

Embedding integration: How European integration splits mainstream parties.

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Abstract

While newly contested issues connected with internationalism, such as European integration and migration, have become more politically salient, much of the literature sees these as largely the domain of ideologically extremist and challenger parties. By contrast, building on work by Kriesi et al, this paper argues that international issues are far more embedded in party stances across the left-right spectrum than the niche and extremist models or Kriesi et al suggest. Accordingly, we develop a typology for categorising parties according to their stances on left-right ideology and their positions on integration. Our analysis employs expert surveys on the stances of all electorally significant parties conducted in 24 European countries in 2013. The results have important implications for understanding the impact of international issues on how parties now appeal to voters.

1. Introduction

To what extent are international issues reshaping European party systems? In particular, are these issues becoming embedded the stances of mainstream parties, in what ways and with what implications? These are the questions we address in this paper.

Literature on European party competition has for some time accepted that issues are structured along both an economic left-right dimension and a libertarian-authoritarian one (Marks et al 2006) or some fusion of the two (Kitschelt 1994). There has also been recognition that new issues, such as European integration and migration, have become more politically salient but these are often viewed as largely orthogonal to the main dimensions (Brug and van Spanje 2009) as well as highly disruptive to existing party alignments (Meguid 2005; Mair 2000; Hix and Marsh 2007). In line with these perspectives, much recent literature that deals with these international issues has focused on the role of ‘challenger’ parties and their entrepreneurial leaders who seek to make their parties politically relevant by their appeal to votes almost exclusively on these new international questions (Meguid 2005; Lynch and Whitaker 2012; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). Much of that literature has concentrated in turn on the rise of ‘populist’ or ‘radical’ right wing parties (Norris 2005; Mudde 2007). In short, international issues from this perspective have largely been treated as extraneous to the main dimensions of party competition (Meyer and Wagner 2013), the terrain of niche and challenger and/or extremist parties, with party stances on integration best described as an inverted u-shape, with opposition found at the far left and right of the ideological spectrum and support in the centre (Hooghe et al 2002; Marks et al 2006).¹

¹ At most points in the rest of the paper we prefer the term challenger party to the often used ‘niche’ party concept which frequently denotes a party that competes on only one dimension, normally a new and orthogonal one. Clearly, this is an important subject in its own right. However, the evidence that we uncover in this paper does not point to niche parties in this sense. We therefore focus on new parties that have entered the political arena and may seek to disrupt political space. Again, our results do not speak to that conclusion.

Rather than asking “For any given value of left-right, how integrationist is a party?”, however, we address the issue of how European integration connects with party stances across a range of issue dimensions. So, we ask: “For a given combination of left-right and integration, where does a party stand on economic left-right, cultural issues, and so on?” In particular, is there a systematic divide emerging within left and right, including the mainstream, in which their stances on integration shape differences on a range of policy dimensions. We do this in order to show that the split within the left and right over integration connect systematically to distinct stances on domestically grounded policy divisions. In pursuing this approach, we extend an argument developed by Kriesi et al. (2006) that discusses how integration has been embedded into existing economic and cultural dimensions of party competition. However, while Kriesi and his collaborators clearly recognize the dilemmas for mainstream right *and* left parties, they also expected empirically a “strengthening of peripheral political actors, who tend to adopt a ‘losers’ programme” (Kriesi et al. 2006, p. 928). By contrast, this paper argues that international issues have been much more integrated into the programs of left and right *mainstream* parties across issue dimensions than the challenger and extremist models suggest. Accordingly, with Kriesi et al we argue that contemporary party competition can be usefully understood in terms of the embedding of international issues, in which international questions play a significant defining role *within* left and right camps. Thus, we suggest to consider viewing parties in terms of a combination of their domestic issue stances on left-right ideology *and* their stances on international questions. From the perspective we advance here, international issues do not comprise simply a set of new challenges that remain unintegrated into mainstream party competition and are the preserve of challenger and extreme parties but rather are a constitutive part of the issue space in which European party politics as a whole now occurs. We show this by not only documenting that there are pro and anti-integrationist camps within the mainstream left and right but also by illustrating that these connect in meaningful ways to other, domestic issue stances. In short, unlike the approach that considers the linear relationship between

the left-right and EU integration, we proceed in an alternative way, considering the embedding of EU integration in a number of salient dimensions of political conflict

