A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion

Journal article

Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the 'inserted' thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the 'insert...

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Authors: Bortolotti, L; Broome, M

• Journal: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
• Volume: 8
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 205-224
• Publication date: 2009-06-01
• DOI: 10.1007/s11097-008-9109-z
• EISSN: 1572-8676
• ISSN: 1568-7759
• Language: English
• Keywords: Intentionality; Ownership of thoughts; First-person authority; Self-knowledge; Rationality; Thought insertion; Self-ascription; Authorship of thoughts