as Lelos, on the south side of Mt. Miasto[110]. In this region several Hellenistic, as well as Mycaenaean, tombs have been found[111]. The Ῥογκίδαι, inhabiting the deme-area known from one inscription to have been called Ῥόγκυον, are there said to have lived between Ἀγρύλεια and Ἱπποτεία[112]. Though these sites are unknown, and appear to have left no trace in any modern place-name, the provenience of the inscription, the modern Embona, the highest village of the island, on the north-western face of Mt. Atabyrion, may well indicate the direction in which the home of the Ῥογκίδαι, who would thus perhaps be located in the same area as that in which lived the Διάκριοι of the Athenian tribute-lists[113], should be sought. This deme probably included the summit of Mt. Atabyrion, most directly, if not most comfortably, reached from the village of Embona[114].

The Κυμισαλεῖς dwelt in the southern part of Camiran territory, in the coastal area, west of the modern Siana. There is a coastal settlement here called Kymisala, and a tombstone of a Κυμισαλεύς was found near it[115]. There are considerable ancient remains here, not only on the hill of Hagios Phokas, but a kilometre further west nearer Kymisala,

across the narrow fertile re-entrant which runs up to the face of Mt. Akramiti[116]. These latter probably represent the central locality and necropoleis of the Κυμισαλεῖς, though whether the remains on Hagios Phocas belong to the same deme-locality is perhaps uncertain.

The Φάγαιοι cannot be attributed with complete certainty to Camirus, and if it be supposed that they were a Camiran deme, there is no indication of the locality of the deme[117].

The Σιλύριοι[118], Ἠριεῖς[119], Πλάριοι[120], Λοξίδαι[121], Εὐριάδαι[122], and Ἀμνίστιοι[123], are all known to have been Camiran demes, but there is no evidence as to their position, and it is thus possible that they are to be located in the Peraea, though there is no site or place-name with which any of them have yet been located.

(c). Ialysian demes.

The uncertainty as to the location of the Camiran demes, is perhaps the main reason why, at present, it is impossible to delineate the political geography of the island. With Ialysus we are again on firmer ground.

The main evidence for Ialysus consists of a list of the priests of Apollo Erethimios[124], an office which was confined to Ialysians. This list gives the names of eight Ialysian demes, while the names of one or two others are known from other sources.

Ialysus lay in the north-west of the island, by the

modern Trianda. Its Acropolis, and perhaps the earliest town, was on the beautiful table-mountain, Phileremos, which dominates the surrounding plain and coastline[125]. Before the synoecism, Ialysian territory presumably comprised the whole of the northern part of the island, including the site of the later Rhodos, an area at that time apparently only sparsely populated[126]. Subsequently the city itself was withdrawn from Ialysian territory, but outside the city-walls of Rhodos, probably all land was reckoned as belonging to Ialysus. To the south-west, Ialysian territory stretched to a point near Phané, while to the east and south-east it stretched across the island reaching the other sea approximately at Mt. Zambika. It thus included the two rich coastal plains, of which that on the west coast is to-day far in advance of the rest of the island in prosperity, and the fertile plain of Maritza.

The names of the known demotics of Ialysus are Βρυγινδάριος, Ἰστάνιος, Ὑπερεχεύς, Νεοπολίτας, Ἀστυπαλιεύς, Ποντωρεύς, Πολίτας, Σιβύθιος, Παλλιοπολίτας and Δαματριάς.

The Βρυγινδάριοι were, as has been noted, under the slightly different name Βρικινδάριοι, an independent community in the fifth century, and appear in the Athenian tribute-lists[127]. An inscription referring to a Βρυγινδάριος who held office as δαμιουργὸς Βρυγίνδει was found not far from Aphantou, on the east coast, and presumably at or near the shrine of the nymph Βρυγινδίς 128. The Βρυγινδάριοι may then

be assigned, with the usual reservations, to this area.

The Ἰστάνιοι [129] occur in the list of priests of Apollo Erethimios more frequently than any other deme, and from this it has been suggested that the site of the temple of Apollo Erethimios, by the modern Tholó, on the main road between Trianda-Ialysus and Galavarda-Camirus, lay within the territory of the Ἰστάνιοι [130]. The argument is of no value, since the temple was the worshipping-place of all Ialysians, and therefore the deme within whose boundaries it lay is not likely to have enjoyed greater access to the priesthood, than any other deme; but the possibility that the Ἰστάνιοι were in this area, of course remains[131].

The Πουπωρεῖς appear to have lived in the area of the modern Archipolis, where they have left some evidence in the form of inscriptions[132]. If this identification be correct, the territory of the Πουπωρεῖς probably bordered on Lindian territory.

Three demotics, Νεοπολίτας, Παλαιοπολίτας, and Πολίτας must be treated together, since the location of one affects the location of the other two. It is commonly held that all three were in some way demotics of Ialysus itself: and of the first and the last this is probably correct. The Πολῖται apparently dwelt on Mt. Phileremos itself, the Acropolis of the later city, known as ἡ Ἀχαΐα πόλις or τὸ Ὀχύρωμα [133]. There is little doubt that the Acropolis was inhabited (if not on the summit) after the archaic period[134], and the use

of πόλις for ἀκρόπολις is sufficiently common to justify the identification[135], though there is no evidence from the site itself to confirm it. The Νεοπολῖται[136], 'inhabitants of the new city' perhaps derived their name from the town which, it may be conjectured, developed at a later date, between the mountain and the sea[137]. The Παλαιοπολῖται do not appear in the list of the priests of Apollo Erethimios, nor is it, indeed, certain that they were an Ialysian deme[138]. If it be supposed, on the analogy of Νεοπολῖται, that the Παλαιοπολῖται were also part of the population of Ialysus, then it is possible as has been supposed that they inhabited the site of the [illegible] city called Κύρβη of which Diodorus says that it was submerged in the legendary period and became desolate[139]; a possible site for Κύρβη would perhaps be the hill Μακρὰ Βουνάρα, the site of the Mycenaean city, in the plain below Phileremos.[140] [illegible] However, with Νεάπολις and Πόλις there does not appear to be room for a third deme, connected with the city territory of Ialysus, and the matter must be left undecided.

The deme of Δαματριάς has been identified with the modern village of Damatria, in the plain of Marizza, and this identification seems fairly certain[141].

As at Camirus there are also several demes whose location is wholly unknown, and which may logically have belonged either to the territory of Ialysus on the island, or in the Peraea. These are the Ὑπερεγχεῖς[142], the

Σιβύθιοι [143] and the Ἀστυπαλιεῖς [144]. Since, however, there is no unequivocal evidence that Ialysus possessed demes in the Peraea it is probable that they should be sought in the island, where there is plenty of available unidentified deme-territory within the boundaries of Ialysus.

Such, in so far as it can be recovered, was the deme-system of the three old cities of Rhodes. An examination of these deme-names shows that they fall into two classes according to their suffixes, those which have a deme-termination, either the regular one in --εύς, --εῖς[145], or in --ιος, or --ιοι [146]; and those which have a gentilicial termination. It is this latter group which excites interest. They are represented at Lindos by the Νεττίδαι, the Βουλίδαι, and the Δρυῖται, and at Camirus by the Ῥογκίδαι, the Λοξίδαι and the Εὐριάδαι. No gentilicial demotic has yet been found among the Ialysian demes, but the list of these demes is far from complete.

These gentilicial terminations suggest very strongly that in the deme-system the old gentilicial system was by no means extinguished. This is confirmed beyond the possibility of doubt by the fact that the Δρυῖται are known not only as a Lindian deme, but also as a Lindian *patra*[147]. However we are to interpret this fact, whether we are to suppose that area in which the family-group of the Druitai lived was simply called a deme, and otherwise left unchanged, or whether the *patra* occupied only a small portion of the area of the deme

to which it gave its name, the identity of the two words indicates very strikingly the extent to which the territorial ties and groupings of the Rhodians were based on gentilicial ties, of family-groups which had established themselves in a particular area. The particular instance from Lindos is the best example of this tendency, but there may be others[148], and there is also to be borne in mind the fact, established earlier[149], that although there could be little doubt that the ktoina, was, like the deme, a territorial unit, there were signs in respect of that organisation also, that the gentilicial element was paramount; the Lindian patra-deme of the Druitai, recalls very forcibly the Camiran ktoina of the Strapiatai[150], with the same gentilicial termination. The gentilicial patra may then have established its influence over some ktoinai, and this influence will have been perpetuated in the deme system, if it be supposed that the deme was the successor of the ktoina.

In the present state of our knowledge it would be foolish to insist further on this matter, but the evidence, however we choose to interpret it, clearly suggests that the deme-system, as it existed after the synoecism, had a gentilicial element in it. This strengthens the impression gained from a study of the gentilicial groups themselves, that the gentilicial structure of the island, both before and after the synoecism was complex and enduring. The strength of

the Rhodian state lay, it may be conjectured, in the contrast between this element, and that other element, consisting of non-citizens, who had come to Rhodes to make their living, which was permanently excluded from the hereditary gentilicial system of the pure Dorians.

Chapter II.

The Constitutions of the Old Cities.

The inequality of the evidence for the history of ancient Rhodes is nowhere clearer seen than in respect of the constitutions of the old cities. For while we possess a very considerable amount of information about the constitutions and magistracies of the cities, in particular Lindos and Camirus, after the synoecism, there survives very little evidence for the period before that event. This fact limits the historical value of the later evidence to some extent, since it is not always possible to tell whether a particular constitutional item is an innovation of the period after the synoecism, or has its origins in the constitution of the independent city.

The evidence at our disposal for the study of the old and the new constitutions is almost entirely epigraphical. For the earlier period, our main source of information consists of four Lindian inscriptions, of the second half of the fifth century, while for Camirus and Ialysus there is no contemporary evidence, and any indications regarding the old institutions have to be based either on later evidence or on the assumption that what existed at Lindos, existed also at the other two cities, as is often the case after the synoecism.

Such an inference is clearly precarious, since there is no reason why, when the three cities were wholly independent communities, they should have enjoyed the same institutions as they did at a time when uniformity was imposed on them from above.

(a) The consitutions of the old cities before the synoecism.

The early political history of Lindos is connected with the name of Cleobulus, one of the Seven Sages and of Lindian origin. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods there existed numerous stories connected with his name, the truth of which may be suspected but cannot be disproved[1], such, for instance, as the record in the Lindian Chronicle of an expedition against Lycia, led by the Wise Man himself[2]. More important, if true, are the statements that Cleobulus was tyrant of Lindos[3], and the reference, in the fabricated letter of Cleobulus to Solon of Athens, in which the former refers to Lindos, as a democracy[4]. However, such evidence has little value, and Cleobulus must ramain a figure of uncertain historicity.

In fact, the earliest, as well as the most important evidence for the Lindian constitution comes from an inscription of about 440 B.C., found at Tymnos in the Rhodian Peraea, but of Lindian origin[5]. It contains instructions for dedications by 'οἱ στρατευόμενοι ἐκ Λίνδο ἢ δαμοσίωι ἢ ἰδίαι ' of the sixtieth part of their μισθός , to

Enyalios. The payment is to be collected by the στρατηγός or the expedition, and handed over to the priest of Enyalios. The next clause appears to provide for the same payment to be made by volunteer contingents serving in the Lindian ranks[6]. The priest of Enyalios is to communicate to the βωλά the total dedicated [illegible] each year, and to transmit the sum held to his successor. The ἐπιστάται are to write down the amount held by the στρατηγοί, and the others who took part in the campaign. The πρυτάνεις in office in the month of Artamitios are to sacrifice to Enyalios a goat, a dog and a kid. At this point the stone becomes unintelligible for two and a half lines[7]; it then goes on to the effect that the βωλά is to marshal the sacrificial procession; the priests are to be followed in the procession by as many hoplites as the βωλά orders. The βωλά is to dedicate a shrine to Enyalios, as soon as it has collected the money privately at Lindos. If the στρατηγοί fail to levy the money from the troops this will be considered impious, and the στρατηγός responsible will have to render account. The same holds good for those who go on the campaign privately. The στρατηγός and the private citizens are to make their payments within a month of their return from the campaign. Finally, the decree is to be inscribed on a stele, erected by the altar of Enyalios.

This document is very informative. The prescript shows

a fully developed constitutional machinery, such as existed at Athens and elsewhere in the contemporary world; the decree is passed by Council and popular assembly; the council has an epistates and a grammateus, both of whom appear in the prescript of the decree. The prytaneis are not mentioned in the prescript, but their existence as a body is testified later on in the inscription. In general there is a striking similarity with the normal Athenian prescript of the fifth century, such as ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷι δήμωι. Ἀκαμαντὶς ἐπρυτάνευε, Ὀνάσιππος ἐγραμμάτευε, Ἀέων εἶπε.[8]

In the body of the text the prytaneis are mentioned as τὸν Ἀρταμίτιον μῆνα πρυτανεύοντες[9]. On the analogy of Athens, where the prytaneis were a tenth part of the Boule, constituting the bouleutai of one of the ten tribes, and held office as prytaneis for a tenth of the civil year[10], it might be supposed that these prytaneis, were a third of the Boule, the bouleutai of one of the three Dorian tribes, and holding office for a third of a year. But the phrase τὸν Ἀρταμίτιον μῆνα πρυτανεύοντες is ambiguous; it indicates certainly that the prytaneis entered into office at a different time from the Boule, and raises the possibility that the life of the prytany was shorter than that of the Boule. But it may also mean that the prytany changed every month; such, in fact, would be the most natural interpretation of the phrase. If this be so, then the basis of election is not likely to have been, as at Athens, the tribe, since this would mean

that each tribe held office four times a year, a procedure which would lead to considerable confusion. It is natural to think of some other basis of election. This may have been the ktoina, since the later deme system consisted of twelve demes[11], one of which would correspond to each month of the year, and it is possible that the number of demes after the synoecism was determined by the number of ktoina existing before it. On this calculation, then, the prytaneis will have been the ktoinatai of a particular ktoina. Since our knowledge of the prytaneis before the synoecism is confined to what is recorded in this inscription both interpretations are possible.

The Lindian Boula probably held office for a year. The clause regulating the transfer of the sixtieths from the retiring to the succeeding priest ordains that this should occur annually in front of the Boula[12]. This may mean that the priest held office for a year, and that he rendered account at the end of his term of office to the Boula then in session, which itself, like the later Boula at Rhodes, which was semestrial, was elected more frequently than he was himself, or that the Boula was annual no less than the priesthood. Certainly it is unlikely that the priesthood was not annual; it evidently lasted at least a year, since account was rendered annually, and it does not seem likely that in the fifth century a priesthood would be

held for life, or for any period longer than a year.

Whatever the duration of a single Boula, its functions in the present instance are fortunately clear. They included the making of arrangements regarding religious festivals[13], which was also among the functions of the Athenian Boule[14], and the part the Lindian Boula played in the transfer of sacred funds[15] is also reminiscent of the authority possessed by the Athenian Boule in financial matters[16].

The sphere of office of the grammateus mentioned in the prescript is not further defined. His presence in this position suggests that he was secretary of the Boula . At Athens in the fifth century that official was elected with each new prytany, the annual election not coming into force until the middle of the fourth century[17]. It is possible that a similar procedure existed at Lindos, and that the grammateus here mentioned was elected either every four months or every month. But the absence of the prytaneis from the prescript suggests that there may have been no connection here with the prytaneis, and that the grammateus may have been elected to serve the same period at the Boula, whose secretary he probably was. Here, again the office occurs only once, and no certainty is possible.

Equally uncertain is the status of the epistatas also mentioned in the prescript. It is possible that his function

was akin to that of the Athenian official of the same name, who presided for a night and a day over the deliberations of the Boule and Ecclesia, and who very often appears in the prescript of Athenian decrees[18]. His function would then be distinct from that of the college of epistatai also mentioned in the inscription as responsible for amounts held by stratagoi and troops[19]. It would however be no less possible to suppose that there existed one board of epistatai, and that, as happened after the synoecism, one of the three was regarded as superior in office to the other two, and that this one contributed his name to the prescript[20].

It is clear that though this document is of great value, it manifests the usual shortcomings of isolated epigraphical evidence; unsupported, in documents of this nature, it provides little more than a list of offices, with no direct clue as to their functions, the method by which election was made, and so on. It is a welcome addition to our knowledge to know that Lindos before the synoecism possessed a Boula and Ecclesia, prytaneis, epistatai and stratagoi, but these offices have to be interpreted in the light of analogy elsewhere, and such analogy, inevitably uncertain in respect of such relevant factors as the extent of the franchise, admittance to the Boula, and to magistracies may be very misleading. In spite, however, of these limitations this document opens the way for some conclusion of major importance.

First and foremost, we can see clearly that the

constitution of Lindos before the synoecism, bore but little superficial resemblance to that which existed after that event. The loss of autonomy and the reduction to the status of a municipality carried with it, automatically, a restriction in the function of the Councils and Assemblies, which after the synoecism were called, in all three cities, μαστροί, and οἱ Λίνδιοι, οἱ Καμιρεῖς and οἱ Ἰαλύσιοι respectively. It is now evident that the names borne by these bodies after the synoecism, at least at Lindos, was not the same as that which had been in use previously.

Secondly, [redacted] in appearance at least, the Lindian constitution closely resembled that of contemporary Athens. This raises a question of some importance, in view of the date of the inscription, namely whether the Lindian constitution was modelled on the Athenian, as a direct or indirect result of the incorporation of Lindos in the Athenian empire. The rather ambiguous evidence from Miletus, contained in the decree regulating Athenian relations with the city, taken in conjunction with later documents showing a democratic constitution, suggests that a constitution on the Athenian model had been imposed here[21]. Similarly the presence at Lindos of magistrates with the same names as magistrates at Athens, combined with the complete absence in the same text of any title without a parallel at Athens, suggests that what appears to have occurred at Miletus certainly occurred at Lindos. The

matter is of more interest to the historian of Athenian imperialism than to the student of Rhodian antiquities, for whom the interest of this possibility would lie in the fact that the constitution found in the Lindian inscription could no longer be regarded as typical of Lindos before the synoecism. This possibility is not contradicted by other Lindian documents which also belong to the period before the synoecism, though they appear to be later than the preceding document. A fragmentary inscription apparently of the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, recording an agreement between Lindos and Lyttos in Crete[22], is not informative for the constitution of the city. More so is a proxeny-decree, which probably belongs to the decade, 420-411 B.C., in honour of a resident of Egypt[23]. The form of the prescript here resembles closely that of the decree regarding the payments of the sixtieths; the decree was passed by Bola and Damos, the secretary is named, followed by that of the proposer of the motion[24]. The main difference is that in this prescript there is no reference to the epistatas.

A second proxeny decree is even more fragmentary, and the prescript of it is lost[25]. Its date is possibly earlier than that of the proxeny for the resident in Egypt[26]. It has been conjectured, on very insufficient grounds, that the prescript contained reference to the passage of the decree by a Bola, but without a Damos, and on the basis of this, it has been supposed that the decree belongs to the

period immediately after the overthrow of the democracy in 411; but there is little to support this hypothesis[27].

In brief, we must be content with the certainty that in form the Lindian government of the middle of the fifth century, and of the time of the Peloponnesian war, appears to have enjoyed the same magistracies and assemblies as did Athens. The possibility that this was due to direct or indirect Athenian action exists, but cannot be proved.

Of the constitutions of Camirus and Ialysus before the synoecism nothing is known from direct evidence, nor can anything be safely inferred from the later constitutions of the two cities, which closely resembled that of Lindos, since the evidence from Lindos indicates that the central government made a clean sweep at this time, and that there is no necessary continuity in magistracies.

The pre-eminance of the Diagoreioi at Ialysus in the early fifth century[28] does not exclude the possibility that subsequently the Athenians may have established a democratic government at Ialysus. However, the expulsion of Dorieus, which appears to have occurred at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is probably to be connected less with such a move which is more likely to have taken place in the period from 460 to 440 B.C., than with general precautionary measures at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.

(b) <u>The Constitution of the old cities after the synoecism</u>.

(i). <u>The relation o f the old cities to Rhodos</u>.

As a result of the synoecism of 408/7 and the events of the succeeding years the citizens of the old cities became politically, though not necessarily by residence, citizens of the new city, which alone possessed full political sovereignty, the authority of the old cities from now on being confined to the administration of municipal and religious affairs. Uniformity in these matters may have been imposed, at or shortly after the synoecism, by a general law, called 'The Law of the Rhodians'[29]. Each of the old cities thus possessed a dual existence and function: its municipal existence as a πλῆθος , and its existence relative to the new city. This second form of existence had to be expressed immediately after the synoecism, since the cities continued to be inhabited, and could not be neglected.

From the viewpoint of the central administration after the synoecism each of the old cities was regarded as a phyla of Rhodos, thus giving a total of three phylai in the new city. Each was named after the city in question, and there thus came into existence the φυλὴ Λινδία , the φυλὴ Καμειρίς and the φυλὴ Ἰαλυσία [30].

The evidence regarding these tribes is so slight as to suggest that they had no political significance. Thus the few Rhodian decrees which survive, while they record the names of the demes of individual Rhodians, in no instance record that of the phyla, either the tribe of the old city nor the wider tribal connotation, such as Λινδία . Moreover

while some of the magistrates of Rhodos may have been elected or appointed on a tribal basis since they formed colleges of three, as many cannot have been so elected, since they form colleges of five. What little evidence exists for these tribes is in an agonistic or religious context, and it seems likely that their activites were largely confined to such occasions. Similarly with the Phylarchos, the tribe-commander; there is no suggestion that the leadership of the tribe was of any constitutional or political significance. It is always in relation to games that he is mentioned. That the Phylarchia was, however, considered a post carrying some prestige with it, is clear from the fact it occupies a prominent position in the record of the cursus of individual careers[31].

The establishment of the new tribes from the old cities, is the external mark of the revolution in sovereignty. The internal mark is that the constitutional organs of the old cities, as they lost their authority, also changed their names. In place of the damos, the 'sovereign body', appears the πλῆθος, the 'body' or 'number'; in place of the Bola are the μοῖραι, a term the exact meaning of which is far from certain; while the prytaneis, previously found at Lindos and from the synoecism onwards the most important college at Rhodos, are probably replaced by the more generically named ἐπιστάται. It appears that the new constitutions were identical in all important respects, and that, where in-

formation is lacking on one particular item, an inference from the practice at the other cities is justified. In one respect, it is clear that the old titles were retained, namely in that of the eponymous priesthood which must now be considered.

(ii) The eponymous priesthoods of the old cities.

The eponymous priest of Lindos, was the priest of Athana Lindia. The worship of the Lindian Athana had existed from the earliest days of Rhodian history, and her temple on the Acropolis was from the archaic period one of the leading shrines of the Greek world, and in the fifth century seems to have been regarded as the religious centre of the entire island[32]. Thus, although the priest does not occur in any of the Lindian documents dating from before the synoecism, there is no reason to doubt that he was from an early date eponym of the city. After the synoecism the name of the priest of each year was inscribed on a stele, most of which has been preserved, and which constitutes the chronological backbone of Lindian inscriptions[33]. The list is continuous from B.C. to A.D.27, while for the earlier periods, the list is preserved from 375 to 357, and from 339 to 326 B.C.[34]. The large gap between 326 and about a century later can be filled with some certainty from references to priests of Athana in inscriptions which can be approximately dated on independent, usually prosopographical, grounds. Such secondary sources of

information are of various types. Perhaps the most numerous are dedications made by the priest and his colleagues in office to Athana Lindia, or to the gods generally, and dedications made in honour of the priest himself by his colleagues, civil and religious. In addition decrees of the Lindian people sometimes mention the name of the priest as a date in the prescript, in the normal manner of eponymous magistrates. Other dedications to Athana Lindia, made by various officials, such as the Rhodian epistatai, stationed at Lindos, are also headed by the name of the eponymous Lindian priest.

In the early years of the third century the worship of Zeus Polieus was associated with that of Athana Lindia, and the eponymous priest assumed the title of ἱερεὺς Ἀθάνας Λινδίας καὶ Διὸς Πολιέως[35]. Since, however, not only did public and private dedications continue to be made to Athana alone[36], but even in the prescripts of Lindian decrees the priest is referred to simply as priest of Athana[37], it is evident that the position of Zeus in the partnership was much the inferior.

Though it is nowhere expressly stated, the election to the eponymous magistracy was probably by lot, since election by lot was the normal method of determining the tenure of important priesthoods; the deity spoke through the lot[38]. It may further be presumed that since all Lindians were, by definition, in possession of full citizen-rights, the lot might fall on anyone. More interesting than this, however,

is the fact that election to the priesthood was regulated on a deme-basis. The list of the eponymous priests of Athana reveals numerous instances in which two brothers or father and son held the priesthood. In such instances it appears to be the invariable rule that between the tenure of office by the one and by the other there is a lapse of three years, or of a multiple of three years. It is further evident that over a period of two hundred years the same regulation existed in regard to demes. Members of the same deme always follow each other in tenure of the priesthood at three yearly intervals. Blinkenberg, to whom is due the discovery of this rule, explained it thus[39]: 'This must undoubtedly be explained by a periodical alternation between certain groups or classes of citizens, fixed in the constitution and the number of three makes us think of the Dorian tribes, which retained some importance in all which appertained to cult.' The uniformity of sequence of the demes in the three-yearly period in fact clearly indicates that the twelve demes were distributed equally among the three tribes. The distribution appears to have been as follows[40]: Tribe A: Ἀλγεῖος: Πάριος: Λινδοπολίτας: Βουλίδας. Tribe B: Κλάσιος: Νεττίδας: Λαδάρμιος: Καμύνδιος. Tribe C: Πεδιεύς: Βράσιος: Καττάβιος: Δρυΐτας. Unfortunately further than this we cannot go: evidently there were only three tribes at Lindos, but the name of only one of them has survived[41].

It is thus clear that there existed an electoral cycle for the eponymous priesthood at Lindos. A similar cycle also existed at Camirus for the eponymous δαμιουργός[42]. At Lindos it was not employed in the election of the priests of Poseidon Hippios[43], and there is no evidence that it was employed in any other office. It would therefore evidently be an error at present to regard this [redacted] cycle* as playing a part comparable to that played at Athens by the tribe-cycle.

A particular feature of Lindian magistracies, which holds for the eponymous priesthood as well, is the formation of groups or κοινά of past holders of the office. These groups of ex-priests joined collectively in dedications to the priest of the year and on other official occasions under the title of ἱερατεύκοτες Ἀθάνας. In one inscription as many as seventeen ἱερατεύκοτες of Athana are mentioned[44], suggesting that the office of priest of Athana was attained in maturity rather than in old age.

A few examples may be given of the use of the name of the eponymous magistrate in Lindian documents other than those mentioned above. Simple honorific decrees, introduced by the words Λίνδιοι ἐτίμασαν, do not carry an indication of date at all[45]. Similarly dedications in honour of private citizens by relatives, and dedications in honour of minor magistrates by their colleagues in the same college are without eponymous date[46]. Decrees of the Lindian people

are normally dated both by the priest of Athana Lindia and the priest of Halios at Rhodos thus: ἐπ' ἱερέως τᾶς Ἀθάνας Λινδίας τοῦ δεῖνος, τοῦ δὲ Ἁλίου τοῦ δεῖνος [47], though in one decree a dating-prescript is wholly lacking, the decree beginning abruptly with ἔδοξε μάστροις καὶ Λινδίαις [48], while another decree bears the name of the priest of Athana, but omits that of the priest of Helios[49]. It is clear that there was no hard and fast rule as to the amount of information that had to be contained in the prescript of a decree. At the same time the name of the priest appears without exception in dedications of a major kind, by συνιερεῖς and συνάρχοντες, and in dedications by certain officials such as Rhodian ἐπιστάται, made to Athana Lindia[50].

The eponymous priest of Camirus was the priest of Hestia and Zeus Teleios. He was known as the δαμιουργός [51]. Of these priests also there exists a list of the annual holder of the office over a long period, akin to the list of the priests of Athana Lindia[52]. It is written on the flattened sides of four half-pillars, which apparently formed part of a portico. The pillars were found scattered and their sequence and the sequence of the names recorded on them are therefore uncertain. According to the most probable reconstruction of the stones the surviving pillars constitute two consecutive half-pillars, forming a complete pillar, and two other halves, of uncertain connection with the previous two[53]. On this calculation the main fragment contains the names of the priests of the third and second centuries B.C.,

while the names on the other fragments, totalling more than a hundred, cannot be dated, though the script which is uniform throughout the text, suggests that they continue into the Roman Imperial period[54]. In spite of the absence of any early names, it is reasonable to suppose, that this list, like that of the priests of Athana Lindia, began shortly after the synoecism, c.406 B.C., when a new epoch in the history of the old cities began.

This list is supplemented by dedications to the gods by the damiourgoi, some of whom do not appear in the list, and which, to judge from the script of the inscriptions in which their names occur, may belong to the late fourth, or early third century. These dedications, of which a considerable number survives[55], conform to a slightly different type from those of Lindos, being mostly confined to religious magistrates, the δαμιουεργοί , the ἱεροποιοί and the priests, and not including the civil magistrates. Each dedication is headed by the name of the damiourgos, together with his title, either as a noun or a participle, thus: [Διοπ]είθης Πεισάνδρου δαμιουεργήσας καὶ ἱεροποιοί, or Δαμιουεργὸς Καλλικρατίδας Εὐαγόρα καὶ ἱεροποιοί.
It has already been noted that the 'triennial rule' operated at Camirus as at Lindos[58].

Very few documents issued by the Camiran ecclesia have survived. One of these begins simply ἔδοξε Καμιρεῦσι[59], and has no reference either to the mastroi or to the

eponymous priest. Two other decrees begin with the name of the damiourgos[60], but unlike some at least of those of Lindos do not mention the Rhodian eponym. In view, however, of the few surviving decrees, it cannot be determined whether the absence of the priest of Halios constitutes an exception or not. As at Lindos, honorific decrees begin with the words Καμιρεῖς ἐτίμωαν, without other prescript or indication of date[61]. The two examples of this type of document are both of Roman period, and one at least of Imperial date, so that the Hellenistic practice may have been different.

The eponym of Ialysus was the priest of Zeus Polieus and Athana Polias ἐν Ἀχαίᾳ πόλει[62], the site of whose temple has been identified on the Acropolis of Mt. Phileremos[63]. The only surviving Ialysian decree, which is concerned with the worship of the deity Alectrona, has no eponymous prescript, beginning with the words ἔδοξε τοῖς μάστροις καὶ Ἰαλυσίοις[64].

It is clear that we have insufficient evidence to argue with any confidence from Lindian to Camiran or Ialysian practice, particularly since the evidence at Lindos shows that there was no uniformity in the use of the eponym even within the one community. In general it seems probable that, as at Lindos, the title and office of the eponymous priest at Camirus and Lindos survived from before the synoecism, but there is no evidence on the point.

(iii) Municipal administration in the old cities after the synoecism.

The evidence for the civil and religious administration

of the three old cities after the synoecism is entirely epigraphical. It has the usual characteristics of Rhodian epigraphical evidence: it is most abundant for Lindos, less so for Camirus, very slight for Ialysus; and it is slight for the fourth century, and grows progressively more abundant, particularly at Lindos, until the first century A.D., after which the number of relevant documents gradually declines.

The absence of literary evidence is not surprising. After the synoecism the old cities ceased to exist politically so far as the outside world was concerned, and thus even an historian such as Polybius who treated Rhodian history in detail, and had Rhodian sources at his disposal, had no need to pay heed to their constitutions and administration. The citizens of these cities were citizens also of Rhodos, where they had their share of sovereign authority, and their activities in their original homes, though sometimes of interest to the antiquarian concerned with the survival of religious cults, a Callimachus or a Pausanias, did not concern the historian of international political relationships.

A common foundation for the study of the administration of the cities is provided by the existence in each of them of an assembly known as the ecclesia[65]. This term, though its main usage is in connection with the assemblies of the independent Greek cities could also be used for any gathering of persons for a set purpose[66]. It was therefore the natural, though not the only term, which

could be used of the Lindian, Camiran and Ialysian assemblies.

In session in the ecclesia, as a deliberative and voting assembly the citizens of the three cities were called, not damos, the normal appellation (when not used of a deme in the geographical sense) of an independent polis, and which at Rhodes was therefore restricted to Rhodos[67], but either πλῆθος or more commonly by the general term, οἱ Λίνδιοι, οἱ Καμιρεῖς, οἱ Ἰαλύσιοι. There appears to be a distinction in the usage of the two expressions. When the Lindians referred to either in relation to another body, such, for instance, as the Rhodian state, or in relation to an individual such as an εὐεργέτας, the term τὸ πλῆθος τὸ Λινδίων is used[68]; while in the prescripts of decrees both honorific and administrative, the term οἱ Λίνδιοι is found[69]. Similarly in the prescripts of all surviving decrees from Camirus and Ialysus the citizens are called οἱ Καμιρεῖς and οἱ Ἰαλύσιοι, but no inscriptions survive from these two cities of the type in which the formula τὸ πλῆθος τὸ Λινδίων occurs at Lindos.

Little is known regarding the sessions of the ecclesiai, though a single inscription from Lindos, our only evidence on the point, referring to αἱ ἀγόμεναι ἐκκλησίαι suggests that in the Imperial period, at Lindos, as at Rhodos, meetings were held at least once every month[71].

The Lindian prescripts show other variations than tha already noted. Some motions are introduced in the form of a

γνωμά of the epistatai, γνωμὰ ἐπιστατᾶν [72], others are said to be introduced either by ἄρχοντες or ἰδιῶται [73], and in confirmation of this at least two important decrees of which we possess the full text, were introduced by private citizens[74]. It may indeed be conjectured that matters of routine were introduced into the assembly by the epistatai, while any citizen had the right to bring forward any motion he pleased, provided it was deemed of sufficient importance by the probouleutic body. Whether the same procedure also existed at Camirus and Ialysus may be doubted; surviving decrees from Camirus are not decisive on the point[75] while the only Ialysian decree was proposed by a private citizen[76]. The bulk of the evidence from the three cities thus suggests that there existed no hard and fast rules in regard to the introduction of measures. The sanction of the Council and People of the old city was normally necessary for all decrees. This approval was expressed in the formula, ἔδοξε μάστροις καὶ Λινδίοις, Καμιρεῦσι, Ἰαλυσίοις [77].

In each of the three cities a council known collectively as μάστροι stood in the same relation to the ecclesia as the Rhodian βουλά stood to the ecclesia of Rhodos. That the μάστροι constituted a council, and not a board of magistrates, is shown not only by the evidence of Hesychius, who glosses μάστροι by βουλευτῆρες [78], but also by the inscriptions containing decrees of the three cities, of which all except one contain in the prescript the formula

ἔδοξε μάστροις καὶ (s.g.) Λινδίοις[79]. Magistrates called μάστροι or μαστῆρες occur in many parts of the Greek world, though apparently mostly in Dorian cities, and it is important both to determine the function of these magisterial colleges and their relation to the Councils of the old cities of Rhodes after the synoecism, since the possibility exists that , even though, at Lindos at least, the μάστροι did not fulfil the functions of the Boula before the synoecism, they may have existed at that time as a college of magistrates, whose name was adopted after the synoecism for the probouleutic council[80].

Generally speaking μάστροι appear to have been some sort of police-officials, especially in connection with offences against religious laws. At Delphi there existed a μάστρικὸς νόμος[81], and anyone who misused the funds given by Attalus II for the education of children there was said to be κατάμαστρος ἱερῶν χρημάτων φωρᾶς , and the mastroi were to proceed against him. At Cos, in the fifth century, the felling of timber within a sacred grove is said to lead to a denunciation in the ecclesia, 'according to the sacred and mastric law'[82]. It is not improbable that the mastroi were originally disciplinary officers concerned with sacred rites, and that the term later embraced a civil function as well. Civil officials called μαστῆρες or μάστροι existed in the fourth century at Athens, on Amorgos, and at Pellene, and at Athens their function, according to Harpocration, was 'to

search out common property'.[83]

There is no evidence to show whether such police-officers, whether religious or civil [redacted] existed in the Rhodian cities before the synoecism. There is a suggestion in the one surviving Ialysian decree that the mastroi there had certain judicial or disciplinary functions[84], but whether that function was inherited from an earlier period, rather than an extension of the competence of the mastroi-Council, cannot be determined[85]. There is however a strong general probability that the magistracy did exist before the synoecism, since there seems no reason why this particular term, but given a totally new meaning, should have been employed for the Council after the synoecism.

The earliest surviving reference to the mastroi at Lindos is in the official letter which Hierobulus, the priest of Athana Lindia, wrote, according to the Lindian Chronicle, on some unspecified occasion, to the mastroi[86]. This has been dated to about 340 B.C.[87]. Also to the fourth century belongs a Camiran inscription in which provision is made for the establishment of certain mastroi within the Camiran ktoinai[88]. It is from the prescript of this decree that the phrase τοῖς μάστροις is omitted.

The same Camiran inscription sheds some light on the method of election of mastroi at least at Camirus, in the fourth century. [redacted] contains a decree ordaining

that the names of all the ktoinai of Camirus, both on the island and in the Peraea, are to be inscribed on a stele which is to be erected in the shrine of Athana Polias. Three commissioners are to be elected to see that the task is carried out as swiftly and cheaply as possible, and payment for the work is to be made by the tamiai. The ktoinatai of the ktoinai inscribed on the stele are to elect one mastros each in the most holy shrine within the ktoina, 'according to the law of the Rhodians'; these mastroi are to assemble in Camirus in the temple of Athana when the Hieropoioi shall proclaim, and to supervise all the public rites of the Camirans[89]. At first sight this suggests the appointment of a college of mastroi, hitherto not elected, for a new and specific purpose. But it does not appear likely that, if there already existed a council of mastroi, another wholly independent body within the same municipality would be given the same name. It is more likely that the inscription does refer to the mastroi of the council, but since it seems clear that the mastroi of the central administration existed before this date[90], and that their functions, certainly probouleutic, probably judicial as well, were wider than the duties of the mastroi envisaged in this inscription, the most reasonable interpretation is that each ktoina was to elect from among its members serving at the moment in the mastroi of Camirus, one who was to serve on this new body, the title of which is not given, which was to supervise religious rites. The authority given here to the ktoina rather than to the deme doubtless derives from

the fact that the decree is concerned with religious festivities, in the performance of which the old group still had greater importance than the damos. But the method of election, by territorial and not gentilicial units, justifies the assumption that the normal election of mastroi to serve in the central Camiran administration was by demes, and not by tribes.

This conclusion is supported by evidence from Lindos. Two Lindian inscriptions of the last half of the first century before Christ, separated by about fifteen years, record long dedications by various citizens, magistrates and priests of Lindos in honour of a priest of Athana Lindia[91]. The first list contains among the dedicants three bodies whose titles are given as μαστροὶ Λινδοπολειτᾶν, μαστροὶ Νεττιδᾶν, and μαστροὶ Ἀργείων, the first named followed by seven names, the second by eight, and the third by nine names[92]. In the second document, the same title is used with each of the twelve Lindian demes on the island. The number of mastroi mentioned after each deme-name varies from eleven to two[93]. In general two interpretations of these lists seem possible; either the mastroi are the mastroi, that is, a council, of the demes themselves, and entered in the dedications as a college; or they are the mastroi of the central Lindian administration, entered under their particular demes, and joining in the dedication either privately or as members of the Lindian administration. The first alternative cannot be disproved, but does not seem at all likely. There exists no suggestion

elsewhere that each deme had its own council of mastroi and even if it is probable that they had some rudimentary administration the members of it are not likely to have been called mastroi, thus causing considerable confusion with the mastroi of Lindos. It is thus much more likely that they are mastroi of the Lindian administration, and since there is no indication that they are past-mastroi[94], they may be presumed to be the Lindian mastroi according to their demes.

The two lists show the most remarkable variation in the numbers of mastroi, both in the individual demes, which vary, in the full list, from eleven to two, and in the same demes in the two lists, which are only separated by a few years, in the first of which the Nettidai have eight mastroi while in the second they have only two, while the Lindopolitai have seven in the first list, and four in the second. The significance of these fluctuations is not apparent. These difficulties perhaps militate to some extent against the possibility of election to the office of mastros being through the deme, since in that eventuality, it might be argued, the number of mastroi in each deme would surely be constant. A similar objection may be raised to the most natural interpretation, and that most in accordance with what is known of the election of magistrates at Lindos, namely that the μαστροί were elected by tribes, among which the demes were distributed, since here again some constancy would be expected in the numbers of μαστροί in each deme. The fluctuation could however be readily explained if member-

ship of a particular deme was incidental to the office, as would be the case, for example, if election was on a gentilicial basis, since the members of the gentilicial groups would be scattered among the various demes. There is no evidence for any election of this type at Lindos, and the prevalence of references to the demes supports the view that the mastroi were elected by demes whether or not they were grouped in φυλαί. It is not possible to determine the total membership of the council, not only on account of the fluctuations in its numbers, but also because even in the instance in which a full list of the island-demes survives, the demes of the Peraea are not recorded. However, the total cannot have been less than sixty[95].

The council, however elected, probably held office for a year, but here again no certainty is possible, since our evidence on this point is confined to a single phrase in a Lindian inscription which suggests that tenure of office of the council was the same as that of the eponymous priest of Athana Lindia[96].

There remains to note the activity of the mastroi in connection with the passage of honorific decrees. Honorific decrees from Lindos, the only one of the old cities for which we have any considerable knowledge, fall into three classes, (a) those in which the honours are bestowed by the Lindians, οἱ Λίνδιοι alone, (b) those passed by the mastroi alone, and (c) those passed by both the people and the mastroi.

(a) No Lindian honorific decree of the fourth, or

about the first seventy-five years of the third, century, has survived. The earliest reference to honours paid by οἱ Λίνδιοι alone belongs to c.225 B.C.[97]. Between that time and c.100 B.C. only seven have survived[98]. From the second quarter of the first century Lindian honorific decrees of this type become more common[99], and are plentiful from the beginning of the Imperial Age, in which, for the period from c.27 B.C. to A.D. 100 over twenty such documents survive[100]. After A.D. 100 they became even commoner, though the form of decree changed slightly.

(b) The second category is that of honours conferred by the mastroi alone. No such decrees survive from the Hellenistic period. The earliest extant examples are from the beginning of the Imperial Age, c.9 B.C.[101]. A few other examples occur within the next thirty or forty years[102], but by A.D.100 honours passed by the mastroi alone have apparently been superseded by the next category.

