
Fire, boycott, threat and harm:
social and political violence within the local community.
A study of three Munster counties during the Irish Civil War, 1922–23.

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Submitted in Michaelmas Term 2010
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

Short abstract

In its investigation of social and political violence during the Irish Civil War, this thesis tackles the diverse range of deliberate, frightening and harmful actions—largely neglected by military and political histories of the conflict—that surfaced in local communities in Ireland during 1922–23. Through a three-county study of Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, in the province of Munster, this thesis examines and explains violence perpetrated alongside and away from armed encounters between the anti-Treaty republican army and Free State forces. It identifies three main categories of violence: arson (the burning of houses, crops and infrastructure), intimidation (including boycott, damage to property, verbal and written threats, animal maiming, cattle driving and land seizure) and violence against the person (bodily damage or death through physical contact or the use of weapons). The thesis charts, where possible, the frequency of the violent act and, in exploring the symbolism and strategies involved in arson, intimidation and violence against the person, identifies two key functions of social and political violence. For one, targeted violence was used, during the Irish Civil War, to regulate community relations: state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing did not take place, but the religious and political minority (Protestants, ex-Servicemen and other British Loyalists) were deliberately persecuted, resulting in their flight from Munster. Land is another powerful motif in the thesis; the second key function of violence was to challenge attitudes towards rural issues and force redistribution outside the official channels. The thesis also places the Irish Civil War in perspective: the prolific bloodshed, sexual violence and gruesome torture witnessed in Central Europe, after World War I, did not become the norm in Ireland. Animals and private property bore the brunt of the severest actions in the three Munster counties. By bringing to light victims' experiences of violence recorded in largely unexplored compensation claims, this thesis captures the complex questions of loyalty and identity—facing armed actors and officials, as well as civilians—that beset the violent and chaotic establishment of independent Ireland.

Long abstract

Violence may seem difficult to rationalise and understand, but it is (by definition) behaviour with intent; violence has a reason, however obscure or unappetising this might be. The particularly brutal violence unleashed by civil wars is beginning to enjoy conceptual autonomy in the historiography and to be examined and explained, independently of war studies and military history, as a phenomenon in its own right. Yet while the Irish Civil War of 1922–23 is gradually losing its status as the great taboo of Irish history, the conflict over the Treaty is still largely approached from a military and political history perspective. Much about this short but bitterly remembered conflict—from the non-combatant's viewpoint in particular—remains unexplored. Through a study of Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, in the province of Munster, this thesis addresses violence perpetrated alongside and away from armed encounters between the anti-Treaty republican army (IRA) and Free State forces; it tackles the diverse range of deliberate, frightening and harmful actions that surfaced in local communities between the ratification of the Treaty on 7 January 1922 and the end of war on 24 May 1923.

'Social and political violence' are terms already laden with meaning and assumptions; there has been much reflection on the centrality of armed struggle to Irish political developments. The transformation of Ireland's governance known as the Revolution (1916–23) is beset, in particular, by controversial historical questions relating to violence and its victims. (There has been less speculation, recently, on the role of violence in social change, although in the past Ireland's perceived tendency towards agrarian unrest was much commented upon). Taking into account the largely unexplored archival evidence on which the thesis is largely based (over 2000 compensation claims made to the British and Free State Governments for injuries sustained during the war), the investigation of 'political violence' is primarily concerned with subversive acts against the nascent Irish government carried out, in the main, by the anti-Treaty IRA. This was a limited military conflict after September 1922, but attacks on civilians, the destruction of private property and huge disruption of daily life in Munster did grant the republicans—and other groups, like labour—success in preventing the Free State from functioning. 'Social violence', in this thesis, encompasses the range of actions (including crop burning, cattle maiming, boycott and the serving of threatening notices) directed, however inchoately, towards local or legislative change (and the resolution of land issues, in particular).

Before tackling the three main categories of social and political violence perpetrated during the war—arson, intimidation and violence against the person—the thesis opens up the compensation process and the complex administrative picture of 1922–23. During the transition from Westminster rule to Irish independence, both the Free State's Ministry of Finance and British Government's Irish Grants Committee (IGC) faced liability for injury and damage sustained during 1922–23. Official attitudes were revealed as governments worked to share (or shirk) their responsibilities towards victims from across the social spectrum (and on both sides of the Irish Sea). Financial stringency was borne of necessity in the Free State, for example, but the often unsympathetic handling of the claims of landlords and 'big house' owners also suggests broader shifts in priorities: land redistribution was a defining issue in independent Ireland and is a motif in this thesis. British Government impatience with mansion owners and high profile Loyalists, such as Free State Senators John Bagwell and John Keane, for example, is one of the more surprising

revelations of this investigation. Both governments also made judgements based on victims' socio-economic status and used discretion in 'deserving' cases.

The thesis deconstructs victimhood and analyses associated identity labels: the swift and substantial decline of the 'minority' population (Protestants, Unionists and ex-British servants) across Southern Ireland, 1911–26, is well acknowledged; initial investigation suggests violence advanced this trend in Munster. Indeed, while reimbursement of victims did not strictly discriminate along political or sectarian lines, it was the 'suffering Loyalist' whose appeals for help became most prominent in Irish and British politics and the press, as well as compensation channels. Pressure groups and charitable organisations such as the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA) and Irish Claims Compensation Association (ICCA) championed the Loyalist cause. The thesis asks what it meant to be loyal to the United Kingdom and finds that British Loyalty was on the one hand defined and manipulated by victims in search of financial remuneration, but may be more usefully conceptualised as a label stamped on individuals by outsiders, whether perpetrators of attacks looking for convenient justifications for violence, or the administrators charged and with picking up the pieces of war.

While the three concomitant counties under consideration share some social, geographical and political features, including the anti-Treaty stance taken by their IRA divisions in 1922, the Munster neighbours experienced violence with varying levels of intensity. The majority of compensation claims (59%) come from Tipperary, a county with something of a historical penchant for radical politics and associated violence (and rural unrest, in particular). (For comparison, 32% of claims studied came from Limerick and 9% from Waterford). In arson, however, the thesis identifies a serious category of wartime violence that was not proportionately diminished in quieter counties and cannot be dismissed as a by-product of a general atmosphere of violence and disorder. Fire is remarkable for its particularly destructive, deliberate nature and has a symbolically 'purifying' effect.

A statistical survey of arson points, in the first place, to its importance as a military tactic: barracks, infrastructure and politicians' homes were destroyed, by the anti-Treaty IRA, in a bid to destabilise the Free State. Victims did, in general, identify arsonists as 'republicans' or 'Irregulars'; military reports confirm the importance of fiery (and other forms of) destruction as anti-Treaty strategy. Yet with its particular capacity to drive families permanently from their home and lands, arson also hit a high proportion of non-military targets. Fires were deliberately targeted: in the burning of private houses and property, Protestants and Loyalists suffered disproportionately. The burning of the big house has been spectacularly depicted in Irish literature; historical analysis of the phenomenon confirms the dramatic, local impact of these attacks: the destruction of some of Munster's finest mansions represented the symbolic dismantling of (the remnants of) landlordism. However, the identity of the enemy was not always obvious during the Civil War and in profiling arson victims, this investigation does not neglect the many 'Free Staters'—Catholics and small farmers—who lost their homes and livelihoods to the flames.

Crucial, too, is what happened to the land left behind; this thesis demonstrates how intimidation was used, alongside arson, to chase out the (usually Catholic, traditionally nationalist) strong farmer or 'grazier', forcing the re-division of his land. The threat of force and psychological pressure led to these (and other) expulsions. This category ('intimidation') includes: boycott, damage to property, verbal and written threats, animal maiming, cattle driving and land seizure—actions that do not involve actual human injury or death, but are worthy of analysis as a form of violence.

Threat is difficult to measure; one person's response to intimidation may be explained by personal circumstances, as much as by reality itself. However, attitudes towards mental distress were changing since World War I and there was reflection amongst victims and the IGC on the effect of repeated intimidation on the psyche. The thesis suggests that intimidation created a genuinely frightening atmosphere in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, where a violent undercurrent could become explicit if certain social and political codes were transgressed.

Sanctions were enforced, in particular, against those who (it was perceived) acquired or used land unjustly (ranches used for grazing cattle rather than tillage, for example, were a tantalising prospect for the rural poor). The history (and historiography) of the land question in Munster are explored: between the Land War and Civil War, the enemy of the landless man had drastically changed and this thesis shows how violence and intimidation was used to settle conflicts between farmers who, thanks to land purchase legislation, now owned their holdings. The Free State's own Land Act (1923) further stirred the hopes of the landless, but it did not solve poverty and congestion; resolution of land issues was sought through local action, as well as legislation. There was a reversion to old tactics; threatening letters borrowed historical pseudonyms and warnings signed 'IRA' or 'military', ordering the recipient to clear out, were written in the familiar, quasi-official style. However, a survey of land seizures and cattle driving (scattering the animals far and wide, to cause inconvenience to their owner) reveals that many of those targeted with these forms of social violence (rife in Co. Limerick, in particular) had only recently bought or leased their land—they were not the alien landlords of old. Investigation of the mutilation of animals exposes an intimate form of violence particularly well suited to the settling of bitter personal rivalries over trespass, for example, or class jealousies within farming.

Not all who were intimidated necessarily fled the three counties and some returned after a few nights, months, or years away. The thesis explores the dichotomy between choice (voluntary migration) and forced displacement and suggests that, while there was no state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing in Ireland akin to the killings and displacements taking place on the Continent at this time, in Munster intimidation was used in an instrumental way, to purge the old enemy. Ex-Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and Servicemen, even those with ostensibly tenuous business or social links with the British administration or military, were forced out of Munster and Ireland. Social ostracism and exclusive dealing (famously christened 'boycotting' in the 1880s), was adapted during the Civil War as a weapon of the town, as well as the countryside. Dozens of Loyalist shopkeepers, motor dealers and hoteliers were put out of business by boycotts; estate-workers and big house employees were driven from their positions by intimidation. Sectarian enmities resurfaced and boycotts were enforced on denominational lines, weakening Protestants' commercial hold on an area, particularly in communities (as Waterford case studies show) where the non-Catholic population and influence was strong. Here, as elsewhere, the thesis emphasises the importance of geography: Protestants in Co. Waterford, for example, were essentially urban based, although local economies were also focused around big houses and surrounding pockets of industry.

Finally, the thesis tackles the category of violence more usually associated with civil warfare: bodily damage or death through physical contact or the use of weapons. The threat of violence was regularly articulated through written or verbal warnings; this thesis also explores those occasions when these ominous promises were followed through. The exploration of violence against the person is focused primarily on attacks on non-combatants: the thesis examines murder and maiming—

largely by armed personnel—of unarmed civilians and those unable to offer physical resistance at the time of attack. Discussion of civilian identity concludes that the identification problem, common in civil wars, was pertinent in Munster: Free State army reports confirm the difficulty in telling friend from enemy and groups that traditionally epitomise innocence in war, such as women, were in fact active in assisting the republicans. Indeed, the thesis shows that the common assumption that—bar a few misguided rebels—the vast majority of the Irish population supported the Treaty and the (sometimes heavy handed) restoration of order by the new government is too simplistic. Support for the republicans was not insignificant and varied according to geography and mercenary motives.

While open battles in the street lasted only a couple of months, gun shot wounds continued to take significant casualties, as republican sniping, ambushes and a policy of kidnap, trial and execution (of unarmed civilians, as well as off-duty soldiers) continued into 1923. In seeking motivations for attacks against the person, a (personal or political) connection with Britain recurs as a powerful explanatory factor: ex-RIC and Servicemen (and their relatives) were punished for past demonstrations of loyalty to the crown. The battle for allegiance was certainly bitterly fought: both sides struggled to control the flow of information and win civilian support. Indeed, while killings were usually carried out by (republican and Free State) armed forces, the conflict in Munster did provide civilians with opportunities for 'indirect' violence: non-combatants' complicity was important to the success of the violent act in destroying (or driving out) the target and there is evidence in some cases that victims and perpetrators knew each other.

Local communities struggled to define self from other, friend from enemy; a range of identity labels—Protestant, 'Loyalist', 'Stater', grazier—gained new currency during the war. The labelling process also took a literal form in the pinning of threatening notices to bodies. Indeed, while murder has an obvious effect on the dead, the manner of the killing can also be symbolic, communicating a message to those left behind: the labelling of corpses of executed civilians, soldiers and ex-RIC as 'spies' or 'traitors' assigned political meaning to individual deaths, warning bystanders not to follow in the deceased's traitorous footsteps. Certainly, the performance of violence—and the message communicated by the act—was very important to republicans: while the murder of disbanded constables somewhat undermines their claims of propriety, deaths were couched in official language and lip service (at least) was paid by anti-Treaty leaders to carrying out killings like a real army. Indeed, while some instances of violence against the person took a more intimate and less ritualistic form (one particularly shocking and apparently sectarian example is the sexual assault of two Protestant servant girls in Sopwell Hall, Co. Tipperary), in general the distinction between legitimate, military targets (National Troops and politicians) and unarmed civilians was maintained.

Neither the anti-Treaty IRA nor Free State Army utilised the break down in law and order to perpetrate the unfettered violence against women, children and the wounded, carried out by paramilitary groups in Central Europe after World War I. Rape, for example, never became a systematic weapon of war and mutilation was reserved for animals. This thesis is not a tale of prolific bloodshed and gruesomeness. What it offers is a reflection on a nonetheless intense and cruel conflict, where a range of violent and intimidating acts were deliberately targeted towards certain groups. The frequency of social and political violence is sometimes difficult to quantify; the threatening atmosphere created by intimidation in particular cannot be measured in any reliable, mathematical sense. The two key functions of violence during the Civil

War are more clearly identified: to persecute the religious and political minority and purge unwanted elements from Munster; to challenge attitudes to rural issues and force redistribution outside the official channels. In drawing out these patterns, this thesis both places the Irish Civil War in international perspective and, by bringing to light previously unexplored victim accounts of violence, captures the complex questions of loyalty and identity—facing armed actors and officials, as well as civilians—that beset the violent and chaotic establishment of independent Ireland.

Acknowledgements

My postgraduate studies would not have been possible without the financial support of the Arts and Humanities Research Council. I am very grateful for the help I received through the Research Preparation Master's and Doctoral Award schemes. Thanks also to the British Association of Irish Studies for a travel bursary, which enabled me to carry out archival research in Dublin. The students, tutors, administrative and support staff at Queen's have made it a wonderful College to be a part of as an undergraduate and graduate; thanks to Dr John Davis for his wise words over the years and the Governing Body for travel grants.

Prof. Roy Foster's brilliant Further Subject on Irish nationalism here at Oxford stimulated my interest in the Revolutionary period in Ireland. I thank him for this and for his guidance as my Master's and D.Phil. supervisor; comments on draft thesis chapters helped shape and direct my research and writing. I am extremely grateful to Dr Tim Wilson for accepting the role of co-supervisor during Prof. Foster's leave, and for giving me the encouragement and direction I needed to complete the final year of research and the writing-up process. He has offered tremendous support, commented on drafts (and re-drafts) and helped more than anyone else in making me think conceptually and comparatively about violence in Ireland.

I also owe a great deal to Dr Matt Kelly. Not only was he an inspiring undergraduate tutor, but his discovery of a 1924 pamphlet on house burnings gave me a fascinating topic for an undergraduate dissertation, which developed into this doctoral thesis. He encouraged me to pursue postgraduate study and has continued to offer support: I was delighted to present my research at the Conference of Irish Historians in Britain (organised by Matt and Dr Ian McBride at the University of Southampton, 17–19 September 2010); thanks to Matt and Ian for the invitation.

I thank Dr Lauren Arrington, Dr Frances Flanagan, Dr Ultán Gillen, Dr Aurelia S. Annat, Dr Marc Mulholland and Dr Mike McCabe, for advice and support during my studies, as well as all members, past and present, of Oxford's friendly Irish studies network. Thank you to all who have discussed ideas with me in Oxford and beyond, including: my assessors for Transfer and Confirmation of D.Phil. status; conveners and attendees of seminars in Irish and Modern British History at Hertford and St John's Colleges and conferences outside Oxford; my generous seminar run-through companion, Eve Colpus; Dr David Thackeray, for sharing material on pre-1920s relief campaigns for British Loyalists. Thank you to my thesis examiners, for taking the time to act as such.

Researching the thesis was facilitated by knowledgeable staff in the History Faculty and Bodleian libraries in Oxford, National Archives (Kew, London), Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (Belfast), National Library and National Archives of Ireland (Dublin), Irish Military Archives (Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin), Representative Church Body Library (Churchtown, Dublin) and Archdiocesan Archives (Drumcondra, Dublin). I am particularly grateful to Catriona Crowe (NAI), for generously granting me access to the un-catalogued compensation material in the first place. Thanks to county historians and archivists from Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, who took time to respond to enquiries and recommended sources.

Finally, I'm forever thankful for the support of my parents, my brothers Patrick and Dominic and the wider Clark, Cassin and Goodwin families, as well as my seven girls, my other dear friends (in Oxford, Manchester and elsewhere), and my boyfriend, Ed. This thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of inspirational grandparents, Maureen Clark and Walter Cassin (a true Irish history scholar).

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Glossary

Abbreviations

Bn.	Battalion e.g. H.Q. Bn. 1: Head Quarters, First Battalion
Bde.	Brigade e.g. Tipp. Bde. 3: Third Tipperary Brigade
DI	Detective Inspector
DSc	Doctor of Science
FRCSI	Fellow, Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland
GSWRC	Great Southern and Western Railway Company
ICCA	Irish Claims Compensation Association
IGC	Irish Grants Committee
IHS	*Irish Historical Studies*
IMA	Irish Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin
IRA	Irish Republican Army*
NAI	National Archives of Ireland, Dublin
NLI	National Library of Ireland, Dublin
O/C	Officer-in-Command
P&P	*Past and Present*
PRONI	Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
RM	Resident Magistrate
SILRA	Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association
TNA	The National Archives, Kew
UIL	United Irish League
WUTRA	Women's Amalgamated Unionist and Tariff Reform Association

*The ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in the Irish parliament, Dáil Éireann, on 7 January 1922, split the IRA. Michael Collins' (pro-Treaty) followers within the organisation made up what would become the Free State Army (or National Troops). The anti-Treaty IRA, known as 'Irregulars', protested the maintenance of Ireland's link with Britain (through the oath of allegiance to the crown) and held out for a republic. This thesis is chiefly concerned with the actions of the anti-Treaty IRA and uses the contemporary label 'Irregulars' interchangeably with the term 'republicans'.

Terms


Cattle driving	Tactic made famous during the Ranch War (campaign of agrarian protest against large-scale stock rearing, focused on Cos. Meath, Westmeath, Galway, Roscommon and Clare, during 1904–8). On a drive, cattle and sheep were scattered far and wide (or illegally taken away) in order to cause trouble for, and harass, their owner (the **grazier**).

Congestion	In the 1880s and 1890s, this term referred to rural problems experienced in certain districts, namely the poor, boggy ground of the western seaboard; more generally, 'congests' or 'uneconomic holdings' are plots too small, or infertile, to afford adequate subsistence.
Grazier	Large farmers, small town businessmen and shopkeepers who had done well out of land reforms in Ireland; through nineteenth century land purchase legislation (culminating in Wyndham's Act (1903)), 'graziers' acquired large ranches that were used for the grazing of cattle, rather than tillage
Haggard	In Ireland and Isle of Man: a yard or enclosure beside the farmhouse where crops are stored
Hayrick	A hay stack
Houghing	Cutting of hamstrings; first recorded in the 1690s as a quick and reliable method of disabling animals and humans
Jennet	Offspring of a stallion and a female donkey; akin to a mule
Turbary	Right to cut turf, or peat, for fuel on a particular area of bog

Note on current value of old money

In general, the compensation payments cited in the thesis are the amounts received at the time, in the old currency. In cases of particular interest and in order to give an idea of the generosity (or otherwise) of compensation bodies—and of the claimant's own boldness (or lack thereof) in seeking remuneration—I have used a factor of 42.5 to convert from pounds c. 1925 (when post-Civil War claims were submitted and awards made) to pounds in 2008, as is suggested for commodities, or lump sums, by the online tool: http://www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/. For example, a compensation payment of £100 is seen to be worth £4250 today.

Map


GALWAY
OFFALY
LAOIS
CLARE
KILKENNY
TIPPERARY
LIMERICK
CORK
WATERFORD
SILVERMINE MOUNTAINS
GLEN OF AHERLOW
COMERAGH MOUNTAINS
R. Suir
R. Blackwater
Borrisokane
Cloughjordan
Roscrea
Dromineer
Nenagh
Killaloe
Templemore
Templetuohy
Templederry
Newport
Ballycahill
Thurles
Limerick
Hallaskenry
Foynes
Kilcornan
Askeaton
Loughill
Boher
Caherconlish
Glin
Shanagolden
Ballyhahill
Adare
Ballingarry
Rathkeale
Croom
Cashel
Golden
Drangan
Mullinahone
Athea
Ballingarry
Newcastle West
Emly
Tipperary
Dromina
Newinn
Fethard
Bruree
Kilmallock
Galbally
Abbeyfeale
Cahir
Clonmel
Carrick-on-Suir
Broadford
Kilfinnane
Ardpatrick
Ardfinnan
Clogheen
Portlaw
Waterford
Kilmacthomas
Tramore
Dunmore East
Cappoquin
Lismore
Dungarvan
Ardmore

Introduction

As behaviour that breaches norms and upsets sensitivities, violence often seems difficult to explain. Twenty-first century governments and the media talk about 'mindless' acts of terrorism against innocent civilians, for example, and in doing so discourage 'rational analysis' of its causes. This form of political violence, which has 'engrossed so much of our attention', since 11 September 2001, 'seems to go straight off the chart of 'common sense'—to be not only unjustifiable, but atrocious, mad'.[1] My thesis, by contrast, rejects the very idea of 'mindless' violence and seeks meaning and purpose in abhorrent acts. My basic assumption (and one at the heart of dictionary definitions of the term) is that 'violence' is the *deliberate* infliction of injury to persons or property.[2] This injury or damage usually involves actual, physical contact, but psychological violence can be just as harmful and I argue for the inclusion of 'intangible states or categories',[3] like threat, in the definition of violence.[4] Violence is behaviour with *intent* and is distinguished from terms like force, aggression or authority, by its instrumental character. 'Violence has a reason (however obscure this might be)'.[5]

The interrogation of violence as an academic subject was pioneered by Hannah Arendt. In 1970 she argued that violence could be examined and explained—independently of war studies or military history—as a 'phenomenon in its own right'.[6] Historians, sociologists and political scientists have increasingly followed her lead. Yet despite the 'boom in civil war studies' (encouraged by the recent global shift away from inter-state war) this type of armed conflict—and the particularly brutal kind of violence it unleashes—enjoyed little 'conceptual autonomy' until Stathis Kalyvas' landmark 2006 study. Kalyvas separates 'violence' from related, but distinct, terms such as 'conflict' and 'war', pointing out that a considerable amount of violence in civil wars 'lacks conventional military utility and does not take place on a battlefield'.[7] The Greek conflicts of 1943–9 are his primary illustration of the 'logic' of violence in civil war: the deliberate infliction of harm on civilians (defined by him as anyone who is not a full-time soldier) cannot be reduced to 'madness'. Political actors instead use selective violence to coerce and control, that is, to maintain or establish rule over, the populace within the contested territory.[8]

This thesis tackles hostilities of a very different scale and intensity: the Civil War in Ireland, over the acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, during 1922–23. The Treaty, ratified in the Irish parliament, Dáil Éireann, on 7 January 1922, established the Irish Free State as a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth. Independence on these terms was anathema to republicans committed to the Proclamation of 1916 and the Treaty split the IRA. Michael Collins' (pro-Treaty) followers within the organisation made up what would become the Free State Army (or National Troops).[9] The anti-Treaty IRA, known as 'Irregulars', protested against

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[1] C. Townshend, *Terrorism: a very short introduction* (Oxford, 2002), 1–2.
[2] Oxford English Dictionary defines violence: 'behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill'.
[3] L.P. Curtis, 'Moral and physical force: the language of violence in Irish nationalism', *Journal of British Studies*, 27, no. 2 (1988), 150–89 at 158.
[4] See Chapter 3: Intimidation.
[5] D. Muro-Ruiz, 'State of the art: the logic of violence', *Politics*, 22, no. 2 (2002), 109–117 at 109.
[6] H. Arendt, *On Violence* (London, 1970), 35.
[7] S.N. Kalyvas, *The logic of violence in civil war* (Cambridge, 2006), 16.
[8] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 20, 27–9, 209.
[9] M. Hopkinson, *Green against green: the Irish Civil War* (Dublin, 1988), 58–69.

the maintenance of Ireland's link with Britain—symbolised painfully, for them, in the oath of allegiance to the crown[10]—and continued to fight for a republic. In the first months of 1922, the anti-Treaty members of the IRA had the advantage—'in terms of numbers and experience'—over pro-Treaty troops.[11] Active in Munster (the province at the heart of this study) during the Civil War, notorious IRA leader and War of Independence guerrilla, Tom Barry, believed that with a more efficient deployment of their 30,000 men, the anti-Treaty republicans could have seized the initiative early on and ended the war in 'three days'.[12] The republicans instead chose a fatal defensive policy and, during a short, geographically-contained war, were never seriously able to compete with the superior firepower of the Free State.

This was, indeed, a limited war: military activity was confined to the first couple of months, July–September 1922, and large areas of the country remained relatively unaffected.[13] Exact casualty figures are elusive. Michael Hopkinson, author of the definitive military history of the war, finds it difficult to even approximate numbers of dead and wounded.[14] He is clear, though, that more lives were lost during the Civil War, than during the War of Independence. Total casualties during 1919–21 amounted to 1400 (made up of 624 British forces and 752 IRA and civilians).[15] Even so, the Irish Civil War was certainly not as bloody as once thought. Figures for combined pro- and anti-Treaty losses of 4000,[16] have recently been replaced with more conservative estimates: by June 1923, total army fatalities numbered 927 (including 77 executed by the government).[17] Numbers of dead were also low by European standards: Alvin Jackson compares total wartime casualties in the Irish Free State of 'probably little more than 1500' with 'the 30,000 or more who died in Finland's civil war—a country with population numbers similar to Ireland'.[18]

The fighting began with the confrontation between National Troops and 'Irregulars' in occupation of the Four Courts, Dublin, during 28–30 June 1922.[19] The Civil War did spread into counties, like Sligo, that had been 'quiescent' during 1919–21.[20] However, the conflict was most intense in the War of Independence hot spots of the south-west, including the three counties (Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford) studied in detail in this thesis. The Free State and anti-Treaty IRA clashed in the streets of the three counties' major towns, in ambushes in more rural parts and vied for control of local barracks. The 'exciting' scenes witnessed in the besieged Waterford city—freed after 'four days strenuous battle'—may not have been

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[10] The oath required of TDs (members of the lower house, Dáil Éireann) and Senators (members of the upper house, Seanad Éireann) on taking their seat in the Irish parliament (Oireachtas).
[11] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, 58.
[12] M. Ryan, *Tom Barry: IRA freedom fighter* (Cork, 2003), 195–6.
[13] There were no major battles and the counties of Galway, Longford, Westmeath, Offaly, Kildare, Kilkenny, Monaghan, Wicklow, Meath, Cavan, Leitrim, Roscommon, Clare and Donegal saw hardly any fighting; see P. Hart, *IRA at war, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 2003), 41.
[14] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, 272–3.
[15] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Dublin, 2002), 201.
[16] F.S.L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine* (London, 1973, 2nd rev. ed.), 467–8; J. Regan, *The Irish counter-Revolution, 1921–1936: Treatyite politics and settlement in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 1999), 374.
[17] J. Augusteijn, 'Irish Civil War', in S. J. Connolly, *The Oxford companion to Irish History* (Oxford, 2007), 277.
[18] A. Jackson, 'The Two Irelands', in R. Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted paths: Europe 1914–1945* (Oxford, 2007), 68.
[19] See Figure 3 [removed].
[20] R.F. Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600–1972* (London, 1988), 512; M. Farry, *The aftermath of revolution: Sligo, 1921–23* (Dublin, 2000), xii.

typical.[21] Even Clonmel, the republicans' 'greatest strongholds in South Tipperary', was easily recaptured by the National Army, under Commandant General Prout.[22] Still, it was only after a number of (what the Munster press called) 'lively' encounters in the summer of 1922—and not insignificant loss of life—that the Free State was able to begin to declare victory in the localities. 'Heavy street fighting' in Limerick, during 11–21 July 1922, took 'many casualties'. Republicans initially held the four main military barracks in the town, but a 'Diehard' offensive against the Free State was difficult and dangerous: the National Troops had 'a fortnight's aggressive firing practice'.[23] Tipperary town witnessed 'fierce fighting' and Golden was won back from the anti-Treaty IRA after an 'all night battle'.[24] Free State Army Command Reports recall other 'sharp encounters', like that at Ballymacarbery, Co. Waterford, between National Troops led by Captain Hayes and the 'Irregulars'.[25]

The military phase, in the three counties analysed in this thesis, was thus intense in some areas, but short-lived. By September, once the Free State had reasserted its authority in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, IRA opposition to the Treaty comprised small, isolated columns of 'Irregulars' limited to guerrilla activity and harassment of the public. Yet it is these attacks against and, in some cases, carried out by civilians, that characterise the conflict in Munster and provide the researcher with the most fascinating—and controversial—questions about this bitterly-remembered and under-explored period in Irish history. Thus the foci of this thesis, like Kalyvas' highly influential interpretation of civil wars across the globe,[26] are those aggressive actions, particularly against non-combatants, which have largely been neglected by conventional military histories of the Irish Civil War.[27] The war is losing its status as the great taboo of Irish history, but, outside the local case study, this readiness to challenge old interpretations still comes largely from a military and political perspective: John Regan tackles issues of state-building and democracy,[28] while Bill Kissane situates the Civil War in the general process of twentieth century decolonisation, explaining why divisions over the Treaty proved influential in the development of the Irish state.[29] Yet the 'martial paradigm' is, as Peter Hart shows, clearly inadequate in describing the events of 1922–23.[30] His research on Co. Cork has been crucial in peeling back the layers of polemic surrounding the history of the early Irish Republican Army (IRA) and charting local community experiences of the revolution in Ireland's governance, during 1916–23. Indeed, Hart's was a groundbreaking application of the county study—a research model innovated by David Fitzpatrick[31]—to a highly contentious period in Ireland's past.[32] This thesis

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[21] *Munster Express*, 29 July 1922.
[22] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 12 Aug. 1922. See Chapter 1 on John T. Prout.
[23] P.J. Ryan, 'Armed conflict in Limerick', in D. Lee (ed.), *Remembering Limerick: historical essays celebrating the 800th anniversary of Limerick's first charter granted in 1197* (Limerick, 1997), 274–276 at 274.
[24] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 2 Aug. 1922.
[25] Irish Military Archives (IMA), Operation/Intelligence Reports by Command, CW/OPS/1/A.
[26] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*.
[27] J.M. Curran, *The birth of the Irish Free State* (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1980); Hopkinson, *Green against green*; S. Mac Suain, *County Wexford's Civil War* (Wexford, 1995); E. Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland* (Dublin, 1989); C. Younger, *Ireland's Civil War* (London, 1970).
[28] Regan, *The Irish counter-Revolution*.
[29] B. Kissane, *The politics of the Irish Civil War* (Oxford, 2005).
[30] Hart, *IRA at war, 1916–1923*, 82.
[31] D. Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish life, 1913–1921: provincial experience of war and revolution* (Dublin, 1977).

follows his lead and the example of other important histories (of Cos. Longford, Monaghan and Sligo),[33] by tracking social and political violence in the under-researched, but strategic, counties of Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, in the province of Munster, during the Irish Civil War.

The theory that differences in actual physical geography explain the relative concentration of violence during the revolutionary period in Ireland was challenged by Hart.[34] 'Single-cause explanations about the geographical distribution' of revolutionary activity remain unconvincing.[35] It is true, though, that during the Civil War the republicans were at times able to use their surroundings—the mountainous districts in north Tipperary, in particular—to their advantage in resisting and undermining Free State authority.[36] In addition, county borders are still important demarcations for historical analysis and certain provinces, like Munster, and counties, like Tipperary, were known for their propensity for radical nationalism, agrarian unrest and violence in general. Maps of violence compiled by Hart, following Fitzpatrick and Erhard Rumpf before him, suggest that the strength of opposition to the Treaty and intensity of Civil War violence, in the three counties under discussion, generally correlated with levels of aggression during the Land War and War of Independence.[37]

The contemporary pamphlet that inspired this thesis also influenced initial county choice.[38] The 'bad pre-eminence' attained by Co. Tipperary in the Irish Claims Compensation Association's (ICCA) map of house burnings (1922–23) commanded interest and demanded explanation; see Figure 1. My undergraduate dissertation on arson confirmed that this county lived up to its reputation during the Civil War: once it took hold, violence persisted in Tipperary.[39] That project also underlined the importance of the local study in understanding a war in which violence was not the sole preserve of the army, of either side of the Treaty divide. Throughout, this thesis also attempts to capture something of the experience of the war in local communities and does not neglect local economic and land issues in explaining violence and responses to it.

The geographical parameters were expanded for my Master's dissertation,[40] and this doctoral thesis, to include the concomitant counties of Limerick and

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[32] Hart, *IRA at war* and *The IRA and its enemies: violence and community in Cork, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 1998).

[33] M. Coleman, *County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910–1923* (Dublin, 2006); T.A.M. Dooley, *The plight of the Monaghan Protestants, 1912–1926* (Dublin, 2000); Farry, *The aftermath of revolution*.

[34] Hart, 'The geography of revolution in Ireland 1917–1923', *Past and Present*, no. 155 (May 1997), 158–9. Hart defines the 'Irish Revolution' as the period 1916–23, but he also recognises the wider debate in historiography over how far the violence and political change of these years should be characterised as a 'revolution' at all; see Hart, *IRA at war*, Chapter 1.

[35] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, 201.

[36] Levels of republican strength and civilian support varied by area; see Chapter 4. Land War heroes such as the 'hillside committee' and 'Rory of the Hill' even reappeared as authors of threatening letters in circulation during the Civil War; see Chapter 3.

[37] Hart, 'Geography of revolution', *P&P*, 148–53; Fitzpatrick, 'The geography of Irish nationalism 1910–1921', *P&P*, no. 78 (Feb. 1978), 142; E. Rumpf and A.C. Hepburn, *Nationalism and socialism in twentieth century Ireland* (Liverpool, 1977), 39–40, 52.

[38] Irish Claims Compensation Association, *The campaign of fire; facts for the pubic: a record of some mansions and houses destroyed, 1922–23* (Westminster, 1924), 2–3.

[39] G. Clark, 'The Free State in flames: new politics or old prejudices? A study of arson during the Irish Civil War', Unpublished undergraduate thesis (B.A., University of Oxford, 2005).

[40] Clark, 'The fiery campaign: new agendas and ancient enmities in the Irish Civil War. A study of arson in three Munster counties', Unpublished dissertation (M.St., University of Oxford, 2007).

Waterford. The Munster neighbours share some social, geographical and political features, including the anti-Treaty stance taken by their IRA divisions in 1922.[41] While west and north-west Waterford has a strong republican tradition, neither Waterford nor Limerick match Tipperary's historical penchant for radical politics and associated violence.[42] Waterford, in particular, does not share Limerick and Tipperary's tradition of agrarian unrest.[43] These differences are crucial for comparative purposes, testing out the possibility that the catalogue of serious injuries I found to be prevalent alongside and away from the military conflict in Tipperary during 1922–23,[44] were simply the side-effect of a particularly intense Civil War experience. I consider other famously hard-line Munster counties, like Kerry and Cork, to be less appropriate for the purpose of comparison. Revolutionary violence in Cork has been charted already in Hart's influential works. Kerry has not been subjected to a detailed, academic study like Hart's, although the 2008 release of Irish Department of Justice files relating to the infamous Kerry mine explosions, at Ballyseedy Cross,[45] hopefully opens up the revolutionary experience of this county for more rigorous scrutiny.

The three Munster counties—Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford—also selected themselves from an archival point of view. The main sources for the thesis—compensation claims made to the British and Free State governments, for injuries sustained during the war—were available for these counties.[46] I recognise that the occurrence of violence does not always dovetail neatly with moments in high politics, nor the terms of reference of administrative bodies, but the chronological parameters of the thesis do reflect, like the geographical schema, practical considerations. The Civil War began in earnest with the shelling of the Four Courts by the Free State, on 30 June 1922, and ended with the dumping of arms by republicans on 24 May 1923. The British and Irish compensation committees invited claims for injuries sustained between the Truce (11 July 1921) and the passing of the (Damage to Property) Act that governed the compensation process in the Free State (12 May 1923). This thesis looks for connections between the conflict over the Treaty and the war on the ground in Munster. I thus begin my survey with the ratification of the Treaty on 7 January 1922 and look, as far as possible, at acts of social and political violence perpetrated in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford between this date and the end of the war, on 24 May 1923.[47]

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[41] Rumpf and Hepburn, *Nationalism and socialism*, 45–7, 58.

[42] Although one Waterford native argues that the county's quiet reputation may be misleading; 'militant nationalism' was not strong in Co. Waterford, during the War of Independence, but 'socialist activism' thrived. See P. McCarthy, 'Waterford hasn't done much either? Waterford in the War of Independence, 1919–1921: A Comparative Analysis', *Decies*, 58 (2002), 89–106 at 106.

[43] W. Vaughan, *Landlords and tenants in mid-Victorian England* (Oxford, 1994), 283–6: when the 32 counties are ranked using official nineteenth century records of the 'number of agrarian outrages per 1000 agricultural holdings', Tipperary in particular shows consistently high rates of violence.


[44] Clark, 'The fiery campaign', unpublished M.St. dissertation.

[45] National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Records of the Department of Justice, 2008/152/27.

[46] Practical issues determined access to the Irish compensation material in particular; the files relating to the Civil War do not survive for all counties and are not catalogued. The opportunity to use Free State compensation claims, from Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, was generously arranged by Catriona Crowe, NAI. See Chapter 1 for a full exposition of the compensation process.

[47] This end date falls slightly later than that of the compensation committees, but allowances were made in some cases (especially by the British Government body, the Irish Grants Committee (IGC)) for late applications. In addition, my study of violence does not rely completely on the compensation material, but draws on other sources, like the local press.

Figure 1: Map showing mansions and houses burned, 6 December 1921–22 March 1923, as reported in the press



Source: Irish Claims Compensation Association, *The Campaign of Fire; facts for the pubic: a record of some mansions and houses destroyed, 1922–23* (Westminster, 1924), 3. The legend is reproduced more clearly as follows:

+	6 Dec. 1921 to 5 Dec. 1922 (1 year)	89
•	6 Dec. 1922 to date, 22 Mar. 1923 (15 weeks)	103
	Total burnings	192

The primary concern of the ICCA, the London-based pressure group responsible for *The Campaign of Fire* pamphlet was, in the words of their report to the House of Lords, the 'injustices suffered by Irish Loyalists'.[48] The outrage expressed at the destruction of 'mansions and country houses', which had

[48] See Chapter 1, Section ii.a.

'greatly…increased since the evacuation by British forces took place and the Free State Government assumed office',[49] was also indicative of a wider uncertainty about the place of the social, political and religious minority in independent Ireland. The swift and substantial decline of the Protestant and Loyalist population in Southern Ireland, 1911–26 (the census dates), is well acknowledged.[50] My Master's research on arson revealed that Protestants, Unionists and big house owners were disproportionately targeted with house and crop burning during the Civil War.[51] Persecution of representatives of British rule persisted, after the creation of the Irish Free State, yet in this cruel and highly localised conflict, questions of identity and allegiance were not always straightforward: Catholics and small farmers also lost their homes and livelihoods to the flames. Indeed, the broad spectrum of harmful actions surfacing across Munster, during 1922–23, involved a range of victims and perpetrators.

I categorise these diverse actions—from house burning, to boycott, to animal maiming, to assault and murder—as 'social and political violence', in an attempt to provide the thesis with a broad, yet clearly defined, theoretical framework.[52] 'Social' and 'political violence' are, of course, expressions already laden with meaning and assumptions; some historiographical context is necessary at the outset. Since the Good Friday Agreement, Irish history writing is not so constrained by the horrors of the Northern Ireland Troubles, but the role of violence in the overthrow of the British state in the 1920s remains a highly charged historical problem as evidenced, for example, in the reaction of the Aubane Historical Society to the publication of *The IRA and its enemies* (1998) and the bitter public wrangling over the 2004 anniversary of the controversial War of Independence ambush at Kilmichael, Co. Cork.[53] The tradition of violence within Irish politics and the centrality of 'organised armed force' to republican strategy[54]—right up until the 1990s—have been well documented. Open insurrections in Ireland famously fell flat, but the 'courage' of the Young Irelanders who took up arms in 1848 'was remembered and their incompetence forgotten'.[55] Indeed, Fenianism taught its followers the function of violence as armed propaganda—a symbolic display of political demands and self-governing ambition that could (and did) extract 'concessions' from the British Government.[56] While the old interpretation of the late eighteenth century to early twentieth century movement for Irish autonomy was one of tension between its constitutional parliamentarian and revolutionary separatist wings, more recently historians have suggested moral and physical force are not binary opposites and that it is more useful to look at the spectrum of strategies employed by nationalists. Michael Wheatley, for example, analyses the blurring of boundaries between constitutional and radical nationalism at a provincial level: in Cos. Leitrim, Longford, Roscommon, Sligo and Westmeath,

[49] ICCA, *Campaign of Fire* (Westminster, 1924), 2.
[50] See Table 2: 'Populations of the three Munster counties, 1911' and Chapter 1 more generally for discussion of the minority issue.
[51] Clark, 'The fiery campaign', unpublished M.St. dissertation.
[52] In this thesis I identify the three main categories of social and political violence—arson, intimidation and violence against the person—which are explored thematically, in Chapters 2–4.
[53] See Chapter 4.
[54] M.L.R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The military strategy of the Irish republican movement* (London, 1995), 2.
[55] L. O'Broin, *Revolutionary underground: the story of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, 1858–1924* (Dublin, 1976), 2.
[56] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983), 360.

advanced politics were contained within the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), even before the crisis of the third Home Rule Bill and World War I.[57]

Indeed, the idea that the Easter Rising and the violence that followed represented a sudden, almost mystical, denouement of centuries of struggle has been revised in both academic and public history. Marie Coleman, for example, challenged the 'creationism' in Irish history writing by beginning her study of Co. Longford's revolutionary experience in 1910.[58] And the relatively new permanent exhibition at the National Museum of Ireland, 'Soldiers and Chiefs: The Irish at War at Home and Abroad from 1550', incorporates the Easter Rising in the history of World War I, reminding visitors that extraneous circumstances did at times determine the course of events in Ireland. Opened at Collins Barracks in 2006, after the dismantling of 'The Road to Freedom' exhibit at the National Museum (Kildare Street), 'Soldiers and Chiefs' proves that rebellion against Britain is no longer exempt from scrutiny as a discrete, sacred history. The exhibit's final display is a list of the 1200 Irish men and women killed 24 April–12 May 1916 as a result of war at home *and* abroad. No cause is painted as more heroic, no death less tragic than another.

Charles Townshend explains why, in Ireland in particular, 'violent acts or threats continued for so long to be an acceptable supplement to, if not an actual substitute for, political dialogue'.[59] At the heart of 'political violence', for him, is the particular relationship between Ireland and the British state: Britain found it necessary to govern Ireland by force, rather than consent; Irish groups, from the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) to the IRA, resisted and rebelled; Britain responded with further coercion, in an ongoing and reciprocal process. This thesis examines political violence in the context of the Civil War: if the state changes, from British rule to native government, is violent resistance to its authority any different? The term 'political violence' was not used at the time, but the key primary sources for the thesis are records of political violence in the first instance. In the thousands of compensation claims made to the Free State's Ministry of Finance, for injuries sustained during the Civil War, victims had to prove the loss, destruction or damage described was committed by persons 'engaged in armed resistance' to the Provisional or Free State Government (or by members of 'any unlawful or seditious association'). The British government compensation body, the Irish Grants Committee (IGC), similarly offered assistance to those civilians—loyal to the Government of the United Kingdom prior to Irish independence—who were attacked during the conflict over the Treaty.[60]

Taking this original material into account, my investigation of political violence looks primarily at subversive or rebellious acts against the Provisional Government, or the government of the Irish Free State,[61] carried out, in the main, by the anti-Treaty divisions of the IRA. In terms of military encounters, this was a limited war: after September 1922, once the Free State Army had recaptured the main republican-held towns in the counties under discussion, IRA opposition to the Treaty comprised small, isolated columns, with little military organisation. By April 1923, republican resistance had become 'a matter of small, scattered bands struggling to avoid arrest in remote areas'.[62] Michael Hopkinson's assessment of the military

[57] M. Wheatley, *Nationalism and the Irish Party: provincial Ireland 1910–1916* (Oxford, 2005).
[58] Coleman, *County Longford and the Irish Revolution*.
[59] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland*, viii.
[60] See Chapter 1 for the terms of reference of compensation law.
[61] The constitution of the Irish Free State was passed and the Provisional Government ceased to function on 5 December 1922.
[62] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, 245.

situation is not in doubt, but this thesis will consider the broad range of subversive actions carried out by republicans: attacks on civilians, intimidation, land seizures, the destruction of private property and the huge disruption of daily life in Munster did grant the republican army some success in undermining the authority of the Free State and the ability of the fledging government to protect its citizens.[63] I acknowledge the uncertainty of the times: the Irish Free State of 1922–23 was far from a solid, established entity; opposition to the Treaty settlement came likewise from a number of quarters. Political violence was certainly not the sole preserve of the anti-Treaty IRA. 'Organised labour', for example, has been largely written out of the history of 1916–23,[64] but evidence suggests disputes with employers were settled with violence, in the communities I studied.[65] And in focusing on the so-called anti-state actions recorded in the compensation claims (and on 'Irregulars' and 'republicans' as the main perpetrators), I am guided by the archival evidence available. I do not mean to pass judgement on the legitimacy—or otherwise—of political violence during the Civil War.

One of the main advantages of the compensation files is that they capture the violent episodes not usually mentioned in military histories, or even contemporary press reports. Under the term 'social violence', then, fall actions and experiences—including crop burning, cattle maiming, boycott and the serving of threatening notices—that were not always prosecutable, nor consistently recorded; behaviour traditionally dubbed 'agrarianism', in other words. This 'peculiarly Irish' category of crime was increasingly used by the British authorities from 1845, in recognition of Ireland's perceived tendency to certain modes of violence.[66] Since the Whiteboy outbreaks of the 1760s, rural discontent had become 'patterned into a particular tradition of action';[67] particular counties, like Tipperary, became known for their recourse to murders, robberies, house burning, houghing of cattle etc. in difficult times, before and after the Famine. The county had a 'record of heroic consistency' as the 'worst' in Ireland for rural violence.[68]

In the past the English countryside 'consumed only a fraction of the political attention…commanded by rural Ireland',[69] but it has by now become something of a historical truism that Ireland, more than Great Britain, had a particular propensity for outbursts of *jacquerie* or 'peasant unrest', that is, potentially organised, but generally spontaneous, reactions to 'momentary and local circumstances', like high rent or food prices.[70] E.P. Thompson famously challenged the 'spasmodic' view of popular history: in eighteenth century England, at least, collective rural violence did not represent 'compulsive responses to economic stimuli'. Communities acted instead in defence of 'traditional rights or customs' (commonly held views on, for example, fair prices or legitimate practices in food production and distribution, which formed part

[63] See for example: Chapter 4 on the republican 'War of Destruction'; Chapter 3 on attacks on farmland.
[64] Foster, *Modern Ireland*, 514–15.
[65] See for example: Chapter 2 on the burning of saw mills etc. on worker-occupied estates; Chapter 4 on the shooting of a Farmers' Party candidate, Godfrey Greene.
[66] K.T. Hoppen, *Elections, politics, and society in Ireland 1832–1885* (Oxford, 1984), 341.
[67] Hoppen, *Elections, politics, and society*, 341.
[68] Vaughan, *Landlords and tenants in mid-Victorian England*, 157.
[69] J.P.D. Dunbabin, *Rural discontent in nineteenth-century Britain* (London, 1974), 12.
[70] P.G. Lane, 'Agricultural labourers and rural violence, 1850–1914', *Studia Hibernica*, no. 27 (1993), 77–87 at 77.

of a broader 'moral economy of the poor').[71] However, the 'complexities of motive, behaviour and function' are still often ignored by those writing on violence in a rural setting.[72] On the Civil War specifically, some historians continue to draw the distinction between rural violence and the real conflict, over the Treaty.[73] For Terence Dooley, the Civil War simply created the 'anarchical conditions for agrarian radicals to operate freely' and tenants' associations in the counties had no central control and clear aims.[74] Hopkinson finds it 'difficult…to relate social protest and grievances in the regions to political developments at the centre'.[75]

Yet even if 'Irregulars' and perpetrators of crop and outhouse burning, cattle driving and land seizures were not the same people, this thesis argues that rural protest posed a real threat to the state; 'social violence' was not an irrelevant side-show to the 'political violence' of the IRA and is important in understanding the violent dynamics of the Civil War. Land issues recur throughout the thesis as the source of conflict in many communities and violence gave added urgency to land reform: Land Acts were a way for the new government to consolidate its position and secure legitimacy in the warring communities. In its original context, certainly, violence designated as 'agrarian' (surfacing in 'disturbances' or 'outrages'), was more suggestive of serious resistance and protest, than simple rural anarchy. Analysis of rural violence as a category distinct from normal, acquisitive or malicious crimes began with George Cornewall Lewis in 1836. To accompany a British Government report on 'the Irish poor', Lewis sought the 'true origin and object' of the disturbances 'so prevalent in that country' for the past 70 years: did the rural class have an 'innate and indelible tendency' to crime and violence, or was there another explanation for the murders, burnings and insurrections?[76] Lewis did not avoid the old cultural stereotypes entirely: he believed that the 'Whiteboy spirit' did account, in part, for the violence in rural Ireland. Yet he also considered more concrete, social and economic reasons for action (such as the 'wretched condition' of the mass of the peasantry, unemployment and dependence on land) and sought to classify crimes 'with reference to the motive, or effect they are intended to produce'.[77]

There had been fires and riots over the administration of the Poor Law in England, but Lewis found that, in this and 'most every…country', violence was motivated by 'malice or avarice, or…present want'. There is 'no stronger contrast' to these 'personal' crimes for instant gratification—homicide committed out of personal vengeance, for example, or a house broken into to obtain property—than violent acts in Ireland, which were intended 'to prevent or compel performance of some future act' and were 'committed by the offenders as administrators of a law of opinion, generally prevalent among the class to which they belong'. Threatening notices and malicious injury to property warned persons not to eject a certain tenant or servant, for example, or give evidence at a trial; beatings, murder, house and hayrick burning and cattle maiming, punished those who did not comply.[78] Lewis overstates Ireland's special status; historians have shown how a 'moral economy', upheld by violence,

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[71] E.P. Thompson, 'The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century', *P&P*, no. 50 (Feb. 1971), 76–136 at 79.
[72] Thompson, 'Moral economy of the English crowd', *P&P*, 78.
[73] N. O'Gadhra, *Civil War in Connacht, 1922–23* (Dublin, 1999), 35.
[74] Dooley, *'The land for the people': the land question in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 2004), 40–2.
[75] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, 90–1.
[76] G.C. Lewis, *On local disturbances in Ireland, and on the Irish Church question* (London, 1836), iii, 1, 2.
[77] Lewis, *On local disturbances*, 94, 98.
[78] Lewis, *On local disturbances*, 94–7.

functioned in other parts of pre-industrial Britain and Europe. Thompson's economic model has been applied to various times and places: Natalie Zemon Davis, for example, has shown how the violent behaviour of crowds in sixteenth century France was legitimated by religious belief and structured by ritual.[79] Nonetheless, Lewis' focus on the collective dimension of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century agitation in rural Ireland and categorisation of violent acts according to their intention and implication, is helpful in conceptualising social violence as a useful, historical label.

What does violence reveal, in the context of Munster in 1922–23, about the 'moral economy' in operation in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford? What were locally received ideas on the grazing system, I ask, or the rights of the landless, or the place of Protestants in an independent Ireland? Thus the term 'social' denotes not the setting (I look at the impact of the Civil War in urban and rural Munster), but collective, violent struggle—however inchoate—towards local or legislative change. While the campaign of political violence fought by the anti-Treaty IRA did not succeed in permanently undoing the Treaty settlement or destabilising the Free State, agents of social violence—civilian and armed—did win concessions from the government on, for example, land redistribution.

With a series of Land Acts and improvements in the lot of the strong farmer, the nature of the land question had, by 1922–23, certainly changed since the Land War. However, the Ranch War (1904–8),[80] for one, proves that land still had the power to inspire resentments and incite hostilities; the general lack of interest in rural violence in the historiography, from the period from Parnell's death (1891) to independence, is certainly not justified.[81] Fergus Campbell's *Land and Revolution*, is a recent and welcome exception. While Campbell does not use labels like political violence or social violence, he has shown, like popular historians E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm before him, how ordinary people enact change, through violent action. Thompson's eighteenth century food rioters forced the authorities to take notice of the poor; prices were determined by crowd pressure, as well as market forces.[82] Hobsbawm revealed how even apparently spontaneous violence 'quickly developed the nucleus of local organisation', in England in the 1830s.[83] The 'multiform activities' of Captain 'Swing' (arson, threatening letters, wages meetings and assaults on overseers), were carried out with consistent aims: to attain a minimum living wage and end rural unemployment.[84] In early twentieth century Connacht, Campbell argues, it was agitation on the ground, not high political concerns, which forced land reform on to the legislative agenda, resulting in the Wyndham Act (1903) and later laws. Public rallies called for the redistribution of grazing land and for landlords to sell their estates to tenants on fair terms; cattle driving, boycotting and intimidation enforced these demands in the local community. Campbell shows how the law of the British crown was replaced by the 'law of the League': he offers the first real account of the role played by United Irish League (UIL) land courts in enforcing an agrarian agenda and reveals in vivid detail what happened to those who

[79] N.Z. Davis, 'The rites of violence', in *Society and culture in early modern France: eight essays* (Stanford, Calif., 1975), 152–187.
[80] See Glossary and Chapter 3, Section iii: 'Cattle driving'.
[81] See Chapter 3, Section v.
[82] Thompson, *P&P*, 'Moral economy of the English crowd', 125.
[83] E.J. Hobsbawm and G. Rudé, *Captain Swing* (London, 1969), 205.
[84] Hobsbawm and Rudé, *Captain Swing*, 195.

transgressed agreed social and moral norms, by refusing to surrender their land to 'the people'.[85]

Campbell's is another successful application of the local study, in researching the revolutionary years in Ireland. I hope that my exploration of social and political violence in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, will contribute to the scholarship on the still contentious and resonant Irish Civil War. This close examination of violence is facilitated by the structure of the thesis. Four chapters are divided by topic, rather than chronologically, or by county. I analyse violence thematically; the thesis does not provide three sets of local histories, nor tell a month-by-month history of the Civil War. Chapter One offers an important introduction to the compensation process, the records of which provide the archival basis for the thesis. It sets out the key questions of allegiance and identity, to be explored throughout the thesis: what was the status of the Protestant, Loyalist minority in the three counties; were victims directly targeted for their religion and politics? What was violence used for, if not to purge the old enemy from the community? In answer, Chapters Two to Four deal separately with arson (house and crop burning), intimidation (being driven from one's home or livelihood by boycott, threatening notices, damage and cattle driving) and violence against the person (maiming and murder). Using the unexplored compensation material, supplemented by other government records, local press and military reports, each chapter drives towards an understanding of the form, function and symbolism of the violent act.

[85] F. Campbell, *Land and Revolution: nationalist politics in the west of Ireland 1891–1921* (Oxford, 2005), 153–6: one occupant of an evicted farm was subjected to boycott, physical threats and arson.

Chapter One: Compensation, violence and victims

Introduction

Thousands of previously unexplored episodes and experiences of social and political violence are recorded in the compensation claims—files which form the statistical basis of the thesis. These sources also capture the complex administrative picture of 1922–23: during the transition from Westminster rule to Irish independence, both the Free State and British Governments faced liability for damage and injury perpetrated during the Civil War. The payment of compensation to claimants on both sides of the Irish Sea was a logistical and financial challenge; the process was also revealing of broader changes in attitude. In responding to violence and providing relief for its victims, governments were forced to reconsider their duty towards certain social groups: what was the status of landlords, Unionists, Protestants and ex-British Servicemen, for example, in an independent Ireland? The 'suffering Loyalist' was an increasingly familiar figure in Irish and British politics and the press; organisations such as the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA) and Irish Claims Compensation Association (ICCA) emerged to supplement government schemes and draw attention to the 'injustices' endured by representatives of the old regime after the new state came into being. In exploring victim identity, this chapter examines the 'Loyalist' motif and looks for the source of other irreducible ambivalences, in incidences of social and political violence during the Civil War. How far can a person's national allegiance, religion, class etc., be linked directly to the attacks against them?

