Where do Peacekeepers go?
Unpacking the Determinants of UNSC-Authorized Peace Operation Deployments

Evgenija Kroeker

Nuffield College

University of Oxford

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Hilary 2023

51,471 Words

Abstract

Where do peacekeepers go? A common assumption in the quantitative study of peace operations is that that peacekeepers are most likely to be sent to difficult-to-resolve conflicts. However, a closer look at the literature reveals that our knowledge on this issue is far from conclusive. Although we know that deployment is not random, we have yet to confidently identify the factors that drive this selection process. The present thesis revisits the question of where peacekeepers go. The starting point of the theoretical and empirical inquiry is the very beginning of the United Nation Security Council's (UNSC) decision-making process. The first paper develops and statistically tests a novel theory on the role that interests of peacekeeping troop contributing countries can play in formal UNSC agenda-setting. The second paper explores the relation between the quality of the UNSC debates following agenda-setting and the time it takes the Council to authorize a first UN or non-UN peace operation to manage a civil conflict. The third paper presents novel time-varying data on 49 different mandate components of all UN and non-UN peace operations deployed to Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019. This approach yields important insights on the role that interests from actors other than the fifteen Council members play in relation to where peacekeepers might eventually get sent. Furthermore, the empirical evidence presented in this thesis indicates that only certain conflict characteristics and attributes of the country experiencing civil strife play a role for the non-random assignment of UNSC-authorized peace operations.

Acknowledgments

My deepest gratitude goes to my advisors, Professors Andrea Ruggeri and Duncan Snidal, for their unwavering support, patience, and guidance throughout my doctoral journey. Your expertise, constructive feedback and encouragement have been invaluable to me, and your belief in my work has been a constant source of motivation. Thank you for the countless meetings (online and offline), coffee chats, and doctoral workshops - your diverse perspectives and suggestions have enriched my research in fundamental ways and I am very grateful to have had the opportunity to work with you.

A special thank you also goes to Nuffield College for providing me with a warm and supportive environment conducive to learning, innovation, and personal growth. I feel very lucky to have had the chance to become a member of this college, to contribute to its professional and social life, and benefit from the many perks it offers its graduate students. Many thanks to Eleni for always supporting the Conflict Dynamics Workshop; to Giuliana and Olivier for helping me out with the (culinary) logistics for this event; and to Natalia, Amy, Ryan and the rest of the staff for ensuring that everything runs smoothly. Most importantly, thank you Nick for recruiting me into the organizing committee. I am so happy to have met you and Anna-Lena and organise these workshops together for the past five years. A big thank you also goes to Laure, Julia, Elli, Hailey, Sam, Emily, Peer, Jan, Said, Ahmed, Chris, Tom, Raluca, and Natasha - your reassurance, warmth, camaraderie, support and the occasional pub night have helped me survive the first two years of the PhD. Thank you also to Benoit and Guillermo for always being up for a fun night. And Maline, I cannot even describe how gratifying, motivating, and fulfilling it was to work with you on our mandates data.

Heartfelt thanks to the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School for providing me with an academic home in Berlin during the pandemic. Special thanks goes to the Centre's early career researchers - Christian, Alex, Allison, Sara, Maurice and Matthias - who integrated me into their community and were kind enough to support me emotionally and help me out tremendously in the last months of my PhD. I am forever grateful that I had the opportunity to share an office with you. A big thank you also to Professor Julian Wucherpfennig who sparked my motivation to pursue an academic profession while supervising my Master thesis and who encouraged me to do peacekeeping research in the first place. Lucie - thank you for having been my Oxford mate during this time; i's only proper that we are also graduating together. I would like to further thank Professors Mark Dawson and

Pierre Thielbörger, Theresa - my partner in crime - as well as our students - Linn, Hashem, Juri, Jessica, and Malte - for another wild (and fun) ride with the Jessup Moot Court. We definitely crushed it.

Many many thanks also to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University for showing me that life outside work is possible and that you can indeed be an academic from 9 to 5. A heartfelt thank you goes to Professor Lisa Hultman for agreeing to invite me way back in 2019 when I sort of ambushed you in Genoa and for eventually hosting me in the spring of 2022 (thanks for nothing, Covid). I am so grateful for this experience - to have finally seen where the UCDP magic happens, to have celebrated the Department's 50-year anniversary and some PhD defences, and to have gotten to know all the kind and brilliant early career researchers, including Susanne, Karin, Jenniina, Gulla, Maxine, Herman, Diego, Giacomo, and Eric.

Last but not least, I am immensely grateful for the support of my friends and family during the writing of this thesis, their unwavering faith in my abilities and their unconditional love. I wish to especially thank Sandra, Helen, Stefan, Finn, Marc, Anne, and Paul, who stood by me through the highs and lows, always offering words of encouragement. My biggest thanks go to my mum and dad - без вас я бы никогда не достиггла всего этого.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction 1

1.1 Guiding research question and motivation 1

1.2 Three decision-making stages, three research articles 4

1.2.1 UNSC agenda-setting: 'Gatekeeping through Peacekeeping? Troop contributing countries and UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts' 4

1.2.2 UNSC deliberations: 'Talking the talk until walking the walk? Quality of deliberation and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization' 6

1.2.3 UNSC mandate design: 'What are they (t)asked to do? Introducing the Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset' 8

Chapter 2. Gatekeeping through Peacekeeping? Troop contributing countries and UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts 12

2.1 Introduction 12

2.2 Prior research: Determinants of UNSC agenda-setting 14

2.3 Theoretical framework: The role of TCCs in UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts 17

2.3.1 Which UNSC 'agenda'? 17

2.3.2 How does a civil conflict enter the UNSC's public formal agenda? 19

2.3.3 TCCs and UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts 20

2.4 Research Design 24

2.4.1 Case selection and analytical sample 24

2.4.2 Dependent variable 26

2.4.3 Main independent variable(s) 28

2.4.4 Control variables 33

2.4.5 Estimation strategy 34

2.5 Results 34

2.6 Discussion and conclusion 42

Appendix 46

Chapter 3. 'Talking the talk until walking the walk'? Quality of deliberation and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization 51

3.1 Introduction 51

3.2 Prior research: Determinants of UNSC reaction time 54

3.3 Theoretical framework: Discourse quality and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization 55

3.3.1 What 'discourse'? 55
3.3.2 Different modes of communication and discourse 'quality' 57
3.3.3 Discourse quality and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization 63
3.4 Research design 64
3.4.1 Case selection and analytical sample 64
3.4.2 Dependent variable 65
3.4.3 Main independent variable 67
3.4.3.1 First dimension: Equal participation 69
3.4.3.2 Second dimension: Level of justification 70
3.4.3.3 Third dimension: Content of justification 78
3.4.4 Estimation strategy 78
3.5 Results 79
3.5.1 Equal participation 79
3.5.2 Level of justification 83
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 90
Appendix 94

Chapter 4. What are they (t)asked to do? Introducing the Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset 97
4.1 Introduction 97
4.2 The case for a new dataset 99
4.3 Introducing the Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset 100
4.4 Visualising the POM Data 104
4.6 An empirical application 119
4.7 Conclusion 128
Appendix 131

Chapter 5. Conclusion 140

Bibliography 147

List of Tables

Table 2.1. UNSC meeting formats 17
Table 2.2. Distribution of civil conflicts and observations in the UCDP/PRIO ACD, 1946-2021 25
Table 2.3. Top 10 TCCs over time, 1990-2018 29
Table 2.4. Determinants of UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts, 1990-2019 36
Table 2.5. Determinants of UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts with interaction effects 38
Table 2.6. Robustness check: Estimation of Table 2.4 with different samples 46
Table 2.7. Robustness check: Estimation of Table 2.4 with OLS 47
Table 2.8. Robustness check: Estimation of Table 2.5 with OLS 48
Table 2.9. Robustness check (Table 2.5): Logistic regression 49
Table 3.1. Functions of formal public UNSC meetings and relation to discourse quality 63
Table 3.2. Descriptive information on civil conflicts in analytical sample 66
Table 3.3. Number of substantive speeches and meetings prior to UNSC peacekeeping authorization by case 68
Table 3.4. Viewpoints and arguments UNSC members and other speakers can refer to in public formal discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization 73
Table 3.5. Top 20 words per topic identified for the public formal UNSC discourse on Burundi 77
Table 3.6. Relative speech frequency, differences in speech length and time to peace operation authorization (UNSC vs Other) 82
Table 3.7. Topic diversity and topic identification across cases 84
Table 3.8. Top 5 topics by case and peace operation authorization speed 89
Table 3.9. Case selection 94
Table 3.10. Relative speech frequency, differences in speech length and time to peace operation authorization (UNSC vs Other) 96
Table 4.1. Number of peace operations in the POM Data by actor 102
Table 4.2. Mandate components in the POM Data 103
Table 4.3. Number and percent of POs mandated to interact with other POs by actor 109
Table 4.4. Frequency and percent of placements in PO sequences by actor 115
Table 4.5. Effect of number of mandate components in UN, regional and international missions on government one-sided violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2016 121
Table 4.6. Effect of the number of mandate components in UN, regional and international missions on rebel one-sided violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2016 122
Table 4.7. Effect of different mandate components of UN, regional and international mission on one-sided violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2016 124

List of Figures

Figure 2.1. Number of times a country was among the top 10 TCCs, 1990-2018 30
Figure 2.2. Average predicted probabilities conditional on TCC contiguity 39
Figure 2.3. Difference in average predicted probabilities conditional on TCC contiguity 39
Figure 2.4. Average predicted probabilities conditional on TCC trade 41
Figure 2.5. Difference in average predicted probabilities conditional on TCC trade and number of TCC that are E10 41
Figure 3.1 Variation in time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization for analytical sample 66
Figure 3.2. Average speech frequency by speaker and conflict (UNSC vs Other) 80
Figure 3.3. Average speech length by speaker and conflict (UNSC vs Other) 81
Figure 3.4. Topic shares across cases 87
Figure 3.5. Average speech frequency by speaker and conflict (E10 vs P5) 95
Figure 3.6. Average speech length by speaker and conflict (E10 vs P5) 95
Figure 4.1. Number of mandate components for the median PO by actor, conflict and over time 105
Figure 4.2. Comparison of mandate components between actors 106
Figure 4.3. Comparison of mandate components over time 107
Figure 4.4. Number of POs, simultaneous POs, and POs with a specific mandate to coordinate with other POs, 1990-2019 112
Figure 4.5. Similarity of mandate tasks among simultaneous POs in the CAR 113
Figure 4.6. Percent of UN POs mandated to perform security/protection or peace-/state building tasks by placement in sequential POs 117
Figure 4.7. Percent of non-UN POs mandated to perform security/protection or peace-/state building tasks by placement in sequential POs 118

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Guiding research question and motivation

Where do peacekeepers go? A common assumption in the quantitative literature on (United Nations (UN)) peace operations (POs) is that peacekeepers are sent to so-called 'hard' cases, that is, to civil conflicts which exhibit certain characteristics that make them more challenging to resolve (see, e.g., Fortna and Howard 2008; Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2021). First prominently introduced by Fortna (2004), the concept of the 'degree of difficulty' of a conflict in terms of the likelihood of its successful resolution has guided many of the systematic analyses on the determinants of PO deployment. Thus far, three dimensions have been identified as complicating the settlement of armed intrastate conflicts.

First, specific dynamics and characteristics of the war itself are assumed to make it harder to resolve. These include a high intensity of fighting between warring parties as measured by fatality counts (Aydin 2010; Derouen Jr 2003; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Stojek and Tir 2015); the type of violence perpetrated in the course of the conflict, such as sexual violence (Hultman and Johansson 2017), violence against civilians (Hultman 2013), and mass killings (Melander 2009); a relatively long conflict duration (Derouen Jr 2003; Gilligan and Stedman 2003); a high number of warring parties and strong rebel groups (Derouen Jr 2003; Fortna 2004, 2008); as well as the manner in which the conflict terminates, with stalemates thought to constitute more difficult-to-resolve cases (Fortna 2004, 2008; Mullenbach 2005; Stojek and Tir 2015).

Second, certain attributes of the country in which a conflict is taking place are held to be correlated with higher degrees of difficulty. In particular, this is assumed to be the case when the government disposes of a large army (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Stojek and Tir 2015); relies heavily on natural resource exports (ibid; Aydin 2010); and is an autocracy rather than a democracy (ibid). Third, conflicts that engage different (direct) interests of the international community's major powers are considered to be harder to resolve (Fortna 2008; Mullenbach 2005; Stojek and Tir 2015).

As Fortna (2004, 271) notes, however, "[...] looks, especially first glances, can be deceiving." A more in-depth review of the literature on where (UN) peacekeepers go reveals that different studies find divergent directions of association between those factors that are believed to characterise more difficult conflicts and the likelihood of (UN) peacekeeping deployment.

For example, while Gilligan and Stedman (2003), Derouen Jr (2003), Mullenbach (2005), and Aydin (2010) find that increasing numbers of battle-related fatalities are positively and significantly correlated with the deployment of UN POs, studies by Fortna (2004, 2008), Stojek and Tir (2015) as well as Hultman and Johansson (2017) do not corroborate these findings. Similarly, Gilligan and Stedman (2003) as well as Derouen Jr (2003) find that UN peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely to be deployed to longer civil conflicts, whereas Fortna (2004), Mullenbach (2005) as well as Stojek and Tir (2015) do not.

Furthermore, while Gilligan and Stedman (2003) as well as Fortna (2004) find that civil conflict countries with governments that dispose of large armies are less likely to see the deployment of a UN PO, Fortna (2008) finds that this relationship is only significant for missions that are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, i.e. do not have a mandate to use force. Stojek and Tir (2015), on the other hand, do not find a significant correlation between these two variables.

Moreover, Fortna's (2004) results suggest that the UN is less likely to send peacekeepers to civil conflict countries that are heavily dependent on the export of natural resources, whereas Fortna (2008), Aydin (2010) as well as Stojek and Tir (2015) do not find any statistically significant evidence in this regard.

Lastly, findings on the direction of association between the interests of major powers in relation to specific civil conflicts and the likelihood of UN peacekeeping deployment are also inconclusive. For example, Stojek and Tir (2015) observe that POs are more likely to be deployed by the UN the greater the trade ties between the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the country experiencing conflict. On the other hand, Mullenbach (2005) and Fortna (2008) find that these missions are less likely to be deployed to former P5 colonies, those countries that are geographically proximate to P5 states or can be considered 'regional' powers themselves.

Consequently, we do not really know where peacekeepers are most likely to go and which determinants influence the decision of the UNSC to authorize the deployment of a PO to address a particular civil conflict. Although we know that deployment is not random (see, e.g., Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017), we have thus far not been able to very confidently point out the factors that drive this selection process.

From a policy perspective, this question might seem moot. Looking at variation in sub-national deployment of UN peacekeepers, Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2018) and Costalli

(2014), for example, find that, once deployed on the ground, peacekeeping personnel is more likely to be dispatched to areas within a country that are more conflict-prone and exhibit higher levels of violence. Consequently, it might not matter for the UNSC or the UN Secretariat whether POs go to conceptually harder cases as long as they go where they are needed most and do what they are supposed to once they are already deployed.

However, from an academic perspective, this question is of great importance, both methodologically and theoretically. In relation to the first point, having a clear understanding of the determinants that drive peacekeeping deployment is crucial for the study of peacekeeping effectiveness. In evaluating whether peacekeeping helps prolong the duration of peace after civil wars (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004), protect civilians from government and rebel violence (Bove and Ruggeri 2016; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013) or reduce the level of hostilities (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014), researchers always have to control for the non-random assignment of POs to be able to draw sound causal inferences. Various sophisticated methods, such as matching (see Fjelde et al. 2019) and instrumental variables (Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020), can help researchers mitigate and efficiently deal with selection bias. Notwithstanding these methodological solutions, one fundamental and conceptual research design issue cannot be addressed in this manner: the choice between cases that should fall into the control group and those that belong to the treatment group.

Organizing cases into the treatment group is straightforward because extensive observational data exists where peacekeepers go. However, this task is more challenging when selecting cases into the control group. Although cases that never saw peacekeeping might seem comparable at first sight, they are the result of different data-generating processes. For example, we might not have observed peacekeeping in, say, Argentina because this case was never on the agenda of the UNSC or relevant regional organizations (ROs) and possibilities for outside involvement were, thus, never discussed. We also never saw peacekeeping in Azerbaijan but the conflict surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh was extensively debated by the Security Council and peacekeeping was seen as a real possibility during these discussions. Whereas Azerbaijan was very close to receiving peacekeeping, Argentina never was.

Ignoring the qualitative differences that exist between cases without peacekeeping deployment has potentially far-reaching implications for how we draw inferences in the study of peacekeeping effectiveness. So far, the assumption is that treatment and control group are

comparable except for PO deployment. However, if the cases in the control group are actually very different from each other, the inferences we draw are biased.

To address this conceptual problem, the present thesis revisits the question of where peacekeepers go but adds a twist: in contrast to existing scholarship, it starts at the very beginning of the UNSC's decision-making process. I argue that one reason for the inconclusive findings in relation to the question of where peacekeepers go lies in the fact that past studies have thus far only examined one (and arguably the last) part of the UNSC's decision-making process in relation to peacekeeping. Before the UNSC can authorize the deployment of uniformed troops, police, and observers on the ground, three other conditions need to be fulfilled. First, all UNSC members need to have agreed to include a particular civil conflict on the Council's (formal) agenda. Second, all members need to have decided that the deployment of a peacekeeping mission is the most suitable solution to manage the civil conflict in question. And third, UNSC members need to agree on the specific mandate for a peacekeeping mission before deployment. Each of these decision-making stages, therefore, precedes the actual deployment of a PO on the ground and adds its own idiosyncrasies to the problem of selection and non-random assignment that should be accounted for in studies on where peacekeepers go.

1.2 Three decision-making stages, three research articles

1.2.1 UNSC agenda-setting: 'Gatekeeping through Peacekeeping? Troop contributing countries and UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts'

The UNSC agenda-setting stage decides which civil conflicts are and which civil conflict are not picked up for consideration by the UNSC. It does so quite rigorously: According to Iwanami (2012), only 16% of all ongoing domestic disputes entered the UNSC's agenda between 1946 and 1999. Likewise, Binder and Golub (2020) observe that less than 30% of all ongoing civil conflicts made it to the Council's formal agenda between 1990 and 2016. Being accepted to the UNSC's (formal) agenda is, therefore, the first hurdle a civil conflict must overcome before the Council can even think about potentially addressing it via peacekeeping. At the same time, agenda-setting might be the more relevant selection stage when compared to peacekeeping deployment because most of the variation we observe in relation to where peacekeepers go might already be explained by the determinants that influence whether a civil conflict is discussed by the UNSC in the first place. Consequently, understanding the factors

that explain variation in UNSC agenda-setting is important for our understanding of peacekeeping deployment.

Zooming in on interest-based determinants of the Security Council's decision-making process in relation to peacekeeping, the first paper examines the actors that hold agenda-setting power (see Chapter 2). Conventional wisdom holds that only the Council's five permanent members enjoy agenda-setting power because any substantive UNSC decision requires their 'concurring votes' (Boulden 2006). In contrast, more recent scholarly work finds that the P5 are not the only formal members within the UNSC who exert control over its agenda (Binder and Golub 2020). The Council's ten elected members can, for example, use the voting rules governing the adoption of the UNSC agenda to their advantage as these decisions fall within so-called 'procedural matters'. In this first article, I suggest that another, hitherto unexplored, group of UN member states also has the capacity to influence agenda-setting in the UNSC: states that are outside of the Council's formal membership but substantively support its policy process in the maintenance of international peace and security via policy implementation. I argue that the capacity of these states to deliver on UNSC policies provides them with de facto decision-making, and thus, agenda-setting power. Because the UNSC is often dependent on voluntary external support to give material effect to their decisions on the ground, policy implementers hold informal bargaining power they can exploit to influence Council policymaking.

In the case of UN POs, the UNSC is completely reliant on voluntary personnel contributions of a select few UN members as it has no standing army of its own. Every time a UN PO is authorized or a mandate for an already existing mission is extended, the UNSC is heavily dependent on the voluntary provision of human capital by the top troop and police contributing countries (TCCs). As UN POs increasingly operate in very diffuse, complex, and dangerous conflict theatres with considerable risk to the physical integrity of deployed troops, it is becoming harder and harder for the UNSC to find enough blue helmets to deploy on the ground. By threatening to pull peacekeepers from existing missions or to not provide troops to future missions, TCCs can thus exploit the UNSC's dependence on their personnel contributions to influence the Council's agenda.

Time-series cross-sectional logistic regressions of all internationalized civil conflicts post-1990 show that TCCs only have an influence on UNSC agenda-setting in relation to civil conflicts when at least one of them also sits on the Council as non-permanent, or elected,

member. My results suggest that these policy implementers can have de facto decision-making and agenda-setting power but only when non-permanent members that are also top TCCs can act as their proxies. Furthermore, I find that the number of elected UNSC members that form part of the group of top TCCs from the previous year matters: whereas the interests of the top TCCs do not seem to matter when only one or two top TCCs sit on the Council, their security and economic interests matter and significantly influence the probability that a civil conflict is discussed for the first time in a formal public meeting by the UNSC in a given year when three top TCCs sit in the Council. These results indicate that when three out of 15 Council members are top troop contributors that can act as proxies for the wider group of TCCs, their chances of bargaining with and convincing other Council members to change their views on discussion are higher when compared to scenarios when only one or two TCCs are non-permanent members.

This paper adds to the comparative study of the UNSC's agenda-setting dynamics and allows us to improve our understanding of the conditions that make Council discussions on civil conflicts more or less likely. It sheds more light on the role that UN members outside of the Council's formal membership can play in UNSC decision-making and provides the first systematic study on the influence of TCCs in this respect.

1.2.2 UNSC deliberations: 'Talking the talk until walking the walk? Quality of deliberation and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization'

Once the UNSC has decided to formally add a civil conflict to its agenda, it must determine whether to deploy a peacekeeping mission. Not every civil conflict that makes it to the agenda of the UNSC also sees the deployment of a peace operation and not every civil conflict which eventually receives peacekeepers does so at the same speed. For example, the civil conflicts in both Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire made it to the Council's agenda relatively quickly. However, it took the UNSC more than eight years to agree on the authorization of a PO in the case of Burundi, whereas it came to the same decision within less than two months in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. The longer it takes the Council to decide to authorize a peace operation to manage a particular conflict, "[...] the higher is the potential for violence to continue unabated and for the number of deaths to rise unchecked" (Hardt 2014, 32). Even if we accept that certain conflict characteristics influence the likelihood of peacekeeping deployment, it might be the case that the longer it takes the UNSC to authorize a PO, the 'harder' the conflict becomes.

This could ultimately mean that where peacekeepers go is not determined by the severity of a civil conflict because the Council acts out of a humanitarian imperative but that conflict characteristics are associated with PO deployment because the slowness of the UNSC's crisis decision-making exacerbates conflict dynamics on the ground prior to engagement.

Taking a closer look at this stage, the second paper examines variation in the time it takes the UNSC to authorize a peace operation. As already mentioned, some civil wars are addressed by the Council via the deployment of peacekeepers rather swiftly after their outbreak, while others linger on the UNSC's agenda for years before receiving assistance. The negotiation and deliberation stage following agenda-setting can, thus, act as an additional bottleneck in the UNSC's decision-making process by considerably slowing down the time it takes the Council to react to civil conflicts via peacekeeping.

In this article, I focus on UNSC peace operation authorization speed and argue that variation in the time it takes the Council to agree on the deployment of a UN or non-UN peacekeeping mission might correlate with variation in the quality of the public formal UNSC discourse preceding authorization. Building on and extending the conceptual work by Risse (2000) as well as Steenbergen et al. (2003), I first assert that the verbal communicative exchanges in these types of Council meetings do not always fulfil the same function. Sometimes, UNSC members meet for bargaining purposes only; sometimes they meet to engage in rhetorical exchanges; and at other times, Council members meet to collectively argue about the type of problem a particular conflict poses as well as the rules and norms that should guide UNSC action in addressing it.

Second, I argue that the different functions public formal UNSC discourse fulfils can be ordered according to a measure of quality. In contrast to bargaining, both rhetoric and arguing represent more high-quality discourse because these modes of communication involve the mutual provision of reasons for the preferences Council members hold. Argumentative discourse is, however, even more high-quality than rhetoric because the goal is not to aggregate individual preferences but engage in a collective communicative process about competing validity claims in which discourse participants are willing to re-evaluate and eventually revise their preferences.

Third, I contend that discourse which displays higher levels of quality prolongs time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization. I expect that public formal Council discourse that follows a logic of arguing is associated with a slower UNSC peace operation authorization speed because

Council members first have to mutually agree on and establish ‘common knowledge’ before they can eventually engage in ‘playing the (bargaining) game’.

To evaluate my argument, I descriptively explore the quality of UNSC formal public discourse based on a three-dimensional analysis with the help of quantitative text analysis methods. Based on the verbatim records of 353 substantive speeches across 34 public formal meetings I select from The UN Security Council Debates corpus (Schoenfeld et al. 2021) for ten civil conflicts from Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and the Middle East post-1995, I find mixed evidence for my argument.

The strongest support for my argument emerges in relation to the equality of participation, specifically speech frequency. When UNSC members and other discourse participants speak roughly equally often, that is, when discourse quality is assumed to be higher, the time to peacekeeping authorization is prolonged. This dynamic is less pronounced in relation to speech length: although time to peacekeeping authorization increases when the use of ‘floor time’ of either speaker type converges and discourse thus becomes more equal and high quality, this relation only holds for a small subset of analytical cases. Regarding the level of justification, my empirical expectation cannot be supported as there is only minimal variation in the diversity of arguments across the ten conflicts under study. Furthermore, although there are some indications that higher quality discourse which considers the well-being of others relatively more often and has a stronger orientation towards the ‘common good’ might potentially slow down peace operation authorization speed, this relationship is not clear-cut.

This study sheds more light on an aspect of the UNSC’s decision-making process that has not yet been systematically evaluated. It extends and applies a concept from the study of domestic legislative politics and democratic systems more generally and links it to an outcome at the international level. It paves the way for new research which might focus on comparing the quality of discourse between legislatures at the national and the state-to-state level as well as comparing the quality of discourse across various international fora in the future.

1.2.3 UNSC mandate design: ‘What are they (t)asked to do? Introducing the Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset’

Although there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of large-N, quantitative research on peacekeeping following the publication of Doyle and Sambanis' (2000) seminal article, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, this strand of literature

is almost exclusively focused on the UN as the single most important actor in the provision of peacekeeping. Although the UN has never been the main provider of POs – (sub-)regional organisations and (coalitions of) states have in fact deployed the majority of POs since the 1940s (Bellamy and Williams 2015; Williams 2016) – the peacekeeping literature has treated non-UN peacekeeping suppliers in a "step-motherly" fashion (Bara and Hultman 2020, 24). In addition, most peacekeeping missions have been deployed simultaneously with other operations by different actors in the same conflict since the mid-1990s (Balas 2011). With the rise of regional and state peacekeeping alongside UN operations, the UN has been aiming to align strategic and operational-level mechanisms, design frameworks for cooperation, and move towards so-called "partnership peacekeeping" (United Nations 2015). While partnership peacekeeping promises a more efficient mobilisation and leveraging of each organisation's strengths and resources, it also presents challenges with respect to possible fragmentation, duplication of efforts, and competition between actors and mandates. More research is needed on whether and how different actors coordinate their peacekeeping activities, on patterns in the division of labour, and on the interdependencies and synergies of different mandate components conducted by simultaneous or sequential POs.

To fill these gaps, Dr. Maline Meiske and I introduce the *Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset*, which contains time-varying information on disaggregated peacekeeping mandate components of all UN and non-UN peace operations deployed to intra- and interstate conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019. For each peace operation, the different mandate components are coded as dummy variables based on 49 pre-defined mandate categories – with a particular emphasis on mandates on the cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping actors. The coding in the POM Dataset is based on the language used in UN and non-UN resolutions (initial and subsequent), provisions in ceasefire or peace agreements as well as official mandate descriptions. The dataset is available in two versions: the primary version presents the data at the peace operation-month level; the secondary version at the peace operation-document level. In total, the dataset contains 87 POs, differentiates between 49 different mandate components, is based on 594 mandating documents, and covers a total of 3,894 monthly observations. Each PO is assigned to one (or multiple) conflict(s) as recorded in the UCDP/PRIO ACD (V21.1), making the POM Dataset compatible with a range of other widely used datasets in peacekeeping research.

We show that the number of mandated tasks of the median peace operation in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased substantially over time. Furthermore, the median UN PO receives

mandates that are three times as large as those of non-UN missions, although there is also a high variance in the overall number of tasks within the group of non-UN missions. UN POs are mandated to engage in a wide variety of tasks whereas non-UN missions have much narrower mandates. However, we also find that non-UN POs' mandates vary significantly across actors, suggesting that these actors specialise in the provision of certain tasks.

We perform statistical analyses after matching the POM Dataset with Bara and Hultman's (2020) data on UN and non-UN mission size and composition to examine the effect of the number as well as different mandate components on government and rebel one-sided violence in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period 2000-2016. The number of tasks does not seem to play a role in influencing the capacity of any peacekeeping actor to prevent one-sided violence, whereas we see interesting patterns when we examine the different peace operation mandate components. Different mandate components seem to influence peacekeepers' capacity to prevent one-sided violence by governments and rebels and the dynamics vary by peacekeeping actor.

Furthermore, we show that non-UN actors such as (coalitions of) states and (sub-)regional organisations are indeed important and distinct players in the peacekeeping realm that warrant further rigorous systematic study instead of being treated in a "step-motherly" fashion (Bara and Hultman 2020, 24). In cases where UN missions and non-UN operations are deployed together or in sequence, their mandates often show a high degree of overlap. This suggests that, depending on the conflict, non-UN missions are likely to affect similar conflict and non-conflict outcomes than UN operations.

This study contributes to different areas in the peacekeeping literature. By including information on non-UN POs, our data will allow scholars to compare and contrast UN peacekeeping with that of regional organizations and (coalitions of) states using one coherent dataset. Furthermore, researchers studying partnership peacekeeping will be able to assess whether the mandates and tasks of POs from different actors are compatible with each other, whether the UN specialises in some mandate areas, whereas non-UN actors specialise in others, and whether partnership peacekeeping works differently in different conflicts. Lastly, by using data on mandates as a dependent variable, peacekeeping scholars will be able to gain a better understanding about how mandates are designed in those political spaces where decisions on whether to send peacekeepers into a conflict are made in the first place.

Chapter 2. Gatekeeping through Peacekeeping? Troop contributing countries and UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts

2.1 Introduction

Who holds agenda-setting power in the UNSC? Conventional wisdom suggests that only the P5 enjoy agenda-setting power because any substantive UNSC decision requires their 'concurring votes' (Boulden 2006). In contrast, more recent scholarly work finds that the P5 are not the only formal members within the UNSC who exert control over its agenda (Binder and Golub 2020). The E10 can, for example, use the voting rules governing the adoption of the UNSC agenda to their advantage as these decisions fall within so-called 'procedural matters'. This means that any combination of nine Council members can put an issue on the agenda.

However, are the fifteen formal members of the UNSC the only actors that can effectively control the Council's agenda? In this article, I suggest that another, hitherto unexplored, group of UN member states also has the capacity to influence agenda-setting in the UNSC: states that are outside of the Council's formal membership but substantively support its policy process in the maintenance of international peace and security via policy implementation. I argue that the capacity of these states to deliver on UNSC policies provides them with *de facto* decision-making, and thus, agenda-setting power. Because the UNSC is often dependent on voluntary external support to give material effect to their decisions on the ground, policy implementers hold informal bargaining power they can exploit to influence Council policymaking.

In the case of UN POs, for example, the UNSC is completely reliant on voluntary personnel contributions of a select few UN members as it has no standing army of its own. Every time a UN PO is authorized or a mandate for an already existing mission is extended, the UNSC is heavily dependent on the voluntary provision of human capital by the top troop and police contributing countries. As UN POs increasingly operate in very diffuse, complex, and dangerous conflict theatres with great risk to physical integrity, it is becoming harder and harder for the UNSC to find enough blue helmets to deploy on the ground. By threatening to pull out peacekeepers from existing missions or not provide troops to future missions, TCCs

can thus exploit the UNSC's dependence on their personnel contributions to influence the Council's agenda.

Time-series cross-sectional logistic regressions of all internationalized civil conflicts post-1990 show that TCCs only have an influence on UNSC agenda-setting in relation to civil conflicts when at least one of them also sits on the Council as non-permanent, or elected, member. My results suggest that these policy implementers can have de facto decision-making and, thus, agenda-setting power but only when non-permanent members that are also top TCCs can act as their proxies. Furthermore, I find that the number of elected UNSC members that form part of the group of top TCCs from the previous year matters: whereas the interests of the top TCCs do not seem to matter when only one or two top TCCs sit on the Council, their security and economic interests significantly influence the probability that a civil conflict is discussed for the first time in a formal public meeting by the UNSC in a given year. These results indicate that when three out of 15 Council members are top troop contributors that can act as proxies for the wider group of TCCs, their chances of bargaining with and convincing other Council members to change their views on discussion are higher when compared to scenarios when only one or two TCCs are non-permanent members.

This study makes three relevant contributions. First, it adds to the recently emerging comparative study of the UNSC's agenda-setting dynamics (see, e.g., Allen and Yuen 2022; Binder and Golub 2020; Lundgren and Klamberg 2022). Even though agenda-setting constitutes the first (and relatively more discriminatory) selection stage in the Council's decision-making process that can eventually result, e.g., in the authorization of a PO, it has relatively rarely been the focus of systematic analysis thus far. This is puzzling because only after the Council has explicitly adopted an item to its official agenda in a public formal meeting, can it begin deliberations on how to address or best deal with said item. Without a clearer appreciation of the conditions under which certain situations, disputes and conflicts enter the UNSC's official programme of work, our understanding of the Security Council's decision-making process remains incomplete and might even impede knowledge accumulation in relation to research questions which examine outcomes of the UNSC's decision-making process, such as where peacekeepers go.

Second, the present article goes beyond the recent studies by Allen and Yuen (2022), Binder and Golub (2020) as well as Lundgren and Klamberg (2022) and extends our understanding of the UNSC's agenda-setting dynamics by shedding light on the role and influence of UN member states that operate outside the Council's formal membership. Although Binder and

Golub's (2020) findings already make an important contribution to our knowledge on the decision-making dynamics of the UNSC by showing that non-permanent members also have a say in Council business, my study goes even further and presents a novel theoretical argument about the influence of top TCCs on UNSC agenda-setting. My empirical findings are encouraging and can serve as the basis for future research which might examine what role other, similar types of actors within the UN system play in setting the public formal agenda of the UNSC or whether the influence of TCCs is restricted to UNSC agenda-setting only.

Third, to the best of knowledge, this is the first systematic study on the influence of troop and police contributions to UN POs on UNSC decision-making. Although there is an extant literature on the supply side of peacekeeping which examines the reasons that motivate TCCs to voluntarily provide personnel in the first place (see Meiske and Ruggeri 2017 for an overview), no studies have yet examined whether these contributions can in turn be used as a bargaining chip in exchange for political influence within the UN system more generally and the UNSC more specifically. Limited research on the determinants of non-permanent Council membership, for example, find that troop contributions can act as a significant enabling factor and increase the chances of being elected to the UNSC (Dreher et al. 2014; Malone 2000). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that there are additional outcomes that TCCs might be able to influence.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. I first present a summary of the key findings of previous research on the determinants of UNSC agenda-setting (Section 2.2). In the next step, I further elaborate on and describe my theoretical argument about the relationship between top TCC interests and variation in the Council's public formal agenda in relation to civil conflicts (Section 2.3). I then describe my research design (Section 2.4) and present the results of my time-series cross-sectional logistic regressions of all internationalized civil conflicts post-1990 (Section 2.5) before I conclude (Section 2.6).

2.2 Prior research: Determinants of UNSC agenda-setting

To date, only a limited number of studies have looked at the Council's (formal) agenda and the conditions under which an item is likely to be picked up for consideration by the UNSC. These studies identify three sets of explanatory variables that can help analyse variation in the Council's agenda. First, scholars find that the interests of the UNSC's permanent members determine which issues do and do not make it on the agenda of the Council and that variation in the UNSC's programme of work is a function of the intensity of P5 interests only (Boulden

2006). As the passing of a Council resolution requires the 'concurring votes' of the P5 according to Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, the permanent members can keep an item off the agenda to prevent interference by the larger international community via the UNSC in their 'spheres of influence' and geopolitically important countries by threatening to veto any future action on a prospective item (Fortna 2008; Neack 1995). In contrast, P5 members might deliberately put an item on the UNSC's agenda to benefit from burden-sharing and split the costs of an intervention among the wider UN community (Voeten 2001) or to legitimize a proposed course of action via a UNSC resolution (Hurd 2002).

