Rich Clients and Poor Patrons: functions of friendship in Clement of Alexandria's *Quis Dives Salvetur?*

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the Theology Faculty at the University of Oxford, in Trinity Term 2004.

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SHORT ABSTRACT

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Quis Dives Salvetur (*QDS*) is a small but fascinating homiletic treatise composed by Clement of Alexandria which seeks to address certain problems concerning the salvific status of wealthy Christians. The aim of this thesis is to ascertain the beliefs and actions that Clement wants his wealthy readers to adopt as a result of reading this discourse. This study presupposes that Clement's views on wealth did not change drastically over the period of time since composing his other works. The implication is that the complex philosophical and theological concepts in *QDS* may be illuminated from similar treatments in his other works.

This study shows that the Graeco-Roman philosophical and cultural conventions of friendship play fundamental roles in the two rubrics under which many of the key concepts in *QDS* may be grouped. Salvation is ultimately friendship and sonship with God, and is the *telos* of philosophical and ethical ascent, where the believer becomes like God in his apathetic and beneficent nature. Clement adapts the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiosis* to describe the way in which a believer progresses from a nascent self-knowledge and self-love at regeneration to the knowledge of God and love of God at his adoption as son and friend. Salvation in *QDS* is not purely an individualistic pursuit, rather it is located in the church as the ideal philosophical community of friends, where relations are grounded on an ethic of reciprocity.

This study challenges the dominant view held by modern scholars that the whole of *QDS* is devoted to vindicating the possibility that the rich can be saved *even as rich*. This view ignores the fact that the rich are to strive for the gnostic state of *apatheia*. Having devoted the first half of the treatise to showing that the wealthy are called to salvation, Clement counsels them, in the second half, to distribute their superfluous possessions indiscriminately to those less well-off in their community, while retaining a frugal self-sufficiency. Concomitant with indiscriminate almsgiving, rich believers must undertake a second repentance which requires them to submit to an advanced Christian who will act as their spiritual patron, guide and advocate before God.

LONG ABSTRACT

Thesis title: RICH CLIENTS AND POOR PATRONS: functions of friendship in Clement of Alexandria's *Quis Dives Salvetur*

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Quis Dives Salvetur (*QDS*) is a small but fascinating homiletic treatise based on the gospel story of a rich man who was unable to fulfil the Saviour's demand to sell his possessions (Mk 10.17-31). The treatise, composed in the late second or early third century by Titus Flavius Clemens, purports to address problems raised by overly literal interpretations of such gospel texts which impinged on the salvific status of wealthy Christians. Evidently there were wealthy believers who were either persuaded by others to abandon their posessions wholesale or despaired at being trenched off from salvation on account of their wealth *per se*.

QDS itself has been comparatively neglected in modern scholarship, with Clement's major works, the *Protrepticus*, *Paedagogos* and *Stromateis*, attracting the most scholarly attention. The few scholars who have been interested in *QDS* typically investigated the treatise as part of broader thematic studies on particular issues such as early Christian attitudes to wealth and pedagogy. There has not yet been a study of monograph length and sufficient analytical rigour that explores Clement's leading ideas and arguments in *QDS*. The aim of this thesis is to ascertain the beliefs and actions that the author wants his wealthy readers to adopt as a result of reading the discourse. This study presupposes that Clement's views on wealth did not change drastically over the period of time since composing his other works. The implication is that the complex philosophical and theological concepts in *QDS* may be illuminated from similar treatments in these other works.

Not much can be gleaned from the text of *QDS* about the original historical situation which gave rise to the adverse scriptural interpretations directed against the wealthy. However, a careful reading of Clement's major works provides evidence that there were several potential problems caused by the presence of the wealthy in the Christian community. These problems included the tendency of the wealthy to use the agape meal as a conventional means of establishing and furthering undesirable hierarchical (patronage) relations with the less well-off, their attraction to the speculative systems and communal ideals of the heretics, and their susceptibility to apostasize during persecutions. Conversely, the economic viability of the community, which comprised a significant number of the less well-off, orphans, widows, and others, was contingent on the generosity of the wealthy. There was thus a tension between economic need and social threat.

QDS must be treated as a persuasive discourse. That is, any analysis of the work must take into account the fact that the arguments are constructed in such a way as to persuade the various intended readers to modify their beliefs or behaviour. That is not to say that *QDS* can be forced into the mould of a classical speech. The work is clearly of a hybrid nature. However, there are functional correspondences between *QDS* and classical rhetorical theory which need to be appreciated in the analysis of its arguments.

In this light, a number of Graeco-Roman philosophical conventions of friendship combine to play a central role in the argumentation of the discourse. In this study many of the key concepts in *QDS* are grouped under two rubrics, both of which are dependent upon friendship.

First, salvation is ultimately friendship and sonship with God, the *telos* of philosophical and ethical ascent, where the believer progressively becomes like God in his apathetic and beneficent nature. Clement's use of the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiosis* has largely been overlooked in modern scholarship. This study shows that this doctrine best explains Clement's understanding of the way in which a believer progresses from a nascent self-knowledge and self-love at regeneration to the knowledge of God and love of God at his adoption as son and friend. Second, salvation in *QDS* is not purely an individualistic pursuit, rather it is located in the church as the ideal philosophical community of friends, where relations are grounded on an ethic of reciprocity. These relations are both reciprocal and hierarchical. At the centre stands the spiritually advanced believer, who acts as the conduit of all spiritual benefits from the father to the Christian community. The spiritually advanced Christian, elsewhere called the true gnostic, is both a spiritual guide and advocate on behalf of immature believers. His standing before the father is that the father does not deny his request.

The main body of *QDS* can be divided into two sections: hortatory (chs 4-27) and preceptive (chs 27-41). The hortatory section consists of a homiletic exposition of the Markan version of the rich man narrative (Mk 10.17-31) which discerns what the Saviour meant by his command, "sell all your possessions". For Clement, the Saviour's command signifies chiefly the moderation of the passions. Through his exegesis of this passage in the hortatory section Clement seeks to show that the wealthy are still called to salvation provided that they so choose to follow his injunctions outlined in the preceptive section. Behind this is his distinction between the words *chosen* and *called* based on the dominical saying, "many are called, but few are chosen". The wealthy believer, as is the case for all believers, is *called* to embark in the process leading towards salvation. However, it is the responsibility of the believer to make himself *chosen* by means of *oikeiosis* to God. To be chosen is to be adopted as a son and friend of God, which can only take place after the rich believer has moderated his passions towards wealth through self-control and thereby shown himself worthy. Moderation of the passions is an extremely delicate process. It cannot be accomplished by the wholesale jettisoning of material possessions which would only serve to exacerbate the passions of the believer, at this early stage of moral development, through the lack of necessities and envy. Nor, however, is moderation attained simply through an inner detachment to wealth, a spiritual separation where one may continue to possess wealth in material terms. It is superfluous wealth, that which exceeds what is required for living on a frugal self-sufficiency, which gives rise to the passions. Therefore, the Saviour's command "sell your possessions" means both to jettison the passions that attend wealth and to stand away from superfluous wealth.

The preceptive section consists of instructions for divesting this superfluous wealth to the less well-off in the community. This divestment is to be done gradually, over a long period of time, and with purpose. There are two logically independent tendencies present in these instructions. In the first tendency Clement follows early Christian traditions (especially the *Shepherd of Hermas* and the *Didache*, with both of which he was familiar) in treating almsgiving as an exchange for spiritual rewards. The wealthy believer is to be indiscriminate in giving, not yet having the spiritual ken for discerning who is worthy to receive. There is the general idea that by giving alms to all who need the wealthy believer contributes towards his own salvation.

In the second tendency Clement's interpretation of the Saviour's command to make friends with unrighteous mammon in Lk 16.9 departs from previous Christian treatments of the subject and leads to a new and remarkable system of reciprocity. The wealthy believer is to use his superfluous wealth to make friends with a certain individual who has the power to save. The beneficiary who has the power to save is called by Clement a *friend of God*. The attributes of the friend of God in *QDS* parallels those of the true gnostic in the *Stromateis*. In *QDS*, Lk 16.9 is seen as a mandate for cultivating patronage relations in which the wealthy believer shares his superfluous wealth, and the friend of God reciprocates with spiritual benefits. The wealthy believer's future salvation is contingent on his ability to enlist the

services of a friend of God. Grace and spiritual benefits are not conferred to the wealthy believer on account of his own merit but rather due to his being *a friend of a friend of God* (*QDS* 33.1). Contrary to expectations of the prevalent culture of the time, the wealthy partner is in the inferior position in the relationship on account of the large discrepancy of the value of the benefits he brings. The wealthy believer's superfluous possessions are material and transient; those that he receives in return are spiritual and eternal. The wealthy believer is thus the client, while the friend of God acts as the spiritual patron. This relationship forms the basis for true repentance, which is available for the wealthy even after baptism. The friend of God not only prays for his charge but also instructs him and pleads before the father as his advocate. Through the spiritual patronage of the friend of God, the wealthy believer is able to progress towards attaining a likeness to God and become a friend of God in his own right.

This study challenges the dominant view held by modern scholars that the whole of *QDS* is devoted to vindicating the possibility that the rich can be saved *even as rich*. This view ignores the fact that in *QDS* the rich are to strive for the gnostic state of *apatheia* and likeness to God. It also misconstrues the treatment of the philosophical notions of indifference and sufficiency in the work. Clement's view of a frugal self-sufficiency should not be confounded with the elitist views of later Roman Stoics like Cicero and Pliny the Younger, who, even though being the ancient equivalent to millionaires, could feel that they had no superfluity. This view also overlooks the persuasive nature of *QDS*, where rhetorical conventions need to be recognized in order to understand the larger argument. This study shows that Clement's approach to the wealthy is far more nuanced.

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To my wife, Kim, and sons, Peter and Matthew, who have endured so much for so long on my account, it is only fitting that I dedicate this work.

D.G.

Abbreviations

Primary Sources

Works of ancient authors are sometimes cited by abbreviated titles following *LSJ* (Greek) and *OL* (Latin) conventions, although I have opted to retain the fuller name of the author and in some cases have extended the abbreviation for purposes of clarity. Works in which I have deviated from the conventions, or which were not listed in *LSJ* and *OL*, are listed below. All translations of Clement's works are my own based on Clemens Alexandrinus, *Opera*, Ed. O. Stählin. 4 vols. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, 12, 15, 17, 39. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905-1909. Other Greek and Latin translations are modified from the *LCL* unless otherwise indicated.

Adulator	Plutarch, *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur*
Adv. Col.	Plutarch, *Adversus Colotem*
AH	Irenaeus, *Against the Heresies*
Cels.	Origen, *Contra Celsum*
Ep.	Jerome, *Epistles*
ET	Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto*
HE	Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
Paed.	Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus*
PE	Clement of Alexandria, *Prophetic Eclogues*
Prot.	Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus*
QDS	Clement of Alexandria, *Quis Dives Salvetur*
Str.	Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*
SVF	*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta,* ed. J. von Arnim

Secondary Sources

ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt
AugR	Augustinianum
CH	Church History
CP	Classical Philology
CQ	Classical Quarterly
GRBS	Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies
HJ	Heythrop Journal
HSCP	Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
HTR	Harvard Theological Review
HUCA	Hebrew Union College Annual
JAC	Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum
JECS	Journal of Early Christian Studies
JJS	Journal of Early Jewish Studies
JR	Journal of Religion
JRH	Journal of Religious History
JRS	Journal of Roman Studies
JTS	Journal of Theological Studies
LSJ	Liddell, Scott and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon.*
NTS	New Testament Studies
OL	Oxford Old Latin

RAC	Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum
RSR	Recherches de science religieuse
Rel. Stud.	Religious Studies
RHPhR	Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses
SJT	Scottish Journal of Theology
SecCent	Second Century
SO	Symbolae Osloenses
SP	Studia Patristica
ST	Studia Theologica
TDNT	Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
ThLZ	Theologische Literaturzeitung
TZ	Theologische Zeitschrift
Tr	Traditio
VC	Vigiliae Christianae
ZKG	Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte
ZNW	Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
ZWT	Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Quis Dives Salvetur (*QDS*)[1] is a homiletic treatise written around 200 CE which seeks to address certain problems concerning the salvific status of wealthy Christians.[2] Although the work is anonymous, it has been recognized since the earliest times, and remains unchallenged today by modern scholars, to have been written by Clement of Alexandria (*c.*150-*c.*215 CE).[3] *QDS* is exceptional for this early period for several reasons, among which is the fact that a major part of its composition is devoted to the sequential, clause-by-clause exposition of a Gospel text, in this case, the narrative of the rich man who was unable to fulfil Christ's command to abandon his wealth in Mk 10.17-31.

When one surveys the monographs and articles published in the past 100 years on the works of Clement of Alexandria one cannot but conclude that *QDS* is somewhat of a neglected child, over-shadowed by the critical gaze that her three larger siblings have

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[1] Also known by its Greek title, Τίς ὁ σῳζόμενος πλούσιος, which is often rendered literally but rather clumsily into English as, 'Who is the rich man that is being saved?'

[2] There is a fair amount of debate as to whether *QDS* in its final form could have been a sermon which had been copied more or less verbatim into its written form either with or without the preacher's awareness. A major problem with regarding *QDS* as a sermon is its relatively large size; *QDS* is only slightly smaller than the Gospel of Mark. Cf. J. Ferguson, *Clement of Alexandria* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974), 166. Some scholars note what they consider to be oral features in *QDS*. Cf. L. W. Countryman, *The Rich Christian in the Church of the Early Empire: Contradictions and Accommodations* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1980), 64n.1, following L. Paul, 'Welche Reiche wird selig werden?,' *ZWT* 44 (1901), 518f. The problem of orality is notoriously difficult to unravel. External evidence based on Clement's predeliction for publishing written treatises covering controversial topics suggests to me that *QDS* was deliberately composed for the written medium with the oral features possibly explained by it having been adapted from previous sermons or simply being the preferred style of the author who wished to give the impression that this readers were present with him (cf. *Str.* 3.4.36.3 for a similar motivation for the use of familiar language in the *Stromateis*).

[3] The church historian, Eusebius of Caesarea, mentions *QDS* as one of several works by Clement. In his *Ecclesiastic Histories* he lists the eight books of *Stromateis* which had been completely preserved at his time (the eighth book no longer being extant, at least in its entirety), the equal number of λόγοι of the now fragmentary *Hypotyposeis*, the λόγος of *Exhortation to the Greeks* or *Protrepticus*, three books of the work entitled *Paedagogus*, his ἕτερος λόγος, *Who is the Rich Man who is being Saved?*, the σύγγραμμα *On the Pascha*, and discourses *On Fasting* and *On Slander and Exhortation to Endurance*, and the [no longer extant book] entitled *Ecclesiastical Canon* or *Against the Judaizers* (6.13.1ff.). The association between *QDS* and Clement as its author continues into the 9th Century. The controversial Byzantine scholar and twice Patriarch of Constantinople, Photius, links *QDS* with Clement as its author in the voluminous account of his private reading, the *Bibliotheca*, which he composed for his brother Tarasios around 845 CE. In this entry Photius also records the first words of the opening line of *QDS*, Οἱ μὲν τοὺς ἐγκωμιαστικοὺς λόγους (*Bibl.* 111.89b30ff.). Photius mentions that *QDS* was in place of *Stromateis* Book 8 in some of his manuscripts. Several extracts from *QDS* are also preserved in florilegia dating from the 15th and 16th centuries. Cf. P. M. Barnard, *Clement of Alexandria, Quis Dives Salvetur*, Texts and Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897), xxviii-xxx.

constantly attracted. This is perhaps at first sight understandable. It could certainly be argued that Clement's major works – the *Protrepticus*, the *Paedagogus* and the *Stromateis* – all contain more than enough to satisfy those scholars interested in the philosophical, spiritual and theological thoughts of a late second century Christian thinker. Nevertheless, the dearth of interest in *QDS* shown by scholars is regrettable. Clement may have been something of a 'maverick' amongst early Christian writers on account of his being equally familiar with the biblical traditions, Greek philosophy, various Gnostic myths, and the rites associated with the mysteries; nevertheless, we have in *QDS* a rare glimpse of how at least one Christian in the second century dealt with the Gospels' harsh demands on the wealthy. That is not to say that Clement's method in dealing with the problem of the wealthy was typical of the early church. The *communis opinio* has it that *QDS* may have had only a modest direct influence in the early church on issues concerning the problem of wealth and the status of the wealthy in the early Christian communities. Eusebius, for example, shows that he was aware of *QDS* and ascribes its authorship to Clement, but he himself found none of its contents particularly useful for his own apologetic purposes other than the story of 'St John and the brigand' which he cites in full from *QDS* 42.[4] On the other hand, Stanislas Giet does make a case that Basil the Great probably knew and used a couple of clauses from *QDS* to formulate his statement on the utility of wealth.[5] The value of studying *QDS* lies, I suggest, not solely in its subsequent influence on the latter church, however putatively modest, but in the fact that it was the first Christian work to deal with the problems of the wealthy with any philosophical or theological rigour, and in the novel and quite ingenious ways in which the author attempts to resolve these problems.

1.1 Problems with past research on *QDS*

The limited research that has been done on *QDS* in the past century has tended to focus on the exegetical section in the first half of the treatise (chs 4-27), where Clement attempts to

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[4] Eusebius *HE* 3.23.5. The narrative of St John and the brigand contributes to Eusebius' bibliography of the apostle John.

[5] S. Giet, 'La doctrine de l'appropriation des biens chez quelques-uns des Pères,' *RSR* 35 (1948), 55-91.

persuade his readers that the Saviour, in the story of the rich man in Mk 10.17-31, did not intend to disbar wealthy people from salvation *a priori*.[6] The majority of scholarly opinion on Clement's exegesis in the exegetical section is disparaging. Whereas most scholars agree that Clement's denunciation of wealth in the *Paedagogus* was marked by ascetic tendencies, they detect in *QDS* a far less negative assessment of wealth, where the emphasis, they suggest, is on ridding the soul from its attachment to possessions without any external deed of renunciation. The most frequent explanation for this is that Clement's personal views on wealth changed over the period of time between composing the *Paedagogus* and *QDS*.[7] R. B. Tollinton sets the tone:

> What Clement fails to see, and the failure is characteristic, is the value for certain temperaments of some external act of renunciation. Everything with him is a matter of the interior life ... Clement's failure to appreciate the spiritual value of an outward act.[8]

The translator for the Loeb edition of *QDS*, G. W. Butterworth, concurs with Tollinton: 'As a result of this exegesis we are robbed of one of the most striking appeals to a man's heroism and contempt of consequences that even the gospels contain. There can be no question that the Christian Church has suffered much, and is still suffering, from that avoidance of the plain meaning of historical records which is characteristic of the Alexandrine system of spiritual or allegorical interpretation.'[9] This attitude has continued to recent times with Ferguson lamenting: '[Clement's] tendency to interpret words spiritually rather than literally waters down the sheer harsh, heroic, material, this-worldly aspect of the gospel; in the end it waters down the Incarnation.'[10] Even Martin Hengel, in a small, popular, but no less engaging book arising from a lecture to an audience of Bavarian lawyers in 1974,

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[6] For a comprehensive literature survey of this topic up until 1980 see Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 1-46.

[7] Markgraf, 'Clemens von Alexandrien als asketischer Schriftsteller in seiner Stellung zu den natürlichen Lebensgütern,' *ZKG* 22 (1901), 511.

[8] R. B. Tollinton, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Liberalism*, 2 vols. (London: Williams & Norgate, 1914), 1.324-325.

[9] G. W. Butterworth, *Clement of Alexandria*, LCL (London: Heinemann, 1919), 267.

[10] Ferguson, *Clement of Alexandria*, 178.

concludes that '... in Clement, traditions of Jewish wisdom, Stoic ethics and the message of the New Testament combine with the specific situation of the Alexandrian church in a new synthesis ... The generally expressed radical and rigorist criticism of property was toned down and made more inward ...'[11] Clement's concern to find a 'liberal' way between radical asceticism and the unquestioning endorsement of riches entailed, in Hengel's view, twisting the plain meaning of the gospel sayings.

In spite of this negative assessment of Clement's exegesis, some scholars do grant the positive value of Clement's emphasis in the second half of *QDS* on the religious and social obligations which go with the possession of property, namely almsgiving. Unfortunately, they neglect to define these social obligations any further other than by merely observing that 'property is the gift of God and in all cases is there to meet the need of others'[12] and that there were 'strict obligations to the community' in their use.[13]

There is thus an inclination by scholars to view the two parts of *QDS* as evincing a tension in Clement's attitudes towards wealth between the inner detachment from possessions, which they see as a dilution of the Gospel imperative, and active almsgiving, considered positively to be more in line with the Christian notion of charity. This impression of paradox is no more evident, though for different reasons, than in the doctoral thesis by L. W. Countryman published in 1980, which is considered by Elizabeth Clark to be the most detailed analysis of *QDS* to date.[14] Countryman seeks in his thesis to determine the overall tendencies of early Christian thinking on the subject of wealth and devotes the whole of his first chapter to the examination of *QDS*.[15] The greater part of his investigation involves a descriptive rather than analytical, chapter-by-chapter summary of the argumentation of the treatise. Based on his

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[11] M. Hengel, *Property and Riches in the Early Church: Aspects of a Social History of Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 77-78.

[12] Hengel, *Property and Riches*, 75.

[13] Hengel, *Property and Riches*, 78. Cf. Tollinton, *Clement of Alexandria*, 326-327.

[14] Countryman, *Rich Christian*; E. A. Clark, *Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 95n.155.

[15] Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 47.

description, Countryman chooses two topics from *QDS* – attitudes to wealth and almsgiving – which he then compares to the writings of other early Christian authors.

Countryman detects two different tendencies in Clement's thinking on wealth in *QDS*. On one hand, Clement was largely negative about riches. He held that riches, though not an evil in themselves, were a serious temptation to the Christian who possessed them. As remedies against the danger of riches, Clement advocated spiritual separation from them involving inner detachment and outer simplicity of life. In this, his position was negative, but not radically so: 'wealth [was] something to disentangle oneself from spiritually, but one may continue to possess it in material terms.' On the other hand, his attitude betrayed a high theology of almsgiving, which granted to wealth a positive role in the salvation of its possessor. As a result one may logically draw the conclusion that the potential benefit of riches more or less counterbalanced their potential harm. Countryman attributes the incongruity to Clement's determination to combine themes drawn from two distinct traditions: Hellenistic philosophy and Jewish Wisdom. The inner detachment from possessions was based on the Stoic category of things morally indifferent (ἀδιάφορα), while the doctrine of 'redemptive almsgiving' was derived from the Hebrew scriptures.[16]

There is however a major obstacle to be overcome before we can accept or reject Countryman's proposal that Clement's adherence to two distinct and disparate traditions lies behind the apparent tension in his attitudes towards wealth. While maintaining 'redemptive almsgiving' to be derived from the Hebrew scriptures, Countryman virtually ignores the context of reciprocity or mutual exchange in which the 'redemptive almsgiving' takes place which seems to depend more on Graeco-Roman philosophical and cultural conventions of friendship. For example, Clement exhorts the wealthy to use their wealth to make friends with a man who is a friend of God (*QDS* 33.1).[17] In return, the friend of God would function as a spiritual guide and secure pardon for the wealthy. Countryman acknowledges that the

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[16] Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 60-63.

[17] Without minimizing the issues involved, I have used the word 'man' thoughout the work to refer to all human beings, male and female, and the human race considered generically.

concept of reciprocity, or what he calls 'the chaplaincy to the rich,' has never been fully explored although it had been noted *en passant* by previous scholars.[18] In his treatment of 'redemptive almsgiving,' Countryman simply restates Clement's friendship terms like 'neighbour,' 'benefactor,' 'friend,' 'admonishing with frankness,' 'friend of God,' 'friend of Christ,' and spiritual 'guards' without betraying an awareness of the significance of these terms and conventions for readers of *QDS* in second century Graeco-Roman society. Urgently needed is a full exploration of the way that the cultural and philosophical conventions of friendship function in this treatise.

While Clement's notion of friendship with God has been explored (though by no means thoroughly) for some time, it is only very recently that there has been even a cursory discussion of Clement's use of friendship terms and conventions pertaining to relations between members of the Christian community.[19] That friendship terms and conventions are present in his works has been occasionally recognized in the past, but several scholars still insist that these ideas are not developed and are only used to depict relations between God and man rather than purely human relationships.[20] These scholars hold that it is not until the fourth century that friendship began to play an important part in the lives and thought of Christians.[21] This thesis challenges this view by showing that Clement has well developed ideas on friendship (between man and God, and between man and man) which play a pivotal role in his argumentation in *QDS*.

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[18] Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 67n.24. Cf. H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 63-64; E. F. Osborn, *Ethical Patterns in Early Christian Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 64-65; J. Patrick, *Clement of Alexandria* (Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood, 1914), 182.

[19] E. Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund: Beiträge zur Geschichte eines religiösen Terminus,' *ZKG* 42 (1923), 186-191. L. Rizzerio gave a paper titled 'L'éthique de Clément et la philosophie grecque' at the 14th International Conference on Patristic Studies held at Oxford University in August 2003 which briefly touched on the friendship motif in Clement's works.

[20] J. C. Thom, '"Harmonious Equality": The Topos of Friendship in Neopythagorean Writings,' in *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 83; C. White, *Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.

[21] White, *Christian friendship*, 3-4; K. Treu, 'Freundschaft,' *RAC* 8 (1972), 429.

Returning to Countryman, there are also good grounds for calling into question his basic conclusion, also held by several scholars, that the whole of *QDS* is devoted to vindicating the possibility that the rich can be saved *even as rich*.[22] First, this idea not only contradicts Clement's other treatments on wealth in his major works, as candidly admitted by Countryman, but also seems to be irreconcilable with Clement's understanding of salvation itself. Salvation for Clement is continually progressive and teleological, involving the assimilation to the divine through philosophical and ethical advancement and imitation of the Saviour. Nevertheless, if we follow Countryman's assessment, we have an incongruent situation in *QDS* in which Clement encourages his readers to strive to be passionless like the Saviour and, at the same time, reassures them that they can be saved *even as rich*.[23]

Second, Countryman's assessment conflicts with Clement's method of scripture interpretation. Whereas Philo, for example, tended to favour the spiritual interpretation of a difficult passage at the expense of the literal, the spiritual or parabolic interpretation for Clement rarely contradicts the plain sense.[24] Countryman's supposition that the rich could be saved *even as rich* would imply that Clement contravenes his own interpretative method, which of course is quite possible, but ought to be subscribed to only as a last resort.

Thus we pose the question that, if we take into account Clement's progressive and teleological view of salvation, how does this change our understanding of his intention for the wealthy reader in *QDS*? There is clearly a need to outline Clement's leading ideas on salvation before any investigation of his intentions in the treatise can take place.

In sum, all articles and books published on *QDS* in the past century can largely be divided into four categories. In the first category, the earlier scholars were concerned with

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[22] Clark, *Reading renunciation*, 94-96; Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 49. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London: Duckworth, 1983), 435, similarly sees *QDS* as the 'earliest treatise to provide a detailed justification of property ownership by Christians.' The proposal that Clement argues in *QDS* that it is possible to be rich and still be saved is the standard view in stock surveys on church history. Cf. J. L. Gonzalez, *A History of Christian Thought*, vol. I (Nashville TN: Abingdon Press, 1987), 191.

[23] Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 61-62.

[24] On Clement's understanding of scripture see pp. 42f.

establishing the text of *QDS*.[25] In the second category, which is aimed at a more popular readership, scholars built upon the translation work of the previous generations to furnish a descriptive if prejudicial summary of Clement's philosophical and theological thoughts in *QDS* as part of his whole corpus.[26] Third, even though *QDS* is a short work compared with Clement's major compositions, it encompasses a few odd curiosities such as the depiction of God as mother (*QDS* 37) and an enchanting story of St John and the brigand (*QDS* 42) that have attracted the attention of some scholars.[27] Finally, the majority of scholars who are interested in *QDS* typically investigate the treatise as part of broader studies on early Christian attitudes towards particular issues such as pedagogy[28] and wealth.[29] Thus several scholars approach the text of *QDS* hoping to glean answers for their questions which we suggest ought not to be asked until sufficient analysis of Clement's intentions in composing *QDS* has been completed. There has not yet been a study of monograph length and of sufficient analytical rigour that explores Clement's leading ideas in *QDS* especially in the areas of friendship, community and the notion of moral progression towards salvation, and how these leading ideas function in his argumentation. Once we are able to appreciate Clement's arguments in *QDS* in the philosophical, religious and literary contexts of the Graeco-Roman culture in which they were composed, we can be certain that we have a more secure and objective basis for making an assessment on his attitudes towards particular issues.

1.2 Aim

In this thesis I aim to ascertain the beliefs and actions Clement wants his wealthy readers to adopt as the result of reading his discourse, *Quis Dives Salvetur?* I propose that this aim

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[25] E.g. Barnard, *Clement of Alexandria, Quis Dives Salvetur* ; E. Schwartz, 'Zu Clemens ΤΙΣ Ο ΣΩΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΠΛΟΥΣΙΟΣ,' *Hermes* 38 (1903), 75-100.

[26] E.g. Tollinton, *Clement of Alexandria*, 1.303-333.

[27] E.g. E. Junod, 'Un écho d'une controverse autour de la pénitence: l'histoire de l'Apôtre Jean et du chef des brigands chez Clément d'Alexandrie (Quis Dives Salvetur 42,1-15),' *RHPhR* (1980), 153-160; C. Nardi, 'Il seme eletto e la maternita' di Dio nel *Quis dives salvetur* di Clemente Alessandrino,' *Prometheus* 11 (1985), 271-286.

[28] E.g. U. Neymeyr, *Die christlichen Lehrer im zweiten Jahrhundert: ihre Lehrtätigkeit, ihr Selbstverständnis und ihre Geschichte* (Leiden: Brill, 1989).

[29] In addition to Countryman, *Rich Christian* and Hengel, *Property and Riches* is the classic work of Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle*, 433-438.

can be best achieved by means of a rigorous analysis of Clement's argumentation in *QDS*, which takes into account the progressive, ethical, and teleological aspects of his salvific schema and his understanding of the economy by which God's benefits are mediated through the Christian community. My thesis is that Clement employs Graeco-Roman philosophical and cultural conventions of friendship in quite developed ways in both his salvific schema and his ideal of Christian community in *QDS*, and that his intention is to persuade the wealthy believer (the prime implied reader) to undertake the relatively austere pastoral remedy which involves living on a modest self-sufficiency, indiscriminately distributing superfluous possessions to the less well-off in the Christian community over a long period of time (possibly to the point where the wealthy believer may no longer be deemed wealthy), and securing the religious patronage of an advanced Christian to act as a spiritual director and personal advocate before God.

1.3 Research Approach

To achieve this aim I have adopted the following approach:

In chapter 2, I explore the literary considerations for the following research by examining the problems that Clement is trying to remedy in *QDS*, and his probable role and standing in the Alexandrian church. In this I will be trying to determine Clement's own perceived authority for writing a treatise such as *QDS* and whether he had the means to impose his views on others. I will attempt to uncover the diversity of attitudes towards the wealthy held by the various Christian, heretical and Gnostic groups in Alexandria with which we might compare those outlined by Clement in *QDS*.

In chapter 3, I identify and describe some of the principal concepts which lie behind *QDS* based on Clement's treatment of them in his other works. My presupposition is that Clement's attitude towards wealth and the wealthy did not change markedly in the period between his composition of *QDS* and his other works (the various emphases possibly being attributed to different rhetorical purposes and genres). This has implications for my hermeneutical method where I frequently have recourse to relevant passages from Clement's

major works to illuminate certain points in *QDS* and *vice versa*. The validity of this presupposition, I believe, will be borne out in a coherent and plausible analysis of *QDS*.

In light of my previous discussion on what I perceive to be the chief shortcomings of previous scholarship on *QDS* (viz. Clement's soteriology and use of friendship conventions), I classify the principal concepts under two rubrics: 'salvation as the τέλος of philosophical ascent' and 'the church as the ideal philosophical community of friends.' The description of the leading ideas of *QDS* based on their treatment in Clement's other works ought to give us a reasonable starting point for understanding how these ideas function in his arguments in *QDS*. One cannot hope to understand Clement's arguments without first appreciating the complexity and development of these leading ideas and concepts.

In chapter 4, which is by far the largest section of the thesis, I undertake a rigorous analysis of Clement's arguments in *QDS*. I explore how the leading ideas from Chapter 3 function in these arguments and how Clement develops several of these leading ideas in *QDS* in interesting ways, occasionally combining them in quite distinctive syntheses.

In the concluding chapter, I will draw together the findings from this study on the actions and beliefs that Clement wishes his readers to adopt from reading *QDS*, and the ways that he employs Graeco-Roman philosophical and cultural friendship conventions in his argumentation. Finally, I will make an assessment on the distinctive and radical aspects of Clement's pastoral solution in *QDS* in comparison with some other early Christian works which touch on the issue of wealth and the wealthy.

Chapter 2

Literary Considerations

2.1 *QDS* as a work of persuasion

QDS, I contend, is quite different from a lot of ancient religious discourse which, as a rule, avoids speaking concretely and can often be characterized by 'a music of words that moved one away as much as possible from everyday concerns.'[30] Clement wrote *QDS* because there was a pastoral problem or a complex of pastoral problems which he felt could be completely or partially removed through discourse. He aims to persuade his readers to make certain decisions, whether to change their views on certain issues or to change their conduct. That his overall aim in *QDS* involves persuasion leads to the prospect that the work may also include some rhetorical influences. That is not to say that Clement regarded himself as a sophist.[31] Sophists, in Clement's view, following a commonplace within philosophical circles, composed their works from self-aggrandizing motives, a charge with which he himself accuses his opponents.[32] There is a distinction, however, between rhetoric and sophistry. Rhetoric, in Aristotle's words, is the art of persuasion.[33] It is the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever. But it was the attitude of persuasion at all costs, for the purpose of admiration, even at the expense of truth, where words and tropes can be so construed that a falsehood can seem like truth, and

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[30] Cf. F. Siegert, 'Homily and Panegyrical Sermon,' in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period*, ed. S. E. Porter (Leiden, New York & Köln: Brill, 1997), 436-437.

[31] Though it must be remembered that the distinction between sophist and philosopher was far less obvious in Clement's time. Cf. L. A. H. Emmett, 'The Divine Rhetor: A Study of Clement of Alexandria' (D.Phil.diss., University of Oxford, 2001).

[32] *Str.* 1.3.22.1-24.4; 2.1.3.1-2; 7.15.92.7.

[33] Quintilian provides a convenient synopsis of the various definitions of rhetoric held by the classical authors (*Inst.* 2.15). Aristotle defines rhetoric as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatsoever and Quintilian as the science of speaking well. These two definitions reflect a difference in emphasis: Aristotle on proof and Quintilian, while not neglecting proof, emphasizes style. Cf. G. A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 13. Aristotle himself argues that rhetoric is a branch of dialectic. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. Cf. *Rh.* 1356a25-33.

truth like falsehood, that brought sophists into most disrepute with Clement and other philosophers.[34] Clement, following the example of the earliest Christian writers beginning with the apostle Paul,[35] frequently took a cynical stance towards ornate speech in reaction to the sophists. To speak or write simply, without excessive embellishment, was considered to be proof of the author's intention to communicate truthfully,[36] and therefore to write or speak simply is itself a rhetorical strategy, a means of persuasion.[37] And while Clement could join Plato in disparaging sophistry as 'an evil art,'[38] he could also be extremely practical and, like Plato, glean what was useful from rhetoric for the purpose of persuading his readers. Clement models himself on the apostle Paul in being 'a Greek for the sake of the Greeks, that we may gain all.'[39] He explains his method of employing an extremely diverse range of classical and Hellenic thought in the *Stromateis* in terms of culling 'what is useful for the benefit of the catechumens, especially when they are Greeks'[40] in order to produce 'persuasion in his hearers' and to engender their admiration for the essential doctrines of the faith.[41] Clement, as does Aristotle, concedes that rhetoric is not completely incompatible with philosophy, and in conjunction with the latter can be useful for persuasion. On the other hand, if not

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[34] Declamations against sophists was a commonplace with several writers in antiquity (cf. for example Plato *Apology*, *Gorgias*; Isocrates *Antidosis* 260-77; Cicero *Inv.* 1.1.1ff.). In *Str.* 1.3.22-23, Clement makes use of an anthology of texts disparaging sophists from the classical and hellenistic period including the Abderite, Solon, the New Testament, Cratinus and Iophon. In the classical period, the persuasive powers and control of the sophists over their audiences (or in modern political terms, their 'spin') was considered a deceptive form of communication and a danger to the Athenian legal system and indeed to democracy itself. To counter the effect of the sophists' bewitching eloquence and cleverness with words, speakers often downplayed their own ability to speak and by doing so highlighted their concern only to tell the truth. Cf. J. Hesk, 'The Rhetoric of Anti-Rhetoric in Athenian Oratory,' in *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, ed. S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 201-230.

[35] 1 Cor. 2.1-5; 2 Cor. 10.10, 11.6; 1 Tim. 6.3-5, the last reference quoted in full in *Str.* 1.8.40.1-2.

[36] *Str.* 7.18.111.1. Cf. Plato, *Apology* 17a-18a.

[37] R. M. Grant, 'Theological Education at Alexandria,' in *Roots of Egyptian Christianity*, ed. B. A. Pearson and J. E. Goehring (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 188, also notes that early Christian rejection of the showy effects of Asiatic rhetoric and the adoption of simple logical statements to produce conviction is itself a form of rhetorical argument. He calls it 'antirhetorical rhetoric.'

[38] *Str.* 1.8.39.2.

[39] *Str.* 1.1.15.5-16.1. Cf. 1 Cor. 9.20-21.

[40] *Str.* 6.11.89.2-3.

[41] *Str.* 1.2.19.4-20.1.

conjoined with philosophy rhetoric degenerates into sophistry.[42] That Clement did not consider himself to be a sophist need not imply that he was completely innocent of rhetoric.[43]

As we will see later in this study, the implied audience of *QDS* include wealthy Christians, spiritually immature and most likely Greek in their worldview, if not ethnicity. They were not advanced Christians who could be persuaded simply through purely rational discourse or by means of such a complex genre as the *Stromateis*. Other more conventional persuasive techniques would be required.

2.2 Implications

Some implications and qualifications arise from our proposal that *QDS* shares some features with rhetorical works. First, I am by no means suggesting the *QDS* can be forced into the mould of a classical speech, whether a deliberative discourse given to a public assembly, or an epideictic oration which praises or censures some notable person, or the forensic prosecution or defence of the lawyer in the law-courts. Clement clearly adopted a number of different genres to compose *QDS*. The proem in the opening chapter of *QDS* includes a highly stylistic harangue of those who flatter the wealthy and resembles in content and terminology the proem of Ps-Philo's *De Iona*.[44] The high style of the proem is toned down to a more conversationalist tenor, in the middle style, in the first part of the main body of *QDS* (chs 4-27). This part resembles an exegetical homily and its stated function is to persuade the wealthy readers, despairing of their jeopardized salvific status, that salvation is still open to them if they so choose to follow the author's guidance. In light of his tripartite classification of persuasive discourses corresponding to three aspects of man[45] in the opening chapter of the *Paedagogus*, Clement would probably call this part hortatory discourse (ὁ

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[42] *Str.* 1.8.39.1-2.

[43] A classic example is the proem for *Protrepticus* which borrows from the style of the sophists.

It must be kept in mind that the rhetorical expressions which irritate the modern reader were useful for persuasion in an ancient context. Cf. Chadwick, *Early Christian thought*, 36; Emmett, 'The divine rhetor'

[44] Siegert, 'Homily and Panegyrical Sermon,' 440.

[45] I.e habits, actions, and passions.

προτρεπτικός), a guide to piety for the building up of faith. In the second part of the main body of *QDS* (chs 27-41), he advises the wealthy reader on a suitable course of actions to take in order to attain to salvation. This part, again in Clement's terms, would come under the province of preceptive discourse (ὁ ὑποθετικός). Both parts of the main body, the hortatory and preceptive forms of discourse, invariably involve persuasion.

In spite of the fact that *QDS* does not fit in the mould of a classical speech, I can see no reason why we cannot make use of some of the *functional correspondences* between *QDS* and classical rhetorical speeches in our analysis of its arguments.[46] We are not hindered by the same obstacles, or at least to the same extent, faced by scholars attempting to employ certain elements of classical rhetorical theory in their analysis of the New Testament epistles, especially those of the apostle, Paul, where there is little positive evidence that the original authors were even trained in classical rhetoric.[47] Thus there has to be some question as to whether the original authors employed rhetorical categories deliberately or sub-consciously. In contrast to the little we know about the NT authors, we can be reasonably confident that Clement had a comprehensive education in the Greek *paideia*, at a time which is considered to be the height of the Second Sophistic.[48] The Second Sophistic was an age of 'flamboyant Hellenism' that saw the ascendancy of rhetoric accompanied by the revival of philosophical schools established around the time of Alexander the Great including Pythagoreanism, Middle Platonism and even Epicureanism. At the height of the Second Sophistic, rhetoric was taught in various degrees in all the schools as part of the classical *paideia*. Rhetoric was

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[46] One would be very hard pressed to support the suggestion that there is no relationship between ancient rhetorical theory and the theory which lays behind such discourses as *QDS*. I propose that there are *functional correspondences* in the areas of rhetorical species, invention, arrangement and style between ancient rhetorical speeches and *QDS*. For this idea, though applied to the analysis of the Pauline epistles, see S. E. Porter, 'Paul of Tarsus and His Letters,' in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 BC - AD 400*, ed. S. E. Porter (Leiden, New York & Köln: Brill, 1997), 569.

[47] New Testament scholars seeking to make use of Greek rhetorical theory generally admit that the apostle Paul had not studied at a Greek rhetorical school. Some suggest that rhetorical handbooks were widely circulated and that Paul had come into contact with them. Alternatively Paul unconsciously applied Greek rhetoric to his writings, in the same way that he used the rules of Greek grammar. Both of these scenarios are not particularly convincing. It is unlikely that Paul could have acquired mastery over these techniques at least to the level which is suggested by the corresponding analyses. Cf. Porter, 'Paul,' 563-564.

[48] G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (London: Routledge, 1993), 13.

such a powerful force in higher education that it is difficult to imagine that an author of such voluminous and erudite writings as the *Stromateis*, the *Paedagogus* and the *Protrepticus* could be attempted by someone completely unversed in its techniques.[49]

A second criticism of NT scholars attempting to employ rhetorical categories in their analysis of the NT epistles includes their failure to take into account the fundamental question as to whether or not all elements of classical rhetorical theory could be applicable to the epistolary genre.[50] It was not until the fourth century CE that Julius Victor became the first rhetorician to treat letter writing as part of a rhetorical system.[51] *QDS* is clearly not of the epistolary genre. It is a homiletic treatise which addresses ethical issues. In relation to this point, there is evidence that Clement's school had domesticated rhetoric for its own use in its classification of the types of discourse appropriate for addressing various ethical issues. This method of classification, which draws upon rhetorical categories, was applied to the various speeches of God and the prophets in the Old Testament. For example, in the *Paedagogus*, Clement refutes the suggestion of any inconsistency between his claim that God is good and the biblical passages which speak of God's anger and punishment. In doing so, he identifies two of the three genera of rhetoric (deliberative and epideictic, omitting forensic) and their divisions in order to show that scriptural passages of censure have God's goodwill as their basis. In the same way that deliberative discourse incorporates both the hortatory and the consolatory forms, there exists in epideictic discourse both the encomiastic and the inculpatory forms which constitute the art of censure, the act of which is a mark of goodwill, not of hatred.[52] In another passage from the *Paedagogus*, Clement, having demonstrated that the harsh admonitions in the scriptures were conducive to repentance and the prevention of

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[49] Anderson, *The Second Sophistic*, 9.

[50] For this criticism of some New Testament scholars seeking to use rhetorical categories on Pauline epistles see Porter, 'Paul,' 565-566; J. T. Reed, 'Using Ancient Rhetorical Categories to Interpret Paul's Letters: A Question of Genre,' in *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, ed. S. E. Porter and T. H. Olbricht (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 292-324.

[51] A. J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, Sources for Biblical Study, vol. 19 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 2-3; Porter, 'Paul,' 567; Reed, 'Ancient Rhetorical Categories,' 294-295.

[52] *Paed.* 1.8.66.1-2.

sins, goes on to show the 'mildness of the Logos,' who wishes to make known that which is noble and useful through epideictic and deliberative discourse. The noble belongs to the epideictic form of speech, the useful to the deliberative. For the hortatory and the dehortatory are a form of the deliberative, and the laudatory and inculpatory of the panegyrical.[53]

Of course, Clement attaches his own meanings for the various genera of discourse quite distinct from his sophistic counterparts, but the point is that, in his view, there were *functional correspondences* between ethical discourse theory and ancient rhetorical theory. Clement here is probably following a Stoic practice of classifying discourses most fitting for particular ethical purposes.[54] Seneca, for example, arguing that a rationale must be given for precepts in order for the prescribed action to be regarded as virtuous (that is, it is not sufficient simply to furnish precepts when giving ethical advice), draws upon Posidonius who holds that not only precept-giving, but even persuasion, consolation and encouragement are necessary.[55]

In a similar vein, the Stoic, Epictetus, an avowed opponent of the sophists, maintains the distinction between rhetor and philosopher, and censures those philosophers who are motivated by praise in the same way as rhetors. The philosopher ought to seek to form good men and be indifferent as to whether or not his lecture halls are full or whether or not members of the audience praise his views. Indeed, the philosopher ought to be chary if his views are praised! Epictetus does concede that there are fitting forms for exhortation, refutation and instruction, and assumes that these are a given. He insists however that epideictic discourse, the special province of sophists, is both unfitting and unbecoming for true philosophers to adopt.[56] Since this method was an established practice of at least some Stoics then Clement could have inherited the classification of the various speeches in the

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[53] *Paed.* 1.10.89.2-3.

[54] The classification of speeches into different kinds corresponding to the various types of men and conditions of the soul was adumbrated by Socrates in Plato's *Phaedrus* 271d-e, which may be evidence of Plato's less hostile attitude towards rhetoric compared to *Gorgias* and the *Sophist*.

[55] *Ep.* 95.65. Cf. Quintilian *Inst.* 1.9.2; Cicero *Orat.* 3.205.

[56] Arrianus *Epict.* 3.23.33.

scriptures from his teacher, Pantaenus, who, Eusebius tells us, was at one time an adherent of that sect.

A third criticism against using rhetorical categories for analyzing texts, and this is not limited solely to NT works, is that the original authors, especially novices, used rhetorical categories as a guide in the creation of rhetoric, and not as tools for the analysis of discourse. Thus it is not self-evident that analyzing the rhetorical categories used will illuminate the meaning of the discourse, or even that rhetorical analysis is the best way of illuminating the meaning of the discourse.[57] There are two points I wish to make here. First, it is not strictly true that ancient authors never used rhetorical categories for analyzing texts, a proposition which is at odds with the examples of Clement's categorization of the different parts of speech employed in scripture mentioned above.[58] Nevertheless, this criticism should caution us to outline precisely what we are trying to achieve by employing certain elements of rhetorical theory in our analysis of ancient texts. Second, I am by no means proposing that employing elements of rhetorical theory is the best or only way of illuminating the meaning of the text of *QDS*. All I am suggesting is that certain elements of rhetorical criticism when applied judiciously can occasionally be useful in this regard. This study is certainly not intended to be a full-blown rhetorical analysis. Rather I intend to make sparing use of certain elements of rhetorical criticism, as one tool among several employed, which will be subordinate to my chief method stated in the opening chapter.[59]

Therefore, with these caveats in mind, and given that we can be reasonably certain that Clement was well acquainted with the rhetoric of his time, though *QDS* itself may not be

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[57] S. E. Porter, 'The Theoretical Justification for Application of Rhetorical Categories to Pauline Epistolary Literature,' in *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, ed. S. E. Porter and T. H. Olbricht (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 105.

[58] An obvious example is found in Clement's categorization of various types of reproach where he defines visitation for the sake of retribution as a very severe form of rebuke (*Paed.* 1.9.79). There he quotes the Gospel saying 'Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets who are sent to you.' He comments on the repetition of the word 'Jerusalem' as an aside, '[The Saviour] repeats the name to make his rebuke emphatic, for how is it possible that one who has known God should persecute the ministers of God?' The point is that Clement understands that identifying word figures can illuminate the meaning of the text.

[59] See pp. 16f.

classified as a pure example of any of the three genera of classical speeches, how can we make use of any functional correspondences between *QDS* and classical speeches? I make four suggestions. First, as previously stated, a major part of my method in this thesis is to examine closely Clement's argumentation in *QDS*. However, classical rhetorical theory shows that persuasion is not effected through rational arguments alone, but other factors such as the emotions and the personal character of the author are also very important. There are thus three means of effecting persuasion that we need to take into account in our analysis of *QDS*.[60] The first kind depends on the personal character (ἦθος) of the author, which Aristotle declares to be the most effective means of persuasion that the author possesses. We are more likely to believe good men than others. The second kind depends on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind (πάθος) with a speech that stirs the emotions. Our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. The third kind depends on proof (λόγος) when the author has proved a truth by means of persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

Second, I suggest that it may be worthwhile to compare the rhetorical strategies, arguments and topoi in *QDS* with those from a wide range of other works of the period which deal with the same subject of friendship, wealth and power, including amongst others such works as Dio Chrysostom's *On kingship* and Plutarch's *How to tell a flatterer from a friend.* In most cases, I will not be implying that Clement necessarily borrows from these works in the formulation of his ideas in *QDS* but rather I intend to illustrate that often his attitudes and strategies reflect that of the culture and milieu in which he lived and indeed would be shared by his implied readers.

Third, it may be helpful for discovering Clement's probable intent within each part of *QDS*, once the structure of the discourse has been determined by other more appropriate

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[60] Aristotle *Rh.* 1356a1-5. Clement declares that there are three things in the case of man: habits, actions, and passions. Each of these have a corresponding form of discourse. Habits are attended to by hortatory discourse, the guide to faith. Actions are the province of preceptive discourse. Persuasive discourse applies itself to healing the passions (*Paed.* 1.1.1).

tools.[61] This is a far more passive and restrained employment of classical rhetorical theory than that used by the majority of New Testament scholars in the past. I do not advocate using classical rhetorical theory to determine the structure of *QDS*, for example. Past studies on NT books, even on the more literary works like Hebrews, have shown highly inconsistent results in attempts to use classical rhetorical theory to determine the structure of the work being analysed.

In classical rhetorical theory there are typically four parts to a classical speech, the proem (*exordium*), the statement (*narratio*), the argument (*probatio*) and the epilogue (*peroratio*). The important thing is not the nomenclature but the fact that each of these parts has quite well-defined functions within the total argument of the discourse. Some of these functions, I suggest, could be applicable to all persuasive discourses, not just those which fit the classical rhetorical mould. In the proem, for example, the author often appeals to the emotions while seeking to establish goodwill and trust with his readers and to dispel any prejudice against him or his cause. The author thereby emphasizes his own character and/or censures that of his opponents. The proem is sometimes considered non-essential, aside from laying out the main reason for writing, unless the author expects some opposition or feels that the readers do not consider his topic important enough.[62] The proem is followed by the narration of the facts and a statement of the propositions that the author seeks to prove in the arguments section. The argument section not only includes the main arguments but also a refutation of the opponents' views. The epilogue summarizes the main arguments and often concludes with an impassioned plea for the readers to accept the author's advice for adopting new beliefs or actions and a warning of the consequences if they fail to do so.

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[61] In this study I use logical discourse analysis to determine the structure of *QDS*. For a description of the method see D. A. Carson and S. E. Porter, *Discourse Analysis and Other Topics in Biblical Greek*, JSNT. Supplement series., vol. 113 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995); J. T. Reed, *A Discourse Analysis of Philippians: Method and Rhetoric in the Debate over Literary Integrity*, JSNT Supplement series, vol. 136 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997).

[62] Aristotle *Rh.* 1414b-1415b.

I propose that the four sections of *QDS* share some functional similarities with the four parts of a classical speech.[63] If this is so then it means that we at least have a starting point. We have a set of questions we can ask about the author's intent for each of the four sections of *QDS*. Undoubtedly many questions will be irrelevant because, as I have mentioned, *QDS* does not fit in the mould of a classical speech, but some others may be quite fruitful.

Fourth, by recognizing that *QDS* is a work of persuasion, we may profitably make use of situational theory which, I suggest, furnishes a thorough foundation on which we can build our analysis of Clement's argumentation in subsequent chapters. In situational theory, a branch of rhetorical criticism formulated by Lloyd Bitzer in 1968, but which can be applied to any work of persuasion and not just classical rhetoric, there are three parts to a rhetorical situation: the first is the *exigence* (*sic*) which can be modified through discourse; the second and third are the *audience* to be constrained in decision and action as a result of the discourse and the *constraints* brought to the discourse by the author and which can be brought to bear upon the audience.[64]

2.3 Rhetorical Exigence

In situational theory a rhetorical exigence is defined as an imperfection marked by urgency. It is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be, which can be modified or eliminated by discourse.[65] In *QDS* 2.1-3, Clement identifies the exigence in the form of two obstacles which prevent the rich believer from attaining salvation. The first obstacle has to do with what he considers to be an exclusivist interpretation of the Lord's harsh saying that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of the needle than for the wealthy to enter the kingdom of heaven. This interpretation is said to have led some rich believers to infer that they were completely excluded from any possibility

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[63] This is a similar approach to Emmett, 'The divine rhetor', 169-170, who divided the Protrepticus into four parts corresponding to Aristotle's four parts of a speech in his analysis.

[64] The following situational theory is based on L. Bitzer, 'The Rhetorical Situation,' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* I (1968), 3-8.

[65] Bitzer, 'The Rhetorical Situation,' 6-7; D. F. Watson, *Invention, Arrangement, and Style: Rhetorical Criticism of Jude and 2 Peter* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 29.

of salvation. As a result, some rich believers despair of their future and loosen their ties with the Christian community which offers them no hope. The second obstacle is that, even should some rich believers interpret the Saviour's harsh teaching correctly, a statement which may imply that some readers had heard a sermon by Clement on this topic previously, they still do not do the works necessary to secure their salvation.

2.3.1 Distinction between rhetorical exigence and historical situation

It should be noted that the idea of a rhetorical exigence can be quite distinct from that of a historical situation which constitutes an integral part of historical criticism. The rhetorical exigence in *QDS* is couched in such broad terms that it fails to shed much light on the specific historical situation lying behind it. We can only discern some general features of the wealthy readers whom Clement is seeking to address in *QDS*, but are left completely in the dark about those who are seeking to exclude the wealthy from the church.[66] Even the provenance (assumed to be Alexandria in light of his treatment of the wealthy in the *Paedagogus* and the assumption that his readers have access to his other writings) and date of *QDS* (all we know is that it post-dates his *Exposition concerning First Principles and Theologies* and possibly the first three books of the *Stromateis*) are uncertain.[67] That the rhetorical exigence is couched in broad and schematic terms[68] may imply that he ultimately sought a wider audience for his work than the Christian community in Alexandria,[69] although I would insist that his understanding of the exigence and his pastoral remedy were influenced by his experiences in, and the cultural climate of, that city. It lends support to my proposal that *QDS* was intentionally composed for the written medium, which Clement recognizes elsewhere as an

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[66] On the rhetorical audience see pp. 40f.

[67] In *Str.* 3.3.13.1 and 3.3.21.2, Clement mentions a projected work *On first principles* which may be the same work as that cited in *QDS* 26.8. *QDS* 26.8 seems to imply that the work has already been completed.

[68] On the schematic expression of the exigence in *QDS* see p. 30.

[69] M. J. Edwards, 'The Flowering of Latin Apologetic: Lactantius and Arnobius,' in *Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians*, ed. M.J. Edwards et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 202, notes a similar feature to the apologetic writings of Arnobius and Lactantius.

effective and irreproachable way of 'reaping the salvation' of a wider audience.[70] This is not likely to be the only reason why he wrote *QDS*. He also felt that the exigence which precipitated *QDS* necessitated a comprehensive treatment which could only be accommodated through a written treatise. A. M. Ritter's tentative suggestion that *QDS* may be a retraction of a previous work by Clement which provoked a critical attitude towards wealth by some church members is attractive.[71] However, I would disagree with the word 'recantation' which implies that Clement's views on wealth had changed, which of course is possible but cannot be presupposed. In my view, it is more likely that *QDS* is a *clarification* and an extended treatment of his previous discussions on the topics of wealth and the wealthy.[72]

2.3.2 How *QDS* may have been circulated

It does raise, however, the question as to how Clement's writings including *QDS* were circulated. Clement's writings are themselves silent on this issue. Some scholars are persuaded by the text critic, G. Zuntz, who observes that the biblical texts from Alexandria were far superior to other texts of the second century and in line with the Greek grammatical tradition of that city.[73] Zuntz notes that both Clement and Origen, while not primarily interested in textual matters, had an intimate acquaintance with Greek grammatical terminology, the second being a master of the philological tradition in his own right, and concludes that there must have been a Christian scriptorium in Alexandria, under the control of the bishop, already in place by the latter half of the second century. This fits in well with the suggestion of the existence of a Christian library in the same city on account of the concentration of such a diverse number of Jewish and Christian sources available to

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[70] Clement is concerned in the *Stromateis* to leave behind records for posterity as a way of teaching readers indirectly (*Str.* 1.1.1). Cf. E. F. Osborn, 'Teaching and Writing in the First Chapter of the *Stromateis* of Clement of Alexandria,' *JTS* 10 (1959), 335-343.

[71] A. M. Ritter, 'Christentum und Eigentum bei Klemens von Alexandrien auf dem Hintergrund der frühchristlichen "Armenfrömmigkeit" und der Ethik der kaiserzeitlichen Stoa,' *ZKG* 86 (1975), 7.

[72] In *QDS* 2.3, Clement refers to those who are already cognizant of his interpretation of the rich man narrative but fail to do the requisite works.

[73] A. van den Hoek, 'How Alexandrian was Clement of Alexandria? Reflections on Clement and his Alexandrian Background,' *HJ* 31 (1990), 190-191; C. Scholten, 'Die alexandrinische Katechetenschule,' *JAC* 38 (1995), 34-36; G. Zuntz, *The Text of the Epistles: a Disquisition on the Corpus Paulinum* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 272-273.

Clement.[74] Whether Clement made use of the hypothetical scriptorium for copying and promulgating his works, or whether he tended to deposit his works in some type of semi-public Christian library, or even his own private collection,[75] where interested readers could visit, and copy them at their leisure (and expense!), or even send their slaves to act as scribes,[76] is largely a matter of conjecture. In the case of *QDS*, the former scenario, I think, is unlikely as it is only afterwards with Clement's successor, Origen, that we have any evidence of scribes and a scriptorium in Alexandria set aside for the publication of Christian works; in this case it was for the production of scriptural commentaries. Eusebius tells his readers that Ambrosius provided Origen with more than seven short-hand writers, many copyists and girls trained for beautiful writing.[77] But this case, aside from some suspicions as to its historicity, is the exception rather than the rule. It shows how ancient writers relied on the system of patronage for financial support and slaves to assist in production.[78] There is no evidence that Clement was ever fortunate enough to have elicited the support of such a patron.

2.3.3 Schematic nature of the rhetorical exigence

Clement has structured the main body of the work based on his twofold diagnosis of the exigence.[79] In the first half, he gives an exposition of the rich man narrative from Mark's Gospel in order to eliminate the fear and despair brought about by other interpretations (*QDS* 4.1-27.1). In the second half, he describes the actions that the wealthy need to perform in order to curtail their pleasures and to attain to salvation (*QDS* 27.2-41.7). It is clear that he

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[74] Hoek, 'How Alexandrian,' 190.

[75] H. Y. Gamble, *Books and Readers in the Early Church: A History of Early Christian Texts* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995), 161, suggests that Pantaenus, Clement and Origen may have had personal libraries which they opened for use by their students, but that it was not until Origen's time that a Christian library had taken shape.

[76] In the Graeco-Roman world, most scribes were found among the slaves in the lower to middle-class professionals. In early Christian literature the scribes who copied the texts were themselves Christian. Cf. K. Haines-Eitzen, *Guardians of Letters: Literacy, Power, and the Transmitters of Early Christian Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7, 130.

[77] *HE* 6.23.

[78] Haines-Eitzen, *Guardians*, 4-5, 41-43.

[79] So M. Wacht, 'Wahre und falsche Armut. Bemerkungen zu Clemens Alexandrinus, Quis dives salvetur Kap. 19,' *JAC* 11 (1984), 339.

depicts the rhetorical exigence in a somewhat schematic way. The rich believers' despair at the exclusivist scriptural interpretations and their neglect in undertaking the requisite deeds can be attributed to the irrational passions of fear and pleasure respectively. These twin passions of fear and pleasure lay at the root of all mankind's problems, not solely those of the wealthy.[80] People are deprived of what is good unwillingly. They are beguiled who are either bewitched by pleasure or terrified by fear. These are voluntary changes, but by none of these will knowledge ever be attained.[81] Fear is attributable to ignorance and thereby can be eliminated by knowledge or right reason,[82] and pleasure can be restrained by training in the conduct of certain actions. These presuppositions undoubtedly constrain to a significant extent Clement's treatment of the problems faced by the wealthy in *QDS*, but they do more than that. The fact that the passions of fear and pleasure are subject to the will provides the rational basis by which Clement can be assured that the exigence can be modified or eliminated through the use of discourse.[83]

Clement can by no means assume that all of his readers would agree with his purpose in seeking the salvation of the wealthy without demur. There were some believers who behaved 'with insolent rudeness' towards the rich members of the church (3.1). Unfortunately, as we have mentioned, it is impossible to identify these opponents of the wealthy any further from the text of *QDS*.

2.3.4 Potential problems with the rich Christian

We do know however from Clement's major works that wealthy believers either wittingly or unwittingly gave rise to a number of problems which threatened the Christian community in Alexandria and as a result could attract some opposition from several quarters.

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[80] E. F. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 98.

[81] *Str.* 1.8.42.3-4. See also *Str.* 6.14; 7.16.101.6; Plato *Laws* 9.863b-d.

[82] For Clement everything contrary to right reason is a sin. Thus the more generic passions – lust, fear, pleasure and grief – are described as various parts of the mind disobedient to reason. Cf. *Paed.* 1.13.101. These ideas are found in Plato *Laws* 9.863c; Aristotle *EN* 1135b; Chrysippus *SVF* 3.256, 60.29-33 and Philo *Ebr.* 2.6. Cf. J. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 243.

[83] *Paed.* 1.8.64.

Liability of the wealthy to abuse banquets and the Agape

This was nowhere more apparent than in the common practice in antiquity for the wealthy to host banquets, a topic which Clement addresses at length in his second book of the *Paedagogus*. He has two overriding concerns here. First, even though admitting that a modest banquet could be conducive to conviviality between its participants,[84] he felt that a very extravagant dinner could be dangerous, not only for the gluttony and pleasure involved but for the undesirable and unequal relationships that these dinners could foster between the host and his guests which in turn could threaten the social cohesion of the Christian community.[85] The wealthy in antiquity often hosted banquets as a medium for displaying their wealth and power and as a means of bestowing benefits to their clients.[86] In Roman culture social advancement or even economic survival often required one to develop relationships with others based on mutual reciprocity. A wealthy patron would often host a banquet either as a reward for services given in the past by a client or with the expectation that the client would reciprocate with a service in the future.[87]

Thus when Clement caricatures the clients who attend the lavish banquets of the wealthy as flies, weasels, gladiators and 'that wild tribe of parasites,' he is, in short, berating a

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[84] *Paed.* 2.1.9.

[85] It is likely that Clement's demands that banquets be devoid of all luxury and consist of only modest foodstuffs were motivated by his desire for a more egalitarian expression of solidarity in the Christian community. It is almost certain, in my opinion, that his demands were designed to loosen the believers' dependence on the wealthy through traditional patronal relationships. Cf. S. Schwartz, *Imperialism and Jewish Society* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 221-222, who observes similar motivations for common meals in the religious practices of Jews in first century Palestine.

[86] Cf. J. D'Arms, 'The Roman *Convivium* and the Idea of Equality,' in *Sympotica: A Symposium on the 'Symposion'*, ed. Oswyn Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 308-320. These power relations were often reinforced by serving food to each participant of a quality corresponding to their status and relation to the host, a practice which was subjected to severe criticism by contemporary writers. Martial complains that the patron's food is expensive and delicious while that of the client is cheap and nasty. The patron and client should eat food of the same quality (3.60). Cf. D. Cloud, 'The Client-Patron Relationship: Emblem and Reality in Juvenal's First Book,' in *Patronage in Ancient Society*, ed. A. Wallace-Hadrill (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), 211-212.