Our approach speaks directly to the central question of this special issue, namely the nature of the dimensional structure of contemporary party competition. By emphasising the ‘integration of integration’ into the positions adopted by parties on left and right across both economic and cultural dimensions, we are distancing ourselves from literature that views Europe as a distinct dimension to party competition. As modest shorthand we refer to the manner in which integration integrates into left and right as the emergence of ‘integration families’, simply because we expect – and find some growing evidence – that international issues begin to cut across existing party families and, importantly, become systematically linked to domestic issues within each family. Our bigger point, however, is to emphasise that integration is a factor affecting the whole of the left-right spectrum. Rather than redefine the ideological space on which parties compete, we argue that integration appears to have sharpened and separated parties *within* left and right on existing dimensions.

There is one issue dimension over which we expect particularly sharp divisions within each camp, namely on the stances that parties take towards the performance of national democratic institutions. This, we argue, is because those on the left and right who oppose integration have reasons to believe that national institutions have been hollowed out by the transfer of power to transnational actors and the loss of political and economic control. We expect therefore that parties – and not only challengers or ideological extremists – that oppose integration appear much more likely than integration supporters to take a negative view of democratic performance domestically. The manner in which integrations embeds into left and right therefore provides a new element to understanding ‘anti-establishment’ and ‘populist’ politics and how it is encroaching into the mainstream.

Our empirical analysis is based on expert surveys conducted by the authors (name withheld) in 24 European countries in 2013 that included all electorally significant parties. We supplement

these analyses with a longitudinal perspective on the basis of Chapel Hill surveys. Our findings show first the explanatory value of conceptualising parties by both left-right ideology and stances on integration. What is more, we also find that parties on both the nationalist left and right are strongly critical of national democratic institutions and, especially, of the EU as well. In short, nationalist stances appear to have become associated with institutional criticisms.

2. Theorising international issues in party competition

We start from a central and well-supported assumption of the importance of the concept of left and right ideology to how parties present themselves and how voters make political decisions in complex choice conditions. While the precise context of left and right ideologies may vary across time and space (Evans and Whitefield 1998), this does not diminish the importance of ideology as a key organising concept in the study of parties. Left and right are central to the ways that parties and voters alike classify themselves (Brady 2011), and to how parties brand themselves and package policies (Lupu 2013; Zachmeister 2006). By positioning themselves in left-right space, parties thereby allow voters to simplify the complexities of policy into a relatively simple heuristic of political choice (Downs 1957).

At the same time, there is widespread agreement that the nature of European party competition has altered over recent decades. While it remains the case that this redistributive dimension is the most important to party competition in Europe (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012), new identity and lifestyle issues, around women's and later gay rights, personal autonomy and the choice or rejection of 'unconventional lifestyles' have reshaped the conflict space in advanced democracies (Inglehart, 1990; Dalton 2015). Over time, many parties developed connections between economic and cultural issues that largely fused economically left with culturally liberal positions and pro-market with culturally conservative positions (Kitschelt, 1994; Knutsen 2006). The literature therefore points either to a two-dimensional structure (economic and

cultural) or to some degree of fusion of the two into a one-dimensional left-liberal/right-conservative space.

This prior shape to domestic conflict space formed the backdrop against which international crises emerged, from the financial crash, the Euro crisis, to the migration crisis, to Brexit. For much of the pre-crisis era, international issues were not associated with divisions over domestic issues because dominant mainstream parties staunchly supported integration. Accordingly, for parties on the left, internationalism could be sold as supportive of a social market and control of capital, as well as being culturally liberalising (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002). For parties of the right, internationalism could be sold as a means of consolidating and liberalising the market system, including the labour market, and developing trade, while they simultaneously appealed to conservative family and lifestyle values as a means of preserving social cohesion in the face of economic change. While such parties of left and right therefore differed in the details of how the international system should operate and what it would deliver, both significantly converged on its neo-liberal foundations: international integration was supposedly beneficial to their core constituents. Nowhere was this more evident than in the 'permissive elite consensus' on the European Union. We also see a strong permissive consensus in the East regarding the value of EU accession across much of the political spectrum (Vachudova 2015).