(c) In the Hellenistic Age there is no evidence that honorific decrees were passed jointly by mastroi and οἱ Λίνδιοι Such decrees, at present, begin abruptly in about A.D.100 and there survive several instances, up till about A.D.300. They fall into two types (i) those passed by Λίνδιοι and mastroi, as, for example, Λίνδιοι καὶ οἱ μαστροὶ Τιβέριον Κλαύδιον Ἀντιπάτρου Μυασαγόρα[103] and (ii) those in which the Λίνδιοι and mastroi are joined by the association of past holders of the eponymous priesthood thus: οἱ ἱερεῖς τᾶς Ἀθάνας τᾶς Λινδίας καὶ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Πολιέως καὶ μαστροὶ καὶ Λίνδιοι Τίτον Φλα Καλλίστρατον.[104]

From this analysis it appears, not only that the bestowal of honours such as crowns was by no means so common in the fourth century B.C. as it subsequently became, but also that in the first place the separate mention of the mastroi was not considered necessary: the Lindians spoke for all. Subsequently the mastroi were recognized as an independent unit, just as the mastroi are listed separately in two Lindian documents of the first century B.C. Whether this reflects a notable rise in the prestige attaching to membership of the local councils, cannot be determined, but does not appear unlikely.

The mastroi, then, it may be suggested, were an annually elected body of not less than sixty members, perhaps elected on the basis of the deme-system, and whose origins probably lie in a like-named magistracy existing before the synoecism in the old cities, as in many other parts of the Greek world, the functions of which were especially of a disciplinary or policary nature. The duties of the mastroi as a council may have included this disciplinary aspect, but their main activity seems to have been modelled on that of the Boule of autonomous states, namely to act as a probouleutic body whose assent was necessary for the legal enactment of proposals other than honorific decrees, in the assembly.

Just as the Boula of Rhodos and other independent cities had their grammateus, so the mastroi in the three old cities had theirs. The post was clearly regarded as of

considerable importance, since in the most complete surviving list of Lindian magistrates the γραμματεὺς μάστρων comes immediately after the important officials entitled ἐπιστάται 105.

It is remarkable that, though more than once found closely associated with the epistatai, he is never found in dedications mentioned together with the mastroi. However, two inscriptions provide evidence that the mastroi and the epistatai shared a single secretary, called γραμματεὺς μαστρῶν καὶ ἐπιστατῶν 106, who is doubtless identical with the γραμματεὺς μαστρῶν. This fusion of functions of the secretary was probably responsible for much of the importance of the office, as reflected in the high position it holds in the individual cursus[107].

Indication of his functions is provided only by two inscriptions. The decree in which is proposed the inscription of the Lindian Chronicle ordains that the inscribing shall be done by two men in the presence of the grammateus[108]. Another inscription, of the early Imperial period, enacts that the transfer of certain sacred monies is to take place in the presence of the mastroi, the epistatai and the γραμματεὺς μαστρῶν καὶ ἐπιστατῶν[109]. Unfortunately neither of these inscriptions illustrates the part played by the secretary in more than a very small field.

Subordinate to the Secretary of the mastroi and epistatai was an Under-Secretary, in one instance called simply Under-Secretary of the Mastroi, in another Under-

Secretary of the Mastroi and the Epistatai[110].

The evidence from Camirus, though less complete, indicates that the same office existed and fulfilled approximately the same functions. One difference is the appearance of the secretary of mastroi as part of the date in a Camiran prescript[111], while in surviving Lindian decrees his name does not so appear. At Camirus, as at Lindos, the Secretary of the Mastroi is found in dedications by συνιερεῖς and συνέχοντες, closely associated with the epistatai[112]. The same dedications also refer to an Under-Secretary, who is not further defined, but who follows immediately after the Secretary of the mastroi[113]. He was, therefore, probably Under-Secretary of the Mastroi. The absence of any reference to a Secretary of the Mastroi in the very slight evidence from Ialysus is no reason for supposing that such an official did not exist there.

In addition to the assembly and Council, each of the three cities possessed a system of magistracies both civil and, more especially, religious. The distinction between the two types is based essentially on the titles of the offices, and cannot be regarded as absolutely fixed. The framework of the system was the same in all three cities, though the titles the magistrates bore sometimes differed. Thus each possessed a supreme magistral college, with the right (though not, it appears, the sole right) to introduce motions called γνῶμαι before the college ecclesia. This

was known at Lindos and Camirus, and doubtless also at Ialysus, though the name has not survived, as epistatai. It has already been noted that similarly-named officials existed at Lindos before the synoecism, where their function cannot, however, be determined[114]. The later epistatai clearly may be a survival or modification of this ancient office, but the title ἐπιστάτης is so common in Greek constitutions of all periods that it may have been established in the cities after the synoecism, without any thought of the previous magistracies of the same name.

Most of our information regarding epistatai derives from Lindian inscriptions recording dedications made by the συνιερεῖς and συνάρχοντες to Athana Lindia, to the gods generally, and to particular deities.

At both Lindos and Camirus the ἐπιστάται were three in number[115]. This suggests that their election may have been on a tribal basis. The earliest mention of epistatai is in a decree of Camirus recording the visit of some Cyrenaeans, in the early part of the fourth century[116]. It shows, what is evident also from a later document, that the epistatai formed a college, of which one of the three was regarded as president. The prescript of both includes the words ἐπιστατῶν τῶν σὺν τῷι δεῖνι[117]. A document of the imperial age from Lindos reveals the same organisation there[118].

Probably the most important duty of the epistatai lay in the proposal of measures within the ecclesia[119], though since such proposals could also be brought by private citizens and we are not able to determine what restrictions, if any, were placed on the introduction of motions by non-magistrates, it is not possible to speak of a restrictive practice in the cities -- even if, in a non-sovereign community such restrictions would be of any great significance.

A Lindian inscription of the fourth century B.C.[120] illustrates further tasks of the epistatai. The decree passed by the Lindians and mastroi, on a gnoma of the epistatai, honours the epistatai and 'thirty chosen men', elected to regulate the election of priests and religious officials, in accordance with οἱ νόμοι , and to ensure that those who had previously been excluded from Lindian sacra should not now be admitted[121]. The epistatai and their temporary assistants were duly praised by the Lindians and the decree recorded on a stele in the sanctuary of Athana Lindia. The payment for the stele was to be made from the treasury of Athana Lindia, and the epistatai in office were to see that the stele was erected[122]. This text well illustrates the top-heavy part played in the municipal administration by the epistatai. Those mentioned on several occasions in this text are presumably the same body of epistatai throughout. They introduce the motion the purpose of which is to praise them-

selves, or possibly their predecessors in office, and they are to ensure that the stele is correctly placed. The subject of the decree is moreover religious administration, and this too indicates an exceptional power vested in ~~which~~ what was a civil office. Similarly in the decree authorising the inscription of the Lindian Chronicle, the site of the document, within the precinct of Athana, is to be determined by the epistatai[123].

Two documents of A.D.22 and 23, which testify to a carefully organised religious revival at this time, reveal the leading role played by the epistatai in these events. One of them, a long, and rather damaged inscription[124], records in great detail the measures to be taken for the restoration of the worship of Athana Lindia. The decree ordains that the epistatai are to be responsible for the inscribing of statues on the Acropolis which are still uninscribed[125]. They are also to open a subscription-list in the ecclesia held in the month of Agrianios, to hand the fund accruing therefrom to the priest of Athana, and to arrange for the inscription of the names of the subscribers on a stele[126]. In addition, at the election of religious magistrates on all future occasions at Diras (?), after the proposal of the various priests and the προβολαί for office, the epistatai are to propose to those who wish to hold the office of ἱεροθύτας that they should do so without payment[127]. Next a fragmentary clause

appears to state that the monies accruing in the future from the provisions of this decree are to be made the subject of a special annual transfer from the outgoing priest to his successor[128]. The latter is to deposit these funds in the temple of Athana in the presence of the mastroi and the epistatai and their secretaries[129]. Finally the decree itself is to be inscribed by a lapicide chosen by the epistatai, and to be placed by them in the position in the sanctuary of Athana specified in the decree[130].

The second inscription is much shorter, and far less informative[131]. It records the election of six χορηγοί from among the foreign population of Lindos for the celebration of the Dionysiac Sminthia. The proposal is introduced by the epistatai, and the choice of the ξένοι is apparently to rest both on the present occasion, and in the future, in the hands of the epistatai[132]. This inscription, brief though it is, indicates very clearly the very great authority possessed by the epistatai of the old cities during their year of office, in the little world of the municipalities. All the other numerous magistracies were evidently overshadowed by, if not actually subordinate to, these officials.

The main source of information for these other offices is a single inscription of the year 27 B.C.[133]. It is an honorific dedication made by οἱ Λίνδιοι in honour of the priest of Athana Lindia and Zeus Polieus of that year, Pantheios

the son of Damoson, by adoption of Kallineikos, and his wife Antipatra, the daughter of Neikasimachos, of the Brasian deme. First in the order of dedicants are the past priests of Athana Lindia, of whom seventeen are mentioned. Next come the epistatai of the current year, followed by the γραμματεὺς μαστρῶν. These are followed by the three ἱεροταμίαι, the treasurers of the central sacred treasury, followed by the συνέδρεις, the priests for the year, of the other deities, namely the priests of Apollo Pythios, Dionysos, Sarapis, Artemis Kekoia, Apollo Olios, Poseidon Hippios, Apollo Karneios, Apollo ἐς Καμινδον, and of the hero Lindos and the other heroes. This long list of priests is followed by the names of the minor civil and religious magistrates, the three three ἐπίσκοποι, three πράκτορες, one ἀγωνοθέτας, three γραμματεῖς, one κᾶρυξ, either two or three stratagoi, whose names are not inscribed, one ἀρχιεροθύτας, and fifteen ἱεροθύται. These are followed in their turn by associations of past priests of other deities, nine of Dionysus, eleven of Apollo Pythios, nine of Sarapis, and eleven previous ἀρχιεροθύται. The list closes with the names of the mastroi arranged according to their demes, as discussed already.

Of these magistrates, the ἐπίσκοποι, the λογισταί, the πράκτορες, the γραμματεῖς, the στρατηγοί, and the κᾶρυξ, all except the last are grouped in colleges of three, indicating again a probable connection with the tribal

division into three. Of the magistracies themselves little can be said since our direct knowledge of them is mostly confined to this inscription which gives no indication of their functions, and evidence derived from the known functions of similarly-named magistrates elsewhere in the Greek world may be misleading.

The ἐπίσκοποι [134] mentioned here are clearly Lindian magistrates, and to be distinguished from the like-named magistrates at Rhodos[135]. They re-appear in a Lindian dedication to the Gods, of about 160 B.C., made by the priest of Athana Lindia, three episkopoi, the Under-Secretary of the mastroi, and the Secretary of the episkopoi[136]. Their duties, like those of the Rhodian episkopoi are unknown.

The λογισταί [137] occur also in the inscription concerned with the revival of the cult of Athana Lindia, in which information concerning failure to comply with the specifications of the decree are to be laid before them[138]. The normal task of the logistai, in other Greek cities, was that of examining state-accounts, and the expenditure of the magistrates[139], but at Lindos, where there is no evidence to suggest that the treasury was controlled by the usual ταμίαι it is possible that the logistai fulfilled this function also. From another inscription we learn of the existence of a secretary of the logistai[140].

The next officials mentioned in the list are the

πράκτορες [141], whose existence at Lindos is not known from elsewhere. The title πράκτωρ is clearly similar, not to the use of that title in Roman Egypt, where it denoted a tax-collector[142], but to the use found in Greek cities of the classical and Hellenistic periods, including, perhaps, Rhodos, where the office seems to have been that of a public bailiff, and collector of fines[143].

The college of γραμματεῖς comes next[144]. Their identity is far from certain. They are evidently not secretaries of any single or particular college, since their title is not further defined. It might be suggested that the grammateis of the various magistraces and official bodies of a particular year formed a college, though this does not explain why the grammateis should be three in number, since there certainly existed more than three separate secretaryships at Lindos[145], of whom one is mentioned elsewhere in this inscription[146], and the number three suggests that the grammateis were elected independently, one from each tribe. It is possible that they constituted a board of public, or state, secretaries, like the familiar δημόσιοι [147] in several Greek cities.

The Secretaries are followed by the κᾶρυξ [148]. His office was probably civil and not religious[149], and he may have been herald to the mastroi just as there existed at Rhodos, as indeed elsewhere, a Secretary of the Boula[150]

The Herald is followed by the stratagoi[151] whose names,

however, were not inscribed, but for which a blank space of three lines is left on the stone. They represent, in the context of this inscription, a very considerable problem. Stratagoi are very familiar officials at Rhodos[152], but apart from in the present inscription, they do not occur as officials elsewhere than in the Capital. Prima facie the stratagoi here mentioned are Lindian and not Rhodian officials. But it is not likely that Lindian military requirements, even if they included the manning of fortified posts in Lindian territory[153], demanded the services of three stratagoi. All Lindians, would in fact be liable to service in the Rhodian army, under Rhodian command, and if they were required to serve under local command in Lindian territory, at all, their services would consist only of the manning of strong points. These stratagoi might be explained in several ways: they might be the Lindian commanders of Lindian troops within the Rhodian army; they might be Lindian military officials, whose duties had become vestigial, but who retained the title of Stratagos which, as we learn from the earliest surviving Lindian decree[154], was borne by the Lindian military commander before the synoecism; they might be, as they were in several Greek cities in the late Hellenistic and Roman eras, civil magistrates, whose duties apparently bore no relation to their military title[155]; or they might be strataggi of Rhodos, whose appearance in a Lindian inscription might be due to their being stationed in the area. The latter

explanation is in fact the least likely of all, since though the central administration appears to have maintained garrisons in the old cities, these garrisons, were probably commanded by epistatai subordinate to area-Hagemones[156]. It is also improbable that these stratagoi commanded Lindian detachments in the Rhodian army since the Rhodian army in the Hellenistic period seems to have consisted almost exclusively of mercenaries[157], and it is unlikely that Lindians formed such a considerable part of the citizen-levy, if it was ever called upon, that they required to be commanded by a general, or a college of generals. The most likely solution thus appears to be that they were either military officials commanding some unimportant local militia, or else a board of civil magistrates with a military title. Of these two alternatives the first is by far the more likely, since no reference to any stratagoi occurs in the numerous documents dealing with Lindian civil administration, and there seems no room for such a board in view of the leading role played by the epistatai. It is therefore most satisfactory to regard them as unimportant military officials, whose activities cannot be further defined. That they were in fact regarded as military officials is perhaps supported by the position they occupy in this list of magistrates, in which they appear as the last of all the non-religious officials.

Whether they were a survival of the old Lindian stratagoi, or were formed after the synoecism, on the model of the Rhodian stratagoi must remain uncertain[158].

This exhausts the list of civil magistrates in the Lindian inscription. Outside this list there remains only to note two officials. First is ὁ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποστολὰς τῶν ξενίων [159], whose duty it apparently was to supervise the dispatch of gifts to foreigners honoured by the city. This post was open to non-Lindians, since the only individual known to have held the office was a Laodicaean[160]. It is therefore unlikely to have been a magistracy of the same authority as the others. Second is the δαμόσιος who was also probably rather a clerk than a magistrate with a sphere of authority. In the inscription referring to the restoration of the worship of Athana Lindia, damosioi are twice mentioned as being required to witness the transfer of sacred monies[161]. At Rhodos[162], and in other autonomous cities, the duties of the damosios normally included such tasks as the care-taking of state buildings, treasuries, armouries and so on, and it is possible that the reference to them in the Lindian inscription indicates that they acted as guardians of the treasury of Athana where the money was to be deposited, and thus, as immediately responsible for the safe-keeping of the money, were required to witness its transfer.

This review of the evidence shows that it is not possible to form a satisfactory picture of the Lindian

magistrates, since the inscription which is our main source of information contains a bare list of titles, and gives no idea of the duties of each office. It is however clear from surviving decrees that the majority of the administrative work was actually carried out by the mastroi and the three epistatai, and it is not impossible that the other offices recorded in the list were largely sinecures. It would certainly be an error to credit them with the responsibilities borne by like-named officials in sovereign poleis.

The same general conclusions are valid also for Camirus and Ialysus, though there is evidence available on the subject. For Camirus the evidence in regard to the civil offices is slight, while that for the religious offices and priesthoods is fairly plentiful. Slight, however, though the evidence for the civil magistracies is, it is sufficient to reveal that in all essentials there existed little or no difference from those at Lindos. Here too there existed an ecclesia[163] and mastroi[164], a board of epistatai[165], and a secretary of the epistatai[166]. The only surviving Ialysian decree was passed by the Ialysians and the mastroi[167], and though the epistatai are not mentioned in the decree, either as proposing it or being in any way responsible for its execution, this is hardly sufficient reason for doubting their existence at Ialysus.

The religious magistracies of the three cities are known from lists of συνιερεῖς, akin to those in which are

mentioned the civil magistrates consisting mainly of dedications to priests of Athana by their colleagues, or dedications by the priest of Athana and his colleagues to Athana, or to the gods, and from the careers of individual citizens recorded on their tombstones or on private dedications. For Camirus the main source of information is in the dedications by the eponymous priests, the δαμιουργός, and his colleagues in religious office, to whom are sometimes added the priests of the individual cults, the συνιερεῖς. A comparison of the religious magistracies of Camirus and Lindos, reveals that though in general organisation was the same, they differed in details, and in nomenclature. This suggests that the individual cities retained after the synoecism the same religious magistracies which they had had before, in contrast with the **uniformity** imposed on the civil magistracies.

The religious magistrates of Lindos were the ἀρχιερόθυτας, the head of the college of ἱερόθυται, the ἱερόθυται themselves, and the ἱεροταμίαι. The ἀρχιερόθυτας is mentioned in numerous lists of religious magistrates of Lindos, from the Hellenistic age to the late Imperial period.[168] The position in which the archierothytas is found in these lists varies, but normally he occurs, followed by the ἱερόθυται, after the priests of the individual cults, at the end of the inscription[169]. The inference that, in spite of his imposing title, the ἀρχιερόθυτας was but a minor official compared

with the priests themselves is probably justified[170]. The naturally close connection between him and the priesthoods is indicated by those inscriptions which contain joint dedications by the ἱερεῖς or συνιερεῖς, the ἀρχιεροθύτας and the ἱεροθύται [171]. This connection is emphasised by the existence of a κοινὸν ἀρχιεροθύτα καὶ ἱερέων καὶ ἱεροθυτᾶν [172]. Past holders of the office, like past priests of Athana formed, in addition, their own informal corporation, the ἀρχιεροθυτηκότες [173]. From the position of the archierothytas at the head of the Hierothytai, it may be inferred that he presided over that body, but beyond that there is no indication of any particular function of his, as opposed to those of the Hierothytai as a whole. That the archierothytas was not normally considered a member of that college perhaps follows from the fact that the Hierothytai constitute a multiple of three without him[174]. His election was therefore probably independent of that of the Hierothytai, though it is reasonable to suppose that he was elected at the same time.

The Hierothyt*ai* were probably elected on the same tribal basis noticeable in the election of the civil magistrates, since the size of the college appears to have varied only between nine and fifteen, both multiples of three[175]. Membership of the college could be attained at an early age[176]. Election to this body was probably not, as the analogous procedure in regard to the same magistrates in other Greek cities might suggest, by the use of the lot. A

decree of A.D.22[177], that concerned with the restoration of the cult of Athana Lindia, indicates that at that time (and there is no indication that the election was anything other than normal) election was by a peculiar combination of nominatio and open vote, a parallel to which is perhaps found in contemporary electoral procedure elsewhere. It appears that those anxious to hold religious office gave their names to the epistatai, and that the latter then proposed them for office[178]. There is no indication as to whether a candidature could be suppressed by the epistatai, or whether they merely acted as a channel by which candidates' names were brought before the ecclesia; in view of the almost univeral power in local affairs wielded by the epistatai the first alternative is clearly not impossible. The supposition that the religious magistrates and priests were elected ἐκ προκρίτων does not mean that they cannot, as their number indicates, have been chosen according to tribes.

The Hierothytai were normally overseers of sacrifices attached to individual temples and cults[179]. At Lindos, however, they were magistrates of the central administration. As such one of their duties was the reception of distinguished strangers in their seat of office, the ἱεροθυτεῖον, a procedure known as σίτησις ἐν ἱεροθυτείῳ 180, comparable to the σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ conferred by Rhodos[181]. The other functions of the Hierothytai are unknown, and little light is shed by the many other places where similarly named officials

are found, since in every instance their duties are ill-defined. It is possible that their duties included the general supervision of Lindian shrines, but, if so, it is unlikely that they possessed any very effective control, since that seems to have been in the hands of the civil epistatai. Membership of the college was clearly frequently attained at an early age, but there are also instances in which it is held in middle life.

The ἱεροταμίαι, treasurers of the central religious funds, occur frequently in inscriptions[182]. In the second century B.C. the size of the college of the Hierotamiai appears to have been nine apart from a secretary[183], while at a later date they appear uniformly as a college of three holding office for three years[184]. In the Imperial period at least, one member of this college was regarded as its president[185], in the manner familiar from the college of the epistatai. The inscription recording measures for the restoration of the worship of Athana Linḍa contains some general information about the office of the Hierotamiai at that date; the salaries which the Hierothytai are to forego are to be handed over by the Hierotamiai to the priest of Athana[186]; and the surplus in the treasury of the Hierotamiai of the previous τριετία, taken over by their successors, is to be deposited in the care of Athana[187]. They are also required to pay, on the estimate of the ἀρχιτέκτων, for

the inscription and erection of the stele recording the measures taken on the present occasion[188]. A clause similar to this last appears in that other piece of piety, the Lindian Chronicle, of one hundred years earlier[189], while from other inscriptions we learn that the Hierotamiai also paid for the erection of ἀνδριάντες within the sacred precinct of Athana[190]. That, in spite of these indications, the Hierotamiai were Lindian magistrates, and not officials of the temple of Athana, is shown by the inclusion of the office in the blend of civil and religious magistracies which consituted the normal public career as recorded in surviving monuments[191]. The existence of this central religious treasury may have obviated the need for a treasury of the individual gods at Lindos; at least no reference to particular ταμίαι or ἱεροταμίαι survives from Lindos. Generalisations based on the above scanty evidence, would not be of any value. It is clear that the collegiate principle was highly developed at Lindos, and it appears probable that the basis of election to the colleges was, as in the civil colleges, on a tribal basis. But beyond that all is still conjecture.

At Camirus the religious officials were differently named. The most important were the ἀρχιερισταί and the ἱερποιοί. There is no evidence of an Hierotamias, or college of Hierotamiai, while, on the other hand, the existence of a single tamias[192] is known, though it cannot

be determined from the context whether he is a civil or religious magistrate.

The Hieropoioi are best known from a series of documents, about thirty in all, recording dedications by the eponymous priest of Camirus, the damiourgos, by twelve Hieropoioi and various other officials, to the gods. These inscriptions can be dated within the period from 280 to 130 B.C.[193].

The normal number of Hieropoioi was twelve[194], which permits the supposition that election to the office was on a tribal basis, four persons being chosen, perhaps according to their demes within the tribes as was the practice at Lindos in the election of the eponymous magistrate[195]. The office of Hieropoios is familiar from many Greek cities and religious centres[196], particularly ~~at~~ Delos, where the annual accounts of this board of magistrates, preserved on stone, form one of the most remarkable epigraphical legacies of the ancient world. At Delos the authority of the Hieropoioi extended over all the temples and shrines of the island[197]. At Camirus, it may be conjectured, on the analogy of Lindos, their authority in religious matters, if seemingly absolute, was limited in practice by the excessive authority of the epistatai. There is, however, one reason for supposing that the Hieropoioi at Camirus were of greater importance, or that greater prestige attached to office, namely that they appear in the annual dedications immediately after the eponymous

magistrate, before the other priests and lesser magistracies. The Hierothytai at Lindos on the other hand, appear almost invariably at the end of the list of συνιερεῖς and συνάεχοντες. All this must, however, remain conjecture, for the only reference as to the actual duties of these magistrates is a single instance in which a Hieropoios was member of a θεωρία 198.

After the Damiourgos and the Hieropoioi, in the fullest Camiran dedication dated c.225 B.C., come the priests of Poteidan Kureteios, Dionysos, Asklapios, Herakles, Aphrodite, the Mousai, Apollon Mulantious and Sarapis. These in turn are followed by the ἀρχιερεύς, followed by the priests of Athana Polias and Zeus Polieus, Apollon Pythios and Apollon Karneios. Next come the civil magistracies, the γραμματεὺς μητρῶν, the ἐπιστάτης, the ἀγωνοθέτης, someone called simply ὑπογραμματεύς, and finally the κᾶρυξ 199. The significance of this order is not certain, but if it implies the normal superiority of rank it is clear that the Hieropoioi were second only to the damiourgos in the religious cursus of Camirus. Nevertheless other evidence shows that sometimes as much as thirty years elapsed between membership of the college of Hieropoioi and attainment of the eponymous magistracy[200].

The duties of the ἀρχιερεύς who comes after the Hieropoioi in the normal lists[201], are uncertain. It has been suggested that the word is the Dorian form of ἀρχιερεύς

and means 'High-priest'[202], but the termination of the word points rather to a connection with such words as ἱερεύς and ἱερεῖον, which appear to mean 'purifier', and 'to purify'[203] ἀρχιερεύς would therefore mean 'Chief Purifier'. The word ἐξιερεύς occurs in one Camiran inscription[204], and it is possible that the ἀρχιερεύς was the president of a college of ἐξιερεῖς[205], but the latter term occurs only once, and in a position which suggests that it was in fact identical with ἀρχιερεύς[206].

At the end of most of the lists of Camiran magistrates occurs a single ἀγωνοθέτης[207], who was responsible for the presentation of games on the occasion of religious festivals[208] Whether the ἀγωνοθέτης was himself a magistrate, or a private citizen exercising a liturgy cannot be determined. Another title, apparently confined to Camirus, is that of the ἱεροκάρυξ of whom sometimes two, sometimes only one, occurs[209]. Their function is sufficiently obvious from their title, and needs no further examination.

It is even less possible to draw a clear picture of the Camiran religious administration than it is of the Lindian owing to the absence of decrees in which reference is made to the spheres of activity of the officials. Of the religious administration of Ialysus virtually nothing is known. No dedications have survived to familiarise us with the titles of the officials. The only surviving Ialysian decree refers

to the ἱεροταμίαι [210], a body whose existence is also testified at Lindos. Apart from this the only information surviving regarding religious officials at Ialysus is a list of officials of the temple of Apollo Erethimios, who lie outside the range of this discussion as belonging to a single temple and not to the central Ialysian administration[211].

There remain certain minor offices which, though forming part of the central religious administration, can hardly be dignified with the name of magistracies, since their holders do not appear in the lists of συνιερεῖς and συνέδροι. These are the νάκοροι, the ὑπονάκοροι, and the μολποί, who, however, sometimes appear in the magistral list. A number of Lindian dedications of the first century B.C. are made by νάκοροι or ὑπονάκοροι, and none of these persons' names are followed by that of their father[212]. This undoubtedly indicates a servile status or servile origin, and since it is not likely that a slave would have held a religious office some of these men may be ἀπελεύθεροι. The normal duties of a nakoros in a Greek city-state were in connection with a particular temple[213], and it appears to have been only at Delos that, as at Lindos, they formed part of the central religious administration[214]. The number of the Lindian nakoroi, who met in a building called the nakoreion[215], varies; there appears to have been only one nakoros, but one or two ὑπονάκοροι [216]. No further

details are available about these officials, whose task was probably to supervise the activities of the nakoroi of the different temples, who were responsible for the general upkeep and cleanliness of the temples and /

The Lindian Molpoi seem to have been of two kinds, some belonging to the central administration, others to the individual temples[217]. In the second century B.C. they certainly existed as central magistrates, while there is no evidence for their attachment to a single temple until the late Imperial period, though the absence of any earlier reference is probably purely fortuitous. The central post seems to have been held by a single person, and not by a college, and the place of this individual in the lists of magistrates suggests that he was the least important of all the religious magistrates. He, or those subordinate to him in the various temples were perhaps responsible for the music requisite on festal occasions. It is not likely that there exists any connection between this office and the Molpoi found as an important office at Miletus, Ephesus and the cities of Amorgos, which seems to have been a peculiarly Ionian institution[218].

Conclusions regarding the civil and religious magistracies of the old cities.

The outstanding feature of the evidence reviewed above is its unrepresentative nature. We are almost entirely dependent on Lindian inscriptions to put life into the

titles found in contexts which give no indication of function. This bias of the sources exists right from the earliest period/ it is only from Lindos that any information survives as to the nature of the constitution of the city before the synoecism. This showed that Lindos clearly enjoyed a fully democratic machinery, which bore close resemblances to that of contemporary Athens, but, because the only Lindian evidence belongs to a period after the absorption of the Rhodian cities in the Athenian League, it is possible that this form of government was not native to the city but was imposed by Athens, here as elsewhere. No evidence exists for the constitution of Camirus before the synoecism, while at Ialysus though before the Athenian domination the family of the Diagoreioi held sway in the city, Athens had driven it out by the time of the Peloponnesian War.

After the synoecism the status of the cities changed fundamentally: Vis-à-vis the new city the old ones were reduced to the rank of tribes, while apparently at the same time, possibly shortly afterwards, their constitutions were radically changed, at the same time as their independent status was abolished. The effect of this profound change in status is apparent in the functions and nomenclature of the old cities from this time onward. Their competence is limited to the internal civil administration of the cities, in a

manner comparable to that of a modern Urban Council, though their authority in connection with religious worship seems to have remained unimpaired. Consequently most of the surviving evidence is concerned with religious administration, and the picture emerges of societies closely associated with their temples, and almost without civic activity. It must, however, be borne in mind that this new condition of things did not constitute a limitation of any person's sovereign rights, since these were transferred en bloc to the new city, where the citizens of the old cities and their descendents constituted the core of the body-politic. The administration of the old cities was probably largely carried out by Lindians, Camirans and Ialysians normally resident in Rhodos, who visited the old cities on festivals, and to attend to the business of the Urban Council, which affected the reduced population of the old cities and the surrounding demes.

The altered status was reflected in the nomenclature now given to the administrative organs of the old cities. The ecclesia remained since the term could be used of any gathering, and was not confined to the political assemblies of autonomous communities. But the Boula gave place to the mastroi, and the prytaneis yielded to the epistatai. In the new administration the effective authority in local matters seems to have resided in the mastroi, a Council of not less

than sixty members, and the epistatai, a college of three, whose power in the execution of decrees, whether concerned with religious or civil matters seems to have been very considerable. The other civil magistracies are for us little but names, since they occur only in lists of magistrates with no indication of function; but the absence of reference to most of them in any surviving decrees, combined with the evident authority of the mastroi and epistatai, as testified by these suggests that many of them can have had little important work to do. It cannot be determined how many of these minor magistracies existed before the synoecism.

The break with the past was far less obvious in the field of religious observance. First and foremost the same eponym remained in existence. There are in addition many other priesthoods of the old gods, Poseidon Apollo, Dionysus and others, and there is no reason to suppose that they too did not exist before the synoecism. There were in the course of time numerous additions to the existing priesthoods, but this happened throughout the Greek world, and is not particularly characteristic of the old cities. What is true of the priesthoods is probably also true of the central religious magistrates, the titles of many of which have survived, though their functions can mostly only be assumed from the analogy of the known functions of like-named officials elsewhere. There is a possibility that as civil activity

declined there was a tendency to multiply religious offices; this would certainly have occurred, had the members of the old cities had no outlet for their desire for authority, but in the present instance the whole cursus of office in the sovereign city of Rhodos lay open to them and there was thus less need to find local satisfaction. It would at the same time be very surprising if, in all essentials at least, the religious life had not flowed on continuously, little disturbed by the upheaval of the civil existence of the cities.

It thus appears that while the essential social continuity between the old world and the new is to be found in the fact that the citizens of the old cities became citizens of the new, the continuity of the life of the old cities was obtained through the uninterrupted performance of religious ceremonies. This emphasises again the two essential strands in the Rhodian way of life, the conservatism of the old communities who, by feeding the new city, introduced into it that same element of conservatism, and the new blood, introduced into Rhodos by foreign settlers without roots in the island.

Chapter III

The Citizen-body and the population of Rhodos.

The evidence for the various elements of the population of Rhodos comes almost entirely from inscriptions. Numerous inscriptions, in particular tombstones, refer to residents of the city in terms which indicate their legal status as full, or partial citizens, as metics or as one of the other categories of foreigners. Such records do not, of course, ever contain an explanation of the status; this has to be inferred from a comparison of various documents, and can at the best be only conjectural.

The main division of the population at Rhodos, as elsewhere in the Greek world, was between full citizen, or, in relation to the smaller group, the deme, to which he belonged, δημότας [1]. and non-citizen. It was hereditary membership of the deme, as has already been noted, which gave citizenship of the city of Rhodos, and, though it was possible for a foreigner to gain entry into a deme[2] this appears to have been an exception to the normal rule. The division into demes has already been discussed[3].

Full-citizenship within Rhodian territory was expressed by the addition of the demotic to the demesman's

name. It is by the demotic that the citizen-body can be distinguished from other elements of the population[4].

The particular status of the full citizen hardly needs further definition. The obligations and privileges of citizenship were fundamentally the same in all Greek cities, and when the evidence is, as here, almost entirely from inscriptions, those obligations and privileges emerge best by contrast with the limitations placed on other less privileged classes.

Next below the full citizen, hereditary member of a deme of one of the old cities, is found another class whose participation in the privileges of full citizenship was in some very uncertain manner restricted. This class is represented by a large number of tombstones from Rhodos, which carry the name of the deceased and that of his father, but no demotic[5]. That the persons whose names are thus recorded were not full citizens is evident from the absence of the demotic. On the other hand it cannot be supposed that they were foreign citizens, since if they had been ordinary foreign citizens their names would be followed by that of the city of which they were citizens, while if they were in possession of any specific rights, such as those associated with metic status, this fact would be recorded after their names[6]. A class which is neither citizen nor

foreigner is something of an anomaly in Greek constitutional history, familiar though an analogous status, that of the civis sine suffragio, is in the Roman constitution. In Greek constitutions the nearest parallel is perhaps to be found in the status of the seven thousand individuals at Syracuse, who having been originally enfranchised by Gelon[7] were excluded from tenure of magistracies, and other privileges of full citizenship, including the vote, by the democracy which succeeded the downfall of the tyranny of Thrasybulus, though they remained citizens[8]. It is self-evident that the class under discussion at Rhodos did not possess inherited deme-membership, but both its origin, and the constitutional disabilities attaching to it are uncertain. Its origin is particularly puzzling in view of the rather artificial nature of the Rhodian citizen-body. When Rhodos was founded, and effective sovereignty was concentrated on it, the citizen-body consisted of the combined citizens of the three old cities, and subsequent admission to full citizenship of those not members by descent of the three old cities was extremely rare. Since citizenship was a closely preserved status how did this not in considerable element achieve this intermediary status? It cannot be explained as consisting of single individuals who were granted a particular status individually, since not only are they so abundant as to suggest that they were an integral

part of the state, but enough information survives to show that the Rhodians normally bestowed specific titles on persons they wished to honour, and that these titles were normally recorded after the individual's name[9]. It is therefore not likely that the status bestowed on a large section of the foreign population, by which members of it were converted into partial citizens, was not recorded in a single instance. These are considerable difficulties, and it seems desirable to avoid them by regarding those whose names are preserved with patronymics only as a specific class with an inherited status. Their origin may perhaps be sought as early as the synoecism. A desire to increase the citizen-body of the new city may have led to an announcement that citizenship would be bestowed on all who applied for it[10]. At Rhodes, however, citizenship bestowed in this manner clearly could not entail citizenship of the old cities. Thus persons taking advantage of the offer could only become citizens of Rhodos[11]. If this may be suggested as the origin of this mysterious class, it is clear that the status cannot have carried with it many obvious disabilities, since few would then have been found willing to adopt it. It appears, in fact, that even if in normal circumstances members of this class were not eligible for the higher magistracies, they could be elected in times of national crisis to posts such as

military commands, demanding technical competence[12]. It seems possible that they enjoyed a full voice in the assembly, in debate and in vote. Thus, it might be said that this class enjoyed the inherited ius suffragii, but lacked in normal circumstances the ius honorum petendorum.

It is further possible that this class consisted of descendents of those who, before the synoecism had been resident in, but not citizens of, the old cities, metics and foreigners of various types. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that descendents of these survived within the old cities -- or at least of Lindos -- with a special status and title, and were not made citizens of Rhodos at all[13].

Both these explanations carry with them the difficulty, that the class under discussion is thereby regarded as descended from settlers of the time of the synoecism, perhaps five hundred years earlier. It does not seem probable that such a class would preserve itself as a self-contained unit in the state as late as the Roman period. Its intermediate status would make its early disappearance inevitable, unless marriage with other elements of the state, or with foreigners, was expressly forbidden; and this in its turn would lead to rapid extinction. It is therefore easier to suppose that the class was continually being fed

with new members from without. If it was so fed, it must have been with foreigners, who were admitted to quasi-citizenship on the same terms. But here there is a further difficulty. The various privileges awarded to foreigners never fail to be recorded on tombstones and on other suitable occasions. Must it therefore be supposed that this one status alone is never mentioned; that either the status was taken so much for granted that it was never recorded, or that it was regarded as being so closely akin to full citizenship that reference to it was not necessary? Such difficulties are inevitable when the evidence is purely epigraphical, and should not be overemphasised. It is perhaps not advisable to add yet further to the categories of foreigners who throughout the Hellenistic age and Roman period flocked to Rhodes, and it is therefore preferable to regard this anonymous section of the population as intact in itself, and enjoying its particular status, without reference to the foreign population which later settled in the town[14].

An intermediate status between citizen and foreigner was also occupied by the μητρόξενοι[15], that is, broadly speaking, persons whose fathers were full citizens, but whose mothers were without citizen-rights. The term is defined by Hesychius and other lexicographers by νόθος or σκότιος[15]. It appears thus to be equivalent to one

aspect of the wider term νόθος, which had several meanings[16]; it could either be used, like the English 'illegitimate', to express the status of one who was born out of wedlock, but whose parents possessed full citizen-rights; or it might be used of an individual only one of whose parents possessed full citizenship, though the marriage had been recognised by the state[17]; or, finally, the term could be used of children born of adultery. In surviving documents the term matroxenos, or rather the term μητρὸς δὲ ξένας, which is the form found in Rhodian documents[18], is used only of those, one of whose parents, either father or mother, was not possessed of full citizen-status. Illegitimate children born of the union of two full citizens may have been called matroxenoi, but there is no certain surviving instance in which the word is used in that sense in an inscription[19].

The status of matroxenoi can only be inferred from inscriptions, and these do not give a clear picture. It is clear that the matroxenos was not a full citizen, since apart from the certainty provided on this point by the mere existence of the term to differentiate from full citizens, out of instances in which the term occurs in inscriptions only once is it followed by the demotic. The same inscription

indicates that the status of matroxenos was not necessarily inherited. The inscription in question[20] is of great importance for the study of the status of the matroxenos, even if, in one particular respect, it cannot be regarded as typical. It is the dedication of a joint monument in memory of a father and his son, the monument to the father being dedicated by his son, that to the son by his son. The father, Ἡράκλειτος Παυσανία , is a full Rhodian citizen, a demesman of an unspecified Ialysian deme, who had been phylarchos of the phyla Ialysia in various Rhodian games[21]. The son, Ἀπολλόδοτος Ἡρακλείτου , is described as Νεττίδας, ματρὸς δὲ ξένας[22]; that is, although born of a foreign woman, he had obtained access to a deme of one of the old cities. That he had not inherited this deme-membership from his father is however clear from the fact that though his father was an Ialysian he was himself enrolled in a Lindian deme[23]. Furthermore, the son of the foregoing, Ἡράκλειτος Ἀπολλοδότου had in his turn not inherited his father's Lindian status, since he is called Σάμιος [24]. (He had, it is true, been given the privilege of epidamia, but this is a personal grant by the state, and does not affect his inherited status[25]). There are thus two problems; first, how is it that a matroxenos, son of an Ialysian, has himself become a Lindian, though retaining the title of ματρὸς δὲ ξένας , and how is that this individual's son has lost this status and become a foreigner, so far as

the Rhodian state is concerned? In regard to the first problem, it has already been noted that no other instance exists in which a matroxenos acquired deme-membership, and that this instance must therefore be regarded as an exception. Moreover, though becoming a Lindian, he did not cease to be a matroxenos. This raises the strong presumption that the membership of the Lindian deme may only have been an honour which did not carry with it the full privileges of the demesman. The evidence does not therefore permit the supposition that the matroxenos could escape from the restrictions placed on him. The title of the grandson, 'Samian' appears to suggest that the son of the matroxenos might in certain circumstances revert to foreign nationality, presumably that of his mother, whose origin is not recorded in the inscription. It would be unwise to draw any very definite conclusions from this, since the individual may voluntarily have abandoned his city of origin, Rhodes, and settled in Samos, where in the course of time he acquired citizenship, enabling him to call himself Samian in the outside world[26]. If so, it must be supposed that he later returned, and settled in Rhodos, and was eventually granted the privilege of ἐπιδαμία. It may be doubted whether this is a more economical explanation than to suppose that in certain, admittedly wholly unknown, circumstances, the status of matroxenos was forfeit, and the son of the matroxenos reverted

to the nationality of his mother.

The duties of the matroxenoi are almost entirely unknown. Three people so designated occur in one list of a ship's complement[27], but since an ordinary foreigner also occurs in the same list[28] nothing can be inferred from it as to any special duties or privileges of the matroxenoi, beyond the fact that on this occasion at least, they were not debarred from service in the navy[29].

The πολίτας or δαμότας, the full citizen, the partial citizen, and the ματρόξενος were the three elements in the population of Rhodos possessing total or partial Rhodian citizenship. The rest of the population, undoubtedly the bulk, consisted of aliens who were divided into various categories according to the rights, privileges and burdens they possessed. The exact nature of the status of these classes is far from certain, since the evidence, though abundant, is not explicit. Most of it, as might be expected, comes from tombstones, which record single names, sometimes with an additional title, from which we are left to draw inferences as to the status of the individual within the state.

The tombstones of foreigners fall into four categories

(a) Those which bear the name of the deceased, and his city of origin, with the addition of μετοίκου or ὢι ἐ ἐπιδαμία ἔδοται:

(b) Those which have in addition to the name of the deceased, his father's name, and his home-city. This class consists of those who were members of cities either subject to, or else connected closely with, Rhodes: (c) Those which have the name of the deceased and his home-town only; (d) Those with the name of the deceased and his ethnic. This category consisted of the slave-population.

