THE RELATIONS OF THE AMAMPOUDO

AND THE COLONIAL AUTHORITIES

(1830 - 1886)

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ROLE

OF THE WESLEYAN MISSIONARIES

by

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A dissertation submitted for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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South African historiography has tended to follow the Great Trek and to avoid the area between the Kei River and Natal. As a result, hardly any attention has been given to an unspectacular but significant chapter in the story of relations between black and white in the nineteenth century. The purpose of this thesis is to explore this by-way, and to examine the relations of the Amampondo and the Colonial authorities at the Cape and Natal between 1830 and 1886.

For the greater part of this period these relations were governed, nominally at least, by the Treaty of 1844, and an attempt has been made to assess its value as an instrument regulating the dealings of a European power and a native tribe. The Treaty System, of which it formed a part, was the creature of a day. Built up between 1834 and 1844, it was swept away by the Frontier War of 1846 and the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854. It has therefore been necessary to ask why the Mpondo Treaty remained a living force for so many years after its counterparts had been abandoned.

The answer to this question is bound up with the political activities of the Wesleyan missionaries, whose
role in the events of these years was of vital importance. Special consideration has been given to the part they played and this sheds new light upon the vexed question of the missionary influence in South African affairs.

In defining the period, 1830 was selected as the starting point because it marked the beginning of Wesleyan mission work in Pondoland. The original plan was to examine the whole period before Pondoland was annexed to the Cape in 1894, but this proved to be too wide a subject, and 1886 was selected as the terminus ad quem because the Treaty was finally abandoned in that year. It has also been necessary to limit the subject by concentrating upon the dealings of the paramount chiefs with the Colonial Governments. This has meant that the affairs of the western section of the tribe have not been considered in any detail, especially after 1878 when Sir Bartle Frere recognised its independence.

Although the works of Walker, de Kiewiet and Theal have proved invaluable in relating Mpondo affairs to their wider South African context, the printed material has been scanty and unhelpful. Theal recorded the more important events with some inaccuracy and considerable bias, and the relations of the Chief Faku with the Trekkers in Natal have found a place in general South African history.
C.J. Uys, Lindsay Young and A.E. du Toit have referred to certain events which impinged upon their studies of Shepstone, Pine and the Cape Frontier respectively, but otherwise the subject has been virtually unexplored. There has been no sustained attempt to examine the motives which drew the Cape and Natal into the affairs of Pondoland, to consider the nature of their relations with its people, and to discover why the allies of 1844 became the enemies of 1878.

There has been no lack of manuscript material. The principal official source has been the Colonial Office records at the Public Records' Office, and especially the despatches and enclosures from the Cape and Natal. Supplementary official material was found in the Archives at Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg. It was evident from these sources that the missionary role was of some importance. This was revealed more clearly by the private papers of two missionaries, the Reverends Thomas Jenkins and Peter Hargreaves, and of two officials, Sir Theophilus Shepstone and Sir Walter Stanford, as well as by the Archives of the Methodist Missionary Society. These sources and other private collections also provided further information of wider interest.

A preliminary survey of the material indicated that
there was a definite relationship between the state of the Mission and the bearing of the Amampondo and the Colonial authorities towards one another. Between 1838 and 1868 the work was in the charge of Thomas Jenkins, who gained a unique influence over Faku and acted as intermediary between him and the authorities. During this period Faku became the bounden ally of the Government, and although it passed through more than one crisis, the alliance survived to the end. In the subsequent decade and a half the Mission was staffed by a succession of young men. The missionary influence declined, and at the same time the Amampondo were alienated from the Cape. After 1882 the work was superintended by the Reverend Peter Hargreaves, an experienced missionary who had previously played a prominent part in Tembu affairs, and it was largely through his efforts that the quarrel was settled in December 1886.

On more detailed examination it became apparent that the pattern was not quite so simple and that the alliance was showing signs of strain even before Jenkins died. It emerged that the turning point was 1856 when William Shaw, who had founded the Mission, left the country. Shaw had commanded the respect of successive Governors, and at more than one crisis in Mpondo affairs had been able to approach them personally. There was nobody to take his place, and
although Jenkins was trusted, he could only keep in touch with the powers-that-be by correspondence which was no substitute for contact. Furthermore, Shaw's success had depended largely upon favourable political conditions, for the Cape authorities had been eager to have Faku as an ally in the rear of the frontier tribes, and had been sensitive to anything that might alienate him, particularly if the culprit was Natal. In 1857, however, the Amazosa destroyed themselves as a military power, and in following years a tendency to expansion displaced the desire for security as the ruling motive of Cape policy. This meant that the authorities were less anxious to cultivate the friendship of Faku and also that the Amampondo became suspicious as their frontiers contracted. Jenkins was unable to prevent or to remove occasions of stumbling, partly because he was inhibited by instructions to keep clear of politics. There would have been difficulties in the 'seventies whoever had succeeded him, for in this period the Amampondo and the Cape became immediate neighbours. But the breakdown in relations was quite definitely aggravated by the absence of anybody, missionary or lay, who commanded the trust both of the Government and of the tribe and could interpret each to other. This is confirmed by the fact that Hargreaves was able to bring the parties together after years of tension. His influence did not approach that of Jenkins, and the reconciliation
of 1886 did not last; but his achievement was sufficient to show that the character of the Wesleyan missionary was an important factor in Mpondo affairs.

Besides demonstrating the importance of the missionary role, this study has served to vindicate the missionary character. The Wesleyans were not without their failings, but they were neither the blind negrophilists abhorred of the "settler" historian, nor the agents of an expanding capitalist imperialism portrayed by a certain African propagandist. Their ruling motive was a concern for peace and justice, and they intervened in politics not of choice but of necessity.

As a detailed instrument, the Treaty was a failure, and it owed its longevity to the early isolation of Pondo-land and to the work of Shaw and Jenkins. Nevertheless, its failure was not complete. In particular, it served to maintain the natives in possession of their lands until the land hunger of the European had been checked. It was also a symbol of friendship and it ultimately broke down, not only because the Amampondo were at fault, and the Treaty itself defective, but also as a result of the arbitrary conduct of colonial officials which remained unchecked when the missionary influence declined.
The material used in this thesis has been defective in at least one respect. Hardly any light has been cast on the part which was played in Mpondo affairs by European traders. They appear occasionally as allies of the missionaries, as ambassadors of the Government or as advisers of the Chief, but for the most part they remain anonymous. Evidence of their activities and interests would have helped further to explain the interest of Natal in Pondoland and to elucidate the events of 1868 to 1885. Although it is dangerous to argue from silence, it seems likely that such evidence would not have modified the conclusions of this thesis to any great extent. There were respectable traders as well as canteen-keepers and scoundrels, but their reasons for being in Pondoland were obviously more interested than those of the missionaries, and this meant that they could never occupy quite the same position. Moreover, while the official material indicates that some traders influenced affairs for the worse and others attempted to improve relations, it also suggests that they made no significant contribution to the mutual understanding of the Amampondo and the Colonial authorities.
ANTI-SLAVERY PAPERS (INCLUDING ABORIGINES PROTECTION SOCIETY).

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<td>A.P.S.</td>
<td>Aborigines' Protection Society.</td>
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<td>Colonial Office Records.</td>
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<td>de Kiewiet: Imp.</td>
<td>The Imperial Factor in South Africa.</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>Hargreaves Diaries.</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Jenkins Private Papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMS</td>
<td>Methodist Missionary Society Archives.</td>
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<td>Natal</td>
<td>Natal Archives.</td>
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<td>Natal SP</td>
<td>Shepstone Papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.P.</td>
<td>British Parliamentary Papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.N.A.</td>
<td>Secretary for Native Affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>St.P</td>
<td>Stanford Papers.</td>
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<td>Theal: Since 1795</td>
<td>The History of South Africa since 1795.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walker</td>
<td>Except where otherwise stated, references are to &quot;A History of South Africa&quot;, 1928.</td>
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Spelling of African names:

Although the new spelling has been used for many names, the traditional form has been retained in other cases. This has been done where the new form is hardly recognisable to the uninitiated, (eg. Sarili for Kræli, or Mahoeshoe for Moshesh) or would cause confusion (eg. Mqikela for Umgikela, which is almost universal in the sources).
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the southeastern seaboard of Africa between St. Lucia Bay and the Fish River, and as far inland as the Drakensberg Mountains, was the undisputed possession of the Nguni peoples. It cannot confidently be said how long they had been there, or whence they had come. Writing was unknown among the Bantu-speaking peoples, of whom the Nguni form a part; and apart from an occasional account of a shipwreck and certain other Portuguese journals, the only source for their early history is oral tradition. This cannot be relied upon implicitly. Antiquaries of different tribes diverge in their accounts, and a wealth of tradition was lost in the upheavals of the nineteenth century. In one respect alone it is fairly reliable. The genealogies

1. J.H. Soga claims that the term Abe-Nguni refers immediately and solely to the descendants of the chief Mnguni, and that only the Amxosa, the Abe-Nguni of Nyasaland, and a few other Natal tribes properly deserve the description. Mnguni was an ancestor of the chief Xosa. The term is here used in the more general sense for the group of south-eastern Bantu who are distinguished linguistically by the presence in their dialects of bush clicks, and among whom bush features are more common than in other tribes. (J.H. Soga: The South Eastern Bantu, p. 81.)


of important chiefs have been preserved with considerable accuracy for a period of three hundred years or more, and in many cases the sites of their graves have also been remembered.\(^5\) This is of value in following the fortunes of tribes within South Africa, but it tells us little, if anything, of the period before the invasion. Physical anthropologists have shown that the Bantu are a mixture of the Negro, Bush and Hamitic peoples who were the original racial groups of Africa,\(^6\) and have suggested that their cradle was the region of the Great Lakes and the headwaters of the Nile, whence they swept south in successive waves from the end of the sixth century onwards.\(^7\)

Two widely divergent theories have been put forward about the Nguni invasion. J.H. Soga distinguished three groups among the Nguni between whom there is no genealogical point of contact. He regarded the Amalala as the earliest inhabitants of the south-eastern coast\(^8\) and believed them to be offshoots of the Makalanga of Southern

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5. This is in part due to the custom of "praising", to which the Bantu attach great importance. (Soga: op. cit., p.71; Hunter: Reaction to Conquest: pp.53, 135f, 372, 407. For accuracy of tradition cf. Soga: op. cit., p.59 – 500 years; Schapera (ed.): op. cit., p.43 – 300 years; Theal: op. cit., p.60 – 10 to 12 generations.


Rhodesia, whose ruler was known to the Portuguese as the Monomatapa. Following Theal and Walker he associated the Abambo and Amaxosa groups with the "Mumbos" and "Mazimbas" whose depredations about Tete on the Zambezi between 1570 and 1592 were described by Dos Santos, and thus dated the main invasion in the early years of the seventeenth century. A.T. Bryant, on the other hand, believed that the ancestors of all the present Nguni peoples crossed the Zambezi near its source, whence they trekked to the vicinity of the Vaal River. Here they divided into Lala, Embo and Pure Nguni clan groups which moved away at different times and in various directions, leaving behind a remnant which was swamped by later Sutu invaders. Bryant's theory rested upon particularly slender

10. Theal: History and Ethnography of South Africa before 1795, I, p.65f.
12. Soga uses the term Abe-Nguni.
16. Bryant: The Zulu People, p.10. In Olden Times, p.5 he placed the dispersion at the headwaters of the Limpopo. This has resulted in a considerable change in his detailed theory of the dispersion.
foundations, but N.J. van Warmelo was no more satisfied with Soga's suggestions, and dismissed all theories hitherto put forward as fanciful.  

The Amampondo are the most important tribe in the Abambo group and Pondoland today comprises a coastal area of about 3,800 square miles between the Umtata and the Umtamvuna Rivers; bounded on the north-west by Griqualand East, and divided into eastern and western regions by the Umzimvubu River. It lies on the eastern slope of the South African plateau which falls in three terraces

17. One reason for Bryant's postulating a north-western entry was his belief that the Nguni could not have crossed the Lower Zambezi as they were unacquainted with canoes (Olden Times, p.5) but the narrative of Dos Santos shows clearly that the Zambezi was crossed near Tete by certain parties which were encountered by the Portuguese, and other parties may well have crossed and pressed on to Natal. A more important reason was the existence of Bakoni (Nguni) tribes in the interior. According to Stow this term is properly confined to the Bakuena group who are said to have come down from the North (Zulu People, p.6f). Bryant preferred this tradition to the supposition that the Nguni tribes in the interior originally came from the coast, (Walker: op. cit., p.115; Walker: Historical Atlas, p.6) but if the Nguni remnant became as Sutu-ised as Bryant believed, it is reasonable to suppose that the story of their origins shared that fate. Indeed Bryant himself admitted this (Zulu People, p.5). He was correct in denying that they are descendants of refugees from Tshaka, but the possibility of a seventeenth century migration from the coast cannot be ignored.

*Theal: The Beginnings of South African History, p. 268f

18. Schapera (ed): op. cit., p.45: "The massive volumes of Bryant and Soga have at least achieved this also that, by coming to conclusions which can by no manner of means be reconciled they have shown onlookers that progress is not being made as merrily as some would have us believe".
from the Drakensberg to the sea. The area above the altitude of 4,000 feet is very similar in surface and vegetation to the highveld.\(^\text{19}\) This was never as popular with the Bantu as the coast, probably because of the lower winter temperatures, and although it formed part of the original treaty state, the greater part now falls within Griqualand East. The second terrace lies at an altitude of 1800 to 4000 feet. Here the surface is more uneven; the rivers flow through deep gorges; and the precipitous hillsides and valleys are clothed with a mixture of grass and bush, with occasional patches of forest.\(^\text{20}\) The coastal terrace is covered to an altitude of 800 feet with dense sub-tropical bush and evergreen forest,\(^\text{21}\) and cliffs averaging 200 feet in height are a common feature of the 120-mile coastline.\(^\text{22}\) The rainfall is plentiful\(^\text{23}\) and the sub-tropical climate of the coast gives way further

\(20\). Wellington: \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 102f, 172, 296.
\(22\). Sneesby: \textit{op. cit.}, p.41. Figures quoted by Sneesby show a range of 49.07" at Port St. Johns; to 30.9" at Tabankulu, cf. Wellington: \textit{op. cit.}, p.247.
inland to a warm temperate climate with occasional frost. Cattle thrive in all areas, and maize and kaffir corn are the principal crops.

Whatever their previous adventures may have been it seems probable that the Amampondô entered this area at the beginning of the seventeenth century. According to tribal tradition the chief Msiza, between whom and Faku there were nine chiefs, came from Swaziland and was buried at lu Thukela. Faku was chief from about 1820 to 1867, and if it is assumed that his predecessors ruled for an average of twenty-five years it may be conjectured that Msiza died between 1595 and 1617. His successor, Ncindise, was buried between the Umzimkulu and Umtamvuna Rivers, and six at least of his successors lived and died in modern Pondoland east of the Umzimvubu. This estimate may be confirmed in general terms from a Portuguese source, for the chronicler who described the wreck of the S. Thome on the coast of Tongaland in 1589, mentioned a kingdom of "Vambe" which comprised a great part of Natal and extended

25. Sneesby: op. cit., p.44.
southwards towards the Cape. If Bryant was right when he equated "Vambe" with the Abambo, this passage indicates that the tribal group to which the Amampondo belong was in Natal at the end of the fifteenth century.

The Amampondo were not the first inhabitants of the area, nor even the first Bantu inhabitants. All Portuguese castaways after 1553 found the country occupied, apparently by people of Bantu type. A journal kept by the pilot of the S. Alberto which was wrecked west of the Umtata in 1593 supplies linguistic evidence from which Bryant concluded that these people were of either the Lala or Embo type. He surmised that they were Amampondo and gratuitously assumed that they had already settled there before 1552. In view of the other evidence, however, Soga may have been correct when he inferred that they were Amalala forerunners of the Amampondo. Bushmen and hottentots almost certainly lived there at an even

31. Theal: Beginnings of South African History, pp. 277-301; The ships wrecked on this coast were the S. Joao (1553), S. Bento (1554), and S. Alberto (1593).
32. Bryant: Olden Times, p.11.
34. Soga: op. cit., p.399.
earlier period, and the former were still to be found in small numbers in the nineteenth century. Nor were the Amampondo ever the only inhabitants. There were Amaxosa kraals east of the Umtata until the beginning of the eighteenth century, while the Amampondomise probably arrived about the same time as their Mpondo relatives, and were still their neighbours in the nineteenth century. Amampondo, Amaxosa and Amampondomise were all mentioned by the survivors of the Stavenisse who trekked along the coast in 1686. They did not encounter the Amaxesibe; but insofar as any conclusions can be drawn from it, the evidence suggests that they too had settled east of the Umzimvubu by the early eighteenth century.

35. Soga: op. cit., p.96.
37. Soga: op. cit., pp. 102, 111.
39. The case of the Amaxesibe aptly illustrates the confused state of tradition. Bryant and Soga agreed that they originally lived near the upper Mpanza River in Natal, until they fled from Shaka. According to Soga (p.351) Sinama led the removal. Bryant (Olden Times, p.254) mistakenly said it was his son Mjoli (cf. Lister, op. cit., p.115 - Sinama was alive in 1829). Neither of these authorities agreed with Lieut. Gov. Bulwer (PP 1880 II (C2584): Memo 20.1.80, enc. in Wolseley to Hicks Beach 6.2.80) who attributed the removal of the Cape Amaxesibe to a dispute about the chieftainship in the days of Shaka's father. Theal (Since 1795, V, p.63) said they migrated more than a century before the Treaty of 1844. His statement was evidently based upon the independent accounts of Xesibe antiquaries given to Cape officials in the late nineteenth century. (Continued)
Little is known of the 200 years following the settlement, and the curtain lifts about 1820, shortly after Faku had become paramount chief. His father Ngqungqushe had fallen in battle with the Amambomvana, and Faku had the

39. (Continued). (F. Brownlee: Historical Records of the Transkeian Territories, p.103: Statement of Jojo to J.M. Orpen 24-5.4.74; PP 1880 LI (C2676): Statement of Jojo to C. Brownlee in Memo. by Brownlee 4.6.80, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 22.6.80; Cape P.P. A105 - 1880, p.356: Statement of Selani.) They date the arrival in Pondoland at least five generations before Sinama, which would be at the close of the seventeenth century, and possibly earlier. Selani stated that the original home of the tribe was at the sources of the Mooi River in Natal, and that the area of Pondoland between the Rivers Imigodi and the Uludeka, which falls into the Umtamvuna, was occupied in the time of Unswayibana, the fifth chief before Sinama. It is not clear whether he meant that Unswayibana led the migration, in which case he is at variance with the chief Jojo, who stated that Xesibe himself had been buried three generations earlier at the Umtamvuna. Jojo also said that Sinama's father, Mayaba, was buried near Umsikaba, and that his grandfather, Gcuma, was buried at Emfundisweni. Charles Brownlee, who as Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East received Jojo's statement, observed that he had "long since and from many sources known that the Xesibe chiefs had lived and died in the areas specified." (Memo. by Brownlee, as above). Contemporary written sources do not help us, for the failure of the Stavenisse survivors to mention the Amaxesibe need imply no more than that they were not settled along the coast. Even allowing for the fact that the Xesibe antiquaries were concerned to refute the Mpondo claim to their lands, their account is probably to be preferred.

The confusion is partly explained by the fact that the Cape Amaxesibe are descended from the left hand House of Xesibe. Possibly, in the manner familiar to Bantu society, they moved away from the ancestral lands after some dispute with the senior houses. These latter fled south from Shaka, some passing through to Tembuland, and others eventually settling near Richmond in Natal.
doubly difficult task of rallying the tribe to his support and of avenging his father's death.\textsuperscript{40} He had hardly established himself when Shaka embarked upon his career of carnage which shook Bantu society to its foundations, and threatened the Amampondo with extermination.

Shaka was an illegitimate son of Senzangakona, chief of the Amazulu. At an early age he was driven away from home with his mother, and at length found asylum with the Imitetwa chief, Dingiswayo, who lived to the south of St. Lucia Bay.\textsuperscript{41} Dingiswayo was a chief of exceptional ability and had created a formidable army by reorganising the traditional circumcision guilds on a military basis. With this new weapon he had imposed his peace upon a large number of neighbouring clans. Shaka's bravery and tactical skill brought him favour in the eyes of the chief, and with his support he became chief of the Amazulu when Senzangakona died in 1816.\textsuperscript{42} Less than two years later Dingiswayo himself was killed, and a disheartened army put Shaka at its head.\textsuperscript{43} Their new leader shared the military genius of his predecessor but lacked his humanity. Whereas Dingiswayo had been content with the friendly co-operation of defeated chiefs, the only courses left open to Shaka's victims were incorporation with the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Soga: op. cit., pp. 303-5, 308.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Bryant: \textit{Olden Times}, pp. 45-9, 64.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Bryant: op. cit., pp. 119f.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Bryant: op. cit., pp. 158f.
\end{itemize}
Amazulu, destruction, or timely flight. As tribe after tribe fell before them, the impis expanded, the vultures were sated, and numberless fugitives stumbled over each other in their haste to be away.

Shaka's first victim was his patron's murderer. Zwide was defeated, and while some of his Ndwandwe warriors transferred their allegiance, others escaped northwards to become the Abenguni of Nyasaland. This remnant fell upon the Amangwane under Matiwane who had already felt the chastising hand of Dingiswayo. They, in their turn, chased the Amahlubi over the Drakensberg into Basutoland and scattered the Amabele before settling on the threshold of Cathkin Peak. In 1821-2 they were attacked by Shaka himself, and themselves crossed the mountains to fall upon the Batlokwa near Harrismith. This attack launched the latter tribe upon a career of plunder on the highveld as the notorious Mantatees. For some years Matiwane remained in uneasy proximity to Moshesh, by whom he was defeated in 1827, after which he led his people across the Drakensberg towards the sources of the Umtata, there to encounter yet greater troubles.

44. Bryant: Olden Times, p.456f.
45. Bryant: op. cit., pp. 135-146.
See page 34.
From the very beginning there were repercussions in Pondoland. In their flight from Matiwane the Amabele fell upon the Amazizi and Amatolo, and survivors from all these clans made their way southwards in the van of a procession of refugees or Amamfengu. They were subsequently joined by a large number of other groups, the most considerable of which was the Amabaca. For some years there was the utmost confusion. The newcomers were not welcomed by the local tribes, and were divided among themselves. The Amabaca were strong enough to maintain their independence despite the deaths of their original leader Madikane and his son, Sonyangwe, but by 1828 most of the other refugees had submitted to the Baca regent Ncapai, or had settled among the Amampondo, Abatembu or Amaxosa.

Sometime in the early '20's, Zulu impis penetrated beyond the Umzimkulu River and chased the Amampondo across the Umzimvubu, but Shaka's major assault upon this area was delayed until 1828. This coincided with Matiwane's

47. Stuart and Malcolm: (ed.) The Diary of H.F. Fynn, p.63.
C2676: Memo. by Brownlee, 4.6.80, enc. in Frere to to Hicks Beach 22.6.80. (P.P.1880 II).
incursion into Kaffraria, and confusion between the Amazulu and the Amangwane in contemporary records makes it almost impossible to follow the exact course of events. It appears that the Amazulu advanced beyond the Umtata, and demanded the submission of Hintsa, the Xosa paramount. This was refused but they withdrew without a trial of strength, probably because their general was taken suddenly ill. The Amampondo escaped into the bush as the impis swept south; but were defeated and plundered of their cattle as they returned at the end of June. Shaka then offered to return some cattle as a sign of their dependence upon him, and in September Mpondo ambassadors were sent

49. See pages 11 and 34; Theal: Since 1795, I, p.392.
51. MMS: Ibid.
52. MMS: Shrewsbury to Secs., 31.12.28. It is unlikely that Shaka had heard of the British reaction to his campaign, for Dundas only left Grahamstown on July 1st. (See page 34 ) Fynn may have prevailed upon Shaka to order the withdrawal, but he does not make in his diary the claim attributed to him by later historians - e.g. MacKeurtan: The Cradle Days of Natal, p.142.
53. Bryant: op. cit., p.623f. MMS: Davis to Secs., 2.7.28, dates defeat of Faku on June 29th.
C.0.48/125: Dundas to Bourke, 15.8.28, enc. in Bourke to Huskisson, 26.8.28: Faku says the Zulu army was in his country for a moon and a half and left about the 8th July.
54. C.0.48/125: Dundas to Bourke, 15.8.28, enc. as above (53)
to his kraal to confirm Faku's submission. They were present on the 22nd September when Shaka was murdered by Dingane and his accomplices.

The coup in Zululand did not bring peace to Pondoland, for within a year another troubler had arrived in the person of Ngqetho. His people, the Amaqwabe, had retained a measure of identity under Shaka, and rather than submit to Dingane, he decamped southward. In the space of a few months he sent the Amaxesibe and other clans hurrying across the Umzimvubu, attacked the Abatembu, and assured himself of notoriety by murdering Lieut. Farewell and two companions who were travelling from the Cape to Natal. Early in December 1829, however, his army was almost annihilated by the Amampondo, and the Amabaca seized

56. Herman: Travels and Adventures of Nathaniel Isaacs, I, p.257;
   Soga: op. cit., p.459;
   Theal: Since 1795, I, p.353.
59. MMS: Shaw to Gen. Secs., 3.11.29.
60. Stuart and Malcolm: op. cit., p.170f;
   Bryant: op. cit., pp. 393-6;
   MMS: Shepstone to Gen. Secs., 25.10.29.
a great number of cattle from the survivors. In 1830, therefore, Faku and Ncapi were without exception the most powerful chiefs in Pondoland.

While these upheavals were ringing out the old order, simultaneous developments both in South Africa and overseas portended a new. Although the purpose of the British occupations of the Cape in 1795, and again in 1806, had been to obtain a strategic port on the route to India, Her Majesty's Government became responsible willy-nilly for a colony of settlement, and in particular for the defence of the Eastern Frontier where the nomadic trekboers had encountered the advancing Amaxosa in the closing years of the 18th century. Successive Dutch proclamations had endeavoured to prohibit intercourse between black and white, but without effect. British forces took part in border warfare during the first occupation, but the first attempt to enforce a definite policy was made between October 1811 and March 1812 by Sir John Cradock, who drove the Amaxosa across the Fish River and formed a double line of military posts along the frontier. This policy failed,

63. Walker: op. cit., p. 137f.
64. Theal: Since 1795, I, p. 192f.
for depredations continued, and in April 1817 Lord Charles Somerset reported that ninety out of one-hundred-and-five families had deserted the Zuurveld in the past eighteen months. At about the same time the garrison at the Cape was reduced by almost half and other measures became imperative. Somerset recognised Gaika as paramount chief in the hope that he would control the Amakosa, and created a neutral zone between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers.

He also appealed to the Colonial Secretary for settlers who would form a barrier against the tribes and eventually make it possible to withdraw the garrison from the frontier.

The suggestion was well received. Reduced trade and large scale demobilisation had caused considerable unemployment at the end of the Napoleonic wars; and poor harvests both at home and abroad had raised the price of corn to an abnormal height and intensified distress, especially among agricultural labourers. Emigration to the United States of America had risen steeply, and at length the Government had intervened and attempted to direct it to the colonies.

66. Ibid.
Somerset's proposal was therefore welcomed as a measure of social relief, and had the added attraction of appearing to promise further economies in defence. Emigration to the Cape was henceforth encouraged, and in July 1819, after news had arrived of the Battle of Grahamstown, the Chancellor proposed a grant of £50,000 for the purpose, and attempts were made to divert emigrants from other colonies. In 1820 and 1821 nearly 5,000 emigrants reached the Cape.

The 1820 settlement had far-reaching results in promoting the development of the colony, and in giving Britain a greater stake in the country. It was also significant as leading to a considerable increase in the contacts between black and white, although this was what Somerset had hoped to avoid. Before long many of the settlers left their holdings, some to work in the towns, and a few to enter the Kaffir trade. This was illegal at first, but in 1821 the Government instituted Kaffir fairs, and eventually licenced traders were allowed to pass beyond the colonial boundary. As early as 1825 a

73. Theal: Since 1795, I, pp. 300-5.
18.

Mr Thackwray had visited the Amampondo, and in 1829 Andrew Geddes Bain spoke of a trader named Shaw who had ingratiated himself with Faku and was trying to exclude others from the country.

However, the first trading visit to Pondoland of which there is documentary evidence was made from Port Natal, where Lieut. Farewell planted a settlement in 1824, with the assistance of a young man named Henry Francis Fynn. Both Fynn and Farewell found favour with Shaka, who allowed them to range the country bartering ivory, and it was in the course of one such expedition, in September and October 1824, that Fynn first entered Pondoland. On a second occasion, early in 1825, he visited Faku who at first suspected him of being a Zulu spy, but eventually allowed


75. Lister: op. cit., p.82.

cf. MLIS: Shepstone to Committee, 25.10.29, — Extract from Journal for August 8th — "Received the following note kindly sent me by an English trader from Faku's place." There is no positive evidence that Shaw was an 1820 settler. Neither Samuel Edward Shaw of Parker's party, nor a son of Mrs. Shaw, (Hockly: op. cit., p.242) who came out independently, would seem to fit Bain's description of him as a man with a grown son in whose company Bain was travelling.


77. Ibid, pp. 105, 128f.

78. Stuart and Malcolm: op. cit., pp. 96-110.
him to set up a trading station with a clan east of the Umzimvubu.\textsuperscript{79} He remained there for nine months and returned to Port Natal in October 1825.\textsuperscript{80} Thereafter he became a regular visitor,\textsuperscript{81} and in 1827 he established himself near the Umzimkulu River with a following of 2,000 natives, the remnants of four tribes who had fled from Shaka.\textsuperscript{82}

The advent of the trader foreshadowed a revolution in the Mpondo way of life, but even more significant in the long run was the arrival of the missionaries. This was another result of the 1820 settlement, for the emigration brought to South Africa a young Wesleyan preacher named William Shaw, who very soon adopted the role of apostle to the Bantu. Shaw recruited several of his pioneer missionaries from the settlers, among them Thomas Jenkins who laboured in Pondoland for thirty years, and exerted a greater influence on its affairs than any other European.

\textsuperscript{79} Stuart and Malcolm: op. cit., p.110.  
\textsuperscript{80} Stuart and Malcolm: op. cit., p.116.  
Herman: op. cit., I, p.31.  
\textsuperscript{81} eg. Stuart and Malcolm: op. cit. pp. 207, 222-5.  
MMS: Boyce to Gen. Secs., 2.7.32.  
\textsuperscript{82} Stuart and Malcolm: op. cit., p.130.  
cf. MMS: Satchell to Secs., 9.11.33.
CHAPTER II

THE WESLEYAN MISSION - 1820-68.

Although Methodist preachers had been at work in the West Indies since 1786, it was not until 1813 that the challenge of foreign missions really caught the imagination of the Wesleyan Church in England. In that year Dr Thomas Coke, who had championed the cause for thirty frustrating years, appealed for volunteers to accompany him to Ceylon. He set sail on December 31st with seven companions. Before he left, missionary societies had been formed in several districts, and in 1818 these were consolidated in the General Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society which assumed responsibility for over one hundred missionaries in Sierra Leone, the Western Cape and Australia, as well as in Ceylon and the West Indian islands.

At the outset the Society’s resources were barely enough to maintain existing work, but it entered South East Africa in 1820 because the initial expense was met from another source. William Shaw came to Albany as chaplain to the Sephton party. This was a private arrangement, and he received a government salary, but the Society’s

committee was prevailed upon to recognise him, and he was accepted as a missionary in connexion with the Wesleyan conference. 5

Shaw's immediate responsibility was for his own party, but from the very beginning he regarded the whole settlement as his parish. On 3 January 1821 he wrote in his journal:

"I ride every other week upwards of 130 miles, and must in future regularly preach eight times during my round, independent of my sabbath labours at home, and occasional labours in other places, but after all I cannot go to many who are saying, come and help us." 6

Even at that period his thoughts were ranging wider. His instructions were to take any opportunity that might present itself of evangelising the tribes beyond the colony 7 and he was soon writing to ask for assistance:

"I hope", he said, "that the committee will never forget that, with the exception of Latakoo, which is far in the interior, there is not a single missionary station between the place of my residence and the northern extremity of the Red Sea." 8

Within a year he proposed a chain of mission stations

7. Shaw: op. cit., p.15.
8. Shaw: op. cit., p.315f. This was not strictly true. The Rev. J. Brownlee was appointed Government missionary with Ngqika in 1820, and was joined by the Rev. W.R. Thompson and Mr. Bennie in November 1821 - Shaw: op. cit., p.321.
along the east coast from the colony to Natal, or even to Delagoa Bay. Having put its hand to the plough, the Society did not draw back, and assistance was forthcoming. It took longer to secure official permission to work beyond the border, but this was granted in June 1823, and in November Shaw and his assistant, William Shepstone, settled at Wesleyville among the Gqunukhwebe. His assistance in arranging a conference between the chiefs and the Colonial authorities won him the confidence of Ndlambe and his son Dushani, and opened the way for Stephen Kay who established Mount Coke in 1825. In April 1825 Shaw pressed further east and visited Hintsa and Vusani, the Gcaleka and Tembu chiefs. After much delay W.J. Shrewsbury began work at Butterworth in June 1827, and in August Hintsa officially recognised the station. In May 1829 William Shepstone established Morley among the people of the Chief Ndepa, who was the descendant of a European castaway. The original site was east of the Umtata,

but this had to be abandoned on 25 October 1829 in face of the advancing Amaqwabe, and when Shepstone returned in April 1830 he started afresh on the other side of the river. **In the interval he had camped near Vusani's kraal and prepared the way for Richard Haddy who founded Clarkebury in April 1830.**

Shaw looked to a station with Faku as the last link in his chain before Port Natal. He visited the chief in May 1829 and was favourably received. **At the following district meeting William Boyce, newly arrived from England, was chosen to begin the mission, and in November 1830 he took up his residence in Pondoland together with Mr and Mrs Tainton and their five children.**

The foundation of Buntingville was the climax of a glorious decade. **In 1820 there had been one Wesleyan missionary in South East Africa, and he had been a charge upon the Government. In 1830 there were twelve stations with thirteen ministers, and the Society had spent £3,120**

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17. MMS: Shepstone to Gen. Secs., 3.3.30.
20. MMS: Shaw to Gen. Secs., 9.10.27.
22. MMS: Boyce to Morley, 11.5.30.
during the year. With the exception of Morley, the stations beyond the colony had been placed strategically with important chiefs who could be expected to protect them, and whose conversion would be of immense importance. To the eye of faith the fields appeared ripe unto harvest.

In fact the harvest was a good way off, and for thirty years at least the work beyond the Kei was a depressing spectacle. Three things combined to destroy the promise of the early years. It was the custom for Wesleyan preachers in England to change their circuits frequently, and this system was applied in Kaffraria where it was quite out of place. The results were disastrous, for hardly had a missionary won the confidence of the people, than he was moved to another station and the process began all over again. In the first eight years there were four changes at Buntingville, but the arrival of Thomas Jenkins in 1838 heralded better times. Although he moved twice before his death thirty years later, he never left Pondoland, and as long as he was alive the worst effects of the itinerant system were avoided. A second factor was the blight of war. Butterworth was destroyed in

William Satchell. 1833 - 1835.
J. Cameron. 1836.
1835 and again in 1846 and 1851, and Clarkebury was threatened on several occasions. Here again the Mpondo mission did not suffer to the same extent. William Satchell withdrew from Buntingville to the colony in April 1835, but the Taintons remained behind at the urgent request of the chief and his councillors, and suffered no harm. In subsequent wars Pondoland was looked upon as a haven of refuge and there was never any question of withdrawal.

Far more important than either itinerancy or war was the fact that the resources available were altogether inadequate for the task. If they were to evangelise Kaffraria, the Wesleyans needed more stations, more men and more money, and these the parent society was unable to supply. South Africa was one field among many, and in South Africa the colonial work expanded rapidly, especially after the annexation of Natal, and absorbed nearly all the reinforcements that could be sent. There was a forward move

Theal (ed): Documents relating to the Kaffir War of 1835; p. 132f: Durban to Faku, 22.4.35.
27. MMS: Palmer to Gen. Secs., 28.5.35.
Gardiner: Narrative of a Journey to the Zoolu Country... in 1835, p.241.
28. Whiteside: op. cit., pp. 109-168 and 357-398 give an account of the work in the Eastern Cape and Natal. Between 1830 and 1850 the number of missionaries in South East Africa rose from 12 to 25, but in both years there were only 4 missionaries between the Kei and Natal. (W.M.S. Reports - 1830, 1850.)
in 1840, for the previous year had been the centenary of Methodism, and the prospect of help from the Thanksgiving Fund had allowed the missionary committee to send nine additional ministers to South Africa. Two of them went to Kaffraria. Horatio Pearse established Beecham Wood not far from Butterworth, and William Garner went to the Amabaca and settled at Shawbury in the following year. But aid did not continue. An ill-considered policy of expansion throughout the world had strained the Missionary Society's resources to their limit, and almost immediately the call went out for retrenchment. This meant that no assistance could be given for a new station with Faku who had now crossed to the eastern bank of the Umzimvubu. In December 1844 the district meeting decided that he could be neglected no longer. The missionary was withdrawn from Beecham Wood to supply Buntingville, and in 1845 Jenkins started work at

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30. Ibid.
MMS: Albany District (West) Minutes, 16.2.41.
33. MMS: Albany District (East) Minutes, 7.12.44. Shaw stated that a gentleman in England made a special contribution for the passage of a missionary to supply Faku. (Boyce: op. cit., p.201). Kaffraria did not reap the benefit of this generosity!
Palmerton near Faku's kraal. When Samuel Palmer died in 1846, nobody was sent in his place, and in 1851 a further missionary was withdrawn. After the murder of James Stewart Thomas in 1856, the position seemed desperate. Fortunately it was a case of the darkest hour coming before the dawn, for the tragedy stirred the Methodist conscience in England; a special appeal was made for funds; and before the end of 1858 missionaries had been sent to each of the surviving stations.

By this time, however, Palmerton had grown apart from the stations west of the Umzimvubu, for in 1850 it had been included in the new Wesleyan district of Natal. Jenkins remained there for seventeen years, preaching, teaching and building a pleasant little village, to a large extent with his own hands and at his own expense.

35. Whiteside: op. cit., p.223.
36. Shaw to Wesleyan Missionaries, 26.9.46.
In 1860 Frederick Mason was sent to assist him, and when Daniel Eva joined them in May 1862, Jenkins was able to establish yet another station. This was called Emfundisweni and was henceforth regarded as the principal mission in Pondoland. The site was not ideal, for it lay in an unoccupied tract between the Amampondo and the Amaxeibe who were always quarreling with each other, but Faku spoke of moving in that direction, and Jenkins thought that this would bring security and a population. In fact neither Faku nor his successor left the Palmerton area, which meant that the country about Emfundisweni was a disturbed borderland for many years to come, and also that the headquarters of the mission was far removed from the centre of the tribe. The new venture was unfortunate in yet another respect, for the cream of the Palmerton community followed Jenkins and the older station began to deteriorate. John Allsopp, who took charge in 1865, was driven to distraction by those who remained, and complained to Boyce, who was now a secretary of the Missionary Society, "The building of Fundisweni is but the removal of Palmerton. Among the people there is scarcely a man we can confide in."

42. MMS: Mason to Gen. Secs., 30.3.60.
43. MMS: Eva to Gen. Secs., 7.6.62.
Missionary Notices: March 1863, p.44: Jenkins, 13.8.62.
44. MMS: Pearse to Osborn, 3.1.61.
Eva to Gen. Secs., 17.3.64.
Missionary Notices: November 1863, p.190:
Jenkins, 28.12.62.
45. MMS: Allsopp to Boyce, 10.5.66.
cf. do. to do., 23.8.65.
The strain of beginning another station was too much for Jenkins, and in the early part of 1864 his health gave way. A holiday in the Cape the following year was of some benefit, but after his return he continued to overtax his strength, and he died at Emfundisweni on the 2nd March 1868 at the age of sixty-one.

From the foundation of Buntingville until the death of Jenkins, the Wesleyan missionaries played a significant part in the dealings of the Amampondo with the Colonial authorities. They were drawn into the political sphere by their concern for peace and justice, and because they enjoyed the confidence both of the Government and of the tribe. They helped to establish a friendly relationship which was sealed by the Maitland Treaty in 1844, and it was through their efforts that the friendship survived more than one serious crisis.

Their political activity was not inconsiderable, but it has always to be remembered that it was incidental to their main task. The Wesleyans were far from being 'political parsons' in search of power and influence.

46. MMS: Jenkins to Gen. Secs., 19.7.64.
47. MMS: Do. to do., 26.7.65.
48. MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 8.3.67.
49. MMS: Minutes of Conference, 1869.
Their primary concern was evangelism, and it was to proclaim salvation to the perishing heathen that they left the comfort and security of the colony. If the fruit of their endeavours was pitifully small, even in Pondoland which did not suffer the disadvantages of itinerancy and war,\textsuperscript{50} it was not because they were diverted from their ministry by preoccupation with secular affairs. The explanation is rather that the demands of the missionaries were incompatible with tribal life, for they asked the convert to abandon ancestor worship, polygamy, lobola, witchcraft and beer-drinking, and these were integral and important parts of the social system. With more ample resources there might have been greater success, but as it was many calls had to go unanswered,\textsuperscript{51} and while grants were a bare minimum it was impossible to train an effective native agency.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 3.9.66, states that there were only two hundred church members and two hundred adherents at Palmerton and Emfundisweni, and offers criticisms of the work.\textsuperscript{cf.} Robert Gray, Bishop of Cape Town: \textit{Journal of a visitation in 1850}, p.89: "I have had some conversation with Mr Jenkins about his work. He does not speak with much confidence of it; though from what he said I could not gather that there was any great room for despondency".

\textsuperscript{51} eg. Natal District Minutes record requests from the Amaxesibe (1853) and Diko (1854).

\textsuperscript{52} An example of the poverty of the mission is the fact that Jenkins was only granted £60 towards the cost of buildings at Palmerton (Albany District Minutes (East) 19.12.45) and that he paid £100 from his own pocket for the new mission house when the site of the station was moved in 1847 (Boyce: op. cit., p.201).
It must also be borne in mind that their participation in political matters was inhibited by very definite instructions from the Missionary Society. On his acceptance by the committee every Wesleyan missionary was given a printed copy of the instructions which were meant to regulate his conduct on the field.\(^{53}\) These included two strongly-worded statements about his attitude to politics. The first was a general counsel, and read as follows:

"We cannot omit, without neglecting our duty, to warn you against meddling with political matters, or secular disputes. You are teachers of religion, and that alone should be kept in view."

The second was intended especially for missionaries to the West Indies, but was enjoined upon any others whose situation made it relevant:

"The committee caution you against engaging in any of the merely civil disputes or local politics of the colony to which you may be appointed, either verbally or by correspondence with any person at home or in the colonies. The whole period of your residence in the West Indies is to be filled up with the proper work of your mission. You are not to become parties in any civil quarrel, but are to 'please all men for their good to edification'; intent upon the solemn work of your office, and upon the eternal state, in the views of which the Committee trust you will think and act."

The decision to print these instructions was taken in December 1817,\(^{54}\) and they should be considered in the

\(^{53}\) "Instructions to Wesleyan Missionaries". Extracts were printed at the commencement of the annual report each year after 1821.

\(^{54}\) MMS: "Instructions to Wesleyan Missionaries": (Printed copy dated 30.9.34).
context of the West Indies at that time. More than one Wesleyan missionary had been accused of preaching sedition and of acting as an agent of the abolitionists.\footnote{55} It was not enough that no charge had been proved in a court of law, for mob violence and the opposition of the planters could ruin the mission whether the accusations were true or false, and it was therefore vital for the sake of the gospel that the missionaries should avoid unnecessary contention. The committee's main purpose was evidently to keep their missionaries out of party squabbles, and in less explosive situations these political clauses were not strictly applied. William Shaw was not criticised for his part in the conference between the border chiefs and Major Somerset in 1824,\footnote{56} nor were his colleagues taken to task for acting as mediators between the tribes and the Government during the War of 1834-5.\footnote{57} On the other hand, W.J. Shrewsbury was reprimanded at the end of 1835 for writing to Colonel Smith and suggesting measures against the warring tribes which shocked philanthropic opinion in England, and embarrassed the Society's committee.\footnote{58}

\footnote{55} Findlay and Holdsworth: op. cit., II, p.25f.
\footnote{56} Richard Watson: *Defence of the Wesleyan Methodist Missions in the West Indies*, passim.
\footnote{57} See page 22.
\footnote{58} Boyce: *Notes on South African Affairs*, appendix II.
\footnote{58} Shrewsbury, J.V.B.: *Memorials of W.J. Shrewsbury*, pp. 400-419. The committee's resolution is printed on p.411.
In the following year his colleagues were explicitly warned

"to guard against being mixed up with local controversies and especially to take care how you commit yourselves not merely through the medium of the press, but by private correspondence or public speeches on any question respecting which party feeling runs high."\(^59\)

After 1836 Shaw was apparently very anxious to avoid any further cause for offence,\(^60\) and Jenkins was even more cautious, especially in his later years. Unavoidably involved in political matters, they had to question their conduct in the light of their instructions, and this explains a tendency at times to be hesitant and non-committal. While it did not altogether prevent their taking a strong line, it limited the influence which they might have been able to exert upon the affairs of Pondoland.

\(^{59}\) MMS: Outgoing Letters Book 1: Beecham to Chairman, Albany, 13.10.36.

\(^{60}\) cf. Shaw's comment on Boyce's 'Notes on South African Affairs' published in 1838: "I could not prevent the publication and I therefore thought it best to agree to it and thus exercise a degree of control over it". He struck out passages which were too strong and altered others. (MMS: Note by Shaw on Boyce to Beecham, 10.11.38).
CHAPTER III

TOWARDS A TREATY

Shaka's invasion in 1828 drew the Cape for the first time into the affairs of the country beyond the Kei River. When the Executive Council heard of the campaign, it decided that the Abatembu and the AmaXosa should be defended,¹ and Major Dundas was sent to tell the chiefs of this decision, and to seek an interview with Shaka.² He was followed by a force under the command of Colonel Somerset, which encountered the Amangwane and routed them under the mistaken impression that they were the Amazulu.³ This interlude led to Faku's first meeting with a colonial official, for Dundas went as far as his kraal in the hope of finding Shaka's messengers.⁴ It was more significant, however, as being the first illustration of a trend which was to play an important part in the policy of the next twenty years. The Government intervened primarily to prevent the tribes being driven towards the colony,⁵ and

2. Ibid.
3. See pages 12-3; C.O.48/125: Bourke to Huskisson 1.8.28.
5. In August 1827 Matiwane (although it was not known to be him) drove about 3,000 Abatembu over the Zwart Kei River into the colony where they caused much damage. Troops were sent, but did not go into action. The Abatembu remained in the colony as unwelcome guests — Theal: Since 1795, I, p.393.
in one way or another it was a concern for the security of the Eastern Frontier which prompted every move towards closer contact with the area in general and the Amampondo in particular.

After 1830 the Wesleyan missionaries favoured intervention for a rather different reason. They hoped the extension of colonial influence would put an end to the squabbles and struggles which were the order of the day, and would thus promote the welfare of the tribes and the prosperity of their work. The situation, as they found it, was chaotic. The Zulu menace darkened the northern horizon, for by Nguni law the cattle which Ncapai had taken from Nqetho belonged to Dingane, and he made at least two attempts to recover them. The Amabaca began to break up under the threat, and in April 1832 Ncapai moved nearer to Faku and paid him fifty cattle for "a place to sit". His submission did not mean that the tribes lived on friendly terms, and for some years it was never quite clear whether they were enemies or allies. The danger on their northern flank did not prevent the

   Do. to do., 2.7.32.
   Satchell to Gen. Secs., 30.5.33, 4.6.33, 11.6.33.
7. MMS: Boyce to Gen. Secs., 2.7.32.
8. MMS: Ibid;
   Satchell to Gen. Secs., 14.7.34.
Amampondo and Amabaca from harrying their neighbours to the south, and Ncapai made frequent raids on the Abatembu, while Faku fell out with Cetani and the Mpondomise chief, Umyeki, both of whom lived near the mouth of the Umtata.

This unsettlement made life difficult for the missionaries at Buntingville, Clarkebury and Morley, and they used their influence on the side of peace. William Shepstone patched up a truce between Faku and Cetani, and when Samuel Palmer took his place at Morley, he gave himself to the task of mediation with enthusiasm and courage. The Abatembu had not forgotten the events of 1828, and in 1834 they asked Palmer to write to Colonel Somerset and to represent their position. He agreed to do so, and when the Colonel sent a letter to Ncapai asking him to desist, Palmer delivered it himself.

11. MMS: Palmer to Secs., 24.6.34.
14. MMS: Do. to do., 24.6.34.
15. MMS: Do. to do., 10.7.34.
It was William Boyce, however, who exerted the greatest influence upon the Colonial Government. By the end of his term at Buntingville he had become quite certain that the Government should establish regular contact with the tribes between the Kei and the Umzimvubu. When he passed through Cape Town on his way to England in March 1843 he expressed this opinion to the new Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and suggested that a British officer should visit these chiefs twice a year with messages and presents. This would help to promote inter-tribal peace and to check oppression. It would also give the natives an opportunity to observe the conduct of Europeans; and would check the frontier tribes by providing the colony with allies in their rear. There was a measure of truth in all this, but Boyce was a man of vivid imagination and he did not err on the side of pessimism when he described the benefits that would follow.

Whatever its practical value, this was the policy which began to emerge in 1835 and the early part of 1836, and as Boyce and his colleagues became D'Urban's private

16. He was going home to be married — MMS: Boyce to Gen. Secs., 26.11.32.
17. MMS: Copy of Boyce to D'Urban, 31.3.34.
18. Ibid.
19. cf. MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 4.5.39, and note thereon by Shaw.
advisers on frontier affairs at this period, it is reasonable to suppose that they encouraged him to adopt it. It was only implemented, however, because it was in the interests of the colony to have allies beyond the Kei, and it was not the intention of the authorities to adopt the role of peacemaker in disturbances which did not directly affect the frontier. War broke out on the frontier in December 1834, and although Hintsa was not directly implicated, his behaviour was suspicious and D'Urban decided to punish him. Before invading Gcalekaland, he called upon the tribes beyond the Bashee to oppose the enemies of the Colony. He accepted the assurance of friendship which Vadana, the Tembu regent, had sent through the Rev. W.J. Davis, and asked the missionary to convey a message to Faku.

"You will apprise him," wrote Sir Benjamin, that "I shall confidently expect good offices at his hands, and especially if the tribes whom I am about to punish should attempt to fly from the just vengeance of the English force through his (Faccoo's) country, with the cattle and spoil they have so atrociously carried off, that he

"will stop their progress and co-operate with me in my proceedings against them, in the benefits of which he and his nation shall join". 24

Henry Fynn had recently left Natal and entered government service, 25 and as he was well known to Faku, 26 he was also sent to Pondoland. He travelled by way of Port Natal and took up residence a mile from Faku's kraal for the duration of the war. 27 As it happened, D'Urban did not require the help of either the Amampondo or the Abatembu, but he expressed the opinion that it would have proved valuable had Hintsa's resistance been more protracted or determined. 28 This is doubtful, but the idea of an alliance against the Amagcaleka was to colour the official attitude towards the Amampondo for some years to come.

The settlement in May 1835 brought the Cape boundary to the Kei, 29 and gave an added importance to relations

26. He had paid several visits to Faku in the 1830's - MMS: Boyce Journal, 9.7.31; Boyce to Secs., 2.7.32; Satchell to Secs., 9.11.33. Stuart and Malcolm: op. cit., p.207, 222-5.
with the tribes beyond that river. This was not reduced by the modification of D'Urban's policy in September, and had the new boundary been maintained, Boyce's proposals for closer intercourse would probably have been put into practice. At the beginning of 1836, Captain Delancy concluded a treaty with Kreli, and visited Faku and Vadana, who promised, as allies of the colony, to remain at peace with each other. He also saw three councillors of Ncapi who made a similar promise on behalf of their chief.

Mere promises were not enough, as was shown in October 1836 when Faku and Ncapi swept a wide area west of the Umtata. By this time, however, D'Urban's frontier policy had been reversed, and the Cape was hoping to secure the peace of the frontier by treaties with its immediate neighbours. This meant the authorities were less interested in the Amampondo and Abatembu, and nothing more was done. When Vadana appealed to Stockenstrom for help, he only received a friendly greeting; and for the

32. Ibid.
33. MMS: Palmer to Secs., 14.11.36.
34. Macmillan: op. cit., pp. 147-165.
next few years the tribes beyond the Kei were left to their own devices. Early in 1838 Faku and Ncapai again attacked the area between the Umtata and Bashee, and drove many Abatembu towards the headwaters of the Kei. Not long afterwards they fell out with each other, and after 1840 the Amampondo and the Amabaca were intermittently at war. Boyce looked on in despair, and in his 'Notes on South African Affairs' he denounced the policy of the new regime. But these disturbances were not directly affecting the colony; the Government had more pressing problems; and the Wesleyans had not yet found favour with Napier. Something more was needed than the fulminations of a political parson to re-awaken official interest in the regions beyond.

36. cf. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 2.11.38.
37. C.0.48/202: Jervis to Napier, 18.10.39, enc. in Napier to Normanby, 11.11.39.
38. Boyce: Notes on South African Affairs, p.115
39. The correspondence of W.B. Boyce gives some idea of the relations between Napier and the Wesleyans in 1838. He describes the Governor in terms that are little less than libellous. (MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 15.10.38) He speaks scathingly of Philip and his friends as availing themselves of their "favouritism" with the powers that be to blacken the Wesleyan missions, and characterises the Government as a reptile whose nature it is to hiss when it cannot sting. (MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 15.4.39).

A private letter of Napier says that Shaw is "like the whole of his brethren, always mixing in politics... and aiming at political power". (C.0.48/202: Napier to Yorke - Pvte and Conf. -) See Roxborough: op. cit., p.220f.
This was provided by the arrival of the Voortrekkers at Port Natal and their subsequent behaviour, which not only led to the annexation of that district but also drew the Colonial Government into a formal relationship with the Amampondo. It is possible to discern the same pattern in this development as had characterised the policy of previous years. On the one hand, the missionaries were concerned for native welfare, and played an important part as the champions of Mpondo interests. The Colonial authorities, on the other hand, were influenced by humanitarian arguments but only acted when the representations of the missionaries were reinforced by a concern for the Eastern Frontier.

The Wesleyans were not unsympathetic towards the Trekkers. When the Rev. James Archbell was asked to become their chaplain, his brethren were not averse to his accepting the invitation; and Boyce argued that they had as much right as the natives to the unoccupied areas in the interior, and criticised "incorrect statements" about their treatment of the native tribes which found their way into the reports of the Aborigines' Protection Society.

40. MMS: Bechuana District Minutes 1838.
42. Boyce: op. cit., p.146 (footnote).
However, both Boyce and Shaw insisted that the emigration should be controlled by the British Government, and that the natives should be secured against encroachment upon their lands. They therefore regarded an independent settlement at Natal with some apprehension, and as Faku had recently returned to the eastern bank of the Umzimvubu, their anxiety increased when the Trekkers claimed all the land between the Tugela and the Umzimvubu by virtue of the grant which Dingane had made to Retief. It was not dispelled by the Trekkers' assurance that they desired peace and would not disturb the chief.

Before he left Buittingville in October 1837, Boyce advised Faku to inform the Government as soon as the Trekkers arrived at Natal that his territory extended to the Umzimkulu River. Nothing was done until the end of October 1838 when Shaw heard of Napier's decision to occupy Port Natal. He thought this might lead to

MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 10.11.38, and note by Shaw.
44. MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 10.11.38.
45. MMS: Do. to do., 15.4.39.
46. MMS: Do. to do., 15.4.39.
47. MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 15.4.39.
colonisation, and immediately informed the Governor that Faku claimed the entire area west of the Umzimkulu although he had been compelled by Zulu attacks to leave it unoccupied. According to Theal this claim was unjustifiable, but Shaw's understanding of the situation was more balanced than that of the great settler historian. The Amampondo had as much right to the unoccupied land as the Trekkers, if not more. They had lived there before the Zulu wars, and were now resuming occupation. The Trekkers, on the other hand, derived their claim through the Amazulu who had swept the area but had never settled there. Moreover, Shaw was looking to the future. If there was to be a colony at Natal, he believed that the boundaries should be so defined as to allow the natives enough land for the natural increase of two generations. The most pressing consideration, however, was not so much that of abstract rights or future needs, but of avoiding immediate trouble. Shaw believed that if the Trekkers once crossed the Umzimkulu, the Amampondo would eventually come into collision with them and be driven back across the Umzimvubu.

48. I have not been able to trace this letter, but its contents may be inferred from MMS: Note by Shaw on Boyce to Beecham, 10.11.38, and C.O.48/200: Charters to Shaw, 9.11.38, enc. in Napier to Normanby, 15.3.39.

49. Theal: Since 1795, II, p.357.
and there was also a danger that they would stir up the tribes in that area against those on the colonial frontier. In such circumstances Shaw's intervention was reasonable.

His letter of 25 October 1838 was apparently Shaw's first communication to Napier on the subject of the Trekkers and the Amampondo, and although humanitarian considerations entered into his decision to occupy Port Natal, the Governor was neither acting under Wesleyan influence nor thinking specifically of the Amampondo. The most significant result of Shaw's intervention was that it impressed Napier with the possibility that the Trekkers might endanger the Eastern Frontier. There was no reference to this in his important despatches of 18 May 1838 and 16 October 1838, but in a private letter to Glenelg, written after he had heard from Shaw, he observed

50. MMS: Note by Shaw on Boyce to Beecham, 10.11.38; Boyce to Beecham, 15.4.39, and note by Shaw. Boyce: op. cit., p.183f.

51. See footnote no. 48.

52. C.0.48/191: Napier to Glenelg, 18.5.38.
C.0.48/191: Napier to Glenelg, 16.10.38.

53. Napier was sent to the Cape with distinct instructions to do nothing about Port Natal. (C.0.48/191: Napier to Glenelg, 18.5.38) He changed his views after five weeks in the Eastern Province, (ibid) but it is not necessary to look any further than Stockenstrom for the agent of his conversion. (cf. C.0.48/191: Napier to Glenelg, 19.3.38).

For the Wesleyans' position at the time, see footnote no. 59.
that it was necessary

"to take into consideration the probability of these settlers once firmly established and their numbers increased, encroaching on the territory of the tribes who occupy the country south and west of the Port of Natal, and ultimately pushing down on those nations who are our allies and on our immediate frontier, and then with the aid of the colonists exterminating the Kaffirs in that direction". 54

If this was a danger, it was only potential, and the Governor was not prepared to take any special action to secure Faku's interests. Major Charters, his private secretary, replied to Shaw in non-committal terms:

"With reference to Faku's fears of the encroachment of the Emigrant Boers on his territory, His Excellency is inclined to think that as yet there are no sufficient grounds for them. The expedition which is about to sail for the purpose of taking military possession of Port Natal, has for its object to check and discourage all attempts at aggression on the native tribes by the Boers, and His Excellency trusts it will have the effect of dispelling any uneasiness which Faku may have on the subject of the violation of his boundaries". 55

Shaw read this as an assurance that Faku's rights would be respected, 56 and the chief was informed to this effect and told to apply for military aid if his boundary was violated by the Trekkers. 57

54. C.O.48/191: Napier to Glenelg (private), 20.11.38.
55. C.O.48/200: Charters to Shaw, 9.11.38, enc. in Napier to Sec. of State, 15.3.39.
56. MMS: Note by Shaw on Boyce to Beecham, 10.11.38.
57. C.O.48/200: Charters to Napier, 27.2.39, enc. in Napier to Sec. of State, 15.3.39.
It soon became clear that he had taken too much for granted. Major Charters himself led the expedition to Natal and remained there for several months.\(^{58}\) The Trekkers told him that Faku did not claim any land east of the Umzimvubu, and he decided that there was no foundation for Shaw's complaint that they were menacing Mpondo territory.\(^{59}\) He was therefore considerably embarrassed when he visited Buntingville on his way back to the Cape, and accidentally discovered what Faku had been told.\(^{60}\) On reaching Grahamstown he asked Shaw for a copy of his own letter,\(^{60a}\) and wrote angrily to Napier that the message to Faku was

"very like a wilful representation of Your Excellency's meaning".\(^{61}\)

This charge was quite unfair, and the missionaries were both angered and startled by his apparent change of front.\(^{62}\) Boyce and Shaw had already asked John Beecham, secretary of the W.M.M.S., to get in touch with the


\(^{60}\) C.0.48/200: Charters to Napier, 27.2.39, enc. as above (57).

\(^{60a}\) MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 15.4.39.

\(^{61}\) C.0.48/200: Charters to Napier, 27.2.39, enc. as above (57).

\(^{62}\) MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 15.4.39.
Colonial Office about the colonisation of Natal, and they now asked him to help secure the Umzimkulu boundary. Boyce thought it would be best to persuade Faku to send a couple of clans to the Umzimkulu and immediately to station a missionary with them, but they also wanted direct pressure on the Colonial Office. When they wrote they had no doubt at all that a colony was about to be formed, but by the time their letters reached London, the Imperial Government had refused to sanction a settlement, and this probably explains sufficiently why Beecham took no action. The matter was prevented from becoming an issue between Shaw and the Colonial Government by the abandonment of Port Natal in November 1839.

Shaw had not obtained for Faku the protection he desired, but his intervention had not been altogether in vain. He had helped to make Napier sensitive to the

63. MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 10.11.38, and note by Shaw.
64. MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 15.4.39.
65. Ibid.
66. MMS: Boyce to Beecham, 4.5.39, and note by Shaw.
67. C.0.48/204: cf. Colonial Office to Bannister (Natal Association), 6.3.39; (Draft on Bannister to Labouchere, 27.2.39.)
68. C.0.48/204: Miscellaneous Offices and Individuals 1839 contains nothing from the W.M.M.S.
possibility that the Trekkers might unsettle the Eastern Frontier, and if the Umzimkulu had not been officially recognised as Faku's boundary, the Government had been more or less committed to this position. These achievements were to prove useful in the near future.

Napier had been ordered to withdraw the garrison from Natal by Lord Normanby, but he soon gave way as Secretary of State to Lord John Russell who was not averse to colonial expansion provided it avoided the twin evils of injustice to the aborigines and unremunerative expenditure. Commercial and humanitarian considerations disposed him in favour of a settlement at Natal. He lent a ready ear to the arguments of the South African Colonisation Society, and after reading an account of a Trekker commando against Dingane, he instructed Napier in June 1840 to re-occupy Port Natal or some commanding height in the vicinity. This was probably intended as a temporary

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70. C.O.48/200: Charters to Napier, 27.2.39, enc. as above (57) - "It will be extremely difficult to remedy this error (i.e. the message to Faku)...as Faku's power is not to be trifled with, and these people are made to comprehend with much difficulty that such errors can be committed in the transmission of important communications".

71. C.O.49/32: Normanby to Napier, no. 19, 30.4.39.


73. Ibid.

expedient while he awaited reports about Natal from the Governor and the Land and Emigration Commissioners. By this time, however, Napier had decided that the only alternatives were annexation or alliance, and he was reluctant to reduce his forces on the unsettled Eastern Frontier for a mere half measure such as this. He therefore asked permission to negotiate. Hardly had he suggested negotiations than an opportunity presented itself, for on 11 October 1840 he received a letter from the Volksraad asking for their independence to be recognised, and also for "all those privileges which constitute the greatness of the nation... under the Queen's noble government". Napier asked for more explicit proposals, and there was now a chance, however slender, that the problem of Natal would be settled in a friendly manner.

Before the Volksraad had time to reply, that chance had disappeared, and Napier had taken the first step

75. These reports were—Bird: op. cit., I, p.606 - 611: Napier to Russell, 22.6.40; C.0.48/215: Report of Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, 11.2.41.
78. Ibid.
towards the forcible re-occupation of the Port. This change was brought about by the dealings of the Trekkers with the tribes west of the Umzimkulu, which led to the intervention of the Wesleyan missionaries and suggested to Napier that the potential danger to the Eastern Frontier was becoming actual. Humanitarian considerations combined with a concern for colonial security to recommend action of some sort.

Bushmen robbers had been at work in the south-west of the Trekker settlement, and in April 1840 Jacobus Uys had been sent with a commando to chastise them. Within a short while rumours had begun to circulate that the Trekkers planned to avenge themselves upon the frontier tribes. Although Napier did not credit the wilder reports, he realised they were unsettling to the natives even if they were not true, and in the course of the year he became apprehensive. More than once in his despatches he referred to the danger that

"as they (the emigrants) increase in numbers, both from natural causes and from continued emigration from hence, an extension of their territory in this

84. Ibid.
"direction will force such tribes as are disinclined to become dependent on them, down upon those which lie in the more immediate neighbourhood of the Eastern Frontier, and bring on collisions which must lead to bloody wars, and might prove fatal to the peace of the colony".85

As long as there was no overt move, he was prepared to be patient and negotiate, but in the early days of 1841 William Shaw reported a Trekker attack on the Amabaca, and the news provoked him to action.

It has been customary in discussions of the "Ncapal Affair" to accept without question the accounts given in Trekker sources and to dismiss the missionary case as exaggerated. 86 It is therefore extremely interesting to discover that there is a large measure of agreement between the two parties on matters of fact. This suggests that the missionary account is substantially reliable and that it can safely be accepted when it refers to circumstances which were unknown to the Trekkers, or to matters about which they would understandably be silent, and it is

86. Cory: The Rise of South Africa p.119f: "Their accounts were little more than hearsay evidence." On p.123f he casts doubts on Jenkins' evidence - "his enthusiasm in his good cause led Mr Jenkins at times to make statements which were not in accordance with the facts". His reference is to the Umzimkulu boundary dispute - (See above, pp. 43f) One is led to ask whether Cory had bothered to read the documents in question. cf. A.J. du Plessis: Die Republiek Natalia, p.150f; C.J. Uys: In the Era of Shepstone. p.10f.
on this assumption that the following account is based. 87

The Uys Commando had not settled the problem of thefts, and in September the matter was again raised in the

87. The Trekker case is well known, and the relevant documents are printed in Bird's Annals of Natal. Of these the most reliable is the official explanation of the Volksraad (I, p.635-9: Volksraad to Napier, 7.4.41), but interesting sidelights are given by the letter of Commandant Lombard to the "Zuid Afrikaan" (I, p.631-4) and the quaint reminiscences of Charl Celliers (I, p.249-51). The garbled account of P.H. Zietsmann (I, p.622) is of little value except as an indication of the reports current in the capital shortly after the affray.

The missionary case has not received nearly as much attention. The most important documents are the Journal of the investigating missionaries (C.0.48/211: Enclosure in Napier to Russell, 21.1.41) and a letter by Shaw to the Grahamstown Journal in which he sets out to controvert the Trekker defence. (Bird: op. cit., I, p.646-9). There are also two anonymous documents originating from Natal. The account of 'Emigrant' was written by an English resident of Port Natal who did not accompany the expedition but received his information from another Englishman who did so. It provides confirmation of at least one point which was mentioned by Faku to the missionaries, but not by the Trekkers. Shaw forwarded this account to the Governor's Private Secretary on 9.4.41. (Shaw-Colonial Govt. Correspondence: Shaw to Moore Craig, 9.4.41). In his covering letter Shaw said he was acquainted with the writer, and that the account had been sent to a Grahamstown merchant for publication. The author was probably George Christopher Cato, for in a narrative, apparently written especially for Bird, (op. cit., I, p.726) Cato said that he set out with the commando but had to leave it to attend to business, and claimed incorrectly that it was in consequence of his report that Shaw represented matters to the Governor. The letter of 'Investigatus' was dated "Natal. 12.7.41" and appeared in the Grahamstown Journal on 12.8.41. It dealt with the reaction to the attack in Pietermaritzburg. (Contd.)
Volksraad. The people of Ncapai were mentioned as the thieves, apparently on the grounds that stock had been traced in the direction of his kraal, and that Uys had encountered a raiding party which included a few Amabaca. The Volksraad decided to send a native embassy to Faku to make enquiries, but it is not clear whether this was done, and with what result. There are indications, however, that Faku asked the Trekkers to allow the Chief Fodo, who was subordinate to them, to assist him against Ncapai, and this suggests that any information he may have supplied would have been unfavourable to the Baca chief.