The giving and receiving of food at a meal in the context of patronage systems could also be ambiguous. The giver might be seeking to establish or reinforce a claim to power, yet food could also be brought to patrons by clients. See C. A. Bobertz, 'The Role of Patron in the Cena Dominica of Hippolytus' Apostolic Tradition,' *JTS* 44 (1993), 174-176; A. McGowan, 'Discipline and Diet: Feeding the Martyrs in Roman Carthage,' *HTR* 96 (2003), 464-468, for both examples in Christian contexts.

[87] Juvenal *Sat.* 5.12-22. Cf. Bobertz, 'The role of patron,' 173; J. Shelton, *As the Romans Did: A Sourcebook in Roman Social History*, 2nd ed. (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 17.

perverse form of friendship and consciously attacking this institution of Roman society.[88] This cultural expectation may illuminate his charge that the wealthy were trying to buy off the commands of God with banquets as *Agapes*.[89] The wealthy, it seems, were motivated to host lavish love-feasts, or *Agapes*, for the purpose of both advancing their own social and religious standing among the less well-off in the community and obliging the guests of the feast to reciprocate with like benefits at a later date, thereby adding to the 'burden of those who do not have.'[90]

Second, Clement wishes to drive a wedge between the common banquet hosted by the wealthy and the traditional *Agape*. He is not opposed to the idea of the wealthy hosting banquets provided that they are conducted in moderation. Indeed, he recognizes that banquets and dinners can enhance solidarity in the Christian community (this can be seen by the way that he marshals scriptural support for the continued Christian participation in banquets from such texts as Lk. 14.8-10 and 14.12-16).[91] Rather the problem arises when the wealthy label these banquets *Agapes*.[92] Throughout the second century, several diverse Christian groups practised and interpreted the *Agape* as expressions of their ideal communities.[93] Some Christian leaders considered this to be very divisive. Initial mainstream response at the beginning of the second century was to try to regulate the conduct of the *Agapes* and to demand the presence of the bishop as, for example, Ignatius does in his attempt to isolate the

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[88] *Paed.* 2.1.7; cf. *Iliad* 19.30-31.

[89] *Paed.* 2.1.4 following 1 Cor. 11.17-22.

[90] *Paed.* 2.1.12. As a rule, the very poor were excluded from banquets in antiquity since they naturally would not be able to return any benefits to the host. Juvenal's first book of *Satires* presents a historically false picture of the client at the banquet of his patron. The client is a very poor man who, even though the relationship is asymmetrical, is unable to reciprocate, he cannot contribute anything, not even a vote. Cf. Cloud, 'Emblem and reality in Juvenal,' 210. See also Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 149-151.

[91] Hence Clement insists on table etiquette in the *Paedagogus*. Manners play an important part both in individual self-definition and group solidarity; the fundamental virtue they assert is that of conformity in a shared discipline of eating together. Cf. B. Leyerle, 'Clement of Alexandria on the Importance of Table Etiquette,' *JECS* 3 (1995), 126-139.

[92] *Paed.* 2.1.4. In contast, Hippolytus of Rome encouraged the wealthy believers to continue to function as patrons of the Lord's Supper. See Bobertz, 'The role of patron,' 173ff.

[93] Clement refers to leaders of rival communities embracing the convivial couch of honour in their *Agapes* as an expression of their authority (*Str.* 7.16.98.2).

Docetists.[94] However, by the end of the second century the practices of some extreme Christian groups like the Carpocratians had brought the *Agape* into disrepute and opened the church to attacks by pagan critics.[95] Clement claims that the Carpocratians and other zealots gather together for the *Agape*, both men and women, and after feasting knock over the lamps and couple with any woman they fancy. In this way they are said to practise commonality.[96] The alleged Carpocratian practice of the *Agape* is, in Clement's view, a distortion of Plato's proposal in the *Republic* that wives be held in common by the guardians.[97] In response he relegates the *Agape* feast to a spiritual ideal, by nature quite distinct from mundane banquets.[98]

Attraction of the wealthy to Gnostic speculative systems and community

Does this imply that the wealthy who conducted their feasts as *Agapes* in *Paed.* 2.1.4 were members of the Carpocratian sect or some other Gnostic or heretical group?[99] There is little doubt that some Gnostic sects like the Basilideans and Valentinians comprised some of the largest and most influential Christian communities in Alexandria at the end of the second

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[94] *Smyrnaeans* 8.2. The majority of modern scholars hold that Ignatius' letters are to be dated to the reign of Trajan. There are some challenges to the consensus which are not particularly convincing in my view. Cf. W. R. Schoedel, 'Are the letters of Ignatius of Antioch Authentic?,' *Religious Studies Review* 6 (1980), 196-201; W. R. Schoedel, *Ignatius of Antioch*, ed. H. Koester, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 4-7.

[95] Cf. Origen, *Cels.* 6.40.

[96] *Str.* 3.2.10.1.

[97] *Str.* 3.2.10.2. One ought to be hesitant in accepting Clement's claims here for two reasons. First, the alleged Carpocratian practice of holding women in common and its attendent justification from Plato's *Republic* is based on the work *On Justice* by Epiphanes, the son of Carpocrates, rather than that of Carpocrates himself. Second, Clement may be attributing the alleged depraved practices of the Carpocratians to their erroneous interpretations of Plato as part of his polemic in discrediting the sect. Cf. A. Le Boulluec, *La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque IIe-IIIe siècles*, 2 vols. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1985), 299-301. It is worthwhile to note that Clement's interpretation of Plato *Republic* 457d which advocates a woman's freedom to choose her spouse is equally specious; a similar rendering is espoused by Epictetus (Arrianus *Epict.* 2.4.8-10). Plato's 'communism' applies only to the ruling class who as a rule practise sexual abstinence. Copulation is only permitted at festivals with partners allocated by lot.

[98] *Paed.* 2.1.6. M. Rizzi, 'Unity of the Symbolic Domain in Clement of Alexandria's Thought,' in *Fourteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies* (Oxford: 2003), also refers to the 'progressive exhaustion' of Agape feasts by the time that Clement wrote and notes the 'marked eschatologization' of the significance of the rite. Rizzi sees this eschatologization as part of Clement's refusal to interpret liturgical acts as mere signs to their symbolic counterparts which are thought to contain the true meanings. Rather, the unity of creation in all of its dimensions necessitates that true worship has its locus in the totality of the life of the Christian; that is, true worship is ethical, progressive and relational (cf. 1 Cor. 13).

[99] Cf. A. McGowan, 'Naming the Feast: the *Agape* and the Diversity of Early Christian Meals,' *SP* 30 (1997), 316-318, who also sees the situation in Alexandria not as 'a two-fold meal picture of eucharist and agape but a conflict between two systems, complete with rival names and ethics.'

century and therefore it is almost inevitable that the wealthy would have had some exposure to their teachings and practices.[100] Not only would the wealthy and educated classes be naturally drawn to the speculative theological systems of the various Gnostic and heretical groups but some would also have been attracted by their ideas and practice of friendship and community.[101] Irenaeus claims that the heretic Marcus appealed primarily to well-bred and elegantly attired women of great wealth by conferring the gift of prophecy on them at his feasts before seducing them.[102] In the Alexandrian scene, Clement calls Valentinus the chief leader of those who promote community and shows his own acquaintance with Valentinus' treatise *On friends* which is possibly the first Christian discourse on the topic of friendship.[103] The impression one gets from these scanty data is that some Gnostic and heretical groups at the time of Clement's ministry in Alexandria were consciously basing their communities on various philosophical and religious ideals.[104] These communities most probably would have competed with the more mainstream groups for the allegiance of the wealthy believer.[105]

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[100] Cf. E. Procter, *Christian Controversy in Alexandria: Clement's Polemic against the Basilideans and Valentinians*, American University studies. Series VII, Theology and religion, vol. 172 (New York: P. Lang, 1995), for a study on Clement's polemic against these groups. There is a tendency for some modern scholars to question the 'Gnosticism' of Valentinus in light of recent discoveries in the library of Nag Hammadi which suggest much less room for a grossly defective material universe and a more restrained mythological system of emanations than other radical groups. See C. Markschies, *Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins*, WUNT, vol. 2/65 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1992). Nevertheless, there is no question that by the time of Irenaeus and Clement Valentinus had 'become' a Gnostic whether through esoteric tradition, a personal change, or the transformation of his tradition by followers. Cf. A. McGowan, 'Valentinus Poeta: Notes on ΘΕΡΟΣ,' *VC* 51 (1997), 158-178.

[101] Origen's wealthy patron, Ambrosius, had originally been a member of the Valentinian sect prior to his conversion to 'orthodoxy' through Origen's teaching (*HE* 6.18). Cf. J. G. Gager, *Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity* (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 82-83, for the intellectual's role in early Christian heretical groups.

[102] *AH* 1.13.3-4.

[103] *Str.* 6.6.52.3.

[104] *Str.* 3.2.5-8. Cf. *Apocalypse of Peter* 78.31-79.21. On Egyptian Gnostic groups offering alternative communities to the mainstream church see A. F. J. Klijn, 'Jewish Christianity in Egypt,' in *Roots of Egyptian Christianity*, ed. B. A. Pearson and J. E. Goehring (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 172-174.

[105] In late second century Alexandria it was probably difficult to distinguish between many of the heretical and mainstream Christian doctrines. A clear example of this is shown by the generosity of a rich Christian patroness of theology who supported both Origen, whose family had recently become destitute after the martyrdom of his father and confiscation of the family possessions, and a leading heretic, Paul, possibly a Valentinian or Marcionite (*HE* 6.2.12-14). Cf. T. D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 83; Grant, 'Theological Education at Alexandria,' 182. Indeed, Clement's complaint that Epiphanes, the son of Carpocrates, was still listed 'in our church members' register' (*Str.* 3.2.7.4) suggests that the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy may not yet have been completely enforced at the institutional level in the late second century Alexandria.

Relevant to our discussion is an article published by Carlo Nardi who observes that several of the ideas, symbols and terms used by Clement to address the wealthy especially in *QDS* 36-37 had special significance in heretical Gnostic groups.[106] The reference to the 'elect of the elect,' the 'seed,' who are the 'salt of the earth and light of the world,' for whom the cosmos was created and is held together until their harvest, the reference to the maternal nature of God, and the exhortation to behold the 'vision of the bosom of the father,' each have counterparts in Valentinian and other heretical Gnostic systems and are often referred to in Clement's polemic against these groups in *Excerpta ex Theodoto* and elsewhere in his writings. These allusions will be discussed where appropriate *in situ* in the analysis of *QDS* in chapter 4. I do contend, however, that in the context of the arguments of *QDS* these allusions are devoid of any residual polemic, although it is an inescapable conclusion that Clement consciously uses them to enhance the appeal of his discourse especially for those readers attracted to the more speculative systems of the heretical Gnostic sects.

Unfortunately for our purposes, whereas Clement does preserve several of the ethical and theological positions held by various Gnostic and heretical sects on issues such as sex and celibacy, the origin of the world, Christology and soteriology, he does not reveal much about their attitudes towards wealth. All that we can glean from his works is that there was a tremendous diversity of attitudes towards the rich held by various, unidentifiable groups. One scriptural passage in particular highlights the diversity of these interpretations (and hence the diversity of attitudes towards the wealthy) prevalent in late second century Alexandria. The debate centred around one of Jesus' sayings common to all of the Synoptic Gospels, his command to the rich man to 'sell what you have, give to the poor, and come follow me' (Mt. 19.21 and parallels). Some groups suggested that 'what you have' corresponds solely to the things of the soul, that is, things of a nature foreign to it (i.e. the passions).[107] Clement agrees

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[106] Nardi, 'Seme eletto,' 271-286.

[107] It is possible that Clement is echoing the position of the Valentinians here. Irenaeus explains that the Valentinians referred to the rich man, who had performed a large amount of righteousness yet refused to follow Jesus on account of his love of riches, as an example of a psychical person, an intermediate class between fleshly and pneumatic persons (*AH* 1.8.3).

with the spiritual rendering but rejects the notion that it is the sole interpretation for it fails to account for the second part of the command where 'what you have' has to be given to the poor.[108] On the other hand, there is evidence in *QDS* that there were some groups who understood that Jesus' command required the wealthy to jettison all of their wealth and so impoverish themselves.[109] This literal rendering Clement also finds inadequate as it fails to take into account the spiritual or deeper significance. Thus, we have the full spectrum of interpretations held by various Christian groups ranging from the totally spiritual to the totally literal and, as we will see in our analysis in chapter 4, Clement tries to hold to both interpretations at the same time with some qualifications.

Susceptibility of the wealthy to persecution

Countryman brings to our attention another issue which often threatened relations between the wealthy and the less well-off members in early Christian communities.[110] This issue has to do with the popular perception that the wealthy believer would be more prone to defect or apostatize during times of persecution. Even in times of peace the wealthy were often considered marginal Christians on account of their business transactions and inevitable relations with pagans and their religious institutions. This situation was tolerated by Christian leaders in varying degrees.[111] But it was in times of persecution that the wealthy were considered most susceptible. To put it simply, in a system where the confiscation of property by the imperial treasury was a normal part of a capital sentence in Roman law, the wealthy had the most to lose during times of persecution. The author of the *Shepherd of Hermas*

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[108] *Str.* 4.6.29.1. Cf. *QDS* 19.6.

[109] Clement perceives the need to refute the view that the wealthy must jettison all their possessions in order to be saved. See discussion on *QDS* 11.1-16.1 on pp. 129ff. It is perhaps attractive to identify those who are emboldened insolently against the wealthy (*QDS* 3.1) as being proponents of this harsh view. However, this is very tenuous. Clement does not elaborate on the views held by those antagonistic to the wealthy.

[110] Cf. Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 131-148.

[111] Hermas blames the wealthy for being mixed up with business, riches, heathen friendships, and many other occupations of this world (*Vis.* 3.6.5-7; *Mand.* 10.1.4-6; *Sim.* 8.9.1).

refers to those who have faith but also material wealth: 'When persecution comes, because of their wealth and because of business they deny their Lord.'[112]

The most obvious way for wealthy believers to survive the trial of persecution without defecting was to jettison most of their wealth, either voluntarily prior to persecution or as a result of confiscation. In Hermas' view the wealthy can only become useful when their wealth is cut away from them; an impassioned attempt to encourage the wealthy who already had their property confiscated by the State, an ordeal possibly suffered by the author himself.[113]

Persecution was an ever-present threat and a frequent reality in late second and early third century Alexandria and other places in the Roman empire. As with several other topics debated vigorously by such diverse groups, views on persecution covered the whole spectrum. On one hand, there were heretics who considered true martyrdom in terms of the knowledge of the one God and deprecated martyrs as unwitting suicide victims. On the other hand, those who have rushed towards death in haste, whom Clement identifies elliptically as 'not belonging to us, but sharing the name merely,' are not really martyrs at all because they show in their haste hatred towards the Creator and thus give themselves up to a vain death much in the same way as the Indian Gymnosophists to useless fire.[114] True or gnostic martyrdom was, for Clement, a means by which one could attain perfection. In agreement with the heretics, he saw that martyrdom entailed knowledge of God. But, against the heretics, the true gnostic,[115] when necessary, was prepared to endure martyrdom as a way of displaying his love to Christ, voluntarily giving up his body for his friend, a 'perfect work of

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[112] Hermas *Vis.* 3.6.5.

[113] *Vis.* 3.6.7. The author of the *Shepherd of Hermas* holds in tension both the need for the wealthy to jettison their wealth to survive persecution and the usefulness of retaining some wealth so that they can do some good with it (*Sim.* 1.9; 2.10). Cf. C. Osiek, *Rich and Poor in the Shepherd of Hermas: An Exegetical-Social Investigation* (Washington, D.C: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 51-52.

[114] *Str.* 4.4.17.3-4.

[115] I have followed E. F. Osborn's convention of distinguishing between true or Christian gnosis (in lowercase g) and heretical Gnostic groups (with a capital G). See, for example, E. F. Osborn, 'Clement of Alexandria: A Review of Research, 1958-1982,' *SecCent* 3 (1983), 219-244.

love.' It seems that Clement also deprecated the wealthy believer's resort to bribery in order to escape martyrdom.[116] And like several of his predecessors, he shared the suspicion that the wealthy were most vulnerable during times of persecution. Indeed, one of his major reasons for exhorting the wealthy to give away their superfluous wealth voluntarily and to live on a modest self-sufficiency in the *Paedagogus* is so that they will be more conditioned to endure persecution and less liable to apostatize during the times of trial and persecution.[117]

It would be difficult to overestimate the social ramifications on the Christian community as a whole at the defection of a wealthy member.[118] The poorer members of the community, the widows and orphans, were largely dependent on the largesse of the wealthier members, the homes of the wealthy would no longer be available for church meetings, the church would be less able to show hospitality to visitors, the wealthy person's influence in the broader pagan society on behalf of the Christian community would be lost. However, the most grievous effect would be on morale; the wealthy Christian's defection at the time of persecution did nothing less than challenge the validity of the community's beliefs.[119] A believer's faithful martyrdom not only bore witness to his own loyalty towards God, but also confirmed the truth of the preaching by showing the power of God.[120] Conversely, the believer's defection not only demonstrated the fickleness of his own faith but drew into question the veracity of the Faith.

In sum, the complexity of the problem of salvation of the rich in *QDS* 2 is matched by the complexity of the problem of rich Christians in general. The very presence of wealthy believers in the Christian communities brought about several potential problems which threatened to disrupt the Christian community. There was thus a tension between the need for

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[116] *Str.* 4.4.14.1-3.

[117] *Paed.* 3.8.41.1.

[118] Eusebius records the anguish suffered by the Christian community in Lyons in 177 in response to the failure of ten believers (he doesn't specify whether they were wealthy) to endure martyrdom: 'They [sc. those who defected] caused us great grief and immeasurable mourning, and hindered the zeal of the others who had not been arrested' (*HE* 5.1.11).

[119] Cf. Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 142-144.

[120] *Str.* 4.4.13.2-3.

the financial and material services which could only be provided by the wealthy and the social and theological problems caused by their inclusion. The relations between rich and poor, the practice and theory of community, are key themes in *QDS* which will be explored in greater detail later in this study.

2.4 Rhetorical Audience

The second element of the rhetorical situation lies in the identification of those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change.[121] These are the readers implied by the text. I propose that there are two main groups comprising the implied readership of *QDS*.

First, the lion's share of Clement's discourse in *QDS* is directed primarily towards those wealthy Christians who were on the verge of apostatising from the faith.[122] They were most likely Alexandrian. Clement refers to those who were already familiar with his exposition of the rich man narrative[123] and had access to another of his works, the no longer extant *Exposition concerning First Principles and Theology*.[124] Clement probably also expects that readers outside of his community would chance upon his work in the future. The rhetorical exigence and, as we will see, the pastoral solution have been generalized to the extent that even wealthy believers in other Christian communities could benefit from his work.

It is noteworthy that the troubled wealthy are baptized Christians. Clement is at pains to point out that his discourse does not make provision for those rich outside of the Christian fold, about whom, perhaps surprisingly, he shows little concern.[125] It is a totally intramural issue. Indubitably influenced by the second century work, the *Shepherd of Hermas*, Clement

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[121] Cf. Bitzer, 'The Rhetorical Situation,' 8.

[122] Clement refers to Anaxagoras, Democritus and Crates in *QDS* 11-12 assuming that his audience were familiar with their exploits.

[123] *QDS* 2.3.

[124] *QDS* 26.8.

[125] *QDS* 2.4.

treats the problem of the rich members' potential apostasy in terms of post-baptismal sin.[126] Clement utilizes the literary style, the oftentimes elaborate diction, types of arguments and other rhetorical devices that are suitable for an educated, and therefore wealthy, readership.[127] As also stated before, Clement certainly feels that the dilemma experienced by wealthy Christians is ultimately a matter of the will and that, as a result of his discourse in *QDS*, he considers that it is possible to persuade the wealthy to carry out his suggested changes in their beliefs and practices. He cannot, however, assume that he could automatically win over all wealthy believers to his pastoral solution without first establishing goodwill. He elsewhere complains that on account of his severe views on wealth and self-indulgence he is accused of being too frugal.[128] Thus he can expect initial resistance to his views in *QDS* by some wealthy readers.

Second, Clement seems to betray an awareness of the hostility and opposition of another group towards his stance on the issue of the salvation of the wealthy and as a result formulates his discourse with the purpose of mollifying this resistance.[129] Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify these opponents any further than to say that they behaved with insolent rudeness towards the wealthy[130] and that they were important enough for Clement not to vilify them openly but rather to try to persuade them of his philanthropic reasons for instructing the wealthy towards the path to salvation.

Ulrich Neymeyr posits another sector of the audience, Christian teachers who are 'filled with the love of truth for their brethren' (3.1).[131] In my view, Neymeyr's claim that *QDS* is directed in the first instance to Christian teachers and only indirectly towards the wealthy

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[126] *QDS* 40-end.

[127] Cf. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 35-36, who refers to Clement's *QDS* as an example of a speech to the rich in his illustration of Aristotle's suggestion that a philosopher-orator must consider the audience in terms of age and *worldly estate.*

[128] *Paed.* 2.3.37.

[129] Countryman's analysis of *QDS* neglects to take into account this second group.

[130] *QDS* 3.1.

[131] Neymeyr, *Die christlichen Lehrer*, 83.

believer is grossly over-stated. Nevertheless, there seems no doubt that Christian teachers who already have a positive attitude towards the wealthy could derive benefit from reading *QDS* and it is possible that Clement had them in mind concomitantly with those who opposed the wealthy.

2.5 Rhetorical Constraints

The third element of a rhetorical situation corresponds to the constraints brought to the situation by the writer. These constraints include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives, and, once the author adds discourse, the writer's ethos, proofs, and style.[132] All of these constraints have the power to direct the decision and action of the audience so as to rectify or at least mitigate the exigence.

2.5.1 Scripture

The first rhetorical constraint has to do with Clement's understanding of scripture. Clement accepted the most important result of the anti-Gnostic conflict, the scriptures of the church, and tried to justify each doctrine by them.[133] With Irenaeus, Clement viewed scripture as a unified whole. The apostle Paul's letters preserve the connection between the Law and the gospel.[134] The two covenants do not stand opposed to each other as proposed by Marcion. There was only one divine economy of salvation which is open to all mankind. This view encourages the employment of a rule known in rabbinic circles as *gezera shawa* where analogies between two texts congruous in meaning or language could be used to resolve apparent contradictions or inconsistencies. The predominant criterion which guides scriptural comparison is what perfectly belongs to and becomes the Sovereign God.[135] In

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[132] Cf. Watson, *Invention, Arrangement and Style*, 31.

[133] H. Campenhausen, *The Formation of the Christian Bible* (London: A. & C. Black, 1972); A. M. Ritter, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Problem of Christian Norms,' *SP* 18 (1989), 421-439.

[134] *Str.* 3.12.86.1.

[135] *Str.* 7.16.97. For Irenaeus see D. J. Bingham, *Irenaeus' Use of Matthew's Gospel in Adversus Haereses*, ed. L. van Rompay, Traditio Exegetica Graeca, vol. 7 (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1998), 302.

adhering to this criterion, Clement was not adverse to adapting a scriptural quotation slightly to bring out what he perceives to be its true meaning.[136]

Although some things in scripture are clear and unveiled, such as moral exhortation, the predominant nature of scripture is parabolic.[137] Therefore, the mechanism of scriptural interpretation needs to permit one to transcend the literal word to reach different and infinite grades of spiritual meaning which coincide with the inexhaustibility of the Logos. The different grades of spiritual meanings are regarded as mysteries and therefore one needs above all the right teacher who knows the truth. Those who have merely tasted the scriptures are believers; those who have advanced further, and have become accurate expounders of the mysteries, are gnostics.[138] This mechanism was possibly developed by Clement's teacher, Pantaenus, who offered a reasonable interpretation of the scriptures which did not diverge from apostolic doctrine.[139]

While all scripture is of divine origin, Clement attaches highest value to the sayings of the Lord. There is thus an inclination for Clement to preserve logia (typically of the sayings of the Lord) and show a certain reverence for them, whatever their source may be, for example Clement of Rome, the Gospel of the Egyptians, the Gospel of the Hebrews, the *Traditions of Matthias* and other unspecified Gospel traditions.[140] He holds to the primacy of the four received gospels,[141] but also values the *Secret Gospel of Mark* which he alleges was corrupted by the followers of Carpocrates.[142]

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[136] Tollinton, *Clement of Alexandria*, 2.178.

[137] *Str.* 6.15.127.3.

[138] *Str.* 7.16.95.9.

[139] *Str.* 1.11.2.3. Cf. Ritter, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Problem of Christian Norms,' 427.

[140] A. van den Hoek, 'Divergent Gospel Traditions in Clement of Alexandria and other Authors of the Second Century,' *Apocrypha* 7 (1996), 58.

[141] *QDS* 5.1; *Str.* 3.13.93.1.

[142] A. Le Boulluec, 'La Lettre sur L'<<Évangile Secret>> de Marc et le *Quis Dives Salvetur?* de Clément d'Alexandrie,' *Apocrypha* 7 (1996), 27-41; M. Smith, *Clement of Alexandria and a Secret Gospel of Mark* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1973). See Osborn, 'Review of research,' 223-225, for a rebuttal of Smith's claim to have found the lost writing of the secret Gospel of Mark.

2.5.2 Oral Tradition

Complementary to, and necessary for the deeper exposition of, the scriptures is oral tradition. There is some debate as to whether Clement identified oral tradition with Irenaeus' rule of faith, although this is in my view unlikely on account of the former's hidden nature.[143] Rather, oral tradition represents the substance of faith as it existed in the one, true and primeval church and is essentially the allegorical method of understanding the deeper sense of scripture.[144] Philo also refers to scriptural precepts as 'rules of truth' which enable one to glean the hidden meanings of scripture.[145] The utterances of Christ preserved in oral form by the apostles and handed over in subsequent generations to few men, while being hidden from many, contain gnosis and wisdom.[146] The reference to the mystical wisdom and the need to search the hidden mind openly employs language of the mysteries.[147] Clement compares those who do not have the understanding or the keen vision of the contemplative soul to the uninitiated of the mysteries.[148] There is a deliberate concealment where the prophecies and oracles are spoken in enigmas and the mysteries are not exhibited indiscriminately to all and sundry, 'but only after certain purifications and previous instructions.'[149]

2.5.3 Style

Some parts of *QDS*, especially the proem, are quite 'literary' in nature, containing the forms and styles representative of a studied writer. These were employed to appeal to an educated readership. While there are no instances of excessive embellishment, *QDS* does convey a perceptible rhetorical influence. On the other hand, in the greater part of *QDS*,

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[143] L. G. Patterson, 'The Divine Became Human: Irenaean Themes in Clement of Alexandria,' *SP* 31 (1997), 508-515, does show that Clement's treatment of the 'rule of truth,' while largely Philonic, is influenced by Irenaeus.

[144] Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 189-190.

[145] Philo *Det.* 128; *Conf.* 2.

[146] *Str.* 1.1.11; 6.7.61.3.

[147] *Str.* 4.25.162.3.

[148] *Str.* 5.4.19.2-20.1.

[149] S. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism*, Oxford Theological Monographs (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 148.

Clement assumes a more conversationalist tone, utilizing his customary middle rather than high style of writing, in order to diminish the sense of chronological and perhaps even geographical distance that separates him from his readers and which makes writing necessary. Clement conceives of his work as a speech. By referring to speaking and listening, he is able to establish a sense of presence with his readers. When he directs his readers in *QDS* to undertake a particular action he occasionally adopts the second person singular form of the imperative (or those with an imperatival sense) in conjunction with the pronoun for extra emphasis.[150] Often when referring to himself as the subject of the sentence he uses verbs in the first person, alternating between singular and plural form, as a personal touch. The conversational style and occasional use of vocatives, first and second person pronouns and verbs are used by Clement to directly appeal to his readers: 'What then? Don't you know, oh well-born people (*I want to speak as if you were here with me*), that in fighting against these noble commandments, you are in conflict with your own salvation?'[151]

In most instances the actual trope or thought figure used by Clement in a particular passage does not largely affect the sense of the argument but the cumulative effect is not something which can be ignored. The impression given in *QDS* is that he has the ability to use the high style of rhetoric but chooses restraint for the purpose of communicating truthfully and to be seen to do so. There are some instances, however, where the tropes used affect the sense of the argument even, in some cases, to the extent of inverting the plain sense of a proposition. I will draw the reader's attention to these in the course of my analysis of Clement's argumentation in *QDS* in chapter 4.

2.5.4 Writer's ethos

The writer's ethos may be defined as the credibility or authority that he brings to his work. The audience is induced to trust in what he says because they trust him, as a good man or as an expert on the subject. There are two chief sources for gauging the nature and extent of

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[150] Σὺ ἀλλὰ παρασχεῖν (32.6); σὺ μὴ κρίνε (33.2); σύ γε μὴ ἐξαπαταηθῇς (34.2); σὺ δὲ μάθε (38.1).

[151] *Str.* 3.4.36.3.

Clement's authority and standing in the Alexandrian Christian community, the *Ecclesiastical History* by the fourth century historiographer, Eusebius, and, of course, Clement's own writings. Eusebius paints a picture of an official, quasi-philosophical, catechetical school in Alexandria led by a succession of prominent teachers beginning with Pantaenus, then Clement and finally Eusebius' own champion, Origen.[152]

Most of what Eusebius has to say about Clement actually derives from the latter's own writings.[153] Unfortunately, for our purposes, these autobiographical details are very sparse indeed. Eusebius does preserve some letters sent by the Jerusalem bishop Alexander to the church at Antioch and to Origen some indeterminate time after Clement had left Alexandria. But that is all. Pantaenus himself left no textual evidence. Origen refers to Pantaenus, though not in the context of a catechetical school, and curiously refrains from mentioning Clement at all. There seems to be no other independent source referring to Clement or the pre-Origenic catechetical school available for Eusebius in the library at Caesarea.[154]

It seems that Eusebius' motive was to demonstrate the preservation of apostolic tradition in the Alexandrian church through to the authorized teachers of his day.[155] Eusebius' overtly apologetic purpose behind the line of succession of Christian pedagogical authority makes one hesitant to accept all of his claims uncritically.[156]

Clement's background

Nevertheless, one ought not to dismiss all of Eusebius' claims summarily. Relevant for our attempt to estimate Clement's standing in the Alexandrian community is the question of his relationship to Pantaenus. In the oft-quoted passage from *Str.* 1.1.11.1, we see that

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[152] *HE* 5.10.4-11.2; 6.6.1; 6.3.3; 6.3.8; 6.8.3.

[153] Cf. Chadwick, *Early Christian thought*, 31; P. Nautin, *Lettres et écrivains chrétiens des IIe et IIIe siècles*, Collana patristica e del pensiero cristiano; 2 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1961), 138.

[154] D. Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria* (Berkeley & Oxford: University of California Press, 1992), 220; Hoek, 'How Alexandrian,' 179.

[155] Cf. especially *HE* 5.10.1.

[156] Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius*, 126-147; R. M. Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Hoek, 'How Alexandrian,' 180-181; D. Rohrbacher, *The Historians of Late Antiquity* (London: Routledge, 2002).

Clement travelled widely, sitting under teachers in places as diverse as Magna Graecia, Coele-Syria, Egypt and Palestine, before settling in Egypt with one supreme in mastery, a 'Sicilian bee.'[157] Here of course, he is utilizing the common literary *topos* of a philosopher's quest, one which was employed in several of his sources, including Justin Martyr[158] and the Jewish historian, Flavius Josephus.[159] Be that as it may, there is no reason to attribute it to a literary fiction. His theological and philosophical speculations and compendious classical quotations throughout his major works show that he was deeply influenced by Platonic,[160] Stoic,[161] Pythagorean[162] and Aristotelian[163] philosophic thought.[164] In addition, Clement's

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[157] Cf. Euripides *Hipp.* 73-81.

[158] In the opening chapters of the *Dialogue with Trypho*, Justin gives an account of his studies with Stoic, Peripatetic, Pythagorean and Platonic teachers, the latter of which proved to be the most influential. It was as a Platonist that Justin became a Christian through the 'old man of the sea.' For this account as a stereotype see E. R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the Conceptions of Early Christian Literature and its Hellenistic and Judaistic Influences* (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968), 58-59; O. Skarsaune, 'The Conversion of Justin Martyr,' *ST* 30 (1976), 66-71.

[159] Josephus relates that at the age of 16 he completed his philosophic formation by making the rounds of various schools of Jewish 'philosophies' – the Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes (*Vita* 10) during which time he spent 3 years with a desert hermit, Banus (*Vita* 11). Most scholars tend to be sceptical of Josephus' account for various reasons. Nevertheless there is a consensus that his motivation seems to have been to demonstrate that he made an informed decision when he joined the Pharisees. Cf. H. W. Attridge, 'Josephus and His Works,' in *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran, Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus,* Compendia rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum. Section 2, The literature of the Jewish people in the period of the Second Temple and the Talmud; 2 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1984), 185-232 and especially S. N. Mason, 'Was Josephus a Pharisee? A Re-Examination of Life 10-12,' *JJS* 40 (1989), 31-45.

[160] Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria.* For Middle Platonic influences see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria.*

[161] There is some debate as to whether Clement depends directly on Stoic doctrine for his ethics. For a direct dependence see M. Pohlenz, *Klemens von Alexandreia und sein hellenisches Christentum,* Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Klasse. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1943). For a counter view that Stoic doctrine was mediated through Philo and Middle Platonism see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria.*

[162] Clement looked favourably upon several tenets held by the Pythagoreans to the extent that he could label Philo, 'the Pythagorean'. Cf. D. T. Runia, 'Why does Clement of Alexandria call Philo "The Pythagorean"?,' *VC* 49 (1995), 1-22.

[163] There is some question as to whether Clement drew upon Aristotle's works directly or whether the Peripatetic doctrines were mediated through Middle Platonism. Cf. E. A. Clark, *Clement's Use of Aristotle: the Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of Alexandria's Refutation of Gnosticism* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1977).

[164] This eclecticism was characteristic of the Stoicism and Middle Platonism of his day. There is also a possibility that Clement was influenced by Neoplatonism through a close relationship with Ammonius, who was to become the teacher of Plotinus. Both Clement and the founder of Neoplatonism may have been in Alexandria at the same time in the early 200's which is supported by Eusebius' statement that Origen, while still quite young, had attended the lectures of the Christian Ammonius (*HE* 6.19.6). Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria,* 3-6, 228; R. E. Witt, 'The Hellenism of Clement of Alexandria,' *CQ* 25 (1931), 195. With respect to the extremely broad range of quotations, it has been demonstrated that Clement at times made use of anthologies or collections of texts from various obscure authors on certain topics. However, this ought not diminish any assessment of his erudition and learning and there is little doubt that in the very least he was conversant with most of the Platonic corpus,

philosophical ideas were clearly influenced by Gnosticism and the mysteries. Eusebius identifies Pantaenus as the 'Sicilian bee' and his arguments are quite convincing.[165] Clement preserves some words of Pantaenus in his *Prophetic Eclogues* and there is no reason to suspect Eusebius' claim that Clement refers to Pantaenus as his teacher in the no longer extant *Hypotyposeis*.[166] What we know about Pantaenus is nevertheless extremely limited.[167] Eusebius suggests that he was a convert from Stoicism[168] and was well-known and highly regarded by some Christians for his expositions of the Old and New Testaments.[169] These expositions must have made a profound impression on Clement who saw fit to preserve them in eight books of the *Hypotyposeis*. It is conceivable that Clement saw himself as an heir to the apostolic tradition through his studies under Pantaenus. It was as the steward and purveyor of apostolic tradition that Clement claimed the most authority for himself in his own writings and it would have been his association with Pantaenus that enhanced his standing with some Christians (as evinced by bishop Alexander's letter).

Clement's role in the catechetical school

There have been vigorous debates in modern scholarship over questions pertaining to Clement's role in the Alexandrian church. Was there a catechetical school in Alexandria

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Euripides, Aristotle, Philo and Homer. Furthermore Clement's commentary on the high life of the Alexandrian elite in the *Paedagogus* conveys what Chadwick calls 'a bookish flavour' with parallels to the satires of Juvenal, Seneca, Petronius and others. Cf. Chadwick, *Early Christian thought*, 35; H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. G. Lamb (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1948). For a list of possible anthologies used by Clement see H. Chadwick, 'Florilegium,' *RAC* 7 (1969), 1144-1145. For the arguments that Clement utilized a fabricated testimony attributed to the sixth century philosopher Xenophanes see M. J. Edwards, 'Xenophanes Christianus?,' *GRBS* 32 (1991), 219-228.

Anthologies were not restricted to pagan authors. Biblical texts were also collected into anthologies according to topic. Cf. *Str.* 3.4.38.1, where Clement takes issue with heretics who collect passages from extracts of the prophets and interpret them incorrectly.

[165] *HE* 5.11.

[166] *PE* 56.2; *HE* 6.6. Cf. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, 3-4.

[167] Eusebius mentions a tradition in which Pantaenus visited India as a missionary (*HE* 5.10.1-2). Chadwick suggests that this might explain Clement's own interest in Indian wisdom; he is the first Christian to mention Buddhism. Cf. Chadwick, *Early Christian thought*, 32.

[168] Eusebius may be stretching this detail. It may be safer to say that Pantaenus was influenced by Stoic philosophy rather than being a former adherent to the Stoic school. Cf. A. Le Boulluec, 'L'<<école>> d'Alexandrie,' in *Le Nouveau Peuple (des Origines à 250)*, ed. L. Pietri, A. Vauchez, and M. Venard, Histoire du Christianisme (Paris: Desclée, 2000), 531.

[169] Cf. Chadwick, *Early Christian thought*, 32-33.

during Clement's time? If so, what was the nature of this catechetical school? What was his role in the catechetical school? What was the relationship between his catechetical school and the church? Did he teach under the aegis of the bishop Demetrius, who, Eusebius informs his readers, presided over the Alexandrian church for 43 years from 189 CE (i.e. throughout the whole duration of Clement's ministry in Alexandria)?

Eusebius' claim that Clement engaged in catechetical instruction is supported by Clement's writings[170] and it is conceivable that he was in charge of a community which had a fairly systematic initiation process from catechesis,[171] to advanced scriptural interpretation and theological or philosophical speculation.[172] However, one cannot discount the possibility that there may have been other catechetical schools in the city, heretical as well as possibly mainstream. Clement's writings gives evidence of different views held by various groups on the subject of catechesis, especially as to whether pre-baptismal catechesis was sufficient or whether further post-baptismal training was required.[173] His own community probably directed its missionary zeal towards the more educated and wealthier Greeks to convince them that Christianity was the 'true philosophy' and the only authentic gnosis, and it stands to reason that these higher social classes would in turn become catechumens in his school.[174] It is possible that his school underwent a significant development in its organization during Origen's time to become the famous catechetical school of which Eusebius speaks.

Even if there were other catechetical schools in Alexandria at the time, Clement's group should not be understood as a private or independent school situated on the periphery of the

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[170] So A. van den Hoek, 'The "Catechetical" School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,' *HTR* 90 (1997), 76. Contra Scholten, 'Die alexandrinische Katechetenschule,' 17, 37, who emphasizes the missionary activity of Clement's group amongst the pagans and downplays its role in preparing catechumens for baptism. Cf. *Paed.* 1.36.4. Van den Hoek (p.69) notes that Clement was a pioneer in using the word κατήχησις to mean specifically 'instruction of those preparing for baptism.'

[171] Clement regards instruction in erroneous pagan, ancestral customs as a form of προκατήχησις (*Prot.* 10.96.2). κατήχησις is instruction which leads to faith. At the moment of baptism faith is instructed by the Holy Spirit (*Paed.* 1.30.1-2). Cf. Hoek, 'The "Catechetical" School,' 67-71.

[172] Hoek, 'The "Catechetical" School,' 71.

[173] The story of St. John and the robber in *QDS* 42 seems to reflect these concerns.

[174] E. de Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie, étude sur les rapports du christianisme et de la philosophie grecque au iie siècle*, 2nd ed. (Paris: E. Leroux, 1906), 39; Nautin, *Lettres*, 140.

church, along similar lines to Justin Martyr's in Rome.[175] From Clement's perspective there was no contrast between church and school.[176] While, on one hand, Clement was the first Christian to talk about going to church, implying a building set aside (not necessarily permanently or solely) for Christians to meet together for worship,[177] he could also describe the church in organizational terms as a school conducted under the teachings of Christ.[178] In the following chapters, I will show that Clement wishes to construct an ideal picture of the church in which, while embracing the conventional notion of the church as an institution with a canon and, to a far lesser extent, an ecclesiastical hierarchy, he adopts several aspects of the philosophical schools by depicting the church as a philosophical community of friends. For now, however, it suffices to say that he himself was an ecclesiastical official, most probably ordained as a presbyter of the church,[179] and saw his own ministry primarily in terms of teaching especially through the medium of writing to educated Greeks.[180] For our purposes, we can be sure that he was, in the eyes of some, not all, a respected teacher of the community and a representative figure championing the cause of (proto-)orthodoxy.[181] We have to temper the likely reception for *QDS* with the caveat that other members of the Alexandrian community probably distrusted him on account of his predilection for Greek philosophy.[182]

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[175] Le Boulluec, 'L'<<école>> d'Alexandrie,' 540.

[176] Hoek, 'The "Catechetical" School,' 71-77. Contra A. Knauber, 'Katechetenschule oder Schulkatechumenat?,' *TZ* 60 (1951), 264.

[177] *Paed.* 3.11.79.

[178] The church is a school for sinners (*Paed.* 3.12.98.1). Cf. Justin *Apol.* 2.2.13 ('the school of divine virtue'). Clement was able to contrast his own community, which he considers a member of the one church, with the many churches of the heretics who abandoned the ecclesiastical canon, corrupted the liturgical practices of baptism and the eucharist, and misinterpreted the scriptures. The heretics, in Clement's view, deceived people with their sophistry and modelled themselves more as leaders of a philosophical school (διατριβή) than of a church (ἐκκλησία) (*Str.* 7.15.92.7). Cf. Hoek, 'The "Catechetical" School,' 73.

[179] In another letter to Origen, Bishop Alexander refers to Clement as the blessed presbyter (*HE* 6.11.6).

[180] Cf. Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, 141, 'Clément a une idée très haute de sa mission. Il se considère comme le <<cultivateur de Dieu>>.'

[181] This is also supported by Clement's statement that his companions compelled him to preserve the traditions of past masters for the benefit of those that should come after (*On Pascha* mentioned in *HE* 6.13.9).

[182] Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, 144.

Clement's relationship with the bishop of Alexandria

Clement's writings betray very little evidence that his community was subjected to the authority and sponsorship of the bishop.[183] He curiously never mentions Demetrius by name and has very few references to church order, even occasionally coupling the terms πρεσβύτερος and διάκονος while omitting ἐπίσκοπος.[184] It is possible, however, that presbyters had a particularly high status and prominent role in Alexandria during Clement's time. Jerome preserves the tradition that at this time 'presbyters always appointed one who was from their own ranks and put in a higher position as bishop'[185] which does not quite sit comfortably with the impression given by Eusebius.[186] In the story of St. John and the brigand preserved in *QDS* 42, the terms presbyter and bishop seem to be interchangeable, although this may be due to Clement following his oral source closely and thus reflecting the situation of an earlier age.[187]

It is possible that the development of a monarchic episcopacy with Demetrius did not take place until around the time of Clement's departure from that city.[188] Even though the received position is that Clement departed from Alexandria on account of the Severan persection (*c.* 202 CE),[189] there is a growing number of scholars who suspect that his departure had more to do with a falling out with the Alexandrian bishop Demetrius who may have found the former's writings too heavily influenced by pagan philosophers and Gnostics just as he later did with Origen. This idea put forward by Pierre Nautin and tentatively

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[183] Hoek, 'How Alexandrian,' 181.

[184] *Str.* 3.12.90.1; 7.1.3.3-4. Cf. Hoek, 'The "Catechetical" School,' 78.

[185] *Ep.* 146.1.6.

[186] U. Neymeyr, 'Episkopoi bei Clemens von Alexandrien,' *SP* 26 (1993), 292.

[187] Neymeyr, 'Episkopoi,' 293. The same impression of the interchangeability between presbyters and bishops in Alexandria, although in this instance the emphasis is on their devotion to Serapis, is given in the alleged letter from the emperor Hadrian to his brother-in-law, Servianus, a good fifty years before Clement's ministry, preserved in the rather fanciful *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* (*Vita Saturninus* 8). The authenticity of this letter is rightfully disputed. Cf. Neymeyr, 'Episkopoi,' 293.

[188] Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, 40.

[189] Even though Eusebius neglects to mention Clement directly as one of those who fled from Alexandria during the Severan persecution. Cf. *HE* 6.1.1; 6.3.1; 6.6.1.

entertained by A. van den Hoek may explain a hitherto puzzling issue.[190] If indeed the sixth and seventh books of the *Stromateis* were written after Clement had left Alexandria,[191] then we may be able to detect a certain polemical tendency to exalt the ideal, gnostic hierarchy in contrast to, and at the expense of, the institutional hierarchy, which could be a reaction to the rising monarchical episcopacy in Alexandria.[192]

There are two passages which I suggest may exhibit this tendency. In the first passage, Clement refers to the true gnostics as those 'more elect than the elect,'[193] who by reason of their perfect knowledge will in the next world be called from the church itself and honoured with the most august glory (as the twenty-four judges and rulers mentioned in Rev. 4.4, 10; 5.8; 11.16; 19.4). The grades here in the church, of bishops, presbyters, deacons, are (mere?) imitations (μιμήματα) of the angelic glory, and of that which belongs to those who follow in the footsteps of the apostles and have lived in perfection according to the gospel (viz. gnostics). The apostle's reference to the various offices of the church in Eph. 4.11-13 signify a progression in the honour *cursus* (κατὰ προκοπὴν δόξης) for gnostics in the next world

> where they will first minister [as deacons], then be classed in the presbyterate till they grow into 'a perfect man.'[194]

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[190] Hoek, 'The "Catechetical" School,' 79; Nautin, *Lettres*, 140.

[191] This suggestion is largely based on the observation that Clement no longer seemed to have recourse to certain manuscripts, especially of Philo, after he was forced to leave in Alexandria. This explains *la rareté des morceaux <<polymathiques>>* and perhaps the development of a more personal theology. Cf. A. Méhat, *Étude sur les 'Stromates' de Clément d'Alexandrie* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 49; D. T. Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature. A survey.* (Assen & Minneapolis: Van Gorcum & Fortress Press, 1993), 144-145. Neymeyr, 'Episkopoi,' 295, corroborates this deduction with his observation of the striking similarities between a passage in the *Hypotyposeis*, which we can be reasonably certain was written after his departure from Alexandria, and our passage above.

[192] Cf. Le Boulluec, 'L'<<école>> d'Alexandrie,' 543-544, who also makes the same suggestion. Of course, Clement could have both fled Alexandria as the result of the Severan persecution and experienced tensions with Demetrius prior to departure. In *Str.* 4.10.76, Clement defends those who have to flee persecution by recourse to Mt. 10.23, 'When they persecute you in this city, flee to another.' Disobedience to this command is, in Clement's view, tantamount to abetting the persecutors in their evil deeds.

[193] An epithet for Clement's true gnostics in *QDS* 36.1.

[194] *Str.* 6.13.107.2-3. Cf. *Str.* 5.5.28.6; 7.17.107.4.

The polemical overtones[195] behind Clement's designation of the ecclesiastical grades here as μιμήματα are brought out more starkly in a neighbouring passage where he refers to the gnostic as one who is *in reality* a presbyter of the church and a *true* deacon of the will of God; '*not as being ordained by men, nor regarded righteous because a presbyter*, but enrolled in the presbyterate, because he is righteous. And although *here upon earth he is not honoured with the chief seat*, he will sit down on the twenty four thrones, judging the people, as John says in the Apocalypse.'[196] Clement seems to take it for granted that the true gnostic will largely go unrecognized by the mainstream church by not being honoured with the 'chief seat,' which is clearly an allusion to Jesus' reproach of the Pharisees in the Synoptic Gospels (cf. Mt. 23.6).[197] He who is honoured with the 'chief seat' in early Christian literature typically refers to one of the foremost leaders of the church.[198] Therefore, it seems likely that Clement's gnostic *Rangefolge* at least had the potential to rival the institutional hierarchy: 'Es bleibt aber eine konkurrierende Spannung zwischen dem Vollmachtsbewußtsein des Gnostikers auf der einen Seite und den tatsächlichen kirchlichen Verhältnissen auf der anderen Seite.'[199]

Whatever is the case, Eusebius is completely silent when it comes to the relationship between Clement's school and bishop Demetrius. The gleanings from the *Stromateis* above

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[195] Méhat, *Étude sur les 'Stromates' de Clément d'Alexandrie*, 57-58, sees the portrait of the true gnostic in this passage as an idealized picture of Pantaenus. If Méhat is correct then it still supports my suspicion of there being a potential tension between Clement's ideal gnostic community and segments of the institutional hierarchy.

[196] *Str.* 6.13.106.1-3. Cf. esp. *Str.* 7.7.42.7 where the gnostics are said to be commissioned by God to have management over the Christian flock.

[197] *Paed.* 3.12.93.2. Bardy sees this as an allusion to Pantaenus.

[198] Cf. *Str.* 7.16.98.2-3 where the heretics are loathe to leave their πρωτοκαθεδρίαι in their churches in order to conform to the mainstream church. Quite likely, Clement is referring to the followers of Basilides and Valentinus who set up rival communities. In Hermas *Vis.* 3.9.7, the πρωτοκαθεδρίται are synonymous with the προηγούμενοι τῆς ἐκκλησίας with no perjorative connotations. In *Mand.* 11.12, the false prophets are those who demand pay for their prophecies and desire the πρωτοκαθεδρία. Origen refers to the bishops and presbyters and those entrusted with the first seats (πρωτοκαθεδρίας) by the people (*Comm. in Matt.* 16.22).

[199] U. Neymeyr, 'Presbyteroi bei Clemens von Alexandrien,' *SP* 31 (1997), 494.

are suggestive but hardly conclusive and it is probably prudent not to be too dogmatic about the issue.[200]

How QDS is likely to have been received

The above assessment of Clement suggests that we cannot presuppose that his writings, including *QDS*, would have been received favourably and unquestioning by all his implied readers. Certainly he was regarded by some Christians, including those in prominent positions like Bishop Alexander, as a representative and spokesperson for (proto-)orthodox Christianity. He was an ordained presbyter but it was his association with his master, Pantaenus, which did most to enhance his standing with these Christians. On the other hand, we see in his major works that he constantly has to pre-empt objections from other Christians and defend his reasons for adopting controversial theological positions and practices, as for example the need to preserve the profound and secret teachings of the church in writing,[201] the utility of philosophy for persuading the Greeks,[202] and the need for post-baptismal training.[203] We can infer from this that he has to tread carefully in canvassing his views in *QDS*. We have already seen that he could expect opposition from some Christians in his aim to bring salvation to the wealthy. He could even expect objections from those he is trying to help who might consider his views on wealth too stringent. The strategies that he utilizes to mollify this opposition and to persuade his wealthy readers to adopt his pastoral measures will be the subject of the following chapters on the leading ideas and analysis of *QDS*.

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[200] Ritter, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Problem of Christian Norms,' 422, in evaluating Nautin's proposal, cautions against the possibility of subconsciously presupposing the traditional conception, according to which Clement would be seen as some type of precursor to Origen, enabling us to see in the 'disciple' (viz. Origen) a reflection of his 'teacher' (viz. Clement).

[201] *Str.* 1.1.18.2–2.20.3. One of Clement's (rather defensive) reasons for composing the *Stromateis* is as a remedy against the forgetfulness of old age and reminders for himself (*Str.* 1.1.11.1), which is considered by Socrates to be the only justification for writing serious discourse (*Phaedrus* 276d). Clement's clear allusion to Socrates' saying suggests that those objecting to his writing the 'secret teachings' were themselves educated.

[202] *Str.* 1.9.43.1–45.6; 6.8.66.1-5; 6.10.80.4–81.4; 6.10.82.1-83.3.

[203] *Str.* 6.18.164.4.

Chapter 3

Leading Concepts of *QDS*

In the previous chapter we explored some of the problems caused by the presence of wealthy believers in the Christian community. We saw that these could involve a good deal of tension. There was the need, on the one hand, for the community to encourage and retain the services of the wealthy for its own economic viability. On the other hand, the presence of the wealthy threatened to disrupt the community's social fabric through their tendency to establish undesirable internal hierarchies of dependence (patron-client relationships). Clement's remedy for this rhetorical exigence in *QDS* must somehow address this tension between economic need and social threat. One would expect a complex exigence to entail a complex remedy and his arguments do indeed presuppose several intricate principal concepts, concepts which are constructed from the author's often creative syntheses of philosophical, ethical and biblical ideas. In this chapter we will investigate several of these leading ideas in turn laying particular stress on how these ideas are developed in his works outside of *QDS*. The results of this chapter will then act as a basis for comparing how Clement adapts or modifies these same leading ideas in his arguments in our analysis of *QDS* in the next chapter.

3.1 Christianity as the true philosophy

A common thread winding throughout Clement's major writings is the presentation of Christianity as the true philosophy. This naturally raises the question of the extent to which his Christianity was influenced by Greek philosophy, a subject which has attracted a vast amount of scholarly debate over the last 100 years. There was once a widely-held view that Christianity and Greek culture were mutually exclusive and substantially incompatible with no real synthesis being possible and thus his eclecticism was only a veneer, an attempt to appear attractive to the Graeco-Roman educated classes.[204] In this view, Clement writes in

[204] For a list of scholars who hold this view see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 2-3.

the guise of a wise Christian philosopher who borrows a few elements or terms from the various philosophical systems which happen to agree with his own religious principles. The foremost exponent of this view, Walther Völker, suggests that Clement's method in the *Stromateis* of demonstrating a religious principle by quoting a range of philosophers is motivated solely by missionary purposes. The several occasions where Clement denies the philosophers' ability to find the truth leads Völker to conclude that philosophy, for Clement, is nothing more than something external, a shell around the kernel (*als Nußkern*) of Christian doctrine.[205] This view has subsequently been vigorously criticized by Eric Osborn, Salvatore Lilla and others, and the *communis opinio* today is that his Christianity was influenced in key areas and in varying degrees by several aspects of Greek philosophy, Gnosticism and the mysteries. This study concurs with Osborn, Lilla and others in that Clement expressed his religious faith in a wealth of philosophical ideas.[206] That is not to go to the other extreme, however, and say that Clement's Christianity was completely subordinate to his philosophy. But rather, Christian doctrine, mediated through the scriptures and esoteric tradition, Gnosticism and Greek philosophy influenced each other mutually and inextricably, resulting in a thorough-going and creative synthesis in his thought.

It is important to note that Völker was at least partially correct (though he is not the first one) in drawing our attention to the fact that Clement's depiction of Christianity as a philosophical system in the *Stromateis* frequently has a discernible apologetic tenor. It is probable that Greek philosophers figured among the most dangerous enemies of Christians, not merely as critics, but as denouncers before the imperial tribunal.[207] At times, Clement states his motive (not his sole one) for utilizing symbolic language and an unsystematic, or

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[205] W. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1952), 8-9. Völker does not take into account the fact that on several occasions Clement's disparagement of philosophy and philosophers is either polemically motivated (in response to criticisms from outside the church or to enhance the ethos of the 'Barbarian philosophy') or a grudging concession to the less-mature Christians who were prejudiced against Greek philosophy.

[206] Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 232.

[207] *Str.* 2.1.2.2-3. In Rome, *c.* 165, the Cynic philosopher, Crescens, was reputed to have played a role in the persecution of Justin Martyr. Cf. Justin Martyr *Second Apology*; Eusebius *HE* 4.16.7-8.

more precisely, a multi-systematic,[208] presentation of his thought in the *Stromateis* so as to confound the sophistic critics of the church.[209] At other times he writes clearly to refute the philosophers' charge that Christians are impious.[210] His strategy involves demonstrating that only Christians follow the true, divinely inspired philosophy, through which they attain to a genuine knowledge of God and hence are alone truly pious.[211] That one of his motives for demonstrating the philosophical nature of Christianity was apologetic ought not to rule out the suggestion that he genuinely intended to transform Christianity into a philosophical system.[212]

Clement did not condone all that was called philosophy, nor did he confine his interest to the teachings of a particular school.[213] As was a common tendency with the Middle Platonists, he shows a predilection for Platonic[214] and Pythagorean philosophy and does not hesitate to fault the Peripatetics, Epicureans and Stoics for failing to proclaim a providence.[215] He refers to Plato as 'that truth-seeking philosopher'[216] and 'truth-loving,' 'speaking as truly

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[208] Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, 7-12.

[209] *Str.* 1.2.21.2-3.

[210] *Str.* 6.1.1.4; 7.1.1-2.

[211] *Str.* 7.1.1.1; 7.9.54.3-4. That is not to say that Clement's apology for using philosophy was the sole theme or even the main theme in the *Stromateis*. Cf. E. Molland, 'Clement of Alexandria on the Origin of Greek Philosophy,' *SO* 15-16 (1936), 57; J. Munck, *Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandria*, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte; Bd. 2 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1933), 41-44,77ff; Tollinton, *Clement of Alexandria*, 1.186ff.

[212] Clement calls Christianity 'our philosophy' (*Str.* 2.20.110.1), 'the true philosophy' (*Str.* 1.5.32.4, 1.18.90.1; 2.11.48.1; 6.7.58.2; 6.11.89.2), 'the philosophy according to Christ' (*Str.* 6.8.67.1), 'the philosophy according to the divine tradition' (*Str.* 1.11.52.2). The full title of the *Stromateis* is '*Stromateis* of gnostic notes in accordance with the true philosophy' (*Str.* 3.18.110.3; 5.14.141.4; 6.1.1.1). Cf. Molland, 'Origin,' 58-59.

[213] *Str.* 1.19.92.3; 5.3.17.4. Cf. Molland, 'Origin,' 59.

[214] Clement's interpretation of the Platonic corpus diverges considerably from that of the Middle Platonists. Cf. D. Wyrwa, *Die christliche Platonaneignung in den Stromateis des Clemens von Alexandrien*, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, vol. 53 (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 1983).

[215] Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 41-59; Molland, 'Origin,' 59. S. Swain, 'Defending Hellenism: Philostratus, In Honour of Apollonius,' in *Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians*, ed. M. J. Edwards et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 157-196, discusses the revival of interest in Pythagoras by those who lauded Greek culture and philosophy at the expense of barbarianism. Pythagoras was the archetypal sage who could be regarded as the major source of Plato's own philosophy. The traditions which surrounded his life by Porphyry and Iamblichus helped further his appeal. Swain argues that it was the mystical and theological aspects of Pythagoreanism which enabled some parts of Hellenism to defend itself in the religious climate of the 2nd and 3rd centuries.

[216] *Paed.* 2.1.18.

inspired.'[217] On the other hand, he censures the Stoics who 'clumsily disgrace philosophy,' teaching that the deity permeates all matter, even in its lowest forms.[218] Even so he does not condemn any of the major philosophical schools out of hand, declaring for example that Cleanthes teaches true theology, and often makes use of their distinctive ideas. Even the whipping boy of the Platonists and Stoics, Epicurus, can be useful for explaining the nature of faith.[219]

Clement distinguishes between two kinds of philosophy. On one side, there was the Greek philosophy of the Stoics, Platonists, Epicureans, Pythagoreans and Peripatetics and, on the other, was the barbarian or true philosophy which is preserved in the scriptures of the Christians. He is not oblivious to the negative view held by several, perhaps the majority of, believers in the community that Greek philosophy was at best useless and at worst demonic, and frequently has to justify his method of citing various philosophical doctrines in the *Stromateis*. His justification lay in his claim that Greek philosophy was in a sense a work of divine providence and hence good.[220] In declaring God as the cause of all good things, he

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[217] *Str.* 1.8.42.1. Cf. Molland, 'Origin,' 58, who sees these epithets as evidence of Clement's genuine love for Greek philosophy.

[218] *Prot.* 5.66.3; *Str.* 1.11.51.1; 5.14.89.3.

[219] *Prot.* 6.72.1; *Str.* 5.3.17.6; 5.11.76.1; 5.14.110.2. Cf. Molland, 'Origin,' 59.

[220] Clement gives three different and ostensibly conflicting theories on the origins of Greek philosophy corresponding to particular problems or issues that he is seeking to address. The first theory attributes the origin of Greek philosophy to the rational principle which all men possess based on the Stoic doctrine of a 'common conception' (φυσικὴ ἔννοια) or 'common mind' (κοινὸς νοῦς) (*Str.* 1.19.94.2; 5.13.87.2; 8.1.2.4). These doctrines, as Lilla notes, were present in middle Platonism (Cicero *Acad. Pr.* 2.10.30; 'Albinus' *Did.* 155.23, 27-8). Clement quotes Paul on the natural righteousness of some pagans who 'are a law unto themselves' (*Str.* 1.19.95.3; 2.9.44.4; Cf. Rom. 2.14). Those pagans who dedicate themselves to a life of philosophical inquiry are in the best position to discern the 'common mind' and as a result Plato, Cleanthes, the Pythagoreans, and several others have declared the one only true God to be God (*Prot.* 6.72.5). In this instance, the Logos himself is identified as philosophy which is represented first as a shower and then as seeds dropped by the husbandman (*Prot.* 6.68.2; 7.74.7; *Str.* 1.7.37.1; the notion of λόγος σπερματικός is also found in Justin Martyr and Philo). For the use of rainfall imagery see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 18-19. The theory of the 'common mind' means that all men have the innate capacity for the knowledge of God which forms the basis of God's justice. (Cf. Molland, 'Origin,' 66-68).

The second theory of the origin of Greek philosophy has a more polemical edge. The similarities between Greek philosophy and Moses and the Hebrew prophets must be attributed to the former's plagiarism of the latter since Moses chronologically predates all of the Greek philosophers (*Str.* 1.7.81.1. Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 29-41). This argument of course has a long tradition and was used in turn by Aristobulus, Artapanus, Josephus, Philo, Justin Martyr, Theophilus and Tatian. A famous example of this, used more by Clement's successor Origen later on, is that of the second century Stoic, Numenius, who is alleged to have written 'what is Plato but Moses atticizing?' Recently, however, M. J. Edwards, 'Atticising Moses? Numenius, the Fathers and the Jews,' *VC* 44 (1990), 64-75, calls into question whether Numenius was directly acquainted with the Old

distinguishes between those things given primarily (κατὰ προηγούμενον) such as Old and New Testaments and those things given as a consequence of other things (κατ' ἐπακολούθημα) such as philosophy.[221] These are not cut and dried categories as he immediately conjectures that perhaps God gave philosophy primarily (προηγουμένως) as a paedagogue or school master for the Hellenic mind, in much the same way that the Law operated for the Jews (cf. Gal. 3.24).[222] The usefulness of Greek philosophy does not merely reside in the distant past prior to the advent of Christ. Even in the present, it can act as a kind of preparatory training for those who attain to faith through demonstration, as a method of buttressing Christian doctrines from the counter-views of heretics.[223]

The true Christian philosophy, preserved comprehensively and perfectly in the scriptures, may also be found in various degrees of verisimilitude in the teachings from each of the major Greek philosophical traditions. The eclectic whole, that is, all the dogmas from these sects which advocate righteousness along with scientific knowledge, together constitutes true

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Testament (contrary to Origen's account in *Cels.* 4.51), and postulates that Numenius knew the name Moses in the form of Musaeus through a work of a Jewish apologist seeking to win the goodwill of the Greeks (p.68).

Greek philosophy may have been stolen from its barbarian counterpart but God has given his grace and as a result several of the original tenets of the barbarian philosophy have been adorned in Greek speech but unfortunately in some cases they have been misunderstood (*Str.* 6.7.55.4). Following Philo, Clement claims that the Greek philosophers, including Plato, occasionally only saw the truth dimly, which supports his claim of the pre-eminence of the barbarian philosophy. Plato's indebtedness to Moses is a reason to adopt and follow his teaching (cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 42).

A third theory of the origin of Greek philosophy is more curious. It claims that Greek philosophy, originally a possession of God, was stolen by some inferior powers or angels, who transmitted it to men. The idea of Greek philosophy being promulgated by fallen angels is also found in Hermias, but otherwise it is non-existent. R. J. Bauckham, 'The Fall of the Angels as the Source of Philosophy in Hermias and Clement of Alexandria,' *VC* 39 (1985), 323-325, links these fallen angels to the Watchers of 1 Enoch and suggests that Clement is responding here to Christian opponents who traced philosophy to the fallen angels as a way of discrediting it. Elsewhere, Clement refers to those who see philosophy derived from the devil (*Str.* 1.1.18.3-4; 6.8.66.1; 6.17.159.1). In Bauckham's view, these opponents wish to disparage the wisdom which the fallen angels revealed as worthless. Clement argues that even though it was stolen it is nevertheless true wisdom. It is in essence a similar argument to that of the Greek philosophers' plagiarism of Moses and the Hebrew prophets. God in his providence permitted the theft because the knowledge thus gained by humanity was beneficial, not harmful (*Str.* 1.17.83.2).