The generic term used to include all aliens regardless of the category to which they belonged was ξένος.
As will be indicated shortly the term was also used at Rhodes and elsewhere in the Hellenistic world for a particular class of unprivileged foreigner resident in the city. The use of ξένος in its wider sense is found in an inscription containing a decision to elect certain χορηγοί for a Lindian religious festival from among the ξένοι, the various categories of which are recorded[30]; it is probably met at Rhodos in the title of ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν ξένων.[31]

At Rhodos, as elsewhere the various ξένοι were divided into categories according to the length of residence proposed by the alien. The distinction is that between the παρεπιδαμῶν and the μέτοικος, the former a bird-of-passage, the latter destined to become a permanent resident. The clearest example of this distinction is that given by Aristophanes of

Byzantium, who defines metic status thus:[32] "A person is a metic, when coming from a foreign place, he resides in the city, paying a tax to certain specific services of the city. For a certain number of days he is called 'a temporary resident', and he is not subject to taxation. If, however, he stays beyond the appointed time, he becomes forthwith a metic and subject to taxation. Similar to the metic is the Isoteles". The only example of this distinction is from the fifth century agreement between Chaleion and Oianthea, in which the term of residence allowed to members of either contracting party in the other's territory is one month, after which the ἐπιδημιὰ δικὰ becomes operative[33]. At Rhodes, as at Athens, the length of time which might elapse between the arrival of a foreigner and his enrolment as a metic is unknown[34]. The name accorded to those who either had not had time to acquire, or had no intention of acquiring, metic status at Rhodes was τοὶ παρεπιδαμεῦντες.[35] In this usage for temporary residents Rhodes does not differ from the large cities of Ionia and elsewhere[36]. Within the ranks of the permanently resident there were many variations at Rhodes, as elsewhere in the Hellenistic world. The old division, which sufficed for Athens in the fourth century, was not sufficient in the large cities of the Greek East in the Hellenistic world, when the foreign populations resident in cities grew as trade expanded. Consequently at Rhodos the metic is but one element in the permanently resident foreign

population of the city.

Metics occur rarely in Rhodian inscriptions, both absolutely and relatively in comparison with other foreign residents[37]. However, a few lists of public subscriptions contain the names of metics alongside of citizens and provide some slight picture of the position of the metic in the social life of Rhodes. A list of the second half of the first century B.C.[38] contains the names of twenty-two foreigners, as opposed to seven citizens. Of these twenty-two six are [illegible] called μέτοικοι , four ὧι ὁ ἐπιδαμία δέδοται , while the rest bear no specific title[39]. Another list of approximately the same date contains the names of nine metics[40] while a third list contains twenty-one metics, as opposed to seventy untitled foreigners[41]. One point of interest emerges in regard to the metics from these inscriptions. In the first inscription, three have προστάται , guarantors, who are themselves full Rhodian citizens, while three have no prostatai[42]: In the second not one of the nine metics is represented by a prostates[43]; while in the third list, there are twenty-one metics but only one prostates[44]. The distinction between those metics who were required to be represented by prostatai, and those who were free from this necessity, is not clear. In Attic law, the prostates presented the metic to the deme in which he was to reside, and after this single act of guarantee the metic stood on his

own feet at law[45]. An explanation along these lines is, however, hardly suitable here, since the metics in these inscriptions are evidently already recognised as such, since otherwise they would not be called metics. Thus the need for guarantee from a <u>prostates</u> should have passed, unless it be supposed that the metics were all on the eve of recognition as metics, and had assumed the title before it was legally theirs. A more likely explanation is, perhaps, that at Rhodos there existed higher status of metic, based on some qualification, perhaps of length of residence, [illegible], and that those who did not possess this [illegible] qualification were represented by <u>prostatai</u> even after they were established as tax-paying metics. Many details of a metic family may be gathered from a group of related inscriptions[46], though [illegible] all the information [illegible] may not be valid for metics generally. In this instance a metic has married a foreign woman, without metic status. The children of the marriage are not themselves metics, but foreigners possessing the citizenship of their father's city of origin; At the same time, though the metic status does not appear to have been inherited, it was possible for the possessor of it to use it as a stepping-stone to a higher status since the metic in this group of inscriptions eventually appears with the title of ὁ ἐπὶ τᾶς δόδοτας, retaining, of course, his original nationality[47].

Of services required from the metic by the state

little is known. No trace of metics exists in the navy, and it is very unlikely that they served, except on occasions of great urgency, in an arm that was manned almost exclusively by full citizens. In similar circumstances the metic could be called upon to fight on land, as we know from Diodorus' account of the siege of Rhodes in 304/3 B.C.[48]

In one inscription from the Rhodian Peraea, of the Hellenistic period, and in two from the Rhodian island of Carpathos, as well as in the narrative of Diodorus, the word πάροικος occurs[49]. It may however be doubted whether the term had any official connotation at Rhodos as it has so commonly in Hellenistic inscriptions of the Ionian cities, where it seems to have superseded almost completely the normal Attic term μέτοικος at this time[50]. The inscriptions from Carpathos, and probably also that from Cedreae, testify to the use of the word in the widest possible sense as referring to the entire foreign population, as contrasted with δᾶμοται and πολῖται. Whether or not πάροικος was regularly used instead of ξένος [51], the term does not occur at Rhodos, where there is, on the other hand, evidence for the use of ξένος in this wide sense. Of equally little value as proof of the existence of a separate class of πάροικοι equivalent to μέτοικοι at Rhodos in the passage of Diodorus, since even if he is reproducing the narrative of a Rhodian historian, he may well have altered that narrative

to make it more consonant with the normal usage of his day, when πάροικος was a more common term than μέτοικος . The language of Diodorus can rarely be pressed to sustain a linguistic argument. There is thus at present no valid evidence either to indicate the existence of a class of paroikoi either in a wide or a narrow sense at Rhodos, nor to su pose that at Rhodos, as in many Hellenistic cities, the term μέτοικος had been replaced by the term πάροικος. There can however be no doubt that the word was used in the sense of 'any foreigner' in territories dependent on Rhodes.

The next class of foreign residents are those known as κάτοικοι or κατοικοῦντες . They do not appear to have lived in Rhodos; ~~xxxxx~~ all the inscriptions referring to them suggest that they were closely associated with Lindian territory[52]. Their nature and status are, however, alike controversial, and an examination of the evidence for their existence cannot be separated from that of the other classes of foreigners.

Katoikoi occur throughout the Hellenistic world[53]. Broadly speaking they fall into two classes (a) the military katoikoi and (b) civil katoikoi. The former, found throughout the Hellenistic kingdoms, and most commonly in Ptolemaic Egypt from the second century, were troops settled on the land, in the same manner as the Ptolemaic clerouchs

in the third century. The collective name for the territory cultivated by these settlers was κατοικικὴ γῆ . The latter type, more commonly known, as at Rhodes, by the participial form κατοικοῦντες , are found frequently in documents of the cities of Asia Minor and the islands, and were a class of non-citizen permanently resident either in the city, or in the neighbourhood of the city, and subject to the city's laws. Though the possibility exists that the term οἱ κατοικοῦντες in the cities of Asia Minor may originally have been applied to soldiers planted by the central authority in the neighbourhood of the city, like the katoikoi in the vicinity of Magnesia and Sipylum[54], it is evident that the term was commonly used of a wide class of foreigners who had no connection with any military katoikia. It is thus necessary to keep distinct the two types of katoikoi; those who were katoikoi vis-a-vis the Crown, be it in Egypt, or Seleucid or Pergamene Asia, and those who were katoikoi or (more usually) katoikountes vis-a-vis a particular city.

The Rhodian katoikeuntes might, prima facie, belong to either category. They are certainly not Rhodian citizens since in almost all inscriptions they are recorded separately after all the demes have been mentioned.[55] They are indeed found only at Lindos, in the Lindian Peraea, and on the island of Carpathos, but their absence from Rhodian documents is not necessarily an argument against their being military settlers

since Rhodos possessed no πολιτικὴ γῆ , and thus could only plant settlers in the territory of the old cities. They occur almost without exception mentioned together with another group called τοὶ γεωγεῦντες ; but this too does not speak against a military settlement, since in Ptolemaic Egypt κλῆροικοι and γεωγοί often occur side by side[55]. Moreover what little we know of the Rhodian army indicates very clearly that the Rhodians fought their battles with mercenaries[57], and the mercenaries may have been given κλῆροι on the island, to keep them at hand should they be needed.

It cannot therefore be denied that the Rhodian κλῆροικεῦντες may be military settlers. On the other hand, the term is normally used of aliens, and there is no objection to this usage here. Further, the argument from silence is not without force: the fact that the κλῆροικεῦντες occur nowhere save in Lindian territory, suggests that they may in fact be, not a Rhodian, but a Lindian, institution. If so, they are not likely to be military. In view of the normal usage of the term in Greek cities, as opposed to the kingdoms, it seems therefore preferable to interpret the term as referring to civil aliens of some sort. The difficulty is to determine what sort of alien is in question.[58]

The term κλῆροικῶν may be used simply to mean 'alien' in the widest sense of any free non-citizen living within city-territory[59]. It is also very common in the sense of a permanent as opposed to a temporary resident. It is

frequently found in this sense in documents from cities of the Hellenistic world in which the various categories of residents are recorded[60], and instances of it occur in cities incorporated in the Rhodian state[61]. Apart from these two general senses, the word is also found in narrower senses. It is used either to denote a particular type of permanent resident alien indistinguishable from the metic, with the same burdens and privileges[62], or another type of permanent resident alien clearly differentiated from the metic[63]. It is [illegible] probable that the Lindian κατοικοῦντες belong to this latter type. An inscription[64] containing a list of foreigners mentions by name two categories of which one is certainly μέτοικοι, while of the other only the letters κα— survive. There can, however, be little doubt in the context that the word is to be completed either as κά[τοικοι] or κα[τοικοῦντες][65]. On the assumption that the katoikeuntes are not military, this inscription is itself adequate evidence for the view that the Lindian κατοικοῦντες were a permanent class of resident wholly distinct from the metics. This is amply confirmed by an inscription from Physkos in which they are one of three classes contrasted with παρεπιδημοῦντες, 'temporary residents'[66]. Their precise status in the state is, however, not evident. It is worthy of note that, unlike metics, those on whom ἐπιδαμία was bestowed, and those honoured with the title of 'Rhodian', the status of katoikos or κατοικῶν is not recorded on tombstones. This may be because

the status possessed by them was very humble, or because the status only existed vis-à-vis Lindos, and for this reason was omitted when the individual was buried at Rhodos.

Eighteen inscriptions mention τοὶ κατοικεῦντες , and nearly all show the same features.[67] The formula used for the κατοικεῦντες is either simply τοὶ κατοικεῦ(ον οῦ)ντες ἐν Λινδίαι πόλει or else they are found joined closely with another body called τοὶ γεωργεῦντες in the general formula τοὶ κατοικεῦντες ἐν Λινδίᾳ πόλει καὶ γεωργεῦντες ἐν τᾶι Λινδίαι[68] In three inscriptions to these two groups is added a third, τοὶ ναυκλαρεῦντες Leaving aside for the moment the question of the identity of this latter group, consideration of the phrase τοὶ γεωργεῦντες ἐν τᾶι Λινδίαι is necessary. The fact that on one occasion the γεωργεῦντες occur not with the κατοικεῦντες but with the patra of the Grennadai[69] indicates that in spite of the omission of the article before the word γεωργεῦντες , the κατοικεῦντες and the γεωργεῦντες were separate bodies[70]. The close relation existing between the two is none the less evident, and it is therefore desirable at this point to examine the nature of the second member of the group, since this may shed light on the nature of the κατοικεῦντες.

The γεωργεῦντες , like the κατοικεῦντες , with whom they are so closely associated and ναυκλαρεῦντες with whom they are associated on separate occasions[71], cannot have been Lindian citizens. From this it follows with some certainty that they are not to be regarded as owner-farmers, like the γεοῦχοι of Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt.[72] Since if they were foreigners who had individually been granted ἔγκτασις γᾶς by the Rhodians the fact would surely be mentioned, by the use of some such phrase as τοὶ ἐνεκτημένοι , found, for example on the neighbouring islands

of Cos, and Calymnos[73]. It thus appears probable that they are non-citizen tenant farmers, or agricultural workers. The term γεωργοί or γεωργοῦντες is in fact normally applied to tenants and agricultural workers in Ptolemaic Egypt, but both words and the similar συγγεωργοί , could also be used as equivalent to γεοῦχοι ,'land-owners'[74]. At Lindos, the fact that the γεωργεῦντες were called upon to provide a liturgy[75] suggests very strongly that they were tenant-farmers[76].

The one distinction between the activity of the κατοικεῦντες and that of the γεωργεῦντες is that while the latter are always described, as would be expected, as working in the countryside[77], the former are always described as working in the city itself. It is therefore possible that they were foreign hirelings in Lindos, rather than independent foreigners with the status of metic. They will thus have occupied, like the ξένοι at Rhodes, an intermediate status between metic and slave: but that the word did not itself imply a specific status is evident from the fact that the γεωργεῦντες and νεωκλαρεῦντες , who were also foreign residents, were classed separately. The phrase τοὶ κατοικεῦντες / was therefore primarily a definition of occupation, not of status in these inscriptions.

There will have been no γεωργεῦντες in Rhodian territory, since Rhodos possessed no <u>chora</u>[78], and the total absence of κάτοικοι from inscriptions from Rhodos suggests that the title did not exist there either. On the other hand an inscription already noted[79] indicates that in the late Hellenistic age metics existed at Lindos as well as at Rhodos. It cannot however be supposed that such metics were juridically subject to Lindos; metic status implied the existence of a sovereign community by

which the status could be bestowed. Here, then, it seems likely may lie the distinction between the metic and the katoikos. The former was subject to the laws of Rhodos, even if he chose for his own purposes to take up residence in Lindos; the katoikos existed vis-à-vis the Lindian municipal administration only. Foreigners who had settled in Lindos, and had not migrated to the capital, they were not citizens of Lindos, and for certain purposes such as those revealed in the inscriptions they were grouped together in the manner of a κοινόν [80]. Similarly the γεωγεοῦντες will have had no status in relation to the Rhodian government, but will have remained in Lindian (and perhaps Camiran and Ialysian) territory.

A final question arises with regard to the κατοικοῦντες, and to a far less degree to the γεωγεοῦντες. Why did they remain in the old cities and their territory, when the opportunity of acquiring metic status in the capital, with its manifest advantages, was open to them? Perhaps either personal inclination, or the inability to make an adequate living in the more competitive atmosphere of the city may be regarded as an adequate cause. But one other possibility may be envisaged, namely that these katoikoi were descended from the old metic population of the old cities, who had lost their metic status after the synoecism. This view, or variations of it, has not been without its supporters in the past[81], and is not impossible, though the survival of such a body unimpaired for at least five hundred years without acquiring new blood, does not appear very probable, and once the admission of new blood is admitted as an almost essential element in the survival of the group, this view ceases to be significantly different from that suggested in the text.

In three inscriptions there occurs alongside the κατοικοῦντες

and the γεωργεῦντες a body called ναυκληρεῦντες [82]. The use of the participle ναυκληρεῦντες, rather than the simple, and more common, ναύκληροι, is probably adequate ground for denying, as also in the case of the κατοικεῦντες and γεωργεῦντες, that the ναυκληρεῦντες constituted a formal and permanent koinon; they were, rather, persons following a common profession who united on particular occasions for particular purposes[83].

The term ναύκληρος is vague, and capable of several different but related meanings, of which the two fundamental are 'ship-owner', and 'captain of a ship'[84], but in the Hellenistic period, the term is apparently used, without reference to ownership, for sea-going merchants, indistinguishable from οἱ ἔμποροι and οἱ καταπλέοντες [85]. There is no reason to doubt that such is the meaning here. Such naukleroi are evidently not Rhodian citizens; they are mentioned in one inscription, a dedication, alongside the katoikeuntes, georgeuntes, and the parepidameuntes. There is thus no reason to doubt that they are also foreigners, defined, like the γεωργεῦντες, by their calling. It is less certain whether they are to be regarded as merchants permanently settled in the Lindian coastal area, and in Physkos, trading with other parts, like the Tyrian and Berytian merchants who each had their own permanent establishments at Delos[86], or whether they were a body the numbers and composition of which were subject to fluctuation. The former, though a more extravagant explanation, seems nevertheless more probable, since in the inscription from Physkos were they merchants only temporarily in Physkos, they would presumably have been included under the title παρεπιδαμεῦντες, who must themselves have primarily consisted of precisely such persons. Further, though the individual in whose honour the statue is set up is stated to have been previously honoured-

by the katoikeuntes, the georgeuntes, the nauklereuntes and the parepidameuntes, the statue itself is dedicated only by the first three groups, which again suggests that they were all of one type, that is, permanently resident, as opposed to the transient parepidameuntes.

It therefore seems likely that there existed at Lindos, and in Lindian territory, four types of foreign residents, of which three, permanently settled there, do not reappear at Rhodos. In regard to the κατοικοῦντες and the γεωργοῦντες, this may be merely a matter of nomenclature, but the peculiar status of Rhodos as a city without territorium made it inevitable that, constitutionally speaking, there should be no γεωργοῦντες at Rhodos, even though (assuming them to have existed at Ialysus no less than at Lindos) persons belonging to this category, and bearing this name, may have lived close under the city walls.

Apart from the metic population of Rhodos, and the permanent foreign population of the old cities, and their territory, whose status and walk of life was adequately expressed in their title, there existed at Rhodos another, apparently very considerable, foreign element, probably known as ξένοι. Here again, the precise status of this class is far from clear. It has been observed that tombstones from Rhodos testify to the existence of a class of residents, who are denoted by only their own name, and that of their city of origin, without the patronymic[97]. Such persons are also found in considerable quantity in subscription lists[98]. That they were not slaves is shown by the addition of the city of origin, indicating that the individual was originally a citizen of the city. The possibility that these persons were the κατοικοῦντες of Lindian inscriptions, cannot be excluded, but the absence of the word κατοικῶν from all tombstones seems almost decisive against this.[89] ~~has already been mentioned and dismissed as improbable~~. Nor can they have

been either of the class of foreigner granted the rights of ἔνκτησις or ἐγκτῆσις, since at least the first of these privileges are normally recorded even on tombstones[90], while the second of them is recorded in lists of foreigners, which also contain the names of foreigners of the class under discussion[91]. This class of foreigner appears to have been the most numerous in the city[92], but his status is obscure, since normally a foreigner in a Greek city, as has been noted, was first of all a (παρ)επιδημῶν, and then after a certain, very short, period, necessarily became a metic. These cannot however be παρεπιδαμεῦντες since the number of their tombstones testifies to the fact that very many of them lived for years, or at least died, at Rhodos, and it is not likely that we are fortunate enough to possess the tombstones of just those unfortunate παρεπιδαμεῦντες who, arriving for either a brief visit, or a permanent sojourn, died within the first few days of their arrival. It is therefore necessary to suppose that there existed a further class of permanent foreign resident, who never acquired metic status. It seems probable that the name given to this apparently unprivileged class of foreign resident, was ξένος [93]. The evidence for the use of this term in a narrow, as well as in a general, sense is not indeed very good, since there is no epigraphical evidence for it from Rhodes[94], and it depends on two writers, Diodorus and Dio Chrysostom, whose use of precise language cannot be pressed[95]. The passages in question, do, however, suggest very strongly that such a class did exist. In the first, rather rhetorical passage Diodorus speaks of the foreign population of Rhodos as consisting of paroikoi and xenoi, while Dio speaks of it as consisting of metoikoi and xenoi. It must remain

uncertain whether this use of **xenos** may be pressed, and whether it may be regarded as referring to the dass of foreigners here in **question.**

The rights and duties of this anonymous section of the foreign population known from tombstones and other inscriptions cannot be determined either by precise indication or by analogy. The presence of a single foreigner of this type in a navy list[96] shows that they might, like matroxenoi[97], be called upon to serve in this force, and the subscription-lists show that, in regard to the payment of subscriptions, possibly only voluntary in name, they contributed alongside foreigners of higher standing. Beyond these not very illuminating facts, there is no evidence for the particular charges of the xenos -- if so he may be called.

The consideration of this large, but apparently humble, section of the city's population leads on to that of the freedmen and the slaves. A reference to a freedman occurs in only one inscription[98], and the only other reference to manumission is in Diodorus' account of the siege of Rhodos, when slaves were offered their freedom on the condition that they shared in the defence of the city[99]. Whether this absence of any reference to freedmen, and indeed the absence of any manumission-deeds, such as are common on the neighbouring island of Calymnos[100], is fortuitous or whether manumission was in fact unusual at Rhodes cannot be determined. The single inscription records the stages by which a certain Epigonos of Rhodiapolis reached the status of metic. The inscription indeed mentions no intermediate stage between the act of manumission and the acquirement of metic status[101], but that is adequately explained by the fact that only those honours of Epigonus are recorded to which he attached the most importance. It seems probable that he became a ξένος, before becoming a metic, but

it cannot be determined whether by the act of ἐλευθέρωσις he was made an ἀπελεύθερος or whether he was straightway regarded as an ordinary free foreign resident. The analogy of the status of manumitted slaves in other Greek cities in Asia Minor and the Aegean, though not conclusive, suggests that the freedman was regarded as belonging to a different category from the metic, though the evidence is not sufficiently precise to indicate whether there usually existed a separate class of apeleutheroi[102]. Thus the question of the position of the freed slave at Rhodos must be left open.

Closely connected with the freed slave was the ἔγγενής [103]. This word usually bears the adjectival sense of 'native', 'inborn' or 'kindred'[104]. In Rhodian inscriptions it occurs quite frequently as an attribute of persons who were evidently slaves. It has therefore been suggested that the word should be equated with the terms οἰκογενής and ἐνδογενής, and taken to mean 'a slave born within the house'[105]. However, two persons referred to in a Rhodian inscription as ἔγγενὴς ἐν Θήραις δαμόσιος / and Στράτιππος ἔγγενὴς ἐν Ἁλικαρνασσῶι γραμματεὺς δαμόσιος [106] suggest that the term may really mean rather 'born in the city'; that is born of slave parents in the city and thus not bought on the slave market. The distinction in fact between this type of slave, and an οἰκογενής may have been very slight[107]. It appears that the Rhodian authorities insisted that even foreigners of this status, whatever they may have been called originally[108] should in Rhodes adopt the title prevalent there[110]. A slave so born might rise, apparently without an express act of manumission, to the status of a metic, while retaining in addition his original title of ἔγγενής [109].

Of the status of the private slave little need be said. There is no reason to suppose that it differed in any respect from that enjoyed by them

in other Greek cities. Admission of slaves to the religious and social koina is however, in itself valuable evidence of the liberal attitude adopted by the Rhodian state, and by individual slave-owners, to the slave population --- in its turn another reason for the social harmony which prevailed in Rhodos[111].

Such were the classes of the foreign population of Rhodes, according to the status enjoyed by them. There existed in addition privileges conferred by the state on foreign residents, possession of which did not imply membership of a particular class, since the privilege might be bestowed on members of various of the above-mentioned classes, but which gave the possessor certain material advantages, and put him, as it were, among the aristocracy of the foreign residents. Benefits of this sort had been conferred on individuals by Greek cities from an early period, and in the Hellenistic age such familiar privileges as ateleia, and proedria became increasingly common[112]. At the same time the bestowal of proxenia once held by a single representative of a foreign city in his own city, and carrying defined obligations and privileges, had come to lose its original significance, and become an honour bestowed on account of public benefactions and carrying no obligations[113]. A parallel phenomenon to this multiplication of privileges and honours was the increasing frequency with which citizenship was bestowed, either as a gift or in return for a payment, on foreigners[114]. This phenomenon which may without exaggeration be said to be almost universal in the Greek world in the Hellenistic and Roman periods creates the impression that, even if material causes such as the need for an increase in defence forces may often have prompted the gift of citizenship[115], the inhabitants of the great cities who were ultimately subject to a central monarchical authority, did not value

their particular citizenship as much as their forefathers had done. This important psychological development of the Greek, particularly of the East Greek, world, by which the way was paved for Roman provincial administration, and eventually, at long remove, for the Antonine citizenship, [illegible] fails to find an echo in the independent city of Rhodos. Rhodes rarely bestowed citizenship on individuals and seldom contracted isopoliteiai within other states in the Hellenistic age[116]. The reason for this is obvious after what has already been said; Rhodian citizenship was still worth something, since it carried with it full sovereignty in a way that citizenship of Miletus or Priene or Alexandria did not. Nor was this sparing bestowal of honours limited to grants of citizenship; from the whole range of Rhodian epigraphy there survive only four proxeny-decrees, and of these four two are earlier than the synoecism[117]. Grants of ateleia and similar awards are wholly absent[118]. This universal absence cannot be attributed to chance: the silence is too complete. Whatever the reason Rhodes did not grant citizenship, concessions or privileges of the type with which the rest of the Greek world has made us so familiar. There is, however, ample evidence to show, that while it bestowed the citizenship but rarely, it had its own system of honours and privileges which fell short of the bestowal of citizenship. Of these honours that most frequently encountered was the right or privilege of ἐπιδαμία[119]. It has indeed been much disputed whether the term describes a status attained by a section of the population, similar for example to the metic status, whether, that is to say there were ἐπιδαμεῦντες as we have already seen there were (in Lindian territory at least) κατοικεῦντες, γενεργεῦντες [illegible] and νακλαρεῦντες; or whether it was an honour, or privilege analogous to those discussed above, ateleia, proxeneia, politeia[120]. The uncertainty arises from the very ambiguous nature of the

term ἐπιδημέω. The usual meaning of the word in Hellenistic states is the same as παραπδημέω already encountered, that is, 'to reside temporarily'. Instances of this meaning are numerous[121]. It has not unnaturally been inferred from this that at Rhodes those known individually as ὧι ἐπιδαμία δέδοται constituted a class comprising foreigners not permanently domiciled in the city. There are, however, numerous reasons for doubting this: first, the word ἐπιδαμέω occurs at most once in Rhodian epigraphy[122]; secondly the term used to express the transitory foreign population appears to have been τοὶ παρεπιδαμεοῦντες [123]; thirdly the form of the expression ὧι ἐπιδαμία δέδοται suggests not attainment of a status but bestowal of a grant; there does not appear to be any instance in which attainment of a particular status is described by the substantive accompanied by the relevant part of a verb meaning 'to give'[124]. On the other hand the use of a verb meaning 'to give' is commonly employed, as might be expected, to express the bestowal of a privilege or honour. Fourthly, an inscription from Rhodos indicates the possession by one individual of ἐπιδαμία and ἔγκτησις [125], and it can hardly be doubted that the two privileges are regarded as analogous; finally another inscription[126] which contains a long list of foreigners, all of the same status, perhaps that of xenoi[127], one only has the addition of ὧι ἐπιδαμία δέδοται to his name[128]. Yet this individual clearly belongs to the same class as all the other foreigners in the inscription. For these reasons it seems preferable to suppose that epidamia was a privilege conferred on certain foreigners and did not itself refer to a particular class of the population.

It is unfortunately far from easy to determine the nature of the privilege bestowed. It has been supposed that it consisted of a grant of temporary residence[129], but this is evidently incorrect, since there are

instances of sculptors who were only granted epidamia after they had resided in the city for many years. Further the term occurs not infrequently on tombstones[130], and this too is not easily compatable with temporary residence. Equally certainly the privilege was something different from a right to own land, since in one instance the two privileges are awarded separately to the same individual[131]. There is one instance of a metic receiving ἐπιδαμία and on this occasion the metic on becoming one ὢν ἐπιδαμίαν δέδωκεν abandoned metic status[132]. This suggests that epidamia was not among the privileges inherent in the status of metic. An examination of the privileges accorded to metics over and above their status reveals one of outstanding importance, namely ἰσοτέλεια. This consisted in releasing the metic from the obligation to pay the metic tax, and replacing this by the payment of the usual taxes levied on citizens[133]. Though nothing is known of the system of taxation employed by the Rhodians it seems not impossible that the bestowal of epidamia may have been the Rhodian equivalent of the grant of isoteleia encountered in other parts of the Greek world. If so, it was evidently a very considerable honour, and not unnaturally recorded on tombstones and other public documents. The fact that ἐπιδαμία has no etymological connection with the notion of taxation is not an argument against this interpretation, since etymologically there can be no doubt that epidamia should refer to some form of temporary residence, but there is equally no doubt that it cannot do so. It must therefore be supposed that the term had acquired a technical meaning divorced from its etymology.

The privilege of epidamia clearly was not confined to those of metic status. It is found frequently conferred on sculptors[134], a profession the members of which rarely possessed metic status[135]. Surviving bases indicate that it was possible for a sculptor to pass directly from the lowest

class of foreign resident of free birth, to possession of epidamia[136], and this, combined with the frequency with which the privilege was bestowed on sculptors, suggests that the Rhodian government may have encouraged the settlement of sculptors and artists by the advertisement of this easily acquired and valuable privilege. Such a hypothesis explains why Rhodes became the centre of a school of sculpture, to which came sculptors from the four corners of the Greek east. Rhodes possessed no great tradition of culture or artistic production which made it the natural centre of such activity. There was no doubt a good market for works of art, and perhaps, though we know nothing of it, a well-developed system of patronage, but these things existed elsewhere also. The original cause for the establishment of this concourse of foreign sculptors, which developed into the later Rhodian school, may perhaps partially be explained by the peculiar privileges offered to such persons by the Rhodian government.

Some information has survived as to the social activities of those in possession of epidamia. They occur in the record of a koinon of aliens, together with metics and xenoi[137]. They possessed in addition at least one koinon of their own, called τὸ κοινὸν συνθυτῶν Ῥοδιαστῶν ἐπιδαμιαστῶν 'fellow-worshippers of the goddess Rhode, to whom epidamia has been granted'[138].

Akin to the possession of epidamia was the right to the title of Ῥόδιος . As with those possessing epidamia our knowledge of those called by this title is derived mainly, though not exclusively, from the signatures of sculptors[139]. Use of this title may be illustrated by the titulature of one of the best-known sculptors in Hellenistic Rhodos -- Epicharmus of Soloi and his son. On the base of one, evidently early, work, Epicharmus appears simply as Ἐπίχαρμος Σολεύς [140]. However, his normal signature is

Ἐπίχαρμος Σολεὺς ὢν ἐπιδαμίαν δέδοται [141]. In his later works he is frequently joined by his son, whom he had taken into partnership; the latter always appear as Ἐπίχαρμος Ἐπιχάρμου Ῥόδιος [142]. Similarly the brothers Demetrius and Plutarchus, sons of Heliodorus, of the first century B.C., appear simply as Δημήτριος Ἡλιοδώρου Ῥόδιος and Πλούταρχος Ἡλιοδώρου Ῥόδιος. On one base, however, Plutarchus signs simply as Πλούταρχος Ἀπαμεύς [143]. It is thus possible that the brothers were citizens of Apamea who settled at Rhodes, and subsequently acquired the title of Ῥόδιος, perhaps because the father also settled in Rhodes and was granted, like Epicharmus of Soloi, the privilege of epidamia. The formula [Λαοδικέ]ὺς ἀπὸ Λύκου ὁ καὶ Ῥόδιος encountered in one signature is not in point here, since this is a normal type of multiple citizenship familiar throughout the Greek East during the Roman empire[144].

So far the similarity between the title ὢν ἐπιδαμίαν δέδοται and that of Ῥόδιος is considerable. This similarity is strengthened by the history of one family of sculptors, throughout the Hellenistic age. The first member of this family known to us is Ἀριστωνίδας Μνασιτίμου, who signed two bases which are dated to about 340 or 330 B.C. On both of these he signs himself Ἀριστωνίδας Μνασιτίμου Ῥόδιος [145]. But in two lists of Camiran Hieropoioi of the first quarter of the third century B.C. the names Τιμαγόρας Ἀριστωνίδα and Μνασίτιμος Ἀριστωνίδα appear [146]. These men, both of them sculptors, are evidently the sons of the previous man, and they are no less evidently Camiran demesmen. Are we then to suppose that Ἀριστωνίδας Μνασιτίμου was also a Camiran citizen, and that the title 'Rhodian' could be conferred even on demesmen of the old cities? Or should we suppose that that he was not a Camiran, but that his sons were admitted to Camiran citizenship, just

as one matroxenos, and one son of a man in possession of σπονδαρία were admitted to membership of Lindian demes?[147] Certainly the latter alternative seems more likely on general grounds: if it be correct the history of these brothers will thus provide the third instance of the admission of foreigners (or, partial foreigners) to deme-membership. But there is at least one good reason for preferring the former alternative[148]. It cannot therefore be claimed on this evidence that the sons of Ῥόδιοι who became full citizens constituted a considerable section of the population[149].

It is clear however that the title Ῥόδιος carried with it access to all magistracies, and that, the honour thus made the bearer the equal, in everything short of deme-membership, of the citizens of the old cities. Two instances survive of Ῥόδιοι, both originally citizens of an Ἀπαμεία, reaching the prytaneia. Of the philosopher Poseidonius of Apamea it is recorded only that he was prytanis of Rhodes[150], but a dedication[151] in honour of the sculptor already mentioned, Plutarchus the son of Heliodorus, records in detail all the offices of state held by him: starting with the quite minor post ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν ξένων, they include that of ταμίας, κλαρωτὰς τῶν δικαστῶν, στρατηγός and πρύτανις. There is no means of deciding whether this ius magistratus petendi belonged to all Ῥόδιοι or whether it was bestowed as an additional honour on the most distinguished. In either case the honour of Ῥόδιος might be bestowed on foreigners of different status, and it can hardly be maintained, therefore, that the were a permanent element of the population, akin to the ξένοι, μέτοικοι or κατοικοῦντες, entry to which followed automatically on the fulfilment of certain conditions.

A summary of the complex evidence surveyed in this chapter shows

that the main division of the population of Rhodes was between citizen and non-citizen. The citizen body consisted primarily of the members of the old cities, the damotai, who possessed a twofold citizenship, that of their own city, and that of Rhodos. In addition it appears to have been possible even for a foreigner to obtain deme membership -- though it was evidently very unusual, since only three examples of such a proceeding survive, and it is probably to be regarded as an exceptional honour. There are also instances of foreigners bearing the title Ῥόδιος acquiring the right of holding office, though remaining outside the deme-system. Again the interpretation of this must depend much on the frequency of the occurrence - and only two instances have survived. The class called μητροξενοι, those born of the union of a Rhodian full-citizen and a non-Rhodian woman, were evidently normally excluded from membership of a deme, and there is no instance of one holding a magistracy.

There also existed a class of persons whose origin is uncertain, who appear to have enjoyed some but not all of the rights of citizenship. The name given to this apparently very considerable section of the population is unknown. Constitutionally it formed a bridge between the full citizens and the unenfranchised foreigners.

The foreign population fall into two main classes according to their length of sojourn in the city. Those whose residence was only temporary were known as παρεπιδαμοῦντες , and, it may be supposed on the analogy of Athenian practice, were not liable either to a special tax, or to general taxation. The permanently resident foreigners fall into various categories, the distinction between which is not always clear. Most numberous of all were the class below that of the metic, perhaps called

ξένοι . Their status, duties and privileges are all unknown, but they evidently formed the rank and file of the foreign population. The metic is well attested in Rhodian inscriptions, although there is much that is not clear. Some metics were represented, or rather accompanied, in public documents by the names of προστάται but the irregularity with which these latter occur indicates that not all metics were required to be so represented. Apart from this the metic at Rhodos probably did not differ much from metics elsewhere, though the peculiar compsotion of the Rhodian armed forces, in particular the navy, probably absolved him from service in those arms.

Several categories of permanently resident foreigners are known from the territory of Lindos. It is unlikely that they also existed in Rhodos under the same names, though the possibility must remain that the names which appear at Lindos were merely the Lindian names for those who possessed a similar status, but with different titles at Rhodos. These were the katoikeuntes, the georgeuntes, [illegible] and the nauklereuntes. It seems probable that the first worked within the city of Lindos and were similar to the metic class found at Rhodos, the georgeuntes were foreign agricultural workers, most probably tenant-farmers, [illegible] The nauklereuntes [illegible] were resident foreign merchants.

Between the free foreign resident, whatever his status, and the slave comes the class of manumitted slave, the existence of which at Rhodos is known only from a single document. This almost complete absence of evidence suggests that in the Hellenistic and Roman periods at least, manumission was by no means a common practice at Rhodos. The slaves themselves seem to have

fallen into different categories. The normal slave is never recorded as such on monuments, and can only be inferred from the numerous tombstones bearing slave names. There existed also a class of slave possessing some slight privileges, known as the engeneis, apparently from the fact that they were born of slave parents at Rhodos and had not been bought as slaves in the market.

Finally there are the titles which might be conferred on foreigners of different rank. Of these there were three main types. First was the right to own land. Secondly there existed the privilege known as ἐνκτησις which, it has been suggested, was equivalent to the bestowal of isoteleia, that is the person so honoured, if a metic, was freed from the necessity to pay the metic [illegible] or other tax applied to foreigners and was permitted to pay only those taxes normally levied on citizens. The third title was that of Ῥόδιος which seems to have been conferred principally, but not entirely, on sculptors. Such persons were evidently highly privileged: some rose to the highest offices of state, though remaining outside the citizen-body, while the sons of one 'Rhodian' certainly became full demes-men. There is however much in connection with the title which remains obscure.

Some observations on the provenience of the foreign population of Rhodos.

The lives of many thousands of foreign residents were cast within the constitutional framework the outline of which has been tentatively, and conjecturally, sketched above. A few observations on the composition of this foreign element may terminate this discussion.

Any such observations necessarily suffer from one fundamental

weakness -- it is almost impossible to determine to within nearer than a century the date of any particular tombstone, our main source of information, and in many instances a determination within even such wide limits cannot be obtained. It is thus only possible to say in general terms that foreigners from this or that city resided in Rhodes in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Attempts at closer definition are not likely to be successful. It can, however, be said with some degree of certainty that very few documents, be they lists of foreigners or tombstones, survive from the fourth century B.C., and this absence of fourth century evidence, though admittedly characteristic of Rhodian epigraphy, itself permits the conjecture that the foreign population of Rhodes was far smaller then than in the Hellenistic and Roman periods.

This vagueness of chronology is compensated in another direction by the fact that the surviving number of documents referring to foreigners is so considerable -- some hundreds in all -- that the story they tell may fairly be supposed to be representative; the argument from silence is of great strength here. Complete or relative absence from, or rarity in, surviving tombstones of this or that ethnic, or city-ethnic is a fair indication that those who carried this ethnic were but seldom seen in Rhodos.

With these reflections in mind, the statistical evidence may now be examined. One outstanding fact is the almost complete absence of reference to Greeks from Greece proper. The most frequent are Athenians[152], as might be expected, and these are few in number compared with the representatives of the cities of Ionia and Syria. The relative scarcity of Athenians at Rhodes corresponds with a corresponding scarcity of tombstones

of Rhodians at Athens[153], and indicates beyond all doubt that there was no close contact between the two cities. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods, even though considerable commercial contacts are testified by the presence of large quantities of Rhodian amphorae in Hellenistic deposits at Athens[154].

Athens, scantily represented though it is, heads the field as far as Greece proper is concerned. Of other cities, only Aegina[155], Argos[156], Thebes[157] appear from the main part of the country, though in the north Macedonians[158] and, surprisingly, Thracian Greeks[159], are not uncommon. The Aegean islands, other than those either closely connected with, or incorporated in Rhodian territory, such as Telos, Nisyros and Cos, are but scantily represented[160]. A corresponding absence of Rhodians from documents from the other islands, even from Delos after the middle of the third century B.C.[161], indicates yet again that Rhodes' main contacts were not with the Cyclades and the Aegean in general.

Once we turn to Asia Minor the difference is immediately apparent. In the North, the cities of the Propontis are well represented[162], recalling the very considerable evidence for political contacts between these communities and Rhodes in the Hellenistic period[163]. The main body of foreigners from Asia Minor falls into two categories, those who were citizens of the Greek cities of Ionia and Caria, and those who belonged to the various native populations of Anatolia, and are designated simply by the use of the ethnic, such as 'Paphlagonian', 'Mysian', 'Phrygian' and so on. This class constituted of course the slave population, and very rarely seem to have risen above it. It is interesting to observe, that they are far less numerous than the free Greek foreign population, and that they come even from those parts of Anatolia most remote from the Aegean

littoral, such as Armenia.

The most frequently represented of all the cities of Asia Minor, and with one exception, the most frequent of all Greek cities, is Ephesus, of which we know of over fifty individual citizens resident in Rhodos[164]. In contrast to this, Miletus is but poorly represented with ten citizens[165], while on the other hand Milesians are by far the commonest foreigners in Hellenistic Athens[166]. This is a very clear and striking indication of two different spheres of contact in cities geographically very close to one another. A strange absentee is Priene[167], while the presence of only four Pergamenes[168] suggests that the links between Rhodes and that city may have been less close than is customarily supposed. As might be expected Greeks from the cities adjacent to the Rhodian Peraea occur frequently; twenty Halicarnassians[169], twelve Myndians[170], and ten Cnidians[171]. Of cities further afield the Phrygian city of Cabala[172], Pisidian Selge with fifteen[173], Soloi, the Rhodian colony in Cilicia with twenty-three[174], and Phaselis another Rhodian colony with twenty[175], clearly had considerable interests in the city. Of the non-Greek peoples of Anatolia the most numerous at Rhodos were apparently Phrygians, of whom sixteen are recorded[176], contrasted with six Pisidians[177], one Mysian[178], two Paphlagonians[179], three Persians[180], eight Cilicians[181], twelve Lycians[182], four or five Lydians[183], seven Lycaonians[184], and two Armenians[185].

