KARL BARTH'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESURRECTION:

ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND CONTRAST

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SHORTER ABSTRACT

on

"Karl Barth's Understanding of the Resurrection:
Analysis, Discussion and Contrast"

by Anthony Thacker
(Regent's Park College, Oxford)

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Trinity Term, 1983 [i.e. [illegible]]

The thesis argues that Barth's dogmatic theology provides the appropriate model for theology and the correct context for understanding his treatment of the resurrection: many critiques fail by attacking symptoms, not cause; and the underlying cause - his dogmatic method, while wide-ranging - is affirmed here. This is done without relapsing into uncritical "Barthian fundamentalism"; indeed, many aspects of his theology of resurrection are subjected to considerable criticism here.

Part One of this thesis covers Barth's earlier pilgrimage - from his "liberal" era, through his break with liberalism to his fully fledged "dialectical" theology. In this context, the resurrection is seen to move from the peripheral, via the realistic (as expression of God's power), to the epistemologically important.

In Part Two, Barth's virgin birth/empty tomb parallelism is discussed - and shown to lack a biblical basis. His talk of the 'forty days' of the Easter period is seen as suppressing Pauline in favour of Lucan chronology, and his idea of this time as the 'pure presence of God' is problematic. The place of the resurrection in IV/1-4 is analysed and discussed. The Klappert/Pannenberg debate on the interpretation of §59 is explored, and Klappert's account is largely rejected. Barth's architectonics are explored, and seen to be a means of distortion in his theology, inflating the relevance of revelation. And Barth's reduction of resurrection to revelation alone is seen to have deleterious effects on his anthropology, pneumatology and ethics.

Finally, Barth's theology is set in contrast - first with Pannenberg, then more generally. Pannenberg's approach is shown to be suspect in the first chapter, and in the second, methodologies are differentiated: phenomenology, apologetics and merely apparent dogmatics are rejected. Barth's own consistent dogmatic method is affirmed, even if, as the recapitulation of conclusions shows, the details of his theology of resurrection can be challenged and improved.

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Trinity Term, 1983

LONGER ABSTRACT

on

"Karl Barth's Understanding of the Resurrection: Analysis, Discussion and Contrast"

by Anthony Thacker

(Regent's Park College, Oxford)

The challenge of the theology of Karl Barth is an inescapable theme for modern theology. This thesis is written from the viewpoint that in the most fundamental matters, in methodological archetype, his programme of Church Dogmatics, Barth was right, and he presents a serious challenge to the many traditions that try to continue theology without properly examining presuppositions which conflict with the proper theme of theology - God's gracious approach to man in Jesus Christ in his self-revelation and reconciliation of the world. The thesis also maintains that within this context much theological work still needs to be done: Barth is not infallible! The thesis follows the theme of the resurrection in Barth's theology - certainly an important theme for him. It shows that many attacks on Barth's theology of resurrection (or aspects, or implications of it) collapse, because they fail to see the self-consistency of Barth's approach in the features they attack: Barth's theology must be understood in its context, so, many attacks need to make an assault on this context if they are going to touch Barth. However, within its context also there are vulnerable features of his theology of resurrection, and many of these are pursued, with weaknesses high-lighted, and some suggestions are made for alternative ways of conceiving things so as to avoid these weaknesses.

The thesis opens with an appetizer, giving the flavour of Barth's approach to the resurrection in three different periods. Then his theology before his break with liberalism is covered, in the context of which, his critical sympathy with pietism is noted, and comments are made on the controversial issue of the role of socialism in this break. The break and the change in outlook, and the impact of new influences is explored, and shown up in his sermons of 1917 and his Romans commentary of 1919. With respect to the resurrection, the change is explored between its virtual submergence before 1914 under the concept of the inner life, and its appearance as a striking theme, exemplifying the power of God in Christ. The final chapter in Part One deals with this theme in Barth's "dialectical phase", i.e., c.1920-24 - especially his second (1922) Romans commentary and his 1 Corinthians commentary. Barth's radicalisation of the conception of the resurrection is examined, as is the move to see its significance primarily in an epistemological context, viz. as symbol of the disjunction between human knowledge and divine revelation.

The development of Barth's theology of resurrection in the move via Christian dogmatics to Church dogmatics (c.1926-1937) is explored in relation to the emergence of Barth's interesting attempt to see as parallel signs of the incarnation and resurrection respectively, the virgin birth and empty tomb, a growth which flowers in I/2 but has a background in the Christliche Dogmatik. This imaginative exposition is discussed in the context of modern theology (namely the critiques of Louth and Pannenberg) and in the biblical context. Our conclusion from the latter discussion is that the biblical basis will not support Barth's construction, since the virgin birth has a different context, and the resurrection is always scripturally linked with the twin signs, negative and positive, of empty tomb and appearances.

Barth's talk in I/2 and III/2 of the revelation of "the pure presence of God" in the "forty days" between Easter and Ascension is analysed and discussed. The implications of his elevation of the significance of the transfiguration for the uniqueness of the resurrection, and of his suppression of Pauline chronology of 1 Corinthians 15:3-8 in favour of the Lucan "forty days", with Paul's conversion a mere "epilogue", are examined. The suppression of biblical features - here in favour of the Lucan chronology - is challenged. Barth's tantalising expression 'the pure presence of God' is explored with respect to parallel comments on II/1 and III/2. In this context, problems in Barth's treatment of revelation, eschatology and time are aired. In this chapter, Barth's concept of time, biblicism and use of history are discussed with relation to the critiques of Roberts, Diem and Harvey, respectively.

Barth's most extended treatment of the resurrection is found in his doctrine of reconciliation (IV/1-4, where its significance is clear not only in the individual treatments (especially in §§59.3, 64.2, 64.4, 69.4, 75.1), but in its strategic significance as the theme in the "transitional discussions": it is pivotal in Barth's expression of the significance of Jesus for us, i.e., for his transition from Christology in the narrower sense to anthropology and pneumatology within the sphere of reconciliation. This significance of the resurrection, as the theme especially of §59.3, has been challenged by Klappert. So the task of Chapter 7 is purely analytical: first the complex structure of the volume, then the place of the resurrection and finally, the soteriological role, are all analysed.

In Chapter 8, three main areas are discussed. First, the interpretation of §59 is considered in relation to the controversy between Klappert and Pannenberg. While Klappert's insights into the radical interfusion of the person and work of Christ in Barth's mature theology are appreciated, many features of his account are challenged. His defence of Barth against Pannenberg's critique by asserting the possibility of five christological methods over against Pannenberg's "from above"/"from below" distinction, and by seeing Barth's Christology as "conjointly from above and below in the history of the humiliation in the cross" is shown to be a misunderstanding of Barth and of Pannenberg. Further his models of correlation of the dimensions of the Christ-event, with his talk of subsumption of various aspects under other aspects of the Christ-event, while having some insight, is shown to be too rigid, misleading, and unusable in his presentation of his defence of Barth: O'Collins' more modest application of the insight is preferred. Thus Pannenberg is vindicated over against Klappert's attack - but Barth himself is vindicated over against Pannenberg's critique. In this context the validity and intelligibility of the "from above"/"from below" distinction is examined with respect to Sykes' attack on the confusions of the distinction. While some of the confusions in the different uses of the distinction are uncovered, the intelligibility of the distinction and the possibility and relevance of it are defended.

Barth's intricate use and interweaving of structures and sub-structures and his radical interfusion of originally separate themes in IV/1-4 are discussed. The consensus view of Barth's "magnificent symmetry" is noted - and rejected. It is argued that the formal parallelism in IV/1-3 hides a massive asymmetry, and that this asymmetrical dimension - supremely though not only in his organising on parallel lines the 'non-material' part-volume IV/3 with IV/1 and IV/2 - serves his purposes in aiding further inflation of the function of revelation in his theology. Above all, the fusion of the three offices with the two states and two natures is shown to be the reason for the imbalance, one-sidedness and distortion caused by Barth's asymmetrical parallelism. In all this, there are many distortions of individual themes, including a distortion in his strategic use of the resurrection.

Finally, Barth's narrowing down of the resurection to revelation alone - a narrowing down achieved with ruthless consistency in IV/1-4 - is challenged. The implications are examined first within Barth's doctrine of the resurrection itself, but then also in relation to those themes that arise out the resurrection, i.e., via the "transitional discussions" into anthropology, pneumatology and ethics. The resurrection itself, it is argued, is seen in terms which, apart from the stress on its concrete historicity, seem similar to the Bultmannian idea that it is merely "the noetic converse of the cross". Further, there is a contradiction in Barth's trinitarian exposition of the resurrection between the Father's exclusive role and the Son's own self-attesting role in the resurrection - a contradiction which may arise for Barth due to the parallel tension between justification and sanctification, and being lifted from that sphere, where the tension may coherently be maintained, and placed into the sphere of the resurrection, where the result is confusion and contradiction. Problems in Barth's many three-fold patterns of the resurrection are discussed, and also the question of the subjective and objective dimension of revelation in Easter and Pentecost.

The anthropological, pneumatological and ethical implications are discussed mainly in connection with various critiques. First, his exposition of sin and evil is considered, and the underlying theme, his understanding of the Void in *III/3*. Barth is defended against the attacks of Wingren and Hick, Wolgschaft and Härle - though the latter two are shown to have made some important points in criticism of Barth. The reduction of the problem of evil to a cognitive one only is noted. Barth's exposition of man in grace, especially his justification, is discussed with respect to the critiques of Küng and Bouillard. The reduction to noetic categories of the positive dimension of anthropology comes through clearly in the discussion, and is also just as clear in Barth's pneumatology, where first we consider his ecclesiology. The contributions of O'Grady and Scott are assessed. In the section on virtues, Outka's treatment of Barth on *agape* is discussed. Finally, in the ethical discussion, Barth's ethical treatment of baptism is weighed up, in relation to the interpretations of it given by Jüngel and Cochrane.

The interpretation of this thesis is that Barth's theology is in marked contrast in its methodological archetype in comparison to most other current models. To illustrate this there is, in the final part, first a particular contrast - with Pannenberg - before the general methodological contrast is discussed.

Pannenberg's contribution is assessed on its own ground, and shown to be problematic in its reduction of the resurrection to its epistemological function (a fault he has in common with Barth) - though most recent essays show an attempt to broaden things a little; but on its present basis, Pannenberg's account is a reduction of the N.T. picture. The suspect features of Pannenberg's eschatology and idea of history are discussed and seen as considerable. Pannenberg's epistemology is also challenged, and his ambiguous attitude to apologetics noted. In terms of methodological archetype, Pannenberg's approach is seen as broadly apologetic.

The final chapter brings the methodological discussion to a head. Very broadly, three different methodological archetypes in theology are differentiated: dogmatic, apologetic and phenomenological. It is shown that many apparently dogmatic methodologies - e.g., notably in popular, or academic fundamentalism - are riddled with apologetic. It is demonstrated that the phenomenological method is impossible. In this connexion, the attempts of Hick and Cupitt to work on the basis of pure openness to the data are shown to be based on an underlying, unacknowledged apologetic. Apologetic methodology - the majority option - is then examined and concluded to be unacceptable, because it is fraudulent and self-defeating. The dogmatic method, and especially that of Karl Barth, is vindicated as the only honest and appropriate one for Christian theology. However, it is recognised that such a conclusion does not warrant uncritical acceptance of all Barth wrote - and in this context, our conclusions from the thesis relating to problematic features of his theology of resurrection are recapitulated.

To Helen

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PREFACE

PREFACE

According to T.F.Torrance, Karl Barth is "the great Church Father of Evangelical Christendom, the one genuine doctor of the Universal Church the modern era has known".[1] Others concur - Pope Pius XII even called Barth "the greatest theologian since St. Thomas Aquinas". Also, the centrality of the place of the resurrection in Christian theology is widely recognised, as is its role in the New Testament as the (explicit or implicit) basis throughout of all that is said. And this agreement remains, despite controversy about the manner and direct theological significance of the resurrection. Our theme therefore concerns a doctrine of central significance in the treatment of a theologian of central importance. However, as Gerald O'Collins says:

> Nowadays it is in some circles a "mistake" to praise Barth and his theology of the resurrection. it has become conventional to dismiss his contribution by pointing to his dubious claim on the historical nature of Easter. He attributes genuine historical character to the resurrection and yet denies historians the right to pronounce on the matter![2]

This thesis will have succeeded in one main aim if it acquits Barth of this charge. However, linked with this is another main proposition of our thesis: Barth's theology - especially his mature theology - has such an integrated structure, with originally separate themes interwoven into a massive, complex and beautiful design, that no single theme like the resurrection can be treated in isolation without considerable distortion and misunderstanding, (the misunderstanding encouraging the misjudgment of the alleged "mistake"). Barth himself has made this principle of his dogmatics clear: "Strictly speaking, in dogmatics and in Church preaching every single statement is at once the basis and content of all the rest" (II/1, p. 257). This is the reason for the great length and complexity of the Church Dogmatics as also of Barth's individual sentences. The integratedness of Barth's approach reaches its height in IV/1-4 which we therefore treat as a whole, which, in chapters seven and eight, forms the centre of our thesis. Because of this principle of coinherence in Barth's writing, we consider his treatment of the resurrection within the overall context of his theology. This leads us, as the thesis proceeds, into wide-ranging discussions of the general character of his theology - his attitude to biblical exegesis and hermeneutics, to history and philosophy, and above all the overall nature of his theology, what we call its "methodological archetype", namely its character as dogmatics . As we proceed, these broader aspects of Barth's theology arise in conjunction with the various aspects of resurrection we raise. However, we also need to face these issues more directly than as incidental themes. Consequently, in Part Three - "Contrasts" - we shall consider the great contrast between Barth's theology and much other theology, first by discussing a particular contrast - with Pannenberg - and then the more general and fundamental nature of the contrast between Barth's dogmatic theology and those with the methodological archetype Barth rejects (i.e., apologetic, etc.). Thus our conclusion raises associated methodological questions as well as completing our study on the resurrection itself.

Before our concluding chapters, we need to have obtained a good understanding of what Barth is actually saying (for it is here where many critiques fail: they attack a Barth of their own construction, not the Barth of his own construction) and also to make a vigorous discussion of what he says on the resurrection and the implications which arise from that. This analysis and discussion we shall make in two parts. In the first part, we consider, over three chapters, the material preceding the Church Dogmatics, assessing three successive phases of Barth's thought: pre-Barthian; pre-dialectical; and pre-dogmatic. In the second part - the heart of the thesis - our treatment of Barth's Church Dogmatics is thematic. We focus on three main themes: his stress on the parallel between the virgin birth as "sign" of the incarnation and the empty tomb as "sign" of the resurrection; his repeated use of the phrase "the forty days" and his understanding of that time as that of "the pure presence of God"; and finally (and by its nature the most comprehensive aspect) his understanding of the role of the resurrection in his Doctrine of Reconciliation (=C.D.,IV/1-4), which occupies us for two chapters. The second part is concluded with a brief treatment of the extent of continuity or development in Barth's theology of the resurrection in this mature period.

An 'appetizer' is given in the first chapter, hinting at the flavour of Barth's understanding of the resurrection at different stages, and taken from the perspective of his various expositions of Paul's Romans.

While earlier in my studies I was more attracted by Pannenberg's approach to the resurrection and theology generally, more recently I have found difficulties there, and at the same time have learnt to value Barth, both on the resurrection and on the whole question of what theology is. This thesis takes a "critical Barthian" approach - "critical", because there is much in Barth's theology I am critical about, including some aspects of his treatment of the resurrection, but "Barthian", because on the question which Barth finds fundamental to theology (which I too consider fundamental), namely, what I term the "methodological archetype" of theology, I am in broad and strong agreement with him.

Next, I should state the conventions I have adopted. First, my discussion of the Church Dogmatics uses the terms 'volume', 'part-volume', the sign § (a 'section' or a 'paragraph') etc., following Barth's own usage. Secondly, abbreviations, which are widely used, are to be found in the bibliography section. Thirdly, in translations, a) Americanisms are translated; b) Capital letters are kept as in the passages quoted; c) I try to use existing translations (and Thomson's translation rather than Bromiley's for C.D., I/1), though I indicate if I modify the translation, e.g.: IV/3,p.7 (tr. slightly altered). But if I make a totally new translation, the German reference comes first, with the existing E.T.

second, thus: K.D.IV/3, S.7 (=p.8). (Some recent translations of the Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe came out too recently, however, for me to make much use of them.) And d) I have translated material only available in German and French to minimise the need to refer to the original; references in the bibliography to articles and books where I have made the translation are preceded by an asterisk. Fourthly, footnotes appear at the end of the thesis. And fifthly, emphases (underlinings) in this thesis, in quotations, are of the original author, except when expressly stated.

Finally, a word of thanks is due to those who have helped me in terms of practical advice, comment, discussion and sympathetic encouragement. My thanks are due, particularly, to Professor John Macquarrie. Then discussions with many students in Oxford University and Regent's Park College in particular, where I spent three years, have proved helpful, so I wish to thank them, and also Principal Barrie White; similarly I thank friends in Munich University for help in 1980. My thanks are especially due to Mr. Mark Atherton, Herr Jürgen Thiede and Miss Helen Stainthorpe for their help with my early attempts at translating German theology, and to my friends Michael and Jane Shenton for generous use of their home and word processor. I thank Helen also for secretarial assistance and much patience! However, any shortcomings and errors are my responsibility.

The thesis is approximately 99,500 words long.

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1:

Romans: Barth in Cross-Section

ROMANS: BARTH IN CROSS-SECTION

In 'Karl Barth on Christ's Resurrection', Gerald O'Collins aptly begins:

> Recent decades have seen a flood of books and articles dealing with the resurrection of Jesus Christ. At no time since the second and third centuries has the central affirmation of Christian faith won so much attention from theologians and exegetes. This renewed interest in the resurrection was pioneered by Karl Barth (1886-1968), whose Epistle to the Romans in its second edition of 1922 marks the real beginning of twentieth-century theology.[1]

It is widely accepted amongst interpreters of Barth that there are two main turning-points in the development of the basic approach of Barth's theology.[2] The earlier and major departure is his rejection of liberalism, which began and developed around the years of the First World War, and his cultivation by contrast of what came to be known as 'dialectical theology': these twin developments reached their culmination, as O'Collins suggests, in R.II(1922). The later transition, if not as fundamental, is still of considerable importance: against the back-cloth of the continued rejection of liberalism, in the phase of his Church Dogmatics (1932-67) Barth purposed to remove even the suggestion of an apparent (existentialist) philosophy,[3] as he now saw the task of theology as that of an exclusively church-based enterprise (hence Church Dogmatics) which should not be compromised by philosophy (hence Church Dogmatics).[4] Like the first departure, this later development did not come 'overnight': there were steps along the way - the lectures on dogmatics, especially the Christliche

Dogmatik (1927) - though without doubt, as Barth himself agreed,[5] the turning-point is his little book on Anselm (1931), where the impact of the formula fides quaerens intellectum on him was far-reaching.

As O'Collins suggests, the resurrection is hardly 'unexplored' in Barth's writing, certainly in R.II. However, considering the 'turning-points' in Barth's thought, so that we may glimpse the role the resurrection plays in Barth's developing theology, we shall take an overview by following some differences in Barth's treatment of the resurrection in the context of his theology in his different commentaries on Romans, which gives us the fixed reference-point for this overview, permitting a kind of cross-sectional analysis. The 1922 version of his commentary was the pinnacle of that 'dialectical' or 'crisis' theology which Karl Adam said 'fell like a bomb on the playground of the theologians',[6] but R.I (of 1919) is rather different and helps us see how he saw things while his reaction against liberalism was still developing and the specifically 'dialectical', 'crisis' phase was yet to come. Finally, his Shorter Commentary on Romans (R.III) comes from the Church Dogmatics period (based on 1940-1 material, but published in 1956), and helps us assess some of the changes from Barth's so-called dialectical stage to his mature approach.

The aim in this chapter is to give a whiff of the issues to come and hint at the development in Barth's treatment of the resurrection.

1. Romans 1:4

In R.I, under Rom. 1:4, Barth makes one emphasis above the others: the resurrection is God's act of power in Jesus Christ. By this powerful act one aeon is ended and a new one begun; one humanity reaches its fulfilment and a new one is inaugurated. Also it is God's act of power (no human act, whether in the preparation, the event or the belief in it); for the new aeon, the age of the Spirit, which it inaugurates, is God's creation - thus there is no special virtue in belief which makes anyone worthy: belief is simply recognition of God, bowing to him and to what he has already done in Christ. It is not until Barth is dealing with Rom. 1:16f. that he mentions the idea of this power of the resurrection as revelation, where he asserts this act of God arises from God's own righteousness, and is not simply self-evident, but is, in fact, a revelation, a miracle of God's power. (R.I, pp.1-11.)

When Barth turns to this verse in R.II, some different emphases come powerfully to the fore: indeed it can be said that his exposition of this verse dominates his whole understanding of the resurrection - and indeed much else - in that commentary. There is still the talk of the resurrection as transformation by which the New World of the Spirit touches the old world of the flesh - but it has been radicalised and indeed in some respects altered.

Whereas the emphasis in the first commentary was on the resurrection as power, which is also revelation, here the primary emphasis is on revelation: "The Resurrection is the revelation: the disclosing of Jesus as the Christ, the appearing of God, and the apprehending of God in Jesus".But this resurrection which is revelation is not the resurrection which may be discovered or denied by the historians, as its relation to human history is ambiguous - historical in that it happened as event, and yet not historical because 'primal-historical' in that it, as the re-creative power of God (as the one who reveals himself), determines the occasion of its happening and recognition. God is therefore giver of knowledge (resurrection knowledge) of himself, not the historian, so Easter revelation is independent of Easter event, because dependent on God in Christ: "Jesus is declared to be the Son of God wherever He reveals Himself and is recognised as the Messiah, before the first Easter Day, and, most assuredly, after it." In highly paradoxical language Barth continues to affirm alternately, resurrection as event yet not event: this 'dialectical' use of language Barth uses seeking to highlight the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between God and man (R.II,pp.29-31).

When Barth returns to this verse in his Shorter Commentary on Romans, he makes little of it, mentioning it as 'power' and as 'revelation', but if anything letting the emphasis fall on Jesus Christ as Son of God (R.III,p.16).

2. Rom. 4:23-25

In this passage in R.I Barth again speaks of the resurrection as power, 'the characteristic act of creation and giving life, through which God has declared his righteousness in power', but he elaborates - the resurrection is as an act of power the triumph of God in which the new creation of forgiveness, faith and promise, freedom and life triumphs over the old world of falling, law and wrath - the resurrection is action from God's side to bring in this new world (R.I,pp.102f).

In his exposition in R.II Barth is preoccupied with his discussion of 'non-historical history' vis à vis Abraham. Can Abraham be relevant to us? It is possible to analyse Abraham by historical criticism: "In times of spiritual poverty, historical analysis is a method we are bound to adopt", Barth says, sarcastically, adding that the typical end of such an attempt to receive spiritual food is to 'pronounce Abraham's personality to be unhistorical'. Instead of historical analysis we should recognise 'we are involved in a contemporary intercourse between the past and the present'. In this context 'resurrection' stands for being, like Abraham, "at the barrier between death and life...To us, as to him, knowledge is impossible, resurrection impossible, the union of 'here' and 'there', which is established only by God and can be awaited only from Him, is likewise impossible". Historical criticism gives us 'possible possibilities' which thus founder against such verities: faith provides the one thing necessary, the 'impossible possibility'. Thus here 'resurrection' functions as a symbol of faith in the power of God to do for us what nothing else, not even historical analysis will do, i.e., solve for us the problems that confront us as they confronted Abraham, the problems of life and death, 'deep-seated human corruption...and the righteousness of God' (R.II, pp.147f.).

His discussion in R.III is much more exegetical than the two earlier ones, The interpretation is very much more christocentric than the earlier passages: Abraham 'trusted' Jesus Christ in that his trust in God was in his promised seed - i.e., Jesus. Jesus is 'our Lord and Head': in the resurrection we have his exaltation and revelation of the life of God's son 'in this murdered son of man'. Further we are raised in him 'from the death we had deserved', raised to be his people, 'clothed with righteousness' (R.III, pp.53f). In this we see the evidence of Barth's christocentric manner of exegesis, his continued stress on resurrection as revelation (if put in less 'dialectical' language than in R.II), and his linking the resurrection with the doctrine of the exaltation of Christ, evidencing Barth's greater debt in his mature work to doctrines of the patristic and Protestant scholastic period.

3. Rom. 6:4f, 9

In R.I, Barth's comments on this passage bring out a little more clearly his understanding of the relation of cross and resurrection: "the burial of Jesus was in truth only the dark, at first incomprehensible rearside of the triumph of the power and glory of God which to begin with happened invisibly in this event, in order to break through victoriously and visibly on Easter morning as the cross of Christ come to light in his resurrection as divine act of atonement" (R.I,p.155). His language, however, continues to talk of the resurrection as the power of the new breaking into the old world, as the triumph of God over sin and death, bringing in a totally new kind of existence: "The life, into which (Christ) entered through his resurrection from the dead, has nothing to do with becoming and ceasing to be, is subject to no development, displays no obsolescence; it is alive in itself since it is life in God. It is essence and not appearance, river not wave, light not lamp" (R.I,p.162). Thus it is not threatened, dispelled or altered by questions of history, human psychology and relativism, even if moralism, romanticism and pietism do suffer in face of these threats (as ultimately human righteousness); but God's righteousness in God's act in the cross puts this old, relativistic world behind us and in the resurrection is his new world which we take part in so we may become what we already are in Christ

(R.I, pp.148-165).

In R.I, Barth entitles his discussion on 6:1-14 'Good Friday', and that on 6:15-23 'Easter', with the implication that Paul talks primarily of our past old world ended in the death of Christ in the first section, but in the second, of the present and coming new life and new world, in the appearing of the power of the resurrection, which has, as its unavoidable end, eternal life (R.I, pp.148-180). However, in R.II he entitles the discussion on 6:1-11 as 'the Power of the Resurrection' and 6:12-23 as 'The Power of Obedience'. Yet the 'power of the resurrection' in R.II is not the same power as in R.I, for there it was the power which appears in our world and is experienced as the new life in which we walk. Now, Barth says:

> The Resurrection is the non-historical (4:17b) relating of the whole historical life of Jesus to its origin in God. It follows therefore that the pressure of the power of the Resurrection into my existence, which of necessity involves a real walking in newness of life, cannot be an event among other events in my present, past, or future life...Because the world is the world, and time is time, and men are men, and so long as they remain what they are, my new life must exist 'beyond' them: as the deadly and incommensurable power of the Resurrection, my new life presses upon my continuing in sin, and, as the criticism of my temporal existence and thought and will, determines also its meaning and significance (R.II, p.195).

He also shows how he sees more radically the significance of the resurrection as revelation: "the visible significance of (Jesus') life cannot be understood apart from the disclosure and revelation of the invisible glorification of the Father. This is the resurrection of Jesus from the dead", (R.II, p.203). He continues to emphasise more clearly the 'non-historical' nature of the resurrection, stressing how it is not "merely another of those human possibilities which Jesus in his Crucifixion abandoned". He denies the empty tomb and the appearances of 1 Cor. 15 have any 'direct and causal connexion' to the Resurrection itself. Resurrection cannot be history or it loses its significance as divine, eternal event. Here, then, in R.II under this passage Barth has sharply radicalised the comment on the irrelevance of relativism which he already pointed out in R.I (in both cases quoting Troeltsch), by arguing that the resurrection is not historical, not (as before) 'new world' really developing within the old world, but non-historical or 'primal-historical', though real as revelation. (R.II,pp.203-5).

In R.III Barth shows the development of his doctrinal interests by centring his discussion on Rom.6 on a discussion of man's sanctification. However, he does not state the resurrection has a causal or determinative role in this sanctification, the new life of the Christian. Most of his language suggests that Christ's death and burial have a 'reflected image' in the life of the man baptised which is attested in baptism and that Christ's resurrection is similarly reflected: "The reflected image of his resurrection of which we are part, with which thanks to our baptism we have 'grown together' is the new life in which...we do walk towards the future" (R.III,pp.68-70); however, on one occasion, he does say this life can only be "founded on the resurrection of

Christ in the same way as his death and burial were founded on Christ's death and burial", but this foundation seems also to be understood in this representational way (R.III,p.69).[7]

4. Conclusion

From these three examples we can see that the idea of the triumph of God's power is a leading theme, especially in relation to R.I, that resurrection in its relation to history is one to explore, especially as in R.II, and that the idea of resurrection as revelation is a key one throughout, whose secrets we must unlock. Other questions will include the question of the relation of resurrection to the new life in Christ and sanctification (as well as justification), to the exaltation of Christ and also to the idea of relativism in knowledge (i.e., implicitly to the whole question of method in theology in the sense of theological basis and starting-point). Here we have some of the main themes that will repeatedly emerge in the course of this thesis.

PART ONE:

THE RESURRECTION IN BARTH'S EARLIER THEOLOGY

CHAPTER 2:

Barth before Barthianism

BARTH BEFORE BARTHIANISM

1. Early Influences

Many critiques of Barth fail to take account of his pilgrimage and plunge instead headlong into various aspects of his thought, divorced from its context in Barth's life. This is a mistake: Barth felt propelled to write because events forced him to rebel against the existing consensus. Before there was any whiff of Barthianism, there was Karl Barth himself, accepting that consensus. Space does not permit much biography, so the interested reader is directed elsewhere;[1] but some features must be noted.

(i) Liberalism

Although Busch describes Barth's theology then as 'very liberal' (KB,p.52), the radical nature of Barth's liberal theology before 1914 should not be exaggerated. His father, though he denied the virgin birth, was broadly accepted by the conservative 'positive' group. Under his influence and that of the more liberal local minister Aeschbacher (who 'spent a lot of time on apologetic and polemic against the ideas of Haeckel' in confirmation classes in 1901-2), Barth studied theology at university from 1914. There he went beyond his father's approach, embracing historical-criticism (in a talk in 1906 he aimed to recover 'the original form of the Lord's Prayer'!) and Kant. By 1906-7 he was studying enthusiastically under Harnack (and thus pursuing historical-critical work more thoroughly), immersing himself in Kant's Critiques , and becoming a committed follower of Herrmann (convinced by the amalgam of Kant and Schleiermacher). He thus began to see Schleiermacher as the 'leading light in his thought' - though remaining 'a stranger to the bourgeois world of Ritschl and his pupils' . In 1908 he went to study under Herrmann and Rade at Marburg, working as assistant editor to the latter in 1908-9 on Christliche Welt.

Herrmann was however far from the more sceptical theologians of his generation - 'He brought with him an element of pietism' (Bouillard) - and was seen as in between 'liberal' and 'positive' theology. Barth gained from Herrmann's christocentric pietism, his rejection of apologetics in favour of 'autopistia', and his rejection of historical enquiry as a means to faith. From this time Barth's interest in historical-criticism (beyond being 'a means of attaining freedom in relation to the tradition') receded, and, unlike his long-standing friend Thurneysen, he never went along with Troeltsch and his historical relativism (though he did read him fairly thoroughly).

The evidence of Herrmann is clearly felt in Barth's earliest published writings (1908-1911) and, according to Busch, in his as yet unpublished sermons during those years while Barth was a curate in Geneva (e.g., in a 1911 sermon, where he says, 'The greatest thing is what takes place in our hearts').

In 'On the Reform of Theological Study'[2] Barth is critical of G. Mix on the relation of theory and praxis in university theology for seeing Christianity and empirical reality together as 'given dimensions': "Christianity is, however, not a given dimension, but individual certainty". And in this certainty, Barth sees the adequate basis for the transition to practice, to Church work. The same perspective is clear in 'What should we do?' where he feels M. Költz' pietistic attack on modern theology (as reducing Jesus to history and leaving faith with a 'religion of the lowest common denominator', when it needs Jesus) is misplaced, since theology's aim is not to present a 'historical-critical Jesus' to the congregation; but in order to narrow the gap between faith and study, theology must deal positively with the praxis of gospel proclamation. Similar concerns emerge in 'Theology and Work for the Kingdom of God', where Barth begins by questioning why far fewer theological students from liberal (unlike conservative) faculties get involved with practical (e.g., missionary) work. His own modern theology ('oriented to Herrmann') is based on religious individualism and historical relativism; however, "Religion knows only of individual value; history knows only of generally valid facts", so the problem of theologians 'crashing' is possible - if religion becomes 'a theologoumenon like others, without personal, living reality'. The tension should not be eased by a 'flight into praxis' (i.e., pastoral work) and ignoring theology (impossible for a student of 'Herrmann or Harnack'), or surrendering theology to unquestioned normative concepts (as with the Roman priesthood) or to agnosticism: honest 'unreadinesss' without arrogance is necessary.

Barth's article sparked replies. E.C. Achelis criticises Barth's individualism for its 'subjectivism' (and says against Barth that there is one 'generally valid source of revelation' - Jesus Christ) and his historical relativism for its 'levelling down' of religion and ignoring of 'the absoluteness of its object', i.e., Jesus, faith in whom depends on religious value-judgment, not historical relativism. P.Drews is sympathetic to Barth's individualism (though sees the community dimension as supplementary) but criticises his relativism: history, but not religion, is relative; so theology is not in a tension of science and religion, but a science based on religion.

Busch misleadingly reports (KB,p.57) that 'Barth was not in Marburg to put his rejoinder on paper' - but Barth did reply (from Geneva), defending his individualism from Schleiermacher (and Kant) against Drews' Ritschlianism, seeing devotion (Affektion) as what is original in Christianity, and Drews' approach as stifling this devotion by making intellectual expression central in theology. Barth defended his union of individualism with historical relativism, seeing the individual's devotion as his liberation in the midst of relativism, not the struggle for absolutising value-judgments via history: the absolute, God, arises not from history but from inner, living theology, from devotion.[3]

This contrast between faith and history re-emerges in 'The Christian Faith and History' - where again Barth argues that divine revelation in history is known, not through historical investigation, but through faith, in that faith is realised in history: "The Christ external to us is the Christ within us". For Barth here, faith is seen "in terms of 'inner experience' which has its 'ground' (not its object) in the 'inner life of Jesus'", (KB,p.57), not 'in the historical tradition of the Church' as Smart summarises,[4] seeing a greater absorption of Ritschl here than is warranted (history retains no determinative role). Barth does discuss Church tradition - supporting Paul, the Reformers, and Schleiermacher, but criticising Protestant Orthodoxy, for their respective attitudes to faith. Jesus is the basis of our faith, because in him "we see an inner condition of life attained which deserves the name of justitia, for it is self-denying obedience in love without reservation, and therefore the perfect actualisation of the a priori determining of man."

Thus in Barth's pre-1914 theology we discern an unextreme liberal theology, indebted to, if not uncritical of, Herrmann, Rade, Schleiermacher, Kant and others, capable of absorbing Paul, Calvin, and Jesus himself into Herrmannesque theology, but rejecting Protestant scholasticism of the 17th century as irrelevant.

(ii) Socialism

Interpreting the origins and role of socialism in Barth's thought, especially regarding its role in his break with liberal theology, has become a focal-point for heated controversy since F.-W.Marquardt's Theologie und Sozialismus: Das Beispiel Karl Barths of 1972, for whom the key to Barth's theology - early and mature - is to be found in his theological working out of his radical socialism: thus also the key to his theology of resurrection is in socialism ('resurrection' language of the dialectical period as 'revolution' language).

Gollwitzer, Marquardt and Hunsinger argue that Barth discovered socialism and Calvin simultaneously in Geneva, enabling him to go beyond bourgeois Marburg theology with its 'Kantian-Schleiermacherian opposition between "religion" and "science"' and on the back of the Reformation doctrine of grace and his socialist praxis to work towards Scriptural and proletarian realism to uniting what had been previously in tension.

By contrast Geyer, Dannemann and Kupisch see in Barth's move to Safenwil (1911) the spur to interest and involvement in the social question (according to Geyer, in Geneva Barth was still reserved towards or even rejecting socialism!) For these interpreters, it is not Geneva's 'proletariat' and Calvin's theology so much as Safenwil's 'farming and industrial community' and the Swiss religious-social movement with its principal spokesmen Kutter and Ragaz that led Barth into socialism.

Both lines of interpretation are wrong on both counts - the origins of Barth's socialist interest, and the link between that interest and the arising of his distinct theological break with his precursors.

Barth's interest in the social question comes well before Geneva: his father was publicly involved in the social question as early as 1894 (Busch: KB,p.69) and Kutter took part in a discussion on his They Must; or God and the Social Democracy (of 1903) in Barth's father's home - so we know the question was already positively raised in the Barth household. Further, in Aeschbacher's confirmation class of 1901-2 Barth heard and noted 'some of the first comments on the social question' (Busch, KB,p.31) - and Bouillard rightly already noted that Barth was politically interested at school (K.B.I,p.80). This interest stayed with him in University days - thus in Jan. 1906 his student lecture on 'Zofingia and the Social Question' concerned a matter "which has preoccupied me since the day I entered Zofingia" in 1904, and lauded Ragaz in the year he was to found Neue Wege. Not that Barth was alone: many theological students were taken up with religious socialism. His first sermon (1907) talked of a social democracy as a movement 'towards the Kingdom of God' and in 1906 and 1908 he went to lectures by W. Simons and Ragaz on the social question. As for Calvin, we have seen that Barth easily assimilated the Reformer to unaltered Herrmannesque theology. Thus clearly Barth's socialist interest goes back as far as can meaningfully be traced and pre-dates both his encounter with Geneva and Safenwil and his break with liberalism: the biographical interpretation is disputed by the facts.

Moreover, this faulty biographical interpretation of Barth goes together with faulty analysis of his writings. Hunsinger reads in a developing crisis in the theory-praxis relation; in 'Modern Theology and Work for the Kingdom of God' Barth is said to be 'at a loss' (though the text shows an exuberant affirmation of modern theology!), he fails to find a basis for praxis in 'The

Christian Faith and History' and, following his so-called discovery of socialism makes 'one last attempt to reconcile himself with liberal theology' in 'Faith in a Personal God', before having to ditch it in favour of socialism. Lessing and Dannemann see a previously vague and unconvincing theory-praxis relation in 'Modern Theology and Work for the Kingdom of God' becoming concrete through a 'conversion' to socialism c. 1910-11 in his 1911 essay 'Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice'. Such analyses are faulty, since Barth's long-standing socialist interest is merely enriched and made more practical by his Geneva and Safenwil experiences; he clearly felt no conflict with liberal theology. At most socialism was a catalyst which would help give him an independent vantage-point under the impact of the explosive events of August 1914. Lessing and Dannemann are, however, right to note that Barth's discussion of 'relativism of values' in the earlier essay indicates an element of going beyond Herrmann.

Barth's union of socialism with Herrmannesque theology is clear in 'Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice',[4a] where he says 'Jesus should be linked with socialism (i.e., socialist aims, not actions of socialists, just as not actions of Christians) and socialism should be linked with Jesus (i.e., that socialists may 'enter into a personal, inner relationship with this man', not so much with the Church or the

'Christian world-view'). For 'Socialism is a movement from below to above' and similarly Jesus' aim 'was entirely a movement from below'; thus Church attacks on the 'vulgar materialism' of social democracy are misplaced since redemption is not transcendent idealism but incarnation, thus 'from the divine side' 'the gospel...is wholly and completely a movement from above to below' (i.e. sociopolitically man is exalted from below in the gospel and in socialism, and theologically man is redeemed from above - 'heaven comes to us'). Further, in his attitude to private property Jesus is said to be implicitly against capitalism, and in saying 'our Father', 'light of the world', etc., Jesus affirms socialist solidarity rather than bourgeois individualism, thus he challenges Christians and socialists alike by presenting socialism in action - so both need the real Jesus.

Barth's reply to the controversy this lecture provoked shows him now well up on socialist writing and thinking. However, he did not yet join the Social Democrat Party (though sorely tempted in 1913), because he did not want simply to provide a religious gloss to socialism. His concern with working-class alcoholism and gambling reveals a puritanical streak in his socialism. On war, while he rejected imperialistic militarism, as is clear in 'Die Hilfe' 1913, he also rejected pacifism and half-way pacifism as naive. On feminism, he succeeded in introducing sports for girls in the local school. In this phase Barth felt the influence of activist Ragaz rather than Kutter; but then, as all through, maybe his strongest influence came from his long-standing friend Eduard Thurneysen, who similarly adopted liberal theology (especially Troeltsch) and religious-socialism. With Thurneysen, Barth could thrash out the issues of liberal theology and socialism in these early days, as also later when they worked on dialectical theology and the transition to dogmatics together - as their extensive correspondence shows.

In conclusion then, Barth's interest in socialism goes back as far as can be traced in early adolescence and pre-dates any dissatisfaction with liberal theology. However, his practical experience in Geneva and especially Safenwil had the effect of making actual, of realising in praxis, his theoretic social concern of those earlier years. Socialism was not the cause of his break with liberalism, though, caught up in the utopianism of it, it gave him the possibility of a difference of perspective from liberal theology which was realised when against his expectations socialism (like everything else) failed to be an international bulwark against war.

(iii) Pietism

Barth's earliest 'theological instruction' in infancy via his mother was of Abel Burckhardt's pietism whose N.T. descriptions made an 'indelible impression' on Barth (IV/2,pp.112f); his father and paternal grandfather were also influenced by J.T. Beck, and in the Barth household pietism was critically affirmed. Barth's progress to Marburg theology signified no real break with this: "Herrmann's theology offered Barth a possibility of assenting to the liberal way of thinking without giving up the pietistic concern" (Busch: Pietisten,p.21), and as Busch points out, the influence of pietism proper, as well as the Herrmannesque variant, is clearly reflected in Barth's writings from university and Geneva days. Barth was critical of pietistic theology - not of their faith; thus in a 1909 book review we see him highly critical of its pietist author Elias Schrenk while retaining 'unequivocal respect for the man himself'. Similarly in his two articles on the American evangelist John Mott we find him impressed by Mott's 'extraordinary personality' yet, as Kupisch reports, Barth stopped his confirmation pupils as well as his thinking students from hearing Mott because of Mott's theologically suspect evasion of problems.

Such criticism of pietism arises from his Herrmannesque theology. However, another element of criticism begins to emerge in sermons in Geneva and more clearly in Safenwil, which could be turned on the liberal theology from which it arose: Barth criticises pietistic 'self-renunciation' as 'world-renunciation'. As Busch points out (Pietisten,pp.28-31), the implication in Barth's criticisms of religious egoism can be seen (with hindsight!) to lie at the root of Barth's later attacks on pietism and with it, liberal theology - i.e., the hint of a move away from religious individualism. The 'train of thought' leads to the rejection of religious individualism in R.I and of religious individualism in R.II. It is not a great leap from criticising Tersteegen's concept of self-renunciation, to criticising Herrmann's doctrine of faith as 'an inner subjection to God'. Yet the leap had not been made before 1914: as Busch rightly notes (Pietisten,pp.39f.), in Barth's lecture on the social movement, despite occupation with socialism which would play a role in leading him away from religious individualism, Barth is still working within the confines of Herrmann's emphasis on 'way of life,' but the content of this 'way of life' is now decidedly influenced by socialism; however, by 1910-11 there were seeds of doubt in Barth's positive appraisal of pietists and the religious impulse of pietism which, after 1914, would spread to fundamental doubts with liberal theology itself - whether of Herrmann or others.

2. The Doctrine of God

Barth's most substantial pre-war work was 'Faith in a Personal God',in which he discusses the problem of talking of God as personal. In his essay he intends to speak from religious experience in a consistent way, and commends Schleiermacher on experience (though he will depart from Schleiermacher's conclusions) and Calvin for his consistency (still Calvin as read with liberal spectacles). In part one, Barth tackles Rothe, Haering, Ritschl, Pfleiderer, Strauss and especially Biedermann on the tension between the transcendental or spiritual dimension and the psychological or individual dimension of personality, finding unity between these dimensions (between thinking and willing) in the ego as 'immediate awareness', and seeing development as the unifying factor between the infinitely open spiritual dimension vis à vis the limiting aspect of individuality. Thus he sees personality as the developing individual spiritual ego. In part two, in discussing God's individuality, he attacks Biedermann, and then Rothe, Haering, Pfleiderer and even Schleiermacher and Fichte for not holding to God's personality and for tearing apart form (God as 'personal' to us) and content (God as 'impersonal' in himself). In part three he turns to the spiritual, transcendent, or, as he prefers it, the 'sublime' aspect of God, affirming much on this score in Schleiermacher, Lipsius, Herrmann and Rothe. In part four he discusses the difficulties for the psychological and transcendental dimensions vis à vis God, i.e., the sublime as personality, and vice versa (which together constitute 'the religious idea'). The sublime ego (sublime in power, holiness and love) seems to submerge the idea of the developing ego - and leads to pantheism; and the developing ego (limited in power, love, etc.) shrivels up God's sublimity - and leads to deism, a 'fluttering away' of the idea of God. However, one may not simply state these two aspects together or state just one side, nor does abstract mediation work, i.e., seeing the ego as the basis of the non-ego since the ego is individuality. For all that, Strauss and Biedermann, who prefer one-sidedness, contradict themselves and thus show (against themselves) that both aspects, sublimity and personality, must be held together. In the last part he rejects the solution (of Siebeck and Lotze) which moves from a known human tension between sublimity and personality to the divine tension, because it succumbs to Feuerbach's critique on God as human projection, and leaves us with God as merely a superman. No, the basis for speaking of God is in religious experience, and the key is found in Jesus' experience, in which and in whom is to be seen personality, and from whose relation with God as Father comes the experience 'God is personality', and again, in Jesus' talk, practice and experience of the Kingdom of God - God's kingly rule in power and glory -

we see sublimity; further the personality achieves its true determination in immersion in the purpose it has to serve, as with Jesus' fundamental commitment to God's will. Thus in the gospel and in religious experience both aspects, sublimity and personality, emerge, and are 'found in many kinds of *relation* with each other'. So in the end we must maintain both aspects while renouncing a formula of unity - since religious experience provides the rationale for their unity but also for the tension between them.

This essay shows Barth at home in liberal theology, concerned however to avoid its extremes, like the 'irreligious Feuerbach', pantheism and deism, but seriously debating the question of God's personality in relation to his infinity as raised by Fichte in 1799[5]. Further, he finds the answer in religious experience, and the biblical story is relevant not as revelation (since in "The Christian Faith and History" he says religious contributions down the ages are equally valid) but as a book of religious experiences. So at this stage, the bottom line for Barth in talk of God both 'in himself' and 'to us' is human religious experience, seen however as a divine creation, so as not to be vulnerable to Feuerbach's critique of anthropomorphic projections of God. It is not at all clear however that Barth has obviated Feuerbach's attack on such projection. Certainly 'religious experience' functions for Barth as a kind of 'natural theology' in the kind of comprehensive sense which the mature Barth opposed. Of course there are continuities with Barth's later concerns - in particular we note the serious occupation with the question of God (which can also be seen in his 1914 sermons and especially in _'Die Hilfe' 1913_, written a month before the outbreak of war), his interest in the continuity between biblical and doctrinal questions and the attempt to overcome the Feuerbachian critique of projection by somehow starting from God - but maybe H.U. von Balthasar exaggerates in saying of the pre-war essays: "in this materially liberal thinking, all essential formal contours of the later positive thinking of Karl Barth already unmistakeably stand out" (_Karl Barth_,p.227) - seeing even moves towards '_analogia fidei_ (or here _historiae_)' here.

3. Resurrection

There are no published articles by Barth on the resurrection prior to his preoccupation with Herrmann (i.e., before 1907/8)[6], though from his 1906 paper on 'The Stigmata of Francis of Assisi' which he saw as 'neuropathic' though miraculous (Busch KB, p.37), we glimpse a modest scepticism on the miraculous generally.

Certainly from the published material of the period 1908-14 we can agree with Busch's verdict on Barth on the resurrection: "As it seems to me, the theme was not yet important in his earliest time of all, his "liberal" time...I suspect that the important concept of the "inner life", of "experience", in Barth's earliest time has made an especial theology of the resurrection superfluous.".[7] While being thus partially submerged, the resurrection does nonetheless play a role, which can be seen in 'Did Jesus Live?' - a 1910 Easter meditation, in which Barth dismisses the apologetic question for and against Jesus' historicity as of secondary importance compared to the 'personal inner life of Jesus', his utter obedience, love and self-denial 'which doesn't stop even at death, since the way to life goes through death'. To the question, if Jesus never lived wouldn't assurance in his inner life be a delusion? Barth sees a parallel with the disillusioned

Emmaus Road disciples whose foolishness and slowness of heart prevented them from seeing Jesus' wonderful life because of his death on the cross: "Easter faith is the certainty of the truth of the revelation made for us in Jesus...But where this Easter faith is, there is the truth...that God makes us living men through the life of Jesus..." And that truth of experience cannot be gainsaid by the scholars. Similarly in his sermon of 3.7.1910 Barth says 'to accept Christ was the Son of God, had done miracles, had died for our sins, was risen' is no use, but what is, is that 'Christ wants to live in you'; and the similar lines of Angelus Silesius Barth would later condemn as 'pious blasphemies' in II/1,p.282 are welcomed in 'The Christian Faith and History', for they "completely hold their own".

The fullest picture of Barth's pre-war attitude to the resurrection now available is found in his sermons of 1913 and 1914. Apart from quoting Lk. 2:34 (as starting to be fulfilled in Jesus' faculty of judgment in Jn. 2:23-25) and bemoaning non-attendance of confirmands following Easter services, Barth's first discussion of the resurrection comes in his Easter sermon of 1913. From his text (Mk. 13:31) he talks of the two worlds of light and darkness. From the perspective of Good Friday alone, we can, like the Emmaus Road disciples, assume darkness has won - but assume falsely, for "the call rings throughout the world since the first Easter morning

– wrapped in deep mystery: the Lord is risen." Indeed Jesus does not reappear in his previous externally limited corporeal existence, "but as the ongoing effective Spirit who now revealed himself first to his own in all his glory, but who now would lead them from victory to victory. Now come the yields of thirty, sixty and a hundred-fold as indeed 'Millions have experienced his presence, his ongoing life, even though they did not know him according to the flesh' and rejoice because Jesus' end has such an amazing outcome; his cross makes the darkness bright: "Easter is most intimately bound up with Good Friday: Jesus' triumph is already contained in his destruction as the blossom is already contained in the bud. In Jesus' sighs of death there was already the joyful message: 'Jesus lives, and I with him!'" As the sermon develops the resurrection element is increasingly submerged mainly back into the crucifixion (i.e. the Easter message is the significance of the cross) but also forward as present experience of the living Christ. The collapse of Easter back into Jesus' life and death and forwards into experience is quite severe, if not totally explicit: the nearest we are to a discussion of the resurrection and the events of Easter is his description of Easter morning as "wrapped in deep mystery" and in his talk of the Emmaus Road disciples' 'Good Friday' sadness. Similarly in his Whitsun sermon he says of Jesus' death: "He does not truly die, but in his death the resurrection was already hidden".

His next and last discussion of the resurrection in his 1913 sermons was quite substantial. In his sermon of 29.6.1913 Barth's text is Peter's picture of Jesus in Ac. 10:39-43. Barth makes his perspective clear: "In general, we can only speak of the life of Jesus if we are somehow moved by him, somehow are in a living relationship with him". Further, he says we cannot know Jesus without loving him and can't love him without knowing him - knowing and loving him 'hang together' - thus where better to start than with Peter, Jesus' companion. And Peter begins: "Jesus lives!...Everything else - what he was to them and what they had to say about him - was contained in the one act of his resurrection. It was the great revolutionising experience of their life". So Peter wants to move quickly from the cross to the resurrection, to God's raising of Jesus and letting him be revealed, his calling Jesus into life, which Peter experienced, so he must share this experience.

From this most positive affirmation of the resurrection now come Barth's qualifications. First, on its historicity: We need not answer whether the resurrection is to be taken literally or spiritually (indeed, there remain "great riddles and contradictions" for the first, and "much that remains unexplored" for the second) - for what is important and secure is the disciples' experience, which was 'like the rise of the sun on a beautiful autumn morning': "Jesus has been revealed to the people as the living One: that is the sure fact of the Easter days."

Secondly on its significance. 'Jesus lives!' for Peter means Jesus is different to all before him, Jesus who is the resurrection and the life lived in that resurrection-fashion before his death, his religion of rejoicing in God, hoping for the completion of his work, his pure heart, love, confidence in God undisturbed by care and mammon: "Jesus is already risen before he died, long before." He quotes Bengel: "the whole gospels 'breathe the air of the resurrection' - so not first the Easter stories" - the disciples breathed its air too, though often relapsing into fear, but convinced finally by his obedient knowledge: he lives, and we also should live (cf. Jn.14:19)". Their hope, their confidence was based on their experience of fullness of life in Jesus.

In his summary, Barth notes that only pre-ordained witnesses saw the risen Jesus, since, "The resurrection of Jesus was not a natural event perhaps like a thunderstorm observable and self-evidently acceptable by[9] everyone. The Pharisees and Sadducees never breathed anything of the air of the resurrection during the life of Jesus or after it". Also, Jesus can be seen during his life as the cause of the fall and rising of many (Lk.2:34). Through hearing the witnesses of the resurrection we know grace, forgiveness of sins is offered to everyone. But faith is also needed to receive Jesus, says Barth in his ('semi-pelagian'!) conclusion.

In this sermon again we find the historicity of the Easter events deliberately ignored as unanswerable and peripheral and also, by use of Bengel's spirant resurrectionem a twin dissolution of the significance of the resurrection of Jesus backwards, into his life and especially his death, and forwards, into present religious experience.

In his next, Easter Day, sermon on the resurrection (12.4.1914) he makes the equation of resurrection and experience of life very clear. In Spring, the birds, buds, blossom and little clouds "know what life is. But who will roll away the stone from the entrance of the tomb for us? Who, then, brings us resurrection...?" – i.e., life. Or are we worried about this 'stone' like the women (this 'stone' of 'difficult...people', of misunderstanding, 'suspicion and hostility' between people, of lack of peace). The 'Easter message" says "the stone has been rolled away, Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, today and for ever!" Indeed, already in "the complete history of Jesus' life and passion" we hear a fine pure echo of the Easter message: "God opened the tomb, even before it was closed..", for: "Jesus was superior to sin and the world, yet for this reason superior from time immemorial to perishableness, though his body might equally be put in the tomb" - for God's powerful light cannot be extinguished, whatever men might do to put it out. On Easter Day the disciples saw the power of God, the power of life (which "they should have grasped long before"). What actually happened in those Easter days is almost impenetrably obscure - so 'we must leave it to the scholars to explain (the N.T. narratives) in their details' - but their awareness arose 'by a miracle of God'. Easter means Jesus' victorious life is 'also for us'. so 'we must get to know him', know the hope in his life, and be able to echo Paul's word in 1 Cor. 15:55, 57.

Barth's sermon of 19.4.1914 parallels the experience of the Emmaus Road disciples with that of his congregation (i.e., the move from disillusionment, through unawareness of Jesus' presence, to experience of life in the risen Christ). In many ways, Barth's exposition here is reminiscent of that of D.F. Strauss[9] (i.e. that disillusionment is surpassed by reading Scripture - 'their hearts burned within them' - as they began to understand - over many years - that the Christ must suffer, and began to recognise the continuing reality of Jesus). An apparent difference comes when Barth talks of Jesus being beside the disciples, although they do not yet recognise him (as opposed to Strauss' idea of a merely subjective awareness), but since Barth sees Jesus' presence beside us today as no less real, maybe the difference to Strauss' interpretation is more apparent than real.

Barth's increasing focus on God is apparent in his four consecutive sermons on Mt.6:33, in the third of which (10.5.1914) he says these words are 'a sigh of relief, a liberation, a redemption...a resurrection...the kingly way of life', which we see uniquely in Jesus who 'although a man like us has from the start gone on the resurrection way'.

Barth's last sermon before the first World War to mention the resurrection came on Ascension Day, which reminds him of Eastertide: "At Eastertide the incontrovertible certainty arose for (the disciples) that Jesus had been given by God to them as their Saviour and Redeemer". Indeed the ascension "was only the highpoint of all these great experiences" of Eastertide, that "God was in Christ (2Cor.5:19), and Christ is now with God, as he always has been".

We sum up. Barth dissolves the historicity of the resurrection into the experience of it, by deliberately avoiding discussion of its historicity; he largely dissolves it in terms of its significance backwards into Jesus' life and especially his death, and forwards into contemporary experience of 'new life'. Easter is understood as the time of revelation, i.e. of God-given experiences which bring about utter certainty, experiences which start 'on the third day' and reach their high-point at the ascension. These experiences are God-given, but apparently are subjective visions either broadly similar or identical to present-day experiences of the living presence of Jesus: Barth's interpretation seems not far removed from that of D.F.Strauss, even though he does not explicitly deny the literal historicity of the Easter events. In sum, while the reality of the resurrection is not denied, it functions as symbol for Barth - of the power and revelation of God known in religious experiences.

CHAPTER 3:

The Transition to Dialectical Theology

THE TRANSITION TO DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY

1. The Turning-Point

(i) August 1914

After the longest period of peace in modern European history, and an accompanying arms race, on 1st August 1914 Germany declared war on Russia. On 4th August, Britain declared war on Germany, and von Harnack wrote the Kaiser's war speech; shortly afterwards, together with 92 theologians and other intellectuals, he signed a manifesto supporting the Kaiser's war policies. Also on 4th August, the German Social Democrats declared themselves firmly with the Kaiser.[1]

Ulrich Dannemann is right to talk of "The Catharsis of the Year 1914 as the Moment of Release for the Beginnings of Karl Barth's Theology", for these events certainly devastated him:

> Among these intellectuals I discovered to my horror almost all of my theological teachers whom I had greatly venerated. As they had gone astray in their conduct, I realised I could not any longer follow either their ethics and dogmatics or their understanding of the bible and of history. For me at least, 19th century theology no longer held any future.[2]

Wieser (unlike McNab) misleadingly over-translates "Irre geworden an ihrem Ethos, bemerkte ich.." as "In despair over what this indicated about the signs of the time I suddenly realised..": Barth's liberal theology met no 'sudden' death in 1914, or 1915 (Frei and Hunsinger), or

1916 with his work on Romans, but in phases, like imbibing hemlock (August 1914), parts of the body dying (1915), other parts dying later (1916 and on) and its final death perhaps not until the 1930's. Certainly the sermons of 13.9.1914, 8.11.1914 and 22.11.1914 betray no change in his theology of the resurrection, which is seen just as clearly as before as a personal, religious experience of new life, above all else. But though his theology and politics did not immediately change, certainly the poison did undermine his 'veneration' of his theological teachers and create "deep disillusionment" (Marquardt) towards mainstream SPD socialism, and make him open to new influences because of his growing freedom from previous intellectual attachments. But why should Barth - previously a follower of the consensus, and now an obscure Swiss pastor - be the one to turn theology upside down?

1. Dannemann, Marquardt, etc. are right to this extent: socialism provided Barth with an independent vantage-point; his instinctive opposition to militarism left him prone to disillusionment when his theological heroes succumbed to jingoism. His theological liberalism and political socialism, comfortably co-existing in 1913, were now irreparably torn asunder...(Maybe also the fact that he was Swiss rather than German enhanced the independence of his vantage-point).

2. The SPD "betrayal" of socialism ruled out the possibility of switching to a socialist 'culture Protestantism' since this betrayal tarred socialism with the same brush as the bourgeois variety; he must be open to new, untainted influences.

3. Barth's pre-war concern with the question of God made him well-placed to absorb the new influences which, in a different way, also began there.

4. Barth's positive, moderate liberalism (with Herrmannesque sympathy to pietism, and positive affirmation of the resurrection as inner experience) may have helped. Perhaps if scepticism had been the

mainspring of his religion then (for the different reasons of disillusionment) maybe he would, like Troeltsch, have switched from theology to philosophy. Instead, throughout Barth's disentanglement from liberalism, we find a positive impulse which leads him to theological re-creation, not destruction. Maybe this positive impulse, already discernible, lies at the heart of the basic contrast between Barth's style of theology and most other types - a contrast we shall repeatedly encounter in this thesis.

5. Barth's pre-war theology of the resurrection is not one of those aspects which led to him leading the exodus from liberal theology. However his interpretation is one of the earliest features to show radical change in the transition to dialectical theology, and may be facilitated by some of its pre-war features - notably its symbolic force for Barth.

(ii) Development, Influences, 1914-16

Although marginally affected by Kutter, it had been Ragaz among the religious socialists whose influence Barth felt more strongly in 1914; but gradually over the next year or two after the outbreak of war Barth's interest in Kutter would grow while that in Ragaz would be more under question - until the difference became insurmountable in 1916. He remained closer to Ragaz politically, even joining the Swiss Social Democratic Party early in 1915, as Ragaz had done in 1913, though perhaps with a different perspective and rationale,[3] and referring to him sympathetically over against his teachers in regard to whom he was now alienated:

> As Ragaz would say, it is of symptomatic significance that a man such as Rade can lose his head so completely in this situation...It is truly sad! Marburg and German civilisation have lost something in my eyes by this breakdown, and indeed for ever.[4]

This scathing attack on Marburg and '"Christliche Welt" Christianity' uttered hardly a month after war began shows us the 'poison' was working - but the new developments took time. During 1915, Barth began to warm to Kutter's themes: "From Kutter I simply learnt to speak the great word "God" seriously, responsibly, and with a sense of its importance"; and, "that the realm of God's power is greater than the realm of the Church", and that God might challenge the Church from outside the Church (as in socialism).[5]

By Autumn 1915 the contrast between Kutter and Ragaz was problematic for Barth; he found it necessary "to place the emphasis where Kutter did" - without excluding Ragaz' approach, and indeed affirming "Ragaz' endeavour to put principles into practice". One fundamental difference beteen these two lay in their theological roots: Kutter's in pietism, Ragaz' in liberalism, and Barth remained sympathetic at this stage to the pietists, as his reaction to E. von May shows.[6] Barth was increasingly to be influenced by the concentration on "the absolute and living God", which he met in Kutter.

Also in 1915, Barth came under another influence - that of C.F.Blumhardt, and through him, of his father, J.C.Blumhardt. The influence of these men is so critical that we must consider it separately.

By 1916, Barth was becoming more critical of the pietists (even 'looking into' Ritschl's polemical History of

Pietism and yet reading thoroughly Tholuck, Bengel, Rieger and above all J.T.Beck, who stressed the coming kingdom not as a human construction but as the power of the future world as "the goal is prepared...through the unfolding of divine seed grains and buds" (which language we find in R.II). [7]

2. Blumhardt, Father and Son

(i) Encounter

Barth's decisive encounter with the younger Blumhardt (1842-1919) came in April 1915: after a sharp encounter with Naumann, whch reminded him of liberal theology's seduction to nationalism, Barth was open to new influence - and met Blumhardt over many days, and was singularly impressed - especially by Blumhardt's comment, "world is world, but God is God". He wrote in almost rhapsodic tones about Blumhardt to Thurneysen (who had introduced Barth to him), and felt his eyes were being opened to a new element - a New Testament element - hope. No doubt Blumhardt's translation of his father's realistic eschatology into one which in its realism embraced socialism (to the extent of leading Blumhardt to become a socialist MP from 1900-6 in the Württemberg assembly) facilitated Barth's openness to him - but his impact on Barth was to lead him well beyond socialist theology. Already, by November 1915 in his "Wartime and the Kingdom of God" lecture, Barth condemns 'secular circles' (including the Church) with the words "the world is the world. But God is God" (Busch: KB, p.87): from now on, Barth argued, God must be taken seriously as of first importance, and not as a mere appendage to human activity. Thus from the Blumhardts Barth was to gain his God/world dichotomy, his eschatological perspective and much else besides. So let us turn to the Blumhardts - using Barth's own material, to see how *he* understood their impact.

(ii) J.C.Blumhardt

The elder Blumhardt (1805-80), a pastor with roots in pietism, experienced the turning-point of his ministry in 1842-3. Following a two-year pastoral encounter with a girl he diagnosed as "demon-possessed", at her exorcism, her sister (by now also involved) shrieked 'Jesus is victor!' - which became for Blumhardt a slogan. Indeed when the revival following this episode began to subside Blumhardt was not unsettled, since he now saw the real battle as 'between Christ and the real powers of darkness in which man finds himself', rather than the pietist battle between Christ and the unconverted human heart.

Other emphases which Blumhardt was led into (which also affected Barth) can be noted:

1. a strong and realistic eschatology (Blumhardt was 'surprised' at his own death, expecting Jesus to return first);
2. a cosmic victorious Christ (over against the pietistic individual salvation);
3. an orientation from divine promise (rather than human need, in pietism);

4. opposition to physical sickness (i.e., not merely the defeat of inner evil, as in pietism, but also health and healing of the physical body - as in Jesus' own ministry);

5. eschatology encouraging present action (rather than suppressing it in favour of 'pie in the sky when you die', etc.) - an attitude arising from his cosmic perspective (Jesus' victory encourages human co-operation, which itself is based on God's claim on man);

6. redemption as cosmically grounded in the future (not individualistically grounded in the present, as in a ghetto community apart from the world);

7. pastoral work as geared to the whole man (i.e., not merely for the inner man - as in pietism - nor merely its secular polar opposite, for the external bodily life of man).

In sum:

> According to Blumhardt it is a "petty view" to treat Christianity as the private concern of every individual. Even the salvation of the individual is bound up with the innermost content of the whole of human history, with the consummation of the victory grounded in Christ's redemptive death and resurrection.[8]

Blumhardt thus represents a spiritual and theological force which enabled Barth, following him, to forge a non-liberal, non-pietistic theology. Blumhardt's significance for Barth (in the long run more important than that of his son, perhaps) should not be obscured by Barth's comments from his mature period, where Barth criticises especially Blumhardt's chiliasm, his utopian expectation of 'the dawn of a new time of grace on earth' (begun indeed, Blumhardt believed, with the cry 'Jesus is victor' in 1843), which led him to confuse 'the resurrection of the dead and eternal life with the thousand year kingdom'.[9]

(iii) C.F. Blumhardt

It was Ragaz' refusal to publish Barth's 1916 essay on the younger Blumhardt that led to Barth's estrangement from Ragaz (until 1944). In the essay, Action in Waiting for the Kingdom of God, Barth reviews Blumhardt's Hausandachten - pleased they are morning devotions rather than a discussion of problems. Barth clearly explains Blumhardt's relevance for him: Blumhardt is 'priestly', representing God's cause and earthing our hope in him; he sees truth organically, not atomistically; he 'starts out from God' and faith in God's revelation; he affirms the hope of God's victory over evil, to meet human need; and in Jesus this victory has begun, which provides real salvation from sin and leads to a real community of Christ's people - through God's action. Barth completes the essay by discussing Blumhardt's prayers (in which these emphases can be seen), seeing the 'main point' in 'calling on God', an active waiting - to "hasten and wait" for God to bring his victory, which comes through Zion, (which is neither the church nor the 'revivalist fellowships', since to be 'God's people' 'there has to be raising from the dead').

In II/1 (p. 635) it is C.F.Blumhardt's transformation of realistic eschatology into support for socialism (as we have noted) which Barth discusses. In his 1919 essay 'Past and Future', contrasting Naumann and Blumhardt, this can also be seen: whereas Naumann's home was the Church (it scarcely mattered if it was Lutheran, Catholic or Mohammedan - 'in any case the Church', Barth adds sarcastically), Blumhardt, following his father "meant something other than the Church when he spoke of 'God'". Further, unlike Naumann, Blumhardt resisted the embourgeoisement of social democracy. And like (and yet so unlike) Naumann, he was a great friend of nature and natural science - understood as "the joyful message of the inexhaustibility of the possibilities of life, which as for Paul once (1Cor.15) for him became an analogy (Gleichnis) of the resurrection". For Barth, Blumhardt was prophetic - in his 'ever-enduring movement between hastening and waiting...'

(iv) The Resurrection in the Blumhardts

In II/1(p.634), Barth tells us how he tried to go back to the elder Blumhardt's 'point of departure', putting aside the view of the younger Blumhardt: if in the period 1915-c.1919 (in view in this chapter) it is C.F.Blumhardt who is the more dominating influence on Barth, afterwards it will be his father. It will be necessary, in exploring the approach to the resurrection in the Blumhardts, to go beyond Barth's own writings: for this we are helped in the main by Gerhard Sauter's Die Theologie des Reiches Gottes beim älteren und jüngeren Blumhardt. [10]

In the elder Blumhardt, a Christology of incarnation and exaltation can be discerned, which to some extent

displaces the alternative model of cross and resurrection. Sauter agrees with J.C.Schreuder that, correspondingly, J.C.Blumhardt preached seldom on the resurrection, focusing instead on the ascension (and arguing that the stress on the Passion which is in Blumhardt is due to the countervailing impact of his 'pietistic milieu') (p.32). In the incarnation and exaltation of Jesus the christological relation of Blumhardt's concept of the Kingdom of God to his slogan 'Jesus is Victor' emerges, and, says Sauter, can be seen as similar to Origen's concept of Χριστὸς αὐτοβασιλεία, and has flaws as a result. (pp.30-34).
However, C.F.Blumhardt altered his father's approach, changing a God/devil antithesis effectively into a God/world or God/man antithesis (pp.111-115) - but this 'meditative clarification (in *Die, so that Jesus will live*) is unbalanced, since the positive side (man's resurrection) 'loses in significance' over against the negative side (man's death), since Jesus' victory is but a divine possibility, of eternity over against time (pp.115f.).

Blumhardt's *theologia crucis* expresses the negative aspect: the cross, as 'costly grace', displays God's will as just and his No to man (pp.117-20); the cross means not affirmation of spiritual against material aspects of life, but death of spiritual structures, so new life is realised, *creatio ex nihilo*, (already in the cross, not the resurrection) (p.121); the cross means the destruction, the 'krisis' of human religion, culture and history (pp.122-124).

