Journal article
Welfare-increasing monopolization
- Abstract:
- The conditions for monopolization to be good for social welfare are examined. Social welfare can be higher when a monopoly sells to a monopoly, with double margins, than when a competitive industry sells to a downstream Cournot oligopoly with differing efficiency levels. This requires inverse demand to be sufficiently concave, and cannot hold when demand is convex. When there are no vertical issues conditions are found for elimination of an inefficient firm to raise welfare, building on Lahiri & Ono (1988). In general greater demand concavity increases the relative importance of the benefit of redistributing output to the efficient firm.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 316.1KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1111/joie.12405
Authors
- Publisher:
- Wiley
- Journal:
- Journal of Industrial Economics More from this journal
- Volume:
- 73
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 167-185
- Publication date:
- 2024-11-11
- Acceptance date:
- 2024-10-04
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1467-6451
- ISSN:
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0022-1821
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
2038584
- Local pid:
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pubs:2038584
- Deposit date:
-
2024-10-14
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Simon Cowan
- Copyright date:
- 2024
- Rights statement:
- © 2024 The Author(s). The Journal of Industrial Economics published by The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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