A detailed examination of the compensation process serves as a vital introduction to the primary sources on which Chapters Two to Four, on arson, intimidation and violence against the person, are largely based. Analysis of this process (and other official sources, like government records and SILRA papers) also reaches the heart of the identity question: was it administrators, attackers, or the victims themselves, who defined labels such as 'Loyalist' and 'Stater'? This is not a chapter on government responses to violence per se; the parameters of this thesis dictate a victim-centred approach based on the compensation material, rather than an examination of the perpetrator's encounter with the forces of law and order. It is hoped instead that the thesis has opened up the topic for further research—increased facilities for and interest in local studies in Munster, for example, and the opening up of City and County Council records,[1] mean that local and national government attempts to manage social and political violence may one day be more thoroughly researched.

i. Compensation: policy and procedure

Dáil Éireann addressed the compensation issue while the Civil War was still raging and a resolution of 1 November 1922 declared that while the Free State Government would proceed with compensation legislation in due course, claims should be made in the interim. Damage to or destruction of property inflicted since 11 July 1921, save that due to accident, would be considered by the Ministry of Finance (Aireacht

[1] In 2006, a new 'Tipperary Studies' library and research centre opened at The Source in Thurles. Limerick City and Waterford County Libraries have 'Local Studies' provision; there is also a dedicated 'Waterford Room' (on local history) at Waterford Municipal Library. County Archives in Waterford hold Council Minutes from the 1920s; the records of Tipperary Town and Urban Councils are open to the public.

Airgid). In a procedure that continued under the Damage to Property (Compensation) Act, passed by the Dáil on 12 May 1923, applications for compensation were made via a standard application form to the county and Dublin authorities. The judge at the local sessions assessed the claim and made a 'decree'. This was considered by the State Solicitor, who reported to the Ministry of Finance, which paid the award, with adjustments or conditions. The emphasis in Free State legislation was on the perpetrator. Under the 1923 Act, applications were invited for compensation for 'loss, destruction, or damage':

> Committed by persons acting or purporting to act on behalf of any organization engaged in armed resistance to the Provisional or Free State Government or by persons belonging to or acting or purporting to act on behalf of any unlawful or seditious association.[2]

Usually claimants could prove the injury was inflicted by the anti-Treaty Irish Republican Army (IRA), but this was not the sole definition of a 'seditious' group; it was often enough to prove malice or pre-meditation on the part of the attacker. In the testimonies of victims of house burning, for example, descriptions of arsonists as 'masked and armed' or comprising gangs of up to fifty men, recur as proof of the deliberate nature of the damage.[3] Michael Carroll, whose long wait for compensation from the Ministry of Finance was the subject of a question in the Dáil,[4] was in bed when he 'began to feel suffocated' and rushed out to find his 'whole property in flames'. There was little doubt the fire was deliberate; the 'businessman' from Murroe, Co. Limerick, 'found inflammable canvas burning all round the place'.[5] Of course, we have to take Carroll's word for it. Arson was a crime of darkness: perpetrators were notoriously difficult to trace and conviction rates low. Given this, John Archer, who carried out a survey on arson in nineteenth century rural Britain, advises taking 'on trust the accuracy of the evidence' from surviving official records, like compensation claims, or court or insurance company reports. Government inspectors were generally able to tell malicious fire from insurance scam: 'tell-tale signs of incendiary origin' included fresh footprints in the vicinity, occurrence during winter weekend nights, and simultaneous fires breaking out in different places.[6]

Irish Free State officials also took steps to verify claims. The Free State Act applied to the kind of injuries for which 'compensation could have been given under the Criminal Injuries Acts' of 1919 and 1920 (if the appropriate avenue for redress, that is, the local circuit courts, had been open in wartime).[7] But that is not to say that the Ministry of Finance entertained any and every claim for 'malicious' or 'criminal' loss or damage that took place within the timeframe of the Act, from the Truce of 11

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[2] 'Irish Free State. Compensation for injury to persons and property. Memorandum', p.7, 1923, Cmd 1844, XVIII.115 (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers database).

[3] See for example, the following compensation claims made to the Free State: National Archives of Ireland (NAI), 392/122, 251, 401/646, 402/103 (Records of the Ministry of Finance, Un–catalogued compensation files: Series 392 (Limerick), 401 (Tipperary), 402 (Waterford)).

[4] Exchange between Padraig MacFhlannchadha TD and Minister for Finance, Ernest Blythe: *Dáil Éireann Debates* (http://historical–debates.oireachtas.ie), xii, 9 June 1925.

[5] NAI, 392/470: Carroll, Limerick.

[6] John E. Archer, *By a flash and a scare: incendiarism, animal maiming, and poaching in East Anglia, 1815–1870* (Oxford, 1990), 68–9. In Munster, during the Civil War, certain districts (like Kilmallock, Co. Limerick) did see a number of fires break out over a few days; see Chapter 2.

[7] NAI, Records of the Ministry of Finance, FIN 1/3103: 'Official Notice'; FIN 1/1602: 'Circular to Councils: discharge of malicious injury decrees'.

July 1921, to 12 May 1923.[8] The new government could not afford anything but the greatest stringency. To decide whether the claim was legally sound and the candidate genuine, the State Solicitor collected 'Supporting Evidence' from witnesses or associates of the victim and inspectors from the Office of Public Works made site visits. Edmond Higgins' claim for the burning of 25 tons of hay, for example, seemed exaggerated and the poor quality land and size of his farm in Co. Limerick proved that the amount was indeed inflated.[9] There were additional specific constraints on Free State compensation. Looting and acts of vandalism can often be explained by the break down in law and order that naturally comes with war; consequently the terms of the 1923 Act regarding theft were very strict for this reason. From boots and tobacco, to food and lodgings, armed men used violence and intimidation to levy goods and services from the community; commandeering was common across all three counties and thousands of claims were submitted for lost or damaged vehicles, animals and other property. The seizure of motor cars, for example, was particularly prevalent in Co. Waterford and in parts of Co. Limerick, 'Irregular communication' consisted entirely of 'bicycles and cars commandeered from country people'.[10] An Irish Fusilier in the Boer War wrote of looting as a 'joy', generating 'excitement' among the men.[11] After World War I, ex-soldiers and landless labourers were lured into violent counter-revolutionary movements in Central Europe by opportunities for 'theft, plunder and extortion'.[12] In Civil War Munster, both sides indulged in this perk of war. In October 1922, 'Staters' were known to perform 'pretended raids of houses, where no real searches are made but meals for the raiders, numbering from 15 to 25, are always commandeered'.[13]

Full remuneration of victims of looting would have been extremely costly; the right to compensation did not, therefore, cover coins, banknotes, or articles of 'personal ornament'.[14] Senator John Bagwell's wife and daughter, for example, were not entitled to any compensation from the Free State for jewellery worth over £243, destroyed in the fire, along with valuable books, furniture and paintings, at Marlfield mansion in Co. Tipperary.[15] Neither was compensation paid for 'consequential damages',[16] like the travel and accommodation costs associated with fleeing Ireland, or loss of income from an occupied farm or boycotted business. Edward O'Connell, a farmer from Parkroe, Ballysheedy (south of Limerick city), received compensation for the destruction of a shed and 100 tonnes of hay in an arson attack on 26 December 1922.[17] However, he was not entitled to any money for the 27 milch cows he had to sell as a consequence of the lost fodder. James Harty and Mary Tobin were similarly recompensed for the crops and farming implements burned in attacks on their

[8] The Truce was a convenient cut-off date for government compensation bodies; separate committees dealt with injuries sustained before and after 11 July 1921. This thesis deals with the Civil War and its chronological parameters are 7 January 1922–24 May 1923; see thesis Introduction. Claims for attacks occurring between July 1921 and January 1922 (which was only a small number, in any case) are therefore not included.
[9] NAI, 392/125: Higgins, Limerick.
[10] Irish Military Archives (IMA), Operation/Intelligence Reports by Command, CW/OPS/2/M.
[11] H. Slim, *Killing civilians: method, madness, and morality in war* (London, 2007), 238.
[12] R. Gerwarth, 'The Central European counter–revolution: paramilitary violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War', *Past and Present*, no. 200 (Aug. 2008), 175–209 at 189.
[13] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot 4, A/0992/1.
[14] T.A.M. Dooley, *The decline of the big house in Ireland* (Dublin, 2001), 202.
[15] See Chapter 2.
[16] Dooley, *Decline of the big house,* 202.
[17] NAI, 392/343: O'Connell, Limerick.

respective farms in Co. Waterford, but the Ministry of Finance dismissed claims for the extra feeding stuff that had to be purchased after the hay and straw were burnt.[18]

In its investigation of Free State compensation legislation, this thesis draws chiefly on claims made under the Damage to Property Act. The bias reflects archival exigencies: these files still exist, albeit in un-catalogued boxes, in the NAI, Dublin. Unfortunately, while there is some trace in the official record of another Free State body—the Compensation (Personal Injuries) Committee—its files are missing from the archives.[19] This Committee was appointed in April 1923 to 'receive, investigate and consider applications for compensation presented by any person who has suffered loss by reason of having been injured in his person or by dependents of any person who has died in consequence of having been so injured' since 21 January 1921.[20] Cases where the injury was sustained by a 'non-combatant in the course of belligerent action between the British forces and the Irish National Forces', or in clashes between the Free State and anti-Treaty armies, were considered by the Committee. Members of the crown forces eligible for army pensions and claimants in cases in which 'the British Government have undertaken full liability',[21] could not receive awards.

The establishment of the Personal Injuries Committee was given 'wide publicity' and thanks to 'notices published in the press' and referrals from other government departments it had, by December 1924, received 6616 claims from the public.[22] Awards were made in almost 70% of cases: £269,289-18-0 was paid in lump sums to the injured and dependents of the deceased and compensation was also granted in the form of monthly allowances, or money held in trust for the victim's children. 'Searching enquiries' were made by the Committee into the authenticity of statements made by applicants and their advocates and advice sought from medical professionals. His Honour Judge Johnson, Henry Kennedy DSc and Dr Thomas Hennessey FRCSI, conducted most of their business in closed meetings, but the Committee also sat for 153 public hearings.[23]

Fairly comprehensive mechanisms for the settlement of wartime injuries had, then, been put in place by Free State legislation and departmental directives. Still, the British Government remained closely involved in the compensation process and whether it liked it or not, continued to honour its financial responsibilities to the former citizens of the Union. The apportioning of blame and wrangling over costs had begun during the War of Independence. Claims for injuries that had taken place between 1 January 1919 and 11 July 1921, were considered by the Compensation (Ireland) Commission, chaired by Lord Shaw, which closed in March 1926 after dealing with thousands of 'pre-Truce' claims.[24] The Shaw Commission's expenditure was apportioned between the two governments: the Irish and British Governments

[18] NAI, 402/98: Harty, Waterford; 402/99: Tobin, Waterford.
[19] Conversation with Gregory O'Connor, Duty Archivist, NAI, 24 April 2009: some records relating to the Committee remain e.g. terms of reference, correspondence and final report, but the actual compensation claims from personal injury victims do not survive. It is very possible these files have been destroyed; certainly their location is not known to archivists.
[20] NAI, FIN 1/3103: 'Compensation (Personal Injuries) Committee'. Thus the Compensation (Personal Injuries) Committee covered the type of violence (maiming and murder) analysed in Chapter 4.
[21] NAI, FIN 1/1605.
[22] NAI, FIN 1/3103.
[23] NAI, FIN 1/3103.
[24] R. Fanning, *The Irish Department of Finance, 1922–58* (Dublin, 1978); its records are located: The National Archives (TNA), CO 905 (Records of the Colonial Office, Records of the Irish Office, Compensation (Ireland) Commission (Shaw and Wood–Renton Commission): Registers, Indexes and Papers).

compensated their own 'supporters' and split the cost 'where the injured person was a neutral in the Anglo-Irish conflict'.[25] Establishing the allegiance of the injured party required investigation and a protracted 'correspondence war'[26] between the Ministry of Defence, Irish Office and applicants' solicitors.

Civil War compensation should have been less complicated: the British Government did not have the same degree of legal responsibility for injuries sustained after the Truce.[27] However, in order to 'alleviate…hardship' arising out of any delay in the assessment and payment of compensation,[28] the British Government offered assistance through its own body. The Irish Distress Committee was set up in May 1922 to assist refugees from Ireland, by recommending grants, loans and advances on compensation payments made under Free State law. The increasing pressure of migration saw the Distress Committee reconvene, in October 1926, as the Irish Grants Committee (IGC), the records of which provide important evidence for the thesis. The arrival of 'as many as 20,000 people, some with their entire families', on British shores, forced the government to acknowledge their responsibility to these disbanded members of the RIC, British ex-Servicemen and civilians 'believed to have been loyal to the British regime in Ireland'.[29] The IGC sat 29 times between October 1926 and February 1930, to deal with cases of hardship endured by Southern Irish Loyalists between 11 July 1921 and 12 May 1923. Grants were made in over 55% of claims; see Table 1.

Table 1: Compensation claims received and total IGC recommendations

Outside scope	895
No recommendation made	900
Grants recommended	2237
TOTAL	**4032**

Total amount recommended: **£2,188,549**

Source: End of Committee report (TNA, CO 762/212).

It was not strictly IGC policy to review inadequate Free State payouts; independent Ireland had fiscal autonomy. However, while the compensation process began in the Free State when the war was barely over, the later running of the IGC presented victims with another avenue of redress. There were a number of cases where appeals were made to both governments for the same incident.[30] Robert Otway-Ruthven applied to the British Government because he had received from the Free State only enough for partial reinstatement of Castle Otway, Templederry, Co. Tipperary and nothing for the furniture and ornaments looted from the mansion before

[25] NAI, FIN 1/3103.
[26] N. Brennan, 'A political minefield: Southern Loyalists, the Irish Grants Committee and the British Government, 1922–31', *Irish Historical Studies*, 30, no. 119 (May 1997), 406–19 at 409–10.
[27] Fanning, *Irish Department of Finance*, 139: the question of liability for compensation for property damaged and injuries suffered during 1919–21 was formally recognised in the Heads of the Working Arrangements for implementing the Treaty, but not mentioned in Treaty; compensation remained, though, 'undeniably the most complex and sensitive of the post–Treaty problems to be resolved in Anglo–Irish financial relations'.
[28] 'Irish Free State. Compensation for injury to persons and property. Memorandum', p.7, 1923, Cmd 1844, XVIII.115.
[29] Brennan, 'A political minefield', *IHS*, 406.
[30] This thesis is based on a collation of compensation data from both governments; calculations and conclusions take the 'overlapping' cases into account.

it was burned.[31] Smaller claimants like John Gleeson of Borrisbeg, Co. Tipperary, were also aware that dual claims could be made. From a 'family of RIC [Royal Irish Constabulary] men', Gleeson was certain of the motive behind the malicious burning of his hay; he did not have to feign loyalty to either government to get two awards.[32] Anna H.G. Clarke, wife of a British Army Major, did not believe her award from the Free State, for the burning of 90 tonnes of hay, was adequate and she asked the IGC for help. Without the hay, she told the Committee (which made a further payment), it was impossible to carry on 'usual farming operations' and it was years before the income from her farm in Kildimo, Co. Limerick, reached pre-1921 levels.[33]

Clarke's claim was ambitious, but she believed herself (probably rightly) to be wholly deserving of compensation. The Ministry of Finance and IGC also made judgements on this score: blatant opportunists were weeded out, for one. Richard Burke's claim to the IGC was rejected on the evidence of Rev. G. McKinley:

> He finds himself now in a poor way because he drank and gambled…he never suffered because he was a loyalist, and whatever loss his business has sustained he himself was the cause of it.[34]

The IGC accused John O'Connell of Glencarney, Rockchapel (near Abbeyfeale, Co. Limerick), of likewise having taken a chance in trying to connect the theft of money, coats and boots from his home, with the Civil War. The 42 year old postman applied for compensation on 11 February 1927, claiming that a 'party of Irregulars…came specially [sic] to my house' on the night 24 January 1923, 'having me down as a marked man for being a strong supporter of the Government'. But the Committee found 'no corroboration of the story and nothing to show any pre-Truce support' of the UK; a letter to the applicant on 28 September 1928 advised O'Connell that only in 'exceptional circumstances' and when 'complete proof is furnished', was compensation paid for stolen money.[35] O'Connell argued that he had no proof of the incident because he was scared to tell anyone at the time: 'I was afraid to open my lips about it…even when the Free State came into operation'. Still, the IGC remained unconvinced that the claimant had 'suffered my part from the Republican party'; if anything, this was a straightforward raid for loot and 'ARJ' (presumably Committee secretary, Alexander Reid-Jamieson) decided that 'no recommendation' was to be made. Ex-constable, Thomas Roulston, moved to Joseph Street, Limerick, after alleged raids on his Kilkenny home. He was then prevented from finding a new job because employers of 'ex-policemen before the Irish trouble' were intimidated. Yet not only was Roulston's claim for 'loss of employment' 'unsustainable' (given a fairly generous RIC pension and inadequate evidence that he had sought work since retiring), the Committee judged the applicant to be unreliable. The former policeman had 'lent his name as a reference to several doubtful County Clare cases'.[36]

An honest, 'poor person' claim, by contrast, like John O'Brien's, was given a more compassionate hearing. O'Brien of Mary Street, Limerick, had been a night watchman for Limerick Co. Borough Council, but was dismissed after the Truce

[31] TNA, CO 762/78/12: Otway, Tipperary (Records of the Colonial Office, Records of the Irish Office, Irish Grants Committee: Files and Minutes).
[32] NAI, 401/4 and TNA, CO 762/64/11: Gleeson, Tipperary.
[33] NAI, 392/254 and TNA, CO 762/71/17: Clarke, Limerick.
[34] TNA, CO 762/82/6: Burke, Tipperary.
[35] TNA, CO 762/104/1: O'Connell, Limerick.
[36] TNA, CO 762/134/14: Roulston, Limerick.

because of his service during World War I. He was deprived of a pension and his health suffered because of the 'vendetta' against him in the years that followed. The IGC deemed his claim 'too high' and found it difficult to see a direct causal link between O'Brien's anxiety over the local hostility against him and medical complaints like 'heart affection'.[37] Still, 'despite reservations the case appears to be one of some hardship, and is, therefore, left for the Committee's consideration'. O'Brien claimed £1000 and was awarded £400 (£17,800 in today's money).[38]

Awards were not necessarily commensurate to the claimant's need. Class-based judgements on victim deservedness were in evidence in the IGC decision making process. That is not to say that snobbery was entirely absent in the administration of compensation payments by the Free State Ministry of Finance: in the case of John Crowe, a draper from Kilcommon, Co. Tipperary, who supplied the Free State Army, the evidence of Commandant General Prout was called into question because 'though an Officer, he was of the servant, rather than the farmer class'.[39] It is true, though, that those better able to articulate their cause, or offer a reliable referee or authority figure to advocate on their behalf, were generously compensated by the IGC. Given the size of his stationmaster's cottage in Foynes (burned on 29 June 1922), Edward Scales' claim seemed exaggerated. However, statements from clergymen and a British Army Major attested to his honesty, good character and genuine difficultly.[40] He was 'badly in need of funds' to refurbish his house and one witness had 'never heard of a more deserving case'.[41] Scales and his family lived in a disused rectory for three years, while they waited for compensation.

The IGC did consider the bigger financial picture and the applicant's ability to return to normality after the war: railway worker Scales, for example, did not possess the assets and connections in England that big house owners (like Sir John Keane, who admitted his claim for the burning of Cappoquin was not based 'on the exigencies of my financial position'),[42] or other wealthier claimants (like Alvary Gascoigne of Kilfinane, Co. Limerick), could turn to in difficulty. Buildings owned by Gascoigne had been used by the RIC and were burned down 'by Irregulars' on 24 July 1922. A claim to the British Government was rejected because 'it does not appear to be a case of extreme hardship'. 'On the balance of probability', the IGC decided, the burning took place during a conflict between National Troops and the anti-Treaty IRA and no special injury was directed against Gascoigne 'who, in fact, does not appear to be himself resident in Ireland'.[43] This claimant was not, like John O'Brien (above) or Edward Scales, struggling to survive in Ireland, but was living in England (in Bath). He had lost rental income for a few years, but not his whole livelihood and the IGC bore this in mind in the handling of his case. Indeed, the IGC

[37] See Chapter 3 on practical difficulties in measuring (and compensating victims of) psychological trauma.
[38] TNA, CO 762/141/13: O'Brien, Limerick. See Glossary for a note on calculating the current value of compensation payments.
[39] NAI, 401/1085, 1585, 1771: Crowe, Tipperary. John T. Prout (1880–1969), born in Tipperary, had fought with the Tipperary Third Brigade during the War of Independence, but after the split he joined the National Army and led a 450 strong command to recapture the city of Waterford from the republicans, in July 1922. On what these accusations of Prout's lower class status were based is unclear, but Prout's Command did have a bad reputation and received the 'worst publicity' of all the pro-Treaty commands during the first half of the war; see M. Hopkinson, *Green against green: the Irish Civil War* (Dublin, 1988), 209.
[40] NAI, 392/522: Scales, Limerick.
[41] TNA, CO 762/138/10: Scales, Limerick.
[42] TNA, CO 762/82/11: Keane, Waterford; see Chapter 2.
[43] TNA, CO 762/87/14: Gascoigne, Limerick.

claimed in its final report to have looked at the financial position of the applicant from various 'angles':

> In the course of political upheaval, the whole community suffers and it is not unreasonable the burden of insignificant losses and losses of articles of luxury, when sustained by well to do people, should rest where it falls… [but] no serious claim [is] rejected or cut down solely on ground of absence of financial embarrassment.[44]

Major Rose's claim was rejected by Britain because the burning of Boskell House took place during a conflict between Free State and anti-Treaty troops and the 'claimant cannot say that this injury was directed against him on account of his support of the British Government prior to the Truce'. The decision was legitimate within the rules of the Committee (Rose was not personally targeted, rather the fire and bomb damage was clearly sustained 'in the course of a conflict between the Irish Regular and Irregular Forces'), but there was a lack of sympathy in its execution. The IGC questioned whether Rose's suffering was as bad as he claimed: he had 'not been out to the place because he does not wish to see the ruins', but there had been no 'evidence of hostility or threat'. Handwritten comments by Reid-Jamieson called Rose's evidence 'absolutely farcical'. There had been 'no molestation' since the destruction of Boskell House, 'no evidence of active hostility or threat' and 'no evidence of active loyalty' on the part of 'Major' Rose (whose personal credibility was attacked in remarks that his was 'only a courtesy title').[45] The Free State paid Rose compensation, but only £3250 of the £13000 it would cost to rebuild.[46]

The financial stringency displayed in these high-profile cases was driven in part by economics. By the end of the war, the Dáil faced a 'financial crisis' and 'colossal' housing problem;[47] spending large amounts on the rebuilding of damaged mansions would have been wasteful. Compensation was understandably a matter of huge public and political interest: early Free State estimates put the material cost of the Civil War at £50 million[48] and, as late as 1927, compensation absorbed 6% of national expenditure.[49] Little more could be squeezed from the ratepayer: taxes were already 'too high for a poor country' like Ireland. The financial picture was not quite as 'gloomy' across the water,[50] but the British Government also had to consider the tax payer, before committing public money to compensation schemes. A new political system—which saw the decline of the Liberal tradition and would witness the first Labour Government—was settling down by 1924, but the British economy was clearly 'less robust' than a decade before.[51] Compensation for victims of Irish violence came fairly low down a priority list which included unemployment, pensions, reform of the Poor Law and local government, and a large Empire.[52] Yet the often unsympathetic handling of the claims of landlords and the contrasting use of discretion by both Governments in what were perceived as more worthy cases involving small farmers, is also revealing of broader shifts in attitude and state

[44] TNA, CO 762/212: 'End of Committee Report'.
[45] TNA, CO 762/41/2: Rose, Limerick.
[46] NAI, 392/537: Rose, Limerick.
[47] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, iii, 4 May, 1923.
[48] T. Garvin, *1922: The birth of Irish democracy* (Dublin, 1996), 164.
[49] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, 273.
[50] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 13 Apr. 1923.
[51] P.F. Clarke, *Hope and glory: Britain 1900–1990* (London, 1997), 119, 128.
[52] Clarke, *Hope and glory*, 135–8.

priorities. An unwillingness to accommodate the 'old ascendancy' is perhaps unsurprising in a country, like Ireland, where landlordism was such a controversial and historically charged issue.[53] The Free State Government did not condone redistribution outside the official channels and the remaining Munster landlords were treated fairly sympathetically, especially by Continental standards.[54] Still, land hunger drove hundreds of acts of violence and intimidation in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford and the Free State Government in particular remained mindful of its duty to the landless and rural poor.

ii. British 'Loyalty'

a) Definitions

Land was not, of course, the sole defining issue at the birth of the new state. 'Loyalist' was as condemnatory as 'landowner', in marking out victims of violence within the local community. This identity label was in regular contemporary usage: George Moynan's 'motor and cycle' business was boycotted 'by all but Loyalists' and the leader of the band of '40 armed and masked men', who carried out the first raid on his premises in August 1920, 'said that he had orders to put out all Loyalists, and the North of Ireland was my proper place'. Moynan had 'always assisted' the RIC and was a friend of Detective Inspector (DI) W.H. Wilson, murdered in Templemore in 1920.[55] But what exactly did it mean to be 'loyal' to Britain? Applicants to the IGC were required to justify their Britishness: help was granted in cases where 'loss or injury described was occasioned in respect or on account of' the claimant's 'allegiance to the Government of the United Kingdom' prior to independence.[56] Did this category have meaning beyond the Terms of Reference of a government committee; was a victim's loyalty to the crown a causal factor in the violence against him?

The accounts of social and political violence set out in Chapters Two to Four are undoubtedly shaped by the IGC source material; incidents of arson, intimidation and violence against the person are explained in terms of the victim's 'loyalty'. It is to be expected that if compensation was awarded on proof of allegiance to the UK, then applicants would frame their application in these terms. Often only a generic declaration of loyalty is offered. 'Republicans' burned Caroline Fairholme's Comeragh House, Co. Waterford, because her family had 'by tradition and practice…been avowed and consistent supporters of the British Crown'.[57] Compensation of this kind was not a new phenomenon. The claims of 'suffering loyalists' have been used by historians to measure victimisation during the 1798 Rebellion.[58] How quickly individuals became familiar with the Civil War compensation process and were able to express their appeal in the language of loyalty may prove only their cynical financial ambition.[59] In their claims to the IGC, Limerick farmers Denis Hickey and John Coleman offer identical explanations for the harassment they experienced—and damage inflicted on their lands—during the Civil

[53] More surprising, as this thesis shows, is the apparent ambivalence of the British Government towards this group. See Chapter 2 on the treatment of big house owners whose homes were destroyed by arson and Chapter 3, Section v, on the 'historical and historiographical problem' of land.
[54] See Chapter 3.
[55] TNA, CO 762/197/33: Moynan, Tipperary.
[56] Terms of Reference printed on all IGC compensation forms.
[57] TNA, CO 762/94/3: Fairholme, Waterford.
[58] T. Bartlett (ed.), *1798: a bicentenary perspective* (Dublin, 2003), 480.
[59] See Chapter 3: one ex-constable put an exact price of £300 on his 'right' to live in Ireland.

War.[60] With Caherass and Croom just a mile apart, the victims may have known each other, but whether they worked together on their application forms or sought advice from the same solicitor, the template answers to the Committee's questions had the same objective: emphasise one's allegiance to Britain, to secure financial reward.

Compensation claimants were keen to make use of the channels open to them and a sense of entitlement developed during the years of IGC operation. On 28 March 1928, Maurice Lynch wrote to the Committee to hurry along his application, attaching a newspaper article on speculation that the IGC was going to consider injuries that took place after 12 May 1923 (Lynch's suggestion being that his pre-Truce case should also be looked at more generously).[61] John Power's cattle were seized by republicans and a levy demanded for their return. Power failed to reclaim this £50 under the Free State's Damage to Property Act and felt aggrieved as result, demanding he be treated the same as other cases 'in my District' in Co. Tipperary (including Senator Bagwell of Marlfield), in which awards were made for similar attacks.[62]

In Co. Waterford, Thomas Kennedy's claim for the driving of his cattle was rejected as a 'neighbour dispute…to be resolved by the County Court'.[63] Arguments between neighbours (over trespass, for example), intended for resolution in the Petty Sessions, did spill over into violence during these years.[64] However, cases like Kennedy's did not fall under the Terms of Reference of the IGC having, in its eyes, nothing to do with the actual war. Still, this did not stop Kennedy trying to couch his claim in the terms required for financial remuneration. To Question Five on the compensation form, whether the 'loss or injury described was occasioned in respect or on account of…allegiance to the Government' of the UK prior to the Truce, the claimant responded: 'The only answer I can give to this is that the defendant's son came to my Solicitor's Offices and said that anyone [sic] should not take up the case as I was a bloody Orangeman'.[65] There is no indication in the compensation file that Kennedy was a Protestant and while sectarian undercurrents cannot totally be dismissed, there is the sense here of a claimant writing what he believed the IGC wanted to hear.[66]

Some were, by contrast, able to recall a more convincing, specific act of loyalty that had singled them out for attack. Dairy farmer Herbert Sullivan's substantial residence, Curramore House in Broadford, Co. Limerick, was burned down on 11 August 1922. The Protestant 'gentleman farmer'[67] was forced to leave Ireland and downsize to a small house in Devon. Sullivan's past service as a JP and High Sheriff for Co. Limerick, in 1889, may have already marked him out as a British Loyalist.[68] Still, it was his overt demonstration of solidarity with British troops during World War I that Sullivan believed accounted for the ill-feeling towards him:

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[60] NAI, 392/24: Coleman, Limerick; 392/29, 31: Hickey, Limerick.
[61] TNA, CO 762/80/1: Lynch, Limerick; see Chapter 3.
[62] TNA, CO 762/68/16: Power, Tipperary.
[63] TNA, CO 762/65/8: Kennedy, Waterford. See Glossary and Chapter 3, Section iii on 'cattle driving'.
[64] See also: NAI, 392/466: Hanley, Limerick; 402/106: Power, Waterford. Chapter 3 suggests certain types of violence and intimidation (such as animal maiming) were more intimate and better suited to the settling of personal disputes over trespass.
[65] TNA, CO 762/65/8: Kennedy, Waterford.
[66] I have not been able to verify Kennedy's religion using the Census of Ireland (1911), or other source.
[67] Occupation given by Sullivan in his Census return (Census of Ireland (1911), NAI, Dublin, http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/ (online database)).
[68] Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), D/989/B/2/9: 'Irish Claims Compensation Association (ICCA) Report to the House of Lords: Statement of the injustices suffered by Irish

> When Troops were quartered near me I used to entertain some Officers…On one occasion in the summer of 1917 as a small detachment was passing Curramore...I asked them all in...gave two Officers and the Sergeant Major lunch, and supplied milk for their men. For doing this I was very much disliked and was much abused afterwards.[69]

Figure 2: Curramore House, Broadford, Co. Limerick



Source: Photograph, Sullivan's compensation file (TNA, CO 762/87/4).

The fact that many IGC applicants had, like Sullivan, fled to Great Britain or Northern Ireland by the time they made their claim also suggests that while the British connection may have been exaggerated in certain cases, for many it was more deep-rooted than something manufactured for the purposes of compensation. There is a batch of claims, for example, from the 'garden city' of Letchworth, Hertfordshire, where—the Tipperary press reported—a 'little colony' of around fifty ex-constables and their families formed from 1922.[70] Britain was seen as a refuge for these people and its government was expected to provide support.

Maurice O'Brien, for example, had high hopes of his new home. The pig and cattle dealer was forced out of Co. Limerick 'on threat of death': after the departure of British forces, 'armed Republicans had possession' of his father Michael's house and on receiving a 'notice to clear out', on 22 May 1922, O'Brien took the cattle ten miles to Limerick for sale, for the final time. He then fled to England, knowing that 'several men who had failed to leave were murdered'.[71] Maurice was particularly fearful for their own life following the murders of an 'ex-Sergeant Welsh [sic] RIC and an ex-Soldier named Gallaher [sic]', who were both 'shot dead' in Newport, Co. Tipperary, just a couple of miles from the O'Briens' home village of Ashroe, Co. Limerick.[72] Advised, 'as all loyalists were', to take any kind of job, Maurice found work as a general labourer in Kent and though 'the promises of His Majesty's Ministers, before

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Loyalists' (Papers of the Irish Unionist Alliance, Papers of the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA), Case Papers).

[69] TNA, CO 762/87/4: Sullivan, Limerick.

[70] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 16 Dec. 1922; see e.g. ex–constable James Coogan, from Waterford (Chapter 3).

[71] TNA, CO 762/59/2: Maurice O'Brien, Limerick. Maurice's father, Michael O'Brien, was granted £400 compensation in his own right, for intimidation suffered in his position as 'chauffeur and handyman' for J.B. Barrington: CO 762/59/3 (Michael O'Brien, Limerick).

[72] NAI, FIN 1/1082: 'Victimised Loyalists: Maurice and Michael O'Brien'; see Chapter 4 on the deaths of a Sgt. Walshe and ex-soldier, Patrick Galligan, in Newport, Co. Tipperary.

and after the Treaty, led us to believe that all loyalists would be adequately compensated', he struggled on 'a weekly wage' and £75 compensation. In Ireland Maurice had made a 'handsome profit' from 'jobbing cattle' on behalf of his father, but in England he had 'no spare money' and was 'anxious' for a small grant from the IGC to 'give me a start' in the cattle business once again.[73] Maurice's expectations of the British Government were rooted in his strong Loyalist identity. He told the IGC in November 1926:

> It will not be possible for me to give any [references] in the Co. Limerick for the following reason – all my neighbours were, and still are, Republicans except those, who, like myself, were driven out and their places burned. I have not had any correspondence with anyone in the neighbourhood since I left five years ago. All the old Loyalists, Magistrates, Ladies and Gents who knew me and my family have left the county long ago. My old clergyman and school teacher has died. I have my ex Police brothers available.[74]

b) Help for Loyalists

SILRA agreed that the British Government had neglected O'Brien and thousands like him. The Association aimed to 'draw the attention of the public to the treatment by HM's Government of those Southern Irish Loyalists who suffered injuries' between the Truce and the end of the Civil War, 'as it constitutes not merely a cruel injustice but a direct breach of faith'. A SILRA report explained that neither government had abided by the principles of 'fair compensation' laid out in the Working Arrangements for implementing the Treaty. The Free State had adopted a 'wholly different' and 'greatly restricted' standard of compensation in the form of the Damage to Property Act (1923) and while the British Government's Dunedin Report of October 1926 had set up a new IGC, to acknowledge the 'distress' caused to 'Loyalists in Ireland…due to their hasty abandonment by the Government in 1921', the 'changing basis of compensation' in practice, like placing limits on awards, was a 'cruel deception of the Loyalists, many of whom are on the verge of bankruptcy'.[75] The Association did not write-off IGC provision altogether, admitting the 'large farmer' had 'got onto firmer ground through…compensation'. SILRA also made use of these official channels on their clients' behalf: by 4 October 1928, 437 claims had been presented and £240,585 compensation paid by IGC 'through the efforts of the Association'.[76] However, the 'limitations' of British Government relief were continually recognised in SILRA meetings;[77] help in the form of loans, donations, food and clothing (and even seeds for poor farmers), was given out to plug the gap.

Neediness or 'suffering' was at the heart of this conception of Loyalist identity; SILRA defined 'Loyalists' as those who lost out when British rule in Ireland came to end: farmers with small holdings, widows and families of ex-RIC, ex-Service men.[78] Before disbandment, the Armed Forces spent around £2 million yearly in Ireland and Chapter Two, Section vi, shows that some shops and businesses were hurt

[73] TNA, CO 762/59/2: Maurice O'Brien, Limerick.
[74] CO 762/59/2: Maurice O'Brien, Limerick. Maurice had three brothers who had served in the RIC. The claimant did not state his religion on the compensation form, but he was probably a Catholic (every 'Maurice O'Brien' in Co. Limerick in 1911, as recorded in the Census, described himself as 'Roman Catholic').
[75] PRONI, D/989/B/5/3 (Papers of the SILRA, Memos, Reports etc.)
[76] PRONI, D/989/B/5/2.
[77] PRONI, D/989/B/1/2 (Papers of the SILRA, Minutes).
[78] PRONI, D/989/B/5/2.

as much by their diminishing customer base, as by deliberate intimidation and boycotting. Even by March 1929, when Relief Secretary, I.H.G. White, conducted his visit to Ireland on behalf of SILRA, there remained a 'poorer class of loyalist sufferers' with 'no resources to fall back on'.[79] The 'plight of many of these people, *through no fault of their own* [my emphasis], is really pitiful'.[80] Loyalty is in this sense portrayed not as something positively asserted, but simply acquired through circumstance, or career choice: men who 'loyally served' in the RIC or the Armed Forces were, post-independence, obvious and unwanted reminders of British law and order in Ireland, but it was 'no fault' of theirs that, during the revolution of 1916–23, their position became untenable.

The dilemma is captured in fiction: the protagonist in Sebastian Barry's *The Whereabouts of Eneas McNulty*, joined the merchant navy for an adventure and the RIC for a steady job, on his return from World War I. 'I did what I did, and I was trying to make my way, just like you', he explained to Jonno, his former best friend who had taken the alternative path and joined the IRA.[81] Catholic Eneas had not made a conscious, political decision to separate himself from the community where he grew up, but for his 'time in the peelers' he was marked out 'as a traitor and a betrayer of your brothers'.[82] His flight from Sligo and attempts, in various parts of the world, to come to terms with his Irish identity, is the subject of Barry's novel. Real life RIC county inspector in Limerick, John M. Regan, whose memoirs were published in 2007, was also a Catholic and, after 1921, had to reconsider not only his place in the force, but also his complex set of allegiances in independent Ireland.[83]

The question of agency is important: both the (real and fictional) policemen, Regan and McNulty, suffered for their perceived allegiance to Britain. Whether they had consciously acted in a 'loyal' way, out of some kind of devotion to the British state, is more difficult to ascertain. 'The problem of ex-Service men in Southern Ireland' was 'one peculiar to that country':

> Every man was a volunteer and went under special promises of his future care made by the British Government. These promises have almost entirely remained unfulfilled…In addition when the British Government left Southern Ireland they left these men and their families to the mercy of those who were their bitterest enemies.[84]

There were, of course, specific pension arrangements for ex-RIC and retired Armed Forces,[85] as well as charitable 'soldiers and sailors' organisations.[86] The IGC 'took serious account' of the provision made for policemen in the Constabulary (Ireland) Act (1922) including: compensation allowance, disturbance allowance, free travelling

[79] PRONI, D/989/B/5/2. SILRA continued to provide information and raise funds and awareness into the 1950s.
[80] PRONI, D/989/B/5/2.
[81] S. Barry, *The Whereabouts of Eneas McNulty* (London, 1998), 81.
[82] Barry, *Whereabouts of Eneas McNulty*, 81, 104.
[83] J.M. Regan and J. Augusteijn (ed.), *The memoirs of John M. Regan: a Catholic officer in the RIC and RUC, 1909–1948* (Dublin, 2007).
[84] PRONI, D/989/B/5/2.
[85] 'Irish Free State. Compensation for injury to persons and property. Memorandum', p.6, 1923, Cmd 1844, XVIII.115.
[86] PRONI, D/989/B/1/2.

warrants and separation allowance.[87] Attempts by veterans to 'pick up the pieces of their civilian lives' were made vastly more complicated, though, by political changes at home.[88] Just as demobilised soldiers of the Habsburg armies saw the order they had fought for 'evaporate' after the war, the sacrifice of the male Irish appeared futile when the 'British Army turned against their country' during the War of Independence.[89] Ex-soldiers and policemen became targets, within their own communities, of arson, intimidation, murder and maiming. During the Civil War, these men (and their families) were left feeling isolated and betrayed not only by their Irish attackers, but by the British Government they once served. Patrick Maher, Co. Tipperary, was caught in this awkward position. The father of a 'spy' (his son had allegedly given information to the RIC during the War of Independence), Maher was driven from his job in Thurles and no longer felt welcome in his local community. Yet neither was help forthcoming from outside: 'I was a British Soldier myself for some time', Maher explained to the IGC, 'but I have nothing out of them'.[90]

Not only was British allegiance (in the form of armed service) poorly rewarded in financial terms, then, but Maher's remarks for one do not denote feelings of pride towards Britain, nor a bond of responsibility between the UK Government and its Loyal servants. The *Church of Ireland Gazette* called British Loyalty 'an affair of the heart', but I have found that these positive, emotional ties were largely absent in the Munster communities I studied.[91] 'Loyalist' may be more usefully analysed, by contrast, as a label stamped on individuals by outsiders, whether perpetrators of attacks, looking for convenient identifiers and justifications for violence, or the government committees and charitable organisations charged and with picking up the pieces of war. Pressure groups and support agencies such as SILRA and the ICCA served a particular kind of 'Loyalist' defined by their financial circumstances as much as their religion or politics.

The first objective of SILRA, as outlined in its constitution, was:

> To keep before the Public *without distinction of Party or Religion* [my emphasis] the great hardships endured by Loyalists and ex-Service men under conditions in Southern Ireland, and to take steps to minimise their sufferings.[92]

In practice, of course, most of those helped were Protestants and SILRA worked in cooperation with charities like the Protestants' Orphans Society. There may have been 'no stranger sight', in the words of Eneas McNulty, than the 'fallen' Protestant 'with no money or land',[93] but the impoverished Protestant was a very real, if problematic, figure in Irish society. Indeed, the notion of 'universal Protestant wealth' is one of the 'pivotal misperceptions' of the non-Catholic minority challenged by Heather Crawford in her 2010 study of 'Protestants and Irishness'. She argues that an 'emotional legacy of past wrongs' shaped Catholic-Protestant tensions well into the twentieth century.[94] The seizure, occupation and exploitation of land by Protestant

[87] TNA, CO 762/212: the RIC Tribunal dealt with 4000 applications between April 1922 and spring 1924, awarding 1990 grants totalling £119,234.
[88] C. Fischer, *Europe between democracy and dictatorship: 1900–1945* (Chichester, 2011), 102.
[89] Fischer, *Europe between democracy and dictatorship*, 102–3.
[90] TNA, CO 762/55/14: Maher, Tipperary; see Chapter 4.
[91] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 21 Sept. 1923.
[92] PRONI, D/989/B/5/6.
[93] Barry, *Whereabouts of Eneas McNulty*, 100.
[94] H.K. Crawford, *Outside the glow: Protestants and Irishness in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 2010), 22.

settlers, and the elite position of the Protestant landowning elite during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, led to particularly bitter and long-held resentments of Protestant economic dominance and unfair privilege.[95] It is true that Catholics had made 'considerable headway by 1922' in overcoming their subordinate economic position.[96] The middle-class, Catholic farmer or 'grazier', who had done well out of land-purchase legislation and had high hopes for prosperity in independent Ireland, is a key character in this thesis.[97] Yet the 'change in the balance' did not diminish anger at perceived Protestant affluence.[98] That 'there's no such thing a poor Protestant' was not a myth that could be shifted easily.[99]

The Association for the Relief of Distressed Protestants (ARDP, founded in 1836) also complained of the lack of awareness amongst well-off Protestants of the extreme poverty and distress which existed within their own community.[100] The ARDP focused on urban poverty and was largely Dublin-centred in its operations. It should be noted that the years 1920–22 passed 'almost unremarked' in the annals of the Association. A 'wartime economy' lasted until 1920, and 1923 was noted for the 'steady progress' of the Protestant poor, before the return of unemployment and hardship in the 1930s.[101] However, myths and misunderstandings aside, 'needy' and 'Protestant' were characteristics at the heart of Loyalist identity—and had been for a number of years. During the crisis over the third Home Rule Bill, Conservative groups in England had rallied in support of Protestants of all classes who, it was feared, would be forced out of Ulster by the imposition of Home Rule on the whole island. By April 1914, the Women's Amalgamated Unionist and Tariff Reform Association (WUTRA) had received £12000 cash and the promise of hospitality for 5000 refugees 'in the event of the government using force to coerce Ulster into accepting the authority of a Dublin parliament'.[102] Middle and upper-class women in rural Sussex, for example, were prepared to house Irish refugees, should the fears articulated in the 'Help the Ulster Women and Children' campaign literature be realised: bloodshed, dislocation and starvation for Ulster families.[103] The First World War, of course, put Home Rule on ice and with the Easter Rising (1916) and Sinn Féin's electoral victory two years later, the moderate, constitutional nationalism of the Irish Parliamentary Party had been eclipsed by something much more radical and republican (and the Partition of Ireland looked to be unavoidable). Yet concern for "those who love the Union Jack"[104] remained—and while the withdrawal of British forces did not precipitate the religious 'civil war' predicted by some Conservative voices, ideas of British Loyalty retained a distinctly denominational tinge during 1922–23.

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[95] Crawford, *Outside the glow*, 23.
[96] Crawford, *Outside the glow*, 146.
[97] See Chapter 3, Sections iii and v, in particular.
[98] Crawford, *Outside the glow*, 146.
[99] Crawford, *Outside the glow*, Chapter 6, 137–168.
[100] M. Maguire, 'A socio-economic analysis of the Dublin Protestant working class, 1870–1926', *Irish Economic and Social History*, 20 (1993), 35–61 at 36.
[101] K. Milne, *Protestant aid 1836–1986: a history of the Association for the Relief of Distressed Protestants* (Dublin, 1989), 18.
[102] D. Thackeray, 'Home and politics: women and Conservative activism in early twentieth century Britain', *Journal of British Studies*, 49, no. 4 (Oct. 2010), 826–848 at 832.
[103] Thackeray, 'Home and politics', *JBS*, 832, 834.
[104] Phrase used in WUTRA campaign literature; see Thackeray, 'Home and politics', *JBS*, 832.

iii. Religion

a) National and international trends

The swift and substantial decline of the 'minority' population in Southern Ireland between 1911 and 1926 is well acknowledged.[105] The reasons for and precise timing of the change are more difficult to pinpoint, because of the long interval between the two censuses and the controversial nature of the relationship between migration and persecution on religious or political grounds. Interpretations depend, of course, on the meaning of 'minority'. The term can be used loosely to cover all ex-Unionists, the British army and public servants in Ireland, but is often equated simply with the Protestant community.[106] Some historians avoid these definitional issues by focusing explicitly on the religious minority. Dooley, for example, tackles the 'plight of the Monaghan Protestants' during 1912–26.[107] A victim's denomination is something (generally) unchanging that can be fairly easily traced; 'Unionism', by contrast, especially outside Ulster, may have only ever been a 'passive, unexpressed preference'.[108] Unionists in Munster, in particular, did not have the numerical strength, social networks and opportunities for political action enjoyed—as Dooley and Farry have shown—by Protestants and Unionists in Counties like Monaghan and Sligo.[109] In researching social and political violence, I excluded preconceived categories relating to religious and political affiliations from my methodology; I categorise acts of intimidation thematically (boycott, attacks on animals, land seizure etc.) and not according to the victim's denomination. I do acknowledge, though, that the religious and political minority—however this was defined—had a particular experience of wartime Munster. Protestants and those with a connection with the British administration in Ireland were targeted with violence and intimidation resulting, in many cases, in their departure from the Free State.

Between 1911 and 1926, the Irish Protestant population, across the 26 counties comprising the Free State, fell by 33% (compared with a total population decline of 5%). 'Protestant' here includes Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists and Baptists, and excludes any other sect. Enda Delaney favours a long-term interpretation of the phenomenon: the departure of Protestants was a trend already established before independence, influenced by economic and social factors, like disbandment, or the decline of the landlord class. Still, he does concede that of a total decrease of around 100,000 in the population of minority religions in Ireland (in the 26 counties, between 1911–26) only one quarter of emigrants was ex-British army, police or their dependents. 'At the very least over 60,000 Protestants who were not directly connected with the British administration left southern Ireland between 1911 and 1926'.[110] And Peter Hart believes that the 'suddenness and scale of this movement eliminates any long-term demographic explanations'. For him, 1921–23 represented, in West Cork at least, the 'crucial years' for the purging of the religious minority from Southern Ireland.[111] Indeed, the 'most dramatic expulsions of non-Catholics seen in

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[105] E. Delaney, *Demography, state and society: Irish migration to Britain, 1921–1971* (Liverpool, 2000), 72.
[106] D. Kennedy, *The widening gulf: northern attitudes to the independent Irish state, 1919–49* (Belfast, 1988), 151.
[107] Dooley, *The plight of the Monaghan Protestants, 1912–1926* (Dublin, 2000).
[108] P. Hart, *The IRA at war, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 2003), 229.
[109] Dooley, *Plight of the Monaghan Protestants*; M. Farry, *The aftermath of Revolution: Sligo, 1921–23* (Dublin, 2000).
[110] Delaney, *Demography, state and society*, 71–2.
[111] Hart, *IRA at war*, 226.

the South' during the revolution occurred in Cork city between March and July 1922; Gerard Murphy reports that the most severe decline took place in the south-east corner of Cork city and links the exodus with the alleged rounding up and shooting of Protestant teenage 'spies' in this area in 1921.[112] For Hart, sectarianism was 'embedded in the vocabulary and the syntax of the Irish revolution'. Violence and intimidation, not social and economic factors, drove thousands of Protestants out of Ireland:

> Munster, Leinster, and Connaught can take their place with fellow imperial provinces, Silesia, Galicia, and Bosnia, as part of the post-war 'un-mixing of peoples' in post-war Europe.[113]

As a term, 'ethnic cleansing' gained wide currency in 1992, during the struggle amongst Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, in the former Yugoslavia.[114] But the expression was first used at the end of World War II,[115] by Poles and Czechs seeking to 'purify' countries of ethnically undesirable elements (Germans and Ukrainians in the case of Galicia, referred to in Hart, above).[116] Not that the repressive actions encompassed by this phrase—from deportations, to expulsion, to genocide—accurately describe the fate of Protestants in the 26 counties after independence. Hart himself is cautious here: 'We must not exaggerate. The Free State government had no part in persecution'. In Southern Ireland there was 'no plan, no ideology, and no institutional support for continental-style ethnic cleansing'.[117] 'Going over the brink', from ethnic conflict to 'perpetuation of murderous cleansing', by definition 'requires some state coherence and capacity'; it generally occurs in an 'unstable geopolitical environment' (like war), when the state exercising sovereignty over the contested territory has become factionalised and radicalised and attempts to assert control over the ethnic minority.[118]

There was no state-sanctioned murder or expulsion of Protestants in Ireland during 1922–23. The 'extermination or expatriation of the Irish Protestants' predicted 'a few years' hence from the withdrawal of the RIC and British Army, did not take place.[119] A 'campaign of persecution is in progress' against Protestants, reported the *Church of Ireland Gazette*, on 6 October 1922, but it was not, the newspaper stressed, orchestrated by the government, nor supported by the majority of the 'Irish people'. The government reserved the use of violence and repressive legislation for the republican minority, that is, the anti-Treaty army wrecking havoc in the counties. The safety of the religious minority, by contrast, was fairly closely guarded. Indeed, the Free State was at pains to appear just in their treatment of Protestants; the new government did not want to be judged badly by the outside world. Dennis Kennedy argues the Free State did, overall, receive good press for its handling of the religious

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[112] G. Murphy, *The year of disappearances: political killings in Cork, 1920–1921* (Dublin, 2010), 247, 324.
[113] Hart, *IRA at war*, 240.
[114] M. Mann, *The dark side of democracy: explaining ethnic cleansing* (Cambridge, 2005), 356.
[115] Mann, *Dark side of democracy*, 17: term 'ethnic cleansing' invented in 1944 by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin.
[116] P. Ther and A. Siljak (eds.), *Redrawing nations: ethnic cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948* (Oxford, 2001), 1.
[117] Hart, *IRA at war*, 245.
[118] Mann, *Dark side of democracy*, 7.
[119] TNA, CO 906/38: *The Weekly Summary*, 20 May 1921.

question.[120] A government report on a flare-up of land agitation in Co. Laois, in 1922, emphasised the 'danger that will arise, both in Ulster, and in England, should the impression…gain ground' that attacks on the Luggacurran estate were 'influenced by sectarian feeling'.[121] 'What will America think of our using our new found liberty…to persecute our fellow countrymen because of their religion', asked the 'Catholic citizens of Ballina' in a petition to Arthur Griffith. The signatories opposed the 'discreditable' campaign of intimidatory notices and 'threatened expulsion' of Protestants in Mayo. They argued not for the special treatment of Protestants, but for the restoration of law and order and continued 'goodwill' with their 'decent fellow citizens'.[122] The *Church of Ireland Gazette* agreed: Protestants must not expect a 'position of privilege in the Irish Free State'. And 'Mr Griffith' and his government, it claimed, delivered just that: a 'square deal' for the religious minority.[123]

Armenians living in Turkey in 1915–17, or the 1.56 million Greeks and Turks forced to move abroad in 1923, as well as the millions of Central and Eastern European ethnic groups murdered or made refugees by German and Soviet governments during and after World War II, suffered an infinitely more brutal fate, during their respective periods of social and political upheaval. Still, while we are dealing with a scaled-down and much less severe instance of the 'un-mixing' process, this thesis will show how victims of arson, intimidation and violence against the person were defined not only by their religion, but were marked out by their common descent or culture—what may loosely be called 'ethnicity'. The around 4 to 5% of the population who were Protestants in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford,[124] were members of a minority group with a meaningful identity—in which religion was closely entwined with, for example, social status, land ownership and British service—and they suffered violence and intimidation because of this status.

The human tendency to 'cleave, compare and exaggerate contrasts', leading to conflict with members of the out-group, is observable in a number of contexts and countries; this does not make its outcomes any more acceptable, but it does encourage historians and sociologists to look for the rationale or objectives of ethnically targeted violence, 'beyond the killing and infliction of hurt'.[125] During the War of Independence, for example, attacks on Protestants could be justified on military terms; minorities were collateral damage in a war against British 'collaborators or informers'. However, the fact that the attacks on civilians 'resumed after the Treaty and British withdrawal indicates the salience of religion or ethnicity as a determinant of violence'.[126] House burnings, assaults, boycotts etc. did not serve an obviously military plan; their purpose was to drive the victim away.

This intimidation, explored throughout the thesis, was not the work of 'angry mobs'.[127] Southern Protestants were not victims of the 'ethnic riot', that is, an intense, sudden and lethal—but nonetheless planned and 'patterned'—attack 'by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic group'.[128]

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[120] Kennedy, *Widening gulf*, 51.
[121] NAI, Records of the Department of the Taoiseach, S566: 'Laois Land Agitation, 1922'.
[122] NAI, S565: **'**Petition to Arthur Griffith, 4 May 1922'.
[123] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 13 Jan. 1922. On 18 Aug. 1922, the *Gazette* reported with 'shock' on the death of Arthur Griffith, who was 'regarded by all creeds and classes as the man able to guide' Ireland's destiny.
[124] See Table 2. No accurate population data for 1922–23.
[125] D.L. Horowitz, *The deadly ethnic riot* (London, 2001), 1, 42, 47, 424.
[126] Hart, *IRA at war*, 243
[127] Hart, *IRA at war*, 244.
[128] Horowitz, *Deadly ethnic riot*, 1–2.