In his positive development, Blumhardt sees 'the resurrection of Jesus Christ "to earth", so to speak', as accomplishing God's justice and corresponding to the dying of the flesh (pp.126f); not that his talk of the exalted Lord 'on earth' means to anticipate the parousia, rather the risen Lord is 'the living One in His community', i.e., not the Church [11] as institution, as 'religion', but 'God's movement towards the world' (pp.126-128); thus the resurrection does not remove the tension between time and eternity, 'the community itself remains powerless in the sign of the risen Lord', so its only difference 'from the world is the knowledge of the world's need', so since resurrection remains resurrection of the Lord alone, Blumhardt's thought here is secure against the charge of anticipation of the parousia (pp.129f.).

In C.F.Blumhardt, the resurrection does, however, play an increasingly significant role in eschatology as a powerful symbol of the reality of God's power, of the disjunction between the 'old world' and the 'new world'; for 'the new world...is manifested...in the creation as such', thus in the sphere of the kingdom of heaven, only God's power, the 'power of the resurrection', will do - we must leave human wisdom, power, art and science on one side (pp.216-223).

From the Blumhardts Barth was to gain this concentration on the resurrection as a symbol of God's power - the resurrection as eschatology - and as symbol of the utter contrast between the old world and the new. He would also gain the opposition to religion, culture, etc., as part of the 'old world' (which 'is "what is not of God"', p.217) and the God/world or God/man antithesis, together with the concentration on God and the Bible. Further, as Rumscheidt notes (a point not made much of by Sauter), Barth's focus on revelation arises here. Rumscheidt quotes Blumhardt (again in Die, so that Jesus will live):

"Precisely what is the centre, the actual centre of gravity in the kingdom of God? The resurrection! The revelation of God in the resurrection!...Only the power of the resurrection, in which we shall see him coming on the clouds of his Father's glory, will achieve things." [12]

3. First soundings

(i) The doctrine of God, 1916-17

Already Barth's pre-war writings showed a concentration on the question of God, so it is not surprising that it is here where we hear the first soundings in Barth's theology of the impact of these new influences.

In 'The Righteousness of God', while some liberal language (e.g. of 'conscience') remains, the new air Barth breathes can be discerned on every page. He stresses the contrast between human righteousness (a tower of Babel) and God's righteousness, which must challenge the human variety, between our 'what shall we do?' and the 'longing [13] for a new world'.

Barth dismisses the apologetic question of God's righteousness versus his "permission" of the war as 'pointless': "for the living God never for a moment manifests himself in our conscience except as a righteous God" - but it affects our self-erected 'tower of Babel' god: that tower, that god, collapses in the face of the righteousness of God. Instead of the tower of Babel route to God (which fails) we should be still and listen to God, recognising him (if in 'fierce inner personal conflict'), whose will is 'wholly other'. So we need faith.

In this essay, we discern a widening of Barth's socialist distaste for bourgeois culture and Christianity into an attack on pseudo-religiosity, we hear the Blumhardtian waiting for God, and above all, something of the radical otherness of God.

This otherness or 'strangeness' of God and the Bible is still more pronounced in 'The Strange New World within the Bible', where Barth draws our attention to the strange, i.e., hitherto misunderstood message at the heart of Christianity in the biblical picture of Jesus, who says "I am the resurrection and the life!" and the human 'echo' of Paul and John - weak if compared with Easter morning - is much too strong for us today. In the

Bible there is history but as such it is uninteresting; only when God is seen as its basis do we understand the history in the Bible; similarly with morality and religion - what is needed is not our morality but God's , so we must decide for or against God's sovereignty, and what the Bible contains is not religion but revelation, it speaks of God - and so we should not be misled - even by Schleiermacher! But, 'In whose power did Christ die and rise again' - who is the biblical God? Not just the one who gives inner 'peace' to individuals, but the heavenly Father on earth, who 'will bless us, not with the power of the church but with the power of life and resurrection': he is Father, Son and Spirit , not just in personal piety but as cosmic redeemer.

Here, the emphases of C.F.Blumhardt have become much more obvious; now also comes his public rejection of Schleiermacher and of pietism.

In between these two essays, Barth's sermon, 'The Pastor who Pleases the People' (published without his permission) shows the same tendencies. Here, there is the sharp contrast between true and false prophets, and, he says, most want the pastor to be a false prophet, i.e., to leave untroubled the relation of church to other homes (and above all, to the factory). But so long as God does not abandon him, he cannot be a false prophet. The choice is radical between false and true, comfort and disturbance, our idols and the living God, meaningless death and real life, the way of Mammon, of the Tower of

Babel and the way of God. How does Barth _know_ God's will? "From my conscience and from the Bible".
Barth's doctrine of God is now radicalised, and he sees the Bible as misunderstood by the scholars and pietists alike: already we see a basic shift from his Marburg theology - not reversing his discovery from Herrmann of the radical irrelevance of history, nor undermining the attitude of _autopistia_ - but undermining the basis of this 'faith' Herrmann found in experience, and moving decisively in the direction of seeing God, his revelation, and the Bible as the basis of faith and theology.

(ii) Suchet Gott, so werdet ihr leben!

Barth's pilgrimage in these years was not alone, but was shared with Eduard Thurneysen. This relationship has been well documented, so all we need to note is that many of Barth's writings were written either in consultation with Thurneysen (e.g., _R.II_), or indeed were written with joint authorship - such as in "Seek God, and Live!' (which, like most other material from this era remains untranslated). The material is virtually indistinguishable - and source criticism is irrelevant! Such joint works clearly express the theology of both authors, as in these twelve sermons.

'Advent' emphasises _waiting_ for God, with a 'longing', waiting, sighing for his righteousness, and for release from the bonds of war, suffering, sin and death. 'It Can

Happen Differently' contrasts our fatalism towards death, misery, laws of nature with the persistence, the faith of the 'importunate widow', in her struggle - and in ours against sin, suffering and death - 'it can happen differently'. God saves from death, so we can hope, wait for God - indeed, we must have such faith, faith which rests on the victory already achieved in Christ. 'The Dead Point' sees the 'human righteousness' of ministers and kings so evident in the newspapers as like the lost sheep trying to lead the shepherd. In reality we are lost, and, for all our piety, in deep need of God, which we need to acknowledge, so the lost sheep may be found and rejoicing in heaven commence: but we need to lay aside our pride and accept God's righteousness. In 'The Other Side' the contrast between the visible and invisible worlds is made - though Jesus' affirmation of the outcast, and his parable of Dives and Lazarus show that invisible world is not as we expect. We are caught up with ourselves when a battle is being fought for our souls, so our idiocies and disenchantments do not matter alongside God being for us. We may be ignorant, like James and John in Mk.10, and focus on our needs, on our culture and civilisation - but the important thing is God's victory, that God understands us: what is central is not our Christianity, but what God knows of us, prepares for us, where he leads us.

'Forgiveness of Sins' is the Good Friday sermon, and Barth notes the seasonal temptation to condemn man with 'the writing that is against us' (Col.2:14), yet says the deepest truth on Golgotha is that God judges not against but for man. We distort the memory of God in this writing from a message of joy in God's victory over sin into one of demand. But Jesus experienced this 'writing against us' on the cross, yet waiting on God, and even asking for forgiveness for the pious and righteous who were crucifying him. Now he has opened up a new era, that of God with us, he has opened up the realm of the living God - so we must not 'look below' (and experience God's wrath) but 'look above' (and experience 'the joy which comes from Christ').

The Pentecost sermon ('The Holy Spirit') talks of the outpouring of the Spirit, so clear in the Pentecost community, so poorly visible today - and yet the fire of the desire for God occasionally flares up brightly in individuals, or in mass movements, like the Russian Revolution (i.e., the 'February Revolution' of Kerensky's Socialist Revolutionaries: Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution was still 5 months in the future): we should wait for this outpouring of the Spirit. (It is interesting to note that Barth can, influenced by the Blumhardts, speak realistically here of the outpouring of the Spirit; that was not possible before 1914 - because of the stress on inner life - and would not be possible again in R.II (1922) - because of the stress on the radical disjunction between this world and the new world of the Holy Spirit!).

'Where is Your God Now' focuses on the Christian's 'longing' for God: only God is a worthy object of this longing, so to drink here is never to thirst again. This longing is the exact opposite of the attitude that religion, that God, tops up human culture, becoming an optional extra: "No fifth wheel on the wagon, but the wheel which drives all the wheels". 'Where There is Love, God is There' also starts with our yearning for God: where is God? Fate interrupts the life of the one set on by thieves on the way from Jerusalem to Jericho - but God is not in fate (even if the priest and levite think so): God is there in the pity, help, love, and salvation of the Samaritan's love: let us call on God for such love, and recognise God is against suffering, death, etc.

'An Example of the Kingdom of God' emphasises the difference of the Bible to our bourgeois assumptions - for the 'dishonest bailiff' (Lk.16) is praised for his astuteness - shocking to bourgeois morality with its sacrosanct Thine and Mine law of property. The children of light should shock too, not by falsification, but by a brotherly act: we too should be astute, holding everything in common like the Pentecost community. In 'What Shall We Do?' we ask this question in face of our 'yearning' - expressed in, e.g., (Kerensky's) Russian Revolution : should we work - or wait? We should open up our hearts, since, in Jesus, God gives us a glance beyond the doors of our hearts, in him we see victory in the struggle against death, sin, etc. - and thus we long for participation in this the more - and indeed this is the one thing: we should long to see God in Jesus! 'Listening!' contrasts religious pomposity and self-importance with listening to God, hearing the word of life, picturing all the leaders of all the churches in one great religious procession - as presenting a human offering to God, where he wants us to hear the word of life: we have a choice between these two ways.

In between the Good Friday and Pentcost sermons comes 'Eternal Life', the Easter sermon on which we must focus. The sermon begins and ends with a call to celebrate the triumph, the victory of Jesus: in the midst of our worship of Mammon, our way of war, 'Jesus Christ is risen from the dead on the third day'; and this victory is over the principalities and powers (Col.2:15). With our 'experience', our 'scientific thinking', our 'unalterable relations', our '"laws" of nature', we want a belief in God, a Christianity - without God; but this religion is chloroform - we find the 'principalities and powers' against us. But the Easter message is 'This world is no more! A new world has burst forth' - he defeated the principalities and powers, by proclaiming God: 'God was in him'. Indeed Jesus already showed he was victor by resolutely going to Jerusalem, he was 'already victor before the battle' and thus gave his disciples eucharist before crucifixion: "For this reason Easter, resurrection, was already in Jesus' cry on the cross in the darkest hour: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" so what happened on Easter Day "was that this word was heard: God is more powerful!" "The 'principalities and powers' are overcome" - and "Their eyes were opened": eyes see God's victory in Christ - 'We may look on' and let live in us the new thing in Christ: "God is stronger! Christ is risen!"

In these sermons the influence of C.F.Blumhardt is very evident. Certainly from the pages we hear the call to wait on, to yearn for God; we hear of the strange new world of the Bible and of God who is totally other; we catch the feel of the God/world antithesis, of the victory of Christ in cross and resurrection and indeed already in his life, of the opposition to the idea of faith as individual option (polemic against pietism) or optional extra (polemic against liberalism), and above all, we hear of hope. In the second edition (1928) this Blumhardtian axis is made still clearer, for two essays are included (to replace one now available elsewhere) - Action in Waiting for the Kingdom of God, and Thurneysen's 1915 essay, 'Our Hope and the Church', in which Thurneysen tells of how he first began to understand the need for hope in the sinful Church on his encounter with Blumhardt in 1907: active hope not reduced to action - above all hope in God and taking God and his way seriously; people with such hope are needed in the Church.

4. Romans I

Now Schleiermacher was rejected, attempts in 1916 to find an alternative base in Kant and Hegel for the onslaught against fashionable theology came to nothing; nor was Kutter, with his suspect pro-German nationalism, any help. Barth and Thurneysen listened to Blumhardt; but it was above all reading the Scriptures with new eyes, and especially Romans, which provided the decisive breakthrough. Notes were made for themselves at first, but eventually turned into a book, finished on 18.8.1918, published in 1919 (Romans I).[14] It was a new kind of work, using not only 20th century works (by Lietzmann, Zahn and Kutter) and those of a generation ago (by Godet, Beck, Schlatter and Fritz Barth) but also much earlier works - by Rieger, Bengel and Calvin: if Barth was to think his way out of 1910 theology, he would have to work with writers of different eras.

In R.I, there is a clear attack on the misleading inadequacy of religion, and also of morality, law and history. Rom.1:18ff. is seen as applicable not so much to fleshly as religious sin: religion is sin. Under Rom.2:1ff., Barth sees religion and culture (including Social Democracy) as self-deception if they think to be God's kingdom, God's new world in the midst of the old: religion is self-deception. Although religion, morality, etc., show up the gap between 'is' and 'ought', they do not bridge it (pp.52f): religion is inadequate. Although religion and morality 'intend' the right, since they do not achieve it, they are superseded by revelation - God's revelation in Christ' (pp.62f.): religion is superseded.

Similarly the Church and Church History are suspect - the former is not the special domain of God's kingdom (p.328), and the latter is "a mishmash of error and violence", says Barth, quoting Goethe (p.140). Above all, it seems, pietism - "the inferno of pietism" (p.216) - is under attack (cf. esp. pp.204ff.). The new life in Christ is not personal experience, or based on it (pp.122-124), indeed in 'most radical phrases' (Busch) "God and 'personal life' have no concern with each other" (p.196) - yet the new life is not without experience (pp.158-160). So what is needed for this new life is not a hero morality, but hearing God's promise and saying Yes to it (pp.72-82).

The disregard of history already plain in Barth's Marburg period increases, and a division in types of history comes into view - not exactly the much-noted Historie/Geschichte distinction, but real and unreal history. History seen by man is world history; history in the power of the resurrection is God's history (p.27), it is non-objective history (p.42), it is absolute, not relative over against so-called history and must displace it (pp.43f.) though not disregard it - indeed it is the deepest meaning of so-called history, fulfilling its deepest content (p.44). Indeed while historical Adam and historical Jesus are alike irrelevant to theology, Adam's fall and Christ's death are significant as presupposition of all history, for behind particular events are changes in heaven (p.131), for in so-called history, in which context such an event is mysterious and unintelligible to man, are hidden events in the beyond; real history, then, the revelation in Christ, shows what God is doing in history (p.338), making people aware of the new world in the power of the resurrection (pp.62ff.).

This contrast between real and so-called history, and similar contrasts between new and old worlds, time and eternity, God and man have led some interpreters (Smart, von Balthasar) to see Platonism at work here. As a caution against such interpretation, it should be noted that Barth understands the new world, etc., precisely not as an ideal world, but as a real one - Idealism is only Idealism without Christ (p.73), and the promise to Abraham is not of Ideal humanity: "In the Bible the promise is understood realistically, not moralistically" (p.95). Here already is something of the realism of the later Barth (conceptually similar to his later methodological concern - in C.D.I/2 - to talk of the reality of revelation before talking of its possibility - §§13 and 16). Maybe Barth does owe something to his reading of socialism for this determination to think realistically rather than idealistically, but for all that, this realism is not accomplished consistently in this work - so the implicit Platonism is certainly detectable. We note especially his talk of time and eternity - God's act in Christ means 'A new time of the world has broken in: the end of all times', so 'time disappears in the eternal Now' (p.59), so 'This aeon is not the last' (p.115), there is a 'change of direction (Wende) in the history of God with the world', 'a change of direction of time' (p.116). But much of this can be seen in the Blumhardts - already there is the Äonenwende in J.C.Blumhardt, and something of the opposition between time and eternity can be seen in C.F.Blumhardt. [15] Direct influence from Plato was in the main yet to come, though of course Barth was familiar with something of Plato - he even talks of him, together with Moses, John the Baptist and the Socialists as 'prophetic' - not already the new humanity, but those who sigh within the old (pp.45f.,186).

H.U. von Balthasar also mentions some implicit Origenism in R.I - and indeed, we see a certain universalism (over against pietistic individual salvation), especially in the discussion of Christ and Adam (Rom.5:18f): "All are righteous in the one man and all men are implicated in the victory of life in the one man" (p.143), so since God's righteousness is no spiritual experience, it is for all who sigh for release from the old order and hunger for reality - all, whether Jew, Greek, pious, worldly, Christian or atheist (pp.148f.). Thus sin and death are unreal powers, only having power in the time of God's patience (pp.137-139). Correspondingly there is much talk of victory (Rom.5:12-21, 'The Victory of Life', pp.124ff.,etc), there is a great celebratory note running through *R.I* (thus while Rom.1:18ff. is discussed as 'Night', Rom.5 is 'Day'), the theme of power - of the spirit (p.64), and above all of the resurrection (pp.2f. *et.freq*). Similarly we hear a note of being on the offensive against evil and suffering (though not from moralism, but joy in the gospel) (pp.110-112). But again all this, even if reminiscent in parts (*apokatastasis*) of Origen, owes far more to the Blumhardts, as can be seen from their writings. (However, there may be some continuity here too - Sauter has seen something of Origen's concept of Χριστὸς αὐτοβασιλεία in J.C.Blumhardt's absorption of the concept of the kingdom of God into Christology by means of the watchword 'Jesus is Victor!'[16]).

The resurrection is a key term in *R.I* and plays a role in each of the main areas so far discussed. Thus over against religion, etc., resurrection is God's righteousness (p.9), is revelation (pp.10,60) (though Barth's later tendency to see resurrection as revelation over against cross or incarnation as revealed should not be read in here: the cross is revelation - p.64), it annuls the special value of religion and the significance of levels of religion and mores (pp.35f.), it is cosmic, not individual, in significance (pp.34f.), it is ignored by human 'righteousness' (p.35), but it should be recognised and believed (pp.9f,35) - though Barth can also say, "the possession, knowledge and acknowledgment of a divine revelation does not alter the situation between God and (the righteous)" (p.32).

Over against so-called history, the resurrection is 'what is real', it is real history (pp.59f), as such, it unites God's righteousness and the law's requirements (pp.53-5), and as this uniting power it is the goal of history (pp.55,27).

Regarding the alleged Platonism, the new resurrection life is seen as somewhat timeless: "The life into which (Christ) entered through his resurrection from the dead, has nothing to do with becoming and ceasing to be, is subject to no development, displays no obsolescence; it is alive in itself since it is life in God" (p.162). Certainly there is a strong dualism between the new world and the old world in which the resurrection is central. The resurrection inaugurates a new humanity (pp2f.), so that a 'new international people of God' forms round it (p.9), it brings in a new aeon, a new world (pp.2f.): "In the resurrection of Christ from the dead, the 'counter-movement of freedom' has made especially its start selectively - it expands from now on in the world and will lead in the future redemption to the restoration of everything that is lost, to the reintegration of God and world, of individual and society, of man and nature" (Dannemann, on R.I): The resurrection is 'the characteristic act of creation and giving life' (p.103), in it, 'new life' has been revealed (p.162); in his resurrection Christ receives a 'new nature' and in him, so do we (p.155). The resurrection is "the decisive new thing 'of my gospel'" (p.36), and thus without it, 'relativism is unavoidable' (pp.40,162). In connexion with this "Platonism", we also note here how Barth's resurrection language in R.I has a ring of powerful symbolism to it: in talking of Rome hearing the gospel, it is an example of the resurrection's power in the world, it is that, "The stone has been rolled away from the tomb" (p.4) again, "The way of righteousness to life, from Golgotha to the empty tomb of Easter morning is opened up once for all for the world" (p.147). Here we see the language of 'empty tomb' - but its reality is not explored - it functions as a symbol of the power of the resurrection, i.e., of the power of God over against man. And so something of the symbolic use of resurrection language already discernible before 1914 is now put to use in a way which, in contrast to Barth's liberal phase, is, however, much more vigorous and extensive. This too can be seen as due to C.F.Blumhardt - and also Kutter (cf.p.4).

When we look at the resurrection as relating to 'Jesus is Victor' in R.I, we meet the central thrust of Barth's treatment. The resurrection is God's triumph (p.103) - indeed Jesus' burial was already the invisible incomprehensible 'rearside of the triumph', but the triumph breaks through visibly in the resurrection (p.155); so because of the resurrection power and its effects, Paul can give thanks (p.4). Above all in R.I, the resurrection is power. Indeed Barth hardly talks of the resurrection without talking of 'the power of the resurrection', as is clear from countless references (cf.

e.g.,pp.34f.). In one passage, Barth expands this idea a little in relation to the crucifixion: the kingdom of God 'in power' 'has become possible on Good Friday and real at Easter' (p.65). The power of the resurrection is the 'power of God' (p34), it accomplishes the 'transvaluation of all values' (pp.41f.), without it man 'stands under a curse' which no law and attempt to keep the law can alleviate (pp.51f.); it, and not the 'reeling adventures of pietistic nurture of the soul', is the basis of the new life in Christ (p.123), thus those who despite not hearing the law are yet doers of it, as doers 'live from the power of his resurrection' (p.34), so the way of life to which the law points 'happens in the power of the resurrection' (p.50). The power of the resurrection brings joy, harmony and hope (p.125). Indeed the apparent power of death from the perspective of the new world (as future and yet present) shows itself to be the power of the resurrection (pp.155f.). Indeed (in marked contrast with later emphases) Barth tends to put the weight on the resurrection in soteriology - even when discussing the blood of Christ (p.68) - thus it is the 'divine act of atonement' (p.155.). So if anything at this stage, the resurrection obscures the crucifixion in significance - quite different to his consistent view in later writings (pp.65,68,155,160, etc.).

As Smart says, a translation of R.I would have granted Barth a different impact on the English-speaking world than that of R.II: "Its whole way of thinking is more congenial to an evangelical liberalism. Jesus' resurrection from the dead is seen as inaugurating a new aeon of the spirit for the whole world. He was the 'hinge of history'".[17] Nonetheless, there are problems in R.I, as Busch has shown with special reference to its critique of pietism; and solving these problems would lead Barth into his revision in R.II. According to Busch, while the primary attack on pietism in R.I is against its individualism (personal experience, etc.), there is also an attack on its religious method, as 'mechanical' - self-made piety. In place of this mechanical piety Barth argues the biblical and Reformation picture is of the organic growth, of the 'silent growth', of the new life in the midst of the old. The individualism of the 'romantic' (i.e., 19th century liberal theology) is attacked, and it is no accident it precedes the attack on pietism: in R.I here we have the roots of Barth's mature view in Protestant Theology that pietism and enlightenment find their difference more in externals than internally, ie., that pietism's individualism should be linked with the dubious trends of the individualism of liberalism. For all this, links with Herrmann can be seen, despite first appearances: while Herrmann said little on pietism directly, he not only attacked doctrine-centred Christianity, but also the mystical view of Christianity. Something of this latter attack, plus a concentration on the concept of 'life' can after all be seen as reflecting in some measure the continued influence of Herrmann, despite Barth's ostensible rejection of 'the romantic', i.e., entire liberal, era. Busch shows how religious socialism played a part - but not an exclusive role - in leading Barth to his attack on pietism. Barth's attack is sharper than that of Ragaz or Kutter, and this can be seen as due to Barth seeing pietism as a symbol of the religious individualism he must attack: his attack has the twin background of Herrmann's attack on mysticism and religious socialism's attack on quietistic individualism, and has the twin targets of pietistic and liberal individualism.

Problems arise for Barth's critique in that he attacks an archetypal 'pietism' - by using tools from pietism. As he later admitted in his autobiographical sketch of 1927, he was more influenced than he realised by Bengel, Ötinger, Beck (and, via Kutter, Schelling). But there is a contradiction in using freely the perspective of the Swabian pietists to attack pietism as such as individualistic. Furthermore, Barth's attack on pietism's 'mechanical', not 'organic', growth has weaknesses - in particular it seems it could be used against the Reformers themselves. In particular it jeopardizes Luther's **simul justus et peccator**: is it 'growth' away from peccator to justus or is it **simul justus et peccator**? Barth is attacking liberalism and pietism, but traces of liberalism and pietism are still very evident - even in the attack; this is because the critique is only half complete - it is an attack on religious individualism because of its individualism. Although there are hints of an attack on religion, "despite all openings in that direction, basically, the first Romans contains no direct critique of religion". Barth will need to tread further into the Reformation and its doctrine of grace before he can complete more convincingly his attack on religious individualism.

The same sort of limitations could be shown at many points in R.I, including the treatment of the resurrection. At this stage Barth is more concerned with the new insights he is making than in working out their ultimate coherence. He was to find it necessary to go further along the road indicated by Blumhardt in the use of a God/man or God/world dichotomy, and this would put into question the idea of the resurrection as bringing in a new, already being redeemed humanity (in 'organic', 'silent growth'), so the resurrection must lose its role as 'divine act of atonement' and be seen increasingly purely as revelation.

5. The Resurrection, 1920

Barth's approach of R.I continued for a while, being more systematised. Certainly he stressed more strongly that God is 'totally other' in his unpublished 'Christian Life' and 'The Christian's Place in Society'; in the former, "He interpreted the life of the risen Jesus there as actually the overall effective presupposition of the great political and the little daily life of man."[18] But neither shows a decisive move away from R.I, for all the stirrings visible. As Barth himself put it: 'The first evidence of this change' from the thinking dominating R.I to that of R.II 'is the address on "Biblical Questions, Insights, Vistas"'.[19] Here we meet the dialectic of Yes and No, and also what Smart calls 'A much soberer and more subdued note' and an emphasis more on death than life. Barth says: "To understand the New Testament Yes as anything but the Yes contained in the No is not to understand it at all. Life comes from death!" Thus the 'Biblical thought and speech...is through and through dialectic". Here we meet the attack on religion Busch found wanting in R.I, correspondingly the attack on individualism is not to be found - indeed resurrection as the 'one experience of man' is affirmed as his individual experience - 'it is the God-fearing individual who is the first to be touched' - not indeed 'personal experience' in the pietistic sense: "Actual experience begins where our alleged experiences cease, in the crisis of our experiences, in the fear of God" Thus religious individualism is suspect not because of its individualism but because it is religious.

Resurrection is not only 'experience' (in this new sense) and as such set over against religion, it is new corporeality' (body, world are to be redeemed), 'new world' (of God, totally other: 'Qualiter? Totaliter aliter!'), and 'sovereignty of God' ('Jesus is Victor', Jesus' death shows him 'at the boundary of our existence' as crisis and Lord). Here are the themes that will be unfolded in R.II.

CHAPTER 4:

The Resurrection in Barth's "Dialectical" Phase

THE RESURRECTION IN BARTH'S DIALECTICAL PHASE

1. Introduction: New Influences

To read both main versions of Barth's Romans commentary, aware that just three years separate them, leads one to ask about the influences in those years that caused such a radical new look at the material. Barth doesn't reject his decisive break with liberalism (as if his 'dialectical' theology were nothing other than the *avant garde* of the new liberalism replacing the old - as has occasionally been suggested[1]). Rather, these new influences had the effect of radicalising Barth's rejection of liberalism - helping him to see better the radical faults in the theology he had swallowed in his youth.

Around 1920, Overbeck, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche made their impact on Barth, introducing new categories, and further upsetting some of the old, notably encouraging Barth's attack on "culture Protestantism". In letters to Thurneysen, Barth mentions reading *Crime and Punishment* in 1915, and references to Dostoevsky become common from April 1915. He talks of Kierkegaard's 'protest against Church worldliness' in June 1919. Thurneysen is reading Spengler and Nietzsche in December 1919, and Barth talks of Overbeck as their 'Melchizedek' in January 1920.[2] This implies Barth has only then discovered Overbeck, not, as J.D.Smart suggests,[3] before November 1919; thus it would not be Overbeck that led Barth to exclaim then:

> Yesterday and today I sat over 1 Corinthians 15, but I came to a dead stop..If only I did not have to come out just now with anything concerning the resurrection..Everything I would say now would be of no consequence. The chapter is the key to the entire letter with its profound disclosures that have their source in ultimate wisdom, some of which have struck us recently like shocks from an electric eel.[4]

Indeed, Barth had been researching on this chapter for some time now. He first mentions it to Thurneysen in January 1919, and wrote a 'mini-commentary' on it in February 1919 [5] where he sees the deniers of the resurrection not as 'nasty heretics' but as 'normal Christians' reminiscent of Ragaz in their anti-transcendentalism. However, certainly Barth found the influence from Overbeck consistent with this breakthrough on 1Cor.15: when he visited Frau Overbeck in summer 1920 she 'said something to the effect that' her husband liked reading 1Cor.15.[6]

From Overbeck Barth gained the radical scepticism towards Christianity as religion, and also the category of 'Urgeschichte' (primal history), which Overbeck used to describe the "life of the early Christians which was in history but not of it, in fact which constituted a complete break with history" because at the outset "Christianity was a life from another world that stood in radical contradiction to everything in this world"[7] Thurneysen confirms this debt to Overbeck and further explains the ways Barth used the term in the works of his

'dialectical' phase:

> By Urgeschichte he meant the events which for the biblical witnesses were a divine history taking place in the midst of history "there and then", "in the years 1-30", or in the words of the creed, "under Pontius Pilate", a history in which all history has its mysterious centre because in it the eternal decisions are made which determine the life of all men at all times.[8]

Furthermore, Overbeck had recognised the intensely eschatological nature of N.T. Christianity, but saw in the patristic apologists the beginnings of the degeneration of this original eschatological, primal-historical Christianity into a historical entity, which in the 19th century was now merely a religious affirmation of human culture.

All this, for Barth, helped to sharpen and radicalise his perspective: his positive affirmation of the new world brought in by God's power (learnt from the Blumhardts) now gained a complementary radical critical negation of the old world and especially the religious contentment with the old world, the world of human aspirations and achievements. While Barth never became a disciple of Overbeck, he gained and used many critical insights from him in R.II and other works of this period. Thus, in Barth's understanding of history, instead of affirming new 'Christian history', he now sees all human history as under judgment. So the 'history' he affirms as revealed in Christ is not human history investigable by historians but is 'primal history' - God's history within history. Meanwhile he retained the eschatological perspective gained from the Blumhardts, affirming the 'new world' as

God's world to be introduced by him. As Smart points out, the effect of these ideas of Overbeck on Barth's theology is that he can now accept positively (or at least as no threat) Troeltsch's relativising of all history and thus also of Christianity[9] - for while historical Christianity might be relativised, primal historical Christianity, the revelation of God, retains its divine absoluteness. Here we find the roots of Barth's well-known contrast between religion (including Christianity) and revelation.

Much has been made of Barth's comment: "if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity, and to my regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance..." (R.II,p.10). The commentary is not a surrender to Kierkegaard's philosophy, but is based on what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' - but, as Smart points out, Barth had already learnt the reality Kierkegaard describes from his reading of Scripture, as well as from Kutter and the Blumhardts. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard helped in the continuing process of rooting out speculative - and especially Hegelian - philosophy.[10] Yet Kierkegaard's influence was not as major on Barth as on many other of his contemporaries. Even in R.II, written at the height of Kierkegaard's impact on Barth, there are actually considerably more references to Dostoevsky than to Kierkegaard. Years later he talked of Kierkegaard as 'the pinch of spice in his theology'.[11] Many of the things Barth wanted to say then he found in Kierkegaard, or indeed were encouraged and deepened by his reading of Kierkegaard, but the latter's individualism, pessimism and incipient anthropocentrism were all to encourage Barth soon to work beyond Kierkegaard.

As for Dostoevsky, Thurneysen felt impelled to write a booklet on the man, such was his significance for them, (just as he and Barth had also written on Overbeck). Primarily it was Dostoevsky's ability to show up in dubious colours the nature of modern, 'civilised' European man - helping Barth and Thurneysen to free themselves from 'cultural Christianity' by his disturbingly accurate portrayal of it. Indeed Dostoevsky had seen Christianity and the church very much in terms of the human search for and desire to possess God which leads to losing God.[12]

Barth was also reading Nietzsche at that time, and though he thought 'Overbeck had more insight'[13], he also found help there for his developing understanding of history in Nietzsche's idea that history is not fully self-explanatory but needs mythical, unhistorical language if historical events are to be properly evaluated.[14]

Further influences of the period include Plato, whom Barth learnt more about through his brother Heinrich who was now lecturing on Plato at Basel, and Kant - or at least the neo-Kantian philosophy of Cohen 'for whom God was the hidden abyss and origin beyond man's life'; so something of the distinction between the ideal and the real in Barth, and the corresponding idea of God as 'unknowable', is connected with his positive reading of Plato and Kant.[15] Barth even valued Otto's The Idea of the Holy as opening 'the way to a basic surmounting of Ritschlianism', though was critical of its counter-productive 'theological spectator attitude'.[16]

Barth's theology was also stimulated by Thurneysen and new colleagues - Gogarten and Bultmann.

Under the influence of all these figures, but also his discovery of 1 Corinthians 15 as the 'key' to that letter, Barth rewrites Romans.

2. The Resurrection in Barth's 'Crisis Theology': Totaliter Aliter

According to Henri Bouillard, "of all Barth's writings, the Commentary on the Letter to Romans (i.e., R.II) is the most difficult to analyse" (KB I,p.19) - a cautionary note to hear at this stage! The apparent linguistic and conceptual incomprehensibility is deliberate, since human knowledge and language about God can only be expressed dialectically and paradoxically and is subject to the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity", in face of which human language and ideas can only stutter.

Since resurrection is not a human possibility but only a divine, it becomes a key word to express the idea that all that is vital in Christian faith and life is _totaliter aliter_, a gift from above, which has no 'point of connexion' (to use later language) with human possibilities save that imposed from above:

> Resurrection means the _new world_, the new world of a new quality and kind...._Qualiter? Totaliter aliter!_...There are no transitions, intermixings, or intermediate stages. There is only crisis, finality, new insight. What the Bible brings us from beyond the grave is the perfect, the absolute miracle. (_WGWM_,p.91).

Occasionally one wonders whether there is really no connexion at all, rather than none save that imposed from above - Barth's language is ambiguous. However, for Barth, the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, the _parousia_, is no 'harmless' conclusion to Dogmatics (_R.II_,p.500), but is, as Hermann Wolgschaft puts it, the 'basic theme of theology generally, code-word for the dialectical relation of God and creature', though in talking of death (and resurrection) Barth doesn't resolve the tension of alternately using 'code-language for a timeless encounter of the creature with God (an encounter not bound up with biological dying)' and seeing death itself as meaning, "as 'the one unique source of immediate real revelation of God', which the cross of Christ has opened to us, the _point in time of dying_, the end of earthly life".[17] The formula 'God everything and man nothing' was rejected by Barth much later (_IV/1_,p.89), but seems dangerously close to the _totaliter aliter_ of his dialectical period, as symbolised by the resurrection. Consequently this aspect of being wholly other will be apparent in each aspect of Barth's treatment of the resurrection in R.II.

(i) Resurrection as Revelation

The tendency to see resurrection as revelation already begun in R.I receives its classic formulation in R.II:

> As the Christ, (Jesus) brings the world of the Father. But we who stand in this concrete world know nothing, and are incapable of knowing anything, of that other world. The Resurrection from the dead is, however, the transformation: the establishing or declaration of that point from above, and the corresponding discerning of it from below. The Resurrection is the revelation: the disclosing of Jesus as the Christ, the appearing of God, and the apprehending of God in Jesus. The Resurrection is the emergence of the necessity of giving glory to God: the reckoning with what is unknown and unobservable in Jesus, the recognition of Him as Paradox, Victor, and Primal History (R.II,p.30).

After commenting on the relation of resurrection to history, Barth adds: "Jesus is declared to be the Son of God wherever he reveals Himself , and is recognised as the Messiah, before the first Easter Day, and, most assuredly, after it" (ib.). Veitch comments, 'The resurrection is the pivotal point for Revelation'[18]; and Smart sums up: "The resurrection of Jesus was the triumphant revelation of the divine world in which alone man's life is fulfilled"[19]

Barth's idea, worked through with tremendous consistency in C.D.IV/1-4, that the primary, maybe even sole function of the resurrection is as revelation, finds its origins here, as does his belief in the importance of revelation for theology (properly developed only from the book on Anselm onwards), though these ideas are not worked out consistently yet.

One question emerging here is: What is revealed in the resurrection? According to Barth it is 'Jesus as the Christ, the appearing of God and the apprehending of God in Jesus'. Certainly Barth already understands this in a fashion different to Bultmann. Barth speaks not merely of the church recognition or merely of resurrection, nor of cross but even of the years 1-30. In dialectical language he says:

> The years A.D.1-30 are the era of revelation and disclosure; the era which...sets forth the...divine definition of all time. The particularity of the years A.D.1-30 is dissolved by this divine definition, because it makes every epoch a potential field of revelation and disclosure (R.II,p.29).

Despite the qualification, it is the years of the whole life of Jesus that is revealed: not just his crucifixion, but also his ministry and, implicitly, the incarnation. By contrast, Bultmann cannot see the especial relevance of the years 1-30. He prefers Barth's comments which undermine the relevance of the historical Jesus as such to the confusing apparent acceptance of the value of the years 1-30.[20] As J.D.Smart points out, the difference is that while both deny direct revelational significance to these years, Barth is prepared (unlike Bultmann) to see special significance in the context of revelation, (seeing no significance in the years 1-30 apart from revelation, κατὰ σάρκα, but as revelation, as of fundamental importance). So: "For Bultmann..only in the church's preaching of the cross came the decisive moment...But for Barth the decisive moment was in the life, ministry, death and resurrection of the person Jesus Christ. Who he was, was hidden in his outward historical form, but hidden to be revealed to faith". The gap here (implicitly, on the real significance or otherwise of the incarnation) will widen.[21]

Veitch points out the universality of revelatory impact of the resurrection for Barth: it 'illuminates' the 'signs' of the Divine Presence found in world history as well as in Israel's past, interpreting them, disclosing their meaning as "that God is found everywhere and that both before and after Jesus, men have been discovered by Him" (R.II,p.97); [22] so resurrection as revelation affects secular as much as religious history. Barth's language of revelation in the resurrection before Easter and before Christ begins to evacuate the specific content of the resurrection of meaning or relation to Jesus, but over the years Barth gradually combated this vulnerable aspect of his theology. However, as Veitch indicates, even in R.II Barth's attitude to religion vis à vis revelation (and thus resurrection) is not quite as negative as one might suspect, since he uses the concept in two senses, 'Religion with its sign character, and religiosity or religion as something merely human' which allows us to see some continuity with later more worked-out ideas in I/1, I/2 and IV/3. Veitch also notes how the question of the relation was not properly worked out - and not sorted out until Barth worked through his ontic/noetic distinction on the basis of his book on Anselm, and how similarly 'revelation' (and, with it, 'resurrection') was merely a slogan, a 'blanket term' waiting to be worked out in Chr.D and I/1-2.[23] Certainly at this stage Barth's doctrine - or slogan - of the resurrection as revelation remains vulnerable to the question of how it can even be described if the diastasis between human knowledge and divine revelation (which seems to remain elusive in our sphere) is as radical as it sometimes seems. If there were strictly no human knowledge, then how could Barth, as a human, describe this state of affairs?

In sum we note a new centre in Barth's interests: his thought has moved from 'revolution' to 'revelation'.

(ii) Epistemology

We explore these epistemological implications of revelation further. Resurrection and revelation are God's own affair. From the human angle - without resurrection as revelation - God is unknown: "Barth can speak of the new world of God...as unknown, and yet in the resurrection of Jesus that new world is revealed to faith so that it becomes the primary certainty of life" (Smart[24]). The epistemological disjunction is certainly intended radically here; as Smart summarises:

> Finally, the inadequacy of all human language has to be recognised. It can at best offer analogies that point beyond the seen into the unseen to describe the indescribable and to make men aware of the unknown God, the unknown man, the unknown humanity, the unknown world, which are ever breaking through all our conceptualities and forcing us to shape new ones.[25]

This indicates a shift in perspective from R.I:

> In 1919 the positive function of law, religion and idealism (which were placed parallel) was to reveal God's No...Religion and idealism, therefore, were a preparation for redemption...In 1922 the No of God becomes more comprehensive. Religion, idealism, and law indicate no movement out of the old world. They belong to the world of death...There is no bridge from religion to grace...Grace is sheer miracle...[26]

There is thus no "point of contact" on our side with divine grace, and no natural knowledge of God - so Barth talks of God as "the Unknown". Thus divine judgment on all human institutions, religious as much as secular, has to be heard and welcomed before the scene is set for the hearing and welcoming of grace, in faith. There has to be death before the divine miracle of resurrection creates the bridge, touches the old world (if only like a tangent 'touching' a circle).

As we explore Barth's radical language here, he talks primarily of a noetic disjunction, though its relation to ontology is not yet clear. Thus while Barth certainly holds to an ontological fundamental difference between God and man, how does he intend the disjunction between time and eternity? the question of continuity or discontinuity of the man before death and post resurrectionem? the idea that one is not righteous but is counted righteous, and hence justified?[27] In the last pair, he apparently thinks of knowledge (assurance on the basis of revelation) rather than of being (being justified, being righteous). But these differences are only worked out coherently later. However, at this stage, his disjunction of divine and human as expressing the doctrine of the sovereignty of God - but in the sphere of the ideal/real split in human knowledge - presents a kind of epistemological Calvinism.[28] And as Bouillard notes, the situation of the new man, the justified man, is not real ('flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God') but a justificatio forensis only, a hope of the resurrection (KBI,pp.23f). In contrast, Wolgschaft argues that the tension between continuity and discontinuity of the man before and after resurrection is not as it might appear a contradictory dialectic of I and Not-I (and Bultmann thought Barth's dialectic here was overstrained), but is really a dialectic of I (as I see myself) and I (as God sees me): thus the discontinuity of old and new man lies in the discontinuity of perspective - human and divine, whereas the continuity of old and new man lies in the 'analogy of resurrection' in the continuity (in the midst of discontinuity) of seed and plant which is Paul's picture in 1Cor.15:35ff.[29] But maybe Wolgschaft has underestimated the linguistic and epistemological discontinuities here. Thus we see the epistemological discontinuity of the resurrection in Barth's comment on Rom.4:17(b):

> The living must die in order that the dead may be made alive. The things which are must be seen as though they were not in order that the things which are not may be called as though they were. Here is the impossibility of knowing, the impossibility of resurrection, the impossibility of God, Creator and Redeemer, in whom 'here' and 'there' are both one. Abraham is brought within the scope of the impossibility by faith...And yet it must not be supposed that knowledge is a fortuitous thing, that resurrection is a contingent happening, and that God is bound to the contradiction between 'here' and 'there' (R.II,p.141).

This last comment provides some evidence of how Barth is thinking, even here in R.II, of an immanent noetic paradox rather than a transcendent ontological paradox.[30] The element of continuity can be seen in the comment on Rom.6:20ff., where in talking of death and life, Barth talks of the 'lightning' of revelation and grace:

> The lightning which sets our existence ablaze illuminates at once our being and knowing...And then, maybe the lightning leaves these things untouched; or refines and purifies them; carbonizes them; or transmutes them into other substances; or perhaps it consumes and destroys them altogether - and yet, not altogether: Non omnis moriar! In every case they are subjected to a radical testing (R.II,p.227).

And the 'altogether - yet not altogether' Wolgschaft rightly points to as recognition by Barth of the continuity within the discontinuity - the point made even more clearly in RD two years later, in exposition of 1Cor.15:35ff.

Barth's theology of the resurrection at this period is to be called 'dialectical', then, because of its heavy stress in this connexion on the brokenness of all human knowledge - such that only in paradox, apparent contradiction, tension of Yes and No and 'analogy of resurrection' can anything be said theologically.[31] Here, in this 'dialectical' phase of Barth's doctrine of the resurrection, we have early echoes of Barth's later, mature theological methodology, with its disjunction between 'Church dogmatics' and 'mixophilosophicotheologia'.

(iii) Urgeschichte

Barth exploited Overbeck's term Urgeschichte in R.II, and again in Chr.D (and, quite differently, in II/2 and later)[32], though he also uses the 'Heilsgeschichte' as a synonym (cf. R.II,pp.57,32,30 on Heilsgeschichte, 'krisis', resurrection and primal history). This is no ordinary history as (for example) understood by critical historians. In a famous passage, Barth says resurrection is an 'event' which took place A.D.30 and yet because it is an event conditioned not by awareness of it but by Jesus' self-revelation it is not an 'event' at all, for apart from revelation, the significance of Jesus is no more or less than other things or people (R.II,S.6=p.30).

Although 'a divine history taking place in the midst of history' (Thurneysen), Urgeschichte did not signify a period of human history which was called divine: this history is 'conditioned by the Resurrection' and thus, in that human sense 'not an event at all'. This means the relativistic science of critical history cannot adjudicate the relevance of the resurrection, for this has nothing to do with historians' history, and everything to do with revelation. Consequently, Barth can happily also use Nietzsche's term, das Unhistorische, meaning something bigger than history in history, since something more than history is needed if Jesus is to be recognised as the Christ (namely revelation).[33]

This radical separation of ordinary history and primal history is related to the diastasis between time and eternity, and brought Barth into a conflict with the historians which continued all through his career. Underlying this disagreement lies the epistemological argument: can man - as historian - sift through the evidence of all events, including religious events? Primal history is, for Barth, history where this is ruled out, where man is not judge but judged, where such perceptions are only occasioned by revelation ("conditioned" by the Resurrection). Thus while there is an ontological dimension to Barth's concept of history, which troubled him enough to make several adjustments over the years, its fundamental character for Barth is epistemological: there is a necessary choice between history pursued by human enquiry in defiance of or in ignorance of revelation, and history based on revelation. In R.II the disjunction is strongly asserted, but its relation to this epistemological disjunction (which dominates everything in R.II) is not, in the nature of things closely argued. But since the resurrection is only history and event for man inasmuch as it is conditioned by revelation, as 'primal history', it is only relevant, is only speaking to man with the power that Barth detects in Scripture, if it is based not on man's enquiry but on God's revelation.

Thus Smart is right to defend Barth against the charge of 'docetism' on the ground of the alleged unreality of the incarnation that his attack on history is supposed to provoke: "What often has been ignored has been the concreteness of the event in history when God's world touched the circle and the firmness with which Barth insisted on the incarnation as the Word becoming flesh".[34]

(iv) Resurrection, Time and Eternity

Barth's mature theology rejected any normative role for philosophy in theology. However, in *R.II.* He was heavily influenced by philosophical ideas, not least on time and eternity. We leave till chapter 6 the discussion on time in Barth's mature theology, noting here his perspective in *R.II* on this issue.

According to Wolfhart Pannenberg: "for Bultmann and for the young Barth, Jesus' eschatology is timeless and deprived of its temporal meaning", and, "the removal of the time element in eschatology resulted in an authoritarian supernaturalism".[35] Wolgschaft also notes that the opposition of eternity to man's fleetingness is in *R.II* conceived as timeless, not as temporally imminent eternity.[36] R.H.Roberts has discussed the background he sees to Barth's diastasis between eternity and time in Kant (and Anselm), Hegel, and Kierkegaard. More significantly, he argues that *mutatis mutandis* 'there is a progression' between *R.II* and *C.D.* in Barth's understanding of time which 'has only the appearance of dramatic discontinuity'.[37] This is, of course, an exaggeration, not only because it ignores Barth's explicit rejection in *II/1*,pp.633-636 of his views in *R.II* on time and eternity (in view of which we are surprised to find no discussion of this passage in

Roberts' essay), but also because it underestimates the significance of Barth's discovery in Anselm and I/1 of a method by which he could successfully discuss the various questions and doctrines of theology while remaining faithful to his basic insight (which is not the destruction of time by eternity, but the need for theology to be more than anthropology, the need for Christian theology to be invulnerable to assimilation to alien thought).

The perspective in R.II is that: "If Christianity be not altogether thoroughgoing eschatology, there remains in it no relationship whatever with Christ" (p.314), therefore, "time is nothing when measured by the standard of eternity" (p.43). When, in this connexion, Barth talks of the "Moment", the "Now", "between past and future" as a standing still of past and future (p.497), Roberts discerns "the formal basis of the eschatological crisis" but concludes, "it offers little to a Christology that must...be related to creation and to the life and work of Christ and his salvation".[38] Roberts pinpoints weaknesses here which we discuss in connexion with Barth's mature theology. In defence of Barth, it should be noted that Barth's context here is love, which, as "human, religious impossibility", "really does see in every temporal 'Thou' the eternal contrasted 'Thou'", such that when men "do the incomprehensible work of love", we perceive time as eternity and vice versa in the "Moment," the nunc stans. So the power of eternity does not mean the irrelevance of what we do in time; awareness of the irreducibly eschatological character of the "Moment" does not mean devaluation of "each single concrete moment" with its "ethical demand": awaiting the Parousia is accepting "our present condition in its full seriousness" (pp.492-501). Further, Barth also explicitly says, "Jesus was the Christ" inside "the flux of time" in which we live, i.e., "time", not "eternity". Barth is not so radically dismissive, even in R.II, of creation (here, man's works of love in space and time) or the 'life and work of Christ'. However, Barth's reduction of awaiting the Parousia to 'serious' living does not yet signify a coherent move beyond theology as anthropology: detemporalised eschatology was not for long to remain the basis of his theology.

(v) Resurrection and Exegesis

To turn from the average historical-critical commentary to Barth's R.II is to move to a different literary genre.[39] Even the similarity with a devotional commentary is not very great. Nonetheless, Barth's commentary was not destined for obscurity. One reason for this was the relatively positive reception by Bultmann, who had recently been establishing his own reputation in N.T. scholarship by his pioneering work on form-criticism. Barth himself never abandoned biblical work as he pursued the question of theology, and is an enemy to all specialisation which would divorce the various aspects of theology, and particularly to the separation of the biblical and doctrinal aspects of theology. The style of his commentaries may change; even R.D. (1924) was already less intense than R.II, and his lectures on John (1925-6) and his commentary on Philippians (1927) show further changes in style, while R.III from his mature period together especially with the many, often extended, exegetical reflexions in C.D. show evidence of the greater "christological concentration" of the mature period.

One difference between Barth and Bultmann already visible, which would become important for their mutual divergence of approach, concerns Bultmann's preference for finding the essential permanent significance in Paul over against purely historical and mythological elements that are less interesting: Bultmann does not find the same approach in Barth and in his review of R.II criticises Barth for this excessive biblicism. Barth replied in the Preface to the third edition (July 1922) that the elements Bultmann wants to discard must remain as part of Paul's actual understanding, so that 'the whole is placed under the KRISIS of the Spirit of Christ' (R.II,p.17). [40] At this stage, however, they agreed on the need to avoid a 'spectator approach' to exegesis, of the irrelevance on mere historical enquiry, 'historical Jesus' studies, etc., on the value of history as giving a sense of freedom over against the text, on the impossibility of presuppositionless exegesis, on the radical relevance of Paul's message of justification over against the bourgeois 'culture Christianity' consensus they were only just starting to attack, the disjunction between the divine and the human, etc. By the 1940's and 1950's they would be in controversy with each other (though never severe enough to halt their correspondence), with Bultmann rejecting Barth's biblicism and Barth rejecting Bultmann's philosophical distortions in his exegesis.

Paul Minear, in an interesting article, has written of the significance of R.II for the question of exegesis. Minear sees the problem of communication between Barth and the exegetes in their different exegetical presuppositions and starting-points: Barth's churchly methodology (i.e. concern with "the prophetic disclosure of heavenly realities to the churches") versus the secular methodologies of 'professional scholars' which 'serve quite alien functions'. Only when Christian scholars seek 'liberation' from these alien, secular functions will the gap between Barthian and mainstream exegesis narrow.[41]

3. Continuations, Developments and Divergences

In its main features Barth's understanding of the resurrection, as indeed his theology generally, did not alter radically in the immediate years after R.II. However that book represented the most concentrated development of Barth's "crisis theology": after the constriction to a 'mathematical point', we might say, things begin to broaden out again. The language becomes less intensely paradoxical, the commentaries seem more like commentaries and less like philosophical discussions, there is increasing determination to relate the new breakthroughs carefully to the old liberal theology (especially that of Schleiermacher) and to the Reformation (which brings with it a concern to begin working things out in terms of dogmatics). The resurrection is still seen as 'krisis' for thought: "in answering the question: what makes Jesus the Christ? in terms of the reference to the resurrection, one is indeed left from man's point of view with what you called 'totally' incomprehensible".[42] **However, already in 1924 there is a move away from diastasis between time and eternity: one who understands Paul correctly will avoid the "temptation to confuse eternity with a great annihilation, and to make of the end-of-history an annihilation"; instead of destroying time, eternity "marks" it. With this, Barth still holds the immediacy of 'the end of time' as existentially near.**[43] The reader of R.D. will find few material alterations to the treatment of the resurrection already discerned in R.II, apart from this.

Nonetheless this book, coupled with Bultmann's 1926 review, show that while some differences remained, this was the period when not only Bultmann was closest to Barth, but Barth most closely approached Bultmann's outlook – as Smart has shown.[44] Thus when, in his most symbolic understanding of the resurrection, Barth can actually say: "Without any doubt at all the words 'resurrection of the dead' are, for (Paul), nothing else than a paraphrase of the word 'God'",[45] Bultmann comments "Barth's understanding of Paul stands out most clearly", and he sees Barth's reinterpretation of the more concrete Pauline eschatological hope in terms of the 'eternal future' as "interpreting Paul really critically; it means understanding him better than he understood himself!"[46] Certainly the same ambiguities between time and eternity remain despite the attempt to show taking eternity seriously does not mean 'annihilation' of time; certainly the indebtedness to philosophical, especially platonic categories, remains clear, despite the attempt to distance himself from them.[47] But, as Bouillard notes, for all its 'ambiguity', Barth's 'intention' of reintroducing the eschatological and transcendent dimension of the Kingdom of God suppressed in the heyday of liberal Idealism must be given due recognition.[48]

Barth's discussion of Schleiermacher on Easter shows the same perspective. Schleiermacher's denial of the resurrection is not so important as its underlying defective Christology; its 'symbiosis' of God and man as equals - "a heresy of gigantic proportions" (GA.11, E.T.,p.104). Thus the effect of the resurrection on us is strengthening rather than awakening of faith - its effect is merely relative (p.97); the primary significance of the resurrection is relative too, in confirming the faith the disciples already had, since faith rests on the twin pillars of church history and Christian civilisation (pp.97-99); and the fact of Easter is effectively denied in favour of the 'swoon theory', such that Jesus' walk to Emmaus sounds like a "convalescent walk" (pp.99). The Christology responsible for this reductionism of Easter"knows nothing of any either/or, of any antithesis of heaven and earth or God and man, of any crisis of movement from real death to real life, of any overcoming of these antitheses that is not nature but miracle", because in Schleiermacher there is "no bondage of the will...no sin...no word of truth...no justification...no repentance...no church...no eschaton..." (pp.101f.).

In this phase Barth's emphases broadly continue with minor developments: his divergence from Harnack, Schleiermacher and, (less virulently) from Herrmann now are publicly worked out. The developing 'dialectical' school is at its most homogeneous - though as interests were worked out - Barth's towards dogmatics, Bultmann's towards existential preunderstanding, Brunner's towards point of contact and Gogarten's towards ordinances of creation - the next few years, c.1927-35, would provide painful parting of the ways for the group, with only Thurneysen of the main group remaining close to Barth.

4. Assessment of Barth's Early Phase

Adolescent interest in historical criticism under the influence of Harnack quickly gave way for Barth under the influence of Herrmann. Already before 1914 there was a positive christocentric dimension to Barth's theology, coupled with a rejection of apologetics in favour of *autopistia*. The impact of 1914 and his openness to the Blumhardts made him question starting with man's personal *faith* (*autopistia*) and encouraged him to seek ways in preaching and theology to begin with God and his kingdom without dissolution into individualism (*R.I*) - hence the type of *autobasileia* Sauter sees in J.C.Blumhardt is reflected in Barth's writings: we have a move from *autopistia* to a kind of *autobasileia*, or better, to what Trutz Rendtorff calls the 'radical autonomy of God';[49] with it, is a move from theology with an anthropocentric starting-point to a theology which is convinced, "one can *not* speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice" (*WGWM*,p.196). Precisely how one *can* speak of God, still more speak of man, without the reductionism Barth wants to avoid, would now become a key problem. Hence, in *Chr.D.*, Christian language is the basis of Christian dogmatics, since there is preaching in the world as there is rainfall; but in *C.D.* the basis of dogmatics is that *in the church* there is "language about God" (*I/2*,p.2)[50]. Thus chapter 5 will focus on material over the period of this change, leading us into Part 2 (our discussion of the resurrection in the context of Barth's theology in *C.D.*).

Barth's theology of resurrection has developed considerably from the early phase, where it was marginal, largely absorbed back into Christ's life and death and forwards into present experience. Under the influence of the Blumhardts we see the emergence of the resurrection as a key theme in Barth's theology, first as a demonstration of God's power (in *R.I*), then as the revelation which symbolises and is the cosmic diastasis between God and the world, ontologically and epistemologically unbridgeable by man (in R.II), and indeed is a periphrasis for God. The development into full-blooded dialectical theology with R.II also brings with it a solution to the abandonment of the simul of Luther's simul justus et peccator in that man in this world is described as utterly sinful, and not even religion, indeed especially not religion, can make him just; and yet in the resurrection his justification is accomplished eternally, thus he is 'just' not in the reality of this world, but eschatologically, as promise: the simul justus et peccator is maintained dialectically, with reference to the resurrection.[51]

PART TWO:

THE RESURRECTION IN THE CHURCH DOGMATICS

CHAPTER 5:

Empty Tomb and Virgin Birth

EMPTY TOMB AND VIRGIN BIRTH

I INTRODUCTION: BARTH'S EXPOSITION

1. Christliche Dogmatik

Behind Barth's discussion of the parallelism between virgin birth and empty tomb as 'signs' of the incarnation and resurrection respectively in I/2, lies the treatment in his Christian Dogmatics (1927). There, in §16.3, he discusses the credal Qui conceptus est de Spiritu sancto, natus ex Maria virgine. He sees the virgin birth as the historical event in which, as primal history, as miracle, the incarnation takes place, and which must be acknowledged as God's direct act (pp.272-274). It runs parallel to Christ's resurrection on the third day, and these two, virgin birth and resurrection, form the boundaries by which, according to the witness of Scripture and the confessions of the Church, the life and person of Christ is to be understood (p.274). These two 'limits' form the occasion of the objective possibility of revelation in that the God-man, as objective possibility of revelation tells of the virgin birth, but as objective possibility of revelation tells of the resurrection, so that virgin birth and resurrection bring respectively to the fore the hiddenness in which revelation occurs and the revelation which occurs in hiddenness. Thus virgin birth and resurrection are related to each other as indispensible basis and indispensible disclosure (pp.274f.).

In his discussion of the _Natus ex Maria virgine_, Barth gets into a tangle. He sees the incarnation as dependent on God, not on Mary, but he sees her virginity as the appropriate, indeed, it seems, the only context for the event of incarnation. He reaches this conclusion christologically, not through a theology of celibacy; but some dubious points are made with even more dubious consequences. While the lack of sexuality is not relevant to Barth, the lack of a male in the virgin birth is; and his distinction between the sexes is so radical here that he allows Mary's femininity, and especially her virginity, to be a requisite of incarnation (i.e., virginity as disentanglement from male history, creativity and ingenuity). Thus he allows the negation of sex to emerge as 'entirely secondary' (while Christology is primary), and the necessity of her virginity for incarnation as secondary ('negative') to the primary aspect ('positive') in the Holy Spirit's work. Thus negation of sex and the definitive significance of Mary's virginity for incarnation emerge as secondary but clear consequences of Barth's exposition. We are very far from Luther's statement: "It does not make much difference whether she was a virgin or a wife, though God willed that she be a virgin".[1] For Barth, Mary's virginity is the negative, secondary prerequisite of incarnation, while God's act of spontaneous creation by the Holy Spirit as _causa efficiens_ (i.e., not cause by means of quasi-sexual liaison, but by a 'God spoke') is its positive, primary prerequisite. So Jesus is "according to his divinity, simply motherless" and "according to his humanity, simply fatherless" (cf.Heb.7:3). So although Barth rejects Catholic theories of immaculate conception, his interpretation does not remove him from biological interpretations or from the idea of femininity, especially virginity, as a context in which one is closer to God - i.e., the idea of two-tier anthropology, with virgin women as closer to God, and with a propensity enabling them more easily to co-operate with God. A peculiar partial 'semi-pelagianism'! (pp.275-282).

This perspective remains as Barth discusses the _conceptio de Spiritu sancto_ under three heads - _formatio_ (generation using Mary's humanity), _sanctificatio_ (transformation of Christ's humanity as God-man - here seen with the Reformed tradition as Christ 'in the form of a slave'), and _assumptio_ (the miracle of incarnation as simultaneity of the first two aspects). Again the first aspect is the 'lesser' and the second the 'greater' - but both are necessary (pp.282-284).

2. Controversy with Brunner

The theme of the virgin birth provides a focus of disagreement between Barth and Brunner. While Barth was writing _Chr.D._, Brunner was writing _The Mediator_. Despite proximity to Barth on many issues, his difference on the virgin birth is very clear. For Brunner, the virgin birth could find its origin historically or dogmatically. But since the evidence suggests it arose not historically but to answer dogmatic questions the first is suspect (pp323f.); the second is also suspect because the theology of incarnation in Paul and John answers these questions better than the theology of the virgin birth and indeed is contradicted in some regard by it; so the virgin birth doctrine should be treated with studied indifference (pp.325f.). Thus to defend the virgin birth on the basis of opposition between divinity and procreation leads into docetism, and to defend it to protect Jesus' sinlessness ignores modern instances of parthenogenesis where the offspring are not sinless. Indeed to argue God could not create a sinless God-man through procreation undermines the doctrine of Christ's "Two Natures", leaving Christ with divine and human sections instead of remaining integrally wholly divine and wholly human simultaneously. Brunner thinks the incarnation needs no such 'biological' explanation to back it up.

Since Barth and Brunner were writing simultaneously, neither was directly criticising the other - though the difference is obvious. Barth's own account is not vulnerable directly to Brunner's attack, since his virgin birth doctrine arises neither from an attack on procreation nor from a defence of Jesus' sinlessness, but his idea that Mary's virginity is necessary for incarnation, apart from its semi-pelagianism, is not far removed from being an attack on procreation, and counts in Brunner's terms as a 'biological' explanation, and is thus implicitly rejected as throwing into doubt the Pauline and Johannine doctrine of the incarnation.

Consequently, we are not surprised that when Barth returns to the theme he should attack Brunner's arguments. For Barth, Brunner confuses sign (virgin birth) and thing signified (incarnation), fails to see his argument jeopardizes other signs ("the appearances of the risen Jesus", "the empty tomb", "all Jesus' miracles") and indeed the thing signified (incarnation) is left suspect: "Brunner's denial of the Virgin birth is a bad business". In polemic, sharp after the Natural Theology controversy (1934-5), Barth comments on Brunner's later comments in Man in Revolt (in linguistic reminiscence of Brunner's 'determination' to 'pass by' the virgin birth) that it is "so bad that my only possible attitude to it is silence" (I/2,pp.183f.).

3. Changes in Barth's Perspective

Barth's meditations of 1926-33 (Christmas), 'Resurrection' (1927) and Credo (1935) help us see developments in Barth's approach. Thus in Christmas in 1926 Barth says 'Pronouncements about "history" (Geschichte) cannot be derived from this text', yet also says the Word "was really with us, in time, in history" (S.9f.=pp.12f., tr.altered). In this we are reminded of Barth's attitude to history in R.II. In 1927 he says virgin birth "means God's presence in our world" (p.17), similarly to Chr.D. he sees it as meaning 'God Himself begins life in "our poor flesh and blood"' (p.19), and emphasises it as divine event but also emphasises Mary's passivity. The same problems emerge as in the 1927 dogmatics, and we wonder if Barth would prefer it if God had created the God-man 'without father or mother' (Heb.7:3), since he sees the virgin birth here as comparable to creatio ex nihilo (ib.). But in 1933 we find Barth focusing on historical elements in the Christmas story as a sign of God's revelation (pp.55-58), again in that year Barth speaks more unambiguously than earlier of the secular historicity of the Christmas events: "the Lord...became man..within our dimension and our time, on our earth and in the midst of our history, so-called world history" (p.60). In 1935, in Credo, unlike in 1926, Barth says Jn.1:14 speaks ofthe word as a becoming, therefore...a history" (p.65), we get the language of virgin birth as 'sign' and incarnation as 'thing signified', the former as 'miracle', the latter as 'mystery', and hear that 'the Virgin Birth has not ontic but noetic significance', and that the exclusion of the male in virgin birth does not mean any apotheosis of woman' (pp.62-72); all this already sounds like much of what Barth would write in I/2.

Similarly in 'Resurrection' (1927), Barth stresses the resurrection as "in history, the destruction of all historical analogy", as such, "the revealed order ...which has set out in argument against the lies of all historical analogy", and "the limitation of all history which has fixed itself and become perceptible in history", etc.; i.e., the resurrection disrupts all historical categories - its non-historical aspect is stressed at the expense of its historical aspect.[2] But in Credo Barth emphasises more positively the concrete historical aspects - the Easter story is "in the continuum of the history of our world" though Barth is still working with special categories of history here as in this period generally: "revelation as disclosure" is "resurrection history" which means "the message of Jesus Christ is on this side, too," i.e., from the perspective of witness to and acknowledgment of revelation "distinguished from an arbitrary interpretation of history" (pp.98-100). We also hear of the empty tomb which must not be 'struck out, which with the appearances form two sides of the Easter miracle which itself is a 'single sign' of Jesus' exaltation (pp.99f). Again the resurrection is like the virgin birth in that language is inadequate to describe it (p.101). We are in Credo on the way towards Barth's sophisticated parallelism of I/2.

4. Parallelism of Signs in I/2

Whereas in Chr.D. Barth's connexions betwen virgin birth and incarnation and resurrection were vague, and aspects were suspect (particularly the semi-pelagian aspect), he works through these relations with remarkable consistency in I/2.

For Barth, the virgin birth dogma is only understandable 'as a unique and peculiar act of God' - this is decisive in seeing its relevance, while Scripture and dogmatic traditions also point to its importance (pp.172-178). It is not the incarnation, but the sign of it. Now while belief in the sign is not 'necessary for salvation' as it were, disbelief in the sign usually vitiates the thing signified, so preachers disbelieving the sign should not spread their doubts (pp.179-181). Signs signify, being in ontic and noetic analogy with the thing signified (p.182). The empty grave is a similar sign, with resurrection as the thing signified (p.179). Indeed these two signs are one, marking out Christ's existence at its opening and close, marking it off by itself, not by human interpretation, i.e., concerning its opening, 'it is free of...arbitrariness', and concerning its close 'it is victorious over...death'. The virgin birth denotes the mystery of revelation, so God is where revelation starts, not human ingenuity; the empty tomb denotes the revelation of the mystery, so God in his majesty submits to the extremities of human life and death, 'He has unveiled Himself as the One He is'. The two signs are one with the same objective content: to doubt either is to destroy both and call in question belief in the incarnation and resurrection (pp.182f.).

The '*dogmatic* necessity' of the virgin birth is expounded from the credal clauses. *Natus ex Maria virgine* indicates divine sovereignty and Jesus' real humanity. As before, Barth emphasises Mary's virginity as a *conditio sine qua non* of incarnation, for it 'is the denial, not of man in the presence of God, but of any power, attribute or capacity in him for God' (pp.185-188). However, while there is a link between virgin birth and original sin, this link is not causal, since the virgin birth is only the sign of the breakthrough of a new humanity (pp.188f.). Nonetheless, sign is to be held with thing signified, so Barth still will not say incarnation is possible without parthenogenesis. Brunner's argument fails because he confuses sign and thing signified - but both belong together, like healing (as sign) and forgiveness (as thing signified) in Mk.2:1-12 (pp.189f.). Barth again denies his virgin birth doctrine has an anti-sexual basis, but although he specifically denies the synergistic or semi-pelagian view of Chr.D. that virginity provides a (negative) point of contact to divine grace, his formal denial does not instance a full material departure from the earlier view in that the virgo becomes (even if she is not) the possibility of being a recipient of grace, by virtue of being non-willing, non-creative, etc., (i.e., still the 'archetypal' attributes of femininity and especially virginity), and in that the dominant malevolent role of the male excluded in Chr.D. becomes that of 'human creaturely eros' in I/2, i.e., 'wedlock' (pp.190-192). But isn't this almost explicitly to base the virgin birth on anti-sexual and even anti-marital ideas (cf.1Tim.4:3!)? Certainly his exegetical backing (pp.193f.) leads to this conclusion, together with the divison of sexual roles already seen in Chr.D. and the idea creeping through the surface that sin is masculine: despite his explicit rejection of Schleiermacher's view that 'the female has no need of conversion' (p.195), maybe Barth is not far from him on this issue. Certainly it is one thing for him to deny his exposition implies synergism, it is another thing actually to avoid such consequences.

Conceptus de Spiritu sancto means God at work - not 'biologically', indeed, biological or mythological parallels are irrelevant since God's work has no parallels. It means God working to unite man to himself, primarily in the incarnation - but with parallels in the 'virgin' birth of believers (Jn.1:12f., 3:3-6), Christ's baptism (Mk.1:9f) and resurrection (Rom.1:4) (pp.196-199). As in _Chr.D._ Barth rules out quasi-sexual activity: the Holy Spirit is _causa efficiens_ (pp.200f).

In conclusion, the sign is not the basis of the incarnation but _vice versa_; so noetically the incarnation stands or falls with the '_conceptio de Spiritu sancto_' - but not ontically; Jesus is not incarnate _because of_ the virgin birth, but _vice versa_ (p.202).