87. (Contd). The pseudonym probably disguised the Rev. James Archbell, for on 27.7.41 Shaw reported Archbell's return from Natal to the Governor's Private Secretary, and stated that he had collected information which confirmed the innocence of Ncapai. (Shaw-Colonial Government Correspondence: Shaw to Moore Craig, 27.7.41). In a private and confidential letter of the same date (ibid) he mentioned specifically that several farmers refused their share of the cattle, and this circumstance was mentioned by 'Investigatus'. A paraphrase of the 'Investigatus' letter had already appeared in the Grahamstown Journal on 29.7.41, and it was followed on 5.8.41 by Shaw's final apologia mentioned above.

89. Ibid.
92. Bird: op. cit., I, p.631-5: Volksraad to Napier, 7.4.41
C.0.48/211: Journal of Missionaries, enc. in Napier to Russell, 21.1.41. Lombard said Faku sent 'to us' for assistance (cf. Cory Collection 1263 - Note by Orpen) but the Volksraad account is probably to be preferred.
Be that as it may, Commandant Pretorius left Pietermaritzburg on 24 November 1840 at the head of a large commando, and was joined by Fodo and his warriors who had an old score to settle with the Amabaca. They first proceeded westward of the Ingele Mountain, apparently in search of bushmen, but when this yielded no result, they pressed south-eastward into the heart of Pondoland. Three burghers were sent to Faku to explain the object of the expedition and to ask him to visit the camp and conclude a treaty of alliance. He refused to go on the grounds of old age and ill health, but the burghers reported that he fully confirmed their information against Ncapai, and told them that he had only recently taken some cattle from him among which he believed there were some belonging to the Trekkers. Faku's account of the visit was rather different, for according to him the messengers behaved in an unfriendly manner and claimed as their property a cow which had been given him by Boyce.

93. Ncapai had defeated Fodo's tribe in 1828 (Bryant: Olden Times, p.385f).


95. Volksraad to Napier (as in 92); cf. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92); 'Emigrant' (as in 94) gives their initials as J.M., P.K., and C.G.

96. Volksraad to Napier (as in 92); Journal of Missionaries (as in 92).

97. Volksraad to Napier (as in 92); 'Emigrant' (as in 94).

98. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92).
When the embassy returned to camp, Pretorius called a council of war which decided to chastise Ncapai, and before daybreak on Saturday 19 December a surprise attack was made on the kraal of one of his councillors. With the exception of one letter which reflects the big talk of the burghers on their return to the capital, the Trekker documents are understandably silent about the details of the attack. According to Ncapai the Trekkers killed twenty-six men, ten women and four children, and captured many other women and children. Some of these prisoners were released, but two years later Shaw submitted to the Colonial Secretary the names of seventeen persons who were still missing, and there is indisputable evidence that several Baca children were apprenticed in Natal. The Trekkers admitted seizing three thousand


100. C.0.48/211: Garner to Shaw, 23.12.40, enc. in Napier to Russell, 6.1.41; Journal of Missionaries (as in 92)


102. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92). Garner to Shaw, 23.12.40, enc. as above (100) puts the loss of life at eight men and three women, but the figure in the journal is supported by the claim that they heard the names of all the men killed. The figures are considerably less than the guesses of Zietsmann (150) and 'Emigrant' (70 to 80).

103. Ibid.

104. Shaw-Colonial Government Correspondence: Shaw to Montagu, 17.5.43.

105. 'Emigrant' (as in 94) reported that one child 5Contd.)
cattle, which tallies well with Ncapai's claim that he had lost the cattle of sixty-two kraals, but their accounts do not refer to the two thousand sheep and goats which he said they had taken. Several stolen cattle were found among the plunder and three Baca women, when interrogated, were said unanimously to have confirmed the information given by Faku. This confirmation was of little real value, but the Trekkers were satisfied that results had proved the justice of their attack.

105. (Contd.) was exchanged by J.N. for a horse. In consequence of Shaw's report (as in 104) Commissioner Cloete was instructed to investigate the case. He found one child apprentice in the household of J.J. Burger and ascertained that a number of others had been carried over the Drakensberg. (Shaw-Colonial Government Correspondence: H. Cloete to Montagu, 8.12.43). In later years J.M. Orpen knew a woman at Winburg in the Orange Free State who had been carried off on this occasion. (Cory Collection 1263/4).

106. Volksraad to Napier, 7.4.41 (as in 92);
107. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92)
108. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92). 'Emigrant' reported that 250 sheep and goats had been taken.
109. Volksraad to Napier, 7.4.41 (as in 92); Bird: op. cit., I, p.249-51: Journal of Charl Celliers. Celliers claimed that he recognised one of seventeen head he had lost and also several others taken from various individuals.
110. Volksraad to Napier, 7.4.41 (as in 92).
111. Ibid. Celliers (as in 109) gives an interesting insight into this interrogation. He related that of two women who were questioned about their knowledge of Ncapai's thefts, "one of them appeared to me to be willing to disclose the truth, but the other denied it persistently". He threatened the former that God would strike her with lightning if she lied, and obtained from her the frightened (Contd.)
Before returning to Pietermaritzburg, Pretorius sent another embassy to Faku but he again refused to visit the camp, although on this occasion he sent a councillor.\textsuperscript{112} His attitude caused great offence to the burghers whose dissatisfaction was duly reported to the chief.\textsuperscript{113} He was also told, whether officially or unofficially is not clear, that a demand would be made for the cattle he had taken from Ncapai,\textsuperscript{114} and Fodo sent a message warning him that the Trekkers intended to pay him another visit.\textsuperscript{115} All this meant that he could not regard the trouncing of his rival with unmixed satisfaction. If he hoped that his being an ally of the Trekkers\textsuperscript{116} would guarantee him against a similar fate, he was disillusioned by the experience of another ally. On the homeward journey

\textsuperscript{111} (Contd.) assurance that Ncapai had robbed them and that there was at his kraal a span of oxen with white bellies which belonged to a man called Uys.

\textsuperscript{112} Volksraad to Napier, 7.4.41 (as in 92).

\textsuperscript{113} 'Emigrant' (as in 94).

\textsuperscript{114} Journal of Missionaries (as in 92).

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Volksraad to Napier, 7.4.41 (as in 92) claimed that they had concluded an amicable understanding with Faku in 1838. (See above, page 43) In January 1840 Servaas van Breda and Dirk van Rooyen were sent by the Volksraad to conclude a treaty with Faku (Preller (ed.): op. cit., p.27, 33). The result of their mission is not recorded, for the Volksraad Minutes for the period January to March 1840 are missing.
Fodo and his men had charge of the small stock, and slaughtered some of the animals which became tired and lame, although the Trekkers had said they should be abandoned. When this became known, they were called to the camp and beaten, while Fodo himself was made a prisoner. This was also reported to Faku, who by this time was quite justifiably alarmed. There was no need for anybody else to put ideas into his head, and the Volksraad showed a typical but none the less stupid lack of imagination when they concluded their official—and incomplete—account of the affair by saying

"From this it is difficult to understand how Faku could have reason to request protection against an attack from us, unless it was furnished him by the missionary or some other person".

In this crisis both chiefs turned to the missionaries at Buntingville. Garner and Jenkins heard rumours of the attack on the day it took place, but these were not confirmed until 23 December when Garner received a message from Ncapai. He promptly wrote to Shaw reporting that the Trekkers were still in the country and observing that Ncapai and Faku would soon be destroyed unless the

117. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92);
"Emigrant" (as in 94).
118. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92).
119. Volksraad to Napier, 7.4.41 (as in 92).
120. Garner to Shaw, 23.12.40 (as in 100).
Government intervened. On Christmas Day messengers arrived from Faku, and the New Year found Palmer, Garner and Jenkins east of the flooded Umzimvubu River. On 2 January they met Faku and heard his story. The ensuing discussion is best described in the missionaries' own words which show that they did not express uncritical sympathy or encourage extravagant hopes:

"Under all these circumstances, he (Faku) said he could not remain east of the Umzimvubu, and wished our advice. After a long conversation in which we showed him it was not our work to select a country for him, he being the chief, he concluded,

1st — By deciding on removing to the neighbourhood of the present Buntingville.

2nd — He requested a letter to be sent informing the Government of his removal and also his letter respecting the country east of the Umzimvubu.

3rd — To desire the colonial government to protect him from the fire that he feared was coming from Natal, as he was a friend of the English.

During the conversation we embraced every opportunity of laying before him his own folly in his late Feticani attacks on the Abatembu, by which means he was left to bear the whole burden of meeting the fires that came from above instead of being made strong by friends behind him and that his conduct towards the Abatembu rendered it exceedingly difficult for us to urge his claim upon the Colonial Government as the Abatembu were friends of the English as well as the Amapondos and yet Faku had made war upon them. We urged upon him to cultivate peace and make friends with all parties, Ncapai, the Abatembus and others, so as to be prepared for what he so much dreaded.".

On 5 January they drafted the letter for which Faku had

121. Garner to Shaw, 23.12.40 (as in 100).
122. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92).
123. Ibid.
asked, stating the reason for his proposed withdrawal and declaring that he had not abandoned his claim to the land between the Umzimvubu and the Umzimkulu. 124

They then visited Ncapi who protested his innocence and gave an account of the raid. Knowing that he would make the most of the affair, and that people in the colony would be very sceptical of his story, they were at pains to ensure that their report was reliable.

"We.... carefully enquired into every particular," they wrote, "so that though it may be called kaffer news, yet we are fully satisfied that it is not exaggerated to any great extent. We heard the names of all the men that were killed, also the name of every master of the 62 kraals". 125

When Shaw heard the news, he did not hesitate to inform Napier who was in Grahamstown at the time. He forwarded Garner's first report on 30 December and asked what steps would be taken to protect Ncapi from wanton attacks by British subjects. 126 The Governor thought the evidence "too slight of itself to induce entire belief", but he had already heard from other quarters that an attack was contemplated. 127 He was afraid that this was

124. C.0.46/211: Faku to Napier, 5.1.41, enc. in Napier to Russell, 22.1.41. Also printed in F. Brownlee: Transkeian Territories Historical Records, p.70.
125. Journal of Missionaries (as in 92).
126. C.0.48/211: Shaw to Napier, 30.12.40, enc. in Napier to Russell, 6.1.41.
127. C.0.48/211: Napier to Russell, No. 3, 6.1.41.
only the first movement against the tribes between the colony and Natal, and that subsequent attacks would lead to chaos on the frontier. On the other hand, he knew Ncapi's reputation, and realised that the Trekkers might have had some just ground of complaint. Nor did he wish to do anything to impede an amicable settlement of the wider problems, with which he was grappling, raised by the Trek. He was therefore content to write to the Volksraad expressing the hope that the report would prove to be false, and warning them that such behaviour would force the British Government to take decisive measures. His strong language left no doubt that his humanitarian instinct had been offended.

When the detailed report came to hand, Shaw transmitted it to the Governor's private secretary, together with a private letter in which he drew attention to Fodo's warning and expressed the fear that the Trekkers would attack Faku unless prompt measures made it hazardous.

132. C.O.48/211: Shaw to Napier, 19.1.41, enc. in Napier to Russell, 22.1.41.
Shaw-Colonial Govt. Correspondence: Shaw to Moore-Craig, private, 18.1.41.
This put the matter in rather a different light. It confirmed the earlier report which was not more palatable for the addition of detail; and tended to substantiate persistent rumours that the Trekkers were trafficking in apprentices. The supposed threat to Faku introduced a new and more important consideration. He had come to be regarded as the ally and friend of the Government, and this gave him a claim to its protection. Moreover, it would be a serious matter for the colony if his powerful tribe were driven in among the Amaxosa. The welfare of the Amampondo and the security of the frontier were both in danger, and Napier agreed with Shaw that it was necessary to act, and to act quickly. 133

The missionary went further, and discussed some of the forms such action might take.

"There are but two measures," he remarked, "which would put an immediate stop to marauding excursions of the Boors in this direction, and these are, the instant seizure (by a British force) of Port Natal or the establishment of a strong military post on the Zimvooboo River. Either of these proceedings would probably produce a pause in the proceedings of the Boors and afford time and opportunity to negotiate with them through some well qualified and confidential agent of the government. To occupy both these points at once would have great influence in moderating the demands of the Boors during any negotiations". 134

134. Shaw—Colonial Govt. Correspondence: Shaw to Moore-Craig, private, 18.1.41.
Napier had already declined to re-occupy Port Natal, and he found no reason to change his views. The need was daily more apparent, and the position on the frontier was less dangerous than he had previously supposed, but he was determined to leave the decision to the unfettered judgement of the Home Government. A force on the Umzimvubu was a different matter. It would not infringe the alleged rights of the Trekkers, for they had never claimed any territory west of that river. Nor would it weaken the frontier defences, for it would be placed in the rear of the border tribes and would be in a good position for recovering booty. Furthermore it would facilitate any future occupation of Natal, and make it possible to negotiate with the Trekkers from a position of strength. Almost immediately he ordered Captain Smith to leave for Pondoland to protect the natives, giving him definite instructions not to enter into political discussion with the emigrants or to interfere in inter-tribal quarrels, and as a post on the Umzimvubu River does not appear to have been mooted before, this move was almost certainly a direct response to Shaw's suggestion.

136. Shaw-Colonial Govt. Correspondence: Moore-Craig to Shaw (private and confidential), 21.1.41.
137. C.O.48/211: Napier to Russell, 22.1.41.
138. C.O.48/211: Instructions to Captain Smith, enc. in Napier to Russell, 22.1.41.
The Ncapai Affair continued to engage the attention of the Wesleyans for several months to come. At the beginning of February Shaw was in Pondoland explaining the purpose of the expedition, advising the chiefs and missionaries, writing to his friends among the emigrants and investigating possible sites for the military post, which was eventually located near the sources of the Umgazi Rivers. The missionaries' report had appeared in the Grahamstown Journal and evoked a reply from Commandant Lombard who cast doubts on Ncapai's innocence and Garner's integrity. This spurred on the missionaries on the spot to investigate the affair more closely, while James Archbell also

139. C.O.48/211: Shaw to Hudson, 17.2.41, enc. in Napier to Russell, No. 13, 11.3.41. Shaw-Colonial Govt. Correspondence: Shaw to Moore-Craig (pvte and conf) 17.2.41; Shaw to Landman 14.2.41.


141. Bird: op. cit., I, p. 631-4: H.S. Lombard to Editor "Zuid Afrikaan", 10.2.41. The Grahamstown Journal reprinted this letter on 1.4.41 with the editorial comment:

"With regard to the attack on the Chief N'Capai, we have reason to believe that he was not so guiltless as, at the time, he pretended to be. His very character is presumptive evidence against him. He is one of the most noted as well as most active freebooters in South Africa."

142. JP: Palmer to Jenkins, Monday evening. C.J. Uys who arranged the Jenkins Papers dated this letter in August, but internal evidence suggests a date in the latter half of April or early May. It is clearly written after Lombard's letter appeared in the Grahamstown Journal, and before Shaw's reply which was published on 5 August. A letter (Contd.)
made enquiries when he visited Natal.  

In August Shaw addressed a letter to the Grahamstown Journal in which he argued with some force that the missionaries' report was reliable, and asserted that after a thorough sifting of the information, he now possessed "an overwhelming mass of evidence to prove that Ncapayi was entirely guiltless of any aggressive act.... and indeed that nothing had occurred to warrant even the smallest suspicion that (the stolen horses and cattle) had been taken into his country". This was a bold statement, and as he did not set it forth in any detail, it is impossible to assess the evidence. It is very likely that he and his colleagues were rather too anxious to exonerate the Amabaca.

Nevertheless, if they erred in this respect, the action of the missionaries in January was amply justified. The question of Ncapai's innocence was really a minor issue, for even if he was guilty, the surprise nature of the attack and the severity of the punishment were indefensible. It is true that Ncapai was treated in no

142. (Contd.) from Shaw to Jenkins dated 14.6.41 (JP) acknowledged a letter from Jenkins dated 12.5.41 containing remarks about the Ncapai Affair, and Palmer was probably referring to the investigations which resulted in this letter.

143. Shaw-Colonial Govt. Correspondence: Shaw to Hudson, 27.7.41; Shaw to Moore-Craig (pvt and conf) 27.7.41.

worse manner than he himself had treated the Abatembu and other tribes, but if the Trekkers wished to be considered superior to the natives it was reasonable to judge their conduct by more exalted standards. Moreover, Faku's appeal was more important than the vicissitudes of Ncapai in determining the Governor's policy, and once it is conceded that he had reasonable grounds for alarm, there can be no question that the missionaries were right to transmit that appeal to the Government. There is no doubt they were suspicious of the Trekkers and averse to their continued independence,¹⁴⁵ and this may have disposed them to overestimate the danger to Faku. It cannot be said, however, that they were blinded by prejudice or guilty of serious and deliberate exaggeration, and it is quite unnecessary to look for any motive less creditable than a desire to do their duty and to put a stop to bloodshed.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵. See page 43.

¹⁴⁶. cf. Shaw-Colonial Govt. Correspondence: Shaw to Landman, 14.2.41: "I know that many of your countrymen are unfortunately prejudiced against the missionaries and think that they are your enemies. But you know me and my brethren - you know that we never said or did anything to affront or injure you. And if we have now reported the attack on Ncapai to the government, it is only because it was our duty to do so and because we wish to see a stop put to all war and bloodshed. We do not desire to see the farmers injured, but we wish to see peace in the land..." cf. MMS: Missionary Notices, December 1842, p.217: Shaw, 21.7.42.
After the Ncapai Affair, Napier was extremely sensitive to any threat to Pondoland and the Eastern Frontier, and it was for this reason that he took a serious view of a scheme which was proposed by the Volksraad later in the year. On their arrival in Natal, the Trekkers had thought it was almost deserted, but after the defeat of Dingane the native inhabitants came out of hiding or returned to their homes, and their numbers were swollen by refugees from Zululand. Most of them were regarded as intruders with no right or claim to any part of the country, and even those who were acknowledged to be old inhabitants were begrudged their land and considered a nuisance. In July and August 1840 the Volksraad discussed the problem and decided that no more than five native families should be allowed on each European farm and that all others should be segregated in special areas. This was not carried into effect and the matter was raised again in the following year. In April 1841 there was talk of re-settling the native residents of Port Natal in the country between the Illovo and Umkomaas Rivers, and on 2 August, at a special meeting requested by the inhabitants of Port Natal, the Volksraad passed its longest and

148. eg. Preller (ed.): op. cit., p.58.
150. Preller (ed.): op. cit., p.110.
most ambitious segregation resolution.\(^{151}\) It was resolved to remove the natives to the area between the Umtamvuna and Umzimvubu Rivers, if necessary by force, and to place them under a chief captain or resident commander appointed by the Volksraad.\(^ {152}\)

If he heard of the earlier resolutions, Napier took no notice of them, but as far as he was concerned, this scheme differed in principle from those which had preceded it. Not only did he find the idea of coercion distasteful, but the area in question was claimed by Faku as well as by the Trekkers, and any attempt to occupy it might bring in its train all the consequences he had feared as a result of the Neapai Commando.\(^ {153}\) In approving his action on that occasion, Russell had instructed him to protect the chiefs,\(^ {154}\) and Napier now decided that this could best be done by resuming occupation of the Port itself.\(^ {155}\)


\(^{152}\) Ibid.


\(^{154}\) Bird: op. cit., I, p.640: Russell to Napier, 17.4.41.

\(^{155}\) Ibid. As in footnote 153.
This was only one of several factors leading to this decision, which was announced in a Proclamation on 2 December 1841. He was also influenced by the Trekkers' refusal to admit that they were British subjects, by his belief that the republic was falling to pieces, and by Lord John Russell's orders to take possession. Nevertheless, the segregation issue was specifically referred to as a reason for the occupation, and it owed its special significance to the Noapai Affair.

157. Ibid.
160. Bird: op. cit., I, pp.658-60: Proclamation, 2.12.41. C.J. Uys commented as follows on Napier's claim to have acted because of the segregation scheme and the refusal of the Trekkers to admit that they were British subjects:
"Yet it is remarkable that he took no steps earlier in the year to prevent them from carrying out their policy of 'segregation' and that he had ordered the troops to advance only after the Boers had abandoned it. The probabilities are, however, that Napier's step had been inspired rather by the Cape and Grahamstown merchants". (In the Era of Shepstone, p.12-13.)
He referred to a public meeting at Grahamstown on 30 October 1841 which was addressed by an Englishman named Toohey who spoke in glowing terms of the fertility and resources of Natal. A report of the meeting and the resolutions passed was published in the Grahamstown Journal, 4.11.41. A copy of the resolutions was sent to Napier on 30.11.41. (C.O.48/214: enclosure in Napier to Russell, 21.12.41). (Contd).
This had demonstrated the dangers of Trekker independence and set British policy on a course which led ultimately to its extinction. The attack on Ncapai had prejudiced Napier and put him on his guard; his subsequent action

160. (Contd). Uys ignored the passage in Napier's despatch of 6.12.41 (Bird: op. cit., I, pp. 660-666) in which he said that while Natal was doubtless fertile, its appearance did not incontestably prove that it was suitable for grazing or agriculture and continued: "It is of course the policy of the English settlers at Natal to colour and perhaps exaggerate its merits because the presence of the troops and a settled government would be peculiarly advantageous to them, as they are chiefly occupied in commerce and therefore look to increased trade...."

Napier continued to be sceptical of the commercial and economic prospects even when he was arguing for annexation in August 1842 (Bird: op. cit., II, pp. 84-86: Napier to Stanley, 23.8.42).

With regard to the other points made by Uys,
1. The segregation policy proposed in April did not involve territory claimed by Faku.
2. He apparently hesitated to act immediately he heard of the August resolutions because he heard of Stanley's succeeding Russell at the Colonial Office and decided to await his instructions (cf. J.P: Shaw to Jenkins, 12.10.41). When Russell's instructions arrived on 13 November (Cape: Incoming despatches) he changed his mind.
3. Napier had no intimation that the scheme had been abandoned when he issued the proclamation; and its abandonment is implied rather than stated in the Volksraad letter of 21.2.42. (Bird: op. cit., I, pp. 691-94)
4. The Trekkers had come no nearer to acknowledging themselves to be British subjects when the troops moved.

161. cf. Muller: Die Britse Owerheid en die Groot Trek, p.242. Napier's minutes on the letter from the Volksraad dated 7.4.41 were hostile. Of the plea that they had firm grounds for the attack, he remarked, "I do not believe one single word of all this humbug"; and again, "All this is a pure invention of their own".
had embittered the Trekkers;¹⁶² and the main purpose of Russell's instructions seems to have been to secure a cheaper and more convenient way of supplying Captain Smith's detachment.¹⁶³ Smith and his men arrived at Natal early in May 1842,¹⁶⁴ and on this occasion there was no withdrawal, for after considerable hesitation the British Government bowed to the inevitable and agreed to the annexation of Natal in December 1842.¹⁶⁵

The significance of the Isapai Affair for the Amampondo was even greater. Here at last the humanitarian concern of the missionary combined with the needs of frontier security to draw the Government decisively into the affairs of Pondoland. Captain Smith's detachment gave visible expression to a friendship that had hitherto been rather nebulous; Napier's reaction to the segregation proposal showed that his attention had been focussed on the area; and the annexation of Natal meant that the Amampondo became the immediate neighbours of a British

¹⁶². Bird: op. cit., I, p.691-9: Volksraad to Napier, 21.2.43. They were especially bitter against the missionaries - Preller (ed): op. cit., p.104f.
¹⁶⁴. Walker: The Great Trek, p.272
colony. The process which had begun in 1828\textsuperscript{166} had been carried far enough for the Amampondo to enter into a formal relationship with the Government.

\textsuperscript{166} See page 34.
CHAPTER IV

THE TREATY OF 1844

The native policy of the Cape in the period separating the frontier wars of 1835 and 1846 was a compromise between the opposing forces of humanitarianism and economy. This took the form of the "Treaty System" which shirked the task of governing the areas beyond the Orange and Fish Rivers and laid the burden of maintaining order on the shoulders of Griqua and African chiefs who were quite unable to bear it. It was an attempt to achieve regulation without responsibility and as such it deserved to fail, even if it was not necessarily doomed to do so.

Broadly speaking the treaties fell into two categories. The Northern Treaties with the Griquas Waterboer\(^1\) and Kok\(^2\) and the Basuto Moshesh\(^3\) were a half-hearted response to the penetration of the Trekkers beyond the Orange River, and were designed to control the relationships of black and white and to secure the land of the natives against

\(^1\) Macmillan: op. cit., p.50.
Cape P.P. 1857: "Treaties...with Native chieftains and others....between 1803 and 1854", p.13.

\(^2\) Macmillan: op. cit., p.214f.

\(^3\) Macmillan: op. cit., p.214f.
encroachment. They were also instruments of alliance pledging the chiefs to co-operate with the Government in maintaining peace and order on the northern border. In the case of the Griquas, at least, they were an alternative to annexation which Philip had warmly commended in 1833 and again in 1842 and which Napier would almost certainly have preferred. The Eastern Frontier Treaties, on the other hand, were an attempt to break away from the old system of raids and reprisals which had led to the War of 1835 and which the "extermination" policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban had promised to reproduce on the Kei border. As they superseded the modified policy of September 1835 which would have brought the bulk of the Amaxosa under British rule, they were also an alternative to annexation, although Stockenstrom hoped that they would demonstrate the advantages of civilised rule and lead ultimately to voluntary submission on the part of the tribes. Had the Government been prepared to police the border effectively and had the colonists been prepared to co-operate with Stockenstrom the system might have served its purpose, but as it was it

never had a chance. Late in 1840 Napier introduced amendments making it easier to recover stolen cattle but these did not still the clamour of Grahamstown. Suspicious, resentful and goaded on by drought the tribes became restless, and the authorities in their turn became nervous, especially in July 1844 when a farmer was shot while pursuing a stolen horse. In September and October 1844 Maitland paid a whirlwind visit to the Eastern Frontier and imposed new and stiffer treaties. Received with suspicion, they were no more effective than the old and the colony drifted inexorably into war with its native neighbours.

It was in the course of this descent upon the Eastern Frontier that Maitland entered into a Treaty of Amity with Faku. He signed it at Fort Beaufort on 7 October along with a treaty for Kreli. Both documents were entrusted to William Fynn and Theophilus Shepstone who saw Kreli on 4 November and then went on to Pondoland.

explained its meaning and purpose to the chief and his councillors, and on 23 November Faku and his eldest son Ndumase affixed their marks. The Amampond© were now the formal allies of the colony.

The Mpondo Treaty was a cross between the Northern and Eastern Frontier categories. It resembled the Northern Treaties in three particulars. In the first place Article XIII secured Faku's territory "against all claims or pretensions on the part of British subjects". This was obviously a reference to the Trekkers at Natal whose raid on Ncapai had done so much to bring the Amampond© to the notice of the Government. They had not given up their designs on Pondoland even when they submitted to British authority and in September 1843 the Volksraad had decided that the bulk of the natives should be removed beyond the Tugela River "and to the further side of the Umzimvubu". Commissioner Cloete had refused to countenance this ridiculous resolution which went further than that which had led to Napier's intervention in December

17. See page 52f.
1841, and as Natal was in the process of becoming a British colony it was unlikely to become a live issue. Nevertheless it was wise to set Faku's mind at rest, and there was a danger that at some future time the colonists might wander in search of grazing into the vacant lands beyond the Umzimkulu just as the trekboers had crossed the Orange River in the years before the organised Trek.

It further resembled the Northern Treaties in being an instrument of alliance. Faku was bound

"as the faithful friend of the Colonial Government (to) be ready at all times, when called upon by that Government, to aid and assist the Colony with all his captains and warriors in any enterprise which may be necessary for the protection of the Colony, or the promotion of the general welfare and security". 21

The potential enemy was not the Trekkers, but the frontier tribes whose restlessness had brought Maitland to the Eastern Province and Kreli whose father had been an enemy in the War of 1835. A concern for the security of the frontier had played a major part in drawing the Government into the affairs of Pondoland and there is little doubt that it was the most compelling reason for entering into the Treaty. Maitland explained to Stanley that it was

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20. See page 68f.
21. Article XI.
his immediate object

"to weaken the confidence of the neighbouring kafirs, and to restrain them... from... hostile operations... by the knowledge that... they would have in their rear an enemy more powerful than themselves, in alliance with the British Government, and ready to fall on them with overwhelming force". 22

With a naivety which suggests that his enthusiasm had run away with his judgement, he continued,

"The good effects of this information were speedily seen in the submissive spirit of the more refractory part of the kafirs". 23

Finally, the Mpondoland Treaty shared a deficiency of that with the Basuto 24 and defined Faku's boundaries without any reference to the exact extent of his authority.

According to Article XII,

"The Governor, admitting the rightful claim long since made by Faku, hereby acknowledges that he is the paramount chief of the whole territory lying betwixt the Umtata River from its mouth to the Waterfall water ford, thence along the ancient line of boundary between the Amapondo and Tambookie nations, to the Kahlamba mountains, on the west, and the Umzimkulu from its mouth along the principal western branch, to its source in the Kahlamba mountains, on the east, and from the coast inland to a line to be drawn along the base of the Kahlamba range of mountains between the sources of the said rivers". 25

22. P.P. 1851, XXXVIII (424): Waitland to Stanley, 7.12.44.
23. Ibid.
25. Article XII.
Maitland and his advisers were fully aware that this included the land of groups which were not an integral part of the Mpondo tribe. Eleven years later Shaw claimed that the long-deserted area between the Umtakatye and Umtata Rivers was placed under Faku merely because it was occupied occasionally by petty clans for whom the Government felt he ought to be held responsible, and the plateau beneath the Drakensberg (or Kahlamba) was probably included for a similar reason.

In the case of the Basuto Treaty the loose definition of Moshesh's boundaries had led to a dispute in which Shaw played a leading role. The French missionary, Casalis, had claimed that it excluded several miles of country which the Barolong occupied with the permission of Moshesh, but Shaw had argued that they were independent and had asked for separate treaties with their Chief Moroka and several other petty chieftains. In May 1844 Maitland had submitted the dispute to his Legislative Council which had decided that, if it were not settled in nine months, a declaratory article should be added to the treaty to the effect that

"... The limits of territory mentioned in the treaty are not to be understood as having been meant either to extend or restrict in any manner whatsoever, the rights which the Chief Moshesh may actually possess to any particular extent of country, nor in any manner to involve any species of guarantee upon the part of the Colonial Government of any territory whatever, but merely to specify the limits which were considered to be under the authority of the Chief Moshesh and in which he was expected to preserve order and tranquility as stipulated in the treaty".28

This almost certainly reflects the approach of the Governor to the present case, but to avoid the difficulties of the Basuto Treaty an article was added which guaranteed the territory against British subjects but also stated that

"... the rights of all petty chiefs who have at any period heretofore resided upon any part of the said territory remain unaltered, and they will be at liberty to reside within the said territory in the same manner as they did before they were disturbed by the wars with the Zoolah nation".29

This was most unsatisfactory. Did it mean that the petty chiefs had a right to land provided they acknowledged Faku as their paramount? On the other hand, if they were to be independent, how could Faku be held responsible for them? What, moreover, was the position of tribes such as the Amabaca who had come to Pondoland as a result of the

28. C.0.48/243: Minute of Legislative Council, 6.5.44, enc. in Maitland to Stanley, 22.7.44.
29. Article XIII.
Shaka Wars? The treaty-makers had not faced these problems and had based their policy on considerations of convenience rather than right. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment of Faku's paramountcy gave him a legal right which the Government could not justly ignore and paved the way for future trouble.

The Treaty was more closely related to the Maitland Treaties with the tribes on the Eastern Frontier and with Kreli. No less than eleven clauses were identical to Kreli's Treaty and several were identical or similar to those with the other Xosa tribes. This was because the Amampondé would occupy a similar position on the south-western boundary of Natal to that of these tribes on the Cape frontier, and also because Pondoland was apparently regarded as a possible receptacle for cattle stolen from the Cape by tribes nearer the border. Some of the articles were of little more than academic interest for some time after 1844, particularly those governing the surrender

31. P.P. 1851, XXXVIII (424): Maitland to Stanley, 7.12.44. In March 1844 there had been a panic on the south-western border as the result of a disturbance among Fodo's people which was at first supposed to have been caused by Ncapai. (C.0.43/247: Smith to Military Secretary, 8.4.44, enc. in Maitland to Stanley, 24.7.44).
32. cf. Article IV.
of criminals and production of witnesses to the British authorities.33 Others guaranteed protection for British subjects passing through the country or residing there with the permission of the Chief,34 and in Article VIII the Chief promised that he would not allow

"the masters or mariners of any ships or vessels to land merchandise, or to traffic with his people in any part of his country, unless such vessel shall be furnished with a licence from the Colonial Government, authorising them to land goods there."35

As in the case of Kreli's Treaty the arrangements for the return of stolen property were at the same time vaguer and more sweeping than those in the Frontier Treaties, for it was stipulated that

"All cattle, horses, or other property, stolen in any British territory in South Africa, and traced into the territory of the contracting chief, shall, if found therein, be restored on demand of any proper British authority, together with full compensation for the entire value of whatever property not found, shall yet be proved to have been stolen at the same time; and in case none of the stolen property traced to the Chief's territory shall be found therein, then full compensation shall be made for all the property so traced".36

An attempt was also made to eradicate the bane of inter-tribal warfare which so hindered and concerned the

33. Articles III - V.
34. Articles II, VII, VIII.
35. Article VIII.
36. Article VI.
missionaries and Faku was asked to give

"... his true word and promise that he will, as far as possible, avoid making war on any of the tribes by whom he is surrounded, and, to that end, that he will endeavour to settle his disputes with other chiefs by peaceful methods; and if, in any case, his just rights and privileges shall be violated, and the offending chiefs refuse to give redress, he will call upon the Colonial Government to mediate between him and the other chiefs, so that war may, if possible, be prevented".37

Finally, in an article which did not appear in either the Eastern Frontier Treaties or Kreli's, the Government promised Faku

"as much aid and assistance as possible, in order to protect the Amaponda nation from unjust and unprovoked aggressions, and to enable the contracting chief to fulfil his engagements entered into by this treaty".38

As a mark of friendship Faku was to receive an annual present to the value of £75 as long as he continued to observe the Treaty.39

Although it has not been possible to trace in detail the negotiations which issued in the Treaty, it is clear that the Governor and the Colonial Secretary consulted Shaw about it. The missionary may, indeed, have made the suggestion. He and his colleagues were the Europeans most

37. Article X.
38. Article XIV.
39. Article XVI.
concerned with the Amampondo, and in his 'Notes' Boyce had argued that treaties securing the boundaries of neighbouring tribes and settling a just system of international intercourse should be an essential corollary of any such annexation or colonisation as was now taking place in Natal. Ever since the Ncapai Affair Shaw had urged the claim of the Baca Chief for compensation and so kept the needs of the area prominently before the Government. Although there was no mention of a treaty in this correspondence it is possible that he proposed it after the Governor arrived in Grahamstown on the 11 or 12 September 1844 and even submitted a draft. This is suggested by a memorandum which he drew up at the request of the Governor and submitted to the Colonial Secretary on 16 September. In the course of this document which suggested several clauses which were later included in the new Frontier Treaties, Shaw wrote,

"His Excellency might also introduce some such article as that suggested in the draft of the proposed treaty with Faku for promoting the objects of the missions and the protection of the native Christians".

40. Boyce: op. cit., p.183f.
41. Shaw—Colonial Govt. Correspondence, passim.
42. He arrived at Port Elizabeth on 10 September (Macmillan: op. cit., p.248).
43. Cape G.H. 19/4: Shaw to Montagu, 16.9.44.
44. Ibid. Underlining mine.
There is no such draft in the bundle of papers labelled "Border Tribe Treaties and Miscellaneous Papers" in the Cape Archives, so it is only possible to guess at its authorship. It may have been drawn up by an official and shown to Shaw by Montagu or Maitland, but the flavour of the article to which Shaw was referring in the above quotation was so strongly missionary as to suggest that he himself was the author. It may also add weight to this hypothesis that Maitland did not mention Faku in his dispatch of 6 September 1844 which informed Stanley that he intended to change the Frontier Treaties.

Apart from the matter of the draft, Wesleyan influence may be detected in three further particulars. The first was the choice of the Umzimkulu as the boundary with Natal. The Trekkers claimed all the land east of the Umzimvubu on the basis of Dingane's grant to Retief, but Commissioner Cloete refused to acknowledge this cession except as showing the bona fides with which the Volksraad had granted farms. Cloete rejected all claims to the entire territory on the grounds that they had neither been occupied effectively nor received even the indirect sanction of Government. He had been instructed to make bona fide occupation the touchstone of every claim.

45. Cape G.H. 19/4.
46. C.O.48/244: Maitland to Stanley, 6.9.44.
47. See page 43.
As it had not registered any farms west of the Umzimkulu, and as he knew that Faku claimed land on the eastern bank of the Umzimvubu, Cloete decided that it would be best to define a boundary between these two rivers with the consent of Faku and Ncapai. This suggestion was forwarded to England in a despatch which crossed one from Stanley outlining the future constitution and boundaries of Natal, but leaving the definition of the south-western boundary to Maitland's discretion provided only that he did not include in the colony any district actually possessed or occupied by a well-established native tribe. Passing on this information on 12 October to Major Smith, the Commander at Port Natal, Attorney-General Porter observed that the Umtamvuna would be a proper boundary but added that the Treaty with Faku would probably have decided the point. This shows that the question had not been settled before the Governor left Cape Town. In his reply Major Smith argued for the Umzimkulu chiefly on the ground that Fodo's tribe lived immediately beyond that river. Theal assumed that this determined Maitland's choice, but in fact the letter was written more than a month after he had signed the Treaty and there is no evidence that

49. C.0.48/246: Cloete to Montagu, 5.1.44, enc. in Maitland to Stanley, 15.3.44.
51. C.0.48/247: Porter to Smith, 12.10.44, enc. in Maitland to Stanley, 10.12.44.
52. C.0.48/247: Smith to Porter, 12.11.44, enc. as above (51)
Smith had ever before expressed this view. On the other hand, there is in the same bundle as the Treaty a copy of the letter which had been written for Faku after the Ncapai Affair and claimed that the Umlizmkulu was his boundary. This points to the conclusion that it was his claim and the arguments of Shaw that decided the issue. Maltland did not consider this definition final, and told the Surveyor-General of Natal that he would be prepared to negotiate with Faku for any alteration that might be indispensable for a well-defined and easily-defended boundary.

In 1855 Shaw claimed that the provision saving the rights of petty tribes was inserted at his suggestion and there is no reason to doubt this. The Wesleyans were not concerned to aggrandize the Amampondo but to secure the land of the natives against European encroachment. In addition to their mission with Faku, they were at work among the Amabaca, and Shaw could not be accused of neglecting Ncapai's interests. Furthermore, the clause

54. Cape G.H. 19/4: Faku to Napier, 5.1.41.
55. For an examination of Shaw's reasons for pressing this claim, see page 44.
58. See page 26.
59. See page 93 (footnote 10).
in question was in entire harmony with Shaw's attitude to the Basuto Treaty. 60

It is hardly conceivable that the Article dealing with missionary activity should have had any other than a missionary origin. 61 Not only did it promise protection to all persons engaged in the work, but this protection was extended to Mpondo converts who were to be allowed to settle at or near any of the missionary villages and were not to be disturbed or injured in person or property for refusing to comply with customs touching "witchcraft, rainmaking, polygamy, circumcision, and forcible abduction and violation of women". The Chief further undertook to encourage his people to send their children regularly to the Christian schools. Shaw may also have been responsible for certain other articles which appeared for the first time in the Frontier Treaties of 1844 and were recommended in his memorandum, but this cannot be established. 62 Whatever the origin of these articles, there is no doubt that his contribution to the Treaty of 1844 was of considerable importance.

On the outbreak of the War of the Axe in 1846 the Frontier Treaties were consigned to the limbo of

60. See page 80.
61. Article IX.
62. Articles III, V, VIII.
unsuccessful expedients and in 1854 the Northern Treaties shared their fate. For over forty years, however, the Maitland Treaty with Faku remained — legally at least — the basis of relations between the Amampondo and the Colonial and British Governments. This is not explained by any intrinsic merit of the Treaty itself, for like all the others it was by no means a satisfactory document. Faku was bound to respect the rights of petty chiefs: but what were these rights and how did they affect his paramountcy? Faku promised to submit his quarrels to British mediation, but what form was this mediation to take and how was the British decision to be enforced? Faku undertook to surrender stolen cattle and to make compensation on the demand of "any proper British authority", but what constituted a "proper authority", who was to decide whether a theft was proved and who was to assess the amount of compensation? Other treaties had provided for a resident agent and had defined his duties: here there was no such provision. The relative success of the Treaty seems to have resulted from the isolation of Pondoland and from the presence of missionaries whose influence and advice was strong enough to affect the policy both of the Mpondo chiefs and the British authorities. With the advance of British rule and the decline of missionary prestige occasions of stumbling arose, the defects were made patent and the Treaty became an anachronism.
Insofar as it was intended to establish peace between Faku and his African neighbours, the Treaty soon proved to be ineffective. This is not surprising, for inter-tribal warfare was endemic in Bantu society, and nothing short of European control was to eradicate it. This was not simply because cattle-raiding was popular or a necessity of life, but even more because the tribal group was unstable. The nucleus of a tribe was related to the chief, but even the smallest included a number of aliens, and at this juncture a large number of foreign clans was associated with the Amampondo as a result of the Shaka Wars. However firm his grip upon the true Amampondo, Faku's paramountcy over these elements could only be exercised as long as they chose to accept his authority or he had the power to enforce it. It was therefore quite in accordance with Bantu usage that they should hanker after independence as they recovered their strength, and that frequent clashes should ensue. But apart from confirming the rights of petty chiefs, the Treaty did not recognise this fact. It spoke of the Mpondo nation,

1. Schapera: Government and Politics in Tribal Society, p.17
2. See page 12.
and assumed a measure of stability and central control which simply did not exist. Indeed, by acknowledging Faku to be "paramount chief of the whole territory lying betwixt the Umtata... and the Umzimkulu" the Treaty may be said to have served the cause of discord rather than peace. Bantu tribes claimed exclusive rights to the land they occupied, but a chief was spoken of as paramount over people rather than territory. Whatever his historical and theoretical claims, his territorial rights would in practice be closely related to the actual extent of his jurisdiction. Should a formerly subject clan assert its independence he would have the right to drive them out but if he failed to do so their land would in effect cease to be his. The Treaty, however, introduced a new conception and gave Faku a theoretical right to a large extent of country over which he had no control, and in spite of the provision for petty chiefs the Amam- pondo regarded this as an additional justification for attempting to subjugate their neighbours.

4. Article XII.
5. cf. Theal, Since 1795, II, p.396
7. Schapera: Government and Politics in Tribal Society, p.14f
8. See page 79f.
9. Vide eg. C.0.48/461: Minutes of Special Commissioners' Meeting at Emfundisweni, 28.3.72, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No. 100, 23.8.72.
The Treaty was first put to the test and found wanting by the quarrel between the Amampondo and the Amabaca. Initially the authorities seemed disposed to take some action. Shaw had pestered them to compensate Ncapai for his losses at the hands of the Trekkers, and it was probably for this reason that the Commander at Port Natal was instructed in January 1845 to propose a treaty with the Baca chief. This step was further recommended by an appeal from Faku who asked that Ncapai should be prevented from attacking him. Captain Kyle of the 45th Regiment was sent to Ncapai and was told to make any engagement conditional upon his keeping the peace. While negotiations were in progress hostilities broke out once more and Ncapai, who seems to have been the aggressor, was defeated and killed. His place was taken by his nephew, Mdushane, who was eager to conclude the treaty, but although the Natal authorities were favourable nothing concrete was done. A separate treaty would have ended

10. Shaw—Colonial Govt. Correspondence, passim. When the Cape Government finally said it was unable to pay compensation, (Montagu to Shaw, 5.1.44) Shaw submitted the correspondence to Beecham for transmission to the Colonial Office. (Shaw to Montagu, 1.3.44). Beecham does not appear to have done anything, and later developments seem to have been decided locally.

11. JP: Smith to Jenkins, 20.4.45; The instructions were dated 24.1.45, but Smith only received them on 22.3.45.


15. Cape G.H. 9/1: Moodie to Dushani, 3.6.46; (Contd).
the mischievous fiction that the Amabaca were Faku's subjects, but it is extremely unlikely that it would have settled the feud unless the authorities were ready to take more definite steps to keep the peace. This they were not prepared to do, for the tribes continued to quarrel after Ncapai's death, in spite of Faku's undertaking in the Treaty, and when Mdushane asked for Shepstone to be sent to set matters right he received an unhelpful reply.

"The Lieutenant Governor" he was told, "does not feel himself in a position to interfere between Faku and the other chiefs in his territory further than by calling his attention to his treaty with the British Government whenever it can be shown that that treaty has been infringed. His Honour is not at present sufficiently aware whether any breach of the treaty has been committed by Faku, or whether his proceedings may not have been provoked by some previous attacks upon his people". 17

Apparently Lieut. Gov. West was not even prepared to investigate.

If this was what British mediation amounted to, it is not surprising that Mdushane decided he would be better out of Pondoland. Some of his people had moved to Natal

15. (Contd.) P.P. 1847-8, XLII (980): Moodie to Secretary-to-Govt. of Cape, 18.6.46; Garner to Moodie, 12.4.47, both enclosed in Pottinger to Grey, 15.7.47.
17. C.O.179/2: Moodie to Garner, 2.3.47, enc. in Pottinger to Grey, 15.7.47.
in April 1846 and he followed them exactly a year later. West allowed them to settle on both sides of the main stream of the Umzimkulu and for two years they paid the hut tax. In 1850 the Government decided to treat this stream as the boundary and stopped collecting the tax on the southern bank, whereupon Mdushane and most of his fellow tribesmen who were still on the Natal side crossed the river to avoid payment. Even then they were well out of harm's way and the question of a treaty was not revived.

A small group of the Amabaca did not accompany Mdushane to Natal but remained in Pondoland under the widow of Ncapai. They moved thirty miles to the north of Shawbury, where the Tshungwana or Osborn Mission was commenced among them by Richard Hulley. Ncapai's son Silonyana (or Makaula) became their chief, and for the next twenty years

18. P.P. 1847-8, XLII (980): Shepstone to Sec.-to-Govt. of Natal, 8.4.46, enc. in Maitland to Gladstone, 26.5.46.
19. P.P. 1847-8, XLII (980): Garner to Moodie, 12.4.47, enc. in Pottinger to Grey, 15.7.47.
20. P.P. 1847-8, XLII (980): West to Pottinger, 28.5.47, enc. in Pottinger to Grey, 15.7.47.
22. Ibid.
they were engaged in sporadic warfare with the Amampondo of which the Government took no notice at all until 1862.

Another tribe with whom the Amampondo were in frequent collision was the Amampondomise, which had split into two sections as a result of dynastic quarrels. Umyeki's section had been driven from Pondoland in 1833 but returned later to settle in the neighbourhood of Shawbury under his son, Mbali, who was acting as regent for a grandson Mhlonhlo. Diko and his followers remained in Pondoland for a longer period but later withdrew for a time and settled west of the Umtata. The latter appear to have been the more powerful, and Diko's son Mditchwa (or Gqirana) figured prominently as an opponent of the Amampondo living west of the Umzimvubu. There was some attempt at official mediation in the 'fifties but the authorities did not take effective action until 1874.

24. e.g. Cape B.K.91: Jenkins to Maclean, 3.1.60; MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 17.6.66, 1.8.66.
25. See page 266, footnote 148.
26. For the history of the Amampondomise see F. Brownlee: Historical Records, p.113-7; Soga: op. cit., p.334f.
27. See page 36.
30. See page 166.
31. See pages 321f.
The most bitter and long-extended struggle, however, was against the Amaxesibe. The Amampondo contended that this tribe had been "children of Faku from olden time," but this the Amaxesibe indignantly denied. So far as the period before the Shaka Wars is concerned it is impossible to say which side was right, but when the country began to settle down once again after the defeat of the Amaqwabe, Jojo was certainly subordinate to Faku. During these troubles he and his grandmother, who was an aunt of Faku, had taken refuge among the Amampondo while the rest of the tribe fled towards the Umtata. After the death of his grandfather, members of the tribe began to return and there was soon trouble with Faku. For a time they sought refuge with the Amabaca but after the Ncapai Affair they returned to their old country on the Umsikaba River. Here Faku again endeavoured to assert his authority but Jojo and his councillors resisted his claims. There followed a long series of attacks and counter-attacks, and although on more than one occasion the Amaxesibe were

32. C.O.48/461: Minutes of Special Commissioners' Meeting at Emfundisweni, 28.5.72, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No. 100, 28.8.72.
33. Cape P.P. A105 - 1880: Minutes of Conference between Jojo and Orpen, 24-5 April 1874; P.P. 1880, LI (C2676): Memo by Brownlee, 4.7.80, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 22.6.80; The account of Mpondoland-Xesibe relations is based on these two documents.
34. See page 14.
forced to change their residence, they stubbornly and successfully maintained their independence. Passage of time only served to harden both sides, and in 1864 Mason remarked that "the Pondos are determined not to rest until the Xesibi submit; and the latter appear equally determined to fight to the last". In 1847 both sides appealed to Natal, but received the usual reply to the effect that the Government could not interfere and this policy, or rather lack of policy, was maintained for many years to come.

Much South African historiography seems to be based on the assumption that the word of an African is not to be trusted, but to conclude from the above evidence that Faku never intended to respect the Treaty in his dealings with other tribes would be less than just. The Amampondo referred their quarrels with the Amabaca and the Amaxesibe to the Government, probably at the suggestion of Jenkins, but in the former case official intervention did not

35. MMS: Mason to Secs., 23.5.64.
For evidence of fighting, in addition to documents quoted above, cf. Natal SNA 1/1/9: Statement of Umtengwane, 11.8.59; and MMS: Allsopp to Boyce, 10.5.66.

36. Natal CSO 11: Statements of messengers from Chief Nogobo and Chief Umyeki;
P.P. 1847-8, XLII (980): Message from Jojo, enc. in Pottinger to Grey, 15.7.47.

37. cf. Theal: Since 1795, II, p.188.
persuade Ncapai to keep the peace, and in the latter the authorities disclaimed all responsibility. Similarly when the other parties asked for action they were simply told to remain at peace, and this was no substitute for mediation. Whatever the defects of the Treaty as an instrument of peace\textsuperscript{38} it might have had a very different effect if the Colonial Government had not shirked its obligations. Their attitude is easy to appreciate for to have mediated between the tribes, and even more to have enforced their decisions, would have been to defeat the aim of 'regulation without responsibility'. Indeed the whole conception of British mediation in affairs which did not directly affect colonial interests savoured of missionary concern, and it may be that Article X embodied Shaw's ideals rather than Maitland's deliberate policy. But to extenuate is not to excuse, and the fact remains that the Government was disregarding a Treaty obligation. Faku's attacks were not always unprovoked, and he was only bound to avoid war "if possible". It is open to question whether he really wanted peace but this does not in any way absolve the Government of its share of the responsibility for the failure of the Treaty.

\textsuperscript{38} See pages 91f.
British mediation might have been expected to remove the missionaries from the sphere of inter-tribal politics, and to leave them in a more favourable position for their primary task of evangelism. That this was his hope is suggested by Shaw's advice to the missionaries in Pondoland in 1846:

"Keep yourselves, as far as possible, from all political affairs of the tribes.... Sometimes I know you cannot avoid entirely being mixed up with the affairs of your people; but let it be as little as possible, and always as their friends."  

Experience was to show, however, that it was not always possible for the missionaries to be the friends of all and the enemies of none, because of their relationship both to the station communities and to the tribes among whom they worked.

The former point was demonstrated during the struggle with the Amabaca. William Garner was amanuensis for Mdushane in his correspondence with the Natal Government, and seems to have performed his task unexceptionably, transmitting the Chief's messages with only an occasional word of explanation.  

But he was also in charge of Shawbury which was attacked by the Amampondo in February


1847, and this brought him into opposition to Faku. The missionaries had always endeavoured to keep their stations neutral and hitherto the Amampondo had respected this policy, but the ties between the station people and their tribal neighbours were very close and it is not surprising that it broke down occasionally. The raid in question was a reprisal for an incident which involved a Mpondo who was living at Shawbury and a local Baca clan. It had evidently taken place without Faku's knowledge, and on hearing of it he offered of his own accord to restore the cattle. He proved as good as his word, but although a first instalment of three-hundred-and-eighty-five head was duly delivered, a difference arose as to whether he had promised to return only the station cattle or also another four-hundred-and-seventy head which had been taken from the neighbourhood at the same time. This difference had not been resolved when Garner visited Pietermaritzburg in September 1847 and complained to the Government. The attack was assumed to be a breach of the undertaking to protect the missionaries and a native messenger was accordingly sent to Faku. This only served to complicate matters. The messenger's conduct at the Great Place

41. cf. LMS: Palmer to Secs., 14.11.36.
42. Article IX.
aroused much ill feeling; he quarreled with Garner; and finally he made off with a number of cattle, or so the missionaries believed. Garner in his turn had a violent argument with Faku, which only Jenkins prevented from becoming serious. Letters continued to pass between Natal and Pondoland and nine months later Shepstone decided that the Shawbury people had only themselves to blame, and that the Government's intervention had caused injustice to the original sufferers. If this was the best mediation the Government could offer, it is perhaps as well that it did not intervene more often. This incident set a precedent and in subsequent years there were several clashes between the Amampondo and the people of Shawbury and Osborn, who came to be regarded with hostility and suspicion.

Jenkins was very critical of Garner's conduct which certainly lacked wisdom, but his own case was to show the danger of his intimate connection with the Amampondo. Because the Government would not intervene, he was the only person who could have hoped to mediate in the conflict

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43. This paragraph is based upon the correspondence between Garner and the Natal Government already cited, and upon documents in the Volume NA 1 in the Natal Archives.

44. JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 23.10.52; 5.11.52; 12.11.52. Charles White to Jenkins, 21.7.55.; MMS: Cameron 17.6.66; 1.8.66.

between the Amampondo and the Amaxesibe. On one occasion at least he did intervene, while at other times he tried to restrain Faku. But he could not claim to be impartial, for rightly or wrongly he shared the view that the Amaxesibe were Faku's subjects. Jojo was suspicious of him, especially after the foundation of Emfundisweni which he regarded as an attempt to dispossess his people "with a thing begotten by government that I could not attack". It is difficult to believe that any such consideration occurred to Jenkins, but Jojo's fears seemed to be confirmed when the Amampondo began to rest at the station before and after their attacks, and this may well have been in Faku's mind when he proposed to move. In 1864 Eva complained,

"... we endeavour as much as possible to persuade them (the Amaxesibe) that we are the general friends of them all, but we cannot succeed in making the other tribes believe that Mr. Jenkins in particular does not advocate the interests of the Amampondo only".

In yet another respect, therefore, the Treaty did not measure up to expectations.

46. MMS: Missionary Notices, March 1859, p.52: Jenkins 27.9.58.
48. Ibid.
49. Cape A105, P.1880: Minutes of Conference between Jojo and Orpen, 24-5.4.74.
50. MMS: Eva to Secs., 17.3.64; 16.3.65.
51. See page 28.
52. MMS: Pearse to Hoole, 7.4.60.
It was also of very doubtful value as an instrument of alliance against the Amazosa, for the Amampondo were hardly useful allies in either of the wars which broke out within seven years of its being signed. The War of the Axe commenced in April 1846. In May the Gaika and Ndlambe tribes invaded the colony, and east of the Kei the excitement was such that the Europeans in Kreli's country withdrew, first to Clarkebury and then to Buntingville. In Government circles there was some division of opinion about the use of native allies. Colonel Hare thought it advisable to call them out, not only to embarrass the enemy but also to prove that this was not a war of the races. For all his earlier enthusiasm, Maitland was of a different mind. On the one hand, he did not want to invite their assistance lest it extend the area of the war and appear to be an acknowledgement of weakness. On the other hand, he did not wish to restrain them should they wish of their own accord to attack the hostile tribes. It is not improbable that Shaw had a hand in shaping his attitude for he occupied a

55. P.P. 1847, XXXVIII (786): Maitland to Grey, 14.10.46. Maitland's policy was severely criticised in the minutes on this despatch in C.0.48/266.
position of some influence, and had frequent opportunities of communicating with the Governor. There is no proof that he discussed this subject with him, but it is certain that he feared the consequences of a collision between the Amampondo and the Amagcaleka, in which he believed the former would stand little chance, and it is not unlikely that he expressed this fear to those in authority.

Be that as it may, the Governor prevailed, and when William Fynn, who had been resident with Kreli, reported that Faku was eager to punish the Amagcaleka, and asked for specific instructions, he was simply informed that the Gaika, Ndlambe and Gcaleka tribes were no longer under British protection. This statement of the obvious was no reply to his enquiry, but in fact he had already received a clearer description of Government policy from another quarter. His brother Henry, who was resident with the Abatembu, had discussed it with Sir Andries Stockenstrom, and informed William that

56. JP: Shaw to Wesleyan Missionaries, 18.8.46. He was a member of the Board of Relief (Gory: op. cit., IV, p.443) and advised Maitland on the resettlement of the "ceded territory" (JP: Shaw to Wesleyan Missionaries, 23.12.46.)

57. JP: Shaw to Wesleyan Missionaries, 18.8.46.

58. P.P. 1847, XXXVIII (786): W. Fynn to Major Smith, 19.5.46; Cloete to W. Fynn, 25.6.46; enclosed in Maitland to Grey, 14.10.46.
"The Government have no desire to call to their aid any native tribes in the punishment intended to be inflicted on those tribes at war with the colony. It is no longer the wish of government to restrain such chiefs who may be desirous of making war upon their own account... at the same time you will be authorised to inform those chiefs that any cattle taken from the tribes at war with the colony will not be claimed from them by the government. The government will however be displeased and in no way consider as friends such chiefs as may plunder the Tambookie... in the neighbourhood of Clarkebury".  

It was easier at headquarters than in Pondoland to distinguish between positive encouragement and a negative failure to restrain. Fynn probably thought he was observing the spirit of the Government's policy, but instead of sitting on the fence as was clearly intended he came down decisively on the side of encouragement. Faku was eager to help, but he was unfriendly with the Amabaca and the Amaxesibe. Fynn therefore visited these tribes himself, and when the chiefs agreed to the venture he arranged for them to take the field in such a way as both to aid and to avoid each other! In spite of missionary disapproval Mdushane was safely despatched in the direction of Clarkebury, but on his return to Buntingville Fynn was astonished to find that the Rev. F.P. Gladwin had met Faku's army at that place and persuaded them to turn back. Mdushane

waited for a few days in the vicinity of Clarkebury, but when the others did not come up he fell upon the very people whom the Government had been concerned to protect. Fynn ordered him, and the Clarkebury and Shawbury parties who had been with him, to restore the booty, and denounced Gladwin's intervention as the cause of the fiasco. It is not surprising that he was annoyed, for in his eyes Gladwin's action and the general attitude of the missionaries savoured of deliberate obstruction of the Government cause. This was a natural impression, but was almost certainly mistaken. It is very likely that they knew as much as Fynn about the policy of Government, but drew different conclusions from their information. They probably shared Shaw's fear of a collision with the Amagcaleka, and in the absence of a positive request for assistance thought themselves justified in opposing anything that might bring this about.

60. P.P. 1847, XXXVIII (786): W. Fynn to H.F. Fynn, 1.9.46; Natal CSO 37: W. Fynn to Moodie, 1.9.46. (Enc. as in 58)

61. It is only possible to infer the reasons for their conduct, for the Jenkins correspondence contains only the letters from Shaw to the missionaries. Shaw's fears about a collision were expressed in his letter of 18.8.46 which probably came to hand before Gladwin intervened, and they may well have arrived at his opinion independently. It is also reasonable to suppose that Fynn attempted to obtain their support, and in doing so divulged the contents of his brother's letter of 23.6.46. Shaw's letter of 18.8.46 is the only one extant that could have reached them before the intervention, and it does not mention the Government policy.
It was early September when the Governor heard of Fynn's endeavours, probably from Shaw who was in touch with his colleagues in Pondoland. He immediately asked for a full explanation of his conduct, and at last provided him with explicit instructions. News of Mdushane's escapade arrived not long afterwards and elicited an apologetic message to the Tembu paramount. In view of his unofficial information, Fynn appears to have been at fault in acting as he did. On the other hand Maitland had only himself to blame for the embarrassment that ensued, for he had ignored a plain request for specific instructions and did not give Fynn any clear account of his policy until he took him to task for failing to carry it out! Although it was at this time that Shaw advised the missionaries to keep clear of politics, he approved of Gladwin's interference with Faku. It was evidently enough for him that

62. In his letter to the Wesleyan Missionaries on 18.8.46 Shaw told them he had frequent opportunities of communicating with the Governor and asked them to write fully "as some of your information may be of great value in various respects". Maitland's information about the movement of Faku came from an unofficial source, (P.P. 1847, XXXVIII (786): B. Maitland to W. Fynn, 13.9.46) and that this source was Shaw is suggested by the latter's letter to the missionaries on 26.9.46 which is clearly a reply to one from them in which they had described Fynn's preparations and indicated that they disapproved of them, at any rate so far as Mdushane was concerned.

63. P.P. 1847, XXXVIII (786): B. Maitland to W. Fynn, 13.9.46, enc. in Maitland to Grey, 14.10.46.
64. P.P. 1847, XXXVIII (786): B. Maitland to Umtirara, 22.9.46, enc. in Maitland to Grey, 14.10.46.
65. See page 100.
this action had been politically wise and had in fact co-incided with the wishes of the Government. Maitland gave way to Pottinger at the beginning of 1847, but the change of Governor had no effect upon this aspect of policy. The war dragged on until the end of 1847 and on two occasions expeditions entered the Transkei, but no assistance was sought from the Amampondo or any other ally.

The pattern of events in the war of 1850-3 was rather different for Sir Harry Smith had no qualms about using native assistance. As soon as hostilities began in December 1850 he asked Lieut. Gov. Pine for a force of three thousand Zulus to act on the rear of the Gaikas. Pine was ready to help, but few people in Natal shared his enthusiasm. Faced with the prospect of delay if not defeat he wrote to Henry Fynn, now the resident in Pondoland, suggesting that he should gather three thousand men from Faku's and neighbouring tribes and advance to the rescue. For reasons that will later become clear.

68. Cory: op. cit., IV, p.510; V, p.52.
70. C.O.179/17: Pine to Smith, 4.7.51, contains a full account of the incident. See also Lindsay Young: The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal 1850-5 - Archives Year Book 1951 Part 2, p.254-69.
71. See page 120f.
72. C.O.179/14: Pine to Fynn, 21.2.51, enc. in Pine to Grey, 31.5.51.
73. See pages 147 - 158.
Fynn had completely lost the confidence of Faku, and there was no prospect of his raising a Mpondo force. But Pine's letter had continued

"If by your personal influence you can induce any tribes from the southern part of this district to join you, you have my consent to taking them, and if you go, throw the whole responsibility of the measure upon me and use this letter".74

His main effort was therefore directed towards the raising of a levy from the tribes living in Natal south of the Umkanzani River. A force of about three thousand men was assembled, but such were the difficulties encountered that it was disbanded at the end of May. This proved to be in accord with the wishes of Sir Harry who had long given up hope of assistance and whose policy had been criticised at the Cape.75

In the course of 1851 serious doubts were cast on the loyalty of Faku. There was no immediate danger of his joining Krell for they had quarreled just before the outbreak of war,76 but suspicions were aroused by his unfriendly attitude to the Natal force,77 and his dealings with

74. C.0.179/14: Pine to Fynn, 21.2.51, enc. in Pine to Grey, 31.5.51.
75. C.0.179/17: Pine to Smith, 4.7.51; P.P. 1851 XXXVIII (1380): Gladwin to Smith, 14.4.51; Smith to Gladwin, 17.4.51, enc. in Smith to Grey, 19.4.52.
76. P.P. 1851 XXXVIII (1334): Mackinnon to Smith, 8.12.50, enc. in Smith to Grey, 12.12.50.
77. JP: Shepstone to Jenkins, 26.4.51; Pine to Jenkins, 7.5.51.
the witchdoctor Umlanjeni and the Gaika Chief Sandile, who were leading opponents of the colony. Understandable as these suspicions may have been, they had very little foundation. Fynn insisted that he had told Faku the object of the force before he left Pondoland, but even if he had done so his recent dealings with Natal were enough to justify the chief's alleged fear that he would be attacked. The embassy to Umlanjeni, which also visited Sandile, was easily construed as an offer of assistance, but Faku protested repeatedly that he only wanted to discover who was responsible for the death of his mother and a wife, and in the light of African beliefs about witchcraft and of subsequent events, there is little reason to doubt him.

At the end of the year Smith resolved to put Faku's loyalty to the test. The position of Kreli had been ambiguous: outwardly he was well-disposed to the Government, but in fact he was harbouring rebel hottentots who

78. P.P. 1852 XXXIII (1428): Smith to Grey, 18.9.51; Fynn to Garvock, 25.9.51, enc. in Smith to Grey, 15.10.51. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 30.9.51.
80. P.P. 1852 XXXIII (1428): Fynn to Garvock (as in 78); Natal CSO 41: Fynn to Moodie, 21.10.51; Faku to Pearse, 6.11.51. JP: Smith to Faku, 27.11.51.
had plundered trading stations in his country, and he was thought to be more directly implicated in the hostilities.\textsuperscript{81} When four waggons belonging to a trader named Crouch were plundered on 26 September,\textsuperscript{82} Sir Harry decided that Kreli should be "most effectually and thoroughly humbled",\textsuperscript{83} and preparations were made to invade his country. A message was sent to Faku calling him to fall on Kreli, and warning him that if he did not respond his resident would be withdrawn and his subsidy suspended.\textsuperscript{84} Faku was not to act alone. In April 1851 Matthew Ben Shaw, a son of the missionary, had been appointed "Mediator" with all the tribes beyond the Bashee who had no British resident.\textsuperscript{85} He claimed to have come to a good understanding with the young Tembu chief Joye and a Fingo named Ludidi, and Smith was relying upon their assistance as well.\textsuperscript{86} The British forces crossed into the Transkei on about 20 December and remained there for six weeks.\textsuperscript{87} Meanwhile M.B. Shaw was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} Cory: op. cit., V, p.433.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Cory: op. cit., V, p.434.
\item \textsuperscript{83} P.P. 1852 XXXIII (1428): Smith to Grey, 15.10.51.
\item \textsuperscript{84} JP: Smith to Faku, 27.11.51.
\item \textsuperscript{85} P.P. 1851 XXXVIII (1380): Smith to Grey, 5.4.51 and encs.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{87} P.P. 1852-3 LXVI (1635): Smith to Grey, 13.1.52 and encs.; Cory: op. cit., V, p.435-9.
\end{itemize}
feverishly endeavouring to mobilise the tribes beyond the Bashee. They Ndamase and Ludidi left Morley with three thousand men on 23 December. They crossed the Bashee and captured some cattle, but were worsted by the Amagcaleka before they joined Colonel Mackinnon's column on New Year's Day. Faku’s assistance did not materialise. He assembled his army but was unable to cross the swollen Umzimvubu. The British withdrew from Butterworth on 14 January, and a fortnight later M.B. Shaw was told to suspend hostilities except in self-defence.