The evidence from Egypt and Syria is most interesting, since it reveals how incomplete the evidence derived from the provenience of Rhodian amphora-handles may be. Thus Alexandria, perhaps the most prolific source of Rhodian amphora-handles[186], was evidently in the closest commercial contact with Rhodes, but the relatively small number of Alexandrians found

in Rhodes -- twenty three[187] -- suggests that day-to-day contacts between the two cities were not as considerable as might be expected. The reverse is shown by the evidence of Antioch and to a less extent, Laodicaea. Tombstones of persons called Ἀντιοχεῖς and Λαοδικεῖς are frequent at Rhodos. It is rarely stated which Antioch or which Laodicaea is meant, and for that reason caution is necessary, but in view of the admitted pre-eminence of the cities of the Syrian Seleucis bearing these names, Antiocheia-on-Orontes, or Antiocheia-by-Daphne, and Laodicaea-ad-Mare, it seems reasonab;e to suppose that the simple mention of the city-name, without any further geographical definition, refers to the Syrian cities of these names. On this assumption, there were sixty-three Antiochenes from Syria living in Rhodos[188], and it may be noted by way of comparison that, on the same assumption,there were two hundred and twenty seven settled in Athens -- the one but highest total[189]. At Rhodes the Antiochenes are the most numerous foreigners, and yet neither archaeology, in the shape of amphora-handles,[190] nor literature records any particular contact between the two cities. The total disappearance of Hellenistic Antioch makes it unlikely that the evidence of the gravestones of Antiochenes in Rhodos will ever receive confirmation from the Syrian city, but that is no reason to doubt that contact between the two cities must have been of the closest, apparently far closer than that between Rhodes and Alexandria. A mention by Malalas of a part of Antioch called ὁ Ῥοδίων may thus refer to a section of the city in which Rhodian merchants once lived[191]. Relations between Rhodes and Laodicaea are testified by refereçe to twenty-eight Laodicaeans in the city[192], a number which indeed is little in excess of the

number of Alexandrians living in Rhodes, but in this instance the difference in size between the two cities must be borne in mind; Alexandria was perhaps the largest city of the Eastern Mediterranean, while there is no indication that Laodicaea was exceptionally large.

Other figures confirm the general impression gained from these salient instances. Few Greeks from Greece proper seem to have settled in Rhodes, in contrast with Athens. In Asia Minor the main sources of foreign population were the great city of Ephesus, the Carian cities such as Halicarnassus, Cnidos and Myndos, and three remoter sources, Selge, Soloi, and Phaselis, none of which is well represented at Athens. Finally, the evidence for Egypt and Syria shows that the bulk of the foreigners from these two regions came from Antioch-on-Orontes which indeed formed the largest single source, Laodicaea and Alexandria, though the representation of the last-named city is perhaps smaller than might be expected from the abundance of Rhodian amphora-handles found there.

The evidence here analysed is one-sided, and in the nature of surviving epigraphical evidence is likely to remain so. Of the great cities of the Greek world only Athens and Rhodes have yielded enough tombstones of foreigners to make statistical computations of any value. We thus cannot say how many Rhodians resided in Ephesus or Alexandria, how many

Athenians in Miletus or Ancyra, and thus to speak of contact between the citizens of any two such cities is perhaps misleading. But within these limits the evidence of tombstones and other documents is of great value, and forms an important and often neglected part of the evidence for the 'Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World'.

Chapter IV

The Constitution of Rhodos.

Epigraphical evidence for the Constitution of Rhodos is far slighter than that which exists for Lindos and Camirus. It consists essentially of the same type of evidence; lists of συναρχίαι and συνιερεῖς, dedications by, and to, important officials, tombstones and honorific decrees in which the dead or honoured man's past offices are recorded in chronological sequence in great detail, and a few decrees. Such evidence, it has been seen, is but a framework, and needs literary evidence to clothe it. For the old cities this liter ry evidence is absent. For Rhodos, as might be expected from the important position the city held in the world, it is quite considerable, and at one stage, when Polybius is describing the proceedings of the Rhodian assembly before and during the Third Macedonian War, enables us to see the various elements of the body-politic in action. Unfortunation these and other passages of ancient writers only illuminate certain aspects of the constitution of Rhodos, notably the powers of the ecclesia and of the chief magistral college, that of the prytaneis, and do not mention such important posts as those held by the stratagoi, the epistatai, and the Hagemones. For these and other less important offices we are dependent on the evidence of inscriptions.

The first office to be considered is the eponymous

priesthood.

(a) The eponymous priesthood of Rhodos.

The eponymous priest of Rhodos was the priest of Halios. Little is known of the early history of the cult of Halios in the island, but that it existed before the synoecism may safely be inferred from Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode, in which the poet recounts the story according to which the island was allotted to Helios, λάχος Ἁλίου [1]. It has been argued that the citizens of the old cities worshipped Helios before the synoecism at a common shrine on the site of the later Rhodos, and that this determined the site of the new city[2]. This is an appealing notion, but there is no evidence to support it (which, perhaps, in the circumstances is not very surprising), and the statement of the scholiast on Pindar's Seventh Olympian, that the ode was written in letters of gold on the front of the temple of Athana Lindia at Lindos, seems to argue against the existence of a common shrine on the site of the later Rhodos, since such a common shrine would naturally enjoy a great prestige and would be a suitable place for recording the praise of Rhodes contained in the poem[3]. In addition, a temple on the site of the future Rhodos would be within the old city-boundaries of Ialysus, and therefore, since Pindar was honouring an Ialysian family, the most suitable place for the ode.

The uncertainty concerning the origins of the worship

of Helios continues to some extent to invest the later history of the cult. Beyond the eponymous function of the priest little is known of it; no material remains identified with the temple survive, and even its site cannot be determined with certainty though it was probably on the lower acropolis-hill, the site of the modern Kastro[4].

In contrast to our ignorance of the cult of Helios our knowledge of the priesthood is in one respect at least considerable. Most of the names of the priests of Helios are known from one of two sources. In the recent war after allied aerial bombardment of Rhodes, a stele was discovered containing the names of the priests of Helios from the first year of the priesthood, that is, presumably, 408/7 or 407/6 down to 368/7 B.C., and again for a period of thirty-four years which cannot be determined but which appear to belong to the early third century. This vital document, as yet unpublished[5], will eventually form the backbone of Rhodian chronology in the same way as the lists of priests of Athana Lindia and the damiourgoi of Camirus, form the backbone of the chronology of those two cities. At present however, so little information from Rhodian sources survives for the fourth century, that the full potentialities of the document cannot be realised. The second source of information regarding the names of the priests are the stamped handles of Rhodian amphorae[6], which are found on almost all excavated sites, and many unexcavated ones, from the Black Sea to Carthage. Of

the two handles of a Rhodian amphora, one normally bore the name of the priest of Halios, the other that of the potter or manufacturer on whose premises the amphora was made, while one or other of the handles also bore the name of the month of the current year[7]. From this source the names of over three hundred priests of Halios survive, and it may be inferred from the fact that none of the priests dated by the stele of the priests to the period 408/7-368/7 B.C. occur on the handles that the latter belong to the period from the middle of the fourth century or later, to the early Imperial period[8]. Since, moreover, it appears unlikely that the large-scale export of Rhodian wine, and other commodities normally shipped in amphorae, continued long into the empire[9], it is probable that we possess on these handles the names of almost all the annual priests of Halios for that period. Thus together with the names on the stele it is probable that the name of almost every priest from the foundation of the city to the early empire is now known. This information is, however, of only limited value, for the reason already stated. There is only the scantiest epigraphical evidence for the priests whose names occur on the handles, and even when they are mentioned in inscriptions, the latter can seldom be accurately dated, while it is usually impossible either from the archaeological context or on historical grounds, to assign a definite date to a particular handle.

The priest of Halios was, it is virtually certain, elected by lot for office[10], and seems to have held office

for a year. This year of office was not related in any way to the 'prytanic year', consisting of two periods of six months, since several inscriptions refer to a single prytanic semester as falling within the years of two different priests[11]. It is thus evident that the entry of the eponym into office fell between the terminal dates of the prytanic semesters, but a more precise date for the entry into office cannot be reached. It is however apparent that the date of the commencement of the eponymous year was changed some time between c.170 B.C. and the Flavianic age, since at the former date the summer semester preceded the winter one, in the eponymous year, while in the latter period the winter semester occupied the first half of the eponymous year[12]. Unfortunately details as to this change are lacking.

The use of the priest of Halios in the dating of documents is straightforward, and the same as that found in the decrees of most Greek cities. His name comes first in a document, followed in state documents by the prytany in office, and by the month[13], in one instance by the name of the Secretary of the Council[14] without the month. In private documents, the name of the priest is followed by the name of the month only[15].

The official known as 'Secretary of the Priest of Halios and of the Hierothutai'[16] is nowhere used as an additional element in the dating of documents, and it appears not unlikely that his duties were connected only with the sacral activities of the Priest of Halios, in his capacity

as president of the college of Hierothytai.

(b) The Rhodian Assembly.

The citizen-body of Rhodos, ἡ μεγάλα πόλις[18], or τὸ ἄστυ[19], was known by various names. Its full title, found in documents of international application such as treaties, and in all documents referring to Rhodes in relation to an external state, community or individual, is either ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Ῥοδίων or simply οἱ Ῥόδιοι[20]. In relation to the three old cities, the Rhodian state and the Rhodian Assembly were known as ~~ὁ δᾶμος~~ ὁ δᾶμος[21] or as ὁ σύμπας δᾶμος[22], a term which was also used in this sense by other cities, for instance Mylasa[23], and Halicarnassus[24]. This latter expression is used in inscriptions, particularly honorific decrees, in explicit contrast to the three old cities, and to the individual πλῆθος, such as τὸ πλῆθος τὸ Λινδίων. The commonest formulae are: εὐνοίας (e.g.) ἕνεκα ἂν ἔχων διατελῇ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ Λινδίων καὶ εἰς τὸν σύμπαντα δᾶμον and ὁ δὲ αἱρεθεὶς ποιησάσθω τὰν αἴτησιν τοῦ στεφάνου καὶ ἀνάθεσιν τᾶν εἰκόνων ἐν τῶι συμπάντωι δάμωι, both of which recur very frequently[25]. In every instance ὁ σύμπας δᾶμος is used of the Rhodian State, embracing the three old cities, and regarded as a single unit, as opposed to the corporate bodies of the old cities. This use of the phrase ὁ σύμπας δᾶμος extends beyond the contrast between the old cities and the new, and is used by demes of the old cities when referring to the sovereign Rhodian

assembly[26].

It is clear that ὁ δῦμος δᾶμος is simply a method of referring to the Rhodian citizen-body in contrast to the communities of the old cities, and would, consequently never be used by a foreign power referring to Rhodes, or in international documents of any sort[27].

The citizen-body of Rhodes in session as a sovereign assembly was called ecclesia, in accordance with an almost universal custom. The most important question, which arises in regard to any sovereign assembly of the ancient world, is 'Who was entitled to sit in it?' The answer to this question is rarely, if ever, apparent from epigraphical evidence, and is usually only to be found in such works as Aristotle's Constitution of Athens. For Rhodes no such information exists. It is possible to argue that admission to the ecclesia extended beyond the damotai, but at present that can be only a conjecture[28].

Information regarding the Rhodian ecclesia comes mostly from Polybius and Cicero, an excellent authority on Rhodian matters, and thus refers to the later Hellenistic period. For the period before the siege of 305/4 there is scarcely any evidence[29]. The only direct evidence referring to the frequency of sessions of the ecclesia is of the imperial period; at this period they were perhaps held once

a month[30], and such a procedure would be normal at an earlier date, and may well have prevailed. The problem is, however, complicated by an inscription of about 170 B.C., that recording honours passed by various Greek cities for Eudemus of Seleucia-on-Calycadnus, the minister of Antiochus Epiphanes[31]. The Rhodian documents on the stone contain reference to two different sessions of the ecclesia separated by a period of months. Of these the first is referred to as ἐπὶ μίαν ἐκκλησίαν and the second as ἐν τᾶι δευτέραι ἐκκλησίαι[32]. These expressions do not apparently refer to a first and second ecclesia existing as two separate bodies within the state, with different conditions of membership, such as existed at Sparta[33] and probably also at Syracuse[34], since firstly, the Greek would then probably be ἁ πρώτα ἐκκλησία [illegible] and ἁ δευτέρα ἐκκλησία [illegible] and secondly there is no suggestion in the decrees passed in the name of the ecclesia, that a single body was not sovereign in the field of legislation. The absence of any adjective with ἐκκλησία also suggests that there is no connection with such bodies as the Athenian κυρία ἐκκλησία[35] and the Argive πλείαι ἐκκλησίαι[36]. The ecclesia is without any explanatory term, and it must therefore be supposed that the phrases refer to sessions of the ecclesia, and presumably successive sessions[37]. If that be correct it appears probable that the ecclesia did not meet

often as every month in the early second century. But the Rhodian documents of this inscription contain so many obscurities that it is wiser to abstain from a definite judgment, based on them alone.

Cicero, speaking of the Rhodian assembly and council of his own day, stated that members of both bodies received payment for their attendance[38]. The payment of the ἐκκλησιαστικὸς μισθός was, as Aristotle noted[39], a characteristic of an extreme democracy. At Athens the payment was authorised finally in 392 B.C., on a motion of Agyrrhius[40], and it seems not impossible that the institution at Rhodes, where the democratic revolution in Athens' favour had occurred only a year or two previously[41], may have been influenced by attempts to pass the measure at Athens. Certainly it may be inferred from Aristotle that Rhodian demagogues before his day had introduced payment for public office[42], though he does not refer this specifically to the ecclesia, and there is no indication that the measure referred to was other than temporary.

The powers of the ecclesia can only be inferred directly from the few surviving decrees.

The most important sphere of authority of the ecclesia was in the field of international relations. Treaties of alliance were valid even if they did not proceed from a formal probouleuma; thus, for instance, the alliance between Rhodes and Hierapytna, of about 200 B.C.[43], the decision to

assist Iasos, if need arose, a year or two earlier[44], and the establishment of friendly relations on a formal basis between Rhodes and Cyzicus[45], all derived from decrees passed by the Damos alone. One other contemporary decree, seemingly of less importance, records both a probouleuma and decision of the assembly in the normal formula ἔδοξε τᾶι βουλᾶι καὶ τῶι δάμωι [46] It is very uncertain what significance is to be attached to the various formulae, and particularly to the presence or absence of the Boula, since it is possible, as the proxeny-decree for Eudamus of Seleucia perhaps suggests[47], that a probouleutic decree might be passed without this being evident in the final decree of the assembly, or at least in its prescript[48].

The authority of the ecclesia in foreign affairs is also indicated by the fact that it was customary for ambassadors from foreign and subject communities to appear before the ecclesia as well as the Boula. In three Rhodian decrees this appearance is expressed by the common phrase, ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰν βουλὰν καὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν [49]. The narrative of Polybius also provides instances of the same practice. The ambassadors of Philip V to Rhodes at the time of his attack on Kios in 202 B.C.[50] and those of Genthius in 168 B.C.[51] appeared before the ecclesia and the Boula.

Most surviving Rhodian decrees bestow elaborate honours on fellow-citizens[52]. These may be authorised either by the Boula alone,[53] by the Damos alone[54], or by the Boula

and Damos together[55]. Such variations in honorific decrees are again common in Athens and elsewhere, and need no emphasis[56]. At Athens certain proxeny and honorific decrees in the prescript to which the Boula alone is named mention a previous decree of the Demos in the body of the decree, and it cannot therefore be inferred from the mention of the Boula alone that the ecclesia was not party to the award at some stage[57]. Nevertheless at Rhodes the honours bestowed by the Boula are often recorded separately, in the honours inscribed on tombstones and in dedications, thus indicating a separate decree and perhaps a separate occasion[58]. The distinction between honours bestowed by the Boula and Damos separately and those bestowed together is not clear, and is a matter of little importance.

In a democratic sovereign assembly, such as that of Athens, motions could be brought forward, through the requisite probouleutic body, by any private citizen, and the ecclesia had the right to unrestricted vote on any such motion. Such also appears to have been the practice at Rhodes. It is clear from Polybius' narrative of Rhodian politics at the time of the Third Macedonian war that there was no restriction on debate, and that motions might be introduced and passed in the face of opposition from the supreme magistrates, the prytaneis[59]. These graphic pages are confirmed by the Rhodian decree for Eudemos of Seleucia, which was introduced by a private citizen[60]. In fact the

only certain instance in which freedom of expression in the ecclesia was suppressed was in 164 B.C., when Astymedes complained in Rome, that as a result of Rome's harsh treatment of Rhodes, the city had lost 'its revenues, its freedom of speech, and political equality'[61].

Apart from the power of decision in foreign affairs the ecclesia was also the elective body of the state. The distribution of election between the vote and the lot is uncertain, but it appears that the vote was more widely used; the use of the lot is expressly testified only of the eponymous priesthood of Halios[62], and of jury-electors[63], and the express statement in these two instances that election was by lot appears to suggest that where there is no specific statement election was not by lot. There are however numerous instances in which officials elected by the damos are sometimes stated to have been so elected[64], and sometimes not; it is therefore difficult to argue from silence, though the impression that the lot was used on a very small scale remains. This is in contrast with the wide use made of the lot in all offices other than those requiring a technical proficiency at Athens and other democracies[65], notably in Tenos[66] which apparently owed much of its constitution to Rhodian models[67].

The evidence regarding the Rhodian ecclesia is clearly not sufficient to form any very definite judgment on it. But it appears in most aspects to resemble the normal

democratic institution of an earlier day, for instance that which existed in Athens in the fourth century. Superficially, that is to say, in Rhodes the ecclesia had all the authority which a fully democratic ecclesia enjoyed. This brings us back to the question asked at the beginning of this section; who was permitted a seat in the ecclesia? Here is the crux of our judgment. Rhodes appears to have been a fully developed democracy. Was it one? Certainly if all δαμόται of the old cities were permitted, regardless of property-qualification, to play a full part in affairs of state, even if, numerically they constituted but a twentieth part of the population, Rhodes must be granted the title of democracy. And if it appears that some who were not members of this core nevertheless received privileges as a result of which they attained office, and their sons acquired deme-membership, and if, as has been suggested, those individuals who appear in surviving records without demotics had admission to the ecclesia, and had the ius suffragii ferendi[68] this too is a mark of a democratic procedure. Undoubtedly, the exercise of democratic practice, in its fullest form, was confined to a small percentage of the population of Rhodes. But in maintaining the exclusiveness of her citizen-body Rhodes was only preserving the old Greek principle, born and matured in far different circumstances, that to be a full member of a community a man must be a citizen ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ξοτοῖν. It is by this standard, which considered the mass of foreigners in the city, as politically irrelevant, that

Rhodes must be judged: and so judged, there is no reason to deny her the claim to be called a democracy.

(c) The Rhodian Boula.

The Rhodian Boula, unlike the Council in most Greek states, held office for six months only. The semestrial term of office was not confined to the Boula, but extended at least to the most important magistracy, the college of the prytaneis and perhaps to others as well. The 'year of office' which may be conveniently called 'the prytanic year' thus differed from the calendar year, and from the year of the eponymous priest. It is fundamental to the Rhodian administration and must be examined in detail.

The origin of the semestrial system is unknown but appears in the post-classical world over a wide area. There are several examples of such a division of the calendar from mainland Greece[69], but it appears with particular frequency in Asia Minor in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Thus it is encountered at Cnidos[70], at Stratoniceia[71], at Tarsus[72], at Antiocheia in Persis[73], at Tyre[74] and at Sidon[75], while in the Aegean it is found at Cos[76] and at Tenos[77]. In most of these instances there is no reason to suppose any connection with the Rhodian use of the semestrial prytanic calendar, but Tenos and Stratonicaea may very well have adopted it in the period of Rhodian domination[78]. It is more immediately relevant to attempt to determine when and why Rhodes introduced this practice, which is certainly very un-Attic.

Unfortunately this cannot be determined; there is no evidence for it in any of the old cities, and no evidence for it from Rhodes earlier than the Hellenistic period. It is thus unlikely that it was borrowed from one of the old cities of Rhodes, but there is no evidence for the Rhodian constitution during most of the fourth century so that the absence of any reference to it before the Hellenistic age is not surprising or significant. Thus it may have been introduced at the time of, or shortly after, the synoecism, though the occasion of the pro-Athenian revolt is not the most likely occasion for the introduction of such an essentially non-Athenian custom. In fact, if its establishment is to be placed so early it seems preferable to place it shortly after the synoecism, when Dorieus and his followers were still in authority[79]. This is supported by the fact that the use of the semestrial prytanic calendar seems to have been more common in Dorian states than elsewhere[80], as were the mastroi, established, probably at the same time, in the old cities of Rhodes.

The prytaneis also served for a semester, and during that time they exercised a permanent presidency of the Boula. Since, moreover, it was an universal custom of Greek democracies that magistrates at the end of their term of office were responsible to the Boula[81], before whom they were required to render an account, and since it is reasonable to suppose that this occurred in the life of each Boula, it is probable that many other magistrates were also in office for

six months. This is perhaps supported by the dedications in honour of individual prytaneis and Secretaries of the Council, by their συνάρχοντες , a term which includes all the important civil posts as well as some military ones. There is no indication that these magistrates held office longer than the prytaneis and the council, and it may perhaps be doubted whether if their term of office was not the same they could be described as belonging to a synarchia.

The Rhodian civil calender consisted of twelve months of thirty days with an intercalary thirteenth month[82]. For the purpose of the prytanic year the twelve months of the eponymous year were divided into two halves, called ἁ θερινὰ ἐξάμηνος and ἁ χειμερινὰ ἐξάμηνος 83.

The winter semester began with Thesmophorios, the month of the autumn equinox, and lasted until Sminthios, while the summer semester began with Artamitios, the month of the spring equinox, and continued until Dalios[84]. It has already been pointed out that the entry into office of the eponym fell in the course of, and not at the beginning of a semester, and that the sequence of the semesters within the eponymous year changed between c.170 B.C. and the Flavianic age[85].

The Boula in office for the semester was called either simply ἁ βουλά [86], or ἁ βουλὰ ἁ βουλεύουσα τὰν θερινὰν (or χαμερινάν or πρώτην or δευτέραν) ἐξάμηνον [87], or ἁ βουλὰ ἁ βουλεύουσα τὰν ἐνεστακυῖαν ἐξάμηνον[88]. Previous Boulái referred to in honorific decrees, are called ἁ βουλὰ ἁ βουλεύσασα, or βεβουλευκυῖα, τὰν θερινὰν (etc.) ἐξάμηνον [89].

Of the number, composition and method of election of the Boula nothing is known, though it seems very probable that membership of it was confined to demesmen, although Cicero's categorical statement, in a discussion of the Rhodian constitution of his day, that the citizens of Rhodes sat alternately in the ecclesia and the Boula might suggest that, if the ecclesia was open to a wider body than the damotai, so also was the Boula[90]. The statement, however is not precise enough to warrant an interpretation which, if correct, would mean that the Boula was not, as we know to have been the case, intimately connected with the higher magistracies such as the Prytaneis, which were normally confined to demesmen[91]. The same author and Dio Chrysostom alike testify that service in the Boula was paid, thus suggest that it was open in principle to those who had little or no resources[92].

Of the two officials connected explicitly by title with the Boula, the first, the Herald[93], needs no comment, since the office explains itself, and is found over a wide area. The other, the Secretary of the Council, is more conveniently considered in connection with the Prytaneis[94].

Many of the functions of the Boula have already been noted in connection with the ecclesia. From Polybius we learn that foreign ambassadors appeared first before the prytaneis, then before the Boula, and then finally before the ecclesia[95]. Communications from foreign powers, and statesmen, such as Marcius Philippus, were made both to the Boula and to the ecclesia[96]. The authority of the Council in military matters

is illustrated by the fact that after the battle of Lade in 201 B.C. the naval commander sent a dispatch to the Boula and prytaneis[97], which was preserved in the prytaneion in the time of Polybius. Similarly during the siege by Demetrius, a sudden crisis in the defence was reported to the Boula[98].

The series of decrees in honour of Eudemus of Seleucia includes one which is a decree of the Boula, appended as a rider to the various decisions of the ecclesia, and there is no indication that the ecclesia was party to this final decree[99]. While the other documents confer, and confirm the conferment of, proxenia upon Eudemus, the decree of the Boula instructs the state couriers who are to visit Antiochus Epiphanes and Eudemus to request the latter to interest himself that the gifts of naval supplies promised by Antiochus to Rhodes should reach the city as quickly as possible[100].

There remains one activity of the Boula, and one which occupied it a great deal, to judge from the numerous references in inscriptions, namely the passage of decrees in honour of distinguished fellow-citizens. Some aspects of this have already been noted in connection with the similar decrees of the ecclesia. Inscriptions, which incidentally provide most of the information regarding the division of the year into semesters, record the award of a golden crown or similar honour, sometimes simply τιμᾶι or ἔπαινος. These honours are often lavishly granted by successive Boulai[101]. Thus one former prytanis who had been on a mission of goodwill

to the Emperior Vespasian, Ἑρμαγόρας Φιλίππου Κλάσιος, is stated to have been crowned ὑπὸ τῶν βουλῶν πλεονάκις χρυσέοις στεφάνοις καὶ ἀνδριάντων καὶ προσώπων ἀργυρέων ἀναθέσεσι [102]. Another individual, more fortunate still, is stated to have been honoured by four different Boulai with a total of five golden crowns, and at least two statues of himself and silver masks, and by two associations of naval crews, with whom he had served, with more than one golden crown, and finally by the mastroi of Ialysus and by another association with other golden crowns[103]. Inscriptions of this type, when recording the different Boulai by which an individual was honoured, usually state precisely the number of times honours were conferred[104]. The different βουλαί are not usually specified in detail if more than two had conferred the honour, though an exception is the inscription mentioned above, which enumerates at length the full titles of four different Boulai[105].

It is needless to emphasise the indication afforded by documents of this type, from Rhodes and every other part of the Greek world, of the declining moral standard of the late Hellenistic, and early Greco-Roman civilisation. But this slightly ridiculous activity, for which the evidence is so abundant, should not blind us to the valuable work done by the Boula, in the days when Rhodes was an independent community with its own foreign policy.

(d) The college of Prytaneis.

Closely linked to the Boula was the college of prytaneis[106], the highest officials of the state. The college consisted according to the evidence of six inscriptions, of five members[107]. One inscription records the names of six prytaneis, but this may be due to the inclusion of the γραμματεὺς τᾶς βουλᾶς [108]. The existence of a college of five πρυτάνεις

as the chief office of state, is surprising since it seems to exclude the possibility of election based ultimately on tribal or deme-organisation, which would yield a college of three or a multiple of three. This, however, is not the only college of five at Rhodes[109], while elsewhere they are quite common[110], perhaps originating in a desire to avoid a deadlock in vote. At Rhodes however this explanation does not cover the instance of the five ὁρκωτάι, appointed under the treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna, to administer oaths, since they were an ad hoc body, without deliberative functions[111]. It is perhaps permissible to suppose that there existed some division of the Rhodian state, of which we are not informed, the basis of which was a division into five.

The nature of the Rhodian prytaneis is not immediately clear. Broadly speaking the term prytanis is applied in Greek constitutions to two types of officials[112]. First there is the type, of which the best known example is the Athenian. In Athens the prytaneis were the body who presided over the Boule, being themselves the Bouleutai of one of the ten tribes, and presiding for a tenth of the conciliar year, known as a prytaneia[113]. The duties of this board were essentially administrative; they interviewed foreign ambassadors, treated with officials of various kind, and were responsible for the general supervision of work destined for the Council.

The second type of prytaneis consists of those who were elected magistrates and not merely a section of the Boule fulfilling a task which fell on all in turn. Prytaneis are found as magistrates, exercising the greatest authority in the state, either as individuals or as members of a supreme college in several cities, as, for instance, at Samos and Iasos[114].

Such magistrates are naturally often found closely associated with the Council, but the point of distinction is that they are elected separately from it, and do not constitute an integral part of it. That this is the category to which the Rhodian prytaneis belong is evident from Polybius' narrative, which shows that the president of the prytaneis was the most powerful figure in the ecclesia and responsible for the shaping of Rhodian foreign policy, often under considerable fire from his opponents[115]. The pryanteis were, in fact, a political force of the first importance during their tenure of office.

This tenure [redacted], like the life of the individual Boula, was of six months, each semester being named after the prytanic college in office, which took its name from its president, thus: πρυτανέων τῶν σὺν Ἀστυμήδει τῶι Ἀρχοκράτεος. The full date of a document is shown by the name of the eponymous priest, followed by the name of the particular prytany, expressed by the name of the president of the college, followed by the calendar month[116]. When the name of the president of the prytany was given there was no need to add ἁ πρώτα or δευτέρα ἐξάμηνος, since the prytany was already identified. Thus the use of ἁ πρώτα [redacted] or ἁ δευτέρα ἐξάμηνος is confined in inscriptions to use either with ἁ βουλά or with πρυτάνιες [redacted] in a general sense[117], as, for example, [τυχᾶι ἀγαθᾶι· οἱ] πρυτάνιες οἱ καὶ ἁρχοντι τὰν [πρώταν ἐξ]άμηνον ἐπὶ ἱ[ερ]έως Ἀριστονίδα καὶ οἱ]δὲι ἔνδεκοι ἐόντες[118].

The existence of a president of the college is testified not only by this method of dating, but also by our literary sources, notably Polybius, who makes it quite clear that the President of the College was pre-eminent in the state. This was due in part to the fact that the

president did not change daily, as did the epistates of an Athenian prytaneia; the prytaneis all remained in office for the same period of six months. He was thus enabled to formulate a continous policy, and to dominate the proceedings in the ecclesia. Polybius shows that the influence of the president of the prytanic college could sway the populace in the face of considerable opposition. This is best seen from the narrative of the period between the Peace of Apamea and the Third Macedonian War. When the Lycian envoys arrived at Rhodes in 187 B.C. Pothion, ὁ πρύτανις τῶν Ῥοδίων, after the Lycian case had been heard, gave an account of the views of both sides before launching into an attack on the Lycians[119]. Again Hagesilochus, chief prytanis of the χειμερινὰ ἐξάμηνος of 172/1, a man of strong pro-Roman sympathies, made use of his position, when it became clear that war between Rome and Macedon was inevitable, to advise the Rhodians to equip forty ships, so that if necessity arose, help could be given to Rome, and on the arrival of the Roman legates he was able to show them the state of Rhodian preparedness. Here clearly Hagesilochus was acting on his own initiative[120]. In the following summer, however, when the feeling of the majority in the ecclesia had veered against Rome, the president of the prytanic council at that time, Stratocles, had considerable difficulty in persuading the Rhodians to dispatch even six ships. In the end he prevailed, but it is clear that he had to rely on his personal authority rather than on any precisely formulated powers[121]. Other examples from the same period also show that the prytanis had great authority, but that at times his policy was liable to be defeated[122].

From the activities of the chief prytanis we pass to those of the college as a whole. For this there is a little evidence, from a Rhodian source, for the time of the siege of Rhodes by Demetrius the

Besieger. At a critical moment in the siege, when it appeared that the harbour was in danger, the prytaneis urged on the citizens to further resistance[123]. Here clearly they were meeting in an emergency, in their capacity as magistrates, and there is no reason to suppose that they had any military authority. The same passage, it is true, describes the death of the chief prytanis in action[124], but the same proviso applies that the circumstances were exceptional. The last passage certainly shows that in a national crisis the prytanis was not excluded from fighting, but nothing more. The epiphany of Athana Lindia at the time of the siege, also refers to the prytanis[124A].

Some of the normal functions of the Rhodian prytaneis are given by Polybius. In 204 or 203 B.C., when Heraclides, the agent of Philip V was sent to Rhodes, it was before the prytaneis that he appeared with his story[125]. He was presumably admitted to the prytaneion as one having important news, since he had no official status, such as was enjoyed by ambassadors. Similarly the man who arrived from Kios while Philip's envoy was telling his tale in the Rhodian ecclesia, with the true story of the sack of the city, appeared before the prytaneis, and his information was brought by a prytanis before the ecclesia assembled in the theatre[126]. On a later occasion, when Perseus' envoys arrived with a communication for the Rhodians, they handed this over to the prytaneis, and it was several days before they were introduced into the ecclesia[127]. Thus although inscriptions only speak of foreign embassies as appearing before the ecclesia and the Boula it is clear that it was customary for them to appear first before the prytaneis. It has already been noted in another context that the prytaneis and the Boula were joint recipients of letters and

dispatches from naval and military commanders. An isolated example survives to show that the duties of the college also included the administration of oaths to foreign ambassadors on the conclusion of alliances, in the presence of the ecclesia[128]. On another occasion ambassadors to go to Rome were elected by the prytaneis though this may have been an exception[129], since otherwise ambassadors appear to have been elected by the ecclesia[130].

The meeting-place of the prytaneis was the prytaneion, and here some members of the college were probably required to be at all times to conduct urgent business[131], just as at Athens some members of the conciliar prytany were always available in the Tholos[132]. The prytaneion housed the state record office, and it was probably here that the so-called δεκτήρια were preserved[133]. The prytaneion played in addition an important role as the centre of civic corporate life. Here was the κοινὴ ἑστία[134], the Common Hearth, at which official welcome was extended to foreigners. Here too were served the free meals at the state's expense, a right to which was one of the honours bestowed by Rhodes, like all other Greek states, on deserving fellow-citizens. This honour, known as σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ[135], and often of a permanent nature, is to be distinguished from the ξένια provided to foreign ambassadors at the κοινὴ ἑστία which was, naturally, an honour confined to one specific occasion[136].

A summary of this rather unsatisfactory evidence indicates as the main features of the prytanic college, that it consisted of five members, of whom one was president, and possessed authority far in excess of the others, and who may be regarded as head of the state during his period of office, in so far as the phrase can apply to any individual within a Greek democratic constitution. The general sphere of competence of the college

was large, and they appear, like the epistatai in the old cities, to have left little room for the activity of other civil magistrates. In particular, In relations with foreign powers, and all that concerned them, ~~in particular~~, they were responsible for all administrative action, though they lacked the power of decision, which was vested in the ecclesia, and do not appear to have enjoyed any particular privileges in regard to the introduction of decrees before that body. Finally, the central position of the college in the state is indicated by the use of the prytany as semestrial eponym.

The three main elements of the Rhodian state were undoubtedly the ecclesia, the Boula, and the college of prytaneis. These three bodies possessed effective civil authority, but to enable them to wield it effectively the assistance of many other officials was necessary. In the closest relation to the central authorities stood the secretary of the Council, the γραμματεὺς βουλῆς. In dedications made by the prytaneis to the gods during, or at the end of, their turn of office, and in other collective dedications by συναρχίαι [137], the names of the prytaneis are commonly followed by that of this γραμματεὺς τῆς βουλῆς [138]. Although he does not appear to have been in title the secretary both of the Boula and of the prytanic college, as his subordinate was undersecretary to both bodies combined, his appearance in the list of magistrates immediately below the prytaneis, and the absence of a particular secretary of the prytaneis suggests that this was in fact the case. Little is known of the duties entailed by this office at Rhodes, but there as elsewhere his main task doubtless lay in the preparation of business for the Council. In addition a document of the reign of the emperor Nero[139], dated by the prytany and the secretary of the Council, instead of by the month, suggests

that at that date his office was of considerable importance. Moreover, his office, like that of the prytaneis is referred to as an ἀρχή [140]. No information survives as to the method of election or tenure of office of these officials. The analogy of Athenian practice suggests that election might have been either from the ecclesia or the Boula, and that tenure of office may have been either the same as that of the Boula, or considerably shorter[141]. In favour of a shorter period is the fact that the Secretary, in the inscription in which he occurs in the prescript, is mentioned in the place of the name of the month, and this perhaps suggests that he held office for that period, the inscription otherwise contains no indication of any period of time shorter than the semester[142].

The undersecretary of the Council and Prytaneis also occurs in the list of magistrates, normally after the secretary and before the stratagoi[143]. He is not mentioned in the prescripts of decrees, and no details of the office survive.

After the undersecretary in the lists of magistrates come the stratagoi. These provide numerous difficult problems to which no satisfactory answers exist. As their name implies their main functions were military, but they occur among the lists of state-officials, and certainly possessed some civil functions, so that they may be conveniently considered at this point.

The number of stratagoi was ten. Of these some are called simply stratagoi, while two others are sometimes described by the explanatory titles, στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, and στρατηγὸς εἰς τὸ πέραν[144] [redacted], akin to the titles familiar from Athenian documents of the fourth century B.C. and later[145]. In one inscription

the names of twelve stratagoi are recorded[146]. No satisfactory explanation of this has been given; it is possible that it represents a later development[147]; it is also possible that the extraordinary stratagoi known as στρατηγοὶ ἐκ πάντων are included here but not elsewhere, but there is no obvious reason why their title should be omitted. It is also possible that the two extra stratagoi are suffect, elected, that is, to fill a vacancy caused by death; but the analogy of other Rhodian suffect offices indicates that offices so held were prefixed by a phrase explaining the nature of the office[148].

Election to the college of stratagoi was undoubtedly at Rhodes, as elsewhere, by vote, and not by lot[149]. The size of the college also suggests that election was not by tribes but on the basis of the same distribution of the people as perhaps underlay the election of the five prytaneis, and other magistracies consisting of five members. What this division was is unknown.

The length of their tenure of office is nowhere stated. The presence of the stratagoi among the magistrates elected on a semestrial basis[150] suggests that the stratagoi were elected for a similar period. It is very improbable that at any period the tenure of a stratagia during war was for six months only, and it is certain that in 200 B.C. it was for a year[151], but it is possible that the office in peace time was held for six months, and was extended, either by separate vote of the people, or by a law of the constitution to a year in war-time. Such a procedure does not seem very economical and it may be argued that there is no reason why officials elected for a year, should not appear among the officials elected for a semester only, since the list of magistrates including στρατηγοὶ is not

headed, as at Tenos, οἱ δὲ ἡγεμὼν τῶν πρατάν ἐξάμηνον[152]. On the other hand the civil functions of the stratagia[153] may have led to its inclusion among the semestrial magistracies in normal circumstances, and that this was so is suggested by the procedure at Tenos, after the Rhodian domination, when the city's constitution was closely modelled on that of Rhodes. In these circumstances the question of the length of the stratagia in peace-time may be left undecided; the yearly tenure in war-time appears certain[154].

The addition to the title, in several instances, of the phrase κατὰ πόλεμον indicates that at Rhodes, as at Athens, certain specific commands were held by individual generals even in peace-time[155]. At Rhodes these were the στρατηγὸς εἰς τὸ (or ἐν τῶι or ἐπὶ τὸ) πέραν, and the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τᾶς χώρας (or τὰν χώραν) the full title of which appears to have been ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τᾶς χώρας τᾶς ἐν τᾶι νάσωι. In addition we hear of an extraordinary stratagos named στρατηγὸς ἐκ πάντων. The region commanded by the στρατηγὸς εἰς τὸ πέραν[156] apparently included all Rhodian territory on the Asiatic Mainland, including Caria and Lycia after the Peace of Apamea[157]. The existence of this official in peace-time indicates that his office was that of a military governor, rather than a general-officer in command of troops in the field, and there seems no reason to doubt that he was Governor-General of the Peraea. There are no traces in Lycia or Caria of any civil officials of equal rank with the stratagos εἰς τὸ πέραν. The significance of the command held by the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τᾶς χώρας τᾶς ἐν τᾶι νάσωι is less evident[158]. The second phrase indicates that the χώρα in question was that of the entire island, excluding Rhodos[159]. The stratagos, then, was probably in command of the defence of the island in the event of attack, as the

strategoi ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας at Athens were responsible for the defence of Attica in the event of invasion[160]. But the possibility also exists that, as has been suggested for other strategoi ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας elsewhere, particularly in cities of Asia Minor in the Roman period[161], the office was rather in the nature of a police post, analogous to that of the chorophylakes in Greece today. There seems no reason, however, to separate the two functions of responsibility for internal and external security so sharply, and it may be supposed that all questions of security lay within the scope of the same stratagos, though limitations on his authority in internal matters will doubtless have existed within the boundaries of the old cities.

These two stratagoi were presumably regular appointments. In contrast to them is the stratagos ἐκ πάντων[162]. Titles analogous to this are found elsewhere in the Greek world[163], but analogy cannot take the place of direct evidence as to the nature of this office, and that direct evidence does not exist. It is therefore by no means certain either what the duties of this official were, or what is meant by the phrase ἐκ πάντων. It seems likely that the latter refers to the method of election of the magistrate in question, meaning ἐκ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν[164]. This would be supported by the general definition of election to military command at Athens given by Aristotle, namely that it is ἐξ ἁπάντων[165]. This interpretation raises the problem as to the method of election of the other stratagoi. If election to this στρατηγία alone was made ἐκ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, from whom were the ordinary stratagoi elected? Since it is hardly possible that they should have been elected from anything less than the totality of the demesmen of the three old cities (this, of course, is independent of the question of the method of their election) it

follows that stratagoi could also be elected from an even larger population group, namely, in addition to the demesmen, the citizens of Rhodos only, the possessors of limited franchise[166]. That such an extension of the basis of election was not confined to elections made during war-time, is shown the addition of the phrase ἐν πολέμωι after the title στρατηγὸς ἐκ πάντων in one, but only one, instance[167]; that it was more normal in time of war seems probable. The extension of the office to this wider body, suggests that normal junior military commands were also accessible to it, since otherwise members of it would not have possessed the experience which made their election as στρατηγοὶ ἐκ πάντων desirable. It is however to be noted that all known στρατηγοὶ ἐκ πάντων are, with one possible exception, in fact full Rhodian citizens[168], while one Ῥόδιος is stated to have been στρατηγός, and not στρατηγὸς ἐκ πάντων.

Of the civil functions of the stratagoi little is known. In Imperial times at least, they were responsible for the erection of statues in public places[169] a duty which rested with stratagoi elsewhere even in the Hellenistic age, for instance at Aegina[170], and therefore perhaps also at Rhodes at that time.

We may summarise our knowledge of the Rhodian stratagoi by saying that they normally formed a college of ten, of whom two occupied special posts, the stratagia of the Peraea, and the stratagia of the Island. The method of election to this office is not recorded, but it was presumably by vote. The office may have been held only for six months in peace-time; in war-time it certainly lasted a year. In addition to this college of stratagoi, the constitution also provided for the election of special stratagoi -- perhaps one, perhaps more on each occasion -- either in peace or in war. These were apparently elected from a larger population-group than that normally eligible for election to the college of stratagoi, though

no certainty is possible, and the few στρατηγοὶ ἐκ πάντων whose names have survived were in fact all δαμόται .

Closely connected with the stratagoi were the ἀγεμόνες . These formed a college of three members[171]. The full title used of these officials in honorific decrees, αἱρεθεὶς ἀγορᾶν [172], indicates that they were elected by the ecclesia, though whether by this we are to understand the larger population-group which voted in the election of the stratagoi ἐκ πάντων , or only the demesmen is not clear.

