

Apollinarius und seine Folgen

Herausgegeben von

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Derivative Genera in Apollinarius of Laodicea

Some Remarks on the Philosophical Coherence of his Thought

Johannes Zachhuber

Apollinarius of Laodicea is known to any student of Patristic theology as the inventor and propagator of an idiosyncratic Christology denying, as the phrase goes, the ‘full humanity’ of the saviour, for which he was subsequently (and duly) condemned.¹ That his ideas about the specific composition of the God-man were of crucial importance to Apollinarius and at the same time provocative in the eyes of many of his contemporaries is beyond doubt. And yet it is difficult to avoid the impression that the specifically *dogmengeschichtliche* approach to the thought of late ancient theologians with its evident background in the earlier heresiological paradigm, in other words an approach whose internal logic is entirely dominated by the development of certain normative doctrines held by the Church, does little justice to a figure like Apollinarius. It may be possible, within this approach, to modify description and evaluation of Apollinarius’s theology; indeed, the bishop of Laodicea has attracted his fair share of scholarly sympathy over the past century, but ultimately he will always be assessed by the standards of a discourse which, centuries after his life, led to certain established results which were then accepted if not by all then at least by many churches.

There may be some inevitability in this perception – after all doctrinal concerns determined not only the hermeneutical frame of Apollinarius’s readers over the centuries but also the selection of writings or, more frequently, fragments that posterity chose to bequeath to us. Yet one should, I believe, at least pose the question whether not there is a picture of Apollinarius as a major Christian thinker of the fourth century that is not completely dominated by this one narrative. That such a picture exists or, at least, that it must

¹ On Apollinarius’s theology in general: Hans Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1904; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1970); Charles E. Raven, *Apollinarianism. An Essay on the Christology of the Early Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923); Henri de Riedmatten, ‘Some neglected aspects of Apollinarian Christology’, *DomSt*, 1 (1948), 239–260; id., *Apollinarianism and IVth Century Christology*, DPhil Thesis (University of Oxford, 1951); id., ‘La Christologie d’Apollinaire de Laodicée’, *StPatr*, 2 (1957), 208–234; Ekkehard Mühlberg, *Apollinaris von Laodicea* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968); Alois Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, vol. 1 (3rd edn., Freiburg/Basel: Herder, 1990), 480–494; Enrico Cattaneo, *Trois homélies pseudo-Chrysostomiennes sur la Pâque comme œuvre d’Apollinaire de Laodicée* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1981); Alessandro Capone, ‘Apollinarismo e geografia ecclesiastica: luoghi e forme della polemica, *Auctores Nostr*, 9 (2011), 457–473.

have existed at some point, would seem all but certain given the historical evidence we possess. The scattered remains of his extensive writing display an unusually high level of speculative sophistication and cover an extraordinarily broad range of topics and genres. Had he not been pushed beyond the margins of orthodoxy, had, which in this case would be likely, more of his writings survived, we might well class him together with Athanasius and the Cappadocians as one of the major theologians of his time.

To accept the likelihood of Apollinarius, the theologian with a wide-ranging contribution to Christian thought, of course, is one thing, discerning even the mere contours of that figure is quite another. It is evident that any such attempt faces considerable difficulties due to the scarcity, the difficulty and the fragmentary nature of his literary remains. These difficulties, however, should not deter from the interpretative attempt even though they must be kept in mind at each step to guard against imprudent and facile conclusions.

These introductory remarks were meant to serve, at the same time, as a preliminary justification for the title I have chosen for my paper. It is my intent in what follows to gauge, in one limited regard, Apollinarius's thought by asking for its philosophical coherence. In doing this I accept the premise that intellectual coherence of some degree is the mark of any major thinker. I think this is true for Church fathers as well as for all others even if one accepts that they were not 'systematic' in any modern or even in a scholastic sense. This premise seems all the more important in a case such as that of Apollinarius where any interpretation of his thought relies heavily on construction. No such construction, however, would be possible without the prior assumption, albeit implicit, of intellectual coherence.

I term the kind of coherence which interests me here 'philosophical' moreover, not because I wish to make a case for specific readings Apollinarius would have had in pagan philosophy. As far as I can see no such case can solidly be made on the basis of the textual evidence we possess. This is not to deny that he possessed some and possibly considerable philosophical erudition; from his background in rhetoric we should be able to deduce some familiarity of what we now call ancient philosophy, and it is difficult to imagine that anyone would have had the audacity to write against Porphyry without some fairly substantial schooling in the wisdom of the Greeks. Be this as it may, however, my point here does not concern these possibilities – or at least it does not concern them directly – but I use philosophical in the broader sense of indicating what one might otherwise call a certain technique of argument, the use of formal, logical or ontological assumptions that are used to make plausible a theological claim.

The specific case I shall be exploring is that of 'derivative genera'. The technical term that is used in the commentary literature of late antiquity is *genos aph'henos* or *genos pros hen*; Anthony Lloyd, who contributed perhaps more than any other more recent author to our understanding of late ancient logic, referred to them as P-series.² They are, as we shall see, of major importance in the philosophical schools of Neoplatonism, especially in their attempt to integrate certain elements of Aristotelian philosophy into their Platonic framework. Yet, once again, while I use writings by those philosophers to illustrate

² Anthony C. Lloyd, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 76–97.

meaning and possible implications of what we find in Apollinarius, I am not committing myself to the assumption that he knew some or all of their writings though I think that, at least in some cases, this is likely.

That Apollinarius knew of derivative genera seems beyond doubt – at least for those who accept as genuine his correspondence with Basil of Caesarea.³ How exactly he understood them and how much use he made of them beyond this particular context is much more difficult to ascertain. I propose therefore to start from an analysis of the extensive and illuminating argument in this writing, which has been preserved in the corpus of Basil's letters as Epistle 362, to establish the contours of Apollinarius's theory. In a second step, I shall explore its background in Christian theology and in the discussion of the philosophical schools, while the third and last part of my paper will probe Apollinarius's use of derivative genera beyond his letter to Basil and thus test the hypothesis that this theory permitted him the integration of various theological topics into one coherent whole.

1. Divine Ousia as a Derivative Genus

The correspondence between Basil and Apollinarius must fall into the early 360s.⁴ The historical context is evidently the rejection of *ousia*-language by the Council of Constantinople in 360 and the subsequent development – prompted, as Hanns-Christof Brennecke has argued, by the emergence of Neoarianism⁵ – towards a re-appreciation of the Nicene Creed. The first result of this development was a synod, in 363, in which Meletius of Antioch and a number of bishops associated with him confessed the Nicene Creed to the Emperor Jovian.⁶ Basil's correspondence with Apollinarius just touches on this event insofar as the last letter we possess, by Apollinarius to Basil, contains what I take to be a passionate rejection of the Meletian synod and its Nicenism.⁷ We have no answer to that letter (ep. 364) nor any other letter addressed to the Bishop of Laodicea by his former friend, only – much later – the well-known episode following Basil's alienation from Eustathius of Sebaste in which the Bishop of Caesarea was first accused of Sabellianism and then deflected this charge onto Apollinarius.⁸

The letters that concern us here must, therefore, originate from the time between the Constantinopolitan synod of 360 and the Meletian synod of 363; I should not hazard

³ Their authenticity has been established, I believe, by G.L. Prestige and H. de Riedmatten. Cf. George L. Prestige, *St. Basil the Great and Apollinarius of Laodicea*, ed. H. Chadwick (London: SPCK 1956); Henri de Riedmatten, 'La correspondance entre Basile de Césarée et Apollinaire de Laodicée', *JThS*, 7 (1956), 199–210; 8 (1957), 53–70.

⁴ Cf. the discussion in de Riedmatten, 'La correspondance' (op. cit. fn. 3), 58–60.

⁵ Hanns-Christof Brennecke, 'Erwägungen zu den Anfängen des Neunizänismus', in Damaskenos D. Papandreu/W.A. Bienert/K. Schäferdieck (eds.) *Oecumenica et Patristica. Fs. W. Schneemelcher zum 75. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1989), 241–257.

⁶ On this synod cf. Johannes Zachhuber, 'The Antiochene Synod of AD 363 and the Beginnings of Neo-Nicenism', *ZAC*, 4 (2000), 83–101.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 96–98.