In April 1852 Cathcart took over from Smith and in August he too invaded Krell's country. The expedition only remained beyond the Kei for ten days, during which time ten thousand cattle were seized. Once again M.B. Shaw made preparations to assist, but the Governor had withdrawn before the tribal commandos were ready to

88. JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 23.12.51.
89. JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 24.12.51.
90. P.P. 1852-3 LXVI (1635): Mackinnon to Somerset, 4.1.52, enc. in Smith to Grey, 13.1.52.
91. P.P. 1852-3 LXVI (1635): Smith to Grey, 16.2.52.
114.

take to the field.96

The roles of the Wesleyan missionaries in the wars of 1846 and 1851 were as different as the policies of the respective governors. In 1846 they had favoured the neutrality of the Amampondo. Now it was William Shaw who told Sir Harry Smith that Joye and Ludidi wished to join the British cause, and suggested that Matthew Ben should be appointed mediator in the Transkei.97 By so doing he prepared the way for these chiefs and Faku to be called out against the Amagcaleka. The main reason for his apparent change of view was probably the extremely serious situation in the early months of 1851. The old year had closed with the British on the defensive; in the new year disaffection had spread, first to the hottentots of the Kat River Settlement, and then to the Cape Corps; and before the end of March hottentot rebels were taking refuge with Kreli and had sacked a store near Butterworth.98 The colony needed allies far more than in 1846, and Gladwin at least among the Wesleyan missionaries agreed with Smith that it was important to have a force in the rear of the

96. JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 23.7.52 and 28.7.52. William Shaw to Jenkins, 23.10.52.
97. P.P. 1851 XXXVIII (1380): Smith to Gladwin, 17.4.51, enc. in Smith to Grey, 19.4.51.
98. Cory: op. cit., V, passim.
enemy. Smith had at first hoped that the Natal detachment would fulfil this purpose, but by the middle of February it was thought in the colony that the scheme had been abandoned. The assistance of these tribes presented an alternative, and to Shaw that alternative was the lesser evil, for he had been afraid that a Zulu force might be mismanaged. Nevertheless he was no more eager than before to see them at war with the Amagcaleka and he was obviously relieved when they were not committed in the campaign of Governor Cathcart. On the spot also the missionary attitude was different. If Garner is to be believed, he and his colleagues were largely responsible for mobilising the tribes in December 1851, and the correspondence certainly shows that Jenkins acted as a means of communication between M.B. Shaw and Faku.

The principle of the neutrality of stations was thrown to the winds, and the missionary institutions took part in the hostilities of December 1851 and were ready to do so again in August 1852.

100. JP: Shaw to Wesleyan Missionaries, 20.2.51.
101. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 1.7.51.
102. JP: William Shaw to Jenkins, 23.10.52.
103. Cape BK 77: Garner to Maclean, 20.10.55; JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 23.12.51, 23.7.52, etc.
104. P.P. 1852-3 LXVI (1635): M.B. Shaw to Governor's private secretary, 1.7.52, enc. in Cathcart 20.7.52. Natal CSO 19: M.B. Shaw to Sec.-to-Govt.-Natal, 3.7.52. JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 28.7.52.
It is apparent, therefore, that the Wesleyan missionaries were not opposed in principle to the use of the Amampondo and other tribes as allies of the colony, but allowed their attitude to be moulded by circumstances. Their role in 1851-2 differed from that in 1846 principally because the policies of the Governors were different. There were other influences at work: in December 1851 they were probably anxious to prove the loyalty of Faku;\textsuperscript{105} in August 1852 they may have hoped, like M.B. Shaw, that the participation of the stations would impress the new Governor in favour of missions;\textsuperscript{106} but more powerful than these was their concern to "Fear God and Honour the King". This was enjoined upon them by their Instructions\textsuperscript{107} and was common to their attitude in both wars.

These wars afforded further proof that it was impossible for the missionaries to keep clear of politics. Their real problem was not whether they should become involved or remain completely neutral; but to what extent they should intervene and how they should balance the sometimes conflicting claims of patriotism and a concern for the welfare of the tribes with whom they worked. The nature of this problem is clear enough, but the evidence is

\textsuperscript{105} JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 30.9.51.
\textsuperscript{106} JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 28.7.52.
\textsuperscript{107} MMS: W.M.M.S. Reports: Instructions to Wesleyan Missionaries.
insufficient to show in detail how it was tackled except in the case of Jenkins and the Amampondo. After the expedition of December 1851 Jenkins wrote officially to M.B. Shaw explaining why Faku had been unable to join the allied force and stating that he was now prepared whenever the Governor should call upon him. When the call came, M.B. Shaw understandably passed it on to Jenkins and asked him to tell Faku. This he refused to do, but he expressed himself ready to advise Faku should the latter ask his opinion. It was implied that this advice would be favourable to his going out as required by treaty. The message was therefore delivered by some other means and, as M.B. Shaw had expected, Faku arranged a meeting of chiefs to discuss the matter with Jenkins. What transpired is not on record, nor is it of much concern for it is the missionary's attitude that is significant. He was prepared to advise the chief at his own request, but was anxious not to appear to be initiating policy or making suggestions. This attempt to dissociate himself from the requests of Government and other parties and to leave the responsibility of decision unmistakably
with Faku was typical of Jenkins' approach to the political affairs in which he was involved.

Experience of the Treaty belied the more extravagant hopes of those who had designed it. It did not establish peace among the tribes of Pondoland; it did not provide a powerful and dependable ally in the rear of the Amazosa; and it did not allow the missionaries to escape from political responsibilities and to give themselves wholly to evangelism. Such disappointments were in some measure inevitable, for nothing short of European administration could have fully attained these ends. On these counts therefore the verdict must be unfavourable to the Treaty policy, but there are extenuating circumstances. If it failed to produce harmony and to desecularise the missionaries, it did so partly because the Colonial authorities had neither the will nor the means to fulfil their obligations; and if it did not ensure positive assistance in time of war, it had the negative value of making it more likely that Faku would remain neutral to save his subsidy. It failed more completely than it need have done because it was not given a chance to succeed, and even in failure it was not without its worth. The role of the missionaries in these affairs suggests a further reflection. If they were unable to escape from politics, neither did they
occupy a position of Olympian detachment from which they could judge the issues impartially and act accordingly. Whether rightly or wrongly they were identified by other tribes with the cause of the people among whom they worked; and in dealings with the Government they could not forget that, if they were advisers of the chief, they were also subjects of the Queen. Their position was delicate and called for careful statesmanship which was not always forthcoming. In Thomas Jenkins, however, the Amampondo had a missionary who was aware of this difficulty and was endeavouring to overcome it, albeit with only partial success.
CHAPTER VI
RAIDERS - BLACK AND WHITE

Between 1848 and 1851 British interests in Pondoland were represented officially by Henry Francis Fynn who held the post of Resident Agent or Assistant Commissioner. After the war of 1834-5 it had become usual to appoint such officials with tribes beyond the colonial boundary and attention had been given in the Treaties to the definition of their duties. Faku's Treaty, however, contained no reference whatsoever to this subject. Whatever the reason for this omission, the situation was brought into line with that existing elsewhere when William Fynn withdrew from Krelis country in 1846. He was already known to Faku as one of the Government officials who had concluded the Treaty, and as Jenkins had been trapped in the colony and Palmer had died, it was natural that he should become his chief European adviser. Although he does not seem to have received an official appointment, Fynn carried

   Macmillan: op. cit., p.158. The first appointment was made among Waterboer's Griquas in 1822 - Macmillan: op. cit., p.37.
3. P.P. 1847 XXXVIII (786): W.D. Fynn to Major Smith, 19.5.46, enc. in Maitland to Grey, 14.10.46.
4. See page 76.
5. JP: Shaw to Wesleyan Missionaries, 18.8.46.
out the duties of Resident until the end of the war, when he returned to his post with Kreli. Sir Harry Smith decided to continue the arrangement, and Henry, who was William's brother, arrived to take up his duties in August 1848.

Announcing this appointment to Faku, Sir Harry wrote

"I send back your older friend Fynn, in order that you may communicate with me direct, and that he may assist you and your people and the missionaries".

His first reason was clear enough, but the term "assistance" could have meant anything, and in the absence of his instructions to Fynn it is impossible to say how exactly Smith interpreted it. The Treaties with the chiefs on the Eastern Frontier had made it quite clear that there the agent's duties were diplomatic, but it would be hazardous to identify Sir Harry's views with those of Stockenstrom and Maitland. Nevertheless, Shaw believed that here too the agent was a diplomat, and strictly speaking he was probably right. But was it realistic to insist too strongly that Fynn was merely

7. See page 105f; Natal CSO 19: Moodie to W. Fynn 30.8.46; Fynn to Moodie 9.10.46
8. C.0.48/285: Smith to Grey, 20.4.48.
   Natal NA Miscellaneous letters 1846/9: Jenkins to Shepstone, 7.8.48.
9. C.0.48/285: Smith to Faku, 3.4.48, enc. in Smith to Grey, 20.4.48.
11. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 22.5.50.
"the eyes and ears of Government", and to assert that he had the right to report to the Government but not to interfere in any way? This might be the legal position, but was it tenable? Shaw himself could remark that Faku acted childishly, and it might be argued that in such circumstances legal niceties were best forgotten, and that the agent had no option but to pass from persuasion to actual interference if the Treaty was to be of any practical use whatsoever. To embark upon this course was to walk along a razor's edge, but this is what Henry Fynn chose to do, and the question arises how far his conduct was either justified or wise.

As the greater part of Fynn's work was concerned with the dealings of the Natal authorities and the Amampondo, it is also appropriate at this juncture to consider what bearing the Treaty had upon their relationships, and in particular whether it solved the problem of stock theft and checked the tendency to expand southwards which had been evident in republican days. An examination of these topics will make it possible to reach some conclusion about Henry Fynn.

12. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 16.8.49.
13. JP: Do. to do., 22.5.50.
14. Ibid.
The problem of stock theft was not relieved and cattle continued to disappear in the direction of Pondoland. It is significant, however, that accusations were levelled, not against people directly subject to Faku, but against bushmen who were supposed to live within his Treaty state. Faku was legally responsible for their conduct but in fact he had neither the will nor the power to exercise this responsibility. When a large herd disappeared in February 1846 and Faku was asked to restore it,\textsuperscript{15} he did not bother to reply, and some months later the authorities heard that he had disclaimed responsibility and had asked assistance in dislodging the alleged robbers.\textsuperscript{16} This incident did not stand alone\textsuperscript{17} and in September the Executive Council decided to send a small party in search of the bushmen. It was also resolved to ask Faku and Mdushane to co-operate with a larger party should that prove necessary.\textsuperscript{18} This commando did not materialise and when Henry Fynn took up his duties the situation was unchanged.

\textsuperscript{15} Natal CSO 19: Moodie to Faku, 17.2.46.
\textsuperscript{16} Natal CSO 19: Moodie to W. Fynn, 30.8.46.
\textsuperscript{17} P.R. 1847/3–LXII (86): Moodie to Montagu, 9.10.46, enc. in Maitland to Grey, 7.11.46.
\textsuperscript{18} Cape GH 9/1: Minutes of Natal Executive Council, 15.9.46 and 17.9.46.
Punitive action was again considered in December 1848 and Fynn was asked to be ready to assist. Once more nothing was done, but Fynn took his duties seriously and did not let the matter drop. In the next few months he assembled evidence from various native sources which led him to suspect that the bushmen were in league with a petty Baca chieftain named Cetwa, the chief Mandela (alias Diko) who lived beyond the Umtata, and Hans Lochenberg of Buntingville who was acknowledged as chief by a number of Fingoes and others. Among his informers was Noapai’s widow who said she was afraid to act against the bushmen in opposition to Cetwa and warned Fynn that he was intending to move further inland. On 4 April he reported this to the Government and promised to secure Faku’s co-operation with any force that might have been sent against the Amabaca. In the course of April his suspicions were intensified, and as there was no response from Natal he decided to take the initiative. Cetwa and Lochenberg were told to come and explain themselves. Cetwa delayed for the better part of a month, and when he

21. Ibid.
eventually arrived protesting his innocence, Fynn arrested him and called upon Faku to punish his people in accordance with the Treaty. Faku needed no second invitation to attack the Amabaca and on 2 May a commando seized an unspecified number of small stock and one-hundred-and-forty cattle, of which Fynn sent ninety to Natal. They also took one-hundred-and-eleven cattle from some of Lochenberg's dependants, but as he had not yet responded to the summons they were left with Faku until his case could be investigated. Fynn had been told of Lochenberg's men taking over cattle from the bushmen and he also believed that Mandela had secretly tendered allegiance to him. When he appeared on 7 May, therefore, Lochenberg was told the cattle would be detained until he could give ample proof that he was not responsible for the thieves. He denied the charges, and continued to do so when he visited Fynn again on 25 June. On this occasion he also reported that Umdwebo, the leader of the bushmen, was claiming to be innocent, and had said he was ready to lead Fynn to the

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
guilty parties who lived further up the Umzimvubu. Fynn's reply was short and to the point: "Your mere statement without any corresponding evidence is of no effect. The cattle remain."  

By this time he was smarting under criticism from the missionaries. They seem to have thought at first that the attack was simply another round in the quarrel between the Amampondo and the Amabaca, and they did not need Shaw's advice to hold themselves aloof. Nor did they interfere immediately it became clear that Fynn was involved.  

It was only on 22 June that they called his conduct into question, probably after they had heard what Lochenberg had to say. They did not dispute his right to call upon Faku to punish the Amabaca but accused him of having acted without full investigation. Having given it as their opinion that the Amabaca were innocent and that there was good evidence against the Amatola bushmen, they

30. Ibid.
31. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 25.5.49.
32. JP: Do. to Do., 30.6.49.
expressed the hope that he would investigate the matter again and make full restitution to the injured parties. Their account of Fynn’s behaviour in this and other matters annoyed Shaw intensely. Far from regretting their intervention, he advised them to tell Faku and Ncapai’s widow to ignore Fynn when he tried to interfere:

"Tell them plainly our government have not sent Fynn to be a ruler in the land, but only as the eyes and ears of the Government."

He told the Governor informally what he thought and considered lodging an official complaint.

34. Cape GH 8/23: Wesleyan Missionaries to H. Fynn, 22.6.49.
35. This was contained in letters from Jenkins to Shaw dated 30.6.49 and 16.7.49. These are not included in the Jenkins Papers but are acknowledged by Shaw to Jenkins, 16.8.49 (JP) from which it appears that
a. Faku had taken a "Buntingville case" out of Fynn’s hands. Shaw said Fynn had no right to interfere.
b. Fynn wished to settle some clans as Government people (See page 137).
c. Jenkins had sent some cattle to Natal for Faku who would not send them through Fynn. Shaw told Jenkins, "You acted quite right.... but while Fynn acts so strangely you need not trouble yourself to show the courtesy of doing this in private letters".
d. There was a possibility that Fynn’s dependants might attack Faku or Ncapai’s widow.

At the same time the missionaries were suspicious of the Government’s plans for Pondoland. See pages 134f, and especially pages 140 - 5.

They may also have known of Fynn’s wish to replace Faku by Ndamase: cf. Shaw to Jenkins, 7.6.50 (JP); Cape GH 8/23: Fynn to Harding, 11.5.50. See page 159.

36. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 16.8.49.
37. Ibid.
If Shaw had hoped that Sir Harry would intervene, he was disappointed, for when Fynn referred the missionaries' letter to him and asked for an enquiry, he replied that it was a matter for the authorities at Natal. Fynn had in fact appealed to them at the same time, but they were slow to respond, probably because West had died. When September came and there was still no reply he began to press his request, for the missionaries' opinions were now so popular that he was afraid the chiefs would lose confidence in him. Colonel Boyes, who was administering the Government, at length gave his half-hearted approval, but it was March 1850 before Walter Harding, the Crown Prosecutor, arrived at Faku's Great Place to investigate.

Although he criticised the terms and tenor of their letter, and in particular their allegation that there was no proof against Cetwa, Harding vindicated the missionaries on every major issue. He criticised Fynn for deciding

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40. Young: op. cit., p.220. He died on 1.8.49.
41. Cape GH 8/23: Fynn to Moodie, 22.9.49.
42. Natal CSO 19: Minute by Colonel Boyes on H. Fynn to Moodie, 10.9.49.
43. C.O.179/57: Harding to Moodie, 2.4.50, enc. in Scott to Newcastle, 21.11.60.
44. Cape GH 8/23: Report upon proceedings of H. Fynn, enc. as in 19.
Cetwa and Lochenberg were guilty without hearing their defence, and considered that his evidence was not sufficiently pertinent and clear to justify his proceedings against either party. He therefore recommended that the cattle should be restored with full compensation. He agreed furthermore that there was good *prima facie* evidence against the Amatola bushmen with whom Umdwebo and his band were at enmity, and he would in fact have proceeded against them had he not been recalled to Natal.  

Shaw was satisfied with the result and hoped it would make Fynn a little more discreet and cautious. He did not expect much more to come of it and in this he was correct. Harding presented his report in June, but Pine, the new Governor, only sent it to Smith in October. Having referred it to the Attorney General, Smith agreed that Pine should compensate the parties from whom cattle had been taken. By this time, however,

45. Cape GH 8/23: Report upon proceedings of Fynn, enc. as in 19. At this time Harding had not seen a deposition made by Jacobus Johannes Uys in 1847, which cast suspicion on Umdwebo. When he did see it, after his return to Pietermaritzburg, he began to doubt whether that chief was as innocent as the missionaries believed. (JP: Harding to Jenkins, 23.9.50.)

46. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 22.5.50, 7.6.50.

47. Ibid.


50. C.O.48/407: Montagu to Sec.-to-Govt., Natal, 11.11.50, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, 6.3.61.
more recent events had complicated the situation, and despite repeated applications by Lochenberg the matter was still unsettled in July 1851.51

Harding came to Pondoland not only to conduct an enquiry but also to obtain a cession,52 and this indicates that the old republic and the new colony shared another problem. Hemmed in on the north by the Amazulu, and on the west by the Drakensberg, the only direction in which Natal could expand was towards the south. It had been a proposal to locate surplus natives between the Umzimkulu and the Umzimvubu that made Napier decide on occupation in 1841,53 and in November 1843 Commissioner Cloete had refused to accept a rather wild proposal by the Volksraad to move the bulk of the natives beyond the Tugela and the Umzimvubu.54 In August 1845 Maitland had designated the principal western branch of the Umzimkulu as the southwestern boundary of Natal,55 but within three years covetous glances were being cast at the open plains beyond.

52. JP: Harding to Jenkins, 6.3.50.
53. See page 68f.
The villain of the piece was Sir Harry Smith who descended on Natal in February 1848 intent upon reconciling the discontented remnant of the Trekkers.\(^56\) The painstaking labours of Commissioner Cloete had reduced the fantastic grants of the Volksraad to reasonable proportions,\(^57\) and in 1847 the Location Commission had recommended that over a million acres should be set aside for the African population.\(^58\) All this was now undone at the stroke of a pen, for with a generosity equalled only by his short-sightedness the High Commissioner declared that every exertion should be made to give Trekkers farms of up to three thousand morgen.\(^59\) A Land Commission was set up with instructions to receive all claims and to be guided by the most liberal construction of such rules as there were. He then went on to resurrect the phantom of segregation by declaring in language that was quasi-divine that

> whereas it appears much dissatisfaction has arisen from the Kafir locations being intermixed with the original occupants of the land, I hereby proclaim and declare that such intermixture cannot be, and all classes of the coloured population who have (Contd)

\(^{56}\) Walker: History of South Africa, p.239f.

\(^{57}\) Bird: op. cit., II, p.387-393: Cloete to Montagu, 30.5.44.

\(^{58}\) Young: op. cit., p.219.

\(^{59}\) G.O.179/4: Proclamation enc. in Smith to Grey, 10.2.48.
"had free locations given to them, must be removed so that a distinct line be established between the different races of Her Majesty's subjects", 60

Lieut. Governor West thought this truckling to the Trekkers would only increase their impatience of control, 61 and also believed that any mass removal of natives would be hazardous, 62 but he was directed to carry out the proposals of the Commission subject to the approval of the High Commissioner. 63

It did not take the Commissioners long to realise that they could not satisfy every claim without making inroads upon the locations, and a minute of 16 April 1848 showed that their thoughts were turning to "the extensive range of fertile and unoccupied country between the sources of the Umzimkulu and the Umzimvubu" 64 where they thought it might be necessary to establish "several native locations under British control with proper superintendence." 65 On 16 August they suggested setting up five locations of fifty thousand acres each within the colony, with the

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60. C.O.179/4: Proclamation enc. in Smith to Grey, 10.2.48.
61. C.O.179/4: West to Smith, No.3, 21.2.48, enc. in Smith to Grey, No.57 (Natal) 30.3.48.
62. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): West to Smith, 20.9.48, enc. in Smith to Grey, 17.7.49. This refers to West to Smith, 1.5.48.
63. C.O.179/4: Proclamation, enc. in Smith to Grey, 10.2.48.
64. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Sub-enclosure in West to Smith, 5.5.48, enc. in Smith to Grey, 17.7.49.
65. Ibid.
possibility of a sixth unless some of the native population was removed. Meanwhile West had been told to proclaim that in assuming sovereignty over the tribes there had been no interference with the powers vested in the chiefs, except insofar as the right had been reserved to amend their laws and to improve the administration of justice. Neither Cloete, who was now the Recorder, nor Shepstone was in favour of this procedure, and West now passed the information to the Commissioners with a reminder of what Smith had said about segregation and asked them whether they had any further recommendations. After some correspondence they guardedly replied that if this were to increase the power of the chiefs, as was expected, it would be desirable to consider moving the bulk of the natives beyond the Umzimkulu boundary. The proclamation

66. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Sub-enclosure 7 in West to Smith, 20.9.48, enc. in Smith to Grey, 17.7.49.
68. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Sub-enclosure 4 in West to Smith, 20.9.48, enc. as in 66.
70. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Sub-enclosure 8 in West to Smith, 20.9.48, enc. as in 66.
was not issued and in July 1849 Smith at last asked for further instructions. 73 Grey approved what had been done but emphatically refused to sanction the policy of segregation. 74 His despatch was written on 30 November 1849, but although Pine had a copy to read on his journey from Sierra Leone, 75 Colonel Boyes cannot have known about it when he gave Harding his instructions in February 1850. 76 Until Pine arrived, therefore, the prospect of segregation threatened the integrity of Pondoland.

This threat was intensified by the pressure of immigration. 77 It had early been recognised as important that the white population of the colony should be increased 78 and Sir Harry acknowledged this need. 79 In a sense his February policy was an attempt to meet it by keeping the Trekkers in Natal, but in fact it had the effect of reducing the land available for new settlement at the very

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73. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Smith to Grey, 17.7.49.
74. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Grey to Smith, 30.11.49.
75. Young: op. cit., p.224.
76. C.0.48/407: Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No. 26, 6.3.61.
77. On the subject of migration see A.F. Hattersley: The British Settlement of Natal.
78. P.P. 1847-8 XLII (980): Moodie to Montagu(?), 17.12.46, enc. in Pottinger to Grey, No.18, 10.3.47.
time when interest in immigration was quickening. The 'Natal Cotton Company' had already acquired over twenty thousand acres with this in view, and in September 1848 J.C. Christopher was asking for two hundred thousand acres on which to settle two thousand people. More concrete was the achievement of J.C. Byrne who sent out over three thousand immigrants after May 1849. The spirit of the time was optimistic, and if the Commission's grants meant that land was scarce, the obvious solution was to look for more beyond the boundary.

This assumption that Natal could expand in the direction of Pondoland was encouraged by Sir Harry Smith. Three weeks before the Commission's minute of 16 April 1848 he had told the Lieut. Governor that the entire area between Natal and Faku's country was available to them, and when he was informed of their views he instructed Fynn to secure Faku's consent to their proposal. Fynn raised the subject twice during his first two months in Pondoland, but without success, for Faku did not wish to have the

80. Hattersley: op. cit., p.47.
81. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Smith to Grey, 15.1.49.
82. Hattersley: op. cit., p.108.
83. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): West to Smith, 5.5.49, enc. in Smith to Grey, 17.7.49. West refers to a despatch from Smith, No. 2, of 27.3.48.
84. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Smith to West, 20.6.48, enc. in Smith to Grey, 17.7.49.
so-called 'Zulus' as his neighbours and took his stand upon the letter of the Treaty. It also emerged that the tract in question was not quite as empty as had been supposed and that the greater part of the coastal area between the Umgazi and the Umzimkulu was now occupied. These facts notwithstanding he suggested that the Government should go ahead and select a site in the expectation that

"... it only (required) the chief's knowledge of the locality, the probable number of the Zulus, and the further assurance of government's protection over him to obtain his acquiescence".

Sir Harry was not averse to forcing the hand of the Chief and advised the Natal authorities to do as the Resident had suggested. Accordingly on 1 April 1849 Fynn received a request, penned six weeks before, to get Faku's consent to a native settlement in the unoccupied portion of his Treaty state. He acted quickly and replied four days later that Faku was agreeable and that June was

85. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Fynn to Moodie, 4.10.48, sub-enc. in Moodie to Montagu, 19.10.48, enc. in Smith to Grey, 17.7.49.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
89. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Fynn to Moodie, 4.4.49, enc. in Smith to Grey, 31.8.49.
the best month for the removal. In the light of Faku's previous opposition and the customary dilatoriness of Bantu diplomacy, the speed with which his assent was obtained was highly suspicious, especially in the context of Fynn's conduct as a whole. Jenkins was led to believe that the removal was imminent, but almost a year was to elapse before the next step was taken.

Sir Harry wanted more than a native settlement. His real aim was to gain control of all Pondoland, and at some time before the end of April 1849 he asked Fynn to seek a voluntary offer of the whole country to the British Government. Fynn knew that as matters stood a direct approach had little chance of success, but Jenkins was convinced that he planned to achieve this end by other means. Smith's request may have been prompted by a despatch from Earl Grey asking information about the possible site of a Roman Catholic settlement which was being planned by the Earl of Arundel and some others. The sponsors of this scheme wanted about one million acres,

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90. P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Fynn to Moodie, 4.4.49, enc. in Smith to Grey, 31.8.49.
91. JP: Jenkins to Shaw, 1.5.48.
92. Ibid. cf. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 25.5.48.
93. Ibid.
preferably in southern Natal or in Faku's country. 95  
Smith sent a copy of this despatch to Natal with a marginal note to the effect that the latter area should be well considered. 96  Another copy went to Fynn. 97  When he first discussed the matter with Jenkins, Fynn planned to report upon the thinly-populated country between the Umzimvubu and the Umtata which included an area which Boyce thought suitable for European settlement. 98  In fact he recommended the country between the Umsikaba and Umzimkulu Rivers.  He estimated that there was a population of ten thousand near the coast, but added that these people considered themselves under the protection of Great Britain and could be moved to vacant land near the Ingele Mountain. 99  Arundel had asked if Natal could acquire

97. JP: Jenkins to Shaw, 1.5.49.  
98. Ibid. cf. Boyce, op. cit., p.171.  

It has not been possible to account for this apparent change of plan. Fynn certainly wanted the Government to occupy the area between the Umtata and the Umzimvubu, (cf. Bishop Grey: Journal of a Visitation .... in 1850, p.93) and he was not trying to deceive Jenkins for he sent him a draft of his report on the other area. (JP: Jenkins to Fynn, 7.5.49)  Either Fynn received specific instructions from the Government of Natal, or else Jenkins misunderstood him.
some such area by treaty\textsuperscript{100} and in his reply Smith observed that the colony could buy the land from Faku,\textsuperscript{101} but if the original question had escaped the Colonial Office the reply did not, and minutes by Elliott and Hawes made it quite clear that Her Majesty's Government would not be prepared to enlarge Natal for this purpose.\textsuperscript{102} By implication this ruled out any European settlement in Pondoland, but once again Colonel Boyes had no idea of the Home Government's viewpoint when he briefed Harding for his mission.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Boyes took advantage of Harding's visit to Pondoland to ask for the cession of

"a certain portion of his (Faku's) territory which was represented to be nearly uninhabited and useless to that chief but which seemed likely to afford increased means of locating a number of native inhabitants of the district and emigrants from the United Kingdom".\textsuperscript{103}

Harding's instructions were the logical outcome of the proclamation of February 1848, and even if Smith had not been asked for his sanction they were in general agreement with his policy. It was unfortunate but not unusual

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} P.P. 1849 XXXVI (1059): Earl of Arundel to Grey, 18.9.48, enc. as in 95.
\item \textsuperscript{101} P.P. 1850 XXXVIII (1292): Smith to Grey, 31.8.49.
\item \textsuperscript{102} C.0.179/7: Minutes on Smith to Grey, 31.8.49.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Cited in C.0.48/407: Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.
\end{itemize}
that they were diametrically opposed to the policy of the Home Government.

Fynn was away at the Cape when Harding arrived and it was probably for this reason that he completed his negotiations before opening the enquiry. Faku would not discuss the matter except in the presence of Mr Jenkins but after a meeting on 1 April 1850 Harding was confident he would get what he wanted. On the 11th the 1844 Treaty was amended and Faku ceded the territory lying east of the western branch of the Umtamvuna and a line

"from the western branch of the said Umtamvuna River where it rises in the Tugela (sic)... in a straight line to the base of the Qathlamba Mountains". For this area which Harding estimated variously to be one and a half million or five million acres in extent, Faku received one hundred cattle.

The policy of expansion was unpalatable to the

104. JP: Harding to Jenkins, 6.3.50.
105. C.0.179/57: Harding to Moodie, 2.4.50, enc. in Scott to Newcastle, 21.11.60.
106. C.0.179/57: Treaty entered into by the Honourable Walter Harding, Esq. and Faku, Paramount Chief of the Amaponda Nation, 11.4.50, enc. in Scott to Newcastle, 21.11.60.
107. C.0.179/57: Harding to Moodie, 2.4.50, 12.6.50, enc. in Scott to Newcastle, 21.11.60.
missionaries but they did not have the power to prevent it. Shaw did not overrate his influence with the powers that be and knew that he was unlikely to prevail against Sir Harry. Their main hope was to prevent Faku giving away land and, failing that, to ensure that any such grants were made openly and fairly. Thus when the native removal seemed likely to materialise, Shaw told Jenkins that Faku should object to Fynn's settling any clans within his territory as 'government people'. If he wished to give land to the Government he should do so before witnesses and with a fixed boundary and price.

They were prepared to take a stronger line about the Arundel scheme. As soon as Jenkins heard of the proposal and of Smith's desire for Faku's submission, he warned Shaw that "every proceeding of the government ought to be watched on behalf of the natives". Shaw was most concerned at the news for he saw in it the double threat of Roman Catholicism and a convict settlement. He immediately advised his colleague to keep himself free from

108. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 25.5.49.
109. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 23.4.50.
110. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 16.8.49.
111. Ibid.
112. JP: Jenkins to Shaw, 1.5.49.
113. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 25.5.49.
advising Faku either to put himself under the Government or to give it land: "They will take it," he observed, "but do not let it be said that you assisted them to get it".\textsuperscript{114} He was ready to go further and contemplated direct action in the colony. In a later letter he said that he would have to be quiet until an official announcement was made,

"then, if I find it is to be a convict colony, I will move heaven and earth in order to defeat it, if possible, as nothing would be more injurious to the native tribes of that part of the country".\textsuperscript{115}

1849 was a year of anti-convict agitation at the Cape and Shaw had enough of this world's wisdom to realise that he had more hope of defeating the scheme on this platform than by appearing as the champion of native interests. In fact he was not called upon to take any action.

Meanwhile Fynn had sent Jenkins a copy of his report and the missionary replied with a frank expression of his opinion.\textsuperscript{116} Fynn had assumed that the Government could have the land for the taking, but Jenkins insisted that as

\textsuperscript{114} JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 25.5.49.
\textsuperscript{115} JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 30.6.49.
\textsuperscript{116} Walker: \textit{History of South Africa}, p.249f.
\textsuperscript{117} JP: Jenkins to Fynn, 7.5.49.
it had been secured to Faku by treaty

"to take possession of it for the formation of a British settlement without, in the first place, coming to a thorough understanding with him and his subordinate chiefs would be such an act of injustice that I cannot see upon what grounds it could be justified".118

He went on to say that if Faku and his councillors approved the cession the Government should pay a fair price, and suggested that part of this sum should be used for Christian instruction and part held in trust for the tribe. He also criticised the statement that the tribes were 'at the disposal of government'. Fynn duly modified his report and in its final form he incorporated the suggestion about payment, and was careful to indicate the need for Faku's consent.119

The success of Harding's negotiations showed that the missionaries could not even be certain that Faku would accept their advice. There is no detailed account either of the meeting with Harding or of the subsequent deliberations of the chief and his councillors which Jenkins attended.120 It may be inferred that Harding laid great stress on Faku's inability to give satisfaction

118. JP: Jenkins to Fynn, 7.5.49.
120. C.0.179/57: Harding to Moodie, 2.4.50, enc. as in 105.
for thefts from Natal and gave the impression that the cession would relieve him of this responsibility. 121 Jenkins thought these arguments no more than a pretext to get land for emigration, and if he did nothing else he seems to have pressed for a delay until Shaw's advice could be obtained. 122 Faku, however, was more anxious to be rid of an unwelcome responsibility than to retain sovereignty over an area most of which was uninhabited, and over people whose allegiance was doubtful. It did not occur to him that the problem of thefts would probably recur if this territory were ever to be occupied by Europeans. 123 He therefore disregarded Jenkins and signed the Treaty without waiting for Shaw's opinion. Shaw had feared as much, but indicated that he would have liked Faku to say he was quite satisfied with his Treaty and did not wish it to be altered. 124 When he heard of the cession, he told Jenkins:

"He (Faku) acted most foolishly, but I am glad you kept yourself quite free from all responsibility in the affair, which was all you could do". 125

121. The inference is suggested by JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 4.4.50, and C.O.48/461: Faku to Pine, 16.11.50, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No. 100, 23.8.72. Faku's letter is quoted in extenso on page 152.

122. JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 4.4.50: M.B. Shaw had read a letter which Jenkins had sent to W. Shaw on 1 April.

123. This danger did occur to M.B. Shaw - JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 4.4.50.

124. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 23.4.50.

125. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 22.5.50.
There was no suggestion that the Treaty was unjust, or that its validity should be questioned. It had been concluded publicly with two missionaries as witnesses and Faku had entered into it of his own free will. Unfortunate it might be, but it had to be accepted, and Shaw could only hope that it would be

"overruled by divine providence to the good of the whole country". 126

The ink on Harding's Treaty was hardly dry when Benjamin Pine arrived in Natal. The new Lieutenant Governor, who was forty-one years old, was a lawyer by training and had eight years experience of Sierra Leone. 127 He brought with him a drive and efficiency which had formerly been conspicuous by their absence, and it was not long before Mpondo affairs felt the impact both of his legal mind and of his conviction that "you must deal with a savage justly and kindly but at the same time very firmly". 128

The same two factors continued to influence policy for Pine quickly realised that Faku could not prevent the thefts which continued to take place, and also that

126. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 22.5.50.
127. Young: op. cit., p.221.
128. C.O.179/17: Pine to Sir George Barrow, 29.3.51.
Harding's cession was of little value for European settlement.

"Under these circumstances," he told Sir Harry Smith, "it seemed to me that measures should be adopted to convince Faku of the necessity of ceding the entire sovereignty of a country the inhabitants of which he could not prevent from committing depredations on Her Majesty's subjects, and thus relieving himself of the obligations of a treaty which he could not observe". 129

His plan was to insist that the Treaty should be strictly observed, and thus to give Faku a practical demonstration of what his obligations involved. Walter Harding was therefore instructed to return to Pondoland. He was to visit Faku and demand the restoration of all stolen cattle, and compensation for any that were not found. This would amount to one thousand and twenty-four head. He was also to ask him to surrender any known or suspected thieves. Should the chief say that he could not perform these engagements, he was to tell him that he had come with a force to offer him as much aid as possible in doing so. 130 Whatever one may think of the fairness of the demand, these instructions were legally unexceptionable, and had they been carried out in detail Pine would have been in a good position to answer criticism.

129. C.O.48/407: Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.

130. C.O.48/407: Instructions to Harding, 26.8.50, sub.-enc. in Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.
Unfortunately for him this did not happen. Harding presented his demand through Fynn, who later complained that the terms in which this was done left him no alternative but to induce the tribes to pay. Instead of leaving Faku to comply or to disclaim responsibility, he cajoled him into surrendering a portion of the fine, and himself collected the balance from surrounding tribes. It is hard to believe Faku's claim that he was not told the reason for the demand, but it is quite conceivable that Fynn said he would be attacked by Harding's burgher escort if he did not comply. In any case the approach of Harding's party had caused a good deal of alarm and the cattle were handed over, not as an acknowledgement of Faku's treaty obligations but in an effort to stave off war, while Harding appeared in the role not of an ally but of a foe. Faku would have resented the demand however it had been enforced, but under these circumstances he more than ever appeared to be a victim of arbitrary and unjust treatment. A large share of the responsibility

131. Natal GH 328: Harding to Fynn, 8.9.50.
134. JP: Jenkins to Pine, 11.1.51.
    See page 151f.
rests with Fynn. He was unwise to play so prominent a part in assembling the cattle, for in so doing he was fulfilling a duty which properly belonged to the Paramount. On the other hand, Harding insisted in his letter that the cattle should be handed over before he could assist Faku against the suspected robbers. This was ridiculous and could hardly be reconciled with his instructions. The truth would seem to be that both men were interested primarily in getting the cattle, by whatever means, and did not appreciate the legal niceties of the Governor's policy.

Harding took charge of the booty and set out for Pietermaritzburg. He was overtaken en route by a messenger with a letter dated 7 October and bearing the marks of Faku and two councillors with Henry Fynn as witness. It read:

"Admitting the justice of the present claim upon me of 1024 cattle which I am now paying, I request the Government will perform their promise by giving me at once efficient aid and assistance to drive out and dislodge the people who may have committed these thefts, and brought the stolen property to a part of the country comprehended in the treaty, a country I never desired to possess, and was secured to me by treaty to prevent such troublesome people entering it."

136. Natal GH 328: Harding to Fynn, 8.9.50.
137. C.0.48/407: Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.
"I cannot continue to be responsible for the acts of wolves. My people cannot pass out of the country we occupy, surrounded as we are by 4 tribes, who are ever our enemies, we cannot even hunt, fearing collision with the tribes around us.

"I beg the Government will take the country under their management. I never desired to be chief over countries I cannot occupy or tribes I cannot govern.

"If the government do this they will release me from a burden I am unable to bear.

"I have ever been the faithful friend of the government and it is my wish ever to continue so." 138

Pine took this to be an offer of the whole of Pondoland, which was unlikely, and thought that his policy had succeeded completely. 139 He immediately sent back six hundred cattle to Faku 140 and intimated through Fynn that when the cession had been completed he would ask permission to restore the balance from the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State. 141 On 23 November he reported to Sir Harry and asked for immediate annexation. 142 His returning the cattle implied that his main purpose had not been to settle outstanding claims but to get land, and this was confirmed by his despatch. He described the

139. C.O.48/407: Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.
140. C.O.48/407: Pine to Faku, 2.11.50, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No. 26, 6.3.61.
141. C.O.48/407: Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.
142. Ibid.
country in enthusiastic terms and observed,

"I conceive..... its acquisition at the time when so large a number of emigrants are pouring into the colony and when the Crown has so little suitable land for their location a fortunate circumstance".143

Knowing that Sir Harry was facing a threatening situation on the Eastern Frontier,144 he was careful to add,

"The acquisition..... is also important as being a step towards the accomplishment of an object extremely desirable for securing the lasting peace of this district and the Eastern Province of the Cape Colony viz. the bringing of the whole tract of country between them under Her Majesty's authority...... a European population in rear of the Kaffirs....... would tend to restrain those turbulent neighbours".145

Pine had every reason to assume that Sir Harry would agree, and appointed a commission to examine the country for purposes of immigration.146

His elation was short-lived, for he had reckoned without the missionaries. When William Shaw heard of the affair he talked it over with Sir Harry who was in Grahamstown147 and had also received a report from Fynn.148 He was annoyed that a demand should have been made on Faku and promised to write to Pine.149 The result was a

143. C.O.48/407: Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.
145. C.O.48/407: Pine to Smith, No. 17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.
146. JP: Pearse to Jenkins, 6.12.50.
147. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 20.11.50, 6.12.50.
148. C.O.48/407: Montagu to Moodie, 11.11.50, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No. 26, 6.3.61.
149. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 6.12.50.
despatch dated 12 days before Pine's,\textsuperscript{150} in which the Colonial Secretary expressed Sir Harry's regret that he had not been consulted as High Commissioner and went on to say,

"His Excellency is inclined to the opinion that Faku's remonstrance dated the 7th October is a just one, and that he cannot be held responsible for stolen property taken by other tribes not under his rule. I am therefore to request full information on this subject particularly as to the actual trace of the property into Faku's country upon which, of course, the demand for restitution is based. His Excellency desires to have the whole facts of the case submitted to him, with the least possible delay, as the good faith of Faku for so many years deserves every consideration".\textsuperscript{151}

It is not fanciful to detect missionary influence in these words, and even if Pine had been able to satisfy Sir Harry, this request would have meant an indefinite delay before annexation.

His plans received a more serious check when another letter arrived from Faku on 3 December.\textsuperscript{152} Jenkins had been in Pietermaritzburg during October and on his return he discussed what had happened with Faku and his chief men.\textsuperscript{153} They categorically denied that they had assented to the letter of 7 October, and levelled the accusations

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} C.O.48/407: Montagu to Moodie, 11.11.50, enc. as in 148.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{152} C.O.48/461: Faku to Pine, 16.11.50, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.
\item JP: Pearse to Jenkins, 6.12.50.
\item \textsuperscript{153} JP: Jenkins to Pine, 11.1.51.
\end{itemize}
against Fynn's handling of the demand which were considered earlier.  

Jenkins told them to send messengers to Pine but they insisted that he should write, and he eventually agreed to do so. His letter was handed to Pine's private secretary by the Rev. Horatio Pearse, and read as follows:

"I, Faku, Chief of the Amapondo Nation write these words to say that I have heard with surprise a letter had come from me to you to say I had given my country or a great part of it to the Government.

"My word to the Governor is this. It is not my letter. I never made such a letter. I say Mr Fynn came to me to say I was to write a letter of thanks to the Government that Mr Harding was returning home and had received the cattle Mr Fynn telling me I should know why the cattle were demanded when he returned from Pietermaritzburg and I signed it. Also Ucingo and Umbulana but no words were spoken about giving away my country to the government. Such a letter I do not know. I hope therefore the Governor will enquire who made that letter. I request also to acquaint the Governor that when it was demanded of me to turn out a thousand head of cattle I was not informed that this was made because of Bushman aggression on Natal. Neither can the government expect this from me since I was relieved from this responsibility by Mr Harding a few months ago when I agreed to cede the country to the Umtakuna River.

"I request the Governor to send me a copy of the letter said to be my letter".

154. See page 147.
155. JP: Jenkins to Pine, 11.1.51.
156. JP: Pearse to Jenkins, 6.12.50.
157. C.0.48/461: Faku to Pine, 16.11.50, enc. as in 152.
There is no doubt that both these letters bore the mark of Faku, and the question arises whether one of them was false, or whether Faku was playing a double game. William Shaw had no doubt that Fynn had tried to dupe the chief, but Horatio Pearse was very much afraid that he might have been privately persuaded to surrender his country. It seems needless to dispute that Jenkins' letter conveyed what Faku actually said. It is also unlikely that he persuaded the chief to go back on an earlier offer to hand his country to the Government, for his conduct during the negotiations in April and at a later date in the matter of assistance against Kreli indicates that he was anxious not to initiate policy. That Fynn's letter was genuine is not so certain. He had a motive for getting the offer, for whether or not he knew of Pine's hopes he already had Smith's instructions to secure Faku's voluntary submission, and his treatment of Cetwa and Lochenberg had shown that he was not over scrupulous in pursuing his ends. On the other hand there is not sufficient evidence to assume that the letter

158. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 6.12.50.
160. See pages 143f.
161. See pages 117f.
162. See page 137.
163. See pages 124–6, 128f.
was a complete fabrication. The only part which was antecedently unlikely was the opening sentence which admitted the justice of the demand, but the remainder quite possibly reflected what Faku had said when that demand was made. It was generally agreed, however, that Faku was liable to be unreasonable when excited\textsuperscript{164} and that he was prone to act childishly.\textsuperscript{165} For this reason it was unwise to take too seriously what he said in moments of anger, for upon calmer reflection he was liable to change his mind. But this is what Fynn seems to have done. Having collected the fine, he drew up a letter based upon the sentiments Faku had expressed and then procured his signature, quite probably by telling him that it was "a letter of thanks to the government that Mr Harding was returning home".\textsuperscript{166} He was not guilty of deliberate falsification, but had indulged in a piece of sharp practice which he had not expected to be questioned.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of these letters, the Jenkins document nullified what Fynn had claimed to be a \textit{bona fide} transaction, and shattered any hopes of annexation that remained. Although he had thought the cession

\textsuperscript{164} Natal CSO 19: Fynn to Moodie, 31.12.50.
\textsuperscript{165} JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 22.5.50.
\textsuperscript{166} G.0.48/461: Faku to Pine, 16.11.50, enc. as in 152.
was a foregone conclusion, Pine had known that something more would be needed to complete the business, and it had been to guard against Faku's changing his mind that the six hundred cattle had been returned and the remainder held hostage. But now Faku had not only changed his mind but had also questioned the validity of the demand, and that with the assistance of a missionary. Little wonder that Pearse found dealings with the Government less easy, and told Jenkins that hard things were being said about him.

Nearly three weeks after receiving Faku's letter, Pine wrote to Jenkins in terms of icy politeness, and told him that Captain Gordon and John Shepstone would be sent to explain everything. Having done his duty by Faku, Jenkins was not inclined to indulge further in political controversy and simply explained to the Governor the circumstances in which the letter had been written. Pearse advised him to be neutral in any further developments and Shaw directed him to attend the meetings of

167. C.O.48/407: Pine to Smith, No.17, 23.11.50, enc.as in 76 . See page 149.
170. JP: Jenkins to Pine, 11.1.51.
171. JP: Pearse to Jenkins, 6.12.50.
the Commissioners as a witness rather than a participant, but to forward minutes to him. The Commissioners came early in 1851 and although they declared Fynn to be free of blame the Government decided to restore all the cattle. This was done little by little over the next four years, and what Pine had begun as an act of generosity came to be looked upon as an act of justice which was essential for the credit of the Government.

The Treaty of 1844 did not establish satisfactory relations between the Amampondo and Natal but it was not an unmitigated failure. It did not provide an answer to the problem of stock theft but here again the fault lay,

172. JP: Shaw to Wesleyan Missionaries beyond the Kei, 30.12.50.
174. Ibid.
175. Natal NA 1: Shepstone to Sec.-to-Govt., 14.5.53; Report by T. Shepstone, June 1853.
Natal SNA 1/1/5: Shepstone to Sec.-to-Govt., 16.8.54 (draft); Sec.-to-Govt. to Shepstone, 20.9.54. etc.
176. "I adopted this course because Faku has ever proved himself a faithful ally of our Government, and because although legally responsible for the depredations under the Treaty he had in fact no power to prevent them. I conceived it moreover to be scarcely just to accept both compensation.... and the cession of the country on account of which it was entered into". - C.0.48/407: Pine to Smith, No.17, 23.11.50, enc. as in 76.
not with Faku but with those who had given him a nominal paramountcy over tribes he did not rule. On the other hand, the country as a whole was saved from incorporation in Natal and division among European settlers which would have been a disaster for its inhabitants. The colony did indeed march southward to the Umtamvuna although the claim was not taken up for a decade, but that was arranged openly and fairly. It is very doubtful whether Pondo-land as a whole would have survived the pressures of segregation and emigration and the designs of Harry Smith and Benjamin Pine had its boundaries not been secured by a treaty which made it necessary to act with caution, and gave the missionaries a weapon with which to contend for African interests when these were threatened.

The Harding Affair put an end to Fynn's usefulness as Resident. His behaviour lost him the confidence of Faku, and even if the Commission exonerated him Shepstone was to find a legacy of bitterness and suspicion when he visited the chief in 1854. He continued to carry out his duties as best he could but both chief and Government came to rely increasingly on Jenkins. Before long he left

178. cf. page 79f.
179. Natal SNA 1/1/5: Shepstone to Sec.-to-Govt., 16.8.54 (draft).
   SP 14: Shepstone to Cato, 18.7.54.
the country to try and raise the Zulu force, and later in the year he was taken ill. It was not surprising, therefore, that Sir Harry dispensed with his services from 1 March 1852.

It is impossible not to feel some sympathy for Fynn. He had been placed in a position that was impossible for a man of his temperament and background. Legally Pondo-land was independent and he was only there as a diplomat representing British interests. But if he was to maintain those interests and to carry out the orders of his superiors, he could not avoid acting in some measure as a chief or a magistrate. To do this successfully required tact and statesmanship which he did not possess. His investigation of the cattle thefts, and in all likelihood his handling of the demand, showed a dictatorial temper and a scant regard for justice. His readiness to force Faku's hand in the matter of native removal, as also the

181. See pages 109f.
   C.0.48/339: Fynn to Cathcart, 27.7.53, enc. in Cathcart to Newcastle, 13.9.53.
183. C.0.48/328: Memorial of H.F. Fynn, 9.10.52, enc. in Cathcart to Sec.–of–State, 14.11.52.
   He was not told officially of his dismissal and was given £250 compensation in 1853. (Above Memorial; also C.0.48/339: Cathcart to Newcastle, 13.9.53, and Minutes thereon.)
criticisms which Jenkins levelled at his preliminary report for Arundel suggest a tendency to ignore African rights when British interests were concerned. The letter of 7 October 1850 may also point to a certain lack of scruple in pursuing his ends. In all these matters, however, Fynn was trying to do his duty as he conceived it and his attitude was not all that different from that of his superiors, which was by no means humanitarian. In a sense he suffered for their sins. There were other respects in which his interference was not forced upon him by his duty. He endeavoured to remove Faku from the chieftainship in favour of his eldest son Ndaraase, who was not the heir in Bantu law;\textsuperscript{184} it is possible that he intervened in other domestic affairs;\textsuperscript{185} and he had a number of native dependants in the country which meant that he was liable to become involved in tribal politics.\textsuperscript{186} Having made due allowance for the difficulties of his situation, it must nevertheless be concluded that Fynn's activities were only partially justified and far from wise, and it was as well for the prestige of Government among
the Amampondo that the missionaries were ready to oppose injustice.

And what of these missionaries? There may have been other and more personal reasons for their animosity towards Fynn for they were men of very different character and outlook, but if this was so they do not appear in the correspondence and personal malice played little part, if any, in their attack upon his conduct. Their ruling motive was a concern for justice and their actions were dictated by head as well as heart. It was only when they had good reason to do so that they challenged Fynn's behaviour in the affair of Cetwa and Lochenberg, and in the Harding Affair Shaw had ample cause for concern while Jenkins intervened only when pressed to do so by the chief. In the one case they were vindicated by judicial enquiry and in the other by the embarrassed withdrawal of the Government. The same concern for justice characterised their attitude on the several occasions when designs were entertained upon the integrity of Pondoland. It might be urged against them that they were interested only in justice for Faku and not for Natal, on the grounds that they did not think it fair to make Faku responsible for thefts committed by independent groups within his territory, \(^{187}\) and were yet

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\(^{187}\) This is never stated categorically to be the missionaries' view, but it is implied in their attitude to the demand. Smith's strictures (see page 151) probably reflect their opinion.
opposed to the dismemberment of that territory. This apparent inconsistency is explained if it be true, as has been argued elsewhere, that Shaw at least was interested rather in the security of native land than the extent of Faku's dominions. These lands had been secured by recognising Faku as paramount. If he could not fulfil the responsibilities of paramountcy, there was a case for revising the Treaty, but not for taking the land and using it to settle outsiders, either black or white.

The three principal means adopted by the missionaries were direct approach to the authorities concerned, whether Fynn or the Natal Government; the giving of advice and assistance at the request of Faku; and pressure upon Sir Harry Smith. The first of these was used effectively on at least three occasions and on two of these it was accompanied by pressure on Smith. There were limits to what could be achieved by such pressure. When Shaw complained about the demand upon Faku, his chances of success were enhanced by the fact that Pine had not consulted the High Commissioner, but Sir Harry took no positive

188. See pages 44, 88.
action after his earlier complaint about Fynn. Had Grey permitted segregation, Shaw's views would have carried little weight. This would also have been the case had the Arundel scheme materialised, although in this instance he seems to have been ready to engage in other forms of opposition which might have had greater effect, more especially as the Editor of the *Grahamstown Journal* was a personal friend.\(^{190}\) As it was the Cape newspapers gave publicity to the missionary case in the two main disputes of the period.\(^{191}\) It was only to be expected that advice to Faku should be more frequent than appeals to the Government but there is little to suggest that the missionaries dictated his policy. There is evidence, however, which confirms an earlier observation\(^ {192}\) that Jenkins did not wish to initiate policy, or to appear to be doing so, and only gave his advice in matters involving the Colonial authorities when asked to do so. It has also been shown that this advice was not invariably accepted.

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192. See page 117.
The events of 1850 helped to shape Pine's unfavourable opinion of missionary political activity, but his later views bore little relation to what happened then. There was some justification for his complaint that "they really see only one side of the picture" but this charge could equally well have been levelled at him. On the other hand, there was nothing to support the claim that they usually appeared in the political arena as "zealous but injudicious partisans of the natives" and the statement that "the desire of power is not confined to sovereign pontiffs". Insofar as Pine was thinking of Pondoland when he penned these words he was allowing natural feeling of disgruntlement to play havoc with the truth.

193. C.O.179/35: Pine to Secretary Sir George Grey, 5.9.54.  
194. Ibid.
CHAPTER VII

MATTHEW BEN SHAW

Henry Fynn was superseded as Government Agent with Faku by Matthew Ben Shaw, a younger son of the Rev. William Shaw. This appointment might have been expected to herald a new order of partnership between the missionaries and the representative of the Government, but if any such hopes were entertained they were doomed to disappointment, for Shaw's term of office was finally to discredit the policy of appointing residents and also to prove that the men of God were not without their human failings.

During the War of the Axe Matthew Ben had entered a partnership which went bankrupt in the depression which hit the Colony in 1848.¹ At the suggestion of Garner he moved to Morley to plant cotton and raise cattle.² He there became friendly with the Tembu Paramount, Joye, and with a Fingo headman named Ludidi, and during the War of 1850–3 he conceived the idea of their assisting the British forces which his father recommended to Sir Harry Smith.³ This secured him an unpaid appointment as "Mediator" with all the tribes which had no British Resident, and in this

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¹ JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 27.2.49; cf. JP: Shaw to Wesleyan Missionaries, 25.9.47.
² Cape BK 77: W.H. Garner to Col. Maclean, 20.10.55.
³ See page 114.
capacity he led the expedition against the Amagcaleka in December 1851. His services on this occasion commended him to Sir Harry Smith who decided to dispense with the Fynns and appointed him Resident with all the tribes between the Kei and Natal.

About the only satisfying feature of his office was the salary of £250 per annum, and experience soon acquainted him with its difficulties. He was the only colonial official with three major tribes — the Amagcaleka, the Abatembu and the Amampondo — as well as a number of smaller groups such as Ludidi's Fingos and Qirana's Amampondonise.

4. See page 112.

5. On 4.2.52 Smith reported that the services of both Fynns had been discontinued from 1.1.52 (C.O.48/324: Smith to Pakington, 4.2.52) but the Cape Colonial Secretary was notified of M.B. Shaw's appointment on 29.1.52 and told that the Fynns would be dismissed on March 1st (Cape GH 8/23: Southey to Lieut. Gov. Natal, 10.6.52). H Fynn received his salary up to 1 March (C.O.48/328: Cathcart to Sec.-of-State, 14.11.52, enclosing Memorial of H.F. Fynn, 9.10.52) but Shaw's salary was evidently paid from 21.1.52 (C.O.48/337: Cathcart to Pakington, 15.3.53).

M.B. Shaw heard that William Fynn had been dismissed because he would not move to Newtondale in charge of the Fingoes (JP: M.B. Shaw to Jenkins, 11.2.52).


It was almost impossible to represent British interests adequately over so wide an area without any European assistance. Apart from this the tribes had conflicting interests and were almost certain to be suspicious of his dealings with others than themselves. Shaw lived at Morley which was in Tembu territory, and it was his deliberate policy to cultivate Joye's friendship and thus to build up a strong pro-colonial party among the Abatembu which would be useful in any future trouble with Kreli. This did not commend him to the latter chief or to Faku, for Kreli was actually at war with the Abatembu, and Joye had given land to the Amampondomise who had fled from Faku's son Ndamase and were constantly at odds with him. Furthermore Matthew Ben thought it his duty to mediate between the tribes and attempted to do so on several occasions.

12. See page 96.
   Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean (official), 3.8.55, enc. as in 9.

He intervened in the following quarrels: Kreli vs. Joye; Ludidi vs. Joye; Ludidi vs. Ndamase; Qirana vs. Ndamase.
intentions were commendable but his efforts only gave rise to rumours which were embarrassing if they were not true and made his position still more awkward. His appointment gave him some standing, and he had the further advantage of being "the great son of the chief of the missionaries", but Garner thought he had very little real influence and his own correspondence reflected a feeling of insecurity as early as February 1854.

As if he had not enough troubles with which to contend, Shaw added others of his own creating. The first of these was the Umdumbi Settlement. During 1851 Faku gave him permission to graze his stock in the neighbourhood of C.0.48/367: A.S. White to Col. Maclean, 20.7.55, enc. as in 11.

15. Ibid.
16. See especially Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Col. Maclean, 1.2.54.

Shaw suggested that Faku's power of attorney which was held by Maclean should be transferred to himself "as much for the sake of regularity, as for the protection of the chief himself". He also referred to an arrangement which he had heard was contemplated with the rebel Hottentots, and stated that if he was not used as the agent he would regard it as a personal slight and reflection, as well as being injurious to his official position. Finally he complained that Shepstone was daily expected in Faku's country but had not informed him of his coming. "This discourtesy", he said, "places me in a somewhat invidious position with the Chiefs, who are thus led to regard my connexion with the Government as merely nominal and subject to constant interference". Maclean was not impressed! (Cape BK 77: Maclean to M.B. Shaw, 23.2.54)
the Umdumbi River in return for a present of blankets.\textsuperscript{18} When men were sent to collect these Shaw told them that he wished to 'purchase' the area at a price of ten cattle a year, and a little later they returned with the Chief's consent.\textsuperscript{19} In September 1851, therefore, he visited Faku and obtained a lease of the country between the Umtakatyi and Umtata Rivers for two hundred years at a price of two thousand cattle which was to be paid in annual instalments of ten.\textsuperscript{20} Jenkins had refused to help him\textsuperscript{21} and advised him to destroy this lease because he thought it would spoil his chances of promotion in the Government Service,\textsuperscript{22} but Shaw ignored him and the missionary took no further action.\textsuperscript{23}

According to Garner, Shaw had hopes of promoting immigration to this area.\textsuperscript{24} This is quite possible for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} C.O.48/374: Evidence enclosed in Addison to Maclean, 14.12.55, enc. as in 7.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Cape BK 77: Copy of lease dated 20.9.51.
\item \textsuperscript{21} C.O.48/374: Evidence enclosed in Addison to Maclean, 14.12.55, enc. as in 7. JP: Jenkins to M.B. Shaw, 18.9.55.
\item \textsuperscript{22} C.O.48/374: Evidence enclosed in Addison to Maclean, 14.12.55, enc. as in 7. JP: Jenkins to M.B. Shaw, 11.9.55.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Cf. C.O.48/374: Evidence enclosed in Addison to Maclean, 14.12.55, enc. as in 7.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Cape BK 77: W.H. Garner to Maclean, 20.10.55.
\end{itemize}
it was thinly peopled and Boyce had long ago suggested that it was suitable for European settlement. As it was, the only immigrants were natives. Some of the people living at Morley were dissatisfied with the station, for the climate was unhealthy and the grazing was indifferent. Garner had refused to change the site, and as a result some residents moved to other mission stations and others needed little encouragement to settle at the Umdumbi, as Shaw's lease came to be called. They were joined by two petty clans under Umlata and Gezani which had left the area at the time of the Amaqwabe invasions. A later arrival was Shaw's old friend Ludidi who had quarreled successively with Joye and Ndamase, and by 1855 there was a population of between three and four thousand.

   Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Col. Maclean (official), 3.8.55.
   See page 14f.
30. Cape BK77: W. Shaw to Grey, 24.8.55, M.B. Shaw said there were 800 to 1000 men (Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean (official) 3.8.55).
These people paid cattle to Shaw for permission to live there and acknowledged him as their chief. Whatever he may have thought they regarded themselves as Government people and were so regarded by the neighbouring chiefs. They acted as though they were independent of the Amampondo, and Shaw was accused of expelling some of Ndamase's subjects because they were not his people, and also of giving instructions in March 1855 "that they were not to allow the Mpondo army to come through the government land". The situation was pregnant with danger. Ndamase complained to Faku when his people were molested, and was told to drive Shaw out if he said he had obtained anything more than grazing rights. There was further unpleasantness over the case of Ludidi and Shaw was also involved as a partisan in a number of disputes arising out of thefts from the Settlement. By the end of 1854

32. See page 171.
33. C.O.48/367: A.S. White to Col. Maclean, 20.7.55, enc. as in 11;
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
38. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Col. Maclean (off.) 3.8.55.
   Cape BK 77: Anonymous Transkeian Traders to Governor, (Contd.)
he had quite definitely made an enemy of Ndamase and it was superfluous for him to attribute the "great and unfavourable change" in his bearing to "the vicious influence of an embassy from Moshesh". 39

All this was serious enough for it impaired Shaw's efficiency as British Resident, but he made an even greater mistake by concealing his activities from the Government. He twice recommended a military post at the mouth of the Umtata, but on neither occasion did he mention his personal interests in the area, and when the truth came out this fact was held against him. 40 He excused himself by saying that as he was acting as a mediator without pay when he obtained the lease, he regarded himself as a private individual, and that he continued to regard his connection with the Settlement as a purely private matter until his father advised him to discuss it with Sir George Grey. 41 This excuse may have been sincere but it was less than convincing and far from adequate. It was too much to expect the tribes to distinguish Shaw the Government...

38 (Contd.) ... uncertain date. (See footnote 56)
39. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean, 22.11.54.
40. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean, 22.11.54.
Do. do. (pvte) 5.2.54.
Memo. by Maclean, 14.9.55.
Memo on Lease, enc. as in 28.
official from Shaw the private landowner and petty chief.

His position was further complicated by unsatisfactory relations with the missionaries. There were several reasons for this state of affairs. They thought he had persuaded the Morley people to move, and Garner maintained that he and his friends were trying to break up the station. Even before the exodus Garner had become suspicious of Shaw's personal conduct and had discovered that he was undermining his authority on the station. Nor did the missionaries have a very high opinion of the Umdumbi Settlement which J.S. Thomas described as "that den of infamy and unblushing licentiousness". The final source of tension was a disagreement about mission policy in which William Shaw and his son were ranged against the local missionaries. When he visited Kaffraria in 1855, William Shaw decided that the station system would have to be overhauled. His colleagues agreed that Clarkebury should be moved to a new site, and that the old station and Morley should be treated as sub-stations of the new mission:

43. Ibid.
44. JP: J.S. Thomas to Jenkins, 2.8.55.
45. MMS: W. Shaw to General Secretaries, 1.8.55.
They also fell in with the proposal for a new sub-station near Shawbury, but were far from happy with a third suggestion. Matthew Ben had offered his lease to the Missionary Society, but although his father had declined this, he proposed to station a missionary at the Umdumbi and to treat Buntingville as a sub-station. He also approached Sir George Grey and obtained his conditional approval to a suggestion that an industrial school should be started at this place. This scheme had apparently been worked out by the two Shaws without consulting anybody else, and William seemed disposed to carry it out in spite of the objections urged by the local missionaries. They would have liked to see an industrial school beyond the Kei, but resented the decision to break up Buntingville for the sake of the Umdumbi and thought their General Superintendent had been led astray by a "blind partiality

47. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 11.7.55.
49. Ibid.
50. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 11.7.55.
53. Ibid.
for his son". By the middle of 1855, therefore, there was little love lost between the Wesleyan Missionaries and the British Resident.

To complete his embarrassment Matthew Ben fell foul of the local traders. Before his appointment he had set himself up as a cattle dealer and when he became Resident he carried on his business. This was not strictly in order but he did not think he was doing any more than some officials in the Colony and maintained that it did not interfere with his official duties. Sometime in 1855 his activities were reported to the Governor in a letter from some "Anonymous Transkeian Traders", who also accused him of trading without a licence during the previous war and spoke of the lease and the Settlement. The most

54. C.0.48/374: A.S. White to Grey, 23.2.56, enc. in Grey to Labouchere, No.16 H.C., 6.6.56.;

The phrase is A.S. White's, but the sentiment was also that of Thomas (JP: J.S. Thomas to Jenkins, 2.8.55) and probably of the others.

55. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Col. Maclean (off.) 3.8.55.

56. Cape BK 77: Anonymous Transkeian Traders to Governor. The letter is dated 10 January 1855, but is endorsed "Received 22 July" and was accompanied by native reports current in 'June'. This suggests that the date should be 10 July, but the letter contains no reference to the collision which took place on the 4th. Furthermore Maclean had apparently received anonymous letters in March 1855 (Cape BK 77: W. Shaw to Maclean, 10.3.55; Maclean to W. Shaw, 13.3.55) and later told Faku that the Government were preparing to investigate Shaw's conduct before the collision occurred. (C.0.48/380: Minute of Interview with Faku, 8.5.56, enc. in Grey to Labouchere, No.21, 11.2.57.)
obvious reason for their attack was a fear that his official position was giving him an unfair advantage, but at least one Transkeian trader had other motives for opposing him. This was Alfred White who was a brother of the Rev. Charles White of Buntingville and of Mrs Jenkins. Not only did he share the missionaries' opinion of Matthew Ben, but he was also interested in Shepstone's plan for a native settlement to which the Resident was unfriendly. There is no proof that he was in any way connected with the anonymous letter but it is clear that it would have been most useful for him to have had Shaw out of the way.

Shaw was feeling distinctly uncomfortable in 1855. Having alienated an important chief and fallen out with his European neighbours, his position was scarcely tenable. He asked Colonel Maclean, the Civil Commissioner of British Kaffraria, for a transfer, warning him that secret enemies were repeating everything that was said against him, and his offer to surrender the lease was probably another symptom of his uneasiness.

58. See pages 214, 219.
60. See page 173f.
Matters came to a head in the middle of the year and the crisis was precipitated by Shaw's relations with the Umdumbi Settlement. At the beginning of July 1855 the Amampondo set out to attack the Amampondomise, and one division of their army passed through the Umdumbi on its way to the lower reaches of the Umtata. The commander was a chief called Nogemani with whom the Umdumbi people had already quarreled, and they were understandably alarmed. Messengers were sent to Morley to summon Matthew Ben and the native teacher James who had been in charge since the withdrawal of the missionary. They came as requested and the Umdumbi forces assembled to await events. After some time Shaw sent the Morley people home, but they lingered on the way and on Sunday evening fell in with part of Nogemani's force on the western bank of the Umtata.

62. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55.
Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Col. Maclean (off.) 3.8.55.
63. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Col. Maclean (off.) 3.8.55;
JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55.
cf. page 27.
65. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55.
66. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55, 11.7.55. This was outside Pondoland.
A skirmish followed in which the Morley contingent killed two of their opponents and relieved them of one-hundred-and-eighty cattle. Had Shaw's orders been obeyed this clash would never have taken place, but when they asked him what to do with the cattle he told them to return them to the Amampondomise and thus implicated himself in what they had done. A more serious encounter took place on the Monday morning when Nogeman's forces came back into the Settlement. One party passed through without incident, but another became involved with Umlata's people and lost several men and all their plunder which was also returned to the Amampondomise. The circumstances are far from clear. Each side blamed

67. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55, 11.7.55.
69. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55, 11.7.55.
72. The following documents refer to the clash:
   Cape BK 77: Do. to do., (official), 3.8.55.
   Cape BK 77: W. Shaw to Grey, 24.8.55.
   JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55, 11.7.55.
the other for having started the fight and Shaw himself gave different reasons at different times. He was present in the early stages of the trouble and Nogemani's men accused him of taking part and killing three men. On the other hand, Shaw maintained that he had tried to parley with the Mpondo party, and had then withdrawn to the rear and gone home, and his story was substantially confirmed by later investigation.