5. Interim Comments

While Barth determined to axe any hints towards 'existential philosophy' in _C.D._ (_I/1_,p._ix_), the reader should not assume rampant existentialism pervades _Chr.D._, certainly not the variety that uses religious language as mere coded symbols for purely secular realities. If in the 1920's Barth used a word like "resurrection" as a codeword - it was a codeword for God. Barth never had problems with the ontological reality of God or with his significance for the world: rather his problems were epistemological - how could God's revelation (in the resurrection) remain God's self-disclosure without becoming a "fact" for individuals to absorb or reject at will but always and again God's act? The move from Chr.D to C.D. gives us a decisive move forward as Barth grappled with this question. Thus in 1927, Christian dogmatics is the theological discipline whereby the theologian endeavours to bring out the legitimate content of Christian talk of God and men, but in 1932, "Dogmatics is a theological discipline. But theology is a function of the Church" (I/1,p.1, my emphasis).[3] As Kreck puts it: "That God is only recognised through God himself, but really discloses his identity to man in Jesus Christ, that is the quintessence of Karl Barth's doctrine of revelation"[4] - i.e., Jesus Christ as faithfully proclaimed in the Church according to the witness of Scripture to this revelation. The change in context from Chr.D. to C.D. gives us a more successful answer to the same question. Together with these changes, on the basis of revelation, Barth wishes to emphasise the more clearly in I/1-2 the historical context of the incarnation - i.e. that God became man and thus acted in 'our time', 'our history', and thus talked more concretely of the historical elements in the gospel story. It is symptomatic of these changes that on top of his recovery of the virgin birth in Chr.D. (a doctrine denied even by his father!) comes his recovery of the empty grave in

Credo and decisively in I/2. This is a time when Barth is still uneasy about historical elements - contrast his comment on Jesus as 'the Rabbi of Nazareth' who historically seems 'commonplace' in I/1,p.188 with §64.3 in IV/2 on 'The Royal Man'; so historical affirmations are significant. So one significant feature of Barth's parallelism of signs is that it shows him no longer decrying the virgin birth or empty tomb as irrelevant for faith. Similarly, we note the abandonment of the category of 'primal history' to describe salvation-historical events in I/2. In Chr.D. the historicity of the virgin birth is primal-historical, but in I/2, "The dogma of the Virgin birth...states that...the event... is a real event accomplished in space and time as history within history" (p.177).

II CRITICAL DISCUSSION: MODERN THEOLOGY

There have been many remarks on Barth's treatment. As representative of two different approaches, we look at those of Andrew Louth and Wolfhart Pannenberg.

1. Andrew Louth

Andrew Louth writes as an Anglican sympathetic to Catholicism on the one hand, and to Karl Barth, i.e, the mature Barth of the Church Dogmatics; his mentor in the Catholic approach to Barth is clearly H.U. von Balthasar, the Roman Catholic Swiss theologian[5].

Louth's theme is 'Karl Barth and the problem of Mariology', a problem not only for Barth, but for Louth himself - for here we inevitably meet an area of conflict for those who wish to take as much as possible from Catholicism with as much as possible from Barth. In the end, for Louth, it is his Catholic interest which wins - Barth does not go far enough on Mariology for him, instead 'Barth...falls victim to fundamental flaws in Protestantism....those of rationalism and individualism'; rationalism, because Barth does not see that apprehension of the mystery of revelation is more than conceptual, rational awareness of it and Mary is indispensible in this more than conceptual mystery, 'for without her that mystery would not have been disclosed'; individualism, because for Barth (according to Louth) in God's revelation to me, he reveals himself, so I have a 'purely individual relationship to God' - but apprehension of God is not individual but rather means apprehension of 'others in God - and the first among these others is Mary' (p.18).

Yet Barth's faults here are much less than 'typical' Protestantism which is far more imbued with rationalism, in that it holds a series of unrelated (but Scriptural) affirmations about Mary with 'no context, no real meaning' - he instances Austin Farrer (p.16). But Barth goes beyond 'typical' Protestantism by providing Mary with a broader context, accepting various christological doctrines which affect Mary, including the virgin birth and the Theotokos doctrine. According to Louth: "Barth's treatment of these themes, as nearly always, is of great brilliance and penetration, in particular his treatment of the Virgin Birth. He does not merely assert or admit this doctrine; he gives it great prominence and probes its theological significance in a very illuminating way" (p.7).

Barth's context for the virgin birth and the Theotokos doctrine is his christological doctrine of the mystery of revelation: Louth accepts this as far as it goes - but it does not go far enough (p.8). Barth's writing on Mariology is in 'another context' - Barth's anti-Roman polemic against the analogy of being; but Barth "held - wrongly in fact - that the doctrine of the analogy of being in Catholic theology implied that there is some common ground between God and creatures" (p.13, my emphasis). So Barth's comments on Mary need a 'third context' (which Louth provides, exploiting other material of Barth's) to replace his limited christological context and the context of attacking a non-existent Roman doctrine. This context, though unused by Barth (p.8), may be fruitful for Catholics who wish to use his insights (p.18); Louth starts with Barth's discussion of the virgin birth. Unlike Barth, Louth concedes, "it is conceivable that God could have revealed himself among us without the need of the miracle of the Virgin Birth" (p.10), but agrees with Barth's language of 'sign' of virgin birth, and 'thing signified' of incarnation, and that they should not be readily separated, since hostility or indifference towards virgin birth threatens the incarnation also. Louth completely agrees with Barth here:

> Barth in fact, as is well known, puts the Virgin Birth on a par with the empty tomb. The Virgin Birth is not the Incarnation, nor is the empty tomb the Resurrection. But dare we separate the inner meaning from the outer expression in either of these cases? (p.11).

Thus, for Barth:

> The Virgin Birth is not simply admitted as a fact, but invested with deep, theological significance; and this significance is tied up with our apprehension of the mystery of God's self-revelation (ib.).

But maybe Barth is guilty of separating outer historical wrapping and inner truth (virgin birth and incarnation) by refusal to look at Mary's role in the virgin birth - the virgin birth as the sign of the incarnation should lead us to an understanding of Mary in 'bridal relationship to God' - not as 'pagan sacral marriage', but as in 'the traditional interpretation of the Song of Songs' (p.14).

Mary's role is that of contemplation (Lk.2:19,51) and thus of "inner involvement in the mystery of redemption", she "is the type of that contemplation and adoration" mentioned in beholding God's glory in Christ (Jn.1:14). From this it "is a short step" to the doctrines of 'immaculate conception', Μαρια παναγια and the 'Assumption' (p.15).

So while Barth's treatment of the incarnation is almost entirely masterly, bringing out the ultimate mysteriousness of God's disclosure of himself in the incarnation, and the part played by the Virgin Birth in this disclosure" (p.17) , and Barth's understanding of virgin birth in relation to incarnation and its parallel with the empty tomb/resurrection link is affirmed as theologically profound, Louth only wishes Barth could have set his understanding of Mary in the context of prayer and contemplation - a task open to Barth as his *Church Dogmatics*, following Anselm's *Proslogion*, is itself, as a whole, set in this prayerful, contemplative context (pp.3f.).

2. Wolfhart Pannenberg

Pannenberg's theology no doubt reflects what Louth would dub as Protestant rationalism and individualism: he is much more critical of Barth than is Louth, but in 1950 he did study with Barth, and, as Frank Tupper says, was 'strongly influenced' by him. He gives us a helpful alternative interpretation to Louth's.

For Pannenberg theological statements arise out of historical events, not the reverse, so the historical basis of christological doctrines determines their value. He sees the virgin birth as a 'legend'[6] in complete contrast to the empty tomb, where "something recognisably historical has been expanded in a legendary way" (p.149). For the virgin birth legend 'probably emerged relatively late', and "Paul and Mark were as little familiar with it as was John" (p.142). Pannenberg believes there is an either-or with virgin birth and incarnation of the pre-existent Word, and he finds the latter preferable (p.143), so he rejects as 'impossible to conceive' Barth's idea of the former as the 'sign' of the latter. These two are in contradiction to each other because, "The story of the virgin birth bears all the marks of a legend that has been constructed out of an aetiological interest, namely, in order to illustrate the title 'Son of God'" (p.149). In contrast, with its sound doctrinal base, the doctrine of pre-existence properly deals with the question of Jesus' divine Sonship: from the revelation in the resurrection "we attain access to the understanding of the old concept of Jesus' pre-existence" (p.150):

> Viewed from the confirmation of Jesus' claim by his resurrection, the inner logic of the matter dictates that Jesus was always one with God...And in view of God's eternity...that God was always one with Jesus, even before his earthly birth. Jesus is from all

> eternity the representative of God in the creation (p.153).

So Barth's 'mystery' and 'miracle' are competing interpretations and cannot be coherently held together: Barth's account is to be rejected. Barth's exposition seems to lead him already 'on the path of Roman Mariolatry' (pp.144,147), i.e., emphasising the relevance of Mary's femininity for the event of the incarnation and of her special aptitude, as one who merely receives, as the appropriate context for God's action. This intention is not biblical (p.144), and implies femininity and virginity make one closer to God (pp.144,147f.). Barth's conclusions about Mary, in the context of his treatment of the virgin birth "would turn the Reformation's _sola gratia_..into its exact opposite" (p.148).

Pannenberg does talk with Barth of the virgin birth, and the biblical receptivity of Mary as a 'sign' or, preferably, a 'symbol' - though not as a historical event of divine action, but as a human legend symbolic 'of humanity receiving the grace of God in faith' (pp.145,148). He agrees with Paul Althaus that we must not see three things in the virgin birth: divine and human paternity in competition; the condition for Jesus' sinlessness; and equal significance to the resurrection. Pannenberg faults Barth on the second and the third, explicitly, seeing doctrines of immaculate conception and confusion of centre with periphery in Christianity, respectively. On this last point, Pannenberg holds Barth's virgin birth/empty tomb parallelism is inadmissible because scripturally they bear unequal weight. First, the virgin birth is fundamentally unhistorical (and thus unsuitable as a vehicle of revelation), whereas the empty tomb (whatever the doubts on details) is fundamentally historical. And secondly, Christianity in Scripture does not exist without Easter, but it can and does exist without the virgin birth (pp.148f.).

In sum, Pannenberg rejects Barth's account because (1) pre-existence strictly contradicts virgin birth ; and (2) virgin birth and empty tomb are not equal historically, doctrinally or biblically. These criticisms, if sustained, demolish Barth's carefully constructed parallelism of sign and mystery here.

3. Assessment

The criticisms of Louth and Pannenberg concerning Barth's virgin birth/incarnation: empty tomb/resurrection parallelism, despite their differences, equally fail to take sufficiently seriously the actual 'context' of Barth's theology.

For Louth, Barth's remarks on Mary need a new theological context: not historical, certainly not anti-Roman polemic, not even incarnational, but contemplative - not a strictly doctrinal or conceptual category, but one which does have doctrinal consequences for Louth. This contemplative context Louth sees as no serious departure from what Barth means, for "in Anselm's search for God in prayer, pre-eminently attention to God, patient waiting on God, Barth found an epitome of theological method".[7]

However, there are two problems here. First, Barth does not see theology as the "search for God in prayer", but as the confession of God's search for man: the most that man can search for in prayer is the knowledge of God which God alone gives: thus what "has to be sought in prayer" is "a knowledge that must be bestowed on man", i.e., "within the limits which God himself imposes on noetic investigation"[8]. Indeed Barth specifically rules out the idea that Anselm's theology means man's search for God: Anselm never directed his argument to the unbeliever or abandoned 'faith itself as a starting-point', or supplemented 'dogmatic' with 'apologetic' action or, 'anagogically or apagogically', based theology on apologetics (p.67). So the encounter with God 'can never be brought about by all our searching for God', and what 'has to be sought in prayer' is intellegere within the context of faith, since "all right seeking (it also is grace) would be of no avail if God did not 'show' himself" (p.38); in sum, "intellectus fidei...can consist only of positive meditation on the object of faith. It cannot establish this object of faith" (p.39). Importantly, however, this 'meditation' "will not on any account be able to set itself in explicit contradiction to the Bible" (p.40,cf.p.33).

Secondly, Louth's 'third context' may help to exploit

Barth's insights for Catholic theology, but does not help us critically assess what Barth himself says and means. Louth's 'third context' for Barth is Mariological- not in the sense of being divorced from Christology altogether, but autonomously Mariological since, in contemplation and meditation, one freely forges separate doctrines relating exclusively to the person of Mary. But this is exactly what Barth explicitly will not allow, and for very good reasons. Mariological statements which are not explicitly at root purely christological ones demonstrate independent Mariology. Barth can accept the doctrine of Mary as "Mother of God" - but only because it "has a biblical foundation" and a "christological context" (I/2,pp.138ff, here p.139). The three extra doctrines Louth wants are purely Mariological, based on speculation exclusively regarding Mary's role in the mystery of redemption: at root, Louth wants Barth to supply a theological context to Mary, because he thinks in terms of a doctrine (as well as experience) of Mary. But why should Barth - on his (Anselmian!) biblical grounds - have a doctrine of Mary? The biblical grounds for such a doctrine are thin. Louth's talk of a new 'context' for Barth's treatment of the virgin birth simply begs the question: by 'context' he already implies that a doctrine of Mary is necessary for Barth - but this is what, on biblical grounds, Barth will not allow.

Louth's Mariological contemplative 'context' disrupts the wider context of Barth's theology, i.e., the role of Scripture in its witness to revelation and the need for proclamation faithfully to attest the witness of Scripture as against free-ranging autonomous, non-Scriptural Mariological speculation. Unless Louth wants more broadly to attack Barth's method, his Scripture principle, his critique fails.

Pannenberg's different critique is similarly flawed. His attacks on both the virgin birth/incarnation link and the virgin birth/empty tomb parallel are based on his theological method, which works from history to theology. This is not only different to Barth's dogmatic method, but also an unworkable basis to criticise Barth. Working historical-critically, Pannenberg sees the virgin birth as a crude literalistic answer, and incarnation of the pre-existent Word as a profound theological answer, to the question of how Jesus is the Son of God. In a historical-critical context Pannenberg's conclusions may follow. However, Barth does not accept this context. Rather, he assumes a stance of 'assumed critical naivety' towards the historical-critical method and its conclusions. This is based on a different assessment of what theology is - i.e., church dogmatics not based on 'the quicksands of history'.[9] Pannenberg's criticism of Barth is irrelevant because of the utterly different premises: only his defence of his different methodology against Barth's would support his historical-critical attack on the virgin birth against Barth's support of it.

Pannenberg's attack on Barth's virgin birth/empty tomb parallel is also historical: that historical evidence for the virgin birth is thin and late, but for the empty tomb, and for the resurrection generally, is early and much attested. Further, the N.T. gives more weight to Easter than to the virgin birth. While the first count misses Barth's analysis with its doctrinal, not historical basis, the second ground is more relevant - for the resurrection does play a far more important role in primitive Christianity and the faith generally than does the account of the virgin birth. Pannenberg's argument is partially flawed, since it is the resurrection which is attested at almost every level in N.T. Scripture, but is is the empty tomb which Barth parallels with the virgin birth. Moreover, Pannenberg's broad acceptance of the historicity of the empty tomb and its value in attesting the resurrection (on the basis of its independent origin from the appearance tradition) is surprisingly different to the virgin birth, the independent origin of which counted against it! However, Pannenberg rightly directs us to Scripture - for here Barth's account is most vulnerable.

III CRITICAL DISCUSSION: BIBLICAL BASIS

1. The Virgin Birth/Incarnation Link

(i) Matthew 1:18-25

The focal-point of Mt.1:18-25 is the word 'Immanuel'. [10] For Matthew, 'salvation' means God with us, so the promise of Mt.1:23 is fulfilled in Mt.28:20, and Mt.18:20 confirms that the presence of an unknown God is replaced by that of Jesus, who is known. In this context, Isa.7:14 becomes peculiarly appropriate, though the Hebrew word, meaning 'nubile woman' becomes in the LXX 'virgin', so any discussion of the virgin birth dogma must recognise this dubious background.

Two possibilities emerge: either the virgin birth was invented by Matthew, so 'Immanuel' could be applied to Jesus; or the virgin birth story pre-dated Matthew and was employed because of Isa.7:14 LXX to corroborate the teaching that God is with us in Jesus. In either case the theological significance of the virgin birth for Matthew would be to fulfil Isa.7:14 LXX and show via prophecy that Jesus is present in the church.

The proximity in Mt.1:23 of virgin birth and 'God with us' does not imply a link with the incarnation; for Matthew, 'God with us' means the presence of the exalted Jesus in the community.

(ii) Luke 1-3

To the modern mind, Luke's most explicit reference to the virgin birth, in Lk.3:23, seems to undermine the genealogy, but this was irrelevant to the evangelists, who valued legal recognition.[11] Now although Lk.3:23 also makes the point that Jesus is Son of God, the intention is non-incarnational, since this is by virtue of his descent from Adam!

While the historical background of the virgin birth in Lk.1:26ff. may be speculated on, we restrict ourselves to theological examination of the canonical text. In that context, the virgin birth seems not highly prominent: it is a work of the Holy Spirit, and a miracle. But the Holy Spirit is evident at every critical stage in the backgrounds of John the Baptist and Jesus (1:15, 35-37,41,67; 2:25-27; 3:16,22; 4:1,14,18); and John's birth of a barren mother is a similar miracle to parthenogenesis. Similarly angels appear at occasions for both John and Jesus (1:11-20, 26-38; 2:9-15). Virgin birth is not presented as linked to the incarnation here, instead we have a theology of the Holy Spirit active in miracles, and his work in Jesus and in the community provides the theological context even in Lk.1:35. Again even that verse does not suggest a 'biological' interpretation of the miracle but that the Spirit's involvement gives rise to Jesus being called 'Son of God': thus Luke does not answer how Jesus became God's

Son, but emphasises the work of the Spirit in the origins of the Messiah, the forerunner, and indeed the Christian community.

(iii) Other Texts in Matthew, Luke and Mark

Mk.12:35-37 (et par.) might imply a questioning of Jesus' davidic descent - though not in the theology of the evangelists; more likely it is a question of 'to what extent' or 'in what way' Jesus is a descendent of David. Maybe even the passage is christologically similar to Rom.1:3f., and implies subordination of davidic descent to divine descent, so the synoptics would give rudimentary implicit hints towards a link between Jesus' davidic descent and his divine descent (and hence, pre-existence).[12]

Lk.2:48f. contrasts Joseph and God as literal and heavenly fathers, respectively. In context this signifies that Jesus, who grows up in an ordinary home, is nonetheless aware that, in the most important theological sense, God is his father. The contrast is too elusive for more to be read out of it legitimately.

Similarly in Lk.4:22, locals from Nazareth mix up Jesus' literal (or legal) father with his divine sonship; their polite rejection is quickly followed by hostile rejection. These doubters call Jesus 'Mary's son' in Mark, and 'the carpenter's son' in Matthew, thus underlining not their title for Jesus as the significant point, but the failure to recognise Jesus' Messianic status.

Finally, we note Mark never mentions Joseph. This ambiguous fact could mean Mark knows of no 'biological' relation to Joseph - or again that he does not know of Joseph, who would 'arise' in later speculation about Jesus' birth!

(iv) Paul's Reference to Jesus' Birth

Does Paul, with his belief in pre-existence and incarnation, provide a link to the virgin birth in Gal.4:4? The evidence is thin - but the point is certainly contested: generally Catholics see the virgin birth in this verse and Protestants don't. [13] The Catholic view has some support in contemporary parallels: some of Paul's contemporaries believed Isaac was conceived by parthenogenesis, and Gal.4:23,27,29 might encourage the belief of the parallel in Gal.4:4, but Rom.4:19f. implies Paul did not share this belief about Isaac's conception. Maybe the phrase 'born of a woman' doesn't refer to the virgin birth but indicates cognizance of it - though even this much is not secure: 'born of a woman' is parallel in Gal.4:4 to 'born under law', which *prima facie* seems to rule out even allusion to the miraculous birth of a virgin. The phrase makes sense in context in following the biblically attested sense of meaning human frailty; further, it becomes more difficult to understand if Paul had known of the phrase. So while Gal.4:1-6 do refer to the incarnation of the pre-existent Son of God, any knowledge of virgin birth implied is unlikely.

(v) Virgin Birth in John's Gospel

With John's Gospel the question of knowledge of and attitude to the Christmas story is most difficult to determine.[14] Various elements of the Christmas story are alluded to, though not decisively enough to determine that John knew of the Christmas story as such, and these elements are treated even more polemically than in Lk.2:48f. and 4:22. Thus Jesus' origins from Nazareth and Joseph are contrasted unfavourably with his origin as Son of God and King of Israel (Jn.1:45,49); his origins from Joseph with his coming down from heaven (Jn.6:42); his origins from Galilee as against Bethlehem with his origins from God (cf.Jn.7:27 and 42-52 with vv.28f.); and, most cryptically, normal birth versus 'virgin birth' - of Christians! (Jn.1:13). The reference to Bethlehem leaves us unsure whether John knew of the tradition of Jesus' birth there - because the point he makes is that Jesus' important origins are not in Galilee or Bethlehem, but God.

But what of the possible allusion to virgin birth in Jn.1:13, one verse before the locus classicus of incarnational theology? Certainly opinion is divided on whether the virgin birth is alluded to here. Probably there is a reference here - certainly John alludes to things not directly discussed - supremely the institution of the eucharist at the last supper, but also to the transfiguration in Jn.1:14.[15] Barth himself sees an implicit allusion to the virgin birth in Jn.1:12f. (I/2, p.373); and it is also possible to argue that 'illegitimate children' in Jn.8:41 alludes to Jewish polemic against the virgin birth.

But even if a positive allusion is intended in Jn.1:13, the plural 'not of bloods' indicates negatively not of father and mother, and positively of the (singular) blood of Christ alone. So if any allusion in Jn.1:12f. to virgin birth is made, it is polemical: not merely birth without a father, but also without a mother, and instead born 'from above' (Jn.3:3); to be 'children of God' (Jn.1:12) is what is necessary. So if Jn.1:12f. alludes to the virgin birth, then far from indicating a biblical link with the incarnation, it instances a biblical polemical contrast between virgin birth and incarnation.

(vi) Conclusion

The virgin birth/incarnation link can nowhere be found clearly and explicitly in Scripture: but may it be legitimately inferred? Certainly free, i.e., unfaithful, speculation on the springboard of Scripture is not permissible. But working out words, concepts, ideas and relations not explicit but certainly implicit in Scripture does take us a valuable step beyond mere biblical phenomenology into biblical theology (from 'material biblicism' to 'formal biblicism', to use

Barth's terminology). Even on this basis, however, no virgin birth/incarnation link may be inferred, for the explicit accounts of the virgin birth find a different theological context - in Matthew, the presence of God in Jesus and thus the presence of Jesus in the community, and in Luke, the powerful, miraculous work of the Holy Spirit in Jesus from first to last, and also in believers: in either case God's work and presence in Jesus and among believers provides the theological context of the virgin birth. Similarly John and Paul, who talk of incarnation, if they can be said to allude to the virgin birth (which is at least uncertain), such allusions if anything make a positive link between virgin birth and incarnation more problematic! The biblical evidence for Barth's positive virgin birth/incarnation link is very thin indeed.

2. The Empty Tomb/Resurrection Link

(i) Mark 16

While Mk.16:9ff. is textually dubious, there is enough in vv.1-8 for our quest. For two explanations of 'He has risen!' (v.6) are given: the empty tomb (v.6) and the projected appearance in Galilee (v.7), which takes up Mk.14:28 and anticipates the original (lost) climax of Mark - which may be reflected in Mt.28:16ff. Pannenberg is mistaken to see in Mark an 'unadulterated account of the empty tomb' (JGM,p.88), since twin explanations of empty tomb and appearance are clearly given. Explicitly, Mark links resurrection with empty tomb and also appearances.

(ii) Matthew 28

Matthew 28 follows Mark's twin explanation of the resurrection by reference to empty tomb (v.6) and appearances (v.7) and furthers both aspects: anti-Jewish polemic recorded in vv.11-15 indicates Jewish opponents of Christianity also accepted 'Jesus' grave was empty' (JGM, p.101); the appearance in Galilee is recorded (vv. 16- 20) (though whether an earthly or heavenly appearance is meant is obscure), and concludes by affirming Jesus' presence with his people. Thus in Matthew also resurrection is explained by empty tomb and appearances; further, it signifies Jesus' ongoing presence with his people.

(iii) Luke 24 and Acts 1

Luke's chronology of events after Easter is stylised - and we discuss the significance of this for Barth's theology in the next chapter. Lk.24:3 speaks of the empty tomb, which is linked in vv.5f. with the resurrection, though Galilee (v.6) now refers to the past, not the future, as Luke focuses the Easter events on Jerusalem; in v.12 Peter confirms the empty tomb; vv.13-35 move on to resurrection appearances with a climax noting the appearance to Peter, and pointing out how the Scriptures, and decisively the breaking of bread, lead to recognition of the risen Jesus. Acts 1:3 sums up Jesus' appearances as 'proofs that he was alive'. So Jesus' resurrection is again explained as empty tomb and appearance – and Peter is a link between both explanations.

(iv) John 20-21

In John, the disciple Jesus loved 'believed' (Jn.20:8) already because of the empty tomb, which is linked with the resurrection (Jn.20:9). This disciple and Peter, who find the tomb empty, later receive special commissioning in an appearance of Jesus (21:1ff., especially vv.15ff.). Similarly Mary of Magdala, who first finds the tomb empty, (20:1f.) first sees the risen Jesus (20:14ff); as in the Synoptics, John explains resurrection by empty tomb and resurrection appearance.

(v) 1 Corinthians 15

Paul focuses on Jesus' appearances (1Cor.15:5-8) and never explicitly mentions the empty grave. He does, however, see this appearance as qualitatively different to his subjective vision of 2Cor.12. Also he explicitly notes not merely that 'Christ died' (1Cor.15:3) but that 'he was buried' (v.4) before being raised: thus Christ's resurrection is seen as raising from the grave. Thus while no account of the empty tomb is recorded here, we can at least say that the empty tomb is compatible with Paul's account and theology of the resurrection.

(vi) Conclusion

In all four evangelists the resurrection is given twin explanation as empty tomb and resurrection appearance, and even in Paul such a link may be implied or is at least compatible with his version. To that extent Barth's link here is proven. However, the biblical picture is clearly not of one, but two historical "signs" to the resurrection: empty tomb and resurrection appearances. On that basis, Barth's account in Credo is biblically more justified than that of I/2, since it acknowledges the miracle of Easter consists in 'two facts', empty grave and resurrection appearance (Credo,pp.99f.), though even there, there is an attempt to dissolve these two into 'a single sign' (Credo,p.99). So Barth's accounts - especially that of I/2 - must be modified: explaining the mystery of the resurrection, in the Bible we have a negative sign (empty tomb) and a positive sign (appearances).

IV ASSESSMENT

1. Christliche Dogmatik

Recoil at difficulties with Barth's advanced parallelistic treatment of virgin birth and empty tomb in I/2 should not lead us to prefer his earlier account in Chr.D., for I/2 improves on that flawed treatment.

Already in Chr.D., Barth aimed at symmetry - but between virgin birth and resurrection. Consequenty we find Barth's treatment of virgin birth - as objective possibility of revelation and as the hiddenness in which revelation occurs - collapses under its own weight. He abandons this interpretation first to see Good Friday rather than Christmas as the veiling to be unveiled in the resurrection (I/1,pp.380,382, etc.), and eventually, as he 'actualises' the incarnation in IV/1-4, the incarnation as life fulfilled on the cross takes the weight here - as reconciliation to be revealed in the resurrection. Also, by I/2 the symmetry is with empty tomb rather than resurrection, which 'fits' more naturally. Thirdly he manages to avoid the crudest aspects of the synergism of Chr.D. in his I/2 version, avoiding some of the worst excesses: (e.g., that 'because' history is male history, Jesus' birth needed to be of a virgin - an idea which was already suspect at least on the grounds of current empirical studies instancing matriarchal societies; that virgin women are somehow more appropriate recipients of grace, leading the Barth of 1927 to make comments reminiscent of those of Schleiermacher he later condemned - in _I/2_,p.195 - as 'better left unsaid'). Though as we have seen, the improvements in _I/2_ are marginal: the dubious implicit anti-sexual bias and the deliberate affirmations of virginity as somehow appropriate for grace (if no longer a formal 'point of contact' with it).

Barth's treatment of virgin birth in _Chr.D._ is seriously flawed and unusable for his later theology; that of _I/2_ improves on this, though some important flaws remain.

2. History and Revelation

From 1927-37 we see evidence of a gradually developing more positive attitude to history - even history as revelation. In _Chr.D._ the virgin birth is only history as primal-history; even in _I/1_ Barth says: 'the historical element at the resurrection of Christ, the empty grave regarded as an element in this event, that might possibly be fixed, was certainly not revelation' since history is potentially 'trivial' (p.373), and since Jesus "historically" seems commonplace (p.188). But in _I/2_, while the empty tomb is not seen as revelation as such (that is focused more on 'pure presence of God' in the revelatory appearances of 'the forty days') it is rescued from anti-historical polemic, and put to constructive use in Christology as historical "sign" of revelation.

3. Contrasts

To supply Barth's theology of the virgin birth with the new 'context' of 'contemplation' may help to exploit some of Barth's insights for Catholic theology, but it more fundamentally disrupts the overall context of Barth's theology than Louth seems to recognise, i.e., faithfulness to Christology, the Scripture principle and opposition to autonomous realms of speculation with any normative role for faith. Exploration along the lines Louth suggests would lead to an abandonment of what is central to Barth's programme. [16] Furthermore, if Barth's account were pushed in Louth's direction, the difficulties in his account concerning female anthropology, dubious exegesis and implicit anti-sexuality would be exacerbated.

As for Pannenberg's critique, we have found implied a demand that Barth forego his own dogmatic methodology in favour of Pannenberg's system, with acceptance of autonomous historical criticism and the basing of revelation on history: to examine his attack on Barth's virgin birth/empty tomb parallel on anything less than this level is to mistake the superficial for the root cause. We have however pursued in a different way to him the biblical basis of Barth's account - and in passing have had to reject Pannenberg's separation of empty tomb and appearances as unwarranted by canonical Scripture.

4. Biblical Imbalance

We have found Barth's virgin birth/incarnation: empty tomb/resurrection parallelism biblically defective - in terms not merely of 'material' but also 'formal' biblicism. (a) Any biblical basis for the virgin birth/incarnation link is extremely tenuous; passages on the virgin birth actually presuppose the alternative theological context of the powerful presence of the spirit of Jesus in the community; conversely, explicitly incarnational passages are usually explicitly christological. (b) The biblical basis for the empty tomb/resurrection link is strong; the biblical approach, however, consistently links both empty tomb and appearances with resurrection - this apparent equality of role is still difficult in I/2 for Barth, with his preference for revelation over against concrete history. (c) Maybe to satisfy theological profundity and architectonics, Barth alters this biblical imbalance: this is a precarious practice for one committed to theology based on dogmatic reflexion on the proclamation of the Scriptural witness to revelation in Christ and is part of a procedure which reaches its culmination in IV/1-4 (for which, see especially chapter 8, section II, below).

In sum, Barth's defective treatment of virgin birth in Chr.D. is improved in some respects in I/2, but the radical architectonic parallelism and questionable implications for sexual anthropology show that on this matter, his account is seriously alien to the witness of Scripture.

CHAPTER 6:

The Forty Days

THE FORTY DAYS

I ANALYSIS OF BARTH'S PHRASE 'THE FORTY DAYS'

1. Context

In talking of the Easter period as 'the forty days' Barth uses this phrase deliberately. Analysis of its usage will uncover implications for Barth's understanding of history and chronology, of biblical exegesis, and of theological matters - revelation, time and the presence of God, as well as of his overall style of theology. Thus we will be led not only into something of the content of Barth's theology of resurrection, but also its broader theological context.

Although material from many parts of C.D. is relevant to our theme, two main contexts emerge: §§14 and 47 in I/2 and III/2 respectively, paragraphs which both deal with the question of time. As Dieter Clausert says:

> If the christological expositions of §§13-15 culminate in an adoption of the classical doctrine of Jesus Christ as 'true God and true man' (I/2,pp.125ff., 132ff), then the title and contents of the fundamental first part of §14, "God's time and our time", are obviously to be understood to the effect that the incarnation of the Word becomes event as the unity of God's time with our time: in Jesus Christ, the true God and true man, God's time and our time are one. The times of his 'expectation' and his 'recollection' are classified as his 'fulfilled time', as both the following parts of §14 show.[1]

Similarly, of §47, R.H.Roberts says:

> In the passage 'Man in his Time', Barth applies the doctrines that have been developed elsewhere, to the human condition as he understands it. Above all,

> the time of revelation as consummated in the resurrection becomes the actual prototypical basis of human time.[2]

Thus Barth's discussion of 'the forty days' has an immediate context in his understanding of time, which can be seen as affected by and affecting the wider context of incarnation and resurrection, anthropology and history, and indeed the doctrines of God and revelation.

2. Meaning

(i) Typical History

In I/2, Barth says:

> We could do so only cum grano salis, but if we were to press the question, which was fulfilled time between Old Testament expectation and New Testament recollection, we would have to reply, the forty days in which Jesus let Himself be seen in this way (sc. as the 'pure presence of God') (Ac.1:3). It is from the recollection of these forty days that light is thrown by the New Testament witnesses upon recollection of the death of Christ and therefore upon His life. Moreover, if we ask concretely what was the object of their testimony, they are the "witnesses of his resurrection" (Ac.1:22f., cf.1:8, 4:33; Lk.24:48; 1 Cor.15:14f.) (p.114).

Why cum grano salis? Not necessarily because Barth is trying to soften the phrase 'the forty days'. According to Barth, with the forty days the New Testament authors are engaged in recollecting the time of the 'pure presence of God', therefore we meet the end of human possibilities in terms of language and therefore history, and so what is said historically about this time must be understood cum grano salis, i.e., the message of the New

Testament witnesses about this period of time is not seizable like any other history, because it is not like any other history:

> The whole historical difficulty occasioned by the Easter story itself has its foundation in the fact that in it the New Testament witness touches the point at which as witness, i.e.,as human language about and concerning Christ, it comes up against its true object, against the point where everything else depends upon this object, which in itself contains the Word of revelation. 'Little wonder human language begins to stammer at this point even in the New Testament (pp.114f).

In face of the Easter story, human language comes up against its limit - hence, according to Barth, the silence of the women in Mk.16:8. This difficulty of language "reflects the uniqueness of that to which their recollection is related" (p.115). Because of this uniqueness, what 'human language' actually does say in its terms of history must as human language in the face of the 'pure presence of God' be taken cum grano salis. Thus in this account of the forty days in I/2, we should understand the cum grano salis as having a wider reference than merely to the figure 'forty days'; it is a cautionary word about the language of the whole Easter event, not merely the forty days aspect.

In III/2, Barth once again discusses the literalness of the phrase 'the forty days'. He argues that N.T. writers reason from Christ's resurrection as effected by God, rather than from apologetic interest in nature miracles, and notes the 'fragmentary and contradictory' narratives of this period, seeing in the phrase a deliberate parallel with various O.T. references to forty days, and with Jesus' time of temptation:

> These parallels are sufficient to show that the forty days are not to be taken literally but typically. They do not offer precise chronological information as to the duration of the appearances. The topography is just as vague...The narratives are not meant to be taken as "history" in our sense of the word...True, these accounts read very differently from myth, both formally and materially, by the fact that it is all about a real man of flesh and blood. But the stories are couched in the imaginative, poetic style of historical saga, and are therefore marked by the corresponding obscurity. For they are describing an event beyond the reach of historical research or depiction (p.452).

While the words not literally but typically are used in connexion with the forty days themselves, the actual force of Barth's restriction seems to stretch further than merely the forty days themselves. Not only the figure 40 (which admittedly is the first cause of the restriction to 'typical' meaning), but the whole aspect of the historical in the Easter event is intended to be understood 'typically' - hence Barth's talk of the stories as "couched in the...style of historical saga". Once again, then, we are told to take the historical element with a pinch of salt: "The narratives are not meant to be taken as "history" in our sense of the word." The stories, because of their form as saga, "are therefore marked by the corresponding obscurity. For they are describing an event beyond the reach of historical research or depiction".

So, in this passage, Barth's talk of typicalness extends further than the mere figure 40, further even than the phenomenon of a period of time which may or may not be 40 days, in which resurrection appearances occurred so as to be recorded as such historically: Barth is, by using the word 'typically', restricting the whole concept and functioning of the historical in relation to the resurrection and the appearances of the risen Jesus.

However, Barth does not restrict the Easter story to a merely 'typical' event. While he blunts the literalness of the phrase, telling us to take it with a pinch of salt, and telling us it is 'typical' history (a restriction blunting, not merely the figure 'forty' or even 'forty days, more or less', but the literal force of the history as such in the Easter story), he also places heavy weight on the actual literal historical elements in the resurrection.

In his discussion of the forty days in I/2, Barth tells us the recollection by the New Testament witnesses of the forty days is "of an event that occurred at a definite time in the past...But...is not a fact belonging to the past" (p.115). There is thus deliberately a tension at the heart of what Barth says: this recollection is 'of a definite datable time'; but because it is a recollection of fulfilled time, what is recalled is "not merely past time, as it is also not primarily future, but purely present time". Barth expands this tension in this way:

> But the Easter story, though it is a happening that once became an event in datable time, does not merely belong to the past. Easter cannot just be regarded in retrospect. Recollection of Easter cannot be merely the repetitive reflection, which is all that any other kind of recollection is, even the most living and realistic. Of course, recollection of Easter is also this repetitive reflection. Its only object is that unique happening, and therefore

> the content of the forty days...Recollection of eternal time, which is what recollection of the risen One is, is necessarily recollection of a time which over-arches our time, and which therefore cannot be confined to the datable time with which it is in the first instance related (p.116).

We can see from all this that although Barth does not want resurrection time to be 'confined' to the past, he is equally concerned to stress that the resurrection time was a historical datable time, i.e., that it did occur - 'about the year A.D.30'. According to Barth, the forty days from Easter to Ascension, the time of the pure presence of God (in the recollection of the N.T. witnesses) was a definitely historical time in that it happened at a definite datable time. While this might be thought inconsistent with what Barth said about taking the forty days 'with a pinch of salt', in fact Barth sees the forty days (and indeed the whole Easter story) as not history "in our sense of the word" but as typical history, historical saga - yet also sees it as historical in another sense (i.e., in that it actually occurred). So to talk is not necessarily inconsistent. However, we are left with a division in history, a division in historical understanding and a division in the functioning of history: what happened historically may be known or not known to have happened, it may be expressible or inexpressible in normal historical language; but this degree of knowledge or expressibility affects in no way the fact that it happened.

To conclude: Barth does consistently undermine our talking of the forty days (and the whole Easter story) in the historical terms of our modern sense of history, but he also consistently lays stress on the historical fact of the forty days (and the whole Easter story) in the sense of its sheer happened-ness.

The discussion in _III/2_ shows Barth thinking and expressing himself in broadly similar fashion: the forty days should 'not be taken literally but typically' (p.452); however, the historical aspect - its 'happened-ness' - must not be denied. There are new elements, however. The historical aspect, while not materially altered, is given greater emphasis. Thus, for the N.T., 'acceptance or rejection of the _evangelium quadraginta dierum_' is to accept or reject the gospel itself (p.443); we must not 'gloss over' the 'bodily character of the resurrection of Jesus' in the forty days. There is the explicit rejection of Bultmann's account, and his category of 'myth', and there is the use of the concept of historical 'saga', yet for all these alterations, the broad structures of the interpretation of the forty days as 'typical' history remain in _III/2_ as they were in _I/2_.

(ii) The Pure Presence of God

What does Barth think was the mode of Jesus in the forty days?

In §47.1, Barth talks of the forty days as the time of 'unveiling' and when Jesus appeared "in the mode of God". But it is in _I/2_ that Barth explores this idea more directly. This time is the exception to the rule that the New Testament speaks eschatologically throughout (and that, an exception which will 'prove the rule'). The Easter narratives are exceptional, because here "we are dealing with the attestation of the pure presence of God" (p.114). In this passage, Barth centres our attention (if cum grano salis!) specifically on the forty days. This restricts this time of the pure presence of God to the 'time' between the resurrection and the ascension. There is nothing in this phrase to lead us to think Barth meant this time to extend beyond this period of the forty days either backwards (to the crucifixion, or the whole life of Jesus) or forwards (to the life of the Church). Yet examination shows the forty days are not utterly alone in being exceptional - further exceptions come in the transfiguration on the mount and the conversion of Saul, and other exceptions also seem to emerge. (To these we will return). This time of the forty days is, then, qualitatively different from all other time. Its qualitative difference lies in the fact that "as fulfilled time (it is) not merely past time, as it is also not primarily future, but purely present time" (p.115).

The contrast is instructive: 'not primarily future, but purely present time'. The words 'pure' and 'purely' translate the words 'rein' and 'schlechthin' in these pages - but the sense of exclusiveness is not intended in these German words - as the qualifying phrase 'not primarily' indicates. Rather Barth means 'absolutely' or 'immediately' or 'directly' present. To that extent, 'purely' might be a misleading translation if the idea were inferred that in the forty days we have to do with the attestation of God as present to the exclusion of any sense of past or future; rather, it is the attestation of God as immediately present - as Clausert has seen, in talking of this period as "die unmittelbare Gegenwart des Auferstandenen". [3] So in this period God's presence is qualitatively different from all other times.

In what does this qualitative difference lie? Barth talks of the recollection of the forty days as the 'recollection of eternal time' (p.116); this again seems to be a comment on the quality of the time of God in the forty days - not ordinary finite time, not 'our' time, but God's time, fulfilled time, eternal time, the time of the pure presence of God. This difference in the quality of the time in the forty days does, however, also have a functional aspect:

> Both this recollection and its object fall into the same category, the category of the single event of God's revelation. God's revelation is the one thing that makes possible both the Easter story and the Easter message (p.116).

The category of revelation is the functional aspect of this qualitative difference in time. However, to say that 'pure presence' is to be understood in terms of revelation and attestation indicates that the pure presence is understood noetically rather than ontically, at least in the first instance.

So in the forty days, was God really purely present, or only known (by those to whom it was revealed) as purely present; again, was God's immediate presence really experienced, or only known about? What, at least, we can conclude is that in this discussion of the doctrine of revelation, for Barth, the focal point of this revelation lies in the forty days, for this is the time when God is 'purely' present, and this time of pure presence is meant to be taken as a function of revelation. Consequently, at all other times, when God is not purely present, there is no revelation - or if there is revelation, it is qualitatively different (weaker) from that in the forty days: this applies equally to all time in the life and death of Jesus prior to the forty days. All this, therefore, reiterates what Barth says about the resurrection as the time of 'unveiling' as opposed to the 'veiling' in the crucifixion and the 'impartation' in Pentecost, which he discussed at length in I/1 (pp.382,400,437,etc.), and repeated in I/2(p.38). Thus talking of the pure presence of God in the forty days as revelation implies a merely (or primarily) noetic rather than also ontic function.

(iii) Revelation and History

For Barth, talk of the forty days necessitates a distinctive mode of history - i.e., historical saga. However, this time is also peculiarly the locus of the revelation of God. These two elements in his interpretation are deliberate: for Barth, that this time is peculiar in its revelatory aspect is why the distinctive mode of history is needed. If we put it the other way round, the distinctiveness of the history, its inability to express itself properly, is the sign from our side that here we are up against the ineffable, i.e., God's self-revelation. Thus these two elements are to be understood together. This makes both defending and criticising Barth here that much more difficult!

II CRITICAL DISCUSSION: LUCAN CHRONOLOGY

1. Introduction

When Barth's use of the biblical material is examined closely in relation to his chronology of transfiguration, resurrection, exaltation and so on, a distinct bias to Lucan theology is visible. It seems Barth has re-moulded the quite different interpretations of Paul and John so that they do not disturb this Lucan chronological framework. The use of such a chronological - literal historical - framework suggests Barth's 'typical not literal' history is not as coherent as at first it seems to be.

In I/2, just before he talks of the forty days for the first time, Barth says:

> Obviously, the previous narrative of the life of Jesus is still pure expectation, even according to Jesus' own words. Even the miracles of this life purport only to be signs of the presence of God. Only the transfiguration on the mount, in face of which Peter immediately wants to build tabernacles, seems formally to prepare for the great exception. And the sequel to Easter, the birth of the Church of Christ, is again the clearest expectation - again perhaps with the exception of Christ's appearance at the conversion of Saul. But the Easter story (with, if you like, the story of the transfiguration and the story of the conversion of Saul as prologue and epilogue respectively) actually speaks of a present without any future, of an eternal presence of God in time. So it does not speak eschatologically (p.114).

Since the transfiguration on the mount and the conversion of Saul are borderlines between the ordinary events in history, and the extraordinary which Barth sees in the forty days as 'prologue' and 'epilogue' to the forty days, we will now examine these two events in Barth's theology.

2. The Transfiguration

Already in I/1, Barth saw the transfiguration as a 'possibility of anticipations of the conclusion and completion of revelation' 'antecedent' to his exaltation (p.518). Now, in I/2, he spells this out more definitely: it is the 'prologue', preparing for 'the great exception' to N.T. 'expectation', the forty days.

Barth's fullest exposition of the transfiguration comes in our section on the forty days in III/2. There, he says:

> The transfiguration...is a good example of how the apostles regarded the pre-Easter life of Jesus from the present to their own time. It might almost be said to anticipate the Easter-history as the latter does the return of the Lord...Everything suggests a theophany...We are obviously in close material proximity to a resurrection story. This is further suggested by the location of the episode on a high mountain; by the statement in Mt.17:6 "(They) were sore afraid"; by Lk.9:32 (cf.Jn.1:14) "They saw his glory"; and by Peter's curious proposal, recorded in all three versions, to erect three tents (again, cf.Jn.1:14)... (Jesus) tells them (Mk.9:9) to say nothing about it to anyone until He is risen from the dead. This obviously suggests that the transfiguration is the supreme prefigurement of the resurrection, and that its real meaning will not be perceived until the resurrection has taken place." And its purpose in the pre-Easter period is obviously to demonstrate that even in this time, although in concealment, He was actually and properly the One he was revealed to be in His resurrection (p.478).

Later, in III/2, Barth says:

> Only "some" (Peter, James and John) witness the

> transfiguration. But this event is only a proleptic anticipation of the resurrection, as the latter is only a proleptic anticipation of the parousia. This being the case, it is best to see the fulfilment of Mk.9:1 in all three events, transfiguration, resurrection and parousia. In the transfiguration they see and know Him already, though only transitively, as the Resurrected (p.499).

(i) Historical Problems

In the original 1921 edition of The History of the Synoptic Tradition, Bultmann says of the transfiguration: "It has long since been recognised that this legend was hardly originally an attempt to put Jesus' Messiahship back into the ministry, since this was done more radically in the baptismal story"[4]. In the first edition, Bultmann cites Usener and Bousset as authorities for this view, though later editions mention also Wellhausen, Loisy, Bertram, Goetz, Goguel and others. Certainly, then, a large group of scholars take the view that the transfiguration is a resurrection appearance story (possibly 'six days after' Good Friday or Easter Day) which falsely (in historical terms) has been antedated into the ministry of Jesus.

Of course such a view is not beyond dispute! The problem is that Barth does not dispute it - indeed, he does not even mention it. Now while neither Barth nor Bultmann mention that work directly in their correspondence, since their letters show them to be well read in each other's writings in the 1920's, it is inconceivable that Barth had not read that book at the time, and thus that he would be unfamiliar with Bultmann's interpretation of the transfiguration. (His later essay 'Rudolf Bultmann - An Attempt to Understand Him' shows him aware of the significance of Bultmann's pioneering work in form-criticism for the latter's temporary agreement with Barth). Since Barth would be well aware of this interpretation of the transfiguration, and since in §47.1 Barth engages in sharp controversy with Bultmann on the question of the resurrection, his silence on Bultmann's interpretation of the transfiguration as antedated resurrection story is the more surprising. Barth cannot be said to have repudiated (except a silentio) the view he rejects.

In conclusion, then: Barth sees the transfiguration as a historical event which took place in the life of Jesus, and not originally a post-mortem resurrection appearance; this event is, for him, qualitatively similar to the resurrection appearances and to the extent of this similarity is qualitatively different to all other time - as such, it is to some extent a prolepsis, an anticipation, of the resurrection appearances. As the consensus of N.T. scholarship eliminates this interpretation, we seem somewhat left in the air by the fact that Barth nowhere relates his own view to that held by the N.T. scholars.

(ii) Doctrinal Problems

Doctrinal problems are encountered when we ask about the extent and quality of the similarity of the transfiguration to the resurrection appearances.

If we assume that the transfiguration anticipates the forty days in some considerable measure, then we run the risk of surrendering the relevance of Easter as a revealing event succeeding the crucifixion. In the tantalisingly brief account of the transfiguration in I/2, it would seem that Barth does run precisely this risk: here Barth says the Easter narratives provide the fundamental exception to the eschatological thrust of the N.T., but "Only the transfiguration on the mount, in face of which Peter immediately wants to build tabernacles, seems formally to prepare for the great exception" (p.114). By saying 'only the transfiguration', Barth differentiates this event from all other events before the forty days, like the miracles or the story of Jesus' own baptism: the transfiguration is qualitatively different from all else prior to the forty days, it alone 'prepares' for the forty days, it alone anticipates the resurrection appearances. The natural conclusion from Barth's words is that whereas for the N.T. (as he sees it) God's presence is not so much present as future, but that in the forty days God is purely present, it would seem also that in the transfiguration, if it does anticipate the forty days, Barth is saying that here, too, God is purely present. However, to say this would rob the resurrection of any relevance as an event after the crucifixion. But to assert that the transfiguration is qualitatively different from all other time preceding the forty days would require us to interpret it on the same level as the forty days to the extent that here Jesus would be revealed - unequivocally - that here he appeared in the mode of God. The transfiguration would be not merely a resurrection story antedated into Jesus' life - it would be a resurrection appearance already in Jesus' life! However, the treatment of the transfiguration in III/2 shows some significant developments from that in I/2.

The basic thrust of these developments is that in III/2, the transfiguration is now seen as a primus inter pares. Whereas in I/2, it is '*only* the transfiguration' that prepares for the exception of the forty days to the N.T.'s eschatological norm, here in III/2, the transfiguration is only the "supreme prefigurement of the resurrection". We are not placing too much stress on the exact words here, because Barth reiterates this quite considerably.

As opposed, then, to the more simple scheme of I/2 of transfiguration as unique anticipation and then the forty days themselves, in III/2, the Johannine signs, the baptism of Jesus, the infancy narratives and even the O.T. Scriptures generally to some extent anticipate the fullness of revelation in the forty days, though of them all the transfiguration is the supreme prefigurement of these forty days. This sequence seems to lack coherence as an interpretation of the events of the life of Jesus. However, this modification clearly alters the uniqueness of the transfiguration as 'prologue' to the forty days.

A further development is seen in Barth's interpretation of Jn.1:14. Already in his lectures of 1925/6 (revised 1933) on John he ruled out the idea that the δόξα was 'a kind of uninterrupted progressive process' of visibility through the cover of the σάρξ (since that implies it was a 'quality of the flesh'), seeing it rather as 'an isolated if also frequent concrete happening, as it were of a lightning kind', and seeing as fruitless the question why the "Synoptics speak expressly of only one such appearance prior to the resurrection, namely in the transfiguration".[5] In I/2, however, Barth says simply: "The resurrection is meant when it says in Jn.1:14, 'We saw his glory'. The resurrection is the event of the revelation of the Incarnate, the Humiliated, the Crucified" (p.111). Whereas in III/2 and later volumes Barth clearly sees the transfiguration as implied in Jn.1:14.

The question arising from the treatment of the relation of transfiguration to the forty days in both accounts remains that of the way in which the transfiguration, so interpreted, seems to rob the resurrection of its special role in the history of salvation. Now as Barth himself seems quite convinced of the special role of the resurrection and the forty days in this history, we conclude something has gone wrong in his interpretation. Perhaps it is this: in much pre-critical and non-critical interpretation of these two events, the transfiguration may be seen as a glorious miracle, perhaps as a confirmation by God of Jesus' Messiahship, perhaps even also a glimpse of Christ's eschatological glory, however, the resurrection was seen as the more fundamental miracle, the defeat of death, the demonstration that God was in Christ; modern critical scholarship has however suggested a far closer material relation between these two events in holding that the transfiguration is an antedated resurrection appearance, i.e. a relation of identity; perhaps the real dilemma of Barth's approach is that it tries to combine the understanding, in terms of historical relation, of the non-critical approach with the closeness of relation (almost material identity) in terms of revelation, of the critical approach: hence the tension.

Let us look at this matter in another way. One difference between the transfiguration (if it is understood as a historical event in the ministry of Jesus) and the forty days is that ostensibly in the transfiguration, Jesus' appearance changes, but not the quality of his aliveness; however in the resurrection, in the forty days, we are dealing with the attestation of a man, the decisively acting subject Jesus himself, precisely _after_ his death. Indeed, Barth readily agrees with this interpretation of the resurrection (_III/2,p.450_).

So in the resurrection, there is the revelation of the power of God over death. (Indeed, in the transfiguration, this question tangentially emerges with Elijah and Moses - though importantly, not with Jesus himself.) But although there seems to be a formal difference between the transfiguration and the forty days for Barth, in that the latter comes after the death of Jesus, it would appear there is no material difference in the revelation in each - the glory is equally manifest. Now if this is the case, we seem led to the conclusion that Barth's pre-Easter Jesus is a Docetic Christ; the Jesus who can be prematurely disclosed in all his eschatological glory in his ministry (in the transfiguration and like events) is more docetic than really human and historical. It might be objected to this judgment that Barth does not think that all Christ's eschatological glory is revealed in the transfiguration. Such an objector might quote Barth, where he has been discussing the Johannine signs, and he says:

> That there are such signs, and that in the transfiguration, as in no other miracle, this sign is performed on Himself, shows that the mystery of His being revealed at the resurrection has not been acquired in the meantime but had been present and was in fact revealed at this later point (III/2,p.479).

Nonetheless, the general tenor of Barth's writing contradicts this. The transfiguration, he says, "might almost be said to anticipate the Easter-history as the latter does the return of the Lord"; in the transfiguration, "A cloud, the symbol both of concealment and revelation, overshadows them...Everything suggests a theophany...We are in close material proximity to a resurrection story". So, then, in terms of what is revealed, although Barth says there is a difference between the revelation in the resurrection and that in the transfiguration, he does not make any actual differentiation between them.

(iii) C.D.III/3-IV/4

Barth occasionally returns to this theme of the transfiguration. In III/3, he reiterates the link between the whiteness of the transfigured Christ and the δόξα of God (p.465).

In IV/2, Barth sets out the difference between the transfiguration and the resurrection more clearly: in the narratives of the transfiguration, there can be little doubt that for Peter, John and James

> ...there has already taken place that seeing of the kingdom, which was to be enjoyed by some of those present. It did not take place in the same way as during the Easter period or at His second and final coming when he will be seen by the whole world. But at any rate it did take place. Awakened from sleep, εἶδαν τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, as Lk.9:32 has it in almost verbal anticipation of Jn1:14 (p.138).

In IV/4, in a passage where Barth is discussing the baptism of Jesus, he comments, "The Gospels are none too lavish with such accounts of direct intervention from above", and mentions the parallels - the transfiguration, the infancy narratives, etc., and says: "As in the present context, the function of all these events is to confirm and display the divinity of the mission of Jesus at certain turning points" (p.64).

Elsewhere, in the reconstructed parts of IV/4, Barth says:

> It says in Jn.1:14 that the community in whose name the Evangelist is speaking has beheld the δόξα of the Logos of God become flesh camping in its midst; this means: Jesus is misunderstood by the world, but recognised by the community which has seen who and what he really was in truth. The Synoptics make the same testimony in narrative form in the so-called transfiguration story (Mk.9:2ff. and par.).[6]

Thus we see that in Barth's later writings on the transfiguration, the tension remains between total anticipation of the revelation in the resurrection and significant difference. On the one hand, he emphasises the difference between the transfiguration and the resurrection appearances, and on the other, with his talk of δόξα and eschatological glory, he emphasises the greatness of the revelation in the transfiguration.

(iv) Reconciliation of the tension

While the tension is not finally reconciled, Barth does answer one aspect of the problem, in seeing the significant difference between the transfiguration, the resurrection and the *parousia* not so much in the content of the revelation as its *audience*. In all three cases it is the δόξα of the Word made flesh in Jesus which is revealed, but in the transfiguration, only 'some' - Peter, James and John - see it, in the resurrection appearances of the forty days, it is all the disciples who witness it, and at the *parousia* it will be the whole world who see the *glory* of Jesus, the kingdom of God come with power (cf.*III/2*,p.499).

This answers part of the problem, because it enables

Barth to keep the transfiguration as a revelatory event in the ministry of Jesus which anticipates the resurrection and yet can be differentiated from it; yet it answers only part of the problem, because it leads us to the conclusion that Barth's pre-Easter Jesus is a Docetic Christ, since in Barth's view he can appear (if only to a few) in all his eschatological glory before the resurrection, before the crucifixion; in this interpretation of the pre-Easter Jesus, it would seem the agony of the passion and the dereliction of the cross are illusory.

What then is the solution to the problem of the relation of the transfiguration and the resurrection appearances? For our part we find the usual critical suggestion of a simple antedating of a resurrection appearance into the ministry of Jesus unsatisfactory. This unsatisfactoriness makes itself felt when we ask the historical question 'Why?': why place a resurrection appearance story into the ministry of Jesus - especially when the distinctiveness of the resurrection was so crucial to Early Church preaching? But if we reject the solution of Bultmann and that tradition of N.T. scholarship, must we not return to Barth's interpretation, with all the difficulties we have seen? The difficulty lies not in the material similarity between the narratives of the transfiguration and those of the resurrection appearances but in conceiving the transfiguration in terms of divine revelation broadly similar to that in the resurrection. If, instead, the transfiguration is seen as a turning-point in the disciples' awareness of the significance of Jesus, 'revelation' of Jesus' person in some degree, and expressed in the eschatological concepts of apocalyptic, the resurrection could be seen, by contrast, as the divine confirmation, after his death, of the eschatological significance of Jesus and indeed of the defeat of the power of death in his person. Such a solution may not be intrinsically impossible for a 'Barthian'. However, the difficulties here concerning Barth's idea of the resurrection as revelation will be met again in chapters seven and eight. While there may be difficulties in this solution, it does see the transfiguration as an event, allows a connexion with the resurrection, and safeguards its difference from the resurrection: we are not left with a Docetic Christ.

2. The Conversion of Saul

In I/2, Barth sees the conversion of Saul as the 'epilogue' to the forty days. Coming some time after the end of the resurrection appearances of the forty days, it is to be differentiated from the time and events of the forty days, yet is in such material proximity to the events of the forty days and to the style of revelation in the forty days that Barth sees it precisely as the 'epilogue' to the forty days - almost the afterthought in God's revelation. Indeed, in Credo (p.98) Barth actually says: "Paul...was drawn belatedly into the history of the forty days".

First, however, let us quote Barth's treatment of this question. Nothing more is said about the conversion of Saul, apart from its being the 'epilogue' to the forty days, until we get to *III/2*; there Barth says:

> His (sc. Saul's) conversion is brought about by an event which would appear to belong in essence to the forty days. For it consists of nothing less than an appearance of the exalted Jesus in person. Paul himself is quite explicit about this, for in 1Cor.15:8 he numbers it with the appearances of the forty days...What is it that makes his conversion so important to Paul himself...? Clearly the real reason is that even the time after the life and death of Jesus, and after the forty days, is a time when this man is still a Subject capable of and in fact engaged in action. For this personal appearance...this event which changes Saul into Paul...shows that the Jesus of that earlier time is still at work (pp.470f).

While Barth mentions the conversion of Saul on a number of occasions in *IV/1-4*, the only substantial comment comes in pp.198-211 of *IV/3*. This is a long exegetical discussion of the conversion of Saul but, although much of the material is not strictly relevant to our theme, the following should be noted.

First, on many occasions, he stresses that in his conversion-event, Jesus encountered Saul as Subject (p.202); secondly, he comments that the Lucan accounts of Saul's conversion "read like analyses of Paul's own 'compressed' statement about his conversion in his letters" (p.203). Thirdly, he says:

> What is first recorded in these accounts (Ac.9 and 22) is obviously a development and description of what Paul himself denotes in 1Cor.15:8 by the phrase ὤφθη κἀμοί: "He was seen of me also"...The use of the term "appearance" shows that even if the incident is a kind of postscript it is numbered with

> the events of the forty days which are constitutive for the existence of the community. (The same term is also found in the summarised statements of Ac.26:16,19). Yet according to the accounts given here, the structure of the incident is not quite the same as that of the appearances of the Resurrected in the Gospels. For we cannot assume from these accounts that Saul saw Jesus of Nazareth in the same way as did the two on the road to Emmaus. The decisive verses in all three versions tell us that what Saul saw (and those with him according to 22:9) was a light suddenly shining upon him from heaven above the brightness of the noonday sun...He certainly saw the Just One (22:14) in His personal self-revelation. But in this first part of the event he saw Him only in His δόξα, in the strange and even frightening irresistibility of His majesty, in a way which could only annihilate all his previous vision and call in question al his earlier existence...(pp.203f.).

(i) Historical Problems

Whereas the historical problems we found with Barth's account of the transfiguration were form-critical, with the conversion of Saul, they concern a redaction-critical judgment - that the variety of theological assessments of the conversion of Saul in the N.T. has been eliminated. What Barth has done is to harmonise falsely the divergent accounts in the various N.T. texts; he has ironed out the distinctive features of the various acounts.[7]

In Luke's theology, resurrection appearances take place in the forty days between the resurrection-event and the ascension; but Paul's experience on the Damascus road occurs some time after the forty days, and so is not to be classed as a resurrection appearance. Also, examination of the accounts of the risen Jesus in both Luke 24 and Acts 1 shows the risen Jesus to be ordinarily physical - the disciples are enjoined to touch him, and he eats a piece of fish before their eyes, so he is no ghost (Lk.24:36-43); however, with Saul's experience in the accounts of Luke-Acts, we have a flashing light and a voice, but a visibly risen Christ is not talked about. This much is clear despite the differences between the accounts in Acts of the conversion of Saul. Clearly, the author of Luke-Acts sees the conversion of Saul as fundamentally different to the resurrection appearances of the forty days.

Paul's own understanding of all this is very different, however. For him, in his account in 1Cor.15, the only difference between his conversion-experience and the resurrection appearances was that it was 'Last of all, as to one untimely born' - which, as Fuller shows, cannot mean occurring too late, but only too early, or else (Fuller's solution) a 'monstrous' birth. Barth tries to harmonise these divergent accounts, but such a harmonisation merely results in the suppression of the distinctive strands of the N.T. witness. He is, of course, aware of the distinctiveness of the Lucan and Pauline acounts of the conversion of Saul; however, his attempt to turn this divergence to good effect is unconvincing. Starting with the chronological framework of Luke-Acts, where the experience of Saul comes after the end of the forty days, he then tries to slot Paul's very different account into this framework, by commenting that "in 1Cor.15:8 he numbers it with the appearances of the forty days" (III/2,pp.470f.) and then concluding that "the time...after the forty days, is a time when (Jesus) is still a Subject capable of and in fact engaged in action" (ibid.p.471). Such a conclusion misses Paul's theological understanding of the significance of his conversion, and does not even do justice to the distinctivenes of Luke's interpretation because of the harmonising. For Paul, the event of his conversion can only be understood in conjunction with the resurrection appearances, but not as an event outside the period of Jesus' appearances, i.e., after the forty days, which tells us something about the appearing of Christ after this time; for Luke, the appearance is not so much an 'epilogue' to the appearances of the forty days, because it is so different from them, it is that the ascended Jesus, from the divine heights, can address man as does God himself from time to time.

Although some might argue Luke and Paul are closer than this, while there is no consensus on the exact relation between them, there does seem to be a consensus on the fact of a radical disjunction in the interpretations of the conversion of Saul and the resurrection appearances generally in the accounts of Luke and Paul - for Luke, Saul's conversion is not a resurrection appearance; for Paul, it is a resurrection appearance, qualitatively different, for example, to his vision of 2Cor.12.

In sum, Barth's attempted harmonisation of the Lucan and Pauline accounts runs against the consensus of N.T. scholarship (as with his treatment of the transfiguration accounts) - and again he gives no reason for this maverick interpretation, still less a defence of it. In doing this, he is far from true to the N.T. witnesses, indeed, his harmonising procedure results in a great distortion of what the N.T. is trying to say.

(ii) Doctrinal Problems

Barth's absorption of Pauline texts into the Lucan chronological scheme also affects his theological understanding of Paul's conversion. For if the consensus view (which sees Paul's account as earliest and most authentic and thus the means of interpreting other passages) is adopted, then the appearance to Paul is precisely not proof of Jesus acting 'as a Subject' after the resurrection period (III/2,p.471), but in fact a resurrection appearance, and indeed, the last in the line of such appearances - before the parousia. In between these times, Jesus is active through his Spirit, in the church, where his death is proclaimed until he comes (1Cor.11:26). Barth's attempted harmonisation of Paul and Luke has the effect of disrupting the N.T. pattern of salvation-historical events.

4. Conclusion: Lucan Chronology

Barth's treatment of transfiguration and Paul's conversion as 'prologue' and 'epilogue' respectively to the forty days has led not only to the disregard (apparently deliberate) of historical arguments widely held that, if true, undermine Barth's exposition, but also to the suppression and distortion of various trends in the N.T. in order to fit in with the Lucan chronology Barth imposes on the material.

This imposition applies not only on the Pauline but also the Johannine material. Among other differences from Luke, John sees the reception of the Holy Spirit on the evening of Easter Day itself, and not ten days after the 'forty days'. According to Barth, in the Fourth Gospel, "Easter, Ascension, Pentecost and _parousia_ are here seen as a single event, with much the same foreshortening of perspective as when we view the whole range of the Alps from the Jura" (_III/2_,p.497). The implication is that John has foreshortened the proper chronology (i.e., that of Luke) for theological reasons, so while his theology can be accepted, his chronology need not challenge the Lucan. The same impression is gained elsewhere: in _I/1_, Barth says Jn.20:22 "can only be a saying of the _risen_ Christ. Therefore the outpouring of the Holy Spirit in Ac.2 is depicted as a work, _supervening_ upon the completed _Kerygma_ of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus...Jn.20:22 and the Pentecost acount in Ac.2 must of course be regarded as the express and solemn testimony to an event, which chronologically was not _limited_, either forwards or backwards, to the precise day of Pentecost" (pp.517f.). Here, 'the precise day of Pentecost' is the archetypal event, Jn.20:22 also witnesses to the outpouring of the Spirit, which itself is not only on one occasion, but wherever God reveals himself in Christ.

Closer in perspective to III/2 is the comment in IV/2 (p.325) where following a reference to Peter's Pentecost sermon and the seeing and hearing of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, Barth then refers to the "abbreviated account in Jn.20:22" - 'abbreviated' because the chronology of Acts is preferred. Thus the same flattening out of the Johannine interpretation in favour of the Lucan can be seen as with the Pauline.

III CRITICAL DISCUSSION: 'PURE PRESENCE'

1. Knowledge versus Reality

For Barth, the resurrection 'is only a proleptic anticipation of the *parousia*' (*III/2*,p.499), and the Easter period the time of 'the pure presence of God'. Were the forty days a datable time in history, when, briefly, proleptically, this eschatological hope of pure presence was no longer future, but purely, or immediately present? Certainly that is how Jürgen Moltmann interprets Barth, understanding him as saying "that 'self-revelation of God' means the 'pure presence of God', an 'eternal presence of God in time', a 'present without any future'", and he objects, arguing the future is robbed of its reality.[8] While there is something in Moltmann's objection, Barth's language is not so clear. Although Barth can talk of 'the pure presence of God among men', his introduction of the phrase actually talks of 'the *attestation* of the pure presence of God' (*I/2*,p.114, my emphasis), and the opening phrase of the discussion similarly qualifies talk of God's presence in saying, "The New Testament...is the *witness to the revelation* in which God is present to man as the coming God" (*I/2*,p.113). The qualification which implies that it is only attestation, only revelation of the pure presence of God, leads us to assume Barth means that the disciples did not themselves experience God as purely present, but only witnessed, had revealed to them, and thus attested, the pure presence of God in the risen Jesus.

Barth supports his view here not by appeal to Scripture, but by referring to the 'distinction in unity between Christ and ourselves': "The forty days and the apostolic age, fulfilled time and the time of recollection, are two different things" (*I/2*,p.118). Certainly he doesn't ask the historical (but also biblical) question as to why the diciples should so attest Jesus, i.e., what experience could lead them to seeing in the risen Jesus the revelation of the pure presence of God. Despite *IV/1*,p.301, the simple fact of the reappearance of a dead man would not necessitate for biblical authors such unique categories (cf.Mk.5:21ff.; Lk.7:11ff; Jn.11:1ff.). With his Lucan bias rendering ambiguous the value of Paul's experience of the risen Christ, Barth misses out on the rich implication for the 'forty days' of Paul's concept of the σῶμα πνευματικόν.

Further support for the idea that Barth is talking of knowledge rather than experience of the pure presence is made when Barth shows that already in *I/2* he understands our own future resurrection as the revelation of our being: "we know that in His revelation to come our own being will be revealed. If we confess that Christ is risen and risen bodily, we must also confess to our own future resurrection" (*I/2*,p.117).

