

# The Anthropology of Hilary of Poitiers

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Doctor Philosophiae (D.Phil.)

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## Short Abstract

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*The Anthropology of Hilary of Poitiers: thesis submitted for DPhil examination*

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This thesis examines the theology of the fourth-century bishop, Hilary of Poitiers, concentrating particularly on two commentaries written at different times in his life.

The thesis starts by examining the texts, and demonstrates that Hilary's commentary on Psalm 118 is loosely speaking a translation of Origen; by comparing both authors with Ambrose, the relationship between Origen and Hilary appears much closer than previously thought.

The main body of the thesis examines Hilary's anthropological theology. Three chapters look at created human nature, looking at the relationship between body and soul, human nature as *imago dei*, and the extent to which human nature can be treated as a platonic universal. The general conclusion is that Hilary is not particularly platonic, and at this stage is not particularly stoic either, but rather is eclectic in his choice of philosophical ideas. The influence of Origen is clear but Hilary only uses Origen's theology critically.

There follow four chapters on the Fall and its impact, focussing particularly on its effects on human nature. In particular it is shown that Hilary presages Augustine's teaching of the fallen will; in Hilary the Will is described as being in thrall to her mother-in-law Disobedience. Another human malady is the effect of the passions or emotions, where Hilary is influenced by Stoic ideas of the process of human action; nevertheless, concepts such as *apatheia* or the *propatheiai* do not appear in his work. These constraints on human action point towards Hilary's theology of original sin; indeed he appears to be the first author to use the phrase *peccata originis* in this sense.

In the concluding chapter, Hilary's place in the continuum between Origen and Augustine is demonstrated; at very least, original sin cannot be called an African doctrine, since it first is named by Hilary, a Gaul.

# Long Abstract

*Isabella Image, Harris Manchester College*

*The Anthropology of Hilary of Poitiers: thesis submitted for DPhil examination*

*Michaelmas Term 2014*

This thesis examines the theological anthropology of the fourth century bishop Hilary of Poitiers and in particular his view of the Fall and how it affected human nature. A secondary interest has been to put this in the long term perspective of development towards Augustine of the doctrine of original sin.

## *Motivation & Key Questions*

The motivation of this thesis is perhaps best described by how the subject evolved. There was one particular trigger which particularly caused me interest.

I originally looked at Hilary with a view to studying his trinitarian theology. However while reading his commentary *In Matthaëum* I was struck by the narrative of the ‘anthropological household’ [my own term] explaining Christ’s words that he sets “a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother...” (Mt. 10.35). Hilary takes the family of five as being five anthropological components that make a human: Body, Soul, Will, joined at the Fall by Sin and Disobedience (Hilary, *In Matthaëum* 10.24-5).

What particularly intrigued me was that when the Will joins with her mother-in-law Disobedience, the result is effectively a fallen will and an internal change in human nature. I had recently finished the undergraduate Augustine paper and had felt rather frustrated about the Will; but one thing at least I understood was that Augustine was essentially novel in his understanding of the fallen Will. And yet here in Hilary was evidence of a pre-Augustinian author who frequently expressed the will as constrained. Further, Hilary scholars frequently analyse Hilary’s theology of original sin (*peccata originis*) and yet they consider this ‘anthropological household’ passage as anomalous in Hilary’s corpus. Thus the whole thesis grew out of my fascination with this passage.

This thesis also allowed me to indulge in a pleasure in philosophy and especially Stoic thought.

Modern philosophers such as Sorabji and Frede rightly place Christian authors in the continuum of development in ideas about the will, determinism, and free choice. However Sorabji and to a lesser extent Frede place Origen and Augustine at opposite ends of the free-will spectrum (seeing Origen as totally free in his understanding of the will, and Augustine at the opposite pole embracing a fallen or even depraved will). It seemed to me that it was possible to see a greater degree of continuity between these two, with Hilary as a stage in between. Luckily then my interest in elements of philosophical psychology overlapped with my desire to know more about the Will in the fourth century.

The key questions for me, then, were: (a) is there in Hilary a precedent to Augustine’s theology of the fallen will and its place in the doctrine of original sin? (b) if so, what are its sources – whether Christian or philosophical (non-Christian)?

These were my internal motivations and questions. This abstract now proceeds to describe individual findings in more detail, in the order that they are presented in the thesis. The novel or independent findings of each chapter are also detailed.

*Methodology & Texts (Chapters 1-2)*

The methodology in this thesis was to use all Hilary's works, but in particular to compare two of his biblical commentaries, namely those on the Gospel of Matthew and on Psalm 118, and to examine how far these differed or were consistent.

While preparing the texts at the beginning of my thesis, what became evident was an immense correlation between Hilary's commentary on Psalm 118, Ambrose's commentary on the same work, and the fragments of Origen's commentary on the same as preserved by the Palestinian catena. On examination of one particular unit (around ## words in Hilary), it transpired that, for a sizeable sample, around 90% of Hilary's exegetical ideas appeared also in either Ambrose or Origen (this was measured by number of words which appeared in matching columns in Appendix 1). The conclusion drawn was that Hilary and Ambrose were both essentially providing a free translation of Origen's commentary on Psalm 118, with Ambrose diverging more than Hilary (but, critically, usually doing so at the end of a lemma). This differs from the current scholarly opinion which is that Ambrose used a range of works – including Origen's psalm commentary, Hilary's psalm commentary, various other scholia or texts – to compose his work. The conclusion drawn here, however, is considerably simpler and explains just as much.

If we conclude that Hilary translated fairly close to his course (in terms of exegetical ideas, even if not verbatim), then any places where Hilary diverges considerably from the other authors indicates a difference in theological opinion. It transpires that this does occur several times – for example Hilary never mentions the Son and Spirit as God's hands even when the other two texts do; he also omits any discussion of 'losing God's image' where the other two do; and there are significant divergences whenever the Fall is mentioned. This latter fact in particular suggests that Hilary strongly disagrees with some theology of the Fall that he is finding in Origen's text.

The main aim of this thesis has been to describe Hilary's theology as it stands, and thus comparison with Origen or Ambrose has deliberately been considered a secondary strand to that analysis. Nevertheless, comparison with Ambrose and Origen on any given lemma occasionally gives an interesting angle and informs the final overall picture.

*Human nature, independent of the Fall (Chapters 3-5)*

Chapters 3-5 discuss human creation as body and soul (Ch3); our creation in the 'image of God' (Ch4); and whether human nature can be considered as one platonic universal (Ch5). In each case, the relevant topic is considered in tandem with other Hilary scholars and in each case, the usual understanding is challenged.

Chapter 3, on body and soul, addresses the question of whether Hilary is more influenced by Platonic or Stoic ideas. To some degree this is a non-question since these two schools shared many elements; nevertheless, Hilary scholars frequently consider this question. In particular, Hilary is often seen as having a platonic-style dichotomy between the positive spiritual soul and the negative earthly body.

Rondeau questions this basic dichotomy. She shows that Hilary continually undermines this body-soul tension by demonstrating that the human eschatological aim is for body and soul to harmonize perfectly. Using this as a starting point, Chapter 3 shows that Hilary cannot be said to be either particularly platonic (or stoic) in this regard. Nevertheless, by comparing the two commentaries (on Matthew and on Psalm 118), it can be shown that he may arguably have a more positive view of the body in his Matthew

commentary. Such slight differences in articulation are in keeping with the textual finding in Chapter 2, that Hilary relies heavily on Origen for his own commentary.

Chapter 4 examines the notion of being in God's image (hereafter called 'imago theology'). Hilary scholars on the whole find that Hilary has an Origenian imago theology, for example in stating that the soul alone is in God's image (not the body). However this thesis shows that such expressions are *only* found in Hilary's Psalm 118 commentary; elsewhere his expressions are more in common with Western thinkers such as Irenaeus.

Indeed, there is tentative evidence that Hilary may be explicitly rejecting elements of Origen's image theology. Origen sometimes appears to suggest that humans lost the capacity of being (in) God's image at the Fall. However, Hilary may be consciously writing this doctrine out.

This chapter thus counters two common assumptions found by Hilary scholars. First, conclusions about Hilary's anthropology cannot be drawn from the Psalms commentaries alone. Secondly, Hilary does not adopt Origen uncritically, but occasionally explicitly rejects Origen's doctrines.

Chapter 5 considers the issue of 'universal assumption' (UA). Most Hilary scholars (but not all) point to phrases such as "Christ is in all of us / we are in him" to demonstrate a theology of universalism in Hilary, whereby Christ assumes not one human body but the whole human race (compare say Nyssen). This hypothesis is examined from two angles, namely whether Adam comprises all humanity and whether Christ does.

The conclusion of this chapter is to reject categorically the theory of UA which seems to arise from a mis-understanding of Hilary's language and a degree of confusion regarding what exactly UA means or implies. For example, Hilary describes Christ as a city comprising each one of us; but his language clearly implies that he sees this as an analogy, not a philosophically justifiable fact.

### *Human nature as affected by the Fall (Chapters 6-9)*

Chapter 6 looks at the Fall itself and identifies two Fall narratives in Hilary: the standard Scriptural narrative of Genesis 2-3, and the 'anthropological household' as mentioned above. This chapter also identifies a Fall narrative that Hilary rejects, namely the Fall of souls into bodies which he seems to think he finds in Origen's text. It is shown that Hilary identifies the effects of the Fall in various ways, but an especially important one here is in terms of the way it changed human nature by introducing Disobedience.

Following this, two particular anthropological effects of the Fall are examined.

In Chapter 7 the effect of the Fall on the Will is examined in more detail as suggested by the anthropological household. Again Hilary's articulation is different across the two commentaries, but he appears to be consistent on the concept of human constraint. It also transpires that Hilary uses *voluntas* three times more often than Ambrose. Like Augustine, Hilary can appear ambivalent on the will's 'freedom': he attributes moral responsibility to the will alone and thus demands free choice, but the extent to which the will itself is free is less clear. At any rate, Hilary also certainly uses the idea of the Fall to explain some constraint on the will (this feeds into the discussion of Augustine's influences for the weakened will in Chapter 10).

In Chapter 8 other psychological factors are discussed, namely ‘thoughts’ and passions. Hilary does not have some Stoic concepts such as *apatheia* or pre-passions. In fact, contra Layton and others Origen’s ‘thoughts’ are not analagous to Stoic pre-passions, but to the rational sense impressions that enter the mind as a first stage. Hilary’s related *cogitationes* are thus not necessarily morally reprehensible.

Chapters 7 and 8 tie together inasmuch as they demonstrate that Hilary’s understanding of the will, emotions and thought all fit together in the context of Stoic ideas of the process of human action.

Chapter 9 then uses all the information so far to discuss Hilary’s theology of original sin. Hilary scholars have already identified that he holds this doctrine, but disagree as to the extent that it is identifiable with Augustine’s doctrine of original sin. Chapter 9 demonstrates that Hilary may be the first author to use the terminology of *peccata originis* (a development on Tertullian’s *vitium originis*); what is more, all humans are felt to share corporately in Adam’s first sin (just as for Augustine). Interestingly, it seems that Hilary’s stance here emerges not so much from his anthropology as from his trinitarian theology and his concern to protect Christ’s sinlessness by referring to his different birth or *origo*.

#### *Hilary in context between Origen and Augustine (Chapter 10)*

The last chapter draws together all the foregoing and also puts Hilary between Origen and Augustine.

With relation to Origen, Hilary is shown to have used many exegetical ideas from Origen while at the same time rejecting some of Origen’s doctrines. Interestingly, some of the ideas that he rejects in Origen (such as the loss of our capacity of being in God’s image) are only first evidenced explicitly in Epiphanius, starting from around a decade later. Hilary thus provides the earliest evidence of rejection of some of these doctrines.

With relation to Augustine, this study of Hilary has shown that Augustine was not being disingenous in claiming that Hilary held a doctrine of original sin (even if differing in some details, for example on the *initium fidei*). Further, this demonstrates that original sin is not exclusively a North African doctrine as is sometimes held – since the first evidence of it in both terminology and mutually consistent doctrines seems to occur in Hilary, a western Gaul.

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# Chapter 1:

## *Introduction*

This introductory chapter presents Hilary and the historical context of his work. In particular, the context is given for the focus of this thesis – Hilary’s anthropology, especially his understanding of the human person, the Fall and sin.

### **1.1 Life of Hilary of Poitiers**

Hilary’s early life is obscure. It is sometimes suggested that he was born in the 300s or 310s, maybe in the Poitiers region of France, and that he was educated at the university of Bordeaux made famous in the poems of Ausonius.<sup>1</sup> However, these facts are purely conjectural: the assumption of his birth year is based on the fact that he must have been in his forties or fifties by the time of his involvement in the trinitarian controversy, and the assumption of his university education is based on his literary confidence and fluency. The sixth century biography by Venantius Fortunatus mentions a wife and daughter, but they are not known from any works of his day (the letter to his daughter Abra is rightly considered by the CSEL editor as medieval forgery).<sup>2</sup>

Hilary springs into history in the mid 350s. He appears to have been involved in

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<sup>1</sup> On birth date: for example DESCOURTIEUX 2008:12-13. On possible education at Bordeaux: SAFFREY 1969:248-251

<sup>2</sup> FEDER 1916: lxxxi-lxxxiii

some debates also involving the ‘court bishops’ Ursacius and Valens, and was finally exiled in 357 by Constantius. The exact reason for the exile remains a mystery, since they are never explicit and Athanasius never lists him among the Western bishops exiled as confessors.<sup>3</sup> In response Gwatkin raised the suspicion of immorality, Feder suggested political disloyalty, and Barnes suggests that Hilary was exiled for failing to subscribe to a condemnation of Athanasius.<sup>4</sup> The inclination of the present writer is that Hilary was exiled for personal reasons and thereafter may not have been considered to hold full episcopal status.<sup>5</sup> In describing an official (doctrinal) hearing held at the Emperor’s command, Hilary states: *Primumque... de persona [mea] calumniatus est, damnatum quondam me a Saturnino, audiri ut episcopum non oportere. Non est nunc temporis, quid ad haec responsum sit, enarrare: sed qui tum audiebant, de fide potius, ut regi placuerat, agitandum esse decernunt.* The words ‘*de fide potius*’ seem to suggest that his original condemnation was not for reasons of faith. If this is true, Hilary seems to have re-invented himself successfully: Tradition, at least, exalted Hilary as a Nicene confessor.

While in Asia Minor, Hilary attended the council of Constantinople and entered discussion with local bishops, becoming well versed in the arguments of the trinitarian controversy in those years. Out of this trinitarian engagement emerge the works for which he is most famous and which are most often studied in the current day, particularly *On the Trinity* for its theology and the various collections of creeds, letters and documents for the historical background of the controversy (*On the Synods; contra Ursacium et Valentem; contra Constantium*).

Hilary probably returned home from exile around 360 or 361. It may have been

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<sup>3</sup> E.g. Hilary is absent from the lists of exiled Western bishops at ATHANASIUS *Historia Arianorum* 33, *Apologia de Fuga* 4. Compare RUFINUS *Historia Ecclesiastica* 1.20

<sup>4</sup> BARNES 1992:137. References to Gwatkin, Feder and others at BARNES 1992:129

<sup>5</sup>HILARY *c.Aux.* 7

Constantius that permitted him to return home as being too much of a troublemaker to keep in the East, as Sulpicius Severus suggests.<sup>6</sup> Alternatively he may have been permitted to return home as part of Julian's general amnesty of Christian bishops, as Jerome suggests.<sup>7</sup>

On his return, however, Hilary continued to stir trouble. He continued to collate documents relevant to the controversies of the day,<sup>8</sup> travelled with Eusebius of Vercelli to gain support in north Italy,<sup>9</sup> and raised charges against Auxentius, the bishop of Milan.<sup>10</sup> He is thought to have died in 367 or 368.<sup>11</sup>

## **1.2 Hilary's Influence**

As a result particularly of his unwavering efforts on behalf of Nicene orthodoxy, Hilary came to be seen as an authority in his own day and in the decades immediately following his death. He was considered one of the greatest doctrinal authorities of the early church, in common with Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine;<sup>12</sup> he is also the earliest

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<sup>6</sup> SULPICIUS SEVERUS *vita martini*, 6.7: nec multo post, cum sancto Hilario comperisset regis paenitentia potestatem indultam fuisse redeundi, [Martinus] Romae ei temptavit occurrere profectusque ad urbem est. Also SULPICIUS SEVERIUS *Chronica* 2.45.4: postremo quasi discordiae seminarium et perturbator Orientis redire ad Gallias iubetur, absque exsilii indulgentia.

<sup>7</sup> JEROME *adv. Luciferianos*, 10: Dominus excitatur, imperat tempestati, bestia [sc. Constantius] moritur, tranquillitas rediit. Manifestius dicam. Omnnes episcopi, qui de propriis sedibus fuerant exterminati, per indulgentiam novi principis [sc. Juliani] ad Ecclesias redeunt. Tunc triumphatorem suum Athanasium Aegyptus excepit; tunc Hilarium de praelio revertentem, Galliarum Ecclesia complexa est; tunc ad reditum Eusebii [sc. Vercellensis] lugubres vestes Italia mutavit.

<sup>8</sup> For example *Coll. Ant. Par.* A I gives a letter from a Paris synod in 360/1, showing that he continued his collections after returning from exile.

<sup>9</sup> RUFINUS *Hist. Eccl.* 1.30-31

<sup>10</sup> HILARY *c. Aux.* 7-9

<sup>11</sup> GOEMANS (1969), esp. 109

<sup>12</sup> CASSIODORUS *Institutiones* 18-22. *In psalterium praefatio* 15: [Cites Augustine...] Dixerunt hoc apud nos et alii doctissimi Patres, id est Hieronymus, Ambrosius, Hilarius...

Western ‘doctor’ of the Catholic Church. Augustine calls him ‘*insignis ecclesiarum doctor*’.<sup>13</sup> Jerome calls him ‘*Hilarius noster*’<sup>14</sup> and upbraids Rufinus when the latter seems to impugn Hilary’s orthodoxy.<sup>15</sup> He even attributes Hilary’s mistakes to an assistant (Heliodore) so as not to malign Hilary himself: *tantum virum et suis temporibus disertissimum reprehendere non audeo, qui et confessionis suae merito et vitae industria et eloquentiae claritate, ubicumque Romanum nomen est, praedicatur*.<sup>16</sup> Both Jerome and Augustine use Hilary as an example for their own work: Jerome continually uses him as a yardstick of excellence in how to translate (see further §2.2) and Augustine cites Hilary in support of his own position on original sin (§10.4a).

Hilary’s influence continued into the medieval period, helped along by the biography composed by Venantius Fortunatus and also by his patronage of the popular saint Martin of Tours mentioned by Sulpicius Severus. Isidore of Seville tells us he was the first Western hymn writer,<sup>17</sup> and Hilary’s hymns were explicitly among those mentioned by the Fourth Council of Toledo (A.D. 633).<sup>18</sup>

His popularity into the high medieval period is demonstrated by the number of churches dedicated to him, particularly in France.<sup>19</sup> Further, his trinitarian work was influential on medieval writers such as Richard of St Victor and Aquinas (despite Hilary’s apparent articulation of the Holy Spirit as merely an adjunct to Father and Son).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.28

<sup>14</sup> JEROME *Comm. in Michaeam Prophetam*, Prologue

<sup>15</sup> JEROME *Apologia adv. libros Rufini* 2.19

<sup>16</sup> JEROME *Ep.* 34.3

<sup>17</sup> ISIDORE OF SEVILLE *de ecclesiasticis officiis* 1.4.2: Hilarius autem, Gallus episcopus Pictaviensis, eloquentia conspicuus, hymnorum carmine floruit primus.

<sup>18</sup> *Canons of the Fourth Council of Toledo*, 13

<sup>19</sup> GAZEAU (1969)

<sup>20</sup> DYER (2011) and further works on medieval usage of Hilary’s writings are referenced at 2011:335, fn.5

The seventeenth-century edition of Hilary's works under the supervision of the Benedictine monk Pierre Coustant became a paradigm for modern editing technique.<sup>21</sup> In modern times, Hilary has become less well known, recognizable by some merely for naming the second trimester of Oxford's academic year. However his works more recently have enjoyed a renaissance among scholars, partly for the information they can give us about fourth century political involvement in religious debates and for his strongly personal contribution to trinitarian theology.

However, Hilary's non-trinitarian works – those which focus on biblical commentary – are not so well studied in the modern day. This is a shame, because they were clearly well studied in his own day, as the comments of Jerome and Augustine show. In particular, many of his comments seem to presage Augustine's defence of original sin, especially in the matter of the fallen will and the very existence of something called original sin as differentiated from particular sin. This is an issue addressed in the current thesis.

### **1.3 Modern scholarship on Hilary's theological anthropology**

Each chapter of this thesis addresses a different issue in Hilary scholarship, so the relevant modern literature is discussed in each chapter where it is most relevant. However, some preliminary remarks here are possible. The following comments apply to scholarship on Hilary's non-trinitarian work; this should be considered a different field from scholarship on Hilary's trinitarian works.

Firstly, it is possible to identify some influential modern scholarship. The

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<sup>21</sup> Critique of Coustant's work in DOIGNON 2007a:59-61

indisputable titan of the field of Hilary studies is the French scholar Jean Doignon (d. 1997), who published over a hundred articles and books on Hilary and related areas over his lifetime. Each chapter of this thesis refers to at least one work by Doignon, sometimes more than one – and yet these will all be different works. Although Doignon’s expertise was broad, he focussed in particular on exegetical and anthropological analysis of Hilary, making him particularly useful here. He also edited some of Hilary’s texts for series such as the *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* series.

Another influential scholar is Luis Ladaria, a Spanish Jesuit who also wrote a number of important books and articles on Hilary’s theology. Ladaria was also vice-rector of the Gregorianum; under his supervision or influence, a number of other Hilary studies have emerged from the Vatican stable.<sup>22</sup> On the whole these have the format of concentrating on a particular concept in Hilary (for example ‘spirit’, ‘*communio*’), making them useful reference works. (In a career move relevant to the current topic on original sin, Ladaria later became Secretary-General of the International Theological Commission which oversaw the Vatican’s re-articulation of the concept of limbo for unbaptized children).

A third important source of Hilary scholarship comes from the research group composing the *Sources Chrétiennes* volumes, and in particular the editors Brisson, Descourtieux, Doignon, Milhau, Pelland and Rocher. These without fail provide excellent introductions to the texts, with ample annotation and bibliography, accompanied by stylistic readable translations – and not just for Hilary.

This has now identified some of the most useful scholarship. It is also worth

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<sup>22</sup> See DUPONT-FAUVILLE in the bibliography. Other unpublished theses are not included in the bibliography here but are available through the Pontifical Gregorian University website, including those by P.M. FUNES-DIAS *Fuerza, Potestad y Reino de Cristo en San Hilario de Poitiers* (2008); G.B. COLAUTTI *Las figuras eclesiológicas en San Hilario de Poitiers* (2005); T.J. BUFFER ‘*Salus*’ in *St. Hilary of Poitiers* (2002); D. CORRY *Ministerium Rationis Reddendae: An approximation to Hilary of Poitiers’ Understanding of Theology* (2002)

identifying some trends in Hilary studies.

Mersch's 1936 analysis of patristic ideas of a 'universal body' included Hilary among the Eastern (Greek) writers (see §5.4b). Wild's 1950 study of divinization in Hilary also asked the question of Hilary's influences; Wild identified divinization as essentially an Eastern theology, although he admitted Hilary manifested it in a different manner from his Greek contemporaries. Similarly, some scholars have identified platonic influences on Hilary's work (see §3.2). In all these cases, the idea is that Hilary's theology was influenced by Greek theology and philosophy during his three-year exile in Asia Minor. This is strengthened by the known influence of Origen on his work (§2.1). More recently, however, the emphasis has been on recovering Hilary's roots in both Western theology and in the Western philosophical tradition. Thus Burns in particular emphasizes Stoic and traditional 'Latin' ideas present in Hilary's thought, and Scully likewise seeks to compare Hilary with the thought of Roman writers such as Cicero.

Another change through time in Hilary scholarship has been in assessments of the impact of his thought. Older scholars have felt Hilary made no original contribution to fourth-century thought, and this is why he may have been studied less than his patristic contemporaries; for example Tennant feels that Hilary has nothing new to say on original sin and merely hands on tradition.<sup>23</sup> More recently scholars such as Dupont-Fauville, Scully and Burns have proclaimed Hilary's novelty and creativity in a variety of completely different areas.<sup>24</sup> This thesis will emphasize Hilary's independent command of his material, while at the same time seeing him as part of a continuous tradition linking Origen and Augustine, two of early Christianity's giants.

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<sup>23</sup> TENNANT 1903:337-8

<sup>24</sup> DUPONT-FAUVILLE 2008:16, 277f. (Hilary is novel on understandings of *communio*); SCULLY 2011:248 (Hilary is novel on universal assumption); BURNS 2012:1-2 (Hilary is novel on progress in Christian life)

#### **1.4 From Origen to Augustine: Hilary's theological context**

The study undertaken here seeks not only to identify Hilary's anthropological thought, but also to place it in his wider theological and cultural context. In particular, this study will be useful in a wider context in two ways. Firstly, it will demonstrate one angle in reception of Origen in the mid-fourth century, before the criticisms of Epiphanius and the debates in the Egyptian monastic communities. Secondly, it will contribute to our understanding of the tradition from which Augustine feels he receives his doctrine of original sin.

Others have pointed to Origenian elements in Hilary's theology, particularly in his Psalms commentaries, since Jerome mentioned that Hilary relied on Origen's commentaries. In Chapter 2, it will be shown that Hilary's dependence on Origen is far greater than previously assumed by modern scholars, demonstrating that Jerome was right to suggest Hilary was a good *ad sensum* translator. There are two consequences of this. Firstly, a change in methodology is needed compared to previous scholars. Rather than just examining the Origenian elements that Hilary has *included* in his Psalms commentaries, it is now possible to make deductions by analysing which passages Hilary has *omitted*. Secondly, it is now possible to compare Hilary's translations with his other works and assess which doctrines within his source text he saw as acceptable even if they are not native to him. For example Chapter 8 will suggest that Hilary is happy to adopt Origen's articulation of human psychology and the mental process behind human action.

This means that Hilary will be provide an indication of how Origen was received in the West before the Origenist controversy of the late fourth century. He omits theology that he is unhappy with; for example he omits any suggestion that the Son and Spirit are

the Father's hands,<sup>25</sup> and also omits what he sees as an inappropriate account of the Fall (§6.2b). Although Hilary is not considered so important as a theologian of human anthropology or as a critic of Origen, he occasionally shows more discernment than either Ambrose or Jerome: he never reproduces the suggestion that humans have 'lost' the image of God, which Ambrose does (§4.5), and he never hints that the Fall involved souls plunging into bodies, which again both Ambrose and Jerome accept as does possibly Augustine.<sup>26</sup> Clark<sup>27</sup> shows how the accusations against Origen change over time in the fourth century; the evidence from Hilary provides continuity between the *Apology* of Pamphilus and Eusebius and the first accusations of Epiphanius. But at the same time, Hilary is happy to use Origen's exegesis (as others did) even if he does not anywhere say that he has done so.

A second context which is of relevance here is that of how the doctrine of original sin develops before the detailed analysis carried out by Augustine in the light of the Pelagian controversy. When accused of inventing a doctrine that does not belong in Christian tradition, Augustine bites back with a list of ten revered church fathers who have discussed original sin. One of these is Hilary. Yet Augustine's citations of the church fathers in question are often fairly loose and unconvincing, and scholars such as Beatrice continue to feel that Augustine is unique in his articulation of original sin. The current study of Hilary will show that the Gallic bishop holds to a form of the fallen will (§7.4-5), to a corporate view of mankind sharing in sinfulness and being referenced by Adam (§5.2, §9.3b), and to the very phrase *peccata originis* as distinguished from individual sin

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<sup>25</sup> Compare the Palestinian catena on v73 with Ambrose *ExpPs118*, 10.17 (absent from Hilary *TrPs118*, 10.1-9). Compare also the catena on v173 with Ambrose *ExpPs118*, 22.22 (absent from Hilary, *TrPs118*, 22.4)

<sup>26</sup> For Ambrose, see §6.2b; for Augustine see §10.4b. On Jerome, see *Comm. ad Eph.* 1 and 3 (Clark 1992:124-5)

<sup>27</sup> CLARK 1992:85-158 (chapter 3)

(§9.3a). All of these are elements of Augustine's doctrine of original sin, and may even suggest that the latter may not have been so disingenuous when he claimed that he had always held a belief in some type of fallen will and corporate sinfulness from birth. Hilary's ideas of original sin seem to arise in the context of the trinitarian controversy, in as much as he explains Christ's sinlessness as arising from the fact that his 'origin' (birth, ancestry) is different to the rest of us sinners.

Modern scholars still refer to the theory of Norman Williams,<sup>28</sup> that original sin is an African doctrine. It is true that the only fathers Hilary refers to are Cyprian and Tertullian,<sup>29</sup> both African writers. But Hilary's usage shows that the doctrine of original sin is known by readers in fourth century Gaul, and thus cannot be called an African doctrine (§9.4b). (Indeed this argument could be further supported by the fact that Augustine had some strong supporters in Gaul, such as Prosper of Aquitaine).<sup>30</sup>

Lastly, Hilary provides a bridge between Origen and Augustine. A range of modern scholars suggest that Augustine uses Origenian ideas,<sup>31</sup> yet there is no consensus on what exactly Augustine was reading or what the medium was through which he received Origenian ideas. Hilary is a scrupulous filter of his material, but the fact remains that some of his articulations have their source in Origen's work. And it will be seen that Augustine's citations of Hilary often come from texts in which Hilary is translating Origen. Thus this thesis will show that Hilary is one route whereby Augustine is receiving Origen's ideas.

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<sup>28</sup> N. WILLIAMS (1927). See further §10.5

<sup>29</sup> HILARY *InMt*, 5.1

<sup>30</sup> SMITH 1990:39-55 discusses the fifth century controversy in Gaul

<sup>31</sup> §10.4d, §10.5

### **1.5 Methodology: comparing Hilary's commentaries**

Hilary is best known for his trinitarian work; however, he also wrote a sizeable body of exegetical works or commentaries, including the *de mysteriis* (a typological work presenting various Old Testament characters as forerunners of the Christian story) and a commentary on Job, now lost but known from Jerome. For this thesis the entirety of Hilary's corpus is considered. However, the main methodology of this study has been to compare two commentaries in particular: his commentaries on Matthew and on Psalm 118, hereafter referred to as *InMt* and *TrPs118*. (Other commentaries are referred to as *TrPs* 1 for that on Psalm 1, etc.)

The commentary on Matthew is unanimously held by scholars to be Hilary's earliest work, dating from before he was sent to exile in 356/7.<sup>32</sup> The early dating follows predominantly from the fact that Hilary here seems to evince a christology that pre-dates any involvement in the trinitarian controversy. (There are some grounds for suggesting a later date; however the scholarly consensus will be followed in this thesis). Some of the work is lost; it had a preface referred to by Cassian but now unknown,<sup>33</sup> and likewise the end may have been lost or replaced since it omits the ending of the Gospel (the Great Commission, Mt. 16-20) and a number of manuscripts end with a few paragraphs from what is in fact Jerome's Matthew commentary. (Particularly strange is that there is only a passing reference to the risen Christ.) Hilary's approach to the text is to see an allegorical meaning behind many of the Gospel stories; in particular, the motif of a disparity between the 'faithless' Jews and the faithful if ignorant Gentiles runs through the whole work. These concepts of *fidelitas* and *infidelitas* will become relevant for our study (see §6.4b, §7.2a).

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<sup>32</sup> WILD 1950:24; DOIGNON 2007a:19-20

<sup>33</sup> JOHN CASSIAN, *de incarnatione* 7.24

Hilary's commentary on Psalm 118, conversely, is thought to be a late work, dating from after his return from exile. The logic for this is that he refers back to his own earlier work *de trinitate*<sup>34</sup> and is clearly concerned about doctrinal orthodoxy; also the work clearly relies on Origen<sup>35</sup> and Hilary is assumed not to have known Origen before his exile.<sup>36</sup> An underlying hermeneutical theme for the Ps.118 commentary is that of the growth of wisdom, starting from elementary principles and eventually leading to Christ; the current life is merely a shadow of things to come, and we must progress from ignorance to knowledge of God.<sup>37</sup> As a result of this focus, the Psalms commentaries have more direct theological anthropology than most of Hilary's other texts, and many modern analyses of Hilary's anthropology rely on the psalms commentaries; sometimes this leads to misguided conclusions when differences across his corpus are not considered.

Why compare these two works in particular?

Firstly, they are roughly the same length (between 45,000 and 50,000 words) which means that statistical comparison can be made (for example, the incidence of certain words as in §7.2e).

Secondly, they are the same genre (biblical commentary), and share a common format. First a lemma is cited, and then a paragraph of explanation follows. Both works have a common hermeneutical approach in as much as scriptural phrases are often taken as allegorical and indicative of a 'higher' truth. However, the audience for these works is not known; for example Burns suggests that he writes the psalms commentary for the wider lay community, whereas Doignon feels that the Matthew commentary may have been

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<sup>34</sup>HILARY *TrPs* [67].15. See further the editorial *admonitio* at PL 10:222D, and DOIGNON 1997:vii

<sup>35</sup> JEROME *Apologia* 1.2: [Hilarius confessor...] qui quadraginta ferme millia versuum Origenis in Job et in Psalmos transtulit. See further §2.2.

<sup>36</sup> DOIGNON 1971:171-2

<sup>37</sup> E.g. *TrPs118*, Proem.1. This approach to the psalms is found in other church fathers; for example ATHANASIUS *Ep. ad Marcellinum* 14: ἡ δὲ γε βιβλος τῶν ψαλμῶν ἔχει καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα πῶς τῆς διαγωγῆς τῶν ψυχῶν... and on the authors of the Palestinian Catena see HARL 1972a:127-8

written for a monastic context.<sup>38</sup> Essentially these are both conjecture.

Thirdly, these two commentaries are thought to be Hilary's earliest work, and one of his latest works. As mentioned the Matthew commentary supposedly dates from before his exile, when he was not yet involved in the trinitarian controversy; the Psalms commentaries date from his later period when he has encountered 'Eastern' ideas and given considerable thought to trinitarian implications of his doctrine. A comparison of the two may thus indicate any change through time in Hilary's theology, not least since his exile in Asia Minor comes between them. Theoretically then we would expect the Matthew commentary to represent a more 'Western' theology, whereas the Psalms commentary may signal a theology affected by his stay in the East.

Fourthly, despite the similarity in genre they have different sources. Chapter 2 will show that this commentary is a fairly reliable translation of Origen (except where Hilary disagrees with the theology). It is therefore more useful for us to study this commentary than that on any other psalm, since for Ps. 118 more can be known about Origen's original commentary: firstly from the meticulous edition of the Palestinian Catena done by Harl and Dorival, and secondly from the parallel adaptation or translation done by Ambrose. These two sources mean that we can know more about Origen's original than for other psalms commentaries, and this means we can deduce more about how Hilary is playing with his source. This then allows comparison with the Matthew commentary, which may well have Origenian influence but is still universally held to be an independently written text.

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<sup>38</sup> BURNS 2012:56; DOIGNON 2007a:20-21. Compare also DESCOURTIEUX 2008:19-22, DOIGNON 1997: x-xv

### **1.6 Research questions**

From the above discussion, a number of issues have emerged that will be the focus of the following study. At the most basic level, the research here examines Hilary's anthropology. This contributes to a number of questions in Hilary studies. Is his basic theology more 'Western' or 'Eastern', more 'Stoic' or 'Platonic' – if indeed such categories can be applied? Does Hilary's theology change through time, and if so how? And is Hilary novel or innovative in any way, or is he merely reproducing his theological tradition whatever that may be?

Moving outwards, it is possible to use analysis of Hilary's anthropology to answer wider questions. Firstly he informs us as to how Origen was received in the mid-fourth century. Secondly, this thesis contributes to understandings of the development of original sin, and what Augustine saw as the tradition that he was following.

Unfortunately it is always necessary to limit the boundaries of one's research. In particular, this study has focused on the theological anthropology of the pre- and post-lapsarian human: his body and soul, his will, his sinfulness. It has not been possible to consider the related issue of salvation and the work of Christ from an anthropological perspective, which would be another thesis in itself.

For example, it has not been possible to examine Hilary's doctrine of grace in detail. One aspect of Augustine's original sin that may be innovative is his doctrine of grace. Hilary certainly believes that God gives us grace to follow him, and we would be incapable without him. But at the same time, Hilary says the *initium fidei* is ours: we must make the first wavering effort and God will then help us along the way. This is contrary to Augustine's position, which suggests that even the *initium* is God's; this logically leads to the doctrine of predestination, considered unpopular by those who otherwise followed him in the fifth century.

Another downside of setting aside salvation is that it would have been attractive to examine Hilary's understanding of the General Resurrection. Hilary often refers to the physical body acquiring the nature of spirit, even in works that pre-date his contact of Origen. In view of the criticisms before and after him (Methodius, the opponents of Pamphilus-Eusebius, and later Epiphanius), it would be fascinating to see how Hilary deals with this. This is all the more true since the conclusions of Chapter 2 imply that Hilary's Commentary on Psalm 1 used that of Origen. Yet the long passage from Origen's Psalm 1 preserved by Epiphanius<sup>39</sup> is absent from Hilary's version of the commentary. Is this because there were two different commentaries by Origen (as suggested by Nautin<sup>40</sup>)? Or did Hilary omit this section – which would be surprising if he holds similar views to Origen? Or has Methodius copied out another text of Origen, and mislabelled it? These questions would bear greater analysis.

The question of salvation (including General Resurrection, grace, human glorification and progress) would merit a tome in itself. At any rate, the following chapters hopefully provide a relatively complete analysis of Hilary's anthropology in terms of human creation and the effect of the Fall.

Chapters 3 to 5 look at the concept of humanity as it was created to be. Chapter 3 examines the most elementary human components, namely body and soul, in the light of their creation. Hilary's influences will be examined and it will be shown that he does show some philosophical influence, whether Platonic or Stoic, but on the whole he belongs squarely within Christian tradition. It will also be seen that there is some change between the Matthew and Psalm 118 commentaries. Chapter 4 examines the notion of the *imago dei*, and shows that Hilary may be more consistent than previously thought with Western

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<sup>39</sup> EPIPHANIUS *Panarion* 64.12-16

<sup>40</sup> NAUTIN 1977:261-279

(or non-Alexandrian) ideas of how humans are in God's image. Chapter 5 will continue the question of human identity but this time will look at corporate identity and the notion of Adam. It will be suggested that Adam is used as a cipher for humanity, and should not be seen as an articulation of the 'universal human'.

Chapters 6 to 9 will turn to consider the Fall and its effects. Chapter 6 presents Hilary's different understandings of the Fall. Two key consequences – the fall of the will and the constraint of the turbulent human emotions – are discussed in the subsequent two chapters (Chapter 7 and 8); the latter will demonstrate the influence of Stoic psychology in Hilary's psalms commentaries particularly, mediated through Origen. Lastly in Chapter 9 Hilary's doctrine and language of original sin will be presented, and it will be seen that this plays a major role in his trinitarian thought.

Chapter 10 will then draw all this together and put Hilary in his place between Origen and Augustine.

Before all that, however, it will be necessary to examine Origen's influence in more detail. Chapter 2 will examine Hilary's commentary on Psalm 118 and demonstrate that this is an *ad sensum* translation of Origen's commentary on the same psalm. Hilary's usage (or non-usage) of Origen will inform the comparative work carried out in the subsequent chapters.

## *Chapter 2*

# Hilary's Commentary on Psalm 118

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents one of the two key texts for comparison in this thesis: Hilary's Commentary on Psalm 118 (hereafter *TrPs118*). In order to determine the extent of Hilary's dependence on Origen, his text is compared with Ambrose's analogous work on Ps118 (hereafter referred to as *ExpPs118*).

It has always been known that Hilary's psalms commentaries, dating from the 360s, were 'influenced'<sup>41</sup> by Origen. The *Patrologia Graeca* text of Origen's introduction to the psalms is footnoted with a stream of references to the parallels in Hilary;<sup>42</sup> the translator for NPNF demonstrated that Hilary always had Origen before him even if he qualifies that Hilary "grew more and more free in his treatment of Origen's exegesis."<sup>43</sup> More recently Whealey<sup>44</sup> even goes so far to use Hilary to re-construct Origen's prologue. She cannot provide any methodological justification for this other than a hunch (but a correct one, in my view).

The key finding of this chapter is that Hilary's text is not merely 'influenced' by Origen as suggested by these scholars, but in fact is a fairly straight interpolation of Origen's commentary.

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<sup>41</sup> WATSON 1898:9

<sup>42</sup> This is true of the majority of footnotes to PG12, 1053-8 and 1073-1084; for example fn.32 *fateberis omnia fere ex Origene nostro mutatum esse Hilarium*; fn.54 *haec ad verbum fere repetit Hilarius*

<sup>43</sup> WATSON 1898:49

<sup>44</sup> WHEALEY 1996:106

## **2.2 Jerome on Hilary's Psalm Commentaries**

Origen is thought to have commented at least a very large part of the psalter, and Jerome tells us that Hilary translated at least a very large proportion of Origen's work:

Si auctoritatem suo operi praestruerat, volens quos sequeretur ostendere, habuit in promptu Hilarium confessorem, qui quadraginta ferme millia versuum Origenis in Job et in Psalmos transtulit. (JEROME *Apologia* 1.2)

Of these 'forty thousand verses', Hilary's commentary on Job is lost but commentaries on the fifty-six psalms survive, as well as commentaries on the titles of psalms 9 and 91. (It should be noted that the psalms mentioned by Jerome do not quite add up with Hilary's surviving corpus; see §2.5d). Jerome mentions the 'forty thousand verses' again in his commentary on Micah (see below); obviously the size of Hilary's undertaking impressed the later scholar. Job and the whole psalter are together comprised of only around 3,500 verses reckoned by modern Scriptural divisions. Watson suggests Jerome may be referring to vergilian hexameters.<sup>45</sup> At any rate whatever Jerome means, at nearly 217,000 words of commentary, Hilary's work is formidable.

For Jerome, good translation involves translating *ad sensum* rather than *ad litteram*. In his letter to Pammachius on how good translation should be carried out, he holds up Hilary as a model of translation.

Sufficit in praesenti nominasse Hilarium confessorem, qui homilias in Job et in psalmos tractatus plurimos in Latinum vertit e Graeco nec

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<sup>45</sup> WATSON 1898:47, fn.104

adsedit litterae dormitatanti et putida rusticorum interpretatione se torsit,  
sed quasi captivos sensus in suam linguam victoris iure transposuit.

(JEROME *Ep.* 57.6)

Jerome somewhat colourfully demonstrates that Hilary did not ‘tie himself down to the listlessness of the literal, nor enchain himself with the contrived rendition of boors’. His point is that translation should be restyled into the target language, and conveying the meaning of the original but in good elegant Latin. This freedom of style tallies exactly with what we shall find of Hilary’s translation of Origen below. Elsewhere he refers to Hilary’s psalms commentaries *in quo opera imitatus Origenem, nonnulla de suo addidit*,<sup>46</sup> and describes Hilary’s translation of Origen as ‘ad sensum’ (*Hilarius... quod in psalmos [quadraginta millia versuum] ad sensum verterit*).<sup>47</sup>

At the same time, there is still no doubt that this indeed a translation rather than a free independent work. When he writes defending himself against charges of Origen, he cites Hilary in his defence.

Nec dissertiores sumus Hilario nec fideliores Victorino, qui tractatus eius  
[Origenis] non ut interpretes, sed ut auctores proprii operis transtulerunt.

(JEROME *Ep.* 84.7)

This time Jerome describes Hilary’s work as a translation (*transtulerunt*) rather than a freer *interpretatio*. Jerome argues that the translations of Hilary and Victorinus are closer than his own, and yet they were not charged with plagiarism. He is attempting to justify his

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<sup>46</sup> JEROME *de viris illustribus*, 100

<sup>47</sup> JEROME *Comm. in Michaeum*, 2

own usage of Origen without attribution or citation in his earlier works. Jerome suggests that Hilary and Victorinus are relatively close to their source, and yet they are still taken as the authors in their own right and not as *interpretes*. Jerome is obviously trying to locate the fine line between translation and independent composition.

Lastly, Jerome does in one letter suggest that Hilary's grasp of Greek was not perfect and that he was assisted by a presbyter called Heliodore in translating Origen.<sup>48</sup> However, he only refers to Heliodore in order not to accuse Hilary of bad exegesis. Jerome states that he does not dare criticize Hilary in any way, so the exegetical errors must belong to Heliodore. Thus, this evidence should be taken with a pinch of salt: he is only trying to save Hilary from a given interpretation, and elsewhere he describes the translation as definitely Hilary's rather than Heliodore's.

So then, Jerome's description of Hilary's work may echo Jerome's own concerns to defend the various accusations against him. Yet the overall picture is clear. Jerome is relatively consistent in suggesting Hilary did 'translate' Origen but that the translation was relatively free and Hilary added independent critique of his original. The next step, then, is to examine the texts themselves to establish for ourselves exactly what Hilary's translation technique was.

### **2.3 Textual witnesses to Origen on Psalm 118**

In order to assess Hilary's own theology it is useful to have an idea of what Origen's text consisted of, so that, if applicable, conclusions may be drawn from Hilary's modifications

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<sup>48</sup> JEROME *Ep.* 34.3, 5

to that text. Unfortunately, a direct comparison between Hilary's treatise on Psalm 118 and Origen's commentary is not possible since the latter does not exist in its original complete form. However, a number of sources enable a degree of reconstruction. These will be presented in this section.

Jerome states that Origen wrote three different types of works on Scripture, namely *σχόλια*; homilies; and *τόμοι* (*volumina*).<sup>49</sup> When he writes to Paula listing Origen's works, Jerome mentions that all three genres exist for the psalms: *excerpta* on the first fifteen psalms, forty-five *libri* on forty psalms, and a hundred and twenty homilies on sixty-three of the psalms.<sup>50</sup> Elsewhere he mentions an Enchiridion and suggests that Origen's works on the psalms are an *opus latissimus* which Jerome himself can only briefly condense.<sup>51</sup> It is not clear whether Origen covered the whole psalter,<sup>52</sup> but the numbers indicate some psalms had more than one homily or commentary associated with them.

With respect to psalm 118 in particular, Hilary's text is probably based on Origen's third category, the commentary (*volumen, liber*), particularly because it corresponds to the other witnesses either direct or indirect to Origen's commentary.<sup>53</sup> Although this was unfortunately not preserved, it had a wide influence on later authors. In Greek, fragments are found in the Palestinian Catena and other similar catenae; citations are also found in

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<sup>49</sup> JEROME *Praef. in XV homilias Ezech. Origenis*: ...et illud breuiter admonens, ut scias Origenis opuscula in omnem Scripturam esse triplicia. Primum eius opus Excerpta sunt, quae graece *σχόλια* nuncupantur, in quibus ea, quae sibi uidebantur obscura atque habere aliquid difficultatis, summatim breuiterque perstrinxit. Secundum homeliticum genus, de quo et praesens interpretatio est. Tertium quod ipse inscripsit *τόμους* nos uolumina possumus nuncupare, in quo opere tota ingenii sui uela spirantibus uentis dedit et recedens a terra in medium pelagus aufugit.

<sup>50</sup> JEROME *Ep.* 33 (dated c.385 by RONDEAU 1982:45). Presumably *libri* are here equivalent to *volumina* (*τόμοι*).

<sup>51</sup> JEROME *Commentarioli*, Prol.

<sup>52</sup> See discussion in RONDEAU 1982:51-2

<sup>53</sup> RONDEAU 1982:56

Pamphilus, Eusebius of Caesarea, Methodius, the Philokalia and Epiphanius.<sup>54</sup> Harl's edition (1972) of the Palestinian Catena on psalm 118 provides the best direct evidence for Origen's commentary not least because of her meticulous work dividing up the fragments among the respective attested authors (possible, for example, due to cross-checking of exegetical points with the glosses in the *Vindobonensis* manuscript, §2.3c).

In the Latin world, Origen's psalms commentaries or homilies were translated by Hilary, Eusebius of Vercelli, Ambrose, Jerome and Rufinus. Hilary's is the earliest such commentary preserved for us, and Ambrose also writes a long Commentary on psalm 118. As we shall see, both of these Latin commentaries go back to Origen. No other fourth century Latin author appears to have broached a commentary on this long psalm until Augustine's *Enarrationes*.

The various modern-day sources for Origen's text will now be examined in more detail.

### 2.3a) Fragments of psalms commentaries in Patrologia Graeca

The section on Origen's exegetical works in Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* reproduced from the edition by the two de la Rue (1733) gives a series of fragments of psalms commentaries extracted from various catenae.<sup>55</sup> A slightly wider inspection of

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<sup>54</sup> List of fragments found in HARNACK (1893-1904) *Gesch. d. Altchr. Lit.*<sup>2</sup>, vol.1, p356-7. Note also the statement of JEROME *Ep.*112.20: Superfluum est te voluisse disserere, quod illos latere non potuit: maxime in explanatio psalorum, quod apud Graecos interpretati sunt multis voluminibus primus Origenes, secundus Eusebius Caesariensis, tertius Theodorus Heracleotes, quartus Asterius Scythopolitanus, quintus Apollinaris Laodicensis, sextus Didymus Alexandrinus. Feruntur et diversorum in paucos Psalmos opuscula. Sed nunc de integro Psalmorum corpore dicimus. Apud Latinos autem Hilarius Pictavensis et Eusebius, Vercellensis episcopus, Origenem et Eusebium transtulerunt, quorum priorem et noster Ambrosius in quibusdam secutus est.

<sup>55</sup> ORIGEN *Selecta in Psalmos* (PG12, 1053-1686). The fragments on ps.118 are at 1585-1628. Other psalm fragments are also found at PG17, 106-150 but these do not concern our psalm. The fragments from the De la Rue edition are to be found in *Origenis Opera omnia* (1733) vol.2 p.510-849.

manuscripts contributes to the edition found in Pitra's (1884) *Analecta Sacra*.<sup>56</sup>

However, even the de la Rue were circumspect about the authorship of the fragments, since it is difficult to extract from the catenae the fragments belonging to any given father.<sup>57</sup> Hans Urs von Balthasar's analysis (1939) suggested these were in fact for the most part Evagrian sentences, based on internal evidence of harmony in style, terminology and theology with known works by Evagrius. This was confirmed by an analysis of a Vatican manuscript by Rondeau (1960), starting from the fragment on Ps.143.1 in which the author refers to 'my book on the Monk'.<sup>58</sup> This is taken to refer to the *Praktikos* of Evagrius.<sup>59</sup>

The analysis below will demonstrate independently that these are not from Origen's psalm commentary. If the relevant fragments from *Patrologia Graeca* are compared with the table in the Appendix giving the Palestinian Catena, Hilary and Ambrose, then it becomes clear that there is minimal correspondence between these latter texts and the *Patrologia Graeca* fragments. While this in itself does not prove Evagrian authorship, it certainly does provide independent proof that these are not from the same text as that used by Hilary or Ambrose.

Hence these fragments from *Patrologia Graeca* have therefore been largely disregarded in what follows, as not providing a witness to the text of Origen used by Hilary.

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<sup>56</sup> *Origenes in Psalmos*, to be found in PITRA *Analecta Sacra*, vol.2 (Tusculum 1884) p395-483; vol.3 (Venice 1883) p.1-522. Of these, the fragments on Ps.118 are to be found at vol.3 p.246-316

<sup>57</sup> DE LA RUE 1733:512

<sup>58</sup> Gloss on Ps143.1, *Vat.gr.754* fol.343v (referring to λόγοι τῶν νυκτερινῶν φασμάτων): ...οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ μέρους γίνονται τῆς ψυχῆς... οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ θυμικοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀκριβέστερον ἐν τῷ μοναχῷ περιελήφραμεν... This is given by de la Rue (1733:840) as ἐν τῷ α'. εἰλήφραμεν (reproducing the manuscript abbreviation).

<sup>59</sup> Cf. the comment of Socrates (*Hist.Eccl.* 4.23) regarding the work of Evagrius known by two names, viz. Μοναχός or Περὶ πρακτικῆς. For discussion on this, and on the textual evidence, see RONDEAU 1960:312-318

### 2.3b) Palestinian Catena on Ps.118

The Palestinian catena on psalm 118 is preserved in two medieval manuscripts and their families.<sup>60</sup> It is thought to date from around the sixth century, from the school of Procopius at Gaza (hence its attribution as the ‘palestinian’ catena).<sup>61</sup> This attribution arises since Procopius was among the earliest to compile commentaries in the form of catenae of church fathers, and this psalm catena has similarities to known catenae of Procopius such as that on Genesis<sup>62</sup> (e.g. similar linking words between fragments; subsequent fathers only added if giving a commentary different from that of the ‘base’ fragment). The dating is supported by the fact the catenist has incorporated fathers who may later have been considered too unorthodox for inclusion, as a result of the Origenistic controversy of the 6<sup>th</sup> c. The geographical provenance and choice of authors could mean that this catena may in turn be based on an earlier edition coming from the library at Caesarea<sup>63</sup> and possibly from Eusebius himself or others such as Pamphilus or Acacius.<sup>64</sup> Unlike later catenae, this one appears to be an original compilation where the catenist has the full commentaries of source authors in front of him.<sup>65</sup>

Although catenae on other psalms are based primarily on the commentaries of Eusebius of Caesarea, Didymus and Theodoret, this one on psalm 118 mainly follows Origen’s with additions from Eusebius or Didymus and from Apollinaris and occasionally

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<sup>60</sup> HARL 1972a:21-28

<sup>61</sup> Citations in HARL 1972a:19, 90

<sup>62</sup> HARL 1972a:39

<sup>63</sup> Cf. HARL 1972a:36

<sup>64</sup> This is the view of HARL 1972a:90, who also cites CADIOU’s view that the longer versions of Origen are in fact expansions by Eusebius.

<sup>65</sup> RONDEAU 1982:57

supplemented by Athanasius, Theodoret and Hesychius;<sup>66</sup> more than half the fragments are Origen's.<sup>67</sup> Unfortunately the state of the manuscripts does not always allow clear demarcation of which comment belongs to which church father; Harl establishes the demarcation by examining language and ideas and by recourse to 'daughter' catenae (i.e. catenae which use excerpts from the Palestinian catena, possibly with re-ordering and paraphrasing).

The catena preserves a fragment of Origen for most verses, typically of between a hundred and a hundred and fifty words in length. Harl feels this is be only a small part of Origen's original because of comments attached to the catena composed by Nicetas of Heraclea (11<sup>th</sup> c.), who explained his method. He states that he omitted some parts of Origen not because of his unorthodoxy, but because he was too verbose: ὡς τοῦ δέοντος περιεργότερον τὰ πολλὰ ἀπεδοκίμασεν.<sup>68</sup> Exactly how much has been omitted is unclear but may be deduced by comparison. For Origen's commentary on the Song of Songs, the Sources Chrétiennes editors found that the catenist has done résumés of Origen's text, since it is much briefer than the text suggested by a Rufinus translation.<sup>69</sup> So again in the present case, comparison with Ambrose and Origen will suggest that the catenist may have omitted a considerable proportion of Origen's text. In the current case, it can be noted that nearly 40% of Hilary's wordcount has a match in Ambrose but not in the catena, although this of course is an extremely crude indication of how much of Origen the catenist has omitted.

It would also be helpful to know how the catenist chose what he wished to preserve of Origen. Harl suggests he was more inclined to preserve spiritual or ethical material, as

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<sup>66</sup> HARL 1972a:29, 88, 90

<sup>67</sup> HARL 1972a:32

<sup>68</sup> Citation and discussion in HARL 1972a:36-8, 86.

<sup>69</sup> BRÉSARD, CROUZEL & BORRET 1991:16

well as comments on specific words (e.g. the comment on the Greek word ἐνύσταξεν v28 is preserved by Hilary in Latin: there are many similar examples).<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, Harl feels the catenist omits technical details; for example, the glosses in the *Vindobonensis* preserve names associated with given exegetical interpretations (Musonius, Xenocrates) which do not appear in the catena. Of course, Harl's suggestion presumes that the exegeses of the glosses were also originally in the commentary.<sup>71</sup>

More work on the various catenae on the psalms is being carried out in Berlin for a GCS edition and ongoing findings may be identified in the articles of Bandt and Risch.<sup>72</sup>

### 2.3c) Glosses on Ps.118

There are various collections of shorter comments on psalm 118; but it is uncertain what work of Origen's these come from. There are two possibilities. They may be the different genre known as σχόλια, and thus a different work of Origen's, or but they may be merely excerpts of the longer commentaries (τόμοι), which thus makes them a good witness to the commentaries as used by Hilary.

Jerome says his *Commentarioli* are based on Origen's Enchiridion. The implication of Jerome's remarks in his prologue is that he is providing a potted version of a longer work, which would in turn imply that these are extracts from Origen's commentaries.<sup>73</sup> This is also supported by his use of Latin word *excerpta* (*primum*

<sup>70</sup> For other examples see *TrPs118*, 4.6, 4.12, 5.1, 5.7, 5.10, 12.3, 12.14, 15.4, 15.13, 18.5

<sup>71</sup> HARL 1972a:62

<sup>72</sup> BANDT (forthcoming), RISCH (forthcoming, a), (forthcoming, b)

<sup>73</sup> JEROME *Excerpta de Psalterio (Commentarioli)*, Prol.: ...in psalterii opere latissimo quasi praeteriens aliqua perstringerem, ut ex paucis quae tetigissem, intellegantur et cetera, quae ommissa sunt, quam vim habeant atque rationem.

[*Origenis*] *opus Excerpta sunt, quae graece σχόλια nuncupantur*).<sup>74</sup> On the other hand, while *excerpta* could imply extracts, it may also be a technical term to translate σχόλια (or σημειώσεις) rather than necessarily ἐκλογαί: for example, Jerome's *Excerpta* on Isaiah is based on σημειώσεις.<sup>75</sup> The difficulty in ascertaining whether the *Excerpta* are σχόλια or excerpts of τόμοι is compounded by the possibility that Jerome could mean different things in different cases. A fuller discussion of the problem is provided by Rondeau, and more recently by Risch.<sup>76</sup>

The issue bears on another collection of shorter comments or marginalia which is more important for current purposes. The glosses on sections of the psalter found in an eleventh century manuscript *Vindobonensis theologicus graecus 8*<sup>77</sup> have elements not found in the Palestinian catena.<sup>78</sup> Harl, the editor of the Palestinian catena, takes these glosses as extracts from Origen's longer commentaries (assuming the etymological understanding of *excerpta* again). If something in these glosses is not found in the catena, Harl deduces that the catenist has consciously omitted that material (for example, to edit theology). For example, at v127 Ambrose refers to a certain Xenocrates and this is also found in the glosses (but not in Hilary or the catena). It seems that here the gloss may well preserve something present in the source text but lost by the catenist; otherwise Ambrose's use of the name at this specific point is difficult to explain. Nevertheless, Risch suggests that the *Vindobonensis* glosses are *not* excerpts from the commentary; he interprets the glosses as preparatory sketches for the larger commentaries, analogous to shorter works of Eusebius which may have been expanded to a full commentary. For example, Risch points

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<sup>74</sup> JEROME *Praef. in XV homilias Ezech. Origenis* (see paragraph cited in fn.48)

<sup>75</sup> RONDEAU 1982:49

<sup>76</sup> RONDEAU 1982:46-51; RISCH (forthcoming, a)

<sup>77</sup> Edited by CADIOU (1936). Cadiou, however, relies on the fragments from *Patrologia Graeca*, which throws doubt on his work. RONDEAU 1982:56; 61-2 discusses other inaccuracies in Cadiou's work.

<sup>78</sup> HARL 1972a:59-63. See also RONDEAU 1982:61-2.

out that Ambrose's comments on Xenocrates are in the *Vindobonensis* marginalia but not in the catena and this is evidence of a different text.<sup>79</sup> The degree to which Harl or Risch is correct depends on how much editing work the catenist is seen as having done.

### 2.3d) Ambrose's Commentary on Ps.118

Unlike the various fourth century Greek texts which make use of Origen's Commentary on psalm 118, that of Ambrose is preserved in its entirety. It thus presents a good source for comparison with Hilary.

Ambrose's is the earliest entire commentary on psalm 118 alone (rather than one which fits into a commentary on the whole psalter). It is dated to the year 389-90 on the basis of details such as scriptural references for particular Sundays and mentions of the martyrs Gervase, Protase and Sebastian (whose relics were only discovered shortly before this).<sup>80</sup> The commentary is thus fifteen to twenty years later than Hilary's.

Pizzolato, the modern editor of Ambrose's Commentary, suggests that it may have originally been intended for a monastic context, where the psalms were regularly recited, either as part of the office or for liturgical use; it may have begun as an oral commentary which was later transcribed.<sup>81</sup> This is based on internal information such as doxologies<sup>82</sup> and allusions to listeners (rather than readers), to liturgical readings and to indications

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<sup>79</sup> RISCH (forthcoming, b)

<sup>80</sup> PIZZOLATO 1987:12-15; see also RONDEAU 1982:153-4

<sup>81</sup> PIZZOLATO 1987:9-11; 20-21

<sup>82</sup> Although it may be true that Ambrose originally preached his strophae, this should not be deduced on the evidence of doxologies alone, since they also appear in similar places in Hilary (for example, both authors have a doxology at the end of the seventh strophe: HILARY *TrPs118*, 7.7 and AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 7.37). The doxology here is thus not a spontaneous acknowledgement of God's glory in an Ambrosian sermon, but mere reproduction of a source text.

regarding time and place;<sup>83</sup> certainly each of the twenty-two of the Hebrew strophae is entitled ‘*sermo (primus, secundus...)*’ in Ambrose but ‘*littera (aleph, bet...)*’ in Hilary. The possibility of an oral source is supported by analogy with other known works of Ambrose which were preached or dictated; for example Paulinus the Deacon tells us that Ambrose dictated the *Explanatio* on Ps.43 as he lay dying.<sup>84</sup>

An important question arises as to whether Ambrose used Hilary, or whether he was relying directly on Origen. This issue of Ambrose’s independence will be studied below; pre-empting that analysis, our conclusion will confirm the scholarly consensus that Ambrose is indeed independent of Hilary and can therefore serve usefully as an autonomous witness to Origen.

#### **2.4 Case Study: Ps. 118.17-24 (strophe ‘gimel’)**

The above discussion of the various witnesses to Origen’s commentary has demonstrated that the Palestinian Catena and Ambrose between them present evidence of Origen on Ps.118 that is independent of Hilary. The present section will now compare these two witnesses with Hilary for a specific section of the text, namely the third strophe, gimel, which covers ps.118.17-24.

##### 2.4a) Layout

The three commentaries for ‘Gimel’, the third strophe of Ps 118, are presented in the

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<sup>83</sup> RONDEAU 1982:151

<sup>84</sup> PAULINUS MEDIOLANIENSIS *Vita Ambrosii* 42

Appendix in three columns which give respectively Origen (from the Palestinian Catena); Hilary; and Ambrose. The texts are laid out so that passages which correspond in the respective authors are placed next to each other. As an example, consider v17a/row6; the layout demonstrates that the opening of the block corresponds in all three authors (namely, that the verse states not ‘reward *me*’ but ‘reward *your servant*’); then comes a couple of sentences in Ambrose for which there is no correspondence in Origen or Hilary (on the nature of being God’s servant); then comes a final sentence which corresponds in Hilary and Ambrose but is not found in Origen (that one is a servant of God, not of sin). No material has been omitted; thus the Greek of v24a follows directly on the Greek of v23/row7 in the catena, with no intervening material in the Greek.

The division into rows has been purely for ease of reference, and row numbers are provided merely for convenience in the present discussion; they may be based on a certain ‘block’ of text marked out by theme or traditional denumeration, but may be somewhat arbitrary where the three authors do not correspond exactly. The term ‘block’ is used here merely to mean a unit of text which treats one particular illustration or exegetical point. An exegetical block may be spread over several rows (e.g. at v21a, rows 3-6 all concern the illustration of Pride using the publican and the Pharisee).

Where there is a closer correspondence between authors (other than the psalm verse being commented on), text may be underlined; for example, v18a/row2 shows that Ambrose, like Origen, refers to the need for our eyes to be unveiled as ‘sickness’ (*aegritudo* c.f. *gravari*, compare *κάκωσις* / *βλάβη* in the catena). Hilary only mentions a ‘cloud of darkness’ (*nubes obscuritatis*), a concept which indeed also occurs in Ambrose (*nebulam quandam*).

2.4b) Division and ordering of material

Once the texts have been arranged in this way, comparison between the authors may be undertaken.

A first point regards the *methodology* of commentary. Origen most usually comments by units of a verse or a half-verse. Most commonly, he discusses the first half of a verse and then leads on to the second half *within* the commentary. For example in v22, an initial discussion on opprobrium (v22a) leads directly within a sentence to v22b ...*for I have sought your testimonies*: φεύγω δ' ἐκείνη τὴν ἐξουδένωσιν καθ' ἣν ἐξουδένωται ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ πονηρευόμενος, καὶ λέγω· περιέλε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ ὄνειδος καὶ ἐξουδένωσιν, ὅτι τὰ μαρτύριά σου ἐξεζήτησα... (Italics denote the lemma; see v22a/row6 through to v22b/row1).

Hilary and Ambrose both use exactly the divisions found in the catena, although the two half-verses may be more clearly differentiated than in the catena. More significantly perhaps, where the catena does *not* appear to have commented by verse or half-verse, neither of the two Latin successors do either. For example, in the catena v23 and 24 are commented together, with no clear distinction between the verses (e.g. the text of v24a itself is not repeated in the Greek; v24b is not even mentioned again); this threading of verses is reproduced in both Ambrose and Hilary. So then, the catenist and our two Latin authors seem in this at least to preserve the method of his source in the way they divide up the psalm for commentary.

The next point of note is that the *order* of themes or exegesis is the same wherever there is correspondence; there is rarely any deviation from that order. For example, the exegesis of v17a “*retribue servo tuo*” proceeds as follows. Firstly the verse is quoted and it is noted that no-one can really ask for God’s recompense since we are all sinners (Origen, Hilary: row 2). Next, Ps102.10 is quoted (all authors: row 3) and self-awareness

with respect to one's works is commended (all authors: row 4). Ambrose alone applies these words to Christ (row 5). All question the arrogant presumption of what is said, and all then make the point that the verse is spoken in the spirit of servanthood (all authors: row 6). Ambrose alone then adds further commentary at considerable length which interweaves with verses from Song of Songs (row 7). So then, the order of thematic or exegetical blocks is almost always the same across the authors.

This correspondence across authors is strongly evident when the material is laid out in this way and it is striking that Ambrose and Hilary have kept to the order of their source in a manner which is absolutely consistent *across* exegetical blocks, so that material is rarely rearranged. However *within* blocks the order may be changed. For example, in v18b/row3 the difference between the Levitical and spiritual law is being illustrated. The earthly Temple, the Aaronic priesthood and the Jubilee year all get a mention, but these occur in a different order in the two Latin authors.

The adherence to order across but not within blocks shows that both Ambrose and Hilary are dealing psychologically with these units of a 'block' or exegetical unit and are working systematically through their underlying source text according to these units or blocks. (This may be contrasted with modern translation which may deal with the unit of a sentence.) Blocks may be adjusted within themselves whether linguistically or theologically, or may even be omitted. It should be noted that this notion of 'blocks' is of course merely theoretical, and are not adhered to strictly (cf. the elision already mentioned of v23 and v24); the concept is provided here merely to illustrate the method that Ambrose and Hilary use when faced with their text.

The concept of exegetical blocks allows further deduction as to the method of the two Latin authors when it comes to extemporising or innovating. A quick glance at the authors when placed side by side is enough to see that the catena is relatively sparse on

Origen's text; Hilary has more; and Ambrose has considerably more again (to the extent that sections of his text with no correspondence in Origen or Hilary have usually been reduced to a smaller font size, since Ambrose is not the main object of consideration here).

It is not clear, however, which is truer to the source: it could be that Hilary has abbreviated his source, or that Ambrose has expanded on it. Indeed, there is evidence that both may occur. Occasionally Hilary explicitly summarizes material: at v24a he refers the reader to what he has already written (*ut jam superius tractavimus*) whereas Ambrose repeats the exegesis; another example of Hilary summarizing occurs at v21b/row2.<sup>85</sup> Hilary also misses out passages e.g. at v18a/row3. Conversely, Ambrose is clearly expanding where he interweaves exegesis of the psalm with that of the Song of Songs;<sup>86</sup> this is further demonstrated by the fact that such Ambrosian expansion is frequently found at the end of the commentary on a given lemma, showing that Ambrose has gone through his source text and, once each lemma was completed, then felt free to innovate with his own material.<sup>87</sup> Typically, Hilary is more likely to abbreviate and Ambrose to expand, but this is not a fixed rule and the reverse may also occur (e.g. it is probably Hilary who is innovating in the expansion at v22a/row5).

#### 2.4c) Source text ('Vorlage')

How far, then, can it be said how far Hilary or Ambrose deviate from their source? The evidence of Nicetas (§2.3b) suggested that the catenist has not preserved much of Origen's text; this is confirmed by the fact that frequently where the catena preserves nothing,

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<sup>85</sup> At v21b/row2 he summarizes a previous argument (*de uno et de plurimis mandatis in superiore versu competentia diximus*), whereas Origen and Ambrose repeat the significance of whether the plural or singular is used of God's commandment(s).

<sup>86</sup> E.g. v17a/row7

<sup>87</sup> E.g. v17a/row7, v17b/row12

Hilary and Ambrose still correspond. This close match between the Latin authors demonstrates that they must have used a similar source text which we can postulate was Origen's commentary or a recension thereof: correspondence between Hilary and Ambrose may be either exegetical<sup>88</sup> or linguistic (to the point of being almost verbatim)<sup>89</sup> and they use the same citations to prove a point.<sup>90</sup> Assuming that Hilary and Ambrose are independent (§2.4d), they must therefore be using a common source text, hereafter to be called the *Vorlage*<sup>91</sup> to distinguish it from both the text found in the catena and from Origen's original text (which may have been later edited, e.g. by Eusebius of Caesarea).

Yet while Hilary and Ambrose frequently correspond, it is the *nature* of the correspondence that is striking. Certainly there is occasional close correspondence between the two, with similarity of language or an identical exegetical point.<sup>92</sup> However, the correspondence is more often somewhat 'lighter', with the authors sharing a similar position in the ordering of exegesis or sharing a certain key point but differing in detail.

For example, while they are still working in exegetical blocks, they often differ in the detail of the exegesis itself. Moreover, sometimes this slight difference in exegesis seems to be triggered by something as simple as a single word or phrase. For example, in v17b/row7 the different exegesis in the two Latin authors regarding the touching of a corpse could go back to a confusion of one word, taken as 'Nazarene' or Christ by Hilary, 'Nazarite' by Ambrose. Here the trigger word does not come from the lemma, but is mentioned in the course of the exegesis; Ambrose and Hilary then respond to it differently.

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<sup>88</sup> E.g. v24a

<sup>89</sup> E.g. v23/row5 (on Isaiah, Jeremiah, Zechariah) or v21a/row3 (on the righteous Pharisee). More on the correspondences in these sections is discussed below with respect to the issue of independence, §2.4d.

<sup>90</sup> E.g. v17a/row3

<sup>91</sup> This word denotes an underlying source text for a translation; for example the underlying Hebrew text used by Septuagint translators, which is not preserved but occasionally differs from the Masoretic Text, is conventionally called the *Vorlage*.

<sup>92</sup> See example in preceding paragraph.

This confirms the idea that Ambrose is working independently of Hilary; his exegesis is subtly different just too often. This confirms the notion of some Vorlage, albeit one that is possibly unclear to either Hilary or Ambrose or both. It could be that our Latin authors are using a corrupted text, or a manuscript somehow difficult to read. However, it is more likely – given the evidence that we have from Jerome – that both authors are independently dealing with a Vorlage in Greek and that differences arise from translation. This is supported by very slight differences where correspondence is otherwise fairly exact. For example, biblical citations are very slightly different, even when citing the lemma (see §2.4d). Also, some phrases are so close that discrepancies are best explained as arising merely from translation: in v23/row5, which appears to be relatively literal translation due to the close correspondence between phrases, Hilary's *Zacharias inter templum et altare occiditur* occurs in Ambrose as ...*Zachariam, qui occisus est inter templum et altare* but with only a difference in tense (*occiditur, occisus est*).

A more convincing example of translation difference between Ambrose and Hilary occurs at v23/row5. The two Latin authors are mentioning the fate of Jeremiah at the hands of the 'princes' of this world. For Hilary, Jeremiah was shut up in a prison (*carcere clauditur*); for Ambrose, he was thrown into a lake (*mitteretur in lacum*). The reference is clearly to Jer. 38:4-13 [LXX 45:4-13], where Jeremiah is thrown into a pit or cistern. The LXX uses λάκκος (a pond, cistern or pit reservoir), and it would be fair to assume Origen does the same. Ambrose translates with the exact cognate word *lacus*, a word not only similar in form but with much the same semantic sphere as the Greek. (Jerome's Vulgate also translated the word as *lacus*.) However this is ambiguous in both Greek and Latin, since it could denote something full of water, while the scriptural passage specifically

states there was no water, only mud.<sup>93</sup> Whether or not Hilary knew the reference better than Ambrose, he is certainly keen to interpret the story more clearly for his readers, and hence states that Jeremiah was shut up in prison.

But if both authors are translating, the differences based on trigger-words remain to be explained. It seems that one of our translators (or possibly both) is handling his text in a slightly lackadaisical manner. Either someone is struggling with their Greek, or they are not concerned to provide a particularly accurate translation (due to time or other motivations). This more careless translator picks out trigger-words without fully reading the text, and works out his own exegesis correspondingly (thus for example *ναζιραῖος* / *ναζωραῖος* as Nazarene /Nazarite). It has already been suggested<sup>94</sup> that Ambrose on ps.118 was a sermon taken down by a stenographer, as indeed happened for other works of Ambrose. Thus it may be that Ambrose was preaching with Origen's text in front of him. He keeps his finger on the text, glances down to read it briefly and then preaches on what he thinks it was about. He can then extemporize after following the commentary for each lemma.

An example of this lack of attention to detail occurs at the end of v24a. The catena gives *ὁ δίκαιος οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἢ λαλεῖ ἐν τοῖς δικαιώμασι τοῦ Κυρίου*, “the righteous man does nothing *other than* speak according to the Lord's judgments” (a reading confirmed by the context). However, a preacher casting a cursory glance at the sentence could take the word *ἢ* as ‘or’, and this indeed is what we find in Ambrose's clumsy translation.

If Ambrose was indeed preaching *ex tempore* with Origen's text in front of him, this would explain why his text differs from Hilary's: for example he sees the word *ναζωραῖος* and uses it in exegesis, but he is constrained by the situation and does not have

<sup>93</sup> Jer 45:6 (LXX): *καὶ ἔρριψαν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν λάκκον Μελχιου υἱοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως, ὃς ἦν ἐν τῇ ἀλλῇ τῆς φυλακῆς, καὶ ἐχάλασαν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν λάκκον καὶ ἐν τῷ λάκκῳ οὐκ ἦν ὕδωρ ἀλλ' ἢ βόρβορος, καὶ ἦν ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ.*

<sup>94</sup> See §2.3d

time to go through the Greek precisely (or with a dictionary). This suggestion could also explain why Ambrose's text is so much longer than Hilary's (125,000 words as opposed to 45,000).

#### 2.4d) Ambrose's Independence

All this assumes that Ambrose is independent of Hilary in his usage of Origen, so before proceeding it is worth summarizing the evidence for Ambrose's independence.

Firstly, there are some details from Origen's commentary which are present in Ambrose but not Hilary. For example, Ambrose mentions Xenocrates as the source of a story about topaz *ad Ps.118.127*: Hilary does not mention this so Ambrose may have got it directly from Origen. Such examples might prove Ambrose's independence; however, given the extent of Ambrose's innovating there is a chance (albeit small) that these could be fortuitous. Further, this particular reference to Xenocrates has already been shown to belong possibly to the scholia rather than the commentary.<sup>95</sup> Nevertheless, when added to the following points these contribute to the theory of independence.

Secondly, scriptural citations are usually subtly different. Arguably they could be harmonizing to known 'standard' translations at hand but a more reasonable explanation is that both are independently translation from Greek (indeed Jerome's *Ep. 34.6* criticizes Hilary's translations of scripture). In v17a/row3, Origen cites Ps.102.10. Hilary and Ambrose give renditions which are only very slightly different:

(HILARY:) <i>Non secundum peccata</i>	(AMBROSE:) <i>Non secundum peccata</i>
<i>nostra <u>fecit</u> nobis, neque secundum</i>	<i>nostra <u>reddas</u> nobis neque secundum</i>

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<sup>95</sup> RISCH (forthcoming, b)

*injustitias nostras reddidit nobis.                      iniquitates nostras restituas nobis.*

Indeed when they cite the various verses of the strophe, there are almost always differences in just a word or so (this is the case for all the verses in this strophe, except v21). These seem to indicate independent translation.

Thirdly, the passages with particularly close correspondence in text are best explained as demonstrating independent translation of a Greek original. For example, consider the following example (from v21a/row3, appealing to Luke 18.11f):

Quanto evangelicus ille pharisaeus                      Quantum laboravit Pharisaeus ille...  
labore se in vitae viam statuit...

...ne in alienam rem rapax esset, ne in                      ...ne raperet aliena, ne iniustus esset, ne  
quemquam injuriosus existeret, ne                      adultaret! Quantum laboravit, ne  
adulteriis dissolveretur?                      peccaret, sicut peccavit publicanus!

Laboravit bis in sabbato jejunans,                      Quantum laboravit, ut bis in sabbato  
suumque corpus per abstinentiam cibi                      ieiunaret!  
ingenti patientiae virtute confecit.

Quanto deinde labore avaritiae                      Quantum laboravit, ut decimam daret  
vincendae, decimas substantiae suae                      omnium quae acquireret!  
in usum egentium intulit?

The sentence-by-sentence correspondence is indicated by the close equivalence of words

(*rapax-injurius-adulteriis* compared to *raperet-iniustus-adultaret*) and ideas (fasting on the sabbath, giving tithes) as well as the repetition of key notions (*ille Pharisaeus*; and most particularly here, *labor / laborare*). It appears as if Ambrose and Hilary are both independently translating from a Greek original.

But the analysis of the previous section has suggested two further arguments for Ambrosian independence. Firstly, as the Appendix shows there are sections which appear in the catena and Ambrose and not in Hilary: hence Ambrose must have been using a text other than Hilary. Secondly, there are the passages with ‘lighter’ correspondence where differences in exegesis appear to be prompted by an individual trigger word or trigger phrase. As has been shown, these seem best explained as arising from each author separately seeking to develop a source text in another language.

Modern scholarly literature is divided on this issue. Most older scholars felt Ambrose stands independently of Hilary (see works by Gariglio, Gastaldi, Goffinet, Pizzolato, Auf der Mar; conversely Ceccato believed Ambrose indeed used Hilary). More recently Risch’s painstaking analysis of the texts and *Vindobonensis* scholia has led him to suggest the converse, namely that Ambrose was using both Hilary *and* Origen in composing his commentary.<sup>96</sup> The below will suggest that Ambrose translates Origen independently, and is thus a separate witness to Origen.

## **2.5 Analysis: Hilary’s translation technique**

### **2.5a) Hilary’s setting**

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<sup>96</sup> RISCH (forthcoming, b)

Goffinet's analysis of how Hilary uses Origen suggests that, while literal translation does occur, on the whole Hilary prefers to translate *ad sensum*.<sup>97</sup> He suggests that this is because Hilary was motivated by his episcopal concerns: for Goffinet, where Origen's expositions are too complicated for the faithful, Hilary illustrates with concrete examples; where Origen is about contemplation, Hilary prefers an active or pastoral approach.<sup>98</sup>

We know nothing of Hilary's intended audience but, unlike what has been suggested for Ambrose, this is almost certainly a written text: he uses words such as 'above' and 'below' (*superior, inferior*) when referring to work already covered or yet to come.<sup>99</sup>

Hilary regularly comes across the problems of translation: *frequenter admonuimus, non posse satisfactionem intelligentiae ex latinitatis translatione praestari*.<sup>100</sup> In speaking of his own work he uses verbs such as *transferre* (most commonly), *interpretare, explicare* and their cognates. He also picks up on individual words and what their exact connotations are.<sup>101</sup>

*Ignitum eloquium tuum valde: et servus tuus dilexit illud* (v140). Non explicat proprietatem verbi hujus latina translatio. Quod enim nobiscum 'ignitum', id graece πεπυρωμένον scribitur. Πεπυρωμένον autem id significat, quod tamquam conflatum igne purgatum sit... (HILARY *TrPs118*, 18.5)

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<sup>97</sup> GOFFINET 1965:140, 164

<sup>98</sup> GOFFINET 1965:140-1

<sup>99</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 2.10, 3.17, 4.6, 6.1, 13.5, 19.6, 22.6

<sup>100</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 12.14

<sup>101</sup> E.g. HILARY *TrPs118*, 4.6, 4.12, 5.1, 5.10, 12.3, 12.14, 15.13, 18.5

Comparison with the catena indicates that such comments most frequently occur where Origen has drawn linguistic interpretation from a particular Greek word, so that Hilary has to refer to the Greek if he intends to explain the point. (Ambrose also frequently cites Greek words when it is necessary to explain a particular exegetical point made by Origen).<sup>102</sup> Thus he himself sees his work as making a Greek text accessible to his audience.

