The Moral Formation of the Intellectual Appetite in Hugh of St. Victor, Philip Melanchthon, and John Henry Newman



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Abstract

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Humans desire a variety of things: food, safety, pleasure, friendship, play, beauty, and so forth. Included among these is knowledge. This thesis is partially about trying to understand this desire to know, often referred to as the "intellectual appetite," and the ends toward which it should be directed. Like other appetites, the intellectual appetite can be morally ordered or disordered. When morally ordered, it is referred to as the virtue of *studiositas*, and when morally disordered, the vice of *curiositas*. If human persons possess an intellectual appetite, if what they know affects how they live, and if they undergo some kind of formal education, then it is reasonable for individual learners to critically consider who or what is forming their intellectual appetites and what they expect formal academic institutions to help them accomplish.

Though the purpose of education is a perennial concern, the debate has intensified and widened in recent decades. Many of the popular visions of education that shape student expectations, animate academic institutions, inform local communities, and determine public policy restrict the scope of the intellectual appetite's tutelage. These visions often regard people as either detached intellects, political citizens, marketplace labourers, technological innovators, or moral and spiritual agents, and orient the process of education accordingly. The tradition of theological reflection on education, known as the "didascalic tradition," provides resources for thinking that people are each of these and more.

This work examines how three influential Christian educators from different centuries and settings defend education's intellectual, practical, and moral ends. Hugh of St. Victor, a leading teacher at the twelfth century Abbey of St. Victor, authored an influential work that integrated the liberal and servile arts with the Christian narrative of creation and restoration. Philip Melanchthon, known as the *Praeceptor Germaniae*, was a Protestant Humanist professor of Greek at the sixteenth century University of Wittenberg and curriculum designer for over eighty schools and universities across Europe. John Henry Newman was a fellow at nineteenth century Oriel College, Oxford, founding rector of the Catholic University of Dublin and the Oratory School in Birmingham, and author of three volumes and numerous essays on university education.

This thesis offers an integrated account of each educator's ideas and practices, synthesizes their major and minor works, compares and contrasts them with each other, and places them in dialogue with contemporary educational philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Stanley Fish. Both Nussbaum and Fish offer profound insights into education. However, Nussbaum's decision to harness the intellectual appetite for the political liberalism of John Rawls, and Stanley Fish's decision to harness it for the modern research university means that both fail to offer comprehensive accounts of education. In contrast, Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman demonstrate that education can form the intellectual appetite to serve multi-dimensional intellectual, practical, and moral goods that foster human flourishing and the common good.

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For Brett Martin and Trent Leach,
who taught me that a school is a faculty of friends,

and

for my children, Ilia, Brecon, and Maeve,
who teach me the joy of daily wonder.

i thank You God for most this amazing
day: for the leaping greenly spirits of trees
and a blue true dream of sky; and for everything
which is natural which is infinite which is yes
e. e. cummings

My work is loving the world.
Here the sunflowers, there the hummingbird —
equal seekers of sweetness.
Mary Oliver, “Messenger”

Introduction

The retina of the human eye has 120 million rods and six million cones and can see approximately seven million different colours. The left pedal on a bicycle is always reverse-threaded. Joplin, Missouri is named for Reverend Harris Joplin and after a period of violent lawlessness merged with the cross-valley town of Murphysburg in 1873. Karl Barth thought a Christocentric theological anthropology of co-humanity an essential political antidote to the inhumanity of World War II. Patience is a virtue I find difficult, but hospitality one I find easy; pastry I like, chocolate I do not. These are all things I know. Some of what I know is intellectually satisfying, some practically useful, some morally beneficial, some pleasantly amusing. The skills I possess may help me secure gainful employment, navigate personal relationships, or save my life. Much of what I know reminds me how little I know. Remarkably, every other human person seems to be similar. We spend most of our lives learning for a variety of ends, some intrinsic, some instrumental. We want to know and to think, make, and act well.

We desire a variety of things: food, safety, pleasure, friendship, rest, play, beauty, and so forth. Included among these is knowledge. This thesis is partially about trying to understand this desire to know, often referred to as the "intellectual appetite," and the ends toward which it should be directed. How do we describe and provide normative guidance to the six-year-old primary student at her desk, the nineteen-year-old carpenter's apprentice at his worktable, the sixty-year-old physicist at her telescope, and the eighty-year-old retired farmer reading his first book of philosophy? What are they doing, why, and to what ends?

That we desire to know should be obvious. That we *should* desire to know and should desire to know some things and not others is not so obvious. Nor is it obvious how this desire should be oriented when its satisfaction becomes costly, as it is in most kinds of formal education. Nor is it obvious what ends any formal academic institution can reasonably accomplish. If human persons possess an intellectual appetite, if what they know affects how they live and act, and if they undergo some kind of formal education, then it is reasonable for individual learners to critically consider how their intellectual appetites are being formed, who or what is forming them, and what they expect formal academic institutions to help them accomplish.

Paraphrasing Plato and Aristotle, David Hicks asks the basic question this work partially answers, "Since learning is an activity and all activities have ends—one studies engineering to build bridges, one builds bridges to speed transit, one speeds transit to accomplish certain commercial or military goals, and so on—learning must also have an end. What is that end?"[1] The identification of multiple possible ends allows us to evaluate their inherent or practical goodness, and if they are found to be good, prepares practical reason to set a course to reach them. When the intellectual appetite is ordered to a broad spectrum of goods, private and common, then we can say it has been morally formed and appropriately employed. Otherwise, it is misdirected or hampered from achieving the ample good it could. Educators in the Christian tradition often describe the intellectual appetite's pursuit of improper or lesser goods through improper means

[1] David V. Hicks, *Norms & Nobility* (Oxford: University Press of America, 1999), 20.

as the vice of *curiositas* and the pursuit of proper goods through proper means as the virtue of *studiositas*. This distinction alerts us to the fact that the pursuit of knowledge is not an unmitigated good but requires tutoring.

The matter of education's end is no mean question, given the enormous amount of time, energy, and material resources devoted to learning and education by students, teachers, and parents, as well as by governments, schools, churches, universities, and other institutions. Hundreds of books are published each year on the practice, the promise, and the demise of contemporary education. Nearly everyone in at least the Western world participates in formal education. For most people, it will be one of the most significant influences in their lives. This is because education is an inherently normative process that determines not only what a person knows, but how he or she relates to that knowledge and to the objects of that knowledge. Education shapes how we think, act, feel, and understand the narratives of our lives and the goods we pursue in and through them. This is true of education generally, and of individual academic institutions, since they transmit and impose disciplinary and cultural norms upon their students, both explicitly and implicitly.

Understanding education's ends should concern anyone who submits him or herself, willingly or not, to being educated. These questions also matter for educators who care about their students' personal, moral, and intellectual formation, and who attend to the pedagogical, curricular, and institutional decisions that affect that formation for good or for ill.

These questions also matter to societies that support education out of a concern for the common good. Certainly, governments that supplement education from the public purse are concerned with the ends of education, even if sometimes they seem myopically obsessed with a "human capital theory" that posits education as a means for producing technically proficient skilled labourers to enhance the national economy and international competitiveness. Even so, many states also value the formation of thoughtful, engaged, articulate citizens who can reflect upon and contribute to their local and national communities in a multitude of ways. This is civic virtue for the common good.

Finally, the moral formation of the intellectual appetite and the ends of education should concern people within religious or philosophic traditions, like Christianity, who recognize that education is morally normative, desire their neighbour's good, and think their own good bound up in some way with alignment to a transcendent moral order. Most people who recognize that life is short and education long want to know that the time, energy, and effort required by education serve a more serious and ennobling goal than their own short-lived material comfort or social prestige.

In order to think through these issues, I turn to Hugh of St. Victor, Philip Melanchthon, and John Henry Newman, three towering Christian theologians and educators in the "didascalic" tradition of the church. "Didascalic" comes from the Greek διδάσκειν / *didaskein*, "to teach," and so I will refer to these figures as "Christian educators" or "didascalic theologians."

Newman once wrote, "from first to last, education," broadly conceived, "has been my line."[2] That summary applies to each of these Christian educators. Hugh of St. Victor was a leading teacher at the Abbey of St. Victor in twelfth-century Paris and authored *de Sacramentis*, arguably the first medieval work of systematic theology; *de Institutione Novitiorum*, a work on the practical formation of virtue; and the *Didascalicon*, which represents a comprehensive integration of the liberal and servile arts with the Christian narrative of creation and restoration. Philip Melanchthon was a celebrated Humanist scholar and the first Professor of Greek at the sixteenth century University of Wittenberg. He wrote the first work of Protestant systematic theology, *Loci Communes*; the Augsburg Confession and Apology; and multiple works on moral philosophy, classical literature, philology, and pedagogy. His reform of over eighty schools and universities across Europe earned him the title *Praeceptor Germaniae* ("Teacher of Germany") and influenced educators and institutions, both Catholic and Protestant, throughout Europe. Finally, John Henry Newman was a nineteenth century fellow at Oriel College, Oxford, vicar of the University Church of St. Mary, leader of the Oxford Movement, founder of the Birmingham Oratory, the Catholic University of Dublin, and the Oratory School in Birmingham. He wrote multiple books on theology and church history, a sophisticated book on epistemology (the *Grammar of Assent*), and three volumes on university education, published in *The Idea of a University* and *Rise and Progress of Universities*. All three educators made significant contributions to the Christian didascalic tradition.

[2] Henry Tristram, ed., *John Henry Newman: Autobiographical Writings* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1957), 259.

Besides these obvious qualifications, I also chose these three Christian educators because 1) they were educators and theologians in equal measure; 2) they represent three distinct historical time periods; 3) they were massively influential both in their own lifetimes and beyond; 4) they promoted liberal education for the laity, rather than simply theological education for the clergy; 5) at least Melanchthon and Newman, and arguably Hugh, had experience educating children, young adults, and adults; 6) they represent three religious settings: medieval Catholicism, Reformation Protestantism, and modern Catholicism; 7) they are largely within the 'Humanist' rather than the 'Scholastic' tradition; 8) they represent three different phases of the university: Hugh just before its formation, Melanchthon in the midst of its Renaissance flourishing, and Newman just after the formation of the research university.

We could also describe these three as "Christian Humanists." Regarding "humanist," I am inclined to adopt Jacques Maritain's definition of "humanism" as an approach to life and learning that

> tends essentially to render man more truly human, and to manifest his original greatness by having him participate in all that which can enrich him in nature and in history. … [Humanism] at once demands that man develop the virtualities within him, his creative forces and the life of reason, and to work to make the forces of the physical world instruments of his freedom.[3]

Though "Christian Humanist" is a contested term among some historians, I use it loosely to refer to Christian scholars and educators of any era who practice, promote, and reflect theologically on the study of "human" versus strictly "divine" subjects for the sake of

[3] Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems of a New Christendom*, tr. Joseph W. Evans (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 1.

individual and corporate, natural and temporal human flourishing. "Christian Humanists" typically rely upon strong doctrines of creation and human dignity that enable them to glean from and work with non-Christian scholars, practitioners, and citizens. For example, John P. Bequette defines "Christian Humanism" as "a type of humanism in which all things are viewed in the light of God's revelation in Jesus Christ." It includes seeing humans as "created in the image of God, wounded by sin, yet redeemed in Jesus Christ," as well as affirming that the "betterment of humankind involves the healing of the human condition … the healing of the created order … and finally a restructuring of human institutions in accordance with this healed created order." For Bequette, Christian Humanism reminds Christians of their "vocation here and now as stewards of the created order."[4]

Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman easily fall within these definitions, as well as within Paul Oskar Kristeller's more narrow definition of Christian Humanists as those "who applied their classical scholarship to biblical and patristic studies and who adopted and defended in their writings some tenets of Christian religion or theology."[5] On my definition, a "Christian Humanist" need not only apply classical scholarship to theological studies, as Kristeller suggests, but may also be motivated by theology to

[4] John P. Bequette, *Christian Humanism: Creation, Redemption, and Reintegration* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 2007), xi.

[5] Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Humanism," in Quinten Skinner and Eckhard Kessler, eds., *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 133.

pursue scholarship, the *studia humanitatis*, and the liberal arts and sciences more generally as manifestations of human nature.[6]

The Christian didascalic tradition did not begin or end with these three, of course. They stand in a long line of Christian educators who reflect theologically and pedagogically on the philosophy and practice of education inherited from Greeks and Romans. The Greek tradition includes Plato and his Academy, Isocrates and his schools in Chius and Athens, Aristotle and his Lyceum, and the practice of Greek *paideia* that nurtured the intellectual, moral, and practical education of citizens. The Roman tradition includes influential educators like Marcus Varro, Quintillian, Cicero, Seneca, and Martianus Capella, whose eccentric and influential *On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury* solidified the seven liberal arts of the trivium and quadrivium as the basis of liberal education. The Christian educators who came after them were largely concerned

[6] For Medieval Humanism, see R. N. Swanson, *The Twelfth-century Renaissance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); R. W. Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000); R. W. Southern, *Medieval Humanism* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 29–60; Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the 12th Century*. (New York: World Publishing, 1957). For Renaissance Humanism, see Jonathan Arnold, *The Great Humanists: An Introduction.* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 1–20; John P. Bequette, ed., *A Companion to Medieval Christian Humanism* (Boston: Brill, 2016); Richard Rex, "Humanism," in Andrew Pettegree, ed., *The Reformation World* (London: Routledge, 2000), 51–70; John C. Olin, *Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings of Erasmus* (Fordham University Press, 1988); Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and the Arts: Collected Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance thought: the classic, scholastic, and humanistic strains* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961); Amos Edelheit, *Ficino, Pico and Savonarola: The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/2-1498* (Boston: Brill, 2008); Arie Johan Vanderjagt; Alasdair A. MacDonald; Zweder R. W. M. von Martels ; Jan R. Veenstra, eds., *Christian Humanism : Essays in Honour of Arjo Vanderjagt* (Boston: Brill, 2009); Jill Kraye, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

with how the revelation of Jesus Christ affected the materials, methods, and ends of education inherited from the classical world.

Besides Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman, the Christian didascalic tradition could be traced through, but is by no means limited to, the educators in the list below, many of whom incorporate each other's work into their own theory and practice. I include this list simply to suggest the historical breadth of the tradition, to indicate where my three primary interlocutors fall within it, and to demonstrate that it includes both major and minor figures from the history of the church.[7] This long tradition of theological reflection on the ends and practices of education, ripe for rediscovery and reappropriation, includes:

- Clement of Alexandria ("Christ the Educator")
- Origen, Catechetical School of Alexandria (*On First Principles*)
- St. Basil ("To Young Men, on How They Might Derive Profit from Pagan Literature")
- St. Augustine (*On Music*; *On Order*; *On Teaching Christianity*)
- Cassiodorus, founder of the Monastery and library at Vivarium (*Institutions of Divine and Secular Learning*)
- Rhabanus Maurus, also known as *Praeceptor Germaniae,* head of the abbey school in Fulda, Germany ("Education of the Clergy")
- Isidore of Seville, Bishop and head of the cathedral school of Seville (*Etymologies*)
- Alcuin of York, architect of the Carolingian Renaissance ("Problems to Sharpen Youths," "Disputation on Rhetoric and the Virtues of Wisdom," *Grammatica*)
- John Scotus Eriugena, successor to Alcuin at Charlemagne's Palace School (*The Division of Nature*)

- Hugh of St. Victor

- John of Salisbury, Bishop of Chartres, student of Abelard and William of Conches, secretary to Thomas Becket (*Metalogicon*)

[7] For a selection of writings from this tradition, see Richard M. Gamble, *The Great Tradition: Classic Readings on What It Means to Be an Educated Human Being* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007).

- Thomas Aquinas, University of Paris ("On the Teacher")
- Bonaventure ("The Journey of the Mind to God")
- Rudolph Agricola (*On Dialectical Invention*; *De formando studio*)
- Desiderius Erasmus, University of Cambridge and Leuven ("On Education for Children," "The Education of a Christian Prince")
- Martin Luther, University of Wittenberg ("Letter to the German Nobility," "Sermon on the Duty of Keeping Children at School")

- Philip Melanchthon

- Johannes Sturm, Gymnasium of Strasbourg, which became the University of Strasbourg ("The Correct Opening of Elementary Schools of Letters"; "On the Lost Art of Speaking," "Letters with Roger Ascham")
- Roger Ascham, Greek Tutor and Latin Secretary to Elizabeth I (*The Schoolmaster*)
- John Calvin, teacher at Strasbourg's Gymnasium and founder of the College and Academy of Geneva, which became the University of Geneva ("By-laws of the Academy of Geneva," "Natural Endowments of Art and Science," in *Institutes of the Christian Religion* II.ii.12–17)
- John Amos Comenius, head of school in Přerov, Bohemia, and Leszno, Poland; architect of Swedish educational reforms (*The Great Didactic*; *Writing on All Learning*)
- John Colet, founder of St. Paul's School, London ("Statutes of St. Paul's School")
- John Milton ("Of Education," *Art of Logic*)
- Giambattista Vico, University of Naples ("On Humanistic Education: Six Inaugural Orations," "On the Study Methods of Our Time")
- Cotton Mather, Harvard College (*The Christian Philosopher; Magnalia Christi Americana*)
- John Wesley, founder of Methodism and Kingswood School (*A Survey of the Wisdom of God in Creation, or, A Compendium of Natural Philosophy*; "A Short Account of the School, in Kingswood, Near Bristol"; *The Desideratum; or, Electricity Made Plain and Useful*)
- Friedrich Schleiermacher, University of Berlin ("Occasional Thoughts on German Universities in the German Sense")

- John Henry Newman

- Jacques Maritain, Catholic Institute of Paris; Princeton University (*Integral Humanism*; *Education at the Crossroads*; *The Education of Man*)
- Pope Paul VI, Second Vatican Council (*Gaudium et Spes*)
- Antonin Sertillanges, Catholic Institute of Paris (*The Intellectual Life*)

- Josef Pieper, University of Münster (*Leisure: The Basis of Culture*; *In Defense of Philosophy)*
- Contemporary Christian educators include Nicholas Wolterstorff (*Educating for Life*; *Educating for Shalom*), Paul Griffiths (*Intellectual Appetite*), James Schall (*The Life of the Mind*) and Stratford Caldecott (*Beauty for Truth's Sake; Beauty in the Word*)

Of course, this bare list does not fully contextualize the thought of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman, but it does demonstrate that they are not alone in thinking about the theology, ends, and practices of education.

Because the Christian didascalic tradition is not well known, even if some of its key figures are, this thesis is partly a work of recovery and *ressourcement* within the history of ideas. Besides uniquely drawing its three primary figures into a dialogue, it also integrates major and minor works from each one that are often treated in isolation, if at all, and draws on untranslated works from Hugh and Melanchthon.

This thesis is also partly a work of "public theology" that attempts to engage in a dialogue about widely shared public goods.[8] Because these three Christian educators are concerned with much more than simply theological education, but with the ways education generally contributes to human flourishing, aspects of their visions of education should appeal to non-Christian and non-religious readers, as well. It may especially resonate with anyone who finds the dominant views on education unsatisfying or too restrictive to accommodate their—or their students'—experiences and aspirations. It attempts to be a coherent and competent conversation partner capable of drawing its

[8] See Hak Joon Lee, "Public Theology," in Craig Hovey and Elizabeth Phillips, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Political Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 44–65.

reasons and conclusions to the surface for the sake of promoting dialogical and associational pluralism.

The work is structured around four pairs of chapters. To demonstrate the didascalic theologians' relevance to current discourses, I begin with two chapters critically engaging the influential educational theories of Martha Nussbaum and Stanley Fish. They are widely-read and influential educators who offer starkly contrasting visions of education. In *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* and *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*, Nussbaum offers a vision of education largely indexed to the politically liberal democratic state envisioned by John Rawls.[9] Chapter one shows how her work gives the impression that the primary end of education is the production of citizens prepared to contribute to the flourishing of politically liberal democracies. Nussbaum thinks the moral formation of democratic citizens is an urgent need given the increasing complexity of a pluralist world and the powerful narrative that education should have exclusively commercial ends. Her theory of education is driven by a vision of the moral formation of compassionate political selves who can "think for themselves, criticize tradition, and understand the significance of another person's sufferings and achievements."[10]

Chapter two analyzes how Stanley Fish implicitly challenges Nussbaum's vision for education on almost every point. In *Professional Correctness* and *Save the World on*

[9] *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

[10] *Not for Profit*, 2.

Your Own Time, he contends that the modern university can do little more than produce students who know how to function within discrete academic disciplines.[11] According to Fish, university education should pursue exclusively academic rather than practical or moral ends. While Fish agrees with Nussbaum that "incursions of capitalism" damage the university, he equally warns against "incursions of virtue" that distract it.[12] His theory of education is thus driven by a vision of the intellectual formation of the disciplinary self for the research university. Whereas Nussbaum argues that the university's aim should be extrinsic—politically liberal students concerned for the flourishing of the globalized and pluralist world—Fish argues that the university's aim can realistically only be intrinsic—the stability of the university and the individual delight its professors and students receive from studying their respective disciplines.

After analysing the educational works of Nussbaum and Fish in chapters one and two, we turn to three theological accounts that index education broadly to the doctrines and narratives of Christianity, and more narrowly to the reciprocal flourishing of the individual learner and her community. The final three pairs of chapters, therefore, investigate, compare, and evaluate how each didascalic theologian articulates the intellectual (chapters three and four), practical (five and six), and moral (seven and eight) ends of education. Chapters three and four consider knowledge as a constitutive good of human flourishing that engenders concomitant delight. Chapter five considers several practical ends of education, including earning a wage, performing a skill, and

[11] *Professional Correctness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); *Save the World on Your Own Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[12] Stanley Fish, "Aim Low," in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (16 May, 2003).

serving one's neighbours, while chapter six examines the skill of rhetoric as a paradigm case of practical learning employed to serve the common good. Chapter seven explores the possibility of education's moral ends, and chapter eight analyzes a set of integrated virtues and methods for forming virtue present in each didascalic theologian's writing and practice.

The overall goal is to articulate a (even if not *the*) Christian account of the intellectual appetite and the ends of education that can help students and educators, religious or not, consider the multiple ends that should be pursued through education for the flourishing of the individual and his society. Too often the dominant visions of education and human well-being are unnecessarily restrictive. They regard people either as detached intellects, political citizens, marketplace labourers, technological innovators, or moral and spiritual agents. The Christian didascalic tradition gives us resources for thinking that we are all of these and more, and that to fulfill each of these roles requires the moral formation of our intellectual appetites through the great but ordinary means of education.

Chapter One

Education and Democratic Political Liberalism: Martha Nussbaum's Compassionate World Citizen

"Nothing could be more crucial to democracy than the education of its citizens."[13]
Marth Nussbaum

Introduction

The classicist and legal theorist Martha Nussbaum and the philosopher and literary theorist Stanley Fish both offer influential normative descriptions of the ends of learning and the intellectual appetite. Though they primarily consider university education, Nussbaum occasionally extends her discussion to include lower levels of education, and it is not clear that Fish would substantially modify his description were he to do the same. Their accounts both locate the ends of education in, and thus order and orient the intellectual appetite toward, two distinct spheres of reference. Nussbaum considers herself preparing the citizen for the *polis*, while Fish considers himself preparing the student for the academy. Neither of them thinks education should prepare the learner to flourish *qua* human in any comprehensive way, but only within the circumscribed roles given them by one of these two morally normative communities. Both visions contain distinct strengths and useful insights, including their common critique of utilitarian attempts to peg the value of education to its ability to prepare students for gainful employment or contribute to national economic growth. Neither model, however, sufficiently accounts for the wide array of moral ends that can be served by

[13] Martha Nussbaum, "Education and Democratic Citizenship: Capabilities and Quality Education," *Journal of Human Development* Vol. 7, No. 3 (2006), 387.

learning and education, nor does either model preclude the need for a capacious theological account of the intellectual appetite and its relation to an individual's moral formation and flourishing within a metanarrative larger than either the *polis* or the university provide. The following two chapters will critically investigate the type of person both Nussbaum and Fish hope learning and education will produce, including the intellectual and moral formation needed to accomplish that end.

Martha Nussbaum's Compassionate World Citizen

Martha Nussbaum has written numerous articles, lectures, and books on education that focus on the moral formation of citizens in contemporary liberal democracies. Her work draws extensively on Indian educator Rabindranath Tagore, as well as Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey, and Johann Pestalozzi, among others. Besides these educational theorists, Nussbaum's works on education, along with her work on moral emotions and law, draws substantially on the psychoanalytic work of pediatrician Donald Winnicott on child development, the psychologist Paul Rozin on disgust, and the sociologist Erving Goffman on shame and stigma. Finally, her educational writings often draw on John Rawls' normative description of political liberalism and intersect with her own extensive writings on the acquisition of basic capabilities by citizens in developing countries. In this sense, Martha Nussbaum is a Rawlsian political liberal who warns that certain popular ends and means of education, if pursued with myopic obsession, are inimical to the strength and health of liberal democracies.

Far from overlooking the moral formation of students in and through education, Nussbaum identifies the primary goal of education to be the moral, emotional, and intellectual formation necessary to develop liberal democratic citizens. She hopes

student–citizens will take their place as compassionate political agents in pluralist, multicultural nations and in a world that requires international cooperation to solve global problems. Though she acknowledges that education often serves multiple ends in a person's life, she explains that the state's primary, even if not exclusive, interest in education is "to devise ways of inculcating in the young the values that sustain the political conception."[14] These values primarily include readiness to subject social and religious traditions to rational scrutiny, active care for the plight of others, and willing participation in national and global communities that are both radically integrated and radically pluralist. Though this comparison may be surprising, given her emphasis on the liberal arts and humanities, the education she describes largely resembles that offered within professional, technical, or trade schools that focus their curriculum and culture on developing a particular type of person for a particular task. Whereas these schools are oriented by visions of the working lawyer, mechanic, medic, or artist, Nussbaum's is oriented by a vision of the working politically liberal democrat. In each of these schools, and in Nussbaum's vision, educators exclude ends, experiences, and attributes of the person that might otherwise be pursued in order to form the student into the ideal. The following sections explain the key features and potential problems of her argument that every school should be a type of Rawlsian trade school for politically liberal democrats.

Cultivating Humanity or Cultivating the Rawlsian Liberal Democrat?

Since at least 1994, Nussbaum has endorsed the political liberalism John Rawls designed

[14] Nussbaum, "Political Soul–Making and the Imminent Demise of Liberal Education," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 37 No. 2, (Summer 2006), 308.

for culturally and religiously pluralist democracies.[15] Within pluralist democratic cultures, free institutions naturally foster a "plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral."[16] Because individual citizens are committed to different reasonable but incommensurate "comprehensive conceptions," political association cannot wait for unanimous agreement on this point, but must generally respect and procedurally accommodate them all.[17] Likewise, neither should liberal democratic states or governments employ or endorse, either implicitly or explicitly, through policy or practice, specific "comprehensive theological, metaphysical, and epistemological doctrines," or specific "ethical doctrines about how lives go well in general."[18] Instead, political liberalism offers a form of tradition-independent "freestanding" political practice to which all reasonable citizens can subscribe, and does so by defending "the idea of human dignity and…social relations characterized by reciprocity and mutual respect, including respect for differing conceptions of the ultimate good in human life."[19] This places moral obligations and political restraints on

[15] Martha C. Nussbaum, "Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Antony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan," *Ethics* 111 (October 2000), 102; "Political Soul–Making," 312. See also *Women and Human Development* (2000) and *Frontiers of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

[16] John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), 766.

[17] Nussbaum, "Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities," 124, 128.

[18] "Political Soul–making," 204. See *Not for Profit*, 9. See also "*Hiding From Humanity*: Replies to Charlton, Haldane, Archard, and Brooks," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* Vol. 25, No. 4, (2008), 335; *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Appro ach* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), chapter 1; *Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), chapter 7.

[19] *Hiding*, 321.

both governments and citizens: governments because they must avoid endorsing any particular religious or secular comprehensive vision of a flourishing life, and citizens because they, when acting *qua* citizens, must think of themselves as legislators, and so likewise avoid basing fundamental political decisions and public arguments exclusively on comprehensive, and therefore exclusionary, doctrines.[20] The animating vision imagines a politically protected public space where citizens are free to pursue liberally reasonable forms of private flourishing and fulfillment. Most of Nussbaum's work since 1994 explores the implications of this Rawlsian model for law, social order, education, and the emotional formation of citizens.

The obligation to harness the intellectual appetite and index education to a Rawlsian version of liberal democracy decisively limits the state's interest in education. It constrains the state to focus on the production of future voting citizens, rather than the spiritual, moral, intellectual, social, cultural, and personal flourishing envisioned by most religious and secular "comprehensive doctrines." Nussbaum observes that because "nothing could be more crucial to democracy than the education of its citizens,"[21] then "a primary task of the public education system" is "to devise ways of inculcating in the young the values that sustain the political conception."[22] Given this, the quality of educational institutions and systems can be assessed on how well they prepare students to participate in democratic social and political organizations that express and foster

[20] See John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," 767, 769, 795.
[21] Nussbaum, "Education and Democratic Citizenship," 387.
[22] "Political Soul–Making," 308.

liberal values.[23] As cultural, political, and economic globalization has increased, schools have also been pressed to "produce adults who can function as citizens not just of some local region or group but also, and more importantly, as citizens of a complex interlocking world." Therefore, Nussbaum celebrates the "emphasis on 'diversity' in college and university curricula," which represents "a way of grappling with the altered requirements of citizenship" in a globalized world.[24]

According to Nussbaum, the virtues and skills that foster political liberalism are currently under threat from the widely lamented harnessing of education by individual, corporate, and national commercial interests, and by the promotion of financially profitable disciplines like applied science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). Though she acknowledges that education does prepare a person for employment and is especially important for the domestic, social, and economic empowerment of vulnerable women, her references to the economic promise of education usually come with dire and sometimes exaggerated warnings. She suggests, for example, that the trend to diminish the Humanities and elevate the practical ends of profit represents "a crisis of grave proportions and grave global significance" that acts "like a cancer" and represents "a world-wide crisis in education," primarily because such a benighted turn undermines the cultivation of crucial democratic skills.[25] The end result of this trend, she ominously announces, will be that "nations all over the world will soon be producing generations of useful machines, rather than complete citizens who can

[23] *Not for Profit*, 9.
[24] *Cultivating Humanity*, 6.
[25] *Not for Profit*, 1–2.

think for themselves, criticize tradition, and understand the significance of another person's sufferings and achievements."[26] The very "future of the world's democracies hangs in the balance,"[27] because the national "impoverishment of mind" will "nourish the politics of obtuseness and hatred all over the world."[28] The battle lines are drawn between respect and love, on one side, and greed and narcissism, on the other. "All modern societies are rapidly losing the battle, as they feed the forces that lead to violence and dehumanization and fail to feed the forces that lead to cultures of equality and respect."[29] In her 2010 commencement address at Colgate University, she pressed these themes, announcing that liberal arts education, which fosters politically liberal virtues and skills,

> is under assault all over the world in our time of economic anxiety, as all nations compete to keep or increase their share in the global market. All over the world, radical changes are occurring in what democratic societies teach both children and young adults, and these changes have not been well considered. Thirsty for economic gain, nations, and their systems of education, are heedlessly discarding forms of learning that are crucial to the health of democracy.[30]

To Nussbaum, the threat to democracy is substantial and imminent. Meeting this threat motivates her concerted attempts to champion liberal education.

Nussbaum's points, even if occasionally exaggerated for rhetorical effect, have significant merit. She rightly concludes that individuals, cultures, and nations are

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[26] Ibid, 2.
[27] Ibid, 2.
[28] "Education and Democratic Citizenship," 394.
[29] *Not for Profit*, 143.
[30] "Commencement Address by Martha Nussbaum," Colgate University, 16 May, 2010.

harmed if education is limited to training professionals and laborers for the job market.[31] This ominous prospect is central to the plots of many dystopian novels and movies for good reason. To the extent that this restriction of the scope and ends of education is happening in India, the United Kingdom, and the United States—Nussbaum's primary examples—it ought to be questioned and resisted.

However, while Nussbaum's own account of the interests that education serves is less constrained than most versions of the "education as job training" model, her own model is sometimes little more comprehensive, due in large part to the constraints imposed by Rawlsian political liberalism. Her account provokes two initial concerns. First, her narrative threatens to reduce individuals not to their economic role as producers and consumers, but to their political role as citizens. Second, her account threatens to obscure significant other good ends of education besides the production of compassionate and cooperative democratic citizens.

First, Nussbaum risks collapsing the individual person into his political function, leading himself to identify himself almost entirely with the state, or his education with the state's ends. This identification might be inimical to democracy, which, among other things, resists totalitarian tendencies to absorb all aspects of life by forcing the political order to recognize private institutions, personal ends, and comprehensive doctrines as more basic than, or at least as basic as, itself. Thus a person's primary identity or vocation is not received from the secular political order, nor from a historical or ideological

[31] See Josef Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009).

metanarrative, despite implicit or explicit claims to the contrary by many nations and states, historical and contemporary. To avoid this, the democratic state might acknowledge its limited role precisely by educating its citizens toward moral, intellectual, and cultural ends that do not immediately serve the state's interests. Though Nussbaum may agree with this proposal, her writings, along with those of Rawls, are open to this challenge because they threaten to reduce a person's moral formation to their formation as a citizen, or at least to trump all other moral ends with those demanded by the liberal political order.[32]

Second, despite the title of her 1997 book, *Cultivating Humanity*, Nussbaum's educational works do not envision the cultivation of a generously understood "humanity" that includes a panoply of moral, intellectual, emotional, relational, artistic, and cultural ends for each student. Her writing lacks a thick description of the many ways education can enable a cultivated "humanity" to flourish. These include, even if not limited to:

- nurturing a taste for the delight of wonder, creativity, and eloquent expression;
- replacing error with truth, and ignorance with understanding;
- experiencing and creating beauty;
- being initiated into a discipline or academic guild, or into a vocation that contributes to the common good;
- acquiring a mental library of common cultural references and allusions;
- developing a wide array of moral and intellectual virtues;
- equipping students to be competent and confident members of society;
- learning the value of living within a tradition of thought and practice;
- practicing leisurely and thoughtful meditation and reflection with friends;
- cultivating interests that enable one to resist being absorbed by consumerist culture, technology, or any other force that threatens to dominate a person's self, time, and energy;
- being introduced to great works of literature, art, and music

[32] See Nussbaum, "Political Soul–Making," 306.

- preparing people to serve cultural and social, rather than strictly political, goods.

This list of good ends that might be pursued by an educated and cultivated humanity could be extended, though the items on it receive little or no attention in Nussbaum's writings. Any she does refer to are largely considered valuable to the extent they contribute to the formation democratic citizens.

Though she draws inspiration from Seneca's letters "On Anger" and "On Liberal and Vocational Studies," Seneca does not appear to agree with Nussbaum that the purpose of the liberal arts is to produce an ideal citizen, either of Rome or of the world. True, like Nussbaum, he praises the liberal arts for their contribution to the formation of virtue and philosophy, and he criticizes the vulgar obsession of "money-making" and advocates a generous regard for one's neighbour. However, Seneca's free philosopher lives within one of the comprehensive doctrines that Nussbaum's political liberalism excludes from state–sponsored education. His philosopher is a person whose freedom consists in his ability to conform his mind to the truths of the universe, his soul to a specific knowledge of good and evil, and his spirit to a range of virtues like loyalty, bravery, temperance, kindliness, simplicity, and economy, the unity of which is "wisdom"—the telos of the liberal arts, as he understands them.[33] Yet, his arguments also leave much to be desired since he apparently sees little intrinsic value in the individual disciplines and does not explain how exactly the liberal arts prepare the soul for virtue. Furthermore, the humanity both he and Nussbaum refer to seems restricted

[33] Seneca, *Moral Letters to Lucilius*, Letter LXXXVIII. "On Liberal and Vocational Studies," 24–30.

when compared to the diverse but capacious visions of the liberal arts and humanities championed, for example, by medieval humanists like John of Salisbury and Hugh of St. Victor, Renaissance humanists like Desiderius Erasmus and Philip Melanchthon, or modern humanists like Josef Pieper and John Henry Newman. Granted, each of these educators found their place within the broad tradition of Christian humanism, and so were able to draw on theological resources like the goodness of the created order, the creation of human persons in the image of God, the contribution of moral virtue to human flourishing, and the morally ordering principle of love. However, even apart from their theological convictions, these educators offer deeper and richer conceptions of the ends of education and the value of learning than either Nussbaum or Seneca.

To be fair, Nussbaum does suggest that "education is not just for citizenship" because it also "prepares people for employment and, importantly, for meaningful lives."[34] However, she is constrained to leave the concept of "meaningful lives" undeveloped due to her commitments to political liberalism and to the state's limited interest in education. The closest she comes to identifying what constitutes a meaningful life emerges in her work on the "capabilities approach" to social justice and development, which argues that states should secure for their citizens "some very important prerequisites of general well-being."[35] Among the ten capabilities that "a decent political order" is responsible to protect and nurture, she includes the minimal capacity to "use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason … in a 'truly human' way, a

[34] *Not for Profit*, 9.
[35] "Political Soul-Making," 305.

way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training."[36] She asserts that "this formation is valuable in itself and a source of lifelong satisfaction."[37] However, this vague and generic statement fails to explain how the government should actually help its citizens cultivate their senses, think, or imagine "in a truly human way," or how or why these minimal capacities provide "lifelong satisfaction." Otherwise, she celebrates education's ability to foster critical consciousness, to increase economic or social power, particularly of women, and to produce engaged and mobilizing citizens. In no way, however, does it diminish the value of these goods to observe that they are not the only ends of education, as Nussbaum's rhetoric sometimes suggests.

Given Nussbaum's commitment to index education to Rawlsian liberal democracy in which citizens disagree about "the meaning and ultimate goals of human life" and how education should serve those various goals, it could hardly be otherwise. Within this Rawlsian framework, she is concerned with the cultivation of "abilities crucial to the health of any democracy internally, and to the creation of a decent world culture capable of constructively addressing the world's most pressing problems."[38] Though her work does not entirely lack references to a more diverse set of individual ends, the only integrating principle for education she considers is the liberal democratic political order and an individual's minimal capacity to think, reason, and sense if they so choose. In this way, her underlying commitment to Rawlsian political liberalism constrains her

[36] *Creating Capabilities*, 33.
[37] Ibid, 152.
[38] *Not for Profit*, 7.

imagination for how education could nurture the intellectual appetite.

The Vices of Primitive Shame and Projective Disgust

In order to become the mature, democratic citizens that Nussbaum thinks political liberalism requires, education must address both what hinders political liberalism and what helps it. Primary among the unhelpful dispositions that must be unlearned are two common but destructive childhood emotions, "primitive shame" and "projective disgust." Together, these generate malicious socio-cultural tendencies that undermine liberal democratic sentiments. Conversely, primary among the skills and dispositions that must be cultivated are the ability to critically examine opinions and tradition; the ability to understand and accept persons and cultures beyond the boundaries of one's own family, tribe, or nation-state; and the ability to compassionately imagine and sympathize with the suffering and vulnerability of others. Because these two sets of concerns recur throughout her work on education, I will address each of them, beginning with the two emotions before considering the three skills.

Nussbaum's work on shame and disgust is located in *Therapy of Desire*, *From Disgust to Humanity*, and *Hiding from Humanity*, the latter of which she describes as "an essay about the psychological foundations of liberalism, about the institutional and developmental conditions for the sustenance of a liberal respect for human equality."[39] She connects these "psychological foundations" with her work on education in chapter three of *Not for Profit*, "Educating Citizens: The Moral (and Anti-Moral) Emotions." There she asks, "What is it about human life that makes it so hard to sustain democratic

[39] *Hiding*, 16.

institutions based on equal respect and the equal protection of the laws, and so easy to lapse into hierarchies of various sorts—or, even worse, projects of violent group animality? … What makes them seek domination?"[40] Her answer comes in a sweeping, if hurried, universal narrative of infant and childhood development. "This story of narcissism, helplessness, shame, disgust, and compassion lies, I believe, at the heart of what education for democratic citizenship must address."[41] Nussbaum recognizes the peculiarity of building a model of education around this story, but considers it essential if education is to adequately form moral sentiments. Because other proposals for education "do not spell out a psychology of human development at all … it remains unclear what problems need to be solved, or what resources we have for solving them."[42]

Central to political liberalism is political equality, and political equality requires citizens who psychologically and emotionally understand that the essence of humanity is "a condition of shared incompleteness" rather than a condition of anxious defensiveness.[43] Therefore, Nussbaum's goal is to see a "society of citizens who admit that they are needy and vulnerable, and who discard the grandiose demands for omnipotence and completeness that have been at the heart of so much human misery, both public and private."[44] Nussbaum narrates the story of primitive shame and projective disgust, therefore, as part of her broader attempt to develop a "reasonable public psychology" that complements Rawls' notion of a "reasonable political

[40] *Not for Profit*, 28–29.
[41] Ibid, 40.
[42] Ibid, 30.
[43] *Hiding,* 16.
[44] Ibid, 17.

psychology." Her goal is to illuminate emotions and motivations that influence social and political behavior, both in order to demonstrate the psychological plausibility of the liberal political concept and to identify emotions and motivations that need to be cultivated through formal education. Many of the emotions that need to be overtaken before they do serious political and social damage were originally set loose by childhood experiences of shame and disgust.[45] These experiences establish deeply embedded emotional patterns that provoke infantile emotions in adult life, usually toward inappropriate objects.[46]

Primitive Shame

Based on the childhood psychoanalysis of pediatrician Donald Winnicott, Nussbaum begins her story with the weakness and frailty that all infants experience. Unable to satisfy their own desires, they are entirely dependent on their caregivers. Unfortunately, their "agonizing awareness" of this inability to overcome intrinsic limitations produces unbearable "primitive shame." This "leads to much instability and moral danger," including the infant's attempt to enslave her parents and later others, and her attempt to mask her shame by fabricating greater reasons to shame others.[47] This usually results in denigrating and shaming others for their behavior, race, gender, sexual desires, or physical characteristics. Nussbaum agrees with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's argument in *Emile* that unless this infant narcissism and desire to dominate are "channeled in a more

[45] *Upheavals*, 402; "*Hiding From Humanity*: Replies," 335.
[46] *Upheavals*, 234.
[47] Ibid, 31.

productive direction," they produce "a world of hierarchy…ethical deformation and cruel behavior."[48]

> In short, I am suggesting that the stigmatizing behavior in which all societies engage is typically an aggressive reaction to infantile narcissism and to the shame born of our own incompleteness. … Thus shame in the self often leads to the wish that others feel shame, and to practices of humiliating or active shaming that inflict stigma on vulnerable people and groups.[49]

If students are to grow into respectful democratic citizens who feel compassion and solidarity with "the other," rather than aggressiveness and hostility, primitive shame must be directly addressed and overcome through education. While students, children must learn that weakness and vulnerability are not shameful, but are a valuable constitutive part of the human condition. Nussbaum agrees with Rousseau that acknowledging our vulnerable interdependence "makes us sociable and turns us to humanity," which becomes the unlikely "basis of our hope of a decent community."[50] Paired with the need to accept mutual dependence, Nussbaum, along with Rousseau, also insists that students need to learn "practical competence" so they can "negotiate well in their environment." This practical competence decreases a child's desire for servants, and will curb his later adult desire to meet his needs through perpetuating pernicious social hierarchies.[51]

"Projective disgust" follows a similar path. Children are taught to associate feelings of disgust with legitimately threatening objects like feces, a rotting corpse, or

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[48] Ibid.

[49] *Hiding*, 219.

[50] *Not for Profit*, 34.

[51] Unfortunately, Nussbaum does not delineate what exactly this practical competence involves.

sour milk. However, they soon illegitimately associate disgust with basic properties like "bad smells, ooziness, sliminess," and with objects that possess these, whether threatening or not.[52] Exposure to such objects apparently heightens a child's sense of vulnerability because the objects threaten to physically contaminate the child by breaching the borders of his or her body. Concurrently, such smelly and slimy objects force the child to acknowledge his or her animality because, like animals, the child also produces disgusting waste products. In order to hide himself from his own animality and from the disgusting waste he produces, the child begins to "project the properties of animality … onto some group of people," and then treats those people "as contaminating or defiling, turning them into an underclass, and in effect, a boundary, or a buffer zone" between himself "and the feared and stigmatized properties of animality."[53] The "psychological contamination" continues when the protected boundaries of the self are extended to include the person's family, race, or nation. According to Nussbaum, this story explains the stigmatization and aggression experienced by, among others, African Americans, Jews, women, homosexuals, the poor, and lower Indian castes.[54]

> Human beings are deeply troubled about being human—about being highly intelligent and resourceful, on the one hand, but weak and vulnerable, helpless against death, on the other. We are ashamed of this awkward condition and, in manifold ways, we try to hide from it. In the process we develop and teach both shame at human frailty and disgust at the signs of our animality and mortality. … Both emotions are associated with forms of social behavior in which a dominant group subordinates and stigmatizes other groups.[55]

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[52] *Hiding*, 322.
[53] *Not for Profit*, 32–33.
[54] *Hiding*, 92–93.
[55] Ibid, 336.

The potent marriage of primitive shame with projective disgust is "especially antithetical to the values of a liberal society"[56] and "soon begins to do real damage." Inevitably, "the narcissistic child's original desire to turn parents into slaves finds fulfillment—by the creation of a social hierarchy"[57] in which those lower on the hierarchical scale are stigmatized as inherently disgusting or contaminating.

This sweeping and controversial narrative of childhood emotional malformation matters because Nussbaum makes pedagogical and curricular suggestions based on the belief that each student possesses these hierarchical and stigmatizing tendencies born of primitive shame and projective disgust.[58] No discipline, class, or stage of a child's entire educational experience can afford to ignore these malevolent emotions or miss the opportunity to replace them with the countervailing ones, "sympathetic receptivity" and "compassionate concern."[59]

However, Nussbaum's psychoanalytic account of the origins of anti-democratic sentiments is less than wholly convincing, at least as a universal and comprehensive account of the origins of every instance of prejudice, racism, hierarchy, oppression, stigmatization, and so forth. Though these are obviously present to one degree or another in particular persons, social groups, or nations, Nussbaum's confidence that she has identified their common infantile source seems strained at best. It appears that people oppress or stigmatize others for many different reasons that have more

[56] Ibid, 321.
[57] *Not for Profit*, 33.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid, 112.

explanatory power than accounts of children who want to turn their parents into slaves because they feel shame about their neediness, and who later finally carry out those fantasies by attacking and subduing others.

Nussbaum does not always rely on such sweeping psychoanalytic narratives, however, to explain anti-social and illiberal behaviour. More helpful are the times she identifies specific historical causes for a given instance of cultural shame or aggression. For instance, she identifies the source of Hindu violence against Muslims in the 2002 Gujarat pogrom in India to be the entrenched Hindu narrative of centuries-long humiliation at the hands of Muslims and British. "Out of this collective sense that their virility has been compromised emerges a narrative of the shame-free nation of the future, one that will be so successfully aggressive, so efficient in cleansing the land of the ones who are blamed for the humiliation, that Hindu pride will reign supreme and inviolate."[60] In this case, her analysis still draws on experiences of shame, but does not require rooting that shame in the infant helplessness of the Gujarat Hindus. As this makes clear, instances of misanthropic behavior may be more immediately rooted in false information, lack of close association, greed, selfishness, fear of deprivation, resentment, nationalistic pride, desire for limited resources, historical grudges, ignorance, and so forth. One advantage of specifying more immediate causes than infantile shame and childhood disgust is that the immediate and obvious causes are more easily addressed and potentially overcome in particular situations. A further concern is

[60] "Toward a globally sensitive patriotism," *Daedalus* Vol. 137, No. 3 (Summer, 2008), 85.

that, if primitive shame and projective disgust are accepted to be the primary sources of illiberal moral sentiments, and if education is intended to form politically liberal moral sentiments, then primitive shame and projective disgust might receive inordinate attention and displace other vices, virtues, sentiments, or skills that should be addressed.

Compassion and the Missing Connection of the Virtues

Against this myriad of moral-emotional threats arising from infancy and childhood, Nussbaum advocates curricular materials and pedagogical methods that enable people to cultivate what she refers to as "moral emotions" or "moral sentiments," and sometimes as "virtues."[61] Among these moral emotions are empathy, courageous independence, and responsible accountability, though the supreme moral sentiment that Nussbaum insists must be cultivated in students is compassion, known historically as "pity," that is, the "ability to imagine the experiences of others and to participate in their sufferings."[62]

She draws on Aristotle and Rousseau to argue that compassion is "a central bridge between the individual and the community," as well as "an essential bridge" to justice because it is an emotional analogue to, or the appropriate emotional response of someone in, John Rawls' "original position."[63] Rawls imagines how people would construct principles of social and political justice if they did so behind a "veil of ignorance" concerning their own personal characteristics, or social and historical circumstances. If they were ignorant of their race, class, gender, and natural talents, how would they construct a just society? The thought experiment is obviously intended to

[61] "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion," 57.

[62] Ibid, 50. On Nussbaum's "compassion," see Joshua Hordern, *Political Affections: Civic Participation and Moral Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 45–60.

[63] "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion," 28, 38.

remove the temptation to privilege one's self or one's own people when organizing a fair and just society.

According to Nussbaum, a person in the original position would feel pity or compassion when she, first, experiences pain at seeing others who are suffering serious deprivation of flourishing, whether or not those suffering actually experience their suffering as deprivation or not; second, when she judges that the deprivation is not entirely the sufferer's fault; and third, when she recognizes that, under different circumstances, the same or similar deprivation might have also befallen her. This last requirement, that the compassionate "pitier" identify with the vulnerability of the pitied, appears to be the most important factor both for Nussbaum and for Rousseau, on whose prescription for the moral formation of pity she draws.[64]

Nussbaum is optimistic that if the pitier feels compassion "deep enough," it will necessarily influence her thought, emotions, speech, and actions. In the case of pity toward the poor, for instance, she suggests that deeply felt compassion will cause the pitier to support political policies that "raise society's floor" in order to reduce poverty.[65] She confidently expects that if such pity is "followed through rigorously enough," it will also lead naturally and inexorably to support for "something like democratic equality." Following Rawls, she explains that "self-interested prudential reasoning," in this case the recognition that the pitier could conceivably suffer a fate similar to the pitied, can be "mined to yield altruistic principles" like democratic, social, and economic equality.[66]

[64] Ibid, 28, 37.
[65] Ibid, 36.
[66] Ibid, 36.

Therefore, whereas primitive shame and projective disgust are the primary sentiments that must be overcome, so sympathetic compassion is the primary moral sentiment that must be cultivated through education in a democracy's citizens.

Though few would argue against compassion, and though it shares similar traits with the Christian virtue of love, an excessive focus on compassion risks burdening it with more than it can bear. It is doubtful that compassion alone can produce the results Nussbaum desires. Her account also risks obscuring the importance of other virtues and character traits that the classical and Christian traditions have identified as essential for the flourishing individual, community, or political order. Among these are contentment, charity, patience, a desire for truth, generosity, hospitality, kindness, gentleness, temperance, humility, courage, justice, practical wisdom, fidelity, perseverance, peaceableness, mercy, and so forth. Her account could be taken to imply that moral formation reaches its end with the emergence of compassion as defined by political liberalism. In this case, the effect would be that as long as students and citizens treat their fellow humans "compassionately," the moral objective of the educator, academic institution, nation, and individual has been accomplished.[67]

Beyond this, we might also consider the widely held observation that the virtues are inextricably connected or reciprocal, meaning that any one virtue or moral emotion depends on the presence of other virtues and moral emotions for its flourishing.[68] This

[67] For a similar concern, see Mark R. Schwehn, *Exiles from Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation in America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 54–56.

[68] See *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.13; *Summa Theologiae* I II 65.1; Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 83–99.

suggests not only that other virtues will be neglected by myopic meditation on compassion, but also that compassion itself cannot be independently cultivated and sustained. Could a person be truly compassionate without practical wisdom to know when compassion is appropriate, or without courage to act compassionately when her people are the source of the pain, or without temperance to act compassionately to advantage another person even when it disadvantages herself? Can compassion alone sustain peaceable dialogue between adherents of competing comprehensive doctrines or move people to self-sacrifice for the sake of the poor and vulnerable? If not, then Nussbaum's heavy emphasis on compassion could have the unintended consequence of weakening the functioning of compassion and the plural liberal order itself.

Strong versions of the argument for the unity of the virtues can be found in Plato's *Protagoras*, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, and Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* I II 65.1. These thinkers argue that no singular habitual disposition, moral sentiment, or act can be considered fully virtuous unless it exemplifies all the cardinal virtues, meaning at minimum that each one plays a constitutive part in every other.[69] For instance, an apparently brave act would not qualify as virtuous unless it is informed by prudence, justice, and temperance, and unless it is performed for a truly, rather than merely apparently, good end. A given act may appear to embody courage, but without each of the other cardinal virtues the act may be in turn unwise, unjust, or rash, and the sentiment unpredictable, unstable, and inconsistent. It would then be, in Aquinas' terms, an "imperfect virtue." Jean Porter summarizes his position as follows:

[69] See *ST* I II 65.1, 66.1–2.

> The virtues cannot be considered as discrete components of the personality of the truly virtuous person, components which can be separated out of the context of her overall personality with their structure and behavioral expressions intact. For this reason, the person who possesses a similitude of a given virtue will not consistently behave in the same way as the truly virtuous person, even in the particular area of life that the seeming and true virtues regulate."[70]

It may be that Nussbaum would be content to cultivate compassion in liberal democratic citizens as nothing more than an imperfect virtue that operates occasionally and intermittently, and with varying ends and degrees of purity, but the significance she accords it and the work she expects it to do suggests otherwise.

Without entering into the debates about whether a person must fully possess each of the virtues in order to possess any one of them, which seems unlikely, or whether most people are capable of perfectly developing and maintaining any one virtue, which seems improbable,[71] the question still stands whether any virtue or moral emotion, like compassion, can be cultivated and sustained, even if on a spectrum, without also at the same time cultivating and sustaining a host of other virtues that support it or function as constituent parts of it.[72] Other virtues that might arguably contribute to or support the exercise of compassion, for example, include the cardinal virtues of justice,

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[70] See Jean Porter, The Unity of the Virtues and the Ambiguity of Goodness: A Reappraisal of Aquinas's Theory of the Virtues," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 21.1 (Spring, 1993), 159. Similarly, Jean Porter, "Virtue and Sin: The Connection of the Virtues and the Case of the Flawed Saint," *The Journal of Religion* 75.4 (October, 1995), 526: "there are forms of the specific virtues which are not possible to the individual who is not fully virtuous."

[71] On this point, see Christopher Toner, "The Full Unity of the Virtues." *Journal of Ethics* (2014) 18:207–227; John Cooper, "The Unity of Virtue," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 15.1 (1998), 233–274.

[72] See Julia Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 73–84.

temperance, courage, and prudence, but also virtues like patience, kindness, gratitude, generosity, hospitality, humility, hope, and so forth. In this way, the virtues are less like separate tools or discrete bank accounts, but more like an integrated ecosystem, wherein each part depends on every other for its individual flourishing. Thus, if each of the virtues just listed contribute to the stable and consistent exercise of compassion and compassionate action, then all of them should be included in Nussbaum's vision of political and moral formation.

Furthermore, unlike Nussbaum's rather optimistic hope that deeply felt compassion will necessarily lead a person to support policies or take costly self-sacrificial action to alleviate another person's suffering, Aristotle and Aquinas, and others, insist that virtuous action requires at least the additional intellective virtue of prudence, also known as *phronesis* or practical wisdom, and the structural virtues, like self-control or perseverance. [73] On the one hand, the motivational virtues, sometimes just called "character virtues," like justice or benevolence, dispose a person's appetites, desires, and passions to be rightly related to particular and general goods. Without these, a person might either be drawn to ends that are not goods, or might be drawn insufficiently to ends that are. On the other hand, *phronesis*, the excellent form of practical reason or deliberation, accepts the nascent epistemic framework given it by the motivational virtues and, in this example, specifies what constitutes a compassionate act in a particular instance, discerns virtuous ways to reach that end, and integrates the desire

[73] See Josef Pieper, *The Four Cardinal Virtues* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1956), 3–42.

to act compassionately with, for instance, the desires to act justly and benevolently. In Julia Annas' words, prudence "integrates and unifies all the relevant aspects of the situation from the start" in order to arrive at a good course of action—the right thing at the right time in the right way.[74] In this way, the character virtues and *phronesis* must act together in order to accomplish comprehensively good acts in the political, domestic, and private spheres.[75] When the compassionate person lacks *phronesis*, he or she may be well intended but are not likely, at least not consistently, to act well.[76] In Aristotle's mind, such a person is like the blind strong man, more likely to injure himself and others than not.[77]

It could be argued that the sentiment of compassion, apart from prudence and a commitment to particular moral goods, has driven both sides of widely diverse policies and practices like abortion, gay marriage, doctor-assisted suicide, enforced euthanasia, mandatory sterilization of the mentally handicapped, bans on indigenous customs and dress, forced conversions, the exclusion of women from sports or positions of leadership, colonization, the institutionalization of the mentally ill or handicapped, and so forth.[78]

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[74] Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, 87.

[75] See *ST* I II 57.4, 58.5; Aquinas' *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Lecture IV, "Prudence;" James F. Kennan, S.J., "The Virtue of Prudence," in Stephen J. Pope, ed., *The Ethics of Aquinas* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002).

[76] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.13; Daniel C. Russel, *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2, 19–20. On *phronesis* as a compound "suite of practical virtues," see *Practical Intelligence,* 20–25.

[77] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1144b13.

[78] C. S. Lewis on "kindness" is similar: "Kindness, merely as such, cares not whether its object becomes good or bad, provided only that it escapes suffering. … It is for people whom we care nothing about that we demand happiness on any terms." *Problem of Pain* (London: Centenary Press, 1940), 33.

This suggests that free-floating and underdefined compassion could lead to mutually contradictory or morally pernicious ends. As Robert Adams explains,

> A readiness and willingness for sympathetic response to persons in need is a form of benevolence, and is normally a virtue. But it may not be a virtue, being deprived of much of its humane significance, if one at the same time embraces, in relevant ways, an ideology that denies the full humanity of the persons to whom one responds sympathetically. Structural virtues such as courage and temperance demand moral integration in a different way, but no less urgently.[79]

Kristján Kristjánsson argues along similar lines. Practical reason requires "a general blueprint of the good life" in order to determine what might constitute "compassion" in a concrete situation and how to achieve it. Following Aristotle, he argues that "*phronesis* requires access to a systematic understanding of the good life that can *indirectly* inform and enlighten her further development and decisions," even if that understanding remains "flexible and open-textured."[80] Daniel Russell also argues that only with an overall "conception of the good life," universally applicable, can *phronesis* know how to integrate multiple ethical concerns to arrive at a single good act.[81] Nussbaum's refusal to explicitly acknowledge any such general picture of "the good life" or "how life goes well in general," and liberal democracy's inability to do so, leaves practical reason

[79] Robert Adams, *A Theory of Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 208.

[80] Kristján Kristjánsson, "*Phronesis* and moral education: Treading beyond the truisms," *Theory and Research in Education* 12.2 (2014), 165. Kristjánsson acknowledges that contemporary liberal democracies will object in theory to the idea of a "blueprint of the good life." In practice, he thinks agreement possible, given "the abundant empirical evidence … on how universal the basic moral virtues really are." Ibid, 168.

[81] Russell, *Practical Intelligence*, 29.

without resources for determining what constitutes a "compassionate" act in any concrete situation.[82]

Because anyone concerned with moral virtue and ordered emotions, like Nussbaum, is concerned with moral action rather than simply moral emotions or sentiments, and because moral action requires prudence, which in turn requires the motivational and the structural virtues in order to discern a wise course of action, no one concerned with moral virtue can afford to avoid considering the comprehensive and integrated support structure that any one virtue depends upon.[83] As Jean Porter argues,

> In actual practice, the exercise of practical wisdom will seldom or never engage only one of the moral virtues. In order to judge how to act in a given situation, an individual must assess what sorts of claims are being placed on her, *and* she must judge how far she is called on to exercise self-restraint in some way for the sake of more important or urgent aims, *and* she must decide which risks are justified by these aims. In other words, all her capacities for feeling, desire, and judgment must be in order if any of them is to operate properly on a consistent basis.[84]

Nussbaum's work fails to adequately acknowledge these insights, leaving "compassion" underdefined and rather directionless.

In sum, Nussbaum's concentrated focus upon the singular moral sentiment of compassion, or pity, has raised several concerns: one, that other virtues integral to a flourishing human life and society might be neglected; two, that compassion itself

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[82] For similar concerns, see Hordern, *Political Affections*, 56. Hordern also argues that Nussbaum has a "political eschatology of internal transcendence" and "mature interdependence" that functions as her implicit vision of the "ultimately desirable human condition" or good life. See 136–40.

[83] On the integral centrality of prudence, see Julia Annas, *Morality of Happiness*, 73–4; *Intelligent Virtue*, 84–89.

[84] Porter, "The Connection of the Virtues," 532–33. Emphasis original. See also Porter, "The Unity of the Virtues," 155.

requires the concurrent formation of other virtues; and three, that compassion requires the cultivation of practical reason, or prudence, in order to know how compassion should be instantiated in any particular time and place, and in order to integrate compassion with the requirements of the other virtues. We might question, four, whether compassion requires a normative vision of integrated human flourishing within a moral or metaphysical order that is larger than the one Nussbaum provides in her versions of Rawlsian political liberalism and capability theory. She acknowledges that the moral emotion of compassion is provoked by the evaluative comparison between one person's state of deprivation and the compassionate person's own vision of human flourishing, but given her commitment to political liberalism, she does not explain either how a person ought to arrive at this vision, nor how to evaluate an alternative vision one already possesses. But if compassion is "the basic social emotion" and the primary moral sentiment required of democratic citizens, her reticence to articulate a vision of human flourishing and the good seems to risk allowing widely diverse, and likely conflicting, expressions of compassion. To avoid this requires indexing compassion to a moral order, or to one of the comprehensive doctrines that Nussbaum prescinds from developing.

Nussbaum's articulation of the human capacities required for flourishing, which she describes in her work on development and social justice, represents one vision of individual and social flourishing, yet while these capacities are commendable and in large part should be supported, they give the appearance of floating free of the philosophical, theological, or metaphysical grounding necessary to solicit widespread support. But this may be unavoidable given her commitment to Rawlsian liberalism, and

to the proposition that Rawlsian liberalism is not itself a "comprehensive doctrine." Her hope can only be that the various "comprehensive doctrines," like Christianity or secular humanism, offer reasons for citizens in those traditions to support her own ostensibly independent and freestanding vision of human flourishing and the common good.

Instrumentalising Education for Democratic Skills

Along with projective disgust and primitive shame, Nussbaum identifies deference to authority, susceptibility to peer pressure, and ignorance as additional threats to liberal democracy. Therefore, in addition to the formation of liberal compassion, she argues that three other goals should animate education designed to produce liberal, democratic citizens: critical analysis of and resistance to received tradition; true and unbiased understanding of the politics, economics, anthropology, and history of the world; and sympathetic moral imagination.

The first ability Nussbaum identifies is the ability to critically evaluate one's own opinions, as well as received traditional or cultural beliefs, practices, and commitments. This requires learning the methods of philosophical reasoning, and employing the pedagogical practice of "Socratic dialogue," both of which challenge students to pursue "critical thinking," to abandon unsupportable opinions, and to resist peer pressure and deference to authority. Few would argue with the analytical evaluation of received ideas and customary practices for their logic and coherence, but sometimes Nussbaum's references to "dead or inadequate traditions" and "prejudices of the past" does not seem sufficiently discriminating or appreciative of the wisdom or logic that may be embodied

in traditions and customs.[85] Accordingly, she writes that every belief and practice should be subjected to critical scrutiny, and "only those that survive reason's demand for consistency and justification" should be accepted.[86]

In *Cultivating Humanity*, for example, she refers favorably to a Notre Dame student who complains that the handling of issues relating to women and homosexuality within the university displays "little rational argument." She does not explain the issues in question, but one can reasonably assume they are grounded in the Roman Catholic Church's official prohibition of homosexual practice and female ordination. For her, this is a positive example of the withering challenge philosophical questions can bring against tradition, the implication being that these two positions are clearly unjustifiable before the high bar of liberal reason. The student complains that his philosophy class taught him to ask questions, but then "they ask you to obey authority and to ask no questions."[87] Nussbaum may be quick to laud examples like this Notre Dame student because she judges that the Roman Catholic Church's position on these issues falls outside the bounds of Rawlsian liberal democracy, and so does not deserve a fair hearing. As she explains,

> Anything that lies inside the political module is, *ex hypothesi*, affirmed by all citizens, at least all whose comprehensive doctrines affirm the key idea of equal respect that underlies the constitution, and the principles embedded in the constitution itself. So, the state does not have to pussyfoot around with these things: it can teach them flat out, as the best ideas to live with together, using whatever devices of imagery, rhetoric, and emotional suasion seem best suited to the task of imparting them to the young. *It has no obligation to be fair to the*

[85] *Not for Profit*, 109–110.
[86] *Cultivating Humanity*, 9.
[87] Ibid, 16.

opposing position.[88]

This last claim is slightly odd, since the liberal model is predicated on the ideas of doing justice to the other, that is, being fair, showing respect, and recognizing the other.

However, while logic and critical analysis are obviously important intellectual skills, the critique of tradition, as well as the discursive exchange between citizens, even about the merits of Rawlsian political liberalism, should be conducted with humility and patience. The motivation for critical analysis should be the desire for greater clarity on the truth, justness, or goodness of the issue at hand, as well as the generous desire to understand those who hold views opposed to one's own, as Nussbaum frequently encourages. Furthermore, few traditional practices and beliefs fail to instantiate some elements of practical or theoretical wisdom, which should be acknowledged and valued, even if aspects of the practices or beliefs are abandoned.

This virtuous and prudential way of exercising critical thinking is sometimes surprisingly absent in Nussbaum's accounts, though it seems vital for a flourishing democratic tradition that attempts to foster respectful dialogue and practical cooperation between citizens operating out of incommensurate comprehensive doctrines. However, for Nussbaum, "non-neutrality is no problem for political liberalism, since it is a partial ethical conception, and neutrality is not what it is about inside the political module."[89] Thus, to participate in the liberal political module requires accepting that certain issues are not open to ongoing investigation and debate, and that certain

[88] Nussbaum, "Political Soul–Making," 306.
[89] Ibid, 307.

beliefs and practices do not deserve a respectful hearing because they fall outside of Nussbaum's criteria for what counts as liberal tolerance or empathetic acceptance.

Nussbaum identifies as her second goal the formation of knowledgeable and responsible "world citizens." This requires, first, accurate, in-depth knowledge of the global and national economies, of the history and social-anthropology of the world's major cultures, ethnicities, and religions, of the legal and political systems in the world, and how each of these factors interacts with the lived experience of men and women in different parts of the world. Second, she states that responsible and integrated world-citizens must have the skills to critically assess historical data and sources in order to evaluate the use of false but dominant narratives that violate vulnerable people groups or unjustly ensconce others in power. Finally, these intelligent world citizens must cognitively and emotionally identify themselves with and be eager to cooperate with people wholly other than themselves. For Nussbaum, "Awareness of the history of cultural, economic, religious, and gender-based differences is essential in order to promote the respect for another that is the essential underpinning for dialogue. There is no easier source of disdain and neglect than ignorance and the sense of the inevitable naturalness of one's own way."[90]

Her third goal for democratic students derives from her concentration upon the "carefully constructed and moralized compassion," described above. "Central to the stability of any society that asks people to make sacrifices," Nussbaum argues, "will be

[90] "Education and Democratic Citizenship," 389. *Not for Profit*, 81: "Knowledge is no guarantee of good behavior, but ignorance is a virtual guarantee of bad behavior."

the sentiment of compassion, together with an ability to imagine vividly the predicaments of others."[91] Nussbaum thus insists that students, as future citizens, need to develop an empathetic "narrative imagination," that is, "the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person's story, and to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have."[92] In order to do this, students must step out of the immediacy of their own situations and step vicariously into the life situation of another, often very different from their own, in order to understand their motives and choices, fears and desires. This stepping out and stepping into requires sympathetic extension of one's self toward another. Such sensitivity can be cultivated most effectively, she argues, through various artistic media that cultivate "capacities of judgment" and powers of the imagination. These capacities and powers are essential to citizenship because they reveal that other persons have complex internal thought lives and experiences similar to our own.[93] While it is difficult to see exactly how such empathic sentiments are necessarily cultivated at any enduring depth through bare exposure to some of the art forms she mentions, like architecture, sculpture, classical music, painting, and dance, her argument for the primacy of drama and narrative literature to this end is much more convincing, and comports with many other similar descriptions of the power of these media to shape the moral imagination of their readers.[94] Narrative literature, in

[91] "Globally sensitive patriotism," 84; "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion," 51.