2. What is Pure Presence?

The talk of 'pure presence of God' in the forty days only comes in I/2, though in III/2 Barth says Jesus appeared to the disciples "in these days in the mode of God" (p.448), and in IV/1 he says the resurrection event and appearances were "...the infallible mediation as unequivocally disclosed in a new act of God, of the perception that God was in Christ" (p.301). In I/2, Barth thinks the glory (Jn.1:14) implies the resurrection. Already in 1925, Barth commented on this verse: "If I see it rightly, δόξα is distinguished from φῶς (v.4f.) in that it does not mean the divine Self-Revealing as such, but those qualities of God which become effective in his revealing or which are seen where he reveals himself - but which are also and primarily of him"[9]. So Moltmann is right to say by self-revelation Barth means not 'personalistic self-disclosure' as in I-Thou relationships, but that God "reveals himself 'as' the Lord".[10]

Barth talks of the pure presence of God as 'a present without any future, of an eternal presence of God in time. So it does not speak eschatologically' (I/2,p.115) and since the resurrection is the time of 'eternal time', 'fulfilled time' in 'our time', "the resurrection of Jesus is not a fact belonging to the past" (ib.). It does belong like all other datable events to the past, but it alone as recollection of eternal time is 'recollection of a time which over-arches our time' and means 'our whole time must be bounded by the reality of this time of God' (p.116); thus the N.T. looks forward, so its message is 'completely eschatological' in recollection of Easter, and knows that: "This God, who is revealed, believed in and confessed in His pure presence, is per se also the coming God" (pp.116f.).

Barth talks of the pure present in his treatment of the eternity of God in II/1, (a passage which has led some to feel Barth has not, even as late as II/1, broken with the diastasis of time and eternity which permeated R.II. [11] Whereas with time, "beginning, middle and end are distinct and even opposed as past, present and future", "Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle and end, and to that extent it is pure duration", thus it is not 'an infinite extension of time both backwards and forwards' (II/1,p.608). Cetainly, as eternal, God is 'present to Himself and therefore omnipresent' (p.609). However, 'it is a poor and short-sighted view to understand God's eternity from the standpoint that it is the negation of time' (p.610). By this Barth wishes to avoid the idea of starting from a human perspective (time) to find a (negative) 'point of contact' with the divine: 'The theological concept of eternity must be set free from the Babylonian captivity of an abstract opposite to the concept of time' (p.611). In this context, Barth sees the 'pure duration' as a 'pure present', which is the 'nunc' of the 'total simultaneous and perfect possession of life', which 'must not exclude the times prior to and after the "now", the past and the future, nor may it exclude the *fluere*. On the contrary, it must include it no less than the *stare*' (ib.). In sum, God as 'pure present' means he is the eternal Now, with the eternity 'lacking the fleeting nature of the present, the separation of before and after', but not lacking 'absolutely what we know as present, as before and after' (p.613): eternity - and thus the eternity of the 'pure presence of God' - includes and transcends time, God is 'in Himself both timeless and temporal' (p.617).

Barth's discussion of 'Ending Time' helps us. Already in *Credo*, Barth rejects the 'abstractions' of eternity as 'a life of any super-temporal kind, or timelessness or infinite time', or any life elsewhere even in 'an eternal world', or our life as becoming 'identical with the life of God'. Instead, it is 'a life in which we shall give *God* the *glory*, 'a life in unbroken peace with God', so descriptions of it as 'supertemporaneousness', etc., have little value, since from our perspective we cannot yet understand 'the time of that God with whom we shall live in unbroken peace in eternal life'.[12] And in his *Dogmatics in Outline* we already gain the perspective of *III/2*: 'Resurrection means not the continuation of this life, but life's completion' so, 'The Christian hope..is...the uncovering of the truth in which God sees our life'.[13] There is sharp polemic in *III/2* against 'pursuing pagan dreams of a good time after death' (p.625), "There is no question of the continuation into an indefinite future of a somewhat altered life" (p.624), thus the 'secret of Calvary', which 'will be revealed as indicated in the forty days' is 'the "eternalising" of this ending life', i.e., "this transition and transformation is the unveiling and glorifying of the life which in his time man has already had in Christ" (ib.). Thus man has no beyond since 'God is his beyond' (p.632) or again Jesus is his beyond (p.640); what man looks forward to is that 'this being of his in his time...will be revealed in all its merited shame but also its unmerited glory', he 'waits' for revelation (p.633). Barth does not see this future of revelation as less than everlasting life, but more - indeed maybe this is why man is prevented from 'living for ever' (Gen.3:22) for this greater future. He sees a biblical example of the revelation at ending time in 2Kings2:1-18, where Elijah's death "takes the form of a revelation to Elisha", and where "Elijah's departure consists in the swallowing up of his mortality in life before the eyes of Elisha" (p.636). And at the last trump (a present without any future) there will take place the 'assumption of the community to meet its Lord' when the final revelation of Jesus' already achieved exaltation will be manifest (p.638).

On the basis of all this, Barth's idea of the 'attestation of the pure presence of God' in Jesus in the forty days seems to bring us up against a wide variety of problems. Clearly Barth wants by this phrase to see this period as in some sense absolute or 'fulfilled time' - i.e., the time on the basis of which all other time gains its rationale and in face of which no other time in 'our time' has any claim to be normative. But Barth implies more than this. It is non-eschatological time, eternal time, in the midst of our time, yet does not (unlike the last trump) end time, though points decisively to the end of time, giving N.T. recollection of it a 'completely eschatological' dimension (I/2,p.115-7). It is God's time, the time of glory, his eternity, his presence, in our time, prototypically. As such it is - or must have some of the characteristics of - the nunc aeternitatis (II/2,p.615), which is not bound by 'succession' and 'division', but somehow includes past and future in it as present without fleetingness, i.e., as 'simultaneous' yet also 'duration', somehow being 'both timeless and temporal'. And finally it must as 'anticipation of the parousia' be a provisional foretaste or witness of 'the "eternalising" of this ending life' (III/2,p.624), of the revelation of life - whether the revelation of Jesus' life as it was, or the revelation (provisionally) of their own lives in Christ as they had been until those forty days.

There are problems of coherence of thought and of the reality of the future in talk of a purely non-eschatological datable time, as Moltmann has shown.[14] Barth's treatment of time, especially, is suspect, and has been heavily criticised in a hostile review by R. H. Roberts[15], who focuses on the circularity of

Barth's arguments and what he calls 'the systematic exclusion of any dimension not immediately derivable from his primal sources of reality'[16] (i.e., revelation as unfolded in I/1-2), as well as showing up something of the philosophical basis lurking in the background of Barth's ideas of time, not only in R.II, where the influence is clear and acknowledged, but also in C.D. Roberts, in viewing Barth's theology from the angle of his suspect treatment of time exaggerates in talking of a 'systematic evasion'. Barth does exclude, in terms of theological methodology, any normative value to 'any dimension not immediately derivable from his primal sources of reality', but he does not dispute the possibility of such dimensions. Barth is said to be against any 'devastating inrush of natural reality' [17], but his treatment of 'other lights' and 'other words' in IV/3, §69.2 'The Light of Life' (especially pp.96ff., 108ff., 116ff.), while signifying no acceptance of 'natural theology' (pp.117f.) or of apologetics (p.109), shows that what Barth rejects is not natural reality, or even the truth which may be perceived apart from the gospel, but the normativeness for Christian theology, and especially for church dogmatics of such autonomous perceptions. Indeed, already in I/1, Barth said, "God may speak to us through Russian communism or a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub or a dead dog" (p.60) - though these would have no normative function for theology. Nonetheless Barth's concept of time does have serious problems of coherence. It is, as Gunton says, 'an area where Barth's critics have been more successful in diagnosing the ills',[18] and he is certainly correct to say "the most convincing criticisms of Barth's understanding of analogy are not those that wish to foist upon him assistance from a different metaphysical world, but those that hold that at least some of the things that he says reveal his kinship with that very world",[19] i.e., that philosophical elements in Barth's concept of time distort his exposition of it. Indeed Cullmann had already argued as much.[20] Gunton summarises these difficulties for Barth's concept of time under five heads: (1) the reality of the future is undermined; (2) Platonism in his doctrine of God; (3) vacuity, contradiction or at least obscurity in Barth's attempt to unite time and eternity in God while also setting them in opposition; (4) a breakthrough in understanding God's eternity and relation with man unsuccessfully accomplished in a doctrine of analogy collapsing into timelessness; and (5) Barth's orientation to the past (election), 'neglect of the third appropriation of the triune God', and lack of serious attention to the real, historical Jesus. These criticisms as listed by Gunton must, in the main, be accepted - together with Gunton's proviso (and against the drift of Roberts' argument) that "these criticisms are not of the whole of Barth's theology, but are made possible by ambiguity in his understanding of time".[21]

Barth's use of the example of the narrative of Elijah's death to illustrate what will happen to our lives at the last trump in the power of the resurrection - i.e., revelation of our previous lives - throws a mask of obscurity over the whole concept of Jesus' self-revelation at Easter. Is Jesus' self-revelation qualitatively different, following Barth's analysis, to that of Elijah to Elisha? It would appear Barth's strange concept of eternal life as the revelation of our lives as they were - in shame and glory (which has been rightly much criticised - as in G.C.Berkouwer's sound discussion [22]) - forces on us the conclusion that in the forty days, the 'attestation of the pure presence of God' is in some way such a revelation. But on that basis, this would leave us with the decisive revelation in the resurrection already anticipated (at least largely) in the revelation in the death of Elijah!

Thus, in sum, Barth's concept of the revelation of the 'pure presence of God' in the forty days leads us obscurely to serious difficulties in his theology concerning the reality of time, the future, the distortion of alien philosophical elements, and his unbiblical and untenable concept of eternal life: deep obscurity remains in the decisiveness of the revelation in the resurrection.

IV CRITICAL DISCUSSION: THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

1. Biblical Exegesis

Underneath Barth's biblical exegesis, in which we have seen a Lucan bias, and confusion in his treatment of the transfiguration and conversion of Saul, and, by association, the forty days, lies a concern to harmonise the Scriptures, to make their message more uniform, less pluriform. Discussing the accounts of Saul's conversion in Ac.26 and Gal.1:1, 12, he comments: "...we must not be over-hasty or over-confident in criticising or correcting one Scripture by another in this regard" (IV/3,p.206).

This is partly due to his critical attitude to historical criticism[23] which he discusses in I/2:

> All relevant, historical questions must be put to the biblical texts, considered as witnesses in accordance with their literary form. And the differences in exposition which result when we answer them can only be to the good, so long as criticism is clearly made to serve this task, so long as it no longer has to serve the foolish end of mediating a historical truth lying behind the texts...As I see it, this does not mean an annulling of the results of biblical scholarship in the last centuries, nor does it mean a breaking off and neglect of efforts in this direction. What it does mean is a radical re-orientation concerning the goal to be pursued, on the basis of the recognition that the biblical texts must be investigated for their own sake to the extent that the revelation which they attest does not stand or occur, and is not be sought, behind or above them, but in them (p.494).

Hermann Diem, in his Dogmatics (Oliver and Boyd, 1959), discusses this attitude of Barth to the exegesis of Scripture. He thinks N.T. scholars find Barth's approach problematic because he works with the canon as

> ...a unified and closed dogmatic whole, which has its basis in a special moment of the Word of God, and thus stands outside the factual estimates of historical criticism...the only work left for historical criticism to do is to study the meaning and the context of the individual biblical writings. In this way, for Barth, historical and Biblical truth coincides (p.62).

Unfortunately, precisely this method leads N.T. critics "to the conclusion that the individual N.T. writings conflict on decisive questions, as for example has been shown by Philipp Vielhauer in regard to Luke's Acts and the letters of Paul" - or indeed the conversion of Saul.

Now, for Barth:

> ...even as regards the comparison of the texts it must be true that historical truth is also theological truth, and conversely. He would then say, and in fact would have to say, not that historical study in this sense must not challenge this alleged unity, but that, if done well, if cannot do so (p.99).

So N.T. scholars would have to ask Barth to show them where their historical study (as such) went wrong when it led them to see divergent theologies in the N.T., or "if that is not possible, to show them how such divergences are compatible with the supposed unity" (ib.). Diem goes in search of the Barthian reply Barth himself doesn't give to this question, seeking a normative authority for understanding the theological assertions of Scripture as a unity, finding it in what Barth calls his 'formal' (i.e., non-fundamentalist) 'biblicism'. For Diem, this comes to a head in Barth's treatment of the forty days: "Here is the point where for (Barth) the actual reality of the history of Jesus gains decisive significance for dogmatics " (p.103), because Barth is not arguing "on the basis of his presupposition about the canon of Scripture" but "with the acceptance or rejection of the '*evangelium quadraginta dierum*'", which can be sorted out "simply by looking at the sources" (*III/2*,p.443). Diem therefore thinks that with the post-Easter events in Barth's treatment, the dogmatic presupposition of the exceptional importance of the witness of the apostles does not precede, here, but is actually itself inferred subsequently from what the apostles witness to, itself, viz., the appearances of the forty days. Thus Diem concludes by asking whether, in his treatment of the relation of Scripture and history, Barth "could not come to an understanding with the historian and even for once proceed to work from history towards dogmatics..." to avoid the risk of degeneration into material (fundamentalist) biblicism (Diem, op.cit.,p.106). Consequently, in discussion with Barth, Diem concludes that:

> there springs positively the task of exploring, historically and theologically, within Scripture itself, the relation between the Word of God and preaching, rather than allowing ourselves, as dogmatists, to be hypnotised by the closed canon of Scripture, and, as historians, to seek only what lies behind it (pp.106f.).

Diem reaches his conclusions on the relation of the forty days to Scripture, etc., on the grounds that, "Barth's use here of the N.T. writings as sources shows the theological movement between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* which Urs von Balthasar described" (p.104). This is a reciprocal movement between form and content: "after completing his *Prolegomena* (*I/1-2*) Barth turned his back on the whole formal question in order to occupy himself only with the content of dogmatics" (pp.102ff.).

However, I do not believe this conclusion can be reached so readily.

For Barth the forty days was special in that the revelation in that period was qualitatively different to that of all other times - it was the time of the 'pure presence of God'. But it is doubtful that Barth here actually bases his case on the historical appearances rather than the apostolic witness to them as such, as Diem seems to think. Further, we have already seen Barth's positive preference for Lucan chronology of the Easter period, ironing out the distinctive features of the divergent accounts of Paul and John; so precisely in the treatment of the forty days, he presupposes the principle of harmony and unity in theological message in Scripture. Based as it is on the forty days, Diem's proposed norm cannot work: because Barth formally gives a role to the historian, self-contradictory elements remain; in particular Barth's lack of a guiding principle to contend with theological variety in Scripture leaves him vulnerable to sliding from 'formal' to 'material biblicism'. This slide is visible in his Lucan bias concerning the Easter period, though fortunately is not general in Barth's theology: his exegetical passages are among the richest contributions of the Dogmatics.

2. Belief and History

Barth explains the tension between the sheer happened-ness of the appearances of the forty days and their 'non-historical' nature by the categories of 'typical history' and 'saga', seeing saga as no 'legend', 'myth' or 'anecdote':

> I am using saga in the sense of an intuitive and poetic picture of a pre-historical reality of history which is enacted once and for all within the confines of time and space. (III/1,p.81).

For Barth, the Bible contains both saga and history, though rarely is it 'pure saga' or 'pure history', and rarely can anything be "unequivocally recognised as the one or the other" (pp.81f.). However, the creation story is pure saga. Apart from pure saga and pure history, there is also 'poetical historical saga' in the Bible; for the most part, historical saga "has to do with the constitutive events of history, with its origins and roots" (p.83). The stories of the forty days between Easter and Ascension are poetic historical saga (III/2,p.452).

'Saga' is a convenient label for Barth, signifying the happened-ness of the basic event, allowing for confusion and diversity in especially the historical elements in the biblical narratives, and letting the texts remain fruitful for exegesis. In short it seems to call a group of passages 'saga' enables Barth to exploit the texts as they stand whatever the problems within or between them. This has led many to criticise Barth on the grounds of what Van Harvey calls the 'morality of historical knowledge'. Harvey means here that historical enquiry should not be distorted by the deceptions of alien dogmatic presuppositions forced on the historian by the believer, and believes Barth's historically ambiguous category of saga breaks the canons of moral historical knowledge in favour of authoritarian belief structure:

> (Barth) appeals to the forty day tradition and the empty tomb stories but in no way answers the many questions biblical critics have raised about these stories. Consequently, Barth uses the stories to argue for the historical nature of the events but concedes that the stories cannot, from a historical standpoint, stand any critical scrutiny. This leaves the believer in the position of accepting an argument, the warrants of which are historical in type, but which are at the same time confessed to be contradictory and "imaginative-poetic"...Insofar as the believer wants to be a historian, or the historian a believer, he has to surrender the autonomy of critical judgment. Barth, in effect, claims all the advantages of history but will assume none of its risks.[24]

For Harvey, Barth is historically 'immoral' - but his charge against Barth fails to stick, since he attacks symptoms only. The reason Barth does not allow the historian his 'critical autonomy' is not primarily due to any authoritarian belief-structure (e.g. due to dogmatic traditionalism in face of historical attacks on elements in the Church year - i.e., the 'forty days'), but because Barth writes not apologetics, but Church Dogmatics. Barth writes entirely differently to Harvey; he opens I/1: "Dogmatics is a theological discipline. But theology is a function of the Church" (p.1); so that is why "As a theological discipline, dogmatics is the scientific test to which the Christian Church puts herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her" (ib,). For Barth, to allow the historian - or anyone else - his 'critical autonomy' is precisely to abandon the proper task of theology, taking, as it were, a third position over against God and man in order to criticise both when no such position exists. Indeed from Barth's perspective, Harvey's question about the 'morality of historical knowledge' cannot legitimately even be put. So while Barth's historical enterprise looks dubious from Harvey's angle, that is because the context of Barth's argument has been ignored. Within its context it is broadly coherent, i.e., from the presupposition that Christian theology works on the basis of revelation, as a dogmatics of the church it is legitimate to speak of the historical content of revelation without obtaining the historian's permission. If someone from Harvey's perspective wishes to question Barth's use of history, he has no option but to tackle the whole question of methodological archetype in theology, ie., to show how an alternative method would be preferable to Barth's dogmatic theological method.

Thus behind and above all the difficulties we have discussed in Barth's account of the forty days lies this question of type of theology. And while we argue there are genuine problems for Barth's theology in relation to exegesis, occasional biblical distortion, confusion in his concept of time, etc., his basic programme is to be upheld.

CHAPTER 7:

The Resurrection in C.D.IV/1-4: Analysis

THE RESURRECTION IN C.D.IV/1-4: ANALYSIS

I ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION

1. Introduction

Barth's theology in general, as well as his treatment of the resurrection, reaches its culmination in The Doctrine of Reconciliation (IV/1-4). Since it is idle to speculate whether Barth might have excelled this in the volume on redemption (Vol.V) that he never started, it is in reconciliation we find the pinnacle of Barth's reflexion on theology and resurrection concentrated.

The synthetic and architectonic drive in Barth already apparent elsewhere is worked through in unparalleled fashion here, and will detain us for much of this chapter, as well as section II of the next chapter. Much of this synthesising of originally separate christological doctrines is first implemented in §59, and since this affects interpretation of the role of the resurrection in Barth's theology, we concentrate on this in section I of the next chapter, taking care in this chapter to understand the role of the themes of that section (and others). Again, this is a volume on reconciliation, or atonement (the German Versöhnung carries both meanings, according to context), so it is here that clearest answers may be found to the question of the role of resurrection in soteriology. We therefore make sure to understand Barth's treatment in, especially, section III of this chapter, before turning to discussion of various direct and more indirect implications in section III of the next chapter.

The theme of the reconciliation God has achieved for man and its revelation in the resurrection as already achieved in the incarnation (itself fulfilled in the cross of the God/man Jesus Christ), together with its implications for anthropology, pneumatology and ethics is pursued with remarkable thoroughness and consistency and is aided by an equally remarkable structure set out _in nuce_ in §58. The structure follows and develops those already used in _II/1-2_ and _III/1-4_, which consist essentially of four chapters, of which the last deals with ethical issues intimately related to the particular doctrines covered. Thus _IV/1_, on 'the Lord as Servant', tends to focus on the once-for-all establishment of reconciliation in Jesus Christ; _IV/2_, on 'the Servant as Lord', tends to focus on the ongoing nature of reconciliation grounded in Jesus Christ; _IV/3_, on the 'True Witness' focuses on the revelation of reconciliation; and _IV/4_ (unfinished) concentrates on ethical issues of reconciliation.

2. Christological Doctrines

As in Barth's theology generally, Christology is the basis of all else, so the fundamental sections in _IV/1-3_,

§§59,64 and 69 are the christological paragraphs. The implications of our discoveries will be taken up in section II of the next chapter.

(i) The Doctrine of the Two Natures

In §59, Barth's account of Jesus Christ as Son of God sees the divinity of Christ most expressed when he is most rejected. In §59.1 Christ's divinity is expressed in his self-humiliation, i.e., his obedience to the Father, which is shown in "His way into the far country, fulfilled in His death on the cross. It is in these two moments and their combination, that there is enclosed the mystery that He is very God" (IV/1,p.177). §59.2 seems equally paradoxical: as Judge, Jesus judges man, "by judging himself and dying in his place" (IV/1,p.157), bringing about the 'end', 'scope' and 'meaning' of the way of the Son of God into the far country (IV/1,p.211); so as Judge Jesus can justly pronounce us righteous, freeing us from ruin "by this giving up of Himself to judgment in our place" (IV/1,p.223).

If, in self-humiliation and being judged, Christ's divinity seems veiled, in §59.3 unveiling is discussed. Beyond the 'judgment, death and end' comes something to us -Jesus' resurrection disclosing the meaning of what went before it (IV/1,pp.296f., 299): "What it was for the N.T. witnesses of this event was not a miracle accrediting Jesus Christ, but the revelation of God in Him" (IV/1,p.301).

In §64, on Jesus Christ as Son of Man, the paradox is inverted: in his humanity Jesus is exalted, and in his exaltation, man is exalted - to fellowship with God, not deification (IV/2,pp.6,20). In §64.2 the theological setting of the exaltation of the Son of Man is discussed - as man he is exalted without destruction of his humanity (IV/2,p.28), but it is "the exaltation of our essence to the completely different sphere" of the inner agreement of Jesus' history with the will of God (IV/2,pp.29f.). This exaltation finds its basis in election, its fulfilment in the incarnation and its revelation in the resurrection and ascension (IV/2,p.31). §64.3 focuses on Jesus' royal progress as seen especially in the Synoptics, not his 'biography', but the one whose real, lowly humanity is attested as regal presence, whose cross is "a description of the whole existence and divine likeness and activity of the man Jesus", and from whom "we have to learn what a creature, a man really is " (IV/2,pp.165,249,166). §64.4 discusses how exaltation in Jesus becomes actual exaltation of our humanity: Jesus' power, which is expressed in our sphere ("the direction which is given us") "has its basis in the resurrection of Jesus", this power becomes ours by virtue of Jesus' existence as royal man, living as one of ourselves (IV/2,pp.265,267).

While IV/3 gives us no new material content concerning reconciliation (IV/3,p.3), it focuses on the self-revelatory nature of reconciliation: "Reconciliation is an occurrence which is not dumb but vocal, not dark but clear, not closed in upon itself, but moving out and communicating itself...Reconciliation is indeed revelation" (IV/3,S.7=p.8). Thus §69 considers the revelation of the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ.

§69.2, on Jesus as 'The Light of Life', focuses on the unity of God and man in Christ, his self-attestation as God and man, not as 'God here and man there' for his divinity and humanity coexist together without incongruity, in unity (IV/3,pp.43,39). In §69.3, as in §§59.2 and 64.3, the history of Jesus is the theme, here, as a 'dynamic teleology' in the prophetic work of Jesus, the victory over darkness, the mediation which only he, as God and man can effect (IV/3,pp.168,191,225). Finally, in §69.4, we read of Jesus Christ as God and man in his self-revelation, for us; how we receive the promise of the Spirit, as the power of Jesus' resurrection in his revelation of reconciliation. The resurrection does not make Jesus God and man, but does reveal that truth. And, more precisely, Christ's power affects us as three expressions of his parousia: as resurrection at Easter, as the Spirit in the time between the times, and as universal revelation at the eschaton. Thus in his resurrection, Christ's being and action as God/man are revealed as "enfolding the world, the humanity distinct from Himself and us all" (IV/3,pp.278,352,282,294,283).

(ii) The Doctrine of the Two States

The static doctrine of Jesus' humilation and exaltation is conceived dynamically by Barth, and is mainly discussed in §59.1 (the self-humiliation of the Son of God as his way "into the far country, fulfilled in His death on the cross" - IV/1,p.177), in §64.2 (Jesus' exaltation as 'the homecoming of the Son of Man'), and in §69.2 (Jesus' self-revelation - as light of life - disclosing his unity in his humiliation and exaltation). The doctrine does emerge elsewhere, however: in §§59.2, 64.3 and 69.3 on the expression of the two states in Jesus' history, i.e., respectively, humiliation in the Judge's being judged, exaltation in the man's royalty, and revelation of both in the God-man's victory; and in §§59.3, 64.4, and 69.4 on the impact of Christology on anthropology, i.e., respectively the verdict on the self-humiliated Son of God, the direction of the exalted Son of Man, and the promise through Christ revealed as unity of both states.

(iii) The Doctrine of the Three Offices

Barth not only uses ontological but also functional christological doctrines in the structure of IV/1-3. The three offices appear in the order priest, king and prophet. While in §59 Barth does talk of Christ's self-offering (IV/1,p.157), he makes it clear the reason little formal discussion of Christ as priest occurs is because he sees this as covered in the treatment of Christ as Judge (*IV/1*,p.275). By contrast, the office of Christ as King is treated more explicitly in *IV/2* (cf. p. 155). But this does not prepare us for the way in which the *munus propheticum* dominates *IV/3*. The *munus triplex* justifies the existence of *IV/3* (pp.13ff.); §69.2 is a discussion on Christ's work as a prophecy *sui generis* comparable with O.T. prophecy *in toto* (*IV/3*,pp.49ff.,esp.pp.49, 65); Jesus' victory in §69.3 is a "narration" of his prophetic work (*IV/3*,p.168); and §69.4 on the person and act of Christ as Lord and Saviour of the world in discharge of his prophetic office (*IV/3*,p.281). In sum, the architectonic significance of the three offices grows with each part-volume of *IV/1-3*.

(iv) The Person and Work of Christ

According to Bertold Klappert, while for Barth, person and work are mutually interwoven, the three sub-sections of §59 nonetheless deal successively with "the *aspect of person* (the subject of reconciliation), the *aspect of work* (the work of the reconciler) and the *aspect of verdict* (the resurrection as judicial ratification)" (*Auferweckung*,p.138).

Barth himself affirms that §59.1 deals with the person of Christ (*IV/1*,p.211) and that §59.2 is concerned with "the work of atonement" (*IV/1*,p.212), and §59.3 certainly takes up the theme of its title - 'The Verdict of the Father'. As in *IV/1*, person and work are interwoven in

IV/2, though the sucessive treatment Klappert discerns in IV/1 is more difficult to discern - though §64.2, on the exaltation of the humanity of the Son of Man, could be seen as more concerned with his personality, whereas §64.3 on the exaltation of his humanity focuses more on Jesus' history, i.e., aspects of his work. However §64.4 certainly does not deal with the theme of 'verdict' - a concept that arose in §59.3 purely in connexion with the juridical language of §59.2. §64.4 does, however, deal with the exaltation of our humanity, i.e., the effect of his person and work for us. Again in IV/3, while person and work are not prominently discussed, Barth explicitly sees person and work, or being and action, as dealt with in §§69.2 and 69.3 respectively, as in his being Jesus is revealed (§69.2), and in his action he reveals himself (§69.3). Barth makes clear also that person and work are treated successively and conjointly, i.e., not separately (IV/3,p.275,cf.p.168). Once again, §69.4 shows no parallel to the "verdict aspect" Klappert discerned in §59.3, though it does talk of the effect of revelation for us. In sum, person and work relate to first and second main sub-section of each part-volume, but verdict, predominant in §59.3, finds no direct echo in the parallel sub-sections of IV/2 and IV/3.

(v) Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection

According to Wolfhart Pannenberg, Barth doesn't see Jesus' resurrection as the ontic (or ontological) basis of Christology, but apparently sees the incarnation in this role (*JGM*,p.111). He also sees Barth's amalgamation of the doctrines of the two natures and the two states as bringing him 'closer to the basic outline of the Gnostic redeemer myth' than is necessary for a 'from above' 'incarnational Christology' (*JGM*,pp.33f.). Klappert believes Pannenberg's interpretation here arises from an assumption that §§59.1, 59.2 and 59.3 refer successively to incarnation, cross and resurrection. While we shall return to the controversy between Klappert and Pannenberg in chapter 8, section I, the analysis of §59 concerns us already.

In §59.1 Barth does discuss the incarnation (*IV/1*,pp.166,211), so when he talks of Christ's "self-humiliation, His way into the far country, fulfilled in His death on the cross" (IV/1,p.177), the cross is not another theme alongside the incarnation (=way into the far country) but fulfilment *of the incarnation*. In §59.2 Barth opens with the question why the incarnation? - It means judgment passed on all flesh, he answers - but a judgment to show grace, "to free us by imprisoning us" (*IV/1*,pp.220,222). He sees Jesus *pro nobis* in four ways: as Judge; as the judged; suffering judgment (in the cross); and acting justly. In all four the cross is the focal point, for he sees himself as discussing the *theologia crucis*, he sees Good Friday as *the* event under discussion in §59.2 (*IV/1*,pp.273,251). In §59.3 he discusses the resurrection as the event which discloses the meaning of the incarnation and the τετέλεσται of the crucifixion (*IV/1*,p.284; cf. the synopsis on p.157). Clearly the pattern incarnation/cross/resurrection is architectonically significant in §59.

The same pattern is discernible more ambiguously in §64, since §64.2 focuses already on election (as basis), incarnation (as fulfilment) and resurrection (as revelation) in discussing exaltation. However, §64.3, on the royal man, comes to a climax in discussing the cross, having already treated of Jesus' distinctiveness, his agreement with God's will, and his activity, seeing the cross as the determining theme (IV/2, p.249). While §64.2 already discussed Jesus' resurrection, he still returns to the theme in §64.4, as he talks of the "power" of Jesus for us which "has its basis in the resurrection" (IV/2,pp.264f.), so although the event of the resurrection is not much discussed in §64.4, the extended commentary on the transition "Jesus lives - and I with Him" holds us still within the theology of the resurrection.

The incarnation/cross/resurrection pattern can also be discerned, if not obviously, in §69. The wide number of references to themes of the locus classicus of the incarnation in Jn.1:1-18 in §69.1-2: 'Light of Life'; discussions of Jn.1:1f.,4f.,9,11; "Logos", doxa (IV/3,pp.50,9,13,48; cf.pp.167,181). So, while the incarnation is not explicitly discussed, it is presumed in this first main sub-section. Even more implicit is the discussion of the crucifixion in §69.3. Barth refers to the crucifixion (IV/3,p.271), and more definitely, says the theologia crucis "denotes the reality of the prophetic work of Jesus Christ" (IV/3,p.409), and the 'prophetic work' of Christ is a clear theme in §69.3 (e.g., IV/3,p.168). By contrast, the theme of the resurrection dominates §69.4 in terms of the threefold division of the parousia (as resurrection, era of the Spirit and eschaton) as the ways of Jesus' self-revelation as reconciling God and reconciled man (cf. e.g., IV/3,p.281).

In conclusion, incarnation/cross/resurrection structures are discernible in all three part-volumes, but the importance of this structure varies between the three part-volumes.

(iv) The Trinity

Barth's Church Dogmatics is replete with three-fold structures that involve the doctrine of the Trinity - so we are not surprised to see the pattern re-emerge in what Barth calls the 'transitional discussion' sub-sections (§§59.3, 64.4 and 69.4), i.e., as the verdict of the Father, the direction of the Son and the promise of the Spirit. Indeed this trinitarian division is vaguely discernible throughout the christological paragraphs: i.e., in the pattern Son of God (IV/1), Son of Man (IV/2) and revelation (IV/3), which is loosely connectable with the pattern of Jesus as Son of the Father whose act reconciles us, Jesus as the Son as the man who is reconciled, and Jesus as the one whose Spirit reveals his power to us.

Again, Barth's trinitarian doctrine of _I/1_ (Father, Son and Spirit as revealer, revelation and revealedness) finds echoes here - especially in the transitional sub-section. Thus in §59 we see how the Father initiates the act of revelation (especially §59.3), the Son in this act, as the one who reveals himself in this resurrection (especially §64.2,III - i.e., pp.116-154, and §64.4), and the Spirit who is the fact of the revelation, the 'known-ness' of this reconciliation. To unfold _IV/1-3_ in such terms is to lay bare the degree of its continuity with _I/1_ concerning the Trinity and revelation.

(v) Prodigal Son Typology

Quite apart from doctrinal influences on the structure of _IV/1-3_, a deliberate christological typology of the Prodigal Son can be seen to have made its impact. The title of §59.1 ("The Way of the Son of God into the Far Country") suggests it, and there are scattered allusions in _IV/1_(pp.259,392,544 & 722). All this is made explicit in §64.2 ("The Homecoming of the Son of Man"), where Barth argues that an 'indirect' christological interpretation is typologically illuminating (_IV/2_,pp.21-25). However, in _IV/3_ this typology - except for one passing reference (p.572) - is totally ignored. Certainly, however, this typology has significantly influenced the architectonics of §§59.1 and 64.2.

3. Doctrines of Man and the Spirit

In each part-volume, following the christological section two anthropological sections follow (focusing on aspects of sin and grace, respectively) and then two pneumatological sections complete each part-volume (concentrating on aspects of the commmunity and the Christian life respectively). We shall follow these themes in parallel, across the part-volumes.

(i) Man in the Light of Christ

As sinless, Christ reveals man's sinfulness - specifically as well as generally, and it is from Christ we gain proper, ie., revealed, knowledge of sin (IV/1,pp.359f.), hence unlike many dogmatics and much preaching, Barth rejects starting with man's sin and proceeding to discuss God's grace in Christ: Christology must be the foundation of anthropology and the basis for accurate understanding of sin (IV/1,p.389).

Thus §§60.1, 65.1 and 70.1 focus on human sin in the light of - in contrast to - Jesus' obedience, lordship and true witness, respectively, focusing on man's pride (§60.2), sloth (§65.2) and falsehood (§70.2) as leading to his fate (as unreconciled) in his fall (§60.3), his misery (§65.3) and his condemnation (§70.3).

(ii) Man Through the Power of Christ

Man is not left to his fate however, but is reconciled in the power of the risen Christ, and receives his justification (§61), sanctification (§66) and vocation (§71). Within the sub-sections, the parallelism is less stringent. However, the discussion begins with introductory comments (§§61.1, 66.1) or setting the theme in the light of Jesus (§§66.2,71.1), proceeds to the divine origin of the act of grace in question (§§61.2, 66.3, 71.2),then to its basis in human response (§§61.3, 66.4, 71.3), and concludes with aspects affecting the continuing life of the Christian (§§61.4, 66.5 & 66.6; 71.4, 71.5 & 71.6).

(iii) The Spirit and the Community

The Spirit's impact on the community, discussed in §§62, 67 & 72, follows the preceding anthropological themes: i.e., §62 continues the theme of the origins of man's life in Christ in justification, in discussing the gathering of the community; §67 follows the idea of man's continuing in Christ in sanctification, by examining the upbuilding of the community; and §72 takes up the talk of man's witnessing, his vocation, by treating of the sending of the community. Again the sub-sections are only loosely parallel: first there is the fact of the Christian community (§§62.1, 67.1, 72.1);

then the expression of the community - generally (§§62.2, 67.2, 72.2), and specifically (§§62,3, 67.3 & 67.4; 72.3 & 72.4). Structurally, however, the discussion is determined more by themes arising from §§61, 66 and 71 than by parallelism across the part-volumes.

(iv) The Spirit and the Christian Life

The Pauline virtues of faith (§63), love (§68) and hope (§73) conclude each part-volume, and are connected with §§61, 66 & 71 - i.e., justification and faith, sanctification and love, vocation and hope, as well as being explicitly related (by contrast) to §§60, 65 & 70, on pride, sloth and falsehood, respectively. §§63.1; 68.1 & 68.2; and 73.1 open by discussing the ground of the virtues, and §§63.2; 68.3 & 68.4; and 73.2 deal with their expression.

4. Ethical Themes

As in II/1-2 and III/1-4, the final chapter of IV/1-4 is devoted to ethics as arising out of the doctrinal issues of the volume. The incomplete final chapter opens by discussing "Ethics as a Problem of the Doctrine of Reconcilation" (§74), concentrating on how the merciful God can be the God who commands (§74.2). Then Barth discusses the foundation of the Christian life in baptism, the basis of which ("Baptism with the Holy Spirit" - §75.1) gives us the essence of the doctrinal content of IV/1-3, and the substance tells of the practical act of baptism as foundation of the Christian life. The material presentation of practical aspects - political and social - of the Christian life arises out of the petitions of the Lord's Prayer (only §§76-78 are extant) and the part-volume was to have concluded with a discussion of the Lord's Supper as thanksgiving or the "renewal" of the Christian life, as Charles Dickinson puts it[1]: thus baptism and eucharist, both interpreted non-sacramentally, and ethically, are seen as the founding act and the ongoing act of the life of Christian obedience in response to God's reconciliation; and the Lord's Prayer provides the guiding basis of the material ethical discussions. Even in the ethical part-volume we have evidence of Barth's brilliance for structures within structures in IV/1-4.

II THE PLACE OF THE RESURRECTION IN THE STRUCTURE OF C.D.IV/1-4

1. Climax of Christology?

In IV/1 Barth says that although Bultmann's name is not mentioned often he is in a quiet but intensive debate with him (IV/1,p.x). One aspect of this debate is intended, when Barth says the resurrection is "not, therefore, the noetic converse" of the cross (IV/1,p.304) and engages in polemic arguing for the "distinctness" of the resurrection as a new act of God beyond the incarnation and crucifixion, and not merely the unfolding of the meaning already inherent in them (e.g., IV/1,p.305). In the light of this and the fact that the christological sub-section on the resurrection is always the last one under discussion, the question arises, Is the resurrection the climax of Christology for Barth? The answer is No. Climax implies rising to a conclusion greater than the foundation, and in christological terms this does not happen with the resurrection in §§59, 64 and 69. In IV/1 Barth sees the crucifixion as the fulfilment of the incarnation (p.177), and sees man's existence "as determined by the saving event of the death of Jesus" (p.357); the resurrection merely reveals what is decisively settled elsewhere, i.e., the intra-divine foundation of reconciliation is seen in election, its historical basis in the incarnation and its fulfilment in the crucifixion, and the reconciliation thus completed is disclosed in the resurrection to men as already completed.

For all the differences in detail, including the architectonic difference, the material picture is the same in IV/2 as in IV/1. The resurrection reveals Jesus "as the One who reigns in virtue of His death, from the cross" and it is the cross which "constitutes the climax" towards which the Evangelists' accounts depicting of Jesus as Lord move (IV/2,pp.29f). Similarly, when in a powerful passage in §59.3 Barth talks of death as end, and yet of something 'beyond' it 'coming to us' (IV/1,pp.296f.), we read Barth in similar vein in §64.4 (IV/2,pp.294f.). One difference, however, is that in IV/2 Barth spends more time concentrating on the link between the resurrection and the incarnation, the 'Jesus lives' and the 'Christmas message', not only in §64.2 but also in §64.4 (IV/2,pp.267,270f.,273). Thus, after the foundation and fulfilment of Christ's exaltation - after the christological climax - as a new act, comes Christ's resurrection, which reveals it.

That Christ's "being and action, were not augmented by His resurrection" (IV/3,p.282) is especially clear in §69.4. Again the resurrection is a decisively new event (IV/3,p.283), and again, the resurrection materially adds nothing to reconciliation, it merely reveals it.

The conclusion is quite clear from all three christological paragraphs: the resurrection, as the theme of §§59.3, 64.4 and 69.4 in no way forms a climax to

Christology for Barth in IV/1-3. Against Bultmann it is urged the resurrection is a genuinely new event and not the "noetic converse" of the cross, i.e., not the arising of Easter faith among the disciples, recognising the significance of Jesus' death on the cross, apart from the Easter event, but revelation after Jesus' death in which Jesus is the decisive subject of the revelation. Yet Barth seeks in no way to undermine what he sees as the decisive significance of the τετέλεσται of the cross: reconciliation is completed on the cross, it is made known in the resurrection.

2. Transition to Man and the Holy Spirit

§§59.3, 64.4 and 69.4 do not consitutute the climax of the christological discussion. However, while still in the christological sphere in the narrower sense (IV/3,p.277), Barth explicitly says that in these sub-sections he is engaged in "transitional discussion" - i.e., transition from the chistological to the anthropological and pneumatological spheres (IV/1,p.284; IV/2,p.265; IV/3,p.276). Barth is discussing the possibility of something "beyond" Christ's death which will affect us, in IV/1, and sees Jesus' resurrection as the basis for such a transition (IV/1,pp.296ff.). Similarly in IV/2 while working within the christological premise of anthropology ("Jesus lives"), he is moving the discussion towards anthropology ("and I with Him") (IV/2,pp.271f.). And again in IV/3, while Barth says "We must enter the anthropological sphere", in §69.4, "we are still moving in the christological sphere in the narrower sense" (IV/3, pp.276f.).

Since there are three discussions of the resurrection, the relation of the resurrection to anthropology and pneumatology must be considered separately in each part-volume.

(i) The Father's Verdict

In §59.3, Barth strongly emphasises that the resurrection is the exclusive act of God the Father (IV/3, p.300) and also emphasises its unrepeatableness, its "once-for-all-ness". When Barth discusses the five conditions the resurrection fulfils showing its move 'beyond' the crucifixion, the focus is on the Father's act, i.e., (1) it is God's exclusive act; (2) it is God's new act; (3) as God's act it corresponds to the crucifixion, i.e., showing God's 'negative act' had a 'positive intention' (IV/1, p.310); (4) as God's act it is historical; and (5) God's act in the crucifixion and resurrection is one act, not two - because the one God is at work in both (IV/1, pp.300-347).

The emphases of §59.3 on the resurrection as unrepeatable and as exclusive act of God are reflected in the remainder of IV/1. Thus §60 on the human sin disclosed in the light of the risen Christ considers man's pride and fall. Pride is, for Barth, the denial of God's exclusive role in reconciliation, it is the attempt to usurp his place, to assert man's divinity and gain eternity, whereas the resurrection reveals God alone has the right to these. Pride is the opposite of Jesus' self-humiliation and of the real and just exercise of divine power in the resurrection, and its corollary is man's fall in which - as biblically described as Adam's fall (IV/1,pp.507ff.) - we see reflected (by contrast of opposites) the unrepeatableness of the resurrection.

Similarly in §61 Barth continues the theme of judging (§59.2) and verdict (§59.3) with justification, the aspect of God's act on man which is unrepeatable. God's good-will to us, revealed in the resurrection is expressed righteously in justification (IV/1,p.556). §61.2 emphasises justification as God's exclusive act, §61.3 concentrates on the once-for-all pardon, and §61.4 touches on the faith that arises as response to justification.

In the pneumatological sphere, the emphases of §59.3 continue. In §62 the gathering of the community reflects its unrepeatable and exclusive basis in God's act - so the Church is when men together may receive the verdict pronounced in the resurrection (IV/1,p.651). Again in §63 Barth explicitly shows how faith has its necessity revealed in the resurrection (IV/1,p.747), and we are thus concerned with the aspect of the Christian life that arises, i.e., the theme of once-for-all-ness is still reflected here.

(ii) The Son's Direction

§64.4 presents contrasting emphases to those of §59.3: the resurrection as Jesus' self-attestation. While the self-revelation is not Jesus' act qua his humanity but qua his divinity (IV/2,p.295), this still presents a different picture (e.g., IV/2,pp.290,299f.) to that of IV/1. A further contrast is that it is not the unrepeatableness but the continuity of Jesus' resurrection, as ongoing direction of the Son that is emphasised in §64.4. With Barth's exposition here of "Jesus lives, and I with Him", we are led into a treatment, not so much of the event which brings new life, as the event which brings new life - or at least reveals it. This continuous-process aspect of the resurrection is clearly expressed in §64.4 (IV/2,pp.304,307), e.g., where he says that a conclusion to be drawn from the revelation in the resurrection, is that a Christian "is always in the process of becoming" (IV/2,p.307).

These emphases of §64.4 - of human involvement in the resurrection (Jesus' self-disclosure), and of the continuous-process dimension - are reflected in the rest of IV/2. Thus in §65 the sin disclosed is sloth and misery. Sloth is "evil inaction", i.e., the denial of exaltation, the attempt to abandon the place given by God to avoid human responsibility, to wallow in godless autonomy (IV/2,p.203); in sum it is behaviour which is the opposite of Jesus, the royal man, and the non-acceptance of what is given man in his exaltation. Misery (§65.3) proceeds as a consequence, i.e., is disclosed in man's sloth, and, by contrast of opposites, reflects the Son's direction as ongoing process (for here, we have Barth's dynamic-actualist remodelling of the status corruptionis - IV/2,pp.483ff.)

Similarly, in §66, man's sanctification reflects the continuing-process aspect of God's act on man. As the synopsis (IV/2,p.499) shows, sanctification is based on Jesus' self-attestation as exalted in his 'direction' to us, it is based on the revelatory power of the resurrection - for the "and I" of "Jesus lives, and I with Him" is the call to repudiate sin. Sanctification as continuing process, and as human involvement in the living out of our lives by grace, is worked out as a call to discipleship (§66.3), as the whole process of regeneration - in contrast to sloth (IV/1,p.560) (§66.4), as a life characterised by good works - i.e., as response to grace (§66.5) and as - at its limit - bearing the cross (§66.6).

In the pneumatological sections, the emphases of §64.4 continue. §67 deals with the dimension of continuing process in the community's life, namely its "upbuilding". Further, this is explicitly seen as arising from the "powerful and living direction of the Resurrected" (IV/2,p.614,cf.p.651). So the community, as built up, grows and is held up in its sanctification in the power of the risen Jesus, in his "direction". Finally, in §68, love reflects Jesus' resurrection, and "prefigures the coming general resurrection" (IV/2,p.836). Thus Outka is right: for Barth, "Faith as reception is man's response to God's 'justifying sentence'; love as self-giving is man's response to God's 'self-direction'" (Agape,p.211). Certainly love expresses for Barth the living out of the Christian life, its dimension as a continuing process.

(iii) The Spirit's Promise

While §59.3 emphasised the exclusive role of the Father, and §64.4 the Son's own role, in his resurrection, §69.4 deals with the Spirit's role, though under the format of dealing successively with Easter to Ascension, the era of the community, of the Spirit, and the *eschaton*, as three forms of the *parousia*. In this context, the Spirit is seen as "Jesus Christ Himself in the power of His resurrection" (IV/3,p.352), and to that extent the discussion in IV/3 follows the pattern of IV/1 and IV/2, though with the difference that in the earlier volumes Barth restricted his discussion to the Easter to Ascension side, whereas in IV/3 we have this broader perspective. As a result, a number of emphases emerge in §69.4: the eschatological dimension, the dynamic tension between Easter and *eschaton*; the power of the Spirit; and above all the prophetic, revelatory nature of Jesus' resurrection. These emphases of §69.4 are reflected in the rest of IV/3, and it will be seen, they reflect not an aspect of the resurrection but already implications of it, i.e., the resurrection is reflected in IV/3 not ontically but noetically: this corresponds to the general difference of that part-volume to its two predecessors as mere revelation of what is materially completed in IV/1-2.

In §70, the sin disclosed is man's falsehood and condemnation. Falsehood is resistance to Christ's prophetic work, and is "the specifically Christian form of sin" (IV/3,pp.434f.); the resistance can be hostile or subtle evasion as in assumed respectability (IV/3,pp.437f), and is the opposite of the action of the Spirit (as the power of the resurrection), denying the missionary task assigned to man, and is lacking the eschatological perspective of hope. The corollary of falsehood is condemnation, which, by contrast of opposites reflects the eschatological promise. In this context, specifically in the context of unexpected pardon in place of the expected condemnation of Job's friends (IV/3,pp.454,462), Barth makes his much-discussed comments on the question of apokatastasis (IV/3,pp.477f.).

Similarly in §71, Barth relates man's vocation to the three forms of the parousia and to the task of witnessing in the power of the resurrection in the era of the Spirit. The emphases of §69.4 emerge in the sub-sections: vocation is a divine call in the person of Jesus through the power of the Spirit (§71.2); its goal is the creation and preservation of disciples 'in Christ' (§71.3); it is the call to be witnesses of God (primarily) and witnesses to God (secondarily) (§71.4); it is the call to follow Jesus Christ despite affliction, not to allow pressure to blunt the **Christian**'s eschatological hope, based on Christ's resurrection (IV/3,p.642) (§71.5); and it is the call to liberation, the move from falsehood to salvation (§71.6).

In the pneumatological paragraphs the emphases of §69.4 continue. In §72 Barth's discussion of the sending of the Christian community emphasises the missionary dimension and also covers the eschatological tension in relation to the community's missionary task, as the synopsis already makes clear (IV/3,p.681). Of course in the pneumatological sections, two of Barth's architectonic principles overlap, namely the last two sections of each part-volume are pneumatological and that the pneumatological discussion arises out of the transitional sub-section, for in this instance §69.4 is also pneumatological. Nonetheless the eschatological dimension ('the Spirit's promise') is intended (cf.IV/3,pp.713-5,810), though the dominant emphasis is concerned with the dimension of witnessing to revelation i.e., mission.

The eschatological emphasis of §69.4 is explicitly discussed in §73, on hope - a theme consciously related to the three-fold form of the parousia as seen in §69.4 (IV/3,p.903), which dominates §73.

Thus in IV/3, as in IV/1 and IV/2, we have found the emphases of the transitional sub-section have determined to some considerable degree the shape of the material in the anthropological and pneumatological paragraphs. In IV/3, there were one or two differences however, arising from the fact that the part-volume is concerned not with material discussions but only with revelation, and also arising from the overlap of two of Barth's triple structures.

3. Exaltation and Resurrection

In IV/2, we noticed Barth broke with the incarnation/cross/resurrection pattern to the extent of discussing the resurrection in relation to the exaltation in §64.2. We must now examine the relation between these two. IV/2 was published in 1955, and when Henri Bouillard's three volumes on Barth came out two years later, he was aware of IV/2, as his references show (e.g., KBII/1, p.117,n.4). However, it is referring to IV/1,pp.134f. that he discusses this relation, and sees person and work as summed up under humiliation and exaltation, with humiliation "accomplished in its fullness in his passion and death" and exaltation "revealed in the glory of his resurrection" (KBII/1,p.116).

This idea that Barth's interpretation of the two states follows that of 17th century Protestant orthodoxy with a simple identification of exaltation and resurrection can be supported from a variety of Barth's writings in the 1940's. Certainly direct identity is stated in Barth's 1943 French work The Faith of the Church (e.g., pp.85,86,88); similarly in his 1948 Christian Doctrine According to the Heidelberg Catechism Barth identifies Christ's status exaltationis with his "resurrection and ascension" (p.72); again in the Dogmatics in Outline, in a passage, the context of which Bouillard refers to (KBII/1,p.116), Barth talks of "the exaltation of Jesus Christ as the mystery of Easter" (p.115,cf.p.121).

However, this simple identity is not made in IV/2. He sees the traditional identification as holding the resurrection as the "datum" of Christ's exaltation, and adds:

> If we have read the New Testament aright, the datum of both the humiliation and the exaltation of Jesus Christ is the whole of His human life including His death. But the resurrection is the event, and not merely the datum, of the revelation of the One who is exalted in His lowliness IV/2,p.299).

If we turn for clarification from this comment in §64.4 to Barth's main discussion on the relation of resurrection and exaltation in §64.2, we find that after a short introduction, Barth briefly deals with the basis of exaltation in election (IV/2,pp.31-36), as he has covered the material in II/2: i.e., the event of Jesus Christ is no 'contingent fact of history' (Lessing) but grounded in the electing grace of God.

In the second part of §64.2 Barth discusses the incarnation as historical fulfilment of exaltation

(IV/2,pp.36-116). He focuses successively on the fact that God the Son is man, his existence is also human existence, he unites "divine and human essence", "He raised up human essence to essence in Himself" - i.e., (i) the mutual impartation of human and divine essences, in Christ (ii) what is addressed to Christ's human essence, and (iii) the common actualisation of divine and human essence in Christ.

Already in this discussion on the incarnation we see discussion on Christ's life and death as well as resurrection as the datum of exaltation, while the resurrection is seen as revelation of exaltation, and, furthermore, there is the mutual coordination of humiliation and exaltation in incarnation (IV/2,p.100). So when the older Christology saw humiliation and exaltation as chronologically expressed in incarnation and resurrection, Barth can no longer agree (IV/2,pp.110f.): he cannot separate the states out, because the whole life and death of Christ is for him simultaneously humiliation and exaltation - and the resurrection is the revelation of all this (IV/2,pp.111f.). For all that, something of the old division is still visible, for the humiliation does not seem closely related here to the resurrection, again the exaltation may be related to Christ's life and death, but it is only first revealed in the resurrection - a pattern which, while consistent with Barth's restriction to a revelatory role for the resurrection, is closer to traditional patterns than Barth's talk of simultaneity might suggest. This closeness to the older Christology can become very clear - as e.g., in IV/2,p.116.

The third part of §64.2 - on the resurrection and ascension as the basis of the revelation of exaltation - carries on much the same picture. Here again we see the mutual coordination and unity of humiliation and exaltation (almost humiliation as exaltation) in Christ's life and death, and we see resurrection as revelation of that exaltation (e.g., IV/2,pp.150f.). Again we hear the resurrection adds nothing materially to Christ's exaltation, it only reveals it (IV/2,p.133), and again we hear criticism of the older Christology's successive states, and the preference for simultaneous, interwoven states (IV/2,,pp.135f.).

However, there is the modification of this picture of resurrection as revelation which we met in our discussion of the 'forty days' - namely Barth's talk of anticipations of the Easter revelation, which culminate in the transfiguration (IV/2,pp.137-139). As we saw in that earlier discussion, that modification increases the ambiguity of Barth's account. To say that Jesus' history and existence is revelation in its totality (IV/2, p.134)is quite different to his grounds for this in referring to exceptional moments of anticipatory revelation, for exceptional incidents do not tell us of the whole history and existence of Jesus: is it the totality or the exceptional incidents in Jesus' pre-Easter history which are particularly revelatory?

Certainly to evidence the one from the other betrays confusion.

As Barth's account in §64.2 continues in the same vein as already discussed, we can now conclude that Bouillard's interpretation of Barth fairly represents the works of the 1940's, but not Barth's main discussion on the theme in IV/2, a volume Bouillard had become familiar with. Against Bouillard's interpretation here, we must emphasise how in IV/2 Barth coordinated humiliation and exaltation, treating them with much greater interwovenness than in traditional dogmatics, and moving beyond simple identification of resurrection with exaltation.

4. Ethics, Baptism and Resurrection

Except in the baptismal fragment published separately as IV/4 (§75), the ethical chapter of The Doctrine of Reconciliation does not concentrate heavily on the relation of resurrection to its themes. However, for Barth, ethics arises in a context defined by God, i.e., in The Christian Life (§§74,76-78), in the context of man's encounter with the God who commands. But this encounter and this command are event, and the recognition of that event "occurs as a *theologia viatorum* in the *lumen gratiae*, in the light of the *parousia* of Jesus Christ, begun in his resurrection, and continued in the presence and action of his Holy Spirit, though not yet at its goal, not yet in the *lumen gloriae*" (GA,7,S.10,cf.S.15).

§74.2 explains the main features of §§74ff.: (1) the role of God (SS.17-27); and (2) of man (SS.28-40); (3) the concretely ethical situation of the encounter of God and man (SS.40-46); and (4) what is divinely commanded and obediently done (SS.46-73). Barth's brief comments on the resurrection in §74.2 (SS.27,30,39) show that apart from providing the setting of the theologia viatorum, the resurrection is not seen in a significant role as the basis of ethics.[2]

This lack of significance is at once apparent in §§76-78, where Barth's reference to the resurrection is only ad hoc. Thus he sees Jesus' resurrection as signifying Jesus as Lord of the world and thus the social and not private dimension of the appeal to God in prayer (GA,7, S.157,cf.159). He repeats the relevance of the eschatological perspective of the theologia viatorum in the three-fold dimension of the resurrection (SS.228,241,281f.); and he talks of the forty days as the time when the Kingdom of God presented itself as already fulfilled to the disciples, who recognised this fulfilment by the power of God - the Holy Spirit - opening their blind eyes (SS.440-442).

An exception must be made with §75 on baptism (IV/4,Fragment). In this paragraph Barth discusses the foundation of the Christian life - but such a foundation can only be found in Jesus Christ (IV/4,p.17), and not in our historical evaluation of him but in the 'indwelling power' of his history shown in his resurrection

(IV/4,p.24). Of course for Barth, the resurrection doesn't effect but only reveals the transition from Jesus to us - even as the basis of the ethical aspects of Christian living, for all that is necessary is already achieved in the death which accomplished his life's task (cf.Jn.19:28), and thus to be human is in one's own time to receive the pledge and promises given (i.e., revealed) in Christ's resurrection, and thereby to participate in Christ's own history then and there (IV/4,pp.24-26).

The foundation of the Christian life, effected in Christ's life and death, and revealed in his resurrection, is manifested to particular men in the work of the Spirit (IV/4,p.27); thus objective revelation to all men in Christ's resurrection is not enough for God - he wills that men subjectively also be brought to the truth and freed for faithfulness to him (IV/4,p.29). This subjective realisation is the 'Baptism with the Holy Spirit' - i.e., the Spirit working through a man, not against, or in spite of him. (Barth's treatment on this point is excellent and confounds still further the travesty of his thought as 'God everything and man nothing': IV/4,p.28). In this sense, baptism with the Spirit is the basis of all else in the Christian life (IV/4,pp.31-40). On this basis, in §75.2, Barth discusses baptism with water as the first obedient response of man to God's command - not infant, but believer's baptism (for in paedobaptism, the response by the baptizand cannot be said to be 'obedient'), and not understood sacramentally but ethically (for then, it would not be the response of man, but still God's act - as by some "infusion" of grace or whatever). Thus Barth's discussion of water baptism proceeds via exegesis to the basis, goal and meaning of baptism, seen respectively as Jesus' example in the Jordan and his teaching after his resurrection, in God's act of reconciliation in Christ (not in the candidates' nor the commmunity's faith) and in being a free, obedient, affirmative public response to God's act of salvation, a response made of, in and into the Christian community (and thus neither a sacrament, nor an act of infants). Its goal is in Jesus' history as fulfilled in his death and revealed in his resurrection whether with John's baptism (in which case this is 'awaited') or with Christian baptism (where it is seen as 'accomplished, actualised and fulfilled') (IV/4,p.86). Its meaning, as 'baptism to conversion' (already in John's baptism), is expressed as obedience and hope. Now Christians receive this hope not from baptism, but from the power of the resurrection (cf.1Pet.1:3), so the "object and content of this hope is the same Jesus Christ who in His resurrection from the dead is its basis" (IV/4,p.197). Thus the question of disobedience and failure after baptism is not ultimately relevant, since our living hope is based not on our own action (in baptism) but on Jesus' resurrection - though hope is not idle, there should be no 'cheap grace', but hope active in prayer, confident in Christ (IV/4,pp.204-210).

Thus we see how the resurrection - as revelation of the foundation of the Christian life accomplished in Jesus' life and death - is the basis of the Christian life in terms of the subjective realisation of revelation (baptism with the Holy Spirit), and the basis of the Christian's obedience to and hope in Christ (expressd first, in baptism with water).

III THE RESURRECTION IN THE SOTERIOLOGY OF C.D. IV/1-4

1. Introduction

In IV/1-4 Barth is concerned with reconciliation - so our analysis reaches the key question for this chapter when we enquire about the soteriological role of the resurrection in this volume: we touch on matters at the heart of the thesis which must be worked out fully in our critical discussion in the next chapter. We shall examine the christological paragraphs in turn, since we have seen there are differences between them.

2. §59

Gerald O'Collins argues that while Barth interpreted the resurrection almost exclusively as revelation in his dialectical period, from I/1 onwards, he began to interpret it more broadly, envisaging a role in reconciliation, history, and also faith, hope and *kerygma*. He thinks not only of Barth's increasing tendency to see the resurrection as historical (begun in I/2, more advanced successively in III/2, IV/1-2 and IV/3-4), but also an alleged similar tendency in its soteriological role, for which he refers expressly to IV/1.[3] While we support O'Collins' contention regarding the historical role, we challenge that regarding the soteriological. In these analytical pages so far, the reader has been introduced to many passages and contexts that show that in *IV/1-4* a clear and marked revelatory role for the resurrection is presented. To establish that this is the limit of the significance of the resurrection in *IV/1-4*, we must examine those occasions where it might be argued Barth claims more.

Already in §59.2, the passage in *IV/1*, pp.227f., might be claimed to teach the resurrection as ontic (or ontological) basis of the community, and as what transforms mere history into existential reality. However, when Barth sees the forty days as the time when Jesus begins a new Gospel history with his disciples, "the time of his community", or when he talks of "the time of the community which begins with the Easter story" (*IV/4*,p.227), the context shows that Easter plays this founding role only as the revelation to the disciples of all that has been told before, i.e., it provokes realisation, awareness by virtue of its character as revelation: the resurrection is not the ontological or ontic basis but only the noetic, i.e., revelatory basis of the community. Again, when Barth says that for faith not to be "a mere acceptance of the truth of an old story", we need "the presence and action of Jesus Christ Himself", as "actuality for us", which proves itself actuality by its own power "in virtue of the Easter story by which it happened" (*IV/1*,p.228), we must not forget that Barth can hardly mean to accept the view of Bultmann and Thomasius (on the separation of objective and subjective atonement, with the former as the creation of the possibility of ζωή, and the latter as its actuality in believers), which he explicitly rejects (IV/1,pp.284f.). Further, careful reading of the context shows Barth does not interpret Easter in this existential way. He says "in virtue of the Easter story by which it happened, in the power of the sum which God has gathered in it, his history is itself not an old and past history:" (IV/1,p.228)– and he has already explained what he means by this slightly convoluted expression: "the Easter narrative...gathers together the sum of all that has been told before. Or, rather, it tells us how the sum which God Himself had already gathered together in all that had gone before was revealed as such to the disciples – again by Jesus himself" (IV/1,p.227, my emphasis). Since also by Jesus' "history" he means his incarnation as fulfilled in the cross, the regular pattern emerges: Jesus' "history" (incarnation and cross) is event (ontic basis) and as revealed in the resurrection it affects human awareness (noetic basis).

The same conclusion is forced on us when we examine the only comments in §59.3 that might be misread as implying the resurrection is seen in more than revelatory terms. Thus Barth sees the "comprehensive relevance of the resurrection, its redemptive significance for us" as depending on "God's free act of grace" (IV/1,p.304). But it is to misread him if it is assumed he means significance as redemption, the context shows that the emphasised concept is that it is God's free act of grace (i.e., the exclusive role of the Father in Jesus' resurrection, in IV/1, as we have seen), and thus "redemptive significance" is not stressed – Barth means only its significance in redemption (which is as revelation of it).

Later, Barth says the N.T. community exists "in that alteration, that is in that differentiated relationship between the death and resurrection of Christ. When a man is in Christ, there is a new creation" (IV/1,p.312). Klappert has seen Barth's Christology as one of the "differentiated relationships of cross and resurrection", in which "neither the cross is subsumed under the resurrection nor the resurrection under the cross" (Auferweckung,pp.34f.). However, Barth makes it clear he understands the nature of the differentiation of the two events in terms of historical actualisation and noetic realisation (or at least the basis of it): "the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, as a second and new divine act, was the revelation of the meaning and purpose of the obedience demanded from and achieved by Jesus Christ, and therefore of His death" (IV/1,pp.312f.). Thus (pace Klappert) Barth's 'Christology of differentiated relationships' does involve the subordination of the resurrection to the cross in the sense that the latter, for Barth, achieves everything necessary for salvation, the former only reveals it (or at least is its basis of revelation).

Finally, Barth says, "In virtue of His resurrection ..Jesus...is...the one Mediator between God and man (1Tim.2:5). He was this in the event of Good Friday to be it for ever - this is what the event of Easter Day revealed and confirmed and brought into effect" (*IV/1*,p.313). This striking phrase 'brought into effect' should not be taken out of the context of the previous sentence where Barth says the power of Easter is to make Good Friday something not merely past-historical, but "a present event, the event which fills and determines the whole present" (ib.); in other words, it makes it known: Jesus was Mediator already and had fulfilled his mediatorial role on Good Friday - Easter brought it into effect by making it known to the disciples (cf.*IV/1*,p.343 , where 'put into effect' more unambiguously refers to making known).

Barth nowhere in §59 undermines the soteriological τετέλεσται of the cross (*IV/1*,p.306), thus he can end the sub-section on the *resurrection* in *IV/1*: "We can go on to think of the existence of man as determined by the saving event of the *death* of Jesus Christ" (*IV/1*,p.357, my emphasis).

3. §64

If anything, the picture we discerned in §59 of atonement completed on the cross and revealed in the resurrection is put even more relentlessly and unambiguously in §64. Barth says:

> The humiliation of God and the exaltation of man as they took place in Jesus Christ are the completed fulfilment of the covenant, the completed reconciliation of the world with God. His being as such (if we may be permitted this abstraction for a

> moment) was and is the end of the old and the beginning of the new form of this world even without his resurrection and ascension (IV/2,pp.132f.).

And what a revealing abstraction! The resurrection is irrelevant for atonement - except to reveal it. Time and again Barth repeats this picture in IV/2, but to ensure no wider role has been missed we consider those passages which might be argued to imply such a wider role.

The ambiguity in IV/2 is not that of a more than revelatory role - in the most extended discussion in §64.2 it is difficult to find even the faintest hint of any such role - but of less: his discussion of pre-Easter anticipatory revelations seems to rob the resurrection of even its decisive revelatory role to some extent. While it is possible to talk of decisive revelation with anticipation of it in some degree, the more its decisiveness and also its anticipation are stressed, the more self-contradictory becomes the portrayal of revelation.

Barth starts with Bengel's comment on the pre-Easter narratives, spirant resurrectionem (IV/2,p.138), and says Jesus' resurrection and ascension have to be taken seriously in themselves - but also in relation to Jesus' history as the act of incarnation, for "This act in its totality has the character of revelation", whereas the resurrection and ascension are the "unequivocal exponents of the character of his being as revelation" (IV/2,pp.134, my emphasis). Thus the pre-Easter sequence of Jesus' life and death "is not entirely devoid of the character of revelation" (*IV/2*,p.135). For Barth (as we have seen), the most significant anticipation of Easter revelation comes in the transfiguration (*IV/2*,pp.137-139). To Barth, the word δόξα signifies *the* word of revelation - and he associates it with the resurrection and the *parousia* - thus he is not so much concerned with the "Messianic Secret" (though he acknowledges there is not much recognition by the disciples, and indeed that Jesus does frequently urge silence on the healed), but "with the δόξα κυρίου which shone round about the shepherds of Bethlehem" (*IV/2*,p.137) and above all, εἶδαν τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ of the transfiguration (*IV/2*,p.138).

While Barth attempts to grade pre-Easter and Easter revelations as partial, and decisive, respectively (*IV/2*,p.134), he surprisingly undermines this decisiveness by saying that the note of unbelief (Mk.9:24) not only describes the situation of Mark 9 following the transfiguration, but "is a note which is not altogether silenced even in the Easter narratives. It is basically overcome only when the disciples receive the Holy Spirit" (*IV/2*,p.138). Here we see how Barth's adopted Lucan chronology together with his understanding of objective and subjective revelation lead him further to undermine even the revelatory role of the resurrection: even after Easter revelation does not dispel doubt - but at Pentecost doubt is dispelled. (This picture may fit with the Lucan schema - but what about Thomas, in Jn.20:24-29?) It seems Barth is saying

Pentecost is the decisive revelation. When he returns to talk of Easter as definitive revelation (IV/2,p.140) this is vis à vis Golgotha: until Jesus dies there can be no definitive revelation of his whole life and death. (Though apparently, one speculates, a transfiguration following the utterance of the word τετέλεσται on the cross might have rendered the resurrection unnecessary for Barth? This does often seem true.)

In sum, in §64.2 with relentless consistency Barth excludes any significance beyond revelation for the resurrection; however he also undermines even this revelatory significance by ambiguously talking of anticipatory revelation in the whole pre-Easter history of Jesus, as instanced by extraordinary incidents - supremely the transfiguration - and by talking of the real qualitative difference at least concerning the note of unbelief, only at Pentecost. Barth's understanding of the revelatory nature of the transfiguration is quite radical here: he talks of a threefold parousia (though not that of IV/3-4) namely transfiguration, forty days and eschaton, with the main difference in each phase being size of audience (three, many more, everyone, respectively).

In §64.3, the same picture emerges: resurrection as revelation - e.g., explicitly in IV/2,p.257 - the N.T. saw redemption "not in the resurrection but the death of the Lord". Similarly, he talks of the transfiguration and even Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi as revelation (thus anticipating Easter) (IV/2,pp.160,254). Even when Barth says that without his resurrection, Jesus would have "gone under in world history" as obscure (IV/2,p.168), he is still thinking of resurrection as revelation - Christ's "hiddenness... could be removed only by his self-declaration" (ib.). We note that the "without His resurrection" is "therefore without the witness of the Holy Spirit" - but wonder how the hiddenness can be said to be irremovable except by the revelation at Easter, Ascension and Pentecost, and yet removed at the transfiguration. Most positively, in criticism of the theology of J.S.Bach's St. Matthew Passion for portraying the passion and death of Christ as a more or less unbroken tale of woe and failing to catch the spirant resurrectionem, the 'Jesus is Victor' of Mt.26-27, we hear of the resurrection as what shapes and colours the pre-Easter gospel narratives. This is of course a decisive insight of N.T. studies - that no 'historical Jesus' may be prised out freed from Easter "mythology", for all the 'historical' bits will 'breathe the air of the resurrection' as much as the Easter narratives. It does not indicate that Barth is understanding the resurrection other than as revelation, however: it is (for Barth) in the light of the revelation in the resurrection that the pre-Easter narratives can be written from their decisively post-Easter perspective.