The tenure of office of the hagemonia was doubtless normally of the same length as the stratagia, that is, probably six months in peace-time, and a year, with possible extensions, in war-time[173]. One inscription, however, indicates that the office might be held for a shorter period. It is a dedication in honour of a magistrate, whose name and office are alike missing, but who was probably a stratagos, by his fellow-magistrates, and by numerous Rhodian associations of the most varied types. Included among the magistrates are οἱ ἀγεμόνες οἱ πέντε μῆνας συνάρξαντες and οἱ ἀγεμόνες οἱ μῆνα συνάρξαντες[174]. It is noticeable that the combined life of the two colleges of hagemones is six months, probably the tenure of office of the stratagos being honoured, but it is not clear why there should be two separate colleges. The second college, οἱ ἀγεμόνες οἱ μῆνα συνάρξαντες , cannot have been elected as suffect to take the place of the previous college, all the members of which had died, since the first college is represented in the dedication as well. The circumstances of this particular dedication are, however, unknown, and since neither of the phrases are parallelled no conclusions can safely be drawn from the inscription.

Hagemones were the rank immediately below that of the stratagoi

in most Hellenistic armies, and at Rhodes they also occupied this position[175]. The magistrates must however be distinguished from the ordinary subordinate military commanders who bore the same title but were not magistrates. The college of three magistrates here in question consisted of administrative officials, with command over the individual areas included in the larger commands of the stratagoi. In the Peraea three hagemones were in charge of Lycia, and Caria[176] and the city of Caunus[177] respectively, all responsible to the stratagos εἰς τὸ πέραν [178], while on the island it appears that each of the three old cities and their territories were controlled by a hagemon, responsible to the stratagos ἐπὶ τᾶς χώρας, though these ἀγεμόνες do not occur in the συναγωγή, and thus represent a transition between the magistrate and the normal military ἀγεμών. One official who was a leading figure in the state at the time of the Mithridatic War, served, apparently at an early stage in his career, as ἀγεμὼν ἄμισθος ἐπὶ τᾶς [χώ]ρας τᾶς Λινδίας [179].

Though no reference has survived to a similar official in Camiran or Ialysian territory, it seems very probable that such existed in each of the three city-territories. It is not altogether clear what duties these officials carried out, and a similar difficulty exists in determining the tasks of their subordinate officers, the epistatai. The latter seem to have commanded troops under command of the central government within the old cities themselves[180], and it is probable that the Hagemones commanded not only these officials and the garrisons but also similar detachments in the countryside, living in peripolia, the existence of which is testified from several documents[181]. But the more important question, whether these various military officers appointed by Rhodos to the territories of the old cities possessed any authority in civil matters over the inhabitants of the

areas in question cannot be answered.

Two officials of the rank of hagemon are the ἀγεμὼν τῶν ἀγεμόνων referred to once[182], and the ἀγεμὼν ἄμισθος, who occurs twice[183]. The former post, apparently one of considerable seniority, may have been either a military command in the field, in which case no doubt the acted as the spokesman of the other hagemones in councils-of-war, and on similar occasions, or may have been the presidency of the board of three military magistrates. The latter is perhaps more probable since in the detailed dedication which survives, made by a general and his hagemones[184], there is no mention of a ἀγεμὼν τῶν ἀγεμόνων. If however this official was president of the board of three or six ἀγεμόνες he was evidently chosen from among them, since the lists of magistrates which record the hagemones do not include a ἀγεμὼν τῶν ἀγεμόνων either. This is in itself a difficulty, since if one hagemon was responsible for certain duties within the territory of each of the old cities, there would not be a spare official to act as president of the college. This may perhaps be explained on the hypothesis that the hagemones did not themselves reside within the territory of the old cities, but sat as a board in Rhodos, issuing instructions which were put into effect by the epistatai in the cities -- but that must remain a hypothesis[185].

The other official is the ἀγεμὼν ἄμισθος. The same qualification is also found attached to the subordinate rank of epistatas, and in each office no doubt the significance of the word is the same. The terms appear throughout the Hellenistic and early Roman periods, and cannot be interpreted as belonging to a brief period when all magistracies were made ἄμισθοι ἀεχαί, as in Athens in 411 B.C.[186] Nor can it be supposed that the holder of such an office was serving as a volunteer, since

the epistatas at least is stated to have been elected to this post by the people. The explanation most consonant with the phrase ἐπιστάτας αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δάμου [187] is that the official so named, after election, volunteered, or agreed to go without his pay, as a mark of patriotism. This is supported by the Lindian decree of A.D. 22/3, concerned with the restoration of the worship of Athana Lindia; here one of the methods envisaged for raising money, is to ask candidates for office if they will serve as Hierthytai without pay, δωρεάν [188]. It is therefore possible that this procedure was a recognised method of assisting the city or state in hard times, or at any time, if one was anxious to increase one's reputation, and that the fact was recorded for this reason on tombstones, and in dedications and honorific decrees.

Below the hagemones in rank come the epistatai, much of our knowledge of whom comes from the Peraea. This military office must be distinguished from that of the epistatai of the old cities, and from that of civil epistatai, also Rhodian magistrates. Military, or semi-military epistatai, who acted as garrison commanders, or phrourarchoi, with a varying amount of civil control, are among the most familiar magistrates of the Hellenistic world. They played an important part in the relation of sovereign and city particularly in the Antigonid and Seleucid kingdoms[189]. In the kingdoms they were probably appointed individually by the sovereign as the occasion demanded, without any regular limitation of tenure of the office. At Rhodes, the functions of the epistatai were essentially the same, and perhaps modelled on the epistatai of the kingdoms. Their method of election was, as might be expected, different. They were elected by the ecclesia[190] no doubt in the same way as the stratagoi, and the hagemones.

The epistatai do not however appear in the lists of συναγόντες , and this suggests that their tenure of office was longer than that of the ordinary magistrate[190A]; this, if true, would be perfectly natural, since their duties as governors and garrison-commanders, at times on the outskirts of Rhodian territory in eastern Lycia, or northern Caria, would have made a semestrial appointment a very uneconomical procedure.

The number of epistatai must have differed at various times according to the extent of Rhodian territory, but regardless of their number they fall into two main classes, those whose field of activity lay in the Peraea[191], and those who appear within the island at Lindos[192]. In both the Lindian and Peraean inscriptions the epistatai sometimes appear singly, sometimes as a pair. The office could evidently be increased to suit the requirements of the particular post.

The presence of Rhodian epistatai at Lindos is surprising. Thoughout the Hellenistic kingdoms, and in Rhodes itself, apart from at Lindos, epistatai were established in cities which were subordinate to the central authority, and not an integral part of it. Lindos, however, was an integral part of the Rhodian state, and the Lindians were the core of the citizen-body of Rhodos. Why then should it be necessary to establish epistatas there, as if it was conquered or subject territory? The same question applies to a lesser extent to the existence of Hagemones commanding the territory of the cities.

It is at least clear that the appointment of epistatai and Hagemones by the assembly cannot be interpreted as an act of hostility by the central authority to its subordinate parts, since the Lindians will themselves have played a part in the election of these officials, and perhaps secured the election of the epistatas whom they wished to come to them.

Most indeed of the epistatai who are known to have been at Lindos were Lindians themselves[193]. It follows also from the fact that the epistatai were elected by a body of which the Lindians were themselves part that the epistatai can have had little or no uncontrolled authority over the lives of Lindian citizens; that they were, in fact, like the Hagemones, simply Rhodian troop-commanders established for the defence of the communities outside Rhodos, to give strength to any local defence-units there may have been. In this respect it is interesting to note that the numerous dedications made by Rhodian ἐπιστάται do not appear to begin until about 200 B.C.[194], and it therefore seems not impossible that the exceedingly troublous years at the end of the third century B.C., when Rhodes was engaged in wars against pirates whose method of attack was to raid undefended points of the coast and carry off human beings and livestock[195], saw the first establishment of this office, which was subsequently maintained as a necessary precaution against piratical depredations[196].

If this explanation of the duties of the Rhodian epistatai at Lindos be correct it will be evident that they differed fundamentally from the epistatai established by Rhodes in their conquered territory.

The epistatai appear in two different types of Lindian inscriptions: first, in dedications made by themselves and the troops under their command, τοὶ συστρατευόμενοι, to Athana Lindia and other Lindian deities[197]; and secondly, in lists of συνέχοντες making a dedication in honour of the eponymous priest of Athana Lindia: in these documents their names appear at the end of the list of syniereis[198]. The usual form of the dedication made by the epistatas is: ἐπ' ἱερέως τᾶς Ἀθανείας τοῦ δεῖνος τοῦ δεῖνος, ὁ δεῖνα τοῦ δεῖνος ἐπιστατήσας ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συνστρατευομένων. The presence almost without exception[199] in these dedications of τοὶ συνστρατευόμενοι

shows unmistakeably the military nature of the command held by the epistatas. Less easy to grasp is the significance of the second class of inscription, those on which the names of the epistatai concur at the end of the lists of Lindian syniereis. Their names clearly do not present an imprimatur authorising the dedication, since it is not probable that a military commander had any authority in the religious administration of the old cities. Further, the fact that the epistatai do not occur in every such list[200] suggests that their appearance was voluntary. It may therefore be suggested that the epistatai participated when they felt so inclined, to show their interest, as representative of Rhodes in the affairs of the old cities, in much the same way as commanding officers in garrison towns now subscribe to local charities.

Notwithstanding the absence of dedications by Rhodian epistatai at Camirus, there are other signs that their use in incorporated territory was not confined to Lindos. Thus at Camirus we hear of ὁ ἐπιστάτας τοῦ περιπολίου[201], while at Carpathus, also an integral part of Rhodian territory, we hear of an epistatas, elected ἐπὶ δύο ἔτη[202], who is praised for his organisation of the defence of the island on the occasion of a raid by some unnamed enemy.

These epistatai, whose sphere of action was limited to a section of the old cities, had clearly little in common with the epistatai who administered and guarded Rhodian possessions in Caria and Lycia. Distinct from both these types is the epistatas, appointed as a magistrate for a single occasion, to act as arbitrator or for some similar purpose. When requested to arbitrate by another power, their position is

superficially very similar to the Rhodian judges, δικασταί , active in the eastern Mediterranean in the Hellenistic period[203]. A distinction must however be made: the dikastai were required to give a legal judgment based on the interpretation of evidence relating to a dispute at law, while the epistatas who intervened, or was invited to intervene, acted in accordance with the interests of Rhodes -- he was in fact a political, and not a judicial, official. This is quite evident from the only certain example of the activity of this type of epistatas. This is an inscription from Syros[204] The people of that city had requested the Rhodians to send an epistatas. In answer to this appeal the Rhodians sent a certain Ochidas whose activity is described in the following words[205]: πᾶσαν ἐ]ποιήσατο σπουδὴν καὶ [ἐπεμέλεσαν, ὅπως διαλύσας πάν]τα καὶ συναγαγὼν [πάντας τοὺς διαφερομένους] τά τε ἀρχεῖα κατασ[τησάμενος, ὅπως διαμένη ἐν τῆι κ]ρατί[στηι κα[τ]α[στάσει - - -] It is not apparent whether Syros was free to choose the epistatas from wherever she liked, or whether she was acting under compulsion from Rhodes, but the activity of the Rhodian epistatas is described in a manner which leaves no room for doubt: 'he arranged the constitution in such a way that it might remain in the best condition'; this clearly means that he ordered it in a manner favourable to Rhodes. It thus appears that Syros at this time, voluntarily or otherwise recognised the authority of Rhodes. The date of the inscription is uncertain, but the script suggests a date not far removed from 200 B.C., and it is thus possible that the activity of the Rhodian epistatas was connected with the incorporation of Syros in the Rhodian Nesiotic League about that date[206]. Be that as it may, it is quite clear from a passage of Polybius that Rhodes on the acquisition of Lycia and Caria sent out officials re-organise the life of these regions in a manner favourable to her, and here again it is legitimate to see the

epistatas - extraordinary at work[207].

There appear, then, to have been three clearly defined types of epistatai at Rhodes; first the garrison-commander and political Resident whose area of activity is Rhodian territory in Asia Minor, both subject and, apparently, incorporated[208]: this epistatas appears to have adhered closely to the type of epistatai found in the Seleucid administration. Secondly the epistatai found seemingly as garrison-commanders, in the old cities of the island, where their presence cannot have constituted a diminution of sovereignty, and where their task probably was simply to safeguard exposed areas from piratical incursions and the like: they were probably subordinate to the Hagemones, and eventually to the Stratagos. Finally, the third type of epistatas appears to have been a specially appointed magistrate whose duty was the establishment of order, in accordance with Rhodian wishes, in newly-conquered or subject communities. There is no evidence for any other activities of this individual.

These three groups of officials, the stratagoi, the hagemones, and the epistatai together with the civil magistracies already discussed, formed the main administrative bodies of the state, and compared with them the rest are, at least to us, very shadowy figures.

The most prominent of the remainder are the ταμίαι, who are recorded after the stratagoi in the list of magistrates[209]. The normal size of the college of tamiai was seven, excluding a secretary[210]. The basis of election in this instances defies elucidation, since the number neither corresponds to any known division of the Rhodian people, nor is it parallelled at Rhodes in any other college. Election to the office, was presumably by vote. The activities of the tamiai, the state-

treasurers, were much the same in any Greek city[211], and thus, although little material evidence survives from Rhodes, their place in the constitution is self-evident[212].

Next on the list comes the college of ἐπίσκοποι, with their secretary. This college consisted at one time of five members, excluding the secretary[213], and was therefore presumably elected on the same basis as the prytaneis[214]. At a later date, though perhaps only temporarily, the college consisted of only three members[215]. The function of this college cannot be determined from the very general title born by the members. The Episkopoi were probably civil and not military officials, since they are never mentioned in any of the inscriptions which record the stages of a military career, nor does the office ever appear in dedications along with epistatai, hagemones or stratagoi. On the other hand the duties of episkopoi within the civil sphere in antiquity are so varied in different states that their functions cannot be determined from analogy[216].

The episkopoi are followed by five ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν ξένων, an office election to which was by vote[217]. The best illustration of this office is provided by an inscription from Amyclae[218], which speaks of an ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν Μεσσηνίων καὶ Ἀργείων καὶ Παιδρείων καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ Σικυωνίων καὶ Ἐφ---, καὶ Μεγαλοπολειτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων οἱ κατοικοῦντες καὶ παρεπιδημοῦντες.

Thus at Amyclae there was a single magistrate whose duty was the supervision of τοὺς ξένους from all over the Peloponnese if not further afield, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the epimeletai at Rhodes were charged with the supervision of all foreigners at Rhodes. The nature of the supervision, and the precise classes of foreigners over whom it was exercised are alike uncertain. It is possible that the ξένοι included all

foreign residents on the island, whether permanent or temporary, as at Amyclae, and that the college exercised the functions now exercised by the police over foreign nationals; for example all foreigners may have had to register with, and report periodically to, the epimeletai, each one of whom may have been responsible for the foreigners from one area. This is however purely hypothetical, and the duties of the board cannot be determined. There is certainly no reason to suppose that the epimeletai were judicial authorities[219] like the ξενοδίκαι mentioned in the fifth century treaty between Chaleon and Oianthea[220], and the ξενοκρίται known from an inscription of the Imperial period, from the neighbourhood of Patara[221], since there is no indication of the existence of a ξενικὸν δικαστήριον at Rhodes, and in any case the title, ἐπιμελητής, strongly suggests a general supervision, rather than a specific juridical function.

In the completest list of Rhodian magistrates, the ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν ξένων are followed by the hagemones of Caunus, Caria and Lycia, and after them the list ends. Other documents reveal, however, the names of other magistrates. A dedication made probably in the second half of the second century B.C. to the gods by the magistrates of the first semester contains several fresh titles.[222] After the episkopoi are mentioned the liturgical magistracies such as the agonothetai and the gymnasiarchai and these are followed by other regular magistracies.

First come the ἀστυνόμοι. The size of the college is not known from direct evidence, but the existence of a college of three at Tenos suggests that a similar number may have existed at Rhodes[223]. From the context in which the magistracy is recorded in individual careers, in one instance after that of κλαρωτὰς δικαστῶν and before that of ἐπιστάτης πύλων and ἀγωνοθέτης [224], it may be inferred that it was not

of great importance. The normal function of astynomoi in Greek cities was that of police officials concerned with the maintenance of public order, and the good appearance of the city, particularly on the occasion of religious festivals[225]. In Rhodes the same duties were doubtless carried out by the astynomoi. In addition they seem to have been responsible for seeing that decrees and other public documents were properly engraved, and for the erection of the stele bearing the documents in a place authorised by the ecclesia[226].

The astynomoi are followed by the ἀγορανόμοι[227]. Here again there is no direct evidence as to the number of the college. The existence of a college of three in the Carian κοινὸν τῶν Τρεμιανῶν, which was at one stage under Rhodian control[228], is hardly sufficient evidence to infer that there were also three at Rhodes, since the koinon had a considerable history before it became Rhodian[229], and therefore, if the number of agoranomoi was based on any model, it need not have been that of Rhodes. It is recorded that at Rhodes, as at Athens, the agoranomoi conducted their business in a building called the agoranomion, in front of which decrees bearing on state-purchases, for example of oil, were erected[230]. Thus at Rhodes, as elsewhere, the duties of the office will have been primarily in the control and supervision of markets and market-prices.

The functions of the agoranomoi are to be distinguished from those of the ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἐπιμεληταί who follow them on the list[231]. At Athens the ἐμπορίου ἐπιμεληταί, a college of ten officials, supervised the import and distribution of such vital commodities as corn[232]. At Rhodes where the import of corn and its distribution was no less important than at Athens, the existence of a special college is natural. The size of the college is

unknown.

Also concerned with the corn-supply were the σιτοφύλακες mentioned in the same inscription[233], and the σιτῶναι. The distinction between these various offices can only be inferred from the analogy of Athens. There the sitophylakes were concerned not with general control of imports, but simply with the enforcement of price regulations for the sale of σῖτος in the agora[234]. The sitonai, familiar officials of the Hellenistic world, and particularly at Delos, where many foreigners held the post[235], were strictly purveyors of corn, acting as middlemen for governments wishing to purchase corn in bulk. The title is, however, used at an even earlier date in Athens in the fourth century, when it refers to extraordinary officials appointed by the state to buy corn on the open market on the state's behalf, in times of famine[236]. The Rhodian sitonai are evidently akin to these Athenian magistrates, and to be distinguished from the international corn purchasers. There is no evidence for the existence of sitonai at Rhodes before the third century after Christ[237], and it is possible that the responsibility for the purchase of corn rested with the ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀγορανόμοι until that date.

The four magistracies here noted, the agoranomoi, the ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἐπιμεληταί, the sitphylakes and the sitonai belong to a category of their own, in that their field of activity was limited to the economic life of the city, and it is clear from the position in which they occur in the list that the office carried with it little prestige, in spite of the very considerable practical importance of the post. The high repute in which Rhodian commercial power was held throughout the Hellenistic world must have been due to small degree to the honesty and impartiality of these officials.

Also mentioned in the same inscription are the ἐπιστάται τῶν παίδων [238]

The size of this college is unknown. Parallels to it are frequent, but the precise duties of the office is in each instance unexplained[239]. Since at Rhodes and elsewhere the post was a magistracy, it doubtless included a supervision over a wider field than education.

The last name recorded in the inscription is that of the κῆρυξ βουλᾶς, an office which has already been noted[240].

All these posts from the prytaneis down to the humblest agoranomos or sitophylax were regular magistracies of the state, tenure of which constituted a title to a place among the synarchontes. There are, in addition, several offices, holders of which were apparently not entitled to be included in the συναρχίαι. Of such minor posts the first to be noted is the board of πωληταί. These are mentioned twice in connection with the payment of stelai bearing state-decrees[241]. Their task was apparently that of buyers or contractors on behalf of the state for the λίθος λεύκιος required for the inscription. The procedure seems to have been that the amount to be expended was decided in advance by the ecclesia, the poletai paid for the stone, and the tamiai paid for the engraving of the decree[242]. Probably, in addition, at Rhodes as at Athens, the poletai were responsible for payment on the state's behalf for all public works[243]. Another official, the δεκάπεντε, also had some responsibility for the preparation of the stone: he apparently drew up the contract on the authority of which the poletai made the expenditure[244].

Some other minor offices occur only in inscriptions of the second and third centuries A.D., though this may be fortuitous. Such is the antitamieus, that is, presumably, a tamias elected over and above the original number to take the place of a deceased member of the College[245].

The use of the preposition ἀντι- as a prefix to a Greek office, distinct the regular use of ἀνθύπατος, ἀντιστρατηγός and ἀντιταμίας in the Greek reddering of Roman promagistrates is sufficiently rare to merit attention; it is parallelled by the form ἀντέχων found as a Greek title at Athens[246], Sardis and elsewhere in the Roman period[247], and probably by the ἀντεχιερεύς [redacted] [248]. Another office known only from a late period is that of θεσμοφύλαξ, recorded only once[249]. In this instance it seems very probable that the office existed at a far earlier date. The usual function of this official seems to have been judicial, it being his duty to see that sentences imposed by the courts were effectively carried out[250]. Another inscription mentions a χρεοφύλαξ [251]. Officials of this name occur frequently in Greek cities, particularly of the Aegean islands, and in Asia Minor, from the fourth century B.C.[252] They acted as guardians of legal documents entailing exchanges of money, and thus constituted, as it were, a sort of state guarantee that the terms of the agreement would be carried out faithfully by both sides[253]. Here again it would be surprising if such an official had not existed at Rhodes long before the earliest surviving testimony[254].

A single late inscription also mentions a λιμενάρχης [255]. This title does not occur elsewhere in the Greek world until the Roman age[256]. It therefore does not seem likely that it was employed in the Hellenistic period in Rhodes, although no other title referring to the control of harbours -- regarding access to which the Rhodians took ample security measures[257] -- seems to have survived.

Mentioned in the same inscription as the limenarches is the ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν δημοσίων ἔργων, 'overseer of public works'[258]. This office, or one very like it, became exceedingly common in the Greek cities of Anatolia in the

time of the Roman empire[259]. Here again there is no certain instance of the office at an earlier date.

All these offices, of which the only testimony is late, indicate how Rhodes gradually came to resemble more and more the common run of Greek cities under Roman sway, by the accumulation of petty offices.

In a rather different category come the γραμματεῖς δημόσιοι, who served in the state offices as scribes[260]. The damosioi were in the first instance of slave origin, and the post continued to be held by slaves, though it was also open to partial citizens, presumably those of very humble degree[261]. The number of these public servants at Rhodes is unknown but they were sufficiently numerous to form a κοινὸν τῶν Δημοσιαβυριαστῶν τῶν Ῥοδίων δούλων[262]. At Cibyra in the Roman period there were probably several hundred such demosioi[263], and in a town as important as Rhodes there are hardly likely to have been less. In Greek states the demosioi were employed in numerous ways, for instance in the police, as wardens of state armouries, and as gymnasium-keepers, and sometimes were even responsible for the education of the young[264].

These magistracies form a transition to those offices which though sometimes included in the synarchia, differed from normal magistracies. These are the offices which were usually regarded by the Greeks as liturgies, that is, offices either for the tenure of which the individual was required to make a payment in advance, or which he was required to hold without payment, and which at the same time involved him in considerable expense. The liturgic system, so widely developed in such different centres of political life, as fifth and fourth century Athens, and Ptolemaic Egypt, played only a minor role at Rhodes, at least before the late Empire. The liturgies appear to have been in all four, the trierarchia, which is discussed

in connection with the Rhodian navy, the choragia, the agonothesia, and the gymnasiarchia, but of these all except the choragia were reckoned as magistracies. The choragia and the agonothesia have in common that they were both concerned with religious occasions, namely theatrical performances and public games. At Rhodes the choragos was chosen from among the wealthier sections of the population, citizen and foreigner, and might perform the liturgy on several occasions[265]. His functions doubtless did not differ from that of other choragoi; that is, he would be required to produce at his own expense a dramatic performance for one of the festal occasions of the city.

The agonothetes occurs in numerous inscriptions from Rhodos, and from the old cities[266]. In the latter documents it is not always easy to determine whether the magistracy was held in the old city or in Rhodos, but there are however numerous instances in which no doubt exists. In the old cities the post, even if carrying with it the burden of a liturgy, was certainly regarded as a magistracy, which entitled the holder to a place among the religious officials of the town[267]. At Rhodes, on the other hand, the status of the office seems to have been more vague. While the agonothetes is not found among the lists of the synarchontes which form the major source of our knowledge of the Hellenistic magistracies[268], one does appear expressly included under the title synarchontes, in the contemporary subsidiary list, already referred to as containing numerous minor offices not recorded in the other lists[269]. The agonothesia would thus appear to be a minor magistracy, and not, like the choragia, a liturgy which did not carry magisterial rank.

The gymnasiarchoi served on a tribal basis, one such official acting in this capacity for his tribe, a representative of which he was required to

equip at his own expense for the gymnasial contests[270]. The office was thus esentially a liturgy, though the important part if played in the Rhodian state, and the predominant position occupied by the office in records of public careers, suggest that it was regarded as an arche, entitling to member of the synarchia.

There existed three different types of gymnasiarchia at Rhodes at the same time. Thus it is recorded of one individual that he was 'gymnasiarch of the tribe, and victorious at the Poseidonia, the Romaia, and the Halieia, and gymnasiarch neoteros', and at a later stage in his career 'gymnasiarch presbuteros'[271]. It is not clear whether the 'gymnasiarch of the tribe' is to be regarded as superior to the two other gymnasiarchs, or the reverse[272]. It at least appears probable that in some way the burdens of the office were distributed among several persons, possibly because the gymnasium at Rhodes occupied, in the absence of the ephebic institution[273], a major role in the training of youths in the city. This importance is reflected in the fact that at a later date the office appears to have enjoyed some eponymity within the state[274], though there is no reason to suppose that the gymnasiarch supplanted the priest of Halios as the city's official eponym[275].

These liturgical magistracies, in part associated with the religious life of the city, lead to the consideration of those magistracies which had a purely religious function. Our information regarding these is far slighter for Rhodos than for the other cities. This is principally because while the lists of magistrates and priests in the old cities included both synarchontes and syniereis, at Rhodos, as a sovereign community the two aspects of administration remained separate, and the two categories of

magistratessdo not appear together. While there exist lists of synarchontes which form the basis of our knowledge of the Rhodian civil magistracies, there are no such lists surviving for the religious magistracies[276]. Our knowledge of the offices is thus derived from the tombstones, and lists of offices held by officials, from which the totality of offices obviously cannot be determined, since no individual is likely to have held all religious offices within the state.

The most important of the religious offices of state, the eponymous priesthood of Halios, has already been discussed[277]. Next in importance appears to have been the προφάτας[278], who was responsible for the oracle attached to the temple of Apollo Pythios on the upper Acropolis[279]. This office does not appear before the late Hellenistic period, when it may be conjectured that the oracle was either first established or else enjoyed a renaissance[280].

Two inscriptions[281] refer to a college of Hierothytai, in one instance consisting of four, in the other five, members - a complication characteristic of Rhodian colleges. They were closely associated with the eponymous priest, as is shown by the fact that they shared a secretary[282]. The function of this college has been discussed in connection with the college of the same name at Lindos[283].

Another inscription refers to three ἱεροποιοί[284]. Their full title is given as ἀιρεθέντες ἱεροποιο[ι] ὑπὸ τοῦ συνπολιτ[ικοῦ] δήμου . They are recorded as making a dedication to Poteidan Porthmios on Carpathos, and two of the three are from a deme within the island of Carpathos[285]. It thus appears as if the office was closely connected with Carpathos, but the addition of the phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ συμπολιτικοῦ δήμου does not permit

us to suppose that it was a purely local office[286], while the dedication to Poteidan Parthmios may be adequately explained by the fact that two of the three were Carpathians, rather than by the supposition that the office was particularly connected with that deity. The ἱεροποιοί do not appear in many Greek cities, and their particular duties are nowhere defined[287]. The title suggests that in individual cults they were responsible for producing sacrifices at the right time in the ritual. Their duties as a magistracy may have entailed the general supervision of sacrifices, though if so they can have differed little from those of the Hierothytai. Mention may also be made here of the δεκαθαυροί [288], who represented the state on official visits to the shrines of foreign gods, though such persons had no religious arche, or sphere of authority to which they were elected by the state, and cannot therefore be considered as magistrates.

Conclusions.

It is hardly possible to form a judgment regarding the spirit which informed the Rhodian constitution in all its aspects; most of the evidence concerns not the working of the constitution but the magistracies themselves, and even the evidence for them consists mostly of lists of offices, with no indication either of the nature of the office, which cannot always be deduced from the title (though it may sometimes be inferred from analogy), or of the method in which it was exercised. Thus conclusions about the constitution must be largely hypothetical, and it is to be hoped of a temporary nature. There are however two fields in which some conclusions may be hasarded, namely in respect of the popular assembly, and of one or two major magistracies.

The writers of later antiquity, Polybius, Diodorus and Strabo,

drawing in varying degrees on Rhodian writers, were at pains to transmit to posterity a picture of the Rhodian politeia, in which it appeared as a democracy of the Athenian type, with ecclesia-rule, and popularly elected magistracies. Rhodes appears by implication, though not expressly, in their pages as the heir of Athenian democratic greatness. The evidence examined in this chapter suggests that significant modifications of this judgment are necessary. Both as a democracy, and as an Imperial power, Rhodes had absorbed lessons of the contemporary world, while retaining some of the old democratic principles of government.

There is enough in the pages of Polybius to show that in the ecclesia, the citizen-body in session, affairs were conducted in the same way as in the democracies of the fifth and fourth centuries; freedom of speech and an extempore oratory prevailed. That the citizen-body was probably but a small part of the population of the city did not, to the Greek way of thinking, deprive Rhodes of the right to call itself a democracy.

If in respect of her assembly, the basis of her government, Rhodes belongs to the classic past, her other organs of government suggest that she lent considerable momentum by her example to the forms of magistracies, and methods of government which were prevalent in the Hellenistic age or became prevalent in the Roman period, particularly in Asia Minor. The characteristic of such governments was that administrative power was concentrated in the hands of a small board of popularly elected magistrates -- at Rhodes the board of five prytaneis. It is evident from Polybius that the Rhodian prytaneis, through their president, controlled and directed foreign, and doubtless domestic, policy themselves, within the

ecclesia in so far as was compatible with the free expression of opinion, and the open vote on all matters of policy. Such an extremely powerful supreme college, is sometimes accompanied, as at Rhodes, by a six-monthly period of office, both for the college itself and for the Council. It cannot be maintained, in the present scanty state of our knowledge, that Rhodes was the prototype of such a system, but it appears not impossible that Rhodes imposed constitutions similar to her own, on cities which she controlled, but which had not been absorbed into the deme-system. At all events the semestrial system, and various other parallels are found in Tenos and Stratonicaea, two cities which were closely dependent on Rhodes. This matter can, however, only be fully explored in the light of the evidence regarding Rhodes' administration both of the Peraea, and of the Nesiotic League.

If it be granted that the semestrial system of Tenos and Stratonicaea may reflect constitutional changes imposed by Rhodes, it is evident that Rhodes may here be following an Imperial policy of which the prototype is perhaps to be found in Athenian imperial practice of the fifth century. In another respect, however, Rhodian practices appear to be dependent on contemporary models. Viewed by itself, indeed, the system of strategoi, with the divisions of spheres of influence, is redolent of the developed Attic constitution of the fourth century, and even the terminology reflects an Athenian model. However the whole hierarchy, strategoi, hagemones and epistatai, points elsewhere.

Though Athens in the administration of her empire, employed phrourarchoi and archontes in individual, perhaps recalcitrant, cities, there is no sign of any graded and coherent system of administration such

as is revealed by this hierarchy. Such a system is however found in the administration of the Seleucid Empire, in which, as at Rhodes, the epistates the civil and military governor of a Greek or semi-Greek city, forms the lowest rank in the system which included the Hyparchus, to whom the Rhodian hagemon corresponds, and the strategos. It is not impossible that at Rhodes the system developed after the Rhodians came into contact with Seleucid administration, by the occupation of the Seleucid foundation of Stratonicea in the latter part of the third century. If, on the other hand, it was evolved by the Rhodians themselves, it shows the visible marks of the environment in which it was employed.

The absence of any direct literary evidence regarding most of the important aspects of the Rhodian constitution means that we can never approach the very core of the problem which looms over Rhodian history -- what gave that community its staying power, in a world where single communities tended to be sacrificed to the interests of the larger glomerate states? Why, even after Rome had humiliated her politically, did she survive in the minds of Romans as the representative of the best of old Greek traditions? These questions await new evidence; in the meantime the dry bones do not live.

Chapter V.

The Rhodian Navy.

I. Developments and Tactics.

A. Introduction.

To writers of the Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine periods, the two objects of greatest admiration in Hellenistic Rhodes were her democratic constitution, and her navy. Fortunately, more of the history and development of the latter can be recovered than is possible of the former.

The history of the Rhodian navy belongs almost exclusively to the Hellenistic age. For the archaic period and the fifth and early fourth centuries there is insufficient information to enable us to descern any development in the period before and after the synoecism, but enough to make it clear that the intricate naval organisation of the Hellenistic period was not inherited unchanged from the earlier period. The early indications of Rhodian naval activity may therefore be passed over very quickly.

The earliest period of Rhodian naval history is illustrated by the reference to the nine ships led to Troy by Tlepolemus in the Catalogue of the Ships, and by the tradition, of uncertain origin, and transmitted only by later writers, of a Rhodian thalassocracy[1]. The former passage is of possible significance for the history of the later Rhodian navy, since the number of ships commanded by Tlepolemus, nine, is in fact the normal size of a battle-squadron of the later Rhodian navy, and it is possible that the size of the squadron had survived from an extremely early period, when each of the three cities had contributed three ships to a common force, either for attack or defence[2]. To argue from this that

in the Hellenistic period, for which the squadron of nine is abundantly testified, the navy was still organised in a way which took regard of the three old cities would however be extremely hazardous, and the possibility remains that there is no connection between the Homeric number, and the later Rhodian squadrons of nine.

Our knowledge of the naval strength of the three cities of Rhodes excluding the Homeric passage, is not earlier than the fifth century. At the time of the Persian crossing of the Aegean in 480, the contribution made by the Rhodian cities to the Persian fleet is unlikely to have exceeded twenty craft of uncertain type[3]. During the period of the Athenian Empire it must be supposed that the Rhodian cities retained no fleets, for independent action, but the continued existence of a fleet, or at least the ability to construct vessels when necessary is shown by the fact that two Rhodian pentekonters sailed under pressure with the Athenian fleet to Sicily in 415 B.C.[4] Moreover Rhodes evidently retained at this time a tradition of seamanship, since in 412 one of the motives which led the Spartans to secure a revolution in the three cities of the island was a desire to win thereby naval crews and foot-soldiers[5]. It may be significant that Thucydides does not state that the Spartans were anxious to acquire Rhodian vessels - but that would depend upon their needs, whether of men or ships, and that cannot be determined.

It seems possible, then, that the Rhodian cities in the decade before the synoecism were capable of putting a few, a very few, ships to sea, but that they were not, either singly or in unison, naval powers, in the manner of Chios, Lesbus and Samos.

The record of events for the period immediately after the synoecism

does not suggest that a pan-Rhodian fleet was rapidly established. Thus in 407, when Lysander, newly appointed nauarch, sailed to take over command of the Spartan fleet in Asiatic waters, he put in at Rhodes, and there collected all the ships which the three cities possessed[6] -- an expression which suggests that, even if the synoecism of the previous year had resulted in a unified command, the units of the three cities were still harboured in their home-ports. In the next year a Rhodian contingent of unknown size was probably present at Arginusae[7], and in 404 Rhodian ships were present at Aegospotamoi[8] -- in these latter instances the fleet was doubtless Rhodian, and administered by a central command.

Evidence from the period between the end of the Peloponnesian war and the reign of Alexander is very slight; it suggests that the naval strength of the city remained small. In the surviving references to the so-called Ῥοδιακὸς πόλεμος [9], in the first decade of the fourth century, no mention is made of any Rhodian ships; but had a substantial Rhodian fleet existed it could hardly have avoided being involved in a war fought mainly in the waters of the island itself. Events of 391-0, when civil war was in progress, emphasize the very limited resources of the city. When Ecdicus, the Spartan nauarch arrived at the island he found that the democratic party had control by land and sea, and was in possession of sixteen triremes; a further passage, indicating that the oligarchical party relied on the assistance brought by the Spartan Teleutias suggests that these sixteen triremes comprised most if not all of the existing Rhodian fleet[10].

The size of the Rhodian fleet at the time of the Social War is not precisely recorded by Diodorus, who gives the size of the combined rebel fleet as one hundred sail, without indicating individual contingents[11]. Again

the size of the Rhodian contingent which in 340 went to the assistance of Byzantium, is not recorded[12], while the reference by Lycurgus to the activity of Rhodian ships in their own harbour after the battle of Chaeronea is equally uninformative[13].

The lack of precise information in the literary tradition of, or relating to, the fourth century, is matched by a complete absence of information from inscriptions. The Rhodian navy of the fourth century was evidently not different from that of any other large Aegean island of the time, and usually overshadowed by the far greater resources of Athens. Its rise to pre-eminence dates from the reign of Alexander, which introduced changes in construction and naval tactics, the effects of which are noticeable throughout the Hellenistic period in the East, as late as the battle of Actium.

B. From the reign of Alexander to the battle of Chios (201 B.C.)

In the late fourth and third century the Rhodian fleet matured into a first-class fighting arm, and for the beginning and end of the period it is possible to determine the principles upon which the navy was employed.

For this period the literary evidence is far more important than the epigraphical. From 332, the year in which a detachment of the Rhodian fleet joined Alexander at Tyre, until 304, the year in which the siege of the city by Demetrius ended, we have in Diodorus a most valuable source. He transmits information which, whether it be drawn from a general Hellenistic historian, or from a Rhodian source (as in his account of the siege)[14], is obviously reliable even in details. At the other end of the period, from the earthquake of 226 until the battle of Chios, Polybius' narrative provides important information. The period between the end of

Diodorus' narrative and the beginning of that of Polybius, is as ill-recorded in this as in all other respects. The lacuna is especially to be regretted, since from what does survive regarding this period it appears probable that it saw important changes in Rhodian battle-tactics, the effects of which are fully recognisable in Polybius' account of the battle of Chios.

The evidence from inscriptions is, as always at Rhodes, difficult to use, owing to the absence of any exact date. Most documents can be dated to the nearest fifty years, only a few any closer. Some of the most important documents for naval history clearly refer to the period of the Mithridatic war, when Rhodes still possessed an efficient fleet, which was Rome's main naval prop in the eastern Mediterranean. This evidence must obviously be used with caution, but in general there seems no reason to suppose that there were any very great changes either in naval policy, in its widest sense, nor in the administration of the navy, between the third and the first centuries. The inscriptions are of two types. First are the dedications made by officers and crews of ships, or squadrons after successful engagements, or after their return home. These vary from bare records of the names of members of the crews, headed by the senior officers, to detailed lists containing the name of each member, with his post. The second type are those honorific and sepulchral inscriptions already frequently mentioned, on which the career of an individual is recorded in detail. In these both the position held and the type of ship on which it was held are recorded. This information, valuable though it is, has obvious limitations: it can only rarely be applied to surviving accounts of naval battles in which the Rhodian fleet was involved. The historians for their part, though they describe operations in detail, record little about

the type of ships engaged.

It was during the reign of Alexander that there occurred that great revolution in Greek naval construction which settled the course of development in war at sea until the battle of Actium; this was the introduction by Alexander, some time after 332, of the tetrere and pentere class of vessel, based on Cypriot or Phoenician models[15]. In 332 these vessels were employed in the Persian fleet against Alexander[16], and were subsequently constructed both for his own navy and for that of his successors. This led at a short interval to the construction of still larger vessels, up to 'thirteens', that is, ships of the bireme class, with oars grouped in pairs and rowed by six and seven oarsmen each[17], and of even bigger vessels which did not form a regular class of warship[18]. This new method of ship-building quickly outmoded in most of the Greek world the previously universal trireme. At Rhodes it seems to have led to the development of a new naval strategy.

The other fact of outstanding importance in the history of the years after the Macedonian conquest of Greece from the naval view-point, was the outcome of the battle of Amorgos in 322, in which the Athenian fleet was severely defeated by the Macedonian one[19]. This meant the end of Athenian influence in naval matters, after a predominance of a century and a half.

To Alexander at Tyre, in the summer of 332, came nine Rhodian triremes and one <u>peripolos</u>[20], or patrol-ship, of unknown type, perhaps a <u>triemiolia</u>, a type of light ship largely employed in the Rhodian navy. The number, nine, is the first indication from the historic period, of the usual division of the Rhodian navy into squadrons of nine. In view of later usage, there seems no reason to doubt that ships sent to Alexander constituted a single

squadron, with the addition -- perhaps normal, perhaps an exception -- of a single peripolos. The dispatch of so small a contingent is remarkable, but a reluctance on the part of Rhodes to commit herself cannot be inferred when no absolute figures for the size of the Rhodian fleet are known. Moreover there are indications that at least in the Hellenistic age, irrespective of the size of her whole fleet, Rhodes normally kept a single squadron of nine ships ready for action[21].

The period between the death of Alexander and the siege of 305-4 contains little definite information about the Rhodian fleet. An action between Rhodes and Attalus the brother of Perdiccas, fought in the waters between Rhodes and Caunus, in which Rhodes was victorious, tells us nothing either of the size of the Rhodian fleet or of its tactical disposition[22].

In the wars of the Diadochi the need for possession of the sea to maintain communications between Greece and Asia Minor was from the beginning an important consideration. Antigonus, threatened by a coalition composed of Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy, turned in his need for a fleet to Rhodes and Cyprus[23]. It has been suggested that the tidal wave which almost engulfed Rhodes in 315 caused considerable damage to the Rhodian fleet, and that it was perhaps for this reason that Antigonus was not given ships when he asked for them, but only permission to build ships in the Rhodian dockyards[24]. These ships cannot naturally be used as an indication of the strength of the Rhodian fleet at this time, but the fact that the total number of ships sent to Antigonos was probably at least forty, is an indication of the capabilities of the Rhodian dockyards[25].

In 312 Antigonus made an alliance with Rhodes, and in preparation for

his campaign of liberation in Greece, acquired from the island ten ships of unspecified type, but probably triremes[26]. Here again it cannot be determined what proportion of the entire Rhodian fleet this represents, but it is of interest to note that the number -- and doubtless the composition -- is the same as that of the squadron sent to Alexander twenty years earlier[27]. This is one reason -- since Rhodes is not likely to have sent her ally only a token force -- for supposing that a squadron of this size was kept permanently in service. In addition there were doubtless light craft ready for operations against pirates in the surrounding waters, and in the bays and creeks of the Peraea. Such vessels would probably not be sea-worthy for the voyage to Greece anticipated by Antigonus.