Given the consensus among the mainstream in their pro-EU stances, most of prior analyses suggest that competition over integration issues remained largely unconnected to the main economic and cultural domestic issue positions (van der Brug and Spanje 2009; Albright 2010) of left and right. From this vantage point, anti-integration policies were the purview of niche parties that competed solely on this issue or ideologically extreme parties (Wagner 2012; Wagner and Meyer 2013), whereas mainstream parties were largely portrayed as a bulwark for Europe's integration against its critics. Hence, prior studies have found a u-shaped relationship with sceptical positions at the ideological extremes (Marks et al 2006). In contrast to this view, however, some analysts did

propose that integration issues theoretically can become “embedded” (Kriesi et al. 2006, p. 924) into the domestic conflict dimensions *within* mainstream parties mainly on the cultural dimension by associating the pro-globalization stance with cultural liberalism and the anti-integration stances with cultural conservatism (Kriesi et al. 2006; Prosser 2016). Empirically, however, Kriesi et al. still expected that the international dimension would continue to pit “peripheral” versus mainstream parties.

However, while we recognise that there are strong reasons for pro-integration parties to remain committed to such stances for reputational and strategic reasons (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016), there is reason to doubt that opposition to internationalisation will stay the preserve of only extremist or challenger parties nearly a decade into the economic and other crises in Europe. Since there is clearly a growing number of Eurosceptical voters, office-seeking mainstream parties should have incentives to pursue them (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Anecdotally, we find increasingly clear evidence of this in cases such as the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom or Fidesz in Hungary or PiS in Poland. If that is the case, we argue, the inverted u-shaped relationship between left and right may no longer provide a fully satisfactory picture of how left and right connect with integration. Moreover, while there are clear reasons to believe that integration will embed with cultural issues, especially after the economic and Euro crises, it is plausible that integration will also become embedded in economic debate. These possibilities speak to ways in which integration should become connected to the main dimensions of party competition rather than remaining orthogonal to it. Moreover, these issues should intrude into the stances of mainstream left and right parties and push parties within each ideological camp to make choices about their core positions on economic and cultural issues that accord with the stances they take on integration. We should in short see differences within left and right camps on core issues that are associated with Europe, not just among peripheral and extreme but the mainstream as well.

We therefore think it is useful to conceive of pro- and anti-integration parties of extreme and mainstream left and right. However, this picture of ‘integration of integration’ into left and right, including we argue the mainstream of both, does not fully capture the complex impact of Europe on parties. We argue that with the growing salience of international integration to party competition, we are also witnessing greater contestation and disagreement over the performance of national and European institutions (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017). While much of the literature on ‘critical parties’ has focussed on the role of populism, we argue integration has a broader impact on party competition as a whole, again including the mainstream. With the collapse in the ‘permissive consensus’, stances on the performance of political institutions have become linked to debates over integration. Anti-integration stances may have become associated with a more negative view about national institutions among parties that are opposed to what these institutions have provided in policy outcomes that they oppose – either on the economic or cultural dimensions. Here, parties that have been systematically denied regime access or control of governing institutions seek to blame undesirable policy outcomes on these institutions. Importantly, while much of the literature and public debate about this issue focuses strongly on the rise of populist parties, again often framed from a challenger or extremist perspective, as we have argued elsewhere (name withheld), we see no reason (or evidence) that negative stances regarding national institutions are the preserve of challenger and/or extremist parties only. Thus, to the degree that we see a split within left and right over integration stances emerge and how these embed differences on economic and cultural issues, we may well see also that the same camps differ in their evaluations over how well institutions work. For the left anti-integration parties, national institutions no longer function to protect welfare or regulate corporate power or to secure some of the left’s fundamental aims of redistribution and social justice. For right anti-integration parties, these institutions fail to protect national culture and identity and so undermine some of the right’s fundamental aims for sovereignty. So, while these critical parties may demand greater national control, they are likely to be highly critical of current national democratic practice. In sum, integration we argue has indeed

been embedded in the main dimensions of left-right/liberal-conservative divisions, shifting parties within each camp to somewhat diverging positions.

Accordingly, table 1 illustrates various theoretical possibilities of how parties across the ideological spectrum may respond on the main dimensions and on a potential new one. The left-most column lists four important policy domains that are either historically established (economy, cultural issues) or that have recently become more pressing (migration, regime evaluations). If our argument is correct, we expect that these issues divide parties *within* the “left” and “right” into distinct camps based on their integration view. To emphasise again, we see strong reasons to believe that the embedding of integration into the stances of parties of left and right will not be restricted to peripheral challenger parties but will extend to include ideologically moderate and mainstream parties as well. That is to say, we would expect that the pro-EU left camp systematically adopts a different position on domestic policies than the anti-EU left. In addition, we would expect the pro-EU right camp to do the same. The summary of our expectations about the stances of each field in Table 1 highlights this logic. We indicate how parties of left and right will broadly share positions on the economy, culture, and migration and how they will likely differ. We also indicate how the emergence of critical positions on national democracy and the evaluations of EU institutions relates to our thinking about these integration stances.