Riotous attacks on Protestants had, allegedly, occurred in Ireland in 1913. In his far from neutrally titled *Intolerance in Ireland*, 'An Irishman' recalled one incident in Limerick: attendees at a Unionist meeting on land legislation, in the Theatre Royal, Limerick, were 'stoned and chased by a Catholic mob'. Protestants shops were wrecked and windows smashed in Protestant churches, halls and schools. These acts, he continued, were a 'daily occurrence' with sectarian conspiracy at the heart: the opening of a branch of the Ancient Order of Hibernians explained the outbreak and the perpetrators of the damage and assault 'all got off, as everyone knew they would'.[129] Neither such attacks, nor comparably bitter accusations, resurfaced during the Civil War. Still, what Donald Horowitz identifies as the two 'general aims'[130] of the riot—'degradation' and 'homogenisation'[131]—apply to the Civil War experience. Violence and intimidation were used, first of all, to degrade the victim, that is, to humiliate or take revenge. Chapter Four, 'Violence against the person', demonstrates how past service in the RIC or British Army was punished with kidnap, murder and assault. Arson and intimidation, explored in Chapters Two and Three, served to teach a bad employer a lesson, reclaim land from a grabber or grazier, or settle old scores over trespass. 'Homogenisation' approaches 'genocidal aims more closely' and, as discussed, Irish Protestants were not subject to ethnic cleansing. Yet perpetrators of intra-community violence in Munster did 'want members of the target group' (a group identified by its religious, cultural and political loyalties, that is, Protestants, ex-British Servicemen and landlords) to 'disappear'[132]—to die, or to leave Ireland.[133]

b) Munster

Not all historians place religion at the centre of their understanding of the Irish revolution. Hart's controversial conclusions, for example, have not been borne out by other local studies. These alternative perspectives do not necessarily undermine Hart's bold research: heightened religious tensions are perhaps to be expected in a county with Cork's particular conditions—including a 'sizable' urban Protestant population in Cork city.[134] Yet Marie Coleman argues that relations between the Protestant community and republican movement in Co. Longford were reasonably peaceful.[135] And while Protestants in Cos. Monaghan and Sligo suffered in economic boycotts,[136] there was not the same level of violent intimidation that resulted in mass departures in Cork.[137] Dooley argues that 'Protestants…living under Dublin rule had less to grieve about than Catholics' in the North;[138] some local Protestant voices in Munster would seem to agree. Attendees at the 'large and representative meeting' in Nenagh, Co. Tipperary, on 15 April 1922, condemned the 'atrocities' in Belfast (incursions against Catholics by the security forces of the new Northern Ireland government). The meeting demanded: 'our fellow Roman Catholic countrymen in the Northern Parliament must be treated in the same way as we Southern Protestants'.[139] There were no claims, from this minority group, that their experience had been anything

[129] 'An Irishman', *Intolerance in Ireland* (London, 1913), 114–17.
[130] Horowitz, *Deadly ethnic riot*, 424.
[131] Horowitz, *Deadly ethnic riot*, 430–33.
[132] Horowitz, *Deadly ethnic riot*, 433.
[133] See Chapter 3.
[134] Hart, *The IRA and its enemies: violence and community in Cork, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 1998), 40–1.
[135] M. Coleman, *County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910–1923* (Dublin, 2006), 155–7.
[136] Farry, *Aftermath of Revolution*, 189–90, 206.
[137] Hart, *IRA at war*, 223.
[138] Dooley, *Plight of the Monaghan Protestants*, 58–9.
[139] *Nenagh Guardian*, 15 Apr. 1922.

other than peaceful. The same conciliatory attitude was on display at a 'special meeting of the Limerick Corporation', on 30 March 1922. The 'position of Belfast Catholics' was discussed and attacks on Protestants were condemned (in particular, the burning of the pavilion at the Protestant Young Men's Association Grounds, Farranshone, Limerick City). Alderman Michael Colivet TD also called the firing into Protestant houses in Limerick (during March 1922) underhand and 'immoral'; the Mid-Limerick Brigade of the IRA dissociated itself from such incidents.[140] The *Church of Ireland Gazette* further proclaimed, in July 1922, that the 'present is an excellent time for the welding together of those interests in Irish life which, for a hundred years, have been opposed to each other', and it was the particular duty of the Church of Ireland population to 'put the prejudices of generations behind them' and support the government.[141]

These reports, of course, came before the Civil War began in earnest: following the confrontation at the Four Courts, in Dublin on 28–30 June 1922, the battle spread to the counties. The most intensive fighting took place in July and August 1922, in the battle for Munster. The Free State Army and anti-Treaty IRA clashed in the streets of the major towns, in ambushes in more rural parts and vied for control of local barracks. Alongside and away from the military conflict, attacks on and by civilians continued and there is evidence from Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford that violence and intimidation were used in an instrumental way, to clear out the old Protestant enemy, during the Civil War. The downwards trend may have been underway before the Civil War, but, between 1911–26, Munster experienced the largest percentage drop in its Protestant population, of the four provinces.[142] When and why did these Protestants leave?

There are no accurate figures for the number of Protestants in the three counties at the outbreak of the Civil War; the demographer's task is complicated by the absence of any data from 1921, when the census was abandoned during the War of Independence.[143] However, with the information available from the 1911 census, we can categorise the population of the three Munster counties, in this year at least, according to religion; even before the revolution and departure of the British administration in Ireland, Protestants comprised a small minority in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford; see Table 2.

Table 2: Populations of the three Munster counties, 1911

	Limerick		**Tipperary**		**Waterford**	
Roman Catholic	135292	95.49%	142193	94.73%	76502	94.76%
Protestant	6247	4.41%	7884	5.25%	4056	5.02%
Other	148	0.10%	24	0.02%	171	0.21%
TOTAL	**141687**		**150101**		**80729**	

Source: Returns of the Census of Ireland (1911)

'Protestant' in Table 2 includes Anglicans (Church of Ireland, England or Scotland, as declared on the Census form), Presbyterians, Methodists and Baptists. 'Other' includes Quakers, Jews, Plymouth Brethren, 'Independent' and cases of 'information

[140] *Limerick Leader*, 31 Mar. 1922.
[141] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 28 July 1922.
[142] Delaney, *Demography, state and society*, 299, 305. Refers to provinces within the 26 counties of the Free State only; Ulster comprises Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan, in these calculations.
[143] A. Mitchell, *Revolutionary government in Ireland: Dáil Éireann, 1919–22* (Dublin, 1995), 241.

refused' (and excludes any other response, or a blank, in the section for religion). Anglicanism was the most common Protestant sect in all three counties, comprising 78% of Protestants in Co. Limerick in 1911, 89% in Tipperary and 84% in Waterford.[144]

The religious make-up of the counties in 1926 cannot be studied in comparable detail until the census returns are opened to the public (in 2027). Still, Delaney's figures for 'percentage change' in the Protestant and non-Protestant populations of the 26 counties do give some sense of the impact this period had on an already small minority. Between 1911 and 1926, the populations of Cos. Tipperary, Waterford and Limerick fell by 7%, 6% and 2% respectively. The Protestant population dropped by 49%, 45% and 41% in Cos. Tipperary, Limerick and Waterford.[145] Irish Protestants were in decline at a much faster rate than non-Protestants in these three counties. Voluntary migration and death may be as much at the root of this change as enforced flight or cultural pressures (high death rates and low marital fertility, for example, had long affected Protestants).[146] Still, a disproportionate number of those leaving Ireland during 1911–26 were Protestants and this does require explanation.

Individual statements portray a feeling that what they experienced was part of a wider victimisation: 'as a Protestant loyalist', Richard Hughes, of Mullinahone, Co. Tipperary, suffered harassment and his home was damaged when hay was brought inside and burnt. One of the attackers—identified by the victim as 'IRA'—told Hughes that he and 'every Protestant Loyalist would soon be cleared out of the Country'.[147] Claimants did not necessarily mention their religion on the compensation form, but in Hughes' case it was possible to verify his Protestantism in the Census returns: 'Church of Ireland'. Hughes, aged 23 in 1911, described himself as a 'landowner' and was resident in Drangan, Tipperary—just two miles from Mullinahone, where the Civil War attacks took place.[148] Copies of the threatening letters in circulation during the Civil War are sometimes contained in the compensation files: some were anonymous, but, in others, notes issued on behalf of the IRA made specific threats against the Protestant community.[149]

Outside urban centres like Waterford city, where there was a concentrated working-class Protestant population (in certain areas, like John's Hill, in particular), the religious minority was small and dispersed enough to make it likely that local Protestants were known in the community. The solicitor investigating Edward Scales' compensation claim, on behalf of the Free State:

> Had been informed by some Catholic clergymen who know the applicant that he…suffered a good deal during our own trouble and was apparently singled out specially to be victimised. I may mention that he is a Protestant and one of the few living in the district and one of the Reverend Clergymen…said that he believed that had a good deal to do with his being burned out.[150]

[144] Census of Ireland (online database).
[145] Delaney, *Demography, state and society*, 299, 305.
[146] Delaney, *Demography, state and society*, 295.
[147] TNA, CO 762/90/6: Hughes, Tipperary.
[148] Census of Ireland (online database).
[149] See Chapter 3 for notices received by Protestants e.g. Willie Roe, Ada Vere-Hunt.
[150] NAI, 392/522: Scales, Limerick.

Scales' stationmaster's cottage in Foynes, Co. Limerick, was completely gutted by fire on 29 June 1922. The Protestant railway worker had demonstrated his British loyalty in other ways, over the years. The neighbour who received the family in the early hours, when Scales' house was 'a mass of flames', recalled:

> I know the Scales were Unionists in politics and that they supplied teas to the soldiers camped at the stations and also that they boarded Naval officers, all of which made them objectionable to the Irregulars and I think this partly accounts for the burning.[151]

The railways were, of course, a particularly dangerous place to work during the war. Scales' religion may have had little to do with the burning of the station buildings, as the Irregulars endeavoured to sabotage infrastructure and undermine the authority of the Free State.[152] Still, if Scales was already marked out in Foynes as the lone, local Protestant, the violent attacks on his home and subsequent impoverishment (see above, this Chapter), must have only increased the isolation. Indeed, the 1911 Census recorded just 13 (Church of Ireland) Protestants living in Foynes Town: 'locomotive fireman' (later stationmaster), Edward Scales, lived with his wife and four children; another (older) Edward Scales headed another family of seven. Births, deaths or children leaving home may have altered the numbers by the time of the Civil War, but railway worker Edward (aged 49, by 1922), and his family, were still in living in Foynes—up until the fiery attack.[153]

Land steward Samuel Doupe's denomination was no secret either and again it was during the Civil War, rather than earlier periods of conflict, that his personal, political and religious allegiances were called violently into question. Doupe had worked at Kilboy House, Nenagh, Co. Tipperary for 25 years, running the estate in the absence of Lord Dunalley.[154] His loyal service to Dunalley, demonstrated in their personal correspondence,[155] and his symbolic position as a guardian of elite, big house advantages, cannot have made Doupe popular locally. The 'privileged position' of herdsmen and stewards on big estates had, since mid-nineteenth century Tipperary, marked out individuals like Doupe (with his salary and free cabin) for violent attack.[156] Indeed, it was 'devoted servant' Doupe who wrote to Dunalley on 6 August 1922, to break the bad news: 'My Lord, Kilboy is in ruins and the front yard is burned to ashes'. With the farming machinery destroyed, 'I don't see how we can carry on' and Doupe knew he was done for without his British protector: 'I suppose I will have to go at once to England as a refugee perhaps you may be able to get me some job…its no use I going [sic] to Limerick for it[']s in a state of war'. Going back to the burnt-out house to make arrangements was 'extremely dangerous': Doupe had been

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[151] TNA, CO 762/138/10: Scales, Limerick.

[152] See Chapter 2 on damage to the railways and Chapter 4 on attacks on railway workers.

[153] Census of Ireland (online database).

[154] The fourth Lord Dunalley (barony cr. 1800) was Henry O'Callaghan Prittie (1851–1927). He was a JP, Lieutenant for Co. Tipperary and a Representative Peer for Ireland since 1891.

[155] National Library of Ireland (NLI), MS 29,810 (Dunalley Papers, of the Prittie family Lords Dunalley, 1665–1937).

[156] M. Beames, 'Rural conflict in pre–Famine Ireland: peasant assassinations in Tipperary, 1837–1847', in C.H.E. Philpin, *Nationalism and popular protest in Ireland* (Cambridge, 1987), 264–283 at 274. William McKenna (TNA, CO 762/137/6: McKenna, Co Tipperary), whose wife and son were viciously attacked in August 1922, was a steward at Golden Grove, Co. Tipperary. With his position came a free house, supplies including milk and coal, and a job for his son, together worth around £160 pa. See Chapter 4.

shot in the left hand during a raid on his own residence and 'armed men' gave him 'one month to get out of the place'. The injury to his finger rendered Doupe 'useless for manual labour', but he remained in Nenagh for a few months, attempting to sell off the animals and gather information for Dunalley's compensation claim. Yet by November 1922, it was in 'fear for my safety' that Doupe 'reluctantly' left Tipperary and found work in Fivemiletown, Co Tyrone.[157] Sectarian language permeates Doupe's account of his departure from Munster: he was 'privately and confidentially informed while preparing to leave' not to return 'otherwise I would be shot as I was looked upon as an ultra loyalist'. The raiders themselves 'indicat[ed] that it was in consequence of being a Protestant…that I was set upon'.[158] Dunalley verified his steward's statement and also provided references for the compensation claims of his head keeper, William Mollison[159] and Denis Carroll,[160] a small farmer from nearby Nenagh, whose house was burned and (during the War of Independence) his police constable son, John, murdered.[161]

Conclusion

Neither Dunalley, nor Charles Bryan, of Co. Waterford, felt secure in the protection offered for the minority religion by the new government. From February 1922, Bryan was repeatedly intimidated, pressed for money and 'threatened with death'. On the night of 14 June 1922, the 'armed men' returned again and 'rushed about [the] house with flashlights shouting for me and threatening [my] life'. Bryan, still in his nightclothes, escaped from a window and hid in a field. He spent 20 weeks away from home (hiding first in Glenbeg, near Dungarvan, then in Lismore) and alleged that while he was away, the IRA visited his family and beat his son (who they accused of giving information to British soldiers). The son died in September 1925 and Bryan's wife 'never recovered from the shock' and died a year later. His attackers told Bryan:

> We want this place for ourselves. Your backers are gone now and you must clear out too as your equals have no right to be in this country.

Bryan, a Protestant and 'strong supporter' of the British Government throughout 'the period of the trouble', had been left in a vulnerable position by the withdrawal of the RIC and British forces in 1922. It was, he explained, after the 'rebels who had been arrested by the British were released' that his family was molested, his wife and son died and he was left a 'broken man'. Yet neither did Bryan find a new 'backer' in the Free State administration: on the run in June 1922, Bryan claims he went to Dublin and was told by 'some member of the government' that 'I could get no protection'.[162]

Thus attempts at religious inclusion—from W.T. Cosgrave's gesture of goodwill in the nomination of high-profile Protestants and Ascendancy figures to the Senate,[163] to local expressions of support for troubled Northern Catholics—seem to have been fairly short lived. Was this indicative of a broader failure, on both sides of the Irish Sea, of government responsibility towards victims of violence? Certainly it

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[157] NLI, MS 29,810(17): 'Correspondence of Lord Dunalley 1922'; see Chapter 2.
[158] TNA, CO 762/39/10: Doupe, Tipperary.
[159] TNA, CO 762/74/3: Mollison, Tipperary.
[160] TNA, CO 762/48/9: Carroll, Tipperary.
[161] See R. Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland 1919–1922* (Dublin, 2000), 199.
[162] TNA, CO 762/111/5: Bryan, Waterford.
[163] William Thomas Cosgrave (1880–1965): Chairman of the Provisional Government and then President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, that is, the head of government, or prime minister; this position replaced by the Taoiseach in 1937.

was the job of British pressure groups to promote the image of the blameless 'Loyalist' and therefore justify their charitable and lobbying roles. The perspectives of the British and Free State Governments, by contrast, were shaped less by victims' neediness and more by wider economic and political concerns. That certain groups were deliberately treated badly by either government, then, may be difficult to prove, but the compensation process does reveal certain biases and priorities—SILRA and ICCA believed, with some good reason, that their 'Loyalist' clients were seen as less worthy of assistance and suffered prejudice because of who they were. The accusation from the ICCA, that the Free State evaded payments to certain individuals through 'unjust counter claims' (deducting 'alleged arrears of Income Tax' from compensation) is borne out in some cases.[164]

Other specific complaints were made about the handling of claims by the Irish courts—the first stage in the compensation process.[165] Gerald Cooney of Ballyard, Co. Tipperary, was 'forcibly removed' from his home, his animals and possessions destroyed and 'personal injuries' inflicted on himself, his wife and children. Cooney claimed it was too dangerous to return to Ireland, but the State Solicitor investigating the case commented derisively that it was perfectly safe for Cooney to give evidence at the hearing; he did not, of course, and in December 1924, the county court judge dismissed the case altogether.[166] Alice Davis felt the court in Tipperary 'was unsympathetic and even hostile to my claim' for compensation, for the shooting of her constable husband.[167] A particular lack of compassion, it was felt, was displayed in the consideration of claims from large landowners. The ICCA suggested the judge at the local sessions in Co. Tipperary had been deliberately obstinate in the hearing of Ada Vere-Hunt's case for compensation, awarding nothing for the attacks on Longfield House (Cashel, Co. Tipperary) and allegedly responding to the accusation of cattle driving that 'grass was intended to be eaten by cattle'.[168]

The problem for families like the Vere-Hunts, with political, social and cultural roots in Britain and Ireland, was that during the Civil War they were caught more than ever between distinct authorities, neither wishing to accept full responsibility for their well-being. Persecution within their local community and unfavourable treatment at hands of the new government may have made the Free State unattractive for the Southern minority, but their historical link and dependence on Britain was also under review. The Vere-Hunts were paid by the IGC, but somewhat begrudgingly, after investigations into the legitimacy of their tenancy and speculation that they had paid money to the IRA to secure protection (not because of threats). In the high-profile cases of Senators John Bagwell and Sir John Keane, whose mansions Marfield (Co. Tipperary) and Cappoquin (Co. Waterford) were burned, the IGC refused to pay any compensation at all, on the grounds that their acceptance of a role in independent Ireland was incompatible with their allegiance to Britain.[169] The following chapters analyse these (and many more) cases in depth, illuminating victims' experiences of violence and (by looking beyond the administrative records) drawing out the meaning, function and intensity of the violent act.

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[164] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9: victims of large income tax deductions and a protracted compensation process included e.g. Major Morel, whose Tipperary mansion was burned; see Chapter 2.
[165] Kennedy, *Widening gulf*, 153.
[166] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9.
[167] TNA, CO 762/53/6: Davis, Tipperary; see Chapter 4.
[168] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9; see Chapter 3 on intimidation of the Vere-Hunts.
[169] See Chapter 2, Section ii.b.

Chapter Two: Arson[1]

Introduction

Fire compels and intrigues. In December 1922, railway stores in Waterford went up in a 'mighty blaze…seen for miles around' and 'citizens attracted by the brightening flare left their homes and congregated…to watch the devastating progress of the fire'.[2] It is only in recent times, though, that fiery destruction—long the stuff of local fascination and speculation—has been subject to historical analysis. In the early nineteenth century, for example, Ribbonmen used 'ruthless force'—including arson—to uphold an 'alternative system of law'. One particularly gruesome act of vengeance, against a farmer who had informed on members of the agrarian secret society, was the burning of Wildgoose Lodge, Co. Louth, in October 1816. The tragic events and controversial trial that followed were made into a 'gothic short story', but were never referred to in 'general histories' until Terence Dooley's 2007 study.[3] Fire is, certainly, one of the 'subjects which seem to engage Irish writers deeply'. Arson, Colm Tóibín observes, has a 'distinguished career' in Irish literature:

> From the extraordinary, incandescent prose of William Carleton's 'Wildgoose Lodge'…to the burning of big houses as the final act in novels (the locals arriving, the odd intimacy between the locals and the quality, the sense of the fire as the end of history) like Elizabeth Bowen's The Last September…Prose is attracted to fire.[4]

However, while the burning of the 'big house', in particular, has been spectacularly portrayed in Irish literature,[5] there had been little or no historical analysis of the role of arson in this dismantling of the old order until Dooley's *The decline of the big house in Ireland* (2001), which proved there were more big houses burned in every province during the Civil War, than during the War of Independence.[6]

This chapter also tackles burning as a historical subject. It examines arson as a form of social and political violence, seeking to build a profile of the type of property—and person—burnt out during the Civil War. Through a survey of the compensation claims it analyses: arson as a military tactic, the burning of the 'big house', the role of arson in the struggle over land, and the targeting of so-called British Loyalists. The chapter addresses the key question—running through the thesis—of the function of violence: were arsonists (anti-Treaty IRA or otherwise) pursuing new agendas, that is, a military and political campaign to destabilise the Free

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[1] Chapter 2 is based on my unpublished Master's dissertation: G. Clark, 'The fiery campaign: new agendas and ancient enmities in the Irish Civil War. A study of arson in three Munster counties' (M.St., University of Oxford, 2007). The Master's dissertation and this chapter draw on the same large body of archival material (compensation claims made to the British and Irish Governments). However, this Chapter is the Master's dissertation much expanded; it examines new sources (manuscripts, military and government reports), includes new and re-written Sections, and while most Figures (photographs of the burnt-out houses) appear in both the dissertation and the Chapter, Figure 4 is new for the doctoral thesis.

[2] *Munster Express*, 16 Dec. 1922.

[3] T.A.M. Dooely, *The murders at Wildgoose Lodge: agrarian crime and punishment in pre-Famine Ireland* (Dublin, 2007).

[4] C. Tóibín, *The Penguin book of Irish fiction* (London, 1999), xxi.

[5] See below, Section iii.

[6] Dooley, *The decline of the big house in Ireland* (Dublin, 2001), 189, 286–7.

State in protest against the Treaty and its failure to establish an Irish republic? Or, did the Civil War provide the conditions for final reckoning of ancient enmities, settling local scores and purging the community of the old enemies—tyrannical landlords, ex-servicemen, Southern Unionists and Protestants?

i. Arson and compensation in Munster

Of the 2018 compensation claims submitted to the British and Free State Governments for all types of wartime injury in the three counties, 1201 (59%) come from Tipperary, 645 (32%) from Limerick and 172 (9%) from Waterford. Based on recorded incidents, then, Tipperary is obviously the most violent county. However, what is significant about arson is that the prevalence of this violent act is not proportionately diminished in quieter counties, accounting for 18% of claims made for injuries sustained during the Civil War in County Limerick, 17% in Tipperary and 12% in Waterford. In other words, arson was not simply a by-product of a general atmosphere of violence and disorder and is remarkable for its particularly destructive and deliberate nature.

The first famous Civil War fire at the republican occupied Four Courts on 30 June 1922 was spectacular, but accidental. In the process of bombardment by the Free State, the wing housing the Public Records Office was destroyed; see Figure 3 [removed]. The attacks reported to the compensation bodies of the British and Irish Governments, on the other hand, depict arson as a conscious and vicious act of destruction. Chapter Three, on 'intimidation', explores the subjectivity of threat: the success of a demand for money, goods, or the individual's removal from the area depended on personal and financial factors and ultimately how seriously the victim viewed the verbal or written warnings served on him. In Loughill, Co. Limerick, for example, Patrick Courtney was ordered to quit the area or 'suffer the consequences'.[7] In this case, the ex-policeman felt sufficiently frightened and fled before finding out if 'the consequences' included the burning of his house or physical assault. Others stayed; violent threats were not always carried through. Arson was far less ambiguous: the highly symbolic and permanent destruction of a home, by fire, was a relatively fail-safe method of clearing out the target from the area—either until they could rebuild, or forever.

Fire certainly has both a tremendous destructive power and symbolically purifying effect; arson removes not only the house (or other target), but all evidence of life. In her famous examination of 'religious violence' in sixteenth century France (attacks by Catholic crowds on Protestants, and vice versa), Natalie Zemon Davis showed how ritual violence was used to 'purify the religious community and humiliate the enemy':

> The religious significance of destruction by water or fire is clear… The fire that razes the house of a Protestant apothecary in Montpellier leaves behind it not the smell of death, of the heretic whom the crowd had hanged, but of spices, lingering in the air for days, like incense. If Protestants have rejected holy water and incense, they still follow Deuteronomy in accepting fire as a sacred means of purification.[8]

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[7] National Archives of Ireland (NAI), 392/18: Courtney, Limerick (Records of the Ministry of Finance, Un-catalogued compensation files: Series 392 (Limerick), 401 (Tipperary), 402 (Waterford)); see Chapter 3.

[8] N.Z. Davis, 'The rites of violence', in *Society and culture in early modern France: eight essays* (Stanford, Calif., 1975), 178–9.

Arson had a similarly 'purifying' effect in Bosnia in the 1990s and fire played an integral part in ethnic cleaning across the region: Prijedor, for example, was made 'Muslim and Croat free' by the burning of their neighbourhoods and homes.[9]

Figure 3 (Four Courts on fire, Dublin, 30 June 1922) has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.

Munster had seen some spectacular fires in its time: after the battle of the Boyne, for example, Tipperary town was burned down in a clash between William and James in 1690.[10] Crop and out-house burning had also been a key feature of the Land War violence of the 1870s and 1880s: official figures indicate that unlike 'crude personal violence', which was in decline as a mode of rural violence, the majority of burnings in Ireland at this time could be deemed 'agrarian'.[11] And during the War of Independence, arson formed part of the cycle of attack and reprisal between British auxiliary forces (like the Black and Tans) and the local IRA.[12] It is not inconceivable, then, that in communities where arson was a familiar criminal tactic, gangs of arsonists formed without clear political objectives. Subsequently there are, in all three counties, a handful of arson attacks where compensation was paid for personal squabbles (between neighbours over trespass, for example, or eviction).[13] Studies of arson during periods of conflict in nineteenth rural Britain, including 'Captain Swing' agitation in East Anglia, for example, and the 'Rebecca' riots in Wales, suggest fires in these cases were more often acts of private vengeance, rather than social or

[9] A. Stiglmayer (ed.), *Mass rape: the war against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (London, 1994), 86, 89.
[10] M. Hallinan, *Tipperary County: people and places* (Dublin, 1993), 138.
[11] C. Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983), 150–1.
[12] J. Augusteijn (ed.), *The Irish Revolution, 1913–1923* (Basingstoke, 2002), 156.
[13] In Limerick: NAI, 392/28, 122, 148, 191, 455, 466, 468. Tipperary: 401/329, 409, 756. Waterford: 402/409, 1023.

political violence.[14] It is worth mentioning, however, that John Archer did find evidence of 'collective community displays of protest' in this 'primarily…individual act of hatred and revenge';[15] until rural conditions in England improved in 1851, unemployment and poverty acted as 'trigger mechanisms'[16] for arson and crop burning was a 'legitimate weapon of protest'[17] by labourers against, for example, farmers who paid low wages.[18]

Few accounts tell us much about the men behind the petrol cans in Munster. J.A. Burke TD, claimed that the 30 to 40 strong band of armed arsonists that attacked his Co. Tipperary home 'were all under 20'.[19] Local reports suggest that the four middle-aged men 'with blackened faces', emerging from Woodrooffe after setting the Tipperary mansion alight, knew the house and surrounding area and may even have had help from the domestic staff. One of the armed men said to the owner, Major Perry: 'it is queer men you must have; we have been here the whole day'.[20] However, in only a few cases was the victim able, or willing, to identify the perpetrators. The armed men who ordered William Wilson to clear out of Coombawn House, Anglesborough, Co. Limerick, before burning the place, identified themselves as "Military"; whether they were anti-Treaty forces remains unknown.[21] This was a conflict in which—after September 1922 and the end of the military phase, in particular—the 'the torch and petrol tin' substituted the 'rifle' as a popular and accessible means of warfare. 'These weapons', warned Patrick Hogan, Minister for Agriculture, were 'much safer for the people who use them, but are at least as effective and much more dangerous to the civilian population'. Arson in Ireland was not just a republican tactic, but, according to Hogan, was utilised to devastating effect by 'a number of gangs, plus a number of individuals, all…with one common bond…a vested interest in anarchy'.[22]


Authorities certainly fear fire as an accessible means of popular violence: arson attacks on Parisian buildings during the final days of the Commune (1871), for example, were blamed on the pétroleuses (female supporters of the Commune, it was alleged, threw small bottles of kerosene into cellar windows, in a deliberate act of spite against the government).[23] Whether these women were responsible for the acts of which they were accused (or, indeed, whether they even existed) was less significant than the huge propaganda value of the female fire-starter: 'the pétroleuse lingered in people's minds, a powerful personification of evil with which to condemn the Commune and to question the very nature of woman'.[24] Indeed, the fact that arsonists cannot always be identified, nor strictly categorised as agents of social, political or criminal violence, does not lessen the impact of arson, nor devalue the study of burning as a wartime occurrence, at least not in Ireland during 1922–23.

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[14] John E. Archer, *By a flash and a scare: incendiarism, animal maiming, and poaching in East Anglia, 1815–1870* (Oxford, 1990); D.J.V. Jones, *Rebecca's children: a study of rural society, crime, and protest* (Oxford, 1989).
[15] Archer, *By a flash and a scare*, 159.
[16] Archer, *By a flash and a scare*, 196.
[17] Archer, *By a flash and a scare*, 6.
[18] Archer, *By a flash and a scare*, 22–3, 132, 147–8, 192.
[19] *Nenagh Guardian*, 3, 10 Mar. 1923. Burke may have exaggerated: the *Nenagh Guardian* claimed that Rockforest was visited by *seven* men 'who adopted the usual procedure, and set the floors ablaze'.
[20] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 10 Feb. 1923.
[21] NAI, 392/318: Wilson, Limerick.
[22] *Dáil Éireann Debates* (http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie), ii, 27 Mar. 1923.
[23] G.L. Gullickson, *Unruly women of Paris: images of the commune* (Ithaca, 1996), 13.
[24] Gullickson, *Unruly women of Paris*, 159–60.

Important patterns can be drawn from the collation of compensation data from the Free State and British Governments. The following statistics, of course, do not speak for all acts of arson committed during the Civil War. Rather, Figure 4 relates to the sample of 2018 compensation claims which were available for study for this thesis.[25] What is provided is a breakdown of the 108, 164 and 20 cases of arson, in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford respectively, categorised by what was burned.[26]

Figure 4: Arson attacks in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, January 1922–May 1923



'Public building or business' includes institutions like courthouses: 'Murroe Sessions House', a 'handsome' red brick building, was burned in March 1923.[27] Workhouses at Nenagh[28] and Clogheen were also destroyed, leaving 'Borstal boys and staff homeless'.[29] Striking in all three counties is the number of attacks on crops and outhouses serious enough for the victim to lodge a claim with the government. Grazing rights and redistribution were divisive issues during the war; the use of arson

[25] See thesis Introduction on archival exigencies.
[26] 'Cases of arson' take into account the overlapping compensation claims i.e. where claims were made to both governments for the same attack.
[27] *Nenagh Guardian*, 24 Mar. 1923.
[28] *Nenagh Guardian*, 10 Feb. 1923.
[29] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 11 Nov. 1922.


to settle land questions old and new is explored in Section iv. The most common type of building burned was, unsurprisingly, the small to medium sized private home. Still, the big house was disproportionately targeted during the war and Section iii asks why, during 1922–23 in particular, some of Munster's finest Protestant and Unionist owned mansions met a fiery end. The next section, however, analyses arson as a military tactic, focusing first of all on the burning of public buildings (and army barracks, in particular).

ii. Military targets

a) Barracks and infrastructure

Until September 1922, when the Free State Army had recaptured the key republican-held towns in Munster (including the capitals of each of the three counties), the course of the Civil War in Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford was determined by the pattern of barrack occupation by pro- and anti-Treaty forces. Rendering barracks uninhabitable made local Free State control difficult and created logistical problems for the nascent state organisation. The torching of Pallas Barracks, Co. Limerick,[30] for example, meant the Free State had to accommodate troops in private houses—an undesirable prospect for a new government trying to prove its ability to protect its civilians from the rebels. Just weeks before the burning of Glanduff Castle, Co. Limerick, Commandant O'Sullivan wrote to its tenant, Frances Ievers, apologising for the sudden occupation of the Castle by National Troops. Intelligence had been received that 'Irregulars were about to take up quarters' and he assured Ievers that the Army would look after her furniture and the estate.[31] Yet his promises were not kept: on 29 June 1922, 200 republicans seized the Castle, looted its contents and set it on fire. The tactic left a trail of destruction: travellers on the road from Waterford to Clonmel in November 1922 passed a 'mass of burned police barracks' on their way.[32] And a 340 year old Co. Waterford landmark, Duncannon Fort—built in case of 'Spanish invasion' and used as a base for British forces until the Truce—was on 15 July 1922 left 'a heap of ruins' after occupation and evacuation by republicans.[33]

Figure 5: Glanduff Castle near Broadford, Co. Limerick, burned on 1 July 1922.



Source: Postcard, Frances Ievers' compensation file (NAI, 392/274).

[30] M. O'Dwyer, 'Local happenings, 1922–23', *Oola: Past and Present*, 9 (2000), 5.
[31] NAI, 392/274: Ievers, Limerick; see Sections iii and iv.
[32] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 1 Nov. 1922.
[33] *Munster Express*, 15 July 1922.

In Co. Limerick, 7% of arson attacks relate to the burning of permanent or temporary 'barracks', many of which had been occupied by the RIC before the Treaty. William O'Connor's 'two-storey slated dwelling house' in Abbeyfeale was occupied by the British as a police barracks until evacuation, by the IRA 'until the time of the spilt' and finally by Irregulars who burned the premises as they left.[34] In Tipperary, 13% arson attacks relate to the burning of barracks—over half of these were formerly occupied by British troops.[35] A *Waterford News* report captures the republicans' delight in ransacking one ex-British stronghold, Kilmacow barracks: a lorry of 15 men 'pulled up at the former citadel of RIC triumphs, sprinkled the place with petrol and set it ablaze'.[36] Arson was thus a strategic and symbolic act, attacking British rule, Free State authority and the apparent seamless transition between the two that represented everything the Irregulars hated about the Treaty.

There are some seemingly impulsive manifestations of this anti-Treaty feeling in evidence in arson attacks in Co. Limerick. Michael Kennedy had entertained the Free State Army at his farm in Askeaton, Co. Limerick, the day before his hay was burned, making him 'unpopular with parties of opposite political views in the locality'.[37] Mary Sidley's sons 'took no part in politics' and her hay 'was maliciously burned' on the night a 'group of Irregulars' raided her neighbours' house for guns.[38] These civilians were punished for their (little more than tacit) support of the Treaty and the National Troops; the burning of their homes does not seem to fall into an organised military strategy. However, across Munster more generally, arson was more than a last resort offence, that is, a defiant but ultimately futile act by those without a prospect of victory. Hopkinson argues that from January 1923 until the end of the war, the anti-Treaty army could do little of strategic value because local organisation had broken down and republican leaders (like Officer-in-Command (O/C) Dinny Lacey in Tipperary or Limerick's anti-Treaty mayor, Stephen O'Mara) were killed or captured.[39] Still, there is evidence, even during this later period, that burnings were planned and arson was used by republicans as a deliberate strategy. On 11 December 1922, the Free State Army reported on the 'organised incendiarism which is now the policy of the "Die-Hards"':

> The Irregulars have told farmers in this District, that it will be useless for them to set any corn this coming season, as they intend to set fire to all corn next harvest.[40]

House burnings—particularly attacks on large mansions—were executed with military precision. Republicans 'took every precaution against interference' by cutting telephone wires surrounding the house,[41] or placing occupants, domestic staff or

[34] NAI, 392/444: O'Connor, Limerick.
[35] The compensation material from Co. Waterford does not contain any claims relating to the burning of barracks.
[36] *Waterford News*, 14 July 1922.
[37] NAI, 392/105: Kennedy, Limerick.
[38] NAI, 392/377: Sidley, Limerick.
[39] M. Hopkinson, *Green against green: the Irish Civil War* (Dublin, 1988).
[40] Irish Military Archives (IMA), Civil War Operation/Intelligence Reports by Command, CW/OPS/1/A; see Chapter 3 on land issues and possible republican involvement in campaigns for redistribution.
[41] *Irish Times*, 15 Jan. 1923: wires cut before the attack on W.T. Cosgrave's 'secluded' home; see below, this section.

passersby under armed guard,[42] to prevent the alarm being raised until the fire was well under way. Mansion burning was certainly an exact science and in a memorable passage from *The Heather Blazing* (which is as much history as fiction; Uncle Tom's experience in this instance is exactly that of Tóibín's own uncle),[43] the Irish writer captures the military process, from the initial order from IRA Headquarters, to the careful removal of precious books before the fire. Gathered at his grandmother's house following de Valera's 1951 election speech in Enniscorthy, Eamon Redmond's father and uncle recall the War of Independence:

> "You couldn't just burn a house, you see," Uncle Tom said. "You'd have to get permission from Cathal Brugha in Dublin. You'd have to present him with all the facts; any of the houses that entertained the Black and Tans, had the officers for dinners and parties, they'd be on the list. Your father'd go up, he was young enough and he pretended to spend the day in the National Library, but he'd slip out to see Brugha, or one of Brugha's men, and then permission would come back and then we'd do the job."
>
> "Burn the house?" Eamon asked.
>
> "We gutted a good few of them all right," his uncle sipped his drink. "Wilton, Old Captain Skrine, the Proctors on the Bunclody road, Castleboro. I have a book upstairs I took from Castleboro the night we went out there. They had a great library. It's a pity I didn't have more time. I still have it upstairs. It has a note inside saying '*Ex Libris Lord Carew*'. What's it called? *Cranford* by Mrs Gaskell. I must look for it. I'm sure it's up there somewhere."[44]

Can this highly organised, fiery destruction be interpreted in terms of a broader politico-military strategy on the part of the republicans? The burning of private homes, including Protestant and Loyalist-owned mansions, to prevent their future use as barracks by enemy forces, makes some sense. Arson attacks on a Limerick big house, Glanduff Castle (Figure 5, above), and a Tipperary mansion, Tullamaine Castle,[45] evidently fall into this category. However, there were also valid, tactical arguments against these fires. Tom Barry, for example, allegedly disagreed with Liam Lynch's policy of burning barracks during the Civil War because, if left intact, buildings could 'be used to hold prisoners and perhaps hostages since the people were no longer willing to give their houses as they had done during the War of Independence'.[46] Republicans Liam Deasy and Dinny Lacey also commented on the increasing difficulty, since the Civil War began, in securing support and practical help from the local civilian population.[47] Why, then, would a guerrilla army sacrifice potentially valuable shelter and resources by destroying private homes and large mansions in particular? It seem plausible that big houses, such as those explored in detail in Section iii of this chapter, were destroyed not as potential Free State barracks, then, but as strongholds of British agents, that is, Loyalists left behind by Britain to sabotage independent Ireland once the war was over.

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[42] *Munster Express*, 3 Mar. 1923: Richard O'Shee's gardener and steward were placed under armed guard during the burning of Gardenmorris; see Section iii.

[43] Many thanks to Prof. R.F. Foster for sharing with me his unpublished essay, '"A Strange and Insistent Protagonist": Tóibín and Irish History', presented at 'Colm Tóibín: the writer and his writing explored' (16 January 2010, Enniscorthy).

[44] Tóibín, *The Heather Blazing* (1992), 172.

[45] See below, Section iii.

[46] M. Ryan, *Tom Barry: IRA freedom fighter* (Cork, 2003), 186.

[47] See Chapter 4, Section i.

These fears proved to be unfounded. Unlike in post-war Central Europe, where the 'forces of order' eventually succeeded in squashing democracy and containing the 'radical turmoil' that raged in Germany and Austria from the Armistice until Spring 1919,[48] the old political regime in Ireland (Loyalists, landowners and Protestants) did not mount a counter-revolution against Irish independence. Nonetheless, while the fighting continued in Ireland, some republicans may have feared a British resurgence. Barry's own account of reprisal burnings during the War of Independence shows the desire of this Munster-based republican, at least, to extirpate the old order and reduce local bastions of British rule to crumbling ruins. Following attacks by the Essex Regiment on houses in the Innishannon district, Co. Cork, the IRA burned 'property of active British supporters'.[49] Then, 'as there were no other active Loyalist homes in that area, we went further afield to teach the British a lesson': the Earl of Bandon's Castle Bernard was burned down in this round of destruction.[50] 'Active' Loyalists or British supporters were not merely those who, in Barry's estimation, 'never considered themselves as Irish', such as Protestants, strong farmers and ex-military officers,[51] but enemies whose continued presence threatened the republicans' separatist Irishness and whose homes, as a consequence, had to be systematically destroyed. The 'leading British loyalist', in any local community, dwelled in the '"Big House"...secure and affluent in his many acres, enclosed behind demesne walls'.[52] Contemporary military considerations, as well as the symbolic purging of the historic enemy, could well explain the destruction of large numbers of these homes during the war.[53]

If the tactical destruction of big houses served a higher republican strategy, arson also granted the anti-Treaty army significant short-term success in preventing the Free State from functioning. The 'principal objects of attack', in this 'campaign…which has been devastating the country', were the 'Irish Railways'.[54] These attacks, including the burning of carriages and goods in transit, were 'on a much larger scale than during the Anglo-Irish War' and 'served to demonstrate Free State weakness'.[55] Republicans seized and set on fire a train at Barnagh Station, Co. Limerick, for example, and livestock and food products were destroyed.[56] Tipperary merchants were then forced to use the canals instead, but the supply chain was continually disrupted by arson. In a 'dastardly and inexplicable outrage',[57] goods meant for the railway (and transferred to the waterways) were destroyed in the burning of Dromineer Harbour stores. Thomas Delaney, secretary of the Grand Canal Company, won compensation from the Free State for this incident.[58] The Great Southern and Western Railway Company (GSWRC) also put forward 'enormous

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[48] C.S. Maier, *Recasting bourgeois Europe: stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the decade after World War I: with a new preface* (Princeton, N.J., 1988, c1975), 4. See also J. Joll, *Europe since 1870: an international history* (Harmondsworth, 4th ed., 1990), 239–71.
[49] T. Barry, *Guerilla days in Ireland* (Naas, 1978, 6th impression), 195.
[50] Barry, *Guerilla days in Ireland*, 195.
[51] Barry, *Guerilla days in Ireland*, 12.
[52] Barry, *Guerilla days in Ireland*, 12.
[53] See below, Section iii: Big houses.
[54] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 2 Mar. 1923.
[55] Hopkinson, 'The Civil War from the pro-Treaty Perspective', *Irish Sword*, 20, no. 82 (1997), 287–92 at 291.
[56] A number of farmers' and merchants' goods were destroyed in this attack: NAI, 392/82: Mangan, Limerick, 392/87: Talbot, Limerick, 392/376: Roche, Limerick, 392/399: O'Connor, Limerick, 392/409: Slattery, Limerick.
[57] *Limerick Leader*, 4 Nov. 1922.
[58] NAI, 401/160: Delaney, Waterford.

claims' and together with the destruction of bridges and the crippling of the creamery industry by 'bomb and fire', South Tipperary's 'wreckage bill' grew 'longer day by day'.[59] In other attacks on the network, a train was burned on the way from Kilmeaden to Waterford,[60] Mallow station and stationmaster's residence were 'maliciously' destroyed by fire[61] and Birdhill signal cabin was burned.[62] The 'war on the railways'[63] also had a human cost: Edward Scales, from Co. Limerick, was made homeless by the burning of his stationmaster's cottage in Foynes,[64] stationmaster Power's dwelling house and furniture were destroyed in the fire at Grange station,[65] and railway workers were even subject to violence against the person.[66]

Kevin O'Higgins, Minister for Home Affairs, certainly saw arson as part of a campaign to undermine the authority of the new government:

> A conspiracy has existed against this State for ten months. Its methods are open and apparent—arson, assassination, general sabotage, war on the economic life of the country, the burning of commercial vans, the mining of picture-houses, and attempting to blow up business establishments.[67]

Oliver Coogan, however, distinguishes between the 'series of pointless and often mindless acts of destruction' against transport, communications and public buildings and the 'more serious' attacks on private houses.[68] This thesis rejects the very idea of 'mindless' violence; arsonists did not commit burnings on a whim. Still, the line Coogan draws between the different kinds of arson attack is a reminder that the fiery campaign was limited neither to the public nor private spheres. In the burning of Senators' homes lies a particularly interesting intersection of the personal and political. As upholders of the Treaty and symbols of Free State authority, Senators were obvious targets for political violence. In reprisal for the executions of republicans under the Free State's 'Public Safety' legislation, IRA Chief of Staff, Liam Lynch, promised to adopt, in his words, 'very drastic measures' against persons and property of all pro-government supporters,[69] including the burning of TD and Senators' homes.[70]

Deputy Burke's home in Roscrea, Co. Tipperary, for example, was one casualty of this policy; see above.[71] The family of Daniel Joseph Byrne TD, of the Farmers' Party in the Dáil,[72] was ordered out of his residence in Mullinahone, Co.

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[59] *Nenagh Guardian*, 3 Feb. 1923.
[60] *Munster Express*, 23 Dec. 1922.
[61] *Limerick Leader*, 1 Nov. 1922.
[62] *Nenagh Guardian*, 26 Sept. 1922.
[63] *Waterford News*, 15 Dec. 1922.
[64] See Chapter 1.
[65] *Munster Express*, 3 Mar. 1923.
[66] See Chapter 4 on two serious assaults on GSWRC employees.
[67] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, iii, 25 Apr. 1923.
[68] O. Coogan, *Politics and war in Meath, 1913–23* (Dublin, 1983), 286–7.
[69] Ryan, *The real chief: Liam Lynch* (Cork, 2005, first published as *Liam Lynch, the real chief*, 1986), 163.
[70] E. O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: the Irish state and its enemies since 1922* (Oxford, 1999), 27, 34–5.
[71] *Nenagh Guardian*, 3, 10 Mar. 1923: Rockforest was burned in March 1923, two months after the destruction of Burke's Co. Kildare residence.
[72] The Farmers' Party (the political wing of the Irish Farmers' Union, set up in 1919) was a pro-Treaty, agrarian political party representing rural interests, in operation between 1922–32 (though it lost much of its support base to Cumann na nGaedheal in 1927). The Party won 7 seats in Dáil Éireann in the

Tipperary, 'at the point of a revolver'.[73] There were conflicting accounts of whether Burke and Byrne were home at the time; most reports suggest not, but either way these attacks must have been frightening and it is worth noting that Byrne did not stand in the 1923 election. The burning of Deputy homes even claimed a life: seven year old Emmet McGarry, son of John McGarry TD, was 'badly burned' when 'armed incendiaries' set fire to his father's house. He died in hospital.[74] Marie Coleman believes that the intensification of arson attacks on politicians' homes, during January to March 1923, was a reaction to the increased number of executions in this period.[75] It was in January 1923 that W.T. Cosgrave's own Beech Park House, Ballyboden—with its grand piano, furniture and 'many valuable Irish books'—was burned.[76] Then when Stephen Gwynn praised the toughness of the Free State Government in the *Observer* in February 1923, his house and library were burned down in retaliation.[77] However, the high profile burnings of Senators' homes in Munster suggest a more complex rationale behind these ostensibly military and strategic burnings.

b) Senators under attack

Cosgrave's choice of members for Seanad Éireann returned a significant Anglo-Irish contingent, like Sir John Keane, whose country seat at Cappoquin, Co. Waterford, was burned in February 1923; see Figure 6. In his claim to the Irish Grants Committee (IGC),[78] Keane outlined his 'natural' association 'with the British connection, having served for 20 years in the British Army', been a Justice of the Peace and had 'social intimacy' with British officers quartered in Ireland.[79] He 'was, and am still, a Senator of the Irish Free State', but did not see conflict between these two sets of commitments. However, the Committee's reply to Keane suggests the establishment of the Free State had created new political loyalties that complicated the issue of motivation:

> Having regard to the number of outrages directed against members of the Irish Free State about the same date…your mansion was destroyed, the destruction in your case may be attributable to a motive other that the record of the public services to which you refer.

Keane withdrew. His acceptance of the Senate nomination in order to 'represent minority interests',[80] shows he located himself cautiously within the new society, but he nonetheless took up the post and pledged allegiance to the Irish Government. Senator James Douglas expressed similar reservations, but ultimately fulfilled his duty: 'while I might not agree with everything that they [the Free State] had done, I regarded them as the government and must be loyal to them…My personal opinions

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general election of June 1922, increasing that total to 15 in 1923; see Hopkinson, *Green against green*, 262.

[73] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 24 Mar. 1923. Byrne's premises were visited again later (14 Apr. 1923) and his hay shed burned.

[74] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 16 Dec. 1922.

[75] M. Coleman, *County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910–1923* (Dublin, 2006), 145.

[76] *Irish Times*, 15 Jan. 1923.

[77] P. Bew, *Ireland: the politics of enmity, 1789–2006* (Oxford, 2007), 440.

[78] See Chapter 1 on compensation procedure.

[79] The National Archives (TNA), CO 762/82/11: Keane, Waterford (Records of the Colonial Office, Records of the Irish Office, Irish Distress Committee and Irish Grants Committee: Files and Minutes).

[80] TNA, CO 762/82/11: Keane, Waterford.

were of no importance'.[81] Fortunately for Douglas, he did not join the 21 Senators—including Keane and John Bagwell—who suffered an 'outrage' during the war. Five other mansions, besides Cappoquin and Bagwell's Marlfield were burned[82] and Dr. George Sigerson resigned from the Senate 'owing to threats against his house'.[83]

In the early hours of 8 January 1923, Marlfield, near Clonmel, Co. Tipperary, was 'broken into by a number of armed men who ordered the occupants out and having sprinkled the contents with petrol set fire to the same and withdrew'.[84] The 20 to 40 man band said that 'they had orders to burn the house, as Mr. Bagwell was a member of the Free State Senate'. The 'imposing mansion, picturesquely situated', was completely gutted save the servants' wing.[85] The valuable library (of his historian father, Richard Bagwell, a 'great Irish authority'[86] on the Tudors), furniture, and paintings destroyed in the blaze, incurred a loss of nearly £15,000 (or £638,000 in today's terms; see Glossary).[87] John's family were at home: the Senator's young sons helped their mother Louisa grab a few possessions, including family paintings; his daughter, Lilla, rushed to set the horses free from the burning stables. The arsonists at Marlfield, it seems, showed less concern than Tóibín's uncle would have done for the literary stock inside.[88] Mrs. Bagwell wrote to her mother-in-law Harriet the day after the attack: 'The Republicans...said it was because Jack had joined the Senate; they asked first thing for him; we were so thankful he was not here'.[89] She was right to fear for her husband's safety; later that month Bagwell was kidnapped by the IRA (he escaped unharmed after just a couple of days).[90]

The county court judge considering his compensation claim to the Free State said the whole court 'knew the reason [for the attack] was that Senator Bagwell was trying to do his best for the country, and the reward he got was that his residence was burned'.[91] Bagwell made a separate claim to the IGC (the payment from the Irish Ministry of Finance, with its strict 'reinstatement clause',[92] fell far short of his expectations).[93] What he (and the Tipperary press) were wrong to assume, however, was that his acceptance of the Senate seat entitled him to relief as a Loyalist. Culturally Bagwell had all the attributes of a prominent Southern Unionist. His family were landowners: the Bagwells acquired Marlfield in 1775. John had proved his military allegiance as a Deputy Lieutenant and held 'an important place in the industrial life' of Ireland as a railway manager.[94] His pre-Treaty connection with Britain could not be denied yet, in October 1928, the IGC finally rejected his claim:

> Mr. Bagwell agrees his house was destroyed because he had accepted nomination as a Senator in the Irish Free State. He suggests, however, that his action in allowing himself to be nominated was the act of a Loyalist


[81] J. Gaughan (ed.), *Memoirs of Senator James G. Douglas* (Dublin, 1998), 98.
[82] D.J. O'Sullivan, *The Irish Free State and its Senate* (London, 1940), 102–7.
[83] *Nenagh Guardian*, 10 Feb. 1922.
[84] NAI, 401/744: Bagwell, Tipperary.
[85] *Irish Times*, 10 Jan. 1923.
[86] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 12 Jan. 1923.
[87] NAI, 401/744: Bagwell, Tipperary.
[88] Section ii.a.
[89] National Library of Ireland (NLI), MS 32,617 (History of the Bagwell family by Harriet Bagwell).
[90] *The Times*, 31 Jan. 1923.
[91] *Cork Examiner*, 26 July 1924.
[92] See Section iii: Big houses.
[93] TNA, CO 762/95/19: Bagwell, Tipperary.
[94] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 12 Jan. 1923.

> determined to support the new Government placed in power on the withdrawal of the British Government from Ireland. It is debateable whether this claim could be admitted in view of the Terms of Reference.

Bagwell believed it was 'the duty of anyone owing allegiance to the Government of the Free State' to accept the Senate nomination (which he did in December 1922).[95] He had performed 'an act of the highest patriotism',[96] but this was the flaw in his case: his actions demonstrated loyalty to the Free State Government, not the Government of the United Kingdom.

Financial considerations undoubtedly shaped the IGC judgement. Full compensation for this fantastic mansion—with its 'art treasures and…historic records which can never be replaced'[97]—would have been impossibly expensive. The IGC did acknowledge Bagwell's modesty in making a relatively small claim—for the jewellery not covered by Irish compensation law—given the huge losses and personal distress he had suffered, not only in the burning of his home, but his kidnap by republicans. However, the 'real point for consideration' by the IGC was not the size of the claim, but the '*reason* for the destruction'.[98] Bagwell had, consciously or not, repudiated his British ties in accepting a political role in autonomous Ireland, allowing the IGC, as a British Government body, to absolve itself of responsibility for his loss.

Figure 6: Senators under attack.
***Left*: John Bagwell's Marlfield, Clonmel, Tipperary.**
***Right*: Sir John Keane's Cappoquin House, Waterford.**



Source: M. Bence-Jones, *Burke's guide to country houses,* vol. 1: *Ireland* (London, 1978).

Keane and Bagwell were from a class with economic, social and cultural roots in both Ireland and Britain. Peter Martin believes that the Revolution forced these people 'to choose to be Irish or British and it is not surprising that many of them found the New Ireland insufficiently attractive to keep them'.[99] However, the compensation evidence suggests it was the British Government who made this choice on their behalf. By refusing to pay compensation, the IGC forced Keane and Bagwell to accept the legal and financial consequences of taking a role in independent Ireland. Persecution within their local community may have made the 'New Ireland' (in

[95] TNA, CO 762/95/19: Bagwell, Tipperary.
[96] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 12 Jan. 1923.
[97] *Munster Express*, 27 Jan. 1923.
[98] TNA, CO 762/95/19: Bagwell, Tipperary.
[99] P. Martin, 'Unionism: the Irish nobility and Revolution, 1919–23', in Augusteijn, *Irish Revolution 1913–1923*, 151–164 at 164.