There was nothing unusual about this collision between two clans, even though they were nominally subject to the same paramount chief, but the Umdumbi Affair derived considerable significance from the fact that M.B. Shaw was involved. When the Rev. Charles White heard Nogemani's side of the story he concluded that Shaw had deliberately attacked the Mpondo force. His opinion was shared by J.S. Thomas who wrote to Jenkins in terms which betrayed

73. CO.48/367: M.B. Shaw to Maclean, 4.7.55, enc. as in 13.
74. JP: C. White to Jenkins, 11.7.55.
75. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean (off.) 3.8.55.
   W. Shaw to Grey, 24.8.55.
   But cf. CO.48/374: Notes by M.B. Shaw on evidence in Addison to Maclean, 14.12.55, enc. as in 7. Shaw claims that the fighting took place without his knowledge.
77. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55.
"My views", he wrote, "are fully in accordance with yours that it is the Providence of God which has permitted this sad affair to take place in order to bring his vile proceedings to an end. It is the more remarkable that this should have taken place just at the time that he thought every object was accomplished by having blinded his poor foolish father and induced him to sanction all his proceedings by completing the breaking up of Morley, and the same process at Bunting, and finally the climax by the establishment of the Industrial School at the Umdumbi, and the removal of the missionary from Bunting there to that den of infamy and unblushing licentiousness".78

Charles White passed on the news to his brother Alfred who had left for the Colony just before the clash, and expressed the hope that somebody would report it to the Government.79 For Alfred this was the last straw - or the golden opportunity. On 20 July he addressed a long letter to Maclean in which he entered fully into Shaw's conduct as Resident, and asked for it to be brought to the notice of the High Commissioner.80 He gave an account of the lease and the Settlement and passed on his brother's description of the fight. The letter was

78. JP: J.S. Thomas to Jenkins, 2.8.55.
79. C.O.48/367: A.S. White to Maclean, 20.7.55, enc. as in 11. A.S. White does not say Charles was his informant, but the letter on which he based his complaint was almost identical with Charles White to Jenkins, 11.7.55 (JP) - and W. Shaw heard that Charles had supplied the information. (W. Shaw to Jenkins, 24.8.55, JP).
liberally besprinkled with charges that Shaw had stirred up or prolonged discord between the tribes, and asserted that his residence in the country had been "most prejudicial to the missionary interest". He accused him of keeping a greater number of cattle than was compatible with his official position and declared,

"Mr Shaw does not enjoy the confidence of a single chief in the country. They all regard him with suspicion and are extremely jealous of the sovereignty he has been erecting in another chief's territories, and over which he rules as despotically as any chief in the country". 81

Maclean had already received a garbled account from Mr J. Crouch 82 and Shaw had sent an official report in which he admitted to being a witness but gave no hint that he had any connection with either party. 83 He now sent White's letter to Shaw who replied honestly but bitterly. 84 He tried to justify the lease, the Settlement and his trade, but denied the charges of interfering with the tribes and gave a rather different account of the Umdumbi incident. In a private letter he complained that the missionaries and traders had greatly misunderstood

84. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean (official) 3.8.55.
him, and added

"There is a good deal of personal feeling at the bottom of all these efforts which, however, does not appear and I have no wish to expose the same". 85

This was also the opinion of his father who sprang to his defence. Writing to Sir George Grey he alleged that Alfred White and others had long been hostile to his son and had tried to circumvent him even in his official duties.

"The key to the present proceedings could easily be supplied," he observed, "but I refrain from doing so as events will soon discover it to Your Excellency's penetration." 86

When he read the incriminating documents which were sent to him by Maclean, he was confirmed in his belief that this was "a disreputable conspiracy to destroy a man's character and future prosperity from private and selfish motives". 87 The obvious inaccuracy of some of the charges gave the Shaws a false sense of security about the others. It was obvious that Matthew Ben would have to leave the country but he betrayed no fear of dismissal in his official correspondence, 88 and his father did his best to ensure that his departure would be on transfer

85. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean (pvte) 3.8.55.
86. Cape BK 77: W. Shaw to Grey, 24.8.55. This hint was never elaborated.
87. Cape BK 77: W. Shaw to Maclean, 30.8.55.
88. eg. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean (pvte) 3.8.55. M.B. Shaw asks here for removal and says he will surrender all connection with the Umdumbi if the Governor desires.
to another post. 89

There was some truth in the complaint that William Shaw was blindly partial to his son, 90 for his letters to Grey and Maclean 91 showed an acute appreciation of his difficulties but hardly acknowledged his mistakes. It was all very well to believe that Matthew Ben's sole aim in going to the scene of the clash had been to prevent a collision, 92 but that did not excuse his being chief of the Umdumbi. It was possibly true that his wish to be transferred proved that he had no plans with regard to his cattle and lands that were incompatible with the public service, 93 but this did not explain his complete silence on the subject until he was forced to speak. One cannot but sympathise with an ailing father's 94 efforts to save his son, but one is also bound to recall his attitude to Henry Fynn. Six years before he had

90. C.0.48/374: A.S. White to Grey, 23.2.56, enc. as in 54. cf. JP: J.S. Thomas to Jenkins, 2.8.55.
93. Ibid.
94. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 16.1.56. Shaw said he was extremely unwell.
"Tell them (Faku and Nqapai’s widow) our Government have not sent Fynn to be a ruler in the land, but only as the eyes and ears of Government. And if any of his dependants presume to attack them to report the matter immediately". 95

It is hard to believe that the same man penned the words,

"It appeared to me possible that Your Excellency might not approve of a government functionary standing in that relation (i.e. Matthew Ben as chief) to these people". 96

Shaw had often read "Judge not that ye be not judged".

He had now to learn its truth in the hard school of experience.

The Amampondo reacted as vigorously to the Umdumbi Affair as the Europeans - more vigorously, in fact, than the Shaws were prepared to believe. 97 Ndamase did not

95. JP: Shaw to Jenkins, 16.8.49. Underlining mine.
97. When Jenkins sent him a copy of Faku’s letter to the Governor, Matthew Ben accused him of procuring it to support White’s charges. (Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean, pvte., 15.8.55). He later apologised (JP: Apology by M.B. Shaw, 13.12.55). Both father and son assumed that it would be possible to carry out their plans for the Umdumbi (Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean, pvte., 3.8.55; W. Shaw to Grey, 24.8.55) and William Shaw actually designated a missionary. (JP: W. Shaw to Jenkins, 16.1.56). Jenkins (JP: Jenkins to W. Shaw, 6.2.56) and Major Addison (Cape BK 77: Addison to Maclean, 24.2.56) were quite convinced that there was no chance of Faku allowing a station there.
believe Shaw when he said the clash was an accident, and warned him to remove his cattle as he intended to attack the Settlement. It was significant that he did not threaten Shaw himself. He also sent messengers to Maclean and referred the case to Faku who now began to complain openly that he had only given Shaw the right to use the Umdumbi for grazing. Jenkins was asked to come to the Great Place. He delayed for three weeks in the hope that Faku would calm down, but when he eventually went there he found that the Chief was thinking of sending an impi against the Umdumbi and Morley. He wrote to the Governor in as mild a strain as possible and persuaded Faku to wait for a reply before taking any action. The letter went first to Colonel Maclean who replied immediately that Sir George Grey would soon visit Faku and settle the matter. In fact the Governor did not reach Pondoland and in October Major Addison was sent to investigate, and open warfare was averted.

98. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 16.7.55.
100. C.0.48/374: Evidence enclosed in Addison to Maclean, 14.12.55, enc. as in 7.
101. JP: Jenkins to M.B. Shaw, 7.8.55.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid. of MMS: Missionary Notices, August 1856, p.140 - Jenkins, 6.3.56.
105. Cape BK 77: Instructions - Maclean to Addison, 4.10.55.
Maclean was far more interested in the Settlement itself than in the *fracas* which had brought it to light. He thought that Shaw's relation to it was inconsistent with his office because it was likely to bias his opinions and to involve him in quarrels with neighbouring chiefs. Furthermore he believed that Faku had only intended to give him permission to occupy the ground and had certainly never anticipated that it would be used to raise up a power separate from his own. His opinion was confirmed by the findings of Major Addison, and he suggested to Grey that as Shaw had set himself up as a chief he should be ordered to compensate Faku for the eighteen men who had been killed. Grey had no hesitation in dismissing him, but held that the Government should accept responsibility for the acts of its Agent and ordered Maclean to visit Faku and settle the matter. He also instructed him to make further enquiries with a view to ascertaining whether Shaw should be charged in the colonial courts under the *Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act.*

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1. **Cape BK 77:** Memo by Maclean on the case of M.B. Shaw, 14.9.55.
2. **Cape BK 77:** Addison to Maclean, 14.12.55.
3. **C.O.48/374:** Notes by Civil Commissioner, enc. in Grey to Labouchere, No.16 H.C., 6.6.56.
4. **C.O.48/374:** Grey to Labouchere, No.16 H.C., 6.6.56.
5. Ibid. of. JP: Jenkins to W.M.M.S. Secs., 26.7.57.
visited Pondoland in April, and the evidence which he collected was submitted to the Attorney-General who decided to take no action. This infuriated the Colonel, but as he himself had said that the witnesses were unreliable it is difficult to see what other course could have been taken. Certainly the ends of justice were adequately served by Shaw's dismissal, for it is most unlikely that he deliberately provoked the Umdumbi Affair, and in other respects his conduct had been unwise rather than criminal. He had owed his appointment to influence rather than to merit, and his career had shown that he lacked the qualities of responsibility and straightforwardness which might have been expected of his father's son.

If there was any danger of idolising William Shaw, this interlude revealed the feet of clay and proved that for all his excellent qualities he was a fallible human being whose personal affections were liable to lead his judgment astray. It was unfortunate that it took place

111. C.O.48/380: Maclean to Liddle, 15.6.56, enc. in Grey to Labouchere, No.21, 11.2.57.
112. C.O.48/380: Travers to M.B. Shaw, 22.9.56, enc. in Grey to Labouchere, No.21, 11.2.57.
113. JP: Maclean to Jenkins, 22.12.56.
114. C.O.48/380: Maclean to Porter, 15.6.56, enc. as in 111.
shortly before he left South Africa for the last time and that his final dealings with the Amampondo should have been of so unpleasant a nature. But this lapse must not be allowed to obscure twenty five years of invaluable service to the tribe and its Chief. His vision and initiative had brought the missionaries to their country and with this one exception he had upheld their interests with a zeal that was tempered by common sense. James Stephen once described him as

"a man of remarkable talent and energy; much sharpened by his intercourse with the secular affairs of mankind, a little probably at the expense of his religious influence."

His record in Mpondo affairs amply confirmed the compliment even if it did not bear out the criticism.

The behaviour of the local missionaries also was not above reproach. Their correspondence gives the impression that they could have done more to avert the crisis but held their peace out of respect for his father until it was too late. After the collision they seem to


116. C.0.48/266: Minute by Stephen, 12.1.47, on Maitland to Grey, 14.10.46.

117. eg. Cape BK 77: Garner to Maclean, 20.10.55. Garner mentioned certain investigations into Shaw's conduct which he carried out privately "for his father's sake".
have been only too ready to believe that Matthew Ben was looking for a quarrel and to put the worst possible interpretation upon his motives. 118 If they cannot be held responsible for everything in Alfred White's letter, 119 his missionary brother certainly encouraged him to write it 120 and cannot be entirely dissociated from the charges, some of which were less than just. On the other hand, Matthew Ben was unfair when he accused Jenkins of inspiring Faku's letter to the Governor in order to support the charges, 121 for the missionary would much rather have had nothing to do with the affair 122 and did his best to avoid further trouble. 123 Maclean returned from Pondoland with a high opinion of his conduct and told the Governor,

"On my own part, I have to express my thanks to Mr Jenkins who afforded me much necessary information and every assistance in his power, and

118. JP: Charles White to Jenkins, 5.7.55.
Thomas to Jenkins, 2.8.55.
120. Ibid.
121. Cape BK 77: M.B. Shaw to Maclean (pvte) 15.8.55.
122. JP: Jenkins to M.B. Shaw, 7.8.55.
Do. to do., 18.9.55.
In the latter letter Jenkins said, "I am very sorry that you have brought me into such a position that in self-defence and as a Wesleyan missionary I shall have to state facts that will do you no good service".  
123. JP: Jenkins to M.B. Shaw, 7.8.55.
MMS: Missionary Notices August 1856, p.140:
Jenkins 6.3.56.
"who having deservedly much influence with Faku has in this as former instances acted in the Christian character of a peacemaker between the Chief and the Government, without in any degree assuming the character of a political agent".  

A tragic sequel was provided to the Umdumbi Affair by the murder of James Stewart Thomas. In accordance with the decision to move Clarkebury, Thomas selected a new site at Ncambele and obtained permission to occupy it from the Mpondomise Chief Qirana. Although well-suited for a mission, the choice was unwise because the area was also claimed by the Amampondo and the Abatembu who resented the fact that they had not been consulted. Thomas made a more serious mistake when he allowed James, the Morley teacher, to remove to the new station before his quarrel with the Amampondo had been settled. Ndamase warned Maclean that this might lead to trouble and within a few days of the Colonel's departure there was a raid on James' kraal. Jenkins was apprehensive,

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124. C.0.48/380: Maclean to Liddle, 15.6.56, enc. as in 111.
125. See page 172.
126. C.0.48/380: Maclean to Liddle, 15.6.56, enc. as in 111.
127. MMS: Missionary Notices, October 1858, p.162;
   Impey, 7.6.58.
128. C.0.48/380: Maclean to Liddle, 15.6.56, enc. as in 111.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. CF. MMS: Missionary Notices, September 1856, p.154:
   C. White, 25.6.56.
136. JP: Jenkins to Thomas, 10.6.56. Thomas died before this letter reached him.
but Thomas was not unduly concerned. He allowed the Morley people to put their cattle in his personal kraal for greater security, and himself moved to the station on Monday 9 June 1856. Early on Saturday the 14th there was another attack, and when he went to investigate, he was fatally stabbed. There is no doubt whatsoever that the murder was unpremeditated, and Ndamase maintained that the attack had been made without his knowledge. He immediately returned the cattle, and Faku had the murderer put to death, although the normal penalty was a fine. The tragedy was in some measure a result of Thomas' own carelessness and it would be unfair to lay too much emphasis on its connection with what had gone before.

Apart from this, the career and disgrace of Matthew Ben Shaw had a threefold significance. In the first place, it provided another example of the difficulties

133. JP: Jenkins to Maclean, 30.12.56.
134. MMS: Missionary Notices, September 1856, p.160: Mrs Thomas, 20.6.56.
136. JP: Jenkins to Maclean, 25.6.56.
137. Ibid.
138. JP: Jenkins to Maclean, 6.12.56. The clan which made the attack was fined 200 cattle. Grey refused to receive them and they were given to the missionaries. (JP: Jenkins to Maclean, 7.7.56, 30.12.56.)
and temptations which beset a Resident Agent beyond the colonial boundary. Sir George Grey had already questioned the wisdom of such appointments and this affair confirmed his opposition to the policy. Shaw was not replaced and for the next twenty years there was no permanent colonial representative in Pondoland. Occasional embassies there were to be, but for the most part both the Government and the tribe had to depend upon unofficial intermediaries. This meant that the missionaries had a vital role to fulfil. Secondly, it led to the interpretation of a point which the Treaty had left rather vague. The Shaws claimed that Umlata and Gezani could not be expelled from the Umdumbi because their rights were guaranteed by Article XIII of the Treaty, but although Maclean had some sympathy with them because their acts had been in some measure a consequence of Shaw's, he insisted that they were Faku's subjects and that their future was a matter for Faku to decide.

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141. See pages 79-82.
143. C.O.48/360: Maclean to Liddle, 15.6.56, enc. as in 111.
144. Cape BK 77: Maclean to Liddle, 10.1.56.
As he interpreted it, Article XIII only gave them the right to occupy land "as separate petty clans ruled under Faku by their own headmen or petty chiefs", and could not be quoted in their favour if they chose to make war with their fellow subjects. This interpretation could be used to support the Mpondo claim that the entire area comprised in the Treaty State belonged to them, and to justify their attacks upon other clans or tribes in that area which tried to assert their complete independence. Finally, Shaw's adventures influenced the attitude which Grey adopted to a scheme which was designed to solve the native problem of Natal, and which has now to be considered.

145. Cape DK 77: Maclean to Liddle, 10.1.56.
CHAPTER VIII

SHEPSTONE AND SEGREGATION

Lord Grey had emphatically rejected the principle of segregation,¹ but the idea died hard, and while M.B. Shaw was pursuing his course in Pondoland, the son of another Wesleyan missionary was putting it forward once more as the solution to Natal's native problem and was looking to Faku for the land that would make it possible.

Theophilus Shepstone did not accept the current belief in 'civilisation by amalgamation'. He was no less interested in civilisation than the Greys in London and New Zealand, but in his opinion it was best achieved by the separation or insulation of the native population. His proposals in 1851 and 1854, however, did not issue from doctrinaire adherence to a rejected principle, but from genuine concern for the honour of the Government and the welfare of the people committed to his charge.

In April 1847 the Location Commission had recommended a modified form of insulation.² They had suggested that

¹ See page 134.
² P.P. 1847-8 XLII (980): Commissioners' Report, 30.3.47, enc. in Pottinger to Grey, No.67, 26.5.47.
there should be eight locations totalling 1,168,000 acres and including "some of the best land in the country and almost all the worst". These were to be administered by European officials who were to "conform as much to their own (native) law as is compatible with the principles of ours until by degrees the whole may be brought under our code". Civilisation was to be carried forward by introducing mechanical schools, promoting public works and other such methods. The whole scheme foundered on the rock of expense, and Shepstone was left to govern a population of 100,000 or more, almost without assistance.

It would be ungenerous to belittle what Shepstone achieved in these early years. He moved thousands of natives into the locations without military assistance; he appointed chiefs where there had been no chiefs; he administered justice to individuals and tribes, and his decisions were accepted without question; and in October 1849 he started to collect the hut tax which realised £8,831 in its first year. Yet when he surveyed his

4. P.P. 1847-8 XLII (980): Commissioners' Report, 30.3.47, enc. in Pottinger to Grey, No.67, 26.5.47.
5. Ibid.
7. C.O.179/16: Shepstone to Pine, 7.4.51, enc. in Pine to Smith, 1.11.51.
Young: op. cit., p.234.
work in 1851 he was far from satisfied.\textsuperscript{8} There were seven locations, but the boundaries of two had not been defined and about one-third of the population was still living outside. Those who were lucky enough to be inside were not leading the idyllic existence which Smith had depicted in 1848.\textsuperscript{9} Of the half million acres in the Impafana Location no more than two thousand were suitable for native cultivation while the pasture was only satisfactory during the summer rains.\textsuperscript{10} Elsewhere the land was being impoverished by overstocking.\textsuperscript{11} More serious was the fact that the natives had no security of tenure, for the Government had not vested title deeds in trustees as Shepstone would have liked.\textsuperscript{12} The task of civilisation was almost impossible, for the means supplied by the natives were sufficient merely to control them, but were totally inadequate for the higher objectives of Christian Government. Some progress had been made towards carrying out the 1847 programme by the appointment of four magistrates in 1850, but their activities had caused a certain amount of unrest, and Shepstone was beginning to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{8} C.O.179/16: Shepstone to Pine, 7.4.51, enc. as in 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{9} P.P. 1847-8 LXII (980): Smith to Grey, No.26, 4.3.48.
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Hattersley: \textit{More Annals of Natal}, p.215.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Young: op. cit., p.237.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} C.O.179/16: Shepstone to Pine, 7.4.51, enc. as in 7.
\end{itemize}
wonder whether the early opportunities had not passed beyond recall.13

These misgivings were brought into the open by a quarrel with Pine which arose out of the abortive attempt to send aid to Sir Harry Smith.14 Shepstone had never heartily approved of the project and on 25 January 1851 he had informed the Governor that there were such alarming reports of disaffection throughout the district that the commando ought to be abandoned for the present. Pine had complied, but a few weeks later he had asked Henry Fynn to raise one in the south of the Colony and beyond.15 When Shepstone discovered this he complained "that in thus virtually annihilating my office and superseding me, His Honour is destroying years of labour and attention".16 On 7 April he submitted an elaborate defence of his past government and concluded by expressing some doubt whether the measures recommended in 1847 were still expedient.17

13. C.0.179/16: Shepstone to Pine, 7.4.51, enc. as in 7.
14. For an account of the commando see Young: op. cit., pp. 254-290. The principal despatches are Pine to Smith, 4.7.51, and private letters, Pine to Barrow, 29.3.51, and Pine to Grey, 28.6.51. All these are in C.0.179/17.
15. See pages 109f.
17. C.0.179/16: Shepstone to Pine, 7.4.51, enc. as in 7.
Pine was convinced that the crisis had its origin in the fears of the Diplomatic Agent and the fertile imagination of his native advisers. "The cause of all the alarm", he told Grey, "is to be found in the inherent unsoundness of the system of governing the natives". 18 Shepstone, he continued,

"is a timid and undecided man unfit to grapple with an emergency, but as a subordinate and acting under orders he will be very useful. I shall now make it my business to acquire personally more knowledge of the natives, and then I have no fear of being able to manage them. The plan hitherto adopted of leaving all to Mr Shepstone, even if he were possessed of far more influence than he really has, is a very dangerous one". 19

He was as good as his word, and by September relationships between the two men had come to such a pass that Shepstone appealed to the Secretary-of-State, and pending his decision asked to be restored to his former position or to be allowed leave of absence. 20

It was in this atmosphere of suspicion and resentment that Shepstone discovered the Governor's plans for the locations. Pine thought they were far too large. 21

19. Ibid.
20. C.O.179/16: Shepstone to Sec.-of-State 20.9.51, enc. in Pine to Smith, 1.11.51. (An extract is printed in P.P. 1852-3 LXII (1697)) For details see Young: op. cit., p. 277-282.
C.O.179/16: Pine to Smith, 1.11.51. (Extract in P.P. 1852-3 LXII (1697)).
They threw too many natives together and allowed them to pursue an unimproved pastoral existence. Another shortcoming was the absence of individual tenure. The need to civilise by amalgamation required that these fastnesses should be broken up and the natives brought into closer contact with the white people. It was most fortunate that this humanitarian undertaking would also solve two other problems - the need for land to satisfy men like J.C. Byrne and others who had received grants from the Land Commission, and also the cry of the farmers for cheap native labour. He therefore proposed

"gradually and cautiously to take small portions, say from 20,000 to 40,000 acres, from the locations, to divide these.... giving one half or even a greater quantity to individual natives... and forming white settlements of the remainder".22

Shepstone received his first official intimation of this policy early in September when he was told to warn the American missionaries in the locations to erect no further permanent buildings as their land might be required for other purposes.23 The first blow fell in November when seven hundred acres of land on the Bluff, which had been occupied by Chief Umnini and his tribe for several generations, were sold in connection with the claims of J.C. Byrne.24

22. C.O.179/16: Pine to Smith, 1.11.51.
Shepstone believed that mistrust and insecurity were no foundation for civilisation, and this is in effect what he said at the end of his letter of 20 September. In his opinion the Government was pledged to the locations and a change of policy would destroy all reliance the natives might have upon the word of its officials. If there had to be a change it should not be attempted before sufficient land had been set aside elsewhere for the natives to occupy, and a plan evolved for their future government. There was merit in these views, but Shepstone made the mistake of appending them to a long and rancorous letter on other matters, and also of observing that movement without security was simply destroying his character. Little wonder Pine was not impressed!

The Umnini auction made it clear that Pine was determined to proceed and that there was no hope for the full policy recommended in 1847. Shepstone therefore set about preparing an alternative scheme which would allow the locations to be broken up with honour, and on 9 December he asked the Colonial Secretary to forward to

Lord Grey a proposal

"To set apart a section of country for the permanent accommodation of the natives, so that they may not be mixed up with the white inhabitants, as they are at present, and abolish the locations altogether".

He insisted that sufficient land should be appropriated before the scheme was explained to the natives, and observed that the only likely tract within the colony was to the south of the Umkomanzi River where there were only a few registered farms. Should this prove to be too small, it could be extended towards the Umtamvuna River to include the territory already ceded by Faku. As two locations had been contemplated there anyway, this would be no great loss to the whites. The land was to be secured to the natives by vesting it in trustees, and two or three magistrates along the northern bank of the Umkomanzi would suffice to regulate intercourse between the Colony and the reserve. He also visualised assistance from native taxes

"so that a system of missions might be established by which this territory..... may be dotted over with stations of one uniform system of teaching and management. Savages cannot understand sectarian differences and peculiarities".

27. Ibid.
He believed that two seasons should be allowed for the removal, and that individuals should be allowed to remain behind if they so wished. At the same time steps should be taken to prevent squatting on Crown land and in unoccupied areas, and also to encourage farm labour.

He went on to explain that such a mass of natives would need to be balanced by a white settlement to avert any possible danger, for in his opinion the frontier tribes had been able to fight with impunity because they had more or less unoccupied country in their rear to which they could send their cattle. He therefore proposed to avert this danger and also to connect Natal and the Cape by forming a settlement between the Umtamvuna and the Umtata Rivers, and by establishing a chain of military posts converging on the mouth of the Umzimvubu, which would be the chief port. The Amampondo and a few other tribes occupied this area, but it was principally waste, although he believed it would soon be thickly populated with unfriendly natives if his plan did not materialise. This new settlement would abut on the Orange River Sovereignty and provide a direct route thence to the St. John's Mouth, and would open up a country about the size of Natal which was well supplied with grazing and timber and suitable for emigration.
The entire area was secured to Faku by treaty, but Shepstone did not think it would be difficult to overcome that obstacle.

"In proposing this plan," he wrote, "I do not feel it is necessary for me to discuss the question as to how far we are at liberty, in justice to the natives, to occupy a country over which they claim some right, but do not really cultivate or use. Much has often been said in favour of such rights which cannot be assented to; circumstances will force the civilised man, when he inhabits the same territory with the savage, to encroach upon the unoccupied lands claimed by the latter. It is undoubtedly, however, incumbent upon a civilised government to prevent any substantial injustice being committed; and I think it is quite possible to arrange such questions so as that the interests of neither party need suffer".28

He did not think there would be any complaints if sufficient land were secured to Faku who already counted upon British protection, and to the other tribes who had all asked at different times to be taken under British rule. Nor did he contemplate any difficulty in moving the Amampondolo from the neighbourhood of the proposed port, for Faku had told him in 1844 that he intended to move towards the Umzimkulu. He continued

"I apprehend that the political circumstances which rendered desirable the acknowledgement of his supremacy over so large a tract... have ceased to have any weight. His relinquishing it would in reality be surrendering a right acknowledged only by us, and never asserted by himself. There is, however, space sufficient to provide abundantly for Faku... as well as to carry out the plan I have recommended".29

28. P.P. 1852-3 LXII (1697): Shepstone to Sec.-to-Govt. (Natal) 9.12.51, enc. in Pine to Smith 27.2.52.
29. Ibid.
His exposition complete, Shepstone turned for a moment to hard facts. Such a plan would be expensive - very expensive. For a moment he hesitated, but soon his optimism returned:

"...... while I admit that it will be very great, I do not think it can be compared with the immense amount of treasure it has been necessary to expend in the prosecution of these frequent Kaffir Wars... Some such comprehensive plan.... would, I conceive, be an actual saving in the course of a few years."  

This argument had been heard before for it had been used in favour of taking over British Kaffraria. But that had not prevented another native war!

Shepstone did not expect much sympathy from Pine and he did not receive it. The Lieutenant Governor sent the letter to Sir Harry with a hostile commentary by Ringler Thomson and observed that he had himself recommended a white settlement in Faku's country, but was now inclined to think that there were weighty military objections.

30. P.P.1852-3 LXII (1697): Shepstone to Sec.-to-Govt. (Natal) 9.12.51, enc. in Pine to Smith, 27.2.52.
33. P.P.1852-3 LXII (1697): Pine to Smith 27.2.52, and enclosure Ringler Thomson to Actg. Sec.-to-Govt., 5.1.52.
34. C.O.48/407: Pine to Smith No.17, 23.11.50, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.26, 6.3.61.
to the scheme. Nor was there any enthusiasm at the Colonial Office. When he read of the commando episode, Lord Grey had agreed with Pine that the system of native government should be revised, and had elaborated a programme which was based on the assumption that "the great aim of our policy ought to be the amalgamation of the different races". He had left office before Shepstone's proposals arrived, but had already approved Pine's suggestions and chided the Diplomatic Agent for being too partial to a system which had been inevitable but ought always to have been regarded as provisional.

Herman Merivale was not so certain. He viewed Pine's suggestions with an apprehension which was increased by their apparent popularity with the white population, and was inclined to take Shepstone seriously when he warned that any interference with the locations would cause disaffection among the natives. While admitting that parts of the memorandum read "rather like an essay than like the development of a practical suggestion" and that

35. P.P.1852-3 LXII (1697): Pine to Smith 27.2.52.
36. C.O.179/17: Minute by Grey 18.11.51 on Pine to Smith 4.7.51.
38. P.P. 1862 XXXVI (293): Grey to Pine 14.2.52.
   (Draft in C.O.179/16).
39. C.O.179/16: Minute by Merivale, probably 11.2.52, on Pine to Smith 1.11.51.
40. C.O.179/20: Minute by Merivale 17.5.52 on Pine 27.2.52.
the full plan was incompatible with Grey's policy, he thought Shepstone's views were valuable and prophesied that his plan would probably be revived in a slightly different shape as the breaking up of the locations continued. His remarks about the proposed settlement reflected the indecision of the Colonial Office about future policy beyond the boundaries of the two Colonies. He wrote,

"That we are not ripe for any such proceeding is of course evident. But I believe that there is no middle course. British dominion in South Africa must either be retrenched or extended. We may abandon British Kaffraria and the Sovereignty or we may retain them, and subjugate in addition the territory now in question, at whatever expense. I question the practicability of any third alternative". 42

Lord Desart, the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary, waxed rhetorical against the heresy, 43 but Pakington decided to wait and see. He replied that Shepstone's statement would be considered when Pine's promised despatch on native government came to hand, and that his proposal for a white settlement would be referred to the Governor of the Cape. 44

41. C.0.179/20: Minute by Merivale 17.5.52 on Pine to Smith, 27.2.52.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. cf. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., pp.62f.
43. C.0.179/20: Minute by Lord Desart 17.5.52 on Pine to Smith 27.2.52.
44. P.P. 1852-3 LXII (1697): Pakington to Pine 26.5.52, No.17.
The scheme might well have been forgotten had it not been for an unexpected development at Natal. In the early months of 1852 the quarrel between Pine and Shepstone went from bad to worse, and by the end of March Pine had made up his mind that Shepstone was no longer of any use as a public servant. Writing privately to Lord Grey he said,

"I really think now that the good government of the natives requires his removal, and I think this is the general opinion among thinking men. He will as far as he can, oppose all attempts to improve the condition of the natives which do not accord with his own views, and they are very limited".46

Not long afterwards, however, he received a despatch in which Grey blamed both of them for the trouble and suggested that their differences might be composed if Shepstone was given a position parallel to that of the Native Secretary in New Zealand.47 Pine decided to bury the hatchet, and Shepstone agreed to the compromise.48 He was now able to appoint a Native Affairs Commission without appearing to attack Shepstone, and when he did so in October 1852 he asked its members to consider, among

45. It was intensified by the news that Grey had revoked Shepstone's dormant commission as governor.
C.0.179/17: Grey to Smith 3.12.51. (draft).
C.0.179/20: Pine to Grey (pvte) 29.3.52.
46. C.0.179/20: Pine to Grey (pvte) 29.3.52.
47. C.0.179/16: Grey to Pine 14.2.52 (draft). This extract was not printed for Parliament.
other things,

"the expediency of the proposal of removing the natives or allowing them to move over the Uomoomaas, or beyond the district altogether".50

In his evidence Shepstone admitted that his original plan would be so expensive that it was unlikely to be accepted, but indicated that he had already made a new proposal to the Lieutenant Governor.51 This modified scheme was elaborated in a Memorandum of 23 January 1854,52 in which he assumed that the British Government did not wish to acquire fresh territory in South Africa, and tried to limit himself to proposals that were inexpensive and practicable. His plan was to acquire supremacy, either by election or by voluntary cession, over all the chiefs between the Umzimkulu and the Umzimvubu with the exception of Faku. The Government was then to tell the natives, except those in the northern and north-western locations, that as many as desired to do so might move to this area under his leadership. There he would rule them according to their own law and custom, so modified as gradually to improve their condition; they would be encouraged to

50. P.P.1852-3 LXII (1697): Pine to Pakington, No.58,7.10.52.
52. C.O.179/35: Memorandum by Shepstone 23.1.54 enc. in Owen to Newcastle 6.3.54.
cultivate useful articles; and in due course the Bishop of Natal would help to establish a system of missions. If he drew off a large number of natives from Natal, it would be necessary and just for the British Government to guarantee the territory against the aggressions of foreigners and British subjects, but this would not increase its responsibilities for obligation had already been laid upon it by the Treaty with Faku.

He went on to deal with a number of objections. Far from creating a possible danger to Natal, this arrangement would prevent the occupation of the area by malcontents who would be a menace. There was no reason why labourers should not migrate thence to the Colony as they already did from Delagoa Bay, and the fact that the natives could leave the Colony if they wished to do so would reduce the danger of resistance to the hut tax or any stringent measures that might be adopted in Natal. Nor was it valid to argue that it would banish the prospect of any future European settlement beyond the Umzimkulu, for, he observed,

"If in the course of events white emigration tends to that direction I believe no Government will be able to stop it, and both parties must adapt themselves to circumstances as they arise".

53. C.0.179/35: Memorandum by Shepstone 23.1.54, enc. in Owen to Newcastle 6.3.54.
He was confident he would be able to conduct the removal without any need for compulsion,\textsuperscript{54} and added that Faku had more than once asked him to become his neighbour and had offered him whatever extent of land he required.\textsuperscript{55}

In conclusion he explained his motives. With the natives in their present position, Natal could not long be safe for either race. Under such circumstances it was his "duty and ambition" to relieve the Government of a difficulty, and his desire

"that having been the chief instrument in placing the natives in such circumstances I (should) endeavour to extricate them".\textsuperscript{56}

He was, he believed, the only person who could attempt this with a reasonable chance of success, and therefore asked the Government to recognise his position and to continue his salary in the form of a pension or allowance.\textsuperscript{57}

This proposal differed in three ways from his previous scheme. The expensive luxury of a new colony was foregone and the native settlement was to be independent of Natal. These changes showed he had realised that the

\textsuperscript{54} Young: op. cit., p.307.
\textsuperscript{55} C.O.179/35: Memorandum by Shepstone, 23.1.54, enc. as in 52.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
Home Government would allow no extension of British sovereignty in South Africa. More significant was the fact that it was a compromise between the opposing principles of amalgamation and segregation. In 1851 he had proposed to locate all the tribes in the south, but this would involve only those who chose to move. The original scheme had been put forward as an alternative to amalgamation, but now he was suggesting a means whereby it could more easily be achieved. If he were to lead off fifty thousand natives and their land were to be occupied by whites, there would be a more equal balance between the races, and it would be easier to compel those who remained to abandon their barbarous customs and to adopt habits of industry. So it appeared to Assistant Commissioner Owen who had not, perhaps, given any thought to the constant influx from the north! Shepstone would no doubt have preferred complete segregation and British control, as suggested in 1851, but now as then his main concern was to provide a refuge for the dispossessed and to compensate the injustice of breaking up the locations. His motives were moral rather than doctrinaire, and if he was an over-confident idealist, he was not a dreamy megalomaniac.

   cf. C.O.179/35: Pine to Sec. Sir George Grey 5.9.54.
It is not necessary to look any further than the fact that it was a compromise to explain the unanimity with which the new proposal was received. The settler-ridden Native Affairs Commission had its own ideas about the type of settlement, but was dogmatic about the principle: "There is no choice in the matter. The future welfare of both races depends upon it". Assistant Commissioner Owen lent his support when he visited Natal in March 1854, and to the bewilderment of Merivale, Pine also argued in its favour. None of these people had been converted to Shepstone's way of thinking, but they had seen in his proposition a means to their very different end. The members of the Commission may have thought it a good way to get rid of Shepstone, as Grey later averred, but it is superfluous to ask with Young whether this was a reason for Pine's change of front.

59. Young: op. cit., p.309, quoting "The Natal Mercury" 25.7.54 which tended to identify their views with his, and a letter in the same paper on 9.8.54 in which Macfarlane, the chairman, disclaims this.


61. C.0.179/35: Ass. Comm. Owen to Newcastle, 6.3.54.

62. C.0.179/35: Minute by Merivale 15.5.54 on Pine to Newcastle 12.3.54.

63. C.0.179/35: Pine to Newcastle 12.3.54 Pine to Sec. Sir George Grey 5.9.54, 24.10.54

64. C.0.179/37: Grey to Russell (confidential) 3.12.55, and enclosure "Memorandum setting forth the wishes and opinions of certain of the Boers of Natal" submitted by W. Macfarlane.

On the contrary his reconciliation with the Government Secretary for Native Affairs, as he was now officially designated, would dispose him to examine the plan in a more sympathetic manner.

This chorus of approval, to which Bishop Colenso added his voice did not convince the Colonial Office. Although Merivale did not share Shepstone's views, he was not unsympathetic. He thought it would be much better to attempt the real government of the people in Natal itself, but as this could not be done without expense to the Mother Country, it might be "good policy thus to weaken those whom we cannot manage". The stumbling block was Shepstone's request for protection.

"British protection means British sovereignty," he observed. "This I should distinctly refuse.... Whenever the white population multiplies the district in question will be subjugated and annexed either to the Orange River Territory, British Kaffraria or Natal. Until then I would in no way meddle with it unless compelled".

Should Shepstone be willing to conduct his emigration on such terms, he thought it might be tried. Peel thought not. He observed that the migrants would probably

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67. C.O.179/35: Minute by Peel 28.7.54 on Pine to Newcastle 3.5.54.
68. C.O.179/35: Minute by Merivale 15.5.54 on Pine to Newcastle 12.3.54.
69. Ibid.
70. C.O.179/35: Minute by Peel 28.7.54 on Pine to Newcastle 3.5.54.
be replaced by refugees and that the numbers involved would make no difference to the success of a wise scheme of government.

"I should decline," he wrote, "to give the sanction of government to Mr Shepstone's proposal, or to promise the protection of this country to any natives that are without our borders.... The natives can quit the district if they please, and it may be an advantage that they should go: but that is very different from directing an organised movement under the guidance of an Englishman and guaranteeing the security of all who take part in it from any difficulty that may arise."\(^71\)

Secretary Grey agreed\(^72\) and discussed the matter with Governor Grey\(^73\) who was asked to report on it from South Africa.\(^74\) This policy was not modified by Pine's detailed consideration of the Commission's report\(^75\) but it was made clear to Governor Grey that there would be no objection to the migration of any number of natives provided they understood that the Government would be under no obligation to them.\(^76\)

Meanwhile, in Natal, Theophilus Shepstone was eager

\(^{71}\) C.O.179/35: Minute by Peel 28.7.54 on Pine to Newcastle 3.5.54.

\(^{72}\) C.O.179/35: Minute by Grey 8.8.54 on Pine to Newcastle 3.5.54.

\(^{73}\) C.O.179/35: Minute by Grey 19.1.55 on Pine to Sec. Grey 5.9.54.

\(^{74}\) C.O.179/35: Sec. Sir George Grey to Gov. Sir George Grey 12.9.54 (draft).

\(^{75}\) C.O.179/35: Minutes on Pine 5.9.54.

\(^{76}\) C.O.179/35: Sec. Sir George Grey to Gov. Sir George Grey, 20.3.55 (draft).
to make his dream come true. Bishop Colenso was sympathetic and promised to seek a loan of £5,000 in England. 77 George Cato, a Durban merchant with business interests in Pondoland, 78 was the most intimately involved 79 and from him came the welcome news that Alfred White was also favourable to the scheme. 80 Shepstone had asked the Governor to let him go ahead and on 28 March 1854 he was given permission for "preliminary but conditional measures". 81 He left Pietermaritzburg on 19 May in a determined and optimistic mood. 82 While realising there might be difficulties with Faku, 83 he was confident of winning over the minor chiefs and believed that the Mpondo paramount would then be forced by circumstances to submit to his terms.

"To tell you the truth," he remarked to Cato, "I care very little what Faku may say, so long as I have the other chiefs on my side". 84

He was partially right, for in the course of his journey

77. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 19.3.54.
78. JP: Cato to M.B. Shaw 1.8.55.
79. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 21.5.54.
80. Natal SP 14: Do. to do., 28.3.54.
81. C.0.48/380: John Bird (for Col. Sec.) to Shepstone 28.3.54, sub.-enclosure in Grey to Labouchere, No.22, 13.2.57.
82. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato, 28.3.54.
Young: op. cit., p.83.
83. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 28.3.54, 21.5.54.
84. Natal SP 14: Do. to do., 21.5.54.
ten chiefs acknowledged him as paramount, including those of the Amabaca, the Amacesibe and the Amanci. His difficulties with Faku were greater than he had ever expected. He had sent messengers ahead intending to have the proposal canvassed by the people so that he could learn all their objections beforehand and answer them in one conversation with the Chief and his councillors. In fact these messengers aroused suspicion and alarm, for the events of October 1850 had not been forgotten. He was said to be leading an expedition to destroy the Amampondo and in Kingwilliamstown Colonel Maclean heard disquieting reports which made him suggest that M.B. Shaw should investigate. Fortunately Jenkins was able to calm them down and to arrange a meeting with Faku.

"This accomplished", wrote Shepstone, "I knew very well that the ball was at my feet. Faku hugged and caressed me like a baby and seemed to be quite willing to do anything I wanted".

86. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 28.7.54.
87. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 21.5.54.
88. Natal SNA 4/4/5+ Ibid.
   cf. Natal SNA 1/1/5: Shepstone to Col. Sec. 16.8.54 (draft).
89. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 28.7.54.
   See pages 147f.
90. Natal SNA 1/1/5: Shepstone to Col. Sec., 16.8.54 (draft)
91. Cape GH 8/25: Maclean to Grey 27.7.54.
92. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 28.7.54.
   Natal SNA 1/1/5: Shepstone to Col. Sec., 16.8.54 (draft)
   JP: Jenkins to W. Shaw, 21.8.54.
93. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 28.7.54.
Appearances were deceptive, if Jenkins is to be believed. According to him Faku refused altogether to cede any further territory, but as he knew that a small part of the Umtamvuna boundary was undefined, he himself suggested that Shepstone should be given 'a kloof or two' for the sake of a distinct line. The Chief agreed, but Shepstone took his offer to include all the tributaries of that river. Both he and Jenkins insisted upon their own interpretation, and as a result the missionary refused to accompany Shepstone on his last visit to the Great Place. He would not oppose him openly, but at the same time he would not associate himself or the Mission with any attempt to bully the Chief. Shepstone was much annoyed and complained,

"I am not.... quite satisfied with Mr Jenkins. He is not straightforward enough, and he as well as his wife have such peculiar notions about the Pondos and Faku's rights that it is most difficult to do anything with them in the face of their prejudices".95

It was also difficult to do anything with Faku in the absence of his missionary, and it took several hours and all Shepstone's "personal influence and character"96 to make him accept the terms. He eventually signed the document which Shepstone had drawn up, but on the

94. JP: Jenkins to Shaw 21.8.54.
95. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 28.7.54.
96. Ibid.
understanding that it would be shown to Jenkins. 97 This agreement gave Shepstone free access to the Umzimvubu (or St. John's) River and complete control of the port short of final alienation. It also stipulated that if the Natal Government transferred the area between the Umzimkulu and the Umtamvuna to him, the latter boundary should be "construed to include all the tributaries of that river." 98

Shepstone was well satisfied with his mission. He assured Cato that he had succeeded far beyond his expectations and was now

"in such a position that I can do pretty well what I like with the whole country." 99

Although the concessions at St. John's Mouth were important, he had obtained very little land and the agreement itself hardly merited such enthusiasm. He was probably thinking, however, of the eagerness with which the chiefs south of the Umtentu River had offered their allegiance,100 and anticipating that in due course this would allow him to extend his dominions. His trip may

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97. JP: Jenkins to Shaw 21.8.54.
98. C.0.179/49: Memo. of agreement between Faku and Shepstone 20.7.54, enc. in Scott to Labouchere 3.6.58.
100. cf. C.0.179/49: Shepstone to Col. Sec., Natal, 30.4.58, enc. in Scott to Stanley, 5.6.58.
not have been the success he made it out to be, but his prospects were far from bleak. Before ever he left for Pondoland he had received many requests from chiefs in Natal who wanted "a slip of country in the new world". In September he was receiving encouraging letters from England, and Pine was continuing to send "very warm notes... on the subject of the scheme." Jenkins had objected to his methods but was favourable to the project, and in May 1855 M.B. Shaw was surprised — and perhaps disappointed — to find little uneasiness among the Amampondo themselves. It only needed the approval of the Home Government to give substance to the dream, and when February 1855 came round and there was still no news, Pine assumed the responsibility of instructing him to take any steps that might be immediately necessary.

Shepstone did not act at once and in July Governor Grey ordered him to do nothing until he arrived in

101. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 9.5.54.
102. Natal SP 14: Do. to do., 2.9.54.
103. Natal SP 14: Do. to do., 23.9.54.
104. JP: Shepstone to Jenkins, 11.9.55.
105. C.O.179/37: M.B. Shaw to Maclean 28.5.55, enc. in Grey to Russell 19.7.55, No.22 (Natal).
106. C.O.48/380: Pine to Shepstone 12.2.55, enc. in Grey to Labouchere 13.2.57.
Natal. The delay did not worry him unduly, for he had heard that the Secretary of State had no objections to a migration if it did not mean responsibility for the Government. Had he but known it, Grey's despatch was the beginning of the end. It was antecedently unlikely that the pioneer of integration in New Zealand would approve of segregation in South Africa, and he did not have to look far for arguments against it. Awaiting his arrival was M.B. Shaw's account of the negotiations with Faku and of the concern which they had aroused. At the end of May Shaw reported again in terms which betrayed an obvious desire to undermine the scheme.

   Pine apparently wrote to Shepstone privately from Cape Town asking him to take no steps. (C.O.179/49: Shepstone to Labouchere 8.2.58, enc. in Scott to Labouchere 10.2.58. cf. C.O.48/380: Grey to Labouchere, No.22, 13.2.57 with enclosure and Minutes).

109. Shaw's reports were written direct to Liddle, Secretary to the High Commissioner. Maclean forwarded one with Schedule 147 of 9.9.54, and another with Schedule 148 of same date. Schedule 165 of 12.12.54 also contained correspondence with M.B. Shaw. These schedules are to be found in Cape OH 8/25, but Shaw's letters are not bound with them. There is a minute by Grey asking for the transmission to him of all correspondence with M.B. Shaw, as from the present position of Natal it was important he should know as far as practicable all that passed in Kaffraria Proper. I have been unable to find these reports of Shaw, but the contents of the first may be inferred from JF: Jenkins to W. Shaw, 21.8.54.

110. C.O.179/37: M.B. Shaw to Maclean 28.5.55, enc. as in 105.
He had visited Faku on 27 May and discovered that neither the Chief nor his people were very concerned about it. This might be due to their having accepted the removal as inevitable, but, he continued,

"should the scheme itself - which is not destitute of merit - be actually carried into effect, it is just possible that the views and feelings of the Pondos may undergo a great revulsion."

There was another possibility. Faku had long desired to move nearer the Drakensberg and his friend Moshesh, but hitherto the tribe had thwarted him. It was now rumoured that he was secretly in favour of the scheme because the danger of trouble with the Zulus would be an additional reason for carrying out his design. He had contemplated this removal before Shepstone's plans were known, and if he had the chance he would probably carry it out whether or not those plans materialised, but if he did so, he would have to wage incessant war with petty tribes who lived nearby and with others who had their eyes on the same area. This was a masterpiece of hypothesis, and Grey used it to the full. He sent a copy to Russell observing that the removal was likely "to bring about much more complicated political events

111. C.O.179/37: M.B. Shaw to Maclean 28.5.55, enc. as in 105.
112. Ibid.
than Her Majesty's Government appear to have been led to suppose".  

It was now a matter of very serious consideration whether the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages. Certainly the Government should not 

"... be hurried into a decision upon so important a subject, which is likely again to plunge into war Kafir tribes who are now in a state of peace, and whose passion for war, if again roused, may produce evil consequences even within our own territories and to an extent which it is impossible to calculate beforehand".  

Then came news of the Umdumbi Affair. If Alfred White had thought to promote the removal by discrediting an opponent, his charges against Shaw had the opposite effect. Grey decided that Shaw had been doing what Shepstone proposed to do, with results which convinced him that it was dangerous to let British subjects set up principalities in Kaffraria. With matters as they stood, he told the Secretary of State, he could probably settle the problems of the Cape and Kaffraria, but if Shepstone moved in that direction with a large body of natives he could not see his way to the future. But he stopped  

114. Ibid.  
115. C.O.48/367: A.S. White to Maclean 20.7.55, enc. in Grey to Russell (Separate) 1.8.55.  
See page 179f.
short of damning the scheme altogether, for he was not yet prepared to say that the safety of Natal might not demand the removal. 116

On his way to Natal Grey visited the Eastern Province and found the local politicians united in opposition to the scheme. 117 They had no wish to see Natal's native population settled in the rear of the Amaxosa 118 and there were already those who were looking to St. John's and Nomansland as possible areas of European settlement. 119

By the time he reached Pietermaritzburg he had made up his mind and on 30 October Shepstone dolefully told Cato, "I am afraid he will not let me go". 120

It remained for Grey to report his conclusions to the Home Government, which he did on 3 December in a despatch of over one hundred pages. 121 Four arguments recurred in this sustained blast against the segregation

119. cf. Ibid.
   Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 9.5.54.
   Natal SP 14: Do. to do., 4.9.56.
120. Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 30.10.55.
scheme and its author. Most important was his contention that it did not provide the answer to Natal's native problem. The greatest danger to Natal was the constant influx of refugees from Zululand. That danger remained the same whether they stayed in the Colony or passed on to a country beyond it, for if Panda followed them up it would be Natal that suffered. If 60,000 people were drawn off to the south, the last state would be worse than the first, for these refugees would soon fill up the vacant space and they would be less civilised than those who had moved. Indeed the main hope of checking this influx lay in the fact that the native areas were filling up and that it would soon be in the interests of the natives themselves to discourage further accessions. Apart from this the only discouraging feature of the situation was the size and position of the locations which encouraged a pastoral existence and thus prevented the natives from acquiring habits of industry. This was not likely to be improved by leading "the wildest, most restless and barbarous of the whole of them" to "a location infinitely more extensive than that which they (had) hitherto occupied where they (would) be altogether isolated from European population" and "removed from all other civilising influences". The removal, therefore, would benefit neither the Colony nor the natives it was
designed to help. If Grey's premisses were accepted, the argument was unassailable.

In the second place he complained that the scheme would alienate a large tract of fertile and almost uninhabited country which could carry a large and wealthy European population:

"It will have passed," he exclaimed, "under the dominion of a single person, selected with no reference to his aptitude for such a position, to be appropriated at his will, to be governed at his pleasure". 122

This was doubly unfortunate because, in Grey's opinion, a European settlement in this area was "the great chance of safety" for white South Africa in its disunited state. Lying to the north-east of the frontier tribes and south-east of the Basuto it would shut in both these groups between two forces and thus "secure those European states, which (were then) in constant jeopardy". This argument showed how little attention he had given to the background and details of the proposal. He wrote as if Shepstone hoped to acquire the whole area between Natal and the Umzimvubu or even the Umtata. In fact he had stated in his memorandum that he would not seek supremacy over the Amampondo, and his agreement with Faku had only given him

a narrow strip of country more than fifty miles north-east of the St. John's mouth. He insinuated that Shepstone was looking for a "princely... grant" or a "noble gift", and ignored the fact that the would-be king had previously asked for British sovereignty over the whole area and suggested a European settlement in the same place and for the same reasons as he now proposed. Could it have been that Grey had not troubled to study Shepstone's 1851 proposal which had been printed for Parliament, or was he simply plagiarising?

It was his third fear that the "new kingdom", as he called it, would be a menace to the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony. Past history taught that the greatest injuries in South Africa had been caused "by constantly swamping our partially improving coloured population, by pouring in upon them fresh hordes of unreclaimed barbarians".

"Why then", he asked, "when a certain line of policy has invariably produced disastrous results, still adhere to it, and try to pour another 60,000 barbarians down on our colonial frontier."

If the Fingos had united against the whites even when placed near their enemies, what could be expected if the "wildest savages" were settled in the vicinity of tribes

123. P.P.1852-3 LXII (1697): Shepstone to Sec.-to-Govt, (Natal) 9.12.51, enc. in Pine to Smith 27.2.52.
so distinguished for their love of war as the Kafirs and the Basuto? As he depicted it, this danger was a phantom from a Grahamstown nightmare, but if it was largely illusory, the fear was real and the argument telling.

Finally - and here Grey was undoubtedly right - it was futile to think that the scheme could be carried out without obligation to the British or Local Governments. Shepstone had put forward the plan and negotiated the cession while still an officer of the Natal Government. Even if his personal influence was greater than Grey was prepared to allow, it was nevertheless true that the natives would confound him with that Government. He neglected to add what Sir William Molesworth had already noted, namely that "his people, like those of Mr Shaw, would be looked upon by other tribes as people belonging to the British Government, for whose conduct the British Government would be held responsible". 124

Not all Grey's arguments were as cogent as he supposed, but the main weakness of his despatch was its treatment of Shepstone himself. Grey thought that the scheme was

124. C.0.48/367: Minute by Molesworth 7.10.55 on Grey 1.8.55.
a wild one, and it was his duty to say as much.\textsuperscript{125} It was not necessary, however, to refer to Shepstone's past service in terms that could easily be thought derogatory, nor to give the impression that he was motivated solely by self-seeking and personal ambition. That his motives were not wholly altruistic is clear from his keen interest in reports that copper was to be found in his territory,\textsuperscript{126} but he hardly deserved the treatment meted out in passages such as the following:

"The proposition, therefore, is nothing else than that Great Britain should establish a new kingdom in South Africa (it is so termed in letters I have seen), make Mr Shepstone the king of that country, guarantee him the security and integrity of his dominions, give him a pension of five hundred a year, and agree that he is to have despotic powers in governing the country.... No guarantees are exacted from him. It is not pretended so princely a grant is to be... in reward of past public services... No condition is imposed on him precedent to his receiving this noble gift."\textsuperscript{127}

The modified scheme had laid Shepstone open to such criticism, but it was unfair to treat this in isolation. Once again one is left asking whether Grey had read the earlier correspondence or whether he was unable to believe that the motives of an opponent could be good. This

\textsuperscript{125} cf. C.O.179/49: Minute by Merivale 17.4.56 on Scott to Labouchere 10.2.58.

\textsuperscript{126} Natal SP 14: Shepstone to Cato 9.5.54, 21.5.54, 28.7.54.

\textsuperscript{127} C.O.179/37: Grey to Russell, No.41 H.C., 3.12.55.
would have mattered little had the despatch found its last resting place in the files of the Colonial Office, but when Grey himself published it in 1857, Shepstone had every reason to feel aggrieved.

There could be no doubt about the verdict of the Colonial Office. Under-Secretary Ball, who had been inclined to support Shepstone, agreed that "the arguments contained in this despatch, though perhaps pushed rather far on some points, should prevail against the scheme", and Henry Labouchere, the fifth Secretary of State in twelve months, was content "to look at this important question through Sir G. Grey's eyes." Segregation was not to be.

Theoretically the policy of amalgamation was more progressive than its rival. In retrospect, however,

128. Cape P.P. 1857: Correspondence between H.E. Sir George Grey, K.C.B., and Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the affairs of the Cape Colony, Natal and Adjacent Territories.
129. C.O.179/49: Shepstone to Labouchere 9.2.58, enc. in Scott to Labouchere 10.2.58.
130. C.O.179/37: Minute by J. Ball, 7.2.56, on Grey, No.41 H.C., 3.12.55.
131. Ibid.
132. They were Sir George Grey, Sidney Herbert, Lord John Russell, Sir William Molesworth and himself.
133. C.O.179/37: Minute by Labouchere 8.2.56 on Grey, No.41 H.C., 3.12.55.
it is impossible to share the confidence of Sir George Grey and his contemporaries. Had there been adequate resources for education and improvement their hopes might have been realised, but these were lacking and in practice the civilising effect of labour and landlessness was not very marked. Segregation and security might have been a sounder foundation for African advancement. At any rate, had Shepstone become a latter day Moses it is by no means a foregone conclusion that his people would have longed for the fleshpots of Egypt.

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the noble sentiments of men like Pine really masked European self-interest, and that the desire to break up the locations owed a great deal to economic necessity and very little to civilising zeal. On the other hand there can be no doubt about Shepstone's motives, whatever Grey may have thought, and by far the most important reason for his proposal was his concern for the welfare of the native people. Personal pique there undoubtedly was in the earlier proposal, but his sense of justice was more important.

Shepstone's failure to win approval for his scheme does not answer the question whether it was practicable or not. It is unlikely that it would have turned out
quite as he planned, but he had a greater chance of success than anybody else. His dealings with Faku leave the uncomfortable impression that the sense of justice and fairplay which undoubtedly influenced him was not very strong when native rights happened to cross his designs, and this could have led to difficulties. Nevertheless Jenkins, who had objected to this treatment of the Chief, could still write of the scheme in an approving manner, which suggests that he was not particularly afraid of trouble. On the whole it seems that if his plans had materialised the results would have been no worse - and possibly better - than those which sprang from the policy which Grey did actually initiate in this area.

One thing emerged clearly from Shepstone's proposals and the reaction of Sir George Grey. The missionaries had managed to keep Pondoland intact in 1850 but the days of isolation were numbered. Shepstone had shown himself impatient of a policy which handed over large unoccupied areas to a native chief, and had actually

134. See pages 214-7.
135. Ibid.
137. See page 202.
231.

contemplated European settlement in Faku's country.\textsuperscript{138} This suggestion had been abandoned, only to be revived by Grey,\textsuperscript{139} and in view of their source his proposals were even more ominous. In 1854 Great Britain had endeavoured to relieve herself of all responsibility beyond the borders of the Cape and Natal,\textsuperscript{140} but the policy of containment had not eradicated an opposite tendency which was henceforth to dominate relations between the Amampondo and the Colonial authorities.

\textsuperscript{138} See page 201.
\textsuperscript{139} See pages 224f.
\textsuperscript{140} See page 232.
"Our policy should be to keep our frontier safe from hostile attacks and to protect our own colonists. If beyond that frontier the natives choose to slaughter each other and the Boers and missionaries choose to assist them, we can't prevent their doing so; by meddling we should do no good but generally make enemies of all parties."

Molesworth's words were extreme, but they expressed the temper of British policy in the middle 'fifties. At Sand River in January 1852, and again at Bloemfontein in February 1854, Great Britain had endeavoured to divest herself of all responsibility beyond the frontiers of the Cape and Natal. On the former occasion Pretorius and his followers had received the welcome assurance that the Queen's Government would not interfere beyond the Vaal.² At Bloemfontein an unwilling Orange Free State had been forced to accept the doubtful boon of independence, and left to deal with Moshesh as best it could.³ This policy had been dictated by the pressure of public opinion in England rather than the needs of South Africa. War on the Eastern Frontier and chaos in the Orange River Sovereignty had discredited the policy of Sir Harry Smith.

1. C.0.48/367: Minute by Molesworth 7.10.55. on Grey to Russell 1.8.55.
2. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., p.64.
3. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., pp.70-84.
Manchester had triumphed, and the interests of Grahamstown or Bloemfontein had hardly been considered. Yet the Governor chosen to implement this policy of withdrawal and neutrality was one whose experience had accustomed him to look at affairs from a Colonial rather than an Imperial point of view. Sir George Grey was selected as the ablest officer in the Colonial service, but his ability proved to be a hindrance rather than a help to his superiors. From the beginning his policy tended to the expansion both of British influence and British sovereignty.

This was not without its effect upon Pondoland. Hitherto the Cape had appeared to be a distant and friendly power ready to counter the designs of Natal. Henceforth relations were to be closer, the Amampondo were to be drawn out of relative isolation into the wider sphere of South African politics, and the illusion that "Truth resided at Grahamstown and the Cape" was to receive a nasty blow. Within ten years a wound had been inflicted which, though small in itself, was allowed to fester and to poison the whole relationship of the Amampondo and the Colonial authorities.

4. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.85.
5. Natal SNA 1/1/5: Shepstone to Colonial Secretary Natal 16.8.54.
The most important problem awaiting Grey was that of relations between white and black. He soon realised that it was impossible to separate the Basuto border and the Eastern Frontier as the Bloemfontein Convention had sought to do. Any collision between the Free State and the Basuto would inevitably affect the Cape. If the former were victorious, the latter would be forced down upon the rear of the Amazosa. If the Basuto invaded the republic, the frontier tribes would be encouraged to follow their example and attack the Cape. War or no war there were persistent reports that Moshesh was in touch with the coastal chiefs, and that boded ill. Grey concluded that neutrality was dangerous and that he ought to have the power to ensure that Free State native policy was at one with that of the Cape. In May 1856 he was protesting that the British Government ought to interfere beyond the Orange River. and in March 1857, when it seemed possible that Pretorius might unite the two republics, he explicitly suggested federation.

6. P.P.1857 (Session 1) X (2202): Governor Grey to Labouchere, No.32, 24.4.56; No.50, 6.6.56.
   P.P.1857-8 XL (2352): Gov. Grey to Labouchere, No.88, 25.8.56; No.94, 27.9.56; No.95, 29.9.56; No.36, 25.3.57.
7. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.98.
Basuto War and subsequent events only strengthened his conviction that federation was the answer, and it was his espousal of this cause, in spite of clear instructions, that led to his recall in June 1859.9

It was not only in his plans for federation that Grey's policy ran counter to that of the Imperial Government. He also hoped to extend British influence in Kaffraria proper and felt free to use its vacant acres to offset the disasters of abandonment. This was a constant if secondary theme of his first term of office. Although they were only applied in British Kaffraria, his civilising plans were designed "to gain an influence over all the tribes included between the present north-eastern boundary of this colony and Natal",10 and he actually considered establishing an educational institution in Pondoland.11 At the end of 1855 his report on the Shepstone Scheme adumbrated a proposal for a European settlement in Kaffraria,12 and that this was not a chance idea thrown out only to be forgotten was shown in 1857 when the Cattle Killing seemed to open up the prospect

9. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.98
11. See page 173.
of expansion beyond the Kei. His main concerns were to relieve suffering and to dispose of refugees, but he told the Cape Parliament,

"I hope, indeed, that I may be able to devise means which will not only enable the government to fill up the vacant portions of British Kaffraria with a European population sufficiently large to maintain itself, and to exercise a powerful influence for good upon the Kafir race, but which will also enable it to establish a European settlement in Kaffraria Proper, sufficiently strong to keep in check those tribes beyond the Kei who have manifested a hostile spirit, and to encourage and support our friends in that quarter whilst their presence will, at the same time, give a great impetus and assistance to the colony of Natal, and occupy the vacant space intervening between us and that country, which, it is essential to both our interests, should not be filled up by new tribes of barbarians swarming in from the interior."¹³

A few days later he published official correspondence on native affairs, including his despatch on the Shepstone Scheme.¹⁴

The first overt action was taken in February 1858. Kreli's people, scattered by the disaster of the previous year, were beginning to return to their chief, whose confidence increased with their numbers. Early in February Grey heard disquieting reports, and ordered Commandant Currie to drive him beyond the Bashee.¹⁵ This done Grey

¹⁴. Cape P.P. 1857: Correspondence.... on the affairs of the Cape Colony, Natal and Adjacent Territories.
¹⁵. Cape P.P. 1858: Votes and Proceedings, p.5. Speech of Governor at opening of session, 10.3.58.
proposed to pave the way for European settlement and the British Kaffrarian system. 16 A number of Fingos were allowed to move from their colonial locations to the vicinity of Butterworth, and in August 1858 Major Gawler located some natives from British Kaffraria at Idutywa. 17 The rest of the area was kept clear by Currie's police. 18

The expulsion of Kreli preceded by a few weeks the outbreak of war between the Free State and the Basuto, 19 and in August and September Grey travelled north to negotiate a peace. 20 During this visit it became clear that he regarded the new world below the Drakensberg as a means of relieving the problems of the interior. Jan Letelle and his clan were a threat to border peace. A representative of the ruling family in Basutoland before the rise of Moshesh, 21 he had become a subject of the Orange Free State in March 1858 22 and continued to steal from the Basuto after peace had been concluded. 23 Grey met him

18. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.140.
20. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.123.
at Hebron and suggested that he should cross the mountains.24 The same suggestion was made to Sikonyela's son, Lehana, who had taken refuge in the Wittebergen Reserve.25 Moshesh did not like this26 for he himself had designs on that area,27 and when Grey visited Morija, the chief's son Nehemiah raised the subject of his settling there. The Governor did not commit himself, but told him to write to him about it. A true son of his father, Nehemiah realised that possession was nine points of the law, and staked his claim before doing so.28

When he did write, his letter was ill received,29 probably because he had complicated Grey's plans for Adam

24. B.R.II, p.503: Jan Letelle to High Commissioner 21.12.58. There was some confusion as to the exact place Grey suggested. Letelle (ibid) mentioned the Queenstown District. Austen, the superintendent of the Wittebergen reserve, took him and Lehana to inspect Kreli's country about the Tsomo, (B.R.II, p.526: Austen to Burnet, Civil Commissioner of Aliwal North, 29.4.59) but Grey insisted that he had in view the territory about the sources of the Umzimvubu and the tributaries of the Tsitsi (Tsitsa?) (B.R.II p.529f: Sec. of High Commissioner to Austen, 10.5.59)


27. cf. B.R.II, p.536: Civil Commissioner, Aliwal North, to Secretary of High Commissioner, 5.9.59.


29. B.R.II, p.535: High Commissioner to Nehemiah Moshesh, 18.8.59 - "I fear that complications may hereafter take place from what has occurred".
Kok and his people. The Griquas had fared badly in 1854. Having failed to reach agreement with them, Sir George Clerk had made it clear that the British Government no longer considered itself bound by its Treaty engagements, and had secretly agreed with the Free State that any land in the inalienable territory which was sold to Europeans should pass under its control. Before long the Griquas would have become a landless proletariat. Grey took up their case soon after he arrived in South Africa, and was eventually told to arrange a settlement which would not require financial assistance from Great Britain. There is a strong presumption that he acted on this permission during his visit to the Free State and suggested that Kok should examine the region between the upper reaches of the Umzimvubu and the Umzimkulu with a view to settling there. At any rate

30. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.82
Walker: History of South Africa, p.267

C.O.48/381: Grey to Labouchere, No.28, 11.3.57.


33. According to Theal (Since 1795, V, p.89), "Sir George Grey felt that he was morally bound to do something for Kok and his Griquas. He therefore offered them a large fertile tract along the headwaters of the Umzimhlava and Umzimvubu Rivers".

Wodehouse wrote of "Sir George Grey's proposal to Adam Kok, that he should dispose of all his possessions... and make arrangements for moving with his tribe into Nomasiland". (C.O.48/413: Wodehouse to Newcastle, 10.6.62, No.84). He continued, "Adam Kok accepted his advice; visited the place proposed..." (Contd.)
... and moved into the territory of Moshesh, where he has since remained in a most irksome and unsettled position".

The latter statement especially implies that the proposal was originally made by Grey. It is possible, however, that both Theal and Wodehouse were thinking of the Memorandum which Grey handed to the Griqua deputation at Cape Town in 1861 after they had examined their new territory. (C.O.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61).

Grey himself did not admit to originating the scheme. Indeed he wrote as if he was trying to control a movement he could not prevent. (ibid) This proves nothing, for he was concerned at that juncture to give the impression that the proposed annexation to Natal would cause great embarrassment. (See pages 253f ). Nor is the absence of documentary evidence conclusive against his making a suggestion in 1858, for the proposals to Lehana and Letelle were verbal, (B.R.II, p.538: Memo by Sec.-to-High Commissioner, 18.9.59) and it was not Grey's practice to report his every doing to the Colonial Office - indeed he would not have informed Newcastle as early as he did but for the Natal claim. (C.O.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61).