⁸ Cf. Lietzmann, *Apollinarius* (op. cit. fn. 1), 20–27; de Riedmatten, 'La correspondance' (op. cit. fn. 3), 53–58.

to guess a more specific date for them. Apollinarius's text is a reply to a previous request sent by the young Basil asking about possible interpretations of the Nicene *homoousios*. Yet underlying this overtly theological query is one we might call philosophical; Basil perceives that confessing the Son *homoousios* with the Father in the Creed presupposes the assumption that *ousia* can be used of the Godhead in an appropriate way. This however to Basil seems doubtful: he knows several definitions of *ousia*; none of them seems to fit the case of the trinitarian Godhead:

Furthermore be so kind as to inform us in more detail about the *homoousion* itself (...) which meaning it has and how one may soundly employ it of things in which neither a common overlying genus is seen, nor a pre-existent material substratum, nor a division of the first into the second.⁹

Of these three cases, the former two are well established philosophically. Basil presents them with a broad brush, and thus we cannot venture any specific identification, but it seems reasonably clear that his first case, γένος ὑπερκείμενον, represents the Platonic model of an ontologically prior genus whereas the second, *ousia* as ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον is of Stoic provenance. That the latter represents Basil's own understanding of *ousia*, even in the trinitarian context, is a view that has occasionally been entertained by respected scholars,¹⁰ but the present text evidences that Basil realised from early on that both these views would be unacceptable if applied to the Trinity. The former would introduce *ousia* as a further item beyond Father and Son and thus confirm the most notorious suspicion opponents of Nicaea had, throughout the fourth century, against that creed.¹¹ *Ousia* as matter, as the substrate that remains when all determination has been removed, was equally disqualified from theological application. Basil leaves no doubt about it here.¹²

His third possibility I find less easy to interpret; it may well be non-philosophical, taken from quotidian use of *ousia* for concrete things, which could then be divided into *homoousia*. Should this be what Basil meant, it would once again not be difficult to see why he was so staunchly opposed to such an interpretation.

Apollinarius's reply to this request is given along the same lines. In other words, he accepts Basil's implicit move from the problem of the *homoousion* to the underlying, quasi-philosophical issue of how *ousia* can be understood in a way that is compatible with trinitarian theology:

We call one *ousia* not only that which is numerically one, as you say, and that which is in one circumscription, but also, specifically, two or more men who are united as a family (γένος): thus two or more can be the same *qua ousia*, as all men are Adam and (thus) one, and the son of David

⁹ Bas., ep 361.15–22 (Lettres 3, 221 Courtonne = 202,13–18 de Riedmatten): ἔπειτα μεντοὶ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὁμοουσίου [...] διαλαβεῖν ἡμῖν πλατύτερον βουλήθητι, τίνα τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχει καὶ πῶς ἂν ὑγιῶς λέγοιτο ἐφ' ὧν οὔτε γένος κοινὸν ὑπερκείμενον θεωρεῖται οὔτε ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον προὑπάρχον, οὐκ ἀπομερισμὸς τοῦ προτέρου εἰς τὸ δεύτερον.

¹⁰ Reinhard M. Hübner, 'Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser der sog. ep.38 des Basiliius' in J. Fontaine/C. Kannengiesser (eds.), *Epektasis. Mélanges patristiques offerts au Cardinal Jean Daniélou* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 463–490.

¹¹ Cf. Rowan Williams, 'The Logic of Arianism', *JThS*, 34 (1983), 56–81, here: 66 and Peter Widicombe, *The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 172–175.

¹² On the problem of Basil's 'Stoic' use of *ousia* cf. Johannes Zachhuber, 'Stoic substance, non-existent matter? Some passages in Basil of Caesarea reconsidered', *StPatr*, 41 (2006), 425–431.

is David being the same as him; in this respect you rightly say that the Son is *qua ousia* what the Father is. For in no other way could there be a Son of God, given that the Father is confessed to be the one and only God, but in some way like the one Adam is the primogenitor of men and the one David the originator of the royal dynasty. In this way, then, both [the idea of] one antecedent genus and [that of] one underlying matter in Father and Son can be removed from our conceptions, when we apply the prodigential property to the supreme principle and the clans derived from a primogenitor to the only-begotten offspring of the one principle. For to a certain extent they resemble each other: there is neither one common genus term of Adam, who was formed by God, and us, who were born of humans, but he himself is the principle (ἀρχή) of humanity, nor matter common to him and us, but he himself is the material (ὑπόθεσις) of all men.¹³

Apollinarius too starts with an enumeration of possible uses of *ousia*. Note that, while seemingly referring back to Basil's letter (ὡσπερ λέγεις), it is not at all clear that he accepts Basil's range of definitions. *Ousia* according to Apollinarius is (1) what is said 'one in number' (μία ἀριθμῶ); (2) what is contained in one 'description' (ἐν μία περιγραφῇ). Of these the first I should take to be the 'first substance' of Aristotle's Categories;¹⁴ the second might well be the 'second substance' from the same writing.¹⁵ The latter is said to contain individuals of which the same 'formula of being' (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) can be predicated, and Apollinarius's 'circumscription' (περιγραφῇ) may well be a substitute for that phrase.¹⁶

This in itself is not altogether insignificant. While Basil's definitions for *ousia* had seemed fairly eclectic, Apollinarius appears to respond (while politely pretending merely to restate Basil's query) with a much more technical exposition of the subject, starting from the terminology adopted in the wake of Aristotle's Categories. Later in his letter, he acknowledges Basil's own definitions almost *en passant*¹⁷ in the manner of a teacher who, having established his own solution to the dilemma offered to him by his students, then goes on to show how on its basis their difficulties can be resolved.

His major argument, however, is that apart from those two there is a further understanding of *ousia*, and it is this third one which alone in his view is acceptable within trinitarian theology. According to this use, which he characterises as 'specific' (ιδίως), *ousia* is used of two or more people who are united κατὰ γένος; how is this to be translated? I think as the following demonstrates, the primary rendering here must be 'family'. *Ousia* then could be applied to those who are generically linked in precisely this way.

¹³ Ps.-Bas., ep. 362.4–23 (3, 222–3 C. = 203.4–19 de R.): Οὐσία μία οὐκ ἀριθμῶ μόνον λέγεται, ὡσπερ λέγεις, καί τὸ ἐν μιᾷ περιγραφῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδίως ἀνθρώπων δύο καὶ ἄλλου ὁποιοῦν τῶν κατὰ γένος ἐνζωμένων, ὥστε ταύτη γε καὶ δύο καὶ πλείονα ταῦτὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, καθὸ καὶ πάντες ἀνθρώποι Ἀδάμ ἔσμεν εἰς ὄντες καὶ Δαβὶδ ὁ τοῦ Δαβὶδ υἱὸς ὡς ταῦτὸν ὦν ἐκεῖνο, καθὰ καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν λέγεις καλῶς τοῦτο εἶναι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡσπερ ὁ Πατήρ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἑτέρως ἂν ἦν Θεὸς ὁ Υἱός, ἐνὸς ὁμολογουμένου καὶ μόνου Θεοῦ τοῦ Πατρὸς, ὡς που καὶ εἰς Ἀδάμ ὁ ἀνθρώπων γενάρχησ καὶ εἰς Δαβὶδ ὁ τοῦ βασιλείου γένους ἀρχηγῆτις. ταύτη γέ τοι καὶ ἐν εἶναι γένος ὑπερκειμένην ἢ μίαν ὕλην ὑποκειμένην ἐπὶ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ περιαιρεθῆσεται τῶν ὑπονοίων, ὅταν τὴν γεναρχικὴν παραλάβωμεν ιδιότητα τῆς ἀνωτάτω ἀρχῆς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν γενάρχων γένη πρὸς τὸ ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς ἀρχῆς μονογενὲς γέννημα. Μετρίως γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς ὁμοίωσιν ἔρχεται. Καθὸ μὴδὲ τοῦ Ἀδάμ ὡς Θεοπλάστου καὶ ἡμῶν ὡς ἀνθρωπογεννήτων ἐν ὑπέρεκειται γένος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀρχή· μήτε ὕλη κοινὴ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἢ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὑπόθεσις.

¹⁴ Arist., cat. 5 (2a11–13).

¹⁵ Arist., cat. 5 (2a14–17).

¹⁶ Cf. for this phrase Arist., cat. 1a1–2; Simplicius, in Cat. (29.16–24 Kalbfleisch); Porphyry, ap. Simplicius, in Cat. (30.5–15 Kalbfleisch = fig. 51F Smith).

¹⁷ Ps.-Bas., ep. 362.19–31 (3, 223 C. = 203.16–26 de R.)

