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Dynamically Stable Preferences.

Abstract:

This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents repeatedly matched to play a symmetric 2 £ 2 game in biological fitnesses. Each agent is biased in favor of one of the strategies, and receives a noisy signal of his and his opponent's bias. With sufficiently accurate signals, the resulting global game selects a unique outcome, allowing preference biases to be shaped by the replicator dynamics. Stability analysis in this setting requires the e...

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Thomas Norman More by this author
Volume:
207
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2004
URN:
uuid:4d01c8b6-0547-4fd1-84dc-6b16dd8b1bbc
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13300
Language:
English

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