Table 1 about here

Following from this, we outline the following expectations about the positions taken by each ‘integration family’ defined by ideology and views of integration. In each issue dimension, the first expectation regards the relationship between an issue position and left and right; the second incorporates the influence of nationalism on issues stances within the left and the right.

Economy:

1. The economic dimension pits left versus right on economic distribution and organisation regardless of stances on international integration.

1a. Anti-integrationist parties of the left are most extreme on economic issues since they advance their criticism of internationalism in its economic effects; anti-integrationist parties of the right likely adopt a muddy position because they appeal mainly on other issues and seek to win support across social groups that have quite distinct views on the economy.

Culture:

2. The cultural dimension pits a liberal left versus conservative right regardless of stances on international integration.

2a. Within each ideological camp, integrationist parties will take more strongly liberal positions because, on the left, these parties have strongly supported the cultural benefits of liberalism, and on the right, because anti-integrationist parties have sought to play up the liberalism's negative cultural consequences.

Migration:

3. The migration dimension pits left versus right regardless of stances on international integration.

3a. Migration is relatively more strongly supported within each camp by integrationists *even those who are culturally conservative* who have seen it as essential to achieving the benefits of market integration and, among left integrationists, because it also satisfies some social justice concerns; however, it is strongly opposed especially by right anti-integrationists for both economic and cultural reasons; left anti-integrationists are less distinct from other left parties on this issue because they focus their criticism of internationalism on capital rather than labour (or poor migrants).

Performance Evaluations of National and EU institutions:

4. Pro-integration parties see national and EU institutions as broadly delivering their programmes which they have been able to pursue because they had regular regime access, which anti-integration parties have (until very recently in some countries) been denied. Anti-integrationists on the left will be critical because national institutions fail to deliver welfare and regulate corporate power; those of the right see national institutions failing to protect national culture. Both anti-integrationist camps will see EU institutions as responsible for policies that threaten their constituents.

3. The surveys and measurement of ‘integration families’

We test these hypotheses using expert surveys conducted in 24 European nations in 2013 that cover all EU-member-states as of January 1, 2014 (except Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta). Given the significant number of small parties that exist in many party systems, we used two criteria to determine their inclusion in this study: (1) they were represented in a national parliament; and/or (2) they received at least 2% of the national vote in the last election. Overall, the 2013 CEE survey covers 71 parties in 10 EU member-states in CEE; and the WE survey covers 108 parties in 14 countries, for a total of 179 parties in 24 nations.

We recruited experts from a master list of scholars who published a peer-reviewed article or book on her party system in the past ten years. Our search generated a list of names with over 1000 experts. For each country, we aimed to have ten completed questionnaires, which we achieved for most countries. We conducted several analyses following Steenbergen and Marks (2007) and Coma and van Ham (2015) to check whether the variance decomposition of indicators in our expert surveys parallels that found in other expert-surveys. Extensive validation analyses show that our surveys produce empirical patterns that closely match those generated by other data sources.²

² For example, there is a high correlation between the ideological placement of parties in expert surveys and the programmatic perceptions of parties by voters (see Dalton et al. 2011). We also validated the expert surveys with extensive analyses (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012).

Moreover, merging the 2014 Chapel Hill estimates with our 2013 data, we find that, on general left-right ideology, estimates for party positions are virtually identical in the two surveys ($r=.97$). The CHES cultural position indicator (“Gal-Tan”) is also closely related to a cultural issue indicator based on migration, social policies, and civil liberties in our expert surveys ($r=.93$). Finally, we find a strong relationship regarding parties’ position about European integration ($r=.93$). All told, these patterns suggest that these different expert surveys produce broadly identical estimates for party positions. We also in previous published analysis (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012) compared our measures of party position, in particular left-right ideology, with the data produced using a quite different method of assessment, namely the Comparative Manifesto Project. There are reasons to expect some greater degree of differentiation between these two approaches, since the CMP does not measure ideological position directly but rather constructs it out of counts of salience (Dalton and McAllister 2014), while the expert survey measures position directly and explicitly distinguishes it from salience. Nonetheless, comparing the CMP and expert survey ideology measures for 2006/7 across 147 European parties showed $r=0.55$. The CMP measure of support for European integration correlated with the one used here at $r=0.56$. Given the substantially different ways of generating data across these measures, we argue that the pattern is assuring of the general validity of the measures used below.