Martin's words) unattractive for the Southern minority, but their link with and dependence on Britain was also under review. The identifiers which marked out Keane and Bagwell and their big houses from the surrounding community—class, religion and political allegiance (demonstrated by past service in the British Army and now their Senate seat)—were also used by administrators to justify (or refuse) compensation payments for their loss. The burning of big houses may have been strategic (following the occupation of a mansion as a barracks, for example, or as part of the republicans' 'reprisal' policy), but a study of arson attacks on the largely Protestant and Unionist owned mansions (like Marlfield and Cappoquin), invites broader speculation on intra-community relations and the use of violence, in the three chosen counties, to settle more ancient scores.

iii. Big houses

J.G. Farrell's novel is set not in the Civil War, but the earlier '*Troubles*' of 1919–21. The Majestic Hotel, as much the heart of the story as the protagonist, Major Brendan Archer, met its fiery fate in a passage that is a powerful reminder of the destructive capacity of arson:

> By the time the inhabitants of Kilnalough had noticed the glow in the sky and motored, ridden or walked out to the hotel, the Majestic was an inferno. Streams of fire the size of oak trees blossomed out of the windows of the upper storeys. Caterpillars of flame wriggled their way down the…carpets and sucked at the banisters and panelling until all the public rooms were ablaze.[100]

After the fire, Archer made an emotional return to the 'charred rubble' of what had been a (wonderfully bizarre and increasingly dilapidated) refuge for its guests from the 'Shinners' in Co. Wexford:

> The Major stepped from one blackened compartment to another trying to orientate himself and saying: 'I'm standing in the residents' lounge, in the corridor, in the writing-room.' Now that these rooms were open to the mild Irish sky they all seemed much smaller—in fact, quite insignificant.[101]

The notion that—once exposed to the elements—this emblem of Anglo-Irish privilege was nothing but a pile of ruins, illustrates the power of arson to engage with the Irish landscape and challenge the place of a building and its occupants in the community. Land purchase legislation had chipped away, since the early twentieth century, at their great estates, and many mansion owners and members of the Ascendancy had chosen to flee Ireland before the Civil War began in earnest (the *Munster Express* reported on 7 January 1922, for example, that Killinane Castle, Co. Tipperary—with its 'hundreds of acres'—was the 'thirtieth Irish mansion to be sold since August'). Still, the big house had continued to provide a refuge for Irish landlords from the outside world into 1922–23. The symbolic destruction of these great homes, by fire, was a direct challenge to their social and economic standing in the local community—and to their outmoded way of life. Accounts of big house burnings in the local press gave readers an insight into an exclusive and privileged world. Tullamaine Castle, near Fethard, with its square, battlemented tower, turrets

[100] J.G. Farrell, *Troubles* (London, 1970), 443.
[101] Farrell, *Troubles*, 446.

and long hall, was 'one of the finest private mansions in Tipperary'.[102] Past occupant, John Maher, MP for Tipperary, kept a 'regal style' at Tullamaine and the current owner, Major Morel, had 'fitted out the place regardless of expense'. Modernisations carried out by the ex-Master of the Tipperary Foxhounds included the building of kennels—and a 'point to point' hunt was held in the Castle grounds. Morel had been resident in the 'beautiful and extensive residence' until a few months prior to its occupation by 'Irregulars', who burned the place as National Troops approached.[103]


Major Perry, a 'large landholder and a representative of a family long associated with the life of South Tipperary' (he was a cousin of John Bagwell and took the family in the night after the burning of Marlfield), also enjoyed fox hunting, and horse racing.[104] He was sitting in the smoking room at Woodrooffe, on a Wednesday evening in February 1923, when his daughter ran in saying the stables were on fire. After 'firing the stables', the four armed men 'got into the house, and going upstairs sprinkled the top rooms with petrol and started a fire which soon gutted the whole house'.[105] Flanked by square courts with cupolas, this had been a grand home; now little remained of the eighteenth century mansion. The demesne had also been the location, earlier in the war, of some intense encounters between the Free State Army and republicans, and it was reported that Perry's compensation claim for the destruction of the mansion would include prior attempts to seize the land and house.[106]

The Perry family, like the Bagwells, were Cromwellian arrivals to Munster.[107] English settlers had imposed themselves, literally, on the Irish landscape through the construction of huge residences. Architecturally varied, what all Irish country houses had in common was their size. Even the more modest 'big' houses were magnified by the wide, open spaces around them.[108] However, if the construction of the big house was part of the civilising process of Plantation, arson was its symbolically uncivilised end. Replacing deference for the old order with defiance was a key part of the IRA campaign of 1916–23. Violence was liberating in this respect; Ernie O'Malley believed that physical force could free the Irish of their 'slave-mindedness'.[109] Thus the physical dismantling of the traditional British power base, the big house, through fire, seems in some ways the logical development of O'Malley's War of Independence training: in 1918 he 'made the men manoeuvre in demesne land to rid them of their inherent respect for the owners. Even yet their fathers touched their hats to the gentry'.[110] For the emboldened republican, arson was the spectacular and violent next step: fire ripped off the roof, blackened the walls and quite literally opened the house to the outside, reclaiming the landscape from the landlord. Charles Clarke's Graiguenoe Park was reduced from a huge, richly decorated home to a burnt-out shell in a matter of hours; see Figure 7. Elizabeth Bowen described the 'hollow of

[102] *Nenagh Guardian*, 28 Oct. 1922.
[103] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 25 Oct. 1922.
[104] *Munster Express*, 17 Feb. 1923.
[105] *Munster Express*, 17 Feb. 1923.
[106] *Munster Express*, 17 Feb. 1923. See Chapter 4 on deadly ambushes near the demesne.
[107] Hallinan, *Tales from the Deise* (Dublin, 1996), 37: the townlands Clashganny West, Kilnacarriga and Middlequarter were in the Perrys' possession from 1719 to 1928, when the lands were acquired by the Land Commission. The family also had a 'great house' in Newcastle, Co. Tipperary, burned down by the IRA in 1921.
[108] Dooley, *Decline of the big house*, 42.
[109] R. English, *Ernie O'Malley: IRA intellectual* (Oxford, 1998), 84.
[110] English, *Ernie O'Malley*, 84.

land' left after Bowen's Court was demolished in 1960: 'One cannot say that the space is empty. More, it is as it was—with no house there'.[111]

Figure 7: Graiguenoe Park before and after the burning. The ruins stood until 1960s, when they were levelled.



Source: Photographs, Charles Clarke's compensation file (TNA, CO 762/18/8).


As an already small Southern Protestant minority adjusted to 'numerical decline' and 'radically reduced circumstances', a lingering 'nostalgia' for 'ascendancy' living is understandable;[112] more surprising is the fairly widespread local, civilian regret at the burning of the big house. Ireland could 'ill-afford' the loss of more fine houses, 'as we had a surplus of ruins handed down from past conflicts'.[113] The transformation of a home, by fire, from 'beautiful' residence[114] to 'blackened ruin',[115] was recorded with sadness. 'Another Tipperary Mansion Gone'

[111] E. Bowen, *Bowen's Court; & Seven Winters: Memories of a Dublin childhood* (London, 1999), 457–8.
[112] M. Busteed, F. Neal and J. Tonge (eds.), *Irish Protestant identities* (Manchester, 2008), 2.
[113] O'Dwyer, 'Local happenings, 1922–23', *Oola: Past and Present*, 4.
[114] See, for example, reports on the burnings of Rockmount and Caroline Fairholme's Comeragh House, both in Co. Waterford (*Munster Express*, 24 Feb. 1923).
[115] Ludlow Jones' 'fine residence' Knocknacree, near Borrisokane, Co. Tipperary (*Nenagh Guardian*, 10 Feb. 1923), for example, and Bagwell's Marlfield (*Clonmel Chronicle*, 10 Jan. 1923), both met this fate.

proclaimed the *Nenagh Guardian* about Ballinacourte, the 'picturesque residence…of Robert Sanders'.[116] While sites of conflagrations may have attracted onlookers, and in some cases arsonists were known locally, burnings did not demand the complicity of the wider community—required in successful boycotts, for example, or campaigns of intimidation. Villagers near Rapla House, for example, did not glory in its destruction. Rapla, a local resident recalled, was 'in my youth…a very nice place…At the entrance to the avenue leading up to the Big House, as I called it, was a beautiful gate-lodge'.[117] Big houses could be important local landmarks: sports days were held at Rapla and a dance was in progress when armed men entered and set the place alight on 4 February 1923.[118] And while Marlfield village—with its distillery and corn mills—had ceased to be 'an important centre of manufacturing industry', the Bagwells remained a 'resident' family, on good terms with the locals. When John's father, Richard Bagwell, inherited Marlfield in 1886, his mother, Harriet, made life 'more civilised' for the workers: she added gardens to their houses, a 'cooking school, Penny Club…tea house' and founded 'Marlfield Embroideries', to give employment to girls and women in their homes.[119] By the 1920s, the master of the house was often away in Dublin on business, but John 'looked forward to the time' when the whole family would permanently reside at their country seat. Nineteenth century tradition seemingly lingered here as, just one week before the mansion was burned, 100 estate employees and their families gathered for a party for the Senator's son, presenting a birthday gift 'as testimony' of their 'good feeling and loyalty'.[120]

[116] *Nenagh Guardian*, 28 Oct. 1922. See Section v on the burnings on Sanders' estate.
[117] M. Elebert, 'Recollections of Rapla', *Cloughjordan Heritage*, 1 (1985), 9.
[118] *Nenagh Guardian*, 10 Feb. 1923. The resident confirmed these reports in his compensation claim: NAI, 401/856: Maloney, Tipperary.
[119] NLI, MS 32,617.
[120] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 3 Jan. 1923.

Figure 8: Rapla House, Co. Tipperary.
***Top* in 1920, three years before the burning, and *bottom* in 1984: abandoned, overgrown and beyond repair.**



Source: M. Elebert, 'Recollections of Rapla', *Cloughjordan Heritage*, 1 (1985), 9–10.

However, while the 'interesting historical associations'[121] of burnt-out buildings (and their 'good landlords'[122]) were celebrated in the local press, nostalgia for the big house was very much absent in government discussions of their fate. Dooley argues, for example, that Irish compensation law was particularly 'ominous' for mansion owners.[123] The Damage to Property Act stipulated, first of all, that judges could consider 'the steps taken or which might reasonably have been taken' by the owner of the property to prevent the injury.[124] The fact that many big houses were vacant when looted, damaged or burned, or in the care of a few domestic staff, meant it was highly unlikely that any resistance could have been forthcoming. Graiguenoe Park was occupied by four servant girls at the time of the burning on 28 February 1923.[125] Clarke, who had added a wing to his grandfather's already huge house in

[121] See for example, reports on the burning of Rapla House (*Nenagh Guardian*, 17 Feb. 1923) and Duncannon Fort (*Munster Express*, 15 July 1922).
[122] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 3 Mar. 1923: employees of the Earl of Bessborough sent a 'resolution of sympathy' following the burning of his mansion near Pilltown, South Kilkenny.
[123] Dooley, *Decline of the big house*, 201.
[124] The compensation process began at the local sessions; see Chapter 1.
[125] *The Nationalist and Munster Advertiser*, 3 Mar. 1923.

1903, claimed he was only away on a 'short visit' and 'had every intention of returning'. The ICCA argued on Clarke's behalf that Graiguenoe had 'never been let and always occupied by Clarke[,] who was left without a home'.[126] This attachment to his Irish residence may have been genuine, but the Free State's paltry award did not give Clarke the chance to stay and the mansion ruins stood until the 1960s, when they were levelled. Caroline Fairholme—an 'elderly...landlord of the district'[127]—also claimed that Comeragh House, Kilmacthomas, Co. Waterford, had been 'constantly inhabited' by her family, for over a century.[128] Yet the place she considered home was taken away, firstly by the fire 'maliciously' started during an anti-Treaty IRA raid on 18 February 1923 and then, more subtly, by the Free State Government: it was 'impossible to rebuild' with the amount awarded.[129] The reinstated building, the victim complained, was 'vastly inferior' to the original Comeragh House. Between October 1923 and September 1926, Fairholme, with 'two servants', made 18 journeys between England and Waterford, to settle her affairs. They travelled 'third class'—a detail twice underlined by the applicant on the claims form, as if to highlight the indignity.[130]

Other estates had been leased to large farmers or graziers, but still remained vacant for long periods.[131] Ievers (of Glanduff, above) was the tenant of the Staveley family and even she had 'not resided there permanently for the past 23 years', spending just one week a year in Ireland 'from 1919 until the time the Castle was burned'.[132] The alleged meagreness of Free State compensation and the difficult prospect of finding new tenants for a place that had been so violently attacked meant that many big houses, like Rapla, were not reoccupied and fell into total disrepair; see Figure 8. And if victims were afraid to even return to their burnt out home, the Damage to Property Act's stipulation that compensation be used to rebuild on the same site, doubtless encouraged the likes of Clarke and Fairholme to cut their losses and retreat to smaller premises in England, or at least downscale their way of life in Ireland. The Earl of Devon claimed £30,300 for his mansion at Newcastle West, Co. Limerick, and was awarded £6,293.8.0, pending reinstatement. The ornate painted ceilings and marble fireplaces of the original Castle were a world away from the proposed reconstruction: a 'plain suburban villa dwelling of no special pretensions'.[133] Some caution should be taken, though, with Devon's description of his mansion, pre-fire. The years had, naturally, taken their toll on the building and over the centuries, parts of the Castle—with its two great halls—fell into ruin. By the time the 'Devons came here', inheriting Newcastle from the Courtenay family, 'they occupied a long, irregular house'.[134]

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[126] Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), D/989/B/2/9: 'Irish Claims Compensation Association (ICCA) Report to the House of Lords: Statement of the injustices suffered by Irish Loyalists' (Papers of the Irish Unionist Alliance, Papers of the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA), Case Papers).

[127] According to the census, Caroline would have been 66 years old in 1922 (Census of Ireland (1911), NAI, Dublin, http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/ (online database)).

[128] *Munster Express*, 24 Feb. 1923.

[129] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9.

[130] CO 762/94/3: Fairholme, Waterford.

[131] D. S. Jones, 'Land reform legislation and security of tenure in Ireland after independence', *Éire-Ireland*, 32, no. 4 and 33, nos. 1 and 2 (1998), 118.


[132] NAI, 392/274: Ievers, Limerick. The Free State advised Ada M.T. Staveley's agent that it was the tenant (Ievers), not the owner (Staveley), who was entitled to compensation: NAI, 392/358: Welply, Limerick. The IGC also dismissed the owner's claim: TNA, CO 762/114/24: Staveley, Limerick.

[133] NAI, 392/285: Devon, Limerick.

[134] Bence-Jones, *Burke's guide*, 224.

The reinstatement clause bound the claimant to the Ministry of Finance's payment schedule, which further encouraged re-building on a more modest scale. Reinstatement was also a drawn-out process: the IGC complained that the Free State's Damage to Property Act had 'empowered the courts to clog their awards with reinstatement conditions'.[135] In a violent attack in which the gardener and steward were placed under armed guard, Gardenmorris 'was burned to the ground and all the furniture' destroyed.[136] Over £13,000 of owner Richard O'Shee's particularly large award of £15,609.9.6, would be released in instalments pending reinstatement and the Office of Public Works reported to the Ministry of Finance at each stage of the re-building over the next three years.[137] Major Morel complained after the burning of his home that 'every inducement' to stay in Ireland was 'taken away' by the Free State Government: it was impossible to rebuild Tullamaine for the amount awarded (Morel was at a £20,000 loss, while the Ministry of Finance 'evaded' the £12,824 compensation payment) and on top of this 'injustice', the Land Commission was beginning to compulsorily acquire his demesne land. Morel's estate had been attacked before: on 22 May 1922 part of the demesne was seized and cattle taken away.[138] The victim's accusation, though, was that it was the Free State Government and not just the locals, who wanted a piece of his 400 acres.

Figure 9: Gardenmorris House, Kill, Co. Waterford.
Burned on 22 February 1923 and rebuilt as it was by O'Shee,
omitting a third storey at one end.



Source: Bence-Jones, *Burke's guide*, 131.

Cosgrave admitted that the Damage to Property Act was 'very tightly drawn', but the big houses burned were 'property of a description which is largely out of date, and not easily marketable, if at all'.[139] Glanduff Castle, for example, was a 'tremendous' mansion; full restoration of its extensive accommodation (including a

[135] TNA, CO 762/212: 'End of Committee Report'.
[136] *Munster Express*, 3 Mar. 1923.
[137] NAI, 402/240: O'Shee, Waterford.
[138] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9. The burning of Tullamaine was reported in *Clonmel Chronicle*, 25 Oct. 1922; see above, this section.
[139] Dooley, *Decline of the big house*, 203.

wine cellar, gun room and tower), would not only have been difficult, but for the government's purposes, inappropriate. Simple economic necessity does in part explain the Free State Government's reluctance to accommodate former landlords: the break up of the large estates was well underway before the Civil War and progress on land purchase was crucial to the 'commercial and financial stability' of independent Ireland.[140] However, broader shifts in political priorities accompanied material concerns in the Irish Free State. 'Landlordism', in the words of William Sears TD, 'is now in its final stage'[141] and in the compensation process it was the owners of the small to medium-sized house or farm, not the out-dated mansion, who most passionately believed that an independent, Irish government should take their side.

Complaints were made, for example, when it appeared that claims from big houses were handled more generously than 'small claims'.[142] A large pay out to O'Shee, who was able to rebuild his chateau-style Gardenmorris House (Figure 9) as it was, omitting a third story at one end, undoubtedly seemed 'very excessive'.[143] The solicitor for Charles White, whose house (used as a barracks) in Annacarty, South Tipperary, was burnt on 3 May 1922, feared that his client, of more modest means, was 'not receiving fair treatment and justice'. White found it 'hard to believe that our own Government would treat a farmer worse than the British Government would have done'.[144] It was normal for the British to protect elite interests; it was expected—even demanded—that Free State sympathies would lie with the people. It had long been expected, too, that the large demesnes would become targets for violence in times of political upheaval. A 1913 pamphlet on the 'Defence of Irish Country Houses' provided practical advice on how to protect mansions from fire.[145] Arsonists, it warned, could gain entry with the 'connivance of an inmate', or by 'stratagem' (the admittance of an attacker posing as a 'piano tuner', for example, with 'confederates in ambush close by').[146] General hints were offered: do not leave ladders lying around; barricade doors and windows with non-flammable materials; 'admit none whose loyalty is not above question'. It was hoped that neighbours would work together in time of attack, using flares to call for help and warn other big houses in the area of fire, and 'houses whose owners were in special danger should be garrisoned by small military parties…as was done in certain counties' during the Land War 'in 1881–82'.[147]

Solicitors for Lord Dunalley of Kilboy House (near Nenagh, Co. Tipperary), certainly anticipated a serious incident at their client's home before the burning—and did not believe his concerns were taken seriously by the Free State. Correspondence between 'S. and R.C. Walker and Son, Dublin' and the Ministry of Defence, shows an apparent unwillingness on the part of the Irish government to afford Dunalley adequate protection from what his representatives (rightly) saw as the inevitable arson

[140] TNA, PRO 30/67/50: 'Letter to Michael Collins, 13 June 1922' (Domestic Records of the Public Record Office, Gifts, Deposits, Notes and Transcripts, First Earl Midleton papers).
[141] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, iii, 14 June 1923.
[142] NAI, 401/305: This compensation file from Co. Tipperary includes a letter from a victim's solicitor dissatisfied with the compensation system and its bias towards owners of big houses.
[143] NAI, 401/305.
[144] NAI, 401/605: White, Tipperary.
[145] PRONI, D/989/C/1/17: 'Notes on the Defence of Irish Country Houses, 1913' (Papers of the Irish Unionist Alliance, Propaganda Material, Printed Pamphlets and Handbills).
[146] There was a suggestion in some cases, such as the burning of Woodrooffe (above), that arsonists did have help on the inside.
[147] PRONI, D/989/C/1/17.

attack ahead. Receiving a telegram from Dunalley (on 19 July 1922) that Kilboy 'was in danger', Walker and co. asked the Ministry for protection:

> Of course we know that it would not be possible to send a guard to every house the owner of which was nervous and feared that it might be attacked, but where there is a particular reason for supposing that a house is to be attacked we take it the position is different. Lord Dunalley's house is of course a large one and a number of people are depending on his establishment being kept up and we are sure that this will have weight with you.[148]

However, perfunctory replies and unhelpful telephone calls suggested Dunalley's fears carried very little weight indeed with the Government. The last letter, dated 2 August 1922, arrived just a couple of days before Kilboy House was burned to the ground (on 6 August 1922); the authorities, it seemed, had merely looked on as another symbol of British rule was destroyed.

The assault on the big house did not, of course, begin with the Civil War. World War I drew questions of loyalty into sharp relief, was the catalyst for the Easter Rising and in suspending Home Rule indefinitely, paved the way for the replacement of constitutional nationalism by a more radical, separatist politics. Service during the war, or a family connection to an ex-officer, recurs in IGC claims as the alleged motivating factor for Civil War arson attacks. Major Rose, for example, owner of Boskell House (burned on 12 July 1922), had felt isolated in his local community in Caherconlish (near Boher), Co. Limerick, since returning from the war. With the nearest police barracks five miles away, 'no protection was given to me'.[149] Anna Clarke, whose hay was burned in Kildimo, Co. Limerick,[150] and Frances Ievers of Glanduff Castle (above), were both wives of British Army Majors—a fact made clear to the IGC. Bowen also identified World War I as the moment the world changed for the Anglo-Irish gentry. The news from Europe broke as the fifteen year old Bowen attended a garden party at Mitchelstown Castle, Co. Cork:

> It was…a more final scene than we knew. Ten years hence, it was all to seem like a dream—and the Castle itself would be a few bleached stumps on the plateau [Mitchelstown was burned in 1922 and the ruins demolished]…Many of those guests…would be scattered, houseless, sonless, or themselves dead.[151]

Bowen's terrible fear that her own home, in Kildorrery, Co. Cork, would also be lost 'in flames', was not realised: Bowen's Court was occupied by 'seventy seven republicans', during the Civil War, but they 'did little damage' and left after four days.[152] Her emotional attachment to her own big house is evident in her novels. The houses in *The Last September* are personified: they have people's names (Danielstown, Mount Isabel and Castle Trent) and are killed by the fire. This sentimentality explains why she portrays arsonists as murderers; as they 'slid away' from the burning house, her fictional incendiaries were 'executioners bland from

[148] NLI, MS 29,810(17): 'Correspondence of Lord Dunalley 1922' (Dunalley Papers, of the Prittie family Lords Dunalley, 1665–1937).
[149] TNA, CO 762/41/2: Rose, Limerick; see Chapter 1.
[150] Chapter 1.
[151] Bowen, *Bowen's Court*, 435–6.
[152] Bowen, *Bowen's Court*, 440–3.

accomplished duty'.[153] However, the idea that there was no emotional or ideological investment in arson on the part of the perpetrators during the Civil War, nor hope for social and economic change through the act of burning, is not borne out in the evidence from Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford. In particular, Section iv reveals how arson was used as a form of protest—and tool for redistribution—in struggles over land.

iv. Land

William Magan—whose ancestral home, Umma More, escaped the fiery fate suffered by his uncle Middleton Biddulph's mansion, Rathrobin, Co. Offaly (burned in April 1923)—believed the Ascendancy's raison d'être disappeared when it was 'shorn of its estates and the opportunity to serve locally in Ireland in the services of the Crown'.[154] Were these losses part of, or accelerated by, the Civil War specifically? Certainly the departure of the British Army and RIC in 1922 removed the opportunity—for Unionists and the 'Anglo-Irish'—to play a role in Irish public life (although a select few did, of course, serve the independent Irish government through membership of the Seanad). The land question, by contrast, was largely resolved by the time of the Civil War and the break-up of landlords' estates well underway. Insecurity of tenure was addressed by legislation in the late nineteenth century, culminating in the Wyndham Act (1903), under which two-thirds of tenants had become proprietors by 1914.[155] Land purchase did not, of course, dispose of all underlying agrarian grievances. Further redistribution—enacted by Free State, rather than British law—was needed to deal with rural poverty and congestion. The Land Act (1923) thus empowered the Land Commission to take possession of tenanted lands.[156]

House burning was another way to force the owner from the land, leaving it to be shared out, with or without the approval of the Land Commission. Digby H. de Burgh's Dromkeen—a two storey Georgian construction[157]—was a fairly modest big house. Still, the family had allegedly lived on the site since 1174 and this descendent of Norman (rather than Cromwellian) settlers was clear about his British loyalties and the culture to which he belonged (de Burgh's son was a Sandhurst cadet). And it was the land surrounding Dromkeen, rather than the house itself, that was at heart of threats made against de Burgh before the burning. In 'most Irish counties', observed the Irish Unionist Alliance pamphlet on the 'Defence of Irish Country Houses' (1913), 'some of the best—because un-exhausted and well cared for—land is attached to mansion houses in the shape of house farms and demesnes'. Accusations that these estates had been secretly 'parcelled out for spoil' by the Land League years before, so that 'persons now living know the portions which…they expect to receive', after independence,[158] echo myths circulating in Ulster around the time of the first Home Rule Bill. National self-government, it was feared, would mean the expulsion of Unionists and, in the meantime, Catholics held a 'raffle' or 'lottery' for the land that would become theirs, when the time came.[159] Indeed, Unionist predictions that 'greed for land will inevitably cause trouble',[160] were seemingly borne out in the Civil War

[153] Bowen, *The Last September* (London, 1929), 206.
[154] W. Magan, *Umma More: The story of an Irish family* (Salisbury, 1983), 381.
[155] Dooley, *'The land for the people': the land question in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 2004), 16.
[156] Jones, 'Land reform legislation', *Éire-Ireland*, 116–19.
[157] Bence-Jones, *Burke's guide*, 109.
[158] PRONI, D/989/C/1/17.
[159] A. Morgan, *Labour and Partition: the Belfast working class 1905–23* (London, 1991), 11.
[160] PRONI, D/989/C/1/17.

and in the targeting of de Burgh's estate, for one. Notices posted before the attack called for 'land for the landless' and warned 'all whom it may concern' to 'keep away from these lands and trees'. De Burgh believed that if the house:

> Had been situated in Great Britain, or in Northern Ireland, no trouble would have arisen…But there was for many years a conspiracy to seize and divide the lands of Loyal men in the South of Ireland…The conspirators were told that the Irish Government would pass a new Land Act which would enable the small farmers and labourers to take the property of the Loyalists.[161]

There is no evidence that the 'conspiracy' against de Burgh extended to direct Free State involvement in the burning of Dromkeen. There are notorious recorded incidents of Free State cruelty, like the Ballyseedy killings in Co. Kerry,[162] but the 'armed men' and 'Irregulars' responsible for arson are always assumed to be anti-Treaty forces, rather than National Troops. Still, an enthusiasm for land for the people, stirred by independence, was felt all the way from ground to government level. Another notice posted on de Burgh's land advertised a 'public meeting' to discuss the division of the estate and 'P. Clancy TD' was billed to speak.[163] Clancy's priorities were clear in the years that followed. In the Dáil, he took every opportunity to ask the Minister for Lands and Fisheries 'if it is the intention of the Land Commission to acquire' various estates in Limerick, including Emly and Clarina, 'for division amongst congests and landless men of the district'.[164] In Co. Tipperary, too, public meetings to discuss the division of estates 'amongst the small holders, labourers, representatives of evicted tenants and landless men in the district' took place—with the support of local TDs—into 1929.[165]

Land hunger is palpable in many other burnings. Before Glanduff (Figure 5) was burned, a local woman told the steward that the 'Old Bitch [Ievers, who was not the owner, but had been the tenant for nearly a quarter of a century]…had the place long enough and that it was about time to get it divided up'.[166] Castle Fogarty, at Ballycahill, near Thurles, Co. Tipperary, was burned on 20 April 1922 'by the local people in the hope that they would get the land attached to it' and Major Valentine Ryan's solicitor advised that 'until such time as the country settled', he should not rebuild.[167] The ICCA protested, in any case, that the £3000 compensation offered by the Free State was 'totally inadequate', following an architect's valuation of £20,667.[168] Other matters were at stake in this case: the Castle may have been burned by occupying republicans to prevent its use as a barracks by the Free State (Fogarty was not completely destroyed: parts of the exterior and one tower survived). However, land was clearly a divisive issue: the burning of Fogarty was accompanied by an attack on the steward in charge of Major Ryan's estate. John Cusack and his wife and daughter 'were in bed, and the raiders, without any warning whatsoever, having fired some shots, proceeded to set fire to the house and its contents. Some of them got on the roof, made holes, and sprinkled petrol all over'. The family made a

[161] TNA, CO 762/37/10: De Burgh, Limerick.
[162] See thesis Introduction.
[163] TNA, CO 762/37/10: De Burgh, Limerick. De Burgh was also physically attacked; see Chapter 4.
[164] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, xxxv, 28 May 1930, xxxvii, 19 Mar. 1931.
[165] W.J. Hayes, G. Cunningham and Moyne-Templetuohy History Group, *Moyne-Templetuohy a life of its own: the story of a Tipperary parish*, vol. 3 (Tipperary, 2001), 27.
[166] TNA, CO 762/185/6: Ievers, Limerick.
[167] NAI, 401/363: Ryan, Tipperary.
[168] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9.

hasty getaway to Thurles in a trap with a 'few articles of clothing', but the house and furniture were completely destroyed.[169]

It was not just big landowners, then, who were driven away by fire. The main enemy of the landless man, by the 1920s, was not the rack-renting landlord of old, or the estate worker who protected him, but the Catholic, nationalist grazier who had bought his way in to the once Protestant, Unionist club of ownership. So while the local big house may have been targeted as a symbol of Plantation and the past injustices of British rule, arson was used to redistribute land across the community. The burning of crops and outbuildings—which accounts for 41% of reported incidences of arson in Limerick, 28% in Tipperary and 45% in Waterford—attacked the heart of farm life, made winter feeding impossible and real hardship ensued, even for the strong farmer. Over 70 head of cattle belonging to 'extensive farmer' and Chairman of the Kilmallock branch of the Irish Farmers' Union (Farmers' Party), John Halpin, for example, were 'left without fodder on Monday morning' after the destruction of his hay barn.[170] Many fires probably went unreported. In his detailed survey of arson in East Anglia, 1815–70, Archer suggests incendiary attacks were not universally reported because newspapers feared publicity led to imitation attacks.[171] In Munster, though, headlines like 'Kilmallock outrages–More hay burned' were still very familiar. Crop burnings in this area were condemned from the pulpit, to no avail.[172] Vast quantities of hay were destroyed at a time: 200 tonnes belonging to Michael Ryan, Killaloe, were burned in January 1922.[173]

Faced with ruin on this scale, the burning of crops and buildings drove some farmers out of their home and even out of Munster. Herbert Sullivan, for example, the Limerick dairy farmer who had served milk to a British regiment during World War I, was forced to downsize to a small house in Devon following the burning of Curramore House.[174] His new situation in the UK was not eased by the 'contemptuous' award of £1800 from the Free State—and the government's evasion of payment for a considerable time.[175] In a different case, John Borland's house and those of his shepherd[176] and housekeeper[177] were set on fire and his land seized for four years. Borland stayed in Scotland for safety and when his farm was finally relinquished, he had been robbed of annual profits of £500, his flock of 500 sheep and lost thousands on the sale of the land.[178] In events that mirrored the Land War campaigns against those who took up the land of the evicted, or refused to withhold rents or labour from the landlord or agent, the sales of burnt-out houses and their estates were subject to local boycott.[179] One auctioneer, Michael Quirke, even had his own hay burned and a threatening letter—'which was of an illiterate type…signed "Cattle Driver"'—posted beforehand.[180]

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[169] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 21 June 1922.
[170] *Limerick Leader*, 15 Feb. 1922.
[171] Archer, *Flash and a scare*, 70–1.
[172] *Limerick Leader*, 1 Feb., 8 Mar. 1922.
[173] *Limerick Leader*, 30 Jan. 1922.
[174] Chapter 1, Section ii.a.
[175] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9.
[176] NAI, 392/318: Wilson, Limerick.
[177] NAI, 392/233: Watson, Limerick.
[178] NAI, 392/314 and TNA, CO 762/83/1: Borland, Limerick.
[179] TNA, CO 762/87/4: Sullivan, Limerick, CO 762/64/11: Gleeson, Tipperary, CO 762/80/20: Carroll, Angas, Scott, Tipperary.
[180] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 17 June 1922.

The lands Quirke was involved with, 'Kiltinian ranches' (belonging to Col. Cooke of Kiltinane Castle—situated on a rock high above the Clashawley River, near Fethard, Co. Tipperary), had in fact already 'been divided into small portions suitable for persons who wanted honestly to acquire land and pay for it'.[181] Still, arson was utilised by those who had missed out on legitimate land purchase and redistribution through the accepted channels. If hay stacks and barns were symbols of wealth, fire was a method of getting even, of disrupting the financial security embodied in the pile of animal fodder. Hay ricks were also popular targets because of relative ease of access (standing away from the main farm buildings) and in winter months, when few other materials were as dry, and therefore combustible, as the safely guarded pile of straw, little effort and few tools, could produce a spectacular flare up—the 'flash and a scare' referred to by Archer.[182] In this way arson could work as a powerful psychological weapon, as well as means of disruption (and financial inconvenience). The fire publicised the fact that this individual had been singled out for special treatment; the rapid destruction, by fire, of farm buildings and winter food supplies, left little time for reflection on the nature of his transgression (although the threatening notices accompanying some burnings do give some clues to motivations). The burning of houses was most damaging in this respect because the incendiaries would need knowledge of the building before firing; the ease with which arsonists found their way around a house (as they did at Woodrooffe, for example) exposed the particular vulnerability of the owner.

v. Arson: complex motivations

Who was most vulnerable to arson attacks during this period? I collated the compensation data from both countries, taking into account overlapping claims (where applications were made to both governments, for the same attack) and found that the Loyalist, Protestant minority was disproportionately targeted. Taking the three-county area as a whole, 25% of buildings burned were big houses and 19% of arson attacks were attributable to the claimant's 'allegiance to the United Kingdom'.[183] Many of the barracks burnt were also formerly occupied by the British Army. Ex-RIC and Army men, including many who had served in World War I were targeted, with their families, for their overt demonstrations of loyalty to the past oppressor. The compensation evidence suggests that the sectarianism and conflicts over land that had characterised Irish-British enmity for hundreds of years persisted during the Civil War. In the burning of Protestant church buildings, lies an apparently straightforward expression of the old religious enmities. Methodist minister Rev. James Johnston, with the steward and church member, Arthur Bridge and Arthur Switzer, made a claim to the Free State for the burning of the chapel at Ballylocknane (also known as Newborough), two and half miles from Adare village, Co. Limerick, on 28 December 1922. The stone chapel was 'lined inside by timber…and good timber floor, containing pews, organ, pulpit, all of which was totally destroyed'.[184] Rectories destroyed include Clonbeg, located on Sanders' Glen of Aherlow estate (the site of a great deal of violence and disruption during the war), which was burned in February 1923.[185]

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[181] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 17 June 1922.
[182] Archer, *By a flash and a scare*, 149, 150, 163.
[183] IGC Terms of Reference; see Chapter 1 on compensation procedure and British 'Loyalty'.
[184] NAI, 392/134: Johnston, Bridge, Switzer, Limerick.
[185] NAI, 401/90: Sanders, Tipperary.

While the 'plea of "military necessity" may be made for the destruction of bridges, the blocking of railways and the looting of provisions shops', the 'damage perpetrated on Protestant Churches' was portrayed as 'gratuitous' and immoral. The 'execrable violation of the churchyard at Kilmacthomas, which was visited by a party of men who dug up the tombstones, scattering them about the graveyard', was also denounced by the *Gazette*.[186] Indeed, the morality of republican tactics was questioned across the board: sniping at Catholic Free State soldiers on their way to Mass[187] was condemned in the local press with as much vigour as Church of Ireland editorials on the burning of Protestant churches.

Still, these attacks must be explained, like most instances of social and political violence, by more than a single motivating factor. Canon Charles Atkinson accounted for the burning of his home, Kilpeacon Rectory, Co. Limerick: it was 'well known' that the ex-Army chaplain was 'loyal to the British Connection'. Atkinson was awarded £100 for personal belongings destroyed in the fire on 28 March 1923:

> A party of 20 armed republicans entered my home near midnight, turned me out with my wife and daughter and set fire to it. We were sent under armed guard to a house near by and released after the fire had been in progress for an hour—most of the house was saved but some rooms were gutted.[188]

Indeed, the house was not destroyed and after the war life returned to relative normality for this small Church of Ireland community: Atkinson held an organ recital at Kilpeacon that summer.[189] During the war, when tensions were temporarily heightened between representatives of the old regime and republicans in protest against the maintenance of the oath of allegiance to the crown, hostility towards the Atkinsons may be accounted for by their so-called 'British connection', as much as their (unchanging) Protestantism.

Sisters Caroline Grace and Louisa Margaret Fairholme of Comeragh House (above, Section iii) were Protestants. Their solicitor explained:

> As a result of violent political and ancestral enmity it is notorious that during the trouble in Ireland the masses of the people were extremely hostile to members of claimant's class.[190]

Did 'class' here refer to the victim's denomination, or to membership of a social elite? Comeragh is not listed in *Burke's guide*, but contemporary reports suggest that it was not far off a 'big house': in 1911 the Fairholmes employed three domestic staff and a forester to take care of the estate, and allegations were also made regarding the kidnap of a 'coachman' in their employment. Louisa's claim for £200, for the stamp collection lost in the flames, was rejected by the IGC: the item was evidently not important enough to be mentioned in her sister Caroline's compensation claim relating to the house and furniture and 'apart from the fact that no claim was made' in the original application, 'it would not appear that this is a case of any hardship'. The sisters moved in fairly privileged circles, but this social grouping was not defined

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[186] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 11 Aug. 1922.
[187] Chapter 4, Section ii.a.
[188] NAI, 392/260 and TNA, CO 762/184/3: Atkinson, Limerick. A separate claim was made by the Representative Church Body for the damage to the building: NAI, 392/411.
[189] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 29 June 1923.
[190] TNA, CO 762/94/3: Fairholme, Waterford.

entirely by denomination: their solicitor asked that notice be given to friends—ladies of 'their class', Lady Frances Alice Anderson and Mary Carew, a Catholic—to attend the compensation hearing in support of the Fairholmes.[191]

The 'class' tension referred to by the Fairholmes' solicitor (resulting in the violent attack against their home), was certainly not a straightforward conflict between privileged Protestants and impoverished Catholics. Chapter Three reveals that a growing Catholic middle class of graziers and large farmers had as much to fear as their former Protestant landlords, in terms of intimidation, cattle driving and attacks on their land. 'Intelligent Roman Catholics', suggested the *Church of Ireland Gazette*, saw the danger in land hunger and forced redistribution; those who used crop burning and other methods to 'drive innocent Protestants from their homes are not worthy of the name of Irishman…and their work is condemned whole-heartedly by the vast majority of decent Roman Catholics'.[192] The burning of the big house was significant and symbolic: fire reclaimed the landscape from the Protestant planter and opened these symbols of British social and economic power—in the words of Farrell's fictional Major—'to the Irish sky'.[193] Yet ordinary 'Free Staters' were at the mercy of the arsonists too: more crops and outhouses were lost to the flames than houses (of any size and ownership). In Munster, the conflict over the Treaty was overlaid with the old battles between religious enemies *and* newer class tensions and intra-community squabbles over land.

There were pockets of industry in these essentially rural counties and fears were raised early in 1922 that 'labour takes a hand in the game'[194]. Local economic activity around Cappoquin, Co. Waterford, for example, was focused not only on Sir John Keane's mansion,[195] but the saw mills on his estate. Both were burned during the war. A strike by Keane's workmen lasted around one month: during summer 1922, work on the estate and sawmills was 'completely suspended' and 'strikers and pickets' continued to milk Sir John's cattle and sell the milk to the townspeople themselves.[196] The mills were burned on 16 June 1922, during this occupation.[197] Between May 1922 and January 1923, numerous malicious attacks were made on outhouses and grounds at Golden Grove, Roscrea, Co. Tipperary, including the burning of farm buildings on 28 July 1922. Compensation was eventually paid by the British Government (nearly half of the £4000 claimed), but correspondence between the IGC and solicitors for the house owner, Elizabeth Henrietta Lloyd-Vaughan, evidenced the 'preliminary difficulty of showing that the damage caused' to Golden Grove was a result of the victim's pre-Truce British loyalty.[198] The victim's late husband P.W.H. Lloyd (d. 22 December 1923) had been a JP, Deputy Lieutenant of the county and (so Elizabeth told the IGC) 'always a staunch Loyalist'. Yet the attempts to drive the couple from their home were attributed by the judge in the Free State compensation hearing—and in Mrs. Lloyd-Vaughan's own testimony—to disputes between the couple and labourers on their estate. Alleged attempts to 'reduce the men's wages' were met with a seven week strike: Elizabeth 'took it that it was the Transport Union…The object was not to get land. It was simply…roughs out of the

[191] Anderson and Carew made their own claim to the IGC for loss of income on farmland seized during the Civil War: TNA, CO 762/89/5: Anderson and Carew, Waterford.
[192] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 23 June, 6 Oct. 1922.
[193] Farrell, *Troubles*, 446.
[194] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 3 Feb. 1922.
[195] Section ii.b.
[196] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 28 June, 8 July 1922.
[197] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 17 June 1922.
[198] TNA, CO 762/99/3: Lloyd-Vaughan, Tipperary.

town'. A clipping in her compensation file, from 7 December 1925, quotes Judge Roche at Birr County Court:

> It is a sad thing that the people of the locality should indulge in such a debauch of savagery…I have no doubt about it that they were induced to come together and do this thing by one or more acting in the name of the sacred cause of Labour.[199]

The red scare was undoubtedly exaggerated in some reports. The cutting of trees and cattle driving on lands around Kilboy, near Nenagh (Lord Dunalley's mansion here was burned in July 1922; see above), was branded 'sheer Bolshevism' by the local press.[200] Still, conflicts between employers and workers did result in violence, including arson. Clearly not all incendiary gangs were anti-Treaty IRA. The burning of a creamery in Tipperary town, for example, initially blamed on departing republicans was, according to a trade union official, 'most likely' carried out by the occupying 'Soviet'.[201] A spate of fires in Ballinamona, Co. Waterford,[202] was the result of a strike.[203] In Co. Limerick, at least eleven burnings were attributed to disputes with workers.[204] It could be argued, of course, that these conflicts would have happened anyway and it was the wartime absence of law and order that simply provided the conditions for protest. Labour trouble during the War of Independence was seen as distinct from the national struggle; IRA Volunteers were actually used as strike-breakers in some areas.[205]

Indeed, despite the efforts of trade unionist turned republican leader Peadar O'Donnell, there was no successful marriage of the republican and socialist causes during this period. In charge of an IRA column in Donegal, during the War of Independence, O'Donnell saw the 're-ignition of Fenian radicalism on the land', but was frustrated that the IRA was sent to police the agitation and that, through the Dáil land courts, the alternative Sinn Féin government acted in favour of landlords and against those involved in cattle drives and land seizures. O'Donnell took the anti-Treaty side during the Civil War, his position on the settlement with Britain incorporating the 'standard republican emotional revulsion and sense of betrayal into a broader class-based, anti-imperialist analysis'.[206] Arrested on 1 July 1922, following the Four Courts-occupation, O'Donnell was imprisoned in Mountjoy, Dublin, where, according to his prison memoir,[207] he shared comradeship and escape plans with inmates including Liam Mellows—the only other republican to grasp the 'fundamentally plebeian nature of the Irish national struggle'.[208] O'Donnell's horror at the execution of Mellows and three other republican prisoners (Rory O'Connor, Joe

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[199] TNA, CO 762/99/3: Lloyd-Vaughan, Tipperary.
[200] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 1 Nov. 1922.
[201] C.D. Greaves, *Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution* (London, 2004, 1st ed. reprinted with a new introduction by Gerry Adams), 359–60.
[202] NAI, 402/98–104.
[203] *Munster Express*, 18 Feb. 1922.
[204] NAI, 392/121, 456–64, 467, 509.
[205] R.F. Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600–1972* (London, 1988), 515.
[206] D. Ó Drisceoil, *Peadar O'Donnell* (Cork, 2001), 23.
[207] O'Donnell did not in fact escape from prison until March 1924, but his vivid reminiscences record numerous attempts to tunnel free, or at least enjoy the 'marvellous rowdyism' (p. 34) and negotiate with sympathetic officials for some freedom of movement—not only at Mountjoy, but in prisons and camps across Ireland, over nearly two years in captivity. See P. O'Donnell, *The gates flew open* (London, 1932), 23, 34–5, 62–7, 79, 102, 105–11, 179–83.
[208] Greaves, *Liam Mellows*, 392. See also Chapter 3, Section v on Mellows.

McKelvey and Dick Barrett), at Mountjoy on 8 December 1922,[209] is captured in *The Gates Flew Open*,[210] as are his continued frustrations at the new, independent Irish government's neglect of the 'social revolutionary dimension' of the Revolution.[211] Michael Collins, O'Donnell complained, had 'confused the Conquest with the mere occupation of the country with British soldiers'. The departure of the British army and administration from Ireland did not constitute full freedom, in other words, so long as the 'imperial exploitation' of Ireland continued through the economic system.[212] During his solitary confinement at Finner Camp, Co. Donegal, O'Donnell reflected further on the 'heresy of the cult of armed men that brought…us to defeat'. The Revolution, he believed, must involve the 'stubborn splendour of the big mass of the people'.[213]

Events on the ground in Civil War Munster confirm that, O'Donnell's attempts to foment rebellion aside, the anti-Treaty campaign was not directed towards social revolution. Republicanism and labour remained separate causes into 1922: when cattle was driven on the lands around Suir Castle, near Golden, and a 'large red flag suspended from a tree', both the Tipperary Transport Workers' Union and the IRA authorities distanced themselves from the matter, the latter promising to 'deal severely' with the perpetrators.[214] And on Robert M.D. Sanders' Glen of Aherlow estate, Ballincourte, in Co. Tipperary, the IRA 'ordered' the self-proclaimed 'Red Army' to evacuate.[215] Some 300 workers seized the estate in May 1922 and reopened the sawmills, which had been closed since Sanders' departure. He had fled to London following an earlier labour dispute at Ballinacourte:[216] in November 1920, tension between Sanders' labourers and Auxiliary RIC and British soldiers, sent to the estate to protect the family from alleged assassination threats, was heightened by accusations the British troops were used as 'strike-breakers' (carting hay and gathering sheep).[217] The occupation and burning of Sanders' mills and, for example, the Cleeve creameries in Tipperary and Limerick may not have been directly connected to the military conflict over the Treaty; the 'raising of the red flag' at Bruree, and the seizure of control by workers across a number of Cleeve sites,[218] including Carrick-on-Suir,[219] took place in any case before the split in the IRA and official start of the Civil War in June 1922. However, our definition of political violence must not be limited to the actions of the anti-Treaty IRA. Public limited companies, like the Cleeve Creamery Co., were not usually awarded compensation by the IGC, because business organisations 'possess neither mind nor conscience and can

[209] Greaves, *Liam Mellows*, 386–393.
[210] O'Donnell, *Gates flew open*, 74–5, 77, 83–9. See Chapter 2, Section ii.a, and Chapter 4, Section ii.b, on the 'Public Safety' Bill and the republican response to the executions.
[211] Ó Drisceoil, *Peadar O'Donnell*, 2.
[212] O'Donnell, *Gates flew open*, 31.
[213] O'Donnell, *Gates flew open*, 168.
[214] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 8 Feb. 1922.
[215] NAI, 401/90 and TNA, CO 762/19/1: Sanders, Tipperary.
[216] D.R. O'Connor Lysaght, 'County Tipperary: class struggle and national struggle, 1916–1924', in W. Nolan and T. McGrath (eds.), *Tipperary: history and society*: *interdisciplinary essays on the history of an Irish county* (Dublin, 1985), 394–410 at 404, 407.
[217] NLI, MS 33,718/F(184/1–39) (Correspondence re strike by labourers on the estate of Robert Sanders of Ballinacourty, Co. Tipperary [1920]).
[218] *Limerick Leader*, 15, 17 May 1922.
[219] Hallinan, *Tipperary County: people and places*, 86: a bitter dispute over wages in the creamery led to a worker takeover, which 'tore Carrick apart'.

be neither loyal nor disloyal', but, after 'deep consideration' and a 'protracted hearing',[220] an exception was made in their case.[221]

Conclusion

To secure compensation from the Free State, Irish law demanded proof that attacks were directed towards the overthrow of the state. In the main, victims could identify perpetrators as 'Irregulars' or 'republicans'; Section ii.a ('Military targets: barracks and infrastructure') demonstrated how the burning of barracks, railway carriages and businesses constituted an anti-Treaty campaign to stop the new government from functioning in the counties. Burnings were not impulsive manifestations of anti-Treaty feeling; arson constituted a deliberate form of tactical destruction. The military rationale for the burning of private homes—and Protestant and Loyalist-owned mansions in particular—is not always obvious. Yet the perpetrators' (O'Malley and Barry, for example) accounts that do survive capture a strong republican desire to rout potential British strongholds. The burning of the big house may thus have served a contemporary politico-military plan, as well as the settling of local scores against an historic enemy. Even during the later stages of the war, from January 1923, when republican organisation in the counties had largely broken down, arson made a serious impact on political and military targets, including Senators' homes. And in these attacks (Section ii.b focused on Tipperary's Bagwell and Waterford's Keane, in particular), lay an interesting intersection of the personal and political and the old and new agendas of Munster's arsonists. Marlfield and Cappoquin were residences of prominent 'Free Staters', but they were also big houses, that is, traditional symbols of Protestant privilege and British landed interest in Ireland.

Such was the complexity of a war with a high proportion of non-military victims, both in terms of what was burned (crops and outbuildings) and the type of building (private houses as opposed to barracks); see Figure 4. Indeed, this detailed exploration of burnings—from high profile mansions to small hay stacks—has shown that while arson was not always carried out by armed men following a military order, it was not random, unorganised criminal activity. Arson was targeted within the local community. The assault on the big house was, perhaps, to be expected, and tightly drawn compensation law in the Free State, in particular, made reinstatement of these tremendous homes difficult and undesirable; see Section iii. Local press reports evidenced some regret at the passing of these historical landmarks, but more decisive in the dismantling the old order were the fires which razed some of Munster's finest country houses and reclaimed the charred land on which they stood.

Land hunger was a powerful motivator in Civil War burnings; the most common category of arson attack in all three counties was the burning of crops and outhouses. Section iv, on 'Land', showed that the firing of hay stacks not only produced an impressive flare-up, but real hardship ensued from the loss of fodder, even for the strong farmer. In chasing out the victim and freeing up his land, arson must be added to the catalogue of intimidatory actions (explored in Chapter Three), directly employed to advance local redistribution. Yet the havoc wreaked by arson was particularly destructive and highly symbolic. House and crop burning could drive out the victim and purify the community of their presence. In all three counties (the prevalence of arson was not proportionately diminished in quieter counties, like

[220] TNA, CO 762/212.
[221] The Cleeves also appealed to the Free State for compensation: NAI, 392/211, 230, 370, 401/382.

Waterford), arson punished victims for their religion, politics and—in particular—their link with Britain.

From the anti-Treaty IRA, to organised labour, to 'landless men', perpetrators of arson were drawn from across the community; motivations for arson were certainly complex (see Section v). Still, what cannot be denied was the significance of the act as a form of protest. Just before Thomas Power's hay-rick was burned, the *Munster Express* reported, one of the Waterford farmer's workers 'said to him: "You are after getting a touch of Home Rule," and then added that the haggard was on fire.' The attack was attributed to Power's earlier dismissal of a worker and did not have 'anything to do with the political trouble'.[222] However, the notion that Power had received a 'touch of Home Rule' in the burning of his hay made a connection between political change, that is, Irish independence, and the realisation of social and economic goals; and this arsonist, like many others, did not discount violence as a means to achieve this.

[222] *Munster Express*, 21 Jan. 1922.

Chapter Three: Intimidation

Introduction

In January 1927 and from the safe distance of Letchworth in Hertfordshire, James Coogan completed his application form to the Irish Grants Committee (IGC).[1] After disbandment from the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) at Dublin Castle in April 1922,[2] Coogan 'came to London direct, it being unsafe to go to Waterford, where my wife was residing…as all the disbanded RIC there had left, having received notices to quit the country or put up with the consequences'.[3] He then joined the 'little colony' of around fifty ex-constables and their families that had formed in the English 'garden city' since 1922.[4] The IGC took into account allowances already received as an ex-constable, and granted Coogan £40 compensation for losses associated with relocation to England. It is the final claim on Coogan's list, though, that provides the most revealing insight into his situation—and the themes of this chapter:

> I am deprived of living in my own country, where I consider I have just as much right to live as any member of the Irish Free State, this is a right I value very much and for which I at least claim £300.[5]

The placing of such a price-tag (over £13,000 in today's terms[6]) on the right to live in Ireland demonstrates, if nothing else, some boldness on Coogan's part. He was not alone, of course, in his strong sense of personal entitlement, nor his attempts to frame the application in the language appropriate for financial reward.[7] Still, his claim was, unsurprisingly, ignored by the Committee. Coogan had not provided convincingly concrete evidence of how ill-feeling towards a representative of British rule in Ireland directly resulted, following the departure of the former rulers, in his removal from Waterford.

Yet what this chapter shows is that the intimidation prevalent in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, during 1922–23, created an atmosphere that was, by its nature, murky and hard to define, but in its effects on local life and intra-community relations, was potent and real. Thus Coogan's contemplation of his own position in the Free State, whatever its worth in monetary terms, raises important questions: were ideas of nationality and identity changing during the violent transition to independence? How and why did (the threat of) physical force, or psychological pressure, lead to the rejection—even 'expulsion'—of certain individuals and families from Ireland? Intimidation must be analysed not simply as a local by-product of general disorder and the war over the Treaty, but as a symbolic and powerful act resulting not necessarily in injury or death, but (often) in the loss of livelihood or the removal of the victim from his or her home, business or lands. Included in this

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[1] See Chapter 1 on compensation policy and procedure.
[2] R. Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland 1919–1922* (Dublin, 2000), 295: official dismissal and administration of pensions and severance pay took place at the Castle and a number of 'disbandment centres'. See Chapter 4 on violent fate of some ex-officers.
[3] The National Archives (TNA), CO 762/80/3: Coogan, Waterford (Records of the Colonial Office, Records of the Irish Office: Irish Distress Committee and Irish Grants Committee: Files and Minutes).
[4] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 16 Dec. 1922.
[5] TNA, CO 762/80/3: Coogan, Waterford.
[6] See Glossary on calculation of current value of 1920s compensation payments.
[7] See Chapter 1.

category are: boycott, damage to property, verbal and written threats, cattle driving, animal maiming and the seizure of land.

i. Threat and flight

Despite its contemporary usage in victims' testimonies and government reports,[8] 'expulsion' remains a problematic term. The word suggests physical compulsion, literally forcing someone out of their home. Yet this chapter deals not with violence against the person (murder is the obvious, permanent removal of an enemy from the community), but actions that—from the victim's point of view—drove them from Munster.[9] The expulsion of an 'out-group' may be 'partly coerced, partly voluntary', such as when a minority reacts to ill-treatment—including cultural suppression (the banning of their language or religion), as well as intimidation and physical coercion—by emigrating.[10] Enda Delaney is right that 'threats of intimidation or revolutionary rhetoric did not necessarily lead' to mass emigration of the 'minority' populace (Protestants, Unionists and ex-British Servicemen) in Ireland during the revolutionary years,[11] but this chapter explores further this dichotomy between choice (or voluntary migration) and expulsion—a contentious issue besetting a number of historical refugee crises.

The question of what turned up to 760,000 Palestinian Arabs out of their homes during November 1947–October 1950, for example, remains a fundamental propaganda issue between the Palestinians and Israelis to this day. Benny Morris' argumentative account challenges both the Arab claim (that Jews expelled Palestine's Arabs as part of a systematic, political-military plan) and the official Israeli narrative (that Palestinians fled 'voluntarily', or they were ordered to do so by their leaders and the leaders of other Arab states). He instead offers a more subtle analysis of the flight from Palestine, identifying four stages of 'exodus' and tracing the practical, financial and psychological pressures that caused the upper and middle classes—and then the masses—to 'pack up and flee' the Jewish state to be.[12] Events in the Middle East represent, of course, a conflict of a vastly different scale and intensity to the Civil War studied here. However, the suggestion that intimidation was similarly used in Munster (as in Palestine) in an instrumental way, to clear out a target group, is likewise controversial—but is borne out by the compensation evidence.

In terms of their decision to leave Munster in 1922, Patrick and Marion Courtney look to have had little, reasonable choice in the matter. This former constable of the RIC and his wife suffered no physical injuries in the attacks against them, but were removed from Loughill, Co. Limerick, in what the State Solicitor reviewing the compensation claim for the Free State Government deemed a 'very cruel case'. The perpetrators took 'forcible possession' of the house in May 1922, wrecking its furniture and contents. Courtney described how the intimidation continued as he fled: the attackers 'tried to prevent me [getting] to the Railway Station' and threatening notices were posted on Courtney's land, warning off

[8] National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Records of the Department of the Taoiseach, S565: 'Threatened expulsion of Protestants in Ballina, Co. Mayo'.
[9] There is some overlap between the injuries categorised as 'intimidation' and offences included in Chapter Four, on violence against the person. However, the imposition of a schema which treats three 'types' of violence in three distinct chapters is helpful in imposing some order on the messy, violent behaviour with which we are faced.
[10] M. Mann, *The dark side of democracy: explaining ethnic cleansing* (Cambridge, 2005), 14.
[11] Chapter 1, Section iii.a.
[12] B. Morris, *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited* (Cambridge, 2004, 2nd ed.), 591.

prospective buyers.[13] The ex-policeman could neither sell the land nor return to it. He was still living in London in February 1927 when, after receipt of compensation from the Free State, he made his application to the IGC.