The ultimate source for Greek philosophy is the same as that for the Law, the divine Logos. For Clement, the diverse divine origins for Greek philosophy testify to their value in training the Christian for wisdom.

[221] *Str.* 1.5.28.2. Cf. Molland, 'Origin,' 62-63.

[222] *Str.* 2.8.37.2; 6.11.94.2.

[223] *Str.* 1.5.28.1; 1.6.35.4.

philosophy.[224] Clement was not the first to use eclecticism as a method in furnishing a true philosophy. Cicero makes similar claims (not assuming any direct influence between Cicero and Clement, of course) in culling the best from every school, illustrating that he was not hampered in the search for truth by adhering to only one school of thought.[225] And whereas Cicero was perhaps indifferent to the occasional charge of inconsistency, one would be mistaken to exaggerate the inconsistency of Clement's 'true philosophy,' which perhaps could be exacerbated by the esoteric layout of the *Stromateis* where he deliberately intends to be obscure.[226] To say that Clement was eclectic from a wide variety of sources does not imply that his philosophy was piecemeal and unreflective. A growing number of scholars are acknowledging that his true philosophy contains highly coherent and original systems of thought.[227] The multi-systematic structure of the *Stromateis* ought to be viewed as an example of hypomnematic literature which demands that the reader participate actively through repeated readings thereby reconnecting in the mind the crucial elements which are scattered throughout the text. This method leads the reader to see the 'organic nature and overall architecture of the thought there expounded.'[228]

From Clement's claim that Christianity is the true philosophy two ramifications directly impact upon his ecclesiology and soteriology. The first has to do with his understanding of the church as a philosophical community of friends, an ideal state which rivals earthly kingdoms and subverts their attendant social, political and economic conventions. The

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[224] *Str.* 1.7.37.6; 6.7.55.3-4.

[225] Cf. Cicero *Tusc.* 5.29.82; Xenophon *Mem.* 1.6.14. Eclecticism as a deliberate plan was a rare and unusual position in antiquity. It essentially had a positive meaning denoting the refusal to submit to tailor-made and supposedly authoritative doctrines. It ought not be confused with syncretism or the disorderly jumble of different opinions. See P. Donini, 'The History of the Concept of Eclecticism,' in *The Question of 'Eclecticism'*, ed. J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 16-33.

[226] *Str.* 1.1.15.1.

[227] E. F. Osborn, *The Beginning of Christian Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This assessment concurs with that of Jerome who pronounces Clement the most learned of all the ancient fathers (*Ep.* 70.4).

[228] Rizzi, 'Unity of the Symbolic Domain in Clement of Alexandria's Thought,' goes on to argue for a specific conjunction of biblical texts to act as an hermeneutical key for reconstruction the coherence of Clement's epistemology.

second has to do with his understanding of salvation as the goal of philosophical ascent, a goal which ultimately is expressed in terms of friendship with God.

3.2 The church as a philosophical community of friends

As previously stated, the Carpocratians, Valentinians and possibly other heretical Gnostic sects in Alexandria consciously practised philosophical community inspired by Platonic and Stoic conceptions of the ideal *polis*. Clement regards the church likewise as an ideal city of just men with its own ruler and lawcode, a city alluded to by poets and philosophers, a city on earth impregnable and free from tyranny, a product of the divine will on earth as in heaven.[229]

This is also evidenced by the copious citations and allusions to Plato's *Laws* and *Republic* in Clement's works. He mildly checks the simple faithful who take offence in being tagged as philosophers by him[230] and reproaches the heretics for caring 'more to seem than to be philosophers.'[231]

Clement followed an early Christian tendency (cf. Phil. 3.20) in which believers regarded themselves as citizens of a heavenly kingdom with its own king and lawcode which demanded their allegiance over and above any other, what they considered, mundane imitation: 'Let the Athenian follow the laws of Solon .... but if you record yourself among God's people then heaven is your fatherland and God your lawgiver.'[232] As a result, Christians saw themselves as exemplary strangers of the earthly *polis*, benefiting the *polis* while unjustly divested of the rights associated with being full citizens. This defensive attitude echoing the sentiments of a persecuted minority is exemplified by the well-known and highly literary passage from the *Epistle to Diognetus* 5.1-10 which may have had an

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[229] *Str.* 4.26.172.2. Clement prays that the spirit of Christ wing him to his Jerusalem. This is an allusion to the Platonic concept of the ideal soul being winged. The soul of the philosopher, having the recollection of the true beauty, would spread his wings and fly away, careless of the world below (*Phaedrus* 249D-250B). Cf. *Prot.* 10.106.3. Cf. also Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, 107.

[230] *Paed.* 3.11.78.1.

[231] *Str.* 7.16.98.1-2.

[232] *Prot.* 10.108.4.

Alexandrian provenance and be contemporary with Clement.[233] For Clement, the advanced believer considers himself a stranger and sojourner in this world, who inhabits the city but despises the things in the city that are admired by the others. He lives in the city as in a desert, and, if he spends a small portion of his time about his sustenance, he thinks himself defrauded, being diverted by business from the good things.[234]

The true *polis* is the Christian community which consists of hierarchical relationships of interdependence, through which God's benefits, both spiritual and material, are distributed to men.[235] These hierarchical relationships are best explained in terms of the Graeco-Roman philosophical and cultural conventions of friendship.

Importance of friendship in antiquity

The topic of friendship (φιλία) was an important part of Graeco-Roman moral philosophy even though it has been largely neglected in contemporary Anglo-American philosophical discussions until very recently.[236] For the most part the contemporary western view of friendship has little in common with that held in antiquity. We tend not to regard friendship as a relationship of affection between members of (typically) the same sex within which definite rules of conduct and mutual obligations apply.[237] Perhaps this is because the individual has taken centre stage in our society and friendship consequently is perceived to be less important. In recent times, a small but growing number of moral philosophers are

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[233] There is a suggestion by H. I. Marrou following E. Stein that the Diognetus addressed in the epistle is the procurator Claudius Diogenes at Alexandria. The official is known from papyri dated between 197 and 203 (during the time that Clement composed several of his major works). In one document from 202/203 he is simply called 'the most excellent Diognetus.' Chadwick supports Marrou's proposal that Pantaenus might be the author of the epistle. Cf. Chadwick, *Early Christian thought*, 138.

[234] *Str.* 7.12.77.3-4.

[235] On the role of the gnostics in the salvation of the simple believers see pp. 64ff.

[236] L. A. Blum, *Friendship, Altruism, and Morality*, International Library of Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 1. In recent years there has been a growing recognition of the role that friendship plays in moral philosophy. Blum's work attacks the Kantian emphasis on impartiality as a principle which defines morality. He uses the case of friendship to argue that impartiality is only one among several other moral principles and virtues and that it is morally appropriate for us to grant benefits to others simply because they are our friends (assuming that there is no moral obligation to do so). O. Leaman, *Friendship East and West: Philosophical Perspectives* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1996), 1, suggests that the recent rise in interest in the topic of friendship has something to do with the renewed concern for establishing the parameters of a virtue ethics as well as the work done recently on personal identity and the self, and the recognition that friendship can reveal a lot about ourselves.

[237] Cf. White, *Christian friendship*, 1.

recognizing that a close relationship exists between the notion of friendship and the sort of society in which it is practised.[238] That is, the various manifestations and emphases of friendship are highly cultural-dependent.[239] In antiquity, friendship conventions, the cultural expectations which defined attitudes and obligations between different parties, did not solely cover egalitarian interpersonal relationships between comrades who held mutual affection for each other. Friendship conventions also encompassed many unequal, social, economic and political relationships including those between husband and wife, parent and child, patron and client, doctor and patient, business associates, fellow-citizens, ruler and subject, even, in some cases, the divine and mankind.

There was much reflection on the theory and practice of friendship in the Greek world in the archaic and classical period. The idea of friendship is probably present in the Homeric epics *inter alia* in the famous relationship between Achilles and Patroclus, or at least was considered to be in later scholia.[240] Pythagoras (*c.* 570-490 BCE) was the first to found a philosophical community based on friendship and to have coined such proverbs as 'friends have everything in common,' 'friendship is equality' and 'a friend is another I,' sayings which would later become commonplaces.[241] Plato wrote a short dialogue on the nature of friendship in the *Lysis* though, like so many of his early dialogues, the quest for a definition of friendship ended in failure.[242] Aristotle was the first to provide a systematic analysis of the

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[238] Leaman, *Friendship East and West*, 2.

[239] Leaman's book, cited above, points out through a collection of essays some of the diverse ways that friendship is manifested in various cultures ranging from Plato in classical Greece, through Maimonides, Confucian China, Indian philosophy and Thomas Aquinas. These essays show clearly that some aspects of friendship are highlighted in one culture which do not appear to be important in others.

[240] Following the example of Diotima in Plato's *Symposium* 208d who saw Achilles' willingness to die at the death of Patroclus as evidence of his love for what is immortal. For the view that the Homeric poems evince friendship relations see J. T. Fitzgerald, 'Friendship in the Greek World Prior to Aristotle,' in *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 19. For an opposing view see D. Konstan, 'Problems in the History of Christian Friendship,' *JECS* 4 (1996), 90.

[241] Thom, 'Harmonious Equality,' 77.

[242] Socrates concludes the dialogue by admitting, 'We have not yet been able to discover what a friend is' (223b7-8). Cf. B. Carr, 'Friendship in Plato's *Lysis*,' in *Friendship East and West: Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. O. Leaman (Richmond: Curzon, 1996), 13-31; A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 1-14.

subject, largely in response to the failure of Plato's *Lysis*.[243] Aristotle sets forth his theory of friendship in the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the seventh book of the *Eudemian Ethics*, the sheer volume of writing devoted to friendship being an indication of the importance that the topic held for him. There is also some treatment of the subject in the *Politics*, the *Rhetoric*, and *Magna Moralia*. Aristotle saw friendship as a virtue, as something morally good in itself, the bond of the state, and one of the most indispensable requirements of life, as natural an instinct as a parent's love for a child. In these works Aristotle addresses three major difficulties with the nature of friendship. Are we attracted to those like ourselves (like seeks after like) or do we seek those who are dissimilar? Is friendship only possible between good men or can vicious men also be friends? Is all friendship of the same kind; that is, existing as one genus but in various degrees, or are there different sorts of friendship? Aristotle's treatment of these questions, which we will explore in greater depth in this chapter, was seminal and influenced philosophers in succeeding centuries not solely those of the peripatetic school but also Stoics, Cynics, Neopythagoreans, middle-Platonists and Epicureans in their deliberations on the subject.

Clement also speculates on the nature of friendship as can be seen in his extensive treatment of the subject in three chapters of the *Stromateis* – 2.9, 2.19 and 5.14 – where he cites various authorities, quotes clichés and proverbs, and proffers his own preferred taxonomy of friendship. His utilization of friendship terms and conventions was not limited to these passages but rather permeated all of his extant major writings and indeed played an important role in his visions for the individual and the community in *QDS*.

The role of gnostics in the salvation of believers

Whereas, on one hand, Christians are all brothers being of one God and one teacher based on the saying of Socrates, 'For you who are in the *polis* are entirely brethren ...,'[244] the

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[243] Fitzgerald, 'Friendship in Greek World,' 13. For a discussion on Aristotle's treatment of friendship and its influence in the peripatetic school see F. M. Schroeder, 'Friendship in Aristotle and Some Peripatetic Philosophers,' in *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald, Society of Biblical Literature (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 35-57.

[244] *Str.* 5.14.98.1-8.

relations between Christians are hierarchical, based on reciprocity and mutual love. At the top of this hierarchy is the advanced Christian, the true gnostic, who having been commissioned by God[245] is the conduit of God's *beneficia* to others in the Christian community, by sharing his possessions as far as he can, and doing good in word and deed.[246] The true gnostic makes up for the absence of the apostles,[247] and, as an intimate of the Lord, imitates God's philanthropic nature being dedicated to his service. This constitutes the government appointed by God.[248] The gnostic, like the great High Priest, is dedicated to the whole service of God which tends towards the salvation of men.[249] Knowing the people's needs, the true gnostic, as a good man, improves his associates and prays alongside those who have recently believed.[250] He will pray that as many as possible may become like him, for he who is made like the Saviour is also devoted to saving.[251] The true gnostic exercises beneficence well. He is eager to give a share of his own good things to those who are dearest to him. And so these are to him, friends.[252]

Unity, reciprocity and the idea of limited goods

A characteristic of this ideal friendship community is its unity.[253] This unity is partially based on reciprocity between its members where possessions are shared and no one goes without the necessities of life. Lying behind this idea is something akin to the anthropological construct of the 'limited good.'[254] Unlike citizens in modern capitalistic

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[245] *Str.* 7.7.42.8

[246] *Str.* 2.19.97.1-2.

[247] *Str.* 7.12.77.4.

[248] *Str.* 7.2.8.3-4.

[249] *Str.* 7.3.13.2.

[250] *Str.* 7.7.49.1-3; 7.12.69.1-3.

[251] *Str.* 6.9.77.4; 7.7.41.6-7.

[252] *Str.* 7.12.80.1-2.

[253] *Str.* 7.11.68.2-3.

[254] S. L. Dyson, *Community and Society in Roman Italy* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 14; G. M. Foster, 'Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good,' *American Anthropologist* 67 (1965), 293-315.

societies, peasants in antiquity often saw local resources as finite and not significantly expandable. All the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship, and honour, exist in finite quantity and are always in short supply, as far as the peasant is concerned. When one individual or family advances its position, this is at the expense of another. This tends to shatter community cohesion and arouse resentment against the privileged. To counteract these tensions, the privileged must use their resources for community causes such as festivals and be seen to be returning the limited goods back to the larger group. In Clement's scheme of divine economics, God, in his providence, supplies enough 'common goods' to meet the needs of all the members in the community without superfluities.[255] It is therefore inappropriate for the wealthy to retain superfluous possessions since that would mean that someone else in the community would have to go without. The wealthy must distribute their superfluous possessions to the less well-off.

It is through the sharing of goods in the community that Clement can claim that, like the Stoic wise man who is content with his virtue for his happiness, he who possesses the Logos needs nothing and never lacks any of the things he desires. If someone should object and insist that he has often seen the just in need of food, Clement would respond that this is rare and occurs only when no one else is just; that is, when the community is dysfunctional.[256] The true gnostic impoverishes himself in order that he may never overlook a brother who is afflicted with the lack of necessities, especially if he knows that he will bear want himself easier than his brother.[257] The notion of reciprocity is nowhere more evident than with regards to the wealthy. The wealthy are to make friends with less well-off believers by means of distributing their superfluous possessions and in return they will attain to salvation;[258] although, how precisely salvation is attained by this means is not explored in the major works

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[255] *Paed.* 2.3.38.

[256] *Paed.* 2.7.40.

[257] *Str.* 7.12.77.6.

[258] *Paed.* 2.7.39. Cf. Prov. 13.8.

but is reserved for the second half of *QDS* in Clement's scheme of what Countryman calls the 'chaplaincy of the rich.'

3.3 Salvation as the philosophical ascent to friendship with God

'Philosophy is the study of wisdom and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes,' writes Clement quoting his Philonic source.[259] Philo gives the same definitions of philosophy and wisdom as Clement because he too attempts to interpret the OT in terms of Greek philosophy.[260] Just as the encyclical branches of the paedeia, music, geometry, grammar (and even rhetoric!), contribute to philosophy, so philosophy itself contributes to the acquisition of wisdom.[261]

Clement embraces the Platonic image of the true philosopher as a lover of wisdom. The philosopher's passionate pursuit of wisdom is like that of a student who attacks his task of learning gladly, does everything he can in order to attain it and can never be sated.[262] Clement follows Paul in seeing Christ as the embodiment of wisdom and subordinates philosophy to it. All the past teachers of the various philosophers can be traced back, first to their immediate masters, Zeno for Cleanthes, Epicurus for Metrodorus, Aristotle for Theophrastus, and then the teachers of these in succession can be traced back to the Egyptians, Indians, Babylonians and even the Magi themselves. But even these ancient sagacious races had teachers whom Clement calls angels, and if one were to trace the teachers of the angels one would ultimately be led to Christ himself, the first teacher and source and hypostasis of wisdom.[263] Therefore true wisdom is γνῶσις, that is, the sure and reliable knowledge and apprehension of things present, future and past, revealed by the utterances of

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[259] *Str.* 1.5.30.1. Cf. *Congr.* 79.

[260] Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 59.

[261] A Stoic definition; cf. *SVF* 2.36, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν φασὶν ἐπιτήδευσιν εἶναι σοφίας, τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. Cf. also Cicero *Off.* 2. Clement elsewhere similarly defines wisdom to be a certain knowledge, a sure and irrefragable apprehension of things divine and human, present, past and future, taught by Christ and the prophets (*Str.* 6.7.54.1). Cf. also 'Albinus' *Did.* 152.6-7. See Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 59.

[262] *Str.* 6.7.55.1. Cf. Plato *Republic* 4.475b-c; *Phaedrus* 278d; 'Albinus' *Did.* 152.4; Plotinus *Enn.* 1.6.7.

[263] *Str.* 6.7.57.3-58.1; Jn 1.3; Gen. 1.1; Prov. 8.

Wisdom, Christ, before his apostles during his earthly ministry. This γνῶσις was in turn imparted unwritten by the apostles to their successors. The Christian philosopher seeking to become wise must desire and strive for this γνῶσις until he attains an unchangeable disposition of contemplation.[264]

True philosophy is a lengthy deliberation that pursues γνῶσις and its source, Wisdom, with a never-ending ἔρως.[265] The act of desiring or longing for someone motivated by love leads Clement naturally to employ friendship terminology and conventions. Part of his motivation is clearly apologetic: Christians are true philosophers who desire and long for the source of all wisdom, Christ. Those who pursue Wisdom are friends of God. Therefore since Christians are friends of God those who persecute them are themselves impious.[266]

Nevertheless, the motif of *Gottesfreundschaft* pervades throughout Clement's writings and can not be attributed solely to apologetic motives. Rather, it signifies a principal concept in his salvific scheme, a τέλος to which all believers can aspire. Whilst Clement predominately depicts man's ultimate end in terms of becoming a lover, son, and friend of God,[267] he also employs in *QDS* the related figures of rest,[268] assimilation to God,[269] eternal life,[270] and participation in the *epopteia*,[271] each with their own significance, which will be discussed in the context of the analysis in chapter 4. Conjoined with the concept of friendship with God is the Pauline tradition which understood God largely in terms of the Roman *paterfamilias* with respect to his absolute power and his commitment of mercy towards his children.[272] Salvation

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[264] ἕξις is a state of the soul formed by the practice of certain activities Cf. Aristotle *EN* 1103b. It corresponds to the Stoic διαθέσις.

[265] *Prot.* 11.113.1.

[266] *Str.* 6.1.1.

[267] *QDS* 7.3; 31.1; 33.2; 34.2. Cf. esp. *Str.* 5.14.96.6; 6.14.114.6.

[268] *QDS* 6.1; 23.3; 31.6; 32.6; 39.6.

[269] *QDS* 7.3.

[270] *QDS* 1.4; 6.1-4; 7.1-3; 8.1-2; 9.1; 10.4-7; 11.1-3 *et passim*.

[271] *QDS* 37.1.

is both progressive and teleological,[273] denoting a process by which man is transformed from his initial state of ignorance to the knowledge of God, from alienation to *oikeiosis* with him, from hatred to love towards him, and from separation to assimilation into the unity of God.[274] This process begins on earth and ends in heaven.

Clement was not original in claiming that those who pursue wisdom could be friends with God. Indeed, it was a controversial topic in philosophical circles in the classical Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman period. Pythagorean friendship reflects a universal relatedness which is discovered in nature. Their slogan, 'Friendship of all with all,' encompassed several ontological levels including friendship between gods and humans.[275] Socrates himself claimed that a wise man was dear to God (θεῷ φίλος) but, as Konstan points out, this is not quite the same as claiming that the wise man is a friend of God.[276] The Stoic formula, 'the wise are friends of the gods,'[277] clearly expanding on the Socratic expression 'the wise are dear to the gods,' merely emphasizes the extent to which the wise live according to nature and does not denote a friendly relationship based on reciprocity between man and personal gods. Epictetus, for example, writes about the wise man's freedom from desire for health, honour, country, friends, children, indeed anything other than virtue, in terms of his being a friend to

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[272] Cf. C. A. Barton, *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 165-168.

[273] 'La dinamica interiore della salvezza è la προκοπή; è un continuo progredire, un continuo avanzare: dalla infedeltà alla fede, alla gnosi, alla charitas, alla eredità. Questo concetto è ben tradotto nei concetti della sequela e della imitazione di Dio e del Signore Gesú: in contesto cristiano la osservanza della legge diventa imitazione della persona; si tratta di assomigliare al Salvatore quanto piú è possibile,' A. Brontesi, *La soteria in Clemente Alessandrino*, Analecta Gregoriana, vol. 186 (Roma: Università Gregoriana, 1972), 598.

[274] *QDS* 7.3.

[275] Thom, 'Harmonious Equality,' 97-98.

[276] Plato *Timaeus* 53d; *Laws* 716c-d; Plotinus *Enn.* 2.9.9. Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 161-202, argues that the idea of friendship with God goes back to Homer and Plato. Recently Peterson's article has been criticized by Konstan, 'Problems,' 96, who claims that neither Philo nor Clement found an analogy for the idea of friendship with God in Platonism or other early texts; they found it rather in a play on words associated with the Cynics. The several examples quoted by Peterson have φίλος with the dative rather than genitive of θέος and hence have an adjectival sense ('dear to God') rather than the nominal ('friend of God'). Konstan's distinction between the use of the dative and genitive with the world φίλος is probably too rigid (Peterson also notes the adjectival form of φίλος with the dative) but it does caution us to proceed carefully. It is prudent to translate φίλος as 'dear' unless there is compelling evidence to render it as 'friend'.

[277] This Stoic saying was disparaged by the Epicurean, Philodemus (*Frag.* 87.12ff.). Cf. Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 165-166.

Zeus and the other gods.[278] That is, the wise man is free. Like Zeus and the other gods, no one can compel the wise man to do anything against his will for he is indifferent to the goods of the world.[279]

The problem of friendship with God

Aristotle, on the other hand, concluded that friendship with God was not feasible.[280] Equality is an essential element of friendship, even an unproportional friendship like that between a parent and a child. If there exists a wide disparity between two friends in point of virtue or vice, of wealth or anything else, then they can no longer expect to remain friends. This is most manifest in the case of the gods whose superiority to man in every good attribute is incomparable. In unequal friendships, where benefits between the two parties are not proportional then the superior party should receive more affection than he bestows which produces a sense of equality between the parties. However, when the gulf between the two parties is too wide, as it is between man and the gods, then there can be no sense of equality and hence friendship is impossible.

Clement is under no illusion when he considers man's inability to requite God with like benefits. In a culture which always expected friendship to involve some form of reciprocity,[281] friendship with God seemingly becomes more implausible by the fact that God is in want of nothing, loving neither pleasure, gain nor money, but rather is sufficient to himself.[282] There are thus two almost insurmountable problems with the theory of man's friendship with God: the unbridgeable disparity between the benefits brought to the

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[278] Arrianus *Epict.* 2.17.24-29.

[279] Cf. especially the syllogism of Diogenes the Cynic which deliberately confuses the adjectival and substantival sense of *philos* in order to show that all things belong to wise men, 'all things belong to the gods; the gods are dear to wise men; the possessions of friends are in common; therefore, all things belong to wise men' (D.L. 6.72). Clement also alludes to Diogenes' sophism in *Prot.* 12.122.10. Cf. Konstan, 'Problems,' 93,96; Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 178.

[280] Aristotle *EN* 1158b20-1159a.

[281] Aristotle *EN* 1155b25-1156a5; *Rh.* 1381a2.

[282] *Str.* 2.6.29.3; 7.3.14.5; 7.6.31.6-7; *Prot.* 4.56.5. In contrast to the Greek gods who do have needs (*Prot.* 2.36.4), God alone is in need of nothing (*Paed.* 3.1.1.1). The passionless state is characterized by the lack of needs (*Str.* 2.6.28.3; 2.18.81.1). One cannot requite God's benefits with sacrifices but rather only by prayer and by giving glory (*Str.* 5.11.68.2). In all these themes Clement follows Philo. Cf. *Immut.* 57.

relationship by the two parties, and the fact that the good God does not need gifts in the first place since he is perfect and lacks nothing.[283] Both problems Philo circumvents. God by his nature being perfect and not in need of anything constantly and unceasingly benefits the universe. By seeking friendship with God man is not fulfilling an unsatisfied need of God but rather is directly benefiting himself. Therefore men can bring nothing except a disposition full of love for their Master.[284]

The progressive nature of man's friendship with God

As we will see, Clement builds upon Philo's solution for both problems significantly through his adaptation of the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiosis*. For now, it is important to note that his schema implies that man's *initial* friendship with God is of a hybrid form where the motives of the two parties are of a different type. The friendship offered by God is virtuous, that is, entirely altruistic, for the sake of man. The friendship offered by a believer in return is utilitarian. The believer seeks friendship with God on account of the benefits the latter bestows in return. I stressed the word *initial* above because Clement's understanding of friendship with God is not static, but rather is dynamic. The believer's motive for friendship with God initially is utilitarian, that is, for salvation, but as the believer progressively becomes virtuous his friendship likewise becomes altruistic. The advanced believer loves God because to love God is a choiceworthy act in itself.[285]

In order to appreciate the distinctiveness of Clement's thought here we need to contrast it with Aristotle's taxonomy of friendship. Aristotle recognized that friendships based on utility and pleasure shared several features with the friendship of the good. While friendship based on virtue could be understood as the only genuine friendship, which endured for life and was an equal relationship between good men, some utility and pleasure could nevertheless be derived from it. Friendship which is founded chiefly on utility or pleasure, however, could be

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[283] Plato *Euthyphro* 14e-15a.

[284] *Det.* 55-6. Cf. *Prot.* 1.6.2; 2.27.3; 9.82.2; 9.83.1.

[285] *Str.* 7.11.67.2-3.

either equal or unequal, but tends to be a lot more spurious, often ending when the friend ceases to be useful or pleasurable. The three kinds of friendship may be ranked in the following descending order: character friendship or friendship based on virtue, friendship grounded in pleasure, and, basest of all, friendship grounded in utility.[286] While Aristotle's taxonomy of friendship was widely adopted in later philosophical discussions on the topic, there was some divergence from his model both with respect to the meaning attached to each of the three kinds of friendship and to their order.[287] Clement himself holds to three kinds of friendship. The first and best is that which results from virtue because love founded on reason is firm. The second and intermediate kind of friendship is by way of recompense which is communal, liberal, and useful for life; for the friendship which is the result of favour is mutual. The third and last kind of friendship is based on intimacy or that variable and changeable kind which is based on pleasure.[288]

Clement's taxonomy is based on Hippodamus' book *On Happiness*, a Neopythagorean work which attributes the virtuous friendships, based on knowledge, to the province of the gods, those based on mutual support to humans, and those based on pleasure to animals.[289] In contrast to Aristotle, Clement grants moral value to utilitarian friendships and denigrates solely those friendships which are based on intimacy or pleasure.[290] The Christian is not a solitary animal but lives in the context of a community where the hierarchical relations are based on mutual reciprocity, concerning not only spiritual goods but also the necessities for daily life (this idea surfaces in *QDS* 13 when Clement urges the wealthy readers to do something useful with their superfluous possessions and to distribute them to the less well-off in the community). Therefore, whereas there are three ends of all action, the true gnostic

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[286] *EN* 1155b18-1156b24; *EE* 1234b-1237b.

[287] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.7.143.8-9; Cicero *Amic.* 6.20-22. Cf. Schroeder, 'Friendship in Aristotle,' 49-50.

[288] *Str.* 2.19.101.3.

[289] *Str.* 2.19.102.1. Cf. Thom, 'Harmonious Equality,' 83.

[290] In contrast, Aristotle considered utilitarian friendship inferior to that based on pleasure (*EN* 1156a24-35).

'does everything for its excellence and utility, but doing anything for the sake of pleasure he leaves to those who pursue the common life.'[291]

There are four observations stemming from Clement's schema of friendship with God. First, friendship with God involves choice and comes at a price. One's desire for friendship with God is reflected by the extent to which one is prepared to forgo the things of this life. Friendship with God may require an individual to turn his back on his earthly possessions and family and to place his trust in God.[292] Abraham is the friend of God *par excellence* on account of his faith, his piety in exhibiting *Gastfreundschaft* to the visiting angels of the Lord at Mamre,[293] and his willingness to abandon his family and wealth in order to follow and to seek after God. For both Philo and Clement, Abraham's choice to follow God was the outworking of his indifference to the goods of the world and the value that he places on the relationship with the eternal benefactor.[294]

Second, one of the benefits of friendship with God includes the reception of the revelation of the mysteries. Moses saw God face-to-face and hence was counted as his friend.[295] Philo speaks of the believer's transition from servant to friend. Whereas for the multitude God is Lord and master, for the advanced believer God becomes Saviour and benefactor. This is seen in the example of Abraham when God says, 'Shall I hide anything from Abraham my friend?' (Gen. 18.17; both the LXX and Hebrew text have 'my servant').[296] A similar thought is expressed in the dominical saying from Jn 15.14-15 where Jesus' disciples are no longer considered servants but friends 'because I have made known to you everything that I

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[291] *Str.* 7.7.49.8. Cf. Plato *Lysis* 210d, where the wise man is both useful and good.

[292] See discussion on *QDS* 22.1-24.2 on pp. 151ff.

[293] *Str.* 4.17.105.3. Cf. 1 Clem. 10.1.

[294] *Paed.* 3.2.12.4; 3.8.42.3. Cf. Philo *Sobr.* 56.2.

[295] Ex. 33.11 LXX; Philo *LA* 1; *Str.* 2.4.20.3.

[296] *Sobr.* 56.2. Cf. *Paed.* 3.2.12.4; 3.7.42.3.

heard from my father.'[297] Servants serve from fear while the knowledge of the mysteries makes men friends.[298]

Third, friendship with God is synonymous with adoption.[299] Peterson attributes a degree of originality to Clement for equating friendship with adoption,[300] but the idea can be traced back to Philo who treats God's adoption of the archetypal wise man, Abraham, in terms of the contemporary imperial practice of adoption for the purpose of providing an heir.[301] Abraham is a friend of God and thus is also nobly born, for he has registered God as his father and become his only son by adoption. As a result he possesses all riches and good things. He is the sole king, for he has received from the All-ruler the sceptre of universal sovereignty.[302]

Fourth, to be a friend of God means to love God. This connection is clearly influenced by the scriptures (e.g. Jn 15.14-15).[303] Clement is exceptional, however, in the degree to which one can become a lover and friend of God in this life.

It was Socrates who, for Clement, provided the key for attaining friendship with God. Following the ancient principle, 'like is dear to like,' Socrates taught that if one wishes to become dear to God then he must become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character; that is, he must espouse the virtues of piety, moderation and justice.[304] Friendship with God is thus contingent on ethics and it is only through the true philosophy, being both theoretical and

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[297] *Str.* 2.9.45.3-4; 7.12.79.1.

[298] Origen *Sel. on Psalms* 22.

[299] *Str.* 2.21.128.4. On Clement's understanding of adoption see pp. 90ff.

[300] Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 190.

[301] An obvious example during Philo's lifetime is that of Augustus who adopted his stepson Tiberius (who in turn had to adopt his nephew Germanicus), as well as the youngest of his grandsons Agrippa Postumus. See M. Goodman and J. E. Sherwood, *The Roman World 44 BC-AD 180*, Routledge History of the Ancient World (London: Routledge, 1997), 43.

[302] *Sobr.* 56-58.

[303] *Str.* 7.11.62.6-7; 7.12.79.1.

[304] Xenophon *Symposium* 4.46ff; Plato *Theaetetus* 176; *Timaeus* 53d; *Symposium* 193b; *Politics* 621c; *Laws* 716c-d. Cf. Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 161-164. J. Annas, *Platonic Ethics, Old and New* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 52-71, shows that the idea of becoming like God was extremely important for the Middle Platonists and key for their claim that virtue does not merely transform a human life but turns a human life into something different in kind.

practical, that one is able to attain to these virtues.[305] Therefore there is a need for all Christians, male, female, young and slave, to philosophize.[306] This world is the *paideia* for acquiring this true philosophy.[307] Clement's three main works correspond to each stage of man's philosophical ascent towards friendship with God: the *Protrepticus*, where Greeks are exhorted to abandon their ancestral customs and align themselves with the New Song; the *Paedagogus*, where new believers, particularly those of higher social and economic station, are exhorted to live an ethical life consonant with their calling; and, finally, the *Stromateis of gnostic notes according to the true philosophy*, which includes a multi-systematic assortment of notes relating to the ethical and mystical life of the advanced believer, whom Clement calls the true gnostic, the true philosopher and friend of God.[308]

3.4 Virtuous actions stem from free will

We now turn our attention to the ethical component of Clement's true philosophy, a well-ploughed field in modern scholarly research with several scholars having traced the mainly Stoic and Middle Platonic roots of Clement's ethical system.[309] I intend here to give an outline of some the main elements of his ethics which occur in *QDS*. My more original discussion on Clement's use of the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις follows later in this chapter.

Harmony and virtue

Clement draws upon both the Platonic and Stoic conceptions of the soul to highlight the role of reason in right conduct. In a well-known passage, Plato depicts the soul figuratively

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[305] Clement follows Philo's quadripartite division of the Pentateuch into the historical, legislative (corresponding to ethics), sacrificial (to physical science), and visionary (to the department of theology) (*Str.* 1.28.176.1-2).

[306] *Str.* 4.1.1.1-2. Even the question as to whether we should philosophize or not can only be decided by philosophical reasoning. Cf. *Str.* 6.18.162.5. See Molland, 'Origin,' 59.

[307] *QDS* 33.6.

[308] Cf. *Paed.* 1.1.3.3; Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 133-134.

[309] On the ultimate Stoic roots of Clement's ethical system see Pohlenz, *Klemens*, 103-180; M. Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des pères de l'église: de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie*, Patristica Sorboniensia; 1 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957). Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 59-117, showed that these Stoic elements are also found in Philo and Middle Platonism. On Clement's transformation of the Stoic ethical elements see D. J. M. Bradley, 'The Transformation of the Stoic Ethic in Clement of Alexandria,' *AugR* 14 (1974), 41-66.

as made up of a charioteer and two horses.[310] The two horses represent not distinct parts of the soul but its modes as it is affected by contact with the body; the good horse typifies the influence of the emotions, the bad horse of desires, and the charioteer is reason. Plato also uses a similar image of a helmsman (the mind) guiding his ship (the soul) in the right direction.[311] Virtue is the harmony of the soul where there is agreement between the inferior parts and reason.[312] Whereas the person who only thinks himself wise is moved by unstable and wavering impulses, the Christian gnostic remains fixed in disposition on account of his adherence to the commandments of the true philosophy which act as his guide to life. In this instance, reason, the ruling principle, if it does not stumble and keeps control of the soul, is called the helmsman.[313]

The Stoics, on the other hand, started with their doctrine of φύσις as a standard for human morals. Virtue is living according to nature as a cosmological providence. Right reason or natural law is identical with the laws established by the universal Logos. The Stoics distinguished between the natures of plants, animals and humans.[314] All three species have a natural propensity. Animals and humans have in addition irrational impulses, but humans alone are endowed with reason by which the impulses must be regulated. Thus, living according to nature for man is the same as living according to reason in the whole course of life.[315] The connection between the Law of Logos (the Mosaic code) and the laws of nature was made by Philo. Since the universe is in harmony with the Law, the man who observes

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[310] *Phaedrus* 246b.

[311] *Phaedrus* 247c.

[312] *Phaedo* 93c3-7; 93e8-9; *Republic* 430e3-4, 443d6-e2; 554e4-5; *Laws* 653b6; 659e2-3; 689d5-7 *et passim*. For the Saviour as charioteer and helmsman see *Prot.* 12.121.1; *Paed.* 3.11.53.2; *Str.* 5.8.52.5. Cf. also Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 97. For the Platonic notion of pleasure being alien to a person and more likely to do him harm than good see *Phaedo* 114e. Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 62.

[313] *Str.* 2.11.51.6.

[314] *Str.* 8.4.10.3-6.

[315] *Paed.* 1.13.101.

the Law becomes at once a citizen of the universe. He regulates his actions according to the will of nature which administers the whole universe.[316]

Irrational passions and the need for a physician of the soul

The irrational passions, if left unchecked, disrupt the harmony of the soul and thus are an impediment to the attainment of virtue. Impulse (ὁρμή) is a movement of the mind towards something or away from something. An irrational passion (πάθος) is an impulse which exceeds the boundaries according to reason, or is disobedient to reason. Irrational passions then are a movement of the soul against nature.[317] They are a disease of the soul which requires a physician to ascertain the cause, prescribe the mode of its removal, and train the soul to assume the right disposition.[318] Fortunately for mankind, the Paedagogue, the Logos, heals the unnatural passions of the soul by means of exhortations.[319] He is the only Paionian healer of human infirmities and the holy charmer of the sick soul by means of precepts and the gift of forgiveness for sins.[320]

Freedom of the will and synergy with God

Central to Clement's ethical system is the freedom of the human will (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) in choosing to follow the commandments of God.[321] Contrary to the deterministic views of the heretics, God does not compel.[322] The Platonists and the Stoics agree that assent is in our own

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[316] *Opif.* 3. Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 92-94.

[317] *Str.* 2.13.59.6.

[318] *Str.* 7.16.98.4-5.

[319] In Clement's view, this is precisely what the Saviour is doing when he commands the rich man to sell his possessions. Selling possessions primarily means to rid the soul of the irrational passions. See discussion on *QDS* 16.2-19.6 on pp. 140ff.

[320] *Paed.* 1.2.6.1-4.

[321] A key argument in *QDS* is that wealthy believers have the freewill to choose to follow or reject Christ's commandments. The fact that they have freewill implies that the wealthy are not necessarily trenched off from the path leading to salvation. On the believer's freewill see discussion on *QDS* 10.1-3 and 26.1-27.1 on pp. 126ff. and 163ff. respectively.

[322] *Str.* 5.1.3.2-3. Cf. Irenaeus, *AH* 4.37.1, man is 'made free from the beginning, possessing its own power, as it does its own soul, to obey [God's] wishes voluntarily, and not by compulsion, for there is no coercion with God ...' For the suggestion that Clement was familiar with Irenaeus' work on this topic see Patterson, 'The Divine Became Human,' 507-508.

power.[323] And while Clement and the apostle Paul have very different ideas on the degree to which man is able to obey the commandments, that does not mean that Clement prefigures the Pelagians (in this respect). Man cannot achieve complete virtue by himself but it is up to him to will to do the good. God grants his grace which works in synergy with man's attempts to obey the commandments perfectly. Since acts of assent are completely voluntary and not the result of force or necessity, we are ultimately rewarded or punished on the basis of our performance of the commandments.

Virtue, for Clement, is based on knowledge planted firmly in reason.[324] In this he follows the Aristotelian position that it is not only what a man does that matters but the state of mind he is in when he does it.[325] Moral virtue is a disposition (ἕξις) by which one chooses what is good and rejects what is evil. And this choice must be a rational choice. Similarly, the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus agreed that virtue stems from a fixed disposition (διάθεσις) of the ruling part of the soul, a power produced by reason.[326]

Moral indifferents and appropriate actions

The Stoics held that there is only one good, virtue, and only one evil, vice; everything else is morally indifferent (ἀδιάφορος). This does not mean, at least in 'orthodox' Stoicism, that the morally indifferent is a moral status some point between virtuous and vicious.[327] Stobaeus distinguishes between three kinds of Stoic actions - virtuous (κατορθώματα), vicious (ἁμαρτήματα), and a third class called τὰ οὐδέτερα. These οὐδέτερα are acts neither virtuous nor vicious in themselves but depend on the disposition of the individual doing them and the particular situation. A similar distinction applies to the Stoic idea of the appropriateness (καθῆκον) of actions, which Clement links to the performance of the

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[323] *Str.* 2.12.54.5-55.1.

[324] *Paed.* 3.6.35.2-3.

[325] *Paed.* 1.13.101.2. Cf. *EN* 1104a30-35.

[326] J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 2-4.

[327] Cicero (mistakenly) implies, in the *Academica*, that there were three types of actions, virtuous actions, vicious actions and intermediates with the intermediates being further distinguished by appropriate and inappropriate actions (*Acad. Post.* 1.27).

commandments.[328] In the case of appropriateness Clement follows the Stoics who distinguish between three classes of act: the completely appropriate (κατόρθωμα), where the actions are appropriate and stem from a disposition obedient to reason;[329] the incompletely appropriate, where actions are appropriate but stem from an uninformed or vicious disposition; and the inappropriate where the action is inappropriate stemming from a disposition disobedient to reason.[330] Both incompletely appropriate actions (μέσα καθήκοντα) and inappropriate actions, since they stem from an uninformed or vicious disposition, are vicious. It is important to note that there is no intermediate moral standard between κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα in 'orthodox' Stoicism. An action is either virtuous or vicious.

Clement adopts this rigid dichotomy when contrasting the virtue of the gnostic with that of a non-believer. In some instances, the gnostic and non-believer may do precisely the same actions, that is, actions that may be deemed appropriate. Nevertheless, since the actions stem from opposite dispositions, the gnostic's actions are deemed virtuous while those of the non-believer are vicious.[331] Clement also identifies a third moral state between the gnostic and non-believer, that of the simple believer. The action of the simple believer is deemed to be intermediate (μέση πρᾶξις) and not vicious.[332] The simple believer's action is, however, not completely virtuous on account of his disposition which is not yet made perfect by knowledge. The simple believer acts from fear and hope which lead to faith and ultimately knowledge only after a long process of *oikeiosis* to God. In Clement's understanding, the actions of a simple believer are virtuous in a proleptic sense; they anticipate knowledge which is true but are nevertheless at this stage incomplete.[333]

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[328] *Paed.* 1.13.102.

[329] *Paed.* 1.13.101.

[330] D.L. 7.108-109.

[331] *Str.* 6.14.111.3-112.1. Clement also disparages the appropriate though misguided actions of Anaxagoras, Democritus and Crates. See pp. 131ff.

[332] Cf. *SVF* 3.510.

[333] *Str.* 1.9.45.6. Cf. J. R. Donahue, 'Stoic Indifferents and Christian Indifference in Clement of Alexandria,' *Tr* 19 (1963), 443, '... the means are morally good but called mediate because they are the actions of the "simple

Clement is able to explain the semi-virtuous nature of a simple believer's intermediate actions in terms of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean.[334] (That is to say that the doctrine of the mean is the ethical standard for the simple believer. As will be shown later, the ethical standard for the advanced Christian, the gnostic, is something far more stringent than the mean). For Aristotle, excess and deficiency in feelings or actions are a mark of vice. Observance of the mean on the other hand is a mark of virtue. The mean is synonymous with moderation; for Aristotle, it is not simply an intermediate state of virtue. Moreover, what actually constitutes the mean is relative to the person. Virtue stems from a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in observing the mean *relative to us* as the prudent man would determine it.[335]

Clement applies the doctrine of the mean mostly in the *Paedagogus*, a work written for recently baptized Christians.[336] There he speaks of moderation as the loftiest ideal in the simple believer's quest for self-sufficiency. Extremes are dangerous, but the mean is good, and all that avoids dire need is a mean (μέσον).[337] The aim of the middle course is to avoid the passions which arise from excesses whether from surfeit or want, self-indulgence or Cynic vanity. The way to steer through the middle course is best achieved by what the Stoics call a life of self-sufficiency.

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believer" who is *in via* to perfect knowledge.' In *QDS* this is played out with the rich believers, as simple Christians, directed to distribute their superfluous wealth indiscriminately, even at the risk of giving to someone unworthy. See discussion on *QDS* 33.2-3 on pp. 197ff.

[334] Donahue, 'Stoic Indifferents,' 443, following Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des pères*, 245. The question of whether Clement is dependent directly on Aristotle or whether Aristotelian doctrines were mediated through Middle Platonism has attracted vigorous debate. Lilla has shown that the doctrine of the mean is also found in both Philo (*Deus* 159-160, 164-5; *Post.* 101; *Migr.* 146-7) and Middle Platonism (Plutarch *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 84a etc). Clark, *Clement's Use of Aristotle* on the other hand, leans towards a more direct dependency. In my view, Clement on different occasions may have had access to either or both Aristotelian and Middle Platonic sources on certain doctrines which makes it almost impossible to unravel.

[335] *EN* 1106a14-1107a9.

[336] There is a good case that Clement was substantially dependent on a text by Musonius for his advice in the *Paedagogus*. See A. Jagu, *Musonius Rufus entretiens et fragments: introduction, traduction et commentaire* (New York: George Olms Verlag Hildesheim, 1979); C. P. Parker, 'Musonius in Clement,' *HSCP* 12 (1901), 191-200.

[337] *Paed.* 2.1.16.4.

3.5 Moderation and self-sufficiency as the basis of community

Stoics, Peripatetics, and Platonists all shared the basic framework for their ethical theory, according to which all questions of value fall under the basic question of what brings happiness (εὐδαιμονία) to man.[338] For Plato happiness has to do with the harmony and virtue of the soul, while for Aristotle, happiness as a moral virtue is living between extremes, living in virtue but still requiring externals. The earlier Stoics rejected Aristotle's definition and claimed that happiness is living in accordance with virtue alone, which is the same as living in accordance with nature.[339] Indifferents (τὰ ἀδιάφορα) such as health, fame, wealth and strength, have no bearing on the happiness of the wise.[340] Clement aligns himself with the Stoics, admiring them for declaring that the soul's pursuit of virtue is not affected by health or disease since these are indifferent to the moral state of the soul.[341]

This rigorous position of the Stoics did not go unmodified even within their own school. Some Stoics saw that some indifferent things could contribute positively to happiness. Certainly the wise person can be happy without good health or a good family but these things can also be aids to his happiness. Zeno himself distinguished between 'things preferred' (προηγμένα) and 'things to be rejected' (ἀποπροηγμένα),[342] a distinction which proved helpful in Clement's refutation of the Basilidean radical dualism that disparaged creation and the human body.[343] Man's very constitution has its place among sensible things and thus is necessarily composed of things diverse but not opposite, the body and the soul. The soul of the true gnostic does not vilify the body nor does it succumb to its inordinate affections.

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[338] T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Discovering the Good: Oikeiosis and Kathekonta in Stoic Ethics,' in *The Norms of Nature, Studies in Hellenistic Ethics*, ed. M. Schofield and G. Striker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 146.

[339] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.77.16-27.

[340] D.L. 7.104-105. Cf. *Str.* 3.7.58.2; 3.8.63.3.

[341] *Paed.* 2.1.15; *Str.* 4.15.19.

[342] *SVF* 1.192.

[343] *Str.* 4.26.164.3-5.

Rather it acts virtuously using the body in the knowledge that God has created it good but nevertheless as a sojourner preparing for its departure.[344]

The ideal of self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) was important for most of the major philosophic groups. Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics and especially the Cynics, all agreed that a happy person was self-sufficient, in possession of all the goods he needs for happiness.[345] For Plato, the Good is perfect and lacks nothing and so, ideally speaking, the person who has attained to the Good needs nothing else, not even friends.[346] The Cynic, Diogenes, claimed that freedom of speech and freedom of action were the most important things in life.[347] To be free one needs to be completely independent (αὐτάρκης) of one's society with all of its trappings of money and conventions of marriage, socially acceptable behaviour etc, and in order to be completely independent of society and men one has to reduce needs to a minimum. All that the Cynic requires is food, shelter and clothing of the meanest sort; his spiritual needs could be satisfied by virtue alone. Therefore he has no desire for wealth, knowledge, pleasure or friendship.[348] Later Cynics reacted against the austerity of Diogenes. For both Bion of Borysthenes and Teles, αὐτάρκεια was not so much a stern renunciation of the world as an attempt to adapt oneself to the world and changing circumstances just as an actor adapts himself to the various roles that he has to play. Self-sufficiency is synonymous with being satisfied with what is at hand. It is not a withdrawing into oneself, but an acceptance of one's circumstances and a concern to discover value in them.[349]

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[344] *Str.* 4.26.165; cf. Plato *Phaedo* 82b-c.

[345] Cf. A. A. Long, *Stoic studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 183. Clement seems aware of the opinions of the various philosophers on self-sufficiency. Hecataeus is said to have called αὐτάρκεια the chief end (*Str.* 2.21.130.5). Polemo, disciple of Xenocrates, held the opinion that happiness is sufficiency in all good things, or of the most and greatest (*Str.* 2.22.133.7). Epicurus regards sufficiency as the greatest of all riches (*Str.* 6.2.24.8).

[346] Plato *Philebus* 20e6; *Lysis* 215a-b.

[347] D.L. 6.69,71.

[348] A. N. M. Rich, 'The Cynic Conception of AYTARKEIA,' *Mnemosyne* 9 (1956), 23-29; Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 58-63.

[349] A. J. Malherbe, 'Paul's Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4.11),' in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 133-134.

Characteristic of Cynic attitudes is their individualism; non-Cynic philosophers stressed the social dimension of self-sufficiency. The Pythagorean, Ecphantus, in a tractate on kingship describes the ideal king as the paragon of self-sufficiency. To be self-sufficient is to be like God; it leads all things but is itself led by nothing. The ideal king is concerned with κοινωνία, φιλία and virtue, all of which stem from his self-sufficiency. He does not amass acquisitions for his personal service on account of any lack, but will cause all good things and have κοινωνία with all.[350]

The apostle Paul held self-sufficiency as an ideal for himself[351] but his idea of self-sufficiency is not heavily dependent on philosophical conceptions of the topic. It does not signify a withdrawal from the world or the deliberate reduction of his needs to a minimum. Nor does he use self-sufficiency to transcend human fragility and create a 'fortress of the wise,' by living according to reason alone.[352] Rather Paul has learned to live with his circumstances in this life whether they be humble or abundant. He knows that his needs will be met by God and that God out of his riches can also supply the needs for the Philippians.[353] Paul accepts the gift from the Philippians not because he needs it but as a means of strengthening his friendship with them through the convention of reciprocity.[354]

Self-sufficiency is also found in the *Shepherd* where, on account of the imminent tribulation which may compel the wealthy to flee the city, rich Christians are enjoined to reduce their needs to a minimum. Again there is no broader commitment to Hellenistic philosophy on the topic. There is no attempt to escape from human finitude in the attainment of happiness although there is the motivation to be less dependent on society. Self-

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[350] Malherbe, 'Paul's Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4.11),' 134-135.

[351] Phil. 4.11-13.

[352] S. K. Stowers, 'Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,' in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians. Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe*, ed. D. L. Balch, J. Ferguson, and W. A. Meeks (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 284-286.

[353] Phil. 4.19.

[354] Malherbe, 'Paul's Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4.11),' 137-139.

sufficiency has a social implication. With their superfluous possessions the rich are to buy 'afflicted souls' – widows, orphans and the needy – through acts of charity.[355]

Clement's ideal of self-sufficiency shares some traits with each of these sources and differs in others. He aligns himself with Plato and the Stoics in claiming that virtue is sufficient for happiness, a central tenet in the Barbarian philosophy.[356] For Clement, self-sufficiency protects the rational dimension of the believer against any threats from the pleasures of the body, and from the uncertainty concomitant with being a finite being.[357] As such, it requires the deliberate reduction of an individual's needs to a bare minimum. Clement concludes from the Saviour's command, 'Take no anxious thought about tomorrow,' that a man who has devoted himself to Christ ought to be sufficient to himself (i.e. living on the bare minimum) so that he is free and unimpeded to follow him.[358] Passions which would normally arise from superfluous wealth are thereby bounded by self-sufficiency.[359] Clement, echoing the sentiment of the *Shepherd*, also saw the divestment of superfluous wealth as the best way of preparing for the ordeal of future persecutions.[360]

Self-sufficiency also provides the basis for God's providence. Clement held that one could use some external 'goods' and still be self-sufficient, exploiting, as did the Stoics, the subtle difference between *use* and *need* made possible by the ambiguity of the word χρεία.[361] It was chiefly for men's sake that all things were made, yet it is not good to use all things, nor at all times. The occasion, time, mode and intention govern the correct use of things and

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[355] *Sim.* 1. Cf. Osiek, *Rich and poor*, 53-54.

[356] *Str.* 5.14.96-97.

[357] The gnostic is lord and master of himself. He is moderate and passionless, unable to be disturbed by pleasures and pains (*Str.* 7.11.67.8). Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 206.

[358] *Paed.* 1.12.98.4.

[359] *Paed.* 2.1.16.4.

[360] *Paed.* 3.8.41.1.

[361] E.g. *Paed.* 2.3.39.1, 'It is necessary for those hastening towards salvation to anticipate beforehand that everything we possess is for use (χρήσεως ἕνεκεν), and the use (ἡ χρῆσις) is for the sake of self-sufficiency (αὐταρκείας χάριν), which one may attain by a few things.' Cf. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 8-9.

invariably this means that men are only to appropriate the basic necessities for life.[362] Although the whole of creation is ours to use, the universe is made for the sake of self-sufficiency, which anyone can acquire by a few things.[363] God created things which can be useful and which are not evil in themselves.[364] In his providence no one is poor regarding necessities provided that men are not greedy and appropriate more than what is necessary.[365]

Self-sufficiency is based on moderation and has a social aspect. Moderation for Clement tends towards frugality. Moderation means to live on the necessities of life without superfluities.[366] Jesus gave his disciples broiled fish to teach them this.[367] While conceding that wine can be useful for good health,[368] Clement advises that it is wise to dilute it with as much water as possible.[369] Gold and silver are unpreferred indifferents as they tend to corrupt the individual and the community. Clement approves of Plato's dictum that 'one ought not to labour to possess gold or silver or superfluous utensils' because they exceed the limits of moderation in not serving some practical purpose. Utensils ought to be multi-functional so that we can eliminate superfluous possessions.[370]

The point from the above discussion is extremely important for our study of *QDS* as there is a tendency for scholars to exaggerate the correct inner attitude of the person holding possessions at the expense of their correct use. Clement's notion of moderation (σωφροσύνη) in his major works, the *Paedagogus* especially, entails *both* a disposition which is not ensnared by the passions from superfluous possessions *and* the appropriate use of these

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[362] *Paed.* 2.1.14.3-5. Cf. 1 Cor. 10.23.

[363] *Paed.* 2.3.38-9.

[364] Contra the heretics who run down created existence and vilify the body. Cf. *Str.* 4.26.163.1-2.

[365] *Paed.* 2.1.14.5.

[366] *Paed.* 2.2.25.

[367] *Paed.* 2.1.14.1.

[368] Clement personally considers it best to refrain from wine completely as shown from his approval of the apostle Paul's dictum, 'it is good not to eat meat or to drink wine' (Rom. 14.20), a statement which Clement sees has affinity with a Pythagorean principle (*Paed.* 2.1.11).

[369] *Paed.* 2.2.24.

[370] *Paed.* 2.3.35; Plato *Laws* 955e.

superfluous possessions. It is inconceivable in Clement's schema for a wealthy person to claim for himself a virtuous inner attitude and at the same time intentionally retain his superfluous wealth for himself. Central to *QDS* is the understanding that moderation directs all superfluous possessions to be made available for common use by the Christian community.[371]

3.6 Likeness to God and the ethical goal of *apatheia*

With respect to the morality of actions, moderation is good but not perfect.[372] Living in moderation curbs the passions, but does not completely eradicate them. This moderation of feeling, where one fears to transgress the mean of an action, is called *metriopatheia*, which represents the moral standard for Plato in the *Republic*, Aristotle, and the Stoics, but for Clement, as for Philo, *metriopatheia* is only a stage on the way to the final goal.[373]

In the *Stromateis* which is directed more towards advanced Christians *metriopatheia* is overshadowed by a higher ideal, *apatheia*, the complete eradication of the irrational passions from the soul, which is to become like God as much as humanly possible.[374] Having kept one's passions in check through moderation by one's own efforts (*metriopatheia*), the believer now proceeds to advance towards the passionless state, through the power of God's indwelling spirit. As the believer advances, he finds that what he reckons to be necessary for life gradually diminishes, ultimately to the point which can be deemed ascetic. Thus, it is best to think of *apatheia* as an intensification of living in moderation and self-sufficiency. For example, whereas the simple Christian is to consume meat in moderation, following the example of Christ who ate broiled fish in front of his disciples,[375] an advanced believer can

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[371] E.g. *QDS* 13.1-7; 19.6.

[372] *Str.* 4.23.147.1.

[373] *Str.* 2.8.39.4; 4.17.107.4. Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 99-103.

[374] *Str.* 6.13.105.1; 6.9.74.1-2. *Apatheia* for the Stoics does not mean a kind of insensibility but rather a freedom from the irrational or excessive passions (cf. Zeno in *SVF* 1.205). Love, for example, could be a rational movement of the soul and hence reconcilable with a state of *apatheia*. See A. Louth, 'Apathetic Love in Clement of Alexandria,' *SP* 18 (1983), 414-415. Clement does not make the same mistake as the Stoics in equating the human virtue with that of God. Cf. *Str.* 7.14.88.5.

[375] *Paed.* 2.1.10.2-16.4.

choose to abstain from meat completely for the purpose of *askesis* in order to weaken the sexual appetite.[376] In a similar way, the Christian husband is to moderate his sexual passions in the early part of his marriage by restricting sexual activity to procreative purposes only. After a period of time, when his wife is no longer fertile and he himself an old man, then the husband is to live with his wife chastely as a sister. Thus through living in moderation over an extended period of time, the Christian husband advances from the state of *metriopatheia* to the ascetic ideal of *apatheia*.[377]

This progression from *metriopatheia* to *apatheia* is also evident, I contend, in the case of the wealthy believers in *QDS*. In our analysis in the next chapter we will see that Clement's ultimate and long-term goal for *all* wealthy believers is the ascetic ideal of *apatheia*.[378] However, before attaining to the gnostic state of *apatheia*, the wealthy, as immature believers, need to undertake the more immediate task of moderating their passions, and so we find that Clement allocates a large part of *QDS* to giving ethical advice consistent with the intermediate state of *metriopatheia*.

3.7 Man's potential for perfection and communion with the divine

Clement evidently wrote a treatise *On the soul*[379] which is no longer extant, but there are sufficient comments scattered throughout his major works which give us some insight into his understanding of the topic. Clement does not argue, or at least did not make it clear that he did argue, for the Platonic idea of the pre-existence of the soul although he is quite aware of it.[380] He does speak of man as existing in the divine mind before his creation. Creation is

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[376] *Str.* 7.6.33.6.

[377] Cf. P. Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), 131-136.

[378] Elsewhere, Clement, in my view grudgingly, admits that simply to be saved is the result of intermediate actions. However, his overriding concern in his major works, and in *QDS*, is to persuade believers to be saved rightly and becomingly by striving for gnostic perfection (*Str.* 6.14.111.3). Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 188-189.

[379] *Str.* 3.3.13.3; 5.13.88.

[380] A doctrine to which Photius claims that Clement ascribed (*Bibliotheca* 109). On the transmigration of the soul see Plato *Timaeus* 47a-b; *Phaedrus*; Philo *Plant.* 14; *Som.* 1.138; *Gig.* 7ff. Cf. W. E. G. Floyd, *Clement of Alexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil*, Oxford Theological Monographs (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 57.

itself represented by God's seeing what he had previously within him merely as a hidden power, and putting forth of his might externally in the act of creating.[381]

Man is of a different essence to God yet it is intrinsic to man's nature to behave οἰκείως with God.[382] The adverb οἰκείως denotes the existence of a natural relationship between man and God and a subjective awareness of such a relationship. Of all animals, man alone was made dear to God with a potential to have filial relationship with God. God made man with his own hand and breathed into him something that was peculiar to himself (τι αὐτῷ ἴδιον ἐνεφύσησεν). The inspiration (ἐμφύσημα) of God is the love charm (τὸ φίλτρον) placed inside man. Man is therefore choiceworthy on his own account.[383]

That which is innate in man, which enables him to have communion with the Creator, is his mind or soul.[384] In the biblical creation account where God made man from the clay and breathed into his face, that which was inspired was the mind.[385] The mind is the source of man's affinity with God since God is Mind, and thus man resembles God by virtue of his rational character.[386] Therefore possession of the Holy Spirit is within the scope (i.e. potential) of man.[387]

The first man, Adam, lacked nothing of the idea or form of man at creation but he was imperfect. Having been adapted for the acquisition of virtue, he still needed to grow in order to attain perfection.[388] The guiding motif for Clement's anthropology is his use of the words image (εἰκών) and likeness (ὁμοίωσις) from Gen. 1.26.[389] These terms are used in various

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[381] *Paed.* 1.3.7. Cf. *Str.* 5.14.94.

[382] *Prot.* 10.100.3.

[383] *Paed.* 1.3.7. Clement describes man as a 'heavenly plant' (*Prot.* 10.100.2-3). Cf. Plato *Timaeus* 90a.

[384] *Prot.* 2.25.3.

[385] *Str.* 5.14.94.3-4. Cf. Gen. 2.7.

[386] *Prot.* 10.98.4; *Paed.* 1.12.98.2; *Str.* 5.14.94.

[387] Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 143.

[388] *Prot.* 2.25.3; *Str.* 4.23.150.3-4; 5.14.94; 6.11.95.5; 6.12.96.1-97.3.

[389] Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 139.

ways in his major writings. 'Image' by itself can denote man in his end-point of perfection, his complete assimilation to God.[390] Elsewhere, following Philo, Clement claims that the Logos is the only complete realization of Gen. 1.26, being both the image and likeness of God.[391] Furthermore, the word 'image' can also denote the basic starting point for man, his created nature, whilst 'likeness' corresponds to the final perfected likeness to God.[392] The dynamic process by which man strives to become perfect in the likeness to God is that of 'following God' (Dt. 14.3) which Clement harmonizes with both the Platonic idea of assimilation and the Stoic idea of living in harmony (ὁμολογία) with nature.[393] All believers then are to strive for moral perfection: 'be perfect as your father in heaven is perfect.'[394] Nothing stands in the way of those who earnestly desire to come to the knowledge of God, neither penury, obscurity, nor poverty.[395] Each animal is to do its natural work. Man, who was made for the contemplation of heaven, is to equip himself with godliness.[396]

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[390] *Str.* 6.14.114.4 referring to Eph. 4.13. Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 139-140.

[391] *Str.* 6.9.72.2; cf. Philo *Her.* 48.231.

[392] *Str.* 2.22.131.6; cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 141.

[393] Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 141. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 106, is incorrect in driving a wedge between the Platonic formula ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, which he attributes to the perfect human τέλος of *apatheia*, and the Stoic formula ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, which he relegates to the mean moral state of *metriopatheia*. The point that Clement is making in *Str.* 2.19.100-1 is that the τέλος of happiness is fully expressed in the Mosaic Law by the injunction, 'Walk after the Lord your God and keep my commandments' (Dt. 13.4), which is consonant with *both* the Platonic *and* Stoic formulae. Clement makes exactly the same point in *Str.* 5.14.95. He shares this idea with Philo, whom he names in *Str.* 2.19.100.3 (although alluding to another passage, viz. *Vita Mos.* 1.22). According to Philo, the τέλος is to live agreeably to nature. It is attained whenever the mind, having entered on virtue's path, walks in the track of right reason and follows God, mindful of his injunctions. To follow God is, then, according to Moses, our goal, when he says, 'walk after the Lord your God' (Dt. 13.4). (*Migr.* 128-131). Thus Philo sees no such distinction between the moral state denoted by Dt. 13.4 and the Stoic formula.

[394] *Str.* 4.22.137.3; 7.14.88.4; cf. Mt. 5.48.

[395] *Prot.* 10.105.2.

[396] *Prot.* 10.100.3.