[92] Not for Profit, 95–96.

[93] *Cultivating Humanity*, 85, 86.

[94] Ibid, 97, 111. Nussbaum recommends Greek tragedy as especially useful for

particular, enables readers to become participants in the struggles and experiences of characters whose lives, cultures, sexual orientations, ethnicities, histories, and so forth are very different from their own.

However, given its central importance to the formation of civic virtues, Nussbaum contends that literature need not be chosen exclusively for its artistic, literary, historical, cultural, or aesthetic merit. Rather, it is justifiable and sometimes necessary to choose "new and disturbing" literature based solely on its "civic value," that is, its ability to challenge students' illiberal cultural "blind spots." She justifies this, in part, by claiming that "a central role of art is to challenge conventional wisdom and values."[95] Similarly, all instruction in the arts and humanities should be "carefully crafted" specifically in order to avoid "defective forms of 'literature'" that inhibit emotional identification with stigmatized groups like minorities or women, and to avoid "artworks that reinforce uneven sympathies," or cynicism about human nature.[96] Instead, art must be carefully selected in order to "bring students in contact with issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and cross-cultural experience and understanding,"[97] providing them insight into "members of other cultures, ethnic and racial minorities, women, and lesbians and gay men."[98] In this way, the "imaginative sympathy" that students develop for these groups can become

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cultivating "the ability to imagine the experiences of others and to participate in their sufferings." *Upheavals*, 426; cf. 304ff., 408–9. As Hordern summarizes, "Through witnessing such performances, people can learn an emotional repertoire which then fuels appropriate judgements amidst comparable real-life circumstances." *Political Affections*, 45.

[95] Ibid, 99, 108.

[96] *Not for Profit*, 109–110.

[97] Ibid, 108–109.

[98] *Cultivating Humanity*, 100.

a "key prop to good citizenship."[99]

Yet, for all her emphasis on the value of various art media, her texts largely instrumentalise the arts by emphasizing their value for forming the compassionate imagination, subverting tradition, reinforcing politically liberal sentiments, or for subversively communicating unpleasant and challenging cultural criticism in a palatable way. She acknowledges that "forming the civic imagination is not the only role for literature," but she does not elaborate what these other roles might be, possibly because doing so might take her outside the bounds of what Rawlsian liberalism can promote.[100] Other good ends of the arts, which Nussbaum neglects, include: [101]

- the value of cultural literacy;
- refreshing delight in aesthetic contemplation;
- art as a personal vocation;
- the social benefits of public beauty, whether "high," decorative, or functional art;
- the good of creativity or wonder at the creations of others;
- moral insight and conviction beyond learning to sympathize with marginalized groups.

In various ways, then, Nussbaum risks instrumentalising the arts or reducing various forms of artistic activity and expression to a form of propaganda that serves the liberal state's interests. The arts can be morally formative, but Nussbaum's assertion that their primary value is the proper formation of democratic citizens again seems to collapse the student into their political identity. Of course, as she argues, both ancient

[99] "Political Soul–Making," 309.

[100] *Cultivating Humanity*, 88.

[101] She romanticises the arts when she asserts "the sort of community created by the arts is non-hierarchical, a valuable model of the responsiveness and interactivity that a good democracy will also foster in its political processes." Studios and troupes of artists seem no more impervious to hierarchy, jealousy, or exclusion than any other types of community. "Education and Democratic Citizenship," 391.

Greek tragedies and contemporary narrative literature can be directly or indirectly relevant to political situations or discourses, but certainly not every piece of literature, theatre, dance, or poetry can be so *prima facie* channeled. Nor is it true to say that a central role of "the arts" in general is to challenge conventional wisdom and values, or that, for example, "when people put on a play together, they have to learn to go beyond tradition and authority, if they are going to express themselves well."[102] Some works of art may challenge convention and authority, as may some works of philosophy or theology, but merely to challenge convention because it is convention is not necessarily wise or prudent. Art can have a subversive power, to be sure, but it need not employ that subversive power merely for its own sake. Rather, it should be used, when it is used, for the sake of the true, the good, the noble, and the just, which may require praising and dignifying convention and tradition, when conventional cultural arrangements and traditional wisdom are good and promote human flourishing, as they often do, and as Nussbaum thinks the convention of political liberalism does.

The selective inclusion of literature, drama, visual art, and dance based on their ability to shape politically liberal sentiments, and the exclusion of works that might be inimical to liberal values seems to import into the classroom a version of Rawls' prescription for public reason. According to Rawls, public arguments and decisions about core political policies and issues should not include exclusive appeals to comprehensive doctrines. This fencing of political debate and decisions has its share of critics, but at least Rawls limits it to political decision-making. Nussbaum appears to require a similar

[102] Ibid.

fencing within educational classrooms, which protects students from being exposed to forms of art that might challenge the concept of political liberalism. To be fair, she only explicitly refers to excluding racist and pornographic literature, and her overall objective might simply be to convince politicians committed to political liberalism that they ought to fund the arts, but her argument encourages a careful policing of works of art that might tutor students in illiberal ways of thinking and feeling. The list of classic and contemporary works that would need to be excluded, however, could be immense.[103] This can hardly be what Nussbaum intends, but her rhetoric in places certainly carries these implications, especially given her statement that the state can use "whatever devices of imagery, rhetoric, and emotional suasion seem best suited" to inculcating politically liberal values in the young, without any obligation "to be fair to the opposing position" if it falls outside of the "partial ethical conception" of political liberalism.[104] In this regard, Nussbaum appears similar to some advocates of standard "comprehensive doctrines" and traditions, who advocate moral, intellectual, and personal formation within the parameters of that particular comprehensive tradition, and who support restrictive policies concerning "uneven" works of art that challenge the religion's teachings or ways of life.[105]

Furthermore, Nussbaum wants to enable students to think critically about tradition and authority, which seems to imply that both she and the students formed

[103] For example, the work of authors like Homer, Augustine, Dante, Milton, or Dostoevsky could be judged to cultivate and reinforce uneven illiberal sympathies.

[104] Nussbaum, "Political Soul–Making," 306.

[105] *Not for Profit*, 108–109.

according to her educational model exist outside of any tradition, and so can evaluate all traditions and authorities on the basis of freestanding, Socratic critical reason. In her critical review of Alisdair MacIntyre's turn toward Thomism in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, she refers to this as the pursuit of "the Aristotelian quest … without piety." In that review, she laments that MacIntyre has chosen to pursue Thomistic ideology over philosophical reason, and suggests that MacIntyre and other thinkers like him, who accept traditions and authorities, often do so because they desire ethical certainty within a moral and social order. Desiring "a unanimity that life has never really had," such people "sink for comfort into the embrace of an authority, whether religious or secular, that will give us order at the price of reason."[106]

However, at least as "tradition" has come to be broadly understood by thinkers like Alisdair MacIntyre and Jeffrey Stout, Nussbaum too operates within and advocates for a particular authoritative tradition of thought and practice. Following John Henry Newman, MacIntyre identifies traditions as historically extended arguments and socially embodied practices focused on goods which that tradition consistently and coherently pursues.[107] Nussbaum's version of Rawlsian Enlightenment liberalism fits this definition, as it does the expanded characteristics of tradition listed by Jeffrey Stout. Stout, for

[106] Nussbaum, "Recoiling From Reason," The New York Review of Books, December 7, 1989, 41.

[107] See Alisdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 12; Alisdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 221–2. MacIntyre's account of "tradition" and its implications for rationality is open to criticism, but his general description of embodied rational traditions of thought, borrowed from Newman, is generally accepted. See Tom Angier, "Alisdair MacIntyre's Analysis of Tradition," *European Journal of Philosophy* 22:4, 540–572.

instance, explains that the Amish tradition can be identified according to its "sacred stories, dogmas, and rituals transmitted across generations," as well as its unity of belief about the world, its "codes of conduct," "tables of virtues and vices," "pieties," and "aspirations." [108] Analogously, he argues that democracy is a tradition, because democracy "inculcates certain habits of reasoning, certain attitudes toward deference and authority in political discussion, and love for certain goods and virtues, as well as a disposition to respond to certain types of actions, events, or persons with admiration, pity, or horror." Thus, the democratic tradition enshrines certain "enduring attitudes, concerns, dispositions, and patterns of conduct," which are debated both internally and externally.[109] As we have seen, Nussbaum's thought also inculcates particular morally formative practices, dispositions, virtues and vices, normative stories, and codes of conduct in line with the broad philosophical tradition of Enlightenment reason, justice, and rationality framed within Rawlsian liberalism. Institutionally, Nussbaum could also be located within the broad tradition of Enlightenment institutions like the University of Göttingen (1737), and American liberal arts colleges like Williams College (1793) and universities like the University of Virginia (1819). These institutions offered education and intellectual formation to a broad, rather than an elite, public, and attended to

[108] Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1.

[109] Ibid, 3. Stout differentiates pragmatic democracy, however, from doctrinaire political liberalism.

students' personal, moral, and civic formation, as well as the public, political, and economic good of the nation.[110]

The question arises, therefore, whether Nussbaum does not think Rawlsian political liberalism is a tradition, which it appears to be at least according to the ways MacIntyre and Stout use the term, or whether she thinks Rawlsian political liberalism, including her educational model, is fungible with the tradition of liberal democracy, and so the only game in town, or whether she wants to strategically avoid critical reflection upon political liberalism and education in order to promote its extension and survival. She might also think that political liberalism and its educational implications avoid MacIntyre's arguments for the fallibility of human reason and the implication that rationality is tradition-constituted. If so, the decision to avoid critical reflection on one's own tradition of political liberalism might tempt students to adopt the kind of arrogant epistemic posture of independent self-sufficiency, invulnerability, and control that she deplores. Another possibility might be that Nussbaum worries whether students and citizens are intellectually robust enough to think critically about art, arguments, or traditions that challenge liberalism. It may also be that Nussbaum would allow debate about political liberalism and its conclusions, but only on terms set by political liberalism, that is, that critical debate should be characterized by each interlocutor engaging empathetically and tolerantly with every other.[111] In general, this last point is

[110] See Chad Wellmon, "Knowledge, Virtue, and the Research University." *The Hedgehog Review* 15.2 (Summer, 2013).

[111] In this way, Nussbaum may resemble chapter seven's version of 'common-ground' humanism.

commendable, but could become problematic depending on how the terms for what qualifies as empathetic and tolerant engagement are set.

More worrisome for Nussbaum's educational ideal would be if the failure to treat political liberalism as a tradition, and the decision to remove art and arguments that promote illiberal and "unbalanced" views, actually failed to teach students how to think critically about traditions, which is one of her key educational goals. However, if students are taught to critically evaluate prevailing dominant authorities and traditions of thought and practice, then Rawlsian political liberalism, along with its normative values, beliefs, virtues and vices should reasonably be expected to come under such scrutiny, since it has become the dominant received tradition on many Western secondary and university campuses. Most importantly, however, we should see that neither her political liberalism nor her educational theory represent tradition-independent, freestanding frameworks that are categorically different from the educational tradition of, for example, Christian Humanism, considered below. There are differences, to be sure, but their characterization as traditions is not one of them.

Conclusion

Nussbaum's writings on education have much to commend them theologically and ethically, though as she herself may admit, they leave much to be desired as a comprehensive or sufficient account of the role of learning and education in a person's life. Generally, the individual goods Nussbaum identifies as the ends of education are commendable: clear, logical, and critical thinking; accurate economic, historical, and cultural information; and the moral emotions of compassion, empathy, and concern, which resemble some Christian accounts of love, justice, and care for the most

vulnerable members of a given society. Further, her awareness of the need to counteract the human tendency to advantage one's self by disadvantaging others comports with many Christian accounts of the relationally disordering effects of sin. And her recognition of human fragility, dependence, and incompleteness also has many theological counterparts.

A theological account of the ends of education can find areas of overlap and consensus with Nussbaum's account, as she might expect, but it can also provide the more comprehensive account from which she refrains. Once this theological account is described, the questions will be whether and how it can learn from Nussbaum, whether and how Nussbaum's account might be expanded even within the terms of her Rawlsian political liberalism, and whether a Christian account might more fully prepare students for their private, public, and political roles, including that of critical and compassionate citizens of liberal democracies.

Chapter Two

Education and the Research University: Stanley Fish's Impractical Disciplinary Self

As far as I can tell those habits of thought and the liberal arts education that provides them don't enable you to do anything, and, even worse, neither do they prevent you from doing anything."[112] Stanley Fish

Stanley Fish's Impractical Disciplinary Self

Whereas Martha Nussbaum harnesses education and the intellectual appetite for Rawlsian liberal democracy, Stanley Fish harnesses them for the modern research university. The university he describes is like an island, and training on the academic island should enable student recruits to navigate the landscape and thrive in its terrain, distinguishing Platonic from Kantian trees, identifying Copernican from Ptolemaic streams, and mapping as yet unexplored regions. But the university cannot and should not promise to prepare students for much else, let alone life back on the mainland. The knowledge and skills learned on the island are intrinsically rewarding, and no justification need be offered to mainlanders who have little experience of the island or fail to appreciate its native beauty. By conceiving university education in this way, Fish offers a vision of learning and education that at almost every point resists the extrinsically oriented education for which Nussbaum campaigns. Indeed, most of what Nussbaum endorses, Fish explicitly opposes, and most of what he praises, she passes over in silence. Even the title of Fish's book on education, *Save the World on Your Own Time*, proclaims his opposition to any plan to use the unique tools of the research

[112] Fish, *Save the World*, 52–53.

university for ends to which they are ill-suited, especially, as in Nussbaum's case, to create compassionate, liberally minded, democratic world citizens. "Civic participation" is a good thing, he explains, but it "is a political rather than an academic goal," and while "citizen building is a legitimate democratic activity…it is not an academic activity."[113]

Fish's chief concern is to identify and defend the distinctive goods that the university can pursue and provide. Though he claims to be interested in "the nature of the academic enterprise" in general, it is more accurate to say that he is narrowly interested in the nature of that enterprise as it has come to be pursued in modern, public research universities. Like Nussbaum, Fish's thought also operates within an institutional tradition, namely, the university that descended from the German cultural and intellectual forces of the late 18th century, organized by Wilhelm von Humboldt into the University of Berlin in 1810.[114] Fish's hermetic moral academy thus has a long history. As Chad Wellmon carefully demonstrates, the research university that Fish inhabits was intended from the beginning—by Humboldt, Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and others—to be a culture that regarded students as initiated apprentices, there to be formed into the ethics and practices of scientific production as a way of life.[115] "It was a social and intellectual structure that formed particular types of scholars, defined their

[113] Stanley Fish, *Save the World*, 67; 120.

[114] The University of Berlin proved the model for University College London in 1826, and the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1876, among similar institutions.

[115] Chad Wellmon, *Organizing Enlightenment: Information Overload and the Invention of the Modern Research University* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 196, 203, 225.

labor and social identity, and legitimated a particular type of knowledge and way of knowing as authoritative."[116] The "disciplinary self" that Fish represents and wants to replicate was the expression of an "ethical imagination, a vision of the kinds of people who inhabited the research university. And it was this ethical imagination that became the central feature of the institution."[117] In short, it was a community whose practices were focused on catechizing the intellectual appetite to accept a narrow type of knowledge as legitimate, and that alone. Therefore, as Mark Schwehn suggests, research specialists pursued knowledge they knew would be superseded by other research specialists after them and were forbidden from asking inherently "non-academic" and non-specialist questions of ultimate meaning that might otherwise have provided significance to their academic vocations.[118]

In *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality*, Julie Reuben follows the impact of this German research model on American universities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[119] In her analysis, "just as religion had been dissociated from 'cognitive' truth, morality became divorced from 'factual' knowledge and aligned instead with 'fictive' and 'aesthetic' truth." As the good was distanced from the true, and thus from the "academic" pursuits of the university, "the establishment of dormitories and the development of other

[116] Ibid, 112. See also 149, 157, 173, 232.
[117] Ibid, 153.
[118] Schwehn, *Exiles*, 3–19.
[119] Julie A. Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996),

extracurricular and administrative forms of moral guidance lessened the expectation that faculty should provide moral guidance and created an institutional separation between morality and knowledge,"[120] implying that "morality became identified with behavior rather than belief."[121] Hence Fish, the heir to these developments, claims that the only moral order that ought to concern the academy is the self-referential one defined by its unique intellectual mandate and capabilities. Professors are research specialists whose real work is producing specialist knowledge and other researchers who will surpass their specialist knowledge.

Fish's focus on purely intellectual ends constricts his discussion of the ends of education and precludes more general reflection on the activity of the intellectual appetite, learning, and education. Given his institutional and intellectual pedigree, Fish contends, and not without reason, that the academic institution is competent to pursue two and only two tasks, and should neither pretend nor promise otherwise. These are to "introduce students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry that had not previously been part of their experience," and to "equip those same students with the analytical skills … that will enable them to move confidently within those traditions and to engage in independent research."[122] In this way, the academic institution researches, teaches, and confers discipline-specific skills.[123] Indeed, Fish warns that foisting other

[120] Reuben, *Making*, 7.

[121] Ibid, 268. Schwehn argues that the relation between religious and moral pluralism and the retreat into "academic" specialist knowledge was clearly identified and endorsed by Max Weber in his influential 1917 paper, "Wissenschaft als Beruf." Schwehn, *Exiles*, 10.

[122] *Save the World*, 12–13.

[123] Ibid, 20, 79, 168.

extrinsic responsibilities upon the university, like forming its students into compassionate world citizens or engineering global good, threatens the purity and integrity of specialized academic research by potentially failing to cultivate the intellectual virtues and discipline-specific research skills that are its chief mandate. For Fish, the ends of education should be a particular species of intellectual formation alone.

Like Nussbaum, Fish attends to ethical formation, but the formation of the "disciplinary self" into the ethos and practices of the academic research culture and the institutions that sustain it.[124] "If you're not in the pursuit-of-truth business, you should not be in the university."[125] By this he means in the "pursuit of truth business" exclusively, with "truth" understood as knowledge justifiable within the confines of disciplinary sciences. The concern for the pursuit, generation, and organization of truth—the university's grand unifying epistemic project—is the only rational framework that determines morality and immorality within the university, outlawing moral crimes like cheating, fraud, and plagiarism, while enshrining intellectual virtues like thoroughness, perseverance, and intellectual honesty, but ignoring all other "extra-curricular" virtues and vices. "Everything follows from the statement that the pursuit of truth is a—I would say, *the*—central purpose of the university,"[126] which requires the ethical formation of the flourishing researcher, but not the flourishing human person.

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[124] Wellmon describes nineteenth century "science" as "an internally coherent culture of knowledge replete with its own customs, habits, and norms … into which people could be inculcated" through the university as disciplinary selves. *Organizing Enlightenment*, 38. See also Schwehn, *Exiles*, 18.

[125] *Save the World*, 20. See also 38.

[126] Ibid, 119.

This leads to three primary questions, namely, 1) whether other good ends can be pursued within formal education alongside academic research; 2) whether an exclusive focus on intellectual formation should be desirable either to an institution or to its students; and 3) whether it is actually possible to bracket out moral formation from immersion in a community structured and conditioned by particular practices, norms, and values.

The Intrinsic Value of Education

Unlike Nussbaum's *Not for Profit*, which explains why people who support a particular model of political organization—Rawlsian liberal democracy—should value and support the Humanities, Fish refuses to justify the Humanities, or learning and education, by appealing to the extrinsic and derivative benefits that other persons, projects, or institutions might obtain from it. The formation and activity of the intellectual appetite through research, teaching, and learning—"for research conducted just because researchers find certain problems interesting"—is a self-contained, intrinsic, and intransitive good:

> When liberal arts education is doing its job properly, it is just like poetry because, like poetry, it makes no claims to efficacy beyond the confines of its performance. … A good liberal arts course is good because it introduces you to questions you did not know how to ask and it provides you with skills necessary to answer them, at least provisionally.[127]

Though Fish's vision has its own deficiencies, he at least offers one rationale for learning and education that is largely missing from Nussbaum's work on education. Fish claims that being educated is like possessing the virtues, in that education is "an activity

[127] Ibid, 52–53.

whose value is internal to its performance," and so its key distinctive is its "unconcern with any usefulness to the world."[128] However, Fish is not content with this defensible statement, but goes on to state, "And what do you do with the answers you arrive at? What do you do with the habits of thought that have become yours? … Beats me! As far as I can tell those habits of thought and the liberal arts education that provides them don't enable you to do anything, and, even worse, neither do they prevent you from doing anything."[129] Once again life off the university island should be of no concern to those who run the island.

At this point, Fish's analogy is only partially successful. Rather than resembling the moral virtues, which are necessarily oriented to good ends, Fish's education better resembles the "structural virtues" like courage or the skills, arts, or *techne* that Aristotle explains can be put to any use whatsoever.[130] They can produce the courageous and skilled assassin or criminal as well as the police officer or judge, the eloquent statesman or the manipulative propagandist. Between moral virtues and skills, therefore, Fish's description of education resembles skills, which are morally neutral, and so neither intrinsically good nor bad. While virtues do represent forms of intrinsic human excellence, their value is also partially bound to their beneficial effects on the world outside the self. Here, there may be an apt comparison with skills, since virtues can be

[128] Ibid, 57, 59.
[129] Ibid, 52–53.
[130] Adams, *A Theory of Virtue*, 33–34.

thought of as morally ordered skills of living well, in that they enable the virtuous person to do the right things for the right people at the right times for the right reasons.[131]

Fish's claim that the recursive benefits of intellectual pursuits inure them from insecurely waiting on the condescending affirmation of some superior sphere of activity could place him alongside figures like Aquinas, Newman, Josef Pieper, and others. However, it is not self-evident that education is intrinsically and without remainder "good," apart from further considerations about human nature, which might make it such, and the ends to which knowledge and education can be ordered. Instead, education and the intellectual appetite must be oriented by the good in order to be good. Thus the comparison between education and virtue cannot be predicated entirely on their shared "unconcern with uselessness," since it is not apparent that the virtues are so unconcerned, nor that education should be.

Inadmissibility of Practical Deliberation and Decision

Fish elaborates on this prescription against utility by proscribing from academic work the practice of deliberation and resolution by the practical intellect. Academic research, at least in the modern research university, must be severed from the person as a private moral agent. Students should not inquire "about what kind of persons they should be," but should content themselves with analyzing what kind of person "Plato or Hobbes or Rawls or Milton thought they should be," but without making normative judgments about that "person."[132] For their part, Plato, Kant, Aristotle, Henry James, and so forth,

[131] Julia Annas, *Morality of Happiness*, 66–83; 385–411; *Intelligent Virtue*, "Skilled and Virtuous Action," 16–52.

[132] *Save the World*, 103.

are worth studying neither because of their ideas, nor their difficult questions, nor their profound answers, but because of the "verbal, architectonic, or argumentative skills they display"[133]—an assertion each of these thinkers would reject.

Fish insists that while students should learn how critically to analyze arguments and texts in order to determine the truth about the texts, and though students might become passionately attached to and argue for "the truth of the position to which they have been persuaded,"[134] they should never be led to act upon the truths to which they are passionately attached. If and how they act are purely private matters. Political policies or ethical options, for example, can be analyzed for their logical coherence and rationality, but they can never be "decided upon," meaning that proper academic practice excludes even deciding that a given policy "is the right one for the country," as well as deciding for and committing oneself to a particular answer to a difficult ethical question.[135] To properly "academicize" an issue, like the abolition of slavery or the regulation of greenhouse gases, a *cordon sanitaire* must be maintained between debate, decision, and action.[136] "Analyzing ethical issues is one thing; deciding them is another, and only the first is an appropriate academic activity."[137] In Mark Schwehn's summary, "Weberian academics," like those in Fish's research university, "ask only whether what someone says about what a text means is true or false and what such a saying might

[133] Ibid, 102.
[134] Ibid, 38.
[135] Ibid, 26. See also Stanley Fish, "I Know It When I See It: A Reply to Kiss and Euben," in Elizabeth Kiss and J. Peter Euben, *Debating Moral Education* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 79.
[136] *Save the World*, 27, 170.
[137] Ibid, 27.

imply."[138] The academic task, therefore, is analysis, not allegiance; criticism, not commitment. Therefore, professors have a moral obligation to "check their moral commitments at the door" and help students do the same, so that both refrain from any activity in the classroom that is "designed to produce action in the world."[139]

Besides the tradition of the modern research university, the French philosopher Pierre Hadot offers an additional narrative that might shed light on Fish's position and the historically anomalous exclusion of rational reflection from practical deliberation. In *Philosophy as a Way of Life* and *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, Hadot traces the historical transformation of philosophy from, first, an integrated ethical, spiritual, and intellectual practice to, second, an intellectual aid for theology to, finally, a specialist research subject confined to classrooms. Without rehearsing his wide-ranging argument, and without agreeing with him in every detail, his basic narrative can be summarized as follows.[140] According to Hadot, classical philosophy was a way of being and living that bound a person's intellectual, emotional, volitional, imaginative, and moral capacities together for the sake of integrated personal flourishing. The practice of philosophy was an invitation to therapeutic conversion and transformation: the goal "was not to develop a discourse which had its end in itself but to act upon souls…to *form* them…to develop

[138] Schwehn, *Exile*, 18.

[139] *Save the World*, 101; 169.

[140] Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 108–109. See also Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*. Tr. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 3–6; 255–70; "Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy," *Critical Inquiry* 16. 3 (Spring, 1990), 483-505; Arnold I. Davidson, "Spiritual Exercises and Ancient Philosophy: An Introduction to Pierre Hadot," *Critical Inquiry* 16.3 (Spring, 1990), 475–482.

a *habitus*…and to *transform*—that is, to change people's way of living and of seeing the world."[141] This integrated practice of philosophical reflection, discourse, and discipline, embodied for example by Socrates, Plato, the Stoics, Epicureans, and Neoplatonists, was abandoned as a "result of the absorption of *philosophia* by Christianity" in the second to sixth centuries. After this, philosophy ceased to be a viable option as a way of life and thought.

However, philosophy's practices of vigilant self-reflection, temperate asceticism, meditation, memorization, communal discourse and deliberation, ethical behavior, and so forth, were welcomed into Christianity. Theologians like Justin Martyr, Gregory Nazianzus, Augustine, Boethius, and later Erasmus and other Christian Humanists, describe Christianity as "the true philosophy." They do so because Christianity, like pagan philosophy, includes not only theoretical truth, but truthful practices, embodied ideas, a living community, and a way of life that its practitioners believed was conducive to human flourishing.

Hadot suggests that when philosophical texts were "rediscovered" by the West, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the scholastic methods of disputation, dominant at the time, often separated rational analysis from ethical or devotional practices.[142] This meant that philosophy did not return as a way of life comparable to the dominant Christian way of life. Instead, philosophy returned as a theoretical discourse that served the development of theological doctrines. When theology's intellectual dominance began

[141] Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, 274. Italics in original.
[142] Ibid, 273–74.

to wane in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and with it the Christian way of life, philosophy did not return with embodied schools, for instance, of Stoics, Epicureans, or Platonists. "In the last analysis, it is the scholastic *teaching* of philosophy, and especially of the history of philosophy, which has always had a tendency to emphasize the theoretical, abstract, and conceptual side of philosophy."[143] Though philosophers like Kant, Descartes, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and others, expected their philosophical writings to transform the way people both thought and lived, Hadot contends that the practice of philosophy and the study of the history of philosophy still retained many features inherited from medieval Scholasticism. Some of these features were resisted by the fifteenth to sixteenth century Christian Humanists, but they were exacerbated by the methods of the research university, in which philosophy became a technical discourse for specialists.

> There is a radical opposition between the ancient philosophical school, which addressed individuals in order to transform their entire personality, and the university, whose mission is to give out diplomas which correspond to a certain level of objectifiable knowledge. … The goal is no longer, as it was in antiquity, to train people for careers as human beings, but to train them for careers as clerks or professors—that is to say, as specialists, theoreticians, and retainers of specific items of more or less esoteric knowledge.[144]

The point of this brief detour is to note that politics, literature, biology, physics, ethics, mathematics, and so forth would historically have been included into the integrated philosophical way of life. Instead, Fish's research-exclusive tradition meticulously detaches them from ethical deliberation and decision, and so presents a

[143] Ibid, 273.
[144] Ibid, 260.

truncated version of each one and a restrictive approach to knowledge, belief, and conviction. If Hadot is right, and Nussbaum along with him, that philosophical reflection and disciplined investigation of the self and the world—the activities of the intellectual appetite and formal education—have always been inextricably tied up with the practical "choice of a way of life," then the assertion that they should remain separate represents a peculiar anomaly in the history of intellectual activity.[145]

Moral theologian Oliver O'Donovan agrees with a related argument of Hadot. Both assert that moral and practical reflection are logically and existentially prior to theoretical reflection and analysis. In O'Donovan's words, an individual "awakes" to find herself already asking questions and making decisions about actions and obligations, awakes to find that she already is a moral agent bound to venture intelligent future actions within an independently existing world.[146] "Practical thought is the most commonplace of human rational exercises, for action is the first and elementary horizon of human existence."[147] This properly basic activity awaits no prior act of philosophical or scientific reasoning, but once practical reasoning and theoretical reflection begin, then begins a dialectical conversation between them that, if properly facilitated, leads toward their critical integration. Rational reflection, investigation, and research are appropriate modes of thought and moments of activity, but they are just that: modes

[145] See Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Curiously, Hadot appeals to Newman's *Grammar of Assent* and Fish to Newman's *Idea of a University* for their respective positions.

[146] Oliver O'Donovan, *Self, World, and Time* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 1–21.

[147] Ibid, 3.

and moments that are pulled toward different, but related, modes and moments like ethical analysis, moral deliberation, and decision. The systolic and diastolic movement between research and deliberation, reflection and decision, is a legitimate and basic intellectual movement. Thus the sociobiologist or physicist does not violate her intellectual integrity if she reflects upon the political, social, or ethical implications of her research. No philosopher to whom Fish refers—Socrates, Plato, Kant, Henry James—would be content with Fish's dogmatic insistence that students refrain from deciding whether their ideas are right or wrong, harmful or beneficial, good or bad, and act accordingly. To learn and change our minds often means changing the way we see the world and act within it.[148]

Still, Fish might counter, academic philosophy as currently pursued within the modern research university should not include or attempt to inculcate the way philosophy was practiced by the philosophers under consideration. Students should not be expected to imitate philosophers who embody their ideas in their life and reflect on their life in their ideas. Fish is right to criticize educators who abuse their positions in order to advocate for causes that represent precariously based special pleading and faulty reasoning or that are egregiously tangential to their discipline or subject. Educators who do so, many of whom are also products of the research university, may not have had any more training in practical reasoning from their teachers than Fish's students have from him. But to the extent that any person or institution has employed

[148] Hence the reason μετάνοια, *meta-noia*, "change of mind," is translated "repentance" and implies conversion.

propaganda and preaching rather than persuasion and argument is the extent to which they have departed from careful deliberation, and may represent a failure to exercise virtues like temperance and prudence.

However, the move to moral deliberation and action does not represent a failure to do philosophy or to perform one's intellectual task. To refuse this move, O'Donovan suggests, would be to truncate the intellectual appetite, which, among other things, desires to know what might be done, and fail to develop the intellectual skills of practical reasoning and deliberation required to move coherently from thought to action.[149] This produces the physicist who either does not or cannot reflect on whether he should weaponize enriched uranium; the biologist whether the proposed experiments on primates are cruel; the investment banker whether he should skirt legal regulations to maximize his shareholders' profits; the diamond mine executive whether he should consider his company's impact on indigenous populations; the advertising executive whether he should foment inadequacy and desires in people for products they do not need or which might be harmful to them physically, morally, or spiritually. These examples would result from failing morally to norm the intellectual appetite.

It might be the case that without an agreed upon moral order according to which these kinds of questions can be indexed, the professor has little authority to guide students from potentially contested moral readings to approximate conclusions regarding moral action. Perhaps in the face of moral and religious pluralism, Fish has simply retreated to the classroom's supposedly amoral refuge. It is true that even when

[149] O'Donovan, *Self, World, and Time*, 71, 75–9.

the good is commonly agreed upon one may stumble along the uneven ground between description of the good and deliberation about the right. However, the concern at this point is simply Fish's denial that moral reflection, deliberation, and decision should accompany academic research and teaching. That will leave Fish's students, though, to develop the habit of practical reason on their own, if at all, given that they will not have seen it modeled by skilled academic practitioners. And if not on their own, then it will likely be peers, employers, and popular culture that will guide the student toward action, rather than the pastors, priests, parents, and therapists on whom Fish places the burden.

Fish's 'hedonistic avowal' and the University's 'non-aims'

Fish not only excludes from the classroom the disciplined practice of ethical deliberation and decision, but he also contends that universities and professors are incompetent to shape the more general moral, political, and existential character of students. The role of education is not to make students into good democratic citizens, whether liberals or conservatives, believers or unbelievers, creative thinkers, social justice activists, morally capacious persons, or liberally tolerant ones. Its task is not to explore the "art of living" or the good life with students. For Fish, the end of education does not include a life well lived, human flourishing, *eudaimonia*, or even a concern to correlate action with knowledge and conviction. Its provenance is not beliefs, identities, moral states, character formation, existential transformation, or concrete acts of any sort that do not pertain directly to the life and health of the academic organism and its activities. [150] Even further, Fish questions whether the knowledge and intellectual formation gained in

[150] *Save the World*, 11, 13, 67–68.

academic settings has any bearing upon students' moral lives: "You will not resolve to do this or that in your ethical life *because* you delivered a judgment on utilitarianism or deontology in your seminar paper."[151] With statements like this, he passes from establishing norms for the public life of the university to establishing normative expectations for the private lives of students.

Though Fish appears to exclude ethical deliberation and moral formation from research institutions by definition, he allows that they can and do take place within religiously based institutions. This caveat implies that academic research and teaching are not inherently inimical to moral concerns, but simply that certain academic traditions, like the secular research university that promotes doctrinaire religious and moral pluralism, are unconcerned or unable to bring them together. This also casts some doubt on his claim that students will not act on the basis of what they learn in the classroom. If students can and do in private, religious institutions, why not students in public, secular ones, as well? Furthermore, it seems that many people do move from intellectual understanding to ethical resolve, whether that takes them to veganism, socialism, environmental activism, racial justice, or to Christianity, Islam, Marxism, or Buddhism, or to the practice of medicine, law, education, or politics in pursuit of the common good and a just order. That research professors like Fish do not witness their students commit themselves to live in ways consonant with their knowledge,

[151] Fish, "I Know It When I See It," 80.

understanding, or convictions may be because their teachers have not helped them develop their practical reasoning, moral deliberation, or moral imagination.[152]

Instead, Fish approves of the well-known summary University of Chicago political science professor John Mearsheimer gave to incoming freshman during the University's annual "Aims of Education" speech in 1988. In it, Mearsheimer asserts that among the university's "non-aims" are "truth and morality:"

> Not only is there a powerful imperative at Chicago to stay away from teaching the truth, but the University … makes little effort to provide you with moral guidance. Indeed it is a remarkably amoral institution. I would say the same thing … about all other major colleges and universities in the country. … Moreover, you will take few classes here at Chicago where you discuss ethics or morality in any detail, mainly because those kind of courses do not exist.

"That burden," he concludes, "falls squarely on your shoulders,"[153] because "the faculty invariably leave it to students to figure out their own answers to moral questions."[154]

Fish also claims that no one chooses a particular field of study or profession because of moral or philosophical convictions. Instead, people simply find themselves

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[152] Alasdair MacIntyre, like Hadot, thinks these skills integral to education: "What education should be about is the transformation of students' conceptions of their goals. … The desires that people bring to their education are ones which they are going to have to modify, or even abandon, if they are to acquire the intellectual and moral virtues." Alasdair MacIntyre, "Values and Distinctive Characteristics of Teaching and Learning in Church-Related Colleges" (unpublished manuscript), quoted in Stanley Hauerwas, "The Pathos of the University: The Case of Stanley Fish," in Kiss and Euben, *Debating Moral Education*, 127–8, fn. 14.

[153] John Mearsheimer, "The Aims of Education." *Philosophy and Literature* 22.1 (1998), 149 – 150.

[154] John Mearsheimer, "Mearsheimer's Response: Teaching Morality at the Margins," in ibid., 195. Several University of Chicago professors might balk at this characterization, including Nussbaum—a University of Chicago professor at the time—as well as Hannah Arendt, Allan Bloom, Leon Kass, James Gustafson, Stephen Toulmin, and others

doing something, and attempt to justify it *in medias res* through "platitudes of disciplinary self-congratulations." [155] Fish's justification for his own work—his "hedonistic avowal," as Stanley Hauweras calls it[156]—is similar: "I like the way I feel when I am doing it."[157] This statement, which harnesses the intellectual appetite to pleasure, is a defense of *curiositas* and seems hard to reconcile with Fish's insistence that the pursuit of truth, rather than pleasure, drives the academic community. Perhaps Fish means that the pleasure a person derives from pursuing truth through academic research leads them to join the academic enterprise, but even so, Fish intentionally refrains from justifying this kind of pleasure as good. He simply states that it is, and that anyone who pursues it knows it is. Conceived this way, education resembles not virtue, to which he compared it above, but rather relationships, sports, or hobbies, activities in which a person might participate simply because the participation is pleasurable. But even particular goods like these must be defended as goods and distinguished from other more salacious pleasure-producing activities. In the case of formal education, the extraordinary time, expense, and resources it requires, as well as the existence of other goods left unpursued, press it to offer a greater defense than simply private pleasure, even though delight in learning is, when placed alongside other goods and ends, an important and valid result of learning. Furthermore, if research, education, and the activities of the intellectual appetite cannot identify and defend their appropriate moral ends, it seems likely that other forces—economic, political, military, ecclesial, social,

[155] Fish, *Professional Correctness*, 113.
[156] Stanley Hauerwas, "The Pathos of the University," 100.
[157] Fish, *Professional Correctness*, 110..

cultural, even criminal—will happily and easily commandeer formal education and educated students to serve their interests.

This leaves open the question why anyone would support the university so that Fish can derive pleasure from reading Milton, or why a person would pursue education if the only end its skilled practitioners can offer is pleasure and the uncritical affirmation or indifferent toleration of whatever ends the student has chosen to pursue before she matriculated. When Fish laments the decline of the Humanities in a *New York Times* editorial, he dismisses arguments for its moral, social, economic, or political utility, but simply complains about the loss of jobs and chides "presidents and chancellors" for failing to "proclaim the value of liberal arts education loudly and often." Unfortunately, Fish's editorial also fails to proclaim its value.[158] He manifestly fails to help his readers discover the meaning or significance of the Humanities, or the intellectual appetite in general, other than as the means to unstable employment and a professional career. For his part, Mearsheimer is much clearer, if more crass, than Fish's Epicurean agnosticism about the ends of education. Mearsheimer states:

> A Chicago education … means that you are likely to make lots of money over the course of your lifetime. To be perfectly candid, a Chicago education is a meal ticket. … It markedly increases the prospects that you will be financially well-off in the years ahead. I might add that virtually all of the faculty I know at Chicago who have children think essentially the same way. They too want their children to go to the best schools so that they can achieve an upper-class lifestyle. … The fact that a degree from here increases the prospects that you will make a lot of money, and maybe even become very rich, is … great news.[159]

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[158] Stanley Fish, "The Crisis of the Humanities Finally Arrives," New York Times (11 October 2010): http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/the-crisis-of-the-humanities-officially-arrives/?_r=0, accessed 12 June, 2015.

[159] Mearsheimer, "Aims of Education," 152. See responses to Mearsheimer by Michael L. Hall, "What Are We Teaching About Morality by Not Teaching Morality?";

Though Fish appears to be a fairly well-inculturated citizen of the research university as envisioned by Humboldt and others, his appeal to personal pleasure is a departure from the beneficial and communal endeavour Humboldt envisioned for scholars in his research university:

> Specialized science, [Humboldt] claimed, gave the scholar a moral orientation, a source of meaning and authority, and made him a member of an ethical community: a community of researchers who were contributing to a human knowledge project brick by brick, technical insight after technical insight. The university was his home, church, and nation. … Above all, science entailed a devotion to something that exceeded the self: science. The university would not need the church, the state, ancient Greece, or any other sources for its norms—science would serve as the normative source for the university.[160]

However, this raises questions both for Fish and for academic research that functions like a moral ontology and intellectual teleology.

In Wellmon's summary above, it appears that Humboldt thought that participation in the project of scientific research (i.e. research in any discipline conducted according to analytical methods) contributed to the broad advance of human knowledge and embedded the scholar within a formative community—themes that recur throughout Wellmon's narrative. Fish asserts that students should be introduced to traditions and equipped with disciplinary skills, but he does not identify the significance or meaning of this introduction either with the good of participatory membership in a community nor the satisfaction of contributing to the trans-historical advance of knowledge. The larger question to be put to Humboldt and his heirs is whether

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Eva T. H. Brann, "When Does Amorality Become Immorality?"; and Patrick Henry, "The Benefits of an Amoral Education," in *Philosophy and Literature* 22.1 (1998).

[160] Chad Wellmon, "Knowledge, Virtue, and the Research University."

specialized research, even within a community and for the sake of knowledge, be it in theoretical physics, Homeric textual criticism, Sumerian philology, or ancient ornithology, offers its devoted practitioners a satisfactory source of meaning and significance, especially given the ascetic sacrifices it requires. Is devotion to the *telos* of unending scientific advance adequate or any more ennobling than Fish's intellectual hedonism? Perhaps, but Wellmon identifies some of the dissatisfaction that plagued even its most devoted early practitioners:

> Specialized science or *Wissenschaft* may well have proven to be an insufficient resource to sustain the longings for unity and purpose that its idealist and romantic forbears endowed it with. It may well have been an inadequate replacement for the manifestly religious-based practices that offered a comprehensive way of life. … Doubts about the validity and sufficiency of science as a distinct form of life intersect with questions surrounding secular forms of knowledge.[161]

Despite these early misgivings, the tradition of academic research, into which students are apprenticed and socialized, continues unabated.

Even if teachers and professors abdicate responsibility for the moral and personal formation of a student, that student herself ought not be blithe or obtuse, given her natural interest in her own flourishing, and given that moral formation, of one sort or another, will occur. Every end that a person seeks through her actions recursively shapes her personally and morally in the pursuit of that end, in part because it habituates her to value, desire, and choose certain goods and ends over others. This point is crucial for understanding how choosing some ends of education over others morally forms the intellectual appetite. Furthermore, as Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue*, Christian Smith

[161] Wellmon, *Organizing Enlightenment*, 258.

in *Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture*, and James Hunter in *The Death of Character* argue, moral formation happens irrespective of the explicit teaching of ethics or morality, but comes with participation in activities like learning and education, and in cultures and institutions like schools and universities.

> Human persons nearly universally live in social worlds that are thickly webbed with moral assumptions, beliefs, commitments, and obligations. … These morally constituted and permeated worlds exist outside of people, in structured social practices and relationships within which people's lives are embedded. They also exist "inside" of people, in their assumptions, expectations, beliefs, aspirations, thoughts, judgments, and feelings. There is nowhere a human can go to escape moral order.[162]

These moral orders, concretized in practices, institutions, and popular ideas, implicitly and explicitly shape a person's assumptions, beliefs, morally imaginable possibilities, epistemic plausibility structures, desires, and feelings. This formation happens through the person's exposure to and participation in the rituals, practices, expectations, narratives, heroes, and even mottoes associated with the institution.[163]

Though Smith and Hunter show that people often critically appropriate elements from more than one moral order in which they are embedded, and so are capable of actively resisting the monolithic domination by one or another, nevertheless, MacIntyre wonders,

> are there or might there be types of social structure that would prevent those who inhabited them from understanding themselves as moral agents? … Are there or might there be types of social structure that seriously threaten the possibility of

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[162] Christian Smith, *Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8. See also James Davison Hunter, *Death Of Character: Moral Education In An Age Without Good Or Evil* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 16.

[163] Hunter, *Death of Character*, 25–26. MacIntyre defines this idea of a "practice" in *After Virtue*, 175.

understanding oneself as a moral agent and so of acting as a moral agent?[164]

MacIntyre worries that monolithic moral orders insulate the moral self and condition it to compartmentalize and maintain multiple, and sometimes conflicting, moral identities and obligations. These derive from the roles dictated by atomistic morally ordered contexts like the research university, corporation, military, or nation-state.[165] Fish's argument that moral deliberation and decision should be studiously restricted from academic intellectual activity threatens to nurture this morally insulated and fractured self. As MacIntyre argues,

> To insist upon terminating one's practical reasoning whenever it directs one beyond one's role requires a peculiar kind of self-discipline. To be able to restrict one's practical reasoning to what will enable one to discharge the responsibilities of one's socially approved roles is to have imposed on one's thinking a set of artificial restrictions. It is to have arbitrarily closed one's mind to certain possibilities of action. … The divided self of a compartmentalized social order … has to have developed habits of mind that enable it not to attend to what it would have to recognize as its own incoherences, if it were to understand itself apart from its involvements in each of its particular roles in each distinct sphere.[166]

Thus schools and universities, professors and classrooms, cannot help but foster morally formative cultures, despite their best attempts to do otherwise. These moral cultures may, if Fish's strictures were enforced, generate morally incoherent, compartmentalized persons. A school that consciously attempts to take no active role in the moral formation of its students already communicates to students that moral formation is a private,

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[164] Alasdair MacIntyre, "Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency." *Philosophy* 74.3 (1999), 314.

[165] Ibid, 324.

[166] Ibid, 326.

individualistic, voluntarist, disjunctive affair that either is not or should not be the concern of the community within which he or she is embedded.

Conclusion

Nussbaum and Fish each offer versions of significant moral ends of education. Nussbaum emphasizes moral formation and service to the political order, while Fish emphasizes the inherent good and pleasure of research and intellectual activity. Though questions emerge concerning both of their accounts, these moral goods and ends should not be lost sight of, even if they will be modified in what follows.

Like Nussbaum, and most others who write on education, Fish offers extensive instruction to the professor and institution about what they ought to do, and to the state about how it ought to relate to the academy. However, both Nussbaum and Fish fail to address the individual learner or offer persuasive reasons why the individual should adopt and commit herself to either educational vision. Neither of these teachers explain why a person should care so deeply about his formation into the ideal liberal democratic citizen, however useful, or why he should begin a difficult educational journey that ends with his own afternoon's delight, however refined, or why the abstract concept of "scientific progress" is a worthy object of a life's devotion, however fascinating. Further, they also fail to offer a description of the catechesis, development, and exercise of the intellectual appetite after a person's formal education has ended, after the democratic citizen has been formed, the scholar established, the MBA employed, and the civil servant placed. This reveals the need for an account that addresses the existential concerns of the learner alongside accounts that describes how formal academic institutions should form students while they have them.

Though Fish is a critic of modern liberalism, his account of the university is similar to Nussbaum's account of the political order. Nussbaum claims that the state can make no judgment on each citizen's comprehensive doctrine, therefore it cannot attempt to shape or form citizens into any particular morality other than what supports the liberal democratic order itself. Fish claims that the modern research university should make no judgment and attempt no moral formation other than what contributes to the ongoing life of the university. In both cases, the institution, whether the state or the university, refuses to attempt moral and personal formation other than what narrowly contributes to its own well-being. In a pluralist culture that lacks agreement about moral norms, Nussbaum and Fish have chosen to describe moral and intellectual formation within carefully circumscribed traditions and institutions. Whereas Nussbaum's account appears to compartmentalize the virtues, Fish's account appears to compartmentalize the person.

Several questions have emerged through the critical analysis of Nussbaum and Fish in these two chapters. One, should education include moral formation along with intellectual formation? Two, should the intellectual appetite be tempered, constrained, or ordered by moral goods? Three, are contemporary state–sponsored schools, colleges, and universities competent to form students morally, especially in a plural context of competing comprehensive doctrines that yield competing moral claims? Four, to which sphere, narrative, or institution should education be indexed: a compassionate world citizen in a liberal, democratic state, or a skilled disciplinary scholar in a morally neutral research university? Or are these adequate options? Are Nussbaum's and Fish's accounts

of the existence, practice, and formation of the intellectual appetite sufficient for Christian ethics and moral theology such that little more needs be offered by way of guidance for people who have been, are being, and will be shaped by the academic institutions that Nussbaum and Fish both represent and hope to perpetuate? Are there important moral and theological truths lacking from their accounts and from the institutions to which they would have the intellectual appetite pledge fealty?

Moral formation and orientation of the intellectual appetite is important since by and large the Christian tradition has not considered the intellectual appetite and the acquisition of knowledge to be undifferentiated goods, but activities that can be turned toward virtuous or vicious ends and pursued through virtuous or vicious means. Even the chance of contributing to the increase of aggregate knowledge or scientific advancement seems inadequate, and should seem inadequate to persons who identify with a more comprehensive tradition like Christianity, which offers a compelling narrative and set of communally embedded practices, ideals, and models that can provide meaning and moral catechesis to the intellectual appetite. In what follows, we will ask the tradition of Christian Humanism, represented by three of its most influential and prolific educators, whether it can offer a more comprehensive narrative and normative description of the matrix of intellectual and moral formation. My question is whether this tradition offers a vision for learning and education that can not only encompass Nussbaum's political state and Fish's research university, but also other good orders and institutions like the individual, the church, and society.

Chapter Three
The Intellectual Ends of Education, Part I: Hugh of St. Victor and Philip Melanchthon

"This is our entire task—the restoration of our nature and the removal of our deficiency."[167]
Hugh of St. Victor

"All the arts are divinely revealed; they are God's gifts, and should be recognized as such. There is a certain godliness in knowing and cultivating them, but not in condemning them."[168] Philip Melanchthon

Introduction

The next two chapters investigate the thesis that knowledge served by education is a good that partially constitutes human flourishing.[169] Though Nussbaum barely mentions this idea in her accounts of education, a version of it serves as the entire justification for education in Stanley Fish's account. For Fish, it is sufficient that he and others find learning enjoyable. Intellectual activity need not be supported or framed by any further anthropological, theological, or philosophical reasons. Even the search for such supports is beneath the dignity of liberal education. One pleasing activity is as good as another, and for Fish it happens to be academic research that pleases. However, Fish's account does not explain whether he and others actually should be pleased with this activity.

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[167] *Didascalicon* I.5.

[168] Philip Melanchthon, *Paul's Letter to the Colossians*. Tr. D. C. Parker (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989), 46–47.

[169] Activities that partially constitute human flourishing are often described as "constitutive" or "basic" goods. See Robert Adams, *Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 14–20, 62, 83, 94; John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 23, 34, 61–69, 84, 105–6; Mark Murphy, *Natural Law and Practical Rationality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 100–135; Aquinas, *ST* I II Q. 1 A. 6; *ST* I II Q. 94 A. 2; *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, I.1.3; *Questiones Disputatae de Veritate*, Q.11 A.3; *Summa Contra Gentiles* III.37; *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* VII.13.

Such desires, pursuits, and pleasures might not be noble or worth the effort people expend on them. But Fish's account offers no way to adjudicate this possibility. Clearly, his sentiment hardly ennobles the pursuit toward which many people commit years of their life, nor helps them understand why those affections matter, why they should be followed, or why feelings of delight often attend the acquisition of knowledge. Nor does it persuade the skeptic that he should spend time learning when other pursuits offer more immediate pleasures.

On the other hand, in her works on education, Nussbaum makes scant references to the goodness and pleasure of wonder, learning, and knowledge and so misses a fundamental motivation for why people pursue education. Rather than appeal to governments and lawmakers concerning the political utility of liberal arts education for liberal democracies, she could appeal to students themselves concerning the inherent and delightful good of understanding and the intellectual virtues, given the kind of nature that humans have. Arguably, such an appeal might draw more people into the liberal education Nussbaum champions, since few will be persuaded to study the liberal arts or humanities in order to be transformed into an ideal Rawlsian liberal democrat. It could be that her Rawlsian political liberalism constrains her from reflecting on basic human nature, but her work on universal accounts of emotions, shame, and guilt suggest otherwise. Therefore, it is surprising that her educational writings largely exclude

references to the inherent goodness of learning and the affections of delight, joy, and satisfaction that accompany it.[170]

Though our three didascalic theologians indwell very different conceptual worlds from Fish and Nussbaum, and partially from each other, and though some differences will be irreconcilable, I hope to find areas of convergence between them. We may find that the Christian didascalic tradition offers Nussbaum and Fish theological supports for their projects that they might not usually employ, but which could make their positions more amenable to a wider audience. The Christian didascalic tradition might also offer Nussbaum and Fish alternative solutions to the problems they perceive inherent to learning and education in pluralist contexts. The recovery of this influential tradition for contemporary theologians and educators partially motivates this thesis as a work of *ressourcement*. On the other hand, we might find that the Christian didascalic tradition, as represented by three of its most important contributors, has something to learn from secular thinkers who normally operate in more religiously and philosophically pluralist contexts.

My goal in this chapter and the next is to analyse the three influential theologian-educators on their own terms. This will require scrutinising both their theological and educational works, bringing texts together that are usually studied in isolation from one another, and challenging some common interpretations. We must often explore the relevant theological foundations that give shape to their pedagogical works. Though

[170] For reflections on Nussbaum's insufficient account of "joy," see Hordern, *Political Affections*, 49–51.

these theologians are dedicated and influential educators, they are also theologians, and on this point they are no different than educational philosophers like Plato, Cicero, Locke, Rousseau, or Dewey, whose educational writings and practices are informed by their philosophical conceptions of human flourishing. In a more limited fashion, I will draw them into dialogue with one another in order to identify points of overlap and divergence.

As one might expect, Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman plot the desires and activities of the intellectual appetite within the capacious framework offered by the Christian doctrines of creation, reconciliation, and redemption. They demonstrate how the activity of the intellectual appetite coheres with a theological account of reality. This provides people who identify with the Christian tradition ways to think theologically about the ubiquitous human desire for knowledge and the ways it is ordered, disordered, and reordered. Though their accounts are not identical, common threads can be teased out of their works and woven together into a fairly coherent picture. Even when the weave is not seamless, the differences prove illuminating and invite critical reflection. Among the anthropological pictures woven from the warp and woof of their texts is that of a human person created to know certain things, to know in a certain way, and to be partially perfected and satiated in that knowing.

From *Esse* to *Pulchrum Esse*: Hugh of St. Victor

We begin with Hugh, the earliest of our three didascalic theologians. He considered education to be integral to the fulfilment of human nature and to salvation history because it satisfies a divinely given need, mitigates the intellectual and physical effects

of sin, and initiates reunion with God. Beginning with his account of creation, this section attempts to explain and evaluate Hugh's conclusion that "we are restored through instruction."[171]

In *de Sacramentis*, his systematic work of theology, Hugh identifies two works of God and introduces us to the theological superstructure within which learning finds its place:

> For there are two works in which all that has been done is contained. The first is the work of foundation [*opus conditionis*]; the second is the work of restoration [*opus restaurationis*]. The work of foundation is that whereby those things which were not came into being. The work of restoration is that whereby those things which had been impaired were made better. Therefore, the work of foundation is the creation with all its elements. The work of restoration is the Incarnation of the Word with all its sacraments. … Worldly or secular writings have as subject matter the works of foundation. Divine Scripture has as subject matter the works of restoration.[172]

Similarly, in *de Scripturis*, Hugh identifies "the subject matter of all [non-scriptural] writings" with the work of creation, and the subject matter of Scripture with the work of restoration.[173] According to these passages, all things can be identified either with creation or with restoration. The incarnation, sacraments, and Scripture, or things directly related to these, remedy or mitigate the impairing effects of the fall. Other writings, cultural practices, and institutions have little or nothing to do with restoration, but are identified exclusively with creation.

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[171] Ibid, I.1. See also I.7.

[172] *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith: De Sacramentis.* Tr. Roy Deferrari. (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007), Prologue II. In his earlier work, *De Scripturis*, Hugh describes the work of restoration as the work which "repaired that which was lost." This happened through the incarnation and "all his sacraments," including those that preceded the incarnation.

[173] Paul Rorem, *Hugh of Saint Victor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19.

However, Hugh does not consistently make the hard category distinctions these passages lead us to expect. Though he seems right to identify the work of creation and the work of restoration as the two most basic works of God, his account of their relation is more complex and integrated than these passages imply. Sometimes Hugh identifies disciplines and texts either entirely with the work of creation or restoration, but at other times he implies that the same disciplines and texts could be directed toward both ends. Paul Rorem also finds the occasional "sharp contrast between sacred scripture and other literature" not as evident in the *Didascalicon*, Hugh's primary work on education. Rorem also wonders how "the schema of works of creation and works of restoration" relates to the *Didascalicon's* integrated curricula.[174] I agree with Rorem that for Hugh, "the liberal arts concern not only creation but also the beginnings of restoration."[175] Rather than bifurcate texts and disciplines into exclusively pursuing one or the other, Hugh is much better when he demonstrates that every text or discipline is capable of pursuing either end. Whether their origin be God's work of creation or God's work of redemption, "the end and the intention ought to regard either the restoring of our nature's integrity, or the relieving of those weaknesses to which our present life lies subject."[176] Thus education could be a conduit for both kinds of God's grace Hugh identifies: "creating

[174] Rorem, *Hugh*, 19–22.

[175] Ibid, 25.

[176] Hugh of Saint Victor, trans. Jerome Taylor, *Didascalicon of Hugh of Saint Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), I.5: "This is our entire task—the restoration of our nature and the removal of our deficiency." See also I.7: "The intention of all human actions is resolved in a common objective: either to restore in us the likeness of the divine image or to take thought for the necessity of this life."

grace," which "implanted certain goods in founded nature," and "saving grace," which "restores the goods which nature … lost" and "inspires those goods which nature being imperfect has not yet received."[177]

With this large framework in place, we can turn to Hugh's description of human creation, and specifically his distinction between the "image" and the "likeness" of God in which humans were created. Following the Patristic tradition, Hugh identifies the "image" with the cognitive capacities of reason and understanding, and the "likeness" with the moral and spiritual capacities for virtue.[178] Being created in the image and likeness thus means that Adam was created spiritually sound with true and adequate, though not absolute, knowledge.

> We think that immediately on being founded he [Adam] received a perfect knowledge and understanding of truth; at least he received that which was *appropriate to first perfection*, and he proceeded to that not by study or any teaching over periods of time, but he received it simultaneously and immediately.[179]

Although impossible to know what the biblical author thought Adam and Eve knew, and though most scholars consider the "image" and "likeness" of Genesis 1:27 to be the emphatic poetic repetition of a single concept, Hugh is right that Genesis presents the first couple as intellectually knowledgeable, morally responsible, and spiritually attuned.[180]

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[177] *De Sacramentis* I.VI.xvii.

[178] *De Sacramentis*, Book I.IV.ii and I.IV.1. See also *Didascalicon* I.viii.

[179] *De Sacramentis*, I.VI.xii. Emphasis mine.

[180] In Genesis 2:16–3:24, the first couple appears capable of using language creatively, developing the garden, identifying species of animals, understanding moral responsibility, feeling sadness, pleasure, and guilt, and relating to the Creator.

Hugh explains that this "perfect understanding of truth" was comprised of a threefold knowledge, first, "of the Creator that he might know by whom he had been made," second, "of himself that he might know that he had been made and what should be done by him," and third, of "what had been made with him and what was to be made by him from it and in it."[181] Similarly, in his *Epitome*, he writes,

> Philosophy rightly spends every effort on three things. The first is the investigation of man; this is necessary that man may know himself and recognize that he has been created. Next, when he has begun to know himself, let him investigate what that is by which he was made. Last, let him, as his practice, begin to meditate on the marvelous works of his maker, so that he may equally understand what it is that was made with him and for his sake. By this triple way the search for wisdom runs toward its end. The end of all philosophy is apprehension of the highest good [*summi boni*], which lies in the Maker of all things alone.[182]

Thus Adam was created with intellectual and moral knowledge of God, himself, other persons, and the non-human creation.

Three points are worth noting in this developing picture. First, Hugh explains that the rational soul was created with the ability to contemplate both the visible, physical world and the invisible, spiritual world. In the *Didascalicon*, he describes this as the "soul's marvellous power" and the "dignity of our nature" which all possess equally.[183] However, man's original knowledge was only complete with regard "to first perfection," that is, he was given truthful knowledge, but was not given the totality of knowledge. Originally, he was, in Coolman's phrase, in "an imperfect state of partially formed

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[181] *De Sacramentis*, I.VI.xii.

[182] Roger Baron, ed., "Hugonis de Sancto Victore *Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam:* introduction, texte critique, et notes," *Traditio* XI (1955), 107; *Didascalicon*, n.5, 177.

[183] *Didascalicon* I.i.

being."[184] His knowledge was true, but not comprehensive. Instead, he was expected to continue learning within all three categories: God, humanity, and the non-human creation.[185] For Hugh, therefore, the need and desire to learn was original. Second, even though limited, Adam's knowledge, whether gained through reason "within" or through the senses "without," was a good that brought him "refreshment" and "joy."[186] This assertion—that learning delights and refreshes—is not surprising given Hugh's exuberant and loving affirmation of the created world as an orderly and knowable gift of God.[187] Contemplative joy or delight is the natural correlate to loving affirmation.

The third point worth noting in Hugh's description of the thick relational order is that Adam and Eve not only recognized the relations, but also knew the vocational roles, responsibilities, and obligations that accompanied each of these relations, that is, "what should be done by him." With respect to Adam's relation to God, contemplation of the visible or the invisible often leads to admiration and through admiration to love of God. Such admiration and love are most likely when creation is most fully known: "For God would not be praised in all His works by the rational creature, if all the works of God were not known by the rational creature."[188] Ever-deepening and expanding knowledge

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[184] Boyd Taylor Coolman, *The Theology of Hugh of St. Victor: An Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 2010)*, 49*.

[185] *De Sacramentis*, I.VI.xiv. See also I.I.vi, xix; I.V.xix.

[186] *De Sacramentis*, I.VI.v.

[187] See Rorem, *Hugh*, 39, 45; Coolman, *Theology*, chapter 1, "Creation as formation," 33–46; Constant J. Mews, "The World As Text: The Bible and the Book of Nature in Twelfth-Century Theology," in T. J. Heffernan and T. E. Burman, eds. *Scripture and Pluralism: Reading the Bible in the Religiously Plural Worlds of the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

[188] *De Sacramentis*, I.VI.v.

of creation should lead to further admiration, love, and praise of the Creator. Regarding Adam's relation to creation, Hugh explains that God left the naming of the animals to Adam in order that Adam might recognize "the nature and the use and the offices of each from the reason implanted in him." Thus Adam should recognize and care for the diversity of creation. Hugh cites the negative rhetorical question in I Corinthians 9:9 ("Does God take care of oxen?") to argue that God does not care directly for the oxen, but gave that responsibility to Adam. "God left to man the care of oxen and the providence of other animals…so that for those from whom he had to received obedience, he might know also how to provide what was necessary."[189] Similarly, man's knowledge of himself meant not only knowing his obligation to obey and love God, but also his obligation of "providence toward his inferior."[190] These are remarkable statements concerning humanity's responsibility to know, love, and care for the non-human world. Despite the fall, Hugh thinks that humanity generally retained this knowledge of the visible creation.[191] Its absence from Scripture indicates its ubiquity. Thus knowledge and understanding of the world and of the relations in which mankind was placed is basic to humanity and should lead to increasing knowledge, refreshing delight, love and worship of God, and providential care for both the human and non-human creation.

Fall and Restoration: Three Evils and Four Remedies

According to Hugh, however, the fall into sin and God's subsequent punishment impaired humanity in three ways: the body became physically vulnerable and subject to

[189] Ibid, I.VI.xiii.
[190] Ibid, I.VI.xiv.
[191] Ibid, I.VI.xiii.

death, the flesh became dominated by concupiscent desires and subject to vice, and the mind became ignorant and subject to error.[192] These three—vulnerability, vice, and ignorance—are the "three evils to which human life is subject"[193] and from which human life needs to be redeemed. The panoply of divine and human responses to these evils saturates everything Hugh writes, and we can begin to see how the hard division he makes between "works of creation" and "works of restoration" fails to capture the way he draws works originally associated with creation into the service of restoration, and the ways in which the works of restoration focus on restoring the integrity of the original creation. [194]

In the *Didascalicon*, he writes,

> Consider these three: wisdom [*sapientia*], virtue [*virtus*], and need [*necessitas*]. Wisdom is the understanding of things as they are. "Virtue is a habit of the mind—a habit adapted to the reason like a nature." A need is something without which we cannot live, but [with which] we would live more happily. … Wisdom against ignorance, virtue against vice, and need against life's weakness [*infirmitatem*]. In order to do away with the three evils, we seek after the three remedies, and in order to find the three remedies, *every art and every discipline was discovered*.[195]

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[192] *De Sacramentis* I.VIII.i. Hugh is not clear what knowledge of the physical world was lost and what retained.

[193] *Didascalicon*, *Appendix A*, 152.

[194] Hugh's assertion that the arts and sciences respond to post-lapsarian threats was widely influential. See Richard William Hunt, "The Introduction to the 'Artes' in the twelfth century," in *The History of Grammar in the Middle Ages: Collected Papers* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1980), 132 n. 2; L. M. De Rijk, "Some Notes on the Twelfth Century Topic of The Three (Four) Human Evils and of Science, Virtue, and Techniques as Their Remedies," *Vivarium* 5.1 (1967), 9–11.

[195] Ibid. See I.vii, III.i, and V.vi. Emphasis mine. The line concerning virtue ("*virtus est habitus animi in modum naturae rationi consentaneus*") quotes Pseudo-Bede, *de Mundi Constitutione*, which is likely invoking Cicero's *De invention* 2.53.159: "*virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus*." A better translation of Hugh might be "virtue is a habit of the mind in the manner of nature in harmony with reason," which implies virtue is a kind of "second nature."

Man needs to restore the divine likeness in which he was created, and he can partially do so through "contemplation of truth and the practice of virtue." Fallen humanity can pursue these because it retains "something of that eternal fire of Truth, which … enlightens them to see a little way in their search for Wisdom."[196] That is, sinful humanity retains its original desire and capacity for truth. Quoting Boethius, Hugh explains that even after the fall, the mind seeks

> the most unfaltering grasp of things present … the understanding of things absent … the investigation of things unknown. … It belongs to this nature, too, that by things already known to it, it should seek after things not known, and it requires to know of each thing not only whether it exists, but of what nature it is, and of what properties, and even for what purpose … and searches rationally why the object exists as it does.[197]

We can now begin to see why Hugh thinks education integral to salvation history, and how it partakes of both the work of creation and the work of restoration. It contributes, one, to the fulfilment and restoration of God's image; two, to the amelioration of the effects of the fall; and three, as we will see shortly, to a preliminary and nascent union with the divine. This leads to his simple, if ostentatious, statement that "we are restored through instruction" or "learning" [*reparamur … per doctrinam*].[198]

Because "man resembles God in being wise and just," man can be restored through "contemplation of the truth," which results in wisdom, and the "practice of virtue," which results in justness.[199] This seems hard to reconcile with Rorem's assertion

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[196] Baron, ed., *Epitome*, 109–110. Quoted in Taylor, "Introduction," *Didascalicon*, 12. Here, Hugh uses "likeness" to refer to both the "image" and the "likeness."

