Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia

Journal article

In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have referred to the case of thought insertion as a clear counter example. In this study, we address and refute the claim that episodes of thought insertion represent examples of experiences lacking for-me-ness. We highlight certain unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems that tend to hamper philosophical discussions of thought insertion. Although thought insertion does not involve a lack of for-me-ness, we do argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed for-me-ness. Finally, we offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders and we discuss how a disturbed for-me-ness may be involved in the formation of thought insertion.

Authors: Henriksen, MG; Parnas, J; Zahavi, D

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Journal: Consciousness and Cognition
• Volume: 74
• Article number: 102770
• Publication date: 2019-07-02
• Acceptance date: 2019-06-19
• DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102770
• ISSN: 1053-8100
• Keywords: minimal self; schizophrenia; for-me-ness; consciousness; thought insertion; self-disorders; first-rank symptoms