In §64.4, once again, the same picture emerges: regeneration and conversion (etc.) took place in Jesus' death so Jesus is Lord and King - and seen as such in his resurrection (IV/2,p.291). This picture is not mitigated by talk of Jesus as "Victor" in his resurrection (IV/2,p.296), since in this passage Barth is still thinking of the "light of (Jesus') resurrection as the light of His cross", and elsewhere, he makes it clear that the victory is to be revelation (IV/2,p.290,356). Similarly, the phrase "the power of the resurrection" and even "the peacemaking power of the resurrection" is, when explained at all, explained as the "power of revelation" (IV/2,p.318). In general, Barth talks of the power of the resurrection when he means its power for us, i.e., subjective revelation, i.e., the Holy Spirit (IV/2,pp.311,323). Again, talk of the "direction" of the Son in the power of the resurrection should not be interpreted in anything other than revelatory categories, as Barth makes clear in talking of the Christian's "walking" as "initiated by the resurrection of Jesus Christ: by His first and transitory and particular revelation, which is so decisive for the existence of the community" (IV/2,p.375).

Finally, we note further revelatory anticipations (the Baptist's vision of Jesus at his baptism and the descent of the Spirit on Jesus - IV/2,p.324) and the idea that Pentecost may be the decisive revelation after all (our being in Jesus, opened decisively in his resurrection "is continually opened in the presence and action of the Holy Spirit" - IV/2,p.331).

Thus in §64.4, as elsewhere in §64, we find the resurrection seen only as revelation - but not uniquely, for its uniqueness is undermined by anticipations before, doubts in the forty days, and decisiveness apparently not till afterwards, at Pentecost.

4. §69

The main difference in IV/3 relevant for this current enquiry is that this part-volume is concerned primarily with revelation of reconciliation and not with unfolding the material content of reconciliation, whereas in IV/1 and IV/2 revelation only became the predominant theme in conjunction with the sub-sections on the resurrection (§§59.3, 64.2, 64.4, 69.4). Thus Barth says: "Reconciliation is indeed revelation. But revelation in itself and as such, if we can conceive of such a thing, could not be reconciliation. It takes place as reconciliation takes place" (IV/3,pp.8f.,cf.p.38). This theme leads Barth to work out the idea already emerging in IV/2, that there is revelation in anticipation of Easter already in the life of Jesus. Barth continues to emphasise that reconciliation as revelation is event and 'history' and thus is such in the incarnation (IV/3,pp.38f.,46): Jesus' life of reconciliation "is Word, revelation, kerygma" (IV/3,p.106), and thus benefits of salvation accrue to us - because in his life of reconciliation Jesus is revealer of all this. Jesus already reveals himself and his benefits in his incarnation (conceived actualistically, not statically, of course). This growing tendency to shift the context of revelation increasingly from the resurrection back to the incarnation continues - though Barth does also try to affirm a decisive content of revelation (as starting-point for witness, as Jesus' "one and total Word" of revelation) in the resurrection (IV/3, pp.116, 159). This tendency narrows the gap between Barth and Bultmann, for his affirmation of the resurrection as the decisive event of revelation ensured distance from seeing the resurrection as 'noetic converse of the cross', and the more its decisiveness is undermined, the less the force of Barth's claim to say something radically different to Bultmann here. Even the subjective awareness of the disciples is deferred till after the forty days, at Pentecost, and the resurrection is increasingly (though not entirely) left as a bare event.

As in IV/2, Barth's talk of Jesus as Victor (§69.3) entails a victory of revelation: Christ's victory, experienced by Blumhardt, comes with new "action in the light of (i.e., by virtue of the revelation of) the superior life of the risen Christ" (IV/3,pp.197,169,170, cf.p.263). Similarly, when Barth talks of Jesus' awakening from the dead as "His unconquerable and indestructible life" (IV/3,p.227), he is talking of God's eternal will, which "is event and revelation in the history of Jesus Christ", and this resurrection 'life' is "the beginning of the history of light shining in darkness" (i.e., revelation). And when we hear again of the "power of the resurrection", he is talking of knowledge (of the divine disclosure), and of what God "speaks of" in Jesus Christ (IV/3,pp.183f.,249). Also we note §69.3 continues the emphasis on Jesus' history as a whole as revelation (IV/3,p.165), so that the encounter with the Baptist is already "immediate revelation" (IV/3,p.232), and the cross is revelation - of "the end of the old man", whereas in the resurrection, it is of "the coming of the new" - or where the revelatory word of reconciliation is grounded in Jesus' existence and crucifixion, and uttered in his resurrection (IV/3,pp.249,271) - comments which show the increasing tendency to gradate levels or types of revelation.

In §69.4, Barth continues to affirm that Jesus' work was not "augmented by His resurrection" but only revealed, so that Jesus' significance did not "remain shut up in Him" but open to the disciples (IV/3,p.282), that "the Holy Spirit (is) Jesus Christ Himself in the power of His resurrection" (IV/3,p.352), and that the resurrection is 'perfect' revelation - yet only 'on the way' to its goal as revelation, i.e., that it is but a preliminary form of the parousia. Finally, we note that in talking of the non-Christian, Barth says he, too, is "reconciled to God in Jesus Christ" (IV/3,p.335f.); however, he remains a prisoner of ignorance and, because of this ignorance, really imprisoned (i.e., his noetic situation is unredeemed - and with it his ontic situation) (IV/3,p.338). Thus revelation (the noetic situation) has a truly creative power, it seems - to alter the ontic situation of man (though not the ontological). There is ambiguity of thought and also an emphasis on the creative power of revelation to which we must return in our critical discussions.

5. §75

Barth's last words in C.D. - in IV/4 do not alter the general picture we have seen. Thus when, for example, he says that in the life of people being renewed, "not apart from the...power of the history of Jesus Christ demonstrated in His resurrection, a power is at work which makes these men...ready to give this event...the central place, in their willing and thinking" (IV/4, p.26), we should again not ignore the context: the fact that such people become "faithful to God..is already the goal of the self-revelation of Jesus Christ in His resurrection from the dead" (IV/4, p.27), because this power is manifested in Jesus' resurrection (IV/4, pp.24f.).

IV/4 - for all its advances in clarity, and determination to demonstrate that **Barth's** theology does not mean a disparaging of the creature and his 'Christian life' or of the historical space and time of Jesus' history and our own history - remains in broad continuity with the thrust of the Church Dogmatics. Thus we see the continuing, even increasing dominance of revelation as an all-determining concept, both in continuity with the trend in IV/3 to see reconciliation as revelation and with III/2 in talking of eternal life as the manifestation of our lives (a concept we found troublesome, obscure and problematic in its impact on the theology of the resurrection when we discussed it in the context of the 'pure presence of God') and the idea that salvation is not affected, only revealed in the resurrection Jesus pledges and promises to all:

> What I was and did for you, what you already have and are in Me, shall and will, in the same divine power as that in which I was raised from the dead, be manifested and brought to light as the reality of your poor life, as your eternal life (IV/4,p.25).

6. Interim Comments

In conclusion, we have seen §59 interprets the resurrection in purely revelatory terms, with the incarnation as fulfilled in the cross as the locus of the event of reconciliation; §64 heightens this picture if anything, and yet at the same time begins to undermine the decisive significance of Easter by talk of anticipations - supremely in the transfiguration, but also elsewhere in Jesus' life and death - and by emphasising more clearly that it is not in the 'forty days' at all, but at Pentecost that the subjective awareness of the disciples takes effect; §69 continues the trend of §64, with a resulting narrowing of the gap between Barth and Bultmann on the theology of the resurrection, and in seeing creative power, ontic significance in man's noetic situation, his hearing or otherwise of revelation; and §75 continues the trends of IV/3, showing further the dominance of the concept of revelation. In sum, we must reject O'Collins' idea that in IV/1-4 the resurrection is seen as reconciliation: its role remains as revelation.

CHAPTER 8:

The Resurrection in C.D.IV/1-4: Discussion

THE RESURRECTION IN C.D.IV/1-4: DISCUSSION

I THE INTERPRETATION OF §59: SEQUENCE AND METHOD

1. The Interpretations

As the christological paragraph in *IV/1*, §59 to a considerable degree determines the course not only of *IV/1*, but because of the parallelism, *IV/2* and *IV/3* as well; furthermore, we have already seen in our analysis that the interpretation of this section - as person and work or as incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection - is at the centre of a controversy between Pannenberg and Klappert. It is for these reasons we concentrate first on this paragraph in our critical discussion of *IV/1-4*.

(i) Pannenberg

Pannenberg believes Barth has a fundamentally *incarnational* Christology. But is Klappert's assumption well-founded, that this interpretation is due to taking the three sub-sections of §59 in *C.D.* as referring successively to the incarnation, cross and resurrection? In introducing his discussion of the "reciprocal inter-relation" of these sub-sections, Klappert says:

> If one starts out from the standpoint of classical Christology, for which Christology and soteriology are oriented to the incarnation,...then the answer seems plain: The three sub-sections of the christological foundation in §59 of the doctrine of reconciliation deal successively with 1. the *incarnation* (The Way of the Son of God into the Far Country), 2. the *cross* (The Judge Judged in our Place), and 3. the *resurrection* (The Verdict of the Father) (*Auferweckung*, p.85).

Klappert accuses many, but especially Pannenberg, of this interpretation, citing the latter's comments that "Barth has once more developed the doctrine of atonement as the interpretation of the incarnation" (JGM,p.280), and that Barth doesn't base Christology on Jesus' resurrection because "for Barth, the doctrine of the incarnation takes the place of this foundation" (JGM,p.111). Klappert understands Pannenberg's assessment of Barth as meaning, Barth actualises, and thereby radicalises, but does not fundamentally abandon seventeenth century incarnational Christology constructed "from above to below" (Auferweckung,pp.87f.). But does Pannenberg make this alleged interpretation of §59 explicit? We follow first passages by Pannenberg that Klappert cites.

In his chapter on methodology in Christology in JGM, Pannenberg makes and defines a basic distinction - between proceeding "from above to below" and "from below to above": 'For Christology that begins "from above", from the divinity of Jesus, the concept of the incarnation stands in the centre', whereas "from below" Christology proceeds from the historical man Jesus, only arriving at the end with the incarnation (JGM,p.33). Characteristically "from above" Christology presupposes the Trinity, and asks: "How has the Second Person of the Trinity (the Logos) assumed a human nature?" (JGM,p.34). This procedure is followed especially by Barth, who "speaks about a 'history' of the incarnation: the Son of God goes into the Far Country, into humiliation, by becoming a man, uniting himself with the man Jesus

(C.D.,IV/1, §59). This connection means at the same time an inexpressible exaltation for the man Jesus to whose lot it fell C.D.IV/2, §64...)." This combination of the two natures with the two states brings Barth nearer than necessary for "from above" incarnational Christology to the pattern of the Gnostic redeemer myth - though Barth differs from Gnosticism in holding that Jesus redeems not himself but man; further Barth sees the humiliation of God as simultaneously the exaltation of man united to him, and conversely (JGM, pp.33f, tr.altered slightly).

As for the resurrection, citing IV/2,pp.122ff.,140ff., Pannenberg says, "according to Karl Barth, Jesus' resurrection is not a completely new event with its own decisive importance, but still only the 'revelation' of Jesus' history consummated on the cross". Pannenberg thinks Barth expressed this most clearly in R.II, where Jesus' resurrection is seen as 'non-historically' relating his whole historical life to its origin in God (R.II,p.195), and sees similarity in this earlier view to Bultmann's idea that the resurrection is only "the expression of the significance of the cross",[1] but moved, in C.D., against his earlier view (R.II) and against Bultmann in allowing the resurrection, as event of revelation, "to be a particular event in the temporal course of Jesus' history" (JGM,p.111). Nonetheless, Pannenberg thinks Barth only rejects Bultmann's tendency to replace the historical resurrection with other 'resurrections' (in faith, kerygma etc.) because it undermines "the basic fact of Christianity" - the resurrection: "Even Barth does not seem to find the ontic (or even ontological) foundation of Christology in the statement of Jesus' resurrection. Is this perhaps a consequence of the fact that for Barth, the doctrine of the incarnation takes the place of this foundation?" (JGM,p.111,n.126)

These passages in JGM make no reference to the successive sub-sections of §59 - indeed much of Pannenberg's critique here is based not on IV/1 at all, but on IV/2 and the essay on Bultmann. However, Pannenberg sees the concepts in II/2 and IV/1, "that Jesus is the one man who was rejected for our sake, and thus the one judged by God for our sake" not only as extending the dialectical idea of the cross expressing the God/world contrast, but as again developing "the doctrine of the atonement as interpretation of the incarnation, not of the historical life of Jesus" (JGM,p.280). Again, Pannenberg thinks Barth's "from above" incarnational Christology makes his account sound kenotic - though their different contexts separate Barth from kenoticism:

> Thus Barth knows of no temporal succession of the two "states" of humiliation and exaltation (C.D.IV/1,pp.132ff). As we have seen, Jesus' resurrection is only the "revelation" of his history, which was consummated on the cross (C.D.IV/2,pp.122ff.,140ff.). The exaltation of man occurs already through the incarnation; it is just hidden until the resurrection (JGM,p.313.n.86).

Apart from passages in JGM cited by Klappert,[2] we should note Pannenberg's positive appraisal of Barth's close correspondence of person and work as reflected by his cross-matching of the three offices with the two natures in IV/1-3, a correspondence Pannenberg adopts in his own way (JGM,p.209). (We should note, for the sake of clarity, Pannenberg assumes office and work are identical; our analysis dealt with them separately, but no doubt there is a close relation between them).

None of Pannenberg's other explicit citations of IV/1 in JGM (pp.155,383-386,264) add anything relevant to the picture, though we should note his criticism of Barth's "Alexandrian" "from above" Christology in IV/2 - i.e., "Alexandrian" in that Jesus' exaltation is that of all men on the basis that the incarnation means the assumption of the human as such and only as such becoming "the existence of a definite man as well". Pannenberg thinks that if Barth had reversed this - seeing God, through this one definite man, taking humanity generally into community with himself - he would have avoided weaknesses here, and maintained his Christocentric perspective more consistently (JGM,pp.348f.).

Outside JGM, Pannenberg has not referred much to the theme we are presently examining. In BQT I he thinks Barth's supratemporal (or pre-temporal) dimension to Christology leaves one still to suspect (despite 'the emphatic theology of the Incarnation') that even in C.D. the weakness of Barth's dialectical phase not to "take the Incarnation quite seriously" is continued (BQT I,p.41,n.73).

Since Klappert's book came out, Pannenberg has extended earlier arguments (JGM,p.127; RaH,pp.5f.) that Barth has inherited some Hegelian concepts (via Marheineke) noting here the "correspondence" (IV/1,p.203) to the history in which God is God, in his own inner life, i.e., reconciliation as the history based on the history in himself, as Trinity (GST II,pp.120f). Apart from such comments, the defence of his programme against Klappert's general attack in the postscript of 1975 to JGM (JGM,pp.400-404), and the defence and development of his "from below" methodology (GST II,pp.129-145), and his view that in Barth the significance of the resurrection is reduced to its value as revelation of Jesus' death and the history completed there (GST II,pp.146-159, esp.p.156), little more of relevance to our theme may be found.[3]

We can now conclude that Klappert has no basis in what Pannenberg actually says to foist on him the idea that his assessment of Barth is based on interpreting the three sub-sections of §59 as referring successively to incarnation, cross and resurrection.

We can also see that Pannenberg does, as Klappert says, attribute to Barth a "from above" method in Christology, and that this attribution, inter alia, has led Pannenberg to stress the incarnational aspect of Barth's Christology.

And thirdly, concerning Klappert's claim that Pannenberg wrongly attacks Barth's Christology for its alleged excessive incarnationalism, we have found two trends in Pannenberg's interpretation: on the one hand, he criticises the dominance of the incarnation in atonement, in that it usurps the role Pannenberg believes the resurrection should have - as foundation of Christology (cf. esp. JGM,p.313,n.86, cited above); on the other hand, he criticises the lack of truly incarnational thought in Barth, with christological statements being reduced to "primal history" or "suprahistory". In fact, without engaging in protracted interpretation of Barth, Pannenberg's critique is a little diffuse: what takes the 'rightful' place of the resurrection as foundation of Christology is sometimes the incarnation, sometimes the "history (of Jesus), which was consummated on the cross", and sometimes the suprahistorical "eternal history of God" (BST II,p.120,n.21). Certainly Klappert's picture of Pannenberg consistently seeing incarnation as supplanting resurrection as basis for Christology is not accurate. But is Pannenberg's critique actually incoherent? Trying to make sense of Pannenberg's various comments (without, I hope, reading in what is not genuinely there!) it seems he believes Barth's doctrine of atonement replaces the resurrection as basis for Christology with suprahistory, incarnation and history fulfilled in the cross: the first is its essential, or ontological basis in the eternal history of God in himself; the second is its realisation as event which itself is fulfilled as the third element here - the incarnation is actualised as history fulfilled in the cross, and is the historical or ontic basis of Barth's

Christology, which leaves the resurrection as the visible or noetic basis of this Christological foundation.

In sum: (1) Klappert rightly notes Pannenberg's assessment that Barth uses a "from above" methodology in Christology; (2) he rightly adds this has encouraged Pannenberg to stress the incarnational dimension of Barth's Christology; (3) however, he has exaggerated the importance of incarnation in Pannenberg's critique of Barth; in particular (4) Pannenberg nowhere explicitly or implicitly interprets the three sub-sections of §59 as referring to incarnation, cross and resurrection, respectively; because (5) Pannenberg recognises that Barth's doctrine of the incarnation is historicised - the incarnation is the expression of the history of Jesus fulfilled on the cross (thus Pannenberg has not taken incarnation and cross as successive events in Barth); yet (6) Pannenberg also criticises Barth's doctrine of the incarnation as de-historicised: so (7) if we have rightly interpreted Pannenberg, he sees Barth's Christology as founded "already" in non-historical eternity, though it is actualised in the incarnational history of the man Jesus, as fulfilled in his death, and then finally revealed in the resurrection - and this is at least close to Barth's own estimate! (cf. IV/2, pp. 31, 116).

(ii) Barth

We needn't speculate idly about Barth's possible reaction – we can move away from such "general" speculations to the "particular" impressions he actually had! In his letter to Pannenberg of 7.12.1964, Barth said:

> As I saw you busily rejecting M.Kähler on the first page (a rejection which made me suspicious of what was to come) the impression I immediately started with on reading your book was a fear that you too would think of following the way "from below to above" – and moreover with a particular determination and urgency in seeking out a "historical" Jesus (GA 6,S.281).

He thinks that Pannenberg's "below", his "historical" Jesus whose pre-Easter message and "devotion" to God are "confirmed through his resurrection from the dead", form a considerably weaker base than Vogel's – yet Vogel "got stuck" with his analysis of the below and never made it to the "above" to have been reached in volume 2 of his Christology which he never managed to write. Again Barth criticises Pannenberg for basing Christology on the historiographical resurrection, so tenuous, like building your house on the "quicksand" of the historiographical calculation of probabilities (GA 6,SS.281f.). Barth awaits a better "crossing of the way from above to below, from the particular to the general"; meanwhile however, since he feels Pannenberg's alternative method doesn't work, he can only see it as "reactionary", i.e., a reversion to 19th century ways of thinking (GA,6,SS.282f.).

In his reply of 9.5.1965, Pannenberg defends his approach as precisely not moving from the general to the particular, but starting with the "particularity...of the historical event of Jesus of Nazareth", otherwise he would start with some "general theological concept". He believes he must adopt a different attitude towards historical criticism, while agreeing with Barth in Barth's general attack on the theological historicism of a Troeltsch or a Harnack, and accepting Barth's orientation to Jesus Christ as the centre of theology (GA,6,SS.563f.).

From this interesting correspondence, we conclude that Barth explicitly rejected Pannenberg's "from below" christological methodology as building on "quicksand". Secondly, Barth wants Christology to move "from above to below" - though this means from the specific to the general (cf. the progression from §13.1 to §13.2, or the move from Jesus' specific obedience, exaltation, etc, to general human obedience, exaltation or whatever). Thirdly, Pannenberg differs from Barth in wanting to evaluate more positively historical criticism, and in not being so sceptical in relation towards the historiographical dimension of the resurrection.

(ii) Klappert

Klappert rejects Pannenberg's "from above"/"from below" division as inadequate. He maintains that not two, but,

> ...five main types of Christology can be distinguished: 1. Christology from above to below (incarnational Christology); 2. Christology remaining below (Jesuology of pure personality - F.Gogarten); 3. Christology from below to above (resurrection Christology - W.Pannenberg); 4. Christology simultaneously from above and below in the kerygma (Christology as proclamation of Christ - R.Bultmann, Essays Philosophical and Theological, pp.273ff., Faith and Understanding I, pp.116ff., 262ff.) or else in the keryqmatic encounter with Christ (O.Weber); Christology simultaneously from above and below in the history of the humiliation in the cross (K.Barth). [4]

Klappert cites IV/3, S.5 (=p.7) in support of his interpretation of Barth: "We are irresistibly compelled first to look and think from above to below, from God to man, but then also and with the same seriousness from below to above, from man to God". Klappert sees this as developing the movement of ideas already in the survey (§58) with the talk of reconciling God, reconciled man and mediator assuring unity of this "double movement" of reconciliation (cf. IV/1, p.122; p.90). According to Klappert, Barth's Christology sees this above and below together: "In other words: Barth is decisively concerned with the interwovenness (Ineinssetzung) of the person and work of Jesus Christ, of Christology and the doctrine of reconciliaton" (p.90).

Elsewhere in Auferweckung, Klappert discusses "The Correlation of the Event of Christ" - i.e., "the classificatory, directional and foundational cadence (Begründungsgefälle) of the three dimensions: Jesus' history, cross and resurrection". He discerns six possible christological models of correlation, and associates each with a particular theologian: (i) cross and resurrection subsumed under Jesus' ministry, with everything settled there (Marxsen); (2) cross subsumed under the correlation 'earthly Jesus-resurrection' (Pannenberg); (3) resurrection subsumed under the correlation 'earthly Jesus-cross' (Gogarten); (4) cross and resurrection are central, with the resurrection subsumed under the cross (Bultmann); (5) cross and resurrection are central, with the cross subsumed under the resurrection (Künneth); (6) cross and resurrection are indissolubly connected and reciprocally related to one another, with neither the resurrection nor the cross subsumed under the other, so this basic correlation of cross and resurrection forms the integral factor of Jesus' pre-Easter history, which itself is understood as prolepsis and anticipation of the cross and resurrection (Barth) (pp.34f.). Thus, according to Klappert, Barth alone (though with like-minded followers) does justice to the dimensions of the Christ-event, whereas his contemporaries all weaken one feature or two in favour of others (e.g., he accuses Pannenberg of not doing justice to the cross).

In his discussion of §59 of C.D., Klappert rejects the view that its three sub-sections refer successively to incarnation, cross and resurrection, and emphasises first the unity of person and work in Barth's Christology, setting this "over against functionalising and soteriologising the person in favour of the work", and "over against ontologising the person and thereby isolating the work" (p.90). Klappert sees the two natures implied from the atonement orientated to the cross, not conversely (pp.93f.), and notes similarly with Barth's cross-matched doctrines: "The interpenetration of Christology and the doctrine of atonement implies and interprets the doctrines of the two natures and the two states" (p.94). Now according to Klappert, Barth's innovation is not uniting person and work or historicising and actualising the incarnation as such; rather, his linking together of the two natures and the two states, etc., gains its rationale as unity of person and work in the history of atonement, a unity found in the unity of Jesus' cross and resurrection, which is as such the unity of Jesus' history, and thus of the incarnation (pp.96f.). Interpreters like Pannenberg, then, who see only actualised incarnational theology in Barth, are deficient because they ignore the significance of the unity of person and work. For Klappert, the unity of cross and resurrection (in Barth) is based on the unity of person and work. This unity is based on the unity of Jesus in his person and work as reconciling God and as reconciled man: this unity is event in the cross (p.98).

So in his discussion of the three sub-sections of §59, Klappert makes his interpretation clear:

> The recognition of the _esse_ in the _operari_ as the methodological consequence of the coinherence of person and work in taking up and considering N.T. functional Christology does not indeed mean the functionalisation of the person in favour of the work...but leads Barth...to...order the aspect of person before that of work within the history of the atonement in the cross, and does not let him distinguish in the reconciliation in the cross between what is at bottom a succession of incarnation-cross-resurrection which chronologises

> and historicises, but between the aspect of person (the subject of reconciliation), the aspect of work (the work of the reconciler) and the aspect of verdict (the resurrection as the judicial ratification). The contours of a Christology of the atonement orientated to the cross and the resurrection become evident by these means (pp.137f.).

Thus §§59.1, 59.2 and 59.3 refer successively, according to Klappert, to person, work and verdict. As he proceeds with his examination of §59, the various aspects of Klappert's interpretation we have mentioned are woven together. Thus he repeats that Barth's Christology does not move "from above to below" - Barth's Christology "is far from all speculatio maiestatis in the framework of a Christology from above (I/1,pp.188-198), and is characterised by an element of indirectness in consequence of the methodological principle of esse sequitur fieri" (p.152). Then he spells out the role of the cross - as interpretative framework for Jesus' history of humiliation, and thus of his divinity (pp.153f.) - and if this is so, Barth is constructing no "from above" incarnational Christology, but is talking of "a concept of God (in Jesus) gained primarily at the cross in its integral significance" (p.159).

Klappert pursues his theme to the end, defending Barth (as he sees him) against Barthian and non-Barthian alike. Thus, at one point he criticises Jüngel as unfaithful to Barth: while rightly understanding the integral significance of the cross in Barth, Jüngel wrongly sees the cross as 'retroactive' (and not, with Barth, as 'retrospective'), and this, says Klappert, brings him close to Pannenberg's retroactive resurrection theory, giving him also a "from below" Christology - the one difference being that Jüngel sees the retroaction in the cross, not (as with Pannenberg) in the resurrection. Thus:

> Jüngel's two ontic modes encompassed by the ontological *enhypostasis* (*Parrhesia*, pp.90f., n.27) matches Pannenberg's unity of the two complementary dimensions of Jesus' historical existence; the Pannenbergian thesis of the retroactive nature of the resurrection matches Jüngel's understanding of the integral nature of the cross (p.162).

So Jüngel (according to Klappert) holds a "Jesuology of the cross" (matching Pannenberg's "Jesuology of the resurrection") which - as with Pannenberg also - is not mitigated by a positive appraisal of Barth's doctrine of the Trinity (pp.162f.).

We can now discern Klappert's main arguments. (1) There are not two but five types of christological methodology: from above; remaining below, from below, from above and below in the *kerygma* (or *kerygmatic* encounter), and from above and below in the history of the Son of God in the cross. (2) Barth's methodology is the fifth of these, not the first. (3) In Barth's Christology, cross and resurrection are indissolubly connected and reciprocally related to one another without either being subsumed under the other, and they are the integral factor of Jesus' pre-Easter history which is their prolepsis and anticipation. (4) Pannenberg wrongly sees Barth's as a "from above" Christology, because he overvalues the incarnation in Barth. (5) This exaggeration is due to misreading §§59.1, 59.2 and 59.3 as referring successively to incarnation, cross and resurrection. However, (6) they refer successively to the aspects of person, work, and verdict (of the Father on the person and work of Christ). (7) Such paradox as there is in Barth's Christology is not (with Jüngel) an ontic, intra-divine paradox, but a noetic paradox - an existential and juridical paradox; there is no paradox at the heart of God himself, but only in our apprehension of his dealings with us.

(iv) A Note: English Assessments of Klappert's Work

Although Klappert's work has yet to be translated into English, his important contribution to christological debate in Germany has been recognised by some here. Gerald O'Collins is clearly influenced by especially Klappert's "models of correlation" (and we shall return to his work, later).

The surprising thing about Robert Ware's discussion of Klappert is that he largely defends Klappert's arguments in his 'theological' discussion, but at the end of his 'exegetical' studies on the resurrection, he concentrates on a psychological interpretation of this event as it impinges on Jesus' disciples.[5] He does criticise "Klappert's stodgy teutonic rhetoric" as an example of the "sea of jargon" of contemporary German theology, and sees his "rhetorical convolutions", as using German "word-building power...often at the expense of clarity"; but he believes Klappert's "intuitively perceived relationships" express "new and fundamental insights", especially in producing "a sound methodological edifice" valuable for "theological hermeneutic and understanding". Methodology, however, is where we challenge Klappert most strongly. Ware refers positively to Klappert's earlier essay in Diskussion um Kreuz und Auferstehung as showing the importance of different interpretative models in theology. Similarly, he endorses Klappert's "models of correlation", seeing, with Klappert, the "crucial importance of the teleological directedness, the irreversible 'baseline gradient' (Begründungsgefälle)[6] discerned in the historical unfolding itself of the Christ-event", which "establishes the irreducible unity of Barth's conception". And since history is not the basis of revelation, "Historical-critical explication thus comes to fruition in the 'theo-ontological' reflection on the integral reality of the person of Jesus Christ in his relationship to God" - so there is no historical Jesus without any dogmatic dimension: "Barth's intuitive recognition of this fact had a determining influence on the starting-point and method of his approach to Christology."

In his book Christ in Perspective in the Theology of Karl Barth, John Thompson[7] stoutly defends Barth, and largely accepts Klappert's interpretations (though, strangely, consistently misspells his name!). Thus he rejects Pannenberg's interpretation of Barth - though with the modification that Thompson only denies that the incarnation is Barth's christological starting-point; he allows (unlike Klappert) that "For Barth...the incarnation is certainly central"; like Klappert, he sees the cross as the starting-point (p.10; cf. pp.7-10). Again, while accepting the substance of Klappert's interpretation of Barth concerning the cross as expression of the unity of God and man in reconciliation and of the unity of person and work, i.e., that the two natures are implied from the atonement orientated to the cross and that they are integrally related to the two states (pp.10f), Thompson raises two important questions: how is the "non-incarnational" Barth of IV/1 related to the incarnational Barth of I/2? (Klappert doesn't answer, but Thompson thinks that despite the more traditional language of I/2 it shows a less well-developed version of what comes to fruition in IV/1-3) (p.12): and what is the role of the incarnation in Barth? (Thompson accepts Klappert's verdicts on Barth himself and on Pannenberg's interpretation of Barth, to the extent of similarly accusing Pannenberg of seeing §§59.1, 59.2 and 59.3 as referring successively to the incarnation, cross and resurrection; but he rightly criticises Klappert for implying the incarnation is excluded in Barth's picture - incarnation, and Jn.1:14 are important to Barth, and he explicitly does say 'the Way of the Son of God into the Far Country' is the incarnation) (pp.12f.). Apart from this element of criticism, however, Thompson does not recognise that these problems affect the whole of Klappert's argument; instead he largely accepts the rest of what Klappert says.

2. Methodological Implications

(i) "From above" Christology?

We recall Klappert sought to replace Pannenberg's "from above"/"from below" division by arguing there are five such approaches. Now his fourth and fifth approaches move "simultaneously from above and below" instancing Weber's Christology as one example of the fourth type. However, already in JGM, Pannenberg answered this point with respect to Weber's attempted via media in the "encounter with Christ": "the question remains whether in such an encounter one is concerned only with a man like other men, or at the same time and in a unique way, with God. The acuteness of the question as to the extent to which one has to do with God in Jesus cannot be avoided by means of the concept of encounter, which leaves everything unsettled" (JGM,p.33,n.42). So, to say encountering Christ and discovering him as Lord does not bypass the from above/from below distinction, for the question remains who is this Christ who is encountered: is he just a man, or also God? And if 'also God' then is this presumed from the outset ("from above") or only reached as a conclusion ("from below")? Klappert does note - but without comment! - this argument by Pannenberg (Auferweckung,p.4). But the question from Pannenberg's angle naturally emerges: who is the Jesus Christ whose history of humiliation in the cross is said to be the foundation of Christology? - is he only assumed to be a man at the outset of the enquiry, so that only as a conclusion of the investigation might it be discovered he is also God ("from below"); or is it assumed right at the outset that he is not only man but also God ("from above")? The first method is utterly alien to Barth : he has always been unmistakeably clear in his writing that Jesus' divinity must never be a deduction but always a presupposition of theology. So Barth is certainly, in Pannenberg's sense, adopting a "from above" christological methodology. Furthermore, Barth explicitly confirmed this in his correspondence with Pannenberg. Klappert's ascription to Barth of a "simultaneous from above and below" methodology is both faulty and an incoherent designation.

But can Klappert's account be so easily dismissed? One problem in concluding this is that we have so far been working on the basis of what the various writers have said. When we examine what they mean, their language, a different layer of confusion arises.

(ii) The Language of "From Above"

(a) The Usage of the Language

By "from above", etc., Pannenberg means method in Christology - the question of whether Jesus' divinity is presupposed at the outset of christological enquiry. This question remains whether terms like "encounter", "self-humiliation in the cross", etc., are used or not.

Pannenberg believes the above/below distinction involves not only methodological procedure but also starting-point in Christology: he talks of a Christology which "begins 'from above'", or of one " 'from below' rising from the historical Jesus", and which "arrives only at the end at the concept of the incarnation". Christology is thus a journey, with starting-point (below/above), travelling (rising/descending) and arrival (divinity of incarnate Jesus/humanity of Jesus).

In Barth, however, apart from his letter to Pannenberg, a different usage prevails. In IV/3 and the corresponding passage in §58 of IV/1, passages Klappert cites as the basis of his interpretation of Barth, Barth argues the "third theme" of IV/3 is that Jesus Christ, the Mediator, is the basis of unity for what has been discussed in IV/1 and IV/2, i.e., unity of both reconciling God and reconciled man. We look upwards and downwards from Christ and backwards to him (=IV/1 and IV/2), and thus "we can speak of Jesus Christ only as we consistently keep before us the one whole of the covenant between God and man fulfilled in him, and therefore of the above and the below" (IV/1,p.123). Barth speaks similarly in IV/3, and in this context of reconciliation sees this 'twofold movement': "we are irresistibly compelled first to look and think from above to below, from God to man, but then also and with the same seriousness from below to above, from man to God..in (this) twofold movement...we are dealing with the whole of the history in which God gives to man salvation but also causes man to give Him glory"

(IV/3,pp.6f., tr.altered slightly). In this context then, Barth is talking of the event of grace, and it is this grace, of the one Mediator Jesus Christ, which moves simultaneously from above and from below, i.e., as reconciling God and reconciled man, simultaneously in Christ's humiliation and exaltation. Equally clearly, Barth is not talking in this context about christological method. He is using the above/below language in a different sense to Pannenberg, as is demonstrated by a comparison with his letter to Pannenberg. For in that letter, in commenting on Pannenberg's book, he naturally uses the above/below language in the sense written in JGM and agrees that (in Pannenberg's sense) his Christology proceeds "from above to below". In contrast to this Pannenbergian context, in IV/1 and IV/3 Barth's talk of above and below relates not to christological method but to the event, or history, of grace as reconciling God and reconciled man in humiliation and exaltation. Nor does Barth's mention in this context of this above and below as "an important decision in relation to the form and method of the Christian doctrine of the atonement" (IV/1,p.123)change anything, since Barth is not talking here of Pannenbergian method - viz., progressing from A to B: Barth means that Christology is totally interwoven with soteriology (i.e., as Klappert rightly, on this point, interprets: the unity of person and work). If one wishes, with Klappert, to describe this as the grace of the Mediator "simultaneously from above and below" and even of Christology "simultaneously from above and below", great care must be taken to remember that the "above" and "below" are not methodological starting-points (as in Pannenberg) but dimensions of the event of grace.

To support his interpretation, Klappert also cites a passage in Barth with a different context (I/1,pp.188-198), assuming that Barth's use of the phrase "from above to below" and attack on speculatio maiestatis is intended in the Pannenbergian sense of the phrase and constitutes evidence that Barth is not pursuing "from above" Christology (in Pannenberg's sense). While the context reveals Barth uses the language in a different sense to that of IV/1 and IV/3, it is not the Pannenbergian, but a third sense here.

In I/1,pp.188-198, Barth is discussing the Welthaftigkeit, the "worldliness" (Thompson) or "secularity" (Bromiley) of the "mystery of God's speech" (in §5.4) - i.e., the ambiguity of God's speech in that Church preaching, Bible - even Jesus Christ himself, the historically "commonplace" and obscure "Rabbi of Nazareth" - are all capable of non-Christian interpretation. Thus God's self-presentation to the world is indirect, since it is in the sphere of the reality which opposes God and thus it is God's miraculous act, his mystery which is expressed incarnationally here in its "worldliness" (I/1,pp.188-192). Barth pursues these issues in a complex excursus dealing with Luther (and Calvin), Gogarten and Przywara. Luther (and Calvin) attack all speculatio maiestatis, since the Word of God is known only in the mystery of his humanity "in the manger at

Bethlehem and in the Virgin's lap" (Luther; quoted in I/1,p.193). In this context Barth returns to Gogarten's criticisms of Chr.D., namely his attack on Barth's alleged separation and isolation of "God in Himself" from "God for us" as a mistaken departure from starting in theology with the past incarnation of the Word. Barth sees in Gogarten's critique an implied reference to the Reformers' attack on speculatio maiestatis (I/1,p.194). Not that Barth rejects the Reformers' views, but that by abolishing the distinction "God in Himself"/"God for us" - and then also making the distinction, Barth had contradicted himself (i.e., because of the lack of a proper anthropology, and the - paradoxical - emphasis on "God Himself"). Barth accepts that in Chr.D. he was self-contradictory - but thinks Gogarten's solutions would worsen his account (I/1,p.195). He sees the incarnation not as a philosophical interpretative principle for dogmatics, but simply "the truth of a divine act", in which "God in Himself" and "God for us" must be differentiated - "in order to be related to one another". Barth will not abandon this differentiation, but sees the importance of relation: in any case, he holds on to the objective/subjective distinction here. In this context, Barth sees Przywara's critique of Chr.D. as a warning not to go further in Gogarten's direction. According to Przywara, Protestant liberalism with its "pantheistic correlation-theology" works "from below to above", with God reduced to the nature of man; however, Barth, with his "reduction" of everything to the "utterance" of revelation, with the incarnation as "but the concrete state of this event of revelation", simply reverses the process, working "from above to below", with man exalted to the nature of God. So Barth, wanting to avoid the dangers implicit in Przywara's critique, must avoid all correlation-theology, "i.e., a theology in which God in His relation to us swings up and down, either from below to above so that God becomes a predicate of man, or from above to below so that man would become a requisite in the nature of God" (I/1,p.196, tr.altered slightly). In this sense "in theology...we must speak of God in Himself" (I/1,p.197), i.e., in Himself, and not as predicate of man or with man as requisite. Now if speaking of "God in Himself" is already speculatio maiestatis, then Luther himself is also guilty of it, since he sees the Word in the beginning, with God, and who was God, as like a man's love filling him though not yet expressed, i.e., that God in his majesty "is pregnant with a Word or utterance" known only to him (I/1,p.197). Barth thinks Gogarten's identification of "God in Himself" and "God for us" is more likely to lead to infringing speculatio maiestatis, since it implicitly denies the indirectness of our knowledge of God, which is precisely what Luther set out to avoid (via humanity "in the manger at Bethlehem and in the Virgin's lap"). Thus Barth must move in the opposite direction to Gogarten to avoid material dangers in his Christology as warned by Przywara (I/1,p.198).

Having examined the context we can now see what Barth means, as well as what Klappert thinks he means.

Klappert hooks on to Barth's distance from speculatio maiestatis, his use of above/below language and his rejection of both "from above" and "from below", and believes he has evidence in support of his "simultaneously from above and below" interpretation of Barth, seeing this as an answer to Pannenberg. But Barth is not talking in this passage in I/1 about christological methodology: "from above to below" there means man exalted to the nature of God, i.e., man becoming "a requisite in the nature of God"; whereas "from below to above" means God reduced to the nature of man; i.e., God becoming "a predicate of man". The correlation-theology and its inverse, both of which Barth feels he must reject, have nothing to do with above/below language in Pannenberg's sense, and cannot be used as a response to Pannenberg's critique. In fact, Barth's talk here of "God in Himself" and "God for us" accords well with Pannenberg's assessment that Barth's Christology is from above (in his sense). (It is certainly not, however, even in this passage in I/1 in the sense used there, a "theology from below" , as a "Christocentric triumph" and "theology of the cross", as claimed by G.C.Berkouwer.[8] In view of Barth's rejection of correlation-theology "from below", this comment makes the obscure even more murky!).

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that, except in his letter to Pannenberg, where he takes up Pannenberg's terminology in Pannenberg's sense, Barth uses the above/below language differently to Pannenberg. In I/1 he understands by it God as a correlation of man and vice versa (and rejects both above and below approaches in this sense), whereas in IV/1 and IV/3 he uses the language to express God's grace as expressive of both reconciling God and reconciled man in the unity of the Mediator Jesus Christ (and accepts both above and below in this sense). In this latter sense Barth is talking not of 'starting-point' in methodology, but of material and lay-out of the content of Christology; Pannenberg may use the language with travelling metaphors; for Barth the metaphor is more of a picture or a building, with different materials worked together into the same artefact.

As for Klappert's use of the language; as a Barthian, he seems to use Barth's language more frequently, with his move from Barth's from above and below (IV/3, S.5) to emphasising the interwovenness of Christology and soteriology. His mistake is to understand Pannenberg's language as if it meant the same as Barth's, and to use Barthian contexts to answer him while misunderstanding him. Thus (1) in Pannenberg's sense, Barth's is a Christology "from above"; (2) Klappert's attempt to refute Pannenberg fails; (3) Barth's talk of "from above and below" in IV/1-3 means the event of grace in Christ; and (4) Klappert's book retains some value in expositing Barth - epecially in his emphasis on the unity of person and work in Barth's Christology.

(b) The Meaning of the Language

We have uncovered great confusion in the usage of above/below language. Is this metaphor intrinsically meaningless and confusing? Stephen Sykes has argued so. He sees Pannenberg's from above/from below distinction as problematic in its intelligibility. He wonders if theology of the resurrection is "from below" and whether Pannenberg's idea of God as "the power of the future" undermines the below/above distinction, and again whether Pannenberg's anthropological basis for some elements of this is suspect.[9]

In a letter, Sykes has furthered this attack: above/below language is confusion, and "in talking so, Pannenberg has done a great disservice to theology". It is not that the language is metaphorical, but its unacceptable connotations that Sykes attacks:

> The problem is that the metaphor gives rise to connotations which are false; specifically in this case the geographical/local metaphor of above/below implies that one "builds" from below or "reaches down" from above. This is nonsense. Literally, there can be no "reaching down" from above - which would be pure blasphemy; "doing theology from over God's shoulder". I can see no good grounds either for supposing that a building begun "from below" would ever "reach" the above. As far as the methodological question is concerned, the only important thing is to recognise that the idea of a "starting-point" is a metaphor which theologians can do without; it is part of the geographical/local imagery and is misleading.[10]

"Starting-points" mislead - since no argument has but one starting-point - even syllogisms have two.

It is important to recognise this argument goes beyond our own - criticising not merely the confusions in above/below language, but fundamentally doubting that there are such distinctions as "from above" or "from below" Christologies. It urges there is no such thing as _a_ starting-point in theology - above, below, or anywhere else - and sees Pannenberg as making a purely verbal distinction, with no basis in the reality of actual coherent theology: "I suspect that our theological thought _especially_ has literally dozens of basic impulses, which give it its characteristics. 'Starting-points' are a false simplification!" [11] However, the imposition of such a linguistic Occam's Razor is gratuitous: the distinction between Christology that deliberately presupposes Jesus' divinity and rejects all hypothetical writing without this presupposition, and Christology that deliberately presumes only his humanity, enquiring whether his divinity may be concluded from the historical evidence, is certainly clear, coherent and intelligible. Sykes has failed to see that the basis of Pannenberg's distinction is not whether humanity or divinity is the _exclusive_ starting-point in Christology, but whether one or other is an _inescapable_ starting-point in Christology. No doubt Pannenberg's theology has many "basic impulses" - but one such impulse is the decision not to presume Jesus' divinity as a _datum_ in his Christology, "at the outset". Similarly, Barth's theology naturally has many "basic impulses" - but one such impulse is the decision not to presume a hypothetical historical or only human Jesus, but only to take seriously Jesus who reveals himself as Son of God.

as the basis of Christology.

Thus Sykes' criticisms of the below/above language, like our own uncovering of confusions, renders the terminology of doubtful value, but the underlying reality, the coherent distinction in methodological archetype in Christology, is retained: there is a genuine distinction, which cannot be bypassed, between starting with Jesus' divinity or his humanity in Christology, between presupposing or rejecting his divinity as a datum of Christology - and the starting-point ("above" or below") is inescapable for Christology (even if it may be argued it is not exclusive). Thus whatever linguistic difficulties may remain for above/below language, an important distinction is made here which must not be brushed aside; if improvement is sought, to end confusion, then a different vocabulary is needed. This we shall attempt - in a broader context than Christology - at the close of this thesis (hinting at this at the end of this chapter).[12]

(iii) Models of Correlation

In his "models of correlation" Klappert argued that Barth did justice to Jesus' history, cross and resurrection - while many other theologians subsume one or other element under some other combination. Many of Klappert's best insights here have been used - and improved - by Gerald O'Collins, in The Easter Jesus and What Are They Saying about the Resurrection? In the latter, he talks favourably of Klappert's essay in his earlier (edited) work, Diskussion um Kreuz und Auferstehung and his (slightly different) models of cross and resurrection.[13] And in the The Easter Jesus, following Klappert, he says:

> Theologians...have exhibited a remarkable tendency to absorb the resurrection 'backwards' or 'forwards'. Consequently they have eroded the signficance of the resurrection by collapsing it into either the prior or the posterior Christological mysteries.[14]

It is absorbed by various theologians backwards - into the incarnation, the ministry or the crucifixion - or forwards - into present experience or the parousia. While this insight is illuminating - many theologians do collapse elements of the Christ-event into other elements - it has limitations. Most suspect is its over-tidiness - and in this regard, Klappert's account is far more dubious than O'Collins': many ascriptions don't fit, since the theologian is bigger than his pigeon-hole; further, the restriction to three dimensions all related to each other in different patterns is inadequate. This is clear on examining Klappert's comments on Marxsen - for Klappert has not distinguished between the incarnation and Jesus' ministry (unlike O'Collins). Klappert's two accounts of the first model of correlation (ascribed to Marxsen) variously describe it as subsuming cross and resurrection under Jesus' ministry, and a Jesuology of the incarnation (Auferweckung,pp.34, 381f.). Klappert's models have actually caused serious confusion here - for the mystery of the incarnation and the ministry of Jesus are not necessarily identical, even if in Barth's account in IV/1-3 the incarnation is actualised, and thus repeatedly talked of as Jesus' history. But if this is so, then Klappert is guilty of random selection in excluding the incarnation from the three dimensions of his "models of correlation" - indeed of "subsuming" the incarnation under the ministry, the "history" of Jesus. The error is particularly serious in that he seeks to defend Barth from Pannenberg's criticism that Barth had replaced the resurrection with the incarnation as ontic foundation of Christology. Klappert's models of correlation fail as a defence of Barth against Pannenberg's critique if they do not consider the relation of incarnation and resurrection. But this is just what they do.

While Klappert has ignored the role of the incarnation in Barth, and has misunderstood that §§59.1, 59.2 and 59.3 do refer, inter alia successively to incarnation, cross and resurrection, he has also failed to see that Barth's ontic/noetic distinction worked out in relation to the Christ-event means a subordination or "subsumption" of the resurrection under the cross, the incarnation and indeed election, in that everything decisive, ontologically and ontically, eternally and historically is determined already in election, incarnation and cross, and so the resurrection is but the revelation of this - in a peculiar Barthian sense "the noetic converse of the cross", as we shall see in part III.

(iv) Starting-Point and Dogmatics

Since we have seen theology does have "starting-points", and since the distinction between Christology presupposing or (as "starting-point") ignoring Jesus' divinity is valid, we now comment that Barth has consistently maintained that theology starts with Jesus Christ as he is attested in Holy Scripture - i.e., as the incarnate Word of God; so his christological method moves (in the Pannenbergian sense) "from above to below". To use O'Collins' and Klappert's language, we have also found that Barth absorbs the resurrection backwards into the formula "election - incarnation/cross."

Finally, if the above/below language be rejected, the distinction we discern here between Barthian and many other methodologies is that, broadly, between two different methodological archetypes in theology: dogmatics and apologetics. Barth's 'from above' methodology corresponds to his dogmatic approach (assuming the incarnation etc); Pannenberg's 'from below' methodology adopts a broadly apologetic approach (working from historical evidence towards christological construction). This basic distinction between Barth's methodology and that of many others arises again here as an important feature as at other points in our discussion of Barth.

II THE STRUCTURES IN BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION: CRITICAL DISCUSSION

1. Symphonic Variations

(i) A.B.Come: "a grand symphony"

Barth's Doctrine of Reconciliation is a symphonic masterpiece, a great work of architecture, a work of exceptional beauty, and yet also a labyrinth. Such at any rate, is the case according to his many interpreters. Thus, acording to T.F.Torrance, "we may compare (Barth's) theological thinking to the music of Beethoven with its breath-taking turns rather than to the predestined texture of Mozart's inimitable compositions"[15]

A.B.Come has commented on IV/1-3:

> The uniqueness of this twenty-five-hundred-page explication of reconciliation lies in the consummate achievement of a grand symphony in which all the diverse themes and melodies and counterpoint that had been experimented with across the years are now brought under perfect control of the master composer and unified into a harmonious whole of infinite complexity and subtlety..It does have a Thomistic flavour in that it seems to comprehend within it all possible positions and emphases and so is hard to pin down and grasp with any sharpness. [16]

Come discusses the "labyrinth" of the Dogmatics, its general outline, and its "inner architectonics", noting how its growth over the years had led to "a large number of interconnecting sub-structures". He notes the importance of the Trinity for the structure (Vols. III, IV and V), and (having already noted the importance of the three offices in IV/1-3) the role of the Trinity in IV/1-3. He notes the Trinitarian sub-sections (§§59.3: Father; §64.4: Son; §69.4: Spirit): "This would seem to imply an appropriation of the Priestly Office of Christ to the Father, and Kingly Office to the Son, and the Prophetic Office to the Holy Spirit".[17] Come comments on the consequently three-fold divisions of reconciliation sin and its results:

> All this makes for a certain beauty in the architectonics of the Dogmatics, especially if you like the number three. But this kind of schematization makes one nervous when he thinks there may be a fourth character of sin that is being totally overlooked.[18]

Come also criticises Barth's trinitarian schema in IV/1-3 as disguising the imbalance between IV/1-2 and IV/3, since the third dimension is not a material part of the doctrine.[19]

Come notes other patterns, too: God/fellowman/the created order/time (in III/2, III/3, and §65.2); and also Jesus Christ/community/individual (in chapter 7 of II/2, and §§61-63, 66-68, 71-73, in parallel across IV/1-3). This latter pattern Come sees as thematically useful to Barth as it ensures human works are only seen as human reflections of Christ's work, and because it means questions about man's subjectivity within salvation can be postponed till the end - and then treated cursorily!.[20]

To sum up, Come thinks: (1) the parallelism -

especially the over-use of the Trinitarian format - is over-tidy and is likely to entail there are major thematic omissions; (2) the cross-matching of the three offices with the Trinity in §§59.3, 64.4 and 69.4 implies assigning the priestly, kingly and prophetic offices to the Father, Son and Spirit, respectively; (3) the trinitarian parallelism disguises the secondary nature of the theme in _IV/3_ (as revelation of reconciliation, not reconciliation itself); and (4) the last three sections in each part-volume of _IV/1-3_ are designed so as to undervalue the role of "creaturely subjectivity" in reconciliation.

So if _IV/1-3_ are "a grand symphony" - or "music rather than argument" (Nicholls[21]) - Come believes that in these four ways the symphonic structure distorts the theme.

(ii) John D.Godsey: "beautiful architecture"

Like T.F.Torrance,[22], John Godsey notes how sometimes in the "architecture" in _C.D._ "the author's well-laid plans have often been altered by the hard demands of the Word of God",[23] and followed unpredicted paths (though not altering the general structure). When Godsey reaches his discussion of _IV/1-4_ he talks of "the unusually beautiful structure of the Doctrine of Reconciliation", [24] and makes nine observations: (1) the parallelism in the structural design of _IV/1-3_ shows great symmetry; (2) Barth interfuses the many doctrines, abandoning the _loci_ approach to dogmatics - especially (3) cross-matching the two natures and the two states (with the states simultaneous, not successive); (4) the priestly office is given precedence, as it is treated first - in IV/1; (5) sin is only discussed in the mirror of the sinless Christ; (6) the objective accomplishment and subjective appropriation of reconciliation correspond to the being and work of Christ and the Holy Spirit respectively; (7) within the subjective dimension, the community thematically, and thus materially has priority over the individual; (8) the discussion of baptism and eucharist in IV/4 shows they are interpreted ethically, not doctrinally within reconciliaton; and (9) the altered order of the Pauline triad to "faith, love and hope" is perhaps just "organisation tactics" - to lead naturally in the eschatological themes of Vol. V (as projected).[25]

If IV/1-4 is "beautiful architecture", then (for Godsey) it is not that of St. Albans Cathedral with its asymmetrical, conflicting Norman and Plantagenet styles, but more like the Anglican Cathedral in Liverpool - high, impressive, but much altered from the original conception and not finished according to the original plan. C.D. also has the gothic (or maybe rococo) flourishes here and there in its intricate sub-structures within its massive symmetry.

Barth himself was unnerved a little by Godsey's account: "Very good, but perhaps you have been more consistent than the work itself! I see more complexities - even contradictions! - in the Church Dogmatics. However the main lines are certainly correct"[26] So, analysts of Barth - be warned!

(iii) The Consensus: "magnificent symmetry"

The view of IV/1-3 as symmetrical, expressed by Come and Godsey, receives widespread support from interpreters of Barth. Colin Brown describes the "symmetrical pattern" of IV/1-3,[27] and Herbert Hartwell thinks its "magnificent symmetry" can be, in synopsis, appreciated if the contents of each part-volume are "placed side by side in columns", so the "mutual parallelism" and "uniform irreversible direction" of the sections can be seen.[28] Using Barth's survey paragraph (§58), Otto Weber makes such a synopsis,[29] as does Hans Küng, who, to re-use the musical metaphor, talks of the "brilliant systematic orchestration" of the doctrine of reconcilation [30]

(iv) Klappert and Pannenberg: "interwoven fabric"

Klappert stresses the unity of person and work in Barth's Christology, decribing the Ineinander and Ineinssetzung of person and work, of Christology and soteriology (which we have variously rendered interpenetration or coinherence and interwovenness or interfusion): the implication is that Barth's Christology is an interwoven fabric, with "ontologisation" of the person and "functionalisation" of the work equally avoided, since person and work are inextricably intertwined (Auferweckung,pp.89-92).

We remember Klappert sees in IV/1-3 not a merely actualised "from above" Christology (interpretation attributed to Pannenberg) but an integrated Christology of "differentiated interrelationships" of cross and resurrection (in the unity of person and work) proceeding "simultaneously from above and below". He relates this contrast of interpretation to the analyses of §59 as based on incarnation/cross/resurrection or person/work/ verdict patterns. Klappert does not imply a precedence of person over work or verdict, rather the interfusion of the two states and the two natures characterises Barth's christological union of person and work. He recognises more accurately than Pannenberg the subtle relation of work and offices in Barth, in not (as with Pannenberg) assuming identity, but seeing the latter as "deployment" of the former (Auferweckung,pp.95f, JGM,p.209).

The innovation in Klappert's account is not the simple pointing to the integration of person and work in Barth (Pannenberg noted this in Barth, as in modern dogmatics since Schleiermacher - JGM,pp.208f.), but his emphasis on the radical transformation of all christological themes Barth has effected by this integration. Many see this as Klappert's key insight - thus Falk Wagner, in 'Theologische Gleichschaltung', accepts Klappert's interpretation here, while arguing that for all this integration, in the interwoven fabric of the two natures, two states and three offices, Jesus' divinity and humanity are still interpreted by their difference:

"Therefore Christology is, as it were, to be comprised as the representation of the system of self-differentiation of christological self-assurance" [31]. So Klappert's contribution is to stress the far-reaching structural and thematic implications of the fundamental integratedness of person and work in Barth. Further, he believes that the person/work/verdict progression, which he detects in §59, does not entail giving priority to any aspect here or undermining the understanding of the fundamental unity of person and work - indeed it underlines it.

Klappert (and also Pannenberg) thus, in their own ways, support the consensus view of massive and fundamental symmetry in IV/1-3, finding this in Barth's integration of Christology and soteriology.

2. Symmetry?

Whether awed, or "nervous", like Come, the interpreters agree in seeing "grandiose symmetry" in IV/1-3. Certainly a glance at the table of contents will reveal parallelistic symmetry, and this impression is furthered by the design of the survey paragraph (§58), and especially the synopsis at the head of that section. However, the degree of symmetry is over-estimated, even if much parallelism and symmetry can be detected, which gives a certain coherence and aesthetic feeling of wholeness to IV/1-4. We must now demonstrate the degree of misinterpretation in the consensus appraisal of symmetry - so we recapitulate the architectonic themes with this in view.

(i) Doctrines of the Three Offices: Two Natures: Two States

Barth's rejection of atomistic loci as the way to express his dogmatics, and his decision to interrelate all themes so that each one has an integral relation to each other - a main cause of the great length of C.D. (Sykes[32]) - is accomplished most comprehensively in IV/1-4. Thus each part-volume treats not one part, but the whole from one angle, amalgamating aspects of doctrines together from this or that angle. Most fundamentally, in the determinative christological sections we find the three offices, two natures and two states interfused. Symmetrically, this could be described thus. In IV/1, Jesus Christ proves his true divinity in his humiliation and therein expresses his high-priestly office; in IV/2, Jesus Christ proves his true humanity in his exaltation and therein expresses his kingly office; and in IV/3, Jesus Christ proves his unity as God-man (unity of two natures) in his act as Guarantor and Witness of God in his humiliation and of men in his exaltation ('coincidence' - unity - of states) and therein expresses his prophetic office (Auferweckung,p.98 [33]).

Here, I believe, we have the clearest example of asymmetry in Barth's architectonics. To see this we pursue the architectonic use of the doctrines separately. We start with the three offices.

In _IV/1_ Barth considers the office of high-priest - briefly. In a few comments in §58 Barth mentions that Jesus is high-priest and that this office is related to the discussion of sin (pride) and justification (_IV/1_,pp.97,143,147), but his comments on pp.128ff. are most revealing. He discusses the three christological "aspects" of his interpretation, which will broaden out into three "perspectives" for understanding reconciliation. In discussing, first, Jesus as true God (_IV/1_,pp.128-130), he does _not_ mention his high-priestly office, but mentions instead his "bearing the judgment". When talking, secondly, of Jesus as true man (_IV/1_,pp.130-132), he does, in an excursus, mention his kingly office (_IV/1_,p.132), and he discusses the two states, saying that chapters XIV and XV deal respectively with "the high-priestly and the kingly office of Christ" (_IV/1_,p.135). But when, thirdly, he treats of Jesus' unity as God/man (_IV/1_,pp.135-138) and notes that no _material_ addition is made therein to the doctrine of reconciliation, he ends his discussion with extensive, heavy emphasis on Christ's prophetic office, for (he believes) this aspect has been under-emphasised, so he wants to "give due weight to the _munus propheticum_" (_IV/1_,pp.137f.). Already we can see that Barth intends priest, king and prophet to function parallelistically in §§59, 64 and 69, but he almost ignores the high-priestly office, submerging it under the preferred picture of Christ as Judge; does mention the kingly office; and very heavily emphasises the prophetic office (in the part-volume that doesn't add materially to reconciliation).

This picture is strongly confirmed by Barth's actual treatment in IV/1-3. In §59.2 Barth explicitly discusses Christ as high priest in only one passage (IV/1,pp.275-277), and here he disarmingly says, "Jesus Christ took our place as Judge. We can say the same thing in this way. He is the Priest who represented us" (IV/1,p.275), and his discussion of the hieratic aspect of Christ's work attempts to express this, concluding:

> In fact we can equally well describe the work of Jesus Christ as his high-priestly work as his juridical work, and we mean and say exactly the same thing. In both cases He takes the place of man, and takes from man an office which has to be filled but which man himself cannot fill...(IV/1,p.277).

It is, however, extemely doubtful that the two different images can mean "exactly the same thing", and Barth's own account shows this. Certainly, however, he believed he was excused further reflection in Christ's hieratic work in this context, and concentrated on his juridical work - hence the sub-section deals with "The Judge Judged in Our Place".

When we turn to §64.3, we find the munus regium does receive explicit and more sustained attention - hence its title is "The Royal Man".[34] Indeed the sub-section is quite clearly dominated by the theme. Thus God is the King and Lord who reconciles "in the form of this man" Jesus - hence the parallels "Behold the man!" and "Behold your king!" in Jn.19:5&14 (IV/2,p.155). Barth finds this 'royal man' theme in the Synoptics, and his examination concentrates on their witness, starting from their "'Truly this man was the Son of God' (Mk.15:39)" (IV/2,p.156). Further, the munus regium is mentioned occasionally elsewhere in IV/2 (pp.291f.,297,316,352,518, and 690). So unlike the scanty treatment of high-priest in §59.2, 64.3 is dominated by the discussion of Jesus as King, as the regal language of that sub-section can be detected outside that sub-section as well.

The picture in IV/3 is very different: the whole part-volume seems to be nothing other than a 942-page exposition of the munus propheticum! This is already admitted in the preface (IV/3,p.x). Not just §69.3, but all four christological sub-sections are suffused with Barth's exposition of Christ's prophetic office. §69.1 shows that the munus duplex related to the material content of reconciliation (IV/3,p.6) and is thus valid, but that there is a third problem of the doctrine of reconciliation, namely its self-revelation, i.e., Christ's prophetic office - and therein lies the validity of the munus triplex (IV/3,p.10). This sub-section pursues the theme of Christ's prophetic office historically i.e., discusses eras when the munus propheticum was undervalued, or properly discovered. He sees the Reformers - especially Calvin - as re-discovering Christ's prophetic office, and this discovery being worked out in practice in mission - in the modern missionary movement. (Interesting as it is, the argument of this excursus is suspect in that the link between the 200-year old protestant missionary movement and the impact of Calvin's ideas is tenuous - due to the delayed impact! The significance of Christ's prophetic ministry for world mission was not realised by Calvin or his followers. Further, there was a dubious world mission at the time of the Reformation - that of the conquistadores - but that was not linked to any of Calvin's discoveries. Barth notes both facts, but is reluctant to conclude the modern era might have understood the munus propheticum better than Calvin!) Barth's explicit exposition of the munus propheticum as revelation and thus the making-known of the gospel - witness, mission and evangelism - helps us see when these themes emerge later, we are still in the sphere of Christ's prophetic office, and what that implies for the community and the individual.

The other christological sub-sections explore extensively various features of Christ's prophetic office. §69.2 deals, within the context of Jesus as the "light of life", with Jesus as a prophet sui generis (IV/3,pp.48-65), such that only in its unity as an entire Old Testament does all that has gone before Christ compare with him in its prophetic dimension (pp.65-72). Jesus is light, revelation, glory (doxa - always signifying revelation in Barth) which means his prophetic office (IV/3,p.72) - so Barth discusses his "right" for saying this (IV/3,p.72-86). He completes the discussion by emphasising Jesus as the light of life, even in the midst of other possible lights, i.e., the relation of revelation in Christ to other lights, other words, other prophecies and prophets (IV/3,pp.86-165). Similarly, §69.3 is conceived as "a narration of the prophetic work of Jesus Christ" under the rubric "Jesus is Victor" (IV/3,p.168). So while §69.2 concentrated on the person of Jesus ("the light of life") as expression of the prophetic office, §69.3 focuses on Christ's being and act (in which he enlightens and enlivens the world) in Christ's bearing and discharge of his prophetic office (IV/3,p.281).

The rest of IV/3 is also strongly coloured by the munus propheticum. Thus sin in §70 (falsehood) is opposition to revelation, to Christ's prophetic office (cf. IV/3,p.374); grace in §71 (vocation) opens with "man in the light of life" (cf.IV/3,pp.481,613f.); the community in §72 expresses its ministry of witness as "a prophetic action" (cf. IV/3,p.895); and the individual 'virtue' in §73 (hope) is a life lived in the midst of the continuing, but "not yet completed" prophetic work of Christ (cf.IV/3,pp.903,941). Elsewhere in §73 Barth even says, "We have now come to the end of this third part of the doctrine of reconciliation. We have been treating of the prophetic office and work of Jesus Christ, of its nature and execution" (IV/3, p.902).[35]

From this examination, we can now conclude that there is an element of parallelism of the three offices in IV/1-3, especially in §§59.2, 64.3, 69.3. But whereas in Chapter XIV Christ as high-priest is mentioned in but one short two-page discussion, in Chapter XV, §64.3 is devoted to Christ as King, and not just §69.3 but all Chapter XVI, and especially all of §69 is devoted to Christ as prophet. However, simply to describe this parallelism is to show how grossly asymmetrical it all is, with variations from the utterly peripheral via the modest to the utterly dominating. This asymmetry is not due simply to any supposed growing appreciation of the role of the three offices, since it is just as clear in nuce in §58.4: Barth's asymmetrical parallelism here is not an ad hoc but a necessary development of the inherent significance of the three themes which he already believed in from the start.

The main reason for the asymmetry is not the virtual abandonment of the high-priestly office, in deference to juridical language (since Barth thinks his juridical picture is esentially identical to the hieratic, and in material terms the balance between the juridical and regal pictures in IV/1 and IV/2 is evenly balanced); rather, it is that the prophetic office utterly dominates IV/3 in a way without parallel in IV/1 and IV/2. When we see how Barth has related the three offices to the two states and two natures we can see where the massive imbalance arises. Put simply, IV/3 is one-sided because "three" into "two" won't go! More specifically, with the two states and the two natures the "third" treatment can only recapitulate the first two, whereas with the three offices, the third theme is genuinely new. Further, this imbalance suits Barth: since he has no new material to cover (vis à vis states and natures), by conceiving Christ's prophetic office as a function of revelation, he can devote a whole part-volume (and the largest of *C.D.*!) to revelation. The imbalance is deliberate, and the choice to devote the part-volume to *prophecy* (i.e., revelation) is deliberate (altering Calvin's and Schleiermacher's ordering of the offices). Further, inasmuch as the natures and states are discussed in *IV/3* (in terms of their unity, and their coincidence), Barth can see *revelation* as the principle of their unity. All this helps to emphasise the dominance of revelation not only in *IV/3*, but in Barth's theology generally. Dubiously, we might express the structure algebraically:

1. Nature X/State Y: Office A;
2. Nature not-X/State not-Y: Office B;
3. Union of X and non-X/
   Union of Y and non-Y
   (=self revelation of
   reconciliation): Office C
   (=revelation).

Apart from Office C (prophetic office) there is no new material. Even the theme of *unity* and of the Mediator is largely anticipated in *IV/1* and *IV/2*. Barth's cross-matching of the three separate doctrines has the deliberately intended effect of massively inflating the significance of revelation in reconciliation, both in terms of sheer volume of treatment, and in terms of its interpretative significance.

(ii) Doctrines of Person and Work

Our examination in chapter 7 of Klappert's person/work/verdict pattern, and the incarnation/cross/resurrection pattern he ascribed to Pannenberg in the interpretation of §59, coupled with a look at §§64 and 69 led us to conclude that it was a mistake to conclude (as Klappert does) that these are mutually exclusive. To the contrary, we found elements of both patterns - though the weakest element in Klappert's person/work/verdict scheme (which we investigate first) is his appellation of verdict to §59.3. Certainly verdict is discussed in "The Verdict of the Father", just as person and work are discussed in the previous two sub-sections. But in IV/3 a clear parallel of the person/work pattern emerges in §§69.2 and 69.3, and a case may be made for a similar if more implicit parallel in §§64.2 and 64.3 in IV/2. But the theme of "verdict" does not arise at all in §§64.4 and 69.4. Since Barth's parallelism is deliberate, we should be suspicious that the theme following person and work is verdict. Our suspicions increase when we are reminded that Barth uses juridical language (instead of hieratic) in §59 and IV/1 generally. Juridical language of "substitution" (or "exchange" or "change of places"[36]) and of the "Judge judged in our place" displaces hieratic expressions. Maybe Christ as the high priest who offers the sacrifice of his passion and death did not emphasise enough for Barth the pro nobis, the Platzwechsel between Christ and us, and on that account he preferred legal images. For whatever reason, Barth has preferred juridical language and consequently speaks juridically in the next sub-section of the Father's Verdict. Since verdict has this role in §59 - and even that role depends on the displacement of the munus sacerdotale by juridical language - we need hardly be surprised to find no parallels in §§64.4 and 69.4.

The conclusion of weakness in Klappert's "verdict" appellation does not entail rejection of the person/work schema in the appropriate sub-sections. Although never dominant, person and work are clearly stated as thematic for §§59.1 and 69.2 (person) and §§59.2 and 69.3 (work); and even in IV/2 the same picture emerges implicitly, for the division is between the exaltation of Jesus in his person (vis à vis election, incarnation and resurrection) (in §64.2), and Jesus' history, his work as royal man (in §64.3). The person/work pattern remains, and to that extent, Klappert is right, even if there is an element of asymmetry or disproportion of treatment - for this imbalance is not great and need not be over-emphasised, even if it should not be under-estimated.