We start by establishing the initial plausibility that the inverted u-shaped relationship between left-right ideology and integration stances may no longer adequately describe the extent of divergence in the stances of parties across the whole ideological spectrum. Figure 1 shows the bivariate relationship in our 2013 data between left-right and integration, and indeed we do find evidence of an inverted u. However, we also note that the very considerable variation outside the ideological extremes in the extent to which left and right predict integration stances. More than that, there are many observations that are relatively far from the inverted u-curve, especially those in the middle of it. It is this puzzle that we try to explain by moving from the question of

“for any given value of left-right, how integrationist is a party?” to asking “for a given combination of left-right and integration, where does a party stand on econ left-right, cultural issues, and institutional evaluations?” In other words, following our reasoning above, it is the differential ways in which integration gets embedded *within* parties of left and right that helps to explain why so many parties are at such a distance from the u-curve.

Figure 1 about here

To do this, we operationalize our theoretical interests in ‘integration families’ defined by parties’ international positions as we developed above, we first considered party stances on European integration using three measures included in the expert surveys (see the appendix for details on question wording). These measure party positions towards economic, political, and general integration. Since we also asked respondents to indicate the general left-right ideology of parties, with 1 denoting the extreme left and 7 denoting an extreme right, we combine the integration and ideology indicator by dichotomizing the left-right scale at the mid-point; and by trichotomizing the integration scale. We then combined them as follows (again, see the measurement table for more details).

Anti-integrationist right: parties are ideologically right and against integration;

Anti-integrationist left: parties are ideologically left and against integration;

Integrationist left: parties are ideologically left and support integration;

Integrationist right: parties are ideologically right half and support integration;

We have two further categories which we label ‘muddy right’ and ‘muddy left’, that is parties of left and right that do not take clear positions on the integration dimension. Clearly, there are good reasons to investigate such parties as entities in their own right. However, we have less strong priors on how integration will embed among them other than to expect they will be positioned between the integration and anti-integration camps on the issues we analyze and have hypothesized above. The overall distribution of these parties in our survey is reported in table 2.

Table 2 about here

An approach of the sort we are proposing to understanding the role of international issues in contemporary party competition differs from the existing focus on mainstream versus niche/challenger parties, since the latter parties are the ones generally expected to take stances in opposition to integration issues – and often only on integration issues – because it is regarded as weakly connected to the main dimensions of party competition over which mainstream parties dominate. However, if our view is correct, we expect to see integration embedding within mainstream parties and thus to some degree also dividing party families.

Table 3 about here

Accordingly, table 3 cross-tabulates each field defined by internationalism stances with party family. Not surprisingly since our measure incorporates ideological stances, we find considerable overlap between integration and party families (Cramer's $V = .56$). The overlap is most pronounced, gratifyingly, with respect to the anti-integrationist party families on left and right. Parties of the anti-integrationist left are mainly drawn from the Communist, Socialist and Green families (though notably from all three of them). But we also see that parties of the integrationist left may also be drawn from Socialists, Greens, Centrists/Liberals and even one Christian-democratic party, as well as (mainly) from Social-democrats. Similarly, the integrationist right includes Conservative, Christian-democrats, as well as many Centrists and Liberals. Our analytical goal, again, is not to suggest that the concept of party family has no meaning in a domestic context, since party families conceptually are linked to stances on domestic issues. Rather, we suggest that stances on Europe's integration will only imperfectly fit with domestic lines of division and will increasingly play a role in shaping the stances of parties on left and right on these divisions.