3.8 Anticipation and participation: the interplay between regeneration and adoption

Clement seldom discusses the Fall.[397] Nor does he seem to have an overly-developed conception of original sin.[398] The disobedience of the first man is the cause of mankind's estrangement from God and the state of the soul which is separated from its communion with, and rule over, the body.[399] As a result, people have become irrational like animals in following their impulses, but they have not become irredeemably irrational.[400] People sin unwillingly largely because of their upbringing and lack of instruction.[401] Prior to regeneration our thoughts were wandering, corrupted by our love of pleasure and our neglect of the commandments.[402] Regeneration has eschatological, ontological and pedagogical implications. It denotes the transference of man's being to the eschaton, where the new believer lives unambiguously in the light and receives here and now in faith what essentially belongs to the future and will become a present reality after the resurrection.[403] Furthermore, the new believer is released from the bondage to Satan due to his sin and has been transferred into the pre-Fall state of primal man where he has the freedom to make the proper use of the natural powers of the soul to choose the beneficial and reject the harmful.[404] The pedagogical implication is influenced by the Platonic notion that to teach and enlighten is to regenerate. In the *Symposium*, Diotima says that there is installed into all the natural love of generating what

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[397] When Clement does discuss the Fall it is to counter the heretical Gnostic views that would connect the institution of marriage to the original sin. According to Clement sexual union was natural to Adam and Eve although they were deceived by the serpent to procreate prematurely (*Str.* 3.17.102-103). Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 143-144.

[398] H. Rondet, 'Le péché originel dans la tradition: Tertullien, Clément, Origène,' *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* 67 (1966), 130-133.

[399] *Str.* 2.7.34.2; 4.3.12.1; 4.13.94.1.

[400] *Paed.* 1.13.101.3.

[401] Cf. D.L. 7.89, 'But the rational animal may be perverted, so [the Stoics] claim, sometimes due to the persuasiveness of external things and sometimes due to the instruction given by one's associates.'

[402] *Str.* 3.14.94.3.

[403] *Paed.* 1.6.29.2-3. Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 154-157.

[404] *Paed.* 2.1.1; *Str.* 1.19.92.1-2; 3.8.68.1.

is like and that the good man generates a counterpart of himself when he trains a youth;[405] while in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates speaks of those who beget and finish men; 'for some procreate with the body, others by the soul.'[406] Similarly the apostle says, 'I have begotten you in Jesus Christ' (1 Cor. 4.15). God is the father and teacher of truth, who regenerates and creates anew, and nourishes the elect soul. God's intent in regenerating man is that man may become a son and disciple and at the same time also be a friend and of a kindred nature.[407]

Regeneration leads naturally to the topic of adoption as sons of God, which, as mentioned, signifies friendship with God in Clement's salvific schema. Adoption is a prominent Pauline theme signifying a great eschatological redemptive event which must be seen in light of the Old Testament redemptive-historical background of the adoption of Israel as the son of God. The adoption of sons signifies for Paul that the promises and privileges of Israel have passed to the church. Thus believers are the true children and seed of Abraham.[408] As with friendship with God, sonship denotes a new status and relation with God over against the bondage under the Law and has ethical implications.[409] Whereas Clement follows Paul both in declaring that sonship is the result of the gift of the spirit[410] and that the first-fruits of sonship are evident even in the present,[411] he does part with him with respect to the timing of the reception of the spirit and the degree to which one can become a son of God in this life. For Clement, the believer's full reception of the spirit, and hence sonship, does not occur at baptism and regeneration[412] but only after a period of training and instruction through which

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[405] *Symposium* 206c-219d.

[406] *Str.* 5.2.15.3.

[407] *Str.* 7.16.93.5-6; *EP* 5.2.

[408] Rom. 9.7, 26; Gal. 3.8, 26, 29; 4.6-7, 28-29; 2 Cor. 6.18.

[409] Gal. 4.1-5.

[410] Cf. Rom. 8.14-16; however, Gal. 4.6ff. seems to suggest that sonship precedes the gift of the spirit.

[411] Enabling the believer to call on the father. Cf. Rom. 8.15; Gal. 4.6.

[412] Rom. 9.26; Gal. 3.26-27.

the believer shows himself worthy of adoption into friendship and sonship with God.[413] With respect to regeneration and the reception of the spirit, Clement talks rather about anticipation (πρόληψις) which he describes in terms of Platonic participation (τὸ μετέχον). Clement understands Plato to say that the chief end is twofold: 1) that which is able to be participated in, and which exists first in the ideas themselves, 'the Good'; and 2) that which participates in it, and receives its likeness from it.[414] This corresponds to the two-fold end of the Christian where the process of striving for the goal, the good life, is itself a goal. Thus the way we reach the end is of equal importance to the end itself.[415]

3.9 From infant to the perfect man and friend of God: the role of *oikeiosis*

While the several individual ethical and epistemological elements of the process by which a believer attains to perfection and sonship/friendship with God are well understood by modern scholars, there has been, in my opinion, a serious deficiency in our understanding of the overarching process in which all these individual elements fit together. This deficiency leads to several unanswered questions. For example, while it is well known that Clement insists that believers follow the commandments, it is not immediately clear why a believer would choose to do so in the first place. How does obeying the commandments of God lead towards the knowledge of (not merely about) God? How does the knowledge of God lead to the love of God? In other words, what are the psychological and psychogogical processes by which man, starting with his natural self *qua* regenerated man, progresses ultimately to sonship and friendship with God?

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[413] *Str.* 2.21.128.4. Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 152-159. Clement elsewhere does speak of regeneration by water from an external or eschatological perspective where regeneration is said to be accompanied by gift of the spirit (*Paed.* 1.6.26.1-3). Baptism in this perspective thus has all the characteristics of perfection incorporating terms such as illumined, adopted, perfected and immortal, the granting of gnosis, and the reference to Christians already practising deification (*Paed.* 1.12.98.3; 1.6.27.1-3; 28.2). However, the fufilment is reserved until the resurrection of those who believe. It is not the reception of something different but the obtaining of the promise already made (*Paed.* 1.6.28.3-5). Faith is the attempt generated in time; the τέλος is the attainment of the promise secured for eternity. In this world believers receive the pledge by faith; after the resurrection believers receive it as present (*Paed.* 1.6.29.2-3).

[414] *Str.* 2.22.131.2; Plato *Parmenides* 132d-e.

[415] Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, 84.

I propose that this process is a Christianized adaptation of the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις.[416] Οἰκείωσις was a central idea in Stoic thinking, describing the process by which an individual, motivated by natural self-love, progresses from an infant amoral state into a mature wise man concerned only with virtue. The term does not have an English equivalent. Often the term is translated as 'appropriation,' which in light of its Latin derivative *proprium* is close to the mark. However, the term appropriation has been used in modern times to refer to the annexation of territory or goods by a foreign country, so that now the term has negative overtones. Translations are invariably going to be clumsy and so I have opted simply to leave it transliterated as *oikeiosis*. In the Stoa, the term often has a passive sense denoting a relationship with an external object, and it is especially the consciousness of such a relationship on which most of the emphasis is placed.[417] It is the 'recognition and appreciation of something as belonging to one'[418] and the attitude of being 'well-disposed' towards that thing.[419] The force of the term *oikeiosis* can be more easily grasped by its more familiar opposite 'alienation' (τὸ ἀλλότριον).

The doctrine of *oikeiosis* focuses on a creature's natural instinct for self-preservation which hinges on its sense of belonging to itself. The Stoics from Antipater onwards were fond of using children as examples in explaining the natural elements of the doctrine.[420] As

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[416] Clement's use of the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις has yet to be fully explored. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, 92, noted some time ago that οἰκείωσις together with the other processes of ὁμοίωσις, ἐξομοίωσις, ἀκολουθία and μίμησις describe a life of increasing likeness, obedience and proximity to God. In his latest book on Clement to be published in 2005, Professor Osborn develops the doctrine further than any other published literature. Most other scholars have ignored the doctrine completely. On the other extreme, Ritter, 'Christentum und Eigentum,' 14, denies that the doctrine has any relevance to Clement. Ritter tries to draw the distinction between Clement and Stoicism with respect to the ethical demands of the Gospel to share one's wealth with others. In doing this, Ritter considers οἰκείωσις doctrine antithetical to the Christian practice of sharing with others on account of its self-centric nature, 'Man denke nur an die stoische, auf frühperipatetische Anregungen zurückgehende οἰκείωσις-Lehre, nach welcher „alle sittlichen Postulate stufenweise aus dem ersten Naturtrieb aller Lebewesen, der Selbsterhaltung und Selbstentfaltung, abgeleitet werden"' (A. Dihle, 'Ethic' *RAC* 6 (1972), 649). Ritter clearly fails to appreciate that the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiosis* is a process which leads from love of self to love of others.

[417] S. G. Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis,' in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. A. A. Long (London: Athlone Press, 1971), 116.

[418] G. Striker, 'The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics,' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983), 145.

[419] Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis,' 116.

[420] The positive view of children as chief agents in their own education by the Stoics ought to be contrasted with the negative view of Platonists, where children are distinguished from adults both by their recalcitrance and

the infant grows and develops it comes to recognize more fully what its own nature involves. There is a growing self-awareness. It comes to recognize that it is natural to pursue certain things, to which it naturally develops a positive attitude which guides its impulses, and avoid others, to which it naturally develops an aversion. An example is the natural fear shown by the child at the sight of a fierce animal which it had never encountered before.

Once the child reaches fourteen its *oikeiosis* changes with the supervention of logos or reason rather than its being directed solely by its natural impulses. As this rational *oikeiosis* develops it leads the youth towards the good or moral awareness, the highest form of perception. Thus as the youth matures he finds that the natural things with which he was initially concerned cease to matter at all. As a rational adult, he comes to recognize that for his own nature, what really matters is his virtue based on reason. Virtue, the only good, consists in making appropriate choices among external things based on reason, and in attempting to put one's choices into effect as best as one can. This leads to a degree of autonomy with regards to moral awareness, with the wise man living according to reason having no need for man-made laws.

The second kind of *oikeiosis* is the process of extended egoism by which the creature becomes not only well-disposed to itself but to other people because they in some sense belong to him. This kind of *oikeiosis* is the beginning of the Stoic notion of justice. The starting point is the observation that it is natural for parents to love their children.[421] (The love of offspring is easier to conceptualize where offspring may be regarded as an extension of oneself). The child moves from passive love, that is, being loved by a parent, to active love, the loving of the parent in return. It is not entirely clear how the transition from passive to active love occurs. Stobaeus suggests that it simply is bound to happen.[422] It most likely

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immaturity, and the Peripatetics, with whom child psychology is aligned with that of the animals. Cf. Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis,' 118.

[421] Stoics also noted the way that parental affection was a natural force amongst most animals. Cf. Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis,' 130.

[422] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.120.8-20W.

has something to do with the Stoic interest in the conferring of benefits, and in their restitution, in which case it bears some analogy with the Aristotelian process which begins with self-love (φιλαυτία) and moves to the love of others.[423] The child comes to recognize that it is loved by its parent and responds with like benefits (with the expectation/hope that it will remain in that love). From the love of parents, the scope for the child's *oikeiosis* broadens in ever widening concentric circles to encompass blood relatives, married relations, friends, neighbours, citizens, public associations and indeed the whole human race.[424] Man is born ultimately for the preservation of others and therefore the wise man will want to play a part in politics, to marry and to have children.[425]

Clement adapts the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiosis* to describe the process by which a believer progresses from an incipient self-knowledge at regeneration to the consummate love of God at his adoption as son and friend. As such it involves an interplay between the subjective and objective perspectives in the determination of the τέλος of man. Clement's adapted process covers the expansion from man's *oikeiosis* to self to his *oikeiosis* to God which is explained, similarly to the Stoics, in terms of parental love for their offspring. There are 5 stages in this process: 1) Self-knowledge leads to self-love; 2) Self-love motivates one to obey the commandments; 3) Obeying the commandments leads to living in harmony (ὁμολογία) with their Divine author, God; 4) Living in harmony with God leads the believer to desire to be in his presence; 5) God reciprocates the believer's obedience and love by adopting him as his son and friend to dwell with him in unity. It must be noted that the interplay between knowledge and love in each of the 5 stages is reciprocal. The more that an individual knows himself, the more he loves himself; the more he loves himself, the more he knows himself. The reciprocity between love and knowledge also occurs between the subject (man) and

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[423] Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis,' 125.

[424] Arius Didymus discusses the Aristotelian notion of friendship in very similar terms where one moves from friendship of self to one's parents, then other relatives and finally to persons outside of one's family. Cf. Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis,' 124.

[425] Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis,' 122.

object (God) of *oikeiosis*. The more that an individual loves and knows himself, the more he loves and knows God; the more he knows and loves God, the more he knows and loves himself.

1) Self-knowledge is the basis of self-love

The starting-point in this process is the regenerated self of the new believer. This regenerated self constitutes the subjective basis for determining the way to God: 'A man completely purified and freed from things that make him only dust, what could he have more serviceable for walking in the path that leads to the apprehension of God than his own self?'[426] The Stoics taught that man by his very nature is imbued with a sense of belonging to himself, a commendation towards preserving himself and towards loving his own constitution and the things that preserve that constitution.[427] That is, man has an attachment to himself which provides the factual basis on which he can make valuations on objects outside of himself. These valuations are based on the positive attitudes he has towards himself and towards the external things that preserve his self. These external things are thus seen from this viewpoint as either belonging or being alien to one.

Clement adapts these ideas into a Christian context when he says that man is made in the image of God and is therefore choiceworthy in himself, and that which is choiceworthy in itself belongs (οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν) to whatever is choiceworthy in itself.[428] Two points can be made here. First, the descriptive fact based on the self-knowledge that one 'is made in the image of God,' necessarily leads to a certain valuation that one is choiceworthy in one's self, which provides the basis for one's self-love.[429] The second has to do with the objective

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[426] *Paed.* 2.1.1. Cf. Seneca *Ep.* 23.6.

[427] D.L.7.85; Cicero *Fin.* 3.16. Cf. T. Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic philosophy* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), 66; Striker, 'The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics,' 153.

[428] *Paed.* 1.3.8.1. Cf. Cicero *Fin.* 3.17-18.

[429] In Stoic thought the term 'valuable' is used for two categories of things: things which are themselves in accordance with nature and things that produce such things. Thus there is a distinction between one's constitution (a thing of natural value) and things that have a causal relation to one's constitution as preserving it. Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Discovering the good,' 155.

perspective of *oikeiosis* where the fact that man is choiceworthy in himself implies that he has affinity with God; that is, man belongs and is dear (φιλητόν) to God.[430]

The initial stage of *oikeiosis* thus involves the basic understanding of who we are and the recognition that we have some type of affinity with God. To 'know yourself' is to know for what reason we were born, whose image we are, our essence, our workmanship and our οἰκείωσις to God.[431] (The self-awareness at this stage is an embryonic form of knowledge. To advance as a Christian is to know oneself increasingly and thereby approach the fullness of the import of Socrates' revelation from the oracle at Delphi. Concomitant with the increasing self-knowledge is the increasing knowledge of God. In its consummation, to know oneself is to know God). This recognition constitutes the first step towards salvation and is based on faith, an incipient form of knowledge.[432] At repentance, as an act of self-love, one chooses to follow God because such following is an act beneficial to one's self.[433]

2) Self-love leads to the observance of the commandments as a duty.

The new believer in his initial choice to follow God acts by faith and not complete knowledge. At this nascent stage of *oikeiosis*, the believer's awareness of the affinity he has with God is limited by the fact that he has some knowledge about God but not of God. The substance of this knowledge is that God punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous, and thus the new believer sees it as his duty to obey the commandments. To 'know yourself' is therefore to know that we are born to obey the commandments, if we choose to be willing to be saved.[434] Thus the new believer, motivated by his self-love, recognizes that the act of obeying the commandments is beneficial to himself (with the promise of salvation) and that the neglect of the commandments is harmful (with the threat of punishment). The new

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[430] Cf. *Paed.* 1.3.8.1, where man is deemed 'lovable' and so is loved by God.

[431] *Str.* 5.4.23.1-2.

[432] *Str.* 2.6.31.1.

[433] *Str.* 2.20.115.1-3.

[434] *Str.* 7.3.20.7.

believer on account of his self-love is thereby motivated by hope and fear. He who fears to offend his father, loves himself.[435]

3) Observing the commandments as a duty leads to living in harmony with the commandments.

In Stoicism, nature as a providential force guides men to virtue.[436] The repeated acts of choosing what is beneficial and rejecting what is harmful to one's own nature, deriving from the initial impulse of duty [*cum officio selectio*], leads one naturally towards an understanding of what is truly good.[437] Similarly in Clement's schema, the Paedagogue lovingly guides us to the virtuous life through the commandments.[438] The believer, after obeying the commandments over a period of time through a sense of duty, gradually becomes capable of making a proper use of the natural powers of his soul in desiring appropriate objects but hating all that would injure.[439] The continued obedience to the commandments, where habit becomes nature, leads the soul to become self-impelled in choosing the good and avoiding the harmful.[440] The point at which the mind of the believer resonates with the mind of the author of the commandments, where the believer begins to think and act like the Logos, Clement calls living or acting in harmony (ὁμολογία).

4) Living in harmony with the commandments leads to deeper self-knowledge and love for God.

The Stoics declare virtue to be a disposition that is in harmony with nature. Living in harmony with the laws of nature is to recognize that they are right with respect to what belongs to man and to live accordingly. At this point virtue is choiceworthy for its own sake, not stemming from fear or hope or anything external.[441] When a Stoic wise man acquires

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[435] *Str.* 2.12.53.4-5.

[436] DL 7.87.

[437] Cicero *Fin.* 3.11.1. Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Discovering the good,' 156.

[438] *Paed.* 1.3.9.1.

[439] *Str.* 3.8.68.1.

[440] *Str.* 7.7.42.5-6.

[441] DL 7.89.

understanding and sees the order and harmony of his acts, he values that order and harmony more highly than the things in accordance with nature that he first loved and he concludes by rational argument that his end lies in conformity with this order and harmony. It becomes the only thing desirable for its own sake.

Rejecting the impersonal providence of the Stoics, Clement claims that living or acting in harmony with the commandments leads the believer to desire and long for assimilation to their divine author. Living in harmony is both revelatory and reflexive. It produces a kind of divine understanding, a light engendered in the soul which makes everything clear and enables the believer both to know himself truly, to know the goodness of God and to apprehend fully that his τέλος is totally bound up in his *oikeiosis* with God.[442] The elevated self-knowledge brought about by acting in harmony with the commandments intensifies one's self-love which in turn deepens one's longing for God and brings a forgetfulness of, indeed a 'magnanimous contempt' for, objects that seemed attractive in the past.[443] The only thing that becomes desirable to the believer is to establish himself within reach of God.[444] Since he loves himself, he loves the Lord and lives in harmony with God's plan of salvation so that he may save his soul.[445] No longer does the believer need the compulsion which is from fear to be restrained from pleasurable things, nor the reward which persuades him to drive back the impulses, but chooses obedience to the commandments on account of his desire to consummate his *oikeiosis* with God. *Oikeiosis* to noetic things naturally leads the mature Christian away from sensible things, enabling him to choose the good on the basis of complete knowledge, to admire generation and its maker, and his assimilation to the divine. Desire for sensible things is quenched by the prospect of *oikeiosis* with God (διὰ τὴν πρὸς σὲ οἰκείωσιν), with the mature Christian recognizing God's providence in all things and the

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[442] The advanced believer possesses a highly developed proficiency in the dialectical processes for understanding himself, the world around him and noetic things. Cf. *Str.* 7.3.17.2-3.

[443] *Str.* 6.9.75.1-2. Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 205.

[444] *Str.* 3.4.33.3.

[445] *Str.* 4.7.42.5; 4.23.152.2.

necessity for him to be in what is God's. He wishes to be unafraid so that he might draw near to God (σοὶ συνεγγίζειν), being satisfied with little, and occupying himself with God's choice of noble things.[446]

5) God reciprocates the believer's obedience and desire for oikeiosis, with adoption as son and friend.

Living in harmony with nature is the highest attainable ethical state in Stoic philosophy.[447] It consists of self-control which counters desire (*metriopatheia*) rather than ministering to it and is largely achievable through an individual's own efforts. For Clement, living in harmony with the commandments leads to the possibility of the believer receiving the gift of complete self-control and eradication of the passions (*apatheia*) through the reception of divine power and the grace of God which is granted when the believer is adopted into friendship and sonship with God.[448] It is through striving for self-control that the believer increasingly becomes dear to God, which, as stated above, is an application of the Socratic principle of 'like becomes dear to like.'[449] While virtue in man is not the same as that in the sovereign God, it is enough for the disciple to become like his master.[450] Moreover, living in harmony kindles the desire in the believer for *oikeiosis* with noble things and love for God. Living in harmony with the commandments is understood by Clement in terms of thanksgiving on the part of the believer in response to God who initiated the giving of benefits.[451] We have then an act of reciprocity in the bestowal of benefits, which, when accompanied by longing and desire for rational intimacy on both sides, constitutes a friendly act. He who consciously receives and keeps the commandments is faithful; and he who by love requites benefits as far as he is able, is already a friend.[452] This reciprocity between God

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[446] *Str.* 4.23.147.3-149.1. Cf. also *Str.* 3.1.4.1; 4.13.94.1.

[447] *Str.* 3.7.57.1.

[448] *Str.* 3.1.4.1. Cf. 2 Tim. 1.6-7.

[449] *Str.* 2.22.132.4-133.2. On Clement's use of the Socratic principle see above p. 74.

[450] *Str.* 6.14.114.5-6 Cf. Mt. 25.10.

[451] *Str.* 6.9.73.2-3.

[452] *Str.* 7.3.20.7. Cf. *Prot.* 9.86.1.

and man which draws man into unity with God is explained by Clement using a metaphor of seamen in a boat who pull on an anchor. They do not drag the anchor to themselves but drag themselves towards the anchor.[453]

The institution of adoption holds a certain advantage over biological parenthood with respect to the issue of inheritance: the parent-to-be can choose an heir who is worthy.[454] In Clement's scheme, the believer's response of thanksgiving to the benefits received from God constitutes his 'worthiness,' which, as related, is a precondition for adoption.[455] The believer's *oikeiosis* with God is consummated when the father adopts him as son and friend by granting the Holy Spirit promised at regeneration. The believer ascends from the state of *metriopatheia* attained through living in harmony with the commandments into the state of a perfectly mature man (cf. Eph. 4.13). No longer is *oikeiosis* characterized by the believer's desire or longing to be with God, for he is already in his midst. Love is no longer desire on the part of the lover; but is an affectionate *oikeiosis* (στερκτικὴ οἰκείωσις), restoring the gnostic to the unity of the faith, unbounded by time and place. He who by love is already in the midst of that in which he is destined to be, and has anticipated hope by knowledge, does not desire anything, possessing, as far as possible, the very thing desired. He thereby remains in the habit of loving gnostically, in the one unvarying state. He no longer needs courage or desire for he has obtained *oikeiosis* (τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀγάπης οἰκείωσιν) to the impassible God which arises from love, and by love has enrolled himself among the friends of God.[456]

Thus the gnostic has passed from the first type of *oikeiosis* based on the single evaluative fact of his attachment to his self into a second type called affectionate (στερκτική) or familial *oikeiosis* where the evaluative fact is his attachment to God. The reference to στερκτικὴ οἰκείωσις can be explained by the Stoic, Hierocles, who has a section in his treatise *What the*

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[453] *Str.* 4.23.152.1-2.

[454] See P. Garnsey and R. P. Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture* (London: Duckworth, 1990), 143-144.

[455] *Prot.* 9.82.5-7.

[456] *Str.* 6.9.73.2-74.1. Cf. also *Str.* 3.8.69.3; 4.13.94.1-4; 4.23.148.1-2.

telos is in which he distinguishes between three distinct kinds of *oikeiosis*. The *oikeiosis* which is directed towards oneself is called 'benevolent' (εὐνοητική), *oikeiosis* towards external goods is called 'due to choice' (αἱρετική), while the familial kind (συγγενική) is called 'affectionate' (στερκτική).[457]

The gnostic's oikeiosis with other men

The Stoic wise man sees himself as rational with the consequence that whatever else is rational will belong to him. The basic other-regarding attitude of care for others who were seen to belong to him must be extended to cover all rational beings. They are now seen to belong to him in the highest degree. The Stoics can speak in a very Kantian way of a 'city' of men and gods and connect the fact that each of us is a member of that city with a utilitarian type of altruism.[458] The Stoic wise man fulfilling his end will be concerned with getting for himself those primary things in accordance with nature that are required to keep him alive and in proper physical form. But he will also be concerned that other people with whom he is living shall also get those things.

Whereas Clement does not speak directly of *oikeiosis* with other believers in his major works he does echo a similar sentiment with his statement that 'a gnostic first cares for himself and then for his neighbours in order that we might become better.'[459] Andrew Louth has argued convincingly that living frugally in *apatheia* frees the gnostic from distractions so as to enable him to love others freely and attentively.[460] In the analysis of *QDS* in the next chapter we will see that Clement does speak of οἰκείωσις with others. The wealthy believer's striving for *oikeiosis* with God is contingent on his attaining *oikeiosis* with an advanced Christian (= gnostic).[461]

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[457] Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis,' 126. Cf. Cicero *Fin.* 3.62-71.

[458] Cicero *Fin.* 3.64. Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Discovering the good,' 176-177.

[459] *Str.* 7.3.16.1. Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Discovering the good,' 177.

[460] Louth, 'Apathetic Love,' 417.

[461] See discussion on *QDS* 30.1-33.1 on pp. 175ff.

3.10 Conclusions

Clement's soteriology in his major writings has a predominantly individualistic dimension. The τέλος of salvation is friendship and sonship with God which is attained through the process of οἰκείωσις by which a believer progresses ethically and epistemically from an incipient self-awareness and self-love at regeneration to the knowledge and love of God made possible by adoption and the granting of the spirit once the believer has shown himself worthy.

However, it would be wrong to ignore the social aspect of Clement's soteriology in his major writings. His vision for the salvation of the individual has as its locus the church as the community of friends. The Christian does not attain to salvation by withdrawing from the world and living as a hermit, struggling alone against the demon of passions, but rather he presses forward to the τέλος through the help and *agency* of various members of the community. At the fore are the advanced Christians or gnostics who teach, intercede for, and assist in the salvation of the other believers.[462] There is thus an interconnection between the two visions, a convergence where the philosophical advancement of the individual towards salvation is contingent upon the church functioning as an ideal philosophical community and *vice versa*. This interconnection exists on account of the fact that both philosophical ascent and Christian community are founded on the formation and development of reciprocal interpersonal relationships, whether between God and the believer, either directly or through God's representatives, the true gnostics, or between believers of the same or different religious or social rank. Clement understands and depicts these interpersonal relationships in terms of Graeco-Roman philosophical and cultural conventions of friendship. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, both the individual and communal dimensions of salvation are present in *QDS*, although, the latter dimension is emphasized far more than is the case in his major works.

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[462] On the role of gnostics in the salvation of believers see above pp. 64ff.

Chapter 4

Analysis of *QDS*

In the previous two chapters we explored some of the literary considerations and analyzed several of the key ideas behind *QDS* in preparation for the analysis of the treatise. We saw that there was a tension between the Christian community's need for wealthy members to ensure its economic viability and the number of problems and conflicts brought about by their very presence, whether through their susceptibility to apostasize during persecution, or their attraction to the speculative systems and communal ideals of the heretics, or their development of undesirable hierarchical relationships which threatened the social cohesion of the community. We also saw that while Clement was widely considered to be an authoritative teacher on moral and religious issues he could nevertheless expect an unfavourable reception from some constituents from both sectors of his implied readership, the wealthy and their opponents, on account of his controversial stance in offering the possibility of salvation to the wealthy and his reputation for espousing rigorous views on wealth. This is an important point. He still needs recourse to the various conventional means of persuasion, including some elements of rhetoric, in order to get his will across. Furthermore, we saw that several of the leading concepts in *QDS* could be categorized under two rubrics: 'salvation in terms of friendship with God as the goal of philosophical ascent' and 'the church as an ideal philosophical community of friends.' These leading concepts form the grid through which Clement's frequently complex arguments must be interpreted. In this chapter, we will explore the argumentation in *QDS* with the aim of discerning the beliefs and actions that Clement wants his readers to adopt as the result of reading the discourse. In doing so, I will draw attention to the various ways that he utilizes the philosophical and cultural conventions of friendship in these. The results of this analysis will be summarized in the final chapter.

The structure of *QDS* consists of four parts: the proem (1.1-5), the *narratio* (2.1-3.6), the main body which in turn may be divided into two sections, the hortatory (4.1-27.1) and the preceptive (27.2-41.6), and finally the epilogue (42.1-18).

4.1 Proem (1.1-5)

Clement's aim in the proem is to establish goodwill with his readers by inciting their indignation against those who flatter the rich, and, at the same time, enhancing his own standing as a true friend to the wealthy believer. The first half of the proem is a sharp attack on those who pander to the wealthy with encomiastic speeches (1.1-3). The second half draws attention to his own philanthropic motives in composing *QDS* (1.4-5).

4.1.1 Beware of flatterers (1.1–3)

The *topos* which extends throughout this section of the opening chapter is that of flattery. During the Second Sophistic there seems to have been an upsurge in the number of essays composed by philosophers from many diverse persuasions on topics pertaining to flattery, friendship, and frankness of speech. In the first century BCE, the Syrian Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara, a household philosopher of Calpurnius Piso, wrote several works of which probably three were *On Flattery* and one *On Frankness*. The Middle Platonist, Plutarch, addressed to Prince Philopappus one of his works, a treatise on *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend.* Cicero and Maximus of Tyre each devoted essays to the question of how to distinguish a true friend from a flatterer. For these authors, there was perceived to be a need, indeed a duty, to alert rulers and the wealthy about the constant danger from flatterers who were insinuating themselves into the coterie of their superiors by feigning friendship. The consensus amongst writers of the Second Sophistic was that flattery was inimical to true friendship. Philo unequivocally calls flattery a 'disease to friendship.'[463] The friendship offered by flatterers was a *feigned* friendship. At the fore was the challenge of how one could

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[463] Cf. *Leg.* 3.182; *Conf.* 48. For a short survey of Philo's attitudes towards flattery see G. E. Sterling, 'The Bond of Humanity: Friendship in Philo of Alexandria,' in *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald, Society of Biblical Literature (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 206-207.

distinguish between a flatterer and a genuine friend. It is in this tradition that Clement composed the proem.

The discourse opens with a scathing attack on those who bear gifts (δωροφοροῦντες) of encomiastic speeches (τοὺς ἐγκωμιαστικοὺς λόγους) to the wealthy (1.1). The panegyrists are denounced not only as flatterers and being servile, labels which would probably be unlikely to surprise Clement's readers, but rather, far more forcefully, as impious and insidious. The language in the opening accusation suggests very strongly that he is depicting the objects of his vitriol as sophists. Laudatory speeches, variously known in Greek as ἐγκώμια or ἔπαινοι, were a type of epideictic oratory and a particularly popular branch of rhetoric exercised by sophists.[464] By referring to the 'sophists' as flatterers (κόλακες) and servile (ἀνελεύθεροι), he not only reiterates the low opinion of sophists expressed elsewhere in his writings but also that which was commonly articulated by other authors in the Hellenic and Roman tradition.[465]

Of the three occasions that δωροφορέω is used in the Platonic corpus, two occur in dialogues in which the main theme concerns sophistry. In both instances, the point of contention is that sophists ply their wares for money rather than from altruistic motives.[466] In our passage, the sophistic way that flatterers deliver their speeches to the wealthy discredits them. They pretend to bestow favours with those things which are not favours

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[464] It is possible that Clement has in mind a certain species of encomiastic speeches called ἄδοξα or the praise of things normally disreputable or worthless. The ἄδοξα brought the sophists most quickly into disrepute. During the Second Sophistic, the composition of encomia on just about any subject was the mark of a sophist's ability; the more worthless and reprehensible the topic the more prestige the sophist could expect to receive, and, from some of the more conservative philosophical circles, the greater censure and disrepute the sophist would draw. Well-known encomia such as Lucian's praise of a fly, Fronto's examples of sleep, smoke and dust, and Synesius' praise of baldness, were written mainly for pleasure and entertainment. Interestingly, Clement does not seem to be opposed to the ἄδοξα genre *per se* but rather he was against the trivial purposes for which it is utilized in this case (viz. on the wealthy). For example, in the opening of the *Protreptikos*, Clement recounts the story of how the minstrel Eunomus was singing a song at Delphi in honour of the dead serpent; when a string on his lyre broke, a grasshopper praising God of its own accord settled on the lyre, and he adapted his music accordingly. There Clement himself utilizes the sophistic ἄδοξα; the difference being that the grasshopper sings to God rather than merely responding to Eunomus' plight in the traditional story. Cf. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic*, 206.

[465] On Clement's attitude towards sophists see pp. 18ff. Cf. Arrianus *Epict.* 4.1.55; Lucian *Nigr.* 23. See Barton, *Roman Honor*, 151, who observes that flattery was ultimately a form of confession and an act of submission in Roman culture.

[466] *Phaedrus* 266c; *Sophist* 222d.

(προσποιούμενοι χαρίσασθαι τὰ ἀχάριστα) for the purpose of much in return. The favours bestowed by the flatterers on the wealthy are not in the interest of the recipients and hence are not deemed genuine.[467]

Impiety was an extremely emotive label for Clement. It was a slur that was leveled at Christians by the civic authorities, an incrimination against which he defends his co-religionists elsewhere.[468] In our passage, the flatterers bestow on the wealthy that which is really the prerogative of God (1.2). God is the benevolent first cause and creator of all things (cf. *QDS* 6-7). Rather than praising and glorifying God, the panegyrists attach honours to men. The text here is quite mutilated and there have been several attempts by scholars to reconstruct this passage. In the first clause, it seems highly probable that τὸ γέρας is the direct object of περιάπτουσι and ἀνθρώποις is the indirect object, whilst the lacuna was probably originally a noun acting epexegetically to τὸ γέρας. Schwartz's suggestion of τὸ<ν ἔπαινον καὶ> τὸ γέρας is as good a guess as any as it balances with the synonyms 'praise' and 'glorify' in 1.2.[469] The general tenor is that flatterers attach praise and honour, which rightly belong to God, to mere men. The second clause is more problematic. Some textual critics have assumed that a) the clause ἐν ἀσ<...>βίῳ κυλινδουμένοις takes ἀνθρώποις as the subject, and that b) ἐνας+lacuna+βίῳ must have originally signified a licentious or unsalvific mode of life; the sense being that flatterers do not merely bestow divine honours to men but they bestow these honours to men *who are wallowing around in a unsalvific way of life* and who lie under the judgement of God.[470]

The sophistic flatterers are also insidious. They astound the minds of the rich with pleasure (1.3). Giving pleasure is the means by which flatterers catch the ruling faculty of the rich believers' minds off guard and blind them to the difference between virtue and vice.

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[467] Aristotle sees genuine benevolence as voluntarily giving for the sake of the recipient and not in the interest of the giver (*Rh.* 1385b1-4).

[468] Cf. *Str.* 7.9.54.4.

[469] Schwartz, 'Zu Clemens ΤΙΣ Ο ΣΩΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΠΛΟΥΣΙΟΣ,' 83-84.

[470] Fell proposes ἐνα<γεῖ καὶ βορβορώδει> βίῳ; Schwartz suggests ἐν ἀσ<τάτωι καὶ βραχεῖ>.

Philodemus speaks of flattering charmers who 'with their deceitful and manifold pleasantries turn many away by seizing the intensity of the emotions and subduing them by enchantment.'[471] Plutarch also alludes to the enchantment of pleasure as a stratagem of flatterers.[472] In our passage, the pleasures which arise from 'unmeasured praises' have dire social consequences[473] in causing the wealthy to neglect their duty in safeguarding the general welfare (τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων) of the Christian community.[474] When flatterers praise the wealthy they are 'pouring fire on fire' and 'heaping pride upon pride' (τύφῳ τῦφον ἐπαντλοῦντες).[475] In the same way that the sexual impulses of the young are inflamed by the consumption of wine,[476] praise and flattery inflames the pride of the wealthy.[477]

The insidious activity of the flatterers has to do with the inherent harmful nature of wealth (1.3). They are censured for their misprision in not undertaking the more benevolent task of excising from the rich the pride brought about by wealth as if it were 'a harmful and death-bearing sickness.' When flatterers bear gifts of encomiastic speeches (οἱ δωροφοροῦντες) to the wealthy, they are, in reality, adding to the rich person's burden a 'death-bearing' (θανατηφόρος) disease. The disease of pride must be remedied by frank speech, rather than flattery.[478]

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[471] *Critobulus* frag. 60.8-12. Cf. D. Konstan and others, *Philodemus: On frank criticism* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 67; C. E. Glad, 'Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus,' in *Friends, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 208.

[472] *Adulator* 51a-b.

[473] The comical and tragic actions of Nero furnished a classic example of the way that unmeasured praise could cause a person to confuse vicious and virtuous actions. Cf. Plutarch *Adulator* 56e-f.

[474] The phrase τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων probably has an economic-political sense that includes the notion of social responsibility. Isocrates (obsequiously) warns Philip of Macedon that there is perception that the risk-taking king cares more for the praise of his courage than for the general welfare (τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων) of his subjects (*Ep.* 2.3.1).

[475] Cf. Plutarch *Adulator* 61a.

[476] Cf. Plato *Laws* 666a; Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 10.55.4; Galen *Mor.* 4.809.4.

[477] Cf. Plutarch *Adulator* 59a.

[478] *Paed.* 1.8.65. The true Christian's speech is characterized by frankness in *QDS* 35.1; 41.2- 3. Cf. Socrates' reflection about the words of Hippothales towards his favourite Lysis. The true friend should humble and reduce his favourite, instead of puffing him up and spoiling him (Plato *Lysis* 210e).

4.1.2 The author's philanthropic motives for writing (1.4-5)

Having completed, for the time being, his vituperative attack on those who flatter and pander to the wealthy,[479] Clement now seeks to enhance his own standing in the minds of the readers with the goal of gaining their goodwill.[480] The sophistic flatterers act as a foil. It was a regular technique of skilled orators and writers to suggest solidarity between themselves and their audience by playing on a common hostility to others, sometimes to the extent of caricaturing the opponents.[481]

Clement's motivation in leading the wealthy readers to the truth through discourse, with no thought of recompense, is philanthropic (1.4), although he restricts the scope of his philanthropy to the initiates (cf. 2.4).[482] In contrast, the sophistic flatterers serve the wealthy with evil intent (τοῦ θεραπεύειν ... τοὺς πλουτοῦντας ... ἐπὶ κακῷ) (1.4).[483] The verb θεραπεύω is used here in the pejorative sense of 'to flatter or wheedle,'[484] which highlights the contrast between the obsequious actions of the sophistic panegyrists and those of the author who seeks to bring healing (ἰωμένους) to the souls of the wealthy in 1.4 (cf. 40.4).

Salvation for the wealthy is to be undertaken in two ways. First, benevolent Christians are to plead before God on the rich believer's behalf. God certainly and gladly furnishes these requests to his children (1.4; cf. 33.1). The role of intercessor is explored in greater depth in the second half of the discourse. Suffice it to say for now, that the word 'children' here does not primarily signify the wealthy believer, but rather the intercessor, the advanced Christian, who enjoys a consummate filial relationship with the father. The wealthy, as simple believers, have not yet attained the advanced stage of adoption, and hence do not have direct

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[479] Flattery resurfaces as a theme in *QDS* 3.1; 35.1.

[480] Cf. Watson, *Invention, Arrangement and Style*, 36.

[481] Cf. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 45.

[482] Echoing Socrates' philanthropic motive for teaching others. See Plato *Euthyphro* 3d.

[483] There are two lacunae in this clause, τοῦ θεραπεύειν [12 letters] τοὺς πλουτοῦντας [10 letters] ἐπὶ κακῷ, which probably do not affect seriously the sense of this reconstruction.

[484] Cf. Dio Chrysostom *Inv.* 36; Arrianus *Epict.* 4.1.77.

recourse to the father.[485] The wealthy receive God's benefits chiefly through the mediation of his children, who are spiritually-advanced Christians. This observation is central to understanding Clement's distinctive pastoral remedy in the second half of *QDS*.

Second, revisiting the medical imagery from 1.3, benevolent Christians need to heal the souls of the wealthy (ἰωμένους τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν) with reason through the grace of the Saviour (διὰ χάριτος τοῦ σωτῆρος) (1.4), an intentional contrast to the ἀχάριστα of the flatterers in 1.1. The author depicts himself here as a good physician of the soul, dispelling ignorance through his recourse to reason,[486] enlightening and leading the readers forward to the possession of truth.[487]

The proem closes with a pithy saying about the requirements for effective prayer and Christian citizenship: 'Prayer requires a soul, strong and tranquil, which is measured out until the last day of life and [Christian] citizenship (πολιτεία) requires a disposition, good and righteous, stretching out to all the commandments of the Saviour' (1.5; cf. Phil. 3.13). The saying shares several verbal and conceptual similarities with the preceding clauses. The first clause, concerning the topic of prayer, refers to the intercessor's need for self-sacrifice and persistence in begging from God on behalf of the wealthy, which is an echo of the sacrificial and unceasing prayer of the gnostic who prays alongside those who have more recently believed, requests for the conversion of his neighbours, and always receives all that he asks (cf. 1.4).[488] The second clause, concerning the topic of Christian citizenship (πολιτεία),

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[485] In his major works, Clement refers to Christians as children of God in two senses: proleptically upon regeneration (simple Christians) and consummately upon adoption (advanced Christians). See pp. 90ff. In *QDS*, Clement uses the term 'child of God' in these same two senses. The wealthy Christian, as a simple believer, is a child of God in a proleptic sense which entails his eligibility for forgiveness from the father (cf. 39.2). On the other hand, advanced Christians, as adopted children of God, enjoy God's undivided attention to their requests (cf. 31.1; 41.5-6). Intercession in *QDS* properly involves cooperation between between the wealthy and the advanced Christians who plead on their behalf.

[486] On the need for a physician to heal the passions of the soul see p. 77.

[487] Clement elsewhere treats truth as a Platonic idea, a conception of God, which is 'seen' by the mind alone. Enlightening the mind dispels ignorance and prepares the way for the philosophical quest of seeking the truth. Cf. *Str.* 5.3.17.

[488] *Str.* 7.7.44.

signifies the need for the wealthy believer to develop a morally good disposition by obeying the commandments of the Saviour.[489]

4.2 *Narratio* (2.1-3.6)

This section shares several affinities with the second element in the arrangement of a classical rhetorical discourse, the *narratio*.[490] It is with the *narratio* that the rhetor instructs the audience as to the nature of the case in dispute.[491] It describes the exigence and the points upon which the rhetor would like the audience to render judgement.[492] The three necessary *virtutes* of the narratio are that it should be brief (*brevis*), clear (*aperta*), and plausible (*probabilis*).[493] In addition, the *narratio* ought to be of a moral character. That is, the rhetor must emphasize his moral purpose and occasionally draw upon the emotional.

This section in *QDS* is logically divided into four parts. In the first part, Clement outlines what he perceives to be the causes behind the problem of the rich (2.1-3). This is followed by a short but intriguing digression (2.4). In the third part, a plan is put forward for the main body of the discourse that would attempt to address these causes (3.1-2). In the fourth, two examples of an athlete's behaviour and attitude in the arena are given in order to encourage the rich reader to renew the contest for virtue (3.3-6).

4.2.1 The two chief problems with the rich Christian (2.1-3)

Having vied for the readers' attention and goodwill in the proem as one who is writing as a virtuous friend, Clement now seeks to convince them of his understanding of the twin *causae*

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[489] Cf. *QDS* 26.6; 28.2. Moses, as the divine legislator, is said to have furnished a good polity through his laws which aim at the right discipline of men in a community (κατὰ κοινωνίαν) (*Str.* 1.26.168.1). A political sense of friendship that has its locus in the intertwining of lives and *praxis* in the ancient *polis* is characteristically but not exclusively Aristotelian. Cf. *VV* 1251b26-37; *EN* 1155a20-30. Cf. also Schroeder, 'Friendship in Aristotle,' 53. Clement elsewhere attributes to Plato the idea that politics is founded on friendship. Cf. *Str.* 1.25.166.1.

[490] *Narratio* (Cicero *Inv.* 1.14.19; 1.19.27; *Orat.* 2.80.326; Quintilian *Inst.* 4.2.2); πρόθεσις (Aristotle *Rh.* 1414a35).

[491] Aristotle *Rh.* 1416b-1417a; Quintilian *Inst.* 4.2.31, quoting Apollodorus. Cf. Watson, *Invention, Arrangement and Style*, 43.

[492] Quintilian *Inst.* 4.2.1, 31.

[493] H. Lausberg, D. E. Orton, and R. D. Anderson, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 1998), §§ 294-334. According to Quintilian the three virtues were held by those of the Isocratean school. Aristotle disagrees with Isocrates on his injunction to be brief. His emendation was that the *narratio* ought to hit the happy mean between long and short (*Inst.* 4.2.32).

that lie behind the problems with the wealthy.[494] He rejects the view that salvation is *a priori* impossible for the rich believer. While the salvific plight of the rich is far more serious than that of the poor, the underlying causes are complex. Part of his motivation is to enhance his own standing as one who has actually thought deeply about this issue and to disparage his rival interpreters for being overly simplistic and naïve (2.1).[495] The first cause is described in ornate style. Some wealthy Christians depart from the way leading to salvation as the result of a hasty and offhand hearing of Jesus' harsh statement about it being easier for a camel to pass through an eye of a needle than for a 'rich man' to enter the kingdom of God (2.2). This leads the rich to despair of their ability to be saved which, in turn, induces them to grant favours continually or habitually[496] to the world on account of the misconception that they now have to depend on the present life as the only one remaining to them. The faulty exegesis deflects the wealthy from finding out who are the 'rich' that the Lord condemns nor how that which is impossible for man can become possible (cf. Mk 10.25, 27). The identity of this 'rich man who cannot be saved' is the central issue for the first half of the main body of the discourse (4.1-27.1). The fact that Clement's description of the first cause is ornate implies that he is not merely guarding against obscurity (i.e. the virtue of being *aperta*) but also that he is drawing out the pathos of, or better still sympathy for, the plight of the wealthy. In short, the wealthy defectors are victims of deception brought about by erroneous scriptural interpretations.[497] The second cause, treated far more briefly but not inelegantly, may be attributed to those who, although interpreting Jesus' harsh command correctly, nevertheless neglect to undertake the deeds requisite for salvation (2.3).[498]

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[494] The purpose of the *narratio* was not merely to instruct but rather to persuade those acting as judges (Quintilian *Inst.* 4.2.21).

[495] See *QDS* 4.3 and 5.2-4 for a similar denigration of the simplistic understanding of other interpreters.

[496] Taking the present participle as continuative or habitual.

[497] The wealthy believers have been persuaded to change their minds from the path to righteousness through either fear or pleasure. It is as if their minds have been placed under a spell. Cf. Plato *Republic* 413c; *QDS* 1.3.

[498] On the rhetorical exigence of *QDS* see above pp. 27ff.

4.2.2 Author's concern for the rich Christian (2.4)

Clement's admission of a lack of interest in the uninitiated here may appear rather brusque (2.4). It is one thing to limit advice to the baptized wealthy. However, it seems unduly callous to claim explicitly a lack of concern for the non-baptized. It is highly probable that the startling statement is rhetorically motivated. By calling the unbelieving rich ἀμυήτοι he is treating Christianity in the language of the mysteries, the doctrines of which may only be divulged to the initiates and must be hidden from those outside.[499] As stated above, he chiefly seeks to persuade two types of reader, the wealthy Christian and the critic who would seek to exclude the wealthy from the Christian communities.[500] It is with the latter group that he seeks to cultivate goodwill with his statement of 2.4. This rhetorical device (*correctio*) acts as a prophylactic preparation for the following statements, which could be misconstrued as improper by the critics wanting to exclude the wealthy.[501]

Clement clearly detects the need to tread carefully with his proposals in 3.1–2 or risk alienating an important sector of his implied readership.[502] The *correctio* in effect directs the readers to focus on the religious affiliation of the wealthy as Christians, a positive attribute, one with which the readers would naturally identify, rather than their economic and social status, which would be considered by some to have a negative bearing on their moral standing.

4.2.3 How *QDS* will address the problems of the rich Christian (3.1-2)

This section outlines the points to be treated in the body of the discourse (3.1-2). These are twofold. First, to show that the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven is not completely cut off from the wealthy and, second, to point out the works and dispositions required for salvation. The preceptive section of *QDS* which focuses on future, necessary actions (chs. 27-

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[499] Cf *QDS* 3.2; 36.1; 37.1.

[500] On the implied audience of *QDS* see pp. 40ff.

[501] Cf. Lausberg, Orton, and Anderson, *Handbook of literary rhetoric*, § 784.

[502] A similar emotive force of party *utilitas* may be found in the prayer of Jesus in John 17:9, ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐρωτῶ, οὐ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἐρωτῶ ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν δέδωκάς μοι, ὅτι σοί εἰσιν. Here, the author of the Gospel of John wishes to highlight the special status of his disciples against the evil κόσμος.

41), can take place only after the definition of term 'rich man' has been resolved in the hortatory section (chs 4-27), a definition which will show that wealthy believers are not cut off from salvation *a priori.*

Clement again claims the moral high ground by depicting himself as a good friend who is motivated by his love of the brethren (φιλαδέλφως) and of the truth (φιλαλήθως). He further enhances his standing as a good friend by lumping together those who cringe to the wealthy on account of love for personal gain, the object of his scorn in the proem, with those who are emboldened insolently against the wealthy (3.1). The polarizing of all parties into just two camps is slightly disingenious. It is designed to pre-empt any possible leverage points that can be taken by rival interpreters. Either one employs the author's approach and acts as a true friend by dispelling despair or one acts either as a parasite or an enemy to the wealthy. There are seemingly no other positions available.

Friendship is also the impulse behind the next two propositions, both of which draw upon the friendly actions of the true gnostic as depicted in the *Stromateis*. The first proposition is concerned with dispelling the fear where no fear is (ἀδεὲς δεδίασι δέος), an echo from Plato's *Symposium* 198a.[503] A true friend is one who takes away fear and ignorance from another by reason. Epicurus, for example, bestowed on his followers what he considered to be the greatest of all gifts, freedom from the fear of the gods, of fate and of death.[504] The second proposition, in which the author describes his task in terms of pointing out (προδεικνύναι) and guiding (μυσταγωγεῖν) the wealthy initiates to the works and dispositions necessary for their souls to ascend towards salvation (3.2), reflects the terminology of the mysteries.[505] Clement has already referred to non-Christians as those

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[503] Cf. *Str.* 1.8.42.3-4.

[504] Lucretius 5.81; Plutarch *Adv. Col.* 1117a-b. Cf. also J. M. Rist, 'Epicurus on Friendship,' *CP* 75 (1980), 127.

[505] Cf. *Prot.* 2.21.12 where Orpheus is called a μυσταγωγός. Whereas the heretics appoint themselves as mystagogues of the souls of the impious (*Str.* 7.17.106.7), Clement uses Paul's account of his passage to the third heaven above to legitimize his own motivation to initiate the elect souls in the mysteries there (*Str.* 5.12.79.1). The third heaven is the realm of generation (or ideas), to which Abraham was initiated by an angel (*Str.* 5.11.74.1).

uninitiated (τῶν ἀμυήτων) with the truth (2.4). In 37.1-3, he discloses the mystery as the secret of God's salvific economy which is revealed with the incarnation of Christ.[506]

4.2.4 Salvation as an athletic contest (3.3-6).

To sway the readers into accepting his twofold prognosis of the problem of the wealthy, Clement sacrifices brevity for the sake of lucidity, utilizing a metaphor of an athlete, a common way of describing the philosophical life and its demands for mastery over the passions.[507] The wealthy readers are invited to regard themselves as athletes contending in the stadium of life (3.3-6). This invitation is qualified by an apologetic, parenthetical trope to illustrate the great and imperishable by the small and perishable, which one suspects actually functions to prepare the reader to attend to the metaphor that follows, rather than being a genuine attempt at an apology for the inappropriateness of the image.[508] Clement's choice of the metaphor of the athlete in the stadium and his inspiring the wealthy to emulate the athlete would have been very appealing to his readers. Roman culture was an agonistic culture. In this society, a male was not necessarily a man. One could be born a male, but one made oneself a man. Manhood was a threshold that all males must pass through by means of severe and continual testing and contending. It could only be achieved by the wilful expenditure of energy and courage.[509] For Clement, manliness (ἀνδρεία) was also synonymous for courage.[510] It was a virtue which characterized his true gnostic who, in the manner of an athlete, perfects his manliness (τῆς ἀνδρείας) by conquering the passions by means of a disciplined life.[511] Our passage acclaims the struggle, the training and sweat, the triumph of one's will in an equal contest. It depicts the ordeal of the man who seeks to become wise by

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[506] J. Ferguson, 'The Achievement of Clement of Alexandria,' *Rel. Stud.* 12 (1976), 63.

[507] 1 Cor. 9.24; Heb. 12.1; 2 Tim. 2.5; Arrianus *Epict.* 2.17.29ff; Plato *Republic* 413c-e.

[508] Cf. Ovid *Met.* 5.416, 'If it is proper to compare little things with big ones ...'

[509] Barton, *Roman Honor*, 38-47.

[510] One of the four cardinal virtues of Hellenism. Courage is the knowledge of what is to be feared, what is not, and what is intermediate between the two (*Str.* 2.18.79.5). A similar definition may be found in Philo *Leg.* 1.65; 1.68; *Spec.* 4.145. Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 77-78.

[511] Cf. *Str.* 7.3.20.3-7; 7.11.67.3-4.

striving for virtue,[512] for which the reward is worth more than any effort and pain exerted in order to attain victory. For Clement, virtue, though having a basis in human φύσις, can only be acquired after a period of training (ἄσκησις) and instruction (μάθησις).

Drawing on traditions similar to those in the Pastoral Epistles and other early Christian works,[513] Clement's metaphor clearly brings out the absurdity of the two hypothetical situations in which an athlete disqualifies himself at the start by not even enlisting in the contest or neglects the necessary training and diet (3.4).[514] The one who is 'also covered with this earthly covering'[515] (= rich Christian) should not disqualify himself from the contest without surveying the majesty of the φιλανθρωπία of God, and not thereafter hope to receive the crowns of immortality without training and contending (3.5). God's φιλανθρωπία is characterized by his merciful nature in being willing to forgive.[516] The second has to do with philosophical *askesis* where the rich believer is to submit himself to the Logos as his trainer, and to Christ as coach. His diet is to consist of the new covenant of the Lord (cf. 37.4), the gymnasium is the commands, and the practice and adornment correspond to the virtues and dispositions respectively (3.6).

Continuing with this metaphor, Clement describes the future goal of the wealthy believer, the culmination of his *askesis*, in terms of an archetypal athlete standing alongside the judge, victorious, with a good conscience, having been confessed worthy of the fatherland above (3.6).[517] There are two key themes behind this passage. First, it is a striking feature of Clement's archetypal athlete, that he, as a proven *man*, feels sure with respect to God.

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[512] Note that the passions are not mentioned at all in the *narratio*. The reason is rhetorically motivated. They are introduced later in *QDS* 11.2.

[513] Cf. 2 Tim. 2.5, 'An athlete is not crowned unless he competes according to the rules.' Cf. 1 Clem. 35.4; 2 Clem. 7. Cf. also G. W. Butterworth, 'The Deification of Man in Clement of Alexandria,' *JTS* 17 (1915), 161.

[514] *Str.* 7.11.67.2.

[515] *Paed.* 3.2.5.1.

[516] *Prot.* 1.4.4; 9.82.2; 10.91.3; 10.104.3; *Paed.* 1.11.96; *Str.* 7.2.8.1.

[517] An example of a philosopher who valued the fatherland above their own land is Anaxagoras. When asked 'have you no concern in your native land?' he replied 'I am greatly concerned with my fatherland,' and pointed to the sky (D.L. 2.7).

Clement elsewhere relates with approval an old anecdote about an athlete who after prolonged training to the attainment of manly strength (πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ἀσκήσας) took up a position in front of the image of Zeus and boldly claimed the victory as his right. This athlete Clement compares with the true gnostic, who, blamelessly and with a good conscience, has fulfilled all that is required in his learning and training, well-doing and pleasing God, all of which have enabled him to attain to the most perfect salvation.[518] Therefore, the true gnostic in the end does not approach God as a supplicant, cap in hand so to speak, but rather asks for what is his due.[519] He has shown himself worthy to attain to heaven and has a good conscience at the moment of his death when he appears before God's judgement seat.[520] (This gives an important insight to Clement's vision for the wealthy believers in *QDS*. Even though the wealthy are treated as immature Christians, his long-term aspiration for them is no different to that which he holds for all believers; that is, they are to strive towards attaining the gnostic state of perfection and *apatheia*).[521]

The second theme has to do with the reference to the 'fatherland above.' We have discussed before the idea of the church being a rival society to earthly kingdoms, with God as its ruler, and the commandments in place of man-made laws.[522] As we will see, the church as a philosophical community of friends provides the locus for the relationships between the rich believers and God, and between rich believers and other believers.[523]

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[518] *Str.* 7.7.48.5-6.

[519] *Str.* 7.12.79.4; 7.13.81.4.

[520] Cf. J. Wytzes, 'The Twofold Way - Platonic Influences in the Work of Clement of Alexandria,' *VC* 11 (1957), 230-231.

[521] On man's potential for perfection see pp. 86ff.

[522] *QDS* 1.5.2. On the church as a philosophical community of friends see pp. 61ff.

[523] Especially evinced in the reverse patronage roles of the rich believer and advanced Christian advocated in *QDS* 33-41.

4.3 Main Body: Hortatory Section (4.1-27.1)

Clement's exposition of the Gospel story of the rich man shares some features with judicial speeches where the speaker not only has to present arguments for his case but also has to counter rival interpretations of the laws under scrutiny. The *crux interpretum* in this section is Mk 10.24-27, with the problem being largely a matter of definition. Clement agrees with his rivals that the Saviour, in his use of the metaphor of a camel and the eye of a needle, prescribed the impossibility of a 'rich man' being saved. But what did the Saviour mean by the term 'rich man'? And what is that which is impossible for man but possible for God? Clement proffers answers to both questions through a clause-by-clause exposition of the entire rich man narrative.

4.3.1 Exhibition of the passage at the centre of the dispute: the rich man narrative of Mk 10.17-31 (4.1-5.4)

The main body of the discourse opens with an invocation to the Saviour that the author be granted the ability to communicate true, fitting and salvific things to the [rich] brethren (4.1). Through discourse Clement hopes to accomplish two ends. First, that wealthy readers may be persuaded that they still have some hope for salvation, and second, that they understand the means by which this hope may be realized.

An invocation to the gods at the beginning of a discourse was frequently incorporated by orators in antiquity.[524] Clement's invocation here not only emphasizes the gravity of the issue being addressed but also enhances his own standing before his readers with the claim of divine sanction for his discourse. The Saviour is invoked precisely on account of his pedagogical and philanthropic nature. He bestows favours to those who are in need, teaches those who ask, removes ignorance and shakes off despair (4.2).[525] The Saviour does this 'by introducing the same words concerning the wealthy, which become (γινομένους) interpreters

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[524]For the invocation to the gods as a rhetorical device see Quintilian *Inst.* 10.1.48; and Cicero *Inv.* 1.16.22.

[525] Cf. the Saviour bestowing eternal life (*Prot.* 9.83.2); God bestowing life (*Prot.* 10.90.3); Christ bestowing life (*Prot.* 11.117.4); the Paedagogue bestowing life (*Paed.* 1.11.96.2). Cf. Philo *Legat.* 22, where the emperor Gaius is referred to as both saviour (ὁ σωτήρ) and benefactor (εὐεργέτης), both cult titles of various Ptolemies. Cf. *QDS* 5.2; 6.1-2.

and secure expounders of themselves' (4.2). The pedagogical role of the Saviour was not bounded by his earthly ministry. The Saviour even now teaches through the inspired scriptures.[526] The participial clause governed by γινομένους gives insight into Clement's method of interpreting scripture. The statement that 'the [Saviour's] words concerning the wealthy become interpreters and safe expounders of themselves' corresponds to Clement's practice of interpreting difficult passages of scripture by juxtaposing them with other, typically better understood, scriptural passages; a hermeneutical practice that he employs in *QDS* and which elsewhere in his writings he condemns heretics for not utilizing.[527]

Clement next quotes the whole rich man narrative from his *Vorlage* (4.4-10). This quotation happens to be the longest scriptural quotation in all his extant works. Indeed, outside of the New Testament documents themselves, *QDS* 4.4-10 represents one of the longest quotations from the Gospels that we have from the first two centuries. What is surprising, considering his preference for the Gospel of Matthew, however, is that in the case of *QDS* 4 the quotation is from the Gospel of Mark.[528]

That *QDS* 4 is intended to represent the Markan version is beyond doubt. Even though the rich man narrative is included in each of the three Synoptic Gospels, Mark's account preserves several distinctive features which Clement considered useful for his exposition. Both *QDS* 4 and Mark 10.17-31 include: 1) the Saviour's prediction that in this present age there shall be family and possessions albeit 'with persecutions;' 2) the observation that the Saviour loved the rich man; and 3) the reference to the disciples' amazement at the Saviour's

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[526] *Str.* 7.16.101.5-6. Cf. 2 Tim. 3.16.

[527] Cf. for example *QDS* 22; *Str.* 7.16.95.9-96.4. D. Dawson notes that Clement's method of expounding scripture and other classical texts by other congruous scripture and classical texts is a major component in his interpretative technique. Clement's intratextual technique is probably influenced by Philo although he does depart from his predecessor in that he does not adhere as closely to the lexical details of scriptural language. Cf. Dawson, *Allegorical Readers*, 213. Clement may also be influenced directly by the rabbinic practice of *midrashim*. Jerome writes that Clement, together with Origen and Eusebius would often cite Jewish opinion when engaged in biblical interpretation (*Ruf.* 1.13). Cf. J. C. Paget, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Jews,' *SJT* 51 (1998), 87-88. A similar cavil against the disjoined nature of heretical hermeneutics was made by Irenaeus (*AH* 1.8.1).

[528] This confused text of Mk 10.17-31, quoted in its entirety in *QDS* 4, with its possible conflation with the *Secret Gospel of Mark* and the other Gospel parallels, may stem from a catechetical situation. Cf. Hoek, 'Divergent Gospel Traditions,' 59. For Clement's use of the Matthean version of the pericope see G. Zaphiris, *Le text de l'Évangile selon saint Matthieu d'après les citations de Clément d'Alexandrie comparées aux citations des Pères et des Théologiens grecs du II au XV siècle* (Paris: Duculot & Gembloux, 1970), 706-731.

declaration about the difficulty for the rich to enter the kingdom of God. Furthermore, Clement consistently throughout *QDS* refrains calling the rich man of the narrative a youth (νεανίσκος) as in the Matthean version or a ruler (ἄρχων) as in the Lukan version. Finally, he states patently, ταῦτα ἐν τῷ κατὰ Μάρκον εὐαγγελίῳ γέγραπται, directly after the quotation, with the suggestion that 'in all the other accepted Gospels (where it occurs) the passage as a whole shows the same general sense, although here and there a little of the wording changes' (5.1).

Having assured the readers that the Markan account of the rich man is consistent with the other Gospel parallels, Clement makes the far-reaching claim that even the ostensibly simple teachings of the Saviour ought to be approached with the aim of discerning the deeper and parabolic meaning (5.2). The Saviour's teachings in the rich man narrative are apparently simple. However, whether the teachings are explained by the Lord to his disciples (5.3), or whether the Lord himself deemed that they were clear enough that they need not warrant further explanation at the time, or whether the disciples themselves felt no need to question them (5.4), the teachings, on account of the fact that they pertain to the τέλος of salvation, still require far more thought and reflection for present-day Christians. This notion of a deeper meaning beneath the text of scripture is consistent with Clement's interpretative method as employed elsewhere in his writings.[529] The style of the scriptures is parabolic and, while the plain meaning of scripture is sufficient for common faith, there is still the need to progress from faith to knowledge (γνῶσις) by searching for the inner meaning of scripture.[530] This inner meaning of scripture is traditional; that is, it is considered to have been handed down by the apostles to chosen men in succeeding generations. Thus, for Clement, a basic rule of exegesis is that every text has at least two meanings: a literal and a spiritual one.

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[529] Clement elsewhere seeks to demonstrate a similar point from the Law and Prophets; namely that they originally spoke in enigmas which need to be discerned intelligently (*Str.* 5.6.40.1-2).

[530] *QDS* 20.4; *Str.* 6.15.126.1-2; 129.4. Cf. also Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 136-142.

Often there are several levels within the spiritual sense requiring the exegete to advance through the higher spiritual stages in order to comprehend them.[531]

Clement's claim that the deeper meaning of the rich man narrative ought to be sought both enhances his own reputation as one who has been deemed worthy to receive these spiritual interpretations in succession to the apostles and as one who is prepared to divulge them to his readers who are willing to progress along the path of γνῶσις. By implication, it also has the effect of diminishing the ethical standing of the opponents who proffer the plain meaning, suitable only for the *simpliciores*.