Looking at the Council's agenda with respect to internal armed conflicts in the period between 1945 and 1999, Iwanami (2012), for example, observes that the likelihood that a civil conflict will be discussed by the UNSC increases significantly if a P5 member is either a direct party to the civil conflict or involved as a third party supporting any warring side. In contrast, she finds that conflicts taking place in former P5 colonies are significantly less likely to make it to the Council's agenda. Likewise, civil strife in countries that are allies to P5 members is also less likely to be discussed.

Analysing the speed with which civil wars enter the UNSC's agenda between 1990 and 2016, Binder and Golub (2020) find that P5 interests cut only one way: an alliance between the country experiencing conflict and a P5 state, geographical proximity of a P5 state to the conflict country and high volumes of (arms) trade between the country in conflict and P5 members considerably slow down the rate with which civil conflicts reach the Council's agenda. Furthermore, they observe that items reach the agenda more slowly if the preferences of the permanent members diverge.

Allen and Yuen (2020, 2021) also find that the degree of harmony between the preferences of the P5 influences agenda-setting in the Council. Examining whether an agenda item made it to the UNSC's programme of work, i.e. whether it was discussed in any formal public meeting, informal private consultation, or both, in the post-Cold War period, the authors find that a higher variability of P5 preferences leads to a lower likelihood of active discussion in a given year; however, more so for formal than for informal consultations.

Second, scholars find that certain characteristics of a prospective item help explain if it makes it to the UNSC's agenda. On the one hand, conflicts that cause large-scale battlefield fatalities and civilian deaths or where norms of human rights and humanitarian law are being violated are expected to receive the attention of the Council because UNSC members will want to act against such situations out of a purely normative humanitarian imperative to prevent further

suffering. On the other hand, high intensity conflicts with lots of fatalities often produce a host of negative effects that often cross borders and spill over to other countries, including the displacement of large populations. Consequently, these types of conflicts will more often qualify as a 'threat to international peace and security' and, therefore, compel the Council to act in accordance with its mandate under Article 24 of the UN Charter (Binder and Golub 2020).

Analysing data on 40 conflicts in the period between 1991 and 2013, Frederking and Patane (2017) accordingly observe that civil wars which generate large outflows of refugees lead to a higher number of UNSC meetings. Confirming these results, Binder and Golub (2020) also find that conflicts with higher numbers of refugees make it to the UNSC's agenda more quickly. In addition, they observe that conflicts which produce higher numbers of civilian deaths are also more swiftly picked up for discussion by the Council. However, the authors qualify that their explanatory variables capturing P5 interests determine the UNSC's agenda more strongly than those capturing the intensity of a civil conflict.

Third and last, there is some recent evidence that the interests of the UNSC's non-permanent (or elected) members also determine which issues make it to the agenda of the Council. Apart from using the voting rules governing the adoption of the UNSC agenda to their advantage, the E10 can also rely on the power of the 'better argument' due to their valuable, often subject-specific knowledge and expertise on a wide range of issues to enable (or prevent) the inclusion of an item on the Council's agenda (Binder and Golub 2020). Elected members are also regularly courted by the P5 as the latter are keen to secure unanimity in the voting on UNSC resolutions to send a strong and united signal and enhance compliance with Council policies by actors in the international system (Mikulaschek 2018b).

Binder and Golub (2020), for example, are the first to show that the interests of the non-permanent members also matter for UNSC agenda-setting speed. In comparison to the P5, an alliance between the country experiencing conflict and at least one E10 state significantly increases the speed with which a conflict reaches the UNSC agenda. However, geographical proximity of at least one E10 member to the conflict country and high volumes of trade between the country in conflict and E10 members considerably slow down the rate with which civil conflicts reach the Council's agenda, as is the case for P5 members. Furthermore, the authors observe that items reach the agenda more slowly if the preferences of the non-permanent members diverge and that preference heterogeneity among the E10 has an even bigger impact on UNSC agenda-setting speed than heterogeneity among the P5.

Going beyond these three types of determinants that have thus far been put forward to explain variation in the Council's agenda-setting with regard to civil conflicts, I argue that an additional, hitherto unexplored, group of UN member states also has the capacity to influence agenda-setting in the UNSC: states that are outside of the Council's formal membership but substantively support its policy process in the maintenance of international peace and security via policy implementation.

2.3 Theoretical framework: The role of TCCs in UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts

2.3.1 Which UNSC 'agenda'?

Defining what UNSC 'agenda' means in the context of the present study necessitates a brief engagement with the different types and formats of meetings that UNSC members can convene to discuss issues pertaining to international peace and security.[1] There are two broad types of UNSC meetings: formal and informal (Security Council Report 2019). Within these larger categories, there are further variations in meeting format as shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. UNSC meeting formats

Formal	*Informal*
Public	Consultations (of the whole)
Private	Interactive dialogue
	"Arria-formula"

Within the formal meeting category, UNSC members can either choose to convene in a public or a private setting. *Formal, public meetings* ought to be the default according to the UNSC's own Rules of Procedure (Rule 48): "Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public" (Security Council 1983). These meetings take place in the Security Council Chamber with the infamous horseshoe-shaped table at UN Headquarters in New York and are open to members of the public as well as the press. The function of these meetings is to hear briefings, hold debates on issues related to international peace and security, *and* take action

[1] For a more comprehensive description of the different UNSC meeting types, see Security Council Report (2019) as well as Chapter 2, "Place and Format of Council Proceedings", in *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Sievers and Daws 2014) and the corresponding book website with up-to-date information (https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-2, last updated 2 February 2023, last accessed 21 March 2023).

vis-à-vis certain situations, most prominently through the adoption of resolutions. Only in these meetings can the Security Council properly discharge its mandated function of maintaining international peace and security by coordinating and deciding on collective action to be taken to address 'threats to the peace', 'breaches of the peace', and 'acts of aggression' as stipulated by the UN Charter. Apart from the fifteen permanent and non-permanent Council members, non-UNSC members may also sometimes participate in formal, public meetings.[2] The proceedings and verbatim records of these meetings are made publicly available in their entirety on the website of the UN's Dag Hammarskjöld Library.[3]

Formal, private meetings are not open to the public or the media, although non-Council members also have the right to participate in these types of sessions. UNSC members convene these meetings when they need to discuss the selection of the next UN Secretary-General, the appointment of judges to the International Court of Justice, or their annual report to the UN General Assembly (Security Council Report 2019). Furthermore, formal private meetings are nowadays predominantly used for consultations between the Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries prior to the renewal or modification of UN PO mandates (Sievers and Daws 2014). In contrast to formal public meetings, the verbatim proceedings of these sessions are not published; "[a] single copy of the record of the meeting is kept by the Secretary-General and can be viewed only by those who attended the meeting" (Security Council Report 2019, 33f.). However, so-called communiqués summarizing the topics discussed are made publicly available on the website of the UN's Dag Hammarskjöld Library.

When Council members convene informally, they can choose between three formats: consultations of the whole, interactive dialogues, and "Arria-formula" meetings. *Consultations of the whole* ('closed door meetings') are convened when UNSC members want to discuss issues only amongst themselves without the participation of other UN member states or organs, whereas *interactive dialogues* and *"Arria-formula"* meetings are convened when the UNSC wants to entertain an informal dialogue with non-Council members (Security Council Report 2019). Similar to formal, private meetings, no meeting records – not even summaries of topics discussed – are made publicly available for informal UNSC meetings.

Both formal and informal Council meetings have their own individual agendas that contain a list of things and issues to be discussed at each meeting. While it might also be worthwhile to

[2] According to the Security Council Report (2019, 32), "[s]tates that are not members of the Security Council can request permission under Rules 37 or 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure to participate without the right to vote, and the Council decides whether or not to accede to such a request."

[3] For example, the verbatim meeting records for all public formal UNSC meetings in 2022 can be accessed via: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2022 (last accessed 21 March 2023).

analyse whether and how the agendas of different UNSC meeting formats overlap, I am interested in explaining variation in the agenda of one particular meeting format with respect to one particular issue-area over time in the present study. In line with Binder and Golub (2020), I focus on the agenda of formal public UNSC meetings in relation to internal armed conflicts. Only after the Council has agreed to discuss a civil conflict formally and publicly can it eventually authorize and take action under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter and, for example, authorize the deployment of a UN PO, thereby discharging its organizational function of maintaining international peace and security.

2.3.2 How does a civil conflict enter the UNSC's public formal agenda?

As Binder and Golub (2020, 3) note, "[a] wide range of actors can bring a situation to the [Security] Council's attention" who in turn decides whether or not to include the item on its public formal agenda (or 'programme of work' as it is also often called). These include the parties to a dispute, the members of the UNSC, other UN member states outside the Council, the UN General Assembly as well as the UN Secretary-General.

Once a request to consider a particular situation or conflict is received by any of these actors, the UNSC President is formally tasked with convening a public formal meeting on this particular issue.[4]

Unlike decisions on substantive issues, such as the authorization of a resolution in line with Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, decisions on the agenda are considered 'procedural'. This means, inter alia, that different voting rules govern the adoption of the Council's public formal agenda. Whereas substantive issues must be decided with at least nine affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members according to Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, procedural matters are decided by nine affirmative votes, with no distinction being made between votes of the permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC as per Article 27(2) of the Charter.

[4] There has been some discussion in the past among UNSC members themselves about the extent of the Council President's powers in this regard and some public formal meetings have been called by previous Presidents even though an item was then not accepted to the UNSC's public formal agenda. However, the common practice nowadays is to only call a public formal meeting when the majority of the Council members is in favour of discussing a particular item (Sievers and Daws 2014).

2.3.3 TCCs and UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts

By now, the deployment of peace operations has become one of the most popular actions the UNSC authorizes to address threats to international peace and security (see Bellamy and Williams 2015; Howard and Dayal 2018; Meiske and Ruggeri 2017), especially when they come in the form of internal armed conflicts. While the UNSC deployed only about ten peacekeeping missions to civil conflicts around the world between 1946 and 1989, the number of operations addressing these types of conflicts increased to 51 in the post-Cold War period.[5]

This development is remarkable because peacekeeping was originally not formally envisioned by the UN Charter. It was first informally developed as an alternative concept to collective enforcement action which was difficult to authorize during the Cold War due to the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. As Morris and McCoubrey (1999, 135) note, "[b]ased upon the principles of consent, [...] [impartiality] and minimal use of force to be exercised only in self-defence, this concept was significantly more limited than the intended scope of the Chapter VII provision[s]."

UN POs were designed along these principles as "small deployments of [uniformed] military and sometimes civilian observers to monitor a cease-fire, the withdrawal or cantonment of troops, or other terms of an agreement [...]" (Fortna 2008, 4) in the aftermath of inter-state armed conflicts. In contrast, today's UN missions are commonly deployed to manage active intrastate conflicts, often while violence and fighting is still ongoing (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014). Accordingly, these operations perform a substantively higher number of tasks on the ground (Di Salvatore et al. 2022), often receive an authorization to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Howard and Dayal 2018), and are significantly larger in size (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017). Whereas about 22,000 UN peacekeepers were deployed to conflicts during the Cold War on average, this number skyrocketed in the post-Cold War period, increasing by a factor of three during the 1990s, and even multiplying by a factor of five in the 2000s (see Meiske and Ruggeri (2017)).

Hence, to implement and sustain the practice of peacekeeping as a method of (civil) conflict resolution and effectively deploy peacekeeping missions on the ground, an extensive supply of personnel that carry out UNSC-sanctioned mandates is necessary. As the UN has no

[5] These numbers are based on the official list of UN POs compiled by the Department of Peace Operations, accessible via: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un_peacekeeping_operation_list_3_2.pdf (last accessed 21 March 2023).

standing army of its own by design (Howard and Dayal 2018), it is entirely dependent on TCCs, i.e. UN member states that *voluntarily* provide uniformed troops, police, and observers, to staff their POs. While the financial costs of a UN peacekeeping mission are automatically shared among all UN members on the basis of a special, pre-defined formula (Meiske and Ruggeri 2017), member states are under no obligation at all to supply POs with human resources; they can freely decide whether and how much personnel they want to contribute (Bove and Elia 2011). In addition, member states can also decide to reverse their initial decision at any point in time after deployment and withdraw any pledged personnel while a UN mission is still ongoing, e.g. as a result of experiencing (large-scale) fatalities amongst their troops during deployment (Oestman 2021).

As the UN's policymaking in relation to peacekeeping has become more streamlined and professionalized over time, a division of labour between three different groups of UN member states involved in this process has emerged.[6] The first group, the *policy makers*, involves all 15 members of the UN Security Council. Their function is to come to a decision and authorize the deployment of a UN PO to manage and resolve an ongoing civil conflict. The second group, the *policy financiers*, includes all 193 UN member states. The task of this group is burden-sharing: they collectively assume the financial costs for the actions the policy makers decide on in relation to UN peacekeeping.

Although, there are theoretically more policy financiers than policy makers, a subset of the latter group shoulders most of the expenses related to UN POs. According to Williams (2020), the five permanent members of the UNSC have consistently been among the top 10 financiers of UN peacekeeping missions and, together, have paid for about 50-60% of the UN peacekeeping budget since 1970. Given that there is such a substantive overlap between those UN member states that authorize UN POs and those that pay for the majority of the missions' costs, and to keep matters simple, I do not make a strict analytical distinction between policy makers and policy financiers.[7]

[6] In delineating the division of labour between different groups of UN member states, I closely follow Williams (2020).

[7] Furthermore, I do not evaluate or focus on the role that policy makers and/or financiers play for UNSC agenda-setting in this research article. Previous studies on this issue have already established robust evidence that both the permanent and non-permanent members of the Council, i.e. the peacekeeping policy makers and financiers, influence UNSC agenda-setting (see Section 2.2). The role of peacekeeping policy implementers in this regard has, however, not yet been addressed, neither theoretically nor empirically. To complement existing research and improve our knowledge on the dynamics of agenda-setting in the Security Council, I choose to focus on this group of actors in the present Chapter.

The last group that is involved in the UN's peacekeeping policymaking, the *policy implementers*, includes all troop- and police-contributing countries. As outlined further above, these UN member states help the policy makers by giving effect to their peacekeeping policies, namely by *voluntarily* providing the necessary personnel and human resources without which a UNSC-authorized PO could not deploy to a conflict theatre in the first place.

Although all 193 UN member states could theoretically decide to deliberately provide any number of personnel to a UN PO, not every country chooses to do so in reality and even if it does, the number of personnel provided across different TCCs varies greatly.[8] Whereas only about 20% of all UN members provided uniformed personnel to UN POs by the end of 1990, this number quickly rose to 40% by the end of 1995 and has steadily increased since then (Williams 2020). By the end of 2018, more than 120 UN member states were providing various UN POs with necessary human resources. Although more than 62% of all UN members contribute uniformed troops, police, and observers in support of the UN's peacekeeping practice nowadays, not every TCC provides personnel in equal amounts. For example, while Ethiopia contributed a total of 7,483 uniformed peacekeepers to various UN POs in 2018, the United States contributed only 8.[9]

In addition, a small number of TCCs typically provides the majority of all UN peacekeeping personnel. While "[...] Western middle powers, such as Australia, Canada, Norway, and Sweden [...]" (Meiske and Ruggeri 2017, 9) consistently provided the lion's share of UN peacekeepers throughout much of the Cold War as well as throughout the first years after its termination, "[...] non-Western states have become the main personnel contributors to UN peacekeeping missions [...]" (ibid) since the mid-1990s. Not only are these new 'top' personnel contributors not from the Western Hemisphere, but they are also mostly developing countries from Africa and Asia. As Williams (2020, 482f.) observes, "[o]n average, since 2000, about 40[%] of the UN's uniformed peacekeepers have been provided by the top six TCCs: with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Nigeria and, more recently, Ethiopia, and Rwanda particularly prominent."

[8] There is an extant literature that examines the reasons a UN member state might have to voluntarily supply UN peace operations with personnel (see Meiske and Ruggeri (2017) for a comprehensive overview). As I am not interested in why a T/PCC contributes UN peacekeepers but rather what effect sizeable and consistent contributions have on UNSC decision-making, I do not engage in a discussion on the supply-side of peacekeeping here.

[9] These numbers are based on the author's own calculations using the country-level version of the *Providing for Peacekeeping Database* administered by the International Peace Institute (IPI) which can be accessed via: https://www.ipinst.org/providing-for-peacekeeping-database (last accessed 21 March 2023).

These numbers strongly suggest that there is a select subgroup of UN member states among the *policy implementers* that carries the majority of the burden when it comes to voluntarily providing UN POs with uniformed troops, police, and observers. These 'top' TCCs are distinct from the relevant policy financiers as the permanent members of the Security Council have consistently contributed relatively little personnel to UN missions in the post-Cold War period (Perry and Smith 2013).

They can also generally be distinguished from the remaining policy makers, i.e. the non-permanent UNSC members. Although there are periods during which the top policy implementers sit in the Council as elected members and can, thus, temporarily act as *de jure* policy makers through the authorization of UN POs, most of the time, they cannot. Non-permanent UNSC members first have to run an intensive campaign and win the election to a Council seat on which they can serve only for two years and to which they can not immediately be re-elected after having served one term (see, e.g., Dreher et al. (2014)). In contrast, UN member states can always freely decide to be policy implementers. Furthermore, those contributors that shoulder most of the burden when it comes to the provision of peacekeepers, the top TCCs, provide personnel very consistently, i.e. they provide large numbers of personnel to multiple missions at the same time, often outside their own region (see Figure 6 in Perry and Smith (2013)).

It is precisely these *top policy implementers* that the Security Council is most dependent on when it comes to peacekeeping policymaking: without the sizeable and consistent personnel contributions of the top TCCs to already ongoing UN missions or to missions that are yet to be devised and for which contributions by these actors can almost be regarded as 'guaranteed', the UNSC would not be able to effectively discharge its responsibility to maintain international peace and security through the deployment of UN peace operations to large numbers of civil conflicts.[10] If, for example, Bangladesh had decided to pull out all 6,532 peacekeepers it was providing across eight UN peace operations in 2018, or if India were to do the same with its almost 6,340 troops, police, and observers across ten missions,

[10] Note, however, that personnel recruitment for a peacekeeping mission can sometimes be highly politically charged and the willingness of TCCs to contribute human resources might be low in certain instances. As Henke (2016) describes, the force generation process for the hybrid UN/African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur (UNAMID) did not go down smoothly and required side payments by the P5 to induce predominantly African states to eventually contribute peacekeepers. Although this is a very important study on a phenomenon that is still poorly understood, I contend that UNAMID might constitute an extremely hard case as the authorization of the mission was highly contentious (and time-consuming) in the first place and the composition of the mission was very much shaped by Sudan's then-President Al-Bashir.

these UN peace operations would have been severely understaffed and would have faced major operational challenges.[11]

I argue that this relationship of dependence creates an informal bargaining leverage for these *top policy implementers* that they can then use to influence the UNSC's public formal agenda with respect to civil conflicts. Because this specific subgroup of UN member states has the capacity to consistently deliver on the Council's peacekeeping policies, the UNSC has an interest to keep these policy implementers happy so that they will continue sending large numbers of personnel to ongoing UN POs but also have an incentive to provide human capital to future peacekeeping missions. To do so, the UNSC gives the top TCCs a 'voice' in its decision-making on agenda-setting and consequently acts as if these policy implementers were *de facto* policy makers.

This means that even though decisions on the public formal agenda of the UNSC are ultimately made by P5 and the E10, I expect that a specific subgroup of UN member states that exists outside of the formal Council membership, namely the top TCCs, can influence UNSC agenda-setting informally in line with their interests. Adhering to previous research on the direction of association between state interests and UN outcomes (see Section 2.2), I assume that the existence of top TCC interests can either increase *or* decrease the probability that a given civil conflict makes it to the public formal agenda of the UNSC in the first place. Consequently, my empirical expectation is as follows:

> ***Hypothesis 1:*** *The probability that a civil conflict enters the public formal agenda of the UNSC changes as a function of top TCC interests.*

2.4 Research Design

2.4.1 Case selection and analytical sample

I test my argument on the relationship between top TCC interests and the likelihood that a civil conflict 'makes it' to the UNSC's public formal agenda on all (internationalized) intrastate armed conflicts between 1990 and 2019.[12] The relevant civil conflicts are selected on the basis of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo

[11] These numbers are also based on the country-level *Providing for Peacekeeping Database* administered by IPI.
[12] The only difference between and intrastate and an internationalized intrastate conflict in the UCDP/PRIO ACD is that the latter conflict type involves external support in the form of troops to either the government and/or the opposing rebel group(s); otherwise, both conflicts are of an internal nature (see Pettersson 2021).

(PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (V22.1) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Shawn, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022). This dataset is widely used in quantitative peace and conflict research as it provides scholars with the most comprehensive and systematic data on organized violence since 1946. Furthermore, to ensure that the results of the present study are relatable and comparable to other quantitative research in my field, I also rely on this dataset for my statistical analysis.

The UCDP/PRIO ACD defines civil conflicts as state-based armed conflicts where an incompatibility about government[13] and/or territory[14] between the government of a state and one or more rebel groups leads to the use of armed force which results in at least 25 battle-related fatalities per calendar year. One country can be involved in multiple civil conflicts at the same time and the ACD accounts for this fact by coding all ongoing civil conflicts involving the government of one state at any given point in time.

The UCDP/PRIO ACD's unit of observation is the civil conflict – active year and I use the same unit for my statistical analysis. This choice is reasonable as the variation in my main explanatory variables as well as my control variables mainly takes place at the yearly level. Further disaggregating the temporal unit of analysis to the monthly level would unnecessarily inflate my data. As is common practice, I only include those yearly observations in my analysis where a civil conflict resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths; years where fatalities stayed below this threshold are excluded.

The entire dataset consists of 2,568 conflict-year observations covering a total of 294 distinct armed conflicts between 1946 and 2021 of which 224, or 76%, are categorised as intrastate or internationalized intrastate conflicts (2,313 observations in total). Of these, 53 civil conflicts started but also terminated in the Cold War period; 63 conflicts started during the Cold War but terminated only after 1990; and 108 civil conflicts only broke out in the post-Cold War period (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2. Distribution of civil conflicts and observations in the UCDP/PRIO ACD, 1946-2021

	Start & End during Cold War	*Start during Cold War*	*Start post-Cold War*	*Total*

[13] This includes an incompatibility about the current type of the political system, demands about the replacement of the current central government or a change in its composition (see Pettersson 2021).
[14] This includes an incompatibility about the status of a specific territory, be it in relation to a demanded change of the state in control of a certain territory, the secession of said territory or a demand for autonomy (see Pettersson 2021).

Frequency	53	63	108	224
Percent	24%	28%	48%	100%
Observations	202	1,538	573	2,313

From these 2,313 conflict-year observations, I exclude the 53 conflicts that started and ended during the Cold War (202 observations) as well as 12 conflicts (323 observations) that started during the Cold War and continued until after 1990 but were first discussed in a public formal UNSC meeting already prior to 1990. I include the remainder of these conflicts but exclude observations prior to 1990 (598 observations). And lastly, I further restrict the sample by excluding those yearly observations after a first public formal UNSC discussion has taken place (223 observations). This means that my analytical sample consists of 967 conflict – active year observations with 159 distinct civil conflicts between 1990 and 2019.

2.4.2 Dependent variable

Conceptually, I am interested in whether a civil conflict enters the public formal agenda of the UNSC at all, i.e. whether it is ever discussed by the Council in this high-level meeting format. To measure this concept, I create a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if a certain civil conflict has 'made it' to the agenda of a public formal UNSC meeting, and 0 otherwise. Note that I only record the first time a conflict is discussed by the UNSC in a public formal meeting and disregard any subsequent discussions in this meeting format as I am interested in the determinants that make it more (or less) likely for a civil conflict to pass this first selection stage in the UNSC decision-making process that can eventually lead to the authorization of a UN peace operation. As I rely on the unit of observation in the UCDP/PRIO ACD, which is civil conflict – active year, I adjust my dependent variable so that it takes the value of 1 only in the year in which the first public formal UNSC discussion takes place and 0 for the preceding years. Observations after the first UNSC discussion are excluded. My unit of analysis is, thus, the civil conflict – first UNSC discussion – active year.

To code my dependent variable, I consulted official UN documents that are accessible online on the UN's own website. More specifically, I used information from the *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council* which provides comprehensive yearly summaries on the items that were discussed by the UNSC in *public formal* meetings.[15] The *Repertoire*, therefore, represents a very rich and convenient resource to check which civil conflicts have

[15] Binder and Golub (2020) as well as Allen and Yuen (2020) also make use of this resource.

and have not been included on the Council's agenda over time. A further advantage of the *Repertoire* is that it allows researchers to filter and view summaries of the UNSC's activities by agenda item and region. Moreover, each overview by region lists the public formal discussions of the Council on a specific situation or country chronologically, making it relatively easy to identify the first time a civil conflict was discussed by the UNSC publicly and formally.

To link every civil conflict from the UCDP/PRIO ACD to potential public formal discussions by the UNSC on that conflict, I rely on information from two further sources. First, the ACD itself and second, the so-called *Intrastate Dispute Narratives* (Mullenbach 2013) that are available on the website of the University of Central Arkansas.[16] The latter resource was primarily compiled by Professor Mark Mullenbach for his own dissertation on *Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes in the 20th Century* but is now also available online for public use. It provides rich information on virtually all intrastate disputes between 1900 and the present day. Each dispute is divided into distinct phases (pre-crisis, crisis, conflict, post-conflict, and post-crisis) and each 'dispute narrative' contains descriptions of the main events that took place in each phase, the main warring parties as well as information on any international involvement.[17] While the UCDP/PRIO ACD is a useful resource to obtain a quick overview on which civil conflict took place in which country or location during approximately which time involving which government and which rebel group(s), the *Intrastate Dispute Narratives* are helpful to gain a more qualitative understanding of each civil conflict and its timeline. A more thorough understanding of a given civil conflict is sometimes necessary as the UNSC often discusses these issues in very vague terms without specifically referring to the primary warring parties, especially when it comes to rebel groups.

Based on the list of 224 (internationalized) intrastate conflicts from the UCDP/PRIO ACD, I read through a total of 406 documents from the *Repertoire* and identified 65 first public formal UNSC discussions. Overall, 29% of all civil conflicts between 1946 and 2019 'made it' to the UNSC's public formal agenda with 23 of these discussions (35%) taking place during the Cold War, and 42 discussions (65%) in the post-Cold War period.[18] These descriptives provide a certain degree of face validity for the data that I collected for two

[16] This website is accessible via: https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/dadm-intratstate-dispute-narratives/ (last accessed 21 March 2023).
[17] Sources for these 'dispute narratives' include media and news reports from e.g. BBC News, Reuters, the New York Times, or Keesing's Record of World Events as well as books and journal articles on specific countries and conflicts.
[18] Note that I include only UNSC discussions after 1990 in my analysis due to data limitations for my main explanatory variable.

reasons. First, agenda-setting in the UNSC is generally believed to be very selective (Binder and Golub 2020; Iwanami 2012), i.e. most civil conflicts are not picked up by the UNSC for public formal discussion. Second, the data confirm a commonly held notion in the literature: the UNSC seems to have become more 'active' after the end of the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union (see e.g. Mikulaschek, Cockayne, and Perry (2010)).

2.4.3 Main independent variable(s)

My argument is that there is an association between the variation in the interests of the UN's top *policy implementers* in the field of peacekeeping, i.e. the top troop- and police contributing countries, and variation in UNSC agenda-setting when it comes to civil conflicts. To retrieve information for and measure my main explanatory variable I make use of several data sources.

First, I use the *Peacekeeping Database* from the International Peace Institute (IPI) (Perry and Smith 2013) to identify the relevant subgroup of top TCCs. Based on UN archival material, this dataset collects the total number of uniformed personnel contributions of each TCC by month, type of personnel (troops, police, experts/observers) and UN peace operation from November 1990 to October 2018. Using the country-level version of the IPI data, I aggregate the total number of personnel provided by month and TCC up to the yearly level, sort the total contributions per year from highest to lowest and select the *top 10 TCCs in each year* as my relevant subgroup. I further lag the data on top contributors because I assume that the probability of UNSC discussion in a given year is influenced by top 10 status in the previous year.

Table 2.3 shows the distribution of the top 10 TCCs over time and Figure 2.1 shows how often a country within this group was among the top 10 troop- and police-contributors between 1990 and 2018. Some interesting dynamics emerge from these descriptives.

Table 2.3. Top 10 TCCs over time, 1990-2018

Year	*Top 1*	*Top 2*	*Top 3*	*Top 4*	*Top 5*	*Top 6*	*Top 7*	*Top 8*	*Top 9*	*Top 10*
1990	Canada	Finland	Austria	Norway	Ghana	Nepal	Ireland	UK	Sweden	Fiji
1991	Canada	Finland	Norway	Austria	Ghana	Nepal	Ireland	UK	Sweden	Fiji
1992	France	Canada	UK	Ghana	Nepal	Indonesia	Poland	Finland	Denmark	Norway
1993	France	Pakistan	India	UK	Canada	Italy	US	Bangladesh	Nepal	Netherlands
1994	Pakistan	France	India	Bangladesh	UK	Jordan	Malaysia	Canada	Egypt	Poland
1995	France	UK	Pakistan	Bangladesh	US	Canada	Jordan	Poland	Nepal	Norway
1996	Pakistan	Bangladesh	India	Zimbabwe	Russia	Brazil	US	Poland	Canada	Finland
1997	Zimbabwe	Pakistan	Poland	Bangladesh	Russia	Canada	Finland	Austria	US	Ghana
1998	Poland	Bangladesh	Austria	Ghana	Finland	Ireland	Argentina	Nepal	France	US
1999	Poland	India	Bangladesh	Ghana	Ireland	Austria	Argentina	Nepal	Fiji	Finland
2000	India	Nigeria	Jordan	Bangladesh	Ghana	Australia	Kenya	Poland	Pakistan	Nepal
2001	Bangladesh	Nigeria	Pakistan	Jordan	India	Ghana	Kenya	Australia	Ukraine	Portugal
2002	Bangladesh	Pakistan	Nigeria	India	Ghana	Kenya	Jordan	Ukraine	Uruguay	Australia
2003	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nigeria	India	Ghana	Kenya	Uruguay	Jordan	Nepal	Ukraine
2004	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nigeria	India	Ghana	Ethiopia	Nepal	Uruguay	Jordan	South Africa
2005	Pakistan	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Ethiopia	Ghana	Jordan	Nigeria	Uruguay	South Africa
2006	Bangladesh	Pakistan	India	Jordan	Nepal	Ethiopia	Ghana	Uruguay	Nigeria	South Africa
2007	Pakistan	Bangladesh	India	Jordan	Nepal	Ghana	Uruguay	Nigeria	Italy	France
2008	Pakistan	Bangladesh	India	Nigeria	Nepal	Ghana	Jordan	Rwanda	Italy	Uruguay
2009	Pakistan	Bangladesh	India	Nigeria	Nepal	Rwanda	Egypt	Jordan	Ghana	Italy
2010	Pakistan	Bangladesh	India	Nigeria	Egypt	Nepal	Jordan	Rwanda	Ghana	Uruguay
2011	Bangladesh	Pakistan	India	Nigeria	Egypt	Nepal	Jordan	Rwanda	Ethiopia	Ghana
2012	Bangladesh	Pakistan	India	Ethiopia	Nigeria	Rwanda	Nepal	Egypt	Jordan	Ghana
2013	Bangladesh	Pakistan	India	Ethiopia	Nigeria	Rwanda	Nepal	Jordan	Ghana	Egypt
2014	Bangladesh	India	Pakistan	Ethiopia	Rwanda	Nepal	Nigeria	Ghana	Senegal	Egypt
2015	Bangladesh	Ethiopia	Pakistan	India	Rwanda	Nepal	Senegal	Ghana	Nigeria	China
2016	Ethiopia	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Rwanda	Nepal	Senegal	Ghana	Burkina Faso	Egypt
2017	Ethiopia	India	Bangladesh	Pakistan	Rwanda	Nepal	Senegal	Egypt	Ghana	Indonesia
2018	Ethiopia	Bangladesh	Rwanda	India	Pakistan	Nepal	Egypt	Indonesia	Ghana	Tanzania

Figure 2.1. Number of times a country was among the top 10 TCCs, 1990-2018



First, although a total of 40 different countries features in the top 10 list shown in Table 2.3, some UN member states appear in this list much more often than others. As Figure 2.1 shows, Bangladesh has been placed among the top 10 TCCs twenty-six times between 1990 and 2018, whereas Brazil was among the top contributors only once (in 1996). Although Pakistan and India have both also featured quite often in this list over the years, Ghana and Nepal have been among the top 10 TCCs even more often. Of course, this is not reflective of the actual relative number of personnel contributions, as Table 2.3 shows that Pakistan and India have consistently been among the top three of the largest troop contributors over the years. Furthermore, Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1 confirm that the composition of the top 10 TCCs has changed over time: whereas Western middle powers like Canada, Norway and Austria dominated the provision of UN peacekeeping personnel up until the early 90s, developing countries from Asia and Africa took the reins from approximately 1995 onwards.

Second, I use the same additional data sources as Binder and Golub (2020) to proxy for the interests of the top 10 TCCs.[1] First, I use direct contiguity as a measure for territorial and/or security interests. The expectation is that TCCs are concerned about conflicts 'on their doorstep' because of potential negative externalities spilling over into their own territory and, because they are not as well-resourced as the permanent UNSC members, prefer conflict management via the UN as a burden-sharing mechanism. Alternatively, TCCs could be more concerned about keeping the UN 'out' of their 'spheres of influence' and, therefore, prefer that a civil conflict in their neighbourhood does not reach the UNSC public formal agenda. I also use the Correlates of War (COW) Direct Contiguity (v3.2) dataset which registers the direct land and sea borders between all states in the period from 1816 to 2016 (Stinnett et al. 2002). To measure contiguity between the country experiencing civil conflict and the top 10 TCCs, I use a dummy variable which records whether any of the top 10 TCCs from the previous year is contiguous to the conflict state in a given year.

Next, I use total trade between the country experiencing conflict and the top 10 TCCs as a measure for economic interests. The assumption here is that expected disruptions in trade due to one trading partner experiencing a civil war will eventually lead to economic losses for a troop contributor that will, therefore, want to engage in burden-sharing via the UN to quickly bring the conflict to an end. I use the COW Trade (v4.0) data which records trade flows between states in the period from 1870 to 2014 (Barbieri and Keshk 2016; Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009). To measure total trade between the country experiencing civil conflict and

[1] Information on arms trade, however, is excluded from the present analysis.

the top 10 TCCs, I aggregate the total trade between each top 10 contributor from the previous year and a civil conflict country in a given year. I lag this variable by one year and apply the natural logarithm because this variable is right skewed.

Lastly, I use information on alliances between the country experiencing civil conflict and the top 10 TCCs as a measure for political interests. I have no specific expectations with respect to alliances. I use the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) (V5.0) data which records all military alliances between states from 1815 to 2018 (Leeds et al. 2002) to create a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there are any top 10 TCCs from the previous year that have a military alliance with the country experiencing conflict in a given year and 0 otherwise.

2.4.4 Control variables

I control for two sets of alternative explanations. First, as described earlier, UNSC agenda-setting is heavily influenced by the interests of its five permanent members. However, Binder and Golub (2020) show that the interests of the ten elected members also matter when it comes to determining which civil conflicts reach the Council's public formal agenda. Consequently, I include proxies for E10 and P5 interests in my statistical analysis and use the same data and the same measures as for my main explanatory variables, top 10 TCC interests.

This means that I create a dummy variable capturing if any E10 and P5 members, respectively, were directly contiguous to a country experiencing a civil conflict in a given year; the lagged and logged total amount of trade between the conflict country and all elected members as well as all permanent members; and a binary variable capturing if any E10 or P5 member had a military alliance with the country experiencing civil strife in a given year.

Including interest proxies for both the 15 UNSC members as well as the top 10 TCCs allows me to examine whether variation in the Council's agenda with respect to civil conflicts is determined only by those states that hold formal, i.e. *de jure* agenda-setting (or policy making) power, or whether states that are outside of the UNSC but support its work via policy implementation also influence discussion dynamics and, therefore, act as informal, i.e. *de facto* policy makers.