[197] *Didascalicon*, I.3, quoting Boethius, *Commentaria in Porphyrium a se translatum* I.i.

[198] Ibid, I.1. See also I.7.

[199] *Didascalicon* I.8.

that Hugh presents the theoretical, practical, and mechanical arts "in terms of creation by itself rather than as part of the process of restoration,"[200] an assertion that chafes against Rorem's own statement, quoted above, that "the liberal arts concern not only creation but also the beginnings of restoration."[201] Alternatively, Coolman suggests that Hugh "conceives of all the arts as arising after the Fall, and in response to it," which situates the arts exclusively "in the project of restoration and reformation."[202] Both Rorem and Coolman may risk misrepresenting Hugh on this point. Instead, it seems that according to Hugh, persons are restored not only through instruction about the incarnation and God's work of spiritual redemption, but also through instruction about creation and all the arts, because these not only resist the deleterious effects of the fall in personal and public life, but they also fulfil man's desire to know and to indwell the natural world cognitively and creatively. That they developed after the Fall does not imply that they would not have arisen, as Coolman implies, had the Fall not occurred. Instead, they restore by helping the human and non-human creation to operate as intended.

However, given the Fall, the three remedies for the three evils of post-lapsarian human existence were necessary—wisdom, virtue, and need [*necessitas*]. To these, Hugh adds a fourth, logic, which serves the other three. These are the four "principal sciences" or "branches of knowledge," which together he will describe as "wisdom" or

[200] Rorem, *Hugh*, 39.
[201] Ibid, 25.
[202] Coolman, *Theology*, 151.

"philosophy," even though "wisdom" also describes one of the four individual sciences.[203] These four sciences "contain all knowledge" and "investigate comprehensively the ideas of all things, human and divine."[204] Thus they are bound up with both creation and restoration, playing a part in the original human desires to know the world, the self, and God, and in the divine and human endeavour to extirpate the "three evils."[205]

The first, "wisdom," mitigates ignorance through the theoretical arts of theology, physical science [*physicam*], and mathematics, the latter of which includes the quadrivium, the four *scientias* of arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. Here we see again the overlap between creation and restoration. Obviously, the physical sciences and mathematics investigate the works of creation but knowing them not only fulfils the created desire to know but also helps ameliorate the effects of the fall that left humankind cognitively ignorant and physically vulnerable. That Hugh has in mind theoretical knowledge of almost any sort, not just theological or religious knowledge, should be obvious. That impression is reinforced when we see him lauding as exemplary the focused, sacrificial, and life-long pursuit of wisdom by non-Christian Greek philosophers, including Parmenides, Prometheus, Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, Democritus, Xenocrates, Zeno, and even poets like Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, Tersichorus, and Sophocles. "Consider how much these men loved wisdom when not

[203] *Didascalicon*, I.11; Appendix A. See Roger Baron, *Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1957), 73–4.

[204] Ibid, II.1; I.4; See also n. 27, 183.

[205] See Hugh's *De Grammatica* and his immensely detailed *On Practical Geometry*; Rorem, *Hugh*, 41–45.

even decrepit old age could call them away from its quest. … I could wish that our students possessed such earnestness that wisdom would never grow old in them."[206]

The second discipline, "virtue," develops moral excellence and resists vice through developing the practical moral arts of individual "solitary" ethics, private "domestic" ethics, and political "public" ethics.[207] These first two arts—wisdom and virtue—"enlighten our ignorance" and "do away with wicked desire."[208] Together, they comprise *intelligentia* and represent "the restoration of our nature," which Hugh calls "a divine action" because they resist the dissolution of sin and contribute to the nascent restoration of the intellectual image and the moral likeness of God which humankind originally enjoyed.[209] Again, it is clear that works cannot be easily divided into categories of "creation" and "restoration."

The third category, the material response to "need," which Hugh describes as *scientia*,[210] includes the practical "mechanical arts" of fabric making, armaments, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medicine, and theatrics,[211] which are "necessary conveniences" that alleviate particular physical and mortal weaknesses that plague postlapsarian humanity.[212] Of these, Hugh notes, "Want it is which has devised all that you see most excellent in the occupations of men … so that we look with wonder not at

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[206] *Didascalicon* III.xiv.
[207] Ibid, II.19; Appendix A.
[208] "*Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam,"* in Taylor, "Introduction," 12.
[209] *Didascalicon* I.8.
[210] Ibid.
[211] *Didascalicon,* I.9; II.20-27; Appendix A.
[212] Ibid.

nature alone but at the artificer as well."[213] Together, the theoretical, moral, and mechanical arts address the three evils, but are complemented by the logical arts, the fourth discipline, which includes the trivium of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. These help people ascertain truth and communicate it effectively. By these arts, people learn to read, reason, and communicate well.[214] Together, the seven liberal arts—arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric—constitute "the best instruments, the best rudiments" for preparing the mind to acquire by its own efforts and enquiries the "complete knowledge of philosophic truth." By them, "a quick mind enters into the secret places of wisdom."[215] The end of education, for Hugh, is thus the limited reparation and restoration of humanity's original cognitive, moral, and physical integrity and well-being: "the arts are concerned … to restore within us the divine likeness," which means to partially restore and fulfil human persons according to their created nature.[216] They contribute either to "the restoring of our nature's integrity, or the relieving of those weaknesses to which our present life lies subject," both of which are goods worth pursuing.[217]

From wisdom to Wisdom

However, all this could make Hugh sound like a nineteenth century progressivist who optimistically placed the hopes of humanity in a program of moral and intellectual self-improvement. Instead, he makes clear that full redemption and restoration are effected

[213] Ibid, I.9.

[214] Ibid, I.1, 3, 11; Appendix A.

[215] *De Sacramentis*, III.iii.

[216] Ibid, II.i. Here, "likeness" appears to include both intellectual and moral attributes.

[217] *Didascalison* I.v.

through the work of Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the sacraments, and will be fulfilled in the eschaton.[218] Furthermore, even the first three chapters of the *Didascalicon* on the liberal arts and philosophy are followed by three chapters on reading Scripture according to its historical, allegorical-theological, and tropological-moral senses, the last of which, through the Spirit, most thoroughly forms persons into virtue.

For Hugh, study forms but the first of a five-step journey that includes meditation, prayer, performance, and contemplation of the divine, which together serve to realign the human person to the original order in which they were created.[219] In his extended dialogue between the Soul and Reason on vanity in *De Vanitate Mundi*, the Soul offers a delightful picture of what the life of learning at St. Victor must have looked like. The Soul describes young and old learning to speak and write new languages, illuminating manuscripts, examining each other's arguments for errors, learning arithmetic and geometry, plotting the rotation of stars, investigating plant and human physiology, learning to make music, and so forth. The Soul is quite taken with this scene: "All are united in their desire to make progress" in "the beauty of a wisdom which is eternal," a task "preferred to all other human activities." Reason, however, in this meditation on vanity, reminds the Soul, "What, then, does it profit a man to probe carefully into the nature of everything and understand it thoroughly" if he does not know where he came from nor where he is going "when this life is ended?" Reason takes the soul through a

[218] *De Sacramentis*, II.II.i-ii.

[219] *Didascalicon* V.9. See also Franklin T. Harkins, "Lectio exhortatio debet esse," in E. Ann Matter and Leslie Smith, eds. *From Knowledge to Beatitude: St. Victor, Twelfth-Century Scholars, and Beyond: Essays in Honor of Grover A. Zinn, Jr.* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 104–112.

similar dialogue regarding travel, labour, wealth, and marriage—other pleasurable pursuits to which the Soul might trust itself. That Hugh has Reason include "study" forces us to acknowledge that Hugh never substitutes the journey toward knowledge for the journey toward God—a move that would misuse the intellectual appetite.[220]

With this, we can see the various strands of Hugh's thought come together. Coolman rightly explains that "while the study of the liberal arts holds a genuinely important place, such 'philosophy' is not the primary or the central object of study." However, I am less convinced by Coolman's conclusion that because of this, the liberal arts are "*only preparatory*" for the study of Scripture.[221] I think they have a much more significant function for Hugh. Coolman stresses, "Hugh does not view the *artes* as an independent means of access to wisdom; rather they are taken up in the service of scriptural reading."[222] While Coolman is right that Hugh intends philosophy and the liberal arts to lead to the study of Scripture, their role is greater than being "only preparatory." Instead, they also partially fulfil man's created nature, serve practical ends, and provide access to wisdom and Wisdom. Most of Hugh's discussion of philosophy, wisdom, and the Son as the divine logos, reason, and Wisdom take place in the first half of the *Didascalicon*, which focuses exclusively on the four-fold account of wisdom and the various theoretical, practical, mechanical, and logical arts, rather than in the second half of the book, which focuses on Scripture.

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[220] *De Vanitate Mundi* I.v, in Hugh of St. Victor, *Selected Spiritual Writings*, tr. a Religious of CSMV (London: Faber and Faber), 1962. Hugh uses a journey motif reminiscent of Augustine's *De Doctrina* I.

[221] Coolman, *Theology*, 152. Emphasis mine.

[222] Ibid.

In Hugh's account, these four divisions of philosophy together constitute "wisdom." Participation in this wisdom also represents a partial and preliminary participation in the "Wisdom of God," that is, in the second person of the Trinity, the logos through whom humanity and the cosmos were created, and in whom they are held together.[223] As Jerome Taylor summarizes, "The need of fallen man for reunion with the divine Wisdom lies at the basis of Hugh's thinking on education."[224] Actually, it lies not only at the basis, but Hugh's neoplatonic vision of reunion with the Wisdom who created the world also lies at the end of man's knowledge of that created world. To know wisdom is to know Wisdom, Hugh might say, because, following Augustinian "realist" notions, he locates the original form or pattern of every created thing in the divine Mind, Word, Reason, and *Logos*, that is, in the second person of the Trinity through whom all things were made. [225] Christ is "the uncreated *Forma* of all created *formae*, the originary patterning, structuring, beautifying—in a word, forming—Wisdom within all created reality."[226] Thus even if ignorant of the true Trinitarian identity of Wisdom who is the Son, the pursuit of philosophy, the four-fold "wisdom" (the theoretical, moral, mechanical, and logical sciences), "is the love and pursuit of Wisdom." This pursuit

[223] See John 1:1–3; John 1:10; 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:15f; Hebrews 1:2. Coolman refers to this as Hugh's "sapiential Christology." *Theology*, 83. For a similar account, see John Scottus Eriugena, *Periphyseon.*

[224] *Didascalicon*, n.1, p. 175.

[225] Ibid. I.1. See also *de Sacramentis* I.IV.xxvi; Coolman, *Theology*, 36–7.

[226] Coolman, *The Theology of Hugh*, 84.

"appears like friendship" with the "living Mind and the sole primordial Idea or Pattern of things, because to its likeness all things have been formed."[227] As Ivan Illich explains,

> As with Augustine, wisdom was for Hugh not something but someone. … The wisdom Hugh seeks is Christ himself. Learning and, specifically, reading, are both simply forms of a search for Christ the Remedy, Christ the Example and Form which fallen humanity, which has lost it, hopes to recover. The need of fallen humanity for reunion with wisdom is central to Hugh's thought. … The ultimate remedy is God as wisdom. Arts and sciences derive their dignity from the fact that they share in being remedies for the same purpose.[228]

Thus, Hugh implies that all pursuits of wisdom for the sake of either the flourishing of the self or the alleviation of cares represent movements toward God. Coolman is right to insist that Hugh expects the study of philosophy to lead to Scripture, but his view seems narrower than Hugh's own, which does not limit the arts to their preparatory role for something else. More accurate is Jerome Taylor's conclusion: "For Hugh, the ultimate concern of the arts is with the changeless archetypal pattern in the divine Wisdom, to whose likeness the arts restore man."[229] Franklin Harkins concurs: "properly ordered reading in the liberal arts serves to begin to restore the original order of humankind as created in the image of God."[230] That is, the arts themselves represent an initial step toward re-formation into the image of Christ, the divine Form and Archetype.

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[227] *Didascalicon* I.2. See also Jerome Taylor, *The* Didascalicon *of Hugh of St. Victor*, 186 n. 39. In n. 42, 187, Taylor identifies "two postulates" of Hugh's educational theory: "the rational creature's exclusive assimilation to the divine Wisdom, and its natural capacity to contain the rest of creation."

[228] Ivan Illich. *In the Vineyard of the Text* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993), 10–11. See *Didascalicon* I.1.

[229] Taylor, 196 n. 2.

[230] Franklin T. Harkins, *Reading and the Work of Restoration* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2009), 73.

In this and many other ways, the *Didascalicon* aligns with and advances beyond Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*, in which the liberal arts and sciences are exclusively valued for their contribution to reading Scripture or teaching doctrine. Instead, Hugh, known as the *secundus Augustinus*, promotes the arts for their additional contribution to man's well-being through a nascent participation in the Son as *Logos* and Creator.[231] Jerome Taylor overstates the case when he writes that, for Hugh, "the pursuit of the arts becomes, in effect, convertible with religion."[232] They are not "convertible" in Hugh's mind, as if one could equally and without remainder exchange one for the other, but they do serve related ends: truth, goodness, restoration to beatitude, resistance to sin's disorder, harmonious understanding of the cosmos, gratitude to God, and so forth. "Twofold is the fruit of sacred reading, because it either instructs the mind with knowledge or it equips it with morals. It teaches what it delights us to know and what it behooves us to imitate."[233] Pursuing wisdom and reading Scripture are thus mutually reinforcing activities that are neither exactly parallel nor convertible, but which deepen and mature when bound together in a single person, community, or culture, because

[231] Harkins suggests that Hugh's *Didascalicon* may follow Augustine's *de ordine* and *de musica* in seeing the arts as restorative, and *de Doctrina Christiana* in seeing them as preparatory to the reading of Scripture. Franklin T. Harkins, "*Secundus Augustinus*: Hugh of St. Victor on Liberal Arts Study and Salvation," *Augustinian Studies* 37:2 (2006), 244–6. See also Grover Zinn, "The Influence of Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* upon the Writings of Hugh of St. Victor," in Edward D. English, ed., *Reading and Wisdom: The De doctrina christiana of Augustine in the Middle Ages* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1995).

[232] Taylor, "Introduction," 15.

[233] *Didascalicon*, V.6. Rorem suggests that "morals" refers to "study, meditation, prayer, performance, and contemplation." Rorem, *Hugh*, 32.

they serve at least one common end: the fulfilment, flourishing, and restoration of the human person.

Distinguishing Creator from creation

In summary, Hugh considers the pursuit of a broadly defined "wisdom" to be a good because, one, it fulfils a basic feature of human nature, in that humans were created to know and understand. Two, it represents a partial restoration of humans to their prelapsarian created form and resists the malforming effects of sin. Three, achieving wisdom represents one way of participating in Christ, the eternal Wisdom of God, through whom the creation came into being. Four, it prepares a person for further re-formation in and through meditation upon Scripture. The first two goods, which relate to the creation and restoration of human nature, and the last, which relates to meditation, can be more easily substantiated from Christian Scripture and tradition than the third. The third, based on an asymmetrical relation between wisdom and Wisdom, is rather more speculative.

Does accurate knowledge and understanding of the cosmos and its inhabitants represent a nascent participation in Christ, or does Hugh's account meld Creator and creation, and so attribute something to the acquisition of knowledge that is more accurately the exclusive work of the Holy Spirit, namely, participation in Christ? If Hugh's argument holds, then every person who knows anything could be said to participate in Christ, because Christ is the Logos and Wisdom of creation. If so, one could argue that increased knowledge is directly proportionate to increased participation in Christ, which seems to confuse the intellectual and spiritual realms. To be fair, Hugh does not think full restoration comes without the incarnation, Holy Spirit, and the

sacraments, but even so, we might object to the notion of even nascent or preliminary "participation" in Christ based on one's knowledge. However stimulating this idea may be, it blurs the important distinction between the Creator and the creation, and seems to ascribe to knowledge what the New Testament ascribes to the indwelling Spirit.

That said, understood in another way, Hugh's idea that the desire for penultimate wisdom represents the seed of a desire for ultimate Wisdom resembles Augustine in a sermon on 1 John 2:27–3:8:

> Because you cannot at present see, let your part and duty be in desire. The whole life of a good Christian is a holy desire. Now what you long for, you do not yet see: though by longing, you are made capable. For just as, if you would fill a bag … you stretch the opening of the sack or the skin … to make it capable of holding more: so God, by deferring our hope, stretches our desire. And by that desiring, actually stretches the mind. And by that stretching, actually makes it more capacious. Let us desire therefore, my brethren. … This is our life, that by longing we should be exercised.[234]

Hugh's thoughts on education could be interpreted thus. Not only would the desire for the four-fold wisdom fulfil natural human desires and needs, but it would also extend the human person toward full participation in Christ, in whom the desire for understanding would be fulfilled. Augustine and Hugh seem to suggest that the pursuit of knowledge will not end because it was never intended to end until it is satiated in Christ and the blessedness of eternal life. Thus, finally, Hugh's educational program cannot fully be understood apart from his mystical and theological framework, or apart from a person's intellectual and moral restoration that includes participating in the

[234] Homily Four on the First Epistle of St. John, 4.6

church and its sacraments, enjoying the indwelling Spirit, and morally ruminating on Scripture.

Therefore, we might conclude that though God is ultimately responsible for the works of creation and restoration, the arts and sciences of wisdom provide a way for human persons to participate in their own preliminary and proleptic restoration, which is teleologically ordered to its completion through grace and the Spirit.[235] Thus the arts possess, in Franklin Harkins' words, "nascent restorative efficacy."[236] This movement stands behind Hugh's decision to devote the first three books of the *Didascalicon* to the arts, which leads to the last three books on divine writings.

However, we can acknowledge this long journey and yet linger with the opening steps of it, in which wisdom is pursued through education in the four principal sciences, some of which serve temporal and practical ends. This allows us to identify the admittedly limited but no less real restoration and perfection such education offers, even to those ignorant of its redemptive *telos*, but especially for this who recognize its penultimate nature. This resembles the context of one of Hugh's most famous quotes: "Learn everything; you will see afterwards that nothing is superfluous. A skimpy knowledge is not a pleasing thing." [237] The immediate context is how historical or apparently insignificant knowledge enables one to understand those things which "are to be known for their own sakes." To that end, Hugh states that "I myself never looked

[235] *De Arca Noe Morali* I.ii, in Hugh of St. Victor, *Selected Spiritual Writings*. See also Coolman, *Theology*, 27.

[236] Franklin T. Harkins, "*Secundus Augustinus*," 221.

[237] *Didascalicon* VI.3.

down on anything which had to do with education," because knowledge of smaller and lower things contributes to knowledge and understanding of larger and higher things.[238]

A Beautiful Mind

Together, the four sciences carry the potential to provide intellectual and moral harmony to a person. Ideas like structure, harmony, order, form, and integration are central to Hugh's vision of humanity.[239] As persons are increasingly "structured" and ordered morally and intellectually, they move from "being" [*esse*] to "beautiful being" [*pulchrum esse*] and "blessed being" [*beatum esse*]— a move that mirrors the original ordering of creation from unformed mass to formed and ordered whole.[240] Hugh sees

> everywhere in created reality, but especially in the divine works of restoration, a gradual, beautifying reformation. And this is his genius: to mirror that perception in his own thought, by reducing intellectual confusion and chaos to orderly and coherent form … and thus facilitate individual and communal re-formation; and, by espousing practices that facilitate it, that result, namely, in *integritas*, *concordia*, and *pulchrum esse*.[241]

The concept of moving from *esse* to *pulchrum esse* is useful when considering the role knowledge and intellectual formation play in human life.

We might be born as "blank slates." We might be born with certain innate formal categories. There might be truths we cannot not know. Regardless, we are born in

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[238] Ibid.

[239] Coolman, *Theology,* 24–5.

[240] *De Sacramentis* I.I.iii. See also I.I.vi, and *De Arrha anime*.

[241] Coolman, *Theology*, 25. See also Boyd Taylor Coolman, "*Pulchrum Esse*: The Beauty of Scripture, the Beauty of the Soul, and the Art of Exegesis in Hugh of St. Victor." *Traditio*, vol. 58 (2003), 175–200. See also *de Sacramentis* I.I.xii, where Hugh states that beauty, as one of the Trinitarian characteristics of God, presents itself to creation under the form of wisdom [*Suscepit enim formam … sapientiae pulchritudo*]. Though the passage is opaque, it does reveal the intimate relation between wisdom and beauty that underlies his notion that as humans enter further into wisdom they move from *esse* to *pulchrum esse*.

ignorance, and as we mature and grow, we learn, but our learning is always partial and so limited, confused, erroneous, prejudiced, and disordered. We do not naturally "think straight" or think well. That does not mean our knowledge is not adequate in certain spheres or for certain tasks. Early on, we move from *esse* to what we could call *technicus esse* by possessing knowledge that is useful for navigating certain obstacles and performing needful tasks. Technical education, whether learning how to suckle a bottle, tie one's laces, dismantle a combustion engine, remove an infected appendix, exegete New Testament Greek, or fly an airplane is useful education whose end is outside the self. It is transitive education focused on an extrinsic problem. Historically, it has also been called "servile" education because it is task-oriented, functionalized training. As others have pointed out, including Nussbaum, many contemporary public policies, academic institutions, and business models are animated by the idea of moving human persons from *esse* to *technicus esse*, from being to technical being. The goal is a person capable of performing a skilled task or service, however complex it may be, which can contribute to the growth or development of some other entity, be it a corporation, business, economy, nation, discipline, or trade. Nussbaum's vision of education, on the other hand, could be described as the move from *esse* to *politicus esse*, education oriented to producing the right kind of citizen for politically liberal democracies. Fish's vision might be characterized as a move toward *scientificus esse*, education oriented to producing the disciplinary self of scientific research. My concern with each of these is their potentially reductionistic anthropologies. Instead, I am more compelled by Hugh's vision of the move from *esse* to *pulchrum esse*, beautiful being, which does not exclude

practical, technical, political, or disciplinary knowledge, but considers each of these within the formation of the person *qua* person, rather than simply *qua* functionary or skilled practitioner.

The standard accounts of beauty, *pulchritude*, inherited from Aristotle, suggest three characteristics of beauty: 1) unified wholeness, integrity, mature perfection, or full actualization; 2) relational harmony, coherence, or ordered proportion of the parts between themselves and with the whole; and 3) *claritas*, gleam, radiance, or the attractive qualities that arrest the observer's attention and affections.

Hugh's concept of *pulchrum esse* refers to more than simply a beautiful mind, but also includes moral, spiritual, and emotional beauty, each of which could be fostered to one degree or another through the educational experiences of an integrated human person. If we concentrate on the intellect, however, the classical characteristics of beauty help us imagine the beautiful mind. First, it is a mature mind that possesses a broad range of knowledge as well as intellectual virtues like patience, justice, discernment, docility, humility, and carefulness. It would not necessarily possess all knowledge, but it would possess a broad base of knowledge and would be able to recognize intellectual lacunae in itself. Second, the knowledge data it possesses are integrated and harmonized not only with other data in the mind, but also harmonized with the cosmos, that is, the intellectual data accurately represent or are proportionate to external reality.[242] The

[242] Hugh's reflections on music, adapted from Pythagoras through Augustine (*de musica*) and Boethius (*de Institutione Musica*) are suggestive of this. The music of the universe (*musica mundana*), of man's soul and body (*musica humana*), and of instruments (*musica instrumentalis*) should be consonant in their rational order, proportion, harmony, and integrated diversity. *Didascalicon* II.v.

beautiful mind also ranks and orders its knowledge, giving proportionately greater significance to knowledge that is more important either in itself, for the individual, or in a given circumstance. In that way, trivial or irrelevant knowledge is treated as such. Finally, the beautiful mind is fascinating and attractive, because it is able to order, harmonize, and present knowledge in ways that enlighten others or that reveal the hidden splendour of the subject matter. Such a mind induces wonder or delight in those who see it working or benefit from its activity.

Though my focus is on the intellectually beautiful, the morally, spiritually, and emotionally beautiful person is similar. Her emotional and moral characteristics are integrated and harmonized not only internally, but also externally. Her desires, activity, and affections harmonize with her identity and vocation as a created human being embedded in a four-fold relation with God, other persons, herself, and the non-human creation.[243] That is, her loves are ordered, and she knows, feels, acts, and worships in ways that are appropriate to each of these four categories of being. Such a person has moved from *esse* to *pulchrum esse* and represents an ideal form of human flourishing.

Education should not only help a person move toward *pulchrum esse*, or at least toward intellectual beauty, but should also nurture within the person love of this kind of person, and the desire to become this kind of person. For our immediate purposes, it means helping people both desire and cultivate a mind that is beautiful in itself, rather than one that is only useful for particular tasks and extrinsic ends. But do all forms of

[243] For a stimulating meditation on similar Pythagorean themes, see Stratford Caldecott, *Beauty for Truth's Sake* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2009), especially chapter three, "The Lost Wisdom of the World."

knowledge contribute to this incipient restoration and formation into intellectually beautiful being? Does the increasing harmony between cognitive understanding, moral virtue, and the cosmos include knowledge ostensibly unrelated either to God or morality, like agriculture, cartography, obstetrics, military history, and particle physics? It seems so for Hugh, and in this I think him right. Any true knowledge of the structure, forces, history, and life of the universe and its inhabitants represents that which humans were created to know. Even more so would education that focuses on forming the mind itself, internally and intransitively. This form of education is traditionally called "liberal" education in part because it liberates the mind to know and to think well.

In sum, we have seen that Hugh considers knowledge, intellectual formation, and education to be good because they represent the divinely intended exercise of one's rational capacity, contribute to the fulfilment of human nature, resist the consequences of sin by moving persons toward their prelapsarian intellectual integrity, partially reduce their physical vulnerability, represent a form of mystical union with the second person of the Trinity as the Logos of creation, and possibly lead, through affirming the good creation, to admiration and love for the Creator.[244] Thus knowledge can be affirmed as good, even if for Hugh it represents only one aspect of and one step toward humanity's complete restoration.

Philip Melanchthon: Philosophy the Creaturely Gift of God

Hugh's account of knowledge and learning may not be unexpected of a 12th century mystical theologian and educator, but what of a Protestant Reformer following Luther's

[244] *Didascalicon* I.i.

emphasis on *sola fides*? Does Melanchthon maintain a similar vision of incipient restoration and perfection of human nature through intellectual and moral formation, or does Melanchthon, as some interpret him, subordinate all learning and education to pragmatic ends? [245] We begin our investigations into Melanchthon's thought by comparing him with Hugh before we consider whether or not he affirms the pursuit of learning to be good for human persons given the nature they possess.

In this section, I will argue that Melanchthon shares Hugh's Augustinian understanding of sin and affirms intellectual formation through education, but does not consider knowledge and intellectual formation an activity of post-lapsarian "restoration." For Melanchthon, the "restoration" narrative suggests a person could contribute to their own salvific justification or sanctification, which he, along with Luther, rejects. In his Colossians commentary, Melanchthon maintains that redemption, restoration, and sanctification result only from the indwelling Holy Spirit. He acknowledges that the human persons can do many things—"eat, drink, walk, see, hear, and perform similar *psychika* [natural] actions … [like] fleshly and social righteousness … and the works of the law."[246] What a person cannot do apart from the Spirit, however, is love, fear, and trust God, or resist the devil's temptations.

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[245] For a good introduction to Melanchthon, see Irene Dingel, Robert Kolb, Nicole Kuropka, and Timothy J. Wengert, *Philip Melanchthon: Theologian in Classroom, Confession, and Controversy* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012).

[246] Melanchthon, *Paul's Letter to the Colossians*, 39–40, commenting on Colossians 1:15. See also Timothy Wengert, *Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon's Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Likewise, Melanchthon does not describe learning as a step toward the renewal of the image of God. He considers the "imago Dei" to be actualistic rather than static.[247] Commenting on the reference to "the image" in Colossians 3:9–10 ("renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator"), Melanchthon dismisses ideas that "located the image of God in the reason and in the old man."[248] Commenting specifically on Genesis 1:26–27, Melanchthon declares that by creating Adam in God's image, God made him "wise, and able to receive the Word." However, through sinning, "Adam did not retain God's likeness." Instead, it must be "restored to us through Christ, who was the true and natural image of God, and for whose sake God has called other men his image." The "image" that matters to Paul belongs exclusively to "the new man" upon whom God actively impresses the "forms" of God's wisdom, righteousness, truth, and holiness. "When God imprints these forms on us, *then* we are the image of God. … the new man is created after the likeness of God."[249] Only when "the heart" is "raised up through faith" and perceives the greatness of God's mercy and goodness can a person be described as "the image of God."[250] Thus, it is pneumatological identification with Christ and growth in the "knowledge of God which effects the image of God."[251]

So far, the prospect of consensus between Hugh and Melanchthon is not promising. Melanchthon implicitly rejects Hugh's understanding that the image was

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[247] See Kusukawa, *Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 95–97.

[248] See Augustine, *De Trinitate* 10.12.19; 14.8.11; Lombard, *Sentences* 1.3; Aquinas *ST* I Q. 45 A. 7.

[249] Melanchthon, *Paul's Letter to the Colossians*, 93–94. Emphasis added.

[250] Ibid.

[251] Ibid, 94.

retained after the fall, even if damaged, and that the true knowledge of "Philosophy" could effect a partial restoration of the image. In contrast to Hugh's vision of a person rising up to participate in Wisdom through the acquisition of wisdom, Melanchthon holds that the direction of movement is exclusively downward from God to man. Yet, just as I doubt Hugh's account of the split between a moral "image" and an intellectual "likeness," so too I doubt Melanchthon's account of the "image" as "original righteousness" that was lost in the fall. Though references to the "image of God" are notoriously sparse in the Bible, several passages—Genesis 9:6, 1 Corinthians 11:7, and James 3:9—assume that the image endures and predicate ethical norms upon it. Paul can describe persons being "remade" in the image of Christ without implying that they lost the original "image" of God.

The primary difference between Hugh and Melanchthon concerns whether the move toward greater intellectual understanding and clarity represents a restoration of original integrity and a partial post–lapsarian redemption of human persons or not. This point matters because we are considering the proposition that learning is an inherently good activity. Neither Nussbaum's nor Fish's accounts prove satisfying on the question of learning as a good, even if they both affirm it to be true. We have yet to see if Melanchthon agrees with the proposition, but we have seen that he disagrees with part of Hugh's reasons for supporting it. Our objective is not only to ascertain whether one of our thinkers supports education as an inherent good, but why they do so or not.

Despite Melanchthon's critical assessment of the prospects of human reason to achieve knowledge of God and of the will to autonomously respond in faith to God, and

despite Luther's famous disdain for Aristotelian philosophy and the pagan virtues, Melanchthon's praise of "natural" human reason and creativity is substantial.[252] "Philosophy," to the extent that it refrains from theological matters beyond its competence, "is a genuine and good creature of God. It is that genuine and reliable judgment of the mind in natural and social affairs, which God has given to human nature." God inspired the pagan poets and philosophers and preserved their books in order to provide humanity with knowledge necessary and useful for its well-being.[253] Melanchthon insists that "all the arts are divinely revealed; they are God's gifts, and should be recognized as such. *There is a certain godliness in knowing and cultivating them*, but not in condemning them."[254] This acknowledgment of "a certain godliness" implies both a divine blessing upon the arts and a natural fittingness in pursuing them. Though Hugh and Melanchthon differ on the "redemptive" element of education and on the status and function of the *imago dei*, they both affirm that the intellectual appetite's desire for truthful knowledge is basic to the created nature of human persons, and can

[252] See Martin Luther, "An Open Letter to The Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate, 1520." Trans. C. M. Jacobs, in *Works of Martin Luther: With Introductions and Notes, Volume II* (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman Company, 1915), Proposals for Reform, Part III.25; Jennifer Herdt, *Putting on Virtue* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 173–196; Kusukawa, *Transformation*, 32–36.

[253] See "On Aristotle," in Sachiko Kusukawa, ed., Christine F. Salazar, tr. *Philip Melanchthon: Orations on Philosophy and Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 204; CR, 342–9. Unless otherwise indicated, references to Melanchthon's lectures and essays refer to this edited volume of his work.

[254] Melanchthon, *Paul's Letter to the Colossians*, 46–47, on Colossians 2:8. Emphasis mine.

be pursued as an inherent good that contributes to human flourishing and enjoys divine blessing.

Knowledge: A Practical or Inherent Good? A Reply to Quirinus Breen

To test my assertion that Melanchthon considered education, broadly conceived, to be a human good, I turn to Quirinus Breen's charge that Melanchthon subordinated all philosophy and theology to the practical office of the orator, and had little regard for their inherent goodness. In his essay, "The subordination of philosophy to rhetoric in Melanchthon," Breen critically evaluates Melanchthon's 1558 "Reply to G. Pico Della Mirandola," in which Melanchthon defends rhetoric against Pico's condemnation. Breen not only recognizes Melanchthon's consistent emphasis on the practical utility of education and knowledge, but also charges Melanchthon with subordinating the practice and content of philosophy and theology to rhetoric and practical utility. This, he thinks, reveals Melanchthon's disdain for disinterested investigation.

> While it is a fact that Melanchthon has a genuine concern for the truth, his method of discovering it belongs less to philosophy than to rhetoric. He makes nothing of Pico's interest in the knowableness of things as such by contemplation and by logic. Nowhere in his *Reply* or in his other works does he praise contemplation; nowhere does he clearly indicate that through logic reality can be reached.[255]

Instead, Breen argues, Melanchthon assumes that nothing new had been discovered by philosophy, including "natural philosophy," since antiquity. The only motive for studying philosophy, therefore, was the instrumental desire to use classical wisdom to improve

[255] Quirinus Breen, *Christianity and Humanism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), 46. For a similar conclusion, see Edward P. Denys, *Philip Melanchthon's Unique Contribution to Education* (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, 1973), 183.

society. The issue is significant. If Breen is right that the evident subordination of philosophy, logic, and dialectic to rhetoric in the *Reply* represents Melanchthon's settled thoughts on the matter, this would imply that Melanchthon had little regard for theology, philosophy, mathematics, or natural sciences that could not be immediately preached, taught, or applied. Investigation and discovery would then be only instrumentally, but not inherently, good. This would settle our question negatively whether Melanchthon regarded the disinterested pursuit of knowledge to be bound up with human flourishing and beatitude. Instead, it would place Melanchthon among those who support education for primarily pragmatic ends.

To be sure, Melanchthon supplies the material for Breen's conclusion and not only in the *Reply*. Melanchthon praises anatomy because it enables medicine, natural science because it confirms God's providence; astronomy because it facilitates navigation; astrology because it predicts a person's moral struggles; mathematics and geometry because they serve architecture; literature because it models exemplary behaviour; theology because it enriches the devotional life, and so on. In the *Reply*, Melanchthon particularly criticizes and lampoons scholastic theologians because their "prodigious fancies and monstrous expressions" about "common nature, *hecceities*, distinctions concerning first and second intentions, about instants, and similar ravings" are opaque to everyone, including the scholastics themselves. They are "of no earthly use" in the commonwealth, the academy, the church, the law courts, or private life. Against such remote intellectual investigation, he quotes two ancient proverbs that give evidence for Breen's charge against him: "Do not labour in vain by doing things that are

of no help," and "what is incomprehensible is false." Instead, Melanchthon writes, "How much better would it have been to propose and expound principles with simplicity; [to show] how useful they are in judging, or in business, or morals, and in common life; [to show] how great artists have translated these principles into utility, and what poets, orators, and other great men have taken from them."[256] In his defence of philosophy in his Colossians commentary, Melanchthon invites his readers to "venerate philosophy," which includes the practical and useful arts, medicine, law, and architecture, as "God's gift to preserve life."[257] These passages support Breen's case that Melanchthon rejects disinterested study in favour of utility.

In reply to Breen, I acknowledge both Melanchthon's practical orientation and Breen's insights, even if I defend Melanchthon against Breen's final conclusion. To do so will require me to visit a few passages I have quoted elsewhere, but which will help us see either that Melanchthon was inconsistent, or that the particular essay under consideration, his reply to Pico's scathing attack on rhetoric in the name of scholasticism, is itself a rhetorically shaped piece of work in which Melanchthon overstates his case for the sake of effect—a technique certainly not unknown among orators of any day. In addition, I will argue that Breen overlooks many of Melanchthon's statements that undermine his argument that Melanchthon exclusively instrumentalizes knowledge.

First, we should recognize the historical context. Melanchthon's criticism of scholastic obscurity and intellectual fastidiousness is common among Renaissance

[256] "Melanchthon's Reply to G. Pico Della Mirandola," tr. Quirinus Breen, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jun., 1952), 417, 424.

[257] Wengert, *Human Freedom*, 83.

writers, who complain that excessive attention to intellectual precision and immaculate exposition comes at the expense of eloquent persuasion and moral inspiration. The claim is that whereas scholastic academics attended to arguments, renaissance humanists attended to people.[258] Furthermore, Melanchthon was primarily a teacher, evidenced in his two most famous works, the *Loci Communes* and the *Augsburg Confession* and *Catechism*. These were written and organized to achieve maximal clarity for the sake of communication. They were not speculative documents intended for other scholars, but pedagogical works intended to clearly communicate the teaching of the Lutheran Reformation.[259] Likewise, we remember that Reformation criticism of scholasticism was also partially intended to discourage people from medieval Catholicism, and move them toward the allegedly more egalitarian, accessible, and simple faith of the Protestant movement. Melanchthon's 1558 reply to Giovanni Pico della Mirandolo's 1485 letter, which championed scholastic logic over, in Pico's estimation, flowery and deceptive

[258] See Brian Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 266–267. For the humanist criticism of scholastics as sophists, see also Karl Hartfelder, *Philip Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae* (Berlin: A. Hofman & Comp., 1889. Reprint: Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1964), 155–60.

[259] The *Loci* significantly influenced Thomas Cranmer, was required reading at Cambridge University, and was chosen to catechize Elizabeth Tudor "as best suited, after the Holy Scriptures, to teach her the foundations of religion, together with elegant language and sound doctrine." John Schofield, *Philip Melanchthon and the English Reformation* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 160. See also Manschreck, *Melanchthon*, 83. On Melanchthon's collapse of logic and dialectic into a pedagogical method, see Walter Ong, *Ramus, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 158–60. On Melanchthon's *Loci* and Calvin's *Institutes*, see Richard A. Muller, "*Ordo docendi*: Melanchthon and the Organization of Calvin's *Institutes*, 1536–1543," in Karin Maag, ed., *Melanchthon in Europe: His Work and Influence beyond Wittenberg* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999).

rhetoric, should be understood in the context of an ongoing public controversy of no small consequence.

Second, as we have seen, Melanchthon does emphasize the practical value of the arts and sciences more often than their simple goodness or pleasure. He sometimes excoriates scholastic methods and subject matter, and he praises practical wisdom over theoretical speculation, even if by Aristotle or Augustine, and especially if by Scotus or Aquinas. Breen, however, goes further and charges that "nowhere" does Melanchthon "praise contemplation." Breen appears to have missed many statements from Melanchthon to the contrary, including the following passage, in which Melanchthon encourages his students to experience for themselves the inherent "pleasantness and sweetness" of astronomy:

> For each one the activity most appropriate to his nature is the most agreeable one … so men are necessarily affected by great pleasure when they *contemplate* the entire nature of things. … If we are born for that *contemplation*, it must needs be a pleasure.[260]

Here, Melanchthon explicitly promotes the contemplation that Breen thinks he discouraged, and he does so precisely because it is "most appropriate" to human nature. Similarly, in his preface to *Initia doctrinae physicae dictate in Academi Witebergensi*, Melanchthon insists that "men are endowed by their Creator with faculties fitted for the contemplation of nature." Therefore, they "delight in investigating the elements, the laws, the motions, and the qualities or forces of the various bodies, by which they are surrounded."[261] Elsewhere Melanchthon asserts that the "main characteristic of the mind

[260] "On astronomy and geography," 118. Emphasis added.
[261] CR VII, 472.

and its foremost function" is to reason, discern things, and perceive order,[262] and that a person unaffected by the sweetness of astronomy "and of knowledge" lacks a human mind.[263] Therefore, because honourable minds love nothing more than truth, he says, they desire a "genuine science of universal nature, of religions, of the movements and effects of the heavens," and so forth.[264] They enjoy "the computation of measures" because this "in itself delights," apart from any practical utility or applied moral, political, religious, or material benefit.[265] In fact, so far is Melanchthon from denying the inherent good of knowledge that he writes, "We shall rightly call happy the man who has comprehended all of philosophy in his mind, and understands the hidden causes of most changes in nature and in the lives of men."[266] At this point, we have clearly moved beyond Melanchthon the practical pedagogue.

In a discourse on anatomy, Melanchthon repeats his argument that education fulfils human nature. Because it is "altogether worthy of man to behold the nature of things," we should not "spurn the contemplation of this wonderful work of the world which is made with so much skill that it can be beheld like a theatre." Going further, and implicitly echoing Hugh, he writes, "Men are made for wisdom and justice, and true wisdom is the recognition of God *and the contemplation of nature*," which we should "examine with zeal."[267] Here, the investigation and knowledge of the created world is a

[262] "Preface to arithmetic," 96.
[263] "Preface to *On the Sphere*," 106.
[264] "Preface to arithmetic," 96.
[265] "Preface to Johannes Vogelin's *Book on the Elements of Geometry (1536)*," 99.
[266] "Preface to arithmetic," 97.
[267] "On Anatomy," 164–5. Emphasis added.

dignifying human activity for which humankind is especially adapted, and while wisdom includes the knowledge of God, it equally includes the zealous contemplation of nature.[268]

Rather than denying the constitutive goodness or delight of knowledge, something like the following from Melanchthon's discourse on anatomy more accurately represents his thought than Breen admits: "Although the sweetness of knowledge in itself attracts good minds, let us nevertheless also be moved by the greatness of the usefulness which is indeed before our eyes."[269] Or as Melanchthon writes elsewhere, "Both the dignity of the arts themselves and the public good should rouse us."[270] In these two passages, Melanchthon pairs theoretical and practical goods: sweetness and usefulness, dignity and public good. While Melanchthon at times excessively criticizes Aquinas and others scholastics, emphasizes the practical over the theoretical, and overstates his case concerning the utility of knowledge, it is not true that he has no concept of the fundamental goodness of knowledge or that he has no appreciation for intellectual contemplation. Contrary to what Breen suggests, Melanchthon regularly praises both the inherent delight and the beneficial utility of philosophy, theology, the arts, and the sciences.

Joy at the Inherent Goods of Creation

We can now see that, despite their theological and cultural differences, Hugh and Melanchthon agree that education and learning serve the human good and represent

[268] For similar in Hugh, see *Epitome*, Baron, ed., p 107; *Didascalicon*, n.5, p. 177.

[269] "On Anatomy," 159. See "On the Order of Learning," 7; "On the study of languages," 34; "Preface to Homer," 41; "Praise of Eloquence," 67.

[270] "Preface to Johannes Vogelin's *Book on the Elements of Geometry*," 101.

gifts of God given for the sake of creation's well-ordered flourishing. Even apart from revealed law or the Lutheran concept of "Gospel," humans are able, in Hugh's words, to exercise "the natural discrimination" between "things which were either to be sought or to be avoided."[271] In Melanchthon's words, people can know "the natural difference between things which are honourable and those which are base."[272] Citing Romans 2:15, Melanchthon explains that the divine law was grafted into human nature, and when the mind is properly instructed or provoked it is able to "recognize the first principles of action and embrace them" in order to distinguish between the noble and the shameful.[273]

Melanchthon argues that besides the intellect's morally discriminating powers of perception, the affections are also morally attuned to feel life-giving "joy that rests in its object" when a person encounters "goods." These "goods" include "uncreated good" like God; "created goods" like wisdom, justice, and order; "honourable created goods" like chastity; "useful goods" that preserve life; or "pleasant goods" like beauty or a cold drink on a dry tongue. When people encounter any of these "goods," properly ordered affections should experience "joy that rests in its object." On the other hand, he continues, the affections naturally experience, or should experience, grief and a "fettering" weariness when facing "natural evil" like the absence of wisdom or justice,

[271] *De Sacramentis* I.VI.vii.

[272] Philip Melanchthon. *The Chief Theological Topics*. *Loci Praceipui Theologici 1*559. Tr. J. A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2011, Locus 6, "The Divine Law: Natural Law."

[273] Ibid.

the presence of disease, destruction, or death, or the commission of "moral evil" as a "privation of righteousness" or departure from God's law.[274]

Unfortunately, Melanchthon does not offer many examples of these various categories. We might wish he had expanded on "honourable created goods" (since it is not clear why he identifies "chastity" as something "created" or what else he might include in this category), and "pleasant" or "sweet" goods [*bonum suave*] (since it would be interesting to know what other goods Melanchthon found delightful or refreshing). One of the pleasant goods he identifies is "beauty," because it evokes "joy in the mind" upon perceiving "order and agreement with God or nature"—a definition of beauty similar to the one we considered with respect to Hugh's notion of *pulchrum esse* above. Melanchthon's definition implies he recognizes the inherent goodness of beautiful artistic creations and may indicate his knowledge of Aristotle's reflections on beauty in the *Poetics*. In any case, it contrasts with the popular image of Melanchthon as a refined but serious scholar entirely focused on practical affairs of state, church, university, and society. That he identifies beauty as a pleasant good that prompts the affective response of joy reveals that he could celebrate things besides education that do not have direct practical application, moral significance, or spiritual edification as their end. It also reveals that, like Hugh, Melanchthon could use the category of the "beautiful" to describe persons in harmony and proportion with God and nature. Both beauty and education resist having their value set exclusively by their utility but represent natural

[274] "Definitions of Many Terms that have been Used in the Church," in *The Chief Theological Topics*, Appendix 2, 517, 525–7.

and pleasing goods that are given by God and are constitutive of human flourishing. Though Hugh and Melanchthon differ on particular points concerning the *imago Dei* and the relation of learning to postlapsarian restoration, their similarity on the fundamental goodness of education and learning, given the kinds of nature humans possess, is clear.

Conclusion to Hugh and Melanchthon

What we were looking for in Nussbaum and Fish we now start to find in Hugh and Melanchthon. Though the following simplifies each of their accounts, Nussbaum's appeal seems to be: "pursue education so that you can be shaped into the ideal politically liberal democratic citizen," while Fish's seems to be: "pursue education if you enjoy being shaped into a disciplinary self for the research university." Whereas Nussbaum lacks a robust and sustained affirmation of the inherent goodness and delight of learning, so Fish lacks a defence of why learning should be pursued simply because some people find it enjoyable. In Hugh and Melanchthon, we find both of these. They not only insist that learning is a simple good, which is the common testimony of humanity, but also offer myriad reasons why it is so. Hugh's and Melanchthon's appeal is much broader and much more basic than Nussbaum's or Fish's: "pursue learning and education because you were created to do so, because it contributes to your flourishing by fulfilling your nature, because it may lead you to worship the Creator, and," at least for Hugh, "because it represents a partial restoration and redemption of your human nature." In short, Hugh and Melanchthon offer analyses of the intellectual appetite that are more capacious, explanatory, and inspiring than either Nussbaum or Fish. By grounding their appeal at least in part on human nature and the opportunity for flourishing, they offer a vision for education that does not reduce the person to a functionary of the political order, to a

hedonist within the research university, or to a skilled employee of the corporation. Instead, their accounts dignify human persons as ends in themselves who ought to pursue that which conduces to their inherent well-being.

Chapter Four
The Intellectual Ends of Education, Part II:
John Henry Newman and the Delight of Knowledge

"Such is the constitution of the human mind that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward."[275] John Henry Newman

Knowledge Is and Is Not its Own End

When we come to John Henry Newman, we are roughly 700 years beyond Hugh and 300 years beyond Melanchthon. One of the most significant differences between their times and his may be the emergence of the research university approximately forty years before Newman pens his most significant educational works. This means that even though Newman's time is much different than our own, he writes on our side of the great educational divide, even if he writes during its early days. We will see that he concurs with many of Hugh's and Melanchthon's conclusions, accepts the importance of scholarly research, and offers a more philosophically sophisticated account of knowledge and education than they do.

Like Nussbaum, both Hugh and Melanchthon contend against the proposition that education should exclusively serve professional or economic interests. Newman does so even more forcefully than his didascalic forebears, likely because the idea that "utility" is the end of education was championed more vociferously in his day than theirs. Building on John Locke's 1693 *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, the Edinburgh Review advanced the pragmatic view of education through a two-year attack (1808–1810) lampooning an Oxford liberal education. Two members of Newman's own Oriel

[275] *Idea*, 97.

College, Dr. Edward Copleston and Mr. John Davison, defended Oxford in a series of articles, from which Newman quotes at length in his *Idea*.

Newman devotes discourses V–VII in *Idea* to the type of intellectual formation he considers the end of university education and the perfection of the intellectual appetite. To understand Newman's contention that knowledge is a human good requires 1) distinguishing knowledge that is not an end from that which is, 2) synthesizing his attempts to describe the character and abilities of the intellectually virtuous mind, and 3) identifying how he supports his conclusion that education and intellectual formation are conducive to human flourishing. This requires us to draw upon multiple works, including his three volumes on university education: *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education*, also known as the "Dublin Discourses" (in *Idea*), *The Rise and Progress of Universities* (*RP*), and *University Subjects Discussed in Occasional Lectures and Essays* (in *Idea*). Only by reading these three companion pieces together, along with other minor sources, can we ascertain Newman's educational ideals.[276] We will also investigate two other works that address similar ideas, namely *University Sermons* (*US*) and *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (*GA*).

Knowledge Not Its Own End

Though Newman entitles Discourse V of the *Idea,* "Knowledge Its Own End," he makes clear throughout discourses V, VI, and VII that certain methods for acquiring and modes of possessing knowledge are not ends in themselves. He derides the mind that holds data

[276] See Mary Katherine Tillman, "Introduction," *Rise and Progress of Universities and Benedictine Essays* (*RP*) (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2001), XXVIII.

and trivia like a box holding a jigsaw puzzle. Such "passive" minds "measure knowledge by bulk … in the rude block, without symmetry, without design." They are "possessed by their knowledge, not possessed of it,"[277] because they have not actively sorted, ranked, and organized what they know. They have not thought, but only acquired. Everything is slotted equally alongside everything else as so many blithely perceived phenomena. This is "mere knowledge" possessed by trivialist "men of information."[278] These are like people who only see the coloured tatters and stitches on the backside of a tapestry but fail to discern the integrated beauty on the front. [279] This is not knowledge worth pursuing for its own sake.

One culprit is curricula that aims at breadth rather than depth, at passing tests and earning degrees, rather than integration, order, and synthesis. An academic institution that promotes this is like "a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill," impersonally churning out graduates rather than like "an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one."[280] It runs the risk…

> …of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study is not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement, which it is not; of considering an acquaintance with the learned names of things and persons, and the possession of clever duodecimos, and attendance on eloquent lecturers, and membership with scientific institutions, and the sight of the experiments on a platform and the specimens of a museum, that all this was not dissipation of mind, but progress. All things are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly.[281]

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[277] *Idea*, 125–6.
[278] Ibid, 115, 117, 121.
[279] Ibid, 196.
[280] Ibid, 129.
[281] Ibid, 127.

Newman identified these pedagogical trends not least with London University (now University College London), founded in 1826 as a "university without religion." According to Newman, it did not "rise to the very idea of a University" because it was "a sort of bazaar, or pantechnicon, in which wares of all kinds are heaped together for sale in stalls independent of each other." Students promiscuously jump from one disciplinary partner to another without committing to any of them. Each discipline is "strange to each, and about its own work or pleasure."[282] This broad but shallow mode of acquiring and holding knowledge, exacerbated by discrete and isolated academic disciplines, resulted in students who "leave their place of education simply dissipated and relaxed by the multiplicity of subjects, which they have never really mastered, and so shallow as not even to know their shallowness"—an enduring dilemma for higher education.[283]

Newman readily acknowledges that a schoolboy's duty is "to store up things in his memory. For some years his intellect is little more than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for storing them; he welcomes them as fast as they come to him." His studies are "treasures for a future day."[284] Such knowledge is "the indispensable condition of expansion of mind." However, it is only the first step, and never "the whole of the matter."[285] The maturing learner increasingly draws on these "treasures" to

[282] "1852 Discourse V," in ibid, 421. See also Newman, "University and King's Colleges in London," from the *Catholic University Gazette* (3 May, 1855), reprinted in William Neville, ed., *My Campaign in Ireland: Catholic University Reports and Other Papers* (Aberdeen: A. King, 1896), 325–34.

[283] *Idea*, 132. "If there is anything I detest, it is the superficial knowledge of many books." "Newman to Simeon (22 Aug 1864)", in *Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman* XXI (*LD*), 205.

[284] *Idea*, 127–28.

[285] Ibid, 129.

perceive their integral relations. This principle pervades each of our three Christian educators.

Clearly, Newman does not think that all knowledge, however acquired and held, is its own end or contributes to the intellect's perfection. He opposes the mass consumption of data that results in bloated cognitive obesity rather than a lean, capable intellect. This compels us to consider the kind of knowledge and intellectual formation Newman champions but struggles to define.

The Philosophical Habit of Mind

From his 1841 sermon, "Wisdom, as Contrasted with Faith and with Bigotry," the discourses and essays collected in *Idea*, and the *Grammar of Assent*, we can draw out three aspects of the type of knowledge and intellectual formation that Newman thinks worth pursuing: its names and constituent parts, its attributes, and its activities.

Newman opens Discourse VI of the *Idea* lamenting that, unlike Greek, no single English word sufficiently expresses the ideal of intellectual perfection.[286] Therefore, he employs a cluster of conceptually equivalent terms: "wisdom," "philosophy," a "philosophical habit of mind," "enlargement of mind," "intellectual culture," an "imperial intellect," "a wise and comprehensive view of things," and the "science of sciences."[287] Other concepts describe constituent parts of the ideal: intellectual *phronesis*, the "cultivated Illative Sense," "right judgment in ratiocination," "inference," and "assent."

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[286] *Idea* 124. The distinction between the moral and the intellectual is essential to Newman, despite Aquino's surprising assessment that "Newman does not operate with a discernable distinction between the theoretical and practical dimensions of wisdom." Frederick Aquino, *An Integrative Habit of Mind* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), 7.

[287] See *US*, 190, 192; *Idea*, 114.

This panoply of terms illustrates the argument from *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* that "there is no one aspect deep enough to exhaust the contents of a real idea, no one term or proposition that will serve to define it. … When an idea is very complex, it is allowable, for the sake of convenience, to consider its distinct aspects as if separate ideas." He illustrates this with ideas like "animal," "Platonism," "Protestantism," and "the rights of man," but could have included ideas like "the perfected intellect," "the educated person," or "the university."[288] His habit of employing a range of terms, even if necessary and enriching, can prove difficult for the reader. Though the phrase "a philosophical habit of mind" is not entirely satisfactory, it does emphasize the intellectual over the moral and makes clear the priority of formation over acquisition.

Even though Newman does not identify the Greek term that underlies his concept, it will help us understand him if we note the Aristotelian terms and concepts from which he almost certainly drew his idea. This requires navigating some of Newman's epistemological terrain that borders and defines his educational landscape.

Early commentators often overlooked Newman's deep indebtedness to Aristotle, but it is now generally accepted. Though Hugh probably only knew Aristotle's *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, Melanchthon repeatedly acknowledges his debt to Aristotle. Similarly, Aristotle was Newman's teacher with respect to intellectual formation, rhetoric, logic, and the concept of tradition. No figure wields more influence on Newman's educational ideas than Aristotle. Newman initially studied Aristotle's

[288] *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (London: Longman, Greens, & Co., 1909) 33–37.

Nicomachean Ethics, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics* as an undergraduate at Oxford. Edward Sillem recounts that Newman produced a detailed analysis of the *Rhetoric*, inscribed copious notes in his copy of the *Ethics*, wrote an article in 1929 on the *Poetics*, and collaborated with Dr. Richard Whately's defense of Aristotle in the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*.[289] Regarding logic, Newman writes, "The boldest, simplest, and most comprehensive theory which has been invented for the analysis of the reasoning process, is the well-known science for which we are indebted to Aristotle."[290] In *Rise and Progress of Universities*, he confesses that he thinks Aristotle "the most comprehensive intellect of Antiquity … the one who had conceived the sublime idea of mapping the whole field of knowledge, and subjecting all things to one profound analysis."[291] Likewise, Discourse V of the *Idea* includes the following encomium to Aristotle:

> While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or not, though we may not know it.[292]

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[289] Edward Sillem, *The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman*, Volume I. (Louvain, Belgium: Nauwelaerts Publishing House, 1969), 151–56. Sillem, 151: "To his studies of these works we can trace the origin of Newman's life-long reflections on our experimental knowledge of individual particular things. In later years these reflections developed into the distinctive Newmanian doctrine of the illative sense." See Newman, "Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's *Poetics*," in Newman, *Essays Critical and Historical, vol. 1* (London: Longman, Greens, and Co., 1907), 1–29.

[290] "Implicit and Explicit Reason," in *US*, 177.

[291] "The Strength and Weakness of Universities. Abelard," in *RP*, 195.

[292] *Idea*, Discourse V, 102. See also Discourse III, 59; "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," in *Idea*, 379.

Finally, after reflecting on intellectual assent to revealed religion in the *Grammar*, Newman writes, "As to the intellectual position from which I have contemplated the subject, Aristotle has been my master."[293] These passages, and many others, support Sillem's conclusion that we should "associate Newman's name immediately and for ever with that of Aristotle."[294] This excurses into Newman's Aristotelianism suggests the value of considering the possible Aristotelian ideas that underlie Newman's terms for the perfected intellect.

The two primary terms Newman uses to describe the perfected intellect are "wisdom" (*US*) and the "philosophical habit of mind" (*Idea*). In a May 1885 article in *Contemporary Review* defending his *Grammar of Assent* against charges of philosophical scepticism, Newman refers to Aristotle's distinction between *nous* and *episteme* from *Nicomachean Ethics* VI. *Nous*, Newman explains, is a faculty that complements the reasoning faculty by apprehending first principles and self-evident truths.[295] These truths, he explains elsewhere, "are our guides and standards in speculating, reasoning,

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[293] *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, edited by I. T. Ker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 277.

[294] Sillem, *The Philosophical Notebook*, 160–1: "He builds his entire position on principles which are no less purely Aristotelian for being purely Newman's as well." Joshua P. Hochschild, "The Re-Imagined Aristotelianism of John Henry Newman," *Modern Age* (Fall, 2003), 334–5: "Aristotelianism saturates *The Idea of a University*. … The Aristotelianism of the *Idea* is not just a recurring trope but an organizing principle." See also "Newman and Aristotle on the Aim of Liberal Education," in Mary Katherine Tillman *John Henry Newman: Man of Letters* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2015), 261–282; Andrew Meszaros, "The Influence of Aristotelian Rhetoric on J.H. Newman's Epistemology." *Journal for the History of Modern Theology / Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte*, 2014, Vol. 20 (2), 192-225.

[295] Newman, "Revelation in its Relation to Faith," in *Stray Essays on Controversial Points, Variously Illustrated*. Privately Printed, 1890, 97.

judging, deliberating, deciding, and acting. … They are the conditions of our mental life."[296] In *Grammar*, he calls the faculty of *nous* "intuition" and lists several standard "first principles" that it apprehends: that the self exists, thinks, feels, and acts; that memory is generally reliable; that we have categories of right and wrong, beautiful and hideous; that the future is affected by the past; that other selves and the external world exist, and so forth.[297] *Episteme* refers to the reasoning faculty that arrives at logically necessary truths[298] on the basis of "surrounding already known truths," i.e., those identified by *nous* or previously arrived at by *episteme*.[299] *Episteme* thus produces logically deduced scientific knowledge, such as conclusions to demonstrative syllogisms typical of geometry. Whereas *nous* attends to the "antecedents" of thought, so *episteme* attends to the "consequents" or necessary inferences and conclusions of thought.[300] According to Aristotle, together *nous* and *episteme* comprise *sophia*, a term Newman does not use, but which is likely the Greek word he has in mind when he laments the absence of an English equivalent.[301] The extent to which Newman was influenced by Aristotle

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[296] Newman, *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908), 283–84; "Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith," in Hugo Miguel De Achaval and J. Derek Holmes, eds., *The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 18.

[297] *GA*, 117.

[298] Fn. "Revelation in its Relation to Faith," in *Stray Essays on Controversial Points*, 97.

[299] "Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith," in *The Theological Papers*, 18.

[300] "Revelation in its Relation to Faith," 98–99.

[301] Aquinas similarly uses *sapientia* for the faculty that considers the highest causes and synthetically judges and organizes all other human knowledge, including *intellectus* and *scientia*, the latter term describing knowledge acquired through *episteme* and *ratio*. See *ST* I II Q. 57 A. 2; *ST* II II, Q. 49 A. 5 AD 3; *De Veritate* Q. 1 A. 9; *Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation* I.3.4; *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* I.1.34; *Commentary on Posterior Analytics* I.34.

rather than Aquinas may be evidenced by the fact that Newman thinks more naturally in the Greek terms than their Latin near equivalents—*sapientia*, *intellectus* and *ratio*—and does not draw on Aquinas' elaborate and sympathetic epistemology.

We can now correlate Newman's definition of *episteme* with two of the three types of inferential reasoning he describes in the *Grammar*: "formal" and "informal" inference. He explains that reasoning leads a person to hold new knowledge Y on the basis of old knowledge X, and that "inference" is the "conditional acceptance" of Y, though it falls short of "assent" to Y, which describes unconditional commitment to Y. Whereas we can gain knowledge directly through our senses, we gain it indirectly through inferential reasoning, much like *episteme*.[302] People often conditionally accept a new Y without being aware of the cluster of contributing antecedents, or "X"s, that moved them to do so. However, reasoning can also be disciplined by the rules of Logic or Mathematics, as in an Aristotelian syllogism, in order to improve its accuracy, and can usually be articulated through words or symbols in order to reason with another person. This is to bring our reasoning processes to the surface for investigation. Newman calls this form of deductive logic "formal inference." Similarly, a person can arrive at a conditional acceptance of Y not as the result of a single conclusive syllogism, but as the result of various independent, but individually inconclusive, strands of probabilities.[303] This is

[302] The faculty that judges the validity of such inferences is the "ratiocinative faculty," the perfected form of which is the "Illative Sense."

[303] See *GA*, 187–213. In a private letter (1864), Newman describes formal inference or mathematical demonstration as an iron rod and informal inference as "a number of separate threads, each feeble," yet together" as strong as the iron rod. To insist upon the former in every situation would "in certain given cases, be irrational and unreasonable." *LD* XXI, 146.

"informal inference." Both of these methods of inference, according to Newman, yield reasoned or logically valid conclusions.

Newman also describes a third kind of inference, which does not easily correspond with either *nous* or *episteme*, but which describes a form of reasoning that might be especially applicable to education in a multi-disciplinary academic institution. Newman calls this "natural inference." This common form of reasoning is spontaneous, effortless, and obscure. It moves from "wholes" to "wholes," meaning that the mind moves from a whole X to a whole Y without identifying the individual antecedents or chain of probable reasoning that moved the mind from X to Y. A person may accept Y or decide to do Y as the result of "natural inference." Comparable to a habit or an instinct that can be perfected with experience, it operates like intuitive feel or a cognitive hunch.[304]

Natural inference is especially interesting in a discussion of education because, as Newman describes it, natural inference is discipline-specific and can be improved by practice. Natural inference operates when an experienced scholar or genius follows hunches, makes predictions, and teases out possibilities even when she is unaware of the antecedent or logically conclusive reasons that compel her.[305] Natural inference seems comparable to the way a skilled athlete, a veteran farmer, or a perceptive psychologist respectively "read" a game, the weather, or a person.

[304] See *GA*, 213–221.
[305] *GA*, 219–20.

Regarding its discipline-specificity, Newman asserts that natural inference "is not a general instrument of knowledge, but has its province, or is what may be called departmental. It is not so much one faculty, as a collection of similar or analogous faculties under one name, there being really as many faculties as there are distinct subject-matters."[306] Thus a single person might have multiple faculties of natural inference. Conversely, a historian, general, poet, and physicist may each have no "sense" for disciplines other than their own, even if within their own discipline they are experts with highly cultivated domain-specific abilities.[307]

Despite being epitomized in geniuses or persons "gifted" in specific areas of knowledge, Newman is clear that natural inference is operative in and can be cultivated by any person. In my analysis, it represents one important end of intellectual formation. I will return to this, but the idea of the cultivated, discipline-specific natural inference lends credibility to the argument, which I considered with respect to Stanley Fish, that one legitimate goal of education should be the formation of the disciplinary self through a kind of apprenticeship to a given discipline and its skilled and sagacious practitioners. Newman defends the apprenticeship approach by invoking Aristotle:

> To use the grand words of Aristotle, "We are bound to give heed to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of the experienced and aged, not less than to demonstrations; because, from their having the eye of experience, they behold the principles of things." Instead of trusting logical science, we must trust persons, namely, those who by long acquaintance with their subject have a right to judge. And if we wish ourselves to share in their convictions and the grounds of them, we must follow their history, and learn as they have learned. We must take up their particular subject as they took it up, beginning at the beginning, give ourselves to it, depend on practice and experience more than on reasoning, and

[306] *GA*, 218.
[307] *GA*, 220.

> thus gain their mental insight into truth, whatever its subject-matter may be, which our masters have gained before us. By following this course, we make ourselves of their number … directing ourselves by our own moral or intellectual judgment.[308]

Though some people may be born with significant abilities in a given discipline, Newman insists that "natural inference" can be developed through practice and close association with learned practitioners.

Rather than merely access the flood of information newly made available in cheaply published books, Newman argues that nuanced intellectual formation and disciplinary acumen requires the presence of a living teacher. In a passage equally applicable to a deluge of printed information as to digital, Newman argues that students who wish to become "exact and fully furnished" in any complex and diversified branch of knowledge must "consult the living man." No book "can convey the special spirit and delicate peculiarities of its subject with that rapidity and certainty which attend on the sympathy of mind with mind" in formal and informal conversations. Furthermore, no book can answer the "number of minute questions" that the reader is bound to have on a complex subject. Though "the general principles" of a field might be learned at home, "the life which makes it live in us, you must catch … from those in whom it lives already."[309] What can be "caught" is not only the passion but also the subtle judgment of the senior scholar to whom the student is apprenticed.

Before we step back over the border between epistemology and education, we should consider the virtuous form of the reasoning faculty, which Newman terms the

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[308] *GA*, 221. See also "The Development of Ideas," in *Essay*.
[309] *RP*, "What is a University?", 8–9.

"Illative Sense." This faculty operates alongside formal, informal, and natural inference, and is considered one of his principle contributions to the field of epistemology. It judges the validity of inferences, whether arrived at formally, informally, or naturally, and integrates this judgment with other relevant factors before moving a person (or not) from the conclusions of inference to assent and certitude. It is the reasoning-judging-assenting faculty. In a letter of 1879, Newman calls it the "inductive sense," and in the *Grammar* compares it to "common sense" or a "sense" for beauty. His most illuminating comparison, though, is with Aristotelian *phronesis*, the intellectual virtue of moral discernment whose end is right action rather than true belief.[310] The cultivated Illative Sense moves a person not to action but to assent. "The sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty, the perfection or virtue of which I have called the Illative Sense."[311] In Anthony Kenny's words, it is like "an intellectual feel for plausibility, or an intellectual nose to discriminate good evidence from bad."[312]

The faculty is common to all people, but its particular exercise, like moral *phronesis*, is unique to individuals, who have to reason and assent as individuals—hence the experience of people assenting to different conclusions on the basis of identical evidence. Similar to "natural inference," it is discipline-specific, "so that a given

[310] *GA*, 228 fn. 1; *Letters and Diaries* XXIX, 115; *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.4. On intellectual *phronesis*, see GA, 228–230. He compares the Illative "sense" to "common sense," "good sense," or a "sense of beauty."