But what of the final sub-sections? Barth says they are the "transitional discussions" - concerning how what is done first and foremost in Christ also touches and transforms the anthropological and pneumatological spheres. This transformation is by the revelatory power of the resurrection (or of the Spirit) in all three transitional discussions. Not that the pattern is a conglomerate person/work/resurrection progression! Rather the picture is of person/work/transition, or, to follow Klappert's insight into the interwovenness of person and work, the picture is of the _person_ who works for us/the person who _works_ for us/the person who works _for us_.

(iii) Doctrines of Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection

In our analysis we showed how the three sub-sections of §59 do refer sucessively to incarnation, cross and resurrection. The way into the far country _is_ the incarnation (_IV/1_,p.211); the work aspect, Jesus' history, does not exclude but is exemplified by his way to the cross - for the cross _fulfils_ the incarnation, fulfils Jesus' self-humiliation as he, the Judge, is judged (_IV/1_,pp.177,293); and the transition to our sphere is made in the revelatory power of the resurrection, as we have seen.

The same pattern emerges - though more ambiguously - in §64, in that in §64.2 the incarnation is at the centre, in §64.3 the cross, and in §64.4, the resurrection is a very significant element - yet the pattern is disrupted somewhat by §64.2, since the resurrection is already treated alongside the incarnation there. Again in §64.3 the cross is only one theme alongside Jesus' miracles, etc., and in §64.4 the resurrection-event gives way to the theme "Jesus lives - and I with Him". But for all that, the imbalance of the parallel between §§59 and 64 should not be exaggerated: the incarnation is still the main theme in §64.2 (IV/2,pp.116f.); the cross is the determinative climax of §64.3, determining the whole of Jesus' existence and activity as discussed in the sub-section (IV/2,p.249); and the "Jesus lives - and I with Him" for Barth still means the power of the resurrection (IV/2,p.265). Thus in §64 the incarnation/cross/resurrection pattern remains intact, even if its parallel with §59 is not symmetrical.

A different ambiguity in the symmetry of the incarnation/cross/resurrection pattern emerges in IV/3: imbalance within §69. In §69.2, despite frequent quotation of Jn.1:1-18 - esp. v.14, the incarnation is no longer the central theme, but one theme among others. In §69.3, the treatment of the cross is very implicit: even though Barth discusses Jesus' victory over evil, darkness, etc., he rarely mentions the cross here. However, in §69.4 we read a very thorough discussion of the resurrection (or else the parousia) in its three-fold form as in the forty days (past), in the Spirit (present), and in the eschaton (future). The discussion of the resurrection in §69 (so understood) is as extensive as that in §59.

The symmetrical ambiguity of §69 may, in the end, be due to the special thematic considerations of IV/3 which we noticed, in connection with the prophetic office: in IV/3 Barth is concerned with revelation, and revelation alone is his leitmotiv; but Barth associates the resurrection closely with revelation - so maybe the partial eclipse of incarnation and cross and the brilliance of the resurrection in §69 are also due to the submerging of all themes, despite his parallel, to the munus propheticum (i.e., revelation).

Another significant feature of Barth's architectonic treatment of incarnation, cross and resurrection (and election) is Barth's three different patterns of presupposition and fulfilment:

(1) The idea of election as presupposition, and incarnation as fulfilment, is the most closely argued - in §64.2 on exaltation. In this context, election functions as extra-historical presupposition of exaltation, whereas incarnation - here theological shorthand for Jesus' history fulfilled in the cross (integration of person and work) - means historical fulfilment of exaltation.

(2) In the first two main sub-sections of §§59, 64 and 69 - but especially in §§59.1 and 59.2 - we find complementary treatments of incarnation as presupposition and cross as fulfilment of Christ's being and history, his person and work - a pattern often implicit and occasionally explicit (eg. IV/1,p.177). In this context things are not very different from the first pair; we have not an extra-historical but an ontological presupposition and an ontic fulfilment.

(3) Again in §59, (and also §§64 and 69), we can discern a model of incarnation and cross as presupposition, and resurrection as fulfilment: here we have the move from incarnational history in the life and death of Christ to man - via the revelatory power of the resurrection, for the resurrection is a purely revelatory fulfilment. In this progression we deal with an ontological/ontic presupposition and a noetic fulfilment (less inelegantly, a presuppostion of being and a fulfilment of knowing).

In discussing the architectonics of these patterns, it would be to miss the point to focus on any elements of tension or antinomy here. However, we do note that of the four elements, election is least discussed - even in §64.2. The reason, as Barth tells us (IV/2,p.31), is because he presumes II/2 throughout his discussion. Barth sees ontological, ontic and noetic dimensions to reconciliation expressed in various presupposition and fulfilment patterns between election, incarnation, cross and resurrection. [37]

We sum up. (1) the incarnation/cross/resurrection pattern is discernible in the progression of all three christological paragraphs. (2) There is asymmetrical parallelism between IV/1 and IV/2; (3) The themes are unbalanced in IV/3, with a predominance of the revelatory aspect, resurrection, and a corresponding submergence of the material aspects, incarnation and cross. (4) The structural setting for discussion of the resurrection is in the transitional sub-section, and the disruption of this pattern in IV/2 with this theme anticipated in §64.2 accounts for the relative thinness of its treatment in §64.4. (5) Various patterns of presupposition and fulfilment express the ontological, ontic and noetic dimensions of reconciliation vis à vis election, incarnation, cross and resurrection.

(iv) Doctrine of the Trinity

Various trinitarian structures may be discerned in C.D. The basic progression through creation, reconciliation and redemption in volumes III to V is not unconnected to Father, Son and Holy Spirit - though Barth urges that the Trinity is not actually an "organising and controlling centre": opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa (I /2,pp.878f.). A vaguely discernible trinitarian progression through the three main sub-sections of each of the christological paragaphs may also be intended: certainly the "transitional" sub-sections lead us into the work of the Holy Spirit (esp. §69.4); the sub-sections immediately prior tend to focus on the work of Christ, the Son of God and Son of Man, which reaches its climax in the cross, and the first main sub-section tends to deal with the basis of the theme in the decision of God and his covenant; though maybe this progression should not be seen as architectonically intended. The main focus of trinitarian structures comes in the "transitional discussions": §59.3 "Verdict of the Father", §64.4 "Direction of the Son"; and §69.4 "Promise of the Spirit". Here, two types of difficulty emerge: contradiction between §59.3 and §64.4, and imbalance between both of these and §69.4.

In §59.3 in IV/1, Barth says the resurrection is the exclusive act of God; but in §64.4 in IV/2 he speaks strongly of Jesus' self-attestation in the miracle: this tension is intolerable, and apparently leads Barth into self-contradiction. Is Barth defensible?

(1) In Chapter 7 we already noted an element of continuity here with Barth's doctrine of the Trinity in I/1. Does pointing to IV/1 as focusing on the Father as Revealer (the one who, without help from man, initiates the revelation in the resurrection) and to IV/2 as focusing on the Son as Revelation (the one who reveals himself in the resurrection) (cf. esp. I/1,p.415) help? On examination, this defence of Barth turns out to be a variant of the second defence - Jesus' resurrection as his act as Son of God. But it raises again the question of continuity between I/1 and IV/1-3. In I/1 Barth associates the Father as Revealer with Good Friday and veiling; the Son as Revelation with Easter and unveiling; and the Spirit as revealedness with Pentecost and impartation (I/1,pp.382,415,430,437). According to John Macquarrie the at first sight questionable attributions of Good Friday to the Father and Easter to the Son (when one might expect the opposite) has a certain justification in that to reverse the attribution implies a divine veto on Good Friday, a deus ex machina, a cosmic

conjuring trick; whereas more profoundly on the cross we see "the metaphysical darkness surrounding the hiddenness of God" disclosing God's love for and self-involvement with man, and at Easter, we see out of the agony of Good Friday, "the Son has emerged as the living centre of a new life and new hope for all mankind".[38] Macquarrie is right here - indeed Barth intended this in the sense Macquarrie discerns, as his language of veiling (on Good Friday) and unveiling (at Easter) shows. But in IV/1-2 Barth talks of both Father and Son involved in both Good Friday and Easter, and while G.C.Berkouwer has complained of theopaschitism implied in Barth's talk of the Father's role in Good Friday,[39] much of the talk of Good Friday as veiling has gone, and with his talk of the Father's exclusive role (§59) predominating over against the Son's role (§64), if anything Barth now associates the Father primarily with Easter (Verdict) and the Son with Good Friday (Platzwechsel), making precisely the reversal Macquarrie warns against. It is certain at least that IV/1 shows radical change on this score from I/1 and that attempts to defend Barth in IV/1-2 by referring to the earlier account need to take into account these important changes within the continuity.

(2) Can Barth be defended by seeing the resurrection in IV/1 as God's exclusive act and in IV/2 as Jesus' act only in respect of his divinity? This apparent solution, explicit in Barth's thinking (IV/2,pp.295f.), is unacceptable for two reasons. First, in §64 Barth is concerned with the exaltation of man - thus if his

resurrection has nothing to do with the exaltation of this _humanity_ and of our human essence, then the whole programme of §64 fails. But this is exactly the implication of seeing his resurrection as the act only of him in respect of his divinity. And secondly, not only is there a doubtful coherence to the idea of an act of Christ solely in respect of one nature only, such thinking tears the unity of Jesus as the God-man: the two natures must cohere in the unity of Jesus Christ. Thus, even if Barth wanted to avoid specifically Lutheran interpretations of the _communio naturarum_ and the _communicatio idiomatum_, he does accept that there is an impartation of the divine nature to the human nature in Jesus and a reception of the human nature by the divine nature (_IV/2_,pp.73-116). This second "defence" of Barth is unacceptable.

(3) Does seeing _IV/1_ as concerning the resurrection-event, but _IV/2_ Christ's ongoing risenness extricate Barth from the contradiction? This solution proposes a chronological division of the resurrection: the Father active on Easter Day, the Son active in the 'forty days' and the Spirit active (as power of the resurrection) since Pentecost. Maybe this is the most fruitful defence of Barth - but is also dubious: can the resurrection be so divided? and what of the _opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa_? This third "defence" is at least as dubious as the contradiction it seeks to remove. So there is nothing for it but to conclude that Barth's parallel between §§59.3 and 64.4 hides a profound

self-contradiction regarding the trinitarian interpretation of the resurrection.

We move on to the question of imbalance between §§59.3 & 64.4 and §69.4. Two features contribute to this imbalance: considering IV/1-2 as materially significant, but IV/3 as mere revelation (the imbalance due to Barth's basic decision to crossmatch the offices, natures and states); and discussing the resurrection in IV/1-2 but only the 'power of the resurrection', i.e., effectively since Pentecost in IV/3. Both features arise for theological reasons - the tremendous significance of revelation, and Barth's talk, going back as far as R.I, of the resurrection as power of God and more specifically in R.II of the Holy Spirit as the power of the resurrection (R.I,pp.34f, R.II,pp.30,159, 295). But if §§59.3 and 64.4 deal with Easter and §69.4 primarily with Pentecost, we see the form of the imbalance; and if we recall that whereas §59.3 deals with resurrection as event, as §64.4 focuses on resurrection as ongoing, §69.4 is concerned with revelation of the resurrection, more precisely of its ongoing character, then we see the material content of the imbalance. The structural ambiguities lead to a disguising of several features of Barth's trinitarian interpretation of the resurrection: (1) there appears no explicit discussion of the role of the Spirit in relation to the resurrection event or the resurrection appearances - this is peculiar in a part-volume on revelation and in a sub-section on the Spirit's role in the resurrection, unless Barth really thinks the Spirit has no role prior to Pentecost (cf. his Lucan chronology again); (2) the relation of the Father and the Son to the era of the community, the 'time of the Spirit' is not spelt out; (3) the relation of all three persons to the _eschaton_ remains unexplored; and (4) the relation between the period of Easter event and appearances to the age of the community is left unclear - and in view of Barth's problematic absorption of Lucan chronology, to understand these mysteries, his interpretation (or lack of it!) is particularly vulnerable here; (5) the duplication of structures, whereby the final christological sub-section deals with revelation and the final doctrinal part-volume deals with revelation, leaves Barth facing as the task for discussion in §69.4, revelation of the material covered in §§59.3 and 64.4 - i.e., revelation of revelation - an excess even by Barth's standards! He can have nothing new to say on resurrection as revelation - hence the drift into discussing the Spirit and the _eschaton_ as revelation in §69.4. (Of course one could speculate as to whether 4000-5000 pages on _The Doctrine of Redemption_ would have answered any of these questions; but Barth can only be judged on what he actually wrote!).

According to A.B.Come it is Barth's _trinitarian_ structures that lead to his widespread three-fold structures in _IV/1-3_ leading Come to be "nervous" about possible omissions. Certainly Barth's architectonic principles have led to a constriction in relation to the material: we note, for example, that Barth had originally planned in IV/1-3 (or in IV/3?) to deal with man's "calling, justification, sanctification and perseverance" (I/2,p.882, my emphasis), but his three-fold structures lead to him collapsing this theme of perseverance into that of calling (i.e., §71.5: "The Christian in Affliction"). So Come is right, we have evidence of a "fourth character " in the life of man reconciled by Christ, which is suppressed, or compressed into the third character, for architectonic needs. However, we have seen that the main reason for Barth's three-fold division of IV/1-3 arises from his fundamental decision to coalesce the offices, natures and states, whereas the Trinity, although fitting also into a three-fold structure (naturally!), is not the basis of the three-way division: Come has over-estimated the trinitiarian aspect of the architectonics of IV/1-3.

In this context we note a weakness in Jüngel's defence of the ontological dimension to Barth's theology over against Marquardt's anti-ontological attack on Jüngel's interpretation, asserting instead that Barth's theology be interpreted socio-politically as praxis. Jüngel correctly notes that Barth expressly says that in the "transitional discussion", we are discussing an "ontological connexion between the man Jesus on the one side, and all other men on the other" (IV/2,p.275), but thinks that the trinitarian dimension of these sub-sections justifies our concluding that we have ontology founded by Barth on theology of the Trinity, so that this makes Barth's assertion meaningful that "this ontological connexion is the legal basis of the kerygma" (IV/2,p.275). [40] Since the primary basis of the three-fold discussion of this ontological basis in §§59.3, 64.4 and 69.4 is not so much the Trinity as the three offices, this throws a dubious light on Jüngel's argument, as does the fact that the Trinity is not discussed in the context Jüngel cites - instead Barth speaks of the "objective basis of our sanctification" in Jesus Christ, with benefits accruing from the reconciliation with its revelation in the cross and resurrection (IV/2,p.274). But the main weakness in Jüngel's point (as in Marquardt's) here is his assumption that the ontological dimension of Barth's dogmatics and its socio-political dimension are mutually exclusive. Instead we should acknowledge Klappert's basic insight concerning the interfusion of person and work, Christology and soteriology, and indeed ontological and socio-political dimension in IV/1-3: Marquardt and Jüngel mistakenly oppose supposedly conflicting elements that are unified in Barth - as Klappert has implicitly seen.

In sum, while it is not trinitarian dimensions but the doctrine of three offices that is primarily responsible for the three-based parallelism, the trinitarian aspect of the "transitional discussion" is also implicated in the asymmetrical parallelism here, which is visible in the contradiction between exclusiveness and non-exclusiveness in §§59.3 and 64.4 and the material imbalance between these two sub-sections and §69.4 -

leading to obscurities in understanding the interrelations of Spirit and resurrection, Trinity and eschaton, and Father and Son and era of the community.

(v) Prodigal Son Typology

The imbalance and symmetry we have discovered underlying Barth's structural parallelism applies to his use of prodigal son typology also. The theme is explicit in the titles of §§59.1 and 64.2; its use is explicitly referred to occasionally in IV/1; Barth examines this typology much more closely in IV/2; however, in IV/3 there is no reference at all to the prodigal son understood as christological typology, since the single reference to the parable (IV/3,p.572) has nothing to do with the history of Jesus, but is part of Barth's polemic against basing theology on religious experience. Here we have another example of the distortions in Barth's synthetic and misleading parallelism, for the parable as used in IV/1-2 relates most clearly to the states of humiliation (far country) and exaltation (homecoming), and since IV/3 has the thin theme of 'coincidence of states' the parable proves unusable in this connexion: prodigal son typology is another victim of Barth's determination to devote a whole part-volume to revelation by means of the three offices matched with the two natures and two states while trying to simulate parallelism between fundamentally asymmetrical themes.

3. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Barth's Architectonics

(i) Triadic Structures

Our examination shows how Come's criticism is right: Barth's triadic structures disguise the fundamental difference between the material (IV/1-2) and subsidiary (IV/3) part-volumes. His assumption that this is due to trinitarianism or fixation with triadic structures is only partially true: while both features are much in evidence elsewhere, the primary basis of the triadic form of IV/1-3 is the use of the doctrine of three offices, and the primary basis of the radical confusion and obscuring of differences between material and revelatory aspects of reconciliation is the intertwining of the offices with the two natures and states.

Barth is left with nothing to say except to talk of revelation, in IV/3. The theme of the Mediator, the God-man is already discussed in IV/2,pp.96ff., and indeed in IV/1, in connexion with the high-priestly office in the one mention of that office in §59: maybe the context of Christ's high-priestly office is a more appropriate context to focus on Christ as Mediator. The theme of the coincidence of states is similarly anticipated - in IV/2,p.292. In IV/3, Barth has nothing left to say - except revelation. Consequently we are left with 942 pages on the theme of revelation - and this massive one-sidedness is heavily disguised by the adoption of parallelistic patterns on top of this one-sided picture. All this is very far from the "magnificent symmetry" perceived by the consensus of interpreters! Nor is this distortion of merely peripheral or aesthetic interest. For Barth's architectonic devices here result, on the one hand, in serious material one-sidedness and contribute to the massive over-emphasis on revelation in Barth's dogmatics, and on the other, in material distortion of themes, such that themes may be omitted or collapsed into other themes (like perseverance) or greatly expanded (such as when the natural pair, pride and sloth, are accompanied by falsehood, as sin vis à vis revelation).

However, rejection of architectonic difficulties and contrivances does not entail wholesale rejection of what Barth says! Indeed much of his richest exegetic material and many of his most brilliant insights are to be found here - such as his O.T. exegetical discussions in §§60, 65 and 70. But in view of the distortions, we must also be cautious in what is accepted.

(ii) Comprehensive Doctrinal Interfusion

Our survey has shown what a vast number of doctrines and themes have been radically interfused. But a question has emerged how many of these unions are 'partnerships of principle' and how many just 'marriages of convenience'? Come assumes, for example, that because the two structures are concurrently juxtaposed, that the matching of offices and the Trinity (Priest/Father; King/Son; and Prophet/Holy Spirit) is deliberate. I am not so sure Barth intended this - but from his integrated account, it is difficult to interpret him with certainty here. Or what of the relation of office and work - since both are primarily discussed in the second main christological sub-section? Pannenberg assumes identity - though I suspect Klappert's more cautious talk of offices as "deployment" of Christ's work is more accurate - but again the ambiguity caused by the structures makes it difficult to be certain, since the distinction is a little blurred. In sum, we can't always be sure whether structural juxtapositions are intended because of the comprehensive nature of the interweaving of originally separate themes.

(iii) Trinitarian Resurrection

We recapitulate our discoveries. (1) The role of the Spirit in the Easter period is not examined. (2) The role of the Trinity in the *eschaton* is unexplored, if tantalisingly hinted at. (3) Apart fom generalities, the relation of Easter period to post-Pentecost period is left vague. (4) The connexion of *IV/1-2* with *I/1* in terms of trinitarian roles in Good Friday, and Easter, is not explicit - though the implication is that the older approach is abandoned or even reversed, when such a reversal is theologically suspect. (5) The role of the Father and the Son in the 'time of the Spirit' is not pursued in the transitional discussions.

(iv) Resurrection and Munus Triplex

We have seen that there are problems with Barth's version of the munus triplex. Godsey naively assumes that because the munus sacerdotale is assigned to IV/1 it has priority. Far from it! Hieratic ideas are almost completely submerged under juridical ones. Nor can we accept Barth's self-assessment that by "judge" he means "exactly the same thing" as by "high-priest". For one thing, if Barth had properly focused on Jesus as high-priest he would have found a more natural context for discussion of Jesus as Mediator. And for another, there can be little doubt that the language of the Judge judged leads into the juridical idea of justification: Barth chooses juridical language because it is different to sacerdotal, easing his lead-in to justification. The resurrection, sandwiched between the Judge judged and justification, is naturally enough (in this context) also juridical: "verdict", and this materially affects the discussion. For underlying the contradiction between the resurrection as God's exclusive act (IV/1) and Jesus' self-revelation (IV/2) is the dynamic tension between justification and sanctification: the doctrine of justification stresses the exclusiveness of God's act in man's salvation, whereas the doctrine of sanctification emphasises man's conscious response to grace. Barth wants to stress not only God's role but also man's (cf. IV/4, p.28) - though not in any synergistic sense: it may seem paradoxical, though it is only that two different senses are intended, in talking of God's exclusive act and man's response not as admixture but total descriptions. (After all, Barth's doctrines of grace and predestination are far from all fatalism!). However, while the tension makes sense in the context of justification and sanctification, it makes no sense when torn out of that context and affirmed of the resurrection - for we are talking of the act of Jesus, and such talk in that context is fundamentally problematic, as we have seen.

In §64 the _munus regium_ is certainly given adequate treatment - especially in §64.3, "The Royal Man". Barth is concerned with the exaltation - but, as we have seen, in contradistinction to his acceptance in the 1940's of the traditional picture of the two states, in _IV/2_ he came to reject the older chronological treatment in favour of an aspective exposition. Consequently he wishes to stress much more the _regnantem in cruce_ (_IV/2_,p.291), and seems inhibited from allying the resurrection too closely with exaltation; and since the exaltation is interpreted, especially in §64.3, as "the royal man" - Jesus' kingly office (and his human nature), then the relation between _munus regium_ and resurrection is also inhibited.

The resurrection vis à vis the _munus propheticum_ is discussed most fully in §69.4. The problem there, as we have seen, is the coalescing of two triadic structures: revelatory "transitional discussions" in the sphere of the revelatory part-volume - so Barth must discuss revelation of revelation of reconciliation! We have seen how to meet this difficulty, the theme alters from Easter period to post-Pentecost. As a result the munus propheticum is related more closely to the era of the community (in which the living Jesus speaks) than to the era of the risen Lord Jesus on earth (resurrection and appearances). Thus for three different reasons the relations of the three offices to Christ's resurrection are curtailed.

(v) Resurrection and Triadic Structures

Person/work/transition and incarnation/cross/resurrection models are discernible in all three christological sections - but are stretched furthest in §64. Again we see the theme of exaltation has affected the structural role of the resurrection: the discussion of an alternative triadic pattern of election/incarnation/resurrection pre-empts much of the discussion of resurrection in the transitional sub-section already in §64.2. Perhaps the departure from the pattern in §59 is due to a difference in Barth's perception of exaltation in IV/2, following his attempt to move from a chronological to an aspective exposition of the two states. For whereas Barth's understanding of humiliation (in IV/1) is as fulfilled in the cross (and then revealed in the resurrection) his picture of exaltation (in IV/2) is still related a little more closely to the resurrection, since Barth's attempt at an aspective interpretation of the states hasn't shaken off the older chronological treatment as much as he thinks. The effects of the problems in §64 are various: (1) despite Barth's attempt at an aspective interpretation, the states are lopsided, with humiliation more concerned with incarnation and cross, and exaltation more with resurrection and ascension; (2) ambiguity remains between the aspective and successive nature of the states in IV/1-3; (3) the diverting of the discussion on the resurrection from §64.4 to §64.2 unfortunately truncates the examination precisely at the point of the relation of the second person of the Trinity with the resurrection; (4) Barth's idea in IV/2 of Jesus' life as revelation (not first in the resurrection) may also arise from the connexion of Jesus' life with exaltation.

In §69, as we have seen, the departure from the triad is in terms of a transformation into an incarnation/cross/Pentecost pattern. And while §59 most closely follows the incarnation/cross/resurrection model, one implication of the sequence is the derivation of the juridical concept basic to §59.3, of "verdict", from the previous sub-section.

4. Coda

With its maze of intricate structures and sub-patterns interwoven into an impressive and beautiful tapestry, and some of the profoundest theology and richest exegesis, it cannot be denied the The Doctrine of Reconciliation is a work of "symphonic" proportions. Barth's rejection of atomistic theology in favour of his integrated approach has bequeathed to his successors an incomparable legacy. It is an amazing programme. We have found ambiguity and asymmetrical features - but in a work on this scale, that is surely inevitable. We are not surprised at the problems met, but at the degree of success within such a task. Barth's work _is_ a symphony, and like a great symphony, it can and must be heard again and again. But like a great symphony, it is only one profound way of describing its theme. Like a symphony, it cannot be the last word on the subject.

III THE SOTERIOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE RESURRECTION

1. Incarnation, Cross and Resurrection

(i) Resurrection within the limits of Revelation alone?

While Pannenberg sees Barth as displacing the resurrection as ontic or ontological basis of Christology with the incarnation, Klappert sees in Barth a Christology of differentiated relationships, with cross and resurrection in equal tension with Jesus' incarnation (or life) as prolepsis. We have found from our analysis in chapter seven that Pannenberg has interpreted Barth closer here, with his recognition that resurrection, although stressed as historical event, is seen as revelation alone, not as ontological basis of Christology. Similarly, we rejected Klappert's idea that §§59.1, 59.2 and 59.3 do not refer to incarnation, cross and resurrection successively, though a person/work/ transition sub-structure is also discernible, and just as person and work are interwoven and unified despite the successive treatment (as Klappert has seen), so also, incarnation and cross are suffused and unified despite being discussed successively - with incarnation as presupposition and cross as fulfilment (IV/2,p.105): in both cases, being and doing are interrelated; the ontological and ontic dimensions are mutually interwoven. But both aspects are differentiated from the noetic dimension: for Barth, despite the tendency in IV/2 and onwards increasingly to stress the pre-Easter history of Jesus (and supremely the transfiguration) as revelation, the event of revelation is supremely the resurrection.

Barth's interpretation of the resurrection is differentiated from the Bultmannian being "merely the noetic converse of the cross" by the emphasis on its historicity as based not first on the subjective awareness of the disciples, but on the act of Jesus himself initiating the revelation. Yet Barth's difference from Bultmann is perhaps not so great here. To be sure, in that Barth, in affirming the historicity of the resurrection, denies that the resurrection can be spun out of the cross from our side, he affirms it is an event, an act of God "beyond" Christ's death, and to that extent is not "merely the noetic converse of the cross". But when we focus on its significance for Barth we do find the resurrection to be "merely the noetic converse of the cross". This is Pannenberg's criticism of Barth: with Barth the resurrection is merely retrospective revelation (noetic converse); for him, it is retroactive revelation (revelation materially affecting what it discloses as true).

Certainly Pannenberg's analysis of Barth is accurate - as is shown by our extensive survey in chapter 7 - Barth interprets the resurrection "within the limits of revelation alone". But two other points should be noted. First, Barth's tendency, particularly marked in §64.3, to undermine even the _revelatory_ role of the resurrection (despite his hints at a formal distinction between e.g. 'anticipatory' and 'definitive'revelation, which is never coherently and consistently argued) leaves the resurrection with even less significance. Its significance appears primarily to be as brute fact (of God), but also as first revelation of the meaning of the whole life of Jesus. Secondly, Barth's talk of revelation or lack of it (a noetic situation) affecting the ontic situation implies a peculiar kind of retroactive - or at least active - revelation. If this is what Barth means, then one could argue this implies Barth is nearer Pannenberg than the latter thinks: Barth would see the resurrection as at least the _ontic_ foundation of Christology. It is difficult to convince oneself Barth does mean to go so far with Pannenberg here: rather, a certain incoherence and ambiguity should be seen in this idea that the resurrection, while not materially affecting salvation, somehow affects man's ontic situation and not merely his noetic, vis à vis salvation.

Thus although Barth sees resurrection within the limits of revelation alone, confusion reigns at the edges: has Barth undermined even the revelatory role by seeing so much revelation before Easter? and has he tried to have it both ways in seeing no _non-revelatory_ role in the resurrection, which nonetheless somehow affects man's _ontic_ situation in salvation?

(ii) Three Trinitarian Forms of Soteriological Role?

We have already discussed some of the incoherence in Barth's trinitarian discussion of the resurrection, with the Father's 'exclusive' role, the Son's role in self-attestation, and the Spirit's role in the ongoing impact of the resurrection in the era of the community. Of course some of the obscurity here (especially that concerning the Spirit's role in the resurrection) might have been settled in the (unstarted) Doctrine of Redemption; but as has been noted IV/1-4 incorporates much of Barth's pneumatology, anticipating C.D.V (sc.§§62,63,67,68,72,73 and 75.1).

Philip J.Rosato (who sees more pneumatocentrism in Barth than many) concludes his discussion of IV/1-4:

> If at the close of the Church Dogmatics the Holy Spirit comes to the centre of Barth's theology, this is because here in the doctrine of reconciliation it becomes patent that Christians in community enjoy provisionally and vicariously what all men are destined to possess: a new, eschatological way of being which corresponds to the ontology of God. Through the Spirit of the Father and the Son, the eternally free gift of divine love which the Spirit Himself is, finds a home in the reconciled man.[41]

Rosato gives a reasonably positive appraisal of Barth - though whether he has properly understood him is another issue. The fact that Barth's dogmatics closes with some pneumatological sections doesn't mean that Barth's theology became pneumatocentric. If he had stopped writing when he was 65, the fact that he had just written four part-volumes on creation would not have meant creation had become central, or that the ethics (III/4) within its sphere was the interpretative centre of Barth's theology! As late as November 1968 Barth showed that the christocentric focus of his theology was undimmed:

> The last word that I have to say as a theologian or politician is not a concept like grace but a name: Jesus Christ...my own concern in my long life has been increasingly to emphasise this name and to say "In him."[42]

But on the basis of Barth's alleged pneumatocentrism, Rosato wants to "improvise" on Barth's theology - even to the extent of obtaining natural theology from it! [43] That he has departed from Barth on an issue so absolutely central to Barth, should be a warning light to treat the rest of his account, qua Barth-interpretation, with considerable caution, as similarly with Donald E.Phillips' rather naive attempt to distil a philosophy (of communication) from Barth, which tries to cull general ideas of communication from a kind of sociological interpretation of Barth: when what Barth has spent his life attacking as the great threat and distortion to true theological work is somehow conjured up magically out of his theology, we must be highly suspicious that gross misunderstanding is going on.[44]

In fact there seems to be a weakness in Barth's treatment of the Spirit (which may be implicit in the fact that §69.4 does not consider the Spirit's role in Christ's resurrection as such): there is a curious tendency to depersonalise the Spirit. Already, the talk in I/1 of the Spirit as "Revealedness" betrays this tendency, and the description of the Spirit as subjective reality and possibility of revelation implicitly continues this tendency. Similarly in IV/3, Barth talks of the Spirit as "the power of the resurrection", the language is impersonal. This tendency also surfaces when we compare the transitional sub-sections. Whereas the Father's role in the revelation in the resurrection is that of the Revealer making his verdict on reconciliation, or the Son's role is that of the Revelation in the person whose "direction" is the continuing basis of our reconciliation, the Spirit's role is that of the Revealedness of the revelation to the believer as the Spirit's promise, i.e., the subjective reality of the power of the resurrection in the life of the Christian and in the Church. Far from pneumatocentrism in Barth's theology, we find the continuing constriction of the person of the Son undermines the Spirit's role and personality in that the Spirit is seen as the revealedness of the revealed action in Christ revealed subjectively to the individual and the Church. If anything, Barth seems almost to have a Binity - with glue (i.e., the Holy Spirit)!

So we conclude there are problems in Barth's trinitarian treatment of the soteriological role of the resurrection. First there is the incoherence of the first two forms, caused by their mutual contradictoriness (Father's exclusive role vs. Son's role in self-attestation) - a problem noted earlier; and secondly, the tendency to consider the Spirit's role in impersonal terms, detectable here as elsewhere, is suspect.

(iii) Three Historical Forms of Soteriological Role?

A.B.Come talks of beauty in the Dogmatics "especially if you like the number three" [45] - and three-fold patterns - even apart from the Trinity and the three offices - abound in Barth's Dogmatics - we recall the election/incarnation/resurrection, and incarnation/cross/resurrection patterns. In III/2,p.499 and in IV/2,p.138, Barth gives a three-fold pattern of revelation: transfiguration/Easter period/parousia, where the main difference between the historical eras is the size of the audience of revelation, though Barth does also say the revelation in the transfiguration "did not take place in the same way as during the Easter period"; but then he qualifies this qualification in saying that the N.T. ascribes to the revelation in the transfiguration "as explicitly as it possibly can, the same quality as it later gives to its definitive actualisation in the accounts of His resurrection and ascension". We remember also the earlier pattern in I/2 and III/2 of transfiguration/Easter period/conversion of Saul (which we discussed in chapter 6). And in IV/3 we meet the triad, Easter period/era of the Spirit/parousia (i.e., eschaton), a pattern said to be three historical (or quasi-historical) forms of the resurrection, or, more usually, of the parousia - for parousia and resurrection are essentially the same (IV/3,p.292).

Since Barth rarely explicitly rejects anything he has said, it is difficult to be certain as to whether he intends all these patterns by the end, or whether his pattern in *IV/3* replaces earlier ones. However, in all these patterns, Barth wants to affirm the resurrection as "definitive" revelation - though in all of them he seems to compromise its "definitive" role, e.g., its definitiveness is undermined by the revelation anticipating it in the transfiguration.

Another defence Barth gives is that Jesus' self-declaration was (for the first time) "not limited" at Easter:

> What the disciples came to see in the appearances of the Resurrection was no more and no less, but initially just the same, as what will one day be manifest to all eyes. They saw the full extent of His work and influence as achieved in His life and death (*IV/3*,p.301).

The difference between resurrection and *eschaton* is the size of audience. One wonders here whether a transfiguration on the cross, following the utterance of τετέλεσται would have obviated the need for resurrection for Barth's Christ! For if that is the (exclusive) role of Easter revelation, and all that is necessary for salvation is accomplished on the cross, maybe the resurrection (except as brute fact) becomes dispensible. This impression is not weakened by Barth's description of the character of the revelation in the 'forty days', as manifestation of Christ's prior human life from the perspective of its glory (*IV/3*,p.312). All this is highly reminiscent, especially of Barth's descriptions in §47.5, "Ending Time", in *III/2*; though also of his talk of "the pure presence of God". Certainly his similar language in relation to the ascension of Elijah leads one to think that such manifestation from Barth's perspective could as easily have come from a transfiguration on the cross – or indeed as ascension. Clearly Barth would reject such a schema! But his actual comments do not lead one very far from such a dubious implicit docetism.

A third defence of the different and thus significant nature of the revelation in the resurrection is that it is for the first time "comprehensive" revelation. And yet he can hardly mean this in any coherent sense, for he makes it clear again and again that "comprehensive" revelation – i.e., with a universal audience – comes only at the eschaton.

And fourthly, Barth sees the distinctive feature in the "absolutely unequivocal" character of revelation in the resurrection. Yet this too is compromised by his remark (IV/2,p.138) that doubt was not overcome in the Easter period but only first after Pentecost, in which case, Pentecost seems the first "absolutely unequivocal" revelation! In this context, it seems Easter would become dispensible for Barth, since reconciliation would be completed at Golgotha, and unequivocal revelation of it effected at Pentecost – i.e., the gap between Barth and Bultmann would evaporate on this issue. In fact Barth's difficulties here arise from his basic differentiation, already in Chr.D., between the objective possibility of revelation in Christ and the subjective possibility of revelation in the Holy Spirit Chr.D., §§14 and 17), and continued in I/2, with the difference that the "reality" of revelation here precedes its "possibility" with both objective and subjective forms (I/2, §§13 and 16). We shall shortly return to this theme.

Barth's account, then, we find undermines the distinctive role of the resurrection even in revelation of salvation, so it becomes difficult to see if any coherent role remains for it which would differentiate his account from the Bultmannian one he so sharply rejects - save the affirmation of the resurrection as event, an affirmation which he can now make with the strict words a "concretely historical event" (IV/2,p.146), which goes beyond what he would affirm in the early volumes of C.D.

Further, Barth's competing three-fold historical patterns of the soteriological role of the resurrection are seen to be suspect. In the pattern of III/2 and IV/2, the role of the transfiguration is most dubious with its implications of a *theologia gloriae* without (because before) the *theologia crucis*, in Barth's account. And in the pattern of IV/3, it is the "second form", the era of the Spirit, that is different in kind - for the resurrection, as the act of Christ, is, for Barth, *objective* revelation, whereas in the era of the Holy Spirit, we are concerned with *subjective* revelation. Furthermore, if we assume, as IV/3,p.312 indicates we may, that Barth has not abandoned the ideas expressed earlier concerning "ending time" and the "pure presence of God", then a further qualitative distinction emerges: Easter period and *eschaton* are concerned with "the attestation of the pure presence of God" but the era of the Spirit is not so concerned: it deals with a different kind of revelation. On both these counts then, the middle term in the *IV/3* triad falls out as inappropriate: Barth's attempt, following his penchant for triadic patterns, to talk of three (quasi-historical) forms of the resurrection (or of the *parousia*) in *IV/3* fails, no less than the earlier triadic patterns.

(iv) Objective and Subjective Revelation

As we have seen, much of Barth's account is related to his basic distinction between objective and subjective revelation. Although the distinction is differentiated from that between objective revelation and subjective appropriation of salvation (e.g., between "possibility" and "experience" of salvation), difficulties nonetheless remain concerning Barth's account of objective revelation, subjective revelation, and the relation between both of them.

The effect of Barth's account is that one can be objectively saved but subjectively damned, for in the τετέλεσται of the cross, man as such, i.e., ontologically, is reconciled to God. It is, however, in subjective realisation of the objective revelation, i.e., the Holy Spirit as the power of the resurrection, that an individual man knows - and on this basis actually is - reconciled, i.e., his noetic and therefore his ontic situation is of being reconciled (or conversely, the unbeliever, though ontologically reconciled, because not subjectively aware of revelation, is not only in his noetic, but also his ontic situation, not reconciled; or, more precisely, not redeemed) (IV/3,p.335ff., esp. p.338; 477f.). There is a radical element of incoherence here - for it is here we are brought up against the question of apokatastasis. What is the fate of the individual non-believer? If it is held he is saved, then although Barth's affirmation of his ontological reconciliation is upheld, he has rejected his statement that the unbeliever is "totally unredeemed" ontically. If however, it is held he is damned, then the statement that he is ontologically reconciled is sacrificed. Crudely: if the unbeliever ends up "in heaven", then his ontic unredeemedness is irrelevant, if he ends up "in hell", then his ontological reconciliation is meaningless! Nor does it resolve this tension to fall back (as Barth does) on to the sovereignty of God, and our ignorance of this detail of his plans (IV/1,p.118,92f., IV/3,pp.477f.) , for that merely obfuscates but does not obviate the necessary choice which remains; for in the final redemption, we shall see either that Barth was wrong to say unbelievers are ontologically reconciled (for they will be condemned) or that he was wrong to say they are ontically unredeemed (for they will be redeemed).[46] Nor again can Barth be saved from this contradiction by our positing a sequence, i.e, unbelievers ontically unredeemed now, but to be redeemed at the eschaton (a reading that imposes universalism on Barth's self-contradictions), since Barth himself specifically excludes it: unbelievers "are not merely not yet redeemed, but totally unredeemed" i.e., ontically, externally and objectively under judgment (IV/3,p.338, my emphasis).

As a result of these confusions many (especially in the conservative evangelical tradition[47]) have discerned universalism in Barth, although he explicitly denounces it. As Berkouwer says, Barth has been brought "to the verge of the apokatastasis" because of the impact on the rest of this theology of "the triumph of election."[48] Barth is indeed in some respects self-consistent: when one asks if here this contradicts his basic thesis in IV/3 that "Revelation in itself and as such, if we can conceive of such a thing, could not be reconciliation" (IV/3,p.8) , he finds Barth means revelation cannot affect the ontological situation (i.e., the reconciliation of the being of "man") but can affect his ontic situation (the redemption of the being of a particular man); e.g. on an absurd hypothesis, if Christ had lived and died without crucifixion, etc., but had still been raised and appeared to people, that revelation would not have altered the situation of death, sin, etc., "man" would remain unreconciled. Yet this degree of self-consistency does not mean Barth has avoided the self-contradiction! However, Colin Brown has not quite seen where the contradiction lies. He notes that, "for

Barth the essential difference between the believer and the unbeliever is that the former knows that he has been reconciled, whereas the latter does not and tries to live as if he is not", and concludes, "What Barth has done is to transpose the action of justification from the encounter of the individual with Christian history to the realm of a super-history where it is objectified, universalised and all but emptied of subjective response".[49] Barth does not, however, empty the individual's concrete encounter with Christ of its subjective response; what he does is to remove from it any determinative significance for salvation. Yet there are problems with Barth's account here. Precisely in the passage where Barth defines the "differentiated relationship between the death and resurrection of Christ", Barth illustrates how the new creation (2Cor.5:17) or "alteration of the human situation" is in no way determined by human subjective response by a parable of a King conferring an order on someone (IV/1,pp.311f.). He says the order stands whether the person receives it in person or not (and maybe even if he doesn't even know about it). Certainly indeed a Vice-Chancellor can confer a degree on someone who does not receive it in person. But what if (as is more to the point) what the King confers is acquittal from capital punishment? Then if the prisoner doesn't receive it in person he is dead! His "ontic situation" is then certainly "totally unredeemed"! There is, then, confusion in Barth's account of the subjective side of revelation.

The confusion in the objective side of revelation we have already noted - namely that the resurrection seems dispensible: a transfiguration or ascension following the word τετέλεσται would seem to obviate the need for resurrection for Barth. Many exegetes have accepted (with varying degrees of forcefulness) that Rom.4:25 implies an ontological or ontic role to the resurrection[50]; however when Barth exposits this passage (*IV/1*, p.306) he expressly rules out such interpretation by reference to the τετέλεσται. At this point we meet again the suspect trend in Barth's exegesis, of suppressing unhelpful trends in Scripture, so they harmonise with his preferred interpretation. We saw this with his adoption of Lucan chronology of the 'forty days' suppressing Paul's account of the resurrection in 1Cor.15:3-8; now we see Pauline theology suppressed in favour of (Barth's interpretaton of) the τετέλεσται. Barth sees the resurrection as dispensible to his account of salvation (*IV/1*, p.308) - indeed it almost seems dispensible to his account of revelation, for all the weight he puts on *limiting* it to revelation.

There is also confusion in Barth's treatment of the relation between objective and subjective revelation. In our discussion on the three "forms" of the resurrection in §69.4, we suggested that underlying Barth's idea that doubt is not overcome in the Easter period but only first at Pentecost is his division between objective and subjective revelation: since for Barth subjective revelation is the work of the Holy Spirit whereas objective revelation is Christ's work, Barth must see Easter as only objective revelation, and Pentecost as first subjective revelation, and therefore subjective certainty can only come first at Pentecost (here Barth is tied to Lucan chronology again). I doubt whether subjective and objective can be so torn apart, however, so that the Easter encounters would be radically without subjective content, only receiving that subjective content at Pentecost. But if Barth is saying this then again at least the Easter appearances become irrelevant, not to say awkward for his theology, for objective reconciliation would be completed on the cross, "objective" revelation in the resurrection (with or without the "sign" of the empty tomb) and "subjective" revelation at Pentecost. The Easter appearances, with their biblical implication of subjective reception of revelation (especially in 1Cor.15:3-8, with the repeated ὤφθη) are then radically unnecessary, even problematic. These consequences seem difficult to avoid for Barth, since the mental agility implicitly required - to think of Easter appearances, as possible and even necessary, without subjective reception of revelation - is a dubious necessity. The only alternative is to accept that there is subjective revelation in the Easter period and abandon the idea that doubt must remain even in the era of the "attestation of the pure presence of God"; to abandon the chronological and, more importantly, the logical divide between Easter and Pentecost with rigid categories of objective and subjective revelation. Unless such a step is taken (away from what Barth explicitly says) his account is in danger of collapsing ("absorbing", "subsuming") the resurrection into the cross and Pentecost conjointly.

2. The Soteriological Role in the Spheres of Man, the Spirit and Ethics

Since Barth's "transitional discussions" deal with the transition from the resurrection to the anthropological and pneumatological spheres, and §75.1 similarly effects the transition to baptism, and since these four sub-sections focus heavily on the resurrection (as revelatory basis of the transition) we are still following up implications of Barth's theology of resurrection. We have already analysed this relationship in chapter 7, and to avoid repeating much of the same material in each case, we shall pursue these themes by means of discussing various expositions and monographs of Barth by his interpreters and critics.

(i) Man in Sin

Our most substantial discussion concerns Barth's account of sin, since it is much criticised: we shall focus our treatment mainly on the critiques of Wingren, Hick, Wolgschaft and Härle.

While Pannenberg criticised Barth (at least in his "dialectical" phase) for his "authoritarian supernaturalism" in seeing in non-temporal eschatology the answer to the problem of "human suffering and frustration" (rather than future hope), he thinks Barth takes human suffering more seriously than Ritschl (CWE, pp.28-31). Gustaf Wingren thinks Barth has made no such advance; in essence, he thinks that all Barth has done is rearrange Schleiermacher's theology, that H.Richard Niebuhr's words on American liberalism apply also to Barth: "A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross".[51] Braaten sums up Wingren's critique of Barth:

> The inflationary development of the concept of revelation in Barth's theology has as its unavowed presupposition the portrait of the modern agnostic with his lack of knowledge of God. While Barth wants to make God the centre of his theology, he has really made man the centre.[52]

Barth had Wingren substitute for him in Basel in 1947, and in rejecting Karl Holl's discussion on work as being far from Luther, we find him naturally wanting to understand "the thoughtful contribution of Gustaf Wingren" as saying something better (III/4, pp.520f.). Wingren's attack on Barth, surfacing in the late 1940's - and continued in the 1960's with his own systematic works - reached a peak in 1954 with his Theology in Conflict[53], **which** sometimes seems, in the chapters on Barth, to be an extended reply to Barth's comments. According to Barth, Holl (and implicitly Wingren) obscures "the difference between God and the creature and their representative work" (III/4, p.520); so, contra Holl, "God's action never takes place 'in and under'. It certainly takes place 'with' man's activity, but also above and in face of it" (III/4,p.521). Thus Wingren refers to this "in and under" (Wingren, pp.33,123), attacks Barth's attitude to "God's action", and doubts Barth follows Luther. Wingren also attacks Barth's concepts of revelation, incarnation, cross and resurrection, law and gospel, the reality of evil, the Devil, etc. In sum, Barth's "difference between God and the creature" and the consequent self-revelation of God obscures the biblical defeat of the devil in the cross and resurrection (obscuring also law, creation, etc., in history and the community's experience).

Already in the 1940's Wingren sees Christ/Devil dualism at the centre of Luther's and Irenaeus' theologies. This dualism, not the God/man antithesis, is in Irenaeus, and so in the Church extending towards the Consummation, we see the Devil and death being destroyed.[54]

In Theology in Conflict, Wingren incessantly argues Barth is only interested in God's self-revelation in the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ: revelation "dominated Barth's system" because it reinforces the God/man antithesis (p.31,cf.p.26,n.6), so Barth has distorted "typically biblical elements" - God, man and revelation - into an unbiblical reduction of the biblical idea of God's act into mere impartation of knowledge (pp.28-30). Our own discussion supports this criticism of the distorting impact of the over-dominance of revelation in

Barth's theology - but he has ruined a good case by wild and vague accusations, so eager is he to do a "hatchet job" on Barth (and Nygren and Bultmann!); he attacks a "Barth" of his fanciful imaginings, at which the real Barth "can only shake (his) head in astonishment" since hundreds of pages of C.D. refute Wingren's analysis of Barth (IV/3,p.261).

Although Wingren quotes from IV/1 (Wingren,pp.28,30), he has not read it properly: he thinks Barth sees reconciliation in the incarnation - instancing Barth's defence of the virgin birth in I/2! (Wingren, pp.109, 111ff., 120f.) - with cross and resurrection as shadow-boxing, as mere revelation (p.114), as mutual reversal since the Revealer "is crushed" in the cross, but "exalted" in the resurrection, as merely involving God and Man, but ignoring any "active, evil power" (pp.112f.). If Wingren had read IV/1 he would have seen Barth sees the incarnation as fulfilled in the cross (IV/1,p.177), he would have seen from §58 that Barth actualises the "two states" and the incarnation (IV/1,p.133), above all, he would have seen from §59.2 how Barth at great length explains the cross as the historical fulfilment of reconciliation, without which there would be no reconciliation (it is only the resurrection which Barth reduces to revelation): Wingren would have seen all this if he had been more prepared to read Barth before criticising him.

In the wake of this comprehensive misunderstanding of

Barth, we are not surprised to find Wingren also misconstrues Barth's transition from Christ to man in IV/1: he thinks Barth's anthropology arises conjointly from the incarnation and "Nothingness" (das Nichtige), whereas N.T. anthropology is based on the cross and resurrection (p.110). However, anyone who had actually read IV/1 - or even III/2 - would have seen that Barth precisely does base everything he says about man on the transition effected by the revelation in the resurrection of the reconciliation fulfilled in the cross - i.e., "God's action" in the cross. Wingren attacks Barth for not doing what he does do, and his argument collapses through analytical incompetence: he ruins a valid case against Barth's reduction of the resurrection to revelation by conjuring up an allegedly similar reductionism of the cross, when hundreds - maybe thousands - of pages of Barth's writings give the lie to this misconceived analysis.

Finally, one central element in Wingren's attack on Barth concerns Barth's alleged "denial of the objective existence of evil" (pp.118,113,37ff.,109):

> There is in Barth's theology no active power of sin, no tyrannical, demonic power that subjects man to slavery and which God destroys in his work of redemption. There is no devil in Barth's theology (p.25).

In a word, Wingren thinks Barth's theology would be improved by being more Manichaean! Wingren concentrates his attack on Barth's concept of evil as "Nothingness" (Das Nichtige) in III/3 (a term we shall translate as the Void). Since Barth says that in creating, God rejected the Void, and sin consists in affirming this non-being as if it were real, Wingren dubs sin in Barth as a mere "ontological mistake" and as lacking "objective existence". Further, since Christ reveals the non-reality of the Void, Wingren concludes, "the fundamental sin is false thinking (whereas)...faith is correct thinking" (pp.36f.). Consequently the Christ-event is a phoney drama with no victory over real evil but mere revelation and knowledge (pp.37f.), whereas the N.T. rules out the idea of evil as the Void since it proclaims the genuine destruction of real evil (p.109); i.e., paradoxically, Wingren holds Barth's God/man antithesis is ultimately monistic, since God becomes the only ontological reality and evil, effectively unreal. Wingren's solution is to heighten the God/Satan dualism and to value highly verses like Jude 6 (marginalised by Barth) to approximate to a biblical (or might we say Manichaean?) dualism (p.38).

Once again Wingren destroys his own argument by grotesque exaggeration - here, via "Christomonism" to ontological monism. Already in R.I Barth rejected pietism, because, inter alia, of the pietist's inability to hear the weeping of Jesus at Lazarus' tomb - i.e., because pietism narrowed Jesus' victory to an inner one, whereas Barth, following the Blumhardts, emphasises the real defeat of evil.[55] Barth still held these basic insights, as his discussion in IV/3 (§69.3: "Jesus is Victor") shows. Barth protested in a letter about Wingren's caricature as "drollery" (Busch: K.B.,p.402), and in the discussion in

IV/3 shows how he still holds to the real victory of Jesus over the devil, and while the devil is no equal power to God, but is the epitome of the Void (Barth avoids Manichaeism) the devil is not absent in Barth's Dogmatics, which Wingren could have seen - had he read it.

In Evil and the God of Love, John Hick[56] also criticises Barth's concept of the Void. The fact that Hick finds Barth's writing (apart from the differentiation between the Void and the "shadowside of creation") unhelpful for theodicy need not detain or alarm us, since Barth's programme rejects all apologetics: to criticise Barth for failing to achieve what he rejects is facetious. We shall however consider four relevant criticisms Hick makes en passant.

First, Barth is "unscriptural": in seeing the Void alluded to in the 'formless and empty' and 'darkness' of Gen.1:2f., Barth engages in eisegesis; also Barth is selective with Scripture, ignoring especially the O.T. strand which views evil as an instrument in God's service (pp.140,147f.).

In a different context, Jüngel says, "dogmatics is consistent exegesis"[57] - and certainly Barth, in talking of the Void in relation to Gen.1:2f., while not seeing the Void as a simple translation of 'formless and empty', is not engaging in idle speculation, but sees in the concept a way of expressing the consistent meaning of

Scripture. He engages in sustained, detailed and thorough exegesis, and his actual exposition is far from idiosyncratic: he is heavily dependent on Gunkel, and even his mention of the "nothing" in Gen.1:2 comes in a citation of Zimmerli (III/1,p.108). Painstakingly analysing the relevant words in Gen.1:1ff., Barth concludes the writer selectively borrows current myths - especially the babylonian legends - of the world's origins, to express his basic theological picture of creation. Thus in the passage, we have "several different and to some extent superimposed pictures" (III/1,p.105), which are used to express God's creative act as also and simultaneously a rejection of the 'formless and empty'. Certainly the 'light' of v.3 is related to the 'darkness' of v.2, and although vv.1 and 3 speak strongly of creation (enough to give rise to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo), v.2 does not contradict those verses, but, in deliberately mythological language, speaks of what is rejected (darkness, the deep, formlessness and emptiness) when God creates light, sky and dry land, indeed when he creates generally.

Maybe Barth could be criticised for inconsistent exegesis or inconsistent dogmatics or philosophy, but Hick's criticism here of eisegesis has no basis - if it did then he would have to attack many of the exegetes also! G. von Rad, for example, also says similar things.[58] To attack Barth on these grounds, however, requires more than the peremptory treatment given by Hick.

The idea that Barth's selective ignoring of O.T. texts on evil as God's instrument (an argument Hick gets from Kurt Luthi) ignores what Barth says, e.g., of Isa.46:7: "darkness and evil..can...be used according to His will", and similarly of other O.T. passages which speak of evil as God's instrument - what Barth rejects here is that "God positively willed, created and posited darkness" (III/1,p.106). So even if Barth (rightly) sees the N.T. idea (of victory over evil and opposition to it) as dominant, this O.T. idea still has its place: Hick's criticism is off target.

Secondly, Barth contradicts God's freedom: his anthropomorphic and mythological description of the origin of the Void negates his doctrine of God's freedom in II/1 (pp.140ff.). For if God is free and all-powerful, isn't it conceivable he could have created a world without the Void emerging? Yet for Barth, the Void is a real if negative and "impossible" possibility; so, did it emerge through God's will or against it? Hick sees that Barth rejects both alternatives, but, noting Barth talks of God not positively willing evil, sees implied that evil is negatively willed, and excitedly asks if, as such, it is part of God's plans or independent of them (p.148) - a meaningless question, if only he had thought what it implies, since it means, did God negatively positively will it or negatively negatively will it?! Hick thinks Barth means God affirms evil negatively - but Hick is confused, and has not understood why Barth specifically talks of positive willing. Not positively willing evil means not a negative affirmation! - but a rejection; however, in rejecting evil God defines it precisely as evil. Similarly (in monogamous society) if Fred Smith marries Jill Brown, and positively wills to marry her in particular, in this act he necessarily rejects other women, so they can be defined as not his wife; nonetheless he does not marry her in order to reject them (i.e., deliberate negation), but in choosing to marry her necessarily does exclude them from being his wife. God, in creating light necessarily excludes darkness, and thereby defines it as darkness. Similarly he created Earth with one moon and therefore not two: creation implies choice, but not negative affirmation! Evil is not positively willed or 'negatively willed' but positively opposed by God: Hick's negative willing is as ontologically unreal as the Earth's second moon.

More significantly, Barth specifically excludes general ideas of freedom: God's freedom is not arbitrary or chaotic, not the freedom to make the circle a square, not the freedom of limitless possibilities (II/1,pp.316f.), but freedom self-limited in accordance with what he has revealed in Christ, so general ideas of freedom forgetting this limit are "idolatry" (II/1,p.320). Now from revelation in Christ of God's defeat of evil, it naturally follows that evil is a real - but impotent - phenomenon, since evil is revealed as defeated, and is revealed as defeated: Barth does not contradict his own concept of God's freedom - though he does contradict

Hick's idea of God's power, since Hick's god - at least hypothetically - might not need Jesus Christ to save the world.

Thirdly, Barth engages in "speculative theorising", so undermining his whole programme (pp.141f.). However, we have seen Barth _is_ working from the biblical witness and introduces the term "the Void" as that which makes sense of its consistent witness. Thus if he is to be criticised it is the detail of his exegesis that we should examine: "The Void" is not "speculative theorising".

Finally, the word and concept _das Nichtige_ is suspect (pp.141, 185-193), because, in avoiding using _Böse_ Barth is involved in "meontic" philosophy - i.e., the _nicht_ in the _Nichtige_:

> It is the existentialist writers who, under such names as _le neant_ (Jean-Paul Sartre), _das Nichts_ (Martin Heidegger), _Non-being_ (Paul Tillich), _das Nichtige_ (Karl Barth), and Nothingness, have faced the threatening, oppressive, or disturbing aspects of our human finitude (p.189).

However, Barth is not an existentialist! Hick claims Barth has reified the "existence" of the "non-existent", believing Barth's idea of God's freedom is to blame, and he even pits the _creatio ex nihilo_ doctrine against Barth on this count. He fails to understand Barth's concept of "freedom" and his theological method based on God's self-revelation in Christ, or that Barth's theological method is compatible with maintaining securely the _creatio ex nihilo_ doctrine - unlike Hick's own. Most importantly, he fails to analyse the word Nichtige. Barth avoids Heidegger's term Nichts to evade existentialist implication! But why Nichtige and not Böse, or Nichtigkeit?

Barth coins Nichtige from nichtig, common in the phrase null und nichtig (null and void), and also commonly meaning 'invalid'. Both sense suit Barth's meaning, that the ontological status of evil is void and invalid; it is das Nichtige, the Void, and as such "is not only ineffectual, insignificant, and trifling, but is downright abominable - yes, accursed".[59]

The Void is not non-being, so Hick's attack is misguided, since Barth explicitly rejects Sartre and Heidegger (III/3,pp.334-349) for seeing "nothing as a principle" (III/3,p.338), claiming neither Sartre (III/3,p.347) nor Heidegger (III/3,p.348) perceive "real nothingness". Somehow Hick fails to notice this explicit rejection of "meontic" philosophy; like Wingren, he is hypnotised by the nicht in the Nichtige, and similarly fails to recognise the sigificance of §50.4, "The Reality of Nothingness", the Reality of the Void. God is not in covenant relation to the Void (III/3,pp.349,360), and opposes it, so it "is that which God does not will" (III/3,p.352); it is ontically evil (III/3,p.353) and can only be - as it is - defeated by God, as a result of which everything to be said of the Void has its "noetic and ontic" basis in this defeat, i.e., Christ's incarnation and death (III/3,pp.354-360), such that, in the light of the resurrection and the parousia the Void "is routed and extirpated", and "has no perpetuity" (III/3,pp.363,360). And since we know of the Void only through the revelation in Christ of its extirpation, the question of theodicy (Hick's question) is a groundless question which Barth deliberately avoids (III/3,pp.365f.). In sum, despite Hick and Wingren, Barth does believe in the reality of evil.

This is not to say Barth's account of the Void is beyond criticism: in subordinating it to the context of revelation in Christ, Barth opens up awkward questions: does he mean the situation of evil has changed since A.D.30 noetically, ontically, or ontologically? Prior to revelation, evil was still real, but Barth's account suggests he considers it not an ontological reality, but primarily noetic (and therefore, as we have seen, also ontic). If so there can be no ontological change, but only noetic (and with it, ontic) - yet it seems unlikely Barth means that reality as we experience it (noetically and ontically) has changed, that cancers are less malignant or dictators less tyrannical since A.D.30. This seems to imply Barth means that there is no change at all - evil is not destroyed ontologically or ontically, but it is only announced that one day it will be destroyed! This problem seems difficult to avoid - unless it is held that the Void has some positive ontological status which is actually destroyed. No doubt these underlying problems led Hick and Wingren to their dissatisfaction with Barth on the Void, even if their critiques were flawed.

Hermann Wolgschaft notes this problem of the change in the status of the Void since Christ's death and resurrection - if the power of the Void is actually (faktisch) broken in the act of creation, "what then do the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ signify?" (Hoffnung,p.69). He thinks Barth's ontic/ontological distinction is "artificial" and sums up Barth's view:

> The Void is overcome in three phases, as it were - 1. Creation as fundamental conquest (already in view in Christ), 2. The revelation of Christ as the "actual" conquest, and 3. The return of the Lord as the universal "revelation" of this conquest (Hoffnung,p.70).

Thus even if in his life Barth's involvement, e.g. in the Church Struggle, shows he knows the hope of resurrection touches this world, his concept of the Void undermines any basis for this involvement, for human responsibility (Hoffnung,p.70). In this ontological/ontic distinction, Wolgschaft detects the ghost of Platonism still in Barth's theology - i.e., space and time merely reflect election - though whereas in R.II resurrection was the impossible possibility, in III/3, death is the impossible possibility (Hoffnung,p.71), a consequence of which, despite Barth's verbal rejection, is apokatastasis (Hoffnung,p.72).

As for death, since biological death belongs merely to the "shadow side of creation", and is thus not the "wages of sin", and since Barth oscillates between seeing death as friend and foe, he operates with two ideas of death: biological death and the "second death" – death as personal, as the consequence of sin (Hoffnung,p.73-75). Wolgschaft sees confusion here: in ascribing to the "transpersonal" "third reality" (in addition to Creator and creature), the Void, evil, Barth heterodoxly inflates the prominence of the demonic; contradicting this ascription, Barth sees sin as man's act, man as personally responsible for the Void; yet the relation of the "third" realm to human responsibility "remains unclear", since Barth only affirms that human failure is the concrete occurrence of the Void (Hoffnung, pp.75f.).

While Wolgschaft's account here is seriously flawed in his reliance on Jüngel's interpretation of death to analyse Barth, and in his exploration of what Barth is supposed not to have said "expressis verbis" (Hoffnung,p.74) about the relation of sin and death, when Barth has written extensively on sin, death and the Void – in III/3 and IV/1-3, he has raised important questions about the reality of the world and sin if the Void is really defeated in election and creation and not in the cross and resurrection: important confusions are mentioned here.

Wilfried Härle makes the closest analysis of the four we examine. He analyses Barth carefully before criticising, focusing on the possibility that Barth sees the Void as God's negative will. Härle recognises this negative will is not simply indifference to, but deliberate "rejection of an object"[60]. Härle summarises Barth in statement form:

a) What God knows he also wills (and conversely).
b) God knows the Void.
c) God does not will the Void (p.244).

Härle expresses this contradiction also by saying that for Barth, God knows the Void (in opposing it in Christ), that "everything that God knows he also wills" (II/1,p.551, III/3,pp.120f.), and thus that God also wills the Void which he opposes, leading to "the absurd thesis: God does indeed will that which he does not will and never can will" (Härle,pp.241f.). Härle rejects the defence of Barth that points to the "broken" character of knowledge, since wilfully holding such contradictory elements (which is integral to Barth's exposition of the Void) would be anti-rational, disrupting theology's claim to be a science (pp.242-244); and since Barth deliberately retains both sides of the contradiction, there are for Barth "theological grounds serious enough to give occasion to be logically inconsistent" (pp.245f.).

Härle sees the same contradiction emerging in Barth's relation of "The Creature and the Void": man's sin is "a reality against God and through God" (p.254); we have "the non posse peccare and the sin which does in fact happen" (pp.252f.); sin is man's decision for the Void, against God's will, and yet within "God's forseeing and plan" (p.253), i.e., within and without God's will.

In this context, Härle relates this theme of the Void to Barth's discussion of the cross and resurrection in IV/1. For Barth, man is not merely in a sinful environment; through Christ, we may recognise man has succumbed to the Void and is thus a sinner (Härle,p.250), as is made clear in Barth's doctrine of substitutionary atonement, where Christ's suffering judgment discloses man as meriting judgment, as sinner. Härle correctly sees that for Barth in the cross and resurrection we have the "noetic connexion", and its "ontic basis", and that the cross means not merely that Christ suffers instead of us but that in his person Christ "made an end to us as sinners and therefore to sin itself", so that the cross for Barth is God's "negative act" which, from the perspective of Easter, is made with a "positive intention", i.e., for man's "ontological determination as God's covenant partner" (p.251). Consequently, cross and resurrection form the basis for the rejection of the man of sin and the revelation of the real man (in this ontological determination) and for the recognition of this, and thus they form "the alteration of the situation of men of all times", by excluding the past of sinful man and opening up the future of real man (pp.251f.). Much of Härle's analysis at this point accords with our own - save that we have highlighted more clearly that for Barth the resurrection is nothing more than "noetic connexion", whereas the cross is related almost exclusively to the "ontic basis" (cf. IV/1,pp.358,502), and that Barth's anthropology does not follow the (N.T.) pattern: cross excluding the past/resurrection opening up the future, but the pattern: cross excluding the past and opening up the future ontically/resurrection effecting this noetically.

Finally, Härle discusses the "reality of the Void", and especially its ontological "localisation", its "modality" (as "possibility", "existence" or "necessity"), and its relation to general reality (pp.255f.).

While Barth treats of the Void in his doctrine of providence, its "ontic context" is in election (III/3,p.351), namely, as "God's discarding activity, based on election" (Härle,p.257). The Void thus has a - relative - necessity, as obverse of election (pp.257f.). For all Barth's talk of "setting aside", his treatment of sin is close to that of Schleiermacher and Hegel (pp.258f.,nn155f.)., since, for Barth, in Christ, the Void lost "even the transient temporary being it had" (III/3,pp.362f.), and thus it both loses its "objective existence", and has its reality, through God's denying, or negating of it (Verneinen) (p.259). Not that Barth means that ante Christum the Void was not yet past reality - as Härle shows by instancing comments asserting that the Void still has some sort of reality post Christum - though now it has become not "an ontic but merely a noetic problem", since its destruction merely waits universal revelation at the eschaton (pp.260f). However, as Härle shows, Barth still must talk of the Void here and now as a "dangerous semblance" whose power, while "broken" still remains, is still permitted, so that we are still a "prey to the Void" (III/3,S.425=p.367) and so, "no significant distinction between the reality of the Void *ante* and *post Christum* is established by Barth" (pp.261f.).

Since both the origin and ending of the Void occur through God's denial of it, Härle sees them both together - not historiographically, but actualistically, and thus ontologically: the Void is intrinsically the past and without existence (pp.262f.). Although Barth rejects the "logical dialectic" that insists that if election is eternal, the Void must be also (III/3,p.361), since Christ's cross and resurrection or *parousia* are its *terminus ad quem* ; Härle thinks Barth cannot escape this logical dialectic, and if Barth wants to he must alter his premisses (p.263). Thus "the Void is a presupposition for grace" just as death is a presupposition for resurrection, and so it is willed "as that from which (God) wishes to redeem and liberate His creation" (II/1,p.556; Härle,p.264).

Härle sums up: the ontological "localisation" of the Void is in its "being-in-relation-to-grace", namely as negative presupposition; its "modality" (through God's denying, discarding will) is a *necessary* relation to grace; and its relation to general reality is affirmed as one of opposition, e.g., in the paradoxical formula "existence of the non-existing" (pp.264-266). Now since Barth differentiates between *voluntas efficiens* and *voluntas permittens*, and means by the former God's positive effective will and by the latter God's negative effective will, Barth resolves the problem of the Void as within God's will but not created by him, by seeing God as effectively willing what he negates, and by equating "affirming" and "causing" (pp.266f.). - and if Barth had expressly equated "causing" with "effectively willing" the latent consequence of his theology would emerge - that God is the author of the Void (pp.267f.).

Härle has not systematised, "harmonised" and "made harmless" the relations of God, the creature and the Void in the sense of positively relating them to the Void, but only by negatively so doing - and this follows Barth's procedures. However, he has raised the spectre of contradiction too forcefully, in the sense that in the very passage Härle cites - "Everything that God knows He also wills" (II/1,p.551) - Barth shows he is aware that this statement must be related to the Void: of sin, death and the devil, Barth says God "knows also the impossible...as that which He has rejected...And He also wills it to be this...Even His non-willing is really a powerful willing" (II/1,p.552). Again in his discussion of the idiosyncratic ontological status of the Void as being in opposition to grace, Härle occasionally makes Hick's mistake of seeing non-willing, rejection, as a kind of "negative affirmation", but there is no affirmative element in God's relation to the Void for Barth: God has rejected evil, not encouraged it, nor even tolerated it as such. Rejected means rejected. So Barth (despite Härle) must resist seeing God as author of the

Void. As our analogy of marriage showed (in relation to Hick's comments), God's act of creation, in rejecting the Void, does not entail causing or affirming it.

There are difficulties with Barth's account of the Void in all this - and Härle has highlighted one closely concerning our theme: Barth's confusing talk about the Void gaining its "reality" in being denied and losing its reality in being denied leaves him in difficulties in describing any relevant difference vis à vis the Void _ante_ and _post_ _Christum_ - i.e, Christ's cross and resurrection provide the historical actualisation of what already "is" the case but will only be universally revealed as such at the _eschaton_. Härle is broadly correct here; we merely add the refinement that Barth relates the ontic element expressly to the cross, and the noetic to the resurrection.