4.3.2 The Saviour as the good Teacher who points to the good God: Interpretation of 'Good teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life' (6.1-7.3)

The Saviour's role as Teacher in the economy of salvation, a *leitmotif* which pervades Clement's major writings, comes to the fore in the exposition of his response to the rich man's question, 'Good Teacher, what must I do in order that I may inherit eternal life?' (Mk 10.17). This question is 'most appropriate' to the Lord (6.1-2). The epithets - Life, Saviour, Teacher, Truth, Logos, Perfect, Incorruptible are cascaded each one after the other in *asyndeton* depicting the good Teacher as the embodiment of his teaching (6.1). The appropriateness of the question raises the subject of eternal life, which is the ὑπόθεσις of the good Teacher's gospel for which he had descended from heaven (6.2). The Saviour intervenes personally into the human sphere in order to teach things necessary for salvation.[532]

Not only is the Saviour's pre-eminence as teacher indicated by his ability to foreknow what topic will be asked, it is also proof that he has come from God (6.3-4).[533] The Saviour uses the rich man's first word 'good' as a prelude or key-note (ἐνδόσιμος) to his response,[534] turning the inquirer to God, who is the good and first and only dispenser (ταμίας) of eternal

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[531] On the parabolic nature of scripture see pp. 42f.

[532] Α παιδεύει, ἃ διδάσκει, ἃ παρέχει. Cf. *Str.* 4.22.139.1; *Paed.* 3.99.1, πάντα ὁ λόγος ποιεῖ καὶ διδάσκει καὶ παιδαγωγεῖ. Cf. also Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 114.

[533] The Saviour's foreknowledge as proof that he has been sent by God is a key Johannine theme. Cf. Jn 6.6; 16.30.

[534] Cf. Aristotle *Rh.* 1415a7 where the word ἐνδόσιμος is used in the context of a prelude in the proem.

life (6.4). The reference to God as a ταμίας is a negative allusion to Socrates' well-known disapproval of a poet's alleged saying that 'Zeus is dispenser (ταμίας) alike of good and evil to mortals.'[535] In contrast to the poet's position, the keynote 'good' signifies for Clement the necessity for the soul 'to *know* the eternal God and giver of good things, the first and foremost, the one and good God' (7.1).[536] The description of God here clearly has Platonic affinities: 'that God is good and the sole author of good to men and that he never changes or deceives.'[537] Clement is influenced by the Platonic ascent of the soul to the idea of the Good when he states that the good God can only be possessed through knowledge (γνῶσις) and apprehension (κατάληψις), and is the author of eternal things from which all sensible things are derived (7.2). God is frequently identified with the idea of the Good in Clement's major writings.[538] Clement, like Plato, not only sees the apprehension of the reality of the Good as the 'real goal of the intelligible world,'[539] but also that this apprehension can not be achieved through ordinary sense-perception.[540] Rather, the Christian ascends to the first principle or cause of everything by means of dialectical processes, typically through the deeper exposition of scripture (cf. *QDS* 5.2-4).[541] The 'knowledge of God' is not, however, solely an intellectual end (i.e. knowledge about God), but rather a relational process which together with the other relational processes of *oikeiosis* and love of God, leads towards the assimilation towards the divinity (7.3). Each of the terms, ἐπίγνωσις, οἰκείωσις, ἀγάπη, and

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[535] Plato *Republic* 379e. Another implication from this passage is that God is blameless. Cf. *Str.* 5.14.136.4 which contains a quotation from *Republic* 379. See discussion on *QDS* 26.3-4 on p. 165.

[536] *Str.* 7.2.5.1.

[537] *Republic* 379b-d. Cf. A. C. Outler, 'The "Platonism" of Clement of Alexandria,' *JR* 20 (1940), 229.

[538] *Prot.* 9.88.1; 4.49.2. Cf. R. P. Casey, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism,' *HTR* 18 (1925), 49-50.

[539] Cp. *QDS* 7.1 with Plato *Republic* 532a-b. The κατάληψις τοῦ θεοῦ is the end of 'walking in the way' (*Paed.* 2.1.1.3). Cf. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, 153-156.

[540] The first efficient cause of motion is incapable of being apprehended by sensation. ' Επιστήμη, which alone the gnostic possesses, is a sure apprehension (κατάληψις), leading up through true and sure reasons to the γνῶσις of the cause (*Str.* 6.18.162.4). Clement sees κατάληψις as both a state (ἕξις) of the mind and an act of assent (συγκατάθεσις) (*Str.* 8.5.16).

[541] God is the first principle of all things. Cf. *Str.* 1.28.178; 1.21.109. See Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, 156-157; E. F. Osborn, *The Emergence of Christian Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 39-68.

ἐξομοίωσις represent processes with profound philosophical and ethical implications which we have discussed in depth in the previous chapter.[542] There exists an interdependence between each of these four processes and together they represent the philosophical progression towards salvation with the τέλος being the attainment of friendship/sonship with God.

4.3.3 The newness of the Saviour's gift, eternal life: Interpretation of 'You know the commandments' (8.1-5)

The commandments in Mk 10.19 function as a *synecdoche* for the whole Mosaic Law. This furnishes for Clement the opportunity to contrast what he sees to be an inadequacy with the Law with 'the greatness of the Saviour and the newness of his favour (χάρις) (8.1; cf. 1.4; Jn 1.17).' The claims of 8.1 are circular. The greatness of the Saviour is also grounded upon the uniqueness of his benefaction.[543]

Following the train of argument in the Letter to the Hebrews, Clement contrasts the relative merits of the Law given by Moses with the benefits given by the Saviour. Moses gave the Law merely as a faithful slave (διὰ δούλου πιστοῦ),[544] while Christ gives benefits and truth as a genuine heir (ὑπὸ υἱοῦ γνησίου). The next argument is borrowed from Paul's thesis in Gal. 2.21 (observing that Clement prefers the Johannine theme of 'eternal life' over Paul's 'righteousness'). In the Galatian passage the apostle draws out the logical implication of a false presupposition held by some of his opponents that righteousness can come via the Law; the implication being that Christ must have died in vain.[545] For Clement, if the Law could furnish eternal life then Christ's suffering must also have been in vain. If Christ's suffering was in vain then the rich man's petition must also be in vain (note the word μάτην

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[542] On Clement's understanding of *oikeiosis* see pp. 92ff.

[543] Cf. Philo's epithet of Dionysus as the inventor of new bounties (εὑρετὴς καινῶν χαρίτων) (*Legat.* 88) and his description of God's election of Abraham in terms of a bestowing on him a fresh and new nation and race (ἐχαρίζετο καινὸν ... καὶ νέον ἔθνος καὶ γένος) (*Heres.* 278). The election necessitates that Abraham no longer have *oikeiosis* (οἰκειοῦσθαι) with those from whom he has been alienated (ἀλλοτριωθέντα).

[544] Cf. Num 12.7 LXX.

[545] Cf. H. D. Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 126-127.

in the first position of both clauses in 8.2). The tension is drawn out with heavy irony. Not only did the rich man *fulfil* the Law (a surprising statement in light of Clement's other dealings with this text),[546] he *fulfilled*[547] it from a young age (8.3)! The idea of a man, in the skittishness of youth (ἐν σκιρτήματι νεοτησίῳ),[548] performing such virtuous deeds would have made a marked impression on the implied reader's sense of honour and virtue.[549] No Roman could be credited with virtue unless he also had the desire and means to transgress those same contracts and bonds.[550] Self-control was most to be praised where it was least to be expected. For example, Seneca acclaims the actions of Alexander, who, normally being so prone to anger, refused to be enticed by his mother to quell a suspected plot against his life from his best friend: 'To the degree that moderation is rarer in kings, to that degree it is the more to be lauded.'[551]

For all of his scrupulous attention to the Law, the rich man is convinced that he lacks the gift of eternal life and asks from the only one who can bestow it (8.4; cf. 9.1). The recognition of the Law's inability to bestow life signifies the rich man's transformation 'from faith into faith' (8.5; cf. Rom. 1.17). The Pauline catch-phrase, used elsewhere in Clement's major works in various ways, denotes here the cognitive conversion from allegiance to the Mosaic Law to the Gospel message.[552] This ostensible transference of allegiance is emphasized by the nautical metaphor where one, being tempest-tossed dangerously in the Law and lying insecurely in a harbour, moors in another safe place.[553]

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[546] Cf. *QDS* 9.1.

[547] Clement deliberately embellishes the rich man's achievements in the Law with the choice of the verb πεπλήρωκε in *QDS* 8.3. Extant manuscripts of Mk 10.20, including Clement's *Vorlage* (cf. *QDS* 4.6), have various forms of φυλάσσω.

[548] Antiphon *Frag.* 17.31; 49.33. Cf. Aristotle *EN* 1154b10-15 for the description of youth in a condition similar to that of intoxication.

[549] Cf. Philo *Post.* 71.

[550] Barton, *Roman Honor*, 217.

[551] *Ira* 2.23.3.

[552] *Str.* 2.6.29.3; *QDS* 9.2; *Paed.* 1.11.97.1. Cf. also E. F. Osborn, 'Arguments for Faith in Clement of Alexandria,' *VC* 48 (1994), 18-19.

[553] Cf. *Prot.* 12.118.1.

4.3.4 The Saviour as a friend to the rich Christian: Interpretation of 'And Jesus looking upon him loved him ...' (9.1-2)

The Saviour is a friend to the wealthy believer. This can be seen from the Saviour's response to the rich man's claim that he had obeyed the commandments since his youth. Not merely does the Saviour love the rich man (Mk 10.21) but he is 'extremely fond of the one well-persuaded in the things he has learned' (9.1). That he did not rebuke the rich man's seemingly ostentatious claim of having fulfilled the Law is surprising. It shows how Clement is able to utilize consciously the Markan version over and against the other Synoptic parallels to support his argument, even if it should depart from his teaching elsewhere in his writings. Elsewhere he follows the Matthean version of the rich man narrative where Jesus' commands 'to sell what you have, give to the poor and follow me' convicts the rich man who boasted of having fulfilled the injunctions of the Law with not having loved his neighbour.[554] One is not deemed virtuous solely by abstaining from vicious acts, one must also perform virtuous acts. That Clement himself considered the rich man's claim to be immodest is apparent from 10.4 with the reference to the rich man's boasting.

The slave/son antithesis, functioning as the core theme in *QDS* 8-9, ought to be understood in light of an individual's legal status in Roman society, where one's legal rights and entitlements were often reflected by one's kinship relations.[555] The freeborn citizen (*ingenuus/a*) was free, but not from the father who held the power of life and death (*ius vitae necisque*) over his children and slaves. Indeed, the son's liabilities to the father were not totally dissimilar to that of the slave's, although they were not so drastic and had different repercussions. It was the father who was the only person to whom the son could surrender absolutely and yet retain his honour.[556] Indeed, the submission and complete obedience of a child to the father's will was a condition of honour in this culture.[557] So whereas the master

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[554] *Str.* 4.6.29.3.

[555] For this section see S. R. Joshel, *Work, Identity, and Legal Status at Rome: A Study of the Occupational Inscriptions* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 27-35.

[556] Barton, *Roman Honor*, 166-167.

[557] Seneca *Ben.* 3.38.3. Cf. Joshel, *Work, Identity and Legal Status*, 35.

needed to coerce and to break the will of the slave, the father could expect his children to respond with ready obedience.[558] The former obeys through abject fear, the latter through reverential fear and love. (Thus, for Clement, the economy of salvation is a process which translates a believer from servitude to sonship. The simple Christian acts as a servant obeying the commandments through fear of the father, while the gnostic is the legitimate son who obeys through love).[559] Through his family the free-born son received a legitimate place in society. He could contract a legal marriage and have children who were themselves legitimate citizens, whereas the slave was a mere chattel that could be disposed of at his owner's discretion and as a result was not considered as a legitimate member of society. The powerlessness of a slave was exacerbated by his lack of socially acknowledged kin. Roman society did not recognize slave spouses as husband and wife; slave children became the property of their mother's owner. In social and legal terms no male slave could be a father and no slave, male or female, had a father.[560] In our passage, whereas the followers of the Mosaic Law are deemed slaves (and by implication, are neither members of, nor have spiritually acknowledged kin in, the kingdom of God), believers who perfectly do the will of the father will be adopted into his kingdom as sons, brothers and fellow-heirs (*QDS* 9.2; cf. Gal. 3.24; Rom. 8.14-17; 10.4; 13.10).[561]

4.3.5 The Saviour as the way to perfection. Man's freedom to choose: Interpretation of 'If you wish to be perfect' (10.1-3)

The Gospel's supremacy over the Law provides the impulse for Clement to slip in a lemma from the Matthean version of the rich man narrative which clearly was not present in his Markan *Vorlage*: 'if you wish to be perfect' (Mt. 19.21). Obviously the rich man was not yet perfect. Even though he was righteous with respect to the Mosaic Law, he nevertheless lacked the means by which he could attain to eternal life. Three times the word τέλειος

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[558] Cicero *Rep.* 3.25.27. Cf. Barton, *Roman Honor*, 166-167.

[559] *Str.* 6.7.60.3; 7.13.87.2. See discussion on *oikeiosis* on pp. 92ff.

[560] Joshel, *Work, Identity and Legal Status*, 29.

[561] See discussion on *QDS* 25.2 pp. 158f., where the apostles are described as brethren in concord with each other and with Christ. On Clement's understanding of adoption see pp. 90ff.

appears with different inflections: 'Therefore, he was not yet perfect (τέλειος), for nothing is more perfect (τελειότερον) than perfect (τελείου)' (10.1). Clement bolsters his claim that Christ is the only means by which one can be become perfect and thereby obtain eternal life without, at the same time, disparaging the Law of Moses, the ultimate authorship of which is also the Logos and is therefore good (cf. 6.1; 8.4).[562]

De Ste. Croix incorrectly implies that Clement here intentionally introduced this verse from Mt. 19.21 as part of an early Christian trend that made Jesus' command, 'Sell what you have,' a *counsel* rather than a *precept*.[563] For de Ste. Croix, the command to sell all becomes literally 'a counsel of perfection' exemplified by John Chrysostom's paraphrase of Jesus' words into 'I lay it down for your determination. I give you full power to choose. I do not lay upon you any necessity.'[564] However, the lemma 'if you wish' does not signify for Clement here a choice between common salvation and some higher form of perfection should one decide to obey the command to sell all one's possessions.[565] Rather, the lemma 'if you wish' indicates a divine sanction of the rich man's freedom to choose to accept or reject God's gift (ἡ δόσις) of salvation itself (10.1). To strive for salvation is to strive for perfection.[566]

As related, freewill (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) is extremely important for Clement as a man's action can only be deemed praiseworthy if performed voluntarily.[567] God does not compel but rather gives to those who voluntarily desire, are earnest and beg in order that they might appropriate salvation as their own (10.1-2; cf. Mt. 7.7; Lk. 11.9).[568]

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[562] The intensification of the righteousness which is according to the Law shows the true gnostic. Cf. *Str.* 6.18.164.3.

[563] Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle*, 434.

[564] *Hom. II de stat.* 5.

[565] Both Augustine *Ep.* 157.23-39, and Jerome, *Ep.* 118, take 'if you would be perfect' to refer to the adoption of the monastic life. Cf. Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle*, 434.

[566] Cf. *Str.* 2.20.123.1-3. On salvation as the τέλος of living the philosophical life see pp. 67ff.

[567] Cf. *QDS* 26.3-4. On the need for freewill in virtuous actions see pp. 75f.

[568] For δόσις as eternal life cf. *QDS* 6.2; *Str.* 6.13.106.4.

The words, 'if you wish, if you really wish,' signify that the onus is on the rich believer not to be deceived but to have the will to 'take possession of that which is necessary' (10.3). The 'one thing [which] remains to you' is expanded into a series of epithets, 'that which is mine, which is good, which is already above the Law, which the Law did not give, which the Law did not make room for, that is unique of the living,' which serve to contrast the sufficiency and supremacy of the 'one thing' to the inadequacy of the Law in furnishing eternal life. What actually constitutes the 'one thing' Clement keeps close to his chest at this point, intentionally building up the suspense until the appropriate time rhetorically for its disclosure (cf. 11.1-16.1).

4.3.6 Boastful, busy and unwilling to choose the good: Interpretation of the rich man departing from Jesus grieved (10.4-7)

The readers' attention is next drawn to the rich man's grieving departure. The impasse reached between the Saviour and the rich man was the fault of the latter. The rich man's claims about his standing in the Law were clearly exaggerated. He who 'fulfilled all things from youth' (8.3) is now criticized as the 'one who boasted excessive things' (10.4).[569] Nevertheless, for all of his extravagant boasts and his occupation about many things (περὶ πολλὰ οἷός ἦν ἀσχολουμένην), the rich man was unable to add the 'one thing' to the rest, despite the fact that this 'one thing' would lead to eternal life (10.4-5). Even though eternal life is that 'which he desires,' he departs grieving at the instruction for life 'on account of which he was making supplication.' He did not truly desire eternal life, nor was he genuinely making supplication (10.5), but rather, like the tyrant Dionysius who feigned interest in the doctrines of Plato but was really motivated by his love of glory,[570] the rich man sought the kudos of making a deliberate choice for the good (προαιρέσεως ἀγαθῆς), a clear reference to the 'choice thing of the Saviour' (τὸ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἐξαίρετον) (10.4-5). The fact that the rich man was unable to choose the good demonstrates that, in spite of his claims that he had

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[569] A possible allusion to Jude 16 which is quoted in *Str.* 3.2.11.2.

[570] 'Plato' *Epistle* 7.338.

fulfilled the Law since his youth, he was not a virtuous person. For a virtuous person has the power and always has the power to act virtuously.[571]

The situation in which the rich man could be busy about many things (<περὶ> πολλὰ ἀσχολεῖσθαι)[572] yet be unable to complete the one necessary action is likened to the story of Mary and Martha (Lk. 10.38-42). Martha is described as ἀσχολουμένην πολλά, being dragged about and troubled in the act of serving (διακονικῶς). In contrast Mary sits at the Saviour's feet having abandoned the act of serving (τὸ ὑπηρετεῖν ἀπολιποῦσα) for the leisure for learning (μαθητικὴν ἄγουσα σχολήν), like a student of philosophy sitting before her master (10.6).[573]

4.3.7 The deeper meaning of the Saviour's demands: Interpretation of 'sell your possessions' (11.1-16.1)

Clement finally discloses his main hypothesis, towards which he has been steadily progressing from the beginning. This hypothesis centres on identifying the Saviour's intention behind his command to 'sell your possessions' (11.2). He rejects opposing interpretations that delimit the scope of the word 'possessions' to *all* material acquisitions *alone*. He has two problems with these. The first has to do with the word *all* with respect to material possessions. It is potentially harmful spiritually and psychologically for an immature believer to jettison all of his possessions rashly, including the necessities for life. The second issue has to do with the priority of the deeper interpretations and the plain meaning of the text. Others assert that the sole interpretation of this clause is the plain meaning which entails that the rich believers abandon all of their possessions, whereas Clement sees that Jesus' command to sell your possessions means *both* to banish from the soul all passions arising from riches *and* to get rid of superfluous possessions (while keeping the necessities for life). The spiritual meaning of the text, since it corresponds to universal spiritual truths, ought to

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[571] *SVF* 3.557-66. Cf. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 4. For Clement, the true gnostic alone has the power to act virtuously in all circumstances. Cf. *Str.* 7.11.60.1-68.5.

[572] Presumably a reference to the attention that the rich man paid to following the injunctions of the Law and his inability to follow the Saviour.

[573] *QDS* 11.4; *Str.* 6.18.162.1.

take precedence over, though not contradict or in any way nullify, the plain meaning. To support his traditional interpretation of 'sell your possessions' Clement furnishes the following six arguments.

1) Spiritual immaturity and the need for moderation

It is an unenviable thing to be without property, 'except by reason of life' (11.3). The last clause is important because Clement elsewhere lauds those who choose the path of poverty provided that they are advanced believers striving to attain to the passionless state, since they do so by choice rather than by compulsion.[574] Rich believers are, however, considered spiritually immature and such a rigorous stance towards poverty is inadvisable, indeed harmful at this stage in their moral development. The doctrine of the mean is the more suitable ethical standard with its avoidance of the excesses of superfluity and poverty. Clement flirts here with sentiments about poverty that have been construed by scholars such as Martin Hengel as 'bourgeois.'[575] In agreement with Aristotle, Clement deems it unlikely that the poor, wretched, diseased, or slaves, could live a life of virtue.[576] The poor, who have nothing at all but are destitute and beg for their daily needs, who are strewn through the streets, could hardly be understood to be at the same time the most blessed, favoured by the gods and the only possessors of eternal life (11.3). However, unlike society's elite he also holds similar misgivings about the moral status of the wealthy. A more measured approach is to recognize that his thoughts here are more in line with those of the philosophical schools, whereby a man needs a basic sufficiency in order to have the leisure to devote himself to the pursuit of philosophy.[577]

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[574] Cf. *Str.* 4.6.26.3-4.

[575] Hengel, *Property and Riches*, 57-59.

[576] *Str.* 2.21.128.3-5; Cf. Origen *Cels.* 6.16, 'For even a common individual would not thus indiscriminately have praised the poor, many of whom lead most wicked lives.'

[577] Plato *Critias* 109e-110a; 110c; Aristotle *EN* 1099b. See above pp. 81ff.

2) Nothing new. The folly of misguided asceticism

It is nothing novel to relinquish all of one's possessions (11.4-12.3). Anaxagoras, Democritus and Crates are examples of ancient characters well known among the Greeks for abandoning their wealth for ostensibly noble purposes and yet ultimately, in Clement's view, for vainglory (11.4). Here he is following a tradition already known to Philo and Cicero, which couples Democritus together with Anaxagoras (though not Crates) on account of their rejection of wealth. The way that they went about doing this however was a matter of some dispute amongst the *literati* of the period. Plato preserves a tradition that though much money was left to Anaxagoras, he neglected it and lost it all. Plato thus censures Anaxagoras for the senseless nature of his wisdom.[578] Diogenes Laertius gives a somewhat contradictory rendition which lauds Anaxagoras' magnanimity in giving his patrimony to his relatives, although only after he had been accused initially of neglecting it.[579] Cicero similarly speaks well of Anaxagoras and Democritus who left the fields they inherited in order to give 'themselves up entirely to this divine delight of learning and discovery.'[580] Horace, rallying his friend Iccius to pursue philosophy, marvels that the herds of Democritus ate up his meadows and corn-fields, 'while his swift mind wandered abroad without his body.'[581] Philo also commends Anaxagoras' and Democritus' intentions to free themselves for the study of philosophy. Nevertheless, he considers the way that they both went about jettisoning their wealth as thoughtless since they did not consider the future needs of their blood relatives.[582]

Whereas readers familiar with Clement's major works would have expected him to follow a similar line to Philo and at least give credit where it is due, that is, for the noble search of

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[578] *Hippias Major* 283a.

[579] Cf. D.L. 2.6.

[580] *Tusc.* 5.115.

[581] *Ep.* 1.12.12.

[582] *Cont.* 14.1.

the philosophic life, his non-conciliatory approach here is somewhat surprising.[583] Clement completely censures the actions of those who abandoned their wealth in the past including Anaxagoras, Democritus and Crates not because it was senseless (as Plato did with Anaxagoras) but on account of false motives, an ascription which is not mentioned in the other traditions. He even goes so far as to deride those who 'bestowed favours on the poor,' the very activity which he encourages the wealthy reader to do later in this treatise! This can be explained by his adherence to the Stoic doctrine of appropriate actions, according to which it is possible to perform appropriate acts (e.g. give money to the poor), but these acts are still deemed vicious if they do not stem from a fixed disposition.[584] Anaxagoras, Democritus and Crates erred in merely scorning the external things (12.2), and not acting from moral motives. This had the inadvertent effect of intensifying even further the passions of their souls leading them to become boastful, vainglorious and scornful over other men.

Completely in line with Clement's method of scriptural interpretation which is guided by the principle that consideration must be taken of what belongs to and becomes the Sovereign God, the Saviour's command to 'sell your possessions' is something new and peculiar to God, which alone brings life but did not bring life to the former ones (12.1). The command infers a doctrine worthy of the Saviour (12.2; cf. 6.1-2). It concerns not solely the phenomenal, which by itself can potentially be harmful and grievous, like the rash actions of Anaxagoras, Democritus and Crates, but rather involves the psychogogical, the training of the soul away from the underlying passions, and the surgical, the act of cutting away and rooting out the alien things of the mind (12.1, 3). The references to 'cutting away' and 'rooting out' the alien things of the mind reflects Clement's understanding of the function of the commandments in attaining to οἰκείωσις with God.[585]

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[583] Origen, *Comm. in Matt.* 15.15, refers to Crates' act of donating his possessions to the Thebans as an pagan example to shame Christians into adopting ascetic rigour. See Clark, *Reading renunciation*, 96.

[584] On appropriate acts and virtue see pp. 78f.

[585] On *oikeiosis* see pp. 92ff.

3) The need for self-sufficiency

The act of jettisoning all of one's possessions will invariably expose their former owner to the harmful effects of psychological despair (12.4-5). An individual who has rid himself of his possessions may still have desire impress upon him by the thought of them (12.4). Indeed, there could be a double grief in being in want and yearning for these.[586] It is impossible for an individual lacking in things necessary for life not to have his spirit broken and have his leisure taken away from the [study of] better things (ἀσχολίαν ἄγειν ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων) because he has to strive constantly to provide for his needs (12.5).[587] The key here is Clement's adaptation of the philosophical ideal of self-sufficiency.[588] In order to pursue the philosophical life the wise man has to have a self-sufficiency (ἡ αὐτάρκεια) which requires that the basic necessities of life be adequately supplied so that he can have the leisure (ἐν τῇ σχολῇ) to devote himself to the pursuit of the true philosophy.[589]

4) Self-sufficiency leads to community

As stated above, Clement's understanding of self-sufficiency has a social aspect.[590] The act of jettisoning all of one's possessions, including the necessities for daily life, will render impossible the practice of sharing (κοινωνία), and thereby contradict the harmony of scripture (13.1-7).· How much more useful it is for the wealthy man to render aid to others, if he is not in distress from lack of property but possesses a sufficiency (ἱκανὰ κεκτημένον) for his own needs? (13.1) Possessing sufficient necessities is a prerequisite for acting virtuously, at least for the Christian who is not yet advanced. To be in no want of necessities

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[586] The *antithesis* stressed by the use of the same stem with opposite prepositional prefixes ἀπουσία and συνουσία.

[587] Cf. the example of Mary in 10.6.

[588] On Clement's understanding of self-sufficiency see pp. 81ff.

[589] Plato *Phaedo* 66c.

[590] On the social aspect of self-sufficiency see pp. 102f.

is the mean between excess and defect.[591] In striving to attain self-sufficiency one is able to support others in the community with superfluous possessions.[592]

What sharing would remain among men if no-one had anything? (13.1) Sharing is the essence of friendship.[593] Clement's discussion on sharing here prefigures his later depiction of the church in terms of a community of friends whose goods can be said to be held in common (κοινὰ τὰ φίλων).[594] True community is only possible when the well-off members, after retaining a sufficiency for their own basic needs, support the less well-off with their superfluous possessions. The sharing of wealth is the 'principle of a loving community' (κατὰ τὸν τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς ἀγαπητικὸς λόγον).[595] Sharing material needs forms the basis of the reciprocity between believers in Clement's second type of friendship which is 'by way of recompense (<τὸ> κατ' ἀμοιβήν), and is social (κοινωνικόν), liberal (μεταδοτικόν), and useful for life (βιωφελές).'[596] How can one obey the Gospel injunctions to support the less well-off (Lk. 16.9; Mt. 6.20; 25.35-43), if one has already jettisoned all of one's possessions? (13.4, 6)[597] In the Gospel accounts, Jesus himself was not infrequently a guest of wealthy men - Zacchaeus, Levi and Matthew - and he did not command that they get rid of *all* of their possessions but rather enjoined that they be shared (13.5-7; cf. Lk. 5.27-29; 19.5f; Mk 2.14f.).[598] Thus in our passage, the Saviour can not have intended that the rich man jettison all his possessions and at the same time in other places enjoin that possessions be shared. This would be the height of unreason (13.7). Therefore superfluous possessions of

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[591] *Paed.* 2.12.128.2.

[592] *Paed.* 2.1.7.3; 2.1.16.4.

[593] Cf. Aristotle *EN* 1162a11; Plato *Phaedrus* 279c; *Lysis* 207c. For Aristotle, only through ownership of property could one bestow favours (τὸ χαρίσασθαι) and assistance on friends or guests or comrades. Cf. *EN* 1159b30-1160a1; 1161b12-18.

[594] See discussion on *QDS* 32.6-33.1 on pp. 179ff.

[595] *Str.* 4.18.112.2.

[596] *Str.* 2.19.101.3. On Clement's taxonomy of friendship see pp. 72ff.

[597] Cf. *QDS* 31.7-9.

[598] Clement regards Levi and Matthew as two distinct persons.

the type which can benefit neighbours ought not to be jettisoned but be used to support the less well-off believers. In this way, 'possessions (κτήματα) are desirable (κτητὰ ὄντα) and properties (χρήματα) are useful (χρήσιμα)' (14.1).

5) Wealth can be useful for others

The fifth ground draws upon the functional similarities between wealth and instruments or tools (14.1-6). Wealth, like tools, comprises things which lie at hand, and ought to be appropriated (ὑποβέβληται; cf. περίβλητος as an antonym to ἀπόβλητος in 17.4) for good use by those who have the knowledge; a commodity which Clement will later claim that the rich man in the story lacked (cf. 20.1). Tools, if used by the rules of art, are deemed artistic (τεχνικόν) but, contrariwise, if the user lacks the skill then the tool takes advantage over (ἀπολαύει) the person's 'absence' (14.2).[599] This last statement is a little curious and has led some scholars to emend the text to make the antithetical parallelism a little clearer.[600] Various suggestions include emending the manuscript's ἀπουσίας to ἀμουσίας, ἀμαθίας or ἀπαιδευσίας. It is possible, however, that Clement is collapsing two metaphors here, that of a tool and that of a servant or slave, objects which, in Graeco-Roman society, were not entirely disparate. They were both objects to be mastered and used. If this is correct, then the idea being conveyed is that of a servant or slave taking advantage of his master's absence. The question arises as to who is primarily to blame? It is not the tool or servant but the master who is to blame for using the tool/servant improperly. This is borne out more clearly in the following paragraph which draws upon the similar attributes of wealth (14.3-4). Wealth, like a tool, is able to be used for a just purpose (πρὸς δικαιοσύνην).[601] However, if one uses wealth unjustly then it is deemed to be an unjust servant (ὑπηρέτης ἀδικίας). The use of justice terminology is deliberate here. One would normally expect an ἀγαθός/καλός –

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[599] Zeno identifies reason 'as the force which is able to supervene over impulse' as a skilled craftsman (τεχνίτης) (D.L. 7.86).

[600] The names of the textual critics and their corresponding emendations mentioned here may be found in Stählin's critical apparatus.

[601] The province of a liberal man. Cf. Aristotle *EN* 1120a.

πονηρός/κακός antithesis. However, we suggest that Clement has in the back of his mind both here and in the next chapter the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις, of which justice (δικαιοσύνη), one of the four cardinal Stoic virtues, plays an important part in how one acts with respect to other human beings.[602] By selecting to use wealth justly one may perform benevolent actions to others and ultimately for oneself (cf. 15.2).

In sum, it is not fit to blame that which is blameless, being neither virtuous nor vicious in itself (14.4).[603] One rather ought to blame that which is able to use the tool either virtuously or viciously This is the νοῦς of man, which has the freedom of discernment and freewill to manage the things given. For Clement, as for Aristotle, blame as well as praise can only be attached to one who acts freely. One ought not to jettison material possessions and retain the passions of the soul which themselves do not make room for the better use of possessions (14.5).[604] Therefore, Christ's command to say goodbye to possessions is expressly stated with respect to ridding the passions from the soul with the goal that by becoming noble and good (καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς) the soul will be able to *use* material possessions well (14.5-6; cf. 19.1). It is a possible allusion to Aristotle's description of the καλοκἀγαθός, the man who is morally perfect, to whom the things which are absolutely noble (καλά), such as the virtues and virtuous deeds, are absolutely noble, and the things which are absolutely good (ἀγαθά), such as power, wealth, glory and honour, are absolutely good. The noble and good man is incorruptible by riches and power.[605] (Note that Clement's accent here is on the soul's *use* of possessions; the idea being that superfluous possessions must be *used* to support the less well-off rather than simply jettisoned.[606] Clement's likely allusion to Aristotle's noble and good

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[602] Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis*, 123-125.

[603] The construction ἀναίτιον ὄν, αἰτιᾶσθαι is a faint echo of Patroclus' description of his implacable master, Achilles. Cf. Homer *Iliad* 11.654.

[604] The image of the soul as a vessel filled either with passions or virtues also occurs in the *Shepherd*. Cf. *Mand.* 2.5.5-7. See discussion on *QDS* 21.1-3 on pp. 149ff.

[605] *MM* 1207b23-1208a4.

man is not a concession to the idea that a noble and good man could remain rich materially; cf. 19.6).

6) Goods of the soul, external goods and indifferents

The sixth ground treats wealth as an external (15.1-16.1). There are two types of possessions. One kind lies within the soul and the other lies outside of it (τὰ ἐκτός) (15.1). Aristotle makes a similar distinction. While Aristotle initially states that good things may be divided into three classes, external goods (τῶν ἐκτός), goods of the soul and goods of the body, he immediately collapses the three categories into two, the goods of the soul and external goods which must include bodily goods.[607] The goods of the soul are good in the fullest sense and highest degree. The τέλος, as an action or activity of some sort, is included among the goods of the soul, and not among external goods. With these two assertions, Clement would undoubtedly agree. However, Aristotle left unanswered the following problem: if the τέλος is radically different from external goods, what right do we have to use the same word (good) in both cases?[608]

In our passage, Clement (probably subconsciously) avoids the problem when he conflates the Stoic doctrine of indifferents with the Aristotelian doctrine of externals. In this hybrid scheme, things pertaining to the soul can be either virtuous (like prudence, justice, courage, temperance and the rest) or vicious (folly, injustice, etc.), whilst things outside of the soul are neither good nor evil in themselves. They are morally indifferent. As related, it is the moral disposition of the doer and the appropriateness of the action with the indifferent objects which determines whether the actions can be deemed virtuous or vicious.[609] Some indifferent objects would naturally be preferred while others ought to be rejected. Wealth is a preferred

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[606] On Clement's emphasis on right use of wealth in *QDS* see Wacht, 'Wahre und falsche Armut,' 339-340, who observes the thoroughly early Christian character of the almsgiving in terms of the love-command (*QDS* 38.5).

[607] *EN* 1098b12.

[608] Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 5.

[609] On moral indifferents and appropriate actions see pp. 78ff.

indifferent because it can be used to perform a virtuous action; for example, the conferring of benefits on others.[610]

In our passage, wealth is treated as a preferred indifferent rather than an external 'good.' If used well this 'external' may *seem* (δοκεῖ) good, and if used viciously it may *seem* vicious (15.1). The use of the verb δοκέω in these clauses is quite deliberate. Being an indifferent, wealth can be neither good nor vicious of itself but only appear so. As we will see later, Clement believes that salvific acts, that is, acts which are both moral and appropriate, can indeed be performed with wealth (cf. 20.2).

Using conventions from οἰκείωσις theory,[611] Clement asks which of the two things Christ deprecates when commanding the rich man to estrange himself (ἀπαλλοτριοῦν) from his possessions: the indifferent or the vicious (15.1; cf. 15.6-16.1)? Indifferent are those things 'which, even when taken away, the passions still remain.' Vicious are 'those things (= passions), which, when taken away, the possessions (= a preferable indifferent) become useful.' The efficient cause is that which controls the passions that remain even after material possessions have long disappeared. This is the disposition (ἡ διάθεσις) of the soul (cf. 1.5). A virtuous action can only be performed from a fixed and just disposition. Its corollary is also true. A morally bad disposition can only perform vicious deeds. The passions have a twofold effect of strangling and choking the reasoning faculty and inflaming desires (15.2; cf. 8.3). Therefore there is no benefit for a person to be impoverished of possessions while remaining wealthy in passions. The error lies in the fact that one has cast away not τὰ ἀπόβλητα, the vicious things which ought to be rejected as harmful to one's soul, but τὰ ἀδιάφορα, which can be potentially useful and beneficial (15.3).[612] Therefore, one must 'say

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[610] D.L. 7.107.

[611] On *oikeiosis* see pp. 92ff.

[612] *Str.* 4.23.147.1-3.

goodbye' to the harmful possessions[613] and not those possessions which are able to benefit, if used in line with the Platonic virtues of wisdom, moderation and piety.[614] Hurtful things [are] to be rejected but externals are not harmful (15.5). The Lord affirms the use of indifferent/external things by commanding not that one should jettison one's livelihood (τὰ βιωτικά), but rather discard that which is liable to use the externals badly, the diseases and passions of the soul (15.6). Wealth in these passions brings death, but brings salvation if they are destroyed (16.1).

4.3.8 The need for a pure soul: Interpretation of 'Come, follow me' (16.1-2)

The command to sell possessions primarily signifies the need to purify the soul. Clement supports this idea by combining the theme of purity from Plato's *Phaedo* with the Matthean beatitude that only the pure in heart will see God (Mt. 5.8), and the Johannine claim that Jesus is the only way to the father (Jn 14.6). True philosophers turn away from the body and its attendant pleasures and concern themselves with keeping the soul pure.[615] Thus the true philosopher is concerned with the purification of his soul, the practice of self-restraint, not being excited by the passions but being superior to them.[616] True philosophy is the practice of being in a state of death.[617]

In our passage the main point has to do with the sequence of steps in the psychagogical process. One cannot proceed to follow God (Mk 10.21) without first purifying the soul from its vicious passions (i.e. attaining the intermediate state of *metriopatheia*). The same sequence of necessary steps is found in both instances of Clement's other expositions of the Matthean parallel (Mt. 19.21). In these passages 'sell what you have' signifies the abstinence from vicious acts, the extinguishing of vicious propensities, their energy being destroyed by

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[613] Cf. Philo *Leg.* 89 with reference to all things mischievous and hurtful that abominable and venomous souls are likely to generate.

[614] *Phaedo* 114e; *Laws* 716c. The three virtues which guide the conduct of a man who wishes to be dear to God.

[615] *Phaedo* 64e; *QDS* 18.7; *Str.* 5.11.67.2.

[616] *Phaedo* 68c; 80e-81a; 114c; *Str.* 4.3.12.5.

[617] *Phaedo* 67e; 81a; *Str.* 4.8.58.2; 5.11.67.2.

inaction. Only when the passions are moderated can one follow Christ and be made perfect in the ascent to the passionless state.[618] Similarly in another passage, 'sell all of your possessions' refers to the first step of denuding of the soul from passions and 'Come, follow me' refers to the advanced step of becoming like God. The advanced process of assimilation cannot be attained by human efforts alone but requires the grace of God.[619] The Saviour becomes the way only for the pure in heart because 'the grace of God does not steal into the impure soul' (16.1-2).[620]

4.3.9 The need to exchange superfluous possessions *and* irrational passions for eternal treasure: Interpretation of 'you will have treasure in heaven' (16.2-19.6)

Purity of the soul remains the focal theme of this section. The soul is impure when it is rich in desires and labouring in many and worldly lusts (16.2).[621] Clement depicts two hypothetical persons with opposing moral dispositions vis-à-vis wealth. The first type of person is an exemplum of a virtuous rich believer (virtuous with respect to the doctrine of the mean). The virtuous rich believer knows that his superfluous possessions are for the brethren and is able to triumph over them by not carrying these things around in his soul (16.3). Should it ever be necessary to be separated from these possessions, he is able to bear their loss equally gladly as their presence. The idea of a good person who uses his wealth well and shows no consternation when he is necessarily deprived of it is in harmony with Aristotle's description of the magnanimous man.[622] It was later to become a commonplace in Stoic writings and form the basis for their doctrine of indifferents. A wise man, declares Cicero, is able to make use of the benefits or race, wealth, connexions, friendships, power etc., if he possesses them, but equally bears their loss with resignation, if they are taken away from

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[618] *Str.* 4.6.28.5.

[619] On the relation between freewill and synergy with God see pp. 77ff.; 100ff.

[620] *Str.* 5.4.19. Cf. *Phaedo* 67b, 'For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.'

[621] The notion of a womb as a metaphor for the vicious soul influenced by passions arising from the love of money, glory and pleasure, can be found in Philo. Though in labour the soul of the worthless man never has the power to bring forth offspring (*LA* 75). Cf. Philo's notion of the soul as womb producing vice or passion (feminine) or virtue (masculine) in *Cher.* 57.7; *Sac.* 3.2; 103.1 *et passim.*

[622] The μεγαλόψυχος does not rejoice overmuch in prosperity, nor grieve overmuch at adversity for he is indifferent to external goods. Cf. *EN* 1124a-1125a.

him.[623] For Clement, this wealthy believer is one whom the Saviour calls blessed and 'poor in spirit,' with an inheritance in the kingdom of heaven (cf. Mt. 5.3, 8), as distinct from a wealthy man unable to live.

In contrast to the virtuous person who treats wealth as something external, the vicious person carries within his soul gold or a field, and seeks always to extend his possession without limit. He is continually on the lookout for more, yet his eyes ever look downwards. How can the one who is fettered by the snares of the world (an echo from Plato's allegory of the cave in the *Republic* or the parable of the sower), who is earth and destined to return to earth (cf. Gen. 3.19), desire and meditate on the kingdom of heaven (17.1)?[624] Even though the words 'field' and 'mine' function as a *synecdoche* for all external possessions which the vicious person 'carries' in place of his heart, they are used because of their analogy to treasure (e.g. Mt. 13.44).[625] This is supported by an extracanonical saying of Jesus: 'for where the mind of man is, there also is his treasure' (ὅπου γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ θησαυρὸς αὐτοῦ),[626] a saying which has affinities with Mt. 6.21 but is probably dependent upon an old tradition similar to that preserved by Justin Martyr.[627]

The Lord knows of two classes of treasures (θησαυρούς): the good, supported from Mt. 12.35a, 'the good man brings forth good from the good treasure of the heart,' and the bad, from Mt. 12.35b, 'the wicked man brings forth evil from the evil treasure of his heart ...' (17.2). These texts support Clement's argument for the existence of preferable and harmful

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[623] *Or.* 2.11.46f. Aristotle states that εὐδαιμονία requires both complete goodness and a complete lifetime. Therefore, 'it is quite wrong to be guided in our judgement by the changes of fortune, since true prosperity and adversity do not depend on fortune's favours' (*EN* 1100b). Similarly, in a fragment of Chrysippus preserved by Plutarch, 'to the good man losing his fortune is like losing a drachma, and falling ill is like stumbling' (*De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1048b).

[624] One is reminded of Socrates' oligarchic man (Plato *Republic* 548a; 554a) who is dominated by the appetitive part of his soul because he is controlled by his desire for wealth. Cf. T. Irwin, *Plato's Ethics* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 214.

[625] *Str.* 4.6.31.2.

[626] A similar saying is expounded in *Str.* 4.6.33.4-6; 7.12.77.6.

[627] Ζητεῖτε δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν, ὅπου γὰρ ὁ θησαυρός ἐστιν, ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ νοῦς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (1 *Apol.* 15.16). This old tradition is preserved also in Coptic sources (e.g. *Gospel of Mary*, *Pistis Sophia*, *Manichaean Psalm-Book* etc). Cf. W. D. Stroker, *Extracanonical Sayings of Jesus* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), §W4.

kinds of treasure with respect to οἰκείωσις doctrine. The former treasure gives great advantage (μέγα κέρδος) on discovery (cf. Mt. 13.44), whilst the latter is ἀκερδή, unenviable, hard to possess, and harmful (17.3). Since wealth is analogous to treasure it follows that there is a certain wealth which may be possessed (κτητὸς ἂν εἴη) and able to be kept (περίβλητος), and conversely another type of wealth which is not to be possessed (ἄκτητος) but to be thrown away (ἀπόβλητος) (17.3-4). Therefore, by analogy, there must be a certain poverty which is beneficial. This poverty is spiritual based on the Matthean addition of 'in spirit' to Q6.20 and similarly 'for righteousness' to Q6.21 in the beatitudes. There is also a wretched poverty, one that is not only without a share in human possessions but without a share in God (17.5; cf. the indigent and destitute in 11.3).

Therefore the reader needs to understand the concealed deeper meaning of the Markan narrative in the spirit of disciples (μαθηματικῶς) rather than clumsily, obscurely, or carnally (18.1; cf. 5.2-4). This statement is an allusion to the Pythagorean practice of distinguishing between the few μαθηματικοί, the advanced associates who had a genuine attachment to philosophy and an understanding of the allegorical symbols, and the many ἀκουσματικοί, from whom the allegorical teachings were concealed.[628]

The τέλος is ultimately not over indifferents but rather over the virtues of the soul: faith, hope, love, love of the brethren, knowledge, gentleness (πραότης), and freedom of arrogance (ἀτυφία). These virtues not only reflect the Pauline triad of faith, hope and love (1 Cor. 13.13; cf. *QDS* 38) but also show Stoic influence. Cleanthes lists ἀτυφία and πραότης as virtues of the deity.[629] Ἀτυφία is the antonym to the τύφος which attends wealth mentioned in 1.3. Love of brethren (cf. 3.1) is the practice of φιλανθρωπία to those who participate in the same spirit within a friendship community.[630]

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[628] *Str.* 5.9.59.1.

[629] *Str.* 5.14.110.3; *Prot.* 6.72.2.

[630] *Str.* 2.9.42.3.

Salvation is contingent on the virtue of the soul. This can be seen from a comparison between the soul and an external, the body.[631] The soul, on one hand, shall neither live nor be destroyed on account of a beautiful body. On the other hand, it is either saved or destroyed depending on its *use* of the body (18.2). There is no radical disparagement of the body with which Clement charges certain groups like the Encratites. The body 'has been given by God' and is the 'temple of God' (1 Cor. 3.17). It is a preferred indifferent, the use of which can be virtuous. This is shown by the observation that someone beautiful in appearance can nevertheless act in moderation, whilst someone ugly can act extravagantly (18.3-4). These antitheses are an adaptation of the Socratic idea that only the wise man is truly beautiful.[632] Its corollary is that a man wealthy in material possessions can hypothetically act dispassionately whilst someone impoverished may be found drunk with desires (18.5).

It is the soul which, first and foremost, shall be saved (18.6).[633] Virtue saves the soul by growing in it, while evil kills it. Therefore, the soul is saved when it is impoverished of passions. Conversely, the soul is destroyed when it becomes wealthy in passions. The readers of *QDS* are no longer to seek the cause of the τέλος in anything other than the disposition of the soul with regards to its obedience to God and its purity and, equally, to its transgressions of the commandments and accumulation of evil (18.7; cf. 1.5; 16.1-2). Man's ruling faculty requires instruction and training to counter the corrupting influences of the passions in order to be able to choose a preferred indifferent and use it in a virtuous act.[634]

To summarize the line of argument in 16.2-18.7, there is a need to distinguish between a genuinely wealthy person and a spurious counterpart. In true Socratic fashion, the virtuous person is the only genuinely wealthy person, for he regards his virtue as sufficient for happiness, and is able to use externals reverently and faithfully in every eventuality (19.1; cf.

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[631] Plato *Phaedo* 67a; 80e-81a.

[632] The wise man is beautiful in the same way that he is just, even if he happens to be ugly in looks (*Str.* 2.5.22.7).

[633] Plato *Phaedo* 80d-e.

[634] *Str.* 2.20.109.3-4.

16.3).[635] On the other hand, those whom the multitude call wealthy are illegitimately so precisely because their appetites for external possessions are never satisfied and hence they are unable to act virtuously. Similar arguments are proffered to distinguish a legitimate poverty from its spurious counterpart,[636] this time however using categories from οἰκείωσις theory. Poverty according to the spirit is positively moral (i.e. poor in passions; cf. Mt. 5.3) and thus is choiceworthy in terms of being what belongs to one (τὸ ἴδιον), whereas the one not poor according to the world is taken in a morally negative sense (i.e. in the Platonic sense where the materially wealthy ever desire more and are never content) and thus this non-poverty ought to be rejected as something alien to one (τὸ ἀλλότριον) (19.2).[637]

To illustrate the meaning of the Saviour's command to 'sell your possessions,' in light of the fact that there are two kinds of wealth, one harmful and the other beneficial, Clement incorporates a diatribe (19.3-6).[638] The speaker is described as as one who is poor in the spirit yet wealthy to God, undoubtedly a reference to the Saviour. The imaginary interlocutor is one who is not poor according to the world and rich in passions, a reference to the rich man of the narrative (19.3).[639] The Saviour commands the rich man to 'stand away from the alien

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[635] Plato *Apology* 30c-d, 41c-d; *Str.* 2.5.22.1-5. The rich man is not he who keeps his possessions to himself but he who gives away. The fruit of the spirit is generosity and true riches are in the soul. Good things are the property only of good men; and since Christians alone are good, it follows that Christians alone are rich (*Paed.* 3.6.36.1). Frugality is in the highest degree rich, being equal to unfailing expenditure, bestowed on what is necessary (*Paed.* 3.8.41.1-2).

[636] Clement's distinction between genuine and spurious counterparts to wealth and poverty is influenced by Plato's *Republic* where the irrational pleasure of a tyrant is considered spurious and slavish, while the rational pleasure of the king is genuine and regal (587b-c). Cf. Wacht, 'Wahre und falsche Armut,' 344.

[637] *Str.* 2.5.22.7. Poverty has to do with the niggardliness by which the rich act as if they are poor, having nothing to give away (*Paed.* 3.4.30.4). Cf. Plato *Laws* 742e6.

[638] On Graeco-Roman diatribe see D. E. Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1988), 200-202; S. K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (Chico CA: Scholars Press, 1981), 48-78,101.

[639] *QDS* 19.3 is a text which has puzzled several scholars. The only manuscript on this passage has τῷ δὴ κατὰ κόσμον πτωχῷ καὶ πλουσίῳ κατὰ τὰ πάθη ὁ κατὰ πνεῦμα οὐ πτωχὸς καὶ κατὰ θεὸν πλούσιος ἀπόστηθι κ.τ.λ. Most scholars agree that the text needs emendation. The only scholar who attempts to justify the text as it stands is, in my view, singularly unsuccessful (see n. 643).

I follow Ritter, 'Christentum und Eigentum,' 16 n.87, and the critical text of Stählin, in suggesting two textual emendations to this passage which can easily be explained by a single instance of scribal *parablepsis*. First, A. Jülicher, *ThLZ* 19 (1894), 20, rightly inserts οὐ before πτωχῷ in the first clause signifying the rich man of the narrative who is not poor according to the world (= rich in possessions). This reflects Clement's thought elsewhere where Plato's Athenian Stranger refers to those whom the many erroneously call wealthy (= the rich according to the world) on account of the abundance of their material possessions (*Str.* 2.5.22.7). However,

possessions (κτημάτων ἀλλοτρίων) dwelling in your soul in order that having become pure in heart you might see God.'[640] To stand away from alien possessions is to sell (19.4), not merely denoting the liquidation of one's assets into cash, but rather the exchange of superfluous possessions for virtuous dispositions (19.5-6). It is precisely the excess or abundance of material wealth over and above (τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περισσά) that which is required for self-sufficiency which leads the soul to be overpowered by the passions.[641] Thus, the command to 'sell your possessions' means both to jettison the passions that attend wealth (14.6; 19.3)[642] *and* to stand away from the superfluous wealth (19.5-6; 37.5), largely because the former can only take place after undertaking the latter, through living on a frugal self-sufficiency. The Saviour exhorts the rich man to let the fleshly poor (οἱ σάρκινοι πτωχοί = an amoral category) have the superfluous possessions.[643] In exchange the rich man will receive spiritual wealth, treasure in heaven.[644]

Jülicher leaves the next clause untouched considering ὁ κατὰ πνεῦμα οὐ πτωχὸς to be a moral positive (i.e. not an allusion to Mt. 5.3). The latter suggestion is not likely since there is a clear allusion to Mt. 5.3 in 19.2 where ὁ κατὰ πνεῦμα πτωχὸς is a moral positive.

Second, U. Wickert, 'Bemerkungen zu Clemens von Alexandrien (Quis dives salvetur 19 und 42),' *ZNW* 50 (1959), 124-125, rightly omits οὐ before πτωχὸς in order to make the clause conform to Mt. 5.3 (= ὁ κατὰ πνεῦμα πτωχὸς). These two emendations taken together thus render 19.2 as τῷ δὴ κατὰ κόσμον οὐ πτωχῷ καὶ πλουσίῳ κατὰ τὰ πάθη ὁ κατὰ πνεῦμα πτωχὸς καὶ κατὰ θεὸν πλούσιος ἀπόστηθι κ.τ.λ.

[640] Cf. Mt. 5.8; *Phaedo* 82b-c. Elsewhere, Clement describes the gnostic who refrains from concerning himself with things that are foreign to him (τοὶς ἀλλοτρίοις αὐτοῦ), and concentrates on things which really belong to him (τὰ οἰκεῖα) (*Str.* 7.11.62.5). See my discussion on οἰκείωσις on pp. 92ff.

[641] Ritter, 'Christentum und Eigentum,' 16 n.87, rightly sees that ὑπάρχοντα πολλὰ καὶ περισσά (19.6) signifies superfluous material possessions. Wacht, 'Wahre und falsche Armut,' 346-347, takes the ὑπάρχοντα πολλὰ καὶ περισσά to signify the bustle involved in attending to many deeds, based on the example of Martha who is described as ἀσχολουμένη περὶ πολλά (10.5). In my view, Wacht fails to recognize the importance of self-sufficiency in Clement's thinking here. The passions are excited by the extremes of poverty and superfluity. Frugal self-sufficiency curbs the natural desires. Cf. *Paed.* 2.1.16.4. See pp. 81ff.

[642] For the idea of purchasing virtue in exchange for the pleasures and passions see Plato *Phaedo* 69a-b.

[643] In *QDS* 37.5, superfluous material wealth is patently referred to as a thing belonging to the world, a poor and foreign (ἀλλότρια) thing, which ought to be shared with the less well-off.

C. Nardi, 'Nota a Clemente Alessandrino, Quis Dives Salvetur 19,3,' *Prometheus* 9 (1983), 109-110, interprets Clement's command, ἐκεῖνα ἐχέτωσαν οἱ σαρκῖνοι πτωχοὶ, quite differently. According to Nardi, ἐκεῖνα corresponds to the passions of the soul which attend wealth (= τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, κτημάτων ἀλλοτρίων in 19.3), the σάρκινοι πτωχοί refer to the indigent poor who lack virtue (= κατὰ κόσμον πτωχός in 19.2-3; cf. 11.3), and thus ἐχέτωσαν is disparaging in tone. The sense of the command is to let the indigent continue to be controlled by their passions which attend the (lack of) wealth. Thus the command, for Nardi, has nothing to do with giving material possessions to the less well-off.

4.3.10 Unwilling to learn from the Saviour: Interpretation of the rich man turning away downcast (20.1-2)

Drawing out the irony of the Gospel narrative, Clement describes the rich man as extremely wealthy (cf. Mk 10.22) and law-abiding who nevertheless goes away groaning and downcast at Jesus' demands (20.1). The rich man desired salvation but was unable to attain it. He did not *understand* how he was able to be both poor and to have wealth, how to have possessions and not to have possessions, and how to use the world and not to use it. Salvation is not a matter of the will alone. Clement could not quote Seneca's words, '*Quid tibi opus est, ut bonus sis? velle*' without taking into account their context.[645] For Clement, as for Seneca, there is no dichotomy between willing and learning.[646] Both writers would agree with Epictetus' statement, 'It is not enough to want to be noble or good, you must also learn something.'[647] Whereas Clement would agree with Epictetus that we must learn about the existence of God, the deity's beneficent nature and how one ought to become an imitator of

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Nardi's interpretation is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, it hardly explains the epithet, καὶ τούτων δεόμενοι, in apposition to the fleshly poor. How can it be said that the fleshly poor *need* to have passions of the soul? Nardi's rendition falls into the same pitfall as those (Gnostic? heretical?) groups who offer solely spiritual interpretations of this passage whom Clement elsewhere charges with failing to explain the clause 'and to give to the poor' (*Str.* 4.6.28.6). In that passage Clement insists that give to the poor signifies almsgiving. Nardi fails to appreciate that Clement's spiritual interpretations as a general rule do not negate the plain sense of scripture.

Second, it assumes that the term σάρκινοι πτωχοί is synonymous to the κατὰ κόσμον πτωχός, i.e the indigent poor who lack virtue (19.2 and 11.3), an equivalence which Nardi has by no means demonstrated. It is more likely that the σάρκινοι πτωχοί are those who are simply less well-off materially (i.e. an amoral evaluation) which is supported by Clement's reference to the one who is rich *in material possessions* as ὁ κατὰ σάρκα πλουτῶν in 19.2. Clement here, I contend, is influenced by the Gospel of John where σάρξ is largely a neutral term contrasting the human and natural with the divine, whereas κόσμος denotes both the object of God's love and a deceitful power which revolts against God. See R. Bultmann, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), 54-55.

Third, Nardi ignores the role that οἰκείωσις plays in Clement's arguments here. Nardi treats τὸ ἴδιον as something morally negative and τὸ ἀλλότριον as something morally indifferent. As stated above (pp. 92ff.), τὸ ἴδιον in οἰκείωσις doctrine is a thing choiceworthy in itself and hence 'belongs to one.' Similarly τὸ ἀλλότριον is a thing which is to be rejected on account of it being 'alien to one.' Wacht, 'Wahre und falsche Armut,' 344, rightly recognizes the early Stoic background to Clement's use of the τὸ ἴδιον – τὸ ἀλλότριον antithesis but neglects to locate it within the doctrine of οἰκείωσις. Cf. *Paed.* 3.3.1-2.

[644] As the Gospel implies (Mk 10.21 etc) the good man, being temperate and just, having sold his worldly goods and given them to the poor, 'treasures up wealth in heaven' (*Paed.* 3.6.34).

[645] *Ep.* 80.4.

[646] Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 224-225.

[647] Arrianus *Epict.* 2.14.10.

him (cf. *QDS* 6-10), in this particular instance he is concerned that rich believers learn to use their superfluous possessions (as indifferents) in virtuous acts.

It is the believer's responsibility both to will to be saved and to learn what actions are required to be saved. The rich man of the story made that which was difficult impossible for himself (20.1; cf. Mk 10.23-24, 27). The impossibility of salvation does not stem from God's predetermination but rather through the rich man's erroneous choices (cf. *QDS* 10.4-5). Whereas an inherent difficulty arises from the soul's tendency to be led around and to be dazzled by the luxuries attendant on sensible wealth, the rich man was still responsible for changing his course from sensible wealth to another, God-taught wealth (20.2). Salvation for rich believers is not impossible as long as they are prepared to will and learn.

4.3.11 Salvation is for passionless souls. Interpretation of 'Who is able to be saved?' (20.3-6)

The focus turns towards the disciples' reaction of fear and astonishment at Jesus' harsh statement about the difficulty for the rich to enter into the kingdom (Mk 10.26). This reaction is consistent with Clement's claim that the 'rich' who are rejected by the Lord are not solely those who have superfluous material possessions, but also include those who are controlled by the passions which attend wealth.

The observation that the disciples at first had become fearful and astonished would be surprising to the reader (20.3). With Clement's customary elevation of the standing of the apostles[648] in his other writings (of which he will avail himself later in this passage), the reader would not be expecting the expression of such negative emotions as these.[649] 'Was it because even [the disciples] themselves possessed many possessions?' (20.3) The risibility of this question, in light of the early tradition that the apostles were *poor* fishermen, is emphasized by the rhythmic nature of the answer and the use of diminutives: ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ δικτύφια καὶ ἄγκιστρα καὶ τὰ ὑπηρετικὰ σκαφίδια ἀφῆκαν πάλαι,

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[648] Here the disciples signify the apostles and not the broader group of Jesus' followers.

[649] The absurdity is enhanced further by the addition of the adverbial use of καὶ twice, the pronoun intensifier αὐτοί, and the adverbial use of the particle μέν, 'Now *even* the disciples, at first, *certainly even these* had become fearful and stricken with amazement.'

ἅπερ ἦν αὐτοῖς μόνα.[650] Having paid short shrift to any suggestion that the disciples might be fearful on account of the abundance of their own possessions, Clement directs the readers back to the issue at hand: why did the disciples ask, 'who is able to be saved?' (20.4) It is here that Clement has recourse to the high standing that the disciples enjoyed in his own community in order to support his interpretative method. The disciples *qua* disciples knew that these words were spoken parabolically by the Lord, and they *qua* disciples understood the hidden meaning. The disciples were in good hope (εὐέλπιδες)[651] for salvation on account of their relative poverty. Nevertheless, it is rather incongruent that they were fearful. This can only be attributed to the fact that the disciples understood the deeper meaning behind the saying (20.5).

This deeper meaning of course is none other than that the Lord was referring to those whose minds were still swayed by their passions. It is notable that Clement attributes the negative emotions of the disciples to the fact that they had only recently become disciples at the time of this incident. This has to do with his distinction between the apostles pre- and post-resurrection. In contrast to the occasionally obdurate understanding and fickle actions of the apostles during Jesus' earthly ministry as portrayed in the Gospel accounts, the apostles after the resurrection have gnostically mastered all of the passions, even those which seem good like courage, zeal, joy and desire, living in an unchanging state of *apatheia*.[652]

Observing that the 'poor' disciples despaired of themselves no less than the rich man of the story, Clement concludes that *both* the one possessing superfluous property *and* the one pregnant with passions will equally be banished from heaven (20.5-6). In this statement he admits to the truth of his opponents' position that a person wealthy in material possessions will be excluded from heaven (although he would qualify this by stating that it is on account of the passions that invariably attend wealth that the rich will be banished rather than material

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[650] *Homoeoteleuton* with words ending in -α.

[651] Cf. *Str.* 2.9.41.1 for the other instance of εὔελπις in terms of looking confidently to an absent good. Cf. also Plato *Phaedo* 63c where Socrates has great hopes (εὐελπίς εἰμι) that there is something in store for the dead.

[652] *Str.* 6.9.71.3.

wealth *per se*). It is a position which he personally holds as can be discerned from his other writings where he declares that 'it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person' to lead a philosophic life.[653] Nevertheless, his concession to his opponent's argument has no damaging effect on his own case which is to show that the one pregnant with passions is equally condemned. This he supports with the gnome, clearly inspired by the Platonic tradition: 'for salvation is for passionless and pure souls' (20.6).[654]

4.3.12 Salvation attained by synergism between man and God: Interpretation of 'That which is impossible for man is possible for God' (21.1-3)

The form of the lemma, τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον δυνατὸν θεῷ (21.1), is quite different from its corresponding construction in the quotation of the Markan narrative in 4.10. Possibly the *chiasmus* is an intentional piece of rhetorical flourish since it is Clement's contention that the lemma, like the identity of the 'rich man,' is grossly misunderstood by wealthy believers (cf. 2.2). It denotes the impossibility of achieving the τέλος of the passionless state (ἀπαθεία) by one's own efforts, without the additional power of God.[655] Clement holds to the Aristotelian notion that a certain virtue can be attained through ἄσκησις and μάθησις but this merely corresponds to the mean moral state of *metriopatheia*, a state which man can achieve by his own efforts. For Clement, the additional power to attain perfection or *apatheia*, the province of the true gnostic, is the divine gift of the spirit, originally granted in a proleptic sense at regeneration. The spirit gives the power of self-restraint that enables the believer to progress from the state of *metriopatheia* to the passionless state. To receive this power believers must show that they are willing to and be capable of undertaking further training, having moderated their passions (21.1-2).[656] God never uses force against a person's will. Rather his grace works in synergism with the

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[653] *Str.* 2.5.22.3. Absurd folly and riches and fear are hindrances to salvation. Therefore, a man wealthy in possessions needs to rid himself of superfluous possessions (*Prot.* 10.101.2-3).

[654] Plato *Phaedo* 67b; 79d.

[655] On *apatheia* see pp. 86f.