I have been unable to establish whether Grey saw Kok either at Philippolis or, as is more likely, at Aliwal North during his 1858 visit. Several pieces of circumstantial evidence suggest that there was some communication on this subject:
(a) Grey's suggestions to Letelle and Lehana, and the fact that he was concerned to help Adam Kok.
(b) Jan Letelle wrote to Grey in May 1859 reminding him of a promise to assist him with waggons when he moved, and with powder, lead and a plough in his new settlement. He went on, "My father, I trust in your word, my Lord, Sir George Grey, and I hope you will take as good care of me as of Adam Kok". This may be interpreted as referring to a similar promise to Kok. (B.R.II, p.531: Jan Letelle to Grey, 22.5.59).
(c) Grey's reaction to Nehemiah's removal: "I fear that complications may hereafter take place from what has occurred. My successor will, however, I am sure, do his utmost to adjust all matters well in so far as he may think it his duty to interfere with them". This was written before Kok's commission had returned from their tour of inspection. (Contd.)
1859,\(^\text{34}\) and pioneered a road over the Drakensberg which could be used in the event of removal.\(^\text{35}\)

Grey fell from grace before his Kaffrarian plans could be given substance. When he left Cape Town the Transkei was largely unpeopled, and its rightful owner an exile in Bomvanaland. Further north Nehemiah Moshesh was settling down, but without government recognition, while Adam Kok was making up his mind whether or not to

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33. (Contd).

(d) Supt. Austen reported Kok’s return in November 1859 in terms which suggest he knew that the purpose of the expedition was to seek a new settlement. (B.R.II p.542: Supt. Austen to Civil Commissioner Burnet, 30.11.59).

In March 1860 Burnet told the Sec.-to-the-High Commissioner: "Captain Adam Kok, on his return from that country, managed, in spite of his promises to the contrary, to slip cleverly through the Orange River and Home; and without affording either Mr Austen or myself an opportunity of learning anything of the result of his journey; ..." (B.R.II, p.559: Civil Commissioner Burnet to Secretary-to-High Commissioner, 3.3.60. Underlining mine).

These letters indicate at the very least that Kok went with the knowledge, if not at the suggestion, of colonial officials.

Taken together these considerations suggest that Kok’s plans were known in official circles before Grey was recalled, and make it not unlikely that the Governor had in fact suggested removal.


cf. C.0.48/402: Do. to do., 30.3.60, enc. in Wynyard, No.69, 20.4.60.
trek. Across the mountains Letelle had lost his desire
to move, but Lehana was waiting impatiently for permission
to do so. It had apparently not occurred to the
Governor that he should consult Faku to whom the area in
question was secured by Treaty.

Before he arrived in England there had been a change
of Ministry, and the Duke of Newcastle had returned to
the Colonial Office. It was he who had ordered the
abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty in 1853, but fortunately for Grey he was changing his views and
was now inclined to think the Conventions a blunder. Reproof was followed by re-instatement, and in July
1860 Grey arrived back in Cape Town. Federation was now

36. Lehana eventually moved in November without waiting for permission from the Central Government, (B.R.II, p.542: Austen to Burnet 30.11.59) leaving his women behind to gather the harvest. In March he was back again having found his settlement opposed by the Amampondo-mise and others. (B.R.II, p.550: Austen to Burnet, 3.3.60) He remained in the Wittebergen reserve until 1864, when he again crossed the Drakensberg to join the Griquas. (Theal: Since 1795, V, p.92) Letelle remained on the border. Early in 1862 he was attacked by Poshuli, and a Free State Commission reported adversely upon his behaviour. After this defeat he lost many followers to the Basuto and declined in importance. (Theal: Since 1795, V, p.94f).

38. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.69.
out of the question, but his plans for Kaffraria had been approved in principle, and for the rest of his time in South Africa they loomed large in his activities as High Commissioner.

Lieutenant Governor Wynyard had brought the subject to the notice of the Colonial Office. After the Governor's departure, he had tried to master the complexities of his policy, and had then asked Newcastle for specific instructions about Lehana and the Transkei. The powers-that-be winced, but Grey was asked to report. He grasped the opportunity with both hands and treated Downing Street to an exposition of what he had intended to do, and a decided expression of opinion as to the policy that ought to be adopted:

"If a system of federation had been adopted in South Africa - as I, until recently, hoped might have been the case - the whole of this question would by degrees have solved itself: and, when I found that such federation was not approved of, I intended to have brought the subject under the review of the Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope at its next meeting, when I think I could have conclusively shown, from the results of the system I have established in other parts of South Africa, that the small tract of country lying between the Kei and Natal might be, by degrees, occupied by a mixed European and native population in a manner beneficial to both races, with the full consent and co-operation of the native chiefs, and that

41. B.R.II., pp.538f: Memo by Secretary-to-High Commissioner, 18.9.59; Sec.-to-High Commissioner to Sec.-to-Lieut. Governor, 23.9.59.
42. C.O.48/398: Wynyard to Newcastle, No.22, 8.10.59.
43. C.O.48/398: Minutes on Wynyard to Newcastle, 8.10.59.
"the native population would, as the necessity for their doing so arose from the spread of the system, have cheerfully submitted to an amount of direct taxation which would have yielded the funds requisite for their government, education and control".44

Expansion, he declared, was inevitable. If his system were followed and gradually extended it would issue in peace and prosperity. Otherwise he could foresee nothing but trouble for the colonies and great military expenditure for the mother country. In his opinion Wynyard should prepare for mixed settlement between the Kei and the Bashee.

The Colonial Office had not asked for this! Merivale was afraid it would let in federation by the back door. He admitted there was much to tempt the imagination but thought it was still possible to hold strictly to the policy of containment.

"But", he concluded, "one thing is certain - such a policy cannot be carried out by an unwilling agent, whose ambition aims at greater things".45

Either Grey or the strict principles of the past six years would have to go, and it was understandable that the Permanent Under-Secretary should be loth to jettison the latter. But he was overruled. Like Sir George Barrow,

45. C.O.48/406: Minute by Merivale, 25.1.60, on Grey, January 1860.
Newcastle was attracted by the prospect of eliminating the Eastern Frontier; like Grey he thought expansion was inevitable. He expressed his views in a minute on Grey's letter:

"A glance at the map and a knowledge of the habits of our countrymen at the Cape must at once convince anybody that the whole of Kaffraria must in a few years become British. It is merely a question of time. We are not free agents in the final issue. The power of the Kafir is departing - his savage nature is yielding to a great extent to the influence of civilisation. Annexation is an ugly word, and ugly deeds have been done under it - but the word ought not to frighten us and the deeds need by no means be repeated.

If Englishmen will take capital into Kaffraria and the natives will work for hire (as is beginning to be the case) some form of government is sure to follow. Can it be a republic between the two English colonies - Cape and Natal. Must it not inevitably be before long absorbed?"46

Merivale had thought this would lead to the re-absorption of the Free State,47 but his superior was prepared to leave that for the future to decide.

   cf. Minute by Barrow, 21.1.60, on Grey to Merivale, January 1860.

47. C.O.48/406: Minute by Merivale, 25.1.60 on Grey Jan. 1860. "The annexation of independent Kaffraria will necessitate the reannexation of the Orange River Territory. It would really be somewhat harsh, as well as scarcely politic to cut these people from the coast and overlap them on all sides and still refuse to govern them if they insist. Then we have in a few years, or even months, Sir George Grey's whole "federal" scheme of South African 'states' complete."
For a moment it seemed as if the future of Kaffraria had been decided – but only for a moment. That so little came of Grey's scheme which had so much in its favour was due mainly to three factors – the Cape, New Zealand and Natal. He had spoken of occupation "without any expense to Great Britain", and Newcastle had noted that condition. In the early 'sixties, however, the Cape Parliament refused to take responsibility even for British Kaffraria, and thus paved the way for the abandonment of the Transkei in 1864. This might not have been an insuperable obstacle for a man of Grey's character, but only thirteen months after his return he was called away from the Cape to deal with a Maori War in New Zealand. He took with him the vision, and the energy to translate that vision into fact. Even before this, however, Natal had upset his calculations by deciding to press its claim to the Harding Cession, and as a result the real issue of occupation had been obscured by a secondary consideration – who shall occupy? Nevertheless, if Grey did not achieve his ambition, the ultimate effect of his policy was the absorption of Kaffraria.

50. See pages 139f.
Grey’s immediate concern on his arrival at Cape Town was the settlement of the Griquas. He was met by a deputation who told him that they had visited "Nomansland" (as the plateau south-east of the Drakensberg had come to be called) and had obtained a cession from some of the chiefs whose rights were secured by Article XIII of the Treaty with Faku. In the case of the Umdumbi Settlement Grey had accepted Maclean’s opinion that such rights were subject to the paramount authority of the Mpondo chief. On this occasion, however, he was disposed to accept the Griqua claim, and there is no evidence that Faku’s rights were even considered. After all, they were no more than nominal. His main concern was to prevent the Griquas’ frustrating his plans by moving as an independent people. They were sent home to consider a Memorandum which laid down, among other conditions, that they should migrate as British subjects.

Not long afterwards he was reminded – for the first time, it seems – that Faku was an interested party. A private letter from Jenkins told him that Kok’s search for a country had unsettled Faku who wanted the matter brought

51. C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.
52. See page 191.
53. C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61, and enclosures.
to the Governor's notice. He therefore had a copy of the Memorandum sent to Jenkins who showed it to the Chief. This upset him even more. On Christmas Day he wrote to the Governor through Jenkins that

"in that country I have a territory which cannot be alienated; it belongs to me and my people from time immemorial; part of it was occupied last winter and part will be as soon as convenient".

Jenkins was careful to explain that this referred only to a small part of the country offered to Kok, but the protest was enough to warn Grey that he would have to walk circumspectly. He decided to visit Kaffraria to sound the chiefs and clarify his plans.

Grey's visits to that quarter were fated. Once again he did not get beyond Kingwilliamstown where he took ill, and Commandant Currie was sent in his stead. Currie's first task was to settle Krelli east of the Umtata in the neighbourhood of the former Umdumbi Settlement. He failed to do so, for Faku would not consent to the scheme in the absence of Ndamase, and Krelli himself refused to

54. Cape GH 18/6: Jenkins to Grey, (pvte) 15.8.60.
55. C.0.48/407: Faku and Umgikela to Grey 25.12.60, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.
Extract enclosed in C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.
57. C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.
58. cf. page 184.
59. C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.
60. C.0.48/407: Instructions to Sir Walter Currie 1.2.61, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.20, 20.2.61.
move without another word from the Government. His disappointment was balanced, however, by another result of his meeting with Faku. Concerned at the prospect of encroachment in the north, the Chief proposed for himself a boundary which would leave to the British Government nearly all the territory between the Umzimkulu and the Umtata which was uninhabited or occupied by tribes other than the Amampondo. According to Currie this proposal was made voluntarily, with the consent of his councillors and the advice of Mr Jenkins whom Faku had insisted should attend the meeting. His aim was apparently to obtain greater security by having the British control Nomansland. It came as a complete surprise, and in his excitement Currie was over-hasty. He asked Jenkins to draw a plan of the line - "lest all this should be said to be an idea of my own" - and galloped off to inspect it. No documentary proof was obtained, and if he intended to return for this he did not do so in the course of that visit. It was nevertheless assumed in official circles that the cession

61. C.0.48/407: Currie to Grey 18.3.61, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.45, 13.4.61.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Cape P.P.1873: A12, p.61.
65. Ibid.
was final. Three weeks later, while still in Pondoland, he sent a written report to Grey describing the country and making proposals for its disposal. Nehemiah Moshesh would remain where he was and Kok would be located between the Umzimvubu and the Umzimkulu. The rest of the country would eventually be taken up by European settlements in the coastal areas between the Umzimkulu and Umtamvuna Rivers, and about the Umtata, and also along the base of the mountains between the Tina River and the upper end of Krelli's country. In July these recommendations were considered by a Committee of the Legislative Council which also examined Currie personally. As Grey anticipated, it was thought expedient

"that speedy measures should be devised for declaring British authority in that part of the country between the Kei and the Bashee Rivers, and the latter and Natal, with a view of securing tranquillity on the borders of the colony".

But the Committee merely went on to recommend that the evidence be transmitted to the Colonial Office

"so that such means may be adopted by the Imperial Government as will ensure peace and efficient government in this part of Her Majesty's colonial possessions"

So much for expansion at the expense of the Cape!

66. C.O.48/407: Currie to Grey 8.4.61, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.57, 29.4.61.
67. du Toit: op. cit., p.150.
68. Ibid.
68a. Ibid.
By this time Grey was on the point of departure, his attention was focussed upon another aspect of the Kaffrarian problem, and nothing more was done. It was as well that Currie's elaborate plans were pigeon-holed. The area between the Umzimkulu and Umtamvuna Rivers was already well populated. Currie himself noted that the country towards the mouth of the Umtata was occupied by four tribes, but they were reported to have joined Kreli, and this was apparently sufficient reason for displacing them. Moreover the latter district embraced the location Grey had intended for Kreli himself, and as he was to be excluded from the Transkei, Currie presumably thought he could continue an unwelcome guest in Bomvanaland. There was doubtless unoccupied territory in Kaffraria, but the effect of such plans as these would have been to crowd the Africans in upon each other, to pave the way for such quarrels as led to the Fingo-Gcaleka outbreak in 1877, and to hasten the process of impoverishment and detribalisation.

69. C.0.179/61: Jenkins to G.C. Cato 23.3.61, enc. in Scott to Newcastle, (pvte and conf.) 5.7.61.
70. C.0.48/408: Currie's Report 29.6.61, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.95, 12.7.61.
71. C.0.48/406: Grey to Merivale, January 1860.
72. cf. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., p.170, on the subject of the abandonment of the Transkei: "The answer to those who attacked both Wodehouse and Cardwell for the dereliction of such desirable land is given in the latter day contrast between an unhappy Ciskei (i.e. British Kaffraria) and a relatively prosperous Transkei".
Although nothing came of his ambitious projects, Currie's mission was a success insofar as it removed any fear there might have been that Faku would obstruct the settlement of the Griquas. Henceforth his attitude towards them seems to have been favourable. There can be little doubt that Grey would have completed arrangements for their removal before consulting the British Government had it not been for obstruction from another quarter. For ten years the Harding Treaty of April 1850 had been neglected, but in 1860 the matter was raised in the Natal Legislative Council and when he visited London at the end of the year, Lieutenant Governor Scott asked permission to take over the cession. He argued that Faku regarded it as British territory, and that many of the petty chiefs who lived near the coast were anxious for British rule. Annexation was essential in the interests of law and order, for the prevailing disorder had a bad effect upon tribes in the Colony, and the formation of two Hottentot settlements was likely to increase this evil. Moreover a large part

73. cf. Cape BK 92: Jenkins to Brownlow, 29.10.62.
74. cf. C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.: "I can really give you no definite information, nor am I yet in a position to ask for instructions as to what I ought to do". A marginal note refers to a Memorandum enclosed which showed that he had very definite ideas of what he was going to do!
75. See pages 139f.
76. C.0.179/58: Scott to Newcastle, No.13, 27.3.61.
77. C.0.179/57: Scott to Newcastle (London) 21.11.60.
of the interior was unoccupied and would be eminently suited to European settlers. His proposal was accepted without demur. A few days later Barrow read in "The Times" that this area had been given to Adam Kok. Elliott immediately scented trouble, and Newcastle wrote privately to Grey telling him what had been done and expressing the hope that he had made no arrangement with Kok without consulting London.

Grey was furious. What had happened seemed likely to upset his plans completely. In a sense he had only himself to blame, for the difficulty would never have arisen had he kept the Colonial Office informed of his schemes. Nevertheless he had reason enough to be annoyed. He had been given to understand that as High Commissioner he had authority in matters affecting the tribes adjacent to Natal as well as the neighbours of the Cape. This surely meant that he should have been consulted before such a decision? More exasperating was the strong probability

78. C.O.179/57; Minutes on Scott to Newcastle, 21.11.60. Newcastle (19.12.60) observed "the only real question is whether we shall allow it to remain in its present lawless condition or place it on the same footing as the neighbouring territory in our possession. I have no doubt that the latter is dictated by a sense of duty as well as of security".

79. C.O.179/57: Additional Minutes on Scott to Newcastle, 21.11.60.
that only speculators would derive immediate benefit from the annexation. By contrast his plans would benefit all parties. He was trying to prevent an open rupture between the Griquas and the Free State. He was endeavouring to avoid an alliance of Adam Kok and Moshesh which could prove dangerous to all the white communities. He was hoping to vindicate the good faith of the British Government and to retrieve the errors of the past. Unfortunately it was six months before he attempted such a positive statement of his case.80 His immediate reaction was such as to draw from Elliott the sarcastic and not unmerited remark,

"I am afraid that Sir George Grey will find any plan, suggested by any other governor, very injurious".81

Every conceivable argument was pressed into service. The Griquas were described in glowing terms. They were wealthy and industrious pioneers of civilisation82 who would prove important auxiliaries in any future native war.83 It would be unwise to displace them in favour of a Colony which could not create a population and dangerous

80. C.0.48/408: Memorandum for Wodehouse, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.112, 6.8.61.
81. C.0.48/407: Minute by Elliott 30.3.61. on Grey to Newcastle, No.20, 20.2.61.
    of. C.0.48/407: Minute by Elliott on do. to do., No.16, 19.2.61.
82. C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.
83. Ibid.
    C.0.48/408: Grey to Newcastle, No.101, 19.7.61.
to make them its unwilling subjects. Either course could only play into the hands of Moshesh. Only after the first broadside had failed to effect the capitulation of the Colonial Office did he grudgingly acknowledge that much of the proposed Griqua territory probably fell outside the Natal claim. He was also afraid of the effect upon Faku. He was being asked to provide land for Kreli, but the prospect of being pressed from both sides at once might alarm him and create some difficulty. Moreover, Grey had been told "that the cession of the country by Faku to the British Government was not such as we should now be justified in maintaining at all costs", and that Chief had actually written "claiming in distinct terms, as his property, part of the territory now annexed to Natal". Once again annexation would play into the hands of Moshesh who had just sent Faku a handsome present and a friendly message. He was also uncertain how the natives would react to being placed under the Legislative Council of Natal, and believed

84. C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.
85. C.0.48/408: Do. to do., No.101, 19.7.61.
86. C.0.48/407: Do. to do., No.20, 20.2.61.
87. C.0.48/407: Do. to do., No.16, 19.2.61.
  cf. C.0.48/407: Do. to do., No.26, 6.3.61.
88. C.0.48/407: Do. to do., No.16, 19.2.61.
89. Ibid.
that the problems of Kaffraria ought to be settled before it was handed over to some distant body of Europeans.\(^90\)

Not all these arguments were bad. The Natal Legislature was certainly not a responsible guardian of native interests; too many demands for land might well upset the Amampondo; and it was undoubtedly imprudent to ignore the power of Moshesh. On the other hand some contentions were weak, and others were demonstrably false. His description of the Griquas was confirmed neither by past history nor by future experience. Faku had not yet been asked to provide for Kreli, but it had evidently not occurred to Grey that he might avoid trouble by locating him somewhere else. Scott was able to call on Harding and A.S. White to vindicate the Cession and to distinguish the visits of April and October 1850;\(^91\) while the testimony of Jenkins was enough to explode the myth that Faku's letter referred to any part of the Natal claim, and showed that annexation would be welcomed by his most responsible adviser.\(^92\) Grey had let his temper get the better of him. His despatches leave the impression of an impulsive, unscrupulous and self-opinionated autocrat.

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90. C.O.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61; No.45, 13.4.61.

91. C.O.179/59: Scott to Newcastle (pvte and conf.) 5.7.61; Do. to do., No.50, 2.8.61.

92. C.O.179/59: Do. to do. (pvte and conf.) 5.7.61 and encl.
The authorities in London were not impressed by this "terrorism". Their sympathy was with the Governor of Natal, and they refused to be bullied. This helps to account for a more reasonable attitude on the part of Grey before he left for New Zealand. Reason was also induced by a report that the Griquas were actually debating whether or not to join Moshesh. He now admitted that there was land enough for Kok between the Natal claim and the Bashee River, and suggested that he should be allowed to settle without delay, if he so desired, in an area to be defined by a Commission representing the High Commissioner, the Cape and Natal. Next day he sailed, leaving his successor to decide what should be done.

Meanwhile Scott was playing his hand well. He acceded to Grey's request not to act on his instructions, but told the Legislative Council he had no doubt his authority to annex would be confirmed. His despatches

93. The description is Fortescue's - C.0.48/407: Minute by Fortescue 10.5.61 on Grey to Newcastle, No.26, 6.3.61.
94. C.0.48/407: Newcastle to Grey 3.6.61 (Draft on Grey to Newcastle, No.26, 6.3.61)
95. C.0.48/408: Grey to Newcastle, No.113, 8.8.61.
96. C.0.48/408: Minute of Executive Council 14.8.61, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.129, 15.8.61.
98. C.0.179/59: Scott to Newcastle, No.41, 5.7.61.
were few and his arguments cogent. He demolished Grey's more extravagant assertions, and passed on every scrap of information about the disorders in Nomansland. By the end of the year it looked as if he had succeeded. A massacre at the Ibisi Missionary Settlement — dutifully and fully reported — convinced the Colonial Office that the country should be taken over immediately. Instructions to this effect were promptly despatched.

When Philip Wodehouse reached Cape Town he discovered that Lieutenant Governor Wynyard had followed Grey's advice. Kok had been told he could move provided he did not encroach upon the Natal claim, and a Commission had been appointed to fix a provisional boundary. This Commission had not yet met, and one of Wodehouse's earliest actions was to ask Scott not to make any formal announcement of annexation until it had finished its work and negotiations with Kok had been concluded. Scott agreed

99. C.0.179/58: Scott to Newcastle, No.13, 27.3.61.  
C.0.179/59: Do. to do., No.41, 5.7.61.  
100. C.0.179/58: Do. to do., No.13, 27.3.61.  
101. C.0.179/60: Do. to do., No.98, 30.9.61.  
102. C.0.179/60: Minutes on Scott to Newcastle 30.9.61.  
103. C.0.405/3: Newcastle to Scott (conf.) 5.12.61.  
C.0.49/55: Newcastle to Wodehouse 5.12.61.  
104. Wynyard to Newcastle, No.39, 13.11.61, and enclosures — C.0.48/409.  
105. C.0.48/412: Wodehouse to Scott, 18.1.62, enc. in Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.3, 18.1.62. Wodehouse had arrived on 15 January (Walker: op. cit., p.279)
albeit unwillingly. Walter Currie and Dr Sutherland, the Surveyor-General, had been chosen to represent the Cape and Natal respectively, and on 3 March they met at the Umzimhlavu Drift in Pondoland. Their meeting ended in deadlock. Sutherland was only authorised to point out a line already defined by Lieutenant Governor Scott. This took the mean direction of the Umtamvuna River and carried on in that direction to the mountains. It took no account of geographical features, crossed low down the Umzimvubu and ended up near the sources of the Tina. Currie believed that the line dictated by the Treaty and the natural features ran from the source of the Umtamvuna to the nearest part of the Drakensberg, keeping as near as possible to the watershed between the Umzimkulu and the Umzimvubu. His opinion was confirmed by the evidence of Jenkins and William Lochenberg. The area between these lines was over one thousand square miles. It had been agreed that if there was disagreement the

108. C.O.48/413: Currie to Cape Colonial Secretary 19.3.62, enc. in Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.53, 19.4.62.
110. Ibid.
Natal line should be observed until a decision was reached,\textsuperscript{111} and Currie accordingly pointed this out to the Griquas.\textsuperscript{112}

Scott had made his one mistake, and it was fatal. The weight of evidence and common sense was in Currie's favour. By claiming too much and not giving Sutherland the power to negotiate, the Lieutenant Governor lost everything that could have made the cession worth while. Currie reported that it would be impossible to settle the Griquas between the temporary line and the Umzimvubu, although his line would give them sufficient room.\textsuperscript{113} Wodehouse overlooked the latter remark which apparently contradicted what Currie had said earlier in a private letter.\textsuperscript{114} He told Newcastle that "sufficient land may be found..... without depriving the Natal Government of what it can in reason claim, if in the first instance we insist on the removal of Nehemiah".\textsuperscript{115} Currie had been inclined to advocate this.\textsuperscript{116} Not so Wodehouse. He saw

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} C.0.48/412: Instructions to Currie 18.1.62, enc. in Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.15, 13.2.62.
\item \textsuperscript{112} C.0.48/413: Currie to Cape Col. Sec. 19.3.62, enc. as in 108.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{114} C.0.48/412: Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.47, 21.3.62. cf.C.0.43/413: Do. to do., No.84, 10.6.62.
\item \textsuperscript{115} C.0.48/413: Do. to do., No.53, 19.4.62.
\item \textsuperscript{116} C.0.48/413: Do. to do., No.84, 10.6.62.
\end{itemize}
more clearly than either his predecessor or Currie that the natives needed land, and that the tendency was to crowd the tribes in upon each other.\footnote{117} Nor was his attention focussed, as was Currie's, on the problem of Kok and Natal. He was better placed to take in the whole South African scene, and in that scene the most prominent figure was Moshesh who was reported to be in league with Panda and Cetywayo.\footnote{118} It had recently been discovered that Moshesh claimed the country occupied by Nehemiah by virtue of a cession from Faku.\footnote{119} Wodehouse did not wish to recognise that claim, but he thought it "impolitic and dangerous" to interfere, especially as Nehemiah had been there three years and had apparently received some countenance from Sir George Grey.\footnote{120} At the same time Kok was complaining that the land left for him was insufficient for a quarter of his people, and was asking for something like his original claim.\footnote{121} Somebody had to suffer, and Wodehouse decided that it should be

\footnote{117}{CO.48/412: Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.35, 15.3.62. 
CO.179/64: Wodehouse to Scott 17.3.62., enc. in Scott to Newcastle, No.44, 1.5.62.}

\footnote{118}{CO.48/412: Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.47, 21.3.62.}

\footnote{119}{CO.48/412: Do. to do., No.35, 15.3.62. 
CO.48/412: Do. to do., No.47, 21.3.62. 
B.R.III, p.147.}

\footnote{120}{CO.48/413: Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.53, 19.4.62. }

\footnote{121}{CO.48/413: Kok to Wodehouse 28.3.62, enc. in Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.53, 19.4.62.}
Natal. He told Scott that he could annex no more than the coastal strip between the Umzimkulu and the Umzamvuna, and wrote privately to Newcastle assuring him "that it would not have been safe or proper to make a different settlement". The Colonial Office was not pleased, but it had been agreed that the High Commissioner should be paramount in native affairs, and his decision was accepted.

It was an unhappy decision for Natal, and as Currie had apparently been misunderstood, it was probably unnecessary. Certainly the Griquas were given more land than they needed, and Natal might well have enjoyed the benefit of Currie's line without disastrous results. Wodehouse cannot be acquitted of a certain lack of patience in dealing with an embarrassing situation of another's making. On the whole, however, it was wiser to disappoint Natal than to break faith with Kok and to annoy Moshesh.

122. C.0.48/413: Wodehouse to Scott 15.5.62, enc. in Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.66, 20.5.62.
123. Wodehouse Private Papers: Wodehouse to Newcastle (pvte) 11.5.62.
124. C.0.48/413: Minutes on Wodehouse to Newcastle No.53, 19.4.62, and on No.66, 20.5.62. C.0.48/413: Newcastle to Wodehouse, 5.7.62. (Draft on No.66).
125. MMS: Cameron to Secs., 1.8.66 - The Griquas were offering farms of 3,000 acres to Englishmen.
126. cf. C.0.48/413: Minute by Newcastle, 7.6.62 on Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.53, 19.4.62.
Scott was disappointed, but bowed to the inevitable. Wodehouse had put him in a very difficult position by giving Kok all the most valuable land, and leaving Natal an awkward angle that did not naturally connect with the Colony and was already well occupied by native tribes. He thought it doubtful whether the Legislative Council would want it, but realised that it might have to be taken in the interests of peace. Whatever may be thought of the colonists, their Governor was inspired by higher motives than land hunger. Disturbances continued, and it soon emerged that Faku's impis were taking a hand. In September the Chief reminded the Natal Government of the Cession and asked it to prevent aggressions upon him if the people were really British subjects. Otherwise he would have to attack them again. Shepstone thought he was trying to get a positive declaration of the Government's plans, and when it became clear that the Colonial Office was behind Wodehouse, the Executive Council decided

128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. C.O.179/64: Scott to Newcastle, No.61, 31.5.62 and enclosures.
that "this Government has no other resource than to take under its government the portion of Nomansland not ceded to Adam Kok". Knowing how the Legislative Council was likely to react, they wanted it governed for a time as a separate dependency on the lines of British Kaffraria, but they were told to grasp the nettle. Scott's forebodings were amply justified, and it was not until July 1865 that the annexation bill passed the Legislative Council in an acceptable form. By that time the tribes had decided nothing would happen, and the formal announcement of annexation caused some disquiet, both in Alfred (as the new county was called) and in Pondoland itself.

The controversy about the future of Nomansland overshadowed a dispute with Faku about the interpretation of the negotiations in 1861. This was not considered important enough to mention in a despatch, but in fact it

134. Ibid.
135. C.O.179/65: Minutes on Scott to Newcastle, No.143, 4.12.62; Newcastle to Scott 25.2.63 (draft on Scott to Newcastle, No.143, 4.12.62).
136. C.O.179/76: Bissett to Cardwell, No.21, 2.10.65.
137. C.O.179/79: Bissett to Cardwell, No.5, 16.1.66; No.16, 1.2.66.
JP: Wodehouse to Jenkins, 29.1.66.
138. Cape GH 8/58: Nicholson to Newcastle 6.6.62. It was alluded to only after Newcastle had asked for Wodehouse's remarks upon a letter from Staff Surgeon Nicholson criticizing policy in Kaffraria.
sowed the seeds of future trouble. The first hint of disagreement was given when Faku intimated, in reply to a letter from Sir George Grey, that Currie had misapprehended his meaning. When he set out for Pondoland in 1862, Currie was told to secure Faku's continued friendship, and to this end he asked Jenkins to meet him at Jojo's place on 1 March with such of his councillors as the Chief might wish to accompany him. Faku wanted to be present himself, but as his age made it impracticable for him to travel, he asked Currie to see him at the Great Place before meeting Sutherland. He agreed, and arrived at Palmerton on 25 February. Next day the Chief sent a messenger asking him to wait until Ndamase arrived. Such delays were characteristic of Mpondo diplomacy, as Currie well knew, but on this occasion he had no time to waste, and replied that he would leave on the 27th. This brought the Chief's great son Umqikela hurrying to the station with another councillor, but Currie was adamant. As a result Faku did not meet him and

139. Cape GH 8/48: Milward to Barkly 2.1.73. This refers to Grey to Faku 24.7.61 and a reply sent through Jenkins.
140. C.0.48/412: Instructions to Currie 18.1.62, enc. in Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.15, 13.2.62.
141. JP: Currie to Jenkins, 25.1.62.
142. Cape GH 8/48: Jenkins to Currie 12.2.62 - Cited in Milward to Barkly 2.1.73.
143. Cape GH 8/48: Minutes of Meeting 26.2.62, enc. in Milward to Barkly 2.1.73.
144. Ibid.
145. C.0.48/407: Currie to Grey 18.3.61, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.45, 13.4.61. He had waited 8 days on his previous visit.
146. Cape GH 8/48: Minutes of meeting 26.2.62, enc. as in 143.
146a. Ibid.
no satisfactory conclusion was reached in the discussions which did take place. 147

The Amampondo were not dissatisfied with the boundary between themselves and the Griquas, but objected to the line west of the Umzimvubu. 148 Currie thought they

147. Cape GH 8/48: Jenkins to Wodehouse, 28.3.62 - Extract in Milward to Barkly 2.1.73.

148. The line defined in 1861 was as follows: "Along the Umtamvuna to the Ingeli mountain, following the most westerly branch; thence along the ridge dividing the waters flowing into the Ibis (branch of Umzimkulu) and the Umzimhla (branch of Umzimvubu), along the heads of the Umzimhla to the Umzimvubu to the Roede, and then along the Umzimvubu to the waggon drift at Hulley's, and thence along the waggon road to the Umtata Waggon drift". (C.O.179/59: White to G.C. Cato 22.3.61, enc. in Scott to Newcastle, (pve and conf.) 5.7.61). According to the Cape papers, the Amampondo agreed in 1862 to the cession of Kok's location only. (Cape GH 8/58: Nicholson to Newcastle 6.6.62.)

In 1872 a Mpondo spokesman told the Special Commission that Faku proposed a line "from the sources of the Umtamvuna to the top of the Ingeli Mountains to the top of the Insizwe Mountain to the Umzimvubu to its source". (C.O.48/461: Minutes of Meeting 28.3.72, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 25.8.72) This corresponds to the line east of the Umzimvubu described by White. There followed an account of an inconclusive argument with Currie about the line crossing the Umzimvubu (ibid). In their report the Commissioners said Umqikela admitted the line east of the Umzimvubu but denied the cession west of that river. They had found by hearsay that Currie in 1862 found the Amampondomise and Amabaca at war with the Amampondo because they would not accept Faku's paramount authority, and suggested a well-defined boundary west of the Umzimvubu which was not agreed upon. (C.O.48/461: Special Commissioners to Col. Sec. 2.4.72, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 25.8.72)
were going back on a previous agreement, and was inclined to blame Moshesh 149 who was claiming that in April 1861 Faku had given him the land occupied by Nehemiah. 150

This was only half the truth. The real difficulty was that the Mpondo representatives did not regard the proposal of 1861 as a final arrangement. In all their previous dealings with the white man such matters had been settled by a written treaty, 151 and they did not expect anything different on this occasion. Faku's proposal was probably put forward as a basis of discussion and such it would remain until the "writing" had been signed. 153 The very fact that the proposed line crossed the Umzimvubu supports this hypothesis. Ndamasie was by this time regarded as a virtually independent chief, 154 and Currie himself admitted that Faku was unwilling to give a decision about the land east of the

149. JP: Currie to Jenkins, 1.4.62.
151. Maitland Treaty, pages 74f.
Harding Treaty, page 140.
Shepstone agreement, pages 216f.
152. CF: Cape GH 8/58: Nicholson to Newcastle, 6.6.62.
Umtata because he was not present.\textsuperscript{155} It was therefore unlikely that he would have alienated the entire area northwest of the waggon road without so much as consulting him. There are hints in later discussions that Faku’s "offer" was not as "voluntary" as Currie made it out to be, and that the line was only carried across the Umzimvubu because he insisted that it should be.\textsuperscript{156} Be that as it may, the Amampondo had ample reason to complain that the Government had taken too much for granted.

Currie’s behaviour was almost idiotic. In the face of obvious dissatisfaction, he maintained that the time for discussion was past.\textsuperscript{157} Asked to produce written proof of the Cession he insisted that the word of a Chief was as good as his writing.\textsuperscript{158} Despite the failure to reach agreement he started to mark out the disputed boundary.\textsuperscript{159} Finally, when Faku asked for another conference, he told Jenkins

"I for my part can see no good in another meeting; they will only attempt to deny themselves again if it suits their purpose. The Government should simply do what is right and ask no further questions".\textsuperscript{160}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[155] See page 248.
\item[156] C.O.48/461: Enclosures in Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72 - see footnote 148.
\item[157] Cape GH 8/48: Minutes of Meeting 26.2.62, enc.as in 143.
\item[158] Ibid.
\item[159] Cape GH 8/58: Nicholson to Newcastle 6.6.62 - referring to Cape newspapers.
\item[160] JP: Currie to Jenkins, 1.4.62.
\end{footnotes}
Whatever his merits as a policeman, Walter Currie was no diplomat. Even if the Amampondo were denying themselves, it was no solution to ignore their complaints. To do so when their case was far from weak, was foolishness. It could not fail to undermine their faith in British justice and to awaken suspicion and resentment.

Jenkins was present at the discussions but it does not appear what part he played. After they had been broken off, he advised Faku to send a message to the Governor regretting the misunderstanding and asking for the boundary question to be discussed again. He would not have done this and himself written the letter had he not thought the Chief's uneasiness was justified. Currie's attitude to this request has already been indicated, and his view prevailed. The High Commissioner had more than enough to do. British Kaffraria, Basutoland, the rival claims of Kok and Natal and the financial

161. JP: Currie to Jenkins, 1.4.62.
162. Cape GH 8/48: Jenkins to Wodehouse 28.3.62 - Extract in Milward to Barkly 2.1.73.
163. cf. His attitude towards the annexation of Alfred: C.O.179/79: Report of Government Messengers 1.12.65., enc. Bissett to Cardwell, No.5, 15.1.66 - "From there we went to Mr Jenkins, who sent us on to Faku, saying as we left, that if Faku required him to come, we were to tell him that he would not, as he had long ago explained the matter to Faku, who however was too stubborn".
164. See page 268.
troubles of the Cape were all demanding his attention. Compared with these problems the Mpondo boundary was a trivial matter. Three years elapsed before Faku received even the vague assurance that the Governor would give his best attention to a settlement when a fitting occasion arose. This was not prompted by a sense of justice. The truth of the matter was that he wanted to gain control of Port St. Johns, and that Jenkins had argued:

"The boundary line may be too far advanced from the colony to be of that importance to call for discussion, but a friendly reply would relieve Faku's mind that his ancient friendship with the Government was not broken off".

The fitting occasion was slow to arise, and meanwhile the memory was allowed to rankle, especially in the minds of the younger men who were now coming to the fore.

The effect of Jenkins' intervention in this matter stands in marked contrast to the success of the missionaries in the case of Harding and Fynn. There are two clear reasons for the difference. In 1850 they had been able to exploit colonial jealousies and to enlist the High Commissioner and Cape opinion against the policy

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165. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., pp.157f.
166. Cape GH 8/48: Wodehouse to Jenkins, 4.5.65.
167. See pages 280f.
168. JP: Jenkins to Wodehouse, 26.4.65.
of Natal. On this occasion the policy complained of was that of a Cape official acting as the agent of the High Commissioner. Formerly there had been a missionary of considerable influence living in the Colony and able to gain the ear both of Sir Harry Smith and of the press. Latterly there was nobody at the Cape approaching the stature of William Shaw and, moreover, Jenkins' ecclesiastical affiliations were with Natal. There is no doubt he was trusted and respected by the Colonial authorities, but without favourable political circumstances and opportunities for personal pressure, respect and trust were not enough. This is confirmed by the fact that Wodehouse's belated assurance to Faku was prompted as much by political motives as by the arguments of the missionary.

Jenkins might have achieved more had he pestered the High Commissioner. In retrospect it seems unfortunate he did not. Yet even he could not have foreseen the ultimate effects of the dispute. At the time the boundary had been defined, but British sovereignty had not been extended; the Amampondo were dissatisfied, but their dissatisfaction was not clamant. Although he was not yet sixty, Jenkins

was already an old man beginning to feel the strain of his political responsibilities. Ever mindful of his instructions from the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, he was careful not to interfere in political matters except at the express request of Faku or Government. On this occasion his obedience was a disservice to the cause of peace and understanding between black and white.

In 1865 Sir George Grey's plans were far from fulfilment. Wodehouse had decided to bring Kok "under the very undefined but very convenient authority of the High Commissioner", which meant in practice that the Griquas were an independent people. On the other side of the Umzimvubu nothing had been done to establish British authority across the Currie line. But the writing was on the wall. Kaffraria was being drawn out of isolation; the confidence of the Amampondo had been shaken; and missionary influence had been shown to be far from decisive.

170. cf. MMS: Jenkins to Boyce, 24.4.67.
171. See pages 31f.
CHAPTER X

PORT ST. JOHNS

So far as the authorities were concerned, the definition of the Currie line and the annexation of Alfred ended Faku's nominal paramountcy over lands he did not occupy and people he could not control. That they did not end what Newcastle termed "an inevitable tendency to extension of frontier"1 was shown by an increasing interest in the mouth of the Umzimvubu, or St. John's, River. From 1860 onwards the economic interests, primarily of Natal, and the political necessities of the High Commissioner combined to make the control of Port St. Johns a matter of some concern. The negotiations which ensued also went to show that the policy of expansion had reacted unfavourably upon the Mpondo attitude to the Government, and their failure struck a further blow at the friendship of thirty years.

The march of events has belied the extravagant hopes which were centred on the St. John's mouth in the 'sixties and 'seventies. At that time it seemed to have a great future as a Port. Vessels of up to a hundred tons had sailed several miles upstream, and although the bar could

1. C.0.48/407: Minute by Newcastle 22.4.61 on Grey to Newcastle, No.10, 9.2.61.
be treacherous it was thought that a "tolerably good harbour" could be developed at a small cost.\(^2\) As there were no natural harbours between the Kei and the Umtamvuna it was expected that this would become the chief outlet for the trade of Kaffraria. It also seemed possible that it would attract commerce from the Orange Free State and, in the 'seventies, the Diamond Fields. Whether the route chosen was by way of Dordrecht and the northern Cape, or across Adam Kok's pass over the Drakensberg, it was nearer to these places than any of the existing ports. What the enthusiasts usually forgot was the nature of the intervening country!\(^3\) Port St. Johns, therefore, was important for what it might become and not for what it was. In the 'sixties it was no more than a tiny trading settlement,\(^4\) visited several times a year by George Cato's little vessel, the **William Shaw**, which usually came from Natal bringing supplies for the white missionaries and traders, and articles such as blankets and beads for the native trade.\(^5\) Occasional calls were also made by trading cutters from Algoa Bay which

\(^2\) C.0.48/407: Pine to Smith, No.17, 23.11.50, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.26, 6.3.61.

\(^3\) cf. C.0.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.

\(^4\) C.0.48/407: Currie to Grey 18.3.61, enc. in Grey to Newcastle, No.45, 13.4.61.

\(^5\) C.0.179/68: Scott to Newcastle, No.131, 21.11.63 and enclosures.

\[\text{MMS: Mason to Secs., 21.6.61.}\]

\[\text{MMS: Eva to Secs., 7.6.62.}\]
were rumoured to be on less innocent business.  

Small this trade might be, but it was enough to attract the attention of the Natal Legislative Council in 1863. The value of the goods sent from Natal to St. Johns had risen from £1649 in 1857 to £5735 in 1861, and although it had dropped by over £2000 in 1862 there was every prospect that it would shortly rise beyond recognition. Scott had been quick to point out that the Griquas would use this port in preference to Durban and his fears seemed to be confirmed when Kok asked Cato's firm to receive all his supplies. It was this fear, and possibly Kok's application, that precipitated an address from the Legislative Council in July 1863 asking Scott to bring the seaborne trade of Kaffraria to the notice of the Imperial Government. Their chief complaint was that goods sent by sea could be taken out of bond and were therefore not liable to duty. This was bad for the

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7. C.O.48/485: Report by Natal Collector of Customs 2.1.78, enc. in Frere to Carnarvon (conf.) 22.5.78.  
Natal revenue. One also senses the feeling that it was bad for Cato's rivals who had to use the overland route. There was also the danger, which would increase as the southern districts of Natal became more thickly populated, that merchandise would be landed at St. John's and smuggled back into the Colony. More sinister was the menace of the gun trade. It was well known that arms and ammunition were finding their way into Pondoland, and the advent of Kok and his motley crew was likely to increase the danger. This was unwelcome news to the white minority at Natal, who were apprehensive of events in Zululand and knew that Cetywayo was in touch with their neighbours to the south. The control of Port St. John's would not be the full answer, for much of the trade was overland and Cato's firm did not engage in it. Nevertheless both Scott and Currie had heard that visitors from the Cape were less scrupulous. These allegations lacked supporting evidence, but proven or no they provided a good argument for supervision of some sort.

11. C.0.179/64: Scott to Wodehouse 30.5.62, enc. as in 8.
C.0.179/74: Memo. enc. in Maclean to Cardwell, No.39, 4.3.65.
Cape BK 91: Jenkins to Maclean 26.12.60.
13. C.0.179/64: Scott to Wodehouse 30.5.62, enc. as in 8.
15. C.0.179/64: Scott to Wodehouse 30.5.62, enc. as in 8.
16. C.0.179/68: Scott to Newcastle, No.131, 21.11.63.
17. Ibid.
C.0.48/407: Currie to Grey 18.3.61, enc. as in 4.
The address did not suggest any specific measures. Scott wondered whether the time had come to enforce Article VIII of the Treaty which stipulated that ships landing goods on the Mpondo coast should be licensed. He mentioned this to Newcastle and Wodehouse\textsuperscript{17a} but nothing was done, and it was left to Lieutenant Governor Maclean to make a concrete proposal. He arrived in Natal on transfer from British Kaffraria at the beginning of an acute depression.\textsuperscript{18} As the revenue fell, the Collector of Customs looked with more than usual jealousy on the untaxed trade with St. John's. Knowing that Faku had on occasion asked for a resident and that Sir George Grey had contemplated a customs house at the mouth of the Umzimvubu, Maclean suggested that a Resident - cum - Customs Officer should be placed there under the jurisdiction of Natal.\textsuperscript{19} The matter was referred to Wodehouse\textsuperscript{20} who replied that he was already considering it.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17a} C.0.179/68: Scott to Newcastle, No.131, 21.11.63.
\textsuperscript{18} de Kiewiet: B.C.P., p.174.
Walkar: op. cit., p.279.
\textsuperscript{19} C.0.179/74: Maclean to Cardwell, No.34, 27.2.65 and No.39, 4.3.65.
\textsuperscript{20} C.0.179/74: Cardwell to Wodehouse, No.878, 26.4.65 (draft)
Cardwell to Maclean, No.41, 25.4.65 (draft).
\textsuperscript{21} C.0.48/428: Wodehouse to Officer Administering the Government, Natal, 21.8.65, enc. in Wodehouse to Cardwell, No.80, 21.8.65.
Although the High Commissioner was not unaware of the grievances of Natal, his chief concern was the menace — real or supposed — of the Orange Free State, and the negotiations for Port St. John’s were primarily intended to cut off the Boers from the sea. The same desire had characterised British policy with regard to St. Lucia Bay and Delagoa Bay in 1861 and 1862. Whether the Free State Boers wanted to get to the sea is another question. De Kiewiet believes they were more interested in a customs treaty with the Cape or Natal than in the acquisition of a port, and he is probably correct. The threat to St. John’s seems to have originated in the anxious mind of John Burnet the Civil Commissioner at Aliwal North. About the beginning of 1860 he wrote,

"My theory is that the Boers will sooner or later destroy the Basutos or drive them in on us.... When this is accomplished and the Boer boundary line is the Drakensberg range what is to prevent their going down upon Faku and forming a settlement on the coast between us and Natal. If old Pretorius were alive he would certainly try his best to accomplish it".

If old Pretorius was dead, his son was very much alive.

In January 1860 he was elected President of the Orange Free State.

22. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., pp. 139 - 153.
23. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., p.142.
24. Gory Collection 1225: J. Burnet’s news on Free State Affairs: Memoranda of his correspondence by Orpen. The date of this remark is uncertain. The next entry is on 16.7.60. The previous date is 3.11.59, but it is on a different manuscript page to the quotation.
State.\(^{25}\) At about the same time Adam Kok discovered his road across the Drakensberg.\(^{26}\) This juxtaposition of events gave point to Burnet's fears, and Wynyard told Newcastle that it might be necessary to extend the boundary to the Umzimvubu

"in order to secure to the British Government command of a harbour that the President will doubtless aim at as an outlet for the districts under his jurisdiction".\(^{27}\)

Grey was asked his opinion, and poured cold water on the proposal.\(^{28}\) He could not have estimated the danger very highly for his reply dealt only with the practical difficulties. Wynyard's suggestion was still part of his larger plan, he said, but the question was one of timing, and he was not convinced the time was ripe. On his return to South Africa, however, he took up the matter himself, and Jenkins was asked whether Faku would agree to a customs house at the Umzimvubu.\(^{29}\) The missionary himself was not

\(^{25}\) de Kiewiet: \textit{B.C.P.}, p.139.

\(^{26}\) See page 241.

\(^{27}\) C.O.48/401. Wynyard to Newcastle, No.21, 15.2.60. Of: C.O.48/402: Do. to do., No.55, 22.3.60. The latter despatch reports Pretorius' remark, "I have one great object in view which I cannot at the present explain...." Burnet thought this meant the seizure of Natal, but Wynyard was inclined to refer it to the seizure of Port St. John's.

\(^{28}\) C.O.48/406: Grey to Elliott, 14.4.60.

\(^{29}\) \textit{JP}: Maclean to Jenkins, 1.3.61.
averse. He was disturbed by the traffic in guns, and had already advised Faku to get in touch with Grey if he could not prevent traders landing spirits. In spite of this he did not think it wise to ask Faku while the country between the Bashee and the Umzimvubu was unsettled, and his advice was apparently accepted.

Wodehouse revived the subject early in 1865. Like Wynyard he was suspicious of the Free State. In October 1864 he had defined a boundary between the republic and the Basuto, but from the beginning it had been clear that this would not preserve peace. The Basuto were resentful, and spoke of war; the coastal tribes were said to be in league with them; and instead of being patient, the Free State insisted that the natives should immediately withdraw from its territory. It needed little insight to see that there would soon be an explosion. Whether or not

30. C.O.179/74: Maclean to Cardwell, No.34, 27.2.65.
32. Cape GH 18/6: Jenkins to Grey (pvte) 15.8.60.
34. JP: Jenkins to Wodehouse 26.4.65. This acknowledges a letter from Wodehouse dated 30.3.65, and refers to a verbal enquiry by a man named Wollaston.
   cf. JP: Wodehouse to Jenkins, 4.5.65.
Burnet had shared his fears with him, Wodehouse seems to have been afraid that this might lead to the Boers crossing the mountains and taking over Port St. John's. He decided to prevent this by making the first move himself. There was no imminent danger and he was quite prepared to wait until Jenkins thought the time had come to approach Faku. 37 Even the outbreak of the Basuto War in June 1865 38 did not worry him unduly. 39 When the missionary reported in December that the Chief was suspicious and wanted fuller information before giving a final answer, 40 he went even further, and remarked,

"we may almost leave the revival of the subject to him, and rest contented with the knowledge that he will not alienate it to any third party". 41

This apparent loss of interest was due to events in the interior. Moshesh had asked to become a British subject and his sons Letsie and Molapo had joined their voices with his. 42 Wodehouse was eager to accede, and assured Cardwell that "such a step seems to offer the only permanent prospect of tranquillity". 43 It would also, of course, remove the threat to Port St. John's.

37. JP: Wodehouse to Jenkins 4.5.65.
38. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.168.
41. JP: Wodehouse to Jenkins 29.1.66.
42. Ibid.
43. Wodehouse Private Papers: Wodehouse to Cardwell 15.1.66.
   cf. C.0.48/431: Wodehouse to Cardwell, No.6, 13.1.66.
By April the situation was completely different. President Brand and his Volksraad had indignantly rejected his offer to mediate and Cardwell had turned down his suggestion about Moshesh.\textsuperscript{44} Even more serious were the Treaties of Imperani and Thaba Bosigo by which Molapo became a subject of the Free State and the Basuto lost half their arable land.\textsuperscript{45} Never before had the outlook been so gloomy. Wodehouse was especially worried by Molapo's submission, for he believed that it had given the Free State immediate access to Kaffraria.\textsuperscript{46} In fact this territory bordered on a remote part of Natal, but his fears were not unfounded for in the south only Morosi stood between the Free State border and the upper reaches of the Umzimvubu.

These developments made the acquisition of Port St. John's a matter of urgency. In dismissing the application of Moshesh, Cardwell had observed that the possession of the coast would allow Wodehouse "to exercise great influence \ldots for good" upon the republics\textsuperscript{47} - and here was the Free State within easy reach of the coast. By good fortune

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} de Kiewiet: \textit{B.C.P.}, pp.189f.
\item \textsuperscript{45} de Kiewiet: \textit{B.C.P.}, p.194.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Wodehouse Private Papers: Wodehouse to Cardwell, 15.4.66.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Wodehouse Private Papers: Cardwell to Wodehouse, 9.3.66.
\end{itemize}
Alfred White was in Cape Town.\textsuperscript{48} Wodehouse talked the matter over with him and then instructed him to negotiate a cession which would control the navigable part of the Umzimvubu. He was to secure Faku's distinct and written consent, and having done so was authorised to buy gifts for the Chief to the value of £500.\textsuperscript{49} There was to be no repetition of the Currie fiasco! At the same time he wrote to Cardwell that the cession was "most necessary, both politically and for the protection of the revenues of the Cape and Natal",\textsuperscript{50} and told him that he would accept it as High Commissioner leaving its disposal for settlement at a later date.\textsuperscript{51}

Any negotiations with the Amampondo were bound to be slow. These were worse than usual. White was delayed by illness and did not reach Emfundisweni until 25 June.\textsuperscript{52} On 2 July he saw Faku, Umqikela and one of Ndamase's councillors but did not get very far with them.\textsuperscript{53} Then Umqikela fell dangerously ill and business was further delayed by death in Ndamase's family.\textsuperscript{54} He again visited

\textsuperscript{48} JP: A. W. White to Wodehouse 4.7.66.
\textsuperscript{49} JP: Wodehouse to A. S. White 18.4.66.
\textsuperscript{50} Wodehouse Private Papers: Wodehouse to Cardwell 15.4.66.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} JP: A. S. White to Wodehouse 4.7.66.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} JP: A. S. White to Wodehouse 29.9.66.
\textsuperscript{cf.} MMS: Cameron to Secs., 1.8.66.
the Great Place on 26 September to be met with assurances of fidelity to the Government and the news that Ndamase was expected shortly. In the end - when exactly is not certain - the cession was refused. By this time Wodehouse was less anxious. It had become clear that the Free State had far too many problems to think of seizing St. John's. Things went from bad to worse on the Basuto border, war broke out again in September 1867, and on 12 March 1868 Wodehouse laid the spectre of a Free State port by annexing Basutoland to the crown.

The annexation did not mean that the High Commissioner could forget the mouth of the Umzimvubu. There had long been reports that copper was to be found in Pondoland. In 1867 these were confirmed and prospectors began to gather about twenty miles north-west of Emfundisweni. On Jenkins' advice Faku reported the discovery to Wodehouse who promised to send a competent person to see him if the ore was found in sufficient quantities. If this development produced more than a passing excitement the economic argument for the control of Port St. John's would be much

56. MMS: Jenkins to Boyce, 24.4.67.
57. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., pp.198f.
59. de Kiewiet, B.C.P., p.229.
60. See page 227.
61. MMS: Jenkins to Boyce 24.4.67; Cameron to Secs., 8.3.67. Natal SNA 1/1/17: Minute to Shepstone 16.1.67.
62. MMS: Jenkins to Boyce 24.4.67.
more powerful.

This was not all. Natal had wanted to take over Basutoland, and having been cheated in this quarter, Lieutenant Governor Keate was careful not to let her interests in Kaffraria go by default. Basuto refugees were crossing the Drakensberg to settle south-west of the Umzimvubu and Keate thought that important results would ensue if this movement continued and especially if the area were proclaimed British territory.

"This new portion of Basutoland," he told the Duke of Buckingham, "would overlap on the west the country of Adam Kok, and it would so to speak feel down towards the mouths of the two rivers between and about the upper waters of which it lies, the St. John's and the Umtata, on the lower waters of which dwell Umqikela's people.... A new trade question would soon arise, the mouths of these rivers would acquire an importance as ports for the introduction of seaborne goods into the interior, which it has long been foreseen that sooner or later their position must obtain for them, especially that of the mouth of the St. John's River, where already a trade injurious to that of Port Natal exists. To the question whether Basutoland is to be supplied from the Cape Colony or Natal, and of the difference of their customs tariffs, would be added a third, that of their supply from a quarter where tariffs are as yet unknown.

"The introduction of white settlers into these regions would probably follow closely upon the extension of trade dealings with them. It would be very undesirable that these should be of the same class as that which has found its way into Adam Kok's territory. The establishment of

“a customs house at the mouth of the St. John’s River, which it has been long felt would be a great gain to this colony, if in any way it were practicable, would under these circumstances soon become an absolute necessity”.64

Even if the copper mines came to nothing, the High Commissioner would still be under pressure from Natal. What was more, the port was not to be the limit, for Keate continued,

“It is no very imaginative forcasting of the future to perceive that this must lead in the end to the widening of the bounds of the two colonies on the seaboard, and inland up to the mountains, until they come together either upon the line of the watershed of the Umtata and Umzimvubu or such other as in due time may be designated by the shifting current of events.”65

The control of Port St. John’s would be but a step to the control of Pondoland.

There was to be no immediate satisfaction for Natal. In March 1869 Wodehouse visited Pondoland66 after concluding the Second Convention of Aliwal North.67 Mindful of these considerations he again offered to buy the river mouth,68 but again he was refused,69 and Port St. John’s was added to the Currie line as a potential source of tension.

64. P.P.1868-9 XLIII (4140): Keate to Buckingham, No.71, 6.3.68.
65. Ibid.
66. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 14.4.69; Allsopp to Boyce 6.4.69.
67. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., pp.233f.
68. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 14.4.69; Allsopp to Boyce 6.4.69.
69. Ibid.
   cf. C.0.48/466: Barkly to Pine 11.12.73, enc. in Barkly to Keate, No.124, 24.12.73.
The unco-operative disposition of the Amampondo was not in the least surprising. The old order was changing. Umqikela took the lead in the negotiations with White, and in 1869 he was Paramount Chief. It was not surprising that the younger generation which he represented should regard the British in a different light to Faku. His attitude had been moulded by the events of the 'forties. Their memories were more recent and less pleasing. They did not share his gratitude and were therefore more ready to take an independent line. Another factor was the attitude of Jenkins. Wodehouse had relied on his support, but when the Chiefs looked to him for advice he refused to say anything one way or the other, which was as good as telling them not to agree. Nor did their experience of the Griquas encourage them to accede. Grey had said they would be British subjects, and as such they had welcomed them. In fact Wodehouse had left them to their own devices, and by 1866 friendship had given way to hostility. It was of no avail for Wodehouse to protest that he had been bound to carry out the

70. JP: A.S. White to Wodehouse 4.7.66.
71. JP: Wodehouse to Jenkins, 28.4.66.
72. MMS: Jenkins to Boyce, 24.4.67.
73. C.0.48/407: Grey to Newcastle, No.16, 19.2.61.
74. cf. Cape BK 92: Jenkins to Brownlow, 29.10.62.
75. C.0.48/414: Wodehouse to Newcastle, No.186, 6.12.62. He will bring Kok "under the very undefined but convenient authority of the High Commissioner".
76. JP: Jenkins to Wodehouse, 9.12.65; A.S. White to Wodehouse 4.7.66.
Natal SNA 1/1/17: Jenkins to Shepstone (pvte) 8.8.67.
policy of his predecessor, or to send admonitory messages to Adam Kok.\textsuperscript{77} The Amampondo did not want to burn their fingers again, and were not convinced by his assurance that it would be different this time.\textsuperscript{78} They had no reason to change their mind in 1869.

Fundamentally, however, it was a question of land. Jenkins realised this at the very beginning and told Wodehouse, "It will require a little time and prudence to check their fears that taking possession of the country is not the end in view."\textsuperscript{79} It would have been surprising had they not been suspicious. All over South Africa the tribes were under pressure. In the north Panda and Pretorius were at odds about the Blood River Territory.\textsuperscript{80} Across the mountains the Basuto were being driven from the fertile plains into the rocky uplands. What if the Boers were independent - were they not white?\textsuperscript{81} To the south Wodehouse had allowed Kreli to return to the Transkei, but only to a portion of his former country.\textsuperscript{82} Further west

\textsuperscript{77}. JP: Wodehouse to A.S. White, 12.10.66.
\textsuperscript{78}. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79}. JP: Jenkins to Wodehouse 26.4.65. cf. JP: Do. to do., 9.12.65: "The fact is he and his people fear lest.... subjugation be the object, at the same time wishful to keep on amicable terms with the Government".
\textsuperscript{80}. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., p.198.
\textsuperscript{81}. cf. JP: A.S. White to Wodehouse 4.7.66.
\textsuperscript{82}. Theal: Since 1795, V, pp.47-9.
the same Wodehouse was coveting for white settlers the lands of the Gaikas and the Emigrant Tembu - and was not the Tembu regent a daughter of Faku? 83

Such was the setting in which they considered their own position. They were dissatisfied with the Currie line. 84 The High Commissioner had indeed promised to discuss it, 85 but of what value was a promise which was unfulfilled after four years? 86 Meanwhile they were not to be bought off by a larger subsidy for the Paramount Chief and a separate one for Ndamase. 87 Another grievance was the annexation of Alfred which Natal was proclaiming with a great flourish at the very season when Faku was asked for St. John’s. 88 It was fifteen years since he had agreed to the cession, and five years since Natal had begun to speak of taking it over. In the interval a number of the petty tribes had acknowledged his paramountcy and some of his people had settled there. The

83. Theal: Since 1795, V, pp.45f, 52f.
84. See pages 264f.
85. Cape GH 8/48: Wodehouse to Jenkins 4.5.65 - quoted in Milward to Barkly 2.1.73.
86. MMS: Allsopp to Boyce, 6.4.69.
announcement came as an unwelcome surprise. At first Faku and his council wanted the cession annulled but eventually they only asked for the boundary to be changed from the western branch of the Umtamvuna to the main stream. They were not likely to be satisfied with the reply that the Lieutenant Governor could not alter the Queen's letter. Nor were they enamoured of the treatment meted out to Kane, a petty chief who opposed the annexation. These grievances made them suspicious of the Government's every move. The Colonial authorities wanted to take a telegraph line through Pondoland, and there was confusion as to what exactly this implied. There was also some apprehension lest an ulterior motive should lie behind the projected admiralty survey of the Mpondo coast. Both these matters had been raised before the first refusal to cede the Port, and had put them on their guard. Finally, the Amampondo could not fail to notice a difference between the request for

89. JP: Jenkins to Wodehouse 9.12.65.
90. Natal SNA 1/1/16: Umqikela (for Faku) to Shepstone, 13.1.66.
91. JP: Shepstone to Jenkins 17.2.66. Natal SNA 1/1/16: Lieut. Gov. to Faku, 10.3.66.
92. C.O.179/79: Bissett to Cardwell, No.5, 16.1.66 and enc; No.16, 1.2.66 and enc. cf. JP: Wodehouse to Jenkins 28.4.66.
93. JP: Jenkins to Wodehouse 26.4.65.
94. Natal SNA 1/1/18: Umqikela (by Canham) to Shepstone 17.11.68.
95. cf. JP: Wodehouse to A.S. White, 12.10.66.
St. John's as conveyed by Jenkins and by White. The former had no detailed instructions and told Faku that the Governor would be satisfied with the land to the top of the heights on both sides of the river. The latter asked for a much larger area "bounded on the west by the Umgazi, and on the east by the Umtafoof River, extending from the sea to a line drawn from one of those rivers to the other, crossing the Umzimvubu immediately above the waggon drift". This difference was accidental, but it was none the less unfortunate. The Amampondo might well be afraid that the larger area would expand in the course of time, and Keate's despatch, had they seen it, would have confirmed their fears. The arguments against the cession were overwhelming and their most obvious course was to take no risks and to refuse.

The earlier negotiations were the last major political issue in which Thomas Jenkins was involved. Unfortunately it cannot be said that the part he played was satisfactory. It was of a piece with his normal practice that he should be prepared to act as the messenger of the Government but

97. JP: Wodehouse to A.S. White 18.4.66.
98. P.P.1868-9 XLI (4140): Keate to Buckingham, No.71, 6.8.68.
not as its negotiator,\(^99\) and no exception can be taken to this. His failure to advise the Chiefs when they asked him to do so was a different matter. Such was his influence that a word from him might have made all the difference to their answer. He was not opposed to British rule as such, for he believed that Faku would do well to have the copper mines under Government control and to receive an allowance for them.\(^100\) Although he may have thought the Government were asking for too much land, there is no evidence that he had modified his earlier opinion in favour of a customs house at the Umzimvubu.\(^101\) If that was so, why did he not advise the Amampondo to accede? He told Boyce that it was because he remembered his position "as a missionary and your servant",\(^102\) but this position had not prevented his giving advice on many other issues. Most probably he remembered Shaw's warning of twenty years before - "They will take it, but do not let it be said that you assisted them to get it."\(^103\) The Amampondo reaction had shown they were suspicious, and Jenkins did not want to harm the work of God by giving


\(^{100}\) MMS: Jenkins to Boyce 24.4.67.

\(^{101}\) MMS: Jenkins to Boyce, 24.4.67.

\(^{102}\) MMS: Jenkins to Boyce, 24.4.67.

\(^{103}\) See page 142.
advice which might later have laid him open to reproach or driven a wedge between the mission and the tribe. In a narrow sense he was right. On the other hand, by refusing to give a lead in a moment of crisis, he failed in his wider Christian responsibility.

This incident demonstrated his limitations as a politician. So long as it was a matter of keeping Faku obedient to his Treaty obligations, or protesting against the wrongdoing of Colonial officials, all was well. When creative statesmanship was called for, however, he was unable or unwilling to meet the challenge. The fault lay, not so much with him as with the body which issued his instructions. These instructions were prudent. They were likely to commend the Wesleyan Missionary Society to the authorities and the colonists. But they inhibited Jenkins from serving a people who trusted him at a time when they needed his help and had the right to expect it. A man of Shaw's calibre might have risen above his instructions, but Jenkins was not such a man, at any rate in his declining years.

Faku died in October 1867, six months before his missionary. He had long been weakening, and after

104. JP: Allsopp to Shepstone, 15.11.67.
1860 he had left more and more to Umgikela. Although he was present when White asked for St. John's, he took no part in the discussion. During his lifetime the Amampondo had been transformed from poverty-stricken tributaries of Shaka to the most prosperous and powerful tribe between the Colony and Natal. This had been brought about partly by the removal of the Zulu menace, and partly by his friendship with the Government, for which he had his missionaries to thank. But he would not have established his authority over the broken clans that fled to his country had he not also been a chief of some ability. He did little to endear himself to the white man. The Ncapani Commando and the Harding Affair, in particular, assured him of notoriety, and the disagreement about the Currie line did not enhance his reputation for consistency. It would not be difficult to dismiss him as an unreliable rogue, but to do so would be less than just. On all these occasions the conduct of his European opponents left much to be desired. Furthermore, for all the rumours of his hostile intentions, he never once took up arms against the Government. He valued the Treaty and endeavoured to observe it, and it was not always his fault that he failed. Much of his supposed inconsistency was due rather to bewilderment in his dealings with white man than to deliberate prevarication.

105. MMS: Missionary Notices, November 1863, p.190; Jenkins 28.12.62; Allisopp to Boyce 10.5.66.
and if this does not wholly excuse him, it is well to remember Maclean's very true remark:

"The words of a Kaffir are not more to be relied upon than the diplomatic phrases of more civilised nations". 107

107. Maclean to Grey's Private Secretary, 18.8.56.
CHAPTER XI

THE END OF ISOLATION

The death of Jenkins put an end for many years to come to effective missionary influence in the affairs of Pondoland. It was unfortunate that this occurred so soon after the demise of Faku and at the very time when the friendship of the Amampondo and the Cape Government was beginning to experience the strain of a more intimate contact which foreshadowed eventual annexation.

The new Chief was ill-equipped to guide his people at such a time. Umqikela was an attractive young man in his late twenties. Even a shrewd observer like Shepstone was favourably impressed on first acquaintance, but within six months he had changed his mind and called him "a besotted fool". He was, in fact, "one of those facile men whose promises and performances have but little connection with one another", and this inherent weakness of character was intensified by his taking to brandy soon after his father's death. This was almost certain to complicate his

4. MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 1.8.66.
5. MMS: Allsopp to Boyce 10.7.68.
relations with the Colonial authorities. As a trader who knew him remarked -

"When the kaffir chiefs are muddled by spirits, they often become, in language at least, unloyal to the Government, and words uttered by their chiefs act strongly on the feelings of their followers".6

Moreover, the spectacle of a drunken chief bred impatience and contempt in the officials who had to deal with him and inclined them to act in a manner that was arbitrary and unwise. In such circumstances it was more important than ever that the Amampondo should have an adviser who was trusted both by themselves and the Colonial authorities, and could explain each to other. Without that there was little hope of a peaceful and beneficial transition from independence to subjection.