We hear no more of the Rhodian fleet until the time of the siege. On this occasion Demetrius Poliorcetes' fleet was large, though not abnormally so when the size of the Antigonid navy in previous years is considered[28]. It consisted of two hundred warships of various classes, and more than one hundred and seventy transport and supply ships[29]. On the Rhodian side there is no evidence that in either year of the siege more than nine ships were committed to battle at a time. This remarkably low figure is the same as that which was put at the disposal of Alexander in 332 and of Antigonus in 312. This is perhaps a third indication that nine ships formed the normal striking force kept in readiness in harbour. It may be conjectured that an additional reason why the fleet remained so small, even in the second year of the siege, is that the Rhodians were unable to construct more ships in the docks while the siege was in progress.

As soon as the siege began the Rhodians sent to sea a detachment of three ships. The class of these ships is not stated; Diodorus calls them

simply τριῆς τῶν ἄριστα πλεουσῶν [30]. They were probably triremes, since they are reported to have sunk enemy shipping by ramming, and no ship lighter than a trireme is likely to have used a ram; while at Rhodes the introduction of heavier vessels belongs to a later date. Within the first week of the siege the Rhodians had given Demetrius a severe shock, even if the material damage was slight, by the use of fire-ships[31]. These ships failed to reach their objectives owing to Demetrius' πλωτὸς χάραξ [32], and the shafts of his troops, but their use raises several interesting points.

At a later stage in the siege when Demetrius in his attempt to capture the harbour discharged lighted brands at the Rhodian fleet, the various artillery-pieces drove gaps in the city-walls, the Rhodian prytaneis decided to counter by attempting to sink the ships carrying the artillery[33]. For this purpose a detachment of three ships was employed, which are described as the strongest available,[34] and the task allotted to them was to ram and sink. The reference to the strength of the craft seems to apply specifically to the prow. The abnormal strength of this on these ships is shown by the fact that they broke through the σεσιδηρωμένος χάραξ with which the vessels were surrounded[35]. Two of the enemy ships were holed below water, and had to jettison their siege-machines, while the third was towed

away out of danger[36]. The severe damage caused by Rhodian rams to these heavy vessels suggests that the type of ram used was an improved model of the ἐπωτίδες , or iron prow-covers, which Polyanthes the Corinthian had found so effective against the attacks of the Athenians in the Corinthian Gulf in 414[37]. By the end of the engagement the Rhodian losses were limited to the capture of one ship with the admiral Execestus, the trierarch and other officers[38].

No further naval engagements of the first year of the siege are recorded. In the following year, (304), Demetrius, who had been worsted at sea[39], decided to force the issue by land, and set to work with the Helepolis[40]. The Rhodians for their part, recognising the superiority which they had established at sea, decided to increase their naval activity. Nine ships were sent out on a roving commission, with orders to capture or sink as much as possible of the enemy fleet[41]. The Rhodian appreciation of the situation was good; if Demetrius' supply-system from Asia Minor could be disorganised, he would be forced to withdraw the besieging troops. Even with due regard for the losses suffered by Demetrius in the previous year by ramming, it seems almost incredible that only nine ships should be employed, and partiality in a Rhodian source might be suspected, were it not that the exact information given in the narrative as to the manoeuvres and successes of this squadron, the types

of ships used and the names of the commanders bears the mark of an authentic, first-hand document.

The squadron of nine was divided for battle purposes into three squadrons of three. The first contingent was commanded by Damophilus, and consisted of three φυλακίδες[42]. This word is described as a Rhodian naval term, and there is some uncertainty as to its precise significance, though it evidently refers to some sort of guard-ship. It is applied more than once in Rhodian inscriptions to tetreres[43], but it is hardly possible that they were tetreres here, since vessels of this class are mentioned nowhere either in the narrative of the siege nor in any reference to Rhodian naval activity in the third century. Further, since the epigraphical evidence indicates that the later Rhodian φυλακίδες were larger than triremes, it is not likely that in the present instance they were aphract vessels. It may therefore be supposed that they were triremes. This detachment practiced two manoeuvres, that of ramming, and that practiced on a large scale for many years, of driving the enemy on shore. By these two methods the detachment succeeded in sinking many enemy ships[44].

The second contingent, consisting of triemioliai, light fast vessels, under command of Menedamus, sailed to the Lycian coast, burnt one ship which was anchored near

Patara, and captured a number of supply-ships, and at least one tetrere coming from Cilicia with a gift of raiment for Demetrius from his wife Phila[45]. It is remarkable that these ships should have sailed unescorted as far as Patara. The reason doubtless lies in the great speed of which Rhodian ships were capable. The third contingent under Amyntas consisted of ships of an unspecified type; this detachment also sank by ramming and captured numerous vessels[46].

Meanwhile Demetrius' efforts against the city increased, and Rhodian resistence grew more fierce. After a vigorous land-attack by Demetrius had been repelled[47], the Rhodians again sent out a squadron, perhaps the same as that which had previously operated and had not returned, under the command of Amyntas[48], who had previously commanded one of the three detachments. The ships are described as the fastest available[49], but no further information is given about them. They sailed across to the Peraea, launched a surprise attack on three pirate aphracts in the employment of Demetrius and captured them, together with a considerable number of κέλητες taking supplies to Demetrius, and sailed back to harbour with their prize, unobserved by night[50]. Shortly after this the siege was abandoned by Demetrius, and peace-terms were arranged[51].

If we are to believe the narrative of Diodorus the

Rhodian navy at the time of the siege achieved little short of a miracle. No doubt the source of this narrative is Rhodian but there is no reason to suppose that any serious falsehoods have been introduced into the text, and it may be used with confidence as the basis of an appreciation of the Rhodian fleet at this time.

First in importance is the fact that now, as in previous years the Rhodian fleet appears to have been extremely small. This is in contrast with the later development of the Rhodian navy, in which as many as sixty-six ships are employed in one year[52]. Certainly the ships which actually gave battle may have been only a proportion, perhaps numerically a small proportion, of the total Rhodian effective; but if small, it was still the most important part, since there is nothing to suggest that the small light ships which might be used for local raids were employed in full-scale naval operations. Various reasons might be suggested for the smallness of the Rhodian fleet. The Rhodians may at this time have been unable to build more ships, either through lack of timber, or dockyard labour, or through lack of crews to man the completed vessels; or they may have kept the size of the battle-fleet small from tactical considerations. It is difficult to decide between these various alternatives. At a later date[53], gifts of timber to

Rhodes suggest that in the late third and first half of the second centuries there was a shortage of that material in the island itself, but even if the same shortage existed at this period, there was plenty of timber to be imported from Syria, controlled by Antigonus, who, until the present cleavage, had been an ally of Rhodes. Lack of timber, therefore, was probably not a main cause for the size of the Rhodian fleet. Shortage of labour is a possibility which cannot be dismissed if only because we have no information on the matter. But it does not seem likely that a city such as Rhodes with a large foreign population would ever lack labour while the means to pay for it existed. Moreover the slave population, which was pressed into service during the siege could, if necessary, have been used for this purpose at an early date. However it remains a possible source of limitation of a shipbuilding programme. More probable, however, as the main cause of the smallness of the Rhodian fleet, is a shortage of crews. It appears very probable, though it cannot unfortunately be demonstrated beyond dispute, that, in normal circumstances, apart from a few technical posts, service in the Rhodian navy, including the lowest rank of rowers, was confined to Rhodian full citizens. A list of a ship's crew from the time of the Mithridatic war[54], in which at most one or two foreigners occur, holding special posts, indicates that even in times of crisis, service in the navy

remained the prerogative of the Rhodian citizen. This corresponds to the evident high regard in which service in the navy is regarded on Rhodian tombstones and in honorific decrees.

If this be correct, those slaves who were freed in 305, to fight for Rhodes will have fought in the army and not in the navy, and the navy will have been almost entirely equipped from the six thousand citizens recorded in the census. It now becomes apparent how short-crewed the Rhodian fleet must have been at this time, and doubtless on earlier occasions also. A trireme normally carried a complement of two-hundred[55], exclusive of marines, so that if every able-bodied citizen served on a trireme, the total fleet could only have consisted of thirty triremes. But there can be little doubt that this figure is far too high. There were the walls of the city to be defended, and apart from citizens and slaves, there were available for this task only one thousand foreign residents. The life of the city still had to continue, and it is expressly stated that sessions of the ecclesia continued[56]. Probably therefore not more than three thousand men were available for service in the triremes, and this number would permit the manning of only fifteen ships of that class. Apart from the triremes however there must also be reckoned the crews of the triemioliai, the complement of each of which

was slightly over one hundred[57]. Thus even if only three triemioliai are included the maximum number of triremes will have been thirteen. This figure of thirteen triremes, which is the maximum the existence of which can be demonstrated from this narrative, may well represent the total effective of the Rhodian navy of this time. It may then be suggested that the size of the fleet was based on very rigid considerations, for the implication of the tradition that only Rhodians born should serve in the fleet is that a large fleet would never be necessary, but that a small, highly efficient one would suffice for all contingencies.

The virtual restriction of service in the navy to full citizens indicates a pride in the arm which is also reflected in the tombstones and honorific inscriptions of distinguished Rhodian citizens[58]. All the posts, from that of simple seaman up to nauarch, are carefully recorded, while of military commands, held, it is clear in far lower esteem, no rank below that of the senior Hagemon is ever given[59]. This corresponds with the relative unimportance of the Rhodian army in the Hellenistic age, and the contrast between the prestige enjoyed by the two arms. At Rhodes service in the navy played the part that service in the army played in the city-states of Greece, where the privilege of service in that arm was largely restricted to citizens. The Rhodian navy was then inevitably small, and of as high a quality as possible.

The second fact of general importance is that the Rhodian fleet appears at this time to have consisted exclusively of light ships. This, in an age of large ship-building, is very remarkable, and is the key to an understanding of Rhodian policy. Large ships were the vogue from the age of the Diadochi onwards, both in the fleets of the kingdoms and in those of independent cities such as Heraclea Pontica[60]. The Rhodians alone did not build large ships. There were probably several reasons for this. First was the difficulty of manning a large ship; the complement of the heptere was, for example, probably over four hundred.[61] It would thus be impossible for the Rhodians, given their peculiar conditions of service, to equip a balanced fleet, if ships of this size were included in it. Secondly, large ships were probably not the most suitable type for the enemies Rhodes might calculate in advance on having to meet. Her foreign policy was to avoid serious war, by keeping on the side of the stronger of the great powers of the day; she might therefore reasonably hope to avoid major actions except on advantageous terms. But one ever present foe existed: the pirates. These were already a serious menace in the fourth century, and though checked by Alexander in 331, were never wholly suppressed. Rhodes had already taken a stand against them before 305, when the pirates joined

Demetrius from a desire to despoil their enemy[62]. Doubtless at this time Rhodian measures were not of the same size as the became in the third century, and were confined to attempts to keep clear the main trade-lines of the eastern Mediterranean, from the Black Sea southwards, and from Rhodes to Egypt and Asia Minor. But the defence and protection of even this area demanded a naval force of offence and defence. For the long-term policy of sweeping the seas, and the short term one of convoying her own merchant-shipping the same weapons were needed: fast, light, aphract vessels, which could meet the pirate ἄκατοι and ἡμιολίαι on equal terms. No heavier vessels would be of much use since handicapped by lack of speed and manoeuvrability, even if they possessed advantages in seaworthiness and stability. Thus the heaviest vessel in the Rhodian navy of the early Hellenistic period was usually the trireme, with greater emphasis laid on such vessels as triemioliai, which combined greater speed and a lighter frame with a lower number of oars.

The two factors, a shortage of man-power and the need to face the pirate ships are not mutually exclusive; together they suffice to explain the size of the Rhodian navy as it is shown in action at the time of the siege of 305-4.

The tactical manoeuvres illustrated by the account of the naval warfare of the siege are (a) ramming, (b) driving

enemy ships on shore and (c) the use of fire-ships.

Ramming was known as a tactical manoeuvre as early as the Persian wars, and came into frequent use during the Pentecontaetia[63]. It was essentially an Athenian weapon, and was considerably employed by them in the naval operations of the Archideamian war. Thus at Sybota in 432 the Athenians employed ramming tactics while the other combatants kept to the older fashion of boarding[64]. But while a trireme possessed the speed and manoeuvrability requisite for coming prow-on alongsides and delivering the ram, it was, in its turn, easily sunk on account of its lightness. Prow to prow, moreover, a trireme could do little. It was therefore not long before the ingenuity of the Corinthian admiral Polyanthes found the answer. In his engagement with the Athenians in the bay of Erineus in 414[65] he formed his ships up, their flanks covered by headlands so that they could not be turned, their prows facing the enemy, and reinforced by iron cushions against which an unprotected trireme could do little, and which, if required, could become a powerful offensive weapon. Ramming itself moreover was of little use in a confined space such as a harbour, where it was not always possible to manœuvre into position against the flank of the enemy ship. Thus though ramming as a tactical manoeuvre might be highly successful in the hands of Phormio, it was not without its disadvantages.

These became apparent in the course of the war, and by the time of the sea-battles of the Ionian war the use of massed fleets in prow-to-prow attack, as at Arginusae, was again becoming frequent[66]. Ramming continued to be used, though apparently on a reduced scale, in the fourth century, though information regarding naval tactics in that century before the battle of Cyprian Salamis is too slight to enable us to form any definite picture. The advent of the heavier ships of the Diadochi turned the scales decisively against ramming. These ships were less susceptible to ramming, because heavier and more difficult to sink, and less capable of ramming because their manoeuvrability was far less. Thus boarding became once more a common practice[67]. Rhodes, however, continued to use the ram, and several instances of it occur in the account of the events of 305-4.

Ramming was not indeed employed tactically by the Rhodians in these operations, that is, as a form of attack by a deployed line, as it was later at the battle of Chios, and in the Antiochic War, since not only was the Rhodian fleet at this time totally inadequate for the purpose, but within the confined space of the harbour there would have been no possibility of using it, even had the fleet been of adequate size[68]. ~~[illegible]~~ It was instead employed as a method of attack by individual ships working independently. Its success was very considerable

against even the heaviest ships, and suggests that the Rhodian ships had some sort of reinforcement on the prow. It is perhaps to this reinforcement which **Diodorus** refers when he speaks of 'the strongest ships'[69]. The instructions to these ships to go out and sink the large vessels on which Demetrius' siege-engines were mounted in inexplicable if some reinforcement was not added to the prow. It may be noted that Diodorus does not say that the section of triemioliai rammed the enemy, but only that it captured them. It thus appears probable that the triremes alone had sufficient stability to be able to take the impact of ramming these heavier vessels, and that it was only to these that the reinforcements, which doubtless resembled Polyanthes' ἐπωτίδες , were fitted[70].

The manoeuvre of forcing enemy ships on shore appears frequently in the tactics of the large fleets of the Hellenistic age. It was not of Rhodian origin, though used extensively by them. The importance of the manoeuvre lies, as has been pointed out, in the fact that it was only by driving your enemy on shore that you could be certain of defeating him, 'for efficient pursuit at sea was impossible, rowers not being machines'[71]. The best example of this procedure is the battle of Cyprian Salamis, when Demetrius drove on shore and captured most of Ptolemy's fleet[72]. The same tactics were employed in 305, by a Rhodian detachment of three ships which drove 'not a few' of Demetrius' supply-

ships on shore and burnt them[73]. The next year Damophilus' three phylakides did the same thing, driving some of Demetrius' ships -- presumably manned merchantmen -- on the shore of Carpathus[74]. In view of the small number of Rhodian ships, it appears less likely that these ships had their flanks turned than that they fled to avoid ramming.

Perhaps the most interesting of the Rhodian tactics during the siege was the use of fire ships. The use of fire against shipping in a confined space had been used in many instances before. At Syracuse in 413[75], during one of the battles in the harbour, the Syracusians attempted to fire Eurymedon's ships which had run aground in the shallows near the marches, and similar tactics were employed in 395 by Dionysius against the Carthaginian merchant-ships which were beached[76]. This time the plan worked, and the fire spread to the enemy shipping moored in the harbour, and caused great damage. On both these occasions, however, once the fire was started, no further control of it was possible. The conflagration, in such circumstances, might or might not spread in the required direction. The Rhodians recognised the importance of being able to control this volume of fire, but the method chosen to overcome this difficulty, probably borrowed from the Tyrians[77], was hardly satisfactory. Light ships, ἀκάτια , were laden with dry and inflammable

material, which was, however, not lit, and were brought by their crews close to their targets[78]. The ἀκάτια were then ignited. The troops on the hostile ships retorted by discharging their missiles at the crews of the burning fire-ships, who were either forced to attempt to extinguish the fire, and thus make their escape, or to swim for it, unless they wished to be burnt to death. Some put their fires out, and fled, more swam for it; we are not told how many failed to do either[79].

Such a technique was clearly of little value, unless it took the enemy wholly by surprise. In 305 the enemy, warned, was able to retaliate, and the vessels served no purpose. The advantage of some sort of fire-ship, or mobile fire, in limited space such as a harbour was obvious, but the Rhodians were not satisfied with the experience of 305, and the use of burning ships was apparently discontinued. The solution of the Tyrians who attached to their single fire-ship other vessels, into which the crews were able to jump, once they had set fire to the fire-vessel, did not, surprisingly occur to them[80]. For all that, the use of fire in naval warfare had a long history at Rhodes and was used, in different ways, as a decisive weapon on more than one occasion.

The defeat of Demetrius in Rhodes harbour is, on closer investigation, not very surprising. The Rhodian victory was due primarily to the careful training of the crews and to the application of a vigorous and calculated naval strategy. Both training and calculation were lacking on the other side. The Macedonians were still really strangers to naval warfare and, when faced with skilful seamanship, the fleet was unable to compensate by weight of numbers for lack of skill. Demetrius' fleet presented a large

and slowly-moving target, the Rhodians a small and very swiftly moving one. The Rhodian strategy, moreover, was simple and sensible: to destroy the enemy's fleet and siege-weapons and to cut off his supplies as near base as possible. In Demetrius' naval activity there is no trace of a general plan. While the concentration of heavy ships within the harbour rendered them almost immobile, he was nevertheless unable to prevent his blockade being run by Ptolemy's ships twice, by those of Cassander and Lysimachus once each, and finally by the Rhodians themselves. He likewise took no precautions for the security of his lines of communication and supply which were attacked by the Rhodian light vessels both in their home-waters and in the open sea. The difference between the incompetence of Demetrius' tactics at Rhodes and his brilliant success at Cyprian Salamis two years earlier is striking, but can be explained by the fact that whereas Ptolemy played into Demetrius' hands by adopting the tactics which Demetrius preferred, the Rhodians' method of attack was new and unexpected, and he had no answer for it.

After 304 little is heard of the activities of the Rhodian navy, and yet there is enough evidence in the changing political scene between 304 and 220 to indicate that it played a leading role in the Aegean. Inscriptions which refer to Rhodian activities against pirates[81], though they emphasise that warfare against these was probably the main occupation of the Rhodian navy shed little light on the actual working of the fleet. Thus for this critical period the room for conjecture is very considerable.

The only glimpse of the Rhodian navy in action in these years is provided by Polyaenus' very brief account of the action between the Rhodian and Egyptian fleets in Ephesus harbour in about 258 B.C.[82]. On the approach

of the Egyptian admiral Chremonides, Agathostratus led out the Rhodian squadron in line ahead, and, once in sight of the hostile fleet, reformed into line abreast[83]. After an interval the fleet returned to Ephesus harbour, whither it was followed by the Egyptian fleet. Here Agathostratus turned about and, τὸ ναυτικὸν πυκνώσας ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν κεράτων , attacked the enemy as they were disembarking and defeated them. In itself the manoeuvre calls for no comment; the deployment from line ahead to line abreast is the normal procedure of ancient navies before giving battle. What is important is the apparent difference of tactics exhibited here by Agathostratus from those employed at the siege forty-six years previously, though now as then the action occurred in the confined waters of a harbour. In spite of the absence of some vital pieces of information, regarding, for instance, the number and type of Rhodian ships employed, it seems clear that Agathostratus co-ordinated his ships as a battle-line, and did not employ them as single vessels as was done throughout the siege. It would be of interest to know whether this difference implies a reorganisation of the Rhodian battle-fleet, perhaps to bring it more into line with the Egyptian navy; but there are two many gaps in the story for us to be able to form a definite judgement.

The earthquake of 226 forms an important episode in the history of the Rhodian navy[84]. Many of the gifts bestowed by the monarchs on the stricken city were of the greatest importance for shipbuilding, and in addition some ships were also sent. The shipbuilding material is of such a nature that it may have been the occasion of Rhodes' introduction to ships of the heavier type. Ptolemy's gifts included enough timber to construct ten penteres, and ten triremes[85], while those of Seleucus Callinicus also included ten penteres[86]. Quite apart from the vast quantities of planking, pitch, resin, tow and so on, also given to the city, in itself sufficient

for the construction of a considerable fleet, these ships represented a considerable accession of naval strength of a particular kind; Rhodes after 226 possessed twenty penteres[87]. Even if she possessed a few at the time of the battle of Ephesus -- there is no evidence that she did -- this sudden increase in naval power must have led to a reconsideration of naval policy. The ships now existed; the question was, could they be manned? Even if the lack of man-power could be successfully overcome, the tactical balance of the fleet must be recast, since the tactics which went with a trireme in detachment or in line differed fundamentally from the tactics required for the efficient handling of the pentere. The fundamental issue then was whether Rhodes could use these new acquisitions without adulterating the quality of her crews, and without abandoning her traditional small-ship tactics.

The immediate effect of the new situation can however only be conjectured. There is no positive indication that ships of the heavier class were used until 201, and there is reason to suppose that in 220 they were not used, though the evidence on the point is not conclusive. If the conclusion from this is that Rhodes never launched the penteres which the monarchs gave her, and that the fleet of 201 is in no way the product of the donations of twenty-five years previously, that might be a further indication that the Rhodian fleet was permanently hamstrung by the prejudice that general service in the Rhodian navy was confined to Rhodian citizens. The Rhodian navy, in such circumstances, could not expand.

In 220 B.C. when it might be expected that the fruits of the gifts of 226 would be available in the form of many new and large warships, Rhodes was forced to make a display of naval strength against Byzantium. On this occasion, ten ships, six Rhodian and four allied, were dispatched

to the Hellespont[88]. The government was perhaps unwilling to make a display of naval strength[89], but the possibility that the new ships were not put to sea because they could not be, remains. Similarly Rhodes sent only three triremes and three aphract vessels to Crete in 219[90].

It is thus not until the years shortly before the Second Macedonian War that a larger Rhodian navy is encountered. In 201 B.C. Rhodian ships were engaged against Philip in the two important battles of Chios and Lade. Of the latter battle little is known, but Polybius' detailed account of the former enables us to see once more the Rhodian fleet in action.

For this engagement Philip had fifty-three cataphracts, including hexeres, hepteres, octeres, enneres, and one dekeres, the flagship of the admiral Deinocrates, but the majority of which were penteres and tetreres; a large number of aphract vessels, including <u>hemioliai</u> and <u>triemioliai</u>; and about one hundred and fifty λέμβοι and πρίστεις [91]. The combined fleet of Attalus and Rhodes, individual contingents of which are not given, consisted, including five Byzantine ships, of sixty-five cataphracts, which were all penteres and tetreres, nine <u>triemioliai</u> and three triremes[92]. Of these it is certain that three penteres, two tetreres and two <u>triemioliai</u> were Pergamene[93], while seven penteres and one trireme were certainly Rhodian[94]. A more precise analysis of the figures is not possible. It is however certain that the Rhodian fleet included penteres, and this marks their first appearance in the Rhodian navy in the surviving literary tradition. There also appear to have been not more than three triremes and seven <u>triemioliai</u> engaged[95].

The main interest of the battle of Chios lies in Polybius' tactical descriptions. The historian, whose own picture is not always clear, notes that the operation resolved itself into two separate engagements, one on

either flank[96]. The battle on the right of the Rhodo-Pergamene line between Attalus and the opposing portion of the Macedonian navy, need not detain us. The most important Rhodian manoeuvre of the battle is the διέκπλους which had been perfected by the Athenian admiral Phormio in the early days of the Peloponnesian war[97]. It consisted of rowing through the ranks of the enemy ships, and in so doing breaking up their oarage, passing through to the rear, and ramming the enemy ship astern, or, if he tried to turn to face his prow to the opposing ram, taking him amidships. This second half of the manoeuvre was called the ἀναστροφή . The success of this operation depended in the first place not on speed or manoeuvrability but on a careful battle-drill. The prime necessity of the attacking force was to be able to save its own oars while destroying those of the enemy, and that could only be achieved by a swift shipping of oars, as each enemy ship was attacked, and an equally swift unshipping as the ships were disengaged. Unfortunately no indication of how this was done has survived, but it must certainly have required very careful training[98]. The answer to the διέκπλους was not long in coming. The Peloponnesians in the gulf of Corinth in 429, when forced to give battle though laden with equipment for a land-operation in Acarnania, attempted a solution; they formed in a circle, prows outward, ready to use to ram if necessary, with their less protected craft in the middle[99]. The entire purpose of this formation was to deny Phormio the opportunity of employing the διέκπλους . The plan failed, in part through the refusal of Phormio to attack and his decision to wait for a wind to come up. Ancient warships could only keep position when actually in motion under oarage, and the wind was bound to jostle and confuse the ships. Phormio's judgment was right, and the wind put the enemy

ships into confusion. At this moment the Athenian fleet charged, sank a number of ships and eaptured twelve[100]. However, apart from the opportune use made of the wind by Phormio, it must be granted that the Corinthian formation was one answer to the use of the διέκπλους . Philip's answer was, however, wholly different. He left his fleet deployed in line abreast, but filled up the gaps between ships with some of his numerous lemboi. It is surprising perhaps that Philip had the naval foresight to do this, since the διέκπλους had fallen out of general usage in the age of heavy ships, and was re-introduced by the Rhodians. His usage of this device suggests that he had learnt of Rhodian tactics before he actually experienced them in person.

The battle between the Rhodians and Philip's forces began when the Rhodians caught up with the Macedonian rear as it sailed away from Chios. The Rhodians took the Macedonian ships astern and broke up their oars[101]. This attack on the oarage of a column in line ahead was clearly a different manoeuvre from the attack on oars in the διέκπλους . It was apparently used again by the Rhodians against Hannibal at Side in 190 B.C.[102]. The Macedonian fleet turned about, and the two fleets formed up in line abreast, their prows head-on. It was now that Philip filled the gaps in his ranks by the interposition of lemboi[103]. This does not however appear to have been a very successful counter. Polybius indeed stresses the great inconvenience which it caused the Rhodians, who were unable to manoeuvre freely or use their peculiar tactics, because the lemboi fell on their oars and put them out of action, and at times attacked the prows and at times the sterns of the ships, so that oarsmen and pilots were alike in difficulties[104]. But the lemboi were very light vessels and their attacks

must have consisted largely of jostling and pushing the enemy ships. The Macedonian crews fought well from the decks of the larger vessels in the encounters that ensued, when the two fleets were almost locked together, but it is clear that the Rhodian fleet broke loose from the scrimmage, and forced its way in a diecplous- movement, in the course of which it rendered useless much of the enemy's oarage[105]. The ships emerged in the rear of the line, which by this time must have been at sixes and sevens, and took the enemy ships, either in the stern or amidships as they tried to turn to oppose their bows to the enemy rear. In this way Philip lost many ships.

Polybius also recounts, though obscurely, a 'technical device' of the Rhodians[106]. He records that in prow-to-prow encounters in the battle the Rhodians ἔμπρωρα τὰ σκάφη ποιοῦντες ἐξάλους ἐλάμβανον τὰς πληγάς, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις ὕφαλα τὰ τρώματα διδόντες ἀβοηθήτους ἐσκεύαζον τὰς πληγάς[107]. The general meaning of this sentence is that, as a result of a certain device, the Rhodians when being rammed took their blow out of water (and were therefore in no danger of sinking), while they 'gave the enemy under-water wounds', that is, rammed and holed below water. So much is clear, but the meaning of ἔμπρωρα τὰ σκάφη ποιοῦντες is not. Tarn has pointed out that it can hardly mean that the Rhodians 'depressed their own bows', since 'apart from the difficulty in doing this in action (we do not know that a galley could take in water), it would not affect the enemy ram, or make it give ἐξάλους πληγάς'[108]. The view that at the critical moment the crew of the vessel (less its oarsmen), or else dead ballast, was moved forward to depress the bows cannot for this reason stand[109]. The fact that the Rhodian vessel rammed below water herself, does not of course need explanation, since it was the normal practice to ram below water[110], or at least on the water-line, and is only mentioned

here (and in the similar passage relating to the ship of Deinocrates)[111] to mark the contrast with being struck above water. However, to force the enemy ram above water must have needed some mechanical device. Polybius does not explain it, and we can only guess at it. Some sort of fender would meet the case; this, if fitted to the prow and amidships, would force the enemy blow to glance upwards. The objection to this explanation is that, as Tarn has pointed out[112], the Rhodians apparently made their vessels ἔμπρωρα during the battle and not beforehand, as would have been the case with any constructional alteration or addition. The objection is serious but would be more so if the language in which the whole manoeuvre is expressed were less vague. While no solution of this problem is possible, it may be noted that the Pergamene fleet also had a system of avoiding under-water ramming, though Polybius' account of this is equally obscure, and the text may be corrupt[113].

The losses of Philip at Chios were twenty-eight cataphracts, including many of his large ships, and seventy-two of his one hundred and fifty lemboi. The allied losses were very slight; the Rhodians lost two penteres and one trireme, but captured two Macedonian tetreres. Attalus lost two penteres by sinking, and two tetreres and the royal flagship captured, and also one triemiolia[114].

Philip's fleet at the engagement which followed near the island of Lade was thus considerably weakened; he had twenty-eight cataphracts and seventy-eight lemboi. Attalus was not present at the battle[115], so that the Rhodians faced Philip alone. The strength of their battle-fleet was not substantially altered. Polybius' account of the battle of Lade survives

only as part of his criticism of Zeno and Antisthenes, and is much abbreviated[116]. The two Rhodian historians are accused of having asserted, after recounting truthfully the course of the battle, that the Rhodians had been left the victors. The battle, as recorded by Polybius, represents a Rhodian defeat; and a defeat caused not through superior skill on the part of the enemy, but by a failure of nerve on the part of the Rhodians. It appears that early in the engagement Philip captured two Rhodian penteres[117], and it is possible that as a result of this the Rhodians for once lost their heads. When one ship, which had been holed and was taking on water, raised it topsail and fled towards the open sea[118], the neighbouring ships followed suit, with the result that the Rhodian admiral Cleonaeus[119], finding himself with only a few ships, was forced to abandon the engagement, and follow the fleeing ships[120]. They were finally forced by storm into shore on Myndian territory, whence the next day they made their way to Cos. The victorious Macedonian fleet moored at Lade, where the Rhodian camp had been, and bivouacked in the enemy's tents[121].

From this brief account no information can be gained regarding the tactics of either side. The battle remains one of the most complete defeats in the history of the Rhodian navy.

The battle of Chios indicates that the Rhodians had developed by the end of the third century various peculiarities in shipbuilding and tactics which, even if they were not unparallelled in all contemporary navies (as they appear to us to have been) certainly differentiated their navy from that of the Hellenistic monarchies. It is clear that Philip had appreciated the danger of these tactics and had formulated counter-measures which were, to a limited extent, successful. The accounts of later battles

such as those of the Antiochic war, do not suggest that such measures became general. In the battle of Side the Rhodians made considerable and successful use of the diecplous, and in other engagements of that war they remained the tactical masters of the situation, even though Antiochus' fleet was commanded by a Rhodian exile, who, it might be thought, would have known or evolved successful counter-measures.

It is at the battle of Chios that ships other than triremes or lighter vessels occur in the ranks of the Rhodian navy. Really heavy ships are not employed either now or on any subsequent occasion, but from now tetreres and penteres appear in the surviving evidence to supplant the old combination of triremes and triemioliai. The latter were present in later battles[122], but there is no indication that they played an important tactical role.

At Chios, again, as perhaps earlier in Ephesus harbour, the battle line is handled as an unit, and not as a glomeration of individual detachments. Without this unified employment such tactics as the diecplous were, of course, an impossibility. The difficulty of supposing that such unified handling of the fleet was in fact a development of the third century has already been noted.

The pressure of contemporary naval programmes had perhaps led Rhodes to abandon her policy of constructing only light ships, and had led to the construction of cataphracts. In spite of this, however, the Rhodian crews still maintained the speed of carage for which they had been conspicuous in the earlier period, and her ships considerable advantage in manoeuvre. It is clear from Polybius that the speed of Rhodian rowing was quite independent of the type of ship in use, and that not only Rhodian triremes, but also tetreres and penteres moved relatively faster

than the corresponding enemy ships. This is the sort of tradition which dies hard like the marching pace of light infantry, and the Rhodians could rely on it to save them from many difficult and dangerous situations.

With the events of 201 a new chapter in the history of the Rhodian navy opens.

C. From the battle of Chios to the alliance with Rome (164 B.C.)

In 200 Philip slipped through the Rhodian and Pergamene blockade in the Bargylietic gulf and made swiftly to Macedon. Shortly afterwards his ships, in support of the Acarnanians, who were attacking Athens, raided the Attic coast, but were defeated by a combined Rhodian-Pergamene detachment, the Rhodian contribution to which was only three tetreres[123]. In the same year Rhodes organised the League of the Islanders[124]. This led to a considerable expansion of naval authority, and apparently to the establishment of a naval force of the islanders under Rhodian command[125]. In the first campaigning season of the Second Macedonian War the Rhodians sent no further ships to supplement those already in the Aegean. In the next year their effort was more considerable, twenty cataphracts being sent under the nauarch Agesimbrotus[126]. It saw, however, no fighting, and in the autumn returned to Rhodes[127]. The following year (198 B.C.) the same number of ships under the same commander was sent out, but again saw no action[128], while for the remainder of the war naval operations are not mentioned. It is therefore quite impossible to determine the nature and development of Rhodian tactics at this time.

In 194 B.C., the Rhodians sent a contingent of ships, under the command of Sosilas, to assist Rome against Nabis. It consisted of eighteen

cataphracts while that of Eumenes consisted of ten cataphracts, thirty lemboi and a variety of other small ships[129]. The Rhodian contingent was thus of about the same size as that which had been employed in the Second Macedonian war. As before there is no indication of its tactical employment. The number of ships, on the first occasion twenty, on the second eighteen, suggests the division into squadrons of nine ships each with an additional single guard ship to each squadron on the earlier occasion, just as had been sent to Alexander and to Antiogonus Monophthalmus over a century before[130].

In the Antiochic War the Rhodian navy played a crucial role in determining the history of antiquity, by providing Rome with the naval power with which she was able to defeat the Seleucid navy. The naval engagements show that the Rhodian navy had developed greatly from the small fleet of the fourth and much of the third century, and that it was at this time among the largest fleets afloat. There is a corresponding development in its tactical employment but the same fundamental elements, in particular speed of propulsion, continue to determine the issue of engagements.

Antiochus' fleet, when he appeared in Asia Minor in spring 197, consisted of one hundred cataphracts and two hundred aphracts including cercuri and lemboi[131]. Five years later, when he crossed to Greece, he took with him only forty cataphracts, sixty aphracts and two hundred transport-ships[132]. His fleet was thus substantially weaker in warships than that of Demetrius had been in 305, though with some thirty more transports[133]. The early stages of the war witnessed no naval engagements, and it was not until Antiochus, defeated at Thermopylae, returned to Asia

Minor, that naval operations began. In late summer 191 Antiochus took measures for the defence of Asia, which included the dispatch of scout-ships to the islands to reconnoitre[134]. This must have constituted a challenge to Rhodes in her position as Suzerain of the Nesiotic Leagues, but no mention is made of any answer by Rhodes to the challenge. Rhodes had perhaps not yet entered the war actively, and allowed the provocation, if such it was, to pass. The single naval engagement of 191 was fought off Cape Corycus near Phocaea. To this battle the Rhodians sent twenty-five cataphracts under the nauarch Pausistratus[135]. This fleet arrived too late for battle, but joined the Roman fleet in pursuit of Polyxenidas and the Seleucid fleet to Ephesus. It then returned home[136]. The winter of this year found Antiochus engaged in a strenuous effort to strengthen his fleet, both by a shipbuilding programme in Asia Minor, and by the addition of new ships from the Phoenician cities which Hannibal was sent to bring to Asia[137].

In March 190 the Rhodians despatched in good time Pausistratus with thirty-six ships, probably mostly tetreres[138]. This fleet was almost entirely captured by Polyxenidas in Panormus, a harbour on the north coast of Samos. The strategem by which this was achieved is described in detail by Livy[139]. Pausistratus, lulled by the promise of Polyxenidas that in return for permission to return to his native Rhodes he would have over the hand Seleucid fleet to the Rhodian commanders, allowed himself to be caught unawares while on shore, and most of his ships were captured. Only five Rhodian and two Coan ships managed to escape the trap[140]. This they did by the use of a Rhodian technical device. Baskets containing lighted fires were suspended to the end of two poles which projected on either side of the prow[141]. These were for use in the event of a ship being

rammed; when the enemy ship came up to ram, the extended poles would force him to keep his distance through fear of being fired by the baskets[142]. This device, which proved its worth on this occasion, was perhaps the most complete answer that could be given to enemy ramming. All other devices suffered from one grave disadvantage; if the enemy chose to approach he might capture the ship by boarding; the fire-baskets on the other hand compelled him to keep his distance. These baskets were not a Rhodian invention, since they had been used in a slightly different way by the Tyrians against Alexander in 332 in an attack on his siege-works[143]. It appears however that the Rhodians were the first to use them in mobile warfare. Livy tells us that the use of the baskets enabled the Rhodians to cut themselves a path through the closely-packed enemy shipping[144].

In spite of the fire-baskets, however, the incident in Panormus-harbour was a disaster, not lessened by the fact that a Rhodian in the service of the enemy had triumphed over their own gullible admiral. These thirty-six ships comprised the largest fleet which Rhodes had, so far as is known, ever put to sea, and it had passed into the enemy's hands almost without a struggle. In spite, however, of their grief at the loss of the flower of the city's youth, the Rhodians now showed a determination almost equal to that of the Athenians before Arginusae. Within a few days twenty ships were dispatched in two squadrons of ten each, under the command of Eudamus[145]. Of these twenty, eighteen were probably tetreres[146], the other two triremes, which were sent under the separate command of Epicrates to Cephallenia, to guard the channels there against the depredations of a Spartan pirate Hybristas[147]. Later in the campaign, when an allied squadron was sent to Lycia, it consisted of two Roman quinqueremes, four

Rhodian tetreres, and two Smyrniot aphracts[148]. This mixed detachment called on its way at Rhodes and collected three more tetreres[149]. These bring the known effective of the Rhodian navy in this year to twenty-three vessels, of which two were triremes. The total number of ships which were at sea in the year must of course include the fleet lost by Pausistratus at Panormus, which gives a total of either fifty-nine or fifty two ships.

The Rhodian fleet was recalled from operations with the Romans to meet Hannibal whose approach from Syria was heralded. Thirteen Rhodian ships under Eudamus were recalled, together with one Coan and one Cnidian pentere[150]. Two days before he arrived from Samos, Pamphilidas set out from Rhodes with thirteen tetreres and collected four more on his way east, from the Rhodian fleet on the Caria station[151]. Eudamus was allotted six aphracts and sent to join Pamphilidas[152]. The squadrons united at Megiste and proceeded to Phaselis to await the enemy[153]. The Syrian fleet under Hannibal had meanwhile reached Side, and in the waters near this city the two fleets met[154]. Livy gives the size of the Rhodian fleet before the engagement as thirty-two tetreres and four triremes[155]. The Syrian fleet consisted of thirty-seven cataphracts, including three hepteres, four hexeres, and ten triremes[156]. When the fleets moved out at first light, Hannibal's fleet approached the enemy in two lines ahead, the left column commanded by the Carthaginian himself, while Apollonius, the Seleucid commander, held the place of honour, the right. The Rhodians moved up in single line ahead, the ναυαρχὶς of Eudamus in the van, Pamphilidas commanding in the middle, and Charicletus bringing up the rear[157]. Eudamus gave the order to advance and deploy into line abreast. This command was given too soon, since the van had not sailed sufficiently far from the shore

to enable the centre and rear to form line on his left between him and the shore. In the resulting confusion Eudamus found himself isolated in the van, now the right of his line, with five ships, and, while the rear was still trying to form up on his left, he became fully engaged with the Syrian left commanded by Hannibal. Meanwhile what might have been an infectious confusion was prevented by the experienced seamanship of the Rhodian crews, who improvised a line until the left was fully extended to the shore, each ship yielding a little water to its neighbour. The fleet once in extended order, the left wing used the tactics which had proved themselves at the battle of Chios, a decade earlier. These were ramming, attacks on the oarage of individual ships, such as had been employed in the opening rearguard action at Chios, and the fully developed διέκπλους. Here too reappears the reinforced prow; this may be inferred from the sinking, by a Rhodian cataphract, or possible even a trireme of a Syrian heptere, an event which caused the enemy considerable consternation[158]. Soon the enemy right-wing began to retreat, Eudamus, on the Rhodian right, meanwhile continued to engage the Syrian left. As at Chios the battles on the two wings developed independently but on this occasion Rhodian seamanship preserved or restored the unity of the line. The Rhodian left came to the assistance of Eudamus, and Hannibal was routed. The

pursuit was not carried out, since in addition to the exhaustion of the rowers following an arduous engagement, which was usually sufficient to prevent pursuit, the marsh-fever from which the crews had suffered before the engagement had lowered their reserves of strength. Hannibal escaped towing his damaged ships, with only twenty undamaged. The chase was subsequently pursued, but the only prize was the damaged heptere[159].