What this means, Apollinarius goes then on to explain in no uncertain terms. They are 'the same' (ταὐτόν) according to substance; the descendant is 'the same' (ταὐτόν again) as his progenitor; the whole family are 'one' (εἷς). In the last statement, it is significant that Apollinarius does not use the neuter, but the masculine form (but cf. John 10:30!). The family or, indeed, all of humanity, are one insofar as they are all the one person from whom they are descended: 'All human beings are Adam'; 'the son of David is David'. This, precisely, is how Apollinarius thinks this model applies to the relationship between Father and Son in the Trinity as well. 'God', the divine *ousia*, is first the Father and then also, by derivation, the Son, but on account of this relationship it is legitimate to call the Son too 'God' *and* also to see the two as one. Otherwise, as he notes, the Son could not be God without violating the principle of monotheism.

This relationship, according to Apollinarius, is different from that envisaged both in the Platonic, transcendent genus and in the Stoic notion of 'material substratum'. Characteristically, his treatment of these two is here¹⁸ in parallel as they both consider symmetric individuals partaking in a common item whereas the derivative *ousia* Apollinarius stipulates is asymmetric. This asymmetry Apollinarius stresses several times in the short text. Adam and the rest of humanity do not share the same genus term because Adam's property is 'made by God' (θεοπλάστος) while we are 'begotten by man' (ἀνθρωπογένητου). The unity thus lies not in what is common to both, but in humanity's derivation from the first human being. Again, their matter is not the same, but Adam himself is the ὑπόθεσις of all humankind. Courtonne translates this term as 'fondement' and Deferrari as 'origin', but I wonder whether Apollinarius does not intend here a stricter parallel with ὕλη thus indicating that Adam is the material from which the rest of us have emerged.¹⁹

* * *

This text, in my view, is of extraordinary importance, and while it would be wrong to call it unknown it still seems to me somewhat neglected. There is no other text from the fourth century, as far as I know, which offers such a robust defence of the *homoousion* within this particular framework of interpretation. We should not forget that the majority of Greek fathers during the fourth century show considerable reluctance towards the Nicene watchword; even the more prominent Nicenes use it rarely unless they defend it as part of their Creed. Apollinarius may well have been the first Eastern theologian who was not merely willing to accept it as a somehow necessary element within an orthodox formula, but embraced it enthusiastically in a variety of contexts. The reason for this willingness to use the word even where defence of the Nicene Council did not mandate it would be found in this very passage: according to Apollinarius, it corresponds perfectly with the one way in which *ousia* can meaningfully be applied to the Godhead.

¹⁸ Ps.-Bas., ep. 362.20–26 (3, 223 C. = 203.16–22 de R.).

¹⁹ For such a use cf. LSJ s. v. IV.4. and the texts given there.

2. Theological and Philosophical Background

Placing Apollinarius's theory in a wider context, pride of place must be given to Christian precedent. The idea that we are all Adam, of course, is soundly biblical suggested by the meaning of the name given to the protoplast and presupposed not least in the crucial passage Rom 5:12–21. It is therefore not surprising that our first evidence for an argument resembling the one we encountered in Apollinarius is found in Origen's commentary on that very verse. All human beings, Origen argues, were in Adam's loins when he was in paradise. They were then expelled from paradise with him, and it is for this reason also that death, which was the consequence of Adam's fall, was passed on to those who were in his loins:

[...] All men, those who are born and have been born in this world, [were] in Adam's loins when he still was in paradise. And all men who were with him, or rather in him, were expelled from paradise when he was himself driven out from there; and through him the death which had come to him from the transgression consequently passed through to them as well, who were dwelling in his loins.²⁰

In support of this claim the Alexandrian quotes Hebrews 7:9 ('One might even say that Levi himself, who receives tithes, paid tithes through Abraham, for he was still in the loins of his ancestor when Melchizedek met him'): if this was true for Abraham and Levi, how much more (*multo magis*) must it be true for all human beings and Adam. We can see Apollinarius's argument prefigured here, but it is not more than a foreshadowing. I see no indication that Origen in the present place offers anything other than an *ad hoc* argument in order to explain Paul's difficult typology.

In another way, too, Origen can be seen as standing in the background of Apollinarius's argument. In his Commentary on John 1:1 the Alexandrine theologian had advanced the influential argument that, since the Logos was there called θεός, not ὁ θεός, he was god precisely by derivation from the Father.²¹ For much of third and fourth century theology this model with evident Platonic leanings became normative.²² It was frequently cited by those who opposed the Nicene Creed,²³ but this observation should not blind us to the fact that the supporters of that symbol, for a long time, relied on its logic as well.²⁴

²⁰ Or., comm. in Rom 5.1 (PG 14:1009C–1010A): omnes homines, qui in hoc mundo nascuntur et nati sunt, in lumbis erant Adae, cum adhuc esset in paradiso; et omnes homines cum ipso vel in ipso expulsi sunt de paradiso, cum ipse inde depulsus est; et per ipsum mors, quae ei ex praevericatione venerat, consequenter et in eos pertransiit, qui in lumbis eius habebantur. English translation: Origen, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Books 1–5*, transl. T. P. Scheck (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 310–311.

²¹ Or., Jo. 2.2 (GCS Origenes IV 1903, 54.12–55.8 Preuschen).

²² Cf. Eus., ep. Euphrat. 3 = Urkunde 3 (AW III/1, 5.10 O.).

²³ Cf. the Macrostich Creed (Ath., syn. 26.4 [AW II/1,1, 252.22–33 O.] = *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten Kirche*, ed. A. Hahn (Breslau: Grass, Barth und Comp., 1897; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1962) 153.–54; Eus., e. th. 2.7.1 (GCS Eusebius IV 1991, 104.3–8 Klostermann/Hansen); Epiph., haer. 3.73.16.2 (GCS Epiphanius III 1985, 288.28–31 Holl/Drummer); Ath., tom. 5,4 (AW II/1, Die Apologien, 8. Lieferung, hg. H. C. Brennecke/U. Heil/A. von Stockhausen, Berlin/New York 2006, 345).

²⁴ Ath., syn. 51.4–5 (275.5–11 O.). Cf. Christopher Stead, *Divine Substance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 260–261.

In fact, it is probable that the creedal phrase ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς was originally meant in precisely this sense.²⁵ Apollinarius, then, presents himself in his letter to Basil as a traditional Eastern theologian with an interpretation of the Nicene Creed that has good claims to be considered genuine.

* * *

On the face of it, Apollinarius's interpretation of *ousia* for the purposes of trinitarian theology can thus be read from within the tradition of Christian theology. At the same time, even a cursory comparison with its earlier parallels makes it clear that there is a philosophical rigour to it that had not existed, as far as we know, in earlier treatments of the same topic. Apollinarius makes the specific claim that *ousia* can and should be understood in this particular sense and that, if it is, it combines the emphasis on the unique dignity of the first principle (ἀρχή) with an unequivocal affirmation of its unity with those derived from it. This unity of derivation, according to Apollinarius, guarantees two things: first, identity between the whole *genos* and, second, predicates that can be applied to the primogenitor can also be used for his offspring albeit not univocally.

The rigidity of this argument invites comparison with ideas routinely used in the philosophical schools at the same time. It is here that the notion of 'derivative genera' must be discussed. They make their first appearance in Aristotle who considers such series where the first member of the class is at the same time the genus term. The classical example, for Aristotle, was the series of positive integers which, according to ancient mathematics were constituted of monads, but the monas (1) was also the first member or element in this series. Aristotle denies that these are proper genera: they do not all fall under the same definition, therefore there is no univocal predication and, consequently, no science corresponding to them. Also, Aristotle opined that those genera would contain members of varying ontological dignity, which in his view was by definition excluded in a genus.²⁶

At the same time, however, he came to accept that some of the metaphysically most important classes fell into this category, being, the good, and soul being notable examples,²⁷ and in his mature works he seems to have entertained the possibility that derivative genera are, at least, quasi-genera and that therefore a quasi-science is possible of them insofar as the one science that has the principal member as its object applies, in an exemplary way, to the derived members as well.²⁸ Thus there is no general science of being because being is not a univocal term, but metaphysics as a quasi-science is justified as that enquiry that deals with paradigmatic being, i. e. substances.

²⁵ Ibid. 233.

²⁶ Cf. Arist., metaph. B (999a6–10) and EN 1.4 (1096a17–19) for the attitude to the same problem in the Platonic academy.

²⁷ E. g. Arist., de an. 2.3 (414b20–415a13).

²⁸ This at least is Owen's famous interpretation: Gwilym E. L. Owen, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle' in id./I. Düring (eds.), *Plato and Aristotle in the Mid-fourth Century*. Papers of the *Symposium Aristotelicum* held at Oxford in August, 1957 (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1960), 163–190 = id., *Logic, Science, and Dialectic*, ed. M. Nussbaum (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 180–199.