[311] *GA*, 223.

[312] Anthony Kenny, "John Henry Newman," in W.J. Mander, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 516. See Ker, "Editor's Introduction," *GA*, xix.

individual may possess it in one department of thought, for instance, history, and not in another, for instance, philosophy."[313] All people possess this ratiocinative faculty, but not everyone possesses its perfected form, and no one possesses it in every discipline or field of knowledge. However, like the abilities associated with formal, informal, and natural inference, the cultivated Illative Sense provides another aspect of the intellectual excellence pursued through education.

If this analysis of *nous*, *episteme*, *sophia*, natural inference, *phronesis*, and the Illative Sense is right, then it appears that Newman has modified Aristotle's description of *sophia* by adding a third and fourth intellectual faculty or way of reasoning. By reading several works together, I have tried to show that the perfected intellect described by Newman as a "philosophical habit of mind" includes 1) *nous*, 2) *episteme*, 3) "natural inference," understood as discipline–specific sagacity; and 4) the cultivated Illative Sense, understood as "right judgment in ratiocination."[314]

Therefore, whereas Aquino suggests that the "wisdom" of Sermon XIV is conceptually equivalent both to the philosophical habit of mind in the *Idea* and the cultivated Illative Sense in the *Grammar of Assent*, I suggest that the "wisdom" of the sermon and the philosophical habit of mind include the cultivated Illative Sense but are not identical to it.[315] Though Newman prescinded from using the English word "wisdom"

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[313] *Idea*, 231.

[314] See *GA*, 221, 223. For more on the relation between the *University Sermons* and the *Grammar*, see Ker, "Editor's Introduction," *GA*, xxii—xxxii.

[315] Aquino, *Integrative Habit*, 7. See Hochschild: "The *Grammar* and the *Idea* together move toward the enthronement of *phronesis* and *sophia*. In his two most philosophical works, Newman offers a reinvigorated articulation of the two central Aristotelian intellectual virtues." Hochschild, "Re-Imagined Aristotelianism," 337.

by the time of the *Idea*, because of its moral connotations, if Aristotle's term *sophia* is modified by the addition of the Illative Sense and natural inference, and "wisdom" is understood in a non-moral sense, then *Sophia*-wisdom could capture the cluster of ideas and terms associated in the *Idea* with the philosophical habit of mind.[316]

Natural Inference, the Illative Sense, and the Disciplinary Self of Research

Before we analyse the activity of the philosophical habit of mind, we should consider the possible contribution that the phronetic Illative Sense and natural inference could make to education, particularly within a pluralist context.

The concept of the Illative Sense emerges from Newman's desire to describe the often subtle and subconscious way people arrive at conclusions and commitments. He contrasts this with "paper logic," the relatively abstract logical deductions that can be rationally articulated in argument. The Illative Sense acknowledges that not every act of reasoning can be identified because human person are not "calculating machines."

Newman also distinguishes "notional" apprehension and assent from "real" apprehension and assent. "Notional apprehension" refers to understanding logical concepts, inferences, and abstractions, while "notional assent" refers to relatively detached acceptance of propositions or concepts: accepting that war is a tragic and costly reality from the comforts of one's Midwestern study is an example of notional apprehension and assent. Understanding and accepting that air flowing over a wing can lift a 200-ton airplane into the sky is notional apprehension and assent. Walking the Somme battlefield in 1916 or reading a first-hand account of the 1st of July battle, flying

[316] See Hochschild, "Re-Imagined Aristotelianism," 336.

across the Atlantic or remembering a particular flight are examples of what Newman calls "real apprehension" and "real assent."[317] The "apprehender" is not detached from the realities involved, but has personal experience of them or is somehow involved with them. Real assent requires trust, conviction, and commitment. It is the difference between knowing the rules of a discipline and committing oneself to practice them. When real assent combines with concrete images and experiences, it captures the imagination and moves the affections, which can lead to commitment, character formation, or action.[318] The move from individual particulars to common abstractions, however, represents an important aspect of learning and the expansion of mind. Neither is inferior to the other, though they possess different properties and have different potentials.[319]

Newman's sensitivity to the context-specific and agent-specific factors of cognitive activity, especially in the natural inferences drawn by the cultivated Illative Sense, influenced significant thinkers like Michael Polanyi, Pierre Hadot, Bernard Lonergan,

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[317] See Aquino, *Integrative Habit*, 18.

[318] See *GA* 14, 55–56, 62–64, 90-91. See Mary Katherine Tillman, "Introduction," in *RP*, xxvi–xviii; Laurence Richardson, *Newman's Approach to Knowledge* (Leominster, UK: Gracewing, 2004), 67–78. My attempt to synthesize Newman's works challenges Daniel Mulcahy's conclusion that the *Grammar* presents "an almost outright rejection" and "disavowal" of the value of knowledge presented in *The Idea of a University*. Mulcahy wrongly identifies liberal education with Newman's account of notional apprehension, notional assent, and formal logic; and wrongly asserts that Newman's concept of science does not include real apprehension and real assent. He misunderstands Newman's distinction between notional and real assent, and he wrongly thinks that Newman denigrates logic and formal inference in the *Grammar*. Daniel G. Mulcahy, "Newman's Retreat from a Liberal Education," *The Irish Journal of Education* 7.1 (1973), 11–22.

[319] For more, see Ker, "Editor's Introduction," in *GA*, xii–xiii; lvii–lxi.

Friedrich von Hugel,[320] and Ludwig Wittgenstein.[321] Lonergan's "fundamental mentor and guide" was Newman's *Grammar of Assent*: "It was from that kernel that I went on to different authors."[322] Similarly, Hadot explains,

> Newman shows in [*A Grammar of Assent*] that it's not the same thing to give one's assent to an affirmation which one understands in a purely abstract way, and to give one's assent while engaging one's entire being, and 'realizing'—in the English sense of the word—with one's heart and one's imagination, just what this affirmation means for us. This distinction between real and notional assent underlies my research on spiritual exercises. … Ever since I started doing philosophy, I've always believed that philosophy was a concrete act, which changed our perception of the world, and our life: not the construction of a system. It is life, not a discourse.[323]

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[320] See Martin Moleski, "Polanyi and Newman: A Reconsideration," in *Tradition & Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical* 41.2 (2014), 45–55. Martin X. Moleski, S.J., *Personal Catholicism: The Theological Epistemologies of John Henry Newman and Michael Polanyi*. (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000); David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan*. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 91–92; Philip A. Egan, "John Henry Newman and Bernard Lonergan: A Note on the Development of Christian Doctrine," *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 63.4 (2007), 1103-1123; F. E. Crowe, ed., *Collection. Papers by Bernard Longergan, S. J.* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), ix.

[321] Wolfgang Kiezer argues that the *Grammar* was "probably the single most important external stimulus for Wittgenstein's thought." Wolfgang Kiezer, "Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman on Certainty," in Michael Kober (ed.), *Grazer Philosophische Studien - Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie,* Volume 71 (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006), 117. Anthony Kenny asserts that Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* includes similar topics, illustrations, and conclusions as *Grammar of Assent*. Kenny, "John Henry Newman," 516–20. See also Cyril Barrett, "Newman and Wittgenstein on the Rationality of Religious Belief," in Ian Ker, ed., *Newman and Conversion* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 89–99; Angelo Bottone, "Newman and Wittgenstein After Foundationalism," *New Blackfriars* 86.1001 (2005), 62–75; Gerald McCarthy, "Newman and Wittgenstein: The Problem of Certainty," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 49.2 (1982), 98–120; Ker, "Editor's Introduction," *GA*, lv—

[322] Bernard Lonergan, "Reality, Myth, Symbol", in Alan M. Olson (ed.) *Myth, Symbol, and Reality (*Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980) 32-33. See also Richardson, *Newman's Approach*, 16 n. 4.

[323] Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, 274; cp. *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 277, 279; Aquino, *Integrative Habit*, 26.

Newman's *Grammar* convinced these thinkers that a person's experiences directly affect how and what they understand or believe, but also that what a person understands and believes through "real assent" alters the way they experience the world. To borrow Polanyi's phrase, knowledge is personal. Real, concrete assent forms the heart and imagination of persons in such a way that they are different than they were before they assented. This phenomenon is one reason I questioned Stanley Fish's strict prohibition against professors helping students learn how to move between experience, understanding, belief, and action.

Even though Newman does not include a discussion of the Illative Sense, inference, or assent in his educational writings, they are useful concepts for thinking about several issues within education. The first concerns the formation of the "disciplinary self" envisioned by the research university and assumed by Stanley Fish. Newman's notion of the domain-specific Illative Sense, when combined with natural inference and deductive reasoning (*episteme*), can help us understand and explain how the disciplinary self, or specialist researcher, is formed through being intellectually apprenticed into a tradition of thought and practice.[324]

Newman's commitment to specialist research, however, is not readily apparent. If he rejected it, we may here be reading Newman against himself. Even though the University of Berlin and London University were decades old by the time Newman wrote his Dublin Discourses, Alasdair MacIntyre articulates a common belief that Newman "did

[324] Newman's concept of "tradition" influenced Alisdair MacIntyre, though Hochschild argues that Newman's remains superior. Hochschild, "Re-Imagined Aristotelianism," 333.

not foresee the rise of the modern research university" and believed that "research was a task for institutions other than universities." According to MacIntyre, Newman also believed that "specialization and narrowness of intellectual focus deform the mind" and that "the qualities and characteristic of the minds of successful researchers" were "incompatible with those of an educated mind." MacIntyre refers to Newman's quotation of Copleston's argument that while "every art is improved by confining the professor of it to that single study … the individual who is confined to it goes back."[325] Likewise, Martha McMackin Garland writes that Newman's "wariness of overspecialization and practical knowledge" means that he did not intend to establish "a university committed to research" nor one that provided "the professors themselves with resources in order to advance their scholarship."[326]

These conclusions are not without support from Newman himself. In his "Preface" to *The Idea*, he states that non-university institutions like the Royal Society, the British Association, and the Ashmolean and Architectural Societies are designed for researchers to advance knowledge, whereas the university is designed for professors to teach knowledge. Research and teaching are located in separate institutions because each

[325] Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Very Idea of a University: Aristotle, Newman, and Us," *British Journal of Educational Studies* 57.4 (December 2009), 347.

[326] Martha McMackin Garland, "Newman in His Own Day," in Frank M. Turner ed., *The Idea of a University* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), 274. In the same volume see Frank M. Turner, "Newman's University and Ours," 284. In contrast, see Mary Katherine Tillman, "*Sed Contra*: Newman on Research and Newman on System," in *John Henry Newman: A Man of Letters,* 303–314; Tillman, "Introduction," *RP*, LXX–LXXIV; Ian Ker, "Editor's Notes," in *Idea*, 575 n. 5; P. J. MacLaughlin, "Newman and Science," in Michael Tierney, ed., *A Tribute to Newman* (Dublin: Brown and Nolan, 1945), 307–336.

requires distinct abilities and both require enormous time: "While teaching involves external engagements, the natural home for experiment and speculation is retirement."[327] Newman worried about academic institutions that offered only a single branch of studies, universities that failed to include every branch of knowledge, or students who confined their reading "to one subject." When they did so, the school or student were in danger of limiting their understanding of the world generally, and of distorting their understanding of their field specifically. While they advanced knowledge of the field, they might fail to see its limits or to what extent it depended on other fields.[328]

Despite MacIntyre's suggestion that Newman was unaware of German research universities, Newman's friend and fellow leader of the Oxford Movement, E. B. Pusey, studied in Göttingen, Germany, from 1825–1827, visited Berlin University, published a two–volume work on theology in the German research universities, and wrote to Newman in 1825 that the methods of German "inquiry in different subjects … seems to be much more solid than usually among us."[329] Newman's remarks in the "Preface" notwithstanding, it seems clear that Newman knew about the research university, did not think specialized research alone deforms the mind, as MacIntyre suggests, nor that it should be excluded from the activities of university professors, as Garland holds. In

[327] *Idea*, 8. For Aquinas on teaching as a *combination* of the active life and the contemplative life, see *ST* II II Q. 181 A. 3.

[328] *Idea*, 95, 147.

[329] Anne Mozley, ed., *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman During His Life in the English Church*, Volume 1 (London: Longman, Greens, and Co., 1903), 87. See also Thomas Albert Howard, *Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 357–8.

the *Idea* and in his plan for University of Dublin, Newman assumes the presence of specialists, but desires them to be liberally educated. If the university produces specialists they ought also to have the philosophical habit of mind. In this way, even a specialist research professor "will just know where he and his science stand" because "he treats his own in consequence with a philosophy and a resource, which belongs not to the study itself, but to his liberal education."[330]

The sentences MacIntyre quotes above originally come from Copleston. In the full quote that Newman uses, Copleston explains that while specialization in society is "beyond all question *necessary*," society "must be careful not to yield up ourselves *wholly and exclusively* to the guidance of this system."[331] Rather than specialization itself, Newman opposes too early specialization by students, too exclusive specialization by professors, and universities that pursue research at the expense of student intellectual formation. He also opposes specialization that fundamentally isolates any one discipline from the others, or that refuses to address broader questions concerning that discipline's goodness. But he clearly envisions specialist professors. As he asks, "What indeed can [a university] teach at all, if it does not teach something particular? It teaches *all* knowledge by teaching all *branches* of knowledge, and in no other way." Therefore, the "Professor of Law, or Medicine, or of Geology, or of Political Economy" remembers that their branch is but one of many branches, and does so because they have been liberally

[330] *Idea*, 146. Newman refers specifically to German research universities in *Rise and Progress of Universities*, 229. The "evils" of such an institution are "often insisted on and may readily be apprehended," not because they pursue research, but because they pursue it alone to the detriment of the students' moral character.

[331] *Idea*, 147. Emphasis added.

educated or are part of a university dedicated to liberal education.[332] Even more explicitly, Newman affirms that specialized "research and system" are "ends in themselves, distinct from effects and works of any kind." The "discovery and contemplation of truth, to which research and systematizing lead" are themselves "sufficient ends" and need no further justification, because they represent aspects of "intellectual culture."[333] This leads Jaroslav Pelikan to argue that specialized research, when combined with teaching and apprenticing students into research traditions, is one of the best ways to promote and protect Newman's thesis that knowledge can be its own end. As students actively process, organize, and evaluate new data or arguments they will also resist the passive accumulation of data Newman deplores and cultivate their own intellectual judgment within particular fields of knowledge.[334]

It becomes even harder to sustain the charge that Newman opposed research when we recall that he established a new journal within his university for precisely that purpose. He founded the *Atlantis* in order to publish the "researches and experiments in the various departments of literature and science" of his professors.[335] Its remit was not to enlighten "the general reader"[336] but to "contribute to the science and literature of the day" as a "bond of connection with the learned bodies of Great Britain and the

[332] *Idea*, 146.

[333] Ibid, 114–5.

[334] Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Idea of a University: A Reexamination* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 79–81.

[335] From an article dated "30th January 1838," in *My Campaign*, 354. See also Editor's Note 5, *Idea*, 575.

[336] "The Atlantis II," in *My Campaign*, 433.

Continent,"[337] and to encourage and record the "investigations," "speculations," and conclusions" recently made by the university's professors.[338] The titles of a few articles his journal intended to publish confirm the point that Newman expected university professors to pursue specialized research:

- "The existence of Butryic Acid among the products of the destructive distillation of Peat, and the formation of several other acids of the series (C H)*n* O_4 by the distillation of vegetable and animal substances"
- "The chemical composition and products of oxidation by nitric acid, of the sporules of *lycopodium clavatum*, and the general chemical constitution of the pollen of the phanerogamic plants"
- "Persian cuneiform Inscription at Behistun"
- "Recent researches into Waldensian Literature"[339]

Whereas the residential colleges within a university attend to the intellectual and moral formation of students, the university "embodies the principal of progress" and "advance," which animates its extension of knowledge through research.[340] Against several detractors who think Newman exclusively championed liberal knowledge rather than research, he writes in "Christianity and Scientific Investigation" that "in the sphere of *philosophy and research*" the university is "the high protecting power of all knowledge and science, of fact and principle, of inquiry and discovery, of experiment and speculation."[341] It is the place "where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified

[337] "The Atlantis I", in *My Campaign*, 430.

[338] "The Atlantis II," in *My Campaign*, 433. See also "What I Aimed At," in *My Campaign*, 299.

[339] Ibid, 430–2.

[340] "Chapter XIX: Abuses of the Colleges. Oxford." In *RP*, 228–29

[341] "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," in *Idea*, 370. Emphasis mine. See also *My Campaign in Ireland*, which includes a memorandum of 1854, in which Newman states that the university should establish certain institutions whose value does not depend on the presence of students. Such institutions include a school with professors

and perfected,"[342] within whose confines, professors should "go on quietly, and in a neighbourly way, in their own respective lines of speculation, research, and experiment."[343] Newman's commitment to research was a significant departure from the Oxford of his day, whose fellows rarely published and frequently left the university for civil and commercial positions.

Laurence Richardson notes that Newman also believed scholars should pass down the fruits of their research to the next generation.[344] In "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," Newman writes, "it is not often the fortune of any one man to live through an investigation; the process is one of not only many stages, but of many minds. What one begins another finishes; and a true conclusion is at length worked out by the co-operation of independent schools and the perseverance of successive generations."[345] Similarly, in the *Grammar*, he signals his concern for the generational advance of knowledge: "The conclusions of one generation are the truths of the next," and "it is our duty … to take things for granted which our forefathers had a duty to doubt about." Unless each generation summarily records "points which have been already been proved and ruled, we shall waste our time, and make no advances."[346] Thus intellectual collaboration across both space and time is essential for the advance of knowledge.

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of mining, agriculture, and engineering, as well as an observatory, an archaeological department, and a hospital. *My Campaign in Ireland*, 96–97. Emphasis added.

[342] *RP*, 16.

[343] "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," in *Idea*, 375.

[344] Richardson, *Newman's Approach*, 139–45.

[345] *Idea*, 382.

[346] *GA*, 150.

Newman also did not limit the fields worthy of research or imply that such research must have a practical end. In the *Idea*, he lists all manner of things that might be studied within the "circle of knowledge" and he commends them all as a theologian simply because they are part of a good creation. Newman's extensive list of what God himself "has an interest in" includes space and time, atoms, electricity, magnetism, gravity, insects, law, philosophy, vegetation, geology, the cedar, the umbrageous banana, agriculture, medicine, languages, commerce, just wars, and so on and so forth. Similar to Hugh's contention that "all the works of God" should be known by rational creatures so that God might be fully praised, and Melanchthon's that nature is like a theatre given by God to be known by the human mind, so Newman concludes that "all that is good, all that is true, all that is beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it great or small, be it perfect or fragmentary, natural as well as supernatural, moral as well as material, comes from [God]."[347]

Though Newman does not explain how research specialists are formed, they obviously require cognitive faculties highly cultivated within their respective fields. The result is a kind of discipline-specific intuition or instinct. Newman's "cultivated Illative Sense" and "natural inference" help us conceive what those specific attributes are, even if his terms are rather idiosyncratic, and they help us explain how these attributes could be cultivated by apprenticing students to skilled practitioners and established traditions of inquiry.

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[347] Newman, Discourse III, "Bearing of Theology on Other Branches of Knowledge," in *Idea*, 66–8; see also "Christianity and Medical Science," in *Idea*, 410. For Hugh, see *De Sacramentis*, I.VI.v.

Natural Inference, the Illative Sense, and Formation in a Pluralist Context

Newman's concepts of informal and natural inference and the cultivated Illative Sense are also relevant to debates about contested issues.[348] I may find it difficult to see why a person arrives at conclusions substantially different from my own. However, I might understand him were I able to see the strands of data, experiences, and arguments that influence his processes of informal and natural inference, and were I able to see the relative significance his Illative Sense affords each strand and why. I might give the same data "quite a different interpretation" because of my own "peculiar and personal mode" of reasoning.[349] Furthermore, this process of reasoning-judging-assenting, which the Illative Sense names, can be difficult to articulate because it may remain as opaque to him as mine can be to me: "As we cannot see ourselves, so we cannot well see intellectual motives which are so intimately ours, and which spring up from the very constitution of our minds."[350] As Frederick Aquino explains, Newman's epistemology acknowledges "the social and intellectual conditions" under which people actualize and integrate their various ideas, commitments, and experiences.[351]

An epistemology that includes the Illative Sense and informal and natural inference implies that people are within their epistemic rights to reach conclusions based on the collective buttressing of individually inconclusive or unidentified supports. This means that even when both sides are exercising epistemic virtues, rational, thoughtful people could disagree about fundamental propositions. That does not imply that the

[348] For "informal" and "natural" inference, see above and *GA*, 187–221.
[349] See *GA*, 217–18.
[350] Ibid.
[351] Aquino, *Integrative Habit*, 38–9.

interlocutors are equally right or equally wrong, nor that one might not reasonably convince the other, nor that they should not discuss the controversial matter or the foundational concepts that gave rise to the disagreement. Neither does it rule out an approach that enables both parties to agree on a practical decision, even if their theoretical bases are different.

Though Newman uses these concepts to explain how people reason and assent, they also offer compelling reasons to practice intellectual humility in the face of entrenched disagreement, and they do so without surrendering belief in realism to philosophical skepticism or relativism. For Newman, the cultivated Illative Sense is the virtuous form of the faculty that reasons-judges-assents, and it can become more adept at reasoning rightly, that is, at approaching truthful conclusions. However, not everyone's reasoning faculty rises to the level of the cultivated Illative Sense, and no one's does in every case. Therefore, we should be open to the possibility that our own reasoning-judging-assenting faculty might be idiosyncratic or faulty with respect to particular issues. It might also be that the same data can reasonably and without epistemic error yield different conclusions. If that is true, then we should engage in dialogue about contested issues with greater intellectual humility, charity, and a genuine desire to understand the reasoning-judging-assenting processes of ourselves and others.

Newman's epistemology encourages the development of what Aquino calls an "embodied particularism of informed judgment." In contexts of religious and philosophical pluralism, people are often pulled between "thick" traditions, practices, or commitments and "thin" concepts like the public discourse of political liberalism.

> Informed judgment, then, envisions the task of cultivating cognitive agents that can move from particular commitments to broader forms of discourse. … The capacity to connect the thick and the thin is at the heart of an embodied particularism of informed judgment. … People who are interested in pursuing truth, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom ought to extend their particular claims to the varied public spaces of human discourse.[352]

This is a form of intellectual humility that acknowledges the thick contexts, or "embodied particularism," of each interlocutor, but that also works to be "informed" about the other for the sake of achieving common judgment, consensus, or cooperation.

Newman's epistemology and the intellectual humility it encourages could be useful in both academic and political contexts shaped by a plurality of religious and philosophical views. In these contexts, Nussbaum allows for debate about every issue save one: the veracity of Rawlsian political liberalism. It brooks no challengers and suffers no compunction to give opponents a fair hearing. However, Newman's epistemology gives us reasons to query this aspect of her solution to the problem of pluralism.

Newman's ideas give cause to doubt that political liberalism is within its rights to exclude from academic or political debate any ideas, however well-reasoned, which it deems "illiberal." Rawlsian political liberalism may be the dominant tradition and many, like Nussbaum, may find it utterly convincing, but that does not imply it is within its epistemic right to suppress serious challenges from alternative views. Instead of preparing students to become entrenched defenders of Rawlsian political liberalism, academic institutions could help students become intellectually honest and humble

[352] Ibid, 38.

citizens prepared to explain and defend their own judgments while working to understand the "embodied particularism" of others. This political virtue is especially important for citizens of democracies, which depend on free and well-reasoned debate. If this is a valuable democratic virtue, based in part on a humble awareness of one's own "embodied particularism," then it should be modelled and practiced in classrooms free from the prohibition against challenging Rawlsian political liberalism.[353]

Furthermore, the concept of the Illative Sense is relevant to Nussbaum's concern for the intellectual, moral, and emotional integration of students, because the Illative Sense recognizes that people make decisions and are moved to assent as complex persons. Newman's concern for the actual concrete experience of human reasoning keeps him from isolating cognitive activities from emotional, moral, relational, or social contexts and influences, particularly when these lead to what he calls "real assent," that is, form of assent that includes conviction, commitment, and action.[354] The Illative Sense acknowledges that each of these are relevant to the process of reasoning.

The Activities of the Philosophical Habit of Mind

Following this analysis, we could say that the goal of the university, according to Newman, is to cultivate *nous*, *episteme*, natural inference, and the Illative Sense in students, so that they become not only generally knowledgeable and skilled practitioners

[353] See Jeffrey Stout's suggestion that Rawls underestimates the significance of a person's "collateral commitments" for political decisions. Like Newman, Stout argues that these commitments "vary a good deal from person to person, not least of all insofar as they involve answers to religious questions and judgments about the relative importance of highly important values." Stout, *Democracy and Tradition*, 70–73.

[354] *GA*, 55f. Newman's examples of assents that moved from "notional" to "real" to action include the move from the intellectual awareness that slavery and duelling are wrong to their actual abolition.

of specific disciplines, but also intellectually virtuous persons who can "reason well in all matters."[355] The goal is not, as we saw above, for students to passively accumulate "mere knowledge" or job-oriented skills. "Mere knowledge" is but the beginning point for reflection.[356] In this section, we consider the educated mind at work.

In generally Aristotelian (and Nominalist) fashion, Newman explains that the intellectually healthy, mature, and virtuous mind begins with knowledge of concrete particulars: "All things in the exterior world are unit and individual, and are nothing else."[357] After assessing particulars, the mind identifies common principles and species into which particulars can be placed: "Let units come first, and (so-called) universals second; let universals minister to units, not units be sacrificed to universals."[358] From here, the mind builds a flexible mental map that coordinates multiple principles and particulars. Finally, it checks the map against the concrete realities it purports to describe and continues the mapping process with new knowledge.[359] "We know … by piecemeal and accumulation, by a mental process, by going round an object, by the comparison, the combination, the mutual correction, the continual adaptation, of many partial notions."[360] True "Philosophy, Wisdom, or Enlargement of Mind" consists in "the comparison of the subjects of knowledge one with another."[361] It seeks "a connected view

[355] *Idea*, 114. See also *Idea*, 95.

[356] *US*, 193–5, 200–204; *Idea*, 74–75.

[357] *GA*, 9. For similarity with Melanchthon, see Denys, *Philip Melanchthon's Unique Contribution*, 185.

[358] *GA*, 279. See also *GA*, 9: abstractions and generalizations like universals "have no existence, no counterpart" outside the mind.

[359] See *Development*, 33.

[360] *Idea*, 134. See also, 96, 105, 116–7, 135.

[361] Ibid, 120–23.

of the old with the new; an insight into the bearing and influence of each part upon every other. … It is the knowledge, not only of things, but of their mutual relations. It is organized, and therefore living knowledge."[362] Elsewhere, he explains that wisdom requires "some analytical process, some sort of systematizing, some insight into the mutual relations"[363] between "a multitude of correlatives" in order to harmonize them.[364]

> It is the power of referring every thing to its true place in the universal system—of comprehending the exact value of each. … It never views any part of the extended subject-matter of knowledge, without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. … It communicates the image of the whole body to every separate member.[365]

He explains to working-class members of an evening seminar that their goal is to develop "a habit of order and system, a habit of referring every accession of knowledge" to what they already know, "and of adjusting the one with the other." To do this they must use "certain principles as centres of thought, around which … knowledge grows and is located." This should enable them to understand and critically evaluate what they know, so that "history is no longer a mere story-book, or biography a romance; orators and publications of the day are no longer infallible authorities; eloquent diction is no longer a substitute for matter, nor bold statements, or lively descriptions, a substitute for proof."[366] Newman's concern for critical analysis and evaluation of multiple genres goes beyond order and system. He wants knowledgeable students able to discriminate

[362] *US*, 196.
[363] *Idea*, 120–3. See also *US*, 192.
[364] See *Development*, 33–35.
[365] *US*, 198.
[366] *Idea*, 404.

between sophistical rhetoric and reasoned argument.[367] Like any habit, the philosophical habit requires repeated and constant practice, in which the mind ruminates upon its knowledge, seeking ever clearer, more orderly, and more true understanding. It is "necessarily a matter of training."[368]

Analogous to the intellectual ordering, ranking, and mapping required by an individual person, so Newman thinks the university must order, rank, and map its constitutive disciplines. Whereas the sciences represent specialized abstractions and particular ways of analysing and viewing the world, a "science of sciences" attempts to place them within a conceptually organized whole.

> The comprehension of the bearings of one science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another, this belongs … to a science of sciences, which is my own conception of what is meant by Philosophy, in the true sense of the word, and of a philosophical habit of mind.[369]

Instead of theology playing the role of "queen" or "science" of the sciences within the university, as some commentators argue, Newman reserves this role for the "architectonic science" and habit of Philosophy.[370]

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[367] *Idea*, 103.

[368] Ibid, 134. See also, 96, 105, 116–7, 135.

[369] Ibid, 57.

[370] Ibid, 87. See especially, "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," in *Idea*, 371–2; and "1852 Discourse V, in *Idea*, 412–13. For commentators who confuse the place of philosophy and theology in Newman's thought, see essays by Turner, Castro-Klarén, and McMackin Garland in the Yale edition of Frank M. Turner, ed., *The Idea of a University*. In that same volume, however, George Marsden correctly identifies the distinct roles of philosophy and theology. For more, see, M. Katherine Tillman, "*The Idea and the Image of a University*," in Tillman, *John Henry Newman: Man of Letters*.

Newman's concentration on the harmonizing activity of the philosophical habit of mind should remind us of Hugh's emphasis on the order, form, harmony, and integration that leads to *pulchrum esse*, beautiful being.[371] Though Newman does not name his ideal *pulchrum esse,* he does use the category of the "beautiful" to describe the intellectually virtuous and knowledgeable person as well as the liberal knowledge of truth, and argues that intellectual beauty is analogous to physical beauty, moral beauty, and bodily health, each of which represent "ideal perfection[s]" of their own kind.[372] The educated intellect "has almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly contemplation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things and the music of the spheres."[373] Whether or not one embraces the vision of cosmic beauty and harmony, the harmonious integration of knowledge through a philosophical habit of mind offers a compelling vision for the knowledge and intellectual formation that represents a natural good of human nature.

The Good of Knowledge Theologically Understood

All that remains is to note Newman's reasons for concluding that integrated knowledge and the philosophical habit of mind represent an important good. True to his goal in the *Idea* to describe education philosophically rather than theologically, Newman does not develop a theology of education comparable to Hugh. Whereas Hugh incorporates learning within the plan of Christocentric postlapsarian restoration and redemption, Newman typically considers it teleologically *sub specie saeculi* as part of the natural and

[371] See Coolman, *Theology*, 25. See also Coolman, "Pulchrum Esse," 175–200; *De Sacramentis* I.I.iii.

[372] *Idea*, 111 185.

[373] Ibid, 124.

necessary maturation of persons.[374] Newman follows Aristotle's famous statement in *Metaphysics* and Cicero's in *De officiis* that by nature all people desire to know and pursue truth. "*Such is the constitution of the human mind* that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward."[375] Therefore, by the acquisition of knowledge "we are satisfying a direct need of our nature."[376] The similarly inherent goodness of intellectual excellence, physical health, and moral virtue is indicated by the ubiquity of institutions dedicated to their flourishing: schools, hospitals, and churches.[377] Because knowledge and intellectual formation are "so really and undeniably good" Newman argues their acquisition more than compensates for the time, trouble, and effort they require.[378]

Though he does not explicitly describe the acquisition of knowledge as a moral duty, he nevertheless argues that "each of us has the *prerogative* of completing his inchoate and rudimental nature, and of developing his own perfection out of the living elements with which his mind began to be."[379] "Educated minds" are obliged to investigate the logical coherence of their prejudices and beliefs. "Such a trial of their intellect is a law of their nature, like the growth of childhood into manhood, and analogous to the moral ordeal which is the instrument of their spiritual life. … Such examination … does but fulfil a law of our nature."[380] In the *Grammar*, Newman adds

[374] Ibid, 105.
[375] Ibid, 97. Emphasis original.
[376] Ibid, 79.
[377] Ibid, 142, 144f.
[378] Ibid, 97.
[379] *GA*, 225. Emphasis added.
[380] Ibid, 126–27.

that humans have a "*sacred duty*" to progress intellectually.[381] Thus Newman suggests that each human person should fulfill their intellectual *telos* to the extent that they are able.

This argument, while generally true, must be handled delicately. Theologically, Newman seems right to suggest that human persons are designed to participate in creation intellectually, and that they should pursue ever truer accounts of creation. The pursuit of coherent and systemic truth partially actualizes and fulfills human nature, and should enable persons to think and act in ways that respect and integrate with, rather than violate or falsify, the nature of things. Moral action broadly construed often requires bracing critical reflection and investigation. The person who possesses a greater quantity of more accurate knowledge within a given area may be freer to act rightly and morally than another person who possesses little or false information. Nevertheless, this line of thought does not imply that every person is morally obligated to know as much as they are able to know, or that someone who knows more is somehow morally better than a person who knows less. The good of accurate knowledge should not be isolated from and elevated above the many other human goods that contribute to human flourishing. Nor, however, should it be ranked less or lifted from the vocational burden of the human person *qua* human person, however delicately and carefully we qualify this "sacred duty." To refuse accurate and coherent understanding is to fail to actualize a constitutive element of human nature.

[381] *GA*, 225-6. Emphasis mine.

Not only did Newman think humans had a sacred duty to pursue intellectual excellence, but he also thought they had a sacred blessing to pursue it in whatever discipline they saw fit.[382] The Creator approves of research into his creation and the works of his creatures. In his 1826 university sermon, "The Philosophical Temper, First Enjoined by the Gospel," Newman contends that "we have no reason to suppose that He forbids knowledge of any kind, and we cannot imagine that He would promulgate…doctrines which contradict previous truths which He has written on the face of nature."[383] Therefore, when we study and investigate things in the manner proper to them, consonant with their nature, through observation, experiment, speculation, research, demonstration, or probability, Newman states, "we have His blessing upon us."[384] Knowing creation is obviously not the only work of the human creature, but it is one appropriate way that humans indwell and affirm creation, and fulfil their place within it. Many people are amateur hobbyists of knowledge unrelated to their practical or professional needs. We know and take satisfaction in knowing harmonic ratios, the Pythagorean theorem, the events of D-Day, the human genome, Thomas Becket's biography, the rhythm of dactylic hexameter, or whatever idiosyncratic white stag of understanding each person seeks on the next page, under the next leaf, or around the next corner of his or her mind.

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[382] *Idea*, 67.

[383] "The Philosophical Temper," in *University Sermons*, 17. His text is John 8:12 (Jesus the "light of the world"), which Newman identifies with the motto of the University of Oxford, *Dominus illuminatio mea.*

[384] *GA*, 227.

In "The Philosophical Temper," Newman defends Christianity against charges of anti-intellectualism and anti-scholarship, arguing that Christianity built on classical models of education, fostered vast humanistic and literary pursuits, and fostered scientific inquiries and discoveries. This occurred in part because Christianity introduced and solidified the view that nature is governed by uniform and settled laws rather than by unpredictable and capricious gods, deities, or other "irregular agents" who interrupt nature at their whim.[385] Thus comes Newman's praise for the "Christian philosopher" Francis Bacon and his empirical investigation of natural phenomena. Bacon could trust the regularity of what he observed because he did not have to worry about gods altering the way the properties of air, earth, or water behaved.

The foundation for Newman's argument that the pursuit of knowledge is a penultimate and natural end in itself appears to be based on his beliefs that knowledge generally perfects human nature, which we have an obligation and some kind of sacred duty to pursue, and that the kinds of research and investigation which contribute to knowledge and intellectual formation are blessed and encouraged by God the Creator and supported by the doctrines and virtues of Christianity.

The Pleasurable Delight of Learning: Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman

This final section of my two chapters on the intellectual ends of education considers more fully the concomitant delight that accompanies learning. If Hugh, Melanchthon,

[385] *University Sermons*, 18. Like Hugh and Melanchthon, Newman criticizes people who expect to find practical, moral, or scientific information in Scripture that can be found elsewhere. See *US*, 16. See also "Editor's Notes," *University Sermons*, 265, on Newman's 1874 letter to David Brown: "I see nothing in the theory of evolution inconsistent with an Almighty Creator and Protector." See also *Idea*, 187.

and Newman are right that learning and intellectual excellence are intrinsic to human *pulchrum esse*, then we would expect such an activity to delight the properly functioning human person. Most people desire to learn not merely to meet a basic need, like acquiring food or reliable shelter, and not simply to qualify themselves for gainful employment, but because they delight in knowing more than they did about whatever strikes their fancy or piques their interest. People are happy to replace ignorance and confusion with understanding and clarity. This concomitant and connatural experience is reflected in the texts of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman.[386]

Hugh celebrates the joy of understanding, particularly in a section concerning meditation, which he defines as "sustained thought along planned lines" that "delights to range along open ground, where it fixes its free gaze upon the contemplation of truth, drawing together now these, now those causes of things, or now penetrating into profundities."[387] This is focused, but free, musing contemplation about morals, God's commandments, and the "wonders" of God's work not only in salvation, but also in creation. Hugh's praise of the practice of sustained thinking about such things could hardly be higher: "If any man learn to love it very intimately and will desire to be engaged very frequently upon it" he will find that it "renders his life pleasant indeed, and provides," recalling Boethius perhaps, "the greatest consolation to him in his

[386] See also Aquinas, *ST* I II Q. 32 A. 8.
[387] *Didascalicon*, III.x.

trials."[388] As I noted in the previous chapter, Hugh affirms that connatural to knowledge of any and every aspect of creation are the joy and refreshment of the spirit.[389]

Even further, Hugh suggests that this activity of meditating on the knowable proleptically anticipates the eschatological leisure of eternity:

> This especially it is which takes the soul away from the noise of earthly business and makes it have even in this life a kind of *foretaste of the sweetness of the eternal quiet*. And when, through the things which God has made, a man has learned to seek out and to understand him who has made them all, then does he equally instruct his mind with knowledge and fill it with joy. From this it follows that in meditation is to be found the greatest delight.[390]

Though Hugh considers the possibility that in the eternal life "perhaps … we shall see all knowledge together at one glance," nevertheless the human activity of knowing endures.[391] When Hugh describes "true blessedness" near the very end of *De Sacramentis*, he implicitly recalls the *Didascalicon's* three evils of death, vice, and ignorance that impaired human life after the fall. "True blessedness," he tells us, "consists of three things:" living without death, loving without offense, and knowing without error.[392]

With this last point about the foretaste of eternity, Hugh echoes a not uncommon theme from the Christian didascalic tradition. Isidore of Seville, discussing the life of learning in his *Etymologies*, writes that "Christians are to live in a manner [now] that resembles the life of their future home."[393] Cassiodorus, in his *Institutions of Divine and Secular Learning*, argues that the wisdom earned from study and labour here is "a

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[388] Ibid.
[389] *De Sacramentis*, I.VI.xiv.
[390] Ibid. Emphasis mine.
[391] Ibid, II.XVIII.xx.
[392] Ibid, II.XVIII.xxi.
[393] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies* II.24.9.

glorious and eternal attainment, from which death cannot separate us."[394] Aquinas famously explains that "the contemplative life begins here in order to be made perfect in the life to come;"[395] Melanchthon refers to someday learning in the "Eternal Academy;"[396] and Josef Pieper describes "the contemplative mode of seeing the things of the Creation" as the "foretaste and beginning" of perfect eschatological joy.[397] In part, these speculations about life in the eschatological new heavens and new earth are predicated on the delight that the contemplative life of learning brings to human persons. The argument is that human persons do not become less than or other than human in eternity, but rather more fully human. Therefore, they are likely to derive pleasure "then" from similar kinds of activities that produce pleasure "now," like learning and contemplation.

Melanchthon also highlights the pleasure that accompanies learning. He prefaces his astronomy textbook with the question, "Who is so hard-hearted … that he does not some times, looking up at the sky and beholding the most beautiful stars in it, wonder at these varied alternations … and desire to know the traces … of their motions?"[398] Though Melanchthon often focuses on the practical usefulness of study, he also regularly celebrates its basic goodness and delight, as he does here to motivate his students:

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[394] Cassiodorus, *Institutions of Divine and Secular Learning*, I.xxviii.5.

[395] *ST* II II Q 180, A. 8. See also *ST* I II Q. 3 A. 6: "the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness."

[396] "*Notitia*," in *The Chief Theological Topics*, Appendix 2, 513.

[397] Josef Pieper, "Earthly Contemplation," in *Josef Pieper: An Anthology* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 145; originally in *Problems of Modern Faith* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1985.)

[398] Melanchthon, "Preface to *On the Sphere*," 106.

> Assuredly, to induce you must be the very pleasantness of study. … For eloquence procures incredible delight; and the history of past exploits gives pleasure to men in wonderful ways. … And nothing is sweeter than to understand in one's mind those things that are passed on to us in [natural] philosophy—about the size of the heavenly bodies and the Earth, the movements of the various stars, and how the heavenly lights, variously mixed and blended among themselves, create differing effects in this sublunar nature, like voices mingled now in one way, now in another, articulating varied songs.[399]

Elsewhere Melanchthon refers to the "sweetness of knowledge in itself," the "highest true pleasure" of knowing Greek and reading Homer and, even more, the "worthy pleasure" gained from "knowledge of the greatest things" that "lead the mind to humanity and pleasantness by their delight."[400] In the opening to his commentary on Aristotle's *Book of the Soul*, he claims that such is the nature of man (*talis est hominum natura*) that people commonly experience learning to be sweet and pleasant (*dulcis et iucunda*), and that some learning, in this case knowledge of the soul and the source of moral virtue, increases both pleasure and profit (*Et auget voluptatem utilitas*).[401] Similarly, when he asks about the end and use of a study of Physics, he refers to the mind's desire to know (*mentibus cupiditatem considerandarum rerum*) and the pleasure that accompanies it (*et voluptatem quae agnitionem comitatur*).[402] In this same vein, in a speech on astronomy and geography, Melanchthon argues:

> For each one the activity most appropriate to his nature is the most agreeable one … so men are necessarily affected by great pleasure when they contemplate. … If we are born for that contemplation, it must needs be a pleasure to natures that are neither preternatural nor distorted.[403]

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[399] "On the Order of Learning," 7–8.
[400] "On Anatomy," 159; "Preface to Homer," 41; "On the Study of Languages," 34.
[401] C*orpus Reformatorum* XIII, "Liber de Anima," 6.
[402] CR XIII, "Initia Doctrinae Physicae," 189.
[403] "On astronomy and geography," 118.

Here we see Melanchthon the humanist scholar testifying to the gratifying satisfaction that accompanies learning, given the kind of nature that humans possess. Without this intense delight it would be hard to understand Melanchthon's comment to George Spalatin in 1524 that he takes such great delight [*delectant*] in ancient books that they are not less dear to him than his own children and that he deplores the stupidity that let such splendid and wise works fall into obscurity.[404] The arts are God's gifts, which should be accepted with respect, used for God's glory, employed for the common good, and delighted in "assiduously" [*studiose fruamur*][405]

These passages balance Sachiko Kusukawa's carefully researched argument that Melanchthon developed his natural and moral philosophy for exclusively apologetical, doxological, theological, or civil purposes. Kusukawa argues that Melanchthon used Aristotle, Galen, and others not primarily as a humanist scholar, but more as a Lutheran theologian in order to develop a moral philosophy that supported Luther's notions of Law and Gospel. His driving concern, she argues, was to distance the Lutheran reformation from the civil disobedience of evangelical radicals like those of Münster and Zwickau, and to undermine Zwingli's theological claims concerning God's interaction with creation.[406] Melanchthon did this, she argues, by "offering *a posteriori* arguments in order to confirm a single point about the divinity, that God created and sustains everything in this physical universe with Providential design."[407] She also argues that his

[404] CR 1, 695.

[405] "On Johannnes Regiomontanus," 238; CR XI, "De Iohanne Regiomontano," 819.

[406] Kusukawa, *Transformation*, 100.

[407] Ibid, 90–93.

concern for accurate anatomical knowledge was to support his arguments for God's providential design of the human body, and his interest in Copernicus and astronomy lay in his commitment to promote astrology as an important apologetic for God's providential design of human events.[408] "Melanchthon's promotion of the studies of astronomy, astrology, geometry and arithmetic was thus motivated towards a single goal, namely knowledge about God as Creator and Ruler."[409] For example, the following statement by Melanchthon is not uncommon: "I am moved to think of the goodness of God when I consider the nature of things, adorned by wonderful variety, and suitable for our enjoyment."[410] Furthermore, Kusukawa argues, his exposition of moral works by Aristotle and others was "not trying to revive or relive the philosophy of the ancients," but he used them "in order to provide an exposition of a *Lutheran* concept of the soul," specifically one which was under Law but needed Gospel.[411]

Each of these claims is well supported in her work and reveals the ways Melanchthon's scholarship was partially motivated by Lutheran convictions and immediately problems. But Kusukawa's emphasis on his "single concern" and "single goal" of arguing for a particularly Lutheran concept of the providence of God tends to obscure Melanchthon's repeated references to the fundamental goodness and delight that accompanies (*comitare)* learning and knowing.[412] In her summary of Melanchthon's 1549 *Initia doctrinae physicae dictate in Academi Witebergensi*, on the study of the

[408] Ibid, 129–34.
[409] Ibid, 144; see also 134, 142.
[410] Melanchthon, "The Scope of Education," 11.
[411] Kusukawa, 122.
[412] Ibid, 4, 158–9, 202.

physical universe, Kusukawa quotes a passage from Melanchthon that she passingly refers to as "striking." Melanchthon writes,

> The whole of nature is like a theatre [for] the human mind [*ingenii*], which God wished to be watched [*aspici*] and for this reason He placed in the minds of men the desire [*cupiditatem*] of considering things and the pleasure which accompanies [*comitatur*] this knowledge [*agnitionem*]. These reasons invite healthy minds to the consideration of nature, even if no use followed. Just as vision delights, even if no use followed, so the mind also, by its own nature, is led to beholding things [*aspiciendas res*]. Therefore these are the reasons of this study, especially because *to consider nature is to follow one's own nature*, and consideration *per se* leads to *the most pleasant joy* [*dulcissimus voluptates*], even if other uses did not follow.[413]

Kusukawa comments that Melanchthon "thus considered natural philosophy worthy in its own right. … Watching this theatre was worthwhile even if no use followed."[414] However, Kusukawa does not integrate this passage, which clearly affirms the essential goodness and delight of study, with the rest of her argument, perhaps because it does not support her "single goal" thesis concerning Melanchthon's patronage of natural philosophy. She quotes this passage, offers a few summary sentences, and carries on with her close reading of texts. But in this passage, Melanchthon suggests that God created human nature to know and to enjoy knowing as a basically good act, apart from any use. The implication is that God desires humans to experience the "most pleasant joy" that comes from following the nature he gave them. Immediately after this passage, Melanchthon also suggests that God inflames the mind to study so that it may acquire

[413] Ibid, 150. From *CR* XIII, 189. See also *CR* VII, 472, in which Melanchthon states that God endowed humanity with "faculties fitted for the contemplation of nature" and so humanity must "of necessity, take delight in investigating the elements, the laws, the motions, and the qualities or forces of the various bodies, by which they are surrounded."

[414] Ibid, 150.

knowledge of God and protection for life, but he describes these as other causes, *aliae causae*, rather than the only causes.[415] Thus, Melanchthon recognizes the inherent goodness and sweetness of study given the kind of nature God has given human beings, even if he desires that persons go on to discover the goodness and sweetness of the God directly. In this, he resembles Hugh in the *Didascalicon*.

Newman's texts lack many references to the delight, pleasure, or sweetness of learning. Newman intended to demonstrate that intellectual formation and a certain mode of possessing knowledge represent natural ends in themselves, given the kinds of nature that humans have. That argument can be made without drawing in the resulting pleasure that accompanies or follows from it. Instead, Newman focuses on the teleological perfection accomplished through intellectual formation. Yet, although references to delight and pleasure are sparse, they are there. For instance, in Discourse V, "Knowledge its own End," he approvingly quotes Cicero's statement that though knowledge comes after our need for food and shelter, it follows closely behind and is necessary for happiness: "Accordingly, as soon as we escape from the pressure of necessary cares, forthwith we desire to see, to hear, and to learn; and consider the knowledge of what is hidden or is wonderful a condition of our happiness."[416] Similarly, Newman invokes Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to summarize the point that liberal knowledge is its own pleasurable end: "Of possessions … those rather are useful, which bear fruit; those *liberal, which tend to enjoyment*. By fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue; by

[415] *CR* XIII, 190.
[416] *Idea*, 104, citing Cicero, *de Officiis* I.13.

enjoyable, where *nothing accrues of consequence beyond the using*."[417] Perhaps Newman thought no other references to enjoyment and delight were needed than these to establish their concurrence, but they seem to appear nowhere else in his three volumes on university education.

However, in the *Grammar*, Newman describes the kind of pleasure which arises *sui generis* from the search for knowledge.

> The pleasure of a search, like that of a hunt, lies in the searching. … There is the interest which attaches to a mystery, not yet removed, but tending to removal,—the complex pleasure of wonder, expectation, sudden surprises, suspense, and hope, of advances fitful yet sure, to the unknown. And there is the pleasure which attaches to the toil and conflict of the strong, the consciousness and successive evidences of power, moral and intellectual, the pride of ingenuity and skill, of industry, patience, vigilance, and perseverance. … Such are the pleasures of investigation and discovery. … There is great pleasure … in proceeding from particular facts to principles, in generalizing, discriminating, reducing to order and meaning the maze of phenomena which nature presents to us.[418]

This passage from the *Grammar* clearly summarizes the intellectual activity of the *Idea*. Newman explains that after the search is over and one has consciously arrived at a hard-won knowledge based on proof, the result is certitude that generates its own species of pleasure.[419] This "special relaxation" and "triumphant" and "enjoyable self-repose of the mind" includes "serene satisfaction," "self-gratulation" and "intellectual security."[420] Though such references are sparse in Newman's work, it is clear that he thinks both the

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[417] *Idea*, 109, quoting *Rhetoric* I.5. Emphasis original.

[418] *GA*, 136.

[419] For a brief explanation of Newman's concept of "certitude," see Ker, "Editor's Introduction," *GA*, xvi—xix.

[420] *GA*, 134.

search for and the possession of knowledge carry their own forms of pleasure and satisfaction.

What do we make of this claim, particularly since human persons appear to enjoy all manner of things that are not good and that Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman would not consider to be ends in themselves? My response is basically that the case for knowledge as a good does not rest on the pleasure it gives. Rather, pleasure is one of the hallmarks of good activities like friendship, play, harmony with God, encounters with beauty, and physical health, which fulfil natural human potentialities or represent the excellent flourishing of human persons. If pleasure and delight did not generally accompany learning, that fact might tell against its elementary goodness. As it is, such accompanying pleasure supports the case for knowledge but does not establish it.

This distinction is important, particularly concerning activities that might please, but which are not good, as well as knowledge that might please but that arguably should not be pursued or possessed either because it is trivial, immorally acquired, acquired for immoral ends, or sought to feed one's vanity or another's demise. This has historically been described as the vice of *curiositas*, as opposed to the virtue of *studiositas*, neither of which are adequately captured by their English equivalents, "curiosity" and "studiousness."

In his perspicacious book, *Intellectual Appetite: A Theological Grammar*, Paul Griffiths identifies a series of virtues and vices related to the intellect, including the temptations to novelty, loquacity, spectacle, ownership, and curiosity. Though people are generally commended for their "curiosity," Griffiths points out that, historically,

curiositas describes a particular ordering of the affections that desires "new knowledge" in order to "control, dominate, or make a private possession of it." The "curious" person cravenly desires knowledge "as though it were the only thing to be had."[421]

Griffiths is not alone in identifying *curiositas* as a moral vice that affects the intellectual appetite when it delights in pursuing improper ends, or pursues good ends in an improper way. In Augustine's terms, the curious want to *enjoy* knowledge as if it were their highest good, rather than *use* it as a penultimate end that directs them to their final end in God.[422] He takes the warning against the "lust of the eyes" (*concupiscentia oculorum*) in 1 John 2 to refer to a desire for knowledge through disordered means or for disordered ends.[423] Bernard of Clairvaux refers to *curiositas* as knowledge sought for its own sake.[424] Thomas Aquinas describes *curiositas* as the desire to know in order to boast or use that knowledge for maleficent ends, when more profitable studies are abandoned for lesser ones, when knowledge is gained from forbidden sources like demons or the magic arts,[425] when knowledge of the creation is not "referred" to the

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[421] Paul Griffiths, *Intellectual Appetite: A Theological Grammar* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 20–21. See also Paul J. Griffiths, *The Vice of Curiosity: An Essay on Intellectual Appetite* (Winnipeg: CMU Press, 2006); Alice Ramos, "*Studiositas* and *Curiositas*: Matters for Self-Examination," *Educational Horizons* (Summer, 2005), 272–81; P. G. Walsh, "The Rights and Wrongs of Curiosity (Plutarch to Augustine)," *Greece and Rome* 35.1 (April, 1988), 73–85.

[422] See *de Doctrina Christiana* I.

[423] See *Confessions* X; N. Joseph Torchia, *Restless Mind: Curiositas and the Scope of Inquiry in St. Augustine's Psychology* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2013); N. Joseph Torchia, "*Curiositas* in the Early Philosophical Writings of St. Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 19 (1988), 111–19.

[424] Sermon 36. *Patrologia Latina* 183, 968. Quoted in Josef Pieper, *Scholasticism* (New York: Pantheon, 1960), 89.

[425] *ST* II II, Q. 96 A. 1.

Creator, when one desires knowledge beyond one's intellectual capacity,[426] or when one covets the unbridled acquisition of knowledge.[427] Similarly, Ulysses finds himself in Dante's *Inferno* because his intellectual curiosity led him to sail beyond the limiting pillars of Gibraltar in order to satisfy his "burning wish to know the world and have experience of all man's vices, of all human worth." Dante's Ulysses implores his men: "Do not deny yourself experience…you were not born to live like mindless brutes but to follow paths of excellence and knowledge." In its pursuit, they transgressed boundaries and shipwrecked near the shores of Mount Purgatory.[428]

Hugh strongly denounces the "vice of curious inquiry" that "makes a habit of chasing after" other people's secret faults or that pursues knowledge through the magical arts of divination, astrology, or augury.[429] Likewise, Newman argues that "curiosity is man's great and first snare." It led Eve to succumb to the serpent's promise to provide her "a strange world of knowledge and enjoyment." She was curious to experience the pleasing tree that promised good food and illicit knowledge. According to Newman, we follow Eve's example

> in reading what we should not read, in hearing what we should not hear, in seeing what we should not see, in going into company whither we should not go, in presumptuous reasonings and arguings when we should have faith, in acting as if we were our own masters where we should obey. We indulge our reason, we indulge our passions, we indulge our ambition, our vanity, our love of power.[430]

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[426] *ST* II II, Q. 167 A. 1.

[427] *ST* II II, Q. 166 A. 1.

[428] *Inferno* XXVI, lines 97–99, 115–120, 141. Mark Musa, translator and editor, *Dante's Inferno. The Indiana Critical Edition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

[429] *De Arca Noe Morali* III.x.

[430] John Henry Newman, "Curiosity a Temptation to Sin," in *Parochial and Plain Sermons* Vol. VIII (Longmans, Green, & Co., 1908), 63–64.

Curiosity, that is, the intellectual appetite unnormed by moral goods, was the vice that killed Icarus, almost killed the sorcerer's apprentice, led Hans Christian Anderson's "little mermaid" to her demise and Faustus to lose his soul.

Examples of *curiositas* might include knowledge that seems hardly worth the effort required to obtain it, like knowing the number of bricks in the Abbey of St. Victor, or a catalogue of the illicit love affairs of a minor 16th century nobleman, or the amount of printer's ink used by Dublin bookmakers on a given day. It also includes knowledge ostensibly achieved by immoral means or for immoral or prurient ends, such as experimentation on unwilling subjects, knowledge gained by torture, or knowledge gained in order to manipulate, oppress, slaughter, or gratify craven desires. However, we should note that what appears trivial to one might not be trivial to another, because such knowledge might be useful to the abbot, a Reformation historian, or a Dublin ink supplier. That said, given the limited resources of time, energy, and materials, much that could be known could hardly justify the resources required to know it, or the sacrifice of more noble or useful things that could have been known or could have been done. Still, to the end that such pursuits manifest the innate desire to know, we cannot criticize them absolutely, but only relative to what else might have been done or known.

Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman together denounce the pursuit of knowledge purely for the ends of financial gain or self-aggrandizement. They also collectively caution students and scholars to exercise discretion against plunging too quickly into

matters too advanced, "in which the mind is busied rather than edified,"[431] or which keeps them "always learning yet never reaching knowledge,"[432] or tempts them to pursue matters whose study fails to pay dividends equal to the inordinate time they require, or which keeps them from other more useful studies.[433] In these cases, Hugh warns, "what has been sought for our recovery may be found to stifle us"[434] and Melanchthon, that those who rush "unrestrainedly toward the higher disciplines," leaping over the foundational ones, will ultimately find themselves tripped up and unable to proceed.[435]

I draw attention to this particular vice to alert us that the intellectual appetite can be misdirected by disordered means and ends, and, like all our appetites, it is not immune to the effects of sin and corruption. *Curiositas* is not an *intellectual* vice, of course, like rashness, dogmatism, or inaccuracy, but a vice of the appetite that misuses the intellect. Similarly, its opposite, *studiositas*, is not an *intellectual* virtue, but is an "appetitive" virtue that directs the application of the cognitive power toward good and ordered means and ends.[436] According to Aquinas, *studiositas* is therefore a subordinate virtue of temperance. Negatively, it restrains immoderate desires for knowledge, disordered means of attaining it, and the desire for knowledge of inappropriate things. Positively, it describes a keen eagerness [*vehementia intentionis*] for knowledge.[437] This

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[431] *Didascalicon* V.7. See VI.4. See Melanchthon, "On the order of learning," 4.
[432] *Didascalicon* V.5.
[433] *Didascalicon* III.13.
[434] *Didascalicon* V.7. See V.10.
[435] Melanchthon, "On the order of learning," 6–7.
[436] *ST* II II, Q. 166 A. 2. See also Augustine, *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* 21 (38).
[437] *ST* II II, Q. 166 A. 2.

excursus into *curiositas* and *studiositas* helps us see that despite their robust praise of the pursuit of knowledge, Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman did not consider the pursuit of knowledge to be an absolute good without remainder, but a good that had to be tutored by and directed toward other moral goods. If the angle of vision shifted slightly, this entire work could be rewritten as an extended investigation into *studiositas* as the ordering of the intellectual appetite toward good ends through education.

Conclusion

In conclusion we return to our dialogue with Nussbaum and Fish. Whereas Nussbaum indexes education to the world of democratic political liberalism, and Fish indexes learning to the borders of the research university, Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman locate it within a narrative that includes creation, human nature, sin, restoration, and the eschatological new heavens and new earth. In their own ways and to varying degrees, they affirm knowledge to be a fundamentally good end given the kind of nature humans have; emphasize the goodness of creation; stress the importance of harmony, integration, and order as guiding principles; refer to the pleasure and delight of knowledge; and demonstrate how knowledge might lead to worship of the creator. The next chapter will move beyond their affirmations that knowledge is a basically good and satisfying activity to critically examine their affirmations of the practical or transitive good of education that serves the flourishing of both individual and community. If chapters three and four consider education as an activity of celebration, the next two consider it as an activity of service. Whereas celebration is akin to worship, so service is akin to love. In knowing, we affirm the Creator and creation, in serving, we love creatures. The three Christian educators believe education can and should serve not only

the political community, as in Nussbaum, or only the academic community, as in Fish, but also the social, ecclesial, and economic communities.

Chapter Five
The Practical Ends of Education, Part I:
Serving the Neighbour, Meeting Needs, Gaining Employment

"Each one does not have for himself alone even that which he alone has."[438]
Hugh of St. Victor

"Your studies do belong to the church and the state, and are not pursued just for the sake of the private sector or for the pleasure derived from them."[439]
Philip Melanchthon

"If a man is well educated, of cultivated mind, well principled, and gentleman-like … he will render himself and his place respectable."[440]
John Henry Newman

Learning as Neighbour-Love.

In the last two chapters, we considered the intellectual ends of education. I argued that knowledge and intellectual formation are fundamental goods that partially fulfil human persons given the kind of nature they have. Though not the only end of education, satisfying the constitutive human desire to know—the essence of a classic "liberal" education—should remain central to educational visions. In this chapter, we will consider practical ends of education, such as gainful employment, meeting practical needs, and serving the near and distant neighbour in one's social, ecclesial, and political communities. Much of the current rhetoric surrounding education, particularly higher education, centres on a cost-benefit analysis of education. Many believe that if education requires a financial investment, which it usually does, it should produce a financial return. This concern is particularly acute given the high cost of attending post-secondary formal education in most countries.

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[438] *De Sacramentis* II.ii.2.
[439] "On Philosophy," in Keen, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 66.
[440] *My Campaign in Ireland*, 314.

However, transitive and intransitive ends of education are often pitted against one another, as if education can only provide knowledge and intellectual formation or qualifications for a rewarding job. On the one hand, some worry that encouraging people to pursue education for its own sake will produce thoughtful but unemployable individuals who contribute little to a nation's economic prosperity or technological advance. On the other hand, some worry that if pursued with financial reward in mind at all, education becomes mere job-training, producing people qualified for particular tasks, but with little ability to think deeply, engage intelligently in the democratic process, or live satisfying lives when not performing the task for which they were trained. However, these need not be the only two options, nor are they mutually exclusive. Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman show us why.

While most discussions of this nature focus on post-secondary education, I am interested in views of education that account for and animate any type of learning in any kind of setting, and which includes not only intellectual, but also practical and moral ends. In this chapter, we will see that they also acknowledge the pragmatic possibilities of education. They do not, however, consider those ends primarily in terms of maximizing material gain through securing lucrative employment. Nor do they regard labour or employment to be ends in themselves. Instead, they broadly consider how knowledge provides increased opportunities to love the neighbour and contribute to the common good through meeting a myriad of real needs and promoting a myriad of real goods. Among these goods, of course, is gainful employment, but this is not the only

good and should not exclude the goods of nurturing one's intellect and loving one's neighbour.

Loving one's neighbour through service is not exclusive to Christianity, but it does lie at the heart of the Christian moral life. The New Testament refers to Christians as *diakonoi*, 'servants', typified by Christ washing his disciples' feet and 'deacons' serving the needy. In this chapter, I want to consider, in dialogue with our three primary interlocutors, how the pursuit of learning might be framed within a Christian narrative that praises sacrificial love in service to the neighbour's good. This way of considering education resists morally normative metanarratives that depict learning as exclusively focused on the perceived intellectual or financial good of the individual learner. Instead, it challenges a person to consider him- or herself primarily as a neighbour called to contribute to the personal and common good of others. This moral identity orders a person's secondary identity as professional, citizen, or guild-member, and does so without ignoring the material and moral importance of these roles.

Within the Christian tradition, the call to love the neighbour or at least not to act against the neighbour is rooted in the belief that God desires the good of people and societies, works to accomplish that good through people within those societies, and has created people to flourish in particular ways and to find meaning through loving and serving others. Theologically, to consider how learning might be ordered by love is to consider how the learner can, directly or indirectly, resist the destructive forces that threaten the just peace and multidimensional flourishing of the post-lapsarian world and

participate proleptically in the world's promised redemption.[441] This allows education to be a form of worship, worldly affirmation, and a form of love and service rooted at least partially in joy at the presence of the other.

The idea of service seems to animate some of Nussbaum's work on education and multi-dimensional development, but it does so implicitly. She envisions a generation of global citizens working across traditional boundaries to address threats to vulnerable people and stable liberal democracies. She summons governments to promote a particular way of studying the Humanities because the ancillary effect, largely unknown to the students themselves, will be their political formation. Thus, her project to orient education to political liberalism appears subversive rather than redemptive. It also fails to offer students the opportunity for moral formation by failing to challenge them to choose a good like loving service rooted in joyful affirmation. Instead, she could appeal to students themselves to pursue education in order to meet multiple goods, including the material and political needs of their nation and world, gainful employment, and a morally formed and satisfied intellectual appetite. This would honour them as moral agents responsible for their own formation and who are likely to find deep contentment in helping others.

Stanley Fish, on the other hand, does not think higher education capable of preparing people for gainful employment outside the university and does not think a

[441] Bernard of Clairvaux: "there are some who seek knowledge in order to edify others: that is love [*caritas*]. … There are still others who seek knowledge in order to be edified: that is prudence." Sermon 36, quoted in Pieper, *Scholasticism*, 89. See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Educating for Shalom*, 258.

university's aims should include encouraging students toward morally informed activity. Both of these aims are beyond the competencies of educators. Fish even claims that Newman's defense of liberal education "anticipates everything" in *Save the World on Your Own Time*—a claim that will hardly stand when we consider Newman's writings and curricula in more detail.[442] Fish presents education as a solipsistic enterprise that terminates in the self—a project with profound, though often unseen, moral consequences both for the person and their society.

Most people, however, want to contribute to some good larger than themselves. They are embedded in multiple intersecting communities that supply them with multiple identities. Supporting and protecting the healthy existence of those communities, which they recognize and celebrate as good, is deeply satisfying. The Christian didascalic tradition, as represented by Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman, recognizes that intellectual formation, knowledge, and training are but one of many ways people can love and serve their neighbours, but they are significant ways. The goal of serving others does not rule out the pursuit of learning for its own sake, nor does it imply that a person must always know in advance how their learning might eventually serve others, if at all. Neither does learning as an act of service rule out becoming seeking qualifications for a particular job. Learning as a form of neighbour love, however, does challenge people to consider the ways learning and intellectual formation, the investment of time and money, as well as one's career or employment, might benefit others by manifesting goods. What are these goods? Though still at a very general level, we could begin with

[442] Fish, *Save the World*, 177.

the broad "community endowments" Joshua Yates identifies as the "good, true, beautiful, prosperous, just, and sustainable."[443] Within each of these six categories a person might rank certain activities or forms of employment. To love one's neighbour is to act in such a way that they are more rather than less able to participate in and enjoy these goods within the context of three primary, overlapping spheres: the social community, the religious community, and the political community.

Hugh on the Practical Arts in Service to Society

Hugh explains that the end of every human art or discipline should be either the discovery of truth, the cultivation of virtue, or the amelioration of physical needs.[444] Individuals and societies require these three goods in order to flourish. Knowledge of these practical arts contributes to the well-being of individuals and communities by offering what they lack or by responding to threats. Though some of the arts and disciplines that Hugh describes would not find a place in traditional academic institutions, knowledge pursued to meet pressing human needs does represent a legitimate end of the intellectual appetite and an opportunity to love and serve one's neighbour.

Among Hugh's four parts of philosophy—theoretical, moral, mechanical, and logical—three of them are directly applied. Some of his most interesting work focuses on the "mechanical" arts used for the good of society. Within the didascalic tradition, Hugh was the first to describe the "mechanical," or "productive" applied arts as a

[443] Josh Yates, *Thriving Cities Project Brief* (Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, 2015); http://.www.thrivingcities.com.

[444] "Appendix A," *Didascalicon*, 153.

constitutive element within "philosophy" and to locate them within salvation history. In doing so, he dignified their practice as a legitimate end of education. According to Elspeth Whitney, Hugh "goes much further toward a comprehensive understanding of technology as a distinct sphere of human activity than do any of his known sources" like Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, or Boethius. "The importance of Hugh of St. Victor's conception of the *artes mechanicae* is clear not only from the originality and cohesiveness of his work but also in the status accorded him by historians of science and technology."[445] This fascinating aspect of the *Didascalicon* significantly influenced writers like Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Kilwardby, Oxford scholar Roger Bacon, and others.[446]

According to Hugh, whereas the theoretical and moral arts serve to restore the divine image and likeness, the mechanical arts were developed to respond to three physical challenges humans face in the post-lapsarian world: the provision of food, preparation for future harms, and remedies against present harms.[447] Hugh's exposition provides a model for how education might be pursued as a loving act of service and helps us see that a person could be employed in skillful and financially remunerated acts of charity. In this way, a profession could serve multiple goods: meeting real needs, participating in society, providing for one's financial and material well-being.

