JASO 28/3 (1997): 339–49

CASTE, KINSHIP, AND IDENTITY IN INDIA

ROBERT PARKIN

I

My intention in this paper is to initiate or at least develop further the application of the themes of identity and ethnicity to Indian material. Although some work in the 1970s addressed these issues (e.g. in David 1977), and there has been recent work on neighbouring Nepal (in Gellner *et al.* 1997), South Asia is not an area that one associates with these themes as much as some other parts of the world, especially, perhaps, Europe or Africa. None the less, as I hope to show, the region is certainly one whose cultural and social formations lend themselves to such treatment. I shall argue very generally, painting with a broad brush and seeking to present familiar material in a fresh light. References will therefore be kept to a minimum.

II

I will begin by giving a brief account of general features. As is well known, India is divided into status groups to which the term 'caste' is generally given. I am not going to discuss all the various problems surrounding the use of this term, restricting myself for present purposes to two aspects. One is that it is not an indigenous term in any Indian language but derives from Spanish/Portuguese *casta,* and

through it from Latin *castus,* literally 'chaste', but by extension referring to something not mixed, pure. By the fifteenth century it had come to be used in Spanish and Portuguese of 'race, kind, breed', a usage which parallels very closely the common indigenous Indian term (not in all languages) for what we call caste, namely *jati.* The other objection is that although Indian society is overwhelmingly constituted of castes, this does not exhaust the social groupings it recognizes. This is true on two levels. First, there are other social groups in the formal sense. There are tribes, who are notoriously difficult to distinguish from castes through formal features but who none the less have a legal status as such and often feel themselves to be tribes as distinct from castes (Parkin 1992: chapter 1). There are also religious sects, of renouncers or the devotees of a particular god, who again show convergences with caste but whose focus is essentially other-worldly and transcendental. Secondly, there are the four varnas (Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra), social categories rather than groups which represent traditional general societal functions (respectively religious authority, secular rule, wealth creation, and service) and who act to group castes to some extent (there are many Brahman castes, for instance, some of whom are virtually untouchable for others). However, there are two qualifications indicating that the varnas are not simply the caste system in simplified form. One is that they exclude the Untouchables. The other is that they are imperfectly represented across India: the south in particular has a wide gap between Brahmans and Shudras, the latter generally including kingly castes in this region. It is important to mention the varnas here because the imitative models used by lower castes are mostly seen in terms of varna, not caste: one aspires to Kshatriya status, for example, more than that of any particular Kshatriya caste locally (such as the Rajputs), who will tend to be protective of their status in any particular region (Brahmans and Vaishyas, by contrast, rarely seem to appear as imitative models, possibly because their vegetarianism and other practices are seen as rigorous, their overall positions in society as relatively lacking in power).

Castes themselves are often seen as occupational groups embedded in a system of division of labour. The nature of this system, in particular from the economic point of view, is still an unresolved controversy, but there is general recognition that it has fundamental ritual aspects, as Dumont's theory makes plain (1980): in brief, the continuance of world and cosmos depends on the Brahman's ritual actions, which he can perform only in a state of purity. It is the function of the other castes to support him in this. One thinks here immediately of the Untouchables, removers of purity-denying pollution for other castes, especially those castes which also have varna status. However, the king and other higher castes also have a role in providing for the Brahman, both in terms of material sustenance (including the means thereto, such as land, though not all Brahmans enjoy this) and in terms of physical protection in the king's case. Economically, many individuals do live from their caste occupation, but there are also many who do not (Quigley 1993). This is not entirely a feature of the modern state and economy. Across the Ganges plain the most frequently encountered Untouchables are the Chamars,

literally and traditionally leather-workers. In practice, however, they have long provided the land-owning castes with their main pool of agricultural labour, to such an extent that this actually seems to have become the prevailing stereotype of them, at least in the literature.

The axis of purity and impurity which Dumont sees as the basis of the way castes are integrated also has a moral dimension. This acts at both individual and caste levels. A characteristic of *kaliyuga*, the debased age in which we live today, is continual rebirth, which involves pain in itself and can be avoided only through ascetic practices based on a commitment to turn one's back on the transient, material world. It is the goal of the ascetic, the renouncer, to achieve this *moksha* or liberation from the cycle of rebirths. But lesser mortals who cannot free themselves from this world are not only condemned to perpetual rebirth, their status at every rebirth depends on the worth of their previous lives. In this way, one can hope to improve one's status through good works and fulfilling one's earthly duties, including caste duties, conscientiously, or fear losing possibly even human status—one can come back as any living creature—through doing evil, even unknowingly. In general, this *karma*, very roughly 'fate', is not a matter for the caste but the individual (Fürer-Haimendorf 1967). But also, lower castes as a whole, especially Untouchables, are said by upper castes to owe their status to their polluting occupations and generally un-Sanskritic practices such as meat-eating and alcohol. This tends to rule out status increases through reform: a caste can give up meat-eating and alcohol fairly easily, and sometimes even its occupation, but convincing others that they have done so is often difficult; besides, one cannot set aside one's history so easily. In effect, the upper castes say, 'Once a Chamar always a Chamar'. Not surprisingly, the lower castes have their own account of the reasons for their condition. This is generally that one of their number in the distant past inadvertently committed a ritual fault, such as eating beef, perhaps having been tricked by an evil Brahman. A variant, found particularly among tribes, is that the Brahmans stole the sacred thread from them. This is tantamount to saying, 'We are not at fault for our status, which is due to knavery or an innocent mistake, both of which can be rectified through compensatory ritual action and/or the restitution of what properly belongs to us.'

III

Equally important as a marker of castes is their endogamy—indeed, this is more salient ultimately than occupation, since it is an area where precept and practice are more prone to converge. Even this needs qualifying, since in practice it is likely to be sub-castes, sub-sub-castes etc. that are the operative units in affinal exchanges. However, I leave this complication aside here. What I stress in the present context is the value placed on common substance. A first point is that

there may be a certain academic bias at work. In India, descent may actually be stressed just as much as the ban on marriages with outsiders, that the outside world is more familiar with: even academic discourse, while recognizing the former, tends to stress the latter as definitional of caste and its sub-groups. In other parts of the world, descent may be stressed more by the analyst than the devaluation of out-marriage. In effect, though, each reinforces the other: although even in India descent lines may be gender-specific in terms of continuity of line if rarely of recruitment of children to it, this is often bound up with considerations of legitimacy which depend in their turn on the children being the issue of a proper marriage. Substance too may be diluted and/or polluted by out-marriage. There is, incidentally, no conflict with the principle of exogamy here: Rajputs are one example of an Indian caste which is divided into exogamous clans but which still protects its substance by a rule of endogamy for itself as an entirety.

However, as Dumont showed long ago (ibid.), what applies to marriage does not necessarily apply to other forms of sexual union, nor is marriage always taken in the same way by different groups. Throughout Indian society, I would say, including among tribes, marriage is important for adult personhood, though in some cases bearing a legitimate heir may be yet more significant. For example, the Ho tribe, in Bihar, associate marriage with effectiveness, ritually 'marrying' not only people but fishing, farming, hunting, and other implements to ensure their effectiveness (Majumdar 1950). But secondary unions are an important feature in many groups. In caste society there are many gender contrasts here as well as caste ones. Men may take second spouses simultaneously, women, if at all, only consecutively. Male polygyny may be due to the barrenness of the first wife (for example, among tribals) as much as prestige (as in the case of Kshatriyas); a good Brahman, however, prefers to remain monogamous. Second wives are caste mates and may, perhaps particularly in lower status groups, be lineage sisters of the first: among tribes, paying a brideprice often implies a right to a replacement in the event of the death or barrenness of the first wife. At this level in the hierarchy women frequently have the right to divorce (or at least to be divorced) and to remarry as divorcees or widows, but higher castes are generally opposed to both practices: widows in particular are highly inauspicious (Gough 1956). All this applies to marriage and to the caste or *jati*, so that endogamy is maintained. However, men frequently pursue relationships with women from lower castes, which may be long-term and lead to issue and to settled, if meagre, provision for it. The difference is that these are not marriages, and although inheritance for the issue of such relationships is not out of the question, it is almost bound to be subsidiary to transmission within the caste-embedded family of marriage and legitimate procreation. Sometimes such liaisons are so common between particular castes that separate castes arise from them, at least if tradition is to be believed. This is also well known among tribes: for example, the Mahali of Bihar trace their origin to past Santal–Munda mixed marriages. The status of such accounts is often very uncertain, especially since castes are often represented even in some of the ethnographic literature as deriving wholesale from mixed-varna unions. But it is

as if a new form of substance may be created if enough people act in this way. Carried on, on a more occasional basis, such liaisons pose a problem in terms of the caste attribution of any children. This is normally solved by attributing them to the caste of the mother.

An interesting variant on the topic of mixed-caste unions is provided by the Nayar, who until recent changes this century lived in matrilineal joint families in south India and have long been regarded as the ultimate test of the notion of the universality of marriage by anthropologists: at least, it has been frequently been doubted if they really have any (see Fuller 1976). Classed as Shudras, they are low in status, yet their women normatively maintain unions with Nambudiri Brahman men, who are very high in status, as well as with Nayar men. There is a distinction, however: in principle, liaisons with Nambudiri eldest sons are purely ritual, not sexual, though from the Nayar point of view they count as marriages. Nayar children are born of liaisons between Nayar women and Nayar men or Nambudiri younger sons, which are marriages from no one's point of view. The distinction between eldest sons and their younger brothers among the Nambudiri is based on the position of the former as privileged heir within the caste—ritually, spiritually and materially—to the man who is father to all the brothers, and on the association found generally in India, particularly in Brahman families, between eldest son and father—quite simply, the younger sons are less important in terms of their family's or caste's continuity or status and can indulge in these liaisons quite freely, especially as they do not entail marriage. From the Nayar point of view, these relationships are ones which actively produce Nayar children but which are with men of higher status than the Nayar men from whom Nayar children are also born.

But what is the importance of Nambudiri eldest sons to Nayar women? I have said that these liaisons constitute ritual marriage from the Nayar point of view, and proper mourning will be observed for these ritual husbands on their deaths, even though they disappear from the woman's life immediately the rite is concluded. For the Nambudiri, however, they are simply a ritual service in return for gifts which the Nayar see as marriage gifts but the Nambudiri do not. The central part of the rite is the tying of a token, called a *tali*, around the neck of the Nayar 'bride' by a Nambudiri eldest son, something which occurs in marriages among all castes all over south India. This allows the Nayar woman to claim the married status she needs to go off and indulge in subsidiary, non-marital relations with other Nambudiri and Nayar men. Does it, however, make the Nambudiri officiant her husband? No, he would say, because the *tali* is never tied by the groom elsewhere in south India. This is only one example of what we might call marriage as liberating in the sub-continent. Marriage to a pole or stake is a frequent part of the usual Indian wedding, but women especially are sometimes married to an object (a sword, for example) or a person who immediately disappears from their lives, so that they have the status of married women but can take part in what would otherwise be much more polluting practices—acting as temple prostitutes, for example, or as Nayar reproducers or, among the Newar of Nepal, indulging in

relations with men of lower castes (Dumont ibid.; Parkin 1997). The point to be made here is that not only substance but also status depends on marriage, but in unpredictable ways: in particular, many Indians manage to evade or limit loss of status by indulging in sexual practices in arenas which are not defined as marriage.

But there are many other aspects that have to be discussed under the rubric of marriage itself. I shall return to the question of substance later, but first I must deal with the question of marriage as system and practice, this time within castes as well as being an aspect of inter-caste distinctions. As in other respects, there is a difference in practice between different status groups, though this is complicated by a south–north contrast which cross-cuts this difference. I start with the so-called *kanya dan* ideology, which is generally associated with north India and with high- and middle-status groups. In brief, this entails the gift of a woman, a virgin, preferably a child, to a family of higher status; giving gifts to superiors is always meritorious, counting as a good work useful in building credit for one's eventual salvation, and this 'gift of a virgin' is the supreme gift of all. Accompanying the bride is normally also a dowry, which is financially crippling for many families but strategically important in making as good a match as possible in terms of status. Given caste or even sub-caste endogamy, the status difference obviously occurs *within* the caste or sub-caste as the case may be. The stress on castes as conveying unity of substance therefore does not prevent further differences arising within the caste itself, or even sub-units of it: indeed, the hierarchy typically pervades the caste itself in this respect and does not end at its boundaries.

As regards the way the marriage system works, there are two qualifications. First, marriages can and do take place between families who were of roughly equal status to begin with, the status difference arising, perhaps only temporarily, as a result of the marriage itself. This is often imitated among groups for whom equality is the norm: the Juang, another tribe of Orissa, mark the high-status difference between wife-takers and wife-givers in the wedding itself, even though these actual differences do not matter outside this context (McDougal 1964). Secondly, the status difference also tends to be kept small because there is a sort of bargaining process: a particular family will strive to ally itself with another family of as high a status as possible, which, however, may well reject the approach for fear of losing status by allying with a family of significantly lower status than itself. None the less, notions of common substance and therefore identity encompass clear status differences within the affinal alliance unit.

Kanya dan ideology is, among other things, one of the unsolicited gift of a virgin to a family of higher status; the approach should come from the virgin bride-to-be's own family, not that of the prospective groom. There is also an emphasis on the unidirectional transfer of both virgin and other gifts: nothing should be taken in return from one's wife-taker, not even, it is often said, a glass of water. This means that women move up the hierarchy. What happens, however, if, as a man, one is at the bottom of any endogamous unit and has no one below oneself to take a wife from? Such unfortunates are often forced to breach caste rules. One strategy is to take a wife from outside and therefore below the

endogamous unit, though not necessarily the wider caste; this contributes to secession and caste-fragmentation, since those of higher status may refuse to associate with those below them henceforth as a result. A new caste identity may then be born. Another tactic is to remain within the endogamous unit but to begin exchanging women within it, in violation of the ban on reciprocity associated with the ideology of *kanya dan*; this may be accompanied by, or modified in the direction of, the offer of a brideprice in place of dowry. In other words, not only may the ban on direct exchange be abandoned, the ban on the groom soliciting for a bride may also be reversed. Again, families concerned for their own status will be faced with the choice of suffering loss of status themselves by too close an association or breaking with their fellows in order to preserve it; they will often choose the latter.

The accumulation of women at the top of any endogamous group also poses problems, especially if the group is concerned for its status. Unmarried mature women are especially a liability for upper castes, not only because of the preservation of the reputation for virginity, but also because her natal family is responsible for the monthly destruction of an ovum and therefore a life. The sooner a female child is given away to her affinal kin, who will then assume this responsibility, the better, hence child marriage. Indeed, girls are not only potentially inauspicious and a burden in terms of the dowry that must be found for them, they are often considered as not belonging to their natal families at all but to the families that will eventually take them in marriage. However, if one has an endogamous boundary above one's head, marrying them off poses extra problems, and indeed there is competition for what marriages are available, for unmarried females tend to accumulate at the top of each endogamous division: hence purdah or the neglect of female infants, extending in the past, especially in Raiput groups, to female infanticide. Here too, the notion of unitary substance is qualified, since a daughter's substance is basically not ours; and indeed, in south India a wife is often regarded as exchanging part of her substance for her husband's on marriage (the male but not female aspect of that substance: see Fruzzetti *et al.* 1992). A boy, on the other hand, represents an heir, and the eldest son will play a key role in one's funeral and in turning one into an ancestor. His substance stays within the group, though as a householder he needs a wife in order to be able to perform the necessary rituals (this is most obviously true of Brahmans).

As one goes down the hierarchy, one eventually encounters castes that have nothing to do with *kanya dan* but who uniformly exchange women, with or without brideprice. Such practices therefore come to be associated with lower status groups, even though actual weddings may be modelled on those of the higher castes. Attempts at reform are frequent, but probably limited in their effects (see Parry 1979). Although there is no exact correlation between wealth and status, it is certainly the case that lower-status groups tend to be perpetually dependent on a brideprice rather than becoming able to offer a dowry. More particularly, perhaps, attempts to reform status are often rejected by some within the group, leading to further fragmentation and more numerous endogamous boundaries, thus

multiplying the problems just mentioned. In truth, the situation is quite fluid, but every sub-group seeking to abandon low-status practices is effectively upsetting established affinal relationships with other groups, meeting resistance on these grounds from its fellows, as well as on grounds of status from groups above it with whom it may be trying to ally itself through marriage.

I hope it will be seen from this how the marriage system, in terms of both the way it works and the models it uses, contributes to the multiplication of and shifts in caste, sub-caste etc. identity, both modifying and supporting notions of common substance through descent. I also said that the south was different in certain important respects, the chief of which is cross-cousin marriage. This means that in structural terms, marriage is conceived as taking place between individuals who are already kin to one another and therefore share doubly in substance, so to speak, since there is also caste. There is also less unhappiness with the notion that wife-takers and wife-givers may be of the same status, and indeed the kinship terminology is structured so as not to make this particular distinction, since it unites the two categories (unlike the northern terminology). In practice there is often a preference for one cross cousin over the other, especially, perhaps, for FZD over MBD, though on the whole this neither reflects nor leads to permanent differences in status between groups. However, Brahmanical circles in south India may have nothing to do with cross-cousin marriage and carry on their affairs in a north Indian fashion (Gough 1956).

IV

Is there actually more than one model of kinship in India or several? To some extent the latter, especially given the north–south divide. However, within the typical north Indian community, it may be more plausible to talk about an accepted common ideology which low-status groups find it impossible to follow for the reasons already indicated. Certainly lower castes often seek to rise in status by abandoning demeaning practices and adopting those of the higher castes. I mentioned earlier the abandonment of alcohol, meat-eating and even occupation, to which one can also add public dancing. In the domain of kinship there may be an agreement to abandon brideprice in favour of dowry, to widen the structural distance at which marriage takes place (often involving the abandonment of cross-cousin marriage), and to cease exchanging women directly. Such decisions are often made in public forums such as caste assemblies and are regarded as binding on all members—otherwise, there is even less chance of the strategy working. Although they amount to changing kinship practice and therefore the structural aspects of kinship, the principle of kinship in terms of common substance through a combination of descent and endogamy remains. However, the actual boundaries may be drawn more tightly, not least because the sub-caste may split on the

issue—and even if it does not, higher sub-castes may well not accept the validity of the reforms or see in them a threat to their own status. What may then well happen is that higher sub-castes change their practices to maintain their distance, meaning that the sub-caste that initiated the changes may find itself chasing a moving target.

The picture changes somewhat when we shift our attention to the tribes. Although typically quite Hinduized in religion and ritual, and generally occupying a niche in local hierarchies which otherwise consist of different castes, many of them, like the Santal, see their identity in terms of tribe, not caste. The Santal, of Bihar and Orissa, are an interesting case in respect of theories of ethnicity (Parkin: in preparation). We have become used to the idea, since Leach and Barth at least, that ethnic and cultural boundaries are not homologous: very broadly, different self-ascribed ethnic groups share cultures, and the same ethnic group may be culturally differentiated internally. At certain periods in recent history, however, the Santal have adopted many upper-caste/Hindu traits and applied them to their own practice in such a way as to claim them as the basis of an anti-caste and anti-Hindu but *adivasi* identity. Thus, in the inter-war period they adopted the sacred thread, used low-caste ritual specialists such as priests and barbers, recognized at least ritually notions of purity and pollution, cremated not buried their dead on the banks of the river Damodar (which is assimilated to the sacred river Ganges), married with vermilion marks and other Hindu features, and avoided the prescriptive marriage systems that some other tribes in the area continue to indulge in. Like castes they still use commensality rules to mark a distance, but reversed the polarity; whereas normally any caste feels able to take even the most vulnerable cooked food from Brahmans, a Santal will refuse to accept anything from them, since they are the chief representatives of casteism and Hinduism. The Santal descent system consists of formally twelve but practically never more than eleven clans, which are not only totemic like those of other tribes but were formerly each also associated with a particular traditional occupation or function, in clear imitation of the caste system.

Although the situation has changed markedly since Indian independence in 1947, in the direction of developing a separate tribal identity based on supposedly 'aboriginal' customs and features, between the wars the Santal were rather imitating those who would unhesitatingly regard themselves as their betters, in the manner of many low castes and other tribes. However, they eventually realized that the normal route to a higher status would do them no good, as the most they could expect would be to be able to enter the caste system at a low position, where they would remain. Staying as tribals, they can claim an identity which is wholly separate from caste, while selectively using some of the practices of the caste system as well as 'aboriginal' markers to do so. In effect, they are saying, 'Our practice is as good as that of any Brahman; we don't need to be a part of the system to show this.' Like a caste too, they postulate their unity in terms of common substance; divided at a lower level into separate but intermarrying clans

and lineages, at the ultimate level all Santal are seen as being agnatically related through their common origins.

This not only recalls many individual castes and sub-castes, it also resembles the way many tribal ethnic groups see themselves in other parts of the world. What is lacking as regards the first comparison is any ritual mechanism integrating the Santal with other groups of like kind sociologically but of different substance and status ethnographically—in short, they do not see themselves as part of a caste system. What is lacking as regards the second comparison is the attribution of ritual status to them in terms specifically of pure and impure: tribal groups outside India may regard each other as less perfectly human than themselves, but integrated rank systems are rare. A high-caste Hindu will automatically give tribals a low status as meat-eating, alcohol-consuming, cousin-marrying hedonists, though since they mostly refrain from polluting occupations they are generally considered a cut above the Untouchables. This is not simply prejudice on the part of higher castes: despite their reformism, for example, the Santal have little in the way of *kanya dan* ideology, and brideprice is still much commoner than dowry. This may indicate that while certain practices are to be imitated, others are to be avoided as casteism. At all events, the upper-caste attitude exemplifies the principle that the status one claims for oneself is not necessarily that accepted by others. In India, disputes over ranking between castes of roughly equal status are legendary at all status levels, among Untouchables and Brahmans as well as among middle-ranking groups. Santal leaders, being astute enough to recognize this, have done what they can to opt out of the status system entirely, by a combination of declaring their separation in terms of descent and of substance generally, reforming customs along caste lines up to a point, and introducing new, 'aboriginal' ones in an attempt to go beyond that point in a separatist direction.

V

It is time to draw things to a conclusion. In this article I have tried to take known and unexceptional facts about Indian kinship and to see them from the angle of caste and tribal identities specifically. I have certainly painted with a broad brush and on a very broad canvas; practice and ideology in India are both more nuanced and complex than I have been able to show here. But in essence my thesis is as follows. Different status groups not only see themselves as different in terms of substance, through descent, they also use marriage practices as one of a number of means not simply of distinguishing groups, but of according them a rank: your practice is less pure than mine, therefore I will regard you as beneath me and not ally my family affinally with yours. In addition, this very denial of affinity reinforces the sense of separation through descent. Although individual castes, sub-castes, etc. may be integrated internally through either high-status *kanya dan*

or low-status marriage exchanges, as the case may be, one has to look elsewhere for what integrates the caste system as a whole. As in many other parts of the world, kinship acts to create and maintain many of the distinctions from which social groups derive their identity.

References

DAVID, KENNETH (ed.) 1977. *The New Wind: Changing Identities in South Asia,* The Hague: Mouton.

DUMONT, LOUIS 1980. *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications* (2nd revised English edition), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

FRUZZETTI, LINA, AKOS OSTOR, and STEVE BARNETT 1992. 'The Cultural Construction of the Person in Bengal and Tamilnadu', in Akos Ostor, Lina Fruzzetti, and Steve Barnett (eds.), *Concepts of Person: Kinship, Caste, and Marriage in India*, New Delhi etc.: Oxford University Press.

FULLER, CHRISTOPHER 1976. *The Nayars Today,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FÜRER-HAIMENDORF, CHRISTOPH VON 1967. *Morals and Merit: A Study of Values and Social Controls in South Asian Societies*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

GELLNER, DAVID N., JOANNA PFAFF-CZARNECKA, and JOHN WHELPTON (eds.), 1997. *Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal,* Amsterdam: Harwood.

GOUGH, E. KATHLEEN 1956. 'Brahman Kinship in a Tamil Village', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. LVIII, no. 6, pp. 826–53.

MAJUMDAR, D. N. 1950. *The Affairs of a Tribe,* Lucknow: Universal Publishers.

MCDOUGAL, CHARLES 1964. 'Juang Categories and Joking Relations', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. XX, no. 4, pp. 319–45.

PARKIN, ROBERT 1992. *The Munda of Central India: An Account of their Social Organization,* Delhi: Oxford University Press.

. . . 1997. 'Tree Marriage in India', in Klaus Seeland (ed.), *Nature is Culture*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

. . . in preparation. 'Proving Indigenity, Exploiting Modernity: Modalities of Identity Construction in Middle India', ms.

PARRY, JONATHAN 1979. *Caste and Kinship in Kangra*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

QUIGLEY, DECLAN 1993. *The Interpretation of Caste*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

JASO

OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES

No. 1 GENRES, FORMS, MEANINGS: Essays in African Oral Literature. (1982). (1 870047 00 1). *Out of print.*

No. 2 DEATH IN PORTUGAL: Studies in Portuguese Anthropology and Modern History. (1983). (1 870047 05 2). *Out of print.*

No. 3 THE GENERAL'S GIFT: A Celebration of the Pitt Rivers Museum Centenary, 1884-1984. (1984). (1 870047 10 9). *Out of print.*

No. 4 CONTEXTS AND LEVELS: Anthropological Essays on Hierarchy. Edited by R.H. Barnes, Daniel de Coppet and R.J. Parkin. (1985). vii + 209pp. Price £12.95 or $30.00. (1 870047 15 X).

No. 5 INTERPRETING JAPANESE SOCIETY: Anthropological Approaches. (1986). (1 870047 20 6). *Out of print.*

No. 6 MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A Survey of Their Post-War Development and Current Resources. Compiled by Peter Carey. (1986). vii + 115pp. Price £8.50 or $17.00. (1 870047 25 7).

No. 7 VERNACULAR CHRISTIANITY: Essays in the Social Anthropology of Religion Presented to Godfrey Lienhardt. Edited by Wendy James and Douglas H. Johnson. (1988). xiv + 196pp. Price £12.50 or $25.00. (1 870047 30 3).

No. 8 AN OLD STATE IN NEW SETTINGS: Studies in the Social Anthropology of China in Memory of Maurice Freedman. Edited by Hugh D.R. Baker and Stephan Feuchtwang. (1991). xiii + 286pp. Price £14.95 or $30.00 (paperback), (1 870047 35 4), £25.95 or $50.00 (hardback), (1 870047 40 0).

No. 9 GOVERNING THE NUER: Documents in Nuer History and Ethnography 1922-1931, by Percy Coriat. Edited by Douglas H. Johnson. (1993). lvi + 199pp. Price £16.95 or $34.00. (1 870047 45 1).

AVAILABLE FROM THE EDITORS, JASO, 51 BANBURY ROAD,
OXFORD OX2 6PE, ENGLAND. Tel. 01865-274682
ALL PRICES INCLUDE POSTAGE. PREPAYMENT REQUESTED.