### 2.5b) Hilary's translation method

So far in this chapter Hilary's work has been called a 'translation'. But what exactly does this entail? It is possible to be more detailed about Hilary's approach.

Goffinet gives examples of this translation technique, such as translating a substantive with an adjective, using two phrases to express one in Origen, and so on.<sup>103</sup> However, Goffinet's analysis is necessarily only done exactly in those places where a text is found in both Hilary and Origen: that is, where some correspondence is already found. By its very nature, however, Goffinet's analysis cannot include those parts of Origen's commentary omitted by the catenist – which is, on the evidence of Nicetas and our comparison of Ambrose and Hilary, most of it. (Nor, incidentally, can he comment on those fragments of Origen where there is no obvious correspondence in Hilary, or vice versa). Lastly, Goffinet uses the Origen fragments by *Patrologia Graeca*, Pitra and Cadiou – in other words, those which are mixed in with fragments from Evagrius or other unknown authors. Hence, the analysis of Hilary's technique carried out in this chapter benefits from the improved edition of the catena published by Harl as well as the

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<sup>102</sup> E.g. AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 2.32, 4.13, 4.15, 5.21, 6.30, 9.9...

<sup>103</sup> GOFFINET 1965:140f.

comparison with Ambrose.

At one extreme, the strophe ‘gimel’ here considered can show evidence of fairly close correspondence to the source. Consider the following example from v22a/row2 (based on Dan. 12.2):

Τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ὀνειδισμοῦ εἰσιν	Peccata opprobrio sunt digna: et idcirco
ἄξια: διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει οἱ	peccatores exurgent in opprobrium
ἀμαρτωλοὶ ἀναστήσονται εἰς	aeternum.
ὀνειδισμόν αἰώνιον.	

This is an example of more ‘literal’ translation comparing the two authors; admittedly the Greek phrase “at the Resurrection” has been omitted, but Hilary is certainly conveying his text closely. Moving away slightly from this verbatim approach, Hilary may embroider on individual sentences: in the previous excerpt for example (see §2.4d) one may note *per abstinentiam cibi* and *in usum egentium* to embellish the descriptions of fasting and tithing. These examples show relatively close adherence to the source text.

More usually, however, Hilary re-works an exegetical idea into his own words. For example, consider the commentary on v18b, commenting on the lemma (*Unveil my eyes*), *that I may see the wonders of your law*. Here there is relatively close correspondence between Hilary and the catena in ideas, but not in words. To explain v18b Origen cites the difference between searching for God’s wonders according to Law, and the revelation of God’s glory to the Christian (citing 2Cor 3.16). For Origen, the link is clearly to do with Moses (the Law versus Revelation); his point is not entirely clear however, at least in the version given in the catena. Hence Hilary’s version is more an explanation than a translation of the original. Firstly Hilary gives a summary statement

expressing in a nutshell what the exegesis will demonstrate: the difference between the Law itself and the ‘wonders’ of the Law (v18b/row2). Then he adds a paragraph (just over a hundred words) illustrating this point (the Jewish Sabbath versus the eternal Sabbath rest; the paschal lamb versus Christ as lamb; etc.). Hilary now returns to echo more closely the antithesis set up by Origen, following the sentences more closely, but with a slight twist: the Prophet’s prayer (μη̄ ἰουδαικῶς, ἀλλὰ μεγαλοφῶνως καὶ προφητικῶς εὐχόμενος) is expressed by Hilary as the bodily versus the spiritual understandings of the law (v18b/row4), and he introduces Rom 7.14 to make his point (*for we know that the Law is spiritual*). But quite closely corresponding sentences have an element of explanation: τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμενος is glossed as *caduco atque infirmo corpore absolutus*, and similarly τὰ θαυμάσια τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου αὐτοῦ is glossed as *haec quae per corporalem observantiam legis magna et mirabilia in coelis praefiguntur*.

Hilary’s version therefore adds considerably to his original, both in clarifying the exegesis and in adding his own theological shine: it is worth recalling that this is what exactly what a ‘good’ classical translation should be doing, since an overly literal one would have been considered *κακοζηλία*. By comparison with all this, Ambrose does make a similar exegetical point about the difference between Moses and Christ (again, an advance on Origen’s point) but does not stick to the original in terms of the ordering of ideas. Instead he provides new examples and discourses at considerably greater length (nearly 900 words for this section, compared with around 180 from Hilary).

### 2.5c) Extent of innovation

In establishing how much of Hilary’s work is translation, it is necessary to establish how much is his own independent work.

On the surface this is methodologically difficult to ascertain. If Hilary's text contains elements that are not in Ambrose or the catena, these could be independent innovation but they could merely witness to parts of the Vorlage that have not been preserved elsewhere. Further, where Ambrose and Hilary differ we cannot say which of the two is closer to Origen, or indeed if both of them are innovating away from their source. And even if the Latin authors agree against the catena, it may be that the Latins are closer to Origen since the catenist too may move away from Origen for theological or practical reasons. So even where correspondences exist between the Hilary and the other texts, this only allows weak conclusions to be drawn. And in all this, differences may be textual or linguistic as much as theological.

What *can* be said, however, is still of prime importance. Firstly, both Hilary's and Ambrose's commentaries are essentially a good readable representation of Origen's text. Hilary certainly does expand, especially where he wishes to clarify a point. He also paraphrases the Greek considerably, and makes theological alterations (see §2.6). But his principle aim is to make Origen's commentary available to a new audience. This is indicated by the ordering of material being consistent from one exegetical block to the next. Both Hilary and Ambrose take each block as it comes, and then explain it as seems most appropriate without necessarily going into a 'literal' translation. The ordering of exegetical blocks only diverges very rarely. Hilary's paraphrasing means that individual ideas or scriptural references may not occur in quite the same order as in the original; but the order of blocks is the same; it is just within the block that the material may be mixed rearranged.

The second point of prime importance confirms this, but is more statistical. Comparing the columns in the Appendix, it can be noted that for this strophe, more than 90% of Hilary's text has a text that corresponds or relates to one in either the catenist or

Ambrose (however tenuously); only around a fifth has no correspondence at all. By comparison, the figure for Ambrose is around 40%. In other words, Ambrose has been considerably freer and has interpolated considerably more material than the older bishop: Hilary, on the other hand, has adhered to a far greater degree to his source. The implication of this is that Hilary is a much more faithful translator than Ambrose, in sense or intention at least, even if not word-for-word. All in all, it is statistically much more likely that any exegesis found in Hilary's commentary was also present in Origen.

#### 2.5d) Corollary: Hilary's commentary on other Psalms

This chapter has dealt with Origen's commentary on Ps. 118. Nevertheless, Jerome mentions that many of Hilary's other psalms commentaries were translations from Origen, so it will be assumed here that they are all translations of the same nature as the Ps. 118 commentary.

However, Jerome only mentions some of Hilary's psalms commentaries as translations of Origen (1-2, 51-62, 118 to the end). Yet Hilary's corpus also includes commentaries on Psalms 13-14, 63-69 without much doubt; commentaries on the titles of Psalms 9 and 91 appear in fewer manuscripts; commentaries on Psalms 15, 31 and 41 are more doubtful still.<sup>104</sup> In the remaining chapters of this thesis, those *not* mentioned by Jerome as translations will be referred to in square brackets, as follows: *TrPs* [67].3. This is merely to denote whether or not they are mentioned by Jerome as translations, without any prejudice as to their authorship.

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<sup>104</sup> The CCSL series of Hilary's commentaries omits those on Psalms 15, 31, 41 as spurious

## **2.6 Adaptation of theology**

For the purposes of this thesis, it will be important to distinguish Hilary's own innovations from material that he derives from his source. This section aims to assess key areas where Hilary may differ from his source.

### 2.6a) Hermeneutics

As one example of how Hilary has dealt with Origen's theology, one may first consider a relatively uncontroversial topic – Origen's hermeneutical approach.

In his *Commentary on the Song of Songs*, Origen famously posits three hermeneutic levels of literal, moral and spiritual, and something similar can also be found here in the fragments from the Palestinian catena. The fragment on v147 contrasts τὸ ῥητόν, the literal, with ἀναγωγή, the moral or educative application for the individual reader; these would correspond to the first two of his hermeneutic levels in the *Song of Songs* commentary. Elsewhere, commenting v141, Origen mentions the historical meaning (κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν) but also a collective sense which symbolises the people of Israel or the church;<sup>105</sup> these would correspond to the first and third (literal and spiritual) levels. Another technique is to take words of the psalmist (described as 'the Prophet' or David) as applying to Christ, or to the ideal believer.<sup>106</sup> This gives at least four possible hermeneutic levels: literal, moral, collective, prosopographic.<sup>107</sup>

With respect to the interpretation of this specific psalm, Origen's fragments suggest he takes it as a Wisdom psalm presenting the Two Ways, of which one is the path to

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<sup>105</sup> Pal.Cat., Origen, on v9, v98, 99, 100; v126-7

<sup>106</sup> Cf. ORIGEN on Ps. 1; also Pal.Cat., Origen, on v139

<sup>107</sup> Cf. HARL 1972a:97-8

perfection. The fact that this particular psalm is taken to teach the progression to virtue is indicated by a number of factors. These include the emphasis on the Law, borne out by the discussion of the eight different kinds of law;<sup>108</sup> and the division into twenty-two strophae designated by the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, which Origen presents as στοιχεῖα (basic elements, rudimentary principles) that allow a progression.<sup>109</sup> As we have seen, Hilary also divides the Commentary into these twenty-two letters, and this is also found in Ambrose, showing that this hermeneutic was re-iterated through the division of the psalm; the Palestinian Catena, however, is not divided in this way.

As already mentioned the Prophet (i.e. psalmist) is taken to be an idealized believer, described for example as ἐκκλησιαστικός.<sup>110</sup> It is assumed that he is David, but there is little reference to the historical circumstances of the king of Israel; any allusions to enemies are taken as spiritual. For example, a significant concept is that of ταπείνωσις, but this ‘humiliation’ is viewed as an interior condition which results from the psalmist’s sin (humility) rather than as a reference to any historical event in David’s life. The fact that the psalmist is an idealized believer means that he also prefigures or is an antitype of Christ, as evidenced by words such as προσωποποιεῖν. Through the words of the psalmist, a number of conceptions of Christ arise: for example that he fulfils the Law, that he is a light to lighten our path; that the Christian should take up the cross and follow him.<sup>111</sup>

The notion of Christ being the fulfilment of the Law brings us in full circle, for as indicated already the psalm teaches the Law: thus the various hermeneutic levels may not be explicitly similar, but ultimately they coincide.

Ambrose’s approach to Psalm 118 is, unsurprisingly, similar. His commentary is

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<sup>108</sup> Pal.Cat., Origen, on v2

<sup>109</sup> Pal.Cat., Origen, Proem.

<sup>110</sup> Pal.Cat., Origen, on v99

<sup>111</sup> E.g. Pal.Cat., Origen, on v105, v120

divided into twenty-two units based on the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, and these are presented as rudiments which are steps for learning the Law.<sup>112</sup> Ambrose, however, attributes a meaning to each of the Hebrew letters (aleph = *interpretatio doctrinae*, gimel = *retributio*, etc.) which he uses in his exegesis. This is not present in Hilary, and not preserved in the fragments of Origen. Nevertheless, it would be characteristic of Origen to have had such analysis, not least because of his awareness of Jewish rabbinical techniques which used similar exegetical techniques.<sup>113</sup> Ambrose's commentary also presents an emphasis on the Law and on a progression towards God which again would be derived from Origen's reading of the psalm.

Pizzolato finds that Ambrose differs from his original in various respects, however. Rather than Origen's neo-platonic spirituality directed at the individual believer, with a focus on *θεωρία* and intellectual education, Pizzolato suggests that Ambrose emphasises the economy of salvation history, with salvation through the church as God's people<sup>114</sup> and emphasis on the sacraments. Rondeau, on the other hand, thinks that Ambrose preserves the neo-platonic emphasis in his mysticism, partly as a result of him interweaving this commentary with his own comments on the Song of Songs.<sup>115</sup>

Hilary, like Ambrose, preserves a number of the hermeneutical features of his *Vorlage*. Both Latins keep Origen's prosopography, although Ambrose appears to be more explicit on the identification of the psalmist as David (v17a/row3) and, extrapolating, of the psalmist as Christ (*iste formetur qui natus ex virgine...*: v17a/row5). This is not Hilary's understanding of the psalmist in this verse.

If Ambrose and Hilary are indeed independent then their treatment of Origen's

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<sup>112</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, Prol.

<sup>113</sup> DE LANGE 1976:103-121

<sup>114</sup> PIZZOLATO 1987:19, 21

<sup>115</sup> RONDEAU 1982:152

prosopography may be an example of them independently innovating. Origen's text frequently appears to have the first person but both Ambrose and Hilary often turn this into the third person (e.g. v17b/row3). This may be for any number of reasons (humility in using 'ego' of Christ; adaptation for a Latin audience; etc.) but it is worth bearing in mind that a feature shared by Hilary and Ambrose might be a result of independent innovation, rather than being something that was necessarily present in the *Vorlage*.

Conversely, the testimony of Ambrose and Hilary sharing a given feature might be strong evidence of what was in the *Vorlage*, even against the evidence of the catena. Both authors pepper their entire work with references to their hermeneutic principle of the Mosaic Law as *umbra futurorum* (Col 2.17): psalm 118 teaches on the (Mosaic) law, but that law itself points to the spiritual law promised by Paul. This principle is repeated constantly in the two Latin authors<sup>116</sup> but is almost entirely absent from the catena.<sup>117</sup> This is surprising since it would be characteristic of Origen's hermeneutical approach,<sup>118</sup> so it seems possible that it is the catenist here who has 'innovated' by removing the references. Maybe he thought them obvious, or conversely maybe a suspicion of Origen's exegetical approach in the sixth century prompted the catenist to write the references to law as *umbra futurorum* out of his text.

### 2.6b) Other changes to Origen's theology

So, given these variations in hermeneutics, how far has Hilary altered other elements in

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<sup>116</sup> The following are examples: HILARY *TrPs118*, 1.5, 1.6, 1.11, 3.4, 3.6, 3.7, 4.5, 6.7, 6.8, 6.12, 9.5, 17.12, 18.8, 19.2, 22.1. AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 3.19, 3.25, 3.27, 5.10, 5.11, 6.29, 18.27 (the idea is also subverted in 18.37).

<sup>117</sup> See 'σκία' & 'μέλλον' in 'Index of Greek Words', Harl 1972b:836, 844. One example occurs at Pal.Cat., Origen, on v18 (cf. also Didymus, on v43)

<sup>118</sup> E.g. the *umbra futurorum* is mentioned in ORIGEN *in Lev.Hom.* 7.4. Origen's general strategy is to interpret the Mosaic law allegorically rather than literally; see the homilies on Leviticus, also *c.Cels.* 2.2.

Origen's theology?

As already discussed, Harl highlighted theological 'anomalies' which were found in the glosses of the *Vindobonensis* manuscript,<sup>119</sup> but she suggested were omitted by the catenist for theological reasons. Similarly, some traces of Origen's theology are taken over by Hilary but not so obvious in Ambrose. In v19b/row5, Hilary mentions the orders of angels (*scit per diversitatem ministeriorum diversas esse praeceptorum observantias, angelorum, archangelorum, thronorum, dominationum, potestatum, et principatum*). The catena is here more concise (mentioning only οἱ ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεις and πᾶν λογικόν); this could be abbreviation or theological smoothing. Ambrose, unusually, omits comment on this half-verse entirely; interestingly, however, he uses the passage on God's commands as light and illumination at a later point (catena and Hilary at v19b/row3-4; Ambrose at v21b/row3). This is the only place in this strophe (gimel) where an entire section appears to have moved from its proper position.

As another example of theological change, the Latin authors appear to have smoothed over Origen's position on the apparent possibility of perfection at v20/rows 3-6 (on the psalm verse *My soul longs to desire your judgments*). Hilary's exegesis here talks of the last judgment (v20/row4); this is a longer passage for him, so it is uncertain whether this is Hilary's personal development of Origen's mention of repayment /retribution, or whether this was present in his source (cf. v20/row5 ἐὰν ἐπιθυμήσω τὰ κρίματα, ἵνα κολασθῶ ἐπιθυμῶ). Also, both Hilary and Ambrose feel that the ability to follow God's judgments *in omni tempore* is part of what we request of God; the Greek, however, appears to interpret the phrase as demonstrating that only the truly perfect man should utter these words (v20/row5). These points add up to the same thing: Origen's text suggests only a 'perfect man' (τελείος, v20/row5) can make such a prayer, whereas Hilary's text makes it

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<sup>119</sup> HARL 1972a:63-66. See also §2.3c

clear that no-one is entirely perfect.

The above figures found that over 90% of Hilary's word count relates somehow to Origen. Since this is the case, then any evidence of divergence from Origen's text suggests that there may be a motivating factor. Admittedly this is effectively an argument *ex silentio*. Yet the absence of any element from Hilary that was present in Origen suggests that Hilary may be consciously and deliberately rejecting an unacceptable doctrine, since he is otherwise happy to borrow Origen's exegesis. The following chapters will find some significant instances of these theological 'omissions' in ways that are indicative of Hilary's thoughts. In particular, Chapter 3 will mention that Hilary omits any suggestion that the Son and Spirit can be called God's hands; Chapter 4 will find that Hilary consistently rejects Origen's idea of humans losing the 'image of God' the Fall; Chapter 5 will suggest that Hilary's peculiar references to Christ as a city may be a rejection of Origen's doctrine of a pre-existent Jerusalem. And chapter 6 will find that Hilary categorically rejects any suggestion of a supracelestial Fall, as hinted by the following passage.

*Adhaesit pavimento anima mea: vivifica me secundum verbum tuum*  
(v25). Potest istud et de assiduitate orationis intelligi, tamquam ex  
peccatorum confessione in terram Propheta prostratus adhaeserit  
pavimento. Sed ut altius aliquid sub his dictis intelligamus, perspecta  
diligentius verborum virtute, necessarium ducimus. (HILARY *TrPs118*,  
4.1)

The catena interprets this verse as referring to the body as punishment for pre-mundane

sin.<sup>120</sup> Hilary disagrees, but is disingenuous about the original text. His comment (*potest istud et de assiduitate orationis intelligi*) is certainly true but omits to mention that the *oratio* referred to was probably Origen's noetic contemplation before the 'fall of souls'. So Hilary rejects this element, although he still interprets the verse as treating the relationship between body and soul. This rejection of the Fall into bodies is shown in more detail at §6.2b.

In some cases, however, this thesis will identify areas where a doctrine can realistically be assumed to be present in Origen (by using the fragments and Ambrose's commentary), but has been completely omitted by Hilary. So then, Hilary is not translating without discernment: he is producing a text which is *usually* a straight elucidation of Origen's text, but which has been corrected theologically for his audience.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed the background and text of Hilary's Commentary on Psalm 118. Although there exists no complete text of Origen's commentary on this psalm, a three-way comparison including Ambrose and fragments in the Palestinian catena has here been fruitful in demonstrating a number of points.

Firstly, Ambrose and Hilary have been demonstrated to be independent translations of a source text (*Vorlage*) which also feeds into the Palestinian catena. The independence of Ambrose and Hilary is proved by Ambrose's usage of Origenian references not used by Hilary; by their slightly different scriptural citations; by the passages with close

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<sup>120</sup> Pal.Cat., Origen, on v25: *Ἐκολλήθη τῷ ἐδάφει ἡ ψυχὴ μου· ζῆσον με κατὰ τὸν λόγον σου.* Ἐξομολογεῖται ὁ προφήτης περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς καταλειπούσης μὲν τὸ κολλᾶσθαι τῷ Κυρίῳ πρότερον, ὅτε ἐν τῇ κακίᾳ ἐτύγχανεν, *κολληθείσης δὲ δι' αὐτὴν τῷ ἐδάφει* καὶ καθελούσης ἑαυτῆς τὸ φυσικὸν ὕψος καὶ ἔπαρμα. Πᾶσα γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσα ψυχὴ *κεκόλληται τῷ ἐδάφει*...

correspondence, where small differences suggest separate translation technique. To these examples more or less discussed in the literature, a fourth argument for independence has here been added, namely the passages with ‘light’ correspondence where differences in exegesis appear to be prompted by a trigger word taken differently by the different translators.

Secondly, Hilary has been demonstrated to be a relatively reliable rendering of Origen’s psalm commentary. This was already suggested by Jerome’s many references to Hilary’s work as a translation, but one that was relatively free (*nonnulla de suo addidit*): Hilary is held up as a model of translation technique. This is further confirmed by comparison with Ambrose, which shows that Hilary was far closer to his original than he is often given credit for, most often showing exegetical or linguistic affinities with Origen; and where there are differences, these indicate Hilary questioning Origen’s theology. In terms of translation technique, both authors stick relatively closely to Origen’s ordering of material and exegetical units. However, Ambrose is considerably more likely to develop his own exegesis and to use his source as a springboard for his own reflections.

All this has been shown by examining the texts in parallel columns, but to some degree it is still impossible to tell for any given sentence whether it is merely an expression of Origen’s text or whether it is Hilary himself innovating. Nevertheless, it is possible to make at least one categorical statement. The introduction at §2.1 indicated that many modern scholars credit Hilary with being ‘influenced’ by Origen, pointing in particular to the psalms commentaries. Yet this language of ‘influence’ is surely inappropriate when used of a translation; it is hardly surprising to find ideas of Origen in a text which is ultimately an edited translation of Origen.

In this dissertation, Hilary’s anthropology will be deduced not only from what he says about the human person, but just as much from what he does *not* say – that is, from

what he omits or re-phrases compared to his original. For this reason the following chapters will analyse Hilary's anthropology in this psalm commentary, but will always compare it with the parallels in the Palestinian Catena and Ambrose. The analysis of his theology will be informed not only by what Hilary has chosen to keep, but also what he has chosen to omit.

## *Chapter 3*

# **Body and Soul**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter will discuss Hilary's doctrine of the elements of the human person, namely his dichotomous anthropology which sees humans as composed of body and soul.

Some scholars see the dichotomous model in Hilary as influenced however remotely by Platonism while others prefer to see Hilary as closer to a Latin Stoic model. Yet even those who may deny close platonic influence still are happy to identify platonic ideas in Hilary's thought such as the soul being separable from the body, or a simplistic identification of the body as inherently bad and the soul as inherently good. The presence of these 'platonic' elements in Hilary will be questioned in the current chapter.

It will be argued here that it is inappropriate to generalize Hilary's anthropology across his works. Hilary shows a visible difference between his Matthew and Psalms commentaries with respect to his anthropology. This is because the latter relies on Origen, and Hilary's influence there should be seen most properly as Origenistic rather than any (pagan) philosophical school. However, Hilary is still critical in his use of Origen.

Lastly, even in the Psalms commentaries the body-soul dichotomy is not so markedly contrasting as sometimes suggested, with the soul in particular just as responsible as the body when it comes to sin (if not more so).

### **3.2 Literature Review**

Almost every modern scholar sees Hilary as having a dichotomous anthropology of body and soul.

This is indeed ubiquitous across Hilary's corpus since he repeatedly juxtaposes or contrasts the body and soul. Fierro cites the 'double creation' of mankind as the basis of Hilary's dichotomy: "Hilario de Poitiers se atiene también a esa interpretación [de una doble creación] que, en cierto modo, rige toda su antropología."<sup>121</sup> Others also see the 'double creation' as the basis of Hilary's anthropology, including Descourtieux<sup>122</sup> and Ladaria.<sup>123</sup>

One exception to this is Orazzo, who concentrates not on a two-fold but a three-fold model for Hilary's anthropology. Orazzo points to passages which show a more Pauline anthropology: *Apostolus enim et carnalem hominem posuit, et animale et spiritalem*.<sup>124</sup> The three-fold emphasis here is also used by Doignon to structure his chapter on Hilary's anthropology.<sup>125</sup> However, Hilary's passage here is in fact distinguishing between types of person, not components of the person (for example he points out even Gentiles can be *animalis*). Also, while he does talk of the relationship between say spirit and flesh,<sup>126</sup> he never elsewhere states that humans are made of body, soul and spirit. So then, Hilary should not be seen as having this three-fold anthropology.

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<sup>121</sup> FIERRO 1964:8

<sup>122</sup> DESCOURTIEUX 2008:58

<sup>123</sup> LADARIA 1977:49f. eg p51: El esquema fundamental de la antropología de Hilario es dualista. (Ladaria says this despite writing on the Holy Spirit, which he identifies as a bond rather than a separate anthropological element).

<sup>124</sup> *TrPs.* [14].7-8, discussed ORAZZO 1986:143-148.

<sup>125</sup> DOIGNON 2005:119 and note the structure of the subsequent chapter (2005:119-144). However, RONDEAU 1962:200-1 rightly points out this passage in Hilary is a *hapax* and he does not refer to the three-fold anthropology elsewhere.

<sup>126</sup> *InMt.* 27.4: Nam ut Spiritus carni [sponsus], ita Spiritui caro sponsa est

(The relevance of Hilary's reference to humans as 'body, soul, will' will be discussed in Chapter 7).

Returning to the dichotomous model, an obvious possible source for this is platonism. Doignon defines Hilary's anthropology as 'platonico-stoic'.<sup>127</sup> Indeed it is features like his anthropology that can lead an author like M. Clark to call Hilary "a convert from neo-platonism".<sup>128</sup> Although Doignon takes many of his examples from Latin non-platonic writers (Cicero, Seneca, also Tertullian),<sup>129</sup> he implicitly identifies characteristic 'platonic' concepts in Hilary. Two in particular will be pursued in this chapter: firstly the concept that the soul is 'separable' and aims to soar free of the body which holds it captive; and secondly the model that the body is the source of all sin and evil, while the soul is absolutely good and divine.

On the other hand Fierro, while seeing Hilary as manifesting a dichotomous anthropology, rejects the link with platonism.<sup>130</sup> Likewise Burns rejects the simplistic "body bad, soul good" model, pointing to the neutrality of the body as well as vitiation of the soul in Hilary's corpus. Burns takes this a step further because he supports a more 'stoic' understanding of Hilary's theology.<sup>131</sup> Nevertheless Colish feels that there is nothing of Stoicism in Hilary, whose use of any Stoic themes is 'unreflective'.<sup>132</sup>

Possibly the best and most convincing analysis of Hilary's anthropology is the concise but perceptive article by Rondeau. She acknowledges the platonic shine of some

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<sup>127</sup> DOIGNON 2005:119

<sup>128</sup> M.T. CLARK 1981:10, fn.33. In turn she probably gets this phrase from the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* 1957:638

<sup>129</sup> DOIGNON 1971:121 and fn.11

<sup>130</sup> FIERRO 1964:337 explains that Hilary's theology is far distant from Ambrose's because the latter is affected by platonic thought: "el factor determinante de esa lejanía ha sido probablemente el platonismo, que apenas deja rastros en Hilario, y en cambio permea profundamente el pensamiento de Ambrosio."

<sup>131</sup> BURNS 2012:203. Compare also p.49: the Stoics "influence not only [Hilary's] treatment of virtue but also shape some of his language about... the relation of body and soul..."

<sup>132</sup> COLISH 1990:123-5

of Hilary's statements, admitting that some of his use of thematic pairs (light-darkness, ascent-fall, captivity-liberation) "...peut a priori sembler suspect d'hétérodoxie néoplatonicienne ou gnostique."<sup>133</sup> But she sees this as a misguided way of reading Hilary who seeks not to separate but to integrate body and soul into the same nature.<sup>134</sup> For her Hilary is not a dualist in his understanding of man's ultimate destiny: although Hilary interprets "au départ ces thèmes dans un sens dualiste, [il] leur fait exprimer au terme une conception de la destinée de l'homme qui ne l'est pas du tout."<sup>135</sup> Although the current chapter may differ with her on some details (for example she still intrinsically sees Hilary's post-lapsarian, pre-salvation body as the source of sin), in essence her position integrating body and soul is the closest to that adopted here.

Something very little discussed in any of these scholars is the significance of differences across Hilary's works. Doignon does mention that the sharp 'separability' of body and soul as found for example in *TrPs*. 129 is likely to follow Origenian thought, as evidenced for example in the latter's first Homily on Genesis.<sup>136</sup> (Doignon holds that Hilary did not know Origen before his exile,<sup>137</sup> so this implies he identifies a development across time in Hilary's anthropology.) Fierro also highlights the origenistic influences on Hilary's late work. Yet despite these acknowledgements of different influences across Hilary's works, there is no systematic attempt to identify specific changes in Hilary's anthropology. Modern scholars predominantly use the Psalms commentaries to deduce Hilary's anthropology; for example the majority of citations in Doignon's article on

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<sup>133</sup> RONDEAU 1962:198

<sup>134</sup> RONDEAU 1962:208-210

<sup>135</sup> RONDEAU 1962:198

<sup>136</sup> DOIGNON 2005:134-5, fn.83 & 84, citing ORIGEN-RUFINUS, *Hom.Gen.* 1.13

<sup>137</sup> DOIGNON 1971:171-2

Hilary's anthropology come from the Psalms commentaries.<sup>138</sup> In a way this is fair: Hilary discourses more on anthropology in his Psalms commentaries than anywhere else; there is simply less anthropological material in his other works. Indeed for some scholars, differences between the commentary on Matthew and those on the Psalms are to be either harmonized or explained away, as can be seen from the passage where Hilary appears to suggest the soul is corporeal (*InMt* 5.8); the various scholars propose a variety of solutions to this (§3.4b).

This suggests it is worthwhile to carry out an analysis of Hilary's anthropology which concentrates particularly on differences across his works. This is what will be assessed in the current chapter.

### **3.3 Body and Soul in the Psalms Commentaries**

#### **3.3a) Body and soul in Hilary's commentary on Ps. 118.73**

One of Hilary's most explicit anthropological discussions comes in *Tr.Ps.118*, 10.1-9 where he comments on Ps. 118.73: *Manus tuae fecerunt me, et finxerunt me: da mihi intellectum, ut discam mandata tua*. Following Origen, Hilary takes this as referring to the creation of mankind as found in the initial chapters of Genesis, and thus presents a clear and usefully lengthy exposition of his anthropology. The passage helps in understanding Hilary's thought on factors ranging from the nature of the Fall to man as God's image. Here, the basic elements of body and soul will be considered.

Hilary's analysis of the passage cited begins with an assertion that mankind is

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<sup>138</sup> DOIGNON (1989a), *passim*. The same may be said of his analysis in 2005:119-144 (Ch4, on Hilary's anthropology)

supreme among all earthly works. After some initial points (for example that mankind plays a part beyond other creatures in knowing and venerating his creator)<sup>139</sup>, he explains why mankind is superior: because we were made by God's hands, not just by one hand (as the sky) nor by his word (as the rest of creation).<sup>140</sup>

Hilary goes on to describe the two stages of creation. The inner nature, or soul, is created *ex nihilo*: it is in the image of God, endowed with Reason, and thus incorporeal: *Incorporeale est, quidquid illud tum de consilii sententia inchoatur: fit enim ad imaginem Dei*. This feature of being in God's image means that it is, to some degree, itself divine: *divinum in eo et incorporeale condendum, quod secundum imaginem Dei et similitudinem tum fiebat*. (Chapter 4 discusses further this issue of humans being in God's image).

The second stage of man's creation, by contrast, is strikingly different (*quanto differt!*)<sup>141</sup>. In this second stage, Hilary's commentary on Ps. 118.73 turns to Genesis 2, where the outer nature is not created *ex nihilo* but rather God takes dust of the earth and moulds it. The significance of this is marked for Hilary by the use of different verbs in the lemma and in Genesis: *Primum ergo non accepit, sed fecit: secundum non ut primum fecit, sed accepit; et tunc formavit vel praeparavit*.<sup>142</sup> The outer nature thus is made from earth and assumes the nature of the thing from which it is made.<sup>143</sup> As a result of earth's nature, man's outer nature is corporeal and in itself inanimate (since for him what is corporeal by its very nature cannot be self-moving); he commonly uses words such as *materia* or *materies* to refer to it.<sup>144</sup>

Taking these two together, Hilary makes it explicit that mankind therefore has a

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<sup>139</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.1

<sup>140</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.3-5, citing Genesis 1 and Isaiah 45 (LXX)

<sup>141</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.7

<sup>142</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.7

<sup>143</sup> See further for example *TrPs118*, 8.18-19. Further discussion at §5.3b

<sup>144</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.7; see also 3.3, 11.5, 18.2

double nature.

Homo vero, cum internam et externam in se naturam dissonantem aliam ab alia contineat, et ex duobus generibus in unum sit animal rationis particeps constitutus, duplici est institutus exordio. Primum enim dictum est: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram* [Gen 1.26]; dehinc secundo, *Et accepit Deus pulverem de terra, et finxit hominem* [Gen 2.7]. (*Tr.Ps.118*, 10.6)

Thus Hilary sees mankind as constituted by two natures, an internal and an external, and creation is in two stages, with Genesis 1 recounting the creation of the internal nature and Genesis 2 giving the external nature. Man's double nature is confirmed for Hilary by a number of pointers in the text: the two stages of creation represented by the two chapters in Genesis; the confirmation of this in God using two hands for the creation; and the different verbs used, showing that the manner of creation was different in the two stages, with the inner nature being *ex nihilo* and the second assuming the nature of its base matter, earth. Hilary closes this section much as he has begun it, with an assertion that this exegesis proves man has a *duplex natura*, as found also in Paul.

Scit in se duplicem beatus Paulus esse naturam, cum secundum interiorem hominem delectatur in lege, et cum aliam in memsuis videt legem quae se captivum ducat in lege peccati. (*Tr.Ps.118*, 10.8)

In other words, Hilary takes Paul's references to inner and outer natures or flesh and spirit as referring to body and soul. As for Paul's other angle – that man is trichotomous,

composed of body, soul and spirit – Hilary suggests that this refers not to the static composition of man, but rather to the act(s) of his creation in three stages: a *duplex natura* formed by a *triplex perfectio*.<sup>145</sup>

### 3.3b) Body and soul elsewhere in Hilary's Psalms commentaries

The view of humanity presented in the commentary on Ps. 118.73 is found more or less consistently throughout the psalms commentaries. For example in *TrPs*. 129 Hilary again mentions the creation of man with 'two natures': *...meminisse debet hominum institutionem naturis duabus contineri, animae scilicet et corporis*.<sup>146</sup> In particular, Hilary's account of the inner man expresses the soul's superiority in terms which appear fairly (neo-)platonian:

...homo interior... effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, movens, citus, incorporeus, subtilis, aeternus. Quantum in se est, speciem naturae principalis imitatur, dum transcurrit, dum circumvolat, et dicto citius nunc ultra oceanum est, nunc in coelos evolat, nunc in abyssis est, nunc orientem occidentemque perlustrat... (*TrPs*. 129.6)

Yet Hilary is at pains throughout the psalms commentaries to indicate the effect that the body has on the soul. He uses two images in particular to illustrate this: that of dirtiness or stain, and that of weakness or infirmity.

The notion of dirtiness follows from the fact that the body has been created from

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<sup>145</sup> *TrPs* 118, 10.8

<sup>146</sup> HILARY *TrPs* 129.4

the earth and thus inherits its nature. Hilary expresses this with words such as *labes* and *sordens*; and also with *(im)mundus* and its cognates, which are used both for the Biblical notion of (un)cleanness in the Levitical sense and also for the notion of purity in heart.<sup>147</sup> Indeed, every instance of *labes* / *sordens* and their cognates in this commentary refers to the effect of the body. The body's earthliness also gives rise to other images. The body's physicality is recalled by the notion of weight or heaviness;<sup>148</sup> the notion of *humiliatio* is given the twin meaning of abasement and bringing to the ground (cf. *humus* 'ground').<sup>149</sup>

An even more common image is that of sickness or physical weakness, especially since both physical sickness and spiritual infirmity end in death: *nunc enim admiscemur morticinae*.<sup>150</sup> This is expressed with words such as *caducus*, *fragilitas*, *morbus* or *contagio*, but overwhelmingly with the word *infirmitas*. Hilary's default way of referring to the human condition is in terms of *infirmitas* (39 instances);<sup>151</sup> this most frequently occurs in phrases such as *infirmitas humana* or *infirmitas naturae nostrae*.<sup>152</sup> So *infirmitas* denotes the condition of the body and soul combined together, the complete human, *natura humana* as a synthesised being. At *TrPs*, [13].3 Hilary likens the sickly human condition to a city disastrously affected by the plague and in need of a doctor. So then, Hilary usually uses *infirmitas nostra* to explain some fault or sin, or the failure of man as a whole to attain to God's glory.

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<sup>147</sup> E.g. Lev. 10.10, Ps. 50.12

<sup>148</sup> E.g. *gravitas TrPs118*, 14.1. See also §3.5b, §3.5c

<sup>149</sup> The double meaning of *humiliatio* is behind the exegesis of Ps. 118.67, given at *TrPs118*, 9.4 (compare AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 9.13-14). This text is discussed further at §6.2b.

<sup>150</sup> *TrPs118*, 3.4

<sup>151</sup> There are two instances of *infirmitas* in *TrPs118* which are of bodily sickness, rather than weakness of human nature: 7.1, 9.8

<sup>152</sup> The following is a typical example: *TrPs118*, 6.6 [homo] per naturae infirmitatem sine peccato esse non possit.

### 3.3c) Influence of Origen

The above presents Hilary's views on body and soul as deduced from a reading of his Psalms commentaries; however, as Chapter 2 shows these are translations of Origen commentaries. The question therefore arises as to how far Hilary is merely repeating his source text – the *Vorlage* – and how far he is interpreting or adapting the theology of his source.

The text preserved by the Palestinian catenist on v.73a is short, presenting only two interpretative points. The first point is that the 'hands of God' which created man are Christ and the Holy Spirit (see below on how Ambrose uses this but Hilary omits it). The second point made in the catena fragment suggests that the use of the different verbs ἐποίησαν and ἔπλασαν in the lemma refers to the creations of body and soul respectively.

However, the text is not entirely preserved because at this point the catenist makes an uncharacteristic interjection. He rejects Origen's interpretation, suggesting that these two verbs do not refer to different stages in man's creation,<sup>153</sup> but are used pleonastically to refer to the same single act of creation (ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω ἐκ παραλλήλου τὸ αὐτὸ σήμαινεσθαι), and he cites other verses to show that the verb πλάσσειν is used of the soul as well as of the body. It appears that the catenist is firmly rejecting the suggestion of a two-stage creation entailing a pre-existent soul.

The catena fragment is only 82 words long, and is not even marked with Origen's name.<sup>154</sup> However, this is certainly only a small fragment of Origen's commentary on v.73a: both Hilary and Ambrose have an atypically extensive exegesis of this half-verse of

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<sup>153</sup> The catenist also mentions and rejects another early interpretation, namely that ἐποίησαν refers to our 'first creation' and ἔπλασαν refers to our re-birth at baptism.

<sup>154</sup> It may be presumed that the fragment is Origen's for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the fragment is placed in first position after the lemma, which is normally the case for Origen fragments in Ps.118. Secondly, the two interpretations found are also found in Ambrose and/or Hilary. Thirdly, the catenist's interpolation mentions Origen by name.

about 1,100 words in length.<sup>155</sup> For the following analysis, Hilary and Ambrose were placed in parallel columns. They turn out to correspond far less than for the strophe presented in the Appendix. This seems to be because at least one of the authors is struggling not to reproduce potentially controversial material; this is typical for Hilary in doctrinally controversial passages (compare the passages on the Fall, §6.2b) and is further confirmed by the fact that the catenist explicitly questions Origen's interpretation here. Nevertheless, the two Latin authors are close enough for it to be certain that they are both reproducing a *Vorlage* considerably longer than that preserved by the catenist. Clearly this verse was of some interest to Origen. A comparison of Hilary and Ambrose provides some indications as to what may have been in Origen's text.

Both Hilary and Ambrose start off with a discourse on the fact that man is the most perfect of all God's creations.<sup>156</sup> For Ambrose, man is *pretiosissimum (opus Dei)*; Hilary calls him *utilius* and *speciosius* compared with other creatures. Yet it is man's internal feature – his soul – which makes him so special. Ambrose asserts the soul is superior, but Hilary explains why: man alone is *rationale, intelligens, dijudicans, sentiens*. However, Ambrose and Hilary diverge a little on what the soul's purpose is. Both agree that it is to be used *ad cognoscendum*; but for Hilary the soul should be for recognizing its Maker, whereas for Ambrose the soul should recognize itself, a dictum which Ambrose attributes not to the Delphic oracle<sup>157</sup> but the Jewish Law.<sup>158</sup>

Another theme found in both Hilary and Ambrose is the different verbs used to

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<sup>155</sup> Hilary: 1117 words on v73a, 147 on v73b (total 1264). Ambrose: 1070 words on v73a, 379 on v73b (total 1449). These statistics include the editorial titles.

<sup>156</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 10.1; AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 10.6-7

<sup>157</sup> PLATO *Charmides* 164d-165a, *Protagoras* 343a-b

<sup>158</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 10.10: Attende tibi, ut Lex dicit (referring to Dt. 4.9). This whole paragraph is devoted to this concept of self-knowledge: Nosce te ipsum, homo... Cognosce te, anima... This theme is also found elsewhere in Ambrose, e.g. *Exameron* 4.9.42

describe man's creation.<sup>159</sup> It has already been mentioned that the catenist rejects the interpretation that this refers to two separate stages, but it forms a key part of the analysis for both Latins. Hilary and Ambrose both point to the relevance of the two different verbs in representing the two elements of man; both mention other textual variants (the words *in aliquibus codicibus...* occurring in both authors);<sup>160</sup> and both explicitly compare Gen 1.26-7 with Gen 2.7 to point out that the Genesis narrative(s) also contain different verbs for the creation of the two elements of man. Further, both authors use this sequence of verbs (first *factum*, then *figuratum* / *paratum* / *plasmatum*) to indicate the distinct origins of body and soul. This double creation of the 'inner' and 'outer' man goes back to Philo's interpretation of the two chapters of Genesis as describing a 'heavenly' man and an 'earthly' one; it is also characteristic of Origen.<sup>161</sup> This identification of the two chapters of Genesis with the inner and outer man is found also in both Hilary and Ambrose,<sup>162</sup> and Paul's old and new man (Col. 3.9-11) are also brought to bear.<sup>163</sup>

However, Hilary does not adopt the exegesis of his source uncritically; he makes changes to his *Vorlage* if he sees it as theologically questionable. For the commentary on Ps. 118.73, Hilary makes two main 'corrections': one in his discussion of the soul as God's image, which will be treated in Chapter 4, and a second with regard to trinitarian theology. As already mentioned, the Palestinian catena and Ambrose's translation both suggest that the 'hands of God' which created man may be understood as Christ and the Holy Spirit; Hilary, on the other hand, seems more cautious. When he gets to the parallel point in his

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<sup>159</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 10.3, 7-8; AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 10.12, 15

<sup>160</sup> Hilary suggests the alternative variant is *finxerunt* (10.3), whereas Ambrose translates *plasmaverunt* (10.12)

<sup>161</sup> ORIGEN-RUFINUS *Hom.Gen.* 1.13

<sup>162</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 10.8; AMBROSE *bon.mort.* 7.26

<sup>163</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 10.17 (the Colossians version) is exactly parallel with HILARY *TrPs118*, 10.8 (this time the Romans version). It is not clear which of the two Pauline references was original to Origen.

discussion of v.73a, he starts a sentence suggesting that God (that is, the Father) may have been accompanied by others when creating man: *Et quia vel locutus ad alterum Deus intelligitur cum dicit 'faciamus hominem'...*<sup>164</sup> but he does not mention the possibility that God's 'hands' might be Son and Spirit. Further, the concept of Son and/or Spirit as the Father's hands occurs elsewhere in Ambrose and the catena, but again is absent from Hilary.<sup>165</sup> Given his particular context in the full throes of trinitarian debates, he may have been anxious about any heterodox statements about the trinity, and thus deliberately omitted this notion of the Son and Spirit being the Father's creative hands, mere subordinate agents of the Father.

On the other hand, Hilary retains the suggestion that other creatures were made by God's word, while man's special dignity required him to be created by God's own hands.<sup>166</sup> This was probably in Origen, as suggested by the catenist's words that, unlike for the other creatures, God *himself* formed man, δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἔπλασε (i.e. the other creatures were created by God's Word, whereas man was created by the hands of the Father himself). Ambrose, however, corrects in the opposite way to Hilary: he maintains the reference to the Son and Spirit as God's hands, but omits the point that man was made by God's hands and everything else by God's Word. Perhaps Ambrose was simply not aware of any problem with a doctrine of the Spirit as God's hand. But it would explain why he omits the distinction that man was made by God's hands and everything else by God's Word, which is potentially nonsensical if one of God's hands (the Son) is itself identical with God's Word.

There are considerable shared elements between the commentaries of Ambrose and

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<sup>164</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.8

<sup>165</sup> Compare PALESTINIAN CATENA on v73 with AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 10.17 (absent from Hilary *TrPs118*, 10.1-9). Compare also the catena on v173 with Ambrose *ExpPs118*, 22.22 (absent from Hilary *TrPs118*, 22.4); the notion also occurs at AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 14.31, 19.37

<sup>166</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 10.3-5 (compare AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 10.9 and 10.12-13)

Hilary. Since Ambrose is independent of Hilary (as shown for example by Ambrose citing 10.8, which is found in the catena but not in Hilary),<sup>167</sup> any shared elements may very well come from Origen. At the same time, however, Hilary reinforces his ownership of his text: the trinitarian correction here shows that Hilary is anxious to correct any heterodoxy he perceives in his source. A more important change in this passage (as far as the current analysis of Hilary's anthropology is concerned) is his change to Origen's presumed assertions about man being *ad imaginem dei*. This will be examined in Chapter 4.

For now, however, we move to compare the picture of Hilary's anthropology gained so far with that in another of his key texts, the *Commentary on Matthew*.

### **3.4 Body and Soul in the *Commentary on Matthew***

What we have seen so far suggests a basic dichotomous anthropology, and the situation initially appears no different in his commentary on Matthew. He refers to a dichotomous model in this work extremely frequently, not merely juxtaposing body-and-soul but also other elements such as body-and-mind or flesh-and-spirit rather than body-and-soul.<sup>168</sup>

Yet while Hilary's early anthropology is as dichotomous as in his later work, there may be some small differences across the works. For example *InMt* twice refers to mankind consisting of body-soul-will.<sup>169</sup> Another question arises as to whether Hilary believes the soul is incorporeal, given that one passage in *InMt* may suggest otherwise

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<sup>167</sup> To be fair, this is not entirely conclusive if taken on its own. Job 10.8a is a fairly obvious verse to cite since the first few words are identical to the lemma Ps. 118.73a; Origen and Ambrose might therefore have inserted it independently. However, they refer to it in a similar place and as discussed in Chapter 2 there is enough other evidence for Hilary and Ambrose translating independently.

<sup>168</sup> HILARY *InMt*. 4.19, 5.4, 5.6, 5.8, 6.3, 8.7, 9.4, 10.17-20, 10.23-24, 11.5, 14.9, 15.5, 16.11, 17.10-11, 17.13, 18.1, 23.2, 27.4, 28.1, 29.2...

<sup>169</sup> HILARY *InMt*. 10.23-4, 23.2. See Chapter 7.

(§3.4b). First however, human creation in *InMt* and *TrPs118* will be compared.

### 3.4a) Creation in *In Matthaeum* (?)

An important question arises as to whether Hilary's dichotomous understanding of human creation in the Psalms commentary is matched in the Matthew commentary. The following excerpt, regarding Christ's teaching on humility, throws up a couple of phrases which are interesting in this regard.

Igitur humilia spirantes, id est, esse se homines recordantes, in coelestis regni possessione constituti, conscii sibi ex sordentibus ac tenuissimis se principiis coalitos in hanc formam perfecti corporis procreari, et in hunc sentiendi, contuendi, judicandi, agendi sensum, Deo profectum ministrante, procedere...

(*InMt*, 4.2)

For Fierro, this is a passing reference to man's creation which is equivalent to the commentary on Ps. 118.73 discussed above (§3.3a), and particularly *TrPs118*, 10.7 *Nam sumitur pulvis, et terrena materies formatur in hominem*. Even the order of terms corresponds, and he presents them in tabular form.<sup>170</sup>

...terrena materies...

...ex sordentibus ac tenuissimis  
principiis...

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<sup>170</sup> FIERRO 1964:48

...formatur...

...coalitos...

...in hominem

...in hanc formam perfecti corporis

*(TrPs118, 10.7)**(InMt, 4.2)*

While the former column is ‘de sabor muy concreto’ and the latter is ‘más filosófic[o] y abstract[o]’, Fierro feels that essentially they are the same narrative: “Hemos pasado de la exégesis directa de un relato popular sobre la creación de Adán a una teología sistematizada que quiere explicar la condición terrestre del hombre.”<sup>171</sup> Fierro appears to move from ‘exegesis of a folk story’ in *Tr.Ps.118* to a ‘systematized theology’ of a ‘philosophical and abstract’ nature in *InMt* (note also his placing of columns, with *TrPs.* on the left). Yet this direction of systemization would be contrary to the chronology, which is generally accepted as placing *InMt* many years before the psalms commentaries (see §1.5).

However, it may be that Fierro has misunderstood the thrust of this passage. Rather than talking about the general creation of humanity, it is probably discussing each individual act of creation, or in other words human procreation and growth.

This is supported by the vocabulary. We should be humble when we remember that our body is derived from elements (*principiis*) described as ‘sullyng and extremely insubstantial’ (*sordentibus ac tenuissimis*). This could indeed describe earth or dust as in the Genesis narrative, but it probably refers to human semen, because it is similar to Hilary’s narrative elsewhere of what is involved in human begetting as opposed to divine begetting (*elementa illa inamina ac turpia*).<sup>172</sup> A similar argument regarding how life

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<sup>171</sup> FIERRO 1964:49

<sup>172</sup> HILARY *trin.* 7.28

comes out of such an insignificant element is found in Methodius.<sup>173</sup> The notion of human procreation is also supported by the word *coalitos*, a word which describes the process of growth (it is used of the gestation process by Aulus Gellius,<sup>174</sup> of bodily formation by Apuleius,<sup>175</sup> and of the growth of plants by Columella<sup>176</sup>). Lastly the word *procreari* also points in this direction.

The fact that this excerpt is about procreation and individual growth is further confirmed by the context. Hilary talks of each human learning through their body to sense, observe, discern and act (*in hunc [corpus] sentiendi, contudendi, judicandi, agenda sensum [procedit]*). The passage goes on to emphasize that we come into the world with nothing, but all have the same *primordia* and are given provision for our life; we should therefore imitate God's goodness by our dealings with each other. The word *primordium* can also be used to indicate part of the process of physical generation.<sup>177</sup>

All this explains why the human form is here called *perfectus*: it does not imply anything about human morality. Rather Hilary is making a point about the perfection of the physical human form despite the 'sullyng, insubstantial' elements it is made from – and this is further evidence of God's goodness.

In sum, then, this passage should not be taken as pertaining to the Genesis creation narrative, and does not bear a comparison with the creation passage in Hilary's psalms commentaries.

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<sup>173</sup> METHODIDIUS *res.* 14

<sup>174</sup> GELLIUS *att.noct.* 12.1.11: Cur igitur iste... non id quoque nihil interesse putat, cuius in corpore cuiusque ex sanguine concretus homo et coalitus sit? (i.e. man is formed in his mother's womb from her blood)

<sup>175</sup> APULEIUS *apologia* 38 (of the generation of fish)

<sup>176</sup> COLUMELLA *res rustica* 2.6, 5.11 *et passim*

<sup>177</sup> COLUMELLA *res rustica* 6.37.7 (of horse colouring): Quod accidere non aliter reor, quam ut avitus color primordiis seminum mixtus reddatur nepotibus.

### 3.4b) Corporeal Soul in *In Matthaeum* (?)

One passage in Hilary could be taken to suggest that the soul is corporeal. Hilary is discussing the nature of the resurrection body, and his argument develops in the following excerpt:

Nihil est quod non in substantia sua et creatione corporeum sit: et omnium, sive in coelo sive in terra, sive visibilium sive invisibilium, elementa formata sunt. Nam et animarum species, sive obtinentium corpora, sive corporibus exsulantium, corpoream tamen naturae suae substantiam sortiuntur; quia omne quod creatum est, in aliquo sit necesse est. (*InMt* 5.8)

In the fifth century Claudianus Mamertus criticizes Hilary for this statement that nothing created is incorporeal, presumably because Mamertus himself sees the soul as incorporeal.<sup>178</sup>

Modern scholars reject the suggestion that Hilary saw the soul as corporeal in a materialistic sense, but otherwise differ as to how to interpret this passage. Coustant, the eighteenth century Benedictine editor, suggests a number of possibilities;<sup>179</sup> he leaves the reader to choose between them, as long as it is understood that the question is not about the substance of souls but only their manner of subsisting: the soul is not bodily in itself (*tota quaestio non de animae substantia, sed de subsistendi modo versetur. Sed haec interpretetur quisque ut volet, modo non credat Hilarium iis dictis animam in se ipsa*

<sup>178</sup> CLAUDIANUS MAMERTUS *de statu animae* 2.9.3

<sup>179</sup> COUSTANT *Patrologia Latina* 9 col. 945-6, fn.(e). See PL 9 col.946-8, fn.(f) and Coustant's analysis of *TrPs118*, 19.8 (*anima corporalis*) at PL 9:629 C-D, fn.(a); and his comments in his *Praefatio Generalis* at PL 9:120D-121A

*corpoream voluisse*).<sup>180</sup> Fierro suggests that, in the philosophical language of Hilary's day, 'corporality' can just mean 'reality' (i.e. indicating the real existence of the soul); his ultimate solution is that when Hilary calls the soul 'corporeal', he merely means it is created.<sup>181</sup> Doignon's brief comments on this excerpt<sup>182</sup> refer to the influence of Tertullian and the Stoics on Hilary regarding the corporality of the soul; he again insists that Hilary should not be understood in a materialistic sense here, but does not suggest an alternative. Most scholars suggest that the soul is called *corporea* in the sense that it has an association with a physical body;<sup>183</sup> all insist that Hilary can't really mean the soul is corporeal in a materialistic sense, since this would be inconsistent with Hilary's statements at *TrPs* 129.6 (see §3.3b).

Which of these approaches seems most correct? To answer this, it is necessary to consider the context of the passage. Hilary is explaining why we should not worry about food or clothing after the General Resurrection. Unfortunately, interpretation is not much helped by context since the thread of Hilary's argument is not entirely clear (a point made also by other scholars).<sup>184</sup> Why does corporeity explain the question he is addressing? It would possibly be more likely for Hilary to have explained this passage by stating that the soul was incorporeal and had no need for such things as food and clothing. In all, Hilary's reasoning here is initially unclear.

Firstly, the general impression of scholars seems correct: Hilary is referring not to a disembodied soul, but to the soul in the body. More specifically, he is referring to the

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<sup>180</sup> COUSTANT *Patrologia Latina* 9 col.946-8, fn.(f)

<sup>181</sup> FIERRO 1964:23-27

<sup>182</sup> DOIGNON 2007a:159, fn.9. See also 1971:313 and fn.3 where Doignon states that Hilary relies on Tertullian's theory of the soul's corporeity, and 1971:383: fn.1 rejecting a materialistic understanding of corporality.

<sup>183</sup> As well as the authors cited, see also WILD 1950:127-8; BURNS 1981:119-122

<sup>184</sup> FIERRO 1964:228f.; COUSTANT *Patrologia Latina* 9: 945-6, fn.(e)

post-resurrection body, and this must be linked to Paul's description of the post-resurrection body in 1Cor. 15. In short, Hilary is not saying that a soul is intrinsically bodily; rather, his argument regards the nature of the bodies in question, on an assumption that all souls are embodied.

Hilary's entire commentary here is based on the understanding that 'tomorrow' in Mt. 7.30-34 refers to the Last Times; so he interprets the Sermon on the Mount eschatologically (*InMt.* 5.7-5.15, interpreting Mt. 6.25-7.5). For example, the well-dressed lilies of the field represent the angels and (by extension) also humans at the general resurrection. The hay of the fields burned in the furnace represents the fire of judgment reserved for non-believers. "Do not judge lest ye be judged" refers specifically to the Last Judgment. Hilary often elsewhere shows an interest in the transformation of our bodies at the resurrection<sup>185</sup> and this is also true in this part of the commentary; for example *InMt.* 5.11 is more specific about how we become more like the angels.

In talking about the resurrection body, Hilary uses the language of 1Cor. 15. For example, the language of being 'clothed' occurs at 1Cor. 15.53, 54 and indeed Hilary has already used it earlier in commentating the Sermon on the Mount (*nos quoque gloria clarificati eius corporis vestiemur*).<sup>186</sup> The link between clothing and the resurrection transformation is continued in *InMt* 5.11 (on the lilies of the field) so the link may be assumed in our excerpt too. So Hilary is not talking about a 'bodily' soul but about the 'embodied' soul in the context of the resurrection body.

The language of 1Cor. 15 also refers to the 'body' both before and after the resurrection. Although the second body is very different from the first, they are nevertheless both explicitly described as bodies. Returning to Hilary, this explains why he

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<sup>185</sup> HILARY *InMt.* 4.3, 4.7, 10.4, 33.9. Found also in Hilary's other works, for example *trin.* 11.49 (see §4.4a), *TrPs118*, 3.3

<sup>186</sup> *InMt.* 4.3

is discussing corporality here: he is trying to express (albeit somewhat imprecisely) the difference between the pre- and post-resurrection bodies: one is material and one is spiritual, but both are bodies (cf. 1Cor. 15.35-57). Admittedly his language is imprecise, because he talks of souls exiled from physical bodies (*corporibus exsulantium*), but asserts they are still embodied (*nihil est quod non... corporeum sit*). But essentially when Hilary states *...animarum species... corpoream tamen naturae suae substantiam sortiuntur*, he is re-asserting the Pauline teaching that the resurrection body is truly ‘real’, even if not material.

This is confirmed by the argument of the passage. In answering the question about future food and drink, then, Hilary’s answer is provided by the sentences that immediately follow the excerpt above.

Atque ideo ineptiam inutilissimae quaestionis Deus arguens, non patitur, anima et corpore in aeternitatis substantia collocandis, spem nostram futuri in resurrectione cibi et vestitus sollicitudine demorari: ne tanto pretiosa reddenti, corpus scilicet atque animam, contumelia in non efficiendis levioribus inferatur. (InMt. 5.8)

The reason that we should not “be side-tracked by concern for food and clothing”, he says, is that our “body and soul will be placed in an eternal substance (*substantia aeternitatis*)”. If God can achieve that, then food and clothing is a minor issue (*levior*) by comparison.

So Hilary is struggling to articulate the difference between a material and a spiritual body, before and after the resurrection, which is what he is trying to articulate in the phrase (*animarum species*) *sive obtinentium corpora, sive corporibus exsulantium*. This is further confirmed by his reference shortly beforehand to our future *substantia*

*aeternitatis*, a phrase which he uses elsewhere when talking of the resurrection body.<sup>187</sup>

When our flesh has been transformed, then whatever the nature of the resurrection body may be, it still has what Hilary can refer to as ‘substance’: so this is what he is trying to emphasize in referring to its physicality.

Hilary’s statement, “*nihil est quod non... corporeum sit; nam et animarum species... corpoream tamen naturae suae substantiam sortiuntur*” is therefore insisting that the resurrection soul is truly in a body. However, this is not a platonic reference to a soul which can potentially be elsewhere. Rather we see here a stoic approach (or at least, an early stoic approach, since as shown in §3.5a below souls may be separable in later Roman stoicism). Here, by the nature of things the soul is integrated with the body and *cannot* be separated. That is the very point of Hilary’s statement. The question is not whether Hilary believes the soul is corporeal *in abstracto*, but whether the soul can separate from the body at all; one should not press the point as to whether he thinks the soul is ‘corporeal’ when it is not embodied. Other scholars assume a separable soul, where one could indeed question its physicality; but that is not in evidence here, and so the abstract soul’s corporeity is not at issue.

Further, none of the scholars mentioned considers the possibility of a difference in Hilary’s thought across his works; the assumption is made that Hilary must be consistent. However, it is suggested here that the different vocabulary points to different influences playing in Hilary’s different works.

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<sup>187</sup> *InMt.* 5.8, 5.15; *TrPs.* 52.16, 134.22, 148.3, 148.5. Hilary also uses expressions such as *natura aeternitatis* (*InMt.* 16.5, *TrPs.* 148.5)

### 3.5 Hilary's influences

With the evidence presented above, is it accurate to see a 'platonic' angle in Hilary's dichotomous anthropology, as implied by some of the analyses mentioned in §3.2?

Although Hilary scholars shy away from attributing him with platonism proper, many still make generalizations about Hilary's work that imply strong affinities with platonic thought. Or is Burns the more accurate, in seeing Hilary as influenced only by Stoic thought?

Of course the very question is to some degree invalid. By the fourth century, Stoicism did not really exist as a separate school, and Platonism had absorbed much of Stoic thought. The labels 'platonic' and 'stoic' are very loose by this period, so they are used here with a degree of circumspection; nevertheless these philosophical labels are used below because they are used in the secondary literature on Hilary.

#### 3.5a) Separability?

One example of a philosophical idea seen in Hilary is the issue of the 'separable' soul. The two components, body and soul, are seen as inherently alien to each other and they may potentially (and ideally) be disjoined from each other. For the soul, the body is *rem non suam*<sup>188</sup> and due to the body the soul is constrained to *regione non tua*.<sup>189</sup> The soul dwells in the body as a *peregrinus* and Hilary advises that one should make an effort to leave the body: *novit incolatus hujus Apostolus ordinem, dicens peregrinandum a corpore et cum Christo manendum esse*.<sup>190</sup>

In *Tr.Ps. 118*, 8.5 Hilary suggests the need to 'leave the world' which he expresses

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<sup>188</sup> *TrPs118*, 3.8

<sup>189</sup> *TrPs118*, 14.18

<sup>190</sup> *TrPs118*, 3.8

as (among other things) rebuffing the effects of the body while still in this mortal life, and not waiting until after death: *Quid enim merces est, emortuis corporibus et exeunte anima dissolutis saeculum reliquisse?*<sup>191</sup> Hilary is suggesting his reader should strive for the soul to avoid the effects of the body while still in this life. At another point, Hilary interprets the psalmist as regretting the association of soul and body:<sup>192</sup> *...anima quae alterius origins est terrae corporis adhaesisse creditur, maximum ipsa certamen suscipiens ut se, manens in eo, ab eius societate divellat...*<sup>193</sup> His implication is that, by dint of a *maximum certamen*, the soul can indeed struggle free from the effects of the body to which it is ‘stuck’. Elsewhere he even goes so far as to suggest that the body is the soul’s prison: *habet hunc [corpus] contagiosi incolatus sui carcerem coelestis naturae captiva generositas.*<sup>194</sup>

One way in which Hilary expresses the different realms of body and soul is by illustrating the soul as a bird, soaring far from the earth which represents the body (discussed further at §5.3b). This relates to (neo-)Platonism inasmuch as it illustrates a concept of the heavy body weighing down the light, ethereal soul. In commenting on Ps. 118.110 *Posuerunt peccatores laqueum mihi: et de mandatis tuis non erravi*, Hilary talks about the devil and his angels laying snares for us. He compares this to the snares laid for birds, which by nature are heavenly but which, through traps, are forced to be earthly.

In coelestem scientiam homo eruditus es: quid tibi cum terrenis operibus et gestis est? Avis effectus es: cur non in naturae tuae elemento moraris? [...] Quid quereris injuriam laquei in regione non tua? [...] Natura avium

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<sup>191</sup> *TrPs118*, 8.5

<sup>192</sup> *TrPs118*, 4.1-2 commenting on Ps. 118.25

<sup>193</sup> *TrPs118*, 4.1

<sup>194</sup> *TrPs*, 119.4

est, ut non cum volent requiescant: tu autem, jam factus columba,  
volando requiescis, id est, in coelestem te sedem et cognitionem a laqueis  
terrenis volatu fidelis animae efferendo. (*TrPs118*, 14.18)

The *homo eruditus* is compared to a bird, and while the snares are not here explicitly associated with the body or the flesh they are certainly associated with the earth, which represents the body (§5.3b). Again, the implication is that it is somehow possible in this life to escape the effects and the body, and Hilary's words to the *homo eruditus* suggest that this latter can achieve exactly such a freedom of soul from body – as may be deduced by Hilary's use of the present tense (*volando requiescis, id est... volatu fidelis animae*).

All such references could be taken to imply a platonic kind of separability in Hilary's works. So is the above evidence of platonic influence? Four points may be made.

Firstly, body-soul dualism is not uniquely Platonic. As Doignon himself points out, Cicero also has a dichotomous anthropology and mentions the 'separable' soul in flight towards its divine source.<sup>195</sup> Annas<sup>196</sup> points out that late Roman Stoics in particular give an almost platonic contrast between body and soul; for example Seneca refers to the body as prison of the soul,<sup>197</sup> and mentions how the soul longs to escape.<sup>198</sup> Also, as discussed (§3.2) there is no evidence whatsoever of the tripartite soul in Hilary – something Stoics categorically rejected.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> DOIGNON 2005:136 cites CICERO *lael.* 4.14, *nat.deor.* 1.20.54, *tusc.disp.* 1.27.66, *disp. tusc.* 5.25.70

<sup>196</sup> ANNAS 1992:55

<sup>197</sup> SENECA *Ep.* 65.16, 65.25f.

<sup>198</sup> SENECA *Ep.* 78.10, 79.11-12. He also refers to the soul's separation from the body as new birth (*Ep.* 102.27-8)

<sup>199</sup> ANNAS 1992:115-20

Still, Stoic thought is normally characterized as seeing a closer bond between body and soul, which (*pace Seneca*) are usually seen as more integrated. Annas points out how this relates to the Stoic interest in contemporary medical developments, where the soul is seen in a more biological way as relating to the body's life force.<sup>200</sup> This brings us to the second point: that as well as 'platonic' metaphors, Hilary also uses language which is more proper to traditional 'stoic' thought. For example, in commenting on Ps. 118.151 Hilary presents the ubiquity of God as similar to the ubiquity of the soul throughout the body: *Nihil a Deo vacat... Ubique est, modo animae corporalis.*<sup>201</sup> For Hilary, the soul is not split when limbs are amputated. Another longer passage in Hilary's *de trinitate* presents the same kind of idea. This time the context is the suffering of Christ.

Ea enim natura corporum est, ut ex consortio animae in sensum quemdam animae sentientis animata, non sit hebes inanimisque materies. [...] Ex quodam enim obtinentis se penetrantisque animae transcurso, secundum ea in quibus erit, aut oblectatur, aut laeditur. Cum igitur compuncta aut effossa corpora dolent, sensum doloris transfusae in ea animae sensus admittit. [...] Affert itaque dolorem per animae infirmis admixtionem, in infirmum sensum suum corpus animatum. (*trin.* 10.14)

Various words in this passage emphasize the intermingling of body and soul: *consortium*, *transcursus*, *transfusa*, *admixtio*. It should be emphasized that these are consistent with Platonic influences. Still, the very notion of the soul used in a 'medical' way to explain the body's perception of pain or pleasure belongs to other schools, such as Aristotelian or

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<sup>200</sup> ANNAS 1992:20-25

<sup>201</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 19.8

Stoic. The close bond between body and soul is also expressed by other phrases such as *animae corporalis, corporis nostri anima, corporis mens*.

Thirdly, all the above examples come from the Psalms commentaries; and in many cases Hilary's comments can explicitly be traced back to Origen. For example, the use of the devil's snares entrapping our heavenly spiritual nature also occurs in Ambrose's interpretation of Ps. 118.110, and thus is likely to go back to Origen.<sup>202</sup> But Origen's influence is not only 'platonic': for example Hilary's passage commenting on Ps. 118.151 (*nihil a deo vacat...*) is similar to a passage in Ambrose illustrating the same lemma.<sup>203</sup> This again suggests that it was present in Origen, but this time it is if anything a more 'stoic' idea that Hilary has received from the Alexandrian. It is thus more proper to point directly to the influence of Origen, rather than to Plato or the Stoics.

Fourthly, and most significantly, there is a question as to how far Hilary really sees the separable soul as anything more than analogy or expression. In her article on Hilary's anthropology, Rondeau identifies passages suggesting the 'flight or fall' tension between body and soul, but suggests that it is wrong to read them in a dualist way.<sup>204</sup> For example, she shows the passage depicting two sparrows as body and soul in *InMt* actually points to the unity of body and soul (this passage will be discussed further below, §3.5c). She explains other passages this way, showing that Hilary's soteriology is not so much about soul escaping body as about the latter transforming into the former's nature: "l'homme... tend vers l'unité. De même, en nous, le Christ opère la fusion de l'homme intérieur et de l'homme extérieure."<sup>205</sup> Rondeau is correct regarding Hilary's soteriology and the

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<sup>202</sup> AMBROSE *Exp.Ps118*, 14.39: Avis es, o homo... [...] Quid enim te in terram dejicis, qui jam coelum petebas? [...] Ante quasi praedam suam diabolus suo jure capiebat [...] Avertat a nobis Deus hos laqueos, quos super peccatores pluit.

<sup>203</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 19.41

<sup>204</sup> RONDEAU 1962:204-210

<sup>205</sup> RONDEAU 1962:209

associated anthropology. However, she fails to identify differences between Hilary's texts on this matter; this will be resolved below (§3.5d).

But certainly it can be counter-productive for scholars to assume a platonic-style separability in reading Hilary. In §3.4b, Hilary's supposed use of the 'corporeal soul' was assessed; it was suggested that this in fact referred to the embodied soul. Indeed, Hilary here assumes that a living soul *cannot* exist without a body (i.e. his reference to the soul implies a living being in entirety). This is a stoic approach, not a platonic one.

Thus, on the issue of separability it is not possible to place Hilary squarely in the box of Platonic thought; many of his ideas are compatible with other schools such as Stoicism. This is not to say Hilary can be squarely labelled as a Stoic either. The fact is that he uses a variety of ways to express and illustrate his thought. But ultimately, Hilary's soteriology is about transforming the body, not escaping it.

### 3.5b) Soul corrupted by body?

Another 'platonic' idea which scholars identify in Hilary's thought is a simple good-bad dualism. He indeed frequently hints that the body is somehow bad or causes sin, whereas the soul represents the spiritual element which is inherently 'good' and seeks after God. This position is emphasized in Doignon<sup>206</sup> and Fierro,<sup>207</sup> and to a lesser extent in Rondeau. For example Doignon likes to point to some Stoic influence in Hilary, but his articulation of Hilary's anthropology is fairly 'platonic' in how he expresses the body ("L'homme charnelle est... occupé par les soucis du corps et négligeant... les requêtes... de Dieu")<sup>208</sup> and the soul ("La présence d'une substance raisonnable et incorporelle... marque la

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<sup>206</sup> See for example DOIGNON 1989a; 2005:118-143.

<sup>207</sup> FIERRO 1964:13-69

<sup>208</sup> DOIGNON 2005:120

première étape du projet de Dieu faisant l'homme à son image, celle de la dignité de l'âme").<sup>209</sup> It is indeed true that Hilary says these, but again a subtler analysis is worthwhile.

It has already been mentioned above (§3.3) how Hilary uses concepts such as weakness (*infirmitas, morbiditas*) and stain (*sordes, labes*) to describe the body in his psalms commentaries. The earthly stain results in our corruption, which in turn means that, without help, death is inevitable.<sup>210</sup> Hilary may even use the language of coercion: *Taceo de naturis corporum, quae nos... per incentiva vitiorum imperfectos esse compellunt.*<sup>211</sup> Conversely, the soul can transform the body in a positive way.<sup>212</sup> For Fierro, it is only the body that needs change if we are to attain salvation. Fierro's book *Sobre la Gloria en San Hilario* discusses Hilary's doctrine that salvation is essentially glorification of the body, and this is the most important part of Hilary's eschatology.<sup>213</sup> For him, salvation entails glorification of the body, not the soul: "La clarificación es asunto exclusivo del cuerpo, en el cual sólo indirectamente puede beneficiarse el alma" (my emphasis).<sup>214</sup> Fierro even goes so far as to suggest Hilary is different from Origen in this regard: he finds that Origen has body and *nous* alike conforming to Christ's glory, whereas for Hilary it is the body alone.<sup>215</sup> Fierro does not talk of any need for the soul to be saved, apart from where its association with the body is concerned.

Rondeau also sees the body as primarily associated with sin and hindering our progress, although she admits sins of the soul: "S'il est parfois question des péchés de

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<sup>209</sup> DOIGNON 2005:128

<sup>210</sup> §6.4a

<sup>211</sup> *TrPs118*, 3.6

<sup>212</sup> *TrPs118* 3.3: nisi glorificato in naturam spiritus corpore...

<sup>213</sup> FIERRO 1964:253

<sup>214</sup> FIERRO 1964:254

<sup>215</sup> FIERRO 1964:336

l'âme et du corps, et même de l'âme seule, la liaison est beaucoup plus fréquente entre corps et péché [...] Même s'il est expressément dit une ou deux fois que ce n'est pas le corps qui pèche, mais la volonté vicieuse,<sup>216</sup> le raccourci d'expression est constant qui parle des péchés du corps."<sup>217</sup> On the other hand, Rondeau (like other scholars) does see that there are plenty of counterexamples to this simplistic body-bad-soul-good model.

For example, although Hilary often calls our body 'corpus peccati'<sup>218</sup> he also uses more neutral language. For example, in *de mysteriis* Hilary suggests Adam's body was merely lifeless matter stirred by a living soul.<sup>219</sup> Indeed Hilary specifically says that the body is not ultimately responsible for sin. He urges us not to misunderstand the words of Jesus that "if the eye causes you to sin, tear it out":<sup>220</sup> *Certe pes sensu concupiscentiae carens damno inutilis est, in quem poenae causa non incidet.*<sup>221</sup> Thus he does not see the bodily member (here the foot) as having caused the sin. Hilary finishes the passage by reminding us that there is no point in mutilating the body without reforming the interior: *Esset autem abscisio membrorum utilis, si et cordis esse posset exsectio.*<sup>222</sup> Indeed Hilary often may speak of the body very positively: not only is it *perfectum*,<sup>223</sup> but it is an intrinsic part of us that will also participate in the resurrection.<sup>224</sup> Hilary admits it seems odd to wish for the body's resurrection, but reassures us that it is right to do so: *arduum*

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<sup>216</sup> Rondeau refers to *InMt.* 4.21, 11.23-4, *TrPs.* 120.7

<sup>217</sup> RONDEAU 1962:202

<sup>218</sup> For example *TrPs.* 62.1, 135.6, 142.2. He frequently uses *caro peccati* especially by reference to Rom. 8.3 (God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh)

<sup>219</sup> *myst.* 1.5

<sup>220</sup> *Mt.* 5.29

<sup>221</sup> *InMt.* 4.21

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>223</sup> *InMt.* 4.2

<sup>224</sup> *InMt.* 16.5: sicut aeternitas naturae nostrae corpus accepit; ita cognoscendum est, naturam corporis nostri aeternitatis assumere posse virtutem.

*autem, sed maxime verum est, aeternitatem ita corporis ut animae sperare.*<sup>225</sup>

Complementing this, there is plenty of evidence that Hilary actually sees the soul as being the instigator of much of human sin. For example, he strings together faults of the soul with those of a body and the world: *hic beatus est, dum vitia carnis coerces, dum animi petulantiam edomat, dum avaritiae famem vincit, dum terrenorum honorum gloriam evitat.*<sup>226</sup> Although this may merely be rhetoric, the soul is elsewhere referred to as potentially *anima infidelis*<sup>227</sup>, and the *superbia animae insolentis*<sup>228</sup> is censured. Most explicitly, the *animae perversitas* is related to the *cor deflexum* as something that can result in straying from the law of God.<sup>229</sup> These phrases seem to indicate that error may be an inherent flaw of the soul itself, regardless of what arises from association with the body. In explaining Mt. 6.22 (*Lucerna corporis tui est oculus tuus*) he states that the ‘eye’ here refers to the ‘light of the heart’. It is that which resolves whether the body remains dark, or attains to light.

Si autem [lumen cordis] obscurum peccatis, et voluntate erit nequam,  
vitiis mentis natura corporis subjacebit. (*InMt*, 5.4)

Thus the terrestrial flesh may encumber us but its effects are compounded by the will and the vices of the mind. Here again the body is just one of many factors that can bring the Christian down, and the iniquities of the mind seem to be more significant than those of the body since they can overcome the effects of the latter.

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<sup>225</sup> *TrPs*, 62.3

<sup>226</sup> *TrPs118*, 1.2

<sup>227</sup> *TrPs118*, 3.14

<sup>228</sup> *TrPs118*, 3.17

<sup>229</sup> *TrPs118*, 1.14

### 3.5c) Differences across Hilary's works

So far here the question of Hilary's anthropology has been discussed without particularly highlighting differences between his texts. However, a comparison is instructive.

The basic position is more or less the same across all Hilary's works. Everywhere, the basic body-and-soul dichotomous model is not only present but emphasized. The body is earthly and terrestrial, and may be described throughout as polluting and corrupting, sick or weak;<sup>230</sup> the soul's role is to stay aloof from it and, when the time comes, contribute to the body's glorification.

At a more detailed level, however, there are hints of a difference in emphasis. For example consider the reference to the 'corporeal' (embodied) soul at *InMt.* 5.8. The discussion there suggested a more integrated or infused understanding of the body-soul union, very different to the separable soul of *TrPs.* 129.6 which is specifically referred to as *incorporeus*. Fierro and Coustant both assume consistency across Hilary's work and attempts to harmonize these two works. However, it may be that this difference in vocabulary should be allowed to stand.

The two texts also differ on separability. For example, we have seen that the metaphor of the soul as a bird in flight seems to imply separability in the Psalms commentaries. Initially the Matthew commentary might appear to have the same metaphor: Hilary describes spiritual persons as birds fed on heavenly bread so that they

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<sup>230</sup> Examples from the Psalms commentaries are given above (§3.3b). Also found in the Matthew commentary e.g. *InMt.* 5.4

can fly;<sup>231</sup> even wicked spirits can be represented by birds,<sup>232</sup> since they are a metaphor for anything spiritual. He also refers to the body's sins as weighing one down (*longeque magis peccata corporum ingravescere, si etiam cupiditatibus adjuventur animorum*).<sup>233</sup>

But as Rondeau points out, none of this implies a separation of soul and body. The most notable bird analogy occurs when Hilary interprets Mt. 10.29 (*nonne duo passeris esse veneunt?*) as referring to the 'two sparrows' of body and soul, sold to Sin for the sake of minor peccadillos:

Quemadmodum autem si evolarent, unum essent, id est corpus in naturam animae transisset, et gravitas illa terrenae materiae in profectum et substantiam animae aboleretur, fieretque corpus potius spiritale: ita peccatorum pretio venditis, in naturam corporum animae subtilitas ingravescit, et terrenam contrahit ex vitiorum sorde materiem, fitque unum ex illis quod tradatur in terram. (*InMt* 10.19)

Here the soul's natural predisposition to fly is prevented by the weighing-down of the earthly body, heavy in its sins. Yet as Rondeau shows, even the reference to the 'sparrows' of body and soul, which fail to fly due to the body's weight, urges the need for body and soul to be integrated together;<sup>234</sup> it categorically does not talk of the soul being separated from the body.

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<sup>231</sup> *InMt.* 22.4: *Saginata vero [hostia] sunt homines spiritales, tamquam coelesti pane ad evolandum aves pastae, caeteros accepti cibi ubertate expleturae.*

<sup>232</sup> *InMt.* 5.9: *sub nomine volucrum exemplo nos immundorum spirituum adhortatur.* Also 7.10: *volucres autem coeli saepe numero immundos spiritus cognominari didicimus.*

<sup>233</sup> *InMt.* 5.4

<sup>234</sup> *InMt.* 10.19

Other differences occur. For example, many scholars point to the ‘double creation’ as contributing to Hilary’s dichotomous model (§3.2, §3.3a). However, this belongs to the psalms commentaries, and we know it is based on Origen; there is absolutely no reference whatsoever to the ‘double creation’ in *InMt*. Likewise the Psalms Commentaries speak of the captivity or enslavement of the mind to the body;<sup>235</sup> but this does not occur in *InMt*. Rondeau also notes this: “Le thème... du corps comme prison de l’âme qui aspire à s’en évader semble absent de l’*In Matthaeum*.<sup>236</sup> Son apparition dans l’*In Psalmos* est souvent ambiguë.”<sup>237</sup> Although her intention here is to demonstrate that Hilary is not so dualist as first might appear, she also picks up on a difference between the two texts.

It should be emphasized that any difference between the two texts is more of degree than kind, and there is no evidence for a categorical shift in Hilary’s thought. For example, the Matthew commentary also speaks of the body’s need for spiritualization before salvation can occur,<sup>238</sup> or of its corruptive effect on the soul.<sup>239</sup> Conversely the Psalms commentaries speak of the soul as culpable as much as the body, as we have seen. Across all of Hilary’s work, both the corrupting effects of the body and the redeeming effects of the faithful soul are found. Words such as *labes*, *sordens*, *(im)mundus* and *pollutus* occur in *InMt* with almost exactly the same frequency as in *TrPs118*.

But in other areas, differences in vocabulary are empirically discernable: the word *infirmitas* is only half as common in the Matthew commentary<sup>240</sup> (and nearly a third of instances occur in Hilary’s last three chapters in the context of Christ’s passion) while the

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<sup>235</sup> For example *TrPs*. 125.4

<sup>236</sup> Rondeau footnotes *InMt*. 24.11 as a possible exception to this

<sup>237</sup> RONDEAU 1962:206 and footnote.

<sup>238</sup> *InMt*. 10.18-19

<sup>239</sup> *InMt*. 5.12 Et haec... merces est, ut in novam coelestemque substantiam ex hac corruptibilis corporis materie transferantur

<sup>240</sup> This refers only to *infirmitas* used in an anthropological sense. References to Jesus healing the sick (*infirmi*, etc.) are common but are not counted here.

*TrPs* is much more likely to speak in terms of *foedus*, (*ad*)*misceo*, *adhaerere* and cognates when referring to the body-soul relationship. Thus, cumulative evidence suggests a slight difference in emphasis with regard to theology or at least vocabulary, and there is a case for suggesting that *InMt* demonstrates a more integrated anthropology, although even *TrPs* may be muting the separability of body and soul (as Rondeau suggests).

### **3.6) Discussion**

So in conclusion, what are Hilary's most obvious influences?

Starting with his Matthew commentary, there certainly is evidence for the dichotomous body-soul model where the body does indeed weigh down the spiritual soul. However, this need not be due to platonic influence alone, and nor should it be taken simplistically. For example at two points he refers to humans as being composed of body-soul-will. Moreover, as Rondeau points out he appears to have a more integrated view of the body and soul: Christian life is not about separating the body and soul, but about transforming the body's nature into the soul's so that both may soar together. For Hilary, scholars rightly emphasize that the body is as much to be saved as the soul is.

Moving now to the Psalms commentary, Hilary's vocabulary seems to express slightly more separability of body and soul and occasionally the notion that the soul must escape the body. However, it has already been shown that Hilary is using Origen's commentary. Hence the influence on Hilary here should be seen as Origenian rather than strictly Platonic. At the same time Hilary is avoiding any extreme position, and always emphasizes the body will also be saved.

Still, later chapters in this thesis will demonstrate ideas familiar with different

philosophical schools. In particular Hilary's concept of the weakened will and human psychology will be shown to have Stoic influences, while his notion of Adam as a universal type for humanity will be shown *not* to be related to Stoic or Platonic thought, *pace* some scholars' opinions on the topic.

Of course, Hilary may use (pagan) philosophical concepts but his thought is fully Christian. The only point where Hilary may diverge from his Christian peers is that he sees the body as potentially to be spiritualized into the nature of the soul in order to achieve salvation. Hilary's thought should probably best be seen as *sui generis* in a way that adopts language from a number of backgrounds but goes beyond these and is always in accordance with orthodox Christian thought of his day. Doignon is correct to emphasize this, for example when talking of the soul: "à la base, elle est sentie comme connexe d'une définition d'inspiration classique; au-delà, elle a nourri une éthique proprement chrétienne, cependant toujours solidaire de sa base culturelle."<sup>241</sup>

Much of the evidence for Hilary's anthropology – found in the psalms commentaries – shows the influence not of any particular pagan philosophical school, but of Origen; and this is exactly as would be expected in a translated work.

Nevertheless, comparison with Hilary's Matthew commentary (and other works) allows us to assess Hilary's anthropology in another context. Although Hilary still sees the body as a potentially negative influence, the same can be said of the soul; and there is no evidence of a separable soul, unlike in the Psalms commentaries. Yet even in the Psalms commentaries, as Rondeau suggests, Hilary's statements are relatively muted when it comes to separability. It may be that Hilary is indeed 'softening' Origen's theology.

It should be recalled however that most differences between the works are merely in emphasis, rather than in theology. Even if he can call the soul 'corporea' in one work

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<sup>241</sup> DOIGNON 2005:128

and 'incorporea' in another, these betray different contexts rather than properly a shift in theology.

## *Chapter 4*

# The human as ‘Imago Dei’

### **4.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter highlighted how some scholars question whether Hilary’s thought is more properly Stoic or Platonic. This chapter will illustrate a similar debate about Hilary’s thought, this time more theological than philosophical: is his articulation of *imago* doctrine more Alexandrian or more Latin? In particular modern scholars have stressed the presence of origenian doctrines in Hilary’s thought.

This chapter will show that Hilary only evinces any origenian influence in the Psalms commentaries; his other works show no evidence of supposed ‘Alexandrian’ *imago* theology at all. Not only do his *imago* doctrines have more common in with Latin authors, but Hilary even appears to write Origen’s doctrine of the ‘lost image’ out of his text. This is our first example of Hilary editing out theologies he disagrees with (others include possibly the notion of the heavenly Jerusalem §5.5c, and more probably the Fall into bodies §7.2b).

The phrase ‘*imago* theology’ will be taken to include the issue of likeness to God, *similitudo dei*.

### **4.2 Current Scholarship**

Hilary uses the concepts *imago* and *similitudo* in a variety of different ways, of

which three in particular may be noted. Firstly, the exegetical: ‘image’ is used to express analogies, types or presaging (for example, current realities are an ‘image’ of things to come). Secondly, the christological: one articulation of the Son is as image of the Father. Thirdly, there is the anthropological. These three usages overlap, but here we concentrate on the issue of humanity as being *ad imaginem dei*. Other uses will only be discussed inasmuch as they affect the anthropological.

Some scholars see Hilary’s *imago* anthropology as essentially Alexandrian.

Pelland and Cantalamessa take Hilary as differing from other early Western theologians.<sup>242</sup>

For example, Irenaeus and Tertullian include the body in the concepts of ‘image and likeness’, giving a much more positive view of physical aspects of humanity. Against this, Pelland sees Hilary and Origen as making only the soul part of the *imago*, thus suggesting a more negative view of the body. Cantalamessa (1980) has a similar analysis, placing Hilary squarely in the Alexandrian tradition. Cantalamessa examines *imago* theology throughout the patristic period and identifies two separate streams of thought. He finds one in Western and Antiochene authors (Irenaeus, Tertullian, Theodore), where the body and soul together form the human in God’s image, and Christ is seen as ‘visible’ image of God; the other stream is the Alexandrian tradition, where it is the human *nous* alone which is *in* God’s image, and the Logos alone is invisible image of the invisible God.

Interestingly, Cantalamessa sees Hilary as merging these two streams, while essentially representing the culmination of the Alexandrian tradition: “lo sviluppo massimo della tradizione alessandrina, come pure il tentativo più avanzato di sintesi con il punto di vista dell’altra tradizione, non si realizza in un autore alessandrino, ma in un autore latino: Ilario di Poitiers.”<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> PELLAND 1983a:430-4; CANTALAMESSA 1980:358

<sup>243</sup> CANTALAMESSA 1980:358

In order to examine the extent to which this might be true, it is worth comparing his articulation of *imago* theology across his commentaries.

#### **4.3 *Imago* as expression of our creation and progression**

The anthropological uses of *imago* theology are found in Hilary's commentaries and particularly his *Commentaries on the Psalms*. In the commentaries he uses *imago* to describe (a) human creation in relation to God, and (b) the dichotomy between the *imago terreni* and *imago caelesti*.

These two anthropological uses of *imago* are continuous with each other, in as much as they denote stages of human development and human progress as a result of Christ's saving work. They are found predominantly in Hilary's Psalms commentaries, which will be further discussed below. For now a passage from his Matthew commentary will illustrate some key aspects of Hilary's *imago* anthropology across his works. This passage demonstrates that he used both these concepts not only consistently, but in harmony with each other as an expression of human development from creation to the eschaton.

In his Matthew commentary, Hilary almost always uses the words *imago* and *similitudo* to describe a hermeneutical approach, or for illustrations.<sup>244</sup> However one passage uses these terms in their anthropological sense. The time of our own (potential) transformation is the moment Christ sends out the twelve apostles to the villages of Judaea (Mt. 10.5-8).

Tota deinde in apostolos potestas virtutis dominicae transfertur: et qui in

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<sup>244</sup> *InMt.* 24.1: [lex] quae imaginem in se futurae veritatis expresserat

Adam in imaginem et similitudinem Dei erant figurati, nunc perfectam Christi imaginem et similitudinem sortiuntur, nihil a Domini sui virtutibus differentes; et qui terrestres antea erant, caelestes modo fiunt. (Hilary, *In Matthaëum* 10.4)

The first key point in this passage, typical throughout Hilary's corpus, is that we are created in God's image and likeness (*in imaginem et similitudinem Dei erant figurati*; cf. Gen. 1.26-7). For Hilary this is fundamental to our creation. In the long passage on human creation discussed in the previous chapter,<sup>245</sup> commenting on the lemma Ps.118.73, he uses the word *imago* sixteen times, proposing it as a key part of understanding humanity and its creation. Humans should remember that they are made in God's image and likeness.<sup>246</sup> For Hilary, the fact that we are in God's image means that we understand that our purpose is to worship God; this is what makes us different from the animals.<sup>247</sup>

This excerpt also raises Hilary's second important use of *imago* anthropology, namely the Pauline dichotomy<sup>248</sup> between old and new man, Adam and Christ. The apostles progress from Adam to Christ, from 'earthly' to being 'heavenly' (*terrestres* to *caelestes*). The use of Pauline dichotomy is found throughout Hilary's commentaries;<sup>249</sup> it is relevant here because one articulation found is that between the *imago terreni* and the *imago caelestis* (image of the Earthly Man and image of the Heavenly Man), predominantly in the psalms commentaries.<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.1-8. See §3.3a

<sup>246</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.2

<sup>247</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.2

<sup>248</sup> Rom. 8.29, 1Cor. 15.49. Compare also Christological passages such as Phil. 2.6-7, Col. 1.15

<sup>249</sup> Hilary expresses dichotomies such as first/second Adam, old/new man, earthly/heavenly Adam in passages such as the following: *InMt.* 10.4; *trin.* 11.22; *TrPs*, 2.41, 52.16, [68].4, [68].23, 122.3, 129.6, 132.7, 143.21; *TrPs118*, 12.4, 15.3, 20.10.

<sup>250</sup> *TrPs*, 56.8, 129.6, 134.21; *TrPs118*, 12.4, 12.5

These two usages (our creation in God's image, and the change from *imago terreni* to *imago caelesti*) are related: they are part of a natural stage of human evolution in Christ. The apostles change from 'in Adam, in God's image' to 'a perfect image of Christ'; surprisingly, this is associated with the acquisition of Christ's powers to perform miracles, not only for the apostles but by implication for all Christian people (*sancti omnes*).<sup>251</sup> This is also connected with the likeness, as is described a few sentences later:

Et ut ex toto, secundum Genesis prophetiam (Gen. 1.26), Dei similitudinem consequantur, dare gratis quod gratis acceperunt jubentur... (Hilary, *In Matthaeum* 10.4)

Gen. 1.26-7 is taken as a prophecy, indicating that our creation is so far incomplete but realizable. In Gen. 1.26 God states 'let us make mankind in our image and likeness' but in Gen. 1.27 he then creates mankind 'in the image of God'. So Hilary sees the likeness as something that God is promising to develop. Further, the phrase *ex toto* ('entirely', 'in all respects') seems to indicate that this likeness is, for all that, not totally absent: humans do currently have *some* degree of likeness, even if it is not an entire likeness to God, which can only be attained through Christ.

The concept of progress occurs also in the psalms commentaries. We are urged to put on the *imago caelesti* and this expresses our growth in knowledge and virtue as we progress towards God; there are several references to our eventual transformation from our moribund mortal state to the glorious one with a spiritualized body.<sup>252</sup> In all, there is an anthropological change here as Christ sends out the apostles is a further step in the

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<sup>251</sup> *InMt.* 10.4; excerpted below, §4.4a

<sup>252</sup> *TrPs*, 54.7: *festinat... in spiritalem redire naturam*. Compare also *TrPs*, 1.13, 128.9

development of mankind, continuous with human creation. The act of creating us keeps developing and will be completed at the eschaton, as shall be seen below.

Scholars who feel Hilary has an ‘Alexandrian’ approach to *imago* theology could point to the fact that the concept of progress in the image is found in Origen.<sup>253</sup> However, all of Hilary’s *imago* theology as presented so far is squarely consistent with the so-called Western tradition, epitomized by Irenaeus and Tertullian. In particular, Hilary’s idea that we gradually develop in our image-likeness through history is in the same ballpark as Irenaeus’s doctrine that likeness is unrealized at the moment of creation but established at the incarnation.<sup>254</sup> Likewise, Tertullian expresses us as gaining likeness through our baptism at the moment when we join the Church;<sup>255</sup> and speaks of our current Christian life as having either the *imago terreni* or the *imago caelestis*.<sup>256</sup> Hilary is consistent with this position, in that likeness is only potential at the moment of human creation, but Christians achieve likeness and a transformed image at the moment of the church’s birth or their own baptism.<sup>257</sup>

#### **4.4 Hilary adopting Origen? *imago* theology in the Psalms commentaries**

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<sup>253</sup> ORIGEN *princ.* 3.6.1

<sup>254</sup> For example IRENAEUS *adv. haer.* 5.16.2. It should be noted that Cantalamessa’s reading is that Irenaeus, like Athanasius, expresses the likeness as lost at the Fall (CANTALAMESSA 1980:182 on Irenaeus, 1980:351 on Athanasius). However the scholarly consensus is that Irenaeus’s Adam lost neither the image nor the likeness; see for example FANTINO 1986:142; HAMMAN 1987:309.

<sup>255</sup> TERTULLIAN *de baptismo* 5.7, regarding baptism: ita restituitur homo deo ad similitudinem eius qui retro ad imaginem dei fuerat (imago in effigie, similitudo in aeternitate censetur), recipit enim illum dei spiritum quem tunc de adlatu eius acceperat sed post amiserat per delictum.

<sup>256</sup> TERTULLIAN *adv. Marcionem* 5.10

<sup>257</sup> Given the discussion to follow in §4.4 and §4.5, it is fair to note that the concept of progress in the image is also found in Origen (*de principiis* 3.6.1)

The position discussed in §4.3 is found across Hilary's commentaries; however, there are some articulations of *imago* theology which are found only in his Psalms commentaries and not elsewhere. This is probably because of his use of Origen for his Psalms commentaries.

#### 4.4a) 'Ad imaginem dei', or just 'imago dei'?

Hilary explicitly states that there is a difference between 'ad imaginem' and 'imago': *Non Dei imago [homo]; quia imago Dei est primogenitus omnis creaturae: sed ad imaginem Dei, id est, secundum imaginis et similitudinis speciem.*<sup>258</sup> Scholars such as Pelland and Rondeau assume that this is an ubiquitous feature of Hilary's *imago* thought, and discuss examples from elsewhere in his corpus on the presumption that Hilary is consistent on this issue.

In order to show that Hilary cannot be read as presenting this theology in the rest of his corpus, it is necessary to discuss other passages put forward by Pelland and Rondeau. For example, both these scholars refer to a passage in *de trinitate* describing our eschatological end. When our physical bodies become spiritual, we shall be 'created again' and be made the perfect image of God.

Caeterum nos... ad Creatoris imaginem reformabimur, secundum  
Apostoli dictum: Exuti veterem hominem cum actibus suis, et induti  
novum eum, qui innovatur in agnitionem Dei secundum imaginem ejus  
qui creavit eum [Col. 3.9-10]. Consummatur itaque homo imago Dei.  
Namque conformis effectus gloriae corporis Dei, in imaginem Creatoris

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<sup>258</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.7

excedit, secundum dispositam primi hominis figurationem. Et post peccatum veterumque hominem in agnitionem Dei novus homo factus, obtinet perfectionem, agnoscens Deum suum, et per id imago ejus, ... et per aeternitatem Creatoris sui imago mansurus. (Hilary, *trin.* 11.49, abridged)

Rondeau<sup>259</sup> and Pelland<sup>260</sup> both suggest this passage distinguishes our current situation *ad /secundum /in imaginem* from the future when we will be a true *imago*. Yet their interpretation is not explicit in the passage, which uses the two types of expression indiscriminately. A translation may clarify.

Further, we shall be re-fashioned into the Creator's image, as the Apostle says: *Having put off the old man and his deeds, and put on the new one – the one who is renewed in knowledge of God, according to the image of his maker*. Thus man reaches his completion as God's image. Once he has come to match God's glorious body, he reaches the point of being (in) the Creator's image, in line with the model established for the first man. When he has put off sin and the 'old man' and is become a 'new man' in knowledge of God, then the act of his creation is brought to completion; he acknowledges his God and thereby becomes his image. He shall remain his Creator's image for evermore.

The phrases *ad /secundum / in imaginem dei* are indeed used along with *imago dei*, but the

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<sup>259</sup> RONDEAU 1962:209-10. Rondeau also sees this passage as describing the moment where the human body and soul come together as *imago*.

<sup>260</sup> PELLAND 1983a:425-430. See also PELLAND 1983b:96-7

differences are grammatically determined: Hilary is certainly not articulating a theological difference between *in imaginem dei* and *imago dei* here. To the contrary, Hilary's main point is the dichotomy already discussed: we move from old to new man, from image of Adam to image of Christ. Rondeau and Pelland are correct that Hilary distinguishes the phrases *ad imaginem dei* and *imago dei* in Psalms commentaries, but they are misguided in reading this into his trinitarian work; Hilary is not making such a distinction in this passage.

Another example is found in Hilary's Matthew Commentary, already cited above in §4.3: in Adam the apostles were formed 'in God's image and likeness', but now they attain Christ's perfect image and likeness.<sup>261</sup> In these lines there is indeed a change from *in imaginem* to *imago*. However, Hilary changes the subject of the possession: from *ad imaginem dei* to *imago Christi*. The emphasis of the passage is not primarily about a change from *ad imaginem* to *imago* (although that is present), but rather from Adam to Christ. This is reinforced by the sentence that immediately follows.

Praedicient regnum coelorum propinquare, imaginem scilicet et similitudinem Dei nunc in consortium veritatis assumi; ut sancti omnes, qui coeli nuncupati sunt, Domino conregnent. (Hilary, *In Matthaëum* 10.4)

Modern translators take *in consortium veritatis* in a variety of ways (Doignon: "la réalité d'une communauté",<sup>262</sup> D.H. Williams: "the fellowship of truth"<sup>263</sup>). However Hilary

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<sup>261</sup> *InMt*, 10.4

<sup>262</sup> DOIGNON 2007a:221: "Qu'ils annoncent que le Royaume de Dieu est proche, entendez que l'on a maintenant avec soi l'image et la ressemblance de Dieu pour qu'elles soient la réalité d'une communauté qui fasse régner avec le Seigneur tous les saints désignés par le mot cieux."

himself elsewhere uses *veritas* to denote the model of an image: “when a model (*veritas*) has been copied, that does not detract from the model”.<sup>264</sup> Again, an English translation clarifies the necessary interpretation.

May they preach that the kingdom of heaven is near! – in other words, [that the saints] now have attained God’s image and likeness, and share it with their Model (*in consortium veritatis*), so that all the saints – those called ‘heavenly’ – might co-reign with the Lord.

The phrase *in consortium veritatis* has been translated as referring to the image’s model, namely Christ. *Veritas* is also used this way by other church fathers such as Tertullian.<sup>265</sup> From the context, it seems appropriate to translate *veritas* the same way here.

Theologically, then, Hilary is suggesting that the disciples are now Christ’s image, and they share with their model the attribute of being God’s image. As far as *imago* theology is concerned, Hilary is not making any significant distinction between *ad imaginem dei* and *imago dei*. His key point is, rather, whose image one is. Again his emphasis is the dichotomy between Adam’s image and Christ’s image, between earthly and heavenly – especially as this excerpt follows straight on from that cited earlier (§4.3): “Those who before were ‘earthly’ now are become ‘heavenly’.”

So then, even if these two passages do use the phrases *ad imaginem* versus *imago*, this appears to be for grammatical reasons as much as doctrinal ones. Hilary is not

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<sup>263</sup> WILLIAMS 2012:112 “They preach the coming of the Kingdom of heaven; they have now acquired the image and likeness of God in the fellowship of truth – as all the saints, who are called of heaven, may reign with the Lord.”

<sup>264</sup> *InMt*, 7.1: Nihil enim veritati detrahit imitationem veritas consecuta.

<sup>265</sup> TERTULLIAN *apologeticum* 47: numquam enim corpus umbra aut veritatem imago praecedat. Also *de corona* 9; *de anima* 18.

emphasizing a theological distinction between the two phrases. This difference is not of major importance to Hilary, and is only made explicit when he is translating a text by Origen.

#### 4.4b) Imago dei as nous, or as the whole human person?

A similar point holds regarding what exactly it is that the *imago Dei* in humans consists of. Hilary explicitly states that it is the soul or rational element which is in God's image: *quod ergo fit secundum imaginem Dei, ad animi pertinet dignitatem*.<sup>266</sup> This citation comes from Hilary's narrative of a dual creation where the soul was created first (Genesis. 1.26-7) and the body thereafter (Genesis 2.7): humans should know the difference between their inner and outer nature.<sup>267</sup> As shown in §3.3b, Hilary describes the soul by stating that the 'inner man' is rational, peripatetic, swift, unbodily, light, eternal,<sup>268</sup> whereas the body was created 'long after' the part which is in God's image.<sup>269</sup> Similar expressions are found throughout the psalms commentaries,<sup>270</sup> as both Rondeau and Pelland<sup>271</sup> point out.

But even within his psalms commentaries, Hilary's expression may be ambiguous: Christ takes up "the body of a human, who was created according to God's image and likeness."<sup>272</sup> This implies that being (in) God's image includes the body. And in the rest of his corpus, Hilary never states or even implies that God's image is the soul alone.

<sup>266</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.8. Also for example 10.7: Est ergo in hac rationali et incorporali animae nostrae substantia primum, quod ad imaginem Dei factum sit.

<sup>267</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.6

<sup>268</sup> *TrPs*, 129.6: Ergo ad imaginem Dei homo interior effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, movens, citus, incorporeus, subtilis, aeternus.

<sup>269</sup> *TrPs*, 129.5

<sup>270</sup> E.g. *TrPs*, 119.12: in substantia animae ad Dei imaginem figuratus

<sup>271</sup> RONDEAU 1962:202, PELLAND 1983a:430-4

<sup>272</sup> *TrPs118*, 16.14: ...[ut] hominis corpus, qui secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei est factus, assumeret.

Rather, he speaks of *homo* being in God's image and likeness without distinguishing body and soul: the human body must certainly participate in salvation. For example, in the excerpts cited at §4.3 Hilary makes no distinction between body and soul:<sup>273</sup> each apostle is now Christ's image in his entirety, and indeed deals specifically with the effects of sin in the human body: *quidquid malorum Adae corpori satanae instinctus intulerat, hoc rursus ipsi [discipuli] de communione dominicae potestatis emundent.*<sup>274</sup>

This is because Christ's saving identification with us is specifically in his assumption of the body. In the eschatological excerpt from *de trinitate* (§4.4a) it is true that we become God's image only when the body has become glorious, or spiritualized. The body must lose its fleshliness, the grosser aspects of its nature; but the fact remains that it is our entire human person that become God's image, not just soul but body also.

This is compatible with the finding of the previous chapter, namely that Hilary, in his non-Origenian works, sees humans as a holistic unit, without the 'platonic' separability of body and soul. This indeed would be truer to mainstream contemporary Latin thought of the time. It is only in the Psalms Commentaries that he states that the inner man alone is part of God's image; again, only when he is translating Origen.

#### 4.4c) Hilary in the Alexandrian tradition?

Both of the scholarly assumptions about Hilary's position in §4.4a and §4.4b are characteristic of Origen. In the first *Homily on Genesis*, the Alexandrian presents a detailed analysis of the various aspect of the verse that God made man 'according to God's

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<sup>273</sup> The same is true of the excerpt at §4.4a

<sup>274</sup> *InMt.* 10.4

image'.<sup>275</sup> This includes the distinction between *ad imaginem* and *imago*. 'God's image' explicitly refers to our Saviour ("who is this 'image of God'... except our Saviour?"); humans are in the Saviour's likeness, *ad imaginem dei* but not *imago dei*.<sup>276</sup> Similarly, the idea that the *imago* in humans is specifically the 'inner man' (whether soul, mind, spirit) is characteristic of Origen's anti-gnostic thought. Origen holds that the *imago dei* categorically excludes our bodies,<sup>277</sup> and only entails the inner man.<sup>278</sup> The two stages of creation for the inner and outer man are also found in Origen<sup>279</sup> as in Hilary. The 'inner man' denotes that within us which is "invisible, incorporeal, incorrupted, immortal"<sup>280</sup> – a sequence of negatives that is similar to Hilary's expression.

Hilary expresses these positions only in the psalms commentaries, whereas elsewhere in his corpus these views are absent or underfined. It therefore seems likely that he presents such views only because he finds them in Origen, and is reproducing them in his loose translation of the Greek commentary in front of him.

So is Hilary's thought Alexandrian, or at least Origenistic? Two points may be made. Firstly, Pelland and Cantalamessa both take the positions of §4.4a and §4.4b as typical for Hilary, but it has been shown these positions are not found in his other work; the modern scholars fail to notice the variation across Hilary's corpus. Secondly, both of these two positions can occasionally be found in Irenaeus and Tertullian. For example,

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<sup>275</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. Gen.* 1.12-15 is on human creation.

<sup>276</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. Gen.* 1.13: Quae est ergo alia imago dei, ad cuius imaginis similitudinem factus est homo, nisi Salvator noster...?

<sup>277</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. Gen.* 1.13: Hunc sane hominem quem dicit ad imaginem dei factum, non intelligimus corporalem.

<sup>278</sup> ORIGEN *Entr. Her.* 23, *c. Cels.* 6.63 (soul); *Hom. Gen.* 13.3 (logos in the soul); *Princ.* 1.1.7, *ad Mart.* 47 (nous). CROUZEL 1956:156-160 gives citations of Origen's different expressions as to what the 'inner man' might entail (soul, *logos* in the soul, *nous*, etc.).

<sup>279</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. Gen.* 1.13; *Hom. Jer.* 1.10...

<sup>280</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. Gen.* 1.13: Is autem, qui ad imaginem dei factus est, interior homo noster est, invisibilis et incorporealis et incorruptus atque immortalis. In his enim talibus dei imago rectius intelligitur.

Tertullian also states that we are created in Christ's image.<sup>281</sup> Further, Tertullian can also be inconsistent on whether the image means mind/spirit or also includes the body<sup>282</sup> – just as Hilary is.

So then, Hilary's fullest articulation of *imago* theology does seem to borrow elements from Origen, and it would be true to say that he is influenced by the Alexandrian in terms of his phrasing and indeed the frequency with which he uses *imago* language in his psalms commentaries. Nevertheless, Hilary's statements are still fully in accord with non-Origenian articulations of *imago* theology as evinced by Tertullian or Irenaeus.

Indeed if anything, Hilary may be modifying or even rejecting parts of Origen's *imago* theology, as the next section will show.

#### **4.5 Hilary rejecting Origen? The lost image**

Two examples have been presented where Hilary expresses Origenian *imago* theology, but only in his Psalms Commentaries: these were the distinction between *ad imaginem dei* and *imago dei*, and the concept that only the inner man is in God's image. However, there is also tentative evidence that Hilary may be consciously and explicitly rejecting one element of Origen's *imago* theology, namely the notion that the image was lost at the Fall. Hilary does refer in his works to the difference between the *imago terreni* and the *imago caelestis*, as Ambrose does; but he never suggests that the latter was lost universally at the Fall.

Origen's first Homily on Genesis states that at some point man has lost the capacity

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<sup>281</sup> TERTULLIAN *res.* 6

<sup>282</sup> Tertullian repeatedly articulates the image as including the body (e.g. *de spectaculis* 18, 23; *adversus Valentinianos* 24) but also gives statements which imply that the 'image' is in attributes such as self-determination and free will (*adversus Marcionem* 2.5, 2.6)

of being God's image but has become the devil's image.<sup>283</sup> Or again, the Saviour sees humans "laying aside God's image and taking up the image of the Evil One"<sup>284</sup> and is moved with compassion to save what he has created, petitioning the Father that his disciples might have their original likeness restored in them. The position that our image was somehow lost at the Fall is also found elsewhere in Origen.<sup>285</sup> The loss of the Creator's image may be described as having the devil's image as here, but Origen elsewhere calls the image in us is that of beasts. For example, he speaks of us being snakes or horses: "If our 'outer man' is human and our 'inner man' is snake, we are not human humans, but merely humans."<sup>286</sup> This sentence goes on to point out that if our 'inner man' preserves the Creator's image, then we are human both within and without. Thus animal imagery is located in the *imago* which, when sinful, is not an *imago dei*.<sup>287</sup> (Cox<sup>288</sup> gives Origen's theology a positive shine by suggesting that we realize God's creation in us when we are depicted as animals. However, this seems misguided; Origen is saying that we are animals because we have lost the inner spirituality that makes us human).

However, Origen gives different articulations elsewhere. At *princ.* 3.6.1 he states that we do have the image but not the likeness, which we gain through progression towards God. In his book on Origen's *imago* theology, Crouzel is circumspect about whether Origen really did believe that the *imago* was lost at the Fall.<sup>289</sup> Although some passages

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<sup>283</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. Gen.* 1.13: Si enim ad imaginem Dei factus homo contra naturam intuens imaginem diaboli per peccatum similis eius effectus est...

<sup>284</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. Gen.* 1.13: [Salvator] videns [hominem] deposita sua imagine maligni imaginem induxisse...

<sup>285</sup> ORIGEN *Comm. Rom.* 1.17, *c. Cels.* 6.63, *Homiliae in Lucam* 39

<sup>286</sup> ORIGEN *Homiliae in Ezechielem* 3.8

<sup>287</sup> See further CROUZEL 1956:197-206, comparing COX 1984

<sup>288</sup> COX 1984

<sup>289</sup> CROUZEL 1956:206-211 discusses whether sin causes us to lose God's image in us for Origen.

(such as those just quoted) might suggest this, Crouzel points out that elsewhere Origen emphasizes that we can recover the image through a godly life<sup>290</sup> and indeed our image is never fully removed but merely lies dormant: “it is impossible for a nature created in God’s image to erase all its properties and take on others pertaining to the images of undetermined reasonless beings.”<sup>291</sup> Hence Crouzel feels that Origen’s image is not lost but certainly obscured. Still, whatever the finer nuance across Origen’s oeuvre, even Crouzel admits passages do exist in Origen where the image is expressed as lost or obliterated. Further, even if they have misunderstood Origen’s nuance, Epiphanius and Jerome do charge him with heterodoxy on this exact point.<sup>292</sup> In all then it is perfectly possible for Hilary and Ambrose to have found some text of Origen that could be interpreted as suggesting the image was lost (whether or not Origen himself actually believed this).

Unlike Origen, Hilary never uses the language of loss in conjunction with the words *imago* or *similitudo*, although plenty of other things are ‘lost’ at the Fall (immortality, the fruits of Paradise, our right to be called human rather than animal).<sup>293</sup> Rather, he enjoins us to remember we are made in God’s image and likeness<sup>294</sup> – implying that we currently are, to some extent at least. Similarly, the passage from *de trinitate* discussed above (§4.4a) presents our eschatological acquiring of the image; but his soteriology is never expressed as humans re-acquiring something lost, even if it may be changed or improved.<sup>295</sup> In that passage, our change is effected in language of renewing,

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<sup>290</sup> ORIGEN *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 20.13

<sup>291</sup> ORIGEN *c. Cels.* 4.83, cited by Crouzel 1956:208. Crouzel also (inter alia) cites ORIGEN *Hom. Gen.* 13.3-4 as an example of a passage where the image is obscured but not lost.

<sup>292</sup> EPIPHANIUS *Panarion* 64.4.9; JEROME *Ep.* 51.7.2; *c. Joannem Hierosolytitanum* 7

<sup>293</sup> Immortality: *TrPs*, 1.13. Fruits of Paradise: *TrPs*, [66].7. The name ‘human’: *TrPs118*, 10.2

<sup>294</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.2. Also for example *TrPs*, 61.4

<sup>295</sup> See also *TrPs*, 129.6, where we put on knowledge of God, good morals and so on so that we might become ‘according to the Creator’s image’.

replacing, new creation, or reaching a goal; it is not expressed in terms of regaining something which was lost.

Now, it could just be that Hilary does believe in the loss of either *imago* or *similitudo*, but by chance or accident happens never to mention it. However, there is a possibility that Hilary is intentionally writing this theology out of his text.

The evidence for this is one part of the commentary on the lemma Ps118.73 “Your hands made and formed me; give me understanding, so that I may learn your commandments”, the creation verse discussed already at §3.3a. Both Ambrose and Hilary spend far longer explaining this one verse than they usually do for other verses. They interpret the verse in light of human creation, and from the Palestinian Catena we know that Origen did too. Some parts of the discussion match in Hilary and Ambrose. (Underlining denotes a match across the columns.)

**Hilary: *TrPs118*, 10.2**

**Ambrose: *ExpPs118*, 10.11**

Hoc enim nomen, ubi rerum superius  
commemoratarum cognitione neglecta  
in vitia deciderit, amittit; indignus  
scilicet jam iudicatus homo nuncupari.

Vivacis animae vigor (sensus, rationis,  
et intellectus capax, atque iudicii) ut  
digna domus tanto habitatore videatur,  
non amittat suae praerogativam  
naturae, ne hominis nomen amittat.

Et qui secundum imaginem et  
similitudinem Dei factus sit, secundum  
exprobrationes propheticas et  
evangelicas,

Scriptura enim eum hominem dicit,  
qui est ad imaginem et similitudinem  
Dei;

aut serpens, aut progenies viperarum,  
 aut equus, aut mulus, aut vulpes ei  
 nomen est.

...peccantem autem, non hominem, sed  
 aut serpentem, aut equum  
 adhinnientem feminis, aut vulpeculam,  
 aut jumentum vocare consuevit.

*Nolite fieri sicut equus aut mulus  
 quibus non est intellectus. In campo et  
 freno maxillas eorum constringe, qui  
 ad te non appropinquant (Ps. 31.9).*

Et: *Dicite huic vulpi (Luc. 13.32), de  
 Herode ait. Generatio viperarum  
 vocatur a Joanne plebs hominum (Luc.  
 3. 7).*

Et proprietas ei nominis sui, ubi de  
 innocentia exciderit, aufertur.

Magnum ergo opus Dei es, homo,  
 magnum est quod dedit tibi Deus; vide  
 ne quod Deus tribuit, amittas magnum  
 illud munus, quod es ad imaginem  
 Dei; et hoc in te puniatur magis.

The texts discuss the loss of the label ‘human’. Both Latin bishops illustrate this by showing that Scripture knows man was made “in God’s image and likeness” and yet in his sinful capacity he is called serpent, brood of vipers, horse, mule /ass, fox. Initially, the main difference between the passages is that Ambrose includes some verses proving that

Scripture calls humans by different animal names; it is characteristic for him to add catenae of scriptural verses to prove his point.

But then there is a bigger change, and the last paragraph presented here shows the two Latin authors diverging more significantly: Ambrose immediately makes the link between the lost name of ‘man’ and the lost image; Hilary does not. Indeed, Ambrose then goes on to emphasize the loss of *imago* (170 words); Hilary does not.<sup>296</sup> Later in his discussion of v73 Ambrose again refers to the lost *imago*;<sup>297</sup> yet again, there is no match in Hilary.

This could be mere chance, since much of Ambrose’s text has no match in Hilary. However, this particular passage hints at Origen. Both Latin bishops mention ‘losing the name human’ (*amittere nomen hominis*) which suggests this was in the text of Origen that they are translating from. The two texts are entirely consistent with what we know of Origen’s theology, which identifies sin with the loss (or obfuscation) of the image and our identification with beasts.

So it seems that of the two Latins, Ambrose would be reflecting Origen more accurately in identifying the lost name ‘man’ with the lost image. This is all the more likely since Ambrose goes on to do so explicitly, immediately after the passage excerpted above. If it is true that this discussion of the lost image was in Origen’s commentary, then Hilary would have known this since he too was using Origen’s commentary. And yet it seems he chose to omit the suggestion that humans lost the *imago dei* at the Fall in his own translation.

On its own this is merely an argument *ex silentio*. However, given that Hilary almost always reproduces something of Origen (§2.5c), it may be seen as doctrinally

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<sup>296</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs118* 10.11: exuti coelestis imaginis ornamento, etiam nomen hominis amittimus, qui gratiam hominis non tenemus

<sup>297</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs118* 10.16: Propterea imago ad eum qui est ad imaginem, venit: et quaerit imago eum, qui est ad similitudinem sui; ut iterum signet, ut iterum confirmet; quia amiseras quod accepisti.

significant when he omits something – as also for example when he edits Origen’s comments on the Fall (§6.2b). Further, only a few years later Epiphanius was propounding that the loss of the *imago* was a heretical doctrine (the *Panarion* dates from around 374; Hilary’s translation is thought to come from the early to mid 360s).<sup>298</sup> Hilary may have seen Origen’s lost image as relating to our physical form and the ‘tunics of skins’, as Epiphanius did.<sup>299</sup> This is supported by the fact that Ambrose also relates the lost image to the tunics of skins in another passage in this very commentary, in language highly reminiscent of Origen and thus again possibly reliant on Origen’s commentary.<sup>300</sup> So there is every reason to think that Hilary may have found such allusions in the Greek commentary. And yet he chose not to repeat them in his own.

This is an argument from verisimilitude, not a proof. But it is certainly without question that the loss of the image at the Fall is a doctrine entirely absent from Hilary’s works. His position is, yet again, entirely consistent with Irenaeus and Tertullian.

## **4.6 Conclusion**

Hilary sees our creation ‘in God’s image and likeness’ as one of the fundamental

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<sup>298</sup> MILHAU 1988a:17-18

<sup>299</sup> EPIPHANIUS *Panarion* 64.4.9: τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα δὲ φησὶν [Origen] ἀπολωλεκένοι τὸν Ἀδάμ. ἐντεῦθεν φησὶ καὶ τοὺς χιτῶνας τοὺς δερματίνους ἐπισημάνασθαι τὴν γραφὴν ὅτι, φησὶν, τὸ *ἐποίησεν αὐτοῖς χιτῶνας δερματίνους καὶ ἐνέδυσεν αὐτούς* τὸ σῶμα, φησὶν, ἐστὶ. καὶ πολλή τις ἐστὶ παρ’ αὐτῷ ἡ ἀδομένη χλεύη.

<sup>300</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs118* 11.14: Utrem autem corpus hoc dici, licet ex pluribus locis, tamen etiam inde intellige, quod Adam et Eva ubi imaginem deposuere coelestis, quam ante portabant, imaginem terreni hominis induentes, tunicas dicti snut vestiti esse pelliceas, corporales enim eos de spiritalibus fecerat culpa commissa [Gen. 3.21].

characteristics of humanity. Yet our creation is not completed in the first week of the world described in Genesis 1; rather, it progresses through human history. We are created with Adam, but through Christ's coming and with godly living we may exchange the *imago terreni* for the *imago caelestis*; this moment is first described at the sending out of the Twelve and he urges us to do the same and take on Christ's image. And eschatologically, when our fleshly carnal bodies are transformed into spiritual bodies, that is when we fully become God's perfect image and our creation is completed. Hilary also regularly expresses our change in Christ as a pauline dichotomy, and in particular often refers to the need to exchange the *imago terreni* for the *imago caelestis*.

Scholars such as Pelland, Rondeau and Cantalamessa are right to give Hilary an 'Alexandrian' shine, particularly because of his statements that the *imago* consists of the soul not the body. However, the situation is more complicated. Although this position is indeed found in Hilary's psalms commentaries – where he is known to be using Origen – but are either absent or at best insignificant elsewhere in his works. Hilary's theology is more consistent with Irenaeus and Tertullian, particularly the notion of *imago-similitudo* development through history which is particularly characteristic of Irenaeus. To the contrary, the body is to be glorified in order to participate in the *imago*. So evidence for 'Alexandrian' influence in Hilary's opus is limited to one of his latest works, the psalms commentaries.

Moreover, in one respect at least it is possible that Hilary is consciously rejecting Origen's *imago* theology when it comes to the suggestion that humans may have lost the capacity of being in God's image at the Fall. In all then, it seems that Hilary may be fairly placed entirely in the Western Latin tradition.

The current chapter has skirted around the related issue of the *imago terreni* which must be exchanged for the *imago caelestis*; in other words, we must put off Adam's

clothes and replace him with Christ. The next chapter will focus on the extent to which the *imago terreni* becomes a metaphor for all humanity.

## *Chapter 5*

# **Adam & humanity**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter (the longest) examines the figure of Adam and, by extension, the concept of humanity ‘in’ Adam or Christ.

The main question here discussed is whether it is possible to say Adam or Christ represent humanity in its totality, and what exactly this representation means. It is widely accepted that, for Hilary, Christ’s incarnation involved a ‘universal assumption’ of all humanity, whereby somehow humans were incorporated into Christ’s body. Some scholars also hold that Adam represents a prior stage of this.

This chapter will suggest that, for the most part, talk of universal assumption (hereafter UA) in Hilary is exaggerated. Universalism does indeed feature in his language of the incarnation, but it seems to be largely metaphorical. Hilary is merely tapping into an established exegetical tradition without significantly elaborating on this notion of universalism; he certainly accepts the notion but it is not central to his thought. Further, many phrases taken by scholars as universalist are in fact misunderstandings of his intentions; and much of what remains is figurative or paradigmatic.

Lastly, the source of Hilary’s universalist language is not primarily Stoic (as suggested by most recent Hilary scholarship) but is more likely to arise from his reading of Origen. In particular, the concept of creation forming Christ’s body, and the concept of Christ as a city, both seem to have roots in Origen’s thought. If anything Hilary may be

muting Origen's expression of physicalism (as seen in his telling of the lost sheep) and of the Christ-city metaphor (which Hilary treats as strictly analogical).

Since Adam does not feature highly in one of our two comparator texts (namely *TrPs118*), and since Christology is an important consideration in this debate, the present chapter will consider Hilary's whole corpus (including *de trinitate*, *de mysteriis* and Hilary's brief hymns). The angle of the Fall and its consequences will be left to Chapter 6.

## **5.2 Adam**

In this section the figure of Adam will be examined, particularly with a view to ascertaining whether Hilary's Adam is an expression of universal humanity. (Discussion of the exact meaning of 'universal' is found at §5.4g).

It will be shown that Hilary uses Adam predominantly in two ways: (a) as a cipher for the human condition, whether as God's image or as fallen; (b) to illustrate the work of Christ, whether as type or as contrast. Although universalism may be argued in the case of Christ (§5.4), the figure of Adam does not appear as a universal except in an analogical or illustrative sense.

### **5.2a) Adam as historical figure**

Before examining hermeneutical methods such as typology and allegory, it is worth emphasizing that Hilary's primary understanding of Adam is as a real human who was an actor at a given historical point. The events of Genesis 1-3 are all, at their most basic

level, historical events. It is true that they then serve as means by which the Christ-story can be understood and analysed, but this does not deny their own veracity.

In exordio sermonis admonuimus, ne quis forte existimaret aliquid rerum gestarum fidei detrahendum, si res ipsas profectus rerum consequentium continere in se doceremus. Nihil enim veritati detrahit, imitationem veritas consecuta. (*InMt* 7.1)

So if Hilary ever uses Adam in any other sense, there is still no doubt in his mind that Adam *also* truly existed. There is no indication that Hilary separates the ‘heavenly man’ of Gen1 from the ‘earthly man’ of Gen2-3 as is characteristic in the Alexandrian tradition back to Philo.<sup>301</sup> There is also no indication of a purely allegorical reading in Hilary, as for example in Philo who explicitly rejects the historical reading<sup>302</sup> and takes Adam and Eve as Mind and Sense-Perception (ὁ νοῦς, ἡ αἴσθησις).<sup>303</sup> This is would be utterly alien to Hilary’s principle that scripture has both a ‘plain sense’ as well as a spiritual reading. Hilary takes the text at face value and Adam as a historical personage.

In its historical aspect, Adam’s story may serve to illustrate the human condition or God’s nature, just as is the case for any other Old Testament character:

Absolute autem Dominus ostendit in Adam atque Abraham peccatores se ignorare, cognoscere autem fideles. [...]

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<sup>301</sup> E.g. PHILO *De Opificio Mundi* 46 (134); *Legum Allegoriae* 1.31, 2.4

<sup>302</sup> PHILO *Legum Allegoriae* 2.9

<sup>303</sup> E.g. PHILO *Legum Allegoriae* 2.24, *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesis* 25

Sic itaque Deus et agnoscit, et nescit; cum Adam peccator nescitur, et Abraham fidelis agnoscitur, dignus scilicet qui a Deo nihil utique ignorante noscatur. (*TrPs* 1.19)

Adam and Abraham here serve as examples, namely that God takes no notice of sinners but pays attention to the faithful when merited (*dignus*). He is usually taken as a slightly negative example, but not one that is particularly depraved.<sup>304</sup> He is just one of many characters who can serve as an example or illustration.

### 5.2b) Adam as representative of humanity

Many scholars suggest Hilary's Christ assumes all of humanity, as will be discussed below. However, due to Hilary's frequent use of Adam-Christ parallelism, the implication is that Adam too somehow 'is' all humanity before the incarnation, as suggested for example by Scully.<sup>305</sup> This section will examine the theory that Adam as expression of the entirety of humanity when taken by himself (independently of Christ). There are three ways in which this occurs.

Adam firstly represents pre-lapsarian mankind created in God's image and likeness. This has already been discussed in §3.3.

Secondly Adam is a cipher for aspects of the human condition after the Fall. For example, Hilary often uses references to 'earth' (*terra*) as a hermeneutical trigger for thinking about Adam's humanity and weakness, and thus our own (the same is true of *limus* which however is less frequent in the biblical text). Psalm 65 (*Jubilare Deo, omnis*

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<sup>304</sup> At *TrPs* 52.9 figures such as Abel, Seth and Noah are presented as examples of 'good' men (by human standards if not God's). Adam is conspicuous by omission.

<sup>305</sup> SCULLY 2011:105-107

*terra*) is taken as referring to both our earthly origin but also the need for all humans, in our earthly state, to sing God's praise.

...universitas nostra ex terra in primo Adam parente genitorum sub plurali numero monstratur cum dicitur: *Jubilate Deo omnis terra*. Simul enim et officium omnium docetur, et origo. (*TrPs* [65].4)

Thus the word *terra* symbolizes the entirety of humanity, and particularly our flesh, since we are descended from Adam who was made from earth: *scriptura humani corporis carnem 'terram' solita est nuncupare*.<sup>306</sup> Similar exegesis is found elsewhere in Hilary's exegetical works<sup>307</sup> and indeed elsewhere among the Church fathers.<sup>308</sup>

Lastly, Adam stands for humanity in passages which are interpreted as illustrating the universality of Christ's salvific work. Two of the most frequently quoted passages on UA in Hilary are the parable of the lost sheep (§5.4d) and that of the paralytic whom Jesus tells 'your sins are forgiven'.<sup>309</sup> Hilary interprets the paralytic as representing the human race, whom Christ heals:

[8.5] Jamque in paralytico gentium universitas offertur medenda... In Adam uno peccata universis gentibus remittuntur... Hic itaque Angelis ministrantibus curandus offertur, hic filius nuncupatur, quia primum Dei opus est: huic remittuntur animae peccata... [8.7] Primum remissionem tribuit [Christus] peccati, dehinc virtutem resurrectionis ostendit...

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<sup>306</sup> *Myst.* 1.5

<sup>307</sup> Similar exegesis of *terra* or *limus* at *TrPs* [14].5, [64].13, [65].4, [66].7, [68].4, 122.3; see also *InMt* 4.3, 4.10, 10.19

<sup>308</sup> See for example the *Epistle of Barnabas* 6.9-12

<sup>309</sup> Mt 9.1-8, commented by Hilary *InMt* 8.5-8.

postremo [docuit] reditu in domum propriam iter in paradisum  
 credentibus esse redhibendum, ex quo Adam parens universorum peccati  
 labe dissolutus excesserat. (*InMt* 8.5, 8.7)

Thus the paralytic stands for Adam ‘in whom’ the sins of all peoples are forgiven. This passage is commonly cited in modern literature hoping to prove Hilary’s Adam is a universal.<sup>310</sup>

However, this is not an interpretation new to Hilary, but a received tradition found also in other patristic writers including Irenaeus,<sup>311</sup> Chromatius<sup>312</sup> and Cyril of Alexandria<sup>313</sup> with further hints appearing elsewhere.<sup>314</sup> Hilary uses this standard exegesis without much elaboration, suggesting only that Adam denotes a universal effect (*in Adam uno*, without further explanation) and possibly a moral example (*ostendit, docuit*). Further, Adam is not here humanity itself, but an example and forbear. (The implications of this passage for original sin will be dealt with at §9.3b).

So what exactly does it mean, to say Adam represents humanity? There is indeed some unspecified relation between the forgiveness of Adam and that of other humans, but that is not the same as saying that Adam is somehow equivalent to all humans. Hilary’s

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<sup>310</sup> LADARIA 1989b:451, BURNS 1981:107, SCULLY 2011:109. Also, PETTORELLI 1969:214-7 and ORAZZO 1983:407-8 compare this passage with *InMt* 18.6 (the lost sheep).

<sup>311</sup> IRENAEUS *adv.haer.* 5.17.1-3

<sup>312</sup> CHROMATIUS *Tractatus in Matthaem* 44.4 (Banterle1990:276): Pro huius ergo paralytici salute id est populi gentilis, uel certe Adae qui auctor humani generis esse cognoscitur...

<sup>313</sup> CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA *Arabic Catena on Matthew* 13 on Mt. 9.1-8 (Caubet-Iturbe 1970:93): “...Due to the faith of the paralytic and those with him who carried him, the Lord granted him [*or, them*] healing; he healed both body and soul at the same time. This detail demonstrates that, for the sins which the paralytic had committed, the Lord therefore tested him with this illness, since these were the sins which had caused his illness. When the Lord said, *Your sins are forgiven*, he was freed from sin – like Adam, whom he forgave after the Fall.” (This scholia is preserved only in Arabic, and is not found in Cyril’s other works). Like Hilary, Cyril stops short of saying that Adam represents humanity.

<sup>314</sup> CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (*Paedagogus* 1.2) quotes Christ’s words to the paralytic (“your sins are forgiven”) as being spoken to all of us. The CONSTITUTIONS OF THE HOLY APOSTLES (2.20) take this verse as being spoken to the bishop on behalf of his flock.

Adam stands for mankind in a variety of ways which are not ‘universals’ in the philosophical sense.

Adam affects us in his capacity as actor: his actions, particularly at the Fall, have had a direct effect on us in a variety of ways (cursing our environment, changing our nature, incurring the universal punishment of death, etc.).<sup>315</sup>

Second, there is Adam as progenitor: like him we are both earthly and weighed down yet also created in God’s image. Universally, our body and soul, nature and preferences are all derived from him *biologically* as the whole human race come from him and he is the father of all.<sup>316</sup> For example, the excerpt just quoted describes Adam as *parens universorum*.<sup>317</sup> This may be more indicative of how Hilary sees Adam’s universal impact.

Lastly, Hilary’s continual approach to scripture is to take people and objects as catch-words that symbolize other things. As mentioned, *terra* is one such catch-word, always representing our origin and nature in Adam. Another is the fig leaves with which Adam and Eve cover themselves; they represent the Law, which can never really hide human shame.<sup>318</sup> But many things in Hilary are ciphers for something else, as will be discussed shortly (§5.3b).

So far, there is no reason to see Adam as a universal, containing the whole human race in his body (except possibly in the biological sense). He is certainly used to represent humanity, but this is strictly as actor, progenitor and cipher – never as a mystic expression of the entire human race.

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<sup>315</sup> See §6.4, §9.3b

<sup>316</sup> *InMt* 1.1, 14.7; *Trin* 4.21...; *TrPs* 136.5, 146.4...

<sup>317</sup> *InMt* 8.7

<sup>318</sup> *InMt* 21.9, 26.2

The one possible exception to this is where Adam is cited as a parallel to Christ. The use of Adam as symbol leads us to consider his significant role as type or precursor of Christ.

### 5.2c) Adam as precursor of Christ

Hilary uses the figure of Adam as precursor to Christ extremely frequently. This appears in two related forms. Firstly his standard reading of the Old Testament is to see all characters as type of Christ or somehow presaging the incarnation. Secondly he repeatedly uses the pauline parallelism of Adam and Christ referring to the old and new or the earthly and heavenly.

The first of these, where Old Testament characters are taken as types of Christ, is the basis of Hilary's *de mysteriis*, in which a series of Old Testament personages are shown to presage the life of Christ<sup>319</sup> – Lamech represents the high priest,<sup>320</sup> Abraham's one extra letter represents the way that the one Christ would restore the church, etc.<sup>321</sup> (This type of exegesis appears throughout Hilary's work; for example at *TrPs* 132.5 Aaron's anointing prefigures that of Christ). In *de mysteriis* the first Old Testament character to be treated is, of course, Adam; here his relationship with Eve is taken as a type for the relationship between Christ and the church.

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<sup>319</sup> *Myst* 1.1: omne autem opus, quod sacris voluminibus continetur, adventum domini nostri Iesu Christi... et dictis nuntiat et factis exprimit et confirmat exemplis. (The related notion of the Law as *umbra futurorum bonorum* is also pervasive in Hilary's *TrPs*, e.g. 51.21, [91].9, 129.10, 134.1, 136.2 and particularly in *TrPs* 118, e.g. 1.5, 1.6, 1.11, 3.4, 3.7, 6.7...)

<sup>320</sup> *Myst* 1.9-11

<sup>321</sup> *Myst* 1.18

Contuendum etiam illud est in Adae somno atque Evae corporatione  
occulti in Christo et in ecclesia mysterii sacramentum; in eo enim  
corporeae resurrectionis fides et ratio continetur. (*Myst* 1.5)

During Adam's dream, one of his bones is taken from him to form Eve;<sup>322</sup> this is taken to prefigure the resurrection, when the church in its capacity as Christ's body is transformed and his glorification becomes ours. There is nothing in this exegesis that shows Adam in a negative light. Hilary's other works also use this notion that the relation between Adam and Eve predominantly prefigures Christ and the Church, and in particular the resurrection of the faithful.<sup>323</sup>

The second use of Adam with respect to Christ is based on Pauline parallelism<sup>324</sup> where Adam is either a forerunner or a contrast which illustrates Christ's work. This parallelism underlines Hilary's interpretation of some key biblical passages, as for example his explanation of the Temptation narrative:<sup>325</sup>

Cibo Adam pellegerat, et de paradisi gloria in peccati locum...  
deduxerat; tertio divini nominis ambitione corrumpat... Igitur adversus  
Dominum tota jam saeculi potestate pugnatur...: ut tenens ordinem  
fraudis antiquae, quem neque cibo pellegerat, nec loco moverat, nunc vel  
ambitione corrumpet. (*InMt* 3.5)

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<sup>322</sup> *Myst* 1.3

<sup>323</sup> *InMt* 19.2, 22.3; *TrPs* 138.29

<sup>324</sup> Rom 5.12-21, 1Cor 15.22. Compare also 2Cor 5.17, Eph 4.24, Col 3.10 (on the 'new man')

<sup>325</sup> *InMt* 3.1-5

Hilary presents Christ's temptation as a 'second go' at the first. (This somewhat Irenaean view of the Temptation narrative is also found in one of Hilary's few preserved hymns).<sup>326</sup> The devil presents Adam with three temptations (food, a 'place,' and ambition), and succumbs. The devil thinks it will be the same again when he sees Christ, and tempts him in the same way, this time to meet with failure. Thus, what was not well done by Adam is taken up and completed by Christ. At the same time there is no indictment or condemnation of Adam for falling and for succumbing to the temptations; it is just that Christ did things better.<sup>327</sup> The interpretation of other passages, such as sending out the apostles to preach,<sup>328</sup> also uses Adam-Christ parallelism.

More often Hilary uses Pauline parallelism in passing when he is describing some feature of Christ and his work; this occurs repeatedly. Sometimes there is explicit biblical citation or allusion.<sup>329</sup> At other points the parallels are referred to in terms of 'first /second Adam'<sup>330</sup> or 'earthly /heavenly Adam'<sup>331</sup> (especially when talking of our eschatological transformation or that of the church). Lastly, there may be a two-way comparison that does not necessarily mention Adam but recalls the Pauline parallelism; these refer for example to the 'old man /new man',<sup>332</sup> maybe also to 'taking off' the old man and 'putting on' the new<sup>333</sup> (this is not quite the same thing in Paul, but Hilary treats it as Adam/Christ parallelism). The point of these comparisons is normally to highlight a change in our

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<sup>326</sup> *Hymn* 3, 1.1-3 (Feder 1916:214): *Adae carnis gloriosa et caduci corporis // in caelesti rursus Adam concinamus proelia, // per quae primum satanas est Adam uictus in nouo.*

<sup>327</sup> See also LADARIA 1989b:446-7

<sup>328</sup> *InMt* 10.4 (see also §4.3 on *imago dei*)

<sup>329</sup> *Trin* 11.22 and *TrPs* 143.21 both cite 1Cor. 15.22 (for as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive)

<sup>330</sup> *TrPs* [68].4, [68].23, 132.7

<sup>331</sup> *InMt* 10.4, *TrPs* 122.3; *TrPs118*, 20.10. Compare also *TrPs* 52.16

<sup>332</sup> *TrPs* 2.41; *TrPs118*, 20.10

<sup>333</sup> *TrPs* 129.6; *TrPs118*, 12.4, 15.13

nature, especially with regard to being transformed from an earthly sinful nature to a spiritual, glorified one, either now (due to baptism) or at the resurrection. In the latter case, inclusion in the body of the Church or of Christ is also a key theme.

So in all, Hilary uses Adam in the context of pauline parallelism way to illustrate the personage of Christ, whether as a forbear or a contrast.

### **5.3 Other expressions of human identity & unity**

In order to identify whether Hilary uses UA, it is necessary to look more generally at Hilary's concept of human identity and unity.

#### 5.3a) *Universitas*

When Hilary is referring to humanity directly, he uses phrases which are common to other Latins in his day. Phrases such as *humanitas*<sup>334</sup> or *genus humanum*<sup>335</sup> and the adjective *humanus* are most specific. Hilary also regularly uses phrases such as *nos, nos omnes* or similar,<sup>336</sup> and words meaning 'all, every' are also found (*cuncti, omnes*<sup>337</sup>).

The words *universi, universitas* are most commonly latched onto in the debate regarding UA. Although these may be used in the more general sense meaning a whole

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<sup>334</sup> *InMt* 22.5, 28.1

<sup>335</sup> *InMt*, 4.10, 4.12, 8.4, 12.2... *TrPs118*, 3.18, 10.16, 13.4

<sup>336</sup> *InMt*, 2.2, 2.6, 4.12, 4.19... *TrPs118*, 1.8, 1.11, 1.13, 1.14, 2.6...

<sup>337</sup> *InMt*, 33.5

group,<sup>338</sup> these words are frequently used of the created order or cosmos, or more specifically the human race. Scholars who see Hilary as propounding a doctrine of universal assumption seize upon his wide use of *universus* and its cognates,<sup>339</sup> especially when talking of the incarnation: *naturam in se universae carnis adsumpsit*.<sup>340</sup>

The scholars concerned typically point to the notion of the human race as an ethical and cosmological category in Stoicism:<sup>341</sup>

...nos natos esse ad congregationem hominum et ad societatem  
communitatemque generis humani... (CICERO *fin* 4.4)

(These scholars appear to take Cicero as a full Stoic). In addition, the connection between the lexeme *universus* and the philosophical notion of universals implicitly underlies the discourse of these modern scholars. However, Stoics used platonic language without being tied to platonic concepts (§5.4g), and furthermore the Latin word *universus* was most often used outside the context of philosophical debate. Whether in the singular or plural, *universus* in everyday Latin most often denotes a plurality taken as a whole, and not an abstract concept.<sup>342</sup> Hilary reflects this, since he uses *universi* in the masculine plural to refer to humanity,<sup>343</sup> and *universa* to refer to the universe and creation, whether including

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<sup>338</sup> There are many examples in Hilary; the following list serves merely as an initial indication. *InMt*, 10.23, 11.3, 13.4, 20.1 (all our possessions), 21.1 (Israel in its entirety), 31.10, 32.3, 33.5 (all the faithful)... *TrPs118*, 1.12 (all God's judgments), 3.7, 5.6 (all debts at the Jubilee), 15.6 (all evil men)...

<sup>339</sup> See §5.3a

<sup>340</sup> *TrPs*, 51.16. The significance of *natura* here, and the nature of the genitive that qualifies it, will be discussed later (§5.4e): it is the use of *universus* that concerns here.

<sup>341</sup> E.g. PETTORELLI quotes Cicero at 1969:230, 231; see also BURNS 1981:104, 106; SCULLY 2011:36-41

<sup>342</sup> Lewis & Short (1984) *A Latin Dictionary*, ad 'universus'. See also discussion in Pettorelli 1969:230-1

<sup>343</sup> E.g. *InMt* 7.4: in praeceptis Domini vita est universorum

humankind or not:<sup>344</sup> both are standard usages in Latin, without necessarily implying any particular philosophical connotations. Further, *universus* most usually refers to the collective entirety of individuals, rather than a new aggregate.<sup>345</sup> In other words it is an equivalent for ‘all’ and is used by Hilary as such: *universa prophetia* ‘every prophecy’,<sup>346</sup> *universa gens* ‘the whole nation’.<sup>347</sup>

What these scholars also (somewhat curiously) fail to mention is that *universa caro* is a scriptural phrase. The Hebrew expression כָּל־בְּשָׂרַךְ (*kol bāsār*) meaning ‘everyone, all (humans), all (creation)’ is ubiquitous in the Old Testament, and most frequently translated in the Septuagint as πᾶσα σάρξ and in Latin as *omnis caro*. However, alternative translations appear (e.g. *cuncta caro*),<sup>348</sup> and of these alternatives *universa caro* is the most common: *ecce ego Dominus Deus universae carnis; numquid mihi difficile erit omne verbum* (Jer. 32:27).<sup>349</sup> Although these examples are from the Vulgate, this variation was also found in the Old Latin versions.<sup>350</sup> Indeed, Hilary himself uses the expression in a directly biblical way. When explaining the verse *Exaudi orationem, ad te omnis caro veniet* (Ps 64.3), Hilary glosses it thus: *quia Deo dignum sit... universitatem carnis ad confessionem... erudiri*.<sup>351</sup> In other words, for Hilary *universitas carnis* is directly

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<sup>344</sup> E.g. *InMt* 25.6: in his, non universitatis... dissolutio est

<sup>345</sup> Discussion in Pettorelli 1969:231, who also cites the juridical meaning of *universitas* as indicating not a separate entity (such as a city) but rather the group of individuals that constitute it.

<sup>346</sup> *Myst* 1.1

<sup>347</sup> *Myst* 1.10

<sup>348</sup> Num. 18.15

<sup>349</sup> See also Gen 6.13, Gen 6.19, Gen 9.16, Lev 17.14, Num 16.22, Ezk 20.48. (NB These are Vulgate references.)

<sup>350</sup> See BREPOLIS *Vetus Latina Database*. Accessed 14/11/2012

<sup>351</sup> *TrPs* 59.12

equivalent to *omnis caro*.<sup>352</sup> Indeed, the phrase *universa caro* is used in this way by a wide variety of Latin authors from Clement of Rome onwards.<sup>353</sup>

So then, Hilary's use of *universus* is a standard Latin Christian way of referring to mankind. Stoic (or platonic) thought may have contributed to its dissemination, but his main source is not primarily platonic or stoic, but Scriptural. It is in a biblical capacity that he uses it to mean 'all, everybody': the term is a simple collective, not an ideal or abstract concept.

### 5.3b) Typological & symbolic expressions of humanity

Section §5.2b-c showed that Hilary uses the figure of Adam to represent or symbolize the human race. However, due to his hermeneutical approach, he can also use other ciphers for humanity and its subsets.

Biblical characters can stand not only for humanity but also its subsets. Adam is not only the entire human race, but at the crucifixion he represents the entirety of Gentiles.<sup>354</sup> The same is true for other Biblical characters, with Abraham representing the faithful; as well as being 'in Adam' and 'in Christ' we are also 'in Abraham' (*in uno enim Abraham omnes sumus*).<sup>355</sup> Herod may be taken to stand for Israel;<sup>356</sup> the older and younger sons commanded to work in the vineyard represent Israel and the Gentiles

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<sup>352</sup> For example the translation 'all flesh = everyone' seems more natural at *Trin* 9.32: ...accepta potestate in danda universae carni vitae aeternitate esset usus. Compare also *Myst* 1.5, 1.7; *Trin* 9.5; *TrPs* 59.12

<sup>353</sup> For example: CLEMENT OF ROME 1Cor. 59.2, 64.1; CYPRIAN *ad demetrianum* 24; GREGORY OF ELVIRA (?) *Tractatus Origenis de libris Sanctarum Scripturarum* 12; AMBROSE *Enarrationes in xii psalmos davidicos* 45.5; *Expositio Evangelii Secundum Lucam* 7, *de excessu fratris Satyri* 2.86; JEROME *in Hieremiam* 3, 6; IRENAEUS *adv. haer.* 3.16.6, 4.27.1; also Augustine, Quodvultdeus, Prosper, Salvian, John Cassian... (See also below on Marius Victorinus).

<sup>354</sup> *InMt* 33.6

<sup>355</sup> *InMt* 18.6

<sup>356</sup> *InMt* 14.7

respectively.<sup>357</sup> In fact, biblical characters are almost always taken to represent some religious or national grouping, and never stand just for themselves.

As Rondeau shows,<sup>358</sup> a related hermeutical technique in Hilary is the prospology found predominantly in *TrPs*: *propheta enim ex persona sua universos docet, quid velle, quid agere, quid profiteri...*<sup>359</sup> The prophet (i.e. psalmist) is frequently said to speak in various personae such as Christ, or as the ‘model Christian’.<sup>360</sup> This is derived from Origen; for example both authors take Psalm 1 as applying to a Christian rather than Christ.<sup>361</sup>

It is not only biblical personages which may be ciphers for something else; the same can be true of just about any place or object that may recur in Scripture. One particular example is that Hilary also uses cities as a cipher for the entirety of humanity or some subset thereof. Hilary’s use of Jerusalem representing Christ’s body is crucial in the UA debate and will be considered at length below.<sup>362</sup> However, all cities represent groups of peoples. The city of the Gadarenes that rejects Jesus is taken in *InMt* as representing the Jews, and he returns to his own city which represents the faithful; the boat in which he returns to the city is also the church.<sup>363</sup> Other cities represent other groups: at one point

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<sup>357</sup> *InMt* 21.11-15

<sup>358</sup> RONDEAU 1985:322-340

<sup>359</sup> *TrPs* 118, 16.1

<sup>360</sup> *TrPs* 53.2-6, 54.2, 55.2, 56.1

<sup>361</sup> RONDEAU 1985:35-38

<sup>362</sup> §5.5b-d

<sup>363</sup> *InMt* 8.4: ...repudiatus [Christus], in civitatem suam revertitur (Mt 9.1). Deo civitas fidelium plebs est. In hanc igitur navi, id est Ecclesia, vectus introiit. For another example of a boat representing the Church see *InMt* 15.10

the cities of the Samaritans represent heretical churches;<sup>364</sup> at another the city and wilderness respectively stand for the Synagogue and the church.<sup>365</sup>

For Hilary, symbolic people and objects are just part of the way of reading Scripture. We have seen that *terra* recalls our creation and weakness in our nature, and that boats represent the church. But there are many more examples. For Hilary mountains and heights represent glory and grandeur,<sup>366</sup> birds stand for the soul,<sup>367</sup> and marriage recalls the body-soul relationship.<sup>368</sup> Indeed some of these appear fairly arbitrary: mothers-in-law represent *infidelitas*,<sup>369</sup> fig trees represent the Synagogue or Law,<sup>370</sup> and fields represent the world.<sup>371</sup> Such interpretations are ubiquitous in Hilary's exegetical works: they are the fundament of his hermeneutic method.

### 5.3c) Summary so far: Adam as cipher

Section §5.3 has demonstrated that Hilary almost without fail uses the characters, settings and props of biblical stories to represent greater truths. In particular, the figure of Adam may express the entirety of humanity. But other biblical characters and things can also represent either the entirety of humanity or any of its subsets, such as Jews, Gentiles or the church. For example, Hilary uses Eve, Sarah, and Rahab the prostitute<sup>372</sup> to

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<sup>364</sup> *InMt* 10.3

<sup>365</sup> *InMt* 14.9, referred to also in *InMt* 21.5

<sup>366</sup> *InMt* 4.1, 4.12, 30.2; *TrPs* 120.4

<sup>367</sup> *InMt* 10.18-9; *TrPs* 123.8-9

<sup>368</sup> *InMt* 27.4

<sup>369</sup> *InMt* 7.6, 10.23-4

<sup>370</sup> *InMt* 21.6, 26.2

<sup>371</sup> *InMt* 32.6, recalling Mt. 13.38

<sup>372</sup> Eve: *Myst* 1.3. Sarah: *Myst* 1.17. Rahab: *Myst* 2.5

prefigure the church. Adam can also represent other groups, such as the Gentiles.<sup>373</sup> And the entirety of humanity may be expressed in other ways – even by the bankers in the parable of the talents.<sup>374</sup>

Therefore to accord significance only to Adam (as does say Mersch)<sup>375</sup> is simplistic in that it by-passes the very basis of Hilary's hermeneutical approach. Hilary's method has been discussed by a significant number of scholars including T.F. Torrance, Kannengiesser and Newlands,<sup>376</sup> but most importantly here his approach to scripture is that everything in Biblical narrative points to Christ or to greater spiritual truths. Everything stands for something else.

This underlines the conclusion of the previous section. In section §5.2 it was demonstrated that Hilary uses Adam to represent humanity: but not in the sense of a mystic universal. Scholars who do believe Hilary's Christ assumes all humanity still differ as to how far Hilary's Adam expresses the same. Some, such as Scully,<sup>377</sup> feel that Christ can only assume a unified humanity if it already exists somehow before the incarnation. However, even if it were true that Christ assumes humanity as a whole, it does not logically follow that humanity was necessarily unified before that. Nor is this borne out by the texts, as is demonstrated by Ladaria<sup>378</sup> who feels that there is a difference in the way that Hilary expresses our unity in Adam and in Christ. For example, in the commentary on Ps.1 Adam represents anyone with a relationship to Christ, rather than being a forefunner

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<sup>373</sup> *InMt* 33.6

<sup>374</sup> *InMt* 27.11. The talents are the Gospel message, which should be given to all humanity (the bankers) in order to gain increase.

<sup>375</sup> MERSCH 1936:416

<sup>376</sup> TORRANCE (1975), KANNENGIESSER (1969a), NEWLANDS (1978)

<sup>377</sup> SCULLY 2011:105-6

<sup>378</sup> LADARIA 1992:120-2

of Christ himself.<sup>379</sup> In this regard, Adam is merely human example, not even a cipher for humanity before its redemption.

Further to all this, there are passages where the Adam story is taken to refer to humanity but where the name ‘Adam’ is never used. For example, Hilary’s analysis of the creation of man (Ps 118.73, analysed at §3.3a) always refers to the First Man with words such as *homo*. Hilary also avoids the name ‘Adam’ in his description of the Fall through the anthropological household (§6.2c, §7.2a): again the man is referred to as *homo* or *primus parens*. This suggests that Hilary is distinguishing mentally between Adam the individual and humanity as a whole.

In all, the suggestion that Hilary’s Adam expresses a universal humanity is here firmly rejected. §5.2 showed that Adam may be also actor, progenitor, illustration or cipher – that is, whenever he is not referred to strictly in his historical context. And it is worth emphasizing again that many references to Adam are strictly historical. However, he does *not* appear to represent a unified humanity in the sense of a platonic universal or aristotelian second *ousia*. Any human unity as expressed by the figure of Adam is merely illustrative, unlike that in Christ which is spiritual but actual.

Even if they differ on Adam, the fact remains that most Hilary scholars see his Christ as certainly assuming all humanity in his incarnation. It is to that critical debate – whether Christ universally assumed of all humanity – that we now turn.

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<sup>379</sup> LADARIA 1992:99, commenting on Hilary’s *TrPs* 1.15: “Adán no es contemplado aquí en paralelismo ni en contraposición con Cristo, sino más bien en relación con el que sigue a Jesús.”

## **5.4 Christ's universal assumption ?**

### 5.4a) Introduction to universal assumption (UA) in Hilary

Modern scholars identify a host of phrases in Hilary which they state points to his sure and certain belief that Christ at his incarnation somehow also assumed not just one man but the entirety of the human race. The following are a small sample of those identified in the literature.

/a/ ut... in eo universi generis humani corpus existeret (*Trin* 2.24)

/b/ erat in Christo Jesu homo totus... (*InMt* 2.5)

/c/ naturam in se universae carnis assumpsit... (*TrPs* 51.16)

A solid majority of Hilary scholars believe that Hilary holds this doctrine. The position taken here will be that expressions of an entire humanity or entire Church are not alien to Hilary's thought, but broadly speaking UA is not as significant for his thought as others claim it to be. Further, Hilary's universality language is often analogical or illustrative, in common with the rest of his exegetical method. Largely such instances occur where he is borrowing an interpretation from elsewhere or where an exegesis forces it. A number of examples of UA, however, are misreadings by overenthusiastic modern scholars (including the phrases /a/ to /c/ just quoted above).

5.4b) Literature review

In the nineteenth century a number of patristic scholars<sup>380</sup> suggested that some early Greek theologians hold the so-called ‘physicalist’ doctrine by which Christ’s incarnation is described as an assumption or taking-on of all flesh concurrently, allowing a soteriology which provides an automatic transformation of the human race (these include Irenaeus, Athanasius, Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria). This is prompted by phrases such as this one found in Irenaeus: *adsuescens habitare in genere humano et... habitare in plasmate Dei...*<sup>381</sup> Although this doctrine passes by a variety of names, it is here called the doctrine of ‘universal assumption’ (UA). Von Harnack suggested that these fathers were writing under platonic influence, particularly in the case of Nyssen. Universalist language is usually held to derive from platonism: on the Latin side a writer who is held<sup>382</sup> to show universalist language is Marius Victorinus,<sup>383</sup> who of course is heavily influenced by neo-platonic teachings.

Hilary is also said to have this ‘physicalist’ doctrine. Mersch’s sweeping survey of ‘in-Christ’ theology (*Le corps mystique du Christ*, 1936) places Hilary<sup>384</sup> in the volume where he treats the Greek fathers, and not in the Latin volume, because he sees affinities between the ‘Greek’ expressions and Hilary’s. Although phrases such as ‘life in Christ, divinization in Christ, new creation in Christ’ all point (for Mersch<sup>385</sup>) to mystic incorporation, his view of our assumption by Christ is more subtle: ‘il s’agit... non pas de

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<sup>380</sup> Ritschl, Hermann, von Harnack. Discussion & citations in SCULLY 2011:7-14

<sup>381</sup> IRENAEUS *adv. haer.* 3.17.1

<sup>382</sup> E.g. by PETTORELLI 1969:232-3; BURNS 1981:101-2

<sup>383</sup> MARIUS VICTORINUS *adv. Arium* 1A.14, 3.3: in isto enim omnia universalia fuerunt, universalis caro, anima universalis, et haec in crucem sublata atque purgata sunt per salutarem deum logon universalium omnium universalem

<sup>384</sup> Chapter on Hilary found at MERSCH 1936:410-437

<sup>385</sup> MERSCH 1936:414

la compréhension de la nature humaine..., mais de son extension... (Pour Hilaire) tous les hommes sont devenus, d'une certaine et réelle façon, intérieurs au Sauveur."<sup>386</sup>

More recent scholars are circumspect about whether platonic idealism is in fact an accurate articulation of the doctrine found in Irenaeus, Athanasius, Nyssen or Cyril, and other explanations for their expressions have been sought.<sup>387</sup> The same is true in Hilary's case. A recent full review may be found in Scully,<sup>388</sup> discussing a wide range of scholars. The best known name rejecting universal assumption in Hilary would perhaps be Wild;<sup>389</sup> those supporting it include Burns, Ladaria and Scully herself.<sup>390</sup> Scully also cites Rondeau as supporting her position, although in fact Rondeau's analysis is more nuanced and she herself may be more ambivalent on the matter.<sup>391</sup> Those supporting UA do vary in detail (for example Burns follows Mersch's notion of 'extension';<sup>392</sup> Burns and Scully emphasize the Latin rather than Greek origins for Hilary's doctrine<sup>393</sup>). Although a long line of scholars have followed Mersch in asserting Hilary's universalism, most recent Hilary scholars prefer to see its basis in Latin rather than Greek thought. But the majority view is that, regardless of the doctrine's source, Hilary does indeed believe that Christ's incarnation was somehow a 'universal assumption,' whatever this is taken to mean. What

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<sup>386</sup> MERSCH 1936:419

<sup>387</sup> E.g. in the case of Nyssen see Cross (2002), Zachhuber (2000, 2005)

<sup>388</sup> SCULLY 2011:3-5

<sup>389</sup> WILD 1950:57-73

<sup>390</sup> See particularly BURNS 1981:97-112, LADARIA 1989a:291-297. Others include CHARLIER 1965:458, 474-7; ORAZZO 1983:399-419

<sup>391</sup> RONDEAU 1985:353-364. Rondeau hesitates to choose between Hilary's Christ as 'représentant inclusif' or 'modèle exemplaire' (1985:363), and prefers to suggest that Hilary can mean both at the same time. Nevertheless, in her analysis she is the scholar whose position probably is closest to that presented in this chapter.

<sup>392</sup> BURNS 1981:99, 101, 103, 104, 106, 108

<sup>393</sup> BURNS 1981:106-112, SCULLY 2011:53-60

is more, some scholars see this as key to understanding Hilary's whole system, such as Ladaria and Scully.<sup>394</sup>

Sections §5.2 – §5.3 have already discussed whether Adam is an expression of a physical entity called 'humanity' which Christ assumes, and the notion has been all but rejected. However, we now address claims of UA in the case of Christ himself.

#### 5.4c) Identifying analogy and metaphor

It has already been shown (§5.2 – §5.3) that Hilary's method involves taking Scripture and interpreting ciphers to ascertain spiritual truths. While this is clearer in some cases (birds, boats) it is certainly true that Hilary does not state anywhere that he is being 'merely metaphorical' when he uses UA language. Yet Tertullian<sup>395</sup> and Cyprian<sup>396</sup> both state baldly we are 'in Christ' or similar, which could be taken 'literally' were it not for the fact that at other times they assert that the idea of the faithful being Christ's body is metaphorical or denotes a moral unity.

How, then, in the absence of any statement such as that of Tertullian, do we know how to read Hilary's language in the case of Christ's body? To some degree this a subjective question; nevertheless, one indication is in his phrasing. For example, at some points metaphors can be indicated by phrases such as *tamquam* when speaking of the

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<sup>394</sup> LADARIA 1989a:291-2; SCULLY 2011:248

<sup>395</sup> TERTULLIAN *adv. Marc.* 5.19.6: Sicubi autem et ecclesiam corpus christi dicit esse - ut hic ait adimplere se reliqua pressurarum christi in carne pro corpore eius, quod est ecclesia -, non propterea et in totum mentionem corporis transferens [*or*, transferes] a substantia carnis. (This text is understood in different ways by different translators, but it is at least possible to say that Tertullian is making a distinction between Christ's personal physical flesh on the one hand, and his spiritual body the church on the other.)

<sup>396</sup> CYPRIAN *de ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 23: Unus deus est et christus unus, et una ecclesia eius et fides una, et plebs in solidam corporis unitatem concordiae glutino copulata...

relation between Christ and his human members.<sup>397</sup> A second example is third-person reporting, which indicates that Hilary puts himself at a slight psychological distance from the view he is citing: “The psalmist *calls* X a Y (and I’ll explain why...)” or “X *is called* a Y (because...)”.<sup>398</sup> This use of ‘he/it calls X a Y’ is also found in Origen: δεκάχορδον ψαλτήριον τὸ σῶμά φησι.<sup>399</sup>

This may be accompanied by a word such as *fieri*, as for example when Christ is likened to a hen (*terrena videlicet nunc et domestica avis factus*).<sup>400</sup> Similarly *fieri* is used at *TrPs*, [68].3 to introduce the analogy of waters rising up to one’s neck as representing the crucifixion.<sup>401</sup>

Lastly, Hilary often indicates a metaphor by using the concessive term *quidam*. This is not found only in Hilary; for example Ambrose also frequently uses *quidam* to indicate metaphorical statements as for example when he suggests that the earth which we ‘wear’ holds us captive as if with a prostitute’s wiles, *meretricis quibusdam illecebris*.<sup>402</sup>

Some of these metaphorical markers (the third-person quotation, the use of *fit*, the use of *quidam*) are found in the following passage, for which a translation is also provided to highlight the ambivalence of the language:

<i>Non potest civitas abscondi supra</i>	<i>A city built on a hill cannot be</i>
<i>montem aedificata...</i>	<i>hidden (Mt 5.15) [...]</i>

<sup>397</sup> *TrPs* 118, 8.16: Est autem tunc etiam timentium Deum particeps, cum patientibus compatitur, cum plorantibus complorat, cum tamquam ejusdem corporis membrum in dolore membri alterius dolet.

<sup>398</sup> See discussion of *TrPs* 147 at §5.5d

<sup>399</sup> ORIGEN *Fragmenta in Psalmos* Ps. 91.4 (PITRA 3.172). See also e.g. ORIGEN *Fragm. ex comm. in epistulam ad Ephesios* 9.113: σῶμα Χριστοῦ εὐρίσκοντες λεγομένην τὴν ἐκκλησίαν...

<sup>400</sup> *InMt* 24.11

<sup>401</sup> *TrPs*, [68].3: Introeuntibus enim aquis usque ad animam, subjectus morti crucis fiebat

<sup>402</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs* 118, 4.4; also for example 11.13 quodam continentiae gelu, 14.39 in quamdam aquilae renovatus es juventutem

<p>Civitatem carnem quam assumpserat <u>nuncupat</u>: quia ut civitas ex varietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium; ita in eo, per naturam suscepti corporis, <u>quaedam</u> universi generis humani congregatio continetur.</p>	<p>He calls the flesh which he had assumed ‘a city’. This is because a city is made up of a diversity and crowd of residents; in the same way, due to the nature of the body he took up, there is contained with him a sort of assembly (<i>quaedam congregatio...</i>) of the whole human race.</p>
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<p>Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione <u>fit</u> civitas, et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus civitatis habitatio. (<i>InMt</i> 4.12)</p>	<p>Thus both he becomes (<i>fit</i>) a city due to our assembly in him, and we are the city’s population by sharing in his flesh.</p>
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Even Ladaria, who is a strong proponent of UA, admits the vagueness of the language here.<sup>403</sup> A similar example of this concessive language is found below (Ps.147, §5.5d). The words *nuncupat* and *fit* do not necessarily imply ambivalence but the overall sense of the passage seems to be to explain why Christ is using a certain illustration. Although these are merely small hints in his phrasing, they contribute to the overall picture that Hilary sees this particular example as figurative or analogical.

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<sup>403</sup> LADARIA 1989a:89 “En él formamos <*quaedam congregatio*>, expresión que denota una cierta vaguedad.”

5.4d) Borrowing from the tradition: the ubiquitous lost sheep

Another passage frequently quoted in the modern literature on UA is Hilary's explanation of the parable of the lost sheep. Here, it seems that Hilary is using a standard interpretation within the Christian tradition.

One interpretation of the lost sheep found in the Fathers is that the sheep are all humans of which the lost sheep is a sample sinner (as in most modern interpretations of the parable). This is found in Tertullian,<sup>404</sup> Cyprian<sup>405</sup> and Chrysostom.<sup>406</sup> However Jerome mentions that there are two interpretations (without showing a preference for either),<sup>407</sup> and indeed the second, more metaphysical, interpretation is found in a number of Greek fathers and also in Hilary.

Ovis una, homo intelligendus est, et sub homine uno, universitas sentienda est. Sed in unius Adae errore omne hominum genus aberravit; ergo nonaginta novem non errantes, multitudo angelorum coelestium opinanda est, quibus in coelo est laetitia et cura salutis humanae. Igitur et quaerens hominem, Christus est; et nonaginta novem relictis, coelestis gloriae multitudo est: cui cum maximo gaudio errans homo in Domini corpore est relatus. (*InMt* 18.6)

The flock of sheep represents the rational spiritual beings (largely the angels) from which one alone, *homo*, has gone astray and has to be brought back by Christ. The idea of the

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<sup>404</sup> TERTULLIAN *de paenitentia* 8.3-5; *de patientia* 12.6; *de res.carnis* 34.1-2. ORBE (1972b:140-147) shows that Tertullian's interpretation changes somewhat during his montanist phase: for example *de pudicitia* 7 discusses at length whether the lost sheep represents any human, or a Christian.

<sup>405</sup> CYPRIAN *Ep.* 51.2.1; 55.15.1; 75.1.2-2.2

<sup>406</sup> CHRYSOSTOM *In Matthaem* 59.4

<sup>407</sup> JEROME *Comm.in Matth.* 3, on Mt 18.12

lost sheep representing mankind or Adam goes back as far as Irenaeus,<sup>408</sup> himself responding to Gnostic interpretations.<sup>409</sup> However, it can be shown that Hilary's version specifically goes back to Origen. Hilary's version of the parable has the extra element that the other ninety-nine represent the supraterrrestrial rational beings, which is found in Origen who frequently refers to this parable;<sup>410</sup> Origen's interpretation is also found in say Nyssen<sup>411</sup> and Cyril of Alexandria<sup>412</sup>. Moreover, Origen has a numerological fascination with the spiritual relevance of the one and the ninety-nine beings. Hilary immediately follows the above excerpt with an explanation of the extra letters added to the names of Abraham and Sarah:<sup>413</sup> his digression seems both irrelevant to lost sheep and highly obscure, unless we bear in mind that Origen's discussion of the one, the numbers ninety-nine and hundred are related to the Hebrew letters that formed Abraham and Sarah's names. Thus Hilary must be using Origen's interpretation (and possibly it has been transmitted to him in a way that he does not fully understand).

It has already been argued that *homo* (or Adam) here is merely representative (§5.2): Hilary states quite clearly that the characters of the story are ciphers for some spiritual or theological reality (*ovis una, homo intelligendus est; et sub homine uno, universitas sentienda est*).<sup>414</sup>

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<sup>408</sup> IRENAEUS *adv. haer.* 3.23.1, 3.23.7-8; note also 3.19.3, 5.12.3, 5.15.2. Irenaeus also mentions gnostic interpretations of the parable, e.g. *adv. haer.* 1.8.4 (cf. 1.16.1).

<sup>409</sup> ORBE (1972b):117-181, esp.177-181

<sup>410</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. in Genesim* 2.5, 9.3, 13.2; *In Ezech.* 4.6. Also *Hom. in Num.* 19.4, which does not mention angels but where the restitution of the one lost to complete the perfect number hundred is important. Compare also *Hom. in Num.* 23.2, *Hom. in Iesu Nave* 7.6, *c.Cels* 4.17, *Comm. in Matth.* 13.29. Ironically, Origen's interpretation seems to return to the gnostic interpretations of the parable (Orbe 1972b:153-161).

<sup>411</sup> E.g. NYSSSEN *c.Eun.* 3.11-12 (=Migne *c.Eun.* 12.1). Also *Hom. in Eccl.* 2 and elsewhere.

<sup>412</sup> CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA (a) *Arabic Catena on Matthew*, 38 on Mt 18.12-22 (Caubet-Iturbe 1970:177, cited at fn.418 below). (b) *Explanatio in Lucae Evangelium*, on Lk 15.7 (PG 72.797-800)

<sup>413</sup> *InMt* 4.12

<sup>414</sup> *InMt* 18.6

Moving now to Christ, Hilary states that the sheep is brought back to the heavenly host: *errans homo in Domini corpore est relatus*. Mersch takes this as categorically universalist: Christ assumes the man into his own flesh.<sup>415</sup> Doignon<sup>416</sup> points out the phrase is ambiguous: it could indicate that the human is ‘in’ Christ’s body, or it could merely denote that the sheep was carried back on Christ’s shoulders. Also, it replaces *in humeros* in the biblical text. Now, as a concession to those scholars who support UA, the phrase is not *very* ambiguous: the specific phrase *in corpore* throughout the Christian period is to be taken in the pauline spiritual sense (‘in the body’, i.e. denoting constituents of the body); I have not found any instance where it can denote how something was carried (i.e. ‘on his back / shoulders’).<sup>417</sup> Moreover, he is clearly talking now about the *homo* rather than the sheep. So there is justification for taking this in a universalist way.

The fact remains, however, that Hilary is not particularly emphasizing the universalist connotations here (if anything he may be muting them) – even though they were certainly present in Origen’s text. How do we know that Origen himself had a UA explanation for this parable? The surviving Origen fragments do not initially appear to support this; however there are hints that this is because any ‘physicalist’ interpretation of this parable in Origen was written out by Rufinus and other translators.

Firstly, on a number of occasions<sup>418</sup> Origen’s use of this parable is triggered by a discussion on being one body (we the church, together with Christ). The texts do not make clear why discussion of the one-body should continually trigger a mention of this parable; but the context suggests that the parable is being used to support a universalist understanding of the church and Christ (*quomodo enim unum corpus plura sunt corpora,*

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<sup>415</sup> MERSCH 1936:419

<sup>416</sup> DOIGNON 1982:202, fn.9

<sup>417</sup> BREPOLIS *Latin Database of Texts (Series A)*, searching for instances from 2<sup>nd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> centuries A.D. Website accessed 01/11/12.

<sup>418</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. in Num.* 23.2; *Hom. in Iesu Nave* 7.6; *Hom. in Ezech.* 4.6.

*et una ovis plures sunt oves quae perierant...*).<sup>419</sup> This only works if the parable itself has a universalist interpretation for Origen.

Secondly, Origen's physicalist use of this passage is further supported by his exegetical heirs. Cyril's expression in this passage is ambiguous: *he carried [the sheep] on his shoulders, that is, the Incarnation of the Word*.<sup>420</sup> The words 'incarnation of the Word' appear to gloss how or where the sheep was carried – possibly indicating a physicalist understanding – but this is not certain. Possibly more decisive are Nyssen's frequent references to the parable, in which UA appears more clearly: ...τῆ ἀπαρχῆ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος συναγιασθέντος καὶ τοῦ φυράματος.<sup>421</sup> However this is to be interpreted (scholars are divided on what Nyssen means),<sup>422</sup> the cumulative evidence certainly suggests that some kind of incorporation or physicalist doctrine is to be found in Origen's interpretation of the parable. This is being dealt with variously by his successors, but the association between the lost sheep and UA seems too frequent to be fortuitous.

So it has been shown that Hilary is using Origen's interpretation of the parable, rather than anyone else's, even at the expense of really understanding it; and also that Origen's interpretation is universalist. Given these two facts, one could argue that one would expect *more* universalism in the Hilary's telling. As it is, the only universalism

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<sup>419</sup> ORIGEN *Hom. in Ezech.* 4.6. The sentence continues: hoc pacto omnes Noe, Daniel et Iob in unum Noe et Iob et Danielelem rediguntur.

<sup>420</sup> CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA *Arabic Catena on Matthew*, 38 on Mt 18.12-22 (Caubet-Iturbe 1970:177): "In heaven there is the assembly of angelic powers, and on earth the rational human race. He calls them the 'hundred sheep'. But one – who is the whole human race – went astray due to idolatry. So [Christ] left the ninety-nine on the mountain – that is, the heavenly place – and came to the world; he sought the human race – that is, the lost sheep – and when he found it he carried it on his shoulders – that is, the Incarnation of the Word – and was more joyful with that one than with the ninety-nine who did not go astray." This expression is not found in Cyril's Commentary preserved in Greek.

<sup>421</sup> NYSSSEN *c.Eun.* 3.10.13-14 (=Migne *c.Eun.* 12.1). See also 3.10.12-13 γενόμενος ὅπερ ἡμεῖς δι' ἑαυτοῦ πάλιν συνῆψε τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον; *ibid.* πᾶσαν τὴν κοινωνὸν τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ καὶ συγγενῆ φύσιν πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν χάριν συνεφελέκασατο.

<sup>422</sup> See debate played out in Zachhuber (2000), Cross (2002), Zachhuber (2005)

evident is one phrase (*in corpore Domini*) which can be read by some as ambiguous (in being similar to the scriptural *in humeros suos*).<sup>423</sup> If Hilary is a universalist, he is not particularly milking it. Indeed one could argue that he merely mentions it and moves swiftly on – not that he rejects the theology, but either it is unimportant to him or even that he is equivocating.

#### 5.4e) Nature and material

Another factor in Hilary's language is that in a large number of cases he is not asserting UA specifically, but in fact making a statement about the nature, form or material of Christ's flesh in the incarnation.

For example, Hilary's use of *natura* is a first clue to his understanding of the incarnation. Referring again to some of the key citations used by other scholars and quoted above, we may note that Hilary does not in fact say that Christ takes up *universam carnem*, but rather *\*natura\* universae carnis* (as for example in /c/ cited above: *naturam in se universae carnis assumpsit*).<sup>424</sup> This is an important distinction. If Christ were assuming 'all flesh', one could debate indeed whether this means Christ assumed a philosophical universal-ideal. However, since he is merely taking on 'the *\*nature\** of all flesh', the problem is eliminated: however *universa caro* is interpreted, its *natura* is certainly not a universal in this sense, but rather the set of features which define or are shared by the individuals of the class. Hilary frequently uses *natura* in this way: e.g. *habitavit in nobis, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis assumens*.<sup>425</sup>

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<sup>423</sup> Luke 5:15 (Vulgate): Et cum invenerit eam, imponit in humeros suos gaudens.

<sup>424</sup> *TrPs* 51.16

<sup>425</sup> *TrPs* 51.17. See also *Trin* 2.24, 11.16, *TrPs* 51.16 twice, 54.9.

*TrPs.* 51.16-7 also makes the same point in terms of *genus*: [*vera vitis*] *genus in se universae propaginis tenet*. Hilary is talking about humans being rooted in the True Vine by a sharing of nature, although we can still be pruned off due to faithlessness or lack of fruit. In context, then, *genus universae propaginis* must here refer to the *genus* of ‘every individual shoot’ rather than ‘some universal or ideal shoot’, especially since the following line goes on to cite individual behaviour.<sup>426</sup> So again *universus* seems to mean ‘all’ rather than ‘universal’ (§5.3a). Further, the whole passage makes it clear that it is the *natura* or *genus* that imports; there is simply no suggestion of any platonic ideal, Stoic conception or even Christian allegorical ‘type’ anywhere in this text.

Returning to *natura universae carnis*,<sup>427</sup> there is also a question as to how the genitive should be read. Such phrases are taken by some modern scholars as genitives of material: Christ takes on a nature that is ‘made of’ all flesh. However, this frequent phrase is surely better taken as a genitive of description (what kind of X): Christ takes on the same type of nature that all humans have. As noted by Rondeau,<sup>428</sup> something similar may be said of the way Hilary uses *nostra*; for example *per assumptionem carnis nostrae corporisque*<sup>429</sup> is more likely to denote Christ’s assumption of flesh ‘like ours’: the implications may be universal, but this does not mean Hilary appeals to the existence of such a thing as a universal humanity. This misunderstanding of this genitive or of the possessive is a frequent feature of modern scholarship on UA in Hilary.

This point may be expressed philosophically as much as grammatically. Many Hilary scholars state that Hilary’s use of human nature is extensive (§5.4g). However, Hilary may rather be providing an intensive definition (i.e. providing an attribute

<sup>426</sup> *TrPs* 51.16: Si qua ergo propago infidelis aut infructuosa est, eradicandam ipsa se praebet; per naturam quidem manens, sed per infidelitatem aut inutilitatem evellitur.

<sup>427</sup> *TrPs* 51.16

<sup>428</sup> RONDEAU 1985:356-364

<sup>429</sup> *TrPs* 124.3

contributing to a definition) rather than an extensive one (the set that the definition applies to). In other words, *natura universae carnis* presents an attribute of the sort of nature Christ assumes, rather than denoting the entire set covered by that nature.

All this contributes to the notion that Hilary's understanding of UA refers to Christ taking on our nature, and not a universal concept or ideal called humanity: *in corpore demutatio habitus et assumptio naturae, naturam manentis divinitatis non peremit*.<sup>430</sup>

#### 5.4f Other expressions of the incarnation in Hilary

Another way to answer whether Hilary believes that Christ assumes us universally is to examine the other ways in which he expresses the incarnation. This is an enormous topic in Hilary studies.<sup>431</sup> Here it will be sufficient to consider a number of angles, with no attempt to be comprehensive.

Hilary uses a number of images to describe the incarnation. For him the Incarnation can be described as the Word descending to earth,<sup>432</sup> dwelling in a human body,<sup>433</sup> or even merely changing his clothing (*demutatio habitus*).<sup>434</sup> But whatever his expression, Hilary is consistent throughout his work that Christ has assumed a particular human being who was visible to other humans and could interact with them: *ut qui... homo cernebatur, ...Dei filius nosceretur*;<sup>435</sup> this is also emphasized by Hilary's interminable references to Christ's human birth (§9.4b). Hilary is anxious to dismiss a docetic

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<sup>430</sup> *Trin* 9.14

<sup>431</sup> See for example SMULDERS (1944), BURNS (1981), LADARIA (1989a)...

<sup>432</sup> *Trin* 9.49, 10.5, 10.16, 10.18, 10.54, 10.69...

<sup>433</sup> Dwelling in a body: *InMt* 4.3, *Trin* 6.36, 9.1, *TrPs* 131.13... Dwelling among men: *Trin* 1.6, 4.42... (Note also Hilary's concept of God dwelling within himself by the mysterious relations of the Persons: *Trin* 4.40, 5.38, 6.19...)

<sup>434</sup> *Trin* 9.14, 9.38-9, 9.51, 10.7, 10.25 (*gerens quidem nos*)...

<sup>435</sup> *Trin* 6.23

understanding of the incarnation and is thus eager to emphasize that Christ assumed an (individual) *homo* in his entirety, both body and soul.

Some suggest the word *homo* is ambiguous and could be taken as either an individual or a universal ('humanity')<sup>436</sup>. For example, the following passage is the source of some debate:

Erat in Christo Jesu homo totus, atque ideo in famulatum spiritus corpus assumptum, omne in se sacramentum nostrae salutis explevit. [...] Erat enim per eum omnis implenda justitia, per quem solum lex poterat impleri. Atque ita et prophetae testimonio lavacro non eget, et exempli sui auctoritate humanae salutis sacramenta consummat, hominem et assumptione sanctificans et lavacro. (*InMt 2.5*)

Some scholars (such as Coustant and Mersch)<sup>437</sup> take the first sentence as denoting all mankind, with *totus* being equivalent to *omnis*; that is, *the entirety of mankind was in Christ Jesus*. However, this seems to be a mis-reading of the Latin, as emphasized particularly by Doignon.<sup>438</sup> Hilary is asking why Christ needed to be baptized; his response is that Christ was both setting an example for us, and sanctifying the waters of baptism by his action. *Qua* God he needs no baptism and is free from sin; *qua* man he both sets an example for us and fulfils the economy which we cannot fulfil ourselves.<sup>439</sup> Thus Hilary's interpretation requires him to emphasize Christ's humanity: hence his opening assertion that *there was in Christ Jesus a complete /whole human being*,

<sup>436</sup> For one example see WILD 1950:59-60

<sup>437</sup> COUSTANT *Patrologia Latina* 9:927C-D, note (a); MERSCH 1936:416-7, fn.6

<sup>438</sup> For discussion of scholarly interpretations of *totus homo*, see DOIGNON (1982).

<sup>439</sup> *InMt 2.5*: Denique et a Joanne baptizari prohibetur, ut Deus – et ita in se fieri oportere, ut homo edocet.

emphasizing that the *homo* is bona fide, with both body and soul, –that is, he is a particular individual. Indeed, Hilary’s question (why Christ needed to be baptized) is a standard in interpreting this passage, and other authors also justify Christ’s baptism in terms of Christ’s humanity.<sup>440</sup> Hilary again appears to be using a standard interpretation of the passage, and it does not involve any universalism.

The relation between Christ’s incarnation and our humanity may indeed be expressed in terms of us being ‘in him’ or he ‘in us’ but this may be eschatological (compare §5.6). However, Hilary frequently seems to gloss physicalist descriptions of the incarnation with other descriptive terms indicating association or fellowship. This is especially noticeable when we examine the other descriptive terms he uses in the very same sentences where UA is otherwise supposed.

...perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo universi  
generis humani corpus existeret (*Trin* 2.24)

The body of the whole human race achieves sanctification, but it does so *per hujus admixtionis societatem*. For all its closeness, the word *societas* does not denote physical identity, but a fellowship of two distinct parts (this holds whether *corpus* is interpreted as “everybody’s body” or “the collection of humans”). Hilary repeatedly uses such terms of association or fellowship to gloss his descriptions of our incorporation in Christ. For example *concorporales (Christo)*<sup>441</sup> is always accompanied by a word that emphasises difference such as *cohaeredes, conformes, comparticipes* (following its Scriptural

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<sup>440</sup> Christ’s humanity in this passage is affirmed by CHROMATIUS *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 12.1– 13.3 (Banterle 1990:80-88); ANON. *Opus Imperfectum in Matth.* 4; JEROME *Comm. in Matth.* 1.3.13; CHRYSOSTOM (a) *arabic catena on Matthew*, 3 on Mt 3.13 (Caubet-Iturbe 1970:32); (b) *Hom. in Matth.* 12.1, on Mt3.13 (PG 57.203)

<sup>441</sup> *TrPs* 56.7, 60.6, [68].14, [68].24, [91].9, 138.30

examples at Eph. 3.6 and Rom 8.17). Words such as *consortium*, *communio*,<sup>442</sup> *particeps* are also used to indicate fellowship (*particeps ejus erit quisquis in justitia manet; quia ipse justitia est*).<sup>443</sup> This should not be taken as universalist; humility demands that we should be quicker to confess ourselves as a ‘participant’ of those who fear God, than as a ‘participant’ of Christ himself.<sup>444</sup>

Thus Hilary uses the incarnation to emphasize Christ’s fellowship among us as a group. For example, the incarnation means that he can speak of us as brothers (*sacramentum quoque fraternitatis in carne est*).<sup>445</sup> Similarly when commenting the lemma Mt 19.9, *love your neighbour as yourself*, Christ is our fellow or neighbour:

...Christum, qui omnium nostrum corpus assumpsit, et unicuique nostrum assumpti corporis conditione factus est proximus... (*InMt* 19.5)

Again, the phrase appears to begin with an apparent bare-faced assertion of physicalist doctrine: *Christum... omnium nostrum corpus assumpsit*. But Hilary then expands in a way which belies this easy reading: Christ is neighbour to each one of us due to his incarnation. Hilary frequently glosses apparently universalist language in this way, which shows he sees Christ’s incarnation as bringing him into fellowship with humans as individuals. We are indeed incorporated into his body somehow, but we are *also* distinct individuals who may have a relationship with him. It is thus preferable to translate the

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<sup>442</sup> Consors / consortium: *Trin* 1.36, 11.17, 11.38, *TrPs118* 8.16, 12.10... Communio (including overlap with the eucharistic sense): *InMt* 4.2, 12.24, 30.2\*, *Trin* 1.33, 8.17\*, 9.13, 11.17...

<sup>443</sup> *TrPs118*, 8.16

<sup>444</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>445</sup> *Trin* 11.15. For other ‘brethren’ references see *Trin* 11.15-20, *InMt* 12.24; see also WILD 1950:52-4, SMULDERS 1944:134-5, CHARLIER 1965:465-6, 473

genitives here as descriptive again: ...*Christ, who assumed a body like we all have, and in consequence of the assumed body became a neighbour to each one of us...*

#### 5.4g) Understandings of ‘universal assumption’

When refuting the notion of universal assumption in Hilary, one problem arising is that of definition. There is notable lack of clarity among modern scholars regarding what exactly is meant by ‘universal assumption’.

Mersch’s argument that Hilary has a ‘physicalist’ doctrine rooted in platonic (or other philosophical) teaching is now largely dismissed, as it often is for other early fathers in whom this doctrine is purportedly found. Nevertheless, the old scholarship had the advantage that the notion of physicalism was relatively well-defined,<sup>446</sup> and so easier to test and refute.

However, the more recent trend in Hilary studies is to attempt to identify the bishop’s Latin Stoic roots. Echoes of Cicero, Seneca and the like are sought in his ideas and language: this approach is used by Pettorelli, Burns, and Scully.<sup>447</sup> But the question still remains as to what exactly these scholars *mean* by universal assumption. Their work abounds with Stoic examples of the *congregatio* or *universitas* of humanity and particularly the common Stoic metaphor of the city as an expression of the unity of all those dwelling on earth (§5.5b). The problem with this expression of UA is that it is still not articulated, but based entirely on metaphors. This is fair to some degree, but the doctrine itself is somewhat ill-defined in these scholars, making it difficult to grasp – and thus, to refute. Scully for example squarely rejects a platonic-physicalist understanding of

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<sup>446</sup> JOSSUA 1968:22-23 (summary) or 23-33 (detail)

<sup>447</sup> PETTORELLI 1969:230-233; BURNS 1981:104-112; SCULLY 2011:53-57

the incarnation but still asserts universal assumption – without giving a clear definition of what she means by this<sup>448</sup> (except that it is not analogical).<sup>449</sup> Ladaria insists on UA as crucial to understanding Hilary's thought, yet his articulation of what this actually means seems perilously close to the position suggested here, namely that Hilary's UA is predominantly ecclesiological if not figurative: “No se trata... de una concepción filosófica de la unidad de todos... Es sobre todo la idea de la vocación de todos los hombres a participar en la vida de Cristo... la que desde el comienzo da sentido a toda la soteriología de nuestro autor.”<sup>450</sup>

Rather than clarifying the issue, their use of philosophical language introduces further complications since it is not used consistently.

Burns correctly suggests that one need not have merely two options, namely the incarnation of a particular man versus UA as (platonic) physicalism. Rather, Burns feels Hilary's universalist passages should be read in an ‘extended’ sense.<sup>451</sup> He goes on to give the usual Stoic examples of universality, but he does not make it clear what he means by ‘extended.’ Burns appears to be echoing neo-scholastic (modern) assessments of universalism, since the term is found for example in Malevez and Burns explicitly refers to Mersch's use of the term.<sup>452</sup>

Mersch uses ‘extension’ in a way found in philosophical logic: “*il s’agit... non pas de la compréhension de la nature humaine..., mais de son extension...*”<sup>453</sup> (The notion of

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<sup>448</sup> See SCULLY 2011:104-133 (Ch4). Scully's chapter seeks to define Christ's universal assumption in Hilary but she merely re-iterates Hilary's language (Pauline parallels, Christ as mediator etc.) without analysing what this unity entails.

<sup>449</sup> SCULLY 2011:5, 164

<sup>450</sup> LADARIA 1989a:293-4; see also 1989a:47

<sup>451</sup> BURNS 1981:99, 101, 103, 104, 106, 108. Also used by Scully 2011:26

<sup>452</sup> BURNS 1981:99

<sup>453</sup> MERSCH 1936:419

comprehension /extension is expressed by other authors with different terms).<sup>454</sup> These refer to the types of description for a thing: comprehension lists the necessary and sufficient features (intensions) that make up its essence whereas extension lists the individual members of the set. Mersch here is describing what it means to say that Christ assumed human nature. However he seems to imply that the nature is all but equivalent to a platonic *ousia*; he asserts that Hilary's doctrine is approaching platonism but in Christian language.<sup>455</sup> This is the contrary to what Burns is intending.

Malevez accepts (what he sees as) platonic universalism in fathers such as Nyssen and Cyril of Alexandria (Hilary also gets a passing mention);<sup>456</sup> he suggests this platonic approach is no longer appropriate but that a UA understanding of the incarnation can be fitted into an aristotelian-thomist system and is thus compatible with modern Catholicism. Malevez also uses the language of extension although again in a different way: for him, Nyssen evinces Christ's assumption of human nature in the 'extensive' (rather than 'collective') sense.<sup>457</sup> Nevertheless, it is questionable whether Malevez is philosophically or theologically coherent (see for example Congar)<sup>458</sup> and at any rate he still uses 'extensive' to indicate a platonic understanding of UA; again this is exactly the opposite from Burns' intention, and does not provide an alternative understanding of universalism in Hilary.

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<sup>454</sup> E.g. CROSS 2002:391 refers to extension /intension (properly speaking, comprehension may refer to the sum of all intensions). Related, but not identical, are concepts of quantity in Aquinas and Aristotle. AQUINAS *ST* 3a, q.7, a.9 distinguishes *quantitas intensiva* from that which is *secundum virtutem*. ARISTOTLE *metaph.* 5.11-14 discusses two types of quantity, namely plurality and magnitude. The Roman Catholic discussions of universalism follow thomist terminology.

<sup>455</sup> MERSCH 1936:420

<sup>456</sup> MALEVEZ 1935a:258, 291

<sup>457</sup> For example at (1935a:269) Malevez several times uses 'extension, sens extensif' (as opposed to 'sens collectif') to describe universal nature in Nyssen. "Par le simple fait d'avoir pris une nature singulière, le Verb s'est mélangé à l'espèce humaine tout entière, c'est-à-dire à la nature considérée selon son extension universelle." Similarly at (1935a:285-6) of Cyril.

<sup>458</sup> CONGAR (1936)

Rondeau hesitates to reject universalism altogether, but recognizes that extension alone is insufficient in explaining Hilary's language. She prefers to take a line where both comprehension and extension serve to exemplify his theology.<sup>459</sup>

What then of the Stoics that Hilary scholars appeal to; does their thought explain UA? Although they would happily use Platonic language regarding universals (e.g. μετέχειν for 'participation'),<sup>460</sup> the Stoics rejected any notion of universals as either ontological or immanent realities. Rather, universals were seen as concepts (έννοήματα) or figments of the rational mind with associated conceptions (έννοιαι).<sup>461</sup> So there is something of an irony here when scholars assert the 'reality' of universal assumption in Hilary: they are appealing for support to a philosophical school which did not believe in universals as ontologically prior ideals, but rather as abstract mental concepts.

So, putting aside modern Hilary scholarship, how could a theory of 'universal assumption' be understood? One could envisage that, with respect to Christ's incarnation, it could mean any of the following; these are not meant to be mutually exclusive, but rather reflect a variety of expressions in the literature:

- (i) (Idealist/Physicalist): that Christ is the platonic 'ideal' of the human, understood in the realist sense
- (ii) (Collective): that he took on all human beings at once;
- (iii) (Representative): that he took on one individual who somehow stands for all;
- (iv) (Seminal): that he is the seed or blueprint from which others derive (in some way other than platonic);

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<sup>459</sup> RONDEAU 1985:356-364

<sup>460</sup> SEDLEY & LONG 1987a:182

<sup>461</sup> SELLARS 2006:84-6; SEDLEY & LONG 1987a:181-3

- (v) (Generic): that he is one of the same species as us – allowing greater community and fellowship of understanding as ‘brothers’ and ‘neighbours’
- (vi) (Moral): that he is joined with us by his love and will for us, and ours for him
- (vii) (Spiritual): that he is joined with us through the Spirit.

(Note philosophers may come up with a different list, e.g. immanent / transcendent / collective universals;<sup>462</sup> but those above are more pertinent to the debate for Hilary). If presented with this list, the language of modern Hilary scholars predominantly suggests the second of these (collective), with strong hints of (ii) to (iv); the subsequent categories are present, but weaker, expressions of universalism. However the foregoing discussion in this chapter suggests the latter half of the list are more reflective of Hilary’s thought.

Then again, one is not forced to choose between any of the above options. These categories imply that Hilary’s is merely expressing an ontological understanding of the incarnation. It has already been shown that there is far less universalism than some suggest, but it is necessary to consider that any universalism he does display is not essentially about the *fact* of the incarnation, but rather about its effects. This leads us to consider Hilary’s ecclesiology and soteriology.

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<sup>462</sup> Cross uses these terms in his discussion of universals in Nyssen. See CROSS (2002) *passim*, for example p.402

## **5.5 Christ's body, the Church**

Ladaria believes that UA in the incarnation is fundamental to Hilary's theology and has immense implications for Hilary's soteriology and ecclesiology.<sup>463</sup> Here it is suggested that the situation is firmly the reverse of this: it is Hilary's inter-related soteriology and ecclesiology that lead to his expressions of universalism in Christ's incarnation.

### 5.5a) Church as body

The notion of the Church as Christ's body is used frequently in the New Testament so it is hardly surprising that Hilary should make such rich usage of the notion himself.

Hoc itaque populo Dei congruit, sub uno patre fratres, et sub uno spiritu unum esse, sub una domo unanimes incedere, sub uno capite unius corporis membra esse. (*TrPs* 132.3)

In common with other Fathers, Hilary emphasizes our unity in Christ,<sup>464</sup> but the present enquiry demands that we ask exactly what this unity consists of. Dupont-Fauville's thesis on the notion of *communio* in Hilary expounds how he sees the sacraments of baptism and eucharist as fundamental in composing the church. For Dupont-Fauville, this then draws us into participation with the other key *communitas*, namely the Trinity.<sup>465</sup> The

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<sup>463</sup> LADARIA 1989a:293

<sup>464</sup> *TrPs* 127.4: Sermo ad plures coeptus, ad unum refertur, docens nos omnes qui in Christo crediderimus unum esse, Apostolo ita confirmare: *Omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Jesu* (Gal 3.28). Sive ergo ad unum, sive ad plures loquetur; in uno id erit significantiae, quod in pluribus.

<sup>465</sup> DUPONT-FAUVILLE 2008:155-180

importance of sacraments in making us part of Christ's body is also drawn out by Charlier in his work on the church as Christ's body in Hilary.<sup>466</sup>

It is certainly true that Hilary sees a parallel between the community of the Trinity and the community of the church; the argument of Book 8 of *de trinitate* is essentially based on this parallel. In this book Hilary is attempting to prove the 'natural' unity of Father and Son (as opposed to the moral unity proposed by the Arians). Most of his arguments are focused on the trinity itself (the Son's birth, unity in glory, Spirit, action...). However, several arguments for the unity of Trinity are based on the unity of Christians. We are one in baptism, mission, and glory.<sup>467</sup> The eucharist joins us together with Christ's flesh in a jarringly literal way: Hilary explains the johannine verses that Father and Son are in each other and we inside them by reference to the fact that Christ is physically inside us when we eat the eucharist.<sup>468</sup> Lastly, the spiritual unity of Father and Son overflows to us in the gifts of the Spirit.<sup>469</sup> The point behind all of this is that what binds us is something more than moral unity; hence we must have a 'natural' unity (whatever Hilary means by that) which ultimately derives from the Father and Son's natural unity. This is a unity of nature which may also be expressed as unity of spirit.<sup>470</sup>

Hilary's argument at this point can appear a little poor (if we have a 'natural' unity with other Christians, this makes the shared 'nature' within the godhead fairly weak) but this is merely part of a cumulative argument; also he does make the useful point that if Christians are united in the Spirit, then the Trinity must be so united. But throughout the long course of this argument Hilary does not use incarnation or assumption language to

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<sup>466</sup> CHARLIER 1965:475. See also MERSCH 1936:428f.

<sup>467</sup> (baptism) *Trin* 8.7-8, (mission) *Trin* 8.9, (glory) *Trin* 8.12

<sup>468</sup> *Trin* 8.14-17

<sup>469</sup> *Trin* 8.29-33

<sup>470</sup> *Trin* 8.27

illustrate our ‘natural’ unity.<sup>471</sup> Rather, the basis for the ‘natural’ unity Hilary insists on (whether between humans, or between humans and God) is emphatically the Spirit: mediated through participation in the sacraments or through mission. There is no philosophical language here of species or genus and individual – merely Scriptural appeal to the Spirit.

### 5.5b) Christ as City

A more unusual image used by Hilary is that of Christ as a city. It is often referred to in the UA debate and is worth discussing at length.

The image of the church as the (new) Jerusalem is a common one in the patristic period, due to its scriptural basis, and it is not surprising that it should be found in Hilary.<sup>472</sup> However, Hilary’s articulation of this common image is more unusual, and this has been noted in particular by those proposing UA.<sup>473</sup>

*[Exiit] verbum Domini ex Jerusalem (Isa 2.3). Hoc ‘verbum Domini’  
caro factum est. Haec caro et Sion et Jerusalem est, civitas novae pacis,  
et speculatorium nostrum. (TrPs 52.18)*

The unusual feature here is that Hilary is using two common scriptural illustrations (church = Christ’s body; church = new Jerusalem), but drops the common term ‘church’, so that he now states that Sion or Jerusalem is Christ’s body. The reasoning goes something like this.

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<sup>471</sup> Hilary does mention at one point that Christ assumed the nature of our flesh, but this is a descriptive genitive; see §5.4e

<sup>472</sup> E.g. *TrPs* 124.4: *Habitemus nunc Ecclesiam coelestem Jerusalem; ut non moveamur in aeternum.*

<sup>473</sup> *TrPs* [13].4, 52.18, [64].2, [68].31, 121.5, 128.9, 147.2; also *InMt* 4.12, 4.24

- (1) Scriptural metaphors: (a) “*Church = Christ’s body*”. (b) “*Church = new Jerusalem*”
- (2) All terms held as equivalent: “*Christ’s body = Church = New Jerusalem*”.
- (3) Omission of central term: “*Christ’s body = Jerusalem*”.

Stage (1) is ubiquitous throughout ancient literature due to its scriptural origins. In Hilary’s work these two ciphers are found particularly in *TrPs*. Indeed the frequent mentions of Sion or Jerusalem in the psalms often trigger a comment from Hilary that this refers to the heavenly city and thus the particular lemma under discussion will be taken to point to some ecclesiological or eschatological reality. That is, the word ‘Jerusalem’ and in particular the word ‘Sion’ (following Origen he differentiates the two) are one of his standard ciphers to point to an ecclesiological interpretation, in common with his hermeneutic method discussed above.

It is not therefore surprising, given how frequently these two metaphors occur, that they should eventually come to be held equivalent. Evidence of this second stage of mixing metaphors is found in *TrPs* [14].5 where those in Christ are described within one sentence as the elect, Christ’s body, a city built on a hill.

Lastly, stage (3). The vibrancy of the new metaphor means it becomes used without the central term. What is more, the fluidity of imagery means that ‘New Jerusalem’ is expressed as equivalent to ‘(old) Jerusalem’, ‘city of the great king’, ‘city on a hill which cannot be hid’. Similarly ‘body’ is held equivalent to ‘flesh’. All this leads to Hilary’s vivid passage in which Christ calls his own flesh a city with many inhabitants.

Civitatem carnem quam assumpserat nuncupat: quia ut civitas ex

varietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium; ita in eo, per naturam suscepti corporis, quaedam universi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit civitas, et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus civitatis habitatio. (*InMt* 4.12)

This excerpt is ubiquitously quoted in the literature on UA in Hilary. Just as a city is made up of a plurality of inhabitants, so also Christ assumes the plurality of the human race: hence he calls the flesh which he assumed ‘a city’ and we are inhabitants of that city by sharing his flesh. Thus these scholars argue that Christ has mystically assumed the entirety of human flesh. Pettorelli’s article on the theme of Sion in Hilary takes it for granted that the city metaphors of *TrPs* and the particularly marked one of *InMt* 4.12 all point to Hilary’s universalism.

Pettorelli and many subsequent scholars all use these city metaphors to demonstrate that Hilary’s universalism is not platonic but indigenously Latin. They cite examples of earlier Latin authors (particularly Cicero) using cities to illustrate the universality of humanity:

nos natos esse ad congrgationem hominum et ad societatem communitatemque generis humani... (CICERO *fin* 4.4, cited in Pettorelli 1969:231)

principio civitatis formam definit [Plato] ad hunc modum: civitatem esse convictum inter se hominum plurimorum... coniuncti inter se concordia... isdem legibus, rectis tamen, officia sua temperantes... (APULEIUS *de Platone et eius dogmate* 2.24, cited in Burns 1981:106)

Duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam qua di atque homines continentur... (SENECA *de otio* 4.1, cited in Scully 2011:55, fn.173)

This Stoic angle gives an apparently pleasing alternative to platonic universalism, and is held to explain Hilary's theology without further need for analysis.

The problem with appealing to Stoic ideas of cities and human *universitas* has already been exposed. Stoics were materialist,<sup>474</sup> so any unity implied by a city is essentially twofold: analogical and moral. On the analogical level, the order within the ideal city is a microcosm of that of the whole cosmos, where everything is ordained by reason and with a benevolent ruler (or god). On the moral level, the citizens of the city all work together altruistically for the good of the whole. On both levels this is thus an excellent image for the church; but not so good for the incarnation, since it implies the union of all mankind in Christ is merely analogical or moral. In other words, if this metaphor is 'Stoic' it merely compounds the suggestion that Hilary's use of universalism is ecclesiological before incarnational.

#### 5.5c) Source of 'Christ-city' language

It is here fully accepted that the Stoic notion of the city is a good parallel with the church, and also accepted that any non-Christian education Hilary received may have exposed him to this colourful metaphor. But it is here proposed that Hilary is getting his language not primarily from the Stoics, but rather from his reading from Scripture and maybe even from

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<sup>474</sup> SELLARS 2006:81-83

Origen.

As mentioned the vast majority of instances of the Christ-city metaphor come from *TrPs*. Chapter 2 showed that Hilary's *TrPs* is a sound translation of Origen's psalms commentaries, and further estimated that most of Hilary's commentary is related in some way to Origen's text. Therefore Hilary is either translating this metaphor from Origen, or is deriving it in response to something he is finding in Origen's work.

(Before proceeding it is worth mentioning that the most 'universalist' example of the metaphor, *InMt* 4.12, would manifest the latest stage of the development of the metaphor as given by steps (1)-(4) at the beginning of §5.5b. This could suggest that *InMt* is a later work, possibly post-dating *TrPs*. However this is against the scholarly consensus and the point will not be pushed here).

One possibility is that Hilary is getting this metaphor directly from Origen, and is merely translating it. This is not unlikely. Origen frequently uses *σῶμα* as a cipher for something else (for example a ten-stringed lute as above, or Behemoth's demons, as well as the apostles or church);<sup>475</sup> likewise Sion can represent the union of the faithful either now or eschatologically, or the habitation of God (see below). However, it has not been possible to find Origen directly articulating a Christ-city metaphor. This does not mean the metaphor is not originally Origen's; the preservation of fragments through the catenae is so scanty that not even one word of commentary is preserved for many psalm verses.

(For example, the Christ-city metaphor is presented by Hilary, *haec caro et Sion et Jerusalem est*,<sup>476</sup> in expounding Ps. 52.7; yet this verse is not preserved in the Origen fragments, nor found in Evagrius, Asterius, Apollinaris, Didymus, Athanasius, nor even in the voluminous psalms commentaries of Eusebius of Caesarea. It is thus impossible to tell

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<sup>475</sup> ORIGEN (a) *Homiliae in job (fragmenta in catenis, typus I + II) e codd. Vat.*, Job 40.27 (PITRA 2.387): Σῶμα δὲ αὐτοῦ δαίμονας λέγει, ὡς αὐτοῦ κεφαλὴ ὄντος... (b) *Selecta in psalmos* Ps. 48.6 (PG 12.1444): Σῶμα γὰρ Χριστοῦ οἱ ἀπόστολοι.

<sup>476</sup> *TrPs* 52.18

either way whether a Christ-city metaphor appeared in the Greek that Hilary was translating). The only fourth-century instance of the Christ-city metaphor outside Hilary that I have traced is from Chromatius of Aquileia (ob. 406/7).<sup>477</sup> However, Chromatius may be using either Origen's Matthew commentary or indeed Hilary's text; therefore his usage of this metaphor is not conclusive either way.

However, although no other usage can be quoted here, what can be said of this Christ-city metaphor is still significant.

It is clear that Hilary himself considers this to be a metaphor from elsewhere (i.e. not his own). At *TrPs* 147.2, Hilary states that Sion 'is thought' to stand for the Christ's body in Scripture: *Corpus quidem Domini... in omnibus Scripturis Sion nuncupari existimatur*. This use of the impersonal passive (*existimatur*) strongly suggests that the Christ-body metaphor is not Hilary's own but derived from elsewhere. (The passage is cited in full in the next section, §5.5d). Moreover, since Hilary is directly translating Origen's text, it is only natural for us to assume that that is where he is finding this metaphor – even Hilary himself sees it as more analogical, as shown again by the third-person reported speech and the use of *quidam*.

It is here tentatively suggested that Hilary's Christ-city metaphor either derives from Origen, possibly with some 'improvement' if Hilary.

In discussing the preexistence of souls, Harl (1987) discusses Origen's reference to the heavenly city or new Jerusalem which represents our eschatological ideal. This heavenly Jerusalem is not just where we are going but also where we come from and thus arguably pre-existent: Origen's argument against Celsus implies that there are those who

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<sup>477</sup> CHROMATIUS *Tractatus in Matthaem* 24.3.4 (Banterle 1990:158): Neque [jurate], inquit, per Hierosolymam, quia civitas est magni Regis, id est typus corporis Christi, quod est spiritualis illa et caelestis ecclesia. Chromatius specifically cites that the city of Jerusalem is, inter alia, a type for the body of Christ inasmuch as it also represents the church. Chromatius may be copying Hilary who also uses the metaphor at this point in the Sermon on the Mount.

have left this heavenly Jerusalem and wandered astray from it (or even fallen from it, ἀποπεπτωκότων, recalling the heavenly location) but will afterwards be re-established there (ἀποκαθισταμένων).<sup>478</sup> It is not clear whether this heavenly Jerusalem is pre-existent or merely spiritual; Harl herself thinks the pre-existent souls are a misreading of Origen, who actually means to speak of God's prescience,<sup>479</sup> and Origen at any rate advises caution<sup>480</sup> with such mysterious truths. Still, if this is a pre-existent Jerusalem, Hilary would certainly have wanted to modify it as he rejects Origen's suggestions of a pre-existent realm.<sup>481</sup> Or it may be that Origen is giving some other expression of human universality; he certainly believes in some version of it as the following shows: *Christus ergo cuius omne hominum genus (immo fortassis totius creaturae universitas) corpus est...*<sup>482</sup> At the end of the day, we cannot know for sure how Origen interprets Zion in his psalms commentaries since all relevant extracts are lost; for example he tells Celsus he has discussed this in his commentaries on Ps. 46 and 48, but these are no longer extant.

While we do not have Origen's texts here, can anything be deduced using Hilary? Only minimally, one may assume, since Hilary was cautious in the face of heterodoxy, and independent in his own articulation. Still, comparing Origen's commentary on Ps13 in *Patrologia Graeca* gives an interesting picture. Greek fragments only survive for verses 1 and 7 (also one short sentence for verse 3). As it turns out, Hilary's commentary only comments on verses 1 and 7. This suggests that his source text only contained these two

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<sup>478</sup> ORIGEN c.Cels. 7.29: Ἴνα δέ τις πεισθῆῖ μὴ παρὰ τὸ βούλημα τοῦ θεοῦ πνεύματος ἡμᾶς λέγειν περὶ τῆς παρὰ Μωϋσεῖ γῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ πολλῆς, ἐπιστησάτω πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς προφήταις, διδάσκουσι τὴν εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ ἐπάνοδον τῶν πεπλανημένων καὶ ἀποπεπτωκότων ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ἀπαξᾶπλῶς ἀποκαθισταμένων εἰς τὸν καλούμενον τόπον καὶ πόλιν τοῦ θεοῦ παρὰ τῷ εἰπόντι ὅτι «Ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἀγία ὁ τόπος αὐτοῦ», λέγοντι δὲ καὶ τό· «Μέγας ὁ κύριος καὶ αἰνετὸς σφόδρα ἐν πόλει τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν, ὄρει ἀγίῳ αὐτοῦ, εὐρίζονι ἀγαλλιάματι πάσης τῆς γῆς.»

<sup>479</sup> HARL 1987:251-2

<sup>480</sup> HARL 1987:240-1

<sup>481</sup> See §4.5, §6.2b

<sup>482</sup> ORIGEN *Hom.Ps.* 36.2.1, trans. Rufinus

verses.

We focus on verse 7. Once fragments by Evagrius have been removed, there are two paragraph fragments remaining which could be from Origen; the fact they are presented as two fragments rather than one suggests that something may have come between them. Now Hilary's translation is almost verbatim, as indeed is remarked by the *Patrologia Graeca* editor in the footnotes (indeed the closeness of the translation is remarkable).<sup>483</sup> Hilary's *TrPs* [13].3 corresponds almost exactly to the first of the *Patrologia Graeca* paragraphs, and *TrPs* [13].5 corresponds to the second of the two; but there is nothing Greek corresponding to Hilary's *TrPs* [13].4, which must therefore hint at what came between the two Greek paragraphs in Origen's text.

As it turns out, this intervening paragraph in Hilary contains an instance of the Christ-city metaphor. Hilary talks of us all being in Christ, and compares this with Mount Zion. (Jerome does not mention this as a psalm translated by Hilary from Origen, but it is always included in Hilary's corpus).

Sion quae sit Apostolus docet cum dicit: Accedamus ad Sion montem, ad sanctam Jerusalem civitatem [Hebr. 12.22]; omnes enim currimus apprehendere, in quo apprehensi sumus a Christo [Phil. 3.12], id est, inveniri in ejus corpore, quod ex nobis ipse praesumpsit, in quo ante constitutionem mundi a Patre sumus electi... (*TrPs* [13].4)

The catenist clearly chose not to reproduce this fragment of Origen. This may be accidental, but it may be that there was something in Origen's text here that was seen as questionable – whether a pre-existent city, an inappropriate expression of universality, or

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<sup>483</sup> Note however that this *Tractatus* is not found in all manuscripts, nor is it mentioned by Jerome as one of Hilary's translations from Origen. Still, it is always included in Hilary's corpus today.

anything else. Hilary may have removed anything too inappropriate.

So although it cannot be proved directly, there is certainly circumstantial evidence Hilary's Christ-city metaphor may be derived from Origen, and it may even be that Hilary is 'improving' on Origen's version. Even if this hypothesis is incorrect, it is certain that this metaphor derives ultimately from the use of Sion as a cipher for the church. In other words, although maybe helped by Stoic notions, Hilary is not relying only on Stoic thought but on Scriptural language and exegetical predecessors for his city metaphor.

#### 5.5d) Implications of 'Christ-city' language.

Even if Hilary's Christ-city language is entirely his own, does it imply UA?

The first point to note is that Hilary only ever uses this trope in the context of the church. Thus although the middle term 'church' is dropped, Hilary is always implicitly remembering its presence. The one exception is the 'universalist' associations of *InMt* 4.12 (*per naturam corporis... quaedam universi generis humani congregatio continetur*). It may be that Hilary is clarifying this a few paragraphs later where Jerusalem is referred to in passing as [*constituta*] *in praeformationem Ecclesiae, id est, corporis Christi, quae magni regis est civitas*.<sup>484</sup> Moreover, *TrPs* [14] makes the connection between the Christ-city of Jerusalem and the 'city on a hill which cannot be hidden' – showing that there may be an ecclesiological connection even here. At any rate, despite these mitigating factors Hilary certainly uses UA language here.

Next, we return to the issue of metaphor in Hilary. When Chromatius uses Christ-city language, he calls the city Jerusalem a *typus* of the body of Christ. Hilary does not say as much at this point, but elsewhere he does state that his use of cities is analogical:

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<sup>484</sup> *InMt* 4.24

*Occiderat enim prophetas, et ad se missos lapidaverat Jerusalem. In civitatis nuncupatione, habitantium facinus ostenditur...*<sup>485</sup>

Is it valid for this Christ-city language to be called analogy? It was shown above that Hilary often uses concessive language when giving an illustration or analogy ('it is called', 'it is said that'). It turns out this is particularly true in the case of Christ-city language. So for example this occurs in the crucial passage of *InMt* 4.12, where words such as *nuncupat* and *fit* may also point to the illustrative nature of the language (see translation at §5.4c). It remains to demonstrate this concessive language with another passage where the Christ-city metaphor is used. At Ps 147.12 Jerusalem and Sion are told to praise God; Hilary explains why the twin names Jerusalem and Sion arise. He then shows that the verse demonstrates that Jerusalem represents the church, and also Christ's body.

*Lauda Jerusalem Dominum, lauda Deum tuum Sion* [Ps 147.12]. Non differt Jerusalem a Sion...

Jerusalem enim est civitas pacis. Et quia Domini nostri regnum in pace et unanimitate sanctorum est; et factus est, inquit, in pace locus ejus [Ps. 75.3]: conventus ille beatorum, qui Dei (f. Domini) regnum est, Jerusalem tamquam civitas pacis est dictus. Civitatem vero hanc vivis, ut ait Apostolus, lapidibus extractam, sanctorum coetus conformis gloriae Dei ex resurrectione consummat [1Pet. 2.5].

Qui se, qualis futurus esset, per fidem in corpore Domini ante speculatus est; et idcirco etiam Sion nuncupatur. Corpus quidem Domini, secundum interpretationis virtutem, quia in eo spem nostram

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<sup>485</sup> *InMt* 24.10

fide contemplamur, in omnibus Scripturis Sion nuncupari existimatur;  
quia Sion speculatio est.

Sed et civitas illa, quae Jerusalem est, quae propter unanimitatem  
civitas pacis est; etiam propter conformationem in se corporis Dei, in quo  
se ante speculata est, Sion nuncupatur: et cujus gloriam adeptam est,  
accepit quoque ejus et nomen. (*TrPs* 147.2)

For Hilary the city is known as both Jerusalem and Sion because of its twin significance. In particular Sion is taken as standing for Christ's body; in context, this is clearly the church. But the language treating Jerusalem as church is different from that treating Sion as body and the latter is marked clearly with concessive language as described in §5.4c; see particularly the underlined phrases in the sentence *Corpus quidem Domini...* One may therefore translate this sentence as follows: *According to the interpretative method, Sion is thought to denote the Lord's actual body, because in him we observe our hope in faith; for Sion means 'contemplation'.*

So then, Hilary is concessive in using Christ-city language, showing that he sees this as a metaphor. In *TrPs* this is always ecclesiological. In the one instance where it is not (*InMt* 4.12) Hilary indeed seems to be breaking out of the church and referring to all mankind: *in eo [Christo], per naturam suscepti corporis, quaedam universi generis humani congregatio continetur* (full excerpt quoted above at §5.4c). But although his expression is more expansive here, there is no reason to take this as anything more than illustrative, just as with the *TrPs* Sion examples.

## **5.6 ...universal salvation?**

If universality is expressed not as the ontology of the incarnation but as its effects, the question naturally arises as to what the scope of salvation should be and who benefits from its effects: is it all humankind, or merely those belonging to the church? And when does the culmination of our universality actually occur?

And indeed it seems that Hilary gives a fairly uncontroversial line on this point. All will rise again: *qui enim in Christo sunt, secundum Christum resurgunt, in quo iam universae carnis consummata est resurrectio.*<sup>486</sup> Thus ‘the resurrection is accomplished for all flesh’.

However, only those ‘in Christ’ will rise to his glory. As we are reminded a few times, whereas some will dwell in glory, others will rise to judgment and damnation.<sup>487</sup> Vituperative comments regarding the damnation of heretics and other such malefactors abound through Hilary’s work. A key passage occurs at *TrPs* 51.16-17 where Hilary is explaining how Christ’s work may be for all, but some are cut off due to their faithlessness. He cites the johannine teaching of the True Vine, where those who do not bear fruit are cut off. So while not all are saved, the scope of salvation is still universal.

While Hilary is uncontroversial in all this, there may be a degree of inconsistency as to when our final unity (or universality) arises. Scully<sup>488</sup> asserts that the ultimate expression of Christ’s assumption of all humanity occurs eschatologically. She points to a number of texts, such as the frequent allusions to Rom 8:17 and Eph 3.6 (*cohaeredes*,

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<sup>486</sup> Cf. *Myst* 1.5: *qui enim in Christo sunt, secundum Christum resurgunt, in quo iam universae carnis consummata est resurrectio.*

<sup>487</sup> E.g. *TrPs* 52.17, 54.16, [69].3, 138.36...

<sup>488</sup> SCULLY 2011:134-163

*concorporales, comparticipes*)<sup>489</sup> or his exegesis of Ps. 62.4 *sic in sancto apparui tibi* where Hilary reads ‘in sancto’ as ‘in Christ’ and takes the whole lemma as referring to how we appear before the Father at the resurrection.

It is certainly without doubt that our future joys will ‘in Christ’, but how far this relies on universality is not so clear. At *Trin* 9.8 Hilary is explaining a long passage from Colossians and has reached Col. 2.9-10a (*in Christ all the fullness of God dwells in a bodily way, and in Christ you have been filled*). He explains this in terms of ‘our’ assumption:

Exposita itaque habitantis corporaliter divinitatis in eo plenitudine, sacramentum assumptionis nostrae continuo subiecit, dicens: *Estis in eo repleti*. Ut enim in eo divinitatis est plenitudo, ita nos in eo sumus repleti. Neque sane ait, estis repleti, sed, *in eo estis repleti*: quia per fidei spem in vitam aeternam regenerati ac regenerandi omnes nunc in Christi corpore manent; replendis postea ipsis, non jam in eo, sed in ipsis, secundum tempus illud de quo Apostolus ait, *Qui transfigurabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, conforme corpori gloriae suae* [Phil. 3.21]. Nunc igitur in eo repleti sumus, id est, per assumptionem carnis ejus, in quo divinitatis plenitudo corporaliter inhabitat. (*Trin* 9.8)

In a surprising move, Hilary apparently asserts that we are currently filled *in eo*, as long as we abide in Christ’s body, but that at the resurrection we will be filled *in ipsis*, presumably implying that at the resurrection we will be filled in our own capacity rather than by recourse to Christ, since our transformation will be complete. Other scholarly

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<sup>489</sup> *TrPs* 2.43, [9].4, 51.3, 56.7, 60.5-6, [68].14, [68].24, [91].9, 121.1, 138.30, 143.23; *InMt* 6.1, 19.10, 31.8. The allusions in *TrPs* are fairly explicit; those in *InMt* are considerably less marked.

interpretations of this passage differ,<sup>490</sup> but it can at least be said that ‘in eo’ refers to the present time (*nunc... manent*) and that at some point in the future we will no longer be ‘in eo’.

This bears on the discussion of universality and ‘our’ assumption because it implies that our basis for being ‘in Christ’, here at least, is predicated on something that is particular to this current age. The passage states that our current fulness is based on his assumption of the flesh (*per assumptionem carnis ejus*) but also by our hope of faith in eternal life which causes us to abide in his body. This language sounds ecclesiological, which brings us back to the issue of what constitutes unity within the church context. Here, the instrument of unity is our faith or confession of Christ (as in this excerpt, and its continuation in *Trin* 9.8); as we have seen, other possible instruments are baptism and the eucharist, with the latter in particular reflecting the sharing of ‘body’.

Thus the *scope* of salvation is certainly universal (including not merely humanity but the whole cosmos); as for *effects* of salvation, some are universal and some are not. This universal scope of salvation is necessary because of the universal effects of the Fall. Now, the *mechanics* of salvation in Hilary may be expressed in a variety of ways<sup>491</sup> – and these mechanics do not necessarily require a universalist understanding of the incarnation. If anything, quite to the contrary: the role of Christ’s individual manhood whether in incarnation, crucifixion, or confession is emphatically maintained. The one instance where universalism is required is in indicating the change of our nature: it is for this that Christ’s assumption of our nature is necessary. But (and this is the key point) assumption of our

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<sup>490</sup> For example, Coustant sees ‘in eo’ as a post-mortal phase where the soul abides in Christ, then ‘in ipsis’ as the soul’s recovery of its body at the resurrection. Wild takes the two phases as this life and the next. Others reject these. See Scully 2011:138-140.

<sup>491</sup> E.g. moral improvement (especially *TrPs* 118), Christ as moral or doctrinal Teacher (more common in *InMt*), recognition of both Father and Son (especially *Trin*)...

*human nature* is not the same as assumption of *humanity* as a universal whether collective, immanent or transcendent.

Thus Hilary may use language where the incarnation itself is expressed in universalist terms, but this is largely to illustrate the universal scope of both Fall ('in Adam') and salvation ('in Christ'). As to the mechanics of soteriology, it may indeed refer to the fact that Christ has taken and transformed our nature: and this is not really what one might properly call Universal Assumption.

### **5.7 Differences across Hilary's corpus**

Before concluding there is one more issue to be dealt with, namely whether there is any difference across Hilary's texts regarding his usage of Adam or of UA language – and if so, what is the significance of such differences.

Starting with the figure of Adam, it could be argued that the protoplast may appear slightly more positively in *InMt* compared to *TrPs*.<sup>492</sup> The former work may give more instances of Adam as progenitor and the latter emphasize more on his sin and its effects; however it is probably more fair to say that there is no obvious difference across the texts. Adam-related metaphors are also used consistently: for example, *terra* represents human nature (or its fallen aspect) in both texts. These are arguably more common in *TrPs* but this is a far longer text than *InMt*; when comparing texts of like length (*InMt* and *TrPs118*), Adam appears as a cipher far more frequently in *InMt*.

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<sup>492</sup> Note that this paragraph refers to all of *TrPs* and not merely *TrPs118*, in which Adam barely appears.

Nevertheless, some differences clearly manifest. Ladaria feels that *TrPs* has far more on Christ as the new Adam realizing the Father's eschatological purpose.<sup>493</sup> In this, the old Adam merely foreshadows the unity: he is not himself an emblem of all humanity in the same way that Christ encapsulates all humanity (for Ladaria).<sup>494</sup> Ladaria's observation springs in part from the fact that the Adam-Christ parallel seems considerably more developed in *TrPs* than in the Matthew commentary, and from the greater eschatological focus. All of this arises partly from the different subject matter, and partly from the fact that for the psalms Hilary is using Origen as a source and thus will have more triggers from Origen's ideas.

Moving on from Adam to Christ, there are frequent metaphors and parables which seem to indicate UA. For example, there is the Christ-city metaphor which is found particularly in *TrPs*; but this regards more particularly an understanding of the church both now and eschatologically.

Yet, Hilary's language is metaphorical, and moreover many examples of UA in Hilary have been shown to be borrowed. It is worth spending a moment discussing whether this is significant. Of course, if an interpretation in Hilary is shown to be from another source, whether from Origen or elsewhere, it cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. Hilary *does* occasionally reject doctrines he is unhappy with (for example when he rejects Origen's interpretation of Christ and Spirit as the two *manus dei*, §3.3c). Therefore, if he accepts an interpretation from elsewhere then he sees it as compatible with his theology. In that sense, then, Hilary does evince universalism. Nevertheless, a few mitigating remarks may be made. Firstly, he mutes these examples by using language that treats them

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<sup>493</sup> LADARIA 1992:120-122

<sup>494</sup> LADARIA (1992:121): "[en *TrPs*] la referencia a Adán [...] es solamente marginal. La unión inicial de todos en Adán está menos desarrollada que la unión escatológica de todos en Cristo. Y aun ésta se acentúa más que la incorporación de todos en Jesús por el hecho de la encarnación, que era la perspectiva dominante en *In Matthaëum*."

as metaphorical. Secondly, when he does use universalist language independently it is not entirely as expected, as in *Trin* 9.8 (cited in §5.6). Some scholars dismiss this passage as atypical; for example Scully and Charlier<sup>495</sup> both attribute it to an earlier, less developed phase of Hilary's theology. And yet *de trinitate* is the only work of Hilary's here considered that has never been suggested as showing any Origenian influence – which implies that of all the texts considered, it may be closest to Hilary's own thought.

So then, it is here agreed that Hilary does use universalist language – and he does so across all his texts.<sup>496</sup> After all, Doignon<sup>497</sup> shows that all of Hilary's major texts (*de trinitate*, *InMt*, *TrPs*) use *assumere* with terms such as *nos* (e.g. *assumptio nostrae*)<sup>498</sup> although in slightly differing proportions. But his articulation points to metaphorical understandings.

## **5.8 Discussion**

So then, does Hilary hold a so-called 'universal assumption' (UA) understanding of the incarnation? It is here accepted that Hilary does indeed use language that one might term 'universalistic'. However, this tendency is simply not as marked as some claim, and at any rate it is debatable what exactly Hilary means by it.

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<sup>495</sup> CHARLIER 1965:474-7; SCULLY 2011:140

<sup>496</sup> Ladaria, Galtier, Doignon, Gastaldi and Scully all agree that Hilary is roughly consistent across his works, despite some differences in emphasis. See SCULLY 2011:27, fn.99

<sup>497</sup> DOIGNON 1953:131

<sup>498</sup> *Trin* 9.8

In the work which is most markedly personal to Hilary, the *de trinitate*, a UA articulation of the incarnation is present but much rarer than other scholars suppose.<sup>499</sup> For example, the most frequent expression of UA that scholars see in this text are those of the type *adsumpsit naturam universae carnis*, which has been shown to be ambiguous at best. Thus the majority of supposed UA examples are lost. Moreover, the remaining expressions in Hilary are almost always mitigated by qualifying factors. For example, at *Trin* 9.8 Hilary's exegesis is triggered by his need to explain the scriptural verse *estis in eo repleti* – which he does by explaining that we will not be *in eo* in the future, a slightly peculiar move if his theology of assumption were particularly marked. Other mitigating factors include his *forma (dei /servi)* language, *natura* language and the qualifying glosses containing words such as *societas*, *proximus*. Where there is universalist language, however, it is here maintained that this is unequivocally concerned with Christ's assumption of *human nature*, not with the universal comprising *humanity* as a whole.

Turning to the exegetical works, the question is how to interpret metaphorical language. The mitigating glosses still occur, and are often passed over too easily in scholarly discussion (for example Pettorelli cites the phrase *Christum, qui omnium nostrum corpus assumpsit* as universalist, without continuing the sentence *et unicuique nostrum assumpti corporis conditione factus est proximus*;<sup>500</sup> other scholars attempt to explain away this verse).<sup>501</sup> These exegetical works also show usage of the metaphors of the lost sheep, paralytic, Adam, earth and so on. Now, there is still the difficulty that it is impossible to some degree to tell how far language really is metaphorical. Hilary's hermeneutical method throughout his work gives us reason to believe that his use of ciphers such as Adam or the lost sheep are metaphorical. Hilary may also use concessive

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<sup>499</sup> *Trin* 9.8 (*estis in eo repleti*), *Trin* 10.25 (*gerens quidem nos...*)

<sup>500</sup> *InMt* 19.5 cited in PETTORELLI 1969:231, fn.65

<sup>501</sup> SCULLY 2011:90-91; LADARIA 1989a:91 and fn.12

language indicating he sees something as a metaphor (*nuncupatur, quidam, intellegendus est*).

Lastly, Hilary's use of Christ-city language seems to derive from Origen; although modern scholars see it as universalist, it may be that Hilary was in fact mitigating a *more* explicitly universalist articulation in Origen's text. Hilary himself seems to suggest that this is someone else's metaphor. Further, he uses the Christ-city concept in a way which indicates that it is to be taken as metaphorical.

Of course, the fact that something is a metaphor does not mean it can be dismissed: a metaphor still stands for something. Indeed in this chapter the decision to use the English word 'metaphor' was taken with care: it seems a touch safer than 'allegory' (which could suggest a fairly esoteric interpretation) but words such as 'analogy,' 'illustration,' 'cipher,' 'paradigm' are also close to the mark. Indeed Hilary's universalist language can even be used in a way that could be described as 'spiritual', as in this line from one of his few preserved hymns. It is a deeply personal alphabetic hymn on the resurrection:

Xriste, reuersus caelos uictor in tuos

memento carnis, in qua natus es, meae... (*Hymnus* 2, ll.41-42)<sup>502</sup>

So if Hilary's metaphors are standing for some truth, what is that truth they illustrate? Hilary's language of assumption indicates the depth of Christ's involvement with us – that he is fully and completely involved in his task on our behalf. But the consequences of *assumptio naturae carnis nostrae* are that he is our brother and neighbour. Unity is also expressed by terms such as our spiritual fellowship, our faith, and

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<sup>502</sup> FEDER 1916:214

our participation in the sacraments (which means for Hilary that he is literally in us). These are the basis of our unity – what we share, especially the flesh of the incarnation and the Eucharist – and not any Stoic or Platonic concept of genus, ideal or even concept. Hilary’s ‘universalist’ language is entirely Christian. It is also entirely ecclesiological, inasmuch as the Church’s remit (scope) is universal. And all this is achieved categorically by Christ’s assumption of *one* individual, even if *on behalf of* all humanity:

...et habitaret in nobis, id est, assumptione carnis unius interna universae carnis incoletet... (*Trin* 2.25)

As often as Hilary talks of Christ assuming our flesh, he also talks of Christ being in fellowship with us because of one individual’s flesh.

The question is to some degree subjective: each scholar may read metaphorical or spiritual language in a different way. However, one thing that can be said with certainty is that these metaphors are not just Latin Stoic in origin. For the lost sheep, the paralytic and general Adam references, these can be shown to belong to the church tradition of Hilary’s day and in particular Origen. Origen is categorically a universalist, and this shines through in his treatment of the lost sheep and possibly of Christ as city; if anything it seems that Hilary has muted these metaphors.

So then, there are certainly universalist expressions in Hilary, but these are simply not as common as some suggest, and what does appear refers to Christ’s assumption of *nature* rather than a universal thing called humanity. Further, it should not be confused with expressions of incorporation in Christ in the ecclesiological sense.

It is now possible for us to examine the implications of this for the Fall.

## *Chapter 6*

# **The Fall**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter looks at Hilary's narratives of the Fall, and also gives an initial discussion on its effects; the effects will be then expanded upon in the following chapters.

Firstly, it will be shown that Hilary is aware of three articulations of the Fall. The first is the Scriptural narrative, which he wholeheartedly embraces theological but does not ever discuss at length. The second he rejects, namely the doctrine of the fall of souls into bodies which Hilary feels he is reading in Origen. The third is the analogy of the 'anthropological household' which demonstrates clearly how he sees the Fall as involving the internal composition of the human person.

This will be followed by an initial examination of the effects of the Fall. In accordance with his 'household' narrative, it becomes clear that Hilary sees a key effect of the Fall as being an anthropological change that alters the human person by introducing Sin and Disobedience into the human make-up. Alternatively Hilary may express this human change differently, in terms of the human person now being buffeted by internal turbulent passions. Both these elements will be expanded in more detail in subsequent chapters.

## **6.2 The Fall narrative**

Hilary rarely discusses the Fall overtly, but its events and effects are alluded to extremely frequently. Still, his allusions suggest three different Fall narratives: the Scriptural story according to Genesis, which he naturally embraces; the Fall into bodies, which he feels he finds in Origen and categorically rejects; and finally an analogy using the ‘anthropological household’ which demonstrates how Hilary shows the Fall as a change in the human person echoing Tertullian’s ‘second nature’.

### **6.2a) The Genesis narrative of the Fall**

It is perhaps not surprising that Hilary’s most frequent references to the events of the Fall are those in accordance with the scriptural narrative of Genesis 2-3 and its Pauline interpretation found in the Epistle to the Romans. Hilary clearly sees Adam’s sin as somehow affecting all humanity.

These Genesis references almost always come in passing, as Hilary is explaining some other passage or theological point. For example, he takes the healing of a paralytic (Mt. 9.2-8) to signify how we are healed of Adam’s sin.

Jamque in paralytico gentium universitas offertur medenda... In Adam uno, peccata universis gentibus remittuntur... Huic remittuntur animae peccata, et indulgentia primae transgressionis ex venia est. (*InMt.* 8.5)

Hilary sharply rejects the interpretation that the paralytic is being healed of his own personal sin.<sup>503</sup> In common with other patristic authors,<sup>504</sup> this passage is taken to refer to the healing of Adam's sin. It is not clear in this passage, however, whether the paralytic's adamic sin is actual, or merely symbolic in the context of the story. Still, Hilary frequently elsewhere refers to the fact that we all have gone astray through Adam's sin.

Sed in unius Adae errore omne hominum genus aberravit. (*InMt.* 18.6)

Quisquis ergo in crimine primi parentis Adae exsulem se factum illius  
Sion recordabitur... (*TrPs.* 136.5)

Another place where the Fall is used to explain another story is at Christ's temptation, which he sees as parallel to Adam's temptation and thus the Fall.<sup>505</sup> Christ's three temptations are to turn rocks into bread; to throw himself from the Temple; and to worship Satan. Hilary matches these to three elements of Adam's temptation, namely seduction with food, being led to a 'place of sin' (the tree), and *ambitio*.

Cibo Adam pellegerat et de paradisi gloria in peccati locum, id est in regionem vetitae arboris, deduxerat, tertio divini nominis ambitione corruperat diis futurum similem pollicendo. (*InMt.* 3.5)

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<sup>503</sup> *InMt.* 8.5: Non enim paralyticum peccasse aliquid accepimus, cum praesertim alio in loco idem Dominus dixerit, caecitatem a natiuitate non ex peccato aut proprio aut paterno fuisse contractam (Jn. 9.3).

<sup>504</sup> §6.2b

<sup>505</sup> *InMt.* 3.1-5, commenting on Mt. 4.1-11

Thus the devil entices Christ with the same three lures that were presented to Adam; this symmetry is necessary to trick and conquer the devil.<sup>506</sup> This connection between the temptations of Adam and Christ are found elsewhere. Irenaeus also suggests that the parallelism between the two temptations is needed to defeat the devil;<sup>507</sup> this is an element of his recapitulation theology, although Hilary does not call it such. The parallel of deceiving Adam and Christ by means of food also occurs in Origen.<sup>508</sup>

Other references to the story of Genesis 3 also refer to the devil's work. Hilary uses this to interpret Christ's injunction that we should be wise as serpents and gentle as doves (Mt. 10.16). He observes that Genesis calls the serpent *sapiens*;<sup>509</sup> we must be as wise as the serpent was at the Fall, even if that was for the wrong reasons. The serpent's ploy is to attack the gentler sex first. His temptation is to seduce her with hope (*spe illexit*) and then more specifically to promise her immortality<sup>510</sup>.

There are other frequent passing references to the Genesis 3 narrative.<sup>511</sup> However it is his use of other Fall stories that is more interesting.

### 6.2b) Rejecting the Fall of souls into bodies

Hilary suggests that the body and soul were created in two very separate stages (§3.3), with the soul breathed into the body long after it was created: *Genesis docet longe postea*

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<sup>506</sup> *InMt.* 3.1: Sed ita dignum nequitia eius et scelere erat, ut in eo cuius morte et calamitatibus gloriabatur homine vinceretur

<sup>507</sup> IRENAEUS *adv.haer.* 5.21.2

<sup>508</sup> ORIGEN frag.62 on Mt. 4.3-10; frag.95-6 on Lk. 4.1f. and 4.4

<sup>509</sup> The Vulgate calls the serpent *callidus*, but Old Latin versions also used variants such as *prudens* and *sapiens*. See BREPOLIS *Vetus Latina Database*, accessed 25/11/2013. Alternatively, Hilary may have been using a standard interpretation of this passage.

<sup>510</sup> *InMt.* 10.13: Primum enim animum sexus mollioris aggressus est, spe deinde illexit, communionem immortalitatis spondit

<sup>511</sup> For example, *InMt.* 21.9; *TrPs118*, 16.9, 19.12; *TrPs* 1.13, 1.19, 51.12, 52.8, 57.2, 59.4, [66].7, [68].15, 119.4, 142.11... see also *passim* throughout this chapter and Chapter 9.

*quam ad imaginem Dei homo erat factus, pulverem sumptum formatumque corpus.*<sup>512</sup>

However, there is no suggestion that this comprised a fall in any way. If anything, it seems that Hilary is specifically removing any theology which he perceived in his source text involving a descent of souls into bodies. This may be seen by comparing Hilary with Ambrose and the catena for two verses, namely Ps.118.25 and Ps.118.67.

Origen used Ps. 118.67 *Prisquam humiliarer, ego deliqui, propterea eloquium tuum custodi in de principiis* as evidence for a fall of souls from a heavenly realm into material physical bodies.<sup>513</sup> It seems he used the same interpretation in his Psalms commentary, because the catenist, Hilary and Ambrose entirely diverge on this verse in a way that suggests they were all trying to avoid reproducing something in the original. Firstly, the catenist entirely omits quoting Origen for this verse – extremely unusually for him, since for most verses Origen’s commentary serves as the catena’s base. Secondly, Ambrose’s treatment is revealing:

*Alia traditio habet: Priusquam humilarer ego \*nescivi\*. Unde putant aliqui, quod anima hominis hoc dicat: “Priusquam humiliarer, ut in hoc lutum corporis introirem, tua quae non legeram mandata nescivi”.*

(AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 9.13)

Ambrose cites the opinion of some who suggest that the soul knew no commands before entering the body. However, by appealing to the version found in the Septuagint (*deliqui*

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<sup>512</sup> *TrPs*, 129.5: Non enim cum ad imaginem Dei hominem fecit, tunc et corpus effecit. Genesis docet longe postea, quam ad imaginem Dei homo erat factus, pulverem sumptum, formatumque corpus ; dehinc rursum in animam viventem per inspirationem Dei factum, naturam hanc scilicet terrenam atque coelestem quodam inspirationis foedere copulatam.

<sup>513</sup> Such at least is the claim, found in fragments preserved by EPIPHANIUS (*Panarion* 64.4.7) and JEROME (c. *Ioannem Hierosolymitanem*, 7). However, this is absent from the translation of Rufinus. See also EPIPHANIUS *Panarion* 64; ep. 51.4.7; JEROME *Comm.Eph.* ad Eph. 1.4; CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA *In Ioannis Evangelium* 1 (PG 73.132-133). (Cyril may be using Epiphanius here).

instead of *nescivi*, in the Greek) Ambrose prefers the interpretation that the soul entered the body as a result of some sin (*ideo accipiamus ‘humiliarer’ ita dictum: eo quod peccato videatur humiliatus*). Due to his reference to the Septuagint, we could deduce that this argument is actually Origen’s, and that the source text is here mentioning a pre-bodily fall of souls (even if only speculatively).

So much for the catenist and Ambrose. Hilary’s exegesis of this verse is brief and suggests that our abasement (*humiliatio*) is a result of sin, and is a discipline that is for our own good.<sup>514</sup> He refers to the abasement as an *emendatio* and *disciplina*. This tallies with the Ambrose passage who also refers to our abasement as *emendatio* that arises through *culpa*. Ambrose makes this refer to Adam’s sin, but Hilary makes it personal sin. In all, it appears that all three commentaries (Hilary, Ambrose, catena) are deliberately avoiding repeating what was in the original; but there is enough to give us a hint as to why.

So far this is not conclusive, but there is more compelling evidence for Hilary’s rejection of a fall to Earth at Ps.118.25 *adhaesit pavimento anima mea*. Both Hilary and Ambrose take this as referring to the soul clinging to the earthly body (represented by the *pavimentum*, the ground or floor). Ambrose’s text is lengthy as usual, but the following excerpt suffices to illustrate his argument.

Denique ejectus de paradiso, hoc est, ex illo sublimi et coelesti loco (ad quem raptus est Paulus sive in corpore, sive extra corpus nesciens, 2Cor. 12.2) – ex illo ergo eminenti loco dejectus in terram, deploret Adam dicens: *Adhaesit pavimento anima mea*; sicut alibi ait: *Humiliata est in pulvere anima mea, et adhaesit in terra venter meus* (Ps. 43.25).

Poenitentiam gerentis haec vox est... (AMBROSE, *ExpPs118*, 4.2)

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<sup>514</sup> *TrPs118*, 9.4

In other words, Adam is cast out of Paradise for some sin. His expulsion results in his soul now clinging to earthly body, represented by the ground (as Ambrose has explained in an earlier paragraph). This suggests that the original text portrayed a descent of the soul into the body (Hilary's version, to be discussed shortly, will confirm this impression). This is further suggested by Ambrose's embarrassed reference to 2 Corinthians: Paul's ecstatic vision is taken to justify the notion that before the Fall, Adam may have been outside the body. Also, Ambrose shortly afterwards gives further evidence that before the Fall 'Adam' was in a heavenly realm: *Qui ante beatissimus auram carpebat aetheream [...], is nunc sollicitudine mundi hujus... curvatus [est].*<sup>515</sup>

This excerpt must represent Origen's source text, because Hilary in one sense matches it closely while at the same time firmly subverting it. Like Ambrose, he cites Paul on the body (although this time he quotes the *corpus humiliationis nostrae*, Php. 3.21) immediately followed by a citation of Ps. 43.25. However, he precedes these citations with a determined rejection of an incorrect interpretation of this lemma. Others may think this verse refers to the psalmist clinging to the ground (i.e. body) out of repentance, Hilary says, but this reading must be sharply rejected.

Potest istud et de assiduitate orationis intelligi, tamquam ex peccatorum confessione in terram Propheta prostratus adhaeserit pavimento. Sed ut altius aliquid sub his dictis intelligamus, perspecta diligentius verborum virtute, necessarium ducimus. (HILARY *TrPs118*, 4.1)

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<sup>515</sup> AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 4.3

Hilary suggests that the lemma actually refers to the awkward tension between body and soul. His defensiveness runs throughout the commentary on this lemma, since he starts with the insistence that there can only be one correct understanding (*multiplex intelligentia non potest in se habere dictorum difficultatem*), and he then tries to argue his case with a number of proofs (*...et multa sunt, quae nos ut hoc potius probabile existimemus admoneant*).<sup>516</sup>

The catena can be placed in parallel with Ambrose, which provides a further indication of the underlying text. Unusually, Hilary diverges far from the other two in his attempt to ‘correct’ the theology. Nevertheless, although the catena and Ambrose shadow each other quite neatly, the catena still plays down any notion of a fall into bodies. The fall from the heavenly realm and the prosopological character of the psalmist are both mentioned. They both also interpret the lemma as referring to penitence for some sin.

PALESTINIAN CATENA	AMBROSE
Origen, ad v.25	<i>ExpPs118</i> , 11.13
καὶ καθελούσης ἑαυτῆς τὸ φυσικὸν ὕψος καὶ ἔπαρμα	ejectus de paradiso, hoc est, <u>ex illo sublimi et coelesti loco</u>
[...] Λέγει δὲ ταῦτα ὁ ἅγιος...	[...] <u>Spiritus ergo propheticus</u> (qui dolorem expressit) <u>vel Dominus</u> (qui suscepit ejus infirmitatem)...

<sup>516</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 4.1

... [καὶ] προσοποποιῶν τὸν  
μετανοοῦντα.

... personam repraesentat Adae, et  
assumit ejus affectum.

However, there are differences between the catenist and Ambrose. The catenist does not mention that the ground signifies the body – which was probably in Origen’s text because it is in both Ambrose and Hilary. Moreover, the catena and Ambrose diverge on whose *persona* the psalmist is representing; we cannot know what was in Origen’s commentary. Despite the defensiveness of the catena and Hilary, the common elements of the three commentaries can be compared and conclusions drawn. It seems that Origen’s text mentioned the ‘ground’ as representing the body. This is taken to mean the soul entering into a body as a result of a sin, and that event being associated with repentance for some sin or for general sin. However, as a caveat it should be noted that we do not have enough evidence to determine what Origen himself said. For example, Origen may not have referred to Adam or the Genesis Fall explicitly; or he may have suggested this as merely one speculative interpretation of this verse. Again, it may be that Origen believed the prelapsarian Adam and Eve did have bodies, but less gross than ours.

Other hints across the Psalm Commentaries suggest that Hilary is consistent in re-writing this theology. For example, Methodius claims that Origen used Ps. 65.11 as evidence that the body is a ‘snare’ or punishment for some sin.<sup>517</sup> Now as it turns out, Hilary does translate Psalm 65. But when he gets to this verse, he mentions it in one brief sentence and moves straight on.<sup>518</sup> This suggests that he may not like the interpretation he found in his source text, but has not troubled to come up with an alternative.

<sup>517</sup> Methodius quoted in EPIPHANIUS *Panarion* 64.46.2-3

<sup>518</sup> *TrPs* [65].22

We cannot say what Origen himself really thought or was proposing in any of these places. However, even if Hilary is misreading Origen, nevertheless from Hilary's angle it is clear that he sees a doctrine he disagrees with; he vehemently rejects any suggestion whatsoever of a fall of souls into bodies. His interpretation also fervently rejects the theology that the soul's embodiedness is a consequence of sin, confirming the analysis at §3.5-6.

### 6.2c) The 'anthropological household' analogy for the Fall

Possibly the most notable passage discussing the will is found at *InMt*, 10.23-4. Hilary is discussing Mt 10.34-36: "*I came not to bring peace, but a sword. I am come to set a man against his father, and daughter against mother, and daughter-in-law against mother-in law, and a man's enemies will be his own household*". Hilary uses one of his common hermeneutical rules that take words of Jesus as teaching on anthropology (e.g. for example, a mention of sparrows at Mt 10.29 is taken as representing the soul and sin at *InMt*, 10.18).<sup>519</sup> So here, the Gospel teaching involves a household of five individuals whose alliances are determined in three consecutive stages; Hilary interprets the household as the human person, composed of a number of elements. The three stages of household alliances become a narrative of Fall and Redemption applied to the human person. The household of five represents the human and the components of which he is made.

- (1) In the first stage, there are three in the household. This household is the pre-lapsarian human, composed of Body, Soul and Will.

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<sup>519</sup> Also a method in other authors, e.g. Origen takes the Creation narrative in *Hom.Gen.* 1 as referring allegorically to the human person. E.g. heaven and earth represent the combination of mind and body (1.2); the fact that earth bears fruit represents our need to bear good spiritual fruits (1.3, 4); the placing of the sun in the sky represents the way Christ illuminates us (1.5); etc.

(2) The Fall occurs, and two more enter the anthropological household:

subsequent humans also have Sin, which is the father of the Body, and Disobedience (*infidelitas*), which is mother of the Soul. These provide the in-laws required by the biblical verses.

(3) However, this household is divided by the sword, which for Hilary

represents the Word of God. This leads to the third stage, when the five-fold individual becomes a Christian through baptism and is renewed in the Spirit. When this occurs, the sword (=Word) divides the household and Sin and Disobedience are cut off and subjected to Body and Soul. This completes the explanation of why the five are divided two against three and three against two.

The details of the relationship between members of the household is not confused in Hilary's narrative and will be discussed further in the next chapter (§7.2a). However, the basic picture is clear. Adam was created with Body, Soul and Will, but somehow the Fall caused the entry of Sin and Disobedience into the human person. In other words, the human nature somehow changed at the Fall; Sin and Disobedience were previously extrinsic but now have become internal components of our anthropological makeup. In particular, the *voluntas* is now constrained by Disobedience. On the other hand, baptism can also alter human anthropology.

Hilary is not alone in interpreting the Gospel story of a sword dividing the household in terms of the human person. In interpreting the parallel story in Luke's

gospel,<sup>520</sup> Ambrose uses exactly the same interpretation that this represents human nature which is corrupted by the Adam's Fall but is restored by Christ.

Possunt etiam videri caro atque anima ab odore, tactu, gustuque luxuriae separata, in una domo se adversus incursantia vitia dividentes, caro et anima subjicientes se legi Dei, et removentes a lege peccati: quorum licet dissensio per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam se verterit [...]; tamen per crucem Domini Salvatoris tam inimicitias, quam etiam mandatorum lege vacuatis in societatis concordiam congruerunt...  
(AMBROSE *Exp. sec. Lucam* 7.141)<sup>521</sup>

Ambrose is proposing exactly the same interpretation of the household divided by the sword, and moreover the three stages are the same. The perfection of the first man's internal composition is damaged by his sin and now discord not only enters but becomes human nature (*dissensio... in naturam se verterit*); humans now fall under the Pauline law of sin (*lege peccati*). Yet as a final stage the Saviour restores the internal human harmony (*per crucem... [caro et anima] in societatis concordiam congruerunt*).

Whether or not Ambrose knows Hilary here, or they are both just using a common interpretation, is not clear. In this case it seems that a link to Origen is *not* so obvious, since it is not clear if he ever interpreted this passage in the same way; his commentary on this Matthew text is lost, but his commentary on the parallel Lukan passage interprets the

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<sup>520</sup> Lk 12.52

<sup>521</sup> Cited by AUGUSTINE *c.sec.Jul.resp.* 5

five members of the household as the five senses.<sup>522</sup> Hence this either comes from Hilary, or is a tradition that both Ambrose and Hilary are drawing on.

### **6.3 First Cause of the Fall**

Hilary seems to have one implicit explanation for the ‘first cause’ of the Fall, namely our createdness: sin was, in one sense, always going to arise due to our earthy weighted body. However, he gives various kinds of explicit explanations for the Fall itself: the devil’s lure, and internal human attributes such as pride (*ambitio*) or disobedience (*infidelitas*). Of these, he appears to see the last as most significant.

(a) The *devil’s lure* has already been demonstrated in the two examples given (§6.2a), of the cunning of the serpent that seduced Eve and of the three temptations which match those of Christ. At the same time, Hilary insists this is no excuse. Those who sin are like the first serpent, who chose to block his ears to God’s word.

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<sup>522</sup> ORIGEN *Fragmenta in Lucam (in Catenis)*, 202: Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ πρόσωπα ἕξ ἐστὶ, ῥητέον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν πρόσωπον, τὸ τῆς νύμφης, τέμνεται εἰς δύο, εἰς νύμφην καὶ θυγατέρα ἐν τῷ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν πενθερὰν διαμάχεσθαι τὴν αὐτήν· καὶ οὕτως ἀπαντὰ τρεῖς ἐπὶ δυσὶ καὶ δύο ἐπὶ τρισὶ διαμάχεσθαι.

πρὸς ἀναγωγὴν δέ· ὡς ἐν ἐνὶ οἴκῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ αἱ πέντε αἰσθήσεις, πρὶν μὲν ἐλθεῖν αὐταῖς τὸν λόγον, ὁμοιοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, ἐπιδημήσαντος δ’ αὐτοῦ μερίζονται· δύο μὲν αἱ φιλοσοφώτεραι, ὄρασις, δι’ ἧς ὀρῶντες κόσμον καὶ τὴν τάξιν αὐτοῦ θαυμάζομεν τὸν κτίστην, καὶ ἀκοή, δι’ ἧς μαθητευόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔπειτα τὰς λοιπὰς τρεῖς· γεῦσιν, ὄσφρησιν, ἀφῆν, τὰς ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ οὐ πεφικυίας πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, αἱ δὲ τρεῖς ἐπὶ τὰς δύο ἀντιπράττουσι μᾶλλον.

τὸ οὖν· “διαμερισθήσεται πατήρ ἐπὶ υἱῷ” ἀφ’ ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς ἀναγνωστέον, οὐκ ἐχόμενα τῶν πρώτων, ὁ ῥητῶς μὲν τὸν τῶν πιστῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπίστων δηλοῖ μερισμόν. συμβολικῶς δὲ “πατήρ” νοῦς μερίζεται “ἐπὶ υἱῷ” μοχθηρῷ λογισμῷ μὴ συγκατατιθέμενος αὐτῷ· “καὶ υἱὸς ἐπὶ πατρί”, ὁ τὸν ἀποθανόντα μὴ θάπτων πατέρα· “μήτηρ ἐπὶ θυγατρὶ”, ψυχὴ τὸν μοχθηρὸν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἀποδεχομένη καρπὸν· “θυγάτηρ ἐπὶ μητέρα”, τὴν ὕλην ἢ μηκέτι ἐνομένη αὐτῆ ψυχῆ· “πενθερὰ ἐπὶ νύμφην”, ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἀνδρὸς τῆς ὑπ’ αὐτῷ ψυχῆς μήτηρ, λέγω δὴ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, καταλιπὼν τὸν ἐκ περιτομῆς λαόν· “νύμφη ἐπὶ τὴν πενθερὰν”, ὁ διὰ τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν λαὸς χωρισθεὶς τοῦ πνεύματος.

Nam serpens innocens esse potuisset, cui aures per se ut surdae sint  
obstruuntur... Illam contumacem atque insolentem antiqui serpentis  
inobedientiam docet. (*TrPs*, 57.3)

Although not explicit in the passage, the implication is that any sin – including the Fall – is due to deliberate deafness. The devil’s temptation is of course pertinent, but the Fall’s first cause is ultimately somewhere within us.

(b) Other passages in Hilary suggest that *ambitio* was the root problem. The section on Christ’s temptations already quoted suggests this was the third temptation matched by Adam’s: *divini nominis ambitione corruerat diis futurum similem pollicendo*.<sup>523</sup> Similarly the serpent seduces Eve by giving hope and promising a share in immortality; it lied that it could achieve this, but Christian preachers can claim in truth that we will indeed be like the angels.<sup>524</sup> These two accounts share the promise that we will be *similes diis* or *similes angelis*. These both involve some kind of desire to achieve a state beyond what is normal for humans.<sup>525</sup> All this recalls the patristic notion that pride was the first cause, found for example in both Origen and Augustine.<sup>526</sup>

(c) Lastly, Hilary’s description of the Fall in terms of the anthropological household mentions that our internal change arose because of Adam’s *peccatum* and *infidelitas*. In the context of the Fall, these are best translated as Sin and Disobedience (to the command God had given). For Hilary, *infidelitas* is a key theme of the Matthew

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<sup>523</sup> *InMt*, 3.5

<sup>524</sup> *InMt*, 10.13: spe... illexit, communionem immortalitatis spondit. ... Quod ille mentitus est, nos praedic[a]mus ex vero, secundum sponsonem Dei angelis similes futuros esse crederent.

<sup>525</sup> At Ps. 118.21 *incredasti superbos*, Hilary and Ambrose both talk of pride as a reason why we do not keep the divine commandments. Ambrose refers this to the Fall, but Hilary does not; it is not clear whether this was in the source text and if so whether Hilary omitted it accidentally or deliberately. (HILARY *TrPs118*, 3.14; AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 3.34).

<sup>526</sup> ORIGEN *Hom.Ezechiel*, 9.2; AUGUSTINE *de natura et gratia*, 33 [xxix]

commentary, as may be noted by its frequency (*infidelis* or *infidelitas* occurs around 80 times) and by its recurrence in the final chapter, emphasizing its importance as a key to understanding the whole work. It has a variety of different significations, so it is hard to find an English translation that encapsulates both the ‘disobedience’ that caused the Fall, and the ‘disloyalty’ of the Jews which is contrasted with the faithfulness or openness of the Gentiles.

These are not unrelated: even the persistent theme of the Jews’ disloyalty points towards our anthropological make-up. This can be seen in the beautifully neat allegory with which Hilary explains the execution of John the Baptist.<sup>527</sup> John (representing the Law) urges Herod (representing the Jewish people) not to bind himself to Herodias (representing *infidelitas*). Herod is emotionally seduced by Herodias and her daughter Salome (who is *voluptas*); thus the two women can ask for John’s head – ‘that is, the Law’s glory’. The whole allegory points to the way that *infidelitas* conspires to avoid the Law. Here and elsewhere,<sup>528</sup> Hilary links the national level (regarding the Jewish people) and the individual anthropological level, as we can see from the way that the vocabulary and concepts match the description of the anthropological household (for example, *infidelitas* is represented by a marriage<sup>529</sup> and begets another anthropological property, namely *voluptas*<sup>530</sup>).

Hilary does often use *(dis)obedentia* or *(in)obedentia* but his preference for *(in)fidELITAS* might be because of its wider semantic flexibility, so that it can apply to the range of situations just mentioned. Further, the latter word is preferred because its opposite – *fides* or *fidELITAS* – is what effects our salvation. As Peñamaría points out, the

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<sup>527</sup> *InMt*, 14.7

<sup>528</sup> *InMt*, 21.9

<sup>529</sup> *InMt*, 14.7: *ipsis [gentibus] tamquam vinculo conjugalitatis annexa est [infidelitas]*. (This regards the earlier marriage of Herodias to Herod’s brother, which made the second marriage unlawful)

<sup>530</sup> *InMt*, 14.7: *...voluptas enim tamquam ex infidelitate orta...*

renewal of the body-soul relation is directly attributable to faith,<sup>531</sup> and this faith frees us from sin and justifies us.<sup>532</sup> It is the specific antidote for the *infidelitas* which is both cause and effect of our Fall.

Diabolus infidelis, Abraham fidelis. Nam ille in hominis transgressione  
fuit perfidus; hic vero justificatus ex fide est. (*InMt*, 2.3)

Since *infidelitas* causes the enslavement of the will, it is faith that will redeem it, as seen also in the example of Peter's mother-in-law excerpted below (§6.4b: *usque credidit, voluntatis suae servitio detinebatur*).

#### **6.4 Some effects of the Fall**

The effects of the Fall in Hilary are described in a wide variety of ways, for example as a curse or as captivity, but also as an event that caused an anthropological change; indeed, these transpire to be the same thing. In particular, the disobedient act made disobedience part of our human nature.

##### 6.4a) Curse, death, captivity

*Earth's curse.* The curse on the earth is not mentioned in *InMt* but occurs in various places throughout the psalms commentaries. In Scripture this is a direct explicit

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<sup>531</sup> PEÑAMARIA 1974:237, citing *InMt*, 10.24

<sup>532</sup> PEÑAMARIA 1974:241, citing *InMt*, 8.6, 21.15

consequence of the Fall, since God tells Adam “Cursed is the ground because of you; through painful toil you will eat of it all the days of your life.”<sup>533</sup> Hilary concentrates on the first phrase of this curse.<sup>534</sup>

[Terra] et in Adae operibus, et in Abel sanguine meruit offensam. (*TrPs.*  
[14].5)

Et haec... ad universitatem humani generis aptata sunt, quia ex uno in omnes sententia mortis et vitae labor exiit (Rom. 5.18), cum dictum est: *Maledicta terra in operibus tuis* (Gen. 3.17). (*TrPs.* 59.4)

primum omnia cum creata et facta sunt benedixit, postea vero ex peccato Adae in anathemate constiterunt (*TrPs.* 132.7)

*Death.* The second excerpt here shows another unfortunate consequence of the curse on the earth: *ex uno, in omnes sententia mortis... exiit*. Since the earth in Hilary represents the human body, the curse on the earth is one on the body; more specifically it is the curse that leads to death for humans. Adam was formed for life, but brought in death.<sup>535</sup>

Neque mors... potest per se in id invalescere... cum decernentis potestas constitutam ab exordio in Adam sub conditione decreti vitae legem demutaverit lege moriendi. (*TrPs.* 51.18)

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<sup>533</sup> Gen. 3.17

<sup>534</sup> See also *TrPs.* 51.12, [66].7

<sup>535</sup> See also *TrPs.* 137.12

*Laudabo Dominum in vita mea. Non enim ea vita, quae nunc est per infirmitates corporis, sua est. Ab Adam namque ista coepit, non cum Adam inchoata est, quam non vitam, sed mortem esse, Apostolus novit dicens: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus (Rom. 7. 24)? (TrPs. 145.2)*

The Fall also has other universal consequences. Sin took a hold: the first man became a slave to sin, infected or contaminated by sin.<sup>536</sup> We lost the right to be called human.<sup>537</sup> Our condition is described as being in exile in another land with another law,<sup>538</sup> while anxious to come home.<sup>539</sup> Thus for Hilary (in the Psalms commentaries), the Fall results in a curse and the coming of death, for both humans and the the entirety of creation.

*Captivity & constraint.* As Doignon points out,<sup>540</sup> Hilary uses the same biblical verses to indicate our sin as other early Fathers (such as Cyprian, Lucifer and Ambrosiaster); Hilary, however, uses them to demonstrate not just the universality of sin but the constraint that the ‘law of sin’ places over us. He cites Rom. 7 on several occasions<sup>541</sup> and the *neccesitas humana* or human constraint that arises from living under sin. Further, Hilary interprets the Babylonian captivity as a cipher for human constraint.

Quae autem sint quae ‘*captivos ducant*’, nos Apostolus docet, dicens:

*Video aliam legem in membris meis militantem adversus legem mentis*

<sup>536</sup> *TrPs.* 142.6 (*peccati servus*), [66].2 (*peccatis coinquinatus*)

<sup>537</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.2 (see also §4.5 on the association with losing the *imago*).

<sup>538</sup> *TrPs.* 136.5: *quisquis ergo in crimine primi parentis Adae exsulem se factum illius Sion recordabitur*

<sup>539</sup> *TrPs118*, 22.6

<sup>540</sup> DOIGNON 1996b:14-17 *et passim*

<sup>541</sup> For example *TrPs118*, 1.3, 22.6; *TrPs* 58.4, 136.9

*meae et captivum me ducentem in lege peccati quae est in membris meis* (Rom. 7.25). Cum igitur inter concupiscentiam carnis et spiritus pugna est, tum ea quae captivos nos conantur sibi subdere pertentant occupare corpus ejusque dominari... (*TrPs*, 136.9)

Hilary is not specific here, but it looks as if he is referring to spiritual beings who keep us constrained under the law of sin (*ea quae nos conantur subdere*). Peñamaría<sup>542</sup> points out that Hilary repeatedly uses the captivity of Sion as a cipher for the soul's captivity to both the body and sin;<sup>543</sup> Hilary explicitly connects this to Adam's Fall and uses the Babylonian Exile to stand for the exile from paradise (*in crimine primi parentis Adae exsulem*).<sup>544</sup> The captivity of body illustrated by the historical exile was bad indeed, but the captivity of the soul is far worse.<sup>545</sup>

Alcain demonstrates how Origen also frequently uses the exile in Babylon as representing human constraint and captivity.<sup>546</sup> Since Hilary interprets Babylon the same way in his Psalms commentaries, it seems clear that Hilary is deriving this metaphor through Origen again. This metaphor will be discussed again in §8.2c and §9.4b; but for now it is sufficient to highlight that this is not so much an external captivity as an internal incapacity and constraint, following an internal change: the human person is now subject to internal passions which prevent him or her from acting in an entirely rational way. This leads us to what is arguably the key consequence of the Fall, a change in human anthropological make-up.

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<sup>542</sup> PEÑAMARIA 1974:238

<sup>543</sup> *TrPs* [13].6, 52.20, 125.3-9, 136.3-9, 136.13-14

<sup>544</sup> *TrPs*. 136.5

<sup>545</sup> *TrPs*. 125.4

<sup>546</sup> ALCAIN 1973:67-78. Alcain cites passages of Origen such as *Hom.Ez.* 1.3, 12.2; *Hom.Jer.* 2.1, 2.2, 3.4, 19.14

6.4b) *Infidelitas* and anthropological change

Hilary expresses the consequences of the Fall as effecting a change in human nature. He is following in the tradition of scholars such as Tertullian, whom we know Hilary read.<sup>547</sup> As already mentioned Tertullian sees the Fall as changing our nature or giving a second nature (*alia natura*) which means that he is subject to a certain depravity through this origin (*vitium originis*).<sup>548</sup> Likewise, later authors such as Augustine see the Fall as having changed human nature, for example when he says the habit of sin has been turned into nature (*in naturam versa*) by Adam's sin.<sup>549</sup>

This change in nature does not, for Tertullian, affect the fact that man is ultimately self-determining. This is not true for Hilary; as we will see, Hilary sees the Fall as affecting the will and human emotions. Section §6.2c presented his description of the anthropological household, which is Hilary's longest and most detailed treatment of the Fall. From this passage it has been shown that the Fall was caused by our *infidelitas* and *peccatum* (or rather, our *infidelitas* and *peccatum* were themselves the Fall). However, Hilary takes the extra step of stating that these were not only the cause of the Fall – or themselves comprised the Fall: they are also the effects of the Fall. This equation of cause and effect is also found in Augustine, for whom “sin and the penalty for sin are the same”<sup>550</sup>: for example, Augustine's fallen will is the penalty for the will's disobedience. So in Hilary, Disobedience and Sin now become fundamental elements of the human person.

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<sup>547</sup> *InMt*, 5.1

<sup>548</sup> TERTULLIAN *de an.* 41

<sup>549</sup> AUGUSTINE *de fide et symbolo* 10.23 (written 392-3)

<sup>550</sup> AUGUSTINE *de nat. et grat.* 24.22

Hilary's interpretation of Disobedience being part of postlapsarian humanity occurs elsewhere:

In socru Petri, vitiosa infidelitatis aestimatur affectio, cui adjacet libertas voluntatis, quae nos quadam sibi conjugii societate conjungit. Ergo ingressu Domini, in Petri domu, id est in corpore, curatur infidelitas peccatorum calore exaestuans, et vitiorum aegra dominatu. [...] Nunc autem ideo infidelitatis socrus Petri nuncupabitur, quia usque dum credit, voluntatis suae servitio detinebatur. (*InMt*, 7.6)

Just as in the narrative of the anthropological household, a mother-in-law is taken to represent Disobedience (*infidelitas*) due to the analogy of the marriage bond being also an anthropological bond. This Disobedience holds the will in thrall (*voluntatis suae servitio detinebatur*), as indeed Hilary states again elsewhere.<sup>551</sup>

This notion that our anthropology is affected by the Fall is found throughout Hilary's work; however it is not always expressed in terms of *infidelitas*. Although that term is thematic in *InMt*, it is much rarer in the Psalms commentaries.<sup>552</sup> In the latter text, other negative attributes form part of our anthropological make-up:

Sanata enim omni cordis contritione, et ne perpetuo rursus subeat alligata, his omnibus humanarum passionum infirmitatibus liberati, placebimus Deo in regione vivorum, anima nostra in requiem suam (ex

<sup>551</sup> For example *InMt*, 5.4-6 suggests that sin perverts the will.

<sup>552</sup> For one example see *TrPs*, [67].6: *Parate vias Domini... Omnis vallis implebitur, et omnis collis humiliabitur* (Lk. 3.3). *Parato itinere nostro* (id est, vitiorum infidelitatisque nostrae vel compressis tumoribus, vel elevata humilitate terrenae labis), ...in corda nostra descendet.

qua per transgressionem primi parentis sui Adae ejecta est) revertente.

(*TrPs*, 146.4)

This passage suggests that before the Fall our soul was at peace but the Fall brought in the weakness of the passions. (This is also found elsewhere in Hilary).<sup>553</sup> The need to be ‘freed’ (*liberati*) suggests that the passions (including emotions) constrain us, as indeed has already been suggested. Similarly we are constrained by the underlying *malitia* which again is an intrinsic part of our fallen state.<sup>554</sup>

(On Ps.118.115, *Declinate a me maligni; et scrutabor mandata Dei mei.*)

Et nescio quem possit excipere. omnibus enim per naturae demutabilis voluntatem malitia adjacet, ipsisque apostolis verbo licet jam fidei emundatis atque sanctis, non abesse tamen malitiam per conditionem communis nobis originis docuit Dominus... (*TrPs*, [15].6)

Thus *malitia* became an intrinsic part of the human condition as a result of the Fall (and this was probably in the source text; the catena is not preserved at this point but Ambrose refers to *malignitas* here). We all contain a degree of malevolence (*omnibus malitia adjacet*) and this is due to the will: ...*per naturae demutabilis voluntatem*.

So then, Hilary sees the key effect of a Fall as anthropological change, and this may be expressed as humans acquiring *infidelitas* or passions to skew their will and their action. This situation can only be remedied by a further change in human nature:

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<sup>553</sup> *TrPs*118, 9.4

<sup>554</sup> Elements of this passage will be discussed again at §7.2c

labes carnis humanae per admixtam in se vitiorum consuetudinem  
aboleri penitus, nisi cum naturae demutatione, non possit. (*TrPs*, 142.13)

This will be achieved by baptism, as shall be shown in §9.5. However, it will be necessary first to consider the will and passions in more detail in the next couple of chapters.

#### 6.4c) Guilt & punishment

But why did this change in nature occur? If he gives any reason at all, Hilary states that the change in our nature was a punishment for the first sin. This is why the language of the curse (on the earth) can be used.

Verum hic Adae terra, quae per illecebram cibi erat criminosa,  
maledicatur. (*TrPs*, [66].7)

Similarly Hilary states the passions<sup>555</sup> and the entry of death<sup>556</sup> are specifically punishments. They do not however remit our guilt, though, since it is stated that Christ dies due to the juridical guilt on flesh: *mundi princeps, nihil [peccatum] inveniens, peccati tamen poenam, id est jus mortis, exseruit.*<sup>557</sup>

However, suggestions of punishment and guilt all occur in the Psalms Commentaries. In the Matthew commentary, however, the narrative of the anthropological household implies that the entry of Sin and Disobedience into the human make-up are considered a natural and inevitable consequence of the first sin; there is no mention here of

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<sup>555</sup> *TrPs*118, 9.4

<sup>556</sup> *TrPs*, 62.6

<sup>557</sup> *TrPs*, [68].8

a curse, punishment or guilt. This makes original sin more a natural outcome than a punishment: the crime is Sin and Disobedience, and thus Sin and Disobedience become part of the human person.

The idea of sin as a natural consequence (rather than a punishment) would be in accordance with expressions of the Fall and its effects in say Irenaeus, where the Fall is seen as part of our weakness and a situation we need to be redeemed from rather than a punishment.<sup>558</sup> Hilary never asks himself why we can be held reprehensible for something which is also a punishment (ie, our own intrinsic Disobedience). Hence we should probably assume that he sees our postlapsarian human nature as (partly at least) a consequence of, rather than purely a punishment for, the first sin and the Fall.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed Hilary's articulation of the Fall and some of its immediate consequences. His simplest use of the Fall refers to elements from Genesis such as Adam or the first sin, and he can be shown to reject any suggestion that the Fall consisted of a fall of souls into bodies. Nevertheless, his most interesting narrative is that of the household whose members are divided by a sword; Hilary takes this as referring to the human and the internal elements he or she is composed of. It is odd that his longest treatment is not scriptural, but treats with the change in human nature effected by Fall. This angle is remarkable, and suggests that Hilary understands the Fall as fundamental for understanding the composition human person, due to the effects it had on us.

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<sup>558</sup> For example IRENAEUS *adv.haer.* 4.39.3 (men have blinded themselves), 3.23.2 (God cursed the earth, not Adam)

In the latter part of the chapter, the effects of the Fall began to be assessed. As well as concepts such as earth's curse, death and constraint, it is clear that Hilary sees Sin and Disobedience not only as the Fall itself but also as the consequences of the Fall. The will (*voluntas*) is affected and constrained by passions from proper action. These two constraints – the fallen will and the turbulence of the passions – are now intrinsic to human nature, and prevent humans from acting rightly. These will be considered in the next two chapters.

## Chapter 7

# Voluntas

### 7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, Hilary's usage of the word *voluntas* will be surveyed. In particular, this chapter will ask how Hilary sees the *voluntas* as an anthropological component, and what the source of his ideas may be.

It will be seen that Hilary uses *voluntas* considerably more often than Ambrose, and uses the term to express concepts that other church fathers may explain without recourse to *voluntas*. In particular, Hilary uses the will to express both individual character or disposition, and a psychological component in general human action. He expresses the Fall in terms of its effect on the will and uses the idea of the *initium voluntatis* to justify how God can still hold us responsible for our actions.

Some of Hilary's uses of *voluntas* are not worth remark in this chapter. As is to be expected, the word sometimes appears merely as an abstract nominal expression of the verb *velle*: that is, where *voluntas (alicuius)* is equivalent in a trivial way to *id quod vult aliquis*.<sup>559</sup> Other standard idiomatic phrases occur (e.g. *ex voluntate sua* to mean 'voluntarily').<sup>560</sup> In addition, references to God's will have been omitted from this discussion. They are frequent particularly in *InMt* where phrases such as *voluntas paterna* are common (22 occurrences), usually reflecting divine purpose in Christ, and thus a shorthand phrase for God's economy. In *TrPs118*, on the other hand, God's will is used

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<sup>559</sup> *InMt*, 14.8: *Contrarium videlicet est, tunc eum voluisse, nunc nolle: et praesens molestia anteriori non convenit voluntati.*

<sup>560</sup> *TrPs118*, 7.8

not of the incarnation, but of God's desire for human response – his desire, that is, but not necessarily the actuality. The notion of God's will occurs only 6 times.

This chapter thus concentrates on the anthropological or psychological meaning of the will; but what is meant here by 'will'? A number of modern scholarly works address the question of the will in antiquity and how the concept develops. However, a wide variety of terms in both Hebrew<sup>561</sup> and Greek<sup>562</sup> express the various concepts covered by the modern English word 'will'.

For example, Greek philosophical discussion includes Plato's use of βούλησις (rational intention), further elaborated by Aristotle. The latter uses the word προαίρεσις in explaining what βούλησις is, but its etymological meaning of 'choice' later comes to incorporate the connotations of 'character'.<sup>563</sup> In the vernacular, words such as θελήσις, θέλημα, ἐκόν might convey volition without any implication regarding rational or non-rational sources of the wish in question. Other key concepts include is what can be said to be ἐφ' ἡμῖν ('up to us')<sup>564</sup> and the notion of τὸ αὐτεξούσιον to describe the crucial human characteristic of self-determination.

Translation into Latin presents its own problems. For example, *arbitrium* is a more natural etymological translation of προαίρεσις, but does not have the nuance of 'character, moral disposition'. The alternative translation *voluntas* is also found,<sup>565</sup> but that is also used to translate βούλησις (as we see in Cicero).<sup>566</sup> And *voluntas* is also used in

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<sup>561</sup> רָצוֹן (*yētzet*, impulse), רָצוֹן (*rāzôn*, goodwill, inclination)

<sup>562</sup> DIHLE 1982:86 cites the following in Paul to express will: βούλομαι, θέλημα, φρόνημα, νοῦς, νόημα, διάνοια, γινώσκω, ἐπιθυμεῖν...

<sup>563</sup> DOBBIN 1991:112-115

<sup>564</sup> This is a crucial notion for Frede, contributing to development of concepts of will as far as this is related to moral responsibility.

<sup>565</sup> DOBBIN 1991:117 cites a fragment where three of the classic ἀρχαί (namely φύσις, ἀνάγκη, προαίρεσις) are translated as *natura*, *vis*, *voluntas*. (The fourth ἀρχή, namely τύχη, does not appear in this fragment).

<sup>566</sup> CICERO *Tusc. Disp.* 4.6.12: simul objecta species cujuspiam est, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura: id cum constanter prudenterque fit, ejusmodi appetitionem Stoici

translating τὸ ἀντεξούσιον. These terms may have conflated in philosophical discussions: Kahn suggests that the phrase *libera voluntas* in Augustine is merely shorthand for *liberum arbitrium voluntatis*.<sup>567</sup> On a slightly different note, the key notion for moral responsibility of ἐφ' ἡμῶν is translated (by Cicero at least) as *in nostra potestate*<sup>568</sup> -- a close enough translation, but with nuances of strength as well as capacity.

Kahn's article starts by distinguishing four uses of 'will':<sup>569</sup> for example, the theological (voluntarist); expressing volition in human action; as Kantian self-awareness; and as a concept in discussions of free will versus determinism. Kahn's categories do overlap somewhat, but he has identified the methodological problem in studying several overlapping but different concepts which are expressed with overlapping but different lexemes.

In order to simplify this problem, the current chapter does not analyse a concept (and the words used to express it) but a word, namely *voluntas*, and how Hilary in particular appears to use it.

## **7.2 Hilary's articulations of the will**

### **7.2a) The anthropological household: *voluntas* and the Fall**

Hilary's longest and most significant passage involving the will is his narrative of the Fall in terms of an anthropological household, already mentioned in §6.2c. To recap,

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βούλησιν apellant, nos appellamus *voluntatem*; eam illi putant in solo esse sapiente, quam sic definiunt: *Voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat*; quae autem adversus rationem incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur.

<sup>567</sup> KAHN 1988:250 fn.20, citing AUGUSTINE *lib.arb.* 2.1.1, 2.1.3

<sup>568</sup> FREDE 2011:90, without reference

<sup>569</sup> KAHN 1988:235-6

the Fall is represented in three stages affecting a human person and his components, using the Gospel household where three are divided against two and two against three. Firstly the human is composed of body, soul and will; in the second stage, sin and disobedience (*peccatum, infidelitas*) enter in; and finally at Baptism they are removed, leaving only a unified body and soul. So far so good, but the devil is in the detail and to some degree it looks as if Hilary has not quite thought his example through: he does not seem entirely clear as to how the will relates to the other members of the household. Yet this is of fundamental interest here. The possible interrelations of anthropological components will be illustrated by diagrams.

In the first stage Hilary cites the will as a third component of man, yet it appears to be somehow a faculty of the other two:

Sed tria tantum in homine reperimus, id est, et corpus et animam et voluntatem. Nam ut corpori anima data est, ita et potestas utrique utendi se ut vellet indulta est: atque ob id lex est proposita voluntati. (*InMt*, 10.23)

Doignon at least appears to think Hilary's will is a faculty of (each of) the other anthropological components since his translation<sup>570</sup> suggests a few lines later that the other components each have their own will: *voluntas unicuique sua adjacet = à chacun d'eux est adjoint un volonté propre* (where "*unicuique = à chacun d'eux*" refers to the four other anthropological components or members of the household.) This is grammatically valid since *unicuique* then has the same antecedent as *ab his* in the previous clause. A viable grammatical alternative is to take *unicuique* as those born *consequentibus generationibus*,

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<sup>570</sup> DOIGNON 2007a:245

i.e. that each one of us has our own will. This is at least more meaningful, since otherwise Doignon's translation suggests that there is actually more than one will in any one human (i.e. soul-body-sin-faithlessness each have a will, which adds up to eight in the household rather than five). Yet Doignon's interpretation is exactly what Hilary seems to be implying throughout *InMt*, 10.23-24; compare for example the excerpt cited just above (*potestas utrique indulta est*), and also with the description of post-baptismal regeneration to be discussed shortly.<sup>571</sup> Hilary's metaphor is starting to fall down: he is not consistent as to whether there is one will or several in post-lapsarian Adam.

But maybe they all have a share in the same will. Hilary's next paragraph implies there is just one will, which marries the combined *homo*.

Nam voluntas unicuique sua adjacet. Ergo jam unius domus quinque sunt: pater corporis peccatum, mater animae infidelitas, et accedens voluntatis arbitrium, quod totum hominem quodam conjugii sibi jure dstringit. Huic infidelitas socrus est... (*InMt*, 10.23)


Hilary appears to suggest that the *voluntas* is what binds the whole man together, 'as if by a marital decree'.<sup>572</sup> Admittedly the usual meanings of *dstringere*<sup>573</sup> do not fit into this

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<sup>571</sup> *InMt*, 10.24 (excerpt beginning "Et quia corpus ipsum..." below)

<sup>572</sup> Doignon translates as follows 2007a:245: [*c'est du péché et de la infidélité que nous sommes issus...*] ...car à chacun d'eux est adjoind un vouloir propre. Ainsi, il y a maintenant cinq personnes pour une maison: le péché père du corps, l'incroyance mère de l'âme, et la liberté de la volonté qui, intervenant, s'attache l'homme tout entière en vertu d'une sorte de droit conjugal. Elle a pour belle-mère l'incroyance...


<sup>573</sup> *Dstringo, -nxi, -ctum*. (I) (very rarely) draw asunder, stretch out (II) (= distineo) hinder, occupy, engage. 2. Puzzle, confound (Plautus: with homo as object). PARTICIPLE (A) strict, severe (B) used of inner mental strife (e.g. in Cicero), hesitating, vacillating (C) (more freq) busy, occupied, engaged



interpretation, nor do those of the easily confused *destringere*.<sup>574</sup> However, an almost identical phrase a few chapters earlier confirms the

proposed interpretation: *...libertas voluntatis, quae nos quadam sibi conjugii societate conjungit* ('...which binds us to itself by a marriage tie');<sup>575</sup> indeed a textual emendation may be appropriate. So now there is just one will, namely the link which 'marries' the man (that is, the one *homo* comprised of body and soul).

The last sentence of the excerpt indicates that faithlessness is the mother-in-law of the will (confirmed in the subsequent paragraph: *libertas voluntatis a socru sua – id est, ab infidelitate – divisa...*).<sup>576</sup> If *infidelitas* is mother of the soul, and




mother-in-law of the will, then the soul must be married to the will (Diagram A). But if this is the conjugal arrangement, there is no clear connection with the 'body' in the household.

But Hilary has said in the above excerpt that the will marries *totus homo*. In this case, it can be said that the will is married to body and soul together (Diagram B). Indeed it may be for Hilary that this is essentially the same as the preceding scenario, if *homo* and

<sup>574</sup> *Destringo, -inxi, -ictum.* (I) *strip off* (leaves of plants, intestines, draw sword)... (II) *touch gently, skim, graze* (A) of beasts; *cause a slight wound* (B) *criticise, censure, satirize*; hence *dstrictus severe, rigid, censorius*.

<sup>575</sup> *InMt, 7.6*


<sup>576</sup> *InMt, 10.24c*



*anima* are essentially equivalent. But then the description of sin and faithlessness as parents of the body and soul does not quite work. Still, this interpretation has the advantage that sin and faithlessness are

clearly extrinsic to the *homo* household (that is, they are extrinsic to the nature of mankind) and it also explains why Hilary cannot quite work out what to do with the will at the end of his exegesis (see below), since it is not technically intrinsic to the *homo* any more than sin and unfaithfulness are.

A third possible way of reading this passage is to take the will as the marriage itself (Diagram C). This complicates the relation between the *voluntas* and her supposed mother-in-law *infidelitas* (since the latter could surely not be called mother-in-law of the marriage itself), and also does not really explain which members are intrinsic to the *homo*. It is also



grammatically less likely due to the *sibi* which implies the will is itself marrying someone. Nevertheless it is the neatest system, and it may be that this is closest to what Hilary is trying to describe, albeit awkwardly. It also explains the stages of salvation history better: firstly body and soul lived in the household, linked by will; then sin and faithfulness came in.

However, glossing over the details, the general picture is clear and certain elements are notable: the description of sin and disobedience as ‘parents’ which are somehow part of yet extrinsic to the anthropological ‘household’; the role of the will and the way it is affected by the Fall; the way that baptism is taken as altering human anthropology.

Despite his muddled metaphor, Hilary proceeds to explain the third stage, where the believer is renewed and regenerated by baptism. At this point the Word of God enters in as a sword and slices away the Sin and Disobedience components.

Et quia corpus ipsum... in naturam animae... evadat...: idcirco jam unum atque idem cum anima velle coepit effici..., quibus libertas voluntatis a socru sua, id est, ab infidelitate divisa, jus suum omne concedit: ut quod erat libertas voluntatis, deinceps animae sit potestas. (*InMt*, 10.24)

So at baptism the nature of the body is subsumed into that of the soul, and the will of the body and soul are entirely synchronized (*unum atque idem cum anima velle coepit effici*). This is a return to the notion that there was somehow more than one *voluntas* or *velle* in the warring household. With baptism, however, the one-ness of the will is restored. (Although with Hilary's confusing narrative, there may have been more than one will even before the Fall – see above).

However, the will is not merely synchronized. It is cut away from Disobedience, and this allows it to relinquish its jurisdiction and become *potestas animae*. This is ambiguous: it is not clear if the will entirely disappears (as suggested by the past tense *quod erat libertas voluntatis*) or merely becomes subordinate, as suggested by the subsequent sentence:

Et origo carnis et origo animae et libertas potestatis in duos dividuntur, animam scilicet et corpus hominis novi, quae unum atque idem velle coeperunt: divisique tres duobus subjacebunt, in dominatum eorum de Spiritus novitate potioribus. (*InMt*, 10.23)

Now the ‘three which were split off’ (*divisiue tres*) are subjected to the other two, namely the body and soul of the New Man: but this appears to classify the freedom of the will as something negative like Disobedience and Sin. Still, the Christian is now categorically composed of body-soul alone. The nominal will (*voluntas*) is no longer a part of the household, although the body and soul still will verbally (*velle*).

It seems that it is better not to push Hilary’s analogy too far: it is internally inconsistent and not well thought through. Rather than solution as suggested by the three diagrams, it seems best not to push the metaphor too far and to accept that Hilary has not been clear in working it out. It can, at least, be said that disobedience and sin are probably somehow extrinsic to man. The position of the will is more ambiguous. It is not extrinsic in the way its ‘in-laws’ are, but nor is it the *homo* itself; it merely binds the *homo* together. It is not clear whether it describes an anthropological component which is intrinsically proper to the human person. Also, at times he speaks of one single will and at other times he suggests that body and soul independently have wills (which must ideally be synchronized).

What can be said, however, is that he sees humans as composed of body, soul, and will,<sup>577</sup> and that the will is somehow affected by the Fall.

Another interesting feature of this passage is Hilary’s reference to the *lex proposita voluntati*.<sup>578</sup> Hilary refers to this *lex* again in catalogue of God’s works in the Old Testament: this time it is the *statutam Adae voluntatis legem*.<sup>579</sup> On a third occasion, in a slightly different phrasing, Adam is described in paradise as receiving a law but also being

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<sup>577</sup> Compare also *InMt*, 23.2

<sup>578</sup> *InMt*, 10.23

<sup>579</sup> *TrPs* 118, 19.12: Qui enim statutam Adae voluntatis legem meminit, qui ipsam illam Evae creationem didicerit, qui maledictionem serpentis audierit, qui clausum vitae lignum Cherubim flammeo gladio et convertibili legerit...

allowed his own will. This is essentially related to the notion of his freedom: *Legem accipit, voluntatis suae permittitur, liber ab omnibus mundi dominus constituitur, paradisi incola est.*<sup>580</sup> These uses of ‘lex’ appear to refer to God’s first command not to touch the apple, and it is noteworthy that Hilary refers to this as a law specifically for the will. After all, before the Fall is the only time that Adam has a fully competent will which can obey any command; thus God’s command is a *lex voluntatis* inasmuch as it is a command which specifically tests Adam’s *voluntas*.

### 7.2b) *Voluntas* and human action

Hilary’s lack of clarity on the will can be partly helped by examining his other uses of the word *voluntas* throughout his commentaries. Ultimately, the will is part of the process of human action.

Soul and will may both be said to function in the process of human action. Hilary states that the intentions of both should ideally coincide (for example when he writes: *...perscrutatur ex anima, ad voluntatis officium animae intentione sociata.*)<sup>581</sup> This coheres with what he has said about their interrelationship in the anthropological household (§7.2a): after baptism, the will is somehow subsumed into (or subordinated to?) the soul and there is no tension between body-soul-will. Clearly the will is seen as having a different focus from the soul, presumably because it includes bodily desires and appetites: that is why this step only occurs once the natures of the body and soul harmonize. Yet at the end of the day, the will and the soul are distinct human components:

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<sup>580</sup> *TrPs*, 134.14

<sup>581</sup> *TrPs118*, 17.1

as we have seen, Hilary speaks of mankind as composed of body-soul-will.<sup>582</sup> When someone is about to face martyrdom, Hilary warns that the soul may conspire with the will in its weakness<sup>583</sup> (showing that the soul may not be Platonically perfect). At the same time, however, there is a degree to which soul and will overlap: the will may be expressed as belonging to the mind.<sup>584</sup>

Further, Hilary describes the will as capable of being swayed: it is regularly described as *ambigua, incerta* or *vaga* or any combination of these terms.<sup>585</sup> On the other hand it is something which can be controlled, and thus something which we may be exhorted to strengthen: Christ's patience of will is an example to us<sup>586</sup> and we should follow Christ in will even if not in suffering.<sup>587</sup> It is not merely our desires that should be trained, but also our attitudes and even our thought processes.

The role of the will in determining human action means that it helps defines each human as an individual, with different characters and dispositions. Although humans are of the same nature, this does not mean that their natural predisposition or their degree of spiritual training are the same. Natural character of course can be changed by the will. Cicero mentions the Megarian philosopher Stilpo whose predilection for women and liquor was bettered by his will.<sup>588</sup> Tertullian also mentions how the will could change a man's natural character or disposition,<sup>589</sup> and variations in individuals (ie. their souls) may be

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<sup>582</sup> *InMt*, 10.23-4; *InMt*, 23.2

<sup>583</sup> *TrPs118*, 15.3

<sup>584</sup> *TrPs118*, 18.5: *ex devota mentis voluntate*

<sup>585</sup> *InMt*, 2.2, 5.6, 6.2

<sup>586</sup> *InMt*, 10.15

<sup>587</sup> *InMt*, 16.11: presumably this means we should be *willing* to suffer on his account even if we don't actually have to suffer.

<sup>588</sup> CICERO *de fato* [5] 9-11. The passage also cites, possibly irrelevantly, the hypothesis Socrates was taken as naturally dull-witted and addicted to women. Surmounting these may have been a matter of Socrates' will, although Alcibiades at least was sceptical.

<sup>589</sup> TERTULLIAN *de an.* 20-21

affected *inter alia* by their wills.<sup>590</sup> Hilary uses phrases such as *bona voluntas* or *mala-prava-perversa voluntas* to denote individuals' different personalities.<sup>591</sup> For example, we fall from God's laws if we have a *voluntas iniqua*,<sup>592</sup> and heretics have an *irreligiosa voluntas* and choose to misinterpret Scripture.<sup>593</sup> Likewise he refers to a *vitium voluntatis*, but it refers not to the human race as a whole, but to specific individuals whose attitudes or desires are misdirected.<sup>594</sup> The example of the Wedding Banquet in (§7.2c) will highlight that there are two types of people, distinguished by their will which is *inemendata* or otherwise.<sup>595</sup> The Prophet has *voluntas et religio*; others have a *vitium voluntatis*;<sup>596</sup> the will of most humans is *vaga, incerta, ambigua*. Thus Hilary uses *voluntas* to express individual character and personality.

Sections §7.3-4 discuss how far all this relates to the Stoic role for the will in human action. Before that, however, the survey of Hilary's usage of *voluntas* needs to be continued.

### 7.2c) Moral responsibility, theodicy and the *initium fidei*

The role of *voluntas* in human action means that it can also denote 'intention', with its legal connotations. Hilary often uses it in connection with God's law: *Lex infidelem Israel intra metum metu continebat, et injuriae voluntatem injuriae vicissitudine coercebat*.<sup>597</sup>

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<sup>590</sup> TERTULLIAN *de an.* 20

<sup>591</sup> *TrPs118*, 8.17, 13.4, 15.1, 16.9, 17.10. *InMt*, 24.7, 18.9

<sup>592</sup> *TrPs118*, 15.1

<sup>593</sup> *TrPs118*, 13.4

<sup>594</sup> *InMt*, 18.11, 22.6; *TrPs118*, 21.4

<sup>595</sup> *TrPs118*, 22.6

<sup>596</sup> *InMt*, 18.11, 22.6; *TrPs118*, 21.4

<sup>597</sup> *InMt*, 4.25. See also e.g. 4.22 which enjoins *voluntas pacis* on a man seeking to divorce his wife; 20.7 *quamvis ad Israel lata lex fuerat, voluntas tamen gentium non excludebatur a lege*.

The *voluntas* is clearly key in ensuring one keeps the law (which need not be Mosaic): it is not hard to follow God's law *si voluntas adsit*<sup>598</sup> and that the *voluntas* should be tireless in seeking the law;<sup>599</sup> it is only by application of the will that we can achieve hope and faith<sup>600</sup> or indeed understand God's judgments.<sup>601</sup>

The other side of the same coin is that the will is implicated in wrong-doing. When addressing Christ's teaching that if our hand causes us to sin we must cut it off,<sup>602</sup> Hilary reminds us that the key point here is not the limb but the will; there is no point in cutting off the hand *relictu voluntatis instinctu*, if the will's urge to sin still remains.<sup>603</sup> Elsewhere Hilary talks of the fact that people sin according to their will, and of the *perversitas voluntatis* which leads some away from God.<sup>604</sup> Thus the will is entirely responsible for sin.

And yet our will is weakened by the Fall. In *TrPs118*, he laments that it is impossible not to be wicked since we all naturally have *malitia*. This *malitia* stems from our capricious will: *omnibus per naturae demutabilis voluntatem malitia adjacet...*<sup>605</sup>

Just as for other early Christian writers, all this has important implications with regard to moral culpability. So how does he reconcile this weakened will with God's justice?

Hilary asserts that we have complete moral responsibility and cannot use a weaker will as an excuse for our sin. In *InMt*, 21.12-5, he discusses the two sons of Mt 21:28-32

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<sup>598</sup> *TrPs118*, 12.15

<sup>599</sup> *InMt*, 5.4

<sup>600</sup> Hope: *InMt*, 5.6. Faith: *InMt*, 6.2

<sup>601</sup> *TrPs118*, 1.12

<sup>602</sup> Mt. 5.30

<sup>603</sup> *InMt*, 4.21

<sup>604</sup> *TrPs118*, 10.16, 8.17

<sup>605</sup> *TrPs118*, 15.6 (commenting v115). See also §6.4b

who are asked by their father to go to the vineyard; interestingly, his understanding is different from the traditional one, since he suggests that the younger son (who said he would go, but didn't) is the more commendable of the two. This is because he was delayed by circumstance: *in eo enim necessitatis mora, sine crimine voluntatis, ostenditur*.<sup>606</sup> The phrase *crimen voluntatis* occurs again at *InMt*, 32.1, with regard to the kiss of Judas: it is the betrayer's *voluntas* that indicts him.

Another example occurs when Hilary differentiates the good and the wicked who are invited indiscriminately to the Wedding Banquet (*Mt* 22.10).

Vocatio [*sc. the invitation to the banquet*] quidem bonos efficere debuerat, quia sancta est, et ex optimo affectu invitantis profecta est: sed per vitium inemendatae voluntatis discrimen est vocatorum. (*TrPs118*, 22.6)

The guests are differentiated by whether they have the *vitium* of an unimproved will. The word *vitium* recalls general depravity but also the effects of the Fall (i.e. a psychological / moral understanding of the will).<sup>607</sup> But the eschatological sense of the passage also recalls a legal context, namely the Last Judgment. Thus one's lot on the Last Day depends on one's will – both in the legal sense of 'intention', and in the psychological sense of a mental faculty that contributes to sinful actions. Hilary makes it clear that even a good deed cannot obtain merit except with the application of the will: *si aliquid remissa voluntate... egerimus, ...devotionis meritum per negligentiam non consequemur*.<sup>608</sup>

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<sup>606</sup> *InMt*, 21.14

<sup>607</sup> E.g. *TrPs118*, 14.20 *vitium originis*; cf. TERTULLIAN *de an.* 41

<sup>608</sup> *TrPs118*, 1.11

However, this is apparently not a sufficient answer to the problem of God's justice. In *TrPs*, Hilary repeatedly raises the problem of theodicy and the question of God's fairness. The following texts are among those which mention moral responsibility or God's justice in one way or another: *TrPs118* 5.11-13, 14.20, 16.9, 18.1-2, 20.5. Some of these are phrased as an *objectio* against God followed by Hilary's *responsio*.

What is more, Hilary may resolve the problem of God's justice by reference to the *voluntas*, as is demonstrated by the following sample passage.

Est quidem in fide manendi a Deo munus, sed incipiendi a nobis origo est. Et voluntas nostra hoc proprium ex se habere debet, ut velit: Deus incipienti incrementum dabit: quia consummationem per se infirmitas nostra non obtinet, meritum tamen adipiscendae consummationis est ex initio voluntatis. [...] Natura quidem et origo carnis suae eum [Prophetam] detinebat: sed voluntas et religio cor ejus ex eo in quo manebat originis vitio ad justificationum opera declinat. (*TrPs118*, 14.20, commenting v112)

This first excerpt asserts our culpability in terms of our nature. We are held back by *infirmitas*, by the *origo carnis* and *vitium originis*; but all we need is *voluntas* and *religio*, and if we make a small inclination of the will God will do the rest (*Deus incipienti incrementum dabit*). Ultimately, responsibility lies categorically with us and not with God: *incipiendi a nobis origo est*.

Hilary asserts that faith, however small, must begin with us: the merit is in this *initium voluntatis*. This very discussion implies, however, that the *voluntas* cannot get farther than an *initium* on its own. That is why the *incipiendi origo* is in our hands, but

God gives the gift *in fide manendi*. Even the saintly Prophet (i.e. Psalmist) is held back by his earthly flesh and his *vitium originis*, although he has a good *voluntas* for which he obtains merit. But when it comes to the crunch, *consummationem per se infirmitas nostra non obtinet*, even for the Prophet. The will can incline to God, but is not capable of getting any further of its own accord. In sum, the solution the problem of God's justice in face of a weakened will is that the will always at least has the power to make the first move. This concept also occurs elsewhere in Hilary, expressed in a number of different ways which suggests it does not yet have a fixed vocabulary (*incipiendi a nobis origo est, ex nobis initium est, initium voluntatis, a nobis est exordium, initium fidei*).<sup>609</sup> Even ignorance is no excuse: even that is culpable if it is wilful (*ignoratio voluntatis*).<sup>610</sup>

Although the evidence is slight, it seems that Hilary's articulation may be unique to him. At v36, both Origen and Hilary ask<sup>611</sup> why humans can be held morally responsible when all things come from God (Hilary asks whether *humana ignoratio caret culpa*; Origen evinces the Christian understanding of the technical phrase 'up to us', ἐφ' ἡμῖν). They both respond by referring to the parallelism of such verses: *Establish for me the way of your commandments...* is the humble prayer for God to play his part, whereas *...and I shall ever search them* is the human part to play. Origen and Hilary both use the same structure, and both use v33 as an example, suggesting that Hilary has again closely followed Origen's text. Yet there is a subtle difference. Origen's response is essentially that complete synergy between God and man is possible, as demonstrated by the parallelism of the verses he quotes. Hilary on the other hand suggests that all is in God's hands but we require the *initium fidei* (here expressed as *a nobis est exordium*, at this point

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<sup>609</sup> *TrPs118*, 5.12; 14.20; 14.30; 16.10

<sup>610</sup> *TrPs118*, 20.5: non habet veniam ignoratio voluntatis: quia sub scientiae facultate nescire, repudiatae magis quam non repertae scientiae est reatus.

<sup>611</sup> ORIGEN, *Pal. Cat.* ad v36; HILARY *TrPs118*, 5.11-13; absent from AMBROSE *Ps118Exp*, 5.26

without mentioning the word *voluntas*). Hilary also prefaces this argument with the point that even asking this question is a *voluntas impietatis*. In all, then, Origen seems to be allowing for grace whereas Hilary may be pinpointing an area which is entirely in our remit.

As a final point it is worth noting that Ambrose has entirely excluded this passage from his commentary; he does have this text however since he comes in with the comment on ‘avarice’ which Hilary and Origen also make for this lemma. Ambrose’s omission may be fortuitous, but he may have chosen to omit something he did not agree with in Origen

#### 7.2d) Self-determination

So far the weakened will has been discussed. But equally, there are passages where Hilary may appear to assert our freedom. For example when he says that our will should be tireless in seeking God’s law,<sup>612</sup> his statement implies this is possible for us. So ambiguous passages do exist. Nevertheless, it seems that this arises because of ambiguity in the word *voluntas*: Hilary distinguishes between will as intention, will as choice, and will as appetite.

Unicuique ad id quod volet via est proposita vivendi, et appetendi atque agendi permissa libertas. Et ob id uniuscujusque aut poena aut praemiis afficietur electio (*TrPs118*, 22.4, commenting v173).

This excerpt initially appears to be categorical that the will is free: Hilary here asserts our complete *libertas*. We each have complete licence to live our way of life entirely

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<sup>612</sup> *TrPs118*, 5.4

according to our wishes (*id quod volet*). And it is on the basis of this that we are judged and receive either reward or punishment.

Yet the *libertas* asserted in this excerpt is a *libertas agendi*, not entirely a *libertas voluntatis*; we are free to \*do\* what we wish, but there is no assertion that we are able to \*wish\* what is rational or righteous. (The *libertas appetendi* here suggests freedom to strive after a thing: freedom to follow desires rather freedom in the desire itself).<sup>613</sup> Indeed, this is exactly the point Hilary is making: if we are judged for penalty or reward, this assumes that our will may not be righteous. This distinction between *libertas agendi* and *libertas voluntatis* is present in other early writers; for example Dobbin suggests freedom in Chrysippus may be of this sort.<sup>614</sup> It may also underlie Augustine's vocabulary of the *liberum arbitrium* to be held as distinct from the *libera voluntas*.

Put in another way, the *libertas* expressed here should not be taken in the same way as the freedom of Epictetus discussed below, which essentially means freedom from passions and false judgements. The subject is free to act, and still has self-determination; but he is still constrained by emotions and psychology.

### 7.2e) Statistics

Padovese suggests that Hilary uses the concept of *voluntas* more than any other patristic author until Augustine.<sup>615</sup> It is certainly true that Hilary's overall usage is higher than one might expect, as can be shown by comparing his usage with Ambrose's for the same commentary.

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<sup>613</sup> *Appeto, -ere.* (I) *strive after* a thing, *grasp after* (A) **Lit.** *seize, rush at* (B) *assault, assail* (C) **Trop.** *desire eagerly, long for*, (of food) *have an appetite for* (II) *draw nigh, approach* (of time and things) (A) *desire, be eager for* (B) *be eager for money, avaricious*

<sup>614</sup> Brief discussion in DOBBIN 2008:67, with references

<sup>615</sup> PADOVESE 1991:8

In his commentary on Psalm 118, Ambrose uses *voluntas* 3.2 times per 10,000;<sup>616</sup> Hilary uses it 9.8 times per 10,000<sup>617</sup> (see Table 1). So in an exactly comparable text – using identical subject matter – Hilary uses it more than three times as often. Moreover, this commentary includes exegesis of v108 where free-will offerings (*voluntaria*) are explained in terms of one’s will (*voluntas*);<sup>618</sup> if this passage is excluded, in order to find only ‘natural’ uses, the figures are 2.8 (Ambrose) and 9.6 (Hilary) per 10,000.

The figures are even more remarkable when Hilary’s other commentary is considered; in *InMt* he uses *voluntas* a staggering 16.7 times per 10,000.<sup>619</sup> Admittedly many of these instances refer to a key theme of the Father’s will in Christ (not analysed here), but even without these there are 12.2 occurrences of (human) *voluntas* per 10,000 of text: more than four times the incidence in Ambrose’s psalm commentary.

*Table 7.1: Frequency of the word voluntas: occurrences per 10,000*

	Ambrose	Hilary
Commentary on Ps. 118	3.2	9.8
<i>same, excluding v108</i>	2.8	9.6
Commentary on Matthew	n/a	16.7
<i>same, excluding Father’s will</i>	n/a	12.2

Not only does Hilary use *voluntas* far more frequently than other writers, but he uses it to express concepts that others express without *voluntas*. For example, he suggests that we should follow Christ’s example of patience; this is an exhortation also found in

<sup>616</sup> 41 instances out of 126,506 words. (NB all these figures include editorial titles and paragraph headings.)

<sup>617</sup> 45 instances out of 46,133 words.

<sup>618</sup> Compare ORIGEN *Pal.Cat.* ad v108

<sup>619</sup> 81 instances out of 48,479 words.

Tertullian,<sup>620</sup> but Tertullian does not express this in terms of will whereas Hilary does (*voluntas patientiae*).<sup>621</sup> Also, as we have seen, there is the way that Hilary uses the will to express the results of the Fall, rather than just its causes.

### 7.2f) Summary of *voluntas* in Hilary

The preceding survey (§7.2a-e) has identified a variety of overlapping ways in which Hilary uses *voluntas* in anthropological contexts.

Firstly, Hilary sees the will as an anthropological component; however, the details of how it fits into the human make-up are not entirely clear. It sometimes appears to be a part of the mind, but also may be affected by the body. It was somehow affected by the Fall; the key passage on this suggests it is now enslaved to Disobedience (*Infidelitas*, its mother-in-law) but other passages suggest its main offence is that it is mutable or out of sync with the soul. At any rate, it was somehow weakened or rendered less competent by the Fall.

Sometimes it does not seem entirely clear how far Hilary sees the will as in accord with human nature. In *TrPs118* the prophet chooses God's commands *non naturali necessitate, sed voluntate pietatis*;<sup>622</sup> another passage states that *natura... eum detinebat, sed voluntas... ad justificationum opera declinat*.<sup>623</sup> However the will is elsewhere expressed as comprising part of nature, as in the anthropological household.<sup>624</sup>

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<sup>620</sup> TERTULLIAN *de pat.* 3

<sup>621</sup> *InMt*, 10.15

<sup>622</sup> *TrPs118*, 22.4

<sup>623</sup> *TrPs118*, 14.20. (Also possibly *InMt*, 10.13: *introspecta uniuscujusque et natura et voluntate*. However this may be hendiadys rather than opposition.)

<sup>624</sup> Also for example *TrPs118*, 15.6: *omnibus enim per naturae demutabilis voluntatem malitia adjacet*

Secondly, Hilary's will appears to hold a key role in human action. As a corollary, this means that the will can also express human character or disposition, since each individual human will can respond to the same situation in different ways. So it can be used to refer to all-round moral fibre (whether this person is 'good' or 'bad' overall) or it may refer to character when related to specific actions (as such it overlaps with 'intention').

In the Psalms commentaries, the fact that the will is weakened leads to a concern as to whether God is fair to punish us for wrongdoing. Hilary's solution however is coherent across the work. The will is imperfect, but not totally helpless, and it is only expected to make the initial step towards God – however small this may be. It must be accompanied by progress towards God, and willingness to work with him. This notion of the *initium voluntatis* is Hilary's solution to the problem of culpability and God's justice.

Theodicy of this sort does not occur in the *InMt* commentary; it may be that this is by chance, or it may be that Hilary's repeated defence of God's justice arise in the context of something Origen has said and that Hilary feels he needs to respond to. At very least, it is not evident in Ambrose or Origen and thus this articulation is possibly novel to Hilary. Another minor difference between the commentaries is that the Matthew commentary may call the will *vaga, incerta, ambigua*. *TrPs118*, on the other hand, explicitly aims to demonstrate the notion of progress in virtue; the will is something to be developed.

Nevertheless, Hilary's use of *voluntas* is essentially the same across the commentaries. All his works treat *voluntas* in relation to the law, being an indicator of intention and (by extension) moral responsibility. In a slightly different vein, Hilary consistently treat of the will as an (or the) origin of human action, which may be swayed by other factors such as the body or emotions.

It is now time to turn to consider how Hilary's usage of *voluntas* fits into the

thought of his day and the evolution of *voluntas* before Augustine. It will be shown that Hilary belongs firmly in the Christian tradition, but is also influenced by Stoic understandings of the Will, which he may have acquired through working on Origen's texts.

### **7.3 *Voluntas* in contemporary thought**

#### 7.3a) Christianity: The fully competent will before Augustine

In common with the underlying classical worldview, early Christian thought held that human self-determination as a key part of what it means to be human.<sup>625</sup> Tertullian does not merely insist that man is endowed with τὸ ἀντεξούσιον (using the Greek).<sup>626</sup> He even goes so far to say that the human gift of being in God's image is for two reasons: firstly that his soul is of God's substance, and secondly that he, like God, has complete *libertas arbitrii*,<sup>627</sup> something which is associated with *voluntas*.<sup>628</sup> This is a high role indeed for the will to play.

An important recurring discussion in the first few Christian centuries is the question of how there can be evil in a world created by a supposedly good creator. The solution is always human self-determination, although the vocabulary for this may differ: Irenaeus against the Gnostics more typically expresses this in terms of ability to

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<sup>625</sup> Compare Epictetus e.g. that man is essentially his προαίρεσις (§7.3c)

<sup>626</sup> TERTULLIAN *de an.* 21. Also found in other 2<sup>nd</sup> c. authors, e.g. THEOPHILUS *Apologia ad Autolyicum* 2.27

<sup>627</sup> TERTULLIAN *adv.Marc.* 2.5

<sup>628</sup> TERTULLIAN *adv.Marc.* 2.6 ...exigeret voluntarie..., ex libertate scilicet arbitrii

distinguish good and evil,<sup>629</sup> while Tertullian uses the language of free-will. Indeed, for Tertullian human free-will is a very part of his perfection.<sup>630</sup>

Attacks from non-Christians meant that this issue of God's goodness and the provenance of evil was important, so assertions of man's free and competent self-determination are almost unanimous and unchallenged throughout Christian literature before Hilary; a few exceptions will be identified in the next section.

For Dihle, this relates to the fact that until Augustine there was *no* concept of the will in the modern voluntaristic sense of denoting the self or individual responses. He demonstrates that in the Greek thought of Homer to Aristotle, action was seen as entirely rational, and 'bad' actions only arise when proper deliberation is prevented (for example by ignorance, or the distractions of the body). Although Greek thinkers occasionally brush with valid motivating factors outside deliberation (e.g. compulsion for Aristotle, fate for the Stoics, revealed knowledge for the esoteric religions), the underlying assumption is always that human action is or should be a result of conscious deliberation. Contrasting with this is the biblical worldview, which Dihle sees as demanding submission without any rational deliberation at all. The (supposed) 'modern' (or 'Augustinian') concept of will simply does not exist.<sup>631</sup> These two contrasting positions – the Greek and Hebrew – are harmonized by Augustine, to whom Dihle (following a number of other scholars, in particular Cochrane – §10.3c, §10.4b)<sup>632</sup> attributes the true and full invention of the will,<sup>633</sup> which also implies self and personality. (As we shall see, Frede entirely disagrees with this analysis).

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<sup>629</sup> IRENAEUS *adv. haer.* 4.39.1-4

<sup>630</sup> TERTULLIAN *adv. Marc.* 2.4

<sup>631</sup> DIHLE 1982:19

<sup>632</sup> Cochrane 1957, Ch.11 includes the will in his discussion on the development of the idea of human personality

<sup>633</sup> DIHLE 1982:123

Dihle's suggestion has been rejected by more recent scholars on a number of grounds;<sup>634</sup> one common critique is his view that there was no concept of the will in philosophical Greek thought before Augustine – but that he is looking at only one particular concept of will.<sup>635</sup> It is now more common to see Augustine as part of an ongoing trajectory of thought on the will, as for example suggested by Kahn 1988 (and also by Frede 2011, on which more below). Kahn demonstrates how Aquinas' *voluntas* differs from Aristotle's βούλησις, for example in decision making and in power over the emotions. Next he traces four intermediate stages: (a) Chrysippus and subsequent Stoic thought on determinism; (b) the effect of translation into Latin; (c) προαίρεσις in Epictetus; and (d) Augustine's merging with Christianity and neo-platonism. (Such stages will be examined in more detail below).

The picture so far would suggest that Augustine is the first to merge Christianity with a concept of the will that involves personality and individual disposition. However Hilary chronologically fits in between Epictetus and Augustine here – and yet he still seems to suggest that the will is weakened by the Fall, and to see it as something denoting character.

### 7.3b) Christianity: The Fall and the weakened will before Augustine

There are countless re-tellings of the Fall in one respect or another dating from before Augustine. However, with a few exceptions which will be noted shortly, *not one of these* describes the Fall in terms of an enslavement of the will. Some accounts are

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<sup>634</sup> Other than that mentioned, criticisms of Dihle include (a) the fact that the incompetence of the will may be dealt with by earlier philosophers but with different vocabulary (e.g. Gosling 1990, Harrison 2006); (b) the presence of voluntarism in Greek literature (cf. Dihle 1982:25-27, 43-46) or philosophy where even the Prime Mover is motivated by love (Aristotle *met.* 12.1072b5-6); (c) the question as to whether labelling the debate as rationalism vs. voluntarism is constructive in the first place (Chappell 1995:207).

<sup>635</sup> See for example FREDE 2011:5-6, KAHN 1988:236-7, HARRISON 2006:5-6

essentially historical-style narratives based on the Genesis story, such as those of Theophilus<sup>636</sup> or Lactantius,<sup>637</sup> possibly with midrash-type embellishments; some entwine Genesis with other sources, such as the Naassene description of the fall of primal man into earthly man.<sup>638</sup> But *none* of these states explicitly that the will is depraved by the Fall, until Augustine.

This is not to say that humans were considered entirely free in their actions. Tertullian posits that our essential goodness is affected by ‘natural’ depravity<sup>639</sup> and that we need progress;<sup>640</sup> Irenaeus mentions weakness and immaturity.<sup>641</sup> Two other excuses are the malign influence of demons (e.g. Justin Martyr)<sup>642</sup> and the corrupting influence of the earthly body and in particular the flesh (e.g. Irenaeus).<sup>643</sup> The important point here is that before Hilary, human weakness or depravity is never expressed in terms of the will – with a few possible exceptions.

I have only been able to identify two passages which could date before Hilary, but even then the details are questionable (I do not claim these passages are exhaustive). These exceptions are important because they show that the language of the will was beginning to be used to express this issue.

The Constitutions of the Holy Apostles describes the work of Christ as releasing man’s will.

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<sup>636</sup> THEOPHILUS *Apologia ad Autolyicum* 2.21

<sup>637</sup> LACTANTIUS *div.inst.* 2.13

<sup>638</sup> Cited by HIPPOLYTUS *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* 5.2

<sup>639</sup> TERTULLIAN *an.* 41

<sup>640</sup> TERTULLIAN *an.* 21

<sup>641</sup> IRENAEUS *adv.haer.* 4.38.1-4

<sup>642</sup> JUSTIN MARTYR *First Apology* 4; 10

<sup>643</sup> LACTANTIUS *div.inst.* 2.13

Χριστὸς γὰρ παραγενόμενος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς τὸν νόμον κυρώσας  
 ἐπλήρωσεν, τὰ ἐπίσακτα περιεῖλεν...· καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τῶν  
ἀνθρώπων πάλιν ἀφῆκεν ἐλεύθερον, οὐ προσκαίρω θανάτῳ δικάζων,  
 ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῃ καταστάσει λογοθετῶν αὐτό. (APOSTOLIC  
 CONSTITUTIONS, 6.22)

Christ's work is described in three ways, the last of which is the liberation of man's *autexousion*. The word *πάλιν* (*again*) indicates man's free will has previously been free (*ἐλεύθερον*) at some earlier point, but then enslaved until Christ redeemed it. The dating of this work is hard to establish: the original text belongs to the early third century but its compilation and editing are possibly late fourth,<sup>644</sup> which makes it hard to ascertain whether this section pre-dates Hilary or not. Also, *τὸ αὐτεξούσιον* and *voluntas* are not strictly equivalent. At any rate, this passage demonstrates the emergence of notions of restricted self-determination, but more cannot be said.

Secondly, there is this text from Origen:

Et non sine causa puto quod non dixerit *odorem dederunt*, sed *odorem suum*, ut ostenderet inesse unicuique animae vim possibilitatis et arbitrii libertatem, qua possit agere omne quod bonum est. Sed quia hoc naturae bonum praevaricationis occasione decerptum, vel ad ignominiam vel lasciviam fuerat inflexum, ubi per gratiam reparatur et per doctrinam Verbi Dei restituitur, odorem reddit illum sine dubio quem primitus conditor Deus inoloverat, sed peccati culpa subtraxerat. (ORIGEN *Comm. in Cant.* 4.1.20)

<sup>644</sup> (on the dating): METZGER 1985:1-62 (esp.15-16, 57-60)

At the Fall (*praevaricationis occasione*), the will's goodness was extracted (*decerptum*). Tennant and Williams both explain away this text in the same way:<sup>645</sup> they suggest that Origen had come across the practice of infant baptism on moving to Caesarea, and this comes across in the current excerpt (written c.240, during Origen's Caesarean period).<sup>646</sup> However, they both feel that this was a temporary aberration in what is otherwise a fairly consistent picture in Origen. Works (supposedly) written before this 'Caesarean phase' are dogmatically insistent on the freedom of the will; and after this phase Origen apparently returns to his original view of man's freedom.

However, Origen refers to a form of original sin at other points in his work,<sup>647</sup> even if not in terms of the will, so discovery of infant baptism need not have prompted this text. Also, if this excerpt belonged to a short-lived doctrinal phase, it was a very short one indeed; the very same book of Origen's commentary on the Song of Solomon shows other examples where the culpability and freedom of the will are firmly asserted.<sup>648</sup> Despite some assertions to the contrary, Origen maybe was not so optimistic about the human condition; see §10.3b.

*Arbitrium* and *voluntas* are very different things, and one can have free choice without freedom of desire-will-personality (as indeed the Stoics point out); it may be that the translator has not been sufficiently careful of the Greek word *προαίρεσις* which may have been in the original text. Nevertheless, this passage again denotes some kind of capacity which was lost at the Fall so that our ability to do good is hampered.

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<sup>645</sup> TENNANT 1903:299; WILLIAMS 1927:227

<sup>646</sup> For this dating see Brésard & Crouzel 1991:11-12, based on evidence from EUSEBIUS *H.E.* 6.32.2

<sup>647</sup> WILLIAMS 1927:223-231, e.g. 230. TENNANT 1903: 296-306, e.g. 302, 303

<sup>648</sup> ORIGEN *Comm. in Cant.* 4.3.21: ...quoniamquidem per arbitrii libertatem possibile est unumquemque ex parte alterius transire vel ad partem Dei si melius, vel si nequius ad daemonum portionem... *Comm. in Cant.* 4.3.5: Sed quia non deest divina providentia ne forte per huiusmodi importunitatem turbaretur libertas abritrii et non esset iusta causa iudicii...

A third example dates from after Hilary, but supports the idea of a Fall associated with the will and also bears many similarities to Hilary's anthropological household.

Just now we said that the mind is going to be one in nature, person and rank. Also there has been a time when, because of its free will, it fell from this former rank and became a soul. And having sunk down even further, it was called a body.

But in time the body, the soul, and the mind, because of changes of their wills, will become one entity. Because there will be a time that their wills and their various movements will have passed, the mind will stand again in its first creation. (EVAGRIUS *Ep. Melania*, 6)<sup>649</sup>

Evagrius describes how the mind falls to become a soul and then to become a body, because of its free will. But the body-soul-mind shall become one again when their wills change. This echoes Hilary's anthropological household narrative in a number of ways – the future harmonization of body and soul; the mind recovering its former dominance; and possibly even the plurality of wills, which shall in the future become one.

None of these passages uses the Latin word *voluntas*, meaning that Hilary appears to be the first early church scholar to express the Fall in terms of this word. Nevertheless, these three passages all express the Fall as affecting our self-determination or ability to act freely; and all date from before Augustine. Hilary thus appears to be on a trajectory that emphasizes how our capacity for action is affected by the Fall, and articulates this in terms of our incapacitated self-determination or will.

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<sup>649</sup> PARMENTIER 1985:31

7.3c) Stoicism: the will and human action

So much for Christian theology; but a trend in recent scholarship has been to see Christian developments as part of the development in the Stoic concept of the will. The following follows the narrative of scholars such as Bobzien and Frede.

The (earlier) Stoic theory of action proposed three or four stages,<sup>650</sup> with initial sense-impressions (φαντασίαι)<sup>651</sup> needing an assent of the mind (συγκατάθεσις) before the final impulse to action (ὁρμή).<sup>652</sup> This assent is based on a variety of considerations, whether rational, appetitive or emotive. In translation, and given different Stoic descriptions of the process, it seems that *voluntas* could denote either the final impulse, or the rational part of the assent, or the overall assent (including emotive considerations). Bobzien points out that moral responsibility here is “not grounded on freedom to do otherwise, but on the autonomy of the agent.”<sup>653</sup> This understanding of human action also allows for moral development, as seen for example in Lucretius, hopefully reaching *ataraxia*.<sup>654</sup>

As many scholars point out (for example Kahn, Bobzien, Dobbin, Frede),<sup>655</sup> a shift then came about in the works of the philosopher Epictetus and his understanding of *proairesis*. Bobzien highlights his new concept of *eleutheria*, freedom from emotions and other things that hinder right assents. She points out that the earlier concept of τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν

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<sup>650</sup> Description for example in FREDE 2011:35-41 *passim*, cf. 157-8

<sup>651</sup> Cicero translates this as *impressio*, due to Zeno preferring the word τύπωσις (‘imprint’) to φαντασία. If entirely rational, the φαντασίαι are equivalent to νοήσεις.

<sup>652</sup> For another (implied) description of the process of human action, see PLUTARCH *Cicero* 40, where he explains that Cicero introduced these terms into Latin (ὁ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καὶ τὴν κατάληψιν...).

<sup>653</sup> BOBZIEN 1998:325

<sup>654</sup> See ANNAS 1992:129-33

<sup>655</sup> KAHN 1998:251-3, BOBZIEN 1998:331-357, FREDE 2011:31-48, DOBBIN 2008:xii

(an actions caused by us, for Chrysippus and earlier Stoics) changes in Epictetus to τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν, the class of actions which we have full control over, – which essentially comprises only our assent to fate.<sup>656</sup> “For Epictetus, a free person is someone who lives as he wills... who is rid of pain, fear and trouble.”<sup>657</sup> Thus freedom is knowing what is τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν; it is *not* freedom to act otherwise, the type of freedom envisaged in later Christian discussions. Bobzien insists that in Epictetus there is no explicit link between freedom and moral responsibility: adulterers are morally responsible, but are not free from their desires. (This link is in fact first found in Christian literature, in Justin Martyr and his pupil Tatian.)<sup>658</sup>

The wise man’s choice to consent to his fate is for Epictetus bound up in the concept of *proairesis*. Dobbin<sup>659</sup> surveys the different uses of the word by the philosopher, for example as a part of human action or in assessments of moral responsibility. He shows that, although it has individualistic overtones, the word is not so far from Aristotle’s rationalism. Long, on the other hand, translates *proairesis* in Epictetus as volition: “[In Epictetus] the crucial idea is that volition [i.e. *proairesis*] is what persons are in terms of their mental faculties, consciousness, character, judgements, goals and desires: volition is the self, what each of us is, as abstracted from the body.”<sup>660</sup> Other scholars differ on the details,<sup>661</sup> but the general sense of individual character is clear: Man is his *proairesis*, as Epictetus says many times.<sup>662</sup>

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<sup>656</sup> BOBZIEN 1998:337

<sup>657</sup> BOBZIEN 1998:341

<sup>658</sup> BOBZIEN 1998:344, FREDE 2011:102

<sup>659</sup> DOBBIN 1991:133-4, cf. 112-5. He suggests that the Epictetus adopted the word, even though it had been hitherto uncommon in Stoic discourse, since it was part of contemporary critique of Stoicism (that is, he made προαίρεσις his own since detractors claimed it was neglected in Stoic thought).

<sup>660</sup> LONG 2002:28

<sup>661</sup> As well as the scholars cited in this paragraph, see DIHLE 1984:60, FREDE 2011:44-48

<sup>662</sup> EPICETUS 3.1.40, 4.5.12 cf. 2.10.1. Dobbin (1991:114) links this ARISTOTLE *EN* 1139b5 (albeit with a slightly different meaning).

The further developments of this concept in the Christian realm are taken up by Frede. While earlier stoicism was merely concerned about causality (how humans could have moral responsibility in a world governed by Fate), Christianity adopts the concepts for debates regarding the existence of evil in a good creation, and the problem of moral responsibility.<sup>663</sup> Against Dihle's suggestion that Augustine merges different classical and biblical worldviews, Frede suggests a continual development. Frede sees Augustine as essentially Stoic in his understanding of the will, but also in his concept of its constraint and incapacity.<sup>664</sup> This matches perfectly onto the Stoic idea of only the wise man or sage being able to act entirely rationally; as shown this concept is linked from Epictetus with the notion of freedom. Thus the majority of us are not 'free' and this is expressed in terms of the will.

All well and good, but how does Hilary fit into this? The answer to this is to examine how Frede and others see Origen as fitting into the development of this concept.

#### 7.3d) Origen: Synthesis of Stoic and Christian thought on human action

For Frede, Origen represents a synthesis between Christianity and Stoic thought on action and the will. Frede sees Origen as essentially Stoic with regard to the free will ("[Origen's] terminology almost invariably [is] found in Epictetus and almost all the major claims [have] their parallels in him, too"),<sup>665</sup> grafted onto a Platonic theological (cosmological) system.<sup>666</sup> (The Stoics as a separate school did not exist this time, but their

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<sup>663</sup> BOBZIEN 1998:412

<sup>664</sup> FREDE 2011:155

<sup>665</sup> FREDE 2011:112 ("...Some of Origen's explications of scriptural texts become intelligible only against the background of the kind of theory we have ascribed to Epictetus.")

<sup>666</sup> FREDE 2011:120

ideas had been absorbed into mainstream Platonism). But for Frede, Origen evinces a crucial difference from the Stoics, namely that Origen's humans are totally free.<sup>667</sup>

This key issue is which kind of freedom this means. Origen is certainly clear on human freedom and the freedom of the will.<sup>668</sup> For example, in Book II of *de principiis* he addresses the question of God's justice as raised by 'gnostics' such as Marcion and Valentinian, in creating different individuals with different lots of fortune or misfortune at birth. Origen maintains that God is not unfair, but distributing each individual according to their free will and how far they have adhered to God before being born in this world. It is because different people have different wills and conditions that they fell in different degrees.<sup>669</sup> He asserts the freedom of the will ubiquitously across his works<sup>670</sup> and indeed for him it is a key doctrine that we can be judged because of our freedom: this defends God's justice and goodness, and explains human moral responsibility.

Nevertheless, Origen does show evidence of constraint in action. For examples he mentions our demons act through our weakness,<sup>671</sup> and that we cannot overcome spiritual battles without God's help.<sup>672</sup> The next chapter will demonstrate further internal constraint such as emotions in Origen. Moreover there is even the fascinating passage quoted in §7.3b which may refer to a lack of freedom for the *proairesis*. Thus there is indeed evidence for constraint in Origen – but it is not expressed in terms of the will. Also, Origen's system allows for moral progress just as much as the Stoic system does, and suggests such progress brings us greater 'freedom'. (It may also be relevant that Origen

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<sup>667</sup> FREDE 2011:177

<sup>668</sup> ORIGEN *princ.* 3.1.1-24 is an entire chapter (and a lengthy one at that) investigating different aspects of human free will. See for example 3.1.6-7

<sup>669</sup> ORIGEN *princ.* 1.4.1

<sup>670</sup> ORIGEN *comm.Mt.* 10.11

<sup>671</sup> ORIGEN *princ.* 3.2.2

<sup>672</sup> ORIGEN *princ.* 3.2.5

writes to refute determinism and defend God's justice, unlike the context of grace and human dependence which are Augustine's concern.) So the main difference between Origen and Frede's Stoics is that Origen is using the will to denote freedom in self-determination, rather than freedom from constraint.

#### **7.4 Discussion**

With this information it is now possible to return to Hilary. How does Hilary fit into the described development through time in understandings of the will? This question may be partly answered here, although more will come in the next chapter.

The first point to note is that, like Origen and Augustine, Hilary shares concepts in common with the contemporary Stoic narrative of human psychology. In particular the word *voluntas* seems to share some of the connotations of *proairesis*, such as individual character or disposition and its use in submitting to God's will (equivalent to Fate for Epictetus). But *voluntas* may also denote a psychological component in the process of human action, which occasionally leads us to ambiguity: it can be unclear whether *voluntas* mean 'desire' or 'intended action'. For example, Hilary tells us 'we must apply our wills',<sup>673</sup> but is there another will with which to apply it? Such an ambiguity occurs in other church fathers who may have lost the Stoic psychology but still use *voluntas* in more than one way. Augustine's dilemma, where he struggles with his will,<sup>674</sup> can be seen in this light. Ambrose also sees a strain between *voluntas* as preference, as anthropological faculty and as intention: "It is not enough to wish well, we must also do well; and it is not

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<sup>673</sup> *TrPs118*, 1.12

<sup>674</sup> AUGUSTINE *conf.* 8.9.21

enough to do well, unless it should come from the right source, that is, from a good will.”<sup>675</sup> But Hilary is aware of these tensions, as when he discusses how Herod earlier had not wished to kill Herod but now is constrained to against his will: Herod both wishes and does not wish to execute John.<sup>676</sup>

Secondly, Hilary implicitly distinguishes between the *voluntas* which provides the mind’s assent to a perception or to an action, and true freedom. In §7.3c above it was mentioned how these are distinct in Epictetus: the murderer is not truly free, but is still morally responsible. This is reflected in both of Hilary’s commentaries. For the anthropological household, pre-lapsarian man has *voluntas*, which is also described as a *potestas*. After the Fall, the referent is now the *arbitrium voluntatis* which has Faithlessness as its repressive mother-in-law. Finally mankind is restored by baptism and now has *libertas voluntatis* (twice) which is related to *potestas animae*; the passage culminates with an assertion of the *libertas potestatis*. The implication is that unredeemed mankind somehow loses true *potestas* in his actions; he can make decisions accurately, but is not truly capable and may be swayed by (unnamed) external factors. *Libertas* only comes when some kind of redemption has been achieved (here baptism, but elsewhere for Hilary *libertas* seems to be eschatological). In *TrPs* the ideal is expressed as the aim to harmonize the “soul’s intention with the will’s office”,<sup>677</sup> in other words to harmonize the spirituality of the soul (ideally yearning for God) with human psychology and action on earth.

Thirdly, where does Hilary get these ideas from? Hilary’s *voluntas* has some aspects which belong more properly to Christian analysis than to Stoicism. For example

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<sup>675</sup> AMBROSE *de officiis* 1.143: non enim satis est bene velle sed etiam bene facere; nec satis est iterum bene facere nisi id ex bono fonte, hoc est bona voluntate, proficiscatur.

<sup>676</sup> *InMt*, 14.8

<sup>677</sup> *TrPs* 118, 17.1 (see also §7.2b)

as mentioned the concept of freedom belongs in Epictetus but is not formally associated with either the *proairesis* nor with moral responsibility. In Hilary on the other hand the *voluntas* is explicitly beholden to its mother-in-law Disobedience and is responsible for human action to the point of being the element responsible for our sin (recall §7.2c). Another difference between Hilary and Stoics like Epictetus is his concern for theodicy and defending God's justice and goodness. As mentioned, although the Stoics are concerned for the tension between fate and free human action, it is Christian thought that adopts these concepts for debates regarding God's justice or goodness. Another way in which Hilary differs here is that Stoic thought suggests children are born without 'freedom' but hopefully develop it through their life times. In the Christian narrative which Hilary follows, Adam was originally 'free' but then fell. For Hilary, this is again expressed as an event affecting the will.

Frede analyses how both Origen and Augustine are influenced by Stoic thought (maybe mediated through Platonic schools),<sup>678</sup> but with the crucial difference that for Augustine denies our freedom whereas Origen relies on it for his various arguments.<sup>679</sup> For Frede, Augustine is entirely consistent with philosophical thought on the will at his time (for example, that the will is needed in cognition – pace Dihle who suggests Augustine invented this)<sup>680</sup> and is thus not a new departure.

However, the evidence from Hilary presented here shows that this was not even adopted into the Christian system by Augustine. Clearly Hilary is also relying on these 'Stoic' ideas; and he does not even seem to think that his articulation is novel, but belongs fully in Christianity.

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<sup>678</sup> FREDE 2011:120, 155

<sup>679</sup> FREDE 2011:170

<sup>680</sup> FREDE 2011:153; 156-159

Can we be more specific as to the source of Hilary's ideas? Some of his articulations seem to be shared with Origen. For example in *TrPs* Hilary's ideas of human action, *cogitationes* and passions seem to have much in common with Origen; this will be developed in considerable detail in the next chapter. And the narrative of the anthropological household does not immediately seem to be borrowed – neither Ambrose nor Origen mention the will – but the evidence from Evagrius suggests that the idea of the will(s) corrupted by the Fall may have been a notion widely spread even if not common. The concept of *proairesis* as indicative of personality is also found in Origen: for example his badly preserved Matthew commentary makes the point that all humans have the same nature but different 'wills' implying personalities.<sup>681</sup>

But it has already been shown how the notions that the Fall corrupted our nature, or that our action is constrained by both external and internal factors, already existed in Christianity apart from Origen (§7.3a); so it is not strange that Hilary should have adopted these ideas. On the other hand, he appears to provide an early example of human constraint being expressed in terms of the *voluntas*; and this also seems to drive him to a greater concern for theodicy as expressed in terms of the will. In these, Hilary appears to be more novel.

## **7.5 Conclusion**

There are three things worthy of note with regard to Hilary's use of *voluntas* in the Christian tradition: (a) his articulation of human weakness in terms of a *voluntas* which is weakened or depraved at the Fall, rather than in terms of the body, demons etc.; (b) his

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<sup>681</sup> ORIGEN *comm.matt.* 10.11

solution to the consequent problem of God's justice, namely the *initium voluntatis* – a concept which will become of great importance a generation later (c) his use of stoic concepts in explaining the process of human cogitation and action.

Rondeau states that the human composition of body-soul-will found in *InMt*, 10.23-4 (and *InMt*, 23.2) is gratuitous: *il s'agit là d'une description logique, non ontologique*.<sup>682</sup> She feels that Hilary categorically has a dualistic body-soul view of the human person as he himself states elsewhere. The evidence of the current chapter belies this. For Hilary, *voluntas* is not the same as the soul (since it may work both with and against the soul) and can overcome one's emotions and human nature. Moreover, it is an essential component of human psychology.

Hilary's two commentaries have differences in emphasis, with *voluntas* more likely to indicate personality in *InMt* and more likely to address concerns for theodicy in *TrPs*. Nevertheless there is consistency in his language. Whenever he talks about God's justice or moral responsibility, he affirms the competence of the will (predominantly in *TrPs118*, but *InMt* also suggests we can apply or improve our wills).<sup>683</sup> Yet he also asserts the will's weakness.

Hilary is aware of the tensions between these positions. His response is the recurring concept of the *initium voluntatis*:<sup>684</sup> we are helpless and dependent on God's grace, but nevertheless we have just enough strength to make the first move. The very need for the theological 'solution' of the *initium voluntatis* demonstrates how hampered the will is in the rest of Hilary's thought. For example, at *TrPs118*, 14.20 Hilary asserts the *initium voluntatis* can lead to redemption, but this is because he has also made the *voluntas* the explicit cause of sin. Hilary is significant in being an early (or even the first)

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<sup>682</sup> RONDEAU 1962:200-1

<sup>683</sup> *InMt*, 6.4; 10.15

<sup>684</sup> Note that the *concept* recurs, not the actual phrase (which only occurs in this form once)

writer who explicitly and consistently asserts a weakened will, which he connects to the Fall. If this is the case, then scholars such as Tennant are very wrong to say that Hilary has nothing new with regard to the theology of original sin:<sup>685</sup> to the contrary, he is the first explicit witness of a key ingredient in Augustine's mix.

Hilary does not explicitly borrow from Origen on the free will: this seems to be his own articulation of the idea of constrain. Nevertheless, Origen's ideas on the notions of human psychology and the process of action, borrowed from the Stoics, certainly seems to be in evidence especially in Hilary's Psalms commentaries. In order to complete our understanding of human constraint, therefore, it is now necessary to turn to examine human *cogitationes* and passions.

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<sup>685</sup> TENNANT 1903:337-8

## *Chapter 8*

### **More Psychology:**

### **Thoughts and Passions**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter showed how Hilary's view of the will implied that the *voluntas* is constrained in a certain regard. This chapter aims to pursue in more detail one particular angle of what this constraint involves.

The approach here is to look at how Hilary conceives of human psychology, and in particular certain elements of the process of human action including thoughts and emotions. Hilary's use of a few Latin words will be examined, and their connotations will be analysed in the course of the discussion. In the wider perspective of this thesis, examining the will human psychology informs us further of Hilary's view of sin and its causes.

A main finding of this chapter will be that Hilary uses notions of psychology that arise through Stoicism (even though Stoicism cannot really be said to exist as a separate school in this period). Nevertheless, some Stoic elements may be said to be in his thought such as *apatheia* and *propatheiai*. It will be shown that Hilary does have a concept of unconscious *cogitationes*, but these should be seen as arising impressions with propositional content, rather than a first reaction to these. Further, much of Hilary's use of Stoic concepts appears to be mediated through Origen; for example his use of *cogitationes*

in the involuntary sense appears solely in the psalms commentaries. Nevertheless, although he uses Origen's articulation, Hilary has his own underlying sense of human constraint which exists independently of Origen.

## **8.2 Passions and emotions**

### 8.2a) Some psychological 'movements' in Hilary

A variety of terms is used to denote psychological movements in Hilary; heresome of his vocabulary is briefly presented. It should be noted that the English word 'emotion' translates a number of Latin words, including states of mind, sentiments, and dispositions which can be 'rationally' as well as 'emotionally' determined; so the word 'emotion' is used loosely in the following sections.

In common with his contemporaries,<sup>686</sup> Hilary uses the word *motus* to designate any kind of event that impacts on the individual. This could be an external event; for example, Hilary uses it in describing the church as a ship protecting us from the world's stormy sea.<sup>687</sup>

But it can also refer to psychological states and this seems primarily to be in the sense of mental reactions to external goods. If there is any ambiguity Hilary will gloss appropriately: for example he might speak of *motūs saeculares*<sup>688</sup> in the former case, or

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<sup>686</sup> Compare ORIGEN-RUFINUS *princ.* 3.2.3

<sup>687</sup> *InMt*, 7.9: *Ecclesia enim instar est navis... quae... subjecta est omnibus et ventorum flatibus et motibus maris.* For other 'external event' uses of *motus* see for example *TrPs118*, 11.1; *InMt*, 8.1, 10.2, 14.14. Compare also *InMt*, 14.17 *affectio commotae mentis.*

<sup>688</sup> *InMt*.8.1: *metum scilicet motuum saecularium nullum esse oportere...*

*motūs affectionis /affectionum* in the latter.<sup>689</sup> Indeed the former may also symbolise the latter, as in the case of wise man who built his house on the rock: the raging of the storm should teach us of the internal *motus* of desires.<sup>690</sup> Even wise men get *motūs*, but they are expected to stand firm and to transform them. *Motūs* can also designate an uncontrolled impulsive reaction, for example when speaking of *molliendis ac frangendis turbidorum motuum nostrorum aculeis*<sup>691</sup> (the *motūs* are spoken of as *turbides* elsewhere too).<sup>692</sup>

Two related words which appear frequently in Hilary are *affectus* and (less commonly) *affectio*. These words both denote a state of mind, mood or disposition, and *affectus* in particular occurs most commonly with a genitive in order to express the given disposition (*affectus placabilitatis; pietatis; pacis*, etc.).<sup>693</sup> However, these are more commonly what in English would be called sentiments rather than emotions proper. This is because *affectus*, inasmuch as it denotes a state of mind, also has a connotation of intention or purpose (*affectus sollicitudinis; salvandi; doctrinae*)<sup>694</sup> or even underlying character (*affectus malitiae; misericordiae; infidelitatis*).<sup>695</sup> In this last case Hilary may instead use *affectio*, which has a similar semantic range to *affectus* but can also denote a more permanent disposition (for example, he calls *infidelitas* both an *affectus* and *affectio* within the same exegesis).<sup>696</sup> The word *affectio* is also more likely to be used together with *motus*, indicating something closer to the English word ‘emotion’.

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<sup>689</sup>*TrPs118*, 11.1, 12.4, 13.13. Compare also *InMt*, 21.3 (the *motus* of astonishment: not an emotion in the English sense, but certainly a mental state).

<sup>690</sup>*InMt*.6.6

<sup>691</sup>*InMt*.18.10: Christ gives an example of being conciliatory so as to soothe and shatter the prickings of our disordered impulses.

<sup>692</sup> E.g. *TrPs118*. 12.4

<sup>693</sup> For example, *InMt*. 4.19 (*affectus placabilitatis*), 5.8 (*pietatis*), 10.9 (*pacis*); *TrPs118*.14.13 (*affectus paternus*), 15.3 (*pietatis*) 21.3 (*laetitiae*), 21.6 (*perfectae charitatis et pacis*)...

<sup>694</sup>*InMt*.5.13, 19.3, 10.27

<sup>695</sup>*InMt*.23.1, 24.10, 7.6

<sup>696</sup>*InMt*.7.6, 7.10

Hilary distinguishes between the *motūs* by themselves and how one uses them. For example, when we are enjoined to love our enemies, Christ crushes the *petulantes motūs* with an *affectus publicae charitatis*.<sup>697</sup> Alternatively, the *motūs affectionum* like love and hatred arise naturally but we should use them to love good things and hate bad things.<sup>698</sup> But conversely, a *motus* can steal in and trouble a hitherto calm *affectio*.<sup>699</sup> If this occurs, then it may be expressed by negative terms such as *perturbatio*.<sup>700</sup>

On the surface, then, we are not morally responsible for *motūs* but we are for our *affectūs* and *affectiones* (but see below). Indeed this underlies his teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. Anger against another (*in alterum commotae mentis affectio*) is as culpable as homicide;<sup>701</sup> and with regard to looking at a woman lustfully, the *illecebrosa affectio* is as blameworthy as adultery itself<sup>702</sup> (unlike others such as Jerome, Hilary does not appeal to pre-passions here to explain the process of sin). Later when Christ talks of the innocence of little children, Hilary's interpretation is that we all need a child's blameless *affectiones* to enter the kingdom of heaven.<sup>703</sup>

### 8.2b) Mutability

Doignon rightly states that emotions make us mutable,<sup>704</sup> although it would perhaps be truer to say that the phrases 'we are subject to *motūs*' and 'we are mutable' are

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<sup>697</sup>*InMt.* 4.27: *petulantes humanarum mentium motus publicae charitatis frangit affectu*. This verse is also referred to elsewhere in Hilary, for example *TrPs.* 119.16

<sup>698</sup>*TrPs* 118. 13.13

<sup>699</sup>*TrPs.* 2.15

<sup>700</sup>*TrPs.* 2.13, [15].10, [41].8, [41].13, 52.11, 53.12, 54.6, 121.10, 125.5, 136.5, 136.12, 136.13

<sup>701</sup>*InMt.* 4.17

<sup>702</sup>*InMt.* 4.20

<sup>703</sup> *InMt.* 18.1

<sup>704</sup> DOIGNON 1989a:124-5

equivalent. Our mutability and corruptible nature are the source of many problems for humanity. Of these, one particular problem is the *motūs affectionum*.

Humani vero motus ipsa plerumque mutatione diversi sunt, et terrenae legis imperfecta natura fit alia, ex alio instinctu se perturbante demutans: et ad id nos diversarum affectionum motus impellit... [*Hilary lists effects of contumelia, damnum, ira, metus, amor, odium, gaudium, dolor, iudicium, aetas*]... His ergo subditi naturae infirmis motibus, aequales esse non possumus, dum et affectu demutabiles sumus et tempore. Et idcirco perfecta bonitas in nullo est, quia eam naturalium perturbationum incentiva demutent. (HILARY *TrPs.* 52.11)

Hilary here presents a long list of how the emotions may change us, and this is thought to explain why no mortal can be good (relative to God, although Hilary concedes that one human may be good relative to another). We are subject to the *motūs* of our nature (*subditi naturae motibus*), and we are changeable or unstable both psychologically and temporally (*et affectu demutabiles sumus et tempore*). Note that age (*aetas*) and material loss (*damnus*) are included in this list: emotions are just one of various things associated with the human condition.

Being mutable and being passible are often linked in the psalms commentaries, often compared with God who is neither.<sup>705</sup> Hilary constantly reminds us that emotions belong to the human condition; God is in no way subject to them.<sup>706</sup> Emotions – or more

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<sup>705</sup> *Trin.* 3.3, 3.13; *TrPs.* 2.13, 2.17, 52.11, 52.12, 53.12, 138.2, 138.3, 138.19, 139.2. Cf. *TrPs.* 52.16, *Trin.* 10.33.

<sup>706</sup> *TrPs.* 1.19, 2.13, 59.3. This is not unique to Hilary. For example Origen also holds that mutability is a natural feature of createdness, while not ascribable to God: ORIGEN *prin.* 1.5.5 (see also SIMONETTI 1962:379, EDWARDS 1992:28)

properly, the wider set of Latin terms used by Hilary – are connected in his works with the weakness and mutability of the human condition. They are thus by extension connected with sin.

So, are we morally responsible for our emotions?

Effectively, the answer has already been in the previous chapter: it is our *voluntas* that determines whether we are to be held culpable. In his commentary on Ps. 52, a key work for understanding Hilary's theology of sin, the Gallic bishop gives a specific answer to this question. In *TrPs*. 52.12 he presents a procession of biblical characters whose actions or attitudes have been sinful before God, but who are among the saints because fundamentally they have had the right will towards God (*ex merito voluntatis*). Moses broke faith with God at and was not permitted to enter the promised land, yet he and Elijah are the two great prophets who walk with Christ at the Transfiguration. Similarly Peter denied Christ three times, but still was given the keys of the kingdom. Hilary uses much of the vocabulary already discussed here to analyse Peter. Peter denies Christ because he is a *demutabilis homo* and the denial stole upon him (*obrepere*) at a moment of alarm. Yet immediately Peter wept, showing the true direction of his underlying will and disposition (*voluntas, affectus*). In the course of this explanation, Hilary uses the word *demutatio* and its cognates six times as the key explanatory point. Sometimes, then, we are simply not able to do what is good. As Hilary clearly puts it, it is one thing to be unwilling, and another to be unable (*aliud est nolle, aliud non posse*).<sup>707</sup> But God knows this, and mercifully judges us only for our will and disposition (*voluntas, affectus*).

And yet Hilary admits that even the will is affected by our mutable nature.<sup>708</sup> (For

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<sup>707</sup> *TrPs*. 52.12

<sup>708</sup> *TrPs* 118. 15.6. See also §8.4c

Hilary the will is not entirely free due to our mutability, yet Tertullian holds we must be mutable for freedom of the will to be maintained).<sup>709</sup> As part of this, the will can be influenced by the *affectūs* or emotions. This may be a good thing, since for example Love is intimately connected with the will: it comes from the will<sup>710</sup> and is an *affectus* that is proper to the will.<sup>711</sup> This suggests that other *affectūs* are not appropriate for the will: for example Hilary frequently makes the point that God's law should be obeyed through love not through fear,<sup>712</sup> and that this will make obedience go beyond the letter of the law.<sup>713</sup> Hilary can express affection by reference to the will alone: *constantiam devotae sibi voluntatis [discipulorum] acceperat [Christus]*.<sup>714</sup>

So our will may be misled by our appetites and desires, but at the same time one of the aims of the Christian life is to train ourselves to keep them under the control of the will; we are instructed to control our *affectūs* so that the *voluntas amantis* may precede any action.

On the other hand, to some degree accountability is irrelevant. We are inadequate in God's sight not merely because of reprehensible sin, but because our very mutability is an offence to God's transcendence and holiness. The many *motūs* of our nature are merely a part of our createdness, and an indication of our inadequacy.

Justificari autem in conspectu Dei quis viventium potest? cui ira, cui dolor, cui cupiditas, cui ignoratio, cui oblivio, cui casus, cui necessitas vel per naturam corporis, vel per motum animae semper fluctuantis

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<sup>709</sup> TERTULLIAN *an.* 21

<sup>710</sup> *TrPs118*, 18.4

<sup>711</sup> *TrPs118*, 16.5

<sup>712</sup> *TrPs118*, 18.5

<sup>713</sup> *TrPs118*, 14.13-16

<sup>714</sup> *InMt*, 31.1

admixta sit... (HILARY *TrPs.* 142.4)

Hilary concedes that these things might be outside our control (*necessitas... admixta*), but they still separate us from God.

An important question that arises if studying anthropological consequences of the Fall is whether human mutability arises because of our createdness, or because of the Fall. The answer is that Hilary is never entirely clear on this, and seems to express himself in different ways at different times. For example on the one hand he may state that mutability is a natural consequence of being made out of mud and earth (§3.3a). But it has already been shown in §6.4b that our passions are a constraint that arise because of Adam's deed:

...his omnibus humanarum passionum infirmitatibus liberati, placebimus Deo in regione vivorum, anima nostra in requiem suam (ex qua per transgressionem primi parentis sui Adae ejecta est) revertente. (*TrPs.* 146.4)

It is difficult to separate what is inherent through our createdness and what comes about through Adam. However, Hilary is not alone in this; for example Athanasius also evinces this tension between our created fragility and the effects of the Fall.<sup>715</sup>

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<sup>715</sup> ATHANASIUS *de incarnatione* 4.4 describes the Fall as a return to the corruptible state that arises from an *ex nihilo* creation.

8.2c) A special case: Sexual desire

Given Augustine's preoccupation with sexuality in relation to original sin, it is worth examining Hilary's standpoint on the matter. It turns out that Hilary is not particularly concerned about sexuality, and sees it merely as one side-effect of human appetites that can have negative aspects but is in itself not negative.

Hilary was married, but we know nothing of his wife. The sixth-century account by Venantius Fortunatus tells us that when his daughter asked for her marriage to be arranged, Hilary prayed for her death so that she might not die in sin. When she died the girl's mother then begged for Hilary to make the same prayer for herself, and also died. *Quis aestimaturus est talem virum ita dilexisse Dominum, conjugis et filiae affectu contemto!*<sup>716</sup> The fifth-century writer Sulpicius Severus implies that Hilary supported Martin of Tours in taking up an ascetic life.<sup>717</sup> Some more modern scholars also see Hilary as rejecting sexuality. For example, Coustant thinks that Hilary denies the diversity of sexes in the afterlife<sup>718</sup> (when commenting on Mt. 22.30 'we will be like the angels'). This would follow Origen, who takes this passage as stating that celestial beings are sexless.<sup>719</sup> However, Scripture states there is no significant sexual differentiation in the next life,<sup>720</sup> so even if Hilary said this it need not mean that he rejected sexuality in the world. And Hilary probably did not say what Coustant suggests: as Fierro points out it is hardly evident in his text.<sup>721</sup>

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<sup>716</sup> VENANTIUS FORTUNATUS *Vita S. Hilarii Episcopi* 1.13

<sup>717</sup> SULPICIUS SEVERUS *Vita Martini* 5

<sup>718</sup> COUSTANT PL9, 1046C-D

<sup>719</sup> ORIGEN *CommMt*, 17.30

<sup>720</sup> Mt 22.30, Mk 12:25

<sup>721</sup> FIERRO 1964:226 fn.23: "Quizá es leer más allá de lo que está escrito." Jerome also accepts that there can be diversity of sexes in the afterlife (*CommMt*, 3).

None of these these are strong witnesses to Hilary's views on the subject. The account with Hilary's wife and daughter is perhaps unsurprisingly thought to be spurious, and the letter to his daughter Abra betraying similar views is thought to be a medieval composition. The evidence in the *Vita Martini* is also ambiguous and inconclusive. It seems more appropriate to follow scholars such as Burns<sup>722</sup> who feel Hilary is almost remarkable in the period for having no apparent interest in asceticism or celibacy whatsoever. There are very few references to sexuality in his works. He does mention the heat of youth compared with the coldness of old age; he talks about eunuchs; he discusses marriage and its symbolism.<sup>723</sup> But on the whole such mentions are only in passing, or allegorized. He also advises controlling our body and its desires, but this does not necessarily mean celibacy or abstinence. While his works contain absolutely no condemnation of sexuality, there are several metaphors from marriage or the sexual act. For example, as already discussed (§3.4a) he talks about the miracle of how God creates each human from such a lowly insignificant substance as the seminal fluid;<sup>724</sup> elsewhere he is at pains to emphasize that such a substance was not necessary for the Son to be begotten of the Father, so that divine begetting is unlike human begetting.<sup>725</sup>

When sexuality is more overtly rejected, it seems Hilary is merely following standard interpretations. Ps. 118.83 states, *Quia factus sum sicut uter in pruina, justificationes tuas non sum oblitus*. Hilary, Ambrose and the catenist all take the wine-skin as representing the human body and its passions; by following God's teaching our passions are chilled as in a hoar frost. Since Hilary and Ambrose both mention continence,

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<sup>722</sup> BURNS 2012:120, 228

<sup>723</sup> *TrPs* 118, 2.2; *InMt*, 19.2, 27.4; *myst.* 1.4; *TrPs*, 127.7-10

<sup>724</sup> *InMt*, 4.2

<sup>725</sup> *trin.* 7.28

sexuality is clearly the issue here and the nature of the parallels suggests this goes back to Origen's text.

HILARY ( <i>TrPs118</i> , 11.4)	AMBROSE ( <i>ExpPs118</i> , 11.13)
Per continentiae autem studium...	Nix haec praeceptio continentiae est, ...
...frigent fidelium corpora;	...quae calorem facit corporeum frigere,
...et calore naturae interioris exstincto, utres erunt frigidi.	...et omnem naturae interioris restinguit ardorem.

All three texts talk of the boiling or bubbling of the passions and desires that needs to be cooled (τὴν θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος / *naturam vitiorum efferventium / ferventium viscerum cupiditates*).<sup>726</sup> In other words, Hilary is not spontaneously mentioning sexuality, but does so because it is explicitly the interpretation of the lemma that he finds in his source.

Indeed, at some points Hilary seems to reject categorically the need for ascetic celibacy.

Plures enim sunt in demersissimo erroris profundo locati, qui doctrinae  
suae perversitatem quadam inanis laboris probitate commendent.

Cernimus namque nudis philosophos corporibus algere: ipso etiam  
conjugiorum usu magistri abstinent: haeretici sicco panis cibo vivunt.

<sup>726</sup> These phrases from, respectively, ORIGEN Pal.Cat. ad v83; HILARY *TrPs118*, 11.4; AMBROSE *ExpPs118*, 11.13

Sed qui tandem otiosi hujus propositi profectus est? totum hoc inane atque ridiculum est, et cum ipsis superstitionis causis miserabile.

(HILARY *TrPs*, [64].3)

Not only does Hilary fail to commend celibacy; he here suggests that abstinence is a vain stupid practice if it is accompanied by false doctrine. Celibacy is acceptable or necessary for some;<sup>727</sup> but Hilary never condemns sexuality *per se*. He thus seems to be one of the few Christian moral writers of the fourth century who does not think that abstinence is a superior path.

That said, although Hilary is unconcerned about sexuality, he certainly is highly concerned about generic desire and concupiscence.

...longe magis peccata corporum ingravescere, si etiam cupiditatibus adjuventur animorum. (*InMt*, 5.4)

Qui Christi sunt, crucifixerunt corpus cum vitiis et concupiscentiis.  
(*InMt*, 10.25)

One vivid passage urges to strike the ‘children of Babylon’ against the rock . Hilary’s interpretation of the lemma is that we are urged to pluck out incipient desires (Babylon’s children) and eliminate them while they are still young.

Periculosae enim sunt jam robustae cupiditates; et difficulter adulta quaeque perimuntur. Levius autem est prorumpentes avellere... Beatus

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<sup>727</sup> *InMt*, 19.2

itaque est, quisquis in exordio inhonestas quasque omnium cupiditatum appetitiones quae ex voluntate carnis oriuntur ...enecabit. (*TrPs*, 136.14)

So here the desires arise from the flesh. Yet elsewhere Hilary speaks of lust of the soul.<sup>728</sup>

It may be that Hilary sees two different sources of desires, namely the body and the soul (note here the appetites come from the flesh's will; compare the question of whether body and soul have different wills, §7.2a). At any rate, there is clearly a link between desire and the will, and between these two and love. These are connected, and if any one of them is rightly directed then they all are.

In sum, the desires of the flesh are generally a bad thing, and should be transformed into spiritual love. Desire does include sexuality although this is not a large concern in Hilary. It would be more accurate to see sexuality as merely one part of the issue of human desires in Hilary.

### **8.3 Hilary and Stoic ideas of mental processes**

#### 8.3a Stoic theory of action in Hilary

We recall the Stoic theory of action (§7.3c). Objects around us form sense perceptions in our mind (*phantasiai*) to which we may give or withhold assent (*synkatathesis*); this assent leads to some action or reaction from us, where 'action' may merely mean some interior response such as an emotion. This process includes ratiocination as well as the will.

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<sup>728</sup> *TrPs*118, 11.1

Hilary shows evidence for this understanding of the process. At one point in the psalms commentaries he comments on how we see *species* in our head; this is equivalent to the Greek *phantasiai*, received or recalled sense-perceptions (in this case recalled in the memory).<sup>729</sup> Elsewhere, Hilary also demonstrates the concept of consent: he states that every action comes about following either reasoned judgement or desire / appetite.<sup>730</sup>

Reasoned judgement is an important aspect of the philosophical assessment<sup>731</sup> of this process and is no less so in Hilary. Hilary talks about how action needs to be reasoned first (*[Propheta] nihil egit quod non antea cogitatione pervolverit*).<sup>732</sup> Elsewhere he insists that action must be taken *de consilii sententia*, a phrase he often uses to denote the reasoning process of deciding on action.<sup>733</sup> His description of prophetic utterance is interesting in this regard: it must be undertaken with ratiocination as all things must, but at the same time the prophet does not necessarily understand what he is saying. All speech occurs *ex sensu cogitationis ac motu*, and this is true of prophetic speech; but for normal speech the mind is *mota* while for prophetic speech it is *impulsa* while *ignorante sensu*.<sup>734</sup> So then, ratiocination is necessary but, for godly discourse, understanding may not be. (There is no parallel for this paragraph in either Origen or Ambrose).

*Voluntas* is taken as a movement of the mind: *cum voluntas motus mentis sit...*<sup>735</sup>

Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter it can be ambiguous as to what this means. The will may be taken as emotive, as for example when Hilary says that people are

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<sup>729</sup> *TrPs*, 120.2: *Humanae mentis natura est, ut si cogitatione aliquid contemplerur, talem se nobis unaquaqueque species exhibeat, qualem eam et cogitando formemus.*

<sup>730</sup> *TrPs*, 137.2: *nemo enim, quod agit, ad id agendum non aut ex fructu oblectationis alicuius aut iudicio bono in eo opinionis adgreditur, dum aut rectum id putat aut eo gaudet.*

<sup>731</sup> *SENECA ep.* 107.3, *CICERO disp. tusc.* 4.37

<sup>732</sup> *TrPs* 118, 8.10

<sup>733</sup> *TrPs* 118, 8.10, 10.4, 10.7, 16.4

<sup>734</sup> *TrPs* 118, 22.2

<sup>735</sup> *trin.* 8.12

led astray due to the *affectus voluntatis*,<sup>736</sup> or when he treats the will as parallel to love.<sup>737</sup> But it may be also held equivalent to the outcome of ratiocination, as indicated when Hilary says that the thought or will is what is reprehensible even if our actions are faultless.<sup>738</sup> This is not confusion in Hilary's thought; it merely arises due to different meanings of *voluntas*, for example as equivalent to *proairesis* in the former example and to *bouleusis* in the latter.

### 8.3b) The seat of emotions: body or soul?

As seen in Chapter 3, Doignon assumes a degree of platonism in his dualist anthropology. We are souls enslaved within a mutable earthly body and this is what causes our mental and emotional instability. Doignon thus sees emotions as arising from our body (or at least, from our embodiedness).<sup>739</sup> Yet the connection with human mutability is also found in the Stoic system (or, more properly, Cicero's telling of it), belonging to the mind: *haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat?*<sup>740</sup> And in §8.4b we will see that Sorabji suggests the influence of Stoic thought, with unwelcome *dialogismoi* entering the mind; this again would suggest emotions arise within the mind. So for Hilary, do emotions arise in the body or the soul?

The answer is: in both. Hilary talks of human deficiencies (anger, pain, desire, forgetfulness...) as arising *vel per naturam corporis, vel per motum animae semper*

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<sup>736</sup> *InMt*, 17.1

<sup>737</sup> *TrPs* 118, 13.2: Differt enim longe obsequium amoris a timoris officio, nec habet gratiam voluntatis necessitatis operatio.

<sup>738</sup> *TrPs*, 57.2

<sup>739</sup> DOIGNON 1989a:123-6

<sup>740</sup> CICERO *disp. tusc.* 4.76.9 (4.35)

*fluctuantis*.<sup>741</sup> In other words, some deficiencies arise through the body (say pain, desire) and others through the wavering soul (say anger, forgetfulness). Elsewhere Hilary sees *motūs* as contributing to the mental process:

Nam cum naturae potentis virtus non tam viscerum fibras, quam appetitus mentis introeat; necesse est non per motus sensuum perspicendi sumat exordium, sed per naturae scientiam etiam futuros motus sensuum praesciens apprehendat. (HILARY *TrPs*. 57.2)

The language here (for example knowledge of one's nature, or that *appetitus* belongs to the mind) is Stoic. This excerpt suggests one should not follow along with the initial spurs of sense-perception but instead have deeper understanding of things to keep the *motūs* under control. The notion of a dynamic mental process is absolutely Stoic: it starts with a *motus*, and then the mind through knowledge applies the will to turn it into an appropriate *affectio*. Use of Stoic language for the mental process is also found in *TrPs*, 52.11 cited at §8.2b.

That said, the issue here should not be whether affections arise in the body or the soul as mutually incompatible units. Rather, it is whether the soul and body work against each other or whether they are in harmony. It would not be true to a Stoic system to divide the body and the soul since these are seen as a holistic process;<sup>742</sup> Annas shows that this derives from medical-scientific as much as from philosophical thought.<sup>743</sup> And in Hilary too, it is probably most accurate to say that *motūs* affect humans as a whole, rather than body or soul separately. Hilary does not anywhere say that the body alone is mutable; it is

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<sup>741</sup> *TrPs*, 142.4 (excerpt quoted more fully at §8.2b)

<sup>742</sup> ANNAS 1992:56

<sup>743</sup> ANNAS 1992:20-25

the full human who is described as *demutabilis*, and this includes the soul.

So, these elements would make Hilary closer to Stoic thought: the language of mental processes (including possibly different stages of emotions, such as *motūs* leading to *affectiones*), the impact of emotions on the soul-mind, the integrated effects of body and soul together, and possibly the emphasis on the will. Also, the emphasis on knowledge and wisdom attained through meditation, prayer, biblical reading and good works is of course characteristically Christian, but is closely related to the Stoic notion of development through life and the long experience it takes to make the Stoic sage.

However, Hilary also differs from the Stoic system, for example in not having a concept of *propassionēs* (§8.4) nor of *apatheia* (§8.5).

#### **8.4 Cogitationes**

It is interesting to consider Hilary's use of *cogitatio*, and in particular the question as to whether Hilary sees us as morally responsible for them. He sometimes speaks of them as the element that makes a human action reprehensible; at other times they appear to be involuntary. This may be due to Origen's influence.

A number of modern scholars take Origen's *(dia)logismoi* as equivalent to Stoic *propatheiai*. It will be here shown that these are strictly not equivalent. Rather Origen's *dialogismoi* should be taken as equivalent to the *noēseis* mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, which properly represent an impression rather than a first response.

##### **8.4a) Cogitationes in Hilary**

One might think that *cogitatio* would indicate mental deliberation, and indeed this

usage does occur.<sup>744</sup> For example in §8.3a above there were two examples of *cogitatio* referring to ratiocination, mentioned in a positive way. However, often the word is more ambiguous and if anything indicates something which infiltrates itself into the mind by stealth (*subrepere* or *obrepere*).<sup>745</sup> For example we should try to suppress the sneaky *cogitationes* by remembering God (*obrepentes itaque sub secreto noctis cogitationes, Dei recordatione compressit*)<sup>746</sup> and no *cogitatio* interrupts if the Prophet is meditating perfectly.<sup>747</sup> The words *subrepere*, *obrepere* are usually used for mental lapses such as *oblivio* (particularly), vices, and sins.<sup>748</sup> This particularly indicates that to some degree Hilary sees *cogitationes* as outside an individual's control, as in the example just quoted: one can fight to subdue them once they have entered the mind, but it not so clear whether the Christian can prevent them from entering the mind in the first place.

In the Matthew commentary, the word occurs only three times, each time in the context that God (or Christ) knows our secret thoughts and we are accountable for these.<sup>749</sup> However, in *TrPs118* alone the word occurs fourteen times, of which several have this connotation of bad thoughts that arise naturally from our mutability or from the devil and steal in to distract us: *nec in (Prophetam) incidit, interjectu novae alicujus cogitationis, oblivio*.<sup>750</sup> (By comparison, the number of occurrences of *motus* is roughly equal in *InMt* and *TrPs118*). This use of *cogitatio* as something unexpected that steals in is found in Hilary's other psalms commentaries as well.

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<sup>744</sup> *TrPs118*. 22.2; *TrPs*. 120.2,133.2

<sup>745</sup> *TrPs*. 62.9, 136.8. Compare the similar usage of *imagines* in *TrPs*. [31].5: *imagines invitit etiam bonis quam frequenter occurrunt*

<sup>746</sup> *TrPs*. 62.9

<sup>747</sup> *TrPs118*. 13.2: *nec in eum incidit, interjectu novae alicujus cogitationis, oblivio*

<sup>748</sup> *InMt*. 11.1, 17.6, 19.3; *TrPs118*. 2.10, 2.11, 8.15, 14.16, 16.13, 18.9; *TrPs*. 2.13, [31].5, 52.12, 57.3, [63].6, [67].29, 120.15, 136.12

<sup>749</sup> *InMt*. 12.12, 23.1, 27.3

<sup>750</sup> *TrPs118*. 13.2

This may be because, in the Psalms commentaries, Hilary is adopting (whether consciously or not) an Origenistic use of the word from his Greek source. Indeed, in one instance it can be shown that *cogitatio* is the direct translation of *(dia)logismos* in Origen.<sup>751</sup> The concept of *dialogismoi* is sometimes used by the Alexandrian in the same specialised way as just described for Hilary: that is, as unwelcome intruding thoughts rather than considered deliberations.<sup>752</sup> (This usage is also evidenced by its developments in later Egyptians such as Antony of Egypt, Didymus, Pseudo-Macarius and Evagrius).

#### 8.4b) *Cogitationes* as equivalent to *propatheiai*?

Sorabji suggests a relationship in Origen between Biblical *dialogismoi* and the Stoic concept of *propatheiai*.<sup>753</sup> This latter term refers to the instinctive and immediate emotions that arise before rational consideration; it was Aristotle who originally introduced the distinction between these and the *pathē* proper (the latter being so-called ‘voluntary’ emotions which have interacted with deliberation). Sorabji demonstrates a relationship between Origen’s *primi motūs*<sup>754</sup> and the interrupting Christian *cogitationes*, and thus links Christian *dialogismoi* /*cogitationes* with Stoic *propatheiai*.<sup>755</sup>

Sorabji’s approach is critiqued by Guly and, in more moderate tones, by Layton.

Guly refutes the passages used by Sorabji (and examines others);<sup>756</sup> he agrees that

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<sup>751</sup> *TrPs118*. 15.6 is a direct translation of Mt. 15.19 as quoted at *Pal.Cat.118*. ad v115. This appears to be a standard translation; compare ORIGEN-RUFINUS *princ.* 3.2.4.

<sup>752</sup> E.g. ORIGEN *exhortatioadmartirium* 11.4: εἰ ... μὴ διδοίη μὲν τόπον τῷ διαβόλῳ ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, μολύνειν ἡμᾶς διαλογισμοῖς πονηροῖς θέλοντι ἀρνήσεως ἢ διψυχίας ἢ τινος πιθανότητος...

<sup>753</sup> SORABJI 2000:346

<sup>754</sup> ORIGEN/RUFINUS *princ.* 3.2.2 (see SORABJI 2000:343, 347)

<sup>755</sup> SORABJI 2000:346-356

<sup>756</sup> SORABJI 2000:346, fn.16 cites ORIGEN *de princ.* 3.2.4, *Comm.Josh.* 15.3, *Comm.Mt.* 21 (Sorabji means 11.15), *Comm.Cant.* 3, *Comm.Ps.* 54.5 §561. Guly adds *Comm.Eph.* ad v4.26a (see his discussion on textual variants at 2011:178); *Hom.Exod.* 4.8 (*‘primi motūs’*); *Comm.Cant.* 3(4).15

Origen's *primi motūs* are equivalent to *propatheiai* but asserts that they are voluntary and that the whole point of these Origen texts is to distinguish a sliding scale of culpability, where thoughts are less culpable and words or deeds more so. But culpable they still are: Guly feels that in Origen, "bad thoughts are always the results of assents."<sup>757</sup>

Guly's analysis is well nuanced and worth reading; however, he appears to have missed some essential elements of Origen's argument. In particular, the whole point about these *motūs* being *primi* in the Origen passages is surely to make the very point that they are instinctive, not rational or voluntary. Further, the whole point of *princ.* 3.2.4 is to demonstrate that some *cogitationes* arise within the individual whereas others are impelled from outside (see below). Thus, *pace* Guly, bad thoughts are categorically *not* always the results of assents and this is exactly what Origen is at pains to demonstrate.

Layton's discussion is more subtle than Guly's. He would agree with the argument presented here, that the very point of Origen using *propatheiai* (when he does) is to make the distinction between what is voluntary – that is, culpable – and what is not.<sup>758</sup> The Origen passage presenting *primi motūs* is not so much about *propatheiai* as the distinction between stimulus and mind's assent.<sup>759</sup> Still, even Layton concurs that Origen may be 'meaning' *propatheiai* even in passages where he does not use the term.

However, it is not so obvious that Origen's first movements are equivalent to *propatheiai*. One reason is that there is no evidence that Origen himself thinks this. The *primi motūs* in Rufinus's Origen seem to indicate first \*movements\* rather than first \*emotions\*: indeed the phrase *primi motūs* repeatedly indicates exactly that in Seneca (sc. the initial response before the mind's assent).<sup>760</sup> As for Origen's Greek corpus,

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<sup>757</sup> GULY 2011:177

<sup>758</sup> LAYTON 2004:119

<sup>759</sup> LAYTON 2004:192 fn.22

<sup>760</sup> SENECA *de ira* 2.1-4 *passim*

*dialogismoι* are ubiquitous, but the word *propatheiai* appears in just one section (or possibly twice at most).<sup>761</sup> And even there Origen uses it obliquely, as a technical term that is more proper to schools of thought other than his own: δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἀπροαίρετον, ὃ καλοῦσιν τινες προπάθειαν γινομένην... Here he is referring to impulsive anger as opposed to deliberated anger; the word ἀπροαίρετον makes the point that it is assent that makes an important distinction between the two types of anger.

The other examples of *dialogismoι* in Origen do not necessarily refer to *propatheiai* either (they are interesting on *logismoι* and emotions, but have no clear link to *propatheiai*). At the end of the day, the difficulty modern scholars have in trying to equate Stoic *propatheiai* with Christian *dialogismoι* is simply that Origen and the Stoics are describing slightly different psychological processes and there is no exact equivalence between the two. And to be fair on Sorabji, he does make this point that the processes are unlike: the difference is better understood “by thinking of it as a change of focus from Seneca’s first movement, the shock, to its cause, the appearance.” He notes that Origen’s usage is a “decisive change” in the concept since *dialogismoι* (unlike *propatheiai*) can arise externally and are properly a cause rather than a first reaction.<sup>762</sup> So it is important to note the differences between Origen and Stoic theories of psychological responses; the similarity is merely because *propatheiai* and *dialogismoι* are both early stages in the journey to a given act. (It is only with respect to Origen that we must disentangle his theory of action from Stoicism proper; conversely later authors such as Didymus<sup>763</sup> or Jerome<sup>764</sup> do explicitly present *propatheiai* as part of the process leading to sin).

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<sup>761</sup> ORIGEN *Comm.Ps.*4.5, used three times, and possibly also *Comm.Eph.* ad v4.26a (see Guly’s discussion on textual variants, 2011:178). The word προπαθόντες also appears in *Exhort. ad Mart.* 23.11.

<sup>762</sup> SORABJI 2000:346

<sup>763</sup> DIDYMUS *Eccl.T.* 294.15-20. See Layton (2000), (2004)

<sup>764</sup> JEROME *Comm.Ezech.* 18.1-2: Deus igitur primos et secundos stimulos cogitationum, quas Graeci προπαθείας vocant, sine quibus nullus hominum esse potest, nequaquam punit. For example, Jerome discusses Christ’s teaching that whoever looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery. If our

But it may be more appropriate to put aside the *propatheiai*, and see the Christian *dialogismoi* as being analogous to the Stoic *noēseis*, which come earlier in the Stoic process of action and perception. All animals start with impressions of say sensory objects. However, adult humans differ from other animals (and children) in that their impressions now require acceptance by reason (or, assent). The key point is that adult human impressions may be rational or have propositional content and may thus be called thoughts (*noēseis*).<sup>765</sup> For example, Diogenes Laertius states, “some impressions are rational, and others non-rational... Rational impressions are thought-processes; irrational ones are nameless.”<sup>766</sup> In a similar way, Philo uses the concept of thoughts that are involuntary and come in before assent.<sup>767</sup>

If we take Origen’s *dialogismoi* as equivalent to these *noēseis*, then the ‘thoughts’ in Origen’s system are not a break, transforming the Stoic idea of *propatheiai*. To the contrary, they are entirely continuous with the Stoic system. The (*dia*)*logismoi* are not (as Sorabji himself admits) a reaction, but the initial impression or cause.

So then, Origen’s *dialogismoi* and *primi motūs* should categorically not be identified with *propatheiai*, but rather with the initial rational impressions that contain propositional content.

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spirit is stimulated by sight of her this is merely innocent pre-passion; it is only a sin if one consents and makes the thought into an affection: si vero consenserit et de cogitatione affectum fecerit..., de propensione transivit ad passionem (*Comm.Mt.* 5.28). The vocabulary here is highly reminiscent of Stoic teaching. See also *Comm.Mt.* 5.28, 26.37, *Ep.* 79.9 to Salvina.

<sup>765</sup> FREDE 2011:37; DOBBIN 2008:xii

<sup>766</sup> DIOGENES LAERTIUS 7.51: ἔτι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι... αἱ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ νοήσεις εἰσὶν, αἱ δ’ ἄλογοι οὐ τετυχήκασιν ὀνόματος. Cited in LONG & SEDLEY 1987, passage 39A (text in 1987b:238; translation in 1987a:237).

<sup>767</sup> PHILO *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesis* 3.56 ad Gen. 17.17

8.4c) *Cogitationes* and moral responsibility in Hilary

Returning to Hilary, this all matters if we wish to establish his understanding of culpability and will. Hilary's usage of *motus* dovetails to some degree with Origen's usage: there is a *motus* and /or *cogitatio* and this leads to sin. So *motus* is being used (*inter alia*) to designate a different, earlier stage of the mental process, even if he never uses phrases such as *propassio* or *primus motus* as do Jerome and Rufinus.

So, are Hilary's *cogitationes* reprehensible? He appears to have a nuanced position on this.

Hilary repeatedly asserts that God judges us not for our actions, but for the thoughts within our hearts.<sup>768</sup> It is categorically for our thoughts that we are held morally responsible. Indeed, when it comes to moral responsibility there are three concepts that seem intertwined in the psalms commentaries, *cogitatio*, *motus* and *voluntas*.<sup>769</sup>

*Cogitationes* must be culpable because they are an indication of the *voluntas*, and it is the *voluntas* which determines culpability. This is true even if the action is not carried through—the *voluntas* is still culpable. (This is the opposite of what Guly suggests). It is the *voluntas* as indicated by *cogitatio* and *motus* that make us reprehensible, not the action itself.

And yet this discussion of *cogitationes* started (§8.4a) with the point that Hilary often talks of *cogitationes* as involuntary, stealthily creeping in to distract us, outside our control but needing discipline that can only be gained through practise. Further, it was demonstrated that this only occurs in the Psalms commentaries. In the Matthew commentary, there is no inconsistency whatsoever: *motūs* are never reprehensible (in

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<sup>768</sup> *InMt.* 12.12, 23.1, 27.3; *TrPs118.* 1.11, 21.8; *TrPs.* 57.2, [65].29, 119.4. Conversely, our soul is free even if the body is enslaved (*TrPs.* 125.4).

<sup>769</sup> *TrPs118.* 21.8: *Deus ipsas cogitationes cordium motusque noscente...* *TrPs.* 133.2: *cujus cogitatio et voluntatus in recordatione peccaminum [...] evagetur.* See also *TrPs.* [13].13: we all have *motūs*, but are reprehensible in how we use them.

themselves), and *cogitationes* always are; it is as simple as that. When he translates Origen, however, Hilary encounters words which are endowed with different theological concepts. This means that movements and ‘unwanted intruder’ thoughts now come to be held reprehensible as they would be in Origen’s system.

So how can we be held responsible for our *cogitationes* if they are uninvited? The inconsistency could arise merely because Hilary is copying Origen thoughtlessly, since this ambiguity holds for Origen too. Guly states that Origen’s *cogitationes* are voluntary and reprehensible, but Sorabji and Layton are more circumspect. After all, Origen devotes *princ.* 3.2.4 to a discussion of the *cogitationes*, and demonstrates that they arise sometimes within ourselves, sometimes from good forces (God/angels), sometimes from bad (devil/demons). They are only reprehensible if we follow them through. Yet elsewhere in Origen we are judged for them.<sup>770</sup> (Layton makes a similar point about the gradual growth of culpability in stages in Didymus).<sup>771</sup>

But Hilary is not blindly following Origen; elsewhere he continually ‘improves’ on his original, and he translates nothing he disagrees with. The problem is simply that *cogitatio*, like *voluntas*, can be ambiguous since it has both a ‘common’ meaning and also a technical meaning in the description of human thought processes. Moreover, there is an interplay in Hilary (or at least, in the Psalms commentaries) between what is within our control and what is not. We may not be able to control individual thoughts or motions, but we can gradually learn to control them more closely and God will give us the grace on our journey. It is this effort that brings us closer to God. This is no inconsistency; we may not be able to control our thoughts or will, but we can learn to improve on our powers and our responses.

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<sup>770</sup> ORIGEN *c.Cels.* 4.53: we are judged by words and deeds but also our *dialogismoi*.

<sup>771</sup> LAYTON 2000:121-33

### **8.5 A difference from Stoic thought: *apatheia***

The absence of any notion of *propassiones* (*propatheiai*) is one example of how Hilary diverges from ‘typical’ Stoic thought. Another divergence is that it is nowhere suggested that emotions should be removed entirely – merely that they separate us from God, and that they should be kept under control and rightly directed (if anything, this is more an Aristotelian position).<sup>772</sup>

Before considering Hilary on *apatheia*, it is worth revisiting Origen’s position. Many modern scholars feel Origen sees the soul as needing to be purified so that it is no longer weighed down by the body but can rise or progress towards the Father. As part of this, one should be freed of the emotions which trouble us. For example, in a psalms homily translated by Rufinus Origen speaks of gradually correcting (*emendare*) ourselves when we are affected by emotions (*commoti*). This is achieved *per continentiam et assiduum meditationem*.<sup>773</sup> The emotions are also mentioned in *de oratione*<sup>774</sup> and even in dogmatic works such as *de principiis*,<sup>775</sup> and seem to be an important part of Origen’s moral teaching.

As well as these references in Origen’s own works, there is evidence that mental self-discipline formed a crucial part of Origen’s teaching curriculum. The best witness to

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<sup>772</sup> Aristotle’s main focus, on the other hand, is to describe the various human functions in a teleological framework; thus, emotions are useful and functional since they relate to appetite, but they are still subordinate to deliberation (e.g. GRAVER 2002:xvii-xix)

<sup>773</sup> ORIGEN-RUFINUS *Hom.Ps.* 36.2.3: nos vero, cum haec mandata suscipiamus et econtrario cum commoti fuerimus, non ab iracundia sed a mansuetudine desinimus... Verum ex hoc saltem incipiamus emendare nosmetipsos, et paulatim per continentiam et assiduum meditationem lenientes iracundiam, veniamus etiam in hoc ut ultra non irascamur...

<sup>774</sup> ORIGEN *orat.* 8.1-2, 10.1 talk about the disposition of the soul, the need to put away wrath, etc.

<sup>775</sup> ORIGEN *princ.* 3.2.2. Emotions fit into the whole discussion on thoughts and temptations, 3.2.1-7

Origen's practical teaching on emotions is the homage to Origen by a pupil about to leave the school.<sup>776</sup> The pupil describes the three initial stages of Origen's curriculum. Firstly one learns logic, to think philosophically and dialectically. Then one learns the physical sciences, and finally ethics.<sup>777</sup> It is only once these stages have been completed that one may proceed to philosophy and theology. It is the third stage, ethics, that concerns us here. The purpose of this stage is to train the pupil to control the soul's impulses<sup>778</sup> and replace these with the divine virtues which keep the soul calm and tranquil.<sup>779</sup> This seems to have been achieved through a combination of education, asceticism and meditation or prayer (compare the phrase quoted in the previous paragraph).

While many modern scholars think that Origen unquestionably pursued *apatheia*, it is worth noting that this opinion is not unanimously held. Rahner suggests that the concept of emotional *apatheia* is not particularly significant in Origen,<sup>780</sup> although he noted the exception of the *Selecta in Psalmos*. His point would have been even stronger if he had known that even the Psalms fragments he quotes mentioning *apatheia* are not in fact Origen's, but belong to Evagrius.<sup>781</sup> Yet authors such as Knuuttila erroneously point to these very Evagrius fragments as proof of *apatheia* in Origen.<sup>782</sup>

Still, *apatheia* is not a concept new from Origen, but essentially follows Stoic teaching. Recall cognition is a result of impressions being formed in the brain and being

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<sup>776</sup> Hereafter footnotes will refer to this *Oratio Panegyrica* as by Thaumaturgus (as in the *Sources Chrétiennes* edition) while duly acknowledging the difficulties in establishing the authorship of this work.

<sup>777</sup> THAUMATURGUS *Orat.Pan.* 7.93-108 (dialectic), 8.109-114 (natural sciences), 9.115-12.149 (moral virtues), 13.150-14.173 (philosophy), 15.173-183 (theology)

<sup>778</sup> THAUMATURGUS *Orat.Pan.* 9.137

<sup>779</sup> THAUMATURGUS *Orat.Pan.* 9.115: one must learn τὰς θείας ἀρετὰς τὰς περὶ ἦθος, ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀτάραχος καὶ εὐσταθὴς τῶν ὁρμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς κατάστασις γίνεται.

<sup>780</sup> RAHNER 1932:127, fn.100

<sup>781</sup> Rahner cites PG12.1085B, 1672C. But both of these are Evagrius; see Rondeau (1960)

<sup>782</sup> E.g. KNUUTTILA 2005:121-2, 127. He cites PG12.1600C, another Evagrian fragment masquerading under the name of Origen (Rondeau 1960). Knuuttila is more convincing when he points to *Comm.Mt.* 13.16, 15.16-7, *Hom.Jer.* fr.25 (GCS 6).

assented to as an act of will: so a viciously barking dog may instill in me fear of pain or death. However, this is to be balanced with the Stoic teaching that all events are pre-determined by a deity who has the best intentions: so I need not really be afraid because my encounter with the dog is all in the hands of the providential deity, and not even pain or death are worth being concerned about in comparison. Thus emotions are ultimately unnecessary and should be eliminated in order to deliberate effectively and attain proper harmony with the natural order of things. The logic of all this also fits neatly with Christianity. Hilary may have known the writings of Cicero, whose best-known exposition of philosophical theories on emotions appears in his *Tusculan Disputations*. Cicero presents the teachings of Epicureans, Cynics, Peripatetics and Stoics, and in this work at least shows a marked preference for the latter: he argues forcefully that emotions (*perturbationes*) must be comprehensively eradicated and there is emphatically no place for them in human life. The ultimate goal is *tranquillitas* (Cicero's translation of the Greek ἀπάθεια). (Of course, this must be seen in the context of the piece: Cicero's statements on grief are a defence before his Roman colleagues, in the face of his evident depression triggered by the death of his daughter Tullia and compounded by career troubles and Caesar's dictatorship.)

In all, given the influence of both Origen and Hilary's own cultural background, we may not be surprised to find appeals to passionlessness in the Latin bishop.

Yet Hilary does not in fact do this. Certainly, as already seen we are bidden to respond appropriately to *motūs* and have only godly, loving *affectūs*. Hilary never uses the word *impassibilitas* with reference to humans, although he does encourage mortal men to aim for *tranquillitas*, echoing Cicero's translation of *apatheia*.<sup>783</sup> Burns suggests that

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<sup>783</sup> *TrPs*, 1.6, [91].9, 127.6, 147.5; *TrPs118*, 12.4 19.4

Hilary is transforming *apatheia* in Origen, preferring to talk of social peace.<sup>784</sup> For Burns, this is one example of how Hilary is autonomous from Origen, moving away from the Alexandrian's asceticism. The aspiration to *tranquilitas* (with its connotations of calmness and serenity but not necessarily elimination) is consistent with another opinion of Hilary's, namely that *motūs* and *affectūs* alike are a natural part of the human condition: it is impossible to eradicate them.

In fact this is the usual usage of *motus*, which can refer merely to physical needs such as hunger.<sup>785</sup> It is even true within those who try to control their emotions: while Cicero insists the four negative *perturbationes* must be eradicated, a wise man may replace them with the three corresponding positive *consistentiae*.<sup>786</sup> This is all the more true outside the Stoic tradition: *pathē* are neither good nor bad, except in their usage.<sup>787</sup> It is thus not surprising to find emotions are accepted in the Christian tradition. Indeed Jerome heavily critiques Evagrius for suggesting that *apatheia* is possible; for Jerome, this would be blasphemous since only God is without emotions.<sup>788</sup>

In summary, the source of Hilary's views is thus undetermined. Hilary may have been eliminating *apatheia* from his Greek text (as Burns suggests), but it may be that Hilary's work reflects Origen's own lack of concern for *apatheia*. At any rate, it is not a doctrine that is particularly important to Hilary: for him, emotions should be controlled, but not necessarily eliminated, because they cannot be. That is why Hilary prefers to use the neutral term *motus* rather than the negative term *perturbatio*.

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<sup>784</sup> BURNS 2012:76 fn.42, citing *TrPs118*, 9.1 (ad v65)

<sup>785</sup> E.g. used of hunger and the libido in ORIGEN-RUFINUS *princ.* 3.2.3

<sup>786</sup> *Metus, aegritudo, libido, laetitia* should be eliminated in favour of *cautio, voluntas, gaudium*. CICERO *Disp. tusc.* 4.11-14

<sup>787</sup> ANNAS 1992:103, fn.1

<sup>788</sup> JEROME *Comm.Mt.* 26.37-9, cited in SORABJI 2000:395-7

## **8.6 Discussion**

The foregoing has highlighted some of the range of mental conditions in Hilary which include emotions, dispositions, states of mind and moods as well as intentions and even sense-perception. It has been shown that Hilary distinguishes between these in terms of how far each is voluntary and, correspondingly, how far each is reprehensible before God. Emotions arise naturally due to our mutable nature, and separate us from God.

Hilary may appear inconsistent on one point, namely whether the *motūs* or *cogitations* are reprehensible and subject to the will or not. This should be seen not as inconsistency, but merely as different applications of the words concerned.

Nevertheless, these discrepancies only occur in the psalms commentaries. In the Matthew commentary, our mental and emotional life is certainly important, but *tranquilitas* is never mentioned as a Christian virtue and the word *perturbatio* occurs only once. It is the psalms commentaries which mention the processes of thought, with sense perceptions, assent, ratiocination and response. This difference across texts could be for two reasons. Firstly, it is a simple fact that the subject matter of the psalms is more conducive to reflection on human psychology and tranquility. Secondly, this use of *motus* may derive from Origen who has an interest himself in the Stoic understanding of human psychology. At any rate, Hilary's psalms commentaries emphasise that we should learn to control the *motūs* and use them rightly. We do have moral responsibility to love, and this is something that is directly under the remit of the will, which can be trained through time just as a Stoic will can.<sup>789</sup>

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<sup>789</sup> *TrPs118*, 13.13 (our emotions should be good so that the *voluntas amantis* may precede any action); *TrPs118*, 16.15

The preceding chapter presented Hilary's use of the constrained will, and the present chapter has shown one way in which the will may be constrained (it has also been shown in Chapter 3 that the physical human body may present a further constraint). It appears that Hilary's understanding of the will is entirely his own, independent of Origen; still, his articulation of human psychology in the psalms commentaries appears to be influenced by Origen.

Various aspects of the theology of sin have now been examined – how we are affected by Adam (Chapter 5), the Fall (Chapter 6), and constraints on the will (Chapter 7-8). We may now turn to consider Hilary's doctrine of original sin itself.

## *Chapter 9*

# Original Sin

### 9.1 Introduction

So far in this thesis, other aspects of our sinful state have been discussed: the Fall, an anthropological change within us, and a sinful state characterized as inherent *peccatum* and *infidelitas*. This chapter brings these together to consider Hilary's theology of original sin, the state of sinfulness that arises through our birth.

Hilary undoubtedly had a concept of original sin, as is evidenced by his use of phrases such as *peccata originis nostrae* and his general association of a certain sinful state with our *origo*.

non abesse tamen malitiam per conditionem communis nobis originis  
docuit Dominus. (*TrP118*, 15.6)

(nos) corporis infirmitas et condicio originis in peccatis detinet. (*TrPs*,  
134.4)

Still, modern scholars debate how far Hilary's view of original sin parallels that of Augustine. Ladaria feels that Hilary's understanding of original sin is as yet undeveloped; Doignon feels that that Augustine is being disingenuous in stating that Hilary has a doctrine of original sin. Peñamaría on the other hand feels that he is all but Augustinian in

articulation, excepting only the issue of the *initium fidei*.<sup>790</sup>

Hilary sees sin as universal, a point which he makes several times,<sup>791</sup> particularly when considering psalms verse that state “no-one does good, not even one.”<sup>792</sup> Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this arises through createdness or secondarily as a result of the Fall.

At any rate, it seems that Hilary is one of the earliest authors who specifically uses the vocabulary of our ‘origin’ (e.g. *peccata originis*) to describe a state of accountable guilt rather than mere stain or vitiation of nature. It is debatable exactly what he means by this.

There is also some question as to how he thinks original sin was transmitted. This is partly because Hilary’s works are ambiguous as to whether the body or soul is seat of the sin. Still, the notion that we inherit it by conception or birth tallies with his doctrine that Christ’s sinlessness arises because of the virgin birth.

## **9.2 The sinful state: Creation or Fall?**

Hilary never clarifies the extent to which our sinfulness arises from our created state, and the extent to which it comes from the Fall. Hilary unequivocally believes that we are currently in a state of sinfulness, expressed in a variety of ways (the stain of sin, the universality of sin, the change in human nature). But the terms used to express this current sinfulness are ambiguous, making it unclear whether it is a result of our createdness or the

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<sup>790</sup> DOIGNON 1981a, b; PEÑAMARÍA 1974

<sup>791</sup> *TrPs*, 52.8-9; *TrPs118*, 15.10

<sup>792</sup> Ps. 13.1, 3; Ps. 52.2, 4

Fall.

For example, let us consider the excerpt from *TrPs*. 15.6 quoted above (§6.4b).

We all have the attribute of *malitia* as a result of the *voluntas naturae demutabilis*: is this due to createdness (as suggested by the word *demutabilis*) or the Fall (as suggested by the use of *voluntas*, which we know was affected by the Fall)? In the same passage Hilary refers to the condition of our *origo* (*per conditionem communis nobis originis*). Does this refer to our origin at creation, or our common conception and birth?

To some degree it does not matter that Hilary does not distinguish between sinfulness that arises from the Fall and that which arises from createdness. Createdness and Fall both affect our \*current\* nature and he does not feel the need to differentiate them further. The distinction between our state at creation and our state immediately before and after the Fall is not particularly important for him. Indeed, Augustine is also ambiguous on this point, for example in saying that we fell because of our creation *ex nihilo* – which seems to imply that our Fall was inevitable. For Hilary at least, this need not be the case.

### 9.2a Sin arising through our creation and embodiedness

The Church Fathers are agreed that all humans sin and are marked with the stain of sin. One way this arises for Hilary is through our createdness. Peñamaría, who argues that Hilary is almost entirely Augustinian in his theology of original sin, suggests that in Hilary there is no body-soul tension before the Fall.<sup>793</sup> However Hilary's narratives of creation are sufficient to refute this, for example at *TrPs* 118, 10.1f. (discussed at §3.3a).

Our very embodiedness means that we are weakened and held back in sin. This is frequently articulated as resulting from the fact that we are made from earth or mud, which

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<sup>793</sup> PEÑAMARÍA 1974:236

explains the stain upon us. The connection between our earthiness and our sins is fairly neo-platonic and is more or less ubiquitous across Hilary's works.

Confundendi erunt qui Sion oderunt... ad terrena sua et originalia  
revertentes (*TrPs*, 129.1)

...in terram recumbunt; ....peccatorum et corporum suorum origini  
inhaerentes... (*InMt*, 15.10)

Those who do not love Zion, or the crowds who sit on the grass, highlight the association of earth with both the body and sin and also with the term 'origin' (or 'original'). Further associations of this type, where our earthy origin implicitly explains our sinfulness, may be found in §3.3a-b and §5.3b.

Still, references to our created condition are not necessarily negative. Our createdness is a simple fact, not necessarily good or bad. It is just a consequence of this that imperfection naturally arises. For example one reason why Hilary may not be particularly critical of emotions is that he sees them as an unavoidable consequence of the human condition.

### 9.2b Sin arising through the Fall

Nevertheless, Hilary is ever ambiguous as to whether our current sinful state arises from the matter of our creation, or through the Fall. For example, Hilary may express our emotions or passions as being part of our *infirmity*, a natural and inescapable part of our

being created from earth.<sup>794</sup> And yet in §6.4b the passions were presented as arising specifically as a result of the Fall,<sup>795</sup> and are a punishment for the first sin.<sup>796</sup>

Still, it is indubitable that Hilary does have a concept of sinfulness that arises at a direct result of the Fall. Moreover, he expresses this in terms of our *origo* (although this may mean our creation). The use of the technical terminology of ‘original sin’ terminology will be discussed in §9.3a; for now aspects of the concept will be demonstrated.

Hilary frequently refers to Paul in a way that presages Augustine’s use, and in particular Romans 7.23 (*I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members*) and the *lex peccati* which is repeatedly mentioned.<sup>797</sup>

Meminerimus eum [David] sub eodem peccato de humanae necessitatis confessione dixisse: *Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in delictis peperit me mater mea* (Ibid., 7); secundum illud: Quis enim gloriabitur castum se habere cor coram Deo, nec si unius diei fuerit infans? – manente in nobis etiam secundum Apostolum et origine et lege peccati. (*TrPs*, 58.4)

...et habitare in carne sua peccati legem obnitentem legi mentis suae senserit et congemuert. (*TrPs*, 61.2)

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<sup>794</sup> Compare §3.3b

<sup>795</sup> *TrPs*, 146.4

<sup>796</sup> *TrPs118*, 9.4

<sup>797</sup> For example *TrPs*, 61.2, 62.7, [67].2, [68].7, [68].14, 136.9; *TrPs118*, 1.3, 22.6 all refer to the *lex peccati*.

In fact Hilary even goes so far as to explain why sin is not technically inevitable, and yet everyone does sin (except Christ):

Quamquam ne in naturis quidem hominum inest necessitas aliqua peccati; sed ex appetitu voluntatis et oblectatione vitiorum peccati usus arripitur. (*TrPs*, [68].9)

(Here again we note that is the *voluntas* as well as *vitia* that is said to be behind the habit of sinning.) He makes this point that there is no *necessitas peccati* elsewhere (see §9.2b).<sup>798</sup>

So far this need not imply any theology of original sin as found in Augustine; for example plenty other Latin writers refer to the stain of sin (see next section). However, this should be taken in parallel with Hilary's view of the Fall identified in Chapters 6-8. It has been shown that (as well as other side effects such as a curse on the Earth and the entry of death). The Fall caused an anthropological change as well in bringing Sin and Disobedience into the human psyche and weakening the will. Hilary also refers to the *vetus peccatum* as causing blindness.<sup>799</sup>

So then, Hilary is certain on our state of sinfulness, and although some of this is bodily it is sure that there was also an anthropological change at the Fall which means that we cannot help but want sin. That Hilary's doctrine approaches Augustine's will be further confirmed below by his 'origo' terminology and by his theology of baptism.

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<sup>798</sup> *TrPs*, 57.3

<sup>799</sup> *InMt*, 9.9 and compare *InMt*, 8.5 where a certain man's blindness is stated to be unrelated to his own or his parents' sin (based on Jn 9.3); by analogy then the paralytic of Mt. 9.2 is held to represent the illness of the human race, not his own sin.

### 9.3 The ‘sins of our origin’

#### 9.3a) The word *origo* and related vocabulary

Hilary has been shown to be ambiguous on whether sin arises from creation or the Fall, and this is also true of the word *origo* which can refer both to our origin as created beings, to the human stock from which we arise (and the condition of our birth). Nevertheless, although it is not yet quite used as a technical term (as in Augustine), it is clear that *origo* defines a certain type of sinful state.

As Ladaria points out,<sup>800</sup> Hilary does not ever use the specific phrase ‘original sin’. He does, however, use various related phrases: *originis nostri peccata*, *sub peccati origine*, *originis vitium*.<sup>801</sup> Already many of the excerpts presented in this chapter have evinced some use or other of the word *origo* in describing this sin. These phrases hint that a technical terminology is arising to describe a certain doctrine on human sinfulness. (Indeed Ladaria asks whether Augustine may have got the phrase ‘original sin’ through Hilary, although he does not feel Hilary has exactly Augustine’s doctrine).<sup>802</sup>

In *de trinitate*, Hilary uses *origo* in discussions of how Christ differs from us because of our different birth. *Origo* here means our descent (the stock we are derived from), but also the physical act of our individual conceptions and births (*ipsae illae corporum atque elementorum nostrorum origines sint pudendae*).<sup>803</sup> For Hilary our weakness comes by birth or conception, but Christ does not share this weakness because of his different *origo*, namely his eternal begetting in the Father.

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<sup>800</sup> LADARIA 1977b:243-4

<sup>801</sup> *InMt.* 10.24; *TrPs* 118. 22.6, 14.20; *TrPs.* 57.3, 58.4

<sup>802</sup> LADARIA 1977b:234-4

<sup>803</sup> *TrPs*, [67].25

non teneat Filius originis suae in nativitate naturam, sed in substantiam alteram conditio... praestantior sit (*trin.*6.18)

...[ut] nostra in eo per virtutem ... [sui] originis vitia non inessent; dum homo natus, non vitiis humanae conceptionis est natus (*trin.* 10.25)

atque ita et ex corporis nativitate homo natus sit, nec sit in hominis vitiis qui non sit in origine (*trin.*10.26)

non tamen in vitiosae infirmitatis nostrae esset corpore, qui non esset in origine (*trin.* 10.35)

Hilary's point is clear: it is our different respective *origines* that means we have *vitia* and Christ does not. It is worth noting that this use of *origo* occurs in other authors of the period, such as Faustinus: *quis crederet quod homo factus fuerat ex originis nostrae matrice, licet sine viri complexu?*<sup>804</sup> Used this way it both refers to our conception/birth and also emphasizes our difference from Christ.

In these trinitarian examples the word *origo* is not quite a technical term, but it is certainly a keyword in a theological argument: our origin indicates our anthropological state (whether sinfulness or immunity from sin).

The phrase *originis vitium* occurs in Tertullian,<sup>805</sup> where he uses it to refer to the corruption of human nature that arises in the Genesis narrative. This causes our 'second

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<sup>804</sup> FAUSTINUS *ad Gallam Placidiam de Trinitate (de Fide)*, 3

<sup>805</sup> TERTULLIAN *an.* 41: *Malum igitur animae... ex originis vitio antecedit, naturale quodammodo.* See also *spect.* 2

nature' which is handed down through the soul. (This element is entirely different from Hilary who usually states the soul is perfect and added later, as already shown §3.3b).

However, this is the only instance of such a phrase before Hilary.

Like Tertullian, Hilary uses *origo* in conjunction with sin to speak of human corruption; he also specifically uses the phrase *vitium originis*, or associates *vitium* with *originis*.<sup>806</sup> But, importantly, he also uses it to talk of our human condition of sinfulness. Admittedly he does not quite use it as a technical term as Augustine does, but it is clear that the state of sinfulness is what is meant (not just vitiation of nature).

scit se sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege se esse natum (*TrPs*118,  
22.6)

Here Hilary implies in Pauline language that we are born under the *origo peccati* which is equivalent to the law of sin. Although this odd phrase could refer to our createdness, Augustine interprets Hilary's phrase as referring to the Fall when he quotes it against Julian.<sup>807</sup>

So Hilary is the first evidence of *origo* language consistently used in the context of a state of sinfulness, even if it is fluid and not quite yet a fixed technical term. But it is also important to note that Hilary's usage assumes that his readers will understand him in this way: Hilary is merely tapping into common discourse. Ladaria makes the same observation with regard to Hilary's discussion of Christ's *origo* in *trin.* 10. Ladaria notes that Hilary assumes without question that Adam's sinfulness is transmitted by birth, and also takes for granted that his readers (even his detractors) will make the same

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<sup>806</sup> *TrPs*,57.3, 58.4; *trin* 10.25, 10.26, 10.35. Most of these are excerpted in this chapter.

<sup>807</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 1.3(9)

assumption.<sup>808</sup> It appears to be an unquestioned presumption of the trinitarian debates of the time that ‘birth implies sinfulness’.

In sum, it is not quite clear what *origo* refers to in Hilary (creation, birth, ancestry). Nevertheless, our state of sinfulness is consistently described with reference to with phrases such as *peccata originis* or using the term *origo*.

### 9.3b) Corporate Guilt

It has been shown (§9.2b) how the Fall means that we are in a state of sinfulness, but this is not novel in Hilary; indeed this position is ubiquitously held among other Church Fathers. For example Cyprian mentions that babies need baptism because they have “contracted the contagion of the ancient death”;<sup>809</sup> Origen states we are all born with the stain of sin;<sup>810</sup> and shortly after Ambrose states that even a one-day-old child has sin even though he never committed a sin.<sup>811</sup> Also, the idea of anthropological change at the Fall is not unique to Hilary; Tertullian states that through it the devil changed human nature.<sup>812</sup>

However, Hilary represents a step closer to Augustine inasmuch as he sees us as sharing not only in a universal ‘stain’ but even in the moral responsibility for the first sin. For Hilary, we all somehow share in Adam’s sin. Indeed, this is the essence of the discussion regarding Adam in Chapter 5 which discussed the universalistic view that Adam represents Everyman (all humans). Adam is a historical individual, but also a

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<sup>808</sup> LADARIA 1977b:235

<sup>809</sup> CYPRIAN *Ep.* 58.6

<sup>810</sup> ORIGEN *Hom.Lev.* 8.3

<sup>811</sup> AMBROSE *de cain et abel* 3.10

<sup>812</sup> TERTULLIAN *spect.* 2.12

cipher for the entirety of humanity, especially when contrasted with the Second Adam whose saving work affects us all just as the First Adam's sin did. (The extent to which Hilary sees Adam as a platonic universal, on the other hand, was shown to be more dubious.)

This is not unusual; contemporary authors such as Athanasius and Nyssen also believed that we somehow share in Adam's sin.<sup>813</sup> But here we do not merely share in sinfulness; we are ourselves somehow responsible. We ourselves shared in the first sin: *in unius Adae errore, omne hominum genus aberravit*.<sup>814</sup>

Hilary also explicitly distinguishes our state of sinfulness from individual sin.<sup>815</sup> At *TrPs*, 57.3 he discusses how Esau was foreknown, rather than predestined, to be a sinner (this theme is also found in Origen).<sup>816</sup> Hilary wishes to make the point that Esau's sin was his own individual sin. Therefore he insists that Esau was not forced to sin (there was no *necessitas peccati*), nor did his birth require it. Further, Esau's future sin was nothing to do with original sin.

Ne vitium referri posset ad originem, praeduratae in his ad obediendum voluntatis crimen exprobrat, dicens: *Furor illis secundum similitudinem serpentis...* [Ps. 57.5 LXX]. (*TrPs*, 57.3)

The psalm lemma therefore demonstrates that Esau's sin is his own, not mere original sin – although Esau is still said to sin because of his *praedurata voluntas*. Christ dies due to this juridical guilt in *TrPs*, [68].8.

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<sup>813</sup> EDWARDS 2002:119, fn.95

<sup>814</sup> *InMt*, 18.6

<sup>815</sup> *TrPs*, 57.3

<sup>816</sup> For example ORIGEN *princ.* 3.1.20

Augustine will use ‘original sin’ to refer to a state of culpability or sinfulness, as much as a specific sin. Hilary is thus possibly the first author to use the language of *peccata originis nostrae* referring to a state of sinfulness and culpability shared by the individual, rather than a mere vitiation of nature; and he assumes his readers will understand that.

## **9.4 Transmission by birth**

### 9.4a) Transmission of hereditary sin

So far it has been shown that Adam’s sin has impinged on us all. This happened in a number of ways, but a common expression in Hilary is that of genetic or hereditary transmission.

Hilary’s language often implies that he sees ancestry as determinative of character. For example the Jews have hereditary *infidelitas*,<sup>817</sup> but the children of Abraham should be like Abraham.<sup>818</sup> So it is a matter of simple genetics, as much as one of theology, if we have inherited some of Adam’s traits, since Hilary constantly refers to Adam as our first parent.<sup>819</sup> This genetic inheritance includes inheriting sin.

A cautionary point is in order. Original sin for Hilary is certainly hereditary, and connected with the flesh. But contradictorily, Hilary elsewhere presents the opposite view: that there is no hereditary sin. He presents Job and Jeremiah cursing the day of their birth, but explains that it is not their soul’s creation they bewail (since that was perfect) but

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<sup>817</sup> *InMt*, 2.1

<sup>818</sup> *TrPs*, 52.19

<sup>819</sup> *TrPs*, 65.4, 136.5, 146.4; also implied by *trin.* 4.21, 10.20

their growth into bodily form in the womb, since the body is the cause of all their weaknesses and infirmities.<sup>820</sup> This passage appears to reject original sin as intrinsic mental fallenness, since it attributes all sin to the body. (It takes our human problems as arising from the flesh, although the flesh is, after all, hereditary in its own capacity.)

Still, the very use of the word *origo* to describe this particular state of sinfulness implies not just our creation but also our ancestry. Ladaria states correctly that Hilary's language about Adam and about our birth (and Christ's birth) assumes hereditary sin.<sup>821</sup> At *trin.* 10.20 Hilary refutes a 'heretical' view that Christ inherited both body and soul from Adam in order to redeem Adam's sin. Hilary refutes this because he believes human souls are created directly by God, but he does not disagree with the position that our sin is hereditary. It turns out that arguments for Christ's sinlessness in Hilary are key for understanding human hereditary sin.

#### 9.4b) The relevance of Christ's birth

It may be that Hilary's view of transmission is not based primarily on our own birth (which somehow transmits sinfulness) but rather on Christ's (which fails to transmit it), as has already been hinted in §9.3a. Given Hilary's trinitarian interest, it is possible that his christology has affected his anthropology rather than the other way round.

Hilary states that we know the Son is truly God based on five things: name, birth, nature, power, confession;<sup>822</sup> but he also says that *nativitas* embraces the other four.<sup>823</sup> Birth is thus the peg that Hilary hangs his hat on for his Nicene articulation of the trinity.

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<sup>820</sup> *TrPs*, 119.12

<sup>821</sup> LADARIA 1977b:242-3

<sup>822</sup> *trin.* 7.9

<sup>823</sup> *trin.* 7.16. I am grateful to Jarred Mercer for pointing these out.

As shown by Smulders, Mattei and others,<sup>824</sup> Hilary uses the concept of Christ's begottenness over and over again in his trinitarian works, not just the *de Trinitate*<sup>825</sup> but also others such as *de Synodis*<sup>826</sup> and even the short work against Auxentius of Milan.<sup>827</sup> Hilary is thorough in using the birth concept for the very reason that it was of such key importance in the trinitarian controversy of the day, as can be seen from his fragmentary collection of contemporary documents related to the controversies.<sup>828</sup>

In the tenth book of his *de trinitate*, Hilary enters into a long discussion about Christ's immunity from suffering and sin, and this argument hinges on an understanding of Christ's birth; as Ladaria points out, his position essentially assumes the doctrine of original sin.

Christ's begetting from the Virgin enables him to participate in humanity and thereby redeem our fallen condition. However, Hilary is careful to specify that Christ is 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' but not himself sinful.<sup>829</sup> For Hilary this is the key point about being born from a virgin – it protects Christ from the necessity of sinfulness. The Word took flesh from the virgin and then received the soul (for Hilary, the soul is added in separately by God for every human child).

So far so good, and this is not particularly novel. For example a similar position is found in Athanasius;<sup>830</sup> Keech demonstrates that Rom. 8.3 is a key part of Augustine's

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<sup>824</sup> For example, SMULDERS (1944) devotes a chapter (Ch.5, p.140-178) to *nativitas* as a foundation for Hilary's expression of trinitarian relations; MATTEI (2003) traces changes across Hilary's works in his use of *nativitas*; WEEDMAN (2007) discusses eternal generation and how far Hilary is relying on other theologians of the time such as Basil of Ancyra.

<sup>825</sup> For example *trin.* 6.18-45, 12.1-34

<sup>826</sup> For example *syn.* 17-18, 22, 23, 26...

<sup>827</sup> *c. Aux.* 6

<sup>828</sup> For example, *Coll. Ant. Par.* A.iv.2-3; B.ii.9; B.ii.10-11. Numbered in WICKHAM 1997 as 1.2.2 (p.21), 1.8.6 (p.60), 1.9 (p.61-4)

<sup>829</sup> *trin.* 10.25, using Rom. 8.3

<sup>830</sup> e.g. ATHANASIUS *inc.* 8.3

teaching on Christ's uniqueness in the context of the Pelagian controversy<sup>831</sup>; Origen says that Christ was sinless because he was not born of physical sexuality;<sup>832</sup> Nyssen also rests an argument on the fact that Christ's birth did not result from sensual pleasure.<sup>833</sup>

But Hilary leaves a gaping hole. He believes in hereditary sin, but yet believes that each soul is created anew.<sup>834</sup> He explicitly rejects Tertullian's traducianism,<sup>835</sup> but does not give a satisfactory alternative mechanism whereby vitiation of the soul is transmitted. As Tennant puts it: "Hilary abandons Tertullian's theory of the mode of propagation of sin, but he fails to present us with one in its place... He consequently reverts almost to the indefiniteness of thought which obtained before Tertullian wrote."<sup>836</sup>

Tennant<sup>837</sup> and N. Williams<sup>838</sup> both suggest that Hilary's theology of original sin follows Tertullian in most respects, including with the *vitium originis*. (Williams follows Tennant closely on Hilary with no original comments). Since Hilary has rejected traducianism, both these authors read *In Mt* 10.23-4 (the anthropological household narrative) as making the flesh the seat of original sin. This is surprising: this text is precisely the one which suggests most strongly a vitiation of the soul and fallenness of the will that is independent of the body. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Hilary indicates elsewhere that sinfulness is transmitted through the body.

Tennant's accusation of 'indefiniteness of thought' is not entirely true. Hilary would protest that each soul created anew is perfect until combined with the flesh (as with

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<sup>831</sup> Discussion in KEECH 2012, Ch.3 (see for example p.104-5)

<sup>832</sup> ORIGEN *Hom.Lev.* 8.3

<sup>833</sup> NYSSEN *Great Catechism* 16

<sup>834</sup> *trin.* 10.20, 10.22

<sup>835</sup> LADARIA 1977b:236

<sup>836</sup> TENNANT 1903:337-8 discusses Hilary

<sup>837</sup> TENNANT 1903:337-8

<sup>838</sup> N. WILLIAMS 1927:298-9

Job and Jeremiah above, §9.4a). Christ alone is sinless because his different ‘origin’ means that even his body is different from that of others.<sup>839</sup> Yet it is certainly also the case that Hilary holds the position that the soul is itself vitiated by the Fall, our entire anthropological make-up changes, and our soul needs redemption as much as the body. (Indeed, to explain passibility Hilary even goes so far as to say that we only experience suffering because the soul is weak and ‘allows’ us to sense the suffering.)<sup>840</sup> Tennant is thus correct that Hilary does not provide a coherent mechanism by which this is transmitted.

Both of these positions are found across Hilary’s works, so it is probably fair to say that he held them both concurrently and with no notion of contradiction. Still, from his discussion of Christ’s different origin we may deduce that there is *something* about conception or birth that explains our souls’ vitiation – even if it is not entirely clear what (he certainly does not hold that sexuality is corruptive, as shall shortly be shown).

So then, it seems that the theology of original sin is already present in the context of the trinitarian controversy, with its debates about the Son’s begottenness and his distinct ‘origin’. Hilary does feel that the body weakens the perfect soul, but at the same time he holds the soul as independently vitiated by the Fall. Even if his theology is not coherent, he does demonstrate the concepts of original sin and assumes the same of his opponents in the trinitarian debates.

#### 9.4c) Anthropological ‘parents’

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<sup>839</sup> *trin.* 10.16, 10.22, 10.35, 10.44

<sup>840</sup> *trin.* 10.14: affert itaque dolorem per animae infirmis admixtionem, in infirmum sensum suum corpus animatum.

Parenthood is not just a matter of the historical figure of Adam. Since the Fall, not just Adam but Sin and Disobedience are our parents (or in-laws), as the narrative of the anthropological household shows. There Hilary states that baptism frees us from *originis nostrae peccatis atque auctoribus*.<sup>841</sup> Ladaria translates *auctoribus* as referring to our anthropological parents Sin and Disobedience,<sup>842</sup> from whom baptism frees us. However, he does note the difficulties with this passage and uses this as a piece of evidence to support his theory that Hilary has not fully thought through the issue of how we inherit original sin.<sup>843</sup> (The phrase is ambiguous, however; Doignon translates it differently, taking *auctoribus* in apposition to *peccatis*, so that the original sin itself is our parent).<sup>844</sup>

A synthesis of the parenthood of the flesh and parenthood of anthropological attributes is found when Hilary explains why it is right for us to dash the children of Babylon against the rock.

Ad infelicem enim illa confusionis et perturbationis nostrae carnem sermo omnis revertitur, quae secundum historiae fidem ex confusionis patribus genita est: quia omnis caro superioris carnis est filia. Ex his enim, qui primum confusis linguis confusionis urbem quae Babylonia est condiderunt, universarum gentium initia dispersa sunt. (*TrPs*, 136.13)

Babylon represents our flesh and its ‘confusion’ (referring to the story of Babel). All flesh goes back to one first flesh (*omnis caro superioris carnis est filia*) but he says that this

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<sup>841</sup> *InMt*,10.24

<sup>842</sup> LADARIA 1977b:241 fn.35

<sup>843</sup> LADARIA 1977b:241 fn.35: todo esto nos hace pensar de nuevo que nos hallamos ante una doctrina todavía no firmamente definida.

<sup>844</sup> DOIGNON 2007a:245: Quand, dans ces conditions, nous somme renouvelés par le bain du Baptême grâce au pouvoir du Verbe, nous sommes séparés des péchés de notre origine, nos instigateurs...

flesh was begotten *ex confusionis patribus*. It is not clear what this means (are the parents ‘anthropological’ or real? Are they confused or themselves Confusion?). However, it seems that this somehow recalls the Fall and the consequent genetic transmission of the Fall’s consequences, even though it is portrayed through the story of Babel. In particular this passage seems to be attempting an explanation at our emotional and psychological state (*infelicem confusionis et perturbationis nostrae carnem*), which arises at one particular event (here Babel); we may compare the view that passions arise through the Fall (§6.4b).

### **9.5 Baptism**

Baptism features highly in Hilary’s works. It brings many benefits, such as bringing us into fellowship with Christ as his brothers.<sup>845</sup> But more relevantly here, Hilary’s language of baptism appears to present all the antidotes to the problems that original sin brings. For example, we have seen that original sin brings a stain or blot upon us; baptism cleanses that.

[homo] cui post baptismi lavacrum nullae adhaeserint sordes, sed sit  
immaculatus et nitidus, sitque ei non corpus stupris contaminatum...  
(*TrPs* [14].6)

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<sup>845</sup> *InMt*, 24.2

As another example, Hilary talks about baptism as the second birth, paralleling the first creation which went so badly. Thus he uses words such as *renati* or *regenerati*.<sup>846</sup> This may also be associated with the fact that the first ‘birth’ led to death, but the second leads to life (*regenerentur in vitam*)<sup>847</sup> as the exact offset to the consequence of the Fall. It has already been shown above (§9.4a, regarding Job and Jeremiah) that all babies are born sinful, and the key theology of baptism in Hilary is as something that removes this sin.

However, we have seen that the events of the Fall somehow led to an anthropological change in Hilary, and this is further confirmed by the fact that baptism seems to reverse this change.

Confringi... nos tamquam vas figuli... gaudeamus: ut et nunc, modo figuli vasis, commortui et consepulti Domino in baptismate in novitate vitae ambulemus [Rom. 4.4]...; et tunc per hunc novae nativitatis profectum, in beatam illam... iteratae reparationis nostrae speciem reformemur. (*TrPs*,2.41)

Here, being shattered like a potter’s vessel (Ps. 2.9) is taken as referring to our baptism. As a result of that, we will be re-formed or repaired (this *iterata reparatio* may recall the *recapitulatio* of Irenaeus). This gives us a new *species*. This view is also found elsewhere in the Psalms commentaries, where baptism is the start of us possessing eternal bodies.<sup>848</sup> Baptism thus has an effect on our physical, corporeal body, even though these effects may only be seen eschatologically.

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<sup>846</sup> *TrPs*, 2.29, 2.31, 2.41, 52.21, [65].11

<sup>847</sup> *TrPs*, 2.31

<sup>848</sup> *TrPs*, [65].11

Nevertheless, baptism also has an effect on our internal make-up, as Hilary makes clear in his narrative of the anthropological household. There, Sin and Disobedience were both the Fall itself and the consequences of the Fall when they became part of us. But baptism reverses their effects.

Cum ergo innovamur baptismi lavacro... ab originis nostrae peccatis  
atque auctoribus separamur; ...a patris et matris affectionibus  
dissidemus; et veterem cum peccatis atque infidelitate sua hominem  
exuentes, et per Spiritum anima et corpore innovati, necesse est ut  
ingeniti et vetusti operis consuetudinem oderimus. (*InMt*, 10.24)

This passage goes on to state further consequences of baptism. First, the corporeal nature of the body becomes spiritual like the soul (while at the same time it “continues in its own matter”). Next, the will is sundered from “its mother-in-law, Disobedience” and surrenders itself to the newly spiritual body and soul; the passage later states that the will becomes entirely subject to the spiritual soul. Here, baptism does not merely reverse the effects of the Fall, but represents a forward step for the human condition: our bodies are no longer at odds with our souls, and our wills are no longer independent but in full control of the soul.

As Wild points out,<sup>849</sup> Hilary’s view of baptism is as of something that will only be completed eschatologically.<sup>850</sup> This is further supported by Hilary’s ubiquitous theology of our glorification at the General Resurrection, when the nature of body and soul are

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<sup>849</sup> WILD 1950:93

<sup>850</sup> *InMt*, 2.4: reliquum sit consummari igne iudicii. Compare *TrPs118*, 3.5

somehow brought together.<sup>851</sup> This is similar to the anthropological household passage where baptism makes the body spiritual like the soul.

Before rounding off baptism, it should be remembered that redemption in Hilary means a number of things and expiation of sin is achieved in a variety of ways. Hilary may use redemption or expiation language without reference to baptism. As a specific example, the healing of the paralytic in Matthew is explicitly a cipher for the removal of original sin; the healing includes forgiveness, resurrection and the entry into paradise, but does not mention baptism.<sup>852</sup>

In sum, Hilary uses standard biblical language and metaphors about baptism. His language demonstrates that (among other things) he sees it as (a) removing the sinfulness associated with birth, through forgiveness;<sup>853</sup> and (b) effecting an anthropological change that works both internally and externally, and has its culmination eschatologically. These two points further illustrate his understanding of original sin.

## **9.6 Conclusion**

Ladaria (1977b) feels that Hilary has the seeds of a doctrine of original sin especially in *trin.* 10, which discusses Christ's separate origin. However, Ladaria suggests that Hilary does not have a coherent theology of original sin, since for example he does not have a model of how the sinfulness propagates in the soul. But even Augustine never quite

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<sup>851</sup> *InMt*, 5.8, 5.11, 10.19, 27.4; *TrPs*, 2.41, 145.2; *TrPs118*, 20.9, 20.10; *trin.* 11.35, 11.49...

<sup>852</sup> *InMt*, 8.7

<sup>853</sup> *InMt*, 21.15: in remissionem peccatorum baptizati...

explains this, as Keech shows.<sup>854</sup> Peñamaría represents a stronger position than Ladaria; he sees Hilary as entirely in accordance with Augustine on original sin, with the sole exception of the *initium fidei*.<sup>855</sup>

Still, Doignon, Ladaria and Peñamaría would all agree that Hilary has some articulation of original sin, whatever the details maybe. This chapter has suggested that Hilary may be the first writer to use the language of our *origo* to refer to a certain class of sins (even though he is ambiguous as to whether the *peccata originis* refer properly to sins that arise from our createdness as being made from mud, or the state of sinfulness that comes from the Fall). Further, this is nearing the status of technical terminology and understood as such by his audience.

Further, this ‘original sin’ is not mere stain or filth associated with the human condition as found in other church fathers before Augustine: Hilary states that all humans participate in the sin itself and its culpability.

It is certainly hereditary (*ingeniti operis consuetudinem*)<sup>856</sup> and it may be distinguished from our individual sins.<sup>857</sup> It is possible, though, that Hilary’s understanding of hereditary sinfulness does not arise primarily from anthropology but through the trinitarian debates of the time and particularly the belief that it was the virgin birth that demonstrated Christ’s sinlessness.

Still, the Fall had a definite effect, in particular in bringing in death and in changing our anthropological constitution so that Sin and Disobedience became intrinsically part of us; this can, however, be reversed in baptism which obtains ‘cleansing’ and ‘forgiveness of sins’ and sets us on the path towards the resurrection.

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<sup>854</sup> KEECH 2012:95, 99, 101-2. Fredriksen argues that, for Julian of Eclanum, this inability to explain the transmission of sinfulness invalidates Augustine’s whole system (see Keech 2012:100).

<sup>855</sup> PEÑAMARÍA 1974:245-6

<sup>856</sup> *InMt*, 10.24

<sup>857</sup> *TrPs*, 57.3

## *Chapter 10*

# Hilary between Origen and Augustine

### 10.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters have examined Hilary's anthropology. This final chapter seeks to put him in his context, particularly by comparing him with his forebear Origen and his successor Augustine. It will be suggested that Hilary is one of the many streams carrying Origenian ideas and exegesis through to Augustine.

In §10.2 Hilary's works are compared; there appears to be a difference in articulation across his opus, which may suggest Origenian influence on certain specific works (particularly the Psalms Commentaries) but may be down to the fact that Hilary's works are of different genres, or to common methods of exegesis across Christian communities.

In §10.3 Hilary's usage of Origen will be assessed. This allows us to deduce what Hilary thinks of Origen: Hilary clearly identifies some of the Alexandrian's doctrines as heterodox but on the whole respects Origen's exegetical method which he largely follows.

In particular, it is suggested that Hilary had a theology of original sin and constrained will independently of Origen, as demonstrated by his independent works (particularly *de trinitate* and *in Matthaëum*). Nevertheless, the psalms commentaries show that he is influenced by the Origenian expression of human psychology and the process of stimulus and response. This feeds into Hilary's articulation of sin and will in that work.

§10.4 examines Augustine's usage and understanding of Hilary particularly in the context of his debate with Pelagius. It is suggested (contra Doignon) that although Augustine's interpretations of Hilary are sometimes a little off-mark, but that on the whole Augustine is fair and accurate in attributing to Hilary a doctrine of original sin, even if it differs from Augustine's in some details.

## **10.2 Hilary's Anthropology**

### 10.2a) Overview

The foregoing chapters have discussed Hilary's anthropology from a number of angles. Some scholars have seen Hilary in a somewhat platonic light, emphasizing his sharp demarcation between body and soul and the ultimate spiritualization of the body (Chapter 3). This places him in a so-called 'Greek' anthropological tradition, which typically sees Christian salvation as a progress towards deification and denial of body. This is certainly present in Hilary's theology, but predominates particularly in his Psalms Commentaries (and even those may deny the need for asceticism, §8.2c). In fact, Hilary appears to be more nuanced on the integration of body and soul. This may be due to Stoic influence but it may be that a more positive view of the body is in fact something that Hilary has inherited as a relatively common feature of the Christian tradition.

Across his works Hilary demonstrates a number of the features of a doctrine of original sin, including a constrained will (Chapter 7), corporate accountability in the first sin (Chapter 6, 9), and a notion of transmission by conception or birth even if this is not quite satisfactorily explained (§9.4a). He even has something approximating to the later

language of original sin (§9.3). All these are characteristically seen as typical of Augustine's theology; their presence in Hilary is an indication that Augustine is not quite as novel as some might suggest (see below, §10.4).

At the same time, many of the conclusions about Hilary have been drawn from comments he makes in passing or are deduced from his underlying assumptions. Nowhere does he discourse systematically about anthropological issues as he does for trinitarian ones. There is also some evidence of variation across his work, as the next sections will show.

#### 10.2b) Comparing Hilary's commentaries on Matthew and on Psalm 118

One of the initial rationales for this thesis was the observation that Hilary appeared to have different expressions of anthropology in his commentaries on Matthew and on Psalm 118 respectively.

To some degree that observation still holds. For example *imago* theology in the anthropological sense is far more common in Hilary's psalms commentaries: *imago* anthropology is found in only one paragraph of *In Matthaëum* but in twelve of *TrPs118*, a text which is of comparable length. *Imago* anthropology is also considerably more detailed and developed in the latter text (§4.4). Likewise the passions are mentioned in both works, but their relevance to human constraint and action really appears only in the Psalms commentaries (Chapter 8). Lastly, any suggestion of a 'separable' soul is more obviously characteristic of the Psalms commentaries and not Hilary's other works (although even there it may well have been muted compared to Hilary's source: §3.5a).

At the same time, there is certainly common ground across these two works. For example the weakness of the will and the existence of original sin are found not only in these two works to an equal degree, but indeed across the whole of Hilary's corpus.

Curiously, it has been found that some doctrinal expressions in Hilary appear in the Matthew and Psalms commentaries, but *not* in the rest of Hilary's corpus. For example none of Hilary's other works mention *imago* anthropology at all in its own right (that is, it is only used to make christological or trinitarian points).<sup>858</sup> Emotions are barely mentioned in the rest of Hilary's corpus.<sup>859</sup> The concept of Adam as a 'universal human' and of Christ assuming all mankind does not occur at all in the rest of Hilary's corpus outside these two commentaries (as argued in Chapter 5). This could arise from the genres and /or subject areas of each text. For example, it is hardly surprising that Hilary's trinitarian works should contain less anthropology; not only are they focused on trinitarian concerns, but they are also targeted at specific assertions about the trinity which Hilary is polemically rejecting.

Strong conclusions about differences between the works cannot be drawn, merely from the different doctrinal or hermeneutical emphases, and other factors must be considered. Nevertheless, it does seem safe to suggest that in the psalms commentaries particularly there is a greater presence of Origenistic articulations, as well as more commonality of thought with Origen. This is consistent with the finding that Hilary is using Origen's text.

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<sup>858</sup> For example, HILARY *c. Const.* 20-21 emphasizes human 'likeness' only to show that the Son should not be called 'like' the Father. Also, the creation of humans 'in our image and likeness' is frequently referred to but only to make the trinitarian point about the plural number of actors involved in creation: *Trin.* 4.17-20, 5.7-10, 5.24; *Myst.* 2.13, 2.14; *TrPs.* 138.26 (compare PELLAND 1983a:446-7).

<sup>859</sup> Again, the exception is when emotions are used in christological analysis: see for example *trin.* 10 which treats at length with the question of Christ's suffering.

### 10.3 Hilary's Usage of Origen

#### 10.3a) Hilary and Origen's orthodoxy

In Chapter 2 it was shown that, in places, over 90% of Hilary's text is taken from Origen, although with periphrasis and re-adjustment of material.<sup>860</sup> And yet at other points, Hilary shows considerable reworking of material while still using occasional exegetical ideas (for example where he seems to be avoiding statements about a supramundane Fall).

As a starting-point for assessing what exactly Hilary was likely to reject in his source text, we may examine the list of heresies put forward by Epiphanius in his *Panarion* of 376 A.D. For most of these 'heresies', it can be shown that Hilary also modifies or omits the relevant doctrine in the Psalms Commentaries.

- (1) *Subordinationism within the Trinity*. Hilary omits Origen's references to the Son and Spirit as *manūs dei* (evidence for which occurs in Ambrose and the catena).<sup>861</sup>
- (2) *Pre-existence of souls*. Hilary accepts (possibly in accord with Origen) that the body was created long after the soul (*longe postea*).<sup>862</sup> But he rejects the concept of a Fall into bodies.<sup>863</sup>
- (3) *Humans lost God's image at the Fall*. Hilary appears to write this theology out of his text consciously.<sup>864</sup>

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<sup>860</sup> §2.7

<sup>861</sup> §1.3

<sup>862</sup> *TrPs.* 129.5 (§6.2b)

<sup>863</sup> §6.2b

- (4) *Garments of skins*. Hilary appears to reject sharply the notion that the body is a punishment for some pre-bodily sin.<sup>865</sup>
- (5) *Spiritual resurrection*. Hilary insists that the resurrection must include the body, although this will only occur when the body ‘takes on the nature of the soul’.<sup>866</sup>
- (6) and (7) *Allegorical reading of Scripture*. Hilary specifically states that scripture may be taken allegorically but that its primary meaning is historical, and that the historical meaning always stands.<sup>867</sup>

Of course, it is not necessarily the case that Origen himself held all of these positions that Epiphanius charges him with. Nevertheless, in several cases Hilary omits observations which he found in Origen’s commentary (as may be seen by turning to the sections referred to in the list above). Hilary adheres quite closely to Origen’s commentary when he feels it orthodox, so any deviation from this pattern is significant. He may even reject Origen’s remarks explicitly.<sup>868</sup>

Origen was always controversial; objections to Origen’s theology of punishment and forgiveness arose even in his lifetime. Methodius wrote a treatise rejecting his resurrection theology.<sup>869</sup> The list of accusations recorded by Pamphilus-Eusebius seems to focus particularly on christology,<sup>870</sup> although there are certainly a number of anthropological accusations (Origen is accused of denying the punishment of sinners and

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<sup>864</sup> §4.5

<sup>865</sup> §6.2b

<sup>866</sup> §3.4b, §3.5b

<sup>867</sup> Compare §6.2a

<sup>868</sup> §6.2b (on a sin being the cause of the fall into a body).

<sup>869</sup> METHODIUS *de resurrectione*

<sup>870</sup> PAMPHILUS – EUSEBIUS *Ap.Orig.* 87

the general resurrection;<sup>871</sup> of saying the soul existed before the body;<sup>872</sup> and of teaching metempsychosis or transmigration<sup>873</sup>). Yet by the time of Epiphanius and Jerome, the accusations become more predominantly anthropological. Dechow argues that the underlying reason for many of Epiphanius's anthropological accusations is that he feels Origen is not sufficiently positive about the human body.<sup>874</sup> For example item (2) above assumes that the body is a negative, or at worst a punishment; (5) arises because Epiphanius rejects Origen's (supposed) notion of *apatheia*.<sup>875</sup>

To some degree, Hilary's commentary may demonstrate that Origen is far more nuanced than the likes of Methodius or Epiphanius give him credit for. For example, as mentioned one of Epiphanius's concerns when he rebuts Origen's resurrection theology is to reject *apatheia* (so Dechow).<sup>876</sup> Yet the analysis at §8.4a found that *apatheia* may not be quite as important in Origen's thoughts as it is sometimes held to be.

But at the same time, Hilary seems to reject many of Origen's doctrines. Given his extensive involvement in the trinitarian controversy it is not particularly surprising to find that Hilary would be cautious about trinitarian doctrines; yet Hilary is 'correcting' much of Origen's anthropology too. As it turns out Hilary has the same concern as later writers to emphasize the positivity of the body;<sup>877</sup> but in addition to the charges mentioned in Epiphanius, it may be that Hilary also modifies Origen on the will and the passions.<sup>878</sup> It may be that Hilary reached his objections to Origen independently, but his re-writes

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<sup>871</sup> PAMPHILUS – EUSEBIUS *Ap.Orig.* 127-149 (the resurrection) and 150-158 (the punishment of sinners)

<sup>872</sup> PAMPHILUS – EUSEBIUS *Ap.Orig.* 159-172

<sup>873</sup> PAMPHILUS – EUSEBIUS *Ap.Orig.* 173-188

<sup>874</sup> DECHOW 1987a:114

<sup>875</sup> So DECHOW 1987a:117-120 e.g. 118

<sup>876</sup> DECHOW 1987a:117-120 e.g. 118

<sup>877</sup> §3.5b, §3.6

<sup>878</sup> §8.4; although this is not certain and depends what one takes Origen himself as having believed.

closely match the accusations made by others (garments of skins, loss of image); so it is perfectly possible that Hilary already knew of these specific charges against Origen's work. Yet he writes around a decade before Epiphanius. He thus provides early Latin evidence of rejection of these Origenistic doctrines.

At the same time, Hilary's very use of Origen's psalms commentaries (and Job commentary)<sup>879</sup> demonstrates a degree of respect and esteem for the Alexandrian exegete. Further, since our knowledge of Origen's commentary is only fragmentary we cannot attribute him with the heresies mentioned by other fourth-century writers. For example even where Hilary vehemently rejects the interpretations of 'others', this does not mean Origen definitely wrote something 'heterodox' in his commentary; all we can be sure of is that Hilary himself found something that he felt was heterodox or had been warned to guard against.<sup>880</sup> So then, Jerome's frequent references to Hilary 'translating' Origen seem fair enough,<sup>881</sup> but his remark about Hilary's Psalms Commentaries is more revealing: *in quo opere imitatus Origenem, nonnulla de suo addidit.*<sup>882</sup>

It should be insisted that Hilary makes extensive use of Origen's exegesis. At the same time, however, he is still fully in command of what he writes (and indeed seems to show considerably more discernment than Ambrose). The frequency or expression of certain themes may go back to Origen, but Hilary has full ownership of his material. This is particularly evident when he deals with material he feels is heterodox.

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<sup>879</sup> JEROME *de viris illustribus* 100 (this commentary on Job is lost).

<sup>880</sup> For example see §3.3 (on Ps. 118.73); §6.2b (on passages which may suggest a fall of souls).

<sup>881</sup> §2.2

<sup>882</sup> JEROME *de viris illustribus* 100

10.3b) Origen and original sin

Modern commentators frequently point to the fact that Origen has apparently has two narratives of the Fall: the fall of *noes* from a supracelestial realm, and the traditional scriptural story of Adam and Eve.

Writing over a century ago, Tennant suggested that Origen was essentially the forebear of Augustine on original sin, inasmuch as Origen proposed a corporate sinfulness and general participation in the Fall (unlike other ‘Easterners’ who maintain individual responsibility). Yet Origen elsewhere insists on individual responsibility. Distinguishing the two narratives in Origen is therefore important in the current context because a fall of *noes* suggests individual sin and retribution, whereas the Adam story suggests some kind of corporate fall. Tennant resolves this problem by suggesting an ‘early’ (Alexandrian) phase characterized by individualism and no mystical unity; and a ‘late’ (Caesarean) phase characterized by frequent references to *sordes peccati*. He suggests that Origen first ‘discovered’ infant baptism on his arrival in Caesarea, and thenceforward rationalized the theology of intrinsic sinfulness.<sup>883</sup> For example, in *Hom.Lev.8.3* Origen speaks of the filth (*sordes*) which we contract at or through birth, and which is purged by baptism. Tennant notes Origen’s use of scripture to support this ‘inborn taint’,<sup>884</sup> and his distinction between *sordes* and *peccatum* when discussing the Virgin Mary and the Christ child.<sup>885</sup> This *sordes* is transmitted hereditarily. In all, Tennant suggests that Origen is substantially a precursor to Augustine; he does not, however, point to how Augustine may have encountered Origen’s doctrines.<sup>886</sup>

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<sup>883</sup> TENNANT 1903:296-300

<sup>884</sup> TENNANT 1903:300

<sup>885</sup> ORIGEN *Hom.Luc.* 14

<sup>886</sup> TENANNT 1903:302-3; 343-5

Beatrice points out that the idea of stain or sin at birth is widespread at this period: for Beatrice, Augustine's novelty is not in suggesting babies are stained, but that they are actually accountable for sinfulness. Still, there are plenty of passages in Origen that do point to the effect of Adam's sin being more than mere stain (see below).

Regarding the two Fall narratives in Origen, Tennant's theory of 'early' and 'late' phases is not generally accepted in modern scholarship, predominantly because of the difficulty of dating many of Origen's works and the circularity that this method can entail (dating some works as late because they refer to the *sordes*, but then pointing to these to show that *sordes peccati* is a late concept). More recently scholars reconcile the two narratives in different ways as belonging to different contexts. For example Alcain suggests that the 'platonic' fall-of-*noes* belongs to Origen's speculative work (particularly *de principiis*) whereas the Adam and Eve story belongs to scriptural commentary.<sup>887</sup> (This is belied if Origen's psalms commentary referred to the fall-of-*noes* as suggested by Epiphanius). Still, Alcain feels that the two worldviews are not quite compatible.<sup>888</sup> Bammel suggests that these two narratives are for Origen different facets of the same event,<sup>889</sup> not two falls but rather a simultaneous fall,<sup>890</sup> or two compatible explanations of how sin entered the world.<sup>891</sup> Harl on the other hand suggests that the narratives cannot be harmonized so easily.<sup>892</sup> She points to Origen's continual reminder that such things are an inaccessible mystery<sup>893</sup> and suggests that a solution may be to re-evaluate Origen's own

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<sup>887</sup> ALCAIN 1973:171

<sup>888</sup> ALCAIN 1973:172

<sup>889</sup> BAMMEL 1989:81 "The idea of a sinful tendency inherited from Adam is not intended by Origen to replace the concept of a previous fall of the individual soul, but is considered alongside it."

<sup>890</sup> BAMMEL 1989:68

<sup>891</sup> BAMMEL 1989:83

<sup>892</sup> HARL 1977:244-7

<sup>893</sup> HARL 1977:240-1

understanding of such things (for example she suggests that some accusations of a pre-existent ‘world’ of souls might actually stem from statements in Origen referring to God’s prescience).<sup>894</sup>

Regardless of how scholars seek to deal with Origen’s two narratives, all that matters here is that Origen certainly made statements that are in accord with Hilary’s (or Augustine’s) understanding of sin. Adam is a type for all humanity,<sup>895</sup> and Death entered because all sinned;<sup>896</sup> yet elsewhere Origen says that death entered through one sin in the singular (*per delictum morti regnum datur*).<sup>897</sup> Humanity is affected in Adam because of our seminal identity, hence sin entered through one man<sup>898</sup> and similarly ‘in Adam all die’ (1Cor. 15.22).<sup>899</sup> Through his seed Adam transmitted physical and moral death (*...habere in semetipsis similitudinem praevaricationis ejus, non solum ex semine sed ex institutione susceptam*).<sup>900</sup> On the related matter of the will, Origen is often held up as an example of complete human freedom. However, his works indicate plenty of examples of human constraint. For example there is the overpowering storm of the emotions;<sup>901</sup> the difficulty of controlling one’s own thoughts, especially when the devil can put ideas into our head;<sup>902</sup> and there is the very weakness of will which Origen sees as a consequence of

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<sup>894</sup> HARL 1977:251-2

<sup>895</sup> ORIGEN *c.Cels.* 4.40 (this concept is also found in Jewish writers such as Philo).

<sup>896</sup> ORIGEN *Comm.Ioh.* 20.39, 20.42: ...τῷ πάντας ἡμαρτηκέναι...

<sup>897</sup> ORIGEN *Comm.Rom.* 5.3

<sup>898</sup> ORIGEN *Comm.Rom.* 5.1, 5.2, 3.3; *Comm.Mt. ad Mt.* 1.18; *Comm.Ioh.* 20.21

<sup>899</sup> Various explanations for the statement that ‘in Adam all die’ are found at Origen’s discussion of Rom. 5.12 (*Comm.Rom.* 5.1, 5.4, 5.6; also *c.Cels.* 1.31).

<sup>900</sup> ORIGEN *Comm.Rom.* 5.1

<sup>901</sup> ALCAIN 1973:75-77 gives a list of references taken from the allegorical reading of Babylon.

<sup>902</sup> ORIGEN *de princ.* 3.2.4. See also §8.4

transgression.<sup>903</sup> Thus although Origen does not articulate the will as fallen, he certainly can point to plenty of examples of constraint on human action.

All in all, Origen does not articulate original sin in quite the same language as Augustine. However, Origen makes plenty of statements that are consistent with an evolution towards Augustine's thought on the effects of the Fall.

### 10.3c) Distinguishing Hilary from Origen

The aim here is to identify as precisely as possible what any Origenian influence might have been on Hilary's doctrine (especially on original sin), as opposed to what Hilary's independent position may have been. Given the differences in genre and emphasis across Hilary's work (§10.2b), it is difficult to draw firm conclusions; nevertheless a few observations may be made.

It has already been seen that Hilary's commentaries are, doctrinally speaking, his own, even if the exegesis derives in large part from Origen. Nevertheless, Origen's influence is certainly present inasmuch as some metaphors or scriptural references occur more often than Hilary would use in independent work. Even if a given metaphor is widespread among patristic authors, the *frequency* of that metaphor in Hilary may still be Origenian.

Some of these are particularly relevant to theological anthropology. For example, the idea of human constraint caused by the will or emotions is found to a lesser degree in Hilary's Matthew commentary but far more common in the Psalms commentaries. These are characteristic of Origen's thought; for example Origen makes a particular exegetical

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<sup>903</sup> ORIGEN *Comm. in Cant.* 4: ...ut ostenderet inesse unicuique animae vim possibilitatis et arbitrii libertatem, qua possit agere omne quod bonum est. Sed quia hoc naturae bonum praevaricationis occasione decerptum, vel ad ignominiam vel lasciviam fuerat inflexum... See §7.3b

point of associating Babylon with the confusion of the emotions. He often mentions that Babylon means ‘confusion’,<sup>904</sup> particularly confusion caused by vices: *Frequenter allegorizantes Babylonem diximus negotia esse terrena quae semper confusa sunt vitiis.*<sup>905</sup> Exile to Babylon means the soul is in confusion, but may be caused by our own sin.<sup>906</sup> All this matches closely with Hilary’s own understanding of Babylon, and is only found to a lesser degree in his other works.

Similarly, a certain theology of Adam appears to be found particularly in Hilary’s Psalms commentaries. In particular, the contrast between the old Adam and new (or earthly /heavenly man, old /new man) is relatively common in Origen’s works, and appears frequently in Hilary’s psalms commentaries (although it appears to a lesser degree in his other works).<sup>907</sup> Adam brought in sin and vice throughout Hilary’s work, but the emphasis that Adam’s action brought in death is also unique to the Psalms commentaries. Also the use of Paul to emphasize our sinful state is only found in Hilary’s Psalms commentaries.

Lastly, Hilary’s understanding of *cogitationes* as sometimes intrusive, unwanted and potentially leading to sin has been shown to be closely related to Origen’s understanding. Moreover, it was shown that this understanding is unique to his Psalms Commentaries.<sup>908</sup> Hilary appears to use language taken from Origen’s expressions of human action and psychology.

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<sup>904</sup> ORIGEN *Hom.Ezech.* 1.3, 12.2; *Hom.Jer.* 19.14

<sup>905</sup> ORIGEN *Hom.Jer.* 3.4

<sup>906</sup> For different aspects of this see ORIGEN *Hom.Ezech.* 1.3, 12.2; *Hom.Jer.* 2.1, 2.2, 3.4, 19.14 (also ALCAIN 1973:67-78)

<sup>907</sup> For example HILARY *TrPs*, 6.4, 122.3, 132.7, 143.21; *TrPs118*, 20.10. This is not common in *InMt* but see 10.4, also old-new allusions at for example 9.4, 10.24

<sup>908</sup> §8.4

Cochrane argued that the concept of human personality was essentially something new in Augustine.<sup>909</sup> For Cochrane this included how we come to know ourselves and the world around us<sup>910</sup> and the system of stimulus and response<sup>911</sup> as well as the existence of the will in the way described in this thesis.<sup>912</sup> Although Hilary is not as detailed or as analytical as Augustine, his work shows evidence of exactly these processes – and these particular elements appear to be the ones that he has gained from Origen.

In all then, some of the expressions related to original sin, as well as some elements of human psychology and action, appear to be attributable to Origen's influence.

Yet at the same time Hilary's theology of original sin is categorically his own, and this can be deduced from his statements in his *de trinitate* and other (early) trinitarian works. The concept that Adam's sin affects us all is not by itself particularly remarkable.<sup>913</sup> But the notion of Adam as representing humanity is already present,<sup>914</sup> even if it may be in the ancestral (rather than typological) sense. More significant still is the discussion of Christ's humanity 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' throughout *trin.* 10 presents a doctrine of inherited sinfulness (not just sinful stain) from which Christ himself is immune specifically by dint of having a different *origo*. Lastly the very vocabulary of *peccata originis* is found not only in the Psalms commentaries but even in the Matthew commentary:<sup>915</sup> showing that this is a concept he works with quite independently of Origen.

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<sup>909</sup> COCHRANE 1957, Chapter 11

<sup>910</sup> COCHRANE 1957:432

<sup>911</sup> COCHRANE 1957:433-4, 446

<sup>912</sup> COCHRANE 1957:402

<sup>913</sup> HILARY *trin.* 10.21: ut quia et corpus et anima Adae in peccato fuit, carnem quoque Adae atque animam Dominus ex Virgine acceperit.

<sup>914</sup> HILARY *trin.* 4.21: ...quia jam in uno Adam omne humani generis exordium constitisset.

<sup>915</sup> HILARY *InMt*, 10.24

Hilary also shows independence in what he chooses to use of Origen. While Hilary does derive a certain amount of material from Origen, he also rejects certain doctrines related to original sin and which seem to have been present in Origen's text. These include the *imago* being lost at the Fall, the concept of garments of skins being adopted at the Fall, and the concept of a Fall from a super-celestial realm. In other words, a doctrine of original sin does not necessarily have to be associated with a pre-mundane realm of souls; this is something Hilary categorically rejects. Similarly, Dechow's analysis of the pseudo-Macarian homilies demonstrates that fourth-century Origenists linked the loss of God's image at the Fall to original sin.<sup>916</sup> Again, the loss of the image is something that Hilary rejects. In other words, it is perfectly possible to hold a doctrine of original sin while rejecting the notions of a supracelestial fall or of the loss of the image.

So then, Hilary's theology of original sin belongs to him independently of any Origenian influence. At the same time, certain expressions such as the new-old Adam or the subjection to the law of sin and the emotions seem to be especially frequent in the Psalms commentaries and thus suggest Origen's influence. Although the theology itself may not be Origen's (Hilary's articulations are always his own), the frequency of some expressions and the understanding of human psychology seems to derive from Origen.

## **10.4 Augustine's Usage of Hilary**

### **10.4a) Augustine's usage of Hilary in anti-Pelagian works**

*De natura et gratia* (415 AD). One reason why Augustine mentions Hilary in his dispute with the Pelagians is that they themselves cite Hilary as an authority for their

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<sup>916</sup> DECHOW 1988:308-9

position. In *de natura et gratia*, Augustine responds to a work of Pelagius which defended the perfectibility of human nature.<sup>917</sup> Pelagius has quoted a number of catholic authors in support of his position (Lactantius, Hilary, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Xystus – a mis-citation – and Augustine himself). He appears to give two citations of Hilary.

Beatus vero Hilarius, cujus verba haec posuit, *Non enim nisi spiritu perfecti et immortalitate mutati, quod solis mundis corde dispositum est, hoc quod in Deo est immortale cernemus* (Hilary *InMt.* 4.7); quid dixerit contra id quod dicimus, vel quid istum adjuvet, nescio, nisi quia posse esse hominem mundo corde testatus est...

Item quod eum [Hilarius] dixisse commemorat [Pelagius]: *Quas [Job] litteras legerat ut abstineret se ab omni re maligna? Quia deum sola mente vitii non ammixta veneratur, deum colere proprium iustitiae officium est.* (From AUGUSTINE *de natura et gratia* 61.72)

Pelagius' intention in citing Hilary is to defend the possibility of human perfection. The use of Job is a commonplace in Pelagian literature, being one of the suite of Old Testament characters whose righteousness is asserted in Scripture and who thus testify to perfectibility.<sup>918</sup>

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<sup>917</sup> AUGUSTINE *Retr.* 2.42. Venit etiam tunc in manus meas quidam Pelagii liber, ubi hominis naturam contra Dei gratiam qua justificatur impius, et qua christiani sumus, quanta potuit argumentatione defendit. Librum ergo quo huic respondi, defendens gratiam, non contra naturam, sed per quam natura liberatur et regitur, *de Natura et Gratia* nuncupavi.

<sup>918</sup> FOLLIET 1969:153-6 presents evidence for Pelagian usage of 'perfect' Old Testament characters, as found within the texts of more 'orthodox' writers such as Augustine and Jerome.

Pelagius uses Job as an example of a man with no stirrings of sin; Augustine counters that Job did indeed have an ‘internal evil of concupiscence’, but conquered it.<sup>919</sup> Their understandings of righteousness are thus different: for Pelagius Job’s righteousness is the absence of concupiscence, whereas for Augustine it means conquering concupiscence with the help of grace. Augustine supports his reading of Hilary by immediately producing another citation from the Gallic bishop: “*If God were to despise sinners, He would despise indeed all men, because no man is without sin...*”<sup>920</sup> This reinforces Augustine’s point that sinlessness is not found (even if it does not quite go so far as to prove that sinlessness is impossible).

*Contra Julianum* (AD 421). In Augustine’s works against Julian of Eclanum, the focus is slightly different. Here Augustine writes at great length to defend the specific doctrine of original sin, in the sense of an inbuilt predisposition to sin present from the time of our conception. Again he cites a suite of church authorities on the subject from both the Latin and Greek worlds,<sup>921</sup> whose number and influence back up Augustine’s own authority. He cites a large number of texts from Hilary, with over 600 words of citations as well as his own commentary on Hilary’s text. In 1.9 Augustine gives two Hilary citations which he paraphrases on several occasions in the work;<sup>922</sup> he enters into a long discussion of Hilary citations at 2.26-29, quoting from Hilary’s Job commentary<sup>923</sup> and

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<sup>919</sup> AUGUSTINE *de natura et gratia* 61.72: Facere est ergo justitiam, in vero Dei cultu cum interno concupiscentiae malo interna conflictatione pugnare: perficere autem, omnino adversarium non habere.

<sup>920</sup> AUGUSTINE *de natura et gratia* 73: Et ipse Hilarius... ait: “*Si enim Deus peccatores sperneret, omnes utique sperneret; quia sine peccato nemo est. Sed spernit discedentes a se, quos apostatas vocant.*” Apart from the addition of the word ‘Deus’, this is a verbatim citation of Hilary *TrPs118*, 15.10.

<sup>921</sup> His ten key sources are Irenaeus, Reticus, Olympius, Hilary, Gregory Nazianzen, Ambrose, Basil, John of Constantinople, Innocent, and Jerome.

<sup>922</sup> Hilary’s phrase *ex peccato omnis caro est* is repeated at AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 1.32, 2.8; *c.sec.Jul.resp.* 4.97, 6.33. His phrase that we are born *sub peccati origine* is found also at *c.sec.Jul.resp.* 1.52, 1.70

<sup>923</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.27

from the psalms commentaries on Psalm 1,<sup>924</sup> Psalm 51,<sup>925</sup> and particularly Psalm 118.<sup>926</sup>

In all cases Augustine presents verses to show that Hilary also supported his position on sin. Three examples may be given.

[Hilarius episcopus Gallum] cum de Christi carne ageret, attende quid dixerit: “*Ergo cum missus est (inquit) in similitudine carnis peccati, non sicut carnem habuit, ita habuit et peccatum. Sed quia ex peccato omnis caro est, a peccato scilicet Adam parente deducta, in similitudine peccati carnis est missus, existente in eo non peccato sed peccati carnis similitudine.*” (AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 1.9)

This first example is used by Augustine to emphasise that (except for Christ) *ex peccato omnis caro est*, a point he also makes elsewhere using Hilary as a proof text.<sup>927</sup> Augustine denies that created flesh is bad (since it was created by God),<sup>928</sup> but our embodied condition leads to sin. Moreover, since flesh is handed down from Adam, sin is too.

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<sup>924</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.28 = HILARY *TrPs* 1.1

<sup>925</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.29 = HILARY *TrPs* 51.23

<sup>926</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.26 = HILARY *TrPs118*, 3.4: “*Quia lex (inquit [Hilarius]) umbra erat futurorum bonorum, idcirco per hanc praefiguratam significantiam docuit nos in hoc terreni et morticini corporis habitaculo mundos esse non posse, nisi per ablutionem coelestis misericordiae emundationem consequamur, post demutationem resurrectionis terreni corporis nostri effecta gloriosiore natura.*”

Or again, AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.26 = HILARY *TrPs118*, 15.6: *Rursus in eodem sermone: “Ipsis (inquit) Apostolis verbo licet jam fidei emundatis atque sanctificatis non deesse tamen malitiam, per conditionem communis nobis originis, docuit dicens, Si vos cum sitis mali, nostis bona data dare filiis vestris.”*

See also the excerpt below, *Rursus idem ipse in expositione...* (AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 1.9 = HILARY *TrPs118*, 22.6).

<sup>927</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.27, citing HILARY on Job: *illa ipsa corpora nostra omnium vitiorum esse materiem...* This fragment is discussed below, §10.5

<sup>928</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.28

Augustine cites Hilary's phrase *ex peccato omnis caro est* repeatedly as a key Hilarian catchphrase<sup>929</sup> – even though this short phrase never actually occurs in Hilary.

Rursus idem ipse [Hilarius] in expositione centesimi duodevigesimi psalmi... “*Vivere se (inquit) in hac vita non reputat; quippe qui dixerat,*

“*Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum...*” [Ps. 50.7], *scit sub peccati*

*origine et sub peccati lege esse se natum.*” [Hilary *TrPs* 118, 22.6].

Sentisne quid audias? Quaerisne quid dicas? Hunc virum tanta in episcopis catholicis laude praeclarum, tanta notitia famaue conspicuum, de peccato originali aude, si quid tibi frontis est, criminari.

(AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 1.9)

In this second example Augustine uses Hilary as evidence that we are born in sinfulness. Julian would have been happy to admit this, but Augustine continues with Hilary's assertion that the psalmist (and thus all humans) is ‘born under sin's origin and sin's law’. What is more, he uses Hilary's phrase to imply an existing terminology of original sin (*hunc virum... de peccato originali aude*).

In expositione autem primi Psalmi idem doctor [Hilarius] non dubitat dicere, naturam nostram, utique istam quae de morbo morbum trahit, ad peccandum ferri, ac sic ne peccemus, adversus eam nos quodam modo fidei religione pugnare. “*Plures enim sunt (inquit) qui cum per confessionem Dei ab impietate discreti sint, non tamen a peccato per id liberi sunt... Et ad haec quidem nos vitia naturae (inquit) nostrae*

<sup>929</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 1.9, 1.32, 2.8; *c.sec.Jul.resp.* 4.97, 6.33

*propellit instinctus... Et idcirco "Beatus est vir qui in via peccatorum non stetit": natura quidem in viam hanc ferente, sed ex via hac fidei religione referente."* [HILARY *TrPs.* 1.4].

Numquidnam istum putabimus accusatorem fuisse naturae, quam condidit Deus? Non utique! [...] *Ad haec, inquit, nos vitia naturae nostrae propellit instinctus.* Quae ista natura est? Numquid gons tenebrarum, quam Manichaeorum fabula inducit? Absit. Catholicus loquitur, insignis Ecclesiarum doctor loquitur, Hilarius loquitur.

Nostra ergo natura est primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata...; cui diabolus a nobis constitui calumniaris auctorem... (AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.28, abridged)

In this third example Augustine uses a passage from Hilary's commentary on Psalm 1 to support a doctrine of human nature's vitiation. If we wish to fight against sin we are to some degree fighting our nature (*sic ne peccemus, adversus eam nos pugnare*) and that this vitiation of nature occurred at the Fall (*primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata*). The Hilary passage he cites points out that we are not free from sin, and that our nature leads us in the way of sin (*natura in viam hanc eferente*) unless right religion corrects this predisposition.

These three examples have demonstrated three key arguments that Augustine wishes to support. He uses Hilary to defend his doctrine that sin is somehow handed down through the flesh (*ex peccato omnis caro*); that we are born under a law of sin (*sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege natum*); and that our nature is vitiated at the Fall (*natura primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata*).

*Contra secundam Juliani responsionem opus imperfectus* (AD 430). In the last year of his life Augustine started another work against Julian, but died before it was

finished. This takes excerpts from Julian and then refutes them one by one. Occasionally Augustine appeals to the authority of church writers before him, and Hilary of course is one of these.

He uses some of the same excerpts that he has quoted in his previous work. The whole citation including the words *sub peccati origine... natum* is quoted at *c.sec.Jul.resp.* 1.52 and referred to again at *c.sec.Jul.resp.* 1.70. Likewise the whole citation where Hilary asserts that *ex peccato omnis caro est* is found at 6.33, and the citation is absolutely identical to his use of it nine years earlier as reproduced above (this citation is also referred to at 4.97). Augustine also brings in a new citation of Hilary that he did not use in his earlier work: *omnes in uno Adam peccasse, Hilarius dixit*.<sup>930</sup> Unlike his previous work against Julian, however, Augustine does not provide a commentary on Hilary's text, but rather cites him in catenae where he combines Hilary with short catchphrases from other earlier Christian authors in order to provide authority to his assertions. Hilary is used to defend the doctrine of original sin (1.52) and in particular that we are born under sin (1.70) and that sinfulness is subsequent on us having bodies (4.97, 6.33).

In assessing which Hilarian texts Augustine has chosen to use, it seems that on the whole he has used the best citations possible if wishing to defend the doctrine of original sin, when considering Hilary's corpus as a whole. A few other good Hilary 'catchphrases' are discussed in Chapter 9 but on the whole Augustine seems to have picked out some of the best citations present in Hilary's work. Of course, one cannot be certain whether Augustine compiled these citations himself or used a florilegium compiled by someone else.

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<sup>930</sup> AUGUSTINE *c.sec.Jul.resp.* 2.164

10.4b) Augustine and Hilary: similarities and differences

The analysis carried out throughout this thesis has suggested that Hilary has a theological anthropology which is not so far removed from that displayed by Augustine (with some differences, to be discussed shortly).

For example Hilary refers to a doctrine of hereditary sinfulness, not just a hereditary stain but the actual sinful state with its culpability (§9.2, §9.3b). Hilary holds that the Fall caused a vitiation in human nature (§6.4b), *pace* Doignon. He asserts that our sinfulness is handed down from Adam (§5.3, §9.3b) and that our redemption is through baptism in the new Adam (§5.5-6, 9.5a). He relates our birth in sin to the fact that Christ, alone sinless, was alone the one with a different kind of birth. He even uses the vocabulary of our *origo* to express all this. Even if Hilary expresses himself differently elsewhere, these are all assertions found in his extant works. And they are all statements that Augustine would identify with. So then, there is considerable common ground between Augustine and Hilary on this doctrine. They even both share an inability to express how original sin can be passed through embodied birth if the body is not itself sinful but God's creation (§9.4b).

Augustine is often held to have been innovative regarding the will (so for example Cochrane, Dihle).<sup>931</sup> But even here the seeds of his thought appear in Hilary. Both authors see the will as an anthropological component which can be conceived of as separate to or influencing other human components; Hilary's description of the *libertas voluntatis* and its loss presages Augustine. Augustine's illustration of the will holding together anthropological components<sup>932</sup> recalls Hilary's anthropological household where the will

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<sup>931</sup> COCHRANE 1957 (Chapter 11), DIHLE 1982. Also S.HARRISON 2006:5 "It is often claimed that [Augustine] is the inventor (or discoverer) of the will..." Nevertheless related concepts are found in Cicero and Tertullian (references in SORABJI 2002:320-321), and we have seen Hilary's use of the phrase *libertas voluntatis*.

<sup>932</sup> AUGUSTINE *de trin.* 10

joins the body and soul together (Cochrane feels the will also joins body and soul in Augustine, although his examples are debatable).<sup>933</sup> Hilary also sees a link between the will and love.<sup>934</sup> Lastly, the will as anthropological component is definitive of the human person: both Hilary and Augustine feel that the will is what defines us as individuals (*quid sumus nisi voluntates?*)<sup>935</sup> and that different individuals may be expressed as having either good or bad wills.<sup>936</sup>

Yet at the same time both bishops see the will as a cause of sin, since the Fall brought about a vitiation of human nature, and that vitiation can be expressed as (inter alia) a vitiation of the will.<sup>937</sup> Moreover, for both bishops the adage holds that humans have to ‘live with the consequences of their actions’ at the Fall. For Hilary, the Fall consisted of Sin and Disobedience, and these are the two very elements which thus enter the human ‘household’ and cause the will’s difficulties. He mentions in two separate passages in *InMt* that the will is enslaved to *infidelitas* and cannot act on its own: *vitiosa infidelitas affectio, cui adjacet libertas voluntatis*.<sup>938</sup> Like-for-like punishment can be seen in Augustine where man’s proud self-sufficiency is punished by God abandoning man to himself, and man is punished for self-will by being given a disobedient will.<sup>939</sup> Another constraint on the will is that brought about by emotions or perturbations, and both bishops

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<sup>933</sup> Cochrane 1957:433-4 interprets Augustine’s discussion of vision (*trin.* 11.2f.) as *voluntas* binding together *anima* and *corpus*. Cochrane’s position is questionable; Augustine’s discussion of the process of vision cannot necessarily be taken as concerning *anima* and *corpus* in the anthropological sense.

<sup>934</sup> E.g. HILARY *TrPs118* 16.15: *dilectio vero propriae voluntatis affectio est*

<sup>935</sup> AUGUSTINE *civ. dei.* 5.9

<sup>936</sup> For Hilary see §7.4. For Augustine, see *c.Jul.*45 (37); *civ. dei.* 14.6. Compare also COCHRANE 1957:507 who discusses how Augustine uses *bona voluntas* to express not just emotion or intellect but the whole man (paraphrasing *lib. arb.* 1.13.27, *civ. dei.* 9.4, 9.5)

<sup>937</sup> AUGUSTINE *civ. dei.* 14.15; *c.Jul.* 3.(17).33 *depravatam quippe primi transgressoris voluntate naturam*

<sup>938</sup> HILARY *InMt*, 7.6; compare 10.23-4

<sup>939</sup> AUGUSTINE *civ. dei.* 14.15

see these too having entered in as a result of the Fall.<sup>940</sup>

Also, both bishops may express psychological conflict in terms of having two wills. One way of reading Hilary's anthropological household (*InMt.* 10.23-4) is that the body and soul each have their own will; elsewhere he differentiates the "soul's intention and the will's office".<sup>941</sup> These are echoed in Augustine's famous quandary in his *Confessions*<sup>942</sup> which he articulates as a clash of two wills reflecting the Pauline law of the spirit and law of the flesh in Romans 7.

In all then, there are considerable similarities between Hilary and Augustine, both on original sin and on the will – not least the frequency with which both use the will as an explanatory concept.

At the same time, of course, there are notable differences between these two authors. One noticeable one is the issue of the *initium fidei*: Hilary asserts the usual position that ultimately humans are responsible for the *exordium* but God thereafter contributes to his grace. This allows human accountability. Augustine's (mature) position, on the other hand, is that even the first flicker of faith is impossible without God's help: this opens him up to criticism on the issue of accountability. It is specifically the *initium fidei* which scholars pick up on when comparing Augustine and Hilary: for example it is specifically this which makes Padovese call Hilary slightly semi-Pelagian, even though Hilary is so similar to Augustine on other points.<sup>943</sup>

Another possible difference (depending on one's scholarly position) regards the origin of the soul. O'Connell and Teske<sup>944</sup> suggest that Augustine's early position on

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<sup>940</sup> §6.4b on Hilary. AUGUSTINE *civ. dei* 14.10

<sup>941</sup> HILARY *TrPs118*, 17.1

<sup>942</sup> For example AUGUSTINE *confessiones* 8.(5).10

<sup>943</sup> PADOVESE 1991:31

<sup>944</sup> For example O'CONNELL 1968, TESKE 1991

cosmology and human origins was strongly influenced by Plotinus, including speculation on the prior life of souls in a supracelestial plane. Along a similar vein, Keech suggests that the opponents of original sin resisted it because it was seen as Origenistic (again, with a prior life in a supracelestial plane). For example Keech demonstrates this in the case of the anti-origenistic *Liber de fide*:<sup>945</sup> “[In] Rufinus the Syrian’s *Liber* [...] the doctrine of inherited Original Sin is criticized as the corollary of Origen’s teaching on the fall of souls from a premundane state.”<sup>946</sup> Even though Augustine rejects the view that the body is punishment for pre-mundane sin,<sup>947</sup> nevertheless he also rejects Creationism since the soul must be responsible for sin before birth.<sup>948</sup> All this can be interpreted as making original sin a doctrine related to Origenism. Now Hilary also holds to the existence of sinfulness from birth (§9.4); however he categorically rejects the notion of the fall of souls into bodies, even if he does believe in the souls being created ‘long before’ the body (§6.2b). Hence a doctrine of original sin does *not* presume or require an origenistic cosmology on human origins. (In fact it is debatable whether Augustine actually believed in a prior life of souls in this way; Tesselle is one example of a scholar who holds the opposite view).<sup>949</sup>

Other differences between the two authors are more a matter of degree. For example, *concupiscentia* is a key explanatory variable in Augustine’s understanding of original sin. Hilary does consider *concupiscentia* but for him it is merely one of a number of elements of the human psyche that cause sin. Likewise the concept of grace is certainly present in Hilary but not to the same degree to which it was developed by Augustine. And

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<sup>945</sup> KEECH 2012:59-62. Keech presents passages from the *liber de fide* which associate Origenism with original sin, e.g. *liber de fide* 32 denies a connection between the Fall and the subsequent entry of death.

<sup>946</sup> KEECH 2012:20

<sup>947</sup> AUGUSTINE *de peccatorum meritis et remissione* 1.31.22

<sup>948</sup> AUGUSTINE *Ep.* 166.21.7: huius igitur damnationis in paruulos causam requiro, quia neque animarum, si nouae fiunt singulis singulae, uideo esse ullum in illa aetate peccatum; nec a deo damnari aliquam credo, quam uidet nullum habere peccatum.

<sup>949</sup> For example TESELLE 1996

a key part of the Augustinian debate – namely whether infants need to be baptized to avoid damnation – cannot be properly assessed in Hilary since he does not raise the issue (although hints suggest he may have had the same approach as Cyprian).

Lastly, a more methodological point of difference between Augustine and Hilary is that of context. Augustine writes on theological anthropology at great length in a polemic context, in order to defend himself against detractors; modern scholars can thus analyse very fine nuances in his position. Hilary on the other hand never discourses explicitly on the will or original sin; his position has been gleaned from passing comments and his articulation is not always clear. Therefore one should be cautious of comparing Augustine and Hilary on a doctrine which Hilary has never treated directly, while Augustine has dealt with it explicitly at great length. For example, Augustine's uses of *concupiscentia* and grace may have evolved specifically in response to the criticisms of Pelagian thinkers.

So much for the differences between Augustine and Hilary. However, this has compared Hilary with Augustine's 'late' position as expressed in his anti-Pelagian works. Yet both of these bishops and particularly Augustine show variation in their expression across their works. In particular Augustine too shows considerable variation in his expressions of the will, according to context (for example, greater freedom when arguing against the Manicheans or the source of evil; far less freedom when arguing against the Pelagians). Some scholars (usually epitomized as Brown, although Brown's thesis calls on earlier scholars such as Pincherle and Burnaby)<sup>950</sup> argue that there is an 'early' phase in Augustine's thought in which he shows an entirely free will; Augustine's position thus changed through time, supposedly triggered by his reading of Paul and sharpened by debate with Pelagian opponents. However, recent authors such as Carol Harrison see more

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<sup>950</sup> BROWN 2000:139-150 (Chapter 15 'The Lost Future'). For example, p.149: "We met him at Cassiciacum as a man certain of his future... In the Confessions he is a man who has lost this certain future." Or again, p.139: "In this decade, Augustine moved imperceptibly into a new world." See p.139, fn.1 for references to other scholars.

continuity of Augustine's doctrine throughout his lifetime, mentioning particularly the will and original sin.<sup>951</sup> Simon Harrison's analysis of Augustine's *de libero arbitrio*<sup>952</sup> also sees continuity between the first book (written 388) and the latter two books (written by 395) and thus a continuity in Augustine's theology of the will. The truth may be somewhere between these poles. Augustine's earlier interpretation of Romans 7 suggested it was not about Paul himself but some hypothetical individual; later against the Pelagians he admits he changed his mind.<sup>953</sup> Likewise *de libero arbitrio* may be read as suggesting a freedom for the will.

However, such variation is also found in Hilary, as for example when he appears to suggest both freedom and constraint in the will in different points in his works. But this if anything merely reinforces the similarities between the two authors: if Hilary were to be compared with the early Augustine, then arguably even more points of convergence would be identifiable.

#### 10.4c) Is Augustine misusing Hilary?

There is scholarly debate as to how far Augustine is misquoting Hilary and his other sources, merely in order to back up his argument against Julian. Beatrice insists that Augustine's theology is unique among orthodox writers,<sup>954</sup> and is different from the sources that he quotes supposedly in his defence. For Beatrice, earlier authors speak of universal sin and the stain of sin, but none before Augustine defend infant sin or general culpability. If Augustine cites earlier fathers on this doctrine, he is doing so only by taking

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<sup>951</sup> C.HARRISON (2006); relevant here are Chapter 6 'The Fall' (p.167-197) and Chapter 7 'The Will' (p.198-237).

<sup>952</sup> S.HARRISON (2006)

<sup>953</sup> AUGUSTINE *Retractiones* 23.1

<sup>954</sup> e.g. BEATRICE 2013:85

them out of their context. (For Beatrice, Augustine derives his theology through the encratist heresy in North Africa).

Doignon also thinks that Augustine is misusing Hilary. For example, regarding Hilary's phrase *scit sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege esse se natum*, Doignon argues that Hilary meant this merely in a judicial sense whereas Augustine takes it to defend the vitiated nature.<sup>955</sup> As another example of Augustine's 'glissement', Doignon points to his use of Hilary's phrase *post demutationem resurrectionis terreni corporis nostri effecta gloriosa natura*.<sup>956</sup> For Doignon, Hilary is referring to a change in the human condition, not in human nature ("...Hilaire avait fait l'émergence d'une nature – c'est-à-dire d'une condition – plus glorieuse"), yet Augustine uses this citation to defend the doctrine of changes in human nature, here becoming more glorious.<sup>957</sup> In conclusion Doignon declares himself sceptical as to how Augustine has used Hilary: "Nous ne saurions [avoir] optimisme. Il nous est apparu en effet que la 'réception' d'Hilaire... chez Augustin s'effectuait par morceaux découpés d'avance et adaptés à l'usage qu'on en voulait faire. Augustin... les retaille, les retouche, les interprète comme il croit devoir le faire."<sup>958</sup> However, we cannot blame Augustine too much (adds Doignon graciously) because he may not have worked with Hilary's original texts but with compilations of fragments.<sup>959</sup> (Doignon uses additional evidence to defend this same position in another article regarding a fragment from Hilary's Job Commentary, discussed below §10.5).

Folliet (1969) holds almost the converse position to Doignon. He compares how Pelagius and Augustine use a fragment from Hilary's Job commentary, in order to assess

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<sup>955</sup> DOIGNON 1981b:17

<sup>956</sup> AUGUSTINE *c. Jul.* 2.26, citing HILARY *TrPs 118*, 3.4

<sup>957</sup> DOIGNON 1981b:17-18

<sup>958</sup> DOIGNON 1981b:18

<sup>959</sup> DOIGNON 1981b:18-19

which has understood Hilary more correctly: *Quas Iob litteras legerat, ut abstineret se ab omni re maligna?*<sup>960</sup> Pelagius uses the fragment in order to justify human perfectibility, something that Job was often taken to demonstrate. By assessing his theology elsewhere, Folliet deduces that Hilary holds that no-one can truly be sinless except by God's grace. Therefore, Augustine has more accurately understood Hilary's sentiment than Pelagius has. Folliet thus dovetails with the positions of Ladaria and Peñamaría (§9.6), who both feel that, despite some differences, Hilary and Augustine are on the same 'horizonte mental'<sup>961</sup> regarding the doctrine of original sin.

So then, is Augustine fair in quoting Hilary as holding the same doctrine as him – or is he being disingenuous and taking Hilary out of context, as Doignon suggests? Well, a few of Augustine's citations are misleading: for example the excerpt from Hilary's *TrPs*, I cited above probably speaks of some individuals being more 'naturally' perverse than others, whereas Augustine takes it to defend the ubiquitous vitiation of humanity. But on the whole, the analysis of these has shown that Hilary is not too far removed from Augustine's positions on the will and on original sin. Although there are of course differences, Hilary shows that Augustine is not radically innovative but is merely developing trains of thought that already exist within the patristic tradition. This is essentially the position taken in different ways by Folliet, Padovese and Ladaria (against Doignon).

Augustine scholars such as Beatrice assume that the bishop of Hippo is disingenuous in those he cites against Pelagius. Yet Ambrose also distinguishes hereditary sin from individual sin, even if in a fairly garbled way, when he suggests that foot-washing

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<sup>960</sup> For references and fuller citation, see first excerpt of §10.4a

<sup>961</sup> LADARIA 1977b:244

is needed to cleanse us from our *haereditaria peccata*.<sup>962</sup> Augustine is thus *not* being disingenuous in attributing some sort of original sin to Ambrose (however minimally Ambrose held it). This section has shown that the same is true for Hilary: Augustine is not being disingenuous in stating that Hilary too holds this doctrine, even if not entirely in the form held by Augustine. So when Augustine says his doctrine is found in earlier church fathers, he is not lying: *non ego finxi originale peccatum, quod catholica fides credit antiquius, sed tu qui hoc negas sine dubio es novus hereticus!*<sup>963</sup>

#### 10.4d) Hilary between Origen and Augustine?

A sizeable body of modern scholars have identified ways in which Augustine may be considered to be influenced by Origenistic ideas (including O'Connell, Teske, Heidl, Bammel, Keech). For example, the view that Augustine's theology was affected by supracelestial cosmology has already been mentioned; although Teske and O'Connell prefer to see this as neo-platonic, both mention the possible relevance of Origen (see above, §10.4b). Heidl suggests that Augustine's conversion was triggered by reading Origen's commentary on the Song of Songs.<sup>964</sup> All in all, the idea that Augustine is Origen's successor is not new; even in 1903 F.R. Tennant was suggesting that Origen was essentially the forebear of Augustinian original sin.<sup>965</sup> All this needs dissecting, because another commonplace in common appraisals of Origen and Augustine is that they represent opposite poles on the related matter of the will's freedom (so Frede, Sorabji).

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<sup>962</sup> AMBROSE *de mysteriis* 32: Mundus erat Petrus, sed plantam lavare debebat; habebat enim primi hominis de successione peccatum: quando eum supplantavit serpens, et persuasit errorem [Gen. 3.6]. Ideo plantae jus abluitur, ut haereditaria peccata tollantur; nostra enim propria per baptismum relaxantur.

<sup>963</sup> AUGUSTINE *de nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1.12.25

<sup>964</sup> HEIDL 2003, Ch.1

<sup>965</sup> TENNANT 1903:344

It is one thing to note Origenian influence, and another to identify specific trajectories whereby Augustine may have received Origenian ideas. Heidl suggests that neo-platonic Christians in Milan may have brought Augustine in contact with Origenian mysticism and exegesis, so that for example Simplicianus may have given Augustine the books of Origen to read.<sup>966</sup> A lesser (and more likely) version of this is to assume that Augustine's Origenism was mediated through Ambrose.<sup>967</sup> Keech suggests that Augustine must have accessed through Origen through Rufinus of Aquileia, and therefore argues for an earlier date for Rufinus's translation in order to show that Augustine's work is influenced at an early date (assuming here that Rufinus of Aquileia is distinct from Rufinus the Syrian).<sup>968</sup> Yet Augustine gradually seems to come to disapprove of Origen; in an early letter (395) he tells Jerome to translate more of Origen,<sup>969</sup> but subsequent references are more negative.<sup>970</sup>

The current thesis has shown that Hilary may be one route through which Augustine accessed Origen's theology, even if through Hilary's lens. Doignon (1981a) examines a fragment which Augustine quotes from Hilary's Job commentary, which in turn is a translation from Origen's Job commentary.

*“Memores igitur (inquit [Hilarius]) et conscii, illa ipsa corpora nostra  
omnium vitiorum esse materiem, per quam [or: pro qua] polluti et  
sordidi nihil in nobis mundum, nihil innocens obtinemus, gaudeamus*

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<sup>966</sup> HEIDL 2003, Ch.3

<sup>967</sup> JEROME Ep. 75.20. For a modern scholar see for example HEIDL 2003:15-16, suggesting that Augustine may have heard Ambrose's *de Isaac* and *de bono mortis* which are in turn influenced by Origen's *Song of Songs*

<sup>968</sup> KEECH 2013:130-4

<sup>969</sup> AUGUSTINE Ep. 28.2 to Jerome

<sup>970</sup> For example Augustine strongly denounces Origen at *de gestis Pelagii* 10

*nobis esse hostem, in cujus concertatione quodam concertationis nostrae bello dimicemus.*" (AUGUSTINE *c.Jul.* 2.27, citing Hilary on Job)

Doignon compares this fragment with what is known of Origen's and Hilary's theology elsewhere. He suggests that the phrase *corpora nostra omnium vitiorum materiem* reflects a negative understanding of the body for Origen, but only a neutral understanding for Hilary, who sees the body as being a locus for sin but not a source of it. He uses evidence such as the textual variant *pro qua* (instead of *per quam*), which suggests that the body is neutral and not active in sinfulness.<sup>971</sup>

Doignon seems a little coy in denying the force of the passage: it certainly seems to imply a negative view of the body in Hilary, even if we accept the variant *materies pro qua*. But he is correct that Hilary is more tempered in his view of the body elsewhere, and it seems fair to assume that Hilary's wording is down to its Origenian source.

Still, whether or not Doignon is right about Hilary's intention, the fact remains that this text is used by Augustine and ultimately derives from Origen. And Doignon's argument essentially suggests that Augustine's understanding of the text is true to Origen's intention (even if not Hilary's) in taking the body as negative.

Further, this derivation from Origen appears to hold for other Hilary quotes. Augustine cites one passage from Hilary's *de trinitate* and one from *in Matthaicum*; apart from that, *all* of his anti-pelagian citations of Hilary come from the commentaries on Job or on the Psalms. And yet both of these are known to be translations from Origen.

Then again, this is not to say that Augustine's theology of original sin definitively comes from Origen (or Hilary). Augustine may not have read Hilary in the 380s; rather, he himself argues against Julian that these were ideas already present in Christianity and

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<sup>971</sup> DOIGNON 1981a:211-2

that he had received through Christian teachers. Hilary's work shows that he may be telling the truth.

### **10.5 Closing Remarks**

The idea that original sin is an African doctrine is found for example in the collection of lectures on original sin by Norman Williams, and more recently by Beatrice.<sup>972</sup> Hilary shows that this doctrine is not purely African. Williams himself admits that in Hilary "the doctrine leaves Africa",<sup>973</sup> and Hilary is a notable exception to the rule that original sin is purely an African doctrine. However, Williams does not go so far as to explain why a supposedly African doctrine is found in a writer who never set foot in Africa to the best of our knowledge, although his travels would have allowed him to cover a wide range of other places in the Empire (from Gaul to Asia Minor, incorporating Rome, Milan and Constantinople on the way). Moreover Hilary does not feel the need to explain or justify his concept of *peccata originis*; he assumes his readers will both understand him and agree with him. Hilary is not just an outlier on original sin, an negligible exception to the rule of an African doctrine. Hilary does not share all of Augustine's doctrines, but the key concept of original sin is undoubtedly present in his work. It is thus simply not accurate to describe original sin as a purely African doctrine.

F.R. Tennant's tome on original sin felt that Hilary contributes nothing and merely hands on tradition.<sup>974</sup> This study of his anthropology shows Hilary as a thinker in his own right, with a theology of original sin and of the will that is novel for its time. Moreover, he

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<sup>972</sup> WILLIAMS (1927); BEATRICE 2013:237

<sup>973</sup> WILLIAMS 1927:298

<sup>974</sup> TENNANT 1903:338

held this independently of Origen. However, he also uses and interprets Origen on psychology and this may well have influenced both his own and Augustine's articulations of the will.

This analysis has also cast light on two different angles of the development of theological anthropology towards Augustine. Firstly, the bishop of Hippo is not himself as novel as is sometimes thought; he indeed belongs in a tradition that holds to hereditary sinfulness and constrained will, even if no father before him identified the extent of the theological tensions this caused. Secondly, this study has highlighted one of the many routes by which Augustine would have been influenced by Origen's theology and exegetical methods. Over a century ago Tennant saw Origen as Augustine's forebear on the theology of original sin.<sup>975</sup> This study has shown that Hilary is one of the links between those two great theologians in the development of that doctrine.

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<sup>975</sup> TENNANT 1903:344

## Appendix

### Third strophe of Ps118 (*gimel*), v17-24: Comparison of Origen, Hilary and Ambrose

Sections which correspond approximately are placed in the same row or adjacent to each other. Correspondence in wording is underlined (except in the case of the lemma).

Further explanation of this table may be found at §2.4.

This table is not to be read through; rather matches across columns and underlined sections may be compared visually. The sections from Ambrose in 6pt font (2,597 words) are not included in the final wordcount; they are included only to provide a visual indication of how much non-matching material is found in Ambrose.

	<i>Origen (Palestinian Catena)</i>	<i>Hilary</i>	<i>Ambrose</i>
V17a/ row1	<i>Ἀνταπόδος τῷ δούλω σου.</i>		1. Tertia littera secundum Hebraeos ‘Gimel’, quae Latine ‘retributio’ dicitur. Denique primo statim versu hoc ostendimus.  2. <i>Retribue, inquit, servo tuo.</i>
V17a/ row2	Ἡμεῖς, <u>οἱ μὴ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ καὶ μὴ μετελιφότες συνείδησιν παρρησίαν ἔχειν πρὸς θεὸν δυναμένην,</u>  <u>εὐχόμενοι οὐκ ἐροῦμεν</u> <i>ἀνταπόδος τῷ δούλω σου.</i>  Εἰ γὰρ ἀνταποδώσει, κολάσει ἡμᾶς κατὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν.	1. <u>Quibus non est constans emundati cordis conscientia,</u>  ... <u>precari ista Prophetae voce non possunt</u> (vers. 17): <i>Retribue servo tuo.</i>  Si enim digna secundum opera nostra retributio aderit, in peccatorum ac delictorum nostrorum poenis manebimus.	
V17a/ row3	Λέγει γοῦν ὁ ἡμῖν παραπλησίως ἐλεηθεὶς ὑπὸ θεοῦ: <u>οὐ κατὰ τὰς ἀνομίας ἡμῶν ἐποίησεν ἡμῖν, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἀνταπέδωκεν ἡμῖν</u> (Ps. 102.10).	Satis est autem, si cui vel haec saltem fiducia gratulandi ad Dominum fuerit: <u>Non secundum peccata nostra fecit nobis, neque secundum injustitias nostras reddidit nobis: quia secundum altitudinem coeli a terra longavit iniquitates nostras a nobis; quia ipse cognovit figurationem nostram</u> (Ps. 102.10-11).	Quomodo supra ipse David ait: <u>Non secundum peccata nostra reddas nobis neque secundum iniquitates nostras restituas nobis</u> (Ps. 102.10), et hic poscit retributionem?
V17a/ row4	Ὁ δὲ <u>παρρησίαν ἔχων πρὸς τὸν θεόν, πεποιθὼς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ συνειδήσει</u> , φησὶν: <i>ἀνταπόδος τῷ δούλω σου</i>	Magnum est tantam in se Dei misericordiam recognoscere, et scire consuetudinem criminum procul a se abesse, et dignum	Illa videtur vox peccatoris esse, haec <u>bene sibi consci</u> , qui praemia boni operis exproscat.

	τῷ μηδὲν ἄξιον κολάσεως πεποικέναι.	Dei misericordia se esse coepisse. Propheta autem hic, in cuius scilicet corpore habitatio Dei digna est, quia sancto Spiritu plenus non communia nec terrena cogitat et effatur, <u>libertatis ejus est</u> , ut oret, <i>Retribuere servo tuo.</i>	
V17a/ row5			<p>Unde possumus etiam hoc intellegere, quod eius persona psalmus iste formetur, qui natus ex virgine pro totius mundi redemptione ad dexteram patris sedere praesumat, sicut ipse ait: <i>Amodo videbitis filium hominis sedentem ad dexteram virtutis</i> (Mt. 26.64).</p> <p>3. Non est tamen alienum adrogans, si David remunerationem a domino deo suo pro egregiis laboribus postulet; praerogativa est fidei atque iustitiae de domini favore mercedem usurpare.</p> <p>Denique reprehenditur Petrus (Mt. 14.31), quia super fluctus ambulans humano magis dubitavit affectu quam apostolica auctoritate praesumpsit. In evangelio quoque docemur habere fidem (Lk 17.6) et non haesitare de his quae supra hominem sunt gerendis. Merito ergo David in superioribus, quasi adhuc imperfectus, secundum peccata sibi reddi refugit atque declinat. In hoc autem psalmo, qui est posterior (Ps. 102.10), quasi fundatus virtutis processu retribuere sibi secundum fidei operisque certamina deprecatur, siquidem etiam Paulus, qui ante dixerat: <i>Non sum dignus vocari apostolus</i> (1Cor 15.9), postea ait: <i>Reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet mihi dominus in illa die, iustus iudex, non solum autem mihi, sed et his qui diligunt adventum eius</i> (2Tim 4.8). Et apostolus sibi pollicetur, hic autem verecundius adhuc precatur, quod utique non insolentis adrogantiae, sed innocentis est conscientiae, ab ipso cui servieris petere mercedem, quam desperare segnitiae materia, sperare autem incentivum laboris est.</p> <p>4. Pete igitur confidenter, si merita suffragantur, ut talia petendo studiosius labores, quo ea petitione sis dignior. Quis athleta, si desperet coronam, descendat in stadium aut, si eam postulet victor, offendet? Probatio spem facit, spes confidentiam. Iusti ergo talis oratio est; delectatur dominus tali precatione, ut pro puritate conscientiae utaris auctoritate.</p>
V17a/ row6	<p>Ἴνα δὲ μὴ δόξη ὁ λόγος εἶναι ἀλαζονικός, ἔχει τι ἀσφαλές·</p> <p>οὐ γὰρ εἶπεν ἀνταπόδος μοι, ἀλλ' ἀνταπόδος τῷ δοῦλω σου, εἴ τίς ἐστι δοῦλος σός καὶ δουλεύει σοι.</p>	<p>2. Sed forte <u>insolentis istud audaciae est</u>, sine aliqua confessionis modestia meritum retributionis optasse, nec se in corpore situm, id est, in vili atque in humili sorte esse meminisse. Excluit autem Propheta omnem de se vanitatis ac jactantiae opinionem.</p> <p>Nam cum dixisset <i>Retribuere ex fiducia innocentiae; servo tuo ex servitutis officio et ex conditionis suae confessione subjecit.</i></p> <p>Constanter igitur haec postulat, qui se <u>Dei servum, non peccati</u> esse meminit: quia omnis qui peccat, servus est peccati (Jn. 8.34).</p>	<p>5. Tamen, quo minus videatur petitio <u>adrogans</u>,</p> <p>...bene addidit: <i>Servo tuo</i> (1Cor 7.22), in quo et humilitatis est gratia et praemium servitutis, <i>Qui enim vocatus est in dominus servus, libertus est domini</i>, quare non praesumat favorem domini, tam pretioso emptus sanguine? <i>Magnum tibi est vocari puerum meum</i> quasi ad servum dicitur.</p> <p>Si quis ergo est servus et <u>bene servit domino et nihil facit quasi servus peccati</u>, sed qui dicit, <i>Servus inutilis sum, quod debui facere feci</i>, bene is dicit, <i>Retribuere servo tuo.</i></p>
V17a/ row7			<p>6. Gloriosa servitus, qua pro nobis servivit et Christus. Beata servitus, qua et tu servis, sed ita, si nihil possit adversarius de tuo sibi servitio vindicare. Amat ergo Christus boni libertatem servuli; denique in Canticis dicit: <i>Quam speciosae factae sunt genae tuae sicut turturis, cervix tua sicut redimicula</i> (Cant 1.9)! Vultus liberior est, ubi est castitatis conscientia, et portare Christi iugum suave est, si ornamenta putes cervicis tuae esse, non onera. Adtolle ergo oculos semper ad dominum deum tuum et quaere deum, ut invenias. Erige cervicem; redimicula, non vincula geris. Muta quoque animalia redimiculis gaudent et falerari sibi magis quam nodari videntur. Genae sicut turturis praeferant insignia verecundiae, redimicula cervicis libertatis attollant fiduciam; leve est enim iugum Christi et ideo cervix eo non premitur, sed levatur.</p>

			<p>7. <i>Similitudines</i>, inquit, <i>auri faciemus tibi et distinctionibus argenti, quoad usque rex in declinatione sua</i> (Cant 1.10). Ex his enim, qui ex lege sunt et prophetis, mediocriter ante crederant gloriam domini Iesu, sed hereditas eius diffusa per populos quo frequentius examinata, hoc amplius est probata; crebrae enim persecutiones ecclesiae iustorum nobis titulos martyrii victoriis ediderunt. Itaque sicut aurum bonum, ita ecclesia, cum uritur, detrimenta non sentit, sed magis fulgor eius augetur, donec Christus veniat in regnum suum et reclinet caput suum in ecclesiae fide. Qui cum venisset ad oves perditas domus Israel, non habebant ubi caput suum reclinare; nunc autem iam redolet fides ideoque dicit ecclesia: <i>Nardum meum dedit odorem suum</i> (Cant 1.11) et dicit cum praesumptione, expectans retributionem.</p> <p>8. Fragrat unguentum gratiae, ex quo virgo generavit et dominus Iesus sacramentum incarnationis adsumpsit. <i>Colligatio</i>, inquit, <i>guttae conso brinus meus, botyro Cypri frater meus mihi, inter media ubera mea requiescit</i> (Cant 1.12). Corpus enim suscipiens dominus Iesus caritatis se vinculis inligavit et non solum se membris nostris et passionibus naturalibus, sed etiam cruci vinxit ideoque sicut botyro in ecclesiae fide et morali requiescit gratia. <i>Nardum Cypri consobrinus meus, in vineis Engaddi</i> (Cant 1.13). Si locum quaerimus, regionis cuiusdam est, in qua opobalsamum gignitur; si interpretationem, Engaddi 'temptatio' Latine significatur. In illis ergo vineis lignum est, quod, si quis compungat, unguentum emittit; hic fructus est ligni. Si non indicatur lignum, non ita fragrat et redolet, cum autem compunctum fuerit artificis manu, tunc lacrimam destillat; sicut et Christus in illo temptationis ligno crucifixus inlacrimabat populum, ut peccata nostra dilueret, et de visceribus misericordiae suae fundebat unguentum dicens: <i>Pater, dimitte illis, quia nesciunt quid faciunt</i> (Lk 23.34). Tunc ergo in ligno compunctus est lancea et exivit de eo sanguis et aqua omni unguento suavior, accepta deo hostia, per totum mundum odorem sanctificationis effundens, et quasi balsamum ex arbore, sic virtus exibat e corpore. Unde ait: <i>Sentio virtutem exisse de me</i> (Lk 8.46). Inde opobalsamum expressio dicitur, eo compunctione ligni balsamum per cavernam punctiois erumpit. Compunctus igitur Iesus odorem remissionis peccatorum et redemptionis effudit (Lk 23.11). Nam et constrictus erat, verbum cum esset, homo factus, et pauper factus est, cum dives esset, ut nos illius inopia ditaremur, potens erat, et desciendum se praebebat, ita ut Herodes spermeret eum et inluderet ei, terram movebat, et haerebat in ligno, caelum obducebat tenebris, mundum crucifigebat et crucifixus erat, inclinabat caput, et exibat verbum, exinanitus erat, et replebat omnia, descendit deus, ascendit homo, verbum caro factum est, ut caro sibi verbi solium in dei dextera vindicaret, vulnus erat, et fluebat unguentum, scarabeus audiebatur, et deus agnoscebatur.</p> <p>9. Respondit et Christus: <i>Ecce es bona, proxima mea, ecce es bona</i> (Cant 1.14). Quoniam cognoverat ecclesia mysterium et pro totius mundi redemptione crucifixum dominum Iesum praedicabat, meretur audire: "<i>Ecce es bona</i>. Quae me bonum dicis, et ipsa bona es et, quia vidisti gloriae meae decorem, et ipsa speciosa es et decora." Quid est autem Christum dicere "bona es" vel "decora es" nisi illud evangelicum: <i>Constans esto, filia, remissa sunt tibi peccata tua</i> (Mt 9.22)?</p>
V17b / row1	Τί δὲ τούτῳ ἀκολουθεῖ, ἐπιφέρειν Ζήσομαι καὶ φυλάξω τοὺς λόγους σου.	3. <i>Vivam</i> , inquit, <i>et observabo sermones tuos</i> .	10. Ergo, cui Christus peccata donavit, recte dicit: <i>Retribue servo tuo; vivam et custodiam verba tua</i> .
V17b / row2			Non habet in retributione quod desperet, quia dominus Iesus mundum venit salvare, non perdere, ideoque inmemor est iniuriae, memor gratiae, sicut in prophetico libro testificatur ipse dicens: <i>Ego sum ego sum, qui deleo iniquitates tuas, et memor non ero. Tu autem memor esto et iudicemur; dic iniquitates tuas, ut iustificeris</i> (Isa. 43.25-26). Quicumque ergo dicit iniquitates suas deo, iustificatur, et quicumque iustificatur, retributionem non timet, sed exposcit, qui retributionem non timet, vivet.
V17b / row3	Τὸ δὲ Ζήσομαι εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον ἐκκλίνει τὸ ζῆν  οὐκ οἶομαι γὰρ εἰ ἤδη ὁ ζῶν λέγει τὸ Ζήσομαι, ἀλλὰ μήποτε ἀναφέρει τὸ Ζήσομαι ἐπὶ ζωῆν	<i>Vivam</i> atque <i>observabo</i> non praesentis temporis res est; sed significatio sermonis huius in futurum se tempus extendit.  Scit enim Propheta quando beata illa et <u>vera viventium vita</u> sit.	11. Sed quare dixit: <i>Vivam</i> , et non dixit vivo?

	<u>ἀληθινήν.</u>	Nunc enim et in <u>pulvere mortis</u> manemus, <u>et in mortis corpore sumus, a quo se liberari</u> <u>Apostolus orat</u> , dicens: <i>Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit a corpore mortis hujus</i> (Rom. 7.24)? Habemus autem etiam nunc admixtam nobis materiam, quae mortis legi et peccati obnoxia est; et in hujus caducae carnis infirmisque domicilio corruptionis labem ex ejus consortio mutuamur: ac nisi glorificato in naturam spiritus corpore, vitae verae in nobis non potest esse natura.	Quia haec vita non est loco praemii, quae in loco mortis est. Dolet propheta in <u>pulverem mortis</u> se esse deductum (Ps 21.16), <u>apostolus cupit ex hoc mortis corpore liberari</u> (Rom 7.24): et putamus quod de hac vita sibi blandiatur propheta?  Omnia hic plena mortis sunt; intrat mors per fenestram, intrat per os tuum, nisi dominis ori tuo ponat custodiam; denique ex multiloquio peccatum nascitur.
V17b / row4	Ἄκουε γὰρ Παύλου λέγοντος περὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων αὐτῷ ὅτι: <u>ἡ ζωὴ ἡμῶν κέκρυπται σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ ἐν τῷ θεῷ. Ὅτε ὁ Χριστὸς φανερωθῆ, ἡ ζωὴ ἡμῶν, τότε καὶ ὑμεῖς σὺν αὐτῷ φανερωθήσεσθε ἐν δόξῃ</u> (Col. 3.3-4).	Audiamus eum, qui se meminit in corpore mortis habitare dicentem: <u>Quia vita nostra absconsa est cum Christo in Deo. Cum autem Christus apparuerit vita nostra, tunc et vos apparebitis cum ipso in gloria</u> (Col. 3.3-4).	
V17b / row5		Hanc ergo retributionem sibi Propheta orat, ut vivat: futurae hujus vitae tempus in loco altero docens, quo ait: <u>Et placebo Domino in regione viventium</u> (Ps. 114.9). Scit hanc mundi istius sedem regionem non esse viventium. Scit nos adhuc secundum praefigurationem legis emundandos esse.	[compare v17b/row13]
V17b / row6		Nunc enim admiscemur morticinae: et in <u>lege quisquis mortuum contrectat, immundus est</u> (Num. 19.11). 4. Sed absit istud, ut quidquam horum in lege corporaliter intelligatur, tamquam per contrectationem mortui quisquam fiat immundus. Joseph ossa egrediens Aegyptum Moyses ipse lator legis abstulit (Exod. 13.19), Eliseus mortuo ut eum vivificaret incubuit (4Reg. 4.34):	Lege <u>mandata Legis</u> , et invenies scriptum: <u>Quia vivens si mortuum contigerit, inquinatur</u> (Num. 19.11). Quantos tangimus mortuos? Inter quantos mortuos versamur? Ideo tibi Auctor vitae dicit: Relinque mortuos sepelire mortuos suos (Mt. 8.22). Ideo tibi alibi dicitur: Surge qui dormis, et exsurge a mortuis (Eph. 5.14). Quomodo tibi diceretur: Surge a mortuis, nisi inter mortuos viveres? Ponamus te mundum esse ab operibus mortuis, et peccati colluvione; quomodo mundus es, qui in corpore mortis es, qui inter sepulcra vivis mortuorum? Oportebat Petrum loqui mortuis; ut procederent de sepulcris suis.
V17b / row7		Dominus ipse [= " <u>Nazareus</u> "?] mortuos manu apprehensos in vitam retraxit (Mt. 9.25): et contrectatio mortui si immundum effectura fuisset,	12. Indigemus ergo purgatione, quia tetigimus mortuos (Num. 19.1). Lex nos mundari jubet: quis tantus, ut supra Legem sit? <u>Ipsam nazareum</u> sanctum dei, si is tetigerit mortuum, immundum pronuntiat (Num 6.9). Ideoque radit caput suum et

		<p>nequaquam a tantis viris, neque a Domino violata lex esset, ipso dicente: <i>Non veni legem solvere, sed adimplere</i> (Mt. 5.17).</p> <p>Sed quia lex umbra est futurorum bonorum; idcirco per hanc praeformatam significantiam docuit nos in hoc terreni et morticini corporis habitaculo <u>mundos esse non posse</u>, nisi per ablutionem coelestis misericordiae emundationem consequamur, post demutationem resurrectionis, terreni corporis nostri effecta gloriosiore natura.</p>	<p>deponit capillum quasi non sanctum et iterum orat ut exaudiatur, qui ante propter mortui adtactum exorare non potuit. Inrationabiles duxit dies, quia inrationabili adpropinquaverat; deponit igitur mortua et superflua capitis sui, ut Christo reconcilietur. Ergo si nazareus purificatur, et nos purificari oportet.</p> <p>13. Omnes contigimus mortuum, <i>Quis enim gloriabitur castum se habere cor? Aut quis audebit dicere mundum se a peccatis?</i> Sit aliquis fortasse qui in sermone non deliquerit, licet rarus iste, de quo deus dicat sicut de sancto Iob: <i>Ille non peccavit labiis suis</i> (Job 22.10), tamen <u>non semper habere potuit mundas cordis sui cogitationes</u>; inicit se diabolus in cor hominis. Pone parata semper et pervigili custodia quisquam cor suum saepserit; tamen in medio peccatorum versatur, necesse habet etiam ipse purificari; unde Esaias cum dixisset: <i>O miser ego, quoniam immunda labia habeo et in medio populi versor immunda labia habentis</i> (Isa. 6.5 et 7), statim descendit unum de Seraphim et contigit labia eius carbone, ut immunda eius labia mundaret.</p>
V17b / row8		<p>5. Et forte si quis existimet sibi in Sacramento baptismi perfectam illam innocentiae, et coelesti vita dignam redditam puritatem; Joannem Baptistam dixisse recolat, <i>Ego quidem baptizo vos in aqua poenitentiae; qui autem post me venit, fortior me est</i> (Mt. 3.11): <i>ipse vos baptizabit Spiritu sancto, et igni</i>: ipsum autem Dominum baptizatum a Johanne (Mt. 3.13) cum adhuc esset in corpore meminerit locutum, <i>Adhuc habeo alio baptismo baptizari</i> (Lk. 12.10).</p> <p>Est ergo, quantum licet existimare, perfectae illius emundatio <u>puritatis</u> etiam post baptismi <u>aquas</u> reposita: quae nos sancti Spiritus sanctificet adventu, quae iudicii <u>igni</u> nos decoquat, quae per mortis injuriam a labe morticinae et societate <u>purgabit</u>, quae martyrii passione devota ac fideli sanguine <u>abluet</u>.</p>	<p>14. Non unum est baptisma. Unum est quod hic tradit ecclesia per aquam et spiritum sanctum, quo necesse est baptizari catechumenos. Est et aliud baptisma, de quo dicit dominus Iesus: <i>Baptisma habeo baptizari quod vos nescitis</i> (Lk 12.10). Et utique iam baptizatus in Iordane fuerit, sicut superiora declarant (Mt 3.13); sed sit hoc baptismum passionis, quo etiam sanguine suo unusquisque mundatur.</p> <p>Est baptismum etiam in paradisi vestibulo, quod ante non erat. Sed posteaquam peccator exclusus est, coepit esse romphaea ignea quam posuit Deus (Gen 3.24), quae ante non erat, quando peccatum non erat. Culpa coepit et baptismum coepit, quo <u>purificentur</u> qui in paradysum redire cupiebant, ut regressi dicerent: <i>Transivimus per ignem et aquam</i> (Ps. 65.12); hic per <u>aquam</u>, illic per <u>ignem</u>, per aquam, ut <u>abluantur</u> peccata, per ignem, ut <u>exurantur</u>. Sed, quod est gravius, et hic ignem et illic sustinemus.</p>

V17b / row9			<p>15. Quis est qui in hoc igne baptizat? Non presbyter, non episcopus, non Iohannes, qui ait: <i>Ego vos baptizo in paenitentiam</i> (Mt 3.11), non angelus, non archangelus, non dominationes, non potestates, sed ille de quo Iohannes ait: <i>Qui venit post me fortior me est, cuius non sum dignus calciamenta portare; ipse vos baptizabit in spiritu sancto et igni; habet ventilabrum in manu sua et permundabit aream suam et congregabit triticum in horreum suum, paleas autem comburet igni inextinguibili</i> (Mt 3.11-12).</p> <p>Non de hoc baptisate, quod fit per sacerdotes ecclesiae, dictum ipse dominus testificatur (Mt 13.49-50), siquidem post consummationem saeculi missis angelis, qui segregent bonos et malos, hoc futurum est baptisma, quando per caminum ignis iniquitas exuretur, ut in regno dei fulgeant iusti sicut sol ipse in regno patris sui. Et si aliquis sanctus ut Petrus sit, ut Iohannes, baptizatur hoc igni. Veniet ergo baptista magnus – sic enim eum nomino, quomodo nominavit Gabriel dicens (Lk 1.15): <i>Hic erit magnus</i> –, videbit multos ante paradisi stantes vestibulum, movebit romphaeam versatilem, dicit his qui a dextris sunt non habentibus gravia peccata: Intrate qui praesumitis, qui ignem non timetis. Praedixeram etiam vobis: <i>Ecce venio sicut ignis</i> (Isa. 66.15), et per Ezechiel dixeram: <i>Ecce profiscar in Hierusalem et insufflabo in vos in igne irae meae, ut tabescatis a plumbo et ferro</i> (Ezek. 22.20).</p> <p>16. Veniat ergo ignis consumens, qui exurat in nobis plumbum iniquitatis, ferrum peccati faciatque nos aurum sincerum. Urat renes meos et cor meum, ut bona cogitem, ea quae castitatis sunt concupiscam. Sed quia hic purgatus iterum necesse habet illic purificari, illic quoque nos purificet, quando dicit dominus: “Intrat in requiem meam,” ut unusquisque nostrum ustus romphaea illa flamma, non exustus, introgressus in illam paradisi amoenitatem gratias agat domino suo dicens: <i>Induxisti nos in refrigerium</i> (Ps 65.12). Qui ergo per ignem transierit, intrat in requiem, transit a materialibus atque mundanis ad illa incorruptibilia atque perpetua.</p> <p>17. Alius ignis iste est, quo exuruntur peccata non voluntaria, sed fortuita, quem paravit servulis suis dominus Iesus, ut eos ab ista commoratione, quae permixta est mortuis, emundet; alius ille ignis, quem deputavit diabolo et angelis eius, de quo dicit: <i>Intrate in ignem aeternum</i> (Mt 25.41), quo ille dives ardebat, qui stillari sibi de Lazari digito poscebat umorem. At vero Lazarus in Abrahae sinu recumbens (Lk 16.24) vitam carpebat aeternam, quam sibi promittit propheta dicens: <i>Vivam et custodiam verba tua</i>. “Vivam” ait quasi nondum vivens; hic enim in umbra vivimus.</p>
V17b / row1 0		<p>6. Et idcirco sanctus Propheta victurum se dicit esse cum vivat, per hanc scilicet <u>umbram vitae</u> ad veram illam <u>regionem viventium</u> transferendum. Secundum quod exemplum, ut dixit <i>vivam</i>; ita et (Subaud. dicit) <i>custodiam sermones tuos</i>.</p>	<p>18. Ergo ista vita in corpore <u>umbra est vitae</u> atque imago, non veritas; denique in imagine ambulat homo et in regione umbrae mortis consistimus. Sed si quis non ad terrena oculos mentis intendat, sed ad spiritualia erigat, ut possit dicere: <i>Spiritus ante faciem nostram Christus dominus</i>, dignus erit qui dicat: <i>In umbra eius vivimus</i> (Lam. 4.20), Christus enim vita est et ideo, qui in umbra Christi vivit, in umbra vitae est, meritoque alibi dicit sanctus domini: <i>In umbra alarum tuarum protege me</i> (Ps. 16.8).</p>
V17b / row1 1	<p>Ὡσπερ δὲ τὸ ζῆσομαι ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰ μέλλοντα κατὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτω μοι νόει καὶ τὸ φυλάξω τοὺς λόγους σου ἀμετατρέπτως, οὐ δι’ ἐσόπτρου οὐδὲ δι’ αἰνίματος (1Cor 13.12).</p>	<p>Custodiuntur interim secundum apostolum Paulum <u>pro parte et per speculum</u> (1Cor. 13.9 et 12). Sunt enim multa saeculi scandala, quae prohibent perfectam in nobis mandatorum esse custodiam. Taceo de naturis corporum, quae nos interim aut per infirmitatem, aut per incentiva vitiorum imperfectos esse compellunt. At</p>	<p>Omnes ergo etiam sancti in umbra sunt, quamdiu sunt in corpore; <u>non perfecte vident, non perfecte, sed ex parte cognoscunt</u>. Ipse Paulus ait: <u>Ex parte enim cognoscimus</u> (1Cor 13.9), ipse vas electionis, cui Christus oculos reddidit et sua inluminavit gratia, <u>non facie ad faciem, sed per speculum videbat</u>, et David revelari oculos suos petit [inf. vers.18], ut removeretur umbra, quae integrum oculorum inpediebat obtutum.</p>

		vero morte victa, et aculeo ejus obtuso, et cum <u>facie ad faciem audiemus atque cernemus</u> ; tunc vere et vivemus, et mandata Dei servabimus.	
V17b / row1 2		[compare v17b/row5]	<p>Regionem autem hanc mortuorum esse quis dubitet, cum sanctus ipse dicat: <u>Placebo domino in regione vivorum</u> (Ps 114.9), quia perfecte hic placere nemo potest, ubi, etiamsi fieri possit ut sua peccata non habeat, in ipsa tamen mortuorum regione vivendo purificatione indiget, quae a contagio eum regionis huius absoluat?</p> <p>19. In umbra igitur hic vivimus et ideo in umbra custodimus verba dei. Et ut exempla utamur, utique ante eramus sub umbra legis, quando custodiebamus neomenias et sabbata quae sunt umbra futurorum, sicut hodieque Iudaei, qui verum sabbatum non vident, qui exemplari et umbrae serviunt. Nos quoque secundum evangelium nunc viventes umbram sequimur verborum dei. Nathanael sub arbore ficu videtur (Jn 1.48), David in umbra alarum domini Iesu sperare se dicit (Ps. 16.8), Zachaeus in arborem sycamori ascendit, ut Christum videret (Lk 19.4). Nobis quoque expandit manus suas Iesus, ut totum mundum obumbraret. Quomodo non sumus in umbra, qui crucis eius protegimur velamento? Quomodo non sumus in umbra, quos crucifixus a malignitate saeculi et corporis ardore defendit? An nescimus, quoniam verbum dei veniens in hunc mundum non sicut verbum advenit, quale erat in principio, quale erat apud deum, sed semet ipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens? Venit in nube levi et, cum esset virtus altissimi, obumbravit Mariae, ut transfiguraret corpus humilitatis nostrae conforme fieri corpori gloriae suae. Sicut ille ergo formam mutavit, cum ex virgine nasceretur, ita et nobis sermones dei transfigurati videntur, cum leguntur in evangelio, cum species eorum videtur in scripturis quasi per speculum, quia tota veritas hic non potest comprehendi. Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, non iam per descensionem, non per speculum, ut transfigurati, sed integra atque expressa veritate resplendant.</p> <p>20. Neque te moveat, quod ait: "Multa verba custodiam," quia, cum unum verbum cognoverit, multa verba cognoscit. In uno multa sunt et in multis unum est. Probandum est igitur, quomodo unum verbum multa sint et multa verba unum verbum sit. Nec difficile doceri, cum dixerit apostolus, quia <i>ipse est imago dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae, in quo creata sunt omnia caelestibus et in terra, sive visibilia sive invisibilia, sive sedes sive dominationes sive principatus sive potestates; omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt</i> (Col. 1.15-16). Unum est igitur verbum quod operatur in singulis, et cum in singulis operatur, operatur omnia et in omnibus. Hoc verbum unicum apud patrem se diffudit in plurima, quia de plenitudine eius omnes accipimus. Itaque si videas singula omnium, quae creata sunt in ipso, videbis in singulis unum verbum esse omnium, cuius pro capto nostro participes sumus. In me verbum est humanum, sed Apostolus succurrat et dicat: <i>Puto et ego spiritum Dei habeo</i> (1Cor 7.10); in alio verbum caeleste, et verbum angelorum in plerisque est. Sunt qui habent verbum Dominationum et Potestatum, verbum iustitiae, verbum castitatis, verbum prudentiae, verbum pietatis, verbum etiam virtutis. Sic unum verbum multa sunt et multa verba unum sunt. Nec vero arduum est istud aestimari, cum legerimus quia omnia potest Spiritus sapientiae.</p> <p>21. Itaque sicut alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae et alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum, alii fides in eodem spiritu, alii gratia curationum in uno spiritu, alii operatio virtutum, alii spiritus cognitionis, alii spiritus consilii plenioris, alii spiritus fortitudinis, alii pietatis spiritus, et in omnibus unus atque idem spiritus est, dividens singulis prout vult. Est spiritus prophetarum, est spiritus apostolorum, est etiam artificum spiritus, sicut et Beselehel et Eliab, quos implevit dominus spiritu divino sapientiae et scientiae et omnis artis, ut facerent amictum et tabernaculum atque altare secundum sensum, quem dedit his Deus (Exod. 35.30 et seq.), sed etiam ceteris sapientibus intelligere et facere omnia opera secundum omnia, quae dominus imperabat. Itaque fecerunt quae non didicerant nec viderant secundum ea, quae his spiritus demonstrabat. Et plerisque videtur alius apostolorum spiritus, alius prophetarum, et diversus in singulis; sed non est diversus, sed unus est spiritus, dividens genera diversa virtutum. Unde non dubium videri debet, si aliis verbum apostolicum, aliis propheticum, aliis angelicum, aliis verbum operatorium datum est, et unum est verbum dividens se singulis pro nostra possibilitate vel pro sua voluntaria largitate. Hoc verbum igitur, quod est caput omnium, hic per speculum video et ideo verba dei hic custodire non possum; sed cum videro gloriam eius revelata facie, tunc vivam et vita vivens etiam verba divina custodiam.</p>
V18a / row1	Ἀποκάλυψον τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς μου καὶ	7. Ordo intelligentiae, qui primo versu continetur, hic idem in	22. Ideo ergo secundo verso dicit: <i>Adaperi oculos meos, et considerabo mirabilia de</i>

	κατανοήσω τὰ θαυμάσια ἐκ τοῦ νόμου σου.	consequentibus est. Ait enim (vers. 18): <i>Revela oculos meos, et considerabo mirabilia de lege tua.</i>	<i>lege tua.</i>
V18a/ row2	<u>Δ</u> ισθάνεται ὁ προφήτης ὅτι ἐπικεκαλυμμένοι αὐτοῦ ἦσαν οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· οἰοεὶ γὰρ <u>κ</u> άκωσις γέγονεν ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ <u>β</u> λάβη...	Scit mortalibus oculis atque corporeis <u>nubem obscuritatis</u> obsistere.	Qui adaperiri sibi oculos petit, utique et <u>gravari</u> intellegit; neque enim medicum rogat nisi qui remedium <u>aegritudini</u> suae poscit. Dicit ergo iste ad medicum venientem de caelo: <i>Adaperi oculos meos.</i> Si turbatus est oculus, facile dolor omnis sedatur collyrio; sin vero acies eius tumoris suffusione praetexitur, maiora remedia quaeruntur. Est ergo, sicut in oculis corporis, ita etiam in oculis animae huiusmodi quaedam passio quae ingravescat necesse est, nisi bonus medicus velamen illud abstulerit et <u>nebulam quandam</u> concreti humoris, quae impedire vel potius operire, ne videat quae videbat, mentis aestimatur obtutum.
V18a/ row3	...ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιότητος τῆς κατὰ τὸν <u>παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον</u> (Col 3.9, Eph 4.22, Rom 6.6)·		Inrepsit aegritudo veteri fermento, eo quod non exuimus ad ecclesiam, non audivimus dicentem boni medici disciplinam: <i>Expoliantes veterem hominem cum actibus eius, induite novum qui renovatur in agnitione secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum</i> (Col. 3.9-10).  Supervestivit ergo se aliquis, non expoliavit: serpit gravior aegritudo, gravat oculos diuturnum velamen, non potest quisquam illud auferre, non Angelus, non Virtutes, non Dominationes, non Potestates. Manet velamen illud, lectionem impedit, visionem obducit: quod non revelatur, inquit apostolus (2Cor 3.14) – hoc est: a quocumque alio –, nisi in Christo fuerit evacuatum. Cum vero conversus huiusmodi fuerit ad Dominum, auferetur velamen.
V18a/ row4	καὶ εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ μόνος ταύτην <u>ιάσασθαι</u> <u>δυνάμενος</u> ,  ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ·  <u>ἐξ</u> ἀπέστειλε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὸν <u>λόγον</u> αὐτοῦ καὶ <u>ίασατο</u> αὐτοὺς καὶ <u>ἐρρυσάτο</u> αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν <u>διαφορῶν</u> αὐτῶν (Ps. 106.20).		23. Habes igitur quomodo auferas velamen, quod manet supra oculos cordis tui; convertere ad dominum, et velamen cadet. Conversus est Paulus ad benedictionem Ananiae; velut squamae ceciderunt ab oculis eius et vidit, qui per triduum ante non viderat (Act. 9.18); simul oculus corporis animaeque sanatur, quia medicamentum ei <u>medicus</u> demonstraverat ille de caelo,  de quo scriptum est: <u>Misit verbum suum et sanavit eos et ex omnibus infirmitatibus suis liberavit eos</u> (Ps. 106.20).

	Ἔρχεται οὖν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀποκαλύπτει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς περιαιρῶν τὸ κάλυμμα· ἡνίκα γὰρ ἐπιστρέψῃ τις πρὸς Κύριον, περιαιρεῖται τὸ κάλυμμα (2Cor 3.16; Exod. 34.34).		Non est medicus iste de terris, qui omnes curat infirmitates, et populos integros sanat. Mitte ergo, Pater, medicum istum, <u>veniat verbum tuum</u> , aperiat oculos meos.
V18a/ row5			Et apostolorum oculi clausi erant, nisi eos Iesus aperuisset. Denique duobus ex his euntibus in castellum, cui nomen Emmaus, cum interpretaretur scripturas et benediceret eos, <u>aperti sunt</u> , inquit, <u>oculi eorum et cognoverunt eum</u> (Lk 24.31). Ergo nisi Iesus aperuisset nobis oculos, nemo vidisset; nisi Iesus sustulisset velamen, nulli evangelii gratia refulsisset. Et Petrus clausos habebat oculos et Iohannes clausos habebat et Iacobus clausos habebat. Denique in monte gravati erant somno, sed excitati maiestatis fulgore divinae oculos cordis sui aperuerunt. Et quia siti in corpore plene videre non poterant, obumbravit eos nubes (Mt. 27.5), ne corporis oculos gloriae caelestis fulgor hebetaret.
v18b/ row1			24. Quis igitur tantus, ut <u>aperiat oculos et legis videat sacramenta</u> , nisi ei Christus demonstret?  Non Moyses tantus. Denique, iubente domino, virgam proiecit et facta est serpens et fugit ab ea; adprehendit caudam serpentis et facta est virga (Exod. 4.3-4); et adhuc non cognoscebat mysterium, quo declarabatur descensurum in terras dominum Iesum, qui cum se exinanisset, deponi in crucem et proici pateretur in tumulum, de quo secundum oracula legis resurgens in gloriam dei divinaeque sedis regale consortium de serpente remearet. Adprehendamus ergo et nos caudam serpentis illius crucifixi, ut potestatem eius regiam possimus agnoscere. Et illa, quae in pedes eius misit unguentem, tenuit eum. Caudam ergo serpentis adprehendit Moyses et apertum est os eius. Non ergo locutus esset de eo, nisi ipse dominus os eius aperuisset.
V18b / row2	Ἦδει ὁ προφήτης ὅτι <u>σκιάν ἔχει ὁ νόμος τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν</u> (Heb 10.1)· καὶ ἐζήτει νοῆσαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ ὧν περιεῖχε σκιάν ὁ νόμος,	Scit ea quae corporaliter in lege praecepta sunt, <u>umbram esse et speculum futurorum</u> . Legem quidem legit: sed optat legis mirabilia contueri.	25. David adaperiri sibi oculos hic petit et in superioribus dixit: <u>Quis ostendit nobis bona</u> (Ps. 4.6)? Erat sub lege nutritus et sciebat, quia <u>lex umbram habet futurorum bonorum</u> (Heb. 10.1); <u>ipsa bona</u> non iam per umbram, sed apertis oculis videre cupiebat.  Noverat, quia exemplari et umbrae caelestium mysteriorum serviebant, qui secundum legem Moysi deserviebant. Volebat ipsam cultus divini comprehendere veritatem et ideo, ut ab oculis suis velamen discuteret, conversus ad dominum precabatur dicens: <u>Adaperi oculos meos, et considerabo mirabilia de lege tua</u> . Intellegebat vere militiam esse caelestem, quam posset unusquisque ex lege cognoscere, cui tamen dominus revelasset.

			<p>Quis enim de terrenis ad caelestia, de umbra ad claritatem, de exemplari ad penetralia veritatis humano gradu sine divino ductu possit ascendere?</p>
<p>V18b / row3</p>		<p>Meminit sancta esse sabbata: sed in <u>aeternorum sabbatorum requie</u> esse desiderat. Utitur quidem azymis panibus: sed fermentum ejicere naturae veteris festinat.</p> <p>Immolat paschae ovem: sed assistere ei qui per <u>Joannem</u> revelatur Agno concupiscit (Jn. 1.29).</p> <p><u>Septimi anni legi satisfacit: sed ipse exactis septem millibus, saeculi esse liber expostulat.</u> Jubilei quinquagesimi anni legem explet: sed pentecostes remissionem ac renovationem obtinere festinat.</p> <p>Scit ex praecepto Dei <u>secundum coeleste exemplar</u> et <u>altarium</u> a Moyse institutum, et Aaron sacerdotali habitu ornatuque vestitum: sed Principis (Christi) sacerdotum, in cujus exemplum haec fiebant, interesse ministeriis properat. Induci quoque in terram sanctam, terram fluentem lacte et melle, tamquam totius hujus orbis peregrinus orat.</p>	<p>26. <u>Quis potest considerare altare illud caeleste verumque templum</u>, sacerdotes et levitas, non istos secundum carnis officia, sed illos secundum spiritus gratiam? Denique hanc solam sibi gratiam pro maximis optabat David dicens: <i>Unam petii a domino, hanc requiram: ut inhabitem in domo domini omnes dies vitae meae et ut videam delectationem domini et considerem templum eius</i> (Ps. 26.4). Quis poterat cognoscere, quod offerret dives magnum munus, secundum quod potest manus eius, ut solvatur eius peccatum? Quis poterat intellegere, si non haberet quid offerre, verbi gratia arietem, quia non solvebatur eius peccatum? Quis poterat advertere, quae essent illae immunditiae, quas solvit non lex quam putant Iudaei, sed lex spiritalis quam Paulus agnovit? Quis poterat videre remissiones peccatorum veras, quarum exemplar in lege, veritas in evangelio est, dicente domino Iesus: <i>Dimissa sunt tibi peccata</i> (Lk 7.48), non per hircorum sanguinem, sed per hostiam sui corporis? Ille itaque dives in lege, qui perfectae maiestatis in Christo plenitudinem confitendo et quasi eam quibusdam ad illud altare caeleste fidei manibus offerendo peccatum suum solverit; ille videt verum sacerdotem, qui videt principem sacerdotum, ille templum verum considerat, qui audit dicentem: <i>Solvite templum hoc, et in triduo resuscitabo illud</i> (Jn 2.19). Magnum templum, de quo virtus exibat et curabat omnes, mirabile illud altare, in quo unius agni sacrificium tulit peccata mundi, ille praestantissimus levita, qui venit non ut ministerium exigeret, sed ut omnibus exhiberet suae ministerium passionis, cui portio deus, qui hic nihil possederit et omnia possideret.</p> <p>27. Quid autem dicam de Hebraeo, <u>quem lex sex tantummodo iubet servire annis et septimo anno exire servitio (Exod. 21.2)?</u> <u>Quis iste Hebraeus liber poterat intellegi?</u> Quis tantus, ut annos aeternos in mente habens videat verum Hebraeum, qui non in perpetuum manet servus, sed sex annis servili functus officio septimo anno gratiam libertatis adipiscitur? Cuius videtur Isaac patriarcha servitutis et libertatis non ignorasse mysterium, qui ait: <i>Servies fratri tuo. Et erit cum deposueris</i></p>

			<p><i>et solveris iugum eius a collo tuo</i> (Gen 27.40), significans fore tempus, quo etsi quis servierit hic positus fratri suo, postea tamen exactis annis, qui ex istis diebus atque istis quos hic exigimus mensibus colliguntur, solvat iugum a cervice sua, quod fit septimo anno remissionis.</p> <p>Conicere possumus veri Hebraei typum in Joseph, qui portavit servitutis iugum, sed eum culpa non cepit, non carcer inclusit, non Aegyptus coloravit. Conicimus in Petro <u>Iohanne</u> Iacobo, qui creati et instituti sub iugo legis solverunt tamen fratris sui Iudaicum iugum, ubi legitimae tempus quietis advenit, quando refulsit his remissio peccatorum.</p> <p>28. Et hoc tamen hic in umbra adhuc gestum comparatione caelestium; <u>quanta autem quies illa</u>, quae ex lege conicitur, in evangelio revelatur, dicente domino Iesu: <i>Volo ut ubi ego sum et isti sint mecum</i> (Jn 17.24)! Quam beatus, qui istius habitationis fructum quietis consortium illic potuerit promereri!</p> <p>Tunc intelletget, quid sit <i>aperuisse oculos, ut videret mirabilia de lege dei</i>.</p>
V18b / row4	<p>...καὶ μὴ ἰουδαϊκῶς, ἀλλὰ μεγαλοφώνως καὶ προφητικῶς εὐχόμενος παρεκάλει λέγων ἄποκάλυψον τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς μου καὶ κατανοήσω τὰ θαυμάσια ἐκ τοῦ νόμου σου,</p> <p>...ἵνα ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν Κυρίου κατοπτρίζεται,</p> <p>...τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμενος (2Cor 3.18), καὶ θεωρῶν τὰ θαυμάσια τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου αὐτοῦ.</p>	<p>Universa quidem ista Judaei corporaliter gerunt: sed haec Paulus aliter intelligit, dicens: <i>Scimus enim quia lex spiritalis est</i> (Rom. 7.14).</p> <p>Haec igitur legis mirabilia, quae velatis oculis adumbrantur, Propheta orat <u>ut cernat</u>:</p> <p>...scilicet ut caduco atque infirmo corpore absolutus, haec quae per corporalem observantiam legis magna et mirabilia in coelis praefigurantur, <u>adspiciat</u>.</p>	
V18b / row5			<p>29. Bene admonuit lectio evangelii quae decursa est, in qua sanatus est leprosus ille, qui dixit: <i>Si vis, potes me mundare</i> (Lk 5.12), in voluntate domini constituens potestatis effectum. Cui respondit similiter: <i>Volo, mundare</i> (Lk 5.13). Praemissa pietas voluntatis, secuta potestatis auctoritas est. Omnibus dicit Iesus "volo", qui non vult esse peccatum. Velle Christi commune in omnes est, mundari fidei est credentis in Christum. <i>Et tetigit eum</i>. Tangit eos, quorum fide tangitur. Denique dicit: <i>Tetigit me aliquis; sentio virtutem exisse de me</i> (Lk 7.46). Habes operationem immaculati corporis, habes remissionem divinitatis.</p> <p>30. Sed ut plenius sanaretur, aperuit oculos eius dicens: <i>Vade, ostende te sacerdoti</i> (Lk 5.14). Multos sacerdotes habebat synagoga; sed qui oculos aperit, falsos non videt sacerdotes, verum aspicit. Quis est verus sacerdos nisi ille, qui sacerdos est in aeternum? Et ideo pater dixit ad eum: <i>Tu es sacerdos in aeternum</i> (Ps. 109.4). Aperuit ergo oculos eius et vidit et intellexit, quale munus pro emundatione sua deberet offerre. Beatus qui audit haec: quanto beator qui videt, qui se vero potest</p>

			ostendere sacerdoti, ut non habeat quod timeat in se videri, qui se prius aspicit facie revelata! Nam nisi ipse se prius viderit, non audebit ostendere, sicut Adam, qui se occultare cupiebat, quia non agnoscebat. Sed iam etiam id quod sequitur consideremus.
V19a/ row1	Πάροικος ἐγὼ εἶμι ἐν τῇ γῆ, μὴ ἀποκρύψῃς ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς σου.	8. Non demutatur affectus orantis. Post haec enim ait, (vers. 19): <i>Accola ego sum in terra; ne abscondas a me mandata tua.</i>	31. <i>Advena ego sum in terra, ne abscondas a me mandata tua.</i>
V19a/ row2	Ὁ προσπεπονθὼς τῇ γῆ, ὁ φιλῶν τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ μὴ πιστεύσας ὅτι ἀναλύσας ἔσται σὺν Χριστῷ (Phil 1.23), οὗτος μὴ λεγέτω <i>πάροικος ἐγὼ εἶμι ἐν τῇ γῆ, ἀλλ' ἴστω ὅτι κατοικεῖ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς</i> : ...	Accola non juris sui terram incolit, sed alienam: neque peregrinus fructum ex ea temporariae operationis exspectat. Novit incolatus hujus Apostolus ordinem, dicens <u>peregrinandum a corpore et cum Christo manendum esse</u> (2Cor 5.8, cf. Phil 1.23). Propheta itaque quasdam imagines <u>coelestium conversationum</u> fide cernens, licet corpus incolat, tamen rem non suam incolit, oculis mentis in coelum erectis.	Non cuiuscumque vox ista est, sed eius qui terrenis renuntiaverit voluptatibus et omni se mundanae cupiditatis exuerit affectu. Ille est in hac terra advena, qui potest dicere: <i>Nostra autem conversatio in caelis est</i> (Phil 3.20), qui suam habet in domino portionem, qui potest dolere, quod diutius vivat in terris, qui vitae huius longaevitae lassatur, cui prolixitas habitationis huius fastidio sit, quam sanctus aversatur et dicit: <i>Vae his qui habitant in terra</i> (Rev 8.13), qui dissolui non timet et, <u>si solvatur, praesumit se cum Christo futurum</u> (cf. Phil 1.23).
V19a/ row3		Scit <u>in coelo thesauros collocandos</u> ; quia ubi thesaurus sit, illic et cor futurum sit (Mt. 6.21).	Hic vere peregrinus in terra est, qui sanctorum est civis et domesticus dei et <u>thesaurum sibi condit in caelo</u> .
V19a/ row4		Non erat illo sensu suae terrae accola,  qui in evangelica comparatione <u>horrea exruit capacia ingentium fructuum</u> ,  et animam suam per praesentium copiam ad delicias adhortatur;  stultus <u>anima ipsa eadem nocte privandus</u> (Lk. 12.18f.).	Non utique is exiens de Aegypto in hanc intellegibilem Aegyptum remeare desiderat nec depositae senectutis et mortis pavescit confinia,  nec <u>horrea struit messibus recondendis</u> , iam alienis victurus aetatibus,  sed sola dives virtutum fecunditate ea congregat,  quae sibi nec <u>mors</u> possit auferre.
V19b / row1	... ἀγίου οὖν φωνή· μὴ ἀποκρύψῃς ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς σου.	9. Ergo accolam se propheta confitens, orat ne mandata Dei a se occultantur.  Nemo enim nisi peregrinus corporis sui, cognitione mandatorum Dei dignus est.	
V19b / row2	Εἰ ἡ ἐντολὴ Κυρίου τηλαυγῆς φωτίζουσα ὀφθαλμούς (Ps 18.9b),  πῶς φησι ὁ προφήτης μὴ ἀποκρύψῃς ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὰς	Quod <u>mandatum Dei quod lucidum sit, et illuminans oculos</u> (Ps. 18.9);  absurde nunc videbitur dixisse, ne sibi mandata Dei occultantur,	

	<i>ἐντολάς σου;</i>	quae hoc naturae in se habent, ut et lucida sint, et illuminent.	
V19b / row3	<i>οὐχ αἱ ἐντολαὶ Κυρίου τηλαυγεῖς, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐντολὴ Κυρίου τηλαυγής,</i>	Sed negligentia aurium affert sensus difficultatem. <u>Illic enim mandatum</u> lucidum et illuminans est, <u>hic mandata</u> absconsa sunt.	
V19b / row4	<i>...ἐντολὴ ἢ κατὰ τὸν βίον τοῦτον</i>	Lucidum mandatum est, per quod ad contuendum lumen mandatorum illuminamur. Per mandatum quod in lege primum est, quo Deum ex tota anima et ex tota virtute amare praecipimur (Deut. 6.5), digni illuminatione cognitionis efficimur. Et sicut de gloria in gloriam transibimus; sic et in lumine videbimus lumen, sic et per speculum faciem ipsam aliquando cernemus. Per hoc enim nunc <u>corporalis vitae mandatum</u> , sacramento baptismi et praecepto Dei illuminamur, et lumine utimur, et in gloria manemus. Per hoc rursum ex mandato mandata cernemus, per hoc ex lumine lumen videbimus, per hoc ex gloria in gloriam transferemur.	
V19b / row5	<i>...ἢ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον ἐντολὴ καὶ τῶν ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεων, ἐπεὶ πᾶν λογικὸν κατ' ἐντολήν ζῆ, κεκρυμμένη ἐστίν.</i>	10. Scit autem in coelis Propheta plura Dei esse mandata, scit per diversitatem ministeriorum diversas esse praeceptorum observantias, <u>angelorum, archangelorum, thronorum, dominationum, potestatum, et principatumum</u> . Quos utique necesse est, ut nominibus, ita et officiis esse diversos, perpetuam tamen mandatorum custodiam pro naturae suae firmitate retinentes.	
V19b / row6	<i>Ὁ προφήτης οὖν εὔχεται πρὸ καιροῦ αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ ζωῆς μυστήρια τῶν ἐντολῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποκαλυφθῆναι.</i>	Atque ob id <u>revelari sibi coelestium mandatorum sacramenta</u> orat: quia sciat se in terrae hujus corpore esse peregrinum.	
V20/ row1	<i>Ἐπεπόθησεν ἡ ψυχὴ μου τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι τὰ κρίματα σου ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ.</i>	11. (Vers. 20). Quartus hic tertiae litterae est versus: <i>Concupivit anima mea, ut desiderem iudicia tua in omni tempore.</i>	32. Meritoque dicit: <i>Concupivit anima mea desiderare iudicia tua in omni tempore.</i>
V20/			Quod utique non facit nisi liber a vinculis, non solum a vinculis sollicitudinis saecularis, sed etiam a vinculis caritatis humanae. Vincula conplura sunt in hoc saeculo: vincula sunt desideria vivendi.

row2			vincula sunt oblectamenta voluptatum, vincula sunt honorum, vincula coniugii. Denique dicit tibi bonus magister. <i>Solutus es ab uxore? Ne quaesieris uxorem</i> (1Cor. 7.27). Nec tamen peccat qui uxorem acceperit, sed innecit sibi vincula mentis, quia sollicitus est quomodo placeat uxori – beator esset, si deo soli placere desideraret –, carnis autem, quia ligatus est qui sui non habeat corporis potestatem. Ergo quia mandatum dei est, quod legis oraculo et apostolico sermone depromptum est (Deut 6.5; et Mt. 10.37), ne quis uxorem divitias honorem necessitudines deo praeferat, qui autem praetulerit, fit obnoxius iudicii dei, ideo prius poposcit, ne abscondat ab eo deus mandata sua. Qui enim mandata cognoverit et custodierit, non refugit iudicia divina, sed desiderat meritoque tamquam revelatis sibi mandatis ait: “Concupivi desiderare iudicia tua in omni tempore.”
V20/ row3	Τί δήποτε οὐκ εἶπεν: “ἐπεπόθησεν ἡ ψυχὴ μου τὰ κρίματά σου.” ἀλλὰ ἐπεπόθησεν τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐν ἡμῖν ὄντος τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι τὰ κρίματά τοῦ θεοῦ;	Non est Prophetae hujus cum caeteris communis vel saeculi sermo: altius sub significatione familiarium verborum intelligentiae suae extulit sensum, dicens: <i>Concupivit anima mea ut desiderem iudicia tua in omni tempore</i> . Multis enim videbitur rectius dictum fuisse, “ <u>desiderat anima mea iudicia tua in omni tempore</u> ”. Et forte quidam existiman id ipsum sub his dictis contineri.	33. <u>Non dixit “Concupivi iudicia” sed <i>concupivi desiderare</i></u> . Sicut enim vita vivere plus est quam vivere – vivere namque commune etiam huius est vitae, vita autem vivere beatorum est, sic concupiscere, ut desideremus iudicia dei, plus est quam desiderare iudicia; concupiscimus enim desiderare, quasi non sit potestatis nostrae desiderium, sed gratiae dei.
V20/ row4		12. Sed meminit Propheta, arduum esse et naturae humanae periculosissimum, Dei desiderare iudicia. Cum enim nemo vivens in conspectu ipsius mundus sit; quomodo desiderabile iudicium ejus potest esse? An cum ex omni otioso verbo rationem simus praestituri, diem iudicii concupiscemus, in quo nobis est ille indefessus ignis subeundus, in quo subeunda sunt gravia illa expiandae a peccatis animae supplicia? Beatae Mariae animam gladius pretransibit, ut revelentur multorum cordiam cogitationes (Lk. 2.35). Si in iudicii severitatem capax illa Dei Virgo ventura est, desiderare quis audebit a Deo judicari? Job omnium humanarum calamitatum militia et victoria perfunctus, qui cum tentaretur, ait: <i>Dominus dedit, Dominus abstulit, sit nomen ejus benedictum in saecula</i> (Job 1.21), cinerem se esse confessus, audita de nube Dei voce non loquendum sibi ultra esse decrevit (Job. 40.1). Et quis erit ausus Dei desiderare iudicia, cujus vocem de coelis nec tantus propheta sustinuit (Job 42.3 et 6), neque apostoli consistentes in monte cum Domino ferre potuerunt (Mt. 17.6)?	Cum enim dominus oblectari nos viderit cupidate desiderii iudiciorum suorum, sobrium auget affectum; cum autem peccamus, non concupiscimus desiderare iudicia dei. Neque enim aegrotus uri desiderat vel incidi, ut possit recipere sanitatem. Refugit qui gravius aegrotat, ne uratur, ne incidatur, ne alligetur, ne abstinence a cibo; qui autem salutarem habet valitudinem, medico securus occurrit. Unde etiam dominus non otiose ait: <i>Desiderio desideravi hoc pascha manducare vobiscum</i> (Lk 22.15), non solum desiderans, sed etiam geminato desiderio concupiscens remissionem tribuere peccatorum.

V20/ row5	...ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνταπόδος τῷ δούλῳ σου (Ps. 118.17a) διηγησάμεθα, ὅτι οὐ πάντων ἐστὶν εὐξασθαι τὸ ἀνταπόδος τῷ δούλῳ σου ἀλλὰ τῶν <u>καθαρῶ τῇ συνειδήσει</u> λατρευόντων τῷ θεῷ, οὕτως οὐ πάντων ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι τὰ κρίματα ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, ἀλλὰ μόνων τῶν μὴ ἀμαρτανόντων· ἐν ἐκείνῳ γὰρ τῷ καιρῷ ἐν ᾧ ἀμαρτάνω, εἰς ἐπιθυμήσω τὰ κρίματα, ἵνα κολασθῶ ἐπιθυμῶ. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τελείου ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι τὰ κρίματα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν ὁ προφήτης.	13. Tenuit itaque Propheta humanae et naturae et conscientiae modum, dicens, <i>Concupivit anima mea, ut desiderem iudicia tua in omni tempore</i> . Non enim iudicium desiderat, sed ut desideret concupiscit: desiderii eum cupiditas, non iudicii continebat. Concupiscit enim desiderare, scilicet ut in tanta innocentia maneat, ut tuto jam et sine metuendi iudicii terrore desideret: rem ipsam nondum per conscientiam humanae conditionis desiderans; sed ejus desiderium, et <u>conscientia perfectae</u> ut proveniat innocentiae concupiscens.	Concupiscamus ergo et nos desiderare iudicia dei – <u>bona conscientia</u> quae, cum examinatur, probatur –
V20/ row6		Scit vero continentem et indefessam desiderii hujus concupiscentiam esse oportere: atque ideo adjecit: <i>in omni tempore, <u>nullum scilicet docens otium nobis esse debere</u></i> , quin semper desiderii hujus cupiditate teneamur.	– et concupiscamus desiderare <i>in omni tempore</i> , ut <u>nullum momentum bonae praetereat vacuum cupiditatis</u> .
V21a/ row1	Ἐπιτίμησας ὑπερηφάνους, ἐπικατάρατοι οἱ ἐκκλίνοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐντολῶν σου.	14. Deinde loquitur, (vers. 21): <i>Increpasti superbos: maledicti qui declinant a mandatis tuis</i> .	34. Sequitur versus quintus: <i>Increpasti superbos; maledicti qui declinant a mandatis tuis</i> .
V21a/ row2		O infelix superbia, quae dedignatur sub praeceptis coelestibus vivere, quae mandata divina animi infidelis tumore fastidit! Plurima sunt humanorum vitiorum crimina, et diversae atque innumerabiles peccatorum operationes: sed nulla magis provocandae in nos irae Dei, quam superbiae causa est. <i>Increpasti</i> enim non avaros, non lascivos, quibus utique increpatio debita est, sed <i>superbos</i> ; quia plures per superbiam, qua humana contemnunt, etiam Deo obsequi spernunt.  15. Sed sint licet praeclara caetera fidei opera, et in omni divinorum praeceptorum custodia devotio immoretur: tamen subrepente superbia, memoria eorum quae recte operamur abolebitur.	Cum dominus Iesus per oboedientiam genus humanum redemerit, iustitiam reformarit, serpens autem per inoboedientiam peccatum introduxerit, quid vitii habeat superbia hinc aestimare possumus, cuius auctor diabolus est, quem inducit propheta dicentem: <i>Ponam thronum meum super nubes et ero similis Altissimo</i> (Isa. 14.14). Itaque cum sit nequissimus, ut honorem non dederit domino deo nostro, peiores tamen discipulos erudit. Ille enim se sic exaltavit, ut vellet aequari et similis esse altissimo, discipulus autem eius significatur ab apostolo indignaturus aequalem similemque se aestimari deo. Scriptum est enim: <i>cum revelatus fuerit homo iniquitatis et filius interitus, qui adversatur et extollitur supra omne quod dicitur deus</i> (2Thess. 2.3-4). Magister igitur similem praesumit, hic superiorem. Ideoque et dominus ad discipulos suos dixit: <i>Maiora his facietis</i> (Jn 14.12), ut, quibus serpens plus ademerat quam ipse amiserat, maiora Christus facere donaret

			quam ipse in terris facerat; in se enim voluit principem mundi fallere, in discipulis triumphare.
V21a/ row3		<p>Quanto evangelicus ille pharisaeus labore se in vitae viam statuit, ne in alienam rem <u>rapax</u> esset, ne in quemquam <u>injuriosus</u> existeret, ne <u>adulteriis</u> dissolveretur (Lk. 18.11 f.)?</p> <p><u>Laboravit bis in sabbato jejunans</u>, suumque corpus per abstinentiam cibi ingenti patientiae virtute confecit.</p> <p>Quanto deinde <u>labore avaritiae vincendae, decimas substantiae suae in usum egentium intulit?</u></p> <p>Quid his praeclarius? quid eorum opere difficilius?</p>	<p>35. Itaque a tanto volens crimine vindicare humanum genus introduxit Pharisaeum et publicanum in templo orantes (Lk 18.10 f.) et docuit, etiamsi bona cetera habeat, quod magis superbus offendat quam humilis, qui nulla virtutum dote subnixus sit; studet enim subplantare diabolus bonis operibus intentos.</p> <p>Quantum laboravit Pharisaeus ille, ne <u>raperet</u> aliena, ne <u>iniustus</u> esset, ne <u>adultaret!</u> Quantum laboravit, ne peccaret, sicut peccavit publicanus!</p> <p>Quantum <u>laboravit</u>, ut <u>bis in sabbato ieiunaret!</u></p> <p>Quantum <u>laboravit</u>, ut <u>decimam daret omnium quae acquireret!</u></p> <p>Quis nostrum haec facit? Quanti habent possessiones et soli incubant fructibus et solis sibi messes reconduunt!</p>
V21a/ row4	<p>Πότε γὰρ ἡμῖν ἢ ἀντικειμένη ἐνέργεια οὐ παλαίει; οὐ μόνον ὅταν ὁμολογουμένως ἀμαρτάνωμεν ἀνταγωνίζεται ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενώμεθα ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀγωνίζεται πῶς ἡμᾶς φυσιώση καὶ ὑψηλόφρονας ποιήση.</p>	<p>Sed incidit in superbiae laqueum, dicens: <i>Quia non sum sicut peccator iste et publicanus</i>: et infelix hoc vitio ex ingentibus operibus cecidit in crimen,</p> <p>...et insolens per hanc <u>virtutum suarum gloriam</u> factus, <u>justificato magis publicano recessit</u>.</p> <p>16. Sed quid de Pharisaeo dicimus? <u>Apostolus non ab hominibus neque per hominem, sed per Jesum Christum</u> (Gal. 1.1), adversus quem <u>diabolus</u> omni virtutis suae arte <u>luctatus est, angelum Satanae</u> qui se</p>	<p>Advertit hoc diabolus et perfudit cum ulcere gravi, ut non teneret caput mente carnis inflatus,</p> <p>...et in eo, <u>in quo laudabilis fore crederetur</u>, ibi <u>reprehensibilior iudicaretur</u>. Agebat enim gratias deo, quod non esset raptor adulter iniustus.</p> <p>Quam noxie ei <u>luctatus est serpens</u> et gravibus eum spiris ligavit! Superiorem fecit, ut de altiore deiceret, inferiorem se praebuit, ut sublimiorem casu graviore prosterneret. Mala ruina est adrogantiae quae superiorem subruit, mala haec lucta serpentis, qua se in plurimos torquet anfractus.</p> <p>36. <u>Inflare</u> volebat et Paulum. Quem Paulum? Illum utique <u>apostolum non ab hominibus neque per hominem, sed per Iesum Christum</u> (Gal. 1.1). Et paene deceperat, ita ut stimulum carnis suae, qui se humiliabat, rogaret auferri. Sed bonus dominus, qui Paulum infirmitatibus vellet</p>

		colaphizaret accepit (2Cor. 12.7 et 8): ut per passionum omnium indefessas molestias, nulla superbiendi occasio per otium temporis posset irrepere.  Ipse quoque eligendi et constituendi sacerdotis quamdam legem ferens, cum jam eum in his quibus episcopum dignum est virtutibus collocasset, neophytum eligi vetuit, ne superbiret, dicens: <i>Non neophytum, ne <u>inflatus</u> incidat in iudicium diaboli</i> (1Tim. 3.6): id est, ne per recens adeptam regenerationis gratiam insolescat, vult illum multo passionum bello ante tentari, vult multis humilitatis et fidei stipendiis provehi.	facere fortiorem, adhibuit ei <u>angelum satanae</u> , ut suis diabolus artibus vinceretur.
V21a/ row5	Ὁ θεὸς δὲ ὑπερηφάνοις ἀντιτάσσεται, ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσι χάριν (Prov. 3.34; Jas 4.6; 1Pet 5.5). Διὰ τοῦτο ὅσῳ μέγας εἶ, ταπεινοῦ σεαυτόν, καὶ ἐναντι Κυρίου εὐρήσεις χάριν (Sir 3.18).	Cor enim humiliatum Deus non spernit, et sacrificium optimum cor contribulatum (Ps. 50.29), <i>quia qui se exaltat, humiliabitur; et qui se humiliat, exaltabitur</i> (Lk. 14.11).	
V21a/ row6			Non mentiebatur Parisaeus, immo etiam vera dicebat; sed omnis qui se exaltat, etiamsi vera dicat, offendit (Lk 18.14). Denique probabilior Pharisaeus ingressus est templum quam publicanus et tamen condemnatus exivit; quantum crimen superbiae, ut ei etiam adulteria praeferantur!  37. Denique Dominus, qui aliis donat, superbis resistit, et tanquam concreditur iis qui se exaltant, sibi hoc certamen vindicat: et qui aliis compatitur, arrogantes increpat; quia nihil gravius, quam ut fratres nostros pauperes superbo oculo despiciamus, conformes nobis intolerabili repellamus fastidio, nostra indignos gratia iudicantes, quia sunt inopes: cum paupertas facilius sit Deo, quam thesaurus acceptior.
V21b / row1		17. Et idcirco <i>maledicti qui declinant a mandatis tuis</i> , quia increpantur superbi: quia per superbiam animi insolentis, et humana despiciamus, et divina negligimus.	38. <i>Maledicti, inquit, qui declinant a mandatis tuis.</i>
V21b / row2	Εἰρήκαμεν δὲ ἤδη ὡς δυνατὸν ἐστὶν ἐκκλίνειν, οὐ μόνον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐντολῆς τῆς ἐνικῶς λεγομένης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ ἐντολῶν·	Sed virtus verbi hic collocati non negligenter est audienda. Promptum enim fuerat dicere, <i>Maledicti qui non obtemperant mandatis tuis</i> . (De uno et de plurimis mandatis in superiore versu competentia diximus.)  Maledicti autem sunt, qui <u>per hanc prophetiae doctrinam eruditi</u> , a mandatis Dei declinant, id est, per vitiorum praesentium desideria <u>ab spe aeternorum mandatorum</u>	Supra dixerat: <i>Ne abscondas a me mandata tua</i> ; et ideo <u>quasi revelata sibi mandata cognoscens</u> , condemnat eos qui declinaverint <u>a mandatis coelestibus</u> .

	οὐπω γὰρ ἐντολῆς δύναται ἐκκλισίς γίνεσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ἐντολὴ Κυρίου εὐθειά ἐστι· διὸ ἐπικατάρτοι οἱ ἐκκλίνοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐντολῶν σου·	decidunt.  Qui enim declinat, id in quo est devitat, et ex alia parte in aliam deducitur, et deflexu quodam de itinere decedit.	Et bene dixit: <i>Qui declinant; directum enim mandatum est</i> , ideo ab eo nemo deflectat.
V21b / row3	[see v19b]	[see v19b]	39. Movet autem qua ratione hic dixerit: <i>Ne abscondas a me mandata tua</i> . Quod enim absconditur, obscurum fit et occultum; cum supra dixerit: <i>Mandatum Domini lucidum, illuminans oculos</i> (Ps. 18.9). Si lucidum mandatum, quomodo absconditur; cum lucernam nemo ponat sub modio? Nisi forte lucidum est unum mandatum, multa autem mandata abscondita sunt. Nam <i>judicia tua</i> , inquit, <i>sicut abyssus multa</i> (Ps. 35.7). Non iudicium sicut abyssus, sed iudicia dicuntur.  40. Vide autem ordinem. Supra ait: <i>Ne repellas me a mandatis tuis</i> ; in sequentibus ait: <i>Ne abscondas a me mandata tua</i> ; hic ait: <i>Maledicti qui declinant a mandatis tuis</i> . Vere maledicti qui declinant a mandatis tuis, qui referre gratiam debuerunt: primo, quia non sunt repulsi; secundo, quia non abscondi a se divina mandata meruerunt. Declinat ergo aliquis quod optavit.
V21b / row4	οὐκ εἶ τις οὖν ἀποπέπτωκε μόνον τῆς ἐντολῆς, ἐπικατάρτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅς κ' ἄν βραχὺ ἐξέκλινεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐντολῆς τοῦ θεοῦ.	Vel <u>leviter ergo declinantem a mandatis Dei</u> maledictionis sententia comprehendit: ut intelligeremus quanti periculi res esset, ea omnino ignorare nos; a quibus declinare maledictum est.	
V22a / row1	Περίελε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ ὄνειδος καὶ ἐξουθένησιν, ὅτι τὰ μαρτύριά σου ἐξεζήτησα.	18. (Vers. 22). <i>Aufer a me opprobrium et contemptum; quia testimonia tua exquisivi</i> .	41. (Vers. 22.) Sequitur: <i>Aufer a me opprobrium et contemptum; quoniam testimonia tua exquisivi</i> .
V22a / row2	Τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ὄνειδισμοῦ εἰσιν ἄξια· διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει οἱ ἀμαρτωλοὶ ἀναστήσονται εἰς ὄνειδισμόν αἰώνιον, ὃ ὄνειδισμῷ ἀκολουθεῖ αἰσχύνῃ αἰώνιος (cf. Dan. 12.2).	<u>Peccata opprobrium sunt digna: et idcirco peccatores exurgent in opprobrium aeternum</u> (Dan. 12.2).	
V22a / row3	Δύο δὲ ἐξουθενώσεις εἰσιν· τὰ ἐξουθενώματα τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός (1Cor. 1.28),		Si contemptus opprobrii loco ducitur, quomodo scriptum est: <i>Contemptibilia huius mundi elegit Deus</i> (1Cor. 1.28)? Sed considera quia mundi contemptibilia dixit, non Dei. Quod enim in hoc mundo

	... καὶ ἐξουδένωται ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ πονηρευόμενος (Ps. 14.4a)		contemptibile, hoc pretiosum est apud Deum. Denique humilitas in hoc mundo contemnitur, sed Dei iudicio comprobatur. Et si publicanus se humiliaverit, exaltatur.  Audi quem diligit, et non pro nihilo habeat Deus. Quicumque sanctus est, qui sine macula vivit, veritatem custodit, non appetivit proximum suum, ad nihilum deductus est in conspectu ejus malignus; omnia quae malitiae sunt, reprobavit (Ps. 14.2-4): talis etiam si sit gentilis, devotione humilitatis a Deo comprobatur. Superbi autem, velut pharisaeus, arrogantia sua pro nihilo ab illo aestimantur. Denique gentilitas non est: devotio autem manet in aeternum.
V22a/ row4	καταφρονῶ τῆς ἐξουδενώσεως ἧν ἐξουδενούσι με οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οἱ ἀνόητοι, ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐκ ἐξουδενώσεως ἀλλὰ τιμῆς ἀξίοις·	Quod autem peccata omnia opprobrio sint digna, in Evangeliiis discamus, tum cum Dominus exprobrare civitatibus illis coepit, in quibus plures virtutes ejus effectae essent <u>nec poenituissent</u> , <u>Corozaim et Bethsaidae</u> (Lk. 10.15).	Cave ergo ne Christo opprobrio sis. <u>Nolo mihi quicumque maledicat, et quasi peccatorem despiciat</u> :  quam grave, si Christus dignum opprobrio ducat! <i>Vae tibi</i> , inquit, <u>Corozaim et Bethsaida</u> (Lk. 10.13). Condemnantur; quia <u>non egerunt poenitentiam</u> delictorum suorum.
V22a/ row5		Quod ab illis coeptum, necesse est ut in omnes ejusdem criminis pares fiat; et tunc humano generi exprobrat non poenitenti, neque in viam evangelicam pergenti, id quod psalmo continetur: <i>Quae utilitas in sanguine meo, dum descendo in corruptionem?</i> (Ps. 29.10.) Exprobrat enim superbis atque maledictis, cur nihil in sacramento sanguinis sui atque mortis utilitatis suae esse existimaverint; cum ille nostri causa et natus et passus et mortuus sit.  19. Tenuit etiam Propheta rationem infirmitatis humanae. Scit inesse quaedam, quae per Dei misericordiam auferenda a nobis sint. Scit Deum tali peccatorum nostrorum confessione orandum, ut etsi digna arguitione habeamus, non tamen arguamur: confitendum enim crimen est, ut obtineatur et venia. Scit deinde post	

		arguitionem in contemptum, id est, in nihilum gentes aestimari; quia scriptum sit: <i>Omnes gentes nihil sunt, et omnia quae a malitia sunt, in nihilum aestimata sunt</i> (Isa. 40.17).	
V22a/ row6	...φεύγω δ' ἐκείνην τὴν ἐξουδένωσιν καθ' ἣν ἐξουδένονται ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ πονηρευόμενος, καὶ λέγω· περίελε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ ὄνειδος καὶ ἐξουδένωσιν...	Sed secundum Prophetiae exemplum auferri a nobis opprobrium et contemptum hac spe ac fiducia deprecari nos oportet: ut addamus ad id quod dicitur: <i>Aufer a me opprobrium et contemptum...</i>	Nos ergo agamus, ut a nobis auferatur opprobrium.
V22b / row1	...ὅτι τὰ μαρτύριά σου ἐξεζήτησα. Διὰ τοῦτο μηκέτι με κρίνεις ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνειδίζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐξουδενεῖσθαι, καὶ γὰρ τὰ μαρτύριά σου ἐξεζήτησα, περὶ ὧν ἔφη μακάριοι οἱ ἐξερευνῶντες τὰ μαρτύρια αὐτοῦ (Ps 118.2a).	...et ( <i>etiam</i> ) id quod sequitur: <i>Quia testimonia tua exquisivi</i> . Et testimonia Dei exquirat, ut argui non debeat; et auferri a se opprobrium contemptumque precatur, ut verecundiam non derelinquat: esse quidem in natura sua confessus arguitionis et opprobrii causam quam a se deprecatur auferri; sed per devotionem exquisitorum testimoniorum eam sperat auferri.	Quis autem est, qui non est opprobrio dignus? Qui <i>exquisivit Domini testimonia</i> . Multi quidem sunt qui volunt inferre opprobrium servis tuis, sed ipsi sunt magis probrosi; quia pro nomine tuo pati opprobrium gloriosum est.
V23/ row1	Καὶ γὰρ ἐκάθισαν ἄρχοντες καὶ καθ' ἐμοῦ κατελάλουν, ὁ δὲ δοῦλός σου ἠδολέσχει ἐν τοῖς δικαιομασί σου· (vers. 24) καὶ γὰρ τὰ μαρτύριά σου μελέτη μου ἐστὶ, καὶ αἱ συμβουλῖαι μου τὰ δικαιοματά σου.	20. <i>Exquirat autem testimonia Dei</i> Propheta, non in otio, neque in insolentia rerum secundarum, sed exquirat multis adversus se residentibus, multis adversus se colloquentibus, dicens, (vers. 23): <i>Etenim sederunt principes, et adversum me detrahebant</i> .	42. (Vers. 23.) Et ideo ait: <i>Etenim sederunt principes, et adversum me detrectabant</i> .
V23/ row2	Ἔχει δὲ τι καὶ ὁ λόγος βαθύτερον· οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου (1Cor. 2.6) σκοποῦσι μάλιστα περὶ τῶν δικαιοτέρων,	Scit omnem prophetiae fidem <u>mundi</u> hujus perosam esse <u>principibus</u> : ...	Vox martyris est, qui perductus ad iudicium persecutorum, cum cogeretur idolis immolare, et constanter resisteret: iudices autem sedentes in tribunalibus stipati officiis, indignantes quod suis non obsecundaretur imperiis, conferrent quo dignum supplicio censerent; stabat intrepidus dicens: <i>Sederunt principes et adversum me detrectabant</i> .
V23/ row3	...καὶ ὡς περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ γέγραπται· παρέστησαν οἱ βασιλεῖς τῆς γῆς καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες συνήχθησαν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ (Ps. 2.2).		Est etiam Domini vox ista, cum convenisset presbyterium plebis, et principes sacerdotum et scribae, et ad concilium Judaeorum deductus esset dicentium: <i>Quid adhuc desideramus testes? audivimus enim de ore ipsius</i> (Mt. 26.65); et staret ante praesidem, et duceretur ad crucem, quid pulchrius diceret, quam: <i>Sederunt principes, et adversum me detrectabant</i> , hoc est, me stante, sederunt principes? Et quia

			tribunalium fulcro sublimes erant, Dominum non videbant. Sedebant ergo, erant in fastigio principatus, nec Principem principum cogitabant. Sed parum hoc. <i>Adversus me</i> , inquit, <i>detrectabant</i> . Ego eorum redemptor adveneram, ego veneram ut omnium peccata mundarem, ut recuperarem amissos, restituerem paradiso sancti Jacob haereditatem; et illi <i>adversus me detrectabant</i> .
V23/ row4		...scit Apostolos cunctis futuros propter Christianum nomen odiosos.	Et ideo imitatores mei, discipuli mei, nolite injuriam erubescere si steteritis ante principes pro nomine meo; cum ego steterim pro vestra salute.  43. Denique traditus in custodiam Petrus cum caeteris apostolis, et postera die statutus ante concilium constanter dicebat: <i>Principes populi, et seniores Israel, si nos hodie dijudicamur, quod benefactum sit homini infirmo, in quo iste salvus factus sit; notum sit omnibus vobis, et omni plebi Israel, quod in nomine Jesu Christi Nazareni quem vos crucifixistis, quem Deus suscitavit a mortuis, in hoc iste astat coram vobis sanus</i> (Acts 4.8, 10), hoc est: Vos estis qui statuistis et Christum; gloriae loco ducimus istam injuriam; quia arguimur pro aegroti hominis sanitate: hanc haereditatem servulis Salvator omnium dereliquit. At illi conferebant inter se dicentes: <i>Quid faciemus istis hominibus</i> (Acts 4.16)? Et dimiserunt eos. Gloriabatur ergo Petrus, et unusquisque apostolorum, quia digni habiti sunt, qui injuriam pro Christi nomine sustinerent. Recte ergo tunc dicerent singuli: <i>Etenim sederunt principes, et adversum me detrectabant</i> .
V23/ row5		Sedent adversus Prophetam principes, et detrahunt tunc, cum audiunt etiam dicentem, <i>Audite verbum Domini principes Sodomorum, attendite legem Dei populi Gomorrhae</i> (Isa. 1.10). Ex consilio enim talium <u>Esaias sectus est, Jeremias quoque carcere clauditur, Daniel leonibus fame ad saevitiam incitatus objicitur, Zacharias inter templum et altare occiditur</u> , apostoli caeduntur, desecantur, crucifiguntur: ut praedicatio Dei auferatur, ut doctrina prophetiae inhibeat, ut vitae aeternae via obsepiatur.	44. Sederunt principes <u>adversus Esaiam</u> , et disputaverunt <u>ut secaretur</u> : sed non timebat eos qui dicebat: <i>Audite . . . principes Sodomorum</i> (Isa. 1.10). Sederunt adversus <u>Hieremiam</u> ut mitteretur in lacum. Sederunt adversus <u>Zachariam, qui occisus est inter templum et altare</u> . Sederunt adversus Susannam, et contra castitatis feminam judicabant: sed ut ostenderetur principum bonum non esse consilium, excitavit pueri spiritum Dominus; et quam principes ream mortis pronuntiaverant, eandem propheta totius innoxiam criminationis absolvit.
V23/ row6	Οὕτως εἶπομι ἄν ὅτι οἱ ἄρχοντες συνεργόμενοι τοῦ		45. Sunt et alii principes, qui adversus nos detrectant, de quibus dicitur: <i>Quoniam non</i>

	<p>αἰῶνος τούτου (1Cor 2.6), ὧν ἐστὶ ἡ σοφία τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου,</p> <p><u>...καθέζονται καὶ σκοποῦσι κατὰ τοῦ δικαίου,</u></p> <p><u>...ἵνα ἐπιβουλεύσωσιν αὐτῷ.</u></p>		<p><i>est nobis colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus principatus et potestates, adversus mundi hujus rectores, tenebrarum harum, adversus spiritalia nequitiæ, quæ sunt in coelestibus</i> (Eph. 6.12).</p> <p><u>Isti sedent et explorant, qui justus sit in hoc saeculo, qui Christianus intente Deo serviat, studiosus boni operis et facti.</u></p> <p>Detrectant de eo dicentes: <u>Insidiamur illi, impediamus eum</u>, prohibeamus eum efficere quæ desiderat, conteramus ejus mentem, frangamus animum ejus adversis frequentibus ac repentinis; et si Deo probatus est propter justitiam, rogemus dari nobis tentationes ejus.</p>
V23/ row7			<p>Neque enim in tantum prophetam, tentationum ejus quas plurimas subiit, potestatem habere potuissent, nisi Dominus probandi sui militis causa dedisset, ut majore eum gloria coronaret. Quis igitur regem Saul excitavit in eum, nisi spiritus malus, sicut legimus, qui se dolebat excludi quotiescumque David vel citharæ sono, vel bonorum consiliorum operumque fidibus ac nervis mentem regis animumque demulcebat (1Reg. 16.23)? Quis excitavit Doech Syri nequitiam, ut sanctum virum proderet, et hospitalem humanitatem deduceret in periculum sacerdotis (2Reg. 22.9-10)? Quis inflammavit ardorem Ammon, ut domum incestaret propheticam, et contristaret animum patris, alterius incesta libidine, alterius injuria (2Reg. 13.14): et qui aliis prophetabat, domus suæ mala prævidere non potuerit? Quis armavit furorem Abessalon, ut patrem domo excluderet, et parricidali persequeretur praelio (2Reg. 15.14)? Sed cum prope viribus regni jam esset sanctus inferior, hoc uno incensa adversum se diaboli restinxit spicula, quod cum filius necem peteret patris, ille tamen salutem filii pietatis mandabat affectu.</p> <p>46. Ergo principes populi, ut Architophel, et caeteri bellantium duces sederunt (2Reg. 18.5). Tractabant principes populi cum Abessalon adversus Prophetam (2Reg. 15.31).</p>
V24a/ row1		<p>Sed hos principum consessus et haec obtrectationum eloquia sprexit fides constans. Consequitur enim: <i>Servus autem tuus exercebatur in justificationibus tuis.</i></p>	<p>...Et ideo dicit: <i>Etenim sederunt principes, et adversum me detrectabant: servus autem tuus exercebatur in justificationibus tuis.</i> Advertimus arma justis, quibus omnes adversariorum repellat impetus.</p>
V24a/ row2		<p>Obstreptibus illis videlicet, et totis poenarum armis inhihentibus, in <i>exercitationibus justificationum</i> Dei spiritus perseverat.</p> <p>21. Sed, ut jam superius tractavimus, <i>exercitatio justificationum</i> et <i>meditatio testimoniorum</i> illa est, qua cum legis opera per corporales efficientias exercentur; exercitatione justificationum tamen et testimoniorum meditatione, bonorum aeternorum per praesentium meditationem quaedam praeparatio comparatur.</p>	<p>Alibi ait: <i>Circumierunt me et expugnaverunt me gratis: pro eo ut me diligerent, detrahebant mihi: ego autem orabam</i> (Ps. 108.3-4): hic ait quod studium ei non exercendae ad belli artes fuerit juventutis, non decipiendi adversantis astutia ulla cordis; ut illum vinceret quem videbat: sed adversum eos praeliabatur, quos non videbat: majorque in eo pietas, quam virtus corporis militabat. Itaque in Dei <i>exercebatur justificationibus</i>; ut contrario ictu diabolus vulneraret. Ille eum ab intentione justitiae, et studio devotionis, occupationibus bellicis conabatur abducere: hic magis se divini operis et cultus meditationibus occupabat. Itaque Dominus protexit eum, in quem speravit, cum quo loquebatur, cui toto adhaerebat affectu.</p>

V24a/ row3	<p>Κἄν λαλῶσι δὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες, εἴτε οὔτοι, εἴτε ἐκεῖνοι· ὁ δίκαιος οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἢ λαλεῖ ἐν τοῖς δικαίωμασι τοῦ Κυρίου·</p> <p>οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπινον ὁ δίκαιος φθέγγεται.</p>		<p><u>Justus enim aut cum Deo loquitur orando, aut divina loquitur opera laudando: et semper loquitur opera Dei; ne loquatur os suum opera hominum.</u></p> <p><u>Nihil terrenum justus loquitur, nihil mortale agit.</u></p>
V24b		<p>Sed testimoniorum meditatio unde oriatur ostendit. Adjecit enim (vers. 24): <i>Et consilia mea justificationes tuae</i>; omnem scilicet vitae curam, omnes consiliorum varios diversosque motus intentos esse justificationibus confitens Dei in Christo Jesu, cui gloria et honor in saecula saeculorum. Amen.</p>	<p>47. (Vers. 24.) Ideoque dicit: <i>Etenim testimonia tua, meditatio mea est: et consilia mea, justificatio tua.</i> Advertit quid doceat, quod haec debeant esse consilia justis, ut meditetur mandata Dei, et exerceatur in Dei laudibus et oraculis; ut justificet Dominum semper. Qui facit quae Deus mandat, quae credit Deo placere, Deum justificat. Quod ex lectione Evangelii possumus intelligere (Lk. 7.30), dicente Evangelista, quia pharisaei spreverunt consilium Dei, non baptizati baptismo Joannis. Hoc in uno libro, in alio autem habes: non justificaverunt Deum, quia baptizari noluerunt. Ideo Dominus ad Joannem dicentem: <i>Ego a te debeo baptizari, et tu venis ad me</i>; respondit: <i>Sine modo; sic enim oportet nos implere omnem justitiam</i> (Mt. 3.14-15). Qui ergo facit mandata Dei, justificat Deum; quia facit ejus justitiam: et bonum est ut consilium Dei sequantur hominum consilia; quia Dei consilium certum semper: nostra autem plerumque incerta consilia ex rerum probantur eventu.</p>

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