[656] *Str.* 2.21.126.1.

believer's will leading to salvation (21.2; cf. 10.1-3). This notion of synergism is further developed by means of one of Clement's favourite metaphors of the philosophic life as a noble agonistic contest (21.3; perhaps an allusion to the wrestling contest between Jacob and the angel of the Lord at Peniel in Gen. 32).[657] To find the good is truly a difficult matter.[658] The kingdom of God is not for those who are slumbering or lazy but those who use force shall seize it (cf. Mt. 11.12). Therefore, believers must *strive* continually in their quest for perfection.[659] This idea has special application for the wealthy who must strive for salvation by distributing their superfluous wealth to the less well-off and living frugally.[660]

The threat of the spirit withdrawing should the believers lose their eagerness (21.2) parallels one of the key images from the *Shepherd* where the soul of the believer is a vessel in which the Holy Spirit dwells. Should other evil spirits find a way to enter the vessel the delicate Holy Spirit distances itself from that person and seeks to live elsewhere in gentleness and quiet.[661] The believer must as a result constantly guard against double-mindedness and self-preoccupation.[662]

4.3.13 Following God and becoming like the son. Interpretation of 'Behold, we have left all things ...' (21.4-7)

The apostle Peter's response, 'Behold, we have left all things and followed you,' lends further support for the claim that the command to sell possessions primarily signifies the ridding of passions from the soul. The apostle Peter is the elect one, the chosen, the first of the disciples, on behalf of whom the Saviour alone pays the tribute. This renders preposterous any suggestion that by 'all things' Peter could be referring merely to material possessions (21.4). The apostle himself grasps the Saviour's implication, by not naïvely

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[657] Cf. *Paed.* 1.7.56.3-57.2 where Jacob wrestles with the Paedagogue.

[658] *Str.* 4.2.4.

[659] Cf. *Str.* 4.2.5.3; 5.3.16.7. The lover of truth needs force of soul in order to cleave to the truth and not stray (*Str.* 7.16.94.5).

[660] *Paed.* 3.7.39.2.

[661] Cf. *Mand.* 5.2.5; 11; 12.5; *Sim.* 9.19.2, 22.3

[662] C. Osiek, *Shepherd of Hermas*, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 120-121.

equating the value of the disciples' possessions, worth the proverbial 'four obols,' with citizenship in the kingdom of heaven (21.5).[663] The only possibility, taking into account Peter's stature within the body of the apostles, is to take 'possessions' as primarily those 'things of the mind and diseases of the soul,' in which case his response would be equally applicable to all those enrolled in the Kingdom (21.6).

The second half of Peter's response, 'and followed you,' alludes to the Platonic motif of assimilation to the Good. To follow the Saviour is to pursue his sinless and perfect nature, adorning oneself[664] before him as before a mirror, educating one's soul and arranging all things in his likeness (21.7). Elsewhere, Clement explains the act of 'following God' in a psychogogical sense based on the command, 'Walk after the Lord your God, and keep my commandments' (Dt. 13.4), from which he deduces that 'the Law calls assimilation (ἐξομοίωσιν) following (ἀκολουθίαν); and such a following to the utmost of its power assimilates.'[665]

4.3.14 Choosing between friends. Allegiance to the true father and the need to separate from superfluous wealth: Interpretation of 'Whoever leaves his home and his parents ...' (22.1-24.2)

Friendship with God may be costly, requiring the dissolution of friendship ties with all who would hinder that relationship. This idea lies behind the next clause: 'Whoever leaves his own things (τὰ ἴδια), parents, brothers and possessions on account of me and on account of the gospel, he shall receive a hundred-fold' (22.1; cf. Mk 10.29-30a). Elsewhere, the Matthean parallel to this verse corresponds to gnostic martyrdom, referring to the man who has conducted himself according to the rule of the Gospel and in his love of the Lord so as to leave his worldly family, wealth and every possession, in order to live a life free from

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[663] Four obols representing a proverbial small sum equating to a minimal daily subsistence. A famous example is that of Origen who sold his whole library of classical texts, accepting in return the small but secure income of four obols a day. On this he said to have lived simply. Cf. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius*, 83.

[664] Cf. Plato *Phaedo* 114d-115a where Socrates declares that a man should be of good cheer about his soul having rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking that they are alien to him, more likely to do harm than good, and after adorning his soul with no alien adornments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice, courage, freedom and truth.

[665] *Str.* 2.19.100.4. The common biblical wisdom theme of following or walking after God in terms of obeying his Law is found in Job 23; Ps 1-2; Proverbs. See above pp.139f.

passion.[666] Our passage concerns the cultural convention of friendship bonds between kin, which were often considered in antiquity to be the strongest of all possible ties. The suggestion that one should dissolve relations with kin could have been deemed offensive to Clement's readers. He intentionally exacerbates the tension in Mk 10.29-30a by juxtaposing an even more offensive statement: 'whoever does not hate father and mother and children, and even his own soul, he is not able to be my disciple' (22.2; cf. Lk. 14.26). By dissipating the tension produced by this more offensive statement he resolves the former by analogy based on the argument from the major to the minor. God (*sic*) in the statement of Lk. 14.26 does not necessarily (in all circumstances) advocate hatred and dissolution from one's dearest ones for elsewhere we are commanded to 'love our enemies' (22.3; cf. Mt. 5.44; Lk. 6.27, 35). Assuming that our kin are by nature more lovely to us than our enemies (an implicit minor premise), we must conclude, arguing by analogy from the minor to the major, that we must also love our kin (22.4).

Clement's next argument is an echo of Socrates' proof in the *Lysis* that the lover is a friend to the loved object.[667] Socrates begins with the contrary premise that the loved object is a friend to the lover even if the loved object hates the lover in return. Using the example of the relationships between children (= loved objects) and parents (= lovers), Socrates notes that children, having been chastened by their parents, at that very moment hate their parents. From the child's perspective the parent is an enemy while from the parent's perspective the child is a friend. Thus we have an absurd situation where one could be an enemy to one's friend and a friend to one's enemy. Therefore, the original contrary premise must be false.

In our passage, Clement similarly begins with the contrary premise that we ought to hate our nearest kin. Since our enemies are by nature less lovely to us than our kin (an implicit minor premise), he concludes that we must hate (or attack) our enemies. However, this inference contradicts the Saviour's command to love our enemies, an absurdity which would

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[666] *Str.* 4.4.15.4-5. Cf. Mt. 19.29.

[667] *Lysis* 213b-c.

be unthinkable in Clement's estimation of the harmony of scripture. The original contrary premise which advocates hatred for our nearest kin must be false.

Through the use of both enthymemes Clement has shown that the Saviour's command in Lk. 14.26 does not necessarily (i.e. in all cases) advocate hatred for our nearest kin. The Saviour is not malevolent. Nevertheless, we are still left with the ostensibly absurd situation where 'one should hate the father and love the enemy.' Clement reconciles this by utilizing two friendship conventions. First, by not taking revenge on an enemy, one cuts away hatred and evil-doing (22.6). The idea of acting in such a way towards an enemy so as not to preclude future friendship was thought to be Pythagorean in origin.[668] There is a suggestion that this is an adaptation of the saying attributed to Bias of Priene, one of the Seven Sages: 'love your friends as if you would one day hate them, and hate your enemies as if you would one day love them.'[669] The idea also appears with Philo who uses it to explain the prohibition against felling fruit-bearing trees in Dt. 20.19. Philo extends the prohibition to the trees of an enemy's land because enemies in the future may sue for peace and become friends.[670] Clement elsewhere also adopts the Pythagorean maxim that an enemy must be aided so that he may not continue to be an enemy.[671]

The second friendship convention has to do with a debated topic in philosophic circles: is one permitted to do a vicious act in order to maintain a friendship, particularly if the friend is one's kin? (22.6) The Pythagoreans recognized that friendship is conditional on the friend's character. The only acceptable ground for ending a friendship is an irreparable moral defect in the other.[672] For Aristotle, friends neither ask for what is morally worthless nor supply

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[668] D.L. 8.23; 1.87. Cf. Iamblichus *VP* 40; Sophocles *Aj.* 679-83; Demosthenes *Arist.* 122; Aristotle *Rh.* 1389b; 1395a; Cicero *Amic.* 59. Cf. also Sterling, 'The Bond of Humanity: Friendship in Philo of Alexandria,' 212-213; Thom, 'Harmonious Equality,' 95-96.

[669] J. M. Dillon and J. P. Hershbell, *Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Way of Life* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 65 n.6.

[670] Cf. *Virt.* 152.

[671] *Str.* 2.19.102.4.

[672] Iamblichus *VP* 232.

such things.[673] His successor, Theophrastus mollified this sweeping judgment with a more nuanced answer: 'A small and insignificant disgrace or defamation should be endured if by that means a great benefit can be provided for a friend.'[674] Although he does not say so in so many words, it appears that Epicurus would admit that he would act unjustly if there was no fear of detection (if that were at all possible!). Cicero probably reacts against this alleged Epicurean position when he lays it down as a first law of friendship that friends should ask another to do only what is honourable.[675]

Clement is similarly unequivocal in proposing a principle which advocates that believers break their ties with friends or family if they deem them harmful for salvation (22.6). The believer ought not to live in fellowship, nor to have concord (ὁμονοείτω), but to dissolve the fleshly relationship (τὴν σαρκικὴν οἰκειότητα)[676] with an atheistic father, son, or brother (22.7).[677] There may be occasions when a believer needs to realign his kinship ties to the Saviour. It is most likely Philo to whom Clement is indebted for this line of thought. Philo infers from Dt. 13.1-11 that if a brother or son or daughter or wife or a housemate or a true friend (γνήσιος φίλος) urges us to fraternize with the multitude, resort to their temples, and join in their libations and sacrifices, then we must punish them as a public and common enemy, taking little thought for the ties which bind us to them (οἰκειότης). We should have one tie of filial friendship (οἰκειότης), one accepted sign of goodwill, namely the willingness to serve God. But as for ancestral kinships, or those derived from intermarriage or other

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[673] *EN* 1159b1-10.

[674] Cf. Sterling, 'The Bond of Humanity: Friendship in Philo of Alexandria,' 213-215.

[675] Cicero *Amic.* 12.40; 13.44. Cf. also Rist, 'Epicurus on Friendship,' 129.

[676] For οἰκειότης (intimacy or friendship) as an antonym to alienation (ἀλλοτριότητος) see Plato *Symposium* 197d. On *oikeiosis* see pp. 92ff.

[677] Elsewhere Clement treats the lemma, 'Anyone who does not hate father or mother ...' in a similar way. It is not an exhortation to hate your family, since scripture also says, 'honour your father and mother ...,' but it does involve the choosing between the conventions and relationships of this world and those of the Kingdom. The lemma can be paraphrased as, 'Do not be led astray by irrational impulses, and do not get involved in ordinary worldly practice.' The ordinary 'worldly practice' which must be suborned and relegated to one's filial relationship to God includes that of the 'natural' family unit, as Clement continues, 'A family constitutes a household, and secular communities are made up of households' (*Str.* 3.15.96.3; cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1252a-b).

similar causes, they should all be cast aside if they do not seek to honour God, which is the indissoluble bond of all the affection which makes them one.[678]

To support his severe stance on the need to dissolve the kinship bonds where one would otherwise be forced to act viciously, Clement employs an imaginary dialogue where he asks his readers to consider the matter as a dispute between two claimants: an atheistic natural father on one side, and the Saviour representing God the father on the other (23.1-5). Each claimant presents his case in turn and each case contains similar appeals. The natural father's case is straightforward: 'I begat you and raised you' (23.1). On these two grounds, the natural father demands that his son 'follow me, join in wrong doing and do not obey the law of Christ.'[679]

In Greek and especially Roman thought it was the father who was the source of a child's life, the one who causes the child to live.[680] Having received the benefits of life and sustenance a child would be forever obliged to the parent without the ability to reciprocate benefits on an equal scale.[681] Thus, it was a cultural expectation in Graeco-Roman society that the child owed absolute submission to the father.[682] However, there were also some who challenged it. Aristotle raises the question whether a man owes his father unlimited respect and obedience or ought he when ill, for example, consult the advice of a physician.[683] For Aristotle, it was quite clear that all people do not have the same claim on us. Even a father's claim is not unlimited, just as Zeus does not have all the sacrifices.[684] Certainly, our parents have the first claim on us for maintenance, since we owe it to them as a debt, and to support

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[678] *Spec.* 1.316-317.

[679] These demands are very similar to those posed by Philo's perjurer to an acquaintance, 'For the sake of our friendship (διὰ τὴν ἑταιρίαν), do injustice, break the law, act impiously with me' (*Dec.* 89). It is highly likely that Clement has derived his court case from this passage in Philo.

[680] Cf. Cicero *Rosc. Am.* 22.63, 26.71. Mothers tend to love their children more than fathers because parenthood costs the mother more trouble (and the mother is more certain that the child is her own!) (Aristotle *EN* 1168a20-27).

[681] Aristotle *EN* 1162a1-10.

[682] Cf. Seneca *Ben.* 3.38.2.

[683] *EN* 1164b22-30.

[684] *EN* 1165a14-22.

the authors of our being stands before self-preservation in moral nobility. Honour is also due to parents, though not indiscriminate honour: one does not owe to one's father the same honour as to one's mother, nor yet the honour due to a great philosopher or general, but one owes to one's father the honour appropriate to the father.[685] Thus, Aristotle cautions that it is impossible to lay down exact rules in cases of conflicting claims of different friends. Each case varies in importance, nobility and urgency, the main point being that no single person is entitled to unlimited consideration.[686] There will be times, for example, when the physician has to be obeyed even against the wishes of the father due to the urgency of the illness. Similarly, if the father is judged to be bad then his demands for a favour in return may be unjust in which case it would not be deemed unreasonable for the son to refuse.

The Saviour's case in our passage builds upon the tension which exists between the cultural expectation of a child's perpetual indebtedness to his father and the idea that even a natural father's claim is not unlimited. He begins his case by listing the benefits he has bestowed on the rich believer. Whereas the natural father merely 'begat' and as a result the son was 'begotten evilly under the world for death' (23.1-2), the Saviour 'gave birth from above' (23.2; cf. 1 Pet. 1.3). Whereas the natural father merely 'raised' the son, the Saviour brought liberation, healing and redemption. The life which is bestowed is also superior in the Saviour's case. Whereas the natural father ironically can only beget a son to a life that is moribund, the Saviour promises to provide a life, unceasing, eternal, above this world (23.3).

The crux of the court case is who has the greater right to be called father. The genuine father is he who bestows the most valuable benefits at most cost to himself.[687] Whereas the natural father is a blaspheming and vicious man, whose demands can prudently be ignored, the Saviour promises to show the face of God, the good father. As a result, the Saviour can

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[685] *EN* 1165a22-30.

[686] *EN* 1164b30-35.

[687] The Saviour is a patron (τροφεύς) who gives himself as bread (*QDS* 23.4). In Roman thought, the father was a saviour (servator/conservator) and, conversely, the saviour was a father. Cf. A. Alföldi, *Der Vater des Vaterlandes im römischen Denken* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1978). Alföldi observes that the oak-leafed *corona civica*, bestowed by a soldier on another, who had risked his life in battle to save him, marked the saved as the 'son' and the saviour as 'the father.'

justly insist that the reader 'call no man on earth your father' (23.2; cf. Mt. 11.28f.) and 'follow me' (cf. the natural father's demand in 23.1). The reader acting in the role of judge in a hypothetical court case is asked to arbitrate between the two claimants as to who has the greater right to be called father (23.5); the appellation 'father' being of course a *synecdoche* for all kinship relations.[688] The exchange of so-called natural kinship relations for their supernatural counterparts is regarded now as a natural act, natural in the sense that one chooses that which is most beneficial to oneself, according to Clement's doctrine of οἰκείωσις.[689]

The need to separate from superfluous wealth

Clement concludes this argument with a direct challenge to the wealthy reader: 'Are you able to be superior to possessions too? Say, and Christ will not lead you away from possession [for] God does not envy. Or do you see yourself being diminished and ruined by them? Abandon them, rip them out, hate them, say goodbye to them, flee from them ...' (24.1-2). This passage, I contend, has been misunderstood by some commentators on *QDS*. Countryman, for example, takes the first part (24.1) as an intentional compromise by Clement, affirming his positive stance towards wealth, whereas the second part (24.1-2) refers to the harsh medicine of complete abandonment which is called for only in extreme cases.[690]

I propose, however, that the first clause ought to be seen as a rhetorical device called an *epitrope*, where a rhetor pretends to allow, even to dare, the reader to decide or to act independently of or contrary to the rhetor's own position. Clement is working on the assumption that it is impossible for the rich believer to be superior to his (superfluous) possessions while he still retains them and thus he must be persuaded to separate himself from

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[688] Cf. Philo *Spec.* 1.316, 'And if a brother or son or daughter or wife or a housemate or a true friend ... urge us to the same things (εἰς τὰ ὅμοια ἐνάγῃ).'

[689] Philo also refers to the exchanging kinships of greater dignity and sanctity. Those who do what is pleasing to nature and what is good are sons of God (cf. Dt. 13.18), which means that God will think fit to protect and provide for them, as would a father (Philo *Spec.* 1.317-318).

[690] Cf. Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 51. This is in spite of the fact that the emphasis is clearly placed on the second clause with several synonymous injunctions, 'abandon them, rip them out, hate them, say goodbye to them, flee from them,' cascaded on top of each other in *asyndeton*, in contrast to the single imperative 'say' in the first clause (24.1).

them. Christ is not malevolent in compelling the rich believer to separate himself from his excess wealth against his will, 'God does not grudge,' but rather the choice for man's own salvation lies with himself. Just as it is necessary for one to choose between Christ and a *disbelieving* kin in the example of the hypothetical court case, the believer's man must choose between the kingdom of God and *harmful* (= superfluous) wealth. To separate from one's superfluous wealth willingly, at considerable cost to oneself, in order to follow God, the object of one's greatest longing, is a friendly act as shown elsewhere by the example of Abraham. The Lord teaches through Abraham that he who follows God must despise country, relations, possessions and all wealth by making him a stranger. As a result of Abraham's costly choice, the Lord called him his friend.[691]

4.3.15 Communal concord versus internal persecutions. Interpretation of 'Now in this time ...' (25.1-8)

Whereas the earliest extant Markan manuscripts of this passage treat 'now in this time, fields and possessions and houses ...' (Mk 10.30b) as a subordinate clause to Mk 10.30a, with the purpose of expanding what is meant by ἑκατονταπλασίονα,[692] Clement's putative Markan *Vorlage* treats Mk 10.30b as an independent clause coordinate to 10.30a. It is impossible to determine conclusively whether Clement himself had modified the text of his Markan *Vorlage* slightly in order to harmonize it with his interpretation of the rich man narrative thus far, or whether it is the result of Alexandrian catechetical school practices and/or homiletical and liturgical traditions.[693]

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[691] See pp. 71ff. Cf. the clear allusion to Abraham's moral choice in abandoning the conventions and relationships of the world for the sake of friendship with God as his ruler in *Str.* 4.4.15.5-6. This indicates gnostic martyrdom. Philo, similarly, in speaking about Jewish pilgrimages to the holy land declares that it is the stronger attraction of piety which leads a Jew to leave his country, friends and kinsfolk and sojourn in a strange land (*Spec.* 1.68).

[692] Interestingly the Western text omitted all of Mk 10.30b while the original scribe of Codex Siniaticus omitted everything after 'now in this time' from Mk 10.30b which, together with large number of variants, suggests that this clause was quite fluid in the first couple of centuries.

[693] Hoek, 'Divergent Gospel Traditions,' 43-62, explains the similarities between the Markan *Vorlage* in *QDS* (*inter alia*) and the variant traditions in Justin as the result of Alexandrian catechetical school practices. Even though the variant of Mk 10.30b is not mentioned in her article it is not implausible that it may be attributed to similar causes.

Clement derives two points from his version of Mk 10.30b. First, he notes that there are two classes of 'possessions' in this clause – kinsmen and material acquisitions – and deduces from this that the Saviour does not call solely those lacking in possessions (ἀχρημάτους), the homeless (ἀνεστίους) and those without siblings (ἀναδέλφους) (25.2). Likewise, once one allows the point that the Saviour called the apostles, some of whom were natural brothers, then by analogy one would have to conclude that he also calls even now those who have material acquisitions. However, Clement is not content to leave the parallels there. Realizing that a literal reading of *brothers* and *wealth* is not entirely suitable for his purposes he immediately returns to his spiritual rendering. The Saviour calls the *wealthy* in the manner outlined in the previous exegesis (viz. wealthy in virtue) whilst the *brothers* ought to be taken ideally as a group of associates in concord with each other and with Christ (ὁμονοοῦντας ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ Χριστῷ).

The notion of concord (ὁμόνοια) is important for Clement whose understanding shares several affinities with philosophical treatments of the *topos*.[694] Concord for Aristotle, for example, is a friendly feeling (φιλικόν). It is more than a mere agreement of opinion which might exist even among strangers. Nor is it an agreement on any subject whatsoever but rather it refers to practical ends. Its natural context is the city or state, where citizens agree as to their interests and carry out their common resolves.[695] Concord can only exist between the good since they are of one mind both within themselves and with each other, whilst the base are incapable of concord except in some small degree since they try to get more than their

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[694] Plato describes the department of politics as being founded on friendship and concord, which are seen when rulers suit their subjects, and subjects are obedient to their rulers (*Str.* 1.25.166.1).

[695] Anxiety about στάσις at the end of the Peloponnesian war seems to have been the impulse for ὁμόνοια becoming a key word of politics and political philosophy. Initially the word was employed fundamentally to formulate a precondition of the internal stability of the state. Cf. Plato's *Republic* where ὁμόνοια is identified with σωφροσύνη (i.e. one of the cardinal excellences the ideal state must exemplify), and where indeed the class system central to Plato's theory is devised to create the optimal conditions for the emergence of ὁμόνοια (*Republic* 431d–432a). Therefore it is not surprising to see it playing centre stage in Zeno's political philosophy as well. Cf. M. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 46. There is indirect evidence that Chrysippus' treatise *On Concord* was a political work which contained different definitions of 'free' and 'slave.'

share of advantages and take less than their share of labours and public burdens, which inevitably results in discord.[696]

The Stoics concurred with the Peripatetics that concord is the mark of friendship that may be found among only the wise.[697] However, they modified the *topos* in two ways. First, they identify the object of concord as the knowledge of common goods, that is, virtues and virtuous actions which benefit all the wise and morally good. Thus concord is more than harmony. It is a shared belief about the affairs of life which is brought about by the knowledge of common goods.[698] Second, they discussed the role of concord in an ideal state consisting solely of the wise. In the ideal state concord is the mark of the relationship which will naturally exist between the citizens. It does not need to be produced by legislation. It will arise out of the nature of the wise, and, as Zeno particularly stresses, from the erotic side of their personality. Eros is the god of friendship and freedom is the preparer of concord.[699] The wise man will love those with an aptitude for the good life. His love is directed not to physical gratification but to friendship.[700]

Clement tends to follow the Stoic notion of concord as agreement over virtues and virtuous acts, based on the knowledge of the good. Love is 'concord in what pertains to reason, life, and manners, or, in brief, fellowship in life, or it is the intensity of friendship and of affection, with right reason, and in the enjoyment of associates.'[701] Right reason leads to the 'knowledge of the good things that are enjoyed in common.'[702] Thus concord is solely the

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[696] Aristotle *EN* 1167a23-1167b16.

[697] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.106.12-17. Cicero defines friendship as concord (*consensio*) in all things, human and divine, conjoined with mutual goodwill (*benvolentia*) and affection (*caritas*) (*Amic.* 6.20).

[698] Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.108.15-18. Cf. also Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City*, 47-56

[699] Athenaeus *Deip.* 8.561c. Cf. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City*, 27.

Plutarch remarks that Diogenes, like Zeno, recognizes concord to be a factor in the ideal society. 'Cynic self-sufficiency does not make the wise man an isolated individual; it makes him an independent individual, able to enter upon relationships based on mutual freedom with other individuals ... The essence of Cynic partnership is the free choice of partners ... City conventions and civic marriage are irrelevant,' Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 61.

[700] D.L 7.130. Cf. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 67-68.

[701] *Str.* 2.9.41.2.

[702] *Str.* 2.9.42.2. Cf. *Str.* 2.18.90.3.

possession of the wise.[703] Whereas Zeno, in his *Republic*, entertained the view that women ought to be held in common to end jealousies arising from adultery and to foster concord,[704] Clement insisted that wise men and women continue to marry but with 'that agreement that is in accordance with reason.'[705] Concord amongst believers is the cement of the Christian community.[706] Thus, the picture we have in our passage is of the apostles as wise citizens, in concord with each other and with Christ; their friendship characterized by their sharing a common understanding of the common goods, that is, virtues and virtuous actions, and by happily submitting to the laws of Christ, their beneficent ruler.

The second observation that Clement derives from Mk 10.30b is that Jesus disapproves of having kin and material possessions *with persecutions* (25.3). Indeed, this seems to be the motive for the changes to the grammatical structure to Mk 10.30b. Through the strategic insertion of a few words (ἔχειν and εἰς ποῦ), Clement (if he was the instigator of the gloss) has changed the meaning of the clause from the originally intended promise of a reward in the new society on earth, which more than compensates for any losses from the old, with anticipated persecutions of the new by the old, into an outright censure of the act of holding on to kin and possessions with 'persecutions.' Nevertheless, the construction εἰς ποῦ appended to the end of the clause Mk 10.30b is perplexing. It is almost certainly a corruption but it is difficult to determine precisely what Clement's *Vorlage* might have been. The conundrum deepens as the construction εἰς ποῦ occurs twice in *QDS*, in this passage and in the full quotation of the rich man narrative at the beginning of the main body (although MS S does include a rough breathing for εἰς in *QDS* 4 which makes a little better sense). If εἰς ποῦ is indeed a corruption then the textual history must be fairly complex.

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[703] *Str.* 7.7.36.4.

[704] Cf. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City*, 26.

[705] *Str.* 2.23.143.1.

[706] *Paed.* 1.8.65.3; *Str.* 3.10.70.1; 7.11.68.2.

Persecutions have both external and internal counterparts (25.3). On one hand, there is the external or more obvious form of persecution which the faithful suffer at the hands of their enemies outside of the church who are motivated by enmity, envy, greed or diabolical influences. On the other hand, there is a far more oppressive persecution from within, where each man's soul is mistreated by 'atheistic desires, various pleasures, wicked hopes and corrupting dreams' (25.4). The soul's inflammation by 'wild lusts' is likened to the stings of wasps which lead towards 'insane desires, despair of life and contempt of God.' Several of these phrases have allusions in well-known passages from classical sources. The reference to 'corrupting dreams,' for example, brings to mind such mythological examples as Byblis' incestuous desires for her brother.[707] In the Platonic corpus, it was only at death or old age that the soul could finally be freed from fear, folly and 'wild lusts.'[708] Sophocles, the poet, muses on the tranquillity of old age: '... most gladly have I escaped this [service of Aphrodite] you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master.'[709]

Internal persecution, a metaphor for afflictions of the passions, is heavier and more difficult to bear on account of it always being present so that the individual being pursued is unable to escape (25.5). This is a similar thought to that expressed by Plato's Eleatic Stranger who describes the inability of certain sophists to escape transgressing their own nonsensical doctrines in terms of the saying, 'their enemy and future opponent is of their own household whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them ...'[710] Clement also draws upon two other metaphors of fire and war to emphasize this point. Fire falling from the outside effects a testing (cf. 1 Cor. 3.13), but the fire inside works death (25.6; cf. 16.1-2). Similarly, a foreign war is easily brought to an end but that which is in the soul is measured out until death. For Clement, the internal, most grievous war is that which is waged inside the soul whereas for Plato it is the *stasis* waged inside the walls of one's

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[707] Cf. Ovid *Met.* 9.

[708] *Phaedo* 81a.

[709] *Rep.* 329c. Allusions to this passage are frequent. Cf. Cicero *Cat.* 14; Philostratus *VA* 1.13.

[710] *Sophist* 252c.

polis.[711] All who experience this form of internal persecution ought to separate themselves from their material possessions or kinship relations, bring peace to themselves, free themselves from the great persecution, and turn away from these to the gospel (25.7). Alluding to the fictive trial scene of *QDS* 23, Clement pleads with his readers to choose the Saviour before all things as their advocate, pleader for the soul and president of infinite life, by highlighting the scriptural distinction between temporary and eternal possessions from 2 Cor. 4.18 and Mk 10.30 (25.8).

4.3.16 Conclusion: Who is the 'rich man' who cannot be saved? (26.1-27.1)

Perhaps surprisingly, Clement does not treat the verse, 'The first shall be last and the last first,' from Mk 10.31 at any length either here or in his major works. Whereas he expresses his judgement here that no further explanation of this verse is needed to further his argumentation up to this point (26.1), the ground he gives for this judgement reveals something of the different levels of interpretation in his hermeneutic schema. He claims that this lemma is not directed solely towards those who have many possessions but rather to *all* believers who have given themselves once to the faith. For Clement, the spiritual sense of scripture deals with issues that are equally applicable to all believers.

At this point of the discourse, Clement summarizes his case by deeming it proven that nothing is lacking in the promise of eternal life since the Saviour has not debarred the wealthy solely on the grounds of possessing wealth (26.2). This is provisional on three counts. First, that the wealthy be willing to stoop under God's commandments. Second, that the wealthy prefer their own life ahead of transient things, a reference to the self-love aspect of οἰκείωσις and the need to separate from their superfluous wealth. Third, that they look to the Lord with steadfast gaze as to the captain of a ship.[712]

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[711] *Laws* 629c-d. Chrysostom *In epist 1 ad Tim hom 7a* mentions three kinds of war: that against barbarians, a stasis in a city, and that which is internal to a person, this being the most difficult.

[712] The metaphor of a good captain steering the ship to a harbour is also used by Theophilus of Antioch to describe God's providence (*Ad Autolycus* 1.5).

Clement raises three fresh arguments, in the form of diatribe, to support his thesis that the wealthy are not debarred on account of their wealth alone. The first question 'how is someone unjust if he gathers a sufficient living?' (26.3) is unassailable on three points. Firstly, he is referring to a sufficiency (βίον ἱκανόν) rather than an over-abundance. Secondly, he is referring to a time before the wealthy man was converted to Christianity and thirdly, even the means by which he gathers a sufficient living are beyond reproach, by careful thought and being thrifty (προσέχων τὴν γνώμην καὶ φειδόμενος).[713] The wealthy are not disqualified from the call to salvation on account of wealth alone; all other possible assailable points, accusations of greed, unscrupulous conduct in gathering wealth, and pre-baptismal sin, having been pre-empted.

The second question takes a slightly different tack. How is someone unjust on account of having been born into a great and wealthy family? (26.3-4) There is no attempt to disguise the fact that the family has more than a self-sufficiency in possessions. Indeed, rather the opposite. The plutocratic nature of the family is consciously alluded to in terms of being immensely abundant in possessions (γένος ἀμφιλαφὲς τοῖς χρήμασιν)[714] and powerful in wealth. This is to highlight the injustice inherent in his interlocutor's position. Why should the man born in such a family be banished from life if being born is an involuntary action and therefore blameless? If there is someone to blame, then it would have to be the primary agent of the conception, God, by whom the one banished from life would have good reason to feel wronged for considering him worthy of temporary luxuries but robbing him of eternal life

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[713] The last point may be an allusion to Aristophanes *Eccl.* 599-600, where Praxagora envisages the transference of private property into a pool of common goods which they shall take care to administer with wise thrift (ἀπὸ τούτων κοινῶν ὄντων ἡμεῖς βοσκήσομεν ὑμᾶς ταμιευόμεναι καὶ φειδόμεναι καὶ τὴν γνώμην προσέχουσαι). If so, then it may be an adumbration to Clement's proposal of common goods for the Alexandrian community later in the discourse (cf. 31.6).

[714] The word ἀμφιλαφής, -ές (on all sides, widespreading) is quite rare and when used in conjunction with wealth denotes an excessive affluence. Cf. Heriodanus *Marc.* 7.12.6.

(26.4). God of course is blameless. He is never the author of evil. The blame must always be with the one who viciously exercised his free choice.[715]

For Clement, as for the Stoics, the character which a person develops is his own even though he lives in a world of cause and effect. A person is not responsible for the environment in which he finds himself. It is in the way that a person acts in relation to his environment that praise or blame may be attributed to him.[716]

With his third question Clement asks, 'why need wealth ever at all rise from the earth if it is a choir-master and patron of death?' (26.5) The metaphors of χορηγός and πρόξενος for wealth and the emphasis with the verb ἀνατεῖλαι together stress the irony of the question. A χορηγός is often used to refer to an individual who defrays expenses for any purpose.[717] Similarly, a πρόξενος denotes a patron or a protector of a person or guild. Thus these two terms are used in a contrary sense where they bring death rather than benefits for their clients (cf. the other type of wealth which is the χορηγός of eternal life in 19.5).[718] It is a rhetorical ploy which Clement employs elsewhere. For example, the motivation behind the heretical groups which advocate abstinence from marriage and procreation is to prevent the introduction of more wretches into the world, or in other terms, to supply further nourishment for death (μηδὲ ἐπιχορηγεῖν τῷ θανάτῳ τροφὴν).[719]

Having shown the inconsistency of the suppositions lying behind the preceding three rhetorical questions, Clement now seeks to spell out the alternative prospects for the wealthy

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[715] It is one's own fault that one does not choose what is best. God is free of blame. Cf. *Str.* 1.1.4.1; 5.14.136.4.

[716] A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics* (London: Duckworth, 1974), 183.

[717] Χορηγός in Greek literature can refer to either a chorus leader or a person supplying the finance. It was one of the public duties of the wealthy in Athens to supply the expenses for the chorus and actors of a drama. The chorus leader supplied the costumes (χορηγία). For Aristotle, χορηγία often denoted material needs for life. Aristotle states that εὐδαιμονία requires external goods in addition, 'for it is impossible ... to play a noble part unless furnished with the necessary equipment (ἀχορήγητον ὄντα)' (*EN* 1099a30-34). Cf. Hermas *Sim.* 2.5, where the wealthy are to furnish (χορηγῆ) the needs of the poor.

[718] For a similar ironic use of πρόξενος τοῦ θανατοῦ see Origen's *Commentary on Romans* 40.7 where the commandment which exposes evil is likened to a patron of death.

[719] *Str.* 3.6.45.1.

reader. This first alternative relates to the reader who is both able to bend to the authority present in wealth, to think in moderation and to be content, to seek God alone, to draw breath from God and to be a fellow citizen with God (26.6). This person stands alongside the commandments 'poor,' free, unconquered, without sickness, unwounded by possessions. Conversely, if the wealthy reader is unwilling to do these things then he is the 'rich man' condemned by the Saviour in his saying about the camel and the eye of a needle (26.7). 'To think in moderation and to be content' (μέτρια φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν) corresponds to the doctrine of the mean.[720] ' Αμέτρια in anything is vicious. Christians are to aim for the μέτρον. The μέσον state is defined as being in no want of necessaries.[721] Σωφροσύνη is contentment, a habit which dispenses with superfluities yet does not fail because it has what suffices.[722] Passions exceed the mean of what is rational and thus the median state helps to curtail the irrational passions.[723]

If the preceding clauses exemplify the ideals for the simple believer then the following three clauses, καὶ θεὸν μόνον ζητεῖν καὶ θεὸν ἀναπνεῖν καὶ θεῷ συμπολιτεύεσθαι, denote actions that Clement typically associates with gnostic Christians (keeping in mind my proposal that Clement expects all his wealthy readers to strive ultimately for gnostic perfection). Indeed these clauses may represent a progression. 'To seek God alone' is synonymous with the gnostic's quest for the knowledge of God (cf. 7.3).[724] Faith, an internal good for a simple believer, can exist apart from the search for God.[725] The obscure clause θεὸν ἀναπνεῖν is possibly used in a metaphorical sense to denote the regeneration of the believer's soul. The third clause 'to be a fellow citizen with God' (θεῷ συμπολιτεύεσθαι) undoubtedly connotes the idea of a heavenly citizenship of the good or more specifically of

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[720] On the doctrine of the mean see pp. 80ff.

[721] *Paed.* 2.1.16.4.

[722] *Paed.* 2.11.55.4.

[723] *Str.* 2.13.59.6.

[724] *Str.* 5.1.12.1.

[725] *Str.* 7.10.55.2.

the true gnostics.[726] This heavenly citizenship of the gnostics does not only imply friendship and affiliation between the good of every age, where like loves like,[727] it also implies a friendship and affiliation with God, and an impulse to become like him.[728]

The exegesis of the rich man narrative concludes with a reference to 'a camel passing through the strait and narrow way before a rich man,' which Clement refrains from exploring at any length, directing the reader to his no longer extant *Exposition concerning First Principles and Theology* (26.8-27.1). This tradition which conflates Mt. 7.14 with the rich man narrative is peculiar for the original context of Mt. 7.14 does not mention anything about a rich man. Clement's own exposition of this tradition is lost to us now. Nevertheless, it is possible that Origen, having been trained in the same circles as Clement, preserves a similar tradition in his rejoinder to Celsus' allegation that Jesus' aphorism about the camel and the eye of the needle was plagiarized from Plato's saying from *Laws* that 'it was impossible to be distinguished for goodness, and at the same time for riches.'[729] Origen treats the 'passing through the eye of the needle' analogously to 'the strait and narrow way;' the camel being appropriate to both similes on account of its crooked physique.[730] It is notable that Origen's explanation of the passage on the 'strait and narrow way' utilizes precisely the same spiritual meanings of 'rich' and 'poor' as Clement in *QDS*.

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[726] Cf. *QDS* 1.5; Philo *Gen.* 4.74.

[727] *Str.* 2.19.100.1.

[728] Cf. *Prot.* 11.117.1; *Str.* 4.6.30.1. Cf. Dio Chrysostom *Disc.* 1.28, 42, 44.

[729] *Cels.* 6.16.

[730] See Clark, *Reading renunciation*, 96-98, for a discussion on the exegesis of this passage by Origen and the anonymous author of the Pelagian work, *De divitiis*.

4.4 Main Body: Preceptive Section (27.2-41.7)

We have seen how the hortatory section of *QDS* (4.1-27.1) hinges on the question of the identity of the 'rich man,' the salvation of whom, the Saviour declares, is nigh impossible. Having argued that the term 'rich man' primarily signifies a 'a person wealthy in passions,' which by means of God's help one may not merely prevail over but actually eliminate (which is impossible to do by oneself), Clement aims to give hope to believers wealthy in material possessions. Wealthy readers are still called by the Saviour to enter the path to salvation if they so choose, though the path will be difficult and will require them to separate from their superfluous possessions. In the preceptive section of *QDS* (27.2-41.7) Clement advises wealthy readers of the actions they need to perform in order to secure the salvation for which they now have hope. The preceptive section, following a short transition, may be divided logically into five parts:

1. An exposition of the two Great Commandments concluding with the proposition that one ought to love Christ by obeying his commands (27.3-29.6).

2. Christ's command that the wealthy ought to make friends with believers who are 'friends of God' (30.1-33.1).

3. In making friends, the wealthy are admonished not to reject believers on account of their apparent lowly status (33.2-36.3).

4. A panegyric on the love shown by the father and his son which obliges the wealthy to support others in the Christian community or risk forfeiting the father's mercy (37.1-38.4).

5. The theme of post-baptismal repentance which emphasizes the extent of the father's mercy and the need for the wealthy to enlist the *officia* of an advanced Christian to act as a spiritual guide and advocate before God on their behalf (38.5-41.7).

4.4.1 There is still hope (27.2)

In the short transition which follows, two of the problems experienced by the wealthy, despair and lack of preparation, which were originally posited in the *narratio* (2.2-3.4), resurface. Neither is one 'absolutely lost because he is wealthy and fearful, nor is someone absolutely saved by being courageous and believing that he is saved' (27.2). The wealthy reader is invited directly to inquire as to 'what hope the Saviour outlines *for them.*' The

isocolon which follows, 'and how the unhoped for (ἀνέλπιστον) may become secure and the hoped for (τὸ ἐλπισθέν) pass into possession' echoes a similar principle to that which Aristotle expressed in his *Rhetoric*, that for a deliberative work to be effective the audience must perceive themselves not to be in a hopeless state. Fear about the future is a necessary incentive to make people deliberate and always includes an element of hope. Those who are, for example, being beaten to death are coldly indifferent to the future. No one deliberates about things that are hopeless (περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων).[731] In light of this, the hortatory section (chs 4-27) can be understood as providing the foundation upon which the following preceptive section (chs 27-42) might be effective. The hortatory section is concerned with removing the sense of hopelessness (with respect to their perceived ineligibility for salvation) experienced by some of the wealthy. The preceptive section is concerned with advising the wealthy on how they may acquire that which has only recently become hoped for (27.2).

4.4.2 The two Great Commandments of love (27.3-29.6)

Clement's first step in advising wealthy readers on the actions necessary for salvation is based on the greatest commandment: 'Love the Lord your God with your whole soul and your whole power' (cf. Mk 12.28).[732] God is the father from whom all things derive their source and in whom all things obtain their salvation (27.3-4). That which Clement is affirming here is precisely that which is being neglected by the sophistic flatterers in 1.2.

By further stressing the indebtedness of the readers to the paternal God who not only loved them beforehand but was responsible for their very being (27.5), Clement raises an issue much discussed in philosophical treatises, that of compensation in unequal or proportional friendships, such as that between a father and child. This is in a similar category to the friendship between a king and his subjects. It involves a superiority in beneficence, the

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[731] Aristotle *Rh.* 1383a.

[732] Clement has substituted ἰσχυος in the Markan text for δυνάμεως which may be a conscious reference to the Philonic idea of measuring according to power (*Op. Mundi* 23). Each thing in nature has its own power (δύναμις). The powers of God are overwhelmingly vast and those of man are feeble in comparison. In our passage Clement may be contrasting the disproportionate capacity for loving in the relationship between God and man. See discussion on *QDS* 37.3-4 on p. 211 below.

difference being that in the case of the friendship between a father and child the benefits bestowed are greater.[733] This implies that children cannot fully repay the services of parents in kind and so must supplement honour and veneration with obedience and service.[734] The Greek or Roman child would always be in debt to the parent, but the parent would not expect payment in full.[735] Whereas for most friendships the inability to reciprocate in like benefits was regarded as a supreme dishonour, it was not so between the child and parent.[736] In this case the problem of unequal friendships is further exacerbated by the fact that God is perfect and in need of nothing. This attribute of God, in which he needs nothing and yet bestows all good things, is a leading idea in Clement's major writings.[737]

The Golden Rule is put forward for deliberation (28.1). One implication of the command 'Love your neighbour as yourself' is that we ought to love God above ourselves, since God is greater than our neighbours (28.2). It is to God that we owe our life, and as a result we ought to love him more than our own life. To love God we must gnostically despise death.[738] Paradoxically the act of loving God more than our own life is a form of loving ourselves.[739] Thus denying God not only robs the good δεσπότης of his authority, it impugns our relationship (οἰκειότης) with him.[740]

Parable of the Good Samaritan

As in the Lukan account, the Golden Rule raises the question of who is our neighbour, to which Clement not surprisingly draws upon the parable of the good Samaritan (Lk. 10.27ff.),

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[733] Aristotle lists two similar grounds to support his claim for the supremacy of the affection held by parents for their children. 1) Parents love their children as part of themselves, whereas children love their parents as the source of their being. 2) The affection of the parent exceeds that of the child in duration; parents love their children as soon as they are born, children their parents only after a certain amount of time when they have acquired understanding or at least perception (*EN* 1161b12-37).

[734] Aristotle *EN* 1159b31-1160a8.

[735] Barton, *Roman Honor*, 169.

[736] Seneca *Ben.* 5.5.3.

[737] On the self-sufficiency of God see p. 70.

[738] *Str.* 4.6.41.1.

[739] *Str.* 4.7.43.1.

[740] *Str.* 4.7.42.3.

first paraphrasing the story (28.2-4) and then offering his own allegorical interpretation (29.1-5). The highly stylistic rewording of the story contains some hermeneutic points which draw upon the plain meaning of the parable as well as some embellishments to draw out Clement's distinctive inferences.

The preamble to the story introduces a rather unexpected example of anti-Jewish polemic: 'Not in the same way to the Jews did [Christ] circumscribe beforehand, [a neighbour] through blood (kinship), nor a citizen, nor a proselyte, nor one who has been similarly circumcised, nor one using the one and the same law' (28.2). While it is reasonable to believe that Clement had encountered Jews in his education and travels, which can be discerned in the use he makes of Jewish literature and the incorporation of Jewish opinion and interpretative method in his works, the majority of scholars believe that Jews themselves do not loom large on his consciousness.[741] It is probable that Clement in our passage is not referring directly to the sentiments of real Jews in Alexandria, the number of which would have been drastically depleted since the revolts during Trajan's reign. However, this argument from silence must be weighed against the fact that Clement tries to convert Jews, amongst others, in the *Stromateis*.[742] Clement refers to both Greeks and Jews as critics against the church with no hint that the Jews belong to the historical past.[743] It must be kept in mind that the earliest Christians of Alexandria are to be placed in a variegated Jewish context.[744] It is apparent that this Jewish influence continues in one form or another during the time of Clement and Origen. Eusebius reveals that Clement wrote a treatise *Against the Judaizers*, although he fails to inform us as to whether these were Christians who adopted Jewish practices or Jewish Christians who frequented both church and synagogue. It is possible that the latter is the case

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[741] Carleton Paget, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Jews,' 86-90.

[742] *Str.* 2.1.2.1.

[743] *Str.* 7.15.89.1-3.

[744] B. A. Pearson, 'Earliest Christianity in Egypt: Some Observations,' in *Roots of Egyptian Christianity*, ed. B. A. Pearson and J. E. Goehring (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 149.

as some time later Origen warns against the Jewish practice of circumcision and fasting.[745] He knows of Christians who go both to the synagogue and to the church,[746] and treats Jewish Christians as a separate group.[747]

The polemic above may reflect a stereotypical disapproval of the oft-perceived Jewish solidarity within their cultural and religious boundaries and their ability to resist the pressures of cultural homogenization. Clement emphatically affirms Christian inclusiveness by denying what he perceives to be its opposite, Jewish exclusiveness. Behind this thought is the Pythagorean ideal of the universality of friendship even to outsiders, which finds its expression in the goal of turning enemies into friends (cf. 22.1-24.2). For Clement, the bonds between friends, or potential friends, are tighter than those of mundane citizenship and biological kinship.[748]

In the parable of the Good Samaritan, a priest and Levite both neglect to have compassion on a fellow Jew who had been left half dead on the road by bandits, while a Samaritan, reviled as a social outcast by Jews, gave succour to the unfortunate victim encapsulating the Christian attitude towards enemies (28.3). Ironically, it is under the influence of a Jewish author, Philo, that Clement elsewhere expounds the Christian attitude towards enemies. Clement, explaining the lemma 'and these your brethren' (1 Cor. 6.8), encourages his audience not to restrict the term to those in the faith but rather to include proselytes, not entirely in the Philonic sense where it refers to Gentiles who have joined themselves to Judaism, but in a proleptic sense, where an enemy could one day become a convert to the Christian faith. All men are the work of one God and all must be regarded as brethren, if not yet.[749]

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[745] *Frag. in John* 114.

[746] *Hom. in Lev.* 5.8. Cf. also P. Oxy. 6.903 fourth century.

[747] Origen *Comm. in John* 1.1.7. Cf. Klijn, 'Jewish Christianity in Egypt,' 164-165.

[748] Cicero expresses a similar order of degrees of social relationship from citizenship, to kinship, through to friendship although characteristically he lists love of country as the highest form of social relationship. Cf. *Off.* 1.17.53-58.

[749] *Str.* 7.14.86.1-2. Cf. Philo *Virt.* 179; *Spec.* 1.51-52.

An obvious embellishment to the Gospel version is Clement's claim that the Samaritan did not come upon the bandits' victim by chance, but rather came providentially stocked with wine, oil, bandages, and more than sufficient payment for the innkeeper (28.3). The object is clearly to portray the Samaritan as the archetypal friend whose love for his enemies blossoms into beneficence, a moral example for Clement's readers to imitate (28.4).[750] A similar motivation lies behind Iamblichus' rendition of the Pythagorean version of the 'good Samaritan' story. In this story a Pythagorean turned into an inn after walking a long and lonely road. The man grew ill and was forced to stay in the inn for a prolonged time which lasted until all of his provisions ran out. The innkeeper out of pity for the man or out of hospitality continued to take care of the man, not sparing any expense. When the illness proved overwhelming the dying man wrote a symbol on a tablet and ordered that if he should die then the innkeeper ought to hang the tablet beside the road so that anyone passing by might recognize the symbol, repay him the expenses, and return thanks on his own behalf. After his death, the innkeeper did as he was ordered and a long time afterwards another Pythagorean passing by recognized the symbol. Having enquired into what had happened, the Pythagorean paid the innkeeper much more than his expenses.[751] According to Iamblichus' own words this anecdote is an example of several 'noble and fitting proofs of [Pythagorean] friendships.'[752] The direction of friendship outside of those in one's *polis* to all universally is not the sole possession of the Pythagoreans. Arius Didymus also treats friendship as an expression of *humanitas*, couching Stoic sentiments in Peripatetic language. No one would refrain from saving a fellow man from being devoured by a beast, or from pointing the way to a traveller, or from showing the way to water to a fellow traveller in the desert. Universal

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[750] Cf. *Prot.* 10.108.5 which quotes Lk. 6.29; *Prot.* 11.115.5; *Paed.* 2.4.43.1; *Str.* 4.3.10; 4.18.111.2; 6.18.164.2. Benevolence (εὔνοια) is wishing to do good to one's neighbour for his sake (*Paed.* 1.11.97.3). Loving God and neighbour are the same tenets which were promulgated by Socrates and the Stoics (*Str.* 5.14.97.1).

[751] *VP* 237-38.

[752] *VP* 240. Cf. Thom, 'Harmonious Equality,' 101.

friendship becomes a concern for the salvation of one's neighbour, an act which is choiceworthy in itself.[753]

To summarize the line of argument up to this point, the Saviour introduces love in both commands but differentiates it in order: first place is to love God and second to love the neighbour (29.1). This ordering is applicable to different contexts elsewhere in Clement's writings. For example, Christian conduct in drinking parties ought to be in keeping with the Law by first expressing intimacy with God through thanksgiving and the chanting of psalms, and only then are we free to show sociability toward the neighbour in respectful comradeship.[754] The function of the summary in our passage is to promote the word 'neighbour' to the foreground of the discourse.

The Saviour as our neighbour

Clement now delves into the deeper meaning of the parable by asking who else could the neighbour (= Samaritan) be other than the Saviour himself (29.2). The Saviour is the only physician (μόνος ἰατρός) of the passions.[755] The wounds suffered by the unfortunate victim correspond to the passions of the soul - the fears, desires, angers, grief, deceits, and pleasures - which the Saviour cuts out utterly from the roots (29.2-4). The wine brought by the Samaritan corresponds to the blood of the vine of David poured over our wounded souls (29.4);[756] the oil (ἔλαιον), by means of a simple word play, to the mercy (ἔλεον) of the father;[757] the bandages to the unloosable fetters of health and salvation, love, faith and hope; and the payment (μισθόν) stands for the angels and rulers who serve us for great reward (ἐπὶ μεγάλῳ μισθῷ) (cf. Rom. 8.19-21). Since the Saviour is the only physician for the passions

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[753] Cf. Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.7.120.20-121.3. Cf. also Schroeder, 'Friendship in Aristotle,' 53.

[754] *Paed.* 2.4.43.

[755] Cf. *Str.* 1.27.171.3-4. Josephus refers to the biblical account in which David through singing songs and playing on the harp was the only physician (μόνος ἰατρός) who could cure King Saul's demonic afflictions (*AJ* 6.168). Cf. *Prot.* 1.5.2, 'when Saul was plagued with a demon, [David] cured him by merely playing.' On the Saviour as physician see p. 77.

[756] Cf. *Didache* 9.2; *Paed.* 1.5.15.3; 2.2.32.2; *Str.* 5.8.48.8; *QDS* 37.6.

[757] Cf. *Paed.* 2.8.62.3, 'The oil (ἔλαιον) is the Lord himself, from whom comes the mercy (ἔλεος) which reaches us.'

of the soul, it is necessary to love him equally with God (29.5). This love, in the same way as to a biological father, is to be expressed in the performance of his will and obedience to his commands (supported by quotations from Mt. 7.21 = Lk. 6.46 and Mt. 13.16f. in 29.6).[758]

4.4.3 The need to make friends with the 'friends of God' (30.1-33.1)

In his train of thought so far, Clement has moved from his first inference that one must first love God and second one's neighbour, based on the plain meaning of the text (29.1), to the intermediate inference that one must love Christ equally with God, based on an allegorical interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan which identifies Christ as our neighbour (29.5). This functions as an important transitional stage to the final inference that he is first who loves Christ and he is second who honours and treats with respect those who believe in him (30.1). This last inference in turn is supported by the statement that 'whatever is done for a disciple the Lord welcomes to himself and reckons it as his own,' which is followed by two scriptural quotations (Mt. 25.34-45; 10.40) promising rewards for those who provide for the disciples and punishments for those who disregard them (30.2-6).

Two aspects of the line of argument above are curious. First, why does Clement incorporate the intermediate step (29.5) if he merely wishes to show that it is incumbent on the wealthy to support those in need in their community? After all, elsewhere he understands the rich believer's ideal attitude, 'I have: why should I not give to those who need?' as the perfect expression of the command, 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself.'[759] There is no perceived need, in that passage, for an intermediate logical step based on an allegorical interpretation of the Good Samaritan text. Second, the expectation that the wealthy honour and treat with respect the beneficiaries of their largesse is culturally foreign. Typically, in Graeco-Roman society wealthy benefactors could expect honour from those that they had benefited, reflecting an unequal relationship based on utility where the latter did not have the

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[758] Cf. *Paed.* 3.11.82.

[759] *Paed.* 2.12.120.

means to re-compensate the former completely (cf. the abject honour that the flatterers bestow on the wealthy in *QDS* 1.1).

I propose that Clement adopted his line of argument above in order to enhance rhetorically the standing of those whom the wealthy are to support. They are not the mere needy which one finds in the streets of any large city like Alexandria, without political privilege and social status; rather they have a very powerful connexion, Christ.[760] The bond between the disciple and Christ, is such that benefits and injuries to the disciple are deemed to be perpetrated personally on the *patron* and protector, Christ himself.[761]

Christ dubs these disciples children (τέκνα), young children (παιδία), babies (νήπια), friends (φίλους) and little ones (μικρούς) (31.1; cf. 1.4). The scriptural quotations corresponding to the epithets reinforce the privileged status of the disciples on account of their relation to the Saviour,[762] emphasizing the threat of punishment for the rich who scorn them and rewards for those who attend to their needs. Clement's aim in showing that the disciples have such a powerful patron or connexion as Christ is to make it more desirable for wealthy readers to cultivate friendship with them (32.6-33.1).

Liberality as the means of making friends

One of the most obvious ways to form a bond of friendship in antiquity, keeping in mind its essentially reciprocal nature, was in the granting of favours or benefits thereby rendering the other person in one's debt. In this way, *liberalitas* was perceived to be an effective means

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[760] Indeed, I suspect that those disciples whom Clement expects the wealthy to support are not poor in the extreme sense but simply rather less well-off than their benefactors. This is supported by two observations: 1) Clement's antipathy towards the indigent classes (cf. 11.3) and 2) the fact that nowhere in the second half of *QDS* does Clement refer to the disciples as utterly poor. Earlier in *QDS*, Clement refers to 'fleshly poor' as suitable recipients of one's superfluous possessions (19.6). The appellative, 'fleshly poor,' functions there rhetorically to draw out the antithesis with the 'spiritually rich' in the next clause. On the idea of relative poverty see P. Brown, *Poverty and Leadership in the Later Roman Empire*, Menahem Stern Jerusalem Lectures (Hanover NH & London: University Press of New England, 2002), Chapter 2.

[761] *Str.* 7.3.21.4-6.

[762] Note the high standing of the children in the *Paedagogus*. Christians are children of God not in reference to the childish character of their education but with respect to their adoption (*Paed.* 1.6.34.1). The father of the universe cherishes affection towards those who have fled to him; and having begotten them again by his spirit to the adoption of children, knows them as gentle, and loves those ones alone, aids and fights for them; and bestows on them the name of child (*Paed.* 1.5.21.2).

of establishing and maintaining a friendship.[763] *Liberalitas* was a desirable virtue in antiquity.[764] It exhibited a man's magnanimity and enhanced his reputation. The wealthy, possessing more resources than the majority of the population and hence being in the best position to practise *liberalitas*, were considered to have a particular need of friends as an outlet for their generosity.[765] Wealth without friends held no real benefit for its possessor. Cicero chides the miserly man for it is he who misses out on wealth's greatest benefits: 'What is more foolish, when men are in the plenitude of resources, opportunities and wealth, than to procure the other things that money provides – horses, slaves ... and not procure friends ... who are life's best and fairest furniture?'[766] In a similar vein, Clement declares elsewhere that,

> it is unnatural for one to live in luxury, while many are in want. How much more glorious is it to benefit (εὐεργετεῖν) the many, than to live sumptuously! How much wiser to spend money on human beings, than on jewels and gold! How much more useful to acquire decorous friends (τὸ φίλους κεκτῆσθαι κοσμίους), than lifeless ornaments! Whom have fields ever benefited so much as conferring favours (τὸ χαρίζεσθαι) has?[767]

Thus it was a cultural expectation in antiquity that a rich man use his wealth to procure friends. This expectation furnishes the background for Clement's interpretation of the remarkably convenient text from Lk. 16.9, which forms the crux of his argument in the preceptive section of *QDS*: 'Make to yourselves friends (φίλους) from the Mammon of unrighteousness so that when you die[768] they will receive you into eternal tents' (*QDS* 31.5).

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[763] Pericles praises the Athenians for 'acquiring our friends by conferring not by receiving favours (οὐ γὰρ πασχοντες εὖ, ἀλλὰ δρῶντες κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους)' (Thuc. *Hist.* 2.40.4-5), claiming that the doer of the favour is the firmer friend of the two since he uses continued kindness to keep the recipient in his debt. On the other hand, the debtor feels friendship less keenly from the consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment and not a free gift.

[764] Cf. Seneca *Ben.* 3.38.3.

[765] Aristotle *EN* 1155a.

[766] *Amic.* 15.55.

[767] *Paed.* 2.12.120.6.

[768] The primary witness for the text of *QDS* (manuscript S) has ἐκλίπητε at *QDS* 31.5 which Stählin emends to ἐκλίπῃ in conformity with the overwhelming manuscript support for the biblical text of Lk. 16.9. In the other citation of Lk. 16.9 in *QDS*, manuscript S has ἐκλίπῃ (*QDS* 13.1). I prefer to leave the text as it stands in this case. One would expect that copyists in antiquity, provided that they were sufficiently alert and capable, would have been more prone to emend a scripture citation to conform to their extant scriptural witnesses. Clement was

Clement derives two implications from Lk. 16.9, one positive and the other negative. First, it is possible for the rich to use their superfluous wealth in a 'righteous and salvific deed,' 'to give rest (ἀναπαῦσαι) to those having an eternal tent with the father' (31.6). Second, all superfluous possessions which are treated as one's own, and not held 'in common' (οὐκ εἰς κοινόν) for those who need, are unjust.

It may be noted that Clement's initial explanation of Lk. 16.9 uses similar language to the description of the nascent Jerusalem community of goods portrayed in Acts 2.42-7; 4.32-7.[769] However, this is not the model of wealthy-poor relations on which he depends. In the Jerusalem community we have the picture of wealthy individuals (with Barnabas lauded for his voluntary donation and Ananias and Sapphira supernaturally punished possibly for their deceit in their attempt to obtain more honour from their beneficence) selling certain though not necessarily all possessions and depositing the funds into a central distribution point managed by Peter and the apostles for the welfare of the whole community. However, there is no evidence in *QDS* of a central distribution point for goods held in common administered by stewards. Rather, as we will see below, Clement proposes a more personal and individualized approach for sharing where rich believers personally seek those whom they ought to support (i.e. a benefaction is the means by which the wealthy may make an enduring friend, a requirement also not mentioned in the Acts passages). Nor does it reflect the primitive utopian model of Plato's ideal state where the harmonious community of goods, including wives and children, was to be practised only among its guardians in order to relieve them from the need to earn their living and to eradicate the potential for rivalry between each

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not adverse to modifying scriptural citations in order to bring out the (his) meaning of the text. Cf. P. M. Barnard, *The Biblical Text of Clement of Alexandria in the Four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles*, Texts and Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899). The effect of the modification from ἐκλίπῃ to ἐκλίπητε would be to emphasize the totally futurist nature of the compensation. That is, the wealthy who 'make friends' now will be welcomed to the eternal tents in the next life. For the use of ἐκλείπω to refer to dying or death see Plato *Laws* 856e2.

[769] Cf. esp. *QDS* 31.6 with Acts 4.32.

other.[770] Clement seems to be concerned that as many of the less well-off members of the Christian community as possible should benefit from the proceeds of the wealthy, not just the higher gnostic caste.

Friends have everything in common

Clement, I suggest, is alluding here to a proverb popular in antiquity, 'friends have everything in common' (κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων),[771] the formulation of which was traditionally ascribed to Pythagoras.[772] Certainly, the Pythagoreans were famous for their practice of placing all their possessions into one common stock, espousing the sentiment that one should yield everything to one's friends except one's freedom.[773] However, the proverb itself is also found in friendship discourses by several philosophers of the Peripatetic, Cynic, Stoic as well as the Neopythagorean persuasion, the Epicureans being a notable exception.[774] Each of these schools had their own understandings of the proverb which are worth briefly summarizing prior to our attempt to understand Clement's thought. Aristotle in his search for the best form of political community saw several disadvantages in the common ownership of property espoused in Plato's *Republic* for the guardian and ruling class. He argued that the sense of property would be destroyed, common ties and duties would be neglected, and that there would be risks of incest, etc.[775] Aristotle's preference was to maintain the contemporary system (i.e. private ownership) and improve it by means of moral ethics and correct legislation in the belief that it would then possess the advantages of both private and common property. The owner of the property would apply himself to the property and improve it while, on the other hand, 'virtue would result in making "friends' goods common goods

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[770] *Republic* 413c-417b; 462e-464b; 543a-c. Cf. A. C. Mitchell, '"Greet the Friends by Name": New Testament Evidence for the Greco-Roman Topos on Friendship,' in *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 240-243.

[771] Clement quotes the proverb twice in *Prot.* 12.122.2 and *Paed.* 2.12.120.4-5.

[772] D.L. 8.10.

[773] *Pythagorean Sayings* 97. Cf. also Thom, 'Harmonious Equality,' 92.

[774] Such a practice in Epicurus' opinion implied mistrust (D.L. 8.10). Such a lack of trust is antithetical to friendship. Cf. Rist, 'Epicurus on Friendship,' 125.

[775] *Pol.* 2.1.1-2.3.

(κοινὰ τὰ φίλων)," as the saying goes, for *the purpose of use* (πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι).'[776] Aristotle concludes that it is better for possessions to be owned privately but to make them common in use.[777]

Seneca also distinguishes ownership from use: 'there are many ways of owning things in common ... Whatever our friend possesses is common to us, but it is the property of the one who holds it; I cannot use things against his will.'[778] Cicero, also echoing later Roman Stoic sentiments, states that having all things in common leads to benefiting others freely. There is a comprehensive bond that unites men and a common right to all things in nature which implies a common use. While most things are assigned to private property through statutes and civil law, everything else ought to be regarded in light of the Greek proverb: 'amongst friends all things in common (*amicorum esse communia omnia*).' Common property in this latter regard is referred to by the poet Ennius as things which cost us nothing to give; a typical example would be the giving of advice. However, since resources are limited and the needy are without number, the spirit of universal liberality must be conducted in such a way that we continue to have the means for being generous to our friends.[779] For all his idyllic language about nature and the 'bond that unites men,' the maxim 'having all things in common' does not entail for Cicero that one's private property be affected. His concern is that one ought to guard against being overly generous and squandering one's private possessions unnecessarily. The friendship proverb is used by Cicero, as by other authors from Aristotle onwards who rejected Plato's communist state, to support the *status quo* of the privileged classes of his society.[780]

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[776] *Pol.* 2.2.4; italics mine.

[777] *Pol.* 2.2.5. Cf. Mitchell, 'Greet the Friends by Name,' 243-244.

[778] *Ben.* 7.12.3-5 italics mine.

[779] *Off.* 1.15.51-52.

[780] Mitchell, 'Greet the Friends by Name,' 244-245. For further examples where the proverb does not affect the private ownership of property see also Plutarch *Amat.* 767e; *Quaest.* 644c-d.

