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Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Abstract:
In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when marching is assortative and sellers' investment precede market competition the investments are constrained efficient.

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Publisher:
Nuffield College (University of Oxford)
Series:
Economics Series Working Papers
Host title:
Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Economics Papers
Publication date:
2000-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:4f583abf-d7b3-41e8-be42-d40ae3e270f5
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11906
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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