The battle was decisive for the war at sea, since Antiochus could hope for no reinforcements. But as the Rhodians themselves realised, it had not been wholly successful. The enemy fleet had largely escaped sinking, more than half of his heavy ships were undamaged, and he had made good his escape with the damaged ones. The battle in fact illustrated the important consideration that total victory could not be expected unless the enemy could be driven on shore, and defeated either by troops stationed on shore for this purpose, or his fleet burned. The shores of Lycia were enemy territory to the Rhodians, and therefore this crowning undertaking was impossible[160]. The Rhodians had thus been cheated of final victory, not by any tactical error, nor by lack of seamanship, but by the limits of human endurance, and because the engagement was fought in enemy waters. It is possible that if Eudamus' victory on the right had been

greater he would have been able to envelop the Syrian left, but as it was Hannibal was able to withdraw in comparative safety to friendly shores. On the other hand Rhodian tactics after the initial error of Eudamus, had been as sound as ever. Although their fleet consisted almost exclusively of tetreres, as at Chios, a power of improvisation at the beginning, and the familiarity of the rowers with a fixed drill, the diecplous, enabled them to put one wing out of action swiftly and reinforce the other. Thus the battle never lost its tactical unity, in contrast with the battle of Chios, where an unified control was never established over the two wings.

The battle over and Hannibal withdrawn, the Rhodians left a force of twenty ships, to discourage any further attempt by the enemy to move west, at Patara and Megiste, under Chariclitus, while Eudamus with seven ships returned to Samos; of these seven four were subsequently sent back to Patara under Pamphilidas[161].

When the combined Rhodian and Roman fleets sailed from Teos to meet Polyxenidas with the Seleucid fleet between the promontories of Myonnesus and Corycus, the Rhodian contingent, commanded by Eudamus, was smaller than it had been at Side, consisting only of twenty-two ships[162]. Of these, three were doubtless those which had been left behind in the spring, when Eudamus had sailed south to meet

Hannibal[163]. In addition he had seven cataphracts which he brought from Side[164]; the remainder were probably ships summoned for the emergency from Lycia. The Roman fleet was eighty strong[165], while the Seleucid admiral disposed of eighty-nine ships, including three hexeres and two hepteres[166] At the very beginning of the battle, as the hostile fleets were deploying into line abreast before making contact, a tactical danger for the allies appeared. The Syrian line, when deployed with its left wing advanced extended far beyond the Romans on the right of the allied line[167]. This flank was therefore open to envelopment, which if successful, would enable the Seleucid commander to roll up the entire allied line from the right. Eudamus, who in sailing out from harbour had led the rearguard and now therefore commanded the left flank, saw the potential danger, and led his swift Rhodian vessels up to the right instead of the left, his ships fitted with fire-baskets in the van[168]. This change of direction brought him opposite his compatriot Polyxenidas, who commanded the Syrian left flank. By this swift and resourceful action the battle-line was stabilized and any opening advantage which the Seleucid fleet may have had, lost. As the battle developed the Roman centre pierced the opposing centre, and fell on the rear of the enemy left, which was engaged with Eudamus. The fire-baskets of the latter were in the meantime playing an important part. The Seleucid ships mostly refused to ram, and exposed their flanks to the

to the Rhodian ram; if any took the chance, it went down in flames. It was while the enemy ships were struggling against this destructive weapon, and against the courage and skill of the Rhodian crews, which Livy emphasises as the chief cause of victory[169], that they were taken astern by the Romans. Both the enemy centre and left flank were surrounded and sunk. The right, seeing the disaster, and the flight of Polyxenidas who had escaped from the encirclement, hoisted sail apace and fled to Ephesus[170].

The merit of victory must be equally divided between the Roman and Rhodian fleets, for each alike manifested at critical moments an awareness of the tactical situation, from which a full co-ordination of the battle plan followed. It was this co-ordination, so rare in Hellenistic warfare, which as much as individual achievements, drove the Seleucid fleet from the sea.

The battle of Myonnesus was the last naval engagement of the Antiochic War, and the last large scale naval operation in which the Rhodian navy was engaged, before 164 B.C. From Livy's account of it and of the battle of Side, considerable information may be gleaned regarding aspects of Rhodian naval policy. These aspects may be summarised as follows:

(1) The most important change in Rhodian naval policy which apparently concurred at about the end of the third century, is the introduction of a considerable number of heavy ships. The tetrere and pentere become the normal vessels of

of the line, and triremes when used, form only a small part of the fleet; at Chios three triremes were present, at Side four. The use of large ships in increasingly large numbers must imply greater reserves of citizen-manpower, than existed at the time of the siege of 305/4, if the argument that service in the Rhodian navy was normally restricted to Rhodian citizens, be sustainable[171]. A possible explanation of this may be that in the wars of the end of the third and the early second century Rhodes was fighting exclusively by sea, and thus did not need to defend the city, as had been necessary in 305 B.C. Thus the majority of the able-bodied citizens would be available for service in the navy. An alternative or subsidiary explanation might be found in a possible rise in population among the ranks of the fully franchised, whether by an increase in the birth-rate or by the admission to full citizenship of foreigners. Neither alternative is, however, very likely. A rise in the birth-rate is against all that we know of Greek population trends of the third century[172]. Certainly it need not be doubted that the total population of Rhodes rose in the Hellenistic age, but that is because it became what it had not previously been, a mercantile centre of the first importance, in which traders of all nationalities settled down; but this does not in any way imply an increase within the citizen body itself. There are moreover undoubted indications that successive Rhodian governments were unwilling to admit foreigners to full citizenship,

except in specific instances and for particular reasons[173]. The first alternative, that on this occasion Rhodes was able to devote her entire man-power to fighting the war at sea, seems therefore more probable.

(2) Changes in the type of ship used, and in the size of the fleet, naturally led to changes in the tactical employment of the fleet. These changes can hardly be apprehended since the evidence for the earlier period is so slight. But, even if the individual nature of the Rhodian tactics in the siege of 305 is not a necessary indication that Rhodes had not already learnt the tactical management of a line of ships as an unit, the absence from any account of any Rhodian naval operation before the battle of Chios of any ship heavier than a trireme, is itself an indication that the tactics of the later period, when the trireme played only a minor role, must have been profoundly different. When heavy ships were introduced cannot be determined; too little survives regarding the battle of Ephesus and the fate of the ships donated in 226 cannot be determined.

The tactics of the developed Rhodian navy conformed closely to contemporary usage. The ships sailed out in line ahead and deployed into line abreast, and the attacks were launched against the entire enemy line. The disadvantage of these tactics is obvious in the account of the battles of Chios, Side and to a lesser degree Myonnessus. Two independen t

battles were liable to develop on the wings, and the support of one wing by the other became extremely difficult owing to the lack of a central control. The commander placed himself on the right wing, and thus became involved in one phase of the battle to the exclusion of the other. The fault was inherent in the tactics of the day, and was due primarily to a failure to appreciate the need for reserve forces; it is even more noticeable in land than in sea-battles[174].

The particular tactics commonly employed by the Rhodians in this sort of battle centred round ramming; ramming as an offensive weapon, and defence against ramming. Ramming was primarily used in close connection with the general tactical manoeuvre of the diecplous, which, if successful, exposed the unprotected rear and flanks of the enemy ship to the ram. Usually as a concomitant, indeed as an integral part of the diecplous, but sometimes also as a manoeuvre against the rear of the enemy line, went the attack on the enemy's oarage. Defensive measures against ramming were frequently tried by the Rhodians; two different types are recorded, one by which, it has been suggested, a fender was fixed to the hull of the ship to cover the below-water area, and force the enemy to ram above water. The details of this are however extremely uncertain. The other device, and an extremely effective one, was the employment of fire-baskets, projecting from the bows, which made ramming very dangerous. The latter were not used at the

battle of Chios, so they were probably introduced, as recorded, by Pausistratus in the Antiochic War, even though they had been employed rather differently elsewhere a good deal earlier.

It is evident that though from c.200 B.C. onwards the composition of the Rhodian fleet did not differ much from that of other contemporary fleets, there existed considerable differences in the tactical employment of the battle-line. This -- the use of the diecplous and the ram -- was based on the skill of the Rhodian crews, their resourcefulness and bravery. These qualities lay at the bottom of the Rhodian successes at sea, and are continually stressed by ancient authorities; speed, skill and courage were, to the historians of the Roman age, the keynote of the Rhodian fleet[175]. This superiority in battle was therefore due mainly to the excellence of the crews and this, it can hardly be questioned, was in turn due to the custom -- if it was nothing more rigid than custom -- that service in the navy was with few exceptions restricted to Rhodian full citizens. Combined however, with this excellence in fighting material went a great skill in the construction of new weapons. It was not so much that the Rhodians invented new weapons; but, in an age in which new types of ships were widely used, they did not hesitate to revive or continue old ideas of tactics, and to borrow adapt ideas for weapons of defence which had proved their worth in the past. Adaptability and native inventiveness seem to have been characteristic of the Rhodians in at

least this sphere.

From 190 B.C. no important developments are observable The Rhodian fleet apparently settled down into its position as a highly efficient fleet with its own distinctive tactics and its own outstanding merits. References which survive for the period 189-164 B.C. add little to our knowledge of the navy[176], and nothing to alter in any way the conclusions already reached.

II. Rhodian Ships.

A few remarks regarding the types of ship employed by the Rhodians are a necessary supplement to the foregoing discussion on naval policy and strategy. There is no evidence that any class of ship was confined to Rhodes, although it is possible that certain types of aphract, notably the triemiolia[177], were employed on a larger scale at Rhodes than elsewhere, as a result of the continued use of such vessels against the Aegean pirates.

The ships employed by the Rhodians in common with the rest of the Hellenistic world may be divided into two categories according to weight and design, (a) cataphracts, and (b) aphracts[178]. The fundamental distinction in construction between these two categories was that in the former the rower was protected by a roof above him, and perhaps by a continuation of the out-rigger (παρεξειρεσία)[179], produced to meet the roof, to shield him on his open side. The deck served also if necessary as an area for marine

operations, if the ship was boarded. All ships from the trireme upwards were constructed in this manner, although in the fifth and fourth centuries the term had been used of triremes only[180]. There is no indication that the Rhodian penteres and tetreres differed in construction from any other cataphracts of the same class[181] except for the addition of various devices that have already been discussed.

It was the aphracts of the Rhodian navy which made it famous[182], though it was skill in handling these light, undecked ships, rather than the ships themselves, which were the main cause of that fame. Remarks made by ancient authors regarding aphracts are nearly always vague, or worse, hopelessly inaccurate, and it is impossible to discover in what way Rhodian vessels differed from those of other navies. There are, indeed, certain indications in our ancient authorities that the Aegean communities and the cities of Asia Minor used on the whole the same classes of light ships[183]. The only aphracts - other than triremes which require no discussion -- known from literary and epigraphical evidence to have formed part of the Rhodian navy are (a) ἀκάτια (b) δίκροτα and (c) τριημιολίαι and ἡμιολίαι.

(a) The ἀκάτιον is recorded only once as being employed in the Rhodian fleet. During the siege of 305-4, the fire-ships that were used in the attempt to set fire to the ships carrying Demetrius' siege-engines, were of this type[184]. The vessel was commonly used for a variety of purposes, some of

which seem contradictory; thus it was used by pirates[185], while the larger type, the ἄκατος was used as a corn ship[186]; the term was used of Charon's barge[187], while a passage in Polybius[188] suggests that the largest ἀκάτια were of the same size as, or slightly smaller than triremes, and penteconters[189]. Regarding the complement of the ship, Strabo tells us that it carried a crew of between thirty and thirty-five[190], while Lucian gives a figure of fifty for the ἄκατος [191]. It may then be supposed that the complement of an akation was about a quarter of that of a Rhodian triemiolia, which was probably slightly under one hundred[192], and the vessel itself correspondingly smaller. The akation, if it is permitted to argue from silence in a matter for which the evidence is so slight, was not a regular ship of the Rhodian navy; The phrases στρατευόμενος ἐν ἀκατίοις or ἄρχων ἀκατίων never occur in honorific inscriptions, though it is possible that they were in such inscriptions subsumed under the more general title, ἔφρακτα . The fact that ἀκάτια are mentioned only in a single passage of Diodorus raises the suspicion that on this occasion they may have been captured from pirates, and used in an emergency for this self-destroying task.

(b) The δίκροτον was a regular Rhodian warship. One inscription refers to an individual as τριηραρχήσαντα δικρότου[193], and another mentions a command held in an ἐπίκωπον πλοῖον δικρότου[194]. The term δίκροτον was applied, not to a specific type of ship, but to a whole class of ships which had a common factor in

the fact that the oarsmen sat in two squads, fore (κάτω) and aft (ἄνω)[195]. It could therefore be applied to any vessel below the trireme -- diremes, and moneres. It is specifically applied to a triakonter[196] -- a ship with thirty oars, fifteen on either side, each rowed by a single man -- and to a Liburnian[197]. A passage of Appian[198] shows that the term δίκροτος did not apply to the hemiolia, and it probably did not apply to the triemiolia either. Thus the trierarchy of the dicroton at Rhodes [illegible] have applied to [illegible] the triemiolia, [illegible] regarded as a separate liturgy[199]. Our knowledge of Rhodian aphracts is too slight to permit us to say what other vessels they included under the term δίκροτον, but it might be inferred from the use of ἐπίκωπος in the phrase quoted above that Rhodian dicrota were more commonly propelled by sail than by oar[200].

(c) The τριημιολία existed at Rhodes throughout the long history of her navy. Vessels of this class were present in 305[201], in the struggle with Demetrius, and its existence in the third century after Christ is also testified[202]. Much uncertainty however exists in regard to its type[203]. Its relation to the ἡμιολία, another ship of uncertain type cannot be determined. It has been held that the two words referred to the same class of ship, and that triemiolia was the exclusively Rhodian form for the more general term ἡμιολία[204] But the form ἡμιολία occurs in one Rhodian inscription[205], while the term triemiolia is found elsewhere than at Rhodes[206]

Moreover Photius carefully distinguishes between the two vessels, when he says that a triemiolia is not thrice the size of the hiemolia, but is a trireme[207], and Callixenus' description of the fleet of Ptolemy Philadelphus, including ships ἀπὸ τετρήρεως μέχρι τριημιολίας also suggests that the triemiolia was akin rather to the trireme than to the hemiolia[208]. The meaning of the prefix τριημι- , like the ἡμι- of hemiolia, with reference to a ship, is unknown[209]. The inference from the false idea of a trireme as possessing superimposed banks of oars, that the hemiolia had one and a half banks of oars[210], may surely be rejected, since apart from a priori reasoning, which is opposed to any idea of superimposed banks, a passage of Appian[211] classes the hemiolia with light single-oared vessels.

Two monuments probably represent triemioliai. The identification of the relief of the stern of a ship[212], carved in the wall on the stairway leading up to the Lindian Acropolis, with a triemiolia, may be regarded as certain, since the ship, or rather, the part of a ship, there portrayed, shows an indentical cross section with a monument representing the prow of a ship, on which there is a dedication by the crew of a triemiolia[213]. However, granted that the ship in the Lindian relief is a triemiolia, the relief is not very informative. The ship shows no marked peculiarities and might represent the stern of a trireme. Its most noticeable features are its outrigger (παρεξειρεσία), ἄφλαστον and στυλίς, while the absence of vents in the outrigger[214], if it be not

artistic licence, may perhaps imply that the oarsmen sat amidships, in that part of the vessel not portrayed in the relief, though if that be so it is not evident why the outrigger should be continued sternwards, unless for protection of the hull. The length of the hull, as visible, is 4m.76, the height of the vessel to the top of the aphlaston 5m.50. That part of the outrigger which is executed is 1.54m. long (outside face)[215]. The complete length cannot however be given since to make such a calculation in default of the whole length of the ship being visible, it is necessary to know the beam, which is, of course, not indicated.

The second monument provides valuable indications of the complement of the triemiolia[216]. On one part of the prow, above the outrigger, is part of an inscription consisting of two long lines (broken on the left), and, below them five columns of names. The first two lines contain the names of the nauarch, or archon of the squadron, followed by the names of his two trierarchs, one of them later to command the Rhodian fleet at the battle of Ephesus[217], and "those who had sailed in the triemiolia"[218]. The supplement of the first two lines is virtually certain[219], and with it the length to which the columns extended on the left. There will have been in all seven columns above the level of the outrigger, of which columns three to seven (the five remaining) will have stopped at the outrigger. According to Blinkenberg's reconstruction[220] the first two columns which are engraved aft of, and above

the level of, the outrigger, will also have continued down to the water-line, below it. Beneath the outrigger, underneath columns three to six, the remainder of the lists were inscribed. The last of all these lists, that is the right hand list below the outrigger, is extant[221], and provides a certain end to the whole inscription, since the stone can be fitted on to the monument at the extreme right, and on the stone, to the right of the list, there is an uninscribed space, showing that there no further names were inscribed. On this reconstruction the total number of names will have been two hundred and eighty-eight[222]. The number of triemioliai, the names of whose crews are recorded, is not certain. Blinkenberg supposed that they were the crews of six ships, comprising two squadrons of three triemioliai, each commanded by a trierarch[223]. There is, however, no indication that a trierarch ever commanded anything more than a single ship[224]. Since therefore there are two trierarchs and one archon in the inscription, it must be supposed that the crews of only three ships are represented. Each vessel will then have had a complement of ninety-six men, about half the complement of a trireme[225]. This calculation, if correct, is of interest, since it means that the triemiolia was not a really light vessel with one man to each oar. For if allowance be made for even twenty epibatai, officers and sailors (a figure which a comparison with the forty three such persons on a tetrere suggests may be on the high side) there remain seventy

six oarsmen, that is thirty-eight rowing on either side of the vessel. This seems an impossibly large number if there was one man to each oar[226]. It therefore seems probable that the oarsmen sat, as in the trireme, a senzile[227]. The difference between the triemiolia and the triereme will then have been one of size and weight rather than of class, and the hypothesis put out long ago, that the triemiolia was a 'light trireme' may be accepted[228].

III Officers and Men.

A. Fleet and squadron officers.

The highest rank in the Rhodian navy was the nauarch. The date of the introduction of the post is uncertain. The earliest nauarch of whom mention survives is Demaratus, the commander of the Rhodian fleet in the campaign against Attalus, the brother of Perdiccas, in 321[229]. It seems likely, however that the office originated at the time of, or shortly after, the synoecism. The title, nauarchus, points less to the model of Athens, where the title was not in use before the Hellenistic age[230], than to that of Sparta, where the office existed in the fifth century[231]. It is perhaps not impossible therefore that the office was not of native Rhodian stock, but was introduced under Spartan influence in the period from 411 to 395. However this may be, the office developed in its own way, apparently independent of foreign influence.

The nauarch at Rhodes possessed two quite distinct functions, that of commander of the naval forces, a post which

existed in peace as in war, and that of plenipotentiary ambassador.

The political authority of the nauarch is best illustrated by the passage of Polybius referring to the dispatch of Theaedetus to Rome in 167, to attempt to secure an alliance[232]. The Rhodian assembly invested him with the rank of nauarch, because it did not wish to pass a psephism in which the desire for an alliance was expressed, through fear of failing in their purpose[233]; that is to say, a rejection of their request by Rome would be more unwelcome if it was public knowledge that the attempt had been made on the authority of the ecclesia, and expressed in a psephism. Theaedetus was therefore appointed nauarch, 'for the nauarch had this power (i.e. that of concluding alliances with foreign states) by the constitution'[234]. This statement indicates that the command held by Theaedetus was the normal nauarchate; the peculiarity lay in the circumstances. Theaedetus did not command a fleet in person; apart from the obvious impossibility of his taking the fleet with him to Rome he was, at eighty[235], too old for such a command. He was however given the post which would enable him to exercise the necessary powers. The fleet during his absence doubtless did not go without a commander, but it cannot be established whether another nauarch was appointed, or whether the active command was in this instance delegated to an hagemon, or an archon[236]. In 154 Astymedes led an embassy to Rome as πρεσβευτὴς καὶ ναύαρχος, in an attempt to induce the Romans to intervene

in the Second Rhodo-Cretan war[237]. On this occasion also it is quite impossible for the nauarch to have held command over the fleet. In more normal circumstances, however, such as during a campaign, the two functions could readily be combined and it was probably for such occasions that the nauarch was originally invested with diplomatic authority. As commander of the Rhodian navy, which formed by far the largest part of the city's fighting forces, and serving away from home for long periods, it was necessary for him to be able to take important decisions without reference to the home government. From this, the particular appointments of Theaedetus and others naturally evolved.

Agesimbrotus, the Rhodian nauarch of 199-7, was present at the conference of Nicaea as the spokesman of Rhodian claims[238]; he had presumably been fully briefed before starting on the campaign, but by virtue of the special powers he possessed by the constitution he could himself make any proposals which might seem advantageous; while, at the same time, if he overstepped the lengths of concession or demand to which the government was prepared to go, his decision could be repudiated. Polybius' obituary notice[239] on the nauarch Theophiliscus also illustrates the political authority of the nauarch, though in an internal matter; it is said of him that it was he who persuaded the Rhodians to ally themselves with Attalus against Philip[240]. Again, Sosilas, who commanded the Rhodian fleet against Nabis in 194, represented

the Rhodian government at the subsequent peace-discussions[241], though there is no suggestion that he, any more than Agesimbrotus, acted on this occasion on his own initiative.

The importance attached to the diplomatic functions of the nauarch is emphasised by the existence of an official known as the σύμβουλος ναυάρχων . Polycles, who held high offices in the state in the early first century B.C. was σύμβουλος ναυάρχων Δαμαγόραι in the year of Mithridates' siege of the city[242]. This office doubtless emerged under Spartan influence. The Spartans during the Peloponnesian war occasionally sent out σύμβουλοι with commanders, whom, for one reason or another, they felt needed watching[243]. These officials had very considerable political and military authority; they could dispose of the units of the fleet in the manner they considered strategically most advisable; they could dismiss a nauarch and appoint his successor[244]. Our knowledge of the Rhodian σύμβουλος is confined to the bare title. But since the reference is to a σύμβουλος acting during the siege of Rhodes it appears likely that the post had become a regular one. In operations in home waters an admiral would hardly be in need of a political adviser, since he would be in touch with the central government. It seems then likely that the σύμβουλος had originally attended the nauarch to advise him on political negotiations which he might undertake in the course of long campaigns abroad, and that he subsequently became a regular official[245].

The epigraphical evidence regarding the nauarchs is

not so abundant as is that regarding the stratagoi[246]. Indeed no surviving inscription recording the past career of the honorand or deceased person, mentions the attainment of the nauarchate, although prytaneis and stratagoi appear in abundance. Even Polycles[247], who held almost every post within the state, never reached the nauarchate. The office may justly be regarded as the peak of a public career at Rhodes. Information regarding it is, however, very slight. No indication survives of the method of election, but it is clear that for an office requiring such technical skill, and involving such responsibilities, the lot was not employed. Equally uncertain is whether the nauarchs were appointed only in war-time, or whether they were peace-time officials as well. In favour of the former alternative is the fact that the nauarchus does not appear in the lists of magistrates[248]; and this interpretation has been supported by various statements in ancient authors referring to the election of nauarchs at the outbreak of a war, but of four passages only one seems necessarily to indicate that the nauarch was elected at the outbreak of the war[249]. Moreover the absence of the nauarch from the list of magistrates is of doubtful significance; the nauarch was not a civil magistrate, nor concerned in any way with civil administration, in the way that the Stratagoi and the Hagemones of subject-territory were. His absence is therefore not very surprising. On the other hand one fact suggests very strongly that the office

existed in peace-time; the existence throughout much of the third century of Rhodian naval squadrons permanently at sea, acting as guardships in the Aegean[250]. Such flotillas may have acted on their own when at sea, but their existence implies the parallel existence of a permanent naval organisation, under the administration of a senior officer. There is nothing to suggest that there was any Rhodian official other than the nauarch, who would have held such a post. It may therefore be supposed that the nauarch was a regularly appointed official in peace as in war, and that the only extraordinary nauarchs were those who were appointed as plenipotentiary envoys.

The length of tenure of office of the nauarchate in war-time is illustrated, but not determined, by the nauarchs of the time of the Second Macedonian War. Theophiliscus, who died in 201 may or may not have held office in that year only, since the admiral of the previous year is not known[251]. On his death he was succeeded by Cleonaeus, his own nomination, who was admiral for the rest of 201[252], and perhaps for 200 also. In 199 Hagesimbrotus was elected, and he held office for at least two consecutive years, 199-8[253]. In 197 the fleet was not at sea, and no name of any nauarch is recorded. Sosilas, who commanded against Nabis in 194[254], probably only did so in one year, since the campaign lasted only one season. In the Antiochic War, Pausistratus was nauarch at the time of the battle of Cape Corycus; in August-

September 191[255]; he was still nauarch the following March when he was killed[256]; since, however, we do not know the date within the year of his appointment, it cannot be decided whether or not this was one year of office or two. Eudamus, who succeeded Pausistratus, held command for the rest of 190, from April to September, when the campaign ended[257].

The names of several nauarchs survive from the third century. Among the documents mentioning them are inscriptions from Delos. Agathostratus, the son of Polyaratus, who commanded the Rhodian fleet at Ephesus in c.258, as nauarch, was honoured at Delos by the Nesiotic League, but he is not called nauarch[258]. Another Delian inscription of the middle of the third century records a dedication by Peisistratus the son of Aristolochus, ναυαρχήσας, καὶ τοὶ συνστρατευσάμενοι[259]. A dedication was also made in the first half of the century by the Rhodians and their nauarch Aristoteles[260]. A fourth inscription[261] belonging to about the middle of the century is of importance as indicating the existence of a permanent fleet at sea, at the time. It is a decree passed by the people of Delos in honour of Antigenes a Rhodian whose function is described by the words αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμο[υ τοῦ Ῥοδίων ναύα]ρχος ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τ[ῶν νεώ]ν καὶ ἐπὶ συμμαχίαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων[262]. With him are honoured his trierarchs, Timaphanes, Dionnus and Hagesandrus; all are described as ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ ... περὶ ... τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων. It is regrettable that the two vital words [ναύα]ρχος and [νήσων] are largely or entirely supplements, though probable ones. However, even

without these two words, the inscription indicates that a senior Rhodian naval officer was appointed to a post ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς. The date of the inscription shows that this was about fifty years before Rhodes controlled the Nesiotic League, from 200 onwards.[263] The use of the preposition ἐπ' with a title indicates that the post was a regular appointment, being parallelled by such offices as the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς χώρας[264]. It is clear therefore that Rhodes exercised her προστασία over the Aegean in the disordered years after the Second Syrian War by means of a regular flotilla whose duty was to protect the lives and property of the islanders. The Islanders themselves apparently took no part in the operation, in contrast to the method employed after 200, when the Islanders were required to provide contingents for this task themselves under supreme command of a Rhodian ἄρχων ἐπὶ τῶν πλοίων τῶν νησιωτικῶν[265]. The nauarchos ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν νήσων was doubtless a subordinate of the nauarch properly so-called, since it does not seem likely that for the period when Rhodes exercised her προστασία, the chief admiral himself took this particularized title. The office probably fell into abeyance at the end of the century, when the Nesiotic League was re-established.

Next below the nauarchus come the naval "ἄρχοντες", a title which is also used of commanders of individual ships such as triemioliai, though instances of this are rare and probably exceptional[266]. Several inscriptions record dedications made overseas, in the islands or in Crete, by an

archon and two trierarchs[267]. Since in each instance the archon is described as commanding more than one ship, as ἓξ ἓκων τριηρέων or ἓξ ἓκων ἀφράκτων, there can be little doubt that they were squadron-commanders[268]. The normal Rhodian squadron consisted [redacted] of three ships, each ship, or at least two of them, commanded by a trierarchus[269]. Inscriptions frequently mention the ἓξ ἓκων ἀφράκτων[270], and also encountered are the ἓξ ἓκων πεντηρέων,[271], ἓξ ἓκων τετρηρέων[272], and τετρημιολιῶν[273].

The absence from our records of an ἓξ ἓκων πεντηρέων is probably fortuitous. The ἓξ ἓκων will then fall in the chain of command between the nauarch and the trierarch who commanded the individual ship. In 305, each detachment of three ships was sent out under archon as an independent unit[274], but in the large fleets of the early second century there would have been sometimes as many as twelve such officers[275].

Τριήραρχοι occur in several inscriptions[276]. The trierarchia at Rhodes, as at Athens, was a liturgy, but the Rhodian differed from the Athenian in one important respect. At Athens it was customary for the state to co-operate with the trierarch in his liturgy to the extent of fitting out certain parts of the ship ἀπὸ τοῦ δημοσίου[277]. A statement of Aristotle however indicates a different practice at Rhodes. The passage[278], which probably refers to the period of the Social War[279], says that the γνώριμοι took action against the demos because the demagogues made payments for public services, and forbade the repayment to the trierarchs of the state's debt to them. The γνώριμοι were compelled, in the face

of threatened legislation, to combine to destroy the demos. No other example of this system of liturgy followed by repayment by the state is known[280]. In it may possibly be seen an attempt by the early democratic reformers to meet opposition to the liturgy by the wealthy section in the city. The state, eventually, either from policy, or because of an empty treasury, at the time of the Social War, did not honour this obligation. From the inscription recording the career of Polycles[281], in the early first century B.C. it is evident that, as at Athens, the liturgy had to be undertaken in peace no less than in war, and that it might, like other liturgies, fall on the same individual more than once. Whether there was, as at Athens, a minimum interval before which the second liturgy was required, is not known.

As elsewhere in the Greek world, the trierarch not only fitted out his ship; he also commanded it. References in inscriptions to trierarchs, and to tenure of office as trierarch[282], do not tell us whether the trierarch commanded in person. Reference has already been made to the dedications made outside Rhodes by the archon of a detachment and his subordinate trierarchs[283]; these all indicate that the trierarch was commanding in person. Perhaps the clearest example of this is from Polybius' account of the battle of Chios, where he says of one pentere, ἐφ' ἧς στρατηγεῖ[284], and any possible doubt there might be that Philostratus commanded in person, is removed by a reference to him later

in the battle[285]. Within the squadron of three ships, it might be expected that each ship would be commanded by a trierarch, but the evidence of the dedications, which show only two trierarchs[286], suggests that the third ship was commanded by the archon in his flag-ship. Whether or not a trierarch also served on this ship is doubtful; there is no evident reason why, if he did, he should not have been included in the dedication, even if the command of the ship lay with the archon.

It is clear from inscriptions that triremes were not the only ships to whose equipment and command the trierarchy applied. References exist to trierarchs of penteres, tetreres aphracts and dicrota[287]. The trierarchy of a trireme is on the other hand never expressly indicated, and it may therefore be supposed that when the word τριήραρχος or τριηραρχήσας occurs by itself, the reference is to command of a trireme. That the trierarchy should have been extended, in the later Hellenistic age, to heavier classes of vessels than the trireme is only natural, since the heavy vessels became increasingly important, and the trireme less so. The same term continued to be used, since it had become familiar both for the liturgy and for the command.

Circumstances can easily be envisaged in which the trierarch would be unable to command his own vessel, and a

substitute had to be provided. This position would normally be filled by the κυβερνήτης [288], who in Greek ships of all periods was the real commander, because of his experience and technical knowledge. It has however been suggested that the command of the trireme fell not on the κυβερνήτης but on the official called the ἐπίπλους, who occurs in four Rhodian inscriptions, which divulge nothing of the nature of the office, and in Polybius' narrative of the battle of Chios.[289]

This view is not without its difficulties. [redacted] The four reference in inscriptions all mention the epiplous in such a way as to suggest that he commanded a ship; thus in the first inscription[290] he is mentioned after the archon (?) and the trierarchs, in the heading of a dedication by a crew of a tetrere; in the second[291] an honorand is said to have served in two different triemiolia[292], under an archon (?) and epiplous; while the third[293] refers to crews which served in triemioliai under an archon and epiplous. The passage of Polybius refers to a Rhodian pentere ἣν ἐκυβέρνα μὲν Ἀπόλλοκος, ἐπέπλει δὲ Νικόστρατος[294]. Segre[295] argued on the basis of the first two of these inscriptions, that there was a clear distinction between a ship commanded by trierarch and one commanded by an epiplous, that the epiplous was identical with the official who occurs in inscriptions with the title ἐπιπλοπλεύς or ἐπιπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ τριηράρχου[296], and that the explanation of both these terms was that the ἔπαρχος or ἐπιπεμφθείς commanded

the ship when the trierarch was unable to do so. But on the one hand the archon and the epiplous are found together even when no trierarchs are recorded, and on the other hand though in two inscriptions, the epiplous is mentioned alongside two trierarchs, in others[297] which give the name of two trierarchs, no epiplous is recorded. It is thus evident that though the connection of the epiplous with the archon appears certain, the combination of trierarchs and ἐπίπλους may be fortuitous. Further the passage from Polybius shows that the kubernatas was in charge of the ship in the absence of the trierarch; had the epiplous commanded there would have been no reason to mention the kubernatas. The supposition that the ἔπιπλους commanded the ship in the absence of the trierarch is not then satisfactory.

The close connection between the archon and the epiplous was recognised by Blinkenberg[298], who supposed that the latter was the commander of the epibatai, a post not otherwise mentioned in our evidence. But this is a conjecture which is unsupported by the evidence, which does not suggest a connection between the ἐπίπλους and the epibatai. Investigation of the meaning of the term ἔπιπλους in other parts of the Hellenistic world yields more promising results. Harpocration[299] glosses the word δίοπος by δίοπος λέγεται ὁ διέπων καὶ ἐποπτεύων τὰ κατὰ τὴν ναῦν, ὃν καθ' ἡμᾶς λαμβάνομεν ἔπιπλουν, while there are several instances in papyri of the Ptolemaic period[300], indicating that in Egypt the epiplous was ship's overseer of a transport vessel. This, like the gloss of Harpocration, suggests that the epiplous was an administrative

post, and not a battle-command. At the same time the Rhodian inscriptions show that the epiplous was attached to the archon whether he was commanding a fleet or only a single vessel. It is therefore possible that the [redacted] was responsible for the administration and upkeep of vessels commanded by the archon. At Athens such upkeep would fall on the individual trierarch who was required to make good any damage that the ship might have suffered other than through enemy action[301]. At Rhodes, however, the trierarch only lent the money for shipbuilding to the state, which would have to make good any damage that might occur. It is therefore possible that an 'overseer' was posted with each squadron commander, whose task was to look after the material condition of the ship on behalf of the state.

Two other officials with uncertain tasks are the ἐπιστολεύς or ἐπιστολεὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ τριηράρχου, who occur in two inscriptions only, once with either verb[302], and the ἀγεμών. The former has been equated with the epiplous[303] but on insufficient evidence. The ἐπιστολεύς occurs in a context similar to that in which the epiplous is also found but that is not sufficient to establish the identity of the two offices. It seems more probable that the ἐπιστολεύς was so called because he was detached by his trierarch for some particular task[304]. The ἀγεμών occurs five times: once in the phrase ἀγεμὼν τετρήρεων καὶ φιλικίδων τετρήρεων[305], once as ἀγεμόνος ἐν τοῖς ἀφράκτοις[306], once as ἀγεμόνος πεντήρεων κατὰ πόλεμον[307], once as ἀγεμὼν τετρήρους κατὰ πόλεμον[308], and once as

ἀρχιὼν τῶν ἡμιολίων[309]. Segre again identifies this Hagemon with the epiplous[310], but this can hardly be correct. It is clear from the fact that in all cases except one the number of ships of which an individual was hagemon is in the plural, that the command was on a level with that of an ἄρχων or squadron-leader, while the addition in two instances of the words κατὰ πόλεμον suggests that the post was a regular peace-time one. It is possible that sometimes an intermediary officer was appointed between the nauarchus and the archontes.[311]

The organisation of the squadrons and higher formations of the navy appears then to have been as follows. The whole fleet was commanded by the nauarch. To him, either immediately or through an hagemon, were subordinate the squadron commanders archontes; these in their turn normally commanded three ships, which would usually be under the command of the trierarch, the individual called upon to shoulder the liturgy of the trierarchia.

More information survives regarding the organisation of the individual ships. Four inscriptions, one of the third, the others of the first, century B.C., contain lists of crews, who made dedications after a campaign, to some deity. The most important of these dedications contains a full list of officers, sailors and epibatai, the complement of a tetrere, a total of forty-three persons, oarsmen being omitted[312]. Two others are similar, but shorter and in-

complete[313]. The fourth list, that of the third or early second century, is also fragmentary[314]. These inscriptions are collectively sufficiently similar for them to be used as evidence for the composition of the crew of a Rhodian ship. There is, however, one difficulty: the type of ship to which the crew belongs is recorded in only one -- the longest -- of these inscriptions. The crew here recorded belonged to a tetrere[315]. However, the difference between the crews of a pentere, tetrere and trireme, and the aphracts presumably lay rather in numbers than in difference of function and office, though some of the terms which occur in one or other of the incomplete inscriptions do not occur in the complete one[316].

The κυβερνάτας is normally placed at the head of the list of dedicants, or if the trierarch is mentioned, immediately after him[317]. This indicates his position as chief ship's-officer. By origin the pilot of the ship, the κυβερνάτας already in the fifth century had become an important person in whose hands lay the whole handling of the ship at sea[318]. At Rhodes his importance is indicated by the reference to the κυβερνάτας Autolycus at the battle of Chios[319]. The reason for this growth in importance is not far to seek; the system of command in Greek navies, by means of trierarchs who might be totally unfitted to command a ship in action, would lead inevitably to the growth in importance of the senior member of the technical services, on whom the

trierarch could rely in danger or difficulty.

Below the κυβερνήτης comes the πρωρεύς [320]. In the dedication by the crew of the tetrere the πρωρεύς is the dedicand, and therefore does not figure in the body of the text[321]. He is however mentioned in the two shorter lists[322], and the office is included among those held by individuals, in the record of their careers[323]. The primary and original task of the πρωρεύς was to stand in the prow of the ship, and direct the man at the stern, the πρωλιοῦχος, by word and gesture[324]. In the course of time, however, his function developed along with that of the κυβερνήτης and he is described as the latter's subordinate[325]. In two inscriptions the post held by the πρωρεύς is denoted in the plural πρωρατεύσαντα τριηρέων [326] and πρωρατεύσαντα τριημιολίαν [327], thus indicating that the πρωρεύς did not necessarily serve continuously on one ship.

Next in the lists comes the κελευστής [328], originally controller of the rhythm of the oars. This office appears to have developed into something akin to the modern quartermaster; the duty of the κελευστής being to see that the crew's rations were equally divided[329]. Next to the κελευστής comes the πεντηκόνταρχος [330]. He, like the κελευστής, occurs only in two lists, and there is no indication of his function in the Rhodian fleet. In the Athenian navy an official of this name was apparently some kind of supply officer, and perhaps responsible for daily expenditure[331].

In some of the Rhodian lists occurs the ναύαρχος [332]. This term was normally employed of a shipbuilder[333], equivalent

to τέκτων , but its use in the sense of 'ship's carpenter' is testified outside Rhodes[334], and is certainly the meaning in these inscriptions.

All these posts, from the kubernatas, down to the ship's carpenter were necessary members of any ship's complement, and it cannot be supposed that there is anything specifically Rhodian about them[335]. There are, however, certain other posts, which are no parallels exist elsewhere, and which suggest a considerable degree of particularisation in the Rhodian fleet. Of these the most interesting is the ἀγεύμενος τῶν ἔργων , mentioned only once[336]. This was apparently a lower rank than that of πρωρεύς , but at the same time it was probably a more specialised task. It has been suggested[337] that he was in charge of the ἐργαζόμενοι , who may have been responsible for the maintenance of sails and other equipment. But the person honoured in the single inscription in which the office occurs, was evidently ἀγεύμενος τῶν ἔργων on a previous occasion, since in the inscription he is called πρωρεύς , and is not likely to have combined the two offices. Since therefore ἐργαζόμενοι occur[338] among those who honoured him when he was πρωρεύς, but a ἀγεύμενος τῶν ἔργων does not, it follows either that on this occasion (and therefore perhaps on all other occasions) the ἐργαζόμενοι were not under a ἀγεύμενος τῶν ἔργων , or else that though the ἀγεύμενος commanded them, he was omitted from the dedication[339]. A connection between

the ἀρχέμενος τῶν ὅπλων and the ὁπλοποιοί cannot therefore be demonstrated. It is possible that ὅπλα is here used in the sense of μηχαναί [340], and that the ἀρχέμενος τῶν ὅπλων was responsible for the upkeep of all the weapons of war the tetrere carried.

Another office, recorded only once, is that of γραμματεὺς τριηράρχου καὶ ταμίου [341]. It is found in a simpler form in another inscription, possibly of Milesian origin, in which a γραμματεύς is mentioned after the trierarchs[342]. In the Rhodian inscription this official occurs after the ἐπιστρεφθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν τριηράρχων. The office itself needs no explanation -- it is another example of the extreme fondness of the Rhodians for secretariats. It implies, however, the existence of a ταμίας on each ship, whose function was presumably to pay the crews. Duties similar to this however appear also to have lain within the province of the πεντηκόνταρχος and the division of duties between the two officials cannot be certainly determined: it is possible that the latter was a subordinate for the former[343].

A single reference to a δεκατάρχας survives[344]. The term does not appear to have been used elsewhere in the Greek world in a naval context[345], so that its meaning must remain uncertain. It is possible that he commanded a group of ten oars on one side of the ship[346], and would thus be subordinate

to the τοίχαρχος -- if such an office existed in the Hellenistic navies[347]. The objection to this view is that since even the smallest ship had more than ten oarsmen, one would expect to find more than one δεκάρχας . Further the absence of the title from the main lists of crews suggests that it was not a regular office.

There remain to consider the humbler members of the crew, sailors with particular tasks to perform. Of these the most important was the πρωρεύς . In the only Rhodian list in which he is mentioned[348], he appears directly after the πυκνίτης and before the ἐρεσσόμενοι . In his hands lay the actual steering of the ship, for he stood at the helm. He was thus the understudy of the κυβερνήτης , and possibly occupied a position rather superior to that of the other ratings. The separation here of the functions of the πρωρεύς and the κυβερνήτης emphasises the change in the status of the latter; this same distinction is made as early as Aristophanes[349]. In the Rhodian inscription in which the πρωρεύς occurs, he is, apart from the ship's doctor, the only foreigner in the crew[350].

Next after the πρωρεύς , in the same inscription, come the ἐρεσσόμενοι . Here they are divided into two groups ἐρεσσόμενοι ἐν πρώρᾳ and ἐρεσσόμενοι ἐν πρύμνᾳ ; in other lists they appear simply as ἐρεσσόμενοι [351]. Their numbers fluctuate; here they number five each in prow and stern, in another list there are only three in all[352] and in another six[353]. The

variations may possibly be explained on the hypothesis that whereas in the one instance, where five in prow and five in stern are mentioned, the vessel is a tetrere, in the others they may be triremes or aphracts. Their tasks were probably as vague as their title suggests -- prow-hands and stern-hands, whose main tasks will have been to look after the sails, rudder, anchor and so on. The number is not excessive for this purpose; in the Venetian light galleys before 1540, eight men were employed for such duties[354]. It is equally possible that they were technical hands concerned with the upkeep of the engines of war, even if the term seems rather vague for so precise a task.