Clement's treatment of the proverb elsewhere diverges markedly from that of the above mentioned authors. The ideal of sharing goods between friends is developed in the understanding that God is the one who ultimately owns all good things and as the ταμίας[781] grants the use of these good things to all members of thė Christian community. All things therefore are common (κοινὰ τὰ πάντα), and it is not for the rich to appropriate an undue share. Retaining superfluous possessions is neither suitable to man, nor to the ideal of the common sharing of goods (οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον οὐδὲ κοινωνικόν), which is based on the principal of love (ἀγαπητικόν). God has given to us the liberty of use, but only so far as necessary; and he has determined that the use of superfluous possessions should be in common (τὴν χρῆσιν κοινὴν εἶναι βεβούληται).[782] It is inappropriate for the wealthy to retain superfluous possessions since that would mean that someone else in the community would have to go without. In this scheme of the limited good, God, in his providence, supplies enough 'common goods' to meet the needs of all the members in the community without superfluities.[783] Therefore the wealthy must distribute their superfluous possessions to the less well-off members of the community. Thus, with respect to the scope of 'private property' we see that Clement and Cicero have quite different views. For Clement, the 'private property' which is to be retained by the wealthy, remembering that all goods are ultimately the property of God, taking into account that the wealthy believer is spiritually immature and hence subject to the doctrine of the mean, essentially consists of the minimum required for self-sufficiency.[784] On the opposite end of the spectrum, one's private property, for Cicero, is quite distinct from, and is never impacted by, the notion of 'common goods.' Cicero's emphasis is to retain sufficient possessions for maintaining one's social status and influence in a class system which was largely defined by wealth. The difference in degree

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[781] Cf. *QDS* 6.4.

[782] *Paed.* 2.12.120.4-5. Clement christianizes the Stoic doctrine of common goods (κοινωνικόν) by introducing the perspective of love (ἀγαπητικόν). Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 164.

[783] *Paed.* 2.3.38. On the limited good see pp. 65f.

[784] For Clement, the doctrine of the mean tends towards frugality. See pp. 81ff.

between Clement's and Cicero's understanding of private property is demonstrated by the exhortations in *QDS* 31.7ff, where Clement repeatedly insists that the rich believer's superfluous wealth must be made common for the many without any concern as to how this would diminish the rich believer's status within society at large.

The need to seek out disciples to support

The command, 'make to yourselves friends,' implies that the onus is placed on the rich believer not to wait to be asked or troubled but rather to seek out actively those who are well-persuaded and worthy disciples of the Saviour (31.7). To support this statement Clement quotes a catena of scriptural texts outlining the generous and cheerful attitude which ought to accompany almsgiving. 'God loves a cheerful giver,' (2 Cor. 9.7) who does not sow sparingly (cf. 2 Cor. 9.6) but shares in common (κοινωνοῦντα) without grumbling, dispute or grief. This generous and cheerful spirit in giving is the condition by which the almsgiving may be called a pure benefaction (εὐεργεσία καθαρά) (31.8).[785] 'Give to all that ask from you' (Lk. 6.30) is an even more praiseworthy approach to almsgiving, which is supported by the saying, 'for such a fondness for giving (φιλοδωρία) is truly of God.' Most divine of all (θεότητα), however, is not to wait to be asked but for the wealthy man 'to seek out who is worthy to receive benefits,' [786] the motivation for sharing (κοινωνίας) being the reward of 'an eternal tent' (cf. Lk. 16.9).

Commendable utilitarianism

Clement's choice of the affective term εὐεργεσία καθαρά to describe the benefaction may be somewhat surprising for readers conversant with Aristotle's description of friendship between the good. It is true that Aristotle would agree with Clement concerning the merit of bestowing gifts with a cheerful spirit to a friend.[787] Furthermore, both Aristotle and Clement

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[785] Following Segaar's textual emendation of καθά in manuscript S to καθαρά.

[786] *Str.* 1.10.47.1.

[787] Aristotle *EN* 1120b27-1121a1.

would insist that beneficence is an attribute of a good man.[788] However, Aristotle maintains that a good man's motivation for giving is entirely altruistic; that is, that he gives for the other's sake without thought of recompense or advantage.[789] Other friendships based on utility or pleasure are so called only by their resemblance to virtuous friendship.[790] It is a sentiment with which Clement agrees elsewhere in his writings; for example, in the hypothetical situation where the gnostic is forced to choose between the 'entirely identical' knowledge of God or everlasting salvation, he would choose the former for its own sake.[791] Nevertheless, in *QDS*, there seems to be no explicit expectation that the wealthy reader give solely for the sake of doing good. Rather, Clement quite patently encourages the wealthy reader to regard recompense as a motive for benefitting the 'worthy ones' in the first place (cf. 31.9).

The notion of bestowing a benefaction in the hope of receiving a recompense is developed further through the commercial metaphors used to describe the exchange: 'O, what a fine trade! O, what a divine sale!' (32.1). The transaction is not only attractive on account of the infinite value of the object sought - a rich believer is able to purchase incorruption itself – but also with that object's low cost: 'Having given the perishing things of [this] world [the rich believer] receives in exchange for these the eternal [tent] in heaven.' The commercial metaphors continue with the rich reader instructed to set sail for the appropriate market, if need be to compass the whole earth, not sparing risking dangers and labours in order that he might buy the heavenly kingdom (32.2). Seeking the market for the good here parallels the literary *topos* of the philosopher's quest.[792]

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[788] *Str.* 4.22.137.1; Aristotle *EN* 1169b9-19.

[789] Aristotle *EN* 1155b; 1156b. Cf. also A. R. Hands, *Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1968), 32.

[790] Aristotle *EN* 1157a26-34.

[791] *Str.* 4.22.137.1.

[792] See above pp. 46ff.

The wealthy reader is to compare the eternal benefits from these friends with the transient nature of their own (superfluous) material possessions: 'Why do transparent stones and emeralds delight you, and a house, fuel for fire or a plaything of time or a bye-work for an earthquake or the hubris of a tyrant? Desire to dwell in heaven and to rule with God, this kingdom a man [that is, a friend] will give you ...' (32.3-4).[793] In light of these benefits, the term εὐεργεσία καθαρά (cf. 31.8) may seem to be an overstatement of the actual moral worth of the action that Clement is proposing. However, the expectation of a reward in itself does not warrant that the benefaction be labelled as utilitarian in the Aristotelian sense. The Gospels for the most part distinguish between rewards in this life and those in the life to come. The author of the Gospel of Luke, for example, expects that the wealthier Christians will freely help those less well-off, but without expecting a return *in this life* (cf. Lk. 6.34-35a; 14.12-14).[794] The otherworldly nature of any reward evidently sufficed for almsgiving to be judged commendable in these writings.

Both views are found in Clement's major works. On one hand, Clement echoes Aristotle's definition of goodwill (εὔνοια) as the wishing of good things for the other's sake as an essential motive for virtuous friendship which results in beneficence (ἡ εὐεργεσία).[795] On the other hand, he follows the tendency of the Gospels to distinguish between rewards in this life and the next. For example, in the opening chapter of the first book of the *Stromateis*, Clement censures the idea of doing anything for the sake of recompense *in this life*. In this case, it is the relative anonymity or, better still, the remoteness ensured by his utilization of written forms of communication which provides evidence of the author's hope in the reward of heavenly citizenship in the next life.[796] Therefore we note that, since the reward of an 'eternal tent' in our passage is essentially otherworldly (and hence an eternal good), the

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[793] Cf *Paed.* 2.12.120.6 and Cicero *Amic.* 15.55.

[794] Mitchell, 'Greet the Friends by Name,' 248-249.

[795] Cp. *Str.* 2.6.28.3; 4.6.29.3 with Aristotle *EN* 1155b25-1156a5.

[796] *Str.* 1.1.9.2-4.

original benefaction could be considered *commendably utilitarian*, thereby justifying, from Clement's point of view, the appellation εὐεργεσία καθαρά.[797]

However, there are two important differences between our text and the first chapter of the *Stromateis*. First, in our passage, as we have seen, Clement exhorts the rich readers to make friends by benefiting the Lord's disciples directly. There is no suggestion that the benefit ought to be made anonymously. Indeed, Clement's schema here requires that the beneficiary be cognizant of his benefactor so that he may reciprocate as would be the cultural norm. Second, even though the reward or advantage is otherworldly, it is the Lord's disciple who is instrumental in giving it, whereas in the passage from the *Stromateis* it is God himself who recompenses. Indeed, it is by imitating God's liberal nature that the disciple is able to bestow the kingdom of God to the rich believer (32.4).[798]

The unequal nature of friendship between the rich believer and disciple

The friendship between the rich believer and the disciple is unequal. It involves a superiority of one party over the other which is reflected in the unequal benefits that they confer on each other. However, contrary to cultural expectations, it is not the rich believer who is the superior party, rather it is the disciple. Even though the disciple only takes a little from the rich believer in this life, he can make the latter a fellow-inhabitant in God's kingdom forever (32.4). The superior nature of the disciple's benefits is not only reflected in the value of the benefit, citizenship in heaven as against financial assistance, but also in the duration in which the benefits are enjoyed. And, as it is in the relationship between man and God, the rich believer must supplement his benefits to the disciple with honour in order to attain to a

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[797] This is consistent with Clement's threefold taxonomy of friendship where the utilitarian form of friendship is likewise commendable. See p. 72.

[798] I propose that Clement here is drawing upon his schema of divine providence in which the gnostics act as mediators of God's benefits to the Christian community. See above pp. 61ff. For supporting arguments for my view that the 'disciple' in our passage represents the advanced Christian or gnostic see my comments on pp. 204f. and 221f. below.

more approximately equal recompense.[799] It is notable that nowhere in *QDS* does Clement exhort the disciple to honour the rich believer in return.[800]

Further evidence that the less well-off disciple has the ascendant position in the relationship is found in Clement's assertion that the onus is on the rich believer to persuade the disciple to receive the benefaction: 'Beg [him] to take, hasten, strive, fear lest he reject you' (32.5). While it would be considered reasonable that the one who initiated the giving would be in the ascendant position, the fact that he is more or less compelled to by circumstances tends to suggest otherwise. The rich believer is commanded by Christ to initiate the giving whereas the disciple has the freedom to either accept or reject the gift and hence the friendship with the rich believer: 'for [the man of God] has not been commanded to take, but you [the rich believer] to provide.'

The impression given in our passage is that the disciple would naturally be reluctant to accept the rich believer's gift. It was a cultural expectation that the individual who received a gift would have to reciprocate with something at least equivalent in value in return later on. Thus, the disciple's reluctance to accept the rich believer's benefaction may stem from a noble desire not to be obligated to him. It was characteristic of Aristotle's magnanimous man (ὁ μεγαλόψυχος) never to ask for help from others, or only with reluctance, but to render aid willingly.[801] Indeed, in our passage, there is the expectation that the disciple of God will initially be reluctant to take the rich believer's benefaction on account of his own virtue and self-sufficiency (the rich believer has to plead for the disciple to accept the gift),[802] and will only accept it, not on account of his own need, but rather for the sake of benefiting the giver. Clement nowhere in the preceptive section calls the disciples 'poor' or refers to their plight as

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[799] Aristotle *EN* 1158b20-28. Cf. *QDS* 30.1; 33.1; 41.1-6.

[800] In contrast to Hippolytus who in the *Apostolic Traditions* directs his readers to insure the honour and generosity of the rich patron of a feast by being ever cognizant of their invited status and behaving properly. Cf. Bobertz, 'The role of patron,' 173-174, 182.

[801] Aristotle *EN* 1124b17-23. See *Str.* 2.18.79.5 and 7.3.18.1 for other allusions to Aristotle's magnanimous man in Clement's writings.

[802] The gnostic being holy and pious is sufficient in himself, standing in want of no other things (*Str.* 7.7.44.5).

particularly desperate, aside from the suggestion that they might appear needy or ill-clad, which may merely mean relative to the wealthy, a clear example of Peter Brown's category of the 'relative poor' (33.5).[803] The rich believer has a greater need to give than the disciple to receive.

Thus far, we have determined that Clement's description of the rich believer's and disciple's motives for giving respectively, the different nature of their gifts, and the unequal relationship between the two, corresponds closely to the hybrid and progressive nature of the friendship between God and man discussed previously.[804] It signifies a friendship between a good man, a disciple of God, and one striving to be good, the rich believer. The disciple of God is motivated by altruism. The rich believer is motivated by recompense of a good reward, the kingdom of God. It is a relationship in which unequal benefits are conferred on each other as an expression of a 'loving community' based on the principle of exchange;[805] the disciple of God mediates God's benefits through to the rich believers and in return the rich believers support the disciple of God by sharing their superfluous possessions. (And like the friendship between God and mankind which is not static, there is an implied progressive element in the hybrid friendship between the disciple of God and rich believer. As the rich believer becomes increasingly virtuous, the friendship between him and the disciple of God approaches Polydamas' philosophical friendship, the friendship of the good).[806]

Friendship endures and meets all needs

Lest the wealthy reader receives the impression that one-off benefactions are sufficient to meet the Saviour's demands, Clement immediately refines his proposition of 32.5 by negating it and distinguishing between one-off benefactions and the mutual reciprocity and association that is concomitant with friendship: 'The Lord did not say 'provide' (παράσχες) or 'give a

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[803] On the relative poor see above n. 760.

[804] On the hybrid friendship between God and man see p. 71.

[805] Cf. *Str.* 4.18.112.2.

[806] On Clement's taxonomy of friendship see pp. 67ff.

benefit' (εὐεργέτησον) or 'help' (βοήθησον) but rather 'make a friend' (φίλον ποίησαι) (cf. Lk. 16.9). And a friend does not come from one gift but rather from 'complete rest' (ἐξ ὅλης ἀναπαύσεως) and long association (συνουσίας μακρᾶς)' (32.6).

The phrases, ἐξ ὅλης ἀναπαύσεως and συνουσίας μακρᾶς, function epexegetically signifying the kind of friendship that the wealthy believer is to establish with the disciple. While ἀναπαῦσις on the part of a needy person could be taken as respite from the lack of the things necessary for life,[807] the term also has deep theological import in Clement's major writings. The motif from the Epistle to the Hebrews of the Promised Land as the rest for the wandering Israelites functions, for Clement, as a paradigm for the τέλος for Christians whose rest resides not in an idyllic country but eternally in God.[808] True rest is a teleological state in which believers become truly impassible, without any perturbation of thought,[809] in which the pure in heart may gaze on God, face-to-face, with knowledge and apprehension.[810] Rest evinced through the calmness and peacefulness of the soul is a characteristic of the true gnostic in this life in contrast with the man of falsehood's predilection for change.[811]

Paradoxically, the future state of rest can only be achieved through toil in this life[812] and a well-off Christian may attain to the true rest only by ascending 'to the heavens by force,' that is, by providing for the needs of those who are in distress.[813] Therefore, it is likely that Clement's use of the term ἀναπαῦσις also signifies the idyllic state in the Christian

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[807] Cf. Aristotle's explanation of a poor man's motive for making friends with a wealthy man in *EN* 1157a20-25.

[808] *Paed.* 1.6.29,35-36; 1.13.102.2.

[809] *Str.* 6.16.138.1-4; *Barnabas* 15.

[810] *Str.* 7.10.57.1.

[811] *Str.* 2.11.52.5.

[812] *Str.* 7.16.93.3.

[813] *Paed.* 3.6.39.2.

community, comprising of harmonious friendships in which all the necessities for life are met so that all members have the leisure to contemplate the vision of God.[814]

The second phrase, συνουσίας μακρᾶς, may merely connote the idea that true friendship requires a long association in each other's company, which is a fairly universal belief: 'Nothing is more characteristic of friends than that they seek each other's society (τὸ συζῆν).'[815] The phrase, συνουσίας μακρᾶς, is used in a quote which originally can be attributed to a play by the 4th century BCE comic poet Alexis, preserved by Clement's contemporary, Athenaeus, in his *Deipnosophists*. It corresponds to a long social intercourse at a symposium. This rendering of συνουσία is found frequently in Clement's major writings, usually in a derogatory sense, though not always, especially where moderation at the banquet is espoused.[816] Συνουσία is also used as a euphemism for sexual intercourse.[817] However, in addition to social and sexual intercourse, the term can connote the philosophical association of the Pythagoreans (ἡ Πυθαγόρου συνουσία), a sect famous for its friendly intercourse between its associates and disciples, and it is conceivable that Clement has this idea chiefly in mind.[818] The idea here is that a friendship community is not only characterized by a state of rest in which all daily needs are provided so that all members of the community have the leisure for philosophical contemplation, it is also characterized by a long acquaintance between each member in the context of a philosophic community.

Up to this point, Clement has made some rather extravagant claims regarding the extrinsic authority held by these disciples of God whom the wealthy are exhorted to support and befriend. These claims include both their power to bestow the heavenly kingdom to the wealthy (32.4), and their representational aspect whereby whatever is done for these disciples

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[814] *Str.* 7.11.68.5.

[815] Aristotle *EN* 1157a20-25.

[816] *Paed.* 2.1.10.2.

[817] *Paed.* 2.10; *Str.* 3 *passim.*

[818] *Str.* 5.9.59.1.

is reckoned as being done for Christ (30.1-6). Indeed, the whole future prospect of salvation for the rich believer hinges on his ability and zeal in successfully establishing a friendship with at least one disciple who has the power and authority to do these things. The Lord gives to the rich believer in response to the latter's ability to bestow honour (τὴν τιμὴν), show goodwill (εὔνοιαν), and establish οἰκείωσις with the worthy disciple: 'For I will not only give to [my] friends, but also to the friends of my friends (καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τῶν φίλων)' (33.1).

The passage above forms an *inclusio* with 30.1 thereby delimiting a distinct literary unit in which Clement tries to persuade the rich reader to support the less well-off disciples in the Christian community. We have already discussed the need for the rich believer to honour the worthy disciple in addition to bestowing benefactions in order to compensate for the large disparity in the value of benefits reciprocated by the disciple. The reference to εὔνοια slightly mollifies Clement's metaphor of a business transaction in *QDS* 32.1-2 as it infers that goodwill, the desire for the other's good, constitutes part of the rich believer's motivation for supporting the disciple.[819] According to Aristotle, εὔνοια is the necessary, though not sufficient, element in friendship. One also needs to spend time with the friend.[820] The word οἰκείωσις denotes a fellowship based on the recognition that the other person belongs to one, for the benefit of one's own soul. Elsewhere, as related, Clement talks about *oikeiosis* to God as a process that the believer is to undertake in order to attain to the τέλος of salvation. In our passage *oikeiosis* is more specifically channelled towards one of God's friends as the means of establishing *oikeiosis* with God.[821]

Friendship between the rich and the 'friends of God' is modelled on patronage

The unknown *Herrenwort*, 'For I will not only give to [my] friends but also to the friends of my friends,' (33.1) is extremely important for understanding Clement's model of

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[819] Cf. *Str.* 2.19.102.4.

[820] Cf. Aristotle *EN* 1166b30-1167a22.

[821] On *oikeiosis* with God see pp. 92ff.

friendship in the preceptive section (chs 27-41). Clement uses it to depict a system in which God's benefits are mediated to the many, chiefly by their connection with a select group who themselves have a special connection to God. This system based on hierarchical interdependencies, as I will try to demonstrate, would most likely have been best understood by Clement's audience in terms of the Roman system of patronage,[822] itself a natural progression from Aristotelian discourse on unequal or proportional friendships. While for Aristotle character friendship can exist properly only between equals, lesser friendships may be classed as proportional with respect to mutual obligation and thus it is necessary to assess the recompense owed for favours on the part of an unequal beneficiary.[823] In his account of proportional friendship, Aristotle paves the way for the obligation between patron and client and a redefinition of friendship along these lines in the postclassical period.[824]

Prior to exploring Clement's dependency on patronage models, it has to be appreciated that the development of patron-client networks between individuals was an essential component of social and economic life during the Imperial period. The aristocratic social milieu promoted the notion that a person's social status was reflected by the size of his *clientèle* which symbolized his power to give his inferiors what they needed. On the other hand, an individual's potential for social mobility largely depended upon the wealth and political connections of his patrons.[825] This ethic of reciprocity was the basic element in several strata of social relations. The ambitious *novus homo* depended for his success on his ability to attract and hold the favour of a *suffragator* who would speak on his behalf before the senate or emperor.[826]

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[822] We can not ignore Brunt's caveat that friendship in the Roman world consisted of a wide range of possible relationships, of which social or political connexions form a small part. Cf. P. A. Brunt, '"Amicitia" in the Late Roman Republic,' in *The Crisis in the Roman Republic*, ed. R Seager (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1969), 199-218.

[823] Cf. *EN* 1162a34-1163b29; *EE* 1241a32-1246a27.

[824] Schroeder, 'Friendship in Aristotle,' 45.

[825] R. P. Saller, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 205.

[826] R. P. Saller, 'Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction,' in *Patronage in Ancient Society*, ed. A. Wallace-Hadrill (London: Routledge, 1990), 58.

So pervasive was the idea of patronage in Roman culture during the Imperial period that the language of exchange was often used to conceptualize man-god, family and friendship relations, indeed, any relationship between persons of different social rank. Interestingly, it could also work the other way around. Thus, patronage relationships could also be conceived in terms borrowed from kinship and friendship relations. Most of the participants in patronage relationships were called *amici* rather than *patroni* or *clientes*. The use of *patronus* in the literature of the early Empire was restricted to advocates, patrons of communities and ex-masters of freedmen. The word *cliens* connoted the idea of social inferiority and degradation. Thus, in place of the terms *patronus* and *cliens* there was a tendency to employ the euphemistic term, *amicus*, as a mark of courtesy.[827] The term *amicus*, however, did not obscure the relative social standings of the two parties and could be applied to the different ranks of *superiores*, *pares*, and *inferiores*.[828]

There are therefore plausible grounds for suspecting *a priori* that Clement would utilize a patronage model for the hierarchical relations between God and the disciples and between the disciples and the wealthy believers. In demonstrating my proposal that Clement's exposition of Christ's command to 'make a friend' in *QDS* 31-36 is based on individual patronage ideology, I will apply four criteria which several Roman historians consider necessary for identifying patronal relationships.[829]

1) Relationship is reciprocal

The first criterion is that a patronal relationship is reciprocal, involving an exchange of favours and services between two parties of different social status. A client, for example, could appeal to a patron for help with bureaucratic, legal, financial or other social

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[827] Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 11.

[828] Pliny, *Ep.* 2.6.2; 7.3.2. Cf. also Saller, 'Drawing the Distinction,' 61.

[829] These four criteria identifying individual patronage are outlined in A. Wallace-Hadrill, *Patronage in Ancient Society* (London: Routledge, 1990), 3.

arrangements. In return for these favours and services a patron could expect to receive honour and political support from his client.[830]

In Clement's scheme, as we have discussed above, there is clearly an exchange of favours or services, with the wealthy providing for the material needs of the less well-off disciple and the disciple in return providing the means by which the rich believer can attain to his heavenly reward (32.4). The cultural assumptions arising from the difference in social status, with the wealthy naturally expected to be in the ascendant position, are completely abrogated and reversed on account of the higher religious status of the disciple and his connexion with God.

Clement here draws upon the patronage ideology prevalent in the empire where the emperor was the foremost of the great patrons.[831] *Beneficia* given by the emperor were not solely the result of impersonal administration but were entirely at the emperor's discretion: 'given not on the basis of firm administrative guidelines, but given to friends or friends of friends.'[832] There are numerous instances, for example, in which the emperor distributed equestrian posts at all levels to his own friends and to friends of those friends.[833] For the Roman elite, *amicitia* with the emperor was of paramount importance. Not only could the aristocrat expect *honores* for himself but he could also expect *auctoritas* derived from his ability to influence imperial decisions, control access to the imperial court, and secure *beneficia* for his friends.[834] In the attempt to secure *beneficia* for his friends, the aristocrat would furnish the emperor with a *commendatio* emphasizing the goodwill and honour shown to himself by his client. Fronto gives a typical example of a *commendatio*, where he explains how Gavius Clarus, a senatorial protégé, attended him,

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[830] K. C. Hanson and D. E. Oakman, *Palestine in the Time of Jesus: Social Structures and Social Conflicts* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 71.

[831] Garnsey and Saller, *Roman Empire*, 149-150; F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World (31 B.C.-A.D. 337)* (London: Duckworth, 1977); Saller, *Personal Patronage*, esp. Chapter 2.

[832] Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 49-50.

[833] G. Alföldy, *The Social History of Rome* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 100-101.

[834] Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 60.

> in a friendly fashion not only with those *officia* by which a senator lesser in age and station properly cultivates a senator senior in rank and years, earning his goodwill; but gradually our *amicitia* developed to the point where he is not distressed or ashamed to pay me the sort of deference (*obedire*) which *clientes* and faithful, hardworking freedmen yield – and not through arrogance on my part or flattery on his. But our mutual affection and true love have taken away from both of us all concern in restraining our *officia*.[835]

In Clement's model, the disciples have a privileged relationship, *amicitia*, with God, the great benefactor, and hence are analogous to the Roman elite. The disciples are the 'friends of God' who, by virtue of their relationship to him, may be brokers of his *gratia* to the many, including the wealthy (32.4). It is therefore vital that wealthy believers cultivate friendship with the disciple who has access to God. God's *beneficia* may only be obtained via the petitions of the disciple who, in a sense, furnishes God with a *commendatio* on behalf of the wealthy believer (33.1). The role of the disciple as mediator of God's *gratia* to the wealthy in Clement's salvation economy cannot be stressed enough. In the several instances in *QDS* where Clement claims that God listens to those who plead and beg from him, he is referring to the pious disciple and not the wealthy believer.[836]

2) Relationship is over a long duration

The second attribute of individual patronage is that the relationship extends over a period of time. A commercial transaction, in contrast, is usually a brief encounter. In *QDS* 32.6, it is clear that Clement understands that Christ's command to 'make a friend' implies a long term relationship. He rejects as inadequate the charitable transactions fostered by the imperatives, 'give,' 'provide,' 'benefit,' and 'help' on account of their implied one-off nature, and insists that the wealthy believer develop a long term relationship with the less well-off, in which the material needs of the latter are furnished over an extended period of time. This accords well with his refusal to entertain seriously in *QDS* the situation in which the rich man sells all of his superfluous possessions at once and gives the lump-sum proceeds immediately to the less

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[835] *Ad Verum.* 2.7. Note the rare use of the normally offensive word *cliens* emphasizing the affection which Clarus held for Fronto. Cf also *Ad Pium* 9.2; Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 10.

[836] Cf. *QDS* 1.5; 41.1-7, where Clement instructs the wealthy reader to enlist the services of a spiritual trainer and advocate supplicating on his behalf. This Clement defines as 'un-hypocritical repentance' (41.6).

well-off. Not only would the sudden large-scale divestment of possessions cause psychological and spiritual harm to the immature wealthy believer (cf. 12.4-5) but it would preclude any need for a long-term relationship between the two parties.

3) Relationship is personal

Third, the patronage relationship is personal as opposed to, for example, a solely business partnership. Even though Clement uses commercial metaphors to emphasize the value of the gift that the disciple bestows (32.1-2), he predominantly describes the relationship with friendship terminology and conventions. We have seen that the rich believer ought to honour, show goodwill and establish *oikeiosis* with the disciple (33.1). The terms 'complete rest' and 'long companionship' in 32.6 also emphasize the personal nature of the relationship. The personal nature of the relationship between the disciple and the rich believer is developed still further in *QDS* 33-36 where the disciple variously pleads directly to God on the rich believer's behalf, teaches things useful for salvation, admonishes with openness, counsels with goodwill and loves the rich believer truly (35.1).

4) Relationship is voluntary

Fourth, a debatable point as to whether it really is a necessary requirement for defining patronage, the patronage relationship is voluntary and not legally enforceable.[837] That is not to say that there would not be social obligations or expectations arising from the exchange of benefits. The relationship would typically be conducted along lines largely determined by the party with the superior status. (This last characteristic opened the way for exploitation that was often endemic in patron-client relations).[838]

The relationship between the wealthy believer and disciple in *QDS* is also voluntary. Clement exhorts the rich believer to make a friend with the disciple. The rich believer is

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[837] P. Garnsey and G. Woolf, 'Patronage of the Rural Poor in the Roman World,' in *Patronage in Ancient Society*, ed. A. Wallace-Hadrill (London: Routledge, 1990), 158. Garnsey and Woolf distinguish between dependancy and clientage. Dependancy relations are links between members of different status groups, but unlike clientage they are not entered into voluntarily and are backed up by legal and extra-legal sanctions.

[838] Cf. P. Millet, 'Patronage and its Avoidance in Classical Athens,' in *Patronage in Ancient Society*, ed. A. Wallace-Hadrill (London: Routledge, 1990), 16.

nevertheless left with the choice to follow or reject his advice. Even though Clement attempts to persuade the rich believer that it would be in his best interests to initiate a friendship with the disciple, there is no legal or statutory requirement that he do so. Still, in light of the greater benefits which would follow, the onus does fall on the wealthy to initiate the friendship. The disciple, who, like the aristocratic advocate, being in a position to respond freely, under no obligation due to the discrepancy between the benefits bestowed and those received, is thereby the party who exercises the real power in the relationship.[839]

Clement, I suggest, is consciously attacking his society's values and practices, by espousing a patronage model in the Christian community where the wealthy believer acts as *cliens* and the less well-off disciple as *patronus*, a broker of the great patron's *beneficia*.[840] This model acts as a corrective to the situation depicted in the proem, in which flatterers pandered to the rich in order to gain favours.[841] It reflects a rival system which rejects the earthly kingdom where the ruler acts as the great patron and distributes his benefits to the multitude through the mediation of his family and friends. In its place, Clement sets up a new hierarchical kingdom where God as the true father acts as the great patron and the select 'worthy disciples' function as the new aristocracy which mediates God's offer of citizenship and benefits to the broader Christian community (cf. 1.5).[842]

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[839] Cf. Quintilian *Inst.* 12.7.12. Cf. also P. Gray, 'Abortion, Infanticide, and the Social Rhetoric of the Apocalypse of Peter,' *JECS* 9 (2001), 334; Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 20.

[840] The idea that a poor man could act as a patron to the wealthy was not entirely unthinkable to the Greek or Roman mind. Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* 2 preserves a dialogue in which Socrates proposes to the wealthy Critobulus, whose property he estimates to be worth 10 talents, that he is in reality extremely poor whilst Socrates, whose property is worth a mere 5 minae, considers himself as truly wealthy. Socrates' grounds are that he has enough to supply his own needs whilst, even if Critobulus had three times his current wealth, he [viz. Critobulus] could not afford among other things, the need to play the benefactor to the citizens, the heavy obligations of supporting his own φίλοι, and the taxes placed on him by the state. Critobulus is forced to concede the logic behind Socrates' arguments and pleas for Socrates 'to take him in hand' (ἀλλ' ὥρα σοι προστατεύειν ἐμου) (*Oec.* 2.9). Millet understands Critobulus' plea to Socrates as a reaction to his consciousness that he is in danger of becoming poorer than his φίλοι, who constantly expect him to help them out. Critobulus thereby takes up the theme of patronage and applies it paradoxically and metaphorically by asking Socrates, a poor man, to act as his patron (προστάτης) and advise him on how he might avoid becoming poor. Cf. Millet, 'Patronage and its Avoidance,' 34-36.

[841] Cf. *QDS* 1.1; 3.1.

[842] On the hierarchical nature of Christian community see pp. 61ff.

4.4.4 Identifying the 'friends of God' (33.2-36.3)

Having persuaded the wealthy readers that it is expedient for them to initiate friendships with those who are 'friends of God,' Clement now turns his attention to the task of distinguishing between these brokers of God's grace and the rest of the faith community. He poses the question, 'Who is this friend of God?' (33.2) Rather than answering this question directly, though, he gives injunctions against prejudging (33.2-6; cf. Mt. 7.1f; Lk. 6.38). The wealthy are admonished not to use same value-system as that held by the prevalent culture in considering the recipients' worth, that is, in terms of their perceived ability to offer a material return.

The task of differentiating between 'the worthy' and 'the unworthy' is well nigh impossible for the wealthy believers on account of their lack of spiritual discernment (33.2). The dilemma is that by attempting to discern who is worthy to receive benefits the wealthy believer runs the risk of neglecting some of those loved by God and thereby incurring the penalty of eternal punishment by fire (cf. Mt. 25). Clement's solution to this dilemma is marvellously simple: the wealthy believer must offer his possessions to *all* the needy indiscriminately (33.3). By giving consistently to all the needy the rich believer is, by the laws of probability, bound to find someone who has the power to save through God.

Potential abuses of almsgiving

Clement is not the first author to deal with potential abuses in almsgiving within the Christian community. Two notable sources from the second century, with which Clement himself was familiar, address the problem in subtly different ways which serve to draw out his tendency.[843] The author of the *Didache*, for example, encourages his audience to give to everyone who asks although with discretion: 'Let your alms sweat in your hands until you know to whom you are giving.' Anyone following this principle is free from blame. The onus is thereby placed on the recipient to examine his motives for receiving, with the

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[843] For the view that Clement not only knew the *Didache* and the *Shepherd of Hermas* but considered them authoritative see J. E. L. Oulton, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Didache,' *JTS* 41 (1940), 177-179; A. von Harnack, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius*, vol. 1 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1958), 53.

genuinely needy being deemed innocent, but the threat of future punishment being reserved for those who are motivated by greed.[844] The second source, from the mandates section of the *Shepherd of Hermas*, is closer to that adopted by Clement. The recipient of the donation is obliged to examine his motives for receiving, again having the threat of punishment reserved for hypocrisy. However, the author seems more concerned to prohibit the benefactor from using his discretion in choosing whom to support. The benefactor is to give to all who need and not to distinguish between those 'to whom to give and to whom not to give.' The giver is blameless even if he is duped into giving to someone feigning distress.[845]

Both our passage from *QDS* and that from the *Shepherd* betray a concern for the potential pitfalls in almsgiving which arise not only from greedy recipients who feign hardship but possibly also from manipulative benefactors who choose to benefit those whom they are able to exploit most; the latter situation being recognized as encouraging the formation of undesirable and rival power groups within the Christian community. To counteract this situation the authors of both works abrogate the right of the benefactor in choosing whom to support. By doing this, Clement shows that he considers the rich believer to be less than morally perfect, which is consistent with his treatments of the rich believer elsewhere in *QDS*. To appreciate the significance of this constraint we need only to contrast it with his description of the liberality of the Christian gnostic in the *Stromateis*, who, on account of his very highest righteousness, is able to discern how much to give, and when and how, and to discriminate between recipients according to desert.[846]

Thus we see that Clement in our passage adheres to the notion of intermediate actions, which while not antithetical to completely moral acts, the province of wise men alone, nevertheless bears a resemblance to virtuous actions.[847] The rich believer, not yet being fully

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[844] *Didache* 1.5.

[845] *Mand.* 2.4-5. For the literary and logical relationship between this passage and *Didache* 1.5 see Osiek, *Shepherd of Hermas*, 106.

[846] *Str.* 7.12.69.5-7.

[847] On appropriate and intermediate actions see pp. 78ff. Cf. also Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 114.

wise but acting by faith, is liable to be mistaken in his opinion of the moral character of the one whom he ought to support and thus Clement offers the expedient alternative of bestowing support to all less well-off believers even if this means that some unworthy believers are benefited (33.2-3).

Principle of concealment and the need to give indiscriminately

The rich reader is enjoined not to judge but rather to open his heart to 'all those enrolled as disciples of God' and not be vexed and turn away from them on account of their lack of physical beauty, inadequate age or meagre financial resources, criteria which reflected a person's status in society, and hence their utility (33.5). The disciples of God do indeed possess spiritual counterparts to these criteria but these are not outwardly perceptible. Their humble external form conceals their inward wealth and beauty from death and the Devil, metonymies for the Christian group's enemies, and thereby enables them to participate in this school common to all (εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο παιδευτήριον εἰσελθεῖν) (33.6-34.1).[848] The two related themes of pedagogy and concealment are fundamental to Clement's thinking and therefore merit further explanation. God occupies himself with man primarily as an educator (cf. 6.1-4). The frequent recourse to exhortations, persuasions, admonishments and threats found throughout scripture presuppose God's benevolent nature and man's freedom to respond to his benevolence. This divine pedagogy not only takes place in this life which can be considered as a κοινὸν παιδευτήριον but also into the next life where the τέλος of philosophical education is salvation.[849] The doctrine of the Reserve, the notion that the truth should be surrounded by discretion, is borrowed from the mystery religions even though Clement offers a rationale for symbolic exegesis by surveying the practice of concealment in the scriptures, in the Greek poets and philosophers, and among the Egyptians.[850] Like the

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[848] Cf. 2 Cor. 4.1-15, 'treasure in earthen vessels.'

[849] J. Wytzes, 'Paideia and Pronoia in the Works of Clemens Alexandrinus,' *VC* 9 (1955), 149-151.

[850] See pp. 44f. Cf. J. L. Kovacs, 'Concealment and Gnostic Exegesis: Clement of Alexandria's Interpretation of the Tabernacle,' *SP* 31 (1997), 414; H. G. Marsh, 'The Use of *MYΣTHPION* in the Writings of Clement of Alexandria with Special Reference to his Sacramental Doctrine,' *JTS* 37 (1936), 65.

initiate in the mysteries, Clement refrains from revealing explicitly the essentials of Christian doctrine in the *Stromateis*. Thus the *Stromateis* need to possess a double character. They must reveal to some without diverging from the necessity to conceal from others.[851] Concealing the deeper Christian doctrines in the *Stromateis* largely had to do with the prevention of hostile attacks from the sophists although it could also function to fence off the γνῶσις from simple believers who were incapable of holding the truth.[852] The truth was often veiled in symbols so that it could only be discerned by those who genuinely seek.[853] This method of concealment relates directly to the nature of God who works all things secretly;[854] the incarnation itself being an example of God's concealment of the truth from the world until such time after the resurrection that the scriptures were opened up and the power of the Lord revealed to those who 'have ears.'[855]

Another example of the concealment principle is the belief that the soul of the believer is the locus for God's presence: 'but hidden inside dwells the father and the servant of this one, who died on behalf of us and has risen with us' (33.6). The idea that the church, as the assembly of the elect, functions as the new temple is typically Pauline.[856] A similar notion, though more elitist with respect to the moral status of the individual, is espoused by Philo: 'For what more worthy house could be found for God throughout the whole world of creation, than a soul that is perfectly purified ...'[857] Clement's position is influenced more by Philo. It is the Christian gnostic, who is of great value, who is honoured by God, and in whom God is

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[851] R. Mortley, 'The Theme of Silence in Clement of Alexandria,' *JTS* 24 (1973), 201.

[852] *Str.* 5.9.54.2-4. Cf. also E. L. Fortin, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Esoteric Tradition,' *SP* 9 (1966), 44-47; Kovacs, 'Concealment and Gnostic Exegesis,' 431.

[853] *Str.* 5.4.19.1-4. Cf. also Bradley, 'Transformation,' 49.

[854] *Str.* 6.16.140.3-4.

[855] *Str.* 5.10.60.1-61.1; 6.15.127.2-3; 7.2.11.2.

[856] 1 Cor. 3.16-17; 2 Cor. 6.16. Also at the individual level where each Christian's body is the temple of the Holy Spirit. Cf. 1 Cor. 6.19.

[857] *Sobr.* 62.

enshrined. In the righteous soul of the gnostic we find the divine likeness and holy image.[858] God's presence in the Christian assembly is mediated through the presence of the gnostic in its midst.

The 'faithful' as spiritual guardians

The wealthy reader, having 'tasted of the truth,'[859] is not to be deceived in a like manner by the humble external appearance of the disciples (34.2). In contrast to other powerful men, the wealthy reader is to enlist 'an army without weapons, without war, without bloodshed, without anger, without blemish, of pious old men, of God-loved orphans, of widows armed with gentleness, of men adorned with love.' The paradox between the spiritual utility and power of the disciples of God on one side and their apparent physical weakness and low social standing on the other is accentuated through the use of a military metaphor and apophatic epithets. An army without weapons would typically be considered to be impotent but it is the power of God which lies behind this particular 'army.'

In antiquity, as in every age, the wealthy and powerful hired guards for the protection of their possessions and persons. In our passage, the rich reader is exhorted to acquire with his wealth such guards (τοιούτους δορυφόρους) for his body and soul whose commander and ruler is God (34.3).[860] Clement's use of the term δορύφοροι is rather surprising. The term often had a negative connotation in the Platonic corpus with tyrants enlisting the services of δορύφοροι for their protection from those over whom they ruled. Thus δορύφοροι were regarded as henchmen working in collusion with a despot, and hence were to be feared.[861] The unscrupulous nature of the δορύφορος who was paid and willing to do the bidding of a tyrant, led to the pejorative use of the word in the ethical sphere depicting the soul being

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[858] *Str.* 7.5.29.5-6.

[859] In contrast to those 'uninitiated with the truth' in 2.4. Cf. Heb. 6.4.

[860] Cf. Plato *Symposium* 193b, ὁ Ἔρως ἡμῖν ἡγεμὼν καὶ στρατηγός.

[861] *Republic* 567d6; e6; 575b2.

assaulted by tyrannical passions and succumbing to pleasures which act as its bodyguards.[862] The Stoic freedman, Epictetus, having been expelled with other philosophers from Rome by the emperor Domitian in the late first century CE, also fostered, as one would expect, a negative attitude towards the ruler and his δορύφοροι.[863] On the other hand, Philo, himself a member of the ruling class in Alexandria in early first century CE, treats the ruler as a βασιλεύς rather than τύραννος. Thus, the δορύφοροι have a positive association for Philo. They are able to function figuratively to describe the role of the senses of the head, hearing, sight, taste and smell, as well as physical health, not only as bodyguards but even as φίλοι to the reasoning faculty of the soul; the senses effectively inform the regal soul of everything that they have seen and heard.[864] Philo maintains a line of thought which depicts fortunate circumstances - wealth, reputation and honours - as the bodyguards for the body.[865] Clement also uses the term δορύφοροι figuratively as bodyguards of both the body and the soul. Thus, the δορύφοροι are φίλοι (cf. 35.2).[866] However, whereas Philo directly associates the δορύφοροι with the individual's senses, well-being and social status, Clement associates them with the community of worthy disciples. The community of friends act as guards for the wealthy believer's body and soul: a sinking ship is lightened, piloted by their prayers; sickness is subdued, being put to flight by the laying on of hands; attacks from brigands are disarmed, despoiled by prayers; force of demons, shattered by their severe commands (34.3). The list of items in these clauses may not be arbitrary but rather chosen as being particularly pertinent to a person of wealth and high social status.[867]

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[862] *Republic* 573a8, e7; 574d7; 587c2.

[863] Arrianus *Epict.* 1.19.7; 1.24.18 *et passim.*

[864] *LA* 3.115; *Det.* 33; 85.6; *Conf.* 19.2; 55.3; 101.3; *Heres.* 286; *Somn.* 1.27, 32 *et passim.*

[865] *Ebr.* 201.2; *Conf.* 18.1; *Her.* 286 *et passim.*

[866] *Str.* 4.23.151.1.

[867] Both seafaring and healing from illness occasioned the setting up of private votive gifts in nearly every sanctuary in the ancient world. Cf. W. Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 13. There is some question as to whether Clement's references to a sinking ship and brigands ought to be taken figuratively. There is some support for this; for example the reference to the body in a drunken state, 'sunken like a ship, it descends to the depths of turpitude' (*Paed.* 2.2.28.3). Clement also mentions that a ship

Gnostic-like qualities of the 'faithful'

These faithful disciples are effective soldiers and steadfast guards (φύλακες βέβαιοι): Οὐδεὶς ἀργός, οὐδεὶς ἀχρεῖος (35.1). Each faithful disciple has a specific function: one is able to plead before God on the rich believer's behalf; another is able to comfort; another to weep and groan sympathetically on the rich believer's behalf before the Lord; another to teach something useful for salvation; another to admonish with openness (μετὰ παρρησίας); another to counsel with goodwill (μετ' εὐνοίας). In contrast to the sophistic flatterers of the wealthy depicted in *QDS* 1.1-2, all the faithful disciples are able to love truly without guile or flattery.[868]

The faithful disciples' duties are essentially two-fold: to admonish their charge with frankness and to petition God on their charge's behalf. Speaking with frankness is an antidote to flattery, which was widely considered to be inimical to friendship. In contrast to how one treats a slave, reproof (and praise) were deemed to be more helpful for free-born children than any sort of ill-usage, since the praise incites them toward what is honourable, and reproof keeps them from what is disgraceful. Speaking with frankness (παρρησία) when motivated by love acts as a safe-guard against flattery, which always seeks to harm. Those who flatter a man have little love for him while those who speak for his good, even though they inflict pain for a time, do him good ever after.[869]

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running in a fair wind was a Christian sign (*Paed.* 3.11.59.2). It is my belief that Clement probably holds a literal as well as a figurative significance to these phenomena, analogous to his method of interpreting scripture. It is not inconceivable for there to be reports circulating around Alexandria of seemingly miraculous escapes from shipwrecks or attacks by brigands as the result of the prayers of Christians. For a discussion of how religions are able to compensate people who endure certain deprivations (i.e. loss of possessions, martyrdom) for desired rewards that seem unavailable in this life see R. Stark, *The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 34-37. For a critique of Stark's treatment of religious compensators see R. Beck, 'Stark and the Pagans,' *Canadian Meetings at Bishop's University, Lennoxville, Quebec* (1999).

[868] Cf. Countryman, *Rich Christian*, 65, 'With these opponents who "behave with insolent rudeness," contrast the behaviour Clement expected of the Christian poor, who will address their patrons with frankness (μετὰ παρρησίας), but with such respect that "they seem to touch not your flesh but each his own soul."' Countryman, incorrectly in my view, identifies the wealthy as the patrons of the Christian poor.

[869] *Paed.* 1.9.75.3.

As we have seen earlier, the ability to petition God on the rich believer's behalf is the sole province of the disciple who has the special status as 'friend of God' (cf. 33.1). This has implications in our discussion on the second repentance in *QDS* 41.4-7, where the wealthy believer is instructed to enlist the services of a spiritual trainer to act as a mediator between him and God.

Clement's praise of the disciples surges to a crescendo with five exclamations each rolling on top of each other in successive waves: 'O, the sweet services of friends ... O, the beauty of their deeds from those who are able to serve God, to obey God, to please God. They seem to touch not your flesh but each his own soul; not to speak to a brother, but to the king of ages who dwells in you' (35.2). These clauses draw on the Aristotelian *topos* of friends being of kindred soul which is supported by the proverb: 'friends have one soul between them,' itself an extension of the notion that a friend is another I.[870] Clement's treatment of this idea elsewhere in his writings sheds light on our passage. The true gnostic is able to perceive things invisible, not through the faculty of vision, but through the comprehension of scientific speculation (ἐπιστημονικοῦ θεωρήματος κατάληψιν), with which he is deemed to see the Lord. This faculty of comprehension of the beautiful, where one moves from the beauty of the flesh to the beauty of the soul, a clear allusion to the subject of Plato's *Symposium*, enables the true gnostic to establish friendships with other believers at a purer (that is, without the taint of pleasure) and more profound level than ordinary Christians.[871]

Identity of the 'faithful'

Throughout *QDS* 34.2-35.2, the religious merits and roles of the 'faithful' disciples are described in the same terms as those pertaining to the true gnostics in the *Stromateis*. This has been observed before. W. Völker equates the 'faithful' brothers in 35.1 with the 'man of God' in chapter 41, both of whom he regards as true gnostics, but fails to distinguish these

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[870] Quote from Euripides *Or.* 1046 in *EN* 1168b8.

[871] *Str.* 7.12.76.7-77.1.

from those more elect than the elect in 36.1.[872] C. Nardi identifies *tout court* the 'army without weapons' (34.2) with the true gnostics, and the rich believer who needs help as one of the 'faithful.'[873] However, Nardi's explanation hinges on Clement's dependency on the Valentinian exegesis of this passage where the rich man of the narrative is deemed a psychic, a member of the intermediate class of men, which in my view is unsubstantiated from the text here.[874]

I suggest that Clement's strategy in *QDS* is a little more complex. The 'army without weapons,' of old men, men, women and orphans, ought to be identified as the 'faithful,' a group of rank-and-file believers quite distinct from the true gnostics, whom Clement now introduces in *QDS* 36.1 as those 'more elect than the elect' (τινὲς τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἐκλεκτότεροι).[875] The difference between the two groups is that where the 'faithful' are each said to have one, specific, gnostic-like role, the true gnostic (ideally speaking) performs *all* of these roles *at the same time*. Elsewhere, Clement concludes his description of the attributes of the gnostic with the concession that a simple believer might do rightly one or two of these things, yet he will not do so in all nor with the highest knowledge, like the gnostic.[876] Clement's imputation of gnostic categories on the 'faithful' is part of his strategy to make the less well-off, rank-and-file believers appear more attractive for the wealthy to support. In this way, the true gnostic himself acts effectively as the *synecdoche* of the whole Christian community;[877] that is, the merits and qualities of all the members of the community are collectively derived from those of the individual true gnostic. This rhetorical strategy is not unlike that which Clement utilizes in the *Stromateis* where by showing that the true gnostic is

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[872] Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, 554.

[873] Nardi, 'Seme eletto,' 272.

[874] The Valentinian exegesis of the passage is recorded in Irenaeus *AH* 1.8.3.

[875] Note the use of the elliptical phrase, οὐ μὴν ἀλλά ('notwithstanding'), which precludes any attenuation of the ethos of the 'faithful' (they are still good, meet for God, and worthy of the title) while at the same time enhancing that of the 'more elect than the elect.'

[876] *Str.* 7.14.84.1.

[877] *Str.* 2.19.98.1-2.

truly pious he defends the religious standing of all believers. The import of our suggestion will become more apparent later on when we discuss Clement's insistence that the wealthy reader enlist a single 'man of God' as his spiritual adviser and intercessor in *QDS* 41.

The elect of the elect

Those 'more elect than the elect' are the true gnostics of the *Stromateis* (36.1).[878] The phrase 'more elect than the elect' is found only twice in the Clementine corpus. In the other instance, the phrase refers to Christian gnostics who possess perfect knowledge and are motivated by beneficence to teach others.[879] Those 'more elect than the elect' are the 'image and likeness of God' (36.2), a state only attained by gnostics who have attained perfection. The gnostic is the 'salt of the earth,' 'light of the world,' the 'seed' (of Abraham; cf. Gal. 3.16; Rom. 9.27), and the 'one who hides the unspeakable things in his mind.' Each of these epithets also has heretical Gnostic connotations and it is not improbable that these allusions here and especially in the following chapter (*QDS* 37) would have appealed to some wealthy and educated readers who may have been attracted to the more speculative theological systems of these Gnostic sects.[880]

As with the 'faithful' in the preceding chapters, there is a paradox between the true gnostic's inconspicuous nature and his relative 'worth' on account of his connexion with God; the more elect the gnostic, the less conspicuous he is.[881] In contrast to the Roman benefactor who, in line with the cultural expectation, seeks honour for himself through institutions such as the morning *salutationes* and promotes his ancestry through dedicatory inscriptions, the

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[878] Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 146.

[879] *Str.* 6.13.107.2-3. On 'the elect of the elect' see p. 52.

[880] The heretical Gnostic connotations are shown by Nardi, 'Seme eletto,' 272-276. The Valentinians, for example, considered the pneumatics to be 'the salt and light of the world' (Mt. 5.13, 14). Cf. Irenaeus *AH* 1.6.1, 13.3.

[881] *Str.* 7.12.77.5.

gnostic patron would be ashamed to receive public recognition of either his religious status or his kinship with God (36.1).[882]

The gnostic's connexion to God is, as stated above, explained in terms of Philo's metaphor of a king adopting a favourite to be his heir and representative.[883] The gnostic is God's legitimate child and heir, having been sent here as if on a certain life abroad (τινα ξενιτείαν) under the great administration (οἰκονομίας) and proportional system of rewards (ἀναλογίας) of the father (36.2).[884] It is comparable to the situation in which an heir is sent abroad by a king in order to gain wisdom for the future task of ruling, an idea which shares several affinities with Philo's allegory on Abraham's migrations from Haran and Chaldea.[885] Whereas the Chaldeans had successfully determined that the phenomena of the world were guided by influences contained in numbers and numerical proportions through their use of astrology, Abraham came to understand God's administration and superintendence of the world by 'living abroad,' that is, by using reason to apprehend the intelligible order.[886] For Abraham, the archetypal friend of God, 'living abroad' was a form of pedagogy leading towards wisdom.[887] In a similar way, Clement's contemporary friend of God, the gnostic, 'lives abroad' as a foreigner in this world where all things visible and invisible have been created: 'some things for [his] service, others for [his] training, and others for his instruction' (36.3).[888]

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[882] Philo observes that the greatness of Abraham's actions is not clear to the multitude but only to those who have tasted the good things which belong to the soul (*Abr.* 89).

[883] On Clement's dependence on Philo's treatment of adoption see p. 74.

[884] For the gnostics as fellow-workers in God's salvific economy, who are rewarded accordingly (i.e. in proportion, ἀναλογία), cf. *Str.* 4.6.37.2. The group closest to the emperor possessing an unchallenged claim on his *beneficia* were the sons and grandsons (natural or by adoption) of his immediate family. Cf. Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 59.

[885] *Abr.* 68-71.

[886] *Abr.* 88. The Christian gnostic, like Abraham, also applies himself to the study of the mystical meanings in the proportions of numbers, geometrical ratios and music. Cf. *Str.* 6.11.84.1-87.4.

[887] *Str.* 1.5.31.2-4.

[888] This life is described as a παιδευτήριον in 33.6.

The gnostic is greater than the world.[889] The continued existence of the world is contingent on the presence of the 'seed' (36.3), an idea parallel to Justin Martyr's explanation for the delay of the *Parousia*. For Justin, God delays causing the confusion and destruction of the world on account of the seed of the Christians.[890] The difference between Clement's and Justin's understanding of the word 'seed' has to do with scope; for Clement the 'seed' refers to the gnostics, while for Justin it refers to all Christians.[891]

4.4.5 Mysteries of love and reciprocity of the covenant (37.1-38.4)

Clement introduces a new topic in the discourse by asking 'Now what is still necessary?' In answer to this, he exhorts the wealthy reader to 'behold the mysteries of love' (37.1).

Bosom of the father

Wealthy readers are to strive to attain the vision (ἐποπτεύσεις) of the bosom (τὸν κόλπον) of the father, to whom the 'only begotten God showed the way' (cf. Jn 1.18).[892] The κόλπος of the father, as seen elsewhere, corresponds to God's invisible and ineffable character.[893] Clement here draws on the broad semantic range of the word κόλπος in order to bring out a sense of God's transcendence as the indemonstrable first principle. The word κόλπος not only refers to a bosom but can refer to any bosom-like hollow, like the sea or a bay (as it does today).[894] Clement elsewhere refers to those who call the bosom of God the Depth (βυθόν), in terms of containing and 'embosoming' (ἐγκολπισάμενον) all things, inaccessible and boundless.[895] In our passage, the wealthy believer is directed towards the

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[889] *Str.* 2.20.125.4-5.

[890] 2 *Apology* 7. Cf. *Epistle to Diognetus* 6, where Christians in the world are likened to the soul in the body. The soul dwells in the body but is not of the body, so are Christians throughout the cities of the world. The soul has been shut up by the body but itself sustains the body and Christians are confined in the world as in a prison, but themselves sustain the world. See also Aristides *Apology* 16, 'I have no doubt but that the world stands through the intercession of Christians.'

[891] Cf. also *ET* 1.26.3.

[892] *Prot.* 1.10.3.

[893] *Str.* 5.12.81.3.

[894] S.v. κόλπος in *LSJ*.

[895] *Str.* 5.12.81.4. For the Valentinian description of the father as Depth cf. Irenaeus *AH* 1.1.1. See Nardi, 'Seme eletto,' 276.

future hope of being able to 'see' the invisible and transcendent God through understanding the mysteries of love. The mystagogue who through his teachings leads the believer to the father is the 'only begotten God,' the son.[896] The ideas and language here, deeply indebted to the mysteries and heretical Gnostic groups,[897] describe how the true gnostic approaches the deity.[898] The gnostic, having become a lover and friend of the one true God, is assimilated to a kindred nature to the object of his love and as a result is destined in the next life to become a celestial creature and to gaze upon God face to face (the ἐποπτεία).[899]

Maternal nature of God

The mysteries of love are expounded with a highly stylistic encomium in 37.2-4. God himself is love and on account of love was beheld by us. God reveals himself on account of his φιλανθρωπία.[900] The first mystery of love distinguishes between the unspeakable part (τὸ ἄρρητον) of God as father and the sympathetic part (τὸ συμπαθές) as mother (37.2). The paternal nature of God, as the first principle of all things, cannot be embraced in words or by the mind alone but only by initiation into the mysteries where God draws the initiate to himself.[901] Clement's description of the sympathetic part of God[902] as his maternal nature stems directly from his society's values corresponding to the woman's role within marriage.

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[896] *Str.* 1.26.169.4; *ET* 1.6.2. Cf. also *QDS* 42.16 where in the next life the Saviour greets the believer and leads him to the father's bosom (ὁδηγῶν εἰς τοὺς κόλπους τοῦ πατρός).

[897] In *Prot.* 2.19.1, Clement uses the verb ἐποπτεῦσαι with the Corybantic orgies as the direct object. Cf. Nardi, 'Seme eletto,' 276-277.

[898] Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 146-158; R. Mortley, 'The Mirror and 1 Cor 13,12 in the Epistemology of Clement of Alexandria,' *VC* 30 (1976), 109.

[899] *Str.* 7.11.68.4-5; 1 Cor. 13.12. Cf. Mortley, 'Mirror,' 109-114. Mortley remarks on Clement's mystical juxtaposition of 'those who are pure of heart who will see God' in Mt. 5.8 and the future expectation of seeing God 'face to face' in 1 Cor. 13.12. Cf. also Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults*, 69.

[900] *Str.* 5.3.16.5 in light of Plato *Phaedrus* 247c. Cf. also Jn 1.14.

[901] Cf. Paul's account of third heaven (*Str.* 5.12.79.1), and the reference to the ineffable goodness of God (*Str.* 6.17.154.1).

[902] *Paed.* 1.8.62.2; 2.1.3; *Prot.* 4.59.2.3-6. On the maternity of God see D. K. Buell, *Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 177-179; Nardi, 'Seme eletto,' 277-281.

The wife's care and sympathy to the physical ailments of the members of her family show that she really is a necessary 'helper.'[903]

The second mystery involves a metaphor of procreation. It includes an extremely surprising oxymoron: 'the father took on a woman's nature (ἐθηλύνθη).' It is surprising for in each of the nine instances where Clement uses the verb ἀπο- or ἐκ-θηλύνω in his major works the sense is derogatory.[904] The μέγα σημεῖον behind this mystery is Jesus Christ, whom '[God] begat from himself. And the fruit that is born from love is love.' The procreation metaphor itself is an extension of the Platonic idea that like produces like. As stated above, Clement understands Plato to say that the chief end is twofold: 1) that which is able to be participated in, and which exists first in the ideas themselves, which he calls 'the Good;' and 2) that which participates in it, and receives its likeness from it.[905] This notion is applied elsewhere to the Platonic idea of the perfect man begetting perfect offspring through teaching. Whereas the childless man fails in the perfection which is according to nature, not having produced his proper successor in place, the perfect man is he that has produced from himself his like.[906] That the father became feminine to bring forth offspring clearly implies both that his fatherhood is his prior and 'normal' state and that God himself remains an unity. God, contrary to the speculative systems of some heretical Gnostic groups, does not require a separate partner.[907]

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[903] *Str.* 2.23.140.2. Cf. Gen. 2.18.

[904] The verb ἀπο- or ἐκ-θηλύνω is applied variously to flowers which through the senses make the soul effeminate (*Str.* 7.7.36.4); exotic herbs which emasculate plain bread (*Paed.* 2.1.3.2); pleasures that titillate the eye and ear (*Paed.* 2.4.41.3); the tears of a drinker after much wine (*Paed.* 2.7.56.3); perfumes which render mankind effeminate (*Paed.* 2.8.65.1); ointment (*Paed.* 2.8.66.3); Ionians who wear long robes (*Paed.* 2.11.105.4); the man wearing a female dress (*Str.* 2.18.81.3); desire which is the female side of the soul. This reflects the Platonic view that the soul is divine and only decays after being made effeminate by desire (*Str.* 3.13.93.1; Plato *Republic* 492a, 495a; *Phaedrus* 254c-e). Cf. the opposite notion of becoming male in *Phaedo* 81c and *Phaedrus* 248c. The woman transforms into man (in a moral sense) when she is become equally unfeminine, and manly, and perfect (*Str.* 6.12.100.3).

[905] *Str.* 2.22.131.2; Plato *Parmenides* 132d-e. On begetting as a metaphor for the leading of a young man's soul to the beautiful see *Symposium* 206c-219d.

[906] *Str.* 2.23.139.5.

[907] Our passage may be a faint allusion to the μητροπάτωρ of the Orphic Hymn (*Str.* 5.14.125.2). Cf. Buell, *Making Christians*, 178; V. E. F. Harrison, 'The Care-Banishing Breast of the Father: Feminine Images of the Divine in Clement of Alexandria's *Paedagogus* I,' *SP* 33 (1997), 402; Nardi, 'Seme eletto,' 279.

Measured to our weakness

The third mystery of love has to do with the kenotic work of the son (37.3). The divine became man in order that man may become divine.[908] The idea that the son, as the image of God, would deign to take on man's flesh and weakness and suffer on his account was a mystery, a paradox.[909] The son having been measured (μετρηθείς) with respect to our weakness, would in return measure (ἀντιμετρήσῃ) us to his power (37.3-4). Clement is dependent here upon Philo's idea of measuring according to power.[910] God does not confer his blessings in proportion to the size of his own powers of beneficence – for they are infinitely great and would overwhelm the recipient and the recipient would collapse – but rather in proportion to the capacities of those who receive them. God therefore measures his beneficence accordingly, dispensing to each thing by fine tuning its allotted portion.[911] As believers advance towards perfection they experience ever-increasing measures of God's beneficence.

The son's willing sacrifice was a supreme act of love.[912] Clement alludes to the Upper Room discourse in the Gospel of John, and to the reference to Christ's sacrifice in terms of a libation offering and a ransom in the Pastoral epistle,[913] with Christ bequeathing a new covenant with the words: 'I give to you my love' (37.4). This may be an extracanonical saying of Jesus or, more probably, a creation from a conflation of texts like Jn 13.34 and 14.27.[914]

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[908] *Prot.* 1.8.4. The language here reflects Irenaeus' famous dictum. Cf. *AH* 3.10.2, 19.1, 16.3 *et passim*. See Patterson, 'The Divine Became Human,' 500-501.

[909] Cf. *QDS* 8.2 with the reference to the 'sign' and *Prot.* 11.111.3, 'O amazing mystery! The Lord has sunk down, but man rose up.' The Lord appropriated the affections of mankind for the sake of showing love and saving without impugning his own unchanging character. Cf. *Str.* 2.16.73.1. See also Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, 81-82.

[910] Cf. *Paed.* 1.8.71.3. This observation was put forward by Professor David T. Runia in his paper 'Philo and Clement on Divine Power' presented at the ASCS conference, La Trobe University, Bendigo, on 3rd Feb 2004.

[911] Philo *Op. Mundi* 23.

[912] *Str.* 7.2.8.1.

[913] 2 Tim. 4.6.

[914] Stroker, *Extracanonical Sayings of Jesus*, I 17.

The son laid down his life which is worth as much as all things on behalf of all of us (37.4-5). Two friendship conventions are present in this statement. The first is that giving up one's life for a friend was commonly considered in antiquity as a mark of altruism, an expression of perfect love for a friend.[915] The *topos* itself plays an important role in the fourth Gospel.[916] However, the *topos* was already well established by the first century. A popular example was that of Achilles who condemns himself to death for not protecting Patroclus whom he loved 'more than his own life.'[917] Later exegetical scholia, following the treatment of this passage in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, linked Achilles' desire with the maxim that a friend is willing to die for his friends.[918] The second convention has to do with the relative value or worth of the benefit. The value of the gift correlates directly with the status of the giver. The only-begotten son gives his life which is worth more than all created things.

The reciprocal nature of the new covenant

A direct ramification arising from the son's gift of his life, on account of its high value and the fact that it was he who initiated the friendship, is that the beneficiary (mankind) is forever obligated to him, reflecting the reciprocal nature of the new covenant. Thus the son is in a position to demand in return that we lay down our lives on behalf of each other (37.5; cf. 1 Jn 3.16; Eph. 5.2).[919] This is essentially a recapitulation of the argument in 27.3-30.6 which begins with the need to love God as the premise, progresses to the need to love the neighbour (viz. Saviour), and concludes with the mandate to love those who believe in Christ.

Wealthy believers both owe their souls to the brethren (viz. the inverted patronage model in 33-36) and are partakers in a treaty with the Saviour (viz. the new covenant in the previous passage) (37.5). Thus they have an inferior spiritual status within the Christian community

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[915] Plato *Symposium* 179b, 208d; Seneca *Ep.* 9.10; Arrianus *Epict.* 2.7.3. The act of dying for one's friend can also be motivated by a virtuous form of self-love. Cf. Aristotle *EN* 1169a29-b2. See Schroeder, 'Friendship in Aristotle,' 41.