Barth's doctrine of the Void seems to fray at the edges: its relation to the "shadow side of creation" is not always clear, nor is the relation of Barth's treatment of the cross, or of sin in _III/3_ to those in _IV/1-3_ unambiguous; but we have shown that in its central features, Barth's account is more defensible than often imagined. Where we are most critical is in the relation of the Void to the cross and resurrection: ontologically the Void is unchanged, since its defeat is grounded in election, and historically, after the resurrection, it is still "permitted". Thus inasmuch as Barth's doctrine of the Void lies behind his treatment of sin in §§60,65 and

70, problems associated with that doctrine emerge: the cross would be a belated actualisation of the "defeat" of evil in election, or more precisely, its rejection; and the resurrection would be a premature indication of how this "defeat" will, at the eschaton, be revealed. Missing in all this is the N.T. belief that Christ's resurrection, and the seal of his continuing presence in the gift of the Spirit, alters the situation of evil and sin; missing is the picture - devastatingly obvious in Acts - of evil "on th un", being routed in the experience of the Christian community; missing is the recognition that the risen presence of Jesus is at work defeating evil and sin within the experience of the N.T. community. Barth's mature theology (unlike that of the Blumhardts) gives us very few clues, for example, on how to relate to phenomena like the Church's ministry of healing. This is because, with the perennially defeated but unchanged Void in his theology, Barth's discussion of the cross and resurrection - and therefore of sin - is undercut.

(ii) Man in Grace

Barth's theology - of "the triumph of grace" (Berkouwer) - is naturally a little less problematic in the area of justification, sanctification and vocation, than in that of sin and the Void; however, in the end, similar problems arise.

According to Barth himself, Hans Küng's Justification correctly analyses Barth on this theme.[61] Küng sees the relation of justification to resurrection (pp.40,54,58, 61,63ff.,88,90), and that justification in Barth is not merely forensic, but also entails man being "ontologically made just" (p.69) and that Barth affirms works of sanctification, only denying they help justifying anyone (pp.69-81). However, he correctly notes that for Barth human faith "has only a cognitive character" and that, if differently, love and hope are only cognitive, too (pp.84f.). Thus we see that Barth's reduction of the resurrection to revelation and then his development of anthropology (man in grace) from the resurrection gives rise to narrowly noetic, i.,e., specifically cognitive interpretations - i.e., there is a corresponding reduction to the merely mental aspects of justification, sanctification, faith, love, etc.

In his "Catholic Response" (pp.99ff.), Küng focuses on Catholic appraisals of doctrine, attempting to show how compatible it can be with Barth, so he can reach his conclusion that Barth's emphases on justification would not require schism from Rome, but could be maintained within a school within Catholicism. Consequently he does not press Barth on the question of soteriological emphases in cross and resurrection, since this is still a matter for debate within Catholicism (p.229), though he does correctly note how many Catholics are coming to assess positively the "neglected" soteriological import of the resurrection (p.230) - (i.e., in contradistinction to Barth, whose account restricts this importance to revelation alone).

In his discussion on Barth's use of the Reformation formulae, simul justus et peccator, sola fide, soli Deo gloria, Küng wonders whether Barth turns "faith into a purely cognitive process" or whether the element of subjective appropriation of salvation might play a stronger role than is apparent (p.260). However in his eirenic assessment of Barth, Küng over-estimates this role, seeing in Barth's discussion of sanctification, and his discussion in IV/2,pp.280-319 of "the process of redemption as light, liberation, acknowledgment, peace and life" (Küng,p.261), this stronger soteriological role for the resurrection. But Barth makes it clear, all these are subsumed to the revelatory role alone - the "power of the resurrection...is the light which falls from His resurrection into the murky den of our existence" (IV/2,pp.310f.) - i.e., revelation; e.g., peace based on the reconciliation fulfilled in the cross and is thus "revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead" (IV/2,p.314). All these facets are grounded ontically in the cross, noetically in the resurrection, as with all the Christian life for Barth, and it is this constriction to the noetic which leads him to over-evaluate the role of cognition in the Christian life, as if man's existence in grace is just a matter of knowledge, such that even love (§68), while not simply cognition, happens in imitation of the cross (IV/2,p.786) through the revelatory power of the resurrection (or of the Holy Spirit, IV/2,p.727) and is based on knowledge received in the revelation (in reversal of 1Cor.13:2).

Again, Küng's concluding chapter does little more than hint at the reductionism in Barth's account of justification, sanctification, etc, (p.279), since a critical examination of Barth's theology takes him beyond his theme - but he notes points which indicate some of the thinness of Barth's treatment of these themes caused by the reduction of everything to a base of cognition of revelation - a reduction when compared to the N.T. picture of the work of the Holy Spirit, the work of the risen Christ in his body.

After analysing Barth on justification[62] Bouillard makes his "critical remarks". According to Bouillard, when Barth uses the word "realised" of the subjective appropriation of salvation, he uses it in the English sense, i.e, comprehend, so that, over against objective realisation, this means reconciliation is subjectively "obtainable by fecund and living knowledge" thus, "faith only has a cognitive role" in justification - this knowledge does not make him righteous (that is the prerogative of God), but the Christian knows what the unbeliever is ignorant of - that he (and all men) are justified in Christ (pp.74f.). Bouillard criticises Barth for hypothesising justification without faith - an idea with no basis in Paul (p.79). Discussing Küng (op.cit, pp.227f,258f.), Bouillard thinks Küng has been too easy on Barth; since, (according to Bouillard) Barth fails to follow Paul's relation of faith and justification, his account cannot be consonant with Catholicism, as Küng had argued (K.B.II/1,pp.77f,n.6). Bouillard also thinks Barth's idea of the inevitable temptation to pride for faith contradicts what authentic faith properly intends, and indeed contradicts Barth's own stress on faith as obedience and humility (pp.78f.; referring to IV/1,pp.616,614,617-621). Thus, although according to Bouillard, Barth is closer than Luther to apostolic thought on the relation of justification and sanctification, he drifts further than Luther from apostolic thought in separating faith from justification and love from sanctification, and in reducing faith and love to the cognitive dimension alone (p.80).

According to Bouillard, while denying salvation by works, Paul affirms works of faith, whereas Barth and Luther, with their sola fide, imply justification is by faith but without works of faith (pp.81-90). In pitting Pauline thought against Barth's, Bouillard relies on exegesis which is not carefully examined. Thus he believes Paul sets aside ceremonial observances but retains the moral law, the decalogue (p.84), and it is at least highly questionable whether this distinction is faithful to the apostle's thought: Paul sees love, not the decalogue, as "the fulfilment of the law" (Rom.13:10)[63]; further, Paul's specific instruction is often not based specifically on the decalogue (e.g. Rom.13:13; 1Cor.5:1-13 [64]) - so Bouillard's distinction here is artificial and misleading for the interpretation of Pauline thought[65], and thus the Scriptural basis of his criticism of Barth is ill-argued.

Again, although Barth improves on Luther by supplementing justification with sanctification, he constructs an "artifice which Paul is unaware of" in dividing the two up, associating the one formally with faith, and the other with love - and even then, this love "is limited to attesting the accomplished justification". Thus Barth ends up misinterpreting both justification and sanctification to some degree (pp.90-92). Bouillard's argument has some strength here - we too have commented on how Barth's tidy parallelistic structures can distort N.T. themes (here justification/faith: sanctification/ love), and we have noted how Barth's constriction to revelation has narrowed his treatment of his anthropology within reconciliation. However, when Bouillard argues that themes of "righteousness" and "justification" are not central to Pauline theology, but only arose in reaction to pharisaical distortions encouraged by Jerusalem Christians, he ignores Paul's conversion from Pharisaism (Phil.3:5) and his strong rejection (unlike some Christian Pharisees - Ac.15:5) of anything pharisaical because his previous thinking had led him so disastrously against God (1Cor.15:8-10), and that this biographical context led Paul to be uniquely aware of and opposed to any tendency towards justification by works, such that even before most or all his letters were written he had dared to challenge Peter on this issue (Gal.2:11f., cf.v.16) - even before 1 and 2 Thess. (cf.K.B.II/1,pp.91f.). Thus Bouillard's attack on Barth here cannot successfully be widened into an attack on Protestantism generally. This same weakness underlies his criticism of Barth's view of the old and new covenants not being two in historical progression but one "realised by the reconciling work of Christ", inasmuch as Bouillard relies on the weak biographical argument that justification only rose as a side argument for Paul (pp.92-98); further he does not differentiate Barth from Luther here, despite Barth's famous reversal of Luther's law and gospel sequence into gospel and law.

Bouillard concludes his discussion of faith and works by recognising the element of validity in Luther's critique of nominalism and the corruption of indulgences - but argues Luther went to excess, and that the necessary improvements were made at Trent. Further, even if (as Küng argued) Barth was misled by Trent's terminology, his attack on "co-operation" in Trent is more fundamental, and also misplaced, since Trent never implied equalisation of God and man, but co-operation in the sense of 1Cor.3:9. Certainly for Catholics also God alone justifies - though active faith is certainly also involved (pp.99f.). However, for all the problems, Catholics have as much to learn from Barth on justification as from Luther (pp.100f.).

Concerning the formula *simul peccator et justus*, Bouillard approves of Barth's insistence that man is not merely declared just but made just, and of the change from the emphasis of his dialectical phase of the new man between time and eternity, but he thinks Barth's new talk "of the time of sinful man and of the time of Jesus Christ" does not seriously progress beyond his "theology of crisis" (p.101), in that, for all the talk of "event" and "history", "perhaps nothing happens, because it has all already happened in eternity" (p.102, quoting Balthasar[66]). Thus for all Küng's comments about "subjective realisation" in Barth meaning genuine "transformation" (op.cit.,pp.260-262), faith is reduced to knowledge in Barth, the new man reduced to his witness of changes effected in Christ's cross and resurrection, and thus, unlike in Paul's account, the "subjective realisation" doesn't touch our being (*K.B.II/1*,p.113). Bouillard consequently thinks that, to be Pauline, the formula were better *olim peccator, nunc justus*, arguing that Barth's exegesis of Rom.7 is not obligatory - the "I" of vv.7-25 could be pre-Christian man as seen by Paul the Christian - and that many other passages oblige a broader understanding of justification, i.e, as signifying real change in the Christian life, for which view he instances Paul as the *homo viator* in Phil.3:12. For Bouillard the *totus* from each part of the formula is removed, and the element of struggle on the journey is important (pp.103-107). More recently, Wolgschaft has also argued similarly that Barth's exegesis of Rom.7 is suspect, since exegetes now recognise Paul is talking there of unredeemed non-Christians. [67]

Thus, while Bouillard does not reject Küng's conclusion that Barth's doctrine of justification is sufficiently compatible with Catholicism not to require schism, he believes Barth's doctrine is still open to Catholic (and Protestant!) doubts - especially concerning the haze of unreality of our justification in Barth, and his reduction of the life of man in grace to its cognitive aspect only.

Bouillard's criticism of the reduction to the cognitive dimension must certainly be supported here: from the perspective of IV/3, we wonder whether the third theme - of vocation, of the attestation of revelation - gives us Barth's preferred perspective on the whole theme of man in grace, since it expresses things most narrowly cognitively. Barth's treatment of the life of man in grace seems to follow the theme of faith seeking understanding, cognitive awareness and attestation alone. Certainly Barth cannot be defended against this criticism by pointing to his talking of the ontological basis (IV/2,p.275) of justification, etc. in Jesus' resurrection, as is implicit in some of Küng's analysis, and more explicit in a comment of O'Grady,[68] since, as Diem points out, in such contexts where Barth uses the word "ontological", he has in mind the ὄντως of Jn.8:36[69] – i.e., arising on the basis of the subjective realisation – awareness and attestation – of freedom in Christ: thus justification, even sanctification, and especially vocation, are, because of their basis in the resurrection as revelation alone, restricted to the cognitive dimension alone.

(iii) Community in Spirit: Church

The same reductionism to the cognitive dimension and the air of unreality with it is apparent in Barth's treatment of the pneumatological sections.

At the close of his reasonably sympathetic discussion on the Church in the theology of Karl Barth and of Catholicism, Colm O'Grady agrees that where the Church is in pre-Vatican II mood it still has much to learn from Barth, e.g., concerning the theological, christological and trinitarian basis of the Church.[70] He agrees that the Church is "the communitarian form of the subjective human response to" the work of the Spirit on the basis of the resurrection; but against Barth, he insists this has a "basis of a participation in divine life and power". O'Grady sees in Barth a 'Nestorian' and 'monophysite' ecclesiology, because of the threat to the "ontological and operational unity" of the Church in Barth's view of it as a "'purely human' reflection of a 'divine Church'" (p.336). This "Nestorian separation of the visible and invisible Church on the basis of a functional monophysitism" (pp.264f., cf.,pp.66-70), this "divine monoactualism" emerges in Barth's Christology, as "in his doctrine on the Church, our Lady, justification and Scripture" (p.337), for in all these God's transcendence is preserved to the exclusion of any immanence "as human life and action", since Barth restricts "all salvific life and activity in the economy of salvation to Jesus Christ alone and as God" (p.339).

O'Grady's objections to Barth are a little more fundamental than he realises. He thinks he is "in complete agreement" with Barth's idea of the community as reflection of the power of Christ's resurrection, yet objects to Barth's unwillingness to countenance human "participation in divine life and power" in his theology (p.336). Yet it is, as we have seen, the critical position of the resurrection, seen as revelation alone, which, since it functions as focus of the "transitional discussions", is the reason for Barth's reduction of everything in the sphere of man and the Spirit to the category of attestation, reflection of the divine etc. O'Grady's analysis of the resurrection in Barth is faulty; he believes for Barth anthropology, ecclesiology and the exaltation of the man Jesus are "effected and revealed in the resurrection of Jesus"[71], such that the resurrection "was more than the declaration of the positive significance of the cross" (pp.175f.), that the prophetic office is but the "noetic aspect" of the resurrection (p.178, my emphasis), and that the resurrection is the commencement of the life of the community and its ontological basis (pp.178f.). While some of the language O'Grady uses is from Barth himself - especially IV/1,pp.300ff, here, and e.g. "brought into effect" (O'Grady,p.176, citing IV/1,p.313), our extensive analyses and discussions already have shown that Barth never means the resurrection to be seen as anything other than revelatory, including when he uses phrases like "brought into effect".

If O'Grady had correctly analysed Barth here, he would have found himself having to criticise Barth's understanding of the resurrection as well as the other doctrines: the troubles with Barth's ecclesiology ("Nestorian", etc.) are not surface features, nor again are they based properly in Christology in general: they arise, in the context of Barth's theology, on the basis of the resurrection, reduced to its function as revelation alone, i.e., in the strategic (in IV/1-4) "transitional" basis to the discussion of the Christian life.

Waldron Scott discusses one aspect of Church life in Barth: missiology (§72 in IV/3). He rightly criticises Barth, with his focus in §72 on mission as attestation of revelation of reconciliation, for reducing mission to its cognitive features. Thus for Barth the "final motive (for mission) is simply that all men may know of their salvation...To the evangelical mind this seems terribly inadequate as motivation for mission", since mission is not informing people of the salvation they have, but of that they can have.[72] Thus Barth emphasises "obedience to the missionary mandate at the expense of responsible stewardship" (p.34). Scott recognises that Barth's truncation of N.T. missiology is based on his theology of resurrection:

> In his discussion of the resurrection, Barth lays emphasis on the fact that the accounts suppress the importance of any personal benefits accruing to the disciples by virtue of that great event. Jesus rose from the dead and appeared to the disciples in order to give them a missionary command (p.31; referring to IV/3,p.303).

Behind all the weaknesses - as well as the strengths - lies Barth's "basic theology" of election of man in Christ in "before" creation (p.42), this emphasis leads Barth closer to teaching apokatastasis than is biblical. Nonetheless, Scott sees much in Barth's doctrine of mission that is challenging and helpful.

(iv) Christian in Spirit: Virtues

So far we have seen a reduction to the cognitive dimension in Barth's treatment of sin, grace and the Church. The same impression is clear in Barth's discussion of faith, love and hope, the "virtues" of 1Cor.13:13 - though, as Gene Outka notes, Barth wants to avoid the focus on man possibly implicit in that word.[73] In his fine exposition of Barth on love, Outka notes that, within the context of life as witness, some traditional aspects of these virtues re-emerge - though not as "divinised properties", but only "in continuity with "all-engrossing interest in God" (pp.249f.). The "virtues" in Barth are related to justification, sanctification and vocation - with faith and justification especially closely related. However, although we are entrenched in the life of man at its most practical here, Barth carefully avoids allowing autonomous discussion of human virtue, to avoid justification being absorbed into sanctification, and both into "praise of human nobility" (p.234). Consequently, Barth correlates faith and love, so love will not absorb faith:

> Barth correlates agape with faith as new events occurring only to certain men. Sometimes he proceeds to say as well that the objects of agape are confined to co-believers (a move I at least find to be confused) (p.255).

Outka rightly sees how Barth's faith-love correlation arises out of his differentiated treatment of the resurrection in §§59.3 and 64.4 (p.211), but is puzzled by the tension emerging in this correlaton between agape as limited to the community and yet as "practised _for the sake of everyone_" (p.210), though he sees Barth means that agape only _makes sense_ within the community, even if practised for the world, it can only properly be understood on the basis of _revelation_ (p.245). So we see that love - and faith and hope - are interpreted on the basis of revelation, understanding, cognitive and noetic categories generally.

Outka himself has not quite realised how radically Barth has reduced love to its noetic aspect - as is made clear in his discussion of Thielicke's interpretation of Barth. Thielicke exaggerates the reductionism in Barth, when he claims the _incarnation_, in actualising the divine will, expresses only "noetic but not ontic-historical progress" (cited pp.245f.,n.92[74]), since the incarnation does carry ontic-historical progress for Barth, and it is only first in the resurrection that the reduction to the noetic dimension is fully effected (though because of Barth's structures, reductionism to noetic categories in the resurrection is decisive for the treatment of love, ethics etc.). But Outka believes, in reaction to Thielicke, that, to charge that, for Barth, "faith and love are *de facto* actions having the status of the 'merely noetic' is to disparage unfairly. Faith as reception and love as self-giving are to affect every level of the psyche. They involve far more than an intellectual act cut off from feeling and moral commitment" (p.246,n.92). Outka has not seen how comprehensively the "intellectual act" is at least the *base* on which all else in the Christian life is constructed, for Barth - though he is right that Barth wants "the widest possible referential expanse within the narrowest epistemological brackets", so that truths have universal application yet are known only in Christ (pp.246f.), and that Barth's treatment of love is essentially subsumed to the idea of witness (pp.255f., 240f., 248-250, 259f.). On this basis Outka is right to criticise the thinness of Barth's treatment of agape, notwithstanding the expending of much ink in *III/4* on practical ethical issues (Outka,p.264). Love is not as such an "intellectual act" for Barth, but the cognitive element is fundamental, dominant and determinative, as is clear from its submerging into the theme of witness, as

Outka himself notes: Barth is not as defensible against the reduction of agape to "noetic progress" as Outka feels.

In sum, while agape may be the furthest planet out in Barth's solar system, it still gains its orbit and its light from the Sun at the centre: revelation in Christ.

(v) Baptism

Barth's willingness to consider baptism in terms of its cognitive dimension marks a late stage in his continuing determination towards consistency, marking an advance, not merely on his 1943 essay on baptism but on other aspects of theology in I/1 and I/2, and even in IV/1-2, as Eberhard Jüngel and Arthur C. Cochrane have shown.

Jüngel notes the 1943 work and how IV/4 departs from it in pursuing a radically non-sacramental view of baptism.[75] Even in the early work, though baptism represents man's renewal through the Holy Spirit's power in Christ's death and resurrection (p.6), Barth sees baptism exclusively in cognitive terms and rejects infant-baptism as only 'half-baptism' since the cognitive aspect is missing (p.9).[76]

Jüngel notes that Barth's treatment of baptism within ethics, although a departure which might seem ironic in veiw of Barth's opposition to the reduction of dogmatics to ethics, makes sense within his view of ethics as part of dogmatics, and his willingness to speak of human action as saving deed (*IV/4*,pp.210ff.)[77] To be sure, in this, Barth does depart from the view he held in *R.II*, for then, he affirmed God's "sole causality" (*Alleinwirksamkeit*) (*R.II*,S.96=p.120), but now, he affirms God's "omnicausality" (*Allwirksamkeit*) over against his sole causality, which Barth now rejects (*IV/2*,p.22; Jüngel, p.15). (Correspondingly his 1920's lectures on ethics (*GA,2*, *GA,10*) barely mention baptism or eucharist).

When Barth talks in §75.1 of "Baptism with the Holy Spirit" he did not have the modern charismatic movement in mind, but, as Cochrane rightly notes, Barth would have been unwilling to let the sacrament of baptism in water simply be replaced by a sacrament of "experiences, illuminations", etc.,[78] for even though he was prepared to countenance the idea of "a theology of the Holy Spirit" on parallel lines to his own christocentric theology, that was on the basis that pneumatology is not anthropology.[79] As Jüngel correctly notes, §75.1 gives us a brief recapitulation of the doctrinal basis of *IV/1-3*, so the resurrection which is the focal point of transition of Jesus to us, is also focused on in this sub-section. That Barth, in *IV/2*,p.275, calls this transition an "ontological connexion", is (as we have seen) important for Jüngel (Jüngel,p.18) but Jüngel assumes that this, and the other feature we have noticed – that the noetic for Barth "carries the whole force of the ontic within it", that as revelation the resurrection has ontic power - demonstrate the resurrection is not "merely noetic" for Barth (p.19,n.23). He is right to see this forbids "the discrediting of the intellect which is common today", indeed it means an over-valuation of it, for, as we have seen, what Barth's account means is that the "merely noetic" has ontic power, i.e., there is no ontic or ontological element to it, but as merely noetic, as revelation alone, it carries ontic or ontological significance, i.e., the ontic and ontological situation of the man in Christ is interpreted within the limits of the merely noetic - hence the utter constriction to the noetic in anthropology, pneumatology, ethics and thus baptism. On this estimation, he is right to see that for Barth the resurrection is the basis for baptism in that it explains what is already effected in Jesus' life (i.e., his baptism by John) (p.21).

In his discussion on IV/4, Jüngel is right to draw attention to the fecundity for conceptual confusion in Barth's use of the "baptism" to describe not only water-baptism, but the outpouring of the Spirit. Baptism with water is conceptually prior, and forms the basis for the image of baptism with the Spirit - yet for Barth, on his analysis, baptism with the Spirit must be conceptually and theologically prior - hence the confusion (pp.24-30).[80]

Jüngel secondly discusses Barth's concept of baptism as a human act - particularly the idea of it as beginning of the Christian life. He notes that Barth's positive appraisal of the concept of *Christus in nobis* (clear when he published what was later *IV/4*,pp.13-23 in the Wolf *Festschrift*) marks a development from *IV/1-2*, where little is said of the *in nobis* (unlike the *extra nos* and *pro nobis*). Jüngel sees a line here from Barth's comments on the "ontological connexion" between Christ and us (*IV/2*,p.275), through his talk of Jesus as Lord entering man, of the "being of the Christian in Christ and Christ in the Christian" (*IV/3*,pp.547f.), to the *in nobis*, as totality of salvation, "revealed both inwardly and from within, establishing a new beginning of existence" (*IV/4*,p.34). Jüngel believes the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*, i.e., revelation arising exernally, is also *revealed* within man, so man is newly established from within, and as such, his life corresponds to Christ, "as *analogatum* of the *analogans* revealing him himself from within." Jüngel believes this move by Barth could, without destroying Barth's basic programme (i.e., implying synergism), or meaning a rapprochement with Bultmann's approach, open the way for an "existential interpretation" of the history of Jesus Christ (pp.31-38). If so, we wonder again whether, since this whole line of development occurs securely within the noetic context of resurrection as revelation alone, any such "existential interpretation", to remain within Barth's own understanding, would have to remain within narrowly cognitive parameters.

And thirdly, Jüngel shows that Barth's development is consistent on human word as on human deed. Whereas in I/1, Barth saw implications from the christological anhypostasis and enhypostasis (which affirm negatively and positively the reality of Christ's human nature in the Word in the event of incarnation) for proclamation - i.e., that it is "man's language about God, in which and through which God Himself speaks about Himself" (I/1,p.106) - in IV/4 he will not speak of the human act of baptism as that through which God acts, but only in it; Spirit-baptism alone is that in which and through which God acts. Yet this development is not restricted to human deeds: the same delineation can be seen with respect to proclamation in IV/3, in that proclamation is now not the Word of God, but a witness to it: Barth's development is consistent (pp.38-41). Jüngel sees this alteration as due to Barth achieving more consistently the implications of his christological concentration first properly worked through in II/2. Jüngel does not think this development means Barth teaches a real absence of Christ in the eucharist or at baptism, but that the human act witnesses to Christ who is "already present", hence Spirit-baptism, as antecedent, brings about the conversion expressed in water-baptism, but hence also the relevance of faith of the baptismal candidate (pp.42-45). Jüngel does not think Barth's approach departs from the Reformation solo verbo-sola fide relation since in Barth "baptism is as human deed an answering deed", corresponding to God's word, and thus a phenomenon of the word (pp.45-47).

Cochrane also defends Barth against the charge that Barth teaches the real absence of Christ in baptism and eucharist. He quotes Barth: the eucharist is "the thanksgiving which responds to the presence of Jesus Christ in His self-sacrifice and which looks forward to His future" (IV/4,p.ix). He also cites in support, Barth's corrections of classical Lutheran and Reformed interpretations of God's omnipresence, i.e., that God is omnipresent in three ways which must be distinguished yet connected: he is present to himself as Trinity, he is specially present in the world in Christ and he is generally present in the world in creation and preservation in his word of reconciliation and revelation (II/1,pp.487-490); most crucially, Cochrane thinks Barth's discussion in §59.3 on Lessing's so-called "ugly ditch" between contingent fact of history and contemporary recognition and relevance, i.e., Barth's view on the resurrection as God's deed altering the situation of all times and all places, demonstrates Barth sees Jesus as really present, since he holds that Jesus' resurrection is no mere past event, since he "is alive and present for ever more".[81] Jüngel has correctly seen that in IV/4, Barth does not (as in I/1) teach that God speaks through man's language; and Cochrane has correctly seen that in IV/4, Barth does not (as in I/2,§16) teach that baptism, eucharist, etc. are the sign-events of the Spirit's work which would imply identifying the Spirit's work with human witness, and thus let synergism in.[82] But neither of them emphasise here how ruthlessly consistent Barth is in seeing Christ's presence as his presence *in his revelation*: it is in the *revelation* of the resurrection that Christ is present in baptism, etc. Consequently, the interpretation of all Christian life - even the presence of Christ - in cognitive terms naturally follows.

Jüngel closes his essay with five "open questions". (1) Barth implies the Spirit is the subject of Spirit-baptism, though there are "appropriational difficulties", since "the Holy Spirit can be the *subject* of baptism *with* the Holy Spirit just as little as water can be the *subject* of baptism *with* water". Jüngel thinks the solution is to see Jesus as the subject: in Barth's schema, Jesus' baptizing with the Spirit could be associated with his humanity (cf.*IV/2*) and his baptism in the Jordan with his divinity (cf.*IV/1*) (pp.47-49). This last suggestion of Jüngel's seems to me to be confused, in that Barth himself associates the baptism in the Jordan (with the attendant theophany) with the glory and majesty and revelatory character of Jesus' humanity (*IV/2*,pp.137,167). (2) If water-baptism serves Spirit-baptism, as witness, what is the function of its uniqueness and how can it serve Spirit-baptism with this necessary uniqueness? (pp.48,49). (3) *Sub specie hominis* baptism is a problematic concept for Spirit-baptism, since in water-baptism, the candidate's plea 'come Holy Spirit' can hardly look forward to baptism with the Spirit since Spirit-baptism is the basis for water-baptism (pp.48,49f.). (4) Is baptism part of ethics - or *vice versa*? The ethical dimension of baptism is clear in Paul - but Paul's exhortatory references to baptism are concerned more with the human existence of the baptized than with the human act of baptism (pp.48,50). And (5) In Gal.5:25 Paul relates being in the Spirit to walking in the Spirit, i.e., human existence to human deed. Thus Paul implies "baptism brings an irrevocable responsiveness of the baptised to bear on the 'life in the Spirit' promised to him" - in the sense of "being responsive". However Barth does not fully relate the two, he does not explicitly bring the indicative (being in the Spirit), effected through Spirit-baptism, to bear on water-baptism (as preparatory to the behaviour evolving from that indicative) (pp.48,50f). Jüngel closes his account with a defence of the N.T. exegetical basis of his approach, from which he concludes baptism cannot be understood as an effective sacrament _ex opere operato_ (pp.51-54,n.70), and with a note that Barth's critique of infant-baptism is not a detachable appendix to his Dogmatics, but arises from the broad context of his theology from _II/2_ on, and that his own questions are thus not intended to undermine, but further Barth's critique.

As for our own quest, we have still found, also in the sphere of baptism (and eucharist and the Lord's Prayer) the same constriction to the cognitive dimension, the "merely noetic" - despite Jüngel's observations on this point.

3. Implications of the Ontic/Noetic Distinction

Our analysis - and that of many others - has shown that the fundamental ontic/noetic distinction is worked through with increasing consistency in C.D.. Further, this distinction pervades Barth's theology of the resurrection, especially in IV/1-4. Yet despite the almost pure consistency with which Barth interprets the resurrection as nothing but revelation, as little more - save than being a concrete historical event - than the "noetic converse of the cross", increasingly as IV/1-4 progresses, we find a two-fold modification: the undermining of the distinctiveness of even the revelatory role of the resurrection, by the corresponding shift in emphasis to Jesus' life, and to Pentecost; and the expansion of the significance of revelation, which is increasingly seen as having creative power, such that the "merely noetic" has ontic and ontological implications. The effect of this narrowing of the resurrection to revelation coupled with the broadening of revelation itself leads one to suppose that for Barth the essence of the resurrection, reconciliation and indeed of theology as such is revelation alone. Consequently we see in Barth a heightening of the 'noetic' categories - revelation (divine action) and cognition (human response).

This restriction of the resurrection to its noetic aspect, a distortion when compared to the fuller N.T. account, which reckons with a more direct soteriological element in the resurrection, is not confined to Christology "in the narrower sense". Our analysis and discussion has shown how, by means of the transition in §§59.3, 64.4, 69.4 & 75.1, sin, grace, Church, virtues and baptism are all similarly restricted to their cognitive aspects: everything in anthropology, pneumatology and ethics with reconciliation seems to be reduced to intellectual, cognitive categories. Not that other themes are not covered! Yet they all find their basis, their centre of gravity and their absolute limits in divine revelation and human cognition.

It is not, of course, to be supposed that to improve things an alteration is needed at every point in the discussion - we do not suggest Barth is necessarily wrong in every single discussion! Maybe in some features the emphasis on the cognitive dimension, even the exclusive emphasis on it, would be valid. Any single element could only be tested by sustained dogmatic and exegetical work. Maybe on that basis baptism, for example, might be seen to be appropriately discussed in the context in which Barth sets it, and yet love, for example might not be so appropriately discussed. However, the re-writing of the Church Dogmatics is beyond the scope of this thesis.

According to Schleiermacher, the faith, or "piety which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a

Doing, but a modification of Feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness".[83] For Barth, faith may be said to be neither a Feeling nor a Doing, but a modification of Knowing, or of consciousness of revelation. In reality, however, faith in the biblical sense is a combination of all three. Maybe even the attempt to prove any one of these as somehow predominant, or the basis or essence of the other two is misguided. Barth's account, for all its consistency and brilliance, is massively one-sided, with its over-valuation of human cognition, and it consequently narrows the biblical perspective down.

IV CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENT

1. Models, Types and Incarnation

In the discussion on the interpretation of §59 our examination led us to the conclusion that, broadly speaking, Pannenberg had correctly interpreted Barth, and that Klappert's arguments to the contrary were based on a misunderstanding of the different uses of from above/from below language in Barth and in Pannenberg. We found that Pannenberg's basic disjunction between these two basic types of christological method survives attack from Klappert (on the argument that there were five basic types) and from Sykes (on the argument that such distinctions between 'above' and 'below' Christologies were based on a linguistic illusion), and agreed that Barth's is correctly described as a Christology 'from above' - a point supported by Barth's own correspondence with Pannenberg on this matter. Furthermore, we found Pannenberg had correctly interpreted Barth as 'absorbing' the resurrection (to use O'Collins' language) - backwards into the incarnation (as Pannenberg says) at least as far as soteriology is concerned; indeed much of what is new in the resurrection is absorbed by Barth into the incarnation, and behind that into election. We concluded that Klappert's models of correlation (by which he sought to defend Barth from this last criticism) were 'tidier' than the facts tailoring individual theologies to fit a constricting and distorting pigeon-holing system, and that, fatally for his investigation, he confused the ministry of Jesus with the incarnation and was thus left answering a criticism that Barth absorbs the resurrection into the incarnation by means of a 'model of correlation' dealing with only the ministry, cross and resurrection of Jesus and thus not with his incarnation as such. Thus we agreed that in his Christology ('from above'), Barth has consistently maintained that Christology, and indeed theology generally, starts with Jesus Christ as he is attested in Scripture, i.e., as the incarnate Word of God.

The incarnation is fundamental for the ontological foundation of Christology for Barth since it is, as we concluded, the fulfilment of what is presupposed in election - i.e, the covenant of grace by which God decides to be for man in Jesus Christ. The incarnation is fundamental in Barth also, for he sees it as the theological basis of the cross; the incarnation is actualised, finding its historical fulfilment in the cross. Furthermore, the incarnation, seen in these actualised terms as event including the crucifixion, is the basis in Barth's theology for the resurrection - for without it there would be nothing for the resurrection (as revelation) to reveal. The incarnation is thus absolutely pivotal in Barth's Christology. Consequently our analysis of §59 shows that, for all the many advances in Barth's Christology which undoubtedly surface here, with his actualising of the incarnation and his profound interweaving of so many originally separate doctrines, the Christology of IV/1 (and indeed of IV/1-4) is profoundly incarnational and does not fundamentally represent a departure in this regard from his classic discussion of incarnation in I/2 (contra Klappert's implied analysis - as seen by Thompson).

2. Asymmetrical Parallelism

In our discussion on the interwovenness of so many originally disparate doctrines in IV/1-4, we concluded that Barth's structural paralellism was radically asymmetrical. Further, we discovered that this fact had more than merely aesthetic significance (as e.g., as element of dissonance adding to or subtracting from the interest of a symphonic work): the widespread apparent parallelism and the widespread asymmetrical features cutting across it led to a number of distortions. Foremost among these, in terms of bulk of material affected, was the way in which IV/3, as the volume on revelation of reconciliation, because of the structural need to maintain the structures and parallels in that part-volume, was so heavily overweighted, leading to tremendously one-sided stresses on the revelatory or 'prophetic' aspect of reconciliation. This is partially a result of the weakness of Barth's extremely complex structures - though also is due of course to the desire on Barth's part to put such a one-sided stress on the revelatory dimension of theology well to the fore, and is consistent with his well-known and long-standing heavy emphasis on the importance of revelation for theology (he has after all been much criticised for his "positivism of revelation"). Barth is thus willingly led into such a one-sided exaggeration of the role of revelation in atonement; but we should also note that it is his ill-fitting asymmetrical parallelistic structures that give him cause to dwell so extensively in that context on revelation.

We also noted that the doctrine of the resurrection was affected in a number of ways by some of the particular features of Barth's dogmatic architectonics. In IV/1, the whole concept of resurrection as 'verdict' was due to an ill-defended decision to abandon the office of priest for that of judge (on the grounds that there is no difference!) If Barth had tried instead to use hieratic language, maybe the language of "acceptance" would have been used - certainly some aspects of the treatment of the resurrection would have been altered. Maybe that of resurrection as exclusively God's act in contradiction to the interpretation in IV/2 of it as an action of the exalted man Jesus could have been avoided - especially since the doctrine of justification would either have been designed differently (less juridically) or introduced at a different point and thus would not have been so closely related (as in practice) to the resurrection as 'verdict' and thus (parallel with the justification doctrine) as an act of God alone. In IV/2 Barth's use of the doctrine of the two states vis à vis the resurrection appeared confused, with a certain ambiguity between aspective and successive exposition of the states. Further, an important side-effect of that discussion was to concentrate Barth's discussion of the resurrection in IV/2 more in §64.2 than in the transitional discussion in §64.4, and the effect of that was to major on a discussion which related the resurrection to the incarnation while largely missing out on a discussion of the relation of resurrection to the historical human Jesus of Nazareth which was due in §64.4. And in IV/3 Barth's use of overlapping triadic schemes compromises his understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit in the Easter period, the period of the forty days (a discussion which might have helped further to unfold some of the things he hinted at in his talk of the period as the time of the 'pure presence of God'), and also leaves unsatisfactorily vague his understanding of the nature and inter-relations of the 'three forms' of the parousia and how each is to be understood in its relation to revelation. (Maybe Barth had planned to answer such questions in C.D. Vol.V, on Redemption!).

Thus Barth's intricate architectonics lead to a tremendous (if intended) over-emphasis on the role of revelation in reconciliation, and also to a series of distortions (major and minor) on the doctrine of the resurrection. All this, it must be said, within the context of a work of monumental intensity, basic consistency, complexity, and, as theology, aesthetic splendour.

3. Soteriology

Our discussion of Barth's soteriology has led us to conclude the basic inadequacy of Barth's doctrine of the resurrection not only in itself, but as it affects a whole series of doctrines in the spheres of man, the Spirit and ethics. This, we found, was due to the fact that for Barth the soteriological role of the resurrection is restricted to its function as revelation. Because revelation is such a dominant concept in Barth, this restriction did not lead to an obscuration of the resurrection or of the other associated doctrines. Far from it! Our analysis of the architectonics of IV/1-4 has shown that for Barth the resurrection has a pivotal role, especially in the "transitional discussions". But this role is restricted to its function as revelation. Thus our complaint against Barth is not so much that his soteriological treatment of the resurrection is obscured, truncated or simply missing, but that it is distorted. By putting all the weight on the revelatory aspect of the resurrection, Barth distorts the biblical and doctrinal understanding of it so that its role is not properly expressed within his doctrine of reconciliation; the same applies mutatis mutandis to those other doctrines which we have seen arise out of or at least are affected by Barth's treatment of the resurrection.

A further distortion results, as we have seen. Barth's emphasis on the resurrection as revelation is tied up with his fundamental division in theology between the ontological or ontic and the noetic, i.e. between being and knowing - and the resurrection (as revelation) is linked with the latter category. The stress on knowing, cognition of revelation, has led to an intellectualising of the nature of the Christian life (i.e., all the anthropological, pneumatological and ethical aspects) which results in a further distortion of the doctrine of the resurrection and these associated doctrines: the Christian life is far more than thinking, knowing, intellectualising, etc. - and it does not escape this criticism to talk of knowledge as the mere basis of everything else: it is quite clear that this trend of inflating knowledge is apparent in Barth's Doctrine of Reconciliation and is owed to the strategic and exaggerated significance he gives to revelation as a noetic (i.e., intellectual) category. Certainly Paul warned against over-valuation of knowledge: "Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up" (1Cor.8:1); "Love never fails. But...where there is knowledge, it will pass away" (1Cor.13:8). Maybe it is rather unfair implicitly to link Barth with Paul's opponents! However, the apostolic warning remains. It is certainly clear that Paul saw knowledge not as the basis of everything else in the Christian life, and the way Barth centralises everything into a cognitive kernel on the basis of knowledge of revelation leads to a fundamental distortion of the doctrine of the resurrection and much else besides.

4. Biblical Exegesis

While in Chapter 5, we questioned Barth's speculative mixtures of exegesis, and in Chapter 6 we concluded that Barth's predilection for Luke's chronology of the 'forty days' betrayed a certain degree of arbitrary, capricious selection or ordering of the biblical passages he used, in Chapters 7 and 8 we have not so directly investigated the biblical basis of Barth's thought. To do so with any degree of thoroughness would have taken us well beyond our theme, and could provide the material for another thesis on its own! But we have found ourselves once again brought up against the exegetical appropriateness of Barth's Doctrine of Reconciliation.

Our case is not that the actually designated exegetical excursuses are somehow faulty. To the contrary, Barth's exegetical discussions in IV/1-4 contain some of the richest, most compelling and imaginative elements of his whole Dogmatics. Rather it is that much of his central approach in the doctrine of the resurrection - especially that it should be conceived in terms of revelation alone - does not reflect the biblical perspective on this. To pursue this the reader should follow the relevant specialist N.T. exegetical works on the theme - especially D.M.Stanley, F.X.Durrwell and Markus Barth.[84] Comparison with the work of these authors and the work of other recent writers on the theme of the salvific role of the resurrection will show that for the N.T. writers, the resurrection, while also having a role in the manifestation of many aspects of salvation (the Fatherhood of God, his love, etc.) also has a major role in the realisation of many other aspects. In raising Jesus from the dead, God did not merely reveal what had been achieved in the incarnation, election or the cross alone, but also made real certain salvific effects for the world, the Christian community and the Christian individual.

Thus, in reaching the conclusions we have discerned, conclusions which affect not only the doctrine of the resurrection proper but also doctrines of man, the Spirit, ethics, baptism etc., Barth presents a doctrine of reconciliation which is in many ways narrower and more constricted than that evident, in its richness, from Scripture.

5. Dogmatics and Methodological Archetype

We have supported Pannenberg's interpretation of Barth on the question of the roles of the incarnation and the resurrection in atonement and Christology. We have found suspect elements in Barth's doctrine of the resurrection, and its many associated doctrines, arising from his use of such complex architectonics on the one hand, and from his single-minded constriction of the resurrection to revelation alone. It might be assumed this would lead us to a wholesale rejection of Barth's Christology and theology - maybe in favour of Pannenberg's. However, this will not be made. Our conclusion is rather that while Pannenberg is right vis à vis Klappert, Barth is right vis à vis Pannenberg.

For all the areas we have found to criticise, these relate not to what is basic to Barth's theology, but to some of the detail in the way he has worked it out. Thus, as it affects the resurrection, we have found suspect elements in Barth's architectonics, his soteriology and his biblical exposition of doctrine - but these are not absolutely fundamental to his programme.

In general, in much of our discussion we have been aware of another dimension to it, dimly visible for much of the time, underlying it. It is now time to make this clear.

Pannenberg is right to force the issue between Christology 'from above' and 'from below': we have found it relates to a genuine issue in Christology. However, the question of methodology does not end with Christology, but goes on to the central questions of theology as a whole: in relation to theology, it can be asked if, methodologically, it proceeds 'from above' or 'from below' - or, to abandon the potentially confusing "geographical/local imagery", the question of dogmatics and apologetics, the question of whether theology in its approach to its own method starts with data arising from the context of committed faith or with apparently neutral empirical data.

PART THREE:

CONTRASTS

CHAPTER 9:

The Contrast with Pannenberg

THE CONTRAST WITH PANNENBERG

I ANALYSIS

Barth's theology is in fundamental contrast with many other approaches. Before we consider these differences in general terms in the next chapter, we turn now to a specific contrast - with Pannenberg. While we shall interpret his approach in its own terms, we shall be especially interested in those issues which relate to the basic themes in Barth's interpretation which we have seen. Since eschatology and history are important to Pannenberg, we begin there.

1. Eschatology

In a chapter in his early work What is Man?, Pannenberg discusses the after-life, and strongly affirms the modern consensus distinction between "Greek" immortality concepts and "Hebrew" resurrection belief, and claims, "modern anthropology has...destroyed the traditional metaphysics of the soul and with it the idea of immortality". But since modern anthropological concepts approximate to "the biblical hope of resurrection", "The hope of resurrection from the dead consciously takes up the destiny that characterises each person's human existence as openness beyond death" (WiM,pp.49,51,53). Thus, regarding the after-life, Pannenberg juxtaposes resurrection hope and salvation beyond death. However, his repudiation of the "Greek" view has been challenged. Allan Galloway does not find Pannenberg's rejection of natural immortality "quite so self-evident",[1] and John Hick has defended both "Greek" and "Hebrew" views, rejecting Pannenberg's dichotomy between them.[2] Despite this, however, as Frank Tupper puts it, resurrection remains "the more realistic concept"[3] - resurrection talk is still widely preferred to immortality talk.

In a later chapter, Pannenberg discusses what happens in the after-life. He says someone who is not faithfully "open to the world" will suffer "exclusion from God and from his own destiny", i.e., "the pain of eternity", since the after-life is "our present life as God sees it from his eternal present", so "only for the person who is in community with Jesus does the resurrection mean eternal life as well as judgment" (WiM,pp.78f,80,81). Hick is dissatisfied with this concept as well, since it does no justice to the brokenness, inadequacy and evil of life, even of Christians' lives.[4] We note further, that it is difficult to interlink this idea with Pannenberg's concern to associate Christology and soteriology closely together. (JGM,p.38).

The same chapter contains hints of Pannenberg's later eschatological theology - his talk of "an eternal present", that "eternity is God's time", in which man's destiny "aims at participation", and that "God...creatively approaches man beyond the boundary of death" (WiM,pp.74,76,78). These earlier hints are later developed into a kind of "thoroughgoing eschatology" (as Schweitzer called his interpretation of Jesus in furthering Weiss' approach).[5] Pannenberg sees a continuity in his approach with those of Weiss and Schweitzer, and a discontinuity with the "non-temporal" eschatologies of the early Barth, Bultmann and Dodd (CWE,p.30f.; TKG,pp.52f.). Pannenberg now works with "the idea of the future as a mode of God's being", such that "God is the power of the future", and indeed that only the future is powerful, in freeing man for his future (BQT,II,pp.242f.). Not that God became the power of the future! He always was - e.g., as hope of the Israelites. But, "The God of Jesus Christ is...himself still future" (AC,p.39), and, most tersely, "In a restricted but important sense, God does not yet exist" (TKG,p.56). However, Pannenberg rejects the concept of process theology that God develops in time, since what proves true at the end will have been true all along (TKG,p.63). Further, the role of Jesus is seen as genuinely significant in this context: Jesus reveals "creative love", which "is the power of the future overcoming past and present" in his offer of forgiveness of sins (TKG,p.65).

As for eschatological anthropology, Pannenberg differentiates individual and social eschatology, noting that biblically - as resurrection and Kingdom of God - they are held together by the doctrines of eschatological resurrection and final judgment. In this context, he criticises as inadequate, secularised - especially Marxist - eschatologies (on the fate of individuals, especially those of previous generations), Ritschl (on the fact of evil and suffering in the world), and the early Barth and Bultmann (on the eschatological need for reconciliation of human suffering and frustration) (CWE, esp.pp.29-31). (Though whether, in view of the socialist dimension to Barth's break with liberalism, and his stress in the 1910's on "yearning", this is a fair criticism of Barth's 1920's theology, is at least arguable.) Pannenberg believes social eschatology - the future "perfect society" - "is unimaginable without a resurrection of the dead" (BQT, III, p.198).

In more recent writings the same emphases remain in Panennberg's eschatological anthropology. However, he relates his eschatological interpretation to Troeltsch's assessment (TPS, pp.107-110); he shows how, within his understanding of eschatology anticipated in Jesus' appearance as risen, the apostolicity and catholicity of the Church is eschatologically based, and is not the mere conservation of the apostolic heritage (EE, pp.219-240); further he retreats, if somewhat ambiguously, from the earlier idea that judgment is the "pain of eternity". He first accepts that for those "who never or only superficially came into contact with the message of Christ" we can say "men outside the visible Church are not automatically excluded from salvation" (JGM, p.272) - which goes some way to meeting Hick's criticism. Later, he suggests the bodies of those judged will "perish" (AC, p.175) - which at least suggests annihilationism; though other comments in the same book hint at universalism, as when he sees in the descent into hell, "the universal scope of Jesus' act of representation...and the universality of salvation" in the cross, which is thus relevant for those with no direct or indirect contact with Jesus or the gospel (AC,pp.94f.) – though he adds, non-Christians have no "guarantee" of salvation (AC,p.95). Further, he argues that the transformation of our mortal lives in the resurrection of the body "does not mean a frozen rigidity as would be the case if eternity were to be viewed as timelessness", and he talks of "the close connection of eternal life with the future of God", and he accepts the idea of growth in its own dynamic in the future life (AC,p.175). Many of these modifications bring him nearer to Hick, whose universalism he declines, since he is unwilling to abandon the ideas of general resurrection and judgment as this would entail a reduction to mere "social eschatology" (cf. AC,pp.175-178).

2. History

As Galloway notes, whereas for Barth, Bultmann and Tillich, "critical history raised problems, for Pannenberg it provided answers" and thus gained a positive role in systematics: this "marks a profound change in the whole direction and ethos of theology".[6]

Pannenberg argues for "Revelation as History", and in the symposium of that name, he takes up the Hegelian idea that the meaning of history can only properly be disclosed at the end of history: "Revelation is not comprehended completely in the beginning, but at the end of revealing history", but this is anticipated in Jesus' resurrection: "The universal revelation of the deity of God is...realized...in the fate of Jesus of Nazareth, insofar as the end of all events is anticipated in his fate" (RaH,pp.131,139). Thus Richard Neuhaus summarises Pannenberg's view as, "Our future is not above us in heaven or running parallel to us in 'salvation history'; our future is ahead of us" (in TKG,p.30), and O'Collins notes, "through his favourite notion of Christ's resurrection as the real anticipation of the end Pannenberg argues that he has solved the problem left by Hegel to Christian theology".[7] Pannenberg sees the resurrection as a historical event, and even views the empty tomb as valuable evidence for it (i.e., vis à vis the idea that if the tomb were not empty, then preaching the resurrection in Jerusalem would be impossible).[8] On this count, Don Cupitt accuses Pannenberg of excessive supernaturalism (his acceptance of a supernatural resurrection as history),[9], but conversely, Daniel Fuller accuses him of insufficient supernaturalism (his unwillingness to view positively other miraculous events, and the particularity of revelation to Israel, in the O.T., or to only some Athenians in Ac.17).[10]

Pannenberg, then rejects the theology of Heilsgeschichte, Barth and existentialism for retreating respectively into "suprahistory", "primal-history" and "the authentic existence of the individual" to escape the difficulties raised by critical history (BQT,I,p.16, cf.GST,I,S.22).

He does not see revelation as theophany but as happening indirectly, "by means of the historical acts of God", and as provided completely only at the end of history; yet this end is anticipated in the fate of Jesus. The Christ-event is, however, only revelatory given its specific historical context (late Jewish apocalyptic), but on this count, as proleptically eschatological revelation, it inspires the Gentile mission, which realises the universality of its message. Thus for Pannenberg, the word of God relates itself to revelation through the historical events by which God reveals himself, ie., as promise, forthtelling and _kerygma_ (_RaH_,pp.125,131,135,139,145,149,152).

Pannenberg has since systematised this interpretation first within Christology (cf. _JGM_) and also within the philosophy of science. Thus in _Theology and the Philosophy of Science_, Pannenberg attempts to show theology is a science ("the science of God", _TPS_,pp.297ff.), and as human science, related to philosophy and history. He draws his own distinction between _Historie_ and _Geschichte_: historiography is limited to the past; history (_Geschichte_) has a dynamic inclusive of present and future, so they interpret the past, since the full meaning of an event is "fully determined only in the total context of history as a whole" - hence his philosophy of history goes beyond historiography (_TPS_,pp.69f.). Since, for Pannenberg, "God" refers "to an all-determining reality...Theology as the science of God would then mean the study of the totality of the real from the point of view of the reality which ultimately determines it both as a whole and in its parts" - hence "The close connection between theology and philosophy", since philosophy "is concerned...with reality in general" (TPS,p.303). Hence for Pannenberg the question of God necessarily concerns history, since history (as opposed to historiography) necessarily raises the question of the whole of history, which raises philosophical questions; and theology, like philosophy, but in its own way, is concerned with the whole of reality (as seen from the determination of reality, in God).

More recently, Pannenberg has deepened the trinitarian dimension of his philosophy of history: while Karl Lowith sees meaninglessness in history and also the lack of N.T. interest in history as ruling out the value of history for theology, Pannenberg believes O.T. concepts, which underlie the N.T., betray a positive appreciation of history; and the question of the truth of history finds its answer only through God (GST,II,pp.112-118). Pannenberg explores the answers of Cobb, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Barth, Jüngel and Moltmann, deducing from his discussion that, for all the problems in the details of his own presentation of it, Hegel's insight into the trinitarian dimension of history in God underlying the truth of history provides the key to understanding here (GST,II,pp.118-122). Pannenberg furthers this insight by relating this trinitarian dimension to history in God to the traditional attributions of Father to creation, Son to atonement, and Spirit to redemption - though without tearing these roles asunder. Cross and resurrection are relevant here in that Jesus' cross puts his own divinity and that of the Father in question, in that, without Jesus' resurrection, not only he himself, but also the Father he proclaimed, would not be God. In various inter-relations the persons of the Trinity in their self-differentiation are in community with each other, and this element of self-differentiation provides room for the creature to be valued, in covenant relation, as partner. (Pannenberg sees, in this concept of man as partner vis à vis the trinitarian differentiation between Father as especially creator, and the other two persons, an answer to the problem of the theodicy). Thus in the tension on the Trinity in the relations ad extra of the persons, "both that the divinity of God is still at stake in history and that God's future reality is nonetheless at work already in the process of history" may be expressed. Thus the tension in the Trinity in the "coinherence of unity and difference" as revealed in Jesus' history holds the coinherence of God's absence and presence, and the future and present of his Kingdom among creatures. In this dynamic between God's absence and presence, Pannenberg believes he meets Lowith's comments about meaninglessness - but this dynamic is based on the God of history and the dynamic of that history(GS, II, pp.122-128).

3. Resurrection

For Pannenberg, Jesus' resurrection is "prolepsis of the *eschaton*", and as such is no mere temporary resuscitation of a corpse, but "radical transformation" (*JGM*,pp.75-77). O'Collins summarises Pannenberg's interpretation well:

> At the resurrection there has already taken place what is to come to all other men at the end of history. Hence the Christ-event, while retaining its historical particularity, enjoys a unique absolute value in revealing God.[11]

In this connexion Pannenberg introduces his methodological preference for "from below" Christology, which we have already discussed,[12] that Christology begins with the history of Jesus, moves via his historical resurrection to the recognition of his divinity and thus of the incarnation. Pannenberg accepts that Jesus held the late Jewish apocalyptic expectation of a general resurrection from the dead, and that Jesus himself expected no "privately experienced resurrection from the dead"; consequently his resurrection was first interpreted as beginning of the general resurrection (*JGM*,p.66), though later in the N.T. - especially in Luke - the eschatological urgency is lost so the resurrection loses its original significance as "tension between the present and the expectation for the future" (*JGM*,p.67). For Pannenberg, the inherent significance of the resurrection implies the beginning of the end of the world; that God confirmed Jesus' pre-Easter activity; that "the Son of Man is...Jesus who will come again"; that, as risen and ascended, and as cause of the beginning of the end of the world, Jesus is God's ultimate revelation; that since Jesus had been crucified the way of law is abrogated (Gal.3:13), and the Gentile mission is to be inaugurated; and that biblical transmission of sayings of the risen Jesus express the explication of the inherent significance of Jesus' resurrection (*JGM*, pp.67-72).

From this we see that the context of interpretation Pannenberg gives to the resurrection is that of history and eschatology: it is to be interpreted according to the meaning inherent in its historical context - i.e., purely eschatologically. The function of the resurrection in Pannenberg's writings is essentially christological, more precisely it is to disclose Jesus as the Christ and is thus, in this functional aspect, an epistemological interpretation.[13]

More recently (in writings from 1968-1978), Pannenberg has kept to similar themes in his treatment of the resurrection, while broadening its base a little. In his *Logik der Auferstehung*, Klaus Kienzler sets over against Pannenberg (and Bultmann and Ebeling) the N.T. concept of witness, arguing that in comparison, Pannenberg narrows the concept to a mere "objective report of a happening". he argues that either to limit the resurrection witness, the ὤφθη of 1Cor.15:3ff. to faith (Ebeling), *kerygma* (Bultmann) or Historiography (Pannenberg) tears asunder the unity of its history. Pannenberg then is accused of reductionism and an inadequate attention to the soteriological dimension of the resurrection and witness to it.[14] Kienzler is certainly correct here, so it is no doubt for the reason of the evident soteriological inadequacy of his account of the resurrection that Pannenberg tries to improve matters in this region. Thus while his 1968 essay still broadly follows the lines of *JGM*, being concerned with the epistemological dimension of the resurrection, and with attempts to see in it the unity of God's futurity and Christ's contemporaneity while avoiding unjustified finitising of God (*GST,II*,pp.160-173), he can already say, "For primitive Christianity the resurrection of Jesus was the foundation of salvation" (*GST,II*,p.160) - yet this foundation is still revelatory. In 1972 he occasionally hints at a soteriological dimension to the resurrection (*AC*,pp.162f.). In 1974, he attempts to further his affirmation not only of corporate but also individual eschatology with respect to Christ's resurrection. He dismisses the argument that it is man's finitude that distances him from God (an argument that holds that since after his death, the risen Jesus was still man, finitude remains eternally) on the grounds that it implies man's finitude does not include death. He also rejects the division into two aspects of death - natural death, and judgment - a division he sees in Barth and Jüngel. Over against the reduction of Christ's resurrection to its revelatory dimension (in Rahner, Bultmann and Barth) he affirms the resurrection as a new event, and as victory over death which paves the way for the re-integration of the ego with the totality of its existence, since in

Christ's resurrection, death without destruction is now possible (GST, II, pp.146-159). In 1978, Pannenberg tries to relate Jesus' resurrection to man's true freedom and salvific future in Christ as relevant for all mankind though symbolically present in the Church, and symbolically celebrated in the eucharist. Thus again Pannenberg affirms the mutuality of corporate and individual eschatology, of Jesus' return and judgment and the Kingdom of God (GST, II, pp.174-187).

None of these alterations marks a major departure in Pannenberg's understanding of the resurrection, nor does the fact that in his most major work in the 1970's he only mentions the resurrection twice (TPS, pp.177,418) imply a break with earlier ideas; he has affirmed the continuity of his understanding of the resurrection in 1975 (JGM, pp.400ff.) and in 1977[15] with his earlier exposition in JGM.

4. Soteriology

For Pannenberg, in JGM, Jesus' divinity, as retroactively established in his resurrection, "remains the presupposition for his saving significance" (JGM, pp.38,135). In view of this we are not surprised he there separates Jesus' resurrection from atonement: the resurrection is connected with epistemology (JGM, Part One); whereas it is his cross he connects with atonement and Jesus' representative significance (JGM, Part Two).

Pannenberg sees a soteriological role in the cross which the official translation has as "vicarious" or "substitutionary" but is better translated as "representative" (Sykes[16]): Christ is representative for Israel (executed for "blasphemy", but in his resurrection demonstrating his executors as blasphemers), and for humanity (dying in the God-forsakenness due to humanity, in its blasphemous existence). Certainly Pannenberg's view is far from 'penal substitutionary' theories, and Sykes even suggests that, "The ambiguity of it is also the ambiguity of Hegel's theology, trembling as it does on the brink of a totally exemplarist view of the person of Christ", though he admits that, for Pannenberg, "the effect of the work of Christ is that 'God-forsakenness of death is overcome for all men'" - "by the hope given us of the coming resurrection to life beyond death".[17] In trying to hang the criticism of rampant subjectivism round Pannenberg's neck, Sykes probably exaggerates here, but Pannenberg's account does not clearly avoid it. As this is something Pannenberg would like to avoid, it is not surprising that he modifies things, implying a more objective element to atonement (AC,p.89), and dismissing the argument of Klappert (which we noted earlier) that Pannenberg subsumes the cross under the formula historical Jesus - resurrection; Pannenberg affirms the unity of cross and resurrection (JGM,pp.403f.), a unity evident in his 1978 article (GST,II, pp.174-187).

5. Interim Conclusion

Pannenberg's aim is to construct a valid "theology of reason or eschatologically oriented ontology" in the context of which his Christology is devised to make it more acceptable or "readily apparent" in its relevance (JGM,p.12). The resurrection finds its place in that setting as the epistemological, or revelatory basis of Christology. Pannenberg unites contemporary rediscovery of apocalyptic with "a metaphysical element derived from a philosophical interpretation of the unity of history" (D.D.Williams[18]), and sees in the historical resurrection-event the anticipation and revelation of the meaning of history and the retroactive confirmation of Jesus' pre-Easter claim to authority, which enable one to affirm Jesus' divinity - i.e, to complete the move in Christology "from below to above". Further, since the one raised was crucified, the cross - or indeed the resurrection, by virtue of its retroactive power - abrogates salvation by law (cf. Gal.3:13), so Jesus himself is now the bringer of salvation. In this context the resurrection has a highly implicit and indirect soteriological role in JGM; so Galloway is certainly wrong to summarise Pannenberg's thought here as "Resurrection is entry into salvation".[19] The epistemological role is dominant, and even in more recent essays where Pannenberg broadens the base of his interpretation of the resurrection, its role is still primarily epistemological, whereas the cross is the focus of soteriology, and so even where he wants to speak of the soteriological role of the resurrection, he feels he must speak of the cross (GST,II,pp.175f,182f.). It should be acknowledged, however, that Pannenberg's later essays do broaden out the soteriological dimension of the resurrection to some extent.

II CRITICAL REFLECTIONS

1. Biblical Perspectives

"In the New Testament...Jesus' resurrection is regarded as the salvation event" (Conzelmann[20]) - however, it is precisely the salvific dimension of the resurrection which Pannenberg (like Barth) does least justice to. Neuhaus may think that, "Resounding through Pannenberg's theology is the Pauline thesis, 'If Christ is not risen, our faith is in vain'" (in TKG,p.41), but Pannenberg narrows down the apostle's understanding of the resurrection. While for Paul the salvific aspect of the resurrection is dominant[21] (when he refers to it he usually relates it to salvation, to Christ's defeat over death for us), its epistemological or revelatory aspect is tangential for him. Further, while Pannenberg's preferred eschatology of permanent "imminent futurity" may present a way of preserving metaphysically the thesis of Weiss and Schweitzer concerning the alleged imminent futurist eschatology of the earthly Jesus, it brings him into conflict with Paul, whose eschatology is at least partially realised. Indeed, in the N.T., it seems that the turning-point for the move from futuristic to partially realised eschatology was - the resurrection. Furthermore, in line with this, N.T. theology sees salvation as partially realised, whereas Pannenberg's soteriology is apparently wholly futuristic.[22] Pannenberg's approach to the resurrection is deficient and suspect when compared to the N.T. account - as Kienzler has also seen.[23]

2. Eschatology

Unlike process theology, Pannenberg affirms there will be a "final event" - his eschatology would dissolve into unreality if he held that the eschaton could be eternally delayed. Yet in the context of his eschatological ontology, this final event becomes problematic. Williams has listed some of the problems, but the decisive difficulty (pace Tupper) is R.W.Jenson's point: "What we are bidden to await is the transformation of the God who is the power of the future into the God who was the power of the future."[24] For if Pannenberg wishes to avoid problems in theism by conceiving God as "power of the future" (BQT,II, pp.201-249;BQT,III, pp.99-115), then the ontological transformation of God at the eschaton reintroduces precisely those problems Pannenberg sought to avoid. What would God become? "Power of the past", "former power of the future", or "power of the present"?. This seems to be a choice between meaninglessness, the death of God, or the reintroduction of those aspects of God's omnipresence from which, because he found them problematic, Pannenberg first fled into eschatological ontology. A veritable Hobson's choice.

3. History

When a theologian or philosopher attempts to establish and demonstrate the truth of a reality or of reality in general, there will be the assumption of presuppositions, though these may be openly admitted, surreptitiously introduced or naively assumed as universally accepted. Pannenberg's apparently arbitrary presupposition that the proper significance of a historical event is comprehensible only in terms of its contemporary significance (a concept by means of which he can assert the definitive interpretation of the resurrection to be as understood within the framework of late Jewish apocalyptic) has been widely challenged, as O'Collins notes. O'Collins asks if the apocalyptic world-view is so normative in the N.T.; wonders if it is valid to ascertain the future end of history by means of a past world-view; and wonders if the general resurrection could be seen as myth anyway.[25] Certainly there are problems here: one wonders if Pannenberg's presuppositions could lead to the absolutising of other religions as well - e.g., of Buddhism via the historical event of the Buddha's enlightenment within its historical context. If so, the presupposition is self-defeating as a contribution to assessing truth-claims in religion.

Sarah Coakley has argued that Pannenberg frees himself from such general (and potentially self-contradictory) deductions from his historical understanding of analogy by holding that the interpretation of an event by means of its historical context in the history of ideas applies not generally, but uniquely to the resurrection. As she rightly points out, there is a circularity in Pannenberg's argument here and a weakness, in that other historical interpretations of the resurrection are at least possible and in that his defence of his adoption of the historical context of apocalyptic by means of his general anthropological concepts is based on a tenuous and highly arguable link between them.[26] However, I doubt that she is right to see Pannenberg's solution is to be found in more anthropology,[27] since, as she so well demonstrates, his use of anthropology merely confuses and weakens his arguments further.[28]

More recently, Pannenberg has related his ideas to the philosophy which holds that the use and context of a word determine its meaning (TPS,pp.177-184 [29]); it is possible there is some mileage in relating the two ideas of historical and linguistic contextuality, though Pannenberg himself does not explicitly relate them, and the parallel between them could be challenged.

Pannenberg's historical presuppositions, it seems, are controversial and not well justified.

4. Epistemology

Since Pannenberg's epistemology is based on eschatology and history (the real meaning of any event is only clear at the end of history, which is, however, proleptically anticipated in Jesus' resurrection) the weaknesses in both his eschatology and view of history threaten his epistemology also. Further, there is an irreconcilable tension between "revelation as history" and "revelation as prolepsis". If Pannenberg sees in the resurrection proleptic revelation, which bridges Lessing's "ditch" between contingent history and necessary truths, and also bridges Hegel's "ditch" (so to speak) between the present meaning of history and ultimate determination of its meaning at the end of history, then it appears that this one event alone is truly revelatory in history. But in that case Pannenberg has surrendered "revelation as history" in favour of a "positivism of revelation" in the resurrection alone. Since Pannenberg attempts to maintain "revelation as history" as well, he contradicts himself.

5. Soteriology

We have seen that Pannenberg's interpretation of the soteriological dimension of the resurrection falls down in comparison with the N.T. approach, so O'Collins is right: "One questionable feature of Pannenberg's position is his lack of attention to the salvific aspect of revelation"[30], and especially of that event he sees as especially revelatory, the resurrection. Indeed in many ways, soteriology is the weakest link in the chain of Pannenberg's theology. Apart from questioning the ambiguity of objective and subjective in Pannenberg's doctrine of atonement, Sykes rightly questions Pannenberg's attitude to Jesus' judges: in affirming Jesus' death as vicarious, Pannenberg must affirm their guilt - but in that case "we have entirely to undo the structure of Pannenberg's theology from its basis".[31] Galloway shows "amazement" at chapter 7 of JGM and suggests Pannenberg construct his doctrine of atonement on the basis of his deduction of Jesus' "essential identity with God", i.e., as undergirded by his concept of revelation.[32] Maybe the fullest improvement would however come from relating atonement to resurrection - which would more securely base atonement in the context of Pannenberg's theology, as well as broaden the base of the resurrection, so Pannenberg's interpretation would be brought nearer that dominant in the N.T. Pannenberg's more recent essays show a small, hesitant step in this direction.

A further problem in Pannenberg's soteriology is apparent in his reduction of theology to ontology: for him eschatological theology and eschatological ontology are virtually interchangeable. Consequently, his ontology leads him dangerously close to historical monism,[33] in that he finds it easy to talk of creation and life

(TKG,pp.64-71), but difficult to talk of destruction and evil, especially in relation to his ontology (cf.,e.g., TKG,p.69).

6. Theological Method

To be familiar with Barth's theology, and to read Pannenberg's works - especially his earlier writings - is to recognise more continuity than might be expected, notably, for our investigation, the primacy of revelation for the interpretation of the resurrection. Yet it is also to realise that Barth's ideas are reproduced here in a different context. Above all, the methodological context is different and is leading Pannenberg further from Barth in his more recent writings (especially TPS). How radical is the divide?

Pannenberg argues in Christology that methodologically there are fundamentally only two choices: "from above" or "from below", i.e, presupposing God's self-revelation or starting from the "anthropological-historical perspective" - and he prefers the latter.[34] One wonders if Pannenberg wishes this distinction to function beyond Christology, i.e, the distinction between theology in general written from its own doctrines, God's self-revelation, etc., and that written from the anthropological-historical perspective; i.e, the distinction in methodological archetype in theology between dogmatics and apologetics. Certainly if Pannenberg had addressed himself more directly to this question, he might have avoided Lash's criticism that Pannenberg's use of his "from below" methodology ambiguously and confusingly straddles the gap between systematics and apologetics.[35] If Pannenberg had applied his own method more consistently, he would have concluded that the wider theological implication of his adopted "from below" methodology would be to see systematics as apologetics. Pannenberg is somewhat ambiguous in this matter, however, for in 1973 he writes condemning the irrelevance of theodicy (a favourite theme of apologetics) in tones that sound almost Barthian[36], yet he also defines a clear and important role for apologetics in theology: "the real task to be performed in 'apologetics' is that of providing a basis for Christian theology in general", i.e, not a reasoned defence, but relating faith to what on reasoned terms is generally acceptable for his "theology of reason" (TPS,p.416). In this context we find Pannenberg follows, if not completely consistently, the methodological archetype of apologetics, which we shall shortly describe.