This was not the only argument in favour of the need for a worthy successor to Jenkins. It was confidently expected that annexation would bring with it greater opportunities than ever before for the proclamation of the gospel,7 and if these were to be used to the fullest advantage, the Mpondo Mission required a leader who could give it "cautious and prudent direction".8

7. MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 8.3.67.
8. MMS: Mason to Boyce 10.3.70.
Such considerations were not lost upon those members of the Wesleyan Mission who knew Pondoland and thought that it would before long be brought under British rule.⁹ Cameron, the Natal district chairman, believed he had a suitable man in Frederick Mason, who had already spent five years at Palmerton¹⁰ and was willing to return to Pondoland on certain conditions.¹¹ In London, William Boyce had other ideas. There had been unfavourable reports about the work in Pondoland,¹² and the small contributions to the funds from Palmerton and Emfundisweni told their own discouraging story.¹³ Money was not plentiful, and other places had a greater claim for consideration. In 1865 he had observed

"We cannot long continue to maintain European missionaries as a sort of native pastor to African tribes at so great a cost".¹⁴ Now he refused to meet the expense of a replacement from the Colony,¹⁵ and the work was left in the hands of John Allsopp and Daniel Eva.¹⁶ The Chief had already asked

⁹. MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 8.3.67.
¹⁰. See page 28.
¹¹. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 5.6.68; Mason to Boyce 8.6.68, 7.10.68.
¹². MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 3.9.66; Allsopp to Boyce 23.8.65.
¹³. MMS: Boyce to Cameron 10.4.65.
¹⁴. Ibid.
¹⁵. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 23.6.68.
¹⁶. Ibid.
Allsopp to take Jenkins' place as the medium of correspondence with the Government, but when Cameron visited Pondoland in May 1869 Umqikela and his councillors asked him to send Mason to Emfundisweni when either of the present missionaries left the country.

"Their main argument", he told Boyce, "was that their present missionaries are children, and they want a man of more wisdom and experience as the head of the mission and the adviser of the Chief who is also a child."

He strongly advised him to comply with the request but Boyce was adamant, and when the draft of stations arrived, there was no change. By this time, however, it had become necessary for Allsopp to leave Palmerton for domestic reasons and he was replaced by Thomas Kirkby. This move was most unfortunate. Not only were the Amampondo annoyed because they had been rebuffed, but Kirkby contrived to quarrel with Mrs Jenkins, a Palmerton trader, his native assistant and the Chief himself. At the end of 1873 he was transferred for the sake of the mission.

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17. MMS: Allsopp to Boyce 21.5.68.
18. MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 19.6.69.
19. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 15.6.69.
21. Ibid.
22. MMS: Eva to Boyce 21.2.70; Mason to Boyce 10.3.70; Allsopp to Boyce 12.3.70.
23. MMS: Cameron to Gen. Secs., 22.4.71; Cameron to Boyce 22.6.71.
24. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 24.5.73; Cameron to Gen. Secs., 9.1.74.
and Palmerton was left without a minister. The Reverend Clement Johns, a native minister, was killed by lightning on his way to take up the appointment in January 1875, and it was another six months before a supply was sent. Meanwhile Daniel Eva had been moved from Emfundisweni at the end of 1871, after lingering there for two years unwilling and unwanted. Cameron had continued to plead for Mason to be sent in his place, but once again he had been disregarded, and William Milward had taken charge of the station. Two years later he too was wishing for a transfer, again for domestic reasons, and when this request was granted at the end of 1874, he left the country without even bothering to bid farewell to the Chief.

The pinchpenny policy of the Mission House had failed to prevent removals, and had succeeded in wrecking the Npondolo Mission. At the beginning of 1875 Mrs Jenkins

25. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 27.1.75.
26. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 2.7.75.
27. MMS: Do. to do., 22.11.71, 20.12.69.
   Eva to Boyce 21.1.70.
28. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 27.11.70.
   cf. do to do, 20.7.71.
29. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 22.11.71.
30. MMS: Milward to Boyce 6.1.74.
31. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 27.1.75.
complained almost bitterly,

"The population is estimated at 200,000, for which population there is to be one English and one native missionary, and one catechist, not even a native evangelist, and two miserable schools where a little reading is taught. On this station there are at least a thousand souls, with a host of young people growing up, for whom no instruction, except what they may learn from the Sunday preaching, is provided, not even a school to teach the girls sewing".32

It was ironic that the General Secretary who helped to bring this about, should have been the very man who had founded Buntingville and had taken such an interest in politics during his ministry in South Africa.

In circumstances such as these the missionary influence was doomed. Jenkins' successor continued to write letters for the Chief, but men who stayed in the country only a couple of years could not aspire to take the place of one who had built up his influence over a period of three decades. After six months as Umqikela's amanuensis, Allsopp wrote that "every day proves how much wisdom is needed to keep the Pondo mind free from suspicion".33 By 1873 the situation had so deteriorated that Milward had to admit

"Both he (Umqikela) and the Pondos seem to fear that any concession to us will only hasten the occupation of this country by the British and hence all our movements are most jealously scrutinised".34

32. MMS: Cameron to Boyce, 27.1.75, quoting a letter from Mrs Jenkins.
33. MMS: Allsopp to Boyce 30.10.68.
34. MMS: Milward to Boyce 10.9.73.
If the missionaries were not trusted by the Amampondo, neither were they respected by the authorities. Lieutenant Governor Keate told Barkly that

"however devoted to their work and however well intentioned, (they) have too little knowledge of the world to be able to counteract the adverse influences by which they are surrounded". 35

In his private correspondence, Theophilus Shepstone was more emphatic by far, 36 and the fact that his bete noir would have welcomed British rule counted for nothing. 37

Jenkins' mantle fell, not upon his successors, but upon his widow. At first she planned to retire to Grahamstown 38 but the tribe were eager to keep her among them. In the hope of persuading her to stay, the Chief asked Wodehouse to appoint her brother, Alfred White, as Diplomatic Agent. 39 This application came to nothing, but she eventually agreed to remain at Emfundisweni. 40 At

36. eg. Natal SP 29: T. Shepstone to H.C. Shepstone, 20.7.71, "Your note from Mr Kirkby shows that he has very little influence with Umqikela"; cf. do. to do., 11.11.71, "Kirkby's letter is an instance of the ignorance most missionaries are in of the real state of matters between themselves and their people, and this is especially the case with young missionaries like the writer".
37. MMS: Kirkby to Boyce 15.10.71, 10.6.72.
38. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 5.6.68, 23.9.68.
39. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 5.6.68.
40. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 4.5.69. At first she was to remain two years. In fact she stayed until her death in 1880.
first her influence was thought to be little short of her husband's, and officials from both Natal and the Cape found it useful to approach the Amampondo through her; but she was never regarded in quite the same light as him. Theophilus Shepstone believed her influence was declining with time, and felt that some of her ideas were out of date; while Joseph Orpen, who led the advance of the Cape Government into Nomansland, described her as "a remarkably nice and good old lady, but a passionate partisan of the Pondos". Whatever her standing with the Amampondo, she did not enjoy the confidence of the Colonial authorities to the same extent as a senior missionary might have done.

British rule was not to be established as soon as was expected, and more than twenty five years were to pass before the Amampondo lost their independence. During the 'seventies, however, they were drawn into much closer relations with the Cape authorities. For more than a decade after the settlement of the Griquas, the position of Nomansland

41. MMS: Cameron to Boyce 25.7.68.
42. Natal SP 17: T. Shepstone to Mrs Jenkins 18.1.71.
   Cape P.P.1880, A105, p. 34: Orpen to Brownlee 23.6.74.
   Orpen does not name Mrs Jenkins but she is clearly implied.
43. C.O.179/102: Keate to Barkly 10.8.71, enc. as in 35.
44. Natal SP 29: T. Shepstone to H.C. Shepstone, 13.5.74:
   "If Mrs Jenkins thinks she is going to keep Pondoland as a close borough for any length of time she is much mistaken".
was ambiguous and obscure. In a sense it was British territory. Faku had supposedly ceded it to the Government; Adam Kok had moved in with the permission of the High Commissioner; and after the second Basuto War, Wodehouse allowed refugees from the interior to settle west of the Umzimvubu. On the other hand, there was no effective British control. Further south in the Transkei, Cape officials were endeavouring to govern by influence, but here there was no local representative of the High Commissioner. In spite of this, the Griquas were supposed by their neighbours to be British subjects, and it was thought that their actions had the approval and support of the Government. It was a case of responsibility without regulation, the very antithesis of the Treaty policy! However reluctant the authorities might be, they could not long delay a further step. Law and order would have to be established.

The need for control was immediately obvious to Lieutenant Governor Scott. In May 1862 he pointed out that Griqua relations with their native neighbours would have to be closely supervised if they were to remain

46. Theal: *Since 1795*, V, p.68.
47. Theal: *Since 1795*, V, pp.53-60.
friendly, especially as Wodehouse had placed twelve or thirteen thousand natives under their government. His fears were not without foundation. By 1866 the friendship of the Amampondo was a thing of the past, and Jenkins anticipated serious disturbances. Hints from the High Commissioner, and even a personal visit, did not check the frequent thefts, which assumed more importance when a white trader lost his cattle, and raiding parties from both sides were found to be passing through Alfred County. The chief offenders were Kok's native subjects whom he was powerless to control, but there was evidence that at least one Griqua official was encouraging and directing their activities. When he visited Pondoland in January 1871, Theophilus Shepstone found Umqikela amenable, but the Griquas would not agree to his mediation. Meanwhile Natal had become more directly involved when the Baca chief

49. Natal SNA 1/1/17: Jenkins to Shepstone (pvte) 8.8.67. cf. JP: Bissett to Jenkins, 7.1.66.
50. JP: Wodehouse to Jenkins, 28.4.66.
51. C.O.179/102: Deposition of Arthur Turton, sub.-enc. in Keate to Barkly, 10.8.71, enc. as in 35.
52. C.O.179/94: Keate to Wodehouse, 17.8.69, enc. in Keate to Granville, No.66, 18.8.69.
C.O.179/102: Keate to Wodehouse 10.8.71 and enclosures, enc. as in 35.
53. C.O.179/102: Shepstone to Kok 17.1.71, enc. in Keate to Barkly 10.8.71, enc. as in 35.
54. C.O.179/102: Keate to Barkly 10.8.71, enc. as in 35.
Tiba fled across the border from a Griqua commando which had intervened in a tribal quarrel.\(^{55}\) This was followed by other infringements of the boundary\(^ {56}\) involving Englishmen and Basuto living in Griqualand. To complete the confusion, there were disturbances west of the Umzimvubu. First Nehemiah was sent hurrying back to Basutoland,\(^ {57}\) and when his place was taken by refugee bands, Kok claimed their country as his, and became involved in their quarrels.\(^ {58}\) It did not help matters when Wodehouse extended his boundary to the Kenia River in 1869,\(^ {59}\) and so appeared to justify his pretensions.

From the beginning of 1868 Keate and Shepstone began to press for the extension of British authority, whether exercised by the Cape or Natal.\(^ {60}\) Wodehouse said he

\(^{55}\) C.O.179/94: Keate to Wodehouse 16.6.69, enc. in Keate to Granville, No.50, 16.6.69.

\(^{56}\) C.O.179/94: Keate to Wodehouse 15.7.69, enc. in Keate to Granville, No.57, 15.7.69; do. to do. 17.8.69, enc. in Keate to Granville, No.66, 18.8.69.

\(^{57}\) Natal SNA 1/1/16: Nehemiah Moshesh to Shepstone 7.12.66.

\(^{58}\) C.O.179/90: Keate to Wodehouse 3.9.66, enc. in Keate to Buckingham, No.87, 3.9.68;
   C.O.179/91: Do. to do. 14.10.68, enc. in Keate to Buckingham, No.107, 14.10.68; do. to do. 24.10.68, enc. in Keate to Buckingham, No.117, 26.10.68.

\(^{59}\) C.O.48/446: Wodehouse to Kok, 31.7.69, enc. in Wodehouse to Granville, No.73, 23.10.69.

\(^{60}\) P.P.1868-9 XLIII (4140): Keate to Wodehouse 8.2.68.
   C.O.179/90: Do. to do., 3.9.68, enc. in Keate to Buckingham, No.87, 3.9.68.
   C.O.179/94: Do. to do., 24.10.68 and enclosure, enc. in Keate to Buckingham, No.117, 26.10.68; Do. to do. 16.6.69, enc. as in 55.
   C.O.179/102: Keate to Barkly 10.8.71, enc. as in 35.
could not do anything, for he had no funds. 61 In fact he did not wish to do anything, for he attributed the Natal attitude to pique. 62 Sir Henry Barkly was more sympathetic, but refused to contemplate Natal control. He believed that the Cape had an even greater interest in the area, and furthermore Granville had only recently laid down that the foreign policy of South Africa should continue to be the responsibility of the High Commissioner. 63 Kimberley agreed with him, and Natal was condemned to the role of a spectator. 64 Although he was in favour of a Resident with the Amampondo 65 and a Magistrate with the Griquas, 66 Sir Henry did not want to act precipitately. British influence might have to be supported by force, 67 and this was undesirable at a time when the Cape had only recently

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61. C.O.48/446: Wodehouse to Keate 3.7.69, enc. in Wodehouse to Granville, No.73, 23.10.69.
62. C.O.48/446: Wodehouse to Granville, No.73, 23.10.69.
63. C.O.48/460: Barkly to Kimberley, No.46, 2.5.72 and enclosure Barkly to Keate 6.11.71.
64. C.O.48/460: Kimberley to Barkly 20.6.72 (draft on Barkly, No.46, 2.5.72.
66. C.O.48/460: Barkly to Keate 6.11.71, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.46, 2.5.72.
assumed control of Basutoland and was soon to be asked to take over Griqualand West. He realised, however, that much of the trouble arose from uncertainty about the tribal boundaries, and also that the situation was becoming more complicated as unauthorised Europeans filtered into the area and obtained grants from Kok and the native chiefs. In these circumstances his thoughts turned to a commission. Shortly afterwards the Wesleyans complained that Kok was attacking the Amabaca west of the Umzimvubu and Umcikala asked him to define the boundary between the Amampondoro and the Griquas. This made a commission even more desirable, and when Kimberley's approval was received he instructed Charles Griffith, James Ayliff and Captain Grant to visit the country. Their findings made it clear that further intervention was necessary. With the exception

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69. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., p.298.
70. C.O.48/457: Barkly to Kimberley, No.106, 14.9.71. The presence of Englishmen who acted as subjects of Adam Kok was regarded with some concern by the Natal authorities.
C.O.179/88: Keate to Wodehouse 9.1.68, enc. in Keate to Buckingham, No.6, 10.1.68.
C.O.179/102: Keate to Barkly 10.8.71, enc. as in 35.
71. C.0.48/407: Barkly to Kimberley, No.106, 14.9.71.
72. C.0.48/459: Barkly to Kimberley, No.5, 3.1.72 and encs.
73. C.0.48/457: Kimberley to Barkly, No.134, 6.11.71 (draft on Barkly, No.106, 14.9.71).
74. C.0.48/459: Barkly to Kimberley, No.5, 3.1.72.
C.0.48/461: Do. to do., No.100, 23.8.72 and encs.
Griffith was governor's agent in Basutoland, Ayliff Civil Commissioner of Wodehouse, and Grant an officer of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police.
of the Amampondo, most of the native tribes wanted magistrates 75 principally to secure themselves against the attacks of their neighbours.76 The Griquas were said to have deteriorated since they had settled in Nomansland,77 and the Commissioners thought that they also should be brought under British rule on the death of Adam Kok, if not before.78 Their conclusions were supported by Shepstone who had been asked to attend the sittings of the Commission.78a He advised against annexation to either the Cape or Natal and recommended instead "the assumption of a general control by Her Majesty's Government over the whole of this area".79

However cordially he agreed with the Commissioners, Barkly's hands were tied. The Cape was on the brink of responsible government80 and under such circumstances he

75. Cape P.P. 1873, A12, p.110f: Commissioners to Col. Sec., 14.5.72.
76. cf. Cape P.P. 1873, A12, p.113: Shepstone to Col. Sec., Natal, 3.6.72.
77. Cape P.P. 1873, A12, pp.110f: Commissioners to Col. Sec., 14.5.72.
78. C.0.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley (conf.) 24.8.72 and enc.
78a. C.0.48/459: Barkly to Kimberley, No.5, 3.1.72.
Natal SP 8: Diary of T. Shepstone, 12.2.72.
80. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., p.299.
The bill passed both Houses on 13.6.72.
felt that

"whatever be the validity of the claims which the Cape Colonists possess on the assistance and sympathy of the mother country in regard to past transactions, it would be most inexpedient to strengthen them... by assuming further control over the natives".81

Shepstone's proposal was diametrically opposed to the whole aim of Imperial policy and Kimberley agreed emphatically with the Governor's conclusion that the question was one for a responsible Ministry to decide "on the basis of colonial interests alone".82

There was little prospect of its being taken up in the near future, for the Assembly was in no mood for territorial expansion. Having accepted Basutoland unwillingly, it had refused to take over Griqualand West,83 and Joseph Orpen was obliged to withdraw a resolution which suggested

"the possibility of its being advisable to get rid of complicated relations and troublesome obligations by the annexation to the colony of the territories lying between it and Natal".84

The Legislative Council was more friendly,85 but in the

81. C.0.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No.102, 23.8.72.
82. Ibid - and marginal note by Kimberley.
83. de Kiewiet: B.C.P., p.298.
84. C.0.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No.102, 23.8.72.
85. Ibid. It had asked Barkly to forward to the Imperial Government the address voted on this subject in 1861, and the report of the Select Committee of that date.
Assembly Orpen was almost alone in advocating the extension of Colonial rule. He contended that both the Imperial and the Colonial Governments were bound by "the most grave and pressing but forgotten obligations" which made it their duty to govern a great part of Kaffraria. The Imperial Government was primarily responsible for difficulties which had stemmed from the direct action of the High Commissioner and concerned Natal as well as the Cape. For that reason he believed it should maintain a regiment on the frontier until some form of settled government had been established in the regions beyond. On the other hand he was convinced that the colonists shared this responsibility "as loyal subjects... and because these acts were done with our concurrence and for our interest alone". Thwarted in 1872, he returned to the attack in April 1873. On this occasion the matter was referred to a select committee of which he was elected chairman. Voluminous papers were called for and Orpen pelted his colleagues with memoranda. On 18 June he submitted a draft report embodying his views only to see it rejected in favour of Saul Solomon's unhelpful but honest statement that there had not

86. Cape P.P.1875, G21, p.94: Report on St. John's Territory, March 1875.
87. Cape P.P.1873, A12, p.6: Memo on Imperial and Colonial Treaty and other obligations with native tribes.
89. Cape P.P.1873, A12, pp.x - xi.
been time enough to give the papers the attention they
demanded. 90

Orpen failed to secure his report, but he achieved
his purpose. In October 1872 war had broken out between
the Amagcaleka and the Abatembu. 91 The Reverend Peter
Hargreaves had dissuaded the victorious Kreli from following
up his advantage, but the incident had been enough to upset
the Frontier, 92 and when Charles Brownlee, the Secretary for
Native Affairs, visited the Transkei he decided that
Government influence and control should be extended in
the rear of these tribes in the hope of preventing a recur­
rence of the trouble. 93 The Ministry therefore acceded
to the repeated requests of the immigrant chiefs Lehana,
Lebenya and Zibi, and sent them a magistrate who was also
to be the accredited medium of communication between the
Government and the other people of Kaffraria, including
the Griquas and the Amampondo. Their choice fell —
almost inevitably — on Joseph Orpen who assumed his duties
towards the end of July 1873. 94

90. Cape P.P.1873, A12, p.xi.
91. Theal: Since 1795, V, pp.57f.
92. Cape P.P.1874, G27, pp.64f: Brownlee to Orpen, 8.7.73.
93. Cape P.P.1873, A10: Sec. Native Affairs to Col. Sec. 2.5.73.
94. Cape P.P.1874, G27, pp.64f: Brownlee to Orpen, 8.7.73.
There was a world of difference between the outlook of Orpen and that of the ministers. He was a man with a mission; they moved unwillingly and of necessity. His motives were largely moral and humanitarian; theirs were primarily strategic. He would gladly have accepted all who would submit; they were emphatic that he should hasten slowly and not encourage applications from other tribes. The Cape Government had taken one hesitant step forward, and wanted to be quite certain of the effect before it took another. But others would be bound to follow, and with an agent such as Orpen they were likely to follow quickly. Before the year was out the Amampondome had been accepted as British subjects; in 1875 the Griquas submitted and protection was extended to the Amabaca. The isolation of the Amampondo was at an end, and for the first time they faced the Cape along a long and artificial boundary.

95. cf. Cape P.P.1873, A10: Sec. Native Affairs to Col. Sec., 2.5.73: "Our Government have in years past undertaken certain responsibilities, and even though we, under present circumstances, would not have burdened ourselves with these responsibilities, we cannot now in honour cast them off; moreover it is not to our interest to do so". John X Merriman reported in Cape Argus, 30.8.79: Molteno "highly as he esteemed Mr Orpen's ability and character, looked upon him as a most dangerous man in these native matters, and likely to involve the government in complications and liabilities".

96. Cape P.P.1874, G27, pp.64f: Brownlee to Orpen, 8.7.73.
97. Cape P.P.1874, G27, p.78: Brownlee to Orpen, 2.10.73.
98. Cape P.P.1875, G21, pp.66-80.
99. Cape P.P.1876, G37, pp.3-10.
One effect of closer contact was to show how necessary it was that there should be a mutually respected interpreter of the Cape and Mpondi points of view, and how disastrous had been the failure to provide an adequate substitute for Thomas Jenkins. With nobody to fulfil this role, relations between the two parties were allowed to deteriorate to an unnecessary extent, and little effort was made by either side to appreciate the position of the other.

The main source of tension was the Currie line west of the Umzimvubu. The Commissioners were told to decide upon a "definite and unmistakable boundary... consistently with the previous arrangements entered into by the Government". They met with no difficulty east of the Umzimvubu, but Umgikela and his councillors denied any cession to the west. Despite the advice of Theophilus Shepstone to consent to "a restricted boundary excluding other tribes hitherto or occasionally at war with them," they refused to surrender an inch. The evidence at their disposal forced the Commissioners to admit the strength of

100. C.0.48/461: Southey to Griffith, 11.1.72, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.
101. C.0.48/461: Commissioners to Col. Sec., 2.4.72, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.
102. Natal SP 8: T. Shepstone's Diary 1.4.72.
102a. Cape P.P.1873, A12, pp.96f: Kirkby to Griffith, 9.4.72.
the Ampondo case, but they thought the surest way of ending inter-tribal troubles was to adhere to the Currie line and to bring the tribes to the north under British jurisdiction. The only alternative was to recognise Umqikela's paramountcy over the whole area, and to insist upon his governing it properly. Barkly agreed that the former was the only practicable course, and believed that Sir Walter Currie's letter to Sir George Grey on 18 March 1861 proved the cession beyond a shadow of doubt. He therefore told them to 'maintain' the line. The Amampondo were furious, but due no doubt to the influence of Mrs Jenkins, they went a long way towards accepting it and simply asked the Governor to alter the boundary in one place where it cut off a portion of Ndamaese's people from the rest of the tribe. This was a reasonable request,

103. C.O.48/461: Commissioners to Col. Sec., 2.4.72, enc. as in 101. They referred to Faku to Pine, 7.10.50, as proof that Faku had surrendered all the land not occupied by his own people. Mrs Jenkins was able to produce documents to contradict this - viz. Faku to Pine, 16.11.50; Pine to Jenkins 27.11.50; Jenkins to Pine 11.1.51 - See pp.148 - 156.

104. Ibid.

105. C.O.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72, and enclosures.

106. Cape P.P.1873, A12, p.100: Commissioners to Umqikela, 15.5.72.

107. MMS: Kirkby to Boyce 10.6.72.

108. C.O.48/461: W. Johnson - pro Umqikela - to Barkly, 10.6.72, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.
but Barkly refused to consider it. It was undesirable to disturb an arrangement concluded so long ago before such a reliable witness as Jenkins, and anyhow Ndamase had been fighting other tribes ever since the Commissioners met and therefore merited no consideration. He was ill-advised to adopt this attitude, and even more so to persist in his refusal when the Amampondo went on to argue that there was no written agreement with Currie and to prove conclusively that the line had been questioned as early as mid-1861.

Barkly failed completely to realise that the Amampondo were not merely perverse, but hungry for land. He knew that Umqikela was suspicious of designs to annexe his territory, for in the previous year the Chief had refused to allow the Admiralty's coastal survey to proceed until Henrique Shepstone had assured him that this was not the end in view. What he did not grasp was that this suspicion and their present attitude had a common origin in the fact that they needed all the land they had. Writing

109. C.O.48/461: Barkly to Umqikela 10.8.72, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.
110. Ibid.
111. C.O.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.
113. Cape GH 8/48: Milward to Barkly, 2.1.73.
114. C.O.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.
in August 1872, William Milward described the situation about Emfundisweni as follows:

"The whole country is in a state of ferment and the people generally are migrating in every direction. Most of the country between the station and the Umtamfuna, in the direction of Natal, will in all probability soon be filled up by the Pondos; and the country between this and Tsungwana will also be occupied by the Amanci and Amabaca tribes, who are rapidly moving into it with their cattle."

If Ndamase was "a troublesome character" it was not simply because he had designs on the cattle or the independence of the Amampondomise. His people were actually settling across the Currie line, and they were doing so because they had to live somewhere and because there was open land in that direction. If the Amampondomise were being brought under pressure as a result, it was no doubt unfortunate, but by no means inexplicable. Would it not have been wiser to have met the wishes of the Amampondomise and to have discussed some fair adjustment of the line?

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Barkly regarded the Amampondomise with an impatient contempt. The Commissioners had reported that all the tribes with the exception of the Griquas were in the lowest depths of

115. MMS: Milward to Boyce 12.3.72.
116. C.0.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.
117. Cape P.P.1874, G27, pp.73f: Orpen to Brownlee, 9.9.73.
barbarism, and that most quarrels or feuds in the area could be traced to Mpondo intrigues.\footnote{Cape P.P.1873, A12, p.118: Commissioners to Col. Sec., 14.5.72.} He was not inclined to be soft with a people such as this, and seems to have shared the common delusion that they would give way to firmness and accept his decision. It did not occur to him that to pursue such a policy was to sacrifice their confidence and to prepare the way for future difficulties.

Matters were not improved by the advent of Orpen. He did not realise any more than Barkly that the crux of the matter was the land problem. In his estimation the Mpondo denial had been caused "by their seeing Government most unfortunately neglecting the very terms and quid pro quo of the cession, that is the establishment of actual Government in the country ceded".\footnote{Cape P.P.1873, A12, p.12: Memo on Amapondo and their relations to Government.} That being the case, "the mere steady exertion of our really enormous influence on the spot by resident officers would cause that line to be respected".\footnote{Ibid.}

Orpen must soon have realised that his interpretation of the Mpondo point of view was superficial and mistaken,
but this made no difference to his policy of firmness which was dictated as well by his view of the Maitland Treaty. This "Protectorate alliance", as he called it, reserved the rights of all petty chiefs who had heretofore resided in any part of the area over which Faku was acknowledged to be paramount. They were to be "at liberty to reside within the said territory in the same manner as they did before they were disturbed by the wars with the Zoolah nation". Furthermore the contracting Chief undertook to call upon the Colonial Government to mediate his quarrels with other chiefs. Orpen maintained that if the Amampondo had neglected these stipulations, then the Colonial Government was under an obligation to interfere on behalf of the injured chiefs. In that case it made no difference whether or not the Amampondo had agreed to the Currie line, for the Government had the right to intervene as judge between the contending parties and to lay it down unilaterally.

121. Cape P.P. 1873, A12, p.29: Memo regarding the state of...... Chiefs and People.
122. Article XIII.
123. Article X.
124. Cape P.P. 1873, A12, p.29: Memo regarding the state of...... Chiefs and People.
129. cf. Cape P.P. 1875, G21, p.101: "They had themselves elected Government as judge between them by the treaty and bound themselves to refrain from war". -(Report on St. John's Territory.)
Here was another source of misunderstanding, for this was not the only possible interpretation of the Treaty and in fact the Amampondo took a different view. They claimed that the rights of the petty chiefs were subject to their acknowledging the paramountcy of Faku and his successors. The Treaty secured the land to them, and if the other chiefs wished to renounce their allegiance, they should leave that land. This was not without official support. It was the view taken by Grey in 1855 after the Umdumbi Affair, and again by Sir Henry Barkly with respect to Jojo in 1874. If it was correct, tribes such as the Amampondomise were really revolted subjects and had no claim upon the consideration of the Government.

Both these interpretations were defective. If the latter tended to ignore the mediation clause, the former made nonsense of the paramountcy. Nothing is to be gained by trying to decide which was the more justified, for in fact the Treaty was inconsistent not only with Bantu law and custom but in itself. Closer relations between

126. Cape P.P.1873, A12, p.80: Minutes of Meeting with Commissioners, 28.3.72.
127. See pages 191f.
128. See page 329.
130. See pages 91f.
the parties were bringing to light those shortcomings which had hitherto been ignored. There was no way out of the impasse except by revision, and there could be no revision without friendly discussion. Instead of this the Amampondo clung to their interpretation, and Orpen clung to his, supported by the Colonial Government when it suited it to do so.

Founded upon misunderstanding, and pursued regardless of Mpondo complaints, Orpen’s policy carried further the process of estrangement which Currie and Barkly had begun. Shortly before he arrived on the scene, the Mpondomise chief Mhlonhlo was compelled by Ndamase’s attacks upon him to place himself under Umqikela.131 This placed Charles Brownlee, the Secretary for Native Affairs, in a quandry. Mhlonhlo’s offer to become a British subject had never been formally accepted, and he was therefore free to turn to the Amampondo. On the other hand, the extension of Umqikela’s power might prove troublesome and dangerous to the Colony. It would be better for Mhlonhlo to remain as he was, and Orpen was told to try and delay the union with the Amampondo without binding the Government to any

131. Cape P.P.1874, G27, p.67: Milward to Barkly, 21.7.73. p.73f: Orpen to Sec. Native Affairs, 9.9.73.
particular course. In the nature of things this could only be a temporary expedient. Mhlonhlo was willing enough to transfer his allegiance, and in October his people and those of his rival Mditshwa were brought under Colonial authority. Adam Kok and other chiefs were told to hold themselves ready to resist any Mpondo aggression but Ndamase, who was expected to give trouble, had the good sense to accept the inevitable and promised to respect the word of the Government. The policy of firmness had apparently been justified by events, and Orpen was encouraged to persevere. Moreover, it had become clear during the crisis that Ndamase was inclined to ignore the paramountcy of his brother Umqikela, and to take an independent line. This fact was duly noted and further confirmed the authorities in their attitude.

Although the Amampondo were wiser than to fight, they were by no means reconciled to the action of the Government.

132. Cape P.P. 1874, G27, p.67: Brownlee to Orpen, 8.8.73. cf. Cape P.P. 1874, G27, p.78: Do. to do., 2.10.73.
133. Cape P.P. 1874, G27, p.78: Brownlee to Orpen, 2.10.73. p.94f: Orpen to Mhlonhlo, 22.10.73.
134. Cape P.P. 1880, A105, pp.19f: Civil Commissioner, Kingwilliamstown to Sec. Native Affairs, 9.10.73.
135. Cape P.P. 1880, A105, p.20: Civil Commissioner, Kingwilliamstown to Sec. Native Affairs, 27.10.73.
136. Cape P.P. 1874, G27, p.73f: Orpen to Brownlee, 9.9.73. p.85f: Brownlee to Umqikela, 17.10.73.
137. Cape P.P. 1874, G27, p.93f: Brownlee to Orpen, 28.10.73.
Mrs Jenkins and others advised them to submit quietly to what it seemed impossible for them to prevent, but in spite of this they continued to plead for some modification of the boundary. When Brownlee visited the area in March 1874 he was approached by two sons of Ndamase; Orpen discussed the matter with Umqikela or his representatives on at least two occasions; and it came up again when Barkly met Umqikela at Emfundisweni in October 1874. During the last meeting Umqikela agreed to the boundary between his people and the Amabaca which he had never seriously disputed, but the Government and its representatives consistently refused to re-open the question.

Far from yielding, Orpen set about establishing British authority in the disputed territory. At the end of May 1874 he was authorised to expel all Mpondo intruders, but to allow any Fingos to remain who were willing to become British subjects. In spite of his marking out the boundary and giving them forty days to remove, people

138. MMS: Milward to Boyce 16.5.74.
139. Cape P.P.1874, G27, p.147: Sec. Native Affairs to Col. Sec., 15.4.74.
143. Ibid.
continued to move in. A few days before the time limit expired, defiance gave way to submission. Several clans which had almost become part of the Amampondo asked to be received as British subjects, and others who were actually members of the tribe denied their birth in an effort to keep their land. While Orpen was receiving their submission, instructions arrived from Cape Town to allow the Amampondo to stay another year. Rather than renounce his advantage, he turned a blind eye, but at a later stage those people who had removed were allowed to return for a further year.

At first sight this was another triumph for firmness. In fact it demonstrated the bankruptcy of that policy. The readiness with which the intruders became British subjects indicated that the Mpondo requests were caused by a real need for land and not by mere awkwardness. The fact that the majority were allowed to remain showed that an adjustment could have been made at an earlier stage with no more injustice to the Amampondomise than they actually had to endure!

145. Ibid.
145a. Ibid.
The whole affair reflects very little credit on the Colonial authorities. It may be conceded that the Amamponento were a difficult tribe with whom to negotiate and that the Amamponentise deserved some consideration. It may also be agreed that the High Commissioner — which meant in effect the Colonial Government — was the paramount power in Kaffraria, and could not be expected to deal with a backward tribe as an independent nation. This does not imply, however, that it was either justifiable or wise to ignore the Amampondo and to impose a unilateral settlement. Their Chief might be "indolent and sensual", but he and his councillors were not children when it came to political affairs, and to treat them as such was simply to demonstrate how to lose friends and alienate people. Apart from their long-standing friendship with the Cape, the Amamponento had much to be said in their favour. They had always disputed the Currie line, and could produce documentary evidence in support of their case. Their initial refusal to make any concessions had prejudiced their case.

146. Natal SP 29: T. Shepstone to H.C. Shepstone, 31.8.71, "... the Ampondos are in my opinion the most impracticable people in South Africa...always excepting the Amabaca".

147. MMS: Kirkby to Boyce 10.6.72.

148. cf. Stanford MS. Reminiscences, p.545: "Pseudo-Scientists who prate of the arrested mental development in middle life of members of the Bantu race would speedily be forced to modify their views if they had to encounter in political affairs the trained councillors of an independent paramount chief accustomed to deal with important issues affecting their relations with white and other neighbours, and the welfare of their own chiefs and people".

149. Cape P. 1873, A12, p.22: Opinions as to good conduct.
but they had soon yielded and were prepared to surrender country which they had never occupied, provided they were not deprived of land they both used and needed. Until this had been arranged, however, they could insist that the Treaty recognised their Chief as supreme. On the other hand, the Cape authorities from Barkly down, thought that the private letter of a white man was enough to discredit the arguments of a Chief, failed to see why the Amampondo were dissatisfied, and insisted on a different interpretation of the Treaty. This complete lack of understanding between the two parties was the most unfortunate aspect of the whole affair.

Although a man of Jenkins' calibre might not have been able to smooth over all the difficulties, he would almost certainly have exercised a moderating influence. Without a trusted mediator the policy of the Cape was imposed by means of its superior strength, but it was a hollow victory, for it shattered the confidence of the weaker party and ensured that all future dealings would be bedevilled by suspicion and mistrust.

Had the Cape Ministry accepted and acted upon Orpen's interpretation of the Treaty, there would have been further trouble over the Amaxesibe who lived east of the Umzimvubu. Their chief, Jojo, had paid tribute to Adam Kok to be received, he thought, as a British subject, but the

Commission found that their land fell on the Mpondo side of the Currie line. They accordingly advised Jojo to make peace, and told Umqikela that he was entitled to stay where he was as long as his people conducted themselves properly. As they did not think this would settle the long-standing feud between the two tribes, they were inclined to recommend their reception as British subjects, either on their present ground— which would necessitate negotiations — or on an unoccupied tract between the Tsitsa and the Umtata.

Jojo had no intention of submitting to Umqikela, and turned to Natal, only to be told that Colony could not interfere. Meanwhile the Amampondo started to press their kraals forward as they were doing across the Umzimvubu, and here too it was in some measure caused by the pressure of population, for the Xesibe country was less densely populated than other parts of Pondoland. Faced

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150. Cape P.P.1873, A12, p.118: Commissioners to Umqikela, 13.4.72.
151. Cape P.P.1873, A12, pp.114, 127: Commissioners to Colonial Secretary, 14.5.72, 18.5.72.
152. Natal SP 29: T. Shepstone to H.C. Shepstone, 15.8.72, 19.10.72, 12.3.73.
C.O.48/496: In 1880 Oxland estimated that Xesibeland was about one-tenth the area of Eastern Pondoland and had one-twentieth the population — Oxland to Brownlee, 3.5.80, enc. in Strahan to Kimberley, No.150, 7.12.80.
with expulsion, Jojo turned to Orpen and asked to be taken over. He was sympathetically received.\textsuperscript{154} In Orpen's opinion the case of the Amaxesibe was exactly parallel to that of the Amampondomise, and the fact that they were on opposite sides of the Currie line was irrelevant.\textsuperscript{155} The Amampondo had disregarded Articles X and XIII of the Treaty, and the injured party had a right to expect Government protection.\textsuperscript{156} What was more, the Xesibe country included copper mines which were believed to be rich and which Umqikela would not allow to be worked.\textsuperscript{157} This nice blend of moral obligation and self interest was not enough to what the appetite of the Cape Ministry, and their suggestion that Jojo might find the protection of Natal more satisfactory drew angry protests from Orpen.\textsuperscript{158} Nevertheless he was forced to admit that Mrs Jenkins would regard any opening of the question as most unjust, and sealed Jojo's fate when he told Barkly that she might consent to the surrender of Port St. John's to prevent this.\textsuperscript{159} The High

\textsuperscript{154} Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.21: Orpen to Sec. Nat.Aff., 30.4.74.
\textsuperscript{155} Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.34: Do. to do., 23.6.74.
\textsuperscript{156} Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.20: Do. to do., 27.1.74.
\textsuperscript{157} Cape P.P.1880, A105, pp.20-1: Do. to do., 27.1.74; 30.4.74 cf. See pages 227, 284.
\textsuperscript{158} Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.29: Sec. Nat. Aff. to Orpen 7.5.74 p.29: Orpen to Sec. Nat. Aff. 21.5.74 p.32: Do. to do., 16.6.74.
\textsuperscript{159} Cape GH 8/48: Orpen to Barkly, 21.9.74.
Commissioner considered the port more important, and the Amaxesibe were sacrificed on the altar of expediency.

The day after his meeting with Umqikela, Barkly wrote his final answer to Jojo. He was living in a country which the Government had continually recognised as under the paramountcy of Umqikela, who had promised to deal liberally with him. It was therefore necessary for him to recognise Umqikela's authority in a formal manner or the Government would be unable to intervene on his behalf. Jojo was in no hurry to comply, and he only submitted under pressure in March 1875. Donald Strachan, who brought about the meeting, reported that Umqikela appeared to be sincere in his promise to prevent encroachment, but that the Amaxesibe were much dissatisfied. The problem had been shelved, not solved.

The abandonment of Jojo did not lead to the acquisition of Port St. John's, and the negotiations in this connection further proved the need for a mediator between the Colonial authorities and the Amampondo. The failure of Wodehouse in 1869 had not closed the matter, and trading interests,

161. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.38: D. Strachan to Orpen, 24.3.75.
162. Ibid.
163. See page 286.
particularly in Natal, continued to press for annexation. The difficulty experienced by the admiralty surveyor in 1871 convinced the Natal hierarchy that it would be useless to broach the subject at that juncture, and Barkly did not think it worth bothering about. At the end of 1873, however, the matter was raised again by Sir Benjamin Pine, prompted probably by the Cape advance into Nomansland. Barkly referred it to his ministers who were not very enthusiastic but said they would co-operate with the Natal Government, and it was eventually arranged that Theophilus Shepstone should be sent to arrange with Umqikela for the cession of the river mouth. The High Commissioner was to appoint an officer who would collect customs at the Cape rates, and after a percentage deduction for Umqikela, the


165. Natal SP 29: T. Shepstone to H.C. Shepstone, 30.9.71: "Mr Keate has written privately to Sir Henry Barkly... and impressed upon him the necessity of postponing any idea of asking for the St. John's Mouth, and he suggests that we are very much more likely to get it than he."

166. C.O.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No.100, 23.8.72.

167. C.O.48/466: Pine to Barkly, No.30, 27.10.73, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.124, 11.12.73.

168. C.O.48/466: Barkly to Pine 11.12.73, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No.124, 11.12.73.

169. C.O.48/478: Minute to Ministers, 16.5.74. Extract in Barkly to Carnarvon, No.81, 5.7.76.
balance would be equally divided between the two colonies. 170

Barkly visited Natal in October 1874 and as nothing had been done, he undertook to communicate with Umqikela and Ndamase on his return journey. 171

Before this he had been in touch with Orpen, who assured him that a cession would be refused, but thought that the Amampondo — and Mrs Jenkins — might agree to the collection of customs. 172 When he met Umqikela, therefore, Barkly simply asked permission to place an officer at St. John's, and offered to pay rent for his house. 173

He followed this up with a memorandum in which he offered Umqikela £200 per annum in lieu of the charges he had lately been levying, and promised to revise this if the trade increased. 174 The Amampondo did not refuse outright, but suggested that it would be enough for the Governor to issue a decree that all ships coming to St. John's should be provided with a licence. 175 This was nothing more nor less than an invitation to enforce Article VIII of the Maitland Treaty, but it was wholly impracticable unless an

170. C.O.48/478: Minute to Ministers, 16.5.74. Extract in Barkly to Carnarvon, No.81, 5.7.76.
171. C.O.48/478: Barkly to Carnarvon, No.81, 5.7.76.
172. Cape GH 8/48: Orpen to Barkly, 14.7.74, 17.8.74. Orpen was strongly opposed to a joint venture with Natal.
175. Cape P.P.1875, G21, p.65: Milward to Barkly, 16.11.74.
officer was placed at the port to see that it was carried out! This was pointed out to Umqikela, who was gently warned not to obstruct the Government's carrying out the provisions of the Treaty. 176

If the Cape acted unwisely with regard to the Currie line, the Amampondo were foolish in the matter of Port St. John's. Their attitude was easy to understand. Events west of the Umzimvubu had left them intensely suspicious of anything the Government might do; there had been talk in the Natal press about extending the boundary to the Umzimvubu; 177 and Orpen had been told that when Umqikela heard of the proposal for a joint customs house he had said it meant splitting the Amampondo in two and taking away his paramountcy. 178 In fact he had little reason to be afraid, for the Government's intentions were innocent. Sir Henry Barkly had gone out of his way to be reasonable; the obnoxious request for land had been dropped; and considering the volume of trade the proposed allowance was generous. 179

177. Cape GH 8/48: Orpen to Barkly, 14.7.74. This talk was not confined to the press. cf. Natal S.P.29: T. Shepstone to H.C. Shepstone, 3.2.74: "Ayliff.... thinks we shall have control to the St. John's River. I don't think much of that idea myself although I believe it is probable that Ayliff's brother William may succeed Brownlee as Secretary for Native Affairs".
179. Cape P.P. 1875, G21, pp.88-90: Only 28 calls had been made between March 1867 and November 1874 - G.P. Stafford to Orpen, 17.12.74.
It would have been well had there been somebody who was trusted by the Amampondo and was also in a position to impress this upon them with sincerity, conviction and authority!

Luckily the matter was not pressed. Barkly visited the port and decided that its commercial capacities had been overrated and the trade in arms exaggerated. It certainly was not worth a quarrel with a tribe numbering 230,000. A further tentative enquiry was made in January 1876, but apparently came to nothing. This was probably prompted by renewed official interest in Natal, which led to a certain amount of correspondence in the course of 1876. In the end Carnarvon decided that it was not desirable to open negotiations at that moment. Barkly's Ministers agreed but expressed the hope

"that the time is not far distant when they will be able to recommend measures for the attainment of that desirable end".

Umqikela had only put off the evil day.

180. C.O.48/478: Barkly to Carnarvon, No.81, 5.7.76.
181. JP: S. Probart to Mrs Jenkins, 10.1.76.
183. C.O.48/481: Carnarvon to Barkly, No.251, 15.9.76. *
184. C.O.48/482: Minute of Ministers, 17.1.77, enc. in Barkly to Carnarvon, No.11, 18.1.77.

* (draft on memo. by Shepstone 4.9.76).
The end of isolation brought with it an end of understanding, and by 1875 the traditional friendship of the Government and tribe had almost ceased to be. Closer relations were revealing the shortcomings of the Maitland Treaty; the Cape authorities were inclined to be impatient; and the Amampondo were loth to move with the times. As the principal difficulties had their origin in the time of Jenkins, it would be unwise to suggest that he or any other Wesleyan missionary could have avoided the trouble. It is clear, however, that the situation became so serious largely because there was no mediator or interpreter who had the confidence of both sides. Although he was fettered by his instructions, the local Wesleyan missionary was the obvious person for such a role, and the mission authorities made a grave mistake when they refused to send a man to Pondoland who might have been able to assume it.
CHAPTER XII

CRISIS

In 1875 the control of Griqualand East passed from Adam Kok to the Cape Government, and the encirclement of Pondoland was complete.1 By the end of 1878 the Maitland Treaty had broken down completely, and although eight years were to pass before it was finally abandoned, it had become a scrap of paper with very little meaning. There were bound to be difficulties when an instrument which had been little more than a symbol of friendship became the basis of day to day relations between a European government and a native tribe, but that is not to say that the breakdown was inevitable. The adjustment was attempted under inauspicious circumstances, and the crisis was precipitated first by the fact that the Amampondo cherished a justifiable sense of grievance against the Government and were determined to resist further encroachment; secondly, by the general unsettlement of native affairs in South Africa; and finally by the vigorous policy of Sir Bartle Frere and his Ministers. The situation was aggravated, as in previous years, by the absence of anybody who could take the place that had been occupied by Jenkins.

The resentment of the Amampondo made them unco-operative neighbours. During his first year as Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East, Captain Matthew Blyth found Umqikela "friendly and loyal to Government", but that was because their dealings amounted to little more than an exchange of compliments. He began to take a different view in March 1877 when he asked permission for the telegraph line from the Cape to Natal to be taken through a corner of Pondoland. Despite the efforts of Mrs Jenkins to persuade him otherwise, the Chief insisted "that he would not allow the telegraph poles to be put up in his country; that his people might destroy them, and also that the Government might claim the land; .... the Government had so repeatedly altered his boundaries and taken his land". This raised again the whole question of the Currie line which had supposedly been laid to rest eighteen months before, and hard words were spoken before Blyth returned home disgruntled to ask for "a strong remonstrance" from the Government.

3. C 0.48/478: Barkly to Carnarvon, 15.4.76.
5. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.53: S.N.A. to Umqikela, 13.7.77 - Brownlee refers to a letter from Umqikela dated 14.9.75 and agreeing to the boundary.
Before feelings on either side had time to abate, a number of natives who had been implicated in a witchcraft murder escaped into Pondoland.\(^7\) Blyth demanded their return in accordance with the Treaty\(^8\) but Umqikela responded with a sheaf of excuses, and did not comply even after the High Commissioner had pointed out his duty.\(^9\) The excuses were not without some force, but the real explanation of his attitude lay deeper. It was not the normal Bantu custom to return refugees unless the two parties were on very friendly terms,\(^10\) and custom counted for more with Umqikela than a treaty obligation which had hitherto been a dead letter. His persistent refusal was a reflection of his resentment about the boundary and of his animosity towards Captain Blyth.\(^11\) Although he had good reason to be resentful, Umqikela's behaviour was indefensible. If he were allowed to act in this way, it would be difficult to establish order in Griqualand East, and the authorities would become the laughing stock of their subjects and of

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8. Article III.
10. Schapera (Ed.): The Bantu Speaking Tribes of South Africa, p.92.
11. cf. C.O.48/485: Mrs Jenkins to Brownlee 1.12.77, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 23.5.78.
their neighbours. By the end of the year the long-suffering Blyth had decided that it was "absolutely necessary for the well being of the Government in the Transkei, as well as for the ultimate good of the Pondo people themselves, that Pondoland should come directly under the Government".  

The arguments in favour of a change were strengthened by events during the Griqua Rebellion in April 1878. A party among the Griquas had opposed the establishment of Cape authority, and when Adam Muis, who was one of their number, was summoned for using seditious language, he fled into Pondoland where he was joined by other malcontents. This occurred at the end of February. On 11 March Umqikela told Blyth that he had ordered Umhlangaso to drive them out of the country, but nothing was done until 11 April, when Muis crossed the border with an escort of ninety-four Amampondo mainly from Emfundisweni, and under the leadership of Josiah Jenkins, a nephew of the Chief and the adopted son of Mrs Jenkins. By this time

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14. Cape P.P. 1880, A105, p.65: Blyth to S.N.A., 19.3.78. C.0.48/486: Blyth to S.N.A., 23.4.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, No.215, 17.8.78.
15. Cape P.P. 1880, A105, p.66: Johnson (pro Umqikela) to Blyth 11.3.78.
disaffection had mounted, and the party was met by a
group of rebels under Smith Pommer. After robbing a
trader they made their way to a laager outside Kokstad
where a large number of Griquas had gathered. Blyth
anticipated an attack, and surrounded the laager, but
before the firing began, Josiah Jenkins and his party
came out under a flag of truce. They were disarmed and
sent back to Pondoland. 16

It is by no means clear what Josiah was doing in the
Griqua camp. He maintained that he had fully intended to
hand over Muis to Captain Blyth on the following day, but
appearances were very much against him and the Natal Mercury
reflected the general opinion when it described his excuses
as specious. 17 According to the Griquas who were taken
prisoner, the Mpondo party had come to fight with the full
approval of Umnqikela and had been told off to burn Blyth's
house. 18 This account was accepted by the authorities, 19
but the truth probably lay somewhere between the two
extremes. In the negotiations which ensued the Mpondo

16. C.0.48/486: Blyth to S.N.A., 23.4.78, enc. in Frere to
Hicks Beach, No.215, 17.8.78.
17. Natal Mercury 30.5.78 - referring to a letter in "The
Times of Natal".
cf. Natal Witness 21.5.78 which accepts his story.
18. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.67: S.N.A. to Governor 23.4.78.
delegates admitted that the Treaty had been infringed but
denied the complicity of the Chief,\(^{20}\) and there is reason
to believe that this was indeed the case. Josiah was a
mere stripling of eighteen\(^ {21}\) and it is possible that he
set out to surrender Muis but allowed himself to be misled.
At worst he and Umhlangaso planned to assist the rebels
without Umqikela being privy to their scheme. Umhlangaso
had been made responsible for driving the Griquas out of
Pondoland; he had already shown himself capable of ignoring
Umqikela's authority;\(^ {22}\) and he was later to prove the
most vocal opponent of the Government.\(^ {23}\) Nevertheless,
if Umqikela himself had not acted in a hostile manner, it
had been shown that he was unable to control his subordi-
nates and this was almost as damaging to his claim to be
regarded as an independent chief.\(^ {24}\)

In fact it is more than likely that Umhlangaso was
the evil genius of this unneighbourly policy. He had

\(^{20}\) Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.70: Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A.,
28.5.78.

\(^{21}\) C.0.48/485: Mrs Jenkins to Brownlee, 1.12.77, enc. in
Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 23.5.78.

\(^{22}\) Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.75: Blyth and Elliot to S.N.A.,
11.6.78: The Rev. H. Rock admitted to writing a letter
"purporting to be the dictation of the Chief Umqikela
and subsequently proved to have been dictated by
Umhlangaso, a minor chief, under pressure".

\(^{23}\) P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Oxland to Blyth and Elliot,
3.8.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 2.9.78.

\(^{24}\) cf. Natal Witness, 4.5.78.
attended Lovedale and his education gave him a position of great influence in the tribe. His power was increased by the fact that Umqikela had by now become a habitual drunkard, and was forced to rely upon his subordinate chiefs and councillors to a far greater extent than Faku had ever done. As an educated man he felt the injustices of recent years and the haughty bearing of Captain Blyth more keenly than most. As the son-in-law of Sandile, he had a close bond of sympathy with the Gaikas who rose in rebellion in December 1877. It is very probable that he encouraged Umqikela's resentment and was primarily responsible for the arguments which were advanced against surrendering the refugees.

Like Josiah, Umhlangaso was closely associated with the Wesleyan mission, and this suggests that a missionary who could have commanded his respect would have been able to exercise considerable influence for good. As it was,

25. C.0.48/485: Mrs Jenkins to Brownlee, 1.12.77, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 22.5.78.
27. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.40: Blyth to S.N.A., 10.3.77; p.71: Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A., 11.6.78.
27a. MMS: Account by Coster of marriage of Umhlangaso, 13.2.68, enc. in Cameron to Boyce 24.4.68. Strictly speaking he was grandson-in-law.
27b. Theal: Since 1795, V, p.159.
28. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Gen. Secs., 13.4.77. cf. MMS: Eva to Boyce, 10.5.70.
John Cameron who was stationed at Emfundisweni seems to have taken no part whatsoever in political affairs, while his colleague at Palmerton was a young man of weak character and little judgment. Mrs Jenkins was no substitute. There was no doubt her influence was on the side of peace, but the course of events showed that it did not count for a great deal, even with those who were nearest to her. She commanded their love but not their obedience. The Wesleyans were no longer alone in the field, for in 1875 Bishop Callaway had formed a mission at St. Andrew's, not far from the Great Place. This was now in the care of his son-in-law, the Rev. J. Oxley Oxland. The Bishop's intrusion had been keenly resented and this strong denominational feeling stood in the way of Oxland's gaining an influence over Umhlangaso. Although he had found favour with Umqikela, he was not in a position to sway the councils of the tribe.

29. The Rev. H. Rock resigned in the course of 1878, apparently as the result of "immorality". cf. MMS: Mason to Kilner, 19.8.78; Calvert to Kilner, 19.8.78. See also footnote number 22.

30. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.40: Blyth to S.N.A., 10.3.77. C.O.48/485: Blyth to Littleton, 10.12.77, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 22.5.78. JP: Mrs Jenkins to Umqikela, 30.10.77.


32. MMS: Milward to Boyce, 4.11.72 etc. 2.7.73; J.R. Cameron to Gen. Secs., 13.4.77.

33. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.302: Oxland to S.N.A., 4.11.79.
With nobody to guide them into less dangerous paths, Umhlangaso and his fellows allowed their feelings to get the better of their judgment, and set out along the road to ruin. It is possible that they were supported and encouraged by traders and canteen keepers, for Blyth spoke more than once of bad European advice.\(^{34}\) If there was such advice, however, those who gave it contrived to remain anonymous, and it was by no means the only or the principal cause of the Mpondo attitude.

The conduct of the Amampondo was sulky rather than aggressive, and even Josiah's adventure did not reflect a general desire to fight. However, the times were such that the authorities were only too ready to believe the worst. To the north in the Transvaal, Secocoeni was defying Shepstone as he had earlier defied the republicans;\(^{35}\) in the south the scare of 1876 was followed in August 1877 by the Gcaleka War;\(^{36}\) while between these two extremes, and more menacing than either, the Zulu impis were waiting eagerly to "wash their spears" and Cetywayo was despatching his messengers far and wide.\(^{37}\) Whether or not their


\(^{35}\) Walker: op. cit., p.382.

\(^{36}\) de Kiewiet: Imperial Factor, pp.165f.

fears were justified, men like Shepstone believed that there was a general desire on the part of the great chiefs to rise in concert and drive the white man into the sea. \(^{38}\) In this context Umqikela's perversity was sinister, and before the Griqua rebellion there had been incidents which made it appear even more sinister. In September 1877 he was reported to be entertaining Zulu messengers at his Great Place, \(^{39}\) and Brownlee's suspicions were not allayed by the assurance that their sole object was to promote friendly intercourse. \(^{40}\) He could not fail to notice that Umqikela's letter also conveyed the first categorical refusal to give up the murderers! \(^{41}\) Nor did it help matters when the Chief returned a non-committal reply to a peremptory demand for the surrender of Kreli, although it later transpired that he had not gone to Pondoland. \(^{42}\) Further offence was given in the new year, \(^{43}\) and by April the authorities were quite convinced that Umqikela was in league with Cetywayo and Kreli. It was

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38. Martineau: The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, II, p.223.
40. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.59: S.N.A. to Umqikela, 25.10.77; p.70: Brownlee to S.N.A. Ayliff, 29.5.78.
41. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.63: Rock (pro Umqikela) to Blyth, 15.11.77; cf. P.P.1880 LI (C2676): Memo by Brownlee, 4.6.80, enc. in Frere to Kimberley, 22.6.80.
42. C.0.806/98: Frere to Hicks Beach, No.120, 28.11.77.
P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Bulwer to Frere, 23.8.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 21.9.78.
43. C.0.48/485: J.S. Jenkins to Brownlee, 29.1.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 22.5.78 - an enquiry as to why British troops had crossed the Umtata (Contd.)
extremely unlikely that he ever thought of common action but this suspicion coloured the official attitude to the part played in the rising by Josiah's party, and provided another powerful argument for placing relations with the Amampondo on a new footing.

These events spanned the first year at the Cape of Sir Bartle Frere. An Imperial statesman of long experience and wide vision, he had been sent out by Carnarvon to inaugurate his scheme of confederation. It had very soon become clear that this would have to be preceded by an unmistakable assertion of British supremacy in South Africa, and duty had therefore combined with disposition to recommend a vigorous native policy.

"I have heard of no difficulty in managing and civilising the native tribes in South Africa," he told Sir Michael Hicks Beach, "which I cannot trace to some neglect or attempt to evade the clear responsibilities of sovereignty. Nothing is easier, as far as I can see, than to govern the natives here, if you act as master, but if you abdicate the sovereign position, the abdication has always to be heavily paid for, in both blood and treasure".

This conviction led Frere to deal with the natives in a

43. (Contd.)... without Umqikela's permission.
cf. Cape Argus, 24.1.78;
Cape P.E.1880, A105, p.64: Under-S.N.A. to S.N.A., 13.3.78 - a report that a deputation had gone to Umqikela from Kreli.


45. Worsfold: Sir Bartle Frere, p.84: Frere to Hicks Beach, 10.8.78.
rather high-handed manner, and it is therefore important to realise that he believed his policy would benefit them as well as the Empire. In his opinion their normal state was "simply the unrestrained increase of idle and savage population", and even the slightest degree of assimilation to the European communities was an improvement. He was genuinely concerned for the civilisation and advancement of the native peoples. If he was ready to precipitate war with the Amazulu, he also lent his support to improvements in land tenure, housing and agricultural methods in the Cape Colony, and deplored the vindictive attitude of his Ministers towards the Gaika rebels. It is also significant that his proposals for the future government of the area between the Kei and Natal were accompanied by a suggestion that the new province should be administered by a civil service consisting largely of educated natives. Frere was an imperialist, but his imperialism was more than a greed for dominion: this must be borne in mind when considering his policy towards the Amampondo.

46. P.P.1878 LVI (C2144): Minute for Ministers, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 4.6.78.
47. de Kiewiet: Imp. Fac., p.175.
   de Kiewiet: Imp. Fac., p.172.
49. P.P.1878 LVI (C2144): Frere to Hicks Beach, 4.6.78, and enclosures.
50. Martineau: op. cit., II, pp.217f: Frere to Hicks Beach, 1.6.78.
Pondoland was a glaring example of what could happen when the Government neglected its responsibilities. Frere viewed its "Monaco-like independence" with amusement rather than alarm, but by the end of 1877 he had decided that its relations with the British authorities would have to be placed upon a more satisfactory footing. Carnarvon warned him that the Imperial Government would not allow the Cape to extend its authority in this direction, but Frere wanted to do no more than shoulder responsibilities which already existed. As he read the Treaty, the Amampondo were "in a position of subordinate co-operation with the British Government as a protected state rather than independent". Like many states in India, they enjoyed much liberty of internal administration, but possessed none of the attributes of really independent sovereignty. All that was necessary was that the Treaty should be enforced. The Government should cease to sleep upon its rights, and Umqikela should be held

52. C.0.806/103: Frere to Bulwer 18.11.77, enc. in Bulwer to Carnarvon, 20.12.77.
53. C.0.806/103: Carnarvon to Frere, 3.1.78.
54. C.0.806/103: Frere to Bulwer, 18.11.77, enc. in Bulwer to Hicks Beach, 20.12.77.
55. Martineau: op. cit., II, p.351: Frere to Sec. of State, 8.2.80.
to his obligations. The officials of the Cape Native Affairs Department assured him that all had been well in the days of Faku and Jenkins, and he assumed, not unnaturally, that Umqikela was putting on airs of independence which had been abandoned by his wiser father. According to Brownlee this changed attitude was probably due to the influence of traders and other Europeans whose interests would be threatened if the country were to come under British rule, and the reports of Captain Blyth seemed to confirm this. This was a mistaken analysis of the situation. It ignored the fact that in Faku's time the Amampondo had been isolated, and the Treaty had not been rigorously enforced. It took no account of the responsibility of previous High Commissioners and their agents for the unfavourable change in their bearing. Nevertheless, Frere drew the correct conclusion. Much of the trouble had been caused by the failure to provide an adequate means of communication between the Government and the Mpondo chief after the death of Jenkins. This

56. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Frere to Bulwer, 18.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 21.9.78.
58. Ibid.
would have to be rectified by the appointment of a resident, who would not be a mere diplomatic agent, like Fynn of old, but an adviser to the Chief, and the official through whom the orders of the sovereign power would be conveyed to its vassal. 59

In addition to this there would have to be some definite arrangement for the control of Port St. John's. Blyth had raised the subject once more at the unfortunate meeting in March 1877, but without result. 60 Since then the Gcaleka War had shattered the complacency of the Cape and banished for ever the day when it was possible to argue that the port was not very important because it was not the only way by which arms could be brought into Kaffraria. 61 Under Frere's influence the Sprigg Ministry was embarking upon the disarmament of the natives, 62 and it was therefore essential to block every channel through which they might be supplied. Furthermore Frere estimated the dangers of foreign interference in Kaffraria more highly than Barkly had done, 63 and the command of Port St. John's was implied

59. C.0.806/103: Frere to Bulwer 18.11.77, enc. in Bulwer to Carnarvon 20.12.77;
P.P.1878-9 LIII (C2252): Proclamation 6.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 26.12.78.
60. Cape P.P. 1880, A105, p.40: Blyth to S.N.A., 10.3.77.
61. C.0.48/466: Barkly to Pine, 11.12.73, enc. in Barkly to Kimberley, No. 124, 24.12.73.
63. Martineau, Op. cit., II, p.213: Frere to Carnarvon 17.2.78. cf. C.0.48/461: Barkly to Kimberley, No. 100, 23.8.72
in his plea that Great Britain should be master of the entire east and west coasts up to the Portuguese border. 64 Finally, the force of the economic argument for control had been greatly increased by the acquisition of Griqua-land East and the development of the Transkei, and as the port by itself would be useless for commercial purposes it was also necessary to arrange for a right-of-way to Kokstad and Umtata. 65

Although he had decided upon his objectives as early as November 1877, 66 Frere was in no hurry to achieve them. As he became convinced that Umqikela was in league with Cetywayo and Kreli, he realised that the Mpondo question would have to be settled before the Zulu difficulty was tackled. 67 Even then he hoped to avoid unpleasantness, and when Bulwer told him that Blyth was unpopular 68 he

64. Martineau: op. cit., II, p.239: Frere to Carnarvon 8.2.78.
Worsfold, op. cit., p.84: Frere to Hicks Beach, 10.8.78.
65. Worsfold: op. cit., p.88: Frere to Hicks Beach 27.8.78.
C.0.806/109: Minute of Frere to Ministers, 30.5.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 2.6.78.
66. C.0.806/103: Frere to Bulwer, 18.11.77, enc. in Bulwer to Carnarvon, 20.12.77.
67. Worsfold: op. cit., p.88: Frere to Hicks Beach 27.8.78: "I hope my despatch will satisfy you that enough has been done to secure (Chelmsford's) position in Natal from a rising in his rear, when he is engaged with the Zulus...."
68. C.0.806/103: Bulwer to Frere, 8.12.77, enc. in Bulwer to Carnarvon, 20.12.77.
discontinued communication through him and planned to send his private secretary with a letter to Umqikela. The Griqua Rebellion broke out before this could be done, and when they were told of the supposed intentions of the Mpondo party, Sprigg and Frere were agreed that the time had come for an understanding. Delay was undesirable, and as Major Elliot, the Chief Magistrate of Tembuland, had gone to Blyth's assistance, they were instructed to work together for a settlement.

The reaction of the Amampondo showed fairly conclusively that they had not intended to fight. A ringleader of the refugee murderers was surrendered; an effort was made to round up the Griquas who had escaped into Pondoland after the Rebellion; and at the end of May a deputation admitted that the Treaty had been broken and agreed to submit to any demand the Government might make. They probably expected a fine and were taken aback by the terms

69. C.0.48/485: Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 22.5.78. Carnarvon noticed Bulwer's remark, and suggested to Frere that care should be taken not to offend Umqikela - C.0.806/103: Carnarvon to Frere, 7.2.78.
70. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.67: S.N.A. to Governor, 23.4.78.
71. C.0.48/485: Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 22.5.78.
72. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.67: Blyth to S.N.A., 4.5.78.
73. Natal Witness, 18.5.78.
74. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.70: Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A., 28.5.78.
which Frere and his Ministers had decided to impose. Frere’s main aim was to prevent future trouble, and as means to this end his demands were reasonable. Unfortunately he chose to impose them "in consideration of pardon" for past offences, and the Amampondo were quite justified in thinking the punishment was out of all proportion to the offence, which they considered slight. If they were not aggressive, neither did they intend to be bullied. Their opposition was hardened by the fear that this would be the first stage in a process which

75. C.O.806/109: Minute by Frere 30.5.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 2.6.78. Printed in Cape P.P.1880, A105, (p.71)as telegram to Blyth and Elliot.

76. Ibid.
would transform their country into British territory and themselves into British subjects. They had no desire whatsoever to lose their independence. The chiefs well knew that it was the deliberate policy of the Cape to undermine their power; and the people were not eager to pay the hut tax and to share the life of the railway construction camps and the diamond diggings. Umhlangaso in particular was determined to keep the Colony at bay. His father-in-law had only recently been shot, a hunted rebel, and during his time at Lovedale he had seen conditions under Colonial rule for himself. It was not surprising, therefore, that they should be reluctant to comply. Violent resistance would defeat its own ends, but it was possible to play a waiting game with some prospect of success, and this the Mpondo leaders resolved to do. They were probably encouraged in this course by the news that the Imperial Government had criticised the tone of Blyth's message to Umqikela about Krelisi and may have hoped that this might lead to his removal and a change in policy. The deputation had been given

77. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Kilner 20.6.78.
78. de Kiewiet: Imp. Fac., pp. 154f: In the magistracy of Umzimkulu, which bordered upon Pondoland, the magistrate estimated that one-third of the population of 3,000 was continually away at labour in the Cape Colony.
80. C.O. 806/103: Carnarvon to Frere 3.1.78.
Cape P.P. 1880, A105, p. 84: Canham to Oxland 9.7.78.
fifteen days to consult Umqikela and other chiefs, but the tribal council did not assemble until 17 June, two days after this period had expired, and then it decided to send no reply until Nqwiliso had been consulted. This was almost equivalent to postponing the matter until the Greek Kalends, for Nqwiliso had claimed to be independent ever since he had succeeded Ndumase in 1876, and had already protested to Major Elliot against Umqikela's giving away land west of the Umzimvubu. The real value of the excuse was shown by the fact that a month later no messengers had crossed the Umzimvubu.