Other posts of minor importance were that of κωποδέτας[355], of ἐλαιοχρήστας, of ἀλεκτρυωνοφύλαξ and φύλαξ, and finally ἰατρός, ship's doctor. Of these all except the last are known only from Rhodes, but the existence of such essential persons as the κωποδέτης in other navies can hardly be doubted. A notice in Photius indicates that the original duty of the κωποδέτας was to see that the oars were strapped to the tholes by leather thongs[356]. Subsequently, no doubt, his duties extended to the general upkeep of the oars. The ἐλαιοχρήστης[357] was presumably responsible for the provision (in a non-liturgical sense) of the olive-oil required on ship, for numerous purposes including the anointing of the bodies of the rowers[358]. The ἀλεκτρυωνοφύλαξ and φύλαξ are also mentioned in one

inscription[359]. It has been suggested that they were responsible for keeping watch over the rowers[360], and this suggestion is perhaps supported by the fact that they are mentioned in the inscription together with the κυβερνήτης and the παρακαθήμενοι. However the former title perhaps suggests rather that they were responsible for guarding the ship itself, against mishaps such as fire, which must have been an ever present danger on ancient ships. A permanent, or a night-guard, would be an elementary precaution.

The ship's doctor as foreigner from Syrian Tripolis[361] is parallelled from a list of a Coan crew[362]. It is perhaps surprising that at Rhodes, so near Cos, for long a centre of medical training, a citizen could not be found for the task, but since the post required particular qualifications service could not be arbitrarily restricted to Rhodian citizens. It is of interest to note that the only other doctor of whom we know at Rhodes was also a foreigner[363].

One final class remains for discussion, the παρακαθήμενοι. These occur in two inscriptions; in one the word [παρακαθ]ήμενοι is followed by three names, after the last of which the stone is broken[364]; in the other, a sepulchral inscription, the deceased is stated to have sailed ἐν τοῖς παρακαθημένοις [365]. The word in a naval context appears to have been confined to Rhodes[366]. Various explanations of the term have been suggested; that they were the oarsmen[367], that they were the epibatai[368], marine troops, and that they were passengers on

board ship[369]. The last interpretation may probably be rejected, since it is not likely that it would be recorded on a tombstone that an individual had been a passenger on a ship; moreover the whole context indicates that the word denoted a normal naval service. The second interpretation that they were epibatai is equally unsatisfactory, since ἐπιβάται were called ἐπιβάται at Rhodes[370], and it is not easy to see why the term παρακαθήμενοι should be employed in the same significance. There remains the alternative that they are the rowers of the ship. The obscurity of the term remains. The normal term for rowers is ἐρέται; why should it not be employed? The question may be unanswerable, but the important fact is that there is no other possible reference to rowers in the Rhodian crew-lists. Moreover the term 'those who sat alongside' might be used appropriately of rowers. Unfortunately the number of παρακαθήμενοι cannot be determined. That they, like the bulk of the complement of a Rhodian vessel, were Rhodian citizens is shown by the sepulchral inscription in which the term occurs; for this is the tombstone of a full Rhodian[371]. The inference from the fact that a παρακαθήμενος might be a Rhodian citizen to the conclusion that he necessarily was, is less dangerous than might appear, since non-citizens are extremely rare in the Rhodian navy.

There is nothing surprising in ship's rowers being full citizens. In the Athenian navy of the fifth century the oarsmen were indeed a mixed bag, consisting of metics,

citizens, and slaves, since only thus could the heavy demands on an imperial fleet be met[372]; but in the less ambitious days of the fourth century, when the Athenian fleet was smaller, the oarsmen were primarily Athenian citizens[373]. Even in the fifth century, moreover, 'to push an oar' was regarded as the honour and duty of the humble Athenian citizen, and Aristophanes has harsh words for those who shirked their duties in this respect[374]. That the Rhodians had the same tradition is in no way remarkable. Moreover, there can be no doubt that members of the crew such as the κωπηδέται and the ἐλαιοχρῆσται, who must have been originally oarsmen, or whom were drawn from the same level of society, were full citizens[375].

This fact, if so it may be regarded, that Rhodian oarsmen, κωπηδέται, ἐργαζόμενοι [illegible] and so on, were by tradition full Rhodian citizens, is of fundamental importance for the understanding of the Rhodian navy, since, as has been shown, the tradition placed severe restrictions upon the numbers of ships which could be manned[376]. There was thus a conflict between a social order in which the privilege of service in the navy was restricted to a few, and the demands of national defence. The system won the day, and was not disadvantageous. The Rhodian navy might pride itself on the skill and devotion of its rowers -- features much stressed by Polybius and Livy[377]. This reliance on οἰκεῖα, and not

ὠκυτὴ δύναμις, was one cause of the great successes of the Rhodian navy.

The complement of a Hellenistic cataphract was not confined to naval personnel. It included also marines, whose primary duty was to fight on deck, and to engage the enemy on his own deck, if battle by boarding was joined. These are included in the dedications made by Rhodian crews, a distinction being made between the simple marines, epibatai and the specialist troops, such as the τοξόται, and the καταπελταφέται. The strength of the epibatai[378] apparently varied between sixteen and twenty for a tetrere at Rhodes, as elsewhere in the Hellenistic world. An Athenian trireme of the fifth century had ten[379], and it is surprising to find not more than double that number on a tetrere[380]. A Rhodian decree of the early third century, which gives the appointments made by the damos for an expedition against pirates, mentions two ἐπιβάται, one ἐπιβάτας ἐπὶ τᾶς τετρήρεος, and one ἐπιβάτας ἐπὶ τῶν φυλακίδων[381]. It is possible that the individual ἐπιβάται here mentioned were in command of the other ἐπιβάται, since we hear of no separate title to denote such a person[382]. The lists of crews shows that out of a total of forty-five ἐπιβάται none are foreigners[383]. Moreover the τοξόται and καταπελταφέται are also Rhodian citizens[384]. This is of interest as showing that whereas in her army Rhodes followed the Hellenistic practice of the large-scale employment of mercenaries[385], in marine posts, where soldiers were required, she preferred to use

citizens.

The τοξόται are in one dedication three in number, in another six[386]. The καταπαλτάφεται are two in one inscription, one in another[387]. Both these figures seem very low, and it appears likely that the καταπαλτάφεται were in command of the sling machines, and that the labour for them was taken either from the ἐργαζόμενοι at either end of the ship or from the epibatai. The appearance of naval catapults on a Rhodian tetrere of the early first century B.C. is of interest, since it has been maintained[388] that, apart from one or two unsuccessful attempts the use of the catapult at sea was not introduced until the Roman civil wars. The possibility thus arises that the Romans learnt of them from the Rhodians.

The complement of a Rhodian man of war consisted then first of the officers and semior ratings from the trierarch down to the κωπηδέτας, secondly of the oarsmen, and thirdly the marines, epibatai and specialist troops. Collectively the complement was known as τοὶ ἐπιβέοντες[389], the crew itself, at least at a later date, as τὸ πλήρωμα[390]. In dedications, honorific inscriptions, and in records of individual careers the most common expression for the entire force, naval and military is τοὶ στρατευόμενοι or συστρατευόμενοι, followed by the type of ship in which the parties had served[391]. Service in the fleet, in general terms, was described by the term στρατεύεσθαι ἐν τᾶς ἀφράκτοις καὶ ἐνάλοις ναυσὶ, though one or other of these two terms was frequently omitted[392]. Another common phrase is

στρατεύεσθαι ἐν τριημιολίαι

term στρατευόμενος is used to express naval or military service of the lowest rank, and is customarily recorded right at the beginning of the record of a career[394]. The term τὸ συστρατευόμενοι is used in the only surviving dedication to the gods, made in honour of a senior officer by his subordinates, who are called τοὶ συστρατευόμενοι [395], and in honorific inscriptions for individuals[396].

The complement of each ship together with the fighting troops sometimes formed a κοινόν , sometimes while still on active service, usually after returning home, for purposes of religious worship. Such κοινὰ συστρατευσαμένων reflect the esprit de corps, which characterised the Rhodian armed forces. Some of the κοινὰ τῶν (συν)στρατευσαμένων or στρατευομένων included both the military στρατευόμενοι , that is the mercenary troops, and the naval crews, the former being thus admitted to more intimate contact with the full citizens who served in the navy, than would perhaps otherwise have been possible. κοινά of which the foreign soldiers were members may thus have played an important part in the Rhodian military system[397].

The writers of later antiquity had many fine things to say of the Rhodian navy, though all in the most general terms[398]. It was, however, generally agreed that Rhodes had a very fine navy, and that its excellence depended not on its size (which is never mentioned directly)[399], but on the speed

of its ships, the skill of its oarsmen, the unexpectedness of the naval tactics and the range of the mechanical devices employed. The two fundamental elements in the success of the navy were the composition of the fleet and the construction of its ships; from this, in any fleet, the rest follows. These two items yield the following analysis: (1) The Rhodian fleet was apparently small, certainly highly successful, at the end of the fourth century. From the end of the third century, if not earlier, it was far larger, and though still most successful, there are indications -- at the rout at Lade, the bad deployment at Side -- that the new fleet was less well trained than the old one had been. (2) The Rhodian fleet was composed of light ships. Of these we know very little; and the main vessel of war was originally the trireme, In the later period heavier ships are introduced, especially tetreres and penteres but the tradition of light ships survives, especially in the continued use of such vessels as the triemiolia. These light vessels may have owed their development to the constant need of such vessels felt by the Rhodians in their continuous wars against the pirates of the eastern Aegean. The tradition of rowing which had grown up in the days of the light ships, continued into the period when heavier vessels were employed. (3) The quality of the Rhodian naval personnel was assured by the virtual restriction of service in the navy to Rhodian citizens. Although this meant a considerable restriction in the size of

the fleet that could be put to sea, this was compensated by the good training and skill of the crews. This condition of training was further enhanced by the fact that from the middle of the third century a permanent flotilla was kept at sea. (4) Within the individual ship there was a considerable decree of specialisation, such as is found also at Athens and Cos. Each individual had his particular task. The advantages of this in action are obvious, but the little we know of the fleets of the Hellenistic monarchs does not suggest that the fact was universally appreciated.

Chapter VI.

The Rhodian army.

The fame of Rhodes in antiquity rested primarily on its navy, and it cannot be disputed that that navy decisively influenced Mediterranean history in the third and second centuries B.C. Nevertheless no naval power, of the international importance of Rhodes can wholly neglect its army. The problem with which Rhodian governments were, it may be supposed, faced, was to reconcile the overriding claims of the navy, with the need to maintain a trained army, in the face of the limitations of citizen man-power.

The Rhodian army has left few traces, which do not enable us to understand the growth of the army. Only the record of ~~a~~ few isolated events from which few conclusions can be drawn, have survived. In spite of this there is, however, good reason for supposing that a change came over Rhodian policy in regard to the army in the late fourth or early third century -- probably about a century before the change which is apparent in naval policy. ~~It~~ That change is, briefly, that in the fifth and fourth centuries evidence exists for the large-scale employment by foreign states of bands of Rhodian mercenaries, particularly specialist-troops; while from the third century until the end of our period it appears to have been customary for Rhodes herself to employ mercenaries troops, and levies of

citizens from subject territory, only the higher commands being retained by Rhodian citizens; while for the same period few Rhodians appear to have served as mercenaries abroad. This suggests ~~in the first mark~~ that Rhodians in this period had appreciated the fact that restrictions in man-power rendered it imperative for citizen-service to be restricted to the navy, on which the ultimate safety of the state depended. This inference can be neither disproved nor proved, since the evidence on which it is based is too slight for it to be possible to regard it as representative -- but it seems at least a possible hypothesis.

Apart from two references to early, possibly unhistorical, land-campaigns in the Lindian Chronicle[1], the earliest reference to Rhodian troops occurs in Thucydides' account of the Athenian forces which went to Sicily in 415[2]; these included seven hundred Rhodian σφενδονῆται -- slingers. The Athenians are not recorded as having employed other slingers in this expedition. The presumption that the Rhodians were distinguished at least among the members of the Athenian Empire for their skill in this arm is borne out by events in Asia Minor some sixteen years later. During the retreat of the Ten Thousand in 399, in the area of the river Zapatas, east of the Tigris, Mithridates' bowmen and slingers outranged the

Greek rearguard[3]. Xenophone overcame this by employing the Rhodians in his ranks, 'of whom the majority were said to be expert in the use of the sling, and whose missiles carried double the distance of the Persian shot. For the slings of the latter, employing handshaped stone missiles, carry only a short distance, while the Rhodians are familar also with the use of lead shot'[4].

In the Greek world as a whole the Baleares, the people of the Balearic Islands, were the main source of trained slingers[5], but it is likely that the Rhodians were the best slingers normally available in the east Greek world. The passage of Xenophon suggests that the popularity of Rhodian slingers was due to the fact that they were unique in using lead instead of stone missiles. There is no indication of an earlier use of lead shot, so that it may be supposed that the Rhodians introduced its employment[6]. The advantages of the new shot were obvious to Xenophon: increased range and perhaps accuracy. The interest shown by Rhodes in the improvement of small arms corresponds to the similar interest shown in naval engineering -- the designing of new types of ships, special devices for ramming, and so on. In a small matter such as the type of shot used for slings Rhodes could not hope to maintain a monopoly, and soon lead-missiles became the normal shot[7].

After the episode recorded by Xenophon, nothing more is

heard of Rhodian slingers, their place apparently being taken by Aetolians, and other peoples of west Greece, and finally by the Achaeans and Cretans, the slingers and bowmen most employed in the Hellenistic armies[8].

Also to the fourth century belong numerous mercenary leaders of Rhodian origin, some of whom rose to pre-eminence in contemporary warfare. Of these the most distinguished were Memnon and Mentor, the brothers who held high command under the Great King[9]. Others are Antenor, praised by the Athenians for his bravery in Asia 'with Alexander the King'[10], Aristoteles, the master of Phocaea[11], and Temenus, who failed to take Teos[12]. All testify to the continuation in the city throughout the fourth century of a military tradition. There is nothing to suggest that generals of this type originally commanded mercenary detachments of Rhodian troops.

Rhodian mercenaries are also mentioned at the time of the siege of Rhodes in 305. On this occasion Ptolemy Soter sent five hundred mercenaries to the besieged city under the leadership of Athenagoras of Miletus[13]. Among these was an unspecified number of Rhodians who had been serving as mercenaries in Egypt. There is no other evidence for the activity of Rhodian mercenaries in the fourth century[14]. The little already noticed only, if at all, becomes significant in contrast with the total absence during the same period of any reference to Rhodians in the Rhodian army.

From 304 to 164 B.C. the evidence, rather more bulky,

appears to tell a different story. First of all, there are signs of spasmodic military activity by Rhodes in this period; first the acquisition of a portion of Caria, perhaps to be attributed to the period between the battles of Ipsus and Corupedion[15]; next the participation of Rhodian troops in the capture of Ephesus by an Antiochus[16]; the campaign against Philip V in Caria from 201 to 197[17]; the operations against Mylasa and Alabanda in 167[18]; and, above all, the protracted struggle with the Lycians[19], and, as an appendix to that, the assistance given by Rhodes to Calynda against Caunus in 164[20]. In all this activity there is, however, no indication, except in the instance of the forces employed against Philip[21], whether the troops were Rhodian citizens or drawn from subject-territory, or mercenary-troops.

Inscriptions of the period do, however, give some information regarding the composition of the Rhodian army at this time. The supreme command was vested in the stratagoi, of whom ten were elected annually, some with special posts, such as στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσω, others presumably having command of troops in action in the normal manner[22]. Subordinate in the field to the stratagoi were the Hagemones. The field-commanders of this name are probably to be distinguished from the area-commanders with the same title[23]. One inscription[24], containing a dedication by Nicagoras, who commanded against Philip in the Peraea during the Second Macedonian War, shows that on this occasion there were eleven hage-

mones subordinate to the stratagos. The name of the formation commanded by the individual hagemon is not known. All Stratagoi and all Hagemones were either full or partial Rhodian citizens[25]. [redacted]. The chain of command from stratagos to hagemon is that commonly found in the armies of the Hellenistic kings, and its occurrence at Rhodes indicates that the city followed contemporary trends in matters of military administration. There is no sign of hagemones in this technical sense in the Greek world, before the end of the fourth century[26] while they occur regularly in the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and Pergamene armies[27].

A single inscription gives considerable information both concerning the commands lower than that of stratagos and hagemon, and concerning the composition of a combined military and naval force in the early third century. It records[28] certain appointments to military posts for an expedition against the island of Aegila, a base for pirates. The first name recorded as elected to serve is that of the συνταγματάρχας ἐπὶ ξένων, a full Rhodian citizen from the Peraean deme of Physcus. The same title occurs again, but without the qualifying ἐπὶ τῶν ξένων in the sepulchral inscription relating to the sons of Timacrates[29], in which it has been assumed that the title referred to a naval post[30]. The word σύνταγμα is, however, not used of naval formations, and the present inscription shows quite clearly that the συνταγματάρχας ἐπὶ τῶν ξένων to which the simple συνταγματάρχας will have been closely akin,

even if not identical, was a military and not a naval command. It is also evident that the συνταγματιάρχας ἐπὶ τῶν ξένων is a field and not an administrative command akin to the Athenian στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ξένων 31). There seems, however, no reason to identify him with the hagemon, since the title ἡγεμών is testified by itself 32). The συνταγματιάρχας was doubtless junior to the hagemon, since the dedication by the στρατηγός Nicagoras is made on behalf of his ἡγεμόνες only 33). It is to be noted that the title συνταγματιάρχης occurs elsewhere as a definite rank only in the Ptolemaic army 34).

After the συνταγματιάρχας are mentioned some marine posts, also held by full Rhodian citizens. The καταπλεύσας is a κελευστής, the ἐπιβάτας ἐπὶ τᾶς τετρήρεος an ἴσπανις, the ἐπιβάτας ἐπὶ τῶν φυλακίδων an Ἄβρεῖος. These posts have already been discussed 35). After them come some further military titles: a list of four or five officers called τῶν ξένων τῶν μισθοφ[όρων λοχαγοί, [illegible] all of whom are foreigners, a Καλύμνιος a Κῶι[ος] an Ἄλεῖος and a [K]αρύστιος. These are followed by the title δι[μοιρίτ]ης or [ι] a term normally used of a soldier or officer who received double-pay 36), but which is also used to denote the commander of a dimoiria, the equivalent of a ἡμιολόχιον or two ἐνωμοτίαι without reference to pay 37). It is clearly in this latter sense that the term is used in the present inscription.

It emerges from this inscription that the principle that the higher commands including those of mercenary troops should be in the hands of Rhodian citizens, included the syntagmatarches but stopped short of the commanders of the mercenary-companies, who were themselves foreigners. A point of some uncertainty is whether the foreign troops mentioned are all to be regarded as mercenaries, or whether some may not be troops levied on subject territory[38], or in accordance with the terms of an agreement between Rhodes and some foreign state, such as that between Rhodes and Hierapytna[39], in which considerable space is devoted to the use of Hierapytnian troops by the Rhodians. Certainly the use of the two distinctive phrases τῶν ξένων and τῶν ξένων τῶν μισθοφόρων suggests that the first-named belonged to a separate category from the ordinary μισθοφόροι, but to which of the other two classes they belonged cannot be determined[40].

Another inscription, probably of the late third century, records a dedication by Rhodians [illegible] at Lato in Crete[41]. The dedication is made to Athana Lindia by the crews and naval officers of three Rhodian ships, and the commander of the land-forces, who, like the συνταγματάρχας of the previous inscription, is a Rhodian citizen[42]. His command is that of ἡγούμενος τῶν στρατιωτῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ξενολογηθέντων. Here again a Rhodian commands mercenaries. Whether this title means that the commander was a hagemon in the strict sense of the term, rather than simply that he commanded a mercenary-force, without re-

ference to his rank cannot be determined[43]. Even if he is not a hagemon in the narrow sense of that term, it is probable that he is a higher officer than the τῶν ξένων τῶν μισθοφόρων λοχαγοί since he is a Rhodian citizen, while all the λοχαγοί are foreigners.

These two inscriptions indicate that in the third century Rhodes had a developed mercenary-army, Another inscription enables us to see how this army was kept at strength. The treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna, dating from the close of the third century[44], includes several clauses relevant to mercenary troops. These clauses are: (a)[45] in the event of a request by Rhodes, Hierapytna is to send two hundred armed troops (unless Rhodes asks for less) of whom not less than half shall be Hierapytnians. If Hierapytna is at war, and thus unable to send two hundred , she is to send as many as she can; (b)[46] Rhodes is to provide the πορεῖα for the journey from Crete to Rhodes; (c)[47] if the request is made in the first four years from the date of signature, Rhodes shall pay nine Rhodian obols per diem for each mercenary, and two Rhodian drachmae per diem for commanders (ἡγεμόνες, ἡγούμενοι) of not less than fifty men; (d)[48] if the call for troops is made after more than four years have elapsed, the same arrangements shall hold, with certain differences: for the first thirty days after their arrival in Rhodes, the Hierapytnians will pay their ὀψώνια, while the Rhodians will pay for the remainder of the time in accordance with the previous clause; (e)[49] if the Rhodians desire to raise mercenary-troops in

Crete, the Hierapytnians are to provide for the safety of the ξενολόγιον in the πόλις, the χώρα and αἱ νῆσοι, so far as in them lies, and to render every assistance to Rhodes for the completion of the ξενολόγιον. Similarly, if the Hierapytnians send a ξενολόγιον to Asia (by which, presumably, is meant that part of Caria under Rhodian domination, the incorporated Peraea excluded), the Rhodians are to render them every assistance to the same end; (f)[50] the Hierapytnians are to allow no other power the right of ξενολόγιον against the Rhodians in Hierapytnian territory; (g)[51] no Hierapytnian is to serve in a force at war with Rhodes, on pain of punishment. Similarly, no Rhodian may serve against the Hierapytnians. This measure is not to be retrospective: mercenaries on service before the treaty comes into force will be allowed to continue in that service.

The importance of Crete as the main source of Greek mercenaries in the Hellenistic world needs no emphasis[52]. Rhodes was not the only state which entered into special agreements, by which she was accorded a monopoly of recruitment in the territory of a particular state. An agreement between Hierapytna and Antigonus Gonatas or Doson, though fragmentary, contains similar terms[53]. At all events it is clear that Rhodes no less than the other powers of the Hellenistic world gave considerable attention to the question of maintaining a supply of mercenary troops.

It is possible that a similar clause may have existed in the treaty between Rhodes and the Achaean League, signed in 198 B.C.(54), since it seems likely that some of the Achaean troops which took part in the Peraean campaign of 197 was provided under the terms of this alliance(55).

These agreements for the provision of troops, like the inscriptions recording the titles of Rhodian commanders in the field, suggest that by the third century the Rhodian army was largely based on mercenary service. A century earlier the reverse had been true: Rhodians are found serving as mercenaries, not as individuals (such as we find in the Hellenistic age) but as a distinct city-group, a Rhodian contingent. Similarly, while the fourth century contains the names of several distinguished Rhodians who became mercenary leaders, only one such person is found in the third century(56).

There is here an apparent change of policy; and it is tempting to suppose that it corresponds to a real change, and is not merely due to the scantiness of the evidence. It seems likely that Rhodes had learnt from the siege the need to place her naval needs first and to dispense with a citizen-militia, and, no doubt, the great prosperity of the city in the early third century, testified in many ways, and not least by the issue of a splendid and voluminous coinage, may have enabled the Rhodians to maintain mercenaries acting on their

own, quite apart from troops serving by agreements with foreign states. But this must remain an hypothesis.

The comparatively small number of Rhodians of the ranks of mercenaries serving overseas[57] seems, on the other hand, an established fact, and for this, too, an explanation must be sought. Here political causes may have played their part. In the fifth and fourth centuries, and to a less extent in the third century, it was rivalry within the individual cities which, ending in the exile of the political opponents of the party temporarily in power, led to banishment or self-imposed exile as the only means of security. στάσις was one of the main conduits through which the mercenary market was fed, and it is for this reason that the peak of the mercenary movement was reached in the fourth century. To much of this tragic waste of life and talent an end was put by the Hellenistic monarchs, at the cost of unlimited political freedom. At Rhodes, though an independent community, στάσις was equally absent, though for a different reason. The city was noted in later antiquity for her εὐνομία -- the excellence of her laws, and the willingness of her citizens to obey them. In the fourth century the history of Rhodes, as of many other Greek cities, is one of continual stasis, but from the time of the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison in 323 until the appearance of Rome as a significant power in the East towards the close of the third century, no stasis is known to have occurred.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that there were few so poor or so politically discontented that only service abroad could answer their needs.

The main task for which Rhodes' army of mercenaries was employed was probably the maintenance of garrisons in the Peraea, and perhaps in the incorporated islands, Carpathus, Syme, Chalce, and Megiste. Garrisons were certainly maintained in Lindos, from about 200 B.C. onwards, but the composition of these is unknown[58]. It does not seem likely that mercenaries would have been allowed to garrison the old cities, and the commander was certainly a full Rhodian citizen[59]. The main garrisons undoubtedly were those of the Peraea[60]. Here military requirements must have been on the increase in the Hellenistic age. Early in the third century a large area of Caria was acquired in unknown circumstances[61]. Later in the century more territory was acquired, Stratonicaea and its <u>chora</u>[62], while in the next century, the cession of the rest of Caria and of Lycia[63], and the purchase of Caunus[64] increased the city's obligations. All these acquisitions meant that more troops were needed, but at the same time they opened the door to other sources of man-power, namely the subject peoples of this territory.

There survives an account of the Rhodian military force in Caria in 197 B.C.[65]. In 201 Philip V had conquered much Rhodian territory here[66]. Of the campaign under the Rhodian stratagos Nicagoras from 201 to 198 little is known except

that he succeeded in recapturing the territory of Idyma, Pisye and Cyllandus from Philip[67]. The campaign of 197, in which the Rhodian forces were commanded by Pausistratus, is recorded in some detail by Livy, who here reproduces the narrative of Polybius. The Rhodian battle-line is described as follows[68]: Rhodii Achaeos milites, lectam peditum manum, habuere medios; mixta ex pluribus gentibus auxilia, equites levisque armaturae quod erat, cornibus circumiectum. Whatever be the right reading here, it is clear that the most important element in the line was the Achaean; this consisted in all of one thousand eight hundred infantry and a century of horse. Of these probably only eight hundred were mercenaries already in Rhodian employment before the year's campaigning began. The remaining one thousand infantry, and the horse, were probably sent by the Achaean League as a result of the alliance signed between the two powers in 198[69]. These latter might be regarded either as allied troops, or as mercenaries under special contract; in either case, if the treaty with Hierapytna be taken as precedent[70], Rhodes will have provided the pay. Apart from the Achaeans there are other mercenaries, and some auxilia whom Livy describes in one passage as ex vario genere, and in another as ex pluribus gentibus[71]. Both phrases refer apparently to the origin of these troops and not to their nature, that is light or heavy, or specialist troops, since it is followed by a list of their nationalities. The names of

the auxilia themselves are in part corrupt[72], but there seems little doubt that some of the communities referred to, namely the Pisuetae, the Nisuetae, and the Tarmianoi, and perhaps the Arei, are to be identified with communities of those, or very similar names, living within that part of Caria which Rhodes had acquired by conquest[73], and which was not regarded as incorporated in the Rhodian state, but was treated as subject territory. It is thus apparent that in at least this instance Rhodes did not fail to make use of levies from her subjects. The list also contains numerous foreign troops, some at least of whom appear to be mercenaries, while the status of others remains obscure[74]. Not the least significant feature of the list is the absence of any reference to a contingent of Rhodians.

This list thus confirms the hypothesis that Rhodian citizens were not required to serve in the army in normal campaigns, except in senior positions, above the rank of commander of a λοχαγός. A mercenary army, however, could never be wholly reliable, as numerous instances of desertion by officers and men in Hellenistic history show$. The difficulty of stimulating an esprit de corps among such a body must have been considerable, though to achieve this was clearly a step towards the maintenance or discipline. In this connection some of the Rhodian koina are of particular interest.

Reference has already been made to those koina, composed

composed largely of ships' crews, designated by the term (συ)στρατευόμενοι or (συ)στρατευσάμενοι [75]. In one inscription reference is made to associations of στρατιῶται which, though the word κοινόν is not used, were in fact κοινά [76]. The honorand, in addition to being honoured by his συναγόντες στρατηγοί and ἀγεμόνες is honoured ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκολουθησάντων στρατιωτῶν χρυσέωι στεφάνωι καὶ ὑπὸ στρατιωτῶν Ἀμφορείων θαλλίνωι καὶ χρυσέωι (στεφάνωι).

The first of these bodies, the ἀκολουθήσαντες στρατιῶται calls for no explanation; the latter is more perplexing. Rhodian <u>koina</u> fall, broadly speaking, into three categories, according to their origin[78]: first, those the object of which was the cult of a particular god or hero, and members of which were called by the name of the god or hero, with the termination --- ιασταί, as [redacted] Παφιασταί and Ποσειδωνιασταί and many others; secondly, those named after either a prominent Rhodian citizen or leading member of the foreign community, and which were called by the name of the individual with the addition of the termination --- εῖοι, such as Ξενδάμειοι and Λυσιστράτειοι; the purpose of these <u>koina</u> was probably more social than religious[79]; and thirdly, gentilicial <u>koina</u>, membership of which was confined to full Rhodian citizens, hereditary members of the tribal organisation of the old cities; these are the <u>koina</u> of πατριῶται and διαγονίαι. The term under discussion in the present inscription, στρατιῶται Ἀμφόρειοι indicates a particular development of the second type. In the

present instance in which the eponym of the koinon is followed by a reference to troops, it seems likely that the eponym was the commander of the troops, and that the koinon derived its name from him for that reason. This is confirmed by the fact that the same inscription refers to a koinon of Δημόνεως Ἀγητόρειοι [80]. The fact that the same person occurs as eponym in other, non-military, koina[80A], does not militate against this view, since in these other instances the eponym may have been the founder or president of these koina, or they may have been founded in honour of him. It may be that the military koina were also originally either founded by, or in honour of, the eponym, but it seems probable that by the time in which they appear in our evidence, that is the third and second centuries B.C., they resembled regimental associations, the establishment of which, after a particular campaign, was normal. Such κοινά will necessarily have consisted largely of mercenary troops, and a particular campaign will have given them a bond and common interest when engaged in routine peace-time duties, or, if they remained in Rhodes after discharge, in civil life. The koina will thus, intentionally or otherwise, have played an important part in establishing esprit de corps among the foreign troops serving in the Rhodian army.

Other koina also clearly drew their members from the armed forces, though it is not possible to distinguish those of which the members were soldiers only from those to which sailors also

belonged. The (συ)στρατευόμενοι have already been discussed. Similar to them were the σύσκανοι [81], 'Messmates'. The words σύσκηνος, συσκηνία, τὰ συσκήνια, mean respectively, 'a man who shares a tent or mess', 'living or messing in common' and 'the institution of common messing' [82]. In Rhodes the term always occurs in contexts which indicate or suggest a close connection with military service and clearly applies to messing or living in common on campaigns. Such koina of σύσκανοι may have comprised either soldiers or sailors or both. A certain example of a naval koinon of σύσκανοι is provided by a Rhodian dedication from Tenedos [83]; in other instances the use of the term in combination with (συ)στρατευόμενοι suggests that they consisted of both naval crews and land forces [84]. The fact that the two terms are not always found together indicates that the suskanoi might, as one would expect, be only a small portion of the whole body of συστρατευόμενοι. In fact the suskanoi appear to have existed both as a sort of independent koinon within the larger military groups and also as a wholly independent Association. One koinon is called the Κοινὸν τῶν Ἑρμειστῶν αὐτονόμων συνσκήνων [85]. The autonomy here referred to is, however, probably not that of the συσκήνοι within a larger koinon of (συ)στρατευόμενοι, but that granted to suskanoi serving overseas, to act on their own initiative and issue their own psephisms [86]. The important fact that the koina were capable of subdivision into independent subunits seems established.

The appearance of seven σύσσιτοι in one inscription is of some interest[87]. These cannot be identified with the συσκάνων κοινόν by whom the honorand had already been honoured. It is to be noted that all the sussitoi are full Rhodian citizens[88]. The title suggests that Rhodes like Sparta had a system of syssitia, but it is quite incredible that the narrow social order on which such a system was based could have existed in Rhodes in the late Hellenistic period. In fact the term σύσσιτοι is found used of members of koina in circumstances which make it quite clear that the title bore no relation to the old Spartan agoge. Thus in Egypt there existed a koinon of σύσσιτοι[89], while elsewhere the term is used of certain officials of κοινά, perhaps the supreme board of officials[90]. It is probably to this type of that the Rhodians in question belong. Possibly the military koina possessed such a board of magistrates corresponding to the epistatai and prostatai of the social koina.

A parallel to these Rhodian military koina is to be found in the large Cyprus garrison. Here we meet τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐν Κύπρωι τασσομένων Θρᾳκῶν καὶ τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐν τῆι νήσωι [τ]ασσομένων Ἰώνων καὶ τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐν τῆι νήσωι τασσομένων Κελτῶν, and even τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐν τῆι νήσωι τασσομένων δυνάμεων[91]. Here, as elsewhere, it would be rash to infer from the existence of similar institutions that Rhodes had deliberately borrowed a Ptolemaic practice, though the

possibility of this, and even of the reverse, always exists. At least it is important to note that the Egyptian and Rhodian governments may both have deliberately employed the same means to bind their foreign garrisons to them. Such associations do not appear elsewhere in the Hellenistic world, where the catoecic system seems to have been sufficient. The possibility of the existence of a system of catoecic tenure at Rhodes, already discussed[92], might seem to be strengthened by the existence of these Associations, which suggest that the mercenary soldier might settle down in Rhodes after discharge. Nevertheless the difficulty of equating the class of resident known as τοὶ κατοικοῦντες with military settlers is very considerable, and it seems necessary to suppose that if mercenaries were retained in Rhodes, after discharge, by grants of some sort, the grant was not one of catoecic land, but rather of that limited citizenship, which Rhodes possessed[93]. It ~~is~~ was not uncommon for cities of the Hellenistic world to grant citizenship to discharged mercenaries[94], but full citizenship was not a status which Rhodes gave in bulk[95]. Any mercenaries to whom this intermediate status was given, and who doubtless resided in Rhodos, must therefore be distinguished from the κατοικοῦντες.

Conclusions about the Rhodian army must be more tentative than those concerning the navy. A summary of the preceding enquiry suggests that much that appears significant in our evidence may in fact not have been so. Nevertheless, some assured facts emerge.

In the fifth and fourth centuries the tradition records the existence of Rhodian mercenaries serving as Rhodian contingents and not as individuals, while from about the end of the fourth century, although a few individual Rhodians are found as mercenaries, notably in Egypt, there is no sign of any Rhodian contingents, serving overseas. From about the same time the employment by Rhodes of mercenaries on a considerable scale becomes evident, while except in the senior commands there is no sign that Rhodian citizens served in the army. These appear to be certain facts. The interpretation of them is necessarily conjectural. It has been suggested that some time after the siege, perhaps in part as a result of it, the decision was taken to retain the limited Rhodian man-power for use in the navy, the importance of which had recently been demonstrated. Increased wealth secured the continuation of an adequate supply of mercenaries. Later, with the acquisition of subject territory in Caria, it appears likely that auxilia were levied from the Carian communities. The existence of military κοινά, regimental associations, is well testified, and possibly indicates an attempt to create interests and bonds for the foreign soldiers in their new surroundings. The existence of such koina suggests that mercenary must have remained in Rhodes after discharge. It is not impossible that they were granted the limited franchise known to have existed at Rhodos.

Events showed that the Rhodian decision to man her army with foreign and mercenary troops was wise. Rhodes' military commitments, except perhaps between 188 and 167 B.C., were slight; her naval commitments from the beginning of the third century B.C. became increasingly large. The success and prestige of the navy was based on its skill and technical prowess, which in its turn was built on the solid reliability of its crews, who were, almost without exception, Rhodian citizens. To adulterate these crews was to run a grave risk of lowering the standard, and destroying the conception of citizen service on which its success rested. It was therefore essential to find the means by which necessary military service was not a drain on man-power required for the navy. The justification of Rhodian policy in regard to the army thus lay in the continued success of the Rhodian navy at sea.

CONCLUSION.

The preceding studies which omit many important aspects of Rhodian life, and deal with topics which are to some extent independent of each other, do not permit any general conclusions, but some indications of the historical interest of Rhodes for the Hellenistic historian based on the foregoing evidence, may be noted.

The main interest of Rhodian history lies in the fact that Rhodes was able to survive, as a really important political power, in her position as an independent city-state, into an age when the city-state had, as a general rule, ceased to have any political significance. This development is of course confined to the period after the death of Alexander. Between the synoecism and the end of the fourth century, Rhodes plays only a subordinate part in a world dominated by Athens, Sparta and, later, Macedon. The career of Alexander may not have been directly decisive for the history of Rhodes, but it is certain that her greatness grew out of the changed circumstances which resulted from his conquests. It does not seem that in the political world there is much continuity between the Rhodes of the time of the Second Athenian Confederacy, and that of the time of the Chremonidean War. In fact that continuity must have existed in the social life and constitutional history of the island,

but almost all traces of it are lost, together with practically all other local evidence for Rhodes in the fourth century. It must therefore be borne in mind that the gulf which appears to exist between Hellenistic and Fourth-century Rhodes may in fact have been less great than now appears. It is nevertheless obvious that, in the political field, in the third and second centuries, Rhodes is in the centre of the picture, while in the fourth century the role she played was more modest.

The rise of Rhodes to greatness in the Hellenistic age appears to be the result of a definite and continuous foreign policy, of which the main feature was, it has been suggested, a determination not to be found on the losing side in a collision between major powers. Combined with this was the ability, due in the main to the excellence of her navy, to retain political freedom of action. The disastrous error of that policy lay, it may be conjectured, in the assumption that Rome was likely to lose the Third Macedonian War, and in the decision to desert the Roman cause in advance before that defeat occurred.

The course and development of this foreign policy seems assured. It appears to have been based on a narrowly political calculation as to how Rhodes could best survive and retain her independence in a world in which she was among the smallest independent states. There is, on the other hand, little sign either in the third or second

centuries of a mercantile foreign policy. On occasions, it need not be doubted, Rhodes was prepared to fight to defend her commercial interests -- the war with Byzantium was no doubt one such instance, the First Rhodio-Cretan war another -- but there is no major issue of policy which seems to have been decided on grounds of commercial expediency.

When we turn from the external expression of this policy to determine the forces which made it, we turn from light to darkness. Many formal aspects of Rhodian public life cannot be adequately determined. It seems nevertheless quite certain both from the formulae of surviving decrees, and from the pages in which Polybius describes the transactions of the Rhodian ecclesia in the middle of the second century, that the Rhodian constitution was a democracy both in form and in fact. Motions designed to alter the whole tenour of foreign policy could be introduced by private citizens or magistrates, and it appears that motions introduced by the chief executive of the state were the subject of open and unfettered debate, and liable to rejection. The citizen body at Rhodes however was only a small part of the entire population, and citizenship was rarely conferred on those of foreign origin. For this reason Rhodes could not be called a democracy in the modern usage of the term. The limitation of franchise was however a normal feature of Greek city-states, and Rhodes must within these limits of definition be regarded as no less a democracy than Periclean

Athens, even if in the latter the numerical discrepancy between citizen-body and total population may have been less.

Rhodes thus presents an arresting and anachronistic phenomenon; a full democracy enjoying complete political independence in a world which had resolved the antimony between authority and independence to the advantage of the central authority and deprived the poleis of all except municipal independence. There is however a reverse to the medal.

In the organisation of her executive magistracies, in the administration of her conquered territory, and in the organisation of her army-commands, Rhodes appears to stand much closer to the Hellenistic world than to the world of Classical Athens. Thus the executive prytaneis of the Rhodian type, who were elected magistrates with wide powers, and not members of the serving Boula, find many parallels in the Hellenistic world, few or none earlier; the specialisation of command within the college of generals is found at Athens and elsewhere from the fourth century onwards, but not earlier. It is possible here that Rhodes may have been among the first to evolve this system since special commands for the Peraea are known relatively from an early date.

The closest similarity between Rhodes and the Hellenistic world is in respect of her administration of her extra-Rhodian territories. Here she appears to have followed closely the methods which existed in the Hellenistic kingdoms,

particularly that of the Seleucids. This is noticeable less in the general system of command, distributed among strategoi and Hegemones, for which there is no exact parallel outside Rhodes, but in the appointment of special magistrates, epistatai or Governors, with civil as well as military authority, over towns in conquered territory, particularly in Caria. These formed an important part of the Seleucid system of [redacted] administration particularly in the new cities. It seems probable that the territories acquired by Rhodes in Caria in the third century, either ultimately or directly, from the Seleucid House, may have introduced her to this form of magistracy. It is, however, to be remembered that the Rhodian administrative system both in the central government and in the three old cities after the synoecism, possessed numerous other epistatai, It is therefore not impossible that the epistatai in Caria were a development of, for instance, those epistatai who served as garrison commanders from the end of the third century onwards in Lindos.

The similarity of the Rhodian army commands to those of the other Hellenistic armies, particularly the Ptolemaic, is undoubted. It would be unwise, in the face of so little evidence, to suppose that the Rhodian system was based on that which obtained, without significant changes, in the Ptolemaic, and to a less extent, Pergamene Kingdoms, but it seems at least at Rhodes to have conformed to a type of

military administration common to at least two Hellenistic kingdoms.

The fusion of the Hellenistic and Classical elements in Rhodian political life, a Classical democratic ecclesia-rule, side by side with a truly Hellenistic executive, is its most striking feature. Such a fusion was undoubtedly a compromise effected by time, and it may be conjectured that in the fourth century the [redacted] powers of the executive were far less than they later became.

There is one other important aspect of Rhodian history of which examination is necessary before a fair picture of the city's achievement can be obtained; that aspect is the administration of the Peraea. There seems to be evidence here to suggest that, in this administration, Rhodes adopted a policy not found elsewhere, though in some respects in approximated to the Ptolemaic treatment of their overseas empire; but examination of this topic and of the possible influence Rhodian administration may have had on Roman policy towards the Greek East at an early date, must be reserved for another occasion.