It seems unlikely, too, that Thomas Hogan—threatened with a gun and 'forced to flee to England'—even contemplated staying in Munster. On 5 April 1922 he was 'compelled to leave my country by Forces of the enemy acting in opposition to the Provisional Government of Ireland'. Hogan was living in Belfast when he applied to the IGC for compensation for the loss of his dentistry business in Thomas Street, Limerick, and the 'injury to health' caused by the traumatic episode (Hogan did not in the end receive his award, because he died in May 1927).[14] It is worth noting that migration from the Free State to Northern Ireland, after 1922, was 'not inconsiderable'.[15] However, others were less convinced than Hogan of the imminent danger and need to leave. In Co. Tipperary, William Carey's 'dwelling house' was damaged and possessions destroyed when a 'party of armed men' fired into his premises with rifles, revolvers and stones, for around two hours. The men 'used threats to Claimant regarding land in his possession', but Carey did not surrender his farm.[16] As John Darby points out, in his study of community relations during the Northern Ireland Troubles, one person's response to intimidation may be explained by their personality or domestic circumstances, as much as by reality itself.[17]

Feelings of unease during the Civil War were no doubt influenced, for example, by previous experiences of rejection or intimidation under British rule. The very terms of reference of the IGC—claimants had to prove injury suffered during the Civil War was 'occasioned in respect or on account of…allegiance to the Government of the United Kingdom prior to the Truce of 9 July 1921'[18]—reflect the expectation of (at least) the British government that ex-Service men, constables and other political or cultural 'Loyalists', would be punished, under the new regime, for their previous loyalty to the crown. There is no doubt that Constable William Hall, for example, suffered for his British allegiance before independence. The stripping of uniforms or 'military decorations' is a 'particularly humiliating experience' for soldiers[19] and in Shanagolden in June 1921, Hall was stripped of his uniform, which was burned when he refused to resign from the RIC. Hall was on sick leave and had been visiting the local dispensary with another constable, Huckerly, when they were 'surrounded by eight armed men', ordered to take off their 'boots, stockings and caps' and told to return (barefoot) to their native Foynes, Co. Limerick.[20] Whether it was this earlier episode, or the arrival of independence and ensuing Civil War, that made Hall leave, is more difficult to ascertain. After disbandment, Hall had been due to take up his sister's shop in Foynes, but his wife was 'threatened' there and the couple fled to

[13] NAI, 392/18: Courtney, Limerick (Records of the Ministry of Finance, Un-catalogued compensation files: Series 392 (Limerick), 401 (Tipperary), 402 (Waterford)).
[14] TNA, CO 762/66/17: Hogan, Limerick. He also applied directly to Free State Government for help: NAI, Records of the Ministry of Finance, FIN 1/1078: 'Compensation of victimised Loyalists': Thomas D. Hogan.
[15] M. Daly, *The slow failure: population decline and independent Ireland, 1922–1973* (Madison, Wis., 2006), 6.
[16] NAI, 401/1076: Carey, Tipperary.
[17] J. Darby, *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland* (Dublin, 1986), 54–6.
[18] IGC Terms of Reference printed on all compensation forms; see Chapter 1.
[19] R. Gerwarth, 'The Central European counter-revolution: paramilitary violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War', *Past and Present*, no. 200 (Aug. 2008), 175–209 at 188–9.
[20] *Irish Times*, 4 Sept. 1920.

Essex in May 1922.[21] Their new home, Chadwell Heath, was apparently becoming another Irish 'colony' (like Letchworth): the Halls were joined there by, for example, Bridget Meade, who left Limerick city for England in April 1922 after being 'repeatedly insulted and threatened'.[22] Gerard Murphy has located other Irish havens in England. He suggests that Protestants and Loyalists who fled Cork in 1922 'did not move far from where they landed', settling in Swansea, Bristol, Plymouth etc. and some small Irish communities formed. In 1924, 80 families, 'all refugees from Cork city and county', were living in Bournemouth.[23]

Cases like Hall's and Meade's (above), and that of James Coogan,[24] who also left before the Civil War began in earnest, complicate the notion of 'expulsion'. It is difficult to pinpoint the precise reason why, or moment when, the victims felt sufficiently 'intimidated' to leave their home or job. Surely the intimidated party retained some control over their own destiny? Financial circumstances did play a part. Darby includes 'social class' as a determinant in the effectiveness of intimidation in driving out the sectarian enemy: early evacuees from the Belfast communities he studied were often families with higher incomes, who left behind those locked in an unpleasant environment by their deprivation.[25] The first to leave Palestine during 1947–50 were the country's urban upper and middle class families from towns like Haifa and Jaffa. These evacuees had 'wealthy relatives and accommodation outside the country' (in Beirut, Cairo etc.) and probably expected to return home before long. Businesses closed and municipal services broke down after their departure; the privileged left behind the poor and unemployed, for whom flight meant instant destitution.[26]

The evidence from the Irish Civil War also suggests it was easier for those already spending time outside Munster, with a safety net in Dublin or England, to flee violence, than it was for victims of intimidation whose livelihoods were already precarious and who lacked the capital to set up a new life elsewhere. Both governments lacked sympathy in their handling of the claims of landlords and big house owners,[27] where victims' intermittent absence from Ireland before the Civil War muddied the concept of being 'driven out'. John Fillans Barr, for example, was 'not exempt from responsibility' for the attack against his property, which took place *after* he 'fled to England'. In the 'heaviest claim' considered by the IGC, Barr was awarded £53,600 for the damage inflicted by a 'roving band of Irregulars' to his 'beautiful Georgian mansion', Killineer House, Co. Louth. The victim argued that he was 'so affected by the outrages' against him (including an attempted assassination, in September 1922) that he was 'not fully capable' of protecting himself and 'could not return' to Ireland to make a claim under the Free State Act. He was forced out, in other words. In the IGC's opinion, Barr had more choice in the matter: he was a man of vast resources (with interests in shipbuilding and commerce), but he had failed to take 'adequate steps to protect' his house by, for example, hiring a caretaker.[28]

There is a contrasting use of discretion within the British and Free State administrations, in compensating poorer claimants. William Walker, for example, had

[21] TNA, CO 762/122/7: Hall, Limerick.
[22] TNA, CO 762/120/4: Meade, Limerick.
[23] G. Murphy, *The year of disappearances: political killings in Cork, 1920–1921* (Dublin, 2010), 326–7.
[24] See above, Introduction.
[25] Darby, *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland*, 89–90.
[26] Morris, *Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited*, 112, 133, 590.
[27] See Chapter 2.
[28] TNA, CO 762/184/3: Barr, Louth.

served 32 years in the RIC and after his death, his widow Rachel was intimidated,[29] having been left—like other ex-police wives—'at the mercy of those who were their bitterest enemies'.[30] During 'armed raids' in 1922, Walker's crops were destroyed, her gates broken and water supply polluted. Yet the widow's dire financial circumstances forced her to stay put in Adare, Co. Limerick: she had no pension and 'no shop will run credit with me', although this may have been as much the result of her social ostracism from the local community, as it was to do with her inability to pay. The IGC were suitably convinced of Walker's deservedness and she was awarded £150 (£6670 in today's terms and a generous sum considering she asked for just £50 in her initial claim).[31] Indeed, organisations such as the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA) were established to raise awareness and funds for those who had no choice but to remain in an intimidating environment: 'open hostility' to the widows and children of RIC men was 'non-evident', reported SILRA as late as 1929, but 'anyone who knows Ireland can realise the sullen feeling of resentment which exists against them owing to their late husbands' services'.[32]

These sullen feelings had a more tangible manifestation during the Civil War, but this chapter shows that victims did not have to experience actual physical harm to feel afraid enough to leave; what Darby calls 'perceived environmental threat'[33] was just as important. During the early stages of the Palestinian exodus, by comparison, families did not flee under Jewish orders or direct coercion, but the desire to move out of harm's way, 'as Zionist troops conquered town after town and district after district', must have been a powerful motivating factor in their departure. In an atmosphere of 'war-filled chaos', those with the resources to leave understandably did so, even before suffering violence themselves.[34] In Munster, this 'feeling of unease or impression that intimidation might occur'[35] suffused many local communities during the Civil War. Fear is personal and unquantifiable in any real sense; 'psychological violence may inflict scars as enduring as they are impossible to measure'.[36] Certainly the mental trauma experienced by civilians and soldiers during the War of Independence and Civil War did not necessarily emerge in the neat, linear fashion conducive to the operation of government compensation committees (with their strict terms and dates of reference). Post-combat disorders have the capacity to this day to 'catch both military planners and doctors by surprise'.[37] However, World War I—and growing post-war suspicions that soldiers shot for cowardice and desertion may have been suffering from war neuroses—encouraged a revision of attitudes towards, and improvements in the treatment of, psychological distress. It had become clear, for example, that the 'nervous disorders…and hysteria' associated with 'shell shock' (a

[29] TNA, CO 762/143/12: Walker, Limerick.
[30] Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), D/989/B/5/2: 'Report by the Relief Secretary on his visit to Ireland in March, 1929' (Papers of the Irish Unionist Alliance, Papers of the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA), Memos, reports etc.).
[31] TNA, CO 762/143/12: Walker, Limerick.
[32] PRONI, D/989/B/5/2. See Chapter 1 on SILRA and its work.
[33] Darby, *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland*, 54.
[34] Morris, *Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited*, 589.
[35] Darby, *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland*, 53–4.
[36] L. Perry Curtis, 'Moral and physical force: the language of violence in Irish nationalism', *Journal of British Studies*, 27, no. 2 (1988), 150–89 at 158.
[37] E. Jones, 'Historical approaches to post-combat disorders', *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences*, 361 (2006), 533–542 at 533.

term coined during the American Civil War), originated from other causes than shock from exploding missiles.[38]

Following the Civil War in Ireland, there was reflection—by victims and compensation committees—on the effect of repeated intimidation on the psyche. The IGC included 'shock' in its definition of 'physical injuries': if a bomb misses body but wrecks the victim's mind, one 'cannot say he not been physically injured'. Included in this category were: the 'nervous breakdown' of a woman who had been compelled to witness her husband's murder and the 'insanity' caused by threats to shoot, or 'persistent nightly raids'. The 'relation between fright and injury to the brain and nervous structure' could be 'proved with medical and scientific testimony',[39] although in practice medical records were rarely provided in the files I studied. In a handwritten letter to W.T. Cosgrave, William Ross asked for £1000 compensation for the shock sustained by his wife 'owing to explosion and street fighting' in Nenagh between 29 June 1922 and 7 September 1922. The pressure had got too much for the family: forced out of his 'market gardening business', Ross was now struggling to support his family in Eardisley, Herefordshire.[40] This testimony, however, was not as convincing as those which made a direct link between targeted intimidation (as opposed to the general state of war) and psychological trauma. Ex-policeman, Thomas Needham, for example, claimed that the 'great mental anxiety that weighed upon' him following assassination threats received between October 1921 and February 1922, forced him to stay in England until 1923 and caused the illness for which he sought compensation. In the end, the IGC ruled that the injuries described 'must have been sustained while on duty with the RIC'; they were not connected with the Civil War and the claim was dismissed as outside the scope of the committee.[41] Though Needham may, of course, have taken advantage of the specific compensation and pension arrangements and charitable provision for ex-Servicemen and RIC.[42]

Niamh Brennan has found that while a 'substantial proportion' of former officers left Ireland permanently in 1922 and joined police forces in Palestine, Northern Ireland and England, others eventually returned after 1923, 'when political stability restored'.[43] However, Richard Abbott identifies a number of constables who simply 'walked away' from the force without, like Needham (above), even claiming financial remuneration. While these ex-policemen were not necessarily traumatised by their experiences in Ireland, some undoubtedly felt 'compelled to leave'—and leave quickly—'given the situation in the country'.[44] SILRA presented Catherine Kelly's application to the IGC on her behalf, giving weight to her claim that intimidation had affected her husband so badly that he died in Clonmel Lunatic Asylum in February 1926. Kelly's tailoring business, in Silver Street, Nenagh, was boycotted because her husband had served in the RIC and in this 'very genuine' case there was 'no doubt whatever' that the ex-policeman 'became demented…owing to the terror under which he lived', including the receipt of threatening letters, 1921–22.[45]

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[38] A. Babington, *Shell shock: a history of the changing attitude to war neurosis* (London, 1997), 106, 108–9, 122, 127, 136.
[39] TNA, CO 762/212: 'End of Committee Report'.
[40] NAI, FIN 1/2388: William Ross.
[41] TNA, CO 762/162/4: Needham, Tipperary.
[42] See Chapter 1, Section ii.b.
[43] Brennan's unpublished research, based on compensation claims, is referenced: E. Delaney, *Demography, state and society: Irish migration to Britain, 1921–1971* (Liverpool, 2000), 37.
[44] Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland*, 295.
[45] TNA, CO 762/180/16: Kelly, Tipperary.

The compensation claims capture this threatening atmosphere in Munster, where a violent undercurrent could become explicit if certain social and political codes were transgressed. It was 'well locally understood', for example, that the purchasers of Denis Murphy's lands in Cashel, Co. Tipperary, 'would be intimidated'. On 8 April 1922, Murphy told the IGC, he was given 'three days to leave Ireland by the IRA'. Yet he could not sell the house: 'no one will touch it because it once belonged to "spud Murphy"', his nickname as a British Government detective. His letter of October 1927 to the Secretary of the IGC revealed that even seven years after he was first 'blacklisted', Murphy's awareness of his treacherous status within the community remained clear:

> Even should I succeed in repairing and getting a tenant, I would then become an English landlord and get no rent. I found the same old ill-feeling towards me, and actions against "dead and alive" old Sinn Fein leaders remembered.[46]

There was local appreciation, too, of the danger of informing. Rachel Walker (above) told the IGC that she did not report the attacks against her, until May 1927, because 'we were warned that if we made any complaint we would be burnt out'.[47] Thus the targeting of individuals needed the cooperation or at least complicity of the community: Walker was injured not merely by the acts of a small gang of the IRA, but was made to feel unwelcome in a wider context. For intimidation to work, for the victim to be genuinely convinced that reporting the initial attack would result in, for example, the burning of their home, they had to believe that speaking to the authorities would be noted locally. Victims of social and political violence in Munster had to face the 'unpalatable truth' at the heart of civil warfare:[48] that former neighbours now condoned violence against them. In only a few cases were the attackers named by the victim, but ex-policeman Patrick Courtney,[49] for one, claimed that he was forced out by John Griffin, Robert Jones and James and Thomas O'Shaughnessy, 'all in the village of Loughill'.[50]

The importance of these intra-community dynamics, of the destructive potential of neighbourhood rivalries and animosities, was not ignored by armed personnel. Indeed, while intimidation includes less conventional forms of civil warfare—threatening notices, attacks on land and animals, and boycotting—this does not mean that it lacked military utility. If the Irish people could not be inspired into 'Republican enthusiasm' by great gestures of violence,[51] Ernie O'Malley understood well the usefulness of intimidation in cajoling and controlling the local population. The IRA policy of executing alleged spies and traitors during the War of Independence, for example, served as a warning of the dangers of loose talk. By 1922–23, O'Malley recalled, 'people eventually learned to shut their eyes and close their mouths'.[52] O'Malley himself was engaged in intimidatory tactics. He defied Lynch's order to kill the editors of newspapers (the *Irish Independent* and the *Irish*

[46] TNA, CO 762/5/6: Murphy, Tipperary. Also made claim as 'Victimised Loyalist' directly to Irish Ministry of Finance: NAI, FIN 1/1086.
[47] TNA, CO 762/143/12: Walker, Limerick.
[48] A. Blok, *Honour and violence* (Cambridge, 2001), 5.
[49] See above, this Section.
[50] NAI, 392/18: Courtney, Limerick. See also Chapter 4: some victims of violence against the person knew their attacker.
[51] English, *Ernie O'Malley*, 78–9.
[52] English, *Ernie O'Malley*, 80.

Times) unsympathetic towards the republicans, but he 'did write intimidatingly' to the press during the Civil War.

ii. Written warnings and threatening letters

History taught the recipient of a threatening letter to take this form of intimidation very seriously indeed. The authorities also took heed: a familiar form of rural protest in Britain and Ireland, the posting of intimidatory notices was logged as a distinct category of injury in nineteenth century crime statistics.[53] British Government 'Intelligence Notes' from the early twentieth century catalogued 'threatening letters or notices' as an indictable 'agrarian offence…affecting the public peace'.[54] Demands for money, goods, or the recipient's removal from the area—and warnings of the punishments to be expected for non-compliance—induced extreme anxiety and 'justified forms of paranoia'.[55]

Quasi-legal language framed threatening letters as orders that had to be obeyed. It is difficult to ascertain whether the typed sheets contained in the compensation files were the actual notices received at the time. Still, a number of interesting letters—copies or otherwise—do survive. Retired RIC Sergeant Maurice Reidy, a 'native' of Glin, Co. Limerick, received the following while stationed in Co. Galway:

> Brigade Head Quarters
> East Connemara
> 30 April 1922
>
> > To Mr Reidy,
> > You and your family are to leave this Divisional Area within 24 hours. If at the expiration of that period you have failed to obey this order you must be prepared to take the consequences.
> > BY ORDER,
> > O/C 4th Western Division

Based on experience and hearsay, Reidy no doubt had his own idea of what 'the consequences' could involve: the burning of his house, assault, perhaps murder? He did not stay to find out, moving to Ballyhahill, Co. Limerick, where, in May 1922, the family was served with a second notice, signed 'J.T. O'C, O/C, IRA Barracks, Foynes'.[56] Again, Reidy took heed of the threat, travelling to and from Dublin and his home in Glin, in fear of being found. His compensation claims to the Free State[57] and IGC relate to the cost of these trips and the damage to furniture in transit.

A straightforward demand had been heeded; a former representative of the British state in Ireland was removed from the community. But why was Reidy so convinced of the threat to his life should he remain at home? Did the letter genuinely draw authority from the IRA? Free State Army reports did identify the posting of threatening notices as an 'Irregular' tactic during the war. Notices served to 'local residents' in parts of South Tipperary and Co. Limerick, in March 1923, dictated that

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[53] Curtis, 'Moral and physical force', *Journal of British Studies*, 184.
[54] TNA, CO 903/19 (Records of the Colonial Office, Records of the Irish Office: Intelligence notes for the Chief Secretary).
[55] E.P. Thompson, 'The crime of anonymity', in D. Hay, *Albion's fatal tree: crime and society in eighteenth-century England* (London, 1977), 255–308 at 255.
[56] TNA, CO 762/144/11: Reidy, Limerick.
[57] NAI, 392/451: Reidy, Limerick.

anyone found 'aiding or abetting the National Army will be given 12 hours notice to quit the district'.[58] A number of authority figures in Tipperary—including the Chairman of the County Council, the chairman of Cashel Urban Council and sheriff of Clonmel—received the following, signed by republican leaders Denis (Dinny) Lacey [O/C Third Tipperary Brigade, IRA] and William Quirke:

> Should any officer or man of the 3rd Tipp. Brigade Area be executed in or outside the Brigade Area you, and certain members of your Board will be deemed participants in the crime and will be dealt with accordingly. War, Truce, or Peace.[59]

These local threats echo orders issued by IRA Chief-of-Staff Liam Lynch—and circulated in the press throughout the war—for retaliation killings of government officials (following the execution of republican prisoners), or the burning of Senators' homes.[60] Posters put up by 'armed Irregulars' in Glin and Ballylongford, for example, read: 'That for every Republican shot, two Staters would fall'.[61] Even relatively minor acts of destruction could be accompanied by written warnings. In December 1922, the Free State Army's Limerick Command encountered Irregulars 'affixing up notices to trees which they had felled', in Kanturk, Co. Cork.[62]

Violence was a powerful means of communication and notices or letters reinforced the message of the violent act. Republicans could not defeat the Free State militarily, but did succeed in inflicting severe blows against infrastructure and undermining the authority of the new government in the localities. Blowing up roads and bridges and tearing up rails disrupted communications. The intimidation of postmen through written warnings made sure the mail service was unable to function. Notices posted near Listowel, Co. Kerry, for example, warned postmen that if they carried out their duties, they would be shot.[63] The intimidation of jurors during the War of Independence had worked in a similar way: violence weakened the grip of the British state on law and order in Ireland and upheld a different system (the Dáil courts). Then during the Civil War, republicans rejected the Free State's own police force, the Civic Guard, as a 'continuation of the old RIC'. A 'proclamation' signed by Dinny Lacey on 22 November 1922 warned 'members of the "Civic Guard"' that after 1 December 1922: 'such measures as are deemed necessary will be taken to prevent this body functioning'. Safe passage would be granted to Guards returning to 'civil employment', provided they gave a 'written undertaking not to take up arms against, nor to assist in any way, the enemies of the Republic'.[64]

By communicating in these quasi-official missives, the anti-Treaty IRA was, in a sense, administering a republican alternative to the Free State. The IRA denied involvement, by contrast, in the intimidation of 'postal officials' in Limerick, in July 1922. 'Masked and armed men' visited 'R.G. Hetherington, P. and J. Waldron and T.J. Phelan' in their homes, serving them with 'orders to leave Ireland'. But these 'outrages' were attributed 'to personal spite on the part of unauthorised individuals'

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[58] Irish Military Archives (IMA), Civil War Operation/Intelligence Reports by Command, CW/OPS/2/M.
[59] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 7 Feb., 24 Feb. and 7 Mar. 1923.
[60] See Chapter 2, Section ii and Chapter 4, Section i.
[61] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[62] IMA, CW/OPS/2/B.
[63] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[64] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot No. 110, A/1100.

and Stephen O'Mara, Mayor of Limerick, agreed to an 'inquiry'.[65] This campaign of intimidation may have had its roots in a different kind of conflict: labour.[66] Irish Government plans to cut postal workers' wages had been causing resentment and a Post Office strike began on 10 September 1922. Services were interrupted across the 26 counties, until work resumed on 30 September. Limerick in particular was 'hard hit': the city's Chamber of Commerce warned of a collapse of trade and unemployment, should the dispute continue.[67] Intimidation, including threatening notices, was used as a kind of picketing, to deter 'scabs' from returning to work. The *Irish Times* published the Post Office's own list of 'cases of alleged intimidation' of postmen, telephone operators and clerks. The father of one female worker in Waterford, for example, was told 'that if he did not want his little business interrupted in the city, he should keep his daughter at home'.[68] In Dublin, people carrying letters for others were 'stopped and deprived of them'. One woman was 'intimidated' and assaulted, for carrying post in her handbag.[69]

Clearly intimidation was not the sole preserve of the military. Historians and social scientists have developed E.P. Thompson's 'moral economy' thesis to show how even loosely aligned groups of people can—through violence—enact social change and uphold collectively held moral codes.[70] Before 'boycott' was even coined as a phrase,[71] election mobs used social ostracism and intimidation to influence public opinion and sway the vote in pre-Reform parliamentary elections.[72] Still, the most effective threatening notices were those letters where—even if IRA authorship could not be irrefutably proved—the recipient had a strong understanding, fostered perhaps by personal experience, or local rumour and suggestion, that an armed power—namely the republicans—lay behind the orders to leave the area.

Ada Vere-Hunt of Longfield House, Cashel, Co. Tipperary, received the following unsigned letter, but told the IGC it was Andy Donnelly, the 'officer in charge of the Mid-Tipperary Division' of the IRA, who cleared the family out:

> Mrs Hunt,
> You bloody Protestant you needn't think the staters are going to get Longfields back for you we will put decent Catholics in your husbands place. We'll give you what we gave Clarke if ye set a foote in it, ye made a dear a bargain when ye kept money from us.[73]

Clarke is Charles Clarke, whose Tipperary mansion, Graiguenoe Park, was burned on 28 February 1923.[74] After two months of serious pressure, including threatening letters, the killing of cattle and raids on their home by a 'large crowd of rebels', Ada and Robert Vere-Hunt were finally driven out of Longfields in June 1922. Two years passed before the couple 'set a foote' on their lands again. They moved into their

[65] *Limerick Leader*, 3 July 1922.
[66] See Chapter 2, Section v: disputes between employers and workers resulted in the burning of crops, creameries and saw mills.
[67] *Irish Times*, 15 Sept. 1922
[68] *Irish Times*, 18 Sept. 1922.
[69] *Irish Times*, 30 Sept. 1922.
[70] See Introduction on definitions of 'social violence'.
[71] See below, Section vi.
[72] G.J. Lyne, 'Daniel O'Connell, intimidation and the Kerry elections of 1835', *Journal of the Kerry Archaeological and Historical Society*, 4 (1971), 74–97.
[73] TNA, CO 762/5/3: Vere-Hunt, Tipperary.
[74] See Chapter 2.

adjoining property, Ardmayle, near Cashel, until this was no longer safe, then spent time away from Co. Tipperary and even Ireland: their compensation file records a stay in Belgium, and hotels in Dublin and Westport (Co. Mayo). Claims were also made for expenses incurred in sending the Vere-Hunt children away with a nurse, during the more disruptive periods of 1922. A range of tactics had been used to remove this prominent family from the county and it is in the threatening notice received by Ada that we get some insight into the perpetrators' motivations—and the convergence of land hunger, sectarianism and anti-British sentiment, in this series of attacks. The Vere-Hunts were clearly identifiable as Protestants and 'Loyalists' (they had entertained a column of the Lincolnshire Regiment at Longfield House, in early 1921). The letter is also boast, as well as a warning: there is no date, but it sounds as though 'Longfields' had already been seized by the raiders at the time of writing and the Vere-Hunts—along with the new 'stater' government charged with their protection—were helpless to resist the land for the people project. The land was not cleared, by Free State troops—and possession given to the family's agent—until August 1924. According to this land agent, interviewed during the IGC investigation, the Vere-Hunts' property had been 'coveted for some years by landless men in the vicinity'. The Vere-Hunts took 'Longfields' on a ten year lease from 1919, an acquisition which the local IRA were allegedly unhappy with; the unpaid money referred to in the letter relates to the frequent (and ignored) demands made by them for a levy on the land.[75]

The relationship between anti-Treaty republicanism and land agitation is contentious.[76] Yet a letter received by Ned Wynne, of Outrath, near Cahir, Co. Tipperary, seems to implicate the republicans in what otherwise could be characterised as a neighbours' squabble over land. A Mrs. Mulcahy was evicted for non-payment of rent in 1893 and the holding passed to an agent, before being purchased (through the Land Commission) by Cpt. Bloomfield in 1908. Wynne bought Bloomfield's share, but when he put the land up for auction in April 1921, the sale was 'rendered abortive' by 'descendents' of the evicted woman, even though Wynne's land agent found no connection between these individuals and the land, and reported that relations between the owner and Mulcahy were 'friendly'. It was 'the IRA', Wynne claimed, that 'put [me] out of my farm', in order to divide the land 'amongst the men who had been "on the run"'. A copy of the letter he received before his departure outlines the republicans' designs on the 212 acre property:

H.Q. Bn. 1
3rd Tipp. Bde.
I.R.A. Barracks, Fethard
22/2/22

To Mr Ned Wynne,
Outrath, Cahir.
(1) You will hand over the lands in Outrath held by you at present before March 10th 1922, to Captain J. Longeran, for the I.R.A.
(2) You will remove all your stock by then off the farm.
(3) No Agricultural Impliments [sic] will be removed, or sold, by you unless you get orders from us to do so.
No furniture to be removed unless ordered.
(Signed) J.D.L. Commandant

[75] TNA, CO 762/5/3: Vere-Hunt, Tipperary.
[76] See below, Section v.

We assume 'J.D.L' to be Capt. J. Longeran, IRA, to whom Wynne was ordered to give up his farm. He did leave, on 1 May 1922, losing his land, his 'practically new' machinery and valuable cattle (the young ones, he complained, had cost £34 each). Wynne understood the grants received from the 'Imperial Government' would be deducted from any compensation received, but hoped the Irish Government would offer a fair award, so he could make a new life in Co. Cork, where his wife was from.[77]

The warnings received by Wynne, the Vere-Hunts and Reidy (above) look like military orders and the targets responded with due urgency. The communications are also reminiscent of threatening letters received by land agents and shopkeepers during the Land War, or notices posted during even earlier (eighteenth century) agrarian agitation. The Irish Claims Compensation Association (ICCA, a lobbying group like SILRA), gathered some particularly interesting letters as evidence, in support of their statement to the House of Lords. The following was posted on Lord Ashtown's Woodlawn estate (Ballinasloe, Co. Galway):

> I hereby give you notice not to aid or assist in working on the grasslands of Woodlawn as the country wants the same for small tenants and means to fight for them to the bitter end.
>
> Remember this goes from the hillside Committee. Abide by what I have said or the next notice you will get will be powder and led.
>
> Sined [sic] Roary of the hill
> who always gives notice
> before he does kill.[78]


'Roary [or Rory] of the Hill' succeeded 'Molly Maguire' in the 1870s, as the ubiquitous 'righter of wrongs' in agrarian conflicts.[79] That resistance of oppression or injustice would come from the mountains was constantly referenced in letters from this period. Parnell even appealed to the 'hillside men' in his speeches.[80] The 'hillside committee' in communication with Ashtown appealed to this tradition. Civil War letters borrowed other sinister Land War motifs, like a hand drawn coffin containing the recipient's name. Amongst a series of letters to Robert Swanton and his son George, both JPs (and both shot at; Robert lost an eye), was one found on 31 July 1881:

> One thing more I have to say
> Is to shun those peelers without delay
> And not to give the country say
> That you should be a traitor
> Robert, George, and Daly too!
> Woe be to them, for I am true,
> A Croppy-still for ever.
>
> GEORGE
>
> You'll go.

[77] NAI, FIN 1/1079: Edward Wynne.
[78] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9: 'Irish Claims Compensation Association (ICCA) Report to the House of Lords: Statement of the injustices suffered by Irish Loyalists' (Papers of the SILRA, Case Papers).
[79] W.E. Vaughan, *Landlords and tenants in mid-Victorian Ireland* (Oxford, 1994), 152.
[80] D.G. Boyce and A. O'Day, *Parnell in perspective* (London, 1991), 4, 300.

Richard Daly, also mentioned in the letter, had his house burned and a notice posted: 'I will stain my hands in your blood…Yours truly, Captain Moonlight'. And 'Croppy' probably harks back to an epithet of the rebels of 1798, who wore their hair cut very short as a sign of sympathy with the French Revolution. 'Despite its crude execution' (irregularly written on an old envelope), 'such a notice carried a definitely political message'.[81] Compare with the 'grave warning' received by Protestant shopkeeper, Willie Roe, on 8 May 1922; see Figure 10.[82] The letter, issued by the IRA at Barrack Street, Cappoquin, Co. Waterford, called Roe an 'informer' of the 'Black and Tans' (just as the Swantons' role in law enforcement in Ireland, and cooperation with the 'peelers' (RIC), had marked them out for attack some 40 years earlier). The 'O/C South Battalion' ordered Roe to 'clear out', or 'we will riddle you with bullets when you least expect it'. If Roe could not imagine this fate, at the bottom of the page a final warning ('Remember this is shure death') and small drawing of a coffin, conveyed the message more clearly. 'W. Roe, who was shot' was written inside.

Figure 10: Extract from threatening letter received by Willie Roe, a Protestant shopkeeper in Lismore, Co. Waterford.



Source: Roe's compensation file (TNA, CO 762/108/11).

Thus while many of the letters in circulation during 1922–23 were of a childish, 'illiterate type'[83] (and alleged IRA authorship could rarely be proved), these notices made use of historic codes of warning and escalation, to make a powerful impact in a modern setting—and were genuinely frightening to recipients like Roe.

Indeed, while the idea that the Civil War provided the opportunity for airing long-held resentments may be appealing, there is also reason to be aware, as ever in the study of the Irish past, of the cleverly rationalised use of history for modern purposes. The profile of those targeted by intimidation reveals that the battle raging in Munster's communities was not a straightforward continuation of the Land War, or expression of anger at the Cromwellian confiscations, but a campaign for redistribution directed, in the main, at the graziers and medium-sized farmers who had recently acquired land, or held more than one, or a larger than average, farm. In the

[81] C. Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983), 111–12.
[82] See below, Section vi, for Roe's case in full.
[83] *Clonmel Chronicle* (17 June 1922) describes a letter received by a land auctioneer; see Chapter 2, Section iv.

1870s, reflected D.P. Moran, 'the issues between rack-rented and insecure tenants, and…cruel, worthless and foreign landlordism, was fairly clear cut'. The kind of land agitation surfacing at the time of Moran's writing (the Ranch War, 1904–8) was a more 'complex and more dangerous problem', involving 'neighbour against neighbour, Irishman against Irishman'.[84] Certainly the fight against the grazier could never generate the 'rich popular resonance' of the Land Wars against the landlord. Yet even if, as Bew claims, the historiography has 'exaggerated' the 'extent of anti-grazier hostility' during the early twentieth century,[85] Section (iii) demonstrates that in Munster, at least, these tensions ran high well into the Civil War.

iii. Cattle driving

D.J. Corey TD did not think 'the question of ordinary land purchase' would continue to cause problems in Ireland in 1923, but 'ranch breaking will be a troublesome question'.[86] Munster certainly saw a revival, during 1922–23, of tactics made famous during the Ranch War. Indeed, amongst the range of violent and threatening acts I have labelled 'intimidation', those associated with the land ('ranch breaking', cattle driving and seizure of farms), provided a real opportunity for local involvement. As the 'only equipment needed' for a drive were 'hazel switches, willing hands and, perhaps, a fife and drum band, the activity could be carried out spontaneously and with little organisational structure'.[87] The 'atmosphere of festivity' does not mean that cattle drives were participated in on a whim,[88] but it does remind us that illegal and injurious actions could be condoned by the public. It was undoubtedly easier for those who did not usually engage in criminal activity, to rationalise participation in a group cattle-drive, or perpetration of other smaller acts of intimidation than, say, the burning of a big house, which could be difficult and dangerous. While many were tired of the disruption to travel and daily life caused by the fighting, on the other hand a local community's tolerance of some acts of violence and intimidation could be an important factor in their persistence.[89] At the heart of cattle driving was the community's desire to regulate access to land and its reoccurrence in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford in this period reveals something of the political and socio-economic motivations of those, including non-military personnel, who took violence into their own hands during the Civil War.

On a drive, cattle and sheep were scattered far and wide, causing maximum trouble for their owner, the hated 'grazier'. The origins of this resentment lie further back but—just as 'land grabber' was employed with derision in contemporary accounts of the Ranch War[90]—the compensation claims prove that 'grazier' had currency as a derogatory label during the Civil War.[91] That Jane Hartigan of Croom, Co. Limerick, had 'let my lands to a Grazer [sic]', for example, was crucial evidence

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[84] P. Bew, *Conflict and conciliation, 1890–1910: Parnellites and radical agrarians* (Oxford, 1987), 149.
[85] Bew, *Conflict and conciliation*, 208.
[86] *Dáil Éireann Debates* (http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie), ii, 5 Jan. 1923.
[87] W. Keaveney, *The land for the people: Robert Henry Johnstone and the United Irish League; a story of land agitation in the early twentieth century* (Dublin, 2007), 179.
[88] C. Deutsch-Brady, 'The cattle drive of Tulira', *Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society*, 34 (1974–75), 35–39 at 36.
[89] See Chapter 4: for those who are not normally bloodthirsty, civil wars typically provide opportunities for 'indirect' violence.
[90] Bew, *Conflict and conciliation*, 162.
[91] Persecuted 'graziers' include: TNA, CO 762/49/12: Davern, Limerick; NAI, 392/434: Barrett, Limerick; CO 762/59/18: Wilmott-Smith, Limerick.

in her case: 'the Grazer's Cattle has been driven on several occasions and on the 31st March [1922], his hay was burnt with my out offices on my Lands'.[92] British land legislation had undermined landlordism and enabled tenants to purchase their land, but it did not create tillage for all, nor solve rural poverty. After the Wyndham Act (1903), the decreasing supply of marketable land saw richer farmers and small town businessmen accumulate large ranches through the eleven month letting of untenanted land (because such holdings were not legally bound by tenant rights).[93] 60% of the total acreage of Co. Waterford, for example, lay with just 12% of occupiers, by the time of the Civil War.[94] Indeed, the progress of land purchase in the three counties did not compare particularly well with Munster as a whole, nor with other parts of Ireland: by 1923, 76% of the total acreage of Limerick had been purchased by tenants under the Land Acts of 1881–1909. The figures for Tipperary and Waterford were 61% and 56% respectively.[95] In the eyes of those scraping a living off small plots, particularly in the congested West of Ireland, grazing was a waste of fertile land and the non-residential pasture a tantalising prospect. Thus the object of cattle driving, during the Ranch War at least, was to 'harass and demoralise the graziers'.[96] Eventually, it was hoped, these men would surrender their land to the community.

The tactic enjoyed some success during 1904–8: Fergus Campbell reveals that after an intensive campaign of cattle driving and the non-payment of rent in Athenry, Co. Galway, frightened graziers sold their estates, the land was redistributed and hundreds of viable small farms created.[97] It was agitation on the ground, Campbell argues, not high political concerns, that brought Irish land issues to George Wyndham's attention in the first place, resulting in the land purchase Act and later laws. In Connacht, the law of the British crown was replaced by the 'law of the [United Irish] League'. *Land and Revolution* (2005) offers the first real account of the role played by UIL land courts in imposing an agrarian agenda (and punishing those who did not give up their land to 'the people'). While peaceful public rallies called for the redistribution of grazing land and for landlords to sell their estates to tenants on fair terms, cattle driving, boycotting, violence and intimidation enforced these demands in the local community.[98]

While animals bore the brunt of the physical violence, the sight of the cattle being marched towards their home, accompanied by a large crowd and even a band, was a menacing one for the owner.[99] Free State troops had to be despatched to deal with the driving of 60 head of cattle off land at Mount Russell, in Ardpatrick, east Limerick.[100] This practice of making the target's life a misery and his livelihood difficult, in order to remove the victim and potentially claim his land, recurs in the evidence from the Civil War. Between January and March 1922, 59 cattle were driven

[92] NAI, 392/517: Hartigan, Limerick.
[93] Bew, *Conflict and conciliation*, 205, 11. John Bourke's lands were held 'under the eleven month system' and during the Civil War his cattle was driven: NAI, 392/282: Bourke, Limerick.
[94] *Munster Express*, 13 Jan. 1923.
[95] E. Rumpf and A.C. Hepburn, *Nationalism and socialism in twentieth-century Ireland* (Liverpool, 1977), 54.
[96] Bew, *Conflict and conciliation*, 140
[97] F. Campbell, *Land and Revolution: nationalist politics in the west of Ireland, 1891–1921* (Oxford, 2005), 183.
[98] On one particularly 'vigorous' campaign of intimidation, in Craughwell, Co. Galway: Campbell, *Land and Revolution*, 153–6.
[99] Keaveney, *The land for the people*, 180.
[100] *Limerick Leader*, 23 June 1922.

from Denis Hickey's land; 23 more were chased off in attacks on 18–19 May. For Hickey the perpetrators' motivations were clear:

> Local small holders and landless people were anxious to have the lands of Croom…divided up and sold to them, and with that object in view, sought to strip the lands, so as to render same useless to the owner.[101]

The area around Croom was, it seems, at the centre of a spate of driving: Jane Hartigan,[102] had let her lands to a grazier there and Hickey's neighbour, John Coleman,[103] submitted an almost identical claim to the Free State. And in the early hours of 2 March 1922, 'a hundred head of cattle were driven off lands at Croom and Carrigeen'. 'The motive for the drive', reported *Limerick Leader*, was 'to focus attention on the need for land by uneconomic holders and labourers in the district'.[104]

Frank Boyle, a 'farmer' from Rath, Abington (near Boher), Co. Limerick, believed that 'local people want to get the land divided', which is why they 'drove my cattle off [and] damaged my farm'. Boyle's fences were cut and his gate and windows smashed in the attacks which took place over four days in January 1923.[105] It worked: many owners like Boyle found it difficult if not impossible to re-let land from which their cattle or the cattle of the previous tenant had been driven.[106] Victims driven off land that they then could not sell, because of local intimidation, incurred a double loss (the actual value of the land and the consequential disappearance of their income from it).[107] Cattle drivers were also 'busy' in 'many parts' of South Tipperary in February 1922. As part of a 'campaign to have grazing lands broken up and divided amongst the working classes', drives took place on, amongst others, the park lands of Col. F.S. Lowe at Kilshane House, near Dromline, where 150 head of cattle belonging to Daniel Devitt of Cashel were chased off.[108] Walls surrounding the demesne and a heavy iron gate were pulled down and notices posted:

> The land for the Irish and the land for the people. These lands are to be for the people, and not for ranches. The cattle were driven off these lands last night. Anyone found bringing them back or repairing walls or gates will meet with instant death.
> (Signed) Captain Moonlight.

The parallels between these notices and letters posted during nineteenth century rural agitation are clear; if the Land War fell outside Lowe or Devitt's own lifetimes, the fictional signatory undoubtedly evoked frightening folk memories of the 1880s. Still, this was 1922 and 'Captain Moonlight' had picked up his poisonous pen for a very different kind of conflict: it was not just alien landlords of large demesnes like Kilshane who had to fear the landless, but middle-class Catholic farmers, like Devitt,[109] who grazed their cattle on the coveted 'ranches', were also under attack. In

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[101] NAI, 392/29, 31: Hickey, Limerick.
[102] See above, this Section.
[103] NAI, 392/24: Coleman, Limerick; see Chapter 1, Section ii.a.
[104] *Limerick Leader*, 3 Mar. 1922.
[105] NAI, 392/15: Boyle, Limerick.
[106] George Fosberry, for example, suffered this fate: TNA, CO 762/57/5: Fosberry, Limerick.
[107] See for example: TNA, CO 762/192/20, CO 762/5/6, CO 762/89/5, CO 762/104/22, NAI, 401/1061.
[108] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 8 Feb. 1922.
[109] Identity of Daniel Devitt (of Farranamanagh, near Cashel, Co. Tipperary) confirmed in the Census of Ireland (1911), NAI, Dublin, http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/ (online database).

September 1922, various 'acts commenced by terror…effectual to prevent…the user of grazing rights'—including cattle driving and tree cutting—drove Jeremiah Casey from a farm he had bought just '3 or 4 years ago'.[110]

Analysis has been focused thus far on the effect of driving on the owner: inconvenience and intimidation. The evidence also reveals the potential rewards for the landless drivers. The animals themselves may have been frightened or injured along the way (those hazel switches had a purpose) and sometimes driving became theft, when the cattle was not returned. 'Cattle-stealing' was 'growing around the Thurles and Goold's Cross districts' in May 1922, for example: 28 animals taken off L. Pennefather's lands at Marlow 'cannot be traced', despite the £50 reward offered for the capture of the perpetrators.[111] However, though it took much time and effort, the missing livestock could usually be gathered together, unharmed. Following the drives around Croom in March 1922,[112] 'the cattle were found on the roadside and during the day efforts were being made to collect them and put them back on the lands'.[113] Cattle was returned to Lowe's demesne, near Dromline (Co. Tipperary, above) and the gate replaced. As Thomas Kennedy's cattle were being taken away from the lands at Pass, near Clonmel, 'a party of the IRA', acting at this stage as a force for law and order,[114] 'appeared on the scene, and recovered the beasts'.[115] The following section, by contrast, explores those cases in which the cattle, sheep or other animals were deliberately injured or killed.

iv. Animal maiming

Kind treatment of animals is a relatively modern concern. In rural societies in the past, men were 'constantly reminded of their dependence on the slaughter of animals, and of the cruelty of animals to each other'.[116] The 'devilish act of cutting out the tongues of horses and cattle' had warranted a statute in England in 1545.[117] Yet before Martin's 'Humanity' Act (1822)—which protected the creature itself from carelessness and cruelty—animals had the status of property and their abuse was an offence against the owner alone.[118] With increased government intervention in health and welfare in the nineteenth century, ideas evolved and humane attitudes became more familiar.[119] Protective legislation was continually renewed. The Munster press reported on 'cruelty to rabbits' in Nottingham: a group of miners were fined for failure to comply with a new Act of Parliament by holding a 'coursing meeting'.[120] Maiming thus upset and inconvenienced an owner increasingly emotionally attached to—as well as financially dependent on—his animals.

The deliberate injuring and killing of animals became (and apparently is still) an expression of grievance against a target, carried out through violence against a living thing cared for and relied on by the target. 'To take it out on an innocent horse

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[110] NAI, 392/284: Casey, Limerick.
[111] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 3 May 1922.
[112] See above, this Section.
[113] *Limerick Leader*, 13 Mar. 1922.
[114] See below, Section v, by contrast, on potential republican involvement in rural violence.
[115] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 8 Feb. 1922.
[116] B. Harrison, 'Animals and the state in nineteenth century England', *English Historical Review*, 88 (1973), 786–820 at 786.
[117] J.E. Archer, *By a flash and a scare: incendiarism, animal maiming, and poaching in East Anglia, 1815–1870* (Oxford, 1990), 202.
[118] Archer, *By a flash and a scare*, 199–200.
[119] Harrison, 'Animals and the state', *English Historical Review*, 786–88.
[120] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 18 Jan. 1922.

was wicked' said Alison Hayes; her pony's nose was cut and 'anti-English' graffiti daubed on her riding stables in west Wales in April 2008.[121] Reports on maimings during the Irish Civil War display a similar sense of bafflement at the taking out of social, political, or personal resentments, on a 'harmless' animal:

> It is difficult to establish any connection between dumb beasts and the existence of unrest in the country; but truth nowadays is stranger than fiction. On yesterday evening three donkeys were discovered dead on the roadside at Barne, and on investigation it was found that the poor beasts had been deliberately shot, a label being attached to each inscribed "Turned their back on Freedom".[122]

We must wonder whether the targeting of a donkey in this case—a notoriously docile and foolish animal, used in popular culture to satirise incompetent British military leaders—was entirely coincidental. Their owner had 'not been disclosed', though we are reminded of the importance of animals to the rural economy and the great losses incurred (and consequently large amounts of compensation sought) following this form of intimidation: the 'rate-paying community will ultimately know to their cost to whom the donkeys belonged'.[123] Still, the labels attached to the dead animals hint at a motive,[124] making an (albeit cryptic) connection between this incident and the conflict over the Treaty. Section (ii) in this chapter analyses violence as a means of communication: the posting of notices and threatening letters reinforced the message of the violent act. Thus whether by (even implicit) acceptance of the new Free State, a past demonstration of British allegiance, or rejection of the IRA cause (by refusing to pay levies to the 'Irregulars', for example), the donkeys' owners had 'turned their back' on the Irish republic and therefore 'on freedom'. Their animals were punished as a result.

Animal maiming could make a powerful public statement. Attacks on livestock by the eighteenth century 'Houghers' in Connacht were accompanied by proclamations in favour of land redistribution (and threatening letters to farmers, signed by the fictional 'Ever Joyce') and during the Civil War, particularly gruesome attacks were reported in the press.[125] Still, maiming was also a highly personalised and often secretive attack. The compensation claims suggest this form of intimidation was difficult to trace and perpetrators were rarely prosecuted. Little detail is offered, for example, on how the animal had been injured; cattle, sheep (and a mare in one case[126]) were simply 'seized and killed by Irregulars'.[127] Patrick Maloney, for example, described the attacks against him: 'the Irregulars came to my lands which I hold under the 11 month system…and took the two bullocks mentioned…and had

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[121] ''Anti-English attack' hurts horse', *BBC News*, 7 Apr. 2008 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/7333435.stm).
[122] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 26 Apr 1922.
[123] This attack took place in a county outside the remit of the thesis (Longford); the compensation material for this county (which may shed more light on the identity of both victim and perpetrator), has not yet been analysed.
[124] Compare with labels attached to human corpses; see Chapter 4.
[125] S.J. Connolly, 'The Houghers: agrarian protest in early eighteenth century Connacht', in C.H.E. Philpin, *Nationalism and popular protest in Ireland* (Cambridge, 1987), 139–162.
[126] NAI, 392/420.
[127] See for example: NAI, 392/488, 392/523. In other cases animals were simply 'killed': NAI, 392/469, TNA, CO 762/14/8.

same slaughtered'.[128] Animal deaths could be coincidental with the military conflict: in a number of incidents in Cos. Limerick and Waterford, cattle and a mare were shot during exchanges between Free State and republican troops.[129] Hares were killed in similar circumstances.[130] A bullock owned by James Quinlan (father of a Free State Lieutenant) was shot when his house in Michelstown was fired into on 24 Apr. 1923.[131] In other cases it was difficult to prove any malicious intent: when John Stephenson's gates were pulled down and cattle let off the land, one cow was found dead—'it is believed from ill treatment as it was a cow in calf'—but there were no human witnesses. Richard Crotty's bullock was similarly found dead, reported the Free State Army, but 'it may have been from disease'.[132]

Other attacks were clearly planned and individually targeted: Cornelius Harnett's heifers were 'maliciously drowned';[133] Philip Heelan's jennet was blinded in a 'wanton and malicious' reprisal over trespass.[134] Retaliation against some perceived wrongdoing is a recurrent feature of these attacks, and seemingly motivates attacks on animals to this day: Oxfordshire police believe that a knife attack on a mare in March 2009 was carried out by 'someone out for revenge'.[135] Like a threatening letter, smashed window, or burnt out haggard, the victim's discovery of a dead or injured animal on his property induced fear and prompted speculation on the intent of the (largely anonymous) perpetrators—and the goodwill of the community at large. Some historians and anthropologists even interpret animal maiming as symbolic murder: 'dead animals meant an act of killing had occurred and it was only a question of time…before the maimer turned' on the owner and his family.[136] In Munster, there is no evidence that animal maiming was followed up by the killing, or attempted murder, of its owner. There were past exceptions (British soldiers in Ireland fell victim to 'houghing' in the eighteenth century),[137] but even during the bitter and bloody Civil War, the maiming of animals was not matched by the mutilation of human bodies celebrated in ritual killings on the Continent. Comparing violence in Ulster around this time, with another European conflict zone, Tim Wilson notes that the absence of mutilation (of people) in Northern Ireland was 'all the more striking when it is remembered that mutilation of animals had long been notorious as a nationalist tactic throughout Ireland'.[138]

Nonetheless, the 'element of intimacy' inherent in animal maiming makes it a very serious and insidious form of intimidation—and one well suited to the settling of a personal grudge or vendetta, between the victim and perpetrator.[139] On 22 January 1923, John Bagge carried out the 'malicious maiming' of 11 head of cattle by cutting off their tails with a billhook (two of the animals were still bleeding the following

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[128] NAI, 392/5, 6: Maloney, Limerick.
[129] NAI, 392/161, 392/276, 392/334, 392/505, 392/506, 402/80, 402/89.
[130] NAI, 392/126.
[131] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[132] IMA, CW/OPS/3.
[133] NAI, 392/331: Harnett, Limerick.
[134] NAI, 402/107: Heelan, Waterford.
[135] 'Pregnant horse slashed with knife', *BBC News*, 10 March 2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/oxfordshire/7934216.stm). The injuries to its back legs resemble a houghing.
[136] Archer, *By a flash and a scare*, 219.
[137] Dr Martyn Powell (Aberystwyth University) spoke about the 'houghing' of English soldiers in Dublin in the 1790s, at the Seminar in Irish History, University of Oxford, 13 Nov. 2007.
[138] T. Wilson, *Frontiers of violence: conflict and identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia, 1918–1922* (Oxford, 2010), 123.
[139] Archer, *By a flash and a scare*, 6–7, 218–9.

morning). The cattle were owned by James Mansfield, a blacksmith from Newtown, Kilmacthomas, Co. Waterford, and labourer Bagge was 'on a message' for Thomas Cheasty, on whose land Mansfield's cattle had trespassed. Bagge was given whiskey and instructed to 'take a piece off the tails of these cattle', in order to 'quieten Mansfield'. In addition, Bagge later told the county sessions, Cheasty offered him £5 to burn Mansfield's hayrick, though this attack was not carried out. Bagge's movements were far from stealthy: a number of witnesses at Mansfield's forge saw the cattle coming out of Cheasty's yard, followed by the accused with blood on his shirt. Perpetrators of this typically clandestine crime did, then, come into contact with the law: Bagge was sentenced to '12 months hard' labour and later summoned from Waterford prison as a witness in Mansfield's damages case against Cheasty.[140] Victims were willing to go to the authorities, if not for the abstract notion of justice, then for financial recompense for what were often costly losses.

In local economies dependent on pasture, the distress caused by missing and injured animals should not be underestimated. Apart from pockets of small, sheep farms in Co. Limerick, the main farming type across Cos. Limerick and Tipperary was dairy: 88% and 81% of all milch cows in these counties supplied creameries. Co. Waterford relied more on 'store and fat cattle',[141] but across Munster, animals were highly profitable commodities. Cows were not the only farm animal targeted during the war. The Free State Army reported on one of the more unusual levies extracted by republicans: notices posted demanded dog licenses be paid to the 'Irish Republic' (rather than the appropriate Free State authority). Failure to comply resulted in the shooting of a number of dogs[142] (and the poisoning of 17 canines, including 'valuable greyhounds', in the Old Turnpike locality of Nenagh, in April 1923).[143] Still, it was cattle that most obviously symbolised the farming system, grazing, which—this thesis shows—came under renewed attack during 1922–23.

Chapter Two, on arson, reveals the high incidence of crop and outhouse burning and its long-term economic implications: the destruction of hay made winter feeding impossible and real hardship ensued, even for the strong farmer.[144] Maiming also struck at the heart of farm life, by attacking the very thing—animal stock—that generates wealth and sustains the grazing system. The killing and injuring of animals thus complemented cattle driving, hay burning and even tearing down walls and fences to let animals escape, in causing huge disruption and inconvenience for graziers, making their position untenable and their land available for redistribution. The deliberate harming of stock often took place on a 'drive', as the animals were chased off their grazing land.[145] The method of disabling the beast is not always known. Houghing (first recorded in the 1690s, as a quick and reliable method of inflicting irreparable damage on animals and humans), was not mentioned by name in the evidence from the Civil War. The cutting of tails, though, was reported in Co. Tipperary and used to particularly spiteful effect in the campaign against Henry Colclough; see below.

However, the severe and unnecessarily brutal character of maiming (Sections (ii) and (iii) indicate the threat of violence, or the inconvenience caused by a cattle drive, were often sufficient to force the owner from his land), adds a further layer of

[140] *Munster Express*, 17 Feb. and 26 May 1923.
[141] Rumpf and Hepburn, *Nationalism and socialism*, 47–8.
[142] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[143] *Limerick Echo*, 24 Apr. 1923.
[144] See for example: NAI, 402/98, 113, 114.
[145] See for example: NAI, 392/512, 392/454.

malice and intrigue to this form of intimidation. Bitter personal rivalries and even class conflicts within farming were in evidence, alongside local campaigns for redistribution. Resentment of horse-breeding, for example, surfaced in some Civil War attacks. 'Well-known racehorse owner', Major Edwards, was targeted during the war: cattle and horses and were driven from Rathduff stud farm and gates and walls 'thrown down'.[146] Henry Colclough had run his farm at Old Shanbally House, Clogheen, Co. Tipperary, since the eviction of the previous tenant a quarter-century before. Colclough 'was not seriously inconvenienced' by his possession of an evicted farm and, in the words of the IGC, suffered 'no appreciable loss prior to July 1921'. Yet some within the local community were less forgiving of his past indiscretion and current strong-farmer status, when war broke out in 1922. Until his death just after the end of the Civil War, Colclough earned £400 per year on his farm and made an additional £400 profit from horse breeding (and around £120 per year in prizes at fairs in Dublin, Clonmel and Kilkenny). His attackers knew exactly how to disable his commercial capacity: on 14 and 16 June 1922, 'twelve Hunters…were maliciously injured by their tails being cut, rendering them valueless for Show or Sale purposes'.[147] The manes and tails of three more Hunters were cut in January 1923, and, between March 1922 and February 1923, a 'considerable number' of Colclough's sheep were commandeered. On 30 May 1923, Colclough was shot dead as he put two horses out to graze, on a field just a few hundred yards from his house. His wife, Susan, received no compensation for his murder; the attack had fallen after the end of the war and outside the scope of the IGC. Still, connections were made between his death and the earlier attacks on his land and animals: 'Shocking Crime at Burncourt – Was it agrarian?' speculated the local press.[148]

Deer parks were rare in Ireland; the malicious shooting of 42 deer (worth £3 a head) between 1 March and 17 December 1922, at Castle Lough, Co. Tipperary, may have been a protest against owner S.G.J. Parker-Hutchinson's use of the land for game. Other attacks on his residence and lands—in 'a somewhat lonely district' near Nenagh—included looting, the cutting of trees and driving off of cattle and sheep (and ten sheep were killed, between June 1922 and January 1923). The claimant and his family had to stay in a hotel in Co. Wicklow for several months, while furniture and house contents were removed to Dublin, in August 1922, to be returned (in March 1924) when conditions were 'more settled'. This was not, though, a process of tremendous inconvenience or hardship: Parker-Hutchinson resided at another residence of his, Timoney Park, near Roscrea, Co. Tipperary, during this period. The victim blamed his 'loyalty': he had been a Deputy-Lieutenant and active in recruiting for the British Army during World War I.[149] Still, the focus of the attacks on the park and its animals, suggest that this privileged and prominent Protestant (Parker-Hutchinson was an attendee of the 'large and representative' meeting of his co-religionists in Nenagh, Co. Tipperary, in April 1922, to protest against the possibility of war),[150] had through his upper-class pastimes set himself apart from his local community and invited jealousy over land.