Among the Europeans in Pondoland opinion was divided, and it was not altogether remarkable that this division should have been largely along denominational lines. The attitude of Mrs Jenkins and the Wesleyan party was ambiguous. Had the concessions been sought avowedly in the interests of good government, they would probably have supported them without reserve. As it was, they agreed

81. C.0.806/109: Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A. 1.6.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 2.6.78.
82. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Oxland to Blyth and Elliot, 17.6.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 26.8.78.
83. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.75: Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A., 11.6.78.
84. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.89: Oxland to Blyth and Elliot, 15.7.78.
with the Amampondo that the punishment did not fit the crime. At the end of October 1877 Mrs Jenkins had warned Umqikela in no uncertain terms what would happen if he refused to give up the refugees, but since then he had gone some way towards doing his duty. They accepted Josiah's story of the vexed incident during the rebellion, and saw no reason for a severe penalty. The other breaches of the Treaty, real or supposed, were not serious enough to justify such measures. It was not surprising, therefore, that they should think the demands grossly unjust. Mrs Jenkins' nephew later claimed that they had consistently advised the Chief to give way for the sake of peace, and Frere accepted this assurance without hesitation. But their advice was without conviction. They made no secret of their opinions; Mrs Jenkins stated publicly that the Government would not go so far as to send in troops; and it was through them that the Amampondo heard about the criticism of Blyth.

85. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Kilner 20.6.78.
86. JP: Mrs Jenkins to Umqikela, 30.10.77.
87. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Kilner, 20.6.78.
88. P.P.1878-9 II (C2220): Oxland to Blyth and Elliot, 17.6.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 26.8.78.
89. P.P.1878-9 II (C2220): Henry J. White to Frere, no date, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 9.10.78.
90. P.P.1878-9 II (C2220): Frere to Henry J. White 28.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 9.10.78.
91. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.84: Canham to Oxland 9.7.78.
they did not encourage defiance, they did not discourage delay.

Oxland, on the other hand, thought the demands were reasonable, and was anxious for the Amampondo to comply immediately. He had some reason to expect that they would do so, and attributed the outcome of the meeting to the work of his Wesleyan neighbours, whom he described as "the obstructive European clique". It was easy to assume that they were trying to thwart the Government's plans. Mrs Jenkins' nephews were the principal traders in Pondoland, and their attitude to the demands was probably coloured by commercial considerations. If the flag was raised at Port St. John's, they would have to pay far more in customs duties than the £15 which was then given to Umqikela for each cargo. It would therefore be in their interests to counsel resistance. The argument was plausible, but for the fact that it was even more in their interests to avoid a war in which they would

92. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Oxland to Elyth and Elliot 17.6.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 26.8.78.
94. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Oxland to Elyth and Elliot 17.6.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 26.8.78.
95. C.O.48/485: Blyth to Littleton 10.12.77, and note by Brownlee, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach (conf.) 22.5.78.
96. Ibid.
lose everything. A comparative newcomer, Oxland was not familiar with past events and failed to appreciate how strongly the Amampondo felt. He did not realise that there would have been the same delay even if Mrs Jenkins and the rest had been completely at one with him.

This misunderstanding would not have been serious had it not been that Oxland had the ear of the Government and the Wesleyans did not. The resignation of Charles Brownlee had deprived Mrs Jenkins of a personal friend at headquarters, and any reliance which the local officials might have placed upon her party had been finally undermined when the missionary at Palmerton admitted to forging a letter under pressure from Umhlangaso. In these circumstances they went unheard, and Oxland's superficial account was accepted without question to the considerable disadvantage of all concerned. On 22 June the Secretary for Native Affairs was told that the present situation was "due entirely to the malign influence of traders and others", and this was followed on 3 July by "reliable information" to the effect that the Amampondo did not intend to send a reply.

97. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Henry J. White to Frere, no date, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 9.10.78.
98. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.71: Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A., 11.6.78.
100. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.80: Do. to do., 3.7.78.
The situation really called for patience and diplomacy, but these were not forthcoming from the High Commissioner and his Cape agents. It apparently did not occur to Blyth and Elliot that they should go down to the Great Place and argue the matter out with the Chief and his councillors, although this would surely have been the best way to counteract the "malign influence" which was supposed to explain his opposition. All they could recommend was force. Imperial troops were passing through Kaffraria on their way to Natal, and it would have been a simple matter to have sent a detachment into Pondo-land and compelled Umqikela to submit. Frere would not allow this but ordered Colonel Wood and his men to stand by while he played his trump card. On 5 July he announced that Umqikela would no longer be recognised as paramount and gave Blyth and Elliot permission to communicate directly with "loyal" chiefs.

To Frere's way of thinking this step was abundantly

101. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.80: Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A., 22.6.78.
102. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.81: S.N.A. to Elliot and Blyth, 5.7.78.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
justified. Umqikela was a drunken sot. He had no cause for complaint against the Colonial Government, except perhaps that Captain Blyth was rather irascible. He had shown his gratitude for all that the Government had done for him and his people by evincing sympathy with Kreli, conspiring with Cetywayo and taking an active part in the Griqua Rebellion. Presented with demands which were designed merely to put the Treaty into practice and to provide for military security and commercial prosperity, he had allowed himself to be led astray by unscrupulous traders and was treating the paramount power with contempt. In such circumstances force would be justified, but it was more humane and less expensive to appeal first to the good sense of Umqikela’s subordinates, some of whom were patently independent. 106 The only trouble was that Frere’s understanding of past events and present attitudes bore little resemblance to the facts, and he might have acted differently had he consulted those who understood the Mpondoland point of view. 107 In particular, the delay in replying to the Government demands was far less serious than he

106. This line of argument is used inter alia in P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220); Frere to Hicks Beach, 26.8.78; Frere to Bulwer, 18.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 21.9.78; Memorandum, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 7.8.78.

107. Frere realised too late the need to explain his policy to the Europeans in Pondoand, hence his memorandum enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 7.8.78 (P.P.1878-9 LII C2220).

See page 369.
believed, and hardly called for such drastic measures. Much difficulty might have been avoided on this and other occasions had Europeans realised that the Bantu view of time was very different from their own.

Sir Bartle's high-handed action met with a measure of success. Elliot was now able to negotiate with Nqwiliso, who was only too willing to cede his sovereign rights to the waters of the Umzimvubu and to sell any land required on the western bank. Across the Umzimvubu, Umqikela's council were not persuaded to surrender the port, but the military preparations on their border did frighten them into accepting a resident. These concessions were of some value, but they were not what Frere had expected. He had been led to believe that the deposition would bring about Umqikela's immediate collapse. Blyth had long spoken of the weakness of his hold upon the tribe and in June he and Elliot had reported that nine minor chiefs would probably support the Government against him. In fact only three did so, and as Nqwiliso, Jojo and Siyoyo had all enjoyed practical independence previously, their

109. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.89: Oxland to Blyth and Elliot, 15.7.78.
111. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.71: Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A., 11.6.78.
action did not weaken Umqikela at all. Frere and his advisers had underestimated the power and influence which attached to the chieftainship even when the Chief himself was an unpopular drunkard. Instead of smashing the resistance, they consolidated it. The Government now appeared to be in the wrong. Chiefs and councillors who might have been willing to accept the earlier terms could not brook this insult to their paramount, and the reception of Jojo rubbed salt into the wound, for it appeared to be a flagrant breach of Barkly's undertaking in 1874. Events were later to prove that the ill-feeling aroused far outweighed the advantage gained, and an act which could hardly have been justified by a balanced assessment of the facts was denied the justification of success.

When Frere wrote to Hicks Beach as if the only purpose of the deposition had been the very sensible one of recognising the actual independence of Nqwiliso and Jojo, he was really trying to save face.

112. Cape P.P.1880, A105, pp.87f: Enclosures in Elliot and Elyth to S.N.A., 21.8.78: Jojo and the Amaxesibe were accepted into direct relations with the Government on 8 July, and Siyoyo and the Amacwera on 5 August. In addition to these chiefs and Nqwiliso, a minor headman named William Nota who lived at the Rode was accepted on 22 July (See page 372f).

113. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Kilner, 20.8.78. See page 329.

114. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Frere to Hicks Beach 7.8.78.
Frere's blunder had aggravated the situation, but there might yet have been a satisfactory settlement had the Government been willing to negotiate and to explain. That this was not done was largely the fault of the local officials, as was shown by two events in the course of August. At the beginning of the month two junior officers were sent to warn Umqikela that the demands had not been abandoned, and in the course of discussion one of them told him that it would make no difference to his status if he did give up the river - he would still be no more than a minor chief. According to Mrs Jenkins this became "the great stumbling block" in the way of their acceding to the demand, and for once Oxland was inclined to agree with her. In his despatches, however, Frere said that if Umgikela submitted he would be recognised in all the power he actually possessed, and again, that he would be allowed to remain chief of the Lpondolo clans east of the Umzimvubu who were willing to recognise him. This was something less

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115. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A., 6.8.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 2.9.78.
116. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Mrs Jenkins to Oxland, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 9.10.78.
117. Ibid.
118. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Oxland to Frere, 11.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 9.10.78.
119. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Frere to Hicks Beach, 7.8.78.
than his nominal position before deposition, but it was certainly something more than a petty chief. It was, in fact, a paramountcy equivalent to that which he had actually exercised. Had the Government been ready to admit this and to make it clear that it did not intend to ignore his actual authority, Umgikela and his councillors might have grumbled at first, but would probably have been ready to accept the situation and to give up the river. After all, Frere had shown them that delay would not beget concessions. As it was, even those who were favourably inclined to the Government were heard to say, "Our chief is dead, and we must die with him".  

Not long afterwards there was an opportunity for some such explanation. Having realised that the Government was in earnest, the Amampondo offered a fine of one thousand cattle instead of the port. When this was refused, they asked for an officer to come and explain the full implications of the demand.  

Elyth and Elliot questioned their good faith, but thought they should meet

121. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Oxland to Frere, 11.9.78, encl. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 9.10.78.

122. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): W. Johnson (pro Umqikela) to Elliot and Blyth, 5.8.78, encl. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 2.9.78.

123. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.94: Josiah Jenkins (pro Umqikela) to Elliot and Elyth, 8.3.78.
Umqikela at Emfondisweni, if only to avoid the charge of impatience. Frere agreed, but prejudiced the chances of success by suggesting Oxland should be the envoy.

He was technically the proper person, for he had been appointed British resident, but in the eyes of the Amampondo he would not have the same standing as Blyth or Elliot. These gentlemen made failure even more likely by telling Oxland he was to meet the Chief only between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. on the day arranged. Considering their experience of native punctuality, this stipulation suggested that they were not really interested whether a meeting took place or not. Oxland completed the fiasco by a short-sighted and small-minded adherence to his instructions. In mid-afternoon of 17 August, Umqikela off-saddled a mile from the station to wait for two minor chiefs. When five o'clock had passed, and there was no prospect of his early arrival, Oxland set off for Kokstad with Colonel Wood, who had accompanied him.

125. P.P.1878-9 III (C2220): Minute by Frere 11.8.78 on Elliot and Blyth to S.N.A., 10.8.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 26.8.78—Printed in Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.128, as telegram to Blyth and Elliot, 12.8.78.
126. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.115: S.N.A. to Blyth and Elliot, 27.7.78.
127. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.129: Blyth and Elliot to Oxland, 15.8.78.
128. Cape P.P.1880, A105, pp.94f: Oxland to Elliot and Blyth, 18.8.78.
By so doing he satisfied himself that the dignity of the Government had been upheld, and destroyed what slender chance remained of his entering upon his work with the goodwill of the Amampondo.

Once Nqwiliso had proved co-operative and Umqikela had accepted a resident, Frere decided to make the best of a bad job and to occupy the Port whether Umqikela agreed or not. Blyth and Elliot insisted repeatedly that a force should march from Kokstad and take possession of the east bank, but they were overruled by General Thesiger, and on 30 August a company of infantry was landed on the other side. On 2 September Oxland arrived at the Great Place to take up his thankless task, and four days later Frere issued a magnificent proclamation confirming all that had been done.

The Colonial Office was presented with a fait accompli and accepted it without a murmur. Frere's policy was

129. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Minute by Frere, 11.8.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 26.8.78.
   P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Thesiger to Frere 2.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 2.9.78.
132. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Oxland to Frere, 4.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 9.10.78.
133. P.P.1878-9 LIII (C2252): Enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 26.12.78.
See Appendix B.
considered "politically wise". His acting without instructions was readily approved. It was clearly assumed that "protection" would lead before long to annexation, and the only anxiety on this score was that the interests of Natal should not suffer. Even this would cease to matter once confederation was established. If the Amampondo hoped that the Imperial Government would reverse Frere's policy, they hoped in vain.

Sir Bartle himself was well satisfied. By opening Port St. John's he had enhanced military security and commercial prosperity. By breaking up the Mpondo confederacy he had secured Chelmsford against a rising in his rear while he was engaged with the Amazulu. By sending Oxland to Pondoland he had made it possible for Umqikela to retrieve his past errors and to return to his position of friendly subordination. The remaining problems would solve themselves in time, and improvements in civilisation would follow this assertion of the principle that there was but one sovereign power in Kaffraria.

134. C.0.48/486: Minutes on Frere to Hicks Beach, No.215, 17.8.78 and No.221, 26.8.78.

135. Worsfold: op. cit., p.88: Frere to Hicks Beach 27.8.78.
P.P.1878—9 LII (C2220): Frere to Bulwer 18.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 21.9.78.
P.P.1878—9 LII (C2220): Frere to Hicks Beach 26.8.78.
366.

Had his forecast been correct, his high-handedness would have mattered but little. Unfortunately his confidence was based upon a mistaken estimate of the Mpondo character, and the immediate future was to show that his policy had done nothing but harm.
It was the fundamental weakness of Sir Bartle Frere's treatment of the Amampondo that it destroyed the possibility of friendly co-operation but did not substitute an effective form of government. The penalty was eight years of disorder. By the time Frere realised that Oxland's agency was ineffective, annexation was out of the question; and when a new High Commissioner and a new Ministry endeavoured to set matters right, the Amampondo had adopted an uncompromising attitude which made agreement impossible. The affairs of Pondoland were a sad commentary upon the bankruptcy of the policy of "mastery".

Oxland's position was impossible from the very beginning. His instructions were to insist that the past was beyond recall, but Umqikela and his council were unwilling to let bygones be bygones. They denied that they owed their existence as a tribe to the protection of the Government against the Amazulu; and they resented the seizure of Port St. John's. Their main complaint, however, was

1. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Frere to Oxland 9.9.78, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 9.10.78.
3. Ibid.
   P.P.1880 L (C2482): Minutes of meeting between Oxland and Amampondo 8.4.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 12.8.79.
the taking over of Jojo with his land. Umqikela was quite prepared for him to go under Government if he wished, but in that case he ought to have crossed the boundary laid down by Griffith and confirmed by Barkly. Xesibeland belonged to the Amampondo; they needed the land; and they intended to have it.

Their dissatisfaction was encouraged by European support. There was resentment in Natal because the Cape stood to gain, and it is possible that traders from that Colony counselled resistance. White Brothers held a mineral concession in Xesibeland and therefore had a special interest in reversing the policy. However, not all the opposition sprang from selfish motives. Wesleyan missionaries both in and out of Pondoland thought Frere's policy unjust, and the Natal Witness and Cape Argus agreed with them.

4. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Oxland to Frere 4.9.78 and Umqikela to Frere, no date, both enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 9.10.78.
8. C.O.417/29: Lease of Pondoland Copper Mines 1.5.77, enc. in Robinson to Knutsford, No.216, 26.3.89.
9. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Kilner 20.9.78; Natal Mercury, 2.11.78; P.P.1880 L (C2482): Frere to Wolseley 23.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 23.8.79.
10. Natal Witness, 1.10.78. etc. Cape Argus, 30.8.79.
They admitted that conditions under Umqikela were unsatisfactory, and were prepared for the Government to assume control of Pondoland, but insisted that this should be done "openly and avowedly for the good of the Pondos as a tribe, and not upon any specious pretence". The opposition was intensified by a belated attempt on the part of Frere to win Mrs Jenkins and her party for his policy. This had taken the form of a "Memorandum of dealings with Umqikela," which gave such a distorted account of past and present that its recipients were led to hope that Frere would reconsider his action when a more balanced view was presented to him. Oxland made no effort to understand the philanthropic motives of his opponents. He regarded them simply as "interested or misguided Europeans" and his opinion was shared by the colonists in general and by Frere himself. Protests were unavailing.

   cf. MMS: Douglas to Kilner 13.1.81.
12. P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): enclosure in Frere to Hicks Beach, 7.8.78.
13. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Kilner, 20.9.78.
   P.P.1878-9 LII (C2220): Henry J. White to Sir B. Frere, no date, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 9.10.78.
   cf. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Do. to do., 9.4.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
15. eg. Natal Mercury, 11.9.78.
16. P.P. 1880 L (C2505): Frere to Wolseley 31.10.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 1.11.79.
By November it was clear to the Amampondo and their friends that they had nothing to expect from Oxland, and Umqikela asked for "two great men" to be sent to settle outstanding questions. The Government was not unwilling, but it is doubtful if such a meeting would have served any purpose. The Amampondo wanted to debate the deposition, the seizure of St. John's and the taking over of the Amaxesibe. In agreeing to negotiate, however, the Government was not receding from the view that the past was a closed book. The discussion was to be limited to matters then at issue, and Oxland impressed upon Umqikela that these were merely the questions of a road from Kokstad to St. John's and of compensation for any land that might be required on the eastern bank of the Umzimvubu. As it was, the Zulu war diverted Frere's attention and joined with Morosi's rebellion to disorganise the Cape administration, and for several months nothing further was done.

19. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A., 9.4.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
21. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A. 9.4.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.

See page 351.
Events on the Xesibe border did not wait upon the convenience of Sir Bartle and the Colonial authorities. The reception of the Amaxesibe involved the Cape in a long-standing and bitter feud which its interference served only to intensify. Along the border the gardens and kraals overlapped each other in hopeless confusion and it needed but little to precipitate a quarrel. The interests of good government demanded that the boundary should be defined and defended. In fact nothing more was done than to appoint a magistrate named Read who was supported by a few policemen. Oxland and Read pressed for a definite boundary, but the Government preferred to keep the matter quiet until the outlook in Zululand was brighter. Meanwhile Read was powerless to prevent thefts and scuffles and Oxland was unable to enforce restitution. All that could be done was to allow the Amaxesibe to defend themselves, and to punish them when they committed reprisals or were guilty of aggression.

25. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.182: S.N.A. to Brownlee, 5.3.79.
26. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Brownlee to S.N.A., 14.7.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
28. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Brownlee to S.N.A., 14.7.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
Read did his best, but it is doubtful whether he met with the complete success that was claimed for him.\textsuperscript{29}

At any rate, the Amampondo complained that they were goaded by Xesibe thefts,\textsuperscript{30} and it would be impossible and unprofitable to try and apportion blame between the two parties.

The situation was complicated by the position of William Nota, a Fingo headman in the Rode Valley. Nota had settled as a subject of Adam Kok, but after the 1872 Commission had defined the boundary, he had paid cattle to Umqikela.\textsuperscript{31} He had remained on friendly terms with the Amampondo until he responded to the invitation of Blyth and Elliot and asked for direct relations with the Government.\textsuperscript{32} Almost immediately he began to lose cattle.\textsuperscript{33} Instead of protecting him, the Government decided in January 1879 that his right to the Rode was not clear enough and that he should once again submit to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item P.P.1880 L (C2482): Brownlee to S.N.A., 10.8.79., enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 18.10.79.
  \item P.P.1880 L (C2482): Strachan to Brownlee 9.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 12.10.79.
  \item Cape P.P.1880, A105, pp.273f: J.R. Cameron to Oxland, 19.8.79; pp.30244: Oxland to S.N.A., 4.11.79.
  \item Cape P.P.1880, A105, pp.87-107: Blyth and Elliot to S.N.A., 21.8.78, and enclosures.
  \item Ibid.
  \item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Umqikela. This inconsistency was bad enough, but to make matters worse the decision was communicated to Oxland, but not to the Chief Magistrate at Kokstad. As a result Nota continued to regard himself as a British subject and ignored Mpondo orders to move. In the course of May there were disturbances, after which Oxland himself visited Nota and explained the position. At the beginning of July Umqikela asked Oxland to help his representatives settle matters, but on advice from Kokstad the Government would not allow him to do so. The refusal was looked upon by the Amampondo as evidence of bad faith and the abandonment of Nota had the more important effect of encouraging demands for the return of Xesibeland.

These disturbances aroused the anger of Charles Brownlee who had replaced Captain Blyth as Chief Magistrate

34. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A., 28.6.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
35. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Minutes of Meeting between Chief Magistrate and Xesibes 1.5.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
36. Ibid.
37. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A., 28.6.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
40. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A. 28.6.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
of Griqualand East at the end of 1878. On his appointment he had hoped for a good understanding with the Amampondo, but the experience of six months convinced him that it was folly to expect a peaceful settlement.

"All our past dealings with the natives show that we cannot expect this," he told William Ayliff, "When the spirit of opposition exists to any extent it cannot be eradicated but by force".

When the Amaxesibe were attacked in force on 2 and 3 August 1879, his inclination was to move into Pondoland without further delay. Oxland agreed with him and informed the Secretary for Native Affairs

"that it would be the most politic, economic and merciful course to at once move a force into Pondoland and take possession of the country."

The officials on the spot had pronounced the failure of "subordinate co-operation" but Sprigg was unwilling to take the bull by the horns and to invade. There was every possible reason for avoiding a Mpondo war. The

42. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Private letter of Brownlee, 28.7.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.
43. Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.211: Brownlee to Ayliff, 27.7.79.
44. P.P. 1880 L (C2482): Brownlee to Oxland 5.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 18.10.79.
temper of the House of Assembly was against it; Zululand was still unsettled; Morosi remained defiant; and the Ministry was about to embark upon Basuto disarmament. Sprigg believed that annexation would be in the interests of the Colony and of the Amampondo themselves, but the time was not ripe. Brownlee and Oxland were told to work for a peaceful settlement.

Had Frere been the master of South Africa he would probably have sent in Imperial troops and taken control. But he had been superseded as High Commissioner for South East Africa by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and when he asked him to keep on hand means for effective action, Wolseley replied that "without instructions from home he strongly objected to the use of Her Majesty's forces in frontier tribal disputes". Frere retorted that the disturbance

46. Cape Argus, 14.8.79;
47. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Statement in House by Colonial Secretary, 4.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 5.8.79.
49. Ibid.
50. Cape Argus, 14.8.79.
51. P.P.1880 L (C2482): S.N.A. to Oxland 9.8.79; Brownlee to Umhlangasolo 11.8.79. Both enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 11.8.79.
53. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Frere to Hicks Beach 23.8.79.
was a branch of the Zulu war, but Wolseley would do no more than send a detachment to Harding and leave a company at Port St. John's. He thought that Frere was exaggerating the gravity of the situation and he was right. Sir Bartle had no alternative but to appeal to the Secretary of State saying he could not be responsible for anything in Pondoland unless he was sure of compliance with any request for support. On 1 November he argued that Pondoland should be brought under the legal protection of the Colony along with other areas of Kaffraria which were as yet unannexed.

Frere must surely have known that his arguments would fall on deaf ears, for he had already received Hicks Beach's despatch of 12 June 1879 which stated bluntly that Great Britain could no longer "be expected to undertake the responsibility of... future government and defence". After Isandhlwana British policy had set out upon the path to abandonment and non-intervention. The Zulu
war, the voracious Transvaal and the rising in Griqualand West were exhausting the resources of the Imperial Chest and the patience of the Treasury. The expense of subduing Umqikela might be small, but anything was too much for Hicks Beach at this juncture. If the Cape had accepted Jojo's submission, it was their affair, and they could deal with it. With regard to Pondoland he was even more emphatic. As he saw it

"all our rights and responsibilities... consist of the St. John's River Settlement, the protection of certain small tribes who have been permitted to withdraw themselves from Umqikela's supremacy and come under ours, and a sort of vague power over Umqikela and those subject to him which is a matter for diplomacy rather than for government. I do not see why we should seek, in that case, to extend these rights which are of no advantage to us. On the contrary, I would, in spite of the obvious objections to such a course, recede from the position we have assumed in Pondoland rather than look to Imperial troops to do what Sir G. Wolseley describes as, and Sir B. Frere admits to be, "police work" in order to maintain it."

He did not rule out the possibility of a change but made it clear that it would have to be at the expense of the Cape.

The crisis of August 1879 soon passed. The day after he had recommended force, Oxland visited the Chief and found

62. C.0.48/490: Minutes by Hicks Beach 6.10.79, on Frere to Hicks Beach, No.252, 23.8.79.
63. C.0.48/491: Minute by Hicks Beach 9.12.79 on Frere to Hicks Beach, No.333, 1.11.79.
he was not so bellicose after all. The affair had only involved the border clans, and Umqikela denied complicity and promised to return the stolen stock. This was done, albeit slowly, and closer investigation led Oxland to conclude that the Amampondo had not been entirely to blame for the outbreak. In December he was given permission to help at the Rode, and when Nota submitted to Umqikela, he felt that confidence in the Government was returning.

The calm was deceptive, for nothing had been done to remove the real causes of tension. This was not altogether the fault of the Government. The trouble in August led to action on the question of two great men. As in 1878, it proved impossible for Frere to send his private secretary, and Wolseley was asked if he could spare an officer. When he refused, the Ministers decided to

64. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A., 10.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 18.10.79.
65. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Kilner, 3.10.79.
66. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A., 10.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 18.10.79.
68. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A. 17.9.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 14.10.79.
70. P.P.1880 L (C2482): Frere to Wolseley 23.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 23.8.79.
appoint a commission,\(^{71}\) and the names of Oxland, Strachan and the Rev. Owen Watkins were put forward.\(^ {72}\) Umqikela had reiterated his request several times\(^ {73}\) but when he heard of this latest development his enthusiasm vanished.\(^ {74}\) He wanted men from Cape Town who had not hitherto been involved in Mpondoland affairs and could be expected to make an impartial enquiry. In February 1880, therefore, he asked for the appointment of the Commission to be countermanded as he could now settle matters with Oxland.\(^ {75}\) The Government agreed, and Oxland was told that his only task would be to agree with Umqikela about the Xesibe boundary after which Xesibelaland would be declared British territory.\(^ {76}\) Umqikela would not agree and asked for a "road" to appeal to the Queen,\(^ {77}\) for recent political changes in England had given hope of better things. The Government thought it better for him to see the High Commissioner first,\(^ {78}\) and as Frere had been recalled by this time, the Amampondo agreed.\(^ {79}\)

\(^{71}\) P.P.1880 L (C2482): Ministerial Minute 23.9.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 14.10.79.

\(^{72}\) Cape Argus, 7.10.79.

\(^{73}\) P.P.1880 L (C2482): Oxland to S.N.A. 10.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 18.10.79; Oxland to S.N.A., 23.8.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach 29.9.79.

\(^{74}\) Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.302: Oxland to S.N.A., 5.11.79.

\(^{75}\) Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.339: Oxland to S.N.A., 20.2.80.

\(^{76}\) Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.341: Under-S.K.A. to Oxland 13.3.80.

\(^{77}\) Cape P.P.1880, A105, p.371-4: Oxland to S.N.A., 31.5.80.

\(^{78}\) Cape P.P.1880, A005, p.387: Memo by W. Ayliff, 7.7.80.

\(^{79}\) C.O.48/499: Oxland to S.N.A., 18.2.81, enc. in Robinson to Kimberley, No.77, 23.2.81.
This new arrangement meant further delay while Umqikela collected funds and once again delay meant trouble. Although Nota had made peace, there were some Amazesibe at the Rode who would neither recognise Umqikela, nor move, although the Government ordered them to do so. This led to disturbances in October and November. There were frequent complaints of Mpondo encroachment upon Xesibe kraals and gardens in the Dambeni Valley which had been the main trouble spot in August. Here too there were scuffles in September and October issuing in more serious clashes in December and January. By this time Basutoland and much of Kafiristan was in rebellion and it was only too easy for the affair to be magnified into an intended invasion of Griqualand East. Brownlee had chafed at the failure to enforce satisfaction on the previous occasion, and indicated that he thought force was necessary now.

80. C.O.48/499: Oxland to S.N.A. 15.3.81, enc. in Robinson to Kimberley, No.132, 25.3.81.
84. Ibid.
86. Theal, Since 1795, V, 192-9.
His plea had even less hope of success than in 1879. The Cape Government was in difficulty enough without fighting the Amampondo, and the Imperial Government definitely favoured conciliation. The General Election in April 1880 had brought the Liberals to power and Kimberley to the Colonial Office. Henceforward Imperial policy was set even more firmly against expansion. Kimberley grudgingly allowed Sprigg to annexe the Transkeian Territories, but told Frere that only paramount necessity would dictate any further extension of direct rule, and that this did not exist in Pondoland. Later in the year Frere was recalled, and in his instructions to Sir Hercules Robinson, Kimberley was quite unequivocal:

"Her Majesty's Government have no desire to exercise any more direct influence over the Pondos than is provided for by the engagements already entered into by the Chiefs, and I have to instruct you to discountenance any movement tending to increase British responsibilities in that quarter. The recent occupation of the entrance of the St. John's River may perhaps have caused an apprehension on the part of the Chiefs that it would be followed by the annexation of the whole of their territory; and you will do well to take any opportunity which may present itself to quiet their minds on this point, and to assure them that, as long as they remain friendly, they will be left undisturbed by the British Government".

90. P.P.1880 LI (C2586): Kimberley to Frere, 18.5.80.
When the Colonial Office heard of Brownlee's views, Robinson was told by telegraph to authorise no offensive action in Pondoland without instructions from the Imperial Government.  

A satisfactory settlement seemed even more likely when the Sprigg Ministry resigned in May 1881. Scanlen and his colleagues were sympathetic. When he visited the Transkei at the end of the year, Sauer, the Secretary for Native Affairs, concluded that the policy of past years could not be justified. There could be no question of returning Port St. John's which Robinson now ruled under a sign manual commission pending annexation to the Cape.

93. C.O.48/500: Kimberley to Robinson, Tel. 24.1.81 (Draft on Strahan to Kimberley, No.151, 18.12.80.)


96. Until August 1881 the Cape exercised authority at Port St. John's by virtue of Frere's Proclamation of 4 September 1878 and another of 23 September 1878 which declared it a free port, under the regulations current at Cape ports. On 13 July 1881 White Brothers warned the Collector of Customs that they were entitled to import goods without duty, and on the 14th they took possession of goods consigned on the "Sir Evelyn Wood". The Cape Government took legal opinion and was told that White Brothers were acting within their rights as Port St. John's had never been legally annexed to the Cape. Robinson, then in Pretoria, was informed and cabled Kimberley on 24 July. Kimberley replied on the 29th that a sign manual commission had been sent out pending the issue of letters patent, and on 2 August Robinson issued a proclamation as governor of St. John's appointing officers and levying Cape duties. Letters Patent were issued on 10 October 1881. (Continued.)
but Sauer thought a money payment might be accepted. He also recommended that Umqikela should be recognised as paramount, and that Xesibelaneland should be handed back to the Amampondo and Jojo's people resettled in Mhlonhlo's district. His colleagues did not entirely agree with him. They admitted that Umqikela had been wronged, but also felt an obligation towards Jojo, and decided "that on grounds both of honour and policy, it (was) now impossible to retreat from the unfortunate position entered upon by their predecessors with the full knowledge and consent of Her Majesty's Government". Sauer was told to visit Umqikela, and authorised to promise a reasonable amount of compensation. When he met the Amampondo on 8 December, Sauer did not divulge these proposals, but listened to their complaints and assured them that the Government was "sincerely desirous... of redressing as far as possible, whatever grievances could be fairly

96 (Contd). (P.P.1882 XLVII (G3112): Smyth to Kimberley, No's 23 and 24, 26.7.81; Robinson to Kimberley, Tel., 24.7.81; Kimberley to Robinson, 29.7.81; Smyth to Kimberley, 16.8.81; Kimberley to Robinson, 20.10.81).
97. P.P.1882 XLVII (C3112): S.N.A. to Premier 28.11.81, enc. in Robinson to Kimberley, 5.12.81.
98. Ibid.
100. P.P.1882 XLVII (C3112): Minute of Ministers (B) 3.12.81, enc. in Robinson to Kimberley, 5.12.81.
established by him (Umqikela), consistent with present circumstances". 101

Unfortunately this conciliatory approach met with a sullen response. The Amampondo were not convinced that the leopard could change his spots, and their leaders had resolved to have no dealings with the Cape Government as long as troops remained in Xesibeland and at the Port. 102 Their attitude was due in large measure to European influence. Mrs Jenkins had died in August 1830 103 and in the first half of 1831 both Wesleyan missionaries had left the country. 104 This had removed an influence which had been consistently in favour of peace, even if it had not been very powerful. Since then the Whites had set an example of defiance by refusing to pay customs duties at St. John's, 105 and Umhlangaso, who was virtually the ruler of Pondoland, had found an ally and adviser in a European of doubtful character. A proclamation dated

101. P.P.1884 LVI (C3855): Notes of Interview between S.N.A. and Umqikela, 8.12.81, enc. in Smyth to Derby, 2.7.33.
102. Anti-Slavery: C153/78: Welborne to Oxland, 8.11.81; Welborne to Robinson, 28.12.81.
103. MMS (KB): Mrs Bowles to Mrs Kilner, 27.8.80.
104. MMS: J.R.Cameron to Kilner, 12.2.81; Douglas to Kilner, 12.5.81.
See page 402.
105. See footnote no.96.
10 August 1881 had announced the appointment of Henry Wellesley Welborne as Diplomatic Agent and Secretary in Pondoland. Welborne had served as a commissariat officer on the northern border until he was dismissed for neglect of duty in February 1879. Since then he had been involved in shady dealings at Kingwilliamstown for which he was later arrested, and during his residence in Pondoland charges of embezzlement and fraud were brought against him in the Colonial courts. His diplomatic career was short and sweet. He made himself unpopular with black and white alike, and a year after his appointment was hounded from the country. It is difficult to attribute any other motive to him than that of gain, for he was promised a salary of £90 a month, and tried to claim damages of over £1,000 after his dismissal.

Welborne launched the Amampondo on a course which cost them the sympathy of the authorities and gained nothing in return. His policy was to ignore the Colonial Government and to appeal directly to the High Commissioner and

106. P.P.1884 LVI (C3855): Enc. in Smyth to Derby, 9.7.83.
108. Anti-Slavery: G10 - Kokstad Advertiser, 2.6.83; C149/169: Welborne to Chesson, 23.70.83; C126/67: Bouverie to Chesson, 13.11.83.
109. C.0.48/507: Oxland to Under-S.N.A., 28.8.82, enc. in Smyth to Derby, (conf.) 16.7.83.
the Imperial Government. The attempt was futile. Robinson merely referred his letters to the Ministers, and a communication to the Colonial Office received a simple acknowledgment. After his flight Welborne went to England and again adopted the role of Mpondo champion. He got in touch with Frederick Chesson of the Aborigines' Protection Society, wrote to "The Times", inspired a question in the Commons, and sent a memorandum to Lord Derby outlining his proposals for a settlement. After Alderman Fowler's question, Derby suggested that Robinson might mediate between the Amampondo and the Amaxesibe, but otherwise Welborne's efforts were fruitless. The Colonial Office told him that any representations by Umqikela through the High Commissioner would be carefully considered, but that Lord Derby could

111. P.P.1884 LVI (C3855): Smyth to Derby, 2.7.83.
112. P.P.1882 XLVII (C3112): Kimberley to Robinson, 14.1.82.
114. The Times, 1.3.83.
115. P.P.1883 XLIX (C3717): Derby to Robinson 15.3.83.
   cf. Anti-Slavery: G134/118 - Fowler to Chesson 15.3.83.
117. P.P.1883 XLIX (C3717): Derby to Robinson, 15.3.83.
make "no promise of meeting his wishes in any particular or of altering his relations to the British authorities in South Africa." 118

The Colonial Ministry did not resent an approach to the Imperial Government. Their attitude towards the Mpondo question was of a piece with that which led to the disannexation of Basutoland and considered handing over all the native territories to the Imperial Government. 119 They did not deny that the actions of 1878 had been ratified by their predecessors, but stressed the fact that they had been carried out at the instance of Her Majesty's representative and had been expressly approved by Her Majesty's Government. 120 They would gladly have allowed Downing Street to find a solution and only acted of necessity themselves.

Sauer's interview with Umqikela convinced him that the Amampondo would not accept compensation for the Xesibe

118. P.P.1883 XLIX (C3717): Colonial Office to Welborne, 26.4.83.
120. P.P.1882 XLVII (C3112): Minute of Ministers, 3.12.81, enc. in Robinson to Kimberley, 5.12.81; P.P.1883 XLIX (C3717): Minute of Ministers 10.4.83, enc. in Robinson to Derby, 16.4.83.
country and on Robinson's advice Jojo was offered a new location. He declined to move, and as the Ministers did not want to coerce him, they had no alternative but to protect him where he was. Nothing definite was done for over a year, for the Ministers were occupied with Basutoland and probably hoped that the Mpondo delegation would visit Cape Town and England. But friction continued, and in April 1883 they gave way reluctantly to the pleas of Oxland and the Acting Chief Magistrate and decided to fix a boundary. Umqikela was invited to send a representative to accompany the Commission entrusted with this task, and was reminded that the Government would consider any reasonable claim for compensation. The invitation was ignored, and the Commission worked alone endeavouring to disturb the Amampondo as little as possible.

122. P.P.1882 XLVII (C3112): Minute by Robinson, 3.12.81, enc. in Robinson to Kimberley, 5.12.81.
123. P.P.1884 LVI (C3855): Minute of Ministers 14.11.83, enc. in Smyth to Derby, 14.11.83.
124. P.P.1883 XLIX (C3717): Enclosures in Robinson to Derby 26.2.83.
125. P.P.1883 XLIX (C3717): Ibid.
126. P.P.1883 XLIX (C3717): Oxland to S.N.A. 27.2.83, enc. in Robinson to Derby 2.4.83; Under-S.N.A. to Oxland 6.4.83, enc. in Robinson to Derby 9.4.83.
This decision is easily understood. Sauer had observed that to do justice to one party necessarily meant the reverse to the other, and it was reasonable for the Cape to favour the Amaxesibe who had never given them any trouble rather than the Amampondo who had long been a nuisance. Nevertheless it would have been more prudent to have moved the Amaxesibe. This would have remedied the main Mpondo grievance and removed a source of constant irritation. Firmness did neither, and the situation drifted from bad to worse.

The idea of a direct appeal to the Imperial Government had fallen into the background after the flight of Welborne. It was revived by this "last act of spoilation" which thoroughly aroused the tribe. Umhlangaso was now encouraged and assisted by E. Hamilton MacNicholas who had succeeded Welborne, and by a trader named Bouverie. A meeting at the Great Place decided to send a deputation to England and the people were called

128. P.P.1882 XLVII (C3112): S.N.A. to Premier 28.11.81, enc. in Robinson to Kimberley, 5.12.81.
129. SMS: Hargreaves to Kilner 20.6.83.
130. P.P.1884 LVII (C3855): Umqikela to Aborigines' Protection Society 1.8.83, enc. in Aborigines' Protection Society to Colonial Office 29.9.83. (Original in Anti-Slavery: C149(T)/103).
upon for cattle to meet the expense. Disease and depression combined with apathy to make the collection a difficult task, and in August 1883 the Aborigines' Protection Society was asked for a loan. While promising assistance if they came, the Society refused financial help and advised them to leave the case in its hands so far as England was concerned. Meanwhile Derby had been asked to receive a deputation and had replied that Umqikela should approach him through the High Commissioner. When this became known, MacNicholas wrote once more to Chesson asking if the matter could be raised in the House of Commons. The Society did suggest to the Colonial Office that Umqikela was entitled to more consideration than he appeared to have received.

HD: 23.10.83.

132. P.P.1884 LVI (C3855): Umqikela to Aborigines' Protection Society 1.6.83, enc. in Aborigines' Protection Society to Colonial Office 29.9.83.
C.O.806/239: Oxland to Under-S.N.A. 28.1.84, enc. in Smyth to Derby, No.39, 5.2.84.


134. P.P.1884-5 LVI (C4590): A.P.S. to Colonial Office 28.4.84.

135. P.P.1884 LVI (C3855): Umqikela to Derby, 27.10.83.

136. P.P.1884 LVI (C3855): Derby to Officer Administering the Govt., Cape, 29.11.83.

137. P.P.1884-5 LVI (C4590): MacNicholas to A.P.S., 7.2.84. (Original in Anti-Slavery: C141/301).

138. P.P.1884-5 LVI (C4590): A.P.S. to Colonial Office, 28.4.84.
but did no more as it had emerged that Bouvierie was modifying his views and beginning to think that annexation might be a good thing after all. 139

In May 1884 the Scanlen Ministry gave way to a coalition of Upington, Hofmeyr and Sprigg. It was defeated on a minor matter connected with the phylloxera, but, as Rhodes remarked, it retired on a bug whose "nasty legs covered the whole of the Transkeian map". 140 The new administration stood for a forward policy in this area and lost no time in annexing Port St. John's to the Colony, along with Tembuland, Gcalekaland and Bomvanaland. 141 Neither this nor their failure to obtain a hearing in London persuaded Umhlangaso and MacNicholas to give up the struggle for Xesibeland and the Port. Diplomacy now began to give way to defiance. On 9 August 1884 Umhlangaso asked Robinson for a Royal Commission to negotiate a fresh treaty on the novel ground that the old one had not mentioned Faku's successors and had virtually ceased to exist on his death. 142 He also forwarded a

139. Anti-Slavery: C126/72: F.W.P. Bouvierie to Chesson, 27.2.84.
   HD: 30.1.84.
140. Walker: op. cit., p.400.
141. Anti-Slavery: C141/303: MacNicholas to Chesson 16.8.84.
142. P.P.1884-5 LVI (C4590): Umhlangaso to Robinson 9.8.84,
   enc. in Robinson to Derby 17.9.84.
proclamation which stated that, as from 15 October, and pending an enquiry into Pondo grievances, there would be a duty of £50 on every vehicle crossing the boundary between Pondoland and the Cape or Port St. John's, and of £10 on every other form of carrier. A much lighter duty would be imposed on traffic from Natal. On 4 October another proclamation declared the mouth of the Umlambo Umkulu to be a free port known as Port Grosvenor. Prior to this there had been reports of a plan to import arms from Germany.

Coming at a time when Germany had declared a protectorate at Angra Pequena and when the activities of Schiel in Zululand were arousing suspicion, these developments attracted the attention of the Colonial Office. It was suggested in London that the British

143. P.P.1884–5 LVI (C4590): Umhlangaso to Robinson 9.8.84, enc. in Robinson to Derby, 17.9.84.
144. Ibid.
145. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Umhlangaso to Bulwer 4.10.84, enc. in Bulwer to Stanley, 26.9.85.
146. C.0.806/239: Oxland to Under-S.N.A. 27.11.83, enc. in Smyth to Derby, No.350, 3.12.83. P.P.1884–5 LVI (C4590): Oxland to Under-S.N.A., 29.3.84, enc. in Robinson to Derby 15.4.84.
149. C.0.806/239: Derby to Robinson 2.1.84.

Do. to do. (conf.) 31.12.84.
protectorate over all Pondoland, which had been claimed in Sir Bartle Frere's proclamation, should be renewed in explicit terms. On 31 December Derby cabled Robinson to this effect and added that "if the Cape Government was prepared to undertake the control of the territory, Her Majesty would probably consent to this." Robinson's Ministers agreed that this was desirable, and on 5 January he replied that

"in the event of Her Majesty's Government establishing immediately protectorate as suggested in your telegram, they (would) submit proposals to Parliament at its meeting for relieving Her Majesty's Government of control over protectorate by annexation of territory to Cape".

Shortly after this had been sent, Robinson received another telegram which had been despatched on the 3rd, and told him to announce that Her Majesty's Government exercised a protectorate over the whole coast of Pondoland. This was done in a Government Gazette issued the same day.

150. C.O.806/239: Derby to Robinson (conf.) 31.12.84.
151. C.O.806/239: Robinson to Derby, tel., 5.1.85.
152. P.P.1884-5 LVI (C4590): Derby to Robinson, tel., 3.1.85. A letter from the Foreign Office on 2.1.85 (C.O.417/8) passed on a rumour that the German Government intended to hoist the flag on the East coast. This may explain the telegram of 3.1.85 in part, but the minutes do not suggest that it was the chief cause.
A paper protectorate did not deter Umhlangaso and MacNicholas and they went ahead with their plans for Port Grosvenor. Captain Sydney Turner was given the sole right to land and ship cargo on the Mpondo coast, and after an unsuccessful attempt in April he brought goods ashore on 13 May. There was another spate of reports that Umhlangaso was negotiating for arms from Europe, and on 17 June news reached Cape Town that Umqikela's councillors were meeting German representatives. The German Consul at Cape Town denied that they had anything to do with him, but official anxiety mounted on 4 July when a proclamation appeared in the Natal Mercury and the Kokstad Advertiser in which Umqikela denied and refused to recognise the right of the Government to assume a protectorate over his coasts, and said he was prepared

154. C.0.417/117: Power of Attorney 2.3.85, enc. in Cameron to Ripon, No.239, 21.4.94.
155. P.P.1884-5 LVI (C4590): Resident Magistrate, St. John's to Under-S.N.A., 13.4.85, enc. in Robinson to Derby 6.5.85; Officer in Charge, St. John's, to Collector of Customs, Cape Town, 11.5.85, enc. in Robinson to Derby 10.6.85.
156. P.P.1884-5 LVI (C4590): Resident Magistrate, St. John's to Under-S.N.A. 13.4.85, enc. in Robinson to Derby 6.5.85; Officer in Charge, St. John's to Collector of Customs, Cape Town, 11.5.85, enc. in Robinson to Derby 10.6.85.
St.P Diary: 12.4.85.
C.0.806/239: Robinson to Derby, tel., 17.6.85.
158. C.0.806/239: German Consul General to High Commissioner 30.6.85, enc. in Robinson to Derby, No.245, 8.7.85.
to negotiate with any nation aiming to open ports and to advance commerce. 159

This was not all. The Lieutenant Governor of Natal was finding the Amampondo awkward on extradition questions, 160 and his Legislative Council were afraid that the opening of Port Grosvenor would lead to smuggling across the Natal border. 161 Along the Xesibe boundary 162 and in the Rode 163 there were spasmodic outbreaks of violence. Commissioners had met the Amampondo on more than one occasion 164 but Umqikela was powerless to stop the trouble even if he wished to do so. 165

161. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Bulwer to Robinson, 30.7.85, enc. in Robinson to Stanley, 9.9.85.
164. HD: 10.10.84, 28.11.84 - 2.12.84. St.P Diary: 27.11.84 - 6.12.84.
Something had to be done - what, was not quite clear.

In the first six months of 1885 the Cape Ministers did not attempt to carry out their undertaking, partly because the protectorate had not been declared in the terms they had approved, but principally because they hoped the Imperial Government would establish order before they took over. When Umqikela repudiated the protectorate, they suggested that an Imperial officer be sent to secure his assent to annexation. Robinson knew he would not submit voluntarily and advised against this. Even if the Chief’s behaviour warranted the use of force, he did not think the Imperial Government should take the initiative lest Pondoland should prove to be another Bechuanaland and it should find itself embroiled in a war without assistance. The Foreign Office had already informed Berlin of the protectorate, in time to forestall a request for German intervention. Further than that the Imperial Government would not go, and,

166. C.O.806/239: Robinson to Derby, tel., 8.7.85.
167. C.O.806/260: Minute of Ministers 31.8.85, enc. in Robinson to Stanley, 2.9.85.
168. C.O.806/260: Minute of Ministers 7.7.85, enc. in Robinson to Secretary of State, No.261, 15.7.85. cf. Stanford MS Reminiscences, p.422.
169. C.O.806/260: Minute of Ministers 7.7.85, enc. in Robinson to Secretary of State, No.261, 15.7.85.
170. C.O.806/239: Robinson to Derby, tel., 8.7.85.
continued Mr Stanley who was now Colonial Secretary,

"It will of course be understood that Her Majesty's Government could not authorise any measures for compelling the Pondos by force to submit to the annexation of their country to the Cape."172

In other words the present unsatisfactory situation was to continue unchanged.

Some time before this despatch had been written a ray of hope had pierced the gloom. Donald Strachan, whose business interests in Griqualand East made him particularly anxious for a settlement,173 visited Pondoland and obtained the assent of Umqikela and Umhlangaso to a meeting with the Cape Government.174 He wrote to Upington who agreed to meet a deputation.175 Observers in Griqualand East and Pondoland were hopeful,176 but they were doomed to disappointment. The deputation met Robinson and the Secretary for Native Affairs on 27 October 1885. Robinson would not re-open the questions of Xesibeland and St. John's; Umhlangaso would not accept

173. Cape Argus 27.10.85.
St.P: Diary: 1.1.86.
174. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Strachan to Upington 5.7.85, enc. in Robinson to Stanley 19.8.85.
175. Ibid.
P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Upington to Strachan 15.7.85, enc. in Robinson to Stanley, 19.8.85.
176. St.P Diary: 5.10.85, 6.10.85.
HD: 26.10.85.
his refusal; and the talks broke down. The stalemate was unbroken, and the outlook was far bleaker than ever before.

The relations of the Amampondo and the Cape between 1873 and 1885 could hardly have been less satisfactory. The initial responsibility was Frere's, for he had at once gone too far and not far enough. He had destroyed a moribund alliance, but had not put the Amampondo in a position where "resentment would be vain and retaliation impossible". The attempt to provide an effective means of communication between the Government and the tribe was a miserable failure, and Oxland's resignation when it came was long overdue. After Frere's departure, however, the Cape Government and the High Commissioner were more reasonable, and the Amampondo were primarily to blame for the continued unsettlement. Umhlangasö was a patriot, and something of a hero, but he jeopardised his own cause by refusing to come to terms and by following the lead of Welborne and MacNicholas. His

177. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Notes of Interview with the Mpondo Deputation, 27.10.85, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.
people had been hardly used, but their misfortune had not been altogether unmerited. It would have been wiser to have compromised and established a more cordial relationship with the Cape. Unless Umhlangaso learned this lesson there was a real danger that the editor of the Cape Argus would be proved correct when he observed pessimistically that Mpondo questions were "we fear, insoluble, except by the war that will come some day". 180

180. Cape Argus, 13.11.85.
CHAPTER XIV

SETTLEMENT

The Mpondo question was not solved by war, and at the end of 1886 the thorny problems of St. John's and the Xesibe country had been laid to rest. The credit for this settlement is shared by Walter Stanford, who became Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East in March 1885,¹ and the Rev. Peter Hargreaves who was the only successor of Thomas Jenkins even to approach his unique position in the regard of the authorities and of the tribe.

Hargreaves came to South Africa in 1857² and spent the first twenty-four years of his ministry at Clarkebury.³ During this unusually long term he began an Industrial School for Boys⁴ and acquired an influence over the Tembu Paramount Nqangelizwe who spent a short time in his home as a child.⁵ His intervention with Kreli prevented the spread of the Tembu-Gcaleka War in 1872,⁶ and when Tembu-land was taken over by the Government in 1875, it was he who drew up the terms of cession.⁷ He was transferred

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to Pondoland at the instance of the Rev. John Kilner, a General Secretary of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, who visited the country in July 1880. Kilner was aghast at what he saw and left with the conviction that the time had come for a forward move with the emphasis on education. He realised that this would benefit not only the Mission but the whole community. Writing to Dr. Osborn, his fellow secretary, he observed

"A few hundreds of pounds for a period of years would do much to give peace and prosperity to Pondoland - yea as a whole! For our missions may vitally affect the political situation."

Through no fault of his own it was two years before Kilner's recommendations were put into practice. His thoughts had immediately turned to a choice between Hargreaves or W.S. Davis, who had started an Institution at Shawbury, but neither of them was available at the time. A senior man from the Natal District was appointed to Emfundisweni but in the unsettlement of late 1880 it was decided that he should not leave the Colony.

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8. MMS: (K.B.) Kilner to Mason 31.7.80.
9. Ibid.
10. MMS (KB): Kilner to Osborn, 5.8.80.
11. MMS (KB): Kilner to Osborn, 9.8.80.
12. MMS (KB): Kilner to Chubb, 13.9.80.
13. MMS (KB): Kilner to Chubb, 13.9.80.
14. MMS: Mason to Kilner, 25.4.81.
Unfortunately this decision was taken too late to prevent the removal of J.R. Cameron, and when Douglas left Palmerton in the middle of 1881 to get married the Amampondo were left without a resident Wesleyan missionary for the first time in nearly fifty years. Thomas Kirkby tried to supervise the work from Kokstad but his efforts were frustrated by the influence of Welborne, whose rise to power at this particular juncture was not altogether accidental. In February 1882 Kirkby complained to Kilner,

"Politically the country is in the hands of a few needy adventurers, who have gained during the last few months such influence over the chief, that they lead him at their will. These men have gained the ear of almost every petty chief in the land and try to influence the people against missions and mission work to serve their own ends, and those among the chiefs whom it was hoped would steer the vessel clear of the rocks are trusting to these false lights which are luring the country to ruin, whilst outside there are hundreds eagerly watching ready to pounce upon the wreck and seize the spoils".

Such was the situation which awaited Peter Hargreaves on his return from furlough in England. When he arrived at Emfundisweni in July 1882 his first task was

15. MMS: J.R. Cameron to Kilner, 12.2.81.
16. MMS: Douglas to Kilner, 12.2.81.
17. See pages 384f.
18. MMS: Kirkby to Kilner, 6.2.82.
20. MMS: Hargreaves to Kilner, 24.7.82.
to put the affairs of the Mission in order, for the property was dilapidated and some of the station people were disorderly. He was soon planning to begin an Industrial School for Boys and wrestling with the gigantic problem of evangelising the heathen. His difficulties were intensified by the opposition of the ruling party at the Great Place. Umqikela was friendly but the influence of brandy and of his advisers meant that he could not be relied upon. Hargreaves was soon dissatisfied with Umhlangaso, and from the very beginning he was opposed by MacNicholas who saw in him a threat to his position and his livelihood. This led to trouble at Paltmerton. After a year in Pondololand, Hargreaves decided that the native minister there should be replaced by a European. The Chief opposed the change, and when he eventually said that the native man could go, he refused to allow his successor to take

21. MMS: Hargreaves to Kilner, 24.7.82.
22. MMS: Hargreaves to Kilner, 11.8.82, 19.10.82.
23. MMS: Do. to do., 19.10.82.
24. MMS: Do. to do., 20.6.83.
25. MMS: Do. to do., 19.10.82, 4.1.83.
26. HD: 11.2.84, 2.1.85, 1.8.85.
27. HD: 14.11.82, 10.9.84, 24.9.85, 5.10.85.
28. HD: 2.2.85, 26.10.85, 23.8.86.
29. MMS: Hargreaves to Kilner, 7.10.86.
31. HD: 24.5.84.
up residence. Instead he himself appointed a headman and gave him authority to administer the sacraments.

It took a year for Hargreaves to install another native minister, and even then there were attempts to interfere with the Mission which he attributed to MacNicholas.

In view of the magnitude of his task and the obstacles which beset him, it is not surprising that Hargreaves did not figure prominently in Mpondo politics for the first few years. Not only did he lack the time and the influence, but he shared the typically Wesleyan disinclination to become involved in political affairs. He could not avoid them, however, even if he did not push himself forward. From the beginning, Umhlangaso used him as an intermediary in his correspondence with the Government about the recurring disputes on the Xesibe border. Early in 1883 Umqikela put him in charge of the official Mpondo archives which had not been in the

31. HD: 18.7.84. The Rev. R. Walton Lewis began a mission with the Amanoi under the chief Qipu (MMS: Lewis to Kilner, 22.6.85).
32. HD: 25.5.84, 21.12.84.
33. MMS: Hargreaves to Kilner, 26.5.85.
34. HD: 21.7.85, 26.2.86.
35. HD: 2.12.84, 3.8.85.
36. HD: 14.11.82, 18.11.82.
hands of the missionary since the death of Jenkins. 37
According to Stanford he was also gaining an influence
over many of the subordinate chiefs and councillors. 38
But as long as MacNicholas was in the ascendant, his
views had a negligible effect upon relations with the
Cape. The failure of the deputation was a serious check
to the white secretary, and from that time forward a
deteriorating situation drew the missionary to the fore
and added weight to his advice.

The appointment of Walter Stanford further strengthen­
ened his position. Stanford had made Hargreaves' acquain­
tance when he visited Emfundisweni on a government mission
at the end of 1884, 39 and after his removal to Kokstad
respect grew into friendship. The two men did not always
see eye to eye on matters of policy, 40 but their frequent
correspondence and their mutual confidence were an impor­
tant factor in events of 1886. 41

37. MMS: Hargreaves to Kilner, 4.1.85.
38. Stanford MS Reminiscences, pp. 403, 478f. *
39. St. P Diary: 24.11.84.
40. Hargreaves was critical of the policy of reprisals
which Stanford supported. (eg. HD: 2.6.86; St. P Ca6/86:
Hargreaves to Stanford 15.9.86). He also disliked the
tendency to deal directly with subordinate chiefs.
(HD: 18.8.85; St. P Diary: 29.11.85). Nor was he im­
pressed with the methods of Lieutenant Sampson who
acted as Stanford's representative in dealings with
the Amampondo in the early part of 1886. (HD: 4.5.86,
6.5.86).
Ca14/86: 18.11.86.
The policy of the High Commissioner was not modified by the visit of the Deputation. Robinson believed that the Cape and the Amampondo should be left to settle their differences without the intervention of any third party. If the Imperial Government assumed any responsibility, it would be difficult to avert a war for the colonists would abandon their prudent attitude and new hopes would be raised on both sides. Direct Imperial interests were not involved, and he therefore thought it would be unwise to extend the protectorate as Stanley seemed prepared to do. He doubted if it could be established or maintained without force, and as there was no prospect of annexation to the Cape with the consent of the Amampondo, the Imperial Government would be saddled indefinitely with a large expense which the Colony could not be relied upon to share. Governor Bulwer had asked that the interests of Natal should be considered in any settlement, but the High Commissioner did not think these were threatened in any way and was concerned to prevent the Amampondo playing off one colony

42. See pages 397f.
44. C.O.806/260: Robinson to Granville, No.56, 3.3.86.
46. C.O.806/260: Robinson to Granville, No.56, 3.3.86.
47. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Bulwer to Stanley, 26.9.85.
against the other. He agreed with Bulwer that Frere's Proclamation in 1878 had virtually terminated the Maitland Treaty and that a fresh agreement was necessary, but was confident that this would follow once Umqikela realised he was isolated and could not hope for the retrocession of Xesibeland. His views were accepted by the Imperial Government which assented to the annexation of the Xesibe country and ignored the suggestions of the Aborigines' Protection Society that it should intervene.

Under such circumstances there was no hope of a peaceful settlement unless the Amampondo could be persuaded to come to terms with a Government which they had long regarded with profound suspicion. This took fourteen anxious months and the issue was in doubt to the very end. The period fell into three phases separated by trouble with the Amazésibe in March and October 1886. The first was characterised by a stiffening of the Cape attitude and increasing disorder along the border;

48. C.O. 806/260: Minute by Robinson, 14.6.86.
50. C.O. 806/260: Minute by Robinson, 14.6.86.
51. C.O. 806/260: Granville to Robinson (conf) 24.6.86.
P.P.1878 LXI (C5022): Stanhope to Torrens (tel.) 11.11.86.
52. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Granville to Torrens (tel.) 18.5.86.
53. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Dillwyn to Stanhope 27.9.86, 14.10.86.
the second witnessed a fruitless attempt on the part of
Hargreaves to bring the parties together and to avoid
further trouble; and the last seven weeks brought the
triumph of persistence over stubbornness and of moderation
over bluster.

The Cape Government was eager to solve a problem which
threatened the peace of the native territories and cut off
Griqualand East from its natural port. At a further
meeting with the Deputation, de Wet, the Secretary for
Native Affairs, had promised to examine the Xesibe ques-
tion, and also to visit Pondoland on a forthcoming
tour if the Amampondo were willing to treat on different
terms. He carried out his side of the arrangement,
only to be advised that Jojo would not agree to move.

The Amampondo, on the other hand, did not give the required
assurance and de Wet quite properly refused a request to
go and talk over matters with Umqikela in a friendly way.

After de Wet had left the area, Umhlangasos explained

54. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Stanford to S.N.A., 22.1.86,
enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.
55. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): S.N.A. to Umqikela, 11.12.85,
enc. in Robinson to Stanley 6.1.86.
57. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Umhlangaso to S.N.A., 8.12.85,
enc. in Robinson to Stanley 6.1.86.
that the Chief had thought an invitation in those terms would suffice and asked for a representative of the Government to go down in his place.  

Stanford offered his services and was given definite terms to lay before the tribe. He was to offer £3,000 for the cession of the Rode, including the main waggon road between Kokstad and Umtata which passed through the valley. The Government considered that the Treaty and subsequent proclamations gave it control of the ports. It was nevertheless prepared to pay the Amampondo £2,000 on condition that they acknowledged that control, and also conceded the right to construct roads to such ports and to use them without tolls. Stanford was authorised to increase these offers to a total of £7,000 should that be necessary. The chief weakness of these terms was that they did not offer compensation for the Xesibe country, but apart from this they were reasonable. Reports from Pondoland indicated that the Amampondo were more tractable, and Stanford's hopes were high.  

58. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Umhlangaso to Stanford, 17.12.85, enc. in Robinson to Stanley, 6.1.86.  
60. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): S.N.A. to Stanford, 2.1.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.  
61. Ibid.  
63. St.P Diary: 2.1.86, 3.1.86.
But at the meeting on 11 and 12 January it soon became clear that the claim to Xesibeland had not been abandoned.

Although he had to report failure, Stanford did not think the negotiations were at an end, and judged that Umqikela and his great son were not unwilling to accept the terms. MacNicholas did in fact communicate with him in the course of February but without result, and at the end of March a settlement was no nearer than it had been in January.

While the Mpondo council procrastinated, tension mounted along the border. In November Nota was driven out of the Rode on the pretext that he was in league with the Amabaca. He soon returned, but Umqikela decided that he had forfeited his right to remain in Pondoland, and on 9 February he again took refuge in the Colony.

On both occasions the Amabaca were involved. Stanford

64. P.P. 1887 LXI (C5022): Stanford to S.N.A., 22.1.86, enc. as in 54.
65. Ibid.
68. P.P. 1887 LXI (C5022): J.S. Jenkins to Stanford, 5.12.85, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.
69. Ibid.
70. P.P. 1887 LXI (C5022): Stanford to S.N.A., 12.2.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.
felt an obligation towards Nota because the trouble had begun when the Government received him in 1878, 72 and Hargreaves agreed with him that a firm line should be taken. 73 He was also afraid that the clashes between the Amampondo and the Amabaca might assume serious proportions, and compared the situation to that which had preceded the Ccaleka War in 1877. 74 In February he recommended that the Government should intervene with authority and occupy the Rode. 75 The Government thought otherwise, for it refused to recognise any obligation to Nota. 76 At first it had told Stanford to be neutral; 77 then it had tried to shift the responsibility onto the High Commissioner and the Imperial Government; 78 and now it merely authorised the arming of the Amabaca and the Amaxesibe. 79

74. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Stanford to S.N.A., 12.2.86, enc. as in 70.
75. Ibid.
   cf. St.P Diary: 30.1.86.
76. St.P Diary: 1.2.86.
   P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Under-S.N.A. to Stanford, 4.3.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.
77. St.P Diary: 27.11.85.
79. St.P Diary: 13.2.86.
   Stanford MS Reminiscences, p.500.
This only made matters worse. De Wet had already told Stanford not to be severe on Colonial natives who raided the Amampando in reprisal for thefts. Now that they had been armed, they became bolder, and on 21 March the Amaxesibe crossed the border in force after some stolen horses, and destroyed twenty-two kraals. They were followed on 25 March by the Amabaca. The Amampando massed to retaliate, and Stanford asked the Government whether Colonial forces should be used to defend the Amaxesibe. He was rather surprised when he was told to inform Umqikeia that if the Amampando again invaded Xesibeland it would be regarded as a declaration of war. In his opinion this was hardly justified for Colonial subjects violated the boundary as frequently as the Amampando. By this time a counter-attack seemed unlikely and he decided to withhold the ultimatum. Three days later the instructions were repeated despite the fact that the only

81. HD: 21.3.86.
MMS: Hargreaves to Secs., 23.4.86.
82. HD: 26.3.86.
St.P Diary: 25.3.86.
83. HD: 22.3.86.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. St.P Diary: 24.3.86.
new aggression had been by the Amabaca. Stanford obeyed, but noted in his diary:

"How the Government will reconcile such a message with the fact the Makaula has an impi... at the present time in Pondoland, puzzles me".

The Xesibe raid had brought matters to a head and had shown the Amampondo quite clearly where they stood. Umhlangaso had asked Stanford to mediate, but he had refused to do so except as part of a general settlement, and while the Government's message was certainly less than fair, it did at least prove that he was not speaking on his own authority.

It was almost entirely due to Peter Hargreaves that more serious trouble was averted. He watched the Mpondo preparations with anxiety and early on 23 March he visited Umhlangaso, who had fully decided to invade the

88. St.P Diary: 27.3.86.
89. Ibid.
   P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): S.N.A. to Umqikela, no date, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.
90. St.P Diary: 27.3.86.
   cf. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): MacNicholas to Acting High Commissioner, 10.4.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 12.5.86.
92. HD: 22.3.86.
   MMS: Hargreaves to Secs., 23.4.86.
Having persuaded him to enquire the cause of the attack before doing anything, he sent a messenger to the magistrate of Mount Ayliff and returned to the camp the next day with the reply. Once again he argued against Umhlangaso's plan and urged him to return home and investigate the charges against his people. Most of the Europeans in the neighbourhood had fled to Natal, but Hargreaves remained at his post, and on the 25th made a last desperate effort to avoid war:

"After breakfast I wrote a strongly worded letter to Umhlangaso and urged him to listen to my advice and not to plunge the country into war. "His councillors and councillors from the Great Place were on my side. A little before dinner he sent to say he should return home".

When the ultimatum arrived, the Amampondo had already dispersed, even though the Amabaca had crossed the border.

