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Journal article

Williamson on inexact knowledge

Abstract:
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson's argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson's account of inexact knowledge is not compelling. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s11098-007-9109-9

Authors


Journal:
Philosophical Studies
Volume:
139
Issue:
2
Pages:
171-180
Publication date:
2008-05-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1573-0883
ISSN:
0031-8116
URN:
uuid:491a6824-0685-47a4-91c5-508c553ece8e
Source identifiers:
251814
Local pid:
pubs:251814

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