Second, I also control for conflict characteristics as well as characteristics of the country experiencing the civil conflict as the literature on UNSC agenda-setting suggests that these dimensions are also important for determining which conflicts are selected for public formal

discussion in the first place. To account for conflict characteristics, I use three different measures. First, I use the cumulative number of battle-related deaths up to a given year based on the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (V22.1) which is available from 1989 to 2021 (Shawn, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022). Second, I use the cumulative number of intentional attacks on civilians by governments and formally organized armed groups up to a given year based on the replication data by Bara and Hultman (2020) which spans the period 1993 to 2016. The advantage of using this data as opposed to the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset (V22.1) (Eck and Hultman 2007; Shawn, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022) is that civilian fatality counts are already linked to UCDP/PRIO ACD actors and conflicts. Third, I use the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (V22.1) to control for the existence of a peace agreement in a given year from 1975 to 2021. To account for characteristics of the country experiencing civil conflict, specifically material capability, I use the yearly composite index of national capability from the COW's National Material Capabilities Dataset (v6.0) (Singer 1988; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). This information is available from 1816 to 2016.

2.4.5 Estimation strategy

As my dependent variable (whether a civil conflict is discussed for the first time by the UNSC in a formal public meeting in a given year) is dichotomous, I use simple binary logistic regression models to analyse the association between my dependent variable and the measures selected to proxy for TCC, E10 and P5 interests as well as conflict and host state characteristics. In cases where covariates perfectly predict the absence of UNSC discussion and observations for these proxies would have been thrown out because of separation and, thus, no coefficients reported, I use Firth's penalized-likelihood approach to retain estimates for these observations (Zorn 2005).

2.5 Results

Tables 2.4 and 2.5 below show the results of time-varying cross-sectional logistic regressions for all internationalized civil conflicts from 1990 to 2019. Table 2.4 shows the results of stepwise regressions: first, I only include interest variables related to contiguity (Model 1), then only interest variables related to alliances (Model 2) and trade (Model 3) before I estimate the full model (Model 4). In Table 2.5, I control for the interaction between TCC interests and the number of top 10 TCCs from the previous year that are also non-permanent UNSC members to control for possible conditional effects.

Starting with Table 2.4, a few interesting results emerge. First, the top 10 TCCs seem to be able to exert influence over the UNSC's agenda-setting when it comes to civil conflicts but only under certain conditions. Among the three proxies used to measure different types of TCC interests, only one is significantly associated with the probability of a first public formal UNSC discussion in a given year. In the full model (Model 4), the coefficient for *TCC alliances* is positive and significant at the 10% level. This means that the probability of a civil conflict being discussed for the first time in a public formal UNSC meeting increases when at least one of the top 10 personnel contributor from the last year has a military alliance with the country experiencing a civil conflict. When there is no alliance between any of the top 10 TCCs and the country experiencing conflict, the probability that the conflict makes it to the UNSC's agenda is 2.1%; however, when at least one of the top 10 TCCs has an alliance with the conflict country, the probability rises to 6.2% and this more than twofold increase in the probability of discussion is significant at the 10% level. Top TCCs, hence, seem to prefer to involve the UN in conflicts that take place in countries they are militarily allied with by putting those conflicts on the formal agenda of the UNSC.

Three explanations might account for this relation. First, the top 10 TCCs are predominantly developing countries that have relatively fewer (military) resources. They might, thus, need help in fulfilling the responsibilities they have under existing alliance agreements and, thus, prefer to share the burden of conflict management with the UN. Second, building on the first explanation, top TCCs might prefer a conflict to be discussed and acted upon via peacekeeping because they could then offer to send their own troops, police, or observers to the country experiencing conflict as part of a wider UN peacekeeping mission. And third, TCCs that have a military alliance with the country experiencing civil strife might want to allow formal discussion of the conflict at the UNSC but use these discussions to prevent any meaningful action in relation to said conflict, thereby fulfilling the responsibilities they hold under their respective alliance agreements in this manner.

Table 2.4. Determinants of UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts, 1990-2019

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
TCC contiguity	-0.600			-0.588
	(0.529)			(0.646)
E10 contiguity	-0.643			-0.780
	(0.504)			(0.572)
P5 contiguity	-0.218			-0.0852
	(0.574)			(0.622)
TCC alliances		0.717		1.437*
		(0.652)		(0.783)
E10 alliances		-0.123		-0.381
		(0.688)		(0.791)
P5 alliances		0.0625		-0.779
		(0.485)		(0.616)
TCC trade			-0.0314	0.0913
			(0.257)	(0.286)
E10 trade			-0.327	-0.249
			(0.274)	(0.285)
P5 trade			0.594*	0.414
			(0.314)	(0.355)
Battle-related deaths	-1.22e-05	-1.46e-06	-4.14e-05	-5.49e-05
	(2.96e-05)	(2.76e-05)	(3.66e-05)	(4.35e-05)
One-sided violence	0.000177	0.000111	0.000325	0.000321
	(0.000205)	(0.000199)	(0.000217)	(0.000244)
Peace agreement	1.198**	1.335**	0.947	1.121*
	(0.528)	(0.533)	(0.609)	(0.638)
Strength host state	-0.711***	-0.899***	-1.184***	-1.048***
	(0.200)	(0.172)	(0.302)	(0.318)
Constant	-6.870***	-9.034***	-12.58***	-11.38***
	(1.508)	(1.414)	(3.400)	(3.453)
Observations	592	592	523	523

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Given that the correlation between TCC alliances and UNSC agenda is only significant at the 10% level, I subject the regression models shown in Table 2.4 to further robustness checks. The results of these checks can be found in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 in the Appendix. First, I rerun Model 4 from Table 2.4 but exclude the variables for trade to evaluate whether the loss of 69 observations from Model 2 to Model 4 in Table 2.4 might cause the variable for TCC alliances to become significant (Model 1). To further evaluate this concern, I rerun Model 4 from Table 2.4 with 523 observations, suppressing the variables for trade, first for contiguity only (Model 2), then for alliances only (Model 3) and lastly for contiguity and alliances (Model 4). Lastly, I run an OLS regression on the original model specification from Table 2.4 to evaluate whether the significance of TCC alliances might be an artefact of my data. Based on these robustness checks, I am confident that the significance of the relation between TCC

alliances and my dependent variable is not an artefact of the data. However, the impact of TCC alliances on the probability of a first public formal UNSC discussion of a civil conflict does not seem to be stable as significance levels vary across model specifications.

Second, in contrast to Lundgren and Klamberg (2022) as well Binder and Golub (2020), I do not find a statistically significant relationship between the interests of permanent or non-permanent UNSC members and the probability that a conflict makes it to the Council's formal agenda. Although larger volumes of trade between the P5 and the country experiencing civil conflict is positive and weakly significant at the 10% level in Model 3, this result is not robust in the full model (Model 4).

Furthermore, I also do not find that the intensity of the civil conflict either in terms of battle-related deaths or civilian victimization significantly impacts the probability of a conflict making it to the UNSC agenda. However, I do find that the existence of a peace agreement between the parties involved in civil strife increases the probability of discussion, whereas higher material capabilities of the country experiencing conflict significantly decreases the chance that a conflict will be formally picked up for discussion by the UNSC. These results overlap with selected findings from the literature on where peacekeepers go, namely that countries who are 'strong' are less likely to see intervention because they are less likely to consent to conflict management attempts from outside actors (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Stojek and Tir 2015).

To check whether overlap between TCCs and E10 matters, Table 2.5 replicates the models in Table 2.4 but additionally controls for the interaction between TCC interests and the number of top contributors that are non-permanent members at the same time, ranging from zero to three. Similar to Table 2.4, I consecutively model each interaction separately for each interest proxy (Models 1 to 6) before I specify the full model (Model 7).

First, I find that TCC contiguity matters when three of the top 10 troop contributors from the previous year are represented on the Security Council as non-permanent members. When three TCCs have a seat in the UNSC and at least one of the top 10 TCCs is contiguous to the country experiencing conflict, the probability that a civil conflict will make it to the UNSC's formal agenda decreases significantly at the 5% level. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 further visualize this relationship.

Table 2.5. Determinants of UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts with interaction effects (number of TCCs that are E10), 1990-2019

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
TCC contiguity	0.840			0.374	-0.408	-0.394	1.663
	(0.939)			(1.180)	(0.611)	(0.687)	(1.877)
1 TCC is E10	0.451	-0.676	-2.288	0.766	-0.484	-0.902	-2.535
	(0.669)	(0.854)	(3.130)	(0.765)	(1.004)	(3.233)	(4.036)
2 TCCs are E10	1.009	-0.815	-0.349	1.466	0.424	0.453	-1.116
	(0.826)	(1.596)	(3.755)	(0.940)	(1.713)	(3.863)	(4.569)
3 TCCs are E10	4.568***	1.452	-10.67	5.048***	2.593	-10.14	-18.73
	(1.125)	(1.955)	(6.654)	(1.350)	(2.208)	(6.758)	(13.19)
TCC contiguity x 1 TCC is E10	-1.079			-0.0113			-1.299
	(1.118)			(1.326)			(1.967)
TCC contiguity x 2 TCCs are E10	-0.577			-0.0514			-0.790
	(1.276)			(1.508)			(2.243)
TCC contiguity x 3 TCCs are E10	-5.011**			-4.701**			-7.239**
	(2.048)			(2.229)			(3.577)
E10 contiguity	-0.217			-0.166	-0.316	-0.452	-0.152
	(0.509)			(0.575)	(0.564)	(0.614)	(0.587)
P5 contiguity	-0.806			-0.727	-0.166	0.0200	-0.786
	(0.673)			(0.735)	(0.653)	(0.716)	(0.808)
TCC alliances		-0.631		1.337*	-0.114	1.584*	-0.649
		(0.984)		(0.759)	(1.162)	(0.887)	(1.424)
TCC alliances x 1 TCC is E10		1.314			1.807		1.954
		(1.126)			(1.319)		(1.472)
TCC alliances x 2 TCCs are E10		2.234			1.611		2.045
		(1.784)			(1.927)		(2.045)
TCC alliances x 3 TCCs are E10		1.664			1.092		3.439
		(2.106)			(2.314)		(2.610)
E10 alliances		-0.304		-0.783	-0.560	-0.634	-0.472
		(0.730)		(0.788)	(0.811)	(0.870)	(0.854)
P5 alliances		0.150		-0.570	-0.509	-0.723	-0.317
		(0.491)		(0.608)	(0.606)	(0.659)	(0.667)
TCC trade			-0.619	0.0141	0.138	-0.304	-0.546
			(0.620)	(0.333)	(0.316)	(0.648)	(0.807)
TCC trade x 1 TCC is E10			0.589			0.360	0.454
			(0.610)			(0.608)	(0.797)
TCC trade x 2 TCCs are E10			0.410			0.269	0.279
			(0.688)			(0.686)	(0.883)
TCC trade x 3 TCCs are E10			1.882**			1.735**	2.669*
			(0.881)			(0.877)	(1.591)
E10 trade			-0.327	-0.190	-0.262	-0.256	-0.0919
			(0.314)	(0.297)	(0.306)	(0.326)	(0.324)
P5 trade			0.368	0.141	0.0707	0.182	0.139
			(0.378)	(0.411)	(0.386)	(0.435)	(0.423)
Battle-related deaths	-1.70e-05	1.36e-05	-1.21e-05	-4.39e-05	-1.25e-05	-1.87e-05	-1.64e-05
	(2.96e-05)	(2.51e-05)	(3.60e-05)	(4.43e-05)	(3.58e-05)	(4.16e-05)	(3.53e-05)
One-sided violence	0.000286	0.000111	0.000130	0.000308	0.000135	0.000111	0.000216
	(0.000193)	(0.000184)	(0.000222)	(0.000244)	(0.000207)	(0.000248)	(0.000252)
Peace agreement	0.791	1.263**	0.757	0.689	1.129*	1.097	0.787
	(0.542)	(0.532)	(0.680)	(0.668)	(0.623)	(0.723)	(0.723)
Strength host state	-0.902***	-1.010***	-1.157***	-0.942***	-0.837***	-1.081***	-0.895***
	(0.226)	(0.190)	(0.310)	(0.313)	(0.296)	(0.334)	(0.313)
Constant	-8.764***	-9.100***	-8.646**	-9.178***	-7.480**	-9.014**	-5.808
	(1.875)	(1.609)	(4.181)	(3.473)	(3.236)	(4.418)	(4.805)
Observations	592	592	523	523	523	523	523

Standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 2.2. Average predicted probabilities conditional on TCC contiguity



and number of TCCs in the UNSC

Figure 2.3. Difference in average predicted probabilities conditional on TCC contiguity



and number of TCCs in the UNSC

For example, when none of the top TCCs is contiguous to the conflict country and no TCC is a non-permanent UNSC member at the same time, the probability of discussion is 5.9%. It increases to 9.5% when on TCC is also among the E10, decreases to 8.8% when two TCCs

are among the E10 and increases to 48.4% when three TCCs are non-permanent UNSC members.

When there is at least one top TCC that is contiguous to the country experiencing civil strife and no TCC is among the E10 at the same time, the probability of first formal public discussion is 2.5%, 3% when one TCC is a non-permanent UNSC member, 5.1% when two TCCs are in the Council but decreases to 3.9% when three TCCs are among the elected Council members.

There is also a significant difference in the conditional effect of TCC contiguity depending on the number of top TCCs from the previous year sitting on the Council as non-permanent members as shown by Figure 2.3. When three of the top 10 TCCs are among the elected members of the UNSC and at least one of the top 10 TCCs is contiguous to the country experiencing conflict, the probability of discussion significantly decreases by 25.8%.

These results indicate that the probability of UNSC discussion of a civil conflict can only be significantly lowered in cases where at least one TCC is contiguous to the conflict country when a sufficient number of TCCs is also sitting in the Council as non-permanent members. Similar to the P5 or the E10 (Binder and Golub 2020), top TCCs might also very well have 'spheres of influence' that they would prefer to keep out of international spotlight and attention. Furthermore, as already described above, the adoption of the agenda is regulated by Article 27(2) of the UN Charter and requires a majority of nine out of 15 members to vote in favour of discussion. When three out of 15 members are top troop contributors that can act as proxies for the wider group of TCCs, their chances of bargaining with and convincing other members not to vote in favour of discussion are higher when compared to scenarios when only one or two TCCs are represented on the UNSC.

Note, however, that the average predicted probabilities when no TCC is contiguous to the conflict country need to be interpreted with caution because they are estimated using the *firthlogit* command in Stata. This penalized maximum likelihood logistic regression is used to retain observations and estimate coefficients for those variables that would otherwise have been thrown out by the standard logistic model in Stata due to separation. Although the results from Table 2.5 are confirmed by running OLS regressions (see Table 2.8 in the Appendix), the standard logistic regressions indicate that the conditional effect of TCC contiguity is not necessarily robust (see Table 2.9 in the Appendix).

Second, I find that higher total amounts of trade between the top 10 TCCs from the previous year and the conflict country is positively associated with the probability of UNSC discussion at the 10% level when three TCCs are represented on the Council as non-permanent members. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 further visualize this finding.

Figure 2.4. Average predicted probabilities conditional on TCC trade and number of TCCs that are E10



Figure 2.5. Difference in average predicted probabilities conditional on TCC trade and number of TCC that are E10



For example, at the higher levels of TCC trade, the probability of discussion is virtually nil when none of the top 10 TCCs from the previous year are represented on the UNSC as non-permanent members. The probability is 3.4% when one TCC sits in the Council, 2.1% when two TCCs sit on the UNSC and 92.8% when three TCCs are non-permanent UNSC members. There is also a significant difference in the conditional effect of TCC trade depending on the number of top TCCs from the previous year sitting on the Council as non-permanent members as shown by Figure 2.5. When three of the top 10 TCCs are among the elected members of the UNSC and the amount of trade between the top 10 TCCs and the country experiencing conflict increases, the probability of discussion significantly increases by 6.9%. These results indicate that TCCs seem to be concerned about potential negative disruptions to their economy as a consequence of their trading partner experiencing civil strife and seem to prefer to pull the UN in under these conditions. As is the case for TCC contiguity, it seems that TCC interests can only influence UNSC agenda-setting when a sufficient number of TCCs are also sitting in the Council as non-permanent members.

2.5 Discussion and conclusion

Who holds agenda-setting power in the UNSC? Although conventional wisdom as well as more recent scholarship suggests that we should only expect the permanent and the ten non-permanent members of the Council to matter in this regard, the present article challenges this assumption. Going beyond the studies by Allen and Yuen (2022), Binder and Golub (2020), as well as Lundgren and Klamberg (2022), I present a novel theory on the role states outside the UNSC's formal membership can play in the Council's agenda-setting. These states lend substantive support to the Council's policy process in the maintenance of international peace and security through implementation. I argue that the capacity of these states to deliver on UNSC policies provides them with *de facto* decision-making and, thus, agenda-setting power.

Using time-series cross-sectional logistic regressions of all internationalized civil conflicts in the post-Cold War period, I test this argument in the context of UN peacekeeping. I evaluate whether the likelihood of the UNSC to discuss a civil conflict for the first time in a public formal meeting in a given year is influences by the security, political and economic interests of the top 10 personnel contributors to UN peace operations in the previous year. In contrast to my hypothesis, I find that top TCCs only have an influence on UNSC agenda-setting in

relation to civil conflicts when at least one of them also sits on the Council as non-permanent, or elected, member.

My results suggest that these policy implementers can have de facto decision-making and, thus, agenda-setting power but only when non-permanent members that are also top TCCs can act as their proxies. Furthermore, I find that the number of elected UNSC members that form part of the group of top TCCs from the previous year matters: whereas the interests of the top TCCs do not seem to matter when only one or two top TCCs sit on the Council, their security and economic interests matter and significantly influence the probability that a civil conflict be discussed for the first time in a formal public meeting by the UNSC in a given year. These results indicate that when three out of 15 Council members are top troop contributors that can act as proxies for the wider group of TCCs, their chances of bargaining with and convincing other Council members to change their views on discussion are higher when compared to scenarios when only one or two TCCs are non-permanent members.

Although my empirical results should be interpreted with a grain of salt, they provide some indication that agenda-setting in the UNSC might not only be controlled by the core Council membership that enjoys *de jure* decision-making power. When evaluating later stages of the UNSC's decision-making process, several scholars, e.g., find that the participation of and input from actors outside the UNSC has shaped the design of UN peacekeeping mandates in several instances.

Bode (2018), for example, finds that UN officials from the Secretariat and selected non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were crucial in putting the protection of children in armed conflict on the UNSC's agenda. Similarly, Oksamytna (2018) finds that the advocacy by civil society and NGOs for a stronger UN response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda eventually led to a more robust deployment on the ground. Mamiya (2016), on the other hand, shows that Canada, a former top TCC during the Cold War, was instrumental in shaping the UNSC's agenda on the protection of civilians in armed conflict which is now a priority task in every UN peace operation as well as an important marker of peacekeeping effectiveness (see Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2021). Taken together, these findings suggest that fully understanding how the Council makes decisions related to its agenda as well as more substantive issues necessitates an analytical lens that goes beyond the five permanent and ten non-permanent UNSC members.

Furthermore, my findings indicate that TCCs can act as *de facto* decision-makers and, thus, agenda-setters if a sufficient number of them also holds *de jure* decision-making power. This

result is interesting for several reasons. First, it suggests that top TCCs are part of their own 'club' that co-exists alongside other political divisions in the UNSC as well as the wider UN membership. Much like non-permanent members that are also members of different formal and informal organizations and might use their term on the UNSC to advance broader 'club' interests (see e.g. Mikulaschek 2018a), elected members that are top personnel contributors to UN POs seem to exhibit similar behaviour.

Second, this finding links well to research on the determinants of election to non-permanent seats on the UNSC. As described further above, Malone (2000) as well as Dreher et al. (2014) find that countries which provide substantial amounts of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions are also more likely to be elected to the Council. Combined with insights from the present study, it seems that personnel contributions prove useful not only in increasing the chances of becoming a non-permanent UNSC member but also the chances of being a more influential elected Council member in relation to agenda-setting.

Third, the empirical evidence presented here indicates that non-permanent members might be heterogenous in their ability to influence Council agenda-setting even though they operate within the same *de jure* decision-making framework. A common argument about why elected UNSC members should matter for Council decision-making in the first place is their ability to exploit procedural rules to their advantage (Binder and Golub 2020; Mikulaschek 2018a). However, my findings suggest that elected members can only make effective use of these rules when other conditions are also satisfied. Along with additional studies on the heterogeneity of the Council's permanent members and their use of the Council (Lundgren and Klamberg 2022), more research on the conditions under which elected members can successfully influence UNSC agenda-setting more specifically and decision-making more generally is needed.

Lastly, in contrast to previous studies on UNSC agenda-setting in the context of civil conflicts, I do not find that the security, political, or economic interests of either the permanent or the non-permanent Council members matters for the probability of a first formal public UNSC discussion. The lack of a significant relationship might be explained by the fact that I do not control for preference heterogeneity among these two groups, whereas both Binder and Golub (2020) as well as Lundgren and Klamberg (2022) do. However, even without controlling for preference heterogeneity, I should be able to replicate at least some of the findings from the literature. The fact that I do not suggests that the relationship between

P5 and E10 interests and the probability of UNSC discussion might not be robust across different model specifications and research designs.

Furthermore, I also do not find that the intensity of the conflict is significantly related to the probability of observing the first formal public UNSC discussion of a civil conflict. In contrast to findings from the literature on UNSC agenda-setting as well as scholarship on where peacekeepers go (Binder and Golub 2020; Fortna 2004; Frederking and Patane 2017; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), I find that the existence of a peace agreement is more relevant for a conflict making it to the UNSC agenda as well as the military strength of the country experiencing a civil conflict. The latter finding is robust across all model specifications and is always negatively significant at the 1% level, suggesting that stronger conflict countries are less likely to see their internal affairs discussed at the UNSC. This result also suggests that certain characteristics, such as the military strength of the country experiencing conflict, are relevant determinants of both, UNSC agenda-setting as well as the deployment of peacekeepers further down in the decision-making process (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Stojek and Tir 2015).

Appendix

Table 2.6. Robustness check: Estimation of Table 2.4 with different samples

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4	(5) Model 5	(6) Model 6
TCC contiguity	-0.718	-0.255		-0.386		-0.569
	(0.555)	(0.637)		(0.601)		(0.608)
E10 contiguity	-0.666	-0.720		-0.753		-0.814
	(0.510)	(0.556)		(0.545)		(0.551)
P5 contiguity	-0.228	-0.189		-0.116		0.00732
	(0.591)	(0.599)		(0.608)		(0.621)
TCC alliances	0.863		1.330*		1.437*	1.527**
	(0.672)		(0.766)		(0.743)	(0.768)
E10 alliances	-0.158		-0.481		-0.227	-0.190
	(0.707)		(0.781)		(0.732)	(0.750)
P5 alliances	-0.0923		-0.685		-0.420	-0.540
	(0.531)		(0.577)		(0.548)	(0.591)
TCC trade		0.00613	-0.0208			
		(0.275)	(0.269)			
E10 trade		-0.259	-0.327			
		(0.279)	(0.279)			
P5 trade		0.516	0.550			
		(0.324)	(0.347)			
Battle-related deaths	-8.02e-06	-4.77e-05	-4.84e-05	-3.38e-05	-2.91e-05	-3.74e-05
	(3.01e-05)	(3.76e-05)	(4.12e-05)	(3.64e-05)	(3.74e-05)	(4.05e-05)
One-sided violence	0.000166	0.000368	0.000261	0.000270	0.000174	0.000237
	(0.000212)	(0.000235)	(0.000227)	(0.000229)	(0.000217)	(0.000240)
Peace agreement	1.284**	0.904	1.156*	0.920	1.148*	1.107*
	(0.543)	(0.617)	(0.632)	(0.618)	(0.628)	(0.642)
Strength host state	-0.738***	-1.090***	-1.142***	-0.758***	-0.922***	-0.806***
	(0.207)	(0.325)	(0.297)	(0.208)	(0.176)	(0.218)
Constant	-7.461***	-11.67***	-12.17***	-7.144***	-9.183***	-8.030***
	(1.735)	(3.515)	(3.341)	(1.577)	(1.486)	(1.854)
Observations	592	523	523	523	523	523

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.7. Robustness check: Estimation of Table 2.4 with OLS

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
TCC contiguity	-0.0136			-0.000761
	(0.0195)			(0.0229)
E10 contiguity	-0.0206			-0.0209
	(0.0171)			(0.0188)
P5 contiguity	-0.00204			0.00118
	(0.0212)			(0.0232)
TCC alliances		0.0278		0.0464*
		(0.0231)		(0.0247)
E10 alliances		-0.00855		-0.00164
		(0.0234)		(0.0257)
P5 alliances		0.0140		-0.00868
		(0.0212)		(0.0243)
TCC trade			0.00389	0.00318
			(0.00980)	(0.0105)
E10 trade			-0.0139	-0.00913
			(0.0121)	(0.0125)
P5 trade			0.0156	0.00804
			(0.0124)	(0.0137)
Battle-related deaths	-1.15e-06	-9.41e-07	-2.18e-06*	-1.92e-06*
	(1.01e-06)	(1.01e-06)	(1.11e-06)	(1.14e-06)
One-sided violence	1.67e-06	4.45e-07	5.30e-06	2.24e-06
	(7.82e-06)	(7.85e-06)	(8.90e-06)	(9.47e-06)
Peace agreement	0.116***	0.119***	0.0913**	0.0964***
	(0.0323)	(0.0326)	(0.0359)	(0.0362)
Strength host state	-0.0288***	-0.0357***	-0.0405***	-0.0377***
	(0.00726)	(0.00587)	(0.00938)	(0.0107)
Constant	-0.0799	-0.158***	-0.213**	-0.178
	(0.0511)	(0.0414)	(0.105)	(0.114)
Observations	592	592	523	523
R-squared	0.097	0.099	0.103	0.113

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.8. Robustness check: Estimation of Table 2.5 with OLS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
TCC contiguity	0.0271			0.0276	0.00168	0.00160	0.0337
	(0.0343)			(0.0362)	(0.0228)	(0.0228)	(0.0385)
1 TCC is E10	0.0239	-0.0285	0.0567	0.0313	-0.0208	0.0664	0.0442
	(0.0299)	(0.0363)	(0.0878)	(0.0311)	(0.0376)	(0.0881)	(0.0870)
2 TCCs are E10	0.0295	-0.0422	0.0991	0.0430	0.00401	0.0896	0.0836
	(0.0378)	(0.0524)	(0.121)	(0.0391)	(0.0554)	(0.122)	(0.124)
3 TCCs are E10	0.407***	-0.144	-0.385	0.429***	-0.0858	-0.414	-1.107***
	(0.0710)	(0.203)	(0.361)	(0.0725)	(0.205)	(0.364)	(0.402)
TCC contiguity x 1 TCC is E10	-0.0307			-0.0111			-0.00740
	(0.0395)			(0.0412)			(0.0453)
TCC contiguity x 2 TCCs are E10	-0.0158			-0.00518			0.00758
	(0.0505)			(0.0520)			(0.0592)
TCC contiguity x 3 TCCs are E10	-0.442***			-0.441***			-0.563***
	(0.0909)			(0.0927)			(0.0978)
E10 contiguity	-0.0116			-0.0126	-0.0125	-0.0123	-0.0112
	(0.0172)			(0.0189)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)	(0.0187)
P5 contiguity	-0.0162			-0.0142	-0.00157	0.00255	-0.0131
	(0.0209)			(0.0228)	(0.0231)	(0.0232)	(0.0227)
TCC alliances		-0.0185		0.0473*	0.00220	0.0490**	-0.00564
		(0.0366)		(0.0243)	(0.0377)	(0.0246)	(0.0371)
TCC alliances x 1 TCC is E10		0.0506			0.0672		0.0788*
		(0.0437)			(0.0454)		(0.0456)
TCC alliances x 2 TCCs are E10		0.0822			0.0554		0.0699
		(0.0599)			(0.0624)		(0.0624)
TCC alliances x 3 TCCs are E10		0.308			0.278		0.587***
		(0.208)			(0.210)		(0.210)
E10 alliances		-0.0159		-0.00671	-0.0115	-0.00856	-0.0105
		(0.0236)		(0.0251)	(0.0258)	(0.0256)	(0.0250)
P5 alliances		0.0158		-0.00141	-0.00320	-0.00477	0.00106
		(0.0212)		(0.0238)	(0.0243)	(0.0242)	(0.0236)
TCC trade			0.00618	0.00152	0.00257	0.00529	0.00655
			(0.0129)	(0.0104)	(0.0106)	(0.0135)	(0.0139)
TCC trade x 1 TCC is E10			-0.00440			-0.00545	-0.00919
			(0.0114)			(0.0114)	(0.0126)
TCC trade x 2 TCCs are E10			-0.00776			-0.00623	-0.0127
			(0.0155)			(0.0156)	(0.0175)

TCC trade x 3 TCCs are E10			0.0626			0.0654	0.120***
			(0.0409)			(0.0412)	(0.0411)
E10 trade			-0.0114	-0.00294	-0.00916	-0.00775	-0.00548
			(0.0121)	(0.0123)	(0.0126)	(0.0125)	(0.0122)
P5 trade			0.00681	-0.00350	0.000874	0.000495	-0.00121
			(0.0126)	(0.0136)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0135)
Battle-related deaths	-1.28e-06	-7.88e-07	-1.69e-06	-1.75e-06	-1.38e-06	-1.39e-06	-1.45e-06
	(9.93e-07)	(1.00e-06)	(1.11e-06)	(1.12e-06)	(1.14e-06)	(1.14e-06)	(1.11e-06)
One-sided violence	2.41e-06	-1.19e-06	-7.24e-07	2.07e-06	-2.35e-06	-3.71e-06	-1.20e-07
	(7.71e-06)	(7.83e-06)	(9.04e-06)	(9.39e-06)	(9.51e-06)	(9.58e-06)	(9.33e-06)
Peace agreement	0.0937***	0.121***	0.0920**	0.0746**	0.105***	0.0982***	0.0901**
	(0.0319)	(0.0329)	(0.0357)	(0.0357)	(0.0365)	(0.0361)	(0.0356)
Strength host state	-0.0310***	-0.0362***	-0.0361***	-0.0345***	-0.0329***	-0.0346***	-0.0364***
	(0.00713)	(0.00589)	(0.00943)	(0.0106)	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0106)
Constant	-0.120**	-0.136***	-0.173	-0.133	-0.0840	-0.154	-0.150
	(0.0549)	(0.0480)	(0.123)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.131)	(0.129)
Observations	592	592	523	523	523	523	523
R-squared	0.148	0.120	0.131	0.174	0.140	0.139	0.205

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.9. Robustness check (Table 2.5): Logistic regression

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4	(5) Model 5	(6) Model 6	(7) Model 7
TCC contiguity	0.827			0.250	-0.567	-0.394	2.460
	(1.028)			(1.410)	(0.681)	(0.687)	(2.142)
1 TCC is E10	0.534	-0.708	-2.288	0.969	-0.470	-0.902	-4.886
	(0.710)	(0.925)	(3.130)	(0.848)	(1.135)	(3.233)	(4.594)
2 TCCs are E10	1.066	1.614*	-0.349	1.775*	2.503**	0.453	0.0881
	(0.888)	(0.856)	(3.755)	(1.046)	(1.086)	(3.863)	(5.043)
3 TCCs are E10	5.007***	3.372***	-10.67	6.040***	4.346***	-10.14	-31.77
	(1.209)	(0.986)	(6.654)	(1.534)	(1.311)	(6.758)	(21.72)
TCC contiguity x 1 TCC is E10	-1.144			0.158			-2.108
	(1.222)			(1.565)			(2.280)
TCC contiguity x 2 TCCs are E10	-0.611			0.0277			-1.407
	(1.407)			(1.767)			(2.633)
TCC contiguity x 3 TCCs are E10	0			0			0
	(0)			(0)			(0)
E10 contiguity	-0.262			-0.213	-0.407	-0.452	-0.178
	(0.538)			(0.630)	(0.613)	(0.614)	(0.669)
P5 contiguity	-0.933			-0.920	-0.155	0.0200	-1.138
	(0.725)			(0.839)	(0.714)	(0.716)	(0.983)
TCC alliances		-0.661		1.612*	-0.0919	1.584*	-0.819
		(1.059)		(0.845)	(1.311)	(0.887)	(1.652)
TCC alliances x 1 TCC is E10		1.498			2.141		2.409
		(1.217)			(1.492)		(1.753)
TCC alliances x 2 TCCs are E10		0			0		0
		(0)			(0)		(0)
TCC alliances x 3 TCCs are E10		0			0		0
		(0)			(0)		(0)
E10 alliances		-0.330		-0.938	-0.684	-0.634	-0.732
		(0.767)		(0.868)	(0.881)	(0.870)	(0.962)
P5 alliances		0.139		-0.678	-0.611	-0.723	-0.431
		(0.514)		(0.672)	(0.660)	(0.659)	(0.777)
TCC trade			-0.619	-0.0177	0.132	-0.304	-1.108
			(0.620)	(0.360)	(0.338)	(0.648)	(0.940)
TCC trade x 1 TCC is E10			0.589			0.360	1.000
			(0.610)			(0.608)	(0.943)
TCC trade x 2 TCCs are E10			0.410			0.269	0.667

			(0.688)			(0.686)	(1.045)
TCC trade x 3 TCCs are E10			1.882**			1.735**	4.978*
			(0.881)			(0.877)	(2.550)
E10 trade			-0.327	-0.224	-0.295	-0.256	-0.159
			(0.314)	(0.325)	(0.327)	(0.326)	(0.362)
P5 trade			0.368	0.212	0.101	0.182	0.292
			(0.378)	(0.438)	(0.407)	(0.435)	(0.483)
Battle-related deaths	-2.49e-05	9.07e-06	-1.21e-05	-6.72e-05	-2.53e-05	-1.87e-05	-3.48e-05
	(3.30e-05)	(2.77e-05)	(3.60e-05)	(5.20e-05)	(4.23e-05)	(4.16e-05)	(4.65e-05)
One-sided violence	0.000293	9.58e-05	0.000130	0.000412	0.000189	0.000111	0.000433
	(0.000211	(0.000198	(0.000222	(0.000287	(0.000234	(0.000248	(0.000298
	)	)	)	)	)	)	)
Peace agreement	0.852	1.356**	0.757	0.780	1.257*	1.097	0.774
	(0.578)	(0.566)	(0.680)	(0.736)	(0.687)	(0.723)	(0.810)
Strength host state	-0.966***	-1.076***	-1.157***	-1.133***	-0.976***	-1.081***	-1.203***
	(0.239)	(0.200)	(0.310)	(0.351)	(0.323)	(0.334)	(0.377)
Constant	-9.385***	-9.742***	-8.646**	-11.10***	-8.774**	-9.014**	-6.476
	(1.988)	(1.695)	(4.181)	(3.859)	(3.522)	(4.418)	(5.429)
Observations	578	570	523	510	503	523	490

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Chapter 3. ‘Talking the talk until walking the walk’? Quality of deliberation and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization

3.1 Introduction

What explains variation in the time it takes the UNSC to authorize a peace operation? Some civil wars are addressed by the Council via the deployment of blue helmets rather swiftly after their outbreak, while others linger on the UNSC’s agenda for years before receiving UN assistance. While the civil conflicts in Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire, for example, made it to the Council’s agenda relatively quickly, it took the fifteen permanent and non-permanent members more than eight years to agree on the authorization of a PO in the case of Burundi, while the UNSC came to a decision on peacekeeping within less than two months in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. These two cases illustrate that the negotiation process among Council members following agenda-setting can act as an additional bottleneck in the UNSC’s decision-making process by considerably slowing down the time it takes the Council to react to civil conflicts via peacekeeping.

In this article, I focus on UNSC PO authorization speed and argue that variation in the time it takes the Council to agree on the deployment of a peacekeeping mission might correlate with variation in the quality of the public formal UNSC discourse preceding authorization. Building on and extending the conceptual work by Risse (2000) as well as Steenbergen et al. (2003), I first assert that the verbal communicative exchanges in these types of Council meetings do not always fulfil the same function. Sometimes, UNSC members meet for bargaining purposes only; sometimes they meet to engage in rhetorical exchanges; and at other times, Council members meet to collectively argue about the type of problem a particular conflict poses as well as the rules and norms that should guide UNSC action in addressing it.

Second, I argue that the different functions public formal UNSC discourse fulfils can be ordered according to a measure of quality. In contrast to bargaining, both rhetoric and arguing represent more high-quality discourse because these modes of communication involve the mutual provision of reasons for the preferences Council members hold. Argumentative discourse is, however, even more high-quality than rhetoric because the goal is not to

aggregate individual preferences but engage in a collective communicative process about competing validity claims in which discourse participants are willing to re-evaluate and eventually revise their preferences.

Third, I contend that discourse which displays higher levels of quality prolongs time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization. I expect that public formal Council discourse which follows a logic of arguing is associated with a slower UNSC PO authorization speed because Council members first have to mutually agree on and establish 'common knowledge' before they can eventually engage in 'playing the (bargaining) game'.