This metaphysical idea was attractive from the point of view of late ancient Neoplatonists for whom the world as a whole consisted of such derivative series,²⁹ and their metaphysics makes ample use of this kind of entity. Within their logical works, on the other hand, which are those most likely to have been familiar to a broader readership, these genera are still discussed primarily because of their logical peculiarities although it seems clear that questions such as whether or not predication *aph' henos* or *pros hen* is equivocal or whether it constitutes a third between univocity and equivocality³⁰ would never have attracted the interest they received, had it not been for the fact that their authors had reason to believe that more or less all real genera were derivative in this sense.

It is intriguing to note that Apollinarius's letter to Basil betrays an awareness of this specific issue. He expressly notes the absence of a common genus term (γένος) predicated (ὑπερκείται) of Adam and the rest of humankind: Adam's property, he writes, is 'made by God' (θεοπλάστος) while we are 'begotten by man' (ἀνθρωπογέννητοι). This in fact is a neat illustration of the logical implication of the *aph' hen* genus. Apollinarius does not tell us how it is resolved at the logical level, but he seems to have been aware of this dimension all the same.

References to derivative genera are encountered in some philosophical texts Apollinarius might well have known. This is first of all the case for the following section from Porphyry's *Isagoge* that celebrated introduction to Aristotle's *Organon*:

We call a genus an assembly (ἄθροισις) of certain people who are somehow related to some one item (πρὸς ἓν τι) and to one another. The genus of the Heraclids is so called in this meaning, from their relation to some one item – I mean to Hercules –, the plurality of people somehow related to one another taking their name, in contradistinction to the other genera, from the affinity derived from him. [...] First the origin (ἀρχή) of anyone's birth was named a genus; and after that, the plurality (τὸ πλῆθος) of people coming from a single origin (ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς) (for example, from Hercules), demarcating which and separating it from the others we say that the whole assemblage of Heraclids is a genus.³¹

Porphyry offers this example in the first major section of his famous text, which discusses the meaning of genus as the first of the five predicables he is dealing with in his treatise. Genus, he explains, is a term with several meanings, and the one described in the above quotation is the first of those.

From what follows in Porphyry's text, it might appear that this first meaning is philosophically irrelevant for he goes out of his way to commend the formal definition of

²⁹ Cf. Procl., inst. 22.

³⁰ For a lengthy discussion of the problem cf.: Simp., in Cat. (CAG 8, 31.22–33.21 Kalbfleisch). Philp., in Cat. (CAG 13/1, 16.21–17.19 Busse) count derivative genera as homonyms.

³¹ Porph., intr. (CAG 4/1, 1.18–2.10 B.): γένος γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἡ τινῶν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἓν τι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἄθροισις, καθ' ὃ σημαίνωμενον τὸ Ἡρακλειδῶν λέγεται γένος ἐκ τῆς ἀφ' ἑνὸς σχέσεως, λέγω δὴ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνου οικειότητα, κατὰ ἀποτομήν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν κεκλημένου. [...] καὶ πρότερόν γε ὀνομάσθη γένος ἡ ἐκάστου τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχή, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς οἷον Ἡρακλέους, ὃ ἀφορίζοντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίζοντες ἐφαμεν τὸ ὅλον ἄθροισμα Ἡρακλειδῶν γένος. English translation: Porphyry, *Introduction*, transl. J. Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3–4 On the interpretation of these lines cf. Barnes, op. cit., 52–54; Alain de Libera, *Porphyry. Isagoge* (Paris: Vrin, 1998), XXX–XXXI. For the broader question of how Porphyry's treatise ought to be understood cf. Riccardo Chiaradonna, 'What is Porphyry's *Isagoge*?' *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 19 (2008), 1–30.

genus as that which has several species as the one philosophers use. To the extent that he introduces the beginner to an understanding of Aristotle's logical works, this would in fact be absolutely correct. Yet at the same time, to those who were no longer novices the relationship between Porphyry's example of the Heraclids and Neoplatonic quasi-genera must have appeared obvious, all the more given Porphyry's use of distinctly philosophical vocabulary: πρὸς ἓν, ἀφ' ἑνός, ἀρχή, πλῆθος, and even ἄθροισμα are most definitely jargon. They all occur in these few lines. With regard to Apollinarius's text, the repeated occurrence of ἀρχή for the originator of the family is especially interesting though one should not forget that Apollinarius too appealed to this understanding of *ousia* as applying to those 'who are united as a family (γένος)'.

One might object that the parallel is limited. While Apollinarius uses the *aph' henos* relationship to interpret *ousia*, Porphyry introduces his example to explain the various uses of genus. Yet while in the framework of the Categories substance is only one of ten kinds of being, and Aristotle as well as his commentators point to examples of genus and species in categories other than substance,³² there is little doubt that within the context of late ancient Platonism the real interest in those formal distinctions was focused on substances. It is therefore no coincidence that Porphyry only a little later in the same, first chapter of his treatise offers *ousia* as the standard example of the division of being (the celebrated *arbor porphyriana*)³³ and thus a reader could be forgiven for thinking that *ousia* was what really mattered.

The significance of Porphyry's example of the Heraclids as one illustration of genus is thrown into even starker relief when one compares another text, which Porphyry certainly knew even though it seems perhaps more doubtful that Apollinarius would have been acquainted with it. This is a passage in Plotinus' *Ennead* 6.1, a text, which in its entirety is meant to demonstrate the insufficiency of Aristotle's Categories from a Platonic point of view.³⁴ Having argued that Aristotle's *ousia* cannot be a single category because it would include both sensible and intelligible being and thus cut across the most important ontological distinction, Plotinus offers the following as a seeming concession to the Stagirite:

But ought we really to call substance one category, collecting together intelligible substance, matter, form, and the composite of both? This would be like saying that the genus [or clan] of the Heraclids was a unity, not in the sense of a unity common to all its members, but because they all come from one ancestor: for the intelligible substance would be so primarily, and the others secondarily and less.³⁵

In the context of Plotinus' overall argument this is still part of the critique. *Ousia* cannot be a category; it is not one kind of being except in the (weaker) sense in which

³² Arist., *de an.* 1.1 (402a22–25); Porph., intr. (6.6–10 B.). Cf. Barnes (op. cit. fn. 31), 124–125.

³³ Porph., intr. (4.21–32 B.), cf. Barnes (op. cit. fn. 31), 108–112.

³⁴ Cf. for this text: Riccardo Chiaradonna, *Sostanza, movimento, analogia: Plotino critico di Aristotele* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2002), 227–249.

³⁵ Plot., *enn.* 6.1.3: Ἀλλ' ἄρα μίαν τινὰ κατηγορίαν λεκτέον ὁμοῦ συλλαβοῦσι τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ ἐξ ἁμφοῖν; Οἷον εἴ τις τὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν γένος ἔν τι λέγοι, οὐχ ὡς κοινὸν κατὰ πάντων, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀφ' ἑνός· πρῶτως γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐκείνη, δευτέρως δὲ καὶ ἦττον τὰ ἄλλα. English translation: *Plotinus*, transl. A. H. Armstrong, vol. 6 (Cambridge, MA/London: Loeb, 1988), 17.

a family is one – on account of their derivation from one first ancestor. Here, all the emphasis is on the gradation of being that would be implied in such a concept: whatever they are, the family's originator is this primarily, everyone else secondarily and thus in a lesser degree.

* * *

While, then, there are striking similarities between Apollinarius's and the Neoplatonists' uses of derivative genera, their theories are not simply the same. They share the underlying idea of a unity-in-plurality constituted by a relationship of generation, but while, for Apollinarius, the cohesion between the first principle and its products dominates, which is why he can use words like 'the same' and, not least, 'homooousios' for both originator and offspring, for the Platonists it is the subordination and gradation implied in these derivative genera that makes the latter attractive for their description of a hierarchical world. The cohesion of all being is not absent from their systems, but it is less significant than ontological gradation, while Apollinarius, who accepts at least implicitly that the derivative relationship is asymmetric and productive of hierarchy even in the case of the consubstantial divinity, the latter aspect takes second stage. Where he wishes strongly to emphasise asymmetry, in the relationship between God and world, he clearly and explicitly departs from the derivative logic.