[146] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 8 Feb. 1922
[147] TNA, CO 762/111/8: Colclough, Tipperary.
[148] Clipping from *Waterford Standard* in Colclough's IGC compensation file.
[149] TNA, CO 762/180/18: Parker-Hutchinson, Tipperary.
[150] *Nenagh Guardian*, 15 Apr. 1922; see Chapter 1, Section iii.b.

v. Land: a historical and historiographical problem

Local resentment of those who had acquired their holdings unfairly or dishonestly (or so it was perceived), or laid precious land to waste (through grazing, for example), was nothing new.[151] While greed does not necessarily motivate violence on its own (opportunist looting is a natural part of war), land is finite and may be worth fighting for. Michael Mann's theories apply specifically to ethnic cleansing: possession of the land by one ethnic group excludes others from its use and 'in agrarian societies this is life-threatening'. Colonial settlement has therefore 'produced especially murderous ethnic cleansing over land'.[152] Attacks on the land during the Civil War did not constitute cleansing and involved murder in only a few cases. Yet while the old conflict between Protestant planter and Catholic native had been complicated by land purchase, the heat had not been taken out of the land question altogether.

Leigh-Ann Coffey certainly emphasises long-standing local land issues in her study of the 'campaign of intimidation' against a group of farmers in Luggacurran, Queen's County, in March 1922. The cattle drives, mutilation of livestock, burning of hay etc. on this former Lansdowne estate, had roots in the landlord's installation of Protestant 'planters' in the place of Catholic tenants in the 1880s. The decision of the evicted to remain in the vicinity 'ensured that the community remained intense and divided'. However, it was the Civil War, more than the 1916–21 period, that provided the 'opportunity for individuals' in Luggacurran 'to act on their long-held resentment'.[153] Their religion had undoubtedly prevented the settlers from integrating fully into the community; Protestants were cast as outsiders and rumours abounded of their Scottish or Ulster origins.[154] Hart cites land as the 'connecting thread' between the victims of the Dunmanway 'massacre' in Co. Cork in April 1922: none of the 14 Protestants killed was a landlord, but together they held much valuable property, some of which was confiscated after their deaths.[155] Still, Coffey does not overstate the sectarian dynamic: the 'land committee' formed in Luggacurran in 1922, to 'forcibly evict' the planters and their families, did not have the widespread support of community and the 'decent' Catholics in the area.[156] A government report on the Laois agitation concurred. Protestant farmer John Goucher had bought his holding, near Ballinakill, under the 1909 Land Act[157] and built up his 40 head of cattle (and a 'substantial house') through 'steady hard work'. His neighbours—'all of whom, with one exception', were Catholics—were 'indignant' at his ill treatment and 'promised to stand by him' after threats were made by the 'Timahoe Land Committee'.[158]

Coffey contends that 'the majority of the Irish population understood the revolution in the context of their own sense of identity and with regards to the interests of their communities'.[159] Religion undoubtedly shaped the construction of

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[151] Bew, *Conflict and conciliation*, 162.
[152] Mann, *Dark side of democracy*, 31–2.
[153] L. Coffey, *The planters of Luggacurran, County Laois: a Protestant community, 1879–1927* (Dublin, 2006), 8, 41–2.
[154] T.A.M. Dooley, *The decline of the big house in Ireland: a study of Irish landed families, 1860–1960* (Dublin, 2001), 162–3.
[155] P. Hart, *The IRA and its enemies: violence and community in Cork, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 1998), 286.
[156] Coffey, *Planters of Luggacurran*, 57.
[157] The estate had been purchased by the Land Commission in 1903. The 'planters', then, were no longer representatives of the local landlord, rather Wyndham and the 1909 Land Act had strengthened their legal hold on the land.
[158] NAI, S566: 'Laois land agitation, 1922'.
[159] Coffey, *Planters of Luggacurran*, 9.

this local 'identity' in Luggacurran, but anti-Protestantism was far too entangled with ideas of landownership to explain the violence against the planters on its own. It was the historic 'fusion of Protestantism with "usurping settler"', rather than hatred of the minority religion per se, that set the scene—in this and so many other communities—for continuing sectarian conflict and lingering resentments of Protestants.[160] Certainly the land hunger stirred by independence in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, discriminate strictly on national or denominational lines. Persistent intimidation—including the seizure of farms—was focused not on the lone, Protestant landlord, who had by now largely been bought out, moved away and faded into obscurity. Rather, attacks on land targeted those—Catholics like David Horgan from Newtown, Pallaskenry, near Kilcornan, Co. Limerick, amongst them—who had recently acquired land. Horgan protested:

> What is the reason of attacking a poor man like me? I have no quarrel with anybody and stand well with my neighbours. I am a catholic. It is that these ruffians want to steal my land and divide it among themselves. We are faced with utter ruin.[161]

The urgency of the land question is palpable in these testimonies. Intimidation was used alongside—and to hurry along—the official channels: violence drove the owner away, leaving his land to be shared out, with or without the approval of the newly empowered Land Commission.[162] 'But for the driving of [the] Applicant out of the country and keeping him out, these lands would not have been acquired under the…1923 Act in Ireland', read a surveyor's statement in support of the claim of Herbert Sullivan, who fled to Devon from Co. Limerick after the burning of Curramore House in August 1922.[163] In his absence, Sullivan's 240 acres became 'deteriorated' and were compulsorily acquired by the Land Commission in 1924, for less than half their true value.[164]

The Free State did not condone the pursuit of economic and social change through force. Minister for Agriculture, Patrick Hogan, reported to the Dáil on the 'gross intimidation exercised by…Evicted Tenants' Associations'.[165] Ireland was home, he calculated, to 'a million and a half landless men, who were "prepared to exercise their claims with gun and torch".'[166] And this 'form of irregularism' had to be 'dealt with along with other aspects of the land question in the forthcoming [1923] Land Bill'.[167] D.J. Gorey TD cautioned that:

> Land settlement cannot be brought about by the argument of the stick. It is no use to give preference either to the fellow who can cut the biggest stick or to

[160] H.K. Crawford, *Outside the glow: Protestants and Irishness in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 2010), 16.
[161] PRONI, D/989/C/2/21: 'Typescript copy statements and reports about IRA atrocities on loyalist families and confiscation of homes and land etc.' (Papers of the Irish Unionist Alliance, Propaganda material: Government White Papers, printed reports and speeches).
[162] D.S. Jones, 'Land reform legislation and security of tenure in Ireland after independence', *Éire-Ireland*, 32, no. 4 and 33, nos. 1 and 2 (1998), 116–19.
[163] See Chapters 1 and 2.
[164] TNA, CO 762/87/4: Sullivan, Limerick.
[165] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, ii, 27 Mar. 1923.
[166] A. Jackson, 'The Two Irelands', in R. Gerwarth, *Twisted paths: Europe 1914–1945* (Oxford, 2007), 70.
[167] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, ii, 27 Mar. 1923.

> the fellow who can give the biggest shout or to him who uses an amount of intimidation. It must be a legal settlement. It must be a settlement under which every man fit and capable of handling land will have an equal chance with the rest.[168]

However, it was the reality of the land seizures, cattle driving and violent intimidation on the ground in communities in Munster, which turned the new government's attention to local grievances in the first place. Gorey TD may have believed that legislation would satisfy land hunger and consolidate the position of the government in troubled areas. For Dooley, the settlement of the land question from 1923 onwards was 'central to the restoration of law and order in Irish society'.[169] It may have also been in the interest of government ministers to exaggerate social disorder, to justify coercive wartime legislation.[170] Yet research on intimidation shows that it was the man with the 'biggest stick', and not the politician, who enacted redistribution. The Free State Government, it could be argued, merely looked on, affording large and small farmers alike little protection from the seizure of their land.

Benjamin Schofield made a small claim for damage and the loss of a mare and cattle, when his farm in Co. Waterford was seized and 'used as a commonage' in February 1923.[171] The Westropp family owned land across Co. Limerick and four generations had served in the British Army.[172] Mountiford Westropp's land at Kildimo was seized and he was forced to sell 'to a "Committee of Farmers at their own price"'.[173] In a separate claim to the Free State, from a location just three and half miles away, Edward Westropp recalled how 'local smallholders took forcible possession' of Ballyshonickbane (near Pallaskenry). Edward felt 'powerless' to act against the men who knocked down his fences to make the lands 'a commonage'; the Free State afforded 'no protection'.[174] Victims could, in general, look to the Free State Army for the restoration of order, although it was not until June 1923, that the army 'won back' Joseph Wheeler's farm, in Bottomstown (near Emly) Co. Limerick, which he had only acquired in May 1921, before it was seized illegally in January 1922.[175] Evidence collected by SILRA hints, further, at blurred wartime boundaries, and conspiracy between the Free State soldiers and perpetrators of intimidation. Even in 'quiet parts of the country', at a small farm near Carlow, 'local people' brought in ploughs, turned up grazing land and chased off the stock—to drive out the farmer and 'split up' the land 'among smaller men'. The Civic Guard and National Troops 'did nothing' in this case because, it was alleged, the leader of the 'gang who turned the

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[168] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, ii, 5 Jan. 1923.
[169] Dooley, 'IRA veterans and land division in independent Ireland 1923–48', in F. McGarry (ed.), *Republicanism in modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2003), 86–107 at 86.
[170] E. O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: the Irish state and its enemies since 1922* (Oxford, 1999), 33.
[171] TNA, CO 762/151/3: Schofield, Waterford.
[172] Mountiford's 'father, grandfathers and great-grandfathers' all served in British Army and it is likely that he (and possibly Edward) were related to Colonel George O'Callaghan-Westropp (1864–1944) of Co. Clare, whose colourful career during the War of Independence (and beyond) was noticed by Fitzpatrick. See D. Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish life, 1913–1921: provincial experience of war and revolution* (Dublin, 1977), 43–4.
[173] TNA, CO 762/98/21: M. Westropp, Limerick.
[174] NAI, 392/227: E. Westropp, Limerick.
[175] TNA, CO 762/31/8: Wheeler, Limerick. The land had been given to Wheeler under the Irish Land (Provision for Sailors and Soldiers) Act of 1919. This legislation extended the benefits of the Land Purchase Acts to men who had served in 'the Naval, Military, or Air Forces of the Crown in the present [First World] war', as if they had been tenants or proprietors; see P. Bull, *Land, politics and nationalism: a study of the Irish land question* (Dublin, 1996), 200–1.

farmer out of his land was brother to one of the chief officers in command of the Free State Army'.[176]

In these conditions, prospects for the return of the land to its owner were poor. Colonel William Fielding, for example, was pessimistic about regaining control of his 690 acres at Baranigue, near Athea, Co. Limerick: 'the Irish Free State Government were repeatedly asked to restore order but were apparently unable to do so and the situation is hopeless now'. In December 1922, Fielding wrote to the Ministry of Finance that the land (held by his family for 70 years) had since January that year been occupied 'by persons without his authority who cut and disposed of his turf and paid him no rents'.[177] The non-payment of rents was recognised by SILRA as a pressing issue for landowners in the Counties.[178] The ICCA goes further, suggesting not just a lack of control of the agrarian situation on the part of the Free State, but the Government's complicity in violent attacks on the land: the newly empowered Land Commission compulsorily purchased Fielding's tenanted lands 'for benefit of those who illegally disposed the owner'.[179] Of course, enforcing the legitimate transfer of land would not have been easy for the wartime government. Prosecution of 'rural violence'—the actions, analysed in this chapter, resulting in the flight of the owner and seizure of his land—was historically problematic and obtaining information from the public notoriously difficult.[180] During the Land War, landlords expected support from the RIC and protection of the process-server in the execution of his duties. Yet without recourse to unpopular and illiberal legislation, or simply opening fire on unarmed crowds, it was difficult to impose order on collective action on the land. Resident magistrates (RM) in Connaught in the 1880s dealt with rent refusal and repossession of evicted farms by summoning culprits for 'trespass' or 'forcible entry' at the petty sessions.[181] Prosecutions for cattle driving could be made under charges of riot, unlawful assembly and conspiracy (and were reported in the press). Yet in the kind of land seizures and claiming of turbary that would again torment landlords and graziers in 1922–23, 'gangs of 'moonlighters' could march about in broad daylight without the police being able to interfere unless some crime were actually committed in their presence'.[182] During the transfer of authority from the RIC to Civic Guard—with armed attacks on Garda stations and patrols continuing well into 1923—keeping order in the counties was even more difficult.[183]

Still, the official administration of the land question did little to dampen the hopes—high within rural communities—that a native Irish government would promote the interests of the landless and small farmer, over the landlord and grazier. It was 'fitting', commented William Sears TD, that the 'old brigade should have held out until a National Parliament would dispose of the last remnant of Irish landlordism'.[184] In discussions surrounding the Land Act (1923), he promised:

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[176] PRONI, D/989/C/2/24: 'Typed report of the connection between the 'Irregulars' and the 'Free State Army', 1923'.
[177] NAI, 392/305: Fielding, Limerick.
[178] PRONI, D/989/B/1/3 (Papers of the SILRA, Minutes).
[179] PRONI, D/989/B/2/9.
[180] E. Malcolm, 'Investigating the "machinery of murder": Irish detectives and agrarian outrages, 1847–70, *New Hibernia Review*, 6, no. 3 (Autumn, 2002), 73–91 at 87.
[181] R. Hawkins, 'Liberals, land and coercion in the summer of 1880: the influence of the Carraroe ejectments', *Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society*, 34 (1974–75), 40–57 at 52.
[182] Hawkins, 'Liberals, land and coercion', *Galway Archaeological and Historical Society*, 52.
[183] NAI, Records of the Department of Justice, H 99/109.
[184] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, iii, 28 May 1923.

> This Oireachtas will put an end to a system that was the curse of this country, and I hope we will hear no more of it in that shape…The announcement that all untenanted land will become the property of the State on an appointed day will go as a message of hope to the people in the West. They have looked upon those ranches as their own for generations. They saw bullocks grazing there while they were starving on bad land.[185]

Clearly old resentments died hard: Cathal O'Shannon recalled there was 'nothing creditable, decent, or serviceable in the whole record of landlordism in Ireland'. His 'congest' constituents had waited a long time for better access to land.[186] And so whatever the reality for the rural poor, under a Land Commission hard pressed to find land for division, the impulse towards 'land for the people' was felt from the ground, to the highest government level.[187]

Land agitation in Italy during this period similarly forced legislators to take notice of the rural poor: the Italian Government expropriated the estates of absentee landlords, 'distributing land in small parcels to peasants'.[188] Charles Tilly disputes descriptions of collective rural violence as 'pre-political': the seizure of land and occupation of farms in Soresina and Sicily was as much a part of the 'massive political mobilisation' following World War I as the formation of political parties and rise of Fascism.[189] In Spain, a 'bizarre' landholding structure had long created tension between the absentee landlords of the 'latifundia' (great extensively cultivated estates), the seasonal labourers who worked there and the peasants scraping a living off dwarf farms divided into minute plots ('minifundia').[190] Attempts by the republican governments of 1931–6 to reform the system—in the name of prosperity and social justice—can, like Italy, be seen in the context of 'mass politicisation'. Mass meetings 'dramatised and publicised' the division between powerful landowners and the poor. The conflict exploded in a 'violent' way in small towns.[191] Ultimately the expectations of the under-privileged were not satisfied: Spain did not have the financial resources (enjoyed by the British Government in its attempts to solve the Irish land question) to compensate for the expropriation of large landowners. Laws intended to break up the absentee-owned estates in fact 'threatened modest proprietors' and very little land was handed over to peasant settlers.[192] Still, the channelling of social discontent into political movements had proved explosive. From Ireland, to the Continent, redistribution of the land of the few, in favour of the many, was a powerful and often violent impulse felt across twentieth century Europe.

Yet despite the work of Tilly, E.P. Thompson and other analysts of collective violence, some historians continue to distinguish between the social and political, that is, between the kind of local conflicts over land studied in this chapter—what is loosely called 'agrarianism'—and the actual war over Treaty. For Terence Dooley, the Civil War simply created the 'anarchical conditions for agrarian radicals to operate freely' and tenants associations in the counties lacked central control and clear

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[185] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, iii, 28 May 1923.
[186] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, iv, 5 July, 1923. Clancy TD also spoke out for his congested constituents; see Chapter 3, Section iv.
[187] Jones, 'Land reform legislation', *Éire-Ireland*, 121.
[188] Blok, *Honour and violence*, 4.
[189] C. Tilly, *The rebellious century, 1830–1930* (London, 1975), 168, 170–1, 289.
[190] R. Carr, *Modern Spain, 1875–1980*, 16–17.
[191] R. Carr, *Modern Spain, 1875–1980*, 117.
[192] R. Carr, *Modern Spain, 1875–1980*, 126.

aims.[193] It is true that even before Irish independence in 1922, indeed since Wyndham, the land question was no longer so closely bound to an overtly political (nationalist) campaign. The leader of the Ranch War, Laurence Ginnell MP, for example, had not enjoyed the support of his colleagues in the Irish Parliamentary Party. Driving targeted the 'grazier', who was 'typically' an 'ambitious man [and] 'good nationalist''. There was also criticism by some in Sinn Féin of ranch breaking and even veteran land agitator Michael Davitt debated whether sub-division of grazing lands would lead to any wholesale increase in the area of tillage.[194] 'Society' and 'politics' cannot, of course, be so easily disentangled: Campbell has shown that Sinn Fein's electoral victory (1918) was accompanied by 'tillage agitation' and while the party's leadership was keen that the land issue should not detract from the campaign for independence, local Sinn Féin branches in Galway did support the claims of small farmers.[195]

However, intimidation of landowners and the violent seizure of farms must be seen in the context of a wider (political and military) campaign to undermine the infrastructure and authority of the Irish Free State. The anti-Treaty IRA did not recognise an independent Irish state that was not a republic and through a range of techniques mounted a physical and moral challenge to the governing ability of the fledgling state. Ada Vere-Hunt was warned not to call on the 'staters' for help[196] and the Westropps and Col. Fielding were offered 'no protection' by the new government[197]. Intimidation of non-combatants and attacks on land ridiculed the ability of the Provisional and later Free State Government to perform its function and protect its citizens, of whatever political allegiance or religion, from violence and disorder. Patrick Hogan agreed that while the conflict surfaced in different ways, with individuals and groups 'all out for different objects…using different methods and…weapons', all forms of violence and disruption constituted a threat to the stability of the Free State:

> You have houses burned, you have banks robbed—sometimes in the name of the Republic and sometimes without any patriotic pretence…you have trains attacked—sometimes in the name of the Republic and sometimes in order to seize goods—you have haggards burned in labour disputes, and you have men murdered for a piece of land. There is no difference in character between any of these episodes. They are simply different phases of what we are fighting.[198]

The pressing question is whether those 'landless men' or 'landless people'[199] identified by victims as the perpetrators of cattle-drives and violent attempts to redistribute land, were the same men as the 'Republicans' or 'Irregulars' named in other claims? 'Land grabbing was much too widespread for all of the blame to be laid at the door of the anti-Treatyites'.[200] And there were few overt claims to social revolution from the anti-Treaty IRA. Indeed, the conservative nature of the Irish

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[193] Dooley, *'The land for the people': the land question in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 2004), 40–2.
[194] Bew, *Conflict and conciliation*, 11, 150–1.
[195] Campbell, *Land and Revolution*, 242–3.
[196] Section ii, this Chapter.
[197] Above, this Section.
[198] *Dáil Éireann Debates*, ii, 17 Jan. 1923.
[199] NAI, 392/214: Dunne, Limerick: 'landless people made an attempt to strip two dwelling houses so as [to] prevent any person working the farm'. Damage to farms in possession of 'a party of landless men': NAI, 392/16: McCoy, Limerick and NAI, 392/19: Liston, Limerick.
[200] Dooley, 'IRA veterans and land division', *Republicanism in modern Ireland*, 170.

Revolution (1916–23)—culminating as it did in a Church-backed Irish Free State, with traditional property rights intact—has become something of an historical truism. This formative period in Ireland's past has instead largely been viewed through a military history or state-building paradigm. Class struggle is downplayed.[201] The biographer of Liam Mellows,[202] the lone 'socialist republican' of the conflict,[203] argues that there was support, on the anti-Treaty side, for social, as well as political, revolution. The Communist Party of Ireland's proposals for the division of the lands of the aristocracy amongst the landless and small farmers, for example, were an attempt to 'present a comprehensive alternative to the kind of Ireland Griffith was determined to create'.[204] In addition, while the IRA Council's 'revolutionary' land policy, published in May 1922, was not followed up by immediate action, its instructions to local commandants, to seize lands and hold properties in trust for the Irish people, 'may well have encouraged the land seizures and cattle drives then proceeding' in land-hungry districts such as Leitrim and Roscommon.[205] However, beyond Mellows (who was executed by the Free State in December 1922) and Peadar O'Donnell (said to have influenced Mellows' thinking on social policy whilst the two were held by the Free State in Mountjoy Prison, Dublin),[206] these ambitions were not widely held. Radical land policies, Greaves concedes, were far 'easier formulated than made good'.[207] Henry Patterson argues, further, that Mellows' programme was not radically left-wing, but rather an attempt to 'preserve intransigent revolutionary nationalism by tapping into perceived social discontent'.[208]

The anti-Treaty position was certainly given 'social sustenance' by the 'large reservoirs of agrarian discontent'; the small farmers of the congested West, in particular, did support the republicans.[209] The pattern of Treaty support was 'logical enough':

> In Southern and Western areas, with their land-hungry small farmers or large agricultural proletariat based on dairying, the tendency was Republican; in the midland ranching districts where, it is said, 500 acres can be managed by a man with a stick and a dog, it was towards the Provisional Government.[210]

Certainly amongst the tenant farmers who occupied the 'uneconomic' holdings (land below £10 valuation or around 20 acres of 'reasonable' land) that comprised 65% of all agricultural holdings in Ireland in 1922, and those who had not yet benefited from land purchase legislation, lay a 'great deal of potential for social upheaval in rural Ireland'.[211] The Free State Army reported:

> Land hunger plays an important part in Irregularism and the freedom which many have enjoyed for the past few years in regards evasion of payment

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[201] H. Patterson, *The politics of illusion: a political history of the IRA* (London, 1997), 25.
[202] C.D. Greaves, *Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution* (London, 2004, 1st ed. reprinted with a new introduction by Gerry Adams).
[203] Patterson, *The politics of illusion*, 27.
[204] Greaves, *Liam Mellows*, 357.
[205] Greaves, *Liam Mellows*, 313–14, 317.
[206] D. Ó Drisceoil, *Peadar O'Donnell* (Cork, 2001), 28. On O'Donnell, see Chapter 2, Section v.
[207] Greaves, *Liam Mellows*, 314, 357.
[208] Patterson, *The politics of illusion*, 27.
[209] Patterson, *The politics of illusion*, 24. See also: Jones, 'Land reform legislation', *Éire-Ireland*, 117.
[210] Greaves, *Liam Mellows*, 302.
[211] Dooley, 'IRA veterans and land division', *Republicanism in modern Ireland*, 86–7.

> of…debts weigh much in the desire to postpone the advent of ordered Government… Until the people are made to realise that they must settle down to normal life again the Irregulars will get some support from a certain class.[212]

The individuals who joined the 'roving bands' of the anti-Treaty IRA, to 'swell the ranks for a day or two', may well have been frustrated small farmers or labourers, willing to engage in violent and destructive acts against suitable targets.[213] Some victims could, indeed, identify the perpetrators of attacks on their property as 'military' men. John Bourke's cattle, for example, were driven by 'armed Irregulars'.[214] One claimant lost three and a half years' rent when a house he owned on Main Street, Rathkeale, Co. Limerick (previously leased to the RIC), was occupied by 'leading Republican' John Hayes, from May 1922 to January 1926.[215] The gradual disintegration of a cohesive, military campaign on the part of the anti-Treaty IRA after September 1922 (by which time the Free State had recaptured the majority of republican strongholds in Munster), may well have given individual republicans freedom from plans and procedure—and the opportunity to settle local scores and agitate on the land.

Earlier in the conflict, by contrast, before the shelling of the Four Courts and the split in the IRA, the propagandists made a clearer distinction between the Army and the 'blackguardly gangs' driving cattle, destroying property and murdering 'for other than political purposes'.[216] When William Kennedy, for example, a 'popular farmer' from the Thurles district, was shot dead near Borrisoleigh, Co. Tipperary, in February 1922, the local IRA investigated the matter and distanced its men from the crime. Kennedy's death was instead 'associated with the trouble about land'.[217] The 'IRA authorities in Tipperary' again repudiated any connection with the murder of an ex-Colonel of the Shropshire Regiment in May 1922 and took 'active steps to apprehend' the men who fired the shots on Higginson.[218] This thesis traces social and political violence from the ratification of the Treaty in January 1922, that is, before the Civil War began in earnest and during which time—in the absence of the departing British forces or a new Free State Army—IRA brigades took it upon themselves to maintain order in the localities. Cattle drivers on the lands of George Ryan at Inch, near Thurles, Co. Tipperary, were 'fired at by IRA', who took possession of the animals for the owner.[219] The day after Ned Wynne received the 'document…requesting him to hand over his farm' to the IRA,[220] the local Anglican vicar, Horace C. Dean, contacted Sean Robinson, IRA, at Clonmel Barracks:

> I write to know if this thing is done with your knowledge and approval. It seems to me to be a most arbitrary and illegal act...I appeal to you to exert your authority and see to it that this man and his family are left in peace and

[212] IMA, CW/OPS/2/M.
[213] IMA, CW/OPS/2/M.
[214] NAI, 392/282: Bourke, Limerick.
[215] TNA, CO 762/195/22: Latchford, Limerick.
[216] *Limerick Leader*, 6 Feb. 1922.
[217] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 8 Feb. 1922.
[218] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 27 May 1922.
[219] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 8 Feb 1922.
[220] Section ii, this Chapter.

> possession of property acquired by them honestly and with the goodwill of their neighbours.[221]

Commandant General Brennan, of the 'Regular IRA', called for a 'period of truce to cattle driving and interference with land…until there is a settled Government in the country'. Persons engaging with cattle driving etc. before the 1 August deadline, 'do so at their peril'. He did hint, though, at the great things expected of a new Irish administration: 'we pledge our honour to use all our influence with the Ministry of Agriculture to have lands which ought to be the people's property fairly divided'.[222] Thus the commencement of the military conflict, on 30 June 1922, did not represent a sudden turning against (and turning out) of the landed, Loyalist enemy from the community. The Civil War instead saw an intensification of campaigns of intimidation and battles over land begun, in some cases, during the War of Independence and Truce period.

British forces ('police and military') had 'selected' Nora Heaslip's premises on Barrack Street, Nenagh, for their refreshments, and she 'catered for them in the kindliest possible manner'. When Heaslip 'refused to discontinue supplying the "Enemy"', she was 'threatened with all sorts of punishment—even Death to myself and Destruction to all I possessed'. The grocer and confectioner 'thought the campaign against me would gradually cease when the [Truce] was signed in December 1921'. She was wrong: 'when fighting commenced between the divided Irish Forces my persecution was renewed in a most outrageous manner.' The 'campaign of terror' against her included firing into her home, the posting of 'death warrants' on her door and raids on her business premises (the shop was looted 5 or 6 times and goods of 'considerable value' taken). Customer testimonies, contained in her compensation file, alleged that Heaslip's shop 'was boycotted because it was the favourite house of the British Forces. It was the general rule of campaign to intimidate her customers and frighten them from frequenting her shop'. The IGC had some doubts about this case. There were suggestions, for example, that Heaslip was in difficult financial straits not because of a boycott, but the falling prices affecting everyone. The dissolution of Heaslip's business partnership with her sister (to whom some customers remained loyal, presumably for other than political reasons) cannot have helped either. Still, the serious attacks against Nora must account, at least in part, for her four month flight from Nenagh.[223] Appeals to the IGC had an obvious (financial) objective—and in Heaslip's case there may have been some irregularities—but the files record what was at stake beyond pounds, shillings and pence. Violent threats and intimidation forced victims to consider their national allegiance and decide whether they belonged and, crucially, wanted to stay, in the Irish Free State.

vi. Boycotting

The intimidation of customers of an ill-favoured shop, like Heaslip's, was not unusual. Boycotting was used with particular effectiveness during the Civil War to render a victim's livelihood—and ultimately life in Ireland—unviable and undesirable. 'Boycott' has, of course, a particular association with Irish history and the tactic resurfaced in the late 1950s during an ugly episode in Co. Wexford: in

[221] PRONI, D/989/C/2/21.
[222] *Limerick Leader*, 28 Apr. 1922.
[223] TNA, CO 762/64/2: Heaslip, Tipperary. Heaslip's solicitors provided the IGC with proof that their client had stayed in England for this amount of time.

response to a Protestant woman's defiance of church teaching on the education of her Catholic children, Catholics of the village, led by local priests, began a boycott of Protestant owned shops and farms in Fethard-on-Sea.[224] The term itself originated in the famous struggle between Cpt. Charles Boycott and the local branch of the Land League, on Lord Erne's Co. Mayo estate (Lough Mask, near Ballinrobe). Boycott's attempts to serve eviction notices on 22 September 1880 were met with complete aversion by the local community: estate employees, his blacksmith and laundress all refused to serve him and he no longer received telegrams or provisions from shopkeepers. The Boycotts, who had previously lived comfortably off Charles' commission as a land agent, were left by their employees to do the house and farm work themselves. The farm became 'public property' as locals wandered across the land, broke gates and chased cattle. If Charles or any member of the household 'set foot outside grounds', they were 'hooted and hissed at and generally derided' (Boycott's young nephew was intimidated when he attempted to collect the mail abandoned by the usual post boy).[225] And so the familiar rural practice of exclusive dealing, now christened 'boycotting', became widely used against landlords and agents, as well as farmers and shopkeepers.[226]

Boycotts were a form of punishment and protest against those whose loyalties or behaviour conflicted with the Land League's campaign for reduced rents and tenants' rights. During 1879–82, the League leadership encouraged rent strikes and the evictions of those who could or would not pay what were considered to be unreasonably high rents were resisted. Anyone participating in evictions, or socialising or doing business with anyone who did, was boycotted. League members were placed at the entrance to shops and pubs to ensure that no trade was carried out with boycotted persons.[227] Charles Parnell demanded that 'a certain amount of pressure from public opinion…must be brought to bear upon those who are weak and cowardly'—including those who took up a farm from which a tenant had been evicted.[228] At Ennis on 19 September 1880, he outlined the 'new form of social and moral excommunication', giving strict instructions on how a 'land grabber' should be treated: 'you must shun him on the roadside'.[229]

The Land League, then, had a specific idea of the enemy in its midst; commonly-held notions of rural society and access to land marked out 'community' from 'pariah'. In one case from nineteenth century Co. Tipperary, opposition to eviction was powerfully demonstrated when around 300 people attended the sheriff's sale of the goods of an insolvent tenant and not a single bid was made.[230] Boycott continued to act as a kind of sanction against those who held or used land unjustly, into the twentieth century and Civil War.[231] British Government Intelligence Notes on Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, during 1915–19, recorded:

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[224] T. Fanning, *The Fethard-on-Sea Boycott* (Cork, 2010), 5–6.
[225] J. Marlow, *Captain Boycott and the Irish* (London, 1973), 59, 139–41.
[226] D. Jordan, 'The Irish National League and the 'unwritten law': rural protest and nation-building in Ireland 1882–1890', *Past and Present*, No. 158 (Feb. 1998), 146–171 at 165; Curtis, 'Moral and physical force', *Journal of British Studies*, 181.
[227] Jordan, 'Unwritten Law', *Past and Present*, 159, 165.
[228] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland*, 117.
[229] Marlow, *Captain Boycott and the Irish*, 134.
[230] Vaughan, *Landlords and tenants*, 178. The sales of burnt out houses and their estates (see Chapter 2) were similarly subject to local boycott. See for example: TNA, 762/64/11, CO 762/80/20, CO 762/83/1, CO 762/87/4.
[231] 'An Irishman', *Intolerance in Ireland*, 92–7.

> The causes which led to…boycotting mainly arose in connexion with the holding of grazing lands, [or] evicted farms, [or the] purchasing of holding land which people in the locality want to get divided.[232]

During 1922–23, Frank Coffey's position as 'caretaker for the plantations' at Kilduff House, Templemore, Co. Tipperary, set him apart, as a supporting letter from SILRA explained: 'In those troubled times any one in Coffey's capacity doing his duty by a landlord would be classed as a 'Loyalist''.[233] He had also in the past 'refused to pay levies to the IRA, and on one occasion gave information to the RIC that an ambush had been prepared', a claim verified by a letter from the ex-RIC officer from Templemore, James Smith, who believed Coffey 'saved my life'. As punishment for this betrayal and his privileged position as an estate worker, Coffey could not get a thresher for his crops, the creamery refused to take his milk and his cattle were driven.[234] Religion had little to do with target choice (Coffey was a Catholic; Hicks, below, a Protestant), as others who worked for landlords, as estate officers, land stewards or agents were, like Cpt. Boycott before them, forced out of their position by intimidation.[235] Robert Hicks was boycotted from spring 1922 and could not get his tillage done. 'My Loyalist neighbours helped me', Hicks explained, but they had their own work and the crop came in late.[236] The withholding of labour left land untilled and livestock untended, with dire financial consequences, even for relatively well-off farmers.[237]

Boycott was an old method that could be fairly easily adapted to new situations and during the Civil War became a weapon of the town, as well as the countryside. The Belfast Boycott a year or so earlier was its first famous urban application. This boycott of northern banks and insurance companies and later of all goods distributed from, or manufactured in, Belfast and other northern towns, was sanctioned, at least at first, by Dáil Éireann and implemented by the County Councils: 'Boycott Committees' kept lists of 'commercial travellers, shops, and factories…selling Belfast goods or dealing with firms handling them'.[238] In the end the boycott only underscored the border, but its purpose was to challenge Partition by illustrating the importance of the south as a market for northern goods and it enjoyed some success, having a 'significant' effect on the banking community and causing

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[232] TNA, CO 903/19.
[233] TNA, CO 762/197/25: Coffey, Tipperary.
[234] TNA, CO 762/197/25: Coffey, Tipperary.
[235] Coffey and Hick's religion verified in the Census (1911). Attacks on estate officers, stewards etc.: TNA, CO 762/39/5 and D/989/B/2/9: Palfrey, Tipperary (forester on Lady Beatrice Pole-Carew's estate; home raided by masked and armed men on 9 May 1922 and could not return to work until April 1923); CO 762/74/3: Mollison, Tipperary (head keeper to Lord Dunalley, Kilboy; see Chapter 2); CO 762/74/14: Nolan, Tipperary (coachman to Charles Clarke, Graiguenoe Park; see Chapter 2); CO 762/77/10: Bourchier, Tipperary; CO 762/196/11: Hayes, Tipperary; NAI, 401/120: Hamilton, Tipperary (in employment of Victor William Christopher Cavendish, the Duke of Devonshire); CO 762/198/5: Bride, Tipperary (ex-Service man granted agricultural training by Ministry of Labour on Devonshire's estate); NAI, FIN 1/2391: John Hurley ('Victimised Loyalist' claim from the gamekeeper for Sir John Keane, Cappoquin, Co. Waterford, who moved to Stratford-on-Avon after being 'compelled to leave Ireland by the republicans' and on the 'point of a revolver'.)
[236] TNA, CO 762/94/11: Hicks, Tipperary.
[237] TNA, CO 762/192/14: Moore, Waterford; CO 762/195/20: Shier, Limerick; CO 762/195/15: Sparling, Limerick.
[238] D.S. Johnson, 'The Belfast Boycott, 1920–1922', in J.M. Goldstrom, *Irish population, economy, and society: essays in honour of the late K.H. Connell* (Oxford, 1981), 287–307 at 291.

even 'greater harm' to the distributing trade.[239] The IRA helped implement the boycott, 'picketing Protestant suppliers of Belfast goods to frighten off Catholic customers'.[240]

The level of coordination of national and local bodies in evidence during this episode, from mid-1920 until June 1922, was not witnessed during the Civil War. Still, there were ways in which the anti-Treaty IRA, with the support of the local community, could enforce the social and economic ostracism of its targets. Letters or notices posted on business premises marked out the boycotted victim. John Holmes of Galbally, Co. Limerick, was discharged from his court clerkship in December 1922. Until May 1923, he attempted to practice as an 'Auctioneer and Land Valuer', but 'threatening notices signed by the IRA warned people to do no business with this 'ex-clerk of Petty Sessions and British Spy'. The 'people' did heed the warnings and Holmes was boycotted until May 1923. Indeed, for this kind of intimidation to work, the local community had to be united in support and in general non-combatants did tolerate what had traditionally been regarded as a morally superior form of protest. Speaking in August 1880, James Redpath, an American journalist with pro-Land League sympathies, called boycotting a 'peaceful war'; the target was encircled with 'scorn and silence', rather than physically hurt.[241] A boycott could 'quietly ruin a man', saving him, in Michael Davitt's words, 'from becoming the victim of an outrage' like murder.[242] The perpetrator, too, would be saved from the legal recriminations associated with more serious offences.

Holmes himself was sure of the reason for his exclusion from the community: 'I am a member of the Church of Ireland and it was because of [this] and of being loyal to the British Government that I was boycotted'. The IGC were convinced by Holmes' story and he was awarded the full £100 compensation he sought.[243] The customers of Clonmel draper, William Sweetnam, were also 'warned not to buy from us but to support their own people'. Sweetnam knew to which 'people' he belonged: 'we were Protestants and not in sympathy' with the actions of the IRA.[244] The boycott forced the family out of business: on 28 October 1922 Mrs. Sweetnam advertised she was 'leaving and clearing [the] entire stock at cut price'.[245]

The patronising of one's co-religionists was not, of course, an unusual practice in Ireland. On return from British service overseas, Eneas McNulty, the unlucky hero of Sebastian Barry's novel,[246] found that:

> Even the Protestant businesses won't touch him, which he tries in the last resort. Not that they would have been likely to employ him in the first place, inclined as they were, and rightly, to see to their own. [247]

Some businesses, then, were hurt less by boycott and more simply by the disappearance of their customer base. Indeed, SILRA endeavoured to help the 'small farmer, shopkeeper…who earned their living from the Army, Navy, and Police' and

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[239] Johnson, 'Belfast Boycott', *Irish population*, 287, 299, 306.
[240] Dooley, *The plight of the Monaghan Protestants, 1912–1926* (Dublin, 2000), 46.
[241] G. Moran, 'The origins and development of boycotting', *Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society*, 40 (1985–86), 49–64 at 50.
[242] Jordan, 'Unwritten law', *Past and Present*, 167.
[243] TNA, CO 762/177/4: Holmes, Limerick.
[244] TNA, CO 762/162/1: Sweetnam, Tipperary.
[245] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 28 Oct. 1922.
[246] See Chaper 1, Section ii.b.
[247] S. Barry, *The Whereabouts of Eneas McNulty* (London, 1998), 54.

relied on the estimated £2million spent by the Forces in Ireland.[248] Nenagh, Co. Tipperary, for example, was known as military town. Since the eighteenth century, soldiers there 'spent freely' in local businesses.[249] Before making awards, the IGC had to consider whether the reported loss of trade was caused by the 'disturbed state of the country',[250] or simply a shrinking (Loyalist) customer base. In its final report, the Committee noted the 'failure of applicants to make due allowance for changed economic conditions in Southern Ireland', in accounting for the losses sustained at their farm or business. The IGC 'could not disregard' the contributory influence of the 'general trade depression' and the loss of purchasing power within the agricultural community in Ireland. However, the IGC was also aware of those 'pitiful instances of shops and small businesses built up before war with energy and thrift, fostered in favouring conditions of war and now ruined as result of post-Truce aggression'.[251] There is, indeed, strong evidence that shopkeepers, hoteliers and others were actively punished during the Civil War for their previous loyalties.[252] Mary Hogan's agricultural goods were boycotted because she used to supply the RIC in Co. Tipperary with horses.[253] Maurice Lynch incurred 'loss of earnings' as a labourer and his wife's knitting business was boycotted, because of their 'British sympathies'.[254] These 'sympathies' may have been displayed in a number of ways, particularly during World War I: Kathleen and Nicholas Rooney had served Marines in their public house in Ardmore, Co. Waterford, which was subsequently boycotted during the Civil War and compensation awarded by the IGC.[255] Custom was withdrawn from William Quinn's public house in Loughill, Co. Limerick,[256] not merely because of pro-British customers, but also because Quinn himself was ex-RIC.[257] After serving in World War I, Stuart Trainor returned to Ballingarry, Co. Limerick, and invested his life savings in a motor business, shop and hotel. Raids on the premises continued until November 1922. A boycott was enforced and the motor and grocery businesses 'completely wiped out'.[258]

The onus on claimants to this British government body was, of course, to prove that the losses suffered through boycott were a result of pre-Truce associations with the UK. Thus it may be that the political or sectarian nature of the attack was exaggerated in some cases. Still, contemporary victims of boycott did see the departure of Protestants as an emerging trend: Mr and Mrs Cecil Burchett, for

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[248] PRONI, D/989/B/5/2.
[249] Hallinan, *Tipperary County: people and places*, 117.
[250] TNA, CO 762/135/5: Mulligan, Limerick; his motor business on O'Connell Street, Limerick town, was 'boycotted' during the war.
[251] TNA, CO 762/212.
[252] TNA, CO 762/50/17: Flynn, Waterford (grocery store boycotted after the withdrawal of the RIC); CO 762/64/16: Allen, Tipperary (boot business boycotted 'after British left'); CO 762/85/3: McConnell, Tipperary (motorcycle dealer forced from premises after RIC withdrawal); CO 762/167/11: Riordan, Tipperary (general merchant still being boycotted in June 1928 because his sons served in World War I); CO 762/194/5: Scales, Tipperary (boycotted because he sold butter to the RIC, prior to their evacuation from Templemore barracks).
[253] TNA, CO 762/168/8: Hogan, Tipperary.
[254] TNA, CO 762/80/1: Lynch, Limerick.
[255] TNA, CO 762/165/6: Rooney, Waterford. Other boycotted hotels: CO 762/14/20: Murphy, Waterford and CO 762/76/10: Lyons, Tipperary (the Railway Hotel was 'placed out of bounds to Irish' because Lyons had 'traded with the military'; Lyons does not specify, but I assume 'military' in this case means the British Army).
[256] Where ex-constable Patrick Courtney lived; see Section i, this Chapter.
[257] TNA, CO 762/84/17: Quinn, Limerick.
[258] TNA, CO 762/82/5: Trainor, Limerick.

example, who ran a shop in Nenagh, Co. Tipperary, complained that 'nearly all the County families who were the back-bone of our business were between 1920 and 1923 driven from the country. This completed our ruin and in 1924 we were compelled to sell the whole property'.[259] The question is how far an economic tool like boycott served a purely sectarian agenda, or the broader purpose of the removal of all remnants of British influence—financial, social and religious. There is a sense that boycotted victims, like shopkeeper Willie Roe, were selected not as the single representative of the minority denomination in a locality, but one member of a larger class of Protestants with a particular commercial or economic hold on an area. Roe ran a 'Family Grocery and Fancy Stationery Store' on South Mall, Lismore, Co. Waterford and in February 1927 claimed he was still feeling the effects of the 1919–22 boycotting of his business, following the departure of the 'loyal gentry and townspeople':

> The "anti-British" sentiment is still a practical factor and influence in this neighbourhood, and trade is placed where that sentiment is acceptable, so that I have lost, and am now still losing, trade.

A shop like Roe's was an obvious target in practical terms. Early in the Civil War it was his 'Bovril, sugar, potatoes, butter' that were demanded in letters from the 'Third Battalion' of the IRA.[260] The relatively ill-equipped 'Irregulars' commandeered a variety of goods for their fight against the Free State.[261] One shopkeeper was forced to supply boots to the IRA in occupation of Roscrea[262] and a Limerick draper recalled: 'the Irregulars were in occupation of Askeaton…and were supplying themselves with whatever they wanted by seizing same from shopkeepers'.[263] Michael Farry, writing on Sligo during this period, agrees that 'when goods were to be commandeered it made sense for the IRA to take those goods from one who was perceived as 'the enemy''.[264] This may have made attacks on Protestants shops and businesses—by an often desperate and under-resourced anti-Treaty army—appear more sectarian than they really were. However, Roe and others like him in Co. Waterford (and, indeed, Limerick and Tipperary), were more than convenient sources of provisions. A more threatening notice, signed simply 'by order, O.C. South Batallion, IRA', gave Roe and his family 36 hours notice to clear out or be 'shot at sight the lot of you and burned in your house'. A sinister postscript revealed something of the author's wider ambitions: 'We will clear all the Bloody protestants out of this town also'. This promise suggests that, in the attacker's eyes, there was a sizeable Protestant contingent in Lismore, set apart from the majority by their economic position, as well as their religion. The returns of the 1911 Census demonstrate that at that time, at least, the family's shop on South Mall would have served a reasonably sized Protestant customer base. Willie was one of only four Methodists in the district in 1911, but of the Lismore population of 2402, 9% were Protestants of all denominations.[265] A personal reference from the Dean of Lismore in

[259] TNA, CO 762/57/4: Burchett, Tipperary.
[260] TNA, CO 762/108/11: Roe, Waterford.
[261] See also Chapter 1, Section i on looting during the war.
[262] TNA, CO 762/57/17: McCorduck, Tipperary.
[263] NAI, 392/164: Canty, Limerick.
[264] M. Farry, *The aftermath of Revolution: Sligo, 1921–23* (Dublin, 2000), 193.
[265] Census (1911): Lismore Protestants comprised 157 persons belonging to the Church of Ireland, 28 Presbyterian, 18 Church of England, 10 Baptist, 4 Methodist. Roe resided with his (Church of Ireland) wife, son, daughter and a Catholic servant girl.

support of Roe's claim confirmed that the 'smaller folk and casual shoppers' did not deal with Roe, whose 'better class' of shop did not mix 'public house' with 'provision business'. Boycott and violent threats during the Civil War thus reaffirmed the suspicion between the Protestant shopkeepers with their 'gentry' patrons, and the rest of the town.[266] Roe could certainly be counted as a member of the 'small Protestant communities in the towns' who had 'developed comparative prosperity' to then be 'considered "fair game"'. According to the *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 'a "bad national record"' became during the war 'a satisfactory cloak to cover sheer covetousness and personal dislike'.[267]

It was not only because of their politics and religion, then, but 'by reason of their…larger stake in the country', that Protestants had something to fear from the outbreak of Civil War.[268] The *Church of Ireland Gazette* celebrated the 'Southern minority' as 'one of the finest assets of the infant state'. As the people who pay the 'greater share' of Ireland's taxes and qualified by 'education and upbringing' to take a leading part in the economy, the persecution and emigration of Protestants would be detrimental to the whole state: 'it would be a serious matter if their energy and character were eliminated and sent to enrich other countries than their own'.[269] The Cleeve family, for example, controlled a huge portion of the dairy industry in Co. Limerick, until a string of factories and creameries were burned during 1922–23.[270] William Frederick Cleeve recalled:

> During the disturbed period in Ireland notices were posted up that our family had made millions of money and were paying enormous sums to the British Government for income tax…and duty. We were held up to public odium.[271]

This kind of antagonism was characteristic of Co. Waterford's Civil War experience in particular, where Protestants were 'essentially urban based'[272]. Concentrated along Waterford harbour, the smaller mansions of the strong merchant families who had risen to dominance by the end of the eighteenth century were as symbolic of the minority influence in the county as the traditional big house. Geography, as ever, is important in Irish history and there were certain areas, like Lismore and the Blackwater valley (as Willie Roe's case suggests), where Protestant culture and influence was strongly felt. Hart and Farry agree that religious antagonism in Cos. Cork and Sligo respectively was particularly resonant in areas where the non-Catholic population was comparatively large. Intimidation was not a campaign against the local, lone Protestant.[273] In these counties, resentment of the financial control exercised by the religious minority over rural and urban communities (Protestants in Co. Sligo owned the biggest farms and made a disproportionate

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[266] TNA, CO 762/108/11: Roe, Waterford.
[267] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 23 June 1922.
[268] P. Buckland, *Irish Unionism, 1885–1922* (London, 1973), 202.
[269] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 23 June and 6 Oct. 1922.
[270] Sir Thomas Cleeve founded the Condensed Milk Co. of Ireland Ltd in 1889, with William Beauchamp and Edmond Russell. Ten claims from Cleeve's descendents (share holders in the business), were received by the IGC: TNA, CO 762/189/6–16. Claims were also made to the Free State.
[271] TNA, CO 762/189/6: W.F. Cleeve, Limerick.
[272] M.B. Kiely and W. Nolan, 'Politics, land and rural conflict, c.1830–1845', in W. Nolan and T.P. Power (eds.), *Waterford: history and society*: *interdisciplinary essays on the history of an Irish county* (Dublin, 1992), 459–494 at 467.
[273] Farry, *Aftermath of Revolution*, 193; Hart, *IRA and its enemies*, 289.

contribution to the commercial life of the county), also manifested itself in boycotting.[274] In Co. Monaghan, where Protestants enjoyed social and economic influence disproportionate to their numerical strength (25% of the county's population in 1911), the imposition of the boycott on Belfast products had been 'aimed at breaking their economic hold on the county'.[275]

In Co. Waterford, power rested not only with the Protestants in towns like Lismore, but entire local economies were dependent on rural Protestants in the big houses and, from the nineteenth century, in pockets around the copper mines and paper mills. In Portlaw, for example, the estate village of the Marquess of Waterford, economic activity was focused on Curraghmore House (of the de la Poer Beresford family) and the nearby Pouldrew Flour Mills.[276] Henry Pyper lost his job when the mills were burned down by the anti-Treaty IRA. He could not stay in Munster, or even in Ireland, because when potential Dublin employers 'found out I was a Protestant…and son of an RIC Sergeant…they said it affected their trade and…could not keep me on'.[277] He escaped to England in 1924 where, at the time of application, he was living in Luton and making a 'difficult living' as a bus driver on £3 per week.[278]

Pyper's plight is an important reminder, if one were necessary, that not all Protestants resided in the grey towers of Lismore Castle (the home of the powerful Cavendish family in Co. Waterford).[279] While violence and intimidation were used to strike against easily identifiable symbols of Protestant influence and British rule in Ireland, boycott also dealt with those who contradicted the received notion of 'the enemy': working-class Protestants, 'small farmers' (included as a deserving group in a SILRA fundraising pamphlet) and those who ran the small shops, motor agents and public houses, for whom ostracism by the local community could be financially devastating.[280] Certainly in the three Munster counties, the long-term effects of a boycott cannot be underestimated: Presbyterians William and Elizabeth Cordner of 'The Garage', Henrietta Street, Waterford City, for example, owned one of the many small businesses 'completely ruined' by a boycott (they later moved to Belfast; William was a native of Co. Armagh).[281] Boycotts could last for years, sometimes until the date of application for compensation.[282] On 2 November 1926, the IGC ruled that John Russell's claim was invalid, because the boycotting of his wife's business began in 1919, following the claimant's involvement in recruiting for World War I (the 'Mill hands' targeted by recruitment were 'especially' involved in the boycott).

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[274] Farry, *Aftermath of Revolution*, 183–5, 194–5, 198.
[275] Dooley, *Plight of the Monaghan Protestants*, 9–10, 45–6.
[276] In the nineteenth century, cotton mills owned by the Malcomson family were another large employer in Portlaw. The 'big house' economy functioned in other Munster counties: during Clonmel's heyday as a busy market town and milling centre, Marlfield (the 'picturesque' estate village of the Bagwell family) was also of 'considerable importance' to the local Co. Tipperary economy; see Hallinan, *Tipperary County: people and places*, 96.
[277] The Census (1911) confirms Pyper (then aged 17 and a 'chemist's assistant' in Johnstown, Waterford city) belonged to the Church of Ireland and his father was an RIC sergeant.
[278] TNA, CO 762/119/9: Pyper, Waterford.
[279] Lismore Castle was damaged and wine and valuable maps stolen, during its occupation, July–August 1922. See NAI, 402/120, 378, 379, 380, 381: Beecher, on behalf of Duke of Devonshire, Waterford.
[280] PRONI, D/989/B/5/2.
[281] TNA, CO 762/139/3: Cordner, Waterford. Census confirms their religion and in 1911 the household consisted of William, Elizabeth, their son, daughter and a Catholic servant.
[282] See for example: TNA, CO 762/167/11: Riordan, Tipperary. Lismore shopkeeper Willie Roe (above, this Chapter) claimed that '"anti-British" sentiment' still affected trade in 1927.

However, in an appeal of 10 November 1926, Russell stressed that even though the campaign against him began outside the Terms of Reference of a committee focused on Civil War injuries, he had been 'suffering hardship and loss since'. And he now had to support his stepsons who, on returning from World War I, 'have lost all prospects of earning their livelihood in the Irish Free State'.[283]

Boycott was a powerful tactic, involving a cross-section of people as both victims and perpetrators; it could tear communities apart. The anti-Semitic dynamic of the Limerick boycott (1904) marks it out as something of a special case, but the episode does illustrate how intimidation works to divide people and how easily a community becomes convinced of the enemy within. In Limerick in 1904, Fr. Creagh's sermons on the Jews' 'nefarious business practices', fuelled popular speculation on the intentions of the new immigrants and a boycott was enforced which 'dealt a severe blow' to the Jewish community.[284] In Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford during the Civil War, rumour and suggestion also played an important role in creating the intimidatory atmosphere, 'more subtle and invidious than cruder forms' of violence, in which Protestants and British 'Loyalists'—rather than Jews—were especially targeted.[285] Indeed, what the study not just of boycott, but a wide spectrum of intimidating actions has shown, is that there lurked within Munster's rural and urban communities a violent undercurrent, which could become explicit if certain codes—regarding land ownership, religion, political allegiance—were transgressed.

Conclusion

These fearful feelings were all-consuming. Individuals and families who had seen their neighbours attacked, or received a threatening letter, like those documented in Section (ii), did not have to experience actual physical harm to feel frightened enough to leave. Section (i) showed too how personal and financial circumstances, and experiences of persecution under British rule, could determine victims' responses to intimidation. Still, while necessary caution is taken with terms like 'expulsion' and 'cleansing', what the chapter proves is that intimidation was used in an instrumental way, resulting in significant departures from Munster and Ireland. By collating compensation evidence from both the British and Free State Governments, I have been able to draw on the experiences of both permanent migrants and those who were displaced for a number of nights, months or years, but later returned home.

It was certainly the intention of the perpetrators—often identified in warning notices and witness accounts as 'republicans' or 'military'—to clear out the old enemy from the community. Ex-RIC and servicemen and their families, even those with ostensibly tenuous business or social links with the British administration, as Section (vi) on boycotting suggests, were punished for their past allegiances. Campaigns of intimidation also had a sectarian dynamic: letters in circulation during the Civil War, including some issued on behalf of the IRA, made specific threats against the Protestant community. Boycotts were enforced on denominational lines, weakening Protestants' commercial hold on an area, particularly in communities (as the Waterford case studies in Section (vi) showed) where the non-Catholic population and influence was strong.

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[283] CO 762/14/17: Russell, Tipperary.
[284] D. Keogh and A. McCartney, *Limerick boycott 1904: anti-Semitism in Ireland* (Cork, 2005), xii, 19, 125–6.
[285] Darby, *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland*, 97.

Still, attacks on Protestant shops and businesses cannot be seen in isolation from the wider political conflict over the Treaty. Violence and intimidation directed against remnants of British rule in Ireland included not just Protestants, but 'Staters' of all denominations who were, in the eyes of the anti-Treaty army, acquiescing in the maintenance of the British link by accepting the Treaty and the oath of allegiance to the crown. Intimidation of civilians and attacks on public and private property, communications and infrastructure, constituted a serious effort to undermine the authority of the new government.[286] Threats to order and stability came from a number of quarters; violence was not the sole preserve of the armed forces—Free State or republican. Resolution of land issues was sought through local action, as well as legislation: Section (iii) shows how cattle driving and harassment (and even animal maiming; Section (iv)) were used to chase away the landowner and re-divide his land. What this chapter demonstrates most obviously is the continued salience and divisive power of the land question in the three Munster counties (and from the evidence available, Co. Limerick in particular stands out as a centre for cattle driving and land seizure). And while historical justifications were given and familiar tactics (like threatening letters) employed, the conflicts witnessed during 1922–23 were not a strict continuation of the Land War struggle against the alien landlord. Independence and the Free State's own Land Act (1923) would stir the hopes of the landless further. Former estate-workers and those associated with big house advantages were turned from their homes and jobs, but intimidation of farmers in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford in the main targeted those who had recently acquired land or held large pastures. Animal maiming (Section (iv)) was used, like cattle driving, to harass and demoralise the 'grazier', but this was also a more brutal, intimate attack, used to settle bitter personal conflicts and class rivalries within farming, which were not necessarily linked to the war over the Treaty, or local campaigns for redistribution.