To evaluate my argument, I descriptively explore the quality of UNSC formal public discourse based on a three-dimensional analysis with the help of QTA methods. Based on the verbatim records of 353 substantive speeches across 34 public formal meetings I select from *The UN Security Council Debates* corpus (Schoenfeld et al. 2019) for ten civil conflicts from Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and the Middle East post-1995, I find mixed evidence for my argument. The strongest support for my argument emerges in relation to the equality of participation, specifically speech frequency. When UNSC members and other discourse participants speak roughly equally often, that is, when discourse quality is assumed to be higher, time to peacekeeping authorization is prolonged. This dynamic is less pronounced in relation to speech length: although time to peacekeeping authorization increases when the use of 'floor time' of either speaker type converges and discourse thus becomes more equal and high quality, this relation only holds for a small subset of analytical cases. In regard to the level of justification, my empirical expectation cannot be supported as there is only minimal variation in the diversity of arguments across the ten conflicts under study. Furthermore, although there are some indications that higher quality discourse which considers the well-being of others relatively more often and has a stronger orientation towards the 'common good' might potentially slow down PO authorization speed, this relationship is not clear-cut.

This study makes three relevant scholarly contributions. First, it sheds more light on one step in the UNSC's decision-making process that has hitherto not been the focus of systematic study. While a necessary prerequisite for any further meaningful Council action (Allen and Yuen 2020), agenda-setting constitutes only the first selection stage in the UNSC's decision-making process by discriminating between civil conflicts that are and are not picked up for serious consideration by the Council. The deliberations of the UNSC following the acceptance of an item on its formal agenda, however, constitute a second and equally important selection stage by distinguishing between civil conflicts that are eventually (not)

addressed by the Council via peacekeeping. As described in Chapter 1, a failure to understand and account for variation in the time it takes the UNSC to authorize a PO to manage a given conflict might ultimately result in omitted variable bias in studies on where peacekeepers go.

Second, I extend and apply a concept from the study of domestic legislative politics and democratic systems more generally and link it to an outcome at the international level, namely variation in UNSC PO authorization speed. Although the Council can also be regarded as a global legislature as it creates legally binding international law with the resolutions it passes according to Article 25 of the UN Charter, the dynamics of the UNSC's debates have not received much systematic attention thus far (notable exceptions include Eckhard et al. (2021) and Scherzinger (2022a, 2022b,)). To the best of my knowledge, this is also the first study which comparatively analyses the quality of the Council's public formal discourse preceding the authorization of a PO. In doing so, it transplants the concept of 'discourse quality'(Steenbergen et al. 2003) from the domestic to the international level, thereby enabling new research which might focus on comparing the quality of discourse between legislatures at the national and the state-to-state level as well as comparing the quality of discourse across various international fora in the future.

Third, this article makes a methodological contribution by using QTA tools to explore variation in the quality of the UNSC's public formal discourse. Although the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003) has become a popular measure which has allowed researchers to go beyond small-N, qualitative analyses of parliamentary discourse to a certain extent, one of the biggest drawbacks of this index is that its construction relies on manual coding. However, to be able to efficiently process and analyse large amounts of speech and text in a 'big data' era, we need to be able to evaluate discourse quality on the basis of more automated coding procedures.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, I present a summary of the key findings of previous research on the determinants of UNSC reaction time in Section 3.2. In the next step, I further elaborate on and describe my theoretical argument about the relationship between the quality of the public formal UNSC discourse and variation in the Council's PO authorization speed in Section 3.3. I describe my research design in Section 3.4 and present my descriptive results in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2 Prior research: Determinants of UNSC reaction time

Similar to the case of UNSC agenda-setting (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2), only a limited number of academic studies has examined variation in the time it takes the UNSC and other comparable intergovernmental organisations to react to civil wars thus far. All of these works employ different conceptualizations of 'reaction time' and consequently examine duration to 'action' at slightly different stages of the Council's decision-making process. Furthermore, all studies highlight the importance of different explanatory variables in this regard.

Binder and Golub (2020), for example, look at UNSC agenda-setting speed and examine which factors influence the duration between the outbreak of a civil war and it being discussed by the Council in a public formal meeting for the first time. They find that the interests of the UNSC's permanent as well as its non-permanent members matter and that preference heterogeneity among the elected members is even more important in determining the speed with which a civil war makes it to the formal agenda of the UNSC than preference heterogeneity among the P5.

In her book, Hardt (2014) analyses differences in the timeliness with which selected regional organizations, including the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Organisation of American States and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, respond to civil conflicts through the deployment of a PO. Looking at the time between when an official demand for a PO is made via a request of a host country or a UNSC resolution and the actual deployment on the ground, Hardt (2014) observes that differences in the level of (in)formality of an organization's decision-making helps explain variation in the speed with which the four different intergovernmental organizations examined engage in conflict management through peacekeeping. Higher levels of informality characterised by close-knit and positive interpersonal relations among decision-makers which can "arise through informal negotiations and socialization, during backdoor diplomacy, and over home-cooked meals and tennis matches" (Hardt 2014, 2) allow certain organizations to react more rapidly to demands for peacekeeping than others.

Similarly, Lundgren, Oksamytna, and Coleman (2021) analyse the determinants of UN peacekeeping deployment speed, that is, the time between the authorization of a PO by the UNSC and its actual deployment on the ground. The authors find that characteristics of the troop contributing countries are key in explaining UN PO deployment speed: countries that depend on the financial compensation they receive for the troops they contribute voluntarily, countries that are directly affected by the negative externalities of a conflict and countries that

do not require parliamentary approval to authorise the placement of personnel abroad deploy their pledged contingents much quicker than others.

Although this small number of studies already covers many different aspects related to the timeliness of the decision-making process of intergovernmental organizations more broadly and the UNSC more specifically, one important stage, at least in relation to the Council's peacekeeping policymaking, has hitherto not been examined: time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization, or the duration between the first appearance of a conflict on the UNSC's public formal agenda and the actual decision to authorize a PO to address it.

Only after a civil conflict has been accepted to the UNSC's formal agenda can the Council begin public deliberations on whether it constitutes a threat to international peace and security and by which means best to address it. And only after the decision to authorize a PO has been made by Council members, does the question of peacekeeping deployment speed become relevant. By neglecting to examine the time it takes the UNSC to authorize a PO to manage a civil conflict after it has made it to the Council's agenda, our knowledge of the UNSC's decision-making dynamics at different stages of the process more generally as well as the determinants of the UNSC's reaction time to civil conflicts more specifically remains incomplete.

In addition to shifting our focus to the duration until UNSC PO authorization, this article also introduces a new explanatory variable in relation to the Council's reaction time to civil wars, namely the quality of the public formal UNSC discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization.

3.3 Theoretical framework: Discourse quality and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization

3.3.1 What 'discourse'?

As described in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1, the ultimate purpose of public formal UNSC meetings is to take action against 'threats to the peace', 'breaches of the peace', or 'acts of aggression'. Only in these meetings can the Council vote on resolutions which authorize e.g. the deployment of a PO to address a specific civil conflict. That is, only in public formal meetings can the UNSC properly discharge its mandated function of maintaining international peace and security. While public formal meetings often produce concrete outcomes which represent the actions taken by the UNSC vis-à-vis a particular issue, these meetings are also

used to inform the Council's policymaking prior to reaching a tangible decision in the first place.

Sessions in which the UNSC votes on draft resolutions (so-called 'Adoption' meetings) represent only one of four subtypes when it comes to public formal meetings. Other session formats include 'Open Debates', 'Debates', and 'Briefings'. 'Open Debates' are usually convened to discuss larger thematic issues (Security Council Report 2019), such as the Women, Peace and Security agenda, the link between climate change and conflict, or the recruitment of child soldiers during armed conflict (S. H. Allen and Yuen 2020). In addition to the fifteen UNSC members, other UN members as well as members of the UN Secretariat can also participate in open debates. 'Debates', on the other hand, are public formal meetings where Council members only discuss very concrete 'national' issues (Allen and Yuen 2020), such as an internal armed conflict in a particular country. Parties that are directly involved in or affected by a conflict are also allowed to participate in these types of formal public meetings under rule 37 of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure (PRP) (Security Council Report 2019). And lastly, during 'Briefings', members of the UNSC receive a presentation about e.g. a particular civil conflict or a certain dimension of a conflict by a member of the UN Secretariat, such as the UN Secretary-General or a Special Representative (ibid).

'Adoption' meetings where the outcome eventually is the authorization of a PO are generally preceded by multiple 'Debates' and/or 'Briefings': as Allen and Yuen (2020, 662) note, "[w]ithout discussion, an issue will never be brought to a vote". This means that Council members inevitably need to engage in a concerted communicative process in which they verbally exchange information on a certain situation or conflict with each other as well as other UN members via speech before making a decision on collective action. Two elements in particular need to be discussed every time a civil conflict makes it to the public formal agenda of the UNSC. First, does the internal armed conflict under consideration constitute a 'threat to the peace'? And second, what action should the Council take to address this threat?

Although the UNSC's mandate is to maintain international peace and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter and although it has certain powers and tools it can use to restore that peace under Chapters VI and VII, there are no rules prescribing which situations or conflicts would qualify as a 'threat' to international peace and security or what the UNSC is supposed to do once it has determined such a 'threat' (see also Gehring and Dörfler (2019)). Consequently, due to the absence of prescriptive criteria according to which the Council

ought to resolve these questions, each time a civil conflict is put on the agenda of the UNSC, all meeting participants have to talk to each other and engage in an information exchange on these two dimensions before the Council can reach an agreement on a concrete course of action.

The verbal utterances and communicative exchanges via speech in different types of public formal meetings preceding the authorization of a PO by the UNSC to manage a civil conflict is what I am interested in in the present study and what I broadly define as 'discourse'.

3.3.2 Different modes of communication and discourse 'quality'

My argument that the public formal discourse preceding UNSC peace operation authorization can explain variation in the time it takes the fifteen Council members to agree on this type of action to manage a particular civil conflict rests on three elements. First, I assert that the verbal communicative exchanges in the public formal UNSC meetings prior to peacekeeping authorization do not always fulfil the same function. Second, I argue that the different functions public formal UNSC discourse fulfil can be ordered according to a measure of 'quality'. And lastly, I contend that discourse which displays higher levels of 'quality' prolongs time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization. In the following, I will address the first and second elements of my theory, whereas Section 3.3.3 will address the third element.

First, I argue that communicative exchanges via talk and speech in the public formal UNSC meetings preceding peacekeeping authorization can fulfil different functions. Here I closely follow (Risse 2000) who holds that communication and the exchange of information through verbal utterances and talk during international negotiations can take various forms that can be classified into different functional categories based on their content.

For example, a public formal meeting might be convened to simply to exchange information. Council members as well as other participating UN members might want to know how many and which state representatives perceive a certain civil conflict as a 'threat to the peace' and what preferences different members have vis-à-vis possible UNSC action, such as the deployment of a PO. The information collected can then be used by each discourse participant to try and satisfy their own preferences and maximise their individual utility in the ensuing

negotiation process within the UNSC. In line with Risse, I call this first mode of communication 'bargaining'.[1]

[1] This bargaining process need not only be carried out in public formal meetings but can also be conducted behind 'closed doors', i.e. in private formal meetings or entirely informal meetings (see also Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1, for a typology of the different UNSC meeting formats).

At other times, UNSC meetings might be called to discuss a civil conflict publicly and formally to put forward justifications for preferences and use speech strategically to try and convince others that certain preferences and views are appropriate and should also be adopted by others. While the function of communicative interactions in public formal meetings as described in the first instance is to collect enough information to enable discourse participants to 'play the (bargaining) game' as successfully as possible, the communicative exchanges described here are used to present rhetorically sophisticated and appealing arguments on the norms that they believe should guide UNSC policymaking vis-à-vis a certain civil conflict. As Risse (2000), I label this second mode of communication 'rhetoric'.

And lastly, the UNSC might convene a formal public meeting to mutually define and co-create the 'common knowledge' that is necessary for bargaining to ensue in the first place. This means that Council members come together in public formal meetings to critically examine the assertions and claims made by other UN(SC) members vis-à-vis a certain conflict. The purpose of verbal communicative exchanges in these instances is not to further one's own preferences and world views as is the case for rhetorical discourse but to question the truthfulness of speech acts in relation to perceived facts that characterise a particular civil conflict, to scrutinize whether the rules and norms that are suggested to inform Council decision-making are appropriate in regard to a certain situation and to ascertain the authenticity of speech acts. UNSC members, thus, try "to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action" (Risse 2000, 7). Like Risse (2000), I call this third mode of communication 'arguing'.

What further elements distinguish 'arguing' from 'rhetoric' and 'bargaining'? According to Risse (2000), the most important difference between these three modes of communication relates to the extent to which the characteristics of a particular decision-making situation are defined.

In the case of 'bargaining', all discourse participants know the set of feasible actions each UN(SC) member has at their disposal when debating a certain civil conflict, they know other members' policy preferences and they also know which elements of the particular decision-making situation others are uncertain about. In short, everyone is on the same page and possesses the 'common knowledge' when it comes to the 'rules of the game'. Importantly, the preferences of all 15 Council members as well as other participating UN members in relation to potential UNSC action vis-à-vis a particular civil conflict are well defined and fixed and

not amenable to change throughout the course of a public formal discourse in cases of 'bargaining'. This means that each of the members knows whether it categorises a certain civil conflict as a 'threat to the peace' and whether it is in favour of any Council action, such as peacekeeping. The information exchanged in public formal meetings is then simply used to maximize individual utility given the characteristics of the specific decision-making situation.

Similar to 'bargaining', discourse fulfilling a purely rhetorical function is also characterised by transparency in relation to the most important characteristics of a particular decision-making situation. Furthermore, discourse participants know what they want and, thus, also have well-defined preferences. In contrast to 'bargaining', however, preferences are, to a certain degree, less static in public formal discourse that resembles 'rhetoric' and they may change as a result of certain members' attempts to convince others of their views via speech.

Communicative exchanges that serve the purpose of 'arguing', on the other hand, take place in a vacuum where Council members lack the common knowledge that would otherwise define a particular decision-making situation and help them 'play the game'. Discourse participants, thus, do not have a common definition of the particular problem they are facing and do not necessarily know what 'game' they are playing because they cannot directly define what kind of problem a particular civil conflict poses. Furthermore, UN(SC) members are unsure about the underlying principles and norms that should guide possible action, i.e. they also do not know 'how to play the game' because a particular civil conflict might present the UNSC with circumstances it has not dealt with previously. Furthermore, the preferences of Security Council and other UN members are not necessarily known or well-defined and can transform in the course of a public formal discourse as they become the subject of interrogation and scrutiny in a communicative process which challenges the validity of every verbal utterance.

Second, I argue that modes of communicative interaction in public formal UNSC meetings that approximate 'arguing' can be considered to represent discourse that is of higher 'quality' than verbal exchanges that are more closely connected to 'rhetoric' or 'bargaining'. I delineate this line of thought on the basis of the characteristics of the different discursive processes as well as their content.

First, the purpose of communicative interaction among Council members in cases of 'arguing' is to collectively (and to a certain extent, objectively) define the exact problem that a civil conflict poses as well as agree on the norms and rules that should guide decision-making to address it rather than just allowing certain actors to put forward their narratives on a civil

conflict, as is the case in rhetorical discourse. “But how do actors adjudicate [what the problem is and] which norm applies? They argue” (Risse 2000, 6).

Rhetorical and argumentative public formal UNSC discourse are, thus, related as both modes of communication involve the presentation of justifications for why a Council member holds a specific worldview or preference. This is in contrast to ‘bargaining’ where UNSC members simply state what they want without providing any reasons in support of their views. As the goal of communicative exchanges in the case of ‘bargaining’ is just to collect information on other members’ preferences, speech does not need to conform to any particular semantic or linguistic format.

However, in contrast to communication that involves ‘rhetoric’, the primary aim of verbal interactions resembling ‘arguing’ is not to employ talk strategically but to ensure that the eventual ‘rules of the game’ reflect the facts of a certain problem as truthfully as possible (Risse 2000). Furthermore, when public formal UNSC discourse is argumentative rather than rhetorical, every verbal utterance and every viewpoint that is introduced into the discourse on a certain civil conflict is heavily challenged and scrutinized to filter out ‘straw man’ arguments where conclusions do not strictly follow from premises (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019).

Beyond ‘mutual reason-giving’, argumentative public formal UNSC discourse is also characterized by the fact that Council members listen to, interact with, and respect each other. This means that, although they critically engage with everything that is being said in a particular discourse on a civil conflict, they do so in a way that is not dismissive of others. In contrast to rhetorical or bargaining discourse, every UNSC member is willing to engage with the speech acts of other members, remain open-minded and change their views and preferences if necessary, so that a consensus on the ‘common knowledge’ can eventually ensue (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019). This aspect further distinguishes ‘arguing’ from ‘rhetoric’ and ‘bargaining’ because Council members can eventually not only change their preferences over outcomes or their utility functions but substantively transform themselves by inherently changing their beliefs and the way they ‘play the game’.

Argumentative discourse also offers every UNSC members an equal opportunity to chime in and introduce any assertions and arguments into the communicative process because relationships of (formal) power retreat to the background (Risse 2000). When Council and non-Council members engage in argumentative discourse in public formal UNSC meetings, all discourse participants are ‘socially’ equal (Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019)

and "[...] have equal rights concerning making an argument or challenging a validity claim" (Risse 2000, 11), regardless of the fact that some UN(SC) members hold more (institutional) power than others.

Moreover, the types of assertions presented in argumentative discourse focus less on how policies will impact the individual interests of the different Council members but rather focus on how the main addressees of an eventual policy will likely be affected or how the UNSC could best fulfil its mandate of maintaining international peace and security as required by the UN Charter. This 'common good' orientation (Steenbergen et al. 2003) further sets apart 'arguing' from 'rhetoric' and 'bargaining': as the latter two modes of communication are primarily used to enable UNSC members to maximise their individual utility rather than mutually create the scope conditions of a particular decision-making situation in relation to a civil conflict, there is no need to consider interests of anyone else but oneself.[1]

In summary, I assume that public formal UNSC discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization can fulfil three different functions: it can be used to engage in individual utility maximisation only (bargaining), to present justifications and reasons for individual preferences (rhetoric), or to collectively think about and define the characteristics of a particular decision-making situation (arguing). Furthermore, I contend that these three types of communication can be ordered according to a measure of 'quality'. Both 'rhetoric' and 'arguing' represent more high quality public formal UNSC discourse than 'bargaining' because they offer Council members the opportunity to explain why they hold certain views and why they think other members should accept their preferences before voting on any Council action vis-à-vis a particular civil conflict. Argumentative public formal UNSC discourse can, however, further be distinguished from rhetorical discourse in terms of quality as 'arguing' goes beyond mutual reason-giving. Ultimately, the goal of argumentative communicative exchanges is not to aggregate individual preferences to produce a specific outcome but to engage in "[...] a [collective] process in which political actors listen to each other, reasonably justify their positions, show mutual respect, and are willing to re-evaluate and eventually revise their initial preferences through a process of [arguing] about competing validity claims" (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 1). Table 3.1 below summarises these intuitions.

[1] As Steenbergen et al. (2003, 25f.) note, "[t]his does not mean that self-interest should be excluded from argumentation. However, someone using self-interest must demonstrate that it is compatible with or contributes to the common good".

Table 3.1. Functions of formal public UNSC meetings and relation to discourse quality

	Logic	Function	Discourse quality
(I)	Bargaining	Engage in individual utility maximisation	Low
(II)	Rhetorical	Present justifications and reasons for individual preferences before engaging in utility maximisation	Medium
(III)	Arguing	Collectively think about and define the characteristics of a particular decision-making situation	High

3.3.3 Discourse quality and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization

Lastly, I argue that public formal UNSC discourse which displays higher levels of 'quality' prolongs time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization. Based on the preceding section, I assume that discourse which resembles 'bargaining', i.e. where UNSC members verbally exchange information that adheres to no particular semantic or linguistic form and where the function of communication is to simply learn about others' (fixed) preferences and then engage in utility maximisation, is of lowest quality when compared to 'rhetoric' or 'arguing'. I assume that rhetorical public formal UNSC discourse is of higher quality than verbal communications which resemble 'bargaining' because in these cases, public formal meetings are used to present arguments and justifications for (relatively fixed) state preferences and positions which means that the information communicated and exchanged between UNSC members is more sophisticated in terms of its content. Lastly, I assume that public formal UNSC discourse which follows the 'logic of arguing' displays the highest quality as the communicative exchanges between Council members go beyond mutual reason-giving and eventually enable discourse participants to define, re-evaluate and revise their preferences in relation to a particular civil conflict and any possible UNSC action.

I argue that when preferences are static and fixed and the 'rules of the game' are known to all UNSC members and the only thing that is left for Council members to do is to 'play the game' and engage in utility maximisation, time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization will be relatively short. That is, when public formal UNSC meetings operate in line with the 'logic of bargaining' and, therefore, discourse quality is low, I expect the Council to authorize a PO relatively quickly. In contrast, I expect time to peacekeeping authorization to increase the

more flexible UNSC members' preferences and the more uncertain and undefined the characteristics of a particular decision-making situation become. I expect that public formal discourse which follows a 'logic of arguing', i.e. displays a high quality, will delay the duration until UNSC peacekeeping authorization because Council members first have to mutually agree on and establish the 'common knowledge' before they can eventually engage in 'playing the (bargaining) game'. My empirical expectation, therefore, is as follows:

> ***Hypothesis 1***: *The higher the quality of UNSC public formal discourse, the longer the time until the Council authorizes the deployment of a peace operation to a civil conflict.*

3.4 Research design

3.4.1 Case selection and analytical sample

I evaluate my argument on the relationship between the quality of discourse and the time it takes the UNSC to authorize a PO on the basis of ten (internationalized) intrastate armed conflicts from the UCDP/PRIO ACD (V21.1) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021). To select the relevant civil conflicts for my analytical sample, I apply three conditions. First, due to the temporal limitation of the text-based dataset I use to extract information on discourse quality (see Section 3.4.2), a civil conflict needs to have started or still be ongoing after 1 January 1995. Second, a civil conflict should also not have experienced the deployment of a UNSC-authorized PO by the UN or another, non-UN actor before 1995. And third, it needs to be possible to link the selected civil conflicts to the respective speeches from public formal Council meetings on the basis of *The UN Security Council Debates Corpus* (Schoenfeld et al. 2019).

Out of the 42 civil conflicts that made it to the Council's agenda in the post-Cold War period (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2), 22 (52.4%) eventually saw the deployment of a UNSC-authorized peacekeeping mission. Ten of these deployments, however, were already authorized prior to the beginning of 1995. I choose to focus on the remaining 12 civil conflicts to compare variation in time to PO authorization among cases that have eventually been address by the Council via peacekeeping. As both civil conflicts taking place in Mali were discussed in the same first public formal UNSC meeting and addressed through the same first peacekeeping mission, I combine these cases. Furthermore, I was not able to identify any speeches relating to conflict ID 412 (Serbia) from *The UN Security Council Debates Corpus*

which is why I exclude this case from my analysis. Consequently, my analytical sample consists of ten cases in total, with eight cases from Sub-Saharan Africa and one case each from Europe and the Middle East.[2]

3.4.2 Dependent variable

Conceptually, I am interested in the UNSC's 'reaction time' vis-à-vis a particular civil conflict, that is, the time it takes the Council to address a conflict through authorizing the deployment of a peace operation. Consequently, I create a duration variable which counts the number of months between the 1st public formal discussion of a civil war by the UNSC and the nth public formal meeting on the same conflict in which the Council passes a resolution authorizing a PO. Note that I include time to Council authorization for UN *as well as* non-UN POs, including (sub-)regional organizations and (ad hoc groups of) states, as the UN oftentimes does not intervene in a civil conflict as the first responder but rather delegates this task to other actors (see Table 3.2). Furthermore, I only count the number of months until the first PO that is authorized by the UNSC to address a given civil conflict.

To code my dependent variable, I make use of two sources. First, I consult the data on UNSC agenda-setting I collected for my study in Chapter 2 to obtain the date of the first public formal Council discussion of a particular civil conflict. Second, I use the *Peace Operation Mandates* dataset (see Chapter 4) to single out the date on which the UNSC authorized the deployment of the first PO to address a given civil conflict for the eight cases from Sub-Saharan Africa and conduct case-specific Internet research for the two cases from Europe and the Middle East.

Table 3.2 below shows the conflicts that comprise my analytical sample, the date of the first public formal UNSC discussion, the date on which the first PO was authorized by the UNSC, the name of the actor and the mission acronym. In addition, Figure 3.1 depicts the variation in duration to UNSC peacekeeping authorization, in months, for my ten cases.

The average time it takes the UNSC to authorize a PO in the case of the ten civil conflicts under study is 25.5 months, or a little over two years. We can see that, for example, in the case of Burundi, it took the Council a little over eight years – more than four times as long – to authorize the South African Protection Support Detachment in Burundi (SAPSD - Burundi). In the case of the Central African Republic (CAR), the Council also deliberated for more than six years before jointly authorizing the European Union Military Operation in

[2] A list of all 42 potential cases can be found in Table 3.9 in the Appendix.

Central African Republic (EUFOR I) and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). In contrast, the decision to deploy a UNSC-authorized PO to the civil conflict in Syria was reached after only one year. In the case of the conflict surrounding Abyei, the Council needed even less time to deliberate: the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was authorized less than one month after the conflict has first reached the UNSC's agenda.

Table 3.2. Descriptive information on civil conflicts in analytical sample

Location	*UCDP ID*	*1st discussion*	*PO authorization*	*Actor*	*PO Acronym*
Burundi	287	25 Oct 1993	29 Oct 2001	South Africa	SAPSD
Central African Republic (CAR)	416	17 Jul 2001	25 Sep 2007	EU, UN	EUFOR I, MINURCAT
Guinea-Bissau	410	6 Nov 1998	21 Dec 1998	ECOWAS	ECOMOG
Ivory Coast	419	20 Dec 2002	4 Feb 2003	France, ECOWAS	Op. Licorne, ECOMICI
Macedonia	417	7 Mar 2001	31 Mar 2003	EU	Concordia
Mali	327/11347	26 Mar 2012	20 Dec 2012	AU/ECOWAS	AFISMA
Sierra Leone	382	27 Nov 1995	8 Oct 1997	ECOWAS	ECOMOG
Sudan (Darfur)	309	10 Oct 2003	30 Jul 2004	AU	AMIS I
Sudan (Abyei)	11344	31 May 2011	27 Jun 2011	UN	UNISFA
Syria	299	27 Apr 2011	21 Apr 2012	UN	UNMIS

Figure 3.1. Variation in time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization for analytical sample



3.4.3 Main independent variable

My argument is that there is an association between the quality of the formal public UNSC discourse preceding the authorization of a peace operation and the time it takes the Council to reach a decision on deployment. That is, the UNSC's 'reaction time' in addressing a particular civil conflict is prolonged when the communicative exchanges among Council members in public formal meetings follow a 'logic of arguing'.

In constructing a measure for my main explanatory variable, I closely follow the conceptual work by Steenbergen et al. (2003) and select three distinct but closely related dimensions to assess the quality of public formal UNSC discourse with the help of quantitative text analysis methods. As described in section 3.4.2, *The UN Security Council Debates* (Schoenfeld et al. 2019) corpus serves as the main data source to retrieve information for discourse quality. It is a text-based dataset which contains the verbatim records of all speeches made in public formal UNSC meetings between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2020.[3]

Overall, this corpus contains 82,165 speeches from 5,748 public formal UNSC meetings. 33,219, or 40%, of these speeches are related to thematic debates in the Council, whereas 48,946, or 60%, of the speeches are related to particular country situations. To identify the meetings and speeches that are relevant for my analytical sample, I rely on information from the corpus's metadata.[4]

In total, I am able to link 353 substantive speeches from 34 public formal meetings that were given and held prior to the authorization of a PO to address the ten civil conflicts that comprise my analytical sample. Note that I only use information from substantive speeches

[3] This dataset is particularly useful because it allows me to follow the negotiations of those civil conflicts that made it to the agenda of the UNSC in the first place. In Chapter 2, I examine the likelihood that a civil conflict ever makes it to the official agenda of the UNSC, i.e. whether it is discussed in a first formal public Council meeting. In this chapter, I study the dynamics of the first as well as all subsequent formal public Council discussions until the authorization of a first PO by the UNSC.
in the same type of meeting format once a civil conflict has been accepted to the official agenda of the UNSC.

[4] More specifically, I use the variable 'agenda_item3', which specifies the name of the agenda item being discussed, to link meetings and speeches to the ten cases that comprise my analytical sample. This variable is especially helpful as it records the name of the country that is experiencing civil strife and is being discussed at a given meeting and addressed by a given speech. A big thank you to Antonio Pires who took it upon himself to add this infamous variable to the corpus so that peace and conflict researchers like me can more easily subset and use the UNSC Debates data.

and meetings for my analysis and exclude speeches made by the President of the UNSC as these are generally of a formal and procedural nature and would, therefore, add a lot of noise to the analysis. Table 3.3 below breaks down the number of substantive speeches and meetings per conflict.

Table 3.3. Number of substantive speeches and meetings prior to UNSC peacekeeping authorization by case

Location	*Number of speeches*	*Number of meetings*
Burundi	121	10
CAR	20	1
Guinea-Bissau	0	0
Ivory Coast	0	0
Macedonia	23	1
Mali	15	6
Sierra Leone	17	2
Sudan (Darfur)	18	2
Sudan (Abyei)	27	4
Syria	112	10
Total	*52*	*456*

The *Discourse Quality Index* was originally developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003) to quantitatively study parliamentary debates and evaluate whether and to which extent parliamentarians actually engage in processes of deliberation and argumentation rather than bargaining or rhetoric. The unit of analysis of the DQI is a single speech; however, only parts that are considered 'relevant' are (manually) coded, i.e. those "[...] that contain[...] a *demand*, [or] a proposal on what decision should or should not be made" (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 27).

The original index consists of five distinct but analytically related categories that "[...] can be combined to form a scale that can serve as an overall measure of discourse quality" (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 30). These include (1) participation, (2) level of justification, (3) content of justifications, (4) respect, and (5) constructive politics.[5] To apply this idea to the specific case of the UNSC, I choose to incorporate the first three dimensions from the original

[5] In the original article, Steenbergen et al. (2003) describe that the DQI is comprised of seven categories; however, this is due to the fact that they disaggregate 'respect' into three sub-categories.

DQI to evaluate the quality of the public formal UNSC discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization.

In contrast to Steenbergen et al. (2003), I do not distinguish between relevant and irrelevant parts of a speech that are made in the course of a discussion on a particular civil conflict but include all speeches in their entirety for my analysis. Furthermore, I do not hand code the selected speeches. Instead, I rely on quantitative text analysis tools to automate coding and exploration.[6]

The following sections go into more detail about each of the three categories that form part of my analysis of the UNSC's formal public discourse quality: (1) equal participation, (2) level of justification and (3) content of justification. Each section provides a definition of the respective dimension, a standard of quality against which to evaluate a particular dimension, as well as my approach regarding measurement.

3.4.3.1 First dimension: Equal participation

The first dimension, equal participation, assesses whether every discourse participant is 'socially' equal (Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019; Steenbergen et al. 2003), that is, whether everyone is free to take part and speak in the deliberations surrounding a specific topic, or whether certain speakers and/or groups of speakers dominate the discourse. I consider discourse to be more socially equal and thus, more high quality when different groups of speakers participating in the formal public UNSC deliberations preceding peacekeeping authorization speak in roughly equal amounts.

I use two proxies and make two different comparisons to evaluate this dimension. First, I use speech frequency to gauge who speaks how often during a particular discourse on a civil conflict preceding the authorization of a peacekeeping mission. I compare two different speaker types. First, I compare speech frequency between UNSC members and all other speakers. As previously mentioned, in addition to the fifteen Council members, non-UNSC members, such as the conflict country itself or other UN member states that are directly affected by a conflict are allowed to participate in formal public meetings under rule 37 of the Council's PRP and they often do so, especially in the cases that comprise my analytical

[6] My analytical sample will increase significantly in future extensions of this paper once I include the substantive meetings and speeches of those additional 20 cases that made it to the agenda of the Council but did not (yet) see the authorization of a peace operation (see Section 3.4.1). It, thus, makes sense to set up an architecture that relies less on manual coding as the number of speeches to analyse will eventually surpass my ability to efficiently hand-code the information I'm interested in.

sample. Second, I compare speech frequency among the permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC. To compare speech frequency across my ten cases, I use the average number of speeches by speaker type, i.e. I count the number of substantive speeches by speaker type across all meetings that precede the authorization of a first PO and divide the sum by the number of substantive meetings per case.

Second, I use speech length to evaluate how much 'floor time' different speakers use if they speak (see also Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019). As neither the UN Charter nor the Security Council's PRP regulate speech time for public formal Council meetings, discourse participants can, theoretically, speak for as long as they want to. Speech length, therefore, proxies for a more substantive type of participation than speech frequency. Although different speakers might express their views and opinions often throughout a discourse, they might not have a lot to say and speak only because that is considered 'good practice' within Council deliberations. Conversely, different speakers might participate relatively infrequently but make relatively more substantive and longer submissions. Hence, an increased use of 'floor time' can potentially substitute for low speech frequency. As for speech frequency, I compare speech length between UNSC members and other speakers as well as among UNSC members (non-permanent versus permanent). To compare speech length across cases, I use the average number of sentences per speech by speaker type, i.e. I count the number of sentences by speaker type across all meetings that precede the authorization of a first PO, divide the sum by the number of substantive meetings per case before I divide the average number of sentences by the average number of speeches by speaker type.

3.4.3.2 Second dimension: Level of justification

The second dimension, level of justification, assesses *how* discourse participants convey information when they engage in communicative exchanges with each other via speech. Do they make claims and draw inferences on the basis of evidence? Do they provide justifications and reasons for their positions in such a manner that they can be verified and/or challenged by others? Do speakers provide coherent arguments where premises and conclusions hang reasonably close together? In short, this dimension of UNSC public formal discourse quality evaluates "[...] to what extent a speech gives complete justifications for [the] demands" (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 28) it puts forward when it comes to discussing whether a civil conflict represents a 'threat' to international peace and security, or whether the deployment of

a peace operation would be the right conflict management tool in a given instance. Here I concur with Steenbergen et al. (2003) in assuming that discourse is of higher quality the more the speeches given by different speakers preceding peacekeeping authorization contain attempts at convincing others of a particular position or course of action "[...] by citing evidence and drawing, or suggesting, inferences from this evidence and from other beliefs and assumptions [...]" (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 25).

To proxy for the level of justification of a public formal discourse preceding the authorization of a PO, I use structural topic modelling (STM) (Roberts et al. 2013) to measure the diversity of arguments that are brought forward by UNSC members in their speeches on a particular civil conflict (see also Munger et al. (2019)). Topic models represent one sub-category of quantitative text analysis methods which help researchers to classify and "organize[...] text[...] into a set of categories" (Grimmer and Stewart 2013, 268) when these categories are unknown (unsupervised classification). In general, topic models enable researchers to discover the main themes (topics) that pervade a large and otherwise unstructured collection of text-based documents by finding patterns of words that appear together and then grouping them into topics which represent distributions of words over a fixed vocabulary (Meyer and Puschmann 2020). Within this class of quantitative text analysis methods, I choose to employ STM specifically because it offers a range of tools that help explore, visualise and, ultimately, more substantively interpret model outputs (see also Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2019).

I am aware that this approach is imperfect for at least the following two reasons. First, the use of STM only allows me to assess *what* UNSC members are saying (see Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019) when they speak in public formal meetings, not necessarily *how* they say something and whether the form in which they convey information semantically resembles an 'argument'. However, I might never be able to replicate the level of detailed manual coding that Steenbergen et al. (2003) propose to assess the level of justification (and discourse quality more generally) because analysing large corpora of speech with quantitative text analysis methods necessarily involves a trade-off which privileges breadth over depth. That is, "[...] the more unrestricted the domain of communication [...] [,] the less detail one can meaningfully extract: keyword relationships or argument elements rather than the detailed argument structures that are possible with relatively small and well-defined corpora" (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 149f.).

Second, even if we accept that the use of quantitative text analysis methods can allow us to gain only limited insights into the complexity of human speech, the question of method

choice remains. Instead of relying on identifying the topics of a particular speech or an overall discourse, previous work that has engaged in measuring the level of justification with text analysis techniques has relied more on the concept of 'integrative complexity'. Integrative complexity specifically focuses on argument structure and the extent to which a speech (or discourse) considers different viewpoints and arguments in relation to a specific topic (Brundidge et al. 2014). It is, therefore, fundamentally concerned with how individuals structure their thoughts and how decision-relevant information is organized in verbal communication (Owens and Wedeking 2011). The assumption is that the more complex the speech, i.e. the more intricate the argument structure linguistically and the higher the diversity of viewpoints addressed, the higher is the level of justification and, thus, the quality of discourse. To measure integrative complexity, these studies rely on the so-called *Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)* program "that examines the words people use" (Owens and Wedeking 2011, 1039) and their "thinking styles" (ibid, 1040) on the basis of 70 different, pre-defined dictionaries that reflect various dimensions of integrative complexity.