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[445] Elspeth Whitney, "Paradise Restored. The Mechanical Arts from Antiquity through the Thirteenth Century," in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, 80.1 (1990), 99.

[446] Richard William Hunt, *The History of Grammar*, 132 n. 2; L. M. De Rijk, "Some Notes on the Twelfth Century Topic of the Three (Four) Human Evils an of Science, Virtue, and Techniques as Their Remedies," *Vivarium* Vol. 5.1 (1967), 9–11.

[447] *Didascalicon* I.8.

Unfortunately, many philosophies of education, including Nussbaum's and Fish's, fail to make this multi-layered appeal to students and other invested parties, even though there appears to be no logical contradiction between the intellectual, social, and financial goods that can be accomplished through education. Furthermore, to actively pursue all three goods, to the extent one is able, conduces to the individual's moral formation because choosing goods as goods habituates desire for the good.

Hugh organizes the practical arts into seven categories and divides them into their own trivium and quadrivium. Three arts (fabric-making, armaments, and commerce) pertain to "external" cover against harms, and four arts (agriculture, hunting, medicine, and theatrics) pertain to "internal" nourishment.[448] Because these arts were developed by reason for the good of humanity, Hugh includes the knowledge and skill necessary to practice these arts within his four divisions of "philosophy".[449]

Jerome Taylor shows that Hugh perpetuates an etymological mistake he inherited from Martin of Laon that relates "mechanical" to the Greek word μοίχος, Latin *moechus*, "adulterer," rather than to the Greek word from which it actually derives, μηχαγη, "machine."[450] Because of this, Hugh refers to these arts as "adulterate." He does not explain why they are called "adulterate" or make any point based on this fact, but simply notes that these arts are called either "mechanical" or "adulterate." He does not judge

[448] *Didascalicon* II.23.

[449] Hugh may have added the "mechanical" to Augustine's and Boethius' earlier tripartite schemes. See George Ovitt, jr., "The Status of the Mechanical Arts in Medieval Classifications of Learning," *Viator* 14 (Jan. 1, 1983), 92–93. For Aquinas' praise of mechanical ingenuity, see *ST* Ia 91 Q. 3.

[450] Jerome Taylor, *Didascalicon*, 191 n.64.

the mechanical arts to be somehow lower in dignity because they are "adulterate." In fact, he places the work of the practical human "artificer" ("to put together things disjoined or to disjoin those put together") alongside the work of nature ("to bring forth into actuality that which lay hidden") and the work of God ("to create that which was not").[451] These are "the three works" in the world. Unlike animals, whose physical needs are provided for "by nature," God gave humans the opportunity to meet their needs though their own rational creativity.[452] "Man's reason shines forth much more brilliantly in inventing these very things than ever it would have had man naturally possessed them." This God-designed lack thus facilitated "all that you see most excellent in the occupations of men."[453]

Hugh's high regard for the mechanical arts is further evident in the surprising fact that he does not praise bare simplicity or extoll the minimum activity needed to sustain life. Instead, he delights in the variety and goodness of the mechanical arts, praising "those most excellent endeavours" that resulted in, for instance, "boundless varieties of painting, weaving, stonecutting or carving, and casting." So wonderful are they that "now we marvel at the craftsman himself together with nature."[454] Though he frames the mechanical arts as responses to threat, they are not only that, but also examples of human ingenuity and creativity within the physical world.

[451] *Didascalicon* I.9.
[452] *Didascalicon* I.9.
[453] Ibid.
[454] Ibid, II.23.

Explaining Hugh's seven categories of mechanical arts illuminates the range of practical knowledge and craft he admires. Hugh's first mechanical art, "fabric-making," includes every kind of sewing, weaving, spinning, or leather-work that is used to make, for example, clothes, carpets, curtains, beddings, saddles, nets, or hats. Within the art of "armament," Hugh includes all skilled labour that might contribute to either defensive or offensive instruments of war, like metallurgy, building, stone-masonry, carpentry, wood-working, architecture, and so forth. His third category, "navigation" or "commerce," which he perceptively calls "a peculiar sort of rhetoric," basically amounts to all forms of international and domestic business. Particularly compelling is Hugh's suggestion that business, often castigated by his contemporaries for its association with greed, "reconciles nations, mitigates wars, establishes peace, and transforms private goods for the common good of all." Unfortunately, he does not elaborate upon this function, but the logic may be that peoples and nations who trade together do not typically go to war against each other, and that private goods should, if possible, be made to contribute to the common good through this practice.

Fourth, "agriculture" includes knowledge of every type of sowing, planting, and reaping. Fifth, "hunting" refers to gaming, fowling, and fishing, as well as the preparation of any type of food or drink. Hugh's extensive description of the types of food and drink included in this category lacks any monastic reserve. It reads like a veritable celebration of the dinner table. He refers to brown bread, sponge cake, pancakes, sweet buns, roasted meats, porridges, vegetables, Italian sausages, minced meat, Galatian tarts, cheese, wine, liquor, mead, beer, and so forth.

The sixth mechanical art, "medicine," responds to both psychological "reactions of the soul" and physical ailments of the body. The seventh and final art is "theatrics," or the "science of entertainment." This, too, is surprising and potentially unexpected for a medieval monastic, particularly since Hugh includes music, dance, wrestling, races, boxing, dramas, singing, and puppets. What "internal" benefit might this science provide? According to Hugh, "theatrics" provides one deterrent benefit—the distraction from lewd or criminal entertainment—and two positive benefits—exercise for the body and "joy that renews the mind" [*laetitia animus reparatur*]. Hugh apparently considers these last two necessary for human well-being since he includes them with other arts that meet fundamental human needs like food and clothing. Hugh's rich celebration the mechanical arts affirms them as a legitimate intellectual end and a legitimate practical way to meet real human needs.

Given Hugh's ecclesiology, we should not be surprised that he values the earthy mechanical arts that serve humanity's physical needs. Hugh describes the laity and clergy as two sides of Christ's body. Though the laity represent the honored right side, his ecclesiology is essentially pneumatological rather than structural. Most important is the common Holy Spirit shared by all rather than the exclusive office possessed by a few. To be a member of the church is to participate in this body through "sharing in the Spirit of Christ." Hugh suggests that the Spirit gives gifts of grace to each person, "yet each one does not have for himself alone even that which he alone has."[455] This is a wonderfully succinct description of the inherently relational and responsible nature of persons

[455] *De Sacramentis* II.ii.3.

uniquely equipped to serve each other. Together clergy and laity are "the two bulwarks of the church."[456] While Hugh does not use the same language as later Reformers, his elevation of the practical arts within philosophy resembles Luther's concept of vocation or *Beruf*, also evident in Melanchthon's and Calvin's writings. Luther in particular emphasizes that all work should be done to the glory of God and the good of the neighbour, whether one is a cobbler, tailor, scribe, plowman, fisherman, teacher, or brewer—repeating many of the mechanical arts that Hugh mentions.[457] In other words, "each one does not have for himself alone even that which he alone has." [458]

Not everyone, however, is convinced that Hugh holds such a high estimation of the mechanical arts. In *The Restoration of Perfection: Labor and Technology in Medieval Culture* George Ovitt, Jr., implies that by using the term "adulterate," Hugh intentionally perpetuates a negative moral evaluation of physical labour similar to the evaluation of sexual "adultery." Ovitt also claims that Hugh wants the readers of the *Didascalicon* to "continue to recognize" that the mechanical arts are "tainted" because they are concerned with physical products and are practiced by "illiberal" people. [459] Hugh's "class bias" thus effects a "denigration of the mechanical arts."[460]

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[456] See *De Sacramentis* II.ii.3. For the public openness of the Abbey of St. Victor, see Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Civilisation urbaine et théologie: L'ecole de Saint-Victor au XII siècle," *Annales* 29 (1974), 1260.

[457] See Gustaf Wingren, *Luther on Vocation*, tr. Carl C. Rasmussen (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2004).

[458] *De Sacramentis* II.ii.2.

[459] George Ovitt, jr. *The Restoration of Perfection: Labour and Technology in Medieval Culture*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 118.

[460] Ibid, 119.

However, Ovitt's Marxist analysis is flawed in several respects. Hugh never claims these arts are "tainted." Nowhere does he evaluate either the products or practitioners of the mechanical arts negatively. In fact, when Hugh lists the originators of the mechanical arts, he includes Hesiod, Cato, Vergil, Vitruvius, Daedalus, Aesclepius, Prometheus, Ceres, Isis, and a host of other notable gods, heroes, kings, and well-known craftsmen—hardly the sort he might have included were he intending to depreciate the value of the mechanical arts in the eyes of his readers.[461] Instead, Hugh simply states that the mechanical arts "are called" (*appellantur*) "adulterate," and tries to explain why some arts are called "mechanical" and some "liberal." Ovitt misses the etymological roots of Hugh's use of 'adulterate' and mistakes Hugh's description for evaluation. Contrary to what Ovitt assumes, Hugh refers to "adulterate" in order to clarify the term rather than to subversively associate these arts with "adultery" in order to defame them.

Ovitt's critical stance in his book departs from his earlier more positive article on the same subject. In the article, he suggests that even though Hugh and the Victorines considered the mechanical arts only the first step on the road to salvation, they did not consider them "less worthy" or "less noble." When Ovitt's book reprints the sentence explaining why the mechanical arts are only "a preliminary step" for the Victorines, the phrase that upheld the Victorine appreciation of these arts is removed.[462] Ovitt's earlier article also speaks positively of the fact that Hugh, along with Bonaventure, "sanctifies

[461] *Didascalicon*, III.2.

[462] Compare Ovitt, "The Status of the Mechanical Arts," 96, with Ovitt, *Restoration*, 120. Missing is the important phrase "not because the subject matter is less worthy or their object less noble."

the process and the product of the mechanical arts" by placing them both "within the context of the larger design of all learning whose source and goal is the *lux* of God."[463] The book includes a similar sentence but complains that because Hugh places the mechanical arts within a scheme of knowledge whose ultimate aim is "the light of God," it causes him to dwell excessively "on the spiritual effects that such labour had on the labourer."[464]

Myopic attention to the spiritual value of the mechanical arts and the subordination of these arts to "higher" ones are two of Ovitt's chief criticisms in both the article and the book. The article laments that metaphysical classification systems like Hugh's kept the mechanical arts from being appreciated for their contributions to theoretical science. To that charge we can simply acknowledge that Ovitt is right. Hugh does not praise the mechanical arts for their contribution to theoretical knowledge. That is not their role. Hugh thinks that knowledge of them is one of the four parts of philosophy, but to suggest that appreciation of the mechanical arts should be predicated on their contribution to the theoretical arts would seem to subordinate them in a way Ovitt rightly wants to avoid.

In Ovitt's book, the complaint shifts to the underappreciated value of physical labour itself. The mechanical arts and manual labour were kept subordinate and lowly for a variety of reasons, Ovitt argues, including the hierarchical systematizations of knowledge that placed theology, or union with God, at the top and anything that was

[463] Ovitt, "The Status of the Mechanical Arts," 96.
[464] Ovitt, *Restoration*, 121.

preoccupied "with the body or with the physical world" at the bottom. Painting with a wide neoplatonic brush, he claims that medieval writers like Hugh thought the mechanical arts were "mired in the fallen world of matter" and were "practiced by 'the sons of ignoble men'—as Hugh of Saint Victor put it." Their products were "useful," but were "suspect to those whose concern was the protection of cultural norms."[465] He also claims that none of the medieval authors of systems of thought like Hugh's were "themselves practitioners of any particular craft." How he knows this is unclear. Nonetheless, this psychological projection enables him to assert that they "had little interest in, or sympathy for, either the craftsmen or the crafts themselves." Apparently, they were alienated from the mechanical arts and so could not appreciate them as worthy or noble ends.

Pace Ovitt, however, nowhere in the *Didascalicon* does Hugh actually consider the spiritual effects of practicing the mechanical arts. Despite locating them within salvation history, he insists that the first purpose of the mechanical arts is simply to meet the very real physical and emotional needs of human persons and communities. This fits with the historical context in which Hugh lived. The twelfth century was not only a time of increasing intellectual activity in places like Paris, but also a time of increasing urbanization, industrialisation, commercialisation, and population. Therefore, physical and psychological needs were particularly acute and came to be met through increasing specialization in the practical arts, trades, and crafts.[466] Further, when Hugh refers to

[465] Ibid, 135–6.

[466] For an overview of technological innovation in this time, see Elspeth Whitney, "Paradise Restored," 76–79; Lynn White, *Medieval Technology and Social Change*.

the “plebians” and “sons of the ignoble,” who in antiquity learned the mechanical arts, he is repeating a widely accepted view. Whereas the sons of free nobleman had the luxury of studying the “liberal” arts, the sons of not-free men generally worked the “mechanical” arts according to their “skill” or “expertise” (*propter peritiam*). The word he uses, *ignobilium*, is the standard word to describe a particular class within ancient society. He neither appears to make a moral judgment on the character of those who study the mechanical arts, nor to suggest that only *plebei* and *ignobilium filii* should learn the mechanical arts in his own day.

Contra Ovitt’s accusations, Hugh dignifies the mechanical arts by placing the knowledge of the mechanical arts within “philosophy,” and by showing how the practice of the mechanical arts meets pressing human needs, contributes to human flourishing, and represents the marvelous expression of human creativity. Anyone praising sweet buns, Italian sausage, drapery, rose bushes, honey mead, and puppets as “most excellent endeavours” can hardly be accused of meagrely appreciating the physical world and the practical arts or of appreciating them solely for their contribution to a spiritualized escape from a material world.

The implication of Hugh’s high praise of the mechanical arts should be relatively clear. Hugh affirms practical ends of education that respond to real human needs and demonstrate human creativity. From Hugh’s categories, we can surmise that he thinks humans need clothing, shelter, defence against harm, a way to exchange private goods, food and drink, psychological and physical well-being, and something like the refreshing

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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

delight that sport, entertainment, and the arts can provide. As we noted above, Hugh does not advocate minimal responses to these needs, but celebrates the infinite variety of possible responses. What is a real human need might be an open question, and this list might be expanded, but Hugh at least affirms as good the attempt to meet practical needs in creative and diverse ways.

Hugh does not explicitly describe the mechanical arts as works of love, but he easily could have. In *de Sacramentis*, he writes that the command to love one's neighbour as oneself implies that what we desire for ourselves we should also desire for the neighbour, "Whether unto necessity of body or unto salvation of soul, and in so far as we can reasonably do so we should aid him" and seek to secure "that for him which is good for him."[467] Recall his phrase quoted above, that each person "does not have for himself alone even that which he alone has." The mechanical arts or any applied ends of education could therefore be opportunities to contribute to the common good of one's neighbour or society as well as an opportunity to meet one's own material needs.

Hugh on Service to the Church

In the *Didascalicon*, Hugh does not specifically mention service to "the church" as a reason to pursue the four principal sciences of wisdom. Clearly, he thinks wisdom and understanding good for the individual, and the mechanical arts good for society. As for practical service to the church, his praise of orthodoxy, criticism of heresy, and careful discrimination between canonical books from non-authoritative apocryphal books suggests that he values the contribution intellectual formation and theological training

[467] *De Sacramentis* II.xiii.10.

can make to the religious community.[468] Furthermore, we know that included among those he taught at the Abbey of St. Victor were men who eventually would take up various offices within the church.

The closest Hugh comes to reflecting explicitly on the intellectual requirements of churchmen is an opaque section of *De Sacramentis* in which he compares Aaron's priestly garments with the garments of Christian priesthood. The conclusion of his symbolic comparison is that one garment represents "fortitude in work and patience in labour," while another represents "wisdom and discretion" and "doctrine and truth." Their combination means "that what we perceive with the intellect of the mind we may fulfil by work." But learning comes first, "lest you presume to teach what you have not first learned."[469] Though vague, this section indicates that those who want to serve through teaching must first submit themselves to learn. Because of this, he lists "the illiterate" among persons not eligible for priesthood.

However, nowhere in the *Didascalicon* does Hugh specifically exhort students to study for the good of the church, even though many of his students were Augustinian friars in the Abbey of St. Victor. That said, Hugh sometimes appears to address future churchmen directly. For instance, he wrote the *Didascalicon* to assist "just men" in the first of five steps leading to the future life of perfection, moving from study and instruction to meditation, prayer, performance, and finally, contemplation.[470] Likewise,

[468] *Didascalicon* IV.vii.
[469] *De Sacramentis* II.iv.6-7.
[470] *Didascalicon* V.ix.

at the end of *Didascalicon* V, he describes three types of students, only the last of whom is praiseworthy:

> There are others, however, who study the Sacred Scriptures precisely so that they may be ready, in accordance with the Apostle's teaching to "give the reason of that faith" in which they have been placed to everyone who asks it of them, so that, for example, they may forthrightly demolish enemies of the truth, teach those less well informed, recognize the path of truth more perfectly themselves, and, understanding the hidden things of God more deeply, love them more intently.[471]

Even were this not written exclusively for churchmen, it would be a useful template for them to follow.

However, as if Hugh recognizes that the above description sounds exclusive to priest or monk, he immediately follows it with a *caveat* that may explain his reticence to single out any particular institution, even the church, as beneficiary of a Victorine education. "But we, because *we intend to give advice to all*, desire what is good should be increased *in all*, and what is perverted, changed. We wish that *all should understand* what we say and that *all should do* what we urge."[472] Note that the two themes in this sentence, understanding and moral action, correspond to the divine image and likeness in which humans were created, which were damaged in the fall and are partially restored through instruction—themes we explored at length in previous chapters. For our immediate purposes, however, note Hugh's insistence that the focus of his teaching is upon "all" persons, apparently without regard for their office or vocation. This may be

[471] *Didascalicon* V.x.
[472] Ibid.

the reason he is reticent to motivate students by appealing directly to the church's good, which he might do were he teaching only clergy or monks.

We also know that unlike traditional monastic schools, William of Champeaux founded the Abbey of St. Victor as an "open" or "external" school, a decision potentially related to the explicitly external and pastoral vocation of the Augustinian canons regular.[473] Situated on the edge of a rapidly burgeoning Paris, just down river from Notre Dame, any interested student could come free of charge to St. Victor, regardless of their vocational trajectory.[474] Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard, and Richard of St. Victor, along with hundreds of students whose names are forgotten, were among those who did so. Hugh's practice reveals his belief that the church benefits from an educated laity and that both laity and priest benefit from the comprehensive education Hugh describes in the *Didascalicon*—an education in the theoretical, moral, mechanical, and logical arts. How any one person's education and learning might benefit their religious community is difficult to say, but that a person might pursue any and all learning with an openness to it being used in some way to benefit that local or global community is not hard to imagine.

Hugh on Service to the State

[473] See Chenu, "Civilisation," 1260; Haskins, *Reading and the Work of Education*, 3–5; Swanson, *twelfth-century renaissance,* 18-19; Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, 202.

[474] See William W. Clark, "The Twelfth-Century Church of St. Victor in Paris: A New Proposal," in *From Knowledge to Beatitude*, 68–85; Jean Longère, ed., "L'abbaye parisienne de Saint-Victor au Moyen Âge," *Bibliotheca Victorina* 1 (Turnhout, FR: Brepols, 1991); Dominique Poirel, ed., "L'école de Saint-Victor de Paris: Influence et rayonnement du Moyen Âge à l'époque modern," *Bibliotheca Victorina* 22 (Turnhout, FR: Brepols, 2010).

Hugh writes relatively little about the political order in the *Didascalicon*. Nevertheless, he is among the first twelfth century thinkers to describe the significance of political ethics for the public sphere.[475] Among the four principal sciences that constitute wisdom, he lists the "practical" or "ethical," among which he includes "public" virtues that teach "how a whole people and nation ought to be governed by their rulers."[476] This is the "political" and "civil" science that serves the "common welfare of civil society" through its "concern for provisions, its balancing of justice, its maintenance of strength, and its observance of moderation."[477] The moderation he identifies refers primarily to the king or prince, who are especially tempted as a class to immoderate ways of ruling.

In *de Sacramentis*, he elaborates further on the complex discernment that the king and his officials require to secure justice and restrain injustice.[478] Writing in 12th century Europe, he explains that political authorities must, first, understand the spheres of jurisdiction unique to the political and the spiritual powers. In the background are the recent investiture controversies between Pope Gregory VII and King Henry IV of Germany, and between King Henry I of England and Pope Paschal II. This quarrel, about who had the authority to appoint priests and bishops, was more or less resolved by the Concordat of Worms shortly after Hugh arrived at St. Victor, but the threat of future clashes was a pressing concern. Second, Hugh explains that secular political authorities

[475] Brian D. Fitzgerald, "Medieval Theories of Education: Hugh of St. Victor and John of Salisbury." *Oxford Review of Education* 36:5 (Oct, 2010), 582. Hugh left nothing like John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*.

[476] "Appendix A," *Didascalicon*, 153.

[477] *Didascalicon* II.xx.

[478] *de Sacramentis* II.ii.4–9.

must discern over whom, what, and where it has authority, as well as the relation between crime and punishment, and so forth. Together, these concerns circumscribe the secular authority's rule and explain Hugh's emphasis on political moderation. "In these ways then secular power should exercise justice, following the institutes of the laws and approving nothing in their judging that is contrary to justice and truth."[479]

Hugh does not refer to the vocation or formation of citizens. Like his contemporaries, he reflects primarily on the duties of political authorities. However, his exhortations to the political powers could easily be extended to include democaratic citizens who share in the political process. Taking up Hugh's challenge that those with political responsibility should understand "public ethics" and exercise "public virtue," a democratic citizen might well decide to educate themselves or task an academic institution with educating students concerning a variety of political, social, and economic issues. The goal would be to enable thoughtful and active cooperation with fellow citizens, if even only through one's vote, for the sake of achieving what common good they can, especially on behalf of vulnerable people. The goal would not be citizens who only work for their own self-interest through, for example, "voting their pocketbook." Some might also desire to serve their neighbours politically through a course of education or training that would qualify them for service in, for example, the military, the law courts, public administration, elected office, or any number of state roles officially designed to serve the community.

Conclusion to Hugh on Education's Practical Ends

[479] Ibid, II.ii.8.

Hugh offers us a vision for how the theoretical, moral, mechanical, and logical arts and sciences could serve near and distant neighbours. His practice of teaching anyone who came to him and his writing for generations after him embodies his belief that "each one does not have for himself alone even that which he alone has."[480] One's knowledge and skill, the fruits of her intellectual appetite's labours, could address her own needs and those of her social, religious, and political communities.

Clearly, Hugh did not think advanced theoretical knowledge pursued for its own sake to be the only or even the primary end of education. One of the most interesting aspects of Hugh's thought is his high regard for the "mechanical" arts that address the physical and psychological needs and threats that communities face. Three of his four parts of philosophy are directly practical. As Hugh explains, the end of every human art or discipline should be truth, the cultivation of virtue, or the amelioration of some sort of intellectual, emotional, or physical need because these are the goods that enable persons and communities to flourish. The public discourse about education is often dominated by concern for self-fulfilment and personal or national economic power and prestige. Largely absent is something like Hugh's integrated vision of how education can serve multiple practical goods for the various communities in which people are embedded.

Melanchthon on Good Works

Melanchthon's understanding of the practical ends of education resembles Hugh's, though his work lays greater stress on the contribution to the religious and political

[480] Ibid, II.ii.1-3.

communities. His emphasis on education as a practical way to love one's neighbours is even clearer than Hugh's, especially if read in light of his doctrine of "good works."

Melanchthon argues that good works—service to society, the church, and the *polis*—are required of Christians.[481] Those called by God to love their neighbours should care about, and act for, their neighbours' social, economic, and religious well-being. According to Melanchthon, good deeds do not justify a person before God, but they are nevertheless fitting and obligatory. His emphasis on good works provoked significant criticism from both antinomians jealous for "Christian freedom" and Lutherans jealous for *sola fide*. According to Melanchthon, God commands good deeds and is pleased by them. Good deeds confirm one's justification, help a person retain faith and avoid punishment, lead to spiritual and material non-salvific rewards from God, and contribute to the flourishing and preservation of the human race.[482]

Advanced knowledge and skill are not required for every kind of good work, but some good works require knowledge and skill normally achieved through extended formal education. It is one thing, for example, to protest human trafficking with a picket sign, and another to earn a law degree in order to prosecute international and domestic traffickers and free their victims. It is one thing to console a terminally ill cancer patient in hospice care, and another to pursue an advanced degree in pluripotent stem cells and cancer immunotherapy in order to contribute toward the cure of the cancer that is killing him. It is one thing to discuss a theological problem over dinner, and another to acquire

[481] See Carl E. Maxcey, *Bona Opera: A Study in the Development of the Doctrine in Philip Melanchthon*. (Nieuwkoop, Netherlands: B. De Graaf, 1980), 65, 202, 278, 288.

[482] Melanchthon, *Loci Communes*, Locus 9, 187.

an advanced degree in Theology and write a book that carefully resolves that problem. All six of these examples might be good works of love on behalf of others, but only a person who has been educated and trained is free to perform the latter of each pair as a work of love. This emphasis on the ethical outworking of the religious life means that persons who care about the common good should be disinclined to consider their education and career choices exclusively as opportunities to advance their financial and material well-being, political freedom, or social capital. Instead, Melanchthon encourages us to consider how our actions in every domain of life—personal, professional, ecclesial, political—should directly or indirectly consider the neighbour's good. The primary reason Melanchthon spent two years reforming the arts curriculum at the University of Wittenberg (1523–25) was that its students needed to be able to think, speak, and act well for the sake of the church and society.

The demand of "good works" on behalf of the neighbour is a challenging perspective largely absent from Nussbaum or Fish, even though it could find common ground with Nussbaum and others who consider service a compelling motivation. Nussbaum might welcome the obligation that Christians feel to do good works if it means that they feel obligated to act as politically liberal democratic world-citizens—a proposition not as ludicrous as it might sound. Nussbaum would certainly endorse Melanchthon's belief that people should be prepared to be fully involved citizens who promote the common good and political order. If Melanchthon is right to insist that at least Christians have moral obligations to their ecclesial, political, and social communities, then they should take their vocation as citizens of pluralist democracies

seriously, even if the way they fulfil that vocation does not necessarily adhere to Nussbaum's Rawlsian restrictions.

Fish would likely find Melanchthon's Christian obligation to do good works objectionable if it means students were obsessed with applying every aspect of their learning to the political, ecclesial, economic, or social good. According to Fish, such expectations distort the educational experience as he conceives it, by violating the strict *cordon sanitaire* he wants to maintain between intellectual activities and practical, political, or professional activities. To be fair, he has an honest and legitimate worry. Students' first question in, for instance, advanced calculus, eighteenth century literature, or quantum mechanics, need not be "how can I use this to benefit society?" Though this question is not immediately relevant to such classes, it might be to others, and it is certainly germane to the overall intellectual, moral, and professional formation that happens during a student's academic education. It is legitimate for a student to wonder how his study and work might positively contribute to the well-being of his communities, and negatively, how they might help him resist those forces that threaten it. Melanchthon, like Hugh, raises these questions by concentrating on the possibility that education and professional training might be pursued as practical forms of love, service, and good work.

The Practical Arts of Medicine in Service to Society

Melanchthon's corpus does not include an elaborate integration of the mechanical arts into philosophy like Hugh's. Only the "mechanical art" of medicine enjoyed an intrinsic place in the late medieval and Renaissance universities where Melanchthon was at home. Medicine enjoyed an especially prominent role at the University of Wittenberg,

in part because one of its founders, Martin Pollich von Mellerstadt, was medical professor, physician to Elector Frederick of Saxony, and vice-chancellor of the university. Melanchthon was arguably the most significant educational and philosophical champion of medicine in sixteenth century Europe. [483] In his reflections on medicine, a science with which he was well acquainted, we can see an example of Melanchthon's clear affirmation of at least one practical end of education in service to society that provides an instructive model for other arts and sciences.

Melanchthon's enthusiasm for the study of medicine was supported by Martin Luther, and together they advanced it among Wittenberg's students. Luther's own son, Paul, for example, graduated to become a chemist and chief physician to the Elector of Saxony. Similarly, Melanchthon's son-in-law, Caspar Peucer, became head of Wittenberg's medical faculty in 1560; and Peucer's own son-in-law, Hieronymus Schaller, became a medical doctor and was appointed to the Wittenberg faculty in 1574. Unlike many of their contemporaries, Luther and Melanchthon rejected purely spiritual causes and remedies for sickness and disease. Instead, they advised patients to seek the advice of medical doctors. Their common approach to medicine is evident in Luther's

[483] Vivian Nutton argues the influence of "Wittenberg anatomy" and medicine "was long-lasting, widespread and accessible to a broad section of the community, from schoolboys to professors, and from book-pedlars to pastors." Vivian Nutton, "Wittenberg Anatomy," in Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham, eds. *Medicine and the Reformation*. (London: Routledge, 1993), 25. See also Wolfgang U. Eckart, "Philipp Melanchthon und die Medizin," and Theodor Koch, "Melanchthon und die Vesal-Rezeption in Wittenberg," in Günther Frank and Stefan Rhein, eds. *Melanchthon und die Naturwissenschaften seiner Zeit*. (Bretten: Thorbecke, 1998); Sachiko Kusukawa, "*Aspectio divinorum operum*: Melanchthon and astrology for Lutheran medics," in Grell and Cunningham eds., *Medicine and the Reformation*, 33–56.

1527 letter to pastor John Hess during an outbreak of the plague. Melanchthon and Luther almost certainly discussed how to respond to this devastating disease. Luther's letter charges people who refuse medical treatment with rashly testing God. Instead, along with prayer, he commends well-staffed and equipped hospitals, nursing care between neighbours, and the use of all "intelligence and medicine," which it would be suicide or murder to ignore. "Use medicine; take potions which can help you; fumigate house, yard, and street; shun persons and places wherever your neighbor does not need your presence or has recovered, and act like a man who wants to help put out the burning city."[484] Above all, Luther insists that people follow the best medical advice to care for their own well-being and that of their neighbour.[485]

Between 1529 and 1560, Melanchthon consistently wrote on and promoted the study of medicine.[486] He praises the practical good of anatomical and medical knowledge because "life, good health and the protection of life are good things" given by God who "commands us to enjoy these divine gifts."[487] He wrote encomiums to medicine because it "brings endless benefits for life," and to Hippocrates, Galen, and Avicenna because

[484] Martin Luther, "Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plague," *Luther's Works Vol. 43 : Devotional Writings II*, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1999), 131–2.

[485] See Chow Sze Ting, "The Reformation and Modern German Medicine," *Chinese Studies in History* 48:2 (2015), 186-214.

[486] Eckart lists nineteen speeches Melanchthon gave in this time. "Philipp Melanchthon und die Medizin," 183–4.

[487] "On the merit of the art of medicine," 170. See Morten Fink-Jensen, "Medicine, Natural Philosophy, and the Influence of Melanchthon in Reformation Denmark and Norway," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, Volume 80, Number 3, Fall 2006, 439-464.

they advanced medical knowledge.[488] In a 1542 address, he praises the "salutary" nature of the physician's art and argues that all people should have some knowledge "of the elements, of the temperaments, of the function and nature of the limbs and organs in humans, of the causes of diseases," and so forth.[489] By 1545, all Wittenberg University arts students were required to have at least rudimentary anatomical and medical knowledge.[490] In 1548, he extolls "the countless benefits of the art of medicine," lauds it as "the gift of God," praises God as the "maker of remedies," and quotes Sirach 38:1 approvingly: "Honour the physician, for God has created him for the sake of our need." Accordingly, "it is most just to recompense such a physician by any kind of favour."[491] In a 1550 oration, he praises anatomy because it assists both professional doctors and private individuals in "protecting health and driving out disease." He declares it "evident madness" not to care for the "fragile bodies" of one's self or neighbour.[492] Melanchthon also considered anatomy and medicine to be forms of natural revelation. They revealed

[488] *Encomium medicinae¸* in CR XI.201. See also *De studio doctrinae anatomicae*, CR XI, 946; *De pulmone*, CR XII, 209; *De consideration corporis humani*, CR XII, 323; *De arte medica*, CR XII, 116. For an example of Melanchthon's familiarity with cures, see "On the merit of the art of medicine," 171.

[489] "On natural philosophy," 134. On the relation of medicine and astrology, see Kusukawa, "*Aspectio divinorum operum*," 37–42, 45. On the influence of Melanchthon's Lutheran astrology on Johannes Kepler, see J. V. Field, "A Lutheran Astrologer: Johannes Kepler," *Archive for History of Exact Sciences*, 31.3 (1984): 189–272; Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein, "Theological Foundations of Kepler's Astronomy," *Osiris*, Vol. 16, *Science in Theistic Contexts: Cognitive Dimensions* (2001), 88-113. See also Charlotte Metheun, "*Lex naturae* and *ordo naturae* in the Thought of Philip Melanchthon," in Metheun, *Science and Theology in the Reformation* (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 19–30, 92–93.

[490] Nutton, "Wittenberg Anatomy," 23.

[491] "On the merit of the art of medicine," 170–73; *De dignitate artis medicae*, *CR* XI, 808.

[492] "On anatomy," 159–160; "De anatomia," CR XI, 32.

the wise Creator's majestic design and opened the possibility of physical explanations and answers for moral and spiritual weaknesses. For Melanchthon, the human body was a theatre of God's grandeur and a collaborative colleague of the soul.[493]

His convictions concerning the physical, theological, and moral value of medicine drove him to promote its study and practice throughout his life. It is thus one concrete example of a practical end of education pursued because of its beneficial effects for the neighbour, despite the great costs of learning it. With a little effort, we can imagine other kinds of knowledge that could be sought because they directly or indirectly alleviate threats and meet needs, much like the threats and needs Hugh thinks prompted the mechanical arts.

Melanchthon on Service to Church

We should not be surprised to find Melanchthon challenging students to study for the sake of the church. He arrived in Wittenberg only months after Luther posted his 95 Theses, and agreed with Luther that church reform required proper interpretation of Scripture, effective teaching of the Gospel, and devout leadership of the newly established Lutheran and Protestant churches.[494] In Manschreck's words, "Education was for Philip the silver bowl carrying the golden fruit of the gospel."[495] We can hear both

[493] See Nutton, "Wittenberg Anatomy," 19–23; Kusukawa, *Transformation*, 75–123.

[494] "Praise of Eloquence," 74–76; "Dedicatory letter to the *Questions on Dialectics*," 86; see also "Reply to Pico;" "On the merit of studying theology," 184–6; "On the order of learning," 6; "On the role of the schools," 12, 15, 16; "On the Study of Languages," 30; "On Aristotle," 205.

[495] Clyde Leonard Manschreck, *Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1958), 131. Melanchthon's "Saxon Visitation of 1528" and his curricular reforms of 1533 both aimed at improving the education and competency of pastors. See Joon–Shul Park, *Philip Melanchthon's Reform of German Universities and Its Significance:*

Melanchthon's humanist and reforming voice when he exhorts a Nuremburg senator never to weary of promoting scholarship among his people:

> Erudition is such a great ornament for the Church that, once it is lost, it is impossible for the most impenetrable darkness not to follow. … Scholarship sheds great light on the Gospel, particularly if the Church has sane judges and arbitrators of studies. … For many and great disputes are held in the Church, which cannot be expounded without erudition. … It is truly the murder of the Church not to support the studies of scholarship; and God will punish this with great misfortunes.[496]

A Lutheran pastor coming from Melanchthon's tutelage was expected to "earn his respect as a St. Paul in the pulpit, a Cicero in the school house and town hall, and an Aristotle in agriculture through humanist learning."[497]

In particular, Melanchthon laid the blame for much of the ecclesial and theological conflict of the 16th century on an inadequate understanding of Scripture and a careless lack of linguistic precision in arguments. To that end, Aristotelian philosophy is especially useful, since it inculcates a careful dialectic, "which offers a correct method that define things cleanly, divides things properly, binds together suitable arguments, and subdivides and judges awful [*monstrosas*] connections in arguments." Without careful dialectic, a person is likely to mutilate the topic under discussion and settle for a war of words (*logomachein*, λογομαχιαν), which Melanchthon considers a "completely childish" (*pueriliter*) situation that hampers access to the truth and theological

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A Study on the Relationship Between Renaissance Humanism and the Reformation (Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Ohio State University, 1995), 124f.

[496] "Preface to the Commentary on the Soul," 144.

[497] Manfred P. Fleischer, "Humanism and Reformation in Silesia: Imprints of Italy—Celtis, Erasmus, Luther, and Melanchthon," in Manfred P. Fleischer, *The Harvest of Humanism in Central Europe* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 87–88.

reconciliation.[498] So important is the ability to use words and arguments well that Melanchthon calls dialectic the "bond of unity" (*vinculum concordiae*) in the church.[499]

Melanchthon also recognizes the value of an educated laity. In a graduation address, he exhorts everyone, regardless of their profession, to study theology for the good of the church:

> The teaching of religion concerns everyone. … All good men have to consider themselves born chiefly for the Church. … Even if some commendable considerations call us to other arts … nevertheless Christian teaching must not be neglected. Some of our time and effort needs to be allocated to it for the purpose of strengthening our own minds as well as for preparing ourselves for the common good of the Church.[500]

Similarly, general intellectual formation can serve the church, even if indirectly: "it is piety to prepare one's intellect so that some time it could be of use to the Church" in some way.[501] Therefore, "the young … have a duty towards God to strive for firm and complete knowledge which will be of use to the Church and the state."[502] Much more could be said, but this should suffice to demonstrate that besides service to society, he also encourages students to pursue education, theological or otherwise, in order to serve and benefit the church.

Today, clearly not every person identifies with the Christian Church, as they generally did in Melanchthon's context. Even so, the majority of the world's population

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[498] CR XI, *Oratio de Aristotele*, 654. For a "war of words," see 2 Timothy 2:14. Melanchthon complained of this regarding at least the Diet of Augsburg and the colloquies of Worms and Regensburg. See Kuropka, "Philip Melanchthon and Aristotle," 24–25.

[499] CR VI, 655.

[500] "On the study of languages," 32.

[501] "On the merit of studying theology," 187.

[502] "Preface to Johannes Vogelin's *Book on the Elements of Geometry*," 101.

does identify with some religious community, and even many non-religious people either recognize the value of religious communities or identify closely with some other kind of social institution that approximates their sociological identity and function. Melanchthon makes three appeals that are instructive when considering how education could serve a religious or similarly significant community. First, some should study in order to fill positions of leadership within that community. Second, everyone in the community should study, in his case, Christian Scripture and theology, in order be engaged members of the community. Finally, every member should consider how their non-theological knowledge or skills might serve the community in some capacity. His threefold appeal reminds us that most people are members of various small organizations, institutions, or communities that could practically benefit from our learning, depending on its particular needs.

Melanchthon on Service to the State and the Common Good

Finally, Melanchthon consistently identifies service to the political order as a chief reason to pursue education. Like the investiture controversy in Hugh's time, the Reformation exacerbated the tension between spiritual and secular powers. The spectre of Thomas Muntzer and the Peasant's War of 1524–5, as well as Anabaptist objections to civil government, were never far from Melanchthon's mind. In the 1559 *Loci,* he writes, "uneducated people are moved by the many perversions and confusions" that occur in government and courts, and because "previously unprepared," they "denounce everything, including the very political order itself," and consign government to the work

of "the devil" or "human pride and greed."[503] Melanchthon judged such conclusions to be irrational, irreverent, and dangerous, and blamed them in part on poor readings of Scripture and inadequate training in moral philosophy. Instead, he argues that civil governments uphold natural law and "the very law of God on civic morals" by implementing the insights of moral philosophy.[504] In the second longest section of his final 1559 *Loci Communes*, devoted to "Civil Rulers and the Validity of Governmental Matters," Melanchthon explains that civil government and civil society rely on "earnest-minded" politically wise and prudent citizens and public officials.[505] When pursued for the sake of God, civil service and public duties can be a kind of political worship of God.[506]

Because he thinks civil government and civil society integral to the proper flourishing of human society, he considers the formation of citizens an essential goal of education. Both "churches and schools" should not only teach about the civil polity but also nurture appreciative reverence for political offices and an orderly civil society.[507] "The civil order is a good thing. It is beautiful, beneficial for the human race, and is the special work of God." It employs rulers, judges, punishments, offices, schools, and armed force in order to provide "discipline and peace and order," instruction in the Christian

[503] *Loci Praceipui Theologici* 1559. Locus 20, 403.
[504] "On the distinction between the Gospel and philosophy," 23.
[505] For the importance of citizens, see *Loci Praceipui Theologici* 1559, 422.
[506] Ibid, 417, 422.
[507] Ibid., 403, 410.

religion, the promotion of "works of virtue," the enforcement of lawful contracts, and "fairness in business dealings" for "the benefit of the common good."[508]

Given the great good of civil order and the perpetual unrest of the early sixteenth century, Melanchthon often reminds his students that their studies "belong to the church and the state, and are not pursued just for the sake of the private sector or for the pleasure derived from them."[509] In his essay, "On the order of learning," he challenges students to be diligent because "your studies do not concern only you, but the state," which requires "erudite counsel."[510] Similarly, in the dedication to his most important ethical work, the *Epitome of Moral Philosophy*, Melanchthon counsels Christianus Pontanus, son of Frederick the Wise's Chancellor, to love Aristotle's *Ethics* and devote "all the powers of your intellect and your mind" to moral and political philosophy, so that at some time "your intellect may be of use to the state."[511] Similarly, his oration "On the merit of laws" praises the various remedial and educative benefits of clear, just, and enforceable law for the sake of "the glory of God and for the common good."[512] One interesting feature of Melanchthon's writing on the good of civil government is that though he discusses justice, princes, punishment, and laws, he appeals most often to the "common good" as the teleological end for which government and commerce should work.

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[508] Melanchthon, *Loci Praceipui Theologici* 1559, Locus 20, 404. On equity in business, see especially 432–34.

[509] "On Philosophy," in Keen, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 66.

[510] "On the order of learning," *Orations*, 5–6.

[511] "Dedicatory letter to Melanchthon's *Epitome of Moral Philosophy,"* 143.

[512] "On the merit of laws," 179. See "Preface to Cicero's *On Duties*," 79–83.

Melanchthon also expects political authorities to ensure "fairness in business dealings" for "the benefit of the common good."[513] According to what we might call Melanchthon's "business" or "economic ethics," Christians must love their neighbour economically and "do unto others" even in their commercial transactions. This includes offering the neighbour the kind of contract or terms they would like for themselves and refusing to take advantage of the neighbour for the sake of one's own profit. In these examples and others, Melanchthon affirms the practical and professional application of education in business but refuses to excuse it from the moral norms of Christianity. Business education and economic justice should also serve the neighbour and the common good.

Conclusion to Melanchthon

Beyond the study of political philosophy and law, Melanchthon also promotes the study of mathematics for the good of the economy; the study of rhetoric for the sake of clear communication; the study of literature and history for inspiring prudent leaders; and the study of geometry, astronomy, and astrology for confirming divine providence, interpreting divine warnings, and identifying individual moral inclinations. He combines his concern for society, church, and state in his "first rule" for instruction in the good of civil society:

> Just as the Gospel neither abolishes nor disapproves of arithmetic, architecture, or the science and art of medicine, so it neither abolishes nor disapproves of the economic or political order. Indeed, it commands us to recognize that these things are gifts of God which this physical life cannot be without. … He preserves our

[513] Melanchthon, *Chief Theological Topics*. Locus 20, 404. On equity in business, see especially 432–34.

> physical life by these things: food, drink, marriage, the civil order, and the arts, such as agriculture, architecture, medicine, and physical life.[514]

Melanchthon's point is that each of the practical disciplines, arts, and sciences he enumerates can and should be used for the common good of humanity. "All the known arts" are God-given "supports for life," so "we ought the more to foster and cultivate them."[515] Along with family, governance, and law, Melanchthon thinks education, the arts, and the sciences "bind" a society together into a common life.[516] Therefore, "parents should place their children at school … so that God can use them for the good of others."[517] Teachers should consider their "school vocation" a divine service that pleases God and "renders a high service to mankind."[518] Citizens should send God their "hottest prayers" that he might provoke the political authorities, as the guardians of society, to establish schools. Princes who do so are more to be praised by posterity than if they discovered new veins of silver and gold.[519]

We should now be able to see similarities between Hugh and Melanchthon on the multiple practical goods that can be served by education. Like Hugh, Melanchthon

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[514] Ibid, Locus 20, 417; See also "Preface to Johannes Vogelin's *Book on the Elements of Geometry*," 100.

[515] Melanchthon, *Paul's Letter to the Colossians*, 47. See also Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 59–60.

[516] Melanchthon, *Chief Theological Topics*, Locus 20, 433-34. "Book of Visitation School Plan," in *Early Protestant Reformers*, 181.

[517] Manschreck, *Melanchthon*, 140. From Melanchthon's 1528 plan for school revision, CR 26: 89–95.

[518] CR XI, 298. See also CR XI, 106–11, "In Praise of a New School;" CR XI, 209–214, "On the Order of Learning." On the requirement that teachers be distinguished by talent, scholarship, virtue, and wisdom, see Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 402; CR XI, 108, 213, 438, 445, 612, 615; XII, 162.

[519] CR XI, *De restituendis scholis*, 492. Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 402.

affirms the inherent good of knowledge, but he is at least equally, if not more, concerned with the ways education enables a person to perform works of service on behalf of multiple communities. That said, conceiving of education and employment as ways to love one's neighbours does not exclude them from also being financially remunerated in gainful employment. Melanchthon, for example, promotes careers in business, education, politics, religion, and the military, but insists they must be guided and disciplined by the command to love and serve the neighbour. This moral call is absent in Fish's accounts of education, but a form of it pervades Nussbaum's concern that the goods served by the liberal democratic order are threatened by certain educational, economic, and political policies and practices. She would demur from suggesting that citizens actively love one another, and though Hugh and Melanchthon differ from her on many important points, Nussbaum insists that for the sake of their national and international neighbours students must pursue critical thinking, accurate economic, historical, and cultural information, and the moral emotions of compassion, empathy, and concern.

John Henry Newman on Liberal Education and Professional Skill

The traditional professional degrees of the medieval and renaissance universities—medicine, law, and ministry—as well as contemporary professional degrees like business, music, and engineering, and trades like carpentry, blacksmith, and pottery each require specialized and particular training focused on creating a product. Compared to liberal education, their end is not a cultivated mind but an excellent

product or service.[520] Hugh and Melanchthon, as we have seen, more or less affirm these kinds of professions, trades, and skills because they represent expressions of human ingenuity and the intellectual appetite, meet needs within society, earn their practitioner a wage, and can be valid ways of loving and serving one's neighbour for the sake of the common good.

Newman acknowledges that "agriculture, medicine, and the arts of life" are God's gifts, and that God sanctions "society, laws, government."[521] However, he does not distinguish so clearly in his writings between the uniquely social, political, and religious needs that learning serves.[522] When he does address the relation between education and the church in discourses seven, eight, and nine in the *Idea of a University*, and in individual lectures on the relation between Christianity and literature, medicine, and physical science, he does so primarily to distinguish between the liberally educated secular and Christian person, and to identify the particular threats posed to and by science, history, and literature when pursued apart from the Catholic Church and Christian theology. He also argues that because theology and science study the same divine and human works, albeit with distinct methods, each, for example, need not theoretically conflict with one another, even if they mutually define the disciplinary

[520] See Aquinas on *ars* as a virtue. *ST* I II., Q. 57.

[521] *Idea*, 67.

[522] On his political thought, see Terence Kenny, *The Political Thought of John Henry Newman* (New York: Longmans, 1957); David Paul Deavel, "Second Thoughts: Newman on Political and Economic Liberty," in *Journal of Markets and Morality* 17.2 (Fall, 2014), 429–443; Edward Norman, "Newman's Social and Political Thinking," in Ian T. Ker and Alan G. Hill, eds., *Newman After a Hundred Years*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Alvan Ryan, "The Development of Newman's Political Thought," *Review of Politics* 7.2 (April, 1945), 210–40.

borders that distinguish them. More than anything, his concern in discourse nine, "Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge," for instance, is to suggest how the church can aid the pursuit of knowledge, rather than how knowledge serves the religious community.

Furthermore, Newman spends very little time reflecting on professional education or the trades and crafts identified by Hugh and Melanchthon. This may be due to the influential attacks on the uselessness of classical and liberal education by the *Edinburgh Review* and, before them, John Locke, to which Newman directly responds in the *Idea*. It could also be due to Newman's need to defend the centrality of liberal studies in a country many thought desperate for practical skills. He takes up the question of the utility of education in "Knowledge and Professional Skill" in order to argue for the utility of liberal studies rather than the good of professional ones, which he merely assumes.[523] According to Newman, liberal studies are useful for the individual in three ways: as a complex person, as a member of society, and as a worker.

His first argument is that though most people will find their way into professions, trades, or services, their identities are not and should not be swallowed up by their particular vocations. This is a defensive move by Newman intended to delay the inexorable and uncritical march toward reducing all university education to vocational training. The twenty-first century debate between liberal and professional education is

[523] Newman's direct and lengthy responses to the Edinburgh Review are hard to reconcile with P. A. Dale's assertion that Newman "regarded his particular educational concern to be the role of religion in education, not the question of liberal versus useful education." P. A. Dale, "Newman's 'The Idea of a University': The Dangers of a University Education," *Victorian Studies* 16.1 (Sep., 1972), 6.

little different from the one Newman faced in the mid-nineteenth century. However, he reminds readers that students will be more than their professions. The hours of their lives will be spent doing many more things than simply working at their job. "He is not always upon duty."[524] They will also be friends, family members, church members, and individual persons with emotional and intellectual lives that exist independently of their professions. Liberal education addresses this aspect of a person's identity and refines "the intercourse of private life."[525] Newman's point is that everyone, no matter their profession, should also have the opportunity to gain general knowledge of the world, cultivate intellectual virtues, develop social graces, and nurture pursuits beyond physical activities and professional skills. This is the education that "makes men."[526] Thus, liberal education is eminently useful or practical because it contributes to a life well-lived, one that is examined, sociable, stimulating, and enjoyable.

Secondly, liberal education in the arts, humanities, and sciences not only benefits the individual, but also enables a person "to discharge his duties to society" more generally. Newman lists its many social benefits: it forms "good members of society," raises "the intellectual tone of society," cultivates the public mind, purifies the national taste, tempers "popular enthusiasm," enlarges "the ideas of the age," facilitates "the exercise of political power," and refines "the intercourse of private life."[527] Therefore,

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[524] *Idea*, 149.
[525] *Idea*, 154.
[526] *My Campaign in Ireland*, 315.
[527] *Idea*, 154. Newman's insistence that every student be liberally educated and that liberal education contributes to the general good of society belies Dale's judgment against Newman's classist elitism. Dale charges that Newman did not think "liberal knowledge is something that ought to be spread abroad to everyone, on principle," but

that which is "useful," Newman insists, contra Locke and the Edinburgh Review, is that which is good, tends to good, or is likely to produce multidimensional goods in a variety of contexts and communities.[528] Thus, a liberal education serves the very practical social good of producing good neighbours and citizens.[529] "If a man is well educated, of cultivated mind, well principled, and gentleman-like, whatever place he is in he will be valued for what he is. … He may be poor, he may be obliged to take a humble trade; but … he will render himself and his place respectable."[530] Liberal education, Newman proclaims, constitutes the best formation for "social and political life."[531] Newman here overlaps with Nussbaum's insistence that the humanities, though only one part of a liberal education, are best suited to cultivate the kinds of citizens needed in liberal democracies. She also argues that the humanities are eminently "practical." But the importance of Newman's point that the worker is more than a worker, and that education can prepare them for private and public life, is easily lost if education is indexed to only one aspect of a student's present or future identity, which, despite the obvious good of liberal democracies and academic institutions, even Nussbaum and Fish are in danger of doing. "He is not always upon duty," Newman insists, regardless of what that singular "duty" might be.

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that it should be limited to the "cultured classes." P. A. Dale, "Newman's 'The Idea of a University'," 25.

[528] *Idea*, 143.

[529] Ibid, 183; See Culler, *The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Newman's Educational Ideal*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 219–226.

[530] *My Campaign in Ireland*, 314.

[531] *Idea*, 183.

Newman's arguments for the individual, social, and political usefulness of liberal education resemble arguments Josef Pieper made in Germany after the Second World War. Pieper, who was deeply influenced by Newman and carries some of his ideas into the twentieth century, warned against the trend he saw developing that threatened to reduce persons to their economically productive profession. This push toward "total work" left little time or energy for "liberal" activities that require "leisure" like culture-making, wonder, worship, community service, and study.

Pieper's concerns demonstrate that the economized utilitarian view of education never waned between Newman's—or Locke's—and our own time. Writing in post-war Germany, Pieper challenges "the totalitarian claim of a commercialized world" to carve out and retain space for the intellectual freedom obtained by liberal education.[532] Elsewhere, Pieper describes this as a conflict between an "overvaluation of work" as an activity to be pursued for its own sake or for its social utility. This first "overvaluation" is interesting, because it identifies the implicit assumption of many people, namely that work and financial gain should be pursued as ends in themselves—inherent goods rather than instrumental ones. To do so, however, reduces the human person to "worker" and ignores the argument that work or economic gain should be ordered to more fundamental goods, such as life and human community.

In contrast, Pieper argues that space must be created for "leisure" in which the liberal arts, philosophy, beauty, and culture can be pursued. He observes that the Greek

[532] Josef Pieper, "Liberal Arts," in *Josef Pieper: An Anthology*. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 112.

word *σχολή* (Latin, *schola*) is the word both for "leisure" and for "school." This type of leisure does not refer to a "holiday" or "break" given only for rejuvenating a worker so they are more productive when they return to work. Instead, "leisure," Pieper writes, in conceptual sympathy with Newman, is a mental and spiritual habit of being that allows the mind and spirit time to contemplate, enjoy human goods, and "steep oneself in the whole of creation." Leisure ensures that "embedded in our social function, [we] are enabled to remain fully human," retaining "the ability to look beyond the limits of our social and functional station" in order "to contemplate and celebrate the world as such, to become and be that person who is essentially oriented to the whole of reality." According to Pieper, leisure is the basis of culture, that is, of that social achievement that "goes beyond the mere necessities of life yet is nonetheless indispensable for the fullness of human experience."[533] In words that Nussbaum and Fish could at least partially endorse, and Newman fully, Pieper argues that leisure is the "preserve of freedom, of education and culture, and of that undiminished humanity which views the world as a whole."[534]

Pieper makes the pointed remark that people who restlessly and fanatically pursue "work for work's sake" to the detriment of the human goods pursued through "leisure" would have been considered slothful or lazy by many in the classical and middle ages, because they were lazy about the most important things. "Idleness, in the medieval view, means that a man renounces the claim implicit in his human dignity. … He does

[533] Pieper, "Leisure and its Threefold Opposition," in ibid, 141–1.
[534] Pieper, *Leisure*, 53.

not wish to be what he really, fundamentally, *is,*" that is, a complex person who flourishes through the pursuit of a variety of vulnerable goods. [535]

Pieper's point is largely Newman's point, that a person's identity should not be reduced to any one function, especially "worker" or "producing consumer," but that he or she should be prepared and given time and space to participate in activities and goods that dignify their human nature. Note that for both Pieper and Newman, simply creating time and space for the possibility of cultural activities is necessary but not sufficient. Instead, both argue that the desire for and ability to participate in such goods must be nurtured. It needs to be modelled, taught, and practiced, as it is in many academic institutions. According to Pieper, the university should not simply "train" a "functionary" with respect to one special subject, but should "educate" the "whole man" who is *capax universi,* "capable of grasping the totality of existing things."[536] Only then may a person, who has been given political and social freedom to do so, "occupy their leisure" in a fully human way and be able to participate in goods like philosophy, the arts, worship, science, or even sport, which are often relegated as secondary to work and economic prosperity.

Newman's third argument for the usefulness of liberal education mirrors one Nussbaum and many others make, namely that liberally educated persons will be able to take up any trade or profession more easily because they will have learned how to learn, analyse, understand, judge, remember, and communicate with other people.[537]

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[535] Ibid, 42-3.
[536] Ibid, 39.
[537] See Nussbaum, *Not for Profit*, 10, 52–3, 112.

They will have "intellectual self-possession and repose."[538] They will be able to "take up any one of the sciences or callings … with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which" anyone who lacks a liberal education "is a stranger."[539]

Newman's basic argument has become something of a truism among defenders of the liberal arts and sciences. Multiple studies verify that employers often look for students trained in the liberal arts and sciences because of their abilities to learn quickly, read carefully, process complex information, work collaboratively, and communicate effectively.[540] Regarding Newman's argument itself, we should remember that the students matriculating at the Catholic University of Dublin came at age sixteen.[541] Their first two years at university, which focused exclusively on a liberal approach to the arts and sciences, corresponds to contemporary Western students' last two years at high school or sixth form, during which most students are exposed to a wide variety of disciplines aimed at cultivating their general knowledge and intellectual acumen. Therefore, while Newman admits that a university may prepare people to be medical doctors, lawyers, engineers, or economists, that is neither all nor the first thing it should do with its students. Instead, students should "proceed through Arts … before they

[538] *Idea*, 135.

[539] Ibid, 145. See also 150–1.

[540] See, for example, George Anders, "That 'Useless' Liberal Arts Degree Has Become Tech's Hottest Ticket," in *Forbes* (August 17, 2015); Galan Janeksela, "The Value of a Liberal Arts Education," in *Academic Exchange Quarterly* 16.4 (Winter, 2012); Debra Humphreys and Patrick Kelly, *How Liberal Arts and Sciences Majors Fare in Employment*. (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Colleges and Universities, 2014).

[541] See *My Campaign in Ireland*, 31.

attach themselves to a particular profession."[542] If they do so, he attests, they will be "more useful, and to a greater number" in the long run.[543]

Dwight Culler, however, complains that Newman undermines his claim that liberal knowledge is an inherent good by also acknowledging that it had practical benefits like benefitting society. Culler claims that Newman ignores Aristotle's and Cicero's hierarchical ordering of useful things to inherently good ones, and that Newman proves himself a Benthamite by accepting "utility" as a "criterion for evaluating knowledge.[544] However, it is not clear at all that he does either of these things. Newman does not present social utility and inherent good as equal ends, but merely acknowledges that they are both possible through the same liberal knowledge. Newman can consistently argue that liberal knowledge is inherently good given human nature, and that liberal knowledge has ancillary practical benefits given human need. Thus, Newman appears to preserve the Aristotelian hierarchical ordering that Culler thinks he "momentarily ignored." It is also not clear where Culler thinks Newman offered "utility" as a "criterion" for knowledge. Instead, Newman simply notes that liberal education, besides being good for the person *qua* person, also benefits him or her politically, socially, and professionally. These are two useful goods achieved by liberal education.

Liberal Education and Professional Training

My reservation with Newman's reflections on the practical ends of education lies elsewhere than Culler's. However compelling his arguments for the usefulness of a

[542] See Ibid, 10.
[543] *Idea*, 145-6.
[544] Ibid, 222–23.

liberal education may be, he offers little to help us understand what he thought of the "mechanical arts," trades, or professions. Newman believes that education serves society and the church, but he exclusively reflects on the ways liberal education, rather than professional training, does so. One might wish that alongside his practical argument for the utility of a liberal education he would include a philosophical argument for the value of a professional one.

Clearly, evidence that he valued professional education and practice is easy to identify. The university, in Newman's words, is a place to prepare "men of the world for the world."[545] He refers to civil servants, medical doctors, soldiers, diplomats, landlords, politicians, lawyers, merchants, and Christian priests without denigrating these professions. He told the first class of students at his new university that they came in order to "make preparation for the prospective professions and pursuits" for which they were intended—law, medicine, civil engineering, and the church.[546] Under Newman's direction, the Catholic University of Dublin purchased and incorporated into the university the medical school of the Dublin Apothecaries' Hall. Newman states that nothing would be more absurd than "to neglect in education those matters which are necessary for a boy's future calling."[547] Even further, after their first two years in liberal studies, after which they were awarded a "Scholar's Degree," students at the Catholic University of Dublin were to spend two years in pre-professional studies, and then

[545] Ibid, 197. See also 407: "Every professional man has rightly a zeal for his profession, and he would not do his duty towards it without that zeal."

[546] *My Campaign in Ireland*, 313.

[547] *Idea*, 140.

another three years in specific professional training leading to master's degrees in either divinity, law, or medicine.[548] Having their foundation in liberal education would enable students to excel in these disciplines and to recognize where their own competency ended and that of another field began. Liberal education was the foundation of the university, but it did not exhaust the university's aims, nor need it. Knowledge, Newman recognized, can serve multiple ends, and it is not immediately clear, either to me or to Newman, that liberal ends are undermined by also acknowledging and pursuing practical ones.

Even so, Newman does not provide an explicit philosophical or theological description of the professions, trades, or crafts, nor does he explain what beneficial and life-giving role they can play on a local, national, or international level. Neither does he explain how they might also represent creative intellectual endeavours, nor how they offer persons meaningful ways to participate in culture and society while earning their bread. My dissatisfaction with his limited philosophical reflection in this area is similar to my dissatisfaction with the narrowed scope of Nussbaum's and Fish's reflections. Though Newman's students spent two years in liberal studies and a possible five years in professional training, the overwhelming bulk of Newman's reflections on education are taken up with defending and explaining those first two years, leaving us to speculate how he thought about the final five. Practically, he affirmed them through the curricular structure of the university; philosophically and theologically, he left them relatively

[548] "Memorandum Relating to Catholic University," Feb. 19, 1853, in *My Campaign in Ireland*, 183. See also 9, 93–4, 147–8, 313–18.

unexplained. This is likely because throughout the discourses and essays collected in *The Idea of a University*, he assumes that "a University, after all, should be formally based (as it really is), and should emphatically live in, the Faculty of Arts," wherein students were liberally educated toward the philosophical cultivation of their minds. Because liberal studies and the philosophical cultivation of mind are central to the "idea" of a university in a way that professional studies are not, Newman wrote very little about them—a lacuna that keeps the *Idea of a University* and *Rise and Progress of Universities* from being comprehensive theoretical reflections on the ends of education and the intellectual appetite.

However, when these works are placed alongside the actual curriculum and structure of Newman's university, we can see that he refused an easy separation between intellectual and professional studies. As he conceived it, the university should prepare students to flourish in their personal, public, and professional roles, none of which should necessarily exclude the others, even if he thought liberal studies perfect human nature in a way practical studies do not. If we conceive of practical studies as a way to love one's neighbour, however, as I argued earlier, then at least the choice to pursue them for that reason participates in and furthers the individual's "perfection," even if morally rather than intellectually. Culler explains the lacuna in Newman's thought by suggesting that Newman only became concerned with practical and professional goals when he encountered the real needs and problems of Irish society. He appears to claim that Newman subsequently modified his vision for the university, which proved a "significant corrective" to the *Idea*. However, given that Newman worked on the Dublin

Discourses and the university curriculum at the same time, Culler's timeline is unconvincing.[549] That said, Culler identifies a concern similar to mine, namely, that Newman's *Idea* does not adequately help us understand the full range of liberal and professional studies that his university offered. Though Newman's university resembles many modern universities, with its combination of liberal education, research, and professional studies, numerous commentators still think that Newman only cared about the liberal education of his students—a misperception that is partially the result of Newman's failure to offer theological or philosophical reflection on the practical and professional education he clearly thought was part of a university's responsibility.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that pursuing a practical or applied end does not violate the essence or integrity of education, but is rather a reasonable goal for embodied souls in a physical world. Once we accept that, our three educators in the Christian tradition help us see how education could serve the intellectual and material well-being of the educated person and of their complex society through a variety of goods. Among those goods are gainful employment, material provision, a flourishing culture and society, a stable political order, and meaningful social and religious communities. These practical goods are met through both physical tasks that work with materials and intellectual tasks that work with ideas. Communities need, for example, quality food, clothing, buildings, and medical care, and they also need just laws, accurate information, persuasive communication, and reliable teaching. With other practical goods, these promote the

[549] Culler, *The Imperial Intellect*, 226.

good, true, beautiful, just, orderly, healthy, and sustainable, and so contribute to the flourishing of overlapping and variously complex communities.[550]

Central to the Christian tradition of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman is the command to love one's neighbour through deeds that contribute to their good. As I also argued, this vision of education as an act of charity on behalf of one's near and distant neighbours does not rule out the pursuit of learning for its own sake, nor for the sake of gainful employment. All three of these are goods that can be pursued at once. Though the Christian tradition includes a strong account of love and good deeds, the idea of serving one's neighbours and promoting their good overlaps with many other religious and non-religious views that regard care of one's fellow humans to be both a basic human responsibility and one that contributes to a meaningful and satisfying life.

Pursuing practical goods not only benefits the community, but also invests a person's study and work with greater meaning or significance than it might otherwise have were it considered simply the most efficient means to a paycheque. And though the actual study or work may not differ, conceiving study and work as acts of loving service contributes to the moral formation of the individual by habituating them to look beyond their own needs to the needs of others. In the work of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman, we have examples of how learning and education can be oriented to personal, social, ecclesial, and political communities.

[550] For these six categories, see Joshua Yates, *Thriving Cities Project Brief* (Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, 2015).

The argument that education might be animated by the desire to love and serve one's near and distant neighbours seems more amenable to Nussbaum's vision that education should prepare the compassionate global citizen of politically liberal democracies than Fish's vision that education should prepare well-trained disciplinary selves who enjoy living within the impractical confines of the research university. At the very least, Nussbaum argues that education can be used as an indirect support for politically liberal polities that attempt to enable every citizen to communicate economically, culturally, and politically on an equal footing. To that end, students and citizens should be taught to compassionately consider the needs of the most vulnerable and to actively resist those cultural, historical, economic, and intellectual forces that threaten vulnerable people or the stability of liberal political orders.

However, neither Fish nor Nussbaum give much of an account, if at all, of education oriented to practical, material goods. Fish thinks the connection between university education and employment is insubstantial, and Nussbaum worries that too strong a connection between education and financial gain will result in the continued evisceration of the intellectually liberal Humanities and of the politically liberal democratic citizens that she wants the Humanities to surreptitiously produce. Though Nussbaum does not, she could appeal directly to students and citizens themselves to pursue their intellectual, moral, and professional education in order to, among other things, promote the multidimensional flourishing of their near and distant neighbours. In a way, this discussion of practical knowledge dovetails with wider discussions concerning the philosophy and theology of "good work," that is, work that meets needs,

creates good, and contributes to the flourishing of the individual worker and the various intersecting and overlapping communities in which they live.[551] In the next chapter we will examine one practical art that each of our five interlocutors identify as essential to a flourishing community, and which offers us an example of a skill charitably used for redemptive ends, that is, the art of rhetoric.

[551] See, for example, Newman's Oxford contemporary, John Ruskin, *Unto This Last* (Orpington, UK: George Allen, 1877); Miroslav Volf, *Work in the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Darrel Cosden, *A Theology of Work: Work and the New Creation* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster Press, 2005); Ben Witherington, *Work: A Kingdom Perspective on Labor* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011).

Chapter Six
The Practical Ends of Education, Part II:
Charitable Rhetoric in Service to Society, Church, and State

"Every human activity is servant to eloquence wed to wisdom."[552]
Hugh of St. Victor

"If someone is not an ignorant judge of things, he should first ponder in his mind that there is nothing that is of such wide-ranging usefulness as the advantage of speech."[553]
Philip Melanchthon

"The gift of words is necessary to be able to persuade; and so the gift of manners may be necessary to win."[554]
John Henry Newman

Charitable Rhetoric

In this chapter, we explore one practical skill emphasized by each of our five interlocutors—the art of rhetoric or skillful communication. While we may be tempted to modify rhetoric with "mere," "empty," or "deceptive," we should refrain from this impulse. Instead, we should consider it along Augustinian lines as a practical good that can be corrupted and turned to ill uses. When rhetoric is informed by charity, as the Christian tradition insists, it can be a powerful tool to clarify truth, facilitate understanding, and inspire beneficial action. It can lead people to see and love the true, the good, and the beautiful, and dignify opponents by handling their views with care. Charitable rhetoric serves as an example of a practical skill shaped by love for the common good. Other professions and skills could follow its lead, giving us, for example, charitable medicine, business, civil planning, policing, and so forth.