CHAPTER 10:

Method and Resurrection: Barth in Contrast

METHOD AND RESURRECTION: BARTH IN CONTRAST

I METHODOLOGICAL CONTRASTS

1. Introduction

As a theologian, Barth often found himself in controversy. Even in his Safenwil days he was not free from it, as the debate about his socialist involvement shows. We see him in confrontation with Naumann, later Harnack, and later again his erstwhile colleagues in the dialectical theology movement - Gogarten, Brunner and Bultmann. Above all he was the implacable opponent of disruption of fidelity to Jesus Christ as provoked by Hitler. Again we find him in controversy with pietism, liberalism, and Catholicism. And yet Barth's theology has not met with a predictable response: he has enraged some and delighted others within each school. Thus within "fundamentalism" we not only have C.Van Til's polemical review and F.A.Schaeffer's potted travesty (which holds Barth to be the theological equivalent of the collapse of value in the West!), but G.C.Berkouwer's sympathetic account; amongst Catholics we not only have J.Hâmer's charge of "occasionalism" but H.U. von Balthasar's more eirenic assessment. Part of the cause of this variegated response is due to the sheer intellectual power of Barth's writing, part is due to the fact that in some sense he presents us with a classical theology - even if it is a classical theology of its own making, and part is due to the fact that Barth's theology, like no other, forces the reader back to question his own motives, presuppositions, norms, sources and methods in theology.

Barth's theology forces us to examine our methodology. We found that his anti-apologetic stance was deepened and radicalised in that, although evident in his influence from Herrmann and his adoption of the idea of *autopistia*, he had to move via the Blumhardts to "faith seeking understanding" - faith based not on itself but on God's self-revelation. He must free "God" from being an appendage (a holy appendage!) of man, so that God defines and reveals himself, and is no longer the toy of the theologian, philosopher or historian. He must affirm what Rendtorff calls the "radical autonomy of God", he must assert, as Kreck puts it, "That God is only known through God, but has really disclosed his identity to man in Jesus Christ". So to argue is to run counter to a great deal of theological writing, and hence has involved Barth in controversy. His theology runs radically in *contrast* to other forms, which, on his analysis, boil down to the same distortion. The enemy he opposes has different names in different settings: it is apologetics (whereas he writes Church dogmatics); it is *analogia entis* (whereas he affirms *analogia fidei*, or *analogia relationis*); it is natural theology (whereas he allows normative value only to revealed theology); it is *mixophilosophicotheologia* (whereas he is interested only in unadulterated theology); above all, it is the idea of "Christianity and..." something (whereas he is interested in Jesus Christ and the faith in him alone). When we discuss theology at this level, we are dealing with methodological archetype. Barth's theology - including his theology of the resurrection - forces such considerations on us, because without seeing this, his theology remains unintelligible. That is why so many critiques of Barth are inadequate: they attack the symptoms of his theology without either examining the presuppositions that lead Barth to his conclusions, or (even more dubiously) examining their own presuppositions which lead them to disagree with Barth. Thus it is no use complaining, as Van Harvey does, about the fact that Barth makes historical statements without allowing the historian autonomous reflection on them, unless we engage in debate about Barth's adoption of dogmatic methodology, which insists God and not the historian has the last word and that that word includes historical statements; it is no use being dissatisfied, as Hick is, with Barth's view of evil as unhelpful for theodicy, when for Barth theodicy is an illegitimate exercise; it is no use urging on Barth, as Louth does, a more autonomous role to contemplation in theology, since, however fruitful that makes Barth's theology for Catholicism, it marks an abandonment of Barth's basic programme allowing autonomy to God's self-revelation alone; it is no use indicting Barth, as Wingren does, for not doing justice to Jude 6, and for insufficient Manichaeism, without examining the basis of his theology, which is not a capricious selection of biblical texts, but is God's self-revelation in Christ as witnessed to in Scripture; and it is not enough to attack Barth's Christology, as Pannenberg does, for being constructed "from above to below" and without recourse to historical criticism, when Barth's "from above" methodology (to continue the metaphor) is not restricted to Christology alone but has its basis in his whole theological programme.

Since Barth's programme is based on fundamental contrast of methodological archetypes, we can only assess its cogency by isolating different archetypes, assessing the confusion between them, and then attempting to see how cogent each method is.

2. Three Methodological Archetypes

(i) Dogmatic Method

In the first archetype, the essential truth of the faith is presumed. Theology is seen as the unfolding of the doctrines of the faith. Within the archetype, it can take varied forms. It can conserve - accept and repeat - traditional doctrines; it can correct theological and proclamatory expressions of the faith with respect to what is at the heart of the faith; it can creatively and aesthetically inter-relate the elements of the faith; it can speculatively push its accepted presuppositions in ever new and unexplored directions, within its norms; it can be written for insiders, e.g., for upbuilding faith, or for outsiders, either as polemical or as eirenic self-differentiation from alien 'faiths'. In whatever variety, however, a theology using dogmatic methodology will always accept the essential truth of its faith as a conditio sine qua non, and will be disinclined to seek compromise with or acceptability to any other thought-and-value-system save on its own terms.

(ii) "Apologetic" Method

The second archetype is like the first in that the truth of faith is assumed (consciously or unconsciously), so there is no genuine starting theological exploration viewing all possibilities as equally plausible prior to investigation; however, unlike the first archetype in apologetic methodology, the theologian engages in dialogue with other thought-and-value-systems - classically, with a view to proving the truth, or at least the respectability of his own faith to outsiders by finding common ground and exploiting this common ground to prove how his faith, rather than the other's thought-and-value-system, does justice to the implications of this common ground. Within this archetype also, theology can take varied forms. It can be highly conservative, "proving" all the traditional tenets of the faith; it can be liberal or reductionist, demonstrating the validity of the "essence of Christianity" (classically holding this "essence" to be unconsciously accepted by the non-believer - as in "anonymous Christianity", etc); it can be traditional, adopting new or traditional defences to maintain the old faith intact; or it can be progressive, showing the faith to be best defended by shedding much of the old faith. In whatever variety, however, apologetic theology never seriously questions the truth of its faith, but is always seeking ways to express itself to convince the outsider of its truth, or at least its reasonableness.

(iii) "Phenomenological" Method

In the third archetype no thought-and-value-system is presumed true or false, nor is the idea of there being no valid faith or ideology accepted or rejected, so if the writer has any faith, beliefs, ideology, opinions etc., these are set aside, so that competing truth-claims of religions (and ideologies, etc.) may be examined dispassionately. No values are presumed, since only those which are absolutely universally accepted without question may be presupposed - and none exist. In theory at least, within this archetype also, writing about theology could take varied forms. It could follow the history of religions approach, dispassionately analysing the developments and inter-relations of various faiths; it could take the comparative study of religions approach, comparing for example some central theme as found in two or more faiths, either simply describing the approaches or discussing - without any element of polemic or pejorative language - difficulties for each view; it could be philosophical, discussing with completely dispassionate objectivity the various truth-claims in religion; or it could be phenomenological in the narrower sense, investigating the pure phenomenon of religious experience without any distortion from previous philosophical presuppositions and ideas. As opposed to the apologetic archetype, phenomenological methodology archetypally avoids prejudicing the account by favourable or unfavourable comments or omissions; it is purely descriptive and not prescriptive, and could only be prescriptive if results emerged obliging compulsory acceptance (or rejection) of any value or belief. In whatever variety, however, phenomenological methodology in theology never presupposes any thought-and-value-system but merely describes its subject-matter dispassionately and in a completely value-free way.

(iv) Interim Comments

Much of the attempt to write phenomenological or apologetic theology receives its impetus from the attitude aptly expressed by Coleridge: "He who begins by loving Christianity better than truth, will proceed by loving his own sect or church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all".[18] The assumption here is that Christian theology and "truth" are markedly distinct, so theology's aim would be to reintegrate them (re-establishing Christianity's claim to be the "truth") or to differentiate them showing how, from the perspective of "truth" Christian theology must be altered or even abandoned. The impact of rationalism, the enlightenment, the rise of biblical criticism and of natural and human sciences, and critiques of Christianity arising in all this have led to a widespread adoption of the perspective implicit in Coleridge's remark. Yet we will show that the separation of Christianity and "truth" is radically impossible or unacceptable for Christianity, as we focus successively on the different methodologies.

3. Apparent Dogmatics

Many approaches which might be thought dogmatic are in fact apologetic in disguise: this can be seen if fundamentalism is examined. Certainly the impression many who reject or accept fundamentalism have is that it is a rigid, dogmatic kind of faith. Yet its expression is permeated with apologetic methodology. Certainly dogmatic arguments may be used ad hoc - as when, for example, in a common piece of argumentation, the Bible's alleged infallibility is based on itself - (viz. 2Tim.3:16, etc.) (for the argument that the Bible states its own infallibility - quite apart from exegetical considerations - will cut no ice with those not yet convinced of its infallibility). But such dogmatic arguments generally only arise ad hoc: most of the theology of most fundamentalists is apologetic, not dogmatic - hence Barr is right to talk here of "conservative apologists" or "fundamentalist apologists", whose apologetic argues both that the Bible's historical accuracy vouchsafes its theological assertions, and that its theology is so marvellous that its historical, and general accuracy is guaranteed.[1]

One main influence on modern fundamentalism, as Barr and

Sandeen have shown, and fundamentalists like J.W.Wenham have acknowledged,[2] is the Princeton school. The note in all modern fundamentalist creeds on the Bible, that it is the text "as originally given" that is infallible - a departure from the Westminster confession (Chapter 1, Article 8) - is due to the representatives of this school, namely A.A.Hodge and B.B.Warfield. Founder of the school was Hodge's father, Charles Hodge, and after Warfield, Gresham Machen led the school. Their writing is not dogmatic in methodology, but apologetic, specifically an eighteenth century rationalism in despite of Hume and Kant. Thus, as Sandeen sees, they consistently held "that if the Bible was to be proven to be God's inspired word, the demonstration must be made on the basis of reason".[3]

All this is clear in A.A.Hodge, for whom, "Christian Theology is the scientific determination, interpretation, and defence" of the Scriptures.[4] After placing theology firmly among 'auxiliary' sciences (which gives it a respectable role among other studies), Hodge places apologetics at the head of theology proper, under which he discusses "the proof of the being of God", "Natural Theology", and "the evidences of Christianity".[5] In his discussion of natural theology, he attacks Hume (without really understanding him), and in his opening words defending the teleological argument we hear the tell-tale tones of apologetic: "It is a universal and necessary judgment of reason that.."[6] Here Hodge seeks the "common ground" on the basis of which to defend his faith.

The same is clear in a later member of the school, Gresham Machen. In his Christianity and Liberalism he attacks the reductionism of the liberal apologist as ensuring that in the end so much is conceded that "the apologist has really abandoned what he started out to defend".[7] Machen seeks, however, to replace liberal, reductionist apologetic with a superior variety, as is clear in his discussion of God and revelation. He rejects the idea of revelation of God through Christ alone, affirming the need for some prior (natural) revelation, since, "Rational theism...is at the very root of Christianity", so proofs of God's existence, confirming belief, "is a vital concern to the Christian".[8] Thus here in the Princeton Theology we have a conservative apologetic based on a rather eighteenth century (pre-Humean) view of reason as the basis for the common ground on which the theology is defended: it has no sympathy with exclusive dogmatics, even of a conservative kind.

Not all fundamentalist theology is as blatantly apologetic as that of the Princeton school. Thus although Louis Berkhof calls his work "Systematic Theology", it reads more like a Christian Dogmatics. However, although he recognises that God's existence - vitally important for Christian theology - cannot be proved to the unbeliever beyond doubt, nonetheless the traditional proofs of God's existence are "not entirely devoid of value" for believers.[9] In this sense Christian theology is reasonable. As for natural theology, etc., he accepts man has an innate capacity for knowing God, and affirms general revelation, agreeing with Warfield that it is "addressed...more particularly to human reason", while endorsing the Reformers' view on the obscurity of this general revelation. So although he rejects the exaltation of general revelation over special revelation, he still values general revelation, and rejects Barth's attack on it (misunderstanding Barth as seeing revelation as "mere flashes"!).[10] Berkhof's approach is less obviously apologetic than the Princeton school, but keen to affirm its theological reasonableness:

> While Reformed theology regards the existence of God as an entirely reasonable assumption, it does not claim the ability to demonstrate this by rational argumentation. [11]

This tension between not being able to demonstrate rationalistically the faith, which can nonetheless be demonstrated as reasonable, is common in the fundamentalist tradition.

While E.J.Young endorses the dogmatic argument for biblical infallibility from the Bible, he enthusiastically welcomes the "evidence" of archaeology held to affirm pentateuchal historicity, and believes biblical inerrancy - or trustworthiness - is reasonably demonstrated, so that only sin blinds men to this truth: these "evidences" convincingly show Scripture is divine.[12]

J.I.Packer quotes C.H.Spurgeon: "Defend the Bible? I would as soon defend a lion" (i.e., no apologetic is needed) - but then Packer goes on to defend it anyway! Packer believes there is common ground between evangelicals and others (whether Christian or non-Christian), namely, "facts", since "right reason cannot endanger sound faith"; and while the unbeliever cannot be argued into faith, evangelical theology should "demonstrate the intellectual adequacy of the biblical faith". Thus Packer believes he is "loyal to the evidence both of Scripture and of empirical enquiry", since he believes each can interpret the other unproblematically. Thus for Packer, "The true antithesis here...is not between faith and reason...but between a faithful and a faithless use of reason."[13]

John Wenham's writing is similar to Packer's. While adopting a modified version of the dogmatic argument for biblical inerrancy (sc. the Bible is inerrant because Christ says so), Wenham exemplifies the same rationalism as the Princeton School:

> Jesus condemns neither minuteness of study nor the exercise of reason. His condemnation comes when the wickedness of men so perverts their reason or their methods of study that they become blind to the inner principles of the divine revelation.[14]

It is "reason" that must not be perverted, then. Wenham actually sees N.T. use of Scripture as "apologetic", and frequently defends the reasonableness of Jesus or the Old Testament (i.e., vis à vis objections to Jesus, or to O.T. passages portraying God recommending slaughter, etc.). [15]

More than most, Martyn Lloyd-Jones recognises there are dangers in apologetics for conservative theology, i.e., in becoming worldly-wise in "approaching the world on the grounds of apologetics instead of (with the apostle Paul), determining not to know anything 'save Christ crucified'." But he too uses apologetics, recognising that rational arguments for Scriptural authority may not convince outsiders, but that apologetic arguments have value in "confirming" and sustaining faith.[16]

Profoundest of all the writers in this tradition (more precisely in Dutch Neo-Calvinism) is G.C.Berkouwer. He is the one whose writing is least tainted by the apologetic motif, and whose theology most closely approximates to dogmatics. This can be seen in his volume General Revelation, which contains an extensive dialogue with Barth, for although he wishes to allow some room for general revelation, this is hedged about with qualifications - that no natural theology is permissible (Berkouwer differentiates general revelation and natural theology), it is intelligible only to faith, its limits are set by Scripture, it can have no normative role in theology, etc.[17] John Riches suggests that it may be Berkouwer's book on Barth that provided the turning-point for Berkouwer expanding his position from a pre-Humean orthodoxy (as we have seen in the Princeton theology) to a much more sensitive and sympathetic reflection on Scripture, and on Catholic, and other theological and philosophical views.[18] General Revelation precedes

Berkouwer's book on Barth, and may mark the transition: certainly, however, while "Berkouwer is no Barth", Riches is right to suggest it is positive engagement with Barth's theology which provided the stimulus to deepen Berkouwer's own works, and it is no doubt Barth's influence which pulls Berkouwer furthest from apologetic methodology in theology.

Many other writers in the fundamentalist tradition - and especially its populists - are crudely apologetic. Thus J.N.D.Anderson defends the historicity of the resurrection, believing that it is the presuppositions of the theologian (but not those of the historian or lawyer!) which encourage doubt. Barr is right to see Anderson as typical of fundamentalist apologists, convinced of the incontrovertible reasonableness of their case, and, even more significantly, of the incontrovertible unreasonableness of anyone who doubts anything they believe.[19]

Rationalism breathes through every page of Francis A.Schaeffer, according to whom the sin of all modern thought, and especially modern theology, is to make "an upper-storey leap" or move "below the line of despair", i.e., allow irrationalism. He believes true Christian theology must adopt a "presuppositional apologetic" to counter the abandonment of absolutes and antithesis - right and wrong, true and false; so while rationality is not the only virtue, it is of fundamental importance, since it "defines and provides a form for the whole" of intelligible discourse including theology. Despite modern irrationalism, Schaeffer believes dialogue and common ground with the non-believer are possible, since "no one can live logically according to his own non-Christian presuppositions", thus apologetic can break down irrational recalcitrance to the gospel.[20] Schaeffer makes the reason clear for his extraordinary confidence in reason in an autobiographical passage, where he explains that having abandoned the Christianity of his liberal background, he read the Bible (for comparative work), and became convinced that "the system the Bible teaches" was right, and can speak for itself "in the market place of...ideas".[21] His trust in reason is clearer still where Schaeffer argues that it is rational that, if God exists (a belief Schaeffer already sees as the only rational option) then the Bible must be infallible: God would not merely "communicate some vaguely true things, but...propositional truth", i.e., that the Bible is infallible is a reasonable, a rational deduction from his existence.[22] This is natural theology with a vengeance!

Michael Green is another writer whose books are permeated with apologetic, and who believes that while argument may not compel the unbeliever to repent, it can show the reasonableness of Christian belief and the unreasonableness of unbelief. Green thinks the results of Christian apologetic are like those scientific results which prove high correlation between smoking and lung cancer - the smoker disbelieving the evidence is like the unbeliever disbelieving the gospel, in view of historical and contemporary evidence, etc. Unbelief is thus irrational. Many of his ideas are similar to Schaeffer's on this point.[23]

But the reader who has the stomach for the crassest apologetics within the fundamentalist tradition should read Josh McDowell, of whose work an admirer claims "no intelligent person can read this with an open mind without coming to the conclusion that Jesus Christ is the unique Son of God and man's only sufficient Saviour".[24] In his brash, populist works, apologetic methodology is transparent: there is faith by the writer, the common ground (reading "with an open mind") and the aim to persuade the unbeliever.

The foregoing discussion shows amply that almost universally, fundamentalist theology is not, as its reputation might suggest, dogmatic, but apologetic in methodological archetype. It is further interesting that the nearest example we find to an exception - G.C.Berkouwer - is exceptional on account of his influence from Barth and his adoption of some of Barth's ideas and sympathetic appraisal of even what he declines in Barth.

4. Apparent Phenomenology

The phenomenological archetype, as we have described it, is an approach often aimed at, but we suggest, never achieved - it always lapses into apologetic methodology, in that, clandestinely, a particular thought-and-value-system is always presupposed. We shall demonstrate this with reference to two English theologians' attempt to adopt 'phenomenological' (or, 'philosophical') method - Hick and Cupitt - before returning to more general observations.

Although Hick's early theodicy, Evil and the God of Love, is clear apologetic in methodology, his more recent works betray the attempt to work with the method we label 'phenomenological'. In God and the Universe of Faiths, Hick argues for a 'Copernican revolution' in theology: the Catholic, "outside the church there is no salvation", and the evangelical Protestant, "outside Christianity there is no salvation" must go; just as geocentric Ptolemaic astromony had to give way to the Copernican heliocentric model, so ecclesiocentric or christocentric theology must give way to truly theocentric faith. In this context Christianity is deposed from the centre of the religious solar system, so that all religions, including Christianity, become planets revolving around the true centre of all faith, the transcendent God; i.e., only, "outside God, no salvation" - but then, for Hick, no one is outside God.[25] So all religions must be studied equally, without prejudice, since the truth is transcendent to all. This apparent use of phenomenological methodology is not so straight-forward, however. Hick gives us elsewhere the real reason for his 'Copernican revolution': is it "credible" that God only saves Christians? Doesn't that reduce God to a Western "tribal deity" from which he must be freed by Hick's Copernican revolution?[26] In fact Hick is unwilling to allow anything that might in any way undermine the universalist soteriology he so confidently deduced in his earlier, blatantly apologetic work.[27] With this elucidation, Hick's motive and presupposition for his 'Copernican revolution' becomes all too clear: afraid the christocentric thrust of Christian theology will threaten the universalist soteriology Hick affirmed in his apologetics, Hick has allowed this apologetic element to dominate his conception of faith so as to stand over against Christianity, in the end demolishing it in favour of creeping syncretism. The apologetic remains - but the context shifts, from Christianity to the attempted reconciliation of all faiths, with the prospect of different religions eventually seeming merely like different demominations.[28] Thus Hick's method, far from being phenomenological, is written out of a clear apologetic intent - safeguarding universalism. This disjunction between Hick's phenomenological aim and apologetic achievment is clearer still in his Death and Eternal Life: he specifically defines methodology in archetypally phenomenological terms as "the principle of openness to all data", arguing for dispassionate, unbiased enquiry into truth.[29] Certainly Hick is sympathetic to, e.g, Buddhist and Hindu ideas on reincarnation, and not merely to Christian and Western talk of resurrection and immortality. But a closer look reveals the same apologetic intent: his sympathetic openness does not extend, as he discusses "Christian Approaches", to the perspective, held by most Christians of all eras, that universal salvation cannot be counted on. Specifically he attacks Barth for allowing the concept of divine sovereignty to impede the idea that universal salvation is an obligatory concept of theology.[30] Once again, once the apologetic of universalism is challenged, his "principle of openness to all data" disappears: he is unwilling to be open to traditional Christian (or other) beliefs in hell, or even towards any perspective - no matter how religious or widespread - which hesitates to affirm absolute certainty in universal salvation. Hick's apparent phenomenological methodology turns out to be apologetic after all, as he presupposes a thought-and-value-system (not necessarily Christian) in which universal salvation is categorically affirmed.

Don Cupitt also thinks his methodology has changed. In Christ and the Hiddenness of God, he accepts that in applying "philosophical method to the study of some basic religious beliefs" (more accurately, Christian beliefs), his "enquiry cannot be theologically neutral", since he must "give reasons for adopting one account of the matter rather than another".[31] This work, seeking to make

Christian theology no longer vulnerable to attacks from British empiricist philosophy (and thus become reasonable) clearly follows the "apologetic" methodology. However, in The Leap of Reason he believes he is no longer "asking what religious belief looks like from one particular point of view"[32] but is starting from the problem of relativism of points of view; furthermore, he believes he can not only proceed without particular points of view (i.e., "phenomenologically"), but can also deduce ethical monotheism of a sort of Christian kind from it to resolve the tension between the tyranny of particular points of view and the anarchy of the worthlessness of all points of view implicit in relativism. With Cupitt, then, we have an example of the attempt to work within "phenomenological" methodology and yet validly make prescriptive judgments about religion and faith.

Similarly to Hick, Cupitt affirms that the true God is transcendent to our faiths, and so faith should affirm its own relativity (i.e., as one of the 'universe of faiths').[33] There are competing truth-claims in religion: that is Cupitt's starting-point. He claims that man is marked as spirit, with freedom, because man can transcend the limitations of his own point of view by actually understanding a different truth-claim while continuing to accept his own; he can make the leap of imaginative understanding. This transcendence cannot satisfactorily be conceived subjectively, but only objectively. Thus what is transcendent is not a subjectivity, but an objectivity; so Cupitt reaches his ethical monotheism where God transcends all possible models of him – and he reaches also his model of the life of faith, i.e., that, sensitive to the relativism, the believer lives out his life in ethical responsibility to the utterly transcendent God.[34]

In the context of this apparent freedom from points of view, the apologetic element, though unrecognised, enters right at the outset: Cupitt prefers relativism to dogmatism – because relativism brings tolerance, but dogmatism, intolerance, and Cupitt prefers tolerance. In this, he makes a truth-claim about competing truth-claims. Based on his apologetic for tolerance, he can deduce a God who, appropriately, is so incomprehensibly transcendent, that all truth-claims about him are said to be undemonstrable, so all must be tolerated: Cupitt's God, in this book, safeguards religious relativism and thus human tolerance. This apologetic element is clearer, if we look at Cupitt's explicit plea for tolerance in Crisis of Moral Authority, where he distinguishes "two-cities" and "one-city" interpretations of the Church/world relation: in "two-cities" Christianity, the Church as minority will be a fanatical sectarian opposition group, and as majority, tyrannical power; but in "one-city" Christianity, even if politically weak and lacking "cutting edge", is morally superior and "the only serious possibility" in the era of the technological global village.[35] Thus even if dogmatic, "two-cities" theology is indefensible.

theologians and church leaders can improve matters by being less permissive of obscurantism and having "a concern for truth".[36] In a word, theology becomes more reasonable, more acceptable to empiricism and pragmatism if it abandons "dogmatic", "two-cities", Christianity in favour of "tolerant", "one-city" Christianity.

While the apologetic for tolerance has a higher profile in this earlier work, we can now see how it clearly underlies The Leap of Reason. Cupitt wants to defend transcendent ethical monotheism as the ideological guarantee of tolerance, but by starting, as he must, with the impossibility of deciding between competing truth-claims in religion (or at least of adducing valid arguments demonstrating the veracity of particular truth-claims), he contradicts himself, by claiming that God so transcends all interpretations of him that truth-claims about him cannot validly be made. This is itself a contestable truth-claim - for it is at least conceivable that one particular interpretation of God is preferable, even vastly preferable, to others. Cupitt doesn't help us, as he claims, to decide between truth-claims, he merely adds another truth-claim. Cupitt's argument fails at this point, as it was bound to, because he attempts to write theology in the style we call "phenomenological", but all the while there is the (unconscious) smuggled-in apologetic for tolerance. As with Hick, the upshot of Cupitt's apologetic is a 'universe of faiths' idea. And finally, just as Hick's apologetic gained autonomy over against his Christianity and led him into syncretism, the same has happened with Cupitt in his more recent writings, with the addition that he believes it necessary to "take leave of God".

Hick and Cupitt are not alone in failing to achieve "phenomenological" methodology: the methodology itself proves, on examination, to be radically impossible. Its mystique is that it looks tantalisingly possible to some - but always dissolves into apologetic methodology when attempted.

Thus when a researcher claims "objective", "dispassionate" research demonstrates as superior one religion, ethic, or aspect of them, we can be sure a value-judgment will have been presupposed, consciously or unconsciously. So if the researcher believes, for example, in loving concern, maybe liberal Christianity would be "objectively" deduced from the "evidence" as the highest religion, or, if detachment is preferred, Stoicism would be concluded. For the researcher, in judging one effect (theoretical or practical) of a religion to be preferable, necessarily demonstrates in his judgment his own value-judgments. The same introduction of value-preferences clearly emerges also in the history of religions approach, where commonly the idea of progress in religion is assumed (a sure device for leading to cultural Christianity) - or it may be primeval originality is preferred (which leads to the search for original "natural" religion). Even where the task, say in comparative study of religions, is seen as purely descriptive, the value-judgments of the writer will constantly distort the impartiality of the descriptions - not least in the mere fact of selecting this theme rather than that, in the context of these faiths rather than those, and thus betraying prejudices and preferences.

The impossibility of phenomenological methodology is related to the well-known is/ought dichotomy: that merely to say something is entitles no particular statements about what ought to be. The decisive problem, however, is cultural and general relativism: if truth-claims are relative, then so are truth-claims about truth-claims! If the phenomenologist claims to discern the truth in truth-claims, he has abandoned relativism and holds to a particular view-point, and is no longer a phenomenologist. If he claims he is still unbiased, etc., he deceives himself, and writes surreptitious apologetics. Thus we conclude the third, or phenomenological, methodology is utterly impossible.

5. Unacceptable Apologetics

(i) Fraudulence

Apologetics is fraudulent because the apologist poses as open to the truth, yet never seriously questions the essential truth of his 'faith' (or truth-and-value-system). The sleight-of-hand can happen (1) in presupposing a 'faith', yet pretending none is presupposed: with Hick, universalism was his unconscious apologetic presupposition, and with Cupitt, it was the need for tolerance. The apologist can "prove" his case by posing as presuppositionless - but making presuppositions anyway.

Alternatively, the deception can occur (2) in securing the "common ground". The faith may be openly acknowledged and presupposed, but the argument is based on "common ground" with the unbeliever whereby the apologist seeks to demonstrate that his own faith more adequately works from the common ground than his rivals'. This method is commonly adopted by the fundamentalists, where common ground is sought in the principle of antithesis (Schaeffer), the historical evidence for the resurrection (Anderson) or the "judgment of reason" (A.A.Hodge). The sleight-of-hand comes in the fact that the ground is not "common". Thus Hodge says, "It is a universal and necessary judgment of reason that order and adaptation can only spring from an intelligent cause" - but it is not universal: Hume (with whom he argues here) denied it! Anderson's historical evidence for the resurrection is not rejected by theologians alone; some historians and even lawyers have not accepted the evidence - so the ground is not common there. Schaeffer's principle of antithesis that "no one can live logically according to his non-Christian presuppositions" turns out to depend on Schaeffer's definition of man as dependent in his "mannishness" on Christianity as "the truth of what is there".[37] Schaeffer's common ground -

that believer and unbeliever alike, deep down, presuppose rationality, non-illogicality - turns out to be based on his definition of Christianity as true.

And Pannenberg's use of universal history, the historical context of the resurrection in apocalyptic providing the "common ground" with modern thought, has been strongly challenged. Other writers also work in this way; thus in general, the apologist can "prove" his case on the basis of "common ground" which is not common. Apologetics is thus fraudulent because it feigns an impartiality which it denies.

(ii) Self-defeating

The task of apologetics is to defend the faith, and thereby to encourage the faithful and persuade the unbeliever. But frequently apologetics - especially hidden apologetics - can assume autonomy over against the faith it supposedly defends, and destroy it. This is particularly clear when apologetics takes a reductionist turn - ie., the faith made more 'reasonable' to the unbeliever by altering its 'unreasonable' aspects. We saw this happening with Hick's universalism - leading him into syncretism, and with Cupitt's spirit of tolerance - leading him into atheism. The same dubious development can be seen in the use of Bultmann's demythologisation programme (ultimately an apologetic device to make Christianity more acceptable to modern man), i.e., in the succeeding dekerygmatisation programme of Fritz Buri and the American 1960's "death of God" theology which was the _reductio ad absurdum_ of that apologetic denouement. Similarly, we are suspicious of the results so far of Pannenberg's programme, with its questionable reduction of theology to ontology, and both to a vacated future which, as event, is itself problematic. The implicit apologetic drive of Pannenberg's theology is becoming more explicit, and a gradual shift is discernible from revelation and Christology to philosophy, via the dominant concept of history. Already the idea that "God does not yet exist" is suspect - and where will these ideas lead? It is certainly common that the apologetic destroys the faith it seeks to defend.

Apologetics, then, is very common, and is certainly possible. But it is an unacceptable method for theology, because it is highly fraudulent (epecially in 'conservative' variants), and dangerously self-defeating (especially in 'liberal' variants).

6. Dogmatic Methodology

With phenomenology impossible and apologetics unacceptable, that leaves only dogmatics! Yet we have seen that many apparent dogmatic theologies drift into apologetics. By the process of elimination we may have established the validity of dogmatics - but is it, too, impossible? The dogmatic methodology as defined in this thesis is exemplified above all by Karl Barth, whose Church Dogmatics, especially in the opening pages of _I/1_, has worked it through more consistently than anyone before him. Yet Barth, who, as we have seen, ruled out any place for philosophy in his theology, and asserted that the criterion of Christian truth is Jesus Christ (I/1,p.3), has been accused of importing philosophy into his theology. R.H.Roberts' somewhat abusive review is a recent example. He makes a number of charges - "cancerous Doppelgänger", "logical parasitism", fear of "natural reality", grace "regurgitates" nature as a revealed natural theology, "theological totalitarianism", his theology has caused apostasy, and is a "Dreadnought"[38] - and it is not always clear if these ad hominem remarks mean anything. Essentially, however, he accuses Barth of absorbing a philosophy of time from Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard, with some input from Anselm, which hardens into an ontological diastasis between time and eternity, God and man, first worked out in R.II and only worked through more thoroughly in C.D. Thus Barth is said on this basis, in C.D., to employ "the systematic exclusion of any dimension not immediately derivable from his primal sources of reality".[39] This is where Roberts, and many other misinterpreters of Barth, go wrong: Barth accepted that natural theology, apologetics, etc., may be possible; what he rejected was that they should have any normative role and thus any role at all in theology. In other words, God can speak through Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard, or through Buddhism or Communism or a dead dog (I/1,p.60) - but these should have no normative role for theology: "God may speak to us through a pagan or an atheist...But that is not equivalent to saying...that we should have ourselves to proclaim the pagan and atheist thing we heard" (I/1,pp.60f.). Barth does not deny "natural reality" and certainly does not "systematically exclude" it; he argues that "any dimension not immediately derivable from his primal sources of reality", i.e., not derivable from what God tells us in his "gracious approach to man in revelation and reconciliation" in Jesus Christ (I/1,p.3), should have no normative role in theology. In a word, Barth insists that Christian theology should at least be Christian theology, it should at least arise purely from God's approach to man and not be distracted by the temptation to fraudulent and self-defeating apologetics. The detection of the language of this philosopher or the concept of that philosopher does not, however, mean that the task of dogmatics has been abandoned - its abandonment only comes when the freedom of theology has been surrendered in some measure to an alien thought-and-value-system: philosophy may only occur eclectically within dogmatic theology - as and when the subject matter can be best expressed in the language of this or that writer. Thus Barth's use of Kant, Hegel or Kierkegaard does not necessarily mean he has abandoned his task, nor does his use of terms like 'ontological', 'ontic', and 'noetic' (reminiscent of, if used differently to, Heidegger). Barth's theological method makes sense of his use of history (which is not an 'autonomous' discipline) in that, in the context of dogmatics, making historical statements - about crucifixion, resurrection, etc. - is now seen not as an impossible, but a necessary exercise. And Barth remained faithful to his method - the only one, I suggest, which is possible, honest and secure for Christian theology. Thus, as Barth says:

> As a theological discipline, dogmatics is the scientific test to which the Christian Church puts herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her (I/1,p.1).

II THE RESURRECTION IN BARTH: CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, as we do, that in his basic methodology Barth is fundamentally right over against his critics, is not to assume he is beyond criticism. We must get beyond the simplistic choice between Barthian fundamentalism and rigid anti-Barthianism. A choice does have to be made on the fundamental issue of methodology, and we have decided with Barth for dogmatics. But within that context there is certainly room for critical appreciation and potential improvement. And we have seen that an area in need of improvement - which it can receive within the basic (methodological) context of his theology - is the theology of resurrection.

Above all, the soteriological dimension of the resurrection needs to be broadened, to accord more closely with N.T. insights. The reduction to the cognitive dimension of sin, grace, church, virtue and baptism provides a truncation when compared with the more realistic picture in N.T. writers. The dynamic reality of the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a genuine event really affecting the picture in a more than merely revelatory way needs to be affirmed: if there is one element in Pannenberg's theology which would improve Barth's own theology, and bring it closer to the biblical witness to Jesus, it is the idea of retroactive power in the resurrection - though retroactive not in revelatory terms only but soteriologically. This would also remove the force of Pannenberg's main criticism, that the resurrection is overshadowed by the incarnation in Barth's theology - a criticism not removed by Klappert's attempted defence of Barth - since on this basis the resurrection would not be absorbed backwards into cross, incarnation and election, and forwards into Pentecost, but would be given the recognition it receives in the N.T. also, as soteriological event. Barth's over-use of the concept of revelation also causes a certain depersonalisation of the Holy Spirit - whose relation to the resurrection, though often affirmed, is never made clear. Again, we are left uncertain about the 'pure presence of God' in the Easter period. Because of Barth's association of various ideas, it seems some kind of revelation is affirmed here - but it seems difficult to differentiate it in Barth's writings from the revelation of Elijah to Elisha. Moreover, the associated concept of our own eschatological resurrection, as a mere revelation of our lives as they have been in merited shame yet also unmerited glory, seems radically obscure. Here the collapsing of the biblical idea of resurrection into revelation alone seems most radical - and confusing. To whom will our lives be revealed? And will we be aware of the revelation? If so, in what capacity? Furthermore we found that Barth's elaborate use of structures, despite the formal parallelism, was radically asymmetrical, and that the most important effect of this was a further, dubious, reinforcement of the role of revelation in his theology. The most important overhaul, then, of Barth's theology of resurrection concerns its reduction to revelation, and the necessity of expanding the soteriological dimension - first, in itself, but also backwards (retroactively) into the life and death of Jesus, and in a sense into the years of expectation in Israel, and forwards into the era of the community, in a more than merely cognitive way.

Other difficulties concerned especially Barth's biblical exegesis. His interpretation of the resurrection is distorted by an unadmitted compression and harmonisation of the biblical narratives, chronologically into the Lucan framework, and theologically into the Johannine τετέλεσται. Similarly, his ingenious virgin birth/incarnation: empty tomb/resurrection parallelism finds no support in Scripture - indeed Scripture provides a different context for the virgin birth doctrine, and and also sees empty tomb and appearance together as the signs - the negative and positive complementary signs - of the resurrection, and not the empty tomb alone. Nonetheless Barth's increasing tendency to affirm the concrete historical reality of the resurrection must be supported, as indeed his attempt to rescue the historical dimension generally. But this needs to be furthered, since Barth's "historical figure of Jesus...often seems to become an ideal rather than a concrete figure".[40]

In this work we have highlighted a number of areas in Barth's theology of resurrection which are of doubtful validity and need reworking to improve them and his justice to the theme in general. However, like Jüngel's essay on Barth's doctrine of baptism, the critical features of this thesis are not written to undermine Barth's basic programme, but to further it.[41]

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES TO PREFACE

1. T.F.Torrance: editor's preface to the E.T. of C.D.IV/1-4, p.VI.

2. G.G.O'Collins: What Are They Saying about the Resurrection? (Paulist Press, 1978), pp.21f.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. G.G. O'Collins: 'Karl Barth on Christ's Resurrection', SJT 26, (1973), p. 85.

2. Cf. for what follows: H.U. von Balthasar: Karl Barth, Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie (Cologne, 1962^{2}); G.C. Berkouwer: Triumph; T.F.Torrance: Karl Barth. An Introduction to his early Theology, 1911-1931 (SCM, 1972), etc.

3. I/1, pp. ixf.

4. I/1, pp. 11f.

5. Anselm, pp. 11f.

6. Karl Adam: 'Die Theologie der Krisis' in Hochland (Year 23, part II, 1926) cited H.Bouillard: K.B.I, p.17 and W. Nicholls: Systematic and Philosophical Theology (Penguin, 1969), p.75.

7. Cf. Barth's similar language as late as IV/4, where in discussion on the same passage he says: "before them there is only a walk in newness of life corresponding to the raising of Jesus Christ from the dead". (IV/4,p.118).

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. The reader is directed to the Bibliography, Section 1B, for the complete list of secondary material used in the preparation of this chapter - but especially to E.Busch: KB.

2. For the list of primary material used in this chapter, see Bibliography, Section 1A.

3. J.D.Smart: Divided Mind, pp. 45-47, exaggerates the significance of scientific method for Barth in this essay: Barth values not the historical method, but its relativism - leaving the door open for 'devotion' to be seen as the way to living faith in Jesus.

4. Ib., p.48.

4A. This essay undermines W.R. Ward's scathing review of Marquardt, Gollwitzer, etc., and his deprecating comment that Barth was basically unpolitical before 1935 - unpolitical in 1914-18 when every political certainty was being shaken. Ward believes no more relevant material will appear ('The Socialist Commitment in Karl Barth' in *Studies in Church History* Vol.15, pp.453-465, here, p.453) - he obviously did not count on this essay of Barth's, nor the volume in *GA* which Marquardt is editing of Barth's socialist speeches!

5. Cf. W. Pannenberg: *BQT II*, p. 202.

6. The full picture will be clear when the relevant *GA* material is published over the next two or three decades, i.e., two volumes on works 1906-21, three volumes of sermons 1907-12, confirmation instruction 1909-21, and perhaps more correspondence volumes from this period.

7. Letter to the author, 9.4.1980: "Das Thema ist in seiner allersten (*sic.*: typing error for allerersten), frühen, "liberalen" Zeit, wie mir scheint, ihm nicht gerade wichtig gewesen...Ich vermute, daß der wichtige Begriff des "inneren Lebens" bzw. des "Erlebnisses" in der frühsten Zeit Barths eine eigentliche Auferstehungs-Theologie überflüssig gemacht hat."

8. MS obscure: perhaps "for".

9. D.F.Strauss: *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, tr. George Eliot, with additions by V.G.Brookshire, J.O.Duke, J.C.Shelley and ed. by P.C.Hodgson (SCM, 1973), from the 1892 edition, pp.740-744, esp. p. 742.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. For the primary and secondary material used, see Bibliography, Section 2.

2. Barth: 'Evangelical Theology in the 19th century', in *The Humanity of God* (Fontana^2, 1967), pp. 12f. (tr.altered).

3. Cf. *Rev.Th.*, p. 28.

4. Ib., p. 26.

5. Barth: *Nachwort*, p.293 (=*GA.11*(ET), p.263): *I/1*, p.82; *II/1*, p.633.

6. Busch: Pietisten, p.47; KB, pp.87f.

7. Ib., pp. 43f.; cf. Rev.Th., p. 38.

8. Barth: Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 650f.

9. Ib., pp. 651f.

10. Page numbers in the text refer to this work.

11. The contrast between 'Church' and 'Community' is not so great in German.

12. H.-Martin Rumscheidt: Revelation and Theology (CUP, 1972), p.10.

13. Sehnsucht ("longing" or "yearning"): for its significance, cf. D.Schellong in G.Hunsinger (ed.): Karl Barth and Radical Politics, pp.148-150 (cf. F.-W.Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus, pp. 183ff., esp. pp.195f.).

14. Page numbers in the text refer to this work.

15. G. Sauter: Die Theologie des Reiches Gottes beim älteren und jüngeren Blumhardt, pp. 29ff., 116.

16. Ib., pp. 33f.

17. Smart: op.cit., p. 82.

18. F.-W.Marquardt: Der Christ in der Gesellschaft 1919-1979 (CKV, 1980), p.22.

19. GA,1, p.155 (tr.slightly altered).

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. The suggestion comes from some writers in the fundamentalist tradition (though not all!); notably: C.Van Til: The New Modernism (James Clark, 1946); F.A.Schaeffer: The God Who is There (Hodder, 1968).

2. GA,2, SS. 72, 324, 336, 363, 364. Barth first read Kierkegaard (without much impact) in 1909 (Busch: K.B., p.116).

3. J.D.Smart: Divided Mind, p.100.

4. Rev.Th., p. 48 (= GA,2, S. 350; the ET abridges the original letter).

5. GA,2, SS.310,320; Busch: K.B., p.108.

6. Ib., p.115.

7. Smart, op.cit., p.101.

8. E.Thurneysen: 'Introduction' in *Rev.Th.*, p.21.

9. Smart, op.cit. p.103.

10. Ib., p.105.

11. Ib., p.106.

12. Ib., pp.64f.

13. Busch: *K.B.*, p.116.

14. Smart, op.cit., p. 115.

15. Ib., pp.111; Busch: *K.B.*., p.116; Wolgschaft: *Hoffnung*, p.50.

16 *Rev.Th.*, p.47.

17 Wolgschaft, op.cit., pp.48, 55f.

18. J. A. Veitch: 'Revelation and Religion in the Theology of Karl Barth' (SJT, Vol.24, No.1, Feb. 1971), p.4.

19. Smart, op.cit., p.110.

20. R.Bultmann: 'Karl Barths *Römerbrief* in zweiter Auflage', reprinted in J.Moltmann (ed.): *Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie I* (CKV^4, 1977), pp. 119-147, here, p.138.

21. Smart, op.cit.,pp.120f.

22. Veitch, op.cit., p.5.

23. Ib., pp.7f.

24. Smart, op.cit.,p.111.

25. Ib., p.116.

26. Ib., p.112.

27. Cf.Ib.,p.110; Bouillard: *K.B.I*, pp.20-30; Wolgschaft, op. cit., pp. 55-59.

28. Cf. the similar summary by Bouillard: *K.B.I*, p.22.

29. *RD* , pp. 185f; Cf. Wolgschaft, op. cit., pp.58, 62f., who sees this as a foretaste of Barth's later use of the concept of analogy.

30. Cf.chapter 8, section I, where Barth's treatment in *IV/1* is discussed in such language by

Klappert and Jüngel.

31. Cf. Smart, op.cit., pp.112-114.

32. For the details, see E.Jüngel: The Doctrine of the Trinity (Scottish Academic Press, 1976), pp.75f., note 57, and C.Gestrich: Neuzeitliches Denken und die Spaltung der dialektischen Theologie (J.C.B.Mohr, 1977), pp.41f., note 9.

33. Cf. chapter 1 on Rom.4:23ff., above.

34. Smart, op.cit., p.115.

35. Pannenberg, TKG, p.52; CWE, p.31.

36. Wolgschaft, op. cit.; cf. also Gestrich, op. cit., p.57.

37. Roberts: KBDT, p. 97; G. Wingren: Theology in Conflict (ET: Oliver and Boyd, 1958), p.23 speaks similarly. For Wingren's attack, see chapter 8, section III, below.

38. Ib., p.99.

39. Bouillard: K.B.I, pp.18f.

40. Readers interested in the rapprochement and divergence of Barth and Bultmann should read GA,1, Smart, op.cit., and Gestrich, op.cit.

41. Paul S. Minear: 'Barth's Commentary On The Romans 1922-1972' in H.-M.Rumscheidt (ed.): Footnotes to a Theology (SR Supplements, 1974), pp.8-29, here, pp.26f.

42. Barth: 'An Answer to Professor Adolf von Harnack's Open Letter' (1923) in H.-M.Rumscheidt (ed.): Revelation and Theology (CUP, 1972), p.46.

43. Barth: RD, p.106.

44. Smart, op.cit., pp.141ff.

45. Barth: RD, p.192; cf. Wolgschaft, op.cit.,p.59.

46. Bultmann: Faith and Understanding I (ET: SCM, 1969), pp.66-94, here, pp.90,92f.

47. Barth: RD, pp. 104-106; cf. pp. 201f, 199f.; cf. Bouillard: K.B.I,pp.44-52, esp. pp.48, 51f.

48. Bouillard: K.B.I, p.52.

49. T.Rendtorff: Theorie des Christentums (Gütersloh, 1972), pp.161-181, e.g., pp.164,171.

50. W.Kreck: Grundentscheidungen in Karl Barths

Dogmatik (Neukirchener Verlag, 1978), pp.75-81.

51. Cf. Bouillard: *K.B.I*, pp.44ff., 36ff.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Luther: *WA*15, 411, 21-23, cited in H.Thielicke: *Between Heaven and Earth* (James Clarke, 1967), p.77.

2. Barth: 'Auferstehung' in *Zwischen den Zeiten*, Vol.5 (1927),pp.201-205, here, p.202.

3. For the significance of the changes, see W.Kreck: *Grundentscheidungen in Karl Barths Dogmatik* (Neukirchener Verlag, 1978),pp.75-95.

4. Ib., p.5.

5. A.Louth: *Mary and the Mystery of the Incarnation* (Sisters of the Love of God, 1977),pp.1-6; references in the text are to this work.

6. Pannenberg: *JGM*,pp.141-149; references in the text are to this work.

7. Louth, op. cit., p.4.

8. Barth: *Anselm*, p.102; references in the text are to this work.

9. See Part Three for this contrast.

10. For this section, see E. Schweizer: *The Good News According to Matthew* (ET: SPCK, 1976), and J.Schniewind : *Das Evangelium nach Matthaeus* (V&R, 1964).

11. Schweizer, op.cit., p.25; see A.R.C.Leaney: *The Gospel According to St.Luke* (A.&C.Black^2, 1966) for this section.

12. Cf. E.Schweizer: *The Good News According to Mark* (ET: SPCK, 1971), pp.254-258.

13. For this section, see J. Bligh: *Galatians* (St. Paul, 1969), and P.Bonnard: *L'Épître de Saint Paul aux Galates* (Delachaux et Niestlé^2, 1972).

14. For this section, see R. E. Brown: *The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus* (Geoffrey Chapman, 1974); C.K. Barrett: *The Gospel According to St. John* (SPCK, 1955); E.C.Hoskyns (ed. F.N.Davey): *The Fourth Gospel* (Faber, 1942); W.Temple: *Readings in St. John's Gospel* (Complete ed., 1945, Macmillan).

15. See chapter 6, below.

16. Louth's suggestions (op.cit.) are the more surprising in view of his acceptance, more or less, of Barth's attitude to natural theology, in 'Barth and the Problem of Natural Theology' (*The Downside Review*, July 1969, No.288), pp.268-277.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. D. Clausert: *Theologischer Zeitbegriff und politisches Zeitbewußtsein in Karl Barths Dogmatik dargestellt am Beispiel der Prolegomena* (CKV, 1982), pp.117f.

2. Roberts: *KBDT*, p.136.

3. Clausert, op.cit., p.132 (my emphasis).

4. Bultmann: *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition* (Göttingen, 1921), p.157; Cf. ET of the second German ed., pp.259f.

5. Barth: *GA,9*, pp.121f.

6. Barth: *GA,7*, S. 267. Already in 1925, in *GA,9*, p.117, Barth preferred "camped" to "lived" - and indeed, preferred "lodged" to both, as capturing both aspects.

7. For this section see R. H. Fuller: *The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives* (SPCK, 1972), cf. esp. pp.43, and 47f.; and Xavier Léon-Dufour: *Resurrection and the Message of Easter* (ET: Geoffrey Chapman, 1974), cf. esp. p.77.

8. J. Moltmann: *The Theology of Hope* (ET: SCM, 1967), pp.57f.

9. Barth: *GA,9*, pp.120f.

10. Moltmann, op.cit., p.56.

11. Roberts, op.cit., esp. pp.97ff., 114ff.; Moltmann, op.cit., pp.50-58; cf. Colin E. Gunton: *Becoming and Being* (OUP, 1978), pp.177-185, esp. pp. 179-181.

12. Barth: *Credo*, pp.169-171.

13. Barth: *Dogmatics in Outline*, pp.154f.

14. Moltmann, op.cit., pp.50-58.

15. Roberts, op.cit., pp.87-146.

16. Ib., p.144.

17. Ib., p.127.

18. Gunton, op.cit., p.177.

19. Ib., pp.181f.

20. O. Cullmann: *Christ and Time* (ET: SCM, 1951), p.60,n.14, pp.62ff.

21. Gunton, op.cit., pp.182-185.

22. G. C. Berkouwer: *Triumph*, pp.151-165, 328-246.

23. Cf. J.Barr: *Fundamentalism* (SCM,1977),pp.218ff.

24. Van A. Harvey: *The Historian and the Believer* (SCM, 1967), pp.157f.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. C. C. Dickinson: 'Church Dogmatics IV/4' in H.-M. Rumscheidt (ed.): *Karl Barth in Re-View* (Pickwick Press, 1981), p.44.

2. Cf. by contrast the different appraisal - from a similar perspective! - by Markus Barth and Verne H. Fletcher in *Acquittal by Resurrection* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

3. G. G. O'Collins: *What Are They Saying about the Resurrection?* (Paulist Press, 1978), pp.26f., 34, 22, citing *IV/1*, pp.297f., 304f.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. R. Bultmann, in *Kerygma and Myth* (SPCK^3,1972) Vol.1, p.38.

2. Klappert does also cite *JGM*,pp.302f. - but this passage is concerned with *IV/2*.

3. For comments on other themes in *IV/1*, cf. *BOT II*,p.209; *EE*,p.259.

4. *Auferweckung*,pp.4f., references in the text are to this work.

5. Heythrop Journal, Vol.16, & April 1975, pp. 22-35, 174-194; esp. pp.25-28.

6. Our own translation of this diffuse concept is

"foundational cadence".

7. St. Andrew Press, 1978; references in the text are to this work.

8. G.C. Berkouwer: Triumph, p.203.

9. S.W.Sykes: 'Appendix. On Pannenberg's Christology "From Below"', p.72 in S.W.Sykes and J.P.Clayton (ed.) Christ, Faith and History (CUP, 1972).

10. Letter to the author: 8.10.1978.

11. Ib.

12. Nicholas Lash: 'Up and Down in Christology', in Stephen Sykes and Derek Holmes (ed.): New Studies in Theology 1 (Duckworth, 1980), pp.31-46, also sees confusion not only in the usage but also the meaning of the above/below language. He rightly points out that Barth's language in IV/1,p.135 is used in a different sense to Pannenberg's methodological use, but fails to see that the ambiguity in Pannenberg's approach which he discerns, between its possibility as systematics or as apologetics, is indeed fundamental to his "from below" methodology: i.e, the "from below" approach in theology is as such systematics written with an apologetic dimension. For further discussion, see Chapter 10.

13 Paulist Press, 1978, pp.7ff., 39f.

14. The Easter Jesus (DLT, 1973), p.126.

15. T. F. Torrance: 'Introduction' (1962), in Karl Barth: Theology and Church (ET: SCM, 1962), pp.9f.

16. A. B.Come: An Introduction to Barth's Dogmatics for Preachers (SCM, 1963), p.62, cf.p.19.

17. Ib., p.75.

18. Ib.

19. Ib., cf. pp.161f.

20. Ib., p.76.

21. W.Nicholls: Systematic and Philosophical Theology (Penguin, 1969), p.119.

22. Op.cit., p.10.

23. J.D.Godsey: 'The Architecture of Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics' in J.D.Godsey (ed.): Karl

Barth's Table Talk (SJT Occ. Papers, No. 10, 1963).

24. Ib., p.9.

25. Ib., pp.10-12.

26. Ib., p.12.

27. C. Brown: Karl Barth and the Christian Message (Tyndale, 1967), pp.26f., and 124.

28. H. Hartwell: The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction (Duckworth, 1964), p.19.

29. O. Weber: Karl Barths Kirchliche Dogmatik - Ein einführender Bericht zu den Bänden IV,1 und IV,2 (Neukirchener Kreis Moers, 1957), p.10.

30. H.Küng: Justification, pp.24-27.

31. F. Wagner: 'Theologische Gleichschaltung' in Trutz Rendtorff (ed.): Die Realisierung der Freiheit (Gütersloh, 1975), p.24.

32. S. W. Sykes: Christian Theology Today (Mowbrays, 1971), p.144.

33. For an ET of this passage, see Thompson, op. cit., p.10.

34. Otto Weber makes the strange mistake (op. cit., p. 62) of not merely seeing the kingly office in §64.3, but the prophetic office in §64.4. While IV/3 had not yet been written, Barth's intention to devote §69.4 (at least) to Christ's prophetic office is clearly put already in §58. However, since prophetic office is linked to revelation (IV/3) and §64.4 (like §59.3) also deals with revelation, the mistake is partly due to Barth's own architectonic confusion.

35. Waldron Scott, Karl Barth's Theology of Mission (Paternoster, 1978), pp.11-14, correctly notes the importance of Christ's prophetic office in Barth's missiology, and generally in IV/3, but mistakenly sees strong parallels with the significance in IV/1 and IV/2 of the high-priestly and kingly offices (pp.11f.); however, we have seen how tenuous the parallels are in terms of the significance of the offices.

36. Cf. Come, op.cit., p.203.

37. The distinction ontological/ontic may seem fine. For a reasonably crisp summary of their distinction from each other and vis à vis the

noetic, see: E.Jüngel: *Theologische Erörterungen* (CKV, 1980), pp.198-201, esp. p.200.

38. John Macquarrie: *The Christian Hope* (Mowbrays, 1978), pp.68f.

39. Berkouwer, op.cit., pp.125-135, 297-327.

40. E.Jüngel: 'Epilogomena 1975' in *Gottes Sein ist im Werden* (J.C.B.Mohr^3, 1976), pp.123-138, here, pp.134f.

41. P. J. Rosato: *The Spirit as Lord* (T. & T.Clark, 1981), pp.127f.

42. Barth: *Final Testimonies* (Eerdmans, 1977), pp.29f.

43. Rosato, op.cit., pp.131ff., esp. pp.148ff.

44. D.E.Phillips: *Karl Barth's Philosophy of Communication* (Georg Olms, Hildersheim, 1981).

45. Come, op.cit., p.75.

46. The criticisms of J. Hick: *Death and Eternal Life* (Collins, 1976), p.259ff. at this point are different.

47. C. Brown: *op.cit., pp.130-133: G.C.Berkouwer:* op.cit., pp.262-296; C. van Til: *The New Modernism* (James Clarke, 1946), p.346 (cf. pp.75, 103, 157), cf. the awkward correspondence with Barth in *GA,6*, pp.342f., 7f., dated 1961; van Til reversed this assessment in *Christianity and Barthianism* (Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1962), p.381.

48. Berkouwer, op.cit., pp.294f.

49. Brown, op.cit., pp.136f., and n.8.

50. C.F.D. Moule: *An Idiom-Book of New Testament Greek* (CUP^2, 1959), pp.194f; D.M.Stanley: *Christ's Resurrection in Pauline Soteriology* (Analecta Biblica 13: Rome, 1961, pp.171-173; G.G.O'Collins: *What are They Saying about The Resurrection?* (Paulist Press, 1978), p.17; also S.Lyonnet (cited O'Collins op.cit., and Stanley, op.cit), and Bruce Vawter (cited Stanley, op. cit., p.20).

51. H. Richard Niebuhr: *The Kingdom of God in America* (Harper & Row, 1959 ed.), p.193.

52. Carl E. Braaten: *History and Hermeneutics* (Lutterworth, 1968), p.13.

53. G. Wingren: *Teologiens Metodfråga* (1954); ET: *Theology in Conflict* (Oliver & Boyd, 1958); references in the text are to the ET of this work.

54. William A. Johnson: 'Developments in Swedish Theology, 1939-1966, in Nels F.S.Ferré: *Swedish Contributions to Modern Theology* (Harper, 1967 ed.), pp.251f., 256, 254, 255.

55. Cf. Chapter 3, above; cf. also, Busch: *Pietisten*.

56. Fontana ed., 1968; references in the text are to this work.

57. Jüngel, op.cit., S.123.

58. G. von Rad: *Genesis* (ET:SCM, 1972), pp.50f.

59. Barth, in a letter, cited in A.C. Cochrane's translator's footnote in O.Weber: *Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics: An Introductory Report on Volumes I/1 to III/4* (Lutterworth, 1953), p.187.

60. W.Härle: *Sein und Gnade* (De Gruyter, 1975), pp.227-269, here, p.244; references in the text are to this work.

61. Barth, in H. Küng: *Justification* (Burns & Oates^{2}, 1981), pp. xxxix f.; references in the text are to Küng's work.

62. Bouillard: *K.B.II/1*, pp.53-72; references in the text are to this work.

63. Bultmann: *Theology of the New Testament. Volume One* (ET: SCM, 1952), pp.259-262, esp. pp.262, 343ff., p.344; V.P.Furnish: *The Love Command in the New Testament* (SCM, 1973), pp.95-111, esp. pp.110f.

64. On this passage, cf. J.T.Saunders: *Ethics in the New Testament* (SCM, 1975), pp.47-66, esp. pp.47-49, 64-66; E.Käsemann: *New Testament Questions of Today* (SCM, 1969), pp.66-81, esp. pp.70-73.

65. R. N. Langenecker: *Paul, Apostle of Liberty* (Baker, Michigan, 1976), pp.109-155, esp. pp.119f; D.E.H.Whiteley: *The Theology of St. Paul* (Blackwell, 1972), pp.86, 211.

66. H. U. v. Balthasar: *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (Cologne^{2}, 1952), S.380.

67. H.Wolgschaft, op.cit., p.79, n.55.

68. C.O'Grady: *The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth* (Geoffrey Chapman, 1968), pp.178f.

69. H. Diem: 'Christologie und Rechtfertigung bei Karl Barth', *Evangelische Theologie* Vol.23 (1963), p.212.

70. C. O'Grady: *The Church in Catholic Theology: Dialogue with Karl Barth* (Geoffrey Chapman, 1969), pp.333-336; references in the text are to this work.

71. C. O'Grady: *The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth*, p.177, my emphasis; references in the text are to this work.

72. W. Scott: op. cit., p.30; references in the text are to this work.

73. G. Outka: *Agape. An Ethical Analysis* (Yale, 1972), pp.233f; references in the text are to this work.

74. H. Thielicke: *Theological Ethics Vol.I. Foundations* (ET: A. &C. Black, 1968), pp.98-117, here, p.110.

75. E. Jüngel: *Karl Barths Lehre von der Taufe. Ein Hinweis und ihre Probleme* (EVZ, 1968), pp.5-11, references in the text are to this work.

76. For the passages in Barth cited here, see Barth: *the Teaching of the Church regarding Baptism* (SCM, 1948), pp.9, 11ff., 27, 48.

77. Rendtorff also notes Barth's ethical treatment of baptism is of a piece with his treatment of ethics as a part of dogmatics in *I/2*; op.cit., pp.119f.

78. A. C. Cochrane: 'Markus Barth - an Un-Barthian Barthian; The Place of the Doctrine of Baptism in the Church Dogmatics', in D.Y.Hadidian (ed.): *Intergerini Parietis Septum (Eph.2:14)* (Pickwick, Pittsburg 1981), p.48.

79. 'Postscript' in *GA,11*, pp. 278f. (ET) - German in 'Nachwort', SS. 311f.

80. Cf. also, T.Rendtorff: 'Der ethische Sinn der Dogmatik', op.cit, pp.128ff.

81. Cochrane, op.cit., pp.44-48.

82. Ib., p.43f.

83. F.D.E. Schleiermacher: The Christian Faith (ET: T. &. T. Clark, 1928), §3, p.5.

84. Cf. note 50, above; also F. X. Durrwell: The Resurrection (Sheed and Ward, 1960); and Markus Barth and Verne H. Fletcher: Acquittal by Resurrection (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER NINE

1. A. D. Galloway: Wolfhart Pannenberg (Allen & Unwin, 1973), p.23.

2. J. Hick: Death and Eternal Life (Collins, 1976), esp. pp.112-128, 221-227.

3. E.F.Tupper: The Theology of Wolfhart Pannen=berg (SCM, 1974), p.75.

4. Hick, op.cit., pp.224-226.

5. A. Schweitzer: The Quest of the Historical Jesus (ET: A. & C. Black², 1911), pp.237-240, 328-401, esp. pp.348f.

6. Galloway, op.cit.,p.11.

7. G. G. O'Collins: The Theology of Revelation in Some Recent Discussion (Ph.D. dissertation No. 6324 for the University of Cambridge, 1.8.1968), pp.73f.

8. Pannenberg: 'Did Jesus Really Rise from the Dead?' Dialog Vol.IV (1965), p.134, cited in Tupper, op. cit., p.157.

9. D. Cupitt: Christ and the Hiddenness of God (Lutterworth, 1971), pp.162f.

10 D.P. Fuller: Easter Faith and History (Tyndale, 1968), pp.177-187.

11. O'Collins, op.cit., p.74; Cf. Neuhaus, in TKG, pp.40-42.

12. Cf. Chapter 8, section I.

13. Cf. H. Neie: The Doctrine of the Atonement in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (De Gruyter, 1979), pp.18-22, who shows the epistemological significance of the resurrection for Pannenberg's appeal to "contemporary Wirklichkeitsverständnis". For Pannenberg's differentiation from Barth, Bultmann and Marxsen, and Bultmann and Ebeling, see H.-G. Geyer: 'Survey of the Debate', and K. Kienzler: Logik der Auferstehung (Herder,

1976), respectively.

14. Kienzler, op.cit., esp. pp.163-169.

15. Conversation with the author, 27.9.1977.

16. S.W.Sykes: *The Soteriology of Wolfhart Pannenberg* (unpublished paper: Cambridge seminar, 1972), p.1; cf. Tupper, op,cit., p.160.

17. Ib., p.6.

18. D. D. Williams in E. H. Cousins (ed.): *Hope and the Future of Man* (Garnstone, 1973), p.143.

19. Galloway, op.cit., p.72.

20. Cited in C. E. Braaten: *History and Hermeneutics* (Lutterworth, 1968), p.79.

21. Cf. C. A. A. Scott: *Christianity According to St. Paul* (CUP, 1927), p.16; F. X. Durrwell: *The Resurrection* (Sheed and Ward ^{2},1969), pp.xxiii, 23-32.

22. Cf. D. M. Stanley: *Christ's Resurrection in Pauline Soteriology* (Rome, 1961), pp.138ff, *et.freq.*; C. H. Dodd: *The Apostolic Preaching and its Development* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1936), pp.135-140, 145-155; W. D. Davies: *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (SPCK^2, 1955), p.298. Of course it is precarious to argue Jesus' own eschatology was futurist - but the futuristic eschatology of his contemporaries - and thus of the *disciples* - will have changed from futuristic to partially realised, under the impact of the resurrection.

23. Kienzler, op.cit.

24. Cited in Tupper, op.cit.,p.288, cf. also pp. 288f., and Williams, op.cit., pp.83-88 and his review of *WiM*, cited in Tupper, op.cit., p.289.

25. O'Collins, op.cit., pp.83f.

26. S. Coakley: *Wolfhart Pannenberg and the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth* (unpublished version of paper: Lancaster, 1978), esp. Part III, and esp. pp.21-24.

27. Ib., p.28.

28. Ib., pp.23f.

29. Cf. esp. W. Pannenberg: 'History and Meaning in Bernard Lonergan's Approach to Theological Method' in P. Corcoran S.M.:

Looking at Lonergan's Method (Talbot Press, 1975), pp.88-100.

30. O'Collins, op.cit., p.80.

31. Sykes, op.cit., p.4.

32. Galloway, op.cit., pp.123-127.

33. Cf. Tupper, op.cit., p.301; cf. also Hick's criticisms of Pannenberg's inadequate discussion of evil, op.cit., pp.221-227.

34. W.Pannenberg: 'Postscript', in Tupper, ib., p.305.

35. N. Lash: 'Up and Down in Christology', in S.W.Sykes and D. Holmes (ed): New Studies in Theology I (Duckworth, 1980), p.34.

36. Pannenberg, in Tupper, op.cit., p.304.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TEN

1A. S.T.Coleridge: Aids to Reflection: Moral and Religious Aphorisms, xxv; quoted in W.Temple: Readings in St. John's Gospel (Macmillan, complete ed., 1945), p.241.

1. J.Barr: Fundamentalism (SCM, 1977), p.72; cf. also pp.47,49,76,78,82, & 86, for a differentiation between dogmatic and exegetical fundamentalism which has similarities with our dogmatic/apologetic differentation.

2. J.W.Wenham: Christ and the Bible (Tyndale, 1972), p.7.

3. E.Sandeen: The Origins of Fundamentalism (Fortress, 1968), p.13.

4. A. A. Hodge: Outlines of Theology (Banner of Truth, 1972 ed.), p.15.

5. Ib., p.19.

6. Ib., p.37.

7. J.G.Machen: Christianity and Liberalism (Eerdmans, 1972 ed.), pp.7f.

8. Ib., pp.55-58.

9. L.Berkhof: Systematic Theology (Banner of Truth, 1958 reprint), pp.20f., 28.

10. Ib., pp.37-39.

11. Ib., p.21.

12. E. J. Young: Thy Word is Truth (Banner of Truth, 1963 ed.), pp.197ff., 32f.

13. J. I. Packer: 'Fundamentalism' and the Word of God (IVP, 1958), pp.6,34,135,140.

14. J. W. Wenham: Christ and the Bible (Tyndale, 1972), p.18.

15. Ib., pp.23, 62ff., and the whole of The Goodness of God (Tyndale, 1974).

16. D.M. Lloyd-Jones: Authority (IVP, 1958), pp.14, 38, 40.

17. G.C.Berkouwer: General Revelation (ET: IVP/ Eerdmans, 1955).

18. J. K. Riches: 'Berkouwer on Common Grace', Theology, Vol. 78 (1975), pp.302-309.

19. Barr. op. cit., p.257, discussing J.N.D. Anderson: A Lawyer Among the Theologians (Hodder & Stoughton, 1973).

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AND

ABBREVIATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS

References in the footnotes or the text to the *Church Dogmatics* (*C.D.*), the *Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe* (*GA*), or other German material with an ET (= English translation) refer to the ET noted in this bibliography if the reference begins with page no. (p.), or to the German original if the reference begins with *Seite* (S.); where there is no English translation, the reference will begin with page no. (p.).

Figures following the abbreviations (listed alphabetically) refer to the number in the bibliography which follows. An asterisk (*) before any item indicates that I have made any translation of it which appears in this thesis, and that I may have translated the title also (as noted in the bibliography).

ABBREVIATIONS

AC	(121);	Agape	(248);	Anselm	(82);
Auferweckung	(35);	BQT,I	(116);	BQT,II	(40);
BQT,III	(120);	C.D: *Church Dogmatics*;			
Chr.D.	(78);	CWE	(119);	Divided Mind	(49);
EE	(130);	GA,1	(69);	GA,2	(80);
GA,3	(13);	GA,4	(68);	GA,5	(14);
GA,6	(106);	GA,7	(110);	GA,8	(12);
GA,9	(75);	GA,10	(81);	GA,11	(72);
GA,12	(102);	GA,13	(82);	GA,14	(78);
GST I	(116A);	GST II	(132);	Hoffnung	(311);
I/1	(55);	I/2	(88);	II/1	(20);
II/2	(90);	III/1	(93);	III/2	(95);
III/3	(97);	III/4	(57);	IV/1	(101);
IV/2	(103);	IV/3	(59);	IV/4	(109);
JGM	(115);	Justification	(210);	K.B.	(27);
KBDT	(257);	K.B.I	(26);	K.B.II/1	(150);
K.B.II/2	(151);	Nachwort	(22);	Pietisten	(28);
Postscript	(110A);	RaH	(113);	R.D.	(74);
Rev.Th.	(48);	R.I	(54);	R.II	(70);
R.III	(89);	TKG	(117);	TPS	(124);
Triumph	(144);				
WA: *Weimarer Ausgabe* of Martin Luther's Works;					
WGWM	(53);	WiM	(114);	Wingren	(307).

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