Although integrative complexity and its measurement through LIWC would arguably outperform other methods when it comes to proxying for level of justification, the program is not available open source or free of charge which is why I choose to use STM through *R*. I would also argue that focusing on what different speakers say in terms of the arguments and viewpoints they introduce in their speech is somewhat related to one element of integrative complexity, namely 'differentiation', which "represents the degree to which an individual acknowledges multiple perspectives or dimensions associated with an issue" (Owens and Wedeking 2011, 1038). Consequently, I assume that the higher the diversity of viewpoints and arguments that are introduced by discourse participants preceding the authorization of a peace operation, the higher the level of justification and, thus, the quality of the public formal discourse. On the other hand, when UNSC members discuss a particular civil conflict only in very unidimensional terms (if at all) before voting on a resolution authorizing the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, I take this as an indication that discourse participants are engaging in 'bargaining' or 'rhetoric' rather than 'arguing'.

To interpret the output of the structural topic models, I proceed as follows. First, I create a non-exhaustive list of the possible viewpoints and arguments that could reasonably be put forward by UNSC members and other speakers when discussing the eventual deployment of a PO to get a better understanding of the potential 'universe' of topics. I use two different types of resources to create this list. First, I consult the literature on the use of narratives, frames,

and speech in the UNSC. Second, I closely examine the verbatim records for two cases from my analytical sample, namely Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi. I chose these conflicts because they represent examples for different 'duration' outcomes: in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the UNSC authorized the deployment of two parallel non-UN POs only 1.5 months after the civil war was first discussed by the Council, whereas it took the UNSC more than eight years to authorize a non-UN peacekeeping mission to address the civil conflict in Burundi. Table 3.4 below shows the non-exhaustive list of the different viewpoints that UNSC members and other speakers are likely to refer to when discussing a civil conflict publicly and formally prior to authorizing a PO.

Table 3.4. Viewpoints and arguments UNSC members and other speakers can refer to in public formal discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization

Viewpoint/Argument	*Element(s)*	*Sub-element(s)*	*Source*
(1) Precedent	Collective Individual		Gehring and Dörfler (2019); author's reading of transcripts
(2) International law	Treaty	UN Charter[8] Human rights Crimes against humanity International humanitarian law[9]	Johnstone (2003); Faizullaev and Cornut (2017); author's reading of transcripts
	Custom[7]	Sovereignty Non-intervention Genocide/ethnic cleansing	
	General principles	Constitution Democracy	
(3) Peace process	Agreement(s)	Ceasefire agreement(s) Peace agreement(s)	Faizullaev and Cornut (2017); author's reading of transcripts
	Communication	Reconciliation Dialogue	
(4) Legitimacy	Appropriateness Proportionality Fairness Responsibility		Schoon and Duxbury (2019); Faizullaev and Cornut (2017); author's reading of transcripts
(5) Colonialism			author's reading of transcripts
(6) Cost of conflict	Refugees/IDPs Contagion		author's reading of transcripts

[7] Including peremptory norms (also known as jus cogens).
[8] Including reference to the mandate of the UNSC which has its origins in the UN Charter.
[9] Including violence against civilians.

	Fatalities	
(7) Cost of peacekeeping	Political Material	author's reading of transcripts
(8) Role of region	Authorization Financial/logistical support	author's reading of transcripts

When a discourse participant talks about precedent (1), it links the conflict currently under discussion to a similar case that the Council has dealt with in the past (collective memory) or it links the conflict and its characteristics and consequences to something in its own history (individual memory). The idea here is to provide other discourse participants with a focal point which encourages (or discourages) a solution that the UNSC has accepted before.

When speaking about international law (2), discourse participants refer to rules of collective behaviour that states in the international system accept as valid to guide state-to-state interaction. These rules can have different sources (treaty, custom, or general principles) and refer to different elements within these. The idea behind using an argument based on legality is to stress that a conflict actor's behaviour either was or was not in violation of certain provisions of international law. For example, when a discourse participant wants to advocate for a conflict to be considered as a threat to international peace and security, it could frame its speech in terms of 'international law' by stressing that conflict parties engaged in egregious crimes against humanity which is considered a violation and, therefore, necessitates the attention of the UNSC.

When making references to the peace process (3) between conflict parties, discourse participants can make a link to the specific rules that the conflict parties have agreed to follow to resolve their differences and bring the conflict to an end (agreements) or to the necessity of verbal communication between conflict parties to find solutions for the conflict (communication). Doing so, enables a discourse participant to either condemn the behaviour of conflict parties as contrary to some legally binding agreement and, thus, advocate for additional action on part of the UNSC or discourage action by pointing out that conflict parties are progressing in implementing their agreements.[10]

Using legitimacy (4) and its different sub-elements as justification for a certain viewpoint enables a discourse participant to point out a behaviour and/or goal that is to be (or has been)

[10] Discourse participants could also point out that conflict parties have not yet signed any agreements and, thus, there is no 'peace to keep'.

obtained as unreasonable or unacceptable according to 'common sense'. This frame can be used to justify behaviour as appropriate given a specific goal or discredit either behaviour or goal as inappropriate or unreasonable.

When framing the discourse in terms of colonialism (5), a discourse participant can refer to the cultural and political events that have made a lasting impact on the identity of the state that colonised and was being colonised or characterise a relationship of hierarchy and dependence between these two states to either qualify why there are special (geopolitical) interests and concerns or to discredit these interests.

When referring to the costs of conflict (6), discourse participants might refer to the negative external effects produced by the conflict, such as the number of refugees and internally displaced people, the number of fatalities or any contagion effects to stress that action by the UNSC is needed to prevent a further deterioration of the situation on the ground. Participants referring to the cost of peacekeeping (7), on the other hand, rather focus on the material and political costs that are connected with the deployment of a UN or non-UN PO to discourage any such action because the financial costs are perceived as too high or to convince others that peacekeeping is actually quite an efficient tool because it helps curb violence, prevent conflict recurrence and prolong the duration of peace and has a relatively low price tag (see also Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2021).

And lastly, discourse participants can bring ROs into the conversation by referencing their willingness and ability to get involved in a certain conflict under discussion (8). Absent agreement to send in a UN operation, participants can, e.g., encourage the authorization of a regional mission or try to persuade others to continue lending financial and logistical support to an already existent regional mission, whereas others might contest the role of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security because they would rather want to see the UNSC as the primary actor in this specific policy domain.

Second, after converting all 353 substantive speeches I could link to the ten cases in my analytical sample into a machine-readable corpus object in *R*, breaking each speech down into tokens (single terms, including words and punctuation), applying standard pre-processing techniques,[11] and creating a document-feature matrix for every public formal discourse preceding the authorization of a peace operation, I run structural topic models using the *stm*

[11] These steps include removing punctuation, removing symbols and numbers, removing stop words that are common in the English language as well as lower-casing and stemming each word.

package in *R* (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2019). For each case, I choose to run the model with 15 topics.[12]

To interpret the topic models, I make use of a diagnostic tool that is built into the *stm* package. I inspect the 20 most likely words that are linked to a topic to get an intuition about the different viewpoints that are introduced by discourse participants across different civil conflicts. Table 3.5 below shows a sample output for the civil conflict in Burundi. Topics 2 and 12, for example, seem to be linked to arguments surrounding the cost and negative externalities of the conflict, while Topics 1, 6, and 13 seem to be related to the legitimacy of the conflict parties.

I repeat this process for each of the 15 topics that are identified by the structural topic models for all ten cases in my sample to connect them to the different argumentative frames I list in Table 3.4 I then use this information to evaluate the diversity of argumentation which I use to proxy for the level of justification, by counting the number of distinct topics that can be identified on the basis of all substantive speeches preceding peacekeeping authorization for each of my ten cases.

[12] Although unsupervised classification methods like STM do not require the researcher to know the categories that the model will output, one of the most important specifications the researcher needs to decide on is the number of topics into which a given corpus ought to be classified into. In future extensions of this paper, I will, thus, have to verify and validate whether 15 is indeed the most efficient number of topics for my models (see also Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019).

Table 3.5. Top 20 words per topic identified for the public formal UNSC discourse on Burundi

Topic 1	*Topic 2*	*Topic 3*	*Topic 4*	*Topic 5*	*Topic 6*	*Topic 7*	*Topic 8*
countri	situat	countri	must	leader	govern	govern	union
burundian	humanitarian	subregion	region	agreement	minist	resolut	european
question	intern	rwanda	organ	polit	situat	council	debat
peac	concern	region	consid	peac	countri	unit	polit
stabil	must	problem	french	process	intern	draft	dialogu
effort	polit	want	lake	parti	peac	support	peac
situat	process	council	franc	peopl	polit	polit	support
council	assist	deleg	violenc	intern	council	secretari	effort
polit	effort	support	council	leadership	meet	can	region
made	communiti	impun	polit	forc	sinc	leader	situat
make	parti	genocid	intervent	communiti	work	state	violenc
parti	deleg	intern	deleg	council	even	dialogu	solut
develop	burundian	peopl	measur	arusha	organ	violenc	organ
can	respons	great	great	one	region	intern	without
believ	continu	one	problem	countri	unit	paragraph	process
region	peac	must	order	reach	posit	also	continu
promot	region	organ	intern	negoti	protect	humanitarian	leader
understand	conflict	communiti	concern	confid	mediat	general	crisi
creat	possibl	lake	confer	part	now	consid	parti
reconcili	leader	establish	african	think	follow	may	facilit
Legitimacy	*Cost of conflict*	*Precedent*	*Precedent*	*Peace process*	*Legitimacy*	*Procedure*	*Role of region*

Topic 9	*Topic 10*	*Topic 11*	*Topic 12*	*Topic 13*	*Topic 14*	*Topic 15*
state	peac	commiss	africa	polit	intern	peac
govern	process	govern	burundian	peac	situat	process
polit	unit	establish	process	intern	council	presid
council	humanitarian	intern	one	communiti	communiti	arusha
armi	call	inquiri	can	countri	region	mandela
militari	parti	assassin	polit	region	dialogu	support
presid	camp	presid	peac	coup	secretari	negoti
peopl	arusha	council	countri	parti	resolut	situat
genocid	intern	impun	violenc	conflict	deleg	region
new	govern	resolut	issu	effort	effort	facilit
econom	situat	general	intern	support	general	parti
forc	violenc	polit	humanitarian	militari	support	council

countri	region	secretari	peopl	negoti	also	thank
intern	right	recommend	ethnic	leader	polit	like
regim	forc	peopl	world	also	peac	intern
even	human	deleg	effort	constitut	concern	great
charter	continu	judici	now	state	draft	conflict
arm	concern	octob	group	situat	presid	unit
unit	negoti	ethnic	communiti	arusha	great	made
general	european	report	parti	peopl	humanitarian	deleg
International law	*Peace process*	*International law*	*Cost of conflict*	*Legitimacy*	*Procedure*	*Peace process*

3.4.3.3 Third dimension: Content of justification

The third dimension, content of justification, assesses whether UNSC discourse participants consider the well-being of others and the interests of the international community at large in their verbal exchanges in public formal meetings preceding the authorization of a peace operation or whether they frame their arguments more around narrow individual or group interests (Steenbergen et al. 2003). The idea here is that discourse which is less focused on the country-specific interests of the discourse participants themselves but more focused on what would be the best outcome for a particular civil conflict or the international community more generally is of higher quality because discourse participants are able to empathise, show solidarity with those that are affected by the negative consequences of a civil war and consider the well-being of others more generally. I consider public formal UNSC discourse to be of higher quality when arguments or topics surrounding legitimacy, international law, and the costs of a conflict are relatively more important than other types of arguments preceding the authorization of a PO.

To proxy for content of justification, I use an additional diagnostic from the *stm* package, namely 'topic shares'. This function allows me to visualize the expected proportion of all substantive speeches that belongs to each of the 15 specified topics that are used to calculate the *stm* output in the first place (see Section 3.4.3.2). Based on this information, I assess the relative importance of different topics and arguments during a particular civil conflict-related discourse that precedes the authorization of a PO by the UNSC.

3.4.4 Estimation strategy

To evaluate my argument about the relation between UNSC peace operation authorization speed and the quality of formal public UNSC discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization, I rely on the interpretation of descriptive patterns that are returned through the use of QTA methods described in the preceding sections. To a certain extent, this approach is

different from the classic observational research designs I use in Chapters 2 and 4. On the other hand, it is similar because QTA tools themselves rely on statistical analysis when extracting information from or classifying words and language based on text data (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).

3.5 Results

3.5.1 Equal participation

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 below show the average number of speeches that were given by UNSC members and other speakers as well as the average length of speeches made by these types of speakers across the different cases of my analytical sample, respectively. Note that both Figures do not show the conflicts in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire because there were no substantive speeches prior to the authorization of peacekeeping in these cases (see Section 3.4.3). The remaining eight conflicts are displayed on the x-axis, while the average number of speeches as well as average speech length by speaker type is shown on the y-axis.[13]

Starting with Figure 3.2 on speech frequency, a few interesting observations emerge. First, there is variation in speech frequency across different cases, both for UNSC members and other types of speakers participating in the formal public meetings preceding peacekeeping authorization. For example, while UNSC members gave more than ten speeches, on average, in relation to the conflicts surrounding the CAR, Macedonia or Syria, they gave no speeches at all in the case of Mali. Likewise, other speakers were quite active in the cases of Macedonia and the CAR, with an average of ten and six speeches per meeting, respectively. However, non-UNSC speakers were barely active in the case of Darfur, only delivering a total of one speech prior to the authorization of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I).

[13] Figures 3.5 and 3.6 as well as Table 3.10 in the Appendix compare average speech frequency and average speech length for the UNSC's P5 and E10 members. As discourse seems rather balanced and, thus, high quality across my analytical sample, I do not discuss the results in the main text.

Figure 3.2. Average speech frequency by speaker and conflict (UNSC vs Other)



Secondly, Figure 3.2 shows that the 15 UNSC members spoke more often than other speakers in almost every conflict-related discourse prior to peacekeeping authorization. The only exception is the case of Mali where all substantive speeches were delivered by non-UNSC members. This dynamic is most pronounced in the case of Darfur where Council members delivered 17 times more speeches than other discourse participants. Likewise, in the civil conflicts surrounding Syria and Sierra Leone, Council members spoke, on average, 7.6 and 4.7 times more often than non-UNSC members. Speech frequency is more balanced in the remaining cases, where Council members only spoke between 1.25 times (Abyei) and 2.6 times (Burundi) more often than other speakers.

This imbalance in speech frequency suggests that public formal UNSC meetings preceding peacekeeping authorization are, overall, dominated by Council members and, thus, not socially equal. Although other speakers are allowed to participate in Council meetings on civil conflicts, overall, they speak less often than members of the Security Council. However, one important insight from Figure 3.2 is that relative speech frequency and, thus, equality of participation between UNSC members and other speakers varies from case to case: some discussions are heavily dominated by UNSC members (Darfur, Syria, Sierra Leone) while others allow for more equal participation of non-Council speakers (Macedonia, Abyei, CAR), suggesting that there is variation in the quality of discourse across cases.

Figure 3.3. Average speech length by speaker and conflict (UNSC vs Other)



Turning to the second proxy for equal participation, speech length, Figure 3.3 shows that there also is variation in the average length of speeches given by UNSC members and other speakers. For example, speeches made by UNSC members in discussions surrounding Syria were, on average, 26 sentences long, whereas speeches made in relation to Macedonia were only 12.4 sentences long. Likewise, other speakers delivered quite long speeches in the case of Syria, with an average length of 63.7 sentences, while speeches in relation to Macedonia were only 19.6 sentences long.

Furthermore, we can see that the relationship between equal participation and speaker type is reversed when examining the dynamics of average speech length: in contrast to speech frequency, non-UNSC speakers always deliver speeches that are, on average, longer than those made by Council members. This insight is interesting because it suggests that non-UNSC speakers that participate in formal public UNSC meetings on civil conflicts can offset their relatively lower speech frequency by using more 'floor time', i.e. by delivering longer (and potentially mor substantive) speeches than Council members.

Interestingly, the dynamics of speech frequency and speech length also move in parallel to a certain extent. For example, when formal public Council discourse preceding peacekeeping authorisation becomes less dominated by UNSC members and allows for more participation by other speakers, as in the cases of Darfur, Syria, and Sierra Leone, the difference in speech length between UNSC members and other speakers decreases, i.e. UNSC members deliver

longer speeches to substitute for lower speech frequency. However, this tendency reverses at some point: when other speakers start dominating the discussions, like in the cases of Burundi, CAR, Macedonia, Abyei, and Mali, speeches delivered by UNSC members are consistently shorter by roughly the same amount, suggesting that Council members only sometimes substitute relatively lower speech frequency with increased floor time.

Table 3.6. Relative speech frequency, differences in speech length and time to peace operation authorization (UNSC vs Other)

Location	Ratio speech frequency	Diff. in speech length	Months to authorization
Darfur	17	-74.24	9.8
Syria	7.62	-37.28	12
Sierra Leone	4.67	-0.83	22.7
Burundi	2.56	-13.17	97.5
CAR	2.33	-14.17	75.4
Macedonia	1.3	-7.22	25.1
Abyei	1.25	-16.45	0.9
Mali	0	-39.33	9.0
GB	N/A	N/A	1.5
Côte d'Ivoire	N/A	N/A	1.5

Table 3.6 shows the variation in both, relative speech frequency and speech length (with UNSC members as base category) as well as variation in the number of months it took the Council to authorize the first PO to address the different civil conflicts in my analytical sample. For completeness, I also include the civil conflicts in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire.

Does variation in the equality of participation and, thus, quality of discourse move together with variation in time to peace operation authorization? When relative speech frequency between UNSC members and other speakers is highest (Darfur), time to first PO is 9.8 months. When the dominance of UNSC members in relation to speech frequency decreases and discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization becomes more equal and, by extension, increases in quality, PO authorization speed slows down (see e.g. Syria, Sierra Leone, and Burundi). Inversely, when UNSC members speak less than 2.5 times more often during formal public meetings and discourse becomes relatively more dominated by non-Council members, less equal and, by extension, of lower quality, time to peacekeeping authorization decreases (see e.g. CAR, Macedonia, and Abyei). These dynamics support my empirical

expectation that discourse which is of higher quality slows down UNSC decision-making and increases the time it takes the Council to authorize a PO.

In relation to relative speech length, we can observe a somewhat similar trend. When discourse becomes more balanced, i.e. when the difference in the average number of sentences per speech delivered by Council members relative to other speakers decreases and discourse, thus, increases in quality, time to peacekeeping authorization increases as well and this relation holds in the cases of Darfur, Syria, and Sierra Leone. Beyond these three cases, however, relative speech length does not move together with PO authorization speed.

3.5.2 Level of justification

Table 3.7 below shows the number of distinct topics that I identified on the basis of structural topic models across eight of the ten cases comprising my analytical sample. Note that the conflicts in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire are omitted from the analysis because there were no substantive speeches prior to the authorization of peacekeeping in these two cases. In addition to topic diversity, Table 3.7 also shows which arguments and viewpoints were introduced into the UNSC formal public discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization, using the labels from Table 3.4.

Overall, it does not seem like Council deliberations prior to the authorization of peacekeeping vary greatly in terms of argument diversity. The minimum number of distinct topics (or arguments) introduced into formal public UNSC meetings is four (see Darfur, Macedonia, and CAR) and the maximum number is six (see Mali, Syria and Burundi). Furthermore, the number of months until UNSC authorization of a peace operation does not seem to vary with the number of distinct topics. For example, whereas four different types of arguments were introduced by UNSC and non-UNSC discourse participants in the case of the Central African Republic as well as Darfur, time to first peacekeeping authorization varies significantly between both cases. Whereas it took the Council more than 75 months (or six years) to simultaneously authorize EUFOR I as well as MINURCAT, the UNSC authorized AMIS I only about ten months after the civil conflict made it to the formal agenda of the Council. Likewise, six distinct types of frames were identified for the civil conflicts in Mali and Burundi, however, the UNSC needed only nine months to authorise the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), whereas it took the Council more than eight years (or 97.5 months) to decide on the authorisation of the SAPSD - Burundi.

Table 3.7. Topic diversity and topic identification across cases

Location	*Darfur*	*Macedonia*	*CAR*	*Abyei*	*Sierra Leone*	*Mali*	*Syria*	*Burundi*
Distinct topics	4	4	4	5	5	6	6	6
Months to authorization	9.8	25.1	75.4	0.9	22.7	9	12	97.5
Topics								
Legitimacy		X		X	X	X	X	X
Cost of conflict	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Role of region	X		X			X	X	X
Precedent		X			X			X
Peace process	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
International law	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
(Cost of) PK			X	X		X	X	

Furthermore, there does not seem to be a relationship between specific topics or combinations thereof and PO authorization speed. In general, I was able to identify seven out of the eight types of arguments I list in Table 3.4; arguments in relation to 'colonialism' were not returned by the structural topic models. Certain topics were present in the formal public UNSC meetings prior to peacekeeping authorization in almost every instance, whereas other topics were introduced relatively sparsely. In either case, the inclusion or exclusion of topics does not seem to vary with PO authorization speed.

For example, arguments about the 'cost of conflict' were introduced in all eight cases under study. As discourse participants allude to the negative externalities of a civil conflict in every case that is displayed in Table 3.7, this distinct topic does not vary across cases and, hence, cannot explain variation in PO authorization speed. This observation is, nevertheless, interesting as it suggests that UNSC formal public discourse participants might see it as necessary and part of common practice to talk about the 'cost of conflict' even though it does not appear to be a significant predictor of agenda-setting (see Chapter 2) and, potentially, PO authorization speed. Similarly, arguments relating to 'legitimacy' (e.g. of the warring parties), the 'role of region' in conflict management, violations against 'international law', and the importance of a 'peace process' were present in almost all UNSC discourses preceding peacekeeping authorization; however, the presence or absence of any of these topics does also not seem to vary with the time it takes the Council to authorize a first PO.

Lastly, arguments alluding to 'precedent' or the '(cost of) peacekeeping' were introduced in only about half the conversations under study, suggesting that these frames are introduced

relatively less often by discourse participants than other frames. In any case, the inclusion or exclusion of these types of arguments does not seem to vary with PO authorization speed either. For example, while Council and non-Council members referred to 'precedent' in the cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, it took the UNSC about 23 months to authorise the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Sierra Leone (ECOMOG - Sierra Leone), whereas it needed about eight years to authorize the South African Protection Support Detachment in Burundi (SAPSD - Burundi).

Overall, these observations suggest that there is little variation in the level of justification across formal public UNSC discussions preceding peacekeeping authorization. Based on the available descriptive information, it is difficult to say whether the patterns in relation to topic diversity displayed in Table 3.7 are related to high- or low-quality discourse. Keeping in mind the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire, where no substantive speeches were given but peacekeeping was authorised by the UNSC only 1.5 months after the first formal discussion, my hunch is that the eight remaining cases experienced discourse of higher quality. It seems that the logic of bargaining is at play when the UNSC holds public meetings that are pro-forma only, i.e. where only the President speaks and there are otherwise no substantive submissions because a decision on collective action has already been made behind closed doors.

On the other hand, when the UNSC decides to convene (multiple) meetings and allows for substantive submissions of discourse participants, this might be an indication that the purpose of communicative exchanges is to, at least, engage in the logic of rhetoric, i.e. provide justifications for the position one is holding, or even engage in the logic of arguing to collectively define the 'rules of the game'. However, based on the information that is returned from the structural topic models, it is not possible to distinguish between rhetoric and arguing.[14] Given that there is little variation in topic diversity, and hence, level of justification as a second dimension of UNSC discourse quality, it does not seem to be a good explanatory factor in relation to UNSC PO authorization speed. Hence, my empirical expectation is not supported when examining the level of justification as a distinct but related dimension of discourse quality.

[14] This might, in the end, not be a substantive problem. As Johnstone (2003, 455) notes "[i]n a setting like the Security Council, it may be impossible to know whether the legal arguments in a given case are strategic or sincere (if any are!), but it is not necessary to make that distinction to support the case that arguments do matter."

3.5.3 Content of justification

Figure 3.4 below shows the topic shares across eight of the ten conflicts that comprise my analytical sample, i.e. it shows the expected proportion of all substantive speeches that belong to each of the 15 topics that were used to calculate the structural topic models. Based on this information, it is possible to assess the relative importance of different topics and arguments that were introduced during a particular civil conflict-related discourse preceding the authorization of a PO by the UNSC and, thus, infer whether time to peacekeeping authorization varies with the quality of deliberation. As in the previous two analyses, the conflicts relating to Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire are excluded.

A few interesting dynamics emerge from Figure 3.4. First, we can see that topic shares vary across cases and that certain topics are relatively more important than others within each formal public UNSC discourse preceding the authorization of a first PO designed to manage an ongoing civil conflict. For example, in the case of Burundi, topics relating to the Arusha peace process are relatively dominant (Topics 15 and 10), along with arguments relating to international law, specifically crimes against humanity committed in the course of the conflict, as well as the legitimacy of warring parties (Topics 11 and 13). The legitimacy of conflict actors as well as requests for a continued peace process between warring parties (Topics 11, 14, 4, 2, and 1) were also among the top five topics in the case of Sierra Leone. Similarly, arguments relating to 'legitimacy', particularly in relation to President Bashar al-Assad, heavily dominated the discourse preceding the Council's authorization of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNMIS). In the case of Abyei, discourse participants mostly focused on the peace process between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) before UNSC members decided to authorize the deployment of a UN PO.

In contrast, the formal public UNSC discussions concerning the civil conflict in the CAR mostly focused on the cost of a potential (UN) PO, the role of other institutions and regional actors, particularly the EU, as well as the negative externalities of the conflict, especially in relation to economic development. Interestingly, the only time the 'cost of conflict' is the most important topic in a discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization is in the case of Macedonia. It also features more prominently in discussions on Darfur, along with arguments related to the peace process between the government of Sudan and the SPLM as well as the role of African regional organizations in conflict management.

Figure 3.4. Topic shares across cases

















Even though arguments relating to the negative externalities of a conflict are present in all eight discussions preceding peacekeeping authorization (see Table 3.7), they are never the most important topic, except in the case of Macedonia. Furthermore, although the 'cost of conflict' is featured in the top five topics in the cases of the CAR and Darfur, other topics, such as 'legitimacy', 'peace process', and the 'role of region' appear to be relatively more important. This observation is puzzling because conflict intensity is often taken to be a significant determinant of UNSC attention (see, e.g., Binder and Golub 2020; Frederking and Patane 2017; Lundgren and Klamberg 2022) as well as action (see, e.g., Aydin 2010; Derouen Jr 2003; Gilligan and Stedman 2003).

Given that I also don't find a statistically significant relationship between levels of conflict intensity and the probability that a civil conflict makes it to the agenda of the Council (see Chapter 2), this might indicate a less robust relation between the cost of civil conflict and the likelihood of UNSC involvement than previously thought. On the other hand, my analytical sample includes relatively many cases where the UNSC first authorized the deployment of a non-UN PO to manage a civil conflict. Since most of our systematic knowledge on various facets of peacekeeping is specific to the UN (see also Chapter 4), it might be the case that the relation between conflict intensity and the dynamics of conflict management when performed by non-UN peacekeepers is simply less pronounced or relevant.

Turning to inferences about the quality of discourse in terms of the content of justification and its relation to UNSC PO authorization speed, Table 3.8 below displays the labels of the five topics with the highest prevalence across different pre-authorization discussions based on Figure 3.4 as well as the months it took the Council to authorize the first PO to address a civil conflict. In relation to content of justification, I hypothesized that discourse is expected to be of higher quality when UNSC formal public meeting participants consider the well-being of others and the interests of the international community at large. In these cases, discourse participants will evaluate how the addressees of an eventual peacekeeping mission will be impacted or how the UNSC, as the main intergovernmental body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, could best fulfil its mandate. Consequently, I suggested that I would expect higher quality UNSC discourse preceding authorization to focus on arguments relating to the 'cost of conflict', 'international law' as well as 'legitimacy'.

Top topics	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Months to authorization
Burundi	Procedure	Peace process	Peace process	International law	Legitimacy	97.5
CAR	Cost of PK	Role of other actors	Role of region	Cost of conflict	Cost of conflict	75.4
Macedonia	Cost of conflict	Precedent	International law	Legitimacy	Cost of conflict	25.1
Sierra Leone	Legitimacy	Peace process	Legitimacy	Legitimacy	Peace process	22.7
Syria	Legitimacy	Legitimacy	Peace process	Role of region	Legitimacy	12.0
Darfur	Role of region	Peace process	Cost of conflict	Role of region	Peace process	9.8
Abyei	Peace process	Peace process	(Cost of) PK	Peace process	Peace process	0.9

Table 3.8. Top 5 topics by case and peace operation authorization speed

When none of these topics play a relatively important role in the formal public meetings preceding UNSC peacekeeping authorization, such as in the case of Abyei, the Council needs relatively little time to make a decision on the deployment of a PO. Once discourse participants start speaking about topics that could reasonably be linked to more 'common good' arguments relatively frequently, time to PO authorization seems to increase. For example, the discourse surrounding Darfur not only included arguments concerning the role of regional actors in conflict management or the peace process between the government of Sudan and the SPLM, but also dealt with the human cost of the conflict. In comparison to Abyei, the Council needed 9.8 months to authorize a first non-UN PO in this case. Furthermore, in both, the Syrian and the Sierra Leonean case, pre-authorization discourse focused heavily on issues of 'legitimacy' in relation to the conflict parties. In comparison to Darfur, PO authorization speed was higher in these two cases: 12 months in the case of Syria and almost 23 months in the case of Sierra Leone.

When all three topics that I associate with a higher quality discourse are relatively frequently referred to by discourse participants, as in the case of Macedonia, PO speed is even higher. However, it does not necessarily seem like there is a relationship between the number of arguments that would signal higher quality discourse and time to UNSC-authorized peacekeeping. For example, whereas the 'cost of conflict', 'international law' and 'legitimacy' were among the top five topics in the case of Macedonia, the discourse around the CAR only discussed the 'cost of conflict' relatively more prominently. However, the Security Council needed three times the number of months to authorize a first PO in the CAR in comparison to Macedonia.

Overall, the relation between content of justification as a third dimension of discourse quality and time to first UNSC-authorized PO needs to be interpreted with caution. Although there are some indications that discourse which considers the well-being of the main addressees of eventual peacekeeping as well as the interests of the international community at large could slow down PO authorization speed, the relation is not as clear cut, at least in the sample under analysis.

3.6 Discussion and conclusion

What explains variation in the time it takes the UNSC to authorize a peace operation? In this article, I argue that variation in UNSC peace operation authorization speed is related to variation in the quality of the Council's formal public discourse preceding authorization. Building on and extending the conceptual work by Risse (2000), I hypothesize that time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization is longer when prior discussions follow the logic of arguing. That is, when Council members and other discourse participants first have to mutually agree on and establish the 'common knowledge' that is necessary to engage in individual utility maximization, UNSC decision-making in relation to peacekeeping is delayed. Based on three dimensions I select from the *Discourse Quality Index* developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003), I descriptively explore this relationship with the help of quantitative text analysis methods. Using the verbatim records of 352 substantive speeches across 34 formal public meetings I retrieve from *The UN Security Council Debates* corpus (Schoenfeld et al. 2019) for ten civil conflicts from Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, I find mixed evidence for my argument.

The strongest support for my argument emerges in relation to the equality of participation, specifically speech frequency. When UNSC members and other discourse participants speak roughly equally often, that is, when discourse quality is assumed to be higher, time to peacekeeping authorization is prolonged. This dynamic is less pronounced in relation to speech length: although time to peacekeeping authorization increases when the use of 'floor time' of either speaker type converges and discourse thus becomes more equal and high quality, this relation only holds for a small subset of analytical cases. In regard to the level of justification, my empirical expectation cannot be supported as there is only minimal variation in the diversity of arguments across the ten conflicts under study. Furthermore, although there are some indications that higher quality discourse which considers the well-being of others

relatively more often and has a stronger orientation towards the 'common good' might potentially slow down peace operation authorization speed, this relationship is not clear-cut.

A few explanations might account for these results. First, in the cases that comprise my analytical sample, non-UN actors, especially regional organizations, were almost always authorized by the UNSC to manage a conflict as the first responder. This observation is congruent with what we know from the broader literature on burden-sharing between the UN and non-UN actors in the maintenance of international peace and security (for an overview, see Meiske (2019)). Non-UN actors often deploy to conflicts first because they are geographically more proximate to the conflicts in question, have a more homogenous membership which is thought to be conducive to quicker decision-making and seem to be able to deploy more rapidly than the UN due to less complex internal processes (Bures 2006; Diehl 1993). Consequently, when the UNSC debates whether to authorize a peace operation by a non-UN actor, the decision-making process might be more straightforward, and thus less time-consuming compared to the authorization of a UN mission. This difference might also be exacerbated by the fact that UN peace operations generally receive larger and more ambitious mandates than non-UN missions (see Chapter 4) which might take longer to be negotiated. In any case, future expansions of the present project in this regard might prove highly useful to understand if there are additional differences between UN and non-UN peace operations that go beyond the design of their mandates or their effectiveness on the ground (Bara and Hultman 2020).

Second, my current analytical sample only includes cases that eventually saw the authorization of a first peace operation by the UNSC. It might be the case that the quality of deliberation, especially in relation to level and content of justification, simply does not vary much within this subset of cases and is, consequently, not significantly related to UNSC peace operation authorisation speed. The analytical and empirical leverage of introducing the concept of discourse quality into discussions of international quasi-legislatures might thus remain underexploited in the current setup. Including cases that made it to the agenda of the UNSC but did not (yet or will never) experience the authorization of a UN or non-UN PO in future extensions of this paper will also make it possible to more directly address concerns relating to the choice of treatment and control groups in studies of peacekeeping effectiveness (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, developing the present project in this respect would also set the foundation for a more robust observational research design that could employ duration analysis (see, e.g., Lundgren, Oksamytna, and Coleman (2021)) to systematically test the

relationship between the quality of discourse, UNSC peace operation authorisation speed, and alternative explanations of the same phenomenon.

Lastly, my identification strategy in relation to both, the dimensions selected to explore the quality of the formal public UNSC discourse preceding peacekeeping authorization as well as the QTA techniques used to measure them might be flawed. In contrast to discussions of domestic parliaments and legislatures which form the basis of the original DQI by Steenbergen et al. (2003), different parameters might be needed to evaluate the quality of their discourse. For example, the members of the Security Council are not (directly) accountable to international or domestic voters. The permanent members have a secure seat on the UNSC by institutional design which means that, regardless of their behaviour, they will not lose their place on the Council. The non-permanent members are elected to the Council by other state representatives for a term of two years and cannot seek immediate re-election. During this time, it is not possible to oust elected members and replace them with other candidates. This means that UNSC members are, if at all, accountable only to other states. Consequently, the quality of the Council's formal public discussions in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security might be expressed through different dimensions compared to domestic parliaments.

In spite of the many limitations of this paper, it has the potential to make two additional scholarly contributions. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study which specifically explores the content of the UNSC's formal public meetings following agenda-setting but preceding peacekeeping authorization in the case of civil conflicts. Thus far, other studies have used the content of these meetings to develop theories about the importance or prevalence of international norms (Dunne and Gelber 2014; Scherzinger 2022b), general Security Council practice (Gehring and Dörfler 2019) or the use of different rhetorical frames in selected case studies (Faizullaev and Cornut 2017; Johnstone 2003). By directing our attention to the content of the UNSC's decision-making in relation to peacekeeping in civil conflicts, this paper provides a foundation on the basis of which future research can build stronger theories about the dynamics of the Council's formal public meetings, both in relation to its causes as well as its consequences.

And secondly, this paper presents an additional application of QTA methods in the field of peace and conflict research specifically as well as international relations (IR) more generally. QTA methods have been used by political scientists for over a decade to study the characteristics and content of political speech produced at the domestic level (Grimmer and

Stewart 2013). However, these tools have only relatively recently been taken up to study phenomena at the international level. With the introduction of the UN General Debate corpus (Baturo, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov 2017), for example, IR scholars have begun to analyse speeches made by state representatives in international forums, primarily to understand variation in foreign policy preferences between states and over time (Chelotti, Dasandi, and Jankin Mikhaylov 2022; Finke 2022; Gurciullo and Mikhaylov 2017). Furthermore, one recent study (Kostovicova and Paskhalis 2021) applies QTA methods to study variation in peace-making outcomes based on gendered patterns of discourse in transitional justice debates in the Balkans. Likewise, Amicarelli and Di Salvatore (2021) highlight the usefulness of QTA tools to analyse different dimensions of peacekeeping post-deployment on the basis of an original text-based corpus containing the digitized records of UN Secretary General reports across 68 UN POs from 1994 to 2020. The present article, thus, adds to this growing literature by providing an alternative to how political speech produced at the international level can be studied and connected to outcomes that eventually manifest as a result of a discursive process.