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[552] *Didascalicon* II.20.

[553] "Praise of Eloquence," 62.

[554] "The Early Chapter Addresses of 1848: The Third Address," in Placid Murray, ed., *Newman the Oratorian: His Unpublished Oratory Papers*. (Leominster, UK: Gracewing, 2004), 190.

Communication and shared understanding is essential for any human community, especially for complex societies that pursue multiple goods in multiple ways. In order to pursue common goods, members of a community must understand and communicate with each other concerning those goods: what goods they legitimately can and cannot pursue, how best to pursue those goods, and what threatens those goods. The art of rhetoric does not, therefore, introduce a new activity to human community, but takes up an essential feature of community and attempts to improve it. When guided by moral virtue, rhetoric fosters communicative and interpretative virtues that help people think well, communicate clearly, understand sympathetically, and respond appropriately. In Craig Gay's threefold classification of speech as either impersonal "catalogue," depersonalizing "monologue," or personalizing "dialogue," charitable rhetoric, as a form of communication that cultivates communion, falls under the latter.[555]

Communion does not require universal persuasion, however. As Newman's epistemology in the *Grammar of Assent* makes clear, the reasons and ways by which any individual comes to assent to a proposition are complex and sometimes idiosyncratic. Sometimes the consensus is, at best, a tense and partial consensus, and sometimes it is altogether impossible. But its chances of success are greater when the words chosen by all involved are clear, judicious, and elegant. This kind of communication is the goal of rhetoric.

Nussbaum and Fish on Rhetoric

Both Nussbaum and Fish recognize the important role artful communication plays in the

[555] Craig Gay, *Dialogue, Catalogue & Monologue: Personal, Impersonal and Depersonalizing Ways to Use Words*. (Vancouver, B.C.: Regent College Publishing, 2008).

political and academic spheres.[556] Nussbaum and Fish are both artful rhetors who endeavour not only to inform their audience but also to move them emotionally and lead them to new actions or patterns of behaviour. In Newman's terms, they attempt to help their audience achieve "real" as opposed to "notional" apprehension and assent. The texts of Nussbaum and Fish bear this out. Alongside passionate argument, they regularly include concrete stories and examples that provoke their readers' affections and compel them to new ways of thinking and acting. Though Fish denies that what happens in the classroom should move students to action, he clearly does not hold the same reservation for his writing.

According to Fish, all discourse, including philosophy, history, literary criticism, and politics, is rhetoric. He explicitly denies that "some God or material objectivity or invariant calculus … underwrites our inquiries" or exists apart from rhetoric. Therefore, because "the probable" is "the only relevant realm of consideration for human beings," "truth" and "good" are contextually defined without remainder and simply refer to "a moment in the history of inquiry" and its rhetorical embodiment:[557] "the skill which produces belief and therefore establishes what, in a particular time and particular place,

[556] See Stanley Fish, "Rhetoric," in *Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 471–502; Fish, *How to Write a Sentence and How to Read One* (New York: Harper Collins, 2011); Fish, *Winning Arguments: What Works and Doesn't Work in Politics, the Bedroom, the Courtroom, and the Classroom* (New York: Harper, 2016); Martha Nussbaum, "Teaching Patriotism: Love and Critical Freedom," in *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Winter 2012), 213-250; Nussbaum, "Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination," in *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn, 1995), 1477-1519; Nussbaum, "Globally sensitive patriotism," 78–93.

[557] Fish, *Doing What Comes Naturally*, 479–80; 322.

is true, is the skill essential to the building and maintaining of a civilized society."[558] Thus, Fish consciously sides with the sophists against the philosophers, and with self-interested persuasion against disinterested pursuits of "truth" or the Christian concept of neighbour-love. Rather than a common quest for truth, Fish is concerned with a common consensus around "the probable" or, at least, around better and worse possibilities.

Nussbaum rejects Fish's claim that "everything is rhetoric," but recognizes rhetoric's power and public importance. "If people interested in relief of poverty, justice for minorities, democracy, and global justice eschew symbol and rhetoric, fearing all appeals to emotion and imagination as inherently dangerous and irrational, people with less appetizing aims will monopolize these forces, to the detriment of democracy."[559] Much of her work aims to rhetorically resist these "less appetizing aims." Her chief interest, therefore, is "public persuasion, about the many ways in which public leaders and educators," including presumably herself, "cultivate sentiments through rhetoric and example."[560] To that end, Nussbaum's general concern that citizens try to understand one another reinforces a central requirement of rhetoric: to communicate effectively, the rhetor must understand both general human character and the particular character, affections, and socio-cultural identities of her hearers. Even if this practice did not guarantee consensus, it arguably facilitates higher instances of sympathetic understanding and lower instances of divisive animosity—dispositions critical to any

[558] Ibid, 480.
[559] Nussbaum, "Teaching Patriotism: Love and Critical Freedom," 250.
[560] Nussbaum, "Globally sensitive patriotism," 83.

functioning community, particularly pluralist democracies.

Clearly, Nussbaum and Fish are aware of the significance of rhetoric for their particular spheres and professions, for the political community, and for Nussbaum, for the public rather than private good. In what follows, I will analyse how Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman each describe rhetoric as a practical skill designed to serve one's near and distant social, ecclesial, and political neighbours in love. A brief historical analysis of the contexts in which rhetoric has flourished will help to put their distinctive aims and achievements in perspective.

The Historical Context of Rhetoric

Rhetoric is obviously a public skill developed and practiced in public contexts. It was consciously employed by church fathers like Gregory Nazianzen, Origen, Ambrose, Chrysostom, and was passed on to the medieval church through Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*. Its origins, however, appear to lie in the unique political situation of 5th century B.C. Athens and the Roman Republic, when public discourse was essential to the *polis* and *civitas*. Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, and subsequently, Cicero and Quintillian, are the fountains from which the stream of rhetoric flowed into the repertoire of politicians, judges, and eventually, preachers. Its usefulness, and therefore its study, declined with the collapsing public space of the faltering Roman Empire. Still, through Augustine and the pagan Martianus Capella, its study and practice endured, though truncated, in the Christian didascalic tradition of encyclopedists and churchmen like Cassiodorus, Boethius, Isidore, Bede, Alcuin, and eventually, Rabanus Maurus. Especially when wed to careful logic and dialectic, each of these educators understand

its usefulness to the church's proclamation and the royal court's national and international affairs.[561]

It appears that interest in the practice of rhetoric increased dramatically in the twelfth century, particularly in French cathedral schools and similar institutions like the Abbey of St. Victor.[562] Although it declined when logic, dialectic, and philosophical content trumped rhetorical form, it reemerged when early Humanists recognized its utility for Italian civic life and for the interpretation of newly discovered texts, and when Protestants employed it to communicate to the masses. By some accounts, rhetoric again faded during the increasingly scientific and industrial nineteenth century, only to re-emerge in the twentieth century with the advent of mass communication. In general, its rise and fall has been tied to the fluctuating significance of public discourse in the political and judicial courts, dialectical argument and textual analysis in the academic community, and preaching and Scriptural study in the church. Especially within pluralist democracies that depend on social media and mass communication, clear and persuasive communication that articulates truth, dignifies opposing views, respects one's audience, and resists malevolent speech and actions are goods we should not quickly dismiss. One might think that the societies of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman were less diverse

[561] For Martianus Capella, see *On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury;* William H. Stahl, "To a Better Understanding of Martianus Capella." Speculum 40.1 (Jan., 1965). See also George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Brian Vickers, *Defence of Rhetoric*; Richard McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," *Speculum*, vol. 17.1 (Jan 1942), 1-32; Quirinus Breen, "Humanistic Rhetoric and the Reformation," *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, 43.1 (1961): 1-14; Rens Bod, *A New History of the Humanities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3.7 and 4.6.

[562] See Swanson, *Twelfth-century renaissance*, 30; Haskins, *Renaissance*, 138–150.

than our own, but that is only barely the case, as anyone familiar with the philosophical, theological, and political controversies of twelfth, sixteenth, and nineteenth century Europe will know. Even so, the arguably increased plural nature of our own day only elevates the importance of skillful and respectful communication between neighbours and citizens.

Hugh of St. Victor

Among Hugh's four principal sciences (theoretical, moral, mechanical, logical), the theoretical and the moral most obviously contribute to the recovery of the divine image. The logical science, on the other hand, which includes dialectic and rhetoric, supports the theoretical science by assisting mental clarity and enabling clear and persuasive discourse between persons. That is, it facilitates a shared search for the true and the good.

Hugh anticipates elements of the sophisticated logic employed in the scholastic *quaestio*, but he, along with Melanchthon and Newman, differ from many scholastics in their emphasis on eloquent and persuasive communication that not only clarifies and informs the head, but also edifies and moves the heart to action and devotion. Whereas dialectic is "clear-sighted argument that separates the true from the false," rhetoric is "the discipline of persuading to every suitable thing."[563] Though Hugh distinguishes these two, he always treats dialectic and rhetoric, wisdom and eloquence, together.

This integration of wisdom and eloquence is common in the didascalic tradition, which sought to avoid, on the one hand, sophistical eloquence without wisdom, and on

[563] *Did*. II.30.

the other, incommunicable wisdom without appeal. The former led too many astray, the latter led too few to truth. According to Hugh, "every human activity is servant to eloquence wed to wisdom."[564] Without rhetoric, the "secrets of Wisdom" are bandied about with "crude discourse" and "vulgar simplicity."[565] With rhetoric, men are able to "fitly discuss things." By it "is life made safe, by it fit, by it noble, and by it pleasurable: for from it the commonwealth receives abundant benefits, provided that wisdom, which regulates all things, keeps it company."[566] Hence, "wisdom and eloquence" became the twinned goal of Christian education.

We should recognize the social and moral ends that Hugh identifies as the goal of pursuing the logical arts, namely the motivation to separate truth from error, to explain truth in winsome ways, and to carry on reasoned and charitable discourse. Thus, charitable rhetoric facilitates both the intellectual and the practical ends of education by serving the pursuit of truth and the relational flourishing of various communities.

Philip Melanchthon

While Hugh's reflections on dialectic and rhetoric are comparatively sparse, Melanchthon's are immense. Besides works on logic, he wrote three textbooks on rhetoric: *De rhetorica libri tres*, "Three Books on Rhetoric" (1519), *Institutiones rhetoricae*, "Instruction in Rhetoric" (1521), and *Elementum rhetorices libri duo*, "Two Books of the Elements of Rhetoric" (1531), and penned a wonderful encomium on

[564] *Didascalicon* II.20.

[565] *Epitome*, Baron, 109–10. Quoted in Jerome Taylor, "Introduction," *Didascalicon*, 12.

[566] *Didascalicon* II.20.

eloquence, *Encomion Eloquentiae* (1523.)[567] These were widely consulted through the eighteenth century, leading Brian Vickers to call him "the great pioneer of German rhetoric."[568] Martin Luther agrees: "I had to fight with rabble and devils, for which reason my books are very warlike. I am the rough pioneer who must break the road; but Master Philip comes along softly and gently, sows and waters heartily, since God has richly endowed him with gifts."[569] Luther later repeats and expands his comparison: "Substance and words, Melanchthon; words without substance, Erasmus; substance without words, Luther; neither substance nor words, Carlstadt."[570] Luther's tribute to Melanchthon's "substance and words"—wisdom and eloquence—mirrors Melanchthon's own oft-recurring praise of his model orator, the "most wise and most eloquent"[571] Odysseus, whom Melanchthon admires for his "sagacity and eloquence," his "strong

[567] See Sister Mary Joan LaFontaine, *A Critical Translation of Philip Melanchthon's* Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968). For the influence of Agricola's pedagogically oriented *De Inventione Dialectica* on Melanchthon, see Manschreck, *Melanchthon*, 34–35; Quirinus Breen, "The Terms 'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melanchthon," *Church History* 16 (1947), 197-209; Deszo Buzogany, "Melanchthon As a Humanist and a Reformer," in Maag, *Melanchthon in Europe*, 87–101.

[568] Brian Vickers, *Defence of Rhetoric*, 281. See also John R. Schneider, *Philip Melanchthon's Rhetorical Construal of Biblical Authority*. (Lampeter, Wales: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990); Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 183–87.

[569] Luther, "Preface," in Melanchthon, *Paul's Letter to the Colossians*.

[570] D. Martin *Luthers Werke* II, no. 3619 (1 August 1537); in Arnold, *Great Humanists*, 139.

[571] "Preface to Homer," 45–7.

mind and … charm of fluent words,"[572] and his "shapely word and noble thoughts."[573] Melanchthon not only praised rhetoric, but was widely-regarded as a master of it.[574]

Melanchthon considers dialectic and rhetoric not only "the *most beautiful*" but also "the *most useful* of all human matters," and he excoriates those who disparage them: "Let us rather administer hellebore to those who disdain the beauty of speech, who are stranger to human common sense to such an extent that they do not even understand what it means to speak."[575] People who "employ no art for speaking" might as well be mute, "for it is not feasible that you can express what you think as it should be understood unless you acquire and strengthen the ability to speak by art."[576]

Though Melanchthon admired the beauty of speech, his chief interest in rhetoric was its service to the state, court, academy, and church.[577] Because the "whole community of men … are held together by speech," rhetoric and dialectic shape nearly every human interaction, whether others "have to be helped by advice or … have to be taught or be it that some dogma is to be defended or that one needs to speak about fair

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[572] "Praise of Eloquence," 66.

[573] "Melanchthon's Reply to G. Pico Della Mirandola," 415. See also Breen, "Humanistic Rhetoric," 1.

[574] When Johann Eck worried that recording his 1519 Leipzig debate with Luther might diminish the spontaneous heat of the moment, Melanchthon replied that the truth might be better served if cooked at a lower temperature. Manschreck, *Melanchthon*, 46.

[575] "Praise of Eloquence," 66, 64. See also "Melanchthon's Reply" and "Praise of Eloquence," 60, 71; "On Correcting the Studies of Youth," in Ralph Keen, *A Melanchthon Reader* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 50–54.

[576] Ibid, 61.

[577] In Melanchthon's rhetorical textbook, *Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo*, the traditional rhetorical motive of pleasing the audience, *delectare*, is dropped, leaving "teaching" [*docere*] and "moving" [*movere*] to dominate. See Vickers, *Defence of Rhetoric*, 281–82; LaFontaine, *A Critical Translation*, 176, 200–3; Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 331–35.

and good laws and equality." On each occasion, speech requires art in order to "place obscure things in the light"[578] and "to move and stimulate minds and thus to affect a person."[579] According to Melanchthon, careless communication is a morally dubious act comparable to giving a stranger poor or misleading directions that delay or deter them from arriving at their destination.[580]

Rhetoric is needed in political and judicial spheres to give sound counsel, to defend sacred and secular law, and to clarify the often obscure facts of legal proceedings that, because of their complexity, require "a method of teaching" and "the vast resources, variety, and beauties of speech (*oratio*)." [581] Rhetoric is the "the queen of commonwealths" because it "rules states … watches over courts of justice … and publicly exposes injustice."[582] Likewise, he argues that logic, dialectic, and rhetoric are essential to, if not identical with, the practice of teaching. Because teaching "is no small art … it is impossible that unlearned men should attain to it."[583] It requires "the use of a very definite kind of speech to set forth what we are talking about correctly and in order, with words that are known and are rightly put together. … Each must be taught by use of proper words and some kind of method and system if it is to be understood."[584]

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[578] Ibid, 62.

[579] Sister Mary Joan LaFontaine, *A Critical Translation*, 85. See Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 185.

[580] Ibid, 63.

[581] "Melanchthon's Reply," 417.

[582] Melanchthon, *Paul's Letter to the Colossians*, 51.

[583] "Book of Visitation School Plan," tr. Henry Barnard, in Frederick Eby, *Early Protestant Educators* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931), 181.

[584] "Melanchthon's Reply," 418.

In a religious context, Melanchthon argues that when the "art of speaking" is neglected, and when "restraints of the arts are broken and knowledge is spread in unsuitable language, without order, definitions or distinctions, disagreements necessarily follow."[585] Therefore, the best chance at religious consensus and cooperation comes when ecclesial dialectic is "erudite, respectful, serious, and loving of truth," rather than "garrulous, quarrelsome, or deceitful." [586] Pastorally, he notes how clear communication serves the devotional life of prayer and worship, which are adversely affected by muddled thinking.[587] Rhetoric also serves succeeding generations by clearly and persuasively handing on wisdom, sound practice, and virtuous examples. Otherwise, "we shall have a posterity that is in no way more sane than past centuries."[588] Finally, rhetorical study facilitates the study of Scripture and ancient texts, which employ both rhetoric and dialectic.[589] For example, Melanchthon thinks the excessively dialectical "schoolmen" missed the essence of David's and St. Paul's writings in part because they failed to understand the rhetoric with which the writings were constructed. [590] So important are the study of rhetoric and dialectic for the life of the church that Melanchthon pegs their practice to Christian obedience: "Those who are involved in the study of piety should fulfil the duty, both towards Christ and towards the public necessity of the Church, to learn how to speak correctly."[591] In these ways, the study and use of

[585] "Dedicatory Letter to the *Questions on Dialectics*," 86.
[586] Ibid.
[587] Ibid, 87–88.
[588] "Praise of Eloquence," 74.
[589] Ibid., 64.
[590] "Melanchthon's Reply," 425.
[591] Ibid., 77.

rhetoric, for the sake of both communication and interpretation, can serve whatever community employs it.

To summarize, we can divide Melanchthon's main reasons for studying rhetoric into two categories. Rhetoric and dialectic assist an individual to a) better understand rhetorically conceived speeches or texts like Scripture; b) sharpen their judgment and understanding, and c) clarify the nature and ground of their beliefs. "Care for speaking well in itself," he argues, "makes the mind more vigorous."[592] Rhetoric and dialectic assist individuals in community to a) explain to others "things that are worth knowing" in clear and powerful ways;[593] b) accurately place one's sentiments and thoughts "before the gaze of others" whether "in public or in private;"[594] c) gently correct those who have erred;[595] d) affectively comfort those afflicted with worry;[596] and e) inspire individuals and communities to action.[597] In this multitude of ways, rhetoric facilitates the communication and cooperation that are essential to a functioning community. According to Melanchthon, charitable rhetoric is necessary for the preacher, theologian, magistrate, philosopher, teacher, or citizen. It is essential

> so that men may be able to teach each other correctly and clearly concerning great and necessary things, concerning religions, concerning the nature of celestial and other things, concerning right and justice and concerning every duty of virtue. … By it states were founded; by it rights, religions, legitimate marriage, and the other bonds of human society were constituted. … As a matter of fact I call a philosopher one who when he has learned and knows things good and

[592] "Praise of Eloquence," 65, 70. See also *CR* XII, 216; *CR* XI, 56–58.
[593] "Dedicatory Letter to the *Questions on Dialectics*," 84.
[594] "Praise of Eloquence," 61–64; "Melanchthon's Reply," 416.
[595] Ibid.
[596] See Simeon Zahl, "The Affective Salience of Doctrines," in *Modern Theology* Vol. 31 No 3. (July, 2015), 428–44.
[597] "In Praise of Eloquence," 72.

> useful for mankind, takes a theory (*doctrina*) out of academic obscurity and makes it practically useful in public affairs, and instructs men about natural phenomena, or religions, or about government.[598]

Thus, Melanchthon, like Hugh, valued the dialectical and rhetorical arts because, when guided by charity, they could achieve good in the personal, social, political, and ecclesial spheres of life, moving people not only toward right belief and understanding but also appropriate and responsive affection, action, and devotion.

John Henry Newman

While Newman's scientific and industrial age was very different from Hugh's and Melanchthon's, anyone who has read Newman's sermons, novels, poems, songs, satires, or letters can attest that he is an eloquent rhetorician. His prose and poetry aims to inform his auditor's mind, direct her affections, and, at times, amuse her and provoke her to action.[599] Several studies on Newman's rhetorical prowess are available, and a full analysis of those works and his practices is beyond the scope of this project. However, they demonstrate that, like Hugh and Melanchthon, Newman always reasoned like a rhetorician in his roles as pastor, educator, and theologian.

In *The Consolation of Rhetoric: John Henry Newman and the Realism of Personalist Thought*, for example, David Whalen describes Newman as "a masterful rhetorician" whose "mind was so profoundly rhetorical, that rhetorical modes of reasoning dominated his thought about virtually any subject throughout his life."[600] Walter Jost

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[598] "Melanchthon's Reply," 416, 418.

[599] See his counsel regarding sermon-writing, in Wilfrid Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, vol. 2 (London: Longman, Greens and Co, 1912), 335.

[600] David Whalen, *The Consolation of Rhetoric: John Henry Newman and the Realism of Personalist Thought*. (San Francisco: Catholic Scholars Press, 1994), 3.

refers to Newman as a "rhetorical theorist who articulated the essential features of an art of persuasion," and for whom "the principles and techniques of classical rhetoric, renovated and expanded, were uniformly his means of conception and proof."[601] Similarly, Edward Corbett suggests that "Newman's adult life was one long exercise in rhetorical activity" and that his *Grammar of Assent* is a "significant rhetoric text," which carefully lays out a rhetoric of holding and communicating belief.[602] No less than Gerard Manley Hopkins calls Newman "our greatest living master of style…and widest mind."[603] Finally, Ian Ker refers to Newman's "brilliance as a rhetorician and satirist."[604] Like Melanchthon, Newman taught Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and his own copy of the Greek text contains copious notes, with praise of Aristotle's rhetorical power and turns of phrases scattered in the margins. Besides Aristotle, Newman learned his rhetorical art from Cicero, whom he calls "the only master of style I have ever had."[605]

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[601] Walter Jost, *Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman*. (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 3; see also Jerry Coats, "John Henry Newman's 'Tamworth Reading Room': Adjusting Rhetorical Approaches for the Periodical Press," *Victorian Periodicals Review* 24.4 (Winter, 1991), 173-180.

[602] Edward P. J. Corbett, "Some Rhetorical Lessons from John Henry Newman," *College Composition and Communication*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), 402. See also Jouett L. Powell, *Three Uses of Christian Discourse in John Henry Newman*. (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1975).

[603] Cited in Ker, "Editor's Introduction," GA, xlix. Ker also notes that Hopkins twice offered to write a commentary on the *Grammar*, but, unfortunate for subsequent readers of both men, Newman turned him down. See *Letters and Diaries* XXX, 191, 207.

[604] Ker, *The Achievement of John Henry Newman* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 153.

[605] Charles Dessain and Thomas Gornall, eds. *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, Vol. 24 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 242.

Newman thought rhetoric a pastoral skill and regarded his entire life's work, whether in the church, university, or oratory, as broadly pastoral, that is, oriented to the care of others. For instance, one of his chief concerns about his Dublin Discourses on the idea of the university was that he did not know his audience and so was unsure how he could best help them understand the important topic at hand.[606] Were he a chemist reporting on an experiment or a mathematician explaining a new theorem, he would not likely have had this concern. But he needed to explain, persuade, and move his audience to action concerning a probable good. This desire to think about how his readers or hearers might most easily receive what he has to say could be captured in the comment that he is a teacher of men, not a lecturer on books.

One example of this is Newman's highly amusing and subversive satires in *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England*. In these lectures, which Ker compares to the satirical eloquence of Dickens and Swift, Newman does not argue for Catholicism directly. Instead, he undermines the implicit objections against it by lampooning Protestant inconsistencies and histrionic fears with marvelous effect.[607] Other examples can be found in his two novels, *Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert* (1848) and *Callista* (1855), his lengthy poem, "The Dream of Gerontius" (1865), and

[606] Ulysses was the model for Melanchthon and Newman. Uncertain of his own abilities, Newman comments that "a description of Ulysses' eloquence … seized my imagination and touched my heart. 'When he began he looked like a fool.' This is the only way in which I have done anything." Wilfrid Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, vol. 2, 336.

[607] See Ker, *John Henry Newman: A Biography*, chapter eight, "Controversy and Satire," especially pages 364–72; Ker, *The Achievement of John Henry Newman*, 159–78. For lively examples of Newman's satire, see Ker, *The Genius of John Henry Newman: Selections from his Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 324–338.

the autobiographical defense of his conversion, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1865). In each of these, Newman presents repentance, conversion, and faith in action rather than in argument. His aim is not to persuade his readers by appealing to their abstract reason, but to reveal what it looks and feels like to be persuaded by appealing to their affective imagination.

In chapter four, we examined Newman scepticism that syllogistic logic alone could move people to accept a propositions, particularly one with significant implications. People do not exclusively employ what he calls "paper" or abstract logic. Very often people assent to some proposition on the basis of what Newman calls "informal" or "natural" inference, or as an action of the Illative Sense working with individually inconclusive but cumulatively persuasive lines of reasoning. On this point, Newman's thought resembles Fish's belief that all knowledge is probable knowledge. Unlike Fish, however, Newman maintains belief in an external reality even if only contingently knowable. Newman's thought also resembles Melanchthon's Humanist critique that syllogistic arguments often tutored the intellect but failed to inform the affections or move a person toward an appropriate corresponding deed.[608] "Logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot round corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism. … After all, man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal."[609] Newman quips that nobody dies for a

[608] See Jost, *Rhetorical Thought*, 2–3.

[609] Newman, "The Tamworth Reading Room," in *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 294.

syllogism.[610] "It is the concrete being that reasons … the whole man moves."[611] Sometimes a true logical demonstration can distort the truth by failing to help a person respond to it appropriately and comprehensively. In fact, right emotions and right action should accompany, and often confirm or disconfirm, right understanding. In Whalen's view, Newman's "highly rhetorical sensibility taught him to see in things … their utility for effecting those interior changes of character and thought that would reintegrate man's disordered faculties" and lead a person to action.[612]

As we saw in chapter two, Pierre Hadot, who was influenced by Newman, also criticizes forms of communication that separate philosophical reflection from practice and action. Philosophy and theology are self-involving disciplines and should not be practiced or understood otherwise. Ideally, an eloquent rhetorician helps the entire person comes into proper relation with an idea. Unlike Fish's ideal of the constrained university professor, Hugh, Melanchthon, Newman, Hadot, and others, do not require their auditors and readers to isolate their intellect from their affections or volition. People are embedded and embodied, and rhetoric is the communicative skill that respects that.[613]

Of course, like the rhetoric practiced by Hugh and Melanchthon, Newman never advocated separating logic from rhetoric. Like them, he practiced a form of "epistemic rhetoric" that recognized the indispensable union of reason and rhetoric when seeking

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[610] Ibid, 293.

[611] Newman, *Apologia*, 169.

[612] Whalen, *The Consolation of Rhetoric*, 35. See also Jost, *Rhetorical Thought*, 3.

[613] Thus Aristotle's insistence that rhetoricians understand the character, virtue, and emotions of their hearers. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1356a, 7–8.

truth and understanding in common with other people. For Newman, rhetoric contributes to the formation of the philosophical habit of mind both in the rhetor and the auditors or readers. To use his epistemological terms, whereas logic aims at "notional" apprehension and assent, rhetoric aims to make possible "real" apprehension and assent.

We see an example of this in two of Newman's three volumes on the university. Whereas the Dublin Discourses, published in the first half of *The Idea of a University*, present the abstract "idea" of a university, his *Rise and Progress of Universities* present embodied "images" of universities and other academic institutions. As Mary Katherine Tillman explains, "Newman understood an idea or a notion to be a mental holding that is abstract and general," which through logic invites notional apprehension and assent. On the other hand, "an image" is "a mental holding that is concrete and particular," which invites real apprehension and assent.[614] An "idea" clarifies, an "image" inspires. Thus, whereas *The Idea of a University* presents a logical and somewhat abstract account of higher education—its "idea"—his *Rise and Progress* presents, in consecutive chapters, impressionistic descriptions of concrete academic practices and institutions in Athens, Macedonia, Rome, Lombardy, Paris, Dublin, and Oxford—its "image." The rhetorical efficacy of actually participating in a given university would be even greater than merely hearing about its "idea" or its "image," but the difference would be one of degree rather than kind.

[614] Tillman, "Introduction," in Newman, *RP*, xxv.

A similar distinction may be made between the "idea" of Aristotle's or Lord Shaftesbury's secular great-souled gentleman-scholars who lived on the literary page, which Newman describes and criticizes in the *Idea*, and an encounter with its "image" in one of the 19th century worldly aristocratic gentleman of good taste who lived in Oxford.[615] An even better example may be the pairing of Newman's "idea" of the liberally educated Christian gentleman-scholar and an encounter with its "image" in Newman himself or one of his own exemplars—Philip Neri, St. Paul, St. Gregory, or St. Basil. Concerning this latter "idea," Newman explains in an address to the Birmingham Oratory that Neri and the early Italian Oratorians of the 16th century were largely well-educated and refined "gentleman." Even so, their "gentlemanlikeness" was by itself as morally worthless as that of the worldly "gentlemen" he would describe a few years later in the *Idea*. But because the Oratorians also possessed deep faith, their courteous discourse, liberal education, and mental versatility was able to "set off and *recommend* an interior holiness akin to the way the gift of *eloquence* sets off *logical argument*."[616] Note how the concrete "image," which could be seen, recommends the abstract "idea," which could not. Just as "the gift of words is necessary to be able to persuade", so "the gift of manners may be necessary to win."[617] Though the abstract and logical *idea* of "Christian excellence" is eminently attractive and facilitates "notional" assent, so the embodied

[615] See Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711; expanded, 1714); Lawrence E. Klein, ed., Shaftesbury: *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[616] Newman, "The Early Chapter Addresses of 1848," *Newman the Oratorian*, 188–91. Emphasis mine.

[617] Ibid, 190.

image of the liberally educated Christian saint may more readily win the hearts of those who encounter what Newman calls the saint's "rhetoric in conduct."[618]

Newman's description of "real" apprehension and assent, which rhetoric enables, resembles what James Taylor calls "poetic knowledge." According to Taylor, poetic knowledge is "a poetic (a sensory-emotional) experience of reality" rooted in "poetic experience," that is, "an encounter with reality that is nonanalytical, something that is perceived as beautiful, awful (aweful), spontaneous, mysterious."[619] Poetic knowledge refers to "the wonder of the thing itself," not, for instance, the notional "essence of trees," but the experience of "the stately presence of the hawthorn in summer."[620] When a person attains poetic knowledge through either speech or encounter, that is, through rhetoric in word or conduct, they are more likely to be affectively moved to assent or act. This is the reason parishioners often remember a sermon's stories long after they have forgotten its theological points. The story captures the imagination and the emotions, causing it to remain in the memory long after the logical or didactic point has faded. Rhetoric that enables Taylor's poetic knowledge also accounts for the power a compelling biography or narrative has to shape the moral imagination of the person who, inspired by the story, consciously or unconsciously begins to imitate the subject of

[618] Ibid. For the "gentlemen" of the university and the Oratory, see Mary Katherine Tillman, "A Rhetoric in Conduct," in *John Henry Newman: Man of Letters*, 233–59.

[619] James Taylor, *Poetic Knowledge* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 6–7. See Newman's comment on the "poetical" ability of revealed religion to transform the way a person sees and experiences reality, in "Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's *Poetics*," in *Essays Critical and Historical*, vol. 1, 23.

[620] Ibid, 69.

the biography or narrative in some way or another. The rhetoric in conduct delivers an attractive image that the reader desires to incorporate into his or her own life.

Conclusion

Much more could be said about the rhetorical skills and techniques of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman, but we have likely seen enough to convince us that all three didascalic theologians consider the communicative and interpretative virtues of rhetoric integral to the practical ends of education ordered by love to the good of the neighbour. In summary, we can draw out the various reasons Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman value the practical utility of rhetoric. Rhetoric:

- enables members within a complex community—political, religious, academic, or otherwise—to communicate clearly and judiciously with their disagreeing interlocutors;
- has the power to move people to action, and when combined with truth, goodness, and beauty, to effect good in the world;
- is an activity that can publicly identify and call people to respond to threats and benefits to the common good;
- is an epistemological aid that trains the mind to order, integrate, and evaluate what it knows;
- compels the speaker to learn their subject well and deeply since they aim at more than just their own intellectual satisfaction;
- compels the rhetor toward charitable sympathy with how and why her audience thinks, feels, and acts the way it does, since the goal is persuasion or shared understanding;
- facilitates the understanding of rhetorically conceived speeches and texts;
- respects persons as whole persons by enabling them to respond in intellectually, affectively, and volitionally appropriate and integrated ways;
- acknowledges the complex ways people actually come to understand and assent to a proposition or make a decision to act.

The art of charitable rhetoric has occupied our attention in part because the Christian educators thought it essential to a comprehensive education, and in part because it serves as an example of a practical skill that can be used to serve the common good. Though rhetoric has often been guilty of subversive manipulation for malicious ends,

Christian love can turn it to serve beneficial ends. Though love and service are not necessarily unique to Christianity, they are characteristic of its comprehensive vision of the moral life and could direct a host of other practical skills, disciplines, and professions. By doing so, love serves the moral formation of the intellectual appetite and the good of the community.

Chapter Seven
The Moral Ends of Education, Part I:
Pulchrum esse, *Humanitas*, and Gentleman Scholars

"Solitary science teaches how each person might build his own life on upright morals and adorn it with virtues."[621]
Hugh of St. Victor

"We willingly give this righteousness of reason the praise it deserves, for our corrupt nature has no greater good than this."[622]
Philip Melanchthon

"Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of man." [623]
John Henry Newman

Introduction to Moral Education

The previous four chapters should enable us to see how education can serve a variety of goods. Whereas chapters three and four emphasized the intellectual good of the individual learner, chapters five and six focused on practical ends of education like learning a skill, gaining material reward, and contributing to the common good. I argued that these ends are reasonable goods to pursue through education, and find extensive support in the works of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman. Chapters five and six also described education as a possible form of neighbour love, arguing that a person's knowledge, intellectual formation, and career should be reimagined as ways to serve the personal, local, national, or global good. Though central to the Christian vision of living well, neighbour-love is not unique to Christianity but overlaps with several religious and philosophical traditions that include service to others as part of a worthwhile human

[621] *Didascalicon*, "Appendix A," 153.
[622] *Augsburg Confession*.
[623] *Idea*, 111.

life. Besides offering a positive vision, this view also resists the increasingly dominant narrative that indexes education to commercial or economic ends.

This chapter and the next consider moral ends of education that can be pursued alongside intellectual and practical ones. Although moral ends are distinct from intellectual and practical ends, all three require knowledge and skill. Intellectual ends include knowledge of particular disciplines and the ability to do what a skilled practitioner of that discipline does, whether historian, sociologist, or physicist. Similarly, practical ends include knowledge of relevant materials, whether bricks or bones, and the skill to build a straight wall or set a broken femur. Likewise, moral ends include more than knowledge about moral issues or the ability to make an argument, but also excellent cognitive, affective, and volitional moral performance. We might say that intellectual ends are realized when a person knows and can *think* well, practical ends when he knows and can *make* well, and moral ends when he knows and can *act* well. All three are legitimate ends of education at any level, and any narrative that indexes education exclusively to one of them is unnecessarily restrictive.

While Nussbaum, Fish, and other scholars focus almost exclusively on universities, it is useful to include a much wider age range. Moral ends pursued by primary and secondary schools are not different in kind from those pursued by the university, even if their respective methods differ. Neuroscientists who study the brain development of adolescents and "emerging adults" confirm that until around the age of 25 the parts and processes of the brain that generally regulate moral behaviour are on a

developmental continuum.[624] Similarly, university education comes at a uniquely vulnerable transition in most students' lives. The personal and moral support structures these "emerging adults" have been depending on are left behind but not immediately replaced. Though a university may not know what to do with its students' moral formation, it cannot claim that students arrive as fully-formed, morally mature adults, even if they are legally allowed to drive, vote, and enlist.[625] Many adults live off the moral and emotional capital—or bankruptcy—of the years leading up to their mid-20s in much the same way they will live off the intellectual capital they acquire during this

[624] These include the frontal lobes, the prefrontal cortex, frontolimbic regions, and the processes of "pruning" and myelination. For the neurological development of "emerging adults," see Jay Giedd, J. Blumenthal, N. Jeffries, F. Castellanos, H. Liu, A. Ijdenbos, T. Paus, A. Evans, J. Rapoport, "Brain development during childhood and adolescence: A longitudinal MRI study." *Nature Neuroscience* 2.10 (1999), 861-863; Craig M. Bennett and Abigail A. Baird, "Anatomical Changes in the Emerging Adult Brain: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study." *Human Brain Mapping* 27 (2006): 766 –777; L. P. Spear, "The adolescent brain and age-related behavioral manifestations," *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* 24 (2000); David Skuse, John Morris, and Kate Lawrence, "The Amygdala and Development of the Social Brain," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1008.1 (2003): 91–101; B. J. Casey, Rebecca M. Jones; Laurence Steinberg, "Cognitive and affective development in adolescence." *Trends in Cognitive Science* 9.2 (February, 2005); Geoff MacDonald and Mark Leary, "Why Does Social Exclusion Hurt? The Relationship Between Social and Somatic Pain," *Psychological Bulletin* 131.2 (2005).

[625] For sociological work on "emerging adults, see Christian Smith, Kari Christoffersen, Hilary Davidson, and Patricia Snell Herzog, *Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, 'Presidential Address: The Emergence of Emerging Adulthood: A Personal History,' *Emerging Adulthood*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2014): 155-162; Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, *Emerging Adulthood: The Winding Road from the Late Teens through the Twenties*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, 'Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens through the Twenties,' *American Psychology*, Vol. 55, No. 5 (May 2000): 469-480; Michael Lamb and Jonathan Brant, "Cultivating Virtues in Postgraduates: A Case Study From the Oxford Character Project" (unpublished), 2016 Conference of The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, "Cultivating Virtues: Interdisciplinary Approaches."

time. Therefore, it is not unreasonable for universities to consider the moral influence they wield upon their students.

Many educational institutions that address moral formation do so because they recognize that academic institutions are moral ecologies where formation happens wittingly or not. They consider themselves responsible to the adults their students will become or to the institutions, nations, and cultures their students will help create. Some academic institutions also observe how individual moral formation and the cultivation of virtuous character works with a general culture of moral order to advance learning and the intellectual virtues the institution naturally prizes.[626]

For many, the question is not whether formation occurs, but whether it is good or bad formation, and whether the institution directs it toward beneficial ends. When considering what virtues an academic institution might address, theorists and practitioners sometimes use versions of the following questions in order to focus the discussion:

- What kind of virtues might grandparents desire for their grandchildren, or would anyone desire for their loved ones?
- What kind of character traits would we like our neighbours to have?
- What might a culture or subculture look like whose population lacked particular virtues, e.g., courage, kindness, patience, or hope?
- What kind of moral formation do we wish we had had as a student?
- The lack of what moral virtues enabled the latest economic, political, cultural crisis?

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[626] Aquinas rightly observes that "the exercising of the moral virtues … is of great value in acquiring knowledge." *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* VII.vi.925. See also Schwehn, "Spirited Inquiry," in *Exiles*, 44–64; A. G. Sertillanges, *The Intellectual Life* (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 17–40.

Even if we can answer these questions, we still face the question whether moral formation falls within the purview of academic institutions or whether they should consciously attend only to intellectual ends and leave moral ends to institutions like the family, church, scouting organization, or youth centre.

We will revisit Nussbaum and Fish on these questions before turning to Hugh's Abbey of St. Victor, Melanchthon's University of Wittenberg, and Newman's Oxford University and the Catholic University of Dublin, in order to consider what they think necessary for students to move toward *pulchrum esse* (Hugh), *humanitas* (Melanchthon), and Christian gentleman scholars (Newman).

Nussbaum's Compassionate Citizens and Rawls' Amoral Scholars

As we saw in chapter one, Nussbaum thinks that the moral formation of students is not only possible, but is urgently needed to respond to the increasing complexity of a pluralist world and to resist the powerful narrative that indexes education to exclusively commercial ends. If that narrative continues to overwhelm education, she worries, schools will produce "useful machines" for the economy, not thoughtful and compassionate citizens for liberal democracies. Instead, education should be indexed to a Rawlsian version of political liberalism and intentionally produce adults who can "think for themselves, criticize tradition, and understand the significance of another person's sufferings and achievements."[627] Therefore, a "primary task of the public education system" should be developing ways to ensure students appropriately value and support the democratic community, develop moral traits like compassion, tolerance,

[627] Nussbaum, *Not for Profit*, 2.

respect, and cooperativeness, and overcome socially crippling emotional conditions like primitive shame and projective disgust.[628] She offers multiple examples for how this could be done, and while I worry her accounts end up instrumentalising education and reducing it to the production of ideal Rawlsian liberal democrats, I affirm her belief that academic institutions generally should pursue more than strictly intellectual and practical ends.

Chapter two demonstrated that Stanley Fish disagrees with Nussbaum on almost every point. He argues that while the formation of students into democratic citizens or virtuous adults might be a good thing, it has nothing to do with the work of a university. To the question who will form students' values and behaviour if not academic institutions, he replies, "Beats me! … I don't see why that's a question I have to answer."[629] Fish offers several reasons for this view. First, the university focuses exclusively on research, teaching, and reproducing disciplinary selves. Anything else is beyond its remit and competency. Second, given the religious and philosophical pluralism represented on university campuses, any attempt to form students morally represents an illiberal and unjust imposition upon them. Third, moral formation is an unfair expectation to have of university classes and professors. It is an "unworkable idea" that no one knows how to accomplish. "What you can't do is reason *forward*, reason that if students take these courses and are taught by this method and introduced to those ideas, they will become certain kinds of persons," specifically, morally reflective virtuous

[628] Nussbaum, "Political Soul-Making," 308; *Not for Profit*, 28–29.

[629] Fish, "I Know It When I See It," in Kiss and Reuben, *Debating Moral Education*, 90.

individuals.[630] "There are just too many intervening variables … between what goes on in a classroom or even in a succession of classrooms and the shape of what is finally a life."[631] Two students may take the same courses, and yet develop "capacities for moral imagination and reasoning (whatever they are)" that lead them in diametrically opposite directions. While Fish agrees with Nussbaum that "incursions of capitalism" damage the university, he equally warns against "incursions of virtue" that distract it.[632] Moral or civic formation has no place in Fish's ideal research university. His unlikely ally in this might be John Henry Newman, to whom we will return after we examine the place of moral formation in Hugh's Abbey of St. Victor and Melanchthon's University of Wittenberg.

Hugh and the Abbey of St. Victor as a "School of Virtue"

To understand Hugh's vision of integrated intellectual, spiritual, and moral formation, we return to his concept of comprehensive restoration discussed in Chapter Three. Hugh imagines the achievement of a person's integrated formation into *pulchrum esse* ("beautiful being") as a process of rebuilding. Each student who comes to St. Victor is an embodied and ensouled construction project, if you will, wherein the half-ruined, half-built edifice cooperates with the architect in order for it to become an externally beautiful and structurally sound dwelling place for God. Though Christ and the Virgin Mary serve as models of solid and attractive "structures," every structure differs because the building materials of individual personalities and circumstances differ. According to

[630] Ibid, 80.
[631] Fish, "Aim Low."
[632] Ibid.

Hugh, the re-construction project is finished through the Holy Spirit who adorns the building with charity and stewards it to eternity. Thus "saving grace" is necessary for comprehensive and integrated *pulchrum esse*, though its beginning is rooted in "creating grace."

His theological vision of each person as a partially reconstructed work site is most readily applicable to Christian academic communities that actively support the wholistic reconstruction of their members. However, even Hugh recognizes that the movement toward *pulchrum esse* does not begin with the arrival of the gracious Holy Spirit. Theologically, he acknowledges the possibility and value of the natural virtues, and practically, he offers insights into the human work required for *pulchrum esse*. As a result, we are not bound to accept Hugh's particular construal of the Christian faith in order to find value in his theological vision and practical teaching. Something similar could be said for both Melanchthon and Newman. They too envision each person as an embodied soul created in God's image teleologically ordered toward redeemed relationship with him, and their educational ideals and practices are integrated with their more comprehensive vision of Christian humanism. Nevertheless, many of their practical insights and moral reflections could be appreciated without accepting their theological commitments. In addition, all three theologians could, in their own ways, defend a practical appropriation of their work that resembles their own selective appropriation of Homer, Aristotle, Cicero, and others.

We can glimpse the Victorine program for integrated personal reconstruction through discipline, virtue, and community in Hugh's fascinating little book *De*

Institutione Novitiorum¸ The Initiation of Novices, written shortly after the *Didascalicon*. Stephen Jaeger calls it Hugh's "major work on the cultivation of virtue," while Bynum describes it as "a theoretical, carefully articulated study of morality."[633] The guiding principle of this book and ostensibly of the Victorine community are found in Hugh's invocation of Psalm 119:66: "teach me goodness and discipline and knowledge, for I have believed your commandments."[634] From this, Hugh concludes that knowledge leads to discipline, discipline to goodness, and goodness to blessedness.[635]

Though knowledge is necessary, it represents only a first step. Hugh, for example, cautions his students not to be carried away by "mere study" and "empty desire for knowledge" into "writings which are obscure or of deep meaning, in which the mind is busied rather than edified"—the vice of *curiositas*. [636] Instead, "for the Christian philosopher," he advises, "reading ought to be a source of encouragement, not a preoccupation." It should "feed good desires, not … kill them."[637] Franklin Harkins summarizes Hugh's basic point: "It is not conducive to the student's objective to become

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[633] C. Peter Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe¸ 950–1200* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 246; Caroline Walker Bynum, *Docere Verbo Et Exemplo: An Aspect Of Twelfth-Century Spirituality*. Harvard Theological Studies 31 (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979), 45–8.

[634] *De Institutione Novitiorum*, "Prologue": *bonitatem et disciplinam et scientiam doce me quia mandatis tuis credidi*.

[635] Ibid. "*Per scientiam itur ad disciplinam¸ per disciplinam itur ad bonitatem¸ per bonitatem itur ad beatitudinum.*" See Coolman, *Theology*, 204: "Both moral *Scientia*, derived from tropological exposition of Scripture, and exterior *disciplina*, practiced in the customs of daily life at St.-Victor, facilitate the formation of interior *bonitas*, goodness within the soul through the acquisition and possession of virtue."

[636] *Didascalicon* V.7.

[637] Ibid.

so carried away by the desire for knowledge that … he never moves on to putting what he has read into action."[638] The student's restoration happens "not by reading alone … but rather by living out what he learns in these studies—that is, by reenacting what he reads." [639] This "reenactment" is possible when knowledge is channeled through discipline.

Discipline, which is the central theme of *De Institutione*, refers to external discipline and presupposes that external discipline aligns the internal soul with virtue.[640] Discipline is the "good and honourable way of life."[641] Through discipline and study, the moral and intellectual virtues are forged together. In the *Didascalicon*, Hugh invokes Quintillian's statement that "morals equip learning" and Bernard of Chartres' counsel that learning requires "a humble mind, eagerness to inquire, a quiet life, silent scrutiny, poverty, a foreign soil."[642] Therefore, "rules for living" and "rules for study" mutually reinforce each other for the sake of the student's complete formation. Together, knowledge and discipline lead to goodness, which can lead to blessedness because blessedness consists, as we saw in chapter three, of the restoration of the two-fold moral and intellectual image of God in which humans were created.

Hugh consistently argues not only that one's internal and external life should be integrated, but that increasing order in one helps to develop order in the other. Thus his detailed concern for external discipline in *de Institutione* was not the result of morose,

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[638] Harkins, "Lectio exhortation," 104.
[639] Ibid, 105.
[640] *De Institutione Novitiorum*, "Prologue." My translation.
[641] Ibid, X.
[642] Ibid, III.xii.

monkish fastidiousness. Instead, he thought careful attention to the moderate ways one dressed, ate, spoke, gestured, and generally interacted with other people helped a person restrain internal vices like lust, evil desires, pride, anger, intemperance, shallowness, and illicit appetites, resulting in a calm mind, orderly affections, and moral virtue.

In *de Sacramentis*, he explains that virtue is "an affection of the mind ordered according to reason,"[643] as well as "a kind of sanity and integrity of the rational soul."[644] Order and integrity are constituent parts of beauty, or *pulchritude*, which is the goal of human formation. The affections and the rational will mutually inform each other. The will is attracted by some things and repelled by others; it loves some things and hates others. Ideally, the affections are habituated to follow the will's reasonable lead and come to love and hate the same things. When the habituated affections are rightly ordered and stable, they are virtues; when not, they are vices. Though "saving grace" perfects virtue and merits it supernatural reward, the virtues are still imperfectly possible through "creating grace:" "the goods of nature and the affections ordered according to nature are natural virtues," which are "praiseworthy and good" even though limited to natural rather than supernatural flourishing.[645] Besides personal discipline, the virtues are formed through life in community.

In *de Institutione*, Hugh reminds the Victorine novices that they have come to a "school of virtue" [*ad scholam virtutum*].[646] Part of their task is to replace old habits with

[643] *de Sacramentis* I.vi.xvii.
[644] Ibid, II.xiii.ii.
[645] Ibid I.vi.xvii.
[646] *De Institutione Novitiorum*, "Prologue."

new and leave behind affections, actions, and vices that slow re-formation and undermine what Odo of St. Victor called the *dulce consortium* and *dulce colloquium*, the sweet community and conversations, of the school. In the *Didscalicon*, Hugh counsels the uneducated members to "gain practice in reading," and the educated members to "pursue the virtues." Nevertheless, "each group should strive for its purpose in such a way that beginners are not devoid of virtue and the learned do not utterly disregard reading."[647]

Surprisingly, *de Institutione* does not comment on the activities one might expect to find in a semi-monastic community of Augustinians. Jaeger points out there is no mention of fasting, penance, mortification, chastity, almsgiving, and so forth. Instead, the dominant dispositions are humility, courtesy, humaneness [*humanitas*], charity, harmony, and kindness; the dominant activities are service, teaching, imitation, self-examination, and reading; the dominant habits relate to hospitality, dress, table manners, speech, and gestures. If the St. Victor Abbey sounds like Newman's Oxford colleges, the Victorine scholars sound very much like Newman's ideal Christian gentleman. Whereas Newman refers to his Christian gentleman's "rhetoric in conduct" by which the external man reveals and commends the inner, so Hugh anticipates Newman when he argues that the outer conduct of the Victorines should reveal and commend the inner life of the man and the community: "from [visitors'] first impressions of the outside they form an estimate of the things concealed within."[648] According to

[647] *Didascalicon* V.vi.
[648] Jaeger, *Envy*, 252, quoting *Liber ordinis Sancti Victoris.*

Caroline Bynum, this represents the Victorine concern to teach "by word and example" through their common discipline, virtue, and daily life.[649]

According to Ferruolo, Hugh's integration of academic training and moral excellence suggested "the clear advantage of studying at St. Victor, where the rules of learning were inseparable from the rules of the canonical life."[650] Though the Victorine community distinguished between the moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social aspects of a person's life, it considered each of these integral to growth toward beautiful being. This level of integration seems to have been unique to St. Victor. One of Hugh's students, Lawrence of Westminster, explains his reasons for studying with Hugh: "With all possible dispatch I chose the excellent and unique doctor, and I embraced his teaching with supreme diligence, since the moral excellence of his life [*vitae honestas*] decorates his learning, and the saintliness of this teacher illuminates his polished doctrine with beauty of manners [*morum venustate*]."[651] Similarly, Hildebert of Lavardin wrote to commend St. Victor's founder, William of Champeux: "until now … You merely gathered knowledge from philosophers; you did not bring forth in yourself beauty of conduct. But now you begin to draw out from it the pattern of good behavior like honey from the comb."[652] Godfrey of St. Victor, Odo of St. Victor, and others, identify the integration of

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[649] Caroline Walker Bynum, "The Spirituality of Regular Canons," in *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages*, 37.

[650] Stephen C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics, 1100-1215* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), 37–8; See Jaeger, *Envy*, 459, n. 60, for references in Hugh to discipline as moral excellence, virtue, or ethics.

[651] Quoted in Jaeger, *Envy*, 246.

[652] Ibid, 245.

the moral, spiritual, and intellectual life as the primary reason they chose St. Victor rather than another school or master. Jaeger suggests that if men wanted "asceticism, escape from the self, sainthood," they went to monastic communities; if they wanted "'letters,' beautiful manners, theological illumination, 'the good,'" they came to St. Victor,[653] where they entered "a courteous and affable society."[654] In this way, the Victorines were "worldly," in that they were not an isolated monastic community protected by an unapproachable wilderness. Instead, they lived on the edge of an urbane Paris, attracting to their community, among others, educated aristocrats, courtiers, and ecclesiastical officials. They received all into their community, but in doing so, they prepared all for a rich life outside the community by initiating them into a version of "Christian Humanism."

Melanchthon and Wittenberg as a School of *Humanitas*

For Melanchthon, moral formation in an academic community starts with pagans like Homer, Aristotle, Galen, Cicero, and others. He considered them guided and inspired by God, offering students secure ways to the knowledge and formation of moral virtue. Though Christ came to teach forgiveness of sins and effect reconciliation with God, he did not come to teach moral precepts or a method of forming virtue.[655] God had already provided that knowledge through the philosophers, poets, historians, and scientists

[653] Jaeger, *Envy*, 268.

[654] Ibid, 253. See also Rorem, *Hugh*, 46.

[655] *Enarrationes aliquot librorum Ethicorum Aristotelis*, CR XVI, 281. See also Christopher Strohm, "Zugänge zum Naturrecht bei Melanchthon," in Günter Frank, ed., *Der Theologe Melanchthon* (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2000), 348. See also CR 11, 398: "On earth there is nothing next to the Gospel more glorious than humanistic learning, that wonderful gift of God."

("natural philosophers"), who should be studied alongside Christian Scripture and theology: "We have in hand Homer, and we have Paul's letter to Titus. … Dare to know, cultivate the Romans, embrace the Greeks."[656] Similarly, he boldly states, "I maintain that religious belief must be drawn from the divine Scriptures; but concerning civil behaviour, I would prefer to listen to Cicero."[657] In Jill Kraye's assessment,

> No sixteenth-century thinker played a more significant role in promoting the study and teaching of ethics than Philip Melanchthon. Through the medium of his textbooks and commentaries, Melanchthon established a place for the writings of pagan philosophers within the Protestant educational syllabus. The fact that ethics, particularly Aristotelian ethics, remained a significant feature of the university curriculum in Lutheran Germany and the rest of Protestant Northern Europe well into the seventeenth-century was in no small measure due to his efforts.[658]

As Melanchthon's statutes for the University of Wittenberg insist, "the professor of ethics shall read Aristotle's *Ethics* in the Greek word for word."[659]

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[656] "On Correcting the Studies of Youth," in Keen, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 56.

[657] CR XVI, 629. For more on the point that the gospel does not supply a "Christian" form of the state or its laws about contracts, property, and so forth, contra many factions in the 16th century, see the introduction to Melanchthon's 1530 commentary on Aristotle's *Politics*, CR XVI, 417–21.

[658] Jill Kraye, "Melanchthon's Ethics Commentaries and Textbooks," in *Classical Traditions in Renaissance Philosophy* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2002), chapter VII, 1. See also Kraye, *Classical Traditions,* VII, 12. In his doctoral dissertation, Ernst Troeltsch suggests that Melanchthon's achievements were downplayed by Lutheran theologians who opposed aspects of his theology. Ernst Troeltsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard und Melanchthon* (Gottingen: Univ.–Buchdruckerei von E. A. Huth, 1891), 89.

[659] CR X, 1010. On Melanchthon and Aristotle, see Nicole Kuropka, "Philip Melanchthon and Aristotle," in Irene Dingel, Robert Kolb, Nicole Kuropka, Timothy J. Wengert, *Philip Melanchthon: Theologian in Classroom, Confession, and Controversy*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 19–29; Nicole Kuropka, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft, Ein Gelehrter im Dienst der Kirche (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002); Heinz Scheible, "Aristoteles und die Wittenberger Universitätsreform: Zum Quellenwert von Lutherbriefen," in Heinz Scheible, Aufsätze zu Melanchthon (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 125–51.

For Melanchthon, schools and universities are necessary not only because knowledge was constitutive of human fulfilment and delight, as we saw in chapter three, and not only because the church, state, and society needed educated personnel and skilled professionals, as we saw in chapter five, but also because the virtues that can be cultivated through academic institutions are necessary for society's stable preservation. The Peasant's Revolt and the civil disobedience of evangelical radicals in Münster and Zwickau convinced Melanchthon that society needed general training in moral philosophy. Like Hugh, Melanchthon thought God gave moral philosophy and the other arts not only to delight but also to preserve human life individually and corporately. Though he acknowledges that people are generally born with "common precepts on morals," he worries that "unless liberal teaching" is added to these basic moral sentiments, "customs will not become milder, nor can what is properly called moral (*ēthikon*) … be achieved."[660] Among these necessary moral additions, he includes the concept of duty and the qualities of moderation, gentleness, elegance, and diligence, which we might call the "civilizing virtues."

Furthermore, those who are going to be teachers, pastors, politicians, or leaders need to possess moral virtue and exercise exceptional practical reason. These could be acquired in an academic institution because Melanchthon expects that long meditation on *pulchritudine virtutis*, the sweetness of virtue, would necessarily inform the student's character.[661] In an essay on philosophy, he suggests that "studies" can be "transformed

[660] "Dedicatory letter to Melanchthon's *Epitome of Moral Philosophy*," 140.
[661] *Philosophiae Moralis Epitome*, CR XVI, 25: *"studia abeunt in mores*."

into character,"[662] and in one on Homer, he argues, "if it is true that … studies are transformed into manners," then "by contact with the most humane and delightful poet, minds also grow gentle and become more humane and peaceful."[663] This practical orientation should not surprise us, especially if we recall Quirinus Breen's charge that Melanchthon thought all ends of education practical. Though I argued in chapter three that Breen overstates his case, it is true, as Nicole Kuropka points out, that throughout his textbooks and teaching notes, Melanchthon consistently, even if not exclusively, draws his students from philosophical, literary, and scientific knowledge toward the practical exigencies of daily life.[664]

Melanchthon might be guilty, however, of a charge often rightly levelled at optimistic literary Humanists, namely, that contrary to their claims, the mere study of the Humanities does not necessarily "humanize" or morally improve a person. Otherwise, one would expect Humanities professors to be paragons of virtue without fail. However, Melanchthon was no dreamy idealist regarding his students' moral lives, as his highly amusing address "On the misery of teachers" and the 1546 university statutes demonstrate. The statutes denounce students who treat the university as a place of unbridled license where they are free to disrupt study, disobey the rector, gamble, carouse the night, break into houses, instigate fights, visit prostitutes, and indulge in immodest dancing and festivals.[665] Despite this caveat, studying moral and religious

[662] "On philosophy," 131.

[663] "Preface to Homer," 44.

[664] Nicole Kuropka, *Melanchthon* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 57.

[665] CR X: 594, 994–98. See Karl von Raumer, "The German Universities," *American Journal of Education* VI (1859), 35-6. "On the misery of teachers," "*de miseriis*

literature may lead to or reinforce one's faith or moral improvement, though not necessarily.

To shape students' moral virtues, Melanchthon does not rely upon literature alone. Not only are virtues learned in the university's classrooms but also through the university's common life. To thrive, the university itself depends on moral virtues like harmony, charity, justice, and meekness. When these virtues are exercised by faculty, students' "judgments" and "characters" are likely to follow because students often emulate the faculty they esteem. If students learn sociable virtues in the university, they are likely to exercise them outside the university, and so contribute to the formation of harmonious societies. If the faculty of the university fail to demonstrate charitable harmony, they could hardly expect their students to.

Therefore, Melanchthon offers this counsel to his fellow academics:

> The universities should be aristocracies, as the beehive is for the bees; let each one perform his duty correctly, let us teach what is useful, let us join our activities good-naturedly, let us help one another, and let us preserve general harmony by philosophical moderation. Let us think of ourselves as living in a Christian, or at least human, community, and let us not rejoice in the brutality of the Cyclopes, in which, according to Euripides, "no one listens to anything from anybody." Do not let ambition fan competition among different ranks, or among the professors, but let private desires take second place to the common good. Let public peace be preferred to private passions. … Let all of us, of all ranks and positions, harmonise our minds and our wills, let us join together our work and studies, and support each other by mutual desires.[666]

This could be a model for any community of persons that wanted to avoid resembling the Cyclopes, Melanchthon's favourite example of cacophonous community. The

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paedagogorum," (CR II, 121–130). See also "*Laus vitae scholasticae*" (CR XI, 298–306); Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 93–4, 406-13.

[666] "On the role of the school," 19, 21 (CR XI, 606–18).

Cyclopes famously refused to live with one another, rejected the gods, and lacked learning, arts, and culture.[667] Their lives were solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish, even if not short.

In a 1526 address at the opening of a new school in Nuremburg, Melanchthon carries these themes into lower schools where the future society and its citizens are formed. He advises city leaders that the absence of rigorous education for both boys and girls undermines religion, laws, private and public virtue, and social civility. In the following plea, "literature" includes philosophy, theology, and history, as well as poetry and narrative prose:

> For what is it that brings greater usefulness to the whole human race, except literature? For no skill, for no craft, indeed not even for the very fruits of the earth—which many think is the source of life—is there such a need as for literature and its study. … When youth are brought up properly by your authority, it will be a defense for the country: for no bulwark or city walls are stronger than citizens endowed with learning, prudence, and the other virtues."[668]

Melanchthon thus appeals in part to the well-being and self-preservation of the government and nation, which he thinks, like Nussbaum, depend on popular education and the formation of civic virtue in the young. He continues:

> The obligation is not limited to the children of this or that individual citizen, it extends to the entire youth of the state whose training demands corporate provision. For the ultimate end which confronts us is not private virtue alone but the interest of the public weal. The truths of religion and moral duty cannot be rightly perceived except by minds soundly prepared by a training based upon the

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[667] See "On Astronomy and Geography," 115; "On the merit of the art of medicine," 170; "On the merit of laws," 175, 180; "On the life of Galen," 213–14; "On Johannes Regiomontanus," 243. For Nussbaum on the *apaedeusia* of the Cyclopes, see *Fragility of Goodness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 252.

[668] William Harrison Woodward, *Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance, 1400-1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906), 224.

> practice of past ages. … Upon the parents and upon the community falls the common obligation of the youth of the city.[669]

Melanchthon proves an especially interesting commentator because, besides the university, he was also involved in what we now consider primary and secondary education, and had extensive experience with the moral and intellectual formation of youth of all ages.[670]

Though established as a university professor at Wittenberg for forty-two years, he was directly responsible for curricular and pedagogical reform at over a dozen universities in Europe, including Tübingen, Basle, and Heidelberg, and at least sixty secondary schools.[671] Three other universities—Marbug, Jena, and Königsberg—were founded under his direct supervision, and many more were influenced by students carrying his ideas back to their home institutions.[672] He is often credited with establishing the public school system in Germany and training hundreds of primary and secondary school teachers, besides maintaining a thriving private school in his own

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[669] Ibid.

[670] Though Newman's students came to Dublin at age 16.

[671] See also Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 436–88, 506–38; Hans Engelland, "Melanchthons Bedeutung für Schule und Universität," *Mitteilungen der Luthergesellschaft* 31 (1960), 24–40; Friedrich Paulsen, *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts aus den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten* Vol. I (Leipzig: Verlag von Veit und Co., 1896), 211–42; Friedrich Paulsen, *The German Universities*, E. D. Perry, trans. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1895), 43; James W. Richard, *Philip Melanchthon: The Protestant Preceptor of Germany* (New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 133–34; Manschreck, *Melanchthon*, 131–57; Denys, *Philip Melanchthon's Unique Contribution*, 314–357.

[672] Joon–Shul Park, *Philip Melanchthon's Reform*, 21–22; Fleischer, "Humanism and Reformation," 27–98.

home that prepared students for the university.[673] Commenting on his influence three hundred years after his death, Richard Rothe, Professor of Theology in Heidelberg, remarked that "the university in all its departments, throughout Protestant Germany, is his creation. This is especially the case with the school of general literature," which Melanchthon established "upon that firm foundation of classical study." [674] Part of Melanchthon's legacy, according to Rothe, was insisting that "the interests of Christianity neither can, nor ought, to be divorced from those of morality, of intellectual culture and of humanity in its broadest sense."[675] Describing his influence beyond Germany, Gábor Almási writes, "The Wittenberg academia was an inspiring institution. … For most of the East Central European scholars it was Melanchthon and his like … who most vividly embodied the ideals of humanism—which was, to be sure, Christian humanism." Like Erasmus, Melanchtho'ns "mission was the joining of *pietas* and *eruditio*, the reformation of life and religion through the reformation of learning."[676]

Besides social and political harmony, what other "noble things" does Melanchthon think could be acquired for the sake of *pietas* and *eruditio*? He often refers to attributes and abilities like eloquent speech, wisdom, heroism, social grace, practical reason, a well-ordered life, virtue, loftiness of mind, "moral elegance," the love and

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[673] See, Kuropka, *Melanchthon*, 56. On his private house school, see Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 491–95.

[674] Richard Rothe, "Rothe's Address on Philip Melanchthon," trans. Erskine N. White, *American Theological Review* 3 (1861), 277. See also Robert Kolb, "Philipp's Foes, but Followers Nonetheless: Late Humanism among the Gnesio-Lutherans," in Fleischer, *Harvest of Humanism*,159–76.

[675] Ibid, 282.

[676] Gábor Almási, *The Uses of Humanism* (Boston: Brill, 2009), 359. See also 41–46.

admiration of good, true, and beautiful things, and the ability to cherish things appropriate to their value.[677] His shorthand for these is not *pulchrum esse*, but simply *humanitas*, a concept with similarities to Newman's educated and cultured gentleman. According to Melanchthon, *humanitas* can be gained, lost, or never achieved. Though "any kind of teaching" could contribute to the formation of *humanitas*, he thinks classical philosophy, poetry, and history the best for "rousing one to virtue," "forming the mind," and leading a person to "pleasantness and humanity" [*humanitas*].[678] We will consider his love of Homer in the next chapter, but note here that he considered Homer's epics to be the semi-inspired "workshop of humanity [*humanitatis*]."[679] In Melanchthon's words, apart from the "Gospel of Christ this world holds nothing more splendid or more divine" than "the study of literature and of the humanities" because these arts can humanize their practitioners through nurturing love of the good, the true, and the beautiful.[680] For that reason, it would be better, he writes, to lose the sun, and apparently cease existence, than to lose these arts.[681]

However, we would not understand Melanchthon if we thought he was exclusively concerned with social stability and personal fulfilment. These are goods, as are the virtues, and he commends those philosophers who think virtue is its own reward, its own final cause, desirable for its own sake [*virtus ipsa est finis, expetenda propter se*

[677] See, for examples, "On the study of languages," 33–34; "Preface to Cicero's *On Duties*," 81; "On Aristotle," 205; "Praise of Eloquence," 66, 73; "Dedicatory letter to Melanchthon's Epitome of Moral Philosophy," 139–143; "The dignity of astrology," 120.

[678] "On the study of languages," 33–34;

[679] "Preface to Homer," 44.

[680] Ibid, 38.

[681] "On the study of languages," 36.

ipsam]. However, he also gently corrects them. For Melanchthon, the true "final causes" of virtue are our debt of obedience to God, the ability for virtue to attract others to God, and ultimately, the fact that God is glorified in our virtue. After these come all other goods and rewards.[682] This returns us to Newman, who castigates non-Christian virtue and appears to restrict the university to intellectual and practical ends. Contra Newman, both Hugh and Melanchthon create space for what they call natural, philosophical, or civil virtues, guided by philosophical and theological reflection on human nature, nurtured by natural desires, and at least partially inspired by "creating grace." Newman, however, is skeptical.