We can thus conclude at this point that Apollinarius in his letter to Basil employs energetically and with rigour a theory of *ousia* as a genus whose unity is guaranteed by derivation from its source of origin. This theory is developed in parallel with Neoplatonic derivative genera even though Apollinarius's use is no mere copy of those. In the interest of theological language describing the Son as God without endangering the primacy of the Father or indeed the oneness of God, he modifies the claims philosophers would normally make about such genera. Where for Platonists the emphasis would have been on the subordination of the many derived from the first principle, Apollinarius, while accepting a difference of rank, accentuates primarily unity and identity between first cause and those who are from it. Conversely, there is no evidence that any Platonist emphasised the unity constituted by a derivative relationship to the extent we find in Apollinarius.

3. Derivative Genera and the Coherence of Apollinarius's Thought

The next question, then, must be how much evidence there is for a broader interest Apollinarius might have had in the use of this particular concept. There are two dimensions to this question. The first is to ask how consistent Apollinarius's theory in his letter to Basil is with his trinitarian theology as we find it developed elsewhere. The second and more difficult one is to enquire into his use of derivative genera beyond trinitarian theology. Only an affirmative answer to the latter of those decides on the issue broached at the outset of this paper; it is this problem, therefore, that will be central for the remainder of this paper.

3.1. Trinitarian Theology

In fact, essential coherence between the trinitarian theology developed with the help of derivative genera in his letter to Basil and Apollinarius's pronouncements on the same topic elsewhere in his extant works, is easily demonstrated. As evidence I take note of only one passage from his *Kata Meros Pistis*:

So that if one asked, 'How is there one God if the Son be God from God?', we shall say, 'On account of the principle of origin, according to which the one origin is the Father. [...] And again if the godless ask, 'How are the three Persons not three gods even though there be one divine nature', we shall say, 'This is because God is origin and Father of the Son, and the latter is image and offspring of the Father and not his brother.'³⁶

Without the use of the philosophical argument of the epistle to Basil, Apollinarius's theory here is exactly the same:³⁷ emphasis on the Father as *arche* must explain the unity within the Godhead thus warding off the charge of tritheism *and* recognise the full divinity of Son and Spirit. The Son as image and offspring of the Father is derived from him. He is, therefore, God, but not the Father's 'brother'.³⁸ This insistence on the Father as God and as *arche* is recurrent throughout this and other texts; *homoousios* for Apollinarius strictly means that the Father *is* the common substance and the Son is *of the same substance* on account of his derivation from the Father who is source and origin of the Godhead. This, we have seen, is precisely the theological point Apollinarius develops with the help of an elaborate theory of derivative genera in his letter to Basil. It corresponds, then, fairly precisely to his trinitarian theology as he explains it elsewhere.

3.2. Creation

What evidence is there that the same principle is employed beyond Apollinarius's trinitarian theology? Given that Apollinarius's letter to Basil had emphasised the analogy subsisting between the trinitarian Godhead and the unity of humankind, one may almost expect to find texts elsewhere in his works that make use of this very interpretation of the oneness of humanity in, and on account of our descent from, the primogenitor. Such use would be all the less surprising given the theological desirability of such a theory which almost seems called for by texts like Rom 5:12 and might easily help explain a variety of theological problems.

A first area in which one would expect to find such an application is the doctrine of creation. We do not have, from the hand of Apollinarius, a systematic and comprehensive treatment of this topic, but a number of extant fragments indicate his understanding especially of God's creation of humankind. One of them, from Apollinarius's commentary on the Psalms, is dedicated to an elucidation of Ps 144:1. The exegetical problem the

³⁶ Apoll., KMP 18–9 (173.17–26 L.): ὥστε εἴ τις ἔροίτο Πῶς εἶς θεός, εἴπερ ἐκ θεοῦ θεός εἶη ὁ υἱός; ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς λόγῳ, καθ' ὃν μία ἀρχὴ ὁ πατήρ. [...] καὶ πάλιν ἐάν εἴπωσιν οἱ ἀσεβεῖς Πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἶεν τρεῖς θεοὶ τρία πρόσωπα, εἰ μίαν ἔχοιεν τὴν θεότητα; ἐροῦμεν Ἐπειδὴ ὁ θεός ἀρχὴ καὶ πατήρ ἐστιν τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ οὗτος εἰκὼν ἐστὶ καὶ γέννημα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ οὐκ ἀδελφός αὐτοῦ.

³⁷ I leave to one side here, as in the paper overall, the interesting transition from the binitarian perspective of the ep. 362 to the trinitarian perspective here.

³⁸ This echoes an anti-Nicene argument cited, e. g. in Ath., syn 51,3 (274.35–275.4 O.) and Ar. 1.14.

commentator has to solve is the hyperbolic claim by the poet that he ‘will bless your [sc. God’s] name for ever and ever’. How can a human being with a limited lifespan make such a commitment? Apollinarius argues that it is literally true only for the life to come (κατὰ τὴν μέλλουσαν ζωὴν) when the individual will be in a position to offer everlasting praise to God. In the present life, the implied subject evidently cannot be the mortal and finite individual; it must be the universal:

In the present life this could only be possible with regard to humanity which is one *qua* descent (διαδοχῆ) because with each preceding generation departing, their descendants (οἱ διαδεχόμενοι) take their place. Therefore also we are all called by the name of Adam, as indeed we are him, and God says ‘I made the earth and man upon it’ (Is 44:12), conceiving of them all as of one.³⁹

The most striking phrase in this passage is ‘humanity, which [or literally: man who] is one *qua* descent’ (ὁ κατὰ διαδοχὴν εἷς ἄνθρωπος). Its use here indicates how deeply the idea of human nature as one on account of its derivation from the first individual was imbedded into Apollinarius’s thinking. He apparently took it for granted to such an extent that he could casually refer to it in a throwaway line. His subsequent explication of this concept through the universal application of the name Adam merely underlines the same point. We are all called Adam and indeed ‘are him’. In the creation of the world, ‘man’ is referred to as one; by using the designation in the singular, God nevertheless includes all individuals. As in the letter to Basil, it is notable that this unity is thought of in personal terms: in Is 44:12, according to Apollinarius, God conceives of all humankind as one man (εἷς not ἓν). Their unity, then, does not consist in a common essence or abstraction; it is the collective persona of the primogenitor.

In an interesting phrase, Apollinarius explains the succession of generations writing that when one generation steps off the next one takes its place (χώρα). He does not enlarge on this claim and it may be inconsequential, but if it is not it might give a fascinating glimpse into his thinking, as it conjures up the image of humanity as a great organism whose final and mortal parts are replaced over time. This succession, however, unfolds and is contained within a continuity of space (*chora*).

For the broader context of Apollinarius’s argument it is important to realise that the Christian doctrine of creation has to reconcile two tensional claims in the Bible: God is said to have made Adam, the first human being, but he is also credited with the creation of humankind in its entirety. The latter claim is implied in the verse from the Book of Isaiah Apollinarius adduces in the present place, but more famously in Gn 1:26–27. It is the latter verse that gave rise to theories of two creations beginning with Philo’s *De opificio mundi*⁴⁰ and reverberating in the fourth century in Apollinarius’s younger contemporary, Gregory of Nyssa.⁴¹ Apollinarius, in the present passage, seems to gesture at

³⁹ Apoll., met. Ps. 144:1 (fig. 301 Mühlenberg): Κατὰ μὲν τὸν νῦν βίον τοῦ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ταῦτα ἂν εἶναι δύναίτο, ὅτι τῶν προτέρων ἀπιόντων εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων χώραν εἰσὶν οἱ διαδεχόμενοι· διὸ καὶ τῷ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ὀνόματι καλούμεθα πάντες ὡς ἐκείνος ὄντες αὐτοί, καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἐργά, φησί, ἐποίησα γῆν καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐπ’ αὐτῆς, ἓνα τοὺς πάντας λογιζόμενος.

⁴⁰ Philo, op. mun. 134–135; cf. Thomas H. Tobin, *The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation* (Washington: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983).

⁴¹ Gr. Nyssa., hom. opif. 16 (PG 44:185 B–D); cf. Johannes Zachhuber, *Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 163–174.

an alternative response to the same problem. If Adam is the same as humanity in general, the creation story can be understood literally while at the same time maintaining its universal implication.

This interpretation receives further support from another fragment in the catena, Apollinarius's comment on Ps 118:73 LXX ('your hands made and moulded me'). In this text, the Bishop of Laodicea seeks to account for the seemingly inappropriate, anthropomorphic word 'to mould' (πλάττειν) with regard to God's creative activity. He points out that, wherever God seems to 'mould', the verb denotes an activity that completes the work at once 'by means of the power that effects such a formation'.

The instances of moulding of which the text speaks must be referred to that first 'moulding' as in 'Before I "moulded" thee in the belly I knew thee' (Jer 1:5). Likewise Job too says that 'Thou hast "moulded" me as the clay' (Job 10:9) he refers to himself the (original) creation from clay in Adam.⁴²

In Apollinarius's view, human beings can say that they are individually created ('moulded') by God (Jer 1:5; Job 10:9), as Jeremiah and Job both do, without contradicting the creation story of the book of Genesis. The reason is that in doing so they refer to the creation of Adam and *in* Adam (ἐν Ἀδάμ) of themselves. Especially striking, almost daring, appears Apollinarius's interpretation of Job 10:9, which mentions Job's formation from clay. This is taken to be, in fact, an indirect reference to Gn 2:7, which Apollinarius describes as ἡ ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ πηλοπλαστία. Job is entitled to this claim because he was included *in* the first creation from clay; that creation of Adam *was* the creation of Man.

There is, then, evidence that Apollinarius, who favoured a literal interpretation of the creation narrative, saw in the creation of the first human being the creation of humanity in its entirety. It may be for this reason that, as far as we know, he refrained from basing his interpretation on the exegesis of Gn 1:26–27 and instead preferred Gn 2:7 in his references to the creation of humanity. It is important for him to emphasise the *corporeal* character of this creation right from the beginning: the soul is only added *after* the body was constituted; there never, therefore, was or could be a disembodied soul.⁴³ At the same time, Apollinarius exploits the use of ἄνθρωπος in the singular in Is 44:12 to drive home the point that God created universal humankind in and through Adam. In a striking reference to Gn 2:7 he claims that the creation of all human beings was included in the formation of Adam from clay. For Apollinarius, God's creative act is both protological and continuing precisely because of the cohesion between the primogenitor and the genus.

3.3. Fall and Universal Sin

For an appreciation of Apollinarius's further theological use of humanity as a derivative genus, it is necessary at this point to consider his ideas about the precise mode in which the succession of human generations produces their unity as 'one man'. We know

⁴² Apoll., met. Ps. 118:73 (fig. 227 M.): καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνην δὲ τὴν πρότην πλάσιν ἀναφέρεσθαι δεῖ τὰς νῦν λεγομένας πλάσεις, οἷον καὶ τὸ Πρὸ τοῦ με πλάσαι σε ἐν κοιλίᾳ ἐπίσταμαί σε· καθὼ καὶ Ἰὼβ λέγει τὸ Πηλὸν με ἔπλασας, τὴν ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ πηλοπλαστίαν δηλῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ.

⁴³ Apoll., met. Ps. 118:50 (fig. 224 M.); Ez 37:6 (90 Mai). This is directly linked to his Christology: in order to restore humanity to likeness with God, the Logos therefore had to become flesh: fid. inc. 4 (306.22–307.2 L.).

from Nemesius of Emesa that Apollinarius was counted among Christian advocates of traducianism:

Apollinarius believes that souls are born from souls, as bodies are born from bodies. For, he holds, soul progresses by transmission from the first man into all his progeny, just like bodily transmission. For souls are [in his view] neither stored up nor now created; for those who say this make God an accomplice of adulterers, since children are begotten by them also. And 'God rested from all the works' that he had begun to make is false since he is still now making souls.⁴⁴

There is no need specifically to emphasise or explain that this theory coheres perfectly with Apollinarius's understanding of derivative genera as the passage is unequivocal in this regard. It is by means of biological generation that the solidarity of humankind is in practice manifested. Apollinarius tellingly refers to 'the first man' and 'all his progeny': traducianism is directly tied to our common descent from Adam. We have already seen how Apollinarius's interest in humanity's unity as a derivative genus is aligned with his commitment to a unitary anthropology: Adam for him is emphatically the man made of clay whose body preceded his soul. The latter cannot therefore be thought to represent the core of human identity in separation from the former. It is in the same vein, then, that he insists on the full transmission of humanity, body and soul, from the first creation. Our entire being is owed to our first forefather: in him God's creation of humankind was complete, as Apollinarius argues with a characteristically bold reference to Gn 2:2 ('And on the seventh day God finished the work that he had done').

Elsewhere, Apollinarius goes into further detail about the procreative process. Human beings are 'ensouled and live', Apollinarius explains, 'of the will of the flesh and of the will of man' (cf. John 1:13). In this act [...] the emitted germinal matter inserts the vivifying power into the receptive matrix.⁴⁵ The terms 'germinal' (σπερματικός) and power (δύναμις) in this passage point strongly to Stoic natural philosophy with its dynamic notion of the cosmos as an evolving entity.⁴⁶ The same vocabulary is encountered in Apollinarius's contemporary, Gregory of Nyssa, who adapts Stoic notions usually in Platonic interpretation to the same end.⁴⁷ In Apollinarius, however, the Platonic overtones seem less marked: after all, the unity of humanity for him clearly is physical, tied to man's corporeal constitution and, as we have seen, the soul itself is explicitly included in these rules of generational succession and descent. In Stoicism, of course, matter precisely is not 'germinal' but without qualities,⁴⁸ but this may be a mere terminological quirk:⁴⁹ Apollinarius's description of the female 'matrix' and its function in the procreative process perfectly mirrors the Stoic idea of a purely passive principle that is acted upon by a dynamic and vitalistic logos:

They [the Stoics] think that there are two principles of the universe, that which acts (τὸ ποιοῦν) and that which is acted upon (τὸ πάσχον). That which is acted upon is unqualified substance, i.e.

⁴⁴ Nemes., nat. hom. (32.3–9 Morani); English translation: Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, transl. R. W. Sharples/P. J. van der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), 70–71.

⁴⁵ Apoll., corp. et div. 13 (191.6–7 L.): [...] τῆς ἐκπεμπομένης σπερματικῆς ὕλης ἐπιφερούσης τὴν ζωοποιὸν δύναμιν εἰς τὴν ὑποδεχομένην μήτραν.

⁴⁶ SVF II 1047 (308.37–40).

⁴⁷ Gr. Nyss., hom. opif. 29 (PG 44:236 A–B); hex. (PG 44:77 D).

⁴⁸ E. g. SVF II 380 (126.30–42).

⁴⁹ Moreover, it agrees with Apollinarius's usage of ὑπόθεσις in his letter to Basil. Cf. at n. 19 above.

matter; that which acts is the reason [λόγος] in it, i. e. god. For this, since it is everlasting, constructs [δημιουργεῖν] every single thing throughout all matter ...⁵⁰

As in Stoic thought, moreover, Apollinarius is insistent that the two are complimentary. This is emphasized in a fragment which, while commenting on the mechanisms of procreation, connects the latter with universal sinfulness. Explaining Psalm 50:5 ('Indeed, I was born guilty, a sinner when my mother conceived me'), Apollinarius writes that asking for God's mercy (cf. Psalm 50:1) indicates that 'the sin in the first creation is passed on to us through the mothers who have conceived us'. Even though Paul in Rom 5:12 appears to link our sinfulness to the 'one man', Adam, Apollinarius argues that it is from the first woman that evil 'through childbirth proceeds to the children':

This is more appropriately said of the mother even though sin is also passed on (διήκειν)⁵¹ from the father. For we are born germinally from the father but perfectly (έντελῶς) from the mothers when we proceed to the light in childbirth.⁵²

That Apollinarius here places so much emphasis on the moment of birth is consistent with his overall anthropology. The complete humanity is not, after all, in the sperm that enters into the female womb at the moment of conception, but it is the result (έντελῶς!) of the interaction of the active and the passive principle during the months of pregnancy that produces the human person.

At the same time, the present fragment makes it fully evident that Apollinarius thought the derivative unity of humanity offered an elegant way, too, for the explanation of original sin and its transmission to all humankind. The Spirit, he writes, which was given to Adam at the moment of creation and showed itself in his prophetic ability,⁵³ is lost with the Fall; this truncated humanity is subsequently passed on and received in the process of sexual generation. This process is reversed only when the resurrected Christ 'breathes on' the disciples and thus passes on to them the Holy Spirit (John 20:22): Apollinarius draws a direct and explicit parallel between this event and the original creation of prelapsarian Adam.

* * *

It appears, then, that Apollinarius's understanding of humanity as a derivative genus, which is one in its first instantiation, has two immediate theological implications: on the one hand, it explains how humankind was created fully 'in the beginning' and yet every

⁵⁰ SVF I 85 (24.5–8): δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄλων δύο, τὸ ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ἄλην· τὸ δὲ ποιῶν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ἄδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. English translation: A. A. Long/D. N. Sedley (eds.), *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 268.

⁵¹ For the term cf. SVF I 153 (41.22–24); II 473 (155.24–30).

⁵² Apoll., met. Ps. 50:7 (fig. 90 M.): οικειότερον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς μητρὸς τοῦτο λέγεται, καίτοι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς δικούσης τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὅτι σπερματικῶς μὲν ἐκ πατρὸς, έντελῶς δὲ ἐκ μητέρων ἐμὲν ἀποκρούμενοι καὶ διὰ τῶν τοκετῶν εἰς φῶς προϊόντες.

⁵³ Prophetic powers are frequently ascribed to Adam in early Jewish and apocryphal literature, but Adam's prophecy is usually placed at the end of his life as its recipient is Seth. In the Testament of Adam, which appears to originate from fourth-century Syria, at least the origin of Adam's foreknowledge of the future is unequivocally ascribed to his time in paradise: Test. Adae 3.2.

person can individually be considered God's handiwork; 'in Adam' we are therefore one insofar as we are brought forth and made by God. At the same time, however, we are also one in Adam's sin and fallenness and hence in our radical separation from God. This tension is not, of course, unique to Apollinarius; it comes with the biblical tradition that Christianity inherited. Yet it is striking that the solution to which the Bishop of Laodicea appears to incline, emphasises the latter more than the former: with Paul, Apollinarius stresses the antithesis of Adam and Christ, and the complementarity of fall and redemption. Whereas his younger contemporary Gregory of Nyssa, for example, builds much of his theology on Gn 1:26–27 and the notion that, in spite of its disfiguration through sin, humanity as an intelligible and noetic *ousia* remains essentially related to God as his image,⁵⁴ Apollinarius's Adam is essentially the man made of clay in Gn 2:7 whose likeness to God is his possession of the Holy Spirit and thus, one might say, *donum superadditum* and supernatural.

The restoration of this condition is therefore tied exclusively to the gift of the Holy Spirit the disciples receive from the resurrected Jesus (John 20:22). Where for Gregory ascetic practice in Israel and the Christian Church works in conjunction with divine grace,⁵⁵ Apollinarius accepts Paul's dichotomy of law and gospel. One might think, Apollinarius writes, commenting on Rom 7:7, that Jesus's words operate in a way similar to the law by discerning the good from the bad. Yet the crucial difference is that while the law only gives us words and leaves it to us to execute its principles,

[...] our Lord Jesus Christ achieves the whole of salvation for those who belong to him through the gift of the Spirit. He creates anew, as it were; he transforms, and he shapes believers when they receive the divine insufflation and are appropriated to it.⁵⁶

3.4. Christology

It seems clear that this perspective on fall and redemption had an impact as well on Apollinarius's most distinctive theological doctrine, his Christology. In Ps.-Athanasius' *Contra Apollinarium* the argument is ascribed to him that Christ could not have been fully human 'because where there is a complete human being, there also is sin' ('Ὅπου γὰρ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἁμαρτία').⁵⁷ One may doubt that Apollinarius himself would ever have resorted to such a crude formulation, but there is no doubt whatsoever that for him the specific contours of his teaching on the person of Christ were determined by his ideas about the solidarity of human nature as a derivative genus. The passage from *De unione* 1 used earlier to illustrate Apollinarius's understanding of human generation goes on to contrast this with the unique origin of the God-man:

⁵⁴ Gr. Nyss., virg. 12 (GNO 8/1, 297.24–300.13 Jaeger); perf. (GNO 8/1, 194.14–196.15 Jaeger). Cf. Zachhuber, *Human Nature* (op. cit. fn. 41), 176–178, 190–192; Michel Aubineau, 'Le thème du "bourbier" dans la littérature grecque profane et chrétienne', *RSR*, 47 (1959), 185–214.

⁵⁵ Cf. Gr. Nyss., laud. Bas. (GNO 10/1, 111 Lendle).

⁵⁶ Apoll., Rom 7:7 (64.27–31 Staab): τοῦ δὲ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τὸ μὲν σύμπαν ἐν τῇ δόσει τοῦ πνεύματος τὴν τῶν ὑφ' ἐαυτῶν σωτηρίαν ἐργαζομένου καὶ οἰοεὶ δημιουργούντος ἡμᾶς ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ μεταπλάττοντος καὶ ρυθμίζοντος ἐν τῷ τὴν θεῖαν ἐπίνοιαν ὑποδέχεσθαι τοὺς πιστεύοντας καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν οἰκειοῦσθαι. The contrast between law and spirit is expressed in starkly 'antinomian' terms at Jo. 10:8–10 (frg. 58,2–5 Reuss).

⁵⁷ Ps.-Ath., Apoll. 1.1 (PG 26:1096 B).

Human beings in general are ensouled and live of the will of the flesh and of the will of man (cf. John 1:13). [In the procreative act], the emitted germinal matter inserts the vivifying power into the receptive matrix. The holy child born of the virgin, however, is constituted by the coming-upon of the Spirit and the overshadowing of the Power (cf. Luke 1:35). No germinal matter brings about divine life, but the spiritual and divine power implants into the virgin the divine foetus and graces the divine offspring.⁵⁸

In Jesus, the active life-principle is replaced by divine power. His birth from the virgin indicates that his individual genesis is different from the birth of normal human beings who are formed, as we have seen, by means of the interaction of the active (paternal) and the passive (maternal) principle both handed down from the first human couple. In his polemic against Diodorus of Tarsus, Apollinarius sharply insists on this point:

And he is not ashamed to say that there is the same *physis*, but a different [mode of] generation: but the birth from the virgin is rendered void and superfluous if that which is begotten does not conform to the [mode of] generation, but is [regarded as] identical with that which is begotten of man and woman.⁵⁹

Given what was found earlier about Apollinarius's understanding of the formation of human beings in the womb, it seems clear that he cannot simply be accused of replacing the sinful part of humanity with divine nature. The human person, in many ways, is only complete at birth and therefore the product of both father and mother; in this way, human sinfulness too is linked to the inheritance of both parents. Still, the slogan cited in Ps.-Athanasius ('where there is a complete human being, there is also sin') is not altogether inappropriate either. Apollinarius sees human nature after Adam and Eve as trapped in sinfulness, and there is no doubt that he believed that the supernatural origin of the saviour was recorded in the Bible to account for the re-entry of undiluted divinity into human history.

3.5. *Salvation, Sacraments, and the Church*

What happens after the Incarnation? We have already seen that Apollinarius draws an exact parallel between Adam's loss of the Spirit in the fall and its gift to the first Christians by the resurrected Christ. John 20:22 in particular was a text of crucial importance for Apollinarius's theology: Jesus 'breathes' the Spirit into his disciples the way God had inspired Adam when he first created the protoplast (Gn 2:7). Apollinarius's exegesis of Rom 7:7, on the other hand, had expressed his emphasis on complete human transformation and even re-creation as a consequence of the Christ event. There is evidence that for his precise interpretation of the relationship between Christ and his Church, Apollinarius once again draws on the model of derivative genera. As Adam was the origin (and thus the whole *ousia*) of natural humanity, so Christ becomes the principle of new, redeemed humankind. Commenting on the installation of the tabernacle in Num 7:1, Apollinarius offers the following typological interpretation:

We are contained in the body of Christ as in the tabernacle, and like a sacrifice we are offered on the altar. For the body [of Christ] is holy as is the tabernacle and the altar; it is of the same kind

⁵⁸ Apoll., corp. et div. 13 (191.4–11 L.).

⁵⁹ Apoll., frg. 142 (241.19–26 L.).

(ὁμογενές) with us *qua* body. It is superior to us, however, insofar as it is holy. In its holiness it has life and has never been without holiness, [not even] before the consecration.⁶⁰

The body of Christ, like the holy tent, contains and includes all Christians. This relationship, like that between Adam and humanity, constitutes homogeneity but also difference: as the source of all holiness, Christ is and remains distinct from those who owe their holiness to, and possess it by derivation from, him. This is where for Apollinarius the analogy between Christ and the tabernacle breaks down: whereas the account in the Book of Numbers mentions Moses' consecration of the altar, such an act was not necessary in the case of the God-man for whom holiness is a substantial attribute.