Appendix

Table 3.9. Case selection

No.	*Location*	*UCDP ID*	*1st discussion*	*PO authorization*	*Actor*	*PO Acronym*	*Sample*
1	Israel	426	30.01.1989				
2	Liberia	341	22.01.1991	22.09.1993	UN	UNOMIL	
3	Serbia	385	25.09.1991				
4	Croatia	390	25.09.1991	21.02.1992	UN	UNPROFOR	
5	Bosnia & Herzegovina	389	25.09.1991	08.06.1992	UN	UNPROFOR	
6	Haiti	381	03.10.1991	23.09.1993	UN	UNMIH	
7	Somalia	337	23.01.1992	25.04.1992	UN	UNOSOM I	
8	Azerbaijan	388	12.05.1992				
9	Georgia	392	08.10.1992	24.08.1993	UN	UNOMIG	
10	Mozambique	332	13.10.1992	16.12.1992	UN	ONUMOZ	
11	Tajikistan	395	30.10.1992	16.12.1994	UN	UNMOT	
12	Rwanda	374	12.03.1993	22.06.1993	UN	UNOMUR	
13	Bosnia & Herzegovina	398	17.04.1993	06.05.1993	UN	UNPROFOR	
14	Burundi	287	25.10.1993	29.10.2001	South Africa	SAPSD - Burundi	yes
15	Yemen	402	01.06.1994				
16	Bosnia & Herzegovina	397	13.11.1994				
17	Sierra Leone	382	27.11.1995	08.10.1997	ECOWAS	ECOMOG - Sierra Leone	yes
18	Congo	408	13.08.1997				
19	Serbia	412	31.03.1998	10.06.1999	UN, NATO	UNMIK, KFOR	
20	Papua New Guinea	369	22.04.1998				
21	Guinea-Bissau	410	06.11.1998	21.12.1998	ECOWAS	ECOMOG - Guinea-Bissau	yes
22	Guinea	307	21.12.2000				
23	Macedonia	417	07.03.2001	31.03.2003	EU	Concordia	yes
24	Central African Republic	416	17.07.2001	25.09.2007	EU, UN	EUFOR I, MINURCAT	yes
25	Ivory Coast	419	20.12.2002	04.02.2003	France, ECOWAS	Op. Licorne, ECOMICI	yes
26	Sudan	309	10.10.2003	30.07.2004	AU	AMIS I	yes
27	Iraq	259	24.02.2004				
28	Uganda	314	19.04.2006				
29	Nepal	269	01.12.2006				
30	Georgia	393	08.08.2008				
31	Libya	11346	25.02.2011				
32	Syria	299	27.04.2011	21.04.2012	UN	UNMIS	yes
33	Sudan	11344	31.05.2011	27.06.2011	UN	UNISFA	yes
34	Mali	11347	26.03.2012	20.12.2012	AU/ECOWAS	AFISMA	yes
35	Mali	372	26.03.2012	20.12.2012	AU/ECOWAS	AFISMA	yes
36	Syria	13042	19.07.2012				
37	Syria	13809	19.07.2012				
38	Ukraine	13219	01.03.2013				
39	Ukraine	13247	16.04.2014				
40	Ukraine	13246	16.04.2014				

41	Ukraine	13306	16.04.2014
42	Colombia	289	25.01.2016

Figure 3.5. Average speech frequency by speaker and conflict (E10 vs P5)



Figure 3.6. Average speech length by speaker and conflict (E10 vs P5)



Table 3.10. Relative speech frequency, differences in speech length and time to peace operation authorization (UNSC vs Other)

Location	Ratio speech frequency	Diff. in speech length	Months to authorization
CAR	2.5	2.1	75.4
Syria	2.1	-11.9	12
Burundi	1.93	4.2	97.5
Sierra Leone	1.8	1.7	22.7
Macedonia	1.6	-2.3	25.1
Abyei	1.5	2.7	0.9
Darfur	1.43	-7.7	9.8
Mali	N/A	N/A	9.0
GB	N/A	N/A	1.5
Côte d'Ivoire	N/A	N/A	1.5

Chapter 4. What are they (t)asked to do? Introducing the Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset

with Dr. Maline Meiske

4.1 Introduction

There here has been a substantial increase in the amount of large-N, quantitative research on peacekeeping following the publication of Doyle and Sambanis' (2000) seminal article. However, three important developments in how peacekeeping has been conducted since the early 2000s have not been reflected in available datasets and hence, hardly been addressed in research thus far. The first development relates to the number and range of tasks that peacekeepers are mandated to perform. We know that (UN) peacekeeping missions have become increasingly comprehensive and multidimensional over time (Meiske and Ruggeri 2017). Peacekeepers nowadays act as providers of security (especially for civilians), as 'traditional' peacekeepers, as security sector reformers, as demilitarization and arms managers, as state-builders and post-conflict re-constructors, and as human rights observers. Yet, when evaluating mission performance, most academic research has focused on peace operations' capacity to reduce conflict and protect civilians (for an overview see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2017)) and paid little attention to the performance of peacekeepers in other areas that fall within the purview of their mandates.[1]

Additionally, quantitative research has traditionally grouped POs into the crude categories of observer/traditional, multidimensional and enforcement missions (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Jo 2006; Sambanis 2008). This neglects which of the many mandate components influence aspects of negative and positive peace and also reveals little about how to design POs in a way as to achieve their intended goals. Additionally, we know little about how different mandate components within one PO interact and jointly influence aspects of peacekeeping outcomes (Diehl and Druckman 2018).

The second development relates to the diversity of actors that perform peacekeeping tasks on the ground. Although the UN has never been the main provider of POs – (sub-)regional organisations and (coalitions of) states have in fact deployed the majority of POs since the

[1] Some exceptions include recent studies on democracy (Steinert and Grimm 2015; Mvukiyehe 2018; Joshi 2013), economic performance (Bove and Elia 2018; Beber et al. 2019; Caruso et al. 2017), rule of law (Blair 2020; Blair, Karim, and Morse 2019), or public health (Gizelis and Cao 2021; Kim 2017).

1940s (Bellamy and Williams 2015; Williams 2016) – the peacekeeping literature has treated non-UN peacekeeping suppliers in a "step-motherly" fashion (Bara and Hultman 2020, 24). While we increasingly have data on where non-UN actors send their peacekeepers (Jetschke and Schlipphak 2019; Mullenbach 2013), we don't know much about what they actually do on the ground, whether they are effective at what they do, which conflict- and non-conflict outcomes they address and affect, and whether there are substantive differences in performance within the group of non-UN actors.

Third, and related to the diversity of peacekeeping actors, POs seldom come alone: according to Balas (2011), the majority of all peacekeeping missions have been deployed simultaneously with other operations by different actors in the same conflict since the mid-1990s. With the rise of regional and state peacekeeping alongside UN operations, the UN has been aiming to align strategic and operational-level mechanisms, design frameworks for cooperation, and move towards so-called "partnership peacekeeping" (United Nations 2015). While partnership peacekeeping promises a more efficient mobilisation and leveraging of each organisation's strengths and resources, it also presents challenges with respect to possible fragmentation, duplication of efforts, and competition between actors and mandates. More research is needed on whether and how different actors coordinate their peacekeeping activities, on patterns in the division of labour, and on the interdependencies and synergies of different mandate components conducted by simultaneous or sequential POs.

To fill these gaps, we introduce the *Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset*, which contains time-varying information on disaggregated peacekeeping mandate components of all UN and non-UN peace operations deployed to intra- and interstate conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019. For each peace operation, the different mandate components are coded as dummy variables on the basis of 49 pre-defined mandate categories – with a particular emphasis on mandates on the cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping actors. The coding in the *POM Dataset* is based on the language used in UN and non-UN resolutions (initial and subsequent), provisions in ceasefire or peace agreements as well as official mandate descriptions. The dataset is available in two versions: the primary version presents the data at the peace operation-month level; the secondary version at the peace operation-document level. In total, the dataset contains 87 POs, differentiates between 49 different mandate components, is based on 594 mandating documents, and covers a total of 3,894 monthly observations. Each PO is assigned to one (or multiple) conflict(s) as recorded

in the UCDP/PRIO ACD (V21.1), making the *POM Dataset* compatible with a range of other widely used datasets in peacekeeping research.

In the following, we first discuss the case for a new dataset on mandated peacekeeping tasks to advance quantitative research on peace operations (Section 4.2). We then provide a more detailed description of the data, our coding procedures, and the sources used (Section 4.3). Next, we visualise selected trends from our data (Section 4.4) and explore facets of coordination and cooperation mandates between POs (Section 4.6). We then present an empirical application on the basis of our novel dataset (Section 4.6) before we conclude (Section 4.7).

4.2 The case for a new dataset

There are a number of different areas within the peacekeeping literature that could beneficially utilize our data on mandated peacekeeping tasks of UN and non-UN missions. First, the study of peacekeeping effectiveness could employ our data to evaluate how multiple mandate components within one peace operation interact with each other to influence a range of peacekeeping outcomes. Thus far, studies have evaluated specific peacekeeping outcomes – e.g., the protection of civilians (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013), electoral violence (Smidt 2020) or the rule of law (Blair 2020) – without taking into account the multitude of tasks within one operation, and without exploring whether the effects of some tasks are dependent on other functions that a peace operation is fulfilling at the same time. Furthermore, knowing the full range of tasks that peacekeepers are asked to perform on the ground enables researchers to evaluate peacekeeping effectiveness not only in terms of negative peace (i.e. peace duration, conflict recurrence, battle-related deaths or civilian victimization) but also explore new outcomes, such as the functioning of the security sector, the level of disarmament and demobilisation, the adherence to and observance of human rights, or the level of public services provision on part of the conflict country's government.

Although our dataset is not the first to provide disaggregated mandates for UN POs,[2] it is crucially the first one to also include non-UN operations. This will allow scholars to compare and contrast UN peacekeeping with that of regional organizations and (coalitions of) states using one coherent dataset. Future research can analyse the different dynamics between UN and non-UN peacekeeping, examine whether there is variation in performance within the non-

[2] Di Salvatore et al. (2022) record mandated tasks of 27 UN peace operations in Africa and Lloyd (2021) for 71 UN peace operations between 1948-2015.

UN category, or investigate the division of labour and coordination between actors. We put particular emphasis on the latter and code multiple mandate components focussing on the cooperation between different POs, UN agencies and other international actors – a feature that further differentiates the *POM Dataset* from already existing data.

Second, and closely related, the literature on partnership peacekeeping can also benefit from our extensive dataset on mandated peacekeeping tasks. Thus far, the majority of studies in this field have been limited to single case studies (Welz 2016) or regions, mostly Africa (see Brosig 2010), and have mostly examined when and why we observe parallel, sequential or integrated missions. In contrast, Schumann and Bara (forthcoming) provide a first quantitative analysis of the interaction between UN and non-UN peacekeeping. They find that, on average, partnership peacekeeping is effective in decreasing battlefield violence but acknowledge that further research is necessary to disentangle the mechanisms of cooperation between UN and non-UN missions. Our dataset enables researchers in this field to further disaggregate multiple simultaneous POs by mandate components and assess whether the mandates and tasks of POs from different actors are compatible with each other, whether the UN specialises in some mandate areas, whereas non-UN actors specialise in others, and whether partnership peacekeeping works differently in different conflicts.

Third, our data can be used to advance our understanding of mandate design and mandate implementation. Although evaluating PO effectiveness is important and highly policy-relevant, we also need to gain a better understanding about how mandates are designed in those political spaces where decisions on whether to send peacekeepers into a conflict are made in the first place. For the UN, this is of course the Security Council and there is some understanding on how decision-making works in this international forum, but we know much less about the decision-making procedures in, e.g., the AU or the EU. Our data can be used as the outcome variable in studies on mandate design of UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Lastly, our data complements recent efforts to study the conditions under which UN peacekeepers implement their mandated tasks (Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2022) and makes it possible to extend the realm of these research questions to non-UN peacekeepers as well.

4.3 Introducing the Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset

The *Peace Operations Mandates Dataset (POM)* is a dataset of UN and non-UN peace operations disaggregated by mandate components. It encompasses all POs conducted by any third-party in intra- and interstate conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019.

Two versions of the dataset are provided: The primary version provides the data at the peace operations-month level; and the secondary version at the peace operation-document level.

Following Bellamy and Williams (2015, 13), we define peace operations as "the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (troops, military observers/experts, and police), […] with an explicit mandate to assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or enforce ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace." This definition encompasses operations conducted by the UN, regional organisations (ROs), ad hoc coalitions of states and individual states. However, political missions, good offices, fact-finding, and civilian electoral assistance missions are not included. In addition, foreign military interventions are also excluded.

The *POM Dataset* draws on and merges a number of sources to obtain the most comprehensive list of POs possible. For UN peacekeeping, all operations led by the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) are included in the dataset; a list of all past and current operations is provided by the DPO.[3] The compilation of non-UN operations is based on Jetschke and Schlipphak's (2019) MILINDA dataset, Mullenbach's (2013) Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions dataset, and Williams' (2016) list of regional peace operations. All three of these datasets deploy the same, or a very similar, definition of POs as we do.[4] Nonetheless, we ensured that all operations fit our definition, and that no operation is duplicated. We paid particular attention to those operations that were only listed in one of the three datasets, which was the case for 20% of all operations.[5]

Overall, the *POM Dataset* contains 87 peace operations. As Table 4.1 shows, the majority of all operations currently included were conducted by regional organisations (52%), specifically the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the EU; about a third was conducted by the UN; and 17% by individual or coalitions of states.

[3] https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unpeacekeeping-operationlist_3_1_0.pdf (last accessed 23 March 2023).
[4] Only Mullenbach (2013) excludes enforcement missions that were not authorised by the UNSC.
[5] POs were included in the POM Dataset if they occurred in at least two of the three datasets used and POs only listed in one of the three datasets were not included if no available information on the mission could be found by the authors.

Table 4.1. Number of peace operations in the POM Data by actor

Actor	*UN*	*Regional Organisations*	*(Coalition of) States*	*Total*
No. of POs	27	45	15	87
(Percent)	(31%)	(52%)	(17%)	(100%)

For each of the 87 POs, we established with which tasks the operations were formally mandated. In a first step, we identified 49 different mandate components. We understand mandate components as "coherent categories of tasks designed to achieve given purposes" (Diehl and Druckman 2018, 30).[6] For example, the mandate component 'Judicial reform/Rule of Law' has the overall aim to strengthen the rule of law and the justice sector and involves tasks such supporting the establishment of a fair and transparent justice system, reinstatement of the criminal justice system, reform of the court system, and promotion of rule of law institutions. All 49 mandate components are presented and described in Table 4.2; the full codebook is provided in the Appendix. The components are generally based on the components provided in the UN's Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council ("Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and political and peacebuilding missions") as well as Diehl and Druckman's (2018) mission types and were further supplemented through an inductive approach used by the authors.

The coding of mandate components performed by each PO is based on the language used in UN and non-UN resolutions, provisions in ceasefire or peace agreements as well as official mandate descriptions. All specific sources are also provided in the dataset. Initial authorising resolutions (or equivalent) as well as all subsequent resolutions are included in the coding, and any changes in mandate components are recorded in the *POM Dataset*. This means that the dataset documents and allows for the study of variation within POs. 594 resolutions (or equivalent) were coded for the 87 POs included in the dataset. On average, 7 resolutions were issued per PO, ranging from 1 resolution for AMISEC to 58 for AMISOM.

[6] Diehl and Druckman (2018) label these categories 'missions'. As 'mission' is commonly used as a synonym for operation in the peacekeeping literature, we decided to use the term 'mandate component' instead, in line with the UN's Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council.

Table 4.2. Mandate components in the POM Data

1. Protection of civilians	*26. Judicial reform/Rule of Law*
2. Protection of PO personnel/facilities	*27. Corrections system*
3. Protection of VIP	*28. Electoral assistance*
4. Police training/ reform	*29. Democracy promotion*
5. Police operational support	*30. Civil society*
6. Military training/ reform	*31. State authority/ institutions*
7. Military operational support	*32. Good governance*
8. Internal security	*33. Media*
9. Border control	*34. Infrastructure and services*
10. Ceasefire	*35. Economic development*
11. Demilitarization	*36. Civilian-military coordination*
12. DDR	*37. International/regional relations*
13. SSR	*38. Donor coordination*
14. Arms control	*39. Sanctions*
15. Mine action	*40. Public information*
16. Humanitarian assistance	*41. Environmental impact*
17. Refugee/internally displaced persons (IDP) assistance	*42. Use of force*
18. Peace agreement process	*43. Ch. VII*
19. Political process (no peace agreement)	*44. Coordination with other PO/international actors*
20. Transitional justice	*45. Coordination within UN*
21. Human rights/ humanitarian law	*46. Monitor simultaneous PO*
22. Women's rights	*47. Support simultaneous PO*
23. Protection of women	*48. Preparation future PO*
24. Protection of children	*49. Transition activities*
25. Women, Peace and Security agenda (Resolution 1325) in PO	

In addition to the main variables of interest, the mandate components, the *Peace Operations Mandates Dataset* includes additional variables such as:

- the official **acronym** of the peace operation;
- the full **name** of the peace operation;
- the **actor**, i.e., the organisation or state(s) implementing the operation;
- the **actor type**, which groups the actors into three types, specifically (1) the United Nations, (2) regional organisations, and (3) states or (coalitions of) states;
- the **country** in which the operation takes place;
- the **country ID**, i.e., the COW country code;
- the **conflict ID**, which is a unique identifier of the conflict in which the operation intervenes, as given in the UCDP/PRIO ACD (V 21.1); in cases where a peace operation intervenes in more than one conflict, all of the relevant conflicts are noted;

- the **conflict type**, i.e., inter- or intrastate conflict;
- the **resolution** or other document that (re)authorises a peace operation, and/or provides a mandate (update) for the operation in a given month;
- the **resolution author**, differentiating between the UN, regional organisations, ceasefire/peace agreements, other official sources, and information from secondary literature;
- the degree of **mandate extension**, noting whether an authorising/mandating document establishes a new mission, widely overhauls the mandate of an existing operation, slightly adjusts the mandate, or merely extends the duration or composition of the operation;
- the total **sum** of mandate components mandated in a document/ in a given month.

4.4 Visualising the POM Data

Our new dataset offers scholars the opportunity to study a range of topics related to peacekeeping, including, but not limited to, peacekeeping effectiveness, the implementation of mandates, complementarities and synergies of peacekeeping tasks, cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping actors, and decision-making in mandate-issuing bodies. In this section, we present examples of how our data can be used to explore trends in peacekeeping mandates, including over time and between organisations.

Figure 4.1 shows the number of mandate components included in different types of peace operations and in different decades. Overall, the median PO in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019 had 6 mandate components. The number of components was highest for operations conducted by the UN (14.9), while regional and state actors only performed a median of 4.4 tasks. Further differences emerge between regional actors: the AU conducted a median of 6.6 mandate components during its missions, with a high degree of variance, while the median EU mission was mandated with 6 tasks.

This finding is in line with existing expectations in the literature: While the UN mostly deploys large, comprehensive missions, non-UN operations are often much more specialized (Meiske 2019, 53-128). Peace operations are rarely deployed alone within a conflict; instead, multiple missions are sent to one conflict, performing additional complementary tasks (Schumann and Bara forthcoming). Accordingly, when mandate components are aggregated to the conflict level, i.e., simultaneous operations within the same conflict are collapsed, the

average is significantly higher than for individual operations, bringing it up to a median of 11.4 tasks.

Figure 4.1. Number of mandate components for the median PO by actor, conflict and over time



Furthermore, our data also shows trends over time, with peace operations mandated to conduct more and more tasks, starting with a median of 4.1 in the 1990s, increasing to 6 in the 2000s, and reaching 14.6 in the 2010s, which coincides with the rise of so-called multidimensional peacekeeping.

Do different peacekeeping actors specialize in specific mandate components? To answer this question, Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of POs performing each of the 49 mandate components, broken down by different peacekeeping actors. The UN, with its comprehensive operations, has been active in all types of mandate components, including security-related tasks, peacebuilding, and humanitarian activities and human rights. States and groups of states, on the other hand, are much more focused on the protection of civilians, the provision of security, and humanitarian assistance. Overall, ROs have been somewhat broader in their

range of activities than individual or groups of states, but stark differences exist between different organisations.

Figure 4.2. Comparison of mandate components between actors



For example, the AU performs a lot of activities related to the provision of security and protection, including the protection of civilians, of VIP parties to the peace process, of peace operation personnel and their facilities, humanitarian assistance, and support to peace agreements and the broader political process. The EU is more specialised in Security Sector Reform (SSR), police and military training, and the promotion of the rule of law and human rights. In line with these trends, the AU is also much more likely to be mandated the use of

force or perform under a Chapter VII mandate than the EU. The EU, on the other hand, is most frequently mandated to coordinate with other operations or international actors (followed by the UN and individual states) as they are often deployed in support of another organisation or to fill a functional gap or niche activity (Brosig 2014). Examples include the

Figure 4.3. Comparison of mandate components over time



EU supporting action to the AMIS and the EU's Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which was deployed in Bunia to allow the UN Secretary-General to reinforce the UN's own presence in the region.

Due to the high temporal disaggregation of the *POM Dataset*, we can also study changes in peacekeeping mandates over time. As can be seen in Figure 4.3, during the 1990s, POs mostly focused on ceasefire monitoring, security related tasks, and humanitarian assistance. Starting in the mid-2000s, the number of mandated tasks increases considerably. Particularly noteworthy is the rise in protection mandates relating to civilians and peace operation personnel, and the authorization of such mandated task under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Additionally, POs have focused increasingly on gender and women's issues more recently, including the promotion of women's rights, the protection of women and children, and gender mainstreaming in POs. This increase coincides with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000. On top of that, mandates specifically ordering the coordination and liaison with other POs, international actors and UN agencies have become more prominent since the 2000s.

4.5 Exploring facets of coordination and cooperation in the POM Data

In addition to exploring trends in peace operations' mandates over time and comparing the number of tasks as well as the composition of mandates between different actors, the *Peace Operations Mandates Dataset* also allows us to take a closer look at the relation between different POs that are active in the same conflict. Apart from mandate categories on security provision, state-building, democracy or human rights promotion, the *POM Data* also includes six mandate categories that capture different aspects of interaction between peace operations.

One category ('coordination with other PO/international actor') records whether a PO is mandated to coordinate and cooperate with other international efforts (e.g., in the realms of humanitarian assistance, or the provision of foreign aid) or liaise directly with another PO that is active in the same conflict. A second category ('coordination within UN') records whether a PO is mandated to liaise with other UN bodies;[7] a third category ('monitor simultaneous PO') codes whether a PO is mandated to monitor the activities of simultaneously deployed POs in the same conflict; a fourth category ('support simultaneous PO') codes whether a PO has the mandate to support the activities of a simultaneously deployed PO; a fifth category ('preparation for future PO') codes whether a peacekeeping mission has the mandate to plan for a future mission in the same conflict by the same or different actor and, thus, create the security conditions necessary for the future operation to be deployed; and a sixth category tells us if a PO is mandated to transfer the functions it is performing on the ground to the host

[7] This mandate category is coded for UN peace operations only.

state or another operation or whether a withdrawal of personnel is envisioned in the near future.

Mandate category	No. of POs	Percent	No. of POs by actor			
			UN	Percent	non-UN	Percent
Coordination with other PO/intern. actors	44	51%	17	39%	27	61%
Monitor simultaneous PO	1	1%	1	100%	0	0%
Support simultaneous PO	31	36%	7	23%	24	77%
Prepare for future PO	13	15%	3	23%	10	77%
Transition activities	21	24%	13	62%	8	38%

Table 4.3. Number and percent of POs mandated to interact with other POs by actor

Table 4.3 shows the distribution of these six categories at the peace operation level.[8] It records the number and percent of all POs that are mandated to interact in any way with other missions.[9] Overall, POs frequently receive the mandate to coordinate their actions with another PO or an international actor which is active in the same conflict. Although every second PO has this mandate (51%), non-UN missions are more frequently mandated to coordinate with other simultaneously deployed missions (61%) than UN missions (39%). In case a non-UN PO receives this mandate, it has to coordinate with a UN operation about half of the time and another non-UN operation the other half of the time.[10] France, for example had the mandate to coordinate its Operation Épervier with the EU's EUFOR mission as well as the UN's MINURCAT in Chad; the US had to coordinate their Joint Task Force with the ECOWAS mission ECOMIL as well as UN's UNMIL in Liberia; and the EU was mandated to coordinate its EUPOL Kinshasa mission with its own EUSEC RD Congo as well as the UN's MONUSCO operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In contrast, when a UN PO receives the mandate to coordinate with another mission, it has to do so with a non-UN peace operation most of the time.

Mandates that prescribe the monitoring of activities of another PO in the same conflict are very rare. Our dataset only records one instance where a UN operation was mandated to

[8] As the category 'coordination within the UN' is only coded for UN missions and, therefore, no comparison can be made between actor types, it is not included in Table 4.3.
[9] Note that POs performed by (coalitions of) states as well as ROs are subsumed under the 'non-UN' category for simplicity. Furthermore, one PO can be mandated to perform any number of interaction tasks at the same time.
[10] The disaggregated information on which actor type a UN or non-UN PO is mandated to interact with as well as the examples given are based on own calculations of the authors based on the POM Data and are not shown in Table 4.3.

monitor a non-UN mission: In Sierra Leone, UNOMSIL was tasked with monitoring the activities of ECOWAS's ECOMOG mission. Two reasons might explain why our dataset only records one such example. First, Sub-Saharan Africa might just be a special case where actively monitoring the activities of another PO almost never happens, in contrast to other regions, such as the post-Soviet space where UN missions have been deployed with the specific goal to monitor operations by the Commonwealth of Independent States (such as UNOMIG in Georgia). Second, the language in our mandating documents might be diluted in the sense that monitoring activities are rather framed as coordination or support activities to avoid contentious discussions about the primacy and role of the UN or regional arrangements in global security matters as touched upon in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

When it comes to supporting a simultaneous PO the same conflict, 36% of all operations in Sub-Saharan Africa are mandated to do so. Similar to the mandate on coordination with another peace operation, the overwhelming majority of missions that receive the task to support parallel missions are those deployed by non-UN actors (77%). When non-UN missions receive such a mandate, they have to support the activities of a simultaneous UN mission in more than two-thirds of the cases. For the UN, it is exactly the other way round: if mandated, UN POs mostly have to support other parallel missions by non-UN actors. Sometimes, the mandate to support a simultaneous PO goes in both directions, i.e., one non-UN mission is mandated to support another UN mission and that same mission is mandated to support the parallel non-UN mission. In the Ivorian civil conflict, for example, France's Operation Licorne was mandated to support the UN's MINUCI and the UN mission was mandated to support Operation Licorne. In other instances, however, the mandate is only unidirectional. In Liberia, for example, UNOMIL was mandated to support the parallel mission by ECOWAS, ECOMOG, but the latter mission was not mandated to support the UN operation, and in the CAR, the EU's EUFOR mission was mandated to support MINURCAT but not the other way round.

Planning for a future PO by the same or different actor and creating the security conditions necessary for the other mission to come in is not a task that POs in Sub-Saharan Africa are asked to do very often; only 15% of all operations in our data receive the mandate to prepare the ground for a future mission. However, non-UN missions receive this type of mandate much more often than UN missions (77% vs. 23%). Interestingly though, when either actor type is mandated to prepare the conditions that are necessary for another mission to come in, it is almost always preparations for a future UN PO, not a non-UN peace operation. In both

the intrastate conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as the interstate conflict in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the respective UN missions had to prepare the ground for a future UN operation; and non-UN missions were mandated to prepare the ground for a UN deployment in Liberia, Burundi, and Mali.

Lastly, POs are asked to engage in transition activities in about a quarter of the cases (24%), with UN operations receiving this type of mandate much more often (62%) than non-UN operations (38%). This relatively high number can partly be explained by the fact that UNSC resolutions often contain specific provisions on the planned or staged withdrawal of personnel – something that non-UN mandating documents rarely (if ever) make a reference to. If we look at examples where transition activities only included the transfer of functions to another mission, however, UN POs are asked to transfer their functions to another UN operation one hundred percent of the time, and non-UN operations are mandated to transfer functions to a UN mission seventy-five percent of the time. The transferral of functions to a non-UN PO, thus, occurs only very rarely and only if non-UN missions are mandated with this task.[11]

Apart from inspecting the distribution of our interaction mandates across actor types, we can also take a closer look at one particular class of cases, namely those where multiple peace operations are deployed to one and the same conflict at the same time (simultaneous POs) and explore the frequency with which these simultaneous operations were mandated to coordinate with another peace operation or international actor over time.

Figure 4.4 shows how many POs were deployed simultaneously into one and the same conflict each year from 1990 to 2019 as well as how many of those missions were mandated to coordinate with a fellow simultaneous PO. As already observed by Balas (2011), 'it takes two (or more) to keep the peace': Peace operations are seldomly deployed to a conflict by themselves. Most of the time, one conflict receives multiple operations by various different actors at the same time. Almost throughout the whole time period, simultaneous POs constitute more than 60% of all peacekeeping missions deployed to conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of a three-year period between 1995 and 1997 in which no simultaneous operations were deployed. Most of the simultaneous operations are also mandated to coordinate their activities with other missions that are present in the same conflict, and increasingly so over time.

[11] Our data records exactly one example where functions were transferred from one non-UN operation to another: In the Central African Republic, the EU's EUFOR II transferred its functions to the AU's AFISM-CAR/MISCA operation.

Figure 4.4. Number of POs, simultaneous POs, and POs with a specific mandate to coordinate with other POs, 1990-2019



Beginning in 2005, 80% or more of all simultaneously deployed POs were also given the mandate to coordinate their actions with other missions on the ground. Interestingly, up until the early 2000s, simultaneous missions received the mandate to coordinate with other POs with a considerable time lag after they had already been deployed to a conflict, whereas coordination mandates seem to be given in a more synchronous manner for more recent simultaneous operations. This observation potentially suggests some kind of learning among the different peacekeeping providers in Sub-Saharan Africa. It might be that these different actors realized over time that coordination among simultaneously deployed operations is necessary for effective conflict management and that parallel missions should be given the mandate to coordinate with one another right from the outset of their deployment. Then again, it might also be the case that the UN and non-UN actors knew all along that coordination among simultaneous peace operations is fruitful but they first had to develop a common organizational framework for such cases of partnership peacekeeping.

Coordinating activities with other operations or international actors on the ground is, of course, not the only mandate that simultaneous missions are asked to perform. Due to the fact that the *POM Dataset* is highly disaggregated temporally and includes non-UN POs in addition to UN POs, researchers can also explore the degree to which the mandates of simultaneously deployed missions overlap and whether these types of missions engage in labour-sharing or task replication on the ground.

Figure 4.5. Similarity of mandate tasks among simultaneous POs in the CAR



For instance, Figure 4.5 depicts the similarity of different POs present in the CAR at four different points in time. The lines connecting the operations represent the degree of similarity between those operations in terms of the tasks with which they are mandated; the thicker the line, the higher the degree of similarity.[12]

In 2005, only two POs were deployed in the civil conflict in the CAR, both by non-UN actors: CEMAC's FOMUC missions as well as France's Operation Boali. The missions' mandates

[12] The Hamming Distance was used to measure similarity.

overlapped in 30% of their components, especially with regards to tasks in the security realm, including the protection of VIP parties to the peace process, the reform of the military and the protection of infrastructure.

In 2008, three additional POs were deployed to the CAR, including one EU operation (EUFOR I), one UN operation (MINURCAT) and one ECCAS operation (MICOPAX). Following the deployment of these additional operations, the degree of similarity between the mandates of FOMUC and Operation Boali decreased, whereas the degree of similarity between FOMUC and MINURCAT as well as MICOPAX increased. Overall, 26% of the 19 mandate components between FOMUC and MICOPAX overlapped in 2008, namely in relation to the reform of the military, internal security, transitional justice, electoral assistance and supporting a simultaneous peace operation. With regards to the overlap of mandates between MICOPAX and MINURCAT, 29% of their 24 mandates were similar in 2008, not only with regards to the protection of civilians, police operational support, and internal security but also in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance, judicial reform, support of state authority and supporting a simultaneous peace operation.

In 2010, only Operation Boali, MINURCAT, and MICOPAX were present in the CAR. MICOPAX and MINURCAT show the highest degree of similarity with 50% of their, in total, 17 unique mandate components overlapping. Operation Boali and MICOPAX, on the other hand, only overlapped in 5% of their mandate components, specifically in their mandate to support the military. In 2014, four new POs were deployed to manage the civil conflict in the CAR, one by the UN (MINUSCA) and three by non-UN actors (the EU's EUFOR II, France's Operation Sangaris, and the AU's AFISM CAR/MISCA). MINUSCA and AFISM CAR/MISCA as well as Operation Sangaris showed the highest similarity in their mandates, whereas AFISM CAR/MISCA and EUFOR II had the lowest overlap in mandate components.

Overall, it is interesting to see how the similarity in mandates changes as additional POs enter and exit one and the same conflict. Whereas the two non-UN POs in 2008 had quite a large overlap in their mandates, this overlap was considerably smaller as additional missions were deployed. Furthermore, there is always at least one simultaneous non-UN mission in 2008, 2010 and 2014 that has a high degree of overlap in mandates with the respective UN mission; not only in relation to the provision of security but also in task areas relating to peace- and state building. Other than that, the similarity of mandates between different non-UN POs seems to be rather minimal, suggesting that particular tasks that UN peace operations perform on the ground might be duplicated by only certain simultaneous non-UN missions, whereas

other simultaneous non-UN operations engage in labour-sharing and address those tasks that the UN does not engage in.

In addition to simultaneous cases, the *POM Data* allows scholars to also study sequential POs and the design of their mandates. Sequential missions occur when one actor's operation is immediately followed by another actor's operation and "there is limited, if any, temporal overlap between the deployments" (Balas 2011, 393).

Table 4.4. Frequency and percent of placements in PO sequences by actor

	Placement								
Actor	*1st*	*2nd*	*3rd*	*4th*	*5th*	*6th*	*7th*	*8th*	*Total*
UN	6 (46%)	6 (46%)	4 (57%)	1 (20%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	*17*
non-UN	7 (54%)	7 (54%)	3 (43%)	4 (80%)	1 (100%)	1 (100%)	1 (100%)	1 (100%)	*25*
Total	*13*	*13*	*7*	*5*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*42*

Table 4.4 shows the number and percent of POs by actor (UN, non-UN) that have been deployed into the same conflict as part of a sequence of operations as well as their placement therein. In general, 42 out of the 87 (48%) POs in the *POM Data* can be classified as sequential, with the UN having deployed 17 (40%) and non-UN actors 25 (60%) of these. Both UN and non-UN missions are sent into conflicts as the first or second actor within a sequence roughly equally often, with non-UN operations being sent as early responders a bit more often than UN operations (54% vs. 46%). When the UN comes into a conflict as the second actor, it follows a previous UN mission most of the time, whereas non-UN missions that are sent in as second actor within a sequence follow non-UN operations most of the time.[13]

UN POs are sent to deal with a conflict as the third actor in a sequence of missions more often (57%) than non-UN operations (43%), with the UN following exclusively non-UN missions at that point in time and non-UN actors also mostly following previous non-UN missions that were deployed in the sequence as second actors. When it comes to being the fourth PO in a sequence, non-UN operations occupy this place much more often (80%) than UN operations (20%). In only one case did a UN mission follow a previously deployed UN operation as the

[13] The disaggregated information on peace operation sequences by actor type as well as the examples given are based on own calculations of the authors based on the POM Data and are not shown in Table 4.4.

fourth actor in a sequence, namely in the Angolan civil conflict, where MONUA was deployed as the fourth peace operation after UNAVEM III in a full sequence of UN missions. Non-UN peace operations, on the other hand, mostly follow previously deployed non-UN operations when they are deployed as a sequential operation in fourth place. CEMAC's FOMUC, for example, deployed to the civil conflict in the CAR in fourth place after the CEN-SAD's peacekeeping mission; the AU's MAES II directly followed MAES I; and the AU's AMISOM was deployed to the Somali civil war as the fourth peace operation in a sequence after IGAD's IGASOM.