Newman's Challenge to Pluralist Moral Formation

Stanley Fish's doubts about pursuing moral ends through secular university education appear to have an unexpected ally in Newman. Both Newman and Fish find the university ill–equipped to form students morally. Fish thinks moral formation in a pluralist context an illiberal and ineffective imposition; Newman thinks it an insipid substitute for Christian faith. For Fish, the attempt is overbearing; for Newman, underwhelming. However, as I hope to show, Newman's theological convictions should have led him to mitigate this criticism and offer at least limited support for the project of moral formation in non-religious academic institutions.

Newman's post-Enlightenment era was arguably more religiously and philosophically pluralist than either Hugh's or Melanchthon's. Therefore, we might expect him to be more charitable toward non-religious moral formation, to have a

[682] CR XVI, 42.

greater appreciation for the value of "pagan virtue," and to argue for the merits of pursuing such virtue through the education of Christian and non-Christian alike in universities. We might expect him to support the religiously unaffiliated "Queen's Colleges" that had been founded in Ireland in the first half of the 19th century. However, he does not, for both practical and religious reasons. Instead, Newman famously states, "It is … a mistake to *burden* [learning] with virtue or religion. … Its direct business is not to steel the soul against temptation or to console it in affliction. … Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another"—a conclusion Fish heartily endorses.[683] Like Fish, Newman thinks the university's immediate goal is the academic training of its students. "Liberal education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman."[684] On the character of the "gentleman," however, Fish and Newman disagree, which opens the possibility of reading Newman as more hopeful on this point than he appears or intends to be.

Newman considered the attempt to use intellectual progress as a means or substitute for moral formation to be central to the rationalistic, secularist liberalism he resisted throughout his life.[685] In 1841, he published seven anonymous letters in the *London Times*, known as the "Tamworth Reading Room Letters." Their immediate target

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[683] *Idea*, V.9, Emphasis mine. See Fish, *Save the World*, 177.

[684] *Idea*, V.9.

[685] In *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, Newman lists eighteen points of "Liberalism" he opposes. The last one is the belief that "virtue is the child of knowledge, and vice of ignorance." This implies that "education, periodical literature, railroad travelling, ventilation, drainage, and the arts of life, when fully carried out, serve to make a population moral and happy." *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908), 296.

was former Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel's speech at the opening of the Tamworth Library and Reading Room. In that speech, Peel lauds the library's decisions to exclude "works of controversial divinity" and forbid discussions on "religious differences." Instead, Peel glories in the usefulness of practical knowledge and promises that if his audience embarks upon the path of knowledge, they would find themselves "cheered onward by a voice from within, of self confidence and of self respect." He quotes Sir Humphrey Davy's assurance that "in becoming wiser" they would "become better" and rise "in the scale of intellectual and moral existence." Whether or not the path of knowledge led to eminence and fame, it would definitely lead to personal improvement and social, economic, and class harmony. Peel concludes by arguing that "the pleasures of knowledge" will overcome "the indulgence of sensual appetite" and lead to the moral improvement of the community.[686] To Newman, Peel's message was clear: suppress theology, praise pragmatism, pursue knowledge, expect moral improvement.

Newman's seven epistolary responses are serious, acerbic, and satirizing. In the second letter, he asks how "the instrumentality of the physical sciences" are to produce "these wonderful moral effects:" "Does Sir Robert Peel mean to say, that … you have but to drench the popular mind with physics, and moral and religious advancement

[686] *Sir Robert Peel's Address On The Establishment Of A Library And Reading Room at Tamworth* (London: Henry Hooper, 1841), 23. In the "corrected" second edition of the published speech these final phrases were changed without explanation to refer to the "uncloying pleasure that springs from mental improvement and increasing knowledge." *An Inaugural Address, Delivered by the Right Hon. Sir Robert Peel, Bart. M.P., President of the Tamworth Library and Reading Room, on Tuesday, 19th January, 1841. Second Edition, Corrected* (London: James Bain, 1841; Tamworth: J. Thompson), 30.

follows on the whole…?" [687] According to Newman, this assumption seriously misunderstands the aims and ability of the classroom:

> Would they be physical sciences if they treated of morals? Can physics teach moral matters without ceasing to be physics? … In what department, then, of physics are they to be found? Can the problems and principles they involve be expressed in the differential calculus? Is the galvanic battery a whit more akin to conscience and will, than the mechanical powers?[688]

To confuse scientific and moral ends is to misunderstand both and achieve neither. Moreover, Newman lampoons Pool's insinuation that the chaotic disorder of humanity's moral passions and actions could be subdued by momentary intellectual distraction—an unconvincing strategy of diversion, Newman thought, that reduces the moral life to a series of impulses and emotions that ignores the usefulness of laws, habits, and real moral growth.[689]

In his attempt to rubbish Peel's argument, Newman even claims that if moral formation occurs, but lacks Christian seriousness, then it is little more than playful gamesmanship. "Human expedients" and "external discipline" simply exchange one "fashionable excess" for another: "You do but play a sort of 'hunt the slipper' with the fault of our nature"—"the venom of the old Adam"—"till you go to Christianity."[690] Even if the popular mind were drenched in ethical knowledge, Newman continues, "to know is one thing, to do is another. … The consciousness of a duty is not all one with the

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[687] Newman, "Tamworth," 261; see also 303–4. Emphasis original.
[688] Ibid, 303.
[689] Ibid, 264.
[690] Ibid, 273–74. He quotes Horace's line that though nature may be expelled, it will always return: *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*

performance of it."[691] Moral improvement pursued through poetry, argument, good society, or experimental science is confused and ineffective. If Peel pins his hopes for social moral improvement on the acquisition of knowledge apart from Christian faith, he is hopelessly naïve:

> Taking human nature as it is actually found, and assuming that there is an Art of life, to say that it consists, or in any essential manner is placed, in the cultivation of Knowledge, that the mind is changed by a discovery, or saved by a diversion, and can thus be amused into immortality,—that grief, anger, cowardice, self-conceit, pride, or passion, can be subdued by an examination of shells or grasses, or inhaling of gases, or chipping of rocks, or calculating the longitude, is the veriest of pretences.[692]

If we seek virtue and inward order, harmony, and peace, Newman insists, "we must seek it in graver and holier places than in Libraries and Reading-rooms."[693]

Newman's objections identify both practical and theological weaknesses in Poole's address. His primary theological objection is that humankind is sinful, morally disordered, subject to vice and the painful vicissitudes of life. The human heart is neither healed nor improved through knowledge and intellectual formation. These are good, but with respect to moral failure and vice, they are little more than momentary distractions and fleeting sops. They do not bring moral health. Neither science nor knowledge leads to religion or Christian faith. To Peel's intimation that they do, Newman

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[691] Ibid, 262.

[692] Ibid, 268. Though Newman thought study did not lead to religion, he readily admits that religion deepens study and is able to draw out from it riches and resources it is incapable of producing on its own. "Say that Religion hallows the study, and not that the study creates Religion." In this way, for instance, "classical poetry," which Newman loved, can become a "type" or foreshadowing of the Gospel. Ibid, 268; 274–75.

[693] Ibid, 268.

keenly replies that if they seem to do so, it is likely because the culture was generally Christian to begin with rather than because science was naturally conducive to religion.[694] Knowledge cannot substitute for faith, nor the university or library for the church, nor logical deductions for moral virtue and action. Though Newman freely acknowledges, as he will ten years later in *Idea*, that "scientific pursuits" are "intrinsically excellent and noble," integral to a liberal education, and beneficial to the community, "still they are not, and cannot be, *the instrument* of an ethical training," at least not when separated from Christian faith.[695] Thus, the Newman of the *Tamworth Reading Room Letters* gives us little support for thinking moral ends could be pursued through education in a pluralist context or even in the academic classroom of institutions like the University of Oxford or his Catholic University of Dublin.

Though the tone is more subdued, Newman's views on this question are similar in the *Idea of a University*.[696] In the *Idea*, however, his description of the educated and cultured gentleman is seductively appealing.[697] The reader is easily drawn into thinking that Newman has replaced the position he took in the Tamworth Letters with a modified

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[694] Ibid, 298.

[695] Ibid, 304.

[696] On Newman's relation to Anglican Oxford and the idea of a religious university, see Peter B. Nockles, "An Academic Counter-Revolution: Newman and Tractarian Oxford's Idea of a University," *History of Universities* (1991), vol. X, 137–97; Mark Chapman, "Newman and the Anglican Idea of a University," *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 18.2 (October, 2011), 212-227; Sheridan Gilley, "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? Newman, Wisdom and the *Idea of a University*," in Stephen C. Barton, *Where Shall Wisdom Be Found?* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 155–68.

[697] Despite Dale's assertion that Newman has in mind "members of the cultured classes whom the Pope was particularly concerned to see provided for," Newman makes it very clear in several places that he has in mind gentlemen of intellect, not gentlemen of class. See *Idea*, 5–6; P. A. Dale, "Newman's 'The Idea of a University'," 25.

version of Peel's own position. Over several pages, Newman eloquently describes how mental cultivation resists the seductions of sensuality, draws a person to more noble loves, and cultivates a fastidious loathing of certain base sins. It makes for a powerful and persuasive first read. But the façade begins to show when Newman mouths the Peel-like sentiments of this perspective, suggesting that sensual indulgence is really "the holyday [holiday] of resourceless ignorance," and that the assaults of moral evil might be parried by a proliferation of museums, gardens, zoological collections, cheap literature, and, with a nod toward Tamworth, "libraries of useful and entertaining knowledge," all of which can "please the eye" and "give repose to the feelings."[698]

His puckish caricature builds until we are left with an effete and affectatious English intellectual, as artificial and hollow as he is charming and appealing. In his *Rise and Progress of Universities*, Newman suggests that the Athenians, too, substituted the beautiful "gentleman" for the moral conscience, and quickly replaced the "beautiful" with the pleasant, and then the pleasant with the sensual.[699] Mary Tillman describes this as the "cult of self-respect, politeness and delicate taste.[700] Even though Newman acknowledges that "intellectual culture" could create in some people a beautiful and

[698] Ibid, 163.

[699] *RP*, 79–81; 85–85. See also *GA*, 255.

[700] Newman's portrait draws upon Aristotle's magnanimous man, Anthony Ashley Cooper's (3rd Earl of Shaftesbury) *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711), and James Forrester's *The Polite Philosopher: Or, an Essay on that Art which Makes a Man Happy in Himself, and Agreeable to Others* (1734). See "Editor's Notes," *Idea*, 616; Culler, *The Imperial Intellect*, 239–40; Mary Katherine Tillman, *John Henry Newman*, 240–41. According to Newman, with a likely reference to Shaftesbury's aesthetics-based ethics, "instead of planting the tree," Shaftesbury "merely crops its flowers for his banquet." *Idea*, 175.

noble image and restrain their "moral nature" from some extreme excesses, his argument in *Idea* follows his Tamworth letters.

For the most part, the "religion of the intellect" simply directs people to other less crass but no less harmful vices, and seduces them into believing that the human mind is the measure of all things. However, it cannot keep them from the "ordinary sin of the Intellect," which mistakes good taste for moral goodness, ill manners for vice, and a gauche *faux pas* for sin.[701] Such a person lacks "the three vital principles of the Christian student": faith, chastity, and love. Their opposites—heresy, impurity, and enmity—are sins against God, oneself, and one's neighbour—sins Newman thinks especially likely in a secular university that lacks personal attention to students' moral formation.[702]

In an oft-quoted line, Newman writes, "Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of man."[703] The point should be clear by now: though Newman admits that "it is well to be a gentleman," the danger is that the gentleman's refined

[701] *Idea*, 172–73. See Hughes, "Conscience," in *The Cambridge Companion*, 206. Newman's objections to the morally and spiritually seductive religion of reason and culture are surprisingly similar to Augustine's criticism of Roman virtues and Luther's criticism of Aristotelian ones. For how Melanchthon is closer to Aquinas and Erasmus, and Newman to Augustine and Luther, compare Herdt, *Putting on Virtue*, chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6.

[702] *RP*, 189. Newman sees these illustrated in the life of Abelard and in German research universities that lack moral principle and the collegiate system. See 73–4, 199, 221, 229.

[703] *Idea*, 111.

manners substitute for moral virtues, and that his elevated devotion to the cultured intellect diverts him from humble devotion to God.[704]

Defending the Gentleman Scholar Against Newman

But can we defend Newman's creation against its creator? Can we be more sympathetic to Newman's educated gentleman than he was? If so, do we align ourselves with the rather facile optimism and aestheticism of Peel?

First, we should acknowledge that Newman's immediate aim to justify the need for a Catholic university played no small part in his rhetorical construction. His objective was not to argue for moral education in non-religious schools, but to show that the pervasive Catholicity of the university was important intellectually, spiritually, and morally. He does s in part by denigrating the moral virtues of a non-Catholic education.[705] Second, he does acknowledge the ancillary social and political usefulness of a liberally educated person. Though the university's primary end is intellectual, along the way it also trains "good members of society," teaches them the "art of social life," and make them "fit for the world."[706]

Third, from a Christian perspective, Newman's secular gentleman scholar has not repented of his sin or been reconciled to God, does not accept the revelation of Christ or

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[704] Ibid, 184–4. For more on the contrast between the Christian and the secular "gentleman," see Newman, "The Early Chapter Addresses of 1848: The Third Address," in Murray, *Newman the Oratorian*, 188–91; Mary Katherine Tillman, "A Rhetoric in Conduct," in *John Henry Newman: Man of Letters*.

[705] In the original fifth discourse, cut from the 1873 edition and subsequently, he asserts that "education must not be disjoined from Religion" and that "Mixed Schools," which allow Protestants, Catholics, and non-religious, "are constructed on a false idea." See *Idea*, 498.

[706] *Idea*, 154.

the Scriptures, and lacks the gracious fellowship of the Church and the quickening presence of the Holy Spirit. He lacks the fruit of the Spirit, the beatitudes, and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. These are not inconsequential deficits. Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman would agree on this point. They are Christian theologians who accept the Christian narrative of creation, sin, reconciliation, and redemption. As a theologian, Newman may be right to feel underwhelmed by the achievement of a secular gentleman scholar devoted to what he calls "the religion of Reason."[707]

These points are well taken and would prove most effective when aimed to persuade a Christian audience, like the one Newman had in Dublin, that they should support an academic institution that aimed to graduate students not merely cultured and educated, but virtuous and Christian. This vision animates Hugh and Melanchthon, as well as Aquinas, Thomas More, Erasmus, Josef Pieper, and others. It is a perennially recurring vision roughly but rightly referred to as "Christian Humanism," the roots of which stretch back to Origen, Basil, Gregory, and Augustine.[708]

We can admit that the virtues acquired by Newman's gentleman are imperfect, ordered to proximate and penultimate goods rather than eternal and ultimate ones. Nevertheless, we should not dismiss them too hastily without acknowledging the

[707] Ibid, 167, 180–1. One of Newman's models for the educated gentleman was the fourth century philosopher Julian, usually referred to as "the Apostate," a fellow student of St. Gregory's and St. Basil's in Athens who became Emperor, suppressed Christianity, and revived Hellenestic and Roman paganism—not a very promising ideal for a Christian theologian or educator.

[708] In G. M. Young's estimation, "the spirit evoked by Erasmus had found its voice at last" in Newman, even though I think Erasmus more generous toward the "pagan" virtues than Newman. "Newman Again," 100.

benefits these virtues offer both the individual and the community. On this point, Hugh and Melanchthon are closer to each other than they are to Newman. Hugh helps us see that even imperfect virtues could be plotted on a teleological and eudaimonistic continuum that draws an individual closer to the original ideal of humanity and closer to the character of God in whose image he or she was created.

Hugh also suggests that God's grace may be active, even if unrecognized, in a person who acquires knowledge and the natural virtues. The unseen animating cause may be God's freely moving Spirit. When Hugh discusses the practical sciences of solitary ethics, private or household ethics, and public ethics, he makes no claim that only Christians can discern these things. Anyone might learn the "solitary science" that "teaches how each person might build his own life on upright morals and adorn it with virtues," the "private science" that teaches how to manage the economics of house and family, and the "public science" that teaches how political authorities should govern their cities and states.[709] These disciplines and practices emerge at least partly from the "precept of nature" and the "natural discrimination" that God gave humanity to help it discern between things "which were either to be sought or to be avoided."[710] When the affections seek the natural goods, those affections nurture the "natural virtues" that are "praiseworthy and good" in whomever they may be found.[711]

Similar to Hugh, Melanchthon distinguishes between "civil" (or "philosophical") righteousness, which can be generally known and pursued through reasoned reflection

[709] *Didascalicon*, Appendix A, 152.
[710] *De Sacramentis* I.VI.vii.
[711] Ibid I.VI.xvii.

on natural law, and the "righteousness of faith," which is unique to Christians and comes through reconciliation with God.[712] "Civil righteousness" includes disciplined self-control and refers to good and right action *coram hominibus* and *coram mundo*, with fellow humans and in the world, as opposed to righteousness before God. It contributes to *humanitas*, being human.[713] Melanchthon, ever fascinated with geometry, astronomy, and natural science, argues that just as general agreement can be found on the common principles of these disciplines, so general agreement could be found concerning the common principles, or "natural laws," that guide human actions toward humanly fulfilling ends.[714] The generic and teleological goodness of creation and creatures can be at least partially apprehended. Because of this, human wisdom and the will's freedom can combine to perform the external works of the Law, guide morals, and establish social order and equitable laws.[715] Through the "light of wisdom" the "natural man" can comply to some degree with the "norms" in the divine mind.[716] Though sin distorts one's epistemology and hobbles one's resolve, impairing the harmony between law and appetite, Melanchthon thinks philosophical righteousness possible. He readily acknowledges—and celebrates—points of agreement with the Aristotelian tradition

[712] See *Philosophiae moralis epitome*, *CR* XVI, 21; *Ethicae doctrinae elementa*, *CR* XVI, 166–67; *Prolegomena in Officia Ciceronis*, XVI, 536–37.

[713] See *Loci Communes*, Locus 4, 57–8; Locus 5, 69; *Augsburg Apology*, Article 4; *Ethicae doctrinae elementorum libri duo*, in CR XVI, 165f.; Joel D. Biermann, *A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 86, 121.

[714] See Metheun, *Science and Theology in the Reformation*, 23–30.

[715] See Strohm, "Zugänge zum Naturrecht," 347–54; Antti Raunio, "Divine and Natural Law in Luther and Melanchthon," in Virpi Mäkinen, *Lutheran Reformation and the Law* (Leiden: Brill, 2006) 21–61.

[716] *CR* XVI, *Ethicae Doctrinae Elementa*, 210.

about philosophical righteousness, the order of natural law, and the acquired virtues.[717] This is one of the reasons Melanchthon urges Frederick the Wise to buy all kinds of Greek and Latin literature and philosophy books for the Wittenberg library, rather than simply books with theological content.[718]

My concern with Newman is that, unlike Hugh and Melanchthon, Newman's rhetoric drains from the moral vision of the natural virtues and excellences the compelling force they should have, especially in the shared public space of the *saeculum*. Melanchthon does not disparage the "law" of secular moral philosophy, even though he restricts it to the formation of civil righteousness and carefully distinguished it from the "gospel" of Christian theology and divine forgiveness. Newman should have followed Melanchthon's lead. Instead, he makes moral attributes morally ambiguous when he should have endorsed them as moral, even if penultimate, goods.[719] Newman is right that both St. Basil and Emperor Julian ("the Apostate") may possess the acquired virtues and a cultured education, but that in itself does not make the acquired virtues morally neutral or only ambiguously good, as Newman implies. Julian's temporal opposition to the church and eschatological opposition to God does not rule out the possibility that he also possessed genuine, if incomplete, virtues. A given person's lack of eschatological orientation does not invalidate the presence of natural moral excellences. And rather

[717] See, among many places, *Ethicae doctrinae, CR* XVI, 38–39, 172–73.

[718] Sachiko Kusukawa, *A Wittenberg University Library Catalogue of 1536* (Cambridge: LP Publications, 1995), xvii.

[719] In Mike Higton's provocative summary, "the problem with Newman's account is not that it is too theological, but that it is not theological enough" because it fails, among other things, to fully appreciate—theologically—the natural moral virtues. *A Theology of Higher Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 106.

than cast aspersions on those moral virtues, however nascent or partial, it would be better to encourage them as good for the person and her communities, and certainly as good with respect to the opposite vices. One would not denigrate a physically healthy body merely because that body pales in comparison with a body already immortal and glorified. Neither should the beauty of art and music be dismissed merely because we may one day experience art and music that entirely transcends it.

Many of the characteristics Newman gives his secular educated gentleman scholar are moral virtues that represent forms of human excellence. These are admirable traits that should be encouraged regardless of whether Newman's gentleman or his institution are confessionally Christian or religious. What are some of these traits Newman thinks possible even in a secular university? He writes that the gentleman scholar can become courteous, calm, moderate, temperate, accommodating, appreciative of beauty and truth, fair, gentle, benevolent, empathetic, teachable, dependable, and amiable.[720] He can develop "a noble and courteous bearing," including tenderness, gentleness, patience, mercy, deference, respectfulness, and justice.[721] Such a person thinks the best of others and avoids slander, self-aggrandisement, rancor, defensiveness, unfair advantage, meanness, and grudges.[722] These, Newman admits, "are some of the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle."[723] These certainly appear to be moral virtues and admirable character traits,

[720] See *Idea*, 1, 76, 92, 154–5;
[721] Ibid, 92.
[722] Ibid, 143, 154.
[723] Ibid, 179–81.

especially since several of them overlap with the fruit of the Spirit, the beatitudes, and the classical cardinal virtues.

Rather than depreciate the imperfect moral virtues because they do not produce the Christian saint, Newman could have followed his own reply to criticisms that universities do not produce many immortal intellectual geniuses. He responds that we should not aim so high. The university does not promise literary or artistic "miracles of nature," but is "the great high means to a great but ordinary end."[724] He should have adopted a similar line with respect to moral formation. The university does not promise to produce Christian saints or heroic paragons of virtue. But it could be one great reasonable means to another great but ordinary end, that of more virtuous and therefore more fully human individuals, neighbours, and citizens.[725]

Newman could have referred to his description of the conscience as "guide of life" that prospectively dictates and commands. "It is a moral sense, and a sense of duty," authoritatively judging certain acts to be right and others wrong.[726] Similarly, it retrospectively judges past actions as either right or wrong and prompts the appropriate affections for each, sanctioning the former with pleasure and admiration and condemning the latter with pain and regret.[727] Though he warns that educated culture

[724] Ibid, 154.

[725] See Mike Higton, *Theology of Higher Education*, 103: however "incomplete," "mixed," and "fragile" the virtue formed in university may be, "it nevertheless makes sense to hope for the university to do real, if limited, good."

[726] *GA*, 73. See also *Idea*, 165; "A Letter Addressed to the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation," in *Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching*, Volume II (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900), chapter five, "Conscience," 246–61.

[727] Ibid, 73–6.

often exchanges conscience for law or beauty, given that he thought conscience universal, ineradicable, and divinely given, he could have attempted to warm its embers for a little moral light and heat.[728]

As we saw in chapter three, Newman believes that speculative reason is able to ascertain reliable "first principles." In the same way, he might have seen that the conscience as practical reason might do the same with respect to moral first principles that direct action.[729] He almost says as much when he notes that even in the midst of social depravity, God makes possible "the heroic outburst of natural virtue" and a "presentiment of [the heart's] true remedies." God's "writing is upon the wall, whether of the Indian fane, or of the porticoes of Greece." That this includes accurate moral knowledge is clear: "He is with the heathen dramatist in his denunciations of injustice and tyranny, and his auguries of divine vengeance upon crime. … All that is good, all that is true, all that is beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it great or small, be it perfect or fragmentary, natural as well as supernatural, moral as well as material, comes from Him."[730] If God could so work in the hearts and minds of ancient Greeks and Indians, then surely also in nineteenth century English men and women.

Finally, Newman could also have built on his "fiercely" held belief, articulated whilst trying to reform Oxford's Oriel College in the late 1820s, that "secular education could be so conducted as to become a pastoral cure" not only spiritually, but also

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[728] *RP*, 79.

[729] On first principles of speculative reason, see Newman, *Present Position of Catholics*, 283–84; "Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith," in *The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty*, 18; *GA*, 117.

[730] Idea, 68.

personally and morally.[731] He echoes this thought in an 1848 address to the Birmingham Oratory when he explains that liberal education, culture, and worldly experience often guard a person from petty misunderstandings and resentments because he or she is thus "patient of differences" in opinion and conduct and is able to "put things in their true light." Then he admits that "these virtues I have mentioned are not necessarily Christian," even though they are "sanctified" and put to "spiritual good" when they become "Christian *in* a Christian," that is, when grace perfects what nature began.[732] Though Newman emphasizes the inadequacy of "nature" and the necessity of "grace" for the transformation of the human heart, based on his own understanding of the goodness and value of what "nature" and the conscience were capable of, he could have tempered his criticism of moral formation in universities and offered suggestions for how it could be pursued with integrity.

Newman famously states that "liberal education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman." While this initially seems like a defense of liberal education, it ends up being a critique. Newman wants a multi-dimensional academic institution that aims to produce not only the gentleman scholar, but also the Catholic Christian. Though Newman thought the university classroom was an unlikely place to forge such a person, as we will see in the next chapter, he thought it eminently possible when the university classroom was paired with small residential colleges, intensive student–teacher relations, and active Catholic ministry. Thus, in the end, Newman's

[731] Newman, *Autobiographical Writings*, 91.
[732] *Newman the Oratorian*, 26. Emphasis in original. See also 221.

complex ideas and rhetorically constructed prose are not as close to Fish as first appears. Though Newman agrees that the university classroom is not the proper place for moral formation, Newman acknowledges, albeit with limited enthusiasm, what Fish does not, namely that academic institutions can nurture stable moral dispositions in students. The "gentleman" Newman describes is more than Fish's amoral research scholar; he is similar in ways to Nussbaum's compassionate democratic citizen, but less than Newman's educated Christian saint. Instead, in Newman's most generous descriptions, he emerges as the refined and cultured moral humanist, whose formation, I argue, is a penultimate good worth working for.

"Common Ground Humanism"

In this final section, we consider the difficult question concerning what goods and moral dispositions a religiously and philosophically plural institution might actively promote among its students. Clearly, not everyone agrees on the content and value of every virtue. Aristotle praises the condescending virtue of magnanimity, which puts others into one's debt but keeps the magnanimous person aloof and indebted to no one. Nietzsche excoriated Christian humility as a cringing necessity transformed into a virtue by the powerless and enslaved. Few business schools would endorse Melanchthon's application of the "golden rule" to financial contracts. Gratitude, generosity, and humility are actively discouraged by a culture oriented to money, power, and material well-being. Courage is hardly laudable if employed to courageously trample human rights.

In the face of disagreement, one legitimate response might be to distinguish between motivational and structural virtues, as Robert Adams does. Motivational virtues like justice, generosity, or kindness are defined by the external goods or ends they

intend; structural virtues like courage, perseverance, or temperance are defined by how they discipline a person internally, regardless of the ends desired. Given that distinction, academic institutions could decide not to pursue motivational virtues, which require identifying substantive goods, but instead aim to help students cultivate the structural virtues and leave students to determine the ends toward which those structural virtues might be employed. If one lacks confidence that even *ad hoc* agreement about moral goods is possible, this would not seem an unreasonable response. However, it may mean giving up the pursuit of even politically liberal virtues like Nussbaum's "compassion" for the suffering of others and "respect" for individual autonomy.[733]

Of some help here might be the schema Perry Glanzer and Todd Ream offer in their book *Christianity and Moral Identity in Higher Education*. Given the plurality of religious and philosophical traditions, a comprehensive tradition-independent universally accepted ethic remains impossible.[734] However, for academic institutions that acknowledge themselves to be morally formative ecologies and refuse to abandon their students' moral identities to the drift of popular, peer, or professional cultures, Glanzer and Ream offer three alternatives.[735]

First, "common ground humanism" attempts to find overlapping character qualities or goods identified as constitutive of human flourishing by a variety of

[733] See Adams, *A Theory of Virtue*, 33–34.

[734] Perry L. Glanzer and Todd G. Ream, *Christianity and Moral Identity in Higher Education* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3. "Humanism" here does not refer to secularistic or atheistic humanism, but humanism that promotes some definite version of human flourishing.

[735] See chapter six, "Searching for a More Human Moral Education: Three Approaches," in *Christianity and Moral Identity in Higher Education*, 113–30.

disciplines and traditions. Second, "secular humanism" attempts to form persons into ideal participants in particular cultural or political traditions, whether "liberal democracy" or "Western Culture." Third, "religious humanism," including "Christian humanism," integrates intellectual formation with morally and spiritually formative practices of a particular religious tradition.[736] They describe these as "more human" approaches because they address "more" of the person than merely their professional or intellectual identity. They can be found in "educational communities keenly aware of and well-defined by comprehensive humanistic moral traditions" that supply "ends, virtues, practices, principles, wisdom, mentors, and models."[737] In short, institutions that adopt one of these "more human" approaches initiate students into moral traditions that promote some definite vision of individual and social flourishing or excellence.

However, Glanzer and Ream write primarily for Christian educators in religious institutions. They do not offer much direction for educators, Christian or otherwise, who work in religiously plural institutions and who hope to nurture morally formative "common ground humanism" in their institutions. They are not very optimistic about "common ground" humanism given "the shallow nature of the agreement" between people from different religious or philosophical traditions.[738] Their doubts echo Newman's dismissal of the "possible" when placed against the "perfect." According to them, virtues appear "quite arbitrary" when considered apart from "a particular

[736] Glanzer and Ream offer Yale University as an example of "secular humanism," Colorado State University of "common ground humanism," and nine different college and universities across several traditions for "Christian humanism."

[737] Ibid, 131.

[738] Ibid, 115.

understanding of what it means to be fully human" or if cut off from a "larger metanarrative used to prioritize and define them."[739]

I do not dispute the significance of indexing moral formation to a normative narrative or identity. Whether one thinks of oneself primarily as a pleasure-seeking animal, an accountable image of God, or a politically liberal democratic citizen will have significant implications for what a person values and pursues. Glanzer and Ream rightly argue that whether a person or institution prioritizes the "human, professional, democratic, or Christian" identity matters. I am less convinced, however, that virtues "*only* gain meaning" when oriented to one or the other of these identities, or that these identities are incommensurable.[740] That people of different religious and philosophical backgrounds agree on the practical content and value of some virtues seems to suggest the contrary. Their theoretical justifications will differ, and will not be entirely irrelevant to the exercise of the virtue, but that theoretical difference does not necessarily rule out practical agreement.

As we have seen, Hugh's "creating grace," Melanchthon's "civil righteousness," and Newman's moral conscience offer theological reasons for pursuing some version of "common ground" humanism that expects to find limited agreement concerning practical moral goods and virtues. In pluralist settings like contemporary state-funded academic institutions, "common ground" humanism may be the best one can hope for. It may be a less comprehensive version than Christian humanism, but it is good

[739] Ibid, 28.
[740] Ibid, 23.

nonetheless, similar to the peace of the mixed city advocated in Jeremiah 29 and Augustine's *City of God* XIX.

In his book, *A Theology of Higher Education*, Michael Higton's vision for religiously pluralist universities seems to fall within the "common ground" humanist tradition. A commitment to "wisdom," including moral formation, does not require "agreement by university staff and students to pursue a Christian vision of the good." While that may be possible in certain institutions, it will not be in most. Instead, Higton illustrates "common ground humanism," though he does not use the term, when he argues for "energetic engagement in serious, socially inclusive, religious and secular arguments about the good, in which those speaking from the midst of Christian formation are insistently questioning voices—but by no means the only voices."[741] Common ground humanism invites all parties to learn what David Fergusson refers to as "multilingual moral fluency."[742] This seems a better alternative than Nussbaum's imposition of monolingual Rawlsian political liberalism or Fish's imposition of moral muteness. Common ground humanism also calls people to work for something like what Nigel Biggar calls "tense consensus" between people committed to different comprehensive doctrines.[743] Biggar's argument that Christians should expect to find common ground

[741] Higton, *Theology of Higher Education*, 237.

[742] David Fergusson, *Church, State and Civil Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 69–70: "Our current task is not to identify a single moral framework acceptable to all citizens, but instead to promote what common moral ground we share through ongoing debate."

[743] Nigel Biggar, "Tense Consensus," in *Behaving in Public: How to Do Christian Ethics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 25–45. See also Joshua Hordern, "Loyalty, Conscience and Tense Communion: Jonathan Edwards Meets Martha Nussbaum," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 27.2, 181–3; Charles Mathewes, "Life Together," in *A Theology*

with peoples of any religion or none resembles Hugh's and Melanchthon's: "Sinful human creatures not only can, but do have *some* grasp of the principles of morality," the most basic of which are "the goods, which together comprise what it means to flourish as a human being."[744]

Numerous people working in philosophically and religiously plural contexts offer lists of basic virtues, capabilities, or goods that appear to contribute to human well-being or at least that represent things people reasonably pursue as good. I note a few of these below. These lists differ in content and justification, specificity and scale. However, if taken as *ad hoc* working models, any one of them could form the basis for conversations about what virtues, capabilities, or goods an academic institution could help its students, regardless of their age or stage, recognize as good and worthy to pursue for themselves, their communities, and the larger world. These could supply the orienting conception of moral order and human good that is lacking in Nussbaum's advocacy of compassion, but which Aristotle and others insist is necessary for virtuous practical reason to arrive at a right act. Examples of lists of goods and virtues include the following:

- Joshua Yates' *Thriving Cities Project* identifies six "community endowments" that are essential to "thriving cities:" the good, true, beautiful, prosperous, just, and sustainable.[745]

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of Public Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 105–42; Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition*.

[744] Biggar, *Behaving in Public*, 31.

[745] Joshua Yates, *Thriving Cities Project Brief*. Each of these can be specified further according to their "resources and practices" and their "institutions and places." For example, "the true" refers to the "realm of human knowledge." Its resources and practices include "research, innovation, teaching, transfer of knowledge, cultural and historical preservation, etc.," and its institutions and places include "universities, libraries, public schools, public squares, media, public art, job training centers, book stores, community gardens, etc."

- Sabina Alkire's "multi-dimensional poverty index" identifies goods to be pursued in developing countries for the sake of "wholeness" and "well-being": health, education, living standards, quality of work, empowerment, physical safety, social connectedness, and psychological wellbeing.[746]
- John Finnis' natural law theory identifies basic goods that contribute to "integral human flourishing": life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, work, play, friendship, self-integration, self-expression, virtuous practical reason, and transcendence.[747]
- Aristotle, in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, lists the virtues of courage, temperance, justice, practical reasonableness, liberality, patience, proper ambition, truthfulness, friendliness, and modesty, among others.[748]
- *Turning the Tide: Inspiring Concern for Others and the Common Good through College Admissions*, a document of the Making Caring Common project at the University of Harvard's Graduate School of Education, challenges colleges to encourage various attributes and practices like sustained community service, gratitude, responsibility for the future, contribution to the common good, respect for the disadvantaged, kindness, generosity, fairness, and honesty.[749]
- The Oxford Character Project identifies four key virtues essential for students to become "the wise thinkers and good leaders the world so desperately needs:" a sense of vocation, an attitude of service, humility, and gratitude.[750]
- The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues at the University of Birmingham (UK), promotes the following "universally acknowledged (cosmopolitan) virtues and values": the moral virtues of courage, justice, honesty, compassion, self-discipline, gratitude, and humility; the civic virtues of service, citizenship, and volunteering; and the intellectual virtues of curiosity, critical thinking, and practical reason.[751]

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[746] Sabina Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms: Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 52. See also Sabina Alkire, James Foster, Suman Seth, Maria Emma Santos, José Manuel Roche, and Paola Ballon, *Multidimensional Poverty Measurement and Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Alkire and Gisela Robles, "Multidimensional Poverty Index 2015: Brief Methodological Note and Results." OPHI Briefing 36, University of Oxford.

[747] Finnis, *Natural Law*, 23, 34.

[748] See *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.5 114028; VI.7 1141b.

[749] Richard Weissbourd, "Turning the Tide: Inspiring Concern for Others and the Common Good through College Admissions." http://mcc.gse.harvard.edu/files/gse-mcc/files/20160120_mcc_ttt_report_interactive.pdf?m=1453303517.

[750] Michael Lamb and Jonathan Brant, "Cultivating Virtues in Postgraduates." http://oxfordcharacter.org/about/

[751] Jubilee Centre, "A Framework for Character Education in Schools." http://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/432/character-education

These sample lists enjoy multiple points of overlap between them and any one of them could serve as the starting point for conversations about the virtues and goods to be promoted within an academic institution, whether primary school or research university. Identifying goods and virtues is the first step toward generating increasingly specific norms and practices that promote and protect these in the lives of individuals and communities. Though still general, these lists illustrate a dimension of "common ground humanism" that could direct moral education and orient prudence, though they obviously leave room for considerable debate about how to specify or instantiate any particular good or virtue.

Though debates in philosophically and religiously plural institutions are inevitable about which goods or virtues are primary and what they mean, participants in such discussions should look for general or negotiated consensus, including mutual concessions, rather than universal agreement. The Christian approach to common ground humanism, if directed, for instance, by Melanchthon's theology of creation and sin, would not be surprised that people from different traditions agreed rightly or wrongly about what virtues or goods constitute human flourishing. Such differences may be due to sin, epistemic distortion, cultural differences, or merely the unique ways people instantiate human goods and virtues. Difference is neither inevitable, comprehensive, nor intractable, however. To treat it as such would be to raise the existence of plurality to a matter of principle that would discourage the pursuit of mutual understanding and common agreement in order to preserve sectarian "pluralism" as an inherently good normative ideal. Instead, Christian educators might participate in the

conversations and provide theologically faithful, even if not utterly unique, reasons that students should cultivate certain virtues, avoid certain vices, love certain goods, and participate in certain practices.

At the least, Glanzer and Ream's schema of "humanisms" and their survey of schools attempting to advance "humanistic" moral formation provide us with more options than Fish's disciplinary self of the research university, Nussbaum's political self of Rawlsian liberalism, or Newman's Christian gentleman of the robustly Catholic university.

Conclusion

In the introduction to this chapter, I asked if academic institutions bear any responsibility for their students' moral education. Even if "common ground humanism" is possible, are institutions responsible to the adults their students will become, the society they will enter, the colleagues they will work alongside, or the political community they will help lead? Many institutions think so and argue that the pursuit of moral ends through education is a reasonable and viable project. Most people expect some kind of intentional moral formation within primary schools, welcome it in secondary schools, and lament its absence in tertiary schools like colleges and universities. Because academic institutions are malleable cultural creations, to include character formation among their explicit goals violates no intrinsic or transcendent form.

Hugh's Abbey of St Victor, Melanchthon's Wittenberg University, and Newman's residential Oxford colleges could each be considered a "school" or, in Melanchthon's terms, a "workshop" of virtue. Without abandoning their intellectual or practical ends, they pursued moral ends as well. Though cultivation of the intellect was usually primary,

these institutions attempted to help the members of their community not only integrate the moral, intellectual, personal, and spiritual aspects of their lives, but also their political, academic, and private identities. These institutions set people on their way by providing them with resources for a journey of gradual integration toward Hugh's *pulchrum esse*, Melanchthon's *humanitas*, and Newman's Christian gentleman scholar.

Chapter Eight
The Moral Ends of Education, Part II: The Virtues and their Formation

"Now that you have come to a school of virtues…"[752] Hugh of St. Victor

"While the entire machine of the world is tottering … nevertheless the ruin is supported by God. Worthy men must exert themselves, each in his place, in order to benefit the common good."[753] Philip Melanchthon

"Regularity, rule, respect for others, the eye of friends and acquaintances, the absence from temptation, external restraints generally, are of first importance in protecting us against ourselves."[754] John Henry Newman

The School of Virtues

With Hugh's *pulchrum esse*, Melanchthon's *humanitas*, Newman's educated gentleman, and the concepts of "common ground humanism" and "Christian humanism" still in our minds, we are ready to consider the virtues and practices of formation that suffuse the educational writings of these three Christian educators. All three consider virtue to refer to stable dispositions of the affections or will acquired through habit governed by rightly ordered reason. They prepare persons to act toward the good and avoid the bad, and to do so with relative ease and satisfaction.

What follows is not an exhaustive account of every moral or intellectual virtue Hugh, Melanchthon, or Newman mention. Instead, my selection is representative. Further, I do not treat each theologian in turn, one after the other, because similar virtues and practices recur throughout all three. That said, if one pedagogue treats a particular virtue or practice in greater depth, his writings may dominate that section. I

[752] *De Institutione Novitiorum*, "Prologue."
[753] "On the merit of laws," 179.
[754] *RP*, 189.

follow Aristotle's, and Melanchthon's and Newman's, basic pattern of situating the virtues between vices of excess and deficiency.[755] I also group virtues together to suggest how they mutually reinforce each other. As I argued in chapter one, virtues are more like parts in an integrated ecosystem wherein each part depends on every other for its individual flourishing rather than like isolated self-sustaining species.[756]

This integration of complex virtues is the goal. Along the way, virtues might be domain-specific and inconsistently exercised across domains. Newman refers to each virtue having its own form of *phronesis* or judgment, which operates differently in each "subject-matter."[757] For example, a person may be disposed to exercise a virtue like honesty or patience within one domain—the workplace—but not necessarily in another—the family. A person may develop moral courage, but not intellectual or physical courage; she may be, Newman says, "just and cruel, brave and sensual, imprudent and patient" in different domains.[758] This is an important point for thinking about moral education. No one has learned a skill until they have learned it. While they are learning it, they require instruction, encouragement, and practice. The same is true

[755] Melanchthon, *CR* XVI, 210: *virtus est habitus electivus, in mediocritate consistens, secundum rectam rationem, ut sapiens diiudicat*; Newman: "Veracity, like other virtues, lies in a mean" (*Via Media*, Lix).

[756] Melanchthon explains, for instance, that love [*dilectio*] is obedience to all the commands of God with true faith, burning love [*incendio amoris*], and joy; that gratitude is composed of justice and truth; and that friendship is a form of justice and generosity because the liberal heart pays back benevolence with benevolence. *Erotemata Dialectices*, *CR* XII, 540. Likewise, Newman explains that justice includes truth, honesty, faithfulness, gratitude, liberality, courtesy, and equity. Fathers of the Birmingham Oratory, eds., *Sermon Notes of John Henry Cardinal Newman: 1849–1878* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913), 169.

[757] Newman, *GA*, 230.

[758] Ibid.

with the virtues. They are often partially formed, episodic, and context-specific. Given what a virtue is, we should not expect otherwise. Different virtues in a person's character may be at different stages along the way toward maturity, and the same virtue might be more developed in one area than another.[759]

This should lead us to be patient and hopeful. The perfectly virtuous person is not likely to be found. If the incarnate Son or, for Hugh and Newman, his mother Mary, are the models of holistic or globally integrated virtue, then everyone else is always "on the way," whether student, professor, or saint. This undercuts Fish's objection that an academic institution should not include moral formation among its objectives because its students' moral characters are open to other influences and cannot be controlled or guaranteed by the institution. Not only would that objection seem to apply to their intellectual formation, as well, but once the ever-incomplete nature and domain-specificity of moral virtue is accepted, Fish's objection becomes moot. Virtue formation is an ongoing process in which an academic institution could play a decisive and self-conscious, though not absolute, role.

Humility and Docility

The fundamental virtue, according to Hugh, is humility—moral and intellectual.[760] Its derivative virtue is docility, or teachableness. Humility (Latin, *humilitas*, "lowness") enables a person to maintain a modest view of her abilities and recognize the goodness and abilities of others. On one side of humility are pride and arrogance, and on the other are self-deprecation and paralyzing feelings of incompetence. Humility is required for

[759] See Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, 38.
[760] See, for instance, *de Sacramentis* II.xiii.ii.

intellectual progress because the proud student refuses to acknowledge his ignorance, snubs teachers and books he disapproves of, and judges some essential but basic knowledge to be beneath him. Divinity students, Hugh suggests, often arrogantly and erroneously believe they can understand the depths of Scriptures and theology without careful and patient study. Such students fail to progress, Hugh argues, because they would rather "appear wise" than be wise.

Others arrogantly claim wisdom on the basis of connections to wise people. "I have known many," Hugh reflects, who mistakenly think themselves "on the road to greatness" simply because they knew "great and wise men." Hugh's sarcasm is sharp and amusing. His proud students boast, "'We … have seen them. We have studied under them. They often used to talk to us. Those great ones, those famous men, they know us.'"[761] Still other students, once they have started to learn, suffer attacks from "an inflated ego" that leads them to overestimate their own intellectual prowess and underestimate everyone else's.[762] In what seems a thinly veiled reference to Peter Abelard, whose bitter opposition led William of Champeux to found the Abbey of St. Victor, Hugh writes, "in our days certain peddlers of trifles come fuming forth … [to] accuse our forefathers of simplicity and suppose that wisdom, having been born with themselves, with themselves will die."[763]

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[761] *Didascalicon*, III.xiii.

[762] See *De Arca Noe Morali* III.10.

[763] Ibid. For the allusion to Abelard, see *Didascalicon*, trans. Taylor, 215 n. 68; *Didascalicon*, trans. Franklin T. Harkins, *Interpretation of Scripture: Theory*, ed. Franklin T. Harkins and Frans van Liere (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2013), 192 n.175.

Abelard is also Newman's paradigmatic example of the proud student and professor. When Newman discusses the dangers of a university that lacks the moderating influence of the church and residential colleges, he identifies pride and theological heresy as the particular temptations of any professor "carried away by his success." Students have their own temptations, but for the talented professor, it is "pride of intellect, the aberrations of reasoning, and the intoxication of applause."[764] For Newman, Abelard represents the promise and peril of the university's essence "of advertising and communicating knowledge for its own sake."[765] Newman explains that Abelard's intellectual arrogance led him, first, to viciously attack his teacher, William of Champeaux, founder of "the celebrated Abbey of St. Victor" who "commenced the work of founding the University out of the Schools of Paris." In fact, Newman credits William, Hugh's friend and colleague, with establishing one of the core principles both of the university and of Newman's intellectual ideal, namely, the "logical principle of constructing all sciences into one system"—a principle evident in Hugh's *Didascalicon* and Newman's *Idea*. However, Abelard's brilliance, eloquence, and popularity were his downfall. His pride made him susceptible to "vanity" and "worldliness," and he violated the principle of James 3:17 that wisdom should be "from above, chaste, and peaceable." Instead, Abelard courted heresy, license, and strife. For Newman, Abelard's prideful ambition to outshine William, his affair with Heloise, and his theological heresy

[764] *RP*, 185.
[765] Ibid, 195.

represent the special temptations of the brilliant but proud professor or student who refuses the balancing influence of a moral community.[766]

Unlike Abelard, Hugh writes, "the wise student, therefore, gladly hears all, reads all, and looks down upon no writing, no person, no teaching. From all indifferently he seeks what he sees he lacks, and he considers not how much he knows, but of how much he is ignorant." He holds "no learning in contempt, for all learning is good."[767] The student who humbly pursues the contemplative life does not contemn those who pursue the active life of good works, which is necessary for "looking after earthly matters."[768] He is humble, teachable, eager to learn from anyone, and honest about his own knowledge. Hugh concludes by pointing out that when the humble student does not understand something, he does not "break out in angry condemnation and think that nothing is good but what he himself can understand."[769] As he counsels Victorine novices in *de Institutione,* a learner one must be a listener, not a litigant [*litigante*].[770] Likewise, he cautions them, "there is a time when nothing should be said, and there is a time when something should be said, but there is truly never a time when everything should be said."[771] Though Hugh frames most of his reflections on humility within the context of learning, especially for the beginning student, he clearly has in mind humility that frames every human relationship.

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[766] Ibid, 192–202.
[767] *Didascalicon* III.xiii.
[768] *De Arca Noe Morali* III.10.
[769] Ibid.
[770] *De Institutione Novitiorum* VI.
[771] Ibid, XVI. "Est tempus quando nihil, et est tempus quando aliquid dicendum est, nullum vero tempus est quando dicenda sunt omnia."

Melanchthon does not refer to humility as often as Hugh, but it is implicit throughout his works. He begins many addresses by acknowledging his youth, inexperience, and unworthiness to speak, and invites "worthy and learned men everywhere to be censors and correctors of all my works."[772] The virtue of humility also underlies his recommendation that scholars critically compare their ideas with others in order to correct unseen errors. "Nothing is worse, or more pernicious, than …some who are less ashamed to persevere in their error than to correct and change their erroneous opinion."[773] The virtue of humility also underlies Melanchthon's harsh denunciation of "sophists" who prefer applause from people over simple presentations of the truth to people.[774]

Like Hugh and Melanchthon, Newman also thinks humility necessary to approach truth.[775] Though he does not make the following connection explicit, we could describe as "disciplinary humility" Newman's ideal that academics should acknowledge the limitations of their own disciplines, including Theology, and respect the natural territory of another's so as not to inappropriately expand their own discipline at the expense of their disciplinary neighbours. For Newman, however, personal humility is a prime example of a virtue impossible apart from Christian devotion. It is replaced either by "condescension," the "act of a superior, who protests to himself, while he commits it, that he is superior still," or by "modesty," a superficial virtue concerned with social

[772] "Preface to the *Book on the Soul*," 155.
[773] "On the role of the schools," 16.
[774] CR XI, 266.
[775] See *University Sermons*, 198.

etiquette. “True humility” is to “feel and behave as if we were low; … an abdication … of those prerogatives or privileges” to which others think us entitled.[776]

That humility can serve the academic life should already be clear. The humble person is appropriately aware of her own limitations and the valuable contributions that others might make. Humility restrains a person from overbearing self-promotion and prepares her to respect other persons. Humility enables us to learn, to learn together, and to learn from anyone. Humility also enables colleagues in an academic institution to honour one another’s disciplines and projects, and to set aside one’s own projects for the good of the whole.

Patience and Orderliness

Patience (Latin, *pati*, to suffer or endure) is the contented or calm endurance of provocation, annoyance, or delay. On one side is irascibility and haste, on the other is despair or apathy. As master pedagogues who consider teaching part of their spiritual vocation, Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman each designed structured curricular programs intended to take students of a variety of ages through the process of slowly acquiring knowledge and forming intellectual skills. Therefore, each one of them warns their students against impatient grasping after knowledge or positions for which they are not yet ready. The hasty student, Hugh cautions, foregoes patient progress and lunges toward knowledge beyond their current abilities. Their “great leap of progress” causes them to “sprawl headlong.” They “lacked the very rudiments of learning, yet deigned to concern themselves with the highest problems.”[777] However, understanding

[776] *Idea*, 176–7.

[777] *Didascalicon*, III.xiii; see also VI.iii.

the highest problems sits at the end of a long journey. Hugh's counsel resembles what any senior academic might deliver to an incoming class: "the man who proceeds stage by stage moves along best. … Do not hurry too much, therefore; in this way you will come more quickly to wisdom."[778] For students, this means an orderly analysis of books and arguments; for teachers, an orderly explanation from the known to unknown; for both, an orderly investigation from better known universals to newly discovered particulars.[779]

Hugh counsels both students and teachers to learn the fundamentals of each art; then by "repeated reciprocal comparison" between them, a person will be able to deepen his or her understanding of the content and boundaries of each discipline.[780] This recalls Newman's counsel from chapter four concerning how to move from an assortment of data to knowledge and understanding. The repeated analysis and comparison Hugh recommends also allows student and teacher to discern the structure or basic principles of a given subject matter to remember it upon command for the sake of meditation.[781] Both Hugh and Melanchthon frequently warn against impatiently abandoning the ancient "sequence of learning" contained in the trivium and quadrivium, those "lower arts" that "sharpen the judgment and prepare one for the acquisition of greater things" in theology and philosophy.[782] These lower arts must be undertaken first, Melanchthon

[778] Ibid, III.xiii.
[779] Ibid, III.8–9
[780] Ibid, III.v.
[781] Ibid, III.xi.
[782] Melanchthon, "On the order of learning," 4. See *De Ordine Discendi*, CR 11, 209–14.

says, because even study of the greatest things can do harm "if they are not undertaken at the appropriate time." Melanchthon laments that "suddenly like mushrooms," lawyers, doctors, priests, and magistrates pop up who lack skills in dialectic, rhetoric, and moral philosophy because they rushed "unrestrainedly toward the higher disciplines" and failed to patiently submit themselves to a prudent order of study.[783] In order to help his students avoid surrendering their reading and education to the randomness of momentary fancy, Melanchthon often advised them individually, required them to submit an annual academic plan, and established a sequence of "prerequisites" to master before being admitted to higher courses.[784] In this way, they were not only prepared for more advanced courses, but could also more easily recognize the complex interconnection of all the knowledge they were acquiring, a concern of Newman's we explored in chapter four. Melanchthon and Newman both lament that in their undergraduate days, they were given too little direction. Newman writes, "I needed a friend to keep me from taking up other pursuits…and I damaged and thwarted the real progress of my mind by dabbling in studies and occupations, good in themselves, but out of place."[785] We should not be surprised that all three pedagogues emphasize the goodness of patience and ordered studies directed by more senior academic guides.

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[783] Ibid., 6–7. See also 16–7 on the importance of "long training" for church ministers.

[784] For more on Melanchthon's "method," see Denys, *Philip Melanchthon's Unique Contribution*, 186–92; *CR* I, 25; *CR* XI, 257; *CR* XII, 190 (cited by Denys); See also Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 352–5; cf. *CR* XI, 112, 120; *CR* XII, 389; *CR* III, 110.

[785] Henry Tristram, ed., *Autobiographical Writings* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1957), 52; cited in Tillman, *John Henry Newman*, 229. Melanchthon may have been especially sensitive to the value of orderly study due to his own haphazard attempt to

Courage, Temperance, and Perseverance

To untangle an obstinate problem, sustain or abandon a difficult course of study, accept a challenging conclusion, overcome mental or material opposition, or advance a novel thesis in the face of opposition requires courage, temperance, and perseverance—an admittedly broad but not unrelated set of virtues: courage to go forward, temperance to reduce distractions, perseverance to see a task to conclusion. Courage (Latin, *fortitudo*, "firmness;" *cor*, "heart) refers to bravery or the ability to face difficulty with the appropriate response to fear. It sits between cowardice and rashness. Temperance (Latin, *temperare*, "to regulate") is moderation, self-control, or sobriety positioned between indulgence and strict abstinence. Perseverance (Latin, *perseverare*, "steadfast continuance") is related to courage because both refer to enduring something difficult, either in a moment (courage) or extended through time (perseverance). As a virtue, it avoids both fatalism and stubbornness.

In his preface to the *Didascalicon*, Hugh compares two types of students: the intellectually dull and gifted. Though the dull must struggle diligently to acquire knowledge, some do so, and he commends their hard-won knowledge. Because others find learning challenging, they despair of learning difficult matters and so fail to learn even "those smallest of which they are capable." They lack courage and the hope that sometimes accompanies it. Among the gifted, some are distracted by worldly affairs or vice. They lack temperance. Still others, who lack the means or family connections that would admit them to schools, abandon all hope of learning. They lack perseverance,

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compensate for the lack of direction he received while a student in Heidelberg. Kuropka, *Melanchthon*, 57–9; Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 30, 339–40.

since neither lack of funds nor family kept others in similar situations from "labouring in hunger, thirst, and nakedness" to "attain to the fruit of knowledge."[786]

Instead of giving up hope of learning, allowing oneself to be distracted by cares, or discouraged by difficulty, Hugh draws the attention of his students to the examples of aged men whose wisdom gradually increased, allowing them to "reap the sweetest fruits of former studies." Among such men are both philosophers and poets: Themistocles, Socrates, Plato, Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles, and others. "Consider, then, how much these men loved wisdom when not even decrepit age could call them away from its quest."[787] So Hugh advocates the diligent practice and "assiduous effort" necessary to cultivate one's natural endowment,[788] a rigorously drilled memory, of which Hugh was a medieval master,[789] earnestness that was willing to sacrifice creaturely comforts and overcome difficult circumstances,[790] as well as hard work, persistent concern, and constant alertness.[791]

Even for those who courageously overcome whatever obstacle presents itself, Hugh still counsels temperance, since their intellectual curiosity and voracious appetite for knowledge could delay their arrival at the knowledge they seek. So he warns them to be temperate even in their pursuit of knowledge. Since they cannot read or know

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[786] *Didascalicon*, "Preface;" see also III.vi.

[787] Ibid, III.xiv.

[788] *Didascalicon* III.vi.

[789] Ibid., III.xi. See Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), and *The Medieval Craft of Memory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Grover A. Zinn, jr. "Hugh of St. Victor and the Art of Memory," *Viator* 5 (1974:): 211– 234.

[790] *Didascalicon*, III.xiv.

[791] Ibid., III.xvii.

everything, they must not try to "compete" with "those who want to read everything. … It does not matter at all whether or not you read every book that has been written. … Read your books carefully, but refuse to be preoccupied by them. Refuse to be greedy."[792]

Melanchthon modeled courage and perseverance. Despite having the disposition of an irenic academic, he could challenge Luther, lead the Wittenberg when necessary, and confront many criticisms levied against him by some Lutheran theologians after Luther's death. For Melanchthon, courage was required by anyone who was willing to fight for the common good. In a passage Melanchthon may have spoken to himself on occasion, he writes,

> Let us strengthen ourselves with this consolation, particularly amidst these dangers in the world, and let us be aware that while the entire machine of the world is tottering, and human affairs are tumbling down, nevertheless the ruin is supported by God. Worthy men must exert themselves, each in his place, in order to benefit the common good.[793]

Melanchthon exhorted his students not to abandon their studies, but to practice moderation and perseverance so they would be ready when the time came to courageously oppose philosophical, ecclesial, political, and moral error on behalf of the common good. So Melanchthon extolls several versions of these virtues when he praises "perseverance and endurance,"[794] "fortitude" against "utmost sloth" and "unjust

[792] Ibid, V.6.
[793] "On the merit of laws," 179. See also "On the merit of studying theology," 183.
[794] Melanchthon, "On the study of languages," 35.

weakness of the mind,"[795] "endurance in bearing much that is troublesome,"[796] and "diligence in unraveling obscure things."[797]

Like Melanchthon, Newman demonstrated these virtues in his own life when responding to low marks at Oxford, opposing the Provost of Oriel, co-founding the Oxford Movement in the face of liberal Anglicanism, converting to Roman Catholicism, founding the Catholic University of Dublin, founding the Birmingham Oratory, enduring an unjust conviction for libel, and responding to criticisms from innumerable quarters. In one of his University Sermons, Newman compares faith to courage, which "does not consist in calculation, but in fighting against chances," illustrated by the statesman who "stands his ground on his instinctive perception of a truth which the many scoff at."[798] In notes for a sermon series on the cardinal virtues in 1860, Newman relates these three virtues—courage, temperance, perseverance—and describes them as "virtues of warfare" in a fallen world. They are necessary to tell the truth, resist evil, withstand ill treatment, and endure ongoing evil without giving up. He suggests that whereas courage responds to external opposition, so temperance responds to internal temptation, and perseverance employs these over the course of time.[799]

Prudence and Discretion

Prudence and wisdom (Latin, *prudentia*, from *providentia*, "foresight") describes sound practical judgment or the excellent application of right reason to contingent matters. We

[795] Melanchthon, "Preface to Johannes Vogelin's Book on the Elements of Geometry," 101.

[796] "On the merit of the art of medicine," 173.

[797] "On Aristotle," 206.

[798] University Sermons, 212.

[799] *Sermon Notes of John Henry Cardinal Newman: 1849–1878*, 170–2.

saw in chapter one that prudence is an intellectual virtue that accepts the ends given it by the moral virtues, discerns what course of action should be taken in a contingent concrete situation, and employs the structural virtues to achieve a virtuous end. Prudence discerns rightly ordered means to achieve rightly ordered ends.[800] It determines what, for example, counts as a "generous" act in a given situation (its "constitutive" function), and adjudicates between virtues, for example, justice and generosity, if they collide (its "integrative" function).[801] It must also discern multiple penultimate ends that are constitutive of the final virtuous end desired. Aristotle remarks that a wise person deliberates well "towards some specific worthy end on matters where no exact technique applies," that is, in which they must use their personal judgment rather than follow a precise set of instructions.[802] Prudence could be understood as the epistemological analogue to the cultivated skill of an excellent improvisational actor, musician, or military commander. When practical reason is used to achieve immoral or unscrupulous ends, however, it is sometimes described as "cleverness" or "cunning."[803] Therefore, "prudence" presupposes morally virtuous desires indexed to a moral structure or moral order.

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[800] Aristotle: "Excellence [of character] makes the goal correct, while wisdom [*phronesis*] makes what leads to it correct." *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 1144a7–8.

[801] On *phronesis*, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI; Aquinas, *ST* I II 58.5; Kristjánsson, "*Phronesis*," 151–71; Thomas Albert Howard, "Seeing with all Three Eyes: The Virtue of Prudence and Undergraduate Education" in David. S. Cunningham, ed., *At this Time and Place: Vocation and Higher Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[802] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 1140a30–34.

[803] See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 1144a24–30, though see Russell, *Practical Intelligence*, 24–5, notes subtle distinctions between prudence and cleverness.

Hugh repeatedly emphasizes the importance of prudential reasoning for discerning which moral and intellectual paths to follow and which to abandon. Regarding moral actions, he states that "without prudence" we cannot "rightly fulfil what we ought." Therefore, "in what else … do we need to be educated, besides prudence and caution?"[804] Regarding intellectual pursuits, without prudence, "we find many who study but few who are wise."[805] Whereas one student progresses rapidly, another "labours long and makes little progress."[806] Therefore, "the student should take no less care not to expend his effort in useless studies than he should to avoid a lukewarm pursuit of good and useful ones. It is bad to pursue something good negligently; it is worse to expend many labours on an empty thing."[807] When prudence is lacking, the student may work frantically, "but he does not make progress. … He pours out his strength upon the wind. … 'always learning yet never reaching knowledge.'"[808] Hugh also laments imprudent lecturers who, unable to discern what should be included and what left out of a lecture, combine everything haphazardly. They overwhelm their students with "unrelated theories or idea" and so "confuse … students more than … edify them." Instead, "we should not say everything that we are able to say, lest we say less profitably the things that we ought to say."[809] The result is "not the teaching of

[804] *De Arca Noe* III.x; see also *De Arca Noe Mystica* VII.
[805] *Didascalicon*, III.iii.
[806] Ibid, V.v.
[807] Ibid, III.iii. See also III.xiii: "Nothing is good if it eliminates a better thing. If you are not able to read everything, read those things which are more useful."
[808] Ibid, III.iii.
[809] *Didascalicon*, III.v., trans. Harkins.

others…but the showing off of their own knowledge."[810] This recalls his counsel to novices, quoted above, that there is a time to say nothing and a time to say something, but never a time to say everything.

Melanchthon's counsel is similar. Students should be helped to prudently choose a path that actually leads toward the end all desire: happiness. Too many, Melanchthon laments, follow "their detestable desires and their stomachs" and are exclusively instructed by experience, "the teacher of the foolish," rather than prudence, the teacher of the wise. Others think the path lies through "riches and money" and "possessions" and so they rush to acquire "the mean and gainful arts" and come to judge the value of everything according to its pragmatic "usefulness to them."[811] Were they prudent, they would see that the path to happiness lies in part through cultivating *humanitas* and virtue, and that their best chance at cultivating these comes through allowing themselves to be taught by Scripture and authors like Homer, Aristotle, and Cicero—men Newman later called "the schoolmasters of all generations."[812]

Newman's treatment of practical reason or prudence (Greek, *phronesis*) is more complex than either Hugh's or Melanchthon's, in part because this virtue manifests itself in different ways across his work. As we saw in chapter four, when Newman translates Aristotle's concept of *phronesis* into an epistemological register, it emerges as the "Illative Sense" in *Grammar of Assent* and as "judgment" in the *Idea*.[813] According to Tillman's

[810] *Didascalicon*, III.v., trans. Taylor.
[811] "Preface to Homer," 39–40, 53.
[812] Newman, "Christianity and Letters," *Idea*, 265.
[813] *Idea*, 151–2; see also 134.

illuminating suggestion, when Newman thinks it into the ecclesial realm, it becomes "the sense of the faithful," when into church history, it is the "principle of tradition in the Church," and when into the ethical realm, the "moral sense" or "conscience."[814] Newman describes it as the virtue that, first, moves a person from an inchoate apprehension of strands of implicit reasoning to, second, judgment about a particular concrete proposition, to, third, assent to that proposition in thought or deed.

Our concern at this moment, however, is for prudence as the virtuous form of practical reason or, in Newman's mind, "conscience." Like prudence, "conscience" performs several activities. In his 1870 *Grammar of Assent*, for example, conscience is both the "internal teacher of religion," as well as the moral "judgment of the reason and a magisterial dictate" that testifies to right and wrong in part through strong emotions.[815] In his 1874 "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," on the freedom of the Catholic conscience, the reference to emotion is absent, but the emphasis on the conscience's activity of knowing and judging as a mediated form of the divine voice remains. In this extended letter, Newman invokes Augustine and Aquinas to draw together natural law, practical reason, and the conscience.[816] He starts with God's attributes, including "justice, truth,

[814] Tillman, *John Henry Newman*, 212, 333. On the conscience, see *Grammar*, 107–9; *The Philosophical Notebook* II, 49, 59, 62, 63; *Idea*, 413. See also Gerard J. Hughes, "Conscience," in *The Cambridge Companion*, 189–220; S. A. Grave, "A Moral Sense," in *Conscience in Newman's Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 30–59.

[815] *GA*, 73. See Newman's cheeky declaration: "I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please,—still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards." "A Letter Addressed to the Duke of Norfolk," in *Certain Difficulties* II, chapter five, "Conscience," 246–61.

[816] In the *Grammar*, he refers his readers to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which moral duty, virtue, and phronesis are "fully considered." *GA*, 228.

wisdom, sanctity, benevolence, and mercy,"[817] represent the "divine law," which has been "implanted…in the intelligence of all His rational creatures."[818] Knowledge of these divine attributes constitutes the natural law that provides an authoritative "rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and wrong." Along with the image of divine "implanting," he also describes the natural law as human "participation" in the eternal law. This apprehension of natural law, whether described as an implanting or as participation, "is called 'conscience'," and it exercises prudence.[819]

Like Aquinas, Newman also describes conscience as the virtue of practical judgment "by which we judge what *hic et nunc* is to be done as being good, or to be avoided as evil"[820] by "this given person, under these given circumstance."[821] Though his references to these two characteristics of the conscience—knowing the natural law and judging particular actions—run together in the "Letter," it is clear that Newman thinks conscience much more than simply the habitual awareness of the first principles of natural law or practical reason. It also represents the work of practical reason prudentially weighing and judging what should be done in the immediacy of the moment. In an article on Newman and conscience, John Finnis describes these capacities

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[817] Newman, "Duke of Norfolk," 246.

[818] Ibid. Melanchthon relates God's attributes to the natural law in his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, *CR* XVI, 284.

[819] "Duke of Norfolk," 247.

[820] Ibid, 257.

[821] *GA*, 228–9. Melanchthon sounds similar when he describes conscience as "the practical syllogism in the intellect, in which the major premise is the Law of God … the minor premise and conclusion are the application, approving something done rightly or condemning a transgression; and this approval is followed by happiness in the heart, and the condemnation is followed by grief." "Conscience," in "Definitions of Many Terms, *The Chief Theological Topics*, Appendix 2, 511.

as the "habitual conscience," which knows, and the "actual conscience," which judges.[822] Newman also seems to distinguish the prudent conscience from the kind of "cunning" that animates Bentham, Mill, Hobbes, Darwin, and Shaftesbury, each of whom seem implicated in his assertion that "the rule and measure of duty is not utility, nor expedience, nor the happiness of the greatest number, nor State convenience, nor fitness, order, and the *pulchrum*. Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with oneself." Instead, "conscience" is the divine messenger speaking "in nature and in grace" to direct a person's desires and actions toward the good and the right.[823]

It is even more important for us to see that while Newman thinks the conscience is universal and ineradicable, "training and experience are necessary for its strength, growth, and due formation" as a virtue.[824] This reveals that Newman thought practical reason capable of being developed through education, and it reinforces my argument in the last chapter that he could have used this concept of conscience to support moral education and formation in the non-Catholic university. Everyone has a conscience, according to Newman, and thus the functioning of anyone's conscience could be improved.