Hargreaves had previously tried to influence Umhlangaso in favour of a peaceful settlement, but without effect. Henceforward his efforts were redoubled, and

93. HD: 23.5.86.
94. Ibid.
95. HD: 24.3.86.
96. Ibid.
97. HD: 25.3.86.
98. Ibid.
99. MMS: Hargreaves to Secs., 23.4.86.
100. HD: 19.12.85.
in the course of the next seven months he saw him at least a dozen times. He was opposed to a new Treaty, probably because this would not go to the root of the trouble and provide for the better government of Pondoland. He also deprecated any connection with the Cape Government which would put the Amampondo at the mercy of the Afrikaner Bond whose native policy he detested. In his opinion the wisest course was to settle matters with the Cape and then to ask for Imperial rule on the Basutoland pattern. On 14 April he discussed the matter with Stanford who agreed that this would be the best solution of the difficulty. Umhlangaso was now more inclined to listen to the missionary's advice, especially when he realised that he could expect nothing of his German friends, and in July he went as far as to

101. HD: 19.4.86; 5.5.86; 31.5.86; 19.6.86; 20.7.86; 23.7.86; 10.8.86; 16.8.86; 2.10.86; 10.10.86; 17.10.86.
102. HD: 14.4.86.
103. Ibid.
104. cf. HD: 21.6.86.
105. HD: 14.4.86.
St.P Diary: 14.4.86.
106. Ibid.
107. HD: 19.4.86; 16.8.86.
Anti-Slavery C138/208: Hargreaves to Irvine 6.8.86.
108. HD: 23.7.86. See page 394.
Herr Emil Nagel, acting on behalf of the German Land and Colonisation Company, obtained the cession of about 160 square miles of Pondoland on 20.6.85, (See page 394; P.P.1887 LXI C5022: Treaty, enc. in Nagel to Colonial Office, 5.12.85) promising in liqu (Contd.)
make enquiries of the Paramount Chief of Basutoland who sent a favourable reply. 109

To secure agreement was one thing; to get action another. Many obstacles had yet to be overcome. Prominent among these was MacNicholas. In November 1885 he

108 (contd.) ... of the grant to educate the sons of two chiefs in Germany. (ibid) He returned to Germany with Umhlangaso's son Oscar. (HD: 23.7.85; 15.8.87) He also undertook to submit the tract in question to German protection and to ask for a German Protectorate over the whole of Pondoland. (P.P.1887 LXi C5022: Treaty, enc. in Nagel to Colonial Office, 5.12.85) He asked for this on 6 August 1885, but it was refused, (C.0.806/260: Foreign Office, Berlin, to Sir E. Malet, 8.1.86) and he was advised to ask the Imperial Government to recognise the grant and bestow title. (P.P.1887 LXi C5022: Nagel to Colonial Office, 5.12.85) The ceded area included the eastern bank of the Umzimvubu and the Colonial Office told him that this was an integral part of the Cape and that permission to settle could only be obtained from that Government. (P.P.1887 LXi C5022: Colonial Office to Nagel 19.1.86) The correspondence was forwarded to the Cape, and on 31 March Nagel was told that the Cape afforded the same facilities for acquiring land and protection to Germans as to British subjects. (P.P.1887 LXi C5022: Colonial Office to Nagel, 31.3.86) On 21 April he was told that Granville would give no further information and that he should address the Cape directly about any land belonging to it. His claim to that portion of the grant which fell outside the Colony was quietly ignored. (P.P.1887 LXi C5022: Colonial Office to Nagel 21.4.86)

Until this letter arrived from Nagel in July 1886, Umhlangaso apparently continued to hope for German intervention. (P.P.1887 LXi C5022: Nagel to Colonial Office, no date - received 19.2.86 - enclosing letter from Umhlangaso; Anti-Slavery C138/210: Irvine to Chesson, 29.3.86.)

had admitted that his position would be untenable if the Xesibe country was not restored,\(^{110}\) and Stanford had summed him up correctly when he wrote,

"I do not think his principles are sufficiently high to enable him to work for the interests of the Colony or the Pondos against his own".\(^{111}\)

After the ultimatum he made a final effort to avoid the inevitable. Writing to Harry Escombe, he asked him to enlist the support of the Governor of Natal for a Royal Commissioner or some other means of settling the problem.\(^{112}\) He also appealed directly to General Torrens who was Acting-High Commissioner in the absence of Robinson.\(^{113}\) By the end of April he knew he had failed.\(^{114}\) Meanwhile he was losing the confidence of Umhangasos and other chiefs who had previously supported him.\(^{115}\) In January the collection of licence money was taken out of his hands.\(^{116}\) From April onwards he lost ground rapidly.\(^{117}\) At the end

\(^{110}\) St.P Diary: 26.11.86.
\(^{111}\) Ibid.
\(^{112}\) P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): MacNicholas to H. Escombe, 2.4.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.
\(^{113}\) P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): MacNicholas to Torrens, 10.4.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 12.5.86.
\(^{114}\) P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): MacNicholas to Escombe, 24.4.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 12.5.86.
\(^{115}\) St.P Diary: 26.11.85.
\(^{116}\) St.P Ca1/86: Hargreaves to Stanford, 4.1.86.
\(^{117}\) St.P Ca3/86: Hargreaves to Stanford, 26.4.86.
Diary: 15.6.86.
of May Umhlangaso told Hargreaves that he would have to be got rid of as soon as possible. 118 Apparently Umqikela was loth to part with him 119 but on 20 August he was dismissed. 120 "The land," sighed Hargreaves, "is delivered of a great troubler." 121

Further difficulty was caused by citizens of Natal, traders and others, who feared that the outcome of these events would be the annexation of Pondoland to the Cape. In the previous year the Cape had ruined their trade with Griqualand East by erecting a customs house on the Natal boundary, 122 and they had no desire to see their interests in Pondoland prejudiced in the same way. In the course of April, J.F. Rethman 123 and T. McCubbin 124 appealed to Governor Havelock who sent their letters to General Torrens and loyally accepted his opinion that Natal should not intervene. 125 In his correspondence with MacNicholas,

118. St.P Ca3a/86: Hargreaves to Stanford, 24.5.86.
120. HD: 22.8.86.
121. Ibid.
122. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Bulwer to Stanley, No. 95, 17.7.85; No. 132, 5.10.85; No. 142, 8.10.85; No. 169, 26.10.85; No. 171, 10.11.85.
123. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): J.F. Rethman to Havelock, 1.4.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 8.5.86.
124. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): T. McCubbin to Havelock, 29.4.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 26.5.86.
125. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Havelock to Torrens, 25.5.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 9.6.86.
Escombe suggested that the Amampondo should seek union with Natal, and observed that the Imperial Government would hardly ignore a clear expression of Mpondo opinion in favour of this. On 18 October he supported a motion for the union of Pondoland and Natal which was proposed in the Legislative Council by Sir J. Bissett and was sent to the Secretary of State. In November Rethman was back in Pondoland as the representative of Bissett's party, advising Umqikela to call on its assistance. But if Natal did not wish to "part with the Pondos," the desire was not reciprocated. There is no evidence that MacNicholas ever brought the matter before the tribe. He would not have succeeded had he done so, for, as Hargreaves remarked in August,

"No one in Pondoland thinks of seeking the aid of Natal. The natives in these parts detest the laws as applied to natives in Natal".

Nevertheless this agitation was unsettling and inclined Umhlangaso to procrastinate. The arguments of the Kokstad

126. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Escombe to MacNicholas, no date, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 12.5.86; Escombe to MacNicholas, 29.7.86, enc. in Havelock to Granville, 10.8.86.
127. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Havelock to Granville, 25.10.86, and enclosures.
129. Ibid.
Political Association, which sent a deputation to Pondoland in August, probably had the same effect.\footnote{131}

The most serious obstacles, however, were those which were raised by the policy of the Cape Government. In the first place, it refused to allow mediation of any kind. However desirable it was to isolate the Amampondo, this indiscriminate refusal appeared to be arbitrary and unjust\footnote{132} and ruined the only real chance of negotiations in the early part of the year. At the beginning of May, the Amampondo were visited by Mr J. Irvine,\footnote{133} who had donned the mantle of Saul Solomon as the champion of native rights in the Cape Parliament.\footnote{134} He drew up a memorandum for the guidance of the Chief, and suggested that they should submit to arbitration and then seek Imperial protection.\footnote{135} When he left he apparently had

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{131} P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Dillwyn to Colonial Office, 14.10.86, enclosing cutting from Kokstad Advertiser, 28.6.86. The Kokstad Political Association was formed with the idea of pressing the claims of Griqualand East upon the Cape Government by agitating for the area beyond the Kei to be formed into a Crown Colony. A deputation visited Umqikela to obtain his support for the proposal that there should be a Royal Commission of Enquiry and for the inclusion of Pondoland in the proposed colony.
\item \footnote{132} Anti-Slavery C138/209: Hargreaves to Irvine, 13.8.86.
\item \footnote{133} HD: 29.4.86 - 4.5.86.
\item \footnote{134} vide Anti-Slavery C138/189-211.
\item \footnote{135} Irvine sent a copy to the Aborigines' Protection Society (Anti-Slavery C138/205: Irvine to Chesson 4.7.86) (Contd.)
\end{itemize}
little hope of a settlement, but on the next day a meeting of the tribe adopted something very like his policy. This was due, in part at least, to the influence of Hargreaves who had seen Irvine's proposals and agreed with some of them. He had come down to the meeting determined to speak his mind if an opportunity arose, and when Umhlangaso asked his advice, he took his chance:

"I told him plainly he must yield the road. The Government would not allow the road to continue closed to Europeans. I also advised him to get strong men to meet the Government and settle past differences".

The Chiefs agreed, and resolved to open the roads but to allow no construction before a meeting with Stanford which was to be attended by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Major Griffith and Mr Irvine.

Hargreaves' motives were very different from those of MacNicholas or the traders. Far from being a device to

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135 (contd.), on behalf of which it was submitted to the Colonial Office on 4 September. It was subsequently printed for Parliament: P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Memorandum submitted to Secretary of State by L.L. Dillwyn Esq., M.P.

136. HD: 4.5.86.
138. HD: 5.5.86.
   cf. MMS: Hargreaves to Kilner, 7.10.86.
139. HD: 5.5.86.
   Stanford MS Reminiscences, pp.505f.
by-pass the Cape, his proposal was an attempt to ensure the success of any negotiations with that Government. The presence of such men would convince the Amampondo that their interests were being considered, and offered far greater hope of a settlement than the inexperienced bluster of Lieutenant Sampson, who was acting as Stanford's representative in Mpondo affairs. The Government thought that the proposal was simply another round in the struggle for the Xesibe country and promptly rejected it. The missionary was disappointed and suspicious. "I think Government is playing a very deep game," he remarked. "They want things settled, but they must be settled only on their lines and not on a just and equitable basis." MacNicholas no doubt welcomed the news, for he was also opposed to the scheme, but the Amampondo were not prepared to abandon it completely. The unwilling Secretary was constrained upon to invite Sir Theophilus to visit Pondoland and give his advice. This would have been

140. HD: 10.5.86. Anti-Slavery C138/208: Hargreaves to Irvine, 6.8.86.
141. HD: 6.5.86; 11.5.86.
C.O.417/12: Spigg to Sir Robert Herbert, 28.8.86.
143. HD: 11.5.86.
144. St.P Ca3a/86: Hargreaves to Stanford 24.5.86.
145. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): MacNicholas to Shepstone 20.5.86, enc. in Havelock to Granville, 31.7.86.
almost as beneficial as the original suggestion. At first Sir Theophilus was inclined to accept, but when he consulted Havelock and was told that the Cape would strongly deprecate his action, he changed his mind. When he received a further letter begging him to come, if only on a private and friendly visit, he asked for the matter to be submitted to the High Commissioner, but with the same result. This was most unfortunate. He would have risen above inter-colonial jealousies, and would have been better able than anybody else to overcome the fears of the Amampendo. Umhangas was willing to have either Sir Marshall Clarke or W.B. Chalmers invited in his stead, but the attitude of the Cape Government left him even more suspicious than his missionary and could not fail to make him sceptical of Hargreaves' advice.

Hargreaves' efforts were finally frustrated by the way in which the Cape Government allowed the Amaxesibe and the Amabaca to raid into Pondoland with impunity.

146. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Shepstone to MacNicholas, 26.6.86, enc. in Havelock to Granville, 31.7.86.
147. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): MacNicholas to Shepstone, 8.7.86, enc. in Havelock to Granville, 31.7.86.
148. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Shepstone to Governor's Ppte. Sec., 24.7.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 31.7.86.
149. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Stanhope to Havelock 20.9.86.
The Amaresibe crossed the border on 30 May,\(^{151}\) and throughout June the two tribes eyed each other uneasily.\(^{152}\) There was a more serious clash on 5 August when a large number of Qipu's people were killed.\(^{153}\) On 10 September they were in Pondoland again.\(^{154}\) Towards the end of the month some Amabaca moved into the Rode and defied government orders to remove or give up their arms.\(^{155}\) They were soon quarreling with Nota and with neighbouring Mpondo clans.\(^{156}\) In the second week of October the Amaresibe once again attacked Qipu\(^{157}\) and a few days later the Amabaca were raiding Mpondo clans further south.\(^{158}\)

These attacks were not unprovoked, and Hargreaves was very critical of the Mpondo thefts which usually caused the trouble.

"It is unreasonable to think that the Xesibe will allow themselves to be plundered with impunity", (Contd.)

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\(^{151}\) HD: 30.5.86, 31.5.86.
\(^{152}\) HD: 19.6.86, 22.6.86.
  St.P Diary: 20.6.86.
\(^{153}\) HD: 6.8.86.
\(^{154}\) HD: 10.9.86.
\(^{155}\) St.P Diary: 20.9.86.
\(^{156}\) Ibid.
  St.P Diary: References in early part of October.
\(^{157}\) HD: 12.10.86.
\(^{158}\) St.P Diary: 16.10.86.

P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Stanford to Under-S.N.A., enc. in Torrens to Stanhope, 27.10.86.
he asserted. "The question of the seizure of
the Xesibe country is quite outside of this thieving
business. A just and righteous cause does
not require lawlessness. In fact it is not aided
in the least by it".159

Nevertheless, he was disgusted with the Government which
allowed its subjects to cross the border, but threatened
the Amampondo with war if they retaliated.160 After the
clash in August, in which the loss of life was heavy and
the sufferers were innocent, he complained to Stanford,161
and as the tension mounted in October, he exclaimed,
"Where is the justice of the present policy?".162

Time and again he urged restraint on Umhlangaso,163
but his advice became less and less influential as the
raids continued. The tribe could not be expected to
submit indefinitely to reprisals that were out of all pro-
portion to the crimes, or to believe in the good faith of
a Government which refused its moderate suggestions for a
settlement. In August, Hargreaves told Irvine,

159. HD: 22.6.86.
160. HD: 31.5.86; 6.8.86.
   Anti-Slavery C138/208: Hargreaves to Irvine, 6.8.86.
161. HD: 9.8.86.
162. HD: 11.10.86.
163. HD: 31.5.86; 19.6.86; 10.8.86; 16.8.86.
"It is difficult to describe the feelings of the Pondos just at this time. They are grieved and they are angry. They believe the Government are doing these things to compel them to fight and to give up their country."

In spite of this the crisis took him by surprise.

The incursions in mid-October were too much for Umhlangaso, and the Lando army was called out and moved towards the border. On this occasion Hargreaves' protests availed nothing. An impi seven hundred strong attacked the Amaxesibe on 19 October, and this was followed up by a larger force on the 20th. But only a fraction of the fifteen thousand warriors was engaged. Qipu, who had suffered most and had most to lose, refused to co-operate, and he was not alone. On the evening of the 19th, Uqikela arrived at Emfundisweni, professedly to recall the army. Hargreaves was sceptical, but on the

165. St.P Ca7/86: Hargreaves to Stanford 11.10.86. Hargreaves stated that he could see no warrant for rumours that the Amampondo intended to attack the Amaxesibe.
166. HD: 18.10.86; 19.10.86.
167. He saw Umhlangaso personally (HD: 17.10.86) and wrote to him. (HD: 19.10.86).
St.P Diary: 2.11.86.
170. HD: 19.10.86.
171. Ibid.
afternoon of the 20th the Mpondo impi withdrew, \(^{172}\) and when the Amaxesibe gave measure for measure on the 21st, the warriors started to go home and the border clans evacuated their kraals. \(^{173}\) For the next ten days it was a one-sided affair, with the Amaxesibe burning Mpondo kraals, and even threatening to attack Emfundisweni. \(^{174}\)

The Amampondo had defied a plain warning and deserved to suffer. But their attack was certainly not what the Cape Ministry made it out to be—a long pre-meditated act of war against a conciliatory Government which had always acted upon the defensive and prevented reprisals. \(^{175}\) It was not so simple to distinguish saints and sinners!

Stanford expected another invasion \(^{176}\) and was told to enrol native levies and to act on the defensive while the Government considered its policy. \(^{177}\) The Cape's finances were in a bad way \(^{178}\) and it soon became clear that the

\(^{172}\) P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Acting Chief Magistrate to Under-S.N.A., 21.10.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville 15.12.86.

\(^{173}\) HD: 21.10.86.

\(^{174}\) HD: 29.10.86.


\(^{175}\) P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Minute by Ministers, 5.11.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 17.11.86.

\(^{176}\) P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Stanford to Under-S.N.A. 28.10.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 15.12.86.

\(^{177}\) P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Telegraphic conversation between Stanford and S.N.A., 24.10.86, enc. in Torrens to Granville, 15.12.86.

\(^{178}\) P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): S.N.A. to Stanford, (conf.) 27.11.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 15.12.86.
Government wanted to avoid unnecessary expense. It was also anxious to satisfy the Imperial Government and public opinion that it had not provoked a war. These considerations suggested opposing courses of action. The former indicated a speedy settlement, perhaps by invasion; the latter demanded that the Amampondo should be clearly in the wrong before anything drastic was done.

Umhlangaso made the first move on 30 October and it was peaceful. He wrote to Torrens enquiring why British subjects were continually invading Umqikela's territory and asking him to restrain them so that a meeting could be held. Hargreaves sent the letter to Stanford and told him that he had urged Umqikela to meet him and come to terms. On 2 November the magistrate met the missionary at Fort Donald. They discussed possible terms and Hargreaves promised to do all he could to bring about an amicable arrangement. He advised a conference but Stanford refused to give an assurance that he would meet Umhlangaso.

179. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Under-S.N.A. to Stanford 27.10.86; Telegraphic conversation between Stanford and S.N.A., 31.10.86; both enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 15.12.86.
180. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Telegraphic conversation, 31.10.86, enc. as in 179.
181. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Umhlangaso to Administrator, 30.10.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope, 17.11.86.
183. St.P Diary: 2.11.86.
The Ministry formulated its policy on 5 November. It dismissed Umhlangaso's letter as an obvious attempt to mislead the Imperial Government and public opinion. Another meeting would be as fruitless as those which had been held in the past. It would only delay a settlement and involve the Colony in further expenditure. Instead of this, Umqikela was to submit a written explanation of his conduct, an offer of reparations and proposals for the future control of his people. If he did not reply within four days, or if his reply was unsatisfactory, the consequences would rest upon him. 184

Umhlangaso saw the ultimatum before it was delivered to Umqikela and immediately asked for an extension of the time limit. 185 Hargreaves suggested ten days, 186 Stanford recommended eight, and de Wet grudgingly allowed six. 187 This was far too short to assemble the chiefs and councillors, and Hargreaves warned Stanford that the answer would be less satisfactory than it might have been had the

184. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Minute by Ministers, 5.11.86, enc. as in 175. Substance conveyed in Torrens to Stanhope (telegram) 8.11.86.
186. Ibid.
Ministry been more generous. He had long conferences with Umhlangaso and his arguments were supported by Dr Stewart of Lovedale who sent a telegram urging his former pupil to seek an Imperial Protectorate and offering to come and help him. In his reply, which was

HD: 11.11.86.

190. Dr Stewart’s role in the Mpondo crisis aroused a good deal of animosity. He strongly criticised the Government’s policy in the "Christian Express" (December 1886, p.178) and wrote to Sir T. Fowell Buxton that the Government was inclined to support a party which was trying to bring on a war. Buxton passed this information to the Colonial Office. (P.P.1887 LXI C5022: Buxton to Colonial Office 19.12.86) The Cape Ministry described his statement as "a libel upon the people and the Government of this Colony". (P.P.1887 LXI C5022: Minute by Ministers 2.2.87, enc. in Robinson to Holland, No.108, 9.2.87). His intervention in Pondoland itself began with a telegram to Umhlangaso on 8 November. Besides offering to come up and suggesting a protectorate, he advised Umhlangaso to gain time until public opinion came to bear on the subject. This was sent to Stanford’s care, with permission for him to read it, and on 9 November he forwarded it to Umhlangaso and informed Stewart of Hargreaves’ efforts. On 11 November more telegrams arrived for Hargreaves, Stanford and Umhlangaso. Stewart was concerned at a report that colonial forces were to occupy Emfundisweni. He told Umhlangaso that his cause was being taken up by Irvine and others and offered to cable home. Stanford replied on the following day that his present orders were to act on the defensive and that Umhlangaso was the chief obstacle to a settlement. He continued: "Shall consult Hargreaves before delivering telegram. Fear account of your efforts Pondo behalf may so elate Umhlangaso as to undo Hargreaves’ work". Stewart replied on the same day in the following terms: "Relieved to know the truth. Agree your view so far as I understand it and am entirely inclined to support Hargreaves’ view. Say so.. (contd.)
delivered on 13 November, Umqikela denied organising and collecting a force and claimed that the aggressions of the Amaxesibe had made his people uncontrollable. He asked for a commission to negotiate a settlement and for more time to consult the tribe.¹⁹¹

As far as the Ministry was concerned, the reply could hardly have been less satisfactory. It meant more delay and more expense. But although the Imperial Government did not wish to interfere with existing arrangements, it had objected to the ultimatum and had warned the Cape that "All means of conciliation should be exhausted before proceeding to extreme measures".¹⁹² Invasion was therefore out of the question. Stanford was asked for his opinion. He rejected a commission but urged an extension of thirty days which Hargreaves had proposed privately, and suggested

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190 (contd.) .. to Hargreaves and to Umhlhangaso. Substitute telegram of to-day for two telegrams of yesterday". (Stanford MS Reminiscences, pp.532-4; St.P Diary: 8-12.11.86) Stewart subsequently wrote to Hargreaves. (St.P Ca20/86: Hargreaves to Stanford 5.12.86).

When Sir Gordon Sprigg publicly attacked Dr Stewart, Stanford telegraphed the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs that there was nothing in his communications opposed to the views of the Government or the interests of the country. (St.P Diary: 21.1.87).

191. P.P.1887 LXI (05022): Minute by Ministers, 15.11.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 17.11.86.

192. P.P.1887 LXI (05022): Stanhope to Torrens (tel) 11.11.86. cf. C.O.417/11: Minutes on Torrens to Stanhope (tel.) 8.11.86.
that Umgikela should be told that the extra expense would have to be considered in the settlement. Having described the terms upon which he and Hargreaves had agreed, he advised the Government to base its demands on the general misgovernment of the country rather than the invasion. He did not think the claim for reparations should be pressed too far as the Amasesibe and Amabaca were equally at fault. The Ministry allowed fifteen days and more or less accepted Stanford's terms. It was unwilling to drop the idea of reparations, but authorised him to accept, in lieu of a fine, the concessions for which payment had been offered in January 1886. He was also to require a guarantee of keeping the peace and to arrange for the restoration of stolen stock, the punishment of thieves and the extradition of criminals. De Wet added that he should not press the Amampondo to the wall and told him,

"If any extension or limitation of the terms of settlement seem to you advisable, you are at liberty to exercise discretion, provided general principle is not departed from".

195. P.P. 1887 LXI (C5022): S.N.A. to Stanford (conf.) 15.11.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 15.12.86.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid.
Much now depended upon whether Hargreaves could persuade the Amampondo to move quickly enough and in the right direction. He urged Umhlangaso to lose no time in getting the chiefs together, and his arguments were re-inforced by further telegrams from Stewart and a letter from Irvine. On 18 November Umhlangaso assured him that the tribe would act upon his advice and that it would immediately comply with the Government's demands if they were reasonable. This did not mean that there were no more difficulties. Umhlangaso was still inclined to grumble at the refusal of a commission which meant that he would have to deal with Stanford, and on 22 November Hargreaves likened him to a large log of wood.

It was at this stage that Rethman arrived on the scene, and he was apparently not the only white man to encourage procrastination. As if this was not serious enough, the Cape Government nearly jeopardised a settlement by deciding on 27 November to disband the levies.

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199. St.P Ca14/86: Do. to do., 18.11.86.
200. St.P Ca15/86: Do. to do., 22.11.86.
201. Ibid.
203. P.W.1887 LXI (65022): S.N.A. to Stanford (conf.) 27.11.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 15.12.86.
Stanford had resisted this proposal on more than one occasion, for he believed that the Amampondo would take it as a sign that the Government was weakening and would therefore be less disposed to come to terms. There was a good deal of force in his argument, but the desire to economise prevailed. Fortunately a week’s notice was required, and Stanford took the liberty of making that notice conditional upon a peaceful reply from the Amampondo.

A draft of this reply was drawn up at the Great Place and sent to Emfundisweni where it was discussed by Hargreaves and Umhlangaso. It was then considered by a tribal meeting which Hargreaves did not attend, and on 2 December he and Umhlangaso met Stanford at Fort Donald. The Amampondo wanted a conference at Emfundisweni, but it was agreed to hold it on 6 December at Ntola’s kraal between the station and the border. Umhlangaso had only gone

204. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Stanford to S.N.A. (conf.) 15.11.86, enc. in 24.11.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 15.12.86.
205. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): S.N.A. to Stanford (conf.) 27.11.86, enc. as in 204.
208. Ibid.
210. Ibid.
to Fort Donald because Hargreaves insisted, but he was pleased with his reception, and the missionary did not think he would be difficult to deal with at the conference.\textsuperscript{211} It was now Umqikela's turn to cause anxiety. He lingered on the road to Emfundisweni, and then excused himself from the meeting at Ntola's on the grounds that he was ill.\textsuperscript{212} Stanford refused to negotiate with mere councillors, but on 7 December he was assured that they had full powers to conclude a settlement, and the conference began.\textsuperscript{213}

Having brought the two parties together, Hargreaves retired into the background. Although he remained with the Mpondoland delegation throughout the conference, he took no part in the discussion.\textsuperscript{214} It remained for Stanford to bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion, and in doing so he secured peace and goodwill.\textsuperscript{215} His approach was flexible and he made good use of the discretion he had been allowed. Although he demanded satisfaction for the

\textsuperscript{211} St.P Ca19/86: Hargreaves to Stanford, 3.12.86.
\textsuperscript{212} St.P Ca20/86: Do. to do., 5.12.86. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Acting Chief Magistrate to S.N.A. 7.12.86, enc. in Torrens to Stanhope 15.12.86.
\textsuperscript{213} P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Acting Chief Magistrate to S.N.A. 8.12.86, enc. as in 212.
\textsuperscript{214} Stanford MS Reminiscences: p.544.
\textsuperscript{215} St.P Ca21/86: Hargreaves to Stanford, 13.12.86. For text of the agreement, see Appendix C.
October invasion, the word "reparation" did not occur in the agreement. Nor did he allow their aggression to obscure their valid grievances. The right-of-way was conceded without any difficulty and agreement was also reached on a better system of border control. The conference then turned to St. John's and Xesibeland. The latter had not been mentioned in Stanford's instructions and strictly speaking he was not meant to offer compensation for the former. Nevertheless he agreed to a solatium of £1,000 for the Xesibe country, and when Umhlangasos argued that an annual payment would be the only just settlement of the St. John's question, he agreed to a subsidy of £200 per annum. The trickiest question was the future of the Rode. The disturbances of the past eight years had been brought about by land hunger as well as ill will towards Nots, and for this reason the Amampondo were at first only prepared to exchange it for an equal extent of ground elsewhere. The question was left over until

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217. See Appendix C.


220. Josiah Jenkins wished to settle there - P.P.1880 L (2482): Oxland to Frere 28.6.79, enc. in Frere to Hicks Beach, 12.8.79.

221. Stanford MS Reminiscences, p.542.

P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Acting Chief Magistrate to S.N.A., 8.12.86, enc. as in 213.
the other negotiations had been completed and they then agreed to hand it over for £600 to secure a complete settlement. The price had been reduced to one-fifth of what had been offered in January in order to compensate the Government for its expenditure on defence. There was some disappointment that Stanford had not given greater prominence to the claim for reparations but the Ministry did not quarrel with the terms of the agreement. When Robinson returned to the country in the new year, they asked him to confirm it and the Imperial Government authorised him to do so on 21 January 1887.

The settlement was only the first part of the programme upon which Stanford and Hargreaves had agreed in April, but unfortunately the request for Imperial protection was never made. Umqikela intended to call a meeting to discuss the question early in 1887 but there is no indication that it was ever held. Once the threat of war had been


223. Ibid.


225. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Robinson to Holland (tel.) 17.1.87.

226. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Holland to Robinson (tel.) 21.1.87.

removed, the matter became less urgent and the habitual dilatoriness of the African probably postponed a decision until it was too late. As a result the government of Pondoland was not improved but rather grew worse.

Umqikela died in October 1887. In the years that followed, the Amampondo drifted into civil war as Umhlangasoo tried to supplant the Paramount Chief Sig cawu. German interest was renewed in 1887 and 1888, and thereafter Sig cawu was pestered by an army of concessionaries. Relations with the Cape deteriorated once again, especially when the Government appointed a resident without consulting the Chief and attempted to force him upon the tribe. Affairs continued in this unsatisfactory state until March 1894 when Stanford and Hargreaves once again figured prominently in negotiations, and the Amampondo agreed to annexation.

Although the agreement of 1886 did not ensure a tranquil future, it did blot out a stormy past. The problems which had caused so much trouble for the past eight years were solved peacefully, and an opportunity was given for the Amampondo and the Colonial authorities to renew their friendship. On the day the agreement was signed, Stanford wrote, "Much of the credit of this settlement is due to Mr Hargreaves' quiet persistent efforts
with the Pondo chiefs". Three months later, when he heard that de Wet was congratulating himself on having dictated every step from Cape Town, he observed, "I have always thought the chief credit due to Mr Hargreaves if to anybody in particular".

Coming as they do from the private diary of the official most involved, these compliments have considerable weight. They confirm that as late as 1886 the missionary influence had not outlived its usefulness. Peter Hargreaves had not attained anything like the position of Thomas Jenkins but there is a real similarity between the two men. Both exercised an influence because they were trusted by the Amampondo and the Colonial authorities. Hargreaves never enjoyed the complete confidence of the tribe, for he entered into an ugly situation and had to contend with opposing influences which Jenkins had never known. But in 1886, and later, the Amampondo instinctively looked to him in time of need. He was not an adviser of governors, but his friendship with Walter Stanford did give him a small and indirect influence upon the policy of the Government and certainly affected the way in which that policy was

229. St.P Diary: 17.3.87.
carried out. Finally, like Jenkins, he was an unwilling politician, not seeking to impose his own pattern upon events but endeavouring to promote the cause of peace and justice. He described his position perfectly when he told Stanford, within a week of the settlement,

"If I did not see it to be a supreme duty to prevent these people rushing on to self destruction, I should just throw up the whole matter".230

CONCLUSION

A desire for security, a tendency to expansion and the need for order – these were the main factors shaping the attitude of the Colonial authorities towards the Amampondo during the period under review. Although humanitarian considerations played no small part, it was only when they coalesced with a concern for the Eastern Frontier that the Cape was drawn irrevocably into the affairs of Pondoland. This concern underlay the mission of Major Dundas, the intervention after the Ncapai Affair and even the occupation of Natal. It loomed large in Maitland's mind when he entered into the Treaty, and continued to influence policy until the Cattle Killing in 1857 broke the power of the Amaxosa and removed the need for an ally in their rear. Thereafter, the claims of security helped to awaken interest in Port St. John's. The need to check the gun trade and the threat of foreign intervention or Boer control suggested that it should be in British hands, and influenced, in varying degrees, every High Commissioner from Wynyard to Frere.

The tendency to expansion became apparent after the colonisation of Natal and was given momentum by the policy of Sir George Grey. At first it was an effect of European land hunger. This lay behind the designs of Natal and the
plans of Shepstone between 1848 and 1854. Although Grey's ambitious scheme of colonisation did not materialise, the settlement of the Griquas and other smaller groups was an attempt to provide for people who had been dispossessed on the Highveld. From the 'sixties onward, commercial interests became more important. They were largely responsible for Natal's desire to control Port St. John's and to substitute her influence for that of the Cape. After Griqualand East had been taken over, they influenced the Cape to an increasing extent, and help to explain the more persistent interest in Port St. John's and the endeavour to obtain a right-of-way through Pondoland.

Once the Amampondo became the immediate neighbours of British subjects, the need for order assumed considerable importance. The sound administration of neighbouring territories demanded efficient government in Pondoland. In particular it called for effective control on the border and a willingness to co-operate with the Colonial authorities in matters of administration and justice. Because these things were absent, the country would probably have been annexed sometime between 1878 and 1886 had it not been for the Imperial Government. At first that Government was bargaining for confederation. In later years it was sufficiently sensitive to humanitarian opinion to insist
upon Mpondo consent and to rule out force except in the last resort.

After 1844 the story of Mpondo-Colonial relations was the story of the Maitland Treaty. This did not come up to the expectations of those who fashioned it. Native wars continued. The Cape did not gain a reliable ally and Natal was not spared the annoyance of stock thefts. It did not suffice to control the coastal trade, nor did it ensure a satisfactory relationship with the authorities in Griqualand East. For many years it was a symbol of friendship, but even this did not endure.

The failure was due in part to the defects of the Treaty itself. Faku could not control the Bushmen in a remote part of Nomansland simply because Sir Peregrine had acknowledged him as paramount chief of that area. Nor was it explained how the rights of petty chiefs were to be reconciled with that paramountcy. No attempt was made, either in 1844 or later, to agree upon the status and duties of a resident. This meant trouble. On the other hand, the extradition articles were irrelevant for many years, and when the authorities tried to enforce them, the Amampondo had forgotten they existed. This meant more trouble. Above all, it was a product of an alien culture. Even with the most careful drafting and the utmost goodwill,
there would probably have been difficulties in carrying it out.

But the Treaty cannot be dismissed as an expedient that was doomed to fail. The breakdown was due as much to the faults of the contracting parties as to the shortcomings of the system. The Colonial authorities were not without responsibility. If inter-tribal peace was not established, it was partly because they would not honour their obligation and mediate. If goodwill gave way to ill-feeling, the change was brought about more by the arbitrary conduct of officials than by any other cause. The obvious superiority of their own culture induced them to regard the Amampondo with contempt and to underestimate their real ability. The annoying delays which attended negotiations were taken as evidence of inferiority and indolence when in fact they expressed a different view of time and were part of a definite system of diplomacy. Prejudice and misunderstanding gave rise to the belief that the native should be treated as a child. The Government should do what was right and ask no questions and although the ward might grumble, the decision would be accepted and all would be well. Impatience was excusable, but a disregard for native rights was not. Moral considerations apart, it was bad politics. The Amampondo at any rate
were not children, and the treatment they received from men like Harding and Currie, Orpen and Frere, was neither forgotten not forgiven. Together with the pressure upon land, which developed as the frontier contracted and the population expanded, it engendered suspicion, resentment and a refusal to co-operate. This does not acquit the Amampondo of their responsibility for the breakdown. The vendetta against their neighbours was against the spirit of the Treaty even if the letter was ambiguous. Their government was weak. They fell prey to the charms of liquor and played into the hands of adventurers. In the later negotiations for St. John's and the case of the refugee murderers they allowed suspicion and resentment to get the better of common sense. In the dismal years of the early 'eighties they were stubborn to the extent of being stupid. Their offences cannot be denied, but they were as much sinned against as sinning.

This indictment of the Treaty must not obscure its real, if limited, success. It helped to preserve the friendship of Faku, and while he lived the Amampondo were dissociated from the frontier tribes and were never considered a military threat to Natal. Even more significant was the fact that it maintained the natives in possession of their lands. It helped to check the southward thrust of Natal, and the story of the Zuurveld was not repeated.
east of the Umzimvubu. The Currie episode and its sequel showed that a scrap of paper would not check the expansion of the Cape, but when Colonial rule was eventually established beyond the Umtata, it prevented the tribes from extending their bounds but did not result in large-scale dispossession. To this extent, therefore, the Treaty served the interests of all the tribes in the area.

That it succeeded, even to this degree, was due almost entirely to the Wesleyan Missionaries. The importance of their political role cannot be gainsaid, and there was a definite relationship between the state of the Mission and the bearing of the Amampondoro and the Colonial authorities towards one another. So far as their political influence is concerned, the fifty-six years between 1830 and 1886 were divided into four periods by the departure of William Shaw, the death of Thomas Jenkins and the arrival of Peter Hargreaves.

When the Wesleyans went to Pondoland, Faku was still recovering from the shock of the Zulu invasion. Through their good offices he was established as the friend of the Government and afforded defence against the Trekkers. Their arguments secured the Umzimkulu boundary and almost certainly obtained the Treaty. In this way they won Faku's
confidence even if they did not save his soul. From 1838 to 1867, Thomas Jenkins remained at his side, endeavouring to keep him obedient to his undertakings and watchful of his interests. A close friend and a trusted adviser, his influence was unsurpassed and his advice was almost invariably accepted.

Although the trust of the Amampondo was never in doubt while Jenkins lived, the missionary influence upon the Colonial authorities weakened distinctly even before his death. Until 1856 there was a prominent missionary at Grahamstown. William Shaw's wide experience and knowledge of Kaffraria gave weight to his views and gained him the ear of successive governors. At two crises in Mpondo history the governors happened to be in Grahamstown and he was able to approach them directly. Personal discussion did much to determine Napier's reaction to the Ncapai Commando and to evoke Smith's disapproval of the Harding Expedition. But this was not the whole explanation of his success. Whatever his standing, Shaw could only move the Colonial Government to action when his humanitarian arguments were reinforced by political considerations. Napier was not prepared to guarantee Faku's theoretical claim to the Umzimkulu boundary in 1839 because colonial interests were not involved. It was a different matter when Faku appealed for help in 1841, for further Trekker
interference in Pondoland might well have upset the Eastern Frontier. Likewise, Sir Harry Smith would not intervene when Shaw complained of the way Fynn was behaving, but acted quickly when the Governor of Natal trespassed on his preserves and threatened to alienate Faku at a time when the frontier tribes were unsettled.

After Shaw left South Africa, the Wesleyan influence was far less powerful. It was by no means destroyed. Jenkins was a correspondent of officials like Shepstone and Maclean, and of Governors Grey and Wodehouse. He was trusted by the Governments, both of Natal and the Cape, and his views were taken into account in their dealings with the Amampondo. Nevertheless, the events of 1862-3 showed that trust was not enough, for Jenkins’ arguments did not persuade Wodehouse to settle the problem of the Currie line. Correspondence was no substitute for contact, and it was far more difficult to upset the policy of a Cape official than to enlist the High Commissioner against Natal.

The period between 1868 and 1882 was one of decay. It opened with the failure to appoint an adequate successor to Thomas Jenkins, and in the years that followed, the Mpondo Mission suffered the worst effects of the itinerant system. Young men came to the country for short spells.
They were all well meaning, but none of them enjoyed the confidence of the Colonial authorities and the chiefs. The Mission declined and the missionary influence in political affairs almost disappeared. This was at the very time when the Amampondo and the Cape were brought into close touch with one another, and the lack of a trusted missionary at this juncture was fatal to the cause of understanding. There was nobody to convince the Government that the tribe had good reason to complain about the boundary, and nobody to convince the tribe that it would be wise to part with Port St. John's. When the crisis came in 1875, nobody, missionary or lay, was in a position to avert the rupture, and the erstwhile allies were transformed into enemies. The appearance of Welborne in 1881 marks the nadir of the missionary influence. Deprived of advice and assistance such as Jenkins had been able to offer, the Amampondo had turned elsewhere.

The arrival of Peter Hargreaves in 1882 was a new beginning. Here, at last, was a missionary whom the Amampondo could trust, and one who commanded the respect of the authorities - or at least of the officials on the spot. It was because he enjoyed the confidence of both sides that he was able to bring the Amampondo and the Cape together in December 1886 and to make it possible for their
differences to be settled peacefully. His position was very different from that of Jenkins, for the years between had done irreparable damage. He was the help in time of trouble rather than the permanent guide of the Chief. His advice was sought when the outlook was bleak, and disregarded when it was bright. But his success, even in such adverse conditions, provokes reflection as to what might have happened had a missionary of his calibre been sent to Pondoland in 1868. Difficulties there would have been but the effects of closer contact would probably have been far less unpleasant.

For the greater part of this period the political activities of the Wesleyan Missionaries were considerable, and yet the fact remains that they would rather not have become actively involved. Their incursions into political affairs were, almost without exception, in the case of peace and justice. They were concerned for the prosperity of their work but did not act from motives of personal profit or prestige. If they intervened, it was because they could not avoid doing so and not because they sought for power.

The instructions to keep clear of politics put them under restraint. For all his influence, Jenkins was self-conscious about his participation in political affairs.
He consistently tried to dissociate himself from the officials or others who used him as an intermediary, and normally gave his advice to Faku only when it was requested. But for this restraint he might have been able to settle the problems which became so pernicious after his death. Had he pestered Wodehouse about the Currie line, his importunity might have provoked the High Commissioner to action. Had he advised the Amampondo how to deal with the request for Fort St. John's, he would probably have removed another stumbling block. On the other hand, this restraint prevented them from becoming mere political partisans or party hacks. The affair of Matthew Ben Shaw showed that even a missionary could not be impartial when he was personally involved. Jenkins was related to the principal traders in Pondoland, and had he been less inhibited, this connection might have led him astray.

It is a nice question whether the instructions were a blessing or a bane. The argument that political activity fell outside the sphere of the missionary is based upon a defective theology, for Christianity is concerned with every aspect of life. Furthermore, to have stood aside and let matters take their course would have been as political an act as to attempt to guide them in the paths of
peace. The instructions were never really interpreted in the strict sense, and on the whole the restraint was wise. The Wesleyan Missionaries derived much of their usefulness in political affairs from the fact that they endeavoured to keep the balance between sheer meddlesomeness and culpable neglect.
APPENDICES

A. The Maitland Treaty - 1844 ....... p.454

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C. Agreement............ 1886 ....... p.461
APPENDIX A.

THE MAITLAND TREATY - 1844.

Treaty of Amity entered into between His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Peregrine Maitland, Knight, Commander of the most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, of the Royal Military Order of William of the Netherlands, and of the Imperial Order of St. Waldimir of Russia, Colonel of Her Majesty's 17th Regiment of Foot, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Castle, Town and Settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, in South Africa, and of the Territories and Dependencies thereof, and Ordinary and Vice-Admiral of the same, Commanding the Forces, &c., &c., &c., - on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty, of the one part, and Faku, paramount Chief of the Amaponda Nation, of the other part.

I. There shall be peace and amity for ever between Her Britannic Majesty and her subjects, and Faku, the paramount Chief of the Amaponda nation, and his subjects, and Faku promises that he will continue to be the faithful friend of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and of all good subjects of her Majesty.

II. The contracting chief will not permit his subjects to harass or annoy the subjects of Her Majesty the Queen of England, who may pass through his country, or reside in it, with his permission, or who may be located in any British territory near the boundary of his country.

III. The contracting chief will use his best exertions to seize and deliver up to the nearest British authority, for trial according to law, all persons who shall have committed, or shall be reasonably suspected to have committed, any murder, robbery, or other offence.

1. Cape P.P.1857: Treaties entered into by Governors of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and other British authorities with native chieftains and others beyond the border of the colony between 1803 and 1854 - p.135
within the limits of the colony, or any of its parts or dependencies, and who shall be found in the territory of the said chief.

IV. Refugees and banditti belonging to other tribes, accused or suspected of having committed crimes within British territory, against the persons or property of British subjects, and who may have fled in order to escape punishment, shall find no hiding place in Faku's country, — but on the contrary, Faku engages that he will use his best exertions to seize all such persons, and deliver them up to the nearest British authority, in order that they may be tried, and, if guilty, punished.

V. The contracting chief undertakes to use his authority and influence to cause all persons within his territory, whose evidence may be required by any court of justice in any British territory in South Africa to appear at such time and place prescribed; and he will take care as much as possible, when delivering up any prisoner to any British authority, to produce, at the same time, to such authority, all witnesses acquainted with the matter in question, whose presence he can command or procure. The British Government, on the other hand, will be prepared to pay all witnesses, who shall attend any such court as has been mentioned, a reasonable compensation for their time and trouble.

VI. All cattle, horses, or other property, stolen in any British territory in South Africa, and traced into the territory of the contracting chief, shall, if found therein, be restored on demand of any proper British authority, together with full compensation for the entire value of whatever property not found, shall yet be proved to have been stolen at the same time; and in case none of the stolen property traced to the chief's territory shall be found therein, then full compensation shall be made for all the property so traced.

VII. All British subjects travelling between the territory of the Cape of Good Hope and Port Natal, with their servants and attendants, and also the native postmen or others employed in the transmission of letters, shall, at all times, be protected by the chief, and permitted to pursue their journey without hindrance or molestation.
VIII. All British subjects resorting temporarily to his country, or residing therein by permission of the chief, for purposes of trade or otherwise, shall be protected by him in their persons and property, but he will not suffer the masters or mariners of any ships or vessels to land merchandise, or to traffic with his people in any part of his country, unless such vessel shall be furnished with a licence from the Colonial Government, authorising them to land goods there.

IX. The contracting chief, having many years ago invited and received into his country Christian missionaries, for the instruction of his nation, hereby gives his true word and promise, that he will continue to be the friend of the missionaries; that he will protect the persons, families, and property of all persons engaged as Christian teachers in his country; that he will permit any of his subjects who desire it, to settle at or near any of the missionary villages or institutions within his territory, and to take their property there with them; that he will not allow any native Christian or inhabitant of a missionary village to be disturbed or injured in his person, family, or property, for refusing to comply with the customs touching witchcraft, rain-making, polygamy, circumcision, and forcible abduction and violation of females; and that he will encourage his people to cause the regular attendance of their children at the Christian schools, that they may be taught to read the word of God, and be gradually trained to become a civilised community.

X. The contracting chief, wishing to live in peace, hereby gives his true word and promise that he will, as far as possible, avoid making war on any of the tribes by whom he is surrounded, and, to that end, that he will endeavour to settle his disputes with other chiefs by peaceful methods; and if, in any case, his just rights and privileges shall be violated, and the offending chiefs refuse to give redress, he will call upon the colonial government to mediate between him and the other chiefs, so that war may, if possible, be prevented.

XI. The contracting chief, as the faithful friend of the colonial government, will be ready at all times, when called upon by that government, to aid and assist the colony with all his captains and warriors in any enterprise which may be necessary for the protection of the colony, or the promotion of the general welfare and security.
XII. The Governor of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, knowing that for many years past the contracting chief has been a faithful friend of the subjects of her Britannic Majesty, hereby gives his word and promise that the British Government will continue its friendship and favour towards Faku, paramount chief of the Amaponda nation, so long as he remains a faithful friend of the colony; and as a proof of his friendship, the Governor, admitting the rightful claim long since made by Faku, hereby acknowledges that he is the paramount chief of the whole territory lying betwixt the Umtata River from its mouth to the Waterfall wagon ford, thence along the ancient line of boundary between the Amaponda and Tambookie nations, to the Kahlamba mountain, on the west, and the Umzimkulu, from its mouth along the principal western branch, to its source in the Kahlamba mountains, on the east, and from the coast inland to a line to be drawn along the base of the Kahlamba range of mountains between the sources of the said rivers.

XIII. The British Government will secure this territory to the contracting chief against all claims or pretensions on the part of British subjects; but the rights of all petty chiefs who have at any period heretofore resided upon any part of the said territory remain unaltered, and they will be at liberty to reside within the said territory in the same manner as they did before they were disturbed by the wars with the Zoolah nation.

XIV. The British Government will also afford the contracting chief as much aid and assistance as possible, in order to protect the Amaponda nation from unjust and unprovoked aggressions, and to enable the contracting chief to fulfil his engagements entered into by this treaty.

XV. The Colonial Government engages that it will cause its best efforts to be made to apprehend any persons residing at the time within any part of the colonial territories in South Africa, whether British subjects or otherwise, who have committed, or are reasonably suspected to have committed, any crime against the persons or property of the subjects of Faku, within his territory, and to deliver them up, to be dealt with according to the laws of the colony, and to be tried in the colony, and will use its influence and authority to cause all persons residing within the said territories, whether British subjects or otherwise, whose evidence may be required upon such cases, to appear at the time and place prescribed, and will
cause all such witnesses to be paid a reasonable remuneration for their time and trouble in attending to give their evidence.

XVI. The Colonial Government further engages, as a mark of friendship, to cause an annual present of useful articles, or money, to the amount of seventy five pounds sterling per annum, to be made to the chief Faku, so long as he continues to observe the terms of this treaty, and to remain the faithful friend of this colony.

This done at Fort Beaufort, this 7th day of October, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-four.

P. MAITLAND, Governor.

Signed and sealed in our presence:

John Montagu, Secretary to Government.
J. Moore Craig.

This done at Faku's Residence, this Twenty-third day of November, in the year of our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-four.

Marks of Faku, Paramount Chief.
X Damas, Chief's principal Son.

Signed and sealed in our presence:

T. Shepstone, Resident Diplomatic Agent to the Slambie Tribes.
W.M.D. Fynn, Resident Diplomatic Agent to the Amacaleka Tribe.
Thos. Jenkins, Wesleyan Missionary.

Umciwengi X Faku's brother.
Bangazita X Their marks.
Cingo X Faku's son.
Umvinjelwa X Faku's brother.
Councillor.
APPENDIX B.

PROCLAMATION ANNOUNCING ANNEXATION OF

PORT ST. JOHN'S - 6 SEPTEMBER 1878.

"The various tribes of Pondo's having been protected from the Zulus and other enemies by the British Government, and having by their friendly conduct shown their gratitude for such protection, were admitted by Sir Peregrine Maitland, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Colony, to treaty arrangements with the British Government in 1844.

The terms of the Treaty were extremely favourable to the Pondos, securing to them the friendship and protection of the British Government, and in return the Pondos bound themselves to a position of allegiance to the British Crown, undertaking, among other conditions, to afford no shelter to the enemies of the British Government, and to surrender to justice all criminals accused of offences in British territory, who might take refuge in Pondoland.

To this treaty, Faku, who was then paramount Chief, and his son Damas, both since deceased, were parties.

When Umquikela succeeded Faku as paramount Chief, he was admitted to all the rights and privileges enjoyed by his father.

But of late years Umquikela has not followed in his father's footsteps, by behaving as his father did towards the British Government.

He has knowingly harboured criminals who had committed murder in British territory.

He has repeatedly refused to deliver such murderers up to justice, assigning no good cause for his refusal, and treating the demands of the British Government and its officers with neglect, and has evinced in many ways an unfriendly and hostile disposition towards the Government.

Lately, when rebellion was attempted in a neighbouring British district, he not only gave friendly shelter to one of the rebel leaders, but sent him back into British territory with an escort, which took part in acts of plunder and threats of murder to European Colonists, joined the rebel camp, and after hostilities had commenced, and Colonial subjects had been plundered, made prisoners and murdered, only surrendered and laid down their arms when they saw that resistance to the force embodied by the magistrate, T. P.P. 1878-9 LII (C2252); Enclosure in Frere to Hicks Beach, 26.12.78.
Captain Blyth, for the restoration of order was hopeless.

Even then Umquikela made no offer of reparation, amends, or even of apology, but maintained his attitude of contemptuous disregard of the remonstrances and demands of the British Government, till a force of Her Majesty's troops approached his borders, he then, through his agents, admitted his breach of his treaty arrangements, and offered to pay a fine of 1,000 head of cattle.

But Her Majesty's Government does not desire to take his cattle. The ingratitude and misbehaviour of Umquikela and his servants would have justified the forfeiture of all the power and property he possesses as a Chief, but, bearing in mind the former good conduct of the late Faku and his people, the Government decides to inflict only such punishment as is absolutely necessary to obtain security against any repetition of such misconduct in future.

The following terms are the terms therefore, which are imposed on Umquikela:

He will no longer be recognised as paramount Chief of the Pondos. The sons of Damas, and all other Chiefs formerly subordinate to Faku, who have behaved loyally to Her Majesty's Government, and who now desire to come under direct relations with that Government, will be allowed to deal directly with the British Government as the sole paramount authority in Pondoland, through residents or magistrates, who will be appointed to manage all relations between the Pondos and the Government.

Umquikela will not be permitted to exercise any control or authority over the navigation of the St. John's River. The sovereignty over the port and tidal estuary of that river is declared to be vested henceforth solely in Her Majesty's Government, and officers will be appointed on behalf of that Government to control its navigation and to levy any customs or port dues which it may be determined to impose.

All Chiefs and people are hereby required to obey any orders of Her Majesty's Government which they may receive through the Resident.

As long as the Pondos are loyal to Her Majesty's Government they will be protected in the peaceful enjoyment of their lives and property, and will be aided in every way to advance their own prosperity.
APPENDIX C.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN CAPE COLONY AND
PONDO CHIEFS - 9 DECEMBER 1886.

Unto all to whom these presents shall come. Be it
known and hereby made manifest that on this, the ninth
day of December in the year of our Lord 1886, the following
Articles of Agreement have been made and entered into
between Walter Ernest Mortimer Stanford Esq., in his
capacity as Chief Magistrate of East Griqualand, and as
such acting for and on behalf of the Government of the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope of the first and the
chiefs "Sigcau", "Masipula", "Hamu", "Manundu", "Umblangaso"
and Josiah Jenkins (as their secretary), acting for and
on behalf of the Pondo Chief Umqikela, his heirs and suc­
cessors, and on behalf of the Pondo nation of the second
part: Witnesseth

Whereas differences have arisen between the said
Colonial Government and the said Pondo chief Umqikela,
with reference to the unsatisfactory condition of the
border in the neighbourhood of Mount Ayliff and Mount
Frere, the hindrance of traffic through East Pondoland,
owing to the unwillingness felt by the Pondo's for the
construction of a road from East Griqualand to the port
of St. John's, and as to the compensation about to be
awarded them for the annexation of St. John's River ter­
ritory and the Xesibe country. Now, therefore, for
finally concluding and adjusting the same, it is hereby
agreed by the said chiefs acting for and on behalf of the
said Chief Umqikela and the Pondo nation as follows:-

1st. The said Umqikela, for himself, his heirs and suc­
cessors, and on behalf of the Pondo nation, hereby
undertakes to properly control the border of his
territory in the neighbourhood of Mount Ayliff and
Mount Frere, to suppress stock or other thefts by
following up spoor, capturing thieves and punishing
them according to Pondo law, restoring stolen stock,
to make compensation to owners, and further engages
to hand over to the Colonial Government all thieves,
other criminals, and suspects who may take refuge
in Eastern Pondoland, and undertakes generally to
promote the interests of justice and good order be­
tween the said Colonial Government and the Pondo Nation.

1. P.P.1887 LXI (C5022): Enclosure in Torrens to
Stanhope, 15.12.86.
2nd. The said Umgikela for himself, his heirs and successors, and on behalf of the Pondo nation, hereby concedes to the Colonial Government the right to enter in, make, construct, and maintain the road through Eastern Pondoland to the mouth of the St. John's River, following the existing line as far as practicable, granting unto them all such outspans and grazing rights as may be required, and the free and undisturbed use of such road, exempt of all tolls, or other charges whatever.

3rd. The said Umgikela for himself, his heirs and successors, and on behalf of the Pondo nation, owing to existing complications between the Fingo headman Nota, and the Pondo residents in that portion of his territory called the Rode, and in order to conclude the same, hereby cedes, assigns, transfers and absolutely alienates for ever, unto, and on behalf of, the said Colonial Government, the said Rode, being all that piece of ground lying to the north and west of the main waggon road, from the Mueba to the waggon drift known as Venus or Dabula's on the Umzimvubu River, the said waggon road to constitute the boundary with the right to enter in, take possession of, and govern the same for and in consideration of the payment by the said Colonial Government, to the said Umgikela, his heirs or successors, of the sum of £600.

4th. The said Umgikela for himself, his heirs or successors, and on behalf of the Pondo nation, hereby renounces all claim to any compensation he may have heretofore had to the territories known as St. John's River and Xesibeland in consideration of the payment to him, his heirs or successors, of an annual subsidy of £200 for St. John's territory, and a lump sum of £1,000 for Xesibeland.

5th. The said Walter Ernest Mortimer Stanford in his aforesaid capacity, and acting for and on behalf of the Colonial Government, in order to promote the better control, good order, and administration of justice on the said border, hereby reciprocates the several stipulations and conditions in clause 1 herein—before agreed upon.

6th. For and in consideration of the cession of the Rode to the Colonial Government the said Walter Ernest Mortimer Stanford in his aforesaid capacity, on behalf of the said Colonial Government, undertakes to pay to the said Umgikela, his heirs or successors, the sum of £600 for and in consideration of the
renunciation by him of all claim against the Colonial Government for the annexation of St. John's River Territory, an annual subsidy of £200, and for and in consideration of the renunciation of all claim against the Colonial Government for the annexation of Xesibeland, a lump sum of £1,000.

In witness whereof the said parties have hereunto set their hands at Ntola's kraal, in Eastern Pondoland, the day, the month, and year aforesaid, in the presence of the undersigned as witnesses.

W.E. Stanford, Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand.
Sigoan (sic), his X mark.
Hamu, his X mark.
Umhlangaso J.S. Faku.
Josiah Jenkins, Secretary.

Witnesses:
Zach S. Bayly, Colonel; Senior Officer, Colonial forces.
P. Hargreaves.
D. Strachan, O.C. Abalondolozi Regiment.

Note: The word "outspans" used in Clause 2 does not mean defined areas, but merely the use of pasturage, firewood and water.
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PRIMARY SOURCES (OFFICIAL)

A. PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE

(a) Manuscript:

1. Original Correspondence to Secretary of State
   (Despatches from Colonies and enclosures;
    Letters from Public Offices and Individuals).
   C.O.417, volumes 1-12: South Africa 1884-86.

   The despatches, enclosures and minutes have been
   the main source. After 1874 a large number of des-
  patches were destroyed, but directions for finding
   printed copies are given in the Registers of Corres-
  pondence (See below). Minutes have been preserved.

   2. Entry Books of Correspondence from Secretary of State.
      C.O.49, volumes 21-62: Cape of Good Hope 1827-1872.
      C.O.405, volumes 1-7: Natal 1852-1872.

      This series has only been consulted occasionally.
      References in the footnotes are usually to the drafts
      which are bound with the despatches from South Africa.

   3. Registers of Correspondence: (Inwards)
      C.O.714, volume 40 (IND 18492): Analytical Index:
       Cape of Good Hope, 1815-70.
      C.O.336, volumes 1-12 (IND 12953-12963, 15390):
       Cape of Good Hope, 1850-1891.
      C.O.714, volume 103 (IND 18567): Alphabetical Index:
       Natal 1850-70.
      C.O.545, volumes 1 and 2 (IND 15374, 15617): South
       Africa, 1884-88.
4. Register of Out Letters:


(b) Printed: Confidential Prints. C.O.806.

Vol. 48: 1875, Cape: Cape and Griqualand West; papers (Afr. 83).
" 74: 1875, War between Transvaal Republic and Native Tribes, correspondence (Afr. 110)
" 98: 1876-7, South Africa: Further Correspondence (Afr. 142)
" 103: 1877-8, South Africa: Affairs; further correspondence (Afr. 147)
" 109: 1878, South Africa: Affairs, further correspondence (Afr. 154)
" 149: 1879, South Africa: Affairs, further correspondence (Afr. 204)
" 169: 1880, Cape: Affairs of Basutoland; correspondence (Afr. 225)
" 187: 1881-2, South Africa: Affairs, further correspondence (Afr. 243)
" 239: 1883-5, Cape: Pondoland; correspondence (Afr. 294)
" 260: 1886, Cape: Affairs of Pondoland; further correspondence (Afr. 313)

B. SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES

Supplementary material was gathered from documents in the Cape and Natal Archives.

The following list indicates those volumes which proved relevant:

CAPE ARCHIVES (Prefixed Cape)

Manuscript:
GH 1/69: Enclosures to Despatches from Sec. of State, 1875
GH 8/25: Civil Commissioner, British Kaffraria, 1854.
GH 8/48: Native Chiefs, Residents, Eastern Frontier, 1856-84.
GH 8/49: Letters Received: Semi-Official, 1854-6.
GH 8/50: " " " 1857-8.
GH 8/58: Enclosures to Despatches from Sec. of State, 1862.
GH 9/1: Letters from Secretary of Volksraad, Captain Smith and Secretary-to-Governor, Natal, 1842-8.
GH 14/1: Border Tribes and Diplomatic Agents, 1839-46.
GH 18/6: Letters from Private Individuals, 1850-62.
GH 19/4: Border Tribe Treaties and Miscellaneous Documents.
GH 19/5: Border Tribe Treaties, 1836-45.
GH 19/6: Copies of Treaties, 1843-5.
GH 19/12: St. John's River Mouth Expedition, 1878.
(There is a gap between March and August 1844)
GH 30/5: " " " 1858-60.
GH 30/6: " " " 1861.
GH 30/16: " " " 1862-60.
BK 77: Transkeian Magistrate, 1854-6.
C.O.1329: Despatches from Secretary of State, 1841.

NATAL ARCHIVES (Prefixed Natal)

Manuscript:
CSO 1, 11, 19, 37, 41 : Colonial Secretary's Office: letters received and despatched.
MA Misc. Letters, 1846-9, NA1, SNA 1/1/1 - 1/1/18: Native Affairs Dept: Letters received and despatched.
C. BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

( ) denotes Command number.
(( )) denotes Sessional number.

1847 XXXVIII (786): Correspondence re... the Kaffir tribes, 1845-6.
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1852-3 LXVI (1635): Correspondence re Kaffir tribes.
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1854-5 XXXVIII (1969): Correspondence re Governor Grey and Orange River Territory, 1853-5.
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1862 XXXVI (293): Natal, Correspondence, 1861-2.
1868-9 XLIII (4140): Correspondence re status of Basutos, 1861-9.
1871 XLVII (6459): Cape, Correspondence, 1866-71.
1877 LX (61748): Transvaal, Native Affairs, 1875-6.
1877 LX (61776): Papers re Annexation of Transvaal, 1876-7.
1878 LV (61961): S.A., Correspondence, 1877-8.
1878 LVI (62144): S.A., Further Correspondence, 1877-8.
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<td>(C2821): Correspondence re Basutoland, 1880-1.</td>
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D. CAPE PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS. (Cape P.P.)

1857 | Votes and Proceedings. |
1857 | Treaties entered into by Governors of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and other British Authorities, with Native Chieftains and Others beyond the border of the Colony between the years 1803 and 1854 |
1857 | Correspondence between His Excellency Sir G. Grey, K.C.B. and Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the affairs of the Cape Colony, Natal and Adjacent Territories. |
1858 | Votes and Proceedings. |
1869 C3 Report of Select Committee of Legislative Council on Native Question.

1873 A10 Return to an Address from the Honourable the House of Assembly, dated 29.4.73, for "the Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs".

1873 A12 Report of Select Committee on Native Affairs.

1874 G27 Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1873.

1875 G21 Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1874.

1876 G37 Report of a Commission appointed.... to inquire into the affairs of.... Griqualand East.

1877 G12 Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1877.

1880 A41 Secretary of State's Despatch on the Extension of British rule in South Africa and the annexation of Pondoland.


1880 A69 Appendix to Mr Brownlee's Report on Pondo affairs.

1880 A105 Pondo affairs: Return of Papers on the subject of.....

1883 G92 Reports and communications relating to affairs in Pondoland and disputes between Ponds and Xesibes.

1886 G30 Minutes, reports and correspondence respecting affairs in Pondoland and the Baca-Pando disturbances.

1887 G10 Memorandum on the Pondo settlement of December 1886 and the events which led to it.

1887 G10a Supplementary Correspondence on the Pondo settlement.
The indexing of those archives had not yet been completed. The letters and District Minutes are arranged in boxes under Districts, with the exception of a few outgoing letter books which contain letters to all parts of the field.

1. **Letters and Journals of Missionaries:**

   - 1820-5 South Africa
   - 1825-30 Albany
   - 1830-4 Albany
   - 1834-57 Albany
   - 1853-63 Natal
   - 1863-67 Natal
   - 1874-76 Natal
   - 1876-85 Natal (Relevant until 1880)
   - 1881-85 Clarkebury
   - 1883-90 South African Conference (Relevant for 1885-1886)

The bulk of the correspondence from Albany and Natal for the years 1837-1857 is missing.

2. **Box of documents relating to the visit of the Rev. John Kilner to South Africa - 1880:**

   Letters from missionaries and copy books of Kilner's letters to missionaries and others. (Referred to as KB in footnotes).

3. **District Minutes:**

   Minutes of the District Meetings of the Albany, Natal and Bechuana Districts.

   Some of these have been damaged in storage and cannot be consulted.
4. Outgoing Letters:

The following letter books were consulted but yielded little of value:

1. August 1820 - September 1845.
2. June 1864 - March 1873; June 1873 - July 1877.
3. October 1884 - December 1893.

Printed:

1. Missionary Notices.

Published monthly throughout the period, these Notices consist mainly of extracts from letters and journals. They proved especially useful for the period 1837-57.

2. Instructions to Wesleyan Missionaries.

A printed document. Copy dated 30.9.34.

3. Minutes of Conference.

These contain details of missionaries' stations, obituaries, and other material of incidental interest.

4. Annual Reports.

B. JENKINS PRIVATE PAPERS. (JP)

Typescript copies of 171 letters and documents of a private and semi-official nature, dated between 1838 and 1880.

This selection was made by Dr C.J. Uys from a wider collection in the Library of the University of Witwatersrand, and the copy consulted is deposited in the Methodist Missionary Society Archives.

I have not had access to the wider collection, but the inventory indicates that the selection contains the bulk of the material relevant to the subject of this thesis.
C. SHEPSTONE PAPERS. (Natal SP)

Manuscript private papers of Sir Theophilus Shepstone and Mr Henrique G. Shepstone, deposited in the Natal Archives.

Relevant material was obtained in the following boxes:

- **SP 8** Diaries of T. Shepstone.
- **SP 14** Including letters from T. Shepstone to G.C. Cato.
- **SP 17** Including letters from T. Shepstone to Mrs Jenkins.
- **SP 27** Diaries of H.C. Shepstone.
- **SP 29** Letters from T. Shepstone to H.C. Shepstone.

D. STANFORD PAPERS. (St.P)

Manuscript diaries and Correspondence of Sir Walter Stanford deposited in the Library of the University of Cape Town.

Relevant material was found in

1. Diaries, 1884-1887.
2. Forty letters from the Rev. Peter Hargreaves to Walter Stanford, dated between 17.11.85 and 19.11.87. (Ca1/85 - Ca13/87).

E. HARGREAVES PAPERS.

Manuscript diaries and fragmentary correspondence of the Rev. Peter Hargreaves, deposited in the Archives of the Methodist Book Room, Cape Town.

HD: Diaries 1832, 1834, 1835, 1836, 1837.

Methodist Book Room File 9: Miscellaneous letters and other documents.

F. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE REV. WILLIAM SHAW AND THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT.

Manuscript copies of Shaw's correspondence with Cape officials between 30.12.40 and 15.3.44 in connection with the Ncapha Affair, deposited in the Archives of the Methodist Historical Society of South Africa, Livingstone House, Grahamstown.
473.

G. ANTI-SLAVERY PAPERS.


Manuscript:

(a) Correspondence received by F.W. Chesson, Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, from:

C126/67: W. Playdell Bouverie, 13.11.83.
C134/118: Alderman Fowler, 15.3.83.
(Enclosures in 207: C138/208-9: P. Hargreaves to J.J. Irvine, 6 and 13.8.86.)

C141/296, 298-300: Mrs E.J. MacNicholas.
C141/297, 301-5: E.B.H. MacNicholas, 23.6.82 and 7.2.84 - 16.8.84.
C147/175-197: Saul Solomon, 8.10.78 - 9.1.83.
C149(I)/103-6: Umqikela, 1.8.83 - 12.7.84.

(b) Miscellaneous Correspondence.

C132/225-32: L.L. Dillwyn to Derby, 12.4.83 - 27.5.84.
C160/181: Umhlangaso to Oxland, 27.10.83.

Printed:

Miscellaneous Press Cuttings:

C133/178: "Kaffrarian Watchman" 10.2.82.
Welborne to High Commissioner 27.12.81, 28.12.81.
Welborne to Oxland, 8.11.81.

C10 "Kokstad Advertiser" 2.6.83.
Warrant for arrest of H.W. Welborne, issued at Great Place, 15.6.82.
Letter from "An Old Pondo Trader" 25.5.83.
H. WODEHOUSE PRIVATE PAPERS.


I. CORY COLLECTION: (manuscript)

Memoranda of Sir G. Cory, deposited in the Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. Two items proved of particular interest:

1226: J. Burnet's views on Free State affairs. Memoranda on his correspondence by J.M. Orpen.

1263/4 "Boers and Bacas": A Memorandum by Donald Strachan, with notes by J.M. Orpen.

J. NEWSPAPERS

Occasional reference has been made to the following newspapers and periodicals:

England: The Times

Cape: Cape Argus

Christian Express

Grahamstown Journal

Natal: Natal Mercury

Natal Witness

Cuttings from certain other newspapers were found in other sources, and where these have been used, reference has been made to the source concerned.
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MAP I

- THE TREATY STATE -

and subsequent modifications

(Sketch map adapted from Walker: An Historical Atlas of South Africa.)
MAP III

THE AMAMPONO AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS