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Against intellectual autonomy: social animals need social virtues

Abstract:

We are constantly called upon to evaluate the evidential weight of testimony, and to balance its deliverances against our own independent thinking. ‘Intellectual autonomy’ is the virtue that is supposed to be displayed by those who engage in cognition in this domain well. I argue that this is at best a misleading label for the virtue, because virtuous cognition in this domain consists in thinking with others, and intelligently responding to testimony. I argue that the existing label supports ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1080/02691728.2023.2177521

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-5679-1986
Publisher:
Routledge
Journal:
Social Epistemology More from this journal
Publication date:
2023-02-22
Acceptance date:
2023-02-02
DOI:
EISSN:
1464-5297
ISSN:
0269-1728
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1325433
Local pid:
pubs:1325433
Deposit date:
2023-01-27

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