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[822] John Finnis, "Conscience in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," in Ker and Hill, *Newman After a Hundred Years*, 410. See also Gerard J. Hughes, "Newman and the Particularity of Conscience," in Ian Ker and Terrence Merrigan, eds., *Newman and Faith* (Louvain: Peeters Press, 2004). For Aquinas on *synderesis* and *conscientia*, see *ST* I I Q.79 A.12–13; on eternal and natural law, see 1a2ae, Q. 91–94. For Aristotle on *phronesis*, see *Nicomachean Ethics* VI; on moral education, see II, 1.

[823] "Duke of Norfolk," 248.

[824] Ibid, 248.

One of the merits of Newman's work on intellectual and moral prudence is his determination to account for how people actually think, why they commit to one thing and not another, and why, to use Fish's example, two students might take the same course in ethics and arrive at opposite reasonable conclusions. For Newman, Fish's example would not represent a surprising or defeating failure on the part of the class or program for moral formation, because intellectual and moral reasoning are often irreducibly personal. He emphasizes this in the following excerpt from his comparison of Aristotle's *phronesis* and his own Illative Sense:

> What it is to be virtuous, how we are to gain the just idea and standard of virtue, how we are to *approximate in practice* to our standard, what is right and wrong *in a particular case*, for the answers in fullness and accuracy to these and similar questions, the philosopher [Aristotle] refers us to no code of laws, to no moral treatise, because no science of life, *applicable to the case of an individual*, has been or can be written. Such is Aristotle's doctrine, and it is undoubtedly true.[825]

He goes on to explain that while an ethical system can supply laws, principles, examples, and solutions to some difficulties—all of which are useful—"who is to apply them *to a particular case*? whither can we go, except to *the living intellect, our own, or another's*?" Ethical systems "cannot ascertain for us, *according to our personal need*, the golden mean." Instead of moral logic, we need an "authoritative oracle" that is "*seated in the mind of the individual…his own judge* in those special cases of duty which are personal to him."[826] We reason as whole persons within the fluctuating contingencies of life rather than as cold logicians within dapper syllogisms.[827] Ethical systems, authorities, and

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[825] *GA*, 228. Emphasis mine. See Russell, *Practical Intelligence*, 19.

[826] *GA*, 228–29.

[827] This partially explains the greater utility of rhetoric over symbolic logic to move people toward theoretical or practical commitments.

friends, while helpful and necessary, are ultimately insufficient apart from a prudent conscience. In a hypothetical situation where queen and pope issue diametrically opposed moral demands, Newman explains he would "give an absolute obedience to neither." Instead, he would consult with theologians, clergy, his confessor, and revered friends. But in the end, if he could not follow their advice, "then I must rule myself by my own judgment and my own conscience."[828]

Whether we understand this cultivated virtue as prudence, judgment, conscience, or practical reason, we should be able to understand its value for helping a person achieve through virtuous means the virtuous ends they desire.[829] It is an intellectual skill that all three Christian educators think can be nurtured through education.

Conclusion to the School of the Virtues

These moral and intellectual, motivational and structural, virtues do not exhaust the list of virtues that Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman emphasize, nor that might be cultivated through and for the sake of education. Fish insists on a hard distinction between intellectual and moral virtues, and admits only the former into the academy. He welcomes intellectual courage and fair-mindedness, for example, but not moral courage and fairness. However, does it require intellectual or moral courage for a historian to reveal the deep flaws of an admired hero? Is a political theorist employing intellectual or moral justice when they treat an opposing theory with due respect? Does the biologist require intellectual or moral honesty to admit the failure of a costly

[828] "A Letter," 243–44; see also Hughes, "Conscience," in *The Cambridge Companion*, 201.

[829] See Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, 84–89, 98.

experiment? The above discussion should help us see not only that moral and intellectual virtues are sometimes hard to distinguish, but also that they often mutually reinforce one another.[830]

However, that we employ a common terminology does not mean that there is no distinction between virtues, of course. We can formally state that moral virtues have "good" affection and action as their end and intellectual virtues "true" reasoning and belief as theirs, and that a person may excel in one set of virtues but not the other. However, both represent aspects of personal excellence, are constitutive of human flourishing, and can be mutually supportive and prove beneficial across a variety of domains.[831] As I have tried to show, these "incursions of virtue," as Fish called them, benefit the individual not only as a person, but also as a citizen, neighbour, and as a student or scholar. In Fish's domain, I would argue that the academy functions better when its faculty, students, and administration exercise typically moral virtues like patience, kindness, temperance, and generosity that go beyond the minimal professionalism required to avoid termination or expulsion.

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[830] Jean Porter describes something like this as a "seepage between the virtues." Jean Porter, *Moral Action and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 178.

[831] For more on the relation between moral and intellectual virtues, see Jason Baer, "On the Distinction between Intellectual and Moral Virtues," in Jason Baehr, *The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 206–22; Jean Porter, *Moral Action*, 138–143; Linda Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 137f.; Julia Driver, "The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue," *Metaphilosophy* 34 no. 3 (April, 2003): 367–383.

We are now ready to move to the final section, which reviews various methods Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman identify for cultivating virtue and character. Like my treatment of virtues, this list will be representative rather than exhaustive. Their "methods" are similar if not identical to many of the practices endorsed by contemporary virtue ethicists and practitioners. Together, they challenge Stanley Fish's claim that because no one really knows how to form the virtues, moral reasoning, or the moral imagination, no one should try, and they overlap with but expand on ways suggested by Martha Nussbaum for the formation of politically liberal compassion.[832]

Methods for the Formation of Virtues and Character

Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman, along with Aristotle and many contemporary theorists and practitioners, generally agree that the following factors contribute to moral formation:[833]

- Cognitive factors:
  - understanding the nature of virtue, virtue formation, and ethical principles
  - the guided practice of moral deliberation, that is, practical reasoning

- Social factors:
  - immersion in a moral community
  - participation in morally formative social rituals or practices
  - inspiration by and imitation of moral exemplars
  - a theological or philosophical metanarrative or tradition

[832] See Fish, "Aim Low."

[833] See Robert M. Adams, "Can Virtue Be Taught?", in *A Theory of Virtue*, 212–32; Julie Annas, "Skilled and Virtuous Action," in *Intelligent Virtue*, 16–51; Darcia Narvaez, "The Co-Construction of Virtue," in Nancy E. Snow, ed., *Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 251–73; Dan P. McAdams, "Psychological Science and the Nicomachean Ethics," in Nancy E. Snow, ed., *Cultivating Virtue*, 307–33; Christian Miller, *Character and Moral Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 230–39; Nancy E. Snow, *Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory* (London: Routledge, 2009).

- Personal factors:
    - belief that virtue and moral character are valuable
    - the drive to aspire or improve morally
    - the habit of repeatedly choosing the good or virtuous option because it is good
    - placing oneself in morally propitious situations
    - self-knowledge regarding natural vices, temptations, and prejudices
    - reflection on past actions
    - visualization of future action

Though I will only elaborate on a few of these methods Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman, elements of each one can be found throughout their writings and practices.

We should remember that these three were not only theorists but also deeply and daily immersed in the actual moral formation of students in academic communities. All three appear to follow the counsel, found in Aristotle, the Gospels, and the Epistle of James, that knowledge of goodness and virtue should be fulfilled through practice. The goal is not to learn about goodness, but to become good.[834] Their experience as educators attuned to the moral formation of their students lends their writings authority and credibility they might not otherwise have. Their experience and expertise is evident in the multi-dimensional approach they recommend. In chapter one of his *de institutione novitiorum,* Hugh outlines both the structure of the work and the programme of virtue formation at the Abbey of St. Victor. He writes that knowledge of how to establish the right and honourable way of life *[institutionem recte et honeste vivendi*] requires a person to collect and compare many different methods [*multis modis*]. Among such methods he includes reasoning, teaching, example, meditation on Scripture, and assiduous

[834] See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.2 1103b27–31; Matthew 7:24; Luke 6:47–8.

inspection of one's past and future actions—all within the life of a small mutually supporting community.[835] Melanchthon's writings emphasize similar methods: learning about moral philosophy, practicing moral deliberation, imitating moral exemplars, engaging morally serious narrative literature, forming virtuous habits, choosing education for morally good ends, reading Scripture, and so forth. Newman concurs. Having seen hundreds of new students arrive at Oxford and Dublin, he writes, "When a boy leaves his home … his faith and morals are in great danger," and the university *qua* university offers little assistance.[836] Whereas the university offers the opportunity to satisfy a student's intellectual desires, his moral needs are met through immersion in the small residential colleges and chapels. Therefore, "regularity, rule, respect for others, the eye of friends and acquaintances, the absence from temptation, external restraints generally, are of first importance" in a student's moral formation.[837]

Among the various methods identified by Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman for forming virtue and moral character within an academic community, we will examine the following: learning about the virtues and moral reasoning, cultivating virtuous habits, imitating moral exemplars, engaging morally formative narrative literature, and living in a community of moral character.

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[835] *De institutione novitiorum*, chapter one: *partim ratione, partim doctrina, partim exemplo, partim meditatione sanctarum scripturarum, partim assidua inspectione operum ac morum suorum.*

[836] *RP*, 189.

[837] Ibid.

Learning about character, virtues, and moral reasoning

Historical and contemporary theorists and practitioners include the benefit of learning about moral character, the virtues, and the exercises associated with practical reason and moral evaluation. This includes learning what virtue is, how virtues are formed, the content of virtues and vices, and methods for deliberating toward action. The logic is that a person who wants, for example, to be humble is aided in that pursuit by learning what humility is, how it can be nurtured, what virtues are constitutive or complementary of it, and what vices undermine it. The very time spent learning about a virtue can be part of the process of acquiring the virtue because learning nurtures a habitual awareness of that virtue in oneself and others. This is to cultivate or sensitize one's moral epistemology.

The person who desires her practical reason to be coherently directed toward the good will also benefit from learning how to recognize the relevant particulars of a given situation. She will benefit from learning how to arrive at a reasonable action that considers relevant moral principles, potential consequences, personal motivations and intentions, and the recursive effects upon her character. This would be to cultivate one's skill of moral perception and description. Cultivating virtue and learning practical reason are not necessarily two separate activities, as the example of prudence—the virtue of practical reasoning—makes clear. Julia Annas is right to argue that "what we learn, as we learn to be virtuous, is practical understanding, which is understanding how to act."[838] In learning, for example, to be humble, we learn how to discern in a given

[838] Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, 32; Adams, *A Theory of Virtue*, 215–222.

situation what the humble act for us would be. This leads Annas to describe virtues as "intelligent habits," which inherently employ nuanced discernment, rather than "routine habits" and automatic responses to stimuli.[839] Finally, learning about the virtue should increase one's desires to see it embodied in oneself and others.

Hugh's counsel concerning virtues and the moral life matches his counsel regarding education more generally: learn from everyone and everything, including the simple and wise, living teachers and ancient books, the lives of saints and the teaching of Scripture. He also recommends using one's reason to consider in advance "what is licit and what is not licit, what is fitting and is not fitting, in every contact, in every place, in every time, with every person."[840] The morally earnest person should not risk themselves to the immediacy of the moment. She has already generally determined how she wants to act in a variety of situations by reasoning forward from the moral good she knows to the moment of decision. Similarly, Hugh counsels novices to reason backwards, reflecting on how past actions and desires did or did not correlate with the good and the right. The morally earnest person "calls each day of his life to justice."[841] When he gets up, he considers what he has done in the night; when he goes to bed, what he has done in the day, and he does this in order to constantly and courageously move toward the good and away from the bad.[842]

[839] Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, 13-15; cf. Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, 108-109.
[840] *De Institutio Novitiorum* I.
[841] Ibid IX.
[842] Ibid.

He assures his reader that whoever will cultivate exercises like this in his heart will soon attain the good and beneficial knowledge [*bonam et salubrem scientiam*] referenced in Psalm 119:66, the programmatic verse invoked in the prologue of *de Institutione*. [843] This good and beneficial knowledge includes the awareness of one's unique weaknesses or temptations, as well as those situations within which one's weaknesses are likely to lead to moral failure. For Hugh, this requires using one's practical reason to adopt practices that specifically address and correct moral weaknesses and take measures to avoid tempting situations.

Hugh exhorts his students to embody the moral truths they are learning about [*studeatis exhibere*].[844] All three theologians emphasize that the mere study of morally freighted literature does not necessarily form a person morally, if done so purely as an analytical or historical exercise.[845] More is required. The analyst is not necessarily a skilled practitioner. For example, in a passage we have already considered, Hugh writes that the active intellect seeks to know "those things which *moral earnestness* will thereafter transform into action."[846] Without this "moral earnestness" he worries that the "Christian philosopher" driven only by "an empty desire for knowledge" will simply keep his mind "busied rather than edified" and "makes a business" of his labours.[847] Julia Annas call this moral earnestness the "drive to aspire," and Robert Adams "being for the

[843] Ibid, "Prologue."
[844] *De Institutio Novitiorum* VI.
[845] See also Robert Adams, *A Theory of Virtue* 12.3, "Integrative Tasks," 221–29.
[846] *Didascalicon*, I.iv.
[847] Ibid, V.vii. On Scripture, see also *De Institutio Novitiorum* VIII; *De Arca Noe* II.vi.

good" in one's actions, desires, and emotions.[848] In Hugh words, "one who has started out on this road should learn, in the books that he reads, to be stirred not only by the art of their literary composition but by a *desire* to imitate the virtues set forth."[849] Along with earnest desire, he counsels his students to pray that God grant them grace to fulfil their desires in good work, and assures them that God will not compel them, but will work with them.[850]

Central to learning for the sake of moral formation is the practice of reading Scripture "tropologically," that is, in a posture of humble receptivity with the intent of being "reconstructed" intellectually, affectively, and especially, morally. "[Scripture] teaches what it delights us to know, and what it behooves us to imitate." It "instructs the mind with knowledge or it equips it with morals," and prepares the mind to embrace, in Hugh's excellent phrase, "the beauty of morality."[851] Hugh envisions the integrated human person who has no need to artificially sequester knowledge from desire, or understanding from passionate moral action. Instead, he exhorts "the man who seeks knowledge of the virtues and a way of life from the Sacred Word" to study and absorb writings that "urge contempt for the world and inflame the mind with love for its creator; which teach the straight road of life and show how virtues may be acquired and vices

[848] For Julia Annas the "drive to aspire" must accompany the "need to learn." *Intelligent Virtue*, 16–25. "Being for the good" is central to Robert Adams' theory of virtue, and it includes loving, wanting, appreciating, thinking highly of, being disposed toward and acting to promote and protect the good. *A Theory of Virtue*, 14–18; 221–29.

[849] *Didascalicon* V.vii.

[850] *Didascalicon* V.ix.

[851] *Didascalicon* V.vi.

turned aside."[852] Jennifer Herdt's description of Desiderius Erasmus applies equally well to Hugh. They wrote on either side of scholasticism's peak, but both wanted "scripture studied and taught in a way that could reform whole persons, not simply inform the intellect."[853] Hugh's counsel to learn about moral excellence from anyone, if combined with his description of reading Scripture and the lives of saints tropologically, opens the possibility of performing tropological readings of any type of literature, whether history, biography, fiction, or so forth. Hugh does not draw this conclusion explicitly, but it seems a reasonable application of his practice of reading Scripture and, as we will see in the next section, is a practice Melanchthon advocates without using the technical term.

It is hard not to see a resemblance between Stanley Fish's ideal university student and Hugh's reference to the student who feverishly "makes a business" of his study by detaching it from his affections, dispositions, and actions. Though Fish acknowledges students have the liberty to do what they like with what he teaches them, it is disingenuous to claim that he is not already teaching them what to do with their knowledge, that is, very little. For Hugh, as for Hadot, Melanchthon, and Newman, the "Christian philosopher" fails if she adopts such a method of practiced dis-integration. This would be true for Scripture or for almost any kind of literature. Nussbaum's suggestion that schools teach certain pieces of literature precisely for their morally formative qualities generally aligns with Hugh's tropological counsel and with some of the virtues Hugh recommends, though Nussbaum's student and selection of literature is

[852] Ibid, V.vii.
[853] Herdt, *Putting on Virtue*, 107.

indexed to democratic political liberalism and Hugh's to the gradual restoration of wisdom and virtue.[854]

Given our knowledge of Melanchthon's appreciation for "pagan" philosophy and literature, we should not be surprised that he strongly defends studying moral philosophy for the sake of forming virtues and learning the skill of moral deliberation. If in doubt, we could recall that he wrote multiple works of moral philosophy, including extensive commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Politics*, and numerous historical and philological annotations on works by Cicero.[855] We also saw in the previous chapter that Melanchthon expects moral studies to improve a person's and community's conventional morality. If a person were taught how to "discern the causes of duties, moderate all actions through reason, and temper them by some gentleness and elegance," he may "not only be gentler in private company, but he would also be more moderate and diligent" in public matters.[856] Melanchthon expects that long meditation on *pulchritudine virtutis*, the sweetness of virtue, will likely pass into [*abeunt*] the student's character.[857] He argues that examples of virtue are necessary along with understanding their definitions and constitutive elements. He also counsels that teaching about virtue [*doctrina de virtutibus*] and vice should be studied because it testifies to God's goodness and demonstrates why a depraved person cannot understand the

[854] Though these are not mutually exclusive.

[855] These include his *Ethica Aristotelis Commentarius* (1529), *Prolegumena to Ciceros De Officiis* (1534), *Philosophiae moralis epitome* (1538), *Ethicae doctrinae elements* (1550), and *Questiones aliquot Ethicae de iuramentis, excommunicatione et aliis Casibus obscuris* (1552).

[856] "Dedicatory letter to Melanchthon's *Epitome of Moral Philosophy*," 140–141.

[857] *Philosophiae Moralis Epitome*, CR XVI, 25: *"studia abeunt in mores."*

complex nature of God, who embodies the virtues.[858] As should be clear, Melanchthon thinks virtues support a variety of ends: personal excellence, harmonious private and public relations, social order, political stability, witness to God's compelling and gracious character, and ultimately, God's glory.[859]

However, Melanchthon was not only concerned with moral virtues, but with practical reasoning. In his preface to Cicero's *On Duties*, Melanchthon explains that "everyone needs some teaching on morals and a description of virtues, so that we understand in our manners and in our judging about human business what is proper and what is not, what is done rightly and what is ill done."[860] Note that along with virtue, he is concerned people learn how to reason well morally and construct just societies. Therefore, he continues, "it is necessary to have forms and images of virtues which we follow in all decisions and in our judgments on all matters."[861] So he recommends that Christians learn the "order and method" of philosophy, for "those who are versed in moral philosophy can practice more easily many parts of Christian doctrine."[862] Cicero's philosophy is particularly useful because his writings are so much more easily understood and adapted to everyday life even than Aristotle's, which Melanchthon cherished. But any philosopher or writer who teaches *honesta vitae praecepta*, "honourable precepts for life," should be read precisely in order to sharpen one's

[858] *Erotemata Dialectices*, CR XII, 540.
[859] *Philosophia Moralia Epitome*, CR XVI, 42.
[860] "Preface to Cicero's *On Duties* (1534), 81.
[861] "Ibid.
[862] Ibid., 129.

judgment concerning moral matters.[863] This teaching, he explains, is strictly speaking to be called humanity [*proprie vocanda est humanitas*], and it shows the way to live, both publicly and privately."[864]

Melanchthon's point is that, when a person studies moral philosophy with a view to their own formation or action, that is, with Hugh's "moral earnestness," and when they recognize and desire the good as good, they are more likely to act toward the good and cultivate virtuous desires and dispositions. To those Christians wary of "pagan" philosophy, Melanchthon explains that moral philosophy is necessary and beneficial for life, but it could come into the world through human reason and the teachings of men like Homer, Aristotle, and Cicero, whereas Christ brought a message inaccessible to reason. Therefore, because it ultimately comes from God, is beneficial, and agrees with theology on many points, Christians should have no qualms learning the content and adopting the methods of moral philosophy.[865]

In general, Melanchthon's emphasis on moral learning resembles Aristotle, whose *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* he taught throughout his tenure at Wittenberg.[866] In the *Ethics*, Aristotle teaches that a properly virtuous person knows a particular action is virtuous, chooses it precisely because it is virtuous, and does so consistently. Thus virtuous action requires a certain degree of ethical reflection, conceptual clarity, and the ability to discern between the excellent, the good, the only apparently good, and the

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[863] *Corpus Refomatorum* 11, 260.

[864] "Preface to Cicero's *On Duties* (1534), 81. See also "On philosophy," 131.

[865] Ibid.

[866] For Melanchthon's lectures on Aristotle, see Kraye, *Classical Traditions*, VII, 6–8.

morally vicious.[867] Such knowledge could either inform a person's practical reason and lead them to desire to act in a particular way and for a particular end, or it could clarify the desires and decisions their practical reason had already arrived at, and thus reinforce otherwise vulnerable unreflective or innate good behaviour and dispositions. In this way, knowledge could serve an important role in leading a person to feel and act appropriately, in Aristotle's words, "to the person one should, to the extent one should, when one should, for the reason one should, and in the manner one should."[868] Further, disciplined moral reflection could create such dissonance in the morally vicious or partially virtuous person such that they desire to harmonize their affections and actions more thoroughly with the morally good and beautiful. As Hugh, Newman, and Melanchthon make clear, a greater understanding of the morally good and time spent contemplating it can direct the person who already desires to improve morally and redirect the person who does not.

Habituated Thoughts, Feelings, and Actions

The last chapter contained numerous references to the connection between "habit" and virtue. This is the most basic and widely accepted characteristic of virtue, especially in the Aristotelian tradition, which describes both how a virtue is acquired and maintained (through habit) and what it is (a habituated stable disposition toward the good). The formation of virtue through habit was central to Hugh's concept of *pulchritudo esse* and to life at the Abbey of St. Victor. For Hugh, virtue includes external habituated *disciplina*, internal stable dispositions, a properly oriented will, and proper affections. Through

[867] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1105a30.
[868] Ibid. 1109a25.

daily discipline, little by little [*paulamtimque*], "the form of virtue is impressed upon the mind, which is kept through the habitual discipline of the body."[869] Concerning the move between habit and stable dispositions, he writes, "when I have begun to do the works of the virtues, I should labor to have the virtues themselves—that is to say, I should possess within myself the virtue that I show in outward works."[870] Hugh acknowledges the difference between simply doing virtue-like actions and actually possessing virtue, but he affirms that habituated virtue-like actions contribute to the stable possession of the virtue itself.[871]

Melanchthon's concept of acquired virtue was basically Aristotelian, though he notes that the concept of "obedience" to God must be added to Aristotle's definitions.[872] Melanchthon wrote an extended commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and Aristotle's method and substance are woven throughout his works, especially on moral philosophy. In *Philosophia Moralia Epitome*, he titles consecutive sections with "What is virtue?", "What are the causes of virtue?", and answers in Aristotelian fashion: "the end of man is virtue, or virtuous action," "virtue is a habit that inclines will to obey right reason," and "habits rise from repeated actions."[873] Vice, on the other hand, is a bad habit that

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[869] *De institutione novitiorum* X: *Paulatimque eadem virtutis forma per consuetudinem menti imprimitur, quae foris per disciplinam in habitu corporis conservatur.*

[870] *Archa Noe* 2.5, quoted in Coolman, *Theology*, 204.

[871] *De institutione novitiorum*, "Prologue"

[872] CR XVI, "Ethicae Doctrinae Elementa," 210. See also "Habits," in "Definitions of Many Terms, *The Chief Theological Topics*, Appendix 2, 530–33.

[873] CR XVI, 38: *virtus est habitus, qui inclinat voluntatem ad obediendum rectae rationi*; 39: *Constat habitus oriri ex crebris actionibus.* See also LaFontaine, "A Critical Translation," 102.

contradicts right reason and the divine mind.[874] The principal and immediate causes of virtue, he explains, are a governing idea [*notitia gubernatrix*] and an obedient will [*voluntas obtemperans*]. The governing ideas have been implanted by God to help a person distinguish between the honourable and the base, and virtue results when a person's will obediently and habitually follows those ideas. In general, he explains, "virtue is the harmony of a man within himself," an "elegant harmony" between appetite and reason. As a bass string or voice grounds the melody, so the mind should habitually come to govern the person, their appetite, and their will.[875]

Newman's concept of what a virtue is and how it is formed is also generally Aristotelian and, like Hugh and Melanchthon, includes the centrality of habit. In the *Idea*, Newman focused almost exclusively on the "philosophical habit of mind." It is not given by nature, but is the result of "training," "discipline and habit."[876] If truly acquired, it is "a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment." It is "the formation of a character … and is commonly spoken of in connexion with …virtue."[877] Moral prudence mirrors intellectual prudence. It too is deeply personal, acquired through

[874] *Erotemata Dialectices*, CR XIII, 538. He adds that virtue is the rule of goodness in action because it is congruent with the eternal rule in the divine mind.

[875] CR XVI, 39. Melanchthon's counsel regarding learning is similar: "As nobody can be either a painter just by watching Dürer paint, or a musician just by seeing Adolph play on the strings, so nobody should believe that he is going to be a master in dialectic without composing something, or disputing, in a word who has no practice in this art." CR XI, 161.

[876] *Idea*, 135.

[877] Ibid, 105.

habit, and "formed and matured by practice and experience."[878] By habit, therefore, "and not by science," does a person perfect "the virtues of justice, self-command, magnanimity, generosity, gentleness, and all others." Prudence, the virtuous habit of practical reasoning, "is the regulating principle of every one of them."[879] Habit alone does not constitute a virtue, of course, since habits can also be amoral or immoral (and hence vices). Therefore, habituated thoughts, feelings, and actions must be informed by the other components of moral formation we are considering: moral knowledge, morally skilled exemplars, and a morally good community.

Mimesis: Imitation of Virtuous Exemplars in Literature, History, and Daily Life

Besides habituation, imitation is the most well-known method for cultivating virtue. We seek to emulate in our own lives qualities of the people we admire. Hugh extolls the value of imitating moral exemplars in Scripture, saints in the history of the church, and brothers in the community of St. Victor:

> Why do you think, brothers, that we should imitate the life and behavior of the good, if not because by imitating them we are reformed to the likeness of a new life? Indeed, in these saints, the form of the likeness of God has been pressed out, and for that reason when we are imprinted with them by imitation we too are formed according to the image of this same likeness.[880]

Hugh pictures the saints as persons in whom the image of God has been re-pressed like a seal into newly softened wax, softened, that is, by the virtue of humility. When their

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[878] See GA, 228–29. See also 228, 251, 269–70, 305, 345, 353; *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions*, 74; Tillman, *John Henry Newman*, 301; See Gerard J. Hughes, "Conscience," in *The Cambridge Companion*, 190.

[879] GA, 230.

[880] Quoted in Harkens, "Lectio," 115, citing *De institutione novitiorum*, 7.40. See also *Didascalicon* V.vi. On the importance of imitation, see Coolman, *Theology*, 200–3; Bynum, "The Spirituality of Regular Canons," 37, 43; Harkins, "Lectio exhortatio debet esse," 116.

stories are read and imitated, the saint's image, now the image of God, is similarly pressed into the wax of the humble reader's soul.[881] The "virtues of others," which we "love and admire," we ought to make our own "through the exercise of discipline and the form of right living."[882] This echoes Paul's advice to the Corinthians (11:1): "Follow my example, as I follow the example of Christ."

Hugh does not include among the morally estimable, however, characters in pagan literature. Though in one place he praises the wisdom of poets like Homer and Sophocles, in another he only grudgingly admits any moral value to pagan poetry, dramas, fables and histories, which he superciliously refers to as parasitic "appendages" or tangential "by-products" of the arts and philosophy. These are best left for "entertaining reading," even if, he confesses, as readers we sometimes "more eagerly take up a thought we come upon in the midst of a story"—a line he could have developed to describe a tropological reading of pagan poetry and philosophy.[883] On the value of pagan stories, the laurel wreath belongs to Melanchthon.

Though he does not call it this, what Melanchthon advocates is a tropological reading of Christian and pagan history, fables, poetry, and narrative. First, like Hugh, Melanchthon commends imitation of the saints as one of three ways they should be honoured. The first way is to thank God for the gifts he gave the saints, the second is to be encouraged by the presence of grace in their lives, but the third is to imitate first their

[881] *De Institutione Novitiorum* VII: *vitam et conversationem bonorum imitari praecipimur*.

[882] *De Arca Noe* 2.6.

[883] *Didascalicon* III.iv.

faith and then "the other virtues, which everyone should imitate according to his calling" in life.[884] Especially interesting is Melanchthon's acknowledgment that the saints' lives are not to be copied any more than Christ's life. They are not to be slavishly imitated, but selectively emulated. To imitate a saint's virtues according to one's own calling implies disaggregating the saint's virtues from the scope and specifics of his or her life and their virtues one from another. The person who would honour the saints thus considers how a given saint manifested a given virtue for the sake of considering how that same virtue might be similarly made manifest in a potentially very different "calling" or circumstance.[885]

We see examples of this selective imitation in Melanchthon's speeches on men like Erasmus, Avicenna, Agricola, Frederick I, Polycarp, Ambrose, Hippocrates, the Apostle Paul, and very many others, whom he presents as men worthy of selective imitation. If collected into one source, they would be Melanchthon's Christian version of Plutarch's *Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans*. In an encomium to Aristotle, he writes, "The mind is roused to virtue by contemplating" the noble examples of good people;[886] and in one to Agricola, "Good examples have great power, and good dispositions are most greatly

[884] *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*, XXI, "Of the Invocation of Saints." See Herdt, *Putting on Virtue*, 109, for Erasmus' very similar counsel regarding proper Christian veneration of the saints.

[885] See Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, "Skilled and Virtuous Action," 16–51; 23: "Doing what your role model does is not repeating that action, but coming to understand what they were doing, in performing that action, and being able to do *that* yourself, perhaps in a quite different way."

[886] "On Aristotle," 205.

roused and kindled by the consideration and admiration of virtue in excellent men."[887] This is especially useful for shaping "the judgment of the young" who lack the experience of their elders. "Not only the mouth and the tongue, but also the *heart*, are shaped by the knowledge of good writers,"[888] Though natural excellence cannot be transferred from one person to another, "nevertheless others can in some way imitate will-power and assiduity."[889] Melanchthon indicates that while formation through story occurs even without directly attending to its moral content, its effects can be multiplied when the reader does so, as might especially occur when her reading is led by a morally sensitive teacher.

What kinds of virtues does he draw out for imitation? After describing Plato's travels and travails for the sake of knowledge he says, "We, by contrast, should be ashamed of our sloth. … Let us therefore be roused by Plato's example, first to love truly the noble arts, and not to shrink from the dangers and toils involved in obtaining them, and then let us imitate his decision."[890] Similarly worthy of imitation are Aristotle's commitment to teach truth in the face of threat, his love of his family, his commitment to public utility, his conscientiousness and skill in teaching, and the "humanity of his character." "Who is not delighted to see and contemplate in one man so many heroic virtues?" [891] In Agricola, it was his diligent study and service to the church; in

[887] "On the life of Rudolf Agricola," 228. See also "On Johannes Regiomontanus," 236, 246; "On Erasmus of Rotterdam," 249–9; "Oration on Aristotle," in Keen, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 83.

[888] "Praise of Eloquence," 68.

[889] "On Johannes Regiomontanus," 246; CR XI, 825.

[890] "On Plato," 194; "De Platone," CR XI, 416–17.

[891] "On Aristotle," 209–10; "De Aristotele," CR XI, 348.

Regiomontanus, his passion for learning, erudition, and piety; in Erasmus, his language, knowledge, endurance, modesty, and kindness; in Ambrose, his pious and steadfast leadership of the church through many controversies; in Frederick I, his faith, loyalty, constancy, and courage.[892] For Melanchthon, lifting up particular virtues from the lives of moral exemplars, whose faults he also acknowledges, both convicts the soul through a comparison with its own moral weaknesses and also creates a desire to acquire the virtues being illustrated.

Unlike Hugh's lukewarm appreciation for pagan stories, however, Melanchthon, a humanist professor of Greek, lauds the power of fables, whether in Hesiod, Aesop, or Scripture, to prepare, especially, young minds to "recognize the distinction between virtues and vices" by leaving, in his excellent phrase, "spines in the mind" that spur them to pursue the good.[893] In 1536, the Wittenberg library contained eighteen volumes of Greek poets, eight of Greek history, eighteen of Greek philosophy, twenty-five volumes of Latin history, and thirty-nine volumes of Latin poetry, due in large part to Melanchthon's influence and his belief that this literature was not only beautiful, but morally formative.[894] According to Melanchthon, "the heavenly God himself" approves fables and considers them "most powerful for bending the minds of men." [895] Melanchthon also praises the wisdom and eloquence of Vergil, Ovid, Pindar, Euripides,

[892] See CR XI for the declamations on Agricola, 438–46; Regiomontanus, 817–26; Ambrose, 566–98; Frederick, 306–16. On Erasmus, see CR XII, 264–71.

[893] "On the usefulness of fables," 56–58; CR XI, 116–20. On Hesiod: CR XI, 111–15. See Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 378.

[894] Kusukawa, *Wittenberg University*, xxxi–xxxii.

[895] Ibid, 58.

Sophocles, and Aristophanes, each of whom, among many others, he lectured on at the University of Wittenberg.[896]

His highest praise, full of sheer childlike wonder, is reserved for Homer, whom he ranks alongside Aristotle and only barely below Scripture.[897] Homer's works, Melanchthon confesses, leave him "stupefied and anxious." They are like "divine miracles" and "the most refined, the sweetest and at the same time the wisest thoughts about all things and matters that can be conceived by any human mind."[898] He admits he hardly knows how to begin responding to them. Rothe rightly describes Melanchthon as "the marriage of a Christian soul with the beautiful and noble, though human, Hellenic nature."[899] Homer inspires readers toward friendship, patriotism, love of family, love of the gods, courage, duty, wisdom, eloquence, and all the other noble traits of *humanitas* on display in his epics. "The learned admire the sagaciousness" of Homer and "place him beyond the common condition of mortals and clearly think that his mind was roused by some divine power."[900] If Homer is excluded, Melanchthon warns, then

[896] He also advocated Aratus, Thucydides: CR XVII, 1019–1113; CR X, 353, 656; Xenophon: CR XVII, 119–23; Lycurgus: CR XVII, 939–79; Isocrates: CR VII, 879. For Vergil, see CR XIX, 285–473; Ovid: CR XIX, 473–655; Pindar: CR XIX, 187–269; Demosthenes: CR I, 669, 837; CR X, 89; CR XI, 104; CR XVII, 685–881; Sophocles: CR XVIII, 275–79; Euripedes: CR XVIII, 279–1131; Aristophanes: CR XVIII, 1131–37. For a rather complete run down of the Greek and Latin authors Melanchthon endorsed, see Denys, *Philip Melanchthon's Unique Contribution*, 203–212.

[897] "Preface to Homer," 41. See CR XI, 397–413. See Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 355-60

[898] Ibid, 42.

[899] Rothe, "Rothe's Address on Philip Melanchthon," 273.

[900] "On the usefulness of fables," 56.

"humanity, virtue, and nobility are excluded…and all that is truly good, holy and pious in the world is excluded."[901]

Melanchthon defends this hyperbolic claim by explaining how Homer, and, by extension, other narrative literature, can aid the moral formation of attentive readers, especially the young, who naturally like the wide experience of life needed to form virtue:

> [Homer] *teaches* many things, *admonishes* wisely on many, and *instills* in the young the most honourable and agreeable notions of modesty, respect and the other virtues. No one is a better teacher of the habits of pleasantness and humanity than he; he *demonstrates* and *accomplishes* a certain experience of life in the young, which is otherwise held in highest praise, but is attributed only to old age. … Indeed, reading Homer performs this divine service, namely to *impress the prudence* of the old upon the youthful mind, for they can *obtain and draw* from this poem, by a short-cut, as from a treasure or a spring those things which old people usually learn from long experience, and which numerous years, the variety of things and the experiences of human life teach them. For the teaching of how to live rightly and happily is not delivered less successfully there than in any writings of the philosophers. … Indeed, he envelops the most serious and holy tenets in the sweetest and most pleasant poetic images, so that *noble and inquiring minds* are educated with, as Plutarch says, a sense of beauty.[902]

This is to approach Homer, and by extension, all morally serious literature tropologically as instances of "wisdom literature" that have the power to shape the way readers think and feel about the world, especially after readers spend days, weeks, and sometimes years with particular stories like the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Such readers step out of the immediacy of their own "stories" and submit their hearts and minds to the immediacy

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[901] "Preface to Homer," 53; CR XI, 413: *excludatur … humanitas, excludatur virtus et honestas … vere bonum, sanctum, piumque.*

[902] Ibid, 43. Emphasis mine. Though Melanchthon does not invoke Aristotle regarding the relation between lack of experience and lack of wisdom in the young, he almost certainly has him in mind. See *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.8, 1142a—VI.11, 1143b; Metaphysics I.1 980–981.

of the narrative story. They imagine themselves into and alongside Homer's characters, where they acquire experiences, emotions, and examples of practical wisdom they would not otherwise have. Their moral imaginations are quickened, and upon returning to the immediacy of their own stories, they are able to draw back with them, vicariously, the moral experiences and wisdom of the story's characters. In doing so readers are able to make rapid progress that might normally require many years. Narrative literature puts flesh on the bones of theory and offers lived examples of beliefs, virtues, and vices in action.[903]

We can consider this in two ways: first, that Melanchthon lauds Homer because his narrative illustrates and reinforces virtues readers recognized as good prior to reading the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; or second, that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* surreptitiously make certain virtues and actions attractive so that otherwise unaware readers desire to imitate them. Though Melanchthon implies both, the latter seems to dominate, in line with the humanist enthusiasm for speech and story that moves the affections and desires toward action. Readers, he thinks, almost cannot help but be changed by living through the experiences of characters more wise and noble than themselves. Such mediated experiences makes people, "more cultivated and more human…as by the arrival of a god."[904] Thus, for Melanchthon, Homer's poems earn the title of "the workshop of humanity."

[903] See Henry Zylstra, *Testament of Vision* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1967), 57.

[904] Ibid, 52.

This almost inevitable power of literature to shape morals through the imagination makes the restriction Stanley Fish, a literature professor himself, places between literature and its moral implications seem strange, because it intentionally overlooks the inescapable effect that literature has upon the reader's affections and desires, whether for good or for ill—an effect Nussbaum embraces and recommends for students' moral formation.

Newman also understood the efficacy of powerful models, evidenced by his own novels, poetry, and autobiography. As he explains in the Tamworth Reading Room letters, "the heart is commonly reached … through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us."[905] He states elsewhere that emotion is essentially necessary for moral action. "God has made us feel in order that we may *go on to act* in consequence of feeling."[906]

Herein lies a danger, however, to which Newman, writing during the heyday of English Romanticism, is very sensitive. Moral affections may be necessary but they are insufficient in themselves, and are very often substituted for moral action. This is the danger, he reminds us in his sermon "The Danger of Accomplishments," of "an elegant and polite education" in the "elegant arts and studies" such as poetry, literature, painting, and music.[907] They may very well move us emotionally by inflaming our desires

[905] Newman, "The Tamworth Reading Room," 242.

[906] Newman, "The Danger of Accomplishment," in *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, Vol. 2 (London: Longman, Greens, and Co., 1908), 371

[907] Ibid.

for the good and the right, but he comments that often, "*we* have nothing *to do*, we read, are affected, softened or roused, and that is all; we cool again,—nothing comes of it."[908] The sentiments rarely make the transition from the pages of the book to the pavement of daily life. Too often such reading loosens the important connection between feeling and action, making the reader think he has done something when really all he has done is felt something. Such habitual reading, especially of heroic or romanticized Christian literature, is dangerous to one's character, "if we allow refinement to stand in the place of hardy, rough-handed obedience."[909] Though washing the disciples' feet "is beautiful in a picture," the "sands of the real desert have no lustre in them to compensate for the servile nature of the occupation."[910]

He overstates his case, however, when he asserts that literature "has *no* tendency to make the conduct, the practice of the man virtuous."[911] Even in the sermon in which he warns against moral affections that fail to reach moral action he acknowledges that "the resources of literature, and the graces of a cultivated mind, may be made both a lawful source of enjoyment to the possessor, and a means of introducing and recommending the Truth to others."[912] Such "mental cultivation *may* be a divine gift" and the "abuse of good things is no argument against the things themselves."[913] Nevertheless, his general

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[908] Ibid.
[909] Ibid, 373.
[910] Ibid, 374.
[911] Ibid, 373. This overstatement also conflicts with his practice of avoiding the lewd sections of Lucretius, Plautus, and Terence when teaching secondary students because these immoral images might lead to immoral desires and behaviours. Newman, LD XXIV, "Newman to Bellasis (25 Jan 1868)," 16-19.
[912] Ibid, 375.
[913] Ibid, 369.

caution is worth hearing. Merely learning about moral virtue, reading morally formative literature, or studying the lives of virtuous exemplars does not automatically make a person moral and may be detrimental to their moral formation if they become habitually satisfied with knowledge and feelings alone. According to Newman, because a person should take the moral formation of her character seriously, she should evaluate the moral content of the musical, literary, or visual art she encounters, and should endeavour to channel her moral aspirations and moral exemplars into her own life and conduct.

Newman is not opposed to using models of educated and cultured "Christian gentleman," whom he finds recurring throughout church history. He praises examples of the refined Christian Humanist who combines deep faith with liberal learning and a "gentlemanlike" disposition. In the sermon above, he invokes educated and artistic biblical figures like Bezalel, Luke, and Paul. In *The Church of the Fathers*, he celebrates St. Basil and St. Gregory, and quotes a letter Basil wrote to Gregory wherein a "true gentleman's" qualities are displayed:

> knowledge how to converse; to interrogate without over-earnestness; to answer without desire of display; not to interrupt a profitable speaker, nor to desire ambitiously to put in a word of one's own; to be measured in speaking and hearing; not to be ashamed of receiving, or to be grudging in giving, information, nor to disown what one has learned from others. … One should reflect first what one is going to say, and then give it utterance; be courteous when addressed, amiable in social intercourse; not aiming to be pleasant by smartness, but cultivating gentleness in kind admonitions. Harshness is ever to be put aside, even in censuring.[914]

[914] Newman, *The Church of the Fathers*, 64–65.

Newman also praises Philip Neri, the 16th century founder of the Congregation of the Oratory. Neri's Oratory was a Catholic society of lay brothers and priests who shared a common life together, thus resembling Newman's beloved Oxford colleges and Hugh's abbey, and who were bound to one another by "human affection" and Christian charity rather than by a rule or vow, as in most monastic communities.[915]

As I noted in chapter five when discussing Newman's use of rhetoric, Newman draws repeated attention to the fact that the original Italian Oratorians were well-educated Christian gentleman marked by passionate faith, supple learning, and gentle courtesy. In one of his addresses to his new Birmingham Oratorians, he emphasizes the integration of cultivated learning with "their new calling." He praises their "mental elevation and culture," "learned studies," "accomplishments of literature, the fine arts," "music," "science," "books," "historical research," "antiquities," and "knowledge of the world." These would now become the "human instruments of doing their work and of promoting the divine glory in their new calling."[916] Besides Neri, Newman provides brief descriptions of other learned Oratorians worthy of emulation like Baronius, Gallonio, Justiniani, Theiner, and the composer Palestrina. Some were scholars, some librarians, some musicians and painters, but all were Oratorians who did not abandon their learned pursuits but integrated them with life and faith in their new calling.

In the last chapter, I suggested that Newman's ideal Oratorian was similar to Hugh's ideal Victorine. Both emphasize the importance of integrating outward speech,

[915] Murray, *Newman the Oratorian*, 329. See also 221.
[916] Ibid, 322–28.

dress, and actions with inward spiritual holiness, intellectual understanding, and moral character. Newman's idea that the Oratorians would embody a "rhetoric in conduct" also applies to Hugh's and Melanchthon's appeal to embodied moral exemplars, whether living, historical, or literary. The stories of Hugh's saints, Melanchthon's Ulysses, and Newman's Neri each employ a form of rhetorical persuasion in the selected and crafted retelling of their conduct. This is possible when readers compare themselves to the virtues and vices of others and attempt to emulate the dispositions, behavior, and habitual ways of being of those they find morally attractive. Noble characters become models whose images we retain in our minds for further meditation. As we meditate upon their virtues, we increasingly desire to embody those virtues in our own lives and so imagine how their virtues, now living images in our minds, might through habituation and practical reason become embodied in our thoughts, speech, and action. If nothing else, there at least may be more conviction that we want to embody their virtues. As Hugh, Melanchthon, Newman, and many contemporary scholars insist, the moral imagination that is stocked by archetypes of the virtues can be as important as deliberate moral reflection for determining what people value and how people act.[917] Therefore, engaging, contemplating, and imitating moral exemplars, whether discovered in literature, history, one's neighbourhood, or at the front of a classroom, is a powerful method for pursuing moral ends through education. Though as Newman warns, it is but one step along the way.

Small Communities and Apprenticing Relationships

[917] Dante Alighieri depicts the reforming sinners on each cornice of Purgatory assiduously contemplating negative examples of vice and positive examples of virtue.

So far, we have considered learning, habituation, and imitation, and conclude by considering the importance of a morally formative community. James Hunter describes character as "the embodiment of the ideals of a moral order—it is formed in relation to the imperatives of that moral order that are embedded in the life of a community of moral discourse."[918] As I have previously argued, academic institutions, especially small ones in which students spend several years, function as structured moral cultures in which students will be intellectually, socially, morally, and emotionally formed.[919] Formation happens regardless of whether the institution teaches ethics or attempts moral formation. Instead, it happens when people are immersed in cultures that are "thickly webbed" with moral assumptions, practices, heroes, virtues, and commitments. These norms are absorbed by persons within these cultures and manifest themselves in those persons' moral epistemologies, desires, and actions. Of course, not all moral communities are conducive to human flourishing. Alasdair MacIntyre asks, "are there or might there be types of social structure that would prevent those who inhabited them from understanding themselves as moral agents? … Are there or might there be types of social structure that seriously threaten the possibility of understanding oneself as a moral agent and so of acting as a moral agent?"[920] To the extent that the culture of any particular academic institution represents a morally inhibiting social structure, the

[918] See Hunter, *The Death of Character*, 16.

[919] For universities as "expressive incarnations of certain moral narratives, traditions and commitments concerning the good, the right and the true," see Christian Smith, *Moral, Believing Animals*, 22. For the importance of friendship to academic institutions, see Schwehn, *Exiles*, 60–63.

[920] MacIntyre, "Social Structures," 314.

students thickly webbed within it—as well as their parents, caregivers, and faculty—have reason to be concerned.

As I have indicated, Newman's modeled his Oratorian community and the Oratory School on the ideal residential Oxford college, which he acknowledges was largely modelled on monastic communities like Hugh's Abbey of St. Victor.[921] The awareness that moral formation happens in small communities was central to both Hugh's and Newman's vision of their academically oriented institutions. For Hugh, the small community was the Abbey of St. Victor and the relationship was formally between a novice and director and informally between all members of the community. For Newman, the small community was the residential college within the university and the relationship was formally between the student and tutor and informally between the students. St. Victor, the Oxford residential college, and the Oratory School were micro-cultures with their own norms for speech, dress, personal relations, table manners, behaviour, and so forth. These models suggest that moral ends might be pursued most effectively within small, mutually-reinforcing communities. Immersion in a community that has intentionally cultivated particular habits, sentiments, customs, and external disciplines tends to shape a person's emotions and reinforce certain normative behaviours in a way that simply learning about the virtues does not. Subtle social pressure to conform is not a bad thing if one is being pressed to conform to a variety of goods.

[921] Newman compares colleges to monastic schools, though not St. Victor explicitly, in *RP*, 215–16.

The belief that a given member of the community contributed to the moral formation of every other member was impressed upon newcomers at St. Victor. Though a novice was placed with a director whose side he hardly left for the first year, the director was not the only influence in the novice's formation. Every member of the community was a moral influence who should teach and model moral discipline through word and act. The novice did not therefore simply receive. Instead, he was initiated into a morally normed community in which he was also expected to be a model for others.[922] St. Victor was a "school of virtue" in which everyone was both student and teacher. Bynum notes that most "teaching" verbs in *De Institutione* have the individual members of the St. Victor community as their subjects: "teaching by the superiors is scarcely mentioned."[923] Brothers in the community offer themselves for "seeing and imitating," giving and receiving examples of good works and words of encouragement, taking even more care with their behaviour when in the presence of others than when in the presence of God alone. [924] Likewise, their speech should either give or acknowledge encouragement and instruction for the mutual edification of everyone involved. Learning in this "school of virtue," therefore, was not limited to didactic instruction, but was an immersive event that included every aspect of a person's life because it affected every aspect of a person. The moral norms could be articulated, as Hugh does, but just as important they were embodied and expressed in actions, thoughts, speech, and emotions that were not immediately moral at all. Because virtues are often learned in

[922] See Bynum, *Docero Verbo et Exemplo*, 46.
[923] Ibid.
[924] *De Institutione Novitiorum* IV.

and applicable to multiple domains, they are often best learned or practiced in a variety of domains, which life in a regular community, unlike a classroom, provides.

Given my analysis of Newman in the previous chapter, I should reiterate that Newman does not think moral formation in an academic institution is impossible, just that it only barely happens in secular institutions and not at all through the research and teaching of the classroom. Instead, "the formation of character, intellectual and moral" occurs through personal relationships with one's tutor and fellow students in the residential colleges.[925] Though the essence or "idea" of a university is intellectual formation in the classroom, its "integrity" or "image" is moral and personal, "the improvement of the individual" in the residential colleges that make up the university.[926] This model was repeated in the primary and secondary school Newman founded in 1859, the Oratory School. It was intended to offer a Catholic alternative to England's celebrated Eton School, and to integrate intellectual, moral, and spiritual formation through the bond of personal relationships.[927] Newman regarded his active superintendence of the boys of the school to be "the nearest return to my Oxford life."[928] He wanted the school to combine the "advantages of a large school with those of private tuition [teaching]" and to offer what most boarding schools did not offer their young students, namely, the "maternal care and sympathy" of nurturing matrons, teachers, and

[925] *RP*, 228; see also 189–90.

[926] Ibid, 229. See also 182.

[927] Unlike the Catholic University of Ireland, Newman's Oratory School, the first lay Catholic school in England, still operates (https://www.oratory.co.uk/). Hillaire Belloc was a pupil, and Gerard Manley Hopkins a teacher. See Paul Shrimpton, *A Catholic Eton? Newman's Oratory School* (Leominster, UK: Gracewing, 2005).

[928] Ker, *John Henry Newman*, 538; Newman, LD XXI, 51.

spiritual directors.[929] Similarly, Newman eventually supported the founding of a specifically Catholic college at the University of Oxford, which could offer Catholic students access to the great academic institution while situating them in a decidedly Catholic community.[930]

In Newman's university—Oxford or Dublin—personal relationship with a tutor, who served as an intellectual mentor, was at the core of the experience. Without this personal relation between academic apprentice and skilled practitioner, Newman warns that an academical system is "an arctic winter," an "ice-bound, petrified, cast-iron University."[931] Newman primarily has in mind his experience at Oriel College, Oxford, where he took up the much-coveted post of Public Tutor in 1826, having been elected a "fellow" of the college in 1822. However, between 1830 and 1832, when Newman resigned, the Provost of Oriel, Edward Hawkins, refused to assign students to Newman. Whereas Newman strongly believed the tutor's role to be a mentoring and pastoral one that also attended to the moral and spiritual formation of students, even if primarily to their intellectual formation, Hawkins strongly thought otherwise, holding to something like Fish's insistence on intellectual formation alone. Newman was attempting to reform an academic culture not entirely dissimilar from some contemporary academic institutions. He refused to accept an institution in which privileged youths muddled their way through degrees, meandering between drunken parties, mediocre academic performance, religious sacrilege, and whatever was then considered "profligate

[929] Ker, *John Henry Newman*, 504–505; Newman, LD XIX, 398; LD XX, 68.
[930] Ker, *John Henry Newman*, 525–28. This college was never founded.
[931] Ibid, 74.

carousing," with very little moral or spiritual direction or intellectual engagement from their academic seniors.[932]

Moreover, Newman believed that without the personal relationship between teacher and student, the academic community becomes a mechanised system characterized by routine and bureaucracy rather than formation and "earnestness." Instead of two persons entering into a multi-faceted relationship whose centre was knowledge, but whose periphery included the wholistic personal formation of the student, Newman claims that in Hawkins' model—replicated in many contemporary university classrooms and "distance education" programs—teachers are "cut off" from students such that neither "entered into the thoughts of the other." Their only point of contact was that they simply occupied the same room at the same time each week. "I have known places," such as Oriel College of the 1830s, "where a stiff manner, a pompous voice, coldness and condescension, were the teacher's attributes, and where he neither knew, nor wished to know, and avowed he did not wish to know, the private irregularities of the youths committed to his charge."[933]

Just as Newman protested that information in easily accessible books could not replace engaging a living professor, so here he protests that merely having access to a professor is also insufficient for true intellectual and moral formation.[934] Instead, these

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[932] See Tillman, "Pedagogy as Care of the Soul," in *John Henry Newman*; Ian Ker, *John Henry Newman*, 27–41; Maisie Ward, *Young Mr. Newman* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1948), 113–15.

[933] Newman, *RP*, 74–5.

[934] This relational concern is reflected in Newman's personal motto, which the Oratory School adopted: *cor ad cor loquitur*, "heart speaking to heart."

require some degree of mutual personal commitment. Part of the "serious" but "really interesting nature" of the tutor's role was to know their students, set their readings, guide their study habits, examine them, and hear their compelling questions and honest concerns. Tutors should combine "good-humour" with "the steadiness of a superior." They should take "an interest in the things which are at the moment nearest to [his student's] heart" as they enter into "conversation, speculation, discussion" during their "intercourse of mind with mind." In this way, "obscurity of thought, difficulties in philosophy, perplexities of faith, are confidently brought out, sifted, and solved; and a pagan poet or theorist may thus become the occasion of Christian advancement." In Newman's ideal scenario, the tutor thus becomes teacher, mentor, friend, guide, and a sort of spiritual director, much like Melanchthon apparently was for students in his private house school and the university, and like many good teachers.[935] In the student-tutor relationship, Newman wants to hold together the "union of intellectual and moral formation," the separation of which he considered "the evil of the age."[936]

Along with the tutor came life together in the college, where external discipline, personal friendships, mutual encouragement, and common activities formed the matrix within which university students would be morally formed. The unique properties of a residential college are irreplaceable for Newman: "regularity, rule, respect for others,

[935] Manschreck, *Melanchthon*, 152, quotes Melanchthon, CR III, 562: "I can assure you that I have a paternal affection for all my students and am deeply concerned about everything that affects their welfare." Manschreck also quotes Camerarius' testimony concerning Melanchthon's generous accessibility to his students, despite Melanchthon's lecturing to up to five hundred students at a time. See Hartfelder, *Melanchthon*, 88.

[936] On the tutor's role, see *My Campaign in Ireland*, 117–20.

the eye of friends and acquaintances, the absence from temptation, external restraints." These are necessary for displaced emerging adults. Though most colleges and universities have abandoned the idea as quaint, the older idea of academic institutions, or small communities within them, acting as a second home, *in loco parentis*, in the place of parents, which functions as a true *alma mater*, "nourishing mother," resembles what Newman expects of the residential colleges.[937] These are places where a student's "better thoughts," "good resolutions," diligence, and steady progress are supported, and his "waywardness," "heedlessness," and "prospective deviations" anticipated and restrained.[938] In short and at their best, these intentional cultures offer students a supportive, attentive, and caring community that desires to help them cultivate those virtues conducive to their flourishing and avoid those vices that threaten it. Newman's views of what would benefit students and what the residential college has to offer seem more realistic and relevant than those institutions that leave students to their own resources or to the company and counsel of their peers and popular or professional cultures.

From both Hugh and Newman, and the many contemporary theorists and practitioners whose findings converge on this point, we learn that character develops within small cultures or social ecologies. Many of the norms of these moral ecologies could be stated explicitly, though often they are not. They are lived into and gradually

[937] Ibid, 214: "It is then a household, and offers an abode to its members, and requires or involves the same virtuous and paternal discipline, which is proper to a family and home."

[938] Ibid, 189–90.

adopted, similar to the way a person's blood acclimates to living at high altitude or an immigrant learns the ways of a new culture. The normative patterns of the culture move from being foreign and external to being familiar and internal, eventually coming to structure the expectations, habits, and speech of the once newly arrived but now fully acculturated person. This process is often quickened through personal relationship with peers and professors—in Hugh's case, a director and monastic brothers, and in Newman's, a tutor who attends directly to the developing person.

Small, morally formative communities are not exclusive to twelfth century Paris or nineteenth century Oxford, of course. The phenomenon can be seen in sports teams, social clubs, small schools, honours programs, character projects, and academic classrooms in which students spend a sufficient amount of time with each other and with a coach, tutor, professor, or director. Such academic communities as these will be morally formative, and could be intentionally so, as Hugh and Newman make clear.

Conclusion

Whereas the last chapter argued that pursuing moral ends through education in an academic institution was a reasonable endeavour, this chapter considered a selection of moral virtues and methods that frequent the educational writings of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman. Though a given virtue may manifest itself differently in private, social, political, and educational contexts, a sufficient core of each virtue remains across the spectrum of "modules." The list of virtues I considered could be extended significantly and their groupings repeatedly rearranged. That the virtues can be grouped as I did, or in a large number of other ways, emphasizes a point I made earlier, that the virtues are not atomistically isolated dispositions, but exist as

constitutive arrangements of other virtues. The closest analogy might be the way colours are made by mixing other colours. Though pure red, yellow, and blue are primary, even they are subtly nuanced depending not only on what colours are mixed with them but also which colours they are placed next to. We could debate whether there are comparable "primary" virtues that are not constituted by a mix of other virtues, but I doubt it, even with respect to the acquired "cardinal" and infused "theological" virtues. My view does not imply the hard doctrine of the "unity of the virtues," about which I expressed doubt in chapter three, but it does suggest that a person who selects a single virtue, whether compassion, humility, or courage, will not be able to cultivate that virtue without a host of other virtues, including the *sine qua non* of prudence.

My analysis of methods for cultivating virtue was similarly selective and representative. The most obvious gap might be the absence of worship, prayer, works of charity, the sacraments, and other uniquely religious or Christian practices. However, though these would have been a regular part of the daily and weekly routine for Hugh, Melanchthon, Newman, and their students, these are not a regular and integral part of many academic institutions that identify as religious or Christian. Nor are they essential to a religious academic institution, which might reasonably think them the primary work of the church rather than the academy. Furthermore, though I have not tried to diminish the religious aspect of the Christian educator's writings—they are pious Christian theologians, after all—I have tried to show that their practices, theories, and theologies might be useful for or attractive to practitioners in institutions that do not share their Christian convictions. In particular, I have tried to address Stanley Fish's diatribes

against “incursions of virtue” in the university and to suggest that Nussbaum’s concentration on liberal “compassion” could be, and needs to be, expanded to include an array of other virtues. Even further, the theologians, including Newman, do not think that the formation of moral character or the acquired virtues necessarily require Christian belief, the indwelling Holy Spirit, the example of Christ, or the hope of eschatological redemption. That is not to underplay the significance of these, but to emphasize that they are not necessary for the formation of acquired virtue. For that, the enduring goodness of the created order, the persistence of the image of God in which humans were created, the adequate functioning of a community’s and an individual’s moral epistemology, the presence of moral exemplars and teachers, and the desire to flourish are sufficient. As Newman says, the virtues are “Christian *in* a Christian” and may represent an instance, in Hugh’s terms, of saving grace perfecting natural grace, but even as acquired virtues they are conducive to the natural good of a person and to the community in which they live. Thus all three Christian educators to varying degrees advocate some version of “common ground humanism,” though Newman less consistently than Hugh and Melanchthon.

The natural or “common” aspect of some of their work also becomes evident when we recognize that the morally formative practices I considered are not unique to them, but can find resonance in nearly every virtue theorist from Aristotle forward. This is significant for any academic institution that decides to attend to more than simply the intellectual or practical ends of education, but to integrate these with moral ends for the good of their students and their society. It means that an academic institution could

adopt a certain set of practices knowing that those practices enjoyed significant overlapping support from a broad range of philosophical, theological, religious, and non-religious practitioners and theorists, rather than simply from three theologians scattered between the twelfth, sixteenth, and nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, the robust support of these three Christian educators for the theologically and practically defensible cultivation of virtue and the pursuit of moral ends alongside intellectual and practical ones might also encourage similar pursuits within academic institutions that share their basic Christian convictions. Such Christian institutions might conclude that whereas the church is primarily responsible for the spiritual formation and devotion of their students, and whereas the academic institution is primarily responsible for their intellectual and practical formation, church and academy share responsibility for their moral formation.

Conclusion

Learning is a human activity. Humans are not the only creatures who learn, but learning is something all humans do. We are born with an innate desire to learn and satisfy our intellectual appetites. It is one way we participate as creatures in the world. We walk through the world, see it, eat it, breathe it, meet its residents, and make things with it. We also wonder at it and want to understand it, entering it with our minds as well as our hands and eyes. This desire to involve ourselves with the world intellectually, like all desires, is aroused by multitudinous ends and employs multitudinous means, some ordered, some disordered. There is *curiositas*, and there is *studiositas*. Generally, we want to think well, make well, and act well, and we seek the company of others who share our desires and can help us satisfy them. This is the work of education: intellectual, practical, and moral apprenticeship. Understanding the nature and formation of the desire for knowledge and the ends of education has been the central focus of this thesis. The overall goal has been to set out a theological vision of education that helps students and educators, religious or not, consider the multiple ends that can be pursued through education.

My concern with many contemporary educational theorists, practitioners, and policy makers, such as Martha Nussbaum, Stanley Fish, and numerous economically oriented politicians and parents, is that they reduce the imaginary of the possible. Too often their visions for education, and with it their visions of human well-being, are unnecessarily restrictive. That is, single-issue proposals convince people that education serves one facet of one possible end. Nussbaum, who harnesses the intellectual appetite

and education for the democratic political liberalism of John Rawls, and Fish, who harnesses them for the late-modern research university, are but two of many examples. These influential but myopic views fail to help individuals and society understand, integrate, and adjudicate between the multiple reasons people desire knowledge or the multiple goods that education serves. While a person might defend one of these proposals as a manageable action plan that an academic institution could realistically implement, such constrained views diminish our understanding and imagination of the fully developed human person who flourishes intellectually, practically, and morally, and of the societies they help create. They also lead us to believe falsely that academic institutions are constitutionally unable to serve multiple good ends and so can shrug off many of the responsibilities they traditionally shouldered.

I share common cause with Nussbaum and Fish in our resistance to views of education that orient it exclusively to material or commercial ends, largely satisfied by well-paying employment. While many educators and students resist exclusively indexing education to the market economy, as education costs and moral pluralism rise, and as social stability and a common cultural identity decline, financial ends increasingly dominate the accepted rationale for education, especially at the university level. This observation is not new and has been made by very many other people over the past forty or so years. What we have often lacked, however, are compelling alternative visions that appeal not only to policy makers but also to students, visions that help students understand themselves and answer the questions, "Why should *I* learn? What do *I* want to know or be able to do? Who should *I* become?" and "What does my family,

community, nation, or world need *me* to do or become? This last question recalls St. Bernard's statement that "there are some who seek knowledge in order to edify others: that is love," and Hugh's that "each one does not have for himself alone even that which he alone has."

The emphasis on three distinct ends of education—intellectual, practical, and moral—should not suggest that these are three incommensurate ends, such that the pursuit of one would necessarily rule out the pursuit of others, either individually or institutionally. The direction any one person sets for their education may depend on his or her abilities, needs, opportunities, and interests, or the needs of the world around them. The Christian tradition has historically classified this kind of choice under the category of vocation or calling. Similarly, any given academic institution may be better equipped or staffed to emphasize one end, though there appears to be no reason why they should abandon the others.

The idea is not that each end discussed in this work must be pursued equally all the time by everyone. A person may choose a course of study primarily for their own intellectual formation, or to acquire skills that qualify them for gainful employment, or in order to serve the needs of their neighbours, or for the moral or spiritual formation it affords them, or for any combination of the above. Furthermore, each person will likely have opportunity over the course of their lives to use the fruits of their education to support a variety of individual and social goods beyond the single end they may have considered when they began their education. Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman make that clear. Even further, they help us see that there need be no inherent tension between

education that cultivates love of God and that which enables love of neighbor, or between education that aims at the spiritual good of the ecclesial community and that which aims at the material good of the social community. Tensions and temptations may exist, but not necessarily. Instead, the Christian didascalic tradition gives us resources for thinking about people as knowers, citizens, neighbours, laborers, moral agents, and spiritual beings, and that education is a great but ordinary means for helping persons flourish in each of these various roles to one degree or another.

Because the long tradition of theological reflection on education is not well known, this thesis is partly a work of recovery and *ressourcement* within the history of ideas. The Christian church has been involved in serious reflection on and the systematic practice of education almost from its beginning. It adopted classical methods and materials of education from Greek and Roman cultures, but adapted them to the world described by the doctrines of creation, sin, incarnation, reconciliation, and redemption. Christian educators questioned how the revelation of Christ as the *Logos*, incarnate God, fully human, and firstborn of the eschatological resurrection informed and affected the desire for knowledge and the need and ends of education. The long didascalic tradition of the church still informs many academic institutions and debates, though often implicitly and inadequately. Its diverse representatives and resources are often unknown. Its attempts to integrate theological, theoretical, and practical wisdom have been largely squeezed out by contemporary monolithic giants of educational theory. Among the many representatives of this tradition, Hugh of St. Victor, Philip Melanchthon, and John Henry Newman stand out for being educators, theorists, and theologians in equal measure, and

so are valuable conversation partners for contemporary educational philosophers and practitioners.

Even though these three differ on several points, they agree on many more with respect to education and the intellectual appetite. They are part of a long and rich tradition of Christian reflection on education that deserves to be engaged because it offers a profound and serious picture of human nature, the human predicament, and the ways education can respond. Though no other work draws Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman into critical dialogue, nor brings their shared ideas to bear on contemporary issues, I have done so in part to demonstrate that this tradition exists and should be drawn into contemporary conversations. This work has required me to integrate a wide range of each educator's theological, epistemological, philosophical, and educational writings, to draw on works by Hugh and Melanchthon works never translated into English and on several of Newman's more obscure works that the secondary literature rarely addresses. I have also had to enter interpretive debates about each of its three chief interlocutors and in places offer my own interpretations.

Though its primary interlocutors are Christian educators, because they are concerned with much more than simply theological education, particular aspects of their visions of education should appeal to non-Christian and non-religious readers, especially those who find some of the dominant views on education unsatisfying or too restrictive to accommodate their—or their students'—experiences and aspirations. These aspirations include many of the good ends that animate the educational writings and practices of Hugh, Melanchthon, and Newman, as well as Nussbaum and Fish. Even

though the three didascalic theologians do not agree on every point, they offer coherent and compelling reasons to cultivate the intellectual appetite through education that moves it toward *studiositas* and away from *curiositas*. They reinforce the intuition that knowledge is a constitutive part of human flourishing that naturally delights. They affirm that education can and should serve practical ends that meet real needs, including gainful employment and love of one's neighbours. And they demonstrate how academic institutions can help students cultivate virtue and character that benefits not only the student but also the societies, states, religious bodies, businesses, and academies they will help create. In this era of splintered and fractious views on education, Hugh, Melanchthon, Newman, and others in the didascalic tradition of Christian Humanism offer profound wisdom and capacious experience concerning the moral formation of the intellectual appetite.

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