In fact, an implicit assumption of our approach is that as stances on international issues begin to cut across lines of party family, we would expect to find that the concept of party family becomes less associated with the positions that parties take on lines of domestic division; while the predictive value of our way of conceptualizing parties by their stances on internationalism becomes increasingly strong. We test this proposition in the analysis shown in table 4, which compares the

adjusted r-squares for the two ways of conceptualizing families when they are regressed on to measures of the main lines of domestic ideological division – on economic distribution, cultural liberalism and conservatism, Gal-Tan, and migration – between 2002 and 2014. (Full results for all the regressions are available in the online Appendix Table 3.) Here we use the longitudinal data available from the CHES expert surveys, so in each year we are analyzing the relationships between issue positions taken by parties, party family, and ‘integration family’ all as measured in the same year. The findings clearly point to the growing value and in some cases in 2014 superiority of the way of sorting parties by integration families rather than party families. This is especially true of the economic dimension, where the predictive value of party family has declined from $r^2=.62$ in 2002 to $r^2=.57$ in 2014, while the value for classifying parties into ‘integration families’ has grown from $r^2=.56$ to $r^2=.68$. Broadly the same picture emerges when we consider Gal-Tan, where the predictive value of integration families has increased dramatically, from .37 in 2002 to .54 in 2014, rivalling the influence of party family; and with regard to both specific cultural issues and especially migration, the international fields appear to out-perform party family as a predictor by 2014. We regard these findings to provide considerable validation to the scheme and its theoretical underpinnings. In short, by 2014, the integration typology substantially structures—even on some dimensions outperforms party families—party positions on domestic issues in ways that make theoretical sense when we interpret their domestic stances not only on the basis of a traditional cleavage framework but also on the basis of the growing relevance of integration issues.

Table 4 about here

4. ‘Integration Families’ and Issue Dimensions

We next turn to the ways in which integration families relate to parties’ positions on a range of other issue dimensions. The goal is to test whether our typology captures the embedding of internationalisation in the mainstream of European party politics. Thus, in line with the theoretical expectations presented in Table 1, we expect parties of the nationalist and internationalist right to take similar views on the many issues when compared to left parties – economy and culture - but to

be quite divergently located on others that reflect the impact of integration on domestic politics— on migration, national and EU institutions. The same will hold true of parties of the left.

To test these hypotheses, we specify a series of models that predict in turn party stances on the economy, on cultural liberalism-conservatism, on migration and evaluations of national democratic institution. Economic stances are comprised by a 7-item scale, with each item ranging between 1 (pro-welfare) and 7 (pro-market). Cultural liberalism is scale comprised 3 items, again with each on a 7-point scale (1= culturally conservative,, 7=culturally liberal. Migration and views of national democratic institutions are single item 7-point scales. Full details of the measures are found in the Appendix.

These models control for key alternative possible explanations discussed above. Namely, we wish to be able to conclude that it is the integration fields that are of relevance, since it is possible that what is driving the variance we observe in the stances that parties take on these issues are the result of other features of parties or country-level differences. We need first, therefore, to introduce country-level as well as additional party-level controls to the analysis. Two contextual characteristics likely impact on the distribution of fields. First, and obviously, the quality of national democratic institutions may incline parties to take more critical stances regarding the quality of national democratic institutions. Countries with poor quality institutions may also give rise to concerns about core elements of liberalism – political and social rights – and high levels of corruption may increase (or undermine) support for redistributive policies. Second, the level of affluence of a country may similarly incline parties to adopt more or less welfare supportive or economically liberal stances or shift parties towards greater support for post-material culturally liberal values. We therefore specify a multilevel multivariate model that controls for these country differences.

Theoretically, we see two main challenges to the usefulness of the concept of integration families that are sorted by left and right and stances on integration. First, we control for the possibility that differences between fields is simply an effect of ideological extremism – in other

words, that the integration families do in fact identify differences in parties within the broad left and right camps but that this is mostly driven by extremism. We examine this by including a dummy variable gauging whether a party is in the left/right most ten percent on the ideology scale. Second, we control for the possibility that differences are the result of the stances taken by new challenger parties that have emerged specifically to compete by taken extreme positions on one or more ideological dimensions. Hence, we also control for both party age and whether a party is a new entrant, defined as having emerged since 2008, to the electoral market after 2008. Together, the variables of extremism, party age and new entrant controls for the mainstream-challenging party dimension in European politics and thus assures that our analysis is able to test directly whether the embedding of integration has indeed resulted in the differentiation that we expect within left and right parties as a whole.

Figures 2-5 about here

The findings in Figures 2-5 show strikingly that the differentiation we expect if the embedding approach has extended to within mainstream parties is robust to the multivariate model specification. Perhaps the most important takeaway, therefore, is that the utility of the concept of integration typology defined by stances on integration and left-right is not removed either by the country controls or by the two main alternative accounts of the differences discussed above. These are not effects simply of ideological extremism or challenger status but are evident even when both of these are taken into account. Indeed, to test further the robustness of the finding against a standard u-shaped extremism account, in which radical right and left parties are the sources of differentiation, we conducted further analysis of each of the four issue dimensions – economy, liberalism-conservatism, migration and national institutions – using the integration families, left-right ideology, the extremism measure as used above, and an additional measure of extremism based on the squared left-right ideology variable as well as the other predictors in the multivariate models. As Table 5 shows, in no case was the extremism term statistically significant.

Left and right continue to strongly define ideological camps on most dimensions; the left as a whole is more left on the economy, more liberal on culture, and more supportive of migration than the right. The scheme we adopt, moreover, shows the ongoing utility of separating the left and right centrist parties on integration stances, since left-muddy are much more like other leftist parties on most dimensions than they are like right ones. However, our scheme also points to the value of understanding integration stances for positions within left and right camp. The more pro-integration the party within each camp, the more likely it is to be more pro-market on the economy, more liberal on culture, and more supportive of migration. These findings are absolutely consistent across these policy dimensions. Anti-integrationist parties are not like one another on any of these dimensions.

There is one issue, however, on which integration typology appear strongly to shape party stances independently of their left-right ideology, namely on the question of the performance of national democratic institutions as well as EU institutions. Here, again controlling for extremism and challenger status, both the anti-integrationist right and especially the left are strongly negative and all other parties are more positive, especially the (right) integrationist ones. As we predicted, since national institutions do not protect the economic agendas of the left or the cultural agendas of the right, so critical parties have emerged in both camps.

7. Conclusions

This paper has built on some previous work, especially by Kriesi and his colleagues, and argued for the need to take international issues as a defining factor in contemporary party competition. Rather than seeing questions such as economic integration, culture, and migration, as challenging but largely orthogonal to the ideological space, we suggest that parties have already systematically incorporated these issues into the politics of left and right. At the same time, integration has had the effect of sharpening divisions within left and right camps on the offerings they present on economic and cultural dimensions.

Our perspective and evidence, however, runs quite counter to much of the literature that points to the orthogonality of integration to one or both of the main lines of political division – the economy and culture – or that integration reframes only the cultural dimension in a new way based on winners and losers from globalization (van der Brug 2009; Prosser 2016). Moreover, our findings suggest a need to move beyond thinking of the relationship between left and right and integration in terms of a u-shaped curve, since the differences we expected theoretically remain even when we control for extremism and new entrant parties as well as party age. Thus, while our analysis therefore largely supports Kriesi’s conceptual expectations, we observe that the sorting of parties on the left and right by stances on integration goes beyond challenger and extreme parties. Rather, it has an impact in shaping the positions of parties across the ideological spectrum.

It is a significant new finding of the paper, however, that the issue of national democratic institutions, emerges as an issue on which the anti-integrationist left and right converge in their evaluations. We argue that this is because pro-integrationist parties have been able successfully to control national institutions for their purposes and thus their opponents have come to see both that these institutions fail to deliver on welfare or cultural defences of nations and that they have been excluded from access to institutions. Those in control in these circumstances can be more easily labelled elites or the establishment. The politicisation of integration on this dimension may be the newest and most contentious aspect of contemporary party competition. We believe therefore that at least some of the public discussion of relationship between anti-integrationist parties of left and right is clarified by this analysis. Take the following stylised (but hopefully accurate) example of the positions of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump in the US presidential campaigns. Both opposed free trade and globalization and were strongly critical of domestic economic and political elites. But Sanders was clearly left in his economic policy, since his criticisms of the international order were mainly economic in character, while Trump’s position was much less rhetorically clear in economic terms and much more based in cultural fears. Anti-integrationists of left and right have quite

different profiles. They do not appear to be fishing in the same pool of voters, except with regard to their strong criticisms of domestic democratic institutions.

Clearly, there are numerous questions emerging from this investigation. We have dealt here with only a few party-level factors associated with each political field. We have also considered the role of national context in a relatively narrow fashion - essentially as controls. However, we expect that there is likely to be considerable influence on the likelihood of party fields emerging in different national contexts. Finally, a clear limitation of our data is that it does not account for more recent developments that have taken place after 2013. However, the eruption of conflict over which stance to take on integration within a number of mainstream parties – in the United Kingdom and Germany most obviously – is strongly suggestive that embedding may have deepened.