[916] Jn 10.11; 15.13.

[917] Homer *Iliad* 18.98.

[918] Fitzgerald, 'Friendship in Greek World,' 19-20.

[919] Friendship for Epicurus is a kind of contract (*foedus*) by which we love our friends no less than ourselves. Cf. Cicero *Fin.* 1.70; Lucretius 5.1019. Cf. also Rist, 'Epicurus on Friendship,' 123.

and are dependent on the goodwill of certain disciples for their salvation. In light of these obligations, Clement poses the questions: 'Shall we shut out the things of the world, the poor and foreign (ἀλλότρια) and disappearing things while storing them? Shall we shut out from one another the things which the fire will have in a little while?' (37.5)[920] Cascading several judgment motifs gleaned from the scriptures one after another without conjunctions, Clement warns the rich that they will be precluded from taking advantage of the father's offer of mercy should they continue to withold their support for the less well-off members of the community (37.6; cf. 1 Jn 3.15; Jn 15.5f.).

The most excellent way to salvation

Shifting from commination to paranesis, Clement encourages the wealthy reader directly (σύ) to learn the surpassing way to salvation taught by the apostle Paul (38.1; cf. 1 Cor. 12.31). This is followed by a short panegyric on the nature and merits of love. To the first statement, 'love does not seek things for itself' (1 Cor. 13.5), are appended three coordinate clauses: ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκκέχυται, περὶ τοῦτον ἐπτόηται, περὶ τοῦτον σωφρόνως μαίνεται. The first clause is an allusion to Rom. 5.5 where the love of God is poured out (ἐκκέχυται) in the hearts of the believers through the presence of the spirit.[921] The next two clauses draw from the Platonic discourses on the topic of love as one of the four types of madness. The verbs denoting manic emotions (ἐπτόηται and μαίνεται) describe how love ought to move the wealthy reader to feel in a certain way for his Christian brother, especially in light of the fact that he is dependent on that brother for his salvation (i.e. in an implied paedagogical setting). The notion of love driving someone insane starts with the Socratic ideal of homosexual love between an older wise man and a handsome pupil.[922] Listening to the discourses of a lover drives the pupil into a philosophic frenzy.[923] The wise man goes on

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[920] *Str.* 4.13.94.3.

[921] *Str.* 2.22.134.4; also Ignatius *Phil.* 5.1.1.

[922] Cf. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, 15-54. The idea is also found in Greek tragedy. Cf. Sophocles *Ant.* 781-800; Euripides *Med.*627-662; *Hipp.* 525-564.

[923] *Symposium* 218a.

to seek the idea of beauty rather than being satisfied with its imitation, pederasty. By means of the right method of boy-loving the wise man ascends from the attraction to the beauty of his lover's body to all beautiful bodies; that is, from personal beauty to beautiful observances, from observances to beautiful learning, and from learning at last to the study which concerns the beautiful itself and that alone, the very essence of beauty.[924] The Socratic ideal of homosexual love is based on moderation and self-restraint unlike the biblical Sodomites whom Clement chastises for 'burning with insane love for boys' (περὶ <δὲ> τὰ παιδικὰ ἐκμανῶς ἐπτοημένοι).[925] In our passage, love paradoxically causes the Christian's mind to flutter and be driven insane *in a self-restrained way* for his neighbour (38.1).[926]

Juxtaposing 1 Pet. 4.8, 'Love hides a multitude of sins,' with 1 Cor. 13.4, 6-8, 13, Clement agrees with the apostle Paul that, out of the triad of faith, hope and love, only love transcends into the next life (38.2).[927] Faith departs when one sees God with one's own eyes (αὐτοψία) (38.3).[928] In the same way, hope vanishes when those things which are hoped for have been granted (cf. 27.2.4-5). On the other hand, love is a τέλος in itself, continuing to grow into the πλήρωμα even after attaining the state of perfection (38.3).[929]

Clement now moves from a panegyric on love to an exhortation to repentance. It is highly likely that he obtained this sequence from his first century namesake from Rome, who also enlists both 1 Pet. 4.8 and 1 Cor. 13 as a prelude to a call to repentance for certain dissidents

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[924] *Symposium* 211c.

[925] *Paed.* 3.8.44.1. Note the similar words ἐκμανῶς and ἐπτοημένοι. Cf. also love for *Plutos* in *Paed.* 3.2.10.2.

[926] Plato *Phaedo* 68c.

[927] This need not be immediately assumed. Irenaeus, for example, declares that the triad of faith, hope and love will endure in the next life. There are some things the knowledge of which only belongs to God and while God continues to be our teacher forever, there will always be a need for faith and hope in the things not revealed. Cf. *AH* 2.28.3.

[928] The enigmatic references in the OT prophecy were unveiled when John the Baptist saw the Lord with his own eyes (διὰ τῆς αὐτοψίας). Cf. *Str.* 5.8.55.3; Mt. 11.13; Lk. 16.16.

[929] Rom. 13.10. Also an allusion to Valentinian thought where 'the seed,' that is, the pneumatics, will be gathered into the Pleroma at the end time (*ET* 1.26.3). Cf. Nardi, 'Seme eletto,' 284-285.

in the Corinthian church.[930] Both Clement of Alexandria and Clement of Rome share the belief that by performing Christ's commandment to love one's neighbour, and undertaking a pure repentance (μετάνοιαν καθαράν), a sinner is able to redeem his past failures (ἀναμαχέσασθαι τὰ ἐπταισμένα) (38.4; cf. 1 *Clem.* 50.5). Our Clement's choice of the verb ἀναμάχομαι illustrates his intention to encourage the wealthy reader to renew the contest for salvation.[931]

4.4.6 Availability of post-baptismal repentance (38.5-41.7)

There is the possibility of a second repentance for sins committed after the seal of baptism (39.1). The issue of post-baptismal sin was extremely controversial in the early church. Baptism clearly was for the remission of sins but what provision was there for sins committed after baptism? Scripture itself seemed to be ambivalent on the issue.[932] On one hand, the author of 1 John[933] suggests the possibility of forgiveness for post-baptismal sins, at least those sins which do not lead to death,[934] while, on the other hand, the letter to the Hebrews[935] rejects any such notion. The topic was a chief concern to the author of the mid-2nd century apocalypse, the *Shepherd of Hermas*. There the author raises the possibility of forgiveness for the baptized but only once and for a limited time. The offer was only open for present believers, not for those who would come in the future, and it was expected that those who did repent would change their conduct for the rest of their lives. To authenticate his pronouncement the author of the *Shepherd* claims special revelation from heaven.[936]

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[930] I Clement 49-50. Cf. E. F. Osborn, 'The Love Command In Second-Century Christian Writing,' *SecCent* 1 (1981), 226, 235.

[931] *Paed.* 1.2.4.3-5.1.

[932] Cf. Osiek, *Shepherd of Hermas*, 29.

[933] 1 Jn 1.6-2.2 and 5.15-18.

[934] It is possible that John's categorization of 'sin not leading to death' rests on the OT and Jewish distinction between inadvertent and deliberate sins. Sacrifices could atone for unwitting sins, but conscious sins could only be removed by the death of the sinner (e.g. Lev. 4.2, 13, 22 etc). Nevertheless, what John meant by mortal sin is highly speculative and the subject of intense scholarly debate. Cf. S. S. Smalley, *1, 2, 3 John*, Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 51 (Waco TX: Word, 1984), 297-299.

[935] Heb. 6.4-17 and 10.26-31.

[936] Hermas *Vis.* 2.2.4-5; *Mand.* 4.3.1-7.

In the second book of the *Stromateis*, Clement addresses the issue of the second repentance, building on the treatment of the topic in the *Shepherd*.[937] He ignores the interim aspect of the second repentance in the *Shepherd* and considers it valid for his own day, several generations later. However, in contrast to the *Shepherd*, he restricts the application of the second repentance to involuntary sins. By distinguishing between involuntary and voluntary sins he is able to harmonize the apparent ambiguity of the texts from scripture. The harsh prohibitions on post-baptismal repentance from the letter to the Hebrews must refer to voluntary sin, while the more lenient texts allowing a further repentance must refer to involuntary sins.[938] A sin is involuntary when it is done in ignorance or under compulsion.[939] Once an individual has become cognizant of his sin and failed to apply himself to training in the commandments, which he is able to do in his own power, then it becomes a wilful sin, no longer covered by a further repentance.[940] Believers who have availed themselves of the second repentance thereby remain in a precarious position with respect to their salvation.[941]

In our passage, wealthy readers are not to be dispirited by the thought that their fate has already been decided by God (38.5). Clement's opposition to the determinist's stance is a major underlying motif throughout this work. The wealthy need to comprehend who is the rich man who does not have a place in heaven and in what way they might flee the difficulties attendant with wealth and be able to enjoy the benefits of eternal goods. Consistent with the treatment of the topic in the second book of the *Stromateis*, post-baptismal repentance is available for those who have fallen into certain sins which may have happened through

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[937] Cf. *Str.* 2.13.57.1-2. Unlike the author of the *Shepherd*, Clement has no need to claim direct revelation. For Clement the *Shepherd* was divinely inspired, on par with other scripture accepted as authoritative by the church at the time.

[938] Heb. 10.26-27 is quoted in *Str.* 2.13.57.2-3 directly after the allusion to the *Shepherd* with respect to successive repentings. 1 John 5.16-17 is alluded to in close proximity in *Str.* 2.15.66.5-67.1.

[939] Cf. *Str.* 6.8.69; 7.16.101.6-7. Ignorance and weakness as the root of vicious actions is found in a wide range of sources. Cf. Plato *Laws* 863c; Aristotle *EN* 1135b12-19; Chrysippus *SVF* 3.256, 60.29-33; Philo *Ebr.* 2.6. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 143-144.

[940] *Str.* 2.13.57.4-58.1.

[941] *Str.* 2.13.56.1.

ignorance or through weakness or unwittingly through circumstances after the seal of redemption (39.1).

Clement reveals here his understanding of the salvific status of wealthy believers, an understanding which he has not divulged explicitly in his treatment of the wealthy thus far. Prior to this point in *QDS*, he has not charged the wealthy believer with any specific misdeed (cf. esp. 26.3-4). Certainly, he depicts the rich as being in a precarious state in regard to their salvation. This is evinced by their need to find a friend of God to act as their advocate before God. However, he has thus far tended more to direct his disapproval against those who wish to exclude the wealthy from the community. He has gone to the extreme of portraying wealthy believers as victims. We saw in the *narratio* that he attributes the problems of despair and ignorance to inadequate scriptural interpretations propounded by others in the community. The fact that some wealthy believers continued to abrogate their responsibilities in supporting other members, in spite of being aware of the correct scriptural interpretations, was attributed to their pleasure in response to the sycophancy of the more disreputable members of the community. The mitigating rendering of the rhetorical situation at that early point in the discourse is understandable. Clement seeks the goodwill of the wealthy readers so that they will be encouraged to read the remainder of the treatise. It is only at this point, as we approach the end of the discourse, that the topics of sin and the need for repentance are broached.[942] The fact that the wealthy are loosening their ties with the Christian community and thereby abrogating their responsibilities for sharing their possessions constitutes an involuntary sinful act. A further repentance exists for involuntary sinful acts on account of the paternal nature of God. Whereas the omnipotent God acts as a stern judge towards the wealthy who reject his love (cf. 37.6), he also acts as a merciful father to a repentant son, a God who could maintain his honour and still respect the suppliant, provided of course that the son is truly repentant (39.2). What precisely signifies true repentance, or perhaps more

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[942] This is reflected by his use of the word μετανοῖα which occurs nine times in *QDS* 38-42 but only once in *QDS* 1-37. Similarly, the word group ἁμαρτ- with respect to the wealthy is found ten times in *QDS* 38-42 and not at all in *QDS* 1-37.

precisely conversion, from post-baptismal sin is the subject of the remainder of the preceptive section.[943] Clement proffers three definitions of repentance, each emphasizing a different aspect.

1) Need to eliminate passions

True repentance (ἡ ἀληθινὴ μετάνοια) is the act of no longer being subject to the passions but rooting them out utterly from the soul (39.2). Purging the passions from the soul makes room for God to re-establish himself (εἰσοικισθήσεται) in the believer, recapitulating the theme of 16.1-2. The reference to the father's 'great and unsurpassable joy' at, and desire for, the repentance of his son (cf. Lk. 15.7) is supported by the juxtaposition of three scriptural texts (Hos. 6.6; Ezek. 18.23, 32; Is. 1.18) in 39.3-4.[944] The claim that God is willing to forgive the wealthy believer (39.5) is further established through the use of a slightly modified Q account of Jesus' analogical argument from the lesser to the greater on the topic of forgiveness (Mt. 7.11 = Lk. 11.13). On one hand, the Lord commands us to forgive daily the brothers *who repent* (cf. Lk. 17.3f.), a command which Clement expects to be able to be obeyed even by the simple believer. How much more does the father wait for those who repent? (39.6) Clement stresses the contrast between the ordinary believer's ability to forgive, and God's, through the use of epithets in apposition. The ordinary believer is described as 'evil.' God on the other hand is 'the father of mercies,' the good father 'of all comfort' (2 Cor. 1.3), and the 'one full of pity and full of mercy' (Cf. Jam. 5.11; Hermas *Sim.* 5.7.3).

2) Need to provide one's own remission

To repent (ἐπιστρέψαι) is the act of ceasing from sins and no longer looking at those things behind (39.6; cf. Lk. 9.62). Clement, consistently with the treatment in the second book of the *Stromateis*, differentiates between remission for sins before baptism and that for

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[943] Μετανοία for Clement, and to a certain extent for the *Shepherd*, connotes a moral transformation and ethical progression. Cf. Osiek, *Shepherd of Hermas*, 29-30.

[944] Ezek. 18.23, 32 is frequently quoted or paraphrased in Clement's works as an encouragement for readers to seek repentance from God. Cf. *Prot.* 12.118.5-119.1; *Paed.* 1.7.58.2-3 quoted; 3.11.86.1 quoted; 3.12.93.3; *Str.* 2.7.35.3 quoted; 2.15.65.3; 6.6.46.3.

sins committed afterwards.[945] The former remission is granted by God, the latter we must each secure for ourselves (40.1).[946] The wealthy believer must provide his own remission by distributing his possessions liberally with others in the hope that he would establish a friendship with a disciple with a special connexion with God.[947]

3) Need for amnesty from the father

True repentance (μεταγνῶναι) involves a sense of regret for past sins committed and the need to ask amnesty from the father (40.1).[948] It is the father alone who is able to make undone the things which have been done, clearly an allusion to the lemma, 'what is impossible for man, is possible for God' (cf. Mk. 10.27). The following subordinate clause outlining the manner in which the father expunges past actions contains two metaphors 'oil from his mercy' and 'dew of the spirit' which signify God's healing activity and providence respectively.[949] To show that the father will forgive past actions, Clement chooses an extracanonical saying of Jesus also preserved by Justin Martyr: 'For in those things I find you in these I will also judge' (40.2).[950] Later writers (e.g. Ps. Athanasius, Johannes Climacus, Evagrius) recognize the saying to be an allusion to the prophet Ezekiel.[951] It is possible that Clement also held this view for he immediately goes on to paraphrase Ezekiel 18.21-24, a double-edged passage which condemns those who fail to continue in the commandments in spite of previously having given generous support to the community in the past and encourages those who prevail over the evil society (πολιτειαν πονηράν)[952] in spite of living

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[945] Which he attributes to the *Shepherd*. Cf. *Str*. 2.12.55.6; Hermas *Mand*. 4.2.2.

[946] Cf. *ET*. 15.2.

[947] Cf *QDS* 30.1-33.1. Cf. also *Paed*. 3.7.39.2.

[948] The presence of regret was an important component of an involuntary error for Aristotle. Cf. Clark, *Clement's Use of Aristotle*, 50.

[949] For the word-play on oil (ἐλαίον) and mercy (ἔλεος) see the story of the Good Neighbour in *QDS* 28-29, especially 29.4, 'this is he who brings forward and bestows freely the oil, which is mercy from the bowels of the father.' For the 'dew of the spirit' see *QDS* 34.1; *Prot*. 11.114.3.

[950] Cf. *Dial*. 47.5.

[951] Stroker, *Extracanonical Sayings of Jesus*, Pro 7.

[952] In contrast to the Christian πολιτεία in *QDS* 1.5.

negligently a long time before repenting (40.2-3). Committing the same fault after repentance is a voluntary sin and hence not covered by a further repentance.[953] Therefore, the wealthy, like those whose bodies are labouring under a great illness, need to adopt a regimen and guard against future sins (40.4).

Forgiveness is possible

The availability of forgiveness for the wealthy is supported by an argument from the general to the specific. Clement addresses a series of different malefactors, counselling each of them, with imperatives in the second person singular, to cease perpetrating their corresponding sins (40.5). The series of sins – theft, adultery, fornication, plundering, bearing false witness, breaking oaths - function as a *synecdoche* for the whole Law, especially the injunctions concerning the treatment of a neighbour.[954] The universal tenor of the passage is illustrated from the reference to the four cardinal Stoic passions of anger, desire, grief and fear, which the believer is to excise from his soul (40.5). By obeying Clement's injunctions and excising the passions the believer will be found at the exodus already reconciled to his adversary; not only to the person offended directly[955] but ultimately to the offended person's patron, God.[956]

This passage is clearly rhetorically motivated, treating the wealthy believer as one species of sinner who has succumbed to the passions in the past. Succumbing to the passions attendant on wealth is not an extraordinary case which precludes the wealthy from taking advantage of the Saviour's offer of a second repentance, a point which seems to be directed as much to the opponents of the wealthy believers as to the wealthy themselves. It is absolutely imperative, however, that the rich cut away their habitual passions, which, though impossible to accomplish immediately, can ultimately be achieved 'with God's power, human supplication, help from the brethren, pure repentance and continuous attention' (40.6), a

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[953] *Str.* 2.13.57.4-58.1; 2.13.56.1.

[954] Cf. Eph. 4.28; Rom. 13.7-10.

[955] Cf. Mt. 5.25; Lk. 12.58.

[956] Cf. Heb. 10.26-27; *QDS* 30.1.

passage which could function appropriately as a succinct abstract for the whole discourse of *QDS*. The believer is not alone in his struggle to rise above his passions. Salvation has as its locus the community of friends and the believer is expected to seek help from his brethren,

> If he has an inkling of what is happening to him, he should say, 'Brother, lend me a hand to save me from going wrong.' Then he will receive help, spiritually and physically. He has only to desire to achieve the good, and he will attain it.[957]

Need to submit to a man of God

Post-baptismal repentance involves the need for the rich believers: a) to purge from their soul the passions which lead to sin; b) to obtain their own ransom for sins by distributing their superfluous possessions to the less well-off; and c) to enlist someone to plead for mercy to the father on their behalf. A careful reader of the treatise would have noticed that two aspects of the second repentance here are covered collectively by the services of the 'faithful' disciples of God in 35.1-2. The rich believer's passions, for example, are moderated through the agency of 'faithful' disciples, some of whom give instruction, others speak with frankness (μετὰ παρρησίας), and others give counsel (35.1), while the task of intercession is undertaken by still other individual 'faithful' disciples (35.2).

The reader would therefore be surprised at the way that Clement now concludes the preceptive section. Whereas the services offered to the wealthy are provided *collectively* by many 'faithful' disciples of God in 35.1-2, he now introduces a certain 'man of God' who, though one man, is able to provide them *all* (41.1-7).[958] The wealthy believer is urged strongly to appoint for himself this man of God to act as his trainer and captain (41.1; cf. 3.3-6). While it is one thing to suggest that the sin of wealthy believers is, in a sense, no different to other sins with respect to its eligibility for second repentance, the salvific status of the one 'who is haughty, powerful and rich' is so precarious that salvation can only be achieved by him submitting himself to the spiritual patronage of a certain 'man of God.'

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[957] *Str.* 3.1.2.5.

[958] See my discussion on Clement's method of conferring gnostic attributes on the 'faithful' in *QDS* 34.2-35.2 on pp. 205f.

The 'man of God' ought to be identified as an advanced Christian, a true gnostic, a connection which was prefigured with the references to the one 'more elect than the elect' (36.1) and the 'friend of God' (33.1).[959] The 'man of God' will clearly be the superior party in the relationship. The wealthy believer must honour, fear and take care to listen to the man of God even if the latter is speaking frankly (παρρησιαζομένου), acting harshly, and at the same time healing (θεραπεύοντος) (41.1; cf. 1.4). While θεραπεύω in this clause can possibly signify a ministerial function, I suggest that the secondary meaning of the word in terms of healing reflects Clement's thinking in this clause: 'it is not beneficial for the eyes to remain undisciplined all the time. [Rather] they [ought] to weep and be stung occasionally for the sake of better health. In the same way, there is nothing more destructive to a soul than continuous pleasure, for it is made blind from the wasting if it remains unmoved by the outspoken word (τῷ παρρησιαζομένῳ λόγῳ)' (41.2-3).

The therapeutic effect of παρρησία was commonly recognized as an important aspect of true friendship. Παρρησία, according to Plutarch, is the most potent medicine in friendship.[960] The frank counsellor, whether socially inferior, equal or superior to the recipient of the advice, was often likened to a physician. Sometimes frank speaking was perceived to be harsh. The Epicurean Philodemus advocates using whatever hortatory means that are available, including harshness.[961]

The wealthy reader is next directed to consider the man of God's role as advocate (41.5-6). The 'man of God' is an ambassador (πρεσβεύων) before God begging for the rich person's release from punishment. Spending many sleepless nights on the rich person's behalf,[962] the

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[959] Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, 553-554, also identifies the 'man of God' in this passage as the true gnostic of the *Stromateis* on account of his role as *Seelenleiter* in advising and praying for the believers.

[960] *Adulator* 74c-d. For a discussion on how frank criticism for Plutarch coheres with friendship and flattery see T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Plutarch to Prince Philopappus on How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend,' in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 61-79.

[961] D. Konstan, 'Friendship, Frankness and Flattery,' in *Friendship, Flattery and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 13.

[962] Cf. Heb. 13.17.

'man of God' is able to charm (μαγεύων) the father with his constant entreaties.[963] His personal standing is such that the father does not withstand his requests. Therefore, the wealthy reader is enjoined with a series of commands to fear this 'man of God' even when he is angry and to respect him when he stays his anger (41.4). The master's indignation at a disciple's lack of progress is a frequent theme in philosophical contexts. Plato, for example, asserts that it would be impossible for the philosopher to be able to teach his audience if both parties are enraged at the same time.[964] Friendship relations between teacher and pupil could soon become strained in a pedagogical setting especially where corrections and admonitions were felt to be particularly unpleasant by the pupil. In the everyday conduct and beliefs of ordinary men, the 'Pythagorean Sayings' advised the elimination of competition and rivalry from all friendship as much as possible, especially from friendship with one's father, elders and benefactors. Both parties should know how to draw back from and master anger, especially the inferior of the two.[965] In our passage the onus is on the wealthy believer as the inferior party to stay his anger.

QDS 41 affords the modern reader a further insight into Clement's understanding of the mechanics of intercessory prayer. The 'man of God' does not merely present the case of the wealthy believer before God like an attorney for the defendant. Rather, he assumes the place of the wealthy believer, groaning and grieving on the other's behalf as if he was taking upon himself the other's predicament.[966] (The ultimate expression of this sacrificial principle is found in the next chapter where the apostle John offers to pay the penalty of death if need be on behalf of the young brigand).[967] In light of both the elevated status of the 'man of God'

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[963] Cf. the apostle John's counsel to the young brigand in the *epilogue*, 'and by many siren-like words laid a soothing spell upon his mind' (42.15).

[964] Plato *Laws* 888a. Cf. Cicero *Amic.* 24.88-25.91; Iamblichus *VP* 101=231. Cf. also Thom, 'Harmonious Equality,' 88.

[965] Iamblichus *VP* 101 = *VP* 230-31. Cf. Thom, 'Harmonious Equality,' 88, 100.

[966] The gnostic takes on a share (μερίσασθαι) in the sins of the one for whom he is interceding (*Str.* 7.12.80.1). This principle is evinced in the response of the gnostic to another believer's financial hardship. The gnostic considers the other's pain as his own grief (*Str.* 7.12.78.1).

[967] On the sacrificial aspect of the gnostic's intercessory prayer see *QDS* 1.5; *Str.* 7.7.49.3-6.

and his willingness to sacrifice himself on behalf of the wealthy believer, he is to be honoured as an 'angel of God' (41.6).[968]

The father, as judge, treats the intercessor as a substitution for the defendant. He extends his mercy according to the merits of, and his relationship with, the 'man of God,' and not those corresponding directly to the wealthy believer. The arrangement, whereby the 'man of God' pleads for mercy on the rich believer's behalf before the father, is called 'unhypocritical repentance.' It is the true gnostic's words and dispositions to which God attends and not directly those of the wealthy believer (41.7; cf. Heb. 4.12; Dan. 3; Jonah 2).

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[968] The advanced Christian is an ἰσάγγελος having trained himself for impassibility and the attainment of gnostic perfection (*Str.* 6.13.105.1; 7.10.57.5; 7.12.78.6; 7.14.84.2).

4.5 Epilogue (42.1-20)

The epilogue of *QDS* shares several functional correspondences with the *peroratio* of a rhetorical speech. The *peroratio* typically has two parts, the *adfectus* and the *repetitio*.[969] In the *adfectus*, the rhetor appeals to the audience's emotions, arousing positive ones for himself and his case and weakening that of the opposition. It was generally considered that the same pathos which the rhetor seeks to elicit in the proem should be elicited with greater intensity in the *peroratio*.[970] In the *repetitio*, the rhetor seeks to recapitulate the main points from discourse in order to refresh the audience's memory so that they can better render judgement.

The logical structure of the epilogue in *QDS* is twofold. The first part functions in the same way as the *adfectus* of a rhetorical speech when Clement relates an edifying story of St John and a young brigand, a story which is largely intended to illustrate the extent of the father's forgiveness (42.1-15).[971] The second part exhibits traits from both the *adfectus* and the *repetitio* of a speech when Clement appeals to wealthy readers to give heed to his advice or risk the consequences of forfeiting the father's forgiveness. These appeals lead seamlessly into a final trinitarian doxology (42.16-20).

4.5.1 Salvation is still possible. The story of St John and the young brigand (42.1-15)

Clement exhorts his readers to attend to his story of John the apostle by stating that a trustworthy hope for salvation remains for them should they truly repent (μετανοήσας ἀληθῶς) (42.1; cf. 38.5-41.7). The veracity of the story is highlighted when Clement playfully calls it a 'myth which is not a myth' (μῦθον οὐ μῦθον) but rather a factual account (ὄντα λόγον), a trope from Plato's *Gorgias* 523a. Like Plato, Clement places his story towards the end of the discourse in order to clarify the preceding arguments and as a means of

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[969] Watson, *Invention, Arrangement and Style*, 67-77.

[970] Quintilian *Inst.* 6.2.

[971] Both manuscripts of *QDS* have a lacuna at this point. The text of St John and the young brigand is preserved in Eusebius *HE* 3.23.5-19.

making an earnest appeal to his readers.[972] The veracity of the story is assured by its oral transmission, being handed down and preserved in memory (42.1). This is a concession to the view held in early Christian circles that the living voice was the best medium for communicating religious truth.[973]

The story of St John and the brigand ought to be interpreted typologically. The three main characters in this story each have counterparts from the main text of *QDS*. The young brigand is a countertype of the rich man of the Markan pericope (and as such, represents the wealthy reader). Clement aims to stir up the reader's feeling of sympathy for the young brigand. He is described as being strongly built, of refined appearance and ardent spirit, all characteristics of a youth suitable to be trained in philosophy.[974] The young brigand is a victim of those who had led him astray by alluring his passions. He is like a 'restive and powerful horse seizing the bridle between its teeth,' a faint allusion to the Platonic illustration of the charioteer of the soul (42.6).[975] At this stage of the story, however, there was no wise charioteer to restrain the young brigand's soul and, like some of the implied readers, he despaired of his salvation (42.7; cf. 2.2).

The bishop/presbyter is the villain of the story. Prior to the youth's baptism, the bishop acts as a friend. He takes the youth to his own home. He rears him (ἔτρεφε), embraces him in friendship (συνεῖχεν),[976] and cherishes (ἔθαλπε) him, all commonplaces for a pedagogical

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[972] Wickert, 'Bemerkungen,' 129-132, wishes to repudiate the idea that *mythos* corresponds solely to literary form while *logos* corresponds to factual contents. Dio Chrysostom's preparation of his audience, in this case the emperor Trajan, for an account of Heracles, also depends on the passage from the *Gorgias* and exhibits several similarities with Clement's prelude (*Disc.* 1.50). In both preludes the audience is exhorted to pay heed to a story that is not fictional but rather an edifying account. The oral nature of both stories is emphasized attesting to the veracity of the accounts. Furthermore, the reason for relating stories are the same in both cases, namely to clarify the points raised in the previous discussion.

[973] *Str.* 1.1.13.3.

[974] The handsome youth provides the starting point for a philosopher's ascent to the love of beauty in Plato's *Symposium*.

[975] Plato *Phaedrus* 254d.

[976] Plato *Timaeus* 43e.

setting.[977] Finally, the bishop enlightens the youth through baptism (cp. Clement's intention to enlighten the wealthy readers expressed in the proem in 1.4). After praising these friendly actions, Clement reproves the bishop for suddenly relaxing his special care and guardianship, and for thinking that the 'seal of the Lord' was sufficient for the youth's protection, opening the way for idle and dissolute people to corrupt him (42.5).[978]

Need for post-baptismal guidance

Clement's reproof, I suggest, may be a remonstration against the contemporary practice of some Alexandrian groups in training catechumens only up until baptism. Special care and guardianship ought to continue after baptism too. He elsewhere explains the Pauline lemma, 'to preach the Gospel beyond you' from 2 Cor. 10.15-16, as pertaining to post-baptismal instruction. Paul did not solely mean the extension of his preaching locally, but rather he is teaching that knowledge, which is the perfection of faith, *goes beyond catechetical instruction*. This has to do with both the magnitude of the Lord's teaching and the rule of the church.[979]

The point of dispute hinges on the sufficiency of the seal of the Lord. On one hand, Clement holds to an external perspective where the rite of baptism empties the soul of evil and the seal causes the soul to be filled by the good God 'in order that the holy one may be guarded by God.'[980] On the other hand, from an internal perspective, the seal corresponds to the proleptic granting of the spirit at baptism that is fulfilled after a long period of training and moral advancement, when the believer is adopted as a friend and son of God.[981] Therefore, it is still possible to fall into certain sins after the seal and redemption (cf. *QDS* 39.1). For this reason it is necessary that the young man (= wealthy believer) be enveloped in a Christian

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[977] Cf. the apostle Paul's claim, 'but we were gentle among you, even as a nurse cherishes her children' (1 Thes. 2.5-7 quoted in *Str.* 1.1.6.3).

[978] The idle and dissolute correspond to the flatterers of *QDS* 1.

[979] *Str.* 6.18.164.4. On the rule of the church see pp. 44f.

[980] *ET* 12.9. Cf. *Str.* 2.3.11.2.

[981] On friendship of God see pp. 90ff.

community under the guardianship of spiritually mature Christians even after baptism. Thus when Clement charges the bishop with being a poor guard (cf. John's retort, 'A fine guardian of our brother's soul it was that I left!') he is recalling a passage earlier in *QDS* where he exhorts the rich believer to 'obtain with your wealth men who will act as guards for your body and soul, whose commander is God' (34.2-35.2).

If the bishop/presbyter is the villain of the story then the apostle John is the hero who represents the gnostic 'man of God.' In contrast to the local bishop who befriends the youth only up until baptism and then suddenly abandons him, John acts as a true friend with enduring consequences.[982] Like the gnostic 'man of God' from *QDS* 41, John promises to represent the youth as an advocate before Christ and to secure his pardon: ἐγὼ Χριστῷ λόγον δώσω ὑπὲρ σου (42.13). Also like the gnostic 'man of God' from *QDS* 41, John is prepared to take upon himself the rich man's due punishment if needs be. The ground he gives for this promise is the example of Christ's self-sacrifice. This self-sacrificial nature of intercession is the ultimate expression of love between members in Clement's new community (cf. 37.4) and an essential element in true repentance (42.15). It recalls Jesus' saying in the fourth Gospel about there being no greater love than giving one's life on behalf of one's friends (Jn 15.13).

The apostle John's preparedness to sacrifice himself also attests to the weight of his words. In Roman culture the weight of a person's word was judged by how much was risked in speaking. Words had weight when the speaker's reputation and life were risked in speaking.[983] For example, when a common soldier arrived at the camp of Otho bringing news of defeat, he was called a liar, a coward, and a runaway by the other soldiers. To certify his words, he fell on his sword at the emperor's feet.[984] Similarly, when a natural grotto collapsed while the emperor Tiberius was dining within, Sejanus shielded him from the

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[982] Wacht, 'Wahre und falsche Armut,' 339 n.7, also notes the parallel between the example of the Apostle John's psychogogy and the *Freundschaftlehre* of the Epicureans and Stoics.

[983] Barton, *Roman Honor*, 61.

[984] Suetonius *Otho* 10.1.

falling stones with his own body: 'As a result of this act [Sejanus] was held in still greater esteem, and though his counsels were ruinous, he was listened to with confidence, as a man who had no care for himself.'[985] John's words to the young brigand are 'siren-like,' having the power to cast 'a soothing spell upon his mind' (42.15). The comforting words of a philosopher-friend are frequently described as 'siren-like' in Graeco-Roman philosophical literature. Alcibiades praises his lover Socrates for the strange effects he personally feels from his words, so much so that he is forced to withhold his ears, like Odysseus before the sirens, lest he should go on sitting beside him till old age.[986] The friends of Epicurus, and indeed all who knew him, were said to have been held fast as if 'they were by the siren-charms of his doctrines.'[987] The Epicurean Philodemus, recognizing that flatterers and wise men share similar effects on their hearers, notes that 'the wise man will never behave in the same way as a flatterer, although some could suspect him of doing so, because he bewitches the mind like the fabulous siren.'[988]

4.5.2 Closing exhortation and warning (42.16-20)

The second part of the *epilogue* in *QDS* has a lacuna of about 20 lines. The surviving text resumes in the middle of an affective figure of *enargeia* with the Saviour leading an angelic host to greet the wealthy believer (presumably at the end of his life) with the right hand and to lead him to the father's bosom (εἰς τοὺς κόλπους τοῦ πατρός) (42.6). The language of the *epopteia* recapitulates Clement's exhortation to the reader to seek admission to the κόλπος of the father in 37.1.

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[985] Tacitus *Ann.* 4.59. Cf. also Barton, *Roman Honor*, 62.

[986] Plato *Symposium* 216a.

[987] D.L. 10.9.

[988] *Herc.* 222 col 2.1-7. Cf. Glad, 'Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus,' 27n.24.

There is a curious textual problem in 42.15 where John is said either to appoint the young brigand over the church (presumably as bishop), or to restore him to the church, depending on which reading in the manuscripts is accepted. We prefer to follow Stählin's choice of ἐπιστῆσαι 'to appoint over' which is not only attested in several good manuscripts of Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical Histories,* but also explains later attempts by scribes to circumscribe the difficulty by choosing terms which suggest that the young brigand was merely restored to the church (an example of *lectio difficilior*).

Having aroused the positive emotions of his readers through the use of *enargeia*, Clement now makes his final plea for repentance by reiterating the exhortations from the preceptive section (42.17-19). Repentance is a matter of the will.[989] Readers can choose to follow Clement's advice, which is based on the prophets, Gospels and apostolic words, and entrust their future salvation (ταῦτα) to the disciples of God and to those who gives surety to God (ἐγγυητής θέῳ) on their behalf (42.17; cf. the advocatory role of the man of God in 41.5-6).[990] By dwelling with the 'disciples of God' and paying heed to and practising their deeds, the reader will see the τέλος of Clement's instructions. He who admits the angel of repentance[991] here in this life will not [need to] repent in the next life nor will he be ashamed when seeing the Saviour coming with his glory and host (42.18). He need not fear the fire (42.18; cf. 37.6).

On the other hand, readers can also choose not to follow Clement's advice and to remain in their pleasures, turning their back on the Saviour who is offering forgiveness. They should be in no doubt that they are entirely responsible for the harmful consequences of this bad choice.[992] Reading the discourse of *QDS* suffices to pre-empt one's recourse to ignorance. Therefore any sin committed after reading the discourse has to be deemed voluntary. In contrast, he who looks for salvation, desires it,[993] and asks with impudence and force,[994] will receive the true purification[995] and unchanging life from the good father (42.19),[996] all topics which are reiterated from the preceptive section.

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[989] Cf. the *peroratio* for the *Protrepticus*, 'But with you still rests the final act, namely this, to choose which is more profitable, judgement or grace' (*Prot.* 12.123.2).

[990] In contrast to the negative example of someone who gives himself as security (ἐγγυάω) for a debt (Prov. 6.1-2) quoted in *Str.* 2.15.70.4.

[991] *Str.* 1.17.85.4; Hermas *Sim.* 9.33.1.

[992] *Str.* 1.18.89.1-2.

[993] In contrast the rich man in *QDS* 10.5.

[994] *QDS* 21.3.

[995] *QDS* 38.4.

[996] *QDS* 6-8.

Clement concludes *QDS* with a doxology which brings the whole discourse to an emotional climax (42.20).[997] In blessing the father, son and Holy Spirit with glory, honour, power and eternal majesty, Clement elevates the heavenly πολιτεία at the expense of its ephemeral Graeco-Roman counterpart. The doxology reflects Clement's transformation of the problem of wealth from being solely a moral issue into a question of political and religious allegiance. The reader must choose to which πολιτεία he will give his loyalty. One cannot serve God and at the same time retain the wealth-centred customs and conventions of this world.

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[997] 1 Clem. 65.2.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

A central tenet of this study is that Clement composed *QDS* because there were pastoral problems concerning the wealthy Christians which he believed could be completely or partially removed through discourse. That is, attempts to understand *QDS* must take into account that it is a persuasive work. We saw in chapter 2 that Clement's task was complicated by the fact that, while he held a certain degree of authority as the leader of a catechetical school and as a protégé of Pantaenus, he could nevertheless expect some resistance from those who might disagree with his aim in bringing salvation to the wealthy, and from some wealthy believers themselves who might consider his advice too stringent. Therefore, Clement needed recourse to different modes of persuasion in *QDS* in addition to logical argumentation, including the need to establish goodwill with his implied readership, and occasionally to use *pathos* to affect the emotions, for example, in gaining sympathy for the plight of the wealthy Christian.

Also in chapter 2 we saw that the existence of wealthy believers in the Christian community, while necessary for the latter's economic viability, brought about several diverse problems. These problems included the wealthy believers' tendency to abuse the *Agape* and establish undesirable hierarchical relations, their attraction to the speculative systems and communal ideals of the heretics, and their susceptibility to apostasize during persecution. These problems (and undoubtedly others) may have given rise to tensions between wealthy believers and others in the community. These tensions are reflected in the conflicting interpretations of the Saviour's harsh demands on the wealthy in the Gospels held by various factions corresponding to their views on the legitimacy of wealthy believers. Some believed that the Saviour's demand that the rich man sell his possessions solely concerned the passions of the soul. Others took a more literal view and advocated that the wealthy jettison all of their material possessions. Even before composing *QDS*, Clement was probably involved in the

debate and it is likely that he had previously given sermons on this topic. That is not to say, however, that *QDS* is a recantation of a previous work. Rather *QDS* was written both to reach a wider audience and to furnish a more comprehensive treatment of the problems arising from the exclusive interpretations of Jesus' harsh demands, which could not be adequately covered by his sermons and other works of a more general nature.

QDS furnishes modern scholars with an unique lens with which to examine the ways that Clement applies his often-complex theological and philosophical concepts, which are frequently stated in abstract terms in his major works, to pastoral situations. My method in chapters 3 and 4 was to analyze the leading concepts in *QDS* in light of their treatment in Clement's major works and to see how they function in the argumentation of *QDS*. For Clement, Christianity is the true philosophy which leads to genuine piety and knowledge of God. In *QDS*, there are two overarching themes under which the leading concepts may be grouped. The progressive and teleological nature of salvation, the goal of which is friendship with God, depicts the individual striving to moderate the passions of the soul and to live in harmony with the commandments in order to be deemed worthy to become a friend of God. However, it would be wrong to suggest that Clement's ethics and soteriology are completely individualistic. This study shows that the locus for salvation is the church as a philosophical community of friends. In *QDS*, rich believers are not faced with the prospect of struggling against their passions alone in their quest for attaining friendship with God, but have a community of friends, especially the advanced believers, who can instruct and intercede on their behalf.

This study also shows that Clement's major works not only illuminate several of the ideas in *QDS* (e.g. central role of *oikeiosis* in his soteriology; the concepts of indifferents, *metriopatheia*, *apatheia*, purity of the soul, etc), but that *QDS* itself can be used to illuminate certain concepts in the major works, which otherwise would have remained obscure. For example, it is only in *QDS* that he discusses the practice of *oikeiosis* with other believers, the role of advanced Christians in the post-baptismal repentance of the rich believers, and how the salvation of wealthy believers is possible through the giving of alms.

5.1 What are rich believers to think and do?

Rich believers still have hope for salvation provided that they are prepared to follow Clement's advice. The Saviour's harsh sayings neither preclude the wealthy from salvation at the outset nor demand that they jettison all of their possessions, including those required to meet their daily needs. Friendship conventions function centrally in Clement's arguments here. Pivotal is the motif of friendship with God. The wealthy need to survey the goodness and philanthropy of God who offers perfection and *oikeiosis* with him if they so desire. Christ is the beneficent Teacher who teaches the way to friendship with God. The good Teacher would never teach anything harmful and thus he could not command the wealthy to jettison *all* their possessions. True asceticism must be based on knowledge, a necessary precondition for virtuous action, and is therefore the province of the advanced Christian and not the spiritually immature wealthy believer. Clement here shows his pastoral concern by recognizing that it would be psychologically and spiritually harmful for the immature believers to jettison *all* their possessions at this stage of their moral development.

Rather than jettisoning *all* their possessions, wealthy believers must distribute their *superfluous* wealth to the less well-off in the community. Pivotal here is the motif of friendship between people (a point ignored by several modern scholars who maintain that the topic of Christian friendship only arises in the 4th century). The Christian community is based on reciprocity between its members where all needs, both spiritual and material, are supplied. In this way we see that living in moderation is closely tied to the practice of κοινωνία. God's providence is conceived by Clement in terms of the ancient notion of the limited good;[998] all believers will have sufficient to live on provided that everyone practises moderation. Immediately some members begin to appropriate more than their needs, others will invariably miss out. Therefore practice of community involves *both* the sharing of superfluous wealth with those who need *and* the fostering of long-term, albeit hierarchical, friendships. Superfluous wealth is dangerous to the rich and gives rise to the irrational passions, but it is

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[998] On the limited good see pp. 65f.

also an external or indifferent which can be used in a moral action. By distributing their superfluous wealth to those who need, the wealthy will be aiding themselves, dispensing with that which is harmful.

5.2 Clement's 'chaplaincy to the rich'

Up to this point, we have been focusing on two pastoral concerns which happen to be complementary. In the first case, wealthy believers who desire to be saved must moderate their passions by divesting themselves of superfluous wealth and thereby subsist on a basic self-sufficiency. In the second, the daily needs of less well-off members of the community can only be met through the superfluous wealth of wealthy believers. The solution which is proposed in the first half of *QDS* is able to resolve both concerns simultaneously, to kill two birds with one stone. Wealthy believers simply need to distribute their superfluous wealth to the less well-off in their community. In so doing, they will be in a better position to moderate their irrational passions, *both* by the act of sharing *and* through the actual reduction of superfluous possessions, and, at the same time, the less well-off members will have their daily needs supplied.

However, in the second half of *QDS* Clement introduces another pastoral concern which serves to complicate his previous pastoral advice. This has to do with the so-called 'chaplaincy to the rich.' Wealthy believers are in such a precarious state with regards to their salvation that they require a trainer, advocate, and spiritual patron, in order to progress along the path towards perfection. Clement conjoins this concern with the two concerns introduced previously in the first half of *QDS* to furnish a single complex pastoral remedy. On one hand, he appeals for the rich to provide for the needs of less well-off members on account of their connexion with the Saviour (31.1). On the other hand, the rich believer needs to make friends with an advanced Christian (= man of God = friend of God = gnostic) who has the power to confer upon him an 'eternal tent' (31.5-6). These two demands are of course logically independent. Nevertheless, Clement is able to harmonize them by drawing upon the Roman cultural convention of initiating friendships through bestowing benefits and adapting the prevalent culture's ideology on patronage. The wealthy believer is to plead with the advanced

Christian to accept his financial benefit. This will oblige the advanced Christian to act as his spiritual patron and reciprocate with spiritual benefits (32.6). Since the task of discerning who is worthy is beyond the spiritual ken of the wealthy believer, not yet being fully wise, he must distribute his superfluous wealth as broadly as possible without discrimination. This has the twofold effect of allaying the needs of a larger number of less well-off members and increasing the rich believers' chances of finding an advanced Christian with the power to save (33.3).

5.3 How distinctive was Clement in *QDS*?

The church, for Clement, is an ideal friendship community, composed of long-term hierarchical and reciprocal relationships, where God's benefits are mediated to all believers via the services (predominately teaching, training and intercession) of the advanced Christian, the gnostic; the wealthy believers reciprocate by furnishing the material needs of less well-off members, among whom may be some gnostics. In the church, the wealthy believer is not left alone in his struggle against the passions of the soul but is to submit to the spiritual patronage of the advanced Christian who teaches him and intercedes before God on his behalf (41.1-6).

Jerusalem collection

To appreciate the distinctiveness of Clement's schema of the relationships between the wealthy and less well-off members of the community it is worthwhile to compare it with similar precedents in other early Christian writings. An obvious example is the apostle Paul's collection for the Jerusalem church.[999] Paul wanted his readers to regard their resources as held in common with other Christians as a sign of κοινωνία, a proof of mutual love.[1000] The decision for the churches in Macedonia and Achaia to participate in the collection for the Jerusalem church was wholly theirs, and not a matter of compulsion.[1001] Nevertheless, the Roman Christians are indebted to the Jerusalem 'poor.' Paul's motivation is based on

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[999] Obligation to the Jerusalem 'poor' had been readily accepted by Paul in the agreement achieved in Gal. 2.9-10. Cf. J. D.G. Dunn, *Romans 9-16*, Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 38B (Dallas TX: Word, 1999), 876.

[1000] Rom. 12.13.

[1001] Rom. 15.25-27; 1Cor. 16.1-3; 2 Cor. 9.1-12; Acts 24.17. Cf. Dunn, *Romans 9-16*, 874-875.

salvation-history where the flow of God's grace is from Jew to Gentile. It betokens the tribute of the Gentiles in the final days from such texts as trito-Isaiah. The reciprocity is unequal; Gentiles have received spiritual things and ought to minister to the Jewish 'poor' in material things.[1002]

In the Jerusalem collection we have a certain precedent with the 'wealthy' (Gentile Christians) being obliged to support the 'poor' (Jewish Christians). However, the privileged spiritual status of the 'poor' has as much to do with their religious ethnicity and salvation-history as the Jewish idea of their dependence on God for their daily needs.[1003] In contrast, Clement's 'poor' have a privileged spiritual status on account of their having attained an advanced spiritual rank through *askesis* and *oikeiosis* and not simply on account of their relative poverty.[1004] Therefore, it is not surprising that there exists no provision in the Pauline epistles for the 'poor' to intercede, teach and guide the 'rich' as there is in *QDS*. Furthermore, the Jerusalem collection does not allow for a continuing reciprocity between the 'rich' and the 'poor.'

Parable of the elm and vine from the Shepherd

More fruitful (if the reader will excuse my pun) in our search for early Christian precedents is the exposition of the parable of the elm and the vine from the *Shepherd of Hermas*. The reciprocity between rich and poor believers is explained by the observable mutual dependence of the elm and vine. The elm (= rich believer), being a fruit-less tree, is not able to produce fruit by itself. The vine (= poor believer) can bear fruit but not when it is on the ground where it is susceptible to rot. However, when the vine is suspended from the elm then it, in a sense, bears much fruit for both itself and the elm. In the same way, the rich believer, being busied about his riches, is spiritually poor, being too feeble to make intercession before God. But when the rich believer rests upon the poor, and gives him what

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[1002] Rom. 15.27.

[1003] The privileged religious status of the poor is certainly present in the epistle of James 1.9; 2.5.

[1004] On Clement's conjunction of gnostic and relative poor see pp. 205f.; 221ff.

he needs, he knows that this will find a reward with God, for the intercession of the poor believer, being spiritually rich, has great power. Thus we have a continual reciprocity where the rich believer helps the poor in all things without hesitation; and the poor believer, being helped by the rich, intercedes for him, giving thanks to God for his master (τῷ κυρίῳ) who constantly supplies his needs. Together they produce a continuous good work.[1005]

In the passage from the *Shepherd* we have a spiritualization of the institution of patronage; the *obsequium* and *operae* owed by the client (= poor believer) to a patron (= rich believer; note the appellation τῷ κυρίῳ above) takes the form of intercessory prayer.[1006] In *QDS*, the institution of patronage is also employed to describe the relation between the rich and 'poor' but their status is the other way round. The 'poor' disciple (= advanced Christian), being a friend of God, acts as the spiritual patron, functioning as broker of God's *gratia* to the community, including the wealthy, while the wealthy believer is in effect a *cliens* who must become a friend of the friend of God (33.1). The distinctiveness of Clement's schema in *QDS* becomes more evident when one appreciates that there is no expectation in the *Shepherd* that the poor will train and guide the rich. The advanced Christian, who trains, guides and interecedes on behalf of the wealthy, thereby can be regarded as a precursor to the later 'poor' holy man who acts as a spiritual patron to the rich in the late Roman Empire.[1007]

5.4 How radical was Clement in *QDS*?

In the introduction of this study I called into question an assessment by Countryman, but also held by several other scholars, that the whole of *QDS* is devoted to vindicating the possibility that the wealthy could be saved *even as rich*. Even prior to undertaking any analysis of the text I put forward three well-known elements of Clement's thought and

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[1005] *Sim.* 2.5.

[1006] There is some question raised in the *Shepherd* as to whether the reciprocity between rich and poor was worked out at the communal church level or through individual patron-client relationships; that is, whether the initiative was left to individuals or if there was in place a centralized charity distribution. Osiek, *Shepherd of Hermas*, 163-164, suspects that it is probably both.

[1007] P. Brown, 'The Rise and Function of the Holy Man, 1971-1997,' *JECS* 6 (1998), 353-376; Schwartz, *Imperialism and Jewish Society*, 196. Similar developments were happening concurrently in Carthage as evinced from Tertullian's writings where would-be martyrs act as spiritual patrons of the rich. See McGowan, 'Disciple and Diet,' 464-468.

interpretative method that seemed to conflict with this assessment including: a) the progressive and teleological nature of salvation; b) Clement's exegetical method which holds various deeper levels of interpretation yet rarely negates the plain sense of a scriptural passage; and c) Clement's treatment of wealth in his other works.

Indeed, having now completed a thorough analysis of *QDS* it seems that my initial suspicions were well-founded. First, if the analysis is anywhere near the mark, it does not seem that Clement directly addresses the question of whether the wealthy who remain wealthy can be saved in this treatise. It is, at most, peripheral to his thought. Indeed, his major concern is to address the opposite question of whether the wealthy must jettison *all* possessions in order to be saved. The closest that he comes to addressing the former question is in the hortatory section (chs 4-27) which addresses the issue as to whether or not wealthy believers are hopelessly and inexorably *precluded* from salvation. It is important to recognize that these two propositions are not equivalent. It is one thing to say that the wealthy are not necessarily precluded from salvation. It is quite another to suggest that they can be saved *even as rich*. The two statements are not simply corollaries of each other. In the hortatory section he intends to show that wealthy believers are called, precisely because all believers are called, and therefore there are still some grounds for hope (cf. 25.2). Thus it is fair to say that the wealthy are called even as rich (hence the examples of Zacchaeus, Matthew and Levi in *QDS*13). But the proposition that wealthy believers are called even as rich implies nothing in itself about the final economic and moral status of the believer when he attains to the τέλος of salvation, taking into account the progressive nature of Clement's salvific scheme.[1008]

The called and the chosen

In his other writings, Clement distinguishes between those *called* and those *chosen* based on the dominical saying: 'Many are *called* but few are *chosen*' (Mt. 20.16; 22.14).[1009]

[1008] Hence the title of *QDS* has σῳζόμενος and not σῳθείς.

[1009] Parallel to the Socratic adage, 'For there are in the mysteries many bearers of the thyrsus, but few bacchanals,' *Phaedo* 69d; *Str.* 1.19.92.4; 3.10.69.1. The called are servants of God but the chosen are sons. Cf. *Str.* 6.7.60.3.

Certainly, this saying has to be seen in light of his polemic against the deterministic views held by the Valentinians and other heretical groups; God is just and does not create some elect and others fleshly by nature. But it also leads to the key tenet of Clement that the call to salvation is open to all people (whether wealthy or not) who have both the freewill to choose to contend for salvation and the responsibility to make themselves worthy to be chosen. Salvation is the τέλος of living the philosophical life and is largely conceived of in terms of sonship and friendship with God. Our study has shown that friendship with God is the τέλος of the process built around the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiosis* where new believers begin with an incipient self-awareness and knowledge about God, and, motivated by self-love implanted in them at the time of their creation, obey the commandments through hope and fear. The very act of obeying the commandments over a period of time has ethical, epistemological and ontological ramifications, where believers through habit gradually become able to moderate their passions (*metriopatheia*) and increasingly use reason in choosing the good and rejecting the harmful through acting in harmony with the author of the commandments, the Logos. Since the commandments themselves reveal something of the beneficent nature of the Good, the believers increasingly long for the Good, desiring to draw near to the good God by being like him in conduct and thought. This corresponds to a second type of *oikeiosis* where the advanced believers move from attachment to themselves as their sole ethical driving force to the desire for attachment with God. Thus, rather than obeying the commandments through fear and hope believers are now inspired by their love for God. In response to the believer's love and obedience, God deems the believer to be worthy of being *chosen* and adopts him as son and friend, granting him the gift of his spirit which enables the believer to attain to the passionless state and thus to ascend to knowledge, perfection and assimilation to God.

Within this soteriological schema Countryman's assessment has no place. The suggestion that Clement is trying to reassure the wealthy that they do not have to separate from their superfluous wealth and live on a frugal self-sufficiency is antithetical to his doctrine of *oikeiosis* where believers gradually grow to despise the mundane things, which allured them

in the past, and become increasingly drawn towards intellectual objects. Clement describes this process in terms of a commercial transaction where wealthy believers are able to exchange their superfluous wealth for incorruptible and eternal wealth (32.1-4). This exchange necessarily involves the indiscriminate distribution of one's superfluous wealth to less well-off members of the community (19.6).

Second, the supposition that the wealthy can be saved even as rich is based on fundamental misunderstandings of Clement's conceptions of indifference and sufficiency. Countryman echoes the views held by later Roman Stoics, when he claims that Clement saw wealth as 'something to disentangle oneself from spiritually, but one may continue to possess it in material terms,' and thereby exaggerates the correct inner attitude at the expense of the correct use of wealth. Clement's own position is that it is unthinkable for an individual to have a correct inner attitude while retaining superfluous wealth (20.5-6). It is impossible for a man to be both wealthy in material terms and to live the philosophical life.[1010] Clement's idea of sufficiency becomes increasingly ascetic as the believer progresses towards perfection. It should not be confounded with the elitist views of Cicero and Pliny the Younger who, though perhaps the ancient equivalents of multi-millionaires, could feel that they had no superfluity.[1011] Clement's understanding of sufficiency is clearly influenced more by Socrates, Jesus, and the apostles, all of whom were relatively poor.

Third, Countryman's supposition fails to take into account the persuasive nature of *QDS*, taking at face value, for example, such statements as 'Say, and Christ will not lead you away from possession [for] God does not envy' (24.1). As we have seen, the context of the passage requires that the statement be understood as a rhetorical thought figure called an *epitrope*, where the author pretends to dare the reader to act contrary to that which he is advocating. The function of the *epitrope* in 24.1 is to emphasize the need to abandon the superfluous possessions which threaten to ruin the believer in 24.2.

[1010] *Str.* 2.5.22.3.

[1011] Contra Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle*, 438.

Occasionally, Clement lays more stress on the deeper interpretation (where 'possessions' signify 'passions'), while relegating, but never negating, the (qualified) plain meaning. This is for three reasons: first, to repudiate those who insisted that the wealthy jettison *all* their material possessions; second, for the purpose of establishing goodwill with his readers by showing that his interpretation is both appropriate to the Saviour and superior to those proffered by others; and third, because the state of the soul and the elimination of passions are fundamental to his soteriology.

A comparison with the Pelagian work 'De Divitiis'

How radical was Clement in *QDS*? To assess just how radical Clement was towards wealth and the wealthy in *QDS* it may be worthwhile to compare his thoughts with those espoused two centuries later in the anonymous Pelagian work, *De Divitiis* (*DD*),[1012] a work which some scholars do take to be radical.[1013] There seem to be several areas in which both Clement and the author of *DD* share similar views.

1. Both agree that rich believers need to obey Christ's commandments in order to be saved, with special reference to the injunction in Mt. 25.31-46 that they provide for the needs of the poorer members (*DD* 13.6; 14.1; 18.4; cf. *QDS* 30).
2. Both hold that Jesus' commandments do not require rich believers to jettison *all* of their possessions but rather that they separate from their *superfluous* possessions leaving themselves a basic self-sufficiency. The author of *DD* defines riches not as gold or silver or any other created thing but as superfluous wealth (*DD* 10.10; cf. *QDS* 19.5-6). Clement would add the necessity for the rich person to moderate his passions (*QDS* 16.1-2) while the author of *DD* would also countenance, in addition, the option for the rich person to become poor should he so choose (*DD* 18.1).

[1012] The text of *DD* is from A. Bradstock and C. Rowland, *Radical Christian Writings: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002).

[1013] Bradstock and Rowland, *Radical Christian writings*, 13, claim that Pelagius takes 'a much harder line than is found in Clement of Alexandria's *Quis dives salvetur?*' Cf. also Clark, *Reading renunciation*, 97-99.

3. Both hold that riches are not evil in themselves but that superfluous wealth can give rise to sin (*DD* 7.5; 17.3; cf. *QDS* 19.6).

4. Both hold to the ancient economic idea of limited goods. The author of *DD* asserts, 'Get rid of the rich man, and you will not be able to find a poor one. Let no man have more than he really needs, and everyone will have as much as they need, since the few who are rich are the reason for the many who are poor' (*DD* 12.1; cf. *Paed.* 2.12.120.4-5).

The differences in emphasis between the two works stem from their opposite points of reference. Clement is exhorting wealthy readers who are despairing on account of the exclusivist interpretations of the Saviour's commands, by showing that salvation is still open to them provided that they distribute their superfluous possessions to the less well-off and submit to the patronage of an advanced Christian. The author of *DD* on the other hand is admonishing the wealthy who are wilfully circumventing the demands of the Saviour's injunctions through specious interpretations that are construed to justify their retention of superfluous wealth and to neglect the plight of the less well-off. Both Clement and the author of *DD* otherwise seem to have very similar views on wealth and the dilemma of the wealthy. These similarities suggest that *QDS* is more radical than commonly presupposed.

5.5 Will the rich believer eventually no longer be rich?

If Clement was not trying to vindicate the possibility that the wealthy could be saved *even as rich* in *QDS*, does that mean that he envisaged that rich believers, who followed his advice in giving indiscriminately, would, after an extended period of time, be no longer rich? That is, would the rich ultimately arrive at the stage where their superfluous possessions are so depleted through unbridled almsgiving that they are no longer in a position to support others? Or does Clement regard the resources of rich believers to be inexhaustible and thus the rich would be in the position to support the less well-off in the community indefinitely?

It seems that he was not directly concerned with such questions in his treatise. His focus was on the more immediate task of exhorting those wealthy believers who were on the brink of leaving the church to renew the contest for salvation by giving indiscriminately to the less

well-off and submitting to advanced Christians as their spiritual guides. That is not to say, however, that these questions are not worth asking. There seems to have been a (genuine or imagined) sentiment in antiquity that one's private resources were not inexhaustible, no matter how abundant, and that unrestrained generosity could indeed threaten personal impoverishment. We have already seen two examples of this. Critobulus sought counsel from Socrates because he feared that he was in danger of becoming poorer than his φίλοι who continuously expected him to help them out.[1014] Cicero claimed that the maxim 'having all things in common' did not entail that one's private property be affected. Rather, one ought to guard against being overly generous and squandering unnecessarily one's private possessions. Private resources are finite, the number of needy infinite.[1015]

However, the idea of intentional self-impoverishment from unbridled almsgiving could also be regarded positively by some early Christians. The author of *DD* envisages a stage of perfection where the wealthy willingly become poor through their continued beneficence, to the extent that they are no longer able to fulfil the obligations of compassion. This causes no insurmountable problems for the community at large, for in God's providence other wealthy believers will take their place (*DD* 12.3-4). Evidently the injunctions for sharing are no longer incumbent on the erstwhile wealthy at this point.

Even though Clement does not address these questions directly, some indication of his thoughts about them may be gleaned from the following three observations arising from this study. First, he advocates indiscriminate almsgiving without being concerned about the need to preserve one's riches (with the exception of retaining a frugal self-sufficiency). This is a significant departure from the conventional wisdom of Cicero (above) and Aristotle whose liberal man is concerned not to give to the wrong people, nor at the wrong time, for exceeding the limit of his resources, he would not be able to support the right ones.[1016]

[1014] See fn. 840.

[1015] See pp. 179f.

[1016] Cp. *EN* 1120b20-27 with *QDS* 32.2-3 on pp. 197ff.

Second, Clement maintains that superfluous possessions give rise to the irrational passions of the soul and thus it is imperative that the rich separate themselves from them.[1017] Indiscriminate sharing corresponds to the proper *use* of superfluous possessions, and as such is an appropriate, if not, at least in the early stages of a believer's ethical progression, a completely virtuous action. Nevertheless, the act of indiscriminate sharing, over an extended period of time, ultimately is the means by which the rich believer excises from himself the superfluous possessions which hinder his salvation.

The third and, in my view, the most convincing observation has to do with Clement's aspirations for the wealthy readers. He is not offering them the concessional option of settling for what he labels elsewhere as 'simple salvation,' which is attainable through the intermediate state of *metriopatheia*. Nowhere in *QDS* is the mere moderation of the irrational passions put forward as the end goal. Rather, having moderated their passions, the wealthy are to strive for perfection and ultimately to attain the passionless state of the gnostic.[1018] In his schema, the wealthy, through living in harmony with the commandments, will naturally be drawn away from their attachment to sensible wealth. All their efforts will be directed towards making themselves worthy to attain to friendship and *oikeiosis* with God, magnanimously despising money, and achieving an ascetic self-sufficiency.

Therefore, it would at least not be inconsistent with Clement's depiction of the gnostic in the *Stromateis* to suggest that the rich believer could conceivably, over an extended period of time of unrestrained liberality and *askesis*, become poor, while attaining to the passionless state. In his love for God and his fellow believers, the gnostic is prepared to impoverish himself by giving to all that need.[1019] Having attained the state of the 'perfect' man, the gnostic becomes an instrument of God's goodness, even though he may no longer be able to give from his own depleted resources. He does not ask for an abundance of wealth to bestow

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[1017] See discussion on *QDS* 19.5-6 on pp. 144f.

[1018] Salvation is for passionless souls. See pp. 126ff.; 147ff.

[1019] *Str.* 7.12.69.1-4.

on the poor but prays that God himself will raise others to supply their needs. And by his prayer, the needs of the poor will be supplied, without his knowledge and without vainglory.[1020] This notion would be in harmony with Clement's other depiction of the gnostic as one who, though having renounced sexual activity in marriage, continues to generate good men through teaching.[1021] The friendship offered by the gnostic, who was formerly wealthy, to others in the Christian community is thereby transformed from its initial utilitarian kind (i.e. benefiting others with his wealth in order to receive salvation) to entirely altruistic (i.e. interceding for and instructing others for their own good), his intercession and instruction now constituting a higher plane of beneficence (κυριακῆ εὐποιία).[1022]

[1020] *Str.* 7.13.81.4-5. Cf. *DD* 12.3-4 above.

[1021] *Str.* 7.9.52.1-2.

[1022] *Str.* 4.6.29.2.

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