Being deployed as fifth, sixth, seventh or eighth mission within a sequence is very rare; almost all PO sequences end after a fourth actor has been sent into the conflict. The only exceptions are the non-UN missions in the CAR, where the ECCAS's MICOPAX was deployed as fifth sequential actor after CEMAC's FOMUC mission, the French mission Operation Boali was deployed as sixth actor after MICOPAX, the AU's AFISM-CAR/MISCA was deployed as seventh actor after Operation Boali, and the French Operation Sangaris was deployed as eighth actor after AFISM-CAR/MISCA.

Overall, POs sent as part of a sequence into the same conflict by the UN follow previously deployed UN POs about as often as previously deployed non-UN operations. If the UN mission is sent in as second actor, it only follows a previously deployed first UN mission. When the UN sends a mission as the third actor in a sequence, however, these deployments are usually preceded by non-UN operations that were sent into the conflict in second place. In contrast, non-UN POs follow previously deployed non-UN missions 80% of the time, regardless of the order in which the sequential non-UN operations were deployed into a conflict. The only instances where non-UN POs followed UN POs include the interstate conflict in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the intrastate conflicts in Somalia, the CAR, and Burundi.

These patterns possibly suggest that sequential POs occur in different types of conflicts: Those that receive a UN response quickly and swiftly; those that see UN POs deployed only after regional arrangements or (coalitions of) states have intervened as first responders and later transfer their functions to the UN; and those that receive no UN response at all and are instead only dealt with by non-UN actors. Examining further where which POs succeed each other is crucial to understanding the response of the international community to long-term threats and an interesting avenue for further research.

Lastly, we can use the information on peace operation mandates in the *POM Dataset* to examine whether the mandates of sequential missions follow any special patterns, e.g., whether they receive mandates that focus on specific subject-areas. For this purpose, we aggregate most of our 49 mandate components into two categories. The first category subsumes tasks related to the provision of security and protection of civilians, UN personnel and humanitarian staff, women, children, or refugees (mandate categories 1 to 17 as well as 23 and 24 in Table 4.2). The second category centres around tasks related to peace- and state building, such as the promotion of the rule of law, assisting in the organisation of elections, promoting democracy and good governance, or supporting the recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of the economy (mandate categories 18 to 22 as well as 25 to 36 in Table 4.2). Based on Table 4.4 above, we then calculate the percent of UN and non-UN POs whose mandates are focused either on the provision of security and protection, peace- and state-building or both subject-areas at the same time by placement within a sequence of multiple peace operations. Figures 4.6 and 4.7, respectively, visualise these results.

Figure 4.6. Percent of UN POs mandated to perform security/protection, peace-/state-building tasks, or both by placement in sequential POs



For the UN, it does not matter whether it is sent into a conflict as the first, second, third, or fourth actor within a sequence of peacekeeping missions, as UN operations are always more frequently mandated to engage in both, the provision of security and protection as well as tasks related to peace- and state-building. This observation also corresponds well with our general knowledge about UN POs (Oksamytna and Lundgren 2021) as well as the patters we

identify in relation to the multidimensionality of UN peacekeeping mandates in Figure 4.2. The only exceptions to this dynamic are the two missions the UN sent to the conflicts in Angola and Côte d'Ivoire. In the case of Angola, for example, the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was exclusively focused on monitoring the bilateral agreement between Cuba and Angola which foresaw the withdrawal of 50,000 troops from the territory of Angola. On the other hand, the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) was exclusively focused on tasks related to peace- and state-building, including

Figure 4.7. Percent of non-UN POs mandated to perform security/protection or peace-/state building tasks by placement in sequential POs



supporting the ongoing peace process and improving the rights of women in the country.

In relation to non-UN POs, mixed mandates that include tasks related to the provision of security and protection as well as peace- and state-building are also frequent, especially when non-UN POs are sent to manage a civil conflict as the fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth actor.[14] When regional organizations or states deploy their peacekeepers to a conflict in the beginning of a conflict, that is as first, second, third or fourth actor, POs either receive mixed mandates or mandates that focus on the provision of security and protection. The percentage of non-UN POs with mandates focusing exclusively on the provision of security, however, decreases the later the mission is sent to a civil conflict within a sequence of multiple POs. Whereas five out of seven missions (71%) received a mandate that exclusively focused on security and

[14] Note, however, that we have only one example each per placement for these four categories as depicted in Table 4.4, so these observations need to be taken with a grain of salt.

protection when a non-UN actor first deployed to a conflict, only one out of four (25%) missions received such a mandate when a non-UN actor intervened in fourth place. The percentage of non-UN POs with a mixed mandate, on the other hand, increases the later non-UN actors deploy to a civil conflict. Whereas only two out of seven (29%) missions received a mandate with tasks related to both the provision of security and protection as well as peace- and state-building when non-UN actors managed a conflict as first responder, three out of four (75%) missions received such a mandate when non-UN actors intervened as fourth actor.

These patterns are interesting as they suggest that non-UN actors primarily engage in security-related tasks only when they go into a conflict as the first responder; the later a non-UN actor deploys within a sequence of multiples POs, the higher the frequency of mixed mandates. This means that the UN is not the only actor that engages in tasks across different subject-areas on the ground. Given that quantitative peacekeeping research is increasingly moving towards also understanding the impact that UN peacekeepers have on non-security related outcomes (see, e.g., Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt (2023); Bove, Salvatore, and Elia (2021)), these dynamics further indicate that controlling and accounting for the presence, mandates, and activities of non-UN missions should become a best practice in the literature on peacekeeping effectiveness.

4.6 An empirical application

To further illustrate the usefulness of the *POM Dataset* for studies of peacekeeping effectiveness, we have matched our mandates data for UN and non-UN peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa with Bara and Hultman's (2020) dataset on the number of UN and non-UN peacekeepers (troops, police, observers) in civil conflicts between 2000-2016.[15] In their paper, Bara and Hultman (2020) examine the effect of UN and non-UN mission size as well as mission composition in terms of personnel type (troops, police, observers) on violence perpetrated against civilians by the government or rebels. The authors find that a greater number of troops and police sent to a civil conflict by the UN as well as regional missions are associated with lower levels of violence against civilians inflicted by the government. When it comes to violence against civilians by rebels, they observe that only UN troops and police are associated with lower levels of one-sided violence, whereas size and personnel composition of regional missions doesn't exert an observable effect.

[15] The timeframe of the replication study is limited because the number of peacekeeping mandates across UN and non-UN POs did not vary greatly prior to 2000.

Using Bara and Hultman's (2020) *UN and non-UN Peacekeeping Dataset* has a number of advantages in comparison to other datasets. First, the data matches POs to civil conflicts from the UCDP/PRIO ACD and is available at the conflict-month level, as is our data. Second, Bara and Hultman's (2020) dataset does not only include UN peacekeeping troop size but also the number of personnel deployed by non-UN actors. Third, one-sided violence has become a very common measure to evaluate the effectiveness of peace operations (Bove and Ruggeri 2016, 2019; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Kathman and Wood 2016; Di Salvatore 2018). Fourth, the data covers an extensive time period up until 2016. And lastly, it offers us the opportunity to control for a popular alternative measurement of peacekeeping, namely mission size and composition in terms of troops, police, and observers.

Originally, the *UN and non-UN Peacekeeping Dataset* has 25,160 monthly observations, of which 6,479 are in sub-Saharan Africa in the time period 2000-2016. In total, the dataset codes information on 43 POs, of which 15 were deployed by the UN; 16 by regional actors (mostly the AU and ECOWAS); and 12 by international actors (mostly the EU and France).[16] Due to slightly different definitions of peace operations, we were able to match 39 POs for a total of 44 civil conflicts. Our analytical sample, thus, contains 6,479 observations, of which 1,396 (or 21.5%) are peacekeeping observations and 5,083 (or 78.5%) are not. The UN is coded as present in 987 observations, regional missions in 452 observations, and international missions in 322 observations.

The dependent variable in all forthcoming analyses is the number of direct and deliberate killings of civilians by governments (OSV Gov) and rebel groups (OSV Reb) respectively. Since the outcome variable of interest is a count variable, we estimate the statistical models with a negative binomial regression. We use the same control variables as contained in Bara and Hultman's (2020) original data, including incompatibility,[17] duration of the conflict, number of battle deaths in the previous month, whether there was any one-sided violence in the preceding month, and the logged size of the population in the host country. Furthermore, we also lag our explanatory variables of interest, number of mandated tasks and mandate components.

[16] Bara and Hultman (2020) define regional missions as those that are either run by a regional organization in their own region or by an ad-hoc coalition of states exclusively or with a large majority from the region. International missions are defined as those run by regional organizations outside their region or coalitions of states from multiple regions.

[17] Incompatibility is measured as a dummy variable for whether the rebels make demands on the government (who should govern and how) as compared to making demands about control over a specific territory.

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the effect of the number of personnel deployed by UN, regional and international peace operations on government and rebel one-sided violence in sub-Saharan Africa in the period 2000-2016, when controlling for the number of tasks a PO is mandated to carry out.[18] We first estimate the isolated effects for each mission type (Models 1-6), before estimating the full model (Model 7).

The most obvious finding is that controlling for the number of tasks that peacekeepers are mandated to implement on the ground does not seem to change their capacity to protect civilians from either government- or rebel-perpetrated violence. Although the coefficient for the number of tasks within UN missions is positive, meaning that an increasing number of tasks peacekeepers are supposed to perform leads to an increase in one-sided violence by governments and rebels alike, it fails to reach statistical significance. For regional as well as international missions, we observe a violence-reducing effect with an increasing number of mandated tasks when looking at government civilian killings, but a violence-enhancing effect when looking at rebel perpetrated violence. However, neither of these coefficients reaches statistical significance.

Table 4.5. Effect of number of mandate components in UN, regional and international missions on government one-sided violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2016

	Model 1: OSV Gov	Model 2: OSV Gov	Model 3: OSV Gov	Model 4: OSV Gov	Model 5: OSV Gov	Model 6: OSV Gov	Model 7: OSV Gov
UN $tasks_{t-1}$	0.260						0.240
	(0.275)						(0.309)
UN $troops + police_{t-1}$		-0.042*					-0.056*
		(0.022)					(0.028)
UN $observers_{t-1}$		1.107**					0.887***
		(0.473)					(0.278)
Regional $tasks_{t-1}$			-0.138				0.226
			(0.234)				(0.222)
Regional $troop + police_{t-1}$				-0.096*			-0.095*
				(0.054)			(0.053)
Regional $observers_{t-1}$				-0.313			-1.040
				(1.171)			(1.078)
International $tasks_{t-1}$					-0.262		-0.215
					(0.313)		(0.448)
International $troop + police_{t-1}$						0.140	-0.091
						(0.183)	(0.177)
International $observers_{t-1}$						-1.235***	-0.760
						(0.437)	(0.617)
Incompatibility	0.485	0.580	0.925	0.932	1.050	0.986	0.536
	(0.698)	(0.640)	(0.714)	(0.702)	(0.824)	(0.703)	(0.755)

[18] In contrast to Bara and Hultman (2020), we also include international missions as these mainly include EU missions when we look at sub-Saharan Arica and we're interested to see whether there are differences in effectiveness within the non-UN actor group as well.

Conflict duration	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Battle deaths$_{t-1}$	0.525	0.512	0.400	0.402	0.408	0.410	0.550*
	(0.330)	(0.330)	(0.312)	(0.295)	(0.316)	(0.311)	(0.321)
OSV dummy$_{t-1}$	3.064***	3.050***	2.966***	2.989***	2.977***	2.956***	3.129***
	(0.522)	(0.535)	(0.556)	(0.557)	(0.553)	(0.550)	(0.504)
Population$_{t-1}$	0.857***	0.880***	0.954***	0.960***	1.007***	0.983***	0.902***
	(0.239)	(0.230)	(0.241)	(0.242)	(0.274)	(0.244)	(0.257)
Constant	-15.32***	-15.75***	-17.02***	-17.14***	-17.95***	-17.49***	-16.09***
	(4.286)	(4.103)	(4.314)	(4.337)	(4.894)	(4.350)	(4.602)
Observations	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

One reason why we don't find an effect of the number of mission tasks on one-sided violence might be because the sample of missions we have coded thus far is spatially and temporally limited. POs in sub-Saharan Africa between 2000-2018 are mostly multidimensional which means that all POs (presumably regardless of actor type) are already fulfilling a lot of different tasks anyways, so that there is not much temporal variation of mandate component numbers in our current sample. However, we expect this to change once we extend our dataset to include POs in other regions as well as missions from before the 2000s.

Table 4.6. Effect of the number of mandate components in UN, regional and international missions on rebel one-sided violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2016

	Model 1: OSV Reb	Model 2: OSV Reb	Model 3: OSV Reb	Model 4: OSV Reb	Model 5: OSV Reb	Model 6: OSV Reb	Model 7: OSV Reb
UN tasks$_{t-1}$	0.405						0.466
	(0.266)						(0.368)
UN troops + police$_{t-1}$		-0.161***					-0.149***
		(0.033)					(0.043)
UN observers$_{t-1}$		2.307***					0.963
		(0.646)					(0.807)
Regional tasks$_{t-1}$			0.552				0.338
			(0.430)				(0.663)
Regional troop + police$_{t-1}$				0.237			0.151
				(0.151)			(0.254)
Regional observers$_{t-1}$				-1.322*			-2.591***
				(0.687)			(0.939)
International tasks$_{t-1}$					0.024		0.129
					(0.454)		(0.722)
International troop + police$_{t-1}$						0.314	0.0501
						(0.343)	(0.483)
International observers$_{t-1}$						-0.691	-1.170
						(0.678)	(1.812)
Incompatibility	0.844	0.825	0.947	0.989	0.957	0.967	0.708
	(0.727)	(0.671)	(0.720)	(0.697)	(0.741)	(0.733)	(0.729)
Conflict duration	0.006	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.010	0.010	0.005

	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Battle deaths$_{t-1}$	1.283**	1.279**	1.182**	1.171**	1.155**	1.172**	1.152**
	(0.606)	(0.550)	(0.545)	(0.534)	(0.519)	(0.519)	(0.586)
OSV dummy$_{t-1}$	3.006***	3.040***	2.743***	2.820***	2.879***	2.891***	3.073***
	(0.508)	(0.471)	(0.409)	(0.386)	(0.392)	(0.390)	(0.409)
Population$_{t-1}$	0.378*	0.416**	0.431**	0.471***	0.345*	0.341*	0.520***
	(0.196)	(0.193)	(0.186)	(0.181)	(0.197)	(0.200)	(0.193)
Constant	-8.898***	-9.487***	-9.756***	-10.43***	-8.354**	-8.281**	-11.14***
	(3.284)	(3.216)	(3.119)	(3.030)	(3.345)	(3.380)	(3.187)
Observations	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Another reason why the number of mandated tasks might not play a role when evaluating the effectiveness of POs might be that missions focus their manpower and resources on a select number of tasks even though the UN for example often authorizes ‘whole of mission’ mandates. These types of mandates often include a whole package of different tasks that are considered 'standard' in a peacekeeping mission nowadays, like security sector reform, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, human rights observation, and electoral assistance. However, peacekeepers on the ground might concentrate on the fulfilment of only certain tasks regardless of the number of total tasks included in the mandate. The UN operation in Mali, MINUSMA, for instance, strongly focuses on the protection of civilians and peace agreement implementation mandates (Lotze 2015). In those cases, it does not matter how many other mandate components an operation is tasked with. Further research is required to evaluate which of the mandated tasks are actually executed by POs and how this effects mission performance.

The results presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 confirm that, in line with Bara and Hultman's (2020) original analysis, mission size and composition have a significant effect on one-sided violence when controlling for the number of tasks POs are mandated to carry out. In sub-Saharan Africa, UN troops and police are equally good at protecting civilians from violence by the government and rebels alike. In the same vein, an increasing number of UN observers increases the number of civilians killed by governments but doesn't affect the number of civilians killed by rebels. For regional missions, an increased number of troops and police reduces government violence like in Bara and Hultman's (2020) global sample, but seems to increase rebel violence, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. Regional observers, on the other hand, reduce the number of civilians killed by either actor, although they only seem to exert a significant effect at rebel violence. For international missions, both

the troop and police as well as the observer category have a conflict-reducing effect on one-sided violence perpetrated by governments, but a conflict-enhancing effect on one-sided violence by rebels, although none of the coefficients for international mission size and composition are significant.

An alternative way of using our data is to look at different mandate components and explore which ones exert a positive or negative effect on the number of civilians killed by governments or rebels. Table 4.7 includes dummy variables for a selected number of mandate components[19] that we have coded in the POM dataset for each actor category.[20]

Table 4.7. Effect of different mandate components of UN, regional and international mission on one-sided violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2016

	Model 1: OSV Gov	Model 2: OSV Gov	Model 3: OSV Gov	Model 4: OSV Reb	Model 5: OSV Reb
	UN	*Regional*	*International*	*UN*	*Regional*
Protection of civilians$_{t-1}$	1.229	1.189	-3.088***	2.495	-6.848***
	(1.683)	(0.895)	(0.537)	(2.090)	(2.203)
Peace enforcement (Ch.VII)$_{t-1}$	0.683	0.281	-3.097	0.624	5.724***
	(0.643)	(0.495)	(3.021)	(3.047)	(2.153)
Ceasefire monitoring$_{t-1}$	1.397**	0.165	-0.551	-0.400	0.241
	(0.550)	(0.694)	(0.531)	(1.275)	(2.921)
SSR$_{t-1}$	1.950**	-3.264***	5.891**	-0.897	-1.537
	(0.786)	(1.153)	(2.674)	(3.174)	(7.536)
Demilitarization and arms management$_{t-1}$	0.942	-0.206	4.019	3.381	2.413
	(1.403)	(0.458)	(3.468)	(3.332)	(2.875)
Humanitarian support$_{t-1}$	-1.877*	-2.186***	-2.488**	4.863***	-2.594
	(1.050)	(0.682)	(1.020)	(1.848)	(1.613)
Rule of law / judicial matters$_{t-1}$	-1.195		-3.088***	-3.521**	
	(1.168)		(0.537)	(1.624)	
Political process$_{t-1}$	-1.673**	1.130*		-1.764	-6.226
	(0.721)	(0.658)		(3.336)	(4.794)
Democracy promotion$_{t-1}$	4.197***	1.658*		1.878	7.845
	(0.834)	(0.876)		(1.343)	(7.410)

[19] Here we only include mission components that the PO is asked to implement vis-à-vis the host country where the mission is taking place. Tasks like the coordination with other external actors, preparing the ground for other POs or communicating the PO's mandate to the local population are excluded in this analysis as we see them as task categories of a different nature.

[20] Model convergence couldn't be achieved for international missions and one-sided violence by rebels which is why Table 4.7 only shows the results of five models.

Electoral assistance$_{t-1}$	1.255*	-2.138***	-0.162	2.128	-4.134**
	(0.761)	(0.438)	(1.044)	(1.624)	(1.646)
Human rights$_{t-1}$	-0.551	0.657	3.127***	-7.778***	1.193
	(2.137)	(0.513)	(0.507)	(2.336)	(1.873)
Support to state institutions$_{t-1}$	-2.666***	-0.535		-0.121	5.018
	(0.928)	(0.823)		(3.558)	(3.723)
Incompatibility	0.563	0.873	0.988	0.930	0.958
	(0.729)	(0.720)	(0.850)	(0.735)	(0.716)
Conflict duration	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Battle deaths$_{t-1}$	0.594*	0.420	0.420	1.284*	1.330**
	(0.342)	(0.316)	(0.318)	(0.712)	(0.611)
OSV dummy$_{t-1}$	3.173***	2.967***	2.992***	3.171***	2.731***
	(0.548)	(0.561)	(0.555)	(0.511)	(0.376)
Population$_{t-1}$	0.883***	0.941***	0.988***	0.416*	0.450**
	(0.239)	(0.245)	(0.287)	(0.220)	(0.183)
Constant	-15.80***	-16.80***	-17.60***	-9.546***	-10.09***
	(4.284)	(4.397)	(5.123)	(3.667)	(3.069)
Observations	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376	6,376

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Some interesting dynamics emerge from this table. When we look at UN POs and their ability to reduce government-induced violence against civilians, we see those missions with mandates on humanitarian support, support to the political process between the warring factions as well as support to state institutions significantly reduces the number of civilians killed. One reason why UN missions that engage in confidence building and mediation between the conflict parties reduce one-sided violence by governments might be that UN peacekeepers are regarded as impartial facilitators. That is, they are not interested in furthering the goals of either warring side which makes them trustworthy conflict mediators that can credibly create a political space in which governments and rebels can safely communicate and make credible commitments to each other. Note, however, that these types of missions only seem to significantly reduce one-sided violence perpetrated by governments but not rebels. For missions with a mandate to support state institutions, the reason why they manage to curb government one-sided violence might lie in the fact that peacekeepers help increase or reinstate the government's authority and territorial control in areas that might have been previously controlled by rebels. This decreases the attractiveness of using one-sided violence to achieve the government's goals. Alternatively, peacekeepers might also help prop up the government's ability to provide public services to the population and thus increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the population and consequently sway previous rebel supporters in favour of the government.

On the other hand, missions that are mandated to observe ceasefires, engage in security sector reform, promote democracy, and assist the electoral process increase government one-sided violence significantly. As ceasefire monitoring is predominantly performed by observers which have been previously found to be ineffective at preventing violence against civilians (Kathman 2013; Kathman and Wood 2016), this finding might not be very surprising. Engaging in the reform of the state's security sector might enable and empower individuals that have previously not served in the government apparatus to abuse their position as law enforcers and keepers of public order and go 'rogue' on the civilian population. Promoting democratic principles and assisting elections in war torn societies where different players are fighting for dominance over territorial and political power might not prevent governments from engaging in one-sided violence because they have a strong preference for the status quo which keeps them in power. Consequently, missions that engage in these tasks might not be able to protect civilians well because governments might use one-sided violence as a strategy to actively undermine peacekeepers' efforts to implement more liberal policies in the host state.

When we look at UN POs and their ability to reduce rebel-induced violence against civilians, only missions that engage in the reform of the rule of law and judicial matters as well as the promotion of human rights and the monitoring of the law of armed conflict seem to make a significant difference. Reforming the judicial and correctional system and introducing principles of international justice might lead rebels to kill less civilians because they fear to be held accountable for their actions by a newly empowered state law enforcement apparatus. Then again, peacekeepers that monitor human rights and/or adherence to the law of armed conflict might induce rebels to commit less violence against civilians because monitoring the observance of basic human rights regardless of a conflict parties association with either the government or the rebel side increases trust on part of the rebels towards UN peacekeepers and their impartial intentions.

For regional missions and their ability to curb government one-sided violence, we observe that missions with security sector reform mandates, humanitarian support mandates and electoral assistance mandates make a positive difference. Further research is needed to explain why regional missions that provide or facilitate humanitarian support reduce government one-sided violence. For missions that engage in electoral assistance, on the other hand, regional actors might be perceived more favourably by incumbent governments simply because incumbents know that these peacekeepers are from the same region and, thus, share

some common norms when it comes to, e.g., elections. Regional peacekeepers' mandate for electoral assistance might well be narrower when compared to the UN and they might just be responsible to prevent violence on an election day and not fundamentally change the distribution of power to the detriment of the incumbent government. Missions with mandates to support the political process between the warring factions, however, incentivise incumbent governments to commit more one-sided violence. This might be due to the fact that regional peacekeepers are not perceived as impartial as UN peacekeepers and therefore not as trustworthy conflict mediators but rather as biased interveners that want to impose the will of those external governments from the region that send peacekeepers to a particular civil conflict.

In contrast, regional missions with a mandate to protect civilians and assist in the electoral process deter violence against civilians committed by rebels. It is interesting that the UN does not seem to make a significant difference in the number of civilians killed by rebels (or governments for that matter) but that protection of civilian mandates in regional missions do seem to play a significant role. This is an interesting puzzle to explore in further research. Regional missions that are mandated to enforce peace, especially under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, are not able to deter violence against civilians by rebels but rather significantly increase the number of civilians killed. This might be due to the fact that regional missions, even though often authorised by the UNSC (see Chapter 3), uphold different standards from the UN on the amount of force to be used on the ground. It might be the case that regional missions tasked with enforcing peace appear biased to rebels. Thus, they freeze the status quo in terms of political power and territorial distribution that disadvantages rebels or prevents them from acquiring more of either resource. As a consequence, rebels might resort to even more one-sided violence to try and extract concessions from the incumbent government (Wood and Kathman 2014). Alternatively, regional missions with peace enforcement mandates might also be sent to conflicts that are intense and very violent to begin with – something that we have not controlled for in this analysis.

And lastly, international missions are able to curb government one-sided violence when they have a protection of civilians mandate, a humanitarian support mandate as well as a rule of law mandate. Because both, regional and international missions, have more (military) troops in their missions than UN missions, they might be able to project more commitment or strength vis-à-vis the conflict parties because they have a lower threshold when it comes to using force in comparison to the UN. Therefore, international and regional missions might be

better at effectively protecting civilians than the UN which has more diverse missions, with police and observers making up 1/5 of missions on average (Bara and Hultman 2020, 14). However, this line of thought cannot yet account well for the fact that international missions are good at curbing government one-sided violence, whereas regional missions are good at curbing rebel one-sided violence.

Since the international category is mostly made up of EU missions to Sub-Saharan Africa, one explanation for why missions with humanitarian support or rule of law mandates seem to make a difference for government one-sided violence might be that the EU also makes development aid agreements with those government that it sends peacekeepers to and, as is custom for such EU agreements, they include certain conditions that the receiving government needs to fulfil before receiving development funds. One such condition could be that the government stops killing civilians in order to receive humanitarian support or support for reforming the justice sector. On the other hand, international missions with security sector or human rights mandates significantly increase the number of civilians killed by governments. The reason why SSR mandates in international missions deteriorate the situation for civilians could be similar to the explanation for UN missions: external interveners empower new actors in the security sector to act as law-and-order enforcers in the public sphere but these actors misuse their new-found power and go 'rogue' on the civilian population. Exploring the mechanisms behind these trends further is crucial for understanding how mandates affect peacekeepers performance.

4.7 Conclusion

In this article, we introduce the *Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset* which contains monthly information on the number and type of mandated peacekeeping tasks of all UN and non-UN missions in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019. We present our coding process and elaborate on the 49 different mandate components the *POM Dataset* includes. In addition, we present descriptions and visualisations of our data, particularly in relation to trends in peace operations' mandates as well as in relation to selected facets of coordination and cooperation among simultaneous and sequential POs. We show that the number of mandated tasks of the median peace operation in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased substantially over time. Furthermore, the median UN PO receives mandates that are three times as large as those of non-UN missions, although there is also a high variance in the overall number of tasks within the group of non-UN missions. UN POs are mandated to

engage in a wide variety of tasks whereas non-UN missions have much narrower mandates. However, we also find that non-UN POs' mandates vary significantly across actors, suggesting that these actors specialise in the provision of certain tasks.

The *POM Dataset* includes six mandate categories that capture different aspects of interaction between peace operations. We show that non-UN POs are more often mandated to coordinate their activities with other (UN and non-UN) POs within the same conflict as well as to support the activities of simultaneously deployed (UN) missions. However, when UN missions are tasked with coordination or support activities, they have to coordinate with and support non-UN missions most of the time, oftentimes unidirectionally. Interestingly, up until the early 2000s, simultaneous missions received the mandate to coordinate with other POs with a considerable time lag after they had already been deployed to a conflict, whereas coordination mandates seem to be given in a more synchronous manner for more recent simultaneous operations, possibly reflecting a move towards partnership peacekeeping. In relation to burden sharing between simultaneous deployments, we find that parallel missions engage in labour-sharing as well as the replication of tasks.

Beyond parallel partnership peacekeeping, the *POM Dataset* also highlights the complexities of sequential peacekeeping operations. These make up almost fifty percent of our data, with non-UN actors providing 1.5 times more sequential missions than the UN. For the UN, it does not matter whether it is sent into a conflict as the first, second, third, or fourth actor within a sequence of peacekeeping missions, as UN operations are always more frequently mandated to engage in peace- and state building activities rather than the provision of security and protection. The pattern is reversed for non-UN operations as they are always mandated to perform security and protection related tasks more often than peace- or state building tasks when deployed as first, second, third, or fourth operation within a sequence.

Furthermore, we showcase that controlling for the simultaneous or sequential presence of UN and non-UN actors and their mandates should become a best practice in the literature on peacekeeping effectiveness. We perform statistical analyses after matching the *POM Dataset* with Bara and Hultman's (2020) data on UN and non-UN mission size and composition to examine the effect of the number as well as different mandate components on government and rebel one-sided violence in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period 2000-2016. The number of tasks does not seem to play a role in influencing the capacity of any peacekeeping actor to prevent one-sided violence, whereas we see interesting patterns when we examine the different peace operation mandate components. Different mandate components seem to influence

peacekeepers' capacity to prevent one-sided violence by governments and rebels and the dynamics vary by peacekeeping actor. We are, therefore, confident that the *POM Dataset* will be useful to researchers working on peacekeeping effectiveness or the design and implementation of peacekeeping mandates.

In 2022, UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, advocated for robust peace and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, led by the AU and supported by the UN (United Nations 2022). Guterres' statement exemplifies the present discussions among policy makers which focus on how tasks of UN and non-UN peace operations should be distributed in the future (Dahir, Sarfati, and Sherman 2020). However, we have yet to fully understand how mandates affect the performance of peace operations and which distribution of responsibilities works well when UN and non-UN operations are deployed together or in sequence.

The *POM Dataset* presented in this article shows that non-UN actors such as (coalitions of) states and (sub-)regional organisations are indeed important and distinct players in the peacekeeping realm that warrant further rigorous systematic study instead of being treated in a "step-motherly" fashion (Bara and Hultman 2020, 24). In cases where UN missions and non-UN operations are deployed together or in sequence, their mandates often show a high degree of overlap. This suggests that, depending on the conflict, non-UN missions are likely to affect similar conflict and non-conflict outcomes than UN operations. Since mandate size and mandate components vary within the group of non-UN actors as well, different states and different regional organisations are likely to also show differences in mission performance.

Furthermore, non-UN peace operations play an important role when it comes to the coordination between and the support of simultaneously deployed peace operations – both mandate components have become more prominent in peace operations over time. Non-UN operations are not only more often mandated to coordinate with and support other peace operations but when UN missions are mandated to engage in both of these tasks, they have to deal with non-UN missions as their partner most of the time. The same is true for peace operations that are sent into conflicts in a sequence as UN operations often enter a conflict after non-UN missions. Non-UN actors are, thus, also critical players when it comes to partnership peacekeeping. We hope that the *POM Dataset* will enable researchers to rigorously analyse this phenomenon in the future.

Appendix

PEACE OPERATIONS MANDATES (POM) DATASET – CODEBOOK

EVGENIJA KROEKER AND MALINE MEISKE

v. 15 May 2021

I. INTRODUCTION

This document outlines the coding criteria used to create the Peace Operations Mandates (POM) dataset. The POM dataset contains data on the number and types of mandated peacekeeping tasks of all UN and non-UN peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2018. Specifically, 49

different ‘mandate components’ are coded, which we define as “coherent categories of tasks designed to achieve given purposes” (Diehl and Druckman 2018, 30).

The following mandate components are coded in the POM dataset:

1. Protection of civilians
2. Protection of PO personnel/ facilities
3. Protection of VIP
4. Police training/ reform
5. Police operational support
6. Military training/ reform
7. Military operational support
8. Internal security
9. Border control
10. Ceasefire
11. Demilitarization
12. DDR
13. SSR
14. Arms control
15. Mine action
16. Humanitarian assistance
17. Refugee/ IDP assistance
18. Peace agreement process
19. Political process (no peace agreement)
20. Transitional justice
21. Human rights/ humanitarian law
22. Women’s rights
23. Protection of women
24. Protection of children
25. WPS in PO
26. Judicial reform/ RoL
27. Corrections system
28. Electoral assistance
29. Democracy promotion
30. Civil society
31. State authority/ institutions
32. Good governance
33. Media
34. Infrastructure and services
35. Economic development
36. Civilian-military coordination
37. International/ regional relations
38. Donor coordination
39. Sanctions
40. Public information
41. Environmental impact
42. Use of force
43. Ch. VII
44. Coordination with other PO/ int. actors

45. Coordination within UN
46. Monitor simultaneous PO
47. Support simultaneous PO
48. Preparation future PO
49. Transition activities

II. CODING NOTES

The coding of mandate components performed by each peace operation is based on the language used in UN and non-UN resolutions, provisions in ceasefire or peace agreements and official mandate descriptions (as well as secondary sources, if necessary). Official reports and concepts of operations are consulted if they are explicitly referred to in a mandating document in relation to the mandate components. Initial authorising resolutions (or equivalent) as well as all subsequent resolutions are included in the coding, and any changes in mandate components are recorded in the POM dataset.

Each mandate component that is mandated in an authorising/subsequent resolution (or equivalent) is coded as 1; all other potential components are left empty (later to be recorded as 0). If mandate components are carried over from one resolution to the next – even if they are not explicitly restated – they are coded as 1. This means all mandate components a peace operation is tasked with at any time are coded as 1. Note that this does not ensure that an activity is performed (or not) by the PO, only that it has been noted in a mandating document.

Some additional coding notes for UN peace operations (*based on PEMA*):

- We only code tasks that the UNSC mandates for the PO or the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General because the latter is the mission's head. We do not code task mandated to any other entity, neither the Secretary General nor other UN agencies (e.g. UNDP).
- We code all PO activities (i.e., active engagement) that the UNSC mandates 'request', 'authorize', 'encourage', 'welcome', etc., or activities that the PO is asked to assist.
- We do not code 'Welcoming of progress'.
- We do not code references to the capacity to perform tasks or requests concerning the composition and planning of the mission and requests to fill vacancies.
- We do not code requests to the UNSG to report on progresses made toward the implementation of the mandate (usually found at the end of the resolution).

The unit of analysis of the POM dataset is the peace operation mandating document.

III. IDENTIFYING AND SUPPORTING VARIABLES

In addition to the main variables of interest, the mandate components, the POM dataset includes the following identifying or supporting variables:

po_acronym	The official acronym of the peace operation.
po_name	The full name of the peace operation.
actor	The actor, i.e. the organisation or state(s), implementing the peace operation.
actor_type	The actor type, which groups the actors into three types: 1 = the United Nations; 2 = regional organisation acting within its own region; 3 = regional organisation acting outside its own region; 4 = state or (ad hoc) group of states.

country	The country in which the peace operation takes place.
country_id	The COW country code for the country in which the peace operation takes place.
region	The region in which the operation takes place: currently only Sub-Saharan Africa; but to be extended to include the Americas, Asia/Pacific, Europe, Middle East/North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
conflict	The conflict to which the peace operation relates – peace operations are matched to conflicts in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 19.1. In cases where a peace operation intervenes in more than one conflict, all of the relevant conflicts are noted. 0 = if the peace operation is not related to a conflict that is part of the UCDP conflict data.
conflict_id	The conflict ID, as given in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 19.1. In cases where a peace operation intervenes in more than one conflict, all of the relevant conflict IDs are noted. 0 = if the peace operation is not related to a conflict that is part of the UCDP conflict data.
conflict_type	0 = interstate conflict; 1 = intrastate conflict.
resolution_id	The resolution ID or other document that (re)authorises a peace operation and/or provides a mandate (update) for the operation. Secondary sources are consulted if no primary data is available.
resolution_author	The author of the resolution: 1 = UN; 2 = RO; 3 = Ceasefire; 4 = Other official source; 5 = Secondary literature; If a document issued by a regional organisation/a ceasefire/other is incorporated into a UN document (i.e. as an annex to a letter), the original author, not the UN was coded.
resolution_date	The full date the resolution was passed.
mandate_extension	The degree of mandate extension, noting whether an authorising/ mandating document: 3 = establishes a new peace operation; 2 = widely overhauls the mandate of an existing operation (i.e. when changes were made to >=5 mandate components); 1 = slightly adjusts the mandate (i.e. when changes were made to <5 mandate components); 0 = merely extends the duration or the composition of the operation without changing the mandate components (i.e. no new mandate components).

IV. MANDATE COMPONENTS

This section defines and describes all 45 mandate components. For all mandate components:

1 = A mandating resolution (or equivalent) explicitly or implicitly (by carrying over an existing mandate) mandates a peace operation to perform the mandate component;

empty = A mandating resolution (or equivalent) does not mandate a peace operation to perform the mandate component.