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Table 1. General Expectations

		Anti-Integrationist	Integrationist
Left	Economy	Interventionist	Market friendly but pro-welfare
	Culture	Liberal	Strongly liberal
	Migration	Pro-migrant	Strongly pro-migrant
	National Democracy	Critical	Positive
	EU Democracy	Critical	Positive
Right	Economy	Centrist	Strongly pro-market
	Culture	Strongly illiberal	Illiberal
	Migration	Strongly opposed	Supportive
	National Democracy	Critical	Strongly positive
	EU Democracy	Critical	Positive

Table 2. Distribution of 'Integration Families'

	Frequency	Percent
Nat Left	14	7.8
Int left	32	17.9
Muddy left	37	20.7
Muddy right	31	17.3
Int Right	46	25.7
Nat Right	19	10.6
Total	179	100.0

Table 3. Integration typology by party family (Cramer's V = .56*, significant at .000)**

	Nationalist left	Integrationist left	Muddy left	Muddy right	Integrationist right	Nationalist right
Communists	5	0	0	0	0	0
Socialists	4	1	8	0	0	0
Greens	1	7	7	1	0	0
Social Democrats	0	16	13	1	1	0
Centrist/Liberal	1	6	6	4	17	0
Christian Democrats	0	2	1	9	9	1
Conservatives	0	0	2	12	17	5
Nationalists	1	0	0	4	1	13

Table 4. Party Family and Integration Typology as predictors of main lines of domestic divisions

Dependent variable:		2002	2006	2010	2014
Economic redistribution	Party Family	.62	.55	.56	.57
	Integration Typology	.56	.59	.68	.68
Gal-Tan	Party Family	.55	.56	.63	.59
	Integration Typology	.37	.44	.46	.54
Cultural Issues	Party Family		.62	.64	.60
	Integration Typology		.51	.50	.62
Migration	Party Family		.58	.60	.60
	Integration Typology		.57	.54	.66

Source: Chapel Hill expert level data, 2002-2014

Dependent variables: Economic redistribution (Irecon), galTan, cultural issues (civlib_laworder + sociallifestyle) and migration (immigrate_policy).

Note: entries are adjusted r-squares when the dependent variable listed in the left-most column is regressed either on dummies for party family (top row) or dummies for the new integration typology indicator. All regressions also include country dummies. Empty cells means variables are not available.

Table 5. Robustness checks of extremism controlling for ‘integration family’, party age, national corruption, and gdp per capita on issue dimensions as dependent variables. Extreme 10% measure first and squared left-right ideology term second. Mixed effect multi-level regression. Nationalist left = reference category

	Economy		Cultural issues		Migration		National Institutions	
Int left	7.34***	3.39*	1.26	- 3.27***	-.87**	-1.65***	.93*	1.33**
Muddy left	4.98**	2.06	-.58	-2.19*	-.53	-1.70***	.64	.80*
Muddy right	17.19***	2.41	4.87***	-1.18	.94**	-.84	.88*	1.04
Int right	18.99***	5.70**	3.22**	-2.46*	-.10	-1.87***	1.45***	1.65**
Nat right	15.40***	-2.46	7.57***	.64	2.33***	.45	.47	.22
New entrant party	.67	.93	-.95	-.90	-.10	-.11	.00	-.50*
Extremism	-1.51	---	.35	---	.16	---	-.33	---
Left-right scale	---	4.88***	---	1.83*	---	.75**	---	.76*
Left-right scale ²	---	-.06	---	-.02	---	-.04	---	-.08
Party age	.01	.01	-.01	-.10	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.01***
Corruption	.31	.05	-.55	-.56	-.29	-.01	.64*	.57*
Gdp per capita	.00	.00	-.00	-.00	.91	-.00	.00	.00

*** p<.000; ** p<.01; * p<.05

Figure 1, Left-right ideology by integration stance 2013




Figure 2. Party stances on the economy controlling for country characteristics (HDI and Corruption) and for ideological extremism, party age and new entrants.




Figure 3. Party stances on cultural liberalism controlling for country characteristics (HDI and Corruption) and for ideological extremism, party age and new entrants




Figure 4. Party stances on migration controlling for country characteristics (HDI and Corruption) and for ideological extremism, party age and new entrants




Figure 5. Party stances on performance of national and EU democratic institutions controlling for country characteristics (HDI and Corruption) and for ideological extremism, party age and new entrants