Such was the complexity of a conflict in which anti-British hostilities, sectarian enmities and local competition over land were bitterly entangled with the war over the Treaty. During the Civil War, observed Eneas McNulty, 'people are choosing who they want in and who they want out'. Eneas had returned to Sligo in 1922 as 'one of the fearing men…the boys of the black-list', after service in the British merchant navy and 'my time in the peelers'.[287] Real life Waterford native and Letchworth resident James Coogan called the Irish Free State 'my own country',[288] but in the violent transition to independence, the place of a Catholic ex-constable was far from secure.[289]

[286] See Chapter 4, Conclusion: destruction of property was a powerful tactic and employed more regularly (and with greater efficiency) than lethal violence against the person, in order to coerce and control the populace.
[287] Barry, *Whereabouts of Eneas McNulty*, 97, 104, 118.
[288] See Introduction, this Chapter.
[289] Coogan's religion verified in the Census: in 1911, 35 year old, 'Roman Catholic', 'RIC constable' James lived with his wife Nora in Johnstown, Waterford city.

Chapter Four: Violence against the person

Introduction

This thesis makes use of under-researched sources—in particular the compensation claims—to capture those violent episodes and experiences that often go unrecorded. Violent death or murder, by contrast, is recognised by historians as an 'unambiguous form of violence that can be measured more reliably' than say damage, threats or forcible displacement.[1] Peter Hart, for example, measures revolutionary violence in Cork by 'bomb and bullet' for this very reason: death and serious injury caused by guns and explosives are relatively easy to trace.[2] In this chapter I also look at violence against the person, that is, the infliction of bodily damage or death through physical contact, or the use of weapons. My focus is violence committed behind the front lines, alongside and away from encounters between the Free State Army and anti-Treaty IRA.

It is possible—as Stathis Kalyvas demonstrates in *The logic of violence in civil war* (2006)—to make a distinction between violence and the military conflict within which the violence takes place.[3] Indeed, it is the violent and intentional victimisation of civilians (defined by him as anyone who is not a full-time soldier), which is the primary focus of his important work. Drawing on data from conflicts around the world, as well as his own extremely detailed and comprehensive research on the wars in Greece (1943–9), Kalyvas explains the 'logic' of civil war violence: the deliberate infliction of harm on non-combatants, by armed political actors, is used selectively, to maintain or establish control, within the contested territory. In communities in Munster, during 1922–23, I also seek 'logic', meaning and purpose in the murder and maiming—largely by armed personnel—of unarmed civilians and those unable to offer physical resistance at the time of their attack (the kidnap and murder of off-duty soldiers, for example). Chapter Three, on intimidation, reveals how the threat of violence, articulated through written or verbal warnings, was used during the Civil War to drive out unwanted elements from the local community. Here I explore those cases in which such ominous promises were followed through.

i. Civilians: definition and discussion

Some civilian fatalities can be accounted for as collateral damage of a war played out close to the people: deaths were inevitable as the Free State Army and anti-Treaty IRA vied for control of Limerick's barracks, or clashed in the streets of Waterford, Clonmel and other republican-held towns. The compensation claims reveal what happened when non-combatants were caught, literally, in the cross-fire of the short, but 'sharp',[4] military phase of the war. Daniel Donovan's claim was rejected by the Irish Grants Committee (IGC) because he suffered gun shot wounds in an exchange between the Free State and 'Irregular' armies in Limerick city on 19 July 1922 (he was injured, in other words, during the course of the fighting and was not targeted for his personal affiliations). As a prison official since 1906, Donovan may have been seen as a representative of the British justice system in Ireland. However, his shooting was deemed non-malicious. Donovan could not prove, for the purposes of compensation, that his injuries were sustained on account of 'pre-Truce' British

[1] S.N. Kalyvas, *The logic of violence in civil war* (Cambridge, 2006), 20.
[2] P. Hart, *The IRA and its enemies: violence and community in Cork, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 1998), 319.
[3] See thesis Introduction.
[4] The local Munster press described a number of 'lively' encounters; see Introduction.

loyalty.[5] George Hehir's daughter, Kathleen, was accidentally shot and killed on Christmas Eve 1922, during 'an altercation between officers of the National Army and some civilians', in Boherboy, Co. Limerick. The IGC rejected his claim for £210, for the loss of his daughter's earnings (17 year old Kathleen supported her siblings by working as a servant in Limerick city). The grieving father felt understandably hard done by; he had already been disappointed by an 'unjust' award of £40 from the Free State Personal Injuries Committee.[6]

However, while Hehir undoubtedly saw his daughter as an unfortunate bystander and a casualty of a military and political conflict in which she took no part, the intentions and identities of Hehir's killers were far from clear. Often, the 'killing of civilians is careless or coincidental and not the main purpose of an attack or of the war as a whole'.[7] Kathleen's death would seem to fall in this category. Louise Ryan states that female casualties of the War of Independence were 'usually' those women and girls 'shot in the cross-fire between the British military and the IRA'.[8] Still, research on Munster during 1922–23 complicates the notion of a passive, homogenous public simply waiting to be gunned down by Irregulars, or rescued by the Free State. For a start, the shots that killed Kathleen were exchanged between civilians and the National Army, not the republicans. Secondly, just because the casualty was not singled out personally and killed, it does not mean she was entirely uninvolved in Civil War violence. The identity of a civilian may be clear outside war—members of this protected group include unarmed men, women, children, the elderly, medical officials—but 'harmlessness', or non-combatant status, is ambiguous within war.[9] The intimidation of shopkeepers and businessmen who had dealt with the British administration in Ireland or supported the Free State Army in some way, shows that even the seemingly innocuous act of boarding soldiers or dealing with a boycotted farmer, could link the 'civilian' victim 'to one side or another'[10]. Notices posted around Newcastle West, Co. Limerick, for example, warned: 'any shops supplying food to the Army will be treated as armed soldiers'. A number of women (allegedly members of Cumman na mBan) were arrested in Nenagh, Co. Tipperary, after posters were distributed in Listowel, Co. Kerry, making similar threats towards shopkeepers.[11]

Neither would Hehir have been removed from harm's way by virtue of being a young woman. In traditional representations of the civilian idea, women and children are the 'epitome of innocence in war'.[12] Nationalist accounts of the War of Independence certainly celebrated the heroic deeds of 'brave young men', while women were 'contained within the conventional narratives of grieving mothers or passive, nameless victims'.[13] In reality, however, women often share the ideologies of armed groups and short of participating in the actual fighting, do support militancy. Female couriers, gun runners, cooks and nurses played their role during 1919–21 and

[5] The National Archives (TNA), CO 762/79/2: Donovan, Limerick (Records of the Colonial Office, Records of the Irish Office: Irish Distress Committee and Irish Grants Committee: Files and Minutes).
[6] See Chapter 1 on the operation of the Compensation (Personal Injuries) Committee.
[7] H. Slim, *Killing civilians: method, madness, and morality in war* (London, 2007), 40.
[8] L. Ryan, ''Drunken Tans': representations of sex and violence in the Anglo-Irish War, 1919–21', *Feminist Review*, no. 66 (Autumn 2000), 73–94 at 77.
[9] Slim, *Killing civilians*, 204.
[10] IMA, Operation/Intelligence Reports by Command, CW/OPS/3/C.
[11] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[12] Slim, *Killing civilians*, 201.
[13] Ryan, ''Drunken Tans'', *Feminist Review*, 74.

involvement continued during the Civil War.[14] Ernie O'Malley certainly seemed to have faith in his female comrades in summer 1922:

> During the Tan war the girls had always helped but they had never sufficient status. Now they were our comrades, loyal, willing and incorruptible comrades. Indefatigable, they put the men to shame by their individual zeal and initiative.[15]

The Free State Army reported on 21 October 1922 that women in Clonmel 'are playing a very important part' in the war, carrying dispatches, bringing clothing and food and 'assisting' the republicans 'in every possible way'.[16] Amongst the 'commercial travellers, postal, and railway workers carrying' messages for the Irregulars in Limerick City, in April 1923, were many women cyclists.[17] Two 'Miss McDonoughs'—called 'female "diehards"' in the Free State Army report—were arrested in Lisvarrinane, Co. Tipperary, the same day that Dan Breen and two comrades were captured in a dug out in Aherlow.[18]

The 'identification problem' is particularly pertinent in guerrilla wars: when the fighting is conducted amongst or even 'through' the people, it is hard for the incumbent power (the Free State, in the case of the Irish Civil War) to 'tell friend from enemy'.[19] One September evening in 1922, 'Irregulars' in Waterford City 'mixed amongst the crowds leaving the picture theatres and indulged in…indiscriminate firing, the object being…to hit and wound some of the National soldiers who were amongst the audience'.[20] National Troops also observed that working along 'wholetime' anti-Treaty IRA personnel in many areas were 'local men' willing to engage acts of destruction and contribute to 'Irregularism' on a more casual—but no less serious—basis. 'In some districts', in Co. Limerick, 'these locals specialise in road, rail and wire destruction and in looting' and were 'responsible for a great amount of the opposition encountered'.[21] By 25 April 1923, 'Irregular organisation' within the Limerick Command was at a 'very sorry pitch' but, supporting the '115 whole time column men' active in Glin, Ballyhahill, Askeaton, Foynes and Ballybunnion, were 'a large number of men who might do one day's or rather night's work of destruction in the week'.[22]

As well as tracking republican personnel, armament levels and 'immediate aims', the Free State Army weekly Command reports obsessively attempted to gauge local 'morale': were 'agrarian motives, labour trouble, lawlessness' helping the Irregulars; what were republican 'relations with the people'? The identity of 'the people', though, was fairly simplistically conceived: the assumption seemed to be that save a few misguided rebels, the majority of the population was united on the side of authority. One Intelligence Officer, for example, observed two postmasters in the Waterford area 'with 'strong "Die-Hard" sympathies', but stated these were not widely shared: Williams, the Postmaster in Kilmacow, 'is believed to be active, and

[14] Ryan, ''Drunken Tans'', *Feminist Review*, 77.
[15] E. O'Malley, *The Singing Flame* (Dublin, 1978), 148.
[16] IMA, CW/OPS/1/A.
[17] IMA, Operation/Intelligence Reports by Command, CW/OPS/2/M.
[18] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[19] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 89, 91.
[20] *Waterford News*, 8 Sept. 1922.
[21] IMA, CW/OPS/2/M.
[22] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.

his Post Office is boycotted at present by the people'.[23] This same 'people', Free State General Brennan commented, 'seem to be getting very tired of this trouble'.[24] Supporters of the Irregulars, it was suggested, did so under threat of violence: information 'is not received very freely' in the Limerick Command area, 'due to fear of reprisals by Irregulars'.[25] Even the relatively weak republican bands of April 1923—Limerick city columns 'hardly deserve the name of "column"'—were intimidating:

> The people show no love for the Irregulars or their tactics, but nevertheless information is slow in coming in. The reason for this is fear of the Irregulars having reprisals afterwards.[26]

Intelligence on republican movements was highly prized. Indeed, while popular 'support' for one side of the other takes many forms, Kalyvas argues that 'malicious denunciation'—civilians informing or 'snitching' on their enemies, by passing information to armed forces—is 'central to civil war'. The war for information and allegiance was certainly closely fought in Munster. 'Spies' and 'traitors' on both sides often met a violent end, as this chapter shows. Keeping quiet could be as dangerous and divisive as speaking out. A report from a Free State Intelligence Officer, for example, hinted at the complicity of civilian funeral-goers in Dungarvan, Co. Waterford, in a republican attack on National Troops. On 10 December 1922, about 4 miles outside the town:

> The Irregulars were laying in wait for the men coming with the car. The car passed the place, but the Irregulars did not fire, as there was a funeral passing at the time. Most of the people at the funeral knew that the Irregulars were there, but they did not tell the officer. They were waiting to see the ambush.[27]

Indeed, the sparse sources that do survive from the republican side suggest that in some communities the warm reception reserved—so the local press would have the reader believe[28]—for National Troops alone, was also offered to the anti-Treaty side. On 5 October 1922, an unnamed soldier:

> Returned from Tipperary on Tuesday evening, having travelled through most of the [third brigade] Area. Things are fine all through there and the civil population are most friendly. On Sunday I was at Mass in Rosegreen, and a column of 35 IRA men armed with rifles marched into the church for Mass. Returning from Mass the column was marching along the road quite openly and the people were all calling out hearty greetings to them. I slept in three different houses, miles apart, and found the same friendliness towards the boys everywhere.[29]

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[23] IMA, CW/OPS/1/A.
[24] IMA, CW/OPS/2/A.
[25] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[26] IMA, CW/OPS/2/M.
[27] IMA, CW/OPS/1/A.
[28] While residents of Bruree welcomed the 'striking progress' made by the Free State in their town, for example, 'Irregulars' were defeated in a 'volley of machine-gun fire': *Limerick Leader*, 31 July 1922.
[29] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot 4, A/0992/1.

In memoirs first published in 1982, Liam Deasy claimed he and three IRA companions were well catered for as they passed through the county: from the 'Powells of Ballynaclough, a very friendly Protestant family', they 'once again' received 'a typical Tipperary welcome'.[30] Geography was important, as ever, in the relative intensity of the republican struggle. The IRA was itself aware of its weaknesses and lack of support in certain areas, but knew how to use the landscape to their advantage. By late 1922, Deasy recalled, thanks to the imprisonment of many officers:

> North Tipperary was considered dormant, with the exception of the district from Rear Cross in the west to Kilcommon north of Templederry, areas which included the north Tipperary mountains. Here with a very small force, we were more than holding our own in keeping the Free State forces at bay.

Following one failed expedition, Deasy and company retreated from the plains of Toomevara to the 'comparative safety' of the Tipperary hills.[31] A Free State Battalion operating around Nenagh reported the 'civilian population in the mountainous districts are favourable to the Irregulars'.[32] O'Malley describes the 'sliding scale': 'weakly-held areas were often nearly eliminated, but again recruited and reorganised'.[33] Geography was crucial, certainly, to this republican leader. During the War of Independence, O'Malley had organised the IRA Second Southern Division (encompassing the 'greater part' of Tipperary, half of Limerick and a 'portion' of Waterford): 'I had cycled or tramped across it…I understood the type of men there'. He was consequently annoyed with his Civil War appointment as Assistant Chief of Staff for Ulster and Leinster—'a strange country', in his words.[34]

The military strength of and support for anti-Treaty IRA at any one time was also unavoidably linked with rise and fall of their leaders: deaths of Tipperary's O/C Dinny Lacey (d. 18 February 1923) and IRA Chief of Staff Liam Lynch (d. 10 April 1923), had a particularly demoralising effect. The capture of Breen, Donovan and Walsh in Co. Tipperary (reported on 19 April 1923) was 'one of the biggest blows the Irregulars have suffered since the outbreak of hostilities, and should go a long way towards establishing peace in the area'.[35] The detention of popular and prominent anti-Treaty men, like Breen, 'finished any organised resistance to our troops in this area'; the 'civilian population' saw the 'downfall of the Irregulars' was near and were 'deserting the "cause" accordingly'.[36]

As is often the case in civil wars, simple mercenary motives undoubtedly accounted for fraternisation with one side or the other in Ireland. 'Country people' in the vicinity of Newcastle West, for example, did back the republicans because, 'while chaos reigned', they could 'avoid payment of both their civil debt and their rates and taxes'. However, the 'town's people are supporters of the [Free State] Army for the same reason, that they will get their accounts paid when more lawful times arrive'.[37] The 'machinery of civilised life' did tend to 'run with more or less smoothness' in

[30] L. Deasy, *Brother Against Brother* (Cork, 1998), 92.
[31] Deasy, *Brother Against Brother*, 91–2.
[32] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[33] O'Malley, *Singing Flame*, 162.
[34] O'Malley, *Singing Flame*, 139–40.
[35] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[36] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[37] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.

areas where the government were in the ascendant, although, the *Church of Ireland Gazette* continued: 'the dislocation caused by Irregular occupation will take long to set right'.[38] A desire for respite from the destruction and disruption depicted so dramatically in the compensation evidence and local press is perfectly understandable. Clonmel may have been 'spared the horrors of a stand-up fight in the streets', but the town was virtually brought to a standstill during the summer: 'the humiliations inflicted on the people and the deprivations which they had to endure was a sufficiently severe trial'. Industry, trade and commerce suffered under Irregular occupation.[39] By September 1922, the Free State had recaptured republican strongholds, but life did not return to normal immediately: in late January 1923, Dungarvan, Co. Waterford, remained 'almost completely shut off from the outside world':

> No daily papers came here on Friday or Saturday…Letters take a long while to come here and the general upset is felt very much by the inhabitants. But for the open port there would be intense suffering among the people for want of provisions…We are thrown back almost to the middle ages and the upset to business is severely felt by the trading community.[40]

The Post Office reported to the Irish Government, in July 1922, on the difficulty of getting messages through: explosions on the railway line, 'impassable' roads and the cutting of telegraph wires, limited communication between Limerick and anywhere but Dublin and Ennis.[41]

That is not to say that the republicans put no thought to the unpopularity of their violent devastation: the Free State Army expected a 'cessation' in the 'War of Destruction' once the 'Irregular leaders wish to curry favour with the people'.[42] Many anti-Treaty soldiers were more realistic than Liam Lynch, who 'clung to the illusion that he could transform the military situation once enough weapons were secured'.[43] Early on in the conflict, anti-Treaty O/C Dinny Lacey had warned republicans could become unpopular in Co. Tipperary if soldiers continued to 'scrounge on the countryside' and upset the local economy (by, for example, burning Tipperary's famous creameries).[44] Yet this is what happened: by May 1923, civilians had become 'fed up' with the 'constant drain on their resources'.[45] 'True we were still given food and shelter', said Deasy of the Civil War, but while the 'hospitality…generosity and…bravery' of the people 'were the real backbone' of the War of Independence, by the later conflict Deasy 'could not help feeling that for the most part we were being tolerated because of who we were or because of our success in earlier times'.[46]

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[38] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 4 Aug. 1922
[39] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 19 Aug. 1922.
[40] *Munster Express*, 27 Jan 1923.
[41] National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Records of the Department of the Taoiseach, S 567: 'Post Office reports'.
[42] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[43] E. O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: the Irish state and its enemies since 1922* (Oxford, 1999), 28.
[44] M. Hopkinson, *Green against green: the Irish Civil War* (Dublin, 1988), 151, 168.
[45] IMA, CW/OPS/2/M. See also Chapter 1, Section i on the 'commandeering' of private property by the republican (and sometimes Free State) armies.
[46] L. Deasy, *Brother Against Brother*, 96.

The Irish Civil War was not as 'protracted' as the conflicts studied by Kalyvas, but in communities in Munster—and the violent Tipperary in particular[47]—already subjected to a two year War of Independence, 'fatigue and suffering…undermine[d] preferences and sympathies', as in Greece and Spain.[48] The desire for the restoration of order trumped pre-war political or social allegiances and ideologies; support was offered to the side that offered civilians protection. In the Free State, 'yearnings for peace and stability' even overrode qualms about draconian state methods: the 'Army Emergency Powers Resolution', introduced in the Dáil on 27 September 1922, allowed for the establishment of military courts with the power to impose the death sentence on non-Army personnel, indefinite detention without trial, and control of the dealing in firearms by the National Army.[49] There are some notorious recorded incidents of Free State cruelty: the Department of Justice files relating to the highly controversial 'Kerry mine explosions', at Ballyseedy Cross,[50] for example, have only recently been released.[51] Still, the impression from the ground is that the most support lay with the Free State, 'even at its most coercive'.[52]

ii. Killing and wounding

a) Armed or unarmed?

Smoke bombs 'were of great advantage in attacking buildings', but republicans in Munster found 'incendiary bombs'—designed to take human life—more difficult to manufacture, or utilise to any great effect.[53] A January 1923 report from the Third Eastern Division of the anti-Treaty IRA, to all battalions in the Third Tipperary Brigade, warned munitions officers and 'divisional chemists' to take care in handling and sourcing explosives: half the 'Mills Bombs' purchased by South Wexford Brigade, 'from a member of the enemy Garrison', were found to be 'fitted with [an] instantaneous fuse'. This was a 'trick…intended to blow up any of our troops into whose hands these bombs may fall'.[54] This trade in unreliable munitions also highlights more controversial questions of allegiance: clearly not all links had been severed between the incumbent power and the insurgents. One republican recorded the 'considerable transfer of "stuff"' from undisciplined Free State ranks to 'our men' around Templemore, Co. Tipperary.[55] 'Stuff' may well have included these dangerous explosives and while each side was mistrustful of the other, deals were done during the Civil War.

While armament levels varied within and across the counties, the anti-Treaty IRA were much better equipped with rifles and revolvers than with bombs.[56] The

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[47] A county with a historical penchant for violence (see thesis Introduction) and the largest share of the compensation claims (see Chapter 2, Section i).
[48] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 116.
[49] C. Campbell, *Emergency law in Ireland, 1918–1925* (Oxford, 1994), 163–4.
[50] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, 240–1.
[51] NAI, Records of the Department of Justice, 2008/152/27.
[52] R.F. Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600–1972* (London, 1988), 513.
[53] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot 4, A/0992/1: 'smoke bombs' were thrown at Limerick city Civic Guards Barracks, John Street (26 March 1923) and placed in a barricade on the Foynes-Loughill Road (24 April 1923). At the Conference of Irish Historians in Britain, University of Southampton, 17–19 September 2010, Dr Niall Whelehan (European University Institute) revealed that dynamite was a similarly unreliable (though fascinating and provocative) resource in Fenian campaigns of political violence in the nineteenth century.
[54] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot 110, A/1100.
[55] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot 4, A/0992/1.
[56] IMA, CW/OPS/1/A: 'Irregulars' in Clonmel, for example, were 'well equipped' with 'Thompsons and Lewis guns', late into October 1922.

impression from the military reports is that gun shot wounds were the more common cause of death and injury in the Civil War. 'Open conflict' and gun battles in the street lasted just a couple of months, but ambushes and sniping continued after towns like Clonmel had been secured.[57] In early October 1922, National Troops were surprised on the Clonmel-Cahir road 'for the third time in two months'.[58] A notice from the Third Tipperary Brigade Headquarters reprimanded one Commander-in-Chief because 'the "Activities"' of his (Eighth) Battalion were 'not up to the mark in the way of sniping'. He was reminded: 'the sniping of sentries lorries and patrols demoralises the enemy as well as inflicting casualties on them. You will see that these "Activities" are greatly increased for the future'.[59]

The press contrasted these 'mean tactics' with the military prowess and confidence with which the Free State defeated its enemies. On the Woodrooffe demesne, near Clonmel, National Troops took a 'gallant stand' against an 'Irregular' ambush which killed three and injured nine. The number of republican deaths was 'unknown', but, despite three dead National Troops and nine wounded, victory was claimed for the Free State, who 'put up a fight worthy of the traditions of Irish valour and routed the enemy, who withdrew to the mountains'.[60] Woodrooffe had been the site of a deadly War of Independence ambush and further deserved its 'unpleasant prominence in local history' with the burning of the big house there in February 1923.[61] Just as the guerrilla tactics that had 'proved so successful against the British were now employed' against the Free State,[62] so the new Irish Government appropriated the discourse of the governor-oppressor in its response to this violence. Tags used in Free State Army reports, for example, like 'Diehard' and 'Irregular', denote the perceived illegitimacy of republican cause and even the immorality of their tactics. 'Those Free State people who had once glorified the ambush', remembered O'Malley, 'now spoke of it as cowardly form of murder'.[63] Deaths of Irregulars were not celebrated: no delight could be taken, for example, in the 'awful mutilation' of three young republicans, killed laying a mine outside the home of a former RM in Clonmel: 'a leg of one of the unfortunate victims was found hanging on to a tree close by'.[64] The ranks of the anti-Treaty IRA did include men of 'undoubted personal courage', such as 'well known' republican leader Patrick 'The Tank' Dalton, of Co. Tipperary.[65] Ultimately, though, it was for the Free State Army and not republican rebels, that the moral high ground was reserved. Republicans were portrayed as bandits, lacking respect for civil and religious authority: attacks on Free State soldiers on their way to Mass were seen as particularly underhand and morally reprehensible.[66] The Catholic hierarchy condemned these attacks and ambushes in crowded streets, which wounded 'peaceful citizens' as well as soldiers.[67] In an

[57] Campbell, *Emergency law in Ireland*, 155.
[58] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 4 Oct. 1922. See also numerous Free State Army reports on sniping: IMA, CW/OPS/1/A, CW/OPS/2/B.
[59] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot 110, A/1100.
[60] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 16, 19 Aug. 1922.
[61] See Chapter 2.
[62] Campbell, *Emergency law in Ireland*, 160.
[63] O'Malley, *Singing Flame*, 152.
[64] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 9 Aug 1922.
[65] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 28 Oct. 1922.
[66] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 20 Sept. 1922 and 14 Feb. 1923.
[67] Archdiocesan Archives, Monsignor M.J. Curran papers, Political papers, Box 2660: 'Pastoral letter of His Eminence Cardinal Logue, the archbishops and bishops of Ireland, to the priests and people of Ireland. To be read in all Churches and public oratories 22 October 1922'.

ambush of the Free State's new police force, Garda Síochána, republicans 'stole whatever valuables the Guards held in their bags', and threw their rosary beads and Sacred Heart badges on floor:

> This is the latest development in the campaign against the people–the new form of frightfulness devised by the apostles of freedom.[68]

Press attention focused on these local outrages and personal tragedies. At Woodhouse, in the deep ravine between the villages of Millstreet and Ballinamult, Co. Waterford, a spot 'ideally suitable for the ambushers' purpose', three National Troops were shot at and killed. And so a fairly routine operation from Dungarvan—to round up an 'Irregular flying column'—ended in horrific fashion for Vol. Larry Phelan from Kilmacthomas (shot through the spine and killed instantly) and Vol. Patrick Foley, of Waterford city (succumbed in hospital to a serious head wound).[69] Twenty-three year old Phelan, it was reported, was a 'splendid type of man' and an 'immense congregation' gathered at his interment.[70] These public outcries of grief contrasted sharply, of course, with the lack of (at least demonstrable) local support at the funerals of British soldiers and policemen during the War of Independence. On 30 May 1920, in Co. Limerick, a guard of honour and coffin 'draped in the Union Jack' made its way to the Catholic churchyard in Killmallock as Constable Morton—killed in an attack on the town barracks—was laid to rest. 'Few townspeople' attended the funeral but, as the coffin passed, 'small groups raised their hats'.[71] Certainly, the treatment of the victim after death can be as symbolic as the killing itself: mutilation of the body or the 'denial of a decent burial' has been observed across different cultures as a powerful show of strength on the part of the attacker.[72]

While the horror of any death is not disputed, the manner of these killings (of Phelan and Foley (above), Kelly (below), et al.) was very different from the cases, explored in the rest of this section, where disbanded British policemen, off-duty soldiers and civilians, were murdered at home, or kidnapped and dumped after death. The loss of local lives in 'fratricidal strife' was marked with a particular bitterness:[73] 18-year-old Corporal John Kelly, for example, shot dead on the march into Clonmel in August 1922, had not died in glory on a faraway battlefield, nor joined the heroes of 1916, but had fallen victim to 'the policy of the Irregulars', that is, their campaign of political violence against the new government. Yet he had at least been 'killed in action' and was armed and able to defend himself at the time of death.

Head-Constable Christopher Davis, RIC, is included in the casualty list—painstakingly compiled by Richard Abbott—of those 493 policemen who died in the discharge of their duty, 1919–22. Around 18% of these deaths took place in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford; see Table 3.[74]

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[68] NAI, Records of the Department of Justice, H 99/109: 'Attacks on Garda Síochána'.
[69] *Waterford News*, 27 Oct. 1922.
[70] Many reports on Free State losses were followed a few days later with news of the soldiers' funerals. See for example: *Clonmel Chronicle*, 23 and 26 Aug 1922: at the funerals of Sergeant Finegan and Private Walter Cantwell, killed in ambush at Redmondstown, near Clonmel, 'every mark of sympathy and respect was shown, indicating the popular grief evoked by the sad occurrence'.
[71] R. Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland 1919–1922* (Dublin, 2000), 82.
[72] A. Blok, *Honour and violence* (Cambridge, 2001), 114.
[73] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 12 Aug. 1922.
[74] Jim Herlihy offers similar casualty figures for the three counties during 1919–22: 38 in Limerick, 43 in Tipperary, 7 in Waterford. See J. Herlihy, *The Royal Irish Constabulary: a short history and genealogical guide: with a select list of medal awards and casualties* (Dublin, 1997), 152.

Table 3: Police casualties in the three Munster counties

	Limerick	Tipperary	Waterford	TOTAL
1919	3	4		**7**
1920	14	22	3	**39**
1921	21	14	5	**40**
1922	1	3		**4**
TOTAL	**39**	**43**	**8**	**90**

Source: R. Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland 1919–1922* (Dublin, 2000), 30, 33, 35, 39, 44, 51, 62-3, 68, 75, 77, 79, 87, 90, 92, 95, 96, 104, 110-11, 119, 121, 127, 148-49, 151, 156, 165-67, 184, 195, 199, 205, 211-12, 220-21, 225-26, 231, 239, 240-41, 249, 253-54, 261-63, 271, 278-79, 285.

Davis, a 42 year old married man from Co. Galway, was killed in an affray in Tipperary town on 3 March 1922. As his 'Crossley tender' and another vehicle were leaving for Dublin, the party was ambushed in Michael's Street: Davis and another constable were shot and later died from their wounds. This was a high profile case, brought to the attention of Parliament.[75] Davis' widow, Alice, and their five children, aged between 6 months and 14 years, 'keenly [felt] the great loss they have suffered' and the family moved to England where, by the time Alice applied for compensation in November 1926, they had joined the 'little colony'[76] of ex-constables and their families in the 'garden city' of Letchworth, Hertfordshire. Davis was a Protestant and a 'most notable reference' from Rev. Horace Deane in Cahir, where Davis had been stationed 'for some considerable time', probably helped to convince the IGC of Alice's need and an award was made.[77]

Yet what complicates this killing—and the shooting of other on-duty, but soon-to-be-ex-constables—is the disbandment of the RIC from 27 March 1922. The armed, centrally organised Irish policing system had always looked different from forces elsewhere in Britain and had struggled to escape its 'paramilitary image'.[78] Thanks to poor administration and intelligence gathering and declining morale after World War I, the twentieth-century constabulary was even further out of touch with an increasingly nationalist public. From 1916, the RIC 'bore the brunt' of the escalating republican intimidation and violence. After Sinn Féin's electoral victory in 1918, efforts to 'isolate and humiliate' the police became 'organised'. And when dwindling officer numbers were boosted by the notorious 'Black and Tan' and Auxiliary forces, policemen became more than ever a legitimate target for IRA violence. Constables killed during 1919–22, then, were casualties of 'political violence', shot as symbols of British 'imperial power'.[79] The murder of a policeman scored a tactical point against the state. Constables were equipped and entitled to retaliate. However, after disbandment, as members of the RIC began to disperse and

[75] House of Lords Debate, 8 Mar. 1922, vol. 49, cc372–83.
[76] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 16 Dec. 1922; see Chapter 3.
[77] TNA, CO 762/53/6: Davis, Tipperary. The case was also heard in the Tipperary courts, under the Criminal Injuries Act, but the Free State was less generous than the IGC; see Chapter 1 on compensation policy and procedure.
[78] Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland,* 14. See also: J.M. Regan and Augusteijn (ed.), *The memoirs of John M. Regan: a Catholic officer in the RIC and RUC, 1909–1948* (Dublin, 2007), 9; C. Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983), 72–3.
[79] Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland*, 16.

return to civilian life, they began increasingly to come under attack and were no longer able to defend themselves.

The death of ex-RIC Sergeant Walshe, for example, took place in the context of disbandment and shows how the republicans' old enemy—the British policeman—once at the heart of the IRA campaign to undermine law and order in Ireland, had become in a matter of months a soft target, whose death was of little strategic value. Walshe was shot dead at the family house in Newport, Co. Tipperary, on 23 May 1922.[80] His killers—'undisguised', in 'trench coats' and identifying themselves as 'IRA'—called him out of the room where he sat with his family and into the hallway, claiming they wanted Walshe at the barrack and 'would do nothing to him'. This was not true: almost immediately several shots were heard and Walshe 'fell back on the sofa with his hands crossed on his breast'. He never spoke again and his 12 year old daughter went for a priest. A native of Abbeydorney, Co. Kerry, there was no evidence of any personal or local vendettas against Walshe. He was targeted—like the other 89 constables accounted for in Table 3—largely because of the regime he represented. There was, though, a crucial difference: the disbanded policemen no longer had the protection of the old power when he was killed. Walshe was unarmed and defenceless at the time of death. It seems Walshe suspected his previous line of work would get him in trouble when the British departed: reports suggest that just prior to the attack the ex-constable was preparing to leave the county with his family (to return to Kerry, perhaps, since his service in Tipperary had ended).[81]

Walshe and his cohort were not nameless representatives of the British state, rather men maliciously sought out and targeted—not in the line of duty, but within their own home—with deadly violence. James Reilly, caught up in the violence surrounding the disbandment of the RIC from Tipperary town, was sought out for his property, as well as his past service. Reilly had served in the RIC for 39 years and on his retirement in 1920 had set up a restaurant and boarding house in Tipperary town 'largely patronised by Crown Forces particularly the RIC'. His line of work 'brought him into great disfavour with the local civilian inhabitants' and he attracted 'the unfavourable attention of the local IRA' further by assisting wounded policemen in Tipperary in March 1922 'and helping with funeral arrangements' (Christopher Davis, above, was one of those killed on this occasion). Under threat from the 'Irregulars', Reilly left for London three days after his final threatening notice (18 May 1922). One week on, his son was visited 'by IRA men' and 'told that if I returned I should be "plugged" [shot with a bullet], as a prominent Irregular wanted my house and would have it at any price'. And as a final insult, a boycott was enforced on the sale of his boarding house business.[82]

Another former agent of the British state, who had by the Civil War been divested of the political and military credentials that had once marked him out for attack, was the ex-Serviceman. Patrick Galligan was also killed in Newport and in the same month as Walshe, though his death took quite a different form. In making her appeal for funds, Bridget Galligan naturally emphasised the financial impact of her husband's murder: Patrick, aged 47, had been earning 35/- per week as a casual labourer and received an army pension of 15/- per week, which ceased on his death; she was left with 'no means of subsistence'. Bridget's situation was one 'of very exceptional hardship' and in December 1926, the IGC granted the soldier's widow £600. Bridget had until that time received no compensation for the attack, though the

[80] Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland,* 293.
[81] *Limerick Leader*, 22 May 1922.
[82] TNA, CO 762/4/2: Reilly, Tipperary.

Free State's Compensation (Personal Injuries) Committee had ruled that an allowance of £1.5.0 per month be paid for each of her six children, from 1 April 1923 until they reached sixteen. The significance of the case, however, lies not in those left behind, but how the ex-Serviceman met his end: on 21 May 1922, Galligan's house in Newport, Co. Tipperary, was raided 'by a number of armed men' and Patrick pulled out of his bed and shot dead. Bridget explained:

> My husband an ex-British soldier who served in India, South Africa and also in France during the Great War was murdered by the Irregulars…in the presence of myself and my six young children…the eldest just over 13.[83]

That the family had to witness the death seems particularly cruel. Usually some distinction was maintained—as in Walshe's murder—between what was in the eyes of the killers a justifiable, political target (like an ex-solider or policeman) and their civilian relatives. Friends of the ex-policeman were, it seems, also at risk: Maurice O'Brien, a Loyalist cattle-dealer from Ashroe, Co. Limerick (just a few miles from Newport) feared for his own safety after this shooting[84] and Edward Delany was frightened he would meet the same fate as 'two friends…Patrick Galligan and Sergeant J Walsh',[85] after he was fired on while collecting 'driven' cattle.

George Brophy's attackers also visited his home, but the actual killing was carried out elsewhere. The former Lieutenant in the British Army (demobilised with a pension after World War I) had previously been kidnapped and held for a month[86] and, on the night of 1 May 1922, was again 'forcibly taken from his home by republicans' and 'afterwards found to have been shot' (the body was not located and identified until November 1922, though his wife Mary believed that George was killed prior to 8 May).[87] The source of Mary's suspicions about the time of death is unclear; perhaps she had heard local rumours. Indeed, Mary seems to have known at least one of her husband's killers: of the party of seven armed men who called at her house in Upper Irishtown, Mary told the inquest she recognised one, O'Donoghue, who 'asked my husband why he did not leave the area when ordered'.[88] RIC men had traditionally been stationed outside their home communities, often in different counties, to prevent the development of local ties.[89] After independence, by contrast, disbanded constables and ex-Service men like Brophy were murdered close to home possibly, as Mary's testimony suggests, by perpetrators known to them. If Mary did not already feel isolated from her neighbours, then, as an ex-Service man's wife, this horrific ordeal cannot have left her in any doubt of the ill-feeling towards her family, which continued after George's death and left the widow in dire financial straits. Their small provision shop and egg-selling business in Clonmel, Co. Tipperary, folded because of 'customer fear'. The local community was afraid, presumably, of patronising a marked family like the Brophys. Certainly the circumstances of George's 'end frightened people away from the shop as in 1922 and 1923 the Irregulars saw to it that no-one had anything to do with their enemies'.[90]

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[83] TNA, CO 762/19/9: Galligan, Tipperary.
[84] See Chapter 1, Section ii.a.
[85] TNA, CO 762/83/12: Delany, Tipperary.
[86] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 8 Feb., 1 Mar. 1922.
[87] TNA, CO 762/88/19: Brophy, Tipperary.
[88] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 29 Nov. 1922.
[89] Regan and Augusteijn (ed.), *Memoirs of John M. Regan*, 12.
[90] TNA, CO 762/88/19: Brophy, Tipperary.

'Kinship…is often enough to degrade a person's civilian status in the eyes of their enemy…The fact that ordinary people are related to people in armed forces leads many to assume that they are inevitably helping [or] hiding…their people…and they must also share the same political views as their kin'.[91] Mary Brophy may have been seen as an 'active sympathiser' in the eyes of George's killers, in the same way the Free State Army kept a close eye on 'Mrs Edwards', who had become 'a notable personality amongst the "Die-Hards"' (and her home under suspicion as an arms store), after the shooting of her son, Sean Edwards, in Kilkenny Prison in August 1921.[92] Yet while these women experienced (very different kinds of) persecution, intimidation and isolation, they were not subject to violence against their person. There were some deliberate shootings during 1919–21 legitimised, Ryan contends, by the collusion of the females in question with the British authorities; 'women were defined through their relationship with the enemy; as spies or as girlfriends'.[93] Still, the gender distinction—apparent in the following account of a lethal War of Independence ambush—seemed to be maintained during the Civil War. On 14 May 1921, Detective Inspector (DI) Henry Biggs and a military officer were travelling 'with three ladies…in a private motor car from Killorcully to Newport', Co. Tipperary, when they were surprised at Coolboreen by a party of twelve armed men. 'On seeing there was a woman in the car an IRA man called out that the attack was to stop' (Miss Barrington[94] had already been killed outright, but as one attacker left the scene 'he told the other lady who had been slightly wounded that he was sorry that the women had been injured'). By contrast, when the 'leader of the group' found out the wounded man by the side of the car was the DI, he and several others 'fired at him ten to twelve times with rifles'.[95]

Of course, what exactly happened at Coolboreen, or at the dozens of military encounters or unofficial episodes of murder and assault that took place during the Irish Revolution, can never be known for sure. Ambushing is a particularly controversial tactic. Though the fallout following their publication suggests otherwise, Hart's works on revolutionary Cork do not dwell overly on the infamous encounter, between Auxiliary officers and IRA Volunteers, at Kilmichael on 28 November 1920. 'Military' episodes such as this, Hart explains, 'account for only a small proportion of revolutionary violence'.[96] Meda Ryan's biography of ambush leader Tom Barry, by contrast, has the defence of the 'freedom fighter' at its heart and deals with Kilmichael in some detail.[97] The public wrangling between Hart and the Aubane Historical Society over the 2004 anniversary of the ambush shows that interpretations of Kilmichael are still set along political lines.[98] Still, the account from Coolboreen makes a suggestion, at least, that the IRA men shared a common understanding of the fair treatment of women in wartime and, as they committed a lethal act of violence, were consciously acting in a socially appropriate way. Violence is often thought about

[91] Slim, *Killing civilians*, 95.
[92] IMA, CW/OPS/1/A
[93] Ryan, ''Drunken Tans'', *Feminist Review*, 83–4.
[94] The daughter of Sir Charles Barrington of Glenstal Castle, Murroe, Co Limerick.
[95] Abbott, *Police casualties in Ireland*, 240.
[96] Hart, *IRA at war, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 2003), 82.
[97] M. Ryan, *Tom Barry: IRA freedom fighter* (Cork, 2003), 49–67. See also: P. Hart, P. O'Cuanachian, D.R. O'Connor Lysaght, B. Murphy, M. Ryan, J. Lane and B. Clifford, *Kilmichael: the false surrender in the War of Independence: why the ballot was followed by the bullet* (Cork, 1999).
[98] D. Fleming, ''War of words' over battle', *BBC News*, 26 Nov. 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4043737.stm). Angry letters were also exchanged between the parties in *History Ireland* during 2005.

in terms of its easily recognisable ends: killing or wounding an opponent. Yet like other forms of social action and behaviour, the performance itself—that is, how violence is carried out—is important.[99] Murder has an unambiguous effect on the victim, but death—and the manner of the killing—can also communicate a message to the relatives, friends and community left behind.

b) Performance

Chapter Three, on intimidation, shows how threatening letters were posted on estates to warn off the landlord or grazier and—if the campaign of intimidation was successful—claim the land for redistribution. These sinister notices used familiar vocabulary and historical pseudonyms; violence against the person could also be accompanied by these similarly stylised warnings. Thomas McGrath's bullet-ridden body was found on the road at Knockeevan, Clerihan, in March 1923. In the press, the death was portrayed as a cold-blooded killing: McGrath was taken, unarmed and executed. The jury at his inquest 'deplored and strongly condemned crimes such as these against the country and the people'.[100] Yet as a National Army soldier (and like the RIC and British soldiers before him), McGrath was a valid target for republicans. According to the *Munster Express*, this sergeant in the Free State Army did not work in intelligence specifically, but his killers seemed to believe he had passed on information about the republicans. As an informer, then, McGrath was 'tried' prior to his death (this according to the parish priest called to the house where McGrath was held, 'to minister to the unfortunate young man'). It was not known how the victim, who had been stationed in Waterford, was brought to the spot in Co. Tipperary where the body was found, nor what exactly happened in between. McGrath, married in Carrick, may well have been a native of Tipperary, and his corpse left in familiar surroundings for added impact.[101] But the motive for the killing was more clearly spelt out: pinned to his coat 'was a paper which bore the words: "Convicted spy—Spies beware. By order, IRA"'. The bullet wounds in McGrath's head and body confirmed the soldier was 'wilfully murdered'; the note too was proof that the death was far from accidental.

The labelling of victims takes place first of all on an abstract level: one step in the 'basic sequence' of actions which enables a person to kill (or tolerate killing) is the 'de-humanising' of the enemy.[102] Labels are used—victims may be described as animals, for example—to make people forget their similarity with the enemy group.[103] This thesis records the range of identity labels—'grazier', 'Loyalist', 'Stater'—used by local communities in wartime Munster, to define self and other, friend and enemy, during the transition from British rule to Irish independence. Labels can also be used literally, to clarify and reinforce the deterrent message of violence:

> Counterrevolutionary rebels in western France [during 1789–99] directed their violence against people accused of informing republican soldiers about their movements; they abandoned mutilated corpses near republican-held towns and

[99] Blok, *Honour and violence*, 108–13.
[100] *Munster Express*, 10 Mar. 1923.
[101] Unfortunately, the Census cannot confirm this guess: there was no policeman named Thomas McGrath in Tipperary or Waterford in 1911 (though of course he may not have joined the force by that time). See Census of Ireland (1911), NAI, Dublin, http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/ (online database).
[102] Slim, *Killings civilians*, 217–8.
[103] Blok, *Honour and violence*, 109.

> hung a tag around the informer's neck with his name and those of the victims who were avenged by his death.[104]

Notes tied to dead bodies in Munster during the Civil War similarly warned what lay ahead for alleged spies and traitors. Labelling the deceased with a threatening message had taken place during the War of Independence:[105] on 7 March 1921, James Maher, of Co. Tipperary, for example, met a gruesome end for giving information to the RIC. 'Taken away from his home by Sinn Feiners', to a bog eight miles from Thurles, James was 'riddled' with bullets and 'a label pinned to his coat marked "Spy Informer Traitor"'. His father's torment continued into the Civil War: as the parent of a 'spy', he was intimidated and could not keep his job at Thurles National Bank. Patrick Maher was dismissed in September 1922, his manager reading out a letter, 'signed "IRA"', warning 'that unless he…wholly discontinued my services permanently as porter', then 'the Bank would be blown up immediately and that his life also would be a forfeit…[and] that I would be shot anyway'.[106]

The Maher family posed no military threat to the republicans; 'spy' James and his backers, the British state, had already been removed. His father was bank worker, not a soldier. The Civil War was not a straightforward continuation of the War of Independence, but rather an opportunity to punish remnants of British rule and relatives of its armed servants, for their past betrayal. The battle for people's loyalties, for information and support, continued when the Free State came into being. It cannot be proved irrefutably, of course, that the killers in the cases mentioned belonged to the IRA and were not murderers with personal agendas borrowing provocative words and familiar tactics (the threatening letter), for show. James Cleary, a Tipperary labourer, 'had no enemies' and according to his brother, 'took no part in politics'. The Free State military authorities confirmed that he had never given information. His employer, Walsh, and the local vice-commandant of the National Army testified to his 'excellent character'. Yet on a December evening in 1922, Cleary was taken out of his employer's house and shot dead. Tied around the head of the corpse (discovered by his brother at New Inn, Co. Tipperary), was a label: 'Convicted spy. Spies and informers beware. One of many. IRA'.[107] Perhaps there had been a mix-up; events leading up to the shooting are certainly confusing.[108] According to press reports, a young man entered the kitchen where Cleary sat with Mrs Walsh and after enquiring of his name retreated, it is presumed, to consult his comrades. The young man then returned, telling Cleary that he was 'wanted outside' and said to Mrs Walsh: 'I did not think there was any man of the name of Cleary in the district'. Cleary was never seen alive again. Thus the motive for the killing—even the identity of the victim—were far from obvious even, it seems, to the 'young man' sent to summon Cleary to his fate. Still, the eight bullet wounds in Cleary's head and body were more conclusive: the

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[104] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 27.

[105] See R. English, *Ernie O'Malley: IRA intellectual* (Oxford, 1998), 80. The dumping of placarded bodies continues to interest historians: the treatment of the corpse during the Irish Revolution was the subject of a paper by Dr Anne Dolan (Trinity College Dublin), at the Conference of Irish Historians in Britain, University of Southampton, 17–19 September 2010.

[106] TNA, CO 762/55/14: Maher, Tipperary. Patrick made a separate appeal for compensation for the murder of his son, James, but the claim was dismissed as outside the IGC's Terms of Reference: TNA, CO 762/67/9.

[107] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 9 Dec. 1922.

[108] It is also difficult to find out anything more about Cleary, without further personal details; the Census records a number of 'labourers' with this name in Co. Tipperary in 1911.

man was dead, the notice on his body was read and reported in the press and a personal tragedy was assigned political meaning.

Thomas Brennan was taken from his home near Lisvarrinane, Galbally, Co. Tipperary, and shot through the head. The label attached to the body—"Convicted Spy"—was meant for all to read; Brennan's body was discovered in a pool of blood, by passersby on the road to Mass.[109] Brennan, a Catholic,[110] was a civilian and had not been convicted of a crime in any official sense. His supposed treachery may have been his position at the local big house: Brennan worked as a gardener on Robert Sanders' estate in the Glen of Aherlow (the mansion there, Ballinacourte, was burned down on 22 October 1922,[111] not long after Brennan's death). Yet wherever Brennan's loyalties lay in life, it was his death, carried out like a military execution and made public by the dumping of the corpse with the threatening note attached, which warned the local community that all 'Free Staters'—from National Army soldiers to big house gardeners—were punishable as spies and traitors of the republic. The execution by the IRA of at least 50 people in Co. Cork during the War of Independence and Civil War, for various 'crimes against the Republic', is the subject of Gerard Murphy's recent and provocative study.[112] Murphy reveals that in most cases families received no information about the fate of the 'disappeared', nor the location of the body. The 'secret burials'[113] in Cork contrast with the public dumping of the executed traitor—sometimes with a notice attached—in the three Munster counties I studied. In terms of violence and the intensity of its revolutionary experience Cork was, as Hart has shown, something of a special case;[114] civilian fatalities in the county and its capital were exceptionally high.[115] Still, Murphy's foray into what remains a 'dark part' of Ireland's history is highly valuable. It seems clear from his social profiling of the dead and disappeared in Cork that to be killed as a 'spy', one did not have to be actively engaged in espionage. So-called treachery covered a multitude of perceived sins. Hart explains: before the Truce, Protestant deaths could be justified as collateral damage in a war against British 'collaborators or informers'. Attacks on 'spies' during the Civil War, by contrast, had 'little to do' with the victim's actual behaviour.[116] Murphy concurs: IRA gunmen in the later period were fuelled by a 'cocktail of suspicion'; in the elimination of the spy circles allegedly operating out of Protestant and Loyalist institutions such as the YMCA and Boys' Brigade, civilians (including boys) were shot in groups and unceremoniously dumped.[117]

It may be difficult to see the military justification for these deaths, but in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, as in Cork, the killing of civilians and unarmed ex-officers was couched in powerful, official language. The 'trial' of republican prisoners and enemies before their 'execution', for example, lent a sense of legitimacy to the proceedings. A Protestant clergyman was allegedly 'arrested' and sentenced to death by 'court martial', for example, for helping local residents put out a fire at the police barracks in Portlaw. The sentence was not carried out and the clergyman escaped with his life, but he was made to face up to his crime and 'compelled to

[109] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 16 Sept 1922.
[110] Census of Ireland (1911).
[111] See Chapter 2; a major labour dispute also took place on the demesne.
[112] G. Murphy, *The year of disappearances: political killings in Cork, 1920–1921* (Dublin, 2010), xii.
[113] Murphy, *The year of disappearances*, 256.
[114] See Chapter 1, Section iii.b.
[115] Murphy, *The year of disappearances*, 39.
[116] Hart, *IRA at war*, 234, 243.
[117] Murphy, *The year of disappearances*, 248–9.

apologise'.[118] Civil wars, 'by their very nature, break down the distinction between combatant and non-combatant', leading to the targeting of those unable to defend themselves. In contemporaneous wars between European states, by contrast, the distinction between armed and unarmed, or soldier and civilian, was 'meant to be at its clearest'. There was an assumption that warfare was in some measure 'rule-bound and subject to codes of morality'.[119] However, just as the normal rules did not apply in World War I—evidenced in the horrific 'atrocities' committed between German soldiers and the Belgian population in the first months of the war—so the 'Irregulars' can be seen to be acting not like guerrillas or bandits, but as a real army. Policies of trial and execution saw the republicans compete for authority with the (in their eyes) flawed and morally weak Free State. Liam Lynch met the 'savagery' of the Irish Government's 'Public Safety' policies with a campaign of execution: supporters of the coercive legislation were to be 'sentenced to death'.[120] Yet while the Free State's summary execution of four prominent republicans on 8 December 1922 was performed 'without any pretence of legality' (in revenge for the shooting of Sean Hales TD), Lynch ordered that republican violence against the other side be controlled and—like a state legal system—commensurate with the offence committed. Provisional Government troops or officials 'convicted' on a list of charges (including the maltreatment of republican prisoners) were to be executed on the production of 'definite evidence', which was to be properly 'recorded' and sent to GHQ.[121]

The compensation claims—and in particular the attacks on civilians recorded in this chapter—hint at a bitter and sometimes cruel conflict. Perpetrators on both sides undoubtedly strayed from the military codes of conduct aspired to by Lynch (and in reality his centrally issued missives carried little sway in such a highly localised and disparately fought conflict). Still, other prominent Munster republicans did attach a great deal of importance to the way violence was carried out, or at least paid lip service to the idea of a fair fight. During the War of Independence, West Cork Brigade leader, Tom Barry, for example, allegedly ordered his men not to shoot off duty soldiers, only revising his policy after their 'callous' treatment by one British regiment.[122] Then, during the Civil War, after Barry's escape from prison and return to the fighting in Munster,[123] he again 'asked his men not to shoot an unarmed soldier: "We'll get them in a fight," he said'.[124] We cannot unquestioningly trust Barry's (or Ryan's) version of events. Ryan's local knowledge of, and new research on, Barry's career are valuable, but her 2003 biography had a clear agenda: to restore to Barry the legacy that was being eroded, in her eyes, by revisionists who challenged nationalist shibboleths and scrutinised heroes.[125] Yet there is, in Ryan's work and Barry's own memoirs, evidence of a dedicated soldier with a strong belief (even if ideas were not always turned into action) that 'the only way to fight a war was in a warlike fashion'.[126] While Barry joined the British Army simply 'to see what war was like, to get a gun, to see new countries',[127] for example, he then learned about military

[118] *Waterford News*, 28 July 1922.
[119] J. Horne and A. Kramer, *German atrocities, 1914: a history of denial* (New Haven, 2001), 423.
[120] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, 34–7.
[121] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot 110, A/1100.
[122] Ryan, *Tom Barry*, 185.
[123] Ryan, *Tom Barry*, 180–4.
[124] Ryan, *Tom Barry*, 186.
[125] See Chapter 4, Section ii.a on the fallout, between Ryan, Peter Hart and others, over the anniversary of the Kilmichael ambush.
[126] Ryan, *Tom Barry*, 185.
[127] T. Barry, *Guerilla days in Ireland* (Naas, 1978, 6th impression), 8.

armament, organisation and morale, using this training to fight, in Ireland, for 'an aim higher than…political freedom', that is, 'for the dignity of man and all mankind'.[128]

'Commitment to soldiership' was a key aspect of Ernie O'Malley's 'Revolutionary mentality'.[129] He took pride in his militarism and studied 'explosives, firearms, strategy, and the techniques of warfare' extensively. O'Malley wanted to fight the war properly; 'leadership and calmness' defined his contribution to the 1916–23 struggle.[130] Writing from Mountjoy Prison, in January 1923, O'Malley anticipated an 'elaborate trial' by the Free State. He refused to engage, though, with the legal niceties of his case, confident instead in his morally superior position as a soldier of the historic Irish republic. Asked by a Free State captain if he required legal assistance:

> I informed him that I did not require legal assistance; that, as a soldier, I had fought and killed the enemies of our nation, and would do so again, so that a trial for the express purpose of passing sentence did not require a defence on my part.[131]

Neither did Dan Breen recognise the authority of the Free State apparatus: collapsed from 'exhaustion and hunger' at the Glen of Aherlow, Breen was captured and taken to Tipperary, 'where I was put through some form of trial'.[132] Breen also contrasts his alleged poor treatment at the hands of the new government (describing the 'humiliation' of being marched through his native town),[133] with his own good conduct in war. Responding to claims from a Tipperary Labour candidate, allegedly intimidated by Breen during the 'Pact' election of 1922, Breen hoped 'my countrymen know me well enough not to believe that I would ever put a gun up to an unarmed opponent'.[134]

Care must be taken with Breen's reminiscences. *My fight for Irish freedom* was 'a ghost-written memoir constructed hastily from Breen's dictation' and in 'blockbusters of revolutionary biography', like this popular publication, the soldier naturally foregrounds the 'exemplary morality of the Volunteers' ahead of the brutal actions of British forces.[135] The shooting of disbanded British policeman and kidnapping of unarmed Free State soldiers, explored in this section, also complicates his claims of propriety. O'Malley and Breen did take lives and like paramilitaries on the Continent in this period were motivated to destroy their enemy—first the British Government, then the Free State—by the 'holiness of the cause'[136] (in their case, the historic Irish republic, declared in 1916, but betrayed by the Treaty). However, the resentment at their loss did not lead to anything close to the 'ultra-violence' unleashed by counter-revolutionary groups—frustrated by the rise of socialism, national decay and territorial disintegration of the post-war years—on the civilian populations of

[128] Barry, *Guerilla days*, 15
[129] English, *Ernie O'Malley*, 73–4.
[130] English, *Ernie O'Malley*, 74.
[131] English and C.K.H. O'Malley (eds.), *Prisoners: the Civil War letters of Ernie O'Malley* (Swords, Co. Dublin, 1991), 25, 28.
[132] D. Breen, *My fight for Irish freedom* (Dublin, 1924), 257–8.
[133] Breen, *My fight for Irish freedom* (1924), 258.
[134] Breen, *My fight for Irish freedom* (1924), 254.
[135] F. Flanagan, ''Your dream not mine': Nationalist disillusionment and the memory of revolution in the Irish Free State', Unpublished DPhil thesis (University of Oxford, 2009), 24, 30–1.
[136] Gerwarth, 'The Central European counter-revolution: paramilitary violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War', *Past and Present*, no. 200 (Aug. 2008), 175–209 at 195.

Germany, Austria and Hungary. World War I produced 'brutalised' veterans across Europe: in Ireland, ex-soldiers became IRA guerrillas, or practiced lethal violence and retribution within the ranks of the notoriously undisciplined 'Black and Tan' auxiliary forces.[137] However, it was in Central Europe, not Britain or France, where violent subcultures emerged most obviously after 1918, and men hardened by 'four years of organised mass killing' found a new outlet in paramilitarism.[138] Activists no longer 'restrained' by military discipline mounted campaigns of a 'wildness and grimness' not seen during the War: women and children were burnt alive in their homes; socialist workers were dragged into barracks and beaten senseless.[139]

The majority of the more than 16 million German, Austrian and Hungarian soldiers who had fought in and survived World War I returned to civilian lives in November 1918. However, when the German government called for volunteers to fight the Bolsheviks in the Baltic lands, the Poles along the eastern frontiers, or the internal Communist enemy, 'thousands were eager to enlist, to prolong the life of violence to which they had become accustomed'.[140] In Austria, the *Heimwehren* sprang up in opposition to 'red' Vienna and, in Germany, Great War veterans could continue to 'defend the Fatherland'—against internal and external enemies—as members of the *Freikorps* (Free Corps).[141] Chapters in this thesis, on arson and intimidation, analyse the powerful urge, experienced across Civil War communities, to drive the local enemy—Protestants, landlords, graziers and 'Staters'—from Munster and Ireland in 1922–23. Republicans did not easily forget past offences. Service during the War, contact with British troops, or the unfair acquisition of land was met, in a number of cases (and as this chapter reveals) by murder and assault. However, Irish paramilitary groups of the period—namely the anti-Treaty IRA—did not utilise the break down of law and order, and absence of a state monopoly of violence, to perpetrate unfettered violence against civilian society to the same gruesome extent as in Central Europe's White Terror, or the Russian Civil War of 1918–20, where death was 'so common people became inured to it'.[142] Casualty figures here reached 3 million,[143] although total deaths in Russia (from the war and the terror, as well as the famine and disease that followed) number more like 10 million.[144] Continental Europe had become the site of some of the most barbaric acts of mass murder in recorded history and the killing would only continue: during 1933–45, 14 million civilians perished in the 'bloodlands' in the east.[145]

c) Motivations

'No pardon is given', boasted a student volunteer during the post-World War I suppression of a communist uprising in the Ruhr (Germany); 'we shoot even the wounded'.[146] When Co. Waterford magistrate Godfrey Greene was 'put on trial' by his captors, by contrast, his life was allegedly spared because: 'we never shoot

[137] J. Lawrence, 'Forging a peaceable kingdom: war, violence, and fear of brutalization in post-First World War Britain', *Journal of Modern History*, 75, no. 3 (Sep. 2003), 557–589.
[138] S. Berger, 'Germany', in Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted paths*, 185.
[139] Gerwarth, 'The Central European counter-revolution', *P&P*, 194–5.
[140] F.L. Carsten, *Revolution in Central Europe, 1918–1919* (London, 1972), 18.
[141] Carsten, *Revolution in Central Europe*, 18.
[142] O. Figes, *A people's tragedy: the Russian revolution 1891–1924* (Harmondsworth, 1998), 774.
[143] Gerwarth, *Twisted paths*, 2
[144] Figes, *A people's tragedy*, 773.
[145] T. Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (London, 2010).
[146] Gerwarth, 'The central European counter-revolution', *P&P*, 192.

wounded prisoners'.[147] Greene returned fire when, on 4 June 1922, a 'large party' shot at his home in Knock-na-Creha, Carrick-on-Suir, Co. Waterford, where his father-in-law, Matthias Walsh JP, also resided. The *Waterford News* reported the 'thrilling tale' of Greene's 'single-handed resistance with the aid of a double-barrelled shot-gun'.[148] By Kalyvas' definition, Greene was a civilian, that is, he was not a full time soldier. Yet while the violence at Knock-na-Creha cannot be characterised as a military encounter, Greene was at least able to defend himself, unlike the unarmed ex-constables and Free State soldiers taken from their homes and executed. Greene's trial and release as a 'wounded prisoner' also suggest a fairly organised and targeted attack on his person. Evidently he had committed some serious offence in the eyes of the 'armed men' who returned to the house on 8 October 1922, fired several shots and 'warned Greene to leave the district or take the consequences'. Greene himself suggested the violence was motivated by pre-existing anti-British sentiment: refusing to resign from his magistracy, Greene had become over the years the 'object of much hostility' and for this longstanding demonstration of loyalty, he was subject to a vicious and 'prolonged attack'.[149]

His injuries were serious indeed. A doctor from nearby Rathgormack testified to the severity of the wounds to his head, chest and arm. Greene suffered shock and loss of blood and for a year was 'incapacitated from doing business'. In this time his lands lay derelict and stock went missing or was commandeered.[150] The effect of the attack on Greene's ability to make a living from his farm is telling; local press reports suggest that current land issues, rather than past service as a magistrate, may explain the campaign of hostility against him. There had been, according to *Clonmel Chronicle*, a number of similar incidents of 'intimidation of farmers' candidates'.[151] Greene was a member of County Waterford Farmers' Union and was due to stand at the June election in their interests. Greene may have been 'well known' throughout Waterford and Tipperary counties, as an ex-JP, strong farmer and aspiring politician, but these credentials did not make him well liked; a number of resentments may have converged in the attacks against him.

Instances of violence against the person are rarely explained by a single motivating factor. We can identify Greene's economic and political interests, speculate how these clashed with a potential attacker's and observe the violent tactics used in the expression of this conflict, but neither pre-existing ideological cleavages, nor irrational factors, can totally explain the violence against him. Still, where the dynamics of the Irish Civil War differed from the conflicts observed by Kalyvas, was in the salience of the overarching national conflict—and in particular broader questions of political loyalty and British allegiance—in these local episodes and experiences of violence. Kalyvas strives to distance his analysis from the widely-held theory that on the ground dynamics in civil wars are just an 'irrelevant manifestation of the macro level'.[152] Individual grievances and local rivalries can align and interact with broader political and military forces, but his observation that, for example, 'revenge' is most recurrent feature in descriptions of civil war violence shows that

[147] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 10 June 1922.
[148] *Waterford News*, 6 Oct. 1922.
[149] TNA, CO 762/71/16: Greene, Tipperary.
[150] TNA, CO 762/71/16: Greene, Tipperary.
[151] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 21 June 1922; see Chapter 2, Section ii.a on the Farmers' Party.
[152] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 390.

violence in these conflicts has become 'an end in itself rather than a means to a political ends'.[153]

In Munster, by contrast, the 'end' of violence may not have been overtly political or military in every case, but contested ideas of British and Irish identity—and a desire to purge those loyal to the old administration from the community—recur in contemporary explanations of these ostensibly personal attacks. George Holland looked to recent history and longer resentments of British rule to account for his assault. Holland's attackers 'accused me of supplying food and lodging…to Crown Forces. The allegation was true…I was always a staunch supporter of the British Government'. Indeed, 'prior to our troops, Police, Gentry…leaving the country', Holland catered for: 'Balls, Dances, Wedding Parties, Receptions, Evening & Tennis Parties, Garden Parties, Flower shows'.[154] The Catholic food supplier and 'confectioner' from Clonmel, Co. Tipperary, had previously served in the British Army and also owned a 'motorcycle and car business' (his stock was stolen and damaged during the Civil War). On 3 August 1922, Holland was badly beaten ('ruptured') on the road and left with a painful reminder of the encounter: he 'had to wear a truss' ever since and could not work.[155] One reason the compensation claims are so valuable as evidence is that they offer an insight into both the immediate experience of violence and the ways in which, through severe wounding or assault, an 'attack lives on and is embodied in the community long after the event'.[156] The horror that 'lived on' for Holland—like many others—was financial, as well as physical. The Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA) supported Holland's claim to the IGC, confirming the impact of his injuries on his 'earning power'.[157]

On the night of 16 December 1922, Henry Murphy of Ballinakill, Co. Waterford, was 'mercilessly beaten and maimed' by five men while on duty as a railway policeman at Great Southern and Western Railway Company (GSWRC) premises. Murphy's was a fairly new, and dangerous, job. The Free State's own police force, the Civic Guard, was formed in February 1922, but as guerrilla war continued into autumn 1922, with 'groups of armed criminals operating throughout the country', the Government directed the Guards towards civil duties (such as railway security), leaving the conduct of the war to the military.[158] The serious permanent damage caused to Murphy in the attack (including an injured spine and left eye) rendered him 'totally disabled from work' and he asked the IGC to compensate his 'material financial loss'.[159] As the anti-Treaty army endeavoured to sabotage infrastructure and communications, the railways were a particularly dangerous place to be during the Civil War: in an attack reminiscent of the kidnap and murder of ex-constables and Free State soldiers, Cornelius Hanafin, a GSWRC employee on the Kilorgan and Cahirciveen branch (Co. Kerry), was allegedly abducted, tried and sentenced to death 'by Irregulars'. His grave had been dug and he was being brought out for execution, when National Troops intervened.[160] The local press and compensation claims catalogue further attacks on railway workers and their homes:

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[153] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 58–61.
[154] TNA, CO 762/196/5: Holland, Tipperary.
[155] Truss: (MEDICINE) support for hernia.
[156] Slim, *Killing civilians*, 59.
[157] See Chapter 1 on British 'Loyalty' and organisations (such as SILRA) established to help injured Loyalists.
[158] C. Brady, *Guardians of the peace* (Dublin, 1974), 90.
[159] TNA, CO 762/163/3: Murphy, Waterford.
[160] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 11 Apr 1923.

Irregulars 'sniped' at railway repairmen in Co. Tipperary;[161] Edward Scales' stationmaster's cottage in Foynes, Co. Limerick, was completely gutted by fire on 29 June 1922.[162] Recorded, too, were hundreds of incidences of damage to tracks and theft from derailed trains.[163]

In the eyes of the IGC, Murphy's was another such unfortunate case: he was 'in the way' of the raiders and 'got hurt'. The Committee rejected his claim that that injury was sustained on account of his allegiance to the UK, ruling that his attackers were merely 'out for loot' and had no political motivation. Press reports agree that this was a robbery gone wrong: Murphy found the men attempting to steal a box of groceries from a wagon and was set upon; his own money was also stolen.[164] Murphy cited his RIC career as evidence to the contrary: as a policeman he secured the arrest of '158 men' during the 'Enniscorthy rising' in 1916 and was devoted to 'suppressing and frustrating' the IRA, 1916–20.[165] It appears that Murphy was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. His attempts to account for the violence in terms of his past British service, rather than his current and very dangerous job, may not totally convince. Still, in this intimate war conducted, Peter Hart has observed, 'within homes and neighbourhoods, often between people who knew each other',[166] it was likely that Murphy's attackers knew about his police record and he may have been victimised for his dubious loyalties. It did emerge in court that the attackers were known to Murphy: he was able to identify two of the men as Simon Keane and Patrick O'Brien and admitted he knew a third, Hennessey, after cross-examination.[167] The night watchman suffered such horrendous injuries; it seems there was more at stake than a consignment of food.

The wounding of off-duty National Army Captain J.J. Cummins and J. Maher looks on one hand like an opportunist raid for arms, but it was also an example of 'malicious denunciation'[168] in action, in which the 'information used to make violence happen' comes from 'civilians, usually closely linked to the victims'[169] (in this case, the girl who recognised the soldiers and gave the cue to shoot). The *Waterford News* alleged that the pair had come to Maher's native village, Kilmacthomas, to get cigarettes for troops quartered in a local workhouse. In such familiar territory, neither saw the imminent danger: when Maher 'sauntered out into the street', a girl's voice was heard—"There they are; shoot, shoot"—and a volley of gunfire rang out. Cummins, unarmed, was shot through the back and approached by attackers looking for arms and ammunition. Maher sustained a less serious flesh wound in the thigh. But this was more than a simple ambush: the attack on local men on their very own doorstep (literally, in Maher's case), caused a 'painful sensation' in the area (Cummins was from Stradbally, around six miles south of the village). The girl who cried 'shoot' may have identified the pair as Free State soldiers, but it also seems likely that she and other villagers knew the individuals. Both were familiar to the anti-Treaty IRA as past comrades: Cummins was Captain of the Stradbally Volunteers during the War of Independence and two months before this encounter, had received a threatening notice ordering him to leave the district. Maher had earlier been 'taken

[161] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 11 Oct. 1922.
[162] See Chapter 1 on Edward Scales' fate.
[163] See Chapter 2 on the damage, caused by arson, to the railways.
[164] *Munster Express*, 3 Feb. 1923.
[165] TNA, CO 762/163/3: Murphy, Waterford.
[166] Hart, *IRA and its enemies*, 18.
[167] *Munster Express*, 3 Feb. 1923.
[168] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 176–9.
[169] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 79–80.

prisoner…by Irregulars operating round Kilmacthomas'.[170] If the Kilmacthomas shooting was characterised by opportunism, then, it was about taking the chance to punish known enemies (and former friends).

Henry Murphy knew his attackers. Mary Brophy (Section ii.a, above) could identify at least one of the men who murdered her husband. Digby de Burgh, a Co. Limerick landowner persistently intimidated during the war (and whose mansion, Dromkeen, was burned) recalled that James McCarthy, the only labourer left in his service, had been 'restless' the day he was surrounded by 'armed men' and attacked on his lands.[171] It seems that this member of de Burgh's own household knew in advance something of the assault planned on his employer. The community may well have shared information on the timing of attacks and identity of perpetrators that was not passed on to the authorities. Concerns were continually raised in Free State Army reports about how 'freely' or not intelligence was received from 'the people'.[172] And Chapter Three shows how the success of tactics like boycott depended on the complicity of the local community. Thus those averse to undertaking homicidal violence themselves can become involved—indirectly—in harming their enemies. They do this both through 'denunciation' and 'collaboration' with the insurgent group.[173] The conflict in Munster has in this sense something in common with civil wars across the world, in providing the 'many people who are not naturally bloodthirsty and abhor direct involvement in violence' with 'irresistible opportunities to harm everyday enemies'.[174] There were worries amongst Church of Ireland leaders that 'young men, and even young women' had become accustomed to killing: 'the doctrine of physical force has been preached for such a long time in Ireland that it has become almost an axiom of our national life'.[175] The Catholic hierarchy too feared that the 'moral sense of the people' had been 'badly shaken' by the war[176] and also condemned female participation in the bloodshed: in response to his request for the release of Mary MacSwiney,[177] Archbishop Byrne was warned by the government about the 'prominent and destructive part played by women in the present deplorable revolt'.[178] However, despite these fears and reasonable measure of moral panic, there were still qualms about the taking of life. Ireland had not become inured to death and devastation.

Ordinary people are able to kill if the order comes from a 'legitimate authority'; they are even more comfortable, understandably, with 'indirect killing' (ethnic cleansing, for example, is not carried out by 'fanatics', but sanctioned by bureaucrats).[179] Hugo Slim cites the '80% rule': given certain conditions, 80% of us will either collude or directly participate in acts of violence, while 10% of people refuse, or take on other duties in war, and 10% actively resist.[180] These conditions

[170] *Waterford News*, 1 Sept. 1922.
[171] TNA, CO 762/37/10: De Burgh, Limerick.
[172] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[173] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 110.
[174] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 389.
[175] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 16 Feb. 1923.
[176] Archdiocesan Archives, 'Pastoral letter [22 Oct. 1922]'.
[177] Mary MacSwiney (1872–1942): political activist famous for her Dáil speech against the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Supported her brother, Terence MacSwiney (Sinn Féin lord mayor of Cork, died on hunger strike in 1920), and was herself imprisoned during the Civil War.
[178] Archdiocesan Archives, Government papers, Box 467: Letter from the President's Office to Byrne, 18 Nov. 1922.
[179] M. Mann, *The dark side of democracy: explaining ethnic cleansing* (Cambridge, 2005), 26–7.
[180] Slim, *Killing civilians*, 214.

hinge on 'our passions as human beings': emotions must be inflamed (or sufficiently cooled) for people to overcome inhibitions and be able to kill. Once a person has entered this 'altered state', they may become accustomed to the previously unimaginable act of inflicting harm on others; a habit of killing can develop in individuals and societies.[181] Robert Gerwarth has shown how the 'culture of defeat' and competitive, masculine mentalities made killing 'an entirely plausible form of political communication' in Central Europe in 1918.[182] Men who fought with the IRA during the War of Independence felt sufficiently alienated from their community and from the state, Joost Augusteijn argues, 'to cross the very high social and psychological barriers against violence' and murder local constables and British officials.[183] Yet even those soldiers hardened by the guerrilla warfare of 1919–21 were not necessarily hungry for a further, gory fight. In *My fight for Irish freedom*, Breen recalls inflicting casualties on the British at numerous ambushes and raids on barracks. The 'enemy had three dead and three wounded', for example, following the 'fierce encounter' at Oola, on the main road from Limerick to Waterford, on 30 July 1920 (Breen's column 'retired without losing a man or receiving a wound').[184] Tipperary's 'gallant son' is silent, by contrast, on Civil War violence.[185] He laments the loss of his 'old brothers in arms',[186] but reveals nothing of the conflicts they took part in. Similarly, the *Fighting Story* pamphlets of county skirmishes and IRA heroism do not cover the period after 1921.[187] There are no Civil War memoirs to match the boastful accounts of violence from the Continent.[188] It is the 'banality of violence' says Kalyvas, which gives civil wars 'a great deal of their appalling connotation'.[189] In Munster, by contrast, there is little evidence that serious violence against and amongst civilians, friends and neighbours had become commonplace. The real cruelty of some individual cases of murder and maiming reverberated through the victim's family and wider community, but this form of violence was nowhere near as routine as non-lethal attacks on persons and animals, and damage to property.

iii. Sexual violence

Stereotypes of the 'fighting Irish' aside, Ireland was not a violent country by Continental standards.[190] There are no indicators in Munster of the kind of mutilation and 'violation' observed in comparable conflicts elsewhere in Europe during this period: Tim Wilson has shown how and why violence committed in Upper Silesia during 1918–22 took a more intense and brutal form than that occurring in another

[181] Slim, *Killing civilians*, 215, 227, 244.
[182] Gerwarth, 'The Central European counter-revolution', *P&P*, 179–181.
[183] Augusteijn, *From public defiance to guerrilla warfare: the experience of ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916–1921* (Dublin, 1996), 87–123, 335–52.
[184] Breen, *My fight for Irish freedom* (1924), 175–77.
[185] Breen, *My fight for Irish freedom* (Tralee, 1964, rev. ed.), Introduction by Joseph McGarrity, xi.
[186] Breen, *My fight for Irish freedom* (1924), 255.
[187] *Limerick's fighting story, 1916–21: told by the men who made it* (Tralee, 1948).
[188] Gerwarth, 'The Central European counter-revolution', *P&P*, 196: *Freikorps* member Ernst von Salomon, for example, described the 'joyful' rituals of violence against property, individuals and 'undifferentiated crowds' during the 1919 Baltic campaign (it should be noted, though, that such accounts may be exaggerated; von Salomon later became a writer and wrote fictionalised accounts of his time as a soldier).
[189] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 389.
[190] J. Bourke, *An intimate history of killing: face-to-face killing in twentieth-century warfare* (London, 1999), 118–26.

'partition' region, Ulster.[191] Only a handful of compensation claims from the Civil War allege sexual assault, for example. Rape is never mentioned by name. Frank disclosure of such traumatic incidents is not perhaps to be expected in a conservative, rural society like Munster in 1922–23. Still, cultural pressure to conceal the humiliation of sexual violence may have been outweighed by the huge propaganda value in publicising such allegations against one's enemy.[192] Ryan has shown how, during the War of Independence, both the British forces and the IRA were keen to assert their own chivalry and 'depict the enemy as disorderly and unmanly'.[193] However rare, serious physical attacks on women are still recorded: on 16 June 1922, four men assaulted Mrs. Harriet Biggs at her home, Hazelpoint, near Dromineer, Co. Tipperary. This was a high profile case: Biggs and her husband were 'Protestant and connected with the landowning class' in the county.[194] The interest of the press[195] and British Parliament show the case invoked shock and concern at the highest level. Lord Carson drew the attention of His Majesty's Government to the attack on this 'young married lady' and 'British subject' because 'of all the horrible outrages that we have had from Ireland since the British troops were withdrawn from that country, this to my mind is one of the worst'.[196] And while Mr. Biggs' use of 'assault' in the compensation claim is ambiguous, the *Irish Times* report is much more suggestive: at the trial of the four young (and local) men charged with the crime,[197] the Prosecution called the case 'the most serious that had come under the notice of the Irish Government for the past twelve months and they were determined…to punish the offenders with the utmost rigour of the law'. A witness, in the house at the time, recalled: 'when she was liberated she was in a frightful state—almost unconscious. She told him that she had been molested by the men'. Mrs. Biggs herself was 'not yet in a fit condition to attend and give evidence' in court.[198] If there were any doubt, Carson read out the victim's horrific testimony to the Lords:

> [While the house was ransacked] I was outraged by different men in turn, one after the other, and a guard was always kept in my room. Finally, I was taken out of my own room, to allow it to be searched for valuables, a light being required for that purpose, and no light being allowed there while I was in it. I was brought by a man in a green uniform into another bedroom, where I was once more outraged by this man. I believe I was outraged altogether on eight or nine different occasions.[199]

The language used by William McKenna, to describe the attack on his wife, is also indicative of sexual assault (even if 'rape' is not mentioned explicitly). The home of this steward on the Lloyd-Vaughan estate at Roscrea, Co. Tipperary, was raided in July 1922 and McKenna ordered to leave within 24 hours (the big house itself, Golden Grove, had been attacked a number of times during May–June and the surrounding farm buildings were burned down on 28 July). The family had only

[191] T. Wilson, *Frontiers of violence: conflict and identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia, 1918–1922* (Oxford, 2010), 66, 122–4.
[192] Wilson, *Frontiers of violence*, 77.
[193] Ryan, ''Drunken Tans'', *Feminist Review*, 84–6, 92.
[194] TNA, CO 762/4/8: Biggs, Tipperary.
[195] *Empire News*, 25 June 1922; *Freeman's Journal*, 9 Aug. 1922.
[196] HL Deb, 3 July 1922, vol. 51, cc196-202.
[197] Michael Grace, Patrick and Edward Hogan (of Dromineer), James Grace (of Annabeg).
[198] *Irish Times*, 9 Aug. 1922.
[199] HL Deb, 3 July 1922, vol. 51, cc196-202.

arrived in Roscrea in March 1922, when William took up the position as steward. Soon after, the 'Republicans' found out that McKenna and his Ulster Volunteer son 'were Orangemen' and they began sending threatening letters.[200] The family did eventually move back to Belfast, via a stay in Scotland, 'to be among our own people'. But, following the July raids, McKenna 'could not get away in time' and his attackers returned at around 10.30pm on 1 August 1922, taking cash, food, furniture, clothes and kidnapping his wife and son. The victims were tied to a tree and not discovered by McKenna until early the following morning. The incident left the 75 year old Mrs. McKenna in 'shock' and her husband's account suggests something even more terrible: 'She will never recover from the outrage committed on her'. 'Outrage' has strongly sexual connotations and the description of the ordeal as one from which Mrs. McKenna 'would never recover' does suggest rape. McKenna was in poor financial straits; the comfortable job he had hoped, aged 72, to hold on to for another ten years was gone. He scraped together a living as a 'jobbing gardener'. Yet he did not even mention loss of employment in his original application and was encouraged by SILRA to resubmit the claim. What McKenna wanted the IGC to consider most was the 'torture which I and my wife went through'.[201]

Similarly unmentionable deeds took place in Sopwell Hall, Cloughjordan, in an attack particularly shocking for the callous separation of the two Protestant staff from the Catholic maid, who escaped the abuses of the armed raiders. The youngest son of the second Lord Ashtown, Sopwell's owner Cosby G. Trench was of noble Galway stock (Woodlawn, the family's huge, Italianate mansion in Kilconnell, Co. Galway,[202] was targeted—like many of its kind—during the Civil War).[203] On 14 August 1922, from the safety of his London home, Trench wrote to friend Henry O'Callaghan Prittie (the fourth Lord Dunalley), about the indecent assault of two servant girls employed at the mansion:

> Our troubles are small compared to yours [Dunalley's mansion, Kilboy House, near Nenagh, Co. Tipperary, had been burned down earlier that month], but I send you a true statement of what happened at Sopwell….I need hardly say that had the raid been confined to robbery, I should have thought little of it, as my neighbours have suffered in the same way–but what a prospect for me in one's old age!...We do not intend to return to Sopwell this winter.

Attached was a typed statement—which Trench did 'not want back' because 'the more these things are known in England the better'—outlining events of 29 July 1922: five armed men demanded beds, looted the house and separating the three women from the two men in the house, 'did their best to outrage them'. The two Protestant servant girls were 'bruised all over and nearly exhausted'. The attackers desisted only when promised money. Trench's statement continued:

> Of the party, two of the men can be identified and sworn to and the others are well known and they are all resident in the Parish. Father [blank space] CC came out two days after, and saw the state of the house and the marks of the

[200] A letter of support from a fellow Lodge member, contained in McKenna's IGC file, confirms the story: 'I say with great confidence they indeed have been very loyal people'.
[201] TNA, CO 762/137/6: McKenna, Tipperary.
[202] See Chapter 3 on threatening notices received by Lord Ashtown at Woodlawn.
[203] Hon. Cosby Godolphin Trench (1844–1925); JP, DL, High Sheriff, Tipperary, 1886; formerly Capt. 1st Royal Dragoons; contested North Tipperary (Liberal Unionist), 1892.

> struggle and was greatly horrified. The whole thing had evidently been carefully planned some time beforehand. The Roman Catholic girl [reported to be Miss Flaherty, a kitchen maid] was not molested.[204]

Statements made in court by the housekeeper, Miss Alton, and housemaid Miss Springer, largely corroborated this version of events. The women were able to identify two of the defendants, having met Hough and Mooney at a number of local dances; Flaherty was separated from the other two and escaped unharmed.[205] Press reports were highly charged and condemnatory: in the dead of night, innocent female servants 'in their night attire' were subject to 'savage treatment' by a gang of men 'armed to the teeth'. The 'flying column' of five did not identify themselves as IRA; they ransacked Sopwell because 'they did not want the Republicans to get the arms'.[206] We must wonder whether these men belonged, in fact, to the Free State Army. The attack took place early in the war, which might explain the lack of uniforms. The culprits were also, in the end, treated fairly leniently by the government. Whether soldiers or opportunistic raiders, these farmers' sons were certainly well equipped with rifles, revolvers and a 'naked bayonet'. Breaking into the cellar, they 'filled themselves with drink' before carrying out 'acts as vile as had ever been committed by the Huns in Belgium, with the difference that the crimes….were committed by native Irish upon their compatriots'.[207]

If reports were correct, the raiders had abused not only their national 'compatriots', but local women with whom they had mixed socially. Certainly the religious identities of the servants were known to their attackers and the conscious separation of the Protestant Alton and Stringer, from the Catholic Flaherty, reveal the cruel deliberateness of their actions. Neither the male domestic staff present (the Egan brothers, left in charge in Trench's absence from his 'ancient home'), nor the owner, were harmed in the attack. Violence had been targeted at the most vulnerable. The exposure of female servants to attack was common during the War; many big houses had been abandoned by their owners before they were looted, damaged or burned.[208] Trench, regarded as a generous and dynamic landlord, who had maintained 'good relations' with his tenants and employees,[209] certainly saw this as a one-off act of war—a heinous aberration—rather than a personal attack against him:

> I know it is confined to a small gang, I believe that are well known. The raid has been forcibly denounced by the priests and I have had a very nice letter from Bishop Fogarty. I think the raiders have rather overshot the mark this time; there is general condemnation. The Prov. Govt. have [sic] taken the matter up and I have some hopes (small, perhaps) that the culprits will be arrested and punished.[210]

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[204] National Library of Ireland (NLI), MS 29,810(17): 'Correspondence of Lord Dunalley 1922' (Dunalley Papers, of the Prittie family Lords Dunalley, 1665–1937).
[205] *Irish Times*, 7 Sept. and 7 Oct. 1922.
[206] *Irish Times*, 7 Oct. 1922.
[207] *Irish Times*, 7 Oct. 1922.
[208] Graiguenoe Park, Charles Clarke's Tipperary mansion near Holycross, for example, was occupied by four servant girls on the night it was burned, 28 February 1923. See *The Nationalist and Munster Advertiser*, 3 Mar. 1923.
[209] *Irish Times*, Obituary, 10 Dec. 1925.
[210] NLI, MS 29,810.

While it 'pained' the judge to sentence 'men of their class, under the circumstances which had been disclosed', severe penalties were handed out by the Dublin court. Still, there is offered some degree of absolution for the perpetrators, in the suggestion that the prevailing wartime conditions—the 'dreadful times' that had forced Trench from Sopwell—account for the men's crimes. Appeals for leniency were made for the young men who had up to that point 'borne a good character'. It was hoped that 'when the country settled down', some 'mitigation of the penalties might be considered possible'. King, Downes and Mooney were sentenced to ten years' penal servitude. Hough who had, it was alleged, remained outside the room where the attacks took place, received five years'.[211]

Social norms and expectations are certainly challenged during a conflict. Civil wars in particular witness the invasion by males of the usually female-denominated domestic arena. House burning, for example, a viciously destructive yet common tactic, employed during the entire 1919–23 period, directly affected those groups who would otherwise avoid serious violence. Some men, Ryan points out, felt ashamed of turning women and children out and—in the words Louisa Bagwell of Marlfield, Co. Tipperary—making them 'stand and watch the darling old home burn'.[212] Some IRA raiders searching for arms (or a wanted male member of the household) during the War of Independence showed 'courtesy' to the female inhabitants.[213] O'Malley recalled that 'RIC reprisals' in the same period also left 'women and small children' alone. At a lodging house in Rineen, Co. Clare, which they had set on fire, police allegedly helped visitors to remove their luggage, although 'the men of the house, who had been drawing water to the blaze, had to hide from them'; 'it's men we want tonight', said the officers, 'we're out for blood'.[214] Civil War arson attacks were often accompanied by a more polite warning and servants, wives and children given (just a few minutes, but enough) time to gather belongings and get out before the fire.[215] Sir John Fox Dillon of Lismullin, a big house in Co. Meath, was visited by some particularly 'courteous arsonists' in 1923. On opening the door to the raiders, the owner was told: '"Sir John, we are very sorry, but we have orders to burn your house."' The IRA 'helped him to remove some of his pictures and some plate and silver'. The family and male servants were kept in a locked room, but the armed men '"assisted the women in removing the property, much of which has been saved."'[216]

Other men may have experienced the 'thrill' of trespassing on female space and rifling through their possessions.[217] During 1919–21, Ryan argues, in the context of a 'guerrilla war fought out in the countryside and isolated villages', women were 'easy targets for frustrated British soldiers and particularly vulnerable to attack'. She contrasts the 'danger and inequality' of the encounter between women dressed in nightclothes (like the Sopwell servants, above) and uniformed, armed (and often apparently drunk) men.[218] The family in flight from the burning house, with no time even to dress properly, is also a powerful motif in accounts of Civil War arson. 'We

[211] *Irish Times*, 21 Oct. 1922.
[212] NLI, MS 32,617 (History of the Bagwell family by Harriet Bagwell); see below and Chapter 2.
[213] Ryan, ''Drunken Tans'', *Feminist Review*, 84.
[214] English and O'Malley (eds.), *Prisoners*, 80.
[215] Lilla Bagwell pulled down the Gainsborough from the drawing room after 'we insisted on their letting us take them out'; see below and Chapter 2 on the burning of Marlfield.
[216] 'IRA's courteous arsonists', in Rathfeigh Historical Society, *A window on the past* (Meath, 1987), 20.
[217] Slim, *Killing civilians*, 238.
[218] Ryan, ''Drunken Tans'', *Feminist Review*, 78, 82–3.

had no one but ourselves', wrote Louisa Bagwell to her mother-in-law, the day after the burning of Marlfield:

> [We had] only ten minutes to dress, with each of us a man in our rooms and they did not want us even to light a candle. The Republicans, we found, had stolen my bag and all the overcoats. Lilla was in bare legs, and we hadn't even a handkerchief; everything has gone–all my rings, pearls, watch.[219]

Still, in a letter 'correcting some details' of a local press report on the fire at Marlfield, Louisa did stress that the arsonists 'offered no personal violence to us in any way' and 'appeared to acquiesce' in the family taking out their personal effects before the house was destroyed.[220]

Contemporary observers of the Land War linked violence with male desires: late marriage during 1871–81, Townshend argues, produced an 'abnormally large group of discontented single men, consigned to the status of 'boys''. The willingness of these young men 'to go 'out' with agrarian bands'—fuelled by 'social inadequacy' and 'sexual frustration'—'may bear some relationship to the persistent cruelty of agrarian outrages' (such as animal maiming).[221] Attacks on the home during the revolutionary period arguably affected women more than the men at whom the violence was purportedly aimed. Reports on raids and burnings used sexualised language to emphasise female vulnerability and suggest the deliberate desecration of the private sphere. Yet violence against the female person was far less common. Ryan's allegedly 'convincing evidence' of widespread attacks and sexual violence on women and girls during 1919–21 is actually based on only a handful of examples. Sarah Benton found no evidence of mass sexual assaults carried out by British troops; rape was 'not a weapon of war'.[222] Female republican sympathisers received humiliating, gendered punishments (like hair cutting),[223] but nothing to match the violent retribution and 'sexually charged torture' served on 'politicised women' by paramilitaries in Central Europe,[224] in the same period.

Klaus Theweleit describes the extreme misogyny ingrained in *Freikorps* culture: in post-World War I Germany, violence against women was fantasised about and celebrated unlike anything recorded in the British Isles.[225] Indeed, besides a few shocking cases, there was no surge of allegations of abuse of women from Munster, following the Civil War. Some centres of conflict, like the Balkans, see a repeated resorting to rape—a familiar weapon since the wars of 1912–13, the 'degradation and molestation' of women played a 'unique role' in the Serbian conquest and 'ethnic cleansing' of Bosnia in 1992. Camps were constructed for the express purpose of sexual torture and rape served genocidal aims successfully in places like Prijedor.[226] Women did suffer in the Irish Civil War, just as most modern conflicts (since World War I) see a disproportionately greater number of non-combatants than soldiers injured or killed. But while this context of 'systematic involvement' of the civilian

[219] NLI, MS 32,617.
[220] *Clonmel Chronicle*, 13 Jan. 1923.
[221] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland*, 113.
[222] Ryan, ''Drunken Tans'', *Feminist Review*, 74.
[223] Ryan, ''Drunken Tans'', *Feminist Review*, 83
[224] Gerwarth, 'The central European counter-revolution', *P&P*, 203–5.
[225] K. Theweleit, *Male fantasies: women, floods, bodies, history*, vol. 1 (Minneapolis, 1987).
[226] A. Stiglmayer (ed.), *Mass rape: the war against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, x–xi, 54, 86, 206.

population leads in some places to attacks on women as a 'conscious military strategy',[227] sexual assault has never been made a wartime tactic in Ireland.

Conclusion

Analysis is naturally shaped by the evidence available: in terms of the compensation material, this thesis draws chiefly on claims submitted under the Damage to Property (Compensation) Act (1923). These un-catalogued files still exist, while the records of the Free State's Personal Injuries Committee, appointed in April 1923 to consider injuries to the person (and claims from the dependents of those who had died), do not survive.[228] There are hundreds more stories of burned out houses, stolen vehicles and damaged lands to draw on, than there are accounts of murder and maiming. Still, the sheer weight of numbers aside, the destruction of private belongings, public buildings and infrastructure was a powerful tactic; material damage to property during the war probably exceeded £30 million.[229] O'Higgins' descriptions of 'local turbulence' hint at acts of vandalism committed out of malice, or on a whim.[230] The republicans' 'War of Destruction' was actually highly planned and had a clear objective: 'to show the people that the Free State Government is unable to function'.[231] It was 'part of the tactics of the irregulars to do as much destruction as possible'.[232]

Detailed instructions left the Headquarters of the Third Tipperary Brigade, on 19 October 1922, for example, on making roads impassable (laying mines, digging trenches, creating obstructions with trees or stones). Dozens of compensation claims filed against the Free State and British Governments relate to the specific damage caused by republicans building roadblocks.[233] The destruction was incessant: 'Lieutenant Engineers' were ordered to 'see that all telephone and telegraph lines in your area are cut, and if repaired they should be cut again as soon as possible'.[234] On 23 January 1923, 'Battalion C/Cs' in Tipperary were told 'to collect immediately all picks, crow-bars and sledges available in their areas and to dump same in a safe place'. These—along with 'one large wrench suitable for removing railways rails'—were to be used in the attack on the network. The practical disruption caused by the wrecking of roads and rail was a tactical coup for republicans.

The anti-Treaty IRA certainly waged a costly war and succeeded, for a time at least, in undermining the authority of the new government in Munster. The insurgents did not utilise lethal violence against the person, with equal efficiency and regularity, to coerce and control the populace. Still, not all non-Army fatalities can be accounted for as the collateral damage of an intense and localised war. An exploration of the death and serious injury of the unarmed and those unable to offer physical resistance at the time of their attack raises important issues of civilian identity and draws out patterns in the performance of, and motivations for, violence in Munster, 1922–23.

'Civilians: definition and discussion' (Section i) shows that the common assumption that—bar a few misguided and violent rebels—the vast majority of the

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[227] Stiglmayer (ed.), *Mass rape*, 63.
[228] See Section i, this Chapter.
[229] D.J. O'Sullivan, *The Irish Free State and its Senate* (London, 1940), 115.
[230] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland*, 366.
[231] IMA, CW/OPS/3/C.
[232] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 21 July 1922.
[233] See for example: NAI, 392/362: O'Grady, Limerick (Records of the Ministry of Finance, Un-catalogued compensation files: Series 392 (Limerick), 401 (Tipperary), 402 (Waterford)); NAI, 392/20: James Teskey, Limerick: Teskey claimed 'the Irregulars were in the District and were continually knocking the trees and wall across the road'.
[234] IMA, Captured Documents, Lot 125, A/1115.

Irish population supported the Treaty and the (often draconian) restoration of order by the new government is not wrong, but is simplistic. Free State Army reports highlight the difficulties in telling friend from enemy. Local case studies complicate the notion of a passive, homogenous public subject to indiscriminate 'Irregular' violence. Desire for respite from the disruption afflicting communities like Clonmel, Co. Tipperary, and Dungarvan, Co. Waterford, is palpable in press reports and compensation claims. Yet support for the republicans was not insignificant and varied according to geography, local leadership, personal ties and mercenary motives.

Open conflict and battles in the street lasted just a couple of months, but the impression from the sources available is that death and injury by gunshot wound remained the most common cause of death and injury, as republican sniping, ambushes and a policy of kidnap, trial and execution (of unarmed civilians, as well as off-duty soldiers), continued into 1923; see Section ii.a: 'Killing and wounding: Armed or unarmed?'. Press attention focused on personal tragedies. The 'mean tactics' of the Irregulars—and in particular the shooting of disbanded and defenceless ex-RIC and British Servicemen—were condemned as unfair and illegitimate. However, Section ii.b, on the 'Performance' of killing and wounding, has suggested that while some incidences of violence against the person took a less ritualistic and more intimate form (attacks on female servants in the home; the savage beating of a railway policeman at his place of work), the performance of violence remained important. Rituals included the labelling of the corpse; notices pinned to the body assigned political meaning to an individual death, warning the community left behind not to follow in the deceased's traitorous footsteps. The battle for information and allegiance was bitterly fought. Murder—and its particular performance within the local community—punished those who betrayed the republican cause. High profile Munster republicans, like O'Malley and Breen, contrasted their idea of a fair fight—of carrying out killing like a proper army—with a Free State lacking in military and moral authority. The anti-Treaty IRA did not utilise the break down in law of order to perpetuate unfettered violence against civilian society to the same gruesome extent as in Central Europe during this period. 'Sexual violence' (Section iii), in particular, has concluded that rape never became a weapon of war in Ireland.

Still, this was an intense and often cruel war: there is evidence that victims and perpetrators knew each other and the community's complicity in violence was central to its success in the killing or forcible displacement of the target. Indeed, while the actual bloodshed was carried out by the two armed powers—the Free State and anti-Treaty armies—what the war in Munster does have in common with the conflicts studied by Kalyvas was the opportunity it presented for 'indirect'[235] violence against the person.

[235] Kalyvas, *Logic of violence*, 389, 413.

Conclusion

Violence is the *deliberate* infliction of injury on persons or property. Whether this injury is physical, psychological, life-threatening, or merely a source of harassment and inconvenience, violence is by definition behaviour with *intent*. It cannot be ignored or dismissed as a by-product of related, but distinct, terms such as war or conflict. The objective of this thesis on 'social' and 'political' violence, then, is to tackle the range of violent and intimidating actions that surfaced alongside and away from military encounters between the Free State and republican armies during the Irish Civil War, 1922–23. The Introduction sets out the necessarily broad theoretical parameters: I define 'political violence' as subversive or rebellious acts against the Irish Free State carried out, in the main, by the anti-Treaty IRA. 'Social violence' covers tactics traditionally dubbed 'agrarianism', but is not limited to violence carried out in a rural setting; it includes collective, violent action towards local or legislative change (boycotts in order to undermine Protestants' commercial hold in the towns, as much as cattle driving to demoralise the grazier in order to redistribute his land). These labels are not meant to restrict my analysis and understanding of the war in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford. I do not attempt to categorise each and every violent episode and experience as either 'social' or 'political'. Rather, I seek from the outset form, function and symbolism in the three main categories of social and political violence: arson, intimidation and violence against the person.

The three types of violence, covered thematically in Chapters Two to Four, stand out for different reasons. Chapter Three, on intimidation, is the longest, reflecting the sheer weight of the compensation evidence: perhaps unsurprisingly, most of the 2018 claims I studied concern non-lethal violence and, in particular, damage to personal property (other than house burnings) or other financial losses associated with boycotts. 'The majority of claims presented to the Committee', notes the IGC in its final report, 'related to loss of farming profits'.[1] Indeed, what comes across powerfully in the compensation claims made to both Britain and the Free State is the chaos reigning in many local communities: O'Higgins speaks derisively of 'local turbulence',[2] but, in Munster at least, the 'War of Destruction' succeeded well into 1923 in 'showing the people that the Free State Government is unable to function'.[3] Waterford was not a safe place in which to own a bicycle or motorcar. Farmers in Limerick in particular had to be wary of damage to their outbuildings and of the outright seizure of their lands. Material damage, like any form of violence, was deliberate and malicious.

For such a highly destructive and symbolic act, arson was also prevalent, accounting for 18% of compensation claims made for injuries sustained during the Civil War in County Limerick, 17% in Tipperary and 12% in Waterford.[4] Archival limitations mean that a similarly statistical survey of violence against the person is, unfortunately, not possible,[5] but the strong impression from the compensation

[1] The National Archives (TNA), CO 762/212: 'End of Committee Report' (Records of the Colonial Office, Records of the Irish Office, Irish Grants Committee: Files and Minutes).
[2] C. Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983), 366.
[3] Irish Military Archives (IMA), Operation/Intelligence Reports by Command, CW/OPS/3/C.
[4] See Chapter 2.
[5] See Introduction and Chapter 1 on archival issues: while the Free State's (albeit un-catalogued and difficult to quantity) Damage to Property compensation files survive, Personal Injury claims do not.

evidence available, as well as from other government, military and press reports, is that murder and maiming were used far less frequently by republicans to undermine the authority of the new government, or to coerce and control the populace for the purpose of other social and economic change. Quantifying violence, in any real, mathematical sense, is a difficult task: the number of houses burned during the war, for example, can be recorded with some precision. It is more difficult to pinpoint prolonged campaigns of intimidation, each of which creates an atmosphere but is not recorded as an individual incident. It is, further, impossible to enumerate those attacks about which victims did not come forward, even to the well-publicised and generally sympathetic compensation bodies.

Still, while the *frequency* of the act in question cannot always be charted with precision, its *function* is much clearer. No death, assault, fire, or other threatening encounter should be dismissed automatically as collateral damage of an intense and localised war. What all three thematic chapters conclude with some conviction is that different violent and threatening acts served particular functions and, connected with this, targeted particular groups of victims (identified by their religion, political allegiance, economic status and gender). Violence served a dual purpose during the Civil War. The first key function of arson, intimidation and violence against the person was to regulate community relations and to purge unwanted elements from Munster. Given the nature of the sources, this has been a story of victims. The great advantage of the under-researched compensation claims, introduced in detail in Chapter One, is that they capture otherwise unrecorded episodes and experiences of violence. The perspectives of perpetrators, by contrast, are nowhere recorded in comparable detail (though republican memoirs, from the likes of O'Malley, Barry and O'Donnell, do offer some insight into the mindset of armed actors during wartime). It is not my intention to tell another tale of the 'plight of the Protestants' or of the 'decline of the big house'. However, while I excluded from my methodology preconceived categories relating to religion and political alignment, the unavoidable trend that emerges is one of minority persecution.

Harriet Bagwell (Senator John Bagwell's mother) recalled Co. Tipperary in the early 1920s:

> Every man went in fear of his neighbour and the plight of Protestants living in lonely farms and cottages, of whom there were many in that country, was pitiable.[6]

Bagwell's words capture the tensions, between Southern Irish Protestants and the Catholic majority, which, Heather Crawford argues, remain to this day:

> The sheer durability of this underlying current of something that is difficult to name but which could perhaps best be described as an alienating sensation of lack of safety, a 'strangeness'…is remarkable.[7]

Given, then, the deep-seated, almost subconscious, nature of inter-denominational resentments, it is vitally important to highlight the discrepancy between the 'fair treatment' of Protestants from a legal perspective (the Free State constitution guaranteed religious freedom to all minorities) and their lived experience.[8] Ireland did

[6] National Library of Ireland (NLI), MS 32,617 (History of the Bagwell family by Harriet Bagwell).
[7] H.K. Crawford, *Outside the glow: Protestants and Irishness in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 2010), 3.
[8] Crawford, *Outside the glow*, 9.

not witness the state-sanctioned 'ethnic cleansing' that haunted Central and Eastern Europe around this time. The swift and substantial decline in the Protestant population, as marked in Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford, as in other Southern counties,[9] did not represent an organised 'expulsion'. The Free State Government reserved the use of violence and repressive legislation for the anti-Treaty army wreaking havoc in the counties, and official records show an administration at pains to appear fair in their treatment of Protestants. However, analysis of the local dynamics of war in Munster shows that the Free State's conciliatory rhetoric of early 1922 was not turned into action. Protestants were not murdered by the state or by angry Catholic mobs, but they were driven out by more subtle, intimidatory tactics.

Chapter Three, which explores the dichotomy between voluntary migration and enforced flight, reveals that boycotts of Protestant-owned shops and businesses successfully weakened the minority's commercial hold on an area, particularly in communities where the non-Catholic population and influence was strong (such as Lismore, Co. Waterford; the harassment and boycotting of Willie Roe, a Methodist grocer from the town, was shocking, but not atypical).[10] Threatening letters, many issued on behalf of the anti-Treaty IRA, made specific threats against the Protestant community. The compensation evidence certainly suggests that perpetrators knew the denominations of their victims. Attacks on Protestant institutions and religious personnel leave even less room for doubt; see Chapters Two and Four on the burning of rectories and a Protestant Young Men's Association pavilion, and the capture of a Church of Ireland clergyman, respectively.

That is not to say that Catholics were exempt from targeted violence, as the hundreds of small farmers and Loyalist ex-soldiers and constables from Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford testified. While in reality most of those helped were Protestants, pressure groups and support agencies such as the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA) and Irish Claims Compensation Association (ICCA) served a particular kind of 'Loyalist', defined by their 'suffering' as much as by their religion or politics. Ex-Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and Servicemen and their families, even those with ostensibly tenuous business or social links with the British administration, were intimidated and ultimately punished for their past allegiances (houses and crops were burned; hotels that had served the troops were boycotted; many could not continue to live in Munster). Identity politics were certainly complex during the Civil War: Catholic ex-constable James Coogan (Chapter Three) felt his 'right' to live in his 'own country' was under threat; prominent Protestant, traditionally Unionist, big house owners Keane and Bagwell (Chapter Two), were excluded from the IGC's definition of 'British Loyalist' for accepting the role of Senator in the Free State.

Indeed, the currency of a range of identity labels in use during the war—'Protestant', 'Loyalist', 'grazier', 'spy', 'Stater', 'traitor'—suggests an urgency within the community to define self and other, friend and enemy, during the violent transition from British rule to Irish independence. In tracking violence against the person, Chapter Four, in particular, shows how brutally (and even literally, in the practice of tying notes to corpses) these labels were stamped on victims, and how competing loyalties were contested in Civil War Munster. The death and serious injury of the unarmed and those unable to offer physical resistance at the time of their attack raises, first of all, important issues of civilian identity: the common assumption

[9] See Chapter 1.
[10] See Chapter 3.

that, bar a few misguided rebels, the vast majority of the Irish population supported the Treaty and the restoration of order by the new government is simplistic. Support for the republicans took many forms and as important as any practical help or supplies offered (or simply taken from) civilians, was the trust of the people: information about enemy forces when required; silent complicity in violent actions the rest of the time. For Stathis Kalyvas, 'malicious denunciation'—civilians informing or 'snitching' on their (local or personal) enemies, by passing information to armed forces—is the main motor for violence in civil war. The war in Munster also provided opportunities, for unarmed civilians, for 'indirect' violence; the evidence shows that both sides struggled to control the flow of intelligence and in some cases the information used to make violence happen came from civilians linked to the victims. However, Kalyvas' theories cannot be applied unquestioningly to Ireland; the Irish Civil War was far less protracted and bloodthirsty than the Greek conflicts at the heart of Kalyvas' important study. I suggest, too, that the overarching conflict over the Treaty, and important national questions of identity and loyalty, motivated local acts of violence more often than Kalyvas—who argues that violence becomes 'an end in itself rather than a means to a political ends'[11]—would concede.

The second key function of social and political violence during the Irish Civil War concerns not those who were chased away, but what was left behind. Land is a powerful motif in this thesis. The destruction of the big house, by arson (brought to life in Chapter Two), reclaimed the Irish landscape from the Planter. The assault on the landlord was perhaps to be expected and thanks to land purchase legislation was already well underway in the counties I study.[12] However, the fires that razed some of Munster's finest mansions to the ground were the final, symbolic step in dismantling the old order. The often unsympathetic handling of the claims of landlords and the contrasting use of discretion by both governments in what were perceived as more worthy cases involving small farmers, also reveals broader shifts in state attitudes. The Free State Government in particular remained mindful of its duty to the landless and rural poor. These priorities were informed, I argue, by the reality of social violence on the ground in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford: haystack and outhouse burning (the most common category of arson attack in all three counties), land seizures, cattle driving and harassment turned the new government's attention to local grievances in the first place, and where the Free State's Land Act (1923) did not go far enough, intimidation forced redistribution outside the official channels. Violence was targeted against those who had recently acquired land, or held large pastures; the medium-sized farmer and grazier, in turn, jealously guarded their property. Animal maiming—of which there are some brutal examples from this period—was used to settle personal vendettas over trespass and class rivalries within farming.

It is important to place the Irish Civil War in perspective. I chart, in this thesis, the wide range of harmful actions that combined to frighten and isolate victims, over a period of weeks, months or years. By its nature murky and hard to define, a threatening atmosphere was created in the communities I study, where a violent undercurrent could become explicit if certain social and political codes were transgressed. What this thesis is not, by contrast, is a tale of prolific death and gruesomeness. Some instances of violence against the person undoubtedly took a less ritualistic, more intimate form: the perpetrators of the savage beating of a railway

[11] S.N. Kalyvas, *The logic of violence in civil war* (Cambridge, 2006), 58–61.
[12] See Chapter 3, Section v: 'Land: a historical and historiographical problem'.

policeman in Waterford and indecent assault of two servant girls in Sopwell House, Co. Tipperary, were known to the victims in each case. The performance of violence was extremely important to the republicans, but the shooting of disbanded constables and off-duty soldiers undermines the anti-Treaty army's claims to propriety. Still, the distinction between the victim and his civilian relatives was generally maintained. The anti-Treaty IRA did not utilise the breakdown in law and order to carry out unfettered violence against women, children and the wounded, as did paramilitary groups in Central Europe after World War I. Rape never became a systematic tactic in Ireland. Neither was animal maiming, fairly common during the war, matched by the mutilation of human bodies. Animals and private property bore the brunt of the severest actions.

In identifying form, assessing function and reflecting on the symbolism of social and political violence, in Munster during 1922–23, I follow the example of analysts of conflicts from across the globe who—like Hannah Arendt before us—see the importance of treating violence as a 'phenomenon in its own right'.[13] The Irish Civil War, it becomes increasingly clear, cannot be understood in terms of conventional military encounters. I engage with the strategies of the two armed forces, attempt to gauge official attitudes towards violence and place death and destruction in Cos. Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford in an international context. However, what emerges is not a straightforward tale of rebellious republicans in conflict with a stable (and morally irreprehensible) independent Irish state. Violence was not the sole preserve of the 'Irregulars'. Arson, intimidation, murder and assault surfaced in labour disputes, in conflicts over land, in sectarian and anti-Loyalist attacks and were utilised across Munster to settle personal, local and historical scores. Indeed, the significance of my research—and where this thesis fits with the collection of local-historical scholarship now available on the topic—is in the characterisation of the Irish Revolution as an intra-community, as much as an inter-state, conflict. Overlaying and interacting with the familiar, political and military battle (ruling British state vs. imagined Irish republic), in other words, was a social, cultural and religious war. Including my doctoral research, detailed studies have been made of the struggle for independence in Cos. Clare, Cork, Longford, Derry, Dublin, Mayo, Tipperary, Limerick, Waterford, Wexford, Sligo and Monaghan.[14] Together, these histories speak of 1916–23 as a process of establishing the kind of country independent Ireland would become, of deciding on the essence of Irishness. Few have yet claimed, with the conviction of Hart, that sectarianism was 'embedded in the vocabulary and the syntax of the Irish revolution'.[15] Yet who you were clearly mattered; personal identities and loyalties were violently put to the test. During this process of definition and re-definition, of Irish identity formation, the 'confessional dimension' proved particularly inflexible.[16] To be Protestant in Munster, during the Civil War, was to be labelled "privileged", "British" and to be tarred with bad memories of, and assumptions about, the old regime—it was to be deemed less Irish than the majority of the Free State.

The local studies—and my research—thus illuminate the issues and experiences ignored by conventional histories of the Revolution. The civilian perspective on war is at the heart of this thesis and preserved in the thousands of compensation claims made to the British and Irish Governments are many untold

[13] H. Arendt, *On Violence* (London, 1970), 35.
[14] By Fitzpatrick, Hart, Coleman, Augusteijn, Farry and Dooley; see Bibliography.
[15] P. Hart, *IRA at war, 1916–1923* (Oxford, 2003), 240.
[16] Crawford, *Outside the glow*, 3.

stories. From Herbert Sullivan, the Protestant gentleman farmer forced out of Ireland for supplying milk to British soldiers during World War I, to Rachel Walker, the impoverished constable's widow who endured armed raids on her home and ostracism by the local community. From owners of picturesque mansions and cherished local landmarks (Rapla House, Graiguenoe Park and Gardenmorris), to 'needy' claimants such as Protestant stationmaster Edward Scales, treated generously by both governments after he was made homeless by the burning of his workman's cottage. From George Brophy, an ex-British Serviceman kidnapped and killed far from home, to Catholic 'big house' gardener and "Convicted Spy", Thomas Brennan, whose body was publicly dumped (with a threatening notice attached) for the local community to see. By bringing to light these largely unexplored victim accounts of violence, this thesis underlines the general importance of the non-combatant's perspective in war and the value of the dedicated study of violence as a field distinct from military history. It captures, too, the particular and complex questions of loyalty and identity—facing armed actors and officials, as well as civilians—that beset the violent and chaotic establishment of independent Ireland through its Civil War.

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