Protection of civilians	• Protecting civilians from physical harm; or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians. • Civilians include a) the civilian population; b) refugees, IDPs, minorities; c) humanitarian personnel (if mentioned in the context of PoC)
Protection of PO personnel/ facilities	• Ensuring the security and free movement of PO personnel. • Protecting the facilities of a PO.
Protection of VIP	• VIP protection for conflict parties and parties involved in peace process.
Police training/ reform	• Reforming, restructuring and rebuilding the police. • Police monitoring. • Training and mentoring the police. • Capacity building of the police. • If Security Sector is mentioned and there is no specific reference to either police or military, then both police and military are coded. (*based on PEMA*)
Police operational support	• Operational support in law enforcement. • Assist offensive operations of local police forces. • Not coded when specific tasks are mentioned that are to be performed alongside the local police forces.
Military training/ reform	• Reforming, restructuring and rebuilding the military. • Military monitoring. • Training and mentoring the military. • Capacity building of the military. • If Security Sector is mentioned and there is no specific reference to either police or military, then both police and military are coded. (*based on PEMA*)
Military operational support	• Operational support for military engagement (e.g. logistical support). • Assist offensive operations of local military forces. • Not coded when specific tasks are mentioned that are to be performed alongside the local military forces (e.g. border control or DDR).
Internal security	• Establishing security, stability, peace. • Violence reduction/cessation/deterrence. • Maintain or restore law and order. • This includes non-ceasefire patrolling.
Border control	• Border security, border control. • This includes non-ceasefire patrolling at the border.
Ceasefire	• Monitoring, reporting, or implementing ceasefire arrangements. • This includes supporting verification arrangements, investigating ceasefire violations, and border monitoring (only if mentioned in relation to ceasefire arrangements). • If ceasefire activities are part of a peace agreement, both are

	coded.
Demilitarization	• Ensuring that specific zones are free from military activity, personal, and equipment. • Creating and/or monitoring buffer/demilitarised zones. • Monitoring the withdrawal of troops and weapons (from specific zones). • Facilitating the cessation of aid to irregular forces. • Force disengagement/disbanding/redeployment/separation. • Monitoring non-intervention/non-interference/non-use of territory for attacks. • Observing any hostile action. • Demilitarization relates to areas and entire groups, not individuals.
DDR	• Supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs. • Disarmament is the removal of weapons etc. from combatants. • Demobilisation is the disbanding of and the discharge of combatants from armed groups. • Reintegration is the process of reintegrating former combatants into civil society. • Focus of DDR activities is on individuals, e.g. (ex-)combatants. • Individual DDR components suffice for coding.
SSR	• Supporting security sector seform (SSR) (coded when SSR explicitly mentioned).
Arms control	• Arms management, incl. collection, storage, and destruction programs (outside of DDR programs). • Monitoring the flow of arms and light weapons.
Mine action	• Detecting and/or removing mines. • Implementing demining programmes. • Facilitating demining education, incl. mine awareness programmes.
Humanitarian assistance	• Facilitating/supporting/delivering humanitarian assistance. • Ensuring the security and free movement of humanitarian personnel (if mentioned in context of humanitarian assistance).
Refugee/ IDP assistance	• Facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). • Creating, managing, and maintaining refugee and IDP camps.
Peace agreement process	• Implementing a peace agreement. • Measures include good offices, mediation, confidence/ trust building activities, reconciliation activities.
Political process (no peace agreement)	• Facilitating and participating in the political process; can include aim to reach a peace agreement. • Measures include good offices, mediation, confidence/ trust building activities, reconciliation activities.
Transitional justice	• Judicial measures to hold individuals accountable for crimes committed during an armed conflict

	• Mechanisms include criminal prosecutions (e.g. of war crimes), truth commissions, international commissions of inquiry, reparation programs, support and security to Special Courts, etc.
Human rights/ humanitarian law	• Promoting, protecting, and monitoring human rights. • Monitoring humanitarian law.
Women's rights	• Promoting women's rights and gender equality. • Promoting women's participation in the peace process, civil society, government, etc. • Assistance to the government to ratify or implement treaties on women's rights. • Meetings with women's representatives. • Implement WPS mandate in host country.
Protection of women	• Protecting women from harm. • Monitoring/addressing/protection from sexual and gender-based violence.
Protection of children	• Protecting children from harm. • Preventing the recruitment of child soldiers and facilitating DDR programs for child soldiers.
WPS in PO	• Women, Peace, Security mandate in PO. • Gender mainstreaming activities, policies, and approaches in PO. • Address sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. • This mandate only relates to actions and activities within the PO.
Judicial reform/ RoL	• Re-establishing, strengthening, or reforming the judicial and legal system (incl. ministry of justice, courts, judges, legislative framework, etc.). • Promotion of the rule of law and RoL institutions.
Corrections system	• Improving prison infrastructure and the conditions in domestic detention centres. • Reforming/restructuring the corrections system.
Electoral assistance	• Assisting the organisation of elections and referenda, incl. organisation, support, supervision, technical/ logistical advice, verification. • This includes voter/ civic education campaigns. • Ensuring electoral security, e.g. to protect voters, candidates and election workers as well as the integrity of the election process.
Democracy promotion	• Promoting democratic institutions and governance.
Civil society	• Developing and supporting civil society capacity. • Civil society organisations include NGOs, women's groups, youth groups, human rights defenders.
State authority/ institutions	• Supporting the extension of state authority/ control throughout the territory. • Strengthening state institutions and basic administrative

	capacity (throughout the territory). • Incl. institution building through support of the transitional authority/ interim administration. • Natural resource management, incl. providing or assisting security for extracting natural resources and supporting the government in addressing illicit exploitation and smuggling of natural resources.
Good governance	• Supporting and ensuring good governance, incl. transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in the management of state affairs. • Strengthen mechanisms to tackle corruption.
Media	• Supporting the establishment of an independent media.
Infrastructure and services	• Infrastructure reconstruction/rehabilitation. • Infrastructure security. • Protecting cultural/historical sites. • Providing public services. • Supporting public health activities, e.g. in relation to endemic diseases. • Facilitate the free flow of people and goods along specified thoroughfares.
Economic development	• Supporting economic recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. • Incl. acquiring funding for economic development and reconstruction. • Supporting liberal economic reform.
Civilian-military coordination	• Supporting/strengthening civil-military cooperation.
International/ regional relations	• Facilitating good neighbourly relations. • Facilitating regional reconciliation, incl. convening regional conferences, mediation, regional agreements.
Donor coordination	• Coordinating (international) donor activity. • Facilitating donor engagement, i.e. through information-sharing.
Sanctions	• Implementing and monitoring international sanctions, incl. arms embargos.
Public information	• Disseminating information on the mandate of the PO, the peace process, the importance of civil society participation, etc.
Environmental impact	• Considering or managing the environmental impact of the PO.
Use of force	• Mission is authorized to use "all necessary means" or "active steps". • Authorisation of a range of coercive measures, incl. use of military force. • Offensive operations against armed actors (e.g. attacks against non-state actors or terrorist groups). • Robust rules of engagement.
Ch. VII	• Chapter VII authorization (only applicable for UN mandates).

Coordination with other PO/ int. actors	• Coordination and cooperation with international efforts. • Liaison with other POs or relevant agencies.
Coordination within UN	• Liaison with other UN bodies (only applicable for UN POs).
Monitor simultaneous PO	• Monitoring the activities of simultaneously deployed POs (in the same conflict).
Support simultaneous PO	• Supporting the activities of simultaneously deployed POs (in the same conflict).
Preparation future PO	• Planning for a future PO (by the same or different actor). • Creating the security conditions necessary for other PO (by the same or different actor).
Transition activities	• Planned/staged withdrawal of personnel. • Transfer of functions to other PO. • Transfer of functions to host state.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

Where do peacekeepers go? As previously stated, a common assumption in the quantitative study of peacekeeping is that peacekeepers are sent to so-called 'hard' cases. I argue, however, that a closer look at the literature reveals that our knowledge on this issue is far from conclusive and that we do not really know where peace operations are most likely to be sent. Although we know that deployment is not random (see, e.g., Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017), we have thus far not been able to very confidently point out the factors that drive this selection process. Furthermore, I contend that a clear understanding of the determinants that influence the deployment of UNSC-authorized peace operations is crucial for the evaluation of peacekeeping effectiveness. Ignoring the qualitative differences between cases that are never addressed via peacekeeping risks conflating different data-generating processes with potentially far-reaching implications for how we draw inferences in the study of peacekeeping performance. To address this problem conceptually, I suggest revisiting the question of where peacekeepers go by starting our theoretical and empirical inquiry at the very beginning of the UNSC's decision-making process.

Before the UNSC can authorize the deployment of uniformed troops, police, and observers on the ground, three other conditions need to be fulfilled. First, all UNSC members need to have agreed to include a particular civil conflict on the Council's (formal) agenda. Second, all members need to have decided that the deployment of a peacekeeping mission is the most suitable solution to manage the civil conflict in question. And third, UNSC members need to agree on the specific mandate for a peacekeeping mission before deployment. All of these decision-making stages, therefore, precede the actual deployment of a PO on the ground and add their own idiosyncrasies to the problem of selection and non-random assignment that should be accounted for in studies on where peacekeepers go.

Each of the research articles presented in this thesis subsequently focuses on one decision-making stage in the UNSC. The first paper zooms in on interest-based determinants of the Security Council's decision-making process in relation to peacekeeping and closely examines the actors that are involved in agenda-setting (see Chapter 2). It presents a novel theoretical argument about the role that states which are outside of the Council's formal membership but substantively support its policy process in the maintenance of international peace and security via policy implementation play in this respect. The second paper looks at the negotiations and deliberations that ensue in the formal public UNSC meetings following agenda-setting (see

Chapter 3). It specifically examines variation in the time it takes the UNSC to authorize a UN or non-UN peace operation to address a civil conflict on its official programme of work. Building on and extending existing work on the dynamics of deliberation, this paper extends and applies a concept from the study of domestic legislative politics and democratic systems more generally and links it to an outcome at the international level. The third paper presents a novel dataset on the mandates of 87 UN and non-UN POs in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019 (see Chapter 4). This dataset will prove highly relevant in the future for advancing our knowledge on non-UN peacekeeping actors specifically as well as the dynamics of partnership peacekeeping more generally.

In relation to my guiding research question, a few interesting results emerge across the different research articles. First, in contrast to previous studies on where peacekeepers go as well as UNSC agenda-setting in the context of civil conflicts (Binder and Golub 2020; Fortna 2004; Frederking and Patane 2017; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), I do not find that the intensity of a conflict, either in terms of battle-related deaths or civilian victimization, is significantly related to the probability of observing the first formal public UNSC discussion of a civil conflict. Furthermore, when examining the content of formal public UNSC meetings, I also do not find descriptive evidence that the human cost and negative externalities of a conflict seem to impact the speed with which the UNSC decides to authorize a peacekeeping mission. These results are surprising and warrant further analysis in the future. However, if these findings hold up for the agenda-setting and negotiation stage, both of which precede the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, previous findings on the relevance of conflict intensity as a determinant of where peacekeepers go will have to be fundamentally revised.

On the other hand, I do find evidence that other conflict characteristics as well as certain facets of the country experiencing a civil conflict matters for the UNSC's decision-making in relation to peacekeeping. The existence of a peace agreement between the parties involved in civil strife, for example, increases the probability of discussion. Similarly, I also find that UNSC members as well as other speakers participating in the formal public Council meetings preceding peacekeeping authorization oftentimes refer to the peace process between warring parties before a decision on deployment is made. Even though the UNSC has authorised peace operations in conflicts where there was 'no peace to keep' in the past and where the consent of the host state was not clear cut (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014), my analyses suggest that, overall, the Council remains a rather conscious actor that attaches

importance to the existence of a negotiation process between conflict parties before directing their attention to potentially managing these situations.

Furthermore, I find that higher material capabilities of the country experiencing conflict significantly decreases the chance that a conflict will be formally picked up for discussion by the UNSC. These results overlap with selected findings from the literature on where peacekeepers go, namely that countries who are 'strong' are less likely to see intervention because they are less likely to consent to conflict management attempts from outside actors (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Stojek and Tir 2015). Since POs are not only dependent on the consent of the host state prior to deployment but also once on the ground (Fjelde et al. 2019), engaging in discussions in relation to cases that are unlikely to allow any outside actors to engage in conflict management might simply not seem worth it to the UNSC.

Moreover, I find that interest-based explanations also influence the dynamics of Council decision-making in the realm of peacekeeping. In relation to agenda-setting, I find that the interests of troop-contributing countries to UN POs matter for the probability that a civil conflict makes it to the formal programme of work of the Council. However, this is only the case when TCCs are represented by enough elected members in the UNSC. When three elected members are also top TCCs, the security and economic interests of other top TCCs are significantly related to UNSC agenda-setting. Furthermore, I find that actors other than the 15 Council members are active participants in the formal public meetings following agenda-setting but preceding peacekeeping authorization. When these types of speakers participate frequently and dominate formal public UNSC meetings, time to PO authorization speed decreases.

In addition, all three research articles that comprise the present thesis also make their own contributions. The first paper, 'Gatekeeping through Peacekeeping? Troop contributing countries and UNSC agenda-setting on civil conflicts', adds to the recently emerging comparative study of the UNSC's agenda-setting dynamics (see, e.g., Allen and Yuen 2022; Binder and Golub 2020; Lundgren and Klamberg 2022). Even though agenda-setting constitutes the first (and relatively more discriminatory) selection stage in the Council's decision-making process that can eventually result, e.g., in the authorization of a PO, it has relatively rarely been the focus of systematic analysis thus far. This is puzzling because only after the Council has explicitly adopted an item to its official agenda in a public formal meeting, can it begin deliberations on how to address or best deal with said item. Without a clearer appreciation of the conditions under which certain situations, disputes and conflicts

enter the UNSC's official programme of work, our understanding of the Security Council's decision-making process remains incomplete and might even impede knowledge accumulation in relation to research questions which examine outcomes of the UNSC's decision-making process, such as where peacekeepers go.

Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first systematic study on the influence of troop and police contributions to UN POs on UNSC decision-making. Although there is an extant literature on the supply side of peacekeeping which examines the reasons that motivate TCCs to voluntarily provide personnel in the first place (see Meiske and Ruggeri 2017 for an overview), no studies have yet examined whether these contributions can in turn be used as a bargaining chip in exchange for political influence within the UN system more generally and the UNSC more specifically. As described further above, Malone (2000) as well as Dreher et al. (2014) find that countries which provide substantial amounts of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions are also more likely to be elected to the Council. Combined with insights from this study, it seems that personnel contributions prove useful not only in increasing the chances of becoming a non-permanent UNSC member but also the chances of being a more influential elected Council member in relation to agenda-setting.

Lastly, the empirical evidence presented in the first paper indicates that non-permanent members might differ in their ability to influence Council agenda-setting even though they operate within the same *de jure* decision-making framework. A common argument about why elected UNSC members should matter for Council decision-making is their ability to exploit procedural rules to their advantage (Binder and Golub 2020; Mikulaschek 2018a). However, my findings suggest that elected members can only make effective use of these rules when other conditions are also satisfied. Along with additional studies on the heterogeneity of the Council's permanent members and their use of the Council (Lundgren and Klamberg 2022), more research on the conditions under which elected members can successfully influence UNSC agenda-setting more specifically and decision-making more generally is needed.

The second paper, 'Talking the talk until walking the walk? Quality of deliberation and time to UNSC peacekeeping authorization', sheds more light on one step in the UNSC's decision-making process that has hitherto not been the focus of systematic study. While a necessary prerequisite for any further meaningful Council action (Allen and Yuen 2020), agenda-setting constitutes only the first selection stage in the UNSC's decision-making process by discriminating between civil conflicts that are and are not picked up for serious consideration by the Council. The deliberations of the UNSC following the acceptance of an item on its

formal agenda, however, constitute a second and equally important selection stage by distinguishing between civil conflicts that are eventually (not) addressed by the Council via peacekeeping. By directing our attention to the content of the UNSC's decision-making in relation to peacekeeping in civil conflicts, this paper provides a foundation on the basis of which future research can build stronger theories about the dynamics of the Council's formal public meetings, both in relation to its causes as well as its consequences.

Furthermore, it extends and applies a concept from the study of domestic legislative politics and democratic systems more generally and links it to an outcome at the international level, namely variation in UNSC PO authorization speed. Although the Council can be regarded as a global legislature as it creates legally binding international law with the resolutions it passes according to Article 25 of the UN Charter, the dynamics of the UNSC's debates have not received much systematic attention thus far (notable exceptions include Eckhard et al. (2021) and Scherzinger (2022a, 2022b,)). To the best of my knowledge, this is also the first study which comparatively analyses the quality of the Council's public formal discourse preceding the authorization of a PO. In doing so, it transplants the concept of 'discourse quality'(Steenbergen et al. 2003) from the domestic to the international level, enabling new research avenues which might focus on comparing the quality of discourse between legislatures at the national and the state-to-state level as well as comparing the quality of discourse across various international fora in the future.

Moreover, the second paper also makes a methodological contribution by using QTA tools to explore variation in the quality of the UNSC's public formal discourse. Although the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003) has become a popular measure which has allowed researchers to go beyond small-N, qualitative analyses of parliamentary discourse to a certain extent, one of the biggest drawbacks of this index is that its construction relies on manual coding. However, to be able to efficiently process and analyse large amounts of speech and text in a 'big data' era, we need to be able to evaluate discourse quality on the basis of more automated coding procedures.

The third paper (joint work with Dr. Maline Meiske), 'What are they (t)asked to do? Introducing the Peace Operations Mandates (POM) Dataset', presents novel time-varying information on disaggregated peacekeeping mandate components of all UN and non-UN peace operations deployed to intra- and interstate conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019. For each peace operation, the different mandate components are coded as dummy variables on the basis of 49 pre-defined mandate categories – with a particular

emphasis on mandates on the cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping actors. The coding in the *POM Dataset* is based on the language used in UN and non-UN resolutions (initial and subsequent), provisions in ceasefire or peace agreements as well as official mandate descriptions.

This data can be efficiently employed to study different aspects of peacekeeping. First, the study of peacekeeping effectiveness could employ our data to evaluate how multiple mandate components within one peace operation interact with each other to influence a range of peacekeeping outcomes. Furthermore, knowing the full range of tasks that peacekeepers are asked to perform on the ground enables researchers to evaluate peacekeeping effectiveness not only in terms of negative peace (i.e. peace duration, conflict recurrence, battle-related deaths, or civilian victimization) but also in terms of 'positive peace'.

Although our dataset is not the first to provide disaggregated mandates for UN POs, it is crucially the first one to also include non-UN operations. This will allow scholars to compare and contrast UN peacekeeping with that of regional organizations and (coalitions of) states using one coherent dataset. Future research can analyse the different dynamics between UN and non-UN peacekeeping, examine whether there is variation in performance within the non-UN category, or investigate the division of labour and coordination between actors. We put particular emphasis on the latter and code multiple mandate components focussing on the cooperation between different POs, UN agencies and other international actors – a feature that further differentiates the *POM Dataset* from already existing data.

Second, the literature on partnership peacekeeping can also benefit from our extensive dataset on mandated peacekeeping tasks. Thus far, the majority of studies in this field have been limited to single case studies (Welz 2016) or regions, mostly Africa (see Brosig 2010), and have mostly examined when and why we observe parallel, sequential or integrated missions. Our dataset enables researchers in this field to further disaggregate multiple simultaneous POs by mandate components and assess whether the mandates and tasks of POs from different actors are compatible with each other; whether the UN specialises in some mandate areas, whereas non-UN actors specialise in others; and whether partnership peacekeeping works differently in different conflicts.

Lastly, our data can be used to advance our understanding of mandate design and mandate implementation. Although evaluating PO effectiveness is important and highly policy-relevant, we also need to gain a better understanding about how mandates are designed in those political spaces where decisions on whether to send peacekeepers into a conflict are

made in the first place. For the UN, this is of course the Security Council. While there is some understanding of how decision-making works in this international forum, we know much less about the decision-making procedures in, e.g., the AU or the EU. Our data can be used as the outcome variable in studies on mandate design of UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Lastly, our data complements recent efforts to study the conditions under which UN peacekeepers implement their mandated tasks (Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2022) and makes it possible to extend the realm of these research questions to non-UN peacekeepers as well.

Bibliography

Allen, Susan Hannah, and Amy T. Yuen. 2020. "Action or Inaction : United Nations Security Council Activity, 1994–2013." *Journal of Peace Research* 57(5): 658–65.

Allen, Susan Hannah, and Amy T. Yuen. 2021. *Getting to Yes? Cooperative Behavior in the UN Security Council*. Working paper (last accessed 1 August 2021).

Allen, Susan Hannah, and Amy T. Yuen. 2022. *Bargaining in the UN Security Council: Setting the Global Agenda*. online edn. Oxford: Oxford Academic.

Amicarelli, Elio, and Jessica Di Salvatore. 2021. "Introducing the PeaceKeeping Operations Corpus (PKOC)." *Journal of Peace Research* 58(5): 1137–48.

Aydin, Aysegul. 2010. "Where Do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27(1): 47–66.

Bächtiger, André, and John Parkinson. 2019. *Mapping and Measuring Deliberation: Towards a New Deliberative Quality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Balas, Alexandru. 2011. "It Takes Two (or More) to Keep the Peace: Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations." *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15(3-4): 384–421.

Bara, Corinne, and Lisa Hultman. 2020. "Just Different Hats? Comparing UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping." *International Peacekeeping* 27(3): 341–68.

Barbieri, Katherine, and Omar M.G. Keshk. 2016. "Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 4.0."

Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M.G. Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2009. "Trading Data: Evaluating Our Assumptions and Coding Rules." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(5): 471–91.

Baturo, Alexander, Niheer Dasandi, and Slava Mikhaylov. 2017. "Understanding State Preferences with Text as Data: Introducing the UN General Debate Corpus." *Reserach and Politics*: 1–9.

Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. 2015. "Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013." In *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peace Operations*, eds. Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams. Oxford University Press.

Binder, Martin, and Jonathan Golub. 2020. "Civil Conflict and Agenda-Setting Speed in the United Nations Security Council." *International Studies Quarterly* 64(2): 419–30.

Blair, Robert A. 2019. "International Intervention and the Rule of Law after Civil War: Evidence from Liberia." *International Organization* 73(2): 365–98.

Blair, Robert A., Jessica Di Salvatore, and Hannah M. Smidt. 2022. "When Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Implement Their Mandates." *American Journal of Political Science* 66(3): 664–80.

Bode, Ingvild. 2018. “Reflective Practices at the Security Council: Children and Armed Conflict and the Three United Nations.” *European Journal of International Relations* 24(2): 293–318.

Boulden, Jane. 2006. “Double Standards, Distance and Disengagement: Collective Legitimization in the Post-Cold War Security Council.” *Security Dialogue* 37(3): 409–23.

Bove, Vincenzo, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2016. “Kinds of Blue: Diversity in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Civilian Protection.” *British Journal of Political Science* 46(03): 681–700.

Bove, Vincenzo, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2019. “Peacekeeping Effectiveness and Blue Helmets’ Distance from Locals.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(7): 1630–55.

Bove, Vincenzo, and Leandro Elia. 2011. “Supplying Peace: Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions.” *Journal of Peace Researc* 48(6): 699–714.

Brosig, Malte. 2010. “The Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa.” *International Peacekeeping* 17(3): 327–42.

Brundidge, Jennifer, Scott A. Reid, Sujin Choi, and Ashley Muddiman. 2014. “The Deliberative Digital Divide: Opinion Leadership and Integrative Complexity in the U.S. Political Blogosphere.” *Political Psychology* 35(6): 741–55.

Bures, Oldrich. 2006. “Regional Peacekeeping Operations : Complementing or Undermining the United Nations Security Council ?” *Global Change, Peace & Security* 18(2): 83–99.

Carnegie, Allison, and Christoph Mikulaschek. 2020. “The Promise of Peacekeeping: Protecting Civilians in Civil Wars.” *International Organization* 74(4): 810–32.

Chelotti, Nicola, Niheer Dasandi, and Slava Mikhaylov. 2022. “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Have a Socialization Effect on Member State Preferences? Evidence from the Un General Debate.” *International Studies Quarterly* 66(1): 1–17.

Costalli, Stefano. 2014. “Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis of Deployment and Violence Reduction in the Bosnian War.” *British Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 357–80.

Dahir, Ilhan, Agathe Sarfati, and Jake Sherman. 2020. The Future of UN Peacekeeping and Parallel Operations. International Peace Institute.

Derouen Jr, Karl. 2003. “The Role of the UN in International Crisis Termination, 1945-1994.” *Defence and Peace Economics* 14(4): 251–60.

Di Salvatore, Jessica, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2017. “Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations.” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Di Salvatore, Jessica, Magnus Lundgren, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Hannah M. Smidt. 2022. “Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66(4–5): 924–51.

Di Salvatore, Jessica. 2018. “Obstacle to Peace? Ethnic Geography and Effectiveness of Peacekeeping.” *British Journal of Political Science*: 1–21.

Diehl, Paul F. 1993. “Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options.” *Armed Forces & Society* 19(2): 209–30.

Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. 2018. “Multiple Peacekeeping Missions: Analysing Interdependence.” *International Peacekeeping* 25(1): 28–51.

Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis.” *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779–801.

Dreher, Axel, Matthew Gould, Matthew D. Rablen, and James R Vreeland. 2014. “The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council.” *Public Choice* 158(1/2): 51–83.

Dunne, Tim, and Katharine Gelber. 2014. “Arguing Matters: The Responsibility to Protect and the Case of Libya.” *Global Responsibility to Protect* 6(3): 326–49.

Eck, Kristine, and Lisa Hultman. 2007. “Violence Against Civilians in War.” *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 233–46.

Eckhard, Steffen, Ronny Patz, Mirco Schönfeld, and Hilde van Meegdenburg. 2021. “International Bureaucrats in the UN Security Council Debates: A Speaker-Topic Network Analysis.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 30(2): 214–33.

Faizullaev, Alisher, and Jérémie Cornut. 2017. “Narrative Practice in International Politics and Diplomacy: The Case of the Crimean Crisis.” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20: 578–604.

Finke, Daniel. 2022. “Party Ideologies and UN Debates.” *Party Politics* 29(2): 281–93.

Fjelde, Hanne et al. 2019. “Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians.” *International Organization* 73(1): 103–31.

Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morjé Howard. 2008. “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 283–301.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269–92.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Frederking, Brian, and Christopher Patane. 2017. “Legitimacy and the Un Security Council Agenda.” *PS - Political Science and Politics* 50(2): 347–53.

Gehring, Thomas, and Thomas Dörfler. 2019. “Constitutive Mechanisms of UN Security

Council Practices: Precedent Pressure, Ratchet Effect, and Council Action Regarding Intrastate Conflicts." *Review of International Studies* 45(1): 120–40.

Gilligan, Michael, and Stephen J. Stedman. 2003. "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review* 5(4): 37–54.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–37.

Grimmer, Justin, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. "Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts." *Political Analysis* 21: 267–97.

Gurciullo, Stefano, and Slava Mikhaylov. 2017. "Detecting Policy Preferences and Dynamics in the UN General Debate with Neural Word Embeddings." *arXiv:1707.03490v1 [cs.CL]*: 1–15.

Hardt, Heidi. 2014. *Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Henke, Marina. 2016. "Great Powers and UN Force Generation: A Case Study of UNAMID." *International Peacekeeping* 23(3): 468–92.

Howard, Lise, and Anjali Dayal. 2018. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping." *International Organisation* 72(1): 71–103.

Hultman, Lisa, and Karin Johansson. 2017. "Responding to Wartime Sexual Violence: UN Peacekeeping and the Protection Agenda." *Global Responsibility to Protect* 9(2): 129–46.

Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2013. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4): 875–91.

Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2014. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting." *American Political Science Review* 108(4): 737–53.

Hultman, Lisa. 2013. "UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50(1): 59–73.

Hurd, Ian. 2002. "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council." *Global Governance* 8(1): 35–51.

Iwanami, Yukari. 2012. "Setting the Agenda of the UN Security Council." *SSRN Electronic Journal*: 1–25.

Jetschke, Anja, and Bernd Schlipphak. 2019. "MILINDA: A New Dataset on United Nations-Led and Non-United Nations-Led Peace Operations." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37(5): 605-629.

Jo, Jung In. 2006. “The UN’s Effectiveness in Post Civil War Peace Durability.” *Journal of International and Area Studies* 13(1): 23–35.

Johnstone, Ian. 2003. “Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument.” *European Journal of International Law* 14(3): 437–80.

Kathman, Jacob D., and Reed M. Wood. 2016. “Stopping the Killing During the ‘Peace’: Peacekeeping and the Severity of Postconflict Civilian Victimization.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12(2): 149–69.

Kathman, Jacob. 2013. “United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments, 1990-2011.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(5): 532–49.

Kostovicova, Denisa, and Tom Paskhalis. 2021. “Gender, Justice and Deliberation: Why Women Don’t Influence Peacemaking.” *International Studies Quarterly* 65(2): 263–76.

Kroeker, Evgenija, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2022. “Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution.” In *Handbook on Peacekeeping and International Relations*, ed. Han Dorussen. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 182–95.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1915-1944.” *International Interactions* 28(3): 237–60.

Lloyd, Gabriella. 2021. “New Data on UN Mission Mandates 1948–2015: Tasks Assigned to Missions in Their Mandates (TAMM).” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(5): 1149–60.

Lotze, Walter. 2015. “United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).” In *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, eds. Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams. Oxford Academic.

Lundgren, Magnus, and Mark Klamberg. 2022. “Selective Attention: The United Nations Security Council and Armed Conflict.” *British Journal of Political Science*: 1–22.

Lundgren, Magnus, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Katharina P. Coleman. 2021. “Only as Fast as Its Troop Contributors: Incentives, Capabilities, and Constraints in the UN’s Peacekeeping Response.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 671–86.

Malone, David M. 2000. “Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on the UN Security Council.” *Global Governance* 6(1): 3–23.

Mamiya, Ralph. 2016. “A History and Conceptual Development of the Protection of Civilians.” In *Protection of Civilians*, eds. Haidi Willmot, Ralph Mamiya, Scott Sheeran, and Marc Weller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 63–87.

Meiske, Maline, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2017. “Peacekeeping as a Tool of Foreign Policy.” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Meiske, Maline. 2019. “Burden-Sharing in Peace Operations: Quantitative Studies on the

Global, Regional, and National Level." University of Oxford.

Melander, Erik. 2009. "Selected To Go Where Murderers Lurk ?" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(4): 389–406.

Meyer, Cosima, and Cornelius Puschmann. 2020. "Advancing Text Mining with R and Quanteda." *Methods Bites - Blog of the MZES Social Science Data Lab*..

Mikulaschek, Christoph, James Cockayne, and Chris Perry. 2010. *The United Nations Security Council and Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset*. IPI Publications: New York.

Mikulaschek, Christoph. 2018a. "Issue Linkage across International Organizations: Does European Countries' Temporary Membership in the UN Security Council Increase Their Receipts from the EU Budget?" *Review of International Organizations* 13(4): 491–518.

Mikulaschek, Christoph. 2018b. "The Power of the Weak: How Informal Power-Sharing Shapes the Work of the UN Security Council." *SSRN Electronic Journal*.

Morris, Justin, and Hilaire McCoubrey. 1999. "Regional Peacekeeping in the Post - Cold War Era." *International Peacekeeping* 6(2): 129–51.

Mullenbach, Mark J. 2005. "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(3): 529–55.

Mullenbach, Mark J. 2013. "Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes, 1946-2012: A New Data Set." *The Midsouth Political Science Review* 14(1): 103–33.

Munger, Kevin, Richard Bonneau, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2019. "Elites Tweet to Get Feet Off the Streets: Measuring Regime Social Media Strategies During Protest." *Political Science Research and Methods* 7(4): 815–34.

Neack, Laura. 1995. "UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?" *Journal of Peace Research* 32(2): 181–96.

Oestman, Jared. 2021. "A Price for Peace: Troop Contributing Countries' Responses to Peacekeeper Fatalities." *International Interactions* 47(6): 986–1015.

Oksamytna, Kseniya. 2018. "Policy Entrepreneurship by International Bureaucracies: The Evolution of Public Information in UN Peacekeeping." *International Peacekeeping* 25(1): 79–104.

Owens, Ryan J., and Justin P. Wedeking. 2011. "Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions." *Law and Society Review* 45(4): 1027–61.

Parthasarathy, Ramya, Vijayendra Rao, and Nethra Palaniswamy. 2019. "Deliberative Democracy in an Unequal World: A Text-As-Data Study of South India's Village Assemblies." *American Political Science Review* 113(3): 623–40.

Perry, Chris, and Adam Smith. 2013. "Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN

Peacekeeping: A New Dataset, 1991-2012. ” *Providing for Peacekeeping No.3*:1–16.

Pettersson, Therése, Shawn Davies, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, and Margareta Sollenberg Magnus Öberg. 2021. “Organized Violence 1989-2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria.” *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809–825.

Pettersson, Therése. 2021. “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook v 21.1.”

Risse, Thomas. 2000. “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics.” *International Organization* 54(1): 1–39.

Roberts, Margaret E., Brandon M. Stewart, and Dustin Tingley. 2019. “Stm: An R Package for Structural Topic Models.” *Journal of Statistical Software* 91(2): 1–40.

Roberts, Margaret E., Brandon M. Stewart, Dustin Tingley, and Eduardo M. Airoldi. 2013. “The Structural Topic Model and Applied Social Science.” *NIPS 2013 Workshop on Topic Models*: 2–5.

Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Ismene Gizelis. 2018. “On the Frontline Every Day? Subnational Deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers.” *British Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 1005–25.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2008. “Short- and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations.” *The World Bank Economic Review* 22(1): 9–32.

Scherzinger, Johannes. 2022a. “‘Acting under Chapter 7’: Rhetorical Entrapment, Rhetorical Hollowing, and the Authorization of Force in the UN Security Council, 1995–2017.” *International Relations*: 1–22.

Scherzinger, Johannes. 2022b. “Unbowed, Unbent, Unbroken? Examining the Validity of the Responsibility to Protect.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 58(1): 2022.

Schoenfeld, Mirco, Steffen Eckhard, Ronny Patz, Hilde van Meegdenburg, and Antonio Pires. 2019. “The UN Security Council Debates.” Harvard Dataverse, V5.

Schoon, Eric, and Scott Duxbury. 2019. “Robust Discourse and the Politics of Legitimacy: Framing International Intervention in the Syrian Civil War, 2011–2016.” *Sociological Science* 6: 635–60.

Schumann, Maurice P. and Corinne Bara. Forthcoming. “A New Era: Power in Partnership Peacekeeping”, *International Studies Quarterly*.

Security Council Report. 2019. *The UN Security Council Handbook: A User’s Guide to Practice and Procedure*.

Security Council Report. 2019. *The UN Security Council Handbook: A User’s Guide to Practice and Procedure*. New York..

Shawn, Davies, Therese Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg. 2022. “Organized Violence 1989-

2021 and Drone Warfare." *Journal of Peace Research* 59(4): 593–610.

Sievers, Loraine, and Sam Daws. 2014. "Place and Format of Council Proceedings." In *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19–109.

Singer, David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainy, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills, 19–48.

Singer, David. 1988. "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985." *International Interactions* 14(2): 115–32.

Smidt, Hannah. 2020. "Mitigating Election Violence Locally: UN Peacekeepers' Election-Education Campaigns in Côte d'Ivoire." *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 199–216.

Steenbergen, Marco R, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, and Jürg Steiner. 2003. "Measuring Political Deliberation: A Discourse Quality Index." *Comparative European Politics* 1(1): 21–48.

Stinnett, Douglas M. Jaroslav Tir, Schafer Philip, and Gochman Charles. 2002. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2): 58–66.

Stojek, Szymon M, and Jaroslav Tir. 2015. "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-Led Deployments to Civil War States." *European Journal of International Relations* 21(2): 352–76.

Stojek, Szymon M, and Jaroslav Tir. 2015. "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-Led Deployments to Civil War States." *European Journal of International Relations* 21(2): 352–76.

United Nations Security Council. 1982. *Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council*, S/96/Rev.7.

United Nations Security Council. 2015. Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping, S/2015/229.

United Nations. 2022. *Secretary-General's Press Stakeout with President Macky Sall* [as delivered]. Statement. Dakar: United Nations Secretary-General.

Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *The American Political Science Review* 95(4): 845–58.

Walter, Barbara, Lise Morjé Howard, and Page Fortna. 2021. "The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace." *British Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 1705–22.

Welz, Martin. 2016. "Multi-Actor Peace Operations and Inter-Organizational Relations: Insights from the Central African Republic." *International Peacekeeping* 23(4): 568–91.

Williams, Paul D. 2016. *Global and Regional Peacekeepers*. New York.

Williams, Paul. 2020. “The Security Council’s Peacekeeping Trilemma.” *International Affairs* 96(2): 479–99.

Wood, Reed M., and Jacob D. Kathman. 2014. “Too Much of a Bad Thing? Civilian Victimization and Bargaining in Civil War.” *British Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 685–706.

Zorn, Christopher. 2005. “A Solution to Separation in Binary Response Models.” *Political Analysis* 13(2): 157–70.