The two ideas of the Church's derivation from Christ as his body and its common bond in the Holy Spirit, which went out from the resurrected Lord, are brought together in Apollinarius's interpretation of the Eucharist.⁶¹ It rests on the interlocking exegesis of a number of key passages, which the Bishop of Laodicea presents in the context of his interpretation of the words of institution (Mt 26:26–28). The first of those verses is Mt 6:11, the fourth petition of the Lord's Prayer. The Greek term ἐπιούσιος, usually translated as 'daily', is notoriously unclear, and several interpretations are proffered in the Patristic period already.⁶² Apollinarius understands it eschatologically:⁶³ the bread we ask for, he asserts, is 'life-giving food in the world to come'. As such, however, it is nothing other than the Spirit; praying for the 'coming bread' the believer asks for the gift of the Spirit.⁶⁴ At the same time, Apollinarius finds in this verse Eucharistic overtones because he links it with John 6:51 ('the bread that I will give for the life of the world is my flesh'): the bread Jesus promises is given 'for the life of the world' as much as the bread the Lord's Prayer asks for is glossed by Apollinarius himself as 'life-giving food'.⁶⁵ To this triad (bread-body-spirit) corresponds a second one: wine-blood-soul as Apollinarius establishes on the basis of Lev 17:11 LXX ('the soul of the flesh is in the blood'). Both blood and soul, then, designate the life-principle in the body. Taken together, the words of institution therefore indicate

[...] the participation [in the Spirit?] which cannot happen without a body. For if the divine power had not been connected with a body and united with blood, we would not through it have participation in God.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Apoll., Num. 7:1 (138 Devresse). Cf. Cattaneo, *Trois homélies* (op. cit. fn. 1), 150–151.

⁶¹ This has been treated in detail by de Riedmatten, 'Some neglected aspects' (op. cit. fn. 1), 248–250 and Cattaneo, *Trois homélies* (op. cit. fn. 1), 141–155.

⁶² Cf. G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982), s. v.

⁶³ Cf. Or., or. 27.13 (GCS Origenes II 1899, 372.3–8 Koetschau) for an early reference to this interpretation. Origen himself, however, prefers to derive ἐπιούσιος from *ousia*: or. 27.7 (366.34–367.12 K.).

⁶⁴ Such a petition is contained in a variant reading of Lk 11:2 which Gregory of Nyssa accepts as original: ἐλθέτω σου τὸ πνεῦμά τὸ ἅγιον καὶ καθαρίσάτω ἡμᾶς. Cf. Gr. Nyss., or. 3 (GNO 7/2, 39.18 Callahan); cf. Georg Walther, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Vaterunser-Exegese* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1914), 37. Apollinarius offers the same spiritualist interpretation of Mt 6:11 at Apoll., Mt. 6:11 (fig. 28 R.).

⁶⁵ Apoll., Mt. 26:26–28 (fig. 134 R.): ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄρτος ἐπιούσιος τὸ πνεῦμα, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τροφή ζωοποιός εἰς τὸν ἐπίοντα αἰῶνα. For the Spirit as 'life-giving food' cf. also Apoll., Jo. 10:8–10 (fig. 58 R.).

⁶⁶ Apollinarius, Mt. 26:26–28 (fig. 134 R.): ἡ βρώσις οὖν καὶ ἡ πόσις ἐδήλωσε τὴν μετοχὴν τὴν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος γινομένην· εἰ γὰρ μὴ σώματι συνήφθη καὶ αἵματι ἠνώθη ἡ θεία δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμεν μετουσίαν δι' αὐτῆς πρὸς θεόν.

As in the case of Adam and old humanity, Apollinarius believes, the transmission of new life given by the Spirit to all believers can only happen through a material medium: this is the Eucharist, which time after time he refers to as 'life-giving food',⁶⁷ a metaphor evidently culled from John 6:51 but at the same time possessing unmistakable pneumatological overtones. More importantly, however, both body and spirit have their origin in the Incarnation of the God-man who in this way becomes the second Adam from whom the Church is derived and in whom it has its unity.⁶⁸

4. Conclusion

I have argued in this paper that Apollinarius adapts from contemporary philosophy a notion of the genus as a derivative unit whose first member is at the same time the whole and therefore embraces the whole class. He incorporates this theory into Christian theology by aligning it with biblical allusions to the universal inclusion of all humanity in Adam. While he is not the first to have capitalised on this logic, he is original – as far as we know – in employing it extensively and with considerable systematic coherence across a wide range of theological topics. Principally and most distinctively, he uses the model to justify the Nicene *homoousios* in his correspondence with Basil the Great, but there are indications that he applied the same principle in his teaching on creation, the fall, the Incarnation, and salvation as well.

Mustering through the relevant fragments gives a vivid sense of Apollinarius's theological potential; as a thinker he was both deeply traditional and strikingly original combining attention to detail with a sweeping and bold vision of the Christian faith. This vision is inspired by a starkly Christocentric, Incarnational theology in the Irenaeian tradition. From the unity of divine nature and human flesh in Jesus Christ, Apollinarius extrapolates an anthropology strongly emphasising humanity's corporeal nature: Gn 2:7, not 1:26–27, is his favourite point of reference for the creation of man; as he reads it, soul or spirit enters only *after* the body has been formed. He consequently avoids the exploitation of the body-soul dualism for the explanation of human sin and fallenness. Human separation from God after the fall, which Apollinarius emphasises more strongly than many other Greek fathers, is the result of the loss of the gift of divine Spirit in the first creation; the latter is only restored when the resurrected Jesus breathes his Spirit into the disciples (John 20:23). Generally, Apollinarius explains human redemption in pneumatological language, but at the same time insists on the necessarily corporeal dimension of the gift of the Spirit: this is achieved by an alignment of the Spirit with the body of Christ and of the gift of the Spirit with the reception of Christ's body and blood in the Lord's Supper.

⁶⁷ Cf. Cattaneo, *Trois homélies* (op. cit. fn. 1), 146–148 with more examples.

⁶⁸ These ideas do not come out in full detail in the extant remains of Apollinarius's writings. Cf. however the argument in the Ps.-Athanasian *De incarnatione* at contra Arianos which, while starting from an interpretation of the Eucharist that is identical to Apollinarius's own position, moves on to ecclesiological consequences along the lines I have suggested here: Zachhuber, *Human Nature* (op. cit. fn. 41), 139–142.

The list of Apollinarius's theological achievements, then, is long and impressive, and I argue that his reception of derivative genera facilitated this success to a considerable extent. A last thought must, however, be reserved for the limits of Apollinarius's concept.

They come out once we observe that a theory of the unity of humanity ought to be able to explain not only how humanity is one, but also how it comes to exist in individual members. It appears that, while Apollinarius had much to say about the former, he hardly succeeded in explaining the latter. A striking contrast between his own and Basil's account of the Trinity in their exchange of letters is, in fact, that the later bishop of Caesarea is much more concerned with a balance between unity and diversity in the Godhead⁶⁹ – it is, of course, precisely this tendency that comes to dominate the celebrated Cappadocian settlement of Trinitarian doctrine in terms of properties or *idiomata* which the three Persons either share or possess individually.⁷⁰ By contrast, Apollinarius's argument is largely geared towards the commonality of the Persons. True, his choice of Adam and humanity introduces a *prima facie* element of plurality into his theory: after all, human beings *appear* to be many. Still, it is striking that, unlike Basil, Apollinarius does not seem to feel the need for a conceptual tool explaining individuation.

The same observation can be made across the whole range of Apollinarius's applications of his derivative theory; they are all tilted towards the side of the universal to the detriment of the particular. He expresses his conviction that we were all created in Adam, but does not explain what it means that in some sense we evidently are *not* all the same individual. The same holds true for fallen humanity, which in some ways really becomes a *massa perditionis* in Apollinarius, an on-going actualisation of the same ontological principle with little or no regard to its individual instantiations. Even Apollinarius's saviour is unique only insofar as he is the product of divine power (not the second Person of the Trinity!) and human nature's passive, maternal element. While Apollinarius has routinely been accused of sacrificing Christ's 'full' humanity in the interest of a coherent Word-flesh Christology, it may well be more appropriate to see his fault in the failure to account for Christ's human (and divine) individuality.

A full appreciation of Apollinarius's contribution to the history of doctrine, which is a task as yet to be achieved, must take into account both his success and his failure. While a more complete picture of his theological achievements is likely to establish him as one of the most formative theological minds of the Patristic period, his one-sided reliance on a model of universal being in its unity and cohesion will without a doubt appear as foreshadowing the failure of later centuries to give an adequate answer when the Christological debate turned the problem of individuality and individuation into pressing challenges to theology and to the Church.

⁶⁹ Bas., ep. 361.24–35 (3, 221 C. = 202.20–28 de R.).

⁷⁰ For the fully developed form of this theory cf. Bas., ep. 214.4.6–15 (2, 205 C.); 236.6.1–22 (3, 53–54 C.) and esp. Ps.-Bas., ep. 38.2